

EXTENDING THE NPT?

A CRITICAL ORAL HISTORY OF THE 1995 REVIEW AND EXTENSION CONFERENCE



Edited by Michal Onderco and Leopoldo Nuti

History and Public Policy Program
Critical Oral History Conference Series

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Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars
One Woodrow Wilson Plaza
1300 Pennsylvania Avenue NW
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www.wilsoncenter.org

**Cover image: Review and Extension Conference of the Treaty on Non–Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Opens at Headquarters. Seated on the podium from left to right are: Secretary–General Boutros Boutros–Ghali; Ambassador Jayantha Dhanapala (Sri Lanka), President of the Conference; Prvoslav Davinic, Secretary–General of the Conference. 17 April 1995. United Nations, New York
Photo # 68537**

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ABOUT THIS BOOK

Michal Onderco

What follows in *Extending the NPT* is a record of a conference conducted at the Erasmus University Rotterdam on 22-23 March, 2018 as a part of the Nuclear Proliferation International History Project.

The conference in Rotterdam was not a traditional academic conference, but followed a critical oral history (COH) methodology with discussion between academic experts on one side and policy veterans on the other.¹ This conference aimed at shedding new light on the indefinite extension of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in 1995. Given the upcoming 25th anniversary of the indefinite extension, and the growing role that the legacy of the extension plays for the NPT politics today, revisiting what happened and how in 1995 was an attractive prospect.

For this reason, the conference brought together the main participants in the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference (1995 NPTREC), including diplomats representing the most important countries present at the conference, as well as a small number of academics. The deliberations were supported by a collection of primary documents related to the 1995 NPTREC, collected in various archives in Belgium, the United Kingdom, Germany, and South Africa. COH methodology expects that the presence of many policy veterans, academic experts, and available primary documents will provide a fruitful ground for a rich discussion of what happened and why in a particular moment in history.

Soon after the 1995 NPTREC, there were a number of attempts to provide a summary of what was discussed.² Thus a major ‘post-mortem’ conference was organized at the Monterey Institute for International Studies less than three months after the 1995 NPTREC with all major participants involved. Some participants in the conference would reference the 1995 NPTREC in their memoirs.³ Yet, the Rotterdam conference is different in several and important ways. Firstly, the time lag of 23 years allowed access to primary documents which were unavailable until recently. Secondly, retirement of major

1 For other similar recent examples, see Onslow and van Wyk 2013, Mallea, et al. 2015

2 Johnson 1995, Rauf and Johnson 1995, Welsh 1995

3 Graham 2002, Markram 2004, Dhanapala and Rydell 2005, Dhanapala 2015, von Wielligh and von Wielligh-Steyn 2015, Dhanapala and Rauf 2017

participants from the active government service meant that they were freer to discuss events which happened over 20 years ago, compared to the situation immediately after the conference. Thirdly, the Rotterdam Conference focused on aspects which were simply not considered by researchers and scholars back in 1995.

Two examples illustrate these differences: the discussion about the origins of the *Decision on Principles and Objectives*; and the discussion of its relevance by the community of experts in the Programme for Promoting Nuclear Non-Proliferation (PPNN). Back at the ‘post-mortem’ conference in Monterey, the *Decision on Principles and Objectives* had been discussed as a given. Other accounts had also shed little light on the deliberations leading to the Decision and the seeds that were sown well before the conference. By contrast, the Rotterdam conference extensively discussed the origins of the Decision on Principles and Objectives in the bilateral exchanges prior to the 1995 NPTREC, as well as the negotiation of the document at the NPTREC itself. Similarly, back in 1995, very little attention was given to PPNN’s role in informing, socializing, and networking diplomats prior to the conference. These two examples only illustrate how the present project has opened new avenues for scholarly inquiry into the key development in non-proliferation regime; and one of the most important moments in post-Cold War arms control history.

The Rotterdam conference was the pinnacle of a two-year effort which consisted of three (often overlapping) building blocks. Firstly, we conducted oral history interviews with twenty-eight policy veterans, usually with heads of delegations or chief negotiators from individual countries. These interviews took place between September 2016 and May 2017. The list of questions for these interviews was composed based on the review of available secondary literature related to the NPT regime, particularly the NPT’s extension in 1995. A vast majority of these were conducted by Michal Onderco, except two which were conducted by Hassan Elbahtimy and Katrin Heilman respectively. With some of the interviewees, follow-up questions were arranged via phone or e-mail.

Secondly, we started collecting primary documents in a number of archives. Declassification requests were filed with the National Archives in Washington, Archives of the Department of International Relations and Cooperation in Pretoria, Political Archive of the Federal Foreign Office in Berlin, Archives of the Secretariat of the European Council in Brussels, and Archive of the Canada Global (Canada’s Foreign Affairs Department) in Ottawa. Unfortunately, in the two years preceding the Rotterdam conference, only some of these requests were processed and declassified. Additional documents were therefore sought in the Archive of the University of Southampton, Rockefeller Archive Center in Pocantico, NY, and in private archives of some of our attendees. A selection of these

documents were included in the document reader distributed to participants ahead of the conference, and are now available at the Wilson Center's website.

Thirdly, on the basis of interviews and available archival documents, we determined what was still unknown or not well understood about the 1995 NPTREC. We then formulated a brief list of questions which policy veterans were encouraged to consider before the Rotterdam conference began. At the same time, we had to select the policy veterans to invite to our conference. As stated before, we opted to invite heads of delegations. However, when these heads were unavailable, their senior policy or academic advisors were invited instead. Only a small number of invited participants turned down our invitation to come to the Rotterdam conference, usually due to scheduling conflicts or due to poor health which would not allow them to travel to The Netherlands. Although these practitioners knew each other from their previous experiences, in most cases they had not been in touch for a decade or more.

It is important to note that we did not send policy veterans each other's interviews. As Mallea et al.⁴ advised, we wanted to avoid giving the policy veterans "too many axes to grind" and invited them to participate in the conference with an open mind. Academic experts were provided with whichever interview they desired, but with the understanding that these were only for their private use ahead of the conference.

The conference itself consisted of six sessions, all conducted in English. All of the sessions were audio-recorded, with the transcript of this recording providing a bulk of this volume. Two experts chaired each session, although one of them was always in the driving seat. The session chairs always had the task of steering the discussion along the questions distributed earlier. Also, the role of the chair was to address probing questions by participants to prevent positive feedback bias. Throughout the conference, the academic experts were invited to ask additional questions for further detail or to expose obvious inconsistencies between participants, the written record, and oral evidence.

The transcription of the meeting was lightly edited to ease understanding.⁵ Participants also had an opportunity to review and correct incorrect transcriptions. Importantly, in two occasions, sections of the text were removed at the request of the participant because the information contained was not deemed appropriate for public record without significant alteration (which would violate the scientific

4 Mallea, et al. 2015

5 We could not identify the authors of a small number of short interventions, whom we listed as [MALE] in the transcript. We include them with the goal of maintaining the authenticity of the transcript.

method). These occasions are clearly marked in the transcript. With the exception of Sven Jurschewsky, who arrived late due to flight complications, all participants took part in the whole meeting.

The present volume continues with a substantive Introduction, briefly summarizing the story of the 1995 NPT extension. This section also presents the main findings from the conference. The remainder of the volume is structured according to individual sessions. Session I “General Mood and Expectations” focused on the period prior to the conference, not only including the interactions that states had bilaterally, but also the steps taken during the so-called Preparatory Committee meetings. Session II “Hurdles for the Agreement” focused on aspects which complicated the NPT’s extension, and how the diplomats in New York dealt with them. Session III “Overcoming the Opposition” dealt with how the indefinite extension became “the only game in town” and how the diplomats persuaded other delegations to support the indefinite extension, or to at least neutralize the opponents. Session IV “Middle East WMD-free zone” focused on the discussion about the problems of WMD (especially Israel’s nuclear program) and possible solutions discussed at the conference. This session also contained important discussions about US promises made to Egypt related to Israel’s nuclear program during the conference. Session V “Principles & Objectives” and Session VI “Strengthened Review Process” provided not only an in-depth look at the negotiating history of the two Decisions of the 1995 NPTREC, but more importantly at the motivation and individual provisions in these documents. Session VI also started discussing the legacy of the 1995 NPTREC.

This project would have never succeeded without advice and cooperation of many colleagues who helped along the way. Together with Leopoldo Nuti, we hatched the first idea for this project over coffee and excellent pastries at Caffè Dei Costanti in Arezzo in July 2015. Leopoldo and Christian Ostermann provided a frequent sounding board for various ideas which were (or were not) taken up in this project. Many aspects of this project crystallized during my fellowship at Fundação Getúlio Vargas in spring 2016. Matias Spektor, whose similar project on Brazil-Argentinian nuclear cooperation⁶ was a source of inspiration (and aspiration), provided countless practical tips and advice on methodological but also practical aspects of organizing the project. Numerous useful tips were also provided by the attendees of the Nuclear Proliferation International History Project (NPIHP)’s Partners Meeting in Stockholm in December 2017. In particular, Joseph Pilat was incredibly generous with his advice and contacts. The conference in Rotterdam would never be such a success without the commitment and stamina of Rocher Koendjibharie, who handled everything from books forgotten on trains to taxis

which failed to materialize. Evan Pikulski, and later Charles Kraus and Kian Byrne at Wilson Center provided excellent support throughout. Yneke Steegstra at Erasmus University made sure that flights and bills were always taken care of. The funding for this project was generously secured by the NPIHP, managed by Leopoldo and Christian, from the Carnegie Corporation of New York. Additional funding was kindly provided by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Erasmus University Rotterdam, and Erasmus Trustfonds.

INTRODUCTION

Michal Onderco

Next year will mark 50 years since entry into force of the NPT, and 25 years since its indefinite extension. The landmark date also prompts numerous countries and observers to talk about the legacy, promises and undertakings taken up in 1995. Yet as is always the case, the memories of the past events often take up life of their own. Because the legacy of the indefinite extension is still alive, we have decided that the landmark extension of the Treaty merits more scholarly study and attention.

With the benefit of hindsight, the indefinite extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1995 appears to have been a foregone conclusion. The early days of the post-Cold War period were the age of great cooperation in managing and decreasing the risks of WMD proliferation. In 1991, the UN Security Council appeared to have reined in Iraq's nuclear program. In the same year, South Africa joined the NPT (although it officially announced it had possessed nuclear weapons only two years later), the United States and the Soviet Union signed the first Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, which entered into force three years later, and the United States withdrew all its nuclear weapons from South Korea. In 1992, China and France joined the NPT, and three post-Soviet republics disarmed and joined the treaty as non-nuclear weapons states. Only a year later, the START II treaty was signed. In 1994, the Agreed Framework was concluded with the North Korea. In 1995, the NPT was extended indefinitely, and the following year, negotiations leading towards CTBT were concluded.

It is not difficult to see the air of inevitable forces of history in the narrative above. When waves were so good, who would have wanted to spoil it by not extending the NPT? Nobody. But there were numerous countries which either wanted NPT to be extended only for a limited period, or wanted to have another review conference at a future point to decide the future of the treaty. These options, known as *extension for a fixed period of time or rolling extension*, were opposed by the United

States and its allies, as well as Russia. It may appear to have been a losing fight – a disparate coalition of states against the two superpowers.

Nothing is further from the truth. At the third Preparatory Committee meeting, in September 1994, barely half of the state parties to the NPT took part in the meeting. This alarmed Western diplomats. Low participation in the Review and Extension Conference, planned only 8 months later, meant that the risk of failure to extend the treaty indefinitely was substantial. The Western group, the primary engine behind support for the indefinite extension, increased diplomatic pressure. The European Union, which before the 3rd PrepCom had decided to send diplomatic demarches to encourage other countries to join the NPT and participate in meetings, decided to accelerate its efforts.

What was more worrying for the Western diplomats, however, was the fear that there might not be enough states supporting the indefinite extension. Regular updates that diplomats sent to their headquarters showed that they did not have enough votes to adopt an indefinite extension. That is why it was decided between the Western countries and Russia that support for the indefinite extension must be demonstrated by a resolution with a sufficiently large number of co-sponsors who would then vote in favor of indefinite extension.¹ This strategy had only one problem – there was no agreement on how such a vote should take place. Should it be open or closed? Should it be a simple majority, or a supermajority? The battle over these questions by the start of the conference was not over, nor did the President of the Conference, Sri Lankan Ambassador Jayantha Dhanapala, consider these rules before the conference started.

In this setting, the indefinite extension was unlikely to succeed. A South African proposal presented by South Africa's Foreign Minister Alfred Nzo called for the adoption of a series of Principles for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, bridging the gap between the supporters and opponents of the indefinite extension.² These

1 Rauf and Johnson 1995

2 Nzo 1995

principles, which formed the basis for the adoption of the conference's *Decision 2: Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament*, also allowed South Africa to justify its position in favor of the indefinite extension.

The position was not easy. South Africa had to defend its position during the summit of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) in Bandung, which took place during the second week of the conference, and during which it was heavily criticized for its position by other NAM countries.³ However, South Africa's insistence on indefinite extension kept NAM from developing a position against it. Suddenly, over half of the state parties became free agents, which made the merits of the NPT's indefinite extension much easier to lobby for.

Existing accounts, based mainly on participants' first-hand observations, focused on the mechanics of the Treaty's indefinite extension rather than on actors' motivations and on their considerations driving them towards the extension. Our project decided to change that. We still paid due attention to the mechanics of multilateral diplomacy, but we were much more interested in the forces and ideas that shaped actors' preferences. These might have been the broader geopolitical situation, domestic politics, pressures from bureaucracy, or blunt use of pressure by the super-powers.

The image that emerges from the critical oral history conference is much more complex. What emerges is a picture of much uncertainty about the outcome, as well as lack of preparation to build bridges. Indeed, one of the stark images which transpires from the conference – and from the archival evidence – is the total focus on lobbying tactics among the Western delegations. In other words, these delegations were not even deliberating a package which could bring the proponents and opponents of the indefinite extension together. While Western countries realized that *something* would need to be offered in return, the discussion of such 'meat on the table' (as it was called during the conference) was not subject to *any* deliberations prior to the NPTREC. This 'meat' emerged only at the conference, thanks to the South African proposal. Instead, much ink *prior* to the NPTREC was spent on thinking about the

3 Markram 2004, Van Wyk 2013

voting mechanism. In thinking about the extension by vote, it was considered by the Western countries (and Russia) that the most important step was to split the unity of the Non-Aligned Movement.

Many NAM countries were opposed to the indefinite extension of the treaty because they saw the performance on disarmament by the Nuclear Weapon States as a disappointment. However, any alternatives which came from the NAM – such as the Mexican and the Venezuelan proposals – were not pursued seriously. Nevertheless, in both cases, the US government reached out to the respective governments and effectively muzzled the proponents of the proposals, even after it was obvious these were not pursued seriously.

In making the indefinite extension the dominant game at the conference, the role of Conference President Dhanapala cannot be underestimated. The President used a lot of creative drafting to paper over the divisions which existed. Many of these were drafted by Dhanapala's advisor Ben Sanders, who knew the vast majority of conference participants. Once the resolution, with 104 signatures in favor of indefinite extension, was approved, it became obvious that indefinite extension was going to happen.

However, Dhanapala's insistence on the extension without a vote opened space for pursuit of yet another agenda – the creation of a WMD free zone in the Middle East. The decision by the United States to go with the extension gave Egyptian delegates political space to their topic. While the indefinite extension would have happened without the MEWMDZFZ, Egyptians managed to push their agenda item by threatening to call a vote – a situation which by then everyone tried to avoid.

The success of the extension without a vote was to a large degree associated with the *Decision on Strengthened Review Process*, and the *Decision on Principles and Objectives*. In discussing these documents, the key for the P5 was to avoid any semblance of conditionality – a condition which the wording of the two Decisions fulfills. In drafting these decisions, the majority of states had no input, as the work was done in the group called 'Friends of President'. Curiously, during the discussion in Rotterdam, it emerged that the United States was willing to extend the negative security assurances as a bargaining chip, but this was never necessary. By comparison, the

Decision on Strengthened Review Process sparked much less discussion among the states at the conference, and was only adopted after brief discussion.

The ultimate success of the NPTREC in reaching NPT's indefinite extension should not be mistaken for a smooth process. At the same time, the ultimate adoption of a solution, which was advocated by the nuclear weapons states, should not be mistaken for recognition of their exclusive dominance. Instead, it was a result of concessions given by these leading powers to what international relations would call secondary (or regional) powers.⁴ Instead of bluntly forcing and twisting arms, the main powers agreed to significant concessions, which led to transformation of the regime and the insertion of new elements into it, which did not have their ideological origins in any of the leading countries. This is not to deny that arms-twisting took place. However, there is an important and under-appreciated story under the existing narrative, which should be further explored.

As the NPT today moves towards the important anniversaries, these subsequent pages will, hopefully, show the underappreciated narrative of the unlikely success of the NPT's extension to the reader.

4 Williams, et al. 2012



EXTENDED SUMMARY OF DISCUSSIONS

Session I “General Mood and Expectations”

The first session focused on the period prior to the conference – the interactions states had bilaterally, but also in the steps taken during the so-called on Preparatory Committee meetings.

The main points which emerged from the discussions were:

- **There was no consensus prior to the conference.** While most governments expected that indefinite extension was going to happen at the outset of the conference, a few months prior there were little expectations about it.
- **There was a strong willingness to take decision by vote.** During the conference, it was made clear that the so-called “P5” had no question in their mind that, if need be, a vote should be called on the extension decision. The P5’s strategy was to have enough votes for the indefinite extension if a vote became a reality. This clashed with the preference of Conference President Dhanapala, who favored a rolling extension for 25 years, as well as an extension by consensus.
- **There was an awareness of the need for ‘meat on the table’ for an indefinite extension.** This was originally a subject not to be spoken about in the Western Group, but overtime it became recognized by all the major powers. For example, in the United States, the internal debate concluded in November 1994 with a conclusion that certain concessions were needed for the indefinite extension to pass. For P5, the two decisions – *Strengthening the Review Process for the Treaty (1995 NPT Review Conference)* and *Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament* – were a price they were willing to pay to have the treaty extended by consensus.
- **The Decision on *Principles and Objectives* emerged only at the conference.** There was no prior discussion about this, although the document originated well before the conference. Participants in the conference unanimously

agreed that the speech by South Africa's foreign minister Nzo, where he proposed the *Principles and Objectives* as 'yardsticks,' was seen as a key turning point of the conference and opened the door to the consensus decision.

- **The origins of the Principles and Objectives were hotly debated.** Sven Jurschewsky discussed the document as originating from one of the meetings of the Programme for Promoting Nuclear Nonproliferation with Peter Goosen at a pool table in Chilworth Manor near Southampton. Jurschewsky maintained that this discussion continued at another venues until the NPTREC, and culminated in a draft of the *Principles and Objectives* decision a day before the start of the conference, jointly drafted by Jurschewsky and South African diplomat Peter Goosen. Some of these ideas were given by the Canadian delegation to Mexico's delegation (led by Miguel Marin Bosch) who, however, turned them into conditions for extension, which violated the spirit and the original ideas developed by the Canadians. Abdul Minty challenged this narrative, stating that these diplomats had no authorization to enter into such discussions. Minty advanced the view that the *Principles and Objectives* originated from internal debate in South Africa, which he personally led, thanks to trust put in him by South Africa's top leadership, particularly President Nelson Mandela and Foreign Minister Alfred Nzo. He also recollected that the South African government was prepared to put it out at the conference, even if the idea was to be defeated.
- **Among the Western countries, there was a concern about NAM.** The Western countries were interested in preventing any emergence of NAM unity against the indefinite extension, a mission which is widely seen as successful. On the other hand, Nabil Fahmy challenged the view that NAM was opposed to the treaty extension, but highlighted the debates within NAM about what the best way to make the treaty 'better'.
- **Involvement of domestic actors.** Participants agreed that, while there was significant commitment to their preferred course of action at the highest levels of government, the governments would not ordinarily get involved in the policy discussions. The only exception to this was the United States, particularly the White House, which became rather involved in a lobbying campaign, as well as Egypt, where President Mubarak held strong views (not favorable towards the indefinite extension) on the basis of regional strategic considerations. In Session III, we later discussed that in some countries – particularly Egypt, Germany, and South

Africa – there was a lively debate about alternatives for an extension, although there was strong leadership from the political top for certain positions.

- **There was a bifurcation between the professional diplomats and ANC political appointees in South Africa.** Unknown to the vast majority of participants, there was a disconnect between the professional diplomats (often holdovers from the apartheid era) and the ANC political appointees (such as Abdul Minty) in South Africa.

Session II “Hurdles for the Agreement”

The second session focused on aspects which complicated the NPT’s extension, and how the diplomats in New York dealt with them.

- **Significance of arms control steps of early 1990s.** Discussions among the participants were inconclusive as to how significant arms control steps were in early 1990s. Whereas Thomas Graham wondered ‘how impressed NAM were’ with these steps, Grigory Berdennikov thought they were seen as a serious commitment.
- **P5 collaboration with China was not easy.** Participants remembered many discussions within the P5 where agreement with China was not easy. Examples included the discussion about the preferred length of the extension (Thomas Graham remembered that the Chinese representative told them that there is no word “indefinite” in Chinese), commitments on disarmament, and the unwillingness to extend negative security assurances in the UN SC Resolution. On the other hand, Chinese representatives appeared to support the non-aligned idea to advance a timetable on disarmament.
- **The discussion within NAM was more on the extension than on disarmament.** Many developing countries did not see ownership in the NPT, nor did they see the NPT as ‘their treaty,’ but rather as a treaty that discriminated against them. Prior to the NPTREC, many of the leading NAM countries were disappointed with the disarmament record after 25 years, and wondered how to use the extension to leverage for more concessions. Abdul Minty mentioned that some expected that nuclear disarmament would happen within the next 20 years, some expected nuclear disarmament would be achieved.
- **Many within NAM were not comfortable with the South African proposal for indefinite extension,** but were not able to contradict the “Mandela effect”. The proposal for the indefinite extension, coming from South Africa, caused a paradigm shift among the NAM. This was an important factor which no NAM country could reject. As Nabil Fahmy

remarked, even if South Africa's preferences were not exactly what other NAM countries preferred, South Africa did not advance any agenda by contradicting any established NAM points. This might have been because many ANC officials, chiefly Abdul Minty, were for a long time a fixture of NAM politics.

- **Two other proposals that came out of NAM – the Mexican proposal and the Taylhardat initiative** – were not seriously pursued. Participants were particularly troubled by the fact that Mexico's delegate Miguel Marin Bosch did not vigorously pursue his proposal, which seemed to have contradicted his prior behavior. However, it was debated that this was likely the result of an intervention from above. Adolfo Taylhardat, on the other hand, had wanted to be the conference president, and when his ambition failed, resolved to make life difficult for the actual conference president. By the time the resolution was tabled however, he was removed from the delegation.
- **For many smaller delegations, the important questions of NPT were not the grand political questions** but rather smaller issues, such as environmental consequences of uranium mining and milling. In other words, not all NAM countries were primarily focused on disarmament.

Session III “Overcoming the Opposition”

The third session dealt with how the indefinite extension became “the only game in town,” and how the diplomats persuaded other delegations to support or at least neutralize the opponents to the indefinite extension.

- **The primary reason why the US was interested in an indefinite extension was fear of proliferation in countries unfriendly to the US.** Both Iraq and Iran were mentioned as concerns. Russia also was a concern, with the main worry being ‘what would happen after the period elapses’. Finally, similar legal considerations were in place toward Germany. concerns.
- **The P5 had no problem with the Principles and Objectives,** because it did not contain any of the items that were non-starters for the P5, such as timelines on nuclear disarmament.

- **The role of the Conference President was important.** Jayantha Dhanapala converted the US insistence on indefinite extension – seen by many – into a consensus decision, because he was determined to extend the Treaty by consensus.
- **The president used a lot of creative drafting.** For example, he avoided the word of extension by ‘consensus’ but ‘without a vote’, which allowed the extension to side-step opposition by countries who opposed the extension. The wording, which said that there was “a majority exists among States party to the Treaty for its indefinite extension,” allowed to prevent opposition from countries which opposed the indefinite extension. Dhanapala appeared to be committed to bringing the conference to a success – however, some participants connected it to his ambitions at the time to become the UN Secretary General.
- **The conference started focusing on the extension at the expense of review because the Chair of Main Committee I decided to prevent a consensus on the review part of the conference.**
- **Importance of the informal advisors to the Conference President, especially Ben Sanders,** cannot be underestimated. Sanders played a key role in drafting the language on the extension. Sanders knew many participants through his distinguished career and his leadership in the PPNN.
- **The key moment was on May 5, when Canada tabled a resolution with 104 signatures.** That moment demonstrated to everyone that the indefinite extension was going to happen, and that, if need be, a vote would be called for and passed. At the same time, it was seen that such a resolution would not be possible (and signatures not honored) if not accompanied by the ‘meat on the table’.
- **In at least two cases – Mexico and Venezuela – the White House contacted their national leaders and asked to silence (in case of Mexico) or remove (in case of Venezuela) their delegation leaders.**
- **The importance of the PPNN as an incubator for ideas and a space for interaction between diplomats** should not be underestimated. The group provided a platform for discussion, education, and exchange for people who stood seemingly on opposite sides of the barricades.

Session IV “Middle East WMD-free zone”

The fourth session discussed the solution to the problems of WMDs (and especially Israel’s nuclear program) at the conference. This session also contained important discussions about US promises made to Egypt during the conference, related to Israel’s nuclear program.

- Prior to the conference, the discussion in the framework of working group on arms control and regional security (ACRS) as a part of the Madrid peace process was unsuccessful. Therefore, Egyptian government initiated bilateral exchanges with Israel, which were however also unsuccessful
- The Egyptian starting position at the RevCon was that although it didn’t like it, indefinite extension was going to happen. Therefore, it had to make the most out of the situation.
- **Egypt’s realization was that it could not stop the indefinite extension**
- **The decision to pursue extension by consensus gave Egypt negotiating space** it would not have otherwise.
- Egypt originally pursued a resolution focused on nuclear-weapons resolution, which was supposed to be factual and not confrontational. However, this proved to be impossible because other Arab countries which had unsafeguarded facilities did not want to be labeled. Therefore, **a new resolution on WMDs was tabled.**
- The United States pressured Egypt to remove Israel from the resolution, something that the Egyptians felt that they could not support. **The United States therefore tried to go directly** to President Mubarak and his political advisor Osama el-Baz. However, they did not succeed in forcing the hand of the Egyptian delegation in New York.
- **Egypt was interested in either voting on both the extension and the Middle East resolution**, or adopting both without a vote. It was not acceptable to vote on one and not on the other.
- **The United States decided that the depositaries would sponsor the resolution after Egypt refused to sponsor it because it did not mention Israel.** Sponsorship by other two depositaries happened without them seeing the resolution before.
- **While there was support for the Middle East resolution, other countries were not directly involved in the negotiations.**

Session V “Principles & Objectives”

This session provided an in-depth look at the negotiating history of the *Decision on Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament* at the conference, but more importantly at the motivation for concluding the documents, and the individual provisions in them.

- The discussion returned to the origins of the *Principles and Objectives* that was discussed already during Session I. However, it was highlighted that any cooperation between Canada and South Africa had to be kept under wraps. Harald Muller remembered the discussion which took place at the Chilworth Manor where the first discussions about *the Principles and Objectives* started. These discussions continued until the conference. Yet, there was little awareness about these contacts in South Africa itself, especially among the top political leadership. The career officials and political elites had little interaction between each other.
- The United States were prepared to go further than just the *Principles and Objectives* – there was also a willingness, on the part of the US, to consider binding negative security assurances (NSAs) if need be. This issue was discussed by the P5 in Geneva prior to the conference, and there was a willingness to move on this issue, but China was unwilling to move its position on NSAs. NSAs were not taken up in the *Principles and Objectives* because everyone remembered the addendum to the UNSCR 984 (1995).
- The P5 were not willing to take up new obligations as a part of the review process, but were willing to do so (especially when it comes to the NSAs) to build positive momentum prior to the conference.
- The key part, for most of the P5, was to avoid any conditions being attached to the Principles and Objectives.
- A majority of delegations had no input into the wording of the *Principles and Objectives*.
- The final decision was moved from a single line listing the three decisions into three lines to avoid any impression that the extension decision was conditional upon the previous two decisions.
- Paragraph 12, which prohibited new supply arrangements for the transfer of nuclear material to states lacking full scope safeguards, became part of the *Principles and Objectives* after NSG adopted it in 1992. But, it was part of earlier drafts at the 1990 NPT RevCon which was not adopted.

Session VI “Strengthened Review Process”

The final session looked at both negotiations regarding the *Decision on Strengthened Review Process*, but also the legacy of the 1995 NPTREC.

- The document on the *Strengthened Review Process* was of significantly less interest during the conference negotiations.
- **The document emerged after the US was approached by Indonesia, which asked for the creation of Preparatory Committees similar to RevCon’s.** The US had no objections on this issue, so they agreed. Russia was very skeptical, fearing that Preparatory Committee meetings would become forums for negotiating new arrangements, which was something to be avoided. Other countries did not see this as important, but thought it was a price worth paying. There was an understanding that none of these commitments were legally binding. Therefore, undue optimism was misplaced.
- **The review process twisted the meaning of some aspects of the Treaty, according to Russian interpretations.** For example, disarmament should be discussed in the framework of genuine and complete disarmament.
- **In the Middle East, the review process was seen as having value.** Although not seeing it positively, there was a recognition that it had a potential to bring new measures.
- **In South Africa, the expectation was that the Strengthened Review Process would lead to a building block approach** where individual issues could be addressed and dealt with.
- Discussion about a link between the indefinite extension and Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests ensued. However, there was a consensus that **there was probably little connection between the two tests and the indefinite extension, and the tests were more likely connected to the domestic nationalistic policies.**
- **Serious effort was put into developing mandate for the FMCT negotiations in the run-up to the 1995 RevCon,** as this was something that was seen as worth-while at the highest levels of the US government, although the issue in general **did not feature in the discussions about the extension of the NPT.**

Participants

POLICY VETERANS

GRIGORY BERDENNIKOV is Ambassador-at-Large of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. He held various positions at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR and later the Russian Federation, and was twice the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs. He served as Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the International Organizations in Vienna, and to the Conference of Disarmament in Geneva.

NABIL FAHMY served as Egypt's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and prior to that held a number of senior positions within Egypt's diplomacy. During his career, he served as Ambassador to Japan and to the United States. During the 1995 NPT Review Conference, he acted as a political advisor to the Foreign Minister.

THOMAS GRAHAM JR. is a former senior US diplomat. He served within the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency between 1970 and 1997, and acted as President Clinton's Special Representative for Arms Control, Non-Proliferation, and Disarmament. He served for 15 years as the general counsel of ACDA.

SVEN JURSCHEWSKY held a number of positions within Canada's Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development. During his career, he represented Canada in the Balkans, China, India, and at the CSCE in Vienna. He was Senior Advisor for Non-Proliferation prior to the 1995 Review Conference, and he was responsible for crafting and executing Canada's strategy for the conference.

ABDUL MINTY served in a number of positions within South Africa's Department of International Relations and Cooperation. He was an Honorary Secretary of the British Anti-Apartheid Movement between 1962 and 1995. He

served as South Africa's Governor on the IAEA's Board of Governors, and later as South Africa's Ambassador to the Conference of Disarmament in Geneva.

HARALD MULLER is Professor Emeritus of International Relations at Goethe University in Frankfurt, and a former director of the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt. He has advised the German Federal Foreign Office on non-proliferation since the 1980s.

JAAP RAMAKER held a number of positions within the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He served as the Netherlands' Ambassador to the United Nations in Geneva and was the Ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. He presided over the negotiations leading to the conclusion of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

SIR MICHAEL WESTON served within the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office, as Ambassador to Kuwait during the First Gulf War, the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, and held positions on several UN expert groups. He currently chairs the Advisory Board of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization.

ACADEMIC PARTICIPANTS

DUCO HELLEMA is a Professor Emeritus of History of International Relations at Utrecht University.

DAVID HOLLOWAY is the Raymond A. Spruance Professor of International History, Professor of Political Science, and Senior Fellow at Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University.

BERND KUBBIG was, prior to his recent retirement, a Research Fellow at the Peace Research Institute in Frankfurt.

LEOPOLDO NUTI is a Professor of History of International Relations at University Roma Tre.

MICHAL ONDERCO is an Assistant Professor of International Relations at Erasmus University Rotterdam.

WILLIAM C. POTTER is a Professor of Non-proliferation Studies and Director of the James Martin Center for Non-proliferation Studies at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies in Monterey, CA.

JOSEPH PILAT is a Senior Advisor in the National Security Office, Office of the Director, Los Alamos National Laboratory, and a Global Fellow in International Security Studies at the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington, D.C.

OR RABINOWITZ is a lecturer at the Department of International Relations at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

MATIAS SPEKTOR is an Associate Professor of International Relations and a Director of the Center for International Relations at Fundação Getúlio Vargas in São Paulo, Brazil.

ANNA-MART VAN WYK is a Professor of International Relations at the University of Johannesburg.



CITY OF ROTTERDAM,
SITE OF CONFERENCE

SESSION I

GENERAL MOOD AND EXPECTATIONS

MICHAL ONDERCO: Good morning, everyone. I would like to welcome you all. I wish you a very good morning, and welcome to Rotterdam. It's a very great honor and pleasure to welcome you here for this unique conference.

This is not really a standard academic conference because we don't have papers and paper presenters, but, instead, this is a piece of critical oral history, and the purpose of our meeting today is to conduct a collective interview between the policy veterans and the academic experts and to discuss the historical record and the differences in existing records and accounts. We are very grateful that you accepted our invitations and joined us for this conference. Our meeting will provide a new and unique way to look at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, and we are certain that, on the basis of this newly available evidence, we are going to get new insights into this historic event.

Early after the Conference, a post-mortem event was organized at the Monterey Institute of International Studies by Bill Potter, and numerous of you took part in that event. The 20 plus years past since, and that gives us a very welcome opportunity to revisit the Conference for two reasons. The first one is that there is new documentary evidence that was unavailable at that time that became available now, and before this event, numerous documents were procured — were acquired in the process of preparation, and you received a selection of them in the reading pack. Most of you chose to have it in electronic form.

Secondly, back in [1995], most of you were in active government service, and so, you were not really able to discuss numerous details because you were bound by laws and professional norms, and we hope that this conference will give you an opportunity to discuss your experiences a little more freely.

**“we hope that in
our discussion
we’ll be able to
better understand
the success of the
extension.”**

The methodology of critical oral history is famous for discussing wars, so our event is the one that discusses cooperation, which I think makes it very unique, and we hope that in our discussion we’ll be able to better understand the success of the extension. In preparation for the conference, we conducted oral history interviews with most of you — actually, with all of you — and also with many other veterans who were not able to join us today due to other combination of professional commitments. These interviews supported the preparation of this conference, and their transcripts will be made available later, but they are also made available to chairs of individual sessions. We’re going to get to that in a second.

Similar to those interviews, this conference is also going to be recorded, and its transcript is going to be made available at a later stage. In addition to the transcript, a report will be made soon after the conference — so, by soon after the conference we mean within two weeks. We record this conference because we believe that our interactions will be of interest to future generations of scholars in history, international relations, or the study of politics. With a view to this goal, we ask you to speak clearly so that the microphones can hear you, but also to be precise in your thoughts and in your words.¹

AUDIENCE: [LAUGHTER]

MICHAL ONDERCO: Before I pass the floor to Professor Nuti, I want to thank those who put not only their trust but also the capital in us. This conference is part of the Nuclear Proliferation International History Project, sponsored by Carnegie Corporation of New York. Additional funding for this conference was provided generously by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands and this university and the Erasmus Trust. I now pass the floor to Professor Nuti to also give a few words of welcome.

LEOPOLDO NUTI: Thank you very much, Michal. It’s great pleasure and honor to be here with all of you, so let me add my own personal thanks to Michal for having accepted our invitation and having accepted to be part of this

1 The introduction is inspired by the opening remarks by Sue Onslow in Onslow and van Wyk 2013, and Matias Spektor and Nicholas Wheeler in Mallea, et al. 2015

project. Let me just give you a couple of explanations about what the Nuclear Proliferation International History Project is all about. About ten years ago, Christian Ostermann, who unfortunately cannot be with us today but who is the director of the History and Public Policy Program at the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington, Christian and I, who had been working together a number of Cold War-related events, decided that we wanted to try to launch a new program for the history of the nuclear age, moving beyond the more traditional Cold War parameters, and we wanted to do two things basically.

One was to apply the methodology that the Cold War International History Project had been using to try to promote the opening of new primary sources. Encourage people to open up their archives, encourage countries that do not have a traditional archival openness to try and promote their own history by having people look at their own archives. So there was one of the key goals we intended to achieve, and almost nine years after and three generous, very generous, Carnegie grants, we have succeeded and in a number of cases, thanks to the cooperation of some of the people who are in this room. Professor Anna-Mart van Wyk from Monash, South Africa, and Professor Matias Spector from Getulio Vargas Foundation in Brazil have done incredible work in promoting the history of the nuclear programs and the nuclear policies of their countries by helping us promote and spread the circulation of the documents coming from their own countries.

Somehow translating them, promoting oral histories, and opening up new sources whenever possible. So there was one key goal of the project, and the second goal was what we ambitiously called capacity building. Encourage the shaping up of a new generation of nuclear historians, and again, in the room you have two of these results of our networking events. One is sitting right here next to me, Professor Onderco, who attended the third Nuclear History Boot Camp, I think, and another one is Dr. Or Rabinowitz over there, who never attended the Boot Camp. She always remind me that somehow we failed to select her, but we made up for it by selecting her when we did the Society of Historians of American Foreign Relations Summer Institute in Washington,

DC, and, ever since, they've both been precious allies in our effort to develop a network of young generation of nuclear historians.

So this is what the project is all about. We would not have been able to achieve what we have done in the past eight years without the help of three fantastic scholars, two of which are here with us today, Dr. Joseph Pilat and Professor David Holloway. The third, Professor Sherwin, is not — wasn't able to come — and sends his regards.

They don't like to be called our senior advisors, but that's what they are and what they've been, three great friends and three great sources of encouragement and support.

This conference today is an experiment for us as well. We've done a number of workshops and conferences in the past, but we've never tried a critical oral history experiment, mixing together practitioners and historians. So we are very excited and very thankful for your cooperation. I know that you have already shared your precious time with Michal for the interviews, and you all decided to participate to the meeting today, so welcome on behalf of myself and Christian Ostermann. Thank you very much for coming, and thank you Michal for doing all of the work to prepare and organize this workshop. I think we are all very excited to get started, so we'll stop here and give him the floor now.

MICHAL ONDERCO: To start with, I think it might be a very good idea to start with a very brief round of introductions. So why don't we start with Ambassador Berdennikov?

GRIGORY BERDENNIKOV: Start on what?

AUDIENCE: [LAUGHTER]

MICHAL ONDERCO: With a very brief introduction of yourself, really, so that we all know who we are.

GRIGORY BERDENNIKOV: Oh. Well, I'm Grigory Berdennikov. I worked in the diplomatic service of the Soviet Union and Russia Federation

for 42 years. Twice I have worked as Deputy Foreign Minister, I was permanent rep to CD and to international organizations in Vienna, Sherpa to the Nuclear Security Summits, Governor at the Board of the IAEA and so on and so forth.

AUDIENCE: [LAUGHTER]

GRIGORY BERDENNIKOV: Well, I am not responsible for anything that happened after 2015.

AUDIENCE: [LAUGHTER]

THOMAS GRAHAM: After your retirement there was a sea change.

AUDIENCE: [LAUGHTER]

THOMAS GRAHAM: We can all tell that.

NABIL FAHMY: Nabil Fahmy. I'm presently the founding Dean of the School of Global Affairs and Public Policy at The American University in Cairo. A couple of years ago I was Egyptian Prime Minister for a year, and, before that I had a career in diplomacy in the Egyptian Foreign Service for 34 years, including Ambassador both in the US and in Japan. During that career, a lot of my focus was on international security issues, be they arms control and within security or conflict resolution in our own region, and there are prolific problems. In [1995] specifically I was a member of delegation to the Review Conference while I was policy advisor to the Foreign Minister, and that's, I think, why you invited me to come to this one.

MICHAL ONDERCO: Ambassador Minty?

ABDUL MINTY: Thank you. My history is a bit different because when people ask what we did we started off as "terrorists" because we were fighting the apartheid system itself and later the apartheid bomb. I mention this because there is very little written, and indeed there's — you can talk of archival material as much as you want, but there isn't archival material about the frontline states and South Africa in terms of the resistance movement on these subjects, but some of this work started and continued from the 1960s onwards, including in '62 an African decision to work for an African nuclear weapon free zone

and later to get rid of the South African bomb.

We became free in 1994 and in 1995 we attended the first meeting of the IAEA General Conference. We were not on the Board of Governors because when South Africa was excluded, we had decided, the Africans, to give that seat to Egypt. But in 1995 I was made the Governor, and I retired in 2011, and I've been the longest-serving Governor on the board of the IEA. This was partly a decision at a very high level politically because we needed to find out very quickly what all the issues were, and regarding peaceful uses we worked actively in Africa to promote that.

I was made Chairman, in 1995, of the South African Council for the Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, and served until 2011. So the approach from then was to work with the liberation forces - and not only the ANC. It was also the South African Council of Churches and a whole host of other civil society groups. So in 1995 I wasn't working for the Foreign Ministry yet, but the Foreign Minister decided that I join the delegation, so I took part in the 1995 Review Conference and was made a member of the President's group, and that happened at all the subsequent NPT meetings.

I was then appointed leader of the South African delegation from the next meeting right up to 2010. In 2015, I was Ambassador in Geneva, and I joined the delegation and negotiated with them until the end. So that gave us the experience that we needed as to how to mould things, particularly in the President's group because there very interesting discussions in that small group

MICHAL ONDERCO: We're going to get to that in following sessions.

ABDUL MINTY: And Grigory and others were there, and so, there are some here, I think, four leaders interacted a great deal, as we did with the US and others for the indefinite extension, but I'll stop.

MICHAL ONDERCO: Okay. Professor Müller.

HARALD MÜLLER: Yes, thank you. I'm Harald Müller. I have been Director of Peace Research Institute Frankfurt, a major German think tank, for 20 years, and I'm now happily retired. The NPT and non-proliferation has been the center focus of my academic work and my scholarship, and I was

lucky enough to get early into contact with the real people that do the work. I participated in the seven NPT Review Conferences. The Review and Extension Conference [in 1995] was my first as a member of the German delegation, and all the RevCons since I could watch and witness as a delegation member.

But I should hasten to add that I feel humbled to be just here on the list of participants with all the big shots who did the real work, because, in my delegation, I was the second least important member. The least important member was another academic who was by necessity less important than I was.

AUDIENCE: [LAUGHTER]

HARALD MÜLLER: But at least the very good organization of the delegation under Ambassador Hoffman's wise leadership kept us in the circle of information, and I think that it gives me some legitimization to be on that list, but otherwise I'm no different from the great Kyrgyz delegation member Bill Potter.

JOSEPH PILAT: I'm Joseph Pilat. I participated in the 1985, [1990], and [1995] Review Conferences in different capacities for the US Government. In 1995, I was a senior advisor to the delegation. I have since contributed to US preparations for Review Conferences, including the one coming up in 2020.

MICHAL ONDERCO: Okay. A new guest with us.

ALEXANDER KOSMODEMIATKY: Yes. Hello, my name is Alexander Kosmodemiatky. Originally I am from Russian Embassy, and, in Russian Embassy, I am responsible for the political issues. That's it. Thank you.

DUCO HELLEMA: My name is Duco Hellema, I am Emeritus Professor of the History of International Relations at Utrecht University and former head of the International Relations Department of that same university. My research, academic research, has been focusing on the post-Second World War history of international relations and not least the Dutch role in these relations, and in August my latest book will be published by Routledge on the global 1970s.

OR RABINOWITZ: And thank you, thank you, everyone. My name Or Rabinowitz. I'm an assistant professor at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, and it's a hobby of mine to follow Anna-Mart, Poldo [Leopoldo Nuti], and David [Holloway], and to stalk them in conferences where I can.

AUDIENCE: [LAUGHTER]

OR RABINOWITZ: I work on nuclear history and nuclear proliferation on the Israeli program, but also I do comparative studies and I look into other cases as well, and I'm very much looking forward to our day today.

BERND KUBBIG: I'm Bernd Kubbig. I was for 37 years a member of the Peace Research Institute (PRIF) that Harald Müller directed for 20 years. I started as an East/West man, and, in 1995, I was dealing with missile defense, but I guess I'm here because of my entry in the last ten years on the WMD-Free Zone in the Middle East, which became my major focus. I have been doing [that] as a member of PRIF in Frankfurt, and now as a retired person at a reduced level.

We try to revive old ideas and generate new ideas for those in the Middle East who still think that it is possible to bridge the fundamental gaps, especially between the Egyptians and the Israelis, as a way of helping to overcome the stalemate and thus to make a successful event to make the NPT Review Conference in 2020 a successful event. We don't give up hope, and, together with my colleague Marc Finaud from the Geneva-based Center of Security Policy, we are issuing a series of policy briefs on new ideas and old ideas, and, right now, we are heading for the next NPT PrepCom in Geneva with a new set of ideas, with new people from the region, and we hope we don't hear the old non-constructive mantra but get new ideas to overcome the stalemate. Thank you.

ROCHER KOENDJBHARIE: Rocher, do you wish me —

AUDIENCE: [LAUGHTER]

MICHAL ONDERCO: Please do

ROCHER KOENDJBHARIE: My name's Rocher Koendjbarie. I am

a student of International Public Management and Policy at this university. Professor Onderco is one of my professors and asked me to assist during this conference. So, once again, if you need anything logistically, bureaucratically, don't hesitate to come up to me.

MARJOLIJN VAN DEELEN: My name is Marjolijn van Deelen, and Marilyn is the easier version of that.

AUDIENCE: [LAUGHTER]

MARJOLIJN VAN DEELEN: I by far do not have the historical knowledge of the NPT that others around the table have. I work in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands. I get to head our department for nonproliferation and disarmament and other nuclear issues that come up on that matter. I was previously posted to the UN in Vienna as deputy representative and have had many other diplomatic functions in other fields.

The first PrepCom of the current cycle of those chairs by Ambassador Van der Kwast of the Netherlands, who was then our Ambassador to the CD in Geneva — I was a part of his team, and I will continue working throughout this cycle up to 2020 to see how we can, yeah, let me put it positively, make a success of this cycle. And, for that, a historical perspective is very important to have to know what's happened in the past and also to build on new ideas. That's it.

DAVID HOLLOWAY: My name is David Holloway. I'm a professor of history and political science at Stanford and also connected with the Center for International Security and Arms ... and Cooperation there, and, sorry, I used the old name. The Center — we dropped arms control. Maybe I'm resisting the change.

AUDIENCE: [LAUGHTER]

DAVID HOLLOWAY: And before I came to Stanford, I taught at the University of Edinburgh in Scotland, and I come from Ireland, and my work has been, to considerable degree in recent years, on nuclear history, on the nuclear history of the Soviet Union, and, more recently, on international —

“We try to revive old ideas and generate new ideas for those in the Middle East who still think that it is possible to bridge the fundamental gaps, especially between the Egyptians and the Israelis...”

the international history of nuclear weapons, which I thought would be an interesting topic to explore and discovered just how complicated it really was. I'm extremely glad to be here at this meeting and looking forward, very much, to the discussions.

I've been involved, as Poldo mentioned, in the Nuclear Proliferation International History Project, and I've learned a great deal from that. It's actually been very interesting. The project has gathered together younger scholars from all around the world for various summer sessions, various conferences, and I think it's great that there's a younger generation of scholars really deeply interested in these issues coming forward. Thank you.

MATIAS SPEKTOR: My name is Matias Spektor. I'm an associate professor of history and political science at the Vargas Foundation in Brazil. The reason I'm here is because, five years ago, in the context of the International History Project, we organized a similar event on the end of nuclear rivalry between Brazil and Argentina. We ran about 300 hours of oral histories with individual veterans in both countries and in the United States, and we then brought them together with secret documents on the table, and we recorded a meeting like this, for three consecutive days, and that was subsequently published by the Wilson Center.

So I'm fascinated by the methodology of critical oral histories and a true believer in the added value of these kinds of exercises. They make all the difference to historians, and this one I have no doubt will be a major contribution towards the history of nuclear diplomacy in the future, so I'm thrilled to be here. Thanks for the invite.

ANNA-MART VAN WYK: Good morning. My name is Anna-Mart Van Wyk. It's nice to be in a country where I can actually pronounce my surname correctly.

AUDIENCE: [LAUGHTER]

ANNA-MART VAN WYK: If I was in the United States, I had to say van Wyk because Van Wyk could not work there. I'm a professor of history at

Monash University Australia and currently also the Executive Dean of the Faculty of Social and Health Sciences at Monash South Africa. Prior to that, I headed up the international studies department at Monash, South Africa.

I became interested in South Africa's nuclear history while doing my PhD on the United States arms embargo against South Africa and how South Africa managed to circumvent that embargo, and that opened up quite a lot of questions about US-South African nuclear relations, which has been the main project I've been working on for the past 12 years. Since 2010, I've been part of the NPIHP piece, and I've branched out my research to all sorts of other collaborations with South Africa, currently focusing on France. I'm here because '95, of course, South Africa did play a significant role in the Review Conference, and, yeah, I look forward to all the insights.

Documents can only tell us so much. They are incredibly important, but I believe in oral history in a conferences and interviews as adding sometimes insights to documents that we wouldn't have otherwise gotten. So I also cohosted a similar oral history conference in 2009 in South Africa on South Africa — the Cold War in Southern Africa together with Sue Onslow, and also the insights that we gained from that conference has been incredibly valuable in telling, you know, a different story in a sense then all, actually giving credit to the documents, that we have sought [through] that conference. So happy to be here. Thank you for the invite.

BILL POTTER: I'm Bill Potter. I founded the Center for Nonproliferation Studies in Monterey, you know, 29 years ago. I also have a chair, the Nunn and Lugar Professor of Nonproliferation Studies. When Michael invited me, I was under the impression that this was an oral history of the relationship between Kyrgyzstan and the NPT Review Process, so I'm surprised to see so many people from other countries here.

No, seriously, 1995 was my first experience in the NPT world, and I did have the opportunity to serve as a member of the first Kyrgyz delegation to an NPT meeting and have served on their delegation at every Review Conference and prep-con since up until 2017, where for various reasons, they chose

not to participate, so I joined the Chilean delegation.

AUDIENCE: [LAUGHTER]

BILL POTTER: That's another story. From a research standpoint too, my major interests have been looking at the nuclear politics of the Non-Aligned Movement because I have an unusual perspective having been connected with the Kyrgyz, but I also have long been interested in US-Soviet cooperation for non-proliferation. I have a new book coming out hoping to derive some lessons from cooperation that was actually quite unusual in the '70s and the '80s and see whether there's some lessons for the future. I think the last thing I would mention is that my greatest, both concern and, I think, to some extent, accomplishment, has been focusing more attention on disarmament and non-proliferation education, [and] training the next generation, though, since I've been doing this for so long, my next generation now, some of my students have already retired.

AUDIENCE: [LAUGHTER]

BILL POTTER: But I do [INAUDIBLE] to this issue, and for me, the most rewarding thing when I attend these meetings, the Review Conference meetings, is to see how many of the students that I've worked with are now on literally dozens of delegations.

MICHAL ONDERCO: We're still waiting for Mr. Jurschewsky coming because there is a problem — there was a problem with his plane ticket, but he is already on campus, so he's somewhere. Ambassador Ramaker.

JAAP RAMAKER: Thank you very much. My name is Jaap Ramaker. I am — used to be a career diplomat for over 35 years, almost 40, I believe. I served in Geneva and in New York two times each, in the '80s as a Deputy to the Conference on Disarmament, and later on as a Deputy to our Permanent Mission in New York. In the '90s, I was Ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva and then later on, for a brief period, also Permanent Representative in New York. In those years, I was active in the '90s both on

NPT and CTBT. In the NPT Review and Extension Conference, I was chairing the Main Committee III on peaceful uses, and, the year after, in 1996, I chaired the test ban negotiations in Geneva.

The — I then moved on to Vienna where I became the PermRep to the international organizations over there, which included, by the way, also — and six months of the presidency of the PrepCom of the CTBTO. In addition, I was a member of the board of the IAEA, like Grigory, with whom, by the way, I was [sic] serving both in Geneva in the '80s and in Geneva in the '90s. And after my retirement in 2004, I became a special representative on behalf of the countries that have signed or ratified the [Comprehensive] Test Ban [Treaty], with the role to convince governments that had not yet done so toto either sign or ratify the Test Ban Treaty so as to keep alive that norm against testing, which was under heavy pressure to be made sure by the Americans especially and to make sure that it would not be a treaty that should be forgotten—prevented that from happening, also together.

MALE: Sorry.

JAAP RAMAKER: ...we being also the Tibor Toth the executive secretary CTBTO until two years ago, three years ago, I believe, In the meantime, I was a member of the Advisory Board on International Affairs of the Netherlands and [in that framework] dealt mostly with security issues, including the nuclear issues.

MICHAL ONDERCO: Thank you. Sir Michael?

MICHAEL WESTON: I am Michael Weston. I've been retired for 20 years. For 40 years before that, I was a member of the British Foreign Service. 35 of those years I spent dealing with the Middle East, either in the area or in London and New York, and then, as a rescue, I was sent to Geneva at an exciting time when we were finishing the negotiation of the CWC.

And then I would have participated in the '95 Conference—Extension Conference of the NPT in New York as a member of the delegation, but the man who was supposed to lead the British delegation was sent off as Ambas-

sador to Zimbabwe at the last moment. And so, with no background at all, I became the leader of the British delegation and Chairman of the Western Group and played a relatively active part in the negotiation, but I was left feeling very much lacking in real knowledge of disarmament, and I'm afraid I feel very humble to be among such experts today. Thank you.

MICHAL ONDERCO: Thank you. Mr. Graham?

THOMAS GRAHAM: My name is Tom Graham. I spent 27 years in the US Government working on nuclear non-proliferation and arms control. 32 years all told. I began in 1970 and I retired from government in 1997. Presently I'm Chairman of a company called Lightbridge Corporation, I have been chairman now for 12 years. It has developed a new type of nuclear power fuel that addresses all of the safety issues that some people associate with nuclear power.

This fuel can't melt down because of its temperature and so forth, and also I — in addition to that, I have done a lot of teaching at universities around the country — in the world actually, mostly in the United States. I completely agree with what has been said about education. I do a lot of speeches. I have published ten books, most of them on this subject, but not all, and one of them is a novel which is —

GROUP: [LAUGHTER]

THOMAS GRAHAM: the one I enjoy the most because you can say anything in a novel...

GROUP: [LAUGHTER]

THOMAS GRAHAM: and attribute to a character what you really believe but don't want to say yourself. I began my arms control work negotiating in the SALT/START process with the Soviet Union and spent many, many years doing that. SALT I, SALT II, START I, and the Euro Missile Treaty, the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty, which I thought was one of the most amazing negotiations in which I have ever participated. In the course of that negotiation there were — we began with 23 parties, NATO and the Warsaw

Pact, to bring an end the Cold War, and during the course of the nearly two years of negotiation five countries changed their names and one entirely disappeared. We ended up with 30 countries instead of 22.

It was a very interesting negotiation, but it wasn't nuclear. Most of the other negotiations in which I was involved addressed nuclear weapons. I participated in a senior role in, I think, every major arms control/nonproliferation negotiation in which US took part during the period from 1970 to 1997. After the end of the Cold War I focused largely on nonproliferation. Also for one year I served as the acting director [CROSS TALK] —

MICHAL ONDERCO: And we have our last participant, Mr. Jurschewsky.

THOMAS GRAHAM: [INAUDIBLE] acting director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in [INAUDIBLE] period.

GROUP: [CROSS TALK]

THOMAS GRAHAM: It was during the period when I served as acting director that we adopted the Moratorium, which is — which was the result of a tremendous intra-agency battle within the US Government in 1993, and it's still all we've got as far as testing is concerned. After the U.S. government decision on the Moratorium was made, some several months later it looked as though China was planning to test and this could force the U.S. to change its policy and follow suit. There was an emergency National Security Council meeting. It appeared as though the policy would be changed. Everyone was very tense at the meeting but the Secretary of Defense spoke up first and said, "What are we doing here? We're Americans. We have our policy. Why should we be influenced by what the Chinese do?"

And everybody else said, "That's right," and we all walked out. The Moratorium has held ever since. That's kind of the way some of the really big decisions get made.

I remember Michael very well at the 1995 Conference; you hid your lack of experience extremely well.

SVEN JURSCHEWSKY: Well, that's true.

GROUP: [LAUGHTER]

THOMAS GRAHAM: Michael and I also had the opportunity to have a tennis game against each other. We both were playing at — staying at the Millennium Hotel — right across the street from the United Nations. It has a tennis court on the 38th floor, and I do not remember what the score was, but Michael says we each won one set. So I guess that's right. I very much enjoyed all those years of experience working on arms control and nonproliferation, almost 30 years in the government, and I'm still doing it some 20 more years later outside the government.

Lightbridge Corporation, the nuclear fuel company, we call ourselves a nonproliferation company, and that is part of the rationale behind our new fuel. You cannot make weapons from it. You cannot reprocess it and make weapons. Doing non-proliferation work in the government as well as without you meet a lot of really great and wonderful people, and you encounter some of the most bizarre developments you could possibly imagine. A great experience. Thank you.

MICHAL ONDERCO: Good. Perfect. Thank you. I think this is the moment for Mr. Jurschewsky to introduce himself.

SVEN JURSCHEWSKY: I'm Sven Jurschewsky. Recently retired from External Affairs Canada. They call it GAC now, which I think in terms of what has happened to the ministry is apt.

GROUP: [LAUGHTER]

SVEN JURSCHEWSKY: I have been on my feet now 30 hours, so, if I'm a little incoherent, I apologize and beg your indulgence. You want sort of a little background thing what's happened since?

MICHAL ONDERCO: No, well, basically how you happened to be in New York at the time.

SVEN JURSCHEWSKY: That is a more complex question than I think —

GROUP: [LAUGHTER]

SVEN JURSCHEWSKY: For most of you. I was brought in 1992. I had considerable experience in nuclear affairs, as well as other stuff. I was brought in to formulate a strategy for — basically to assist the Americans on getting an indefinite extension to the NPT. And I took advantage of the next three years to attend conferences to get to know some of you, especially through the PPNN, which was a very valuable forum in forming the kind-of networks that were important during the Conference.

My job was to look at only the extension decisions, and I should point out that Peggy Mason, who had been Canada's disarmament ambassador, was asked to do other things. And it was simply my team that operated for the next three years until, shortly before the Conference or six months before Chris Westdal was appointed, and [sic] we had a small team which developed Canada's position under my direction, and we carried that forward. We developed — I don't — I didn't really see it as a social thing, even though — I hope you remember that I paid you a bottle of Rebel Yell at the Conference [LAUGHS].

THOMAS GRAHAM: The finest whiskey in Kentucky.

GROUP: [LAUGHTER]

SVEN JURSCHEWSKY: I don't even know what the bet was about [LAUGHS].

THOMAS GRAHAM: For the Rebel Yell?

SVEN JURSCHEWSKY: Yeah.

THOMAS GRAHAM: Well, it was a whiskey known —

SVEN JURSCHEWSKY: I know, but what had we bet about that I lost?

THOMAS GRAHAM: No, it wasn't loss of a bet so much. You gave it to me because of a successful NPT extension.

JOSEPH PILAT: You thought it was [INAUDIBLE]

THOMAS GRAHAM: You and Chris gave it to me because we had achieved our objective.

SVEN JURSCHEWSKY: We had, yes. It was, for me, a time of very intense time. I attended all these conferences. We developed a huge database of national policies which vivified Canadian strategy at the Conference. We had, for example, two groups. I was only involved with the indefinite extension decision. Others were working on the other parts of the Conference, but we had two groups. One was, I think, called the Metropolitan Group. There was another one, but I came out of our assessment of the Conference as — there was no consensus on anything, and not only was there no consensus, you couldn't put some countries in the same room with some other countries.

MICHAL ONDERCO: We're going to come to that in a bit.

SVEN JURSCHEWSKY: I know, and so we divided it all up into countries that more or less got along together. Then we told different stories to different people, and I think rather successfully. I think, in that conference, we punched above our weight. We were very successful in all three groups. It was really the last time that I worked on nuclear weapons.

I went on to other work in intelligence and North Korea, I spent a great deal of time in North Korea on that sort of thing, and also on trade matters. For me, the Conference was — it came out — as a personal comment, it came out of really my experience as a young person in the '50s hiding under a desk while the nuclear attack sirens were howling and me thinking, "Duck and cover is not going to make it. I've seen the movies."

NABIL FAHMY: You're supposed to put your head between your legs.

SVEN JURSCHEWSKY: I know. That's duck and cover, and I joined the Anti-Nuclear Movement, and that vivified, at the personal level, a lot of what I did at the Conference and the kind of ideas I had and that I shared with others. I found it one of the more rewarding experiences of my 37-year career.

THOMAS GRAHAM: If I could just add to that, I think that Canada played a key role in the Conference, and part of it is what you just described, your willingness to be the country that introduced a resolution and gather the co-sponsors.

SVEN JURSCHEWSKY: I'm — that was Chris's job. Chris — I was the one who negotiated in the President's Committee because I had the most to do with the two papers, but Chris was a person of enormous charm, enormous volubility, and that was his end of it.

MICHAL ONDERCO: So I think this is a good moment to sort of start discussing the —

THOMAS GRAHAM: If I just could add one more thing?

MICHAL ONDERCO: Sure.

THOMAS GRAHAM: Did you hear what happened to Chris in New York a few years after the Conference? A year or so after 2001.

SVEN JURSCHEWSKY: Well, I know Chris went on to be Ambassador in the Soviet Union — Russia.

THOMAS GRAHAM: After the CD [Conference in Disarmament].
[CROSS TALK] —

SVEN JURSCHEWSKY: Yeah, that I don't know. By that time I was into deepest [sic] Bosnia.

THOMAS GRAHAM: Oh, this was after 2001 when security had changed, and Chris was still at the CD [CROSS TALK] —

SVEN JURSCHEWSKY: [CROSS TALK]

THOMAS GRAHAM: Chris was coming back from Geneva to go to Ottawa, but he changed planes in New York. And he had a briefing book with him, which was unclassified, but the cover page said, "Weapons of Mass Destruction," and when he got off the plane he forgot to take the cover page with him. He had the rest of the book.

SVEN JURSCHEWSKY: Yeah?

THOMAS GRAHAM: But he left the cover page on his seat. One of the stewardesses saw that and called the police, and he was arrested...

GROUP: [LAUGHTER]

THOMAS GRAHAM: ...and held for 24 hours before they could get him out.

MICHAL ONDERCO: So we —

SVEN JURSCHEWSKY: Only in New York.

THOMAS GRAHAM: Only in New York.

MICHAL ONDERCO: We started talking already about the resolution, and one of the things that came out — the resolution came out in a number of interviews that I had with a number of you. But, of course, the idea is why to have a resolution in the first place. I mean, why was the resolution chosen as the means of — how did it come about?

SVEN JURSCHEWSKY: From my discussions with Dhanapala, the two papers in and of themselves did not amount to a decision. That had to be done — and one had to coalesce the strong work that Peter Goosen did in the President's Committee and defending those two papers. One had to coalesce that into a document, into a resolution, that actually extended, and put in words, the indefinite extension of the Treaty.

MICHAL ONDERCO: But the idea —

SVEN JURSCHEWSKY: Without that, there would have been no extension, and it was Chris who took that around and one by one persuaded.

MICHAL ONDERCO: But the idea that there should be resolution is older one, right? Because I remember, in your interview, you mentioned the idea to have a resolution was already put forward much earlier.

GRIGORY BERDENNIKOV: Well, first was a resolution coming from Taylhardat.

MICHAL ONDERCO: Yes.

GRIGORY BERDENNIKOV: For 25 years. And that we didn't like too much.

MICHAL ONDERCO: But I remember from our interview, you mentioned that you first had the idea that there should be a resolution already in the meeting of the Western Group and Russia in Geneva about a year before. That this is a way to bind people to support.

GRIGORY BERDENNIKOV: No. This I don't remember. What was — what happened was that we had, the five of us, the nuclear weapon states...

THOMAS GRAHAM: Four plus Germany. [CROSS TALK]

GRIGORY BERDENNIKOV: No, actually Sha Zukang was there too.

MICHAEL WESTON: Yes. And Germany was not [CROSS TALK].

GRIGORY BERDENNIKOV: And Germany was not.

THOMAS GRAHAM: But if I could just add, Dhanapala very much wanted a rolling 25...

MICHAEL WESTON: Yeah.

THOMAS GRAHAM: ...outcome, and — but most of all, he wanted an outcome that was non-divisive and which would bring people together, a consensus outcome. And I met with him many times early on, and I told him that the United States would never, under any circumstances, vote for anything but indefinite extension. We could get outvoted — that's okay, or we would be happy to win by one vote. We didn't care about consensus, and that was the line we took and stayed with, and he finally decided, "How can I make that into a consensus?" And he did it really in a quite imaginative way.

GRIGORY BERDENNIKOV: Well, the first week, as I remember, we all just talked to people and tried to convince them of the benefits of indefinite extension. But that tactic failed. Then, the question was what to do. We had on the table the Venezuelan proposal and nothing from us. So there was an idea to have this indefinite extension, to put it to the public, and not only to put but to gather co-sponsorship...

MALE: Mm-hmm.

THOMAS GRAHAM: Right.

THOMAS GRAHAM: NIKOV: ...for this proposal.

MICHAEL WESTON: Yeah.

GRIGORY BERDENNIKOV: And if the co-sponsors would, well, amount to a majority, then the thing is done, and that was the play.

MICHAL ONDERCO: Yeah.

GRIGORY BERDENNIKOV: And it was very well executed by the Canadian Delegation, for which we are very grateful.

MICHAL ONDERCO: We —

GRIGORY BERDENNIKOV: And it was the only way for a successful conclusion of the Conference.

SVEN JURSCHEWSKY: The difficulty was — I was involved in some of those discussions before the Conference at the various PrepComs, and PPNN meetings, and others of that nature, and my concern was that there was no political basis for a bold resolution.

MICHAL ONDERCO: So, this is what I was trying to get at because we will talk about what happened at the Conference in the next session, but —

THOMAS GRAHAM: There's no political basis for what?

SVEN JURSCHEWSKY: For an extension decision. That there had to be a —

THOMAS GRAHAM: Oh.

SVEN JURSCHEWSKY: Had to be — you have to put some meat on the bone.

THOMAS GRAHAM: Political basis.

SVEN JURSCHEWSKY: Political basis that gathered people together in some way that exacted — to be very frank, but exacted a price, and these were the discussions that I was having, I think separate from you fellas.

THOMAS GRAHAM: Right.

SVEN JURSCHEWSKY: That would exact the price from the weapon states

THOMAS GRAHAM:t.

THOMAS GRAHAM: South Africa played an important role in that.

SVEN JURSCHEWSKY: South Africa played a critical role.

MICHAL ONDERCO: So —

SVEN JURSCHEWSKY: A critical role.

MICHAL ONDERCO: So, I think this is a good moment to start talking about that because the — there is a considerable difference of opinion. Let's call it that way. And there is also a considerable difference of opinion with existing material — of the existing material evidence.

THOMAS GRAHAM:If I can make one comment. I remember working with Abdul [Minty] on this, and, the very first day of the Conference, our two delegations met with your Foreign Minister [South Africa] and our Vice President, and the two of them told the two delegations that we want you to work together and you better do it. But what I read in the press — correct me if I'm wrong, but what I read in your press as it filtered through New York was that, initially, there was criticism for working with the West, but then you ended up being the heroes of the Conference — and the key broker in the process.

SVEN JURSCHEWSKY: I think the key role was played by Alfred Nzo.

MALE: Mm-hmm, and the beginning.

SVEN JURSCHEWSKY: At the — right at the beginning. And, you know, that — I know Peter presented him with the two papers the — I think the morning before he gave his initial address where he tabled these two papers, and I remember sitting with him during that whole first — you know, initial speeches, and then he said, “You boys have something, and I've got to go off the [INAUDIBLE] and make sure it happens.”

There was throughout resistance — what I would call the NAM radicals — that had to be overcome. Thank you very, very much. But I think if there was a hero who bit the bullet, it was Alfred Nzo, who tabled those two papers — in a sense the beginning of the endgame right at the start of the Conference.

THOMAS GRAHAM: Right.

SVEN JURSCHEWSKY: And that was the critical, strategic decision that was made, and that was his decision. I was very impressed by him. I sat with him through those speeches, and, you know, it's just stuff we always ignore. It's nonsense, but it's not. It's a lot. Work had gone into those speeches. Like an old African chief — I've spent a lot of time in Africa. Like an old African chief, he paid attention to everything and synthesized it.

MICHAL ONDERCO: So, let's talk about — a little bit about building of these political basis before the Conference. Because this is where a lot of these discussions took place, and from many of you and from the interviews that — one of the things that is becoming obvious is that there was no certainty that there is going to be this majority, so how did — basically what were your — how did you approach this at the time of the PrepComs, for example?

JAAP RAMAKER: I will say very briefly that I remember, as someone who was not so intimately involved in all of these things, is that for a long time nobody wanted to admit — especially not the Americans, that you could not have only an extension decision, that something had to be added, and you could go with conditions or whatever, but it was actually [INAUDIBLE] —

GROUP: [CROSS TALK]

JAAP RAMAKER: ...the ones that you were in, in Geneva, and you were not supposed to raise anything of the sort. No, no. It had to be review, and it had to be a separately extension conference and nothing more. And many of us already knew that, in the end, that it was not possible, that there had to be something in return or whatever, but you were not supposed to say it before the Conference.

THOMAS GRAHAM: Yes, but if I could just add to what Jaap just said, we had a meeting in Washington with the South African Ambassador, who told us that South Africa was going to support us but on the condition that it be done in a way that would bring both sides together and would require some of the things that you just mentioned, and so, by the time we got to the Conference, we knew we couldn't just have an extension. We had to work out the Principles and enhanced review

MICHAL ONDERCO: If I may pass the floor to Minister Fahmy.

NABIL FAHMY: Well, I think we're going through the same problem we went through in '95.

GROUP: [LAUGHTER]

NABIL FAHMY: Different states need to talk to each other and think that's the world.

MICHAL ONDERCO: Okay.

NABIL FAHMY: The fact is the major powers had the interest, and I completely respect that. But there was another discussion ongoing as well, and they were the majority of the members of the NPT, Anyway, I'm trying to follow the structure which you gave us. Therefore at this point I am commenting on events before the Conference...

MICHAL ONDERCO: Yes.

NABIL FAHMY: ...rather than at the Conference.

MICHAL ONDERCO: That's what I aim at, yes.

NABIL FAHMY: The sense in the developing world was NPT is good but not enough, so how do we make it better? And our sense was nuclear states have to do more in nuclear disarmament, and the Conference was an opportunity to raise those issues, irrespective of whether we're going to extend it, indefinitely or for 25 years, and we, of course, had positions on it.

At the time, nuclear disarmament issues more topical than they are today,

The sense in the developing world was NPT is good but not enough,

so how do we make it better?

so these were not simply issues dealt with by diplomats at conferences. They were actually national public issues being discussed. So my sense, at least in the Non-Aligned Movement, was the goal was a —successful NPT, but didn't think that indefinite extension was the best way to do it, and we were not looking at a conference that would simply come out with an extension only. That was not going to work. We had our differences within the Non-Aligned Movement, whether it's 25 years, revolving, or extension, and we can deal with that later, but I remember talking to Tom before the Conference, I remember talking to Dhanapala before the Conference, raising all the issues of concern to my country as a member of the Non-Aligned Movement, but also saying that at the end of the day our position will depend on whether the results of the Conference reflects reality.

And I was very clear in using those terms because if there's progress — and we have no reason to kill the whole project, because we're not [INAUDI-BLE], but at the same time we were not about to go along with any decision or proposal that would say NPT is savior the world, and we all supporting this by consensus. So the mood, I think, was not as negative as people try to project, but it wasn't either as positive or — and I frankly don't think that you could have gotten an extension indefinitely, if there wasn't some — as he just said, some meat on the table. That would not have gone through as easily as it did.

MICHAL ONDERCO: So you started with the view from the Non-Aligned Movement, and, of course, Ambassador Minty's from South Africa, was at that time a new member of the Non-Aligned Movement and had also views on this. How did you see that sort of — the issue of the meat on the table?

ABDUL MINTY: First of all, we were not new because the ANC was an observer member in the Non-Aligned Movement. We were not a state, but attended all meetings. There are a lot of difficulties with this situation to try and describe South Africa because people needed to pigeonhole us and lock us into a certain context which we did not recognize. I was involved in nuclear issues since 1962 and we were later monitoring South Africa's nuclear weapon development.

Everybody denied it, but we knew what was going on. It was found later that we were right. Now the easiest way to understand it, the shortest way to the issues, is that we had in South Africa what we called an apartheid bomb, meaning it was created by that state to defend the apartheid system, however you describe it, I'm not going to get into it. Every single official who participated in the NPT process until we came to the extension meeting, was actually part of the apartheid regime. They had no contact with the Non-Aligned Movement and knew none of the leaders. They knew no one and hadn't worked with anyone. And here we had an issue which we couldn't move with unless we had the total confidence of the Non-Aligned Movement and the African continent.

So some of what has been written subsequently is actually a distortion of the truth. They had no capacity to do that. When I was brought in — I wasn't working for the South African government, but I was brought in because I had worked with the OAU, with SADC and the Frontline States. Very few people know — although if they look at the records, they will see, but they don't put any importance on it, that Julius Nyerere was a very early critic of the NPT. He refused to sign the NPT because of its discriminatory nature, and later, when pressed, Tanzania and countries in Southern Africa would not sign the NPT either because South Africa was developing nuclear weapons.

At that time these countries were considered to be stupid, and we took a lot of flak. So he managed to keep the Frontline States without signing the NPT, but what the apartheid rulers did, with the major western countries is to claim that if you don't sign the NPT, then South Africa will not sign it either, and the challenge is to make South Africa sign it. That was very early before the NPT Review and Extension Conference. So that influenced the discussions. That influenced the alliance formation. That influenced who trusted whom and how they worked.

I was brought into the process just before the review meeting. We considered what we should do, and there were only options that everyone knows about. We decided there, different to some of the advice that we would go for

indefinite extension.

MICHAL ONDERCO: So how about the exchange that — because Mr. Jurschewsky already discussed the cooperation that was there between Canada and South Africa.

ABDUL MINTY: It was between Canada and... What I'm saying is that we had very good relations with Canada throughout the Commonwealth with Prime Minister Trudeau. I met him regularly every two years. I'm talking ANC now.

MICHAL ONDERCO: Yeah.

ABDUL MINTY: And the resistance movement, okay? Now then we're involved in all those discussions we're talking about now. So, when you say Canada and South Africa at that time, they were not talking to the new South Africa. They were talking to the officials that the new South Africa also allowed some space to, but those people did not have any confidence from the Non-Aligned.

So when Dhanapala was doing his work — and I was only advisor to the South African delegation because I was not working for the Foreign Ministry, and so, as advisor, I was always kept on the side. In this process, I found that we had lost out on some of the issues we had discussed in Pretoria earlier, because our officials didn't have the confidence to push a lot of them very strongly because they'd had a whole lot of discussions with other Western countries, and so they were caught up in those negotiations, and questions of trust and so on. . So the decision that we took in the end was that we think it is a correct decision to keep to some of our objectives.

I won't go into all the reasons, but they are very important. But if we lost, fine. We had nothing to lose. We had everything to gain, and the other problem was, we wanted the world to be free of nuclear weapons in about 20 years. People forget that. That's what we wanted. So we had to have a strategy. Now we were also working with the whole Non-Aligned Movement taking a position but we worked both within groups and across groups. It's a very difficult thing to do, because when you start within groups you have the Non-Aligned

first, and the African Union regionally, but we decided we had to reach out to all if we're to have global peace, global security, global consensus. So we worked for a consensus decision.

Everybody talked. Dhanapala went for 25 years because he thought he could get the majority for that.

Many people went for [certain] things because they thought they could go for majority decisios, and we said, "No, we shouldn't go for majority. We should go for consensus," and that Minister Nzo said immediately that we have the possibility to work for world peace on this issue. The minute his speech was delivered, a flurry of countries came to us and said they wanted to join us with our proposal because they had thought of similar proposals, but they said they didn't want to make them early in the Conference.

MICHAL ONDERCO: So the work on this 'meat', as it was called and — before, and to put on the skeleton of extension, when did those discussions about what could be the meat on the bones to start?

THOMAS GRAHAM: When the President's Council began, was when that really happened, the third week of the Conference, Dhanapala created the President's Council of 25 states.

MICHAL ONDERCO: Okay, so there is disagreement —

GROUP: [CROSS TALK]

MICHAL ONDERCO: Okay, so Sir Michael, and then here and here. Let's — Sir Michael.

MICHAEL WESTON: Yeah, I just wanted to make one point about the lead-up to the Conference, and that is that one must not forget that the most extensive lobbying campaign that I have ever known was mounted where we produced states most people had not heard of but certainly didn't have representatives in New York, and we got them all out of the woodwork and got them to New York.

Not that — I mean, I agree entirely that the objective was to have a consensus decision, but we at any rate believed — and I think this was a view

of the five nuclear weapon states, that it was necessary as a fallback to know that if it came to it, we could win a vote. That is all I wanted to — not to be overlooked.

THOMAS GRAHAM: Absolutely.

MICHAL ONDERCO: Ambassador Berdennikov.

GRIGORY BERDENNIKOV: I fully agree with this. Our main task at the '95 Conference, as we saw it from Moscow, was the extension. This was the crux of the matter, and then how we get it was another matter. It was quite clear that just by talking to people, we cannot get it, so we came out with this device of getting co-sponsorships. Then the question was: should we still go for a vote, when everybody saw that co-sponsors were more than majority, or should we show some flexibility and add on sweeteners?

And we thought that it would be wise if we, in addition to having an extension adopted by consensus, would also have the decision to strengthen the Review process, and the decision on the principles and objectives of nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament as well as the Middle East resolution. For us, those were, well, important things, but not as important as the extension. But, in order to have a smooth conference as the Chinese were insisting on, we could have those things. For us, as Russia, for example, the Middle East resolution was very easy because we voted for the idea of a nuclear weapon zone there year after year at the UN.

For the Americans, it was difficult, but they also that they would be ready to talk to other interested people and try to find the consensus. We were very supportive, but, for us, it was very good.

MICHAL ONDERCO: But I want to come back to what we were talking about—about the sort of discussions before that were here—and Mr. Jur-schewsky.

SVEN JURSCHEWSKY: We were very concerned about the NAM, and we were also concerned about WEOG from the Canadian perspective. WEOG, for us, was the early meeting, and so you could say that you don't like, and you

say you don't like it, and, well, we were up 'til midnight last night, and it — we can't change a word. We — as far as the extension decision, absented ourselves from WEOG discussions in a very, very strong sense. That also gave us a certain freedom of action.

We would attend the meetings, but it was pretty pro forma. In our assessment of — which was very, very detailed, very detailed, of the NAM and — oh, well, actually, of all the states' party [sic], we discovered that there were a large number of PermReps which we called “no foreign minister PermReps,” and these were people who — people of substance - who basically made policy on their own account. This, for us, was a deep concern because how do you address that?

You can't use the normal diplomatic means, and that was, in fact, Chris's major job, was to address that specific problem. There was also discussion about how to — I don't want to say decapitate because that's way too strong, but how to mollify, perhaps is a better word.

GROUP: [LAUGHTER]

SVEN JURSCHEWSKY: And there was a meeting of — as you will recall, there was Marin Bosch — it was not possible for you to talk with him — no, is a great lack, because he played an important role not just at the Conference but throughout his career, taking a moral position on nuclear weapons, which one should also take into account, not just the other stuff. At the — there was concern about position, especially in North America.

Mexico had just joined NAFTA. Well, we created NAFTA and — but Mexico has, in many, many issues, had taken a radical position, which didn't make people in Washington happy and oftentimes didn't make us happy, and at the so-called 'Three Amigos' Conference in — I think it was in San Jose — it was in Texas somewhere, if I remember right. A decision came to — let's build a golden bridge for Marin Bosch.

JAAP RAMAKER: Hm.

SVEN JURSCHEWSKY: And I was instructed by the Prime Minister to

“I remember specifically discussions with the Mexican Embassy in Ottawa

that there were to be no conditionalities, additional conditionalities associated with that paper, if he were to table it. “

hand over to Marin Bosch the Strengthened Review Conference paper, which he [INAUDIBLE] and he misused it. I remember specifically discussions with the Mexican Embassy in Ottawa that there were to be no conditionalities, additional conditionalities associated with that paper, if he were to table it. Well, he did table it, and he did put conditionalities onto it, which, I think, in the way in which the Conference worked out, both diminished his leadership, which was very important in terms of how the NAM operated, diminished his leadership of the faction that wanted a limited extension. That was important. Even though we had this paper, he misused it.

MICHAL ONDERCO: There was a question from Professor Spektor.

MATIAS SPEKTOR: Sure. Could I ask you to tell us a little bit about how far up-to-date concerns for the PrepComs when in your capital cities — because one of the fascinating things, and it speaks to the subject you just raised, is the role of Presidents and how much and how far Presidents at the end were committed. I mean, we have evidence of the White House moving to a large degree to make this happen. I don’t know what the situation was in the Kremlin or in Cairo or in Johannesburg.

What was the situation at home? Was this something that the leadership cared about, and when exactly did the leadership begin to care about it?

SVEN JURSCHEWSKY: In Ottawa, the pressure on me to do well for an indefinite extension was intense. [LAUGHS] That part was unpleasant, but an interest in the nuts and bolts of things, no, zero. Zero. It was simply the extension decision itself that was important. How it was achieved, the mechanics of the PrepCom — downtown, they couldn’t care less.

MICHAL ONDERCO: So there was a point raised here, and then we move to Ambassador Fahmy.

GROUP: [CROSS TALK]

NABIL FAHMY: I’ll answer the question, but let me just make one point before that. Going into the Conference, the Non-Aligned Movement was divided, and that was the sentiment. And it wasn’t between the way it continued

the NPT or not, but do we support indefinite extension or a revolving extension? That's my first point. But, in response to Professor Spektor, it's a great question. In my own country at least, all the PrepCom work was the mandate of the Foreign Ministry, and that went up all the way up to the Foreign Minister.

Because you were reaching for such a wide-ranging decision, like an indefinite extension, that decision sort of kept hitting the Presidency. And President Mubarak in particular at one point made an announcement that, "I'm not going to sign on to an indefinite extension." Not everything is or should be reported to the Presidency especially if they are not serious consequential issues I suppose it's the same in the other countries,

Do we have new obligations? And what happens with our own geopolitical situation? These are important issues that deserve to be reported up. It wasn't an issue of whether the presidency was involved or not. They were, but in the macro sense.

MICHAL ONDERCO: Ambassador Minty, you had a comment on that?

ABDUL MINTY: No, I just wanted to say that you see all these preparation were there. You have to then make a judgment as to what actually happened, and it happened irrespective of these preparations, although there were groups. So what happened was the South African Proposal. That changed everything.

SVEN JURSCHEWSKY: Exactly.

MICHAEL WESTON: Absolutely.

ABDUL MINTY: Right?

SVEN JURSCHEWSKY: Exactly.

ABDUL MINTY: Now Michael, we were at the lunch with the Vice President. I was a South African representative, and there was a small table. There were about seven or so tables, but there we were together. You want to say what you said then?

MICHAEL WESTON: No, you tell me.

GROUP: [LAUGHTER]

ABDUL MINTY: I was quiet, sitting next to the US Ambassador and Vice President, and Michael said, after they discussed a few things, that “I think we can all go with the South African proposal.” I was just sitting there, and the response from some is, “No. If we go with the South African proposal then NAM will take it over, and it will destroy the Conference.”

MICHAL ONDERCO: So who gave that response?

ABDUL MINTY: I’m not prepared to talk about it because there are hundreds of things I cannot talk about because of the nature of our discussions at that time. So, when that had happened, the following day, I was with Thomas. We had a bilateral meeting with the US delegates.

THOMAS GRAHAM: That’s right.

ABDUL MINTY: The following day after the South African proposal.

THOMAS GRAHAM: I didn’t hear the first part of it.

ABDUL MINTY: No. The day after we made our proposal to the full meeting, the next day we had a bilateral.

THOMAS GRAHAM: Yes, yes, that’s right

ABDUL MINTY: Between the Vice President and his delegation and us, and I was with our Foreign Minister and our troop of officials who were all mainly from the South African Foreign Ministry. So, there we put in forward [our proposal], and the Vice President says, “We think we can go with your proposal.” So, there had been an overnight change in reflection as to whether one can go for it. In the meanwhile, Mexico called me [and] said, “Very good proposal. We have an identical one, but we didn’t want to put it forward at this stage,” and half-a-dozen other countries came with similar statements.

[They said,] “We have some proposals, but we wanted to wait for the Conference to proceed to see how it goes, and feel the atmosphere, in there and, after that, you know, we would go, ‘You guys just went the first day. How do you think this is possible?’” Our response was, that we, South Africa, had

decided on principle on this issue — we wanted global disarmament very quickly. We had decided that we would go for the high ground. If we lost, that's fine, but that is what we thought the situation needed with the end of the Cold War.

MICHAL ONDERCO: So there was —

ABDUL MINTY: So that's how it happened.

MICHAL ONDERCO: There was some mild disagreement on that point.

SVEN JURSCHEWSKY: We were happy that Alfred Nzo tabled the two documents right at the beginning because we had heard rumors of other proposals, which we found would have confused issues, would have made that — made it —

ABDUL MINTY: Another proposal from where?

SVEN JURSCHEWSKY: Beg your pardon?

ABDUL MINTY: Other proposals from South Africa?

SVEN JURSCHEWSKY: No, no, no, no. From other countries. But, the evening of Alfred Nzo tabling these two papers, we had an informal meeting with some people in the American delegation, and it was clear to me then that, yes, this was going to fly with the Americans, but as far as us having other ideas, no. That's not the case. At least not from my position, which was the person who is solely responsible for the extension decision. That was certainly not the case. You got it from somebody else, and they were talking not according to instructions.

ABDUL MINTY: [CROSS TALK]

SVEN JURSCHEWSKY: We were very, very pleased with how things worked.

ABDUL MINTY: People were shocked at South Africa's proposal and welcomed it. So, as a result, like things come [sic] out of the woodwork, a whole lot came out.

SVEN JURSCHEWSKY: Yes.

ABDUL MINTY: And some said, “We also had some ideas. We also had some ideas close to you. Can we partner with you?” And we said, “No. We don’t want partners as such” because we wanted to cover other issues as well, including the Middle East Conference, etc.

MICHAL ONDERCO: The Middle East decision, for example, doesn’t figure — and we’re going to talk about the other — it doesn’t figure [CROSS TALK].

SVEN JURSCHEWSKY: [CROSS TALK] much later.

ABDUL MINTY: We had decided earlier ourselves because of the threat of Israel.

SVEN JURSCHEWSKY: Yes.

ABDUL MINTY: Since South Africa has just come out as a new country with the old regime having collaborated a great deal with Israel on nuclear issues.

SVEN JURSCHEWSKY: Yes.

ABDUL MINTY: And the development of the South African bomb. So how can we not take that into account?

SVEN JURSCHEWSKY: Of course.

ABDUL MINTY: It is impossible.

MICHAL ONDERCO: Can I go to Ambassador Graham? Go ahead.

THOMAS GRAHAM: Well, I have several things I would like to comment on, but first, this most recent one, it was more than a bilateral. It was a joint “you will work together” meeting.

GROUP: [LAUGHTER]

ABDUL MINTY: You see, in that dynamic, after that, we went out and we found why was the information I was given before different from the meeting.

THOMAS GRAHAM: But we had — the US had completely accepted [CROSS TALK].

ABDUL MINTY: US at that meeting threw its 100% lot, and the Vice President said to — he appointed Susan.

THOMAS GRAHAM: Susan Burk.

ABDUL MINTY: Because the delegation was big, and Susan Burk would negotiate with me, since my Minister appointed me, and the two of us would make sure that the delegations worked together, and I think his words were, “If there is a problem, let me know. I want the wheels to be oiled, and I want to hear everything South Africa says.” That working together made a very big difference also when we approached other countries. We were not ashamed of working with the US, but some people had much to say that the US has this policy and that policy and so on.

We had meetings with Egypt ahead of the the conference. Among the first, I went with Minister Nzo to Cairo. No other official from South Africa went, okay? So there we had discussions, and Egypt was against the indefinite extension, and we continued those discussions later. We had the same with other non-aligned. Where Benin came from, I don’t know. I think some person in the French ministry just decided, and now everybody writes about it that, you know, that was a way to divide the NAM. You can’t divide with Benin.

GROUP: [LAUGHTER]

NABIL FAHMY: [CROSS TALK] I think what Ambassador Minty is saying is completely true. We differed with South Africa on the extension issue, but we were ready to work with them.

ABDUL MINTY: Yeah.

NABIL FAHMY: So we had a difficult situation with an extension, we don’t like this, but at the end of the day, (the NPT) is important, and we wanted to work with the South Africans and others on substance.

THOMAS GRAHAM: But, coming back, we certainly, of course, weren’t

unhappy about working with South Africa either because, very early on in our deliberations and preparing for the Conference, we concluded that South Africa would be the key state. I mean, that was very much what we wanted to do. And on the question of a vote versus consensus, like Canada, like Russia, we didn't care how it went. We were happy to win by one vote. That's what the Treaty said, majority vote, and we were prepared for that.

We were not against consensus, but we didn't give it a lot of thought until Dhanapala began to insist upon it, and then we tried to work with him to get consensus. But, in the early days, we weren't even sure if we could win a vote, and so our early efforts were aimed at persuading as many countries to be with us as possible so that we could win a vote, as I believe Grigory said Russia — that was Russia's view. And with respect to the NAM, our objective simply was to prevent a unified NAM position, which would have meant there was no way we could have won the vote if that had happened.

That was all that we tried to do with South Africa and with Benin. And as far as making foreign policy on their own, that was very much my concern too, and, from the time I first was given the assignment to lead US efforts on the subject, I determined I was going to go to capitals rather than talk to people at conferences exclusively, and I think that made it — at least my perception was that made a big difference because I could talk with the real decision-makers, and many countries were happy that I made the effort to come and talk with them.

And in terms of how interested the White House was and how interested President Clinton was, I mean, he was in favor of all of this. Nobody in the White House ever paid that much attention to what I did until about two months before the Conference. Susan Burk managed the inter-agency [process] for me, and we — the two of us prepared our own instructions. There was a big article in *The New York Times* in January of 1995 saying, "This big conference [is not far away]. The US isn't prepared." That was the first time the White House, reacting to that article, really became involved.

On Miguel Marin Bosch, we met with the Mexicans endlessly. I mean, endlessly, and I rather liked Marin Bosch myself, and he told me some very

funny stories, which I will tell off-the-record but not now, but I had a good relationship with him. To this day, I am not convinced that Mexico wanted to defeat indefinite extension. They wanted to be seen as doing their own thing, and the resolution that they introduced, they never intended to really push; they just put it out there. I mean, it terrified the White House; it was declared to be a clear and present danger to the United States, which it was not, of course. Their resolution was just them saying, “This is what we wanted.” It had some conditionality in it that we didn’t like, but it was never really a problem. And on the Middle East, my sense was that it was not surprising that the Foreign Minister’s concern was Israel and their unconstrained arsenal, and how could Egypt in good conscience go along with a treaty that prevented that so near to them? Then, of course, that long, long, long process began, involving everybody in the Middle East to try to find some...

MICHAL ONDERCO: Well —

THOMAS GRAHAM: ...some solution.

MICHAL ONDERCO: We’ll talk about the Middle East in a session in the afternoon. I would — have a long list of people who wanted to make remarks, so I would like to start with Prof. Müller

HARALD MÜLLER: Thank you, Michal. I want to bring in a slightly different perspective in the discussion on the preparation of the Conference, and that is both the German and the European, and the two are closely together.

On Germany, you know that, when we signed and ratified the Treaty, we gave a long declaration, which sounded almost as a list of reparations, and you also know that, in the European Union, which was a very young union at the time, and the NPT review process and extension process at the time was the first experimental test of the Common Foreign and Security Policy after the Maastricht Treaty, and it to force with a new instrument which it offered.

Well, to the intra-German thing. When Germany was deciding on its policy towards extension, there was a considerable controversy whether we should go for indefinite extension or not, and the controversy even raged within the

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Foreign Office, where we had two offices that did work on the NPT, one focusing on disarmament and one focusing on nonproliferation, and they got into a clash with the disarmament head opting against indefinite extension, and the nonproliferation head opting pro.

And, incidentally, they also belonged to different parties. And that reflected in many ways deep doubts on indefinite extension, which you can find in the Social Democratic Party on disarmament issues, in the Green party on disarmament issues, but also among the Conservatives, which, at the ratification date, made a certain deputies voting against ratification. That was ten years ago, but, anyway, some of the mood was still there. It took a long, hard discussion, and the decision at the highest level, at Foreign Minister and Chancellor level to make a German policy to work for indefinite extension.

From their discussion, there was a predilection that it should be a consensus decision. Otherwise, the opposing side might find new food for their own positions and also because the legal department at the Foreign Office had picked out, given the fact that Rule 28/3 was not agreed upon in the run-up to the Conference. That there might be legal doubts if a decision was taken by vote rather than without a vote. Now, in the European Union, as I said, it was the first time that the Maastricht Treaty and its instrument of Joint Action was really tested.

Belgium presidency had proposed to make extension the experimental field for joint — for the first Joint Action of the union as early as ‘93, and the attempt ran afoul because there were misgivings about the idea of indefinite extension without a plus. We had new members, Sweden and Austria. We had the old member, Ireland, all neutral countries and all with a stake in disarmament issue who were reluctant to go for indefinite extension without something plus. And again, the fear was that, if it came to a vote in the end, that European unity that was with great effort and great pain united behind indefinite extension might explode at the end of the Conference.

So the mood in Germany was we need indefinite extension, but we need a plus to make it palatable to our own domestic discussion and for the unity of

the Union, and we want to avoid a vote, and there was no idea how to get this. I inserted an idea which I had heard in one of the PPNN meetings at Chilworth Manor, where, in a late discussion at a bar, this idea of a plus was aired and one could hear ideas about—[with] a much more attentive focus [CROSS TALK]...

SVEN JURSCHEWSKY: [CROSS TALK]

HARALD MÜLLER: ...and about standards, yardsticks, which could be added to an extension, and I conveyed these ideas to our Foreign Office, but, at the time, the reaction was 'interesting', and then it was dropped. When Foreign Minister Nzo gave his speech in the general debate, it electrified the delegation leadership because they believed 'here is something by which we can solve our problem.' To get a plus, which is not conditional, and to avoid a vote, and from that moment on, the German delegation leadership interested in working on it.

MICHAL ONDERCO: We're going to talk about it in the next session, but we still have a few people who —

THOMAS GRAHAM: Quick question.

MICHAL ONDERCO: We have — we are going to talk about these things at the Conference, in the next session, but Ambassador Berdennikov.

GRIGORY BERDENNIKOV: Well, answering on the question from Dr. Spektor, the Russian position on the Review and Extension Conference was in favor of indefinite extension. That was a position not only from — well, and mainly from the Foreign Ministry, but it was agreed that it was a major player in this setting: meaning the defense, the atomic industry, and some others. So we were on a very solid basis when we came to New York, and we were very glad to see that the United States, Britain, and France were also with us on the indefinite extension.

China was a little bit equivocal on this issue. It never pronounced against indefinite extension but was always, well, underlying the smooth Conference. A smooth Conference [CROSS TALK]...

THOMAS GRAHAM: Whatever that was.

GRIGORY BERDENNIKOV: What was meant behind the — well, you better ask them. But our — well, there was a possibility, of course, that it wouldn't be possible to achieve this goal of indefinite extension. We were only allowed to bring to the attention of the center ideas on what to do next if the indefinite extension was not possible at all. But it never came to that. After the Canadian proposal, it was all done.

MICHAL ONDERCO: Bill.

BILL POTTER: Yes, thank you. It's really fascinating, and as an American but as one who observed the process from the vantage point of a very small country in Central Asia. I mean, the discussion here as — is as if there were a handful of friends of the President who were making all of these decisions, but there were a lot of other countries in the game. Most of them had no idea what was going on in the Presidential Consultations, but also, I think interestingly, and I think I speak for many countries, the main concern for them at the Review and Extension Conference was not whether the Conference was going to be extended indefinitely, whether there was going to be an extension of 25 years.

They were actually interested in the substance of the review process, what was going on in the main committees. That's what occupied them, and mainly that was a diversion. Let them focus on, you know, issues that either, you know, Jaap or Erdos were discussing, but they were indeed invested for their own national purposes in the focal points of those main committees, and I think that's important to recall. My recollection, having been at a meeting I think at the very beginning, maybe even the day before the actual Review Conference began, was that there was never any resolution to how the voting would take place, even if there were a vote. As a consequence it was not a given that notwithstanding the list of names that Tariq and maybe others had collected, that, if it was a secret ballot that you could actually count on those countries who had made their pledges.

So I don't think it was as sure a bet about what the outcome would be

from a vote, if a vote, in fact, had to transpire. But I would hope that we also, you know, pay a little bit of attention to some of the other parties who made part of the blocks. Perhaps they could have been delivered, but I'm not also as certain that this was as much in the bag as, maybe the EU was an exception but, for some of the other countries in the room.

MICHAL ONDERCO: Ambassador Ramaker.

JAAP RAMAKER: Yes, well, I asked for the floor maybe some time ago, but and in the meantime the discussion went on, and so let me put a couple of things together. First, Michael said on that the efforts we — many of us put in to bring also the small countries into New York to participate in the Conference. Then, adding to what Tom said on the importance of what the Americans did, visiting the capitals, and, of course, the central issue of the first day when Foreign Minister Nzo took the floor and set the tone for the entire Conference, and I think that, as far as I understand, we have learned to understand the mechanisms in New York when it comes to the delegates there, the ambassadors there. A great many, more than we think, are completely, as was mentioned, on their own without any instructions. So, for instance, and those have been brought in. These Ambassadors were playing it by ear, and yes, you could go as the United States to their capitals, but the result would not filter through to New York, and it seems to me that maybe Abdul could confirm that. Or, it seemed to me that, when you came forward with a number of constructive, reasonable ideas, that certainly many of the African countries, Sub-Saharan African countries would take those ideas as a clue. And that, by doing so, that already you've brought, in very general terms, a great number of them into your sphere of influence. And, after all, the African group in New York is the most numerous of the regional groups.

There's no other group with so many members as the African group. . So, from that point of view too, which I missed in the discussion, already, the South African initiative, I think, was very important.

MICHAL ONDERCO: We're going to talk a little more about the South African move in the second half, but, before we go there, I still want to still say

“These Ambassadors were playing it by ear, and yes, you could go as the United States to their capitals, but the result would not filter through to New York.”

before the — what happened before the Conference. Professor Holloway.

DAVID HOLLOWAY: Yes. Thank you. I have a — perhaps another general question, and maybe a little bit running counter to Bill Potter’s question about the people who were disregarded, and it arises out of the conversation we’ve had so far. How was the calculation made about who was going to be important at the Conference, and how early on? And was there a kind of consensus? Maybe it was just obvious, for example, that South Africa would play an important role. Ambassador Graham mentioned that, you know, the US said — understood early on that South Africa would be important.

And so, how are those — did the various countries that you represented have a kind of similar map of the distribution of power and influence in the world that would really shape the outcome, or was that more uncertain? Was there more learning that went on about who would actually play a key role?

MICHAL ONDERCO: Ambassador Berdennikov.

GRIGORY BERDENNIKOV: Well, we also did some reconnaissance of the lobby, before the conference, of course. We went to capitals, but this game is not very, you know, informative, because in many countries, when you come and mention NPT they say, “What?”

GROUP: [LAUGHTER]

GRIGORY BERDENNIKOV: And you have to explain the whole history, and, well, the usual answer is, “Well, thank you very much. We’ll consider what you said and we will report to the upper echelon.” But, after talking to people in New York, at least to the Russian delegation, it became obvious that, if we really want an indefinite extension, we have to make a serious push for it, in action — not in just words. Then we would have a very good chance to have a majority. And we thought it was worth taking a chance and pushing for it because without it, it was clear that the indefinite extension would be considered by many as an extreme solution, and people would tend to go to the middle ground, i.e. for something less than indefinite extension, and that would run against our instructions, after all, so [CROSS TALK] —

MICHAL ONDERCO: So let's stay on this question of distribution of power. [INAUDIBLE]

THOMAS GRAHAM: I can briefly mention the thinking that we went through. South Africa was going to be crucial because of President Mandela, because they had given up weapons, and because it had a good relationship with the NAM leadership. The P5 were important, for obvious reasons, but China never joined in, never even took a position. Germany and Japan are activist, vigorous states interested in the subject, so they were going to be important. Australia was very interested and very energetic and was going to play an important role in the process, which they did. Also, Colombia was important, the next NAM Chair.

Indonesia was important, the then current NAM Chair. Egypt was important because of its role and its region and also its longtime commitment to disarmament, and Mexico was important given its longtime commitment to disarmament. So I tried to go to all those capitals. All those states did play an important role, all — every one of 'em.

MICHAL ONDERCO: Minister Fahmy.

NABIL FAHMY: Sure. Just to confirm the point, I think even though you may find some states operating at the level of the head of delegation rather loosely, but whether it is, for example, the Permanent Members or countries like my own, going into any conference, including the NPT, we can — and we do, put up a list of 20, 30 influential countries who traditionally have been important in these issues, as well as who happen to have the head of the EU or the AU or whatever Non-Aligned Movement. So you can target in a considered fashion who you think you will be influential, and most of them will be influential. There may be a couple of others.

So it's not really a completely loose game. The other point I'd like to make is: we appreciate it very much countries that send their representatives to Cairo to discuss with our high officials, but, if you want it go all the way to the President and talk to him about the Prep Committee, he wasn't going to focus with you. If you talk to him about the issue of extension alone, he probably

would pay attention, but you also have to stop by the Foreign Ministries, not the Head of State to talk about [sic], who is going to be the head of the first Prep Committee.

That — it's not a President's interest. It isn't a lack of interest in national security, but it is, frankly — you try to raise your concerns because they're your institutional, not presidential, concerns, way beyond what is logical.

MICHAL ONDERCO: Okay. Mr. Jurschewsky.

SVEN JURSCHEWSKY: In terms of influence, for us, it was obvious the P5 were going to be very influential, some of the Europeans, but, in terms of the outcome of the Conference, for us, the NAM was critical. That was the most important thing, and, whether the NAM would be divided or whether it would be unified, that was, for us, critical, and that was another reason for us to see South Africa in the positive light that we did, very positive light. You had a good Foreign Service. You had terrific officers working the file. You'd given up your nuclear weapons. You had good cred, street cred, on the issue.

That made it very, very important for us, and in terms of that, you were also a member of NAM and the kind of role that you would play in Bandung, and we considered right from the beginning that meeting in Bandung would be critical to the outcome of the Conference. I remember sending telegrams of instruction to [UNCLEAR], “Goddamn it, get somebody in the room. I know it's illegal. I know you're not supposed to do it. Do it,” and then getting on the phone and shouting even louder. That, for us, was critical, that Bandung meeting in terms of the outcome of the Conference. On China, I agree that China didn't play a big role.

I — as it happens, throughout the conference, from the very strong relationship with Sha Zukang, which stood me — and largely because my wife is African. Sha really liked that for some reason, and more from smoking in the hallway to, “Boy, your wife is really nice,” and those type of things. In discussions with him, very informal discussions, it was clear to me that his diffidence was all about the testing question. China had not completed its program of testing, and he wanted to have room to do that. For him, that was critical, and

that made the rest of — and that conditioned the rest of his position and — in negotiations and in discussions, was — the question of testing was central.

Lastly, in terms of how we've pictured the Conference—a conference is a psychological event, and we wanted to accomplish creating a certain psychological momentum, and that is, in fact, what Alfred Nzo succeeded in doing. Once he tabled that — and remember I said earlier the endgame right at the beginning — for us, in a sense, apart from the meeting in Bandung, the conference was over. We knew we were going to have a good result because the psychology had been created. The only thing that could have damaged it — and I didn't think of it at the time but only afterwards because I'm far from being a Middle East expert — was the Middle East resolution. That became, at the end, a critical moment.

But, in larger terms, I thought from the beginning, from that — the first week that the psychological momentum for which the South African delegation provided deserves full, full marks.

MICHAL ONDERCO: There is a lot of discussion about this South African proposal and the momentum that it brought into the Conference, and I think that's a good point to start our discussion after the break, so I would propose that we break for 15 minutes and then continue on the discussion.

MICHAEL WESTON: May I just say one thing about...

MICHAL ONDERCO: Sure.

MICHAEL WESTON: ...the lead-up, because I think, as far as the UK was concerned, our view was that, indeed, as everyone has said, the NAM position was crucial, but our ambition was rather less than perhaps some others. Our ambition was to ensure that there was no consensus in the NAM, and it was a rather negative view, but that — and that was what we really were concentrating on beforehand. Then, of course, South Africa came and took us forward, but, beforehand, our determination was to see that we spoiled any consensus in the NAM. Divide and rule, I think is —

GROUP: [LAUGHTER][CROSS TALK][LAUGHTER]

“a conference is a psychological event, and we wanted to accomplish creating a certain psychological momentum, and that is, in fact, what Alfred Nzo succeeded in doing”

GRIGORY BERDENNIKOV: For a good cause...

JAAP RAMAKER: The point that Michael is making is very important. In the NAM, prior to the Conference — and I returned to the CD in Geneva and the First Committee in New York in I had a particular problem with the Non-Aligned. There were a couple of radical countries in that group that set the tone, and all the others, the reasonable ones, followed. And you could not allow that to happen in this particular conference. So what you had to do, you had to sort of neutralize those radical countries, isolate them from the moderates. This was my experience in New York when the transparency in armament draft resolution came under attack from the radical non-aligned. My experience was that if you talk individually to the great majority of NAM, they were perfectly reasonable and perfectly common sense so that you could loosen them from the radicals. The result was that there was no NAM position on the issue. Otherwise, you would have had a maximalist NAM position based on the radicalist objectives in that group.

NABIL FAHMY: Can I [INAUDIBLE] point?

THOMAS GRAHAM: But somebody —

NABIL FAHMY: The supposed “radical” members of NAM we’re not against the extension of the Treaty.

MICHAL ONDERCO: Come again?

THOMAS GRAHAM: Sorry, say again?

GROUP: [CROSS TALK]

NABIL FAHMY: They’re both described as radical, and, again, quote, unquote, none of them were against the extension of the Treaty, but they were against the indefinite extension.

THOMAS GRAHAM: So? It doesn’t make them right.

GROUP: [LAUGHTER]

JAAP RAMAKER: Sorry, but, I mean, that was [INAUDIBLE] disarm-

ment and nonproliferation and arms control there was [CROSS TALK].

NABIL FAHMY: They wanted more. All of them wanted more. None of them wanted less.

GROUP: [CROSS TALK]

THOMAS GRAHAM: Somebody at that Bandung Conference — no matter how reasonable certain states might have been, once the leadership in the NAM determines what the position is, everybody follows it, and somebody had to stand up and object, and somebody did, and so NAM...

GROUP: [CROSS TALK]

MICHAL ONDERCO: We have — so we have the last remark by Joe, who is going to chair the next session, and then we go for a coffee break.

JOSEPH PILAT: Yeah, I just wanted to close in on the mood. I think that this has been an extraordinary discussion of the mood leading into the Conference, but I think we may not have given sufficient attention to some external developments like the end of the Cold War, the flourishing of arms control that was occurring at the time, the positive developments in the former Soviet Union, especially Ukraine and its move, as well as efforts that had begun already to strengthen the IAEA. In addition to the mood that existed, there was a strong effort to influence the mood as it was going on.

First, through efforts to get new states into the Treaty, and this was, I think, an extraordinary diplomatic effort that took Tom and others to places he's never been before. And it was, I think, very important in the ultimate endgame. Secondly, the move of the venue from Geneva to New York was a calculated move to undermine the influence of the CD ambassadors in the process, and, as well, to make it a — to broaden the participation.

MICHAEL WESTON: Yes. Yes.

MICHAL ONDERCO: I think those are very good points, and we can sort of start working off them in the next session, so let's have a 15 minutes break, and let's start at 20 to 12:00 with the next session. Thank you.

SESSION II

HURDLES FOR THE AGREEMENT

MICHAL ONDERCO: Do we have a hammer? Can we continue with the next session? And the next session is going to be chaired by Dr. Pilat, and so I give him the floor.

JOSEPH PILAT: Thank you. I had mentioned in my last intervention that, in many ways, some of the external developments in the preceding five years to the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference were very positive in terms of the historical debate on the issues of the Treaty, and efforts were being made to change the environment in ways that were optimal to getting a positive solution at the Review and Extension Conference. However, I think that many were concerned — most were concerned about the prospects of achieving indefinite extension, and maybe even some had worse concerns about the future of the Treaty at that time.

Why is that? I think what this session is designed to do is to look at this series of hurdles and issues that had to be faced in 1995 and in the lead-up of — I will just raise a few issues and then open it for discussion. Before we get to specific issues at the Conference, I think one of the things that people were thinking about was the fact that states that had been leery about the NPT when it was concluded might view indefinite extension as an issue for them. I think Harald's remarks about Germany and the debate in Germany are germane here. I think that there were other states that had similar debates. I think you could even find people in the US government agencies that argued whether or not we should adopt an indefinite extension decision.

Related, would indefinite extension be opposed by key rising states in the

NAM for the reasons that Germany and Japan, Italy, and others were concerned in the '70s about the initial treaty? Would the issues that had divided the parties over the history of the Treaty from '70 to '95 be seen as sufficiently addressed to allow the parties to think that they should be proactive about finalizing the Treaty for an indefinite period?

Question of where the disarmament successes that occurred, particularly between '90 and '95, sufficient to make states feel that, if they have to give up leverage with indefinite extension, that it would be worth it. And what about new challenges of nonproliferation, particularly those in Iraq and North Korea at the time?

How did all these issues play into assessments about the prospects for the Conference and how they had to be dealt with? Yes.

NABIL FAHMY: Well, let me — and I'll be very concise, but take you from the macro to the micro. Our reading of the Treaty is that if you — if we really care for it, it's supposed to lead to general disarmament, so, intellectually, you cannot have it indefinitely extended. It's supposed to reach a conclusion, and then you have another situation which you have to legalize, but that's sort of the — if you want the idealistic academic situation, that was one issues which we discussed, but we didn't stop at that, frankly, for very long. Secondly, the second issue really was — has there been enough done in terms of the obligations of the nuclear states, have they done enough to implement their obligations there?

And then there was another issue — how best was it for a non-nuclear state to use the NPT to help encourage these states to do more? That was another issue. Certainly, and this is, frankly, where we became even more negative, and when I say negative, I have to be careful here. I don't think there was any chance whatsoever that the NPT would not be extended. The issue was how long and in what context?

So — but that, I'm talking here about the length of extension. Our problem with the indefinite extension. It created an indefinite asymmetry in obligations in our region and that was a problem for us. How can we indefinitely

accept that this asymmetry exists? So, that was really the third problem we had, but, for us, we went into the conference assuming that there was going to be an extension, and we would try to do as much as we could to make sure that it responded to the concerns of as many members as possible because countries joined the treaties to achieve a national security objective.

JOSEPH PILAT: Any comments?

OR RABINOWITZ: Or refrain from joining treaties.

NABIL FAHMY: But they didn't have a voice there then.

THOMAS GRAHAM: I'll say a couple of points, somewhat a bit repeating what I said before, but we did not — by the time of the Conference itself, we went there with the idea that there would be an extension, but it probably would be by vote. But, prior to that, we were not sure that we could win the vote, and that was because we saw the — it was our view that there was a reasonable possibility that the NAM would come to a unified position or something that — I don't know what we would have done in the end, but our position was that we would never vote for anything other than indefinite extension.

We wouldn't vote for a lesser outcome, but then, at the last minute, would we have changed our position? Who knows? But our thinking was that we would go for a vote for indefinite extension, and it might fail, if some other provision prevailed, and, if it had a majority, then that would be it. [INAUDIBLE]. The review process was a complete failure as far as disarmament was concerned in the — '68 the non-nuclear weapon states wanted interim steps like test ban and so forth, and a few of them in the Treaty itself, and the US and the Soviet Union said no to that.

We were the co-chairmen, and we both promised that they (the interim steps) would be addressed in the Review Conferences, the Review Conference process. They never were, really. I mean, they (these issues) certainly were engaged, but the US and Soviet Union, and I think Britain as well, as I recall, refused to move on the interim steps. And so at the Review Conferences before, before the indefinite extension at the Review and Extension Conference, two

Review Conferences completely failed over the CTBT, and, at the other two, this issue was essentially papered over, so that's not my definition of progress.

In the strategic area, yes, there were — was progress, with SALT and START. The START, I guess, a bit more, but, still, a substantial stockpile of weapons remained. SALT simply capped it where it was and started going a bit down lower, but I could see how the NAM might not think that was sufficient. We thought it was the best we could do.

JOSEPH PILAT: They were the so-called Presidential Nuclear Initiatives that dropped tactical weapons down significantly in 1991 —

THOMAS GRAHAM: The Gorbachev-Bush understandings [CROSS TALK] —

JOSEPH PILAT: The Bush/Gorbachev, yes.

THOMAS GRAHAM: Yes. There was that. Yes. That was important. I'm not sure how impressed the NAM was with that, but we thought it was very important, and I think Russia and others did, but, you know, it's something that could be reversed, and so, I don't know, but I — certainly I think they were important.

GRIGORY BERDENNIKOV: Well, on the goal of the general and complete disarmament and on the indefinite extension, we had the same position. On the achievements, quote unquote, we had a little bit different view. We thought that the fact that we started in earnest the CTBT negotiations and that everyone knew that this is serious, by '95 they knew it was serious, was a big plus, especially compared to Reagan years when the CTBT was a complete No for the United States. Then on the strategic side, we also had not only START 1 but START 2, though it was not ratified by then, but at least our common public position was in favor of that and so forth.

So the situation we thought was not as desperate as in the previous period of the '80s, but with some leverage on the — on some non-aligned countries. I think our assessment was right. It was possible to prevent the monolith on the side of the non-aligned.

THOMAS GRAHAM: Well, on the test ban, it was a very close thing in the US to actually go for it in '94. There was a law passed in '92 which required that — which allowed five tests a year for three years, and, after that, the US was required to pursue a test ban, and so the question before Clinton was — when he came in, “Do — does the United States do those 15 tests, five a year for three years?” And, initially, I was the — that year was '93 — I was the ACDA Acting Director. Initially, I was the only person on the Deputies' Committee, and then, subsequently, on the National Security Council that favored not doing the tests.

The Secretary of Energy and the White House Science Advisor came around, and, by the time of the second meeting on this at the National Security Council, the three of us were in favor of not doing the tests. The Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense were not in favor — they wanted to do the tests, and General Powell sort of — what he said was, “Well, I'm a military man, and I want the best weapons possible, but whether we test is up to the Secretary of Energy. If she says we don't need it, then maybe we don't.”

So he kind of took a position in the middle. It went to Clinton with a split decision, and he consulted with a couple of very significant senators, like Senator Nunn, and decided that he could get away with not doing the tests. And there was no reason to do the tests because three of them were for improvements on bomber weapons that the Defense Department didn't want. They just wanted to do tests. They didn't want the — these improvements because the nuclear weapons had been taken off the bombers as a result of the Presidential [Nuclear] Initiatives, and then the other two were — one was for confidence and the other — the fifth was for the British, and so we decided that —

I mean, the outcome was that we wouldn't do the tests, I mentioned that brief subsequent flurry with the Chinese. That might have might have overthrown the decision, but it didn't. But it was very close. It was 3-3 on the National Security Council.

GRIGORY BERDENNIKOV: Well, but nobody knew about this score in the wider world.

“The Secretary of Energy and the White House Science Advisor came around, and, by the time of the second meeting on this at the National Security Council, the three of us were in favor of not doing the tests. “

MICHAEL WESTON: As Tom said, one of the tests was for the British. Indeed, I think it was on site ready to go. We were thoroughly unhappy when we were told we weren't going to be able to test, but, having accepted reality, we certainly thought that, on the basis of the CTBT negotiation, and certainly when the date went in, we thought that that was as much as one — as the non-nuclear weapon states could expect in the way of progress towards — on reduction. And, of course, the UK — and since Gerard is not here, I think I can say on his behalf — and France too, we were relatively comfortable in as much as the number of our weapons, so small by comparison with the Russians and the Americans, that we were not worried about it in the foreseeable future, and the line that, when they reduced their thousands to hundreds, we'll begin to think about reducing our hundreds to tens, with a line that we were perfectly happy with, quite frankly.

GROUP: [LAUGHTER]

MICHAEL WESTON: And so — [LAUGHS] but —

THOMAS GRAHAM: The Chinese Ambassador had said in response to a question, I think you were present, Michael. I think we had a P5 meeting somewhere, in Geneva I believe, and Gerard said to the Chinese Ambassador, he said, “Well, now, you know, aren't you prepared to reduce? Because we have the START treaty, and it's bringing that — going to bring the levels down by 50%, which you always said was your objective for you to actually participate in disarmament.” And he said, “Oh, did we say that? I don't remember when we said that.”

GROUP: [LAUGHTER]

THOMAS GRAHAM: “We couldn't have said that.” China was not easy to deal with. [CROSS TALK]

GRIGORY BERDENNIKOV: Well, at the same time, Chinese were very keen to support the non-aligned...

MICHAEL WESTON: Yeah.

THOMAS GRAHAM: Yeah.

GRIGORY BERDENNIKOV: ...timetable on...

THOMAS GRAHAM: Yeah.

MICHAEL WESTON: Yeah.

GRIGORY BERDENNIKOV: ... disarmament, so —

THOMAS GRAHAM: That's right. You know, and, another thing, Gerard asked the Chinese Ambassador, "Are you for indefinite extension?" And he said, "Indefinite? It's a very good word, but we don't have it in Chinese."

GROUP: [LAUGHTER]

LEOPOLDO NUTI: I sort of ask this question to Ambassador Fahmy during our break, but I would like to bring it back and ask you if you could please be a little bit more specific about what the discussion in the NAM group was about before the Conference. I mean, what kind of goals were being discussed other than indefinite extension? I mean, were there — was there any specific disagreement about which objectives could or could not be achieved and if this was the case what was being discussed?

NABIL FAHMY: Well, again, my focus at the time, with the different hats I had, was on the decision to extend, and, if so, for how long and what [INAUDIBLE], but, when I mentioned disagreement in the NAM, the disagreement — and, I agree with Ambassador Minty who could probably complement this much more, the disagreement was more on the extension than on how much disarmament we could get. I mean, we could all ask for more than our NAM colleague on our left or on our right, but, at the end of the day, the deliverance would come from the permanent member states, so it wasn't an argument that we were going to split on.

It was much more on, okay, how do we leave this — it was a tactic to the extension, so — but I'll leave Abdul if you want to comment on that.

JOSEPH PILAT: Abdul.

ABDUL MINTY: Well, I just wanted to share my experience with the NAM and also our interaction, particularly with Western countries in terms of the NAM. And I think the perception often was that it's a very unthinking almost monster because it can become negative and destructive. So there was also an element of fear — that it takes on decisions that are unsustainable, that it can't work, and so on. So the greatest problem was how little the West knew about the NAM because, they considered this largest group in the world as always acting as a block.

Now, the basic thing about the NAM, which ran right through our veins, was that the NPT was a discriminatory treaty. It's not our treaty. We are discriminated against. It is that of the Five. So we would have quarrels all the time until that situation was somehow resolved. Everyone misses this, even in this discussion. No one mentioned it once. It's the only treaty that's discriminatory, and, at the same time, we want a world with a rules-based global system. So we were often taken as voting fodder into conferences. We have to agree to positions. We often agree to positions, and, when we've hardly left the Conference, some or all the big powers walk away from it. We have had this when we have hosted several such conferences in South Africa after we became free, and that's an experience, especially regarding the World Conference against Racism.

Everybody agreed on the final document, and then a Minister from a particular big country goes up and says, "We don't agree" — so most ask "You can't be really against racism." Now, these perceptions are fundamental. You cannot escape it because those people perceive it as an insult to their dignity — and it's very deep. So we had to work around these issues in order to get [some results].

A number of countries had meetings with us about the NPT, and there was one very important one of the South, who said: "We want to join your proposal, be partners, because you guys have been isolated for so long, and you probably don't know how to work within the UN context. You know, South Africa was excluded."

And those officials who were from the government side — now, remember, and this is often forgotten, they had only worked mainly with the West.

Not one of the former disarmament or other officials in the Foreign Ministry went to Moscow or engaged meaningfully with a Non-Aligned or African country. They had been enemies. How could they do that? But we had another group, which is the ANC. We also had something rather unusual set up for a different purpose, which I had the responsibility to run in Oslo, which was the World Campaign against Military and Nuclear Collaboration with South Africa, and the main sponsors were the Presidents of the Frontline States, then Willy Brandt, Olaf Palme, Coretta Scott King, and a number of other personalities. We also discussed the NPT in that context, not in a formal way, but when I met them. Another area that's neglected is the Commonwealth Summits. I went to all of them from 1960 to 1994, save one. There, Heads of States would talk directly to each other and to African and other leaders to try and get support for particular issues, and those Heads of States responded — and this is how President Nyerere became a very good advocate of countries of the South in that discussions.

No one writes about it or talks about it, but that happens at the retreat, the two-day retreat of Commonwealth Heads where only the Heads are present. So there's a lot of experience in terms of actual discussions and lobbying for particular positions.

Now, when we saw some of those countries, and they said they knew more than us and some of our colleagues said, "Oh, yes, we want your help because we don't know much because of isolation," I had to respond and say, "No. I've come to the UN from 1960 onwards. We prepared the declaration that apartheid was a crime against humanity in the UN. We achieved a whole lot of decisions in the UN. We got South Africa excluded all over the place, and that could not be done by a group that doesn't know much."

So we think we can deal with this issue ourselves, and, secondly, we were very humble. We said, "It is our idea," and Minister Nzo had said, "Please let others add some more ideas to it," and that is what we had said in Bandung to the NAM. We are not absolutely ready to this. The Conference must decide, but we think this is a path forward, so people agreed with that. So, later on, we

had to try and get this grouping to work together and remember that, as early as 1962, the Africans, at Heads of States level, decided to make the continent a nuclear-weapon-free zone. And they knew South Africa, inside the NPT, would not do so for a long time and all that, so that was the country identified early on as a country not saying it had nuclear weapons at the time but that it would never support this.

But the African side was that they didn't want French tests in Africa, as they were going on at that time, and others, so they took a very strong continental position. So they also worked very closely with the South African Liberation Movement, which attended these meetings. So a lot of these things are somehow not fully understood, and I think the fact that we treated the NPT as a discriminatory treaty and there was still work to be done to make it a true global arrangement also influenced all that.

So you had the NAM accused of taking, if you wish, an automatic reaction, a knee-jerk reaction on many issues, but it had to do with this. And, finally, it's true that there has not been much improvement on disarmament, and that's a main complaint of the NAM at every meeting. Disarmament is underplayed. Thus, the Western countries would say, "Because we haven't moved on that, you are not taking a strong position on nonproliferation." So in one of the NPT preparatory meetings in Geneva some years ago, a Western country said this again, and I asked "Since we're supposed to have a dialogue, please tell me which NAM country is not doing enough on nonproliferation?" There was no response.

I just want to conclude on this. We are the only country out of 40 involved in the Khan network to have prosecuted and secured a conviction. I went to the IAEA Board and gave them the full report of the court case.

We invited the 40 countries, "Please, will you do so?" Not one. Now, I have actually seen items sold by Western countries to some of the non-aligned countries, or to one, where we have refused it and they took me to a place and said, "You don't sell us this, but look what we got from this country." Now, all this affects the way you look at the NPT and everything else because its double

standards are really horrendous in that way, so to get commitment even on the — look at the Khan network. President Bush called my President, “Please act.” I was put in charge. We worked on it. We secured a conviction. He phoned back to congratulate us. Say, “You know, thank you very much. You’re the only one, even my allies are not helping me very much,” and so — we confiscated the documents, by the way, when we got there. So we know what went on with the other countries. All right? I don’t think it’ll help anyone for me to mention it. I’m not going to blame you, but I’m saying that we need to look at the truth, and other people know it, and the public know it.

In order to get confidence and trust from others, one really has to address these issues in some way. We will partner with anyone to discuss matters openly, but it is for the Conference to take the final decisions. We were working for a consensus outcome but were also open to the last minute to see if anyone else had any other ideas. We asked everyone to put them forward. I’m sorry, but I thought I had to say this just to convey the context of countries in the South and to promote better understanding.

JOSEPH PILAT: No, but I’m glad you did, and we’ll come back to it. First, Matias, and then Weston.

MATIAS SPEKTOR: I just a follow-up question, Ambassador, to your point. I was wondering whether you got specific pushback from developing countries. At the time, a lot of talking developing capitals was that the Mandela administration was doing the job on behalf of the Americans, that the Clinton administration had pushed Mandela very seriously to move forward and to separate from the NAM and thereby create the division that would allow for a positive result, understand, from the point of view of the P5.

I was wondering to what degree you got pushback. Did you realize that there was pushback going on, and how did you deal with it at the time?

ABDUL MINTY: Well, just a little background. You see, the fact that *we* were in favor of South Africa giving up its nuclear weapons was the biggest test in a sense because many on the continent and elsewhere said, “Why do you want to agree with the apartheid regime?” We had always been against the

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nuclear weapons of South Africa. We had campaigned all over the world for it, so when the apartheid regime did for its own motivations. That’s difficult to accept for my colleagues in the Foreign Ministry, who were working at the time, or they say there were no own motivations, but the motivation was very clearly with them and many Western countries that Mandela should not have the bomb.

Many were stating that he would give it to Gadhafi, give it to Fidel, or who else? That I heard from some. People told me this also. They said these things quite openly. So, when we could think of global peace and were prepared to swallow this, why should we be afraid to be working with the United States.. So, when the United States in that meeting said to us, “We would like to work with you, we were open to that. Everybody knew about it. The African countries knew about it as well as the NAM. If you say we were pushed — and I don’t know in what way we were pushed -

MATIAS SPEKTOR: Yeah, I mean resistance on the part of other developing countries accusing South Africa...

ABDUL MINTY: No.

MATIAS SPEKTOR: ...of breaking the ranks of the NAM.

ABDUL MINTY: No, no. We did not break the ranks of the NAM. At the NAM summit in Bandung, we said, “We’ve made a proposal in New York. You don’t have to agree to it. You can put your own proposals. We don’t even know if the NPT will accept it, but it’s our humble proposal from one country.” That’s all. We didn’t ask for a NAM position. Our Foreign Minister and our Ambassador to the UN went to Bandung, and this is what they said. That’s why Bandung took to a decision besides what the NAM Secretariat had prepared before — a limited timetable. So we had potential with them. In the end, we also said to them, when we met with them in New York, “If you think that the other things that we’ve got, you know, Principles and Objectives, all that, that this creates a whole package, support it; but, if you have any other ideas, please feel free to bring them forward.”

And so the relationship was very good. There was no hostility. No one told us that you have bent to the United States at that time. I mean, maybe they thought it, but they didn't say so. But the point about it is that we were never afraid of being associated with any country with whom we were working together on a policy we agreed on. So that was how we were able to [CROSS TALK].

BILL POTTER: So I can [CROSS TALK]...

JOSEPH PILAT: We'll come back.

BILL POTTER: ...this precise point here?

JOSEPH PILAT: Yes, go ahead, Bill.

BILL POTTER: So we were talking about the NAM as if it doesn't include India at this moment in time, and so I would be curious, particularly given your close relationship, you know, with India and the role that it played in the anti-apartheid movement. It may be the case that there were no concerns about how the NAM parties to the NPT would respond, but it seems to me that India is a — kind of another elephant in the room, and I'm kind of curious about the degree to which they may have weighed in with other NAM countries on this whole issue of the indefinite extension because they certainly weighed in, in some respects, with Dhanapala. This is my understanding, in any case, so I'd be curious about the role that India played in this timeframe [INAUDIBLE].

ABDUL MINTY: See, the key issue is that, on the eve of the New York meeting, we took our decision. So there was no time between that and the actual statement of Minister Nzo to discuss with very many people and so on, but, in preparations, we did go to certain countries, Egypt and a number of other countries, to discuss with them the general issue without a commitment. Egypt, the first one, we said to, "We are thinking of an indefinite extension." We didn't even say we are going to do it, and Egypt had some objections and gave us very good reasons.

We went back with Minister Nzo and rethought it all out to see how we

can do it, so we brought in these other issues to make it more acceptable to the rest of the international community. Then we worked for our package. India did not engage. So remember, India's history with us is a bit different because we had the largest population of Indian origin in South Africa, so we had long relations with them, and Mr. Gandhi did propose a method of reducing the nuclear threat, and he took the plan to the UN, but most of the countries rejected it, and then, as soon as he lost the election, they had the test. They have made efforts on trying to get rid of nuclear weapons at that time and wanted an international agreement at the time.

So I think that there are lots of problems in terms of why we've had proliferation because, if you do not get support from the five main countries and they do not play their part, as many of the non-aligned see it, then you are likely to proliferate, and that is what we kept saying. We said it even at the NPT review meeting.

JOSEPH PILAT: Okay, I have a direct intervention from Michal, and then I have a list that includes Sven and Gregory.

MICHAL ONDERCO: I just want to come back to the point because you said that the decision was made on the night before [CROSS TALK].

ABDUL MINTY: No, no, not on the night, on the eve.

MICHAEL WESTON: On the eve [CROSS TALK].

ABDUL MINTY: [CROSS TALK]

MICHAEL WESTON: Okay, okay.

GROUP: [LAUGHTER]

MICHAEL WESTON: Anyway, you suggested — you said on the eve of it there was decision-made, there was no time for wider consultations, but, from the archival documents, we know that that decision was made on the 1st or 2nd of April, which was sort of two weeks and a bit before the Conference, and, on the 3rd of April, a letter was sent to the Americans that contained broad outlines of what later would become the Principles and Objectives, and,

in that meeting, you were nominated as the person who would act as an emissary of the government to go and talk to other governments, so you did have at least two weeks to go and talk to these people.

ABDUL MINTY: I don't know where the documents come from. I have not seen them. We had a — if you wish, a government that was an enemy to us until then. We had a meeting to discuss what to do, and there were officials there. They took notes. I've not seen them, they never showed them to me so far. So I was not an emissary only then. I was an emissary in other contexts many years before, so my relationship with the Third World and President Nyerere on this issue emanate from a much earlier period. So they have also taken me into their government delegations, and that is why I was asked to draft the OAU statement in the '60s long before these developments on the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone.

So I think that the fact that I was following these issues, we had the confidence of the African governments. They supported us, and I went to them often, regularly, and many Asian governments too, and Caribbean, actually, in addition to that. So where these stories come from, I don't know. I'm saying, the first time that we put forward the issue and got a response was in New York when the Minister spoke. Before that, the United States was told, "We are going to go for indefinite extension."

We had tested each of the possibilities — even before that meeting, we had this all out. Long before. We said, "What about this?" You know? So there were discussions where many issues were taken up, but we didn't say that's a proposal we're going for when we met Egypt and others, so, at that time, we simply worked out at the last minute some of these issues — some documents we were working on, you know, two or three days before the NPT. Actually drafted the [INAUDIBLE], and then Minister Nzo said he wanted to see it. He saw it. We then put it forward, and then we also said, the other proviso, that it's open to everybody. Anybody can come and make a proposal.

It was not a firm proposal cleared with others, but most people jumped on it and said that this will be the best way forward, so it surprised us, to be

honest. We put it forward as a humble proposal, and then the quick response that we got pleasantly surprised us, and then we started to work with it.

JOSEPH PILAT: Sven.

SVEN JURSCHEWSKY: Yeah, I — well, many of these comments on Western attitudes towards the NAM and, you know, these seats in Africa and all the rest of it, I think that's absolutely true. That, in many ways in our political strategizing, we look at Africans as not having agency. They're simply subjects of our determinations, and I think that arms Western diplomacy in a large number of missions, not just nonproliferation. On the advances of the '90s, I'd rather think they were pretty modest. We had a bunch of bilateral agreements between the US and Russia, and at — you know, we were very pleased at Canada, you know, suited our general policy and general disarmament policy, but I don't — given what I said earlier about the Third World, I don't think they have much political impact on the rest of the world.

They didn't, [COUGHS] and for the reasons that Mr. Minty suggested. I think it's pretty modest. I had the miserable experience of having to work on the FMCT mandate issue with Ambassador Shannon, and it convinced me that barring possible — I mean, from our perspective, getting an FMCT mandate was, for us, a bit of window dressing, show time. “Look, we're serious here. Look, Third World. We're serious. We're trying to do something,” but, given the way in which things broke out, especially with respect to Pakistan and India and the issue of stocks, I was convinced that we would never again see a treaty of universal application other than the Chemical Weapons Treaty.

And I think that's true today, and we have to start thinking about nuclear disarmament in a completely different way, remembering that a nuclear disarmament is a zero sum game and pareto optimality is a strict requirement for any agreement. FMCT launched me down that path with the help of thinking. We will never see an FMCT. There is no way that you can square the strategic problems of India and Pakistan with those of Israel. That ain't gonna happen. It can't be done. There are some fundamental contradictions there, etcetera, etcetera, etcetera.

On the CTBT, yes, the Americans negotiated, and they also insisted on an EIF that insured that treaty will never come into force.

OR RABINOWITZ: Did they know it would never come into force, or were they —

GROUP: [CROSS TALK]

JOSEPH PILAT: We'll discuss that in a different session.

GROUP: [CROSS TALK]

SVEN JURSCHEWSKY: On North Korea, and it was in this period that I began some pretty intensive work on North Korea, which ended up by spending four years [CROSS TALK]...

GROUP: [CROSS TALK]

SVEN JURSCHEWSKY: ...off and on, in the place, it's sui generis case. Everybody recognizes this is not a model for anything else, and the impact on the [INAUDIBLE] system has pretty — been pretty marginal, as it should be because it's a pretty marginal country, in many ways, politically. Which is not to say that it can't cause a great deal of difficulty, as it is right now. North Korea represents, to me right now, the most dangerous threat to world peace, to regional peace, that exists. At the time, the focus was on the famine, the floods, and the way in which the US diffused — I think wisely by President Clinton — diffused the refusal of the North Korea to allow IAEA inspections, which was the Framework Agreement, but which set the stage for further disappointments and, frankly, the situation we find ourselves in. That agreement was deeply flawed. North Korea is unto itself. I don't believe it has much impact on how other countries, either in the West or in the Third World, think about nuclear weapons or disarmament.

JOSEPH PILAT: They walked out of the NPT Review and Extension Conference.

SVEN JURSCHEWSKY: Yes.

JOSEPH PILAT: And I don't think anybody noticed [CROSS TALK].

“North Korea represents, to me right now,

the most dangerous threat to world peace, to regional peace, that exists.”

SVEN JURSCHEWSKY: Exactly. Exactly.

THOMAS GRAHAM: I want to explain the provision on the test ban.

JOSEPH PILAT: Can we talk about [CROSS TALK]

GROUP: [CROSS TALK]

MICHAL ONDERCO: But we are — it's — we're going to talk about...

JOSEPH PILAT: Different session.

MICHAL ONDERCO: ...it in a different session, so we're going to come back to that.

SVEN JURSCHEWSKY: I'm sorry [INAUDIBLE] that I raised it.

GROUP: [LAUGHTER] [CROSS TALK]

GRIGORY BERDENNIKOV: Well, from our point of view, what was the situation before the '95 session? As we understood [CROSS TALK]...

GROUP: [CROSS TALK]

JOSEPH PILAT: Please, please.

GRIGORY BERDENNIKOV: The Bandung Declaration was not very committal for the non-aligned countries. If I am not wrong, it spoke about the desirability of extending the NPT, without specifying what kind of extension, and that, from our point of view, gave — opened up the door for any kind of interpretation including the indefinite extension, which is also an extension. And after we received the Declaration, we thought that, really, there is a very good possibility to have an indefinite extension there because the Bandung Conference didn't say that the non-aligned are against the indefinite extension. That was our starting point.

JOSEPH PILAT: Anybody want to intervene right now? I think that one of the interesting questions by the views put forward by Nabil and Abdul on NAM positions is how do you see — how did you see the South African proposal as reflecting those positions? It seems quite modest, given the presen-

tations you made on the NAM views of the Treaty and nuclear weapons, but could you explain how the South African proposals were designed to address those broader NAM concerns?

ABDUL MINTY: People may have forgotten that Minister Nzo himself in his speech talked about the discriminatory nature of the NPT.

NABIL FAHMY: Yup.

ABDUL MINTY: So, you see, all I'm saying, as I said earlier, that many countries didn't pay attention to the things the NAM countries were saying because it didn't matter if they say these things because they didn't like that. So, if you look at that statement, he says "The NPT is a discriminatory treaty." It's all in the same speech we're talking about now. What we said was, number one, we need to get an African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone. We can't have a NPT for a time period and keep that zone permanent, for Africa.

The French may decide to test again after that, and we didn't want that. We didn't want any country to do it in Africa. So, to secure Africa, we had to support an indefinite extension. Now, at the time, people didn't understand it. They thought we were playing some trick, — or some game or whatever, but that is a basis on which we discussed it inside South Africa, and then we went from there to say we also don't want a situation — remember, we've just come out of a country that had nuclear weapons — where some country feels that, after 10, 20 years, whatever the period is, they'll break out if things don't work well, but they'll know they have a time limit, and, within that time, they can prepare to have nuclear weapons at the end because they know that that time will come. So we wanted to close this possibility in terms of nonproliferation, that we don't want anyone to feel that they can develop some weapons in between, in order to get ready for this time limit. Remember, before that, as we were fighting apartheid, we had experience of Brazil, Argentina, and others working with South Africa on nuclear weapons.

So, we knew that these things happen and had happened before, so we wanted to close around that. We went in with a very humble approach. The ideas we had, and that's why we put everything in the basket on the first day,

and, if others had other things to add to the basket, please do so, and let's see if we can refine it all.

So, we thought the other issues we had were part of the decision. The Middle East, Principles and Objectives, and so on, and that this would give the non-aligned and us confidence that this treaty will become better than what it was before because we would have all these other issues put in as well.

JOSEPH PILAT: Nabil.

NABIL FAHMY: Again, I can't, of course, speak to the South African thinking in any way comparable to what Ambassador Minty just did, but let me give you the perception of the South African Movement. People underestimate frequently the Mandela factor. What happened in South Africa was a larger than life context that we were all very proud of. At the same time, it created a new paradigm in regional politics, as well as international. We worked also very, very close to ANC, even before the end of apartheid, so our relations with the ANC were quite extensive.

When we first heard, as — what you said, of the possibility of indefinite extension, we were very uncomfortable with that point. We weren't as much concerned with breakout afterwards because you can't breakout if you don't have any industrial basis for a program. I mean, there's no real short-term breakout. If you already have it, then the whole project that you've established was wrong with it from the very beginning. Anyway, but we were not ready to ignore the influence and the respect that South Africa under Mandela was clearly having, including with ourselves. So, from our very early consultations, we drew the conclusion that there's a different paradigm, and that there's a different kind of thinking that we ought to deal with in the non-aligned and over and above in the NPT as a whole.

I completely agree with Ambassador Minty. The logic behind their movement was “We want to deal with the NPT extension issue, but there are other issues that concern the NPT members,” which he repeated. So, even though we differed on the extension and we did not like the extension issue, we were still ready to deal with them seriously on the substance of the other issues, and

we actually — and it takes me into the next thing a little bit — had, therefore, in our mindset going into the Conference, “Okay, this is one possibility, and this is the other possibility, but the first one’s going to be more powerful,” so I would argue that the idea of indefinite extension was probably a given much earlier than people think.

If you read the political paradigm carefully, whether it went through without a vote or with a vote is a different issues, and that’s going to lead me to a discussion with Tom, but we, from very early on, assumed that the extension would be indefinite even though we didn’t like it.

JOSEPH PILAT: Michal.

MICHAL ONDERCO: So I want to come back to this point because, if you read the letter that — after this meeting in South Africa, that Thabo Mbeki sent to Al Gore, he talks in the letter very in big terms about the fact that commitment to nuclear nonproliferation is a part of a commitment that South Africa brings towards human rights, global justice, and so on and so forth. Has this argument ever been raised within the NAM setting, and what sort of credibility has it been given?

NABIL FAHMY: Well, again, I’ll let the Ambassador respond more so, but, first of all, this was very early on and after...

MICHAL ONDERCO: Yes.

NABIL FAHMY: ...[INAUDIBLE], so it’s too early to say this is what the assessment was then, but there was an aura around South Africa at the time, and nothing that they were saying, conceptually, was inconsistent with NAM thinking, irrespective of the fact that they — their judgment on the extension, although was useful, may have been a point of difference. Their weight in the system was something you wouldn’t ignore, and, for us, it was positive weight, irrespective of the fact that we disagreed with them on issue of extension.

JOSEPH PILAT: Ori.

OR RABINOWITZ: Yeah. Thank you. My question is for Ambassador

“There were a lot of protests in Africa at the French testing

at the time in Algeria, so we wanted to seal off the African continent from any nuclear tests as a matter of principle that no one should test nuclear weapons in Africa.

Minty. You mentioned one of the factors — one of the motivating factors was potential was a fear of France or maybe other countries potentially testing, and — but the NPT doesn't bar a country like France from testing, so maybe this was tied to the CTBT debate or to a hope that an NPT extension would lead to a CTBT, to a test ban? Or some kind of other condition of tying it, maybe?

ABDUL MINTY: No. You see, there were a lot of protests in Africa at the French testing at the time in Algeria, so we wanted to seal off the African continent from any nuclear tests as a matter of principle that no one should test nuclear weapons in Africa. That was what it was. We didn't know about the capacities of people or whatever. We just wanted to say it was wrong in principle, and we don't want Africa to have that, and that was a basis of us moving, as I say, as early as 1960 [INAUDIBLE], and then, once that resolve shows adopted by the OAU, we didn't go every year with new resolutions. After we were free, when we had to implement the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone, and then we had some conferences. Together. We had the first one in Egypt, and we had one in South Africa...

NABIL FAHMY: Pelindaba.

ABDUL MINTY: ...and elsewhere, and then we moved to get our treaty on the African Nuclear-Weapon Free Zone set up, and a special group of commissioners, that is still working.

JOSEPH PILAT: Bill.

BILL POTTER: Oh, thanks. So we've mentioned already — Dhanapala describes this to some extent in his book — the fact that there was a kind of a parallel approach that the Mexicans had developed. Unfortunately, we don't have a Mexican representative here, and Miguel passed away this past year, and I think it's important, you know, for the purposes of the project here, not to assume that it was the South African proposal from day one that was going to be the basis for the package, and I personally don't know very much about the origins of the Mexican proposal. I mean, they were an observer, they weren't a full-fledged kind of NAM member. Is there anyone here who can say a little

bit more about the origins of the Mexican proposal?

SVEN JURSCHEWSKY: I gave it to them.

BILL POTTER: Okay, well, I suspect Miguel might have had a different interpretation, but that's a [CROSS TALK].

GROUP: [LAUGHTER]

SVEN JURSCHEWSKY: I got instructions from the PMO after the San Jose summit. I gave them my papers. I did. I wasn't happy about it. I was not happy about it, but I did.

THOMAS GRAHAM: They told us they were going to do it during the conference.

SVEN JURSCHEWSKY: Yeah.

THOMAS GRAHAM: And they did it, and as I said earlier, my impression was not that they intended it to be a serious proposal in the sense of gathering votes, but it reflected what their position was. They never tried to gain co-sponsors or additional support, but it was just there in the records.

BILL POTTER: It hasn't squared — in my mind, I mean, I believe. Abdul, you said that they'd actually approached you also to partner in some fashion. I don't think it was just a superfluous, you know, initiative here. I can't imagine that Marin Bosch would have been engaged in that kind of an activity, and I — and there's nobody here who can adequately speak to the origins from the Mexican perspective for this, but I think it's an element that, you know, merits some consideration.

SVEN JURSCHEWSKY: Well, the — Marin Bosch's final statement does make some of those — some of that clear.

This was part of larger effort on the part of Canada and the US to bring Mexico into — not just into an — nonproliferation matters, but generally in a foreign policy sense, more in line with the sorts of things we believed in, and I was at numbers of meetings with — between Mexico, ourselves, and the US, towards that end. Numbers of meetings, some of which were quite rough. At

the time, it was — we were thinking in terms of Mexico becoming a member of the OECD, where it, frankly, had to take a different policy stance in order to fit in. This was all part of that.

ABDUL MINTY: And that's why they had to leave NAM.

SVEN JURSCHEWSKY: That's right.

ABDUL MINTY: It's a condition.

SVEN JURSCHEWSKY: That's right. Now, this was part of a larger effort that rose out of NAFTA, which, of course, now is under a threat.

JOSEPH PILAT: I think the —

THOMAS GRAHAM: But then again, this proposal was not one like others where you put something down and you try to gather support. They didn't do that. They tabled it late in the process and didn't try to tussle with us for it. They told us — we met with them several times a week, during the four weeks of the conference, and they told us about it, and they did it. The White House still panicked, but they —

NABIL FAHMY: Can I just — question.

NABIL FAHMY(?): Tom, do you see this as — if I assume that we're just saying — I'm sure you're saying it, you believe it to be true, but if it's true, do you think this is a decision taken by Miguel or by the Mexican government simply to table it but not to pursue it?

SVEN JURSCHEWSKY: I —

NABIL FAHMY(?): Because I agree with Bill. It's not his nature to table something and not pursue it, so was this a government decision?

THOMAS GRAHAM: That's what they did [CROSS TALK] —

NABIL FAHMY(?): I know, but you can see this as his decision or the government's decision? I'm just curious to figure out.

THOMAS GRAHAM: Well, I don't — I mean, I don't know if it was Ze-

dillo's idea, Gonzalez Galvez's idea, or Marin Bosch's idea. My sense was then it probably was Gonzalez Galvez, who made the decision — he was the Deputy Foreign Minister, and they didn't intend to try to compete with or overturn the Canadian resolution. I don't believe it was ever their intent, so, if that wasn't their intent, then the logical conclusion, what it comes to, is that they wanted to have their own statement on the table. They were a great — had been and still are — a great leader in the disarmament field internationally, and they thought what they had was slightly better, but it wasn't significantly — it wasn't tremendously different from the [CROSS TALK] —

SVEN JURSCHEWSKY: It wasn't at all.

THOMAS GRAHAM: [CROSS TALK]. It had conditionality.

JOSEPH PILAT: Okay, Sven, I'd like this to be the last word on this point.

SVEN JURSCHEWSKY: I had a — after the Mexicans tabled it, I had a stormy meeting with Marin Bosch because of the conditionality, which had not been agreed in San Jose, and he claimed — and, here, political reporting becomes important because I had my political report of his Foreign Minister's meeting with my Foreign Minister, which said that it makes — is that it agreed to no conditionality. He turned around and said, "Here is my report," and read it out that the Canadians had not objected to conditionality, but you can figure out for yourself who's right here. My sense, after that meeting, was that he had intended to do more with it, but, when the South Africans tabled it and in a much more complete and with the Principles and Objectives associated with it, a much richer piece of meat on the table, to continue that metaphor, he gave up, that this was not a horse that was going to go anywhere. That's a guess on my part, just from that meeting.

THOMAS GRAHAM: He tabled at least a week after that South African —

SVEN JURSCHEWSKY: No, but he raised it in his statement, in his national statement.

THOMAS GRAHAM: He still put it down.

MALE: OK.

THOMAS GRAHAM: [INAUDIBLE]

SVEN JURSCHEWSKY: Well, I guess maybe he felt he had to. I don't know.

JOSEPH PILAT: I think the — this will be an area, I think, for some future archival research, and we'll look into it then. Harald.

HARALD MÜLLER: Yes, thank you, Joe. I think that this is quite an important point here. The discussion about different initiatives that emerged within the Non-Aligned Movement and which, of course, had a natural tendency to prevent the movement to take unified positions. I just want to add an observation about a certain such initiative, which is the Taylhardat Initiative, which ended up in getting the agreement of a very smart group of non-aligned and made it into the nation's proposal, which was tabled later in the Conference, but Taylhardat had his personal agenda.

He was, like Jayantha Dhanapala, a member of PPNN. So I have some insight in what developed there. Taylhardat wanted to become President of the Conference, and, as you know, it was decided fairly early on that he wouldn't, but Jayantha — and from that moment on we had a tense atmosphere in PPNN because Taylhardat didn't take it in a good mood. And he pursued this repeated extension initiative, asking largely to restore his own self-confidence either by making life difficult for Dhanapala or by prevailing in the conference with this proposal and thereby showing that he was a more efficient and better leader.

At least he managed to get it acknowledged by the non-aligned and to be tabled by the head of the non-aligned, but that was, of course, not the big thing he had aimed at, and, anyway, he was already removed from the delegation when the tabling happened.

THOMAS GRAHAM: Marin Bosch wasn't removed from the delegation.

GROUP: Taylhardat.

HARALD MÜLLER: From Venezuela.

JOSEPH PILAT: There was a special meeting in the NAM during the Review and Extension Conference that led to a small suspension of the actual activity. Do you guys want to offer any thoughts on that meeting and its importance in terms of the decision package?

ABDUL MINTY: You see, when the package was worked out and after Bandung, we had quite a lot of meetings with NAM members in New York, and then it became clear that, when they looked at all the options available, they thought that the South African proposal was one that they would go for. So, as it's been said already, the Mandela factor, whatever we want to describe it as, and the political legitimacy and support given to South Africa, but it was moving forward. I think the fact that we had a proposal that the US also supported meant that things were moving along. So they then engaged through all kinds of discussions about what we could do, mainly on disarmament.

What is probably at that time too was not appreciated is how important it was for South Africa to also work for the Middle East resolution. It was always associated with Egypt and the Arab countries as if for the rest of the continent and others it didn't matter. There was total solidarity on it throughout and also, as I say, because Israel had nuclear weapons, in a contiguous zone. So how does that prejudice us in creating a nuclear-weapon-free zone if another country very close to it, and with African members near it, are not able to move forward on the same issue? So, we wanted to have an international position that was universal and everybody could adhere to.

So, all the Africans were sympathetic, but no one came to say, "Why are you working for the Americans?"

JOSEPH PILAT: Sven had a comment, I think, that, you know, that is very important. We looked at the progress we had made in arms control, nuclear and non-nuclear, from the late '80s up until the Review and Extension Conference, and, you know, in fact, there has probably been no five or six years that have produced greater results in arms control, and, as Sven rightly says, that there — you know, they were modest. They were the start of a development that

has actually made more progress, and it's still regarded around the world as still modest.

And so, in some ways, this suggests that the Article VI debate is a very complicated debate in many respects, but the — I think that there — you know, the — there was a lot of hope and a lot of circles about what might happen, and expectations were high that we'd be moving further and faster in terms of arms control than we had in the previous periods, and the question is — different things started to appear though. I think the question of expectations as they developed both before and during the Review and Extension Conference was significant, but I also saw something at the Review and Extension Conference that I hadn't seen before, and it may be just the fact that I hadn't — it was my accident that I missed it, but I saw a lot of non-nuclear weapons states, particularly from the NAM, begin to question what we were reporting as arms control successes, and that hadn't happened in the past.

And, in my experience, at least in this way, I remember, in Main Committee One, Ambassador Scheinman had presented a lengthy report on everything that the United States had done that was consistent with our obligations under Article VI, and a young Indonesian diplomat stands up and accused him of being a liar. He says, "How can you tell us that when you have no proof of it?" And the young diplomat was very angry, and the — you know, I hadn't seen that kind of emotion.

But we're seeing that issue since '95 developed in very clear ways, but — and any thoughts about those kinds of issues, the — both the expectations surrounding future progress as well as the limits to future progress and the modalities of bilateral arms control as we move forward? Nabil.

NABIL FAHMY: Well, again, this study is on the '95 extension, so I won't get into projection of what happened after.

JOSEPH PILAT: Yes, please.

NABIL FAHMY: But the question really — I think it's important to take into account context. The non-aligned countries, even the supporters of the NPT, supported it as a discriminatory treaty, but it was the best thing we could

get when it was adopted, and we're now being asked to accept this discriminatory treaty indefinitely. So they were obviously, after 25 years, still not satisfied with the achievement, and now they were asked to confirm that this was going to be part of the situation as we move forward. So it was natural that — I know — I don't know the case where Larry's view was being questioned.

I'm not at all committing to his credibility at all, but, seriously speaking, there was a frustration that this was not the promise we received back when the Treaty was first put into force. It was possibly an unrealistic promise of general and complete disarmament. So it wasn't what we got. It was quite logical that they would be disappointed with the results and expect more, especially when you're saying, okay, this is what it's going to be, indefinite. So I'm not at all surprised by this, but it's not — it's a function of what you're asking rather than only what you've done.

ABDUL MINTY: You see, that disappointment and lack of progress on disarmament when, at the same time, there was so much pressure on nonproliferation, which we, the developing world, all agreed to. Even where we disagreed with the actual proposal, we agreed we wanted to protect the NPT. This led to us saying in the 2015 NPT meeting, that there was a great danger that the NPT was now to become a nuclear weapon states treaty. This wasn't something that we didn't feel, because everything you've discussed and anything you did, if they didn't agree the rest of the membership, was almost irrelevant in terms of moving forward.

So, they created for themselves over a period a virtual veto. Now, the expectation at the NPT Conference in 1995 was that, at least in 20 years, with all the building blocks working, — if they had worked — we would have gone through those review session and made important progress. But, when people actually started coming to those meetings, to the preparatory meeting and so on, they didn't come with a mandate to negotiate. They came with a mandate just to express a position as before.

So you saw no movement from '95 on all those issues, and, therefore, there was growing disappointment. I remember the Malaysian Prime Minister telling

me after two or three years after the 1995 decision, “You made a mistake in going for the indefinite extension” because now they have no incentive. Yet, we all worked on the basis that you have to trust the international community and have to work with them because you have to produce global peace.

There was thus great disappointment in the non-aligned world.

JOSEPH PILAT: Sven.

SVEN JURSCHEWSKY: Part of the problem in talking about Article VI is that there are two ways of talking about it. One is the language of morality, which no one can really disagree with. Nuclear weapons are bad things, and then there’s the game theoretic of language of mutually assured destruction and all that kind of stuff, which is really how negotiations go forward and the way in which the linkage that existed for a short time between those two modes of thought and how they reinforce each other, and which I had hoped would be reinforced by NPT ‘95, was very quickly dissipated. I attended the disarmament committee afterwards and — at the UN and led a chair — a friends of the Chair thing, and I was appalled at everyone’s performance.

I had a temper tantrum of a kind, threw papers in the air and all of this type of stuff, but it was clear to me that the kinds of substantive improvements in how the debate would be carried forward and the institutional modalities in which they would consist wasn’t going to happen, and that suspicion in ‘95 turned out to be true. We got the Thirteen Steps, for which we can thank Peter, but we didn’t get full-blown strengthened reviews. We didn’t. And, since then, every Review Conference has been a disaster.

JAAP RAMAKER: Except 2010.

SVEN JURSCHEWSKY: That’s 2010. Well, perhaps not a disaster, but it hadn’t brought as much either. You know, do we do these things — you know, there’s another elephant in the room, subsequently, and this is the Bush thing, the exchange of letters in, what was it, 2008. The auguries that were — there was huge optimism, especially in the NGO community, that was generated by NPT ‘95, and that optimism has withered.

JOSEPH PILAT: Yes, Bill?

BILL POTTER: Now, let me take a solid contrarian perspective, and I do this very cautiously given the people who are assembled here, but it relates to my earlier point about the larger body of countries represented at this Review and Extension Conference, but I recall, perhaps not accurately, but I sat through the entire general debate. I heard country after country speaking about why the NPT was important to them, and the arguments were not all couched in terms of Article VI. There were countries who, in fact, were particularly interested in the benefits of peaceful uses.

Maybe it's because I spend much of my time in the Main Committee Three, that's something that I came away with. The big takeaway for a number of states, certainly for Kyrgyzstan, where our big adversary actually were the Canadians and the French, was the progress that was made in looking at the economic and environmental consequences of uranium mining and milling, in attempt to generate remedial — remediation efforts for the countries in Central Asia. That was a major takeaway. That was really important, and it was something that Kyrgyzstan continued to return to. There were an interest also really, for the first time in the NPT context, looking at Central Asia Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zone.

Which was not seen principally as a disarmament measurement, but, again, it related to the environmental dimension. So all I caution about is, as we look back, not to assume that every country that was interested in the indefinite extension was driven exclusively by concerns about nuclear disarmament. Certainly, that was important, but other countries had very specific issues, which was why the NPT was important to them, and I don't want us to lose sight of that because of the composition of the membership here.

GROUP: [CROSS TALK]

JOSEPH PILAT: Tom.

THOMAS GRAHAM: Oh, I think that I can understand the disappointment in the NAM. I share it myself, but I do think it was misplaced. I do not think that what has happened since '95 in any way is a result of what the NPT

“The big takeaway for a number of states, certainly for Kyrgyzstan, where our big adversary actually were the Canadians and the French...”

decision was. If the decision had been 25 years rolling periods, 10 years even, or just that the NPT had been discontinued, how would it change things? Indian, Pakistani tests? Would it change that? Test ban was blocked in the US Senate, would it change that? We did get because of '95 — we probably sold it because of '95, we did get a CTBT treaty signed and in existence. That's one thing we can say can be attributed to '95. Nuclear-Weapon Free Zone in the Middle East, or WMD-Free Zone in the Middle East. That's a function of the peace process, Israel and so forth. How do you think that has had anything to do with '95? The FMCT was blocked by Pakistan years ago and will never probably reappear. I mean, maybe someday but not in the near future. Reductions, further reductions? That's blocked by the US/Russia relationship, which also has nothing to do with '95. Could we continue through the nuclear-weapon-free zones and try to expand that?

Well, just try your hand at thinking of reducing nuclear weapons in South Asia, if you think that is going to happen. 1995 was an attempt to make safe the most important treaty we had, and second, maybe, just maybe, it was hoped that it would have a spinoff effect and then do more, and it did do that one thing. It got the CTBT signed, but all these other reverses are — I just don't see — they would have happened anyway, and so I — I can understand the disappointment. I am disappointed myself.

JOSEPH PILAT: Yes.

DUCO HELLEMA: I guess I have a more general question. Some remarks have already been made about it. The broader picture of the mid-1990s that, looking back, I think was a very remarkable period of time in a post-Cold War history of international relations, a brief period of, I would say, Western optimism, Western optimistic dominance, internationalist feelings, what, Francis Fukuyama-type of optimism.

And what — during the — at the Conference of 1995, I think the Western countries got what they wanted in a form of indefinite extension.

Could we conclude that this result, you know, this positive result, and that following disappointments were a typical product of this brief period of, let's

say, Western dominant optimism or optimistic dominance?

JOSEPH PILAT: I think that's an interesting theory, and I think that it certainly has much merit too. I also think Tom's comments looking at the post-'95 world and the successes or failures and as they tie to the decision itself is also very valuable, and I think there would probably be a lot of things to discuss in terms of both theories, but I think we'll have to leave 'em on the table. We've run out of time, so please join me in thanking yourselves for...

GROUP: [LAUGHTER]

JOSEPH PILAT: ...excellent presentations here.

GROUP: [APPLAUSE]

MICHAL ONDERCO: We're going to be now going for lunch just down the hallway, and we aim at starting again at 2:30, so a little more than an hour.

SESSION III

OVERCOMING THE OPPOSITION

MATIAS SPEKTOR: Okay. Welcome back. The challenge is enormous after lunch. We have to keep ourselves awake for the next hour-and-a-half. This session is on hurdles, again, on turning points, and on how the various countries overcame opposition to the emerging consensus. So, to get us started, why don't we go back to one of the things that came out of the last session? Many of you said that you were willing to go for a vote if need be. But consensus was better than a vote, if possible. The question is what were the P5 willing to offer as way on concessions in order to get consensus and prevent the vote from taking place?

GRIGORY BERDENNIKOV: It's very simple. It's just in the document. We offered principles and whatever.

GROUP: Objectives.

GRIGORY BERDENNIKOV: Objectives? Which is a very good document, much better than the long, never-ending final documents of later Review Conferences. This is a precise, short document. Even if you don't like the Treaty language, you don't need to be a professional to understand it.

MATIAS SPEKTOR: Ambassador, so you didn't have any trouble sending the Principles back home?

GRIGORY BERDENNIKOV: No. Absolutely not, and, even now, we can sign under it. There is nothing against our position there. On the strengthened review process, again, the same. It was a product of a long period of work and trying give-and-take process, and there was nothing surprising in it. We, long

ago, before the Conference, decided that we can go along with it. As for the resolution on the Middle East, it was not really a problem to us because we supported the Egyptians drafts each year in the General Assembly. So, for us, it was not a major concession.

MATIAS SPEKTOR: Okay. Were there any demands for concessions that you were not prepared —

GRIGORY BERDENNIKOV: Well, if the non-aligned would insist on our agreement to the timetable for nuclear disarmament— it will not fly with us, and, if that was their price for the Principles document, there would be no document by consensus. It's clear. Or that would be adopted again by vote — with them in favor and us against, and then, of course, there would be the indefinite extension decision also adopted by vote.

MATIAS SPEKTOR: So it was low-cost for Russia. Sir Michael, was it low-cost for the UK as well?

MICHAEL WESTON: Absolutely. Yes. No, same position. Yeah, same position.

MATIAS SPEKTOR: Ambassador Graham?

THOMAS GRAHAM: We knew it was coming, and we met with the South African delegation. Vice President Gore was present along with Foreign Minister Nzo, and this was totally no problem.

MATIAS SPEKTOR: Okay. Could we get your comments, please, on the role of the Chair during the negotiations? What was the role of this particular Chair? Did his personality impact at all in the course of the negotiations?

THOMAS GRAHAM: All right, since I just said something. In my personal view, Jayantha Dhanapala was the best possible choice as Chair. He converted a firm US position, which a lot of people initially didn't like and some still don't, to a consensus outcome, and he worked a lot of other problems very well. He created the Presidential Committee, I believe it was called, which solved the — I mean, resolved — the outstanding issues, most of them in the disarmament

field, and he selected a membership for that committee, which was to his own liking. I don't know that it was to anyone else's liking.

GROUP: [LAUGHTER]

THOMAS GRAHAM: I know it was not to Washington's liking, but it was the right group to have, and they came out with an excellent document, which lives today, so I think he was — played a extremely important role.

NABIL FAHMY: [INAUDIBLE]

ABDUL MINTY: But he started, you see, by —

NABIL FAHMY: No, no. Go ahead. Go ahead.

ABDUL MINTY: But, I mean, because the non-aligned had a position and the largest number of —

BERND KUBBIG: Could you speak up a little bit?

ABDUL MINTY: Because of the position of the non-aligned as the largest group, and that one he thought would take a position by a vote and maybe for a period — so he went along with that until me made our statement, and then that played to some difficulties for him because he was working with some people, informally, but then he used the Presidential Committee very well. But, in fact, after that, I was at all the NPT review meetings, and that one played a very important role, but so did the others too because he had the five and then selected countries, and we could bounce ideas backwards and forwards and work the text, but we all had to accept that we were writing a document for the whole conference.

So, it wasn't just that we had to agree, but we had to produce something the whole conference would agree at the end. So that interaction was really fascinating for many of us who were not in any way engaged with the P5 or other important countries before that. So, when he saw that things were moving in a different direction, he allowed it and used his diplomatic skills, with consultations across and so on, and it worked extremely well. So I think he was sort of made for the job.

“...for us, the idea of calling for a vote remained a possibility, even if you have to do it alone, until we were fully satisfied with the package.”

MALE: Thank you. [INAUDIBLE]

NABIL FAHMY: A couple of quick comments. First, and I don't want to be pedantic of this, but I — after so many years of doing this, I probably can't stop. We actually objected to the word “consensus” when it was suggested to us at the Conference, and we said, “If you use the word ‘consensus,’ we will not come along because that means we support this decision.” If you use the word “adopted without a vote,” then we can go along if the resolution is not objectionable to us. So we would never join language which describes what happened as a consensus on any of the resolutions, but that's the first point.

Second point is I think Dhanapala deserves tremendous credit, and I'm not talking here about the Middle East yet but on the issue of extension — well, first, before I get to that, for us, the idea of calling for a vote remained a possibility, even if you have to do it alone, until we were fully satisfied with the package. That being said, Jayantha came to me several times personally and kept asking me, “How far can you go? What language can you accept?” Now, given that we were all negotiating a lot of different things, I wasn't about to get into that because I didn't actually know what the whole package was going to look like, but a point I made to him continuously, what I said, that, if it's not an objectionable outcome, if the resolution reflects reality, we will not stop.

I mean, basically there's two points. If the package is acceptable, as long as the language reflects reality, we won't object to it, and, if you read the language, it doesn't say there's a consensus. It says there was a widespread majority. We didn't give that language. He drafted it, or somebody else did, but he was listening very, very carefully, trying to find out what is the common area where we can all live with and then, ultimately, when we all reached agreement on the elements of the package, he actually had the language prepared, I just wanted to make those points, and I'll get to the Middle East later.

THOMAS GRAHAM: But, let me just slightly modify what I just said.

MATIAS SPEKTOR: Please.

THOMAS GRAHAM: When I said “consensus,” I perhaps should have said

“parliamentary consensus,” not a real consensus, and so he — and he added something new to the idea of parliamentary consensus. It was like this — do I hear any objection? No, [HITS THE TABLE WITH FIST] passed. Like that. In other words, not only was it on a no-objection basis, but you had to object really fast.

GROUP: [LAUGHTER]

THOMAS GRAHAM: And, second, after it was over, 11 — on the condition that it didn’t affect the outcome — 11 countries were allowed to speak against the decision, and 11 countries were allowed to speak for the decision. So I think it was about as creative a, quote, parliamentary consensus, close quote, that I’ve ever seen.

MICHAEL WESTON: I don’t want to disagree. In general, I agree. He did a great job, but I look to — I looked back at what I wrote at the time and two points. One was that I think he had ambitions at that time to be Secretary General of the United Nations, and I commented in my — the report I sent to the Foreign Office that I thought he lacked the stamina that was necessary to be Secretary General of the United Nations. And I do — I remember, at the time, being frustrated that he didn’t keep our noses to the ground stone just that little bit longer on the — not on the extension, of course, but on the final — is it the final —

GROUP: Document.

MICHAEL WESTON: And the lack of it, and so I would just offer that, as a slight disagreement with that, he was absolutely perfect in that.

MATIAS SPEKTOR: Fascinating. Professor Müller?

HARALD MÜLLER: Right. Two remarks. First, on consensus, just as spoke before me where he points out that there was consensus only on the existence of a majority for the indefinite extension. So the consensus concerns the matter of fact, which was undeniable, but the matter of fact, of course, was a trigger to extend the Treaty indefinitely. I think it’s really — it’s sort of ingenious formulation...

JAAP RAMAKER: And the majority [CROSS TALK].

HARALD MÜLLER: ...which [CROSS TALK].

MICHAEL WESTON: Yeah.

MATIAS SPEKTOR: Sorry, say again, please?

JAAP RAMAKER: The majority was what the Treaty text required.

MALE: Yes, exactly.

MATIAS SPEKTOR: Yes, of course.

MALE: Exactly.

JAAP RAMAKER: [INAUDIBLE] to be fair, he was always within the limits of —

HARALD MÜLLER: The formulation of the sentence, of course, refers also to, I think, to Article X.2 of the Treaty. I would slightly disagree from Sir Michael. I've seen failed Review Conferences where the attempt to create consensus at the last moment drawn into the early hours of the next day and, of course, failed, like in 1990. I think we had a Chairman of Main Committee 1 was determined to prevent consensus on a final declaration on the review, and I think that Jayantha Dhanapala recognized this as well and saved us all the frustrating night after which we would have to give up anyway. So I was quite happy because the next day was my birthday, and he took me wide awake for the champagne the next morning.

GROUP: [LAUGHTER]

JAAP RAMAKER: I remember that Dhanapala went to meet the three Main Committee Chairmen and said, "Are you ready in your Committee?" Because he wanted the review part out of the way so he could concentrate on the extension of the NPT, I said I would give him my — our report on time, and I don't — I suppose the same was with Erdos in Main Committee 2. But he must already have known, of course, by then that Main Committee 1 was a mess. But he wanted to have wrapped up the Committee work and done with it.

BILL POTTER: Yeah, but I have a question, and I don't even have a hint as to the answer to the question. My experience over the years is that you have a formal structure and then you often have individuals who play a role disproportionate to the position that they occupy at the Review Conference, and we can talk about that whether it's 2010, 2000 — and other meetings.

What is not clear to me are who are the confidantes, who are the parties to who Jayantha turned? I mean, he — presumably there were some, circle, maybe they were his PPNN colleagues. Maybe there was another diplomat we haven't mentioned at all, and maybe for good reason, you know, the Secretary General of the Conference, Davinic there. I don't know — I mean, they — so there's a question also, what role of any — you know, did he play, the bureau? I probably should have asked Jayantha this myself, and I will in the future, but I'm curious from those of you who also were principals in the deliberations.

Did you have the sense that he also turned to one or two individuals? Was there someone like, you know, Kongstad, who played a major role in — I think in 2010 — or a Tom Markram, who people referred to for counsel? I'm curious whether anybody observed such a process in place.

GRIGORY BERDENNIKOV: Well, I think Ben Sanders.

MICHAEL WESTON: Yes.

HARALD MÜLLER: Yes.

BILL POTTER: Mhm.

HARALD MÜLLER: I second that. Ben Sanders participated in part of the drafting.

GRIGORY BERDENNIKOV: He not only participated; he played key role in drafting the language of extension. There was a special small group to draft the language that we have now in Decision Three, and it was his making. Well...

MATIAS SPEKTOR: Yes, please.

GRIGORY BERDENNIKOV: On consensus, well, I'm not as versed on

**“[Ben Sanders]
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parliamentarian consensus, but actually we have in the CD the consensus rule. And, in the CD setting, it means that consensus is when nobody voices an open objection. You may feel whatever you want, but, if you don't voice an objection, it means consensus was reached, and, in that sense, you may call it also adopted without vote. In my parlance, it is the same, and, well, that's how it was done.

NABIL FAHMY: I beg to differ, really, because we specifically told Jayantha also that we would not ask for a vote, but we would be 1 among the 11 who spoke after the adoption saying you're not part of the widespread majority. So — but we didn't stop the vote, the resolution, but we explained that we're not part — so for us it was important, to focus that this is adopted without the vote rather than with what could be interpreted as a positive consensus.

GRIGORY BERDENNIKOV: And you — again, in our understanding, it doesn't matter what you say afterwards.

GROUP: [LAUGHTER]

GRIGORY BERDENNIKOV: You can say it — this is the worst solution that you might have thought of, but if you, at the moment of adoption, do not raise your voice against, then it means you agree.

NABIL FAHMY: I disagree with that because, specifically — even if you look at the Security Council or you're a permanent member, there are votes that are adopted, and people explain their position before and after the vote. So part of the agreement was, okay, we will let this pass but with the expressed agreement that we will have the right to say what — we did not join in this majority.

MATIAS SPEKTOR: Mm-hmm.

MICHAL ONDERCO: If I may raise a point, in one of the earlier sessions, it was decided for Jayantha Dhanapala the preferred option was 25 year extension. When did he sort of abandon that idea? Or when did that idea—

GRIGORY BERDENNIKOV: Well, when the majority was formed. When

the co-sponsors under the Canadian draft reached the majority of 50% plus 1, he had to...

GROUP: [LAUGHTER]

GRIGORY BERDENNIKOV: ...adopt to the reality(?).

MATIAS SPEKTOR: Do you recall precisely when it is that it becomes clear that a vote will not be needed because the reason majority when in the course of those weeks? Please.

NABIL FAHMY: You're making an assumption here. There's a majority meant at the vote would have passed. It did not mean that there would be no vote.

MATIAS SPEKTOR: [CROSS TALK]

NABIL FAHMY: And for different people.

MATIAS SPEKTOR: Sure.

NABIL FAHMY: I mean, we had a different condition, but that's [CROSS TALK].

MATIAS SPEKTOR: Mm-hmm. But do you recall when it becomes the [CROSS TALK] —

GRIGORY BERDENNIKOV: My answer is it was clear when we had the package, the package meaning the indefinite extension, Principles, new process, and the Middle East resolution. When the package was ready, then everything was in its place, and it was clear for everyone that it will pass without a vote.

MATIAS SPEKTOR: All right, so —

SVEN JURSCHEWSKY: I'm — there's something — maybe my memory is wrong. As we headed towards the final stages of the Conference, discussions in the President's Committee were going forward. It was fairly obvious that these concessions would be successful, and I'm talking about a week before the end. There was no Middle East resolution at that point — when people were discussing it, but there was nothing on the table, and that did not happen until

after the President's Committee deliberations concluded, if I remember right, the temporal thing. While this was going on, while the discussions in the President's Committee were going forward, Chris Westdal was running around the bars of the UN with his draft, button-holing people.

So, these things were taking place all at once, as it were, except for the Middle East resolution, which happened right at the end. I may be wrong in my memory — in my recollection. I was very tired at the Conference by then, but I think I'm right about that. It was the last thing that happened — was the Middle East thing, and I remember I fell asleep during the discussion.

GROUP: [LAUGHTER]

MATIAS SPEKTOR: Ambassador Fahmy.

THOMAS GRAHAM: And the last thing that had happened on the Middle East resolution was the discussion in the basement that evening, which was a fruit of [INAUDIBLE].

SVEN JURSCHEWSKY: By that time, I was sleeping.

NABIL FAHMY: There's a difference here between two different phases of this. What you're talking about, which is correct, is the resolution we adopted.

SVEN JURSCHEWSKY: Yes.

NABIL FAHMY: Not the Middle East Resolution.

SVEN JURSCHEWSKY: That's — no. The resolution would be — that was Chris's. He was already running around with it.

NABIL FAHMY: Now, hold on. We had submitted a resolution on a nuclear-free zone in the Middle East to the Arab group, and we were working on it at the Conference. That went — that became subject of negotiations, particularly between us and the Americans for a period of time

SVEN JURSCHEWSKY: But not *quorum publicum*.

NABIL FAHMY: Sorry?

SVEN JURSCHEWSKY: Not *quorum publicum*, not in public.

NABIL FAHMY: I'm not telling you if it was public or not. I — everybody

who was [CROSS TALK] —

SVEN JURSCHEWSKY: We all knew about it, but the — it — wasn't it right at the end?

NABIL FAHMY: No. What happened the end was they —

SVEN JURSCHEWSKY: ... it was passed.

NABIL FAHMY: What the —

SVEN JURSCHEWSKY: After the feat — I don't — first thing, I don't think this is very important.

GROUP: [CROSS TALK]

NABIL FAHMY: The resolution adopted was on weapons of mass destruction. The agreed resolution originally presented was on nuclear weapons, so there were two resolutions.

SVEN JURSCHEWSKY: And I'm — then I may be mistaken, Ambassador Fahmy.

MATIAS SPEKTOR: Okay, I think we have — is this a two point — a two finger?

THOMAS GRAHAM: We were both there, when it was finished.

SVEN JURSCHEWSKY: I was sleeping.

THOMAS GRAHAM: And what happened was...

JAAP RAMAKER: So, maybe you were wrong

THOMAS GRAHAM: ...we were talking about something that didn't yet exist, and what could we do on the resolution? And the Arab side wanted to say that all countries in the Middle East that had not yet joined the NPT should join, and they were Israel, UAE, Djibouti, and Oman. We were reporting every half-hour to the Israeli mission and telling them how it was going. Israel was very opposed to their name being included. The rest of it was agreed in concept, WMD-free zone and so forth, two paragraphs, but not really down.

“...we were talking about something that didn't yet exist, and what could we do on the resolution? And the Arab side wanted to say that all countries in the Middle East that had not yet joined the NPT should join, and they were Israel, UAE, Djibouti, and Oman.”

And then, at some point — and this is the evening before indefinite extension was approved, about 8:00 at night in the basement of the General Assembly. Djibouti and Oman and the UAE appeared, and they said, “We don’t want to be named either,” and so, then, Egypt couldn’t carry on in that position.

So, — I don’t want to put words in your mouth, Nabil. You essentially said that Egypt and Syria now would not co-sponsor the resolution. It was believed we had to have a resolution to get indefinite extension and so had to have something. Dhanapala said, “Not me, I won’t introduce the resolution.” Then, he looked at me and said, “How about the depositaries?” And I said, “Well, as far as this one is concerned, okay, but I don’t know about the others. They’re at a nice dinner, where I was supposed to be if I hadn’t been here. Michael and the other P4 and Germany are there. Of course, I will have to check with the other two first.” So, I went over to the phone in the corner, and I called up the restaurant and asked for the private room where they were, and I spoke with Michael, and he said, “Yes, UK would co-sponsor.”

And then I spoke with Sergey Kislyak, and he said, “I have to check with — I think we can, but I have to check with Moscow first,” and, the next morning, Sergey called me in my hotel room and said, “I can co-sponsor, but there’s a condition,” and I said, “What’s that?” He said, “I have to read it first.”

GROUP: [LAUGHTER]

THOMAS GRAHAM: So, I believe that it was written during the night, and I called Dhanapala and said we would do it, and that was the story. Is that essentially accurate Nabil?

NABIL FAHMY: Not really.

GROUP: [LAUGHTER]

NABIL FAHMY: I know you’re — that’s what you remember, but let me — and my version may not be completely accurate either, but let me tell you what I think happened. Are we now moving into that section, or —

MICHAL ONDERCO: Can we talk about that in the section — in the next session when we talk about the —

NABIL FAHMY: Because I — my version is a bit different from others.

NABIL FAHMY: Okay. Let's hold that then.

MATIAS SPEKTOR: Professor Müller.

HARALD MÜLLER: Yeah. I just want to make a brief point concerning your question, when was it clear that there was a majority? Well, I think it was documented on May 5th when Canada put on the resolution with 104 signatures, but I recall that, before that, in one of the Western group sessions, Ambassador Westdal announced that he was now above a majority. It was collecting signatures, and that might have been even a week earlier, but I have no notes.

SVEN JURSCHEWSKY: It was very early, if I remember, right.

HARALD MÜLLER: So, the 5th of May was at the end of the third week, but I suppose that the majority was achieved sometime during the second week.

SVEN JURSCHEWSKY: That I'm not sure of. That I'm not sure of.

HARALD MÜLLER: Or by the end of the second week. I don't it was later.

SVEN JURSCHEWSKY: I think going into the third week.

HARALD MÜLLER: Okay.

DAVID HOLLOWAY: Yeah, I have a question that diverges a little bit from this discussion, and I see that one of the topics or one of the headings for this session is hurdles, but I'm wondering what were the — how are the incentives read? So I have listed two specific forms. One is did the people making the arguments for extension — when I read the speeches people made, they say, "Well, 20 years ago, we expected maybe there would be 20 nuclear weapon states. Now the Treaty has been successful, the number is smaller," but — and also occasionally people say, "No, it was very important to have the Non-Proliferation Treaty in the negotiations about the nuclear weapons that were left in Ukraine, and Belarus, and Kazakhstan after the Soviet collapse." Would it have been as easy to deal with that issue if there weren't a treaty and — so that's one question.

Secondly, was it important also in the case of South Africa that there is a treaty then there's a commitment made when you sign the Treaty, to give up the weapons and sign the Treaty. So, in a way, what is the kind of positive argument that's put for the NPT? And the converse of that is what were the main concerns about proliferation at the time? Iraq was mentioned earlier. Of course, that was kind of recent memory. Iran was also, if I recall, an issue. I don't know if the DPRK was already —

SVEN JURSCHEWSKY: It was.

DAVID HOLLOWAY: But yes, of course it was. We had the Agreed Framework in 1994. So were people making the argument that, you know, if we don't have an NPT, it'll be much more difficult to deal with these issues than if we do have an NPT? I'm just interested to know what — were there only hurdles? There are also incentives or goals to achieve it, and how important were arguments like that in the negotiations?

GROUP: [LAUGHTER]

MATIAS SPEKTOR: Anyone?

THOMAS GRAHAM: What was the question?

MATIAS SPEKTOR: So one of the questions is, did the P5 in particular fear that the reason why the NPT ought to be saved and extended was because there were dangers of proliferation? Were there any obvious candidates for proliferation around the world at the time? Someone mentioned Iraq, but was Iran a concern with saying that North Korea was potentially a concern?

THOMAS GRAHAM: I can answer that.

MATIAS SPEKTOR: Please.

THOMAS GRAHAM: The only reason — well, that's overstating it. The primary reason the US wanted to have indefinite extension was because the fear of proliferation. [CROSS TALK] —

OR RABINOWITZ: Fear of what?

GROUP: Proliferation.

THOMAS GRAHAM: Fearing that the proliferating states would likely be unfriendly to us. Second, Iraq obviously was a — had been, by that time, a nuclear threat. Hopefully dismantled, but, as you recall, there was another war after the first one — after that date. And Condi Rice famously said, “We don’t want a smoking gun to be a mushroom cloud”. Of course, I think that...

JOSEPH PILAT: Above New York.

THOMAS GRAHAM: ...they way overstated it, but, nevertheless, that was a concern expressed by some. Second, Iran was a big problem by that time. We made — the US made a number of demarches with many different countries about Iran and their nuclear weapon — potential nuclear weapon program, although we didn’t yet know about Natanz and Arak. But we met — and that was ‘95, and we were very concerned about Iran rebuilding the Bushehr reactor. And then, third, North Korea, we already had experienced a dust up with North Korea in 1993–94, which led to the Agreed Framework, and so, yes, definitely in spades, all three were considered a problem at that time, 1995.

MATIAS SPEKTOR: Ambassador.

GRIGORY BERDENNIKOV: Well, in addition to what was just said, I would add that we get a more general concern on our hands if the NPT would go away. In such a case, the whole safeguards system would be gone as well, and that, in our view, would be a complete disaster.

THOMAS GRAHAM: Oh yes, yes.

GRIGORY BERDENNIKOV: And that would create a new, brave world, actually, and we thought that we shouldn’t even play with that. And that is why we were very scared, you know, of either one period of 25 — or rolling periods because, really, just imagine if we agreed to have 25 years. 25 years means 2020, and I’m almost sure now that, if we were to agree to it in 2020, the NPT would be finished, in the present political situation. With the rolling periods, first, the question is whether it is legal, according to the language of the Treaty.

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Main Committee,
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condemning
themselves.”

The Treaty doesn't mention this option. So we could be challenged by anyone at any time. And then, to pass from one period to another, you would also need some kind of a decision taken, so it is the same as having one period and then deciding what to do again. So, actually, both options were a door to a disaster.

MATIAS SPEKTOR: That's an excellent point [CROSS TALK].

THOMAS GRAHAM: I used to make that argument over and over again, but not nearly so eloquently.

GROUP: [LAUGHTER]

MATIAS SPEKTOR: Thank you, Ambassador. Joe.

JOSEPH PILAT: I must admit, I have to agree with the eloquence of both ambassadors, but I'd raise an interesting point. Because we work — and this gets back to the consensus point in a different way — because have historically worked by consensus in the Main Committees, the Main Committee, considering nonproliferation, was literally asking Iraq and North Korea to join a consensus condemning themselves. I mean, think about that. Iraq bargained a little and got language they found acceptable and stayed in the consensus. The North Koreans used that to leave the Conference. In their letter, they argued how they were, along with their good friend the United States, miserably treated and had to leave.

MATIAS SPEKTOR: [LAUGHS] Excellent. Did you want to react to this?

DAVID HOLLOWAY: Yes, my question was not whether there were worries. The question, I think, Ambassador Berdennikov answered. The question is if the NPT itself was seen as an indispensable mechanism for trying to address those issues because that's the kind of key argument, in a way. If you do away with that, then you're in a much worse position in trying to deal with proliferation. That seems to me that's an important argument.

THOMAS GRAHAM: If I understand correctly, David, President Kennedy, at a press conference —

DAVID HOLLOWAY: Yes.

THOMAS GRAHAM: You know that comment?

DAVID HOLLOWAY: Yeah.

THOMAS GRAHAM: He said 15 to 20 nuclear weapon states by 1975. I think that would have happened, and a lot of people believe that would have happened. Nuclear weapons were looked upon by some countries as just another weapon. Sweden had a program. Switzerland twice voted to have one.

SVEN JURSCHEWSKY: Taiwan, South Korea.

GROUP: [CROSS TALK]

THOMAS GRAHAM: Hazardous from our point of view, overwhelmingly.

GRIGORY BERDENNIKOV: Don't forget about multinational national forces.

DAVID HOLLOWAY: Yes, also.

GROUP: [LAUGHTER] [CROSS TALK]

MICHAL ONDERCO: So that — if I'm — I want to go back to the discussion we had before David's question because we talked the — sort of the idea when it was clear that there is going to be an extension, when there was the majority and so on and so forth. Especially for those who are pushing the majority, so for Canada and the Western countries and Russia as well, what was the motivation for you at that moment not to abandon the negotiations on the Principles and Objectives? If you knew that you had the signatures under the resolution, why didn't you go for the bare bones extension?

SVEN JURSCHEWSKY: My view was that you couldn't have the one without the other. That we needed — we had to have the meat on the table, and otherwise —

MICHAEL WESTON: But you have the signatures.

SVEN JURSCHEWSKY: That and 3.50 will get you a coffee at Starbucks.

GROUP: [LAUGHTER]

THOMAS GRAHAM: I hope it's good coffee.

SVEN JURSCHEWSKY: That's a very legalistic point of view.

MATIAS SPEKTOR: Okay.

SVEN JURSCHEWSKY: People can say, "Look, we did it in view of," and if the view of is gone, bugger off. You've changed the rules of the game. It wasn't possible to do that politically. Would have been a lie.

MATIAS SPEKTOR: So, —

THOMAS GRAHAM: There was a time when, at least occasionally, the US called itself obligated, that we had committed ourselves to South Africa.

ABDUL MINTY: I think it's difficult when you're not in a conference, but, as the situation is moving along, there are a whole lot of understandings that develop, and, if any one group or country broke away from it, it would immediately jeopardize all the other things that were agreed to. So you can discuss it as an academic issue.

MICHAL ONDERCO: Yeah.

ABDUL MINTY: "What about this?" And so on, and maybe there can be some PhDs on it, but it won't be highly relevant to what was being discussed and what was understood to be the common purpose of all of that effort.

SVEN JURSCHEWSKY: Again, I have to agree with Mr. Minty that it's part and parcel of the psychology of these events. It's of a piece. People have developed expectations, and, if those expectations are in some respect disappointed, they don't — they don't need 3.50 for a coffee.

GROUP: [LAUGHTER]

HARALD MÜLLER: Well, in our delegation, one major concern was the lack of clarity about the decision-making rule that was an argument notably developed by the legal department in the Foreign Office.

SVEN JURSCHEWSKY: Legal —

HARALD MÜLLER: Because — well, I mean, the point is we want to go

to vote, but we have no rule on how the vote is to be taken. Parties who want to avoid the vote because they know they are likely in the minority could then filibuster you. And, in the end, if it would have been a secret vote, there was a certain lack of certainty how that would resolve, despite all the beautiful signatures under the Canadian resolution.

SVEN JURSCHEWSKY: Lawyers have an obligation to give opinions that are useful. Not the contrary.

GROUP: [LAUGHTER]

SVEN JURSCHEWSKY: But that's a good lawyer.

HARALD MÜLLER: But in the German mindset —

SVEN JURSCHEWSKY: I know [CROSS TALK].

GROUP: [CROSS TALK] [LAUGHTER]

SVEN JURSCHEWSKY: If a lawyer doesn't give you a useful answer, get another one.

GROUP: [CROSS TALK]

SVEN JURSCHEWSKY: As is possible. They don't make policy. They support policy.

MATIAS SPEKTOR: Could we now talk about those hardline cases and how the P5, in particular, dealt with them? Indonesia, Iran, what did it entail?

NABIL FAHMY: Indonesia? [INAUDIBLE]

MATIAS SPEKTOR: Wasn't it Indonesia?

NABIL FAHMY: No.

MATIAS SPEKTOR: No?

ABDUL MINTY: Maybe in somebody's dream, but in reality no.

GROUP: [LAUGHTER]

THOMAS GRAHAM: Indonesia was hardline with us.

“I was carrying a letter from President Clinton to President Suharto, in which he encouraged indefinite extension, but he also said that the US would look with favor on the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the ASEAN region, in Southeast Asia. “

MATIAS SPEKTOR: Well, Indonesia was hardline with you, was it?

THOMAS GRAHAM: Yes.

MATIAS SPEKTOR: Tell us about it.

THOMAS GRAHAM: Well, I went there, and I was carrying a letter from President Clinton to President Suharto, in which he encouraged indefinite extension, but he also said that the US would look with favor on the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the ASEAN region, in Southeast Asia. The U.S. had never agreed to that before and had been asked many times — because the US Navy didn’t like the idea. And I was supposed to deliver it personally to President Suharto, but they said, “You can’t do that, and you can’t see the foreign minister either. You have to talk to us,” the number three, four, and five foreign ministry officials. So that wasn’t completely positive for the situation and then we had a debate. The Indonesians said “As soon as the conference begins, you will adopt rolling 25s,” and I said, “No, we won’t. We are going to stay with indefinite extension. No matter what happens, we will vote for that,” and back and forth like that for quite a while. And then, finally, he said — Ambassador Ibrahim it was — he said, “Well, I guess it is going to be a very difficult conference,” and I said, “Maybe,” and then that was it. That was not really a very friendly conversation.

MATIAS SPEKTOR: Were they difficult during the conference in their interactions with you? Do you remember?

THOMAS GRAHAM: By the end, Wisnamurti, the Ambassador in New York, after Alatas, the Foreign Minister, arrived, for the last week, he told me that they wanted one substantive change. They wanted to make clear that the PrepComs could consider issues involving the Principles and be, in other words, mini-Review Conferences. I had no instructions on that. At that moment, I was sort of talking with other people, milling around. A lot of defense advisors were sitting right behind me, and I didn’t know — wasn’t really sure what I should do, and — but I went ahead and took the chance.

Wisnamurti was positive, as opposed to what had happened a few months

earlier. He said, “Oh, okay, Tom. Come on. Give us a crumb,” and so I said, “Okay.” We agreed, and that was that. So I found that a somewhat difficult process, whereas I never had any trouble with Iran at all.

MATIAS SPEKTOR: Thank you. [CROSS TALK]

JOSEPH PILAT: And I would just like to highlight the fact that Indonesia was very critical throughout the Main Committee 1 proceedings, including the challenge to Larry Scheinman, the [INAUDIBLE].

MALE: There were countries in the Conference that were — didn’t really like the idea of indefinite extension. Venezuela, for example.

THOMAS GRAHAM: I mean, disagreeing is not being difficult, it’s a part of the process, of course. People disagree. It’s how you do it.

MATIAS SPEKTOR: Mm-hmm. Mm-hmm. And Iran was not — did not pose a massive opposition?

THOMAS GRAHAM: Iran?

MATIAS SPEKTOR: Mm-hmm.

THOMAS GRAHAM: They were only interested in access to nuclear trade. That was the only issue they were really interested in. They didn’t — I think it was the third PrepCom — they might have objected to women being present or something like that, but, other than that, no. They were fine. They — I mean, they disagreed on this one point, but that was the only thing.

JAAP RAMAKER: But, there was this hang-up the Iranians had with export controls and — which is, of course, essentially what Tom was saying. They had, essentially, the idea to multilateralize export controls, meaning, of course, that these would cease to exist.

ABDUL MINTY: But, they had a case, you see? Because they had some exports that had to go to them and could not be exported by the countries. So they asked — in fact, they asked me because of the NSG context, as to whether those decisions could be looked at again, and it was not in a confrontational way. “This country has denied X, Y, Z, and we want it for legitimate

trade. Why do they do that?” Indeed, in the one case, part of the NSG meetings when I took it up, the government itself would revise this position, and, when they revised this position, they thought that they could achieve this with a number of other items. So they were trying to build up some technology and capacity, and, when they found that this was being denied unilaterally, they said, “But why can’t we have it? What is the reason for it? We’re not doing anything wrong.” So, they did have a case from the national standpoint to take up the exporting countries. That’s why they took it up at the NPT as well. This was at a meeting of the NSG specially called to discuss these issues, and they sent delegations to Vienna. They sent a delegation there to participate in it with other members and were quite open at that time.

GROUP: [CROSS TALK]

JAAP RAMAKER: But, we had this discussion on export controls, but, of course, export controls do not prevent the development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, and there are many countries that accept export controls and have their imports of sensitive materials and are flourishing [CROSS TALK].

ABDUL MINTY: But see, they saw themselves as loyal members of the NPT, and they were then finding why other countries were discriminating against them. That was basically the issue, and they were taking it up in different ways. So then not with any position that if you don’t agree we are not going to vote for it. It was nothing like that, and they were actually keen on having a dialogue.

BILL POTTER: So, I’m curious. I mean, you had in ‘92 the major revisions to the NSG guidelines under the Chairmanship of Tadeusz Sztrulak. Then, you kind of fast-forward to ‘95, and you have Sztrulak as the Chair of the Drafting Committee for the Conference. Is there any — is that seen as — by some countries that were not happy with the NSG — as an issue at all, or is it just irrelevant?

ABDUL MINTY: Well, the NSG works in mysterious ways.

GROUP: [LAUGHTER]

ABDUL MINTY: Very, very mysterious ways, and I was Chairman of it [LAUGHS]. The problem is that, if a few countries, three or four, decide on a certain procedure, then there is a good chance that they will get the rest to go along with it. And so, if you were a country that was aggrieved, you couldn't. But, of course, the other good part about it is that you could have a dialogue directly. So as NSG officials, we used to have a dialogue with Israel, with Iran, with a few countries, and we'd even say to them, "Please put proposals in terms of regulations that you think that you aren't happy with." So, in that sense, it was a kind of open process. Then, of course, some countries like Israel, India, and others wanted to join, and then at that time we said, "No. You can't really join, but you can have a dialogue with us." So, they were all obviously unhappy with that. But, every year before the NSG itself met, they used to have separate meetings with the officials of the NSG and sharing with them what they were doing, and the others could make their representations to the NSG if they so wished on particular issues. But Iran did have particular export items that they were denied, and the country concerned changed its policy with regard to those items, so Iran then found that they could buy those items. So that was a positive outcome.

MALE: Ambassador Jurschewsky.

SVEN JURSCHEWSKY: Sven, make it easy on yourself.

GROUP: [LAUGHTER]

SVEN JURSCHEWSKY: There's a different — it's a question. When the Conference began — and it's in line with overcoming the opposition at turning points. When the Conference began, there were a huge number of NGOs operating, and most of them were in favor of unlimited extension. To what extent did this have an impact on the Conference? I mean, they engaged in tremendous... my wife was getting lunch every day...

GROUP: [LAUGHTER]

SVEN JURSCHEWSKY: ...from someone, and she said, “I don’t know anything. I’m pregnant,” and —

GROUP: [LAUGHTER]

SVEN JURSCHEWSKY: But you can talk to your husband in bed. To what extent did that have an impact? And I had the sense — I can’t really nail it down, with the exception of Greenpeace, with which I had a very constructive relationship, to my surprise, was a New Zealander who headed the delegation who switched over to supporting an unlimited extension. To what extent was there a change, in NGO opinion, by and large? And to what extent did that have an impact on the conference? It’s not a question that I can answer myself or I have views on even.

MATIAS SPEKTOR: Yeah. [INAUDIBLE]

THOMAS GRAHAM: I would just make two comments on this. First, curiously, I had a decent relationship with Greenpeace as well.

SVEN JURSCHEWSKY: Yeah.

THOMAS GRAHAM: But I was talking, not to the people who were there, but I had the number of all kind of management, and, I guess, it’s this country, isn’t it? Isn’t that where they’re headquartered?

SVEN JURSCHEWSKY: Yeah. Yeah.

THOMAS GRAHAM: One person from those offices came to the Conference, so they were okay. The other thing I would mention is that Joe Cirincione organized a “support NPT extension” NGO. It was an NGO just for that purpose, and they did a number of things. They set up a meeting with — correct me if I’m wrong about this, Bill, but Ambassador Ayewah of Nigeria and I were to address a group of African ambassadors who were present. This was at the second PrepCom, I believe. They were present in New York and about 20 or 25 of them, and so Ayewah couldn’t appear in the end, but his special advisor read his statement, and I made a statement as well, but, in his statement, he said that — which she read — he thought that nuclear weapons were impor-

tant, that everybody should have a chance to have one, if only for a few years, to see if they liked them and that the only reason that Nigeria [CROSS TALK]

ABDUL MINTY: He wanted to rotate yours.

GROUP: [LAUGHTER]

THOMAS GRAHAM: [CROSS TALK] Nigeria doesn't have them now, was because they couldn't afford them. Well, after it was over, I had about 20 African ambassadors lined up to ask me, "How do I sign up for indefinite extension?"

GROUP: [LAUGHTER]

SVEN JURSCHEWSKY: That was the number two in the delegation, wasn't it? He was number two?

THOMAS GRAHAM: What's that?

SVEN JURSCHEWSKY: That was the number in the African delegation.

THOMAS GRAHAM: Ayewah?

SVEN JURSCHEWSKY: Yeah.

THOMAS GRAHAM: Yeah, but the number one guy didn't do much.

SVEN JURSCHEWSKY: No, but the —

THOMAS GRAHAM: He was number two, yes.

SVEN JURSCHEWSKY: Yeah.

THOMAS GRAHAM: You're right.

MALE: [CROSS TALK]

BILL POTTER: There's another role, I think, that the NGOs play, and it was really, you know, a very small number of them who were reporting on a, you know, daily basis as to what had transpired. And particularly, again, for the smaller delegations that were not able to participate in the Presidential Consultations who might not even be able to attend meetings that were being held

simultaneously. The reporting by Rebecca Johnson and others was exceptionally useful in terms of being able to take the pulse and know what was actually going on. So it may not have directly influenced anybody's positions, but it was a very useful contribution to an understanding of what was transpiring.

ABDUL MINTY: We had a lot of briefings with them because some of them were also connected to us through the anti-apartheid work of all the years. Women's international network, for example, where they tend to specialize much more on nuclear issues, but we knew them before this occurred.

MATIAS SPEKTOR: : One of the most vocal opponents to indefinite extension was the then-representative of Venezuela, who ends up being removed from his position, and the gossip in Latin America in America is that Ambassador Thomas Graham was very good at being a vigorous diplomat, you know, twisting arms. That's the folklore in Latin America.

THOMAS GRAHAM: Well, I —

MATIAS SPEKTOR: Ambassador, can you reminisce?

GROUP: [LAUGHTER] [CROSS TALK]

THOMAS GRAHAM: I was not at all sorry to see him go, but I — obviously I didn't have the power to do that. It was the White House, but I was delighted that he left.

GROUP: [CROSS TALK]

MATIAS SPEKTOR: But why has it moved that way? Did Venezuela pose a serious threat to the majority?

THOMAS GRAHAM: Well, the White House didn't really have to ask for his removal, but he was the only Latin American — by that time, the only Latin America ambassador who didn't support indefinite extension. We had a 32 out of 33, but, you know, 33 to 0 is a better number.

GROUP: [CROSS TALK] [LAUGHTER]

THOMAS GRAHAM: He certainly, at that point, wasn't a threat.

MICHAL ONDERCO: So, what, was this just a prestige thing?

THOMAS GRAHAM: To get rid of him? Well, I mean, he wasn't a threat to the outcome. But I suppose he could have thrown a lot of muddy water on me after it was over and set the press off. That's probably what they were worried about. I had been worried about him earlier. Joe, do you remember that? When that happened?

JOSEPH PILAT: I — vaguely. I was actually going to comment on [CROSS TALK].

THOMAS GRAHAM: But there was an attempt to get rid of Marin Bosch much earlier, but by then —

JOSEPH PILAT: In 1990.

THOMAS GRAHAM: And — but that —

GROUP: [LAUGHTER] [CROSS TALK]

THOMAS GRAHAM: Zedillo personally was contacted by Clinton to get rid of Marin Bosch, and he agreed. He just didn't say when [CROSS TALK].

GRIGORY BERDENNIKOV: He was sent to Barcelona.

JAAP RAMAKER: Is that the explanation for Barcelona?

GROUP: [CROSS TALK]

THOMAS GRAHAM: And he was appointed the Consul General in Barcelona, a very nice job.

GRIGORY BERDENNIKOV: A nice place!

GROUP: [CROSS TALK]

THOMAS GRAHAM: So that's not really getting rid of somebody. As I said earlier, I liked Miguel Bosch. He was his own man, and, agree with him or not, but Taylhardat was — he wasn't very nice, and I think he might have been a problem afterwards, negative with the press afterwards. But I don't know. In any case, I was happy to see him go, but it was the White House's decision.

JOSEPH PILAT: Yeah, I was just going to say that any discussion of NGOs and indefinite extension really has to look at PPNN and not only the seven or eight years that they were active before '95 but the fact that — I think that the content of the South African proposals had been, at least, socialized in the PPNN arena and, I think, pushed and pursued there in important ways.

MICHAL ONDERCO: Can I talk more about that?

THOMAS GRAHAM: Great. Absolutely. [CROSS TALK]

JOSEPH PILAT: Maybe Harald would be better to talk.

THOMAS GRAHAM: They were very good, and they played a major role in Pelindaba.

HARALD MÜLLER: What do you want to know?

GROUP: [LAUGHTER]

MICHAEL WESTON: Well, Joe suggested that PPNN sort of was the incubator for the ideas that then animated some South African thoughts.

HARALD MÜLLER: As you know, the most important part of PPNN, of our activities, was these briefing sessions, as we call them, which were practically small conferences initially thought to socialize young diplomats into the issues, but, more and more, it grew into a forum where, you know, the more senior people appeared. Everyone was discussing the more the '95 Conference approached, the major issues there. And one of the big advantages of the whole the whole format was that there was time enough and occasions to meet at the margins and to exchange views outside of the formal sessions. And there were such exchange in which I participated, where, indeed, ideas that sounded very much like the package were ventilated, seriously pursued.

JAAP RAMAKER: The idea was, indeed, that — I've known Ben Sanders very well because he was compatriot. Still did — still is. He's still alive? Because I lost contact with him, yeah?

MICHAL ONDERCO: He was alive as of last year.

GROUP: [CROSS TALK]

JAAP RAMAKER: Oh, okay. Okay, fine, fine. No, but the —

SVEN JURSCHEWSKY: Is John still alive?

MICHAL ONDERCO: Yes.

JAAP RAMAKER: He was frustrated by the fact that diplomats, being diplomats, there was an enormous turnover in them. Every time there would be completely inexperienced and un-knowledgeable set of diplomats, if that's a word, young diplomats who were manning all of these conferences without having a clue and so on and so, and he wanted also to educate and, in this manner, have better functioning Review Conferences. And I think that was one of the very useful things Ben Sanders did; he had seen that so often while he was working in the UN Secretariat on disarmament matters. I remember Soviet Ambassador Israelyan back in the CD in the eighties. He used to say, "Every year, we have to start all over again" because half of the diplomats was new, and so — and Sanders saw the same in the periodic review processes. He said we have to do something about it.

HARALD MÜLLER: Well, Ben once told me that the starting point for his idea of PPNN was during a post-mortem conference to '85, when I, as a then 60-year-old boy, told the people who had basically played the big roles in '85, "You're all so old," and he said, "Oh, the boy got something here, and we need to educate the young people," but, as I said, there was really a shift in the composition of the participants in PPNN conferences as the '95 Conference approached, moving towards seniority. And —

SVEN JURSCHEWSKY: Also moving towards fancier and fancier venues.

GROUP: [LAUGHTER] [CROSS TALK]

HARALD MÜLLER: [CROSS TALK] PPNN — well, I mean, during the Conference, I think, at least eight PPNN members, maybe more, were either in delegations or in the Secretariat or were the President of the Conference, as

"Every time there would be completely inexperienced and un-knowledgeable set of diplomats, if that's a word, young diplomats who were manning all of these conferences without having a clue and so on and so, and he wanted also to educate and, in this manner, have better functioning Review Conferences."

Jayantha. And we met regularly, all of us, and Jayantha attended when he could find the time to discuss the course of the Conference and try to feed back our own discussions and our delegations. I cannot judge whether that had any impact, but at least it was, if you wish, the backdoor of communication among some delegations.

JAAP RAMAKER(?): Harald, could I ask another question regarding Germany's commitment to indefinite extension? One of the things that came out in the oral histories that Michal did in preparation for this, one of the things is the notion that many countries were uncertain about Germany's commitment, and that might come up in the course of negotiations as something to be reckoned with. What's your recollection?

HARALD MÜLLER: Well, I think I addressed this question already this morning, but I'm happy to repeat myself. There were discussions in the political elite during the preparation stage, '94. There was a dispute in the Foreign Office, which ended by the opponent of indefinite extension being sent to the Caucasus. There was debate in Parliament, which ended in almost unanimous resolution in which the liberals, the Greens, Social Democrats, and the conservatives all voted for indefinite extension.

That was the first time ever you had an official and formal endorsement of the Treaty by our Parliament. And it ended by the decision a Chancellor and Foreign Minister together in '94, in early '94 to support indefinite extension and to commit to EU action on that behalf, and that basically ended the debate in Germany. I think our delegation was not unhappy that people looked at us with a question mark because it made us more important. But I think whoever observed Ambassador Hoffmann operating at the Conference would confirm that he was really a fierce adherent to the Treaty and its indefinite extension.

JOSEPH PILAT: Other key countries had similar debates, including Japan, and I think that, you know, we think about the West and the OECD world as firmly behind indefinite extension, but it took a while before that actually happened. The — some of the German concerns go back to reunification... I hap-

pened to be at the summit when two point — Two Plus Four was announced, and I can't tell you, from the Soviet's representatives to Belgians and others from Europe, "What are we going to do about Germany and the bomb?" I mean, it was almost as if we were in the pre-NPT debate over the German question, and it was quite remarkable, and the feelings were quite palatable in 1990.

HARALD MÜLLER: I recall the discussions before the Two Plus Four Treaty was included and there was this request that we renounce weapons of mass destruction again, and then there was some indignation.

GROUP: [CROSS TALK]

HARALD MÜLLER: Why should we do it again? We have done it more than anybody else, and we had debates about that, and the argument, which won the day, was, "Look, we are uniting. We are getting much more visible and possibly more powerful, and there are historical reasons for our neighbors to be concerned, so why do — don't we do them the favor and try not again?" That settled it. In Europe, you had similar debates. I know of at least, of course in the three neutral states, Sweden in particular at the time, in Belgium, and in Italy. Italy is one of the fathers of the 25-years limit. One should not forget that. And there was, of course, a debate whether it would be a good idea to eliminate that. I don't know about The Netherlands. Jaap might know this.

JAAP RAMAKER: It probably was before my time because I sort of did other things as well in between. I can't recall anything but we were firmly behind the indefinite extension...

HARALD MÜLLER: ...but that's the reason why I took so long, took side up on the joint action for indefinite extension, more than half a year.

MATIAS SPEKTOR: Okay. Although, did you have a question?

LEOPOLDO NUTI: [CROSS TALK] two fingers on this, but when you — particularly for Harald, but — for Joe as well. When you say that there were debates in these countries, do you mean debates were among the three alternatives, indefinite extension, one period, or more periods, or were there other

alternates being considered? Can you be a little bit more specific about what alternatives were being discussed?

HARALD MÜLLER: Well, I mean, the debate did not go into the precise text of extension resolutions. It was, more or less, a critical debate on indefinite extension.

LEOPOLDO NUTI: Okay.

HARALD MÜLLER: And one would have certainly worked of all the operational alternative if the indefinite extension would have lost the day, but, since it didn't come to that — I mean, there was none in Germany. No one, no fixation and weighing of alternatives, and I'm not familiar enough with the other European Union countries to judge that, but I suppose that it was similar.

LEOPOLDO NUTI: Okay.

HARALD MÜLLER: Because what —

JOSEPH PILAT: Everything I have a seen and felt —

HARALD MÜLLER: Once [CROSS TALK] indefinite, you have no need to discuss the alternative.

LEOPOLDO NUTI: Okay, but if there was a debate, those — there was — somebody must have opposed indefinite extension, right?

HARALD MÜLLER: Oh, yeah, you have [CROSS TALK]...

JOSEPH PILAT: [CROSS TALK]

HARALD MÜLLER: ...to indefinite —

LEOPOLDO NUTI: Extension.

HARALD MÜLLER: And you have the counter position, which says, “No, because this would mean that.” That's the debate, and, if that debate is finished and the debate is finished by the decision for indefinite extension, the alternative — and an alternative debate about other options would be moot. That's all that happened.

MATIAS SPEKTOR: Joe?

JOSEPH PILAT: The — what I saw in some of these national debates was much like Harald describes, a — less of a legal — study of legal options than a question of whether or not the issue that came up when the NPT was first proposed for a lot of major European and Asian states. Whether they're — or not — they would accept a second class status for all time was the heart of the debate, and it came out as indefinite extension that there weren't as many details as the 1960s and '70s debates.

MATIAS SPEKTOR: Sven.

SVEN JURSCHEWSKY: I find this fascinating. We've never had that — those kind of debates, and certainly not back then. There was a national consensus in favor of nonproliferation and disarmament. In fact, the pressure was for us to take more radical and stringent positions, especially on disarmament. That was then. Now, the way that Canadian policy has changed, I'm not so sure that there would be as — I mean, what happened? I got instructions from the Prime Minister's office. "You're going to do this — one of the four pillars of Canadian policy, this year, do it," and a special line of authority was set up between myself and the deputy, and that was it. There was no debate.

There was no discussion, and it was going to be indefinite extension, period, finished. Now that may, in the political mind of the Prime Minister's office, have a lot to do with our relationship with the US, but it also, I have to say, would have reflected Canadian public opinion. There was, in fact, no need of a debate.

HARALD MÜLLER: I never doubted that Canadians are better angels than Germans.

GROUP: [LAUGHTER]

SVEN JURSCHEWSKY: That's not true, and you know it, Harald.

GROUP: [LAUGHTER]

MICHAL ONDERCO: Has there been any —

MALE: [CROSS TALK]

THOMAS GRAHAM: If I could —

JAAP RAMAKER: Sorry.

MICHAL ONDERCO: Has there been any debate about the desired course direction in a sort of broader debate, not within a smaller circle? A broader debate in place in countries of the South, so, like, in Egypt or in South Africa?

ABDUL MINTY: Sorry, what kind of broader debate?

MICHAL ONDERCO: About whether the indefinite extension is desirable?

NABIL FAHMY: At the time?

MICHAL ONDERCO: Yes.

NABIL FAHMY: We had a debate, and it was quite public about that for several reasons. We look at the context. We had ratified the NPT in '81 after a failed Review Conference in '80, and then the Madrid Peace Process had started, the ACRS process that hadn't moved on arms control, didn't succeed in moving things forward. We were trying to negotiate a bilateral understanding. So being asked to come and make an indefinite commitment was a big public issue, and that's why I mentioned earlier why, of course, the President didn't get engaged in the set of principles or this or that. He spoke out repeatedly on the issue of indefinite extension, against it.

We did — we have a limited number of NGOs that deal with these issues, so I think we were having discussions, but they weren't really that public, and it was mostly in the media.

MATIAS SPEKTOR: How about South Africa?

ABDUL MINTY: Well, South Africa was quite complicated at the time because we had just come out of an apartheid system, which did not allow much debate or discussion. So what you had, which I have been at pain to try and convey because it's a difficult concept since it's not the experience of most people

in their own countries, is that we had two pillars. One is, if you wish — and I'm summarizing — the resistance to the apartheid and the opponents of apartheid, and they had never been to any of the preparatory meetings etc. before 1995. It was those who were working in the government — that is, previous supporters of the apartheid system who were engaged in those events. I'm not saying they were putting those ideas forward, but they were engaged in it.

So we didn't have a very big debate, but the one thing about us which is a bit unique is that the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings made a huge impact in our country. It was massive. And we, as children, were not only reading about it but even reciting poems about it.

We had a South African Peace Council in the 1950s, and it organized on Hiroshima Day some event, and one of the experiences some of us had as very young persons was that, at one such commemoration, we were attacked by recent Hungarian refugees who wished to demonstrate their loyalty to the apartheid system — so there were a lot of learning process as you grow up in this atmosphere.

So, to participate in such action, you could face the full might of the law, and, if you were active in the Congress movement, you would not wish to give them more opportunities to victimize you further. So we had to work around difficult conditions.

MICHAL ONDERCO: But moving to '95, work of some South African historians, so, for example, Jo-Ansie van Wyke, she summarizes in her book that there was an ongoing debate within the ANC in '92 and '93, '94, '95 whether the Treaty should be extended at all, and then how long should it be extended.

ABDUL MINTY: Well, there were quite a lot of individuals who would say various things, but they did not represent any social forces, and they didn't form any strong element in the trade union movement or the churches or the ANC. But remember, the South African Council of Churches, the religious bodies, the trade unions and others, all worked together with the ANC, maybe not always through the ANC, but all worked together, so they all had similar objectives regarding nuclear weapons.

That is why we could jump this issue and agree with the apartheid regime

that we should get rid of our nuclear weapons. There were a few, even one or two senior members of the ANC, who said, “No, it was a mistake to give up all weapons.” Some said we should have kept them. The motivation of the regime at that time was seen as being identical to what of the big Western powers who all wanted South Africa to be disarmed. That is why we got rid of our chemical and biological weapons and also a lot of other capacities that we had which was built up with the support of those countries before.

So they — [LAUGHS] they helped the apartheid regime, and then they closed it all down as we came to the democratization – so that created a lot of suspicion, and some still persists.

MALE: Anna-Mart has two fingers on that, and [INAUDIBLE]. Go ahead.

ANNA-MART VAN WYK: Thank you. Just to link up to what Ambassador Minty has been saying, I mean, you must remember that only 1994 was the democratic elections in South Africa, and 1995 was the Review Conference. So, when the existence of the nuclear weapons program was made public in Parliament for the first time in March, 1993, South Africa was still in the midst, you know, of negotiations for a new democratic system there. I remember, I was still a university student at that time. It’s just the announcement kind of disappeared, and all the other important things as well happened in the country. There were no public discussions about — and South Africa only signed the NPT in 1991, so, between 1991 and 1995, with everything that was happening in the country, apartheid coming to an end, all the violence that was still prevalent in the country, negotiations in Kempton Park, it really dominated what was happening around that time.

There was no public debate that I knew of, you know, about the NPT or the Review Conference of ‘95. We don’t even know where it was. Not even in history classes did we, you know, discuss anything like that, but just also to link this to something said. Some people in the — I even see one or two people, you know, kind of like what was saying that, you know, maybe we shouldn’t have gone that route. I’ve got a quote, Joe Modise, who was the minister of defense in a meeting with Waldo Stumpf. He said, “Dr. Stumpf, Africa is actu-

ally cross with you that you dismantled the nuclear weapons. Africa would have liked very much to have its own weapon,” and Julius Nyerere basically said a similar thing, but they were foreign and minority, and I think they kind of, like, were not really serious when they said that because the ANC had a legacy where they — and they have been against nuclear weapons for a long time.

GROUP: [CROSS TALK]

NABIL FAHMY: Just to correct my own language. In using the word “debate,” one assumes that you’re getting different opinions. In the discussion we were having, it wasn’t about do we support indefinite extension or not. It was, basically, what other extensions would be useful? Nobody was supporting the indefinite extension, and, strangely enough, except for some minor writers, very few people were actually calling for withdrawal from the NPT. So there was a public discussion much more than the public debate it.

MATIAS SPEKTOR: Thank you ever so much. We’re going to break now for quarter of an hour, and we’ll be back very soon for the next session.

SESSION IV

MIDDLE EAST WMD-FREE ZONE

BERND KUBBIG: Good afternoon, everybody. Last round before the water bus and dinner. Good evening, everybody, afternoon. As the title says for this session, it's the shortest one, by the way, Middle East WMD-free zone. No *problématique*, a very easy kind of discussion. I guess we might be finished before 5:00, but we'll see. Maybe there's something behind it in the context. I would like to suggest not to be too repetitive, because we have a lot of things about consensus, about this tension thing and so on, but I think there is some linkage on these questions. I wish we had Ambassador Einhorn with us, but he couldn't make it, but he, like Mr. Fahmy, had given wonderful transcripts on the issues, one authorized and one semi-authorized, and I would like to take the role of the Chair and, from time to time, refer to both of them because they are not quite consistent and because people in the room are being — I would say attacked, but seen in a different light than they may be seeing themselves. I'm looking at you, Mr. Graham, for example.

GROUP: [LAUGHTER]

BERND KUBBIG: And I think the theme, to structure a little bit our discussion, although you are sovereign, I would suggest probably to use the word “friction” or “division.” And I might start bottom-up with Mr. Fahmy, maybe, as the key player in this respect, I guess, historically and also, maybe, also in current terms. Let me remind you, from my perspective, somebody who tries to get out and new ideas revived, in Vienna, the last NPT PrepCom, and now in Geneva, as the coordinator of the Academic Peace Orchestra Middle East,

I must say that this resolution on the Middle East is not just history, but it's a very important point of reference for all those who would like to shape the current debate, especially among the Arabs and the Arab World, plus or vis-à-vis three co-sponsors. And the interesting thing is that Egypt has submitted a proposal during the last discussion of the First Committee last October in New York to ask the UN Secretary General to become active in this area, WMD-free zone, convene a conference, again, and opt for a treaty text.

It is interesting— and this is a deviation from history that not the three co-sponsors of a major actors or Egypt, who actually wants to get into the game obviously because it's very disappointed, but it's the United Nations, so you might come back to that. In any case, this resolution has become a very important point of reference. If you agree that we might, of course you may change the course— follow the way of divisions, of tensions, my first question that I would like to raise is the one that concerns the — at the time, 1995, the Egyptian delegation itself. I — am I right that there was a kind of division between those who favored disarmament and those like yourself, Mr. Fahmy, because of your position, who are more in the extension game?

At the second level, I would raise would be the issue of coordination, or non-coordination, among the Arab states themselves. As I understood, your answers during your interview, again, there were various divisions of opinions. And maybe, then, a third issue would be in here, the tensions come in or different interpretations come in between Mr. Einhorn and yourself, Mr. Fahmy, on the importance of the President, in this case Mubarak, and the way Americans were complaining behind your backs on these things. But why don't we start on giving the floor to Mr. Fahmy on how your delegation came out of this.

NABIL FAHMY: Sure. Let me just make one point as a question, and then I'll answer very candidly whatever your answer is. Everything we say is on the public record, or can we choose not to put something in the public record?

BERND KUBBIG: That's Michal.

LEOPOLDO NUTI: Well, I mean, we can switch the tape recorder off.

NABIL FAHMY: No, I don't mean that. I mean, what I'm worried about is the public record being transcribed. That it's made available to the public. I mean, if we say something that —

LEOPOLDO NUTI: If you want to erase something, I mean, we can leave it out

MICHAL ONDERCO: Yeah, [INAUDIBLE].

NABIL FAHMY: Okay.

MICHAL ONDERCO: Just make sure that you say when to leave it out and when we can start again.

NABIL FAHMY: Well, we'll see it anyway, so — before it comes out.

ABDUL MINTY: When we see a text.

MICHAL ONDERCO: Yeah.

LEOPOLDO NUTI: Yeah.

NABIL FAHMY: Okay.

BERND KUBBIG: So that's why I think you're safe.

NABIL FAHMY: I'll try to be then as —

LEOPOLDO NUTI: Michael, can we also switch the tape recorder off?

NABIL FAHMY: No, I'm not worried about that.

MICHAL ONDERCO: I'm not sure how easy it is going to be to turn it back on.

NABIL FAHMY: [INAUDIBLE]

BERND KUBBIG: But, if it serves the truth, I think it would be wonderful.

GROUP: [LAUGHTER]

BILL POTTER: [CROSS TALK] last time when I saw Bob Einhorn, he said before you start to speak he wanted to indicate that he disagrees with you, so —

We were negotiating on the basis of “this is not a resolution we like, but the votes are there, so it’s going to go through”

GROUP: [LAUGHTER]

BILL POTTER: Regardless of what you have to say. [LAUGHS]

NABIL FAHMY: If he didn’t, it would be a problem. Let me start by saying that, when we went into the Conference in, if you want, the year before, before I actually reached the Conference, we had just come out of the ACRS, as I mentioned, not succeeding, but we have also tried to get into bilateral negotiation with the Israelis between the two Foreign Ministries, and it didn’t work either. So we were going into the conference having — really trying to get something done even outside the NPT before then. That’s my first point. My second point is Egypt has always been the most proactive among the Arab countries on the zone issue.

BERND KUBBIG: Very much so.

NABIL FAHMY: In all different forums. When the Conference started, our point of departure was we don’t like indefinite extension, but it’s going to happen. We were negotiating on the basis of “this is not a resolution we like, but the votes are there, so it’s going to go through”. So it wasn’t that we were at the conference still trying to stop the extension. Our assessment was it was going to go through, so the issue then was: Okay, what can we get in the Conference given that it’s probably going to go through with the extension irrespective of whether it goes through without a vote or with a vote? That’s a different issue. Now, in terms of — well, again, I’ll answer your questions in this context. Therefore, going into the Conference from day one, we intended and drafted a resolution calling for universal adherence to the NPT, which is what we do every year at General Assembly for the last 25 years, and the resolution always refers to the only state that is not a member of the NPT.

The only difference between this resolution and GA resolution is this was not attempted to be rhetorically harsh. It was intended to be factual, so it refers to Israel by name but doesn’t get into — it didn’t get into condemnations and stuff like that. In the discussions we had, the point was made to us because we used the language originally, “unsafeguarded facilities.” That, no, it wasn’t the only country that didn’t have unsafeguarded facilities in the Middle East. It was

the only country that would not ratify the NPT, and that's why you had the names of two or three other Arab countries initially in the first [INAUDIBLE].

BERND KUBBIG: Djibuti, Oman, and UAE?

NABIL FAHMY: Yes, but that was not on the weapons of mass destruction resolution. That was on a nuclear-weapons-free resolution. So that's how this actually started, and that was part of the discussion, and, as Tom said, these three countries got annoyed when they ultimately saw their names publicly, and they said, "We don't compare with the Israeli situation because Israel has a serious problem," and, on that point, they're right, the original language should have said either non-member. So, anyway, that was the initial phase of the resolution.

There was no difference between different members of the Egyptian delegation whatsoever. We simply — because we are proactive on disarmament, we have a large team, each group designated for certain committees dealing with the content of the NPT, per se, peaceful uses, the disarmament part, all these issues, and then a very small group dealing with the extension issue and the Middle East resolution, per se. So our commitment to the NPT as an objective — by the way, even before we joined, Egypt chaired the First Committee when the Treaty was adopted back in '60s, so the goal isn't something we didn't support. We didn't like the ultimate result, and so on. So, for that reason, we had the disarmament people. We had the nonproliferation people. We had the peaceful use people, and you had those dealing with the high politics issue. That — but there was no difference in their position, per se, and I mentioned the difference among the Arab countries was not about whether we have a Middle East resolution or not, and it wasn't about whether we refer to Israel or not. It was about using the right language, which I explained. As this process went on — and Tom, correct me if I'm wrong, I remember we were either in Room Four or Room Five in the bottom floor at the UN —

THOMAS GRAHAM: [INAUDIBLE]

NABIL FAHMY: And Secretary Albright, at the time, was Permanent Representative in —

“Osama el-Baz was not somebody who dealt with disarmament, but he was close to the President.”

THOMAS GRAHAM: And then, to some extent, merged with this an effort to please the Foreign Minister, for Israel to take a step, and the Saudis got involved at one point.

NABIL FAHMY: Yeah, but what I mean is that Albright, at the time, was the Ambassador in New York. She wasn't then Secretary of State, and she came to us at the meeting. Nabil Elaraby was the head of our delegation, I was dealing with this issue with him, and she basically came and said, “One, the — how can you expect us to support a resolution with Israel's name in it? You need to take Israel's name out of it,” and our response at the time was, “There's no criticism here, but how can you expect us to present a resolution on the Middle East without specifically saying that we'd like Israel to join? Because we're calling for universal adherence.” And we went on in this debate consistently.

Then she said, “Well, okay, we get the extension resolution adopted without a vote, and we will abstain” — I'm not sure if she said abstain or vote against — “your resolution.” My answer, then, was, “Either they're both without a vote or they're both voted on,” and our instructions were — our instructions literally were if they're both voted on, we will call for a vote on the extension and vote no. We will probably lose the vote, but we will vote it on anyway, if they're both voted on. In that discussion — and this is where the point I made previously, I don't know what Bob said, but I assume this is what he was talking about. I mentioned previously the Americans, when they say something, they assume it's done. Al Gore tried to phone President Mubarak

BERND KUBBIG: [LAUGHS] The Vice President to the President.

NABIL FAHMY: Mubarak did not take the phone call, so Gore phoned Osama el-Baz, who was Mubarak's policy advisor, and told him what the concern was, that he wanted indefinite extension without a vote and all that. Osama el-Baz was not somebody who dealt with disarmament, but he was close to the President. He was also originally from the Foreign Ministry, so he phoned Nabil Elaraby, and we were all in Room Four or Room Five at — in the basement, and we were sitting there, and some young man comes in and says to Nabil Elaraby, “Osama's on the phone,” and the answer was, “Not now..”

GROUP: [LAUGHTER]

NABIL FAHMY: So whatever Al Gore said to Osama never came to us as members of delegation. It came to us from the Americans in New York who assumed that they had achieved what they wanted

GROUP: [LAUGHTER]

NABIL FAHMY: Because the ten — five minutes or ten minutes later, Albright tells Nabil Elaraby, in my presence, “But your instructions are A, B, C, and D.”

MALE: [LAUGHS]

NABIL FAHMY: And Nabil Elaraby looks at me and he says, “Do you have those instructions?” “Of course not.”

MALE: [LAUGHS]

NABIL FAHMY: And Nabil is a nice guy. So he gets annoyed by all this, and he leaves the room. So I’m — at the time I was not an ambassador formally, so I’m there sitting with the American Ambassador, and she looks at me and says, “What do we do? What do I tell Gore?” I responded politely but candidly that “I have no relation with Gore.”

GROUP: [LAUGHTER]

NABIL FAHMY: “You can decide whatever you want to, but, if you want to get this done, we need to sit down and try to find an answer to this” because our assumption was this is going to go through by a vote. So we wanted to get something out of the Conference, even though we didn’t like the result that’s coming out of the Conference. We had, again, this discussion with the Americans, who kept repeating, “But how can I support this resolution if it has Israel?” And we kept saying, “We’re not going to allow for a vote on our resolution alone rather than on the whole thing.” Then I say this, and I say this frankly, Tom, respectfully, but it happened. The Americas decided that, if Mubarak isn’t taking the phone calls, then we need to find a way contact with Mubarak. So Clinton wrote him a letter specifically saying, “The two guys up

there in New York are” — “but let me be careful here — “complaining about delegation in New York, to be precise.

MALE: [INAUDIBLE]

NABIL FAHMY: The message, essentially, was, “These guys are giving us a hard time.” First of all, the — our President had just said two weeks earlier, “I’m not going to sign on indefinite extension,” and you’re talking to a guy with a military background, you should think twice before telling him to call in his negotiators in the middle of negotiations. Mubarak never did that. He may, at times, have differences with one of his principals, but never while he’s working. So we were never told even what Clinton sent to Mubarak. My — our common friend Bob Einhorn told me, “Clinton just sent a letter to Mubarak,” and I remember thinking, “He just made my day.”

GROUP: [LAUGHTER]

NABIL FAHMY: Not because I wanted the conference to fail but because I knew Mubarak would act exactly the opposite, and it’s only after end of discussions I suggested when Albright said, “What do we do?” And Tom, correct me, who exactly was telling — because I forget. “What do we do?” I said, “Look, I’m not going to submit a resolution in Egypt’s name without referring to Israel, and you can’t support Israel, so the only thing we can do then is somebody else submits the resolution,” and we suggested depositaries. In that case, it’s not an Arab resolution, and, frankly, it should carry more weight because depositaries are the depositaries for the whole Treaty. Then, the Americans talked to the Russians and the British delegation and ultimately came back, but they came back with the request, “Okay, let’s not make it only a nuclear resolution but make it a weapons of mass destruction resolution.”

For us, the NPT is not concerned chemical and biological, but we didn’t have a problem with that because we actually had our own Middle East weapons of mass destruction-free resolution initiative announced in the early ‘90s, so, substantively, it wasn’t a problem for us, although how are you going

to monitor a chemical weapons thing as part of the NPT? But anyway, if this moves forward — and they came back to us saying, “Look, you can’t expect to have a zone created in the near term, so what about practical measures?” Eh, it wasn’t ambitious, but it was a reasonable proposal, and the actual negotiations on that draft resolution did not take that much time in comparison to how crucial it was. It’s only after that the Americans agreed to go back and talk up to depositaries about whether or not they could come up with a resolution. That we phoned Cairo, which we did every evening, to brief them on what’s happening, and it’s only then that we heard of the Gore contact from Cairo, or the letter that Clinton had sent Mubarak from Cairo, and the instructions from Mubarak were, “Keep on your policy.” So the idea that there was any pulling — the only hitch throughout the Conference that we ever faced was: how do you deal with the sensitivity among the three Arab countries of being referred to in a resolution about the Middle East, which normally only refers to Israel because it’s the only regional member that’s not ratified?

There was never any pulling back. It does not mean that what Bob thinks happened — he doesn’t think it happened. But it’s the typical problem — is that every time they ask for something, they assume it went all the way up. Well, one call — phone call was not taken. The other letter was carefully considered, of course. It came from a very high official, the President of America. But it’s not something that Mubarak would do in the middle of negotiations. If he felt that we had pursued the wrong policy, later, he might have said, “Okay, you guys should do this in the future,” but that’s not the way he operates. So at no time was there any pull back from Cairo, and I would argue that we actually had more authority and confidence from Cairo because we were very honest with officials in Cairo that, whether we like it or not, this extension’s going to happen, so let’s look at what we can get at the Conference rather than a futile attempt to get oppose extension.

Even though the same people were saying, “We don’t like indefinite extension,” but, as has been said repeatedly, there was a point where you can realize it can happen without a vote or it can happen with a vote, but it’s going

to happen. At that point, we were not wasting our time on trying to oppose the extension.

THOMAS GRAHAM: Let me tell the American side of this.

BERND KUBBIG: Can we just —

THOMAS GRAHAM: [CROSS TALK]

BERND KUBBIG: For a little bit — I think I would like for the record. I mean, this is unusual for the record, and I think there is — there's two things that need to be clarified at this point, and the first one would be Mr. Einhorn is in full praise of yours and your colleagues diplomatic skills in doing something, in convincing the — to get the three co-sponsors on board without Egypt, and my question is this: why without Egypt? This would have meant ownership, hegemony, if you had joined.

NABIL FAHMY: No. If I — for me to — politically, for me to talk about the Middle East, I need to — I have to be completely candid. I have a constituency back home that does not understand why I joined the NPT, that hasn't seen any progress after that, and some of them will tell you — and it's partially true. Not 100% true, but partially true, that we had received commitments from the major powers that, if we joined the NPT, they would make a best effort to get the Israelis to join. Now, we have that commitment. It's not on paper though, but I can tell you where and when it's actually given. Now, it didn't succeed, and I'll leave aside why. So there was an angry constituency, and every year, we would submit the same resolution to the General Assembly.

We had occasionally also submitted resolutions to the IAEA. So I could not politically afford to submit a resolution on the Middle East which does not say Israel, even though we had watered down the language so it was very factual. It wasn't rhetorical in any sense. For me, it was much better to have the few depositaries who deposit the Treaty sponsor a resolution where they are saying — “You need to get practical measures in this area,” and to have this as one of the legs of the agreements reached at the Extension Conference was also significant for us.

BERND KUBBIG: And the constituency is the military or...?

NABIL FAHMY: No, general — everybody. Everybody.

BERND KUBBIG: Okay.

NABIL FAHMY: Anybody who was following the issue simply — I mean, again, there's a record here that goes back 25 years that General Assembly every year is the same resolution.

BERND KUBBIG: One more point and then Mr. Graham, and that is — also for the record, I think it would be important to get something resolved where Mr. Einhorn says, “President Mubarak wasn't really informed. He didn't know about the zone,” and you say, “Well, wait a minute. He wrote a — we wrote a 15-pages memo for him.”

NABIL FAHMY: Mhm.

BERND KUBBIG: “And he was informed.”

NABIL FAHMY: Sure.

BERND KUBBIG: “And he gave us instructions.” Could you just clarify this for the record?

NABIL FAHMY: Yeah, I write the memo. Bob doesn't. That's my clarification.

GROUP: [LAUGHTER]

NABIL FAHMY: Okay? I wrote the memo. Amr Moussa was signed the memo. It involved not only the nuclear issues. It actually dealt also with the chemical weapons issues before that, and the fact that we were at — not ratified, not join the BW either, and it went — it was — I forget about — eh, it's over ten pages. And he comments on almost all the substantive operative paragraphs. So he knew very well what we were going to do at the Conference. We did not have to go back to them to tell them, “Okay, we're going to move from a nuclear weapon proposal to weapons of mass destruction” because he was the sponsor of the weapons of mass destruction proposal anyway.

So we didn't have to go back to him on that, but what we were doing, in

“Okay, we're going to move from a nuclear weapon proposal

to weapons of mass destruction” because he was the sponsor of the weapons of mass destruction proposal anyway.

other words, not supporting the extension, and then, okay, given that it's going to happen, we're going to go for resolution on the Middle East, of course he knew of that, and he was on board 100%. And again, even after the two very high-level contacts from America, his instructions to us were to keep going.

BERND KUBBIG: Mr. Graham, Mr. ...

THOMAS GRAHAM: Now [CROSS TALK] —

BERND KUBBIG: ...Mr. Einhorn is — was — is very critical of you. He's saying he didn't — you didn't make his day. On the contrary, he said, because of uncoordination between you and him, it occurred that this co-sponsorship was —

THOMAS GRAHAM: I didn't have anything to with this particular business that Nabil is discussing. There were many people working on this subject in the US government. President Mubarak had proposed the weapon of mass destruction-free zone in the Middle East...

BERND KUBBIG: 1990.

THOMAS GRAHAM: ...before the process even began.

BERND KUBBIG: 1990.

THOMAS GRAHAM: So it is an old — not old, but established Egyptian position. I met with Foreign Minister Moussa in the spring of '94, I believe it was, and he indicated in very, very strong terms that Egypt would not support indefinite extension, might not even support the NPT as a treaty, long-term, unless Israel made at least a step in the direction of eventually joining the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state. And he repeated that in subsequent meetings, but it was this first meeting that was the important one, and Nabil was there as well. And I remember when I walked out the door Nabil said, "You shouldn't think of your meeting with the Foreign Minister as a failure," and I said, "Well, what else would you call it?"

And so we tried to do something. Initially, I tried to do something, and, gradually, it went up the line. We had the American Ambassador in Egypt

involved. We had the American Ambassador in Israel involved. We had Assistant Secretary of State for the Middle East, Bob Pelletreau, involved and we had Secretary of State Christopher involved, who made two trips out there just for this purpose. And so it wasn't that we didn't try. And I went there and talked to the Ministry of Defense and the Foreign Ministry in addition to doing a speech at Jaffa University. The Defense Ministry wasn't too helpful, but the Ministry of Foreign Affairs said, "Well, we know how important the NPT is, and, if it wasn't that we're concerned about nuclear weapon stockpiles in Iraq and Iran, we would consider joining, but that's — we don't see that happening anytime in the foreseeable future, so we'll just have to wait until things work out into a better situation in the Middle East," and I said, "Couldn't you do something, just some small step?"

And then he said, "Well, we'll consider it." Well, they never did do anything, and so alternatives were pursued. The Saudis were involved for a while, but it eventually it fell to the Egyptians, and Bob Einhorn was the key player, but the — he, by no means, was the only one. And I can't speak to this particular disconnect, but it sounds most unfortunate, but the night before — as I said earlier, the night before indefinite extension passed, we still had nothing. I mean nothing in any way agreed, and no text in front of us to work from. We had a meeting at the State Department with Dhanapala as the Chair and Madeline Albright, myself, and Bob Einhorn on the US side and Nabil and an ambassador from Syria, and I think there were two other —

NABIL FAHMY: That was in New York, though. Not in Washington.

THOMAS GRAHAM: Yeah.

NABIL FAHMY: [INAUDIBLE] UN.

BERND KUBBIG: UN?

NABIL FAHMY: Yes.

THOMAS GRAHAM: Yes.

MICHAEL WESTON: You said the basement of the State Department.

“The Saudis were involved for a while, but it eventually it fell to the Egyptians, and Bob Einhorn was the key player, but the — he, by no means, was the only one.”

THOMAS GRAHAM: Oh, I'm sorry. UN, yeah, sorry.

MICHAEL WESTON: You meant the UN. You meant the UN, yeah.

THOMAS GRAHAM: In the basement of the United Nations. And so we were arguing — we'd been arguing for quite a while, and we were, at the moment, arguing the naming issue, and the three states show up — Djibouti, Oman, and the UAE. And they said to us — as Nabil accurately said, they didn't want to be named either for good reason, and so the Egyptians and Syrians said, "We are not going to sponsor this resolution if it doesn't name Israel," and Bob Einhorn was going over to the telephone roughly every half-hour to call the Israeli mission to keep them apprised of what was happening. And then Dhanapala says, "Well, don't look at me. I'm not going to sponsor it," and then he looked at me and just said, "How about the depositaries?" And we really wanted to have something, you know? Because, for obvious reasons, we thought it was important to indefinite extension, and also we had promised that we would try to do the best we could here. And so I said, "As far as this depositary is concerned, yes, but I have to check with the other two," and I called Michael, and I called Sergey, as I said earlier, and so we ended up with a resolution that was typed up over the night, I assume, and Sergey had his chance to read it before it was in the news.

MICHAEL WESTON: The UK didn't bother.

THOMAS GRAHAM: [LAUGHS] And anyway, as I recall, the way it came up was — on the floor, it was that the — Dhanapala began to start, again, and the Iranians made an objection to something — some language in the Middle East resolution, so we all gathered around the Iranian Ambassador's seat at the General Assembly, and I think it was a good hour-and-a-half, two hours arguing about whatever this was, and, finally, language was found that satisfied him, and so then we went to Dhanapala, proposing extension: "Any objections? No."

And then strengthened review: "Any objections? No." And then Statement of Principles: "Any objections? No." And then he says, "And now I have a resolution introduced by the three depositary states on the Middle East," and

that passed — I believe that passed the same way [INAUDIBLE].

BERND KUBBIG: So you would say you make the case for, still make the case in hindsight for, this co-sponsorship, and you would probably say that Mr. Einhorn, again, who cannot be here, who says, “This was an uncoordinated policy if I had to say something — “

THOMAS GRAHAM: Well, I mean, this was earlier. [CROSS TALK]

BERND KUBBIG: No, I mean, that’s what he says in his authorized transcript, so I’m just quoting him, you know?

THOMAS GRAHAM: Well, he was present in our meeting in the basement. Einhorn was there, and —

BERND KUBBIG: It has no — it doesn’t sound so.

THOMAS GRAHAM: Albright, myself, and Einhorn were the US delegation [CROSS TALK]...

NABIL FAHMY: The whole team was there.

THOMAS GRAHAM: ...in the basement.

BERND KUBBIG: Okay.

THOMAS GRAHAM: He was there. It was not an uncoordinated policy at the end. And it was US policy, Egyptian policy, the UN, NPT policy.

BERND KUBBIG: Okay.

THOMAS GRAHAM: So it is a perfectly legitimate part of the NPT package of extension and is binding on all parties, and I — in 2010 — Nabil may remember, remember the Egyptians said, “Okay, 15 years is enough, and we want some action,” and something was put in the Final Document about “Let’s have a conference on the subject of the Middle East.” The Egyptians had wanted a negotiating conference, the US didn’t think it could support that and suggested a discussion conference. I was out of government by that time but was asked by the White House, since I was going to Cairo anyway to speak to the Council on Foreign Relations, of which Nabil was a member. We had

a discussion, and I said, “Could you guys possibly accept the non-negotiating conference, a discussion conference?”

And they — if I recall, I don’t remember it was Nabil or someone else, but someone said, “Well, the only reason — the principle reason he wanted to make it a negotiating conference is because we want the Israelis to actually say something,” and so a month or two passed, and Egypt accepted that. I believe — I don’t have any proof of this, but I believe that the expectation was that the US would deliver Israel, since we were given the proposed conference on our terms.

BERND KUBBIG: That’s right.

THOMAS GRAHAM: And we never could. And so that led to the failure in 2015 with much harsher language from the NPT parties.

BERND KUBBIG: I mean, that’s the [CROSS TALK] —

THOMAS GRAHAM: I think it all —

BERND KUBBIG: And you said it two times, implicitly, explicitly, there was a kind of — please correct me. Your working assumption was the US would do some arm-twisting whatever to strong convincing towards Israel to make its commitment. This is also in 2010.

THOMAS GRAHAM: We wanted to deliver if we could.

BERND KUBBIG: Yeah.

THOMAS GRAHAM: I mean, given all of the considerations.

BERND KUBBIG: Is that a fair statement?

NABIL FAHMY: It’s more than fair, but let me — it’s fair, but there’s a bit more to it than that. We had joined the NPT in ‘81, reversing long-standing policy without anything having actually changed, but we had decided, “Okay, we’re going to take the high road rather than insist of reciprocity as we move forward,” and that was on the assumption that the main players would ultimately help get the Israelis to join on board. And that didn’t work. So, in ‘95,

when the extension happened and we agreed to not declare the creation of a zone immediately but to take practical measures towards the creation of a zone, we assumed that there would be something happening between '95 and 2010, but nothing happened again there. So you're getting a build-up and disappoint here. 2010, I was not in government. I left government in 2008, but I was in Cairo, and I did meet you, of course.

THOMAS GRAHAM: You were at that meeting.

NABIL FAHMY: Yeah.

THOMAS GRAHAM: We had dinner.

NABIL FAHMY: Sure, sure. No, I was around, and I'm still around
[CROSS TALK].

THOMAS GRAHAM: I had my daughter with me.

NABIL FAHMY: Sure.

THOMAS GRAHAM: She was very impressed with your...

NABIL FAHMY: [LAUGHS]

THOMAS GRAHAM: ...business acumen.

NABIL FAHMY: Thank you.

NABIL FAHMY: In 2010, we —

BERND KUBBIG: For the record also?

NABIL FAHMY: That's the only part you're going to get for the record.

GROUP: [LAUGHTER]

NABIL FAHMY: Then we had a discussion in 2010 about this conference with the compromise language, with the Finnish Ambassador. The Finnish Ambassador was the coordinator for that.

BERND KUBBIG: Mr. Laajava.

THOMAS GRAHAM: Oh.

NABIL FAHMY: Yeah.

BERND KUBBIG: Jaakko Laajava.

GROUP: [CROSS TALK]

NABIL FAHMY: And we tried that for a while. What you just saw, you referred to earlier in your comments, the last Review Conference, the Egyptians were so frustrated that they decided, look, you're not taking this seriously in the NPT Conference, so we're going to make it completely political and take it back to the UN. That's why they submitted the resolution in the First Committee. Like, okay, well, since the NPT members cannot fulfill their commitments that they made during the Extension Conference, we will then make it —

THOMAS GRAHAM: As Nabil says, I don't work for the government anymore. I will say I think that was the right thing to do. [CROSS TALK]

NABIL FAHMY: Well, that's why they went to the UN...

BERND KUBBIG: [CROSS TALK]

NABIL FAHMY: ...and said, "Okay. We want to raise it with Secretary General of the UN." It's clearly not going to be an easy process to get the Secretary General to supervise negotiating a treaty, but you've now moved from let's try to deal with the technical issues to, "Okay, we'll go back to politics, if that's all we can do."

THOMAS GRAHAM: I'd like to say two or three other little things. First, in 1995, I had the specific authorization from the White House to be responsible for the extension of the NPT.

BERND KUBBIG: Well, that's important for the record.

THOMAS GRAHAM: That was my job, and it was in print, and I wanted to work hard on this issue, I didn't want in any way to lay down on the job I was — it was always a pleasure to meet with Foreign Minister Moussa, but I made seven trips to Egypt [CROSS TALK].

NABIL FAHMY: Yeah, Tom came up frequently. Yeah, sure.

THOMAS GRAHAM: And so — and others tried hard, and then when we had our discussion in Cairo in 2010, I said — and I believed it when I said it. I didn't make it up. I said, "I know this isn't what you wanted, a discussion conference, but it's the furthest the US has ever gone. You should give it a try." And they did give it a try, and the US could not deliver, and so I think they took the right next step, but I think this issue is going to come back with a vengeance next time, and we'll see what happens.

MICHAL ONDERCO: If I may just — because this is basically the discussion between Ambassador Graham and Mr. Fahmy.

THOMAS GRAHAM: Well, not —

MICHAL ONDERCO: But I want to say — I want to ask from the other countries, how did you see this discussion going on? If in London, in Ottawa, in Berlin, Bonn — at that time, at that time, in Pretoria. How did you see this discussion about the Middle East weapons of mass destruction-free zone? Do you see something where you said, "Well, if Americans and Egyptians can work it out, we're going to agree"? In Moscow? Or did you have anything to add to that discussion?

SVEN JURSCHEWSKY: Me, because it's short. We were happy. We had nothing to add, and the fear and concern that you had anything in such an arrangement you could topple it over, that would be a consideration. We would just support it(?)

NABIL FAHMY: If I can just make one comment which may answer your question, the number of delegations sitting in the room watching what was happening was extremely large.

OR RABINOWITZ: No?

BERND KUBBIG: It was extremely large.

NABIL FAHMY: Large. Even though most of the talk was between two delegations, but the Conference was engaged on this. Everybody had some-

body in there sitting, you know, trying to follow it, but I'll let the others speak on it.

MICHAEL WESTON: No, well, we were afraid that it was going to upset all the good work, and we weren't going to have indefinite extension, and it was going to be snatched away at the last moment, and, therefore, we saw it as a price that we certainly were willing to pay, and we would be as helpful and constructive as we could, and that's why I agreed without hesitation. I didn't even refer it.

BERND KUBBIG: Harald?

HARALD MÜLLER: Well, I think our main feeling was prayer and gratitude that we weren't involved.

GROUP: [LAUGHTER]

HARALD MÜLLER: That would have been difficult because of our relationship with Israel.

MICHAL ONDERCO: Ambassador Berdennikov?

GRIGORY BERDENNIKOV: Well, I already indicated our approach. I really don't remember how it was in details, but, hmm, I really doubt that we could have reported something to Moscow before reading it. And so my gut feeling is that we did the same as the British. We just agreed without referral.

BERND KUBBIG: Yeah.

MICHAEL WESTON: But you read it, unlike me.

GRIGORY BERDENNIKOV: Well —

GROUP: [LAUGHTER]

GRIGORY BERDENNIKOV: We read it — well, we got the text but not early in the process. But, really, we were very happy that the two could work together.

THOMAS GRAHAM: Well, I agree because, after all the pushing and shov-

ing, [CROSS TALK].

GRIGORY BERDENNIKOV: We were happy to help.

THOMAS GRAHAM: [CROSS TALK] we all did what we could.

SVEN JURSCHEWSKY: One thing that we did bring our Middle East experts, the people knowledgeable about the issues, to New York for that resolution. There was no need to refer to Ottawa, in other words.

GRIGORY BERDENNIKOV: Well, yeah, and that is also true.

SVEN JURSCHEWSKY: Yeah.

THOMAS GRAHAM: But anyway, looking to the future, not because this matter has been concluded, I doubt very much that this issue is going away any time soon. And it was very difficult the last time in 2015, I would think it will be much worse in 2020. You know, that is often the way things go.

BERND KUBBIG: I would like to draw your attention, if I may, to two aspects that deal with relations, and one of them is that Mr. Einhorn could not answer, and that was the question to what extent Egypt had relations or did communication with Iran, which will be my first question. And the second one, probably much more important, is the way Israel as a non-member of the NPT as we know, but as the tiger in the room, how you would like to summarize or problematize the relationship in — against the backdrop that you mentioned, Mr. Fahmy, being of the ACRS talks. You mentioned the Peres — you did have direct communication with Shimon Peres and his group, but I think you said it's — “we knew that he could not deliver for domestic reasons.” Maybe you want to — also, for the record, to elaborate on that?

NABIL FAHMY: Let me answer it this way. For us, after trying multilateral for many, many years, we started to — in parallel with a multilateral forum — also engage the Israelis directly, bilaterally, and this, of course, was much easier to do once we had a peace agreement with the Israelis. And even more so, when the Madrid Peace Process started, in spite of the fact that the ACRS process didn't success, we slowly started to talk to the Israelis about this. We had

— let me just put it this way, and I won't get any further on this because I'm writing a book about it.

We had substantial talks with the — with Shimon Peres, — as Foreign Minister at the time, not — he wasn't Prime Minister at the time, and it got him to consider in detail, but let me stop at that because also, in terms of your study, for us, this was not part of the NPT process. This was a bilateral negotiations, and the reason I say this is, if I made it part of the NPT process, then I would have to become much more negative in the NPT because we had not succeeded outside the NPT. So I wanted — and I'm talking about the country, Egypt did not feel the NPT had done enough but definitely felt it was better than not having anything. So we did not want to come and say because we had failed in the bilaterals, we then have to make the NPT Conference a fail. That was not the objective. So — and I think I'm correct on this — I don't think we talked to the Israelis once during the Conference, and, if I'm not mistaken, that was intentional because it was not about negotiating with Israel. It was about negotiating with the parties to the NPT. But we were negotiating with Israelis before the Conference bilaterally.

On Iran, the only time I — and it may be because we were simply so busy. We had — I personally have, even today, direct contact with the Iranian Foreign Minister because he happened to be in New York in the '90s when I was at the mission there, and we were friends when we were all much younger. But — and we talked to them regularly within multilateral meetings. So I'm pretty sure that our delegation talked to the Iranians during the NPT Conference, but I personally do not remember talking to them at all or anybody dealing with the extension issue and the Middle East issue, except that last day when we had to find the language for the resolution. So, in all honesty — and I would argue also, if you look at the record carefully, whether you want to believe this or not, the Iranians actually say all the right things about nuclear issues in multilateral context. They actually try to project themselves as being very positive, very cooperative on these things. You won't find them taking negative positions in multilateral conference, which is different when the lan-

guage they may use if it's of a regional issue and a security issue. So we did not focus on Iran on the extension issue or on the Middle East issue in '95, to be honest with you. I've talked with them about that later but not in putting the extension together.

THOMAS GRAHAM: [CROSS TALK] And let me just add to that. I didn't either. I had — I did talk with the Iranian Ambassador from time to time on trade issues and related access issues, always in the presence of someone from the EU, of course. That was my orders from the White House. And the fellow that was on the floor raised the objection I had never seen before. So maybe he came from the capital to do that. I don't know.

BERND KUBBIG: What I like very much in your not yet authorized but very extensive transcript, with your colleague, on this issue is — and I think I may create code for it because it's so emotional, and, at the same time, it's so telling. To — you said this after the weeks we — you were exhausted in — after '95, but, at the same time — let me quote, if I may so. “That asymmetry has always been a problem with us.” And then you said, “So, no, we came out of the Conference tired, not satisfied, but feeling that we had gone through a good battle, but we did not come out euphorically in any sense.” Then, you say, “We never in our wildest imagination thought we could get the three depositaries to adopt the position on the Middle East,” so I think, from your perspective, you could go home and present to your President and your Foreign Minister that you had achieved something, which is very remarkable result. Is this the way — correct wording — correct representation of your wording?

NABIL FAHMY: The interpretation is correct, but we didn't convey it that way. I mean, we were careful in going home not to claim victory because, on the substance we had — we were not any closer to universal adherence by — through the Middle East members of the NPT or to a zone? No. We weren't really that much closer, and we were all — I mean, our delegation were all professional diplomats, so they knew the meaning of a resolution, the meaning of language and what's absent from the language. So, in that sense, we weren't going to back and say, “We're victorious.” On the other hand — and I made

“We never in our wildest imagination thought we could get the three depositaries to adopt the position on the Middle East”

this point earlier, from the very beginning of the Conference, we already felt it's going to be extended, so we were negotiating, really, with a very limited hand.

However, that several major players wanted to extend the Conference without a vote gave us negotiating room, which we wouldn't have had had you said, "Okay, we'll go for 25 years or indefinite with a vote." Because you wanted more than what you had to get, it actually gave us room to work with, and we used it, I think, reasonably well. We did not try to overreach but had full decision making authority. The decision to have the depositaries sponsor the resolution was taken at the table, and it wasn't because we were going beyond our authority. It was because we had the authority. Contrary to what people think, what people say, the Foreign Ministry is the institution responsible for these issues in Egypt. And, as I mentioned in the memo, we had the President sign off on what we were going to do. Now — and he was never concerned with whether we came up with 3 depositaries or 15 sponsors, but he wanted something out at the Conference. So we were, if you want, professional negotiators with tremendous authority, but you know what?

We had a bad hand, and we came out with something. But we were also professional national security people. We weren't going to go back home and say, "Okay, we've solved the asymmetry." It hadn't been solved yet.

GROUP: [CROSS TALK]

BILL POTTER: I'm confused.

THOMAS GRAHAM: Wait just a second.

BILL POTTER: It's a procedural matter, if I may. So a number of people seem to have documents that not all of the members who participated in the Review Conference or the moderators for these sessions have seen, and I'm just — I don't understand exactly who received what in advance of this meeting or what other participants at this meeting who received subsequently. You're kind of quoting from interviews, and so I...

MICHAL ONDERCO: [CROSS TALK]

BILL POTTER: ...as to the process.

MICHAL ONDERCO: So for the — okay, so, I mean, just address that procedural question. In about — two months ago, when there was an email sent to all the chairs of these sessions, there was also line in that email that said, “If you wish to receive any of the transcripts, you can do that,” and Bernd requested the interviews that are related to this session, so he received them. Those who didn’t request any of them didn’t receive them. But they’re going to be made available at a later stage on the website. Yes.

MALE: [CROSS TALK]

BILL POTTER: Okay. I thought the question was the documentation that could be received either electronically or hard copy.

MICHAL ONDERCO: [CROSS TALK] Yeah, but that was the email that was sent to everyone, but to chairs, so to Bernd, Joe, Matias...

NABIL FAHMY: None of us got the email saying ‘you want to see the transcripts’.

SVEN JURSCHEWSKY: We never saw the transcripts.

MICHAL ONDERCO: No, but you received — you approved your transcript because — well, I’m not sure about you because that was Hassan supposed to arrange, but, for everyone else, you’ve seen your transcripts, and you’ve approved them, but what [CROSS TALK] —

MICHAEL WESTON: Our transcripts, not the others.

THOMAS GRAHAM: I haven’t seen anything on this subject or any other except —

MICHAL ONDERCO: Your own.

THOMAS GRAHAM: Well, yes, except my own.

MALE: Yes.

MALE: Yeah.

MALE: Yes.

THOMAS GRAHAM: I just want to say, Nabil, and I want the record to show the US, as I said earlier, never — at least until well into the Conference, was never that interested in consensus. We wanted to win, and we wanted to get the Treaty extended by as big a vote as possible. That is the way we thought about it. It was Dhanapala that wanted the consensus, and we wanted to please him as the Conference President. And, furthermore, we did not want to prevent Egypt from getting something out of this because we said we would try to do something, and so we were not unhappy that the resolution, or in the form it went through. So it was — we did not regard that — the US did not regard that as any kind of defeat or something. We were happy it worked out the way it did.

NABIL FAHMY: I agree with you completely on both points. At the beginning, you weren't pushing for — a decision without a vote, but, the minute we felt that you wanted that, we immediately had more room.

THOMAS GRAHAM: Yes, sure. Of course.

GROUP: [CROSS TALK]

NABIL FAHMY: At the beginning, you were not. At the beginning, we actually felt worse than in the middle of the Conference.

THOMAS GRAHAM: I'm glad you found it.

NABIL FAHMY: Yeah.

BERND KUBBIG: Harald?

HARALD MÜLLER: I just want to say on the history of the NPT after '95, it really looks like an Egyptian victory. Because, until that moment, the Middle East issue has never played a dominant role in any of the Review Conferences. After '95, the Middle East resolution always has been a reference document, and, when the issue was worse, like the confirmation in 2010, or the practical steps, the conference in —

MALE: [INAUDIBLE]

HARALD MÜLLER: No, in 2000, and the Conference in 2010, the Conferences became a success, and when the issue was not worked, like in 2005 when the Bush administration revoked the previous commitment, or in 2015 when you were dissatisfied with the result, the Conference failed. So it's really — it's a landmark in the history of the NPT.

BERND KUBBIG: And it is so because, right now in the current discussion, especially among Arab countries, it's the point of reference to get a kind of united position on it. But, going back to Ambassador Graham and his look into the future, my question — and my doubts are the following ones. I think with a move to go to the United Nations — to the UN General Assembly — I think your country has isolated itself from the Arab herd, flock, so to speak, is isolated now and has given up actually it's hegemonic position within the Arab world, and I wish, contrary to your interpretation, that we would find a way of getting you, the Egyptians, back in a face-saving way as the leader again of this zone issue. And my suggestion would be, as a face-saving way, to go back from the political to the working level.

And I think, Mr. Fahmy, what is needed since '74 is a text that, like the Pelindaba Treaty or the other ones, that you can work on together with the Arab countries. I think this would be something that probably can be a unified factor on this.

NABIL FAHMY: Well, let me suggest something.

THOMAS GRAHAM: [CROSS TALK] Are you talking about a Middle East free zone treaty text?

BERND KUBBIG: Yes.

THOMAS GRAHAM: That's just like saying, "I hope the sky is green tomorrow."

BERND KUBBIG: I don't think so. I don't think so.

THOMAS GRAHAM: You cannot have green sky.

BERND KUBBIG: You cannot call forever for such a zone without knowing what it means.

THOMAS GRAHAM: Someday it will happen, but not under current circumstances.

BERND KUBBIG: Why not?

THOMAS GRAHAM: Well, it's — I mean, I think it's important in dealing with these issues to go after what's — what is the possible. Israel's not going to agree to that with the situation with Iran and Iraq and Saudi the way it is? It's just — it's not possible, and — I don't think, and — but maybe someday. Everyone knows what these peace plan contours would likely be, if that could ever be negotiated. And, if that happens, certainly this could happen too, and this might even happen before, but the — I just don't see it in the — I feel the same way about nuclear disarmament. It's just not going to work right now.

NABIL FAHMY: Let me just —

BERND KUBBIG: My point is just about a unified [CROSS TALK].

NABIL FAHMY: Sure. Let me just comment. First of all, why the Egyptians went to General Assembly. You cannot exaggerate the level of frustration that exists in Egypt and its implications on policy. This is not rhetoric. We have not ratified a single arms control agreement since 1981. A single one! Including the one we hosted for Africa when the very first document was made in Egypt, and then we hosted the celebration, although the Treaty was actually negotiated in Pelindabala in South Africa. We have not ratified that nevertheless nor any other treaty because there's no movement. So don't underestimate what the lack of progress has had a negative policy effect on our pursuits. We always tend to be one step ahead of the region in arms control because we think, in the larger context, it's useful. That's my first point. That's why they went to the Assembly. If you were to show me evidence of a seriousness of purpose in negotiations, the Egyptians will do both at the same time. If not, we'll draw from the political part, but there's no implication of seriousness in negotiations.

I would even add to that two points, quickly. One, Bill's over there. Patricia, one of his former colleagues and my former colleagues, and I actually drafted a full text of a treaty on establishing for zone free weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. We — and all the details. And we've published it. So, if there was any seriousness of purpose, the content is there. It's not about the detail of how — of what we put in the agreement. Even that proposal will need some give and take, but it's more about the political readiness to actually take that step, so, again, I agree with Thomas. A bit farfetched, but I agree with you. You want that? You want the text? I can give you a text that we published four years ago.

NABIL FAHMY: My last point —

BERND KUBBIG: I know it. I mean —

NABIL FAHMY: My last point —

THOMAS GRAHAM: I have one more comment here.

NABIL FAHMY: Just one last point.

THOMAS GRAHAM: [INAUDIBLE] sure.

NABIL FAHMY: I've actually been looking for anything to make this work even step-by-step. And, as I mentioned to you just before we started, I even took the Iranian nuclear deal with the P5 plus Germany and looked at how we can possibly take advantage of that, not by destroying it, by — but by adding onto it without changing the parameters, and the deal is the deal between the P5 plus Germany and Iran. That's their baby. But how can we take the actual substance of that and add to it something at a certain point in time, in a time frame, that serves both the Iranian that you had the concerns about and also the nuclear — and you — I can give you all a copy of that when it's published very, very soon. So, if there's something serious, I'm happy to look at it, but, so far, there's nothing.

THOMAS GRAHAM: Recently, Cherif Bassiouni ran a discussion on this subject — what would you call that?

NABIL FAHMY: Track two?

THOMAS GRAHAM: Is it two or is it one-and-a-half or —

NABIL FAHMY: Whatever.

THOMAS GRAHAM: Anyway, it —

NABIL FAHMY: Authoritative people.

THOMAS GRAHAM: Mostly NGO-driven, but there were government people involved in the peace process and free zone — with a free zone as a part of it.

BERND KUBBIG: But it's basic [INAUDIBLE].

THOMAS GRAHAM: Hmm?

BERND KUBBIG: An Israeli [INAUDIBLE] —

THOMAS GRAHAM: Israel, Jordan, US, and Egypt, and the next of the free zone exists. It was worked out with the participation of the NGOs from Israel, among others.

BERND KUBBIG: I know.

THOMAS GRAHAM: And so there it is. It's there.

BERND KUBBIG: We were talking about Track One.

GROUP: [CROSS TALK]

THOMAS GRAHAM: We know what it would look like.

NABIL FAHMY: I'm not sure about this now.

BERND KUBBIG: We — on this last point, I think the most promising way forward has been suggested by your colleague, Mr. Ulyanov, on May 8th last year in Vienna.

GRIGORY BERDENNIKOV: I agree

BERND KUBBIG: ...where he says [that] we have to find a way to unite these two tracks, disarmament on the one hand, the legitimate Egypt call

[INAUDIBLE] for disarmament on the one hand, and the Israeli concern for regional security matters, and you suggest — or he suggests in this [INAUDIBLE] document — to have at least one session on Israeli security concerns, and I think one can build on this and make this much more — try at least to make this more equal as a way of looking before, but I like very much your proposal, bilateral, your country and Israel. It would be the something where bilateralism is much more important as a lesson from history than multilateralism. If you ask me, I would do something.

I would — we call it an Sisi initiative, and we have been trying together with an old campaign manager to do what Mr. Mubarak says — said in 1990 to produce a face-saving way for you to put this out to the highest level and open, like Mr. Mubarak did, a new chapter in the entire discussion on this — WMD, plus rockets, missiles, plus bringing Israel in and legitimizing Israeli concerns concerning the region interests as a way of conceding. Maybe this could be something for your consideration.

MICHAL ONDERCO: There was a comment by Dr. Rabinowitz.

OR RABINOWITZ: Thank you, everyone, and thank you, Nabil, for a fascinating talk. You mentioned earlier in your talk that, at one point, the US said that it would pressure Israel. You said, “I can tell you later,” so my question is can you tell us [LAUGHS]?

NABIL FAHMY: [LAUGHS]

OR RABINOWITZ: You mentioned the Americans told us that they are willing to pressure Israel to join the NPT at the certain point, or I might have misheard, but —

NABIL FAHMY: I never used the word pressure.

THOMAS GRAHAM: Exactly.

NABIL FAHMY: Because the Americans never used pressure...

OR RABINOWITZ: I’m paraphrasing

NABIL FAHMY: ...with Israel, but I never use it anyway.

OR RABINOWITZ: [LAUGHS]

NABIL FAHMY: No. What I said — or I’ll tell you later — was more about our bilateral negotiations with the Israelis because they were actually quite substantive but also very sensitive, so I don’t want to get that even on the public record, but the other part of it was the Americans promised us every other day, “We’ll get the Israelis on board,” but we don’t take that serious.

GROUP: [LAUGHTER]

BERND KUBBIG: Sorry about that [INAUDIBLE].

OR RABINOWITZ: Worth a shot.

MICHAEL WESTON: “We’ll try to get,” surely they say, don’t they not? “We will.”

GROUP: [LAUGHTER]

THOMAS GRAHAM: But anyway, this — so this informal process, I was part of it. We had four meetings, four or five meetings, in the capitals, and a complete free zone treaty was drafted with the assistance of Israeli experts, Egyptian experts, American experts, and Jordanian experts. So it wouldn’t take much to convert that into a real treaty, but Nabil is right. The interest to do it has to be there.

BERND KUBBIG: Go ahead. Take it.

THOMAS GRAHAM: [CROSS TALK]

BERND KUBBIG: Big difference, I guess, between track one, track one and a half, and track two.

THOMAS GRAHAM: Well, this was sort of track one and a half.

MICHAL ONDERCO: I think, on this point, we can wrap up the discussion. I thank you all for your interventions, especially to — for the last session for Minister Fahmy and Ambassador Graham. This concludes the full part of our session today.

SESSION V

PRINCIPLES & OBJECTIVES

BILL POTTER: Okay, ladies and gentlemen, friends, I've been given a green light to begin this morning's proceedings. I suspect that much of what we have to say now is going to be anti-climactic not only because the discussions yesterday, but, because of the news this morning, we've all been focused on other developments.

But I think there are some issues that you know merit some additional attention and, I should mention, I don't have, well it's not as privy as you believe from my intervention yesterday to the interviews, if I could just have your attention. Jaap and Sven?

MALE: Sorry, sorry.

BILL POTTER: Okay, thank you. I didn't have access to the interviews, so I'm not really informed by what you may have shared with the organizers. And we have, in fact, discussed a number of the questions already that were on the list here, so there's an element of an idiosyncratic nature. There are questions that I have that I want to try to elicit some responses to. And there's some other issues that I think are important that are linked to the questions that were prepared by the organizers.

But one issue, and maybe we'll start with this, if you don't mind. There was a question or two yesterday about the role of PPNN. But my impression was that, for many around the table, for whatever reasons this was, it was, I mean, PPNN was regarded as useful, playing a not an insignificant role. But that is at odds with my general understanding of the importance of that body in the lead-up to the Review Conference, and so I would like to just spend a little bit more time trying to illicit responses from those of you who were prin-

“There is, I think, over the last half decade a rising recognition that the way in which the Third World is has changed dramatically.

cipals in crafting the P&O’s but also, with respect to the other decisions and the resolution, to better assess what we think collectively was the importance of this body.

And it’s not simply an academic question because there are those of us who today see, you know, tremendous divides between not only the nuclear weapon states and the non-nuclear weapon states but other groupings who are pessimistic about efforts to find common ground, to engage in any form of bridge building, and there’s a tendency on the part of some of us who can remember a PPNN to suggest that maybe a comparable initiative might be important looking forward.

Not to 2020 because there’s no time really for this kind of an exercise. And so I would be quite interested to be as, kind of, candid as we can about the role played by this unusual body and to see where in particular they made a difference. And, if we conclude that they didn’t really play that much of a role, I’m fine with that conclusion. But I think we should kind of approach this head on, rather than kind of the asides that we made yesterday.

And perhaps we can talk about this in the context of the Principles and Objectives. We know how the Principles and Objectives directly were introduced into the Review and Extension Conference, but I would like to hear about the extent to which the PPNN in particular may have played a role in the development of these ideas. So we have a number of people around the room who were involved in this process, so I would like to start with that if I’m allowed to do so. Yes, Sven?

SVEN JURSCHEWSKY: I think the two questions are really at odds. I agree with you that your initial question is an important one, and we discussed some of this yesterday, certainly. Abdul mentioned some important aspects with respect the relations and perceptions, and so did I between developed world and Third World. There is, I think, over the last half decade a rising recognition that the way in which the Third World is has changed dramatically.

When I was at Wilton Park some time ago, what I was asked to address as someone who has worked both on nuclear issues, as to an extent in postings in

the Third World, is how do we talk about LDC's? The first line of the speech was: "Don't call them LDC's, their growth rates are higher than ours."

I don't know if PPNN would be a venue to revive that, I think. But I think a purpose-built organization that takes seriously the way in which the world has changed and developed and there are various aspects to this, how one regards Asian countries is very different from how one regards African countries, it's different again to how one looks about, looks at Latin American countries. There is some strong regional differences that have to be taken account, as well as with respect to individual countries.

Brazil plays a different role in Latin America than, say, Nigeria or South Africa do in Africa. These kind of nuances have to be taken account in a purpose built organization put together with experts, both in the issue at hand — nuclear weapons, nonproliferation, as well as the politics of these countries and the economics of these countries. It's not something you can just throw out. I would venture to say that something organized by — simply by members of WEOG is not going to be successful, but it must begin with a partnership with the key countries of the Third World to developing a forum like this, an informal forum in which the issues can be discussed in a credible spirit of open-mindedness.

BILL POTTER: But my point, an interesting intervention, and I'm pleased to, at some point, maybe look to the future, but I was more interested in trying to get an assessment from those of you who were involved in the PPNN...
[CROSSTALK]

SVEN JURSCHEWSKY: I don't think it had much to do with this question. I think that it just wasn't organized in that way. It wasn't organized with a view to Third World countries. It was countries of influence, and before in the process, Third World countries, the issues of NAM, they never came up. The kind of regional distinctions which obtained in a different way never came up.

BILL POTTER: Okay, thank you, let me hear from others who were also involved. I mean, Harald, you certainly were engaged from day one, and, Grigory, you were also involved. I would like to hear from your perspectives as well.

HARALD MÜLLER: Well, I think one should not mystify that organization and recognize the possibilities it had but also the limits. When Ben brought together the core crew, his idea was to really mirror in some way the globe as it related to the NPT. So, initially, the three depositaries were there but not France and China.

French and Chinese representatives were only invited after '92, and they joined the NPT. We had Egypt from the beginning — was Mohammed Shaker. We had always somebody from Latin America, one, occasionally two, one from sub-Saharan Africa. So the Third World, so to speak, was there and consciously there. South Africa was, I think, taken only after '95. Peter Goosen was taken, in ignorance of what you described yesterday, Abdul, namely the internal division of the South African Foreign Office.

So the idea was, indeed, to have world opinion represented in the group. But it was not a negotiation body. And never aspired to be one. It was a very frank exchange of information and of opinion. Just to give you a very early example, in 1987, one of our two Russian participants offered insights of Russian intelligence on Iraq's nuclear weapons program very early on. And the majority of the group was, well, I mean, "that was all under control."

This member told me — told me later — that he went back to Moscow and reported there that the best experts in the world don't believe that Iraq had nuclear weapons — very curious, but it shows the openness of these exchanges. It was also a place where one could test out ideas for the further development of the NPT or — and positions in the Review Conference, but it was not — not a body to build consensus. If you just imagine that we had Jayantha Dhanapala and we had Adolfo Taylhardat, in the run-up to the Conference, it's quite obvious that consensus was not to be found.

There was, of course, then the — the function of PPNN to offer a forum, which developed over time and intensified the closer we came to the conference, where senior people came in from the important actors and had a chance, without the straightjacket of the protocol, to talk quietly about things. Also, without the risks that these things would go into the open then, would be

ruined before they really entered the diplomatic arena.

So it was a sort of trust building exercise. It was sort of offering a forum, and, of course, it had some function for communication between delegation of which members were in, in PPNN, even during the Conference. But the real game was, in the end, the Presidential Consultations, and not PPNN. And the organization had no true influence there. And I think that's also the correct way as things should be, I'll stop there.

BILL POTTER: Thanks Harald. Tom?

THOMAS GRAHAM: I just have a brief comment about PPNN. I had some contact with them all through the process of the extension. As I recall early on, they hosted a conference in Caracas that I attended, and, from time to time, I would talk with them, Ben Sanders in particular. I thought they were very committed to the 25 year arrangement, and I had many arguments — not arguments but discussions with Ben Sanders about that, about what our position was and how we were not going to change. And he said, “Well, you’re going to have to accept, 25 years that’s the way it’s going to turn out.” I thought they made an important contribution.

BILL POTTER: Thank you Tom. Grigory?

GRIGORY BERDENNIKOV: Well, I was more involved in PPNN since the very beginning, I mean, but I was involved first as invitee and then as a core. And I always thought that it was an extremely useful organization. We used to look at it as sort of a training and educational ground for the official meetings. And, from that point of view, I think it was without comparison.

And I do not think that PPNN had a set position for a 25 years or indefinite extension. Taylhardat was, of course, there, but so were others. And, well, it was not a place to make decisions, it was, as I said at the training. In a nowadays situation, I think, such a board would be very important and useful because many people who — who are now dealing with those issues are newcomers actually to this area and have very little experience.

And this direction, they don't know the feeling, the chemistry of intrica-

cies you know. And dealing, for I think for everyone in such a position, would be worth.

BILL POTTER: Thank you. I'm going to put the PPNN aside for the moment, and our focus is supposed to be on the Principles and Objectives in this morning's session. And I've heard basically over the years kind of two narratives, and the narratives kind of depend on whether I'm talking to my Canadian friends or my South African friends as to the origins of the Principles and Objectives and the role that these two countries played in the formulation of the P&O's.

And I'd be interested if we can come to some resolution as to the precise contributions made by these two parties, and perhaps others, in the kind of genesis of the Principles and Objectives. You kind of hear bits and pieces about this in the preceding discussion. Again, Michael sharing with me at the last moment you know some...

MICHAL ONDERCO: You received that by email.

BILL POTTER: I just, I haven't had a chance to read it, so I saw one line which is just kind of a teaser here, but I'd be interested if those who were involved, particularly from South Africa and Canada, can help us kind of reconstruct how the Principles and Objectives originated, and, with this as the kind of entrée, I'm also quite interested to see whether there were other potential Principles and Objectives that were kind of dropped along the way. Sven, you wanted to...

SVEN JURSCHEWSKY: I can address the question in a hypothetical way. If Canada had supported South Africa in an overt way during the Presidential Consultations, this would have damaged South Africa's standing with the NAM. There are some countries in the NAM that have an allergy to members of WEOG. And so Canada's role with respect to that objective had to be behind the curtain as it were.

And that was another problem for Canada. Looking at it hypothetically, there was another problem for Canada in that, until the Conference itself, the U.S.

was — had a strong inclination for a — a straight resolution without the bells and whistles, without the meat as I put it. This, for us, analytically posed a problem in so far as we believed that such a proposition was impossible diplomatically.

And so it was important for us to keep our powder dry with respect to our American friends. Canada's role is — what I'm saying — is necessarily in the Conference at as far as the two papers were concerned had to be sotto voce. And I remember in my participation in the Presidential Consultations, I only intervened in areas where there was severe difficulty, and I remember one where Ambassador Errera tried to propose the proposition that there was no definition to utter and complete disarmament. And I managed to get my — my research team working overnight and managed to supply such a definition in rather dramatic form the next day, which was part of my intention.

The Canadian role before largely played out through three — through CNN, through PPNN, and I don't think it's any mystery that Peter Goosens and I formed a relationship in Southampton. Other people here have spoken to that, and we obviously had exchanges. Now, further than that, I'm not willing to go. In another context than hypothetically. I know I have in other contexts, but I think in terms of the — the lack of communication in this area between South Africa and ourselves since, I regret those interventions.

BILL POTTER: Okay, this is all hypothetical of course here. Can we move from the hypothetical to the more concrete, or are we all now so circumspect that this is too sensitive...

SVEN JURSCHEWSKY: It was a sensitive issue for us insofar as our relationship with the U.S. and our commitment to a — to a stance that we thought would have a chance of success.

BILL POTTER: Right, but we are now engaged in a historical...

SVEN JURSCHEWSKY: Well, that's good for academics, it's not good for intelligence officers and political analysts, political operatives.

BILL POTTER: Would anyone like to contribute to our discussion to try to better understand the history here perhaps? Yes, Harald.

HARALD MÜLLER: Well, just to follow what Sven has indicated, I was witness to an early conversation — I think it was April '94 in Chilworth Manor, I think Darryl has reported on that in the material for PPNN.

MICHAL ONDERCO: Number 4 in the reading packet.

HARALD MÜLLER: Darryl was not present, by the way, so that was obviously his knowledge was a consequence of communication in the Southampton team, and with Peter, John, and me — John Simpson and me being, you know, listeners more or less to the...

SVEN JURSCHEWSKY: [CROSSTALK] and the famous pool table.

HARALD MÜLLER: And, you know, the — what was discussed there was fairly general, a general possibility of solving the conundrum of the Review Conference with these polarized positions by having some more serious review system and to have standouts or yardsticks for them. This conversation, which was, of course, a snapshot, went no further than that. It was not substantial about the yardsticks, except the mention of that disarmament must be all there, period, it was not possible.

SVEN JURSCHEWSKY: I can go just a taste further, those conversations continued. But they continued on a face-to-face basis, and, for obvious reasons of security, it was important that South Africa have complete — complete freedom of action when the Conference began and that, according to their considerations, were able to play the two papers as they saw fit given the circumstances at the time.

Now we heard Abdul mention the other day that the decision was made on the eve of the Conference. You know, there is another backdrop to this, and that is the — the intense interest of parts of the P5 governments that normally don't get involved in nonproliferation discussions — had in the participants and one wanted to avoid attention.

So it was all face-to-face encounters between myself and Peter, and, I have to say, in that context, those ideas were developed over time.

BILL POTTER: Thanks Sven, Tom you wanted to...

THOMAS GRAHAM: This is slightly off the subject but only slightly. I wrote a memorandum within the U.S. government in about November of 1994 saying, “If we’re going to get indefinite extension, here is what we have to do, here’s what we will have to agree to.” And it wasn’t too different from what ended up in the Principles and Objectives. That memorandum was strictly within the U.S. government, but we may have preferred — obviously, we did prefer just a simple resolution. But, in terms of what actually ended up in the Principles, we never had a serious problem with it. That memo was considered in the abstract, and it was acknowledged by the Defense Department, and, basically, the reaction was “Well yeah, we don’t like it all that much but you’re probably right.”

And then, when we learned, after we had conversations with South Africa, that they would support indefinite extension but they wanted to do it in a way that would bring people together, bring sides together, we understood generally what that meant, and we certainly wanted to have South Africa on board far more than we would want to have a bare bones resolution. And I would say two weeks before the Conference, we sort of knew what was going to be in the Principles, and, when it was unveiled by the Foreign Minister, we raised no objections — as I said yesterday, we raised no objections to the Principles at all that I can recall.

BILL POTTER: Thank you, I want to give Abdul a chance to also contribute to our discussion here, go ahead, if you had a...

SVEN JURCHEWSKY: Perhaps we’re being paranoid in Canada with respect to the U.S. but that strategy which I hypothetically laid out to that position was very closely held within a very small number of people. It was not shared with most of the Canadian delegation.

BILL POTTER: Okay, thank you. Abdul?

ABDUL MINTY:

[AMBASSADOR MINTY ASKED HIS ORIGINAL REMARKS TO BE REMOVED AND REPLACED WITH THE FOLLOWING:

When we had prepared in consultations in advance of the Conference in Pretoria

all of us did not know that academic meetings and others with some Western governments had taken place on an ongoing basis and certain friendships developed. I wasn't aware of this but as I said I was not working for the Department of International Relations so I did not see any documents or anything of that kind.

Whilst we worked on a number of issues we had a very strong position on disarmament and did not want just an extension but linked to a strengthened review process, principles and Middle East resolution. They were part of a package.

I did not attend the President's group but then heard that one of the western delegates had spoken very dismissively about our positions on disarmament which were allowed to pass, also by our officials. I went into the meeting and intervened by stating that it was not acceptable to us and if that was the attitude they were insisting on we may have to go to Pretoria and ask for fresh instructions or withdraw our proposal.

This caused a shock in the room and eventually the government concerned retracted its position and we were able to move forward. There were several tense moments like these in the corridors and elsewhere and I had to remain there throughout the whole session until the very end. It should be recalled that our Minister wasn't there and nor was our UN Ambassador who played a very big part but is not one that you hear about in any of the literature.

Thus, what people classified as South Africa in this context was made up of certain individuals with whom they interacted with 99 percent of the time but they did not benefit from the knowledge that others had.

Whilst we went with positions to the Conference we also thought that they would be discussed within each of the regions and they would tell us what they would like to have. Then of course we had had a lot of discussions among, if you wish Democratic South Africa, which is the terminology we used for the broad population and you even see it in statements of Minister Nzo when he specifically talks of Democratic South Africa.

None of our officials used that language because it was brought in by the liberation movement, the ANC, a distinction that this represented all the people of South Africa and not just a group.

In the Pretoria discussions in some areas we felt that weaker wording would be

better than stronger words that will not be implemented. When we moderated the drafts they were also very weak in other areas which had to be strengthened but those who had prepared it may have had discussions with officials of Western countries before and decided they would not fly. I don't know the background.

So we tried to follow our established position in New York but we also had very few people from Democratic South Africa who would have been new to the process compared to those who had been engaging for two or three years in advance of them, even with the dismantling of the nuclear weapons program and all that.

Some leaders wanted a big role to show they had changed colours to peacemakers from warmongers and suddenly they had even presented a gift to the IAEA which came from the bombs into a ploughshare. Its still there and we did not fight it and we knew it wasn't genuine and not from the democratic government.

So in that period the South African energy department was under Pik Botha a former Foreign Minister and he wanted an image for South Africa and de Klerk to outbid the ANC an to show the are really good guys, the same people just transformed.

There were all those tensions and there was all that playing for roles and for recognition. Even now they point to this gift in Vienna which is on the side before the entrance to the Board room. So there was a lot of propaganda going on because of the impending change.

Another important matter around our 1994 visit to the IAEA General was that Egypt continued as the Board Member after the exclusion of the apartheid regime and it did good work for Africa. But Minister Nzo also arranged several meetings with the African Group which I knew well because of my regular visits to Vienna and anti-apartheid work there. The Group welcomed me warmly and they did not know any of other officials. They had great difficulty working with them because they associated all them with the apartheid structures and it took some time to try and build confidence. They of course recognized the Minister and when he left for other meetings etc he left me in charge. This is part of the history of the preparations of the relationships before we went to the NPT Conference. The IAEA General Conference was very important and was our first conference by Democratic South Africa in the Agency.

We could not have had an indefinite extension without the Principles and Objec-

tives and the Strengthened Review Process. If you look at Minister Nzo's speech you see that he explained it all very precisely. It was not written in a way that anybody needed to interpret it. The headings had sections of what had already been discussed in different contexts and it was hoped that it would create consensus as it did.]

BILL POTTER: Thank you so much Abdul. I know Sven and Tom wanted to weigh in, but Michael said he wanted a two figure intervention here so I wanted...

THOMAS GRAHAM: I wanted to...

BILL POTTER: Okay, I'll call on all of you in just a moment. [CROSS-TALK]

MICHAL ONDERCO: So, Ambassador Minty, if I understand correctly, the ongoing discussion was going on in South Africa, do I understand you correctly saying that the leftover apartheid officials would have preferred an indefinite extension without any conditions?

ABDUL MINTY: I don't know. They never shared it with us. All we know, you see, it's a bit difficult to talk in that language because, as we use summary approaches, we can also distort the reality. There were some who made some efforts to cross over, but the problem was that they had no experience in that area, they didn't know any of the non-aligned leaders that they were interacting with. So, for them to have an input, about Africa and non-aligned, socialist countries — communist, they used to call them. So we had those links, and we would discuss this and had been discussing it for a very long time so we would have relationships with these people.

MICHAL ONDERCO: You...

ABDUL MINTY: They had no input on...

MICHAL ONDERCO: But you suggested that they — that they had a different view and that they wanted a weakening of some of these provisions...

BILL POTTER: He was talking about the President's Council, not — he

wasn't talking, I don't think, about the South African government. It was more in the consultation.

ABDUL MINTY: It was in the consultation, it was one of the five, for example, said this thing on disarmament we cannot have. And some of our people who were present seemed to have accepted it, but I did not know until later. And then, when I heard, I was shocked, and I asked them, "Why didn't you object to this thing?" Well, I think we should let it go and so on, I don't think there was any bad motivation, let me make this clear. I think they felt, "let's make progress and we'll see." That's the best interpretation I can give.

For me, it was unacceptable because President Mandela would never allow it — just not allowed it if he heard that South Africa had agreed. So I had to intervene and say, "You know, I'm sorry, we'll walk out of the whole thing, I'll go to Pretoria now and get new instructions and say that this is not sustainable here." Then, the [inaudible] a lot of bilaterals came to light about it through the individuals and others.

But Dhanapala knew about some of this, [INAUDIBLE]. But we discussed it, I had to work with Susan Burk all the time, she had no problem. The language, position, and so on, and didn't say that you should moderate what I am saying here, you know.

BILL POTTER: Thanks Abdul. Sven, and then Tom.

SVEN JURSCHEWSKY: Yeah, I'm going to support what Abdul has said to a certain extent. In my discussions with Peter, which began in Southampton and continued at virtually every meeting of the PPNN and PrepComs and so on and so forth and various venues where we meet, those conversations became more and more specific as time went by and became very, very specific indeed on the eve of the Conference.

In those conversations, we agreed that there had to be a balance in the two documents. The strengthened reviews was easy, it was an easy thing to define in terms of principles. More difficult were the Principles and Objectives. But I have to say that, in terms of my discussions with Peter, the principal — the principal impediment that we were talking about, I don't know if impedi-

ment is the right word, but the principal condition that we were trying to address in our discussions was acceptability to the P5.

We believed that, if the P5 found it acceptable, then we would — we were home free. NAM did not come up in any large sense in those conversations, and, I have to say, that the tensions, that there was such a thing as democratic South Africa, I only learned about it today. This was something that I did not think of, that said, after Abdul arrived in — in New York, it became clear to me that there were tensions internal to the South African delegation, which caused me concern in terms of Canadian objectives.

And I remember wondering whether I should take a stronger role in the President's Committee than I had to that point. In the end, I decided not to. I decided to — I decided to have confidence in the momentum that had been built up in the committee in favor of the two documents and that worked out, it worked out. I did worry about it at the time.

That political context of that tension I never really understood, I have to say. And that had to do with, I think, the poverty of Canadian political reporting from Pretoria. That I say — I wouldn't have said that was working, but I say now. I just wasn't aware of those kind of tensions and those kinds of camps as it were. But, as we went on in our discussions, and, again, got more and more precise and more and more detailed, that's how we thought about it.

Third World countries were a second order condition, to NAM members to our hopes for acceptance by trying to go. The idea was to go as far as you could with — with what the P5 would accept without causing heart attacks. And, frankly, in those discussions, that was my role — to bring those kind of considerations to the fore. And I don't think in all instances I got it right.

BILL POTTER: Thank you, Sven. I'm going to call on Tom in a moment, but, Nabil, I also want to kind of set up a question for you because, out of Abdul's observation that the kind of the old regime had no context whatsoever with the NAM, it was exclusively with the West. How Egypt kind of proceeded the functioning of the South African delegation in these deliberations, you're the one person around the room who might kind of be able to help us

understand that. But first, Tom

THOMAS GRAHAM: I just want to follow up on Abdul’s closing comments. By the end of November, 1994, the U.S. was fully aware that we could not get indefinite extension without other things. There was going to be a political price, but the one thing we wanted to avoid was conditionality, whereas the NPT would go down if certain goals were not met. The memorandum that I circulated that I referred to earlier — it actually went a little bit farther than the Principles did, I think you could have gone farther, a little bit. As far as the U.S. was concerned, I can’t speak for my colleagues, but we were prepared for a little bit more.

And so this wasn’t entirely parallel to your effort, but it was definitely parallel, and they came together very well at the Conference.

BILL POTTER: Thanks, Tom, that’s very interesting. Nabil?

NABIL FAHMY: Well, our diplomacy, whether we’re at meetings or not, tends to be intrusive. In other words, we get decent briefings from asking questions over and over. We also get clarification. What I’m going to share with you is impressions rather than necessarily the truth. It’s what we think we sensed from very early on that South Africa seemed to be cooperating rather easily with the big guys — we’ll put it that way — even before the Conference, that was the impression.

But we drew a conclusive assessment as to where South Africa would actually go from the Foreign Minister’s visit and Ambassador Minty’s visit to Cairo and their assessment of “OK, this is what we want to do.” And, as I said earlier, where we differed with them on the issue of extension, we were comfortable that they were looking at this as “Okay, we have to find something for everybody in this package.” Which was not the approach we were watching earlier, but I would be exaggerating our assessment if I said that we really understood what was pushing and pulling within the delegation itself.

But, yes, we could see that they were going in one direction, and then they shifted into a more comprehensive direction. But the impression that the Foreign Minister and Ambassador Minty left on us was much, much stronger

“As far as the US was concerned, I can’t speak for my colleagues, but **we were prepared for a little bit more**”

and that this was the direction that South Africa is going from now on, irrespective of whether a delegate in one of the committees or before that was moving on language one way or the other.

Let me add to that that, at the very beginning, before their visit to Cairo, we did not assume that the extension as that. The minute that they came down to Cairo with a comprehensive understanding of where things would go, it wasn't because they had changed positions but, no, because they were sending a package that would be acceptable to everybody.

BILL POTTER: How much in advance was the visit then?

MICHAL ONDERCO: You have the exact the date?

NABIL FAHMY: But I remember, I don't know the date but...

ABDUL MINTY: It was close, but I don't remember the date.

NABIL FAHMY: But that visit was extremely substantial, it reflected to us a serious projection that we would not ignore, even though on one element we clearly had a difference of opinion. At that point for us, it was "we have to change gears and what do we get out of the Conference," rather than "whether there's an extension or not." And we were not at that point at all looking at "is it by a vote or not." The assumption was if the major powers want to do it by vote, they were going to get this, so it's what do we do.

My long answer to your question is: yes we could very easily see that there are different voices in the delegation, but it was more of a gradual progression rather than at the same time for us.

BILL POTTER: Thanks, Nabil. In a moment, Tom, I'm going to turn to you and ask you to help us understand those additional notes that we never got. Michael, I want to give you a chance and then also, Grigory, if you want to kind of share a Russian perspective on this.

MICHAEL WESTON: I just want to make one comment, it's atmospheric more than anything. When we started the Presidential Consultation, we thought we knew what the South African position was, and I remember being

absolutely horrified when we went into the meeting and Abdul Samad appeared and the line was not what — what we had been expecting at all.

And this — this was really quite, quite a bombshell for us at the beginning of this conference. I didn't actually realize how constructive and helpful Ambassador Minty would be. At that point, I thought, "My god" [INAUDIBLE].

BILL POTTER: Thank you. Let me continue this strain, and then I'll add to the list Michael. Gregory?

GRIGORY BERDENNIKOV: Well, for us, the most important thing was to avoid conditionality. To avoid conditionality didn't mean any, well, specific language in this P&O document. It was important not to have this conditionality in the document on extension as well. We also understood that we do not have enough time to have a full-fledged document on the table for a final document of the usual Review Conference. And the P&O document would have to be much shorter.

And that gave us some relief and hope. I think that we were rather encouraged [INAUDIBLE] and we were very much indebted to you, to South Africa, at least we felt that.

BILL POTTER: Michael, a follow-up?

MICHAL ONDERCO: It was actually from up from what Sir Michael was saying...

MICHAEL WESTON: I think that I was just [CROSSTALK].

MICHAL ONDERCO: I know, but I have a question for you. So I have a question for you because you said that you were surprised by how constructive the discussion was with Ambassador Minty was when he came.

MICHAEL WESTON: Subsequently.

MICHAL ONDERCO: Yes [CROSSTALK].

MICHAEL WESTON: In the beginning, it was all downhill.

MICHAL ONDERCO: I just wanted to say that among the documents that we collected for this conference is a document that we got in the archives of the Federal Foreign Office, and it's an assessment of the Western view of the positions of countries. And that was produced on the 6th of April so a little more, a little less than two weeks before the Conference.

And that document that South Africa is assessed as 'leaning no'. So was the fact that South Africa actually came up with this package proposing indefinite extension, was that a surprise for you?

MICHAEL WESTON: No, I don't — I don't think it was. I don't know who — this was the German Foreign Ministry, was it, who produced this list?

MICHAL ONDERCO: But it's a document circulated among the Western countries, so it's a WEOG document.

MICHAEL WESTON: Yes, well I do — I don't know the basis of that assessment.

MICHAL ONDERCO: Okay.

MICHAEL WESTON: Which, as I say, the point was — it was not under, on the subject of extension or not extension. It was on the subject of the Principles and Objectives, where we thought we knew what the South African position was, and we thought we could live with it. And then we became uncertain for a while when — when we went into those Presidential Consultations.

BILL POTTER: Thank you, Michael, it's interesting. For those who haven't looked at this, I shared this with Grigory a moment ago. I found in my archive a 1995, somewhat more specifically dated Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation "Consideration of the Extension [of the] Treaty," and they have a chart, country by country, with their assessment of "for unconditional indefinite extension, agrees under certain conditions, against extension, and undecided," and, remember, this was produced in '95. South Africa was undecided according to the best Russian sources here, so, if you don't have this [CROSS-TALK].

GRIGORY BERDENNIKOV: 70 in favor of indefinite extension, which was a very comfortable figure.

JAAP RAMAKER: So this is an unimportant observation, I think in the meeting of the Presidential group. I remember that, in the corridors in the UN, I ran into Peter Goosen, the South African delegate, and, under his arm, he had a bunch of papers, and I said, “What are you up to?” or something. And he explained to me that the idea was, indeed, to come up with proposals that would allow an indefinite extension to go through smoothly together with a side deal. When I heard this, it was, to me, a great relief because I thought — and many others too — that we would not get an indefinite extension without a price.

But I still remember Peter Goosen, whom I knew well, and speak the same language going down those escalators, as they’re called in the UN, with those papers, and that group was probably on his way to some of you to discuss this idea before the actual meeting of Dhanapala’s consultations, and I thought that this is the approach we should take.

BILL POTTER: This is an interesting observation that I think it merits some further consideration. I mean here you have, you know, Jaap, the Chair of Main Committee Three going about his business, presumably one of the senior figures at the Review Conference, and yet there is this divide between what was going on in the Presidential Consultations and what the majority of delegates including those who had major roles...

JAAP RAMAKER: Just to clarify we were, it was a formality, of course, but the three Chairs were indeed in the consultation. As I mentioned to some of you, my main contribution, however, was to keep my mouth shut, actually.

BILL POTTER: So you know more than you’re letting on now. [LAUGHTER].

JAAP RAMAKER: That is, of course, a fact of life, and so we — it wasn’t a complete separation, but, in the case of the Chairmen of the three main committees, I’m sure that the Chairman of the First Committee would have made a “great” contribution! I don’t even know he was in there, but then we were all

three committee Chairmen invited I suppose.

BILL POTTER: Okay, thank you.

JAAP RAMAKER: But it was a formality.

BILL POTTER: I'm going to call on Tom, but is this on this point?

SVEN JURSCHEWSKY: No, I was going to — I do want to make a point about interpretation. But I think we should finish this conversation first.

BILL POTTER: Okay, Tom, I think it was interesting what you've mentioned in terms of the fact that, at least from your vantage point, the U.S. could have lived with additional Principles and Objectives. Can you kind of elaborate on what those might have been?

THOMAS GRAHAM: Well, for one thing we were, we probably, and I'm basing this just on my own judgment, considering the reaction to the memorandum, we probably, at that time, could have lived with legally binding NSAs. I think we could have. I'm not saying you could, I'm saying that I think we could have. I mean we have signed up for so many of them in the regional context that. But, I don't know, it might have been contentious, but it was in the memo, and it was not...

BILL POTTER: Why did that not appear in the [CROSSTALK]...

BILL POTTER: Abdul and Grigory and then...

ABDUL MINTY: Just on this, part of the difficulty — and there were people with objections, and there wasn't time to be able to create, if you wish, a consensus. So it was not something that we dropped it in the speech and so on, it just wasn't the time to do it. Because we had to finish the Conference with things that were agreed and so on, but we were very strongly committed to that decision.

BILL POTTER: Thanks, Grigory? Oh, I'm sorry.

THOMAS GRAHAM: And another thing I want to add here in this discussion is not that the Presidential Consultations were not tremendously impor-

tant. They were, obviously, but don't ignore the meeting in Ambassador Butler's apartment because major issues were resolved there. And the attendance was roughly the same as the Presidential Consultations — I don't remember exactly but it was.

BILL POTTER: Speak up, can you hear?

THOMAS GRAHAM: Sorry, the Australian Ambassador Butler called a meeting at his apartment, and I forget exactly what day it was, but I would say maybe three days before the resolutions were voted, and there were significant agreements reached that had not been fully resolved, at least not yet in the Presidential Committee.

And I think the officials who were in attendance were roughly those who were in the President's Consultation, there were about 20-25 national representatives, and I do remember that Iran was there because the White House was upset about that.

BILL POTTER: Thanks...

THOMAS GRAHAM: And so, anyway, it was a very important meeting.

BILL POTTER: We can pursue that in a moment. I think Grigory and then Sven, is it on this?

GRIGORY BERDENNIKOV: On NSAs.

BILL POTTER: Okay, do you want to speak up, can you hear? Grigory?

GRIGORY BERDENNIKOV: On NSAs, as far as I remember, the heart of the matter was that we addressed it within the five in Geneva on the eve of the Conference in New York. With a view to reach an agreement on exactly what it was you mentioned, of binding NSA.

And the way, managed to have an agreement between the four of the five because what — it was difficult, but we managed. But Chinese refused to move an inch from their party position.

THOMAS GRAHAM: Their no-first-use.

GRIGORY BERDENNIKOV: The no-first-use. So the document that we managed to produce was that the four agreed about the common formula for the NSA and that the People's Republic of China reconfirmed its position. And that was the basis of the addendum to the Security Council resolution which was passed on the eve of 1995 NPT Conference.

THOMAS GRAHAM: Each country made a national statement that...

GRIGORY BERDENNIKOV: Which was then added to the resolution of the Security Council. Actually, the body of the resolution was about the positive security assurances, which is about helping the victims of the nuclear weapon use. And the negative assurances are contained in an addendum to it in the form that we discussed and agreed in Geneva.

At that time, everybody remembered about this resolution. Nowadays, it's almost forgotten.

THOMAS GRAHAM: And, to some extent, I mean, I don't know, people may not agree with this, but, to some extent, it's kind of a little bit semantics because the World Court the next year upheld these national statements as being legally binding because of the context in which they were made. You know, you can't ignore [CROSSTALK].

THOMAS GRAHAM: I'm just saying that, whether it says that it's legally binding or not, that it — it was pretty close to that anyway because of normal legal interpretations and so — but it wasn't, it didn't seem that way, but, over time, it...

GRIGORY BERDENNIKOV: Nowadays, it is different because the positions of some countries have evolved, and the latest example is the nuclear posture, which is a little bit different.

BILL POTTER: Okay, I'm going to get back to the speakers list, so I have Sven and Harald. I've been told that we actually can run until a quarter of eleven, so I'm inclined for us to do so, and I have one other question that I want to raise, certainly before we conclude. But, Sven, do you want to?

SVEN JURSCHEWSKY: First, a puzzle: immediately after the national statements portion of the Conference, I noted this puzzle in my own mind and with respect to maybe somebody has an answer, that you raised Ambassador's Butler's participation in the Conference. Immediately after the national statements, Ambassador Butler returned to Canberra. This struck me as more than passing strange.

THOMAS GRAHAM: He did what?

SVEN JURSCHEWSKY: He returned to Canberra and then immediately came back to Washington again, to New York again, but he did leave the Conference. This caused me some concern at the time. I just, this is just a puzzle. I do want to say something about interpretation and these questions, these are very important, I think, for academics. But neither my intentions nor Peter's coming out of our discussions were approved by the Presidential Committee.

What was approved were the words on the page. I have resisted again and again, in other forum where Canada's role has a different context, giving any indication of what I intended in my discussions and dispositions out of concern that this might have some of an effect of interpretation of what is on the page. And I note this in particular with respect to something that's close to us in Canada that we worry about, and that is the originalist theory of the interpretation that vivifies a good chunk of American legal profession.

And this is a cover for the most recondite conservative views, and these interpretationists amount to a hidden — a hidden import of ideological...

THOMAS GRAHAM: What are you saying?

SVEN JURSCHEWSKY: I'm talking about your Supreme Court. I don't think that the drafters should reveal what their intentions were because that's not what was approved. What was approved were the words on the page, period, finished. Other people can speculate why they put those words there.

THOMAS GRAHAM: But that's what [INAUDIBLE]

SVEN JURSCHEWSKY: Well speculation, but I will never answer a question like that.

“That means it opens a legal, and it opens a constitution question, which one by all means wanted to avoid. And also, the consequence are completely unclear. What if one of the conditions would not be implemented?”

BILL POTTER: Well then, I’m not going to call upon you again. So those who are prepared to speak and tell the truth, Harald, you’re on my list again.

HARALD MÜLLER: I want to go to another point which is related to concessions, and that’s conditionality. The interesting thing is that, whenever one discusses 1995, it’s all about the indefinite extension. Well, it was indefinite and unconditional, and that was basically the instruction by which my own delegation went to New York.

The Principles and Objectives, on that question, and I think it’s duly listed in the list of questions for that session. And we were much behind the Principles and Objectives thing, but it opened also concerns regarding conditionality, and to avoid conditionality was an essential part of our instructions there, and Sven might beat me up for making a lawyer’s argument again, but [LAUGHTER] the problem was that, if that were conditions, it would alter the substance of the Treaty, and that means that it should go either through the amendment process, and it should go through the ratification process at hand.

That means it opens a legal, and it opens a constitution question, which one by all means wanted to avoid. And also, the consequence are completely unclear. What if one of the conditions would not be implemented? And what is the legal and political consequence of that? We didn’t come to a conclusion for answering this question other than saying anyway it would be a mess, and we want to avoid this mess.

So conditionality — non-conditionality was essential for us, and that brings me to an episode which I think, apart from myself, no one is recording toward the end of the Conference. And that was when the plenary went into drafting mood, made itself the drafting committee, I have not the procedure not exactly in my memory. And it was on the 11th or the 12th of May. And the draft before us listed the three decisions in a single sentence.

And, at this point, when that was called up a member of the American delegation, Mary Lee Hoinkes Pointus came down to our desk and told Ambassador Hoffman, “Look, we don’t like that formulation in a single sentence because, afterwards, this could give them reason to interpret the Principles and

Objectives as conditions. We don't want to speak up on that because, if we do it, that could lead to a debate, which, at this point in the Conference, we want to avoid. Please, could you do it?"

So Ambassador Hoffman asked for the floor and said, "I have an editorial suggestion, could we put each of the three decisions in a line, number them A, B, C and avoid the single sentence?"

THOMAS GRAHAM: What was the formulation, again, that Mary Lee objected to?

HARALD MÜLLER: Well, it was the lining up of the three decisions in a single sentence, in one line. Pure formality, but, you know...

THOMAS GRAHAM: [INAUDIBLE]

HARALD MÜLLER: So Hoffman was his obvious innocence and took the floor and made the suggestion and there was some move on the Indonesian side — bench, but I think they really didn't get it and also there were things going on so it was just gaveled down, and the change was generally to avoid conditionality.

THOMAS GRAHAM: Conditionality was what we wanted to avoid at all costs because that puts the NPT at risk, and that was the bottom line. We recognized, of course, that the Statement of Principles is the political price so, in that sense, they were related, but it doesn't impose conditions. Conditionality would be if the CTBT isn't signed in 1996, NPT is abrogated. That was anathema to us.

SVEN JURSCHEWSKY: That's exactly my point.

BILL POTTER: Let me ask another question. We've been talking about the disarmament related provisions in the P&O's, but those were not the only ones, and I'm particularly curious about paragraph 12, which prohibits new supply arrangements for the transfer of nuclear material to states lacking full scope safeguards. How did that get into the Principles and Objectives?

THOMAS GRAHAM: Well, that was of course the U.S. objective for the

NSG, and the NSG had accepted it...

OR RABINOWITZ: It was adopted in '92.

BILL POTTER: No, that was part of the '92.

SVEN JURSCHEWSKY: That's your answer, bill

THOMAS GRAHAM: I'm not saying that the U.S. pushed for that, but we certainly supported it.

BILL POTTER: Well, I could imagine the U.S. bringing it up, but let's clear what the thinking was of other parties at that time. Because that's the one from my vantage point, the one element of the P&O's that is not being recalled by most countries around the world today.

THOMAS GRAHAM: Well, Bill, if we've got the dates right, if that was accepted by the NSG...

BILL POTTER: That definitely was accepted.

THOMAS GRAHAM: In '92, this was '95, and, number one, anything that could be done to strengthen the NSG rule — that would be regarded as good, and, number two, you wouldn't want the Statement of Principles to be in any way contrary to decisions by the NSG. So it probably was put in the text for some combination of those reasons. There were a number of NSG members on the Presidential Consultation group, it wasn't just the U.S.

BILL POTTER: But I can imagine why the NSG members would have been supportive, but it's less clear to me why the other non-NSG members were supportive.

THOMAS GRAHAM: Oh, I see.

BILL POTTER: Given the manner in which the NSG is often referenced in the NPT context.

GRIGORY BERDENNIKOV: Some of the skeptics were not present at the conference [INAUDIBLE].

BILL POTTER: Joe, did you work on this plan?

JOSEPH PILAT: Yes, the language had been agreed by consensus in 1990 that the lack of a final document left it up to the NSG to take care...

THOMAS GRAHAM: That was...

BILL POTTER: Okay, that's interesting.

THOMAS GRAHAM: Good answer.

BILL POTTER: Did South Africa have any concerns or interests in this, it was just not really a major point?

ABDUL MINTY: It didn't develop then, it developed a little later.

BILL POTTER: Afterwards.

ABDUL MINTY: Also in the IAEA context and so on. But I would come back to Minister Nzo's speech, you'll find there's no document in the South African government speeches that uses democratic South Africa, except those written by the Minister and some of us. So there was an allergic reaction on the part of others to describe it as democratic South Africa. They wanted always to say South Africa. We couldn't say that, you know, after 1994 because we had different policies on women's rights and all other issues.

But you see the last sentence in Minister Nzo's speech, it says with a capital D "Democratic South Africa."

We wanted international and regional security being achieved by complete nuclear disarmament. The South African experience — security was provided by nuclear disarmament rather than nuclear proliferation, and this was significant not only for the threshold states but also for the acknowledged nuclear weapon states.

South Africa believed that, with the necessary political will, it was possible to create a world free of nuclear weapons. There was a big distinction now. They had seen that South Africa is transformed, and it signed the NPT. And that this was a big revolution and change, but, if they wanted acceptability in that context, but they could not actually use the word "democratic" anywhere,

not because they never knew democracy but there was a reaction that we, for example, were trying to impose this into speeches, which was unnecessary.

But this part, we did with the Minister himself, and they couldn't of course argue with the Minister's speech. So you will find that, sometimes, those things that won't normally appear to say anything would say something in the context. You will not find a single document before that at any of the preparatory meetings which none of us attended using language of that kind. So, when it was the first time, it was very important for us domestically and in the African context.

Also in that statement, the Minister spent a lot of time about using the Agency's peaceful uses for Africa and the need for that. That also didn't exist before. So there were a whole lot of new elements that were put in his speech which were not issues that had been raised before, officially, through him. In discussions maybe, but not in that context.

BILL POTTER: Nabil?

NABIL FAHMY: I just have a question, if I may. And I don't mean it in any negative sense, but I was sort of taken by what Tom said, positively. Tom said that, like, in answer to your question, that the U.S. might have been ready to agree to legally binding security consensus. My question, really, is: in looking at the Principles and then the — more the Principles, but also the other elements of the review process, the permanent five, were you really ready to take on new obligations or simply want to pay, having to pay a cost for the extension?

In your — in looking at the review process, could you, without conditionality, but were you ready to take on new obligations or not?

GRIGORY BERDENNIKOV: That's not, we — if I might, we were ready at that time to try to produce a common formula of NSAs which would be acceptable to all of the five. And then you would produce it and agree among the five then we thought that it could be made obligatory by the decision of the Security Council.

But, very soon, it became crystal clear to us that China will not join the rest of the P5, and, in this situation, to be bound by obligatory something on

this issue and leave China free as a whistle would be just foolish.

THOMAS GRAHAM: I agree [CROSSTALK]

NABIL FAHMY: I actually agree with your argument. But my question isn't about the assurances themselves, it's, — because we've had this debate almost every Review Conference. You consistently refuse to take on new obligations in review process and simply wanted to be a review of what happened and what didn't happen.

GRIGORY BERDENNIKOV: Nabil, that was not done as a part of the review process. That was meant as atmosphere building measure taken by the Security Council just before the Conference.

NABIL FAHMY: You're confirming what my understanding is, thank you.

THOMAS GRAHAM: I was just saying what I thought...

NABIL FAHMY: Well, I wanted you to say more on it, but I didn't...my conclusion was exactly what the Ambassador said, that this is something you were doing together to help the Conference. But it was outside of conference. Sure, I accept that.

THOMAS GRAHAM: Yes, yes of course.

BILL POTTER: So we have about two minutes, I've asked my kind of stable of questions that I wanted to raise, and I really appreciate it. I think there was a lot of new information that was conveyed at this session, and I greatly appreciate everyone for their — almost everyone for their candor. Any kind of last remarks that anybody would like to make before we adjourn for coffee? If not, then please join me in thanking all of our speakers.

[APPLAUSE]

SESSION VI

STRENGTHENED REVIEW PROCESS

MICHAL ONDERCO: Okay, ladies and gentlemen. And I would like to start the second, the last session of our conference. Poldo was supposed to be here, but life is not doing him well, so he stays there in the corner.

LEOPOLDO NUTI: [INAUDIBLE]

MICHAL ONDERCO: And we decided to devote this last session to the discussion of the strengthened review process. And, especially, the idea of how the strengthening of the review process was important for the extension of the Treaty and also what are the ideas — some of the ideas that were floated before the Conference were also ideas for a strengthened review process and then actually never got off the ground.

And I want to start with a very general discussion of some of the more ambitious ideas that were floated before the Conference. One of them was the Conference President Dhanapala's idea that he presented in a number of places, including some of the PPNN conferences, that there should be an executive council established for the NPT that would discuss the alleged violations of the NPT.

GRIGORY BERDENNIKOV: With him Chair.

MICHAL ONDERCO: That has never been discussed.

GRIGORY BERDENNIKOV: No, that was the main issue.

MICHAL ONDERCO: Okay, well then. So did he ever propose that officially?

GRIGORY BERDENNIKOV: No, no. But everybody there knew.

MICHAL ONDERCO: Okay, so how come? So tell us more.

GRIGORY BERDENNIKOV: Well what is there to say, it was a good plane, but couldn't fly [LAUGHTER].

LEOPOLDO NUTI: That wasn't very good.

MICHAL ONDERCO: When did he officially — when did he first time come up with that idea? Or did he ever come up with that idea in a conference setting?

GRIGORY BERDENNIKOV: No, in the Conference, he knew that it would not fly.

THOMAS GRAHAM: I mean, I didn't, my recollection is that the Principles...

MICHAL ONDERCO: Sorry, go ahead.

DAVID HOLLOWAY: Sorry, we missed the point.

BERND KUBBIG: We can't hear.

DAVID HOLLOWAY: Oh, the last point that Mr. Berdennikov made, I'm sorry, in that discussion.

GRIGORY BERDENNIKOV: No, that was off the record [LAUGHTER].

DAVID HOLLOWAY: I'll just ask somebody else.

MICHAL ONDERCO: So there was a — there was a discussion about the idea of establishing an executive council to discuss NPT violations, it was floated by Dhanapala. And Ambassador Berdennikov said that there was, that that was a nice plan, but it could never fly, and then Ambassador Graham continued.

DAVID HOLLOWAY: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

THOMAS GRAHAM: Neither Michael nor I can remember it coming up in the Conference itself. But I wanted to say that it was my impression, it is my recollection, I should say, that in the Presidential Council discussions that the Principles and Objectives document was the main interest and enhanced review much, much less. It was there, but it received less attention.

And then I mentioned yesterday that, when Alatas came that last week at

some gathering a day or so before the indefinite extension passed, Wisnamurti, on behalf of Alatas, asked me if we would object, if the review, the PrepComs, could act as sort of mini reviews and the Principles issues discussed therein. I had to agree on the spot, so I did agree, and that has been the practice. I'm not sure whether that was ever written down in the document — I just haven't looked for it, but that certainly has been the practice that disarmament issues do come up in the PrepComs.

MICHAL ONDERCO: Numerous interviewees suggested that especially the United States and Russia were opposed to this idea of making the Review Conferences more about substantive issues. And you told us yesterday that you — you were asked to throw something...

THOMAS GRAHAM: No, what I was asked for was — I mentioned it at greater length yesterday — what I just said. Alatas had come to New York in hopes of doing something, even though it was clear indefinite extension was going to pass under the parliamentary consensus, shall we say, arrangement and there at this meeting, and everyone was milling about. Wisnamurti approached me saying, "Couldn't the PrepComs be mini Review Conferences, and Principles and Objectives issues be brought up in the PrepComs," and I didn't know what to say but realized I had to say something right then.

My defense advisors were right behind me, so I was a little bit intimidated, and I decided, well, I would take the chance, but I was hesitating, and Wisnamurti said, "Come on, Tom, give us a crumb." And so I threw them a crumb.

MICHAL ONDERCO: Ambassador Berdennikov.

GRIGORY BERDENNIKOV: We were originally very skeptical of the whole issue. We thought that the Treaty has already achieved what was to be done at the Review Conferences and, actually, what was still pending there could be the review of the implementation of the Treaty. And, if some recommendations were necessary, those recommendations should concern the deficiencies of such implementation, and that's it.

Any negotiations of new measures or of something that goes beyond the

**“Wisnamurti said
“Come on, Tom,
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And so I threw
them a crumb”**

Treaty or changes the meaning of the Treaty were inappropriate in the review process. That said, we also understood that, on the other hand, it was necessary to be a little flexible on this score because not to give anything will not just fly. That's how this document appeared as we see it.

THOMAS GRAHAM: I just want to say, with respect to this concession that I made to Wisnamurti, I never heard anybody object to it subsequently. But I don't know if it was actually written down anywhere. It was verbal, but it is the way the PrepComs have functioned ever since, that those issues do come up, and they certainly are addressed. But PrepComs are not platforms for negotiating new things, that's for sure.

But I will say that, at the end of the original NPT negotiations, some of the non-nuclear weapon states wanted interim steps included in the body of the Treaty such as the test ban and other such issues, and our two countries opposed that. We told them that we would negotiate those issues in the Review Conferences. And, of course, we never did and no doubt about that, but that statement was made at the very beginning.

GRIGORY BERDENNIKOV: The idea of negotiating anything within the framework of the Treaty is somewhat flawed because not everyone is a member of the Treaty, and some are just impossible without those.

THOMAS GRAHAM: I was not advocating, I just mentioned.

GRIGORY BERDENNIKOV: And what we are really disappointed about, in terms of practice, how it was actually done, is the fact that, through the so-called strengthened review process, some interpretations were approved though they are, in our view, completely against the provisions of the Treaty.

MICHAL ONDERCO: For example?

GRIGORY BERDENNIKOV: For example, nuclear disarmament in the Treaty is a part and parcel of general and complete disarmament, nothing else. It is not a separate measure in the NPT. And, somehow, it was established during the strengthened review process that it can be a separate measure. And we have made our own review of the Treaty and its negotiating history, and now

we think we should try to work against such distortion of the Treaty.

MICHAL ONDERCO: Sir Michael, you had...

MICHAEL WESTON: I'm not sure I can follow that because I was going to say that I think it was important when thinking about 1995 to say that, at least as far as my delegation was concerned, that there was quite a spirit of optimism and that we had had a success, not just in extending the Treaty indefinitely but in generally getting us all together again and going the same direction. But that doesn't fit with what Grigory has just said, so I think I must have been starry eyed.

MICHAL ONDERCO: Were there multiple people who were starry eyed back in 1995?

NABIL FAHMY: No, not at all frankly. The review process had never been something that we found impressive and we felt that we had extended the Treaty indefinitely with important steps, the Principles, and the other documents, taken included on the Middle East, but we clearly understood they were not legally binding and, therefore, if we weren't going to have a substantive review process, then one has to accept for what it is but not claim victory of history or undue optimism, frankly.

MICHAEL WESTON: May I just amplify just very briefly I mean what I think is, the general situation was that there was progress in reduction of nuclear weapons, the CTBT was about to be agreed, and, generally, we felt that it was a good time for disarmament.

MICHAL ONDERCO: Bill?

BILL POTTER: I — this is related, but, if I'm out of order, you can so rule, but what I recall in 1998 for the first time I saw what was an aborted effort to actually unrolling text. I mean, there was this very strange, and I had this most contentious PrepCom I've ever seen, and parties almost came to blows at various points in time, but, somehow, the strengthened review process was interpreted by enough parties that you actually spent much of the PrepComs trying

“Review Conferences did not function well before indefinite extension, and they have not functioned well after indefinite extension. And that has nothing to do with the Review Conference process as such”

to draft language.

I can't recall the degree to which the P5 had problems with that. Maybe people thought it would self-destruct. My recollection, Sven, is that Canada was the instigator of that exercise.

SVEN JURSCHEWSKY: I was long gone by then.

BILL POTTER: But it was with — the strengthened review process was, at least, was sufficiently, perceived as sufficiently robust at the second PrepCom after 1995 to experiment with this issue, and I know Canada was making an argument, if I recall correctly, that one had to, in fact, assess the current situation, and that wasn't just for the Review Conference, it was something that could be done in the PrepCom process.

SVEN JURSCHEWSKY: It was one of the things that came out of it. One of the things that I was thinking about was the really sorry record of Review Conferences up to that point. And of ways in which the process could be strengthened to promote happier outcomes. I don't think we succeeded and for a huge variety of reasons and that's a huge disappointment to me.

MICHAL ONDERCO: Tom?

THOMAS GRAHAM: Well, first on that point: the Review Conferences did not function well before indefinite extension, and they have not functioned well after indefinite extension. And that has nothing to do with the Review Conference process as such. It has to do with national positions on the test ban and on the Middle East WMD-free zone and so forth. And also the consensus rule where you can't have a final document unless everybody agrees.

And I am not saying that I am against that, but I am saying that, as long as you have that rule it is, it's relatively difficult on some of these issues to get everybody to agree to anything meaningful. And I also want to associate myself with what Michael said. Our delegation was optimistic and positive throughout the entire 1995 process. We never had a doubt that it would come out in an acceptable way, and, in my opinion, it did. And we should all remember, if it wasn't for the NPT, nuclear weapons would have spread all over the world. As President Kennedy said in 1963, by 1975, 15 or 20 nuclear weapon states, and

that was well before developments in certain countries that would enable them to become nuclear weapon states.

That number today probably would be 40 or 45, if they really wanted them. The NPT has been the most successful, the most important international security treaty ever negotiated. It has flaws, it's not perfect, there's things wrong with it, it can be improved, it hasn't been successful in addressing some of the major issues of the day, but we would be lost without it.

MICHAL ONDERCO: Okay, Minister Fahmy was first on my list.

NABIL FAHMY: I want to sort of nuance what I said, I try to answer questions precisely.

MICHAL ONDERCO: Yes.

NABIL FAHMY: If you're asking us what we felt then, it's different from is the NPT good or bad or...

MICHAL ONDERCO: No, that was not the question.

NABIL FAHMY: Okay. What we felt then was still the Treaty continued to be a discriminatory treaty, but the fact is, and there was of course the desire to extend it either indefinitely or 25 years evolving or whatever. But I can tell you even beyond our own Middle East issue, there was no way in the sun that we would come out highly optimistic. But there was a sense of where, well, this was a tough negotiation, and some steps were taken.

Now the optimism wasn't there, the recognition that there were some steps taken, and we did acknowledge the value of the Principles and, for that matter, what we thought was the value of the review process. It didn't mean that we felt okay now every five years we will adopt a series of new measures. But, yeah, there was this sense that, in spite of everything, this process may get even better. I wouldn't sort of take it between optimism and a doomsday scenario.

I have to respond to Tom for a second. I'm not a big fan of the NPT, but I think the world would be worse without it, let me very clear about that. That being said, I actually agree with President Kennedy that, without it, you would

have more nuclear states than with it. But that's not the evaluation of the Treaty. The Treaty was meant to actually achieve nuclear disarmament and prevent nuclear proliferation, so we were supposed to go less, not — not prevent going more. So I don't challenge the statement, but that's not what we're evaluating.

MICHAL ONDERCO: Okay, Ambassador Berdennikov?

GRIGORY BERDENNIKOV: Well, I agree fully about the merits of this treaty. I think actually this treaty is a miracle which could have been achieved only in the conditions that prevailed in the world at the end of '60s and beginning of '70s. If now we tried to make something comparable we will definitely fail, definitely. And the idea of making improvements to this treaty is a little bit difficult for me because if we touch anything in the Treaty in terms of amendments, then goodbye the Treaty. We will lose it. That is clear to us.

JAAP RAMAKER: That goes for many of these treaties.

GRIGORY BERDENNIKOV: Especially for this one because we will never...

JAAP RAMAKER: Not another one, yeah.

GRIGORY BERDENNIKOV: Yeah, yeah, but for this treaty we will never have as much ratifications for the amended treaty as for the Treaty that we have now. So better we put it aside and do not touch it and the more we stick to the written language of the Treaty, the better it is.

MICHAL ONDERCO: Ambassador Minty, I'll give the floor to you, but I want to — I have a question that is specifically related to South Africa. Because, in his speech, Minister Nzo says that the review process should contain permanent subcommittees, and that idea never became permanent. Why did that idea never take off?

ABDUL MINTY: Partly because of lack of time.

MICHAL ONDERCO: Okay.

ABDUL MINTY: And consultations because, with every new subject that

we put forward, we lose time to get buy-in from different groups, the P5, the non-aligned, the rest. So, if they were not biting, there was no way that we could have imposed it.

The point that I wanted to make is that the NPT success was mixed in most of the Third World. They felt they didn't get many things on disarmament, and that was a priority, but they thought that it was a more hopeful world that we were going to face in the light of the cooperation, and that was genuine throughout. As odd as it may sound to you, my Minister even sent me to India and Pakistan for discussions about the NPT.

So there were really great expectations not for dramatic things or revolutionary things but for a building block approach: you pick a subject, discuss it through a meeting, agree, and that would form a basis, and then, at the next meeting, we would pick up from there and go a step-by-step process.

Yes, we can do without the NPT, but it's the only treaty in which nuclear weapon states are committed to disarm though they may not honor it, but they're committed to it. And the Third World over the past period has become less and less convinced that the NPT is important.

Now this is the big danger that, in the past 20 or more years, there is a lot of lack of credibility. You see that participation at NPT meetings is at a very low level. No great dramatic leaders coming there like Ali Alatas and all the others to say you must do this or do that. Some governments prepare well and put positions that may cause divisions or whatever, but there's no advance.

So they really expected things very differently: we gave up nuclear weapons, or never had them, and we understood rightly or wrongly that the nuclear weapon states would also begin the process of disarmament, not just reduction, and this is not happening. Then what do we do?

Now, in my view, we also see public opinion even in the P5 and in Western Europe and other Western countries, also giving less importance to the NPT. So what are the implications for the future if you cannot command that kind of public support? In 1995, there was a lot of support. We went to meetings in Western countries where huge crowds came to the meetings — we had

“The effort of enhanced reviews was in fact to try and put in place a review process

which would have a better chance at coming up with successful conclusions. It didn't work, it hasn't worked, and it's not likely to work.”

to explain our position, why we thought what we did and so on, but that was a different atmosphere.

We could address quite big meetings of the public and at universities, and that has all gone. So maybe they feel that they have achieved their work, and they've said nothing more needs to be done. So I think it's bringing the NPT into disrepute, and that's why I took the view, in 2015, that we must avoid the Treaty becoming a nuclear weapons states' treaty as opposed to everyone's treaty, and that is what has been happening in the review process after '95.

MICHAL ONDERCO: Next person on the list, Mr. Jurschewsky, yes.

SVEN JURSCHEWSKY: First of all, on the origins of the Treaty, after the Berlin Crisis of '61, the Cuban Missile Crisis, I suspect related, we had a whole host of agreements. East-West agreements and Africa stabilize East-West agreements. We had the Tripartite Agreement on the status of Berlin. We had the [INAUDIBLE] by Germany, we had the CSCE, and we had the NPT.

In my view, the NPT was, from the beginning, part of the structure of East-West stabilization. The stuff about the gloss that is put on it by NAM is something that came afterwards, which does not diminish its political significance or the way in which we should interpret the Treaty now. But it wasn't like that at the beginning, it wasn't like that at the beginning.

The effort of enhanced reviews was in fact to try and put in place a review process which would have a better chance at coming up with successful conclusions. It didn't work, it hasn't worked, and it's not likely to work. Looking ahead, we have two developments that I think are important with respect to the Treaty, because I agree with what people said, it's not front of mind anymore, and the nuclear crisis is not front of mind anymore.

I grew up with nuclear alarms and huddling under my desk in grade school, that was my experience. I grew up with [INAUDIBLE] school and listening to the Russian boats approach the American picket ships and me worrying about whether I would die a virgin [LAUGHTER].

JAAP RAMAKER: That was the main thing.

SVEN JURSCHEWSKY: That was the main thing. That is all gone now. The generation, that's the generation of the '60s, that is gone. Publics are not like that, other worries have become front of mind. The chief front of mind, ISIS, Islamic terrorism, the social and political and economic changes occasioned by globalization, that's front of mind.

That does not say that the Treaty is less important, it's just not high on the political agenda. We do have a number of instances in the world today which require thought about nuclear disarmament and how we go about it. And those two issues are not being addressed in any kind of rational way. One is the crisis on the Korean peninsula, which, given yesterday's appointments, should in our minds achieve, get closer to front of mind. And having — my having had considerable experience in North Korea simply accentuates that worry.

The other one is not often considered, and it has linked issues come out of it. One is the relationship with India, between India and Kashmir. And there is a fundamental imbalance there. Indians have a preponderance of armored forces. The Pakistanis have TNDs, have theater nuclear devices, which they will use in the event of an armored thrust. They — Indians do not have a like response. They go from there, from there the Indians would have to go to city busters in the 30 to 35 kiloton range. There would be immediate escalation.

We have, at the same time, problems in Kashmir which are not being addressed by anyone in any kind of plausible way which is a *casus belli* between those two countries, especially with the advent of serious water shortages. Most of the rivers that feed the Punjab on both sides of the border rise in Kashmir. India has announced it will not be bound by the India Water Treaty. That's a serious matter because Pakistani agriculture depends on that water.

So the nadir is there. At the same time we have a weakening of the non-proliferation system, in the exchange of letters between Manmohan Singh and President Bush which created a de facto nuclear weapon state out of India. This is not a good thing with respect to the proliferation, the NPT. And how we deal with that, and, in fact, we must remember will create a precedent in how we deal with other countries that are weapons states and cannot have under

the Treaty as it is worded today, cannot persist with their nuclear arsenals.

That template of how we deal with — are we going to deal with other countries, are we going to deal with Pakistan the way we dealt with India? Is that smart? Are we going to deal with North Korea in the way that we dealt with Pakistan, with India? These are serious issues which I fear are quickly coming to the fore. It may be the case that, in the very near future, nuclear war will again be front of mind.

MICHAL ONDERCO: Thank you, I will pass the floor to you but I would like to come back to the discussion of the strengthened review process and maybe the expectations of immediate...

THOMAS GRAHAM: Just one thing...

MICHAL ONDERCO: Sure, go ahead.

THOMAS GRAHAM: Abdul, I agree with you that the NPT has grown weaker, and, if we lose the NPT, we can forget forever about nuclear disarmament, and, likely, nuclear weapons will spread throughout the world, especially as climate change moves in and smaller countries look to such weapons as the only defense against encroaching neighbors. I think it's critical to bring the CTBT into force. I think it's critical to do something about the WMD free zone and the other issues, but, if we lose the NPT, we — I don't know, it's the jungle.

Sven is right, less attention is being paid to the NPT when more attention should be paid to it. These serious issues should be faced, instead of negotiating a global treaty that just recommits countries that have already given up nuclear weapons. The energy of the world community should be placed on test ban, WMD free zone, on trying to develop more constraints, to be more of a community, and the NPT has to continue in order for that to happen. So I hope it will.

MICHAL ONDERCO: I want to continue with a very general question about at the end of the '95 Conference when you had these expectations about the future. There were still — at that time, there were significant countries

that were outside of the Treaty. Brazil was, for example, one of them, that was still at that time out of the Treaty. Did you think that what was agreed at the Extension Conference as a part of the package is going to be, is going to entice additional countries to join the Treaty?

Or was that something that you were having on your mind when you were thinking about these agreements? I see Ambassador Minty nodding.

ABDUL MINTY: We expected that that would happen because of this, you know, optimism and hope and so on. But those were standing out for whatever concerns they had would now come in because they would see a framework in which they could, through strengthened review process and all the rest of it, raise the issues and negotiate positions, so we did expect that more countries would come.

MICHAL ONDERCO: Minister Fahmy?

NABIL FAHMY: We didn't really look at it to that degree. On other words to the interpretation, it wasn't that we were trying, but our interpretation was that, given that extension was going to happen, we as state parties in the thing had achieved something, so we had made our case the better in what we are committed to. But we didn't frankly get to the point where this would be necessarily attractive to others, although, if that was the case, we would have welcomed that very highly.

GRIGORY BERDENNIKOV: Well, we, as I mentioned earlier, we looked at the Conference as having the main goal or *raison d'être* in the extension of the Treaty, which was an equivalent to salvaging the Treaty from disappearing. And when that was done, we were very glad that, maybe not as a consequence of these decisions but, in terms of time, Brazil decided to join the Treaty after the Review and Extension Conference.

But on the other hand, we also should remember that, soon after the Review and Extension Conference, very troubling developments took place in the Hindustan peninsula, with the nuclear testing by both sides in '98. We didn't expect that to follow the extension conference and that was sort of a

sobering experience. And, well, to be frank, the good example of Brazil wasn't followed by other so called threshold states.

MICHAL ONDERCO: Minister Fahmy, and then?

NABIL FAHMY: I just have a question, frankly, because I don't know what the answer is. I was told a few years later by Indian colleagues that one of the decisions — one of the reasons why they openly tested was the extension of the Treaty indefinitely. I don't know if this is true, I'm not defending the case at all. I'm just curious if anybody have any feedback on this? I don't know what the answer is.

THOMAS GRAHAM: India test?

NABIL FAHMY: Yeah.

SVEN JURSCHEWSKY: I think [INAUDIBLE] having, we're talking about Pokharan II in '99? My reading, serving in India and having contact with Indian military authorities, was part of the impetus was China and the stationing of missile brigades in Tibet. That was seen as a direct provocation by India. Personally, India has spoiled its advantage with respect to Pakistan, they had a conventional advantage, now it has no such advantage because of the reasons I said earlier. As far as the Chinese, who I've talked to about this, they were mystified.

NABIL FAHMY: You said part of the reason...

SVEN JURSCHEWSKY: You had a BJP government who is deeply nationalistic and an India in possession of nuclear weapons that is associated with and still is membership, permanent membership in the Security Council and a certain degree of status, a recognition of India as a great power. And that is associated in the Indian political mind, particularly in its nationalist elements in the BJP and associated political parties with the possession of a nuclear arsenal.

OR RABINOWITZ: The exact quote of the leadership was: "Today, we have shown that we're not eunuchs".

SVEN JURSCHEWSKY: Yeah, yeah.

BILL POTTER: It's interesting also that the tests occurred immediately after the conclusion of the '98 PrepCom, whether or not there was any connection.

SVEN JURSCHEWSKY: I don't think there was a connection [CROSSTALK] you know.

BILL POTTER: Because literally people were on their way home in the [INAUDIBLE].

MICHAEL WESTON: Immediately after the what?

BILL POTTER: The '98 prep comm [CROSSTALK].

SVEN JURSCHEWSKY: Pokharan II was a failure from the Indian perspective. They tested, there was a number of tests actually, I forget exactly how many.

OR RABINOWITZ: Five.

SVEN JURSCHEWSKY: But they tested both fission and fusion devices. The fission device worked, the fusion device didn't. And the subsequent Pakistani tests, the fusion device worked. And this is a matter of grave unhappiness on the part of the Indians.

THOMAS GRAHAM: The reason, there's one reason and one reason only that India tested, and that's because the Vajpayee government was elected.

SVEN JURSCHEWSKY: Yeah, that's what I...

THOMAS GRAHAM: They had pledged since 1964 to do tests if they ever controlled the government. And they finally did, and they carried out their party platform. As Vajpayee made clear afterwards, it was done for purposes of prestige and the idea that India was now a great power. He said that the tests had given to India "greater respect". That's Vajpayee talking. And that is why it happened. They have stopped testing now, so has Pakistan, so we still have a chance.

JAAP RAMAKER: The bilateral arrangements between them?

“They had pledged since 1964 to do tests if they ever controlled the government. And they finally did, and they carried out their party platform.”

THOMAS GRAHAM: They both said — they both said within short time of one another, that they would observe the moratorium, so hopefully there won't be any more tests, but that depends on future developments. But I have done a lot of study of the Indian program, and they were obsessed with themselves and not China or anything else. They wanted to prove that people on the subcontinent are as good as people in Washington, London, or anywhere else in terms of having a nuclear weapon [CROSSTALK].

SVEN JURSCHEWSKY: But the China thing in India is, especially after '61.

THOMAS GRAHAM: They had it for 25 years.

SVEN JURSCHEWSKY: Absolutely bizarre.

MICHAL ONDERCO: Okay, [CROSSTALK].

LEOPOLDO NUTI: I'm sorry, just on this one very quickly. I agree with the idea that it is a very nationalist project and other evidence of this is that they were already preparing for a test with the previous nationalist government in the early '90s and that they were stopped by international pressure, so, as soon as Vajpayee got back into government in 1998, I think, almost immediately, he started to — he asked to prepare for a test to be carried out. Because he had been prevented from doing it the previous time.

MICHAL ONDERCO: I have Ambassador Minty on my list.

ABDUL MINTY:

[AMBASSADOR MINTY ASKED HIS ORIGINAL REMARKS TO BE REMOVED AND REPLACED WITH THE FOLLOWING:

I just wanted to share that, although we may have been naïve immediately after the NPT review conference, Minister Nzo sent me to India and Pakistan to report on our experience with the NPT. We were very worried about the hostility and possible nuclear buildup in that region and knew about the earlier Action Plan that Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi submitted to the UN.

So when I got there, I had discussions with both sides. I was horrified at the level

of hostility between the two countries. When I was in one of the countries there was a train accident in the other where numerous people died, and there was rejoicing in the one country. Now we in South Africa have a Muslim community and Hindu community all originally originating from India, not from the area that is currently Pakistan.

So we also said that their conflict was dividing us, and South Africa did not want to have that. Both countries, but India much more, had very good relations with the ANC, historically, [inaudible].

We hosted the '98 NAM conference. When we started the conference, India had just detonated a nuclear weapon.

NAM has very strong traditional positions on nuclear disarmament to which India and Pakistan always subscribed. When the conference began we had a special commission to discuss disarmament, for a few days. Normally it would take half a day.

And as South Africa we came to a conclusion that India didn't like - we said we would never allow on South Africa soil for India to get recognition as a nuclear weapon state. President Mandela took that position himself. There was a very strong reaction from the Indian government with potential damage to bilateral relations.

Subsequently, we engaged both countries, for example when we had joint meetings. In general, when we tried to put in the document a commitment on nuclear disarmament, India said no we don't want to do this and we already have a common position in the NAM.

So we always had to work out careful language, and their leaders said we are not against complete disarmament but if the big Powers don't comply we cannot support it.

At one conference with some other former NPT colleagues we decided to ask India to host a conference and invite countries from the region. This they did, and invited China but not Pakistan. So we had some movement on it, and at the conference we had discussions with the Indian military - we asked the military to talk about their military doctrines and so on. And they needed permission from the Foreign Office to talk about it publicly, and the government gave them permission to do it and they did.

So there's an interesting dialogue about how they perceive their situation. We thought that we had a duty and a responsibility to at least put issues to them and if they do not accept it that's fine but we had to have a dialogue. So every opportunity we

“And then the question was:

what was the Indian thinking then? And those of us who participated in the subsequent negotiations, well I, at least, had a very strong suspicion — not suspicion, it was almost clear to anybody — that the Indians in particular had only one interest...”

had, we did push disarmament with both India and Pakistan. And of course later, with the Khan network and other things, we even prosecuted Pakistani officials involved in smuggling things out of South Africa. Once sitting with the Pakistani representative at the IAEA Board, I said I'm going to do a report on their violations of our laws and he said: “You don't have to announce it here.” I said I do. One of their senior diplomats had told our people when we complained that they were violating our laws, “catch us if you can.” We had caught them and were obliged to report it.

The negative side of it is that we were surprised at the fact that very few countries supported us or thanked us for our action against the Khan network.]

MICHAL ONDERCO: Ambassador Ramaker.

JAAP RAMAKER: Well, this, as we move a little moment beyond '95 to 1998, there are a couple of things that probably remain unmentioned. I think these dynamics of that part of the world, the triangle of Pakistan, China, India is perhaps a bit more complicated than only a nationalists motives on the part of India. There is an element of, I think, strategic relationship that could come about in later years. But the interesting thing is, when we concluded the NPT Review Conference, we, on the test ban issue, we decided on an end date the end of '96.

Only a few months later, that date, the end date was refined in a General Assembly resolution where the stipulation was that the test ban would be signed, concluded, at the outset of the 51st General Assembly session. And that General Assembly resolution had consensus in the United Nations — not in the NPT, in the United Nations — and it meant that not only the five NPT nuclear weapon states were on board, they were already, because the NPT, but also India, Pakistan, and Israel, and that was the interesting thing.

And then the question was: what was the Indian thinking then? And those of us who participated in the subsequent negotiations, well I, at least, had a very strong suspicion — not suspicion, it was almost clear to anybody — that the Indians in particular had only one interest, and it is to make sure that they would never be a prohibition on nuclear weapon testing, so the planning was already there, the option had to be open.

And I don't think that, when we had the negotiations, that it was Vajpayee government, that came later, and they did it because...

THOMAS GRAHAM: The negotiations were over.

JAAP RAMAKER: That's right but during the negotiations, but I suppose there was no doubts about it.

THOMAS GRAHAM: As you know, we went to take the Treaty out of Geneva, we went to the Troika at the UN and said, "Will you introduce it and [INAUDIBLE]."

JAAP RAMAKER: So it was [INAUDIBLE].

THOMAS GRAHAM: We discussed it.

JAAP RAMAKER: By India [CROSSTALK] and it was a whole series of efforts over the months to prevent this treaty from ever reaching the end...

THOMAS GRAHAM: Well, in the UN.

JAAP RAMAKER: All the questions of the Indians, I mean[CROSSTALK].

JAAP RAMAKER: The problem was already, then, my understanding and well in December 2005 — already there was the first time that the Indians were caught red-handed already in December '95 because they wanted to conduct already then a nuclear test explosion.

THOMAS GRAHAM: I think there was the Rao.

OR RABINOWITZ: The Rao government wanted to conduct tests in '95 [CROSSTALK].

OR RABINOWITZ: The Rao government wanted to conduct the test in '95, but the U.S. got enough intelligence, and they superseded. And, in '96, Vajpayee was sitting in a very short lived government, about 13, 14 days, and you also get the green light to test, but the government was already totally down, so they realized they couldn't conduct the test before the government would fall, so that was canceled. The test was in the making years before '98.

MICHAL ONDERCO: So we don't, anyway...

JAAP RAMAKER: That whole thing is at the heart of the problem of the entry into force of the test ban.

MICHAL ONDERCO: So we don't have the Indians here...

THOMAS GRAHAM: I want to say, before we conclude, something about the entry of force provision of the CTBT.

MICHAL ONDERCO: But we...

THOMAS GRAHAM: But not now, but before we leave.

MICHAL ONDERCO: Okay, Professor Nuti, you had a question?

LEOPOLDO NUTI: Yeah, I mean it's coming from hearing some of the things that have been said — I think from something that Sven Jurschewsky said — about the importance of the NPT historically in the context when it was created. And so I wanted to throw in — in the discussion one more general idea related to this and connected to the 1995 Conference.

I mean, when you look back historically, the Treaty was mostly conceived for one goal, and that was to prevent German nuclear rearmament. Everything else that came with it was an addendum, was something that resulted out of the negotiations. But the Treaty was mostly a Cold War tool to stabilize the European equation. That, I mean, when you read the historical documents of '66, '67, that is unmistakable. It's not meant, — meant, people thought about President Kennedy, people thought about other issues, but there was one key issue at stake.

So, basically, what you have here is a treaty that was crafted for one specific goal that has been forced to multitask itself to accomplish a number of very different goals, and that is, I think, to its credit that it has prevented the proliferation of a number of countries, but it was not conceived for that goal. And so you have its limits here as well because it was crafted to achieve one goal, and it accomplished more than that.

So, here, is my question — I mean, did anybody in 1995 think that this

might have been the opportunity to rethink the whole Treaty and turn it into something more suitable to accomplish what we now wanted to accomplish given that it was conceived with a very different specific goal in mind?

MICHAL ONDERCO: Ambassador Berdennikov?

GRIGORY BERDENNIKOV: Well, this was a very interesting remark. Well, in our thinking, the Treaty authors didn't have only Germany in mind when they negotiated.

LEOPOLDO NUTI: Well, I'm interested in Russian observations.

GRIGORY BERDENNIKOV: I know. But, really, it was a global treaty, they had in mind the whole world. But, in the time of negotiations, the question was whether the possession of the nuclear weapons will be prohibited only to states...

LEOPOLDO NUTI: Or to alliances.

GRIGORY BERDENNIKOV: Or to the groups of states. And the formulation of Article I was made in such a way as to cover both possibilities, and that was one of the goals that the Soviet delegation pursued. With some resistance at some points from other quarters. But, finally, it was resolved in a very satisfactory way. So the German question was of course an important question but not the overwhelming question, at least in our view [CROSSTALK]

THOMAS GRAHAM: Grigory, the U.S. view was the same as yours. This was conceived as a global treaty, Germany was not at the center of it at all. Kennedy did worry about it early on in the 1960s, he did worry that, if he couldn't stop Israel from testing, that Germany would be next and that that would lead to an uncontrollable situation. But that was not the NPT, that was not what the NPT was about. The NPT was about controlling the spread of nuclear weapons all over the world, and it was not a Cold War treaty.

In fact, indeed, it was, for some years — it was one of the principal means of communication between the United States and the Soviet Union, our nonproliferation discussions. It always was a global treaty, it was not focused on

Germany, and, in 1995, no one, to the best of my knowledge, gave any thought whatsoever to doing a new treaty, which, of course, would be impossible.

The NPT is unamendable because of the amendment requirements in it, and anything like the NPT itself could never be negotiated again. In fact, I don't think anything short of someday maybe a treaty eliminating nuclear weapons for everyone — I mean, way in the future, maybe someday that will be negotiated, but not another NPT.

MICHAL ONDERCO: I see that Poldo's reaction has spiked interest, so I have four people on my list.

JAAP RAMAKER: I would just interject that I have a quote here of President Kennedy, and it is very, very — July 1960 — very, very clear that this is a global treaty.

LEOPOLDO NUTI: But that was in 1963. The Treaty was drafted in '66. Kennedy was way dead by then [LAUGHTER].

BILL POTTER: There's a lot of revisionist talk going on right now. I mean, people around this table could speak with great authority about what transpired in 1995. There are others who I would trust more in terms of the rationale for the '68 Treaty, the history leading to the Treaty, the role of Germany, the role of a host of other issues, so let's be cautious as we try to help us understand '95 not to delve into areas where I would suggest that there are other people probably who are not in the room here who are better informed.

We all have views. I mean, there are a number of other statements that have made that I was not inclined to speak to, but the notion that, absent the Treaty, we can speak with confidence about the number of other countries that would have acquired nuclear weapons is — I'll be polite and say — not very well considered.

There are all kinds of factors that we know of that influence nuclear decision making, so I'm a great fan of the NPT. I think it's been tremendously important, but let's not overstate what cause and effect — the cause and effect relationship is with respect to proliferation and the existence of the Treaty.

The one point that I do want to make here is that we would be ill-informed not to recognize the significant role that concern about Germany

played in the negotiation of the NPT. It was not the only consideration. I think there was a recognition by both the United States and the Soviet Union at the time that proliferation was a problem in terms of international stability, regional stability — there were a variety of considerations that both parties appreciated at the time. They were concerned about different threats, different countries, but Germany certainly was an issue, so let's not you know diminish that without attempting to explain everything in terms of Germany.

The last point that I would make, if I may not have an opportunity to take the floor again here, is that I think it's really important, as we interpret the '95 situation, the lead-up to '95, and post '95, to recognize the unusual relationship that did exist between the United States and the Soviet Union at that time. I think that that was tremendously important, and I think it was alluded the kinds of bilateral consultations that were held on a regular basis.

There was a sense of a joint commitment to this particular enterprise, and what I find most disturbing today for the first time, literally for the first time, I question whether that joint enterprise is perceived as a common denominator in the two capitals. And so I think that's tremendously worrisome but I think we would be ill-advised to discount the importance of that special U.S.-Soviet relationship with respect to '95. Now withstanding all of the other factors that were important.

MICHAL ONDERCO: Sven?

SVEN JURSCHEWSKY: I agree with most of what's been said, and I won't rehearse it again. The NPT has been regarded and analyzed in different ways at different times, and that reflected the development of political thought, of security concerns and so forth. And it's important to consider why that — the Treaty has been able to encompass those different perceptions.

The CWC, the chemical weapons convention, is a treaty of positive law. You cannot — here is a list of all the things you can't do. And, if it's not in there, you can do it. That was an enormously long treaty. And it's highly inflexible, it is not capable of reinterpretation or reconsideration the way that the NPT is.

The NPT is a treaty of principles *grosso moto*, and that allows for it to

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be applied in different ways in different contexts, politically, security, and the rest, and that's an important way to think about the Treaty and also, frankly, to think about future nonproliferation instruments. That we are much better off to think about principles and enact them in treaty language than to think about permissions and denials in the way that the chemical weapons treaty is formulated.

I think as we go forward in a world which is increasingly populated by black swans, with, you know, huge fat tail events of supposedly low probability, it's important to think more in terms in principle than, I think, in terms of permissions and denials.

MICHAL ONDERCO: Professor Müller.

HARALD MÜLLER: Thank you. Well, of course I take it that the two big powers had in mind the globe and not just Germany when this was negotiated. It would be surprised if it were differently. Because, at the time, more than a dozen countries had either small nuclear weapons programs or considerations, and it would be — it would be very surprising if the intelligence services of the United States and Russia, or the Soviet Union would have completely overlooked that.

In my country, however, it was taken personal. And I mean the expression much quoted by Franz Josef Strauss and Konrad Adenauer of “Versailles of cosmic dimensions”, or Morgenthau Plans show that there was a feeling this was aimed against us. And still, the Treaty had immediate consequences. After we signed in 1969 under the new government led by Willy Brandt, certain experiments and research projects stopped at the Fraunhofer Institute, which was funded by the Defense Department.

Implosion experiments, fire plate experiments had been going on until that time. And that was over then long before we ratified in '75. And one of the miracles, I think, to which the NPT mightily contributed is a complete turning around of this narrow national feeling that this treaty was an enemy to a point where — where we went to full support for indefinite and unconditional extension with the support of all the major parties in Parliament, the President,

the Chancellor, and what have you.

It is one of the miracles of almost an identity shift in a major country. Which one can credit to a large degree to the Treaty itself.

MICHAL ONDERCO: I have Joe, and I have Ori on the list.

JOSEPH PILAT: I think the historical debate on the origins and meaning of the NPT really does deserve more critical attention, I think I agree with a lot of Bill's points on that fact and we don't do ourselves justice by, by offering shorthands to that issue. On the specific issue of whether or not we looked at new beginning for the NPT in 1995, it, there was some discussion as I recall primarily among NGOs and academics on whether or not the Treaty would survive.

Whether or not it could be amended to make it more survivable, whether or not it could be amended to address the issue of the N3, those kinds of issues, I think, never — I think were pretty clearly resolved quickly as not possible. The amendment terms of the Treaty don't make amendments practical or even possible. It's worse than the entry of the CTBT in terms of thinking about amendments, and I think that became very clear very quickly, and the kinds of — the kinds of changes that would be significant for the NPT were seen as actually possibly threatening it if it undercut the Treaty, as many noted nobody believes could be replicated in 1995.

MICHAL ONDERCO: Ori.

OR RABINOWITZ: So current question, about '95 — so, if we go back to the Israeli perspective, spring of '95 is Prime Minister Rabin's last six months in office, he was assassinated in November. It's just after Oslo I, and the Rabin government is busy working on trying to conclude the Oslo II, which happened to be signed in Cairo in September '95. So under extreme pressure, lots of domestic product broiling, a lot of cooperation with Cairo as far as I know, also in Oslo II because it was signed in Cairo.

I don't think, as far as I know or can tell, that the Clinton administration seriously pressured the Rabin government at that point in time on NPT concessions, not to my knowledge. Maybe I'm wrong, but they were frying other fish at that specific moment in time. But what I do think or what I have read,

“So that’s basically the general question

— do you know, have you heard of this notion, was it discussed, was the FMCT seriously considered as an NPT extension in ‘95, anything you can add?”

and there is some indication that there was a conceptual thinking about creating a second tier quasi-NPT extension in the form of Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty, FMCT, which, hopefully, Israel would be able to join, which would kind of freeze the nuclear race in the Middle East. So that’s basically the general question — do you know, have you heard of this notion, was it discussed, was the FMCT seriously considered as an NPT extension in ‘95, anything you can add?

NABIL FAHMY: Let me add, as far as I’m aware, I don’t think that, I’m not aware of any serious discussion of having a formal extension of the NPT substantively on anything, so it would also apply in this case, I don’t know of any concrete suggestions to do that. That being said, I know that there were suggestions that maybe we should try that angle rather than the zone, weapons of mass destruction, completely. But that didn’t carry any weight in the debate either. And, of course, there were our bilateral discussions, which were something else.

MICHAL ONDERCO: Joe?

JOSEPH PILAT: Yeah, Tom may have a better memory of it, but, you know, the U.S. interest in Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty as one of the foundation steps towards eventual disarmament, was strong until the late ‘60s and then it sort of disappeared off the scale. The Clinton administration revived interest in it as part of the lead-up to the ‘95 Review and Extension Conference.

And I think that, as I recall, at the — at Los Alamos, we were tasked to do a lot of preparatory work during the — that mid-’90s period on fissile material, the administration was very serious about it. I think that we had probably in the last — since that time, we’ve been asked to do work on FMCT three different times at high intensity. That was one of them, and that was probably one of the most intense efforts that we were asked to do.

MICHAL ONDERCO: Sven?

SVEN JURSCHEWSKY: As somebody who had a lot to do with Ambassador Shannon’s efforts to develop a mandate in Geneva, our view for the

rationale — I'm glad you mentioned it, you've added to my stock of knowledge. Our view at the time — we weren't all that happy about having to do this — was that this was part of stage setting. It wasn't substantive on the part of the U.S. We probably — maybe have been wrong about that given what you have said, but that's part of diplomacy too.

In terms of — it became very, very quickly clear to us that this is a loser, that we weren't going to do it. And it only took — it took an amazing effort on some really creative drafting to get a formulation on stocks that bridged the gap between India, Pakistan, and the rest of us. It did not, however, amount to a real negotiating mandate, and there have never been negotiations on it. The Canadian delegation, as far as I know, in Geneva is still trying to beat that dead horse because they have nothing else to beat.

This is going nowhere, and it's to regret that it is. In terms of a larger Canadian picture of the importance of this treaty, in terms of Pierre Trudeau's strategy of suffocation, this was the next step after the CTBT, this was the next step in actualizing the strategy of suffocation towards complete disarmament, this isn't going to happen anytime soon, which is too bad.

MICHAL ONDERCO: As we've bid goodbye to Professor Müller, who has to catch a train [CROSSTALK]. I pass the floor to Ambassador Graham.

THOMAS GRAHAM: I do not think that is correct, as far as the U.S. position is concerned. I agree with you and what Joe said about it. FMCT was something of long interest in the U.S. We thought it was something worth pursuing, we never could get negotiations on it because Pakistan kept blocking it at the CD. But we wanted to try, and we certainly recognized how difficult it would have been. I mean, maybe negotiations wouldn't have succeeded but we wanted to try.

SVEN JURSCHEWSKY: I'm glad to hear. Frankly, I've learned something today: not always is intelligence correct. [LAUGHTER]

MICHAL ONDERCO: I think — I think that may be a good point to also close our discussions. I'm very thankful that you all came and you gave your

best to our two days, one and a half day of our discussions about the 1995 NPT Review Conference. I've heard throughout the conference from many of you that you heard new things, and that was basically the point of our meeting, to bring up new evidence that could also help us to understand the 1995 Conference and, through it, also a lot of the dynamics in the early post-Cold War period in arms control.

I would like to thank you all for coming, I would like to thank you all for being frank, for being outspoken, for withdrawing the minimum necessary information from us. As we said before, the transcript will be made and it will be sent to you, and, for any corrections in terms of some things that maybe misunderstood or something that may be mis-transcribed, I would be very thankful if you didn't change substantively the content of your statements or to the least degree possible.

And I again thank you very much, and I'm very happy that you came with us. Thank you, everyone. [APPLAUSE]

LEOPOLDO NUTI: Let me just add my own personal thanks and my fellow co-director of the project Christian Ostermann's personal thanks for Michael for delivering the logistical and organizational brand of this very successful event. [APPLAUSE]

MICHAL ONDERCO: Thank you very much, there is a lunch waiting for you.



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