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17. September 1980

Sehr geehrter Herr Generalsekretär,

für Ihren Brief vom 28. August und die damit verbundene Fortsetzung unseres Gedankenaustausches danke ich Ihnen.

Ich habe mit großer Aufmerksamkeit Ihre Einschätzung der gegenwärtigen internationalen Entwicklung gelesen. Wie Sie aus meinem Schreiben vom 12. August wissen, teile ich Ihre Sorge über das Wett-rüsten und seine weitere Beschleunigung. Meine Sorge geht weiter: Die kritischen Entwicklungen im Mittleren Osten haben noch nicht das Stadium erreicht, von dem man sagen könnte, daß sie im Sinne der internationalen Politik und des internationalen Bewußtseins risikofrei geworden wären. Die Lage im Nahen Osten ist schwieriger geworden. Und damit hört die Zahl der Gefahrenzonen nicht auf.

In dieser Situation sind die Vereinigten Staaten fühlbar durch ihren Wahlkampf in Anspruch genommen. Man kann Ihnen schwer widersprechen, wenn Sie meinen, daß das Schicksal der Welt wichtiger sei als jeder Wahlkampf. Auf der anderen Seite ist es nichts Neues, daß die Vereinigten Staaten vor ihren jeweiligen Wahlen nur bedingt handlungsfähig sind. Das gehört zu den Nachteilen einer Ordnung, die auch ihre Stärken hat. Und ich bin im übrigen der Auffassung, daß es für den weiteren Gang eben doch bedeutungsvoll ist, wer regiert. Ich kann das jedenfalls für

An den  
Generalsekretär  
des Zentralkomitees der KPdSU  
Herrn L. I. Breschnew  
Moskau / UdSSR

die Bundesrepublik Deutschland ziemlich genau beurteilen.

Mit anderen Worten: Meine Ansicht zu Ihrer Darstellung der Probleme, die ich in vielen Punkten teile, lautet: Ich sehe keine realistische Möglichkeit, daß die Amerikaner bis zu ihren Wahlen zu substantiellen Verhandlungen kommen. Aber ich sehe doch mit Befriedigung, daß die beiden Außenminister sich sehen werden und daß für Oktober - hoffentlich mehr als symbolische - Verhandlungen in Aussicht genommen sind.


Es wird sich lohnen, unbeschadet der amerikanischen Wahlen eine große Anstrengung zu unternehmen, um das Prinzip der annähernden Gleichheit durch Verhandlungen in die Wirklichkeit umzusetzen. Es wäre sicher gut, wenn die Verhandlungen zur Substanz vorbereitet würden, indem man sich über die Rahmenbedingungen verständigt, in denen sie stattfinden sollen. Sie wissen vermutlich, daß die Bundesregierung die amerikanischen Verbündeten in dieser Richtung ermutigt. Es wäre wichtig, wenn Ihr Außenminister das Gespräch mit seinem amerikanischen Kollegen so konstruktiv wie möglich führt.

Die deutschen Sozialdemokraten und die Sozialistische Internationale werden sich weiterhin mit Nachdruck für eine Politik der Rüstungsbegrenzung einsetzen. Wir wissen, was von Vereinbarungen auf militärischem Gebiet für die Entspannung und für das Schicksal der Welt abhängen kann.

Auf dem für November in Madrid vorgesehenen nächsten Kongreß der Sozialistischen Internationale werden wir - auf der Grundlage des von der Arbeitsgruppe für Abrüstungsfragen unter Vorsitz von Kalevi Sorsa erarbeiteten Berichts - eine umfassende Stellungnahme zu diesem Komplex

abgeben. Dabei werden die Fragen einer Begrenzung der Mittelstreckenraketen in Europa natürlich eine Rolle spielen. Und wir werden auch sicher nicht versäumen, uns dazu zu äußern, wie solche Beschlüsse in die politische Praxis umgesetzt werden können. Ich werde gern dafür sorgen, daß Sie vom Ergebnis dieser Beratungen unterrichtet werden.

Mit allen guten Wünschen



Kopie sowie Kopien der Briefe  
Breschnew an W. B. v. 28. 8. 1980,  
W. B. an Breschnew v. 12. 8. 1980

an

1. Kalevi Sorsa
2. Bernt Carlsson

17. 9. 1980

V e r m e r k

Betr.: Gespräch Willy Brandt mit Botschafter Semjonow  
am 11. Dezember in Bonn

Weitere Teilnehmer: Egon Bahr, Leonid Grigorje-  
witsch Ussytschenko, Thomas Mirow, sowjetischer  
Dolmetscher

Botschafter Semjonow begann das Gespräch mit einer aus-  
führlichen Würdigung des vor 10 Jahren abgeschlossenen  
Moskauer Vertrages und verband dies mit einem Dank an  
den Vorsitzenden als dem Architekten dieser Politik.

In seiner Erwiderung machte W.B. deutlich, daß er im  
Hinblick auf die Folgewirkungen des Vertrages mehr er-  
wartet hätte. Daß dies nicht geschehen sei, läge zum  
einen an den personellen Konstellationen, die sich in  
der Mitte der siebziger Jahre bei den westlichen Ver-  
handlungspartnern der Sowjetunion ergeben hätten. Zum  
anderen und hauptsächlich aber daran, daß es nicht  
gelingen sei, eine Gleichgewichtigkeit herzustellen  
zwischen deutlichen Fortschritten auf politischem und  
ökonomischem Gebiet einerseits und sehr geringen Er-  
folgen bei dem Bemühen um wirksame Vereinbarungen  
auf militärischem Gebiet. Diese Disparität habe man  
nicht vorhergesehen. Jedenfalls seien er und Breschnew  
bei den Gesprächen auf der Krim 1971 davon ausgegangen,  
daß diese Komplexe eine Einheit darstellten. Der Rüstungs-  
wettlauf sei die eigentliche Frage, und die bedrohliche  
Entwicklung auf diesem Gebiet bringe ihn zu der Ein-  
schätzung, daß eine neue Eiszeit drohe.

Auf die Frage nach seinen Eindrücken von den Gesprächen in den USA stellte W.B. fest, es sei gut, daß die UdSSR eine ruhige Haltung gegenüber dem Wechsel in den Vereinigten Staaten eingenommen habe. Er fürchte allerdings, daß es nicht schnell genug gelinge, Verhandlungen herbeizuführen, um eine neue Umdrehung der Rüstungsspirale zu vermeiden. Wenn das nicht gelinge, drohe eine neue Eiszeit. Schließlich aber müßten sich die USA und die Sowjetunion wieder an einen Tisch setzen. Er verstehe, daß die Verantwortlichen in der UdSSR der Meinung seien, mit SALT II eine Art Rechtstitel in der Hand zu halten. Aber dies helfe wohl nicht weiter. Jetzt sei vielleicht die einzige Lösung, daß sich beide Vertragspartner um ein adäquates Verhalten bemühten. Einige Elemente von SALT II könnten auf amerikanischer Seite vielleicht durch "executive order" geregelt werden. Es käme darauf an, den Zusammenhang zu den eurostrategischen Waffen zu sehen. Seit den Brüsseler Beschlüssen sei ein Jahr vergangen. Jetzt dürfe man nicht weitere Zeit ungenutzt verstreichen lassen. Zwar habe man in Genf formal die Gespräche eröffnet, jedoch ohne zur Substanz vorzustoßen. Das Problem sei wohl, daß für die USA der erste Teil des Doppelbeschlusses wichtiger sei und für die Europäer der zweite Teil.

Nicht der KSZE-Prozeß als solcher, aber das Schlußdokument von Helsinki sei ein Fehler gewesen. Formelkompromisse hätten bestehende Differenzen überdeckt und dadurch Illusionen geweckt. ~~.....~~ Bescheidenheit sei daher vorzuziehen. Der Beginn des Überprüfungstreffens in Madrid sei schlimm gewesen. Man müsse wohl neu ansetzen.

Semjonow stellte fest, es falle ihm schwer zu entscheiden, ob das Jahr 1970 oder das Jahr 1972 wichtiger sei, obwohl er an den Vorgängen des Jahres 72 maßgeblich beteiligt gewesen sei. Man dürfe die Bedeutung der USA nicht über-

treiben. Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland habe eine wichtige Stellung. Es sei gut, daß Egon Bahr sich jetzt verstärkt um Abrüstung kümmern wolle. Er sei gern bereit, sich mit ihm häufig zu treffen.

Willy Brandt unterstrich, Egon Bahrs neue Aufgabe sei zentral wichtig. Die USA seien ein Kontinent wie die Sowjetunion und immer noch mit großer Vitalität. Die neue Administration könne möglicherweise etwas isolationistisch sein und auf Europa schimpfen. Dies mache ihm aber keine große Sorge, weil dies dazu führen könnte, daß die Europäer selbständiger würden. Dazu müßten sich vor allem Frankreich und die Bundesrepublik Deutschland zusammenschließen. Man müsse aber wissen, daß Frankreich zur Zeit größere Rüstungsanstrengungen unternahme und eine gewisse Anlehnung an die USA suche. Auch die Bundesrepublik Deutschland werde sich von den Vereinigten Staaten nicht trennen können.

Semjonow erklärte, er halte ein solches, wenn möglich noch detaillierteres Gespräch auf höherer Ebene für wichtig. Es gebe in der Geschichte subjektive und objektive Faktoren. Die objektiven Gründe für SALT seien stärker als das Trennende zwischen ihnen und den USA. Das gelte auch für die Vorgänge des Jahres 1970. In den USA gebe es im Hinblick auf die Einschätzung der Sowjetunion viel Irrationales und Unrealistisches. Aber die objektiven Interessen würden schließlich wieder zur Zusammenarbeit führen. Wichtig sei, daß die Zusammenarbeit zwischen der UdSSR und der Bundesrepublik weiter intensiviert würde, um den Prozeß der Entspannung zu fördern. Er glaube nicht an eine neue Eiszeit. Er habe kürzlich mit Kossygin gesprochen. Dieser habe ihm unter Hinweis auf die großen Investitionen der UdSSR im Norden ihres Landes versichert, man glaube in Moskau nicht an neue Gefahren. Eine neue Eiszeit schließe man aus.

Willy Brandt sagte darauf hin, es sei vielleicht besser, von einer Kalt-Wetter-Periode oder einer Frost-Periode zu sprechen. Die Frage stelle sich, was in einer solchen Phase aus den deutsch-sowjetischen Beziehungen würde. Unser Interesse sei, die bilateralen und europäischen Beziehungen so gut wie möglich zu gestalten, aber es sei nicht sicher, ob das gehen werde. W.B. wies auf den intensiven Handel hin und auf die menschlichen Erleichterungen: schon in Frankreich sei nicht überall Verständnis dafür zu finden, welche Bedeutung dies für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland habe. In den USA erst recht nicht. Aber es könne sein, daß wir unter Druck kämen. Wir seien nicht so autonom wie die Sowjetunion. Herz und Verstand und Interesse sprächen aber für die Fortführung dieser Politik.

Semjonow: Die Beziehungen müßten weiter entwickelt werden, unabhängig von den übrigen internationalen Beziehungen. Man müsse die Linie der Entspannung fortsetzen, weil es dazu keine Alternative gebe. Er habe sich neuneinhalb Jahre mit der strategischen Rüstung befaßt. Die These vom "First Strike" sei eine Illusion. Ebenso das Streben nach nuklearer Überlegenheit. Es bedürfe nur eines geringen Potentials, um die Überlegenheit der Gegenseite in Frage zu stellen. Das Beharren auf diesen Illusionen führe zu einer großen Verarmung der Welt, aber nicht zu einer Lösung der Probleme. Die SALT-Linie müsse fortgesetzt werden, und zwar schnell. Man wisse den Beitrag der Sozialistischen Internationale auf dem Madrider Kongreß zu schätzen. Es gebe Differenzen im Detail. Man lehne aber diese Überlegungen nicht ab, sondern wolle nach Berührungspunkten suchen. Die Wissenschaft führe die Welt in ein neues Zeitalter. Die Menschheit könne heute ihre Ernährungsprobleme lösen. Die Forschungsentwicklung auf dem Gebiet der Genetik stelle eine große Hoffnung, aber auch eine schreckliche Gefahr dar.

Willy Brandt dankte für die Erwähnung systemüberwölbender Probleme in diesem Zusammenhang. Er habe schon oft festgestellt, daß wissenschaftliche Experten in Ost und West übereinstimmende Analysen hätten. Es gebe aber einen äußerst schwerfälligen Prozeß, diese Analysen in die Politik einzuführen. Die UdSSR müsse wissen, daß sie mit einem starken militärischen Potential assoziiert werde. Er habe verstanden, daß, aus der Sicht der UdSSR, es vier Gegenpole gebe: Amerika, Europa, China und Japan. Die Verantwortlichen in Moskau täten gut daran, sich darauf einzustellen, daß von der künftigen amerikanischen Regierung ein "Linkage" versucht werden würde, d.h. die Verbindung von verschiedenen Problemen. Dies könne, wenn es richtig verstanden würde, sogar nützlich sein. Die Weltmächte müßten mehr über die Weltpolitik reden. Auch im deutsch-sowjetischen Verhältnis sei es wichtig, den politischen Dialog wieder zu verstärken. Die bilateralen Beziehungen seien etwas blutarm geworden, zu routinemäßig, zu buchhalterisch.

Semjonow: Damit sei er völlig einverstanden. Es gelte jetzt die Arbeit fortzusetzen und alle Ebenen mit einzubeziehen: Helsinki und Madrid wie auch die Abrüstungsbemühungen, um die sich Egon Bahr kümmern wolle. Man müsse folgendes richtig verstehen: die Abrüstungsvorschläge der Sowjetunion seien aus einer Position der Stärke heraus gemacht worden. Man wolle das Gleichgewicht. Es sei wichtig, das Programm für den 26. Parteitag der KPdSU sorgfältig anzusehen. Man habe sich wichtige Aufgaben gestellt: vor allem die Versorgung mit Nahrungsmitteln und Konsumgütern zu verbessern. Die Sowjetunion baue auf einen kontinuierlichen Fortschritt, der von vielen Millionen Generationen zu tragen sein würde. Ohne Krieg ließen sich alle Probleme lösen. Es sei wohl nötig, dem Vorbild der Wissenschaften zu folgen und auch in der Politik neue Kategorien einzuführen. Es sei manchmal schwieriger, auf der eigenen Seite Verständnis zu wecken, als sich in Verhandlungen mit der Gegenseite zu einigen.



Er danke sehr für das Gespräch und wolle betonen, wie hoch Willy Brandts Meinung in Moskau geschätzt werde.

Willy Brandt dankte seinerseits, auch für die freundliche Würdigung von Madrid. Er lege großen Wert darauf, nicht nur mit dem identifiziert zu werden, was in der Vergangenheit war. Er wolle noch einmal betonen, für wie wichtig er Egon Bahrs neue Aufgabe halte. Im übrigen hoffe er auf ein baldiges Wiedersehen.

Semjonow: Er werde in Moskau berichten. Breschnew habe das Wettrüsten die große Gefahr unserer Zeit genannt. Er würde sich freuen, nach seiner Rückkehr das Gespräch fortsetzen zu können.

TE M:~

Part Three:  
International Diplomacy

**1981**

Source: The Atlantic Council  
Http://www.acus.org/docs/8302-  
Teaching\_Values\_Successor\_  
Generation.pdf  
Contributed by Giles Scott-Smith.

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# The Successor Generation: Its Challenges and Responsibilities

## The Atlantic Council's Working Group on the Successor Generation

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*Washington D.C.  
January 1981*

## THE SUCCESSOR GENERATION

### I. The Nature of the Problem

Are those who were born into the turbulent and interdependent post-war world adequately educated with respect to the heritage, values and basic principles of our common Western civilization to play a fully responsible part in strengthening our heritage and way of life? Is the problem a generational one or one of our society as a whole?

The Atlantic Council's "Successor Generation" Working Group initially debated these questions and answered the first with a resounding "No."

As to the second, the term "successor generation" is used generically to cover all individuals up to roughly 40 years of age, well over half of the population of the United States. Whether or not they are more or less able than their elders to cope with today's problems is not the issue here. The shrinking of the planet and the technological revolution have vastly increased both the complexity of today's international problems and the speed of change. Education adequate for previous generations born into a simpler world is not adequate today. It is the younger generation whose character and judgment are developing and who will bear the responsibility for dealing with the challenges of the rest of this century.

Those born since the 1930's, including most elementary and secondary school teachers and many younger college professors, have no personal memories of *why* the democracies had to fight World War II. Hitler and Stalin have become mere textbook names, hardly more relevant than Caesar or Napoleon. This generation has little personal understanding of the suffering and sacrifices entailed, or of the massive and dedicated efforts made in the early post-war years to develop a new and better international order to prevent a third cataclysmic war.

During the last decade there has been little perceived danger until recently. The West has tended to view "*détente*" as meaning significantly improved East-West relations, and not much credence was given to those who claimed that the Soviet concept of "*détente*" and "peaceful co-existence" is nevertheless a different form of struggle for global predominance. Little need has been felt to heed Jefferson's warning that "eternal vigilance is the price of liberty." Western society as a whole, and especially its youth, has been evolving beyond old-fashioned nationalism and belief in armed force as an instrument of policy. An increasingly post-industrial society has stimulated emphasis on the quality of life. It was, and is, hard for many to realize that Soviet society, being ruled by ideologically trained managers, has not similarly evolved and still stresses militant ideological struggle backed by armed force and totalitarian rule.

The anti-institutionalism of the 1960's has waned, but even in its heyday the vast majority of its proponents — as distinct from its more radical agitators — were motivated not by an erosion of values but by disillusion with the working of the institutions they had been taught to revere. There has not been, and is not now, any lack of youthful idealism. The problem is to encourage it along constructive lines.

When first formed in 1979 the Atlantic Council's Working Group on the Successor Generation sought to define the scope of the problem in terms with which it could reasonably expect to deal. Transmission of values was basic — but what values? Obviously not the whole range. It was agreed that the Council, in keeping with its purpose of strengthening the ties between free nations, should focus on the fundamental values of the Atlantic Community. Its values are at the heart of Western civilization, and many of its basic moral and human values are shared by people everywhere, including those under totalitarian rule.

It was agreed that the most fundamental value of the peoples of the Atlantic Community is freedom — freedom to choose one's own religious beliefs, other values, way of life, and institutions. It was agreed that these freedoms are threatened by militant totalitarianism, which permits no freedom of choice, and

especially by that of the USSR., which has sought inexorably to extend its system and area of control by all means: political, economic and psychological if possible, by armed force if necessary.

It was clear to the Working Group that only the effectively concerted strength of the free nations, especially those linked in the Atlantic Alliance, would suffice to meet this threat.

It was also clear that the free world's defense could not be military alone, despite the importance of adequate defensive strength. Rather it must be based upon an understanding of the threat in its political, psychological and economic as well as its military dimensions. Essentially freedom depends upon the *will* of free peoples to defend their heritage, values and way of life. That will depends upon understanding of *what* they have to defend, *why* they need to defend it, and *what* they need to defend it against. The Group firmly believes that the kind of world order which will evolve during the coming decades will depend upon the understanding, vision and will of free peoples acting together to strengthen and defend their free institutions. It requires understanding of the principles upon which their institutions are based and of the responsibility of the citizen, individually and collectively, to give effect to those principles.

The problem, as the Working Group sees it, is that those who are — or will be — succeeding to positions of leadership in the United States and in other nations which share our values, may not be sufficiently aware of the challenges to the foregoing factors to enable them adequately to discharge their individual and collective responsibilities in dealing with the problems and opportunities of today's and tomorrow's world.

Any solution of the problem must be educational — in the broadest sense of the word, including not only academia, but the media and other influences upon the formation of mature intellect and judgment. Yet, even the realm of academia alone, from kindergarten through graduate school, is vast. The key element is the practitioner — his awareness of the problem, his interest, and his desire and ability to help. The challenge is clearly far beyond the reach of any one organization. The efforts of many institutions and educational associations will be necessary.

The work of the President's Commission on Foreign Language and International Studies, and surveys by the former Office of Education, the Educational Testing Service, the Council on Learning and others have all revealed a frightening degree of ignorance, even on the part of university and graduate students, of the contemporary world around us. They have revealed grave deficiencies in knowledge of geography, any foreign language, basic political science, economics and modern history, especially recent history which bears so heavily upon the coming years.

Never before have population pressure, technology, instant communications and rising expectations combined to produce such an acceleration of history and the need for adequately trained and prepared individuals, leaders and followers alike, to reach sound value judgments. The responsibility for that training and preparation presents a major challenge to our educational system.

## II. The Extent of the Problem

The extent of knowledge in specific fields on the part of individuals and of the general public is relatively easy to quantify. Attitudes are much more difficult to measure with any degree of precision. The American Council on Education (ACE) and the Educational Testing Service (ETS) have done extensive quantitative studies on student knowledge of the basic factors of international relations, foreign languages and cultures and civic education. The ETS has recently completed for the Council on Learning's task force on Education and the World View a sophisticated nation-wide survey of over 3,000 undergraduates in some 185 colleges and universities. The purpose was to ascertain not merely the degree of knowledge but also the ability of students to correlate what they knew into understanding of international problems.

The responses are still being analyzed, but partial results for 1,000 seniors have been made available. These seniors had a mean score of 50, with significant differences between fields of study. History majors ranked first, scoring 59.3; but education majors, the teachers of tomorrow, scored lowest with 39.8. Foreign language proficiency was very low, one-third reporting a "survival level" (for example, how to read signs or ask directions) but only 7 percent said they could read a simple book without a dictionary.

On questions designed to measure understanding, less than 20 percent answered correctly questions about global agricultural production and less than 30 percent answered correctly questions about the Helsinki Accords relating to human rights, a bipolar versus a multipolar international system, or the role of the non-aligned countries. Less than 14 percent correctly answered questions on elements of the world's principal religions. These findings point up the statement in the report by the President's Commission that: "The urgency of issues confronting the United States increases the need of an educated electorate; we cannot wait for another generation to become educated about these issues."

In reporting on the status of civic education in America today, the U.S. Office of Education in mid-1979 expressed growing concern about "citizen apathy in the United States, apparent neglect of citizen education in the schools, and discrepancies between changing social and political conditions and educational practice." Apathy is reflected in low youthful participation in the electoral process. According to the Census Bureau, 40 percent of the total voting age population is under 35 years of age. In 1976 presidential election only 42 percent of those 18 to 24 bothered to vote while 55.4 percent of those 25-34 voted. According to a New York Times-CBS survey in November 1980, only 56 percent of the 18-29 year old group were registered to vote, compared to 83 percent of those 45-64, and 76 percent of those over 65.

In autumn of 1979 the President's Commission on Foreign Language and International Studies, in responding to the President's mandate to examine the study of foreign languages and the study of international issues, problems and cultures by young Americans today, warned of "threats to national security and the economy," as a direct result of "America's scandalous incompetence in foreign languages (which) explains our dangerously inadequate understanding of world affairs." Offering ignorance of foreign languages and cultures as one explanation for the United States' weakening position as an exporting nation, the report noted that one of the world's leading exporters, Japan, has 10,000 English-speaking business representatives in the United States, while there are fewer than 900 American counterparts in Japan, with few of them speaking Japanese. In further confirmation of these observations, the American Council on Education recently reported the findings of a study that indicates "at most, only 5 percent of prospective teachers take any course relating to international affairs or foreign peoples and cultures as part of their professional preparation."

It is therefore not surprising that students at both the pre-college and college levels are woefully lacking in knowledge of geography and 20th century history in their relevance to today's international problems. The North Atlantic Assembly, which brings U.S. Members of Congress together with their counterparts from Canada and Western Europe in order to study and debate critical international issues of common concern, has created a task force of parliamentarians from these countries to study "the gap in political

awareness in the successor generations — those generations of Americans and Europeans who lack first-hand knowledge of shared experiences during World War II and the post-war development of our common institutions such as NATO and OECD." The preliminary report of the task force attributes this gap in political awareness to "both educational, cultural, and information-communication factors," and suggests that the former "are most easily identified and are of primary concern." The task force concludes that the basic problem in Western Europe and North America today is "that the concept of democracy has either been taken for granted or has merely been treated in terms of the national political machinery. Rarely has it been subjected to examination or critical analysis, nor has its preservation been considered."

In this country, the Gallup Organization, the National Opinion Research Council, Potomac Associates, and others have over a number of years surveyed attitudes toward such questions as spending for defense compared to spending for welfare, willingness to assist in the defense of various countries and confidence in various institutions. Comparable research in Europe has been done by the European Communities through their "Eurobarometer" studies, by Dr. Ronald Inglehart of the University of Michigan, and others. A series of Eurobarometer polls taken in 1977 -1979 fails to indicate trends because the polls were not repeated over time, but were specifically broken down by age groups. They showed preponderantly less favorable attitudes toward the United States and its policies among younger groups than among their elders. There were, however, interesting exceptions.

For the European Community as a whole, support for membership in NATO was substantially the same in all age groups from 16 to 55 and over, at roughly 40 to 44 percent. Nevertheless, the minority favoring "neutralism" was half again as large among the young as among their elders — 21.7 percent as against 13.9 percent. Yet, in France and Belgium more young people than old supported NATO. For the Community as a whole, younger opinion was more in favor of following independent foreign policies than their elders. On economic matters, in answer to a question as to the best means of assuring European economic stability and prosperity, responses showed that substantially more young than old favored independent policies as compared to cooperation with the U.S. The same was true with respect to those who thought the U.S. sought economic domination over Europe rather than mutual advantage.

In general terms, despite the surge of student radicalism in the 1960's, there appears to be less generational difference of attitudes between younger and older groups than might be expected. Both have developed new interests and attitudes in recent years. Personal interests retain priority for both but both show increased revulsion toward war, interest in protecting the environment and in a life style that involves more than material interests. Inglehart calls this the development of "post-materialism." We may well be developing a "successor society" along with a successor generation. Yet, how Western society develops depends upon the latter. There is no lack of youthful idealism and we have opportunities as well as problems in the way it is channeled.

In October 1980, the Gallup Organization took a poll for the Atlantic Council on attitudes toward NATO. It showed that more of the 18-29 age group favored *increasing* our commitment to NATO than those 50 and over (28.2 percent as against 17.1 percent) and also more favored *reducing* our commitment (10.4 percent as against 5.1 percent). Educational level revealed a similar picture, with 23.1 percent of college graduates favoring increased commitment compared to 14.9 percent of those with grade school education and 8.1 percent of college graduates favoring decreased commitment compared to 6.6 percent of the grade school group. Keeping the commitment unchanged was favored by 50 percent of the college group compared to 32 percent of grade school group, with 45 percent of the latter answering "unsure."

A poll conducted in August 1980 by the Roper Organization for the United Nations Association showed that although 53 percent of the respondents thought that the U.N. was doing a poor job, the age group of 18 to 29 year olds was markedly more internationalist than older age groups. This was interpreted to mean that younger Americans need leaders who will articulate ways of strengthening international institutions and identifying areas of common interest between nations.

The problem is that this need is inchoate. There is unnecessary ignorance of geography, of current and recent history, of the diverse elements of our common Western civilization, of the application of democratic principles through our political and economic institutions, and of the forces shaping the modern world. Ignorance, parochialism, apathy, and prejudice have combined to increase misunderstandings and divisive attitudes on the part of each side of the Atlantic toward the other. The decline in European studies in American universities, of student and faculty exchanges with Europe, and of public and private funding for both, have had deleterious effects on this side. Similar factors in Europe and, more importantly, distorted impressions of American society, have produced attitudes ranging from cool indifference to active anti-Americanism. Naturally the extent of these attitudes varies from country to country, but their prevalence is clearly cause for concern.

A paper recently prepared by the U.S. International Communication Agency ("The Successor Generation: Implications of European-American Relations") states:

The successor generations of the United States and Western Europe are of increasing concern to us. If it is true that their views of the European-American relationship differ from those of their predecessors, significant implications may exist for the vitality and durability of the close ties which have linked us during the past generation.... Our concern is whether the European-American relationship, as we have known it since 1945, will endure during the remainder of this century as a new generation of Americans and Europeans occupies positions of leadership in their respective societies.

A qualitative paper on the situation in Europe, especially in the German Federal Republic, by Alexander Klieforth, recently Minister for Public Affairs at the Embassy in Bonn, is given as an Appendix to this paper.



### **III. The Purpose of the Program**

After several months of considering the nature and complexities of the successor generation problem and means of dealing with it, the Working Group adopted the following brief statement of its purposes: In today's interdependent and turbulent world no nation by itself alone can assure the freedom and other basic values of its own people. Common effort of like-minded nations is essential to develop, promote and defend freedom, human dignity, rights and opportunities. This common effort has a tendency to decline from generation to generation unless it is constantly re-enforced.

The mission of the Atlantic Council's Educational Program is to revitalize awareness of these factors on the part of succeeding generations of Americans and Europeans.

The dignity and liberty of the individual, his freedom to worship in his own way, to choose his own form of government and to seek a better life for himself and his children are universal human values. They are common to all mankind, including peoples subject to totalitarian rule.

The nations of the Atlantic Community certainly have no monopoly of these values, but they and a few others have made great efforts to develop democratic institutions to give these values practical reality. Their efforts have been emulated by many other peoples. Full achievement of this objective requires constant effort to strengthen and defend their free institutions against those who would subject the individual to the state.

The Preamble to the North Atlantic Treaty states that: "The Parties ... are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage, and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law." Article 2 of that Treaty continues: "The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded."

The Atlantic Council's education program, acting as a catalyst, clearing house and resource, seeks to stimulate greater educational emphasis (not merely through academia but through other channels as well) on salient factors, including:

- The common heritage of the peoples of the Atlantic Community, their histories, languages and outlook, the factors that unite them, the problems that divide them, and the richness of their diversities.
- The commonality of their interests and their destiny in today's and tomorrow's world.
- The relevance of history, particularly recent history, to understanding of the international issues of today.
- The realities, the problems and the opportunities of increasing interdependence.
- The basic principles and nature of both free and totalitarian systems.
- The danger which heavily armed and militant totalitarianism poses for the free world and the free way of life .
- The international dimension of citizen responsibility.
- The fact that security is not solely a military matter but a political, economic, social and psychological one as well.
- Above all, the responsibility of the individual to do his part to strengthen our free institutions and to defend them.

Essentially the mission is to assist succeeding generations to reach and act upon sound value judgments in the face of the dangers and opportunities of today's and tomorrow's interdependent world.

#### IV. Values

In formulating its program, the Working Group considered the values most relevant in the context of its purpose to be freedom, the dignity of the individual, the principles of democracy and the rule of law. All are given application in theory, if not always fully in practice, in the working of our democratic institutions. All have an ethical basis.

In contemporary society young people are confronted by a conflicting array of value systems. Authority of the family, the school, the church and the government have all been weakened. Technology provides unprecedented opportunities and dangers. Worldwide communication is instantaneous; conflict and disorder anywhere make news and TV brings it into the home more vividly than anything a child learns in school.

The adolescent and young adult faces the problem of finding himself in relation to conflicting beliefs and values encountered in his interactions with others. Unless he finds a firm ethical base, he feels little connection with the past or responsibility for the future, little allegiance to what has gone before or little hope of modifying what may follow.

In Western society, the schools and universities are responsible for preparing the intellects of young people to engage the world of ideas and beliefs as free minds capable of analysis and judgment. There must be not simply "do-goodism" but realistic advancement of our national interests of all kinds. And they are vital to securing the respect of others and willing acceptance of our leadership. A leader must, above all, be respected.

Over and beyond the values of any particular grouping of human beings these ideals form an ethical framework which has objective validity, of which one can aspire to have a degree of understanding — not perfect, but approximate — and which can give a measure of insight and guidance to those who seek it. The common Western Judeo-Christian belief system which has developed over the centuries is the closest we have to such an ethical framework.

A democratic society and a democratic world are dependent upon the capability of the individual to examine questions of value and of purpose in critical fashion. We need not fear that the young will be seduced to error if they are permitted to examine a variety of belief systems critically and openly. The dedicated teacher certainly desires to implant this capability of reaching sound judgments but needs the tools, help and encouragement to do so.

The kind of society our successors fashion — whether they will enhance and clarify, or reject and replace the traditional values our society bequeaths them — depends very much on how today's young people select among the many value systems to which they are exposed.

The application of traditional value systems to the problems of today's unstable and interdependent world presents dilemmas and challenges. How, for instance, do we reconcile moral horror over nuclear arms with the responsibility to preserve and carry forward our heritage of freedom? The set of values necessary for decision would seem to be based upon a point of view that stands above immediate political issues, and which finds guidelines in the deeper truths of nature and religion which tend to give priority and order to the resolution of such issues .

Today, the fundamental issue in the international arena is who will construct a new international order appropriate to today's world, to replace the old one shattered in the first half of this century.

In the early post-war years the grim shadow of World War II gave impetus to the search for a new and effective international political and economic system. The UN and its affiliated institutions of the World

Bank, International Monetary Fund, World Health Organization and Food and Agriculture Organizations, as well as other specialized agencies, were created quickly. There also emerged a pattern of closer political relationships between the free nations of Western Europe, the United States and Canada. They become linked in a North Atlantic Alliance — and a politico-military organization, NATO — and, more importantly, they were linked by the sometimes dimly realized but deeper bonds of our common Western heritage, values and civilization.

Their relationships are not exclusive — these systems have ties of varying degrees of closeness with other nations worldwide. For example, the "Atlantic" community of nations has broadened to include Japan, Australia and New Zealand in matters of economic cooperation and development, as embodied in the OECD, and increasingly in the fields of defense and energy supply security. The point is, however, that these nations — in addition to their common interests — perceive a shared heritage of values.

The object was to create a structure sufficiently flexible to house the diverse interests and requirements of the entire non-Communist world. Even beyond the democratic world, it was hoped that the universal human values to which these nations are dedicated would, by their attractive power, eventually wear away the rigidity of totalitarian systems. We have seen signs of that emerging in Yugoslavia, in China, in Eastern Europe, most recently in Poland, and in the courage of dissidents in all communist countries.

The ethical framework of their values is a powerful unifying force, in some ways even stronger than national interests. It is based in part upon the accumulated experience and wisdom of the Judeo-Christian, Greco-Roman, and European cultures. One generation after another has added, adapted, tested for error, reconciled theories with practice and practice with theory. The resulting framework is complex: it may not be wholly consistent, it may not be fully adequate to today's world, but it is enduring. From it does emerge a sense of direction, an aid to understanding, an insight into the values that transcend those of the individual, of class, of sect or any generation.

To promote and defend that framework requires the dedicated common effort of many individuals in many lands. The framework, the dedication, and the common effort have a tendency to decline from generation to generation unless constantly reinforced.

## V. The Threat

Young people, like many of their elders, in addition to having only a dim understanding of the common values that hold the Atlantic community together, may also be only vaguely aware of the nature and extent of the threat to our way of life posed by militant totalitarian expansionism.

This has been changed to some extent by growing evidence of the dangers posed by Soviet policy, such as the occupation of Afghanistan, but only in the sense of eliciting new interest in national defense, without a clear understanding of *why* collective defense in general and the Atlantic alliance in particular are needed and why the US-Soviet relationship seems to be increasingly affected by turbulent change in the developing world. There may be, however, a new receptivity for information about such matters — and also a greater need for it.

Many of our people — both young and old — are not fully aware of the chain of events that brought about the formation of the Atlantic alliance (what is generally referred to as the early Cold War including such signposts as the Yalta agreements, Soviet occupation of the countries of Eastern Europe, Soviet pressures on Iran and Turkey in 1945/46, the Greek civil war, the invasion of Czechoslovakia, the Berlin blockade and the Korean war). Yet those events explain how the last and present generations of national leaders came to see the world and American interests and obligations. Furthermore, a good many people — including many of the younger generation — have come to consider nuclear war as unthinkable. Certainly many perhaps do not realize fully the extent, pace, and momentum of growing Soviet military power or of Soviet doctrine and policies. There is also a belief, perhaps now altered somewhat by Afghanistan, that confrontation between East and West involving the Third World has little immediate effect on our national interest.

If young people are not fully aware of the importance of collective defense, it is partially because they do not know enough about the societies that we confront — what it is like to live under unitary totalitarian rule rather than pluralistic democracy and how oppressive communist rulers have to be to stay in power. Many members of the younger generation tend to deplore and even question the need for military security and the inevitable sacrifices it entails. When a "threat" to the United States is direct, it may be too late to do anything constructive about it. Collective defense requires some understanding of what a threat to the security of another country can be: indirectly, but very importantly a threat also to us. Some lessons of history need to be learned, and taught, over and over again. We should be neither surprised nor critical that collective security is not as well understood by the youth of today as it was by the youth of a generation ago, when the need for it was more obvious.

There is a good deal of evidence to indicate that the younger generation, both at home and abroad, has not learned adequately the relevance of history to the real world of today. History shows that prolonged peaceful co-existence between nations has been the exception rather than the rule. Yet to be truly relevant this knowledge must cover the root causes of past conflicts. In this age of accelerating historical developments it is more important than ever before to be aware of the causes of change in this century.

The Atlantic alliance was established in 1949 to counter the threat of Soviet aggression against Western Europe. Its members were determined to avoid the errors of the 1930's when they had failed to respond effectively to successive Nazi encroachments into surrounding countries. This time, they sought to deter aggression by making clear in advance their determination to resist it collectively. For thirty years, this has prevented the threat of Soviet encroachment further West in Europe from materializing. Today the threat is global, and political, economic and psychological as well as military. Greater understanding, both of post-World War II history and of recent developments and trends, is necessary.

There is a danger that pointing to the realities of Soviet power and its growth in recent years may be misinterpreted as merely escalating the arms race and the danger of war. Actually, the application of

deterrence has been and is a major factor in *preventing* war. The West need not fear an equilibrium of power, but that equilibrium has been disturbed in recent years. This is something that should be more widely and better understood, in a calm and reasoned way.

In brief, the Working Group believes that more knowledge about the Soviet Union — and, *mutatis mutandis*, about Cuba and other Communist countries — is highly desirable. It can lead, in fact, to calmer and less emotional view of momentary crises. Political mood swings in America have been a problem even when people had relatively more knowledge than they have today about world politics.

Are we in danger of "returning to the Cold War?" Or has it never ended? A respected former American Ambassador to the USSR has observed: "What the Soviets mean by 'peaceful coexistence' is exactly what we mean by 'cold war:' achievement of our aims without fighting." Naturally our aims are not the same as theirs. We do not seek the destruction of communism, only the prevention of its expansion against the will of the people concerned. While East-West relations appear to have changed in many respects in recent years, there is as yet no evidence of any *fundamental* change.

Current issues cannot be understood outside of their historical context. In this connection, many people today have only a superficial understanding of the Cold War and its underlying causes. This is not a question of "realism" versus "revisionism." A debate between the two views might shed more light than any effort to present only one side of that controversy.

This subject involves giving people some conceptual framework for an understanding of important issues. For almost a decade it was difficult to discuss Cold War issues and history because of revulsion over the Vietnam war. There is no question but that it affected foreign perceptions of the United States as well as our own self perceptions. We are beginning to pay for this in many ways.

The three purposes of the Atlantic Alliance ("the three D's") are deterrence, defense, and *détente*. The degree of unity of purpose the alliance has achieved among its members has not only prevented further armed aggression in Europe but has provided the necessary pre-condition both for peaceful co-existence and for constructive East-West relations. We can now see that Soviet power has turned elsewhere, first to Cuba and then to Angola, Ethiopia, South Yemen, and Afghanistan. It is clear that insecurity anywhere — both inside and outside the NATO area — impacts on the interests of our allies in Western Europe and Japan as well as on our own.

Communism as an ideology is not itself a danger to the United States or Western Europe or Japan.<sup>1</sup> It is not an appealing doctrine to our young people, and it should not be presented to them as if it were a monster ready to devour them. However, Communist ideology is important to understand, for it forms part of both the mental makeup and the arsenal of our adversaries. One cannot understand what is going on in Cuba, Angola, or Afghanistan unless one understands both the doctrine and the totalitarian methods that motivate Communist leadership. The people of these countries are much less moved by it, but they do not make the decisions. The horrors of Cambodia, for example, cannot be understood without reference to the primitive communism that motivated the Khmer Rouge leadership. A study of Marxism (preferably taught by non-Marxists, not necessarily anti-Marxists) and of communist systems is important for young people as part of their early education. America doesn't have to worry about being taken over by communism, but it does have to worry about the role of communism as a weapon of psychological warfare. What we need fear most is ignorance.

The Atlantic Alliance now consists entirely of democratic countries; and Japan, Australia and New Zealand are also democratic. A wealth of common values and traditions and perceptions undergird our

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<sup>1</sup> Joseph Sisco dissents from this statement.

alliances in both the Atlantic and Pacific. We are disappointed when we and our allies differ on various issues, but the best protection against divisive stresses and strains is better understanding of our *common* interests.

Understanding of the threat we face can best be developed through the teaching of modern history, including its ramifications in the fields of political, economic and social science. There is no need for a "cold war" approach — topics such as "problems of national independence and security" or "diverse economic and social systems" provide a solid basis for analysis. The essential is to provide the student with the basis for informed and independent judgment. The approach must be factual, not emotional, but dramatic historical events can heighten interest and understanding in the learning process.

## VI. The Atlantic Council's Approach

The Working Group believes that citizen participation in the governance of society is the heart of democracy, that education today requires a much higher degree than ever before of international content to prepare citizens to deal with national and international problems, that civic responsibility has an ethical base, and that our heritage of democratic freedoms today faces anti-democratic forces which threaten Western society and require its internal strengthening and ability to withstand diverse external threats.

Strengthening the American educational system to meet these challenges presents a monumental task. Fortunately, recognition of the problems involved is growing. The work of the U.S. Office of Education, the President's Commission on Foreign Language and International Studies, and the Council on Learning has done much to alert academic opinion. The International Communication Agency, despite declining appropriations, has done what it could to carry out exchange programs, as have private organizations such as Youth for Understanding and the American Field Service. The creation of the Department of Education and passage of the International Education Programs Act of 1980 have been major steps in the right direction.<sup>2</sup>

Conscious of these and other efforts, the Atlantic Council is also conscious both of its own limitations and of the contribution it is particularly suited to make. Dedicated to strengthening the political, economic, defense, and cultural ties between the free nations of Western Europe, on the one hand, and the United States and Canada, on the other, it has had many years of experience in stimulating constructive thought and action with respect to our Atlantic relations. "Atlantic" in focus — meaning concern primarily with the components of Western civilization, culture and interests — the Council is catholic with respect to all elements which link those who share that civilization. It also has close ties with kindred organizations in other NATO countries and appropriate international organizations and is already working closely with them.

Coping with the problem will inevitably involve a long-term effort by the entire educational system from kindergarten to graduate school in this country and in others. *The Council's program seeks to stimulate the American educational system, and to the extent possible those of our allies, to greater recognition of the problem and greater attention to the kind of education needed to correct it.*

The education we seek to encourage includes the basics essential to understanding of today's world — foreign languages, geography history (especially modern history) and political, economic and social science. It includes involving an international dimension in all relevant elements of curricula. It includes greater emphasis upon studies of Western civilization, culture and languages to bring the pendulum back from its recent swing away from Western studies and it includes the basic principles upon which our free democratic political and economic institutions are founded. It includes the comparison of democratic and totalitarian systems. It includes the relevance of history, modern as well as earlier, to the problems of the world today. Above all, it includes stimulating the educational system to provide greater understanding of the basic principles of Western civilization and of the individual citizen's responsibility to strengthen and defend these essential elements of our free way of life.

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<sup>2</sup> General Goodpaster states that there is a good deal of skepticism with regard to the creation of the Department of Education and dissents from this statement.

## The U.S. Program

In developing an initial program of action, the Group has formulated a series of: (1) results it hopes to see achieved, (2) activities it will endeavor to encourage, and (3) the means it plans to use. These can be stated as follows:

### A. Results

- I. Greater awareness of the Successor Generation problem and increased sensitivity to its implications on the part of future national leaders as preparation for the fulfillment of their responsibilities.
- II. A manpower pool of persons who have attained a sufficient degree of outlook, knowledge of international affairs and language proficiency to serve as generalists and specialists in responsible positions in the public and private sectors, including business and academia.
- III. Enhanced appreciation for and participation in the democratic process — an informed and motivated electorate.
- IV. Improved communication between official and academic practitioners, domestically and internationally, with respect to the conduct and teaching of international relations.
- V. Greater financial support for efforts to achieve these results.

### B. Activities To Be Encouraged

- I. Increased support for international exchange programs, official and private, and greater involvement of the academic community in such exchanges.
- II. Greater official and private support for professional associations and institutions to develop and carry out innovative and interdisciplinary programs of international studies.
- III. Academic emphasis on *advanced* rather than superficial language training.
- IV. Greater emphasis on European studies, including history, languages and culture.
- V. Greater emphasis on interdisciplinary treatment of the political, economic and security problems of an interdependent world.
- VI. More analytical consideration of divergent political, economic and social systems and of the principles upon which they are based.
- VII. Greater emphasis on the relation of ethics to the conduct of public and foreign policy.<sup>3</sup>
- VIII. Development of more effective teaching methods, aids and curriculum content, and better textbooks with respect to international affairs.
- IX. Improved public education through television and other media coverage of international events with greater depth and perspective.

### C. Means

In view of the magnitude of the task, the Working Group emphasizes its belief that attainment of its objectives can be achieved only by working to the maximum possible extent through existing groups and organizations. Its role is that of the stimulator, catalyst and clearing house. It recognizes the importance of working primarily with and through *leverage groups* such as professional associations and institutions of learning rather than individuals.

These groups represent the practitioners — the educators, administrators, school and university faculty members whose individual and collective efforts will determine the extent to which these objectives can be achieved.

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<sup>3</sup> Joseph Sisco would qualify this point, commenting that a weakness of the Carter Administration's policy was to stress human rights in some cases, such as Brazil, at the expense of more relevant considerations.



To reach this audience most effectively, the Council's Working Group has targeted that constituency primarily responsible for the content of education today:

- University presidents, deans, faculty and curricula planners.
- Professional associations of professors and teachers.
- School principals, administrators and teachers.
- Teachers' organizations at the national, state and local levels .
- Textbook writers and publishers .
- The media insofar as it relates to education.

To the extent practicable, other non-academic influences, i.e. family, church, community and peer groups.

The program seeks to build on the work of the U.S. Office of Education and the Danforth and Kettering Foundations with respect to civic education and that of the President's Commission, the Council on Learning and others with respect to the international components of education. It will focus its efforts on those aspects of education which relate primarily to the understanding, enhancement and preservation of our common Western heritage, civilization and values.

Its efforts at stimulation will be carried out through liaison with key professional organizations and directly with academic institutions, including organizing seminars and encouraging others to do so .

In its efforts to serve as a catalyst and clearing house it will seek to ascertain the most effective pertinent educational programs, especially innovative and interdisciplinary ones, being carried out or developed in our educational system and bringing them to the attention of others for emulation or adaptation.

It will seek to encourage and assist professors, teachers and of textbook authors to find improved methods of providing students with adequate basic background in the fields covered by the program, including the development of significant curriculum content.

It will make maximum use of publications of professional associations to stimulate pertinent thought and action by their members.

It will seek means to influence the media, insofar as they relate to education or influence on our young people, to present material with greater depth and perspective. It will investigate the possibilities of stimulating the production of , motion pictures or video tapes for classroom, television or general showing, including background material on major contemporary problems.

In the process it expects to organize, and will encourage others to organize:

- National and regional seminars on teaching training and means of helping teachers to help themselves;
- National seminars on curricula;
- International seminars on young leaders;
- International seminars of educators

## **The International Program**

Joint ventures are being organized by the Council with the North Atlantic Assembly, the Atlantic Institute for International Affairs, and the Atlantic Treaty Association (ATA).

Specifically, the Council has succeeded in helping the North Atlantic Assembly (Members of Congress and of the Parliaments of other NATO countries) to establish a new "Successor Generation" sub-committee of its Committee on Education, Cultural Affairs and Information. The Council is working closely with this subcommittee, is engaged in exchanging ideas and information with respect to pilot programs similar to ours, and expects, through the subcommittee, to encourage the development of similar groups in other NATO countries, with a continuing program of cooperation and exchange of ideas and information.

The Council is organizing with the Atlantic Institute a "Young Leadership Program" of issue-oriented seminars bringing together emergent leaders of U.S., Canadian, Western European, and Japanese labor unions, academia, news media, business, industry and government.

The Council is also working with the Atlantic Treaty Association and its Education Committee with a view to stimulating similar educational programs in other NATO countries. The Education Committee meets at least three times a year, in connection with meetings of the ATA Council and Assembly. The Council will participate in these meetings and encourage and assist the Committee to organize seminars of persons in a position to further appropriate educational development in their own countries and to provide pertinent program material. We will also make special efforts through the ATA Council and the ATA assembly, as well as through the Education Committee, to stimulate action by the respective national member organizations.

The Atlantic Council has long sponsored the American Council of Young Political Leaders, the U.S. affiliate of the Atlantic Association of Young Political Leaders, which organizes exchange visits and conferences of persons who have embarked on political careers. It has also sponsored the Committee on Atlantic Studies, a group of university professors, in the United States and Canada working with their European counterparts to encourage a better understanding of Atlantic Communities affairs in colleges and universities.

The Working Group is convinced that the knowledge, attitudes and judgments of the Successor Generation will go far to determine the future security and well-being of the American people, those of the other members of the Western Alliance and other free nations. It will also go far toward determining the future international order in which they and their successors will live.

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-Contributed by Bernd Rother.]

Dr. Thomas Mirow  
6 July 1981

RE: Conversation of SPD Chairman Willy Brandt's with the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Leonid Brezhnev on 30 June 1981 in Moscow

The meeting lasted for about 2 hours and 45 minutes. Additional participants from the Soviet side: [Foreign Minister Andrey] Gromyko, [Central Committee Secretary Boris] Ponomarev, Blatov; from the German side: [Minister of State in the Chancellery Hans-Jürgen] Wischnewski, Mirow. Also one interpreter each. Brezhnev opened with an introduction of about an hour he read from a manuscript, Brandt replied also for about an hour. Then additional issues were discussed.

Brezhnev defined the international situation as very worrisome. Therefore today it is even more important than in the 1970s to find a common language. Back then one treated each other as partners and potential friends. Today there is no longer a spirit of good will. In particular the weapons at our disposal are even more terrifying. Therefore efforts for peace have become ever more important, yet the actual situation looks different. We are deeply concerned about the United States who is striving for military superiority. The danger of war is increasing, the accumulated capital of confidence is decreasing. Responsibility for such developments is not only with the United States but also with those who follow them on their path. We ask ourselves the question how the Federal Republic of Germany [FRG] would react if the Soviet Union would strive for a hegemonic position and act in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf like the U.S. does. We have much detailed evidence for a changed American policy. For instance, an American diplomat from the MBFR delegation stated the talks in Vienna make no sense: Consensus already reached there has to be scaled back to a minimum.

We do not want to drive a wedge between the U.S. and their European allies but the policy of détente is in the interest of all peoples. Therefore Western Europe has to exert its influence.

Especially fateful consequences can be expected from NATO's [double-track] decision. Here [FRG Chancellor] Helmut Schmidt did play an active role. "Bonn has really done a thorough job". The Americans want to change the balance of forces in Europe and globally to their favor. The new Soviet [intermediate-range] missiles cannot reach the United States but the new American missiles could hit the Soviet Union. Pershing II and Cruise Missiles are not a response to the SS-20 but a strike against Soviet strategic capacities and thus a qualitative change.

The Soviet superiority always asserted does in fact not exist. Of course, the SS-20 missiles are better than the old ones. Yet their assignment has remained constant: countering NATO's nuclear weapons. NATO's forward-based systems and the British and French systems included, there exists an approximate balance of nuclear carriers in Europe, namely about 1,000 systems on both sides. In addition, for each new SS-20 an

old missile will be withdrawn. Also the SS-20 program does not change that the West continues to enjoy a 1.5 times superiority if one counts the warheads.

An implementation of NATO's decision would increase Western superiority to a double capacity. This is something the USSR would not be able to tolerate. It would have to apply countermeasures. By the way, then the Federal Republic would be reduced to a missile launch ramp of the U.S. and will be incapable of pursuing its own security policy. The support of the [FRG] Federal Government for the NATO decision is a step away from the course of the [1970] Moscow Treaty [between USSR and FRG and signed by Brezhnev and Brandt]. However, the course steered by Willy Brandt, and initially also by Helmut Schmidt, is still correct.

There must be no more war started from German soil. We in the USSR have not forgotten the 20 million dead of World War II but we want to live in peace with Germany. We never behaved disloyal towards the Federal Republic but now we are portrayed as a menace. The events of 1941 [German attack on USSR] will never be repeated even when the Soviet Union has to tighten its belt.

There seem to be some who object to a good German-Soviet cooperation. This is why the NATO decision was made. We will fight against this decision even when this causes trouble for the [FRG] Federal Government. We do not understand why the German Social Democrats are complacent with the undermining of the policy of détente. We want to strengthen trust and expand cooperation. Yet Soviet good will is not enough. The Soviet Union wants negotiations about the limitation and reduction of nuclear weapons, including forward-based systems, and the British and French systems. During the course of negotiations we are willing to observe a qualitative and quantitative moratorium. However, negotiations may not serve as camouflage for the introduction of new systems. If Europe takes a clear position, the U.S. would not be able to do anything. Every such [European] initiative would be welcomed by the Soviet Union.

Brezhnev then referred to various proposals he had made in his CPSU Congress speech of 23 February 1981, and to his most recent proposal for a nuclear-free zone in Northern Europe. He will also consider to turn the Baltic Sea area in a nuclear-free zone if NATO acts accordingly.

Despite all differences between both sides, Brezhnev continued, we still assume there exists consensus that peace is the highest, guiding and required value. Therefore we have many options for joint and parallel activities. This is how he views his upcoming meeting with Chancellor Helmut Schmidt: It ought to be a step forward and result in concrete progress in the spirit of the Moscow Treaty and the joint [FRG-USSR] communiqué from 1978. There are still many reserves for our cooperation, like in the gas-pipeline-deal. Bilateral relations could develop nicely if it would not be for factors interfering from outside.

Eventually Brezhnev voiced grave Soviet concerns about American policy towards China. We will draw consequences, in particular if arms deliveries will come into play. [...]

In his response Willy Brandt expressed his great concern. [...]

The Federal Republic has a vital interest in improved relations between the global powers. The United States is not a monolithic bloc, its policy can be influenced. We know about the USSR's skepticism but the Chancellor [Schmidt] brought from [his April 1981 visit in] Washington the firm commitment for negotiations about euro-strategic weapons, and NATO has reiterated this in Rome.

It has been said Helmut Schmidt has done a thorough job. In reality, he has made thorough arguments. During the [FRG-Soviet] talks in Bonn in 1978 he linked in the joint communiqué respective passages about the approximate balance explicitly also to intermediate nuclear forces. [During his visit] in 1980 in Moscow there were talks about this. It is understandable that the USSR feels threatened by new medium-range weapons. However, we also feel threatened by the SS-20. Mutual threats must be eliminated soon through negotiations. [Brandt] understands the Soviet view to include forward-based systems and accepts that the British and French potential is counted. [...]

Brezhnev repeated the interest of both sides in negotiations. The Federal Republic can make a major contribution here. He wants to ask openly why the United States gets through with everything. The Europeans must articulate their interests now in order to achieve a turn towards arms control.

With regard to Poland he defined the events as consisting of two features. First, the political leaders there have committed grave economic mistakes resulting in discontent of the masses. This is currently to be revised. Second, however, these mistakes are exploited by anti-socialist forces eager to liquidate socialism in Poland, such as the extremist forces within "Solidarnosc". Those are supported from the West with concrete aid. The Poles have to solve their problems themselves. Yet the USSR will provide any imaginable support and assist Poland in an emergency.

B. asked W.B. then about the new French President which Brandt obviously knows well. [...]

Hans-Jürgen Wischnewski finally confirmed the importance of Brezhnev's upcoming visit to Bonn. The German interest in this visit extends far beyond partisans. It would be desirable to agree on an exact date as soon as possible. This will be a sign for a positive development in Europe.

Brezhnev thanked and stated his willingness to come to Bonn in November.

T. Mirow

[Translated for CWIHP by Bernd Schaefer].

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ASSESSMENTS AND RESEARCH

(U) WESTERN EUROPE: NEUTRALISM AND ANTI-TNF SENTIMENT

(S/NF) Summary

A survey of neutralist and anti-nuclear trends in allied countries reveals that neutralism in Western Europe is no more significant today than it has been in the past. In several countries, including those with entrenched communist parties, it has actually declined. Preoccupation with neutralism obscures the US focus on the salient policy issue of the moment: opposition to theater nuclear force (TNF) modernization. European opposition to TNF extends far beyond relatively insignificant traditional neutralist groups. It stems from a deep-seated European anxiety that the US may embark on a confrontational course with the Soviets.

The decade of detente has psychologically reinforced European preferences for accommodation as a means for resolving East-West problems. The closer one's location to the Eastern bloc, the stronger these preferences are. The US rhetoric of "margin of safety," along with statements underscoring US strategic inferiority, has exacerbated European fears of a decoupling of the US strategic deterrent and made it more difficult for allied heads of governments to translate public perceptions of the Soviet threat into support for an expanded defense effort. Opinion research concerning the Federal Republic of Germany has indicated that the direct link between sharpening the perception of the threat and heightened support for defense has a definite limit. Too negative a portrayal of the threat becomes counterproductive.

Although keenly aware of the implications for the threat, West Europeans will resist initiatives that they believe may polarize East-West relations. This

-Contributed by William Burr.

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RDS-B 8/13/61 (Baumann, 1.)

Secret 12-1-61  
August 11, 1961

United States Department of State  
Office of FOI, Privacy, & Classification Review  
Review Authority: FLEISHER, ERIC  
Date: 04/19/95  
Case ID: 9201796

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attitude reflects their fear that polarization will create a Cold War climate, jeopardize their economic interests in Eastern Europe, and nullify their limited ability to take independent positions on certain international issues.

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(S/NF) Overview

Talk of rising European "neutralism" does not explain the growing opposition to cruise missile deployment and thus makes the designing of policies to deal with the TNP issue more difficult. European opposition to TNP extends far beyond the traditional neutralist groups. It stems fundamentally from a pervasive anxiety that the US, having purged itself of its national guilt following the Vietnam entanglement, may embark on an ideologically induced confrontational course with the Soviet Union that would sharply escalate the arms race and revive the Cold War. Short of a Soviet intervention in Poland, the West Europeans would be likely to resist such a course.

This is not to suggest that European publics and elites minimize the gravity of the Soviet threat. The oft-repeated concern that successor generations in Europe lack a historical memory of the immediate postwar era is irrelevant, even if partially true. The fact that the West Europeans share a continent with an immensely powerful and totalitarian neighbor inhibits members of the current generation, as it did their parents, from embracing neutralism. It does not prevent them, however, from seeking to stabilize East-West relations at the lowest possible level of tension. The relaxation of East-West tensions during the 1970s has psychologically reinforced the European predisposition toward accommodation rather than toward confrontation as a means of resolving differences. Because of their proximity to the USSR, West Europeans prefer to hope that Moscow also may find it in the USSR's interest to stabilize East-West relations.

Confronted with this mood, European leaders have found it difficult to alter public perceptions of the Soviet Union. Their ability to do so has been further circumscribed by what they judge to be a rhetoric of confrontation by the US that is not matched by unambiguously threatening Soviet acts, particularly in Europe. (Even the SS-20 is not seen as the kind of threat that would call for the confrontational response that an invasion of Poland would.) Thus, European leaders, while supporting TNP modernization, believe that revitalization of arms control talks offers the best chance to stabilize relations with Moscow and reduce the risks of a nuclear conflict into which they would be drawn.

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But European publics are skeptical about Washington's stated intention to pursue meaningful TNF arms control talks or to reconstitute the SALT process. This apprehension, magnified by the rhetoric of "margin of safety," has led Europeans in general to conclude that TNF serves a war-winning strategy rather than deterrence. This conclusion has revived fears of decoupling. Those who resist TNF argue that allied deployment of new systems when superpower relations appear to be chilling might invite a Soviet strike against Western Europe, to which the US, because of its self-proclaimed strategic inferiority, would be likely not to respond.

Other pragmatic considerations also impel the West European governments to avoid initiatives that may polarize East-West relations. Detente has meant far more to the Europeans than it has to the US. It has stimulated considerable economic and social intercourse on both sides of the Oder-Neisse, particularly between East and West Germans. In the best of economic times, the West Europeans would want to sustain the advantages of a dialogue with Moscow. Faced with deteriorating economic health, the allies are even more intent on limiting the use of trade and technology transfer as political levers in East-West relations. The announcement of a new agreement on US-Soviet grain trade is likely to increase European determination to maintain trade patterns with the East.

Finally, Europeans believe that the diminution of dialogue with Moscow and the resuscitation of bloc-to-bloc rigidity would circumscribe the limited latitude they established in the 1970s to take positions on certain international issues independent of the US. To be sure, the European allies are well aware that they remain bound by certain military-strategic facts of life over which they have no control. But they will be reluctant to abandon the influence that they have developed and the heightened sense of self-esteem that has accrued to them as a consequence.

Opposition to TNF deployment in Europe is more visible in West Germany and the Low Countries. Along with Italy and the United Kingdom, these countries would be the sites for GLCM (ground-launched cruise missile) placements. An analysis of the underlying forces of opposition to TNF in the major West European countries and selected smaller ones follows.

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(C/NF) Federal Republic of Germany

Fear of nuclear weapons and nuclear conflict is increasing in the FRG, but to regard this fear as rising neutralist sentiment is oversimplified. Public opinion polls reaching back into the 1950s in the FRG show support for West German neutralism varying from 15 to 30 percent of the respondents. The figure today is about 20 percent, with much of it where it has traditionally existed--in the pacifist, pro-disarmament elements of the Social Democratic Party (SPD).

But the proportion of Germans that currently opposes TNF deployment is much larger than that supporting neutralism or unilateral disarmament. Two principal factors form and affect German attitudes toward both defense in general and specific defense measures: perception of the Soviet threat and confidence in US leadership. And perception of US leadership is the more critical.

Opinion research indicates that the direct link between sharpening the perception of the threat and heightened support for defense has a definite limit. Too negative a portrayal of the threat becomes counterproductive. Rather than strengthening resolve, it feeds fears about the likelihood of nuclear war and reduces confidence in the US ability to counter the Soviet threat effectively. If this point of diminishing returns vis-a-vis threat assessment has not already been reached on TNF in the FRG, Soviet propaganda is exploiting those German concerns that would hasten its approach.

Besides historically rooted German pacifism, moral idealism, and fear of another war (which would annihilate the Germans), other factors have fed or failed to impede opposition to TNF. The 12-year-old SPD/Liberal Party coalition's pursuit of Ostpolitik could be sold only with the argument that the Soviet military menace was neither an imminent nor an eternal threat to the FRG. Bonn was able to maintain steady real growth in its defense spending in the 1970s because the economy was strong, and these expenditures did not have to compete for resources with social spending. Ostpolitik could enjoy consensus support only as long as defense was not shorted and the SPD commitment to defense strength was conspicuous. But Bonn did not build its case for defense on public discussion of an increasing Soviet threat, incompatible with Ostpolitik.

Now, however, as the German parliamentary opposition has rightly claimed, West Germans have been somewhat lulled into lethargy by Ostpolitik's portrait of the USSR. They can not be reprogrammed overnight into a threat-sensitized populace--least of all by a government that seeks to salvage key aspects of detente by pressing for arms control efforts and East-West dialogue.

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A large part of Bonn's salesmanship for TNF deployments has been based as much on justifying German faith in the US willingness to negotiate as it has been on the military requirement to respond to the Soviet buildup.

TNF has also become the rallying cry of many Germans with other political and economic fears and frustrations. Opponents include anti-nuclear environmentalists, anti-military pacifists, anti-war moralists and church people, and a minority of otherwise disenchanted, alienated youth. Their familiarity with defense issues ranges from peace "scientists" laden with counterarguments and quantitative data to the naive dropouts who react emotionally to "overkill," feel the need to save the developing world, or insist that the morally superior West should make the first move toward disarmament. The significance of fear of nuclear conflict cannot be overrated in generalizing TNF opposition in the FRG.

Germans are overly sensitized at the moment to the vulnerability that their location brings. Soviet officials warn the FRG often of its inescapable targeting for early destruction. Moreover, many who are not pacifists or neutralists still despair over what they see to be an inevitable arms escalation brought on by 1) unbridgeable US-Soviet differences on measuring military balance and 2) the inexorable advance of weapons technology.

It is the moral component of TNF opposition and deep fear of a nuclear conflict that has enabled traditional German neutralists and the minuscule German Communist Party to win much broader support for their anti-TNF petitions, rallies, and marches than they realistically could have expected. German leaders insist that, for Washington's part, reassertion of US moral leadership--for peace and to control nuclear arms--is both essential and sufficient to turn the tide in the West's favor on TNF. On the other hand, addition of enhanced radiation weapons (ERW) deployment or other items to the nuclear agenda would severely overload German and European circuits and likely be TNF's deathknell.

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(C/NF) France

French popular reservations over long-range TNF modernization and ERW are not new phenomena. Rather, they represent the most recent expression of traditional French concern over the escalation of superpower confrontation. Although France has maintained an expensive defense establishment of its own and has developed its nuclear and missile capabilities, French policy in the post-World War II period has been--and under Mitterrand will continue to be--based also on dialogue with the Soviet Union. Paris seeks a relationship aimed at the avoidance of confrontation.

In the same way, France recognizes the need of the alliance to improve and expand its arsenal but questions such rearmament if it is not accompanied by dialogue with the Warsaw Pact. The French trust more in their own abilities than in alliances, particularly when they cannot be the dominant partner. Their greatest fear is that the superpowers will carry confrontation to misadventure and worldwide nuclear conflict. Thus, political leaders of both the former Giscard and the current Mitterrand government, intellectuals, newspaper columnists, and other opinion-makers have expressed varying degrees of concern about the "confrontational rhetoric" used by the Reagan administration since it came to power.

These fears notwithstanding, France has not experienced an outburst of neutralism and/or anti-TNF sentiment this spring on the scale typical of other northern European countries. The fact that France, not being a member of the military organization of NATO, did not participate in NATO's double-track decision has, along with the Gaullist tradition of independent management of France's nuclear arsenal, diminished the impact of the TNF debate in France.

Furthermore, the French were absorbed in Presidential elections, Mitterrand's victory, and legislative elections. As the election period ended, the communists--who often initiate pacifist-type manifestations in France--found themselves tied to government responsibility. Mitterrand's embrace of the double-track decision and public recognition of the European imbalance caused by the SS-20s have further outflanked those elements inside and outside the French Communist Party who would normally spearhead an anti-TNF drive. The number of French anti-nuclear activists has neither grown nor shrunk in recent years, but their sentiment currently is somewhat absorbed in the efforts of their ideological brothers to begin governing France.

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(C/NF) United Kingdom

Britain since World War II has spent a heavier share of its GNP on defense, including an independent nuclear deterrent, than have the other major European allies. These expenditures have enjoyed bipartisan support, Tory and Labor. Labor has been marginally more willing to cut defense expenditures when, as periodically happens, Britain's continued relative economic decline makes that necessary, but leaders in both parties almost always have shared strategic assumptions and commitments.

This is now ceasing to be the case. Labor's long acquiescence to relatively high defense budgets depended upon an unspoken premise: that British workers would not have to pay for defense with lower living standards or reductions in social expenditures. In addition, Labor membership for some time has included a pacifist and/or neutralist strain, which owed most of its limited public appeal to moralistic arguments but could also count on the support of the tiny minority of leftist Britons who sympathized with the Soviet Union and distrusted the United States.

Over the last two years, these advocates of traditional British pacifism have been joined by more pragmatic Labor Party leftists who see in the defense budget the resources otherwise unavailable for social services and public investment. This ad hoc alliance of Labor leftists has taken control of Labor Party policy in large measure and has made unilateral nuclear disarmament, withdrawal of all US nuclear weapons from Britain, and heavy cuts in overall British defense costs the new party gospel.

These anti-defense views have had virtually no impact on the Conservative government, which remains strongly pro-defense. The typical Tory MP supports defense even more fervently than the government itself. British public opinion remains strongly anti-Soviet, and the pacifist trend in Labor so far appears more the creation of a committed minority than a genuinely popular issue.

Nonetheless, even in Britain, popular concern about the possibility of nuclear war is rising. Although opinion polls show that defense policy is near the bottom of the typical voter's list of important issues, polls also indicate that a majority of voters now opposes the government's decision to build the Trident missile submarine force. Public support for TNF deployment has fallen away from the narrow majority that originally supported it.

Under the British parliamentary system, Labor's anti-nuclear and anti-defense views need not be approved by the

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electorate in any positive sense at the next general election, due not later than May 1984. If the voters look to Labor for such other reasons as the Tories' poor economic record, only an intense popular concern over Labor's defense views could keep Labor out of power.

Thus far, there appear few signs of any such concern. In spite of Tory governmental efforts to inform and arouse the public about defense, most British voters seem to care little about the subject. Among the minority that takes defense issues seriously, the traditional support for high defense expenditures has diminished. Meanwhile, for the first time since before World War II, Britain's defense efforts appear, to a substantial degree, hostage to the fortunes of the next general election.

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(C/NF) Italy

Italians share the general European fear that the presence of US nuclear weapons in Europe increases the risk of Soviet attack, but the TNF issue has aroused little public reaction. There is some popular neutralist sentiment, but attempts to mobilize it have largely failed, because the current Italian perception of a threat of war remains low. Unlike the case in Germany or the Netherlands, religion plays an inconsequential role in anti-TNF agitation. The Catholic Church has not espoused a pacifist line and has remained aloof from the debate.

The Italian Communist Party (PCI) and the Italian Socialist Party (PSI) are the only two major parties with the potential to exploit neutralist opinion, which is widespread in both. But domestic constraints limit the ability of either party to capitalize on that opinion. The PCI is also affected by its need to allay domestic suspicions of its links with Moscow. It must prove its respectability and reliability as a supporter of Italy's security alliances if it is to attain its goal of government participation.

Only the small Radical Party has attracted anti-military and anti-nuclear elements by openly opposing current security policies. It resists TNF deployment and supports unilateral disarmament. It has drawn away some PSI and PCI followers on this score, but has little influence.

Under these circumstances, Italian Governments have consistently ignored negative public opinion and taken positions concerning nuclear weapons, including TNF deployment, that meet NATO wishes. In turn, Rome seeks to parlay this acceptance into greater status within the alliance.

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(C/NP) Belgium and the Netherlands

TNF deployment has been a contentious issue in both Belgium and the Netherlands. Although strong opposition to deployment exists in both countries, its origins differ.

In the Netherlands, Calvinist principles of ethics and morality have reinforced the long Dutch history of neutralism and pacifism. As a consequence, the churches--mainly Protestant but Catholic as well--have become the leading force in the anti-TNF campaign. The Dutch have demonstrated growing enthusiasm for arms control. A 1980 poll showed that 57 percent opposed the production and deployment of new nuclear weapons; 24 percent favored production but opposed deployment; and only 18 percent favored production and deployment. Under these circumstances, it is unlikely that any Dutch Government will accept TNF deployment in the Netherlands.

In Belgium, TNF opposition has become hostage to more urgent economic and linguistic tensions. The socialists, who have led the anti-TNF crusade, are able to translate defense expenditures into a "guns or butter" argument as the economy deteriorates and the ability to fund welfare programs declines. The willingness of any Belgian coalition to sacrifice domestic programs for TNF modernization is accordingly very limited. The prospect for deployment in Belgium, although more likely than in the Netherlands, does not stand better than an even chance.

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(C/NF) Norway and Denmark

Despite the fact that both Norway and Denmark followed neutralist policies before World War II, current opposition to TNF deployment in Europe and support for a Nordic nuclear-weapons-free zone do not result from any increase in neutralism or pacifism. Recent public opinion polls in Norway have shown that support for NATO has now increased to an all-time high. However, fear of nuclear war, caused by the increase in Soviet nuclear weapons, the stalemate in arms control talks, and the adoption by the Carter and especially the Reagan administrations of policies to build up nuclear arms and deploy more of them in Europe, has created receptivity to arms control schemes.

The ruling Norwegian Labor Party, which holds only a plurality in Parliament, fears that defections by its anti-militarist followers, although few, could drive it from power in the parliamentary election in September. Its leaders, therefore, supported a proposal by those groups that Norway join with the other Scandinavian countries in a Nordic nuclear-weapons-free zone, provided that such a zone included territory outside Scandinavia and were part of a continent-wide arms control system. Labor government leaders make clear that their endorsement responds to broader Norwegian desires to put pressure on the US to intensify efforts to restart arms control talks.

Danish Social Democratic leaders are more careful in backing such a zone, but they make clear that they support the Norwegian objective and are responding to both general Scandinavian fears of a nuclear arms race and, for them, overly belligerent US policies toward the USSR.

Prepared by INR/WEA staff  
K23406

Approved by H. Donald Gelber  
K29214

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GROMYKO ON NO FIRST USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Summary

In his September 22 UN General Assembly speech, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko modified the ancient Soviet proposal to ban first use of nuclear weapons. General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev's 26th CPSU Congress iteration of that proposal earlier this year had implicitly recognized the legitimacy of use of nuclear weapons in response to aggression with conventional forces. Gromyko's new argument is that no first use of nuclear weapons could ever be justified. The change appears to be part of Moscow's effort to capitalize on West European sensitivity to nuclear issues--both enhanced radiation weapons (ERW) and theater nuclear forces (TNF).

\* \* \* \* \*

During the early 1950s, the Soviet position evolved from one of demanding a ban on nuclear weapons per se to the 1955 proposal to ban the use of such weapons. In 1960, the Soviets further refined that idea and proposed to ban first use of nuclear weapons. Traditionally, Western powers objected that a ban on first use would put NATO at a disadvantage in the event of a Warsaw Pact attack with conventional forces.

In 1972, during the heyday of detente, the Soviets sought to meet that Western objection by proposing a combination ban on first use of nuclear weapons and first use of force. Under such an arrangement, a country that was

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Report 237-CA  
September 28, 1981

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Case ID: 9201796

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the victim of aggression with conventional weapons would be free to defend itself, and thus use of nuclear weapons in response would be recognized as legitimate. Gromyko made this proposal in his speech to the UN General Assembly in September 1972. The Soviets went back on the 1972 idea in November 1976 when the Warsaw Pact proposed a ban on first use of nuclear weapons in Europe.

Brezhnev, however, returned to the 1972 formula in a March 2, 1979, speech when he proposed that CSCE (Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe) states "reach an agreement on not being the first to use either nuclear or conventional weapons... something like a non-aggression pact." Brezhnev repeated the idea of a combined ban on first use of nuclear weapons and conventional forces in Europe in his February 1981 speech to the party congress.

Gromyko has now in effect reversed Brezhnev's congress wording and gone to a highly propagandistic formulation denouncing as immoral, indeed criminal, any first use of nuclear weapons. In doing so, he has apparently given up any thought of negotiating any agreement with the West on the subject. But he probably calculates that his present tack puts the USSR in a better position to try to exploit the peace movement in Western Europe and concerns there about ERW and TNE.

Prepared by R. Baran, J. Parker  
x29194

Approved by R. Baran  
x29194

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Dr. Thomas Mirow  
28 September 1981

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Brandt, Berliner Ausgabe*,  
Bonn (Dietz) Vol. 9, 2003.  
-Contributed by Bernd  
Rother.]

Note

RE: Conversation Willy Brandt's with French President Francois Mitterand on 23 September 1981 in Elysee Palace  
(also present: Thomas Mirow; Interpreter)

The talk was focused on issues of security policy.

Francois Mitterand stated that now, in 1981, there exists more or less a strategic balance. By 1985 there will be a Soviet superiority. Afterwards, until about 1992, he foresees a superiority of the United States.

He said to have included strategic aircraft into that equation.

France could build the neutron bomb today but in all likelihood it will not do so. The neutron bomb requires a strategy of escalating response, and this strategy does not square with the capacities of the French nuclear force. After a talk with him [Mitterand] in Paris, the Soviet Ambassador emphasized mutual agreement about the need for a balance in Europe. Yet this does not match with the actual course of this talk and his [Mitterand's] conviction. A balance must exist on a global scale, not just in Europe. Also French nuclear forces are only slightly larger than what is actually needed for deterrence, thus France cannot accept an inclusion of these forces into negotiations.

He is for negotiations. The United States must not strive for superiority. He is against moratoria since 150 SS-20 missiles are sufficient to destroy everything. He sees no sense in the decrease of overkill capacities.

He is aware that the deployment of Pershing [missiles] will naturally change the strategic situation. It would be good if there would be no need to build them. His statements in an interview with [German weekly magazine] "Stern" were cut and edited. He stays firmly to the NATO decision [of December 1979].

In his response Willy Brandt outlined the German interpretation of NATO's decision. For a while there had been fear the United States would view it differently. Eastern conventional superiority exists for a long time already. It gets partially overstated. If the United States wants to achieve conventional parity, it must introduce the military draft.

Then Willy Brandt explained the particular German situation possibly created by the SS-20 deployment (where the exact quality would be difficult to assess, by the way) and the introduction of Pershing and Cruise Missiles, as well as by an expected Soviet military reaction to the latter. He encouraged Francois Mitterand to address in his forthcoming meeting with the German Federal Chancellor the Euro-strategic and global balance.

He [Brandt] voiced understanding for the French situation, but he also referred at the question of Soviet legitimacy to counterbalance the French forces, and at Soviet security considerations with regard to China.

In conclusion, Brandt explained the concerns of the Federal Republic's young generation and its consequences for the SPD.

Francois Mitterand considered it legitimate to count a Soviet counterbalance to the French forces. He has to deal with a fundamental contradiction where so far he cannot see a solution: the contradiction between the national destination of French nuclear forces and the security obligations resulting from a membership in the Atlantic Alliance. There is no precise answer to the question when French security interests are essentially threatened.

Adenauer's thesis', as mentioned by Brandt, that no missiles must be deployed in Germany capable of threatening the Soviet Union, he [Mitterand] could understand very well. Thus he prefers that the Pershing do not have to be deployed. He also understands the concerns of the Soviet Union. Balances of forces are in essence temporary balances. One has to attempt to eliminate the SS-20 through negotiations, and in the future he will make this clearer in public. He does not want Germany to turn into a powder keg. Also he wanted to emphasize that he does not apply the term "neutralism" with regard to developments in Germany.

Thomas Mirow

## Aufzeichnung

über das Gespräch des SPD-Vorsitzenden mit Secretary Haig  
am 5. Oktober 1981 im State Department

Beginn: 5.30 pm, Ende 6.15 pm

Teilnehmer: WB

Secretary of State Haig

Botschafter Hermes

Ass. Secretary for European Affairs, Eagleburger  
und die Herren W.Stoessel, Kornblum, Rosen

Vorbemerkung

Vor dem Beginn des offiziellen Gesprächs mit H. wurde die Friedensbewegung angesprochen, u.a. die Haltung der der Union nahestehenden jungen Leute zur Nachrüstung und zur Abrüstungsdebatte und die erwartete Wirkung auf die öffentliche Diskussion in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland.

\*

H. berichtet einleitend über seine Gespräche mit dem Präsidenten über Cancun, B. über seine Begegnungen in New York, u.a. mit VN-Botschaftern und Muñoz Ledo. Als eines der Hauptprobleme stelle es sich für ihn, für die in Dritte-Welt-Fragen tätigen Organisationen (WF, GATT) ein gemeinsames Dach zu finden.

H. kündigt eine grundsätzliche Rede des Präsidenten vor Cancun an, die seine, H.'s, VN-Rede fortführen solle. Die Frage der "global negotiations" habe große Schwierigkeiten bereitet, denn in den USA gebe es große Vorbehalte aus Sorge, die Mängel der Welt sollten lediglich neu verteilt werden. Nach seinem Eindruck hänge die Haltung der E-Länder von deren Erfahrungsstand ab. Für ihn seien vor allem gute Handelsbeziehungen und ein gutes Investitionsklima für die Entwicklung wichtig. Er hoffe, daß sich

in den nächsten Wochen einige positive Lösungen ergeben. Hinsichtlich des Ergebnisses von Cancún sei er "more optimistic than pessimistic".

B. empfiehlt, dogmatische Dispute zu vermeiden. Die These "keep your own country in order" habe verwirrt. Es gebe aber Länder, in denen neben der privaten Investitionstätigkeit zusätzliche Anstöße nötig seien. In der ICIDI sei die Investitionstätigkeit der multinationalen Unternehmen positiv bewertet worden. Hinsichtlich der "global negotiations" gestatte er sich den Rat, Einfluß auf die Gestaltung der Tagesordnung zu nehmen. Natürlich sei eine Grundsatzdebatte nötig, dennoch müßten maximalistische Forderungen hinsichtlich der Tagesordnung vermieden werden. Vielmehr sei es nötig, die Probleme Nahrung und Energie in den Vordergrund zu rücken. Er weist auf McNamara's Idee einer Energy-Financing-Authority bei der Weltbank hin.

H. betont, man sei nicht "ultimately" dagegen. Man fürchte aber eine neue Bürokratie. Stattdessen wolle man versuchen, eine "supervisory group" zu entwickeln. Hinsichtlich Cancún gebe es ein positives Programm auf den Gebieten Nahrung, Energie und Handel. Deshalb sei er hinsichtlich der Ergebnisse zuversichtlich. Er habe heute dem Präsidenten gesagt, man müsse die sich entwickelnde Welt spüren lassen, daß man sich für sie verantwortlich fühlt. "You need mutual trust".

Er bittet sodann um einen Bericht über die Situation in Europa; dabei bezieht er sich auf seine soeben beendete Berlin-Reise.

B. erklärt eingangs, man habe die Reaktion von H. auf die Vorgänge in Berlin bewundert. H. ergänzt, nach seiner Einschätzung seien die meisten Unruhestifter keine Berliner Bürger gewesen. Die Berliner Bürger hätten sich gegenüber früher nicht geändert.

B. erinnert daran, daß es Demonstrationen auch in anderen Ländern gegeben habe; er selbst habe es in New York im Zusammenhang mit dem Vietnamkrieg erlebt, wie Präsident Johnson Mühe gehabt habe, eine Veranstaltung im Waldorfhof zu erreichen.

Er weist auf die Vielschichtigkeit der Probleme Berlins hin. Die Stadt ziehe als Folge ihres besonderen Status eine große Zahl von Leuten an, die nicht zum Militär wollen. Auch er sei sicher, daß die Krawallmacher vornehmlich aus Westdeutschland kämen, dennoch müsse man wissen, daß sich die Berliner Jugend anders zusammensetze als die Westdeutschlands. Es gebe außerdem Probleme mit den Ausländern, so sei Berlin die drittgrößte türkische Gemeinde in der Welt. Die Verwaltung verfüge über Leistungsschwächen. Es könne auch nicht akzeptiert werden, daß angesichts der Wohnungsnot Häuser leerstehen.

Aber er habe dem Kanzler gesagt, es sei ein Fehler, die Friedensbewegung als anti-amerikanisch, neutralistisch oder gegen die eigene Regierung gerichtet zu betrachten. Ihr Ziel sei es, dem, was die Regierungen tun, etwas hinzuzufügen. Die jungen Leute verstünden die Notwendigkeit des overkill nicht. In Deutschland, wo sie lebten, sei das größte Arsenal von Atomwaffen der Welt auf engstem Raum konzentriert. Leider sei in die Öffentlichkeit gebracht worden, daß er, anders als der Bundeskanzler, die Friedensdemonstration am 10. Oktober nicht für eine Kampfansage an die Regierung hält. Er habe festgestellt, daß man mit den jungen Leuten diskutieren könne; sie stimmten zwar mit uns nicht überein, hörten aber zu, und er sei zuversichtlich, man könne den größten Teil integrieren. Er habe Breschnew davor gewarnt, die Friedensbewegung als eine kommunistische Bewegung zu betrachten, ihre Anhänger hätten vielmehr grundsätzlich etwas gegen Raketen. Dabei verkenne er nicht, daß kleine kommunistische Gruppen die Friedensbewegung zu infiltrieren suchten, die aber im Kern von der Evangelischen Kirche ausgehe. Er glaube, daß es gelingen werde, diese Gruppen zu integrieren. Als positiv bezeichnete er es, daß nach den Vorgängen in Berlin eine Tendenz unter den jungen Leuten bestehe, nicht der Polizei die Arbeit zu überlassen. Man müsse deshalb auch damit rechnen, daß bei der Bonner Demonstration Jugendliche gegen die Krawallmacher vorgehen. Seine These sei es, das Protestpotential von Gewaltpotential zu trennen. Wenn die Abrüstungsverhandlungen begonnen hätten, werde es leichter sein, mit den jungen Leuten zu argumentieren.



H. sagte, früher sei man über die Sorge in den europäischen Ländern irritiert gewesen, "to trade Hamburg for New York". Jetzt sei die Sorge eine andere. Er stimme darin überein, es gebe keine Tendenz zum Neutralismus oder zur "Finnlandisierung", vielmehr einen profound concern über die Massierung von Waffen. Hinzu kämen ökologische Forderungen. Man könne die Jugend überzeugen, wenn die Abrüstungsverhandlungen erfolgreich seien - "und ich versichere Ihnen, daß wir ernsthaft verhandeln, das sagte ich auch Gromyko, und er hat es nach neuneinhalb Stunden verstanden". Dennoch seien Resultate nicht schnell zu erwarten. Er sei betroffen über die Sorge der Sowjetunion, dem Westen gehe es nur darum, einige mobile Systeme neu zu lozieren. H. betont, man betrachte die europäische Sicherheit nicht als von der eigenen unterschieden, es sei ein einheitliches Paket, deshalb liege den USA auch Konsultationen. Allerdings brauche es Zeit, bis man die Position des anderen sieht.

Man fühle, und das decke sich mit seinen Nato-Erfahrungen, daß die Russen nicht so schnell bereit seien, sich an den Tisch zu setzen. Seit Dezember 1979 habe man sie darum gebeten, er hoffe, man werde den Russen klarmachen können, was die Alternative sei: es gehe nicht um Fragen der Überlegenheit, sondern um das Gleichgewicht. Er betont, daß er dies klarmachen müsse, weil er wisse, daß es in seiner, B.'s, Partei besonders diskutiert werde. Man gehe ernsthaft an die Gespräche und in der Erwartung, Erfolge zu erzielen. Diese Gespräche involvierten vitale europäische Interessen.

B. gibt auf Bitte von H. eine Bewertung der polnischen Situation. Seit Anfang des Jahres glaube er, die Zeit komme, zu der die polnische Arbeiterbewegung in die Verantwortung gezogen wird. Die Bevölkerung wolle zunehmend mehr Ordnung. Sie müßten auf den Nationalismus setzen. Er wisse nicht, wieweit das möglich sei, ohne die russische Sympathie zu verlieren. Nach seinen Gesprächen mit Breschnew habe er nicht den Eindruck, daß eine Intervention drohe. Insbesondere Jaruselski habe dessen Vertrauen. Das Problem sei, da die Partei ein Vakuum gelassen habe, das Solidarnóś nicht füllen könne, komme die Armee. Mit Walesa habe man ein besonderes Problem: einerseits wolle man ihn nicht entmutigen, ihm andererseits aber deutlich machen, wo Grenzen sind.

H. betont, auch er sei der Überzeugung, es gebe ein Blutbad im Falle einer Intervention, die Situation sei "immanagable".

H. spricht WB auf dessen Bedenken gegen einen Beitritt Spaniens zur NATO an. Man verfolge damit das Ziel, das spanische Militär zu einer anderen Beschäftigung als in der Vergangenheit zu bringen. Das schlimmste sei ein Scheitern des demokratischen Prozesses. Von einer militärischen und wirtschaftlichen Integration hätten schließlich alle Europäer Vorteile.

B. erwidert, wenn er Mitglied der Regierung wäre, würde er die ihm, H., bekannte Position der Bundesregierung teilen. Wenn die Spanier beitreten wollten, so solle man sie daran nicht hindern. Seine Zweifel bezögen sich auf drei Punkte:


- Das Verfahren: Es sei nach seiner Einschätzung besser gewesen, zunächst den Beitritt der Spanier zur EG zu vollziehen. Wegen französischer Vorbehalte werde das aber schwierig sein; diese bezögen sich allerdings nicht nur auf Agrarfragen.
- Was die Frage der Demokratisierung anlangt, so sei er skeptisch, denn, darauf habe Filipe Gonzalez ihn hingewiesen, die Putschgenerale seien durchweg auf amerikanischen Hochschulen ausgebildet worden.
- Das russische Prestige sei tangiert, er gehe davon aus, daß nach der Entscheidung ein weiteres Land - Syrien oder Vietnam - dem Warschauer Pakt beitrete. Vor allem die Jugoslawen hätten davor gewarnt, den Russen einen Vorwand zu geben, das Gleichgewicht im Mittelmeerraum zu stören. Das beziehe sich auf Albanien. B. erinnert an Gespräche, die Eagleburger ~~bei seiner Jugoslawienreise mit Grabert~~ geführt habe.

Er betont, er ~~sei nicht gegen den Beitritt, aber er~~ habe Zweifel.

H. sagt, mit Sorge betrachte man die Entwicklung in Nicaragua. Man werde eine demokratische Entwicklung unterstützen, die Armee werde aber stärker, nicht zuletzt durch die über Kuba einfließende sowjetische Militärhilfe. Gromyko habe ihm zwar gesagt, wir sollten uns über Kuba nicht aufregen, er habe ihm aber erwidert, daß dort mehr sowjetische Soldaten stationiert seien als amerikanische in Europa.

B. betont, daß er keine eigenen Erfahrungen zu Nicaragua habe. Der österreichische Bundeskanzler werde nach Cancún dort hinreisen. Hermes ergänzt, auch Bundesaußenminister Genscher.

H. äußert den Wunsch, Kreisky zu sehen. B. bemerkt, dieser habe sich sehr positiv über die Zusammenarbeit mit dem neuen US-Botschafter geäußert.



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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING

Tuesday, October 13, 1981

TIME AND PLACE: 2:00-2:45 p.m.  
SUBJECTS: Theater Nuclear Forces  
Egypt

PARTICIPANTS:

President Ronald Reagan

State

Secretary Alexander M. Haig, Jr.  
Deputy Secretary William P. Clark  
Mr. Richard Burt, Director, Politico-Military Affairs

Defense

Secretary Caspar Weinberger  
Deputy Secretary Frank Carlucci

CIA

Director William Casey

JCS

General David C. Jones  
Lieutenant General Paul F. Gorman

ACDA

Acting Director Norman C. Terrell

White House

Mr. Edwin Meese III  
Mr. James A. Baker III  
Mr. Michael K. Deaver  
Mr. Richard V. Allen  
Mr. David Gergen  
Admiral James W. Nance  
Ms. Janet Colson

OMB

Associate Director William Schneider

NSC

Mr. Sven Kraemer

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Review October 13, 1987

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NLS M03-1282 #2

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-Contributed by James Graham Wilson.

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MINUTES OF MEETING

The President: I know what the agenda items are for today, but I want to touch upon another matter first in the area of Soviet human rights. What is the situation now with Professor McClellan's Russian wife, who is not being allowed to emigrate? What about the Soviet religious group in the basement of our Embassy in Moscow? What about Shcharanskiy? Would some quiet diplomacy help? These should not be part of our TNF negotiations, but is there any way we could indicate to the Soviets that we would be happier in any negotiations if there were progress with these cases?

Secretary Haig: I raised each of these cases with Gromyko, both in the one-on-ones with him and in the larger planning group. Gromyko did not budge. On Shcharanskiy, he told me that Shcharanskiy was well known in the U.S., but was barely known in the USSR. I urged Gromyko to let Shcharanskiy go; to let this sick man leave now, rather than letting him die, thus causing far greater problems.

The President: Well, let's keep track of this. Okay, Dick (Allen), let's get on with the agenda.

Mr. Allen: We have two agenda topics today: First, an update on Theater Nuclear Forces (TNF) negotiations preparations, and secondly, a review of the situation in Egypt. We also have a consent item on bringing Central America/Cuba issues before the NSC as soon as possible.

Issue 1: Theater Nuclear Forces Negotiations Preparations

Mr. Allen: TNF negotiations begin with the Soviets on November 30 in Geneva. We earlier affirmed the Administration's commitment to NATO's "dual track" decision of December 1979 on modernization and arms control, and at an April 30 NSC meeting reviewed the criteria and timing of such negotiations. The preparatory work has progressed through the Interdepartmental Group (IG) process, under Al Haig's personal direction and with participation of Defense, ACDA, and others. Now, Cap will be going to Europe to meet with different defense officials, and on October 26, we will again be consulting with our Allies in NATO at the Special Consultative Group (SCG). Our objective here is not to settle on a negotiation position today, but to get an update on where we stand.

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Secretary Haig: I want to underline that this is not a decision meeting but an update prior to completion of work on our negotiation position. We will need an NSC meeting within a month on the negotiating position we develop.

In their 1979 decision, the Allies agreed to a modernization program that is on track everywhere except in the Netherlands. The Germans, Brits, Italians, and Belgians have all shown great courage. Schmidt and Genscher have both threatened to resign on this issue, even though they face substantial pressures, including the 250,000 protesters who marched in Bonn this weekend. We have had increased concern about the Dutch, but in my meeting in Egypt with Dutch Foreign Minister Talboys, I was assured that the Dutch would not withdraw their deployment decision, but only undertake a necessary delay in reaching a decision.

In 1979, the Allies also agreed to TNF arms control negotiations, and we agreed to consult closely with our Allies. The IG, which State and DOD co-chair, with major ACDA participation, has undertaken extensive work on these issues. The Alliance consultations are important because the primary purpose of the negotiations is political, i.e., to update the TNF modernization program. An actual arms control agreement is secondary and has little prospect because of the imbalance of forces. NATO's Special Consultative Group, the SCG, is the forum for these consultations. It is chaired by Assistant Secretary Eagleburger and will be meeting next on October 25.

Let me summarize where we stand in the IG. There is general agreement that: (1) we will propose a phased, comprehensive approach that seeks reductions to the lowest possible levels on land-based TNF missiles in the first phase; (2) we will insist on equal limits for like systems, and these limits must be global; (3) we will negotiate only U.S. and Soviet systems and will not even compensate for these Allied systems -- a point we may need to reconsider; and (4) we will insist on stringent verification procedures that will almost certainly go beyond National Technical Means (NTM).

More specific elements include IG agreement that: (1) Soviet SS-20's, 4's, and 5's must be limited, and that there must be also constraints on shorter systems, including SS-21's, 22's, and 23's; (2) warheads on launchers will

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be the unit of account; (3) we want to ban refires; and (4) we will not negotiate aircraft in the first phase, but may be required to discuss them in the first phase because of Soviet claims concerning the balance. Gromyko threw the aircraft balance issue at me in our UN talks.

Issues remaining to be resolved include: (1) the TNF-SALT (START) relationship, which is as yet undefined. As the talks go on, they will merge.

The President: What does that mean, merge?

Secretary Haig: The Soviets will not be allowed to double count us.

Secretary Weinberger: Then you don't mean merging negotiations.

Secretary Haig: No. I am referring to an interrelationship. You cannot do one thing in one forum without it relating to the other forum.

Secretary Weinberger: But we may not be ready on an issue in one area and could be dragged into that issue through the other forum.

Secretary Haig: We'll have shrewd negotiators. They can hold the line.

Mr. Allen: We might remind the President that our Chief negotiator for TNF will be Paul Nitze, and that for START, it will be General Ed Rowny.

Secretary Haig: We favor having the two negotiations in the same location to facilitate coordination.

Other issues remaining to be resolved include: (1) levels of reductions, i.e., ceilings and floors; (2) limits on shorter-range missiles; and (3) verification issues. We need to study each of these issues in-depth. Verification could be the most controversial issue for the Allies. We must avoid an Allied perception that we are scuttling the talks at the outset by insisting on verification criteria the Soviets are unlikely to accept; we must treat the Allies gingerly on this matter. In general, the Allies have been supportive on our approach.

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Secretary Weinberger: We at Defense agree with many of the points made by Secretary Haig: (1) the emphasis on land-based missiles, including SS-20's, 4's, 5's, 21's, 22's, and 23's; (2) banning refires; (3) omitting aircraft in any first phase; (4) stringent verification procedures; and (5) Alliance consultations.

There is, however, another point we would also like to bring out. It is the question of what we would like to achieve in these negotiations. We are conscious of several difficult dilemmas. If we are perceived as not engaging in serious negotiations, our modernization program will not go through. If we succeed in reaching only a cosmetic agreement, our modernization program will also come to a halt, being perceived as no longer necessary. Or if we are viewed as not making progress in negotiations, the Soviets will make it seem to be our fault, and our modernization program will be endangered.

We need to assess the nature of our tasks brought on by the strength of Soviet programs. They have 750 SS-20 warheads now. The SS-20's are mobile, accurate, powerful, hard to find and to hit, and they are targeted against all of Europe and against China and Japan. The U.S. has no counter. In addition, a new generation of Soviet shorter-range systems is on the way. We may find our 1979 TNF modernization program to be insufficient.

In this light, we might need to consider a bold plan, sweeping in nature, to capture world opinion. If refused by the Soviets, they would take the blame for its rejection. If the Soviets agreed, we would achieve the balance that we've lost. Such a plan would be to propose a "zero option." Initially, it would, of course, be limited only to long-range land-based missiles, in which the Soviets are preponderant. If it were ultimately decided to adopt this option, it should be proposed by the U.S. in a spectacular Presidential announcement, not at the mid- or lower-level SCG on October 26 or in terms of some "lowest possible numbers" formula. The "zero option" should be considered carefully here, and no parts of it should be given away at the October 26 SCG. We should not be using the "lowest possible numbers" formula at the SCG or in any other forum. -- If we adopt the "zero option" approach and the Soviets reject it after we have given it a good try, this will leave the Europeans in a position where they would really have no alternative to modernization.



The President: Do we really want a "zero option" for the battlefield? Don't we need these nuclear systems? Wouldn't it be bad for us to give them up since we need them to handle Soviet conventional superiority?

Secretary Haig: The "zero option" will not be viewed as the President's initiative. It has already been proposed by the German Social Democrats and by Foreign Minister Genscher in Moscow, and it is a subject of intense debate in Europe. There are also some serious problems with any "zero option." We should be looking for the hooker and must study this issue fully. What would happen in one or two years when it comes time to deploy, if we have a "zero option" on the table? With such an option, the Europeans will surely reject any new deployments.

Secretary Weinberger: The Soviets will certainly reject an American "zero option" proposal. But whether they reject it or they accept it, they would be set back on their heels. We would be left in good shape and would be shown as the White Hats. As to the nuclear battlefield systems we need, we would not be including these shorter battlefield systems, e.g., the Enhanced Radiation Weapons (ERW) systems, only the longer-range ones. Also, we would be insisting on stringent verification criteria and on dismantling.

Mr. Allen: Genscher told me that verification is a popular issue in Europe. -- Norm (Terrell), do you want to express ACDA's views in behalf of Eugene Rostow?

Mr. Terrell: Gene Rostow and Paul Nitze regret that they cannot be here today. They are in Europe discussing some of these issues with our Allies. ACDA supports the IG consensus positions stated by Secretaries Haig and Weinberger. On the "zero option," we believe it requires further study, and that it should be considered principally in terms of its impact on our deployment schedule in 1983. We favor keeping the "lowest possible levels" formula for the October 26 SCG meeting. "Lowest possible" includes zero. We also want to stress the importance of accurate data and of effective verification.

The President: How will we verify an agreement?

Mr. Allen: We will have the national technical means, satellites, and so on. But in addition, we will be looking at on-site inspections and other means. The problem is that because of the Soviet obsession against inspections, our insistence may appear to some Europeans to have the effect of scuttling the negotiations.

The President: Even if you could have inspections, who could really travel and verify in that vast country?

Mr. Casey: With a zero ban, it would be easier.

The President: Even then, the Soviet Union is a large country. Couldn't they easily hide something in Siberia or somewhere else?

Mr. Meese: With a zero ban, we would have an easier indicator of whether or not the Soviets were complying.

Secretary Weinberger: The Soviets would have to dismantle their systems. Third countries and international organizations might need to be involved, but nothing is guaranteeable.

The President: Maybe we should be leasing some of the people from the Third World nations at Cancun to help verify the dismantling.

Mr. Allen: We are running short of time. General Jones, can you comment on the views of the Chiefs?

General Jones: We support TNF negotiations. I think it's important to gain Allied confidence so we can proceed with the modernization program. We agree with the outline presented by Secretaries Haig and Weinberger. However, we have two concerns at present. First, on the reference to warheads-on-launchers as the unit of account. We may want to count warheads-on-missiles instead. We will need to study this further. Secondly, and this is a major concern, we do not want the reference to aircraft not being negotiated in a first phase to imply that aircraft could be negotiated in a future phase. That would be a slippery and dangerous slope. Aircraft are required for both nuclear and conventional roles and involve other special consideration as well.

Secretary Haig: General Jones' points clearly get us into the SALT/TNF relationship. For example, in the data exchange issue on the balance, we will need to count aircraft somehow. That will be our nightmare.

Mr. Allen: Cap, you will be gone until the 24th?

Secretary Weinberger: Yes, I take it from the discussion that in my NATO meetings, I will be reporting on our preliminary preparations and will reaffirm the November 30 starting time for negotiations, but will say nothing substantively on our negotiating approach. I take it we have agreed on a similar position for the October 26 SCG.

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Issue 2: Egypt and Other Business

Mr. Allen: We are out of time. For the update on the situation in Egypt, could Al Haig and Bill Casey provide the President with written reports? On a different matter, we have received preliminary indications that if embargoed, two U.S. compressor components, which the Soviets want for their Siberian pipelines, would cause a two-year delay in the pipeline's operation. We will need to check this matter out carefully.

Secretary Haig: I am not so sure that we are confident of the impact of those compressors. We will need to check it out.

Deputy Secretary Carlucci: There is a decision pending before the President on national security considerations in technology transfer. This item should be factored in.

Secretary Weinberger: Senator Percy talked to me on the plane from Egypt about this issue. He is pushing for 200 more caterpillar pipelayers to go to the Soviet Union.

The pipeline brings enormous amounts of hard cash to the Soviet Union, which they use to strengthen themselves militarily.

Mr. Allen: Our next meetings, later this week, will focus on the Central America/Cuba issue and on the East-West paper.

Deputy Secretary Carlucci: The East-West discussion should include the technological transfer issue. Right?

[There was general agreement among participants.]

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
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November 16, 1981

**UNCLASSIFIED**NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION  
DIRECTIVE NUMBER 15THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES  
(Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces)

On the recommendation of the National Security Council, which met on November 12, 1981, I have made the following decisions regarding the U.S. position for the first round of the negotiations on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) scheduled to begin on November 30, 1981.

- We will propose an agreement on intermediate-range land-based systems that would remove and dismantle the Soviet Union's SS-20 and retire SS-4 and SS-5 systems in return for no deployment of the U.S. Pershing II and GLCMs.
- We will also indicate that we are prepared to seek subsequent limits with significant reductions for other nuclear weapons systems.
- We will negotiate in good faith to achieve global, equal and verifiable levels of weapons.
- The Interagency Group will ensure that the negotiating instructions, including enumeration of objectives and principles, are fully congruent with the President's decisions as expressed in this National Security Decision Directive.



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Collection: Presidential Directives  
Item Number PD 01602.

**UNCLASSIFIED****SECRET**~~Review on November 12, 2001~~~~Extended by P. V. Allen~~~~Reason: NSC 1.13 (c) (e)~~

Declassify on: OADR

Declassified/Released on 5-17-91  
under provisions of E.O. 12356  
by S. Tiley, National Security Council

(F87-1035)

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INDEXED

INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

W. J. W. / S. S. I. / 21

November 20, 1981

81 NOV 20 P 7:47

SECRET/NOFORN

TO: The Secretary  
FROM: INR - Hugh Montgomery  
SUBJECT: INF: The Soviet Approach



As you know, the Soviet press has dismissed as propaganda the President's offer to forego deployment of Pershing IIs and GLCMs if Moscow would agree to dismantle its SS-20s, SS-4s and SS-5s. Nevertheless, we think that the Soviets may refrain from rejecting in principle a zero option and might attempt instead to redefine it to include US forward-based aircraft as well as Allied nuclear systems.

There are indications Moscow foresees spending the first year of negotiations defining which systems will be limited. We expect the Soviets to press also for a freeze on all medium-range systems (which would cover Pershing IIs) as they proposed last fall, or for the moratorium on land-based missiles which they have used in their propaganda offensive since last spring. Additionally, Moscow will probably propose limits on SLCMs.

Although the negotiations will be prolonged, Moscow may eventually compromise on FBS because it fears that GLCMs and particularly Pershing IIs would pose a greater threat than forward-based aircraft. The Soviets may also fear that without an INF agreement, NATO's initial deployment of 572 missiles would be followed by additional systems.

The Soviets are unlikely, however, to show flexibility on FBS until they are convinced that the deployment of Pershing IIs and GLCMs cannot be averted. Even if they compromised, they would probably defer rather than drop outright their FBS demands.

At the preliminary talks in Geneva last fall, the Soviets contended that INF negotiations could proceed, but no agreement could be concluded without a ratified SALT treaty. We think the Soviets will reassert this position, because in the absence of a SALT agreement both sides would have the means effectively to circumvent limits on INF systems.

The Digital National Security Archive. Collection: Soviet Estimate. Item Number SE00551.

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Soviet statements indicate Moscow will exclude systems with ranges below 1,000 kilometers, perhaps because Eastern Europe acts as a buffer to protect Soviet territory from NATO's intermediate range missiles, and because the Soviets have more systems with a range from 150 to 1,000 kilometers.

As a counter to a US proposal to limit the SS-12/22 and SS-X-23 missiles, the Soviets might initially call for much broader negotiations to encompass nuclear artillery, tactical missiles and even warhead stockpiles. Such a Soviet counter-proposal might strike a responsive cord with the European peace movement if its attention turned to shorter range nuclear weapons. If Moscow eventually agreed to limits on the SS-12/22 and SS-X-23, it would at a minimum insist on limits on US and probably West German Pershing I missiles, as well as on US forward-based aircraft.

Finally, Moscow may also take certain military steps to gain leverage during the INF talks and to increase Soviet military capabilities. For example, Moscow could deploy SS-20s well beyond current numbers. The Soviets might be able to deploy long-range SLCMs and GLCMs by the mid-1980s.

Drafted: INR/PMA/GPT:RHansen:cb  
11/20/81 x28702  
Cleared: INR/PMA:RMartin  
INR/SEE:RBaraz

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Part Three:  
International Diplomacy

**1982**

[Source: WBA, A 9, 7  
Also published in *Willy Brandt, Berliner Ausgabe*, Bonn (Dietz) Vol. 9, 2003.  
-Contributed by Bernd Rother.]

[Translation from Russian; Letter from Leonid Brezhnev to Willy Brandt, 22 February 1982]

Copy to:

H.S. [Chancellor Helmut Schmidt]  
HJW [Minister of State Hans-Jürgen Wischniewski]  
E.B. [SPD General Secretary Egon Bahr]

Dear Mr. Brandt:

I want to redirect your attention to the question we already discussed between the two of us during our meetings last year in Moscow and Bonn. I mean the problem of nuclear medium-range missile in Europe.

I state it frankly: The course of Soviet-American negotiations regarding this problem in Geneva leaves us with serious and growing concerns. The American side's position does not at all display any willingness by the United States to direct the issue towards an agreement. Quite to the contrary. You, Mr. Brandt, might very well remember when we talked about the upcoming Soviet-American negotiations. Back then you expressed your full understanding for our position to include in these negotiations not only Soviet medium-range missiles but also forward-based American systems and the respective nuclear systems of Britain and France. And indeed, it looks as if there is no other viable option.

The Americans, in the meantime, want to hear from the first day of negotiations until today nothing else than their own "zero option" which can only be characterized as a mockery of reason.

According to this American proposal, the Soviet Union ought to reduce in fact all its medium-range missiles to zero, i.e. scrap them, while on the NATO side neither one single missile, nor any aircraft carrier for nuclear weapons would have to be destroyed. Yet there exist almost 1,000, or to be exactly 986 NATO systems, among them more than 160 ballistic missiles. If we would agree to this idea, NATO would achieve a more than twofold quantitative superiority of carriers for intermediate nuclear forces, and in the area of nuclear shells even a triple superiority. In other words: This way the balance in the field of nuclear medium-range missiles would turn out even worse than through the implementation of the notorious NATO decision. Instinctively, we feel ourselves caught in the thought that the Americans want to force us through this "zero option" to choose "the lesser of two evils". Yet this is a primitive method that does not speak to the seriousness of U.S. negotiation strategy.

In order to make their proposals unacceptable to the Soviet Union from the onset, the Americans raise another absurdity: They insist we also scrap those medium-range missiles deployed in the East [of the Ural Mountains] and are not related in any way to Europe.

Without any doubt, for you the absurdity of this question is evident. During your visit in Moscow you expressed yourself the desire to withdraw those Soviet missiles not essential to the balance to positions [in the East] from where they cannot reach Western Europe.



No less absurd is also the U.S. negotiation position pertaining to our medium-range missiles in the USSR's European part.

It is well known how even those Western European politicians, who dispute against the facts the existence of an approximate medium-range missile balance, hold the opinion that the balance was only shifted by the deployment of the SS-20. This means, nobody thought of an "imbalance" with the previously much larger number of our SS-4 and SS-5. This raises the question why the Americans demand from us now the destruction of all our medium-range missiles SS-4, SS-5, and SS-20 – and all this with the preservation of NATO's entire nuclear arsenal? Is there any hint of logic here? Obviously this has not anything to do with logic.

And in addition to all this, the Americans recently decided to enter another complicating element into their Geneva negotiation positions. Namely, they insist on limits for Soviet missiles with ranges shorter than medium-range. Summing it up, we have every reason to say that the acceptance of American proposals would result in a unilateral Soviet disarmament. As you correctly remarked during our last meeting, this is something nobody can demand from us. According to your own words, this fact is indisputable.

All this leads us to a conclusion I mentioned during my recent meeting with your colleagues from the Socialist International: It seems like Washington wants to use the Geneva negotiations to calm down the public of the West European countries protesting against the dangerous military plans of the U.S. And then, when negotiations have deliberately been pushed into a dead end, the U.S. wants to justify this way the planned 1983 deployment of its almost 600 new medium-range missiles in Western Europe.

And here, Mr. Brandt, I must say this quite frankly: We can only marvel how most Western European statesmen and politicians, also in the Federal Republic [of Germany], either really do not comprehend Washington's game, or whether they pretend they do not understand it. And some among them even play openly into the hands of the Americans.

I remember well your words that Soviet-American negotiations are vital to the Federal Republic, and that the FRG will contribute towards a positive development of these negotiations. The Federal Chancellor, Mr. Helmut Schmidt, told me the same. I would be dishonest not to admit that we do not perceive such a positive impact of the Federal Republic on the U.S. position.

I am far from interfering into internal matters of your party. As I have been informed, the SPD leadership wants to analyze the state of Soviet-American negotiations only at its party congress in fall of 1983, and only then it will define its position on the plans of new American missile deployments in the Federal Republic. If this is the case, it is appropriate here to ask ourselves whether the SPD leadership will just be confronted with facts created, and thus it will be inconceivable how it can turn the course of events into a positive direction. Now I do not intend to repeat to you Soviet positions on the issues under negotiation in Geneva. We already forwarded them to you. Recently we also reiterated them in public since the American side had published its own Geneva proposals and simultaneously distorted our positions.

I just want to emphasize one thing: We are indeed willing to take wholly radical steps in the area of nuclear arms limitations in Europe. This could be a more than threefold reduction of existing nuclear medium-range missile arsenals from 1,000 down to 300 on both sides. This

could be a complete liquidation of these arsenals. This could be a complete liquidation of nuclear weapons in Europe, medium as well as tactical range.

The only, and from our perspective non-negotiable, pre-condition to realize any of these three scenarios is a strict adherence to the principle of parity and equal security on both sides.

I am very well aware how you are in favor of policies of détente and peace. Thus I am certain, Mr. Brandt, you will understand the motives guiding myself when I draw your attention to the state of negotiations in Geneva.

Sincerely,  
L. Brezhnev  
22 February 1982

[Translated for CWIHP by Bernd Schaefer.]

17. März 1982

Sehr geehrter Herr Generalsekretär,

zunächst möchte ich Ihnen danken für Ihren Brief vom 22. Februar 1982, in dem Sie Ihre Überlegungen und Sorgen zu dem Stand der Verhandlungen in Genf zum Ausdruck bringen. Sie können sicher sein, daß wir diese Verhandlungen mit äußerster Aufmerksamkeit verfolgen.

Der Stand ist ohne Zweifel unbefriedigend. Ich finde es auch nicht gut, wenn durch eine zweimonatige Osterpause der Eindruck entstehen kann, daß die Verhandlungsführenden es so eilig gar nicht haben.

Ich sitze nicht am Verhandlungstisch und bilde also mein Urteil aus dem, was ich von den Beteiligten höre. Dabei brauche ich sicher nicht zu unterstreichen, wie wichtig dafür Ihre Eindrücke sind. Ich halte es daher für hilfreich, wenn bisher bewährte Wege des Gedankenaustausches weiter zur Verfügung stehen.

Lassen Sie mich in gewohnter Offenheit sagen: Die amerikanische Null-Lösung erscheint mir ein Ausgangspunkt für die Verhandlungen, von dem man weiß, daß es dabei nicht bleiben kann. Die Vorschläge der Sowjetunion sind, wie sie bisher vorgelegt wurden, auch umgekehrt nicht annehmbar.

An den  
Generalsekretär  
des Zentralkomitee der KPdSU  
Herrn Leonid I. Breschnow  
Moskau / UdSSR

Es ist kein Zweifel, daß der sowjetische Vorschlag einer Null-Lösung heute nicht erreichbar ist; wie ich höre, wird er in Genf auch gar nicht ernsthaft behandelt. Man konzentriert sich auf den Stufenplan, den ich, aus deutschem Interesse, nicht für gut halte.

600 Systeme auf beiden Seiten würden jedenfalls zum Beispiel bedeuten, daß amerikanische Raketen hier stationiert werden müssen. Die Amerikaner sind frei, veraltete Flugzeug-Systeme durch neue Raketen-Systeme zu ersetzen. Daß dies die Sowjetunion vorschlägt, muß verwundern, weil sie damit selbst im Prinzip die Möglichkeit eröffnet, mit ihrer Zustimmung eine Situation zu schaffen, die sie sonst als eine grundsätzliche Veränderung der strategischen Lage zu ihrem Nachteil bezeichnet. Sie wissen, daß ich nie zu denen gehört habe, die Angst haben, wenn sich die beiden Supermächte verständigen, denn eine Verständigung der beiden mächtigsten Staaten bedeutet Entspannung. Jede Verständigung ist besser als keine. Aber was Raketen angeht, so halte ich es doch für wünschenswert, daß dies nicht auf unsere Kosten geschieht. Dafür werden Sie sicher Verständnis haben.

Nach meinem Eindruck befinden sich die Verhandlungen im Anfangsstadium. Ich halte es für denkbar, daß sie erst dann in eine ernste Phase kommen, wenn die amerikanischen Vorstellungen zur Reduktion der interkontinentalen Waffen und zu den Verhandlungen in Wien genau bekannt werden, womit durch eine Rede des amerikanischen Präsidenten im Mai zu rechnen ist.

Die Position, die Sie, Herr Generalsekretär, in Ihrer Rede vor dem Gewerkschaftskongreß in dieser Frage eingenommen haben, halte ich für hilfreich, auch wenn wir nicht ermessen können, ob die Sowjetunion nicht ihr Produktionsziel bei den SS 20 schon erreicht hat. Ihre einseitige Entscheidung kann jedenfalls eine Stabilisierung der Lage bedeuten und damit die Verhandlungen erleichtern, so lange die Amerikaner technisch nicht in der Lage sind, ihre Raketen zu stationieren, was, wie Sie wissen, sechs Jahre, also bis 1989, brauchen würde. Deshalb wird die Frage eines vereinbarten Moratoriums im Herbst 1983 wichtig, falls die Verhandlungen bis dahin noch nicht zu einem Ergebnis gekommen sind.

Wir haben ein wichtiges Jahr vor uns, das Kraft und gute Nerven erfordert, bei Ihnen wie bei uns, damit die Entwicklung berechenbar bleibt und zum Guten gewendet werden kann. Ich hoffe, daß das zwischen uns gewachsene Vertrauen dabei hilft.

Mit freundlichem Gruß

gez. Willy Brandt

Zustellung ü/EB

Kopie:  
HJW

*[Reagan, Ronald. The Reagan Diaries. Ed. Douglas Brinkley. New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 2007, p. 81.]*

**Wednesday, April 21 [1982]**

An N.S.C. meeting on "START" our idea for Strategic Arms Reduction Talks with the Soviets. We've had a team working on this. Some of the journalists who write so easily as to why we don't sit down and start talking with the Soviets should know just how complicated it is. Our team is doing a good job. Israel bombed a P.L.O. base in Lebanon. There have been some provocations and an unfounded report that an Israeli plane was shot down.

Took the afternoon off on a beautiful spring day and went down to Quantico for a horseback ride.

ve any questions, just ask

USSR START 1/2

Box 36

Reagan Presidential Library, J. Matlock Coll.  
Series II, USSR Subject Files, Box 36, Folder 1  
USSR START. -Contributed by Elizabeth Charles.

Withdrawal

JET 5/24/2005

FOIA

2001-061

ZUBOK

No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
1	7/29/1981	B1
1	12/4/1981	B1
1	12/4/1981	B1
5	ND	B1
1	12/30/1981	B1
1	ND	B1
1	11/24/1981	B1

ET

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

Pipes  
1913  
START

June 8, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR

Ms. Nancy Beard-Dyke  
Assistant to the Vice President  
for National Security Affairs

Mr. L. Paul Bremer, III  
Executive Secretary  
Department of State

Lieutenant Colonel Robert Meehan  
Assistant for Interagency Matters  
Office of the Secretary of Defense

Mr. William Schneider  
Associate Director for National  
Security and International Affairs  
Office of Management and Budget

Mr. Thomas S. Cormack  
Executive Secretary  
Central Intelligence Agency

Ms. Jacqueline Tillman  
Executive Assistant to the  
United Nations  
Representative to the United Nations

Colonel Charles F. Stebbins  
Executive Assistant to the  
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

Mr. Joseph Fresel  
Executive Assistant  
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

Ambassador Edward Rowley  
Chief Negotiator  
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

Ms. Teresa Collins  
Chief, Executive Secretariat Staff  
International Communication Agency

SUBJECT: Fact Sheets on START

The attached fact sheets on the U.S. proposal, and proposed reductions,  
in START are approved for use by agencies.

*Michael O. Wheeler*  
Michael O. Wheeler  
Staff Secretary

Attachments as Noted



STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTIONS TALKS (START) -- PROPOSED REDUCTIONS

On May 9, the President announced a bold, new proposal to reduce significantly the risks posed by large nuclear arsenals. He has proposed a phased approach to reductions focused on the most destabilizing elements of nuclear forces. The initial phase would reduce the total number of ballistic missile warheads by one-third, to about 5,000, would limit the number of warheads carried on ICBMs to one-half that number, and would cut the total number of ballistic missiles to an equal level about one-half of the current US level. In a second phase, we would seek further reductions in the overall destructive power of each side's arsenal to equal levels, including a mutual ceiling on ballistic missile throw weight below the current US level. We will also treat bombers and other strategic systems in an equitable manner. The proposed reductions, coupled with effective verification, will substantially reduce the nuclear threat and will make a major contribution to the stability of the nuclear balance.

The significant reductions proposed by President Reagan are shown in the following comparison:

FIRST PHASE

	<u>Approximate Current Levels</u>	
	<u>US</u>	<u>USSR</u>
Ballistic Missile Warheads (Land-Based and Sea-Based)		
• Proposed ceiling of 5,000	7,200	7,500
Land-Based Ballistic Missile Warheads		
• Proposed ceiling of 2,500	2,150	3,900
Ballistic Missiles (Land-Based and Sea-Based)		
• Proposed ceiling of 450, approximately one-half current U.S. levels	1,400	2,350

SECOND PHASE

## Missile Throw Weight

• Proposed ceiling below current U.S. Levels	1 MMT	1 MMT
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STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTIONS TALKS (START) -- THE US PROPOSAL

The President has opened the door to a more constructive relationship with the Soviet Union based upon the principles of reciprocity and mutual restraint.

Arms control is an important instrument for securing such restraint. Equitable and verifiable agreements, when combined with sound foreign and defense policies, can play a critical role in enhancing deterrence and ensuring a stable military balance.

The President has outlined the objectives of U.S. arms control policy:

- Significant Reductions: We seek to reduce the number and destructive potential of nuclear weapons, not just to cap them at high levels as in previous agreements.
- Equality: Americans will accept nothing less. We want agreements that will lead to mutual reductions to equal levels in both sides' forces.
- Verifiability: We will carefully design the provisions of arms control agreements and insist on measures to ensure that both sides comply. Otherwise, neither side will have the confidence needed to accept the deep reductions that we seek.

On May 9, the President announced a bold and realistic two-phased U.S. approach to the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) aimed at these objectives.

- In the first phase, we will seek to reduce the number of ballistic missile warheads by one-third, to about 5,000. No more than half the remaining ballistic missile warheads will be on land-based missiles. We will also seek to cut the total number of all ballistic missiles to an equal level, about one-half of the current U.S. level.
- In the second phase, we will seek further reductions in overall destructive power of each side's arsenals to equal levels, including a mutual ceiling on ballistic missile throw-weight below the current U.S. level.

The President's proposal attempts to reduce the threat of nuclear war by enhancing deterrence and securing a stable nuclear balance. The main threat to the strategic balance has been the massive

Soviet buildup of ballistic missile forces. Because of their large size, increasing accuracy, and short flight times, these missiles (and particularly land-based ICBMs) pose a significant threat to U.S. deterrent forces.

- To enhance deterrence and ensure a stable nuclear balance, the President's proposal focuses, in the first phase, on significant reductions on ballistic missile warheads and deployed ballistic missiles themselves. This would halt and reverse the destabilizing trend that would have been permitted under the unratified SALT II Treaty.
  
- In the second phase, we will seek further reductions to equal ceilings on other elements of strategic forces, particularly ballistic missile throw-weight. Throw-weight is an important measure of the size and destructive potential of ballistic missiles. First phase reductions will reduce the current disparity in ballistic missile throw-weight, and lay the groundwork for the second-phase reductions to achieve an equal throw-weight ceiling below current U.S. levels.

The President's approach is reasonable and equitable. It would lead to significant reductions on both sides and a stable nuclear balance, which should be in the interest not only of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., but of the entire world. The President has emphasized our intention to negotiate in good faith and to consider all serious proposals from the Soviets.

The debate on nuclear weapons issues has focused public attention on a matter of crucial importance. It is now time to demonstrate support for the ambitious, yet realistic, approach to strategic arms control embodied in the U.S. START proposal. The START negotiations will begin on June 29.

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON


July 5, 1982

Dear Member,

The President has provided his guidance to our Ambassador to the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks in Geneva. I want to share with you President Reagan's letter to Ambassador Rowny, as well as other information that explains the Administration's views on arms control.

I hope the enclosed material will help you as you formulate your own views. To be successful, our negotiators need support from the Congress and from the public. For that reason, I am providing this material directly to you and to your colleagues.

Sincerely,



William P. Clark

Enclosures

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

June 25, 1982

Dear Ambassador Rowny:

You are about to undertake one of the most important tasks of our age -- the negotiation of an effective and equitable strategic arms reduction agreement. Your efforts in this endeavor are vital to the citizens of the United States and the Soviet Union, and to all mankind.

Despite more than a decade of intensive negotiations, nuclear weapons continue to accumulate, and the strategic relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States has steadily become less stable. A major reason for this has been the massive buildup of the Soviet Union's ballistic missile force over the past 15 years.

An historic opportunity now exists for both the United States and the Soviet Union to reverse this process, and to reduce substantially both the numbers and the destructive potential of nuclear forces. Such reductions to equal levels must immediately focus on the most destabilizing elements of the strategic balance if we are to promptly enhance deterrence and stability and thereby reduce the risk of nuclear war. Further, the achievement of this goal should greatly reduce the nuclear anxiety that has become such a conspicuous feature of public concern throughout the world.

I do not underestimate the monumental nature of the task of effectively reducing forces. But while the task is formidable, the importance of undertaking these negotiations is fully appreciated by the American and, I believe, by the Soviet people. We must learn from the shortcomings of earlier efforts for, as you are well aware, the American people will not accept an agreement unless it is equal and verifiable, and contributes to stability.

The proposals you take to Geneva represent a practical, phased plan which will protect the legitimate security interests of both sides. It is designed to enhance deterrence and to achieve stability by reducing nuclear forces on both sides to equal levels in a verifiable manner. Its provisions significantly reduce the forces of both the Soviet Union and the United States and, therefore, contain benefits for both sides, as well as for the rest of the world.


I know that you and your delegation will present these proposals clearly and persuasively, along with the fundamental considerations that lie behind them. And, I want the Soviet delegation to know that concerns and proposals put forward by them will be given careful consideration by us. For our part, the United States is ready to move forward rapidly toward an agreement reducing strategic nuclear arms, and I am confident that if our efforts are met with the same seriousness of purpose by the Soviet Union, we can seize the historic opportunity that lies before us.

As the two leading nuclear powers in the world, the United States and the Soviet Union are trustees for humanity in the great task of ending the menace of

nuclear arsenals and transforming them into instruments underwriting peace. I am convinced that this can be done if both nations fully accept the principle that the only legitimate function of nuclear arms is to deter aggression.

I wish you Godspeed in your efforts, and assure you that these negotiations will have my personal attention.

Sincerely,



The Honorable Edward L. Rowley  
Chairman  
U.S. START Delegation  
Washington, D.C. 20451

U.S. ARMS CONTROL POLICYBACKGROUND

Since the end of World War II, the U.S. has been the leader in serious disarmament and arms control proposals. Many of these have focused on controlling the spread of nuclear weapons. For example, in 1946 the U.S. submitted a proposal (the Baruch plan) for international control of nuclear weapons and nuclear energy. In 1955, President Eisenhower presented his "open skies" proposal, under which the U.S. and the Soviet Union would have exchanged blueprints of military establishments and provided for aerial reconnaissance. The Soviets rejected both plans.

Major arms control agreements to which we are a party include the Limited Test Ban Treaty (1963), which prohibits nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space, and under water; the Direct Communications Link or "hot line" (1963), improved in 1971, for use by the U.S. and U.S.S.R. during international crises; the Outer Space Treaty (1967), which bans placing nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction in outer space; the Non-Proliferation Treaty (1968), the purpose of which is to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons; the Seabed Arms Control Treaty (1971), which prohibits the emplacement of nuclear weapons or weapons of mass destruction on the seabeds and ocean floor beyond a 12-mile coastal zone; the Accidents Agreement (1971), which provides for U.S.-Soviet measures to reduce the likelihood of accidental nuclear war; the ABM Treaty (1972), which imposes limitations on defense against ballistic missile weapons; and the Interim Agreement on Strategic Offensive Arms (1972), which froze the number of strategic ballistic missile launchers on either side.

U.S. PRINCIPLES

One of President Reagan's first official acts was to order an intense review of arms control policy, to learn the lessons of the past in order to achieve more lasting progress in the future. Four principles, which the Administration is working to put into practice, underlie the U.S. approach to arms control. We seek agreements that:

- Produce significant reductions in the arsenals of both sides;
- Result in equal levels of arms on both sides, since an unequal agreement, like an unequal balance of forces, can encourage coercion or aggression;



- Are verifiable, because when national security is at stake, agreements cannot be based upon trust alone; and
- Enhance U.S. and Allied security and reduce the risk of war, because arms control is not an end in itself but is a complement to defense preparations as an important means of underwriting peace and international stability.

#### U.S. NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL INITIATIVES

On November 18, 1981, President Reagan offered to cancel deployments of the Pershing II and Ground-Launched Cruise Missile (GLCM) if the U.S.S.R. would eliminate its SS-20, SS-4, and SS-5 missiles. The U.S. is negotiating toward this end with the U.S.S.R. in Geneva. On May 9, the President announced a two-phased approach to the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START), which began on June 29, aimed at the following objectives:

- In the first phase, we will seek to reduce the number of ballistic missile warheads on each side by 1/3, to about 5,000. No more than half the remaining ballistic missile warheads will be on land-based missiles. We also will seek to cut the total number of all ballistic missiles to an equal level -- about half the current U.S. level.
- In the second phase, we will seek further reductions in overall destructive power of each side's arsenal including an equal ceiling on ballistic missile throw-weight below the current U.S. level.

#### CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

The U.S. is party to the two existing international arms control agreements affecting chemical and biological weapons. The first, the Geneva Protocol of 1925, prohibits the use in war of these weapons; the second, the Biological Weapons Convention of 1972, prohibits the production, development, and stockpiling and transfer of biological and toxin weapons. Both of these agreements contain a common and fundamental flaw. Neither incorporates adequate means to verify compliance. Soviet compliance with both has been brought into sharp question by events in Southeast and Southwest Asia and in Sverdlovsk in the USSR. Because of this, it is clear that effective verification provisions are essential to future agreement in these fields. The U.S. is committed to achieving a complete and verifiable prohibition of chemical weapons development, production, stockpiling, and transfer, and to that end, we participate in the 40-nation Committee on Disarmament in Geneva.

#### MUTUAL AND BALANCED FORCE REDUCTIONS (MBFR)

The MBFR talks between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, underway in Vienna since 1973, are concerned with the reduction and limitation of conventional forces in Central Europe and with associated

confidence building, stabilization, and verification measures. On June 10, 1982, the President announced in Bonn the new NATO initiative to seek common collective ceilings in the reductions area (the Federal Republic of Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg in the West, and East Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia in the East) of about 700,000 ground forces and about 900,000 ground and air forces. The NATO initiative also includes measures to encourage cooperation and verify compliance.

#### VERIFICATION AND COMPLIANCE

Arms control agreements with a highly secretive adversary like the U.S.S.R. cannot be based simply on trust. We must have effective means of verification that enable us to know with confidence whether agreements are being honored. In practice, this means we must be able to monitor activities in the areas covered by such agreements in order to detect any violations; we must be able to do so early enough to permit us to assure Soviet compliance and take steps to offset the effects of any noncompliance. Agreements that cannot be effectively verified are not acceptable.

In the past, we have relied primarily on national technical means (NTM) of verification -- sophisticated data-collection methods (e.g., photographic, electronic, radar, seismic) operated unilaterally by the U.S. As arms control agreements, the systems they cover, and the possibilities of concealment become more complex, it will be essential to supplement NTM with some form of "cooperative" verification measures. The Reagan Administration has made clear that the U.S. will insist on verification procedures, including the possibility of measures beyond national technical means, if necessary, to ensure full compliance with any agreement.

## ARMS CONTROL AND NATO INF MODERNIZATION

### BACKGROUND

In order to sustain NATO's deterrent strategy in the face of the massive buildup of Soviet intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF), NATO ministers agreed in December, 1979, to modernize the Alliance's INF, while pursuing U.S.-Soviet negotiations on arms control involving those forces. This decision was reconfirmed by NATO in May, 1982. In the absence of a full arms control agreement arising out of U.S.-Soviet INF negotiations, the U.S. will deploy 108 Pershing II's and 464 ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs), beginning in December, 1983. The new systems will be mobile and capable of dispersal in times of crisis, thus enhancing their survivability and reducing the danger of a Soviet preemptive attack. These deployments have not been forced in Europe but, rather, were arrived at through a process of genuine consultation and joint decision with our NATO partners. Modernization will not increase the risk of a nuclear war limited to Europe; on the contrary, the deployments will serve to reduce the risks of Soviet attack by reminding the Soviets that they cannot hope to limit a nuclear war to the territory of others.

### SOVIET DEPLOYMENT

The need for NATO modernization stems from the fact that in the mid-1970s, the Soviets began deploying the triple-warhead SS-20, exacerbating the threat to our European Allies and adding to an already destabilizing imbalance in INF.

- The Soviets currently deploy some 315 mobile SS-20's, with 945 warheads, in addition to 280 single-warhead SS-4 and SS-5 missiles, for a total of over 1,200 warheads on longer-range INF missiles (not counting refires). NATO has no similar systems deployed.
- This deployment gives the Soviets a capability to hit, accurately and in great number, targets located anywhere in Western Europe from locations deep within the U.S.S.R. far beyond the range of any of NATO's European-based systems.

If deterrence is to be maintained, the Alliance must move to redress the imbalance, either through negotiation or, in the event a concrete INF arms control agreement obviating the need for GLCM and Pershing II is not achieved, through modernization.

### U.S. ARMS CONTROL PROPOSAL

NATO's INF modernization has not set back the prospects of arms control but, in fact, has forced the Soviets to accept, in principle at least, the need to limit their own nuclear weapons.

As a result of NATO's demonstrated resolve to modernize its nuclear forces, the U.S.S.R. has been persuaded to put on the negotiating table, for the first time, nuclear forces that threaten the Allies. Without NATO modernization, there would be no prospect of reducing the Soviet nuclear threat to Europe.

We are now negotiating with the Soviets in Geneva on the basis of the President's November 18, 1981, proposal to cancel deployment of Pershing II's and GLCMs in exchange for elimination of all Soviet SS-20's, SS-4's, and SS-5's. We are focusing on longer-range INF missiles because they are the most destabilizing systems. The U.S. proposal, if carried out, would be a major step toward achieving stability at dramatically reduced levels of forces. During the first round of negotiations in Geneva, the U.S. tabled a treaty that embodied this proposal. Both sides have had a chance to set forth their respective positions and to ask questions about the position of the other side. The talks have been serious and businesslike; we intend to consider Soviet proposals and to negotiate in good faith.

#### SOVIET OBJECTIVES

Soviet proposals made thus far contain elements that cannot provide a basis for an equitable and verifiable agreement. They would permit the Soviets to keep intermediate-range nuclear missiles while prohibiting comparable U.S. systems. A Soviet proposal outlined earlier this year would not require destruction of a single SS-20 missile, but the proposal would force the cancellation of NATO's modernization program and the virtual elimination of U.S. nuclear-capable aircraft from Europe. The Soviet proposal, based on contrived claims that a balance exists in INF, includes U.K. and French systems and calls for reductions from an unequal starting point, which would give the U.S.S.R. an overwhelming advantage.

A so-called unilateral "moratorium" on further deployment of Soviet intermediate-range nuclear missiles announced by President Brezhnev allows the Soviets to retain all of their currently deployed INF missiles but calls for a halt in the NATO deployment preparations, thus prohibiting NATO from fielding comparable systems. Since this "moratorium" was declared, the Soviets have continued to deploy new SS-20 missiles and construct facilities for still more of them. The Soviet objective clearly is to forestall NATO deployment without sacrificing Soviet INF superiority. NATO must remain committed to modernization of its INF if it is to convince the Soviets that they have no alternative to serious negotiations toward reducing the nuclear threat.

## START PROPOSAL

### BACKGROUND

On May 9, 1982, President Reagan announced a new proposal to reduce substantially the nuclear arsenals of both the U.S. and the Soviet Union to equal levels and to reduce the threat of nuclear war. The negotiations, beginning on June 29, are called START (Strategic Arms Reduction Talks) -- to emphasize the President's goal of nuclear weapons reductions and to signify a break from the unratified SALT II Treaty.

The President's initiative has opened the door to a more constructive relationship with the U.S.S.R. Such a relationship, however, can be built only on reciprocity and mutual restraint. Arms control is an important instrument for securing such restraint. Equitable and verifiable agreements, when combined with sound foreign and defense policies, can play a critical role in enhancing deterrence and ensuring a stable military balance.

### U.S. ARMS CONTROL OBJECTIVES

The President has outlined the objectives of U.S. arms control policy:

- Substantial Reductions. We seek to reduce the number and destructive potential of nuclear weapons, not just to cap them at high levels as in previous agreements.
- Equality. We seek agreements that will lead to mutual reductions to equal levels in both sides' forces. The U.S. will accept nothing less.
- Security. We seek agreements that will enhance U.S. and Allied security and reduce the risk of war.
- Verifiability. We will carefully design the provisions of arms control agreements and insist on measures to ensure that both sides comply. Otherwise, neither side will have the confidence needed to accept the deep reductions we seek.

### START NEGOTIATIONS

To enhance deterrence and ensure a stable nuclear balance, the President's proposal focuses, in the first phase of negotiations, on significant reductions in ballistic missile warheads and deployed ballistic missiles. This would halt and reverse the destabilizing growth in ballistic missile warhead numbers that

would have been permitted under the flawed and thus unratified SALT II Treaty. In this first phase, we will seek to reduce the number of ballistic missile warheads by at least one-third, to about 5,000. No more than half the remaining ballistic missile warheads will be on land-based missiles. We also will seek to cut the total number of all ballistic missiles to an equal level, about one-half the current U.S. level.

In the second phase, we will seek further reductions to equal ceilings on other elements of strategic forces, particularly ballistic missile throw-weight. Throw-weight is an important measure of the size and destructive potential of ballistic missiles. First-phase reductions will reduce the current disparity in ballistic missile throw-weight, and lay the groundwork for the second-phase reductions to achieve an equal throw-weight ceiling below current U.S. levels.

RELATIONSHIP TO SALT

The President's START proposal has built upon the experience of the SALT process. It is U.S. policy to take no action that would undercut existing agreements, provided the Soviets exercise equal restraint. We believe that this policy can contribute to a positive atmosphere for START negotiations. However, the Reagan Administration will not pursue ratification of SALT II for three broad reasons:

- First, the Treaty has specific flaws. These include the perpetuation and codification of dangerous, destabilizing asymmetries, illustrated by a unilateral Soviet advantage of 308 modern, heavy ICBMs. It contains several ambiguities, particularly with respect to provisions for verification. It permitted force expansion and did not achieve force reductions -- it is possible that the Soviet ICBM forces alone could have grown to more than 8,000 warheads under SALT II.
- Because of these and other shortcomings, SALT II never achieved the broad national support that a treaty of this importance must have. Even before the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, there was a divisive debate on the merits of the Treaty. Attempting to ratify SALT II now would only reopen that controversial debate -- at a time when a broad consensus behind the President's proposal is needed and when we should focus our full attention on achieving substantial reductions.
- Finally, formalizing the SALT II Treaty would make achievement of the President's goals for START more difficult by establishing unacceptable precedents for a future agreement. For example, Soviet Backfire bombers are not included in an equal treatment of bombers, and heavy

missiles are treated in a manner inconsistent with our plans for START. These and other provisions would have to be changed later in START. While our policy of not undercutting the general limitations of SALT II would not impede progress toward START, codifying them most certainly would.

#### A REASONABLE APPROACH

The main threat to the strategic balance has been the massive Soviet buildup of ballistic missile forces. Because of their large size, increasing accuracy and short flight times, these missiles (and particularly land-based ICBMs) pose a significant threat to U.S. deterrent forces. The President's START proposal attempts to reduce the threat of nuclear war by enhancing deterrence and securing a stable nuclear balance.

The President's approach is reasonable and equitable. It would lead to significant reductions to equal levels on both sides and thus to a more stable nuclear balance, which should be in the interest not only of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., but of the entire world. The President has emphasized our intention to negotiate in good faith and to consider all serious proposals from the Soviets.

STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTIONS TALKS (START) -- PROPOSED REDUCTIONS

On May 9, the President announced a bold, new proposal to reduce significantly the risks posed by large nuclear arsenals. He has proposed a phased approach to reductions focused on the most destabilizing elements of nuclear forces. The initial phase would reduce the total number of ballistic missile warheads by one-third, to about 3,000, would limit the number of warheads carried on ICBMs to one-half that number, and would cut the total number of ballistic missiles to an equal level about one-half of the current US level. In a second phase, we would seek further reductions in the overall destructive power of each side's arsenal to equal levels, including a mutual ceiling on ballistic missile throw weight below the current US level. We will also treat bombers and other strategic systems in an equitable manner. The proposed reductions, coupled with effective verification, will substantially reduce the nuclear threat and will make a major contribution to the stability of the nuclear balance.

The significant reductions proposed by President Reagan are shown in the following comparison:

FIRST PHASE

	<u>Approximate</u> <u>Current Levels</u>	
	<u>US</u>	<u>USSR</u>
Ballistic Missile Warheads (Land-Based and Sea-Based)		
o Proposed ceiling of 3,000	7,100	7,300
Land-Based Ballistic Missile Warheads		
o Proposed ceiling of 1,500	2,150	1,900
Ballistic Missiles (Land-Based and Sea-Based)		
o Proposed ceiling of 850, approximately one-half current U.S. levels	1,400	2,350

SECOND PHASE

## Missile Throw Weight

o Proposed ceiling below current U.S. levels	2 MTS	3 MTS
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# Introduction of Strategic Weapons by the U.S. and U.S.S.R. 1972-1982

ICBM—Intercontinental Ballistic Missile  
 SLBM—Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile  
 SSSN—Nuclear-Powered Ballistic Missile Submarine  
 ALCM—Air-Launched Cruise Missile



ALCM



Trident  
(Old Class)  
SSSN


U.S.

1972

1982



Bockair  
Bomber



Delta I SSSN

Delta II SSSN

Delta III SSSN



Typhoon SSSN

U.S.S.R.

1972

1982

US-USSR STRATEGIC FORCE COMPARISON  
TOTAL ACTIVE INVENTORY

Ballistic Missiles

	<u>1962</u>		<u>1972</u>		<u>1982</u>	
	<u>US</u>	<u>USSR</u>	<u>US</u>	<u>USSR</u>	<u>US</u>	<u>USSR</u>
ICBMs	70	40	1054	1500	1053	1390
SSBNs/SLBNs	9/144	38/100	41/656	57/500	33/544	70/950
Warheads	222	140	3700	2000	7200	7500
Throw-weight (Klbs)	400	500	3000	7000	4000	11,000

Nuclear-Capable Bombers

Bomber	1700	160	500	150	347	400
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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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September 15, 1982


National Security Decision  
Directive Number 56

PRIVATE INF EXCHANGE (S)

With respect to the private INF exchange which took place at the close of the last session, I have decided the following:

- The U.S. should continue to press for the zero/zero approach.
- No actions should be taken to close the private channel. If the Soviets respond in that channel, the following points should be made:
  - The U.S. believes the zero/zero proposal is the best approach to reduce the risk of nuclear conflict and to ensure effective verification.
  - The U.S. cannot accept a position in which the Soviets retain short time-of-flight SS-20 ballistic missiles while the U.S. foregoes Pershing II ballistic missiles (and retains only the slower, air-breathing GLCMs\*).
  - If the Soviets continue to be adamantly opposed to zero/zero, we should place the responsibility on them to propose alternatives for equitably reducing the total missile force structures. (S)

In preparing for the possibility of a Soviet response to the exchange, an NSPG working group should prepare, on a close-hold basis, talking points which outline the specific military and other reasons why the U.S. cannot accept it. (S)



\* and shorter range ballistic systems

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by S. Tuley, National Security Council

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
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-Contributed by William Burr.



Directorate of Intelligence

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# Peace Groups and Leaders in INF Basing Countries

[Redacted]

A Research Paper

This paper was prepared by [Redacted] Office of  
Central Reference, and [Redacted] Office of  
European Analysis.

Comments and queries are  
welcome and may be addressed to

[Redacted] FURA, [Redacted]

This paper was coordinated with the Directorate of  
Operations, the National Intelligence Council  
Analytic Group, and the National Intelligence  
Council [Redacted]

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C/R 82-14873  
E/R 82-10114  
November 1982



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[Redacted]

**Peace Groups and Leaders  
in INF Basing Countries** [Redacted]

**Overview**  
*Information available  
as of 25 October 1982  
was used in this report.*

This research paper discusses the most prominent peace organizations and leaders in [Redacted] countries designated by NATO as hosts for Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) basing: [Redacted] Italy.


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EU 82-10114  
November 1982



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


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
Italy

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Peace demonstrations in Italy have been comparable in size to those in other INF basing countries, and public opinion surveys show that antinuclear sentiment extends considerably beyond groups that demonstrate.<sup>3</sup> Nevertheless, peace activism in Italy is concentrated more on the far left than is the case in other INF basing countries.<sup>3</sup> During the past year, peace activity has increased, primarily because the Italian Communist Party (PCI) has decided that it can profit politically by exploiting the issue.

In principle, the Italian peace movement consists of more than 500 local, regional, and national committees and associations representing both secular and religious organizations across the political spectrum, with the exception of the extreme right. Yet most of the non-Communist groups have a small membership, and no strong national organization devoted exclusively to "peace" has arisen. The small Radical Party is militant and active, but its influence is weak. The activities of the PCI and, to a limited extent, the Italian Socialist Party (PSI) have been much more important to the peace movement.

In general, the peace movement has suffered from a leadership vacuum:

- No major political figure has made a full commitment to the peace movement.
- The movement itself has not produced a charismatic figure capable of transforming it into an independent force that can exert significant pressure on the Italian Government.

The preeminent role of the PCI in peace activity has not precluded differences within the movement over everything from ideology to tactics. While a broad community of purpose sometimes unites the diverse groups in demonstrations, major differences of attitude are never far from the surface and have even caused scuffles between rival groups on occasion.

The Italian peace movement so far has focused mostly on organizing protest demonstrations and rallies and circulating petitions. Some groups advocate more

vigorous tactics to impede GLCM base construction at Comiso, Sicily, and a few demonstrators have tried to obstruct construction vehicles. Acts of violence against INF cruise missile deployment may occur, but Italian security officials have said that the peace movement poses no threat to the stability of the government or to the successful installation of GLCMs in Sicily.

In contrast to the peace movements in the other INF countries, the Italian movement focuses almost exclusively on issues that affect Italy and has had less contact with foreign peace activists than the movements in Northern Europe.<sup>3</sup> In addition to the attention it receives in the media, and especially in the Communist press, the movement has generated its own publications to disseminate its message.

We believe that because many of the demonstrations have been planned and organized by long-established groups—especially political parties—these groups have financed them from their own resources.

**Origins of the Italian Peace Movement**

The Italian peace movement attracts the young in general and the leftist oriented in particular. The movement began as an apparently spontaneous effort on the part of minor leftist political parties, the Italian Communist Youth Federation (FGCI), and some pacifist groups. The immediate popular success of the march for peace between the towns of Perugia and Assisi, which was sponsored by those groups in September 1981, attracted the attention of the PCI and some elements of the PSI, which saw in the peace movement a way to enhance their popularity with the electorate. In our judgment, the two parties feared that they were losing out on the peace issue with voters and quickly developed their own peace policies in an attempt to organize and channel the movement for their own political ends.

**Roles of the PCI, the PSI, and Organized Labor**

The PCI, the PSI, and the union federations are probably the only organizations capable of providing the peace movement with the leadership it needs to become an effective national force.

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Demonstration in Comiso, Sicily, 4 April 1982



PCI. Since the fall of 1981 the PCI has been the dominant force behind the larger demonstrations. Despite its major role in the peace movement, however, the PCI has been reluctant to pull out all the stops against NATO's INF program:

- The party wants the Italian people and other West European parties to regard it as a Western party and not as a slavish follower of the Soviet line.
- The PCI hesitates to attack the Socialists, who support NATO's INF position, because it needs continued cooperation from the Socialists to maintain its control in local government coalitions.

Thus the PCI waited until other West European groups had demonstrated against INF deployment before staging its own protests. The party played a prominent role in organizing a demonstration in Rome on 24 October 1981 that attracted 200,000 participants. This demonstration, while primarily focused against INF deployment in Italy, also criticized Soviet SS-20 deployment. The PCI also organized the demonstration on 4 April 1982 in Comiso, which attracted 30,000 participants, a demonstration in Milan on 17 April 1982 attended by nearly 100,000, and the demonstration on 5 June 1982 in Rome that drew more than 100,000.

We believe that the PCI stepped up its agitation in late 1981 mainly because its leaders hoped to profit politically from being the main "force for peace" in Italy, and to focus the party's energies on something other than internal bickering over martial law in Poland. In our judgment, PCI leaders hoped that once the peace movement had become respectable in Western Europe, the party could take a leading role in Italian activity and in the process create difficulties for its rival, the PSI. They probably hoped that the Socialists, as members of the government that had supported NATO's dual decision on INF, would have to choose between remaining out of the movement, thereby appearing to be against peace, or playing second fiddle in what was already a PCI show. The second choice could have allowed the PCI to lead the Socialists into positions that would make relations with their coalition partners extremely awkward. The PCI has failed, however, to draw other major parties into the peace movement on its terms, and in order to avoid appearing too isolated, the Communists have tried to avoid obviously one-sided anti-Western positions during the past few months.

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**PSI.** The top leadership of the PSI has announced that it will support the deployment of INF if its preferred solution of the "zero option" proves unattainable. Nevertheless, the party has been feeling its way cautiously ever since the big upswing of peace activity last year, and its moves have not always been consistent. [redacted] the Socialist leadership was surprised by the popularity of the Perugia-Assisi march and embarrassed by its own absence from the impressive demonstration of October 1981. Later that fall the PSI made a brief attempt to establish its own peace credentials by organizing demonstrations in about 100 Italian cities. The party emphasized broad themes such as the need for a balanced reduction in arms and the negative effects of Soviet arms policy, and refrained from opposing the government policy on INF. These peace actions did not have the desired impact on the public, however, largely because the press and other parties denounced PSI activity as a blatant political maneuver. [redacted]

After some months of indecision, the PSI now seems inclined to refrain from peace agitation, even though some factions of the party are pressing for a more active stance. We believe that the party pulled back partly because its efforts were unsuccessful, but also because its leaders had decided that they could weather criticism for not being in the forefront of peace activity. Perhaps more significant, they were able to attack the PCI for what was termed extremist, anti-NATO, and anti-US activity. [redacted]

The PSI leadership has been unable to prevent some party members from participating in peace demonstrations. [redacted] the leadership counsels party members against such activity. Few Socialists appeared at the demonstration in Rome on 5 June, for example. Nevertheless, internal tensions persist. The president of the Sicilian Regional Assembly, a PSI member, has at times lent support to the demands of local anti-INF organizations, and the PSI leadership has been trying to bring him into line without making a public issue out of the disagreement. [redacted] Some Sicilian PSI members wanted to participate in the demonstration in Comiso but did not do so because of pressure from the national-level party leadership. [redacted]

**Organized Labor.** Another sector of society capable of greatly boosting peace activity in Italy is organized labor. During the fall of 1981, leaders of some major unions made public statements in support of the peace movement that appeared to presage major labor participation in marches and demonstrations. Since then, however, a vaguer and more moderate approach has been evident. [redacted]

[redacted] labor is deeply divided on the question of participation in demonstrations (especially those dominated by the PCI), as well as on the specific issues addressed by the peace campaign. [redacted]

The Italian United Federation of Labor Unions is composed of the PCI-controlled General Confederation of Italian Labor (CGIL), the Christian Democratic Party-oriented Confederation of Italian Workers Syndicates (CISL), and the Union of Italian Labor (UIL), which is affiliated with the PSI and the Social Democratic and Republican Parties. The 10 million union members—almost half of the Italian working force—usually back the foreign policy decisions of the United Federation leadership. Generally supportive of detente and disarmament, the United Federation also acknowledges, with varying degrees of enthusiasm, the need for the North Atlantic Alliance. [redacted]

The United Federation as a whole has taken the position that disarmament negotiations should be exhausted before proceeding with the NATO nuclear modernization program. Leaders of CISL and the UIL say that they will support the decision to deploy GLCMs at Comiso if negotiations fail; the CGIL, however, strongly opposes the installation of missiles at Comiso. The Geneva disarmament negotiations and the crisis in Poland have somewhat distracted trade union support for the peace movement. Organized labor did not help sponsor the Comiso demonstration, and CISL and UIL refused to participate in the one on 5 June. [redacted]

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(U) INF NEGOTIATIONS: THE LIKELY SOVIET APPROACH

Summary

Moscow has insisted that negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) link limits on Soviet "medium-range" land-based missiles with limits on US forward-based systems (FBS). The Soviets define FBS as aircraft on European territory and on carriers in adjacent waters that could strike the USSR.

Moscow contends that NATO's planned deployment of 572 Pershing IIs and ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs) will add to the US strategic advantage, and that the Pershing IIs in particular will allow the US to launch a surprise attack. At the preliminary INF talks in the fall of 1980, Moscow rejected an INF agreement not accompanied by a SALT treaty, probably because of the potential for circumventing limitations on intermediate-range nuclear forces in the absence of new limitations on strategic systems.

The Soviets assert that each side now has about 1,000 medium-range nuclear delivery systems in Europe. Moscow has indicated it will propose to limit these systems, which it defines as having a "radius of operation" of 1,000 to 4,500 kilometers and as consisting of:

- Soviet SS-4, SS-5, and SS-20 missiles and Backfire, Badger, and Blinder bombers;
- "over 700" US aircraft, including F-4s and F-111s based in Europe, A-6s and A-7s on carriers, and FB-111s; and
- "about 300" British and French systems, including French Mirage aircraft, British Vulcan and Buccaneer bombers, French land-based intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs), and British and French submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs).

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November 20, 1981

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The Soviets thus appear to be counting some out-of-area aircraft. All FB-111s are now stationed in the US, and Moscow seems to be including US planes on carriers not normally deployed in European waters. Moreover, Moscow excludes from its list all nuclear-capable Soviet and non-Soviet Warsaw Pact tactical aircraft in Eastern Europe that are within range of NATO territory.

In contrast to previous practice, recent Soviet statements on the INF balance have not referred to US Poseidon missiles assigned to NATO. The Soviets thus appear to have eliminated from their negotiating position what promised to be a contentious issue, because these missiles presumably would be covered by a SALT agreement.

Soviet statements suggest that Moscow will seek to limit the number of platforms (launchers and airplanes) rather than weapons (warheads and bombs). The Soviets assert that NATO has a 50-percent advantage in the number of weapons on medium-range systems, and that NATO would have a 2:1 advantage if it deployed Pershing IIs and GLCMs as planned. Moscow would have difficulty, however, supporting these contentions even using its own list of systems.

The Soviets will probably continue to assert that limits should be confined to Europe only. Moscow probably believes that a global regime would unduly restrict the number of medium-range missiles it could target against China.

In recent months, the Soviets have proposed stopping the deployment of SS-20s in the western USSR if NATO does not deploy GLCMs and Pershing IIs. In addition, the Soviets probably fear that NATO could use submarine-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs) to circumvent an INF agreement. Thus, the Soviets may well seek to limit SLCMs as well.

The Soviet press has dismissed as propaganda President Reagan's offer of November 18, 1981. During negotiations the Soviets are likely to counter the US proposal for a zero option by insisting that it would have to cover US FBs and allied systems.

Moscow may eventually compromise on FBs because it fears that GLCMs and Pershing IIs would pose a greater threat than forward-based aircraft. The Soviets may also fear that without an INF agreement NATO's initial deployment of 572 missiles would be followed by additional systems.

The Soviets are unlikely, however, to show flexibility on FBs until they are convinced that the deployment of Pershing IIs and

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GLCMs cannot be averted. Even if they compromised, they would probably defer rather than drop outright their FSS demands. If Moscow deferred these demands, it would probably propose limits on SLCMs as well as on Pershing IIs and GLCMs.

Moscow may also take certain military steps to gain leverage in INF talks and to increase Soviet military capabilities. Moscow could, for example, deploy SS-20s well beyond their current numbers. The Soviets might be able to deploy long-range SLCMs and GLCMs by the mid-1980s.

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## Soviet Premises

The Soviet Union has insisted that INF negotiations link limits on Soviet "medium-range" land-based missiles with limits on US forward-based systems (FBS). According to the Soviet definition, FBS are aircraft on European territory and on carriers in adjacent waters that could strike the USSR.

The Alleged Strategic Threat. NATO views INF talks as aimed at redressing the preponderance of Soviet intermediate-range nuclear weapons in Europe. For Moscow, however, the optimal result would be to avert NATO's deployment of Pershing IIs and GCLMs and to reduce the threat posed by US and allied nuclear systems that are already in Europe that have ranges sufficient to strike the Soviet Union. Moscow argues that the existing systems give the US an advantage in the global nuclear balance, despite a US-Soviet parity in central systems.

The Soviet position that INF talks should address the US "strategic" threat from European bases has its genesis in SALT negotiating history. The Soviets argued in SALT I that any system should be considered strategic if it had a range sufficient to strike the homeland of the opponent from its usual peacetime base. Even after dropping their insistence on such a comprehensive definition, they pressed for the inclusion in SALT I and II of US forward-based systems.

Moscow agreed to put aside the FBS issue in SALT I and again at Vladivostok in 1974 for other Soviet SALT II objectives, but stated that they expected FBS to be addressed at a later time. The agreed Statement of Principles for SALT III includes the assertion that SALT III negotiations will be conducted "taking into consideration factors that determine the strategic situation." Soviet negotiators clearly intended this language to cover US forward-based systems, although the US specifically rejected such an interpretation. At the preliminary INF talks in Geneva in the fall of 1980, the Soviets emphasized that the US systems embraced by their proposals had a strategic capability against the USSR. They have made this assertion repeatedly over the past year.

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Thus, the Soviets intend to address in negotiations beginning in Geneva on November 30 what they maintain is the unilateral advantage of the US which arises from the geographic difference between the two parties, and which allows the US to supplement its strategic capabilities with intermediate-range nuclear weapons. Moscow contends that NATO's planned deployment of 572 Pershing IIs and GLCMs will add to the US strategic advantage. The Soviets argue that the Pershing II would give the US the ability to launch a surprise attack on Soviet strategic installations. Defensa Minister Dimitry Ustinov wrote in the Pravda issue of July 25, 1981, that although the US claimed it would deploy medium-range missiles to defend Western Europe, the US would actually use them for "preventive" strikes against ICBMs and other strategic targets in the Soviet Union. Ustinov implied that Pershing IIs in Western Europe would give the US an advantage that could affect the outcome of a global nuclear war.

INF and SALT. After SALT II was signed in June 1979, Soviet officials refused to begin INF negotiations unless SALT II was ratified. They relented on that condition in July 1980. At the preliminary talks in Geneva that fall, the Soviets contended that although INF negotiations could proceed, no agreement could be concluded without a ratified SALT treaty.

The potential for circumventing limitations on intermediate nuclear forces in the absence of new limitations on strategic systems is probably the chief reason why the Soviets have insisted on linking the two issues. Moscow may well believe that the US, unfettered by limitations on central-system warheads or launchers, would replace whatever it gave up in an INF agreement with US-based strategic weapons. Announced US plans to deploy SLCMs doubtless reinforced arguments in Moscow that a free-standing INF agreement would allow the US to deploy systems in Europe that could threaten the USSR. In Moscow's view, such an agreement might also lead Washington to think it could spare the US homeland from Soviet attacks by forgoing the use of ICBMs.

An INF agreement unaccompanied by a SALT treaty would, of course, leave Moscow free to target additional ICBMs against Europe. Thus, both sides would have options for circumvention that could make INF negotiations a hollow exercise.

## Moscow's Likely Approach

Recent remarks by Soviet officials provide a good indication of the posture Moscow will take during the INF negotiations this fall. The Soviet position on the systems to be limited, the unit of limitation, and the area of limitation will be similar to their requests to the Soviet stance at the preliminary talks.

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Systems To Be Limited. The Soviets assert that each side has about 1,000 medium-range nuclear delivery systems in Europe. Ustinov in his July 25 Pravda article and Brezhnev in an interview with Der Spiegel on November 2, 1981, implied that the Soviets would propose to limit such systems, and that they defined them as having a range or "radius of operation" of 1,000 to 4,500 kilometers. Willy Brandt was told in a message delivered by a Soviet diplomat in late July 1981 that such systems consist of:

--Soviet SS-4, SS-5, and SS-20 missiles and Backfire, Badger, and Blinder bombers;<sup>1/</sup>

--"over 700" US aircraft, including F-4s and F-111s based in Europe, A-6s and A-7s on carriers, and FB-111s; and

--"about 300" British and French systems, including French Mirage aircraft, British Vulcan and Buccaneer bombers, French land-based IRBMs, and British and French SLBMs.<sup>2/</sup>

Certain aircraft on both sides are conspicuously missing from Moscow's list, namely:

--F-16s and F-104s assigned to NATO, which have flight radii exceeding that of the F-4;

--300 British and French Jaguars, whose flight radius of 1,100 kilometers is about the same as the Mirage IV's; and

--Soviet SU-24s (Fencers), nearly all of which are based in the USSR, but whose flight radius of 1,190 kilometers is 50 percent greater than that of the F-4 assuming NATO fuel reserves.

Moscow also excludes all nuclear-capable Soviet aircraft in Eastern Europe. These encompass MiG-23s and 27s (Floggers), SU-7s and 17s (Fitters), and MiG-21s (Fishbeds) which are within range of much NATO territory.

The Soviets appear to be counting some out-of-area aircraft. All FB-111s are now stationed in the US. Although Ustinov did not specify how many A-6s and A-7s he was counting, Leonid Zamyatin, the Chief of the CPSU's International Information Department,

<sup>1/</sup> For a previous discussion of the systems Moscow is likely to include, see INR Report 111-001, Moscow Modifies Count of NATO INF: Implications for INF Negotiations (CONFIDENTIAL, NOT TO BE DISSEMINATED OUTSIDE OF THE DEPARTMENT), 28 FEBRUARY 1981.

<sup>2/</sup> Brezhnev in his Der Spiegel interview did not mention the Soviet nuclear list, but referred to "systems" which "include" the "systems" of their type.

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indicated in December 1979 that the US had 292 carrier-based aircraft in Europe. In fact, however, the US normally deploys two carriers within range of Europe and in time of crisis is unlikely to deploy more than four. Each of these ships would probably carry no more than a total of 36 A-6s and A-7s, which would make only 144 such aircraft on four carriers.

In contrast to past Soviet statements, neither Ustinov nor Brezhnev nor the message to Brandt referred to US Poseidon missiles assigned to NATO. The Soviets have thus apparently eliminated from their negotiating position what promised to be a contentious issue, because these missiles presumably would be covered by a SALT agreement. Moreover, their inclusion would invite a US counterproposal to count Soviet SLBMs.

The continued inclusion of F-4s is consistent with previous Soviet proposals. Moscow cited forward-based aircraft to bolster its case for US concessions in SALT and in the preliminary INF talks last fall. The Soviet rationale for limiting F-4s is not clear, however, particularly in light of Ustinov's assertion that the Soviets only include systems in the INF balance with a range or operational radius of 1,000 to 4,500 kilometers.

Assuming standard US fuel reserves, the F-4 has an operational radius of 750 kilometers without aerial refueling and from a base in Denmark could strike only a small corner of the Baltic Military District in the USSR. Assuming less stringent NATO fuel reserves, however, the F-4 would have a radius of 1,090 kilometers without aerial refueling and from its various bases in Western Europe could strike targets in the USSR all along the borders with Eastern Europe. Both radii assume a high-low-high flight profile, however, which would risk heavy losses of aircraft attempting to penetrate Soviet air defenses.

The Soviets may also be assuming aerial refueling by the F-4. In June 1981, Viktor Karpov, the Soviet negotiator at the preliminary INF talks, told Embassy Moscow officials that the F-4 had been included because it could be aerially refueled. He added that a solution to the F-4 issue might be for the US to provide a statement along the lines of the Soviet Backfire statement in SALT II, i.e., a commitment to limit the operational radius of the aircraft. Moscow probably feels this would be a safe proposal, because the USSR's tactical aircraft would be excluded on the grounds that they cannot be refueled in the air. Such a capability, however, is under development for the SU-24 (Fencer).

The Soviets may have considered including the Pershing 1, which has a range of 740 kilometers, in the systems to be limited. In June 1981, the Soviets told Brandt in Moscow that the Pershing was a threat to Soviet territory. They insisted that INF negotiations should cover this missile.

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But neither Ustinov nor Brezhnev nor the July message to Brandt mentioned the Pershing I in their discussions of the INF balance. No doubt this omission was intended to deflect potential Western demands that the SS-12/22 with a range of 925 kilometers and the SS-X-23 with a range of 500 kilometers be subject to limitations.

As a counter to a US proposal to include short-range missiles in INF talks, Moscow might initially propose such broader negotiations, which would include nuclear artillery, such tactical missiles as the Lance, or even warhead stockpiles. If Moscow eventually agreed to limits on the SS-12/22 and SS-X-23, it would at a minimum insist on limits on US and probably West German Pershing I missiles, as well as on US forward-based aircraft.

Unit of Limitation. Soviet statements suggest that Moscow will seek to limit the number of platforms (launchers and airplanes) rather than weapons (warheads and bombs). The Soviets did not explicitly address this issue at the preliminary INF talks, but did imply that they were seeking limits on platforms rather than weapons.

The Soviets probably believe that such a stance would allow them to maintain superiority in weapons while agreeing to parity in platforms. The Soviets may also believe it would allow them to avoid:

- proving their contention that NATO enjoys substantial advantages in weapons;
- disclosing details about their systems; and
- dealing with refires.

In statements since the preliminary talks, the Soviets have asserted that NATO has a 50-percent advantage in the number of weapons on medium-range systems in Europe, and that NATO would have a 2:1 advantage if it deployed Pershing IIs and GLCMs as planned. Moscow, however, would have difficulty supporting this contention, even if it used its own list of systems comprising the INF balance.

Even assuming maximum loadings on NATO aircraft and minimum loadings on Soviet aircraft, the West would have only about a 30-percent superiority. Assuming more likely Soviet payloads (in which some aircraft carry bombs and others air-to-surface missiles), total NATO weapons would be 5 to 10 percent higher than total Soviet weapons. Moreover, if one included Soviet Fencers, Floppers, Fitters, and Flashers which could strike NATO territory

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from their current bases in the western USSR and Eastern Europe, the Soviets would have an advantage of nearly two and a half to one.<sup>3/</sup>

Moscow probably intends to continue replacing its SS-4s and SS-5s, which have a single warhead, with SS-20s, which have three warheads. By proposing limits on platforms rather than weapons, the Soviets would be free to increase the number of weapons deployed and to withhold data on how many weapons its platforms carry.

Soviet intermediate-range nuclear forces enjoy a large superiority in missile refires. This will give Moscow further reason to argue for platforms as the unit of limitation. The Soviets have not, however, addressed this issue or even acknowledged that they have refires.

Area of Limitation. At Geneva in the fall of 1980, the Soviets rejected a US proposal for combined global and regional arms of limitation, arguing that the talks concerned only nuclear arms in Europe. (Moscow traditionally defines European Russia as territory west of the Urals.) Although Moscow has apparently included out-of-area A-6s, A-7s, and FB-111s in the NATO total, the Soviets will probably continue to assert that limits should be confined to Europe only.

Moscow probably believes that a global regime would unduly restrict the number of medium-range missiles it could target against China. In Moscow's view, a global regime of equal ceilings that allowed for enough missile systems in the Far East would give the West a numerical advantage, because most Soviet SS-20s targeted against China can not be simultaneously targeted against NATO, while all NATO Pershing IIs and GLCMs in Europe could be targeted against the Soviet Union.

Moscow may also prefer regional limits so that it can hold aircraft in reserve in the Far East which could be brought to within range of Western Europe during a crisis that, in the Soviet view, justified abrogation of an INF agreement. The Soviets might argue in future negotiations that they could not move large numbers of aircraft without being detected. Nevertheless, the West would have at most a few days' warning of such a transfer.

<sup>3/</sup> See Tables 1 and 2, appended. The Soviet superiority in weapons increases to nearly four to one if one also counts nuclear-capable Floggers, Fishers, and Fishbeds which are currently based out of range of NATO territory, but which are west of the Urals and could be moved forward in time of crisis.

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Moscow might be prepared to limit the number--now 36--of SS-20 launchers in the western foothills of the Urals. The Soviets will likely exclude, however, the 36 SS-20 launchers just east of the Urals, which can hit all of Western Europe. (The SS-20 has a range of 4,400 to 5,000 kilometers.) Moscow will almost certainly contend that SS-20s in the Far East are out of range of Western Europe, and that they could not be moved within range in time for use in a European war.

If the US pressed for global limits, the Soviets might respond by demanding the right to deploy more missiles and aircraft than NATO to compensate for Soviet defense needs against China. Moscow might also call for global limits on all aircraft on both sides with ranges from 550 to 4,500 kilometers, because the West has a slight numerical superiority in such aircraft. In addition to aircraft already included by Moscow, such limits would:

--cover US F-4s, F-16s, A-6s, and A-7s outside Europe, as well as US A-4s, US and Allied F-16s, Allied F-104s, and British and French Jaguars;

--also cover Soviet SU-24s (Fencers), Soviet and non-Soviet Warsaw Pact MiG-23s and 27s (Floggers) and SU-17s (Fitters);

--but exclude Soviet and non-Soviet Warsaw Pact SU-7s (Fitters' and MiG-21s (Fishbeds) in Eastern Europe.

An Immediate Freeze. In November 1980, the Soviets proposed a freeze on "the aggregate number of principal nuclear arms on the European continent." This proposal encompassed both missiles and aircraft. In recent months, the Soviets have publicly narrowed their freeze proposal to a "moratorium on deployment in Europe of new medium-range nuclear missiles." Soviet spokesmen have explained that the latter proposal would mean the deployment of no more SS-20s in the western USSR if NATO did not deploy Pershing IIs and GLCMs.

Moscow has stated that Western acceptance of a moratorium is not a condition for INF negotiations. We can expect, however, that the Soviets will press hard for a moratorium. If the US does not accept such a proposal, the Soviets might decide to suspend unilaterally the deployment of SS-20s to demonstrate to the European public Moscow's sincere interest in successful negotiations. Moscow would judge that the burden would then fall on NATO to make some reciprocal gesture.

A Soviet Zero Option. The Soviet press has dismissed as propaganda President Reagan's offer of November 18, 1981, to deploy of Pershing IIs and GLCMs if the Soviets would dismantle their SS-4s, SS-5s, and SS-20s. Valentin Falin, First Deputy Chief of the CPSU's International Information

Department, told West German newsmen on October 28, 1981, however, that Moscow would examine a zero option very thoroughly, if it were proposed. He interpreted the zero option, however, to mean elimination of all medium-range systems on both sides, including US forward-based aircraft.

The Soviets may calculate that the European public would perceive such a sweeping version of zero option as showing a greater commitment than the US to disarmament. During negotiations, the Soviets are likely to counter a US proposal for a zero option by attempting to focus discussions on which systems should be limited under it. It can be expected that Moscow would attempt to avoid any onus if a zero-option outcome were not achieved.

### Possibilities for Soviet Compromise

SALT negotiating history shows that a longstanding Soviet objective has been to limit US deployment not only of GLCMs but also of SLCMs. The Soviets have been reluctant to compromise on limiting these systems, which were among the last SALT II issues to be resolved. Agreement was reached under the SALT II protocol to ban until the end of 1981 the deployment of GLCMs and SLCMs with a range of more than 600 kilometers and the testing of MIRVed GLCMs and SLCMs. During a meeting of the US-USSR Standing Consultative Commission in March 1980, the Soviets indicated that they would not proceed with the reduction to 2,250 strategic systems under SALT II without a resolution of the protocol issues or an extension of the protocol.

Soviet officials have argued that the survivability, accuracy, range, and penetrability of GLCMs and SLCMs would greatly increase NATO's capabilities against the USSR. In addition, the Soviets have asserted that it would be difficult to detect GLCMs and SLCMs and to distinguish between conventional and nuclear systems. They also noted in SALT talks that the MIRVing of GLCMs and SLCMs would compound these problems.

Moscow contends that Pershing IIs launched from West Germany could strike Soviet ICBM installations. The Soviets argue that the Pershing II is very accurate and has a range of 2,500 kilometers. They also maintain that Pershing IIs could strike Soviet ICBMs and other installations in the western USSR just five or six minutes after launch.<sup>4/</sup> Moscow's concerns are heightened because

4/ In fact, the Pershing II has a range of 1,800 kilometers, compared with 740 kilometers for the Pershing I, and a circular error probable (CEP) of 10-15 meters, compared with 400 meters for the Pershing I. CEP is the radius of a circle within which half of the missiles are expected to fall. The time required for the Pershing II to fly its full range is 13-14 minutes; the time required to reach ICBM sites in the western USSR would be at least twice the Soviet estimate.

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the Soviets are unlikely to have an adequate defense against Pershing IIs and GLCMs until the late 1980s at the earliest.

The Soviets have other concerns. They fear the transfer of new US systems to the Allies. Transfer to the FRG would be especially objectionable, given traditional Soviet fears of a resurgent German military threat.

The Soviets may also suspect that if NATO is able to overcome political opposition to INF modernization, the planned 572 missiles will be just the beginning of a more far-reaching expansion of NATO's military capabilities, including the deployment of even more Pershing IIs and GLCMs. Moscow may also believe that the deployment of new NATO missiles would facilitate the deployment of US enhanced radiation weapons and binary chemical munitions in Europe.

Possible Terms of Soviet Compromise. The above concerns may offer inducement for the Soviets to compromise on FBS in order to reach an INF agreement. Moscow is, however, unlikely to show flexibility on FBS until it is convinced that the deployment of Pershing IIs and GLCMs cannot be averted. Until then, Moscow will endeavor to derail NATO's plans for INF modernization by undermining public and official support for them, particularly in the basing countries.

Even if the Soviets compromise, however, they will probably defer rather than drop outright their FBS demands. They might, for example, attempt to link initial concessions with an agreement to negotiate limits on aircraft in a second phase of INF negotiations. Alternatively, the Soviets might propose that FBS figure in another negotiating arena, such as a Conference on Disarmament in Europe.

Moscow will argue that it would have no leverage to constrain French and British systems under an agreement that set equal ceilings on Soviet medium-range missiles and on US Pershing IIs and GLCMs. The Soviets told Brandt in June that they were prepared to reduce the number of SS-20s targeted against Europe, but that some were required to counter British and French systems. NATO's contention that these systems are strategic, and therefore can not be limited under INF talks, does not address the avowed Soviet objective of limiting the ability of the West to strike Soviet territory from Europe.

The Soviets may ultimately believe that the benefits of limiting US Pershing IIs and GLCMs would justify dropping their insistence that British and French systems be included in INF limits. If Moscow should compromise on this regard, it would

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nevertheless, insist that the US agree not to transfer systems limited by an INF agreement to the Allies or use other means to circumvent the agreement.

An agreement that limited or banned Pershing IIs and GLCMs, but which permitted SSCMs, would be of marginal value to the Soviets unless SSCMs were addressed in SALT negotiations. SSCMs and GLCMs share much the same capability. Therefore, even if the Soviets dropped their demand that US foreign-based aircraft be included in INF negotiations, they would probably propose limits on both GLCMs and SSCMs.

Soviet Military Measures. Finally, Moscow may take certain military steps to gain leverage during negotiations and to increase Soviet military capabilities in the event the negotiations fail. The Soviets have vowed that if NATO proceeds with INF modernization, the USSR will act to prevent the US from establishing military superiority. Moscow has not specified what measures it would take, but there are two it could implement with relative ease. The Soviets could:

--continue to deploy SS-20s well beyond their currently planned number;

--deploy to forward areas such shorter range systems as the SS-X-23 and SS-12/22, which to date have not been based in non-Soviet Warsaw Pact countries.

In addition, Moscow might be able to deploy long-range SSCMs and GLCMs by the mid-1980s. Moscow would, however, have to reconcile its negotiating posture, including its proposal for a freeze on medium-range systems, with new deployments.

Prepared by Robert W. Hansen  
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Approved by Robert A. Martin  
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Table 1. WESTERN INF SYSTEMS

<u>Soviet Name of Western Systems</u>		<u>US Estimate of Weapons per Platform<sup>1</sup></u>	<u>Total Weapons</u>
F-111 (US)	45	1	260
F-105 (US)	164	1	328
A-1H (US)	228	1	228
A-69/A-7a (US)	292	1	228
S-3 SBMA (French)	18	2	584
Hotels Sigma (UK)	64	1	18
S-21 SBMA (French)	80	3	192
Vulcans & Buccaneers (UK)	55	1	80
Mirage Iva (French)	46	1-2	55-110
		1	46
<u>Total US, UK, and French Weapons</u>			<u>1,791-1,846</u>

1/ The Soviets have identified these systems as figuring in their calculation of the INF balance in Europe. The numbers are based on a presumed Soviet count. The aircraft cited are nuclear-capable.

2/ This estimate shows figures for warheads and bombs.

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Table 2. SOVIET INF SYSTEMS

<u>Soviet List of Soviet Systems</u>	US Estimate of Weapons per Platform <sup>2/</sup>	<u>Total Weapons</u>
SS-20 (SS-20)	3	405
SS-9 (SS-9)	1	296
SS-16 (SS-16)	1	35
TO-2 (SS-20)	1	104-156
SS-16 (SS-16)	2-4	470-533
SS-20 (SS-20)	2-3	140-290
SS-20 (SS-20)	1-3	<u>1,450-1,713</u>
<u>Other Comparable Soviet Systems</u>		
SU-24s (Fencers)	2	570
MiG-23s and 27s (Floggers)	2	1,268
SU-7s and 17s (Fitters)	2	544
MiG-21s (Fishbeds)	1	270
		<u>2,652</u>
<b>Total Soviet Weapons</b>		<b>4,102-4,367</b>

- 1/ The Soviets have identified these systems as figuring in their calculation of the INF balance in Europe. The numbers show a presumed Soviet count. The missiles cited are west of the Urals. The aircraft cited are nuclear-capable and based in the western USSR. Naval aircraft are excluded.
- 2/ This estimate shows figures for warheads and bombs. Refires are not included.
- 3/ The numbers are based on US data and refer to nuclear-capable aircraft of the types cited that can strike NATO territory from their current bases in the western USSR and Eastern Europe. There would be 1,470 more aircraft and 2,625 more weapons, if one counted nuclear-capable Floggers, Fitters, and Fishbeds which are currently based out of a range of NATO territory, but which are west of the Urals and could be moved forward in time of crisis.

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**TRANSCRIBED COPY FOLLOWS**

- -Soviet SS-4, SS-5, and SS-20 missiles and Backfire, Badger, and Blinder bombers;

- -"over 700" US aircraft, including F-4s and F11s based in Europe, A-6s and A-7s on carriers, and FB-11s; and

--"about 300" British and French systems, including French mirage aircraft, British Vulcan and Buccaneer bombers, French land-based intermediate-range ballistic missiles (FRB11s, and British and French submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs).

The Soviet press has dismissed as propaganda President Reagan's offer of November 18, 1981. During negotiations the Soviets are likely to counter the US proposal for a zero option by insisting that it would have to cover US FBS and allied systems.

Moscow may eventually compromise on FBS because it fears that GLCMs and Pershing IIs would pose a greater threat than forward-based aircraft. The Soviets may also fear that without an INF agreement NATO's initial deployment of 572 missiles would be followed by additional systems.

The Soviets are unlikely, however, to show flexibility on FBS until they are convinced that the deployment of Pershing IIs and

GLCMs cannot be averted. Even if they compromised, they would probably defer rather than drop outright their FBS demands. If Moscow deferred these demands, it would probably propose limits on SLCMs as well as on Pershing IIs and GLCMs.

Moscow may also take certain military steps to gain leverage in INF talks and to increase Soviet military capabilities. Moscow could, for example, deploy SS-20s well beyond their current numbers. The Soviets might be able to deploy long-range SLCMs and GLCMs by the mid-1980s.

strike the homeland of the opponent from its usual peacetime base. Even after dropping their insistence on such a comprehensive definition, they pressed for the inclusion in SALT I and II of US forward-based systems.

Moscow agreed to put aside the FBS issue in SALT I and again at Vladivostok in 1974 for other Soviet SALT II objectives, but stated that they expected FBS to be addressed at a later time. The agreed Statement of Principles for SALT III includes the assertion that SALT III negotiations will be conducted "taking into consideration factors that determine the strategic situation." Soviet negotiations clearly intended this language to cover US forward-based systems, although the US specifically rejected such an interpretation. At the preliminary INF talks in Geneva in the fall of 1980, the Soviets emphasized that the US systems embraced by their proposals and a strategic capability against the USSR. They have [2 words illeg] assertion repeatedly over



on linking the two issues. Moscow may well believe that the US, unfettered by limitations on central-system warheads or launchers, would replace whatever it gave up in an INF agreement with US-based strategic weapons. Announced US plans to deploy system in Europe that could threaten the USSR. In Moscow's view, such an agreement might also lead Washington to think it could spare the US homeland from Soviet attacks by forgoing the use of ICBMs.

An INF agreement unaccompanied by a SALT treaty would, of course, leave Moscow free to target additional ICBMs against Europe. Thus, both sides would have options for circumvention that could make INF negotiations a hollow exercise.

#### Moscow's Likely Approach

Recent remarks by Soviet officials provide a good indication of the posture Moscow will take during the INF negotiations this fall. The Soviet position on the systems to be limited. [2 words illeg] of limitation, and the area of limitation will be [3 words illeg] [2 words illeg] the Soviet stage of the preliminary talks.

Certain aircraft on both sides are conspicuously missing from Moscow's list, namely:

F-16s and F-104s assigned to NATO, which have flight radii exceeding that of the F-4;

300 British and French Jaguars, whose flight radius of 1,100 kilometers is about the same as the Mirage IV's; and

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1/ For a previous discussion of the systems Moscow is likely to include, see INR Report [no. illeg] Moscow Modifies [illeg] of [illeg] TNF: Implications for TNF Negotiations [3 words illeg] [sentence illeg]

[3 lines illeg]

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Europe could strike targets in the USSR all along the borders with Eastern Europe. Both radii assume a high-low-high flight profile, however, which would risk heavy losses of aircraft attempting to penetrate Soviet air defenses.

The Soviets may also be assuming aerial refueling by the F-4. In June 1981, Viktor Karpov, the Soviet negotiator at the preliminary INF talks, told Embassy Moscow officials that the F-4 had been included because it could be aurally refueled. He added that a solution to the F-4 issue might be for the US to provide a statement along the lines of the Soviet Backfire statement in SALT II, i.e., a commitment to limit the operational radius of the aircraft. Moscow probably feels this would be a safe proposal, because the USSR's tactical aircraft would be excluded on the grounds that they cannot be refueled in the air. Such a capability, however, is under development for the SU-24 (Fencer).

The Soviets may have considered including the Pershing 1, which has a range of 740 kilometers, in the systems to be limited. In June 1981, the Soviets told [name illeg] Moscow that the Pershing was a threat to Soviet territory. [illeg] limited than INF negotiations should [illeg] this missile.

(4th paragraph until the end)

The Soviets probably believe that such a stance would allow them to maintain superiority in weapons while agreeing to parity in platforms. The Soviets may also believe it would allow them to avoid:

- proving their contention that NATO enjoys substantial advantages in weapons;
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In statements since the preliminary talks, the Soviets have asserted that NATO has a 50-percent advantage in the number of weapons on medium-range systems in Europe, and that NATO would have a 2:1 advantage if it deployed Pershing IIs and GLCMs as planned. Moscow, however, would have difficulty supporting this contention, even if it used its own list of systems comprising the INF balance.

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(5th Paragraph to end)

Moscow probably believes that a global regime would unduly restrict the number of medium-range missiles it could target against China. In Moscow's view, a global regime of equal ceilings that allowed for enough missile systems in the Far East would give the West a numerical advantage, because most Soviet SS-20s targeted against China can not be simultaneously targeted against NATO, while all NATO Pershing IIs and GLCMs in Europe could be targeted against the Soviet Union.

Moscow may also prefer regional limits so that it can hold aircraft in reserve in the Far East which could be brought to within range of Western Europe during a crisis that, in the Soviet view, justified abrogation of an INF agreement. The Soviets might argue in future negotiations that they could not move large numbers of aircraft without being detected. Nevertheless, the West would have at most a few days warning of such a transfer.

An Immediate Freeze. In November 1980, the Soviets proposed a freeze on "the aggregate number of principal nuclear arms on the European continent." This proposal encompassed both missiles and aircraft. In recent months, the Soviets have publicly narrowed their freeze proposal to a "moratorium on deployment in Europe of new medium-range nuclear missiles." Soviet spokesmen have explained that the latter proposal would mean the deployment of [illeg] more SS-20s in the western USSR if NATO did not deploy Pershing IIs and GLCMs.

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A Soviet Zero Option. The Soviet press has dismissed as propaganda President Reagan's offer of November 18, 1981, that deployment of Pershing IIs and GLCMs if the Soviets would not dismantle their SS-4s, SS-5s, and SS-20s. [2 words illeg], First Deputy Chief of the CPS [illeg] International Information

(paragraphs 4 &5)

Soviet officials have argued that the survivability, accuracy, range, and penetrability of GLCMs and SLCMs have asserted that it would be difficult to detect GLCMs and SLCMs and to distinguish between conventional and nuclear systems. They also noted in SALT talks that the MIRVing of GLCMs and SLCMs would compound these problems.

Moscow contends that Pershing IIs launched from West Germany could strike Soviet ICBM installations. The Soviets argue that the Pershing II is very accurate and has a range of 2,500 kilometers. They also maintain that Pershing IIs could strike Soviet ICBMs and other installations in the western USSR just five or six minutes after launch.

(paragraphs 4,5 & 6)

Even if the Soviets compromise, however, they will probably defer rather than drop outright their FBS demands. They might, for example, attempt to link initial concessions with an agreement to negotiate limits on aircraft in a second phase of INF negotiations. Alternatively, the Soviets might propose that FBS figure in another negotiating arena, such as a Conference on Disarmament in Europe.

Moscow will argue that it would have no leverage to constrain French and British systems under an agreement that set equal ceilings on Soviet medium-range missiles and on US Pershing IIs and GLCMs. The Soviets told Brandt in June that they were prepared to reduce the number of SS-20s targeted against Europe, [illeg] that some were required to counter British and French systems. NATO's contention that these systems are strategic, and therefore can not be limited under INF talks, does not address the avowed Soviet objective of limiting the ability of the West to strike Soviet territory from Europe.

The Soviets may ultimately decide that the benefits of limiting US Pershing IIs and GLCMs would justify [illeg] their insisting that British and French items be included in INF limits. If Moscow should compromise in this regard it would



nevertheless insist that the US agree no to transfer systems limited by an IF agreement to the Allies or use other means to circumvent the agreement.

An agreement that limited or banned Pershing IIs and GLCMs, but which permitted SLCMs, would be of marginal value to the Soviets unless SLCMs were addressed in SALT negotiations. SLCMs and GLCMs share much the same capability. Therefore, even if the Soviets dropped their demand that the US forward-based aircraft be included in INF negotiations, they would probably propose limits on both GLCMs and SLCMs.

Soviet Military Measures. Finally, Moscow may take certain military stands to gain leverage during negotiations and to increase Soviet military capabilities in the event the negotiations fail. The Soviets have vowed that if NATO proceeds with INF standardization, the USSR will act to prevent the US from establishing measures it would take, but there are two it could implement with relative ease. The Soviets could:

- continue to deploy SS-20s well beyond their currently planned number

- deploy to forward areas such shorter range systems as the SS-X-23 and SS-X-12/22, which to date have not been based in non-Soviet Warsaw Pact countries.

In addition, Moscow might be able to deploy long-range SLCMs and GLCMs by the mid 1980s. Moscow would, however, have to reconcile its negotiating posture, including its proposal for a freeze on medium-range systems, with new deployments.

Part Three:  
International Diplomacy

**1983**

(E5)

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27 Jun 2002

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CHANNEL RELEASED IN PART  
HANDLING NODIS  
B1, 1.5(A), 1.5(F)

PAGE 01 ROME 02617 011751Z  
ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-00 ADS-00 /000 W  
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O 011748Z FEB 83  
FM AMEMBASSY ROME  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5415

~~SECRET~~ ROME 02617

NODIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: MNUC, GLCM, NATO, IT  
SUBJECT: DUAL KEY FOR ITALY

REF: ROME 1133

1. ~~SECRET~~ ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SEPTEL REPORTS COMMAND AND CONTROL ASPECTS OF  
JANUARY 31 TALKS WITH THE ITALIANS ON THE COMISO MOU.  
REFTEL DESCRIBES INTER ALIA ITALIAN PAPER PROPOSING THE  
ESTABLISHMENT OF A WORKING GROUP TO EXAMINE THE POSSI-  
BILITIES FOR A DUAL KEY ARRANGEMENT [REDACTED]

-Contributed by William Burr.

B1

3. ON MORNING OF FEBRUARY 1, EMBASSY RECEIVED FOLLOWING  
LETTER FROM GENERAL GIORDO, CHIEF OF THE MOD'S THIRD  
DIVISION (OPERATIONS), FOLLOWING UP ON THE ITALIAN  
WORKING GROUP PROPOSAL. THE LETTER IS DATED JANUARY 28.  
BEGIN INFORMAL TRANSLATION: REFERENCE: OUR LETTER OF  
5 SEPTEMBER, 1978. DURING THE JANUARY 14 MEETING, IN  
ORDER TO COMPLY WITH POLITICAL DEMANDS, A PROPOSAL WAS  
MADE REGARDING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A U.S.-ITALIAN  
WORKING GROUP. THIS GROUP WOULD HAVE A MANDATE TO  
EXAMINE THE TECHNICAL FEASIBILITY AND THE COSTS RELATIVE

~~SECRET~~  
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EXTEND CLASSIFICATION

PAGE 02 ROME 02617 011751Z

TO MEASURES OF A "PHYSICAL" NATURE, DESIGNED TO  
SAFEGUARD ITALIAN DECISIONMAKING POWER IN THE CASE OF  
USE ON OR FROM ITALIAN TERRITORY [REDACTED]  
NOT COVERED BY THE 1963 TECHNICAL AGREEMENT. (COMMENT: DECAPTIONED  
SEE BELOW.)

B1

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Date Printed:  
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CHANNEL: n/a  
HANDLING: NODIS

2

4. THE PROPOSAL DERIVES FROM A GROWING POLITICAL AND PUBLIC SENSITIVITY TO THE PROBLEM OF NATIONAL CONTROL OF [REDACTED] AS THE DEFENSE GENERAL STAFF PREVIOUSLY INDICATED IN THE REFERENCED LETTER.

B1

5. WE HOPE FOR AN ANSWER IN THE VERY NEAR FUTURE WHICH WILL ENABLE US TO AGREE ON THE MEETINGS AND ACTIVITIES TO BE CARRIED OUT. END TEXT.

6. COMMENT:

WE ARE NOT CERTAIN OF THE CONTENT OF THE 5 SEPTEMBER, 1998 LETTER, BUT WE IMAGINE FROM THE CONTEXT THAT THE LETTER PROPOSED SIMILAR DISCUSSIONS. WE HAVE IDENTIFIED THE 1963 AGREEMENT REFERRED TO IN GIORDO'S LETTER. IT WAS SIGNED APRIL 1, 1963 BY EUCOM AND THE ITALIAN DEFENSE GENERAL STAFF, [REDACTED]

B1

[REDACTED]

WE RECOMMEND THAT GIORDO'S LETTER NOT BE ANSWERED DIRECTLY, BUT BE FOLDED INTO THE BACKGROUND OF DEALING WITH THE COMISO PROBLEM.

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

PAGE 03 ROME 02617 011751Z

7. REQUEST DEPARTMENT REPEAT TO SECDEF. RABB

~~SECRET~~

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WASHINGTON

March 28, 1983

NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION  
DIRECTIVE NUMBER 86

U.S. APPROACH TO INF NEGOTIATIONS ~~(S)~~

The U.S. Delegation to the INF negotiations is directed to make a proposal based upon the following elements to the Soviet Union before the end of the current round of negotiations: ~~(S)~~

- The U.S. continues to believe that the zero-zero outcome is the optimal outcome. ~~(S)~~

- Without an agreement which satisfies the criteria we have previously identified, however, the U.S. will deploy LRINF land based missiles as planned by NATO. ~~(S)~~

- While maintaining the other elements of the U.S. INF position, and, as an interim step towards the ultimate elimination of all LRINF land based missiles, the U.S. could agree to accept a limit at one of a number of certain discrete levels provided that the level would satisfy the criteria cited above and provided the Soviet Union is prepared to agree to reduce its corresponding LRINF land based missile forces to an equal level. ~~(S)~~

- Therefore, the U.S. INF Delegation should notify the Soviet Delegation that the U.S. is prepared to enter into an interim agreement under which the United States would accept a limit at some finite, agreed number of warheads on longer-range, land based INF missile launchers if the Soviet Union reduces the number of warheads on its LRINF land based missile force to an equal level on a global basis. ~~(S)~~

- The U.S. views such an agreement as an interim step to the total elimination of weapons of this class. It hopes the Soviet Union will recognize the wisdom of this and join us in this view, but it does not make a commitment by the Soviet Union to ultimately negotiate a zero-zero outcome a precondition for the negotiation of what we would view to be an interim solution. ~~(S)~~

Ronald Reagan

~~SECRET~~  
~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

OADR

~~SECRET~~

Declassified/Released on 5-17-91  
under provisions of E.O. 12356  
by S. Tilley, National Security Council

(F87-1035)

JAPAN DEFENSE  
DSZ  
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**SECRET**

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
JCS MESSAGE CENTER

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ROUTINE  
R 011011Z APR 83  
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1258  
INFO USMISSION GENEVA 5854  
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 4558  
AMEMBASSY LONDON 9861  
AMEMBASSY BONN 7780  
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 7140  
AMEMBASSY SEUL 7648  
COMUSJAPAN YOKOTA AB JA  
SECDEF WASHDC

ZYUW RUEKOA6085 0911016  
USMISSION USNATO 1263  
AMEMBASSY PARIS 2634  
AMEMBASSY ROME 6395  
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 6942  
AMEMBASSY BEIJING 8681  
CINCPAC HONOLULU HI  
COMNAVFORJAPAN YOKOSUKA JA

OF U.S. SECURITY GUARANTEES TO JAPAN BY REINFORCING SUSPICIONS AMONG CERTAIN JAPANESE THAT EUROPEAN SECURITY COMES FIRST TO THE U.S. ON THE OTHER, IT WOULD CREATE FERTILE GROUND IN JAPAN FOR SOVIET ATTEMPTS TO DRAW JAPAN INTO SEPARATE NEGOTIATIONS IN WHICH THE QUID PRO QUO WOULD BE JAPANESE GUARANTEES TO PROHIBIT DEPLOYMENT OF U.S. NUCLEAR OR NUCLEAR-CAPABLE FORCES IN AND AROUND JAPAN.  
5. ASST. SEC WOLFOWITZ REPLIED THAT U.S. WOULD RESIST SOVIET ATTEMPTS TO MAKE A DISTINCTION BETWEEN EUROPEAN AND ASIAN DEPLOYMENTS, BUT IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN PRINCIPLE OF A GLOBAL CEILING COULD NOT BEGIN SETTING REGIONAL SUB-CEILINGS, WHICH WOULD, IN ANY EVENT, BE MEANINGLESS IN PRACTICE BECAUSE OF SS-20 RANGE AND MOBILITY. POINTING OUT THE GREAT DIVERSITY OF SOVIET STRATEGIC AND THEATER NUCLEAR WEAPONS, BESIDES THE SS-20'S, WHICH CONSTITUTE THE TOTAL POTENTIAL THREAT TO JAPAN. HE SUGGESTED THAT GOJ SHOULD ATTEMPT TO GUIDE PUBLIC DISCUSSION AWAY FROM STRICT FOCUS ON SS-20'S IN ORDER TO REDUCE THE OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE SOVIETS TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF AN OVERLY SIMPLIFIED VIEW OF THE PROBLEM AMONG JAPANESE PUBLIC. BT

SECRET SECTION 01 OF 02 TOKYO 06085

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: MARR, JA, US  
SUBJECT: INF CONSULTATIONS WITH JAPAN

1. (S) ENTIRE TEXT.
2. SUMMARY:  
- ON MAR 30, ASSISTANT SECRETARY WOLFOWITZ AND EMBOFFS MET WITH FOREIGN MINISTRY DIRECTORS GENERAL AND OFFICE DIRECTORS TO DISCUSS THE NEW U.S. INTERIM PROPOSAL FOR INF REDUCTIONS. THE MOFA OFFICIALS SAID THAT GOJ WOULD BE RELEASING ON MAR 31 A PUBLIC STATEMENT OF FULL SUPPORT FOR THE PROPOSAL AND THEY EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR THE PROCESS OF CONSULTATION THAT HAD BEEN INITIATED AS A RESULT OF THE SECRETARY'S VISIT TO TOKYO. THEY ALSO TOOK THE OPPORTUNITY TO EXPRESS GOJ CONCERNS ABOUT THE POSSIBLE PITFALLS FOR U.S.-JAPANESE SECURITY RELATIONS AS NEGOTIATIONS ON INTERIM PROPOSALS GET UNDERWAY IN GENEVA. THEY SAID THEIR GREATEST WORRY IS HOW TO DEAL EFFECTIVELY WITH THE CURRENT SOVIET EFFORT IN JAPAN TO ENCOURAGE A SEPARATE JAPANESE-SOVIET NEGOTIATION ON SS-20'S DEPLOYED IN THE FAR EAST, BECAUSE SOVIET GOAL IS TO THWART CURRENT TRENDS IN JAPAN TOWARD MUCH MORE ACTIVE AND OPEN SUPPORT FOR U.S. FORCE DEPLOYMENTS. EMBASSY BELIEVES THAT, WHILE THE RESPONSIBILITY RESTS LARGELY WITH GOJ TO RESIST SOVIET PRESSURES IN JAPAN, THERE MUST ALSO BE DUE CONSIDERATION GIVEN IN U.S. INF PLANNING PORCESS TO THE POTENTIAL FOR DAMAGING U.S.-JAPANESE DEFENSE RELATIONS IF WE APPEAR TO IGNORE ASIAN SECURITY CONCERNS. END SUMMARY.
3. MOFA PARTICIPANTS IN MAR 30 INF DISCUSSIONS INCLUDED NORTH AMERICAN BUREAU DIRECTOR GENERAL KITAMURA (CHAIRING), UN BUREAU DIRECTOR GENERAL KADOTA, EUROPEAN BUREAU DIRECTOR GENERAL KATO, NORTH AMERICAN BUREAU DEPUTY DG YAMASHITA, UN BUREAU DEPUTY DG ENDO, EUROPEAN DEPUTY DG TANAKA, SECURITY DIVISION DIRECTOR KATO, AND SOVIET OFFICE DIRECTOR TAMBA, AS WELL AS SEVERAL OTHER STAFF OFFICERS. AFTER ASST. SEC WOLFOWITZ HAD EXPLAINED THE TERMS OF THE NEW U.S. INTERIM PROPOSAL FOR INF REDUCTIONS, AND ANSWERED SEVERAL QUESTIONS ABOUT THIS, MOFA OFFICIALS REPLIED THAT GOJ FULLY SUPPORTS THIS PROPOSAL AND WOULD SO ANNOUNCE PUBLICLY AFTER PRESIDENT REAGAN'S PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT.
4. THEY THEN PROCEEDED TO VOICE THEIR CONCERNS ABOUT THE POTENTIAL REPERCUSSIONS IN JAPAN IF AN INTERIM AGREEMENT ON INF RESULTED IN REDUCTIONS IN EUROPEAN SS-20'S AND NOT FAR EASTERN SS-20'S. ON THE ONE HAND, THEY SAID, THIS WOULD DAMAGE THE CREDIBILITY

Dept. of State, RPS/IPS, Margaret P. Grafeld, Dir  
( ) Release ( ) Excise ( ) Deny (X) Declassify  
Date 7/29/2003 Exemption \_\_\_\_\_

ACTION (U,6,7,8)  
INFO PMD-1(1) SECDEF:(\*) SECDEF(9) USDP(15)  
ASD:MRAL(2) ASD:PA&E(1) DD(1) NMIC(\*) SWS(1)  
DC-4A(1) AT-X(1) DIO(1) DE(1) DG-1B(1) DG-1D(1)  
DB-1G(1) DB-2(1) DB-2B(1) DB-2D(1) DB-2D1(1)  
DB-3B(2) DB-5B(1) DB-5D(1) DB-5D3(1) DIA(1)

SECTIONAL(1)

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CDSN=MAK786

**SECRET**

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SECT 01 OF 02

# SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
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ROUTINE

R 011011Z APR 83

FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1259

INFO USMISSION GENEVA 5855

USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 4559

AMEMBASSY LONDON 9862

AMEMBASSY BONN 7761

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 7141

AMEMBASSY SEOUL 7649

CINCPAC HONOLULU HI

COMNAVFORJAP YOKOSUKA JA

ZYUW RUEHKOAG085 0911020

USMISSION USNATO 1264

AMEMBASSY PARIS 2635

AMEMBASSY ROME 6396

AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 6943

AMEMBASSY BEIJING 8682

AMEMBASSY JAKARTA 6273

COMUSJAPAN YOKOTA AB JA

SECDEF WASHDC

THIS REGION. MOFA OFFICIALS SEEM TO RECOGNIZE THAT IT IS LARGELY THEIR ROLE AND RESPONSIBILITY TO RESIST SOVIET EFFORTS TO MANIPULATE JAPANESE PUBLIC OPINION AND DRIVE WEDGES IN U.S.-JAPAN SECURITY RELATIONS. THEY HAVE ALREADY BEGUN QUIETLY TO SEEK OUT LDP MEMBERS WHO CAN BEGIN WORKING WITHIN POLITICAL CIRCLES TO BROADEN THE BASE OF INFORMATION AND UNDERSTANDING ON THESE COMPLICATED ISSUES. HOWEVER, EMBASSY STRONGLY URGES THAT U.S. INTERESTS IN MAINTAINING AND PROMOTING A STRONG DEFENSE ALLIANCE WITH JAPAN ARE SYSTEMATICALLY WEIGHED IN THE PROCESS OF DEVELOPING NEGOTIATIONS AND PUBLIC POSITIONS ON INTERIM INF PROPOSALS. END COMMENT. MANSFIELD BT

SECRET SECTION 02 OF 02 TOKYO 06085

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: MARR, JA, US

SUBJECT: INF CONSULTATIONS WITH JAPAN

6. FINALLY, THE JAPANESE SIDE DREW ATTENTION TO THE LINE IN PRIME MINISTER NAKASONE'S LETTER OF RESPONSE TO PRESIDENT REAGAN ON THE INTERIM PROPOSAL, WHICH READS: "...EVEN IF THE INTERIM SOLUTION WILL NOT INVOLVE TRANSFER OF SS-20'S TO THE FAR EAST, IT IS IMPORTANT THAT DUE CONSIDERATION BE GIVEN TO THE SECURITY OF ASIA, COMPARABLE TO THAT GIVEN TO EUROPE." THIS LANGUAGE, THEY EXPLAINED, IS DESIGNED TO MEET JAPANESE CONCERNS WITHOUT SAYING THAT REDUCTIONS MUST BE ACHIEVED IN BOTH REGIONS. THEY SUGGESTED THAT IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO GOJ IF THE U.S. COULD REITERATE THIS PHRASE, OR SOMETHING EQUIVALENT TO IT, AS APPROPRIATE.

7. WOLFOWITZ POINTED OUT THAT WHILE JAPANESE WERE ASKING FOR "DUE CONSIDERATION, COMPARABLE TO THAT GIVEN TO EUROPE," THE EUROPEAN AND JAPANESE SITUATIONS WERE OF COURSE NOT PRECISELY COMPARABLE AND DUE CONSIDERATION WOULD HAVE TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF THAT FACT. FOR EXAMPLE, WE HAVE NO REQUIREMENT FOR "COUPLING" THROUGH THE BASING OF U.S. WEAPONS ON JAPANESE SOIL, INDEED VERY MUCH THE OPPOSITE. ALSO, CONVENTIONAL DETERRENCE PLAYS A MUCH LARGER ROLE IN THE JAPANESE CONTEXT THAN IN THE EUROPEAN. THE JAPANESE SIDE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THERE ARE INDEED IMPORTANT DIFFERENCES BUT THAT THE JAPANESE PUBLIC IS STRONGLY CONCERNED TO SEE A REDUCTION IN THE SOVIET THREAT AND, IF THERE IS NO SUCH REDUCTION AS A RESULT OF THE INF TALKS, SOVIETS WILL ATTEMPT TO EXPLOIT JAPANESE FEARS IN ORDER TO GENERATE PRESSURE HERE TO MAKE OTHER CONCESSIONS IN ORDER TO REDUCE THE SOVIET THREAT TO JAPAN. IT IS PERHAPS FOR THIS REASON THAT THEY SHOWED A GREAT DEAL OF INTEREST IN THE QUESTION OF WHETHER AN INTERIM AGREEMENT WOULD BE LINKED TO FURTHER NEGOTIATIONS ON REDUCTIONS DOWN TO ZERO.

8. COMMENT: BOTH THE HIGH LEVEL OF THE JAPANESE ATTENDANCE AT THIS MEETING AND THE TENOR OF THEIR COMMENTS REVEAL THE VERY SERIOUS ATTENTION GOJ IS NOW DEVOTING TO THE INF DILEMMA. THEY WILL EXPECT THEIR VIEWS TO RECEIVE CAREFUL CONSIDERATION IN WASHINGTON AND, TO A DEGREE, MAY TEND PURPOSELY TO EXAGGERATE THE SIGNIFICANCE OF INF AS A LITMUS TEST OF THE CREDIBILITY OF U.S. SECURITY GUARANTEES. IT IS ALSO APPARENT THAT MOFA OFFICIALS CONCERNED WITH SECURITY MATTERS WILL BE EVALUATING U.S. RESPONSIVENESS TO JAPANESE CONCERNS ABOUT INF, IN RELATION TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF SUPPORT IN JAPAN FOR THE DEPLOYMENT OF SHIP-BASED U.S. NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN

ACTION

(I,M)

INFO PMD-1(1) SECDEF:(\*) SECDEF(9) USDP(15)

ASD:MRAL(2) ASD:PA&E(1) DD(1) NMIC(\*) SWS(1)

DC-4A(1) AT-X(1) DIO(1) DE(1) DB-1B(1) DB-ID(1)

DB-1G(1) DB-2(1) DB-2B(1) DB-2D(1) DB-2D1(1)

DB-3B(2) DB-5B(1) DB-5D(1) DB-5D3(1) DIA(1)

SECTIONAL(1)

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MCN=83091/02017

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PAGE 1 OF 1

011011Z APR 83

SECT 02 OF 02

# SECRET

*Reagan, Ronald. The Reagan Diaries. Ed. Douglas Brinkley. New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 2007, p. 155-156.*

**Friday, May 27-Tuesday, May 31 [1983]**

The summit in Williamsburg on all our minds but 1<sup>st</sup> on Fri. had a press interview & then met with Prime Minister Nakasone of Japan – 1<sup>st</sup> name Yasu. We met in office & then lunch in the St. dining room. He impresses me more every time I see him. At lunch we surprised him with a birthday cake. I can't believe he's 65. I had him pegged for 45. He's off to Johns Hopkins U. for a speech & then on to the summit.

I finished the day in Williamsburg with a 2 hr. prep meeting for the Summit.

Sat. 28<sup>th</sup> – A full day what with touring all the facilities arranged for the Summit. Out table – at least 40 feet long was hand built by a craftsman as a gift to the govt. for us at the Summit.

Had bilaterals with Pres. Mitterand (France) & P.M. Thatcher, then a dinner meeting with the other 6 heads of state & the Pres. of the European Council, Gaston Thorn. I opened the subject of the I.N.F. deployment. After full discussion it was agreed that we'd have foreign ministers draw up a statement of approval of deployment & negotiations to reduce & hopefully eliminate all such intermediate range weapons. We met on Sunday morning & out of the blue both Mitterand & Trudeau said they couldn't support such a statement. The discussion grew very brisk with Margaret, Helmut, Yasu & Amantore (Italy) all having at them. I got angry & did about 20 minutes. We were one hour late for lunch. In the afternoon meeting we started again on a new draft that tried to meet some of the language complaints without weakening the statement.

While Ministers were working on drafts, we took up matter of an ec. statement & believe it or not the same 2 had objections to that. We stood firm – I thought at one point Margaret was going to order Pierre to go stand in a corner. It was hard to remember we had started the day with a prayer service in the tiny church. Maybe that's what did it because we closed the day with both issues resolved, cordially restored & no winners or losers.

Sunday night dinner was very pleasant at the old Royal Gov's. palace. We discussed the middle east but didn't make it an agenda issue.

Monday morning meeting very productive – agreed to do more to cooperate on medical research etc. Rallied around full ec. statement. At an outdoor lunch we met exchange students – 1 from each of our countries. I filled our leaders in on Central Am. Later in day, met with Helmut Kohl – he's solid & with us all the way. Monday night dinner (Nancy had arrived, thank Heaven) was something of a banquet. Press already hailing the Summit as a success. Tues. saw each of the heads of state off. (Mitterand, Thatcher & Kohl) had left the night before. Thank you's all around & back to the W.H.



Absolutely secret  
the only copy  
(rough draft).

SESSION OF POLITBURO OF CC CPSU  
31 May 1983

Chairman com. ANDROPOV Yu. V.  
Present com[rade]s. Aliev G. A., Gorbachev M. S., Grishin V. V., Gromyko A. A., Tikhonov N. A., Ustinov D. F., Chernenko K. U., Demichev P. N., Dolgikh V. I., Kuznetsov V. V., Ponomarev B. N., Solomentsov M. S., Zimyanin M. V., Kapitonov I. V., Rusakov K. V., Ryzhkov N. I.

In the beginning of the session comrade Andropov expressed words of deep sadness about the death of comrade Arveed Yanovich Pelshe. Comrade Andropov informed that the funeral of comrade Pelshe, according to the decision of the CC is going to be held at 11 o'clock on the Red square by the Kremlin wall. The members of the funeral commission will come to the Dom Soyuzov at the time of carrying out the body; the rest of the members of Politburo, candidates to members of Politburo and the secretaries will come at 11 o'clock straight to the Mausoleum.

[ANDROPOV.] Now I would like to address the issue, which in my opinion deserves the exchange of opinions and suggestions.

Today I've talked with a number of members of the Politburo about our government's announcement of the response connected with the deployment of American missiles "Pershing-2" and cruise missiles in the countries of Western Europe; and also concerning the resolution adopted by the countries of "Big Seven" in Williamsburg. It's important that we discuss this matter, exchange opinions, and express the suggestions that should be developed.

If you look at the events that are taking place in the Western countries, you can say that an anti-soviet coalition is being formed out there. Of course, that's not accidental, and its highly dangerous. At the session of the NATO countries, that's going on in Williamsburg, very aggressive speeches are given; and the very resolution adopted by the "Big Seven" is non-constructive, but aggressive.

If you analyze the reaction of the countries of the West on our declaration, then the reaction has two sides. From one side, our declaration had impressed them very much. There are indications, seen through some of the speeches of some of the western politicians that give hope to normal and productive high level talks about the decrease of the arms race and disarmament, especially of the nuclear weapons. On the other side there are indications of absolute fulfillment of the so-called double decision of NATO, which is the placement of nuclear missiles in the countries of West-

ern Europe.

Actions of president Reagan, who is a bearer and creator of all anti-soviet ideas, creator of all the untrue insinuations regarding our country and the other countries of the Socialist Community, deserve very critical and harsh reaction from our side. Meanwhile in the press, Michail Vasilyevich [Zimyanin], those actions don't find that full coverage and deserving answer. This, of course, is not right. Imperialistic countries of the West want to put together a bloc against the USSR. They act together and, as you saw, Reagan managed, though with some pressure, to convince his partners in the "Big Seven" to sign the resolution and express their opinions against the politics of the USSR.

Now let's see what we do. To my disappointment we act alone. Some of us speak out, but we all do it separately. We, the countries of Warsaw Pact and the other socialist countries that don't belong under Warsaw Pact, have to demonstrate strong unity. But the leaders of the socialist countries are buried in their national problems. These, if you pardon my words, are just minor unimportant actions.

That's why I have a suggestion to gather here in Moscow first secretaries of socialist parties' CCs and the chairmen of Sovmins for debating the current situation. At that meeting we could exchange opinions about the talks on the arms race and disarmament, decrease of the nuclear missiles in Europe, about the last decisions of the NATO countries, and about the other subjects, related to our counteraction to the policies of the Imperialistic countries, targeted at the worsening of the global situation.

Of course, there comes up the question of Romania: what to do with it? It seems to me that not to invite Romania is not in our interests, without it we can't really hold a meeting, though, as it's known, they voted against the publication of our declaration.

A question appears: when to hold a meeting and with what to conclude it. It seems to me that we can't put away for a long time this sort of meeting, because the Western countries are quite active today. For now we aren't active enough. I think that we should assume positions now, before the meeting, to start the counteraction against the policies of the imperialist states. It seems to me that on that meeting we should develop, adopt, and then publish a document that would express our reaction on NATO's decision. Maybe in that document we could once again bring up the suggestions that were brought up before about non-aggression acts between the countries of the Warsaw Pact and the countries of NATO. It's quite possible that other ideas could be brought up.

In his recent speech, [Former West German Chancellor Willy] Brandt, introduced an idea about joining the talks on the limitation of nuclear missiles in Europe and limitation of strategic

Source: TsKhSD, F. 89 Op. 42, D. 53, LI. 1-14.

Translated and published in  
Cold War International  
History Project Bulletin No. 4,  
Fall 1994, pp. 77-80.

nuclear missiles. Maybe we should all think about that idea and make it an official proposal—join the talks about the nuclear missiles in Europe with the talks about the limitation on all the strategic nuclear weapons. We also should think when and where to bring up this proposal. I think that MFA and the Ministry of Defense will decide on that problem.

We have to open up a wider network to win public opinion, to mobilize public opinion of the Western countries of Europe and America against the location of the nuclear weapons in Europe and against a new arms race, that's being forced by the American administration. The behavior of Japan, and especially of the president [Yasuhiro] Nakasone worries me. He completely took the side of the more aggressive part of the Western countries, and he completely supports Reagan's actions. Because of that we should consider some sort of compromise in our relations with Japan. For example: we could think about joint exploitation of several small islands, that have no strategic importance. Maybe there will be other suggestions. I, personally, think that Japan could initiate more active cooperation with the Soviet Union in the economic sphere.

The next point concerns China. I think that the Chinese aren't going to move any further on their positions. But all our data shows that they could increase their trade with USSR. They did offer us a trade agreement for this year, that substantially increases our goods exchange [compared to] the previous years of trading with China. Because of that we might have to send comrade [First Deputy Prime Minister Ivan V.] Arkhipov to China to conduct a series of talks and to "feel the ground." And if we succeed in improving our economic ties with China through cultural, sports, and other organizations, it could be considered a big step ahead.

Now about the Middle East. To say that the events in the Middle East don't bother us would be wrong. The fact is that we have very good relations with Syria. But Syria argues against the agreement that was made between Israel and Lebanon, Syria has no friendly relations with Iraq. Recently Syria has been facing minor problems with PLO, and in particular with [PLO Chairman Yasser] Arafat. In one word—here is a problem we have to think about.

If you look at our propaganda, you can come to a conclusion that it's quite calm when it comes to strategic preparations of NATO. That's true, we shouldn't scare people with war. But in our propaganda we should show more brightly and fully the military actions of the Reagan administration and the supporting countries of Western Europe, which in other words means disclosing in full scale the aggressive character of the enemy. We need that, so we could use facts to mobilize the soviet people for the fulfillment of social and economic plans for development of

the country. We can't, comrades, forget in this situation defense sufficiency of our country. These topics should be constant in our media. You remember comrade L. Y. Brezhnev at the XXVI session of CPSU [23 February - 3 March 1981] said, that military threat is coming and because of that we should lead a struggle against the influence of military revanchist ideas of the West. That's what it came to: Reagan calls up the senators if they support the ideas of the Soviet Union, and charges them with treason. Why don't we use press to speak against the lazy bums, those who miss work [*progulshikov*], bad workers? I ask the comrades to express their opinions about the questions brought up and maybe comrades have other suggestions. Who would like to take the stand?

GROMYKO. I completely approve of the suggestions that were expressed by Yu. V. Andropov. First of all about the call of the meeting of the leaders of socialist countries, countries of the Warsaw Pact. That kind of meeting, to my opinion, we should gather. [Romanian leader Nicolae] Ceausescu, I think, we should invite to the meeting. I would say, it's beneficial for us.

ANDROPOV. Right now they are asking for a consultation.

GROMYKO. Particularly they were asking us for that. The meeting of the leaders of the countries of the Warsaw Pact will show the unity of our Pact and prove our principal positions in the questions of nuclear weapons and reduction of arms race. I think that we should adopt at the meeting a document, as rightly mentioned before Yuri Vladimirovich [Andropov]. This document should sound very clearly. Along declaration shouldn't be made, but it should be sharp and concrete. This would be our collective action of the countries of Warsaw Pact. It is needed.

What to do with the talks? I fully support the suggestion of Yuri Vladimirovich about uniting the talks on nuclear armament in Europe and strategic armament in whole. As you know, Reagan has got a goal, whatever it takes him, to place the nuclear missiles "Pershing-2" and the cruise missiles in the European countries. A question comes up, what should we do, whether we should continue the talks? As it's known, Western countries, many of them, are ready for deployment. That's why we should bring in something fresh. And in connection with that this suggestion about uniting the talks will serve our interests.

ANDROPOV. We should invite for these talks the English and French, let them participate, they are nuclear countries.

GROMYKO. I think the English and French will refuse for sure to hold the talks, but we should invite them, that's right. The main suggestion, I think, is the combined talks. That type of a suggestion deals with the restriction of nuclear armament in the whole, which means that in the talks they will include the tactic missiles, also. In

their time Western countries themselves put a question about the talks on all kinds of nuclear weapons.

ANDROPOV. That's good, let them say that themselves, how they view that suggestion.

GROMYKO. It will be easier for us to keep in contact with those who speak against all kinds of nuclear weapons. I think, that they can try this, in spite of the fact that they will insist on location of nuclear weapons in Europe. In a word, this will give us a break.

ANDROPOV. Anyway, we don't lose anything.

GROMYKO. New ideas are starting to appear in America, though not officially, but it's very important. Maybe they will agree to union. Anyway, this line [idea] will have to be fulfilled right away.

We will have an extra plan—it is the continuing of the talks on restrictions of use of strategic nuclear armament in the world and restrictions on nuclear armament in Europe. The United States, as it's known, is talking about the fact that they can only strike in response to aggression. I think, that they without enough reason wouldn't dare to use nuclear missiles. Against the first strike are also Canada, England, France, and Western Germany. This we also have to use skillfully in our propaganda and in our practical interests.

Regarding Japan, I have an idea: why don't we use our suggestion regarding the islands of Hamabai [sic-Habamai?—ed.], Kunashir, and other small islands, that really are very little spots, and draw the border, I mean make an adjustment of the border. It would be then the most prestigious suggestion.

ANDROPOV. When I talked about Japan, I didn't mean that suggestion. I talked about joint exploitation of several little islands.

GROMYKO. We could do both at the same time. These same islands are small dots in the ocean and they don't have such a grand strategic importance.

About China. The People's Republic of China expresses wishes to broaden our economic ties. Even in practice it is starting something in that sphere, for example the increase of goods exchange.

ANDROPOV. This should be checked out, as I said.

GROMYKO. I think, that the Chinese aren't going to go for anything else. One of the terms for normalization of our relations is the withdrawal of our troops from Chinese borders. It seems to me that we could think about that. But then the Chinese began to push for withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia.

ANDROPOV. I suggest we don't bring up that question.

GROMYKO. Regarding Mongolia. Maybe we should withdraw part of the army away from the border. There is a danger in the Middle East

that Israel will strike against Syria. If Syria ruins Reagan's plans, Americans will go bankrupt.

ANDROPOV. I would suggest we turn to Syria to advise it not to pull itself into this conflict. If the events start happening, we should warn Syrian leaders beforehand to work out a corresponding plan.

GROMYKO. Syria sends tanks to Lebanon. Our task is to advise Syrian leaders to withhold from any participation in the events of the war.

ANDROPOV. Maybe we should write a letter about that to [Syrian leader Hafez] Assad?

USTINOV. All that we do regarding defense we should continue doing. All the missiles, that we planned to install, should be installed. All the airplanes should be stationed at the spots we agreed upon. Reading the resolution that was adopted by the "Big Seven," I should say, it was very cunning and strict. But it has its weak points and we should figure out how to use them. But everything happens in life, so "they" may be installing the missiles in England, FRG, and other countries.

I consider the suggestion of Yuri Vladimirovich absolutely correct that we should carry out active work, to counteract against the imperialistic actions of our enemies.

Regarding Mongolia I should say, that if we move the Soviet army, that's now located there back to our territory then we will lose a very good post. Everything is already equipped there. That's why we have nowhere to move on the Soviet border.

Regarding Cambodia and Vietnam, we already talked about it not once. I figure that we shouldn't lose positions won in battles, but we should retain them. The sanctions which were discussed earlier by Yuri Vladimirovich, should be supported. We will look at it very carefully and think about our actions. We also have to think about talks in Vienna and Geneva, in regards to nuclear weapons as well as strategic. In fact I consider very rightful the suggestion to combine both of these talks. Maybe, Y.V. Andropov will consider it rational to speak out with that suggestion, and maybe give another suggestion, let's say, about decrease of nuclear weapons by 50 percent, including French and English nuclear weapons.

TIKHONOV. England and France will never agree to that.

USTINOV. If they don't agree, than our proposal will sound all over the world. The middle-range missiles, Western countries wouldn't refuse against their location in Europe.

GROMYKO. But what then to reduce?

USTINOV. We can reduce all the rockets.

GROMYKO. We proposed that.

USTINOV. Yes, we already proposed, but we should offer again. About Japan I would like to say that we can look only at very small islands, but the big island Kunashir—we have quite settled

there. For example, from the Japanese sea we can only access through the strait of La Pérouse, and, I should say, here we would substantially cut our maneuvering space.

About the meeting with governments of socialist countries. I completely agree with Yuri Vladimirovich. We should expose the Western countries, their offensive speeches and military tone. Maybe Yu.V. Andropov should say something on that topic, too.

GROMYKO. I will have a speech at the session. In that speech, it seems to me, I should spell out a number of suggestions.

USTINOV. Maybe I should give an interview? In one word, we activate the work, gather socialist parties and agree with them on this subject.

CHERNENKO. Even if Romania doesn't sign, we could adopt a resolution without the signature of Romania.

USTINOV. Japan hadn't joined the military alliance of the Western countries, yet. That's why we should act not only upon Japan, but the other countries, also, so that not only we openly spoke out against militaristic intentions of Reagan administration, English, Japanese and others, but the socialist countries did it, too, and the leaders of the socialist countries could have spoken out, too. By the way, in those situation they have kept silent. We have, comrades, to build, strengthen the socialist bloc, but very skillfully. To my regret, the relations between Vietnam and China are very strained. I absolutely agree with the decision of Yuri Vladimirovich about enforcing anti-war propaganda, targeted at the arms race, wrong suggestions of the Western countries and especially at the American administration. It looks like the Americans thought about installing a space command. In a word, I would like to say, that we should more widely speak out about our suggestions and expose the militaristic intentions of the Western countries.

ANDROPOV. Of course, we aren't going to change Reagan's behavior, but we will expose his antisoviet, militaristic intentions very decisively.

TIKHONOV. Reagan doesn't react any more to our suggestions. Regarding the uniting of the talks, this is one more of our important suggestions, and we should bring it in. Missiles, of course, they will place in Western Europe. But [we] should explain it broadly and clearly to our people and all other nations of other countries. The resolution of the Soviet government is a very important document. We now have only to develop propaganda, expose the actions of the West and have a strong influence over people. I think that meeting that Yuri Vladimirovich talked about is vitally important to be held. And with that we should somehow hint to socialist countries that they alone and each one of them, let's say GDR, Czechoslovakia, Hungary give a speech. Let's say a speech for Nuclear-free Zone in Europe and

on the other topics. [Bulgarian leader Todor] Zhivkov, for example, can give a speech about Nuclear-free Zone in the Balkans. Now about China. All the initiatives about the increase in goods exchange between USSR and China come from China. This is very important. That's why we should feel the ground about broadening our economic relations with China and send to China comrade Arkhipov for the talks.

Regarding removal of the troops from the Chinese border, to me it seems like an unrealistic act.

Regarding Syria, as comrades have talked about it, everything is correct. If Syria gets involved in a conflict, then we can lose everything we have in the Middle East. And we have to keep Syria in our orbit. That's why we should conduct more work with the Syrian government. We have to find such a method in our propaganda, such forms and methods of conducting it so as to tell our people the truth about the nuclear war, but not to scare them, as Yuri Vladimirovich correctly pointed out.

CHERNENKO. It's absolutely correct, that Yuri Vladimirovich gathered us today, and the suggestion is right about a meeting with the leaders of all the members of the Warsaw Pact. If you look attentively at our friends—Czechs, GDR, Hungarians, Bulgarians, you get an impression, that the leaders of these countries don't worry about the current situation. That's why the very fact of calling a meeting will mean a lot. I think that we should call a meeting in a near future, as said Yuri Vladimirovich.

VOICES. Support the suggestion about the calling of a meeting.

CHERNENKO. At that meeting we can talk about China, about the Middle East and about other important questions of the international situation. I think that all the questions that Yuri Vladimirovich stated in his speech were very correct. There gathered a "big Seven" of Western aggressive states, but we are also a "big Seven," and we should meet, but this would be now a meeting of "big Seven," fighting against nuclear arms and for peace.

About working out the suggestions, that Yuri Vladimirovich talked about, I think, that, including our interests, we should prepare them well and introduce [them] to [the] CC.

GRISHIN. I completely support what Yuri Vladimirovich suggested. The situation is dangerous. The resolution of the "Big Seven" that they will put the missiles in Europe, has an offensive character. Actually, there is being formed a bloc based on an anti-soviet platform. Western countries try to outweigh the countries of the Warsaw Pact with the nuclear weapons. The meeting should be held before the meeting of NATO.

GROMYKO. It could be held even after NATO's meeting. Then we could find out their point of view on several questions.

GRISHIN. On our meeting we should call socialist countries to active counteraction toward imperialistic countries. About the invitation of Romania, I am for it, though there's no guarantee they will sign the resolution. They behave very badly. Not long ago, as it was known, Ceausescu hosted [conservative West German politician, Bavarian state premier Franz Josef] Strauss and during the talks he spoke very badly. I think that we should prepare a good, short, but sharp document, that will be adopted there.

I am completely for opening of wide range of propaganda in our press and among our oral propagandists, which was mentioned before by Yuri Vladimirovich.

ANDROPOV. In that sphere we so far don't do a whole lot.

GRISHIN. I think that with Japan we should look for the way to soften the relations. With China we could develop economic relations on higher levels. Of course, China won't give up on Cambodia, and on that issue we will never come to an agreement. I think, that we should keep Syrians from unnecessary actions, so that they don't get pulled into military confrontation.

ANDROPOV. At one point, remember I told the Cubans that we won't fight for them and won't send any troops to Cuba. And it worked all right, the Cubans accepted it. We should tell the same thing to Syrians. I think such a saying will prevent them from confrontation.

GORBACHEV. You said it right, Yuri Vladimirovich, that the time now is calling us to increase actions, taking necessary steps to develop a broad program of counter-measures against the aggressive plans of the Western countries. And in the inside plan we have certain serious tasks. We can take some action towards the countries of CMEA [Council on Mutual Economic Assistance], countries of Warsaw Pact, and separate socialist countries. I completely support the suggestions about holding a meeting and other actions, that were suggested here, including the military line.

The United States is moving to Europe. Here we can't wait. We have to act.

ALIEV. I support all the suggestions of Yuri Vladimirovich. This complex of actions is vital to be carried out. Our external politics has an offensive character, but the character of a peace offensive. The imperialists are irritated by our suggestions. All that you said here, Yuri Vladimirovich, regarding a meeting of the socialist countries, improving relations with China, about the Middle East, especially about starting a wide propaganda—all this deserves special attention and should be adopted.

DEMICHEV. Why don't we write a letter to Reagan from the name of comrade Andropov?

ANDROPOV. I would modernize a bit the suggestion of P. N. Demichev and write a letter

to the participants of the meeting of the "Big Seven," and then, maybe later, to Reagan.

PONOMAREV. In response to the actions of the "Big Seven" we should work out our suggestions. Maybe, after the meeting of the leaders of the socialist countries we should hold party activities, and meetings in the country.

USTINOV. This is all correct, but what if we scare the people?

PONOMAREV. On 20 June, for example, there's going to be an Assembly of Peace in Prague, we should use it for propaganda of our peaceful propositions.

ZIMYANIN. I completely agree with what Yuri Vladimirovich said. I would ask a permission to begin realization of this ideas starting tomorrow. In particular, gather the editors of the leading newspapers, information agencies and tell them about these ideas, especially point the sharp end of our propaganda at Reagan and his aggressive suggestions.

KUZNETSOV. I think, we should activate also the work in parliamentary relations, especially about sending our parliamentary delegations to France, USA, and the other countries. Obviously, on the session in A.A.Gromyko's speech he should mention these questions.

ANDROPOV. Now I would like to tell you, comrades, the most important [item], what I would like to inform you of. I am talking about improvement of our work inside the country, and about the increase of our, leaders' responsibility of the assigned tasks. It doesn't only concern me—Andropov, or Gromyko, Ustinov, we all are personally responsible for the departments that we lead. Comrade Tikhonov has to keep a tight grip on Food industry. Comrade Gorbachev has to use fewer weather excuses, but organize a fight for the crops, mobilize people so that they don't talk about bad weather, but work more, so they use every good day, every minute for gathering more crops, do all we can to increase wheat crops and other grain and meat and dairy. Comrade Aliev has an important task—improvement of the public transportation system. Comrade Kapitonov has to increase the common goods production, more should be done in that field. Comrade Demichev should be stricter with the repertoire of the theaters, we have too many negative sides, and the other questions in the development of our culture demand more attention. You, Petr Nylovich [Demichev] are the one to be asked from in this sector. I wouldn't talk about the other comrades, they all know their departments and their goals. I think that you should gather all your employees and tell them about the ideas and tasks that we talked about today. You can gather all of them or you can gather them in according to groups, whatever is better.

USTINOV. Maybe I should gather with comrade Smirnov<sup>1</sup> all those in defense and we'll talk about our defense.

TIKHONOV. I will gather all the ministers

and their VPs and talk to them about these subjects.

RUSAKOV. We have to, obviously, check everything that's going on in the socialist countries in these areas and then let them know our suggestions and give them friendly advice.

ANDROPOV. All this, comrades, can be done and I think that you will take these tasks actively. There is a suggestion to give to comrades Gromyko and Zimyanin a task to summarize all that we talked about on our session, and prepare a suggestion about the counteractions towards the actions of the imperialistic states, targeted at worsening of the international situation. Don't be long with the preparation of those suggestions and entering them in the CC. Agreed?

EVERYONE. Agreed.

ANDROPOV. On this permit me to end our meeting.

(Source: TsKhSD, F. 89, Op. 42, D. 53, Ll. 1-14.)

1. [Ed. note: Evidently a reference to Deputy Prime Minister Leonid Smirnov, head of the Military-Industrial Commission (VPK).]

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*The intense, neo-Brezhnevite and almost neo-Stalinist conservatism of the brief Chernenko interregnum (Feb. 1984-March 1985) pervades this July 1984 Politburo excerpt. The transcript also illuminates the relationship between fluctuations in CPSU leadership and reassessments of past party history. On this occasion, the Politburo's consideration of requests for rehabilitation from several one-time rivals of Nikita S. Khrushchev who had been ousted from the party in intra-leadership struggles in the 1950s prompts a vigorous bout of Khrushchev-bashing. (The three erstwhile party stalwarts who had petitioned the Politburo—Vyacheslav M. Molotov, the long-time USSR foreign minister; Georgii M. Malenkov, for a time considered Stalin's likely successor; and Lazar M. Kaganovich, one of Stalin's key henchmen and First Deputy Premier after Stalin's death—were all expelled from the party leadership in 1957 as members of the "Anti-Party Group" that had allegedly plotted to overthrow Khrushchev. Also seeking additional privileges was Alexander Shelepin, once KGB chief under Khrushchev but now denouncing him.) Sympathetically considering the requests of the "Anti-Party Group" to be restored to honored party positions, one Politburo member after another—especially Defense Minister Ustinov, Foreign Ministry Gromyko, KGB chairman Viktor M.*

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

MEETING WITH CPSU GENERAL SECRETARY ANDROPOV

3:00 p.m., Thursday, June 2, 1983

CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE HEADQUARTERS, THE OLD SQUARE, MOSCOW

Andropov of this time...  
...U.S. Soviet relations...  
...General Secretary...  
...relations...

General Secretary Andropov welcomed me back to the Soviet Union, saying that he would not ask me how I felt being back, since I was an old Muscovite. I responded that I was struck by all the beautiful buildings that had gone up in recent years. It was not so when I first came here nearly sixty years ago.

I then said to the General Secretary that I would like to give him a remembrance of the man who first brought about relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. I noted that it was now the fiftieth anniversary of the institution of U.S.-Soviet relations, and we really should have a celebration, but I could only leave the General Secretary an autographed picture of President Roosevelt.

I also said that I wished to give him a copy of my memoirs of our relations during the war with Stalin. The General Secretary thanked me warmly for these two gifts and went immediately into reading a prepared statement. The statement was as follows:

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Source: W.A. Harriman Papers, Box 655 Library of Congress  
Washington, D.C. - Contributed by Nathan Jones

"Mr. Harriman, Mrs. Harriman, we would like to say that we value that both of you considered it necessary to come to Moscow at this time. We know you are active champions of improved U.S.-Soviet relations and know you are guided by concern where relations are going at this time."

I interjected that the General Secretary was absolutely correct in that perception.

The General Secretary continued:

"Let me say that there are indeed grounds for alarm. The situation, such as it is, is no fault of ours and unless reasonable measures are taken the relations could become still worse. At this time they are developing quite unfavorably and this does not suit us at all. We hope that you can influence those who think along the same lines.

"Forty years ago, Mr. Harriman, you came as Ambassador of the United States to the Soviet Union. We were then allies. We succeeded in rising above the differences in our social systems and united in the face of the fascists and defended peace in the world. We saw your own personal contribution at that time, and we do not forget it.

9  
"Today the Soviet people and the American people have a common foe -- the threat of a war incomparable with the horrors we went through previously. This war may perhaps not occur

through evil intent, but could happen through miscalculation.  
Then nothing could save mankind.

"It would seem that awareness of this danger should be precisely the common denominator with which statesmen of both countries would exercise restraint and seek mutual understanding to strengthen confidence, to avoid the irreparable. However, I must say that I do not see it on the part of the current Administration and they may be moving toward the dangerous 'red line'.

"I shall not pass judgment on the peculiarities of the American political system. Nevertheless, why is it that every election campaign, especially the Presidential campaigns, must be accompanied by anti-Soviet statements? Why must there be a hullabaloo about a lag in armaments or windows of vulnerability?

"It is probably far easier to appeal to chauvinism and to other such sentiments than to tell the truth. The elections pass, but they leave their aftermath. Mistrust and enmity have heated up, and there is a sharpening of the arms race and new arms programs.

"But we would prefer to think that the policy of a country such as the United States should be built not on a momentary but on a realistic, stable basis. For instance, what is the

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line of the present Administration in respect to the Soviet Union? It appears oriented on speaking ill, military preponderance and economic and other kinds of harm. I venture to say to you, quite frankly, that such a line in the first instance shows a lack of understanding of the role and potential of my country and of the United States, and you know better than us the impact it has in relations between the United States and its allies. It is exceptionally damaging for international relations as a whole.

"The previous experience of relations between the Soviet Union and the United States cautions beyond all doubt that such a policy can merely lead to aggravation, complexity and danger. No results can be expected from it; both sides lose -- not ours alone. And the engendering of new types of arms complicates our task.

"Nothing is left to the imagination in what Washington throws down as threats, damnations and outright abuse, but they are mistaken. We are not that kind of people nor that kind of politicians. Nothing can come of it.

"We are convinced that in present international conditions, taking into account the military situation and the growing number of explosive problems, we cannot afford the luxury of destructive rivalry in interaction between the United States and the Soviet Union.



"We treat our relations with the United States seriously, fully understanding their significance for peace and the need to avoid nuclear war. We would prefer peaceful coexistence, mutually-beneficial or, even better, good relations as our policy.

"However, I will make no secret of the fact that beyond all doubt there is one victim of the evil which may come from the attitude taken by the White House. That is confidence, the confidence which began in the last decade and was valued throughout the world. These are not just swear words that are being put out but an attempt to undermine all the things created bilaterally and on a broader plane in that period.

"In these conditions, we can simply have no confidence in the present Administration and certain people should really give that a lot of thought.

"Nor are we in the habit of interfering in election campaigns. We conduct our affairs with the United States and those leaders elected by the people. We make no linkages for understandings between the United States Government to how they would reflect on chances of this or that party or this or that candidate for President. We do not evade contact with the Republican or Democratic Parties. Our conversation today is a graphic example. We want to normalize our relations on an equitable basis to benefit all Americans, regardless of their party.

"Finally, I would like to say that we pay tribute to the personal dedication of Mrs. Harriman and the Governor to strengthen mutual understanding for better relations, for building on our common interest in peace and good relations. I also note that we follow with interest the efforts by your family that the United States have solid and thoughtful experts on the Soviet Union. We welcome that through your lucky hand it would appear that scholars, diplomats and others can develop an objective understanding of the Soviet Union.

We know that the Harriman family is actively participating in the political life of the United States. We would appreciate your setting out a few views on the prospects in your country and for relations with the Soviet Union."

When the General Secretary finished this statement, I responded that I wished to address first his last remarks. I said that I was grateful that he understood the attitudes of my wife and myself which we hoped could be to the benefit not only to the people of our country, but of his. I continued that he had asked for my comments. I would be glad to make some.

I wished to say that his remarks appeared directed both against the United States and against the current Administration. It was not clear to me which of his remarks were general and which were directed against the Administration. The General

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Secretary responded that all of what he had said that was critical was related to the current Administration, but he should not be taken as criticizing when he said that it is a fact of life that in an American election campaign a wave of anti-Sovietism is raised. He was, however, not faulting the people or the United States as a nation.

I responded that it would not be appropriate for me as a private citizen to make comments regarding an American administration. If I were to do so, the place would be in the United States and not in the General Secretary's office. The General Secretary immediately responded that that would go without saying, and it was certainly not something which they expected of me.

I continued that regarding his suggestion that in an election campaign adverse comments were always being made about the Soviets, many people speak during these campaigns and many say some difficult things. I said that I did not know the source of his information, but in my view they were not the rule but the exception. I also continued that it was our general policy to develop sound relations with the Soviet Union, to develop trade, and to take actions which would be beneficial not only to the people of the United States but to the people of the Soviet Union.

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I could say that as far as I am concerned, and my wife, our attitude would be as we have said, and one beneficial to the improvement of relations.

I added that I wished to recall that I had been in Moscow under more agreeable circumstances, when we negotiated the Limited Test Ban Treaty, still one of the most successful agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union. Its twentieth anniversary would be next month. I said that I believed we could return to those days, if we could cooperate, if we could work together to improve relations. I was dedicated to that goal and so was my wife, and I felt that our visit would help in that respect.

I also noted that I fully agreed with the General Secretary that it was not his affair to become involved in American politics, but I felt it was possible for the Soviet Union to take steps which could help to improve relations. I also had to note that other actions were sometimes taken which made it more difficult to do so. I said it would be helpful if the General Secretary could give me a significant message to take back or if he could make some statement beneficial, to and which would improve relations.

I noted that I was not here to speak of things which could make our relations more difficult; the General Secretary knows them already. I repeated that I hoped the General

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Secretary could make statements on improving relations which would encourage American opinion towards their improvement. I said that I felt there was more goodwill in the United States than perhaps apparent at this time. That goodwill was latent, but ready to express itself.

I then noted that my wife would like to say something at this time. Mrs. Harriman then expressed her gratitude to be included in the conversation and reaffirmed that she shared her husband's views. She said that she knew there were many things which we cannot do, but she said that we should talk about those things which could work to our common good.

My wife asked whether it might be a good idea if more Members of Congress should ask to visit the Soviet Union this summer. Mrs. Harriman noted that House Majority Whip Tom Foley was already heading a delegation arriving July 1. She said she would like to know whether they would be well received. Mrs. Harriman emphasized her belief that it was better to meet and to talk directly rather than through written communications.

The General Secretary responded that in principle the Soviets were in favor of meetings of that sort. Each visit would, of course, be weighed on its merits, but it was important that people meet with each other. The meetings did not necessarily have to be with the General Secretary himself, but they certainly could be with his colleagues. In short, his answer was yes.

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I then continued that I appreciated his recalling our wartime relations. I had come at that period with the British and other Americans to find out what was needed. We were able to send supplies to enable the Red Army to resist so gallantly as it did, so effectively, and eventually to drive the enemy out. I said that not just myself but others would be ready to support the improvement of relations again if the Soviets could take appropriate actions.

The General Secretary responded that in making my observations I had mentioned that there were some Americans who wanted good relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. He also took note of my comment that the critical remarks were incidental, since as he had said the Soviets were prepared to work with any Administration in our common interest. He said that he would like my leaving him with that impression.

The General Secretary said he still had one more point to raise. He added that in regard to my comment that the Soviets take at times certain actions which complicate the situation, he wanted to note that we stand on different positions. What the Soviets believe are the right steps, the Administration thinks are wrong, and vice versa. He wanted to know how to do this, by what mutual steps. He said, however, it could not be by the one step which it appears President Reagan wants -- a Soviet unilateral laying-down of its arms. That could not be.

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I said that I agreed on the need for reciprocity. I emphasized again that I was not here to discuss difficulties -- that is, to review the steps that the Soviets have taken or what they say the U.S. has taken. Nevertheless, our discussion should be in general terms how to work on or to get around our difficulties.

I said we must continue, however, to be able to tell the Soviets frankly what we are against. I said I wished to emphasize that whoever is saying the American people are not for peace, as are the Soviets, was informing the General Secretary incorrectly. Americans are just as anxious as the Soviets to develop and improve relations.

I reiterated my view that we should first deal with those matters which stand the best chance of success. There are those which are more difficult and it is not useful in the first instance to go into those with which we are at variance. We should go into those on which we can have agreement. I repeated my belief that the General Secretary knew the areas in which the United States is opposed to what the Soviets have done. I felt then we could discuss how to overcome them if the General Secretary indicated how important it is to have good relations.

Frankness remains all-important, and from what the General Secretary had told me, I said that I believed that it was his point of view. The General Secretary interjected that that was certainly his point of view.

I then asked whether the General Secretary could tell me of anything he could do to make the situation easier for those who wanted to improve relations -- what messages he might have or what actions he might take on his own toward progress as a whole. The General Secretary responded that he would think it over.

I reiterated my hope that he would do something, and my wife supported me. The General Secretary then responded somewhat heatedly, asking whether what the Soviets were supposed to do was to make unilateral concessions. He said that he felt the Reagan Administration was demanding one-sided actions by the Soviets and refusing to act reciprocally. He maintained that the Soviets' suggestion of the freeze would not work against the interests of either side. He also said that in his view, of late the United States Administration was not even answering the Soviet approaches.

I then asked if I could talk to Ambassador Dobrynin whenever I met him, which was regularly, of possibilities, and the General Secretary responded that I was always welcome to talk. I said that I was glad to hear the General Secretary was ready to think over ways of moving relations forward. I noted that I would be seeing the press this afternoon -- my usual practice when I am in Moscow. I asked whether there was anything that I could say to them to encourage their reports along this line.



The General Secretary asked me to tell the media that it was the most sincere and fervent desire of the Soviet government to have normal relations with the United States and to develop them in the best traditions of those relations. He emphasized that there were good traditions in Soviet-American relations and that the Soviets do not forget them.

When I noted that the press at the conference would not be just Americans but from other countries and Soviets as well, the General Secretary asked me to say in addition that he was ready and interested in developing Soviet-American relations, to search for joint initiatives, proposals which might make the present situation easier. He added that he would in that instance be awaiting the U.S. response.

I then thanked him for his courtesy in receiving me. I wished him well in his important leadership of his great country. I hoped that he would remain in good health and achieve what he desired, with the objective we had discussed in mind. I noted that I had one last statement.

I was now 91 years old, and I did not know how many more times I could come to the Soviet Union. I wished to let the General Secretary know, however, that I was someone in the United States with whom I hoped he would speak, just as I would be talking to his Ambassador, on matters important to our relations. He thanked me and said that he would certainly do so.

I then noted that I should not take any more of his time and hoped that the meeting had been as useful to him as it had been to me. He noted that he was very happy with the meeting (Arbatov later informed me that Andropov had passed the word that he felt the meeting was a success).

COMMENT:

(6) The principal point which the General Secretary appeared to be trying to get across to Mrs. Harriman and me was a genuine concern over the state of U.S.-Soviet relations and his desire to see them at least "normalized", if not improved. He seemed to have a real worry that we could come into conflict through ~~miscalculation~~. He was critical of the current state of relations, but was careful to stress -- several times -- that efforts for improvement had to be mutual. This point about the need for Soviet, as well as U.S. steps was included in the Pravda and Tass summaries of our talk.

I felt Andropov was making a major effort to be non-polemical in our conversation.

I am not in a position to make a real judgment on Andropov's health, although we noted occasional tremors of his hands, but not when they were in repose, and a rather rigid walk. He was in full command of himself and his part of the meeting: read his statement without effort, and responded or made points during the exchange quickly and without reference to Aleksandrov.

Also present, besides Mrs. Harriman, the General Secretary and myself, were the General Secretary's Assistant, Andrey M. Aleksandrov-Agentov, and the interpreter, Viktor Sukhodrev, both of whom had been at all my previous meetings with Brezhnev, as well as Peter Swiers, who was able to accompany me again on a trip to the Soviet Union through the courtesy of the Department of State.

*Reagan, Ronald. The Reagan Diaries. Ed. Douglas Brinkley. New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 2007, p. 165.*

**Monday, July 11 [1983]**

Ambas. John Gavin came by. He's a darn good Ambassador. Had the usual "issues lunch." Later met with A.W. Clausen now head of the World Bank. He'd like us to increase our contribution to the bank but there's no way we could get an increase through Cong. Foreign Minister Genscher of W. Germany came to report on Chancellor Kohl's Moscow visit. The Chancellor really stood firm on our NATO unity & that we were going to deploy intermediate range missiles in Europe on schedule in Dec. No question but the "Russkys" are upset about this.

Kase Bendtson, Bill Wilson, Jack Hume, Joe Coors & Dr. Edward Teller came by to press me on setting up a "Manhattan" type project to have a crash program on finding a defensive weapon against nuclear missiles. I have to agree with them it's the way to go.

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NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION  
DIRECTIVE NUMBER 104

September 21, 1983

U.S. APPROACH TO INF NEGOTIATIONS - II ~~(S)~~

The basic US position taken at the INF negotiations in Geneva is and remains a sound one. Its essence is captured in the US proposal to eliminate the entire class of land-based LRINF missiles. This proposal remains the optimal outcome for the US, for NATO, for Europe, and, I believe, for the Soviet Union. It is a principled position which involves the most significant degree of reductions possible in the class of LRINF weapons which cause most concern to both sides. It fully meets our own, and NATO's, criteria for a genuine arms reduction agreement and it remains my hope that the Soviet Union will eventually see the wisdom of our proposal. ~~(S)~~

In the interest of exploring all possibilities, and on the basis of close consultations with our allies, I decided last March to propose an interim step towards the ultimate elimination of all LRINF land-based missiles. While actively keeping our proposal to eliminate all land-based LRINF missiles on the table, the United States formally notified the Soviet Union that the United States is prepared to enter into an interim agreement under which the United States would accept a limit at some finite, agreed number of warheads on LRINF land-based missile launchers if the Soviet Union reduces the number of warheads on its LRINF land-based missile force to an equal level on a global basis. This proposal also meets the basic criteria we have established and is in the US, NATO's and, I believe, the Soviet Union's interest. ~~(S)~~

Both of these proposals have been translated into draft treaty texts and provided to the Soviet Union. Regrettably, the Soviet Union has not, as yet, provided a serious response to our interim proposal. They have not demonstrated, through their actions at the negotiating table, that additional initiatives on our part are the appropriate next step in the negotiations. Nor have they demonstrated any flaw in the fundamentals of the US position and in the criteria upon which it rests. The US, therefore, will not offer any new initiative altering the fundamental US position that the US seeks an agreement which meets agreed NATO criteria and which significantly reduces the number, and could lead to the ultimate total elimination of, nuclear warheads on LRINF land-based missiles. ~~(S)~~

There should be no doubt that without an agreement which satisfies the criteria we have identified, the US will, with the cooperation of our NATO allies, deploy LRINF land-based missiles as planned. ~~(S)~~

The Digital National Security Archive.  
Collection: Presidential Directives.

Item Number PD01751

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under provisions of E.O. 12958  
by S. Tuley, National Security Council (F87-1032)

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At the same time, during the course of the next round of INF negotiations, and with the first NATO LRINF missile deployments, it is more essential than ever that the US aggressively pursue an agreement on LRINF missiles which meets the criteria we have established for such an agreement and thus furthers both US and NATO security interests. Through the end of this year, we and our allies will have to work very closely and very diligently to be in a position to deploy NATO LRINF missiles on schedule as planned in the absence of such an arms reduction agreement. As we do so, the US must continue to work with equal vigor and in equally close cooperation with our allies on the negotiating track of the NATO 1979 dual-track decision. Finally, in doing so, we must exploit every opportunity to ensure that we are perceived as being equally committed, as we are, to both tracks.

~~X~~

Basic Decision. In light of this, I have decided to take the necessary steps to "flesh out" the fundamental US INF position and to do so using a step-by-step approach that unfolds over the course of the next negotiating round. This approach should include the early presentation of general statements on each of the three major areas identified by NSC discussion: the PERSHING II/GLCM mix, regional missile sub-limits and the consideration of aircraft. By carefully crafting these general statements so as to protect later US options to the maximum extent possible, and presenting them in a timely manner, the intent is to:

- clarify the US INF position in these areas;
- demonstrate that we are exploring every avenue in seeking an acceptable agreement which meets the criteria we have identified, and US/NATO security requirements; and
- posture ourselves so that, should we choose to consider more detailed positions on any of these items later in the round, we face the minimum risk from the Soviet assertion that the US is introducing new material so late in the negotiations that NATO deployments must not proceed until there is sufficient time to consider the new elements. ~~SECRET~~

Implementing the Step-by-step Approach. In implementing this decision, the following strategy should be applied:

- The initial US step should be the presentation of general statements made near the beginning of the round. These should protect future US negotiating options to the maximum extent possible but place clear markers on the remaining issues which we may have to develop more fully during this round.

- Work should continue on a priority basis to refine the more detailed options we may wish to consider on each of these subjects later in the round (e.g., in the October time-frame).

- During the round, the use of these more detailed positions as they are developed can be considered as needed. ~~SECRET~~

- Finally, if necessary prior to the mid-November FRG Bundestag debate, all of the elements of the US INF position set forth by that time (some more detailed by that point than others) can be pulled together into a coherent presentation of a comprehensive position that could be newly compelling to the public, but which is not, nor could be successfully characterized by the Soviets to be, a "late change" in the US position requiring that NATO deployments not proceed as scheduled until adequate time for full discussion in Geneva is provided. ~~(S)~~

The Treatment of Aircraft. The basic US position remains that we prefer to focus on the LRINF missile issue, the issue involving the destabilizing systems of most concern to both sides. However, in the interests of pursuing an agreement which meets the US criteria, we are certainly prepared to consider proposals involving aircraft that also meet these criteria. In doing so, however, we will exercise extraordinary care so as not to degrade NATO's conventional defenses or the critical contribution made to both those defenses and to the defense of other US interests by dual-capable and carrier-based aircraft. Therefore, on this subject, instructions for the US INF Delegation should be drafted to reflect the following:

- Ambassador Nitze should inform the Soviets that he is now authorized to explore in general terms possible limitations on LRINF aircraft which would involve equal, verifiable limits on US-Soviet LRINF aircraft only and which do not entail a degradation of NATO conventional capability.

- Having done so, the US Delegation should invite the Soviets to offer their views concerning how such a limitation could be crafted within the parameters of the stated US criteria.

- The US Delegation should, to the extent possible, limit discussion to LRINF aircraft, and should deflect discussion of other dual-capable and carrier-based aircraft.

- Pending the completion of additional work in Washington, the US Delegation should not offer any additional proposals on the treatment of aircraft without first obtaining authorization from Washington. ~~(S)~~

The Senior Arms Control Policy Group will develop contingency US proposals on the aircraft issue for use if needed.

- The Policy Group should use as a baseline a global, equal limit on F-111, BADGER and BLINDER aircraft at or above planned US levels. Such a contingency proposal should be refined to minimize its risks to the US if adopted. If better alternatives to this proposal are subsequently generated, these should also be developed in detail.

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- This tasking does not imply that I have decided to make a more detailed proposal on aircraft during this round. ~~X~~

Regional Missile Sub-limits. On the subject of regional missile sub-limits, I have decided that we should adopt the following formulation as the first step on this issue. In the context of an agreement involving equal, global limits on LRINF missiles, the US is prepared to consider not offsetting the entire Soviet global LRINF missile deployment by US deployments of LRINF missiles in Europe.

- To implement this, the instructions to the US INF Delegation should reflect that in the context of a discussion of equal, global limits on LRINF missiles, Ambassador Nitze is authorized to explore in general terms Soviet views on alternative means of implementing this commitment. In doing so, he should consider the additional work which will be ongoing in Washington and keep open US negotiating options under study. ~~X~~

The Senior Arms Control Policy Group should continue to refine a specific, more detailed US proposal on the regional missile sub-limit issue. At the same time, we must avoid the perception of a separate Asian balance. The baseline alternative that the Policy Group should focus upon should be the offer of a US commitment not to deploy in Europe more than a certain proportion of the global level of LRINF missile warheads permitted under any agreement, with the right to deploy LRINF missiles elsewhere to an equal global ceiling.

- The Policy Group should also continue to consider the merits and risks of a possible contingency proposal for equal European subceilings within equal global ceilings. ~~X~~

PERSHING II/GLCM Mix. The PERSHING II system offers a much needed, time-urgent, hard-target kill capability. Any reduction of the 108 PERSHING IIs to maintain a fixed ratio would reduce NATO's ability to hold at risk time-urgent targets at longer range. Clearly, the PERSHING II system cannot be eliminated, short of Soviet acceptance of the zero/zero outcome. At the same time, we should be prepared to assure both the Soviets and our allies alike that in the context of an acceptable agreement entailing significant reductions, we would consider reducing the planned PERSHING II deployment in an appropriate manner. ~~X~~

One proposal suggested has been to keep the current ratio (approximately one PERSHING II missile to every four GLCMs) under an agreed, limited deployment. This could reassure all concerned that PERSHING II would be reduced under such an agreement, and thus could be seen as a substantive move in the eyes of the Soviets. However, there are a number of concerns surrounding such a proposal that require additional study. ~~X~~

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On the PERSHING II/GLCM mix issue, I have decided that the initial step the US should take is the presentation of the following position. In the context of an agreement involving significant reductions from current Soviet and planned NATO deployment levels, the US is prepared to distribute the reductions to be made from planned levels of forces between both the PERSHING II ballistic missile and the GLCM deployments in an appropriate manner. ~~X~~

In support of this position, the Senior Arms Control Policy Group should examine the mixes that would result at various alternative aggregate levels involving reductions in both systems and resulting from the application of the criteria that PERSHING II and GLCM must be deployed in organizationally efficient units.

- This work should determine if a commitment to maintain roughly the currently planned PERSHING II/GLCM deployment ratio makes sense in light of the mixes generated when consideration is given to organizationally efficient units.

- It should also explore in more detail and on a priority basis the advantages and disadvantages of using the concept of ballistic missile to cruise missile ratios to encourage a shift away from ballistic systems to slow-flying systems.

- This study should also review the implications of such a proposal for both deployment and negotiations. ~~(S)~~

Verification. Final preparation of verification annexes as appropriate to support the draft US INF treaties should be completed on a priority basis so that these annexes can be tabled in Geneva as early as possible during the next round. ~~X~~

Other Work. Work should proceed to identify the preferred US missile warhead number associated with the US interim proposal against the contingency that we may wish to table a proposal including such a number during this round. ~~X~~

Suspenses for Tasked Work. The additional study tasked by this NSDD should be completed as comprehensively and as rapidly as possible in order to support the strategy outlined in applying a step-by-step approach. The Senior Arms Control Policy Group will provide a status report on September 30 on all work tasked in association with this NSDD and not completed by that date.

Previous Guidance. This NSDD supplements NSDD-86 and other guidance previously issued on the US INF position. ~~X~~

*Ronald Reagan*

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22. September 1983

Sehr geehrter Herr Generalsekretär,

zunächst möchte ich Ihnen für Ihren Brief danken. Ich weiß die Art zu schätzen, in der Sie ihn geschrieben haben.

Lassen Sie mich in der Offenheit antworten, die die Lage verlangt, in der wir teils gemeinsame Interessen haben, was die Verhinderung einer Verschlechterung der internationalen Lage angeht, teils parallele, wie sie sich aus unseren unterschiedlichen Positionen ergeben.

Ich erkenne Ihre Bemühungen in diese Richtung und kann mir vorstellen, daß Flexibilität gerade einer Weltmacht nicht immer leicht fällt; ich verstehe, daß sie ihre Grenzen an den Sicherheitsinteressen ihres Landes findet. Was ich Ihnen nahebringen möchte, will diese Grenzen durchaus berücksichtigen.

Ich denke an eine Lage, wie sie sich aus den heute erkennbaren Faktoren für die zweite Hälfte des November ergeben könnte: Kein Ergebnis in Genf, noch keine amerikanischen Raketen auf dem Boden

An den  
Generalsekretär  
des Zentralkomitee der KPdSU  
Herrn Jurij Andropow  
M o s k a u / UdSSR

westeuropäischer Staaten, aber rund 250 Systeme SS 20, fähig, Westeuropa zu erreichen. Das wäre für mein Land eine Situation, für deren Dauer die SPD gewiß nicht eintreten könnte, denn wir verfolgen, wie Sie wissen, das Ziel, die SS 20 so weit reduziert zu sehen, daß die Stationierung amerikanischer Raketen überflüssig wird. Zu dieser Position gehört auch, daß man die vorhandenen britischen und französischen Systeme in geeigneter Weise berücksichtigen muß.

Sie selbst haben die Bereitschaft erklärt, Ihre SS 20-Systeme beträchtlich bis auf eine Ebene zu reduzieren, die ausreicht, ein Gleichgewicht zu den Systemen der britischen und französischen Nuklearwaffen herzustellen. Meine Anregung ist: Beginnen Sie damit! Beginnen Sie damit in einer Weise, die der Öffentlichkeit in Westeuropa und in Amerika klarmacht, noch während keine neuen Raketen hier stationiert sind, bis zu welcher Konsequenz es der Sowjetunion ernst ist, eine neue Runde der Aufrüstung zu verhindern und ein Ergebnis in Genf zu erreichen. Nichts könnte dem Bemühen um die Verhinderung neuer amerikanischer Raketen bessere Aussicht auf Erfolg geben als ein solcher dramatischer eigener und einseitiger Schritt der Sowjetunion, der einseitig auch eingestellt werden kann, wenn amerikanische Raketen dennoch stationiert werden. Es würde manche aus der Situation befreien, übrigens auch die Friedensbewegungen hier und in Amerika, die den Eindruck erwecken könnte, als ob sie für die Erhaltung des gegenwärtigen Potentials eintreten, während sie sich gegen die Stationierung neuer amerikanischer Raketen aussprechen.

So sehr ich die Vorschläge der Sowjetunion würdige und den Willen zu konstruktiven Verhandlungen darin spüre: Ich habe den Eindruck, daß in diesen entscheidenden vor uns liegenden Wochen nicht mehr Vor-

schläge helfen, die unter Vorwänden verzögert werden oder mit dem Hinweis beantwortet werden können, daß die Verhandlung über sie lange Zeit erfordert, sondern daß nur noch konkrete Handlungen, nachprüfbar, im positiven Sinne alarmierend, zu dem Ergebnis führen können, das wir miteinander wünschen.

Dies ist ein Beitrag, den die Sowjetunion leisten kann, niemand sonst. Ich weiß, wie schwer es fällt, aber er würde die Sicherheitsinteressen Ihres Landes voll wahren.

Was die sozialdemokratischen Parteien angeht, so möchte ich Ihre Aufmerksamkeit auf die Begegnungen lenken, die diese Parteien aus den kleinen NATO-Staaten seit mehr als zwei Jahren zu dem Thema der Genfer Verhandlungen haben, und an denen Vertreter der SPD und der Labour-Party regelmäßig, der französischen Sozialisten seltener, als Beobachter teilnehmen. Obwohl die einzelnen Parteien zum Thema der Raketenstationierung unterschiedliche Standpunkte einnehmen, habe ich Grund zu der Annahme, daß sie im nächsten Monat mit einer geschlossenen Empfehlung an die Öffentlichkeit treten werden, nämlich den Verhandlungen in Genf mehr Zeit zu geben.

Ich begrüße Ihre Bereitschaft und erwidere sie, Konsultationen zu diesen Fragen auf den Ebenen zu intensivieren, die jeweils fruchtbringend sind.

Wir nehmen unsere begrenzten Möglichkeiten, auf die amerikanische Regierung einzuwirken, voll wahr. Daß sich eine Lage entwickelt hat, in der wir der Verantwortung und dem Verhalten der Sowjetunion ein größeres Gewicht beimessen, ist gewiß etwas, was es ohne die Beziehungen, die sich auf der Grundlage des Moskauer Vertrages entwickelt haben, nicht geben würde.

Ich erwidere den Ausdruck aufrichtiger Hochachtung.

gez. Willy Brandt

Sottosottoserie 5: Dibattito parlamentare sugli euromissili e negoziati sul disarmo

**UA 1: "Materiale informativo per la dichiarazione introduttiva del presidente del Consiglio in occasione del dibattito alla Camera"**

- **2. Promemoria Negoziato di Ginevra sulle forze nucleari intermedie e dialogo Est-Ovest con particolare riferimento ai rapporti italo-sovietici [10/1983]**

**ABSTRACT –A memo about the relationship between Italy and the Soviet Union during the Geneva negotiation. It suggests some steps that Italy should undertake to keep alive the East-West dialogue and to preserve the Italian economic interests.**

Fascicolo .....

Anno .....

N. ....



# PRESIDENZA DEL CONSIGLIO DEI MINISTRI

UCD

Negoziati di Piuverve  
e Rapporti Est-Ovest



*Ufficio del Consigliere Diplomatico  
del Presidente del Consiglio dei Ministri*

NEGOZIATO DI GINEVRA FNI E DIALOGO  
EST-OVEST CON PARTICOLARE RIFERIMEN-  
TO AI RAPPORTI ITALO-SOVIETICI.

A) Negoziato di Ginevra

1 - Obiettivo : mantenimento iniziativa da parte occidentale

1a- Strumento : quantificazione della proposta intermedia

Limite oggettivo : rispetto dei principi enunciati da Reagan, senza dunque assumere responsabilità di forzare il quadro di riferimento alleato, già concordato

Elementi chiave da considerare : rapporto tra livello globale e sottotetto europeo (anche ai fini di un riconoscimento implicito, ma camuffato, dei sistemi franco-britannici) : 2 su 3, preferibilmente, un pò più basso

PROPOSTA POSSIBILE : FORMULA QUANTITATIVA VICINA ALLE CIFRE DELLA "PASSEGGIATA NEL BOSCO" : APPROSSIMATIVAMENTE 490 TESTATE PER LIVELLO GLOBALE ET 290 PER SOTTOTETTO. (Questione da sciogliere : composizione qualitativa della formula, e cioè accettazione o meno dei soli "Cruise").

1b- Tempi : la proposta alleata dovrebbe essere resa pubblica entro il 14 novembre

2b- Evento ri-  
levante : primi arrivi del materiale connesso con lo spiegamento dei missili (15 o 22 novembre)

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*Ufficio del Consigliere Diplomatico  
del Presidente del Consiglio dei Ministri*

2.

Occasioni utili per maturare proposte  
e per sensibilizzare opinione pubblica:

....	Novembre	Incontro con Andreotti e Spadolini o in alternativa Consiglio di Gabinetto
9	"	D'intesa con Andreotti (sono gli Esteri ad avere competenza sul negoziato in materia di controllo degli armamenti), contatto con Presidente del Gruppo Speciale di Consultazione NATO (si riunisce a Roma il 10 novembre)
10	"	Incontro con Trudeau
....	"	Comunicazioni del Governo alla Camera (Il 31 ottobre vi è stato un dibattito ai Comuni sulla base di una mozione presentata dal Governo: il 22 novembre è previsto un dibattito al Bundestag)

B) Rapporti bilaterali italo-sovietici  
in funzione del mantenimento di un  
dialogo Est-Ovest.

1 - Obiettivo : ripresa dei rapporti economici come contributo al mantenimento del dialogo Est-Ovest nel caso di insuccesso dei negoziati di Ginevra

1b- Strumenti : sollecita definizione tecnica contratto ENI-SOYUZGAS (vi sono buone prospettive)

Concreto impegno sovietico al riequilibrio dell'intercambio (vi è un'incoraggiante disponibilità sovietica)

Convocazione, entro novembre, commissione Mista e approvazione governativa del contratto ENI-SOYUZGAS

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3.

(è stata già convocata la "Grande Commissione"  
a livello politico, franco-sovietica che si ter-  
rà in novembre a Mosca)

- 2b - Rilancio contatti con Paesi dell'Est-  
europeo (Ungheria e Romania?)
- Visita in Italia del Vice Primo Mini-  
stro magiaro
- Visita in Ungheria del Presidente del  
Consiglio
- Una volta definita la nuova posizione  
negoziale <sup>allegata</sup>, lettera di risposta  
a Ceausescu.

**8. Promemoria Evoluzione dello spiegamento dei missili intermedi sovietici [10/1983]**

**ABSTRACT – A very exhaustive memo on the deployment of the Soviet Intermediate Nuclear Forces from 1977 to 1983.**



*Ufficio del Consigliere Diplomatico  
del Presidente del Consiglio dei Ministri*

EVOLUZIONE DELLO SPIEGAMENTO DEI MISSILI  
INTERMEDI SOVIETICI

L'Unione Sovietica ha sin dagli anni '50 avvia-  
to lo spiegamento nel proprio territorio di missili capaci di  
colpire obiettivi in Europa. Già agli inizi degli anni '60 ri-  
sultavano schierati circa 600 tra SS-4 e SS-5 puntati sull'Eu-  
ropa. In quel periodo, gli Stati Uniti disponevano in Europa  
di un numero assai inferiore di missili, grossomodo, compara-  
bili: il Thor e il Jupiter, installati nel Regno Unito, in I-  
talia e in Turchia.

Nel corso degli anni '60, tuttavia, esattamente  
alcuni mesi dopo la crisi cubana, gli Stati Uniti decisero di  
ritirare tale tipo di sistemi d'arma. Da quel momento, l'Unio-  
ne Sovietica ha mantenuto una sorta di monopolio sui missili  
intermedi, tollerato dal momento che lo squilibrio era consi-  
derato compensato dalla superiorità vantata a quel tempo dal-  
la forza strategica americana; circostanza questa che forniva  
un deterrente adeguato a eventuali aggressioni sovietiche.

La parità strategica, conseguita dall'URSS nel-  
la seconda parte degli anni '70 cambiava ovviamente il quadro  
di riferimento globale, facendo riemergere l'egemonia sovietica  
sulle forze intermedie; egemonia che assumeva dimensioni  
preoccupanti, e particolarmente destabilizzanti, con l'avvio,  
proprio in quegli anni, dello spiegamento degli SS-20. Tutto  
ciò - da notare - avveniva in un momento in cui le forze del  
Patto di Varsavia mantenevano, così come mantengono tuttora,  
una netta superiorità nelle forze convenzionali.

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2.

L'introduzione degli SS-20 non ha avuto solo l'effetto di approfondire, in termini quantitativi, lo squilibrio di tali sistemi d'arma in Europa; ma anche quello, certamente più pericoloso, di accrescere l'effetto destabilizzante di tale dislivello a causa delle migliori caratteristiche tecnico-operative di tali armamenti. Lo spiegamento dei missili SS-20 è proceduto ad un ritmo serrato secondo il seguente calendario:

data	SS-20	testate	SS-4/SS-5
fine 1977	10	30	559
fine 1978	70	210	503
fine 1979	140	420	436
fine 1980	200	600	411
fine 1981	270	810	351
Marzo 1982	300	900	297
Marzo 1983	351	1.053	240

Non è senza interesse l'esame delle modalità con cui tale evoluzione si è verificata.

Nell'ottobre del 1979, in pratica alla vigilia della doppia decisione NATO, risultavano già spiegati circa ~~140~~<sup>120</sup> missili SS-20 per un totale di ~~420~~<sup>300</sup> testate nucleari, e 436 tra SS-4 e SS-5. Il 6 di quel mese il Presidente Breznev, in un discorso a Berlino Est, dichiarava: "suscitano serie inquietudine i pericolosi piani di dislocazione di nuovi tipi di missili americani a testata nucleare nel territorio dell'Europa Occidentale, come annuncia oggi a gran voce la propaganda occidentale. Diciamo senz'altro che

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la realizzazione di questi progetti modificherebbe sensibilmente la situazione strategica nel Continente. Il loro scopo è quello di spezzare l'equilibrio delle forze creatosi in Europa e di tentare di assicurare alla NATO la supremazia militare". (\*)

In realtà, malgrado l'asserita situazione di equilibrio, da parte sovietica si continuò nello schieramento di nuovi missili SS-20. Nel novembre del 1981 - si era alla vigilia dell'inizio del negoziato di Ginevra - l'URSS aveva schierato circa 270 missili SS-20 con un complessivo numero di testate di 810. In quel periodo, in un'intervista allo "Spiegel", Breznev dichiarava: "I Paesi NATO dispongono di 986 vettori di tale natura, dei quali oltre 700 appartengono agli USA (F111, FB111, F4, nonché velivoli a bordo di portaerei nei mari ed oceani che circondano l'Europa). Vi è un ulteriore potenziale di 64 missili balistici e 55 bombardieri britannici. La Francia possiede 144 unità (94 missili e 46 bombardieri). L'URSS dispone di 975 unità di armi analoghe. La situazione non si è modificata allorchè l'URSS i-

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(\*) Nell'ottobre 1979 l'Istituto Internazionale di Studi Strategici di Londra dichiarò anch'esso che all'epoca esisteva un equilibrio di forze tra la NATO ed il Patto di Varsavia. Lo I.I.S.S. tuttavia precisò che, per giungere a tale conclusione, esso aveva incluso nel calcolo i missili strategici Poseidon imbarcati su sottomarini assegnati dagli Stati Uniti alla NATO (400 testate nucleari) che erano già stati contabilizzati nel SALT II e dovevano pertanto essere esclusi dal calcolo delle FNI, nonché gli aerei F20-111 distanza negli Stati Uniti ma assegnati alla NATO.



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niziò a sostituire gli obsoleti SS-4 e SS-5 con i più moderni SS-20. Con la messa in funzione di un nuovo missile noi ritiriamo uno o due missili dal nostro arsenale, per distruggerli unitamente alle relative rampe di lancio.... I citati dati, che chiariscono la realtà, dimostrano senza ombra di dubbio che è senza fondamento il "baccano" della NATO circa una "superiorità inaccettabile" dell'URSS nei sistemi a medio raggio e circa la necessità di un "controspiegamento". Semmai è l'URSS che dovrebbe porre la questione di un controspiegamento. Se nell'Europa Occidentale verranno spiegati quasi 600 missili addizionali, la NATO avrà una superiorità di una volta e mezzo nei missili e quasi due volte nelle testate".

In sostanza, usando criteri artificiosi e assai dubbi parametri comparativi, Breznev giudicava che, a quel momento, si fosse pervenuti ad un sostanziale equilibrio dei sistemi d'arma intermedi fra Est e Ovest.

Ancora una volta egli dovette smentirsi.

Siamo al marzo del 1982. L'URSS ha in quei pochi mesi ac cresciuto lo schieramento missilistico degli SS-20 da 270 a 300 unità. Il giorno 16 di quel mese Breznev annuncia "una moratoria unilaterale sullo spiegamento di armamenti nucleari a medio raggio nella parte europea dell'Unione Sovietica". A quel momento erano in fase di costruzione nella zona europea dell'URSS tre basi per SS-20 che vennero completate prima che il successivo 18 maggio, Breznev si affrettasse a dichiarare che "il congelamento annunciato dai sovietici includeva il completamento dei preparati

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vi per lo spiegamento dei missili".

Ma anche questa volta la scelta dei tempi si è rivelata intempestiva. Proseguirono, infatti, i lavori di costruzione nella zona europea di una ulteriore base di SS-20. Nel complesso, a partire dalla dichiarata moratoria, i sovietici hanno completato la costruzione di quattro basi per SS-20 nella parte europea dell'URSS e l'installazione di 36 nuovi missili SS-20 per un totale di 108 testate (pari praticamente da soli alle 112 testate che verranno spiegate sui missili "Cruise" a Comiso nel corso dei prossimi cinque anni). Nello stesso arco di tempo (marzo '82 - marzo '83) l'URSS ha costruito due basi per SS-20 in Asia per un totale di 16 missili e tre nuove basi sono in corso di allestimento e destinate a diventare operative nel 1984 nel territorio asiatico dell'Unione Sovietica.

- **15. Promemoria Rapporto tra i sistemi nucleari francesi e britannici capaci di colpire il territorio sovietico e le forze sovietiche capaci di colpire Regno Unito e Francia [10/1983]**

**ABSTRACT – A comparison between the Soviet Intermediate Nuclear Forces and the Anglo – French system capable of reaching the Soviet Union. With many interesting data, this memo intended to demonstrate that the Soviet INF outnumbered by far NATO nuclear forces.**





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RAPPORTO TRA I SISTEMI NUCLEARI FRANCESI E BRITANNICI CAPACI  
DI COLPIRE IL TERRITORIO SOVIETICO E LE FORZE SOVIETICHE NON  
STRATEGICHE DISLOCATE IN EUROPA E CAPACI DI COLPIRE IL TERRI-  
TORIO DEL REGNO UNITO E/O DELLA FRANCIA  
DESCRIZIONE DEL DIAGRAMMA

QUADRO (d) :

Il quadro ( $\alpha$ ) indica la consistenza attuale dei dispositivi nucleari francese ed inglese, che risultano così costituiti:

Regno Unito - 64 missili Polaris su sottomarini. Gli inglesi non hanno mai rivelato ufficialmente il numero delle testate di cui sono dotati i missili Polaris. Secondo fonti ufficiose attendibili ogni Polaris è dotato di 3 testate non indipendenti, per un totale quindi di 192 testate.

Un certo numero di Polaris è inoltre dotato di testate non esplosive. I sovietici calcolano tutte le testate come esplosive e indipendenti, per un totale di 336.

Francia - 98 missili, dei quali 18 a terra e 80 installati su sottomarini e 44 aerei. Il totale dei sistemi inglesi e francesi è quindi di 162 missili e 44 aerei.

A tali forze i sovietici aggiungono 723 aerei a lungo raggio della NATO, dei quali hanno chiesto l'inclusione nello accordo FNI di Ginevra.

QUADRO (B) :

L'URSS dispone - secondo stime americane - delle seguenti forze nucleari non strategiche in grado di colpire, dal territorio sovietico o da basi avanzate nel territorio dei Paesi del Patto di Varsavia, il territorio del Regno Unito e/o quello della Francia:

670	aerei a lungo raggio (Backfire, Badyer e Blinder)
390	bombardieri navali
2450	aerei a medio raggio
650	missili intermedi
30	missili installati su sottomarini
493	missili intermedi a lungo raggio SS-20, SS-4 e SS-5



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per un totale complessivo quindi di 4683 fra missili e aerei.

QUADRO (X) :

Esprime il totale delle forze nucleari non strategiche sovietiche in grado di colpire il territorio del Regno Unito e / o quello della Francia ove venisse accettata l'opzione zero, eliminando cioè dal totale i 493 missili intermedi a lungo raggio SS-20, SS-4 e SS-5.



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ALLEGATO

PROGRAMMI DI MODERNIZZAZIONE FRANCESE, BRITANNICO E DELLA  
NATO


Al termine del programma di modernizzazione, che avrà inizio nella seconda metà del 1985, l'arsenale nucleare francese, fermo restando il numero dei missili (98), passerà da 98 a 592 testate.

Al termine del programma di modernizzazione britannico (che avrà inizio verso il 1990 e sarà terminato verso il 1995), l'arsenale inglese, sostituiti i 64 missili Polaris con 64 Trident, vedrebbe il numero delle testate passare dalle attuali 192 (o 336 secondo le stime sovietiche) a 512 o 896 (a seconda che si decida di installare 8 o 14 testate indipendenti per ciascun missile).

A compimento del proprio programma di ammodernamento (la "doppia decisione" del '79) la NATO disporrebbe a sua volta di 572 missili Pershing e Cruise ciascuno dotato di una testata.

Insomma, l'Unione Sovietica ha già adesso un numero di missili intermedi a lungo e medio raggio superiore di circa 400 a quello di cui disporrebbero insieme alla NATO, il Regno Unito e la Francia a compimento dei loro tre programmi di modernizzazione (ed un numero di testate pari a quello proiettabile nel 1995 per NATO, Francia e Regno Unito). Inoltre la Unione Sovietica ha 3.410 bombardieri a lungo raggio contro 767 bombardieri (NATO, Francia, Regno Unito) capaci di colpire il territorio sovietico.

RAFFRONTO DELLE FORZE ANGIO-FRANCESI CHE POSSONO COLPIRE L'URSS E DELLE FORZE NON STRATEGICHE SOVIETICHE IN EUROPA CHE POSSONO COLPIRE INGHILTERRA E FRANCIA (MISSILI E AEREI)



Translation from Russian

Highly Confidential!

P r o t o c o l  
of the extraordinary meeting of the Committee of Ministers for Defense from the  
Warsaw Treaty member states

Berlin  
20 October 1983

[...] [list of participants]

In the spirit of the Prague Political Declaration from 5 January 1983, and the Joint Declaration by the highest representatives of party and state from seven socialist states on 28 June 1983, the Committee of Ministers for Defense discussed the situation resulting from the deployment of new American medium-range nuclear missiles in some Western European countries.

[...]

In light of the U.S. and NATO's strive for military superiority over the Warsaw Treaty countries, and the large-scale preparation for a war against the socialist community, [...], the Committee of Ministers for Defense deems it appropriate to apply respective countermeasures in case of a deployment of new American medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe; in order not to tolerate NATO military superiority and maintain a balance of forces in the interest of peace, and to guarantee the security of the allied countries.

The Committee of the Ministers of Defense d e c i d e s:

1. Defense Ministries and Unified Command have to comply timely and completely with all measures outlined in protocols concerning the development of armies and naval forces under the Unified Command for the period between 1981 and 1985.  
Measures are to be implemented until 1985 in order to increase combat potential of armies and fleets through further perfection of combat readiness and combat strength, as well as through equipment with more modern and perfect (modernized) armaments and battle technology.
2. Together with the Ministries for Defense, the Unified Command will have to work out measures to increase the command capacities of the Unified Forces and realize those between 1983 and 1985.
3. Further planning for development of army and naval units serving within the Unified Forces in the next five years (1986-1990) must include practical measures in light of the potential deployment of new American medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe, as well as qualitative and quantitative changes of weapons for armed combat.

The Minister for National Defense of the Socialist Republic of Romania (SRR), Colonel General C. Olteanu, expressed his following own opinion on the decision made by the Committee of Ministers of Defense:

- delete from the first paragraph “situation resulting from the deployment of new American medium-range nuclear missiles in some Western European countries”;
- delete from the fourth paragraph the following: “respective countermeasures in case of a deployment of new American medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe”;
- add to the second bullet point of the decision: “which were laid out in the documents agreed”
- delete from the third bullet point: “the potential deployment of new American medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe”

These proposals for modifications were outlined by Colonel General C. Olteanu during the meeting. All other members of the Committee of Ministers for Defense expressed their non-approval of these proposals by the delegation of the army from the SRR, as they stood in contradiction to the meeting’s agenda. In their respective statements they criticized the Romanian proposal.

The meeting of the Committee of Ministers of Defense was conducted in a functional atmosphere, and in the spirit of friendship and mutual agreement.

[...] [signatures, including SRR]

[Translated for CWIHP by Bernd Schaefer].

Translation from Russian  
Highly Confidential!

S t a t e m e n t

by CPSU Central Committee and USSR Minister of Defense, Marshal of the Soviet Union  
D. F. U s t i n o w, at the extraordinary session of the Committee of Defense Ministers of  
Warsaw Treaty Member States on 20 October 1983 [in Berlin]

[...]

This extraordinary session of our committee is convened due to the grave escalation of the international situation and, in consequence, of the growing danger of war against the socialist community. It is due to the need to apply effective countermeasures to preserve the security of our states.

The source for the growing danger of war is evident. It was clearly defined at the Prague meeting of the Warsaw Treaty member states Political Consultative Committee, and at the Moscow meeting by the leading representatives of or states. This source consists of the openly aggressive policy from the United States and NATO against the USSR and the other countries of the socialist community, and against all progressive forces in the world.

A particular danger for the countries of the socialist community is the insistent effort by U.S. and NATO to deploy new American medium-range missiles in Europe. With this, the U.S. Administration and the highest representatives of leading NATO countries have openly declared the fight against the socialist community. They join a path of far-reaching war preparations against the Warsaw Treaty states.

Dangerous tendencies, both in aggressive intention and practical actions by Washington and NATO, get confirmed by an entire range of circumstances.

First, the "crusade" against communism and in fact against the USSR and the other countries of the socialist community, announced 1 ½ years ago by U.S. President Reagan, has not just stayed a slogan but became a program of action and basis for U.S. and NATO policy. Its main goal consists in is determination to "destroy socialism as a social-political system". Nothing more, and nothing less.

And now both the political and military leaders of the U.S. are guided by this policy in their actual actions. The leaders of NATO countries also want to achieve the goals defined by this policy. These goals express themselves through all measures economic, political, and ideological, and military as pursued by U.S. and NATO. From appeals and slogans, the ultra-reactionary forces of imperialism have moved toward its actual implementation. This is where we see the particular threat to peace and the future of our planet.

Second, the U.S. and its NATO allies attempt with all their force to destroy the achieved military-strategic balance between USSR and USA, between the Warsaw Treaty and NATO. They bank on the buildup of new nuclear weapons systems, both strategic and medium-range - which are viewed as means for a first strike, the "decapitation strike".

Here we have the intercontinental ballistic missiles MX (they first want to deploy 100 and later 200 more), the first and second modification of the Trident systems (24 submarines), and the strategic bombers B-18 and B-52 with long-range cruise missiles. This way the number of warheads on strategic carriers will increase at the start [of a first strike] about 1.5 times, and it will consist of about 16,000 units (currently they have 11,000 units). There are also plans to install long-range cruise missiles on submarines and ships.

The American Pershing and cruise missiles scheduled for deployment in Europe are part of this strategy to reach superiority over the Warsaw Treaty countries and to conduct a nuclear first strike.

With unprecedented means and speed, U.S. and NATO are pushing the modernization of conventional armaments and general-purpose forces. Over the next years the battle options of ground forces and the fleets of NATO naval forces are supposed to grow by more than a quarter, and tactical aircraft forces are scheduled to increase 1.5 times. They have set course to supply their forces with new precision arms, automated drone strike capacities included, and other new systems which in their yield capacities come close to tactical nuclear weapons. As a result, the percentage of new armaments within NATO armies will increase year by year. Compared to overall military expenditures, investments in these areas of modernization will grow faster.

They are about to develop plans to militarize space.

In one word: Currently there is no direction of military efforts, and no type of armaments, where U.S. and NATO do not strive for superiority and follow a mission to overtake the USSR and Warsaw Treaty countries at any cost in order to create an unfavorable situation for us.

With unprecedented speed, the U.S. and NATO increase their appropriations for war preparations in order to receive ever more billions for their goals. The Reagan administration is anything but shy to use all means, lies, propaganda, pressure, and blackmail at its disposal. An example was the large-scale provocation, intentionally schemed up by U.S. intelligence services, by a South Korean airliner in Soviet airspace in the Far East. Right after this provocation and literally one day later, massive anti-Soviet propaganda enabled the American 'hawks' in the U.S. to get the colossal 1984 military budget of over 280 billion dollar through Congress. This amount almost doubles U.S. military spending from just about three to four years ago!

Some NATO allies of the U.S. are no less eager to contribute towards war preparations against the USSR and the other countries of the socialist community. One just has to mention that the pace of growth in military spending by Western European countries was two- to three-fold in recent years.

Third, the U.S. administration and NATO leaders maneuver by any means to have their hands free for increased war preparations. At the same time, they are eager to evade honest negotiations about the cessation of the arms race, and about arms limitations. Since the current U.S. administration came into power, due to its fault all negotiations over these extraordinarily important issues have been interrupted or moved into a dead end. We even must say that the U.S. only came to negotiations over limitations of nuclear



forces in Europe due to pressure by Soviet initiatives and global public opinion. Currently the Americans abuse these negotiations for the betrayal of peoples and a fake show according to which the U.S. allegedly also wants arms reduction. In reality, “our negotiation partners”, as Comrade [CPSU General Secretary Yuri] Andropov recently declared, are by no means in Geneva to reach an agreement. Their task is different – they want to buy time and then deploy ballistic Pershing-2 missiles and long-range cruise missiles”.

The so-called U.S. flexibility in these negotiations is also worthless. It actually boils down to a juggling with numbers in the sense of how many missiles the USSR must reduce. and how many American missiles are to deploy in Europe.

The lack of any good will on the U.S. side to conduct negotiations and reach arms limitation agreements on the basis of parity and equal security results in the opening of every new channel to build more arms.

Under these circumstances the likelihood of unpredictably dangerous events is increasing. If the policy of the U.S. and other NATO countries will not change, the world will be pushed more and more towards a fateful line whose crossing can result in the unleashing of a nuclear catastrophe.

Fourth, in synchronization with the arms build-up by the U.S. and NATO the scope of their military exercises expands year after year. They are arranged with wide territorial expansion from the Arctic Sea to the Mediterranean, from the depths of U.S. territory to the borders of the countries of the socialist community. [...]

Fifth, the U.S. and NATO have launched a limitless “psychological” offensive against the USSR and the countries of the socialist community. It aims at preparing broad public opinion for the inevitability to prepare for the fight against socialism and communism by military means. It aims at deceiving the peoples and camouflaging the true desire of imperialist reaction for global domination. This is why they pursue the deeply inhuman slander and lies, even vulgar hollering against the socialist countries. This is also the source for large-scale ideological diversion, blackmail, and provocative acts against the countries of the socialist community.

Manipulation of people in their own countries, ideological diversion and blackmail against the countries of the socialist community have become in the U.S. and NATO countries a part of official government policy and an important element for war preparation.

All this serves as evidence for a wide-ranging and targeted preparation for an aggression against the USSR and other Warsaw Treaty countries by the imperialist reactionary circles of United States and NATO. With blind imperialist lunacy they openly talk about conducting a nuclear war to reach their selfish goal, namely the achievement of global domination. Policy and actions by the current U.S. administration and some NATO politicians represent extraordinary great danger for the security of the countries of the socialist community and entire mankind.  
[...]

In July [1983] already Comrade A n d r o p o v made it absolutely clear in his meeting with FRG Chancellor K o h l: “If there will be a deployment [of U.S. missiles in Europe], then we will not cede our position and weaken our defense. We will implement timely and efficient countermeasures to guarantee the security of the USSR and its allies”.

The leading representatives from parties and states of the socialist community have stated their firm and unshakeable position at their Moscow meeting where they declared the Warsaw Treaty countries “will not under any circumstances tolerate a military superiority of others”. Yet the leaders from the NATO bloc did not respond to our warnings at all. Even now they do not display even most basic reason in their decisions. They remain deaf to our constructive proposals guided by sincere efforts to reach agreement on treaties to limit nuclear armaments.

[...]

In recognition of its responsibility toward its fraternal countries and the entire world, and to prevent a nuclear catastrophe, the Soviet Union is undertaking everything to create a real balance against U.S. attempts to shift the balance of strategic arms.

However, we do not strive for nuclear superiority and will not tolerate the abuse of nuclear blackmail to implement a policy of strength against us. To each attempt to destroy the existing military-strategic balance, the Soviet Union will give an appropriate response. For us, words and deeds are identical.

[...]

In response to the deployment of American medium-range missiles in Europe we will apply required and efficient measures. The USSR will abandon its moratorium of deploying its medium-range missiles in the European part of the Soviet Union. It will begin with additional deployment of such missiles, land-based cruise missiles included. We will also strengthen clusters of our long-range operative-tactical missiles.

We will also implement measures to make it transparently clear how frightening U.S. considerations actually are pertaining to the geographical remoteness of its territory.

The Soviet government will undertake everything to ensure permanent combat readiness of USSR forces, in particular for those units within the Unified Command [of the Warsaw Pact] commissioned to act in the Western and Southwestern theater of war, against a strong and technologically well-equipped adversary. Those units will be preferably treated with the most modern armaments.

[...]

It is obvious that these measures will not come along easy for us. Notwithstanding this, the USSR makes those major efforts and expenditures since the question of maintaining reliable security for our state and all states of the socialist community, as well as the guarantee of socialism’s existence as a social-political system, is at stake.

In fulfillment of its internationalist duty, the Soviet Union will continue in the future to increase the combat strength of its forces in the interest of our common defense. In the current situation we also expect an increase in contributions from our friends to the common cause of increasing defense capabilities of the socialist community.

[...]

The solution of the main problem – improvement of technical equipment for the Unified Forces – requires a series of measures. On one hand combat strengths of fraternal armies can be decisively improved through deliveries of most modern technology and armament from Soviet production what were presented to you this summer. Such modern equipment represents more than one third (about 35 percent) of all arms slated for the equipment of allied armies and naval forces.

[...]

On the other hand it is mandatory to exploit the developed economic basis of the countries of the socialist communist in a more complete way.

[...]

We must achieve that the Unified Forces of the Warsaw Treaty and allied armies are not just in no way inferior to the probable adversary - neither in armaments, nor in training, nor in combat readiness; but that they are superior to this adversary.

[...]

Our repeated appeals to the leadership of U.S. and NATO on the highest level, with the explicit admonition to weigh soberly and objectively the dangerous tendencies in the present development of international relations and draw reasonable conclusions meeting broad interests of mankind, are hitting a wall of muteness.

The Reagan administration and the governments of leading NATO countries have decided to begin the deployment of American missiles in Europe at any cost without taking into account the dangerous consequences of this lunatic move. Now they are enforcing realization of their intended plan. Major parts of equipment and the first series of missiles will be delivered to the bases in Italy, England and the FRG in November already. Final construction to build infrastructure on these bases is already completed, and they have started to train personnel.

If there will be no agreement in Geneva until the end of the current year, and U.S. and NATO will not refrain from the already confirmed dates for the deployment of new American medium-range missiles, then negotiations over nuclear arms limitation in Europe will be devoid of any purpose. [...]

On 5 January 1983 the leading representatives of our states made in Prague the unanimous decision to issue a clear order to the Unified Command and the Defense Ministries to continuously and attentively monitor war preparations by the U.S. and its allies. They were ordered to work out and implement measures in time to safeguard a reliable defense capability of Warsaw Treaty members and to keep the Unified Forces on a high level of combat readiness. And it is our duty to fulfill this order given to us exactly and with honor. Nobody will relieve us, the military, from this task.

[...]

And this is no accidental mood held by one man [referring to himself, B.S.] but a vital necessity. It is the demand coming from the military-political situation we have. Any deviation from this course is dangerous to our peoples and countries.

[...]

[Translated for CWIHP by Bernd Schaefer]

*Reagan, Ronald. The Reagan Diaries. Ed. Douglas Brinkley. New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 2007, p. 190.*

**Monday, October 24 [1983]**

This was really a Monday. Opened with NSC brf. on Lebanon & Grenada. Lebanon gets worse as the death toll climbs. More bodies are found & more critically wounded die. Ambas. Hartman (Russia) came by. He confirms what I believe: the Soviets won't really negotiate on arms reductions until we deploy the Pershing II's & go forward with MX. He also confirms that Andropov is very much out of sight these days.

Phoned Tip & Howard Baker to express hope they'd stay firm on keeping the Marines in Lebanon – both said yes.

The Pres. of Togo visited. He's anti-communist & pro West. A meeting with the Joint Chiefs – they outlined the final details for our move on Grenada scheduled for 9 P.M. take off. No evidence of any moves by Cuba.

Jack Anderson came by with some ideas about ed. & the lack of history in our schools. Also an idea to give people a chance to sound off about legitimate beefs with govt. We're looking his ideas over.

So far not even a tiny leak about the Grenada move.

Then at 8 P.M., Tip, Jim Wright, Bob Byrd, Howard Baker, Bob Michel & all our gang met upstairs in the W. H. & we told them of the Grenada operation that would take place in the next several hours. We gave them the complete briefing. In the middle of the meeting Margaret Thatcher called. She's upset & doesn't think we should do it. I couldn't tell her it had started. This was one secret we really managed to keep.

## **UA 5: Miscellanea**

- **Promemoria Riunione di Ottawa del gruppo di pianificazione nucleare della Nato 28/10/1983**

**ABSTRACT – Some reflections on the outcome of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group meeting in Ottawa. The Italian government praised the NATO resolution to keep the INF at a minimum level of deterrence, while critiquing the Soviet refusal to compromise.**



*Ufficio del Consigliere Diplomatico  
del Presidente del Consiglio dei Ministri*

Roma, 28 ottobre 1983

N O T A

A Palazzo Chigi si esprime vivo apprezzamento per i positivi risultati raggiunti alla riunione a livello ministeriale di Ottawa del Gruppo di Pianificazione Nucleare della NATO.

Sui preparativi della riunione il Presidente Reagan aveva negli scorsi giorni informato il Presidente Craxi con un messaggio personale. A sua volta, l'On. Craxi aveva espresso alcune valutazioni e suggerimenti che prospettavano l'importanza che dalla riunione emergessero decisioni coerenti con la posizione alleata e in particolare con l'obiettivo di mantenere il numero degli ordigni nucleari in Europa a livelli strettamente necessari per salvaguardare le esigenze di difesa. In questo senso, si nota a Palazzo Chigi, il Presidente del Consiglio ha manifestato compiacimento per le decisioni adottate, la cui attuazione consentirà <sup>all'Alleanza</sup> di ridurre il proprio arsenale nucleare in Europa al più basso livello mai raggiunto negli ultimi 20 anni.

In particolare, al termine del periodo di applicazione delle decisioni di Ottawa, la NATO avrà ridotto l'insieme delle armi nucleari di un terzo; i sistemi missilistici a corto raggio, di circa la metà ed avrà, nel complesso, ritirato approssimativamente 5 testate nucleari per ciascuna nuova introdotta. In precedenza, e sempre in relazione al programma sulla dimensione e composizione dei sistemi nucleari

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avviato in collegamento con la doppia decisione della NATO del dicembre 1979, era già stato deciso il ritiro di 1000 testate nucleari.

A Palazzo Chigi si fa notare che questa iniziativa rappresenta un momento qualificante ~~del~~ processo di stretta concertazione interalleata al quale l'Italia fornisce un contributo fattivo e costante. Nei frequenti incontri che il Presidente del Consiglio ha avuto nelle scorse settimane con alti esponenti del Governo americano e con lo stesso Presidente Reagan, un'attenzione particolare era stata dedicata alle modalità con cui rapportare i sistemi nucleari in Europa ai livelli della reale minaccia, al fine di contenere la dissuasione e la deterrenza nei limiti necessari agli obiettivi <sup>della</sup> ~~interessa~~ sicurezza e <sup>ai</sup> ~~ai~~ bisogni di difesa.

Le decisioni di Ottawa, si fa notare, rispondono a queste preoccupazioni. Con esse la NATO ha reso operante un programma unilaterale di riduzione degli armamenti nucleari attualmente esistenti dando - come aveva preannunciato Craxi al Senato lo scorso mercoledì - "il segno ulteriore di una volontà positiva nella ricerca di livelli minimi ed essenziali della difesa".  $\sqrt{E}$  ora auspicabile che analogo atteggiamento venga assunto con credibilità e senza mistificazioni dal Patto di Varsavia.

Certamente, si nota a Palazzo Chigi, le recenti decisioni del Governo di Mosca, di procedere ai preparativi per l'installazione di nuovi sistemi missilistici nella Cecoslovacchia e nella Repubblica Democratica Tedesca contraddicono con l'obiettivo del controllo e della riduzione degli armamenti nucleari in Europa ed indicano una volontà di ~~intermediazione~~ <sup>intimidazione</sup>

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del Presidente del Consiglio dei Ministri

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che non aiuta la ricerca di un accordo equo e verificabile al minimo della forza schierabile.

Anche la decisione recentemente annunciata da An dropov di sospendere il Negoziato <sup>di Ginevra</sup> qualora venisse avviato il programma di spiegamento degli euromissili, deve essere considerato con grande preoccupazione. La volontà negoziale degli Alleati non è mai, infatti, venuta meno in questi ultimi due anni nonostante che dall'inizio della trattativa di Ginevra l'URSS ha considerevolmente accresciuto il numero degli SS-20 puntati sull'Europa.



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MAXWELL AFB, AL 36112

HISTORY

of the  
Headquarters, 7th Air Division  
1 October 1983 - 31 March 1984

(Unclassified Title)

Volume 1 of 3 volumes .

Narrative

RCS: HAF-CHO(AR) 7101

Assigned to

Eighth Air Force, Strategic Air Command

Stationed at

Ramstein Air Base, Germany  
APO New York 09012

*Charles E Arnold*

CHARLES E. ARNOLD, TSgt, USAF  
Historian

*Robert N. Millhaem*

ROBERT N. MILLHAEM, Colonel, USAF  
Vice Commander

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coordination and tasking. The further addition of a second bomber planner, two targeteers and an expert in ECM and attrition would have added to staff awareness of B-52 capabilities and improved overall tasking effectiveness. Late announcements of the pre-exercise briefings prevented the participation of aircrews who were already flying missions. These briefings should also have been planned for and included in the exercise OPORDs. Delayed planning affected a variety of missions. Better advance planning among the various agencies would have provided smoother operations and prevented any delayed or cancelled activities. In a similar area, late installation of secure voice equipment and the failure of previously coordinated message procedures at the deployed location hampered initial activities of the ADVON members. As in many of the exercises in Europe, poor early planning, lack of coordination or failure to follow previously established procedures caused the majority of difficulties in effecting a smooth operation.<sup>75</sup>

Able Archer 83 Command Post Exercise

◆ The next activity to include a small SAC ADVON contingent took place from 7 to 11 November 1983. The

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75. Rpt(C/DECL OADR), "CRISEX 83 Trip Rpt", 7AD/DO8/DOO/INT, 24 Oct-8 Nov, 9 Nov 83, Ex 261.

annual SACEUR-sponsored Exercise Able Archer received token ADVON support from SAC. The command post exercise which culminated the large scale REFORGER series of live exercises emphasized the transition from conventional to chemical and nuclear operations. Since the SAC presence in Europe was limited almost entirely to conventional warfare (tankers in the ETTF retained an EWO commitment) the command avoided any alignment-actual, simulated or otherwise-with nuclear activities. The ADVON provided nine liaison officers for a newly developed conventional build-up portion of Exercise Able Archer 83. These officers came from Headquarters SAC(2), Eighth AF(3), Fifteenth AF(1) and 7AD(3). The ADVON members deployed to the three major support centers (AFNORTH, AFCENT and AFSOUTH), SHAPE Headquarters and the UK RAOC. Strategic Air Command objectives consisted of observation of B-52 and KC-135 employment, interface with SACEUR and NATO staffs, updating location guidance and determining the scope of future SAC participation. The commander in chief European Command originally envisioned a large-scale SAC ADVON at all the major ACE locations. Due to SAC doubts concerning the direction and value of Able Archer and prior commitments, 7AD suggested to SAC that a total of 14 members be deployed as an observer team. When SAC advised of the ability to augment the team

with only nine people, the division notified 5ATAF that noone could be deployed to that location (Vicenza, Italy). This notification on 9 August 1983 outlined the level of participation occurred.<sup>76</sup>

◆ The overall tone of the low key conventional buildup during the first three days of Exercise Able Archer argued heavily against future SAC ADVON participation. Due to the low-key aspect many sub-command centers failed to respond to message traffic and other centers did not participate at all. Very little realistic tasking of SAC bombers took place effectively preventing the exercise of B-52 procedures training. The observers at SHAPE Headquarters felt that Able Archer was not only too short for effective ADVON training, but also it remained primarily a nuclear procedures exercise. Beyond the limited play of conventional bomber tactics and execution, tanker planners had even less activity. The exercise used primarily preplanned numbers of tankers.

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76. Msg(S/DECL OADR), 7AD/DO to HQ SAC/DOO, "Exercise Able Archer 83", 231630Z Dec 82, Ex 281; msg(S/DECL OADR), 7AD/DO to SHAPE/OPS, "Able Archer", 211615Z Jan 83, Ex 282; msg(S/DECL OADR), USCINCEUR/ECJ3 to 7AD/DO, "Able Archer 83", 252031Z Jan 83, Ex 283; msg(C/DECL OADR), 7AD/DO to SHAPE, "Able Archer", 281104Z Apr 83, Ex 284; msg(C/DECL OADR), 7AD/DOX to USCINCEUR/ECJ3-EX, "Able Archer", 081215Z Jul 83, Ex 285; msg(C/DECL OADR), 7AD/DO to COMFIVEATAF, "Able Archer 83 augmentee requirements", 091300Z Aug 83, Ex 286.

and sortie capability and did not allow for reallocation of assets. For instance, one AFCENT request to disperse KC-135s to an alternate location did not produce any response because the locked in scenario required future chemical and airfield attacks on the base in question. For these and a variety of similar reasons, the 7AD after action report advised against future SAC participation in Exercise Able Archer. A further change in emphasis and allowances for making simulated bomber and tanker employment more realistic left open the possibility for future participation. Primarily, 7AD and SAC became familiar with the basic tenets and activities of Exercise Able Archer and knew what type of information needed to be built into the exercise during future planning conferences.<sup>77</sup>

Crested Eagle/Dense Crop 84

●) From 8 to 14 March 1984, the SAC ADVON took part in the simultaneous command post exercises Crested Eagle and Dense Crop 84. Crested Eagle a CINCENT exercise, tested organizations throughout the Allied Command Europe (ACE) in the conduct of conventional warfare. Dense Crop 84, scheduled and conducted by CINCSOUTH, took place at

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77. Rpt(S/DECL OADR), "Ex Able Archer 83 SAC ADVON After Action Rpt", 7AD/DOO, 1 Dec 83, Ex 287.

- Lettera Traduzione della lettera di Nicolae Ceausescu a Helmut Kohl sugli euromissili [11/1983]

**ABSTRACT – A very interesting letter from Nicoale Ceasescu to Helmut Kohl. The Romanian President made some suggestions that could ease the Geneva negotiation: the Warsaw Pact could accept “not taking into account the UK and French missiles”: the German government could “postpone the deployment [of the Intermediate missiles] to the end of 1984 or the beginning of 1985”; the NATO and the Warsaw Pact countries should organize a conference “to discuss the issue of the Intermediate Range Missiles”**

6

Signor Helmut Kohl  
Cancelliere Federale della Repubblica Federale di  
Germania

Egregio Signor Cancelliere,


mi rivolgo di nuovo ad Ella in riferimento alla prospettiva dell'imminente passaggio all'installazione di missili a medio raggio americani sul territorio di alcuni paesi dell'Europa occidentale compresa la Repubblica Federale di Germania.

Il popolo romeno nonché tutti i popoli dell'Europa tramite azioni e vaste manifestazioni si pronunciano decisamente ed estremamente preoccupati per l'arresto della corsa agli armamenti nucleari, per la tutela del diritto fondamentale alla vita, per la protezione dal pericolo della catastrofe nucleare, convinti che la pace e la sicurezza <sup>possono</sup> non'essere preservate con nuove armi bensì con la riduzione di esse.

La Romania attribuisce una particolare importanza al blocco dell'installazione di nuovi missili a medio raggio in Europa ed al passaggio al ritiro ed alla distruzione di quelli già esistenti e ritiene che ancora non siano state sfruttate tutte le possibilità di compromesso e che ancora sia possibile raggiungere un'intesa nel quadro del negoziato ginevrino tra Unione Sovietica e Stati Uniti.

E vero che fino a questo momento non è stata raggiunta un'intesa in questo negoziato ma sono state presentate importanti proposte sia da parte americana sia da parte sovietica compresa la proposta fatta dal Presidente del Soviet Supremo in un'intervista rilasciata alla Pravda il 27 ottobre 1983 che hanno avvicinato di molto le posizioni il che dimostra che è possibile trovare una corrispondente intesa.

A questo punto è indispensabile adoperarsi a Ginevra al fine di realizzare un accordo equilibrato anche se esso non è perfetto ed anche se esso non risolve tutti i problemi. Comunque l'installazione dei missili americani nel Suo paese ed in altri paesi europei va impedita e rispettivamente va provveduto al ritiro ed alla completa distruzione <sup>della maggior parte</sup> dei missili a medio raggio sovietici.



Al fine di giungere a quest'obiettivo importante e prioritario si potrebbe convenire a non tener conto dei missili francesi e britannici inserendoli nella base di calcolo del rapporto generale delle forze nucleari tra le due parti che dovrebbe essere l'oggetto di negoziati successivi con la partecipazione della Francia e della Gran Bretagna.

Partendo dalla responsabilità che assumiamo nei confronti del destino dei nostri popoli, della pace e della sicurezza sul nostro continente, sono del parere che è arrivato il momento in cui vanno intensificati gli sforzi, in cui dobbiamo rivolgerci direttamente sia all'URSS sia agli USA affinché i negoziati vengano proseguiti e non si passi all'installazione dei nuovi missili a medio raggio.

Nello spirito del messaggio che ho inviato ad Ella nell'agosto di quest'anno torno a rivolgermi ad Ella con l'appello che la Repubblica Federale di Germania ed Ella personalmente chiedano, agendo in modo corrispondente, che venga raggiunto un accordo che permetta il blocco dell'installazione di nuovi missili a medio raggio o almeno il rinvio dell'installazione alla fine del 1984 o all'inizio del 1985 affinché nel frattempo il negoziato sovietico-americano possa continuare cosicché l'Unione Sovietica non installa più missili riducendo, conformemente alle sue dichiarazioni, un numero dei missili già esistenti.



In questo senso la Romania considera molto importante una riunione di tutti i paesi membri della NATO e dei paesi membri del Patto di Varsavia per discutere esclusivamente sul problema dei missili a medio raggio in Europa ed apportare un contributo alla realizzazione di un'intesa nel quadro del negoziato ginevrino tra Unione Sovietica e Stati Uniti affinché esso porti al blocco del passaggio alla installazione dei nuovi missili a medio raggio ed al ritiro ed alla distruzione di quelli già esistenti.

Oltre a ciò sono del parere che un vertice sovietico-americano rappresenterebbe un contributo prezioso all'esito positivo del negoziato ginevrino. Esso influirebbe positivamente sulla vita internazionale e starebbe nell'interesse di tutti i popoli dell'Europa anche se avesse come risultato semplicemente il blocco dell'installazione dei nuovi missili la riduzione e la corrispettiva distruzione di quelli già esistenti.

E noto che le parti con il Trattato sulla Non-Proliferazione di Armi Nucleari si sono impegnate ad impedire l'ulteriore proliferazione di armi nucleari e di non passarle a nessuno e di non accettare da nessuna parte il trasferimento diretto od indiretto di armi o dispositivi nucleari.

?  
L'installazione in alcuni paesi dell'Europa occidentale e dell'Europa orientale viola in quanto tale e di fatto il Trattato sulla Non-Proliferazione creando un precedente pericoloso che certamente potrebbe indurre altri paesi a provvedere all'installazione di simili armi sui propri territori.

Traendo conclusioni dalle dure lezioni della Storia e dal fatto che le due Guerre Mondiali di questo secolo sono scaturite in Europa, allora i popoli del continente e specie il Suo popolo hanno un interesse vitale a fare di tutto per impedire una nuova catastrofe che condurrebbe alla distruzione della vita umana e della civiltà.

L'installazione dei nuovi missili sul territorio tedesco porta effettivamente alla trasformazione di questo territorio in un vero e proprio arsenale di armi nucleari e costituisce un pericolo per la Repubblica Federale di Germania e la Repubblica Democratica Tedesca che sarebbero i primi bersagli di un conflitto nucleare che comporterebbe la loro distruzione completa.

Sono convinto che Ella ed il Governo della Repubblica Federale di Germania si impegneranno per il blocco dell'installazione dei nuovi missili e per la conclusione positiva del negoziato ginevrino con l'obiettivo di realizzare un equilibrio con equa sicurezza tra le due parti non con l'aumento bensì con la riduzione degli armamenti cosa che è nell'interesse del Suo popolo, di tutti i popoli, della pace e della sicurezza internazionale

- 7. Promemoria sui negoziati Fni e Start 12/11/1983

**ABSTRACT – This memo to Craxi argues against the merging of the Inf and Start negotiations proposed by the Finnish government and backed by the Canadian Prime Minister Trudeau. The proposal could jeopardize the Geneva talks and harm the European interests.**



*Ufficio del Consigliere Diplomatico  
del Presidente del Consiglio dei Ministri*

Roma, 12 novembre 1983

A P P U N T O  
PER IL PRESIDENTE DEL CONSIGLIO

In questi giorni si è tornati a parlare della fusione dei negoziati FNI e START. Da ultimo la proposta è stata fatta proprio dal Governo finlandese e sostenuta, sia pure in termini molto più ambigui, da Trudeau. Al riguardo si possono fare due ordini di considerazioni: il primo di carattere generale e di opportunità tattica; il secondo, di merito.

Circa il primo ordine di considerazioni, che forse oggi è il più importante da fare, non vi è dubbio che il proliferare di proposte alternative rispetto a quelle concordate nell'ambito dell'Alleanza Atlantica e presentate dagli Stati Uniti a Ginevra non può che accrescere la confusione e ridurre le già esigue possibilità di un ripensamento delle proprie posizioni da parte dell'Unione Sovietica. Le varie idee che vengono prospettate (che si tratti di una fusione dei negoziati START e FNI, di un allargamento del negoziato nucleare strategico alle cinque Potenze nucleari, di una riesumazione della formula della cosiddetta "passaggiata nel bosco") potranno essere oggetto di utile riflessione quando si avranno idee più chiare sul futuro del negoziato di Ginevra, e cioè se, con il dispiegamento dei primi missili NATO, i sovietici si limiteranno a sospendere il negoziato o decideranno invece di interromperlo. Nella seconda ipotesi, ovviamente, si porrà per gli occidentali il problema dello studio di un quadro diverso nel quale inserire la trattativa FNI, e la sua incorporazione come un "volet" separato nel negoziato START potrebbe costituire una delle varie possibili vie di uscita dalla nuova situazione che sarebbe determinata dalla scelta da parte dell'URSS della linea più intransigente sul futuro del negoziato FNI.

Circa il secondo ordine, da una eventuale fusione potrebbero ridiscendere i seguenti tre tipi di effetti:

- si aprirebbe la strada, nel quadro di un negoziato globale, a formule di compensazione che potrebbero non rispondere (come già avvenuto in qualche misura nel SALT II) agli interessi specifici dell'Europa;
- poichè le FNI rappresenterebbero tutto sommato un comparto marginale di un negoziato strategico unificato, i paesi europei potrebbero perdere quel ruolo di partecipazione alla elaborazione delle posizioni negoziali occidentali ed alla conduzio-



*Ufficio del Consigliere Diplomatico  
del Presidente del Consiglio dei Ministri*

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ne della trattativa che <sup>è</sup> loro riconosciuto dagli Stati Uniti nel negoziato FNI ma che sicuramente, come già avviene per il negoziato START, non potrebbe essere svolto in una trattativa che avesse per oggetto il rapporto globale di forze tra le due Superpotenze;

- il negoziato START non è destinato a dare risultati se non in tempi molto lunghi e pertanto l'effetto di una fusione sarebbe un corrispondente rinvio nel tempo di una soluzione del problema FNI.

*Ami.*

3) Sezione II: Attività istituzionale  
Serie 2: Presidenza del Consiglio dei ministri  
Sottoserie 3: Relazioni internazionali

## **Sottosottoserie 5: Dibattito parlamentare sugli euromissili e negoziati sul disarmo**

**UA 4 . "Note sul dibattito" , [1983] - 16/11/1983**

Considerazioni sul dibattito alla Camera sull'installazione dei missili a Comiso; interventi di Berlinguer nelle sedute del 5 dicembre 1979 e del 16 novembre 1983, **pp. 6-7**

**Abstract – In a memo to Craxi, his Diplomatic Counsellor, Antonio Badini, warns against the latest Soviet proposals. Badini argues that renouncing without any compensation to the deployment of the American missiles would be tantamount to the realization of a long term goal of the Soviet Union, i.e. the decoupling between the Western European and the American defence system. [...] That the Soviet proposals “can be taken as a possible basis for an agreement is surprising. We can only hope that this fact does not imply that, from a political and psychological standpoint, the process of *finlandization* of Europe is far more advanced than we believed this far”**



Ufficio del Consigliere Diplomatico  
del Presidente del Consiglio dei Ministri

Roma, 16 novembre 1983

SCALETTA DI CONSIDERAZIONI DI CARATTERE PIU'  
GENERALE

1. Negli ultimi mesi ci siamo trovati di fronte a forme di ingerenza da parte sovietica negli affari interni dei Paesi occidentali che non hanno precedenti nella storia dei rapporti Est-Ovest. E ciò da parte di una potenza che anno dopo anno afferma alle Nazioni Unite che anche solo discutere la situazione in Afghanistan rappresenta una interferenza negli affari interni di quel paese.

Eppure, vediamo nei giorni scorsi l'Ambasciatore sovietico a Bonn prendere diretto contatto con i capi dei gruppi parlamentari del Bundestag per metterli in guardia contro i risultati del voto che il Parlamento tedesco terrà la prossima settimana su questo problema. Sempre da parte dell'Unione Sovietica, che pure definisce una creatura della CIA un movimento popolare che ha coinvolto dieci milioni di persone come Solidarnosc, si incitano apertamente i movimenti pacifisti in Occidente a tentare di rovesciare nelle strade le decisioni dei loro Governi, salvo tuttavia rimproverarli aspramente se si permettono di menzionare l'esistenza degli SS-20 sovietici. I Paesi occidentali sono soggetti ad una campagna martellante di intimidazioni e minacce, da quelle concernenti la rottura del negoziato di Ginevra a quelle ben più gravi di un potenziamento della minaccia nucleare diretta esclusivamente contro l'Europa.

E' legittimo interrogarsi sulle ragioni di tale accresciuta disinvoltura. Non è certo da escludere che essa trovi incoraggiamento da un particolare clima psicologico che si è venuto ad istaurare, <sup>in Europa</sup> al quale non sono estranee le pressioni e le attività propagandistiche dell'URSS. (\*)

(\*) Rogers nell'odierna intervista alla Repubblica accenna, sulla base di informazioni attendibili alla presenza di personale sovietico all'interno del movimento dei pacifisti.



Ufficio del Consigliere Diplomatico  
del Presidente del Consiglio dei Ministri

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2. La rinuncia senza contropartita allo spiegamento dei missili americani in Europa sancirebbe la realizzazione di un obiettivo perseguito da tempo dall'Unione Sovietica e cioè la separazione tra il sistema di difesa dell'Europa Occidentale e quello degli Stati Uniti (il c.d. decoupling). Ma le finalità delle proposte sovietiche non si fermano qui. Ciò che viene proposto a Ginevra è un trattato che prevederebbe un impegno contrattuale preciso e permanente per gli Stati Uniti - quello della rinuncia a spiegare i missili in termini a lungo raggio in Europa Occidentale - mentre l'URSS assumerebbe un impegno flessibile che rimarrebbe <sup>di fatto</sup> subordinato alle decisioni prese autonomamente in materia di modernizzazione dei rispettivi sistemi nucleari da parte della Francia, della Gran Bretagna e Cina che non sarebbero firmatarie del Trattato. A parte il carattere giudicamenente anomalo di un accordo del genere, balza agli occhi il fatto che con esso si creerebbero le premesse per costringere negli anni a venire i Governi europei ad esercitare pressioni su Parigi e Londra perché rinunzino ai loro programmi di ammodernamento missilistico. E ciò perché, in caso contrario salirebbe parallelamente il livello della minaccia nucleare sovietica che è diretta non solo contro Francia e Gran Bretagna, ma anche contro i paesi europei non nucleari come Italia e Germania che non sarebbero protetti dai sistemi franco-britannici ed avrebbero rinunciato alla protezione dei sistemi americani.

Oltre a dividere gli Stati Uniti dall'Europa, l'Unione Sovietica realizzerebbe quindi anche l'obiettivo di porre in contrasto tra loro gli interessi di sicurezza dei paesi europei membri dell'Alleanza. Con buona pace non solo per la coesione di quest'ultima, ma anche per le idee, per altri versi apprezzabili, che vengono ricorrentemente avanzate sulla costituzione di un polo europeo di difesa nell'ambito della NATO.

3. E' sorprendente che simili proposte trovino un eco positivo da molte parti e siano considerate come basi più o meno accettabili di un accordo. Vogliamo sperare che questo non stia ad indicare che sotto il profilo politico-psicologico, il processo di finlandizzazione dell'Europa ~~è~~ <sup>è</sup> assai più avanzato di quanto avessimo fin qui ritenuto.



*Reagan, Ronald. The Reagan Diaries. Ed. Douglas Brinkley. New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 2007, p. 203.*

**Thursday, December 8 [1983]**

The Soviets have walked out of the “start” talks but not so definitely as in the INF talks. This is regular time for holiday break & they didn’t say they wouldn’t be back. They just said they were unable to set a date for their return.

Our dead Navy pilot is being returned to us by the Syrians. We still don’t know cause of death. After a couple of routine meetings & lunch with Geo. B. I left for Indianapolis. Addressed the Nat. Forum on Excellence in Ed. About 2000 teachers, students, state legislators, Govs., School Board members etc. Was well-received although I’m sure the few from N.E.A. weren’t happy. They were on record as saying that if I didn’t come with a pledge of more money for Ed. the meeting would be a “sham.” Well I didn’t come with any pledge – to the contrary I told them Fed. money was not the answer. I was given a very warm reception.

MEMORANDUM

9038

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

December 13, 1983

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCVARIANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK

SUBJECT: American Academic on Soviet Policy

The telegram from Moscow I mentioned this morning is attached at Tab I. It reports on the observations of an experienced American academic who spent about ten days in discussions with senior Soviet officials, including Boris Ponomarev, candidate member of the Politburo and head of the Central Committee's International Department, and several other Party and Institute officials not often seen by Americans.

Among the source's conclusions were:

--Fear of war seemed to affect the elite as well as the man on the street.

--A degree of paranoia seemed rampant among high officials, and the danger of irrational elements in Soviet decision making seems higher.

--The election next year seems to have become a key determinant in Soviet foreign policy making, with the aim not to permit the President to assume the role of peacemaker.

--There seems to be a growing climate of neo-Stalinism and outright chauvinism on the lower levels of the bureaucracy.

The scholar also was told that Andropov had directed a more activist role in the Middle East, and that Andropov is increasingly seeking to take control over foreign policy and to undermine Gromyko.

Paragraphs 2-11 are the most relevant ones in the long cable.

Attachment:

Tab I Moscow telegram 15409 of December 10, 1983.

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EXDIS  
E O 12356 DECL OADR  
TAGS PGOV, PREL, ECON, FINR, UR  
SUBJECT: AMERICAN ACADEMIC ON SOVIET FOREIGN AND  
DOMESTIC POLICY

1. ENTIRE TEXT

2. SUMMARY: AN AMERICAN ACADEMIC WITH EXCELLENT ENTREE TO THE SOVIET POLITICAL ELITE BRIEFED EMBASSY ON HIS DISCUSSIONS HERE NOVEMBER 27-DECEMBER 8. HE BELIEVES, BASED ON THESE DISCUSSIONS, THAT A SIGNIFICANT SHIFT HAS TAKEN PLACE IN SOVIET THINKING AND ATTITUDES, ESPECIALLY TOWARDS THE U.S., OVER THE PAST SIX MONTHS. WHERE EARLIER SOVIET DECISION-MAKING WAS FOUNDED ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY ON PRAGMATISM AND REASONED CALCULATION OF SOVIET INTERESTS, EMOTIONALISM AND EVEN IRRATIONALITY ARE NOW ENTERING INTO PLAY. THE ACADEMIC PERCEIVES A GROWING PARANOIA AMONG SOVIET OFFICIALS, AND SEES THEM LITERALLY OBSESSED BY FEAR OF WAR. HE BELIEVES THAT THE U.S. PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS HAVE BECOME THE CENTRAL DETERMINING FACTOR IN SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY.

3. THE ACADEMIC HAS NOTED, FURTHER, A CERTAIN SENSE OF LEADERLESSNESS AND A LACK OF AN INTEGRATED FOREIGN POLICY, WHICH HE ATTRIBUTES TO ANDROPOV'S LENGTHY ABSENCE FROM THE SCENE AND THE UNCERTAINTY THIS HAS GENERATED. HE FEELS THAT THERE ARE SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES WITHIN THE LEADERSHIP--PARTICULARLY ON DOMESTIC POLICY--AND PINPOINTS THE LOWER PARTY ORGANS (AT THE DISTRICT LEVEL) AND THE ECONOMIC BUREAUCRATS AS THE MAJOR SOURCES OF OPPOSITION TO ANDROPOV'S DOMESTIC PROGRAMS, AND ANTICIPATES THAT ANDROPOV WILL SHORTLY ATTEMPT TO OVERCOME THIS OPPOSITION THROUGH WIDESPREAD PERSONNEL CHANGES IN THE ECONOMIC MINISTRIES AND AT LOWER PARTY LEVELS. ALTHOUGH THE ACADEMIC SENSED THE SAME WIDESPREAD RECOGNITION AMONG HIS OVERLOOKERS AS HE HAD DURING A PREVIOUS VISIT IN MAY OF THE NECESSITY FOR ECONOMIC CHANGE, HE DETECTED MUCH LESS OPTIMISM THAT THE KIND OF CHANGE REQUIRED TO BREAK OUT OF THE CURRENT IMPASSE COULD BE REALIZED. HIS OWN BELIEF IS THAT THE LEADERSHIP IS EITHER UNWILLING OR UNABLE TO PURSUE OTHER THAN A GRADUAL, INCREMENTAL APPROACH TO ECONOMIC CHANGE, AND THAT EACH SMALL STEP WILL BE ABSORBED BY THE SYSTEM RATHER THAN REFORM IT.

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4. THE ACADEMIC'S INTERVIEWERS ACKNOWLEDGED THAT ANONIMUS HAD UNDERGONE AN OPERATION TO CLAIMED THAT HE WAS NOW BACK AT WORK ALTHOUGH A SCHEDULED VISIT TO THE ACADEMIC CENTER. THE INTERVIEWERS STATED THAT ANONIMUS HAD STOOD IN FOR ANOTHER SECRETARY DURING THE LATTER'S ABSENCE. ANONIMUS HAD BEEN COMPLETELY RECALLED BY THE SUBJECT.

5. THE ACADEMIC IDENTIFIED THREE MAJOR CURRENTS IN SOVIET THINKING THAT HAD EMERGED SINCE HIS VISIT HERE IN MAY.

A GROWING SENSE OF CONCERN OVER THE STATE OF THE NATIONAL ECONOMY AND A FEELING OF ANXIETY OVER THE CHANGES IN SOVIET POLICY GENERALLY. THE OFFICIAL LINE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS IS GENERALLY BELIEVED BY THE POPULACE.

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A HIGH DEGREE OF CONCERN AMONG HIGH OFFICIALS WITH WHOM THE ACADEMIC SPOKE, NOT UNLIKE THE ATTITUDE OF THIRTY YEARS AGO. SINCE HIS MAY VISIT, THE ACADEMIC HAS NOTICED THAT ATTITUDES HAVE BECOME MORE REGIONAL AND EMOTIONAL, ESPECIALLY WITH RESPECT TO THE U.S., AND HE DID NOT DISCOUNT THE POSSIBILITY OF EMOTIONAL CLEARANCE IN SOVIET DECISION-MAKING. HE CITED THE STRAIGHTFORWARD CLAIM MADE TO HIM BY ONE OFFICIAL THAT THE KAL FLIGHT HAD BEEN DELIBERATELY STAGED BY THE U.S. -- NOT AS AN INTELLIGENCE FEINT -- BUT TO PROVOKE THE USSR AND ANTI-SOVIET FEELINGS IN THE WORLD.

6. THE ACADEMIC DECLARED THAT THE STATEMENT RECENTLY MADE BY BRZEZINSKI THAT THE SOVIETS "WOULD CRAWL BACK TO THE NEGOTIATING TABLE" WAS COMPLETELY INCONSISTENT WITH

EXD-1

EXD-2

EXD-3

EXD-4

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