







DOCUMENT READER
PART I

THE EUROMISSILES CRISIS AND THE END OF THE COLD WAR, 1977-1987

10-12 DECEMBER 2009
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
ROME, ITALY

Convened by the Machiavelli Center for Cold War Studies (CIMA); the Woodrow Wilson Center's Cold War International History Project (CWIHP); Fondazione Craxi; the George Washington University's National Security Archive; the University of Paris III-Sorbonne Nouvelle; and the University of Paris I-Pantheon Sorbonne; in cooperation with Bundeskanzler Willy Brandt Stiftung; and under the sponsorship of the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Embassy of the United States in Rome.

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The Euromissiles Crisis and the End of the Cold War, 1977-1987

Dear Conference Participants,

We are pleased to present to you this document reader, intended to facilitate discussion at the upcoming conference on the Euromissiles Crisis, to be held in Rome on 10-12 December 2009.

This collection was compiled by the Cold War International History Project (CWIHP) and the Machiavelli Center for Cold War Studies (CIMA) with indispensable support from conference participants, outside contributors, and institutional sponsors. It is by no means comprehensive. In selecting the documents, we sought to include some of the most important materials available and to provide a broad overview of the Euromissiles Crisis from a variety of perspectives.

This reader is divided into four parts: *The Peace Movement* highlights the perspective of the grass-roots activists from both sides of the Iron Curtain who opposed the Euromissiles deployment and the arms race generally, and the three chronological sections on *International Diplomacy* focus upon the actions and views of the policy-makers and world leaders who were at the very center of the Euromissiles Crisis.

We are extremely grateful to everyone who contributed documentary evidence to this reader, including Gianni Battimelli, William Burr, Malcolm Byrne, Elizabeth Charles, Lodovica Clavarino, Helge Danielsen, Ruud van Dijk, Matthew Evangelista, Nathan Jones, Holger Nehring, Leopoldo Nuti, Giordana Pulcini, Bernd Rother, Giles Scott-Smith and James Graham Wilson. Piero Craveri, Laura Pizei and Serena Baldari played a key role in making documents from the Craxi Foundation available in this reader.

Once the documents were in hand, a number of people worked to ensure that this collection was ready for dissemination, including Christian Ostermann, Bernd Schaefer, Mircea Munteanu and Kristina Terzieva at CWIHP, the German Historical Institute's German History in Documents and Images Project Manager Kelly McCullough, Lars Unar Stordal Vegstein from the London School of Economics, as well as an extraordinarily capable team of CWIHP Research Assistants, including Pieter Biersteker, Amy Freeman, Ekaterina Radaeva, Elizabeth Schumaecker, and Katarzyna Stempniak.

This reader and the larger conference to which it is connected benefited immensely from the support of Fondazione Craxi, the National Security Archive at the George Washington University, the University of Paris III-Sorbone Nouvelle, the University of Paris I-Pantheon Sorbonne, Bundeskanzler Willy Brandt Stiftung, the London School of Economics' Cold War Studies Centre, and BCC Roma. The Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Embassy of the United States in Rome deserve special thanks for their central roles in sponsoring and hosting this conference.

Finally, we would also like to recognize the efforts of those whose hard work has made this conference possible, including Matteo Gerlini for his pioneering research at the Fondazione Craxi, and of course Leopoldo Nuti, and his outstanding staff, Giordana Pulcini, Lodovica Clavarino and Flavia Gasbarri, as well as the Wilson Center's Diana Micheli, who designed the conference poster and program.

Tim McDonnell
Washington, D.C.
November 2009

The Euromissiles Crisis and the End of the Cold War, 1977-1987

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Part One:
The Peace Movement

Rome, Italy, 10-12 December 2009

Volume 9. Two Germanies, 1961-1989
The Ostensible End of the Protest Movement (March 15, 1975)

In the following article, political scientist Bernd Guggenberger analyzes the protest movement of the previous years. He explores its motivations and strategies, as well as the reasons behind its apparent loss of momentum in the mid-1970s. On the basis of this analysis, Guggenberger predicts a "revived Biedermeier era," referring to a period in the early nineteenth century when people – at least publicly – made a turn away from politics and towards private life.

The Return to Reality

Where is the protest movement going? A definite answer to this question is impossible, if for no other reason than our temporal and spatial proximity to this phenomenon. The discernible approaches, motivations, and directions are too diverse and ambiguous: the development also proceeded too breathlessly; the passage of time left so many things outdated, things that the culturally-critical social sciences had already deemed all but "certain knowledge."

One only has to remember the theory of the "end of ideologies," which was proclaimed with missionary zeal until well into the 1960s. What remained of it when one took stock of things at the end of that decade? Not only did a new right-wing party establish itself here in the Federal Republic in the mid-1960s in the wake of the economic recession; a "New Left" also emerged, and as a worldwide movement at that. Its criticisms were ignited precisely by the anti-ideology stance of industrial society, the complacency of the older generation, the sobriety and everyday pragmatism of the politicians, and the general quest for affluence [*Wohlstandsorientierung*] that was prevailing everywhere.

What remains when we look back at the "doctrines" of the early 1970s today? And when we think of slick formulas such as re-ideologization, polarization, anarchy, and class struggle?

Today, in 1975, is the ideological permeation of broad areas of social life, indoctrination and political polarization, class struggle and anarchy still the central issue in schools and universities?

What is immediately obvious to everyone is that, outside the walls of our universities, and in large part even within them, things have gotten noticeably quieter. Gone is the pure excitement, the hectic revolutionizing, the outpouring of emotions. Gone, too, is the lightness, the optimism, the brilliant carefreeness that was thoroughly characteristic of this collective escape from the despised world of the fathers. Initially, the spokespeople of the "New Left" included many more artists and poets than politicians and functionaries of organizations. This has changed fundamentally. No longer does the talented loner, the critical, well-read, original, sharp-tongued, articulate individualist dominate the scene, but rather the – often meticulously tidy – wooden, but well-prepared, narrow-minded dogmatist of an SED-friendly "Marxism-Leninism."

With the new "Spartacist" formation (and some other large and small groups that call themselves Communist), the revolution has lost its "cosmopolitan" flair. It has become provincial, petty-minded, bigoted, and is mostly consumed by arguments about the proper exegesis of each respective text that promises liberation. It no longer feels responsible for all the world's problems, but contents itself – sometimes in a way that is almost pushy and petty – with the articulation of "student interests." At first glance, this new student generation doesn't seem all that different from the older, "quiet," or "skeptical" generation of the 1950s and early 1960s, which, from time to time, also "took to the battlefield" with neatly printed cardboard placards to protest increases in streetcar fares and cafeteria prices.

Despite all of the revolutionary slogans that remain (and can still be seen on university walls today), it is hard to overlook the fact that there is hardly anyone who still seriously believes in revolutionary interpretations of current situations. The revolution has been put on ice, and the revolutionaries are taking a breather. This "breather" served above all to push the revolution off the public stage. It is taking place once again – here in this country with typical German thoroughness – in auditoriums, in lecture halls, and at meetings of SPD leftists. The unusual sobriety actually points more to exhaustion than to a deceptive calm before a new storm. The revolutionaries are tired, sad, disillusioned. In the end, it is more draining to be against everything than to totally subordinate yourself to one idea, one mission, or one commitment, to dedicate yourself fully to one thing.

What the antiauthoritarian "New Left" never really managed to find, however, was precisely this sense of security and identification that springs from dedication to a cause. They never found a clear-cut theme, their own distinct purpose. For a while, they seemed to have found it in a concern for the Third World, in dealing with war, need, hunger, and suffering on the margins of the affluent world. Identification with the revolutionaries of the Third World promised guidance and a boost to one's own revolutionary efforts. By feigning participation in a worldwide, unified front of the oppressed, they gained courage and at the same time found a purpose and a direction for their own rebellious desires again. And they saw themselves as an important factor in the global struggle.

It was precisely the more far-sighted and critical theorists of the "New Left" who saw how much secret safeguarding of interests, how much "private" interest accompanied this orientation, how

unsustainable this strategy would thus be in the long run. Failure in the real world of politics and the accompanying frustration, the relapse into discouragement and desperation were not hard to prognosticate. On top of that, the political developments in Cuba, China, and Vietnam also made their own contribution. What had begun so full of hope, what had suddenly made the world seem so “young” again: the rediscovery of humanity, the feeling of being connected globally, the return to individuality, spontaneity, and the power of the human will to move mountains – all of this went off like fireworks. The antiauthoritarian exuberance has dissipated. People are finding a new point of orientation somewhere between subculture and party Communism.

The promising revolt against the constraints of the alienating world of technology and science was just a short flirt with freedom. All of a sudden, among the supporters of sub-culturalism, a privatistic cultural pessimism started to appear from behind the well-justified criticism of industrial society. The blind and desperate flight from reality and the future led to the total exclusion of any all-connecting social reference to the rest of the world.

The situation looks a little different on the “other side,” among the champions of an orthodox cadre strategy. Here, it is not the return to the individual person that offers evidence of capitulation in the face of the real tasks and problems that industrial society poses to socially imaginative citizens, regardless of their political orientation; instead, it is the “escape” into believing in the security-bestowing Marxist historical philosophy of the nineteenth century. Partaking of a more than century-old understanding of structure and law, which leads to an avowal of the social teachings of Marx, Engels, and Lenin, has less to do with “criticism” and “intellectual freedom” than with a deeply rooted need for security, safety, and a clear orientation with regard to the origins and goal, the meaning and future course of history. Believing in a law of history that works behind the participants’ backs and ultimately remains inaccessible to them always also involves some fear of freedom and some fear of the infinite openness and uncertainty of historical existence.

So what remains; what should remain? What is there to preserve beyond all the fronts and factions?

First and foremost, the protest of the young generation did away with a host of long-outdated taboos once and for all. What had often been regarded as unspeakable up to that point was called by name, without hesitation. Language and general behavior have become freer, if not always also more tolerant; but on the whole there was an increase in openness and the willingness to engage in criticism. This can certainly be entered as a win on the overall balance sheet, even if the “losses” cannot be ignored: a persistent lack of understanding of the need for governance, rash denouncements of “the formal,” of “superficiality” in social relations, of tradition in particular, and a general readiness to rebel that prevents authority from being able to be experienced as a source of enrichment and self-enhancement as well.

What was new and often unfamiliar: a basic, underlying moral sensitivity to need and misery, to the disenfranchised and oppressed, a sense of the one-ness of the world, of universal concern no matter where evil should emerge. But unconditional side-taking turned all too easily into aggression, knowledge into know-it-allness, and justifiable criticism into sweeping accusation.

And yet: the sometimes downright hectic "openness" to the problems of the time and the day would not fail to leave a lasting impression. Most of the problems that were raised were not the fantasies of pessimists or hysterics; they were about the basic survival of humanity. It was definitely not superfluous to point urgently, again and again, to the errors and weaknesses of our system, to imminent hunger catastrophes, psychological threats, the situation in the Third World, the self-destructive arms race, and a lot more. These things were not new in the sense that no one had ever recognized them or given them precise names. But they were brought into the public eye, the veil of indifference was torn away, and the disastrous adjustment to misery and worldly catastrophe was prevented, sometimes dramatically – this is certainly the unquestionable contribution of this movement. All of this is the original moral and emancipatory achievement of the "New Left."

But what will happen now? To be sure, the comparatively less spectacular "long march through the institutions" that we are experiencing now is not a carefully planned and systematically implemented strategy of overcoming the system by "treading softly." The revolution of yesterday and today is taking place partly in radio studios, newspaper editorial offices, publishing houses, educational institutions, political party groups, and the headquarters of associations. This definitely has something to do with political strategy, but far more with the transitory status of the mostly student rebels and the psychological constitution of the movement as a whole. After the relatively unproductive theoretical assault, most are now concerned with the concrete application and practical testing of system critique. Effective work in the neighborhood and the workplace, social involvement among apprentices and pupils, project-related teamwork in small groups – in the present phase of development all of this ranks far ahead of the distant goals of the revolution and is regarded as more important and more meaningful than comprehensive theoretical analyses and sweeping diagnoses of the era [*Zeitdiagnosen*].

What we are presently experiencing is a new, totally unfamiliar "modesty" with respect to political demands: an orientation toward what is closest at hand, toward whatever is directly important to one's life at the present time. It is a concentration on whatever seems just within the realm of the politically possible.

This return to modesty is no coincidence. It is part of a larger and more general shift in direction: the "limits to growth," an appeal to a moderating reason that cannot be ignored. The energy crisis, with its long-term repercussions for the stability of the entire global economy, has been a decisive factor in raising general awareness of the risks facing our planet. We are beginning to realize that the pathological cycle of the arms race, that the global resources, environmental, and food crises, that the stultification of cities, the social, cultural, and psychological crises that find expression in neuroses, drug addiction, asocial behavior, crime, and increasing suicide

rates, that all of these indicators of decline and self-destruction ineluctably force humanity to confront the question of survival.

The reality of crises and the growing awareness of crises also influence the development of the protest movement. In contrast to older social-revolutionary movements, this movement, from its very beginning, was not the product of shortage but rather of abundance. Therefore, the crisis of this affluent society [*Wohlstandgesellschaft*] is also its very own crisis, because only a prospering society can afford the "luxury" of a protest against affluence and its consequences. The end of the ideology of growth and prosperity also means the end of the manifestations that ignited the protest.

Added to this is the growing pressure that rising student numbers are exerting on universities. The practice of *numerus clausus*, which students in all disciplines will certainly be faced with soon, has already led students to worry so much about their own university admission and major that they barely have any leftover energy for other activities.

Because of this additional pressure, the protester sees himself as being entirely caught up, for the very first time, in a situation that has been ruled an overall crisis. He shares in the general fear of the future and experiences the doubt and uncertainty that plagues everyone. It can therefore be expected that his reactions will not deviate substantially from those coming from his social environment. He, too, will initially react to the dreaded situation of a general shortage of means by restricting his expectations and demands, also – and particularly – in the area of politics. He will be prepared to live with contradictions and compromises in a way that he would not be during times of carefree prosperity.

So, as for the prognosis for the further development of the protest movement: for the near future, a new Biedermeier era is more likely than a new chapter in the great battle for freedom. It remains to be seen whether our epoch, whether the heirs to the former protest generation, in particular, find their way to that "happiness based on melancholy" that literary historian Paul Kluckhohn attributed to the historical Biedermeier era in the period leading up to the March Revolution of 1848. Traces of worn-out, hypochondriac, privatist tendencies, a good dose of thinking about individual security, and the tendency to approach the inevitable with resignation – albeit without panic – are in any case easy to make out in current guiding models.

Source: Bernd Guggenberger, "Rückkehr in die Wirklichkeit" ["The Return to Reality"], *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, March 15, 1975.

Translation: Allison Brown

The 1977 Alastair Buchan Memorial Lecture

HELMUT SCHMIDT

The Alastair Buchan Memorial Lectures have been established as a tribute to the Institute's first Director. The 1977 Lecture was delivered by Helmut Schmidt, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, on 28 October 1977.

In his address the Chairman of the Institute's Council, Professor Ernst van der Beugel, welcomed the speaker as follows: 'Mr Chancellor, to govern implies a keen sense of priorities, the priority you have chosen in delivering the second Alastair Buchan Memorial Lecture, is a very high tribute to Alastair's memory and a great privilege for this Institute. Our welcome is twofold. We, of course, welcome you as Head of Government of the Federal Republic. We are, however, proud to welcome you also as Helmut Schmidt, member of this Institute since 1959. In welcoming you as Federal Chancellor, we would like to express our conviction that what happens in the Federal Republic will, to a very great extent, determine the fate of Europe and of the Western Alliance. We admire your achievements; we trust your policies; we share your concerns; you inspire our confidence, not in the least with regard to that central moral problem of Government: to strike a just and effective balance between freedom and authority. In welcoming our member, Helmut Schmidt, we think of the many intellectual contributions you have made to the work of this Institute by preparing papers and by participating in our discussions. In spite of the enormous burden of your high offices – Parliamentary Leader of your Party, Federal Minister of Defence, Federal Minister of Finance and, finally, Federal Chancellor – you have always found time for this Institute.

Alastair was primarily a scholar, but, at the same time, deeply interested in acts of policy. . . . It is, therefore, more than fitting that a man of action, dedicated to the conceptional basis on which policy should rest, honours with his Lecture this afternoon, the scholar, who never lost his link with concrete acts of policy'.

It is a privilege and a challenge for me to deliver to you today the 1977 Alastair Buchan Memorial lecture.

I consider it a very special privilege because in this way I can pay tribute to Alastair Buchan and at the same time indicate my appreciation and admiration for the work carried out by the International Institute for Strategic Studies. Alastair was a brilliant thinker on subjects concerning war and peace. He was an outstanding journalist. He was also a good pedagogue. When I first participated in an international meeting organized by the IISS there were several working groups among which was one on nuclear strategy and another on conventional warfare. I had volunteered for the latter but Alastair said, 'No, you go to the first one because this is what you have to learn'. And so I did. He was the fine Director of the Institute when I became a member 18 years ago; I came to be his friend because I shared his deep concern about maintaining world peace and global security as a major pre-requisite for human freedom and happiness.

At the same time I consider it a challenge to try to analyse within the short space of this memorial lecture some important aspects of Western security. I know that there are many in the audience today who have devoted more time and intellectual power to the dimensions of Western security about which I propose to speak: strategic and political aspects on the one hand, economic and social aspects on the other.

New Dimensions of Security

In preparing for this lecture I picked up again Alastair Buchan's book *Power and Equilibrium in the 1970s*.[1] It is an important and a very thoughtful book in which Alastair analysed the structure of world politics only five years ago. His main concern was with the balance of power

[1] *Power and Equilibrium in the 1970s* (London and New York: Praeger, 1972). The Russell C. Leffingwell Lectures, 1972.

between the United States, Western Europe, Japan, the Soviet Union and China. Brilliant thinker though he was, he did not at that time devote much attention to the economic, the social and the internal aspects of Western security, which I will discuss today as new dimensions of security. These aspects do not replace the earlier models of balance and imbalance of power around the globe. But I believe that they must be added to those concepts which, in time, they will change and modify. I know, of course, that Walter Bagehot once stated: 'One of the greatest pains of human nature is the pain of a new idea'. Yet I believe that it is in the best interest of a tradition established and promoted by Alastair to try to understand these new dimensions of security now rather than to discover in the future that we made the wrong decisions because we failed to understand them and take them into consideration.

What are these new dimensions? First, economic development. By this I mean the necessity to safeguard the basis of our prosperity, to safeguard free trade access to energy supplies and to raw materials, and the need for a monetary system which will help us to reach those targets. There was a feeling not too long ago that we had few problems in this field. However, the oil crisis, the phasing out of the Bretton Woods agreement, world-wide inflation, unemployment and inadequate economic growth, have together changed the picture and have created widespread feelings of insecurity.

Second, social security. By this I mean the necessity to achieve and maintain social peace at home, making goods and jobs available for our people and at the same time telling them bluntly that there are limits to what the state can do for them. It is in this connection that I would like to congratulate my friends Jim Callaghan and Denis Healey on their success in fighting inflation and restoring confidence in Sterling. The battle is not yet over, but you, the British, have come a long way since last year and I firmly believe that the outlook is good.

Third, domestic security. By this I mean the necessity to strengthen and defend our society against terrorists whose sole aim is to destroy its fabric with acts of brutal killing and kidnapping. You have had your share of terrorist activity in this country and you have faced up to it. Now we in Germany are faced with a different, but equally ugly, form of terrorism. So are the Dutch and other nations. We are determined to put an end to it without sacrificing the liberal qualities of our society. In connection with this I would like to point to and applaud the work done by the IISS in analysing terrorism, and I want to urge more international co-operation to stop terrorist activities.

J. B. Priestly in his book *The English* quotes himself – because he believes his idea is important, and I fully agree – to the effect that foreigners often only see the walls around the gardens of Britain and fail to appreciate the beauty of what lies within them. Here indeed is one of the main reasons why many foreigners misjudge Britain and the British. But in the framework of this lecture the analogy has another application: in the past we have all worked towards maintaining and mending our outward defences but have possibly neglected the economic structure of our gardens, the importance of the well-being of its plants and the threats to their roots. Therefore, while I do not mean to suggest that we should drop our guard of outward defence, I shall devote most of this lecture to the internal considerations of Western security. I shall concentrate on the economic dimensions, but first I shall analyse some current strategic and political issues.

The Necessity of Arms Control

Most of us will agree that political and military balance is the prerequisite of our security, and I would warn against the illusion that there may be grounds for neglecting that balance. Indeed, it is not only the prerequisite for our security but also for fruitful progress in East–West detente.

In the first place we should recognize that – paradoxical as it may sound – there is a closer proximity between a hazardous arms race, on the one hand, and a successful control of arms, on the other, than ever before. There is only a narrow divide between the hope for peace and the danger of war.

Second, changed strategic conditions confront us with new problems. SALT codifies the nuclear strategic balance between the Soviet Union and the United States. To put it another way: SALT neutralizes their strategic nuclear capabilities. In Europe this magnifies the significance of the

disparities between East and West in nuclear tactical and conventional weapons.

Third, because of this we must press ahead with the Vienna negotiations on mutual balanced force reductions (MBFR) as an important step towards a better balance of military power in Europe.

No one can deny that the principle of parity is a sensible one. However, its fulfilment must be the aim of all arms-limitation and arms-control negotiations and it must apply to all categories of weapons. Neither side can agree to diminish its security unilaterally.

It is of vital interest to us all that the negotiations between the two super-powers on the limitation and reduction of nuclear strategic weapons should continue and lead to a lasting agreement. The nuclear powers have a special, an overwhelming responsibility in this field. On the other hand, we in Europe must be particularly careful to ensure that these negotiations do not neglect the components of NATO's deterrence strategy.

We are all faced with the dilemma of having to meet the moral and political demand for arms limitation while at the same time maintaining a fully effective deterrent to war. We are not unaware that both the United States and the Soviet Union must be anxious to remove threatening strategic developments from their relationship. But strategic arms limitations confined to the United States and the Soviet Union will inevitably impair the security of the West European members of the Alliance *vis-à-vis* Soviet military superiority in Europe if we do not succeed in removing the disparities of military power in Europe parallel to the SALT negotiations. So long as this is not the case we must maintain the balance of the full range of deterrence strategy. The Alliance must, therefore, be ready to make available the means to support its present strategy, which is still the right one, and to prevent any developments that could undermine the basis of this strategy.

At the meeting of Western heads of State and Government in London last May I said that the more we stabilize strategic nuclear parity between East and West, which my Government has always advocated, the greater will be the necessity to achieve a conventional equilibrium as well.

Today, again in London, let me add that when the SALT negotiations opened we Europeans did not have a clear enough view of the close connection between parity of strategic nuclear weapons, on the one hand, and tactical nuclear and conventional weapons on the other, or if we did, we did not articulate it clearly enough. Today we need to recognize clearly the connection between SALT and MBFR and to draw the necessary practical conclusions.

At the same meeting in May I said that there were, in theory, two possible ways of establishing a conventional balance with the Warsaw Pact states. One would be for the Western Alliance to undertake a massive build-up of forces and weapons systems; the other for both NATO and the Warsaw Pact to reduce their force strength and achieve an overall balance at a lower level. I prefer the latter.

The Vienna negotiations have still not produced any concrete agreement. Since they began the Warsaw Pact has, if anything, increased the disparities in both conventional and tactical nuclear forces. Up to now the Soviet Union has given no clear indication that she is willing to accept the principle of parity for Europe, as she did for SALT, and thus make the principle of renunciation of force an element of the military balance as well.

Until we see real progress on MBFR, we shall have to rely on the effectiveness of deterrence. It is in this context and no other that the public discussion in all member states of the Western Alliance about the 'neutron weapon' has to be seen. We have to consider whether the 'neutron weapon' is of value to the Alliance as an additional element of the deterrence strategy, as a means of preventing war. But we should not limit ourselves to that examination. We should also examine what relevance and weight this weapon has in our efforts to achieve arms control.

For the first time in history arms-control negotiations are being conducted when there exists a weapon capable of destroying all living things. Failure of such negotiations can no longer be compensated for by banking on military victory. That is why it is of such crucial importance that all should realize the seriousness of the Vienna negotiations, and why results must be achieved there. I would like to list seven 'musts' and 'must nots' for these negotiations:

1. Both sides, all participants in the MBFR negotiations, must state their willingness to bring the negotiations to a positive con-

clusion and to be party to reductions on an equal basis.

2. Priority must be given to the aim – and it must be achieved without delay – of preventing any further increase in the military confrontation, and thus dispelling apprehensions.
3. The threat of a surprise attack must be eliminated.
4. The confidence-building measures voluntarily agreed at the CSCE must be accepted with binding effect.
5. It must remain the principal objective of MBFR to achieve, by means of reductions, a balance of forces at a lower level.
6. Force reductions must be oriented to the principle of parity and must be verifiable. Parity and collectivity must be recognized as the fundamental and determining principles.
7. The capability of both Alliance systems to organize their defence must not be impaired.

We should also consider whether it is necessary to extend the confidence-building measures beyond the agreed scope. Even if we should achieve conventional parity within the MBFR reduction area, this will still fall considerably short of parity of conventional forces in Europe as a whole. This is underlined by the fact that the Soviet Union has substantially increased her strategic reinforcement capabilities and could rapidly bring forwards forces concentrated outside the reduction area whereas American forces, if reduced in MBFR, would be cut off from Europe by the Atlantic.

Since the West formulated its double strategy of deterrence and detente ten years ago, progress along the road to detente has been respectable. The 'Ostpolitik' of the Federal Republic of Germany, based firmly on the Alliance, has promoted and helped to shape this development. The Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin has been another step towards stability and security in Europe. Berlin, once a major source of crisis, is not the problem it was. Security in Europe has been reinforced by bilateral agreements in which the parties undertake not to resort to force.

The American commitment to Europe no longer stems solely from rights and obligations arising from World War II. Rather, that commitment rests on the security interests of the United States and Western Europe alike. The Soviet Union and her allies have explicitly recognized this fact by putting their signatures to the Final Act of the CSCE in Helsinki. For us in Germany, the German question remains open; we are called upon to achieve the reunification of Germany. But the German question cannot, and must not, have priority over peace. This is a contribution of the Federal Republic of Germany to stability in Europe.

World Economy and Security

The need for deterrence and detente cannot, however, detract from the fact that a sound economy – and for me this includes full employment just as much as social justice – is the foundation of all security. This is true in two ways: unless our economy flourishes we can maintain neither the military equilibrium nor the stability of our free and democratic institutions. The Western economies have been profoundly shaken by the serious recession following worldwide inflation, the collapse of the international monetary system, and the oil crisis. Today our primary task is to restabilize the economic foundations of the democratic state and thus not least the foundations of our common security policy. Let me stress what Henry Kissinger said in his 1976 Alastair Buchan Memorial lecture before this Institute:

> A world that cries out for economic advance, for social justice, for political liberty and for a stable peace needs our collective commitment and contribution.[2]

Today, just as in the immediate aftermath of World War II, the economic and military aspects of our security policy are again on a par with each other. In 1947 George Marshall called for a working economy to establish the political and social conditions under which free institutions can exist. That task presents itself anew today under different conditions. Since the end of World War II the Western democracies, favoured by constant economic growth, have experienced the full effects of democratic equality; they have transformed themselves into open societies with more social justice. For the individual citizen, the State is today the guarantor of social

[2] 'The 1976 Alastair Buchan Memorial Lecture', *Survival*, Vol. XVIII, No. 5, September/October 1976 (London: IISS), p. 194.

security and social justice. Never before has the working population had so large a share of the nation's economic prosperity.

We have to ask ourselves, however, whether this redistribution process has not cut profits unreasonably and thus caused the decline in investment and capital expenditure in recent years. One cause of our economic problem – that of insufficient investment and capital expenditure – lies, I believe, in the greater risks for companies arising from the faster rate at which the world economic structure is changing, rising oil and energy prices, and the partial saturation of important markets in the industrial countries.

Owing to the development of the social security network, public expenditure in this area has risen at a faster rate from year to year than the gross national product. Today we have, I believe, reached the load limit in many of our countries, at least for the time being.

On top of this, the developing countries are stepping up their demands on the Western industrial world. They demand both full control over their raw materials and higher prices; they demand more development aid; they demand the biggest possible share of the benefits of Western investment in the Third World; and they demand unrestricted access for their industrial products into our markets. In the last analysis, these are claims on the gross national product of the Western industrial countries.

For years the Western countries have been exposed to the pressure of inflation, the result of excessive demands on their GNP. It was the monetary crisis of 1971 that exposed challenges, which existed earlier, in concrete form. In the following years inflation was fuelled by an unprecedented boom in the commodity sector, and ultimately by the price policy of the OPEC cartel. All this led to a structural upheaval in the global balances of payment network, to a structural upheaval in world trade, in world demand and thereby in employment.

The dangers of inflation are still with us today. Throughout the world, the days of cheap energy and raw materials are over: prices are very likely to continue to rise in real terms, and this means relative to the price of the goods which the industrial countries manufacture and export.

The answer to our problems cannot lie in dismantling our social achievements, in rolling back social progress. The stability of liberal democracy depends on the extent to which we can secure greater social justice. If the Federal Republic of Germany is today enjoying considerable stability it is because she has made social justice a broad reality.

There are three problems which the West will have to resolve in the economic sector, not least for the sake of its security.

The first is to construct and safeguard a liberal, flexible and hence working world economic system. The international economic order we created after 1945 enabled the Western democracies – and also some developing countries – to expand their economies at a speed and with a constancy which have no parallel in economic history. Through their free trade and capital transactions the Western countries have grown more and more into one vast market. The ever-increasing international division of labour was, and still is, the main source of progress and prosperity. National economies have thus become increasingly interdependent. But this interdependence, of a hitherto unknown degree, has not only provided stronger impulses for growth in an expanding world economy, but has also now led to greater inflation and recession. The effects of the world recession have been greatest for those countries whose economic structure is least flexible and whose political management has been least able to adjust to the new situation. This crisis has deepened the disparities between the Western countries. It has exacerbated the divergence of rates of inflation, and created payments imbalances which have grown steadily worse.

The recession has thus become a great threat to our world economic system: the tendency to try to solve problems unilaterally with protectionist measures has increased, and is increasing daily. We must ward off this threat in a united effort.

Protectionism offers no solutions. World economic interdependence has led to a synchronization of economic fluctuations between all nations. Where, as in the countries of Western Europe, exports in important branches of industry account for half or more of total production, no single country can free itself from the vortex of world economic recession by its own efforts. In practice, nations have lost their economic autonomy. An attempt to return to unilateral national measures would be

disastrous. The only way out is through closer economic co-operation.

The Western democracies are about to embark on this road. Since the beginning of the recession we have successfully intensified our efforts to co-ordinate economic policy. We have agreed to pursue growth and full employment without repeating the old inflationary mistakes.

To achieve this consensus is essential. Let me make this point clear: there are no economic panaceas which can be recommended to, or prescribed for, governments by majority decisions, as it were. Each government must, in consultation with its partners, take those steps which take into account the special situation of its country.

In this joint effort a major aim must be to restore foreign trade equilibrium. The present payments imbalances originate only partly from the oil price explosion. In the three years 1974–6, the accumulated OPEC surplus amounted to 145 billion US-dollars, whereas the deficit countries were in the red on current account to the amount of 210 billion. The oil price explosion can, therefore, explain only part of the deterioration of the global balance of payments network.

The current account deficits of the oil-consuming industrial and developing countries in relation to OPEC cannot be rectified by traditional instruments of adjustment. The prime remedy is to consume less oil. Other measures are the development of alternative sources of energy and the stepping up of exports to the oil-exporting countries in line with their own development and the increase in their capacity to absorb goods from the industrial oil consumers.

In the meantime we must provide adequate facilities for financing these deficits but in a way which does not delay the reduction of non-oil deficits. The creation of the Witteveen facility is an important step to this end.

Today, the structural modification caused by the progressive international division of labour coincides with other structural changes, such as in demand, or technical changes on the supply side. This has no doubt led to an aggravation of the employment situation and a strengthening of protectionist forces.

However, we must realize that trade policy cannot serve as a national instrument for creating jobs. Such a solution could only have short-term success – that is, only until such time as the trade partners take countermeasures. These considerations apply to Europe in particular. The European Community, being the world's biggest exporter and importer, depends on open markets. To yield to protectionist temptations would be suicidal for Europe.

Markets must be kept open for industrial exports from the Third World as well. The Western countries need co-operation with the Third World on a basis of trust, and it is in their own uppermost interest to integrate the developing countries fully into the system of world trade.

What is more, in view of saturation in our own markets, the markets of the developing countries with their unlimited demand potential could become an important pillar of our future growth. However, if one wants to export one must import as well. We should therefore enable the developing countries, by more imports and greater transfers of capital, to buy more from us.

The OECD countries have so far, on the whole, withstood the temptation of protectionism and kept their markets open. This success is of crucial importance. It contrasts our present situation with that of the 1930s when the Western countries, by destroying free world trade, drove each other into a state of permanent depression and permanent unemployment.

As far as my own country is concerned, we are resolved to continue to keep our markets open. On 1 July 1977 the West–European Free Trade Zone was implemented. It is the world's largest free trade area for industrial products. The open system of world trade must be maintained.

Access to Raw Materials

The second major task which confronts us is to ensure our raw material and energy supplies. Let us bear in mind that whereas the Eastern industrial countries are self-sufficient as a group, at least in raw material and energy supplies for the time being, the West, apart from foodstuffs, consumes more raw materials and oil than it produces. The Western countries depend on massive imports from the Third World.

There are thus two sources of danger for our raw material supplies. These supplies can be endangered, for one thing, by the outbreak of war or civil war in Third World regions, and, for another, by insufficient production due to insufficient investment in the Third World.

We have all been conscious of the first source

of danger since the Middle East war of 1973 and the oil crisis. Another region which is of vital importance to the security of our raw material supplies and which has become a trouble spot in international affairs is Southern Africa.

Conflicts in the Third World give the Soviet Union an opportunity to expand her influence. Imagine the implications for Western economic security if the Soviet Union, with South Africa and Rhodesia, as her allies, were to monopolize, for example, world chromium supplies. To avert the dangers arising out of Third World instability the West has to pursue a policy aimed at the peaceful solution of conflicts and a peaceful conciliation of interests in those regions.

The conflicts in the Middle East and Southern Africa have long attracted the attention of Western foreign policy. The United States is making every effort to mediate in the Israel–Arab conflict. Europe supports this by an effort of its own and by its willingness to play an active part in the economic reconstruction and development of the region following a peace settlement. In Rhodesia, London and Washington in particular are trying to bring about a peaceful transfer of power to the black majority; in Namibia the five Western members of the Security Council are trying to find a solution. The Federal Republic of Germany is playing an active part there. The Western powers are endeavouring to convince South Africa of the need for fundamental and rapid reforms.

Even if political stability can be assured, however, one can only import what has been previously produced. Here lies the second source of danger for our raw material supplies.

Raw material investment in developing countries is no longer financed and promoted as it once was. In the mining sector in particular, exploration and prospecting in the Third World have largely come to a standstill. There can be no doubt about the long-term consequences. Henry Kissinger warned at UNCTAD IV against an explosion of raw material costs – he should rather have said prices – should the current investment trends continue. The lead-time for large-scale mining projects is six to eight years and sometimes more. In other words, the said danger to our raw material supplies does not hit us today – but it is today that we must act.

The indispensable co-operation between industrial and developing countries in the exploitation of raw material resources must be restored and intensified. To provide stable and close co-operation between industrialized and developing countries it is, I believe, necessary and justified that guarantees for those private investments should be given by the host countries. This should become a general rule and, in the framework of the North–South dialogue, a necessary *quid pro quo*.

How should we ensure our energy supplies? If there is a cardinal problem for the economic security of the West, it is that of energy. More than half of the Western world's energy requirements is at present being met by mineral oil. But we must face a fact which no policy can change: this is the exhaustion of world oil reserves which is now becoming apparent. Recent studies by the OECD, MIT and EXXON agree that predictable oil supplies may not even suffice to cover requirements in the 1980s. And I am afraid this fundamental fact will not be notably changed even by the new oil fields which you in Britain have discovered in the North Sea.

The main consequence is that the wasteful use of energy, of which we have made a habit, must stop. We must be quick to make decisive progress on energy conservation and the development of new types of energy.

In this situation the industrial countries cannot afford to forego any option for energy policy. This is particularly true for nuclear energy. But I would add that a key role in this respect falls to the United States who uses half of the energy consumed by the Western world. It is therefore in our interest that President Carter should be successful with his energy conservation programme.

Trade with the East

The third major task of Western security policy in economic terms is to establish balanced and stable economic relations with the Communist state trading countries of the East.

Since 1970 East–West trade has practically quadrupled. The Federal Republic of Germany is the most important Western trade partner of each of the Communist Eastern countries. This strong intensification of trade and co-operation is the result of political detente and also of the economic interests of both sides. The economies of the Communist East have reached a stage of

development where their growth also depends more and more on an increase in productivity. That is why the East has a strong and lasting interest in importing Western technology.

The East, due to its large potential of raw materials and energy, affords the West the possibility of diversifying, to a certain extent, its raw material and energy imports. At the same time it offers markets which are especially attractive for the West because they are not, or not fully, involved in the synchronization of Western business cycles. In 1975, for instance, due to the world recession, German exports dropped by almost 4 per cent in nominal terms whereas the exports to the Soviet Union rose by 46 per cent, thus making a valuable contribution towards improved use of capacities and a better employment situation in my country.

Who, then, derives the greater benefit from East–West trade? There are critics in the West who say that the West, by its technology exports, indirectly helps the Soviet military build-up. Critical voices in the East will probably object that helping the West to preserve jobs is supporting the capitalist system. I believe that these conflicting arguments in themselves indicate that East–West trade benefits both sides. And so, after all, it should and must be.

A couple of decades ago the American writer Ambrose Bierce said: 'Calamities are of two kinds: misfortune to ourselves and good fortune to others'. I do not think that this applies in modern economic conditions of interdependence. I would say today: economic misfortune to others will cause calamity to ourselves. And good fortune to others will also cause good fortune to ourselves.

If the Western countries act jointly, the development of trade relations and of industrial co-operation with the East can, I am convinced, be essential for both our own economic security and the safeguarding of peace.

Another urgent task I have often mentioned is to get the East to assume a constructive role in the North–South issue. So far, the Soviet Union and her allies have supported verbally the demands of the developing countries, but as regards financial support they have been trying to pin the responsibility entirely on the West. The development aid of the East is negligible compared with its economic potential, and even more so compared with Western contributions. In 1976, for instance, the amount of official development assistance transferred by the Federal Republic of Germany alone was two and a half times as high as the total transfer made by the Soviet Union plus all the other Eastern bloc countries together. Or to give you another example: the official development assistance of all the OECD countries in 1976 was 27 times as high as that of the Comecon countries including the Soviet Union.

The integration of the Eastern countries into the world economic system has already progressed so far that they can feel the direct impact of inflation and recession in the Western industrial countries. They should recognize, therefore, that world economic stability is in their own interest. But this stability, and ultimately the stability of world peace, can no longer be ensured unless hunger and distress in the Third World are overcome. This is a goal which requires the joint efforts of all industrial countries. The Eastern bloc countries can no longer retain the role of disinterested onlookers in the North–South dialogue, limiting their support to the supply of military weapons.

Terrorism

Finally, let me say a few words about the deep shock we have all felt over the last four weeks as a result of terrorist action. The focal point of the events themselves was my country, but from day to day it became increasingly clear to people in all corners of the world that terrorism is not a problem of exclusively German concern but an international problem of global dimension.

In my country, we have experienced with gratitude what it means in such a situation when other countries rally round with advice, with active assistance. And it has been an exercise and a very fine experience in practical solidarity. During those days, gestures were made, I feel, for co-operation among the world's nations and for a common stand, a common effort to overcome the plague of international terrorism with its contempt for human life and with its aim of destroying democratic society.

I would like to express the hope that this terrible experience will prompt the United Nations to adopt quickly the convention which we have proposed against the taking of hostages. Nobody today can any longer make light of terrorist violence as the work of people who

have simply been led astray by allegedly political motives, and on top of that grant them political asylum. Jonathan Carr in the *Financial Times* wrote the other day: 'The German terrorist cannot really be classed with any political wing. If they can be compared to anything it is to Dostoievski's devils, people who by their own admission are ready even to throw acid into a child's face if it will help their cause. What is that cause? Beyond destroying society it is impossible to say'.[3] I think he is right. Moreover, the effect is not only on domestic politics. In extreme circumstances terrorism might even trigger off international conflict.

Therefore, we should act together to confront the blindness of terrorist killers with the steadfastness of our democratic convictions. Let us together continue to defend human dignity and human rights as inviolable and inalienable values; and let us defend the right to live and to enjoy personal freedom, rights we all identify as inalienable principles.

Ladies and gentlemen, I have tried to outline the dimensions of a policy aimed at establishing and maintaining a state of affairs in which our free democratic institutions can survive and prosper.

The industrial democracies of the West produce 65 per cent of the world's goods and their share in world trade is 70 per cent. They are the motive force of world economic growth and technological progress. The power and moral superiority of our belief in the freedom and dignity of Man is evident.

This is why, inspired by a constructive will for reform, all of us endeavour perpetually to renew democracy. Only in this way can we remove weaknesses, obsolete conditions, and injustices.

The industrial democracies of the world must further intensify their co-operation: in the European Community, in the Atlantic Community and in the Trilateral Community formed by Europe, North America, and the Pacific region embracing Japan, Australia and New Zealand. This cohesion is of crucial importance for peace, for economic growth and the cause of freedom, justice and human dignity.

[3] *The Financial Times*, 24 October 1977, p. 16.

No less decisive, however, is the relationship between the two big powers, because on them depends how much of the surface of our globe will be covered by the policy of detente and to what extent its substance will be strengthened by a policy aimed at preserving peace. We feel encouraged by the statements made by the two leading personalities of both sides.

Jimmy Carter gave the assurance that in the search for world peace the United States will be found in the forefront and stand by her commitment to the freedom of Man. The following passage from his speech before the United Nations on 4 October 1977 appears to me to be of particular significance.

> We must look beyond the present, and work to prevent the critical threats and instabilities of the future. If the principles of self-restraint, reciprocity and mutual accommodation of interests are observed, then the United States and the Soviet Union will not only succeed in limiting weapons, but will also create a foundation for better relations in other spheres of interests.[4]

Leonid Brezhnev said early this year:

> The allegations that the Soviet Union goes beyond its defence requirements and is seeking military superiority to be able to deal the first blow are malicious and unfounded.

And in the same speech Brezhnev rightly stated:

> There is no more burning and vital task than that of making peace durable and indestructible.

He added:

> As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, we shall not be found wanting.[5]

In our quest for security and peace in Europe and world-wide, we shall take the two statesmen by their word. For, in the last resort, the survival of mankind depends on the strengthening of world peace.

[4] Address by President Carter to the UN General Assembly, 4 October 1977 (USIS).

[5] Leonid Brezhnev, 'Outstanding Exploit of the Defenders of Tula', *Pravda*, 19 January 1977.

A DIALOGUE WITH THE SOVIETS: NUCLEAR WEAPONS, DISARMAMENT AND NUCLEAR ENERGY

American Friends Service Committee
1501 Cherry Street
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A DIALOGUE WITH THE SOVIETS: NUCLEAR WEAPONS, DISARMAMENT AND NUCLEAR ENERGY

September 22 - October 1, 1979

by Everett Mendelsohn

For two weeks in late September and early October, 1979 a delegation called together by the American Friends Service Committee visited the Soviet Union. The intent of the group was to discuss the nuclear arms race and the relations between military and civilian uses of nuclear energy. Members of the group included a number of activists directly involved in nuclear disarmament projects and others with long interest in nuclear warfare, disarmament and nuclear energy issues:

Dr. Helen Caldicott
Dr. William Sloan Coffin
Dr. Arthur Macy Cox
Marta Daniels
Dr. William Harris
Dr. Everett Mendelsohn
Wendy Mogey
Terry Provance
Pam Solo

Our discussion centered around six issues: (1) Cuba, the Soviet interpretation of what Cuba means for the current SALT discussions, and ratification procedures in the Senate and what the Soviets think it means for the development of U.S. policy; (2) the SALT treaty itself, the ratification process in the Senate, and Soviet views regarding the implications of potential failure to ratify the treaty; (3) what comes after SALT, especially initiatives for capping the arms race; (4) Euro-strategic weapons and the decisions that NATO will be making in the next two and one-half months concerning their deployment; (5) talking to the Soviets about what it means to talk to Americans; and (6) nuclear energy, particularly focusing on weapons proliferation, waste

disposal, health matters, and alternative perspectives for energy.

Overall Evaluation:

Having made a number of visits in the last decade and a half to the Soviet Union to discuss political and disarmanent issues, I found on this visit a greater flexibility in mind, a greater willingness to explore approaches that were not theirs, than I had found at any previous time. The involvement of increasing numbers of people in discussions of this sort with Americans and other Europeai shows. Their ability to hear our ideas, reflect on them, as well as to expound their own ideas, was impressive. This confirms a view which a number of others, particularly those in and around Pugwash, have had, that there is the beginning of a substantial, knowledgeable, disarmament-oriented community within the Soviet intellectual and policy world, and particularly among senior advisors to the Soviet government. The frankness we had in our discussions, however, means that we really cannot attribute statements directly to many people by name. Instead, we are able to list the people with whom we talked and to describe the different issues we talked about and the kinds of responses we found in general terms.

Cuba and SALT

Let me turn first to the Cuba issue. We discussed this issue at two places--one, the Institute of the U.S.A. and Canada, which is one of the Institutes of the Academy of Sciences, which are not only scholarly, but from which several members (including its Director) are very senior advisors to the Soviet government. We talked with them in groups, and on one or two occasions, on an individual basis. Further, we talked directly with two high-ranking members of the Soviet

Foreign Ministry, both of whom had been deeply involved in the SALT negotiations at the very highest levels.

Cuba worries them, and the American response to Cuba worries them. It worries them because they see the issue of Cuba and the question of troops there as unrelated to the SALT negotiations except in the most general way. They felt that the American reaction to what was purportedly discovered is a contrived reaction; they felt that the issue was being used by hawks as a way of undermining the credibility of SALT within the Senate. They were particularly disturbed by the fact that it was the Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Frank Church, who broke the issue and broke it in as negative a manner as possible. They were worried by the sharp positions people took--"SALT ratification is not possible unless the Soviets change their current position," said Frank Church. "The status quo will mean the defeat of SALT," said the Carter administration in one of its early briefings.

Within the course of our discussion in the Foreign Ministry they gave their explanation of the Cuban situation in the following terms. At the time of the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, there had been between 25,000 and 30,000 Soviet troops and the beginnings of missile emplacements. During the negotiations that took place at that time the Soviet Union agreed to cut down their troops and to withdraw missiles on a reciprocal basis. At the same time, the U.S. cut back troop emplacements and withdrew its forward base missile system from Turkey. The reciprocity was in the agreement and in the signed documents at the time. Their feeling is that at the moment this reciprocity is being undercut.

I would stress here the extent to which reciprocity is an important concept for the Soviets; they came back to it over and over again in the discussion. It was on this basis that they felt something else was happening in the current situation beyond the actual problem of troops. They pointed out that there are approximately 2500 Soviet troops involved, they say, in training missions, and 1300 Soviet civilian personnel involved in back-up, training, and support systems. They point out that these 2500 troops are comparable to the number of U.S. troops stationed at the Guantanamo Naval Base on Cuban soil. Further, they note that these 2500 troops and civilian advisors, while they rotate in and out, have been in Cuba constantly since 1962, and they point out that American intelligence has known this constantly since 1962. They have had neither opportunity to hide this nor reason to do so, and they list a number of documents and statements made by U.S. intelligence over the years showing that the presence of Soviet troops in Cuba has been known and monitored all along. With this in mind, then, they wonder what will come next from the U.S. political arena and they expressed real fears that this may undermine the SALT ratification procedures. I confess that we couldn't help but be in general agreement with their sense of total disillusionment of the introduction of the Cuba issue into the middle of the SALT ratification process.

SALT Ratification - Soviet Perspectives

Let me turn to SALT and indicate who it was that we talked to on this issue. In addition to the Foreign Ministry and the Institute of the U.S.A. and Canada, we talked to members of the Institute of World Economics and International Relations, the senior

editor of Izvestia, who is well known as a personal advisor to Brezhnev as well as being one of the senior columnists and commentators in the Soviet political system, a former admiral, with connections to the Ministry of Defense. We also had conversations on the issue with several political officers at the U.S. Embassy.

There is little doubt that SALT looms large in the Soviet perspective and that they place great importance on its ratification without substantial amendment. They feel that if the treaty must go back to renegotiation, the process may be thoroughly undercut. They see a lack of leadership in directing SALT through the Senate, and this concerns them. They wonder about whether the U.S. is indeed serious about arms control or whether SALT is being used as a pretext for further advancement of arms, and they point out that the Senate is insisting on a 5% increase in arms spending for next year.

Equality

A couple of issues involved in SALT are important to underline. First, the concept of equality. SALT II, as no prior U.S.-Soviet agreement does, includes an agreement that the weapons capabilities on both sides now have reached equality. To the Soviets this was a terribly important step, for in their view, as long as they were seen as the second-rate power, they were in position to be manipulated. Having announced equality and written it into the treaty, they now claim that there is a new position from which to move toward more general arms reduction rather than just arms control.

Soviet Data:

A second item which is terribly important from the U.S. point of view is that the treaty gives real numbers. For the first

time in a signed treaty with the Soviets there are accounting systems. We know how many missiles they have in place and of what sort. That both the Soviets and the U.S. have agreed on the actual numbers of weapons in existence gives a base line from which any future negotiations can take place. In the past this has been a difficult issue, but in this case the Soviets have given the numbers that we have always said are necessary. Further, the treaty includes the full expectation of verification. Both sides believed that they had confidence in their own inspection and verification systems.

If SALT Fails

What if SALT fails? Certainly this was the major question on the minds of the Soviets with whom we talked, and in our minds as well. None of us in our delegation is a vigorous supporter of SALT itself, but all are vigorous opponents of its defeat, and this was communicated to our hosts. SALT, we felt, does not go nearly far enough in stopping the arms race; on the contrary, it allows continued escalation. On the other hand, the defeat of SALT in the current political situation could well mean not only a turn-back in political terms, a turn-back to Cold War attitudes (which, after all, is exactly what the opponents of SALT in the Senate and outside are calling for), but could also trigger a substantial addition to the arms race. This addition could be very dangerous in that it would involve the deployment of counterforce weapons and the concommitant adoption of a "first-strike" strategy. Both sides seem able to move to these weapons in the very near future (in the U.S. the MX system and in the Soviet Union the continuing MIRVing of missiles, for example). These weapons, if deployed, become more difficult to verify or inspect and may increase the illusion that

fighting a nuclear war is possible, and under certain circumstances necessary. A failure to ratify SALT at this time would almost certainly provide strong incentives for each side to achieve weapons superiority rather than the current equality. These factors would substantially increase the difficulties in negotiating any future treaty and would mean that the overall level of weapons deployed would be increased. The instabilities created by potential weapons inequalities, probable first-strike capacity, and decreased verifiability could add a significant new element of insecurity to a world already insecure and unstable enough.

A Nuclear Moratorium

In our discussions with the Soviets, we tried out several of our own ideas, exploring their responses to several elements of the political program we are developing for the U.S. The first of these was the idea of a moratorium on the deployment, testing, and production of nuclear weapons. We see these as linked, but separable in terms of negotiation.

Freeze and Deployment

The proposal addressed most directly was that of a freeze of deployment of strategic nuclear weapons. We felt that we wanted to urge a freeze at the earliest possible moment, perhaps even a commitment to it before SALT was ratified, and certainly immediately after. This is particularly important given the nature of counterforce weapons and the time frame of SALT. SALT puts a limit on certain weapons until 1981, after which the long-range cruise missiles, ground and sea-launched and mobile ballistic missiles could be deployed if controls had not been extended through negotiation. The move to new weapons allowed by the treaty has negative consequences in terms of the nature of the weapons (counterforce capacity of some), in terms of the nature of the verifiability of the mobile systems.

and in terms of escalating of the arms race. We, therefore, see the next two years as critically important. With equality in place, with the numbers of weapons now recorded, with verifiability agreed to by both the Soviet Union and the United States, we are at a perfect place to put a cap on the arms race in strategic weapons, at least at the point of their deployment. This represents the last opportunity for ending the arms race.

Such a freeze speaks to some of the fears that people have. A major fear expressed in the Senate has been that the SALT agreement, as it now stands, allows the Soviets to increase substantially the number of missiles. This is because they will deploy more MIRV'd ICBM's. The Senate SALT opponents say that this means the Soviets can not only go past us, but achieve a kind of counter force ability within the treaty's terms itself which would put the U.S. at a disadvantage in a war. A freeze would prevent this from happening. It would also prevent the deployment of the MX and Trident II by the U.S. These are counterforce weapons. We were pleased by the interest shown in this proposal. At no point did we get a really negative response; at some places we got good, hard, intelligent, knowledgeable questions about what the implications would be both for SALT and after. We received strong affirmative response in the Foreign Ministry.

Total Ban on Testing

We explored the other elements of a moratorium, including a total ban on the testing of weapons. Such a ban is now possible with both nations having in principle said they are for it. However, the United States' desire to continue testing of very small weapons may be a problem. A total test ban at this point would be another significant way of cutting off the development of new weapons systems before they can be deployed. A ban on testing can be handled easily through

existing verification systems, requiring some black box monitoring, but not the complex monitoring systems which we thought necessary twenty years ago when we first began discussions with the Soviets on this issue. I believe a ban on testing represents a significant political item for the American disarmament agenda in the near future.

Ban on Production

The third element of moratorium was a ban on production of nuclear weapons. Stopping producing weapons not only releases resources for human and social needs, but it also means that the whole momentum of arms research and development activities would be phased down. When the production component of R. and D. is dropped out, the research component also tends to slow.

Verification

Problems of verification are real, however, and we directly addressed this issue with the Soviets. To verify a production ban reassures on-site inspection of a kind that we have not been able to negotiate with the Soviets to date. We raised the question of whether on-site inspection is possible and their response was "why not?" When we referred to the difficulties encountered in the past, they responded, "To the extent that you are really serious about a full ban on production, to that extent the amount of inspection that can be carried out on Soviet territory will also become more serious, right to the total limit." This response came from three different sources, indicating that part of our fear of not being able to reach agreement on inspection issues needs to be thoroughly re-examined. This included human on-site inspectors, as well as black boxes.

They linked any freeze and any moratorium to what to them looks like a major new threat coming through NATO.

Euro-Strategic Weapons

The speeches of Henry Kissinger and General Alexander Haig in September 1979 backed President Carter's proposal that NATO must decide in December to put in place a series of new weapons, medium range missile systems, the Pershing II and the cruise ground - launch systems, which would be based in Europe and have the capability of reaching the Soviet Union from Europe. Kissinger argued that these weapons are needed to give NATO the capability of waging "liminted nuclear wars." To the Soviets this represents a major escalation of the arms race in that it makes their cities and their weapons targets. The argument made by Kissinger and Haig is that we need more bargaining chips in our discussions with the Soviets. If we wish to avoid this escalation through NATO, we have only two and one-half months during which intense effort must be made to make sure that NATO does not go this route. The Soviets make the point that we should negotiate a cut in the Euro-strategic systems that now exist--the SS-20, the Backfire Bomber, and the missiles on the U.S. side emplanted in Germany--instead of going on to new weapons.

Background on the SS-20

The history of the European weapons controversy begins with Kissinger's deal with the Russians, that if they would leave the U.S. Forward Base missiles (carried by planes from aircraft carriers and Britain based bombers) out of the SALT II negotiations, in turn he would give them favored nation trade status. This deal was undercut by the Jackson-Vanik amendment to the trade bill, and the Russians responded by beginning deployment of the SS-20 and the Backfire Bomber

system targeted at Europe. These Soviet weapons, however, replaced older Soviet missiles (SS-4 and SS-5). Should we not push for reduction in both the SS-20 and backfire on their side and in our forward base missile system on our side rather than move into a new round of missile and counter missile, particularly of this medium range strategic form that is being proposed?

Two high Soviets, with whom we talked, saw a Soviet willingness to enter into discussion on reduction of these European systems rather than seeing NATO move ahead in putting them in place (Leonid Brezhnev's October 6 speech in Berlin confirmed our own gleamings). Many of those we talked to saw a reason to reduce their SS-20 Backfire system and our forward base system, if we were willing to do so. However, they note the additional difficulty represented by China and France. An independent Chinese and French nuclear capacity represents a direct threat to the Soviets. They urged a joint U.S.- Soviet approach to persuade China and France to join negotiations.

Military Cuts - Budget Data

Returning directly to one concept which they and we both discussed and which they have previously advanced is the idea of the reduction of defense budgets through a mutual 10% cut. We discussed the realities of such a notion with them and indicated that to ensure that a 10% cut occurs, there is need to have the proper data to measure it. Just as the SALT agreement can ensure what's going on because of the data given, so too to ensure a 10% reduction, you need the data, which means better budget data. We explored with them the ways of gaining this information--data which they traditionally do not give out. They said, however, that these kinds of statistics can be made available progressively as the seriousness of the reduction discussions grows. And they pointed directly to SALT as a precedent for more

forthcoming attitudes. They said that the difficulty they have had was with what they called established patterns in the past, but indicated their belief that these could be altered.

Economic Conversion

We raised the issue of economic conversion or, as they called it, reconversion from arms production to civilian production in our conversations. We suggested that were they, and we, to become involved in serious reconversion studies, taking sectors of the arms economy and indicating the ways in which they could be reconverted into civilian productive sectors, that this would provide "confidence building" steps. Each side could see the other thinking seriously about reconverting their economy in real segments to civilian uses in terms of time, numbers, people, etc.

Overall Assessment on Disarmament

How serious are the Soviets about disarmament? This is hard to assess in that both the U.S. and the Soviet Union have substantially increased their armaments every year since 1945 and we have seen little in the way of a pull-back. SALT I led to seven years of an arms race which quadrupled the number of nuclear weapons in possession on each side. During both the SALT I and SALT II negotiating processes, the Soviets very significantly increased their nuclear capacity, substantially catching up with the U.S. and gaining a functional equality. On the other hand, we did in 1962 negotiate a ban on nuclear weapons testing in the atmosphere, we did negotiate a SALT I treaty successfully, and we did negotiate a SALT II treaty successfully. As we look at the Soviet record in these, it's, if anything, somewhat more forthcoming than ours. Our technicians have taken the lead at almost every turn in the development of new weapons,

while the Soviets generally have been responders. I would conclude that the Soviets are serious about disarmament if they feel immediate threats are removed, particularly in terms of U.S. superiority which had been maintained up until the SALT II treaty, and if what they see as the threat in the east from China can be removed by bringing China into a broader negotiating system.

Soviet - U.S. Communications

Let me turn to the issue of the Soviets' talk to the U.S. In our discussions we were able to hear a whole series of very thoughtful, direct, specific comments on problems like a freeze and moratorium, problems like Euro-weapons, problems of getting data on budget cuts, and on reconversion models. Our question was, how can this kind of discussion which we were able to have be made available to the American public? Traditionally, Soviet press conferences are canned. A sloganeering statement is put out as the words of President Brezhnev, or one of the other senior officials, and there is little room for interaction and for the kind of probing which we found in our meetings. We talked to over 100 Soviet scientists, government people, advisors, and scholars, and many of these are extremely interesting in exchanges because they are flexible, knowledgeable about their system and ours. We urged them to be more forthcoming in their exchanges. We felt that the U.S. press ought to be sought out more by the Soviets and we felt that the Soviet Union had a lot to gain by allowing thoughtful and analytical people to talk to the U.S. press and to come to the United States for talks.

The U.S.S.R. and Nuclear Energy

Now to the final issue: nuclear energy. We visited the Soviet atomic energy installation at Novovoronezh, the largest in the

Soviet Union. We also met with the Deputy Director, and several of his associates, of the State Committee on Atomic Energy, which represents the equivalent to the Atomic Energy Commission in the U.S. We visited with a group at the Institute for Chemical Physics of the Soviet Academy of Sciences. We visited with several members of the very well known radium laboratory at the University of Leningrad. We visited with others in the University of Leningrad. We talked with a number of staff members of the Ministry of Health particularly concerned with radiation issues.

Commitment and Proliferation

We found an almost complete commitment to a strong nuclear energy policy. The Soviets are optimistic about being able to achieve the nuclear energy capacity that they want and they are optimistic about being able to solve any problems attendant on it. We raised what seems to us the most critical problem of nuclear energy--namely, proliferation of nuclear weapons through materials diverted from civilian uses. We cited the nations which have not directly been given bombs or bomb-making capacity by the super powers, but which have diverted technology or materials to gain actual nuclear weapons capacities--India, Pakistan, probably Brazil, probably South Africa, probably Israel. The Soviets were also concerned about this. However, they were quite sure that their own management of their systems was sufficiently tight, that there could be no diversion from it. They were fairly confident that in the reprocessing that they were engaged in for materials which came to them from other countries (they are one of the major enrichment and reprocessors of fuels for nuclear plants) and in the plants that they export they had control. We asked were they confident, however, in the ability of the International

Atomic Energy Agency, of which they were one of the major establishers, to handle the problem of proliferation. The answer from the State Committee on Atomic Energy was a very simple "no." They were not confident. When we talked about what this meant, the furthest they would go was to say that we need some more direct Soviet-U.S. cooperation on tightening up the whole area of civilian uses and diversions of civilian nuclear materials which could be used for weapons construction. In spite of the problems, however, they were committed to continuation of nuclear energy reactors. They point out, however, that their interest and worry about proliferation led them to alert the U.S. intelligence system of South Africa's growing capacity to make bombs. They pointed to this as indication of their good faith in opposing proliferation.

The Problem of Waste Disposal

We talked at length with people at all these places about the problem of waste disposal and handling of waste. They admitted at once that it was a critical question. Their general response, however, was one of technological optimism. They felt they could handle it and that technology would, if not today, certainly in the future, solve all the many unsolved problems that we raised with them. They pointed with satisfaction to their system of storing radioactive waste materials in multi-barrier systems within geological formations. They noted a large amount of experimentation with vitrification (that is, enclosing the waste in solid vitreous blocks), but they are not using that system yet. France is the only country that has begun doing it, but still on a very small level. They also noted that their civilian nuclear energy program is small by comparison to that of the U.S. or Western Europe. They have only 12 to 15 plants in

operation, and although they have more in planning, the amount of waste coming from their civilian system is small.

When asked about how waste from military production and production capacity facilities were handled, they said they didn't know. And it was quite clear that if they did know, they wouldn't tell us, and a complete curtain was drawn between discussion of civilian systems and military systems. This differs from the greater openness with which both civilian and military problems can be explored in the United States. This was not possible, at least by people like us, within the context of the Soviet Union.

Health and Safety

We then explored issues of health and medical genetic problems. They are aware of the issues; they participate in the International Commission for Radiation Protection and have their representatives on the Commission. However, it is fair to say that there was no crack in their agreement that they do safety well and that really there is no problem of radiation safety in the Soviet Union. They felt they could meet all the issues that we raised with them. On the other hand, I think it is fair to say that the data they gave us at the nuclear energy establishment we visited of the whole body radiation received by workers in the plant was much too optimistic to be true. It just doesn't meet with any of the technological realities which we know of from the operation of plants anywhere else in the world. And having seen their plant, while it was nice, it certainly was not that much more tightly constructed than the others we know of, and therefore I think we have to say that their optimism may be shielding a series of other issues or problems.

They shared with us their studies on environmental effects of radiation in the concentric circles around their plants and they said their studies show no environmental contamination whatsoever. Again, looking at data like that suggests that we are not getting the whole story. Radiation just does not behave in that way, however careful they may be. They pointed out over and over again that not being a system depending on economic competition, but one depending on planned and staged development, they weren't forced to race ahead the way a private corporation in the U.S. might. Perhaps, but nonetheless their total optimism really seemed problematic to us. Again, data from workers involved in manufacturing of weapons, or from areas around weapons manufacturing facilities, were totally unavailable.

Alternative Energy

We had one fascinating discussion on alternative energy futures with the group at the Institute of Chemical Physics. These were people who had been engaged in a number of Pugwash discussions. They knew what the issues under discussion were, both in the West and in the Soviet Union and had some very inventive approaches. They were particularly thoughtful and innovative in energy conservation. One of the points that one of their senior figures made is that they believed they should be developing new energy sources, particularly solar energy. There is experimentation and developmental work going on in this field, and it was his feeling that by the end of the century a fairly significant solar capacity will be developed. I was impressed by the extent to which this man really knew the numbers, the amounts of energy which could be gained from these different systems when used

in different ways. He was also very aware of the amounts of energy used in the various productive systems, the production of the goods, services, transport, etc., that a society uses. He was not talking in vague generalities, but he was pointing to very well researched ideas. His major thrust was that what had to occur now was a substantial move to conserve on energy in the production of goods, services, and transport. And he analyzed sectors of the economy and indicated ways in which there could be very substantial savings in the interim as new non-nuclear energy sources are developed. He said when he looks at the energy needs versus availability, the problem of an energy shortage is a problem of only one generation. Unfortunately, he said, it's our generation. He believed that a generation hence we will have new sources in place and, in addition, will have transformed the nature of our productive techniques to ensure substantially less energy use.

In other discussions they pointed to the potential for expanded use of their proved gas and coal reserves so that the Soviet Union for the foreseeable future will not be a net importer of energy resources. In the course of one discussion, the claim was advanced that in the next five-year plan there will be a substantial increase in budgeting for gas and coal use at the expense of nuclear energy. This was information given to us by a strong proponent of nuclear energy.

U.S.-Soviet Similarities

One of the things I think we can conclude is that the general discussion by those involved in nuclear energy in the Soviet Union is strikingly similar to that in the United States. Technological optimism abounded. There was a blindness to the longer-range problems and to the extent to which when uncertainties multiply--uncertainties

of proliferation, of waste, radiation, health--the rate of development ought to decrease.

We explored with them the idea of a moratorium of nuclear energy development, particularly in light of weapons proliferation problems, but met a generally negative response. We pointed also to health and safety elements which might be served by such a moratorium. The idea received a positive hearing only in the group who were seriously looking at alternative energy futures.

Conclusion

The discussions were wide-ranging, remarkably frank, and most important, suggestive of areas for specific political action and education. Particularly on issues of nuclear disarmament, the Soviets were very forthcoming and helped identify places where new initiatives could well lead to positive Soviet responses. On the planned deployment of new Eurostrategic weapons in NATO, we discovered not only their concern, but also proposals which might serve to reduce the nuclear threat in Europe rather than increase it. They were markedly positive to the concept of a freeze on deployment and production of all strategic nuclear weapons immediately after SALT II ratification. They firmly backed the need to move rapidly to SALT III negotiations so that another long hiatus between treaties does not become a period of arms escalation. They shared the concern for nuclear weapons proliferation, but held back from linking it to a slowed pace of development of civilian nuclear energy. The group felt that exchanges of the sort achieved were very valuable and hoped that they might be extended beyond the narrow circle of participants currently involved. The group encouraged the Soviets to move openly to engage the U.S. press in candid exchange.

After World War II, the AFSC was concerned to begin to ease the suspicions and tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union. In 1949 Quaker scholars and businessmen travelled from Philadelphia to Washington, New York, and Lake Success (headquarters of the UN) to make contacts with anyone who could offer an opportunity to bring rapprochement with the Soviets. They maintained contact with the State Department and with the chief Russian delegates to the UN. They published a pamphlet, The United States and the Soviet Union, in which the authors were seeking to find the means to achieve a transition from an attitude of suspicion and hatred to one of tolerance and forbearance.

In 1955 the AFSC sent a team to the Soviet Union, to visit for a month. The team met with private individuals and officials, saw a variety of institutions and projects. A pamphlet based on this trip was issued, Meeting the Russians, and the team back in the U.S. lectured widely, wrote articles and attempted to interpret a more sympathetic and understanding account of the Russian scene than was usually found in American publications.

Also in 1955 the Conferences for Diplomats program in Europe, part of the AFSC International Divison's programs, issued invitations to the Soviet Foreign Ministry to have Soviet diplomats participate, and they began to do so in 1956. These opportunities for confidential dialogue brought the Soviets into an international grouping and also gave them increasing openness to AFSC initiatives.

Further direct exchanges over the last 20 years have included reciprocal seminars for academics, journalists, and social scientists, work-camp/seminars for young people, and a Secondary School Teacher exchange (now seconded to American Field Service). Our long concern and involvement with the Soviet Union has enabled us to continue contact with the many past participants in Moscow and Leningrad, and has given the AFSC an entree for dialogue with leading Soviet experts.

The Disarmament and Conversion Program of the American Friends Service Committee is working to stop the arms race, convert military production and promote nonviolent conflict resolution. The AFSC has a network of 35 offices in the United States and to contact the office closest to you please write to the nearest regional office listed on the back of this pamphlet. Please use the reply form provided here.

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PROTEST AND SURVIVE

Protest and survive

Second (Revised) edition
Fourth printing

Keep this booklet handy

Prepared for the People of England by E.P. Thompson 1980
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Messages to the British Public

From the Right Hon. William Whitelaw, MP, Home Secretary:

"Most houses in this country offer a reasonable degree of protection against radioactive fall-out from nuclear explosions and protection can be substantially improved by a series of quite simple do-it-yourself measures."

(*Times*, 12 February 1980)

From Mr William Rodgers, MP, Labour parliamentary spokesman for Defence:

"It was the view of the previous Government that theatre nuclear modernisation was essential, and that is our view today."

(*Hansard*, 24 January 1980)

From Dr Alan Glyn, MP for Windsor and Maidenhead:

"I welcome the decision to instal 40 bases in Britain."

(*Hansard*, 24 January 1980)

From Mr Stephen Ross, MP for the Isle of Wight, Liberal parliamentary spokesman for Defence:

"I shall mention hovercraft, which are built in the Isle of Wight. We need a large hovercraft capable of quickly conveying tanks on to beaches, particularly in the Middle East. The quickest solution is to buy those for sale from Hoverlloyd, which operates between Ramsgate and the Continent."

(*Hansard*, 24 January 1980)

From the Right Hon. James Callaghan, MP, Leader of the Opposition:

"We must welcome the intention of President Carter to set up a task force of 100,000 men which could move quickly into position, if only because of the utter dependence of the West on oil."

(*Hansard*, 28 January 1980)

From Mr Eldon Griffiths, MP for Bury St Edmunds:

"In the event of . . . demonstrations by political zealots it is better that British military police rather than Americans should be doing the job of protection."

(*Hansard*, 24 January 1980)

From Mr James Scott-Hopkins, Euro-MP for Hereford-Worcester:

"Releasing details to the general public of a Home Office pamphlet, *Protect and Survive*, describing what to do in a nuclear attack would cause unwarranted panic and be an irresponsible action. With the limited amount of spending money available, Britain should place priority on building up its armed forces."

(*Worcester Evening News*, 19 February 1980)

From Mr W. Blake, in another place:

"Then old Nobodaddy aloft Farted & belch'd and cough'd, And said, 'I love hanging & drawing & quartering Every bit as well as war & slaughtering'."

Protest and Survive

by E.P. Thompson

The following letter appeared in *The Times* on January 30, 1980, from an eminent member of Oxford University:

Reviving Civil Defence

From Professor Michael Howard, FBA
Sir,

The decision to provide bases in this country for United States cruise missiles; the future of our own "independent" strategic deterrent; the extent of our provisions for civil defence: all these have surely to be considered together as part of a single defence posture. No evidence emerged in the course of last Thursday's debate (January 24) that this is being done by the present Government.

The presence of cruise missiles on British soil makes it highly possible that this country would be the target for a series of pre-emptive strikes by Soviet missiles. These would not necessarily be on the massive scale foreseen by Lord Noel-Baker in your columns of January 25. It is more likely that the Russians would hold such massive strikes in reserve, to deter us from using our sea-based missiles as a "second strike force" after the first Soviet warheads had hit targets in this country.

This initially limited Soviet strike would have the further objective, beyond eliminating weapons in this country targeted on their own homeland, of creating conditions here of such political turbulence that the use of our own nuclear weapons, followed as this could be by yet heavier attacks upon us, would become quite literally "incredible".

Civil defence on a scale sufficient to give protection to a substantial number of the population in the event of such a "limited" nuclear strike is thus an indispensable element of deterrence. Such measures should not be covert and concealed. On the contrary, they should be given the widest possible publicity; not only so that the people of this country know that they will be afforded the greatest possible degree of protection in the worst eventuality, but so that the credibility of our entire defence posture should not be destroyed through absence of evidence of our capacity to endure the disagreeable consequences likely to flow from it.

In the absence of a serious civil defence policy, the Government's decision to modernise or replace our "independent deterrent" will be no more than an expensive bluff likely to deceive no one beyond these shores, and not very many people within them.

Yours faithfully,
M.E. Howard,
Chichele Professor of the History of War,
All Soul's College, Oxford.

This letter contains a number of very serious assertions and speculations, and I will proceed to examine these. We must first note that the letter is composed of two distinct elements, although these are so interwoven that the inattentive reader might be confused into taking them as a single progressive argument. One element is a speculative scenario as to future events; the other concerns the postures and pretences appropriate in the theatre of nuclear diplomacy. We will attend now to the first.

According to the scenario, the enemy – which enemy is plainly stated to be the Russians for as many years ahead as speculation can go – will make a pre-emptive strike against Britain with nuclear missiles. This is not anticipated to occur before 1982, since the decision that 160 or more United States cruise missiles should be based on British soil was taken by NATO (without consultation with the British parliament) on December 12, 1979, at Brussels; and it will take about three years before their manufacture is complete and they have been transported and sited in this country.

Professor Howard considers that the presence of these missiles on our soil will make it "highly possible" that this country will be the target, not for one, but for *a series of pre-emptive strikes,* at some time in 1982 or thereafter. So far from "deterring" the Russians, he supposes that the presence of these missiles here will provoke and draw down upon us these strikes. We may agree that his reasoning here is sound.

I am less happy with the next step in his reasoning. He does not suggest that there will be any counter-strikes by British-based missiles against the Russians. On the contrary, he supposes that the Russian strikes, although "limited", would succeed in "eliminating" all of these 160 cruise missiles. And that the Russians will hold more "massive strikes" in reserve to "deter us from using our sea-based missiles" against them. In the absence of adequate measures of civil defence, these first "limited" strikes would create conditions of "political turbulence" in this country, preventing "us" (but I am not now sure who "us" can be, unless the typesetter has inadvertently dropped the capitals into the lower case) from massive nuclear retaliation. If, however, a sufficient proportion of the surviving population were prevented from acts of "political turbulence" by measures of civil defence, then a proper military strategy could be pursued by NATO, and massive second-stage nuclear exchanges could freely commence.

It will be seen that the purpose of civil defence is political and provisional. It is to ensure the necessary degree of stability in that short interval between the first and the second (retaliatory) nuclear strike. Professor Howard does not take his scenario any further. He does not tell us whether the "massive strikes" of the second stage would seal the entrances to the air-raid shelters and block up their air-ducts.

We may suppose, at least, that these second strikes will be effective in bringing "political turbulence" to a prompt end, and thereby in removing the necessity for further civil defence. At this stage the professor passes over to the consideration of the correct degree of mendacity to be exercised in our current defence "posture", and we will consider that element in his argument later on.

Now, as to the scenario, we will commence by noting that Professor Howard, in a letter to *The Times* whose intent is to advocate much greater expenditure and publicity on civil defence, does not, in any single clause, indicate any detail of what such defence might consist in, nor how effective it might be. His terms are all general. He wishes there to be "measures", which afford "the greatest possible degree of protection", and "evidence" of "our capacity to endure the disagreeable consequences likely to flow from" our present military and diplomatic strategies. But he does not indicate what measures might be possible, nor does he even explain what could be "disagreeable" about the expected event.

Professor Howard is perhaps himself a little uneasy on this count. For he reassures us that these pre-emptive strikes by Russian missiles "would not necessarily be on the massive scale foreseen by Lord Noel-Baker in your columns of January 25". He wishes us to suppose that this "series of strikes", which "eliminate" the 160 cruise missiles scattered on our soil, are to be, as these things go, a mild and local affair.

I have therefore consulted the letter from Philip Noel-Baker in *The Times* of January 25. Lord Noel-Baker is the recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize for his work for international conciliation over very many years. We may take it that he keeps himself well-informed. In his letter he notes that "many voices are being raised in the United States, Britain and elsewhere to argue that nuclear wars could be fought without total disaster; some even suggest that nuclear war could be won". He then goes on to detail the findings of Mr Val Peterson, who was appointed United States Civil Defence Administrator twenty-five years ago, and who organised many exercises, national, regional and local, at the height of a previous Cold War.

Mr Peterson drew the following conclusions from his successive exercises. In 1954 the national exercise was estimated to have had a yield of twenty-two millions of casualties, of whom seven millions would have been dead. In 1956 fifty-six millions, or one-third of the population of the United States, were presumed as casualties. In 1957:

> "If the whole 170 million Americans has Air Raid Shelters, at least 50 per cent of them would die in a surprise enemy attack. In the last analysis, there is no such thing as a nation being prepared for a thermonuclear war."

From evidence of this order Lord Noel-Baker concludes:

> "Any use of nuclear weapons will escalate into a general war . . . There is *no* defence against such weapons; and . . . nuclear warfare will destroy civilisation, and perhaps exterminate mankind. To hope for salvation from Civil Defence is a dangerous self-deluding pipe dream."

I do not know whether Professor Howard is a pipe-smoker or not. But he has at least taken care to cover himself against this argument. The series of strikes envisaged in his scenario "would not necessarily be on the massive scale" which Lord Noel-Baker foresees. What he foresees is possible (we should note), and perhaps even probable, but not "necessarily" so. That is a large relief. But, then, on what scale are we to suppose that a more "limited" attack might be? If we are to be futurist authorities on war, or even historians of war, then we should be exact as to weaponry and as to its effects.

> **"When radiological conditions permitted movement, district and borough London controllers should assume that one of the priority tasks for their staff, in areas where survivors were to continue residing, would be to collect and cremate or inter human remains in mass graves.**
>
> **"Once the initial clearance of corpses has been completed, there would be still a problem of several weeks, and perhaps months, of an above average rate of dying from disease and radiation effects. Nevertheless, a return to the pre-attack formalities should be the objective in the longer term."**
>
> *Home Office circular No.ES 8/1976, issued on a "need to know" basis to chief executives of Councils.*

There is a good deal of talk around today, from "defence correspondents", military strategists and the like, which leads us to suppose that the military, on both sides of the world, are capable of delivering very small nuclear packs, with the greatest accuracy and with no lethal consequences outside the target area. Professor Howard's scenario is evidently supported by some such assumptions: the Russians are to "eliminate" 160 cruise missiles, but only local damage will be done.

Now there are two points here which require examination. The first concerns the known power and probable effects of these weapons. The second concerns the strategic assumptions of those "experts" who suppose that any nuclear war could be limited in this way. We will now turn to the first.

It will not have passed Professor Howard's notice that there appeared in *The Times,* nine days before his own letter, a major article ("The Deterrent Illusion", January 21) by Lord Zuckerman. The author was the Government's chief scientific advisor from 1964 to 1971, and, in addition to drawing upon his own extensive experience, he also draws, in this article, upon that of eminent United States scientists and advisors.

Lord Zuckerman's testimony (which should be read in full) is wholly dismissive of the notion of a "limited" nuclear strike, confined to military targets only:

> "It is still inevitable that were military installations rather than cities to become the objectives of nuclear attack, millions, even tens of millions, of civilians would be killed, whatever the proportion of missile sites, airfields, armament plants, ports, and so on that would be destroyed."

And he explains that strategists, in calculating the estimated effects of missile strikes, employ the acronym CEP (Circular Error Probable) for the radius of a circle within which 50 per cent of strikes would fall.

Thus we have to deal with two factors: the 50 per cent of missiles which fall *within* the CEP, and the 50 per cent which fall *without* and which "would not necessarily be distributed according to standard laws of probability". Lord Zuckerman does not tell us the presumed CEP for a "limited" strike aimed at a single missile base, and this is perhaps an official secret. But in the debate that was eventually held in the Commons (*Hansard,* 24 January) *after* NATO's decision

to base cruise missiles here, statements were made which enable an impression to be offered.

I must first explain that the strategy of nuclear warfare has now become a highly specialised field of study, which has developed its own arcane vocabulary, together with a long list of acronyms: CEP, MIRV (multiple independently-targetted re-entry vehicle), ICBM (inter-continental ballistic missile), ECCM (electronic counter-counter measures), MEASL (Marconi-Elliott Avionics Systems), and, as the plum of them all, MAD (mutual assured destruction).

In this vocabulary nuclear weapons are sub-divided into several categories: *strategic* – the inter-continental missiles of immense range and inconceivable destructive power, which may be submarine-launched or sited in silos and on tracks behind the Urals or in the Nevada desert: *theatre* (long, middle or short-range), which may be bombs or missiles, carried on aircraft or permanently sited, or moved around at sea or on land on mobile launch platforms: and *tactical.* Sometimes NATO strategists refer to "theatre" weapons as "tactical" ones, and sometimes they are referring to smaller battlefield nuclear (and neutron) devices – land-mines, artillery shells, etc., which could be mixed in with "conventional weapons".

These several degrees of weaponry form "a chain of deterrence". Mr Pym, the Defence Secretary, spoke in the House of Commons on January 24 of "an inter-locking system of comprehensive deterrence . . . a clear chain of terrible risk", with the pistol and the grenade at one end and the MX missile at the other.

It is generally agreed that "the West" has the advantage in *strategic* weapons, although this fact has been concealed from the Western public in recent months in order to direct attention to long and medium-range *theatre* weapons, where it is said that the Soviet Union has recently attained an advantage by replacing the SS-4 and SS-5 missiles with the very deadly SS-20, and by introducing the Backfire bomber. It is to meet this "threat" to parity in the middle link of the chain that cruise missiles are to be introduced by NATO all over Western Europe.

On December 3, 1979, Mr David Fairhall, the *Guardian's* defence correspondent and a very zealous apologist for NATO, published a map (reproduced on page 7) which illustrates how NATO apologists perceive the European "balance". It will be seen from this map that the Soviet threat is very serious, since it is marked in heavy dotted lines and thick arrow-heads, whereas NATO's response is delicately etched. It will also be seen that NATO's existing, pre-modern weaponry (the Pershing I, the F III and the Vulcan) is pitiful, and will not even be able to destroy Rome or Naples, nor any part of Greece. So that if it were not for the submarine-launched ballistic missiles (Polaris and Trident), NATO would be reduced in a nuclear war to stinging itself, like a scorpion, to death.

Either NATO or the map is pretty silly, or both. The point, however, is that present strategic thinking supposes a "limited" nuclear war, with "theatre" weapons. This limited war will be localised to a small area from the Urals to the Western coast of Ireland. In this scenario, "strategic" weapons (ICBMs and the like) will be held back for a "second strike", so that neither Siberia nor the North American continent will be under any immediate threat. Professor Howard has adopted this

scenario, in supposing the Russians will employ their own "theatre" weapons (SS-20 or Backfire bombers) in a pre-emptive strike upon our cruise missile ("theatre") bases.



With grateful acknowledgements to The Guardian.

Let us now examine this scenario more exactly. Sir Frederic Bennett (Torbay) affirmed in the Commons debate on January 24 that the warheads of these Russian theatre missiles "have at least the destructive capacity of the bombs dropped on Nagasaki and Hiroshima", although Mr Churchill (Stretford) had different information: "By today's standards Hiroshima's bomb was a puny and miserable weapon" and (he said) each SS-20 missile carried a pack equivalent to 100 Hiroshima bombs.

It will be seen that two well-informed Conservative spokesmen differed in their information by a factor of one hundred. This is a trivial disagreement (since both are agreed that these missiles are capable of very great destruction). But it serves to illustrate the fact that, when we come to hard information, the air is very much fouled up today.

The reasons for this are easy to identity, but they illuminate a part of the problem, so we will digress to explain them. First, it is axiomatic that each military bloc has an interest in misleading the other, and this is done both by concealing information and by deliberately spreading disinformation.

In general, each bloc is at pains to deny and conceal its own areas of greatest

military strength, and to advertise a pretence to strength in areas where it is weak. The intelligence agencies which report on each other's resources are themselves an interest-group, with high ideological motivation, and on occasion they deliberately manufacture alarmist reports.

Lord Zuckerman gives evidence as to the steady flow of "phoney intelligence" and "far-fetched" predictions as to Soviet military power which have influenced United States planning over the past twenty years. There is no reason to suppose that this fouling-up of information takes place only in Western capitals.

The name of the game, on both sides, is mendacity. Indeed, "deterrence" might itself be defined as the biggest and most expensive Lie in history; and it was, in effect, defined in this way by our Defence Secretary, Mr Pym, in the debate on January 24: "Deterrence is primarily about what the other side thinks, not what we may think".

The debate on that day was the first to be held in parliament on the subject of nuclear weapons for fifteen years, and it lasted for about 5½ hours. It was distinguished throughout by the paucity of hard information, although it should be said that Mr Pym imparted some new information, and more than had come at any time from the previous administration.

Mr Pym announced the near-completion of the "Chevaline" programme to "modernise" the warhead of our Polaris missiles – a programme costing £1,000 millions, which had been carried out in the deepest secrecy, and without the knowledge of the full Cabinet, and in defiance of official Labour policy, on the authority of Mr Callaghan and two or three of his particular friends.

Thus the House was given this information *after* the decision had been taken, the money had been spent, and the work had been done. I do not know how £1,000 millions was tucked away in a crease in the estimates and hidden from view (just as the many millions expended on internal security services, telephone-tapping, etc., are hidden from view), but it suggests that the level of official mendacity is today very high indeed.

In any case, let us be fair, Mr Pym did give the House this information, and we may suppose that he did so in order to embarrass Mr Callaghan, Mr Fred Mulley, Mr Healey and Mr David Owen (the co-partners in this expensive deception), and to reduce them to silence or assent on other matters of nuclear weapon "modernisation" in the ensuing debate.

In this he succeeded very well. (We may suppose that he held other, "second-strike", secret material back as a further deterrent.) But apart from this malicious little political detonation, the yield of new information in the debate was low. The House was not informed where the cruise missiles are to be sited, nor, most importantly, whether the British Government will have any effective control over their operation and launching. But this is another matter.

The second reason why the air is fouled-up is that the military and security elites in both blocs, and their political servitors, cannot pursue their expensive and dangerous policies without continually terrifying the populations of their own countries with sensational accounts of the war preparations of the other bloc.

To be sure, the plain facts are terrifying enough without any embroidery. But it

is necessary to persuade the native populations that the other side is stealing a lead in order to justify even greater preparations and expenditure at home.

This is as necessary in the Soviet Union as it is in the West, despite the absence of any open public debate over there on the issues. For the Soviet military budget is very heavy, and this entails the continual postponement and disappointment of people's expectations as to improving services and goods. In particular, a quite disproportionate concentration of the nation's most advanced scientific and technological skills takes place in the military sector – as it does, increasingly, even in this country. The threat from the West, whether it exists or not (and in Soviet perception it certainly does), has become a necessary legitimation for the power of the ruling elites, an excuse for their many economic and social failures, and an argument to isolate and silence critics within their own borders.

In the West we have "open debate", although it is contained by all-party "consensus" and is not permitted to intrude in any sharp way into our major media. I have discussed elsewhere (*New Statesman*, December 1979) the ways in which this is carefully controlled by the preparation and selective release of "official information".

An interesting example of this manipulation came out towards the end of the Commons debate. In responding, Mr Barney Hayhoe, the Under-Secretary for Defence, sought to allay fears expressed by the patriotic Mr Peter Shore (Labour's shadow Foreign Secretary) that the NATO programme of missile "modernisation" might not be *large* enough to keep up with Soviet missile programmes. Mr Hayhoe replied:

> "The United States is planning to introduce cruise missiles, carried on B 52 bombers, for the strategic role. It is planning an armoury of 2,000 or 3,000 missiles . . . forming only one part of a huge strategic triad alongside ICBMs and submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and all due to enter service in two or three years' time."

This programme is to be *in addition to* the existing United States "strategic" resources (which are generally agreed to be already in excess of Russia's, and which have always been so).

Now I am not an expert in these matters, and I do not usually follow the specialist press. But in the past three months, and especially in the weeks preceding the NATO decision of December 12, I followed the general press with care. I have on my desk now a thick file of clippings from the defence correspondents of the more serious daily, weekly and Sunday papers. Yet this is the first mention I have met with of these rather substantial United States plans, which are to be added to NATO's little provision.

"The Alliance should plan to maintain an adequate conventional defence as long as necessary to negotiate an acceptable peace. If not successful in achieving its aims with conventional forces, NATO will employ nuclear weapons as necessary."

Document (NATO 'secret') DPC/D/74/30, Appendix B, Item 1.

The entire "debate" in Britain was conducted in the press and television on the basis of letting the people believe that there was a massive build-up of Soviet SS-20s and Backfire bombers, all aimed at "NATO" (but with the United States, the dominant power in NATO, removed from the equation), and that NATO's programme of nuclear weapon "modernisation" was a tardy and inadequate response to this. Nothing at all was mentioned, in the general press, as to this little addition to the Western sum ("2,000 or 3,000 missiles") as part of "a huge strategic triad".

In fact, NATO's "modernisation" programme, taken together with that of the United States, was one of *menace*. It was certainly perceived by Soviet leaders as menacing. This perception hardened, on December 12, when NATO endorsed the full programme at Brussels. In response, the hard arguments and the hard men had their way amongst the Soviet leadership, and, two weeks later, the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan took place. It is a textbook case of the reciprocal logic of the Cold War.

I am not suggesting that Russian missiles are not multiplying, nor that they are not menacing to us. They are both. My point has been to illustrate the logic of "deterrence"; and to emphasise that the whole basis of our information is corrupt, and that every official statement, on both sides, is either an official lie or a statement with direct propagandist intent which conceals as much as it reveals.

As to the actual facts of the "nuclear balance", objective research by such bodies as the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute give rise to conclusions more complex than anything that we have been offered in our press or on our screens. Thus, in one count of strategic weapons, by individual bombers and missiles, the Soviet Union appears to be a little ahead of the United States; whereas by a different count of actual warheads (for the US Poseidon missile carries an average of ten warheads, each capable of being independently targeted) the United States appears as having twice as many weapons (8,870 to 3,810) as Russia. This is, of course, before "modernisation". The available information has been examined with care by Dan Smith in *The Defence of the Realm in the 1980s* (Croom Helm, 1980), and his fourth chapter, "Of Numbers and Nukes", is essential reading. Please get it, and read it.

We are now in a position to conclude this digression, and to return to Lord Zuckerman and to Professor Howard.

Lord Zuckerman has shown that we must take into account two variables when considering the effect of the "series of pre-emptive strikes" which Professor Howard envisages as being drawn upon us by cruise missile bases: the 50 per cent of missiles falling within the CEP, and those falling without.

We have seen that the SS-20 is the "theatre" missile which we must expect to strike Britain, and that the lowest estimate of its destructive capacity is "at least" that of the bomb dropped upon Hiroshima. This bomb (Mr Churchill reminded the House) caused the death of 100,000 persons within hours, and of a further 100,000 who have died subsequently, in the main from radiologically-related diseases.

I do not know the CEP of a missile of this very small yield. I would guess that if it was buffeted about and wobbled a little – and if the aiming and homing devices

were a trifle inexact (as Soviet electronic technology is reputed to be) – then it could miss the target by several miles. The meditated strategy of both sides is to send, not one accurate missile at each target, but missiles in clutches of thirty or forty.

These strikes would be made against the major bases from which these missiles are deployed. Currently, Lakenheath and Upper Heyford are being mentioned as these. Upper Heyford is less than fifteen miles as the crow or the SS-20 flies from the centre of Oxford city, and Lakenheath is, by crow or cruise, just over twenty miles from Cambridge. It is possible that Cambridge but less probable that Oxford will fall outside the CEP. Within the CEP we must suppose some fifteen or twenty detonations at least on the scale of Hiroshima, without taking into account any possible detonations, release of radio-active materials, etc., if the strike should succeed in finding out the cruise missiles at which it was aimed.

This is to suppose that the Soviet strike is homing onto clearly-defined and immobile targets. Now this matter is unclear, since we have been told a number of contradictory things by defence "experts", some of which are perhaps disinformation (to set the public mind at rest) but most of which are whistlings in the dark, since United States military personnel will take the decisions in their own good time.

We have been told that they will all be housed at Upper Heyford and Lakenheath, and will be moved out to launching positions in times of emergency, perhaps on mobile transporters carrying four at a time. We have been told that they will be permanently sited, in six, or twelve, or forty different stations. The latest statement to come to hand is from Mr Pym, and was given, not to the House of Commons, but on a BBC TV phone-in programme:

> "I think you will find that there may be a certain spread of these weapons, but no decision is yet taken . . . Because they would be scattered it would be an impossible task in the foreseeable future for the Russians to knock them out. This is part of the merit of these particular weapons." (*Cambridge Evening News*, 6 February 1980)

The poor fellow was really saying that he does not know, and he is waiting for an American officer to tell him. He added that:

> "From the point of view of siting the cruise missiles I don't think it makes a great deal of difference. It is really a security and defence and strategic consideration, and of course one must take public opinion into account as far as one possibly can."

This is a politician's way of saying that the military will take the decision, and that public opinion will be disregarded. Three weeks before this Mr Pym gave a somewhat more honest reply to questions from the Member for Swindon (Mr David Stoddart) who had discovered that Greenham Common, near Newbury (Berks) and Fairford (Glos.) are being considered by US military as convenient places for little batches of missiles: "I urge the Secretary of State to keep these updated nuclear weapons well away from Swindon". Mr Pym responded thus:

> "The siting of these weapons in no way affects the vulnerability or otherwise of a particular place. It is a mistake for anyone to think that the siting of a weapon in a particular

place . . . makes it more or less vulnerable. We are all vulnerable in the horrifying event of a holocaust." (*Hansard*, 15 January 1980)

I do not know whether the citizens of Swindon find this reassuring or not. Mr Pym was saying that he thinks that the Americans will decide to "spread" and "scatter" these weapons, so that the enemy will have to spread and scatter his strike over a very much larger area in order to have any hopes of "eliminating" them. If the Russians really want to find the cruise missiles out, then there will be CEPs dotted all across southern, central and eastern England. There is nothing very special being prepared by NATO for Oxford, Swindon and Cambridge: Luton, Sheerness and Southampton will be just as "vulnerable", and there is no way of describing a series of nuclear strikes against cruise missiles except as "a holocaust".

This is before we take account of Lord Zuckerman's other variable – the 50 per cent of strikes which would fall outside the Circular Error Probable. These will be missiles whose navigational or homing devices are inaccurate or which, perhaps, are brought down on their path. It would be over-optimistic to suppose that every one of these would fall on Salisbury Plain or on that barren patch of the Pennines around Blackstone Edge. I have taken a ruler to a map of Europe, and I cannot see any way in which an SS-20 despatched from Russia could home in on Newbury or Fairford without passing directly over central London.

If by misadventure a strike outside the CEP fell on a major city the damage would be considerable. Lord Louis Mountbatten told an audience in Strasbourg in May 1979 that "one or two nuclear strikes on this great city . . . with what today would be regarded as relatively low yield weapons would utterly destroy all that we see around us and immediately kill half of its population". And Lord Zuckerman adds that "a single one-megaton bomb" – and the warhead of the SS-20 is said to be 1½ megatons – "could erase the heart of any great city – say, Birmingham – and kill instantly a third of its citizens".

There is no room in this island to "scatter" missiles without bringing multitudes into mortal danger, and there is no room to "search" without inflicting a holocaust. As Lord Zuckerman has said:

> "There are no vast deserts in Europe, no endless open plains, on which to turn war-games in which nuclear weapons are used into reality. The distances between villages are no greater than the radius of effect of low-yield weapons of a few kilotons; between towns and cities, say a megaton."

We are now at last prepared to cast a more realistic eye upon Professor Howard's scenario.

According to this, the "initially limited Soviet strike" might, in the absence of civil defence precautions, create conditions of "political turbulence" which would prevent "us" from using our own nuclear weapons in retaliation. This would be regrettable, since it would inhibit the escalation from "tactical" or "theatre" to "second-strike", sea-based nuclear war. But he envisages civil defence measures "on a scale sufficient to give protection to a substantial number of the population", enabling this number to endure the "disagreeable consequences" which would ensue.

The object of civil defence, then, is not so much to save lives as to reduce the

potential for "political turbulence" of those surviving the first strike, in order to enable "us" to pass over to a second and more fearsome stage of nuclear warfare. It is Professor Howard's merit that he states this sequence honestly, as a realist, and even allows that the consequences will be disagreeable.

We are still entitled, however, to enquire more strictly as to what measures would be *on a scale sufficient*, what proportion of the population might constitute *a substantial number*, and what may be indicated by the word *disagreeable*.

It is not as if nuclear weapons are a completely unknown quantity, which have only been tested in deserts and on uninhabited islands. They have been tested upon persons also, in 1945, at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and to some effect. These effects have been studied with care; and the beneficiaries of this sudden donation of advanced technology were so much struck by the disagreeable consequences that they have continued to monitor its effects to the present day.

One remarkable consequence of those two detonations is that the survivors in those two cities, and the descendants of the sufferers, were transformed into advocates, not of revenge, but of international understanding and peace. To this day work for peace is regarded as a civic duty, and the mayors of Nagasaki and Hiroshima regard this work as the principal obligation of their office.

For example, in 1977 an International Symposium on the Damage and After-Effects of the bombing of these two cities was inaugurated, and a number of reports of this work are now in translation. I have read condensations of these, as well as other materials from Nagasaki.

It had been my intention to condense this material still further, and to remind readers of the effects of the first atomic bombings. I have now decided to pass this matter by, for two reasons. The first is that I have found the task beyond my powers as a writer. After reading these materials, whenever I approached my typewriter I was overcome by such a sense of nausea that I was forced to turn to some other task.

The second reason is that, at some point very deep in their consciousness, readers *already know* what the consequences of these weapons are. This knowledge is transmitted to children even in their infancy, so that as they run around with their space-weapons and death-rays they are re-enacting what happened thirty years before they were born.

There is, however, one area of convenient forgetfulness in this inherited memory. The moment of nuclear detonation is remembered vaguely, as a sudden instant of light, blast and fire, in which instantly tens of thousands of lives were quenched. It is thought of as a stupendous but instantaneous moment of annihilation, without pain or emotional suffering.

But this is not accurate. It is now estimated that 140,000 were killed "directly" by the bomb on Hiroshima, and 70,000 by that on Nagasaki, with an allowance for error of 10,000 either way in each case. But the bombs were dropped on August 6 and 9, and the accounts for *immediate* casualties were closed on December 31, 1945. This reflects the fact that a very great number of these deaths – especially those from burns and radioactivity – took place slowly, in the days and weeks after the event.

Michiko Ogino, ten years old, was left in charge of his younger sisters when his mother went out to the fields to pick eggplants. The bomb brought the house down on them all, leaving his two-year-old sister with her legs pinned under a crossbeam:

"Mamma was bombed at noon
When getting eggplants in the field,
Short, red and crisp her hair stood,
Tender and red her skin was all over."

So Mrs Ogino, although the clothes were burned from her body and she had received a fatal dose of radiation, could still run back from the fields to succour her children. One after another passing sailors and neighbours heaved at the beam to release the trapped two-year-old, failed, and, bowing with Japanese courtesy, went on their way to help others.

"Mother was looking down at my little sister. Tiny eyes looked up from below. Mother looked around, studying the way the beams were piled up. Then she got into an opening under the beam, and putting her right shoulder under a portion of it, she strained with all her might. We heard a cracking sound and the beams were lifted a little. My little sister's legs were freed.

"Peeled off was the skin over her shoulder
That once lifted the beam off my sister.
Constant blood was spurting
From the sore flesh appearing . . ."

Mrs Ogino died that night. Fujio Tsujimoto, who was five years old, was in the playground of Yamazato Primary School, Nagasaki, just before the bomb dropped. Hearing the sound of a plane he grabbed his grandmother's hand and they were the first into the deepest part of the air raid shelter. The entrance to the shelter, as well as the playground, was covered with the dying. "My brother and sisters didn't get to the shelter in time, so they were burnt and crying. Half an hour later, my mother appeared. She was covered with blood. She had been making lunch at home when the bomb was dropped".

"My younger sisters died the next day. My mother – she also died the next day. And then my older brother died . . .

"The survivors made a pile of wood on the playground and began to cremate the corpses. My brother was burned. Mother also was burned and quickly turned to white bones which dropped down among the live coals. I cried as I looked on the scene. Grandmother was also watching, praying with a rosary . . .

"I am now in the fourth grade at Yamazato Primary School. That playground of terrible memories is now completely cleared and many friends play there happily. I play with my friends there too, but sometimes I suddenly remember that awful day. When I do, I squat down on the spot where we cremated our mother and touch the earth with my fingers. When I dig deep in the ground with a piece of bamboo, several pieces of charcoal appear. Looking at the spot for a while, I can dimly see my mother's image in the earth. So when I see someone else walking on that place, it makes me very angry."

I will not quote any more of the testimony of the children of Nagasaki (*Living Beneath The Atomic Cloud*). What it makes clear is that the "instant" of detonation was protracted over days and weeks, and was full, not only of physical misery, but of unutterable yearning and suffering. A great river runs through Hiroshima, and

each year the descendants set afloat on it lighted lanterns inscribed with the names of the family dead, and for several miles the full breadth of this river is one mass of flame.

After this we still have to consider the future tens of thousands who have died subsequently from the after-effects of that day – chiefly leukemia, various cancers, and diseases of the blood and digestive organs. The sufferers are known as *Hibakashu*, a word which ought to be international. Some *hibakashu* suffer from the direct consequences of wounds and burns, others from premature senility, others from blindness, deafness and dumbness, others are incapable of working because of nervous disorders, and many are seriously mentally deranged. Only two comforts can be derived from the expert *Nagasaki Report*: *hibakushu* have been distinguished by their mutual aid, sometimes in communities of fellow-sufferers: and the genetic effects of the bomb (which are still being studied) do not as yet appear to have been as bad as was at first apprehended.

"Radiological conditions may be expected to prevent any organised life-saving operation for days or weeks following an attack. Trained health service staff would be vital to the future and should not be wasted by allowing them to enter areas of high contamination where casualties would, in any case, have small chance of long-term recovery."

Home Office circular on the preparation of health services for nuclear war, ESI/1977.

We may now push this distressing matter back into our subconscious, and re-consider the possible effect of "a series of pre-emptive strikes", with scores of weapons very much more powerful than those bombs, upon this island.

It is true that the inhabitants of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were very little prepared for this advanced technology, and, indeed, in Nagasaki the "All Clear" had sounded shortly before the detonation, so that the populace had trooped out of their conventional shelters and the women were working in the fields and the children playing in the playgrounds when the bomb went off.

Our own authorities might be able to manage the affair better. With greater warning, stronger houses, and with some more effective measures of civil defence, some lives might be saved, and perhaps even "a substantial number". Indeed, two Conservative MPs have calculated that effective measures might reduce deaths in a nuclear war in this country from about thirty-five millions to just twenty millions, and I will allow that fifteen millions in savings is a substantial number indeed.

Nevertheless, two comments must be made on this. The first is that the death or mortal injury of even the small figure of twenty millions might still give rise to the conditions of "turbulence" which Professor Howard is anxious to forestall. The incidence of disaster would not be evenly spread across the country, with hale and hearty survivors in all parts standing ready, with high morale, to endure the hazards of the "second strike".

Air Marshal Sir Leslie Mavor, Principal of the Home Defence College, addressing a civil defence seminar in 1977 said that "the main target areas would be so badly knocked about as to be beyond effective self-help. They would have to be more or less discounted until adjoining areas recovered sufficiently to come to their aid". Those parts of the country "holding no nuclear targets" might come through "more or less undamaged by blast or fire".

> "Their difficulties would be caused by fall-out radiation, a large influx of refugees, survival without external supplies of food, energy, raw materials . . ." (*The Times*, 16 January 1980)

This seems a realistic assessment. There would be some total disaster areas, from the margins of which the wounded and dying would flee as refugees; other intermediate areas would have energy supplies destroyed, all transport dislocated, and persons, food and water contaminated by fall-out; yet others would be relatively immune. But even in these immune areas there would be some persons in a state of hysterical terror, who would be ready (if they knew how) to intervene to prevent the second stage of Professor Howard's scenario.

The second comment is that we do not yet have any realistic notion of what might be *a scale sufficient* to effect *substantial* savings, nor what measures might be taken. We may certainly agree with the professor that no such measures are either planned or contemplated. The defence correspondent of *The Times*, Mr Peter Evans, in an illuminating survey in January, discovered that measures have been taken to ensure the survival of the high personnel of the State. This has long been evident. There will be bunkers deep under the Chilterns for senior politicians, civil servants and military, and deep hidey holes for regional centres of military government. That is very comforting.

The population of this country, however, will not be invited to these bunkers, and it is an Official Secret to say where they are. The population will be issued, some three or four days before the event, with a do-it-yourself booklet (*Protect and Survive*), and be sent off to wait in their own homes. They will be advised to go down to the ground floor or the cellar, and make a cubby-hole there with old doors and planks, cover it with sandbags, books and heavy furniture, and then creep into these holes with food and water for 14 days, a portable radio, a portable latrine, and, of course, a tin-opener.

I have for long wondered why sociologists and demographers keep writing about "the nuclear family", but now it is all at length set down and explained, and there is even a picture in illustration of the term (see page 17).

Now this might save some lives, but it will also make for an unhappy end to others. For the principal effects of nuclear weapons are very intense heat, blast and radio-active emissions. Within a certain distance of the centre of the detonation all houses, cars, clothes, the hair on dogs, cats and persons, and so on, will spontaneously ignite, while at the same time the blast will bring the houses tumbling down about the cubby-holes. We must envisage many thousands of nuclear families listening to Mr Robin Day's consensual homilies on their portable radios as they are burned, crushed or suffocated to death.

Those outside this radius might be afforded a little temporary protection. But

A Nuclear Free Europe

We are entering the most dangerous decade in human history. A third world war is not merely possible, but increasingly likely. Economic and social difficulties in advanced industrial countries, crisis, militarism and war in the third world compound the political tensions that fuel a demented arms race. In Europe, the main geographical stage for the East-West confrontation, new generations of ever more deadly weapons are appearing.

For at least twenty-five years, the forces of both the North Atlantic and the Warsaw alliance have each had sufficient nuclear weapons to annihilate their opponents, and at the same time to endanger the very basis of civilised life. But with each passing year, competition in nuclear armaments has multiplied their numbers, increasing the probability of some devastating accident or miscalculation.

As each side tries to prove its readiness to use nuclear weapons, in order to prevent their use by the other side, new more "usable" nuclear weapons are designed and the idea of "limited" nuclear war is made to sound more and more plausible. So much so that this paradoxical process can logically only lead to the actual use of nuclear weapons.

Neither of the major powers is now in any moral position to influence smaller countries to forego the acquisition of nuclear armament. The increasing spread of nuclear reactors and the growth of the industry that installs them, reinforce the likelihood of world-wide proliferation of nuclear weapons, thereby multiplying the risks of nuclear exchanges.

Over the years, public opinion has pressed for nuclear disarmament and detente between the contending military blocs. This pressure has failed. An increasing proportion of world resources is expended on weapons, even though mutual extermination is already amply guaranteed. This economic burden, in both East and West, contributes to growing social and political strain, setting in motion a vicious circle in which the arms race feeds upon the instability of the world economy and vice versa: a deathly dialectic.

We are now in great danger. Generations have been born beneath the shadow of nuclear war, and have become habituated to the threat. Concern has given way to apathy. Meanwhile, in a world living always under menace, fear extends through both halves of the European continent. The powers of the military and of internal security forces are enlarged, limitations are placed upon free exchanges of ideas and between persons, and civil rights of independent-minded individuals are threatened, in the West as well as the East.

We do not wish to apportion guilt between the political and military leaders of East and West. Guilt lies squarely upon both parties. Both parties have adopted menacing postures and committed aggressive actions in different parts of the world.

The remedy lies in our own hands. We must act together to free the entire territory of Europe, from Poland to Portugal, from nuclear weapons, air and submarine bases, and from all institutions engaged in research into or manufacture of nuclear weapons. We ask the two super powers to withdraw all nuclear weapons from European territory. In particular, we ask the Soviet Union to halt production of the SS-20 medium range missile and we ask the United States not to implement the decision to develop cruise missiles and Pershing II missiles for deployment in Western Europe. We also urge the ratification of the SALT II agreement, as a necessary step towards the renewal of effective negotiations on general and complete disarmament.

At the same time, we must defend and extend the right of all citizens, East or West, to take part in this common movement and to engage in every kind of exchange.

We appeal to our friends in Europe, of every faith and persuasion, to consider urgently the ways in which we can work together for these common objectives. We envisage a European-wide campaign, in which every kind of exchange takes place; in which representatives of different nations and opinions confer and co-ordinate their activities; and in which less formal exchanges, between universities, churches, women's organisations, trade unions, youth organisations, professional groups and individuals, take place with the object of promoting a common object: to free all of Europe from nuclear weapons.

We must commence to act as if a united, neutral and pacific Europe already exists. We must learn to be loyal, not to "East" or "West", but to each other, and we must disregard the prohibitions and limitations imposed by any national state.

It will be the responsibility of the people of each nation to agitate for the expulsion of nuclear weapons and bases from European soil and territorial waters, and to decide upon its own means and strategy, concerning its own territory. These will differ from one country to another, and we do not suggest that any single strategy should be imposed. But this must be part of a trans-continental movement in which every kind of exchange takes place.

We must resist any attempt by the statesmen of East or West to manipulate this movement to their own advantage. We offer no advantage to either NATO or the Warsaw alliance. Our objectives must be to free Europe from confrontation, to enforce detente between the United States and the Soviet Union, and, ultimately, to dissolve both great power alliances.

In appealing to fellow Europeans, we are not turning our backs on the world. In working for the peace of Europe we are working for the peace of the world. Twice in this century Europe has disgraced its claims to civilisation by engendering world war. This time we must repay our debts to the world by engendering peace.

This appeal will achieve nothing if it is not supported by determined and inventive action, to win more people to support it. We need to mount an irresistible pressure for a Europe free of nuclear weapons.

We do not wish to impose any uniformity on the movement nor to pre-empt the consultations and decisions of those many organisations already exercising their influence for disarmament and peace. But the situation is urgent. The dangers steadily advance. We invite your support for this common objective, and we shall welcome both your help and advice.

Support for END

The appeal for a nuclear-free zone in Europe was launched at a special press conference in the House of Commons on April 28 1980, and simultaneously in four other capitals. At that time it was supported by 61 Labour Members of Parliament, two Welsh Nationalist MPs, one Scottish Nationalist and an Ulster Nationalist. Many distinguished people in literature and the arts, scholarship and public life were among the initial supporters. 11 members of the Labour Party's National Executive and 5 members of the General Council of the TUC signed the appeal before publication.

Hundreds of additional signatures have been arriving at Bertrand Russell House every week ever since the publication of the appeal. They include such distinguished scholars as Professor Sir Moses Finley, Sir Joseph Hutchinson, Dr Joseph Needham and Professor Peter Townsend; eminent Churchmen, such as the Bishop of Dudley, the Dean of Canterbury and Canon Paul Oestreicher; the well-known cricket commentator and writer, John Arlott; prominent personalities from the world of theatre, entertainment and broadcasting, like Juliet Mills, Helen Shapiro and Susannah York; military men such as Brigadier Harbottle. Since the end of April more parliamentarians have endorsed the appeal, including David Alton, Liberal Member for Edgehill.

In Europe the response reaches across an extraordinary breadth of opinion. Among those who have expressed support for the general objectives of the campaign are Gunnar Myrdal, the eminent Swedish economist and Roy Medvedev, the Russian historian and defender of civil rights. Rudolf Bahro, recently imprisoned in East Germany, and now working with the Green Party in West Germany, is a signatory, and so also are leading exponents of liberal "Eurocommunist" policies in West Europe – Pierre Joye (Belgium), Professor Lombardo Radice (Italy) and Manuel Azcarate (Spain). In France signatories include Dr Alfred Kastler, the physicist and Nobel laureate, Professor Pierre Bourdieu, the eminent sociologist, theologians, priests, artists and scholars. Growing support in West Germany has been encouraged by Professor Ulrich Albrecht, the Professor of Peace Studies at the Free University. Famous artists include Joan Miro (Spain), Victor Vasarely (France), and Piero Dorazio (Italy); while among distinguished political figures, we find Artur London (Czechoslovakia), Professor B. de Gaay Fortman, the leader of the Dutch Radical Party in the Senate, Maarten van Traa, the International Secretary of the Dutch Labour Party, Andras Hegedus (former Prime Minister of Hungary), Melo Antunnes (recently Portugal's foreign minister) and Francisco Marcelo Curto (former Minister of Labour in Portugal), Albert de Smaele (former Belgian Minister) and J. Pronteau (executive member of the French Socialist Party). From Greece up to Finland, and from Ireland to Moscow, the END appeal is being discussed by an ever-growing circle of concerned men and women.

In order to express your support for the appeal please complete and return the section overleaf.

I ENDORSE THE STATEMENT ON A EUROPEAN NUCLEAR-FREE ZONE, AND CONSENT TO THE PUBLICATION OF MY NAME IN THIS CONNECTION.

Signed . . . . . .

Name (in block capitals) . . . . . .

Address . . . . . .

. . . . . .

. . . . . .

Designation . . . . . .

I enclose £. . . . . to help with the Campaign (if you possibly can!)

Please return to the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation, Bertrand Russell House, Gamble Street, Nottingham, NG7 4ET. (Lists of additional signatories can be attached.)

when they eventually emerge (after some fourteen days) they will find the food and water contaminated, the roads blocked, the hospitals destroyed, the livestock dead or dying. The vice-chairman of Civil Aid, who is a realist, advises thus: "If you saw a frog running about, you would have to wash it down to get rid of active dust, cook it and eat it". (*The Times*, 14 February 1980.) And, according to Professor Howard's scenario, people will still be living in expectation of "yet heavier attacks".



The Nuclear Family

If we are to learn from the experience of the people of Nagasaki and Hiroshima, then I think it is, after all, unlikely that many survivors will be devoting their energies to "political turbulence", since, unless they know the entrances to the governmental deep bunkers, they will have nothing to turbul against. Most will be wandering here and there in a desperate attempt to find lost children, parents, neighbours, friends. A few of the most collected will succour the dying and dig among the ruins for the injured.

The measures outlined in *Protect and Survive* do not seem to me to be on *a scale sufficient* to reduce the consequences of a nuclear strike to the compass of a small word like "disagreeable". It is possible to imagine measures on a greater scale. The evacuation of whole cities, as is planned in the USA and perhaps in the Soviet Union, is inoperable here because this island is too small. But one might imagine the excavation of vast subterranean systems beneath our towns – and perhaps beneath All Soul's – complete with stored food and water, generating systems, air-purifying systems, etc.

This might save *a substantial number* of lives, although one is uncertain what it would save them for, since above ground no workplaces, uncontaminated crops or stock would be left. The logic of this development, then, will be to remove these activities underground also, with subterranean cattle-stalls, granaries, bakeries, and munitions works.

It is certainly possible that, if civilisation survives and continues on its present trajectory until the mid-twenty-first century, then the "advanced" societies will have become troglodyte in some such fashion. But it would not be advisable to suppose that our descendants will have then at length have attained to "security", in the simultaneous realisation of the ultimate in "deterrence" with the ultimate in "defence". For the military will by then have taken further steps in technology. Neutron weapons and Earth Penetrators already exist, which can drive death underground. All this will be perfected, "modernised", and refined. There will be immense thermonuclear charges capable of concussing a whole underground city. And, in any case, by the time that humanity becomes troglodyte, it will then have been already defeated. "Civilisation" will then be an archaic term, which children can no longer construe.

We will now turn to the second assumption which underpins Professor Howard's arguments. This concerns "tactical" or "theatre" nuclear war.

The professor supposes a "theatre" war confined to Europe, which does not escalate to confrontation between the two superpowers. We will not chide him too much on this witless supposition, since it is now commonplace in the strategic thinking of both blocs. Indeed, it is commonplace not only as idea but also as fact, since immense sums are spent on both sides to match each other's weapons at "tactical" and "theatre" levels.

We have seen that poor Mr Pym (who is still waiting to be told by an American officer what to do) is quite as simple on this matter as Professor Howard. Both suppose a "chain of deterrence", according to which war may not only start at any level but it may be confined to that level, since at any point there is a further fearsome threshold of "deterrence" ahead.

This is not the same as the proposal that *local* or *regional* wars with nuclear weapons may take place. That is a reasonable proposal. If the proliferation of these weapons continues, it is possible that we will see such wars: as between Israel and Arab states, or South Africa and an alliance of African states. Whether such wars lead on to confrontation between the superpowers will depend, not upon the logic of weaponry, but on further diplomatic and political considerations.

This proposition is different. It is that nuclear wars between the two great opposed powers and their allies could be confined to this or that level. This is a silly notion at first sight; and, after tedious and complex arguments have been gone through, it emerges as equally silly at the end. For while it might very well be in the *interests* of either the USA or the USSR to confine a war to Europe, or to the Persian gulf, and to prevent it from passing into an ultimate confrontation, we are not dealing here with rational behaviour.

Once "theatre" nuclear war commences, immense passions, indeed hysterias, will be aroused. After even the first strikes of such a war, communications and command posts will be so much snarled up that any notion of rational planning will give way to panic. Ideology will at once take over from self-interest. Above all, it will be manifest that the only one of the two great powers likely to come out of the contest as "victor" must be the one which hurls its ballistic weapons first, furthest

and fastest – and preferably before the weapons of the other have had time to lift off.

This was the commonsense message which Lord Louis Mountbatten, shortly before he was murdered, conveyed to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) at a meeting in Strasbourg. He referred to the introduction of "tactical" or "theatre" weapons:

> "The belief was that were hostilities ever to break out in Western Europe, such weapons could be used in field warfare without triggering an all-out nuclear exchange leading to the final holocaust.
>
> "I have never found this idea credible. I have never been able to accept the reasons for the belief that any class of nuclear weapons can be categorised in terms of their tactical or strategic purposes . . .
>
> "In the event of a nuclear war there will be no chances, there will be no survivors – all will be obliterated. I am not asserting this without having deeply thought about the matter. When I was Chief of the British Defence Staff I made my views known . . . I repeat in all sincerity as a military man I can see no use for any nuclear weapons which would not end in escalation, with consequences that no one can conceive."

The same firm judgement was expressed by Lord Zuckerman in *The Times* on January 21: "Nor was I ever able to see any military reality in what is now referred to as theatre or tactical warfare":

> "The men in the nuclear laboratories of both sides have succeeded in creating a world with an irrational foundation, on which a new set of political realities has in turn had to be built. They have become the alchemists of our times, working in secret ways which cannot be divulged, casting spells which embrace us all."

Professor Howard takes his stand on these irrational foundations, and practices alchemy in his own right. The spells which he casts on the public mind are presented as "civil defence". He calls for measures (unnamed) which must be "given the widest possible publicity", in order to ensure "the credibility of our entire defence posture", a posture which might otherwise be seen to be "no more than an expensive bluff".

The professor supposes that he is a tough realist, who is drawing conclusions which others, including politicians, are too timorous to draw in public. If we spend thousands of millions of pounds upon nuclear weapons, then we either intend to use them or we do not. If we intend to use them, then we must intend to receive them also.

But, as he knows, there are no practicable civil defence measures which could have more than a marginal effect. He is therefore telling us that "we" must replace one expensive bluff by a bluff even more expensive; or he is telling us that "we" have decided that we are ready to accept the obliteration of the material resources and inheritance of this island, and of some half of its inhabitants, in order to further the strategies of NATO.

These are two distinct propositions, and it is time that they were broken into two parts. For a long time the second proposition has been hidden within the mendacious vocabulary of "deterrence"; and behind these veils of "posture", "credibility" and "bluff" it has waxed fat and now has come of age.

The first proposition is that nuclear weapons are capable of inflicting such "unacceptable damage" on both parties to an exchange that mutual fear ensures peace. The second is that each party is actually preparing for nuclear war, and is ceaselessly searching for some ultimate weapon or tactical/strategic point of advantage which would assure its victory. We have lived uneasily with the first proposition for many years. We are now looking directly into the second proposition's eyes.

"Deterrence" has plausibility. It has "worked" for thirty years, if not in Vietnam, Czechoslovakia, the Middle East, Africa, Cambodia, the Dominican Republic, Afghanistan, then in the central fracture between the superpowers which runs across Europe. It may have inhibited, in Europe, major "conventional" war.

But it has not worked as a stationary state. The weapons for adequate "deterrence" already existed thirty years ago, and, as the Pope reminded us in his New Year's Message for 1980, only 200 of the 50,000 nuclear weapons now estimated to be in existence would be enough to destroy the world's major cities. Yet we have moved upwards to 50,000, and each year new sophistications and "modernisations" are introduced.

"The exercise scenario foresaw and developed a declaratory policy by the Warsaw Pact of no first nuclear use and a related NATO negation of this policy. The Alliance was therefore able to start from the assumption that its strategy of flexibility in response could take nuclear weapons fully into account . . . as a means to attempt war termination and restitution of the status quo . . .

"A message sent to an enemy during hostilities with strong ultimate features (demanding an end to hostilities and threatening to use nuclear weapons) should not be sent without a definite use decision by the nuclear power actually having been taken."

Report of NATO WINTEX 1977 exercise, prepared by the staff committee of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group ('secret').

The current chatter about "theatre" or "tactical" nuclear war is not a sophisticated variant of the old vocabulary of "deterrence"; it is directly at variance with that vocabulary. For it is founded on the notion that either of the superpowers might engage, to its own advantage, in a "limited" nuclear war which could be kept below the threshold at which retribution would be visited on its own soil.

Thus it is thought by persons in the Pentagon that a "theatre" nuclear war might be confined to Europe, in which, to be sure, America's NATO allies would be obliterated, but in which immense damage would also be inflicted upon Russia west of the Urals, while the soil of the United States remained immune. (In such a scenario it is even supposed that President Carter and Mr Brezhnev would be on the "hot line" to each other while Europe scorched, threatening ultimate intercontinental ballistic retribution, but at last making "peace".) This has been seen as

the way to a great "victory" for "the West", and if world-wide nuclear war seems to be ultimately inevitable, then the sooner that can be aborted by having a little "theatre" war the better.

The cruise missiles which are being set up all over Western Europe are weapons designed for exactly such a war, and the nations which harbour them are viewed, in this strategy, as launching platforms which are expendible in the interests of "Western" defence. In a somewhat muddy passage, Mr Pym assured BBC listeners that:

> "It is never envisaged that these weapons are in any sense a response to a nuclear attack from the Soviet Union which comes out of the blue. This is a lesser weapon, which would be deployed from these bases in times of tension, not only from the United Kingdom but throughout the other countries in Europe." (*Cambridge Evening News*, 6 February 1980)

Mr Pym has also confirmed to the House of Commons (*Hansard*, 24 January 1980) that the cruise missiles "are to be owned and operated by the United States". Their use must be sanctioned by the President of the United States on the request of the Supreme Allied Commander of NATO, who is always an American general. It was for this reason that Senator Nino Pasti, formerly an Italian member of the NATO Military Committee and Deputy Supreme Commander for NATO Nuclear Affairs, has declared: "I have no doubt that the tactical nuclear weapons deployed in Europe represent the worst danger for the peoples of the continent":

> "In plain words, the tactical nuclear weapon would be employed in the view of NATO to limit the war to Europe. Europe is to be transformed into a 'nuclear Maginot line' for the defence of the United States." (*Sanity*, July/August 1979)

Meanwhile the United States is urgently seeking for similar platforms in the Middle East for another small "theatre" war which might penetrate deep into the Caucasus. And an even uglier scenario is beginning to show itself in China, where greed for a vast arms market is tempting Western salesmen while United States strategists hope to nudge Russia and China into war with each other – a war which would dispell another Western phobia, the demographic explosion of the East. The idea here is to extract the West, at the last moment, from this war – much the same scenario as that which went disastrously wrong in 1939.

These little "theatre" wars (not one of which would obediently stay put in its theatre) are now all on the drawing-boards, and in the Pentagon more than in the Kremlin, for the simple reason that every "theatre" is adjacent to the Soviet Union, and any "tactical" nuclear strike would penetrate deep into Russian territory.

The plans for the European "theatre" war are not only ready – the "modernised" missiles designed for exactly such a war have been ordered, and will be delivered to this island in 1982. And at this moment, Professor Howard makes a corresponding *political* intervention. Let us see why this is so.

Professor Howard wishes to hurry the British people across a threshold of mental expectation, so that they may be prepared, not for "deterrence", but for actual nuclear war.

The expectations supporting the theory of deterrence are, in the final analysis, that deterrence will *work*. Deterrence is effective, because the alternative is not only "unacceptable" or "disagreeable": it is "unthinkable".

Deterrence is a posture, but it is the posture of MAD (mutual assured destruction), not of menace. It does not say, "If we go to nuclear war we intend to win": it says, "Do not go to war, or provoke war, because neither of us can win". In consequence it does not bother to meddle with anything so futile as "civil defence". If war commences, everything is already lost.

Those who have supported the policy of deterrence have done so in the confidence that this policy would prevent nuclear war from taking place. They have not contemplated the alternative, and have been able to avoid facing certain questions raised by that alternative. Of these, let us notice three.

First, is nuclear war preferable to being overcome by the enemy? Is the death of fifteen or twenty millions and the utter destruction of the country preferable to an occupation which might offer the possibility, after some years, of resurgence and recuperation?

Second, are we ourselves prepared to endorse the use of such weapons against the innocent, the children and the aged, of an "enemy"?

Third, how does it happen that Britain should find herself committed to policies which endanger the very survival of the nation, as a result of decisions taken by a secret committee of NATO, and then endorsed at Brussels without public discussion or parliamentary sanction, leaving the "owning and operation" of these "theatre" weapons in the hands of the military personnel of a foreign power, a power whose strategists have contingency plans for unleashing these missiles in a "theatre" war which would not extend as far as their own homeland?

The first two questions raise moral issues which it would be improper to introduce into an academic discussion. My own answer to them is "no". They are, in any case, not new questions. The third question is, in some sense, new, and it is also extraordinary, in the sense that even proposing the question illuminates the degree to which the loss of our national sovereignty has become absolute, and democratic process has been deformed in ways scarcely conceivable twenty years ago.

But Professor Howard's arguments are designed to hurry us past these questions without noticing them. They are designed to carry us across a threshold from the *unthinkable* (the theory of deterrence, founded upon the assumption that this must *work*) to the *thinkable* (the theory that nuclear war may happen, and may be imminent, and, with cunning tactics and proper preparations, might end in "victory").

More than this, the arguments are of an order which permit the mind to progress from the unthinkable to the thinkable *without thinking* – without confronting the arguments, their consequences or probable conclusions, and, indeed, without knowing that any threshold has been crossed.

At each side of this threshold we are offered a policy with an identical label: "deterrence". And both policies stink with the same mendacious rhetoric – "posture", "credibility", "bluff". But mutual fear and self-interest predominate on one side, and active menace and the ceaseless pursuit of "tactical" or "theatre"

advantage predominate on the other. Which other side we have crossed over to, and now daily inhabit.

"Nuclear weapons must be employed . . . to convey a decisive escalation of sufficient shock to convincingly persuade the enemy that he should make the political decision to cease the attack and withdraw. To evidence our solidarity, I am considering use in all regions employing both UK and US weapons using primarily aircraft and land-based missile systems. The initial use would be restricted to GDR, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romania, Hungary and Bulgaria."

Telex message from General Alexander Haigh, then Supreme Allied Commander Europe to the NATO Command, during the WINTEX 77 exercises.

Professor Howard himself has certainly thought the problem through. His letter was a direct political intervention. He called on the British authorities to rush us all, unthinkingly, across this thought-gap. His language – his anxiety as to possible "political turbulence", his advocacy of measures which are not "covert or concealed" – reveals a direct intention to act in political ways upon the mind of the people, in order to enforce a "posture", not of defence but of menace; and in this it corresponds, on a political level, with the menacing strategic decisions of NATO last December at Brussels.

The high strategists of NATO are busy in the Pentagon and the Hague, and Professor Howard is busy at All Soul's, but they are both working away at the same problem. One end of the problem was clearly stated, at the height of the old Cold War, by John Foster Dulles:

> "In order to make the country bear the burden, we have to create an emotional atmosphere akin to a war-time psychology. We must create the idea of a threat from without."

But that was when the problem was only in its infancy. For the country – that is, *this* country – must now not only be made to bear a burden of heavy expense, loss of civil liberties, etc., but also the expectation, as a definite and imminent possibility, of actual nuclear devastation.

Hence it becomes necessary to create not only "the idea of a threat from without" but also of a threat *from within*: "political turbulence". And it is necessary to inflame these new expectations by raising voluntary defence corps, auxiliary services, digging even deeper bunkers for the personnel of the State, distributing leaflets, holding lectures in halls and churches, laying down two-weeks supplies of emergency rations, promoting in the private sector the manufacture of Whitelaw Shelters and radiation-proof "Imperm" blinds and patent Anti-Fall-Out pastilles and "Breetheesy" masks, and getting the Women's Institutes to work out recipes for broiling radio-active frogs. And it is also necessary to supplement all this by beating up an internal civil-war or class-war psychosis, by unmasking traitors, by

threatening journalists under the Official Secrets Acts, by tampering with juries and tapping telephones, and generally by closing up people's minds and mouths.

Now I do not know how far all this will work. There are tactical problems, which those who live outside All Soul's are able to see. Whitehall's reluctance to issue every householder with a copy of *Protect and Survive* is eloquent testimony to this. For there is a minority of the British people who are reluctant to be harried across this threshold. These people have voices, and if they are denied access to the major media, there are still little journals and democratic organisations where they are able to speak. If the mass of the British public were to be suddenly alerted to the situation which they are actually now in – by "alarmist" leaflets and by broadcasts telling them that they have indeed every reason for alarm – then the whole operation might backfire, and give rise to a vast consensus, not for nuclear war, but for peace.

I suspect that, for these reasons, Professor Howard is regarded, by public-relations-conscious persons in the Establishment, as a great patriot of NATO and an admirable fellow, but as an inexperienced politician. The people of this country have been made dull and stupid by a diet of Official Information. But they are not all *that* stupid, and there is still a risk – a small risk, but not one worth taking – that they might remember who they are, and become "turbulent" before the war even got started.

I suspect that the strategy of high persons in the Cabinet Office, the security services, and the Ministry of Defence, is rather different from that of Professor Howard. There is preliminary work yet to do, in softening up the public mind, in intimidating dissidents, in controlling information more tightly, and in strengthening internal policing and security. Meanwhile planning will go forward, and at the next international crisis (real or factitious) there will be a co-ordinated, univocal, obliterating "civil defence" bombardment, with All-Party broadcasts, leafleting and the levying of volunteers, and with extreme precautions to prevent any dissenting voices from having more than the most marginal presence.

So that I think that Professor Howard is a little ahead of his times. But the *arguments* which Mr Howard has proposed, are, exactly, the arguments most deeply relevant to the present moment. That is why I have spent all this time in examining them.

I have sought, in these pages, to open these arguments up, to show what is inside them, which premises and what conclusions. I have not been trying to frighten readers, but to show the consequences to which these arguments lead.

Nor have I been trying to show that Professor Howard is a scandalous and immoral sort of person. I do not suppose myself to be a more moral sort of person than he. I think it unlikely that he put forward his ghastly scenario with any feelings of eager anticipation.

And, finally, although I am myself by conviction a socialist, I have not been grounding my arguments on premises of that kind. I do not suppose that all blame lies with the ideological malice and predatory drives of the capitalist "West", although some part of it does.

Socialists once supposed, in my youth, that socialist states might commit every kind of blunder, but the notion that they could go to war with each other, for ideological or national ends, was unthinkable. We now know better. States which call themselves "socialist" can go to war with each other, and do. And they can use means and arguments as bad as those of the old imperialist powers.

I have based my arguments on the *logic* of the Cold War, or of the "deterrent" situation itself. We may favour this or that explanation for the origin of this situation. But once this situation has arisen, there is a common logic at work in both blocs. Military technology and military strategy come to impose their own agenda upon political developments. As Lord Zuckerman has written: "The decisions which we make today in the fields of science and technology determine the tactics, then the strategy, and finally the politics of tomorrow".

This is an inter-operative and reciprocal logic, which threatens all, impartially. If you press me for my own view, then I would hazard that the Russian state is now the most dangerous in relation to its own people and to the people of its client states. The rulers of Russia are police-minded and security-minded people, imprisoned within their own ideology, accustomed to meet argument with repression and tanks. But the basic postures of the Soviet Union seem to me, still, to be those of siege and aggressive defence; and even the brutal and botching intervention in Afghanistan appears to have followed upon sensitivity as to United States and Chinese strategies.

> **"I can think of no instance in modern history where such a breakdown of political communication and such a triumph of unrestrained military suspicions as now marks Soviet-American relations has not led, in the end, to armed conflict."**
>
> *George Kennan, former US Ambassador to the Soviet Union, and Professor Emeritus, Princeton Institute of Advanced Studies.*
> Observer, *10 February 1980.*

The United States seems to me to be more dangerous and provocative in its general military and diplomatic strategies, which press around the Soviet Union with menacing bases. It is in Washington, rather than in Moscow, that scenarios are dreamed up for "theatre" wars; and it is in America that the "alchemists" of superkill, the clever technologists of "advantage" and ultimate weapons, press forward "the politics of tomorrow".

But we need not ground our own actions on a "preference" for one of the other blocs. This is unrealistic and could be divisive. What is relevant is the logic of process common to both, reinforcing the ugliest features of each others' societies, and locking both together in each others' nuclear arms in the same degenerative drift.

What I have been contending for, against Professor Howard, is this. First, I have

shown that the premises which underlie his letter are *irrational.*

Second, I have been concerned throughout with the use of *language.*

What makes the extinction of civilised life upon this island probable is not a greater propensity for evil than in previous history, but a more formidable destructive technology, a deformed political process (East and West), and also a deformed culture.

The deformation of culture commences within language itself. It makes possible a disjunction between the rationality and moral sensibility of individual men and women and the effective political and military process. A certain kind of "realist" and "technical" vocabulary effects a closure which seals out the imagination, and prevents the reason from following the most manifest sequence of cause and consequence. It habituates the mind to nuclear holocaust by reducing everything to a flat level of normality. By habituating us to certain expectations, it not only encourages resignation – it also beckons on the event.

"Human kind cannot bear very much reality". As much of reality as most of us can bear is what is most proximate to us – our self-interests and our immediate affections. What threatens our interests – what causes us even mental unease – is seen as outside ourselves, as the Other. We can kill thousands because we have first learned to call them "the enemy". Wars commence in our culture first of all, and we kill each other in euphemisms and abstractions long before the first missiles have been launched.

It has never been true that nuclear war is "unthinkable". It has been thought and the thought has been put into effect. This was done in 1945, in the name of allies fighting for the Four Freedoms (although what those Freedoms were I cannot now recall), and it was done upon two populous cities. It was done by professing Christians, when the Western Allies had already defeated the Germans, and when victory against the Japanese was certain, in the longer or shorter run. The longer run would have cost some thousands more of Western lives, whereas the short run (the bomb) would cost the lives only of enemy Asians. This was perfectly thinkable. It was thought. And action followed on.

What is "unthinkable" is that nuclear war could happen to *us.* So long as we can suppose that this war will be inflicted only on *them,* the thought comes easily. And if we can also suppose that this war will save "our" lives, or serve our self-interest, or even save us (if we live in California) from the tedium of queueing every other day for gasoline, then the act can easily follow on. We *think* others to death as we define them as the Other: the enemy: Asians: Marxists: non-people. The deformed human mind is the ultimate doomsday weapon – it is out of the human mind that the missiles and the neutron warheads come.

For this reason it is necessary to enter a remonstrance against Professor Howard and those who use his kind of language and adopt his mental postures. He is preparing our minds as launching platforms for exterminating thoughts. The fact that Soviet ideologists are doing much the same (thinking us to death as "imperialists" and "capitalists") is no defence. This is not work proper to scholars.

Academic persons have little influence upon political and military decisions, and less than they suppose. They do, however, operate within our culture, with ideas

and language, and, as we have seen, the deformation of culture is the precedent condition for nuclear war.

It is therefore proper to ask such persons to resist the contamination of our culture with those terms which precede the ultimate act. The death of fifteen millions of fellow citizens ought not to be described as "disagreeable consequences". A war confined to Europe ought not to be given the euphemisms of "limited" or "theatre". The development of more deadly weapons, combined with menacing diplomatic postures and major new political and strategic decisions (the siting of missiles on our own territory under the control of alien personnel) ought not to be concealed within the anodyne technological term of "modernisation". The threat to erase the major cities of Russia and East Europe ought not to trip easily off the tongue as "unacceptable damage".

Professor Howard is entitled to hold his opinions and to make these public. But I must enter a gentle remonstrance to the members of the University of Oxford nonetheless. Does this letter, from the Chichele Professor of the History of War, represent the best thoughts that Oxford can put together at a time when human culture enters a crisis which may be terminal? I have no doubt that members of that University hold different opinions. But where, and how often, in the last few months, have these other voices been heard?

I am thinking, most of all, of that great number of persons who very much dislike what is going on in the actual world, but who dislike the vulgarity of exposing themselves to the business of "politics" even more. They erect both sets of dislikes around their desks or laboratories like a screen, and get on with their work and their careers. I am not asking these, or all of them, to march around the place or to spend hours in weary little meetings. I am asking them to examine the deformities of our culture and then, in public places, to demur.

I am asking them whether Professor Howard's letter truly represents the voice of Oxford? And, if it does not, what measures they have taken to let their dissent be known?

I will recommend some other forms of action, although every person must be governed in this by his or her own conscience and aptitudes. But, first, I should, in fairness to Professor Howard, offer a scenario of my own.

I have come to the view that a general nuclear war is not only possible but probable, and that its probability is increasing. We may indeed be approaching a point of no-return when the existing tendency or disposition towards this outcome becomes irreversible.

I ground this view upon two considerations, which we may define (to borrow the terms of our opponents) as "tactical" and "strategic".

By tactical I mean that the political and military conditions for such war exist now in several parts of the world; the proliferation of nuclear weapons will continue, and will be hastened by the export of nuclear energy technology to new markets; and the rivalry of the superpowers is directly inflaming these conditions.

Such conditions now exist in the Middle East and around the Persian Gulf, will shortly exist in Africa, while in South-East Asia Russia and China have already

engaged in wars by proxy with each other, in Cambodia and Vietnam.

Such wars might stop just short of general nuclear war between the superpowers. And in their aftermath the great powers might be frightened into better behaviour for a few years. But so long as this behaviour rested on nothing more than mutual fear, then military technology would continue to be refined, more hideous weapons would be invented, and the opposing giants would enlarge their control over client states. The strategic pressures towards confrontation will continue to grow.

These *strategic* considerations are the gravest of the two. They rest upon a historical view of power and of the social process, rather than upon the instant analysis of the commentator on events.

In this view it is a superficial judgement, and a dangerous error, to suppose that deterrence "has worked". Very possibly it may have worked, at this or that moment, in preventing recourse to war. But in its very mode of working, and in its "postures", it has brought on a series of consequences within its host societies.

"Deterrence" is not a stationary state, it is a degenerative state. Deterrence has repressed the export of violence towards the opposing bloc, but in doing so the repressed power of the state has turned back upon its own author. The repressed violence has backed up, and has worked its way back into the economy, the polity, the ideology and the culture of the opposing powers. This is the deep structure of the Cold War.

The logic of this deep structure of mutual fear was clearly identified by William Blake in his "Song of Experience", *The Human Abstract*:

> And mutual fear brings peace;
> Till the selfish loves increase.
> Then Cruelty knits a snare,
> And spreads his baits with care . . .
>
> Soon spreads the dismal shade
> Of Mystery over his head;
> And the Catterpiller and Fly
> Feed on the Mystery.
>
> And it bears the fruit of Deceit,
> Ruddy and sweet to eat;
> And the Raven his nest has made
> In its thickest shade.

In this logic, the peace of "mutual fear" enforces opposing self-interests, affords room for "Cruelty" to work, engenders "Mystery" and its parasites, brings to fruit the "postures" of Deceit, and the death-foreboding Raven hides within the Mystery.

Within the logic of "deterrence", millions are now employed in the armed services, security organs and military economy of the opposing blocs, and corresponding interests exert immense influence within the counsels of the great powers. Mystery envelops the operation of the technological "alchemists". "Deterrence" has become normal, and minds have been habituated to the vocabulary of mutual extermination. And within this normality, hideous cultural abnormalities have been nurtured and are growing to full girth.

The menace of nuclear war reaches far back into the economies of both parties, dictating priorities, and awarding power. Here, in failing economies, will be found the most secure and vigorous sectors, tapping the most advanced technological skills of both opposed societies and diverting these away from peaceful and productive employment or from efforts to close the great gap between the world's north and south. Here also will be found the driving rationale for expansionist programmes in unsafe nuclear energy, programmes which cohabit comfortably with military nuclear technology whereas the urgent research into safe energy supplies from sun, wind or wave are neglected because they have no military pay-off. Here, in this burgeoning sector, will be found the new expansionist drive for "markets" for arms, as "capitalist" and "socialist" powers compete to feed into the Middle East, Africa and Asia more sophisticated means of kill.

> **"The MX missile will be the most expensive weapon ever produced – some estimates run as high as $100 billion to deploy 200 missiles. Building its 'race track' bases will involve the largest construction project in US history . . . More than 20,000 square miles may be involved for this system . . . in the sparsely inhabited states of Utah and Nevada. Some 10,000 miles of heavy duty roadway will be required, and perhaps 5,000 additional miles of road . . . The MX will thus require the biggest construction project in the nation's history, bigger than the Panama Canal and much bigger than the Alaskan pipeline."**
>
> *Herbert Scoville, Jr., "America's Greatest Construction: Can It Work?",* New York Review of Books. *20 March 1980.*

The menace of this stagnant state of violence backs up also into the polity of both halves of the world. Permanent threat and periodic crisis press the men of the military-industrial interests, by differing routes in each society, towards the top. Crisis legitimates the enlargement of the security functions of the state, the intimidation of internal dissent, and the imposition of secrecy and the control of information. As the "natural" lines of social and political development are repressed, and affirmative perspectives are closed, so internal politics collapses into squabbling interest-groups, all of which interests are subordinated to the overarching interests of the state of perpetual threat.

All this may be readily observed. It may be observed even in failing Britain, across whose territory are now scattered the bases, airfields, camps, research stations, submarine depots, communications-interception stations, radar screens, security and intelligence HQ, munitions works – secure and expanding employment in an economic climate of radical insecurity.

What we cannot observe so well – for we ourselves are the object which must be observed – is the manner in which three decades of "deterrence", of mutual fear, mystery, and state-endorsed stagnant hostility, have backed up into our culture and

our ideology. Information has been numbed, language and values have been fouled, by the postures and expectations of the "deterrent" state. But this is matter for a close and scrupulous enquiry.

These, then, are among the strategic considerations which lead me to the view that the probability of great power nuclear warfare is strong and increasing. I do not argue from this local episode or that: what happened yesterday in Afghanistan and what is happening now in Pakistan or North Yemen. I argue from a general and sustained historical process, an accumulative logic, of a kind made familiar to me in the study of history. The episodes lead in this direction or that, but the general logic of process is always towards nuclear war.

The local crises are survived, and it seems as if the decisive moment – either of war or of peace-making and reconciliation – has been postponed and pushed forward into the future. But what has been pushed forward is always worse. Both parties change for the worse. The weapons are more terrible, the means for their delivery more clever. The notion that a war might be fought to "advantage", that it might be "won", gains ground. George Bush, the aspirant President of the United States, tries it out in election speeches. There is even a tremour of excitement in our culture as though, subconsciously, human kind has lived with the notion for so long that expectations without actions have become boring. The human mind, even when it resists, assents more easily to its own defeat. All moves on its degenerative course, as if the outcome of civilisation was as determined as the outcome of this sentence: in a full stop.

I am reluctant to accept that this determinism is absolute. But if my arguments are correct, then we cannot put off the matter any longer. We must throw whatever resources still exist in human culture across the path of this degenerative logic. We must protest if we are to survive. Protest is the only realistic form of civil defence.

We must generate an alternative logic, an opposition at every level of society. This opposition must be international and it must win the support of multitudes. It must bring its influence to bear upon the rulers of the world. It must act, in very different conditions, within each national state; and, on occasion, it must directly confront its own national state apparatus.

Recently the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation has issued an all-European Appeal for European Nuclear Disarmament. The objective of this Appeal will be the establishment of an expanding zone in Europe freed from nuclear weapons, air and submarine bases, etc. We aim to expel these weapons from the soil and waters of both East and West Europe, and to press the missiles, in the first place, back to the Urals and to the Atlantic ocean.

The tactics of this campaign will be both national and international.

In the national context, each national peace movement will proceed directly to contest the nuclear weapons deployed by its own state, or by NATO or Warsaw Treaty obligations upon its own soil. Its actions will not be qualified by any notion of diplomatic bargaining. Its opposition to the use of nuclear weapons by its own state will be absolute. Its demands upon its own state for disarmament will be unilateral.

In the international, and especially in the European, context, each national movement will exchange information and delegations, will support and challenge each other. The movement will encourage a European consciousness, in common combat for survival, fostering informal communication at every level, and disregarding national considerations of interest or "security".

It is evident that this logic will develop unevenly. The national movements will not grow at the same pace, nor be able to express themselves in identical ways. Each success of a unilateral kind – by Holland in refusing NATO cruise missiles or by Romania or Poland in distancing themselves from Soviet strategies – will be met with an outcry that it serves the advantage of one or other bloc.

This outcry must be disregarded. It cannot be expected that initiatives on one side will be met with instant reciprocation from the other. Very certainly, the strategists of both blocs will seek to turn the movement to their own advantage. The logic of peace-making will be as uneven, and as fraught with emergencies and contingencies, as the logic which leads on to war.

In particular, the movement in West and East Europe will find very different expression. In the West we envisage popular movements engaged in a direct contest with the policies of their own national states. At first, Soviet ideologues may look benignly upon this, looking forward to a weakening of NATO preparations which are matched by no actions larger than "peace-loving" rhetoric from the East.

But we are confident that our strategy can turn this rhetoric into acts. In Eastern Europe there are profound pressures for peace, for greater democracy and international exchange, and for relief from the heavy burden of siege economies. For a time these pressures may be contained by the repressive measures of national and Soviet security services. Only a few courageous dissidents will, in the first place, be able to take an open part in our common work.

Yet to the degree that the peace movement in the West can be seen to be effective, it will afford support and protection to our allies in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. It will provide those conditions of relaxation of tension which will weaken the rationale and legitimacy of repressive state measures, and will allow the pressures for democracy and detente to assert themselves in more active and open ways. Moreover, as an intrinsic part of the European campaign, the demand for an opening of the societies of the East to information, free communication and expression, and exchange of delegations to take part in the common work will be pressed on every occasion. And it will not only be "pressed" as rhetoric. We are going to find devices which will symbolise that pressure and dramatise that debate.

Against the strategy which envisages Europe as a "theatre" of "limited" nuclear warfare, we propose to make in Europe a theatre of peace. This will not, even if we succeed, remove the danger of confrontation in non-European theatres. It offers, at the least, a small hope of European survival. It could offer more. For if the logic of nuclear strategy reaches back into the organisation and ideologies of the superpowers themselves, so the logic of peace-making might reach back also, enforcing alternative strategies, alternative ideologies. European nuclear disarmament would favour the conditions for international detente.

As to Britain there is no need to doubt what must be done to protest and survive.

We must detach ourselves from the nuclear strategies of NATO and dispense with the expensive and futile imperial toy of an "independent" deterrent (Polaris). We must close down those airfields and bases which already serve aircraft and submarines on nuclear missions. And we must contest every stage of the attempt to import United States cruise missiles onto our soil.

Although we know that 164 cruise missiles are planned to be sited in Britain by 1982, Mr Pym (as we have seen) is still waiting for a United States officer to tell him where they will be sited. Official leaks suggest that the major bases for the operation will be at Lakenheath in Suffolk, at Upper Heyford in Oxfordshire, and possibly at Sculthorpe (Norfolk).

Whether they are permanently sited at these spots, or dragged around on mobile platforms in "emergency" to subsidiary bases (as at Fairford or Greenham Common), we can be sure that there will be a permanent infra-structure of buildings and communications devices, wire and ferocious guard dogs. It should be easy to find out what is going on. As a matter of course, in a question of national survival, any responsible and patriotic citizen should pass his knowledge of these matters on, whether they call it an "official secret" or not. How can a question which may decide whether one's children live or not be anyone's official secret?

There will also be a flurry of preparations, such as road-building and the strengthening of culverts. As Mr Churchill noted in parliament, the transporters for Pershing missiles weigh 80 tons, and are heavy enough to crush 90 per cent of the German road network. All this they will have to attend to, and there will be time not only for us to find it out but also to do our best to bring it to a stop.

The first necessity of *Protect and Survive* is to contest the importation of these foul and menacing weapons, which are at one and the same time weapons of aggression and invitations for retaliatory attack. In the course of this, there must be great public manifestations and direct contestations – peacefully and responsibly conducted – of several kinds. We must also take pains to discuss the question with the United States personnel manning these bases. We must explain to these that we wish them to go home, but that they are welcome to return to this country, as visitors, in any other role.

As it happens, these major bases are to be placed in proximity to the ancient universities of Oxford and Cambridge, and it seems to me that there is useful work to be done from these old bases of European civilisation. There will be work of research, of publication, and also work of conscience, all of which are very suitable for scholars.

Upper Heyford is a few miles out of Oxford on the Kidlington road (A43): take the left fork by Weston-on-the-Green, and then turn left again at Stone. The fellows of Cambridge who wish to inspect their fiendly neighbourhood base at Lakenheath must drive a little further. One route would be on the A10 through Ely to Littleport, then turn right on the A1101 and wiggle across that flat fenny land alongside the Little Ouse. Gum boots should be taken.

Oxford and Cambridge, then, are privileged to initiate this campaign: to plot out the ground: and to recommend which measures may be most effective. But they

may be assured that thousands of their neighbours can be brought to take a share in the work. And there are plenty of other places which will need visiting, alongside the general work of education, persuasion and creating a sharp political weather through which the politicians will have to sail. Our aim must be to ensure that, by 1982, any politician who still has a cruise missile on board will fear to put out to sea at all.

As for the international work, this is in hand, and I hope that before the summer is out we will receive news from – and exchange delegations with – the movement in other nations. The Dutch already have a start on us. They are, in a sense, the founders of this movement. Their torchlight processions were out in force last November, in Amsterdam, Heerlen, Groningen and Utrecht; and an alliance of left-wing organisations and of the Dutch Council of Churches proved to be strong enough, in December, to defeat the government and to enforce a postponement of the Dutch decision on cruise missiles. In Belgium also there is a movement, and in West Germany the "green" movement against nuclear power is looking in the same direction. Indeed, a movement is astir already in West Europe, and only Britain, the first home of CND, has been yawning on its way to Armageddon.

A final, and important, consideration is that this European work *need not wait upon governments*, nor should it all be routed through centralised organisations. What is required, and what is now immediately possible and practicable, is a *lateral* strategy.

Indeed, this strategy, even more than the conventionally "political", is the most appropriate for exchanges between Western and Eastern Europe. Any existing organisation, institution, or even individual, can look out for any opposite number and get on with the work. Universities and colleges – or groups within these – can commence to exchange ideas and visits with colleagues in Warsaw, Kiev or Budapest. Students can travel to Poland or to Prague. Trade unionists, women's organisations, members of professions, churches, practitioners of Esperanto or of chess – any and every kind of more specialised group can urge, along with their more particular common interests, the general common interest in European Nuclear Disarmament.

Before long, if we get going, we will be crossing frontiers, exchanging theatre and songs, busting open bureaucratic doors, making the telephone-tappers spin in their hideaways as the exchanges jam with official secrets, and breaking up the old stoney Stalinist reflexes of the East by forcing open debate and dialogue, not on their mendacious "peace-loving" agendas but on ours, and yet in ways that cannot possibly be outlawed as agencies of the imperialist West. If we have to do so, then we must be ready to inspect each others' jails. We must act as if we are, already, citizens of Europe.

It would be nicer to have a quiet life. But they are not going to let us have that. If we wish to survive, we must protest.

The acronym of European Nuclear Disarmament is END. I have explained why I think that the arguments of Professor Howard are hastening us towards a different end. I have outlined the deep structure of deterrence, and diagnosed its outcome as terminal. I can see no way of preventing this outcome but by immediate actions throughout Europe, which generate a counter-logic of nuclear disarmament.

Which end is it to be?

If you wish to help with the British Campaign contact Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, 29 Great James Street, London WC1N 3EY. If you can help with the European Campaign, write to Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation, Bertrand Russell House, Gamble Street, Nottingham NG7 4ET.

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Spokesman
Pamphlet No 71
45p

Dear Colleague,

Concern about the danger of a nuclear holocaust has grown in the last year. So far, however, most initiatives to reverse the nuclear arms race have been taken at national levels. We think that a call from people all around the world to stop the arms race could strengthen these efforts.

On the basis of recent experiences of the freeze movement in the U.S. and the peace movements in Europe, it appears that a call for an immediate nuclear freeze may find worldwide support.

Physicists know each other around the world, and it should be possible to find among ourselves an international consensus on such an initiative. If we physicists unite our worried voices irrespective of political differences, our appeal should have considerable impact. It would be presented to the concerned governments, to international organizations and made public through the press and other forums. We hope that this freeze appeal would then spread to other communities so to gain an even wider support.

We are therefore asking you to support the following freeze appeal

WE CALL FOR AN AGREEMENT TO HALT THE TESTING, PRODUCTION, AND DEPLOYMENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS DELIVERY SYSTEMS. MEANWHILE, NO FURTHER NUCLEAR WEAPONS OR DELIVERY SYSTEMS SHOULD BE DEPLOYED ANYWHERE.

This is repeated with a preamble on the following page. If you are in agreement, please sign the appeal and return it to one of us before the end of October.

We are starting this action with a limited number (40 to 60) of physicists from all parts of the world whose names represent a reference for the whole community. Then a widespread dissemination will be made to seek a consensus from the whole community. We have some ideas on how to start this further action. We would be, however, grateful if you let us know any idea you might have on steps and ways to contact the largest possible part of the physics community in your country.

Yours very sincerely,

Daniele AMATI
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A CALL TO HALT THE NUCLEAR ARMS RACE

Despite many efforts, conferences, and negotiations the nuclear arms race is accelerating. There are now more than fifty thousand nuclear weapons, some of which have yields a thousand times greater than the bomb that destroyed Hiroshima. This means some three tons TNT equivalent for every person on earth. The counting of numbers of warheads and missiles is no longer relevant for security. On the contrary, the nuclear arms race diminishes security and brings us closer to nuclear holocaust.

Mankind's fate is in its own hands. The catastrophe of nuclear war can and must be prevented. The nuclear arms race must be reversed. It must be reversed now, there is no time to be lost. It can be reversed if people from all over the world work together for this common goal. Let us unite all voices to call for an immediate freeze of the nuclear arms race. This is a necessary first step towards nuclear disarmament. It is simple and comprehensive. People with different political and religious convictions, organizations and movements from many nations may work together to achieve it. The freeze should not be postponed until the conclusion of time consuming negotiations. We, physicists from all over the world, support the following appeal:

WE CALL FOR AN AGREEMENT TO HALT THE TESTING, PRODUCTION, AND DEPLOYMENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS DELIVERY SYSTEMS. MEANWHILE, NO FURTHER NUCLEAR WEAPONS OR DELIVERY SYSTEMS SHOULD BE DEPLOYED ANYWHERE.

Signature :

Name :

Address :

No Cruise Missiles



European Nuclear Disarmament : Ken Coates

No SS20's

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European Nuclear Disarmament

"Remember your humanity, and forget the rest. If you can do so, the way lies open to a new Paradise; if you cannot, there lies before you the risk of universal death."

Russell-Einstein Manifesto, 1955.

I The Most Dangerous Decade in History . . .

At the end of April 1980, following some months of consultation and preparation, an appeal for European Nuclear Disarmament was launched at a press conference in the House of Commons, and at meetings in a variety of European capital cities. The text of the appeal reads:

We are entering the most dangerous decade in human history. A third world war is not merely possible, but increasingly likely. Economic and social difficulties in advanced industrial countries, crisis, militarism and war in the third world compound the political tensions that fuel a demented arms race. In Europe, the main geographical stage for the East-West confrontation, new generations of ever more deadly nuclear weapons are appearing.

For at least twenty-five years, the forces of both the North Atlantic and the Warsaw alliances have each had sufficient nuclear weapons to annihilate their opponents, and at the same time to endanger the very basis of civilised life. But with each passing year, competition in nuclear armaments has multiplied their numbers, increasing the probability of some devastating accident or miscalculation.

As each side tries to prove its readiness to use nuclear weapons, in order to prevent their use by the other side, new more 'usable' nuclear weapons are designed and the idea of 'limited' nuclear war is made to sound more and more plausible. So much so that this paradoxical process can logically only lead to the actual use of nuclear weapons.

Neither of the major powers is now in any moral position to influence smaller countries to forego the acquisition of nuclear armament. The increasing spread of nuclear reactors and the growth of the industry that installs them, reinforce the likelihood of world-wide proliferation of nuclear weapons, thereby multiplying the risks of nuclear exchanges.

Over the years, public opinion has pressed for nuclear disarmament and detente between the contending military blocs. This pressure has failed. An increasing proportion of world resources is expended on weapons, even though mutual extermination is already amply guaranteed. This economic burden, in

both East and West, contributes to growing social and political strain, setting in motion a vicious circle in which the arms race feeds upon the instability of the world economy and vice versa: a deathly dialetic.

We are now in great danger. Generations have been born beneath the shadow of nuclear war, and have become habituated to the threat. Concern has given way to apathy. Meanwhile, in a world living always under menace, fear extends through both halves of the European continent. The powers of the military and of internal security forces are enlarged, limitations are placed upon free exchanges of ideas and between persons, and civil rights of independent-minded individuals are threatened, in the West as well as the East.

We do not wish to apportion guilt between the political and military leaders of East and West. Guilt lies squarely upon both parties. Both parties have adopted menacing postures and committed aggressive actions in different parts of the world.

The remedy lies in our own hands. We must act together to free the entire territory of Europe, from Poland to Portugal, from nuclear weapons, air and submarine bases, and from all institutions engaged in research into or manufacture of nuclear weapons. We ask the two super powers to withdraw all nuclear weapons from European territory. In particular, we ask the Soviet Union to halt production of the SS-20 medium range missile and we ask the United States not to implement the decision to develop cruise missiles and Pershing II missiles for deployment in Europe. We also urge the ratification of the SALT II agreement, as a necessary step towards the renewal of effective negotiations on general and complete disarmament.

At the same time, we must defend and extend the right of all citizens, East or West, to take part in this common movement and to engage in every kind of exchange.

We appeal to our friends in Europe, of every faith and persuasion, to consider urgently the ways in which we can work together for these common objectives. We envisage a European-wide campaign, in which every kind of exchange takes place; in which representatives of different nations and opinions confer and co-ordinate their activities; and in which less formal exhanges, between universities, churches, women's organisations, trade unions, youth organisations, professional groups and individuals, take place with the object of promoting a common object: to free all of Europe from nuclear weapons.

We must commence to act as if a united, neutral and pacific Europe already exists. We must learn to be loyal, not to 'East' or 'West', but to each other, and we must disregard the prohibitions and limitations imposed by any national state.

It will be the responsibility of the people of each nation to agitate for the expulsion of nuclear weapons and bases from European soil and territorial waters, and to decide upon its own means and strategy, concerning its own territory. These will differ from one country to another, and we do not suggest that any single strategy should be imposed. But this must be part of a trans-continental movement in which every kind of exchange takes place.

We must resist any attempt by the statesmen of East and West to manipulate this movement to their own advantage. We offer no advantage to either NATO or the Warsaw alliance. Our objectives must be to free Europe from confrontation, to enforce detente between the United States and the Soviet Union, and, ultimately, to dissolve both great power alliances.

In appealing to fellow Europeans, we are not turning our backs on the world. In working for the peace of Europe we are working for the peace of the world.

Twice in this century Europe has disgraced its claims to civilisation by engendering world war. This time we must repay our debts to the world by engendering peace.

This appeal will achieve nothing if it is not supported by determined and inventive action, to win more people to support it. We need to mount an irresistible pressure for a Europe free of nuclear weapons.

We do not wish to impose any uniformity on the movement nor to pre-empt the consultations and decisions of those many organisations already exercising their influence for disarmament and peace. But the situation is urgent. The dangers steadily advance. We invite your support for this common objective, and we shall welcome both your help and advice.

Several hundred people, many of whom were prominent in their own field of work, had already endorsed this statement before its publication. They included over sixty British MPs from four different political parties, and a number of peers, bishops, artists, composers and university teachers. The press conference, which was addressed by Tony Benn, Eric Heffer, Mary Kaldor, Bruce Kent, Zhores Medvedev, Dan Smith and Edward Thompson, launched a campaign for signatures to the appeal and by Hiroshima Day (August 6th, the anniversary of the dropping of the first atomic bomb on Japan) influential support had been registered in many different countries. Writers such as Kurt Vonnegut, Olivia Manning, John Berger, Trevor Griffiths, J.B. Priestley and Melvyn Bragg had joined with church leaders, political spokesmen, painters (Joan Miro, Vasarely, Josef Herman, David Tindle, Piero Dorazio), Nobel Prize winners and thousands of men and women working in industry and the professions. British signatories included the composer Peter Maxwell Davies, the doyen of cricket commentators, John Arlott, distinguished soldiers such as Sir John Glubb and Brigadier M.N. Harbottle, and trade union leaders (Moss Evans, Laurence Daly, Arthur Scargill and many others). It was generally agreed that a European meeting was necessary, in order to work out means of developing the agitation, and in order to discuss all the various issues and problems which are in need of elaboration, over and beyond the text of the appeal.

The Bertrand Russell Foundation is working on the preparation of this Conference. A small liaison committee has been established to co-ordinate the work in Great Britain, and various persons and groups have accepted the responsibility for co-ordinating action in particular fields of work. For instance, a group of parliamentarians will be appealing to their British colleagues, but also to MPs throughout Europe; academics will be writing to their own immediate circles, but also seeking international contacts; churches are being approached through Pax Christi; and an active trade union group has begun to develop. Lists of some of these groups will be found at the end of this pamphlet, which has been

prepared in order to outline some the issues at greater length than proved possible in the appeal itself.

II "A Demented Arms Race . . ."

1980 began with an urgent and concerned discussion about rearmament. The Pope, in his New Year Message, caught the predominant mood: "What can one say", he asked, "in the face of the gigantic and threatening military arsenals which especially at the close of 1979 have caught the attention of the world and especially of Europe, both East and West?"

War in Afghanistan; American hostages in Teheran, and dramatic pile-ups in the Iranian deserts, as European-based American commandos failed to 'spring' them; wars or threats of war in South East Asia, the Middle East, and Southern Africa: at first sight, all the world in turbulence, excepting only Europe. Yet in spite of itself Europe is at the fixed centre of the arms race; and it is in Europe that many of the most fearsome weapons are deployed. What the Pope was recognizing at the opening of the decade was that conflicts in any other zone might easily spill back into the European theatre, where they would then destroy our continent.

Numbers of statesmen have warned about this furious accumulation of weapons during the late 'seventies. It has been a persistent theme of such eminent neutral spokesmen as Olof Palme of Sweden, or President Tito of Yugoslavia. Lord Mountbatten, in his last speech, warned that "the frightening facts about the arms race . . .show that we are rushing headlong towards a precipice".[1] Why has this "headlong rush" broken out? First, because of the world-wide division between what is nowadays called "North" and "South". In spite of United Nations initiatives, proposals for a new economic order which could assist economic development have not only not been implemented, but have been stalemated while conditions have even been aggravated by the oil crisis. Poverty was never morally acceptable, but it is no longer politically tolerable in a world which can speak to itself through transistors, while over and again in many areas, starvation recurs. In others, millions remain on the verge of the merest subsistence. The third world is thus a zone of revolts, revolutions, interventions, and wars.

To avoid or win these, repressive leaders like the former Shah of Iran are willing to spend unheard of wealth on arms, and the arms trade paradoxically often takes the lead over all other exchanges, even in countries where malnutrition is endemic. At the same time, strategic considerations bring into play the superpowers, as "revolutionary" or "counter-revolutionary" supports. This produces some extraordinary

alignments and confrontations, such as those between the Ethiopian military, and Somalia and Eritrea, where direct Cuban and Soviet intervention has been a crucial factor, even though the Eritreans have been engaged in one of the longest-running liberation struggles in all Africa: or such as the renewed Indo-China war following the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, in which remnants of the former Cambodian communist government appear to have received support from the United States, even though it only came into existence in opposition to American secret bombing, which destroyed the physical livelihood of the country together with its social fabric. A variety of such direct and indirect interventions owes everything to geo-political expediency, and nothing to the ideals invoked to justify them. Such processes help promote what specialists call the "horizontal" proliferation of nuclear weapons, to new, formerly non-nuclear states, at the same time that they add their pressure to the "vertical" proliferation between the superpowers.

Second, the emergence of China into the community of nations (if this phrase can nowadays be used without cynicism) complicates the old pattern of interplay between the blocs. Where yesterday there was a tug-o'war between the USA and the USSR, with each principal mobilising its own team of supporters at its end of the rope, now there is a triangular contest, in which both of the old-established contestants may, in future, seek to play the China team. At the moment, the Chinese are most worried about the Russians, which means that the Russians will feel a constant need to augment their military readiness on their 'second' front, while the Americans will seek to match Soviet preparedness overall, making no differentiation between the "theatres" against which the Russians see a need for defence. It should be noted that the Chinese Government still considers that war is "inevitable", although it has apparently changed its assessment of the source of the threat. (It is the more interesting, in this context, that the Chinese military budget for 1980 is the only one which is being substantially reduced, by $1.9 billion, or 8.5%).

Third, while all these political cauldrons boil, the military-technical processes have their own logic, which is fearsome.

Stacked around the world at the beginning of the decade, there were a minimum of 50,000 nuclear warheads, belonging to the two main powers, whose combined explosive capacity exceeds by one million times the destructive power of the first atomic bomb which was dropped on Hiroshima. The number grows continually. This is "global overkill". Yet during the next decade, the USA and USSR will be manufacturing a further 20,000 warheads, some of unimaginable force.

World military spending, the Brandt Report on North-South economic

development estimated, ran two years ago at something approaching $450 billion a year or around $1.2 billion every day.[2] More recent estimates for last year show that global military expenditures have already passed $500 billion per annum or $1.3 billion each day. Recently both the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and the Warsaw Treaty Organisation both decided to increase their military spending annually over a period of time, by *real* increments of between 3% and 4.5% each year. That is to say, military outlays are inflation-proofed, so that weapons budgets will automatically swell to meet the depreciation of the currency, and then again to provide an absolute increase. It is primarily for this reason that informed estimates show that the world-wide arms bill will be more than $600 billion per annum or $1.6 billion each day very early in the 1980s.

As a part of this process, new weapons are continuously being tested. At least 53 nuclear tests took place in 1979. South Africa may also have detonated a nuclear device. New missiles are being developed, in pursuit of the ever more lethal pin-pointing of targets, or of even more final obliterative power. In 1980 the Chinese have announced tests of their new intercontinental missile, capable of hitting either Moscow or Los Angeles. The French have released news of their preparations to deploy the so-called "neutron" or enhanced radiation bomb, development of which had previously been held back by President Carter after a storm of adverse publicity. In the United States, the MX missile, weighing 190,000 pounds and capable of throwing ten independently targeted and highly accurate 350 kiloton (350,000 tons of TNT equivalent) warheads at Russia, each of which will be independently targeted, with high accuracy, is being developed. The R and D costs for this missile in 1981 will amount to $1.5 billion, even before production has started. This is more, as Emma Rothschild has complained,[3] than the combined research and development budgets of the US Departments of Labour, Education and Transportation, taken together with the Environmental Protection Agency, the Federal Drug Administration and the Center for Disease Control. The MX system, if it works (or for that matter even if it doesn't work) will run on its own sealed private railway, involving "the largest construction project in US history".[4] It will, if completed, "comprise 200 missiles with 2,000 warheads, powerful and accurate enough to threaten the entire Soviet ICBM force of 1,400 missiles".[5] No doubt the Russians will think of some suitable response, at similar or greater expense. As things are, the United States defence budget from 1980-1985 will amount to one trillion dollars, and, such is the logic of the arms race, an equivalent weight of new weaponry will have to be mobilised from the other side, if the "balance" is to be maintained.

All this frenetic activity takes place at a time of severe economic crisis, with many western economies trapped in a crushing slump and

quite unable to expand civilian production. Stagnant or shrinking production provides a poor basis for fierce rearmament, which nowadays often accompanies, indeed necessitates, cuts in social investment, schools, housing and health. The price of putting the Trident system into Britain's arsenal will probably be outbreaks of rickets among our poorer children.

But military research takes priority over everything else, and the result is staggering. In the construction of warheads, finesse now passes any reasonable expectation. A Minuteman III multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicle (or MIRV, as such a vehicle is conveniently described) will carry three warheads, and each warhead has an explosive power of 170,000 tons of TNT (170 kilotons, or kt). A Minuteman weighs 220 lbs. The first atomic bomb ever used in action had an explosive force of 12kt, and it weighed four tons.

Miniaturisation of megadeath bombs has made fine progress. So has the refinement of delivery systems. This is measured by the standard of Circular Error Probability (CEP), which is the radius of that circle centred on the target, within which it can be expected that 50% of warheads of a given type might fall. Heavy bombers of the second world war, such as those which visited Hiroshima and Nagasaki, had a very large CEP indeed. The Minuteman III system expects to land half its projectiles within a 350 metre radius of target, having flown more than 8,000 miles to do it. The MX, if it goes according to plan, will have a CEP of only a hundred metres. Such accuracy means that it will be perfectly possible to destroy enemy missile silos, however fortified these might be. The Russians are catching up, however. Their SS 18 and SS 19 missiles are already claimed to have CEPs of 450 metres.

If rocketry has advanced, so too has experimental aviation. The Americans have already tested Stealth, an aeroplane which "is virtually invisible to Soviet radar". Critics say that invisibility has been purchased at the cost of multiple crashes, since the new machines are fashioned into shapes which are decidedly unfunctional for flying, in order to elude detection. Stealth is a fighter, but plans have been leaked (in the course of the American elections, during which, apparently, votes are assumed to be attracted to the most bloodthirsty contender) for a similarly-wrought long-range bomber. Officials in the US Defence Department insist that contorted shapes are only part of the mechanism which defeats radar detection: apparently new materials can be coated onto aircraft skins, to absorb radio waves. By such means, together with navigational advances, it may be hoped to secure even greater accuracy of weapon delivery.

Two questions remain. First, as Lord Zuckerman, the British Government's former chief scientific advisor, percipiently insists, what happens to the other 50% of warheads which fall outside the CEP? The military

may not be interested in them, but other people are. Second, this remarkable triumph of technology is all leading to the point where someone has what is politely called a "first-strike capability". Both the Russians and the Americans will soon have this capability. But what does it *mean*? It clearly does *not* mean that one superpower has the capacity to eliminate the possibility of retaliation by the other, if only it gets its blow in first. What it does signify is the capacity to wreak such destruction as to reduce any possible response to an "acceptable" level of damage. This is a level which will clearly vary with the degree of megalomania in the respective national leaderships.

All informed commentators are very wary about "first strike capability" because with it the whole doctrine of mutually assured destruction (appropriately known under the acronym MAD) will no longer apply. With either or both superpowers approaching "first strike" potential, the calculations are all different. Yesterday we were assured, barring accidents, of safety of a bizarre and frightening kind: but now each new strengthening of the arsenals spells out with a terrifying rigour, a new, unprecedented danger. Pre-emptive war is now a growing possibility. It is therefore quite impossible to argue support for a doctrine of "deterrence" as if this could follow an unchanging pattern over the decades, irrespective of changes in the political balance in the world, and irrespective of the convolutions of military technology.

In fact, "deterrence" has already undergone fearsome mutations. Those within the great military machines who have understood this have frequently signalled their disquiet. "If a way out of the political dilemmas we now face is not negotiated", wrote Lord Zuckerman, "our leaders will quickly learn that there is no technical road to victory in the nuclear arms race".[6] "Wars cannot be fought with nuclear weapons", said Lord Mountbatten: "There are powerful voices around the world who still give credence to the old Roman precept – if you desire peace, prepare for war. This is absolute nuclear nonsense."[7]

Yet serious discussion of disarmament has come to an end. The SALT II agreements have not been ratified. The Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is breaking down, and the non-nuclear powers are convinced that all the nuclear weapon states are flouting it, by refusing to reduce their nuclear arsenals. It is true that following the initiative of Chancellor Schmidt talks will open between Senator Muskie and Mr Gromyko in order to discover whether negotiations can begin on the reduction of medium range nuclear arsenals in Europe. But unless there is a huge mobilisation of public protest, the outcome of such talks about talks is completely predictable.

III Limited War: the End of Europe?

In spite of detente, and the relatively stable relations between its two main halves during the past decade, Europe remains by far the most militaristic zone of the contemporary world.

At least 10,000, possibly 15,000, warheads are stockpiled in Europe for what is called "tactical" or "theatre" use. The Americans have installed something between 7,000 and 10,000 of these, and the Russians between 3,500 and 5,000. The yields of these weapons range, it is believed, between something less than one kiloton and up to three megatons. In terms of Hiroshima bombs, one three megaton warhead would have the force of 250 such weapons. But nowadays this is seen as a "theatre" armament, usable in a "limited" nuclear war. "Strategic" bombs, for use in the final stages of escalation, may be as large as 20 megatons. (Although of course those destined for certain types of targets are a lot smaller. The smallest could be a "mere" 30 or 40 kilotons, or two or three Hiroshimas). Towns in Europe are not commonly far apart from one another. There exist no vast unpopulated tracts, plains, prairies or tundras, in which to confine a nuclear war. Military installations nestle among and between busy urban centres. As Zuckerman has insited "the distances between villages are no greater than the radius of effect of low yield weapons of a few kilotons; between towns and cities, say a megaton".

General Sir John Hackett, a former commander of the Northern Army Group of NATO, published in 1978 a fictional history of the Third World War.[8] In his book this was scheduled for August 1985, and culminated in the nuclear destruction of Birmingham and Minsk. At this point the Russians obligingly faced a domestic rebellion, and everyone who wasn't already dead lived happily ever after. The General, as is often the case, knows a lot about specialised military matters, but very little about the sociology of communism, and not much more about the political sociology of his own side. Of course, rebellions are very likely in every country which faces the immediate prospect of nuclear war, which is why the British Government has detailed contingency plans for the arrest of large numbers of "subversives" when such a war is about to break out. (These may be discovered, in part, by reference to the secret County War Plans which have been prepared on Government instructions, to cope with every problem from water-rationing to the burial of the uncountable dead). But there is no good reason to imagine that subversives are harder to arrest in the USSR than they are in Britain, to put the matter very mildly. Nor is there any very good reason to think that that the Soviet Union stands on the brink of revolution, or that such revolution would be facilitated by nuclear war. The contrary may be the case. General Hackett's novel has Poles tearing

non-existent communist insignia out of their national flag, and contains a variety of other foibles of the same kind: but we may assume that when it speaks of NATO, it gets things broadly right.

The General discusses the basis of NATO strategy which is known as the "Triad". This is a "combination of conventional defence, battlefield nuclear weapons and strategic nuclear action in closely coupled sequence". Ruefully, General Hackett continues "This was as fully endorsed in the United Kingdom as anywhere else in the Alliance. How far it was taken seriously anywhere is open to argument. There is little evidence that it was ever taken seriously in the UK . . . an observer of the British Army's deployment, equipment and training could scarcely fail to conclude that, whatever happened, the British did not expect to have to take part in a tactical nuclear battle at all . . . "[9]

General Hackett's judgements here are anything but fictional ones. The Earl Mountbatten, in the acutely subversive speech to which we have already referred, spoke of the development of "smaller nuclear weapons" which were "produced and deployed for use in what was assumed to be a tactical or theatre war". "The belief was", said Mountbatten "that were hostilities ever to break out in Western Europe, such weapons could be used in field warfare without triggering an all-out nuclear exchange leading to the final holocaust. I have never found this idea credible". If a former Chief of Staff and one-time Chairman of NATO's Military Committee found the idea unbelievable, this is strong evidence that General Hackett is quite right that NATO's basic strategy was indeed not "taken seriously" in the UK. Yet the doctrine of "flexible response" binds the UK while it remains in force in NATO, because it is enshrined in NATO's 1975 statement for Ministerial Guidance, in article 4:

> "4. The long-range defence concept supports agreed NATO strategy by calling for a balanced force structure of interdependent strategic nuclear, theatre nuclear and conventional force capabilities. Each element of this Triad performs a unique role; in combination they provide mutual support and reinforcement. No single element of the Triad can substitute for another. The concept also calls for the modernisation of both strategic and theatre nuclear capabilities; however, major emphasis is placed on maintaining and improving Alliance conventional forces."

Article 11b develops this beyond any possible ambiguity:

> "b) the purpose of the tactical nuclear capability is to enhance the deterrent and defensive effect of NATO's forces against large-scale conventional attack, and to provide a deterrent against the expansion of limited conventional attacks and the possible use of tactical nuclear weapons by the aggressor. Its aim is to convince the aggressor that any form of attack on NATO could result in very serious damage to his own forces, and to emphasise the dangers implicit in the continuance of a conflict by presenting him with the risk that such a situation could escalate beyond his control up to all-out nuclear war. Conversely, this capability should be of such a nature that control of the situation would remain in NATO hands."

Yet so jittery and mobile are military techniques, and so rapidly does their leapfrog bring both superpowers to the unleashing of ever newer devices, that the settled NATO principles of 1975 were already, in 1979, being qualified:

> "All elements of the NATO Triad of strategic, theatre nuclear, and conventional forces are in flux. At the strategic level, with or without SALT, the US is modernising each component of its strategic forces. And, as will be described below, the other two legs of the Triad are being modernised as well.
> Integral to the doctrine of flexible response, theatre nuclear forces provide the link between US strategic power and NATO conventional forces – a link that, in the view of many, poses the ultimate deterrent against a European war.
> With Strategic parity codified in the recent SALT II agreement, and with major Soviet theatre deployments such as the Backfire bomber and the SS-20 missile, some have perceived a loose rung near the top of the flexible response ladder. Thus, consideration is being given to new weapons systems: Pershing II, a nuclear-armed ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM), and a new mobile, medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM)."[10]

This fateful decision came at the end of a long process of decisions, beginning with Richard Nixon's arrival in the United States Presidency. So it was that NATO finally determined, at the end of 1979, upon the installation of nearly 600 new *Pershing II* and *Tomahawk* (cruise) missiles.[11] The cruise missiles are low-flying pilotless planes, along the lines of the "doodlebugs" which were sent against Britain in the last years of Hitler's blitzkrieg, only now refined to the highest degree, with computerised guidance which aspires to considerable accuracy. And, of course, they are each intended to take a nuclear bomb for a distance of 2,000 miles, and to deliver it within a very narrowly determined area. There is a lot of evidence that in fact they don't work in the manner intended, but this will increase no-one's security, because it merely means that they will hit the wrong targets.

President Nixon first propounded the doctrine of limited nuclear war in his *State of the World* message of 1971. The USA, he said, needed to provide itself with "alternatives appropriate to the nature and level of the provocation . . . without necessarily having to resort to mass destruction". Mountbatten, of course, is quite right to find it all incredible. "I have never been able to accept the reasons for the belief that any class of nuclear weapons can be categorised in terms of their tactical or strategic purposes", he said.

As Lord Zuckerman put it to the Pugwash Conference

> "I do not believe that nuclear weapons could be used in what is now fashionably called a 'theatre war'. I do not believe that any scenario exists which suggests

that nuclear weapons could be used in field warfare between two nuclear states without escalation resulting. I know of several such exercises. They all lead to the opposite conclusion. There is no Marquess of Queensberry who would be holding the ring in a nuclear conflict. I cannot see teams of physicists attached to military staffs who would run to the scene of a nuclear explosion and then back to tell their local commanders that the radiation intensity of a nuclear strike by the other side was such and such, and that therefore the riposte should be only a weapon of equivalent yield. If the zone of lethal or wounding neutron radiation of a so-called neutron bomb would have, say, a radius of half a kilometre, the reply might well be a 'dirty' bomb with the same zone of radiation, but with a much wider area of devastation due to blast and fire."[12]

Pressure from the Allies has meant that Presidential statements on the issue of limited war have swung backwards and forwards. At times President Carter has given the impression that he is opposed to the doctrine. But the revelation of "directive 59" in August 1980 shows that there is in fact a continuous evolution in US military policy, apparently regardless of political hesitations by Governments. Directive 59 is a flat-out regression to the pure Nixon doctrine. As the *New York Times* put it:

"(Defence Secretary) Brown seems to expand the very meaning of deterrence alarmingly. Typically, advocates of flexible targeting argue that it will deter a sneak attack. But Brown's speech says the new policy is also intended to deter a variety of lesser aggressions, . . . including conventional military aggression . . ."

Obviously, as the NYT claims, this is liable to
"increase the likelihood that nuclear weapons will be used."[13]

Where would such weapons be used? That place would experience total annihilation, and in oblivion would be unable to consider the nicety of 'tactical' or 'strategic' destruction. If 'limited' nuclear exchanges mean anything at all, the only limitation which is thinkable is their restriction to a particular zone. And that is precisely why politicians in the United States find 'limited' war more tolerable than the other sort, because it leaves a hope that escalation to the total destruction of both superpowers might be a second-stage option to be deferred during the negotiations which could be undertaken while Europe burns. It does not matter whether the strategists are right in their assumptions or not. There are strong reasons why a Russian counter-attack ought (within the lights of the Soviet authorities) to be directed at the USA as well as Europe, if Soviet military strategists are as thoughtful as we may presume. But the very fact that NATO is being programmed to follow this line of action means that Europeans must awaken to understand what a sinister mutation has taken place, beneath the continuing official chatter about "deterrence".

The fact that current Soviet military planning speaks a different language does not in the least imply that Europe can escape this

dilemma. If one side prepares for a "theatre" war in our continent, the other will, if and when necessary, respond, whether or not it accepts the protocol which is proposed for the orderly escalation of annihilation from superpower peripheries to superpower centres. The material reality which will control events is the scope and range of the weapons deployed: and the very existence of tens of thousands of theatre weapons implies, in the event of war, that there will be a 'theatre war'. There may be a 'strategic' war as well, in spite of all plans to the contrary. It will be too late for Europe to know or care.

All those missiles and bombs could never be used in Europe without causing death and destruction on a scale hitherto unprecedented and inconceivable. The continent would become a hecatomb, and in it would be buried, not only tens, hundreds of millions of people, but also the remains of a civilisation. If some Europeans survived, in Swiss shelters or British Government bunkers, they would emerge to a cannibal universe in which every humane instinct had been cauterised. Like the tragedy of Cambodia, only on a scale greatly wider and more profound, the tragedy of post-nuclear Europe would be lived by a mutilated people, prone to the most restrictive and destructive xenophobia, ganging for support into pathetic strong-arm squads in order to club a survival for themselves out of the skulls of others, and fearful of their own shadows. The worlds which came into being in the Florentine renaissance would have been totally annulled, and not only the monuments would be radioactive. On such deathly foundations, "communism" may be installed, in the Cambodian manner, or some other more primary anarchies or brutalisms may maintain a hegemony of sorts. What is plain is that any and all survivors of a European theatre war will look upon the days before the holocaust as a golden age, and hope will have become, quite literally, a thing of the past.

A move towards European Nuclear Disarmament may not avoid this fearful outcome. Until general nuclear disarmament has been agreed and implemented no man or woman will be able to feel safe. But such a move may break the logic of the arms race, transform the meanings of the blocs and begin a unified and irresistible pressure on both the superpowers to reverse their engines away from war.

IV We Must Act Together . . .

If the powers want to have a bit of a nuclear war, they will want to have it away from home. And if we do not wish to be their hosts for such a match, then, regardless of whether they are right or wrong in supposing that they can confine it to our "theatre", we must discover a new initiative which can move us towards disarmament. New technolo-

gies will not do this, and nor will introspection and conscience suddenly seize command in both superpowers at once.

We are looking for a *political* step which can open up new forms of public pressure, and bring into the field of force new moral resources. Partly this is a matter of ending super-power domination of the most important negotiations.

But another part of the response must involve a multi-national mobilisation of public opinion. In Europe, this will not begin until people appreciate the exceptional vulnerability of their continent. One prominent statesman who has understood, and drawn attention to, this extreme exposure, is Olof Palme. During an important speech at a Helsinki Conference of the Socialist International, he issued a strong warning. "Europe", he said "is no special zone where peace can be taken for granted. In actual fact, it is at the centre of the arms race. Granted, the general assumption seems to be that any potential military conflict between the super-powers is going to start someplace other than in Europe. But even if that were to be the case, we would have to count on one or the other party – in an effort to gain supremacy – trying to open a front on our continent, as well. As Alva Myrdal has recently pointed out, a war can simply be transported here, even though actual causes for war do not exist. Here there is a ready theatre of war. Here there have been great military forces for a long time. Here there are programmed weapons all ready for action . . ."[14]

Basing himself on this recognition, Mr Palme recalled various earlier attempts to create, in North and Central Europe, nuclear-free zones, from which, by agreement, all warheads were to be excluded. (We shall look at the history of these proposals, below). He then drew a conclusion of historic significance, which provides the most real, and most hopeful, possibility, of generating a truly continental opposition to this continuing arms race:

> "Today more than ever there is, in my opinion, every reason to go on working for a nuclear-free zone. *The ultimate objective of these efforts should be a nuclear-free Europe.* (My emphasis). The geographical area closest at hand would naturally be Northern and Central Europe. If these areas could be freed from the nuclear weapons stationed there today, the risk of total annihilation in case of a military conflict would be reduced."

Olof Palme's initiative was launched exactly a month before the United Nations Special Session on Disarmament, which gave rise to a Final Document which is a strong, if tacit, indictment of the arms race which has actually accelerated sharply since it was agreed. A World Disarmament Campaign was launched in 1980, by Lord Noel Baker and Lord Brockway, and a comprehensive cross-section of voluntary peace organisations: it had the precise intention of securing

the implementation of this Document. But although the goal of the UN Special Session was "general and complete disarmament", as it should have been, it is commonly not understood that this goal was deliberately coupled with a whole series of intermediate objectives, including Palme's own proposals. Article 33 of the statement reads:

> "The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of agreements or arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the zone concerned, and the full compliance with those agreements or arrangements, thus ensuring that the zones are genuinely free from nuclear weapons, and respect for such zones by nuclear-weapons States, constitute an important disarmament measure."

Later, the declaration goes on to spell out this commitment in considerable detail. It begins with a repetition:

> "The establishment of nuclear-weapons-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned, constitutes an important disarmament measure,"

and then continues

> "The process of establishing such zones in different parts of the world should be encouraged with the ultimate objective of achieving a world entirely free of nuclear weapons. In the process of establishing such zones, the characteristics of each region should be taken into account. The States participating in such zones should undertake to comply fully with all the objectives, purposes and principles of the agreements or arrangements establishing the zones, thus ensuring that they are genuinely free from nuclear weapons.
>
> With respect to such zones, the nuclear-weapon States in turn are called upon to give undertakings, the modalities of which are to be negotiated with the competent authority of each zone, in particular:
>
> (a) to respect strictly the status of the nuclear-free zone;
>
> (b) to refrain from the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against the States of the zone . . .
>
> States of the region should solemnly declare that they will refrain on a reciprocal basis from producing, acquiring, or in any other way, possessing nuclear explosive devices, and from permitting the stationing of nuclear weapons on their territory by any third party and agree to place all their nuclear activities under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards."

Article 63 of this final document schedules several areas for consideration as nuclear-free zones. They include Africa, where the Organisation of African Unity has resolved upon the "the denuclearisation of the region", but also the Middle East and South Asia, which are listed alongside South and Central America, whose pioneering treaty offers a possible model for others to follow. This is the only populous area to have been covered by an existing agreement, which was concluded the Treaty of Tlatelolco (a suburb of Mexico City), opened for signature from February 1967.

There are other zones which are covered by more or less similar agreements. Conservationists will be pleased that they include Antar-

tica, the moon, outer space, and the seabed. Two snags exist in this respect. One is that the effectiveness of the agreed arrangements is often questioned. The other is that if civilisation is destroyed, the survivors may not be equipped to establish themselves comfortably in safe havens among penguins or deep-sea plants and fish, leave alone upon the moon.

That is why a Martian might be surprised by the omission of Europe from the queue of continents (Africa, Near Asia, the Far East all in course of pressing; and Latin America, with the exception of Cuba, already having agreed) to negotiate coverage within nuclear-free zones. If Europe is the most vulnerable region, the prime risk, with a dense concentration of population, the most developed and destructible material heritage to lose, and yet no obvious immediate reasons to go to war, why is there any hesitation at all about making Olof Palme's "ultimate objective" into an immediate and urgent demand?

If we are agreed that "it does not matter where the bombs come from", there is another question which is more pertinent. This is, where will they be sent to? Clearly, high priority targets are all locations from which response might otherwise come. There is therefore a very strong advantage for all Europe if "East" and "West", in terms of the deployment of nuclear arsenals, can literally and rigorously become coterminous with "USA" and "USSR". This would constitute a significant pressure on the superpowers since each would thenceforward have a priority need to target on the silos of the other, and the present logic of "theatre" thinking would all be reversed.

V Nuclear-free Zones in Europe

If Europe as a whole has not hitherto raised the issue of its possible denuclearisation, there have been a number of efforts to sanitise smaller regions within the continent.

The idea that groups of nations in particular areas might agree to forego the manufacture or deployment of nuclear weapons, and to eschew research into their production, was first seriously mooted in the second half of the 1950s. In 1956, the USSR attempted to open discussions on the possible restriction of armaments, under inspection, and the prohibition of nuclear weapons, within both German States and some adjacent countries. The proposal was discussed in the Disarmament Sub-Committee of the United Nations, but it got no further. But afterwards the foreign secretary of Poland, Adam Rapacki, took to the Twelfth Session of the UN General Assembly a plan to outlaw both the manufacture and the harbouring of nuclear arsenals in all the territories of Poland, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic and the

Federal German Republic. The Czechoslovaks and East Germans quickly endorsed this suggestion.

Rapacki's proposals would have come into force by four separate unilateral decisions of each relevant government. Enforcement would have been supervised by a commission drawn from NATO countries, Warsaw Pact adherents, and non-aligned states. Inspection posts, with a system of ground and air controls, were to be established to enable the commission to function. Subject to this supervision, neither nuclear weapons, nor installations capable of harbouring or servicing them, nor missile systems, would have been permitted in the entire designated area. Nuclear powers were thereupon expected to agree not to use nuclear weapons against the denuclearised zone, and not to deploy their own atomic warheads with any of their conventional forces stationed within it.

The plan was rejected by the NATO powers, on the grounds first, that it did nothing to secure German reunification, and second, that it failed to cover the deployment of conventional armaments. In 1958, therefore, Rapacki returned with modified proposals. Now he suggested a phased approach. In the beginning, nuclear stockpiles would be frozen at their existing levels within the zone. Later, the removal of these weapon stocks would be accompanied by controlled and mutually agreed reductions in conventional forces. This initiative, too, was rejected.

Meanwhile, in 1957, Romania proposed a similar project to denuclearise the Balkans. This plan was reiterated in 1968, and again in 1972.

In 1959, the Irish Government outlined a plan for the creation of nuclear-free zones throughout the entire planet, which were to be developed region-by-region. In the same year the Chinese People's Republic suggested that the Pacific Ocean and all Asia be constituted a nuclear-free-zone, and in 1960 various African states elaborated similar proposals for an all-African agreement. (These were retabled again in 1965, and yet again in 1974).

In 1962 the Polish government offered yet another variation on the Rapacki Plan, which would have maintained its later notion of phasing, but which would now have permitted other European nations to join in if they wished to extend the original designated area. In the first stage, existing levels of nuclear weaponry and rocketry would be frozen, prohibiting the creation of new bases. Then, as in the earlier version, nuclear and conventional armaments would be progressively reduced according to a negotiated timetable. The rejection of this 1962 version was the end of the Rapacki proposals, but they were followed in 1964 by the so-called "Gomulka" plan, which was designed to affect the same area, but which offered more restricted goals.

Although the main NATO powers displayed no real interest in all these efforts, they did arouse some real concern and sympathy in Scandinavia. As early as October 1961, the Swedish government tabled what became known as the Undén Plan (named after Sweden's foreign minister) at the First Committee of the UN General Assembly. This supported the idea of nuclear-free zones and a "non-atomic club", and advocated their general acceptance. Certain of its proposals, concerning non-proliferation and testing, were adopted by the General Assembly.

But the Undén Plan was never realised, because the USA and others maintained at the time that nuclear-free zones were an inappropriate approach to disarmament, which could only be agreed in a comprehensive "general and complete" decision. Over and again this most desirable end has been invoked to block any less total approach to discovering any practicable means by which it might be achieved.

In 1963, President Kekkonen of Finland called for the reopening of talks on the Undén Plan. Finland and Sweden were both neutral already, he said, while Denmark and Norway notwithstanding their membership of NATO, had no nuclear weapons of their own, and deployed none of those belonging to their Alliance. But although this constituted a de-facto commitment, it would, he held, be notably reinforced by a deliberate collective decision to confirm it as an enduring joint policy.

The Norwegian premier responded to this demarche by calling for the inclusion of sections of the USSR in the suggested area. As long ago as 1959, Nikita Khrushchev had suggested a Nordic nuclear-free zone, but no approach was apparently made to him during 1963 to discover whether the USSR would be willing to underpin such a project with any concession to the Norwegian viewpoint. However, while this argument was unfolding, again in 1963, Khrushchev launched yet another similar proposal, for a nuclear-free Mediterranean.

The fall of Khrushchev took much of the steam out of such diplomatic forays, even though new proposals continued to emerge at intervals. In May 1974, the Indian government detonated what it described as a "peaceful" nuclear explosion. This provoked renewed proposals for a nuclear-free zone in the Near East, from both Iran and the United Arab Republic, and it revived African concern with the problem. Probably the reverberations of the Indian bang were heard in New Zealand, because that nation offered up a suggestion for a South Pacific free-zone, later in the same year.

Yet, while the European disarmament lobbies were stalemated, the Latin American Treaty, which is briefly discussed above, had already been concluded in 1967, and within a decade it had secured the adherence of 25 states. The last of the main nuclear powers to endorse it was the USSR, which confirmed its general support in 1978. (Cuba withholds endorsement because it reserves its rights pending the evacuation of the Guantanamo base by the United States). African pressures for a similar agreement are notably influenced by the threat of a South African nuclear military capacity, which is an obvious menace to neighbouring Mozambique, Zimbabwe, and Angola, and a standing threat to the Organisation of African Unity. In the Middle east, Israel plays a similar catalysing role, and fear of an Israeli bomb is widespread throughout the region.

Why, then, this lag between Europe and the other continents? If the pressure for denuclearised zones began in Europe, and if the need for them, as we have seen, remains direst there, why have the peoples of the third world been, up to now, so much more effectively vocal on this issue than those of the European continent? Part of the answer surely lies in the prevalence of the non-aligned movement among the countries of the third world. Apart from a thin scatter of neutrals, Europe is the seed-bed of alignments, and the interests of the blocs as apparently disembodied entities are commonly prayed as absolute within it. In reality, of course, the blocs are not "disembodied". Within them, in military terms, superpowers rule. They control the disposition and development of the two major "deterrents". They keep the keys and determine if and when to fire. They displace the constituent patriotisms of the member states with a kind of bloc loyalty, which solidly implies that in each bloc there is a leading state, not only in terms of military supply, but also in terms of the determination of policy. To be sure, each bloc is riven with mounting internal tension. Economic competition divides the West, which enters the latest round of the arms race in a prolonged and, for some, mortifying slump. In the East, divergent interests are not so easily expressed, but they certainly exist, and from time to time become manifest. For all this, subordinate states on either side find it very difficult to stand off from their protectors.

But stand off we all must. The logic of preparation for a war in our "theatre" is remorseless, and the profound worsening of tension between the super-powers at a time of world-wide economic and social crisis all serves to speed up the gadarene race.

VI A Step Towards New Negotiations . . .

Of course, the dangers which already mark the new decade are by no means restricted to the peril arising from the confrontation between the superpowers. In the past, these states shared a common, if tenuous, interest in the restriction of nuclear military capacity to a handful of countries. Once they were agreed upon a non-proliferation treaty they were able to lean upon many lesser powers to accept it.

America, the Soviet Union and Britain tested their first successful

atomic bombs in 1945, 1949 and 1952. France joined the 'club' in 1960, China in 1964 and India in 1974, when it announced its 'peaceful explosion'. After a spectacular theft of plans from the Urenco plant in Holland, a peaceful explosion is now expected in Pakistan. Peaceful explosions in South Africa, Israel, Libya, Iraq, Brazil: all are possible, and some may be imminent.

One by-product of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan is the resumption of supply of American weapons to Pakistan (so much for President Carter's campaign for "human rights") in spite of clear presumptions involved in the agreement on non-proliferation.

And there is worse news. The announcement of a major programme of development of nuclear power stations in Britain, at a cost which commentators have assessed as £20,000 million or more, does not entail simply a headache for English environmentalists. It seems at least thinkable, indeed plausibly thinkable, that some entrepreneurs have seen the possibility of launching a new boom, supported on technological innovation, following the random exportation of nuclear powerplants to the Third World.

With such plants and a meccano set, together, if necessary, with some modest bribery or theft, by the end of the eighties there may be a Nigerian bomb, an Indonesian bomb, not a proliferation but a plague of deterrents.

Solemnly, we must ask ourselves the question, knowing what we know of the acute social and economic privations which beset vast regions of the world: is it even remotely likely that humanity can live through the next ten years without experiencing, somewhere, between these or the other conflicting parties, an exchange of nuclear warheads?

The moral authority of the superpowers in the rest of the world has never been lower. Imperatives of national independence drive more and more peoples to accept that their military survival requires a nuclear component. Even if Afghanistan had never been invaded, even if NATO had not resolved to deploy its new generation of missiles, this burgeoning of destructive power would remain fearful. As things are, the superpowers intensify the terror to unimagined levels.

In this new world of horror, remedies based on national protest movements alone can never take practical effect, while Governments remain locked into the cells of their own strategic assumptions. Yet something *must* be done, if only to arrest the growing possibility of holocaust by accident.

We think the answer is a new mass campaign, of petitions, marches, meetings, lobbies and conferences. The fact that talks on disarmament are stalemated, that United Nations decisions are ignored, and that confrontation has replaced negotiation only makes it more urgent that the peoples of Europe should speak out. All over Europe the nations *can* agree, surely *must* agree, that none will house nuclear warheads of any kind. The struggle for a nuclear free Europe can unite the continent, but it can also signal new hope to the wider world. With an example from Europe, non-proliferation will no longer be enforced (and increasingly ineffectively enforced) by crude super-power pressures, but also, for the first time, encouraged by practical moral example. A European nuclear free-zone does not necessarily imply reduction of conventional weapons, nor does it presuppose the demolition of the two major alliances. But the absence of warheads all over Europe will create a multinational zone of peaceful pressure, since the survival of the zone will be seen to depend upon the growth of detente between the powers.

No-one believes that such a campaign as this can win easily, but where better than Europe to begin an act of renunciation which can reverse the desperate trend to annihilation?

FOOTNOTES

1. *Apocalypse Now?* Spokesman, 1980, p.3.
2. Estimates vary markedly, because it is difficult to know what values to assign to Soviet military production costs. If budgets are taken, then Soviet expenditure is apparently greatly reduced, because under a system of central planning prices are regulated to fit social priorities (or cynics might say, Government convenience). The alternative is to cost military output on the basis of world market or United States equivalent prices, which, since the USA still has a much more developed economy than the USSR, would still tend to underestimate the real strain of military provision on the Soviet economy.
3. *New York Review of Books*, April 3rd 1980: "Boom and Bust", pp.31-4.
4. Herbert Scoville, Jr: America's Greatest Construction: Can it Work? *New York Review of Books*, March 20th 1980, pp.12-17.
5. "The MX system can only lead to vast uncontrolled arms competition that will undermine the security of the US and increase the dangers of nuclear conflict", says Scoville.
6. Apocalypse Now? *ibid*, p.27.
7. Apocalypse Now? p.13.
8. *The Third World War*, Sphere Books, 1979.
9. *Op.cit.*, p.50.
10. *NATO Review*, No.5, October 1979, p.29.
11. The acute problems which this missile has encountered in development make an alarming story, which is told by Andrew Cockburn in *The New Statesman*, August 22nd 1980.
12. F. Griffiths and J.C. Polanyi: *The Dangers of Nuclear War*, University of Toronto Press, 1980, 1980, p.164.
13. Editorial, August 1980.
14. This speech is reproduced in full in *European Nuclear Disarmament: A Bulletin of Work in Progress* (Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation), No.1, 1980.

The European Disarmament Campaign is structured in a series of 'lateral' committees. For example, the parliamentarians who have already supported the appeal in Britain are forming an Inter-Party Parliamentary Committee, which will canvass further support in the House of Commons, and also write to MPs in all the other European Parliaments. An Inter-Party Trade Union Committee has been established for the same purpose, and there already exist committees of Churches and University Teachers, which are working in the same way. We urgently need volunteers who are able to co-ordinate similar efforts in other fields of work. The existing co-ordinators are:

Parliamentary:	*Stuart Holland and Michael Meacher, House of Commons, Westminster, London, SW1*
Churches:	*Mike Moran, Pax Christi, Blackfriars Hall, Southampton Road, London, NW5*
Universities:	*Jolyon Howorth, 19 Princethorpe Close, Shirley, Solihull, West Midlands*
Trade Unions:	*Walt Greendale, 1 Plantation Drive East, Hull, HU4 6XB*

In England a small Committee has been established to co-ordinate the various initiatives which are developing. It consists of E.P. Thompson, Monsignor Bruce Kent and Dan Smith (of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament), Peggy Duff (of the International Confederation for Disarmament and Peace), Mary Kaldor, Stuart Holland, MP, and Ken Coates (of the Russell Foundation).

In Europe, it is hoped that national liaison groups will be formed, in order to help the preparatory work for a widely representative conference. There follows a preliminary list of European signatories, which gives some idea of the early responses to this initative.

International Supporters of E.N.D.

International Supporters of END have signed an endorsement of the appeal "A common object: to free all Europe . . .", which states that:

We have received with sympathy the proposal of the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation for an all European campaign to free the soil and territorial waters of all European states from nuclear weapons.

In our view, this proposal merits urgent attention, and we support its object. While consultation must take place within each country, to take into account the particular conditions of each nation's life, we urge that this be pressed forward immediately, with a view to the ecouragement of such an all European movement.

To facilitate this work we should welcome a European meeting to explore the problems involved in creating a nuclear-free zone, to discuss a variety of intermediary proposals which are already being suggested as possible steps towards the objective, and help in the development of a major popular campaign for peace and disarmament.

We think such a meeting should be convened as soon as the organisational and financial problems can be resolved.

AUSTRALIA
R. Arnold, Metalworkers and Shipwrights union
Prof Noel G. Baptist, Biochemist and Pugwash member
Ken Bennett, Asst. Nat. Sec. Labor Party
Prof C. Birch, Univ. of Sydney
Hon. Lionel Bowen, Dept. Leader, Fed. Parl. Labor Party
Dr J. Camilleri, Latrobe University
J.L. Cavanagh, Senator
Don Chipp, Senator, Leader Australian Democrats
Manning Clark, Historian
Ruth Coleman, Senator
Prof R.W. Connell, Macquarrie University
Dr A. Davidson, Author
Peter Duncan, MP, former Attorney General, S. Australia
Doug Everingham,MP and former Vice-Pres. World Health Organisation
Herbert Feith, Monash University
George Georges, Senator
A.T. Gietzelt, Senator
Hugh Hamilton, Building - Workers Industrial Union
Joe Harris, BRPF, Australia
Harry Hauenschild, Pres. Trades and Labour Council, Queensland
Mark D. Hayes, Researcher
Ian Hinckfuss, Queensland University
Clyde Holding, MP
M.F. Keane, MP
James B. Keefe, Senator
Ken Kemshead, BRPF, Australia
J. Kiers, Peace Liason Committee
Prof B.J. McFarlane, Adelaide
A.J. McLean, Building Workers Industrial Union
G.D. McIntosh, Senator
C.V.J. Mason, Senator, Leader Australian Democrats
Jack Mundy, Trade Unionist, leader of Green Bans
George Petersen, MP
Cyril Primmer, Senator
M.F. Reynolds, Deputy Mayor, Townsville
Mavis Roberton, National Executive, CPA
P.A. Rogan, MP
Dr Keith Suter, Vice-Pres. UN Association
Mark Taft, Assistant Nat. Sec. CPA
R.C. Taylor, Nat. Sec. Railways Union
M.E. Teichmann, Monash University
D. Watson, lecturer
Bob Webb
Rev John Woodley, Uniting Church
Richard Wootton, Uniting Church, Australian Council of Churches

AUSTRIA
Dr Gunther Anders, Author
Prof Paul Blau, Pugwash member
Dr Engelbert Broda, Chairman, Austrian Pugwash Group
Leopold Gruenwald, Author
Harald Irnberger, Editor in Chief of *Extrablatt*
Prof Robert Jungk, Author, and teacher at Technical University, Berlin
Prof Eduard März, Economic Historian
Prof Dr Ewald Nowotny, Kepler University
Theodor Prager, Author

BELGIUM
Baron Allard, Anti-war and disarmament campaigner
Jos Beni, President of CIDePE
Ghislain Deridder
Luc Heymans
Alois Jespers, President of IKoVE
Pierre Joye, Editor of *Cahiers Marxistes*
Paul Lansu, Student
Roger Leysen and twenty-three cosignatories
Ignaas Lindemans, President, Pax Christi (Flanders)
Robert Pollet, Gen. Sec. Belgian Fellowship of Reconciliation
Dr A. de Smaele, Former Government Minister
Y. Testebrians, Teacher

CANADA
Prof Gerry Hunnius, Sociologist

CZECHOSLOVAKIA
Artur London, Author, victim of the Slansky show trial
Ivan Hartel, Artist

DENMARK
Villum Hansen, Chairman, Danish Committee for Peace and Security
Dagmar Fargerholt of Rungsted Kyst and fifty-two co-signatories
Ilse von Kruedener
Sven Moller Kristensen, Writer, editor and literary critic
Niels Madsen, Emeritus Professor of Chemical Engineering
Thorkild Johs. Nielsen

FINLAND
Prof Erik Allardt, Sociologist
Prof Dag Anckar, Political Scientist
Prof Osmo Apunen, Specialist in International Relations
Prof Göran von Bonsdorff, Political Scientist, Chairman of the Finnish Peace Union
Prof Antero Jyränki, Specialist in Public and Constitutional Law
Prof Jorma Miettinen, Radiochemist and Pugwash member
Pekka Oivio, Chairman, Finnish Trades Union Congress
Erkki Tuomioja, Associate Mayor of Helsinki
Tapio Varis, Director of TAMPRI
Prof Raimo Väyrynen, Specialist in International Relations and International Peace Research Association
Prof Georg Henrik von Wright, Historian and Philosopher of Science

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Bruno Baron-Renault, Mouvement des Radicaux de Gauche
Maurice Barth, Dominican Priest
Jacques Berthelet, Author
Paul Blanquart, Journalist
Jacques Paris de Bollardiere, General (retired)
Claude Bourdet, Editor, journalist
Pierre Bourdieu, Sociologist
Pierre Bourquin, General Secretary MDPL
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B. Calvinhac
A. Carrouget
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Jean Casou, Writer
Francois Cavanna, Writer
D.E. Chantal
Jacques Chatagner, National Secretary, Movement for Peace
Bernard Clavel, Writer
Claude Corvi
C. Costa-Gavras, Film Director
C. Delbo, Writer
Robert Davezies, Catholic Priest and writer
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Marrianne Herblot
Pierre Jalée, Economist
Andre Jeanson, Former Trade Union leader

Michel Jermann
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Solveig Helle
Per Chr. Hemmer, Professor of Theoretical Physics
Kirsten Holden
Siri Sverdrup Lunden, Professor of Slavic Languages, Oslo University
Aslaug Groven Michaelsen, Authoress, Prof in Nordic Literature, mother and grandmother
Dr Eva Nordland, Educationalist
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Haakon A. Olsen, Physicist and Pugwash Member
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Spokesman Pamphlet No. 72 **50 pence**

STATEMENT OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

On 7-8 October 1981, under the chairmanship of Professor Carlos Chagas, President of the Pontifical Academy of Sciences, at the headquarters of the Academy (Casina Pius IV, Vatican City), a group of fourteen specialized scientists (*) from various parts of the world assembled to examine the problem of the consequences of the use of nuclear weapons on the survival and health of humanity.

Although most of these consequences would appear obvious, it seems that they are not adequately appreciated. The conditions of life following a nuclear attack would be so severe that the only hope for humanity is prevention of any form of nuclear war. Universal dissemination and acceptance of this knowledge would make it apparent that nuclear weapons must not be used at all in warfare and that their number should be progressively reduced in a balanced way.

The above-mentioned group discussed and unanimously approved a number of fundamental points, which have been further developed in the following statement.

* * *

Recent talk about winning or even surviving a nuclear war must reflect a failure to appreciate a medical reality: any nuclear war would inevitably cause death, disease and suffering of pandemic proportions and

(*) Carlos Chagas, Rio de Janeiro; E. Amaldi, Rome; N. Bochkov, Moscow; L. Caldas, Rio de Janeiro; H. Hiatt, Boston; R. Latarjet, Paris; A. Leaf, Boston; J. Lejeune, Paris; L. Leprince-Ringuet, Paris; G.B. Marini-Bettòlo, Rome; C. Pavan, São Paulo; A. Rich, Cambridge Mass., A. Serra, Rome; V. Weisskopf. Cambridge Mass.

without the possibility of effective medical intervention. That reality leads to the same conclusion physicians have reached for life-threatening epidemics throughout history: prevention is essential for control.

In contrast to widespread belief, much is known about the catastrophe that would follow the use of nuclear weapons. Much is known too about the limitations of medical assistance. If this knowledge is presented to people and their leaders everywhere, it might help interrupt the nuclear arms race. This in turn would help prevent what could be the last epidemic our civilization will know.

The devastation wrought by an atomic weapon on Hiroshima and Nagasaki provides direct evidence of the consequences of nuclear warfare, but there are many theoretical appraisals on which we may also draw. Two years ago, an assessment undertaken by a responsible official agency described the effect of nuclear attacks on cities of about 2 million inhabitants. If a one-million ton nuclear weapon (the Hiroshima bomb approximated 15,000 tons of explosive power) exploded in the central area of such cities, it would result, as calculated, in 180 km^2 of property destruction, 250,000 fatalities and 500,000 severely injured. These would include blast injuries, such as fractures and severe lacerations of soft tissues, thermal injuries such as surface burns, retinal burns and respiratory tract damage and radiation injuries, both acute radiation syndrome and delayed effects.

Even under optimal conditions, care of such casualties would present a medical task of unimaginable magnitude. The study projected that if 18,000 hospital beds were available in and around one of these cities, no more than 5,000 would remain relatively undamaged. These would accommodate only 1% of the human beings injured, but it must be stressed that in any case no one could deliver the medical service required by even a few of the severely burned, the crushed and the radiated victims.

The hopelessness of the medical task is readily apparent if we consider what is required for the care of the severely injured patients. We shall cite one case history, that of a severely burned twenty year old man who was taken to the burn unit of a Boston Hospital after an automobile accident in which the gasoline tank had exploded. During his hospitalization he received 140 litres of fresh-frozen plasma, 147 litres of fresh-frozen red blood cells, 180 millilitres of platelets and 180 millilitres of albumin. He underwent six operative procedures during which wounds involving 85% of his body surface were closed with various types of grafts, including artificial skin. Throughout his hospitalization, he required mechanical ven-

tilation. Despite these and many other heroic measures, which stretched the resources of one of the world's most comprehensive institutions, he died on his 33rd hospital day. His injuries were likened by the doctor who supervised his care, to those described for many of the victims of Hiroshima. Had twenty score of such patients been presented at the same time to all of Boston's hospitals the medical capabilities of the city would have been overwhelmed. Now, consider the situation if, along with the injuries to many thousands of people, most of the medical emergency facilities had been destroyed.

A Japanese physician, Professor M. Ichimaru, published an eyewitness account of the effects of the Nagasaki bomb. He reported: "I tried to go to my medical school in Urakami which was 500 meters from the hypocenter. I met many people coming back from Urakami. Their clothes were in rags and shreds of skin hung from their bodies. They looked like ghosts with vacant stares. The next day I was able to enter Urakami on foot and all that I knew had disappeared. Only the concrete and iron skeletons of the buildings remained. There were dead bodies everywhere. On each street corner, we had tubs of water used for putting out fires after air raids. In one of these small tubs, scarcely large enough for one person, was the body of a desperate man who sought cool water. There was foam coming from his mouth, but he was not alive. I cannot get rid of the sounds of the crying women in the destroyed fields. As I got nearer to the school there were black, charred bodies with the white edges of bones showing in the arms and legs. When I arrived some were still alive. They were unable to move their bodies. The strongest were so weak that they were slumped over on the ground. I talked with them and they thought that they would be O.K. but all of them would eventually die within two weeks. I cannot forget the way their eyes looked at me and their voices spoke to me forever...".

It should be noted that the bomb dropped on Nagasaki had a power of about 20,000 tons of TNT, not much larger than the so-called "tactical bombs" designed for battlefield use.

But even these grim pictures are inadequate to describe the human disaster that would result from an attack on a country by today's stockpiles of nuclear weapons, which contain thousands of bombs with the force of one-million tons of TNT or greater.

The suffering of the surviving population would be without parallel. There would be complete interruption of communications, of food supplies and of water. Help would be given only at the risk of mortal danger from

radiation for those venturing outside of buildings in the first days. The social disruption following such an attack would be unimaginable.

The exposure to large doses of radiation would lower immunity to bacteria and viruses and could, therefore, open the way for widespread infection. Radiation would cause irreversible brain damage and mental deficiency in many of the exposed in utero. It would greatly increase the incidence of many forms of cancer in survivors. Genetic damage would be passed on to future generations, should there be any.

In addition, large areas of soil and forests as well as livestock, would be contaminated reducing food resources. Many other harmful biological and even geophysical effects would be likely, but we do not have enough knowledge to predict with confidence what they would be.

Even a nuclear attack directed only at military facilities would be devastating to the country as a whole. This is because military facilities are widespread rather than concentrated at only a few points. Thus, many nuclear weapons would be exploded. Furthermore, the spread of radiation due to the natural winds and atmospheric mixing would kill vast numbers of people and contaminate large areas. The medical facilities of any nation would be inadequate to care for the survivors. An objective examination of the medical situation that would follow a nuclear war leads to but one conclusion: prevention is our only recourse.

The consequences of nuclear war are not, of course, only medical in nature. But those that are compel us to pay heed to the inescapable lesson of contemporary medicine: where treatment of a given disease is ineffective or where costs are insupportable, attention must be turned to prevention. Both conditions apply to the effects of nuclear war. Treatment would be virtually impossible and the costs would be staggering. Can any stronger argument be marshalled for a preventive strategy?

Prevention of any disease requires an effective prescription. We recognize that such a prescription must both prevent nuclear war and safeguard security. Our knowledge and credentials as scientists and physicians do not, of course, permit us to discuss security issues with expertise. However, if political and military leaders have based their strategic planning on mistaken assumptions concerning the medical aspects of a nuclear war, we feel that we do have a responsibility. We must inform them and people everywhere of the full-blown clinical picture that would follow a nuclear attack and of the impotence of the medical community to offer a meaningful response. If we remain silent, we risk betraying ourselves and our civilization.

Volume 9. Two Germanies, 1961-1989
Protest March in Bonn (October 12, 1981)

Between 250,000 and 300,000 demonstrators gathered in Bonn on October 10, 1981, to protest NATO's Dual-track Decision, thereby forming the largest rally in West German history to date. Despite the differing political platforms of the various groups participating in the rally, the demonstrators exhibited a surprising degree of solidarity and were determined to conduct a peaceful march.

Bonn: Half Fortress, Half Festival
Observations at the March of 250,000 in the Hofgarten[1]

Some have already spent the night on Poppelsdorfer Allee. It's cold and rainy. At 5:26am, the first chartered train arrives at the main train station. The residents of Bonn have parked their cars on side streets. The police are standing by: white helmets, pistols, but no rubber clubs. Three thousand civilian marshals. As the hours go by, the city is transformed into a combination of fortress and festival.

Five columns of marchers form and set off toward the Hofgarten. Only a quarter of the 250,000 protesters (or 300,000? Or even more?) find space there. The rest of them spread out all over. Bonn has 285,000 residents. You can see them – provided that they themselves are not outside on the streets – behind their curtains; some wave happily, others look doubtful and frightened. What will this day bring?

On the streets, the first information booths start springing up. Two young people are schlepping a two-meter-long, papier-mâché bomb on a moped. It reads, "This is the cross of our time." The people from the Committee for Peace and Disarmament have painted skeletons on their white tunics. Mothers are carrying infants in their arms. Even some dogs, well-behaved on leashes, are wearing signs. For example: "I sh** on the neutron bomb."

[1] A park in Bonn's city center – trans.

People are laughing a lot. Total strangers link arms. White flags and banners outnumber red ones. Even the DKP [German Communist Party] refrained from using its color [red] here and there: little white doves flutter on the background of its flag. The lettering is green.

Pre-march rallies are taking place all over. Helmut Gollwitzer's[2] voice comes through the loudspeaker, loud and full of emotion: "Helmut, we're coming. Helmut, we're coming."[3] He makes reference to the Easter March movement. "Resist!" he calls out. You can hear words like "people's struggle" and "revolt of the masses" being shouted out.

[. . .]

Many stores, especially jewelry, clothing, and fur stores, are not only closed, but some storefront windows have also been boarded shut to protect against possible stone-throwing. Demonstrators spray-paint their comments on these wooden planks. One reads: "Dear business owner, even a second wooden wall won't help when a neutron bomb is dropped." A driver who couldn't find a secure parking spot in front of his home put a sign on his windshield for safety's sake: "Trade unionist for peace." Some of the people marching here want to wait a while before they do what they have planned. At the Douglas perfumery on Kaiserplatz, you can read slogans like: "You have the might; we have the night" and "Break a leg! Who's afraid of the first stone?"

Music is everywhere: Irish folk music with bagpipes, workers' songs, chansons. Suddenly it's all drowned out. "Peoples of the world, hear the signals." The song of the American civil rights movement "We shall overcome." Young DKP people try to sing along, but they apparently don't know the words.

The speeches at the main event are virtually impossible for many to hear. For those who never make it to the Hofgarten, there's no such thing as shared euphoria. But even those who didn't see or hear anything and finally went to a pub to escape the rain aren't disappointed. They halfway expected that to happen. "It isn't so important. The main thing is that so many people have come, that's really great."

Celebrities on folding chairs. Erhard Eppler, Heinrich Böll, retired general [Gerd] Bastian, military theorist [Alfred] Mechtersheimer, who has been threatened with expulsion from the CSU, Professor Gollwitzer, actor and singer Harry Belafonte, Coretta King, widow of the murdered Martin Luther King. In her speech, Petra Kelly, the federal chair of the Greens, demands that Chancellor [Helmut] Schmidt step down, and she declares Eppler, so to speak, the new chancellor. Eppler folds his hands under his chin and rolls his eyes upward. The only speaker up there who slips into screeching demagogy is Uta Ranke-Heinemann, the daughter of the

[2] Lutheran theologian and pastor, and critic of the Vietnam war and the arms race – trans.
[3] Gollwitzer's forewarning is to Chancellor Helmut Schmidt – trans.

former federal president. An embarrassing appearance: “Our politicians don’t notice that they’re crazy. We don’t want people dying for foreign megalomania.”

Eppler gives interviews backstage in German, English (fluent), French (not quite as fluent): “The SPD presidium met five weeks ago. I told them I was going to be speaking here, and no one had any problem with it, not even Herbert Wehner.” Eppler is the most important speaker here, it seems. Pastor [Heinrich] Albertz refers to him as the possible leader of a new party to the left of the SPD. And when senior FDP politician William Borm gives his speech, he is confronted with chants of “Eppler! Eppler!”

The rally is over at around 5:30pm. Only the Communist Workers’ League of Germany (KABD) continues to expatiate along Poppelsdorfer Allee on the subject of “a nuclear-free Europe from the Atlantic to the Ural Mountains.” Their rendition of their hymn “We are the young guard of the proletariat” is slightly disrupted by members of the Hare Krishna sect who dance by, passing out cookies to onlookers.

At the Hofgarten, the most unlikely thing happens. A message goes out over a loudspeaker on the stage and in response hundreds of people crawl through the mud collecting paper and trash. It is gathered in huge piles to facilitate the great clean-up by Bonn’s sanitation department. At Hotel Bristol, which not only let the marchers use the bathroom but the patio as well, the doorman praises the discipline of the peace demonstrators.

People are looking for their buses. Others are running to catch their trains. Some drop the stones they brought from home, as Heinrich Böll warmly requested in his closing words.

Train station, 6 pm. A young blond boy of five is waiting for the train with his parents. The message “I don’t want any atomic bombs” is written on the back of his long white shirt. A dove is painted on the front. Many demonstrators can’t find their departure meeting-points. Many of the numerous people who are wandering around lost in the “Auswärtiges Amt” [“Foreign Ministry”] subway station have set up a night camp. The next day is stormy and rainy, and the city is back to normal.

Source: “Bonn, halb Festung halb Festival. Beobachtungen beim Aufmarsch der 250 000 im Hofgarten” [“Bonn: Half Fortress, Half Festival. Observations at the March of 250,000 in the Hofgarten”], *Die Welt*, October 12, 1981.

Translation: Allison Brown

[Reagan, Ronald. The Reagan Diaries. Ed. Douglas Brinkley. New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 2007, p. 44.]

Friday, October 16 [1981]

This was a day that didn't stop – 1 on 1 with 8 different Sens. on AWAC's. A meeting with the P.M. of Mauritius. Then one with Dr. Kohl leader of the opposition party to Helmut Schmidt. He said the 250,000 demonstrators in Bonn against the U.S. came from all over Europe and it was an affair orchestrated by the Soviet U. He made a good point – that propaganda is painting us as a militaristic people when the truth is we are the most moral & generous people on earth. We should be appealing to the world on the basis of morality.

Lunched with a group of editorial page editors from all over the U.S. Did a Q&A.

An NSC meeting that has left me with the most profound decision I've ever had to make. Central America is really the world's next hotspot. Nicaragua is an armed camp supplied by Cuba and threatening a communist takeover of all of Central America. More meetings & finally home with an arm full of homework & my problem.

Volume 9. Two Germanies, 1961-1989
The Peace Movement and German Foreign Policy (October 19, 1981)

In the following essay, Alfred Grosser, a French political scientist and expert on German affairs, examines the origins and motivations of the West German peace movement, which he interprets as part of a broader "not with us" attitude that was evident in the country's foreign policy. This article first appeared in the Paris daily *Le Monde*.

"This Crisis is the Most Serious One of All"

French political science professor Alfred Grosser, 56, is among the most knowledgeable experts on Germany. The following article was taken from the Paris daily "Le Monde."

It might well be that Helmut Schmidt remains chancellor until the 1984 elections. But it could also be that he soon falls – either to the right or to the left. To the left would mean that his liberal allies let him down because the government's social policy was too lax and the budget policy not restrictive enough. To the right would mean that his own party let him down on account of military policy.

It cannot be ruled out that the pacifists and the CDU opposition will triumph at the same time; this would lead to an explosive situation. At the moment, though, most of the attention is being directed at the schism between the demonstrators in Bonn and the totality of the three parliamentary parties.

The most reliable ally of the United States within the alliance has become the country with the liveliest anti-Americanism. The country in which neither reunification nor Europe were primary concerns, but rather security, has become a country in which the "not with us" attitude and the refusal to view foreign policy from the perspective of defense seem to be triumphant. What a surprise!

Nevertheless, two constant factors, which could serve to explain the turnaround to a great extent, cannot be ignored.

First of all, the [West German] relationship to the past is very different from the French one. When François Mitterrand said at his press conference: "France does not confuse pacifism as a postulate with peace as a result," hardly anyone contradicted him: this was because of 1938,

when France and England capitulated in Munich because they were weak[1]; and because they were pacifists, they got war.

In the Federal Republic, the two comparisons are 1939, the start of the war, and 1945, the catastrophe, the dead and the ruins that resulted. If so many Germans are demonstrating now for the idea of peace, then it is partly because so many Germans had once been stirred to cheer the war.

Furthermore, there is the continuation of a movement that started in 1950 with the announcement of rearmament, an announcement that surprised an entire generation – a generation that was convinced that militarism must be atoned for with anti-militarism.

There is definitely a connection between the “not with me” of the 1950s and the huge crowds in Bonn. Between the two lies the “no” of the nuclear scientists’ manifesto of 1956, as well as the entire anti-nuclear movement: Whereas in France the word “nuclear” has a predominantly positive connotation, above all because of the sacrosanct notion of national independence, in Germany the peaceful use of nuclear power was poisoned by the totally negative symbolic impact of nuclear weapons.

But how did it reach the scale of the Bonn demonstration and the support it met with? Because people are more likely to demonstrate in Germany than in France? Certainly. And that applies to all kinds of demonstrations. With or without violence. With the affirmation of aggressive marginal groups by youths, or, as in Frankfurt, with a multi-generational demonstration aimed at peacefully preventing the construction of a new airport runway that would harm the environment.

There is a contrast to note here. Sometimes, a demonstration signifies the rejection of the political system; at other times, it is an expression of the democratic spirit, because the democratic will should not be asserted only on election days. At the march in Bonn, both aspects were united – reason enough not to place too much importance on the vigorous efforts of the small Communist party and its few small satellite parties to infiltrate the demonstration.

When both currents are able to flow together, it is not just because of the aims of the demonstration, but because institutions have not functioned properly. In the institution of parliament, the large majority party offers little reason for hope and hardly any incentive for participation.

Justice, as an institution, rules too often on the side of authorities who treat people as deviants and enemies when they are simply critical thinkers or young people guided by exacting ethics.

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[1] In the Munich Agreement (September 1938), France and England allowed Germany to take the Sudetenland, in an attempt to avoid war with Hitler. Hitler violated the agreement the following March by seizing the rest of Czechoslovakia – trans.

Thus, a court recently decided in favor of the Bavarian government when it did not want to accept a young woman into state service as a teacher. This woman insisted on swearing to uphold the constitution only on the condition that this loyalty did not lead to a conflict with the principles of her Christian faith.

This case is characteristic for two reasons. First, because of the totally new scope of women's activism, but especially because of the religious component of the German "not with us" movement. This was already noticeable in the spring at the church conference in Hamburg, and it will become even more obvious, because the Sermon on the Mount is constantly being cited in justification of the "peace lovers" as opposed to the belligerent missile-deployers.

Here, too, the situation can be explained through a comparison with France: If German churches, especially the Catholic Church, had not become so dissociated from matters of justice, if, for example, on the evening before the Bundestag elections they had spoken of unemployment – as, for example, the French bishops did – instead of divorce, and about the Third World instead of public finances, then the schism with the demanding grass roots might not have given that very grass roots occasion to refer to the Holy Scripture without regard for the political consequences.

This is of course only one of many explanations. German democracy's own logic also creates points of vulnerability for itself: Refusing military service for reasons of conscience immediately became so respected that it could almost become the rule.

And the instruction provided by a whole generation of young teachers, in which existing society was presented as inherently perverted, has had just as great an impact as the Establishment's refusal to grant justice and its lack of understanding.

The Establishment, in turn, also advocates a "not with us" attitude in its own way. For its members, it is self-evident that the Federal Republic should not assume any responsibility anywhere in the world, no matter how strong its economic power might be. The outside world will only accept a timid and cowering Germany.

Certainly, fear of nuclear death plays a role. In a different international, social, and political climate it would doubtless be less intense. The infighting among the leaders of social democracy, rising unemployment, the seething tide in Poland that seems to suggest that some leeway is possible under Soviet rule: The points of departure for destabilization are manifold.

It is still too soon to say that the firmly-anchored, thirty-year-long stability of the Federal Republic has already been supplanted. The Federal Republic has previously withstood other moral crises without losing its basic orientation. But the present crisis is without a doubt the most serious one of all.

Source: Alfred Grosser, “Diese Krise ist die schwerste” [“This Crisis is the Most Serious One of All”], *Der Spiegel*, October 19, 1981, pp. 34-35.

Translation: Allison Brown

Appello dei fisici italiani

In questo periodo in cui riprende la corsa al riarmo nucleare, con un diretto coinvolgimento dell'Italia, sentiamo il dovere, in quanto fisici, di fornire all'opinione pubblica un contributo di chiarezza, fissando alcuni punti sui quali, pur nella diversità delle nostre opinioni politiche e delle nostre affinità ideologiche, il nostro giudizio è concorde.

1. Il potenziale devastatore delle armi nucleari è enorme. Per esempio, la più grande bomba termonucleare esplosa finora ha liberato, in una frazione di secondo, una quantità di energia molte volte superiore a quella complessivamente liberata in tutte le esplosioni avvenute in tutte le guerre combattute dall'invenzione della polvere da sparo ad oggi (comprese le due guerre mondiali, i bombardamenti a tappeto di Germania e Giappone, le bombe nucleari di Hiroshima e Nagasaki, la devastazione del Vietnam).

2. La corsa agli armamenti nucleari ha raggiunto dimensioni abnormi: l'Unione Sovietica dispone oggi di circa 7000 testate nucleari strategiche e gli Stati Uniti di circa 9000 (ciascuna testata ha la capacità di distruggere una città). Vi è inoltre un numero circa due volte maggiore di armi nucleari «tattiche», molte delle quali hanno un potenziale superiore a quello della bomba che ha distrutto Hiroshima e sono dislocate in Europa. Un conflitto nucleare in Europa, in cui anche solo una piccola frazione di queste armi venisse utilizzata, comporterebbe la totale distruzione dell'Europa; moltissimi europei morirebbero subito, e la maggioranza dei superstiti invidierebbe i morti.

3. È impossibile difendersi dalle armi nucleari. Qualunque guerra combattuta con armi nucleari non avrebbe vincitori; causerebbe per tutti i contendenti morti e distruzioni su scala e di natura mai sperimentata prima nel corso della storia umana.

4. Dunque il problema fondamentale è impedire ad ogni costo l'uso di armi nucleari. La via migliore per realizzare questo scopo è la totale eliminazione di tali armi; ma questo non è un obbiettivo di facile realizzazione. Occorre però almeno impegnarsi perché le armi nucleari si diffondano il meno possibile; per questa ragione molti di noi presero pubblicamente posizioni nel 1967 per sostenere il Trattato contro la proliferazione delle armi nucleari (TNP) e l'adesione dell'Italia a tale trattato. Oggi 115 Paesi militarmente non nucleari hanno aderito al TNP che costituisce, (pur nel preoccupante contesto di una proliferazione, che non accenna ad arrestarsi, degli armamenti nucleari dei Paesi che già ne dispongono) un valido freno alla incontrollata proliferazione delle armi nucleari ad altri Paesi.

5. Per quel che riguarda i Paesi militarmente nucleari, ed in particolare i rapporti fra le due superpotenze, Stati Uniti ed Unione Sovietica, è opinione diffusa che la esclusione dell'uso delle armi nucleari sia garantita dalla certezza che, ad una aggressione nucleare («primo colpo»), corrisponderebbe una risposta di rappresaglia («secondo colpo»), che causerebbe la totale distruzione del Paese aggressore. La relativa invulnerabilità delle armi nucleari strategiche attualmente esistenti (bombardieri a lungo raggio d'azione, missili balistici intercontinentali basati a terra, missili su sommergibili) e la enormità degli arsenali disponibili (l'1% delle armi strategiche americane sono sufficienti ad eliminare l'Unione Sovietica come società civile e viceversa) garantisce largamente tale capacità di rappresaglia.

6. L'enorme differenza delle armi nucleari oggi operative rispetto alle armi convenzionali usate nel corso della storia implica alcune conseguenze, che contraddicono convinzioni sviluppatesi attraverso secoli; idee ormai obsolete, che continuano però a dominare il modo di ragionare di larga parte dell'opinione pubblica e di molti uomini politici. Per esempio, per realizzare l'equilibrio del terrore non è necessario che le due superpotenze abbiano lo stesso potenziale distruttivo, in una situazione in cui i loro armamenti sono più che sufficienti a distruggere l'avversario. In questo contesto, l'idea che una delle due superpotenze sia «più forte» dell'altra è insensata; eppure si continua a pensare in questi termini. Così, al concetto di *sufficienza* si sostituisce, nel migliore dei casi, quello di *parità*; ma la parità è difficile da definire: ognuna delle due parti prudentemente sottovaluta l'efficienza delle proprie armi e sopravaluta quelle dell'avversario. Ne consegue un permanente stimolo per la corsa agli armamenti, che ha portato agli enormi arsenali attuali, ed il cui esito sarà prevedibilmente una universale catastrofe.

7. Come arrestare questo corso suicida? La schematica analisi fatta più sopra suggerisce che vi è, senza rischio, un largo margine per iniziative, anche unilaterali, di limitazione e riduzione degli armamenti: per esempio, l'ex ambasciatore americano in URSS, G. Kennan (che non è certamente un estremista) ha recentemente suggerito riduzioni immediate del 50%. D'altra parte una politica di limitazione delle armi nucleari non può aver successo se viene perseguita da una sola parte. A questo proposito, siamo ben consci del fatto che, laddove è possibile per gli scienziati occidentali prendere pubblicamente posizione su questi temi anche in posizione critica rispetto ai loro governi, ciò non è consentito nell'Unione Sovietica ed in altri Paesi dell'Est Europeo. Ma questa asimmetria non può indurci al silenzio.

8. Come europei ed italiani, siamo particolarmente preoccupati della ripresa di una corsa agli armamenti nucleari in Europa, con la installazione dei missili sovietici SS20 (al

ritmo di uno alla settimana) e con la prospettiva della installazione di nuovi missili americani sul suolo europeo (108 Pershing II e 464 missili «cruise»). Alcuni di noi ritengono che la «doppia decisione» NATO del dicembre 1979 (dare inizio alla costruzione dei missili Pershing II e dei missili «cruise» dal 1983; offrire ai sovietici di trattare per una limitazione e riduzione delle armi nucleari in Europa), decisione che è stata condivisa dal governo italiano, fosse giustificata come contraltare al programma di «modernizzazione» dei missili a media gittata sovietici (i missili SS20 sono molto più rapidi e precisi dei missili, che dovrebbero rimpiazzare, gli SS4 e SS5; inoltre ciascuno di loro, a differenza degli SS4 e SS5, è dotato di 3 diverse testate nucleari). Altri fra noi ritengono che tale decisione sia stato un errore: perché non giustificata da una reale necessità (vi sono già migliaia di armi nucleari «tattiche» in Europa occidentale, e alcune delle armi nucleari strategiche americane sono comunque già assegnate alla NATO); perché prelude ad una ripresa della corsa agli armamenti in Europa, che renderà tutti meno sicuri; perché la installazione di armi nucleari sul proprio territorio (l'Italia si è impegnata ad accogliere le basi di lancio per 112 missili «cruise») aumenta il rischio anziché contribuire a rafforzare la propria sicurezza. Ma siamo tutti concordi nello sperare che la trattativa sovietico-americana che inizierà alla fine di novembre a Ginevra porti nei tempi più brevi ad un accordo che non solo arresti questa spirale di riarmo nucleare in Europa, ma dia inizio ad un processo di riduzione delle armi nucleari; e soprattutto auspichiamo che gli Stati europei, e in particolare l'Italia, svolgano in ogni sede internazionale e specialmente nell'ambito della NATO, un ruolo attivo e autonomo in questo senso.

9. I recenti sviluppi della corsa alle armi nucleari in Europa sembrano finalizzati alla eventualità di una «guerra nucleare limitata» in Europa. È infatti in tale prospettiva che si sviluppano armi nucleari il cui scopo appare piuttosto quello di *combattere* una guerra nucleare sul campo che quello di *dissuadere* dall'inizio di una tale guerra. Per esempio, sia la cosiddetta «bomba al neutrone» che la maggiore accuratezza e minore potenza delle testate nucleari degli SS20 (rispetto agli SS4 e SS5 ce gli SS20 dovrebbero rimpiazzare) vengono spesso interpretate come passi in tale direzione. Nutriamo il più profondo scetticismo sulla possibilità che un conflitto nucleare in Europa possa mantenersi limitato: la prospettiva che esso sfoci in una guerra nucleare totale, che significherebbe la fine della nostra civiltà, ci appare assai più probabile. In ogni caso — ed è nostra responsabilità di scienziati mettere questo bene in chiaro — una guerra nucleare in Europa, per quanto limitata, comporta la distruzione dell'Europa stessa, su scala enormemente più drammatica di quanto avvenne nella seconda guerra mondiale.

10. Un aspetto della introduzione di nuove armi nucleari in Europa che ci sembra importante sottolineare riguarda la introduzione della versione strategica dei missili «cruise»: missili volanti a bassa quota, di lunga gittata, portatori di testate nucleari, molto precisi. I missili «cruise» hanno una larga flessibilità di impiego (da terra; dal mare, dall'aria) e di ruoli (strategico o tattico, nucleare o convenzionale), piccole dimensioni (lunghezza 5 m, diametro 50 cm), costo relativamente basso. È presumibile che, una volta messi definitivamente a punto, vengano prodotti in gran numero (prima dagli Stati Uniti, poi dall'Unione Sovietica e forse anche da altri Paesi). Come conseguenza di tutto ciò, risulterà messo in dubbio il fondamento di qualunque limitazione (anche unilaterale) delle armi strategiche, e cioè la sicura conoscenza dell'entità degli arsenali strategici dell'avversario (che sussiste attualmente con il solo ausilio di mezzi di osservazione nazionali, essenzialmente satelliti). Dunque, la introduzione dei missili «cruise» compromette la stessa fattibilità tecnologica (a prescindere dalle difficoltà politiche) di accordi di limitazione delle armi strategiche perché ne viene meno la verificabilità. Sarebbe dunque tragico se il progetto di installazione dei missili «cruise» in Europa (nonché le recenti decisioni americane di produrre questi missili in larga scala e in varie versioni) dessero il colpo di grazia al tentativo di impedire il superamento di questa pericolosa, e irreversibile soglia; tentativo che si sarebbe dovuto realizzare con il Trattato SALT III (in tale prospettiva i missili «cruise» basati a terra e in mare sono stati proibiti nel Protocollo al Trattato SALT II), e che occorre sperare possa ancora aver buon esito con la ripresa delle trattative sovietico-americane sulla riduzione delle armi strategiche prevista per l'inizio del prossimo anno.

11. Infine vogliamo sottolineare — riecheggiando quanto dichiarato dal premio Nobel per la pace A.D. Sakharov —, che l'obbiettivo di arrestare la corsa agli armamenti e diminuire il pericolo di una guerra nucleare è preminente rispetto ad ogni altro. Non sembrerebbe dunque giustificato un rifiuto di intraprendere una trattativa su questi temi, che venisse motivato da argomenti estranei, per quanto questi possano essere considerati importanti (per esempio, la presenza militare sovietica in Afganistan). D'altra parte, non è realisticamente prevedibile alcun progresso nel controllo degli armamenti in una situazione internazionel di ritorno alla guerra fredda. A questo proposito auspichiamo che i comportamenti di politica internazionale di ogni Paese permettano una ripresa della politica di distensione.

NOTE INFORMATIVE

1. La stima corrente dell'integrale di tutte le esplosioni fino alla fine della seconda guerra mondiale è di 5 mt (5.10^9 Kg di TNT). Una quantità dello stesso ordine di grandezza (entro un fattore 2) rappresenta il contributo successivo (essenzialmente in Vietnam). La maggiore bomba termonucleare, esplosa dall'Unione Sovietica, produsse circa 60 mt.

2. George F. Kennan è un illustre membro dell'Establishment americano; è stato per molti anni l'ambasciatore degli Stati Uniti in Unione Sovietica, e poi ha diretto (dopo R. Oppenheimer) l'Institute for Advanced Study di Princeton. Per la proposta qui citata vedi The New York Review of Books, 16 luglio 1981.

E P THOMPSON

BEYOND THE COLD WAR



NOT the Dimbleby Lecture

BEYOND THE COLD WAR

by

E P Thompson

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Author's Note

This lecture was delivered in Worcester City Guildhall on November 26th 1981. I have corrected it and extended it at some points. It is an extended version of the lecture which I would have delivered on the BBC if the original suggestion that I might give the 1981 Dimbleby Lecture had not been withdrawn. My particular thanks are due to the Worcester Citizens Committee–a non-political committee representing individuals from the City Council, local societies and churches–which invited me to give the lecture in my own city; to Councillor Jeff Carpenter, its chairman; to the Mayor and Mayoress of Worcester, who were in attendance on the platform; and to Mr Jonathan Dimbleby who encouraged me to go ahead and to ensure that the Dimbleby Lecture (even if an unofficial one) was delivered in 1981.

It will be very clear to readers that this lecture was written before the tragic events–the imposition of martial law and the repression of Solidarity–commenced in Poland. It is impossible to foresee the outcome of these events as this lecture goes to the press. It may be thought that they confirm the more pessimistic part of my analysis and refute the more optimistic alternatives which I proposed.

I am uncertain. I will only say that these events make an analysis, on the lines of this lecture, more relevant and more urgent. The outcome may still depend on our own actions. The movement for peace, West and East, can no longer be content with contesting missiles. We must strive to loosen Europe from the military hegemony of both super-powers, and to press forward measures of demilitarisation in every part of our continent. Peace and freedom must now, more than ever, be seen as one cause. There is no other way.

E.P.T.

23 December 1981

BEYOND THE COLD WAR

I am honoured to have been invited to deliver this lecture, here in my own city, by a committee of fellow-citizens of no particular political persuasion, united by their concern for serious and open discussion. It is kind of you to open the Guildhall to me, and to make me so much at home.

My difficulty is that I have been favoured with so much publicity for a lecture which I did *not* deliver that any lecture which I do now deliver is bound to come as an anti-climax. It is as if the bishops were finally to assemble and open Joanna Southcott's mysterious box, and find nothing within it but a recipe for making muffins.

And yet I can glimpse, out of the corner of my eye, something which may be important. I wish I could see it more clearly, and describe it clearly to you. I think that we may now be living, this year and for several years ahead, through episodes as significant as any known in the human record.

I will not dwell on the perils. We are well aware of these. Human ingenuity has somehow created these immense destructive powers, which now appear to hang above us, alienated from all human control. They are now talking of siting laser weapons on the moon—weapons which, in a literal sense, will be lunatic.

We are aware, all of us, of the overplus of this nuclear weaponry, much of it crammed into our own continent: land-mines, artillery, torpedoes, depth-charges, missiles launched from the ground, from submarines, from the air. We may differ as to the exact 'balance' of weaponry held by the adversary parties. But we are also aware that, when the overkill capacity of weaponry is such as to enable the destruction of civilised conditions for life on our continent thirty times over, calculations of 'balance' are becoming

irrelevant.

We may also, after two years of mounting anxiety, begin to feel slight twinges of hope. The superpowers have at last been brought to the negotiating table. Something might even be done to halt or to reduce the weaponry in Europe.

This is good. But what an effort it has taken to get the politicians there! And what a discrepancy there is between the procedures of war and those of peace! The decisions to develop new weapons—to deploy the SS-20, to put the neutron bomb into production, to go ahead with cruise missiles—are taken by a few score people—at the most by a few hundred—secretively, behind closed doors, on both sides. But to check, or to reverse, any one of those decisions, nothing will do except the voluntary efforts of hundreds of thousands—late into the night and through weekends, month after month—addressing envelopes, collating information, raising money, meeting in churches or in school halls, debating in conferences, lobbying parliaments, marching through the streets of Europe's capital cities.

In the past 18 months I have visited fellow workers for peace in the United States, in Czechoslovakia, in Finland, Norway, Denmark, Belgium, Holland, Germany and France. The story is always the same. People are determined. They are encouraged by growing support. But they are running out of puff. How long can they go on?

And if they relax, then in two or three years the weapons—accompanied by new weapons of equal barbarity, nerve-gas, bacteriological warfare—will begin to come back. We are running the wrong way down an escalator: if we stop running we will be carried up to the top.

To check the missiles is something. But the political launch-pad for all these missiles is the adversary posture of the two great rival alliances, grouped around the USA and USSR: that is, the Cold War. If this adversary posture were to be modified—if it were to be undermined by new ideas and movements on *both* sides—then, not only the weapons, but the launch-pad for them would be taken away. And many of the difficulties attending disarmament, whether nuclear or conventional, would fall also.

This is what I shall examine in this lecture. I do not intend

to rehearse the history of the Cold War, nor to examine, once again, why it started. I will enquire into its real content *today*. What is the Cold War now about? Is it necessary? And, if it is, whose is the need?

Let us go back, first, not to the origin of the Cold War, but to a moment just before it broke out. My own generation is the last which witnessed that moment as adults. Our perception of 'Europe' remains, to this day, a little different from that of younger generations. Europe, for us, included Warsaw, Prague and Budapest and, more distantly, Leningrad and Moscow. But for many young Westerners, 'Europe' now means, first of all, the EEC.

The young have grown up within a fractured continent. The Cold War has been a received condition, which has set the first premises of politics and ideology from before the time of their birth. It is now a settled and unquestioned premise: a habit. Most people assume that the condition will persist—far into the 21st century, for the full length of their own lifetimes—if war does not supervene. It has always been there.

But it has not always been there. I do not suggest that Europe, before the Cold War, was in any way, politically or culturally, united. It was the seat of rival imperialisms which extended over the globe. It was the seat and source of two devastating world wars. It was a battlefield for opposing ideologies.

Yet the savage divisions among Europeans did not exist as a fracture splitting the continent in half. They ran deeply *within* the political and cultural life of each nation-state. European states went to war; yet Europeans remained within a common political discourse.

This was true, most of all, in the climactic years of the second world war. From 1941 to 1944 Nazi Germany and its allies occupied an area and commanded resources very much greater than the EEC. Yet, paradoxically, there grew up within occupied Europe a new internationalism of common resistance.

From Norway to Montenegro, from the coast of Kent to the suburbs of Stalingrad—and it is necessary to recall, with

an effort, that Britain and Russia then were allies and that it was the prodigious sacrifice of Soviet life which turned the tide of that war—there was a common movement of resistance. Polish and Czech units served alongside British forces; British liaison groups—among them Churchill's son, Randolph, and the Conservative M.P., Brigadier Fitzroy Maclean—served with the Yugoslav partisans.

It is the fashion to be cynical about all that now, and for good reasons. The expectations and hopes of that moment were naive. The alliance of anti-fascist resistance—the alliances of liberals, Communists, agrarians, social-democrats, Conservatives—were later dishonoured, and on both sides.

But we might also recall that they were honoured for a while, and honoured with sacrifice of life. The aspiration for a democratic Europe—extending the good faith of those alliances forward into the peace—was authentic.

Some of these expectations were to be betrayed. But they remain there, in the record. I have said that others now seem to us as naive. Here is a young British officer—aged twenty-two—writing in a private letter from the Middle-East in 1943:

> How wonderful it would be to call Europe one's fatherland, and think of Krakow, Munich, Rome, Arles, Madrid as one's own cities. I am not yet educated to a broader nationalism, but for a United States of Europe I could feel a patriotism far transcending my love for England.

This Union he saw as 'the only alternative to disaster.' And later in the same year he wrote:

> There is a spirit abroad in Europe which is finer and braver than anything that tired continent has known for centuries, and which cannot be withstood. You can, if you like, think of it in terms of politics, but it is broader and more generous than any dogma. It is the confident will of whole peoples, who have known the utmost humiliation and suffering and have triumphed over it, to build their own lives once and for all. . . There is a marvellous opportunity before us—and all that is required from Britain, America and the U.S.S.R. is imagination, help and sympathy. . .

What sad reading this makes today! Some will find it Euro-centric, others will find it sentimental or innocent in its view of the motives of politicians and states, all will know that the hopes were to be defeated, within two or three years, by events. But the expectations were commitments, to the extent of life itself, and they were shared by many thousands across the continent.

In January 1944 this officer wrote to his brother:

> My eyes fill very quickly with tears when I think what a splendid Europe we shall build (I say Europe because that's the only continent I really know quite well) when all the vitality and talent of its indomitable peoples can be set free for co-operation and creation.

Ten days later he parachuted onto a high plateau in East Serbia—in the region of Tsrna Trava—where he was to serve as liaison officer with a contingent of Bulgarian partisans.

It is not my business now to record the savage warfare and the privations of the next months, as these partisans and their small British support-group were driven backwards and forwards across the snow-fields by superior forces. It is a complex story, clouded by the refusal of the British authorities, to this day, to release some archives. In May small Bulgarian partisan forces set off on an ill-planned and ill-fated drive directly into the heart of Bulgaria. They were overwhelmed; most of them were massacred; and the British officer, my brother, was executed. He was subsequently proclaimed a National Hero of Bulgaria, and despite some nasty twists and turns in Bulgarian politics, he remains that to this day. I have been, twice, along the route of that march; my wife and I two years ago visited the mountains around Tsrna Trava and talked with surviving partisans. The events of that time have not been forgotten, although they have been clouded by Cold War mythology, and on both sides. But that, again, is a different and complex story.

My point is this. My brother's aspirations for the future were not unusual, although his fate exemplified the cause of this common resistance in an unusual way. Throughout Europe men and women looked forward to the fruits of victory: a continent both democratic and at peace. There

would be different social systems, of course. But it was supposed that these systems would be chosen by each nation, with popular consent. The differences need not be occasions of war.

These expectations were becoming casualties when British forces confronted Greek partisans in Athens in December 1944. None survived the shock of the onset of the Cold War. The polarisation was absolute. I am not concerned, now, to examine why this happened. But happen it certainly did. Communists were expelled from the political life of the West: in France, in Italy, and to the prison islands of Greece. Liberals, social-democrats, agrarians, and, then, Communists who had proved to be too sympathetic to the alliance with democracy or too critical of Stalin: all these were purged from the political life of the East. Some were subjected to monstrous faked trials, were executed or imprisoned. The Cold War era, of two hostile Europes, commenced.

I will make only one, over-simplified, comment on that moment. The cause of freedom and the cause of peace seemed to break apart. The 'West' claimed freedom; the 'East' claimed the cause of peace. One might talk for hour upon hour in qualification of both claims. Each is made up of one part of truth and another part of hypocrisy. 'The West', whether directly through NATO or indirectly through the arrangements of the United States military, co-existed and co-exists easily enough with regimes notorious for their abuse of freedom and of human rights: with Salazar's Portugal, Franco's Spain, the Greece of the Colonels, or with the military tyranny in Turkey today. And this is before we look to Latin America, Asia or Africa. The Soviet Union's dedication to 'peace' co-existed with the military repression of unacceptable motions towards democracy or autonomy within its client states: notoriously in Hungary, 1956, and Czechoslovakia, 1968. And this is before we look towards the military support given to Third World regimes within the Soviet sphere of influence, or towards Afghanistan.

But, in the time open to me, I can only note both claims, which have long underpinned the ideological contestations of the Cold War. And I must add that, when every allowance is made for hypocrisy, both claims have a little colour. It is

not that 'the Free West' has been an exemplar of democratic practice. But it is in the West that certain important democratic practices have persisted, whereas in 'the East'—after *gulag* and faked trial, the repression of the Hungarian insurrection and of the Prague Spring, the psychiatric confinement of dissidents, and the monotonous State-licensed idiocy of Communist intellectual orthodoxy—the very term 'People's Democracy' became sick.

That is familiar, and a source of much self-congratulation to Westerners. What is less familiar—for the young are not taught this carefully in our schools—is that the West was perceived by the East—and perceived for good reasons—as the most threatening and irresponsible military power. The first atomic detonation over Hiroshima, by the United States (but with the assent of our own government) sent panic-waves across the Communist world which contributed much to the onset of Cold War. From that moment, and for over twenty years, there was no question of 'balance' in the nuclear arsenals of the two parties: the West had an overwhelming superiority in destructive nuclear power.

We have been reminded of this recently by two independent voices of authority, each of them dissenting voices from the opposed superpowers. George Kennan, the former American ambassador to Moscow whose famous despatch (by 'Mr. X' in *Foreign Affairs,* July 1947) contributed to the post-war policies of United States' 'containment' of the Soviet Union, has reminded Americans that 'it has been we. . . who, at almost every step of the road, have taken the lead in the development of this sort of weaponry.' (This is not, by the way, as the BBC Reith Lecturer for 1981 has alleged in his know-all way, 'at best a half truth': it is a plain, and easily verifiable, fact). And Roy Medvedev, the Soviet supporter of free intellectual enquiry and civil rights, has commented that, with the brief exception of the Soviet advance in satellite technology in 1957-8, the United States has always led in weapons technology—

> obliging the USSR to try to catch up from a position of inferiority. This permanent dynamic has structured Russian responses deeply, creating a pervasive inferiority complex that has probably prevailed over rational calculations in the 70s.

It is a dramatic instance of the trajectory of our times that these two distinguished men, starting from such different presuppositions and passing through such differing experiences, should have now come to a common point of commitment in support for the active peace movement.

From August 1945 onwards there were voices enough to argue that 'the West' should put its advantage in nuclear weapons technology to use. These voices went on for many years—calling for a 'preventive war' or for the 'liberation' of Berlin or of East Europe. Some voices were influential enough—John Foster Dulles, James Forrestal (the paranoid United States Secretary for the Navy who went mad in office)—to induce a legitimate 'paranoia' on the other side. The United States has rattled its nuclear weapons in their scabbard, as a matter of state policy, on at least 19 occasions. By the end of the 1940s it had surrounded the Soviet Union with a ring of forward strategic air-bases, all—with the exception of Alaska—outside United States' territory. The only attempt by the Soviet Union to establish a comparable forward base was repelled by the direct ultimatum of nuclear attack: the Cuban missile crisis. The humiliation suffered then by the Soviet rulers powered the upward build-up of Soviet missiles in the 1960s.

I am not endorsing either claim without qualification. I mean only to repeat that both claims had colour: the West to 'freedom' and the East to 'peace'. And this placed the political culture of Europe in a permanent double-bind. Those who worked for freedom in the East were suspected or exposed as agents of Western imperialism. Those who worked for peace in the West were suspected or exposed as pro-Soviet 'fellow travellers' or dupes of the Kremlin. In this way the rival ideologies of the Cold War disarmed those, on both sides, who might have put Europe back together. Any transcontinental movement for peace *and* freedom became impossible. Such a movement glowed for a moment in 1956 and, again, in 1968. Each time it was, ironically, the 'peace-loving' Soviet forces which ground out the sparks under an armoured heel.

Let us move back to our own time. For I am addressing the

question—not what caused the Cold War, but what is it about today? And it is no good trying to answer this by standing at its source and stirring it about with a stick. For a river gathers up many tributaries on its way, and turns into unexpected courses.

Nor is it any good asking me to deliver to you some homilies called 'the lessons of history'. History teaches no simple lessons, because it *never* repeats itself, even if certain large themes recur.

In fact, received notions of the 'lessons' of recent history are often actively unhelpful in dealing with the present, since these establish stereotypes which interfere with contemporary vision. This is very much the case with today's Cold War. Because it was widely believed in the 1930s that World War I was 'caused' by an arms race and by inflexible structures of alliances, essential measures of collective security were not taken to halt Hitler and to prevent World War II. Today the 'lesson' of World War II has stuck in the public mind while the 'lesson' of World War I has been forgotten. Because it is widely believed that military weakness and appeasement 'caused' World War II, many people now condone new forms of militarisation which will, if unchecked, give us World War III.

At the same time there is, in both West and East, a simple transference of remembered images to the present. The 1930s burned in memory the image of a major militarist and expansionist power (Nazi Germany) whose appetite was only fed by each new scrap of appeasement; which had an insatiable drive to conquer all Europe, if not the world. Politicians and ideologists, West and East, have renamed this insatiable potential aggressor as (respectively) Russia or America. It is a compelling identification. Yet it rests on the assent of memory rather than upon analysis or evidence. It appears plausible simply because it looks so familiar.

But to understand the present we must first resist the great suggestive-power of memory. This is, surprisingly, where the historical discipline may be helpful, may teach 'lessons' of a different kind. For historians deal always with long-term eventuations—social, political, economic process—which continually defeat or contradict the expectations of

the leading historical actors themselves.

History never happens as the actors plan or expect. It is the record of *unintended* consequences. Revolutions are made, manifestos are issued, battles are won: but the outcome, twenty or thirty years on, is always something that no-one willed and no-one expected. Boris Pasternak, the great Russian poet, reflected in *Dr Zhivago* on the 'indirect results' of the October Revolution, which 'have begun to make themselves felt—the fruits of fruits, the consequences of consequences.'

I like this phrase, 'the consequences of consequences', and wish we could see the Cold War in this way and not in terms of the intentions of the actors in 1947. We might see it, then, more clearly, as an abnormal political condition. It was the product of particular contingencies at the end of World War II which struck the flowing rivers of political culture into glaciated stasis, and struck intellectual culture with an ideological permafrost. The Cold War frontiers were fixed, in some part, precisely by 'deterrence'—by the unprecedented destructive power of the nuclear weaponry which, by coincidence, was invented at this historical moment.

It is an odd and very dangerous condition. A line has been drawn across the whole continent, like some gigantic geological fault, with one great capital city catapulted across the fault and divided internally by a wall. On each side of this line there are not only vast accumulations of weaponry directed against the other, but also hostile ideologies, security operations, and political structures. Both sides are preparing, and over-preparing, for a war in which both would share in mutual ruin. Yet both parties deny any intention of attacking the other: both mutter on about 'deterrence' or 'defence.'

If we ask the partisans of either side what the Cold War is now about, they regard us with the glazed eyes of addicts. It is there because it is there. It is there (they might say) because of the irreconcilable antagonism between two political and social systems: totalitarianism versus democracy—or Communism versus capitalism or Western imperialism. Each must be motivated, of its own inherent nature, by the desire to vanquish the other. Only the mutual fear of

'deterrence' can stave off a total confrontation.

The trouble with these answers is that they are phrased in terms of the ideological justifications for the Cold War at the moment of its origin. They remain fixed, in the permafrost of that icy moment.

A brief survey will show us that the notion of two monolithic adversary systems conforms uneasily with the evidence of the past decades. To take the Communist bloc first: if it is aiming to vanquish Europe and then the World, it is making a bad job of it. It has lost Yugoslavia. It has lost Albania. The Soviet Union and China have split bitterly apart. From the time of the post-war settlement, which established a protective belt of client Communist states around Russia's western frontiers, there has been no further expansion into European territory. Twenty-five years ago Soviet and NATO forces were withdrawn from Austria, and the peace treaty which guaranteed Austria's neutrality has been honoured by both sides.

There has also been a major recession in pro-Soviet Communist movements in the West. The Cominform, established in 1947, was seen by Western ideologists as a Trojan horse within Western societies: or a whole set of Trojan horses, the largest being in Italy and France. The Cominform has long been broken up. Disgusted by the events of 1956, by the Soviet repression of the 'Prague Spring' in 1968, most Western parties have turned in a 'Eurocommunist' direction: they are sharply critical of the Soviet denial of civil rights, oppose Soviet military policies (including the intervention in Afghanistan), and in general have supported Polish Solidarity. This is true of the huge Italian Communist Party (which endorses a critical commitment to NATO), of the influential Spanish party, and of the small British party. The French Communist Party, which has been ambiguous on questions of civil rights has steadily lost support in the French electorate.

Or take the question of Marxism. In Cold War fiction Soviet Communism is supposed to be motivated by a philosophy, 'Godless Marxism', with universal claims. The strange development here is, not only that religion appears to be reviving in most parts of the Communist world, but

that the intellectual universe of Marxism is now in chaos. In the Warsaw Pact countries there is something called Marxism-Leninism, learned by rote, which is a necessary rhetoric for those who wish to advance within the career structures of the state. It provokes, in the public generally, nothing but a yawn. I can think of no Soviet intellectual who, *as a Marxist,* commands any intellectual authority outside the Soviet Union.

Yet, in an odd sideways movement, Marxism as an intellectual system has migrated to the West and to the Third World, just as certain liberal beliefs have been migrating to dissident circles in the Communist world. Marxism in the West has fragmented into a hundred argumentative schools. And most of these schools are profoundly critical of the Soviet Union and of Communist practice. Marxism is certainly a vigorous intellectual influence in the West and in the Third World—an influence at work in many universities, journals, and works of scholarship. But whatever this Marxism may be—and it is becoming difficult to say what it is—it has nothing whatsoever to do with Soviet expansionism.

Look where we will, the evidence is at odds with the Cold War fictions. Poland is only one of several East European nations which are now deeply indebted to Western banks. What are we to make of a 'people's democracy' in hock to the capitalists? The Soviet Union depends for grain upon the prairies of the Mid-West of America, and the farmers of the Mid-West depend, in turn, upon these annual sales. West Germany has recently completed an agreement which will bring natural gas from Siberia, to the extent of close on 10% of the country's energy needs. The French government is at present negotiating a similar agreement for natural gas which 'would make France depend on Soviet gas for 26% of its requirements in 1990.' (*Times,* 11 November 1981). Long-standing trade agreements traverse both blocs and there is even that phenomenon, which one observer has described as 'vodka-cola', by which Western multinationals have invested in Soviet and East European enterprises, taking advantage of the low labour costs and the absence of industrial conflict in the Communist world. Even the Soviet ICBMs may incorporate components of United States design

or manufacture. Of course the American military reserve the top-flight computers and technology for their own use. I do not know whether the American public should draw comfort from the fact that the ICBMs directed at them may be guided by second-rate components of their own design.

I am not saying that the social and political systems of East and West are identical or even comparable. I am saying that the first Cold War premise—of irreconcilable adversary posture between the blocs across the whole board—has become a fiction. And in the course of last year, events in Poland have made the old fiction look even odder. We now have a Polish pope. We also have a huge, nationalist and Catholic, but also socialist, Polish trade union movement, Solidarity, a great deal more insurgent, and more far-reaching in its demands, than any union movement in the West. To be sure, the Russians do not like this at all. But they have not, as yet, been able to stop it, and the longer it succeeds the more its example is likely to prove contagious. Once again, if we assume that the aim of Soviet Communism is to overrun all Europe, then it is not doing very well. It can't even hold what it has.

If we turn the picture around, and look at the West, we discover other contradictions. At the moment of the Cold War's origin—when the permafrost set in—the United States had emerged from the second world war, alone of all the advanced economies, with a huge unimpaired productive capacity. The 'American Century' was, exactly, *then:* economic and military strength were overwhelming, and diplomatic and cultural influence ensued. NATO, perforce, was an alliance expressive of United States hegemony, and, in its military structure, under direct American command.

But the American Century was not to last for a hundred years. In past decades the American economy has entered into a long secular decline in relation to its competitors: Japan, the EEC powers (notably West Germany and France). The cultural influence and the diplomatic authority of the United States has entered a similar decline. And United States conventional military forces also suffered a catastrophic defeat in Vietnam. Only the overwhelming nuclear strength has been maintained—has grown year after year—has been

protracted beyond the moment of its origin. United States militarism seeks to extend forward indefinitely—to cast its shadow across Europe—a supremacy of economic and political force which existed thirty years ago but which has long ceased to exist. In one sense the present crisis in Western Europe can be read in this way. The United States is seeking to use the muscle of its nuclear weaponry to compensate for its loss of real influence.

This crisis has been reflected first, and most sharply, within Western European Social-Democratic and Labour movements. When the Cold War first struck, there was a fierce contest within these movements. This was (I must simplify) seen as a contest between pro-American and pro-Communist tendencies. A small and honourable tendency argued for a 'third way' or 'third force' between both tendencies: it lost all influence when the Two Camps finally took up their adversary stance.

As a general rule, the pro-American, or Atlanticist tendency won, and the pro-Communist tendency was expelled or reduced to a grumbling opposition. But victorious Atlanticism placed Social-Democracy in an odd position. It entailed the submission of Social-Democratic and of Labour parties to the hegemony of the most vigorous capitalist power in the world in military, diplomatic, and even in some economic, political and cultural affairs. This did not extinguish the humanitarian impulse in the programmes of those parties. So long as the economies continued to grow, it was possible, despite this overarching hegemony, to re-distribute some wealth within the native economy, and to assert some priorities in the fields of welfare, health or education. It was possible to keep electorates—and party activists—satisfied.

This is no longer possible. The reasons are self-evident. Some are directly economic: recession no longer affords space for humanitarian programmes, while it also stimulates direct competition between United States and EEC economies. Others are ideological: there has been a resurgence of the uninhibited reproductive drives of capital, from its United States strongholds, taking directly imperialist forms in its pursuit of oil, uranium, scarce resources, and markets in the Second and Third Worlds, and propping up client military

tyrannies. These reasons alone might have brought Atlanticism to the point of crisis. But the crisis, today, is above all political and military.

It no longer makes any sense for American hegemony to be extended over Western Europe through the institutions of NATO when, in the intervening thirty-five years since the Cold War set in, the balance of real forces has tipped back perceptibly towards this side of the Atlantic. It makes no sense at all for decisions as to the siting of missiles—and as to the ownership and operation of American missiles on European soil—to be taken in the Pentagon, when these decisions affect the very survival of Europe.

I have crossed the Atlantic a good many times in the past 15 years; and I can testify that, while the flight-time is getting less, the Atlantic ocean is getting wider. The United States has many virtues, and, among these, it is a more open, less secretive, less stuffy society than our own. But its political culture is now at an immense distance from that of Western Europe. It is, for example, the only major advanced society which has never had a political Labour movement, or Social-Democratic party, participating directly in national government. Its electorate is apathetic, and each successive President, in the past four elections, has been returned by a steadily declining proportion of the eligible electorate. President Reagan came to power with the support of little more than one-quarter of the possible total.

American political life in the past two decades has been vulgarised (I am tempted to say brutalised) and domesticated: that is, increasingly subordinated to the demands of domestic log-rolling. The average American citizen learns nothing of European affairs in his local newspaper or on his local TV channels. The present United States administration is, in its preoccupation with domestic issues and with domestic public image, effectively isolationist in its mentality; but it is an isolationism armed with nukes. Military muscle, nuclear weapons, are seen as a substitute for, not a supplement to, diplomacy.

How is a European Atlanticist today to bring any influence to bear upon such an administration? No Senators or Congressmen for Europe sit in Washington. Nor can they

deliver any votes to the President, and ask for little services in return. When President Reagan wanted to site the MX missile on its giant tracks in Nevada and Utah he was forced to back away because he was losing the support of hard-core Republican electors. The Senator for the state of Nevada was one of his own political inner-set. But Chancellor Schmidt and Mrs Thatcher (if she were ever to harbour an un-American thought) are not part of his set. West Germany or Britain may be in an uproar about cruise missiles, but they have no voices in the Presidential electoral college.

It is this tension which is pulling Western European political formations—and especially those of Social-Democracy—apart. Atlanticism has outlived the rationale of its moment of formation: neither the socialist nor the European liberal tradition can consort easily any more with an overarching American hegemony, whose priorities are, ever more nakedly, determined by the reproductive needs of American capital. Some European socialist parties have simply opted out. The Spanish Socialists are now campaigning to revoke the entry of Spain into NATO, and in Greece the victorious socialist party, PASOK, is committed to expel US nuclear bases. In other countries—West Germany, Britain—the battle has been joined *within* the parties. It is the issue of Atlanticism, and not the issues which the media favour—constitutional squabbles, the personality of Tony Benn—which has contributed most to the formation of the British Social Democratic Party and the continuing conflicts within the Parliamentary Labour Party. An inherited ideological formation, an Atlanticist dogma, has come under challenge; the challengers are not pro-Soviet although they are the inheritors of the grumblers and the third wayers who lost out at the Cold War's origins; they are looking for a new alternative, but they cannot yet spell its name.

What, then, is the Cold War, as we enter the 1980s, *about*? The answer to this question can give us no comfort at all. If we look at the military scene, then nothing is receding. On the contrary, the military establishments of both superpowers continue to grow each year. The Cold War, in this sense, has broken free from the occasions at its origin, and

has acquired an independent inertial thrust of its own. What is the Cold war now about? It is about itself.

We face here, in the grimmest sense, the 'consequences of consequences'. The Cold War may be seen as a show which was put, by two rival entrepreneurs, upon the road in 1946 or 1947. The show has grown bigger and bigger; the entrepreneurs have lost control of it, as it has thrown up its own managers, administrators, producers and a huge supporting cast; these have a direct interest in its continuance, in its enlargement. Whatever happens, the show must go on.

The Cold War has become a habit, an addiction. But it is a habit supported by very powerful material interests in each bloc: the military-industrial and research establishments of both sides, the security services and intelligence operations, and the political servants of these interests. These interests command a large (and growing) allocation of the skills and resources of each society; they influence the direction of each society's economic and social development; and it is in the interest *of* these interests to increase that allocation and to influence this direction even more.

I don't mean to argue for an *identity* of process in the United States and the Soviet Union, nor for a perfect symmetry of forms. There are major divergencies, not only in political forms and controls, but also as between the steady expansionism of bureaucracy and the avarice of private capital. I mean to stress, rather, the *reciprocal* and inter-active character of the process. It is in the very nature of this Cold War show that there must be two adversaries: and each move by one must be matched by the other. This is the inner dynamic of the Cold War which determines that its military and security establishments are *self-reproducing*. Their missiles summon forward our missiles which summon forward their missiles in turn. NATO's hawks feed the hawks of the Warsaw bloc.

For the ideology of the Cold War is self-reproducing also. That is, the military and the security services and their political servants *need* the Cold War. They have a direct interest in its continuance.

This is not only because their own establishments and their own careers depend upon this. It is not only because

ruling groups can only justify their own privileges and their allocation of huge resources to 'defence' in the name of Cold War emergencies. And it is not only because the superpowers both need repeated Cold War alarms to keep their client states, in NATO or the Warsaw Pact, in line. All these explanations have force. But, at an even deeper level, there is a further explanation—which I will describe by the ugly word 'psycho-ideological'—which must occasion the grimmest pessimism.

The threat of an enemy—even recourse to war—has always afforded to uneasy rulers a means of internal ideological regulation and social discipline. This was a familiar notion to Shakespeare. The dying Henry IVth, knowing that the succession was beset with enemies, advised his son—

> Therefore, my Harry,
> Be it thy course to busy giddy minds
> With foreign quarrels. . .

This advice led Henry Vth to Agincourt.

The fear or threat of the Other is grounded upon a profound and universal human need. It is intrinsic to human bonding. We cannot define whom 'we' are without also defining 'them'—those who are not 'us'. 'They' need not be perceived as threatening: they may be seen only as different from 'us'—from our family, our community, our nation: 'they' are others who do not 'belong'. But if 'they' are seen as threatening to us, then our own internal bonding will be all the stronger.

This bonding-by-exclusion is intrinsic to human socialisation. 'Love and Hate', William Blake wrote, 'are necessary to Human existence.' This will not go away because we do not think it nice. It is present in every strong human association: the family, the church or political party, in class formation and class consciousness. Moreover, this bonding-by-exclusion establishes not only the identity of a group, but some part of the self-identity of the individuals within it. We belong to a family, we are citizens of Worcester, we are middle-class or working-class, we are members of a party, we are British: and some of this is internalised, it is our own identity.

Throughout history, as bonding has gone on and as identities have changed, the Other has been necessary to this

process. Rome required barbarians, Christendom required pagans, Protestant and Catholic Europe required each other. The nation state bonded itself against other nations. Patriotism is love of one's own country; but it is also hatred or fear or suspicion of others.

This is not, in itself, a pessimistic finding, since we have developed very strong regulatory or counter-vailing influences to inhibit the aggressive constituent in bonding. We have 'civilised' ourselves, sometimes with success. In the early 19th century, a stranger or 'outcomling' walking through Lancashire might be hooted or pelted with stones. Or if a lad were to court a girl in the next village, in the West Riding, he might expect to be beaten up or driven out by the local youths. We do better today. We sublimate these aggressions in pop concerts or in football crowds. New racial conflicts in our society are alarming, but we do not despair of overcoming these ugly tensions also. We can even co-exist, except in disputed fishing-grounds or in academic philosophy, with the French.

Yet let us not take comfort too easily. War has been a constant recourse throughout history. It is an event as common in the human record as are nettles in the hedgerows. Despite all our 'civilisation' this century has seen already the two bloodiest wars in history, both engendered in the continent which prides itself most upon its civilised forms.

Let us return to today's Cold War. I have argued that the condition of the Cold War has broken free from the 'causes' at its origin: and that ruling interests on both sides have become ideologically addicted, they need its continuance. The Western hemisphere has been divided into two parts, each of which sees itself as threatened by the Other; yet at the same time this continuing threat has become necessary to provide internal bonding and social discipline within each part.

Moreover, this threat of the Other has been internalised within both Soviet and American culture, so that the very self-identity of many American and Soviet citizens is bound up with the ideological premises of the Cold War.

There are historical reasons for this, which have less to do with the actualities of communist or capitalist societies than

we may suppose. Americans, for a century or so, have had a growing problem of national identity. America has a population, dispersed across half a continent, gathered in from the four corners of the globe. Layer upon layer of immigrants have come in, and new layers are being laid down today: Vietnamese and Thailanders, Cubans and undocumented Hispanic workers. Internal bonding tends to fall, not upon horizontal nationwide lines—the bonding of social class remains weak—but in vertical, fissiparous ways: local, regional, or ethnic bonding—the blacks, the Hispanics, the Poles, the Irish, the Jewish lobby. The resounding, media-propagated myth of United States society is that of an open market society, an upwardly-mobile free-for-all: its objective not any communal goal but equality of ego-fulfilment for everyone.

But where, in all these centrifugal and individualistic forces, is any national bonding and sense of American self-identity to be found? American poets and novelists have suggested better answers—America (they have suggested) might be the most internationalist nation in the world—but the answer which has satisfied America's present rulers is, precisely, in the Cold War. The United States is the leader of 'the Free World', and the Commies are the Other. They need this Other to establish their own identity, not as blacks or Poles or Irish, but as free Americans. Only this pre-existent need, for bonding-by-exclusion, can explain the ease by which one populist rascal after another has been able to float to power—and even to the White House—on nothing but a flood of sensational Cold War propaganda. And anti-Communism can be turned to other internal uses as well. It can serve to knock trade unions on the head, or to keep dissident radical voices or peace movements ('soft on Communism') on the margins of political life.

But what about the Soviet Union? Is there a similar need to bond against the Other within Soviet culture? I can speak with less confidence here. But there are indications that this is so.

The Soviet Union is not 'Russia' but a ramshackle empire inherited from Tsarist times. It also has its own fissiparous tendencies, from Mongolia to the Baltic states. It has no need to invent an Other, in some fit of paranoia. It has been struck,

within active memory, by another, to the gates of Moscow, with a loss of some 20 million dead. One would suppose that Soviet rulers, while having good reason for a defensive mentality, would need the Cold War like a hole in the head. They would want it to go away. And, maybe, some of them do.

Yet the Cold War, as ideology, has a bonding function in the Soviet Union also. This huge collocation of peoples feels itself to be surrounded—it is surrounded—from Mongolia to the Arctic ice-cap to its Western frontiers. The bonding, the self-identity, of Soviet citizens comes from the notion that they are the heartland of the world's first socialist revolution, threatened by the Other—Western imperialism, in alliance with 1,000 million Chinese. The positive part of this rhetoric—the Marxist-Leninist, revolutionary bit—may now have worn exceedingly thin; but the negative part remains compelling. The one function of the Soviet rulers which commands consensual assent throughout the population is their self-proclaimed role as defenders of the Fatherland and defenders of peace.

There is nothing sinister about that. But the bonding function of Cold War ideology in the Soviet Union is directly disciplinary. The threat of the Other legitimates every measure of policing or intellectual control. In Stalin's time this took the form of indiscriminate terror against 'counter-revolutionaries'. The measures of terror or of discipline have now been greatly modified. This is important and this is hopeful. But the function of this disciplinary ideology remains the same.

What it does is to transform every social or intellectual conflict within the Soviet Union into a problem affecting the security of the state. Every critic of Soviet reality, every 'dissident', is defined as an ally of the Other: as alien, unpatriotic, and perhaps as an agent of the West. Every impulse towards democracy or autonomy in Eastern Europe—the Prague Spring of 1968, the Polish renewal—is defined as a security threat to the Soviet frontiers and to the defensive unity of the Warsaw powers.

Like the populist American denunciation of 'Commies', the Soviet denunciation of 'Western' penetration can be

turned to every purpose imaginable in the attempt to impose internal discipline:—but with the important difference that in the Soviet Union the attacks of the media and of political leaders are supplemented by more powerful and more intrusive security forces. Even juvenile delinquency, or the new wave of consumerism in the Soviet white-collar and professional groups can be denounced as Western attempts to 'subvert' Soviet society. And General Semyon Tsvigun, first deputy chairman of the KGB, writing recently in *Kommunist,* has instanced the 'negative influence' of Western styles and pop music upon Soviet young people as examples of the 'subversive' activities of the external 'class enemy'.

This is the double-bind which the Soviet people cannot break through. It is weary but it works. And it works because the Cold Warriors of the West are eager to be in the same card-game, and to lead into the strong suits of their partners, the Cold Warriors of the East. The Western Warriors, by championing the cause of 'human rights', in the same moment define the dissidents of the East as allies of the West and as security risks. It is a hypocritical championship on several counts, but we will leave this aside. It is utterly counter-productive, and perhaps it is intended to be so. It does no-one, except the Cold Warriors of the other side, any good.

The boycott of the Moscow Olympics is a case in point. Initially this may have been welcomed by some dissident intellectuals in Eastern Europe and among some Soviet Jews. It was to do them no good. A Russian friend tells me that, as an operation promoting liberty, it was a disaster. The boycott bonded the Soviet people against the Other. In a state of siege and isolation for half-a-century, the Olympics offered to open international doors and to give them, for the first time, the role of host on the world stage. They were aggrieved by the boycott, not as Communists, but in their latent patriotism. They had allocated resources to the Olympics, they had rehearsed their dancers and their choirs. They were curious to meet the world's athletes and visitors. Critics of the Olympics were felt to be disloyal, not only by the security services, but also by their workmates and neighbours. The boycott hence made possible the greatest crack-down

upon all critical centres of opinion in the Soviet Union in a decade. It was a gift, from the CIA to the KGB. Lord Killanan and the British Olympic team, who ignored President Carter and Mrs Thatcher, did the right thing, not only in support of the Olympic tradition but also in support of the cause of peace. But 'dissent' in the Soviet Union has not yet recovered from the Western Cold Warriors' kind attentions.

It can be seen now, also, why the most conservative elements in the Soviet leadership—the direct inheritors of Stalin—*need* the Cold War. This is not only because some part of this leadership has arisen from, or spent some years in the service of, the bureaucratic-military-security complex itself. And it is not only because the very heavy allocations to defence, running to perhaps 15% of the gross national product, must be justified in the eyes of the deprived public. It is also because these leaders are beset on every side by difficulties, by pressures to modernise, to reform or to democratise. Yet these pressures threaten their own position and privileges—once commenced, they might pass beyond control. The Polish renewal will have been watched, in the Soviet Union and in other Eastern European states, as an awful example of such a process—a process bringing instability and, with this, a threat to the security of the Communist world.

Hence Cold War ideology—the threat of the Other—is the strongest card left in the hand of the Soviet rulers. It is necessary for bonding. And the card is not a fake. For the Other—that is, the Cold Warriors of the West—is continually playing the same card back, whether in missiles or in arms agreements with China or in the suit of human rights.

We could not have led up to a more pessimistic conclusion. I have argued that the Cold War is now about itself. It is an ongoing, self-reproducing condition, to which both adversaries are addicted. The military establishments of the adversaries are in a reciprocal relationship of mutual nurture: each fosters the growth of the other. Both adversaries need to maintain a hostile ideological posture, as a means of internal bonding or discipline. This would be dangerous at any time; but with today's nuclear weaponry it is an immensely dangerous condition. For it contains a built-in logic which must

always tend to the worse: the military establishments will grow, the adversary postures become more implacable and more irrational.

That logic, if uncorrected, must prove terminal, and in the next two or three decades. I will not speculate on what accident or which contingency will bring us to that terminus. I am pointing out the logic and thrust of things, the current which is sweeping us towards Niagara Falls. As we go over those Falls we may comfort ourselves that it was really no-one's fault: that human culture has always contained within itself a malfunction, a principle of bonding-by-exclusion which must (with our present technologies of death) lead to auto-destruct. We might have guessed as much by looking at the nettles in history's hedges.

All this perhaps will happen. I think it at least probable that it will. We cannot expect to have the good fortune of having our planet invaded, in the 1990s, by some monsters from outer space, who would at last bond all humanity against an outer Other. And short of some science-fiction rescue operation like that, all proposals look like wish-fulfilment.

Yet I would ask you to cast your minds back to the considerations in the earlier part of this lecture. I have offered you a contradiction. I argued, at first, that a whole era of Cold War might be drawing to an end. Today's military confrontation is protracted long after the historical occasion for it has come to an end. And my argument here is close to a recent editorial comment in the London *Times* (2 October 1981):

> The huge accumulations of weaponry which the two brandish at each other are wholly out of proportion to any genuine conflict of interests. There is no serious competition for essential resources, or for territory that is truly vital to the security of either, and the ideological fires have dwindled on both sides. In strictly objective terms a reasonable degree of accommodation should be easily attainable.

But I argued, subsequently, that the Cold War, as adversary military establishments and adversary ideological posture, was an on-going, self-reproducing road-show, which had

become necessary to ruling groups on both sides. Can we find, within that contradiction, any resolution short of war?

Perhaps we can. But the resolution will not be easy. A general revolt of reason and conscience against the instruments which immediately threaten us—a lived perception, informing multitudes, of the human ecological imperative: this is a necessary part of the answer. Such a revolt, such a shift in perception, is already growing across Europe. But this cannot be the whole answer. For if the Cold War has acquired a self-generating dynamic, then, as soon as public concern is quietened by a few measures of arms control, new dangers and new weapons will appear. We must do more than protest if we are to survive. We must go behind the missiles to the Cold War itself. We must begin to put Europe back into one piece.

And how could that be done? Very certainly it can not be done by the victory of one side over the other. That would mean war. We must retrace our steps to that moment, in 1944, before glaciation set in, and look once again for a third way.

If I had said this two years ago I would have despaired of holding your attention. But something remarkable is stirring in this continent today; movements which commenced in fear and which are now taking on the shape of hope; movements which cannot yet, with clarity, name their own demands. For the first time since the wartime Resistance there is a spirit abroad in Europe which carries a trans-continental aspiration. The Other which menaces us is being redefined—not as other nations, nor even as the other bloc, but as the forces leading both blocs to auto-destruction—not 'Russia' nor 'America' but their military, ideological and security establishments and their ritual oppositions.

And at the same time, as this Other is excluded, so a new kind of internal bonding is taking place. This takes the form of a growing commitment, by many thousands, to the imperative of survival and against the ideological or security imperatives of either bloc or their nation-states. In the words of the Appeal for European Nuclear Disarmament of April 1980:

> We must commence to act as if a united, neutral and pacific Europe already exists. We must learn to be loyal, not to 'East' or 'West', but to each other.

This is a large and improbable expectation. It has often been proclaimed in the past, and it has been as often disappointed. Yet what is improbable has already, in the past year, begun to happen. The military structures are under challenge. But something is happening of far greater significance. The ideological structures are under challenge also, and from *both* sides.

I said, at the beginning, that the Cold War had placed the political culture of Europe in a permanent double-bind: the cause of 'peace' and the cause of 'freedom' fell apart. What is now happening is that these two causes are returning to one cause—peace *and* freedom—and as this happens, so, by a hundred different channels, the transcontinental discourse of political culture can be resumed.

The peace movements which have developed with such astonishing rapidity in Northern, Western and Southern Europe—and which are now finding an echo in the East—are one part of this cause. They have arisen in response not only to a military and strategic situation but to a political situation also. What has aroused Europeans most is the spectacle of two superpowers, arguing above their heads about the deployment of weapons whose target would be the 'theatre' of Europe. These movements speak with new accents. They are, in most cases, neither pro-Soviet nor manipulated by the Communist-influenced World Peace Council. Their objective is to clear nuclear weapons and bases out of the whole continent, East and West, and then to roll back conventional forces. Nor is it correct to describe them as 'neutralist' or 'pacifist'. They are looking for a third way. A third way is an active way: it is not 'neutral' between the other ways, it goes somewhere else.

The Western peace movements, in majority opinion, bring together traditions—socialist, trade unionist, liberal, Christian, ecological—which have always been committed to civil rights. They extend their support to the Polish renewal and to Solidarity, and to movements of libertarian dissent in the

Warsaw bloc. And from Eastern Europe also, voice after voice is now reaching us—hesitant, cautious, but with growing confidence—searching for the same alliance: peace *and* freedom.

These voices signal that the whole thirty-five-year-old era of the Cold War could be coming to an end: the Ice Age could give way to turbulent torrents running from East to West and from West to East. And within the demands of the peace movements and also in movements of lower profile but of equal potential in Eastern Europe there is maturing a further—and a convergent—demand: to shake off the hegemony of the superpowers and to reclaim autonomy.

This demand was glimpsed by Dr Albert Schweitzer in a notable broadcast appeal from Oslo in April, 1958:

> Today America with her batteries of nuclear rockets in Europe is present with mighty military power in Europe. Europe has become an in-between land between America and Russia, as if America by some displacement of a continent had come closer to her. But if atomic rockets were no longer in question, this unnatural state of affairs would come to an end. America would again become wholly America; Europe wholly Europe; the Atlantic again wholly the Atlantic Ocean—a sea providing distance in time and space.
>
> In this way could come the beginning of the end of America's military presence in Europe, a presence arising from the two world wars. The great sacrifices that America made for Europe during the second world war, and in the years following it, will not be forgotten; the great and varied help that Europe received from her, and the thanks owing for this, will not be forgotten. But the unnatural situation created by the two world wars that led to a dominating military presence in Europe cannot continue indefinitely. It must gradually cease to exist, both for the sake of Europe and for the sake of America.
>
> Now there will be shocked voices from all sides. What will become of poor Europe if American atomic weapons no longer defend it from within and from without? What will happen if Europe is delivered to the Soviet? Must it then not be prepared to languish in a communist babylonian form of imprisonment for long years?
>
> Here it should be said that perhaps the Soviet Union is not quite so malicious as to think only of throwing itself on Europe at the first opportunity in order to devour it, and perhaps not quite so unintelligent as to fail to consider whether there would be any

advantage in upsetting her stomach with this indigestible meal.

What Europe and the Europeans have to agree is that they belong together for better or for worse. This is a new historical fact that can no longer be by-passed politically.

Albert Schweitzer argued this, twenty-three years ago, from the perspective of a West European. In the long interval that has now passed it is possible to make this same argument from an Eastern European perspective also. We no longer speculate upon the old ambition of John Foster Dulles—the 'West' *liberating* the 'East'. Eastern Europe has commenced its own self-liberation. In cautious ways, Romania, Hungary and East Germany have established small areas of autonomy, of foreign policy, economy or culture, while the Polish renewal signals a social transition so swift and far-reaching that speculation upon its outcome is futile. In Czechoslovakia, where social renewal was ruthlessly reversed in 1968, the hegemony of Soviet military power remains decisive. But here also courageous voices of dissent are beginning to consider a strategy in which the cause of freedom and the cause of peace can draw strength from each other as allies.

On November 16th, 1981, there was issued in Prague a statement by three spokespersons of Charter 77, the courageous organisation defending Czechoslovak human rights: Václav Malý, Dr Bedrich Placák, and Dr Jiri Hájek. This stresses the mutual interdependence of the causes of peace and of liberty. The Helsinki accord on human rights is an 'integral and equal component' of the cause of peace, since without respect for these rights 'it is impossible to speak of an attitude to peace worthy of the name'. Yet (the statement continues) 'it is difficult to regard as genuine champions of these rights and freedoms those who are stepping up the arms race and bringing closer the danger of war.' 'Our continent faces the threat of being turned into a nuclear battlefield, into the burial-ground of its nations and its civilisation which gave birth to the very concept of human rights.' And it concludes by expressing the solidarity of Charter 77 with all those in the peace movement who are also upholding the rights endorsed by the Helsinki accord:

'It is our wish that they should continue their struggle for peace in its indivisibility, which not only applies to different geographic regions but also covers the various dimensions of human life. We do not have the opportunities which they have to express as loudly our common conviction that peace and freedom are indivisible.'

The question before Europeans today is not how many NATO forward-based systems might equal how many Soviet SS-20s. Beneath these equations there is a larger question: in what circumstances might *both* superpowers loosen the military grip which settled upon Europe in 1945 and which has been protracted long beyond its historical occasion? And how might such a retreat of hegemonies and loosening of blocs take place without endangering peace? Such an outcome would be profoundly in the interest, not only of the people of Europe, but of the peoples of the Soviet Union and the United States also—in relaxing tension and in relieving them of some of the burdens and dangers of their opposed military establishments. But what—unless it were to be our old enemy 'deterrence'—could monitor such a transition so that neither one nor the other party turned it to advantage?

We are not, it should be said, describing some novel stage in the process known as 'détente'. For in the early nineteen seventies 'détente' signified the cautious tuning-down of hostilities between states or blocs, but within the Cold War *status quo.* Détente (or 'peaceful co-existence') was licensed by the superpowers: it did not arise from the client states, still less from popular movements. The framework of East-West settlement was held rigid by 'deterrence': in the high noon of Kissinger's diplomacy détente was a horse-trade between the leaders of the blocs, in which any unseemly movement out of the framework was to be discouraged as 'de-stabilising'. Czechs or Italians were required to remain quiet in their client places, lest any rash movement should disturb the tetchy equilibrium of the superpowers.

But what we can glimpse now is something different: a détente of peoples rather than states—a movement of peoples which sometimes dislodges states from their blocs and brings them into a new diplomacy of conciliation, which sometimes runs beneath state structures, and which sometimes defies

the ideological and security structures of particular states. This will be a more fluid, unregulated, unpredictable movement. It may entail risk.

The risk must be taken. For the Cold War can be brought to an end in only two ways: by the destruction of European civilisation, or by the reunification of European political culture. The first will take place if the ruling groups in the rival superpowers, sensing that the ground is shifting beneath them and that their client states are becoming detached, succeed in compensating for their waning political and economic authority by more and more frenzied measures of militarisation. This is, exactly, what is happening now. The outcome will be terminal.

But we can now see a small opening towards the other alternative. And if we thought this alternative to be possible, then we should—every one of us—re-order all our priorities. We would invest nothing more in missiles, everything in all the skills of communication and exchange.

When I first offered a synopsis of this lecture to the BBC, I promised 'some practical proposals and even a programme, as to how this could be done'. But I realise now that, even if time permitted, such a programme would be over-ambitious. This cannot be written by any one citizen, in Worcester. It must be written by many hands—in Warsaw and in Athens, in Berlin and in Prague. All I can do now is indicate, briefly, programmes which are already in the making.

One such programme is that of limited nuclear-free zones. I have the honour to speak now in the Guildhall of the nuclear-free city of Worcester. I need not say here, Mr Mayor, that this is not just a gesture of self-preservation. It is a signal also, of international conciliation, and a signal which we hope will be reciprocated. Such signals are now arising across our continent. A Nordic nuclear-free zone is now under active consideration. And in the South-East of Europe, the incoming Greek government is pledged to initiate discussions with Bulgaria and Romania (in the Warsaw Pact) and with non-aligned Yugoslavia, for a further nuclear-free zone.

Such zones have political significance. Both states and local authorities can enlarge the notion to take in exchanges

between citizens, for direct uncensored discourse. In Central Europe a zone of this kind might go further to take in measures of conventional disarmament also, and the withdrawal of both Soviet and NATO forces from both Germanys. This proposal is now being actively canvassed in East Germany as well as West—the East German civil rights supporter, Dr Robert Havemann has raised the question directly in an open letter to Mr Brezhnev—and is now being discussed, in unofficial circles, in Poland and Czechoslovakia as well.

The objectives of such larger zones are clear: to make a space of lessened tension between the two blocs: to destroy the menacing symbolic affront of nuclear weapons: to bring nations both East and West within reciprocal agreements: and to loosen the bonds of the bloc system, allowing more autonomy, more initiative to the smaller states.

But at the same time there must be other initiatives, through a hundred different channels, by which citizens enlarge this discourse. It is absurd to expect the weapons systems of both sides to de-weaponise themselves, the security systems of both sides to fall into each other's arms. It is, precisely, at the top of the Cold War systems that deadlock, or worse, takes place. If we are to destructure the Cold War, then we must destabilise these systems from below.

I am talking of a new kind of politics which cannot (with however much goodwill) be conducted by politicians. It must be a politics of peace, informed by a new internationalist code of honour, conducted by citizens. And it is now being so conducted by the international medical profession, by churches, by writers and by many others.

Music can be a 'politics' of this kind. I will take an example from this city. We had the honour here, at the last Three Choirs Festival, to hear the first British performance of Sallinen's *Dies Irae.* This work is a setting of a poem about the threat to our planet from nuclear weapons by the Finnish poet, Arvo Turtianen, commissioned by the Ensemble of the Hungarian People's Army—I don't much like armies but I can't object to a military Ensemble which commissions a work on peace—first performed in Budapest, and then performed in our own city.

If this is a small, but beautiful, sound of reconciliation, then other sounds are large and loud. For across our continent the world of popular music is now making its own sounds of peace and freedom. There is, today, some generational cultural mutation taking place among the young people of Europe. The demonstrations for peace–Bonn, London, Madrid, Rome, Amsterdam–have been thronged with the young. The young are *bored* with the Cold War. There is a shift at a level below politics–expressed in style, in sound, in symbol, in dress–which could be more significant than any negotiations taking place in Geneva. The PA systems of these popular music bands are already capable of making transcontinental sounds. The bands may not be expert arms negotiators; but they might blast the youth of Europe into each others' arms.

It has been proposed that there might be a festival–it might be called 'Theatre of Peace'–somewhere in Central Europe in the summer of 1983. Young people (although their elders would not be excluded) would be called to assemble from every part of the continent, bringing with them their music, their living theatre, their art, their posters, their symbols and gifts. There would be rallies, workshops, and informal discussions. Every effort would be made to invite youth from 'the other side', not in pre-selected official parties but as individual visitors and strays. For 1982 the project may be too ambitious: but as a 'primer' for this plans are now afoot for a popular music festival on an island in the Danube close to Vienna early in August 1982. Already the first responses to the plan are such that the problem is one of keeping the numbers within the limits requested by hospitable Austrian authorities.

I return, in my conclusion, to the most sensitive, and the most significant, issue of all. How do we put the causes of freedom and of peace back together?

This cannot be done by provocative interventions in the affairs of other nations. And it certainly cannot be done by the old strategy of Cold War 'linkage'. If we look forward to democratic renewal on the other side of our common world, then this strategy is plainly counter-productive. No-one will

ever obtain civil or trade union rights in the East because the West is pressing missiles against their borders. On the contrary, this only enhances the security operations and the security-minded ideology of their rulers. The peoples of the East, as of the West, will obtain their own rights and liberties for themselves and in their own way–as the Portuguese, Spanish, Greek and Polish people have shown us. What is needed, from and for all of us, is a space free of Cold War crisis in which we can move.

There might, however, be a very different kind of citizen's linkage in which, as part of the people's détente, the movement for peace in the West and for freedom in the East recognised each other as natural allies. For this to be possible, we in the West must move first. As the military pressure upon the East begins to relax, so the old double-bind would begin to lose its force. And the Western peace movement (which can scarcely be cast convincingly by Soviet ideologists as an 'agent of Western imperialism') should press steadily upon the state structures of the East demands for greater openness of exchange, both of persons and of ideas.

A transcontinental discourse must begin to flow, in both directions, with the peace movement–a movement of unofficial persons with a code of conduct which disallows the pursuit of political advantage for either 'side'–as the conduit. We cannot be content to criticise nuclear missiles. We have to be, in every moment, critics also of the adversary posture of the powers. For we are threatened, not only by weapons, but by the ideological and security structures which divide our continent and which turn us into adversaries. So that the concession which the peace movement asks of the Soviet state is–not so much these SS-20s and those Backfire bombers–but its assistance in commencing to tear these structures down. And in good time one might look forward to a further change, in the Soviet Union itself, as the long-outworn ideology and structures inherited from Stalin's time gave way before internal pressures for a Soviet renewal.

It is optimistic to suppose so. Yet this is the only way in which the Cold War could be brought to an end. I have also conceded that an end of glaciation–with new and turbulent torrents across the East-West divide–will entail new risks. We

have observed this for a year as the Polish crisis has unfolded. To those who have been habituated to Cold War stasis this looks like dangerous 'instability'.

Yet I will argue, against these critics, that in such an emergency the peace movement itself may prove to be the strongest force making for stability. Only a non-aligned peace movement could moderate this great social transition, enabling our political cultures to grow back together, and restraining both NATO and Warsaw power rulers from intervening to check the change or from seeking to gain advantage from the discomforture of the other side. The peace movement must say– and has already been saying–'Let Poland be Polish and let Greece be Greek!'

We may be living now, and in the next few years, in the very eye of crisis. The Cold War road-show, which each year enlarges, is now lurching towards its terminus. But in this moment changes have arisen in our continent, of scarcely more than one year's growth, which signify a challenge to the Cold War itself. These are not 'political' changes, in the usual sense. They cut through the flesh of politics down to the human bone.

Dr Nicholas Humphrey, in his remarkable Bronowski lecture, warned us of one possible outcome. I have been proposing another. What I have proposed is improbable. But, if it commenced, it might gather pace with astonishing rapidity. There would not be decades of détente, as the glaciers slowly melt. There would be very rapid and unpredictable changes; nations would become unglued from their alliances; there would be sharp conflicts within nations; there would be successive risks. We could roll up the map of the Cold War, and travel without maps for a while.

I do not mean that Russia would become a Western democracy, nor that the West would go Communist. Immense differences in social system would remain. Nations, unglued from their alliances, might–as Poland and Greece are now showing us–fall back more strongly into their own inherited national traditions. I mean only that the flow of political and intellectual discourse, and of human exchange, would resume across the whole continent. The blocs would discover that they had forgotten what their adversary posture was about.

Where Dr Humphrey and I are united is in our conviction that we do not live in ordinary times. To work to bring the Cold War to an end is not one among three dozen things which we must remember to do. It must be, for tens of thousands of us in Europe in this decade, the first thing we must do; and it must inform everything we do.

Our species has been favoured on this planet, although we have not always been good caretakers of our globe's resources. Our stay here, in the spaces of geological time, has been brief. No-one can tell us our business. But I think it is something more than to consume as much as we can and then blow the place up.

We have, if not a duty, then a need, deeply engraved within our culture, to pass the place on no worse than we found it. Those of us who do not expect an after-life may see in this our only immortality: to pass on the succession of life, the succession of culture. It may even be that we are happier when we are engaged in matters larger than our own wants and ourselves.

We did not choose to live in this time. But there is no way of getting out of it. And it has given to us as significant a cause as has ever been known, a moment of opportunity which might never be renewed. If these weapons and then those weapons are added to the huge sum on our continent– if Poland drifts into civil war and if this calls down Soviet military intervention–if the United States launches some military adventure in the Middle East–can we be certain that this moment will ever come back? I do not think so. If my analysis is right, then the inertial thrust of the Cold War, from its formidable military and ideological bases, will have passed the point of no return.

The opportunity is *now*, when there is already an enhanced consciousness of danger informing millions. We can match this crisis only by a summoning of resources to a height like that of the greatest religious or political movement's of Europe's past. I think, once again, of 1944 and of the crest of the Resistance. There must be that kind of spirit abroad in Europe once more. But this time it must arise, not in the wake of war and repression, but before these take place. Five minutes afterwards, and it will be too late.

Humankind must at last grow up. We must recognise that the Other is ourselves.

E.P. Thompson, who has taken a leading part in the resurgence of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, is here questioning the fundamental condition of contemporary life, the Cold War and the adversary posture of the two blocs. His analysis of our current predicament will, we believe, help the process both of preserving peace and of restoring freedom to Europe. Edward Thompson brings to the subject a historian's knowledge, a writer's skill and the commitment of an activist in the Peace movement.

Beyond the Cold War is the text of what was originally intended as the Dimbleby Lecture. Readers may now form their own judgement on why the BBC decided to have no Dimbleby Lecture in 1981.

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The jacket was designed by Louis Mackay
The photo on the front cover (by courtesy of the Associated Press) shows the first meeting of the Russian and American soldiers on the Elbe April 1945.

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

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COMISO

Ben Thompson

i

THE PLACE

Comiso is a medium sized town, of 27,000 inhabitants, situated near the Southern coast of Sicily facing towards Africa. In August 1981 it was announced that Italy's share of the 464 cruise missiles earmarked for Europe were to be placed here, at the nearby derelict airport of Magliocco.

Sicily's exposed position deep in the mediterranean basin has attracted the interest of military men since time immemorial. Although nowadays we naturally think of Sicily as a part of Italy, she has been occupied in her history by Greeks, Romans, Arabs, Normans and Spaniards, finally coming under the rule of Naples for about a century and a half before being liberated by Garibaldi in 1860 during the campaign which led to the unification of Italy. Archimedes was buried there at Syracuse; and at Gela, about thirty kilometres up the coast from Comiso is the tomb of the poet Aeschylus who is reputed to have died when a short-sighted eagle mistook his head for a rock and dropped a tortoise on it. Sicily has its own language, quite distinct from Italian and incomprehensible to Italians, which comprises bits of French, Arabic, Spanish and Italian. The local dialects vary so much, however, that Sicilians from different regions generally speak Italian to each other

ii

During the war years the fascist regime used special police powers to suppress the mafia, but after the occupation the Allies allowed it to flourish again, encouraging prominent mafiosi to take positions of power in local government as a baulk against the communist threat. These elements, fearful

that Rome might compromise their power, raised a separatist army and attempted to force a breach with Italy. Although the attempt was unsuccessful, the predominance of the mafia was re-established, to become a permanent bane in the life of post-war Sicily. The mafia now carry out over 100 murders a year on the island, most of them arising out of internal feuds over the lucrative heroin trade. The killings go mainly unpunished, largely because of the rule of 'omertà' (underworld law of silence) which forbids recourse to the rules of authority. Sicilian society in general is rigidly structured and patriarchal, with great emphasis being placed on home life and the family. Something of the traditional attitude towards women in Sicily can be gathered from the fact that until after 1960, when the custom was first challenged in a court of law, it was regarded as quite honourable for a young man to forcibly abduct the girl of his choice and rape her, after which it was assumed that her only choice would be to marry him.

iii

Comiso today

The present day town of Comiso is relatively prosperous by Sicilian standards. Although the terrain is semi-tropical with clumps of huge 'figodindia' cacti dotted around an almost treeless landscape, the region is highly fertile. Vineyards abound, and large areas of land are cultivated under polythene cloches, producing early season fruits for export all over Europe. Although there is no heavy industry, a major source of employment is provided by the marble and granite sawmills, of which there are fifty-five. The products of these mills, as well as the early fruits are transported on to the continent by over 1,000 articulated lorries, mainly owned by their drivers. Unemployment is minimal, and educational facilities good. Politically, the town has a strong Communist Party vote (43%).Visitors coming into Comiso for the huge demonstration on April 4th saw *'No ai missili'* written on the hillside behind the town in enormous sheets of agricultural polythene.

i

THE BASE

Mussolini used many sites in Sicily which are now being redeveloped as part of NATO's southern flank. He had an ambitious scheme for using the island of Pantelleria to control the whole Mediterranean; his propaganda efforts on behalf of this island garrison were so successful that on June 11th 1943 the entire British 1st Infantry Division were sent on landing craft to invade the island, which promptly surrendered claiming to have run out of drinking water. A more effective outpost is now being prepared on Pantelleria in the form of one of the most powerful and advanced radar stations in the world, which will operate in support of the US Sixth Fleet in anti-submarine warfare operations. The airport at Comiso was also used by Mussolini, and the citizens of Comiso experienced aerial bombardment as a result. Magliocco airport was one of the first objectives of the US Seventh Army in the July 10th invasions, and the walls of the surviving airport buildings are said to bear still-visible pock marks from the American machine guns.

Sicily took on an especial strategic significance for the south flank of NATO with the expiry of Britain's military agreements with Malta in March 1979. A serious flaw in NATO's southern defences was discovered in July 1980, when a Libyan spy plane crashed after having overflown Sicily and Calabria without being detected. The new radar station on Pantelleria, as well as others, on the island of Lampedusa as well as mainland Sicily are designed to strengthen the 'NADGE' (Nato Air Defence Ground Environment) network and eliminate such 'holes' in NATO's radar coverage in the south.[1]

ii

The strategic position of Comiso at the southernmost tip of Italy points to a special feature of this site which could have great significance. Cruise missiles based here would penetrate a good 800 miles further south than any other cruise planned for deployment, to take in the whole of Morocco, Algeria, Libya and Egypt. In comparison, missiles based in West Germany would hardly touch Libya and Egypt. This means

that the missiles in Comiso could be used either in a conflict in Europe, or a conflict arising from one of the flashpoints in the Middle East, a generous choice of two 'limited nuclear wars'. After the Gulf of Sirte incident, when aircraft from the US Sixth Fleet clashed with Lybian fighters during a dispute over the extent of Lybian territorial waters, Italians were awakened to the possible threat of involvement in a war emanating from this quarter. A cartoon in 'La Repubblica' showed a terrified Prime Minister Spadolini hiding behind his desk:

> 'I'm in favour of cruise, it's an extra defence against the Sixth Fleet.'

While Quedaffi's threats against the United States were treated with some derision, the idea that he might have a go at Magliocco didn't seem so far fetched.

iii

Magliocco

The site itself hardly looks like a promising location for a 'superbase' in 1983. The front of the base sports a fine iron gate suspended between massive concrete pillars and guarded by 'carabinieri', but the perimeter is bounded on three sides only, the back being quite open and accessible. Until recently farmers used to grow wheat on the airfield rather than let it lie idle, and there are still vineyards running right up to the unfenced rear of the base. Some demolition works have been going on in the base since April '82, but there's little sign of activity; one or two lorries trundling back and forth in the heart of the massive wasteland looking like dinky toys. As far as the local opposition have been able to discover there are no contracts so far issued to builders for anything resembling a cruise missile hangar, although large barracks are planned, and, according to an article in the newspaper 'Paese Sera'[2] there are plans for a hospital centre with 3,470 beds, for the exclusive use of US personnel. (Comiso itself has 120 beds for 27,000 people!) If this is true it could mean that Comiso has been surreptitiously lined up to play some other role, not yet announced, perhaps as a

barracks for the Rapid Deployment Force. To confuse matters still further, Francesco Rutelli of the Radical Party, who has published one of the first comprehensive peace research manuals to appear in Italy[3] told me that he believes that some or all of Italy's 112 cruise missiles may in fact be installed elsewhere. He suggested four sites:

> Aviano (near Vicenza); Camp Darby (near Livorno); Gioia del Colle (Bari) and the appropriately named Perdas de Fogu ('Stones of Fire') in Sardinia.

i

POLITICAL BACKGROUND

Italian politics works on a multi-party system, with parliament being controlled by whoever can form a workable coalition government. The post-war years have seen a large number of such coalitions, which often last only for a matter of months. However, the dominant force has always been the Christian Democrats, Italy's largest political party. The Communist Party (PCI) is second in size, and the Socialists third. At the moment (September '82) the government is a five-party coalition of Christian Democrats, Socialists, Republicans, Liberals and Social Democrats under the leadership of a Republican Prime Minister, Giovanni Spadolini.

The major political party which opposes the base is the PCI. Originally formed as a breakaway from the Socialists in 1921, this party is now about twice the size of the Socialist Party, and exerts a powerful influence even when not directly involved in the governing coalition. Although it was originally conceived of as a revolutionary party, towards the end of the war the PCI decided that there was no chance of achieving communism through revolution in Italy, and the then leader, Togliatti, joined the government and signed the traditional oath of allegiance to the king. The present PCI leadership stress their belief that every country should be allowed to develop its own form of communism without interference from foreign powers. This has led them into bitter confrontation with the Soviet leadership, with whom relations could hardly be worse. The PCI is thus a 'Eurocommunist'

party rather than a 'Soviet communist' one, in distinction to some other Communist Parties in Europe, for instance those in Denmark and West Germany, which still adhere to Soviet policies and promote peace movements affiliated to the World Peace Council. It might be fair to say that the position of the PCI on the installation of cruise missiles is broadly similar to that of the Dutch and Belgian Labour Parties. After preliminary debates in parliament in October and December 1979, when the ruling coalition approved the new missiles, the PCI asked the government to take the initiative of requesting NATO countries to postpone the decision for at least six months, to give the USSR time to consider a suspension of SS20 installations. There is a parallel with our own Labour Party also in that although the PCI have been responsible for mobilising enormous numbers of supporters at the big demonstrations in Rome and Comiso and elsewhere, they are still regarded with caution by many non-aligned peace movement activists, both for their failure to take a clear-cut unilateralist stance, and as a major parliamentary party which might turn out in the final analysis to be more interested in gaining power in government than in stopping the missiles. In this respect it seems that the quality of opposition to be found amongst local political leaders of the PCI varies considerably from region to region. I mention this because the major tension in the Italian peace movement arises from conflict between established parties of the traditional left and politically non-aligned groups, mainly adhering to pacifist traditions. Italy has a strong movement of conscientious objectors, which struggled hard for many years to win the right to opt out of military service. (Since 1972 it has been legal for young Italians to choose an alternative form of civil service, rather than bear arms, for their obligatory year of national service.)

ii

The political parties opposing deployment of cruise in Italy are the PCI, PdUP (Partito di Unità Proletaria), some small independent left-wing groups and the Partito Radicale. The Radicals, however, refuse to join a PCI dominated alliance, maintaining that the Communists' sudden interest in

disarmament is hypocritical. The Partito Radicale is consistent in that throughout the '70s they campaigned actively against nuclear arms and against compulsory military service. Recently they organised a plebiscite in Avetrana, near Apulia, where 80% of the population turned out, and a stunning 98.8% voted against the construction of a nuclear power plant.

There is as yet no single unifying body in the peace movement in Italy. Peace activities have been carried out by a proliferation of local groups, some dominated by the political parties, others of a more pacifist or religious orientation. At the time of the large demonstration in Rome in October 1981 a group called the 'October 24th Committee' was formed, which is perhaps the nearest thing to a representative committee presently existing, but the breadth of its membership seems to prevent it from taking up clear-cut positions, and it has therefore tended to become a co-ordinating body for the organisation of large demonstrations, rather than a unified secretariat capable of operating on all political levels against nuclear re-armament. The Trades Unions have been fairly sluggish in offering support, although the local T.U. federation in Sicily now opposes the base. The Catholic Church has also been backward in offering support, with the exception of certain individual bishops. However, the Christian Workers Association (ACLI), with a majority of Catholic members, has consistently opposed the base, both in the Sicilian region and nationally. After the 11th October demonstration at Comiso their National Secretary, Domenico Rosato, wrote an angry letter to the management of RAI TV complaining that while the RAI news report was dismissing the demonstration as a Communist conspiracy the ACLI banner was passing right across the screen! Also worthy of mention is ARCI (Italian Recreational and Cultural Association), a nationwide organisation with over 1,000,000 members drawn from the left which operates courageously in many parts of Italy on a whole variety of issues, and has frequently given invaluable help to the peace movements.

These patterns operate in Sicily, broadly speaking, as elsewhere; however, although members of the Sicilian Regional Assembly generally follow party discipline in formal motions of the Assembly, there are many Socialists

and even Christian Democrats who personally oppose the base and who support the peace movement.

i

THE CAMPAIGN

From 1952 until 1978 Comiso voted for a left-wing council with a Communist mayor. The present council, which is currently supporting the base, is a coalition of Socialists, Christian Democrats, Republicans, Liberals and Social Democrats, with a Socialist mayor. When the first rumours went around that Comiso had been chosen as a missile base (in April '81) this council voted unanimously in favour of an 'ordine di giorno' rejecting the base. However, after the official announcement party discipline prevailed and the Socialist mayor made an about-turn to support the base.

Shortly after the official announcement, on August 7th 1981, CUDIP (Comitato Unitario per il Disarmo e la Pace) was formed, with representatives from Comiso, Ragusa, Pachino, Catania and Palermo. The president of the Committee is Giacomo Cagnes, who was the mayor of Comiso for most of the twenty six year period preceeding the new administration. The first project which CUDIP undertook was to organise a demonstration at Comiso on 11th October. They expected about 10,000 people, and got about 35,000. The press was relatively uninterested, but the government were so alarmed that a month later they sent a high-ranking official of the Christian Democrat Party, complete with hired pop-group, to try and talk them out of it. About a thousand people turned up. The Hon. Piccoli compared the demonstrators to 'The geese of Capitol Hill, stupid beasts who cackle pointlessly'. CUDIP pointed out that it was the geese of Capitol Hill who, in 390 B.C. awakened sleeping sentries thereby saving Rome from being taken by the besieging Gauls. The Hon. Piccoli scratched his head and went home.

ii

Guidelines

After the success of the October demonstration, CUDIP set up a permanent office in Palermo, with the aim both of

developing a documentation centre, and also internationalising the campaign in Comiso by bringing it to the attention of the growing peace movements elsewhere in Europe. On December 6th members of CUDIP attended a working group in Brussels on 'local opposition to nuclear arms: the Comiso example'. It's worthwhile listing the conclusions of this working group here, because they have an important bearing on the way the campaign has run so far, and may run in the future:

a) The peace movement should internationalise itself; exchange information; co-ordinate timetables for international demonstrations; develop adequate strategies for mass communications (getting the national press to report on events in other countries); practise international solidarity in situations of crisis.
b) Above all it is important that the resistance should arise from the local population. Any activity or action in the locality should be co-ordinated together with them.
c) Resistance must always commence in a non-violent fashion if we wish to leave open the possibility of following through to success. In Comiso this resistance, particularly in the final stages, must be internationalised to avoid being marginalised and suffocated as a purely regional conflict.
d) To achieve the cancellation, or at least the suspension of the cruise missiles at Comiso is of great importance, not just for Comiso and for Italy, but for the whole of Europe.
e) The petition for the cancellation of the base must be signed at an international level. The population of Comiso must know that they are not being isolated
f) The movement at Comiso in Sicily needs a permanent office of information. The possibility of an international fund-raising effort should be investigated.
g) It is essential that Comiso support committees should appear in Europe, not instead of the European peace movement, but as a part of it.[4]

Above all it is important that resistance should arise from the local population.

This point has been made to me many times in conversation with CUDIP members, both in Palermo and Comiso. The population of Comiso are by no means apathetic about the

construction of the missiles base. Two-thirds of them signed the petition which called for the cancellation of the base. Press coverage of the campaign is now fairly extensive, even if frequently inaccurate. Everyone in Comiso has an opinion about the base, and the local propaganda battle is fierce. If there is an enemy here it is not apathy, but quiet despair; the feeling that this has been decided in Rome and that nothing can be done about it. Hence the importance which CUDIP attaches to the internationalisation of the campaign. Since there are so many local political conflicts in Italy, and so many strikes and demonstrations, they believe that the only way to make central government sit up and take notice, and at the same time relieve the people of Comiso of their feeling of isolation in confrontation with Rome, is to attract international solidarity and pressure. But this international support is not, and cannot be, a substitute for a well-organised local campaign. A problem arises here, because Italy does not have a single powerful umbrella movement such as, for example, CND in Britain. Hence there is a tendency for individual groups to arrange actions in isolation without co-ordinating their efforts with other groups. This obviously can lead to dissipation of resources, particularly when rival groups start trying to canvass international solidarity for their actions.

iii

Sources of Opposition

There are several interwoven strands in the local opposition to the base. Of course the fear of becoming involved in another World War is a very important determinant. Sicilians with memories of the Allied air attacks on Palermo and Comiso were not amused when the 'Trinacria 2' exercise last November exploded hypothetical H-bombs over Palermo and Catania. Perhaps a more immediate source of opposition amongst this population (as yet largely uneducated in the niceties of 'counterforce' doctrines, etc.) is their fear of the effect which a large influx of US service people would have on their lives in terms of the importation of the drug trade, prostitution and organised crime into an area which has hitherto been mafia-free. A third very important determining

feature is the knowledge that the building of the base will involve the expropriation of large areas of highly fertile land. In Sardinia, for instance, bases once established have shown an alarming tendency to grow and grow, so much so that they have now swallowed up 9.2% of the island, and the authorities have taken to closing large areas of the coast to fishermen for months at a time so that naval exercises can be carried out with live ammunition.

If the Sicilian people now have to confront mafia interests in relation to the various construction contracts relating to the base, their dilemma is partly the result of an earlier struggle over land rights, in the late '40s and early fifties. At that time a fierce campaign of land occupations was carried on, mainly dominated by the PCI, in an attempt to break up an archaic form of land distribution persisting from the Roman occupation whereby large estates known as 'latifondi' were parcelled out to the peasant farmers at exhorbitant rents by 'gabelloti'—middle men who were often also mafiosi. The result of the campaigns was the setting up of an agency for land reform, which, while not highly successful from the peasants' point of view, had the effect of persuading the rural mafia to sell up their country estates and move into the cities, putting the proceeds of the sales into urban activities such as building and the drug trade. For many Sicilians, the struggles against the mafia, and landlords and the missiles appear as parts of a single battle with roots going back into the nineteenth century and beyond. Latter-day poets who arrive in Comiso obsessed with the fate of Aeschylus are often not equipped to appreciate this immediately, which is why it is so important that activities carried out in the area should be co-ordinated with the local peace movement, who know the population they are dealing with, and not simply imposed from outside.

iv

For the most part, the points outlined in the conclusions to the Brussels working group have been taken up with exemplary efficiency. Although the Dutchman Laurens Hogebrink, in a report on a visit to Sicily in October '81 described himself as 'the first representative of the new peace

movement north of the Alps to visit Comiso',[5] the town has since been visited by representatives of the IKV (Dutch Interchurch Peace Council), CND, END, Pax Christi, Die Grünen, Le Cun du Larzac, SCAT and many other groups. Comiso support groups have appeared in many countries, including West Germany and Holland. A petition was launched, calling for the cancellation of the base, and on April 4th a second large demonstration attracted between 50 and 100,000 people, making it the largest demonstration seen in Sicily since the war.

The response of the authorities to the April 4th demonstration was to announce, a few days before the event, that a contract had been finally awarded for the clearing of the site at Magliocco, and that work would begin, officially, on April 5th. The night before the demonstration, 1,000 carabinieri spent the night at the base for fear of a preventative occupation by the protesters. Eventually the work was put back a few days, to allow people who had come from other parts of Italy to disperse.

Throughout April, peaceworkers all over Sicily collected signatures for the Comiso petition.

> After months of silence, the decision of the Italian government to install cruise missiles in one of the most productive zones of Sicily has become official.
>
> The opposition of the population and their legitimate representatives, never consulted, has been of no avail.
>
> In the Paris Peace Treaty (1947), it is explicitly forbidden to use Sicily for military ends.
>
> We ask that the decision to install missile bases at Comiso be revoked.

On April 29th, to intensify the campaign several members of CUDIP went on hunger strike. The day after they started their fast the head of the regional PCI in Sicily, Pio la Torre, was shot by the mafia in Palermo along with his driver Rosario di Salvo. At their funeral in Palermo on May 3rd his deputy and successor, Luigi Colajanni, pledged that the Sicilian PCI would carry on the struggle against the mafia and the missiles; Ninni Guccione of ACLI said 'Those whom in Sicily, try and spark off powerful new unitarian processes like

La Torre did, can now expect this sentence of death'. While the funeral was going on, members of CUDIP were passing through the huge crowd in the Piazza Politeama collecting signatures for the petition.

By about the beginning of June, the petition had reached its target of one million signatures. The hunger strike was called off after the strikers achieved their demand of audiences with the head of the Regional Assembly, Salvatore Lauricello, and Prime Minister Spadolini. So far only the audience with Lauricello has taken place, though it achieved little result since Lauricello himself is well known to be against the base and has expressed his views openly. The signatures were handed in to the Regional Assembly, and then taken to Rome by a deputation en route to the Brussels Convention. A special session of the Sicilian Regional Assembly was called, but disappointingly voted again in favour of the base. Twenty-nine deputies, including Lauricello, absented themselves rather than vote.

i

THE MAFIA

The death of Pio la Torre was a blow to the peace movement in Sicily. He had been a leading supporter and campaigner in the fight against the base since his return to Sicily to lead the regional PCI some eight months earlier. It's unlikely that his involvement with the peace movement was the primary motive for the murder. He was a dedicated opponent of the mafia, and had served on the anti-mafia commission in Rome. At the time of his death he was said to be preparing investigations into the bank accounts of suspected mafiosi, and it was mainly due to pressure from la Torre and the PCI that the Rome government had agreed to send a powerful new police chief, General Carlo Alberto Dalla Chiesa, to Palermo to lead investigations into the mafia.

As a Sicilian, born in Palermo just a few hundred yards from where he was murdered, la Torre had been involved in the land occupations in the early fifties, even serving a spell in prison as a result. Many newspapers, reporting on his death, made a connection between the date of his assassination and that of the massacre of Portella della Ginestra on the

1st of May 1947, when peasants celebrating a recent left-wing election victory were machine-gunned by bandits on the orders of the mafia. It may not be too far-fetched to suppose that the choice of timing for the murder was intended as a deliberate warning to the new rapidly growing mass movement not to oppose mafia interests in the base. Crowds at la Torre's funeral chanted:

La Torre has been killed, the missiles have already been fired.

ii

The mafia pose real problems for the peace movement in Sicily, not just in terms of assassinations and direct physical threats, but because they can also make life difficult for anything or anyone that they don't like by means of 'ambiente', pressure applied through a complicated system of social contacts which can include the police, tax inspectorate, or local government. When a number of Sicilian peace groups decided they wanted to set up a peace camp near Magliocco airport they were unable to find a site because local farmers were too frightened to let them on the land; it was rumoured that some of them had been threatened with dynamite. Eventually the peace camp was set up in late July, in the nearby nuclear-free zone of Vittoria, 10 kilometres from the base.

iii

I was in Palermo on September 3rd of this year, and I went to visit an anti-mafia documentation centre called the 'Centro Giuseppe Impastato', after a member of the Italian new left who was killed by the mafia several years ago. The director of the centre, Dr Umberto Santini, took me afterwards to eat in an open air pizzeria owned and run by Impastato's brother Giovanni. While we were eating, two men came over to our table and told us that General Dalla Chiesa and his wife had just been shot in the centre of Palermo.

At his first meeting with journalists after he arrived to take up his new post Dalla Chiesa had recalled Pio la Torre's involvement in the land reform struggles over thirty years before, adding:

> I also was there on those fields of Corleone, fighting banditry and the mafia.

Less than five months later, in a dimly lit square behind the Piazza Politeana he found himself following la Torre through the same doorway into history.

COMISO '82–'83

Comiso has now become a prime focus of interest for the European peace movements, who believe that a victory here could make deployment of the new missiles in West Germany politically very difficult, thus perhaps holding up the missiles altogether.

The campaign on the ground in Comiso itself is still in a rudimentary stage of organisation. The peace camp has moved from Vittoria and found a temporary site in an olive-grove about half a mile from the base, and some non-violent actions have begun in an attempt to block traffic and obstruct the works. These have achieved some success; for instance the construction work on the site, due to start on September 1st had to be put back several days when the campers organised a sit-in. However, these actions have mainly involved young people from other parts of Italy and Europe, without much support from the local population. During the next year CUDIP will be appointing a full-time organiser in Comiso. Fundraising efforts are being stepped up, and funds are arriving from Comiso support groups in different parts of Europe and America. An appeal has been launched to buy a piece of land for a permanent international peace camp, though it is possible that owing to the difficulties of maintaining such a camp in the area the plan may eventually be commuted into the establishment of a peace centre in Comiso itself. Conditions for the development of a strong mass-movement seem good. The local population are fundamentally opposed to the base. They spend time in the streets and the piazzas talking to each other, they are curious of strangers. However, the organisational task of realising this potential is formidable. Before the September 1st blockade the peace campers arranged a meeting with some peasant farmers; none of them came. At the blockade itself there

were only 200 people, about half of them foreigners. The town council have taken to describing the campers as 'pacifisti' and 'filosovietichi'.

Here also pressure and support from the international peace movements can have a helpful effect. We need to assist the Italian peace movement in its struggle to develop a unified structure, both by encouraging those peace workers in Italy who are currently working on the possibility of creating a CND type structure in that country, and also by locating the reliable and established local committees and suggesting that they act as clearing houses for actions planned on an international scale. In this way some of the diverse groups might be encouraged to co-operate more closely and much waste of time and effort could be spared.

A Comiso support group has been recently formed in the UK, and would welcome enquiries and support. Details from END.

GOING TO COMISO

A member of CUDIP in Palermo once gave me an excellent single-sentence description of Sicily:

> 'Sicily is very far away', he said, 'and very expensive to get to.'

Palermo is further from London than Warsaw or Belgrade, or the Straits of Gibraltar. However, there is a good air link and many cheap flights operate for the benefit of Sicilians living and working in this country. It should be possible to get a return flight to Palermo or Catania for around £140, even in the high season. If at first you don't succeed, try again, because there are lots of charter firms operating them. END may be able to assist with advice. If going overland remember that Italian trains are very cheap (though unbearably crowded in high season). To take a bus to Milan or Rome and then travel to Catania by train would probably cost about £100 return. There are also ferry services to the island. Boats leave several times a week from Genova, taking 24 hours to travel down the West coast of Italy (cost about £20 each way for a foot passenger) and a daily ferry service leaves Naples each evening at 8.30 p.m., crossing in 10 hours

to Palermo. There are regular shuttle flights from Rome also, cost about £65 return. Alitalia in London keep timetables, and take bookings for these flights. Up-to-date train and ferry timetables are kept by the *Italian State Tourist Department, 201 Regent Street, London W1 (tel: 01-439 2311).*

Buses run twice a day from Palermo Piazza Marina to Comiso, every day except Sunday and bank holidays; 6.30 a.m. and 2.50 p.m. The cost is about £3.50. Buses run from Catania, Piazza Patro Massimo at 10 a.m., 1.30 p.m. and 6.30 p.m., Sundays and bank holidays 1.30 p.m. only.

There may be a camp-site at Comiso or there may not; efforts are being made to continue the peace camp, but it is possible that hostile pressures may cause it to be abandoned. Best check the state of play with END in London or CUDIP in Palermo before going.

And finally, I have been asked to remind you that Comiso is a quiet town in an as yet unspoiled rural area which follows a traditional pattern of life which is quite alien to visitors coming from the insalubrious conurbations of Northern Europe. For a maximum of worthwhile contact and effective discourse with the local population, a minimum of hippy gear is required.

NOTES

1. 'Stranamore-Lagorio in Sicilia'–Gianluigi Cortese *Pace e Guerra,* No. 3, January, 1982.
2. 'L'American compra la Sicilia per uso nucleare'–Franco Tintori, *Paese Sera,* 6 August, 1982.
3. 'Per il Disarmo'–Francesco Rutelli edizione *Gammalibri,* July, 1982.
4. Quoted from CUDIP bulletin No. 1, 'Elements for an analysis of the situation in Comiso', (available in English from END).
5. Memorandum on a visit to the new peace movement in Sicily, October, 1981, Laurens Hogebrink (IKV).



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The independent Hungarian peace movement is interested in receiving materials and visits from Western peace activists. They are particularly interested in opening correspondence with schools and universities peace movements, but they cannot at this stage be deluged with visits and correspondence. If you wish to exchange letters, please write in the first place to: Andrew White, 41 Hodford Road, London NW11 8NL.

The symbol and badge of the New Hungarian Peace Movement

ERRATUM

Page 50
Sentence beginning "And this would bring about..." *should read:*

And this would bring about, as no kind of provocation but as a normal event, the entire withdrawal of foreign military presence and bases, first from Central Europe (including West Germany), and next from our continent: to be specific, of Soviet forces and bases from East Europe and of American forces and bases from the West.

FOREWORD

'Does a genuinely autonomous peace movement actually exist in Hungary?', Ferenc Köszegi asks in the first of his two important articles in this pamphlet. The answer is a confident 'yes'. But its existence and operation have to be understood in terms of a set of conditions which are very different from those to which we are accustomed in the Western peace movement. Some of these conditions apply with equal force to all societies over on the 'other side' of the East/West divide. Others are peculiar to Hungarian national circumstances and to the comparatively 'liberal' and flexible stance of the Hungarian authorities.

These conditions take a little time to understand. The Western peace movement ought not to expect an instant adoption of its own recipes or forms of activity in the East. Köszegi provides the best possible guide for our understanding, and his thoughtful accounts are intended to provoke 'dialogue' between our movements, not instant identity.

All the same, a little background explanation will be helpful. In a further important article* Ferenc Köszegi and István Szent-Iványi discuss the 'Struggle around an Idea' which underlies the new movement:

> This is the first time in decades that the two halves of Europe have interested themselves so much in each other. We have not met with such a degree of interest for a long time. This interest is more than simple curiosity. Those West Europeans who are beginning a dialogue are tied to living relations with East Europeans, since no serious result in the field of the peace campaign can be reached without cooperation. And, if 'the waves of the peace movement stop at the gates of Vienna', then, after a time, this will mean that Western movements have been in vain; it will prove that in Eastern Europe there is no genuine desire for spontaneous movements.

* *New Society*, 21 & 28th October, 1982 (offprints available from END office).

> In the last analysis it will vindicate those who have maintained, from the start, that the single and exclusive aim of peace movements is the weakening of the defensive capacity of the West. . .

But it is in the nature of most communist societies, with a centralised political and ideological life, that there should only be a marginal space permitted to autonomous activities: 'spontaneity' itself may be suspected (around whatever issue) since it might pass beyond centralised Party control. This has applied also in the area of 'peace movements': that is, official Peace Committees or Councils (normally affiliated to the World Peace Council) might be founded upon the genuine desire of the people for peace, but their work should be seen as that of engaging in informal diplomatic relations with Western opinion. Such an official Council might perhaps be compared with Chatham House (in certain of its activities): that is, a semi-official institution, sometimes a forum for informal and flexible discussion, but essentially existing to forward the diplomatic aims of one side only, and without any pretence to autonomy or spontaneity.

These organisations (Köszegi and Svent-Iványi argue) had come to receive the 'suspicion of citizens' and this evoked a 'neutral social attitude' to the peace movement at the time of the first Cold War:

> In the Peoples' Democracies of Eastern Europe, the peace movement had fundamentally discredited itself by the end of the forties and the beginning of the fifties. At that time, instead of the neutral term 'peace movement' the expression used was 'peace struggle', which was intended to camouflage the scarcely-concealed preparations in expectation of a Third World War. Gradually the militant 'peace struggle' lost its original meaning and became a euphemism for armament, expansion and a policy of intimidation. The term further lost significance and credibility because, with the passing of time, it was used in relation to everything. Everywhere it was used in a manner which radically distorted its original meaning—a familiar example is the rhyme:
>
> Collect your scrap, your iron send:
> With these too your peace defend!

Köszegi and Szent-Iványi give an unflattering account of the response of certain official Councils to the new peace movements in the West. In some countries these Peace Committees were regarded only as 'transmission belts of state or Party policy'. The purest, 'almost ideal-type form' of such an official movement is taken from Romania:

> On the first of November 1981 a national campaign against armaments was launched. Quickly, throughout the country, in every factory, workshop, state farm and office 'mass meetings' were held in line with the published directives. These sharply condemned the arms race and forwarded their resolutions to the Party's central organs. The national campaign was concluded, on December 6th, with a huge rally. . . The personal composition of the delegations was decided after careful deliberation by the institute, factory, workshop and state farm Party committees. Although participation at the rally was only on the basis of personal invitation or as a member of one of the delegations, the security forces were represented in large numbers. In all, 300,000 people gathered in Bucharest's Republic Square and listened to the Party Secretary, N. Ceausescu's, thirty-five minute speech.

In Hungary the political and ideological climate is altogether less centralised and repressive. There is more space for discussion and even for autonomous initiatives. The Hungarian National Peace Council has shown more flexibility, both in response to the movement stirring among Hungary's youth and to the Western peace movement. This has opened a space in which the new independent peace movement is arising. It is a movement of the young, which is in dialogue both with the official Peace Council and with the non-aligned peace movements (like CND, END and IKV) in the West. It is a sensitive and difficult space since, as Köszegi and Szent-Iványi write, 'the centres of power are constantly filled with alarm at the possibility that a peace movement. . . beyond their control might have a magnetic effect on oppositional elements, and might, in time, become a centre of opposition'. Moreover, the tenderness of the authorities towards this development results from the fear that an opposition could spring up under the 'guise' of officially-supported goals:

> Such an initiative would put the respective governments in a most uncomfortable position, because, while on the one hand they very much agree with and support every Western peace movement, and recognise their demands as legitimate, they could not be so indulgent towards the wishes of a spontaneous domestic peace movement, if only because of the ties of their alliances.

The new peace movement, then, is arising in an extremely sensitive situation, within a delicate balance of both internal and external forces. It is well that the Western peace movement should appreciate this, and not rush into the space with amateurish enthusiasm. The wisest heads in the new peace movement (and they are very wise) are fully aware of the precarious position which the new movement occupies. This is one of the questions which Ferenc Köszegi writes to us about.

He writes with complete openness. Everything is placed on the table without reserve. Hungary is a remarkably open society, today, in terms of the ideas which circulate widely in discussion groups, in the universities, in the schools. There is a delicate line between activities which are 'semi-legal'– that is, ideas and causes which may be canvassed informally, in small groups, but which may not be fully expressed in public meetings or in print; and 'semi-illegal' activities, which are regarded by the authorities as 'oppositional', such as *samizdat* (unauthorised duplicated publication, circulating usually in a few copies only) or 'underground university' lectures. 'Semi-illegal' activities may meet the harrassment and interference of various kinds from the authorities. (An excellent survey of the current state of the 'democratic opposition' in Hungary (by Bill Lomax) will be found in *Labour Focus on Eastern Europe,* summer 1982.)

This democratic opposition includes many distinguished writers and intellectuals, some of whom are also anxious for a dialogue with the Western peace movement: a *two*-sided dialogue, of course, in which their own proposals are listened to with care. I am especially grateful to my friend, Miklos Hirásti, the writer, and to Laszlo Rajk. An example of a (sharp) peace initiative of their own will be seen below, p. 32. There are many other names and voices in Hungary's plural discourse, and there is a vibrant political and artistic

life in Budapest. One other important voice, long in dialogue with us in the West, is Mr András Hegëdus, the former Prime Minister, now a widely-respected independent, and a signatory to the original END Appeal. While I was in Budapest my lecture on 'Beyond the Cold War' was published in semi-illegal *samizdat.*

There are some differences as to policies and strategies within this new discourse. That is what we should expect: it is the same over here. These are discussed by Köszegi. They are differences in which we should not intervene, and they will be settled much better without us. They lie along the official/unofficial and the 'semi-legal'/'semi-illegal' hairline.

Andrew White of Cambridge END and I went to Budapest in late September, on the particular invitation of the 'Peace Group for Dialogue'. We did not wear cloaks and we did not carry daggers. Other visitors from END and IKV had preceded us. We went on a perfectly normal visit to exchange views with fellow workers for peace, and we made it clear that we wished to talk with anyone, official or unofficial, who shared our objectives. Although the authorities might have preferred it if our visit had been under the auspices of the official Peace Council, relations were courteous and proper and no difficulties were placed in our way. I found it to be a good deal easier to enter and leave Hungary than I sometimes find it to be to enter the United States.

After four days Andrew and I were in no doubt whatsoever about the reality of the new peace movement in Hungary. We were surprised, above all, by two things. First, the extraordinary and rising support among young people, many of whom wear the CND or other 'Western' peace badges (but CND's is now universal). This dramatic mood of peace– and desire to communicate with us in the West–is perhaps strongest of all in the secondary schools, in the age-group 14 to 18. Second, the remarkable knowledge and the mature judgment of our hosts in the Peace Group for Dialogue. Ferenc Köszegi himself, and his wife, Borbála, are both young graduates (specialising one in history and the other in problems of the mentally-retarded); others are graduates

and students, school students, young artists, and young working people. They have total dedication to our common work for peace, and great organising flair. Fuller accounts of the new movement will be published in the November *END Bulletin* and successive numbers. These are our sisters and our brothers, and in the next year or two, we will come to know them well. They are in the very front place, and the most exposed place, of our European work for peace. They have adopted the principle of complete openness. We were proud to bring back the new badge of the movement (which appears on our cover) in our lapels.

The badge shows the CND badge in Hungarian colours in the form of two clasped hands. One hand is theirs: the other is our own. And I must explain one little incident which took place while in Budapest which in the hands of certain Western correspondents might have been made into some cold war 'drama'. I had been invited by the group to give a public lecture while in Budapest, and (somewhat to my surprise) it was suggested that I might take up themes from 'Beyond the Cold War'. I readily agreed, and the authorities in the University kindly signified that a lecture-theatre would be available. But on arrival in Budapest it turned out that there were difficulties in obtaining a public place for the lecture. I had more than one discussion with officials and members of the National Peace Council, in which they kindly invited me to give the lecture, but on their own premises and before an invited audience. I was, of course, willing to accept their invitation: but (as I explain in the lecture) I felt obliged, by commitments made in my writings and before audiences of the peace movement in West Europe, to say that I could only do so if I was also permitted to give the lecture, under the auspices of my hosts, in a public place.

In the event the arrangement proved to be impossible. I met with no discourtesy and relations with the Peace Council were proper: more than that, I was entertained by them to an excellent lunch at which we had a very frank and unreserved exchange of views. But our friends in the independent peace movement still wished the lecture to take place, even if a public place could not be obtained. I therefore

delivered it, through the great hospitality of one of Hungary's leading novelists, Mr George Konrád, in his private apartment. Despite the somewhat short notice (only two hours) some eighty attended the lecture—mainly young people—which was in any case as many as could occupy the floor-space of our generous hosts.

I wish to emphasise that this was not a dramatic or furtive event but one which we considered to be perfectly *normal*. It is normal and right that peace people in every part of Europe should find each other and enter into dialogue. If certain among the authorities were uneasy about my lecture, then I recall that there are authorities on this side—including within the BBC—who have shown unease also. Our hosts suggested that my lecture be included in this pamphlet, not because they agreed with all parts of it, but because this will symbolise the new stage of 'dialogue', the two clasped hands.

E.P.T.

Ferenc Köszegi

THE MAKING OF THE NEW PEACE MOVEMENT IN HUNGARY

by Ferenc Köszegi

Does a genuinely autonomous peace movement actually exist in Hungary? In posing this question it must be borne in mind that it would be misleading to apply West European standards to the Hungarian situation. The peace movement in Hungary must be thought of in terms of small cell-groups in various universities and secondary schools, which may be only very loosely organised, if at all. Unfortunately the lines of communication between these groups have been tenuous at best. Whether these small cell-groups can be organised into a movement will have to depend mostly on indigenous initiatives. But support from the peace movement in the West can also be of decisive importance.

An interlocking system of common interests between East and West can and must be strengthened. As Tony Benn has said: '. . . unless Europe can get together it could easily be sucked into the global power struggle now intensifying between the USA and the USSR, perhaps triggered off by events as far apart as Afghanistan or El Salvador. It will take a long time for Europeans to identify and develop a basis of cooperation strong enough to supersede the present pattern of division, suspicion and hostility.'[1] If this goal is to be achieved, the new East-European peace movement could play a very significant role.

I

Representatives of some small peace-oriented cell-groups, along with other individuals, held a little 'conference' on June 12th of this year in Budapest. The main topic under discussion was the question of attending and participating in the forthcoming Vienna Festival. Other items crystallised around two other issues: our attitude toward the 'official'

peace movement, and our need for a comprehensive discussion of our future plans.

As would be expected, there were dissenting voices in regard to the very possibility of a new peace movement in Hungary. Those expressing this opinion felt that the role of these groups was simply to act as a catalyst for complaints about the condition in East Europe and would be likely to end in some sort of theatrical demonstration, showing the world once more that freedom of choice does not exist here. Such views naturally deflated some of the enthusiasm, but these opinions have neither been ignored nor silenced. We are trying very hard to find a balance between those who are more enthusiastic and those who, for theoretical reasons, regard the idea of a new peace movement with extreme reserve. We have agreed to practise among ourselves the spirit of the *Berlin Appeal*, where it states that:

> . . . the question of peace [must] be discussed in an atmosphere of tolerance and recognition of the right of free expression. Every spontaneous public expression of the desire for peace should be supported and encouraged.[2]

Although it would not be right to speak of a new peace 'movement' in the normal sense of that term, the phenomenon is spreading rapidly and is strong enough already to be a main topic in intellectual discussion in Hungary.

Various names have sprung up to describe this new movement, and it is difficult to tell where they come from. The new peace movement is called unofficial, non-official, autonomous, spontaneous, grass roots, dissident, oppositionist. These names carry with them a strong flavour of political prejudice, and even the desire to manipulate. In an over-politicised society, the label given to an infant phenomenon can be of great importance in terms of public attitude, at home and abroad, towards it, as well as the type of persons who will gravitate towards it once it comes into the public eye. In the present circumstances, the simple designation, 'new peace movement', is perhaps the most value-neutral, and therefore the best term to employ in describing the various social forces which are gathering themselves together

under the banner of peace.

The religious and secular elements in this movement are in agreement that nuclear catastrophe is our greatest enemy. In spite of differences of religious and/or political beliefs, a moral consensus has asserted itself as to the need for joint action to prevent nuclear war.

Most interesting is the age of the participants. Those who are most active, enthusiastic, and almost naively candid in their opinions are the 14 to 20 year age group. This age group shoulders almost exclusively the initiative in the new peace movement. At the university level there are only small groups involved, while the majority remain indifferent. In the secondary and trade schools, however, there is a flurry of activity which is gaining momentum increasingly.

An example of this is the Anti-Nuclear Campaign Hungary (ANC), a group organised about a year ago in the secondary schools. This organisation has about 100–150 card-carrying members, who have been making their views known through leaflets, drawings, badges, etc. They are genuinely a spearhead in the peace movement. Even the Communist Party daily *Népszabadság* has published one of their placards.[2] They are gaining popularity among the young because they are truly a spontaneous and independent group. They have a loose organisational framework whose mechanisms are open to inspection. They have many active provincial branches.

The ANC is presently seeking an appropriate connection with the official Hungarian nation-wide Peace Council, which, quite frankly, has lost touch with the common person, as is indicated by the formation of the ANC itself. At the above-mentioned 'conference' one ANC founding member stated that their immediate goal was the abolition of nuclear weapons, but that a long-term goal was the abolition of all weapons. The anti-militarist thrust of the ANC is apparent in their slogan 'Let's Melt the Weapons!'. The ANC is one very important element in what we are here calling the new peace movement.

There are other independent actions in the secondary schools having no relation to the ANC, although these actions are usually short-lived. A central problem is that the spontaneous enthusiasm quickly becomes institutionalised,

which also explains much of the lack of interest in the universities. The response to official lukewarmness in the secondary schools shows a marked tendency toward radicalisation.

There are a few universities in which this new movement is gaining strength. These are mostly the Arts universities where students are perhaps most sensitive and where they have closer connection with the West. There are some contradictions in this movement however, which will be looked at later.[4]

The new movement in Hungary has had two distinct branches. The first branch, in the schools, we have touched on above. Now we must look briefly at the second branch, that of the religious groups involved. Some of this we have touched on in the paper cited above (see note 4). Since the writing of that paper there have been some new developments, and new information has become available.

While the student movement has been dealing exclusively with disarmament, the religious groups, called *base communities,* have been concerned mainly with militarism in general. Having first appeared in the sixties, the base communities are spreading in Hungary. There are now about 300 such communities, each numbering about 30–40 persons. They are against military conscription and are seeking a civilian alternative to military service. They are truly pacifist, and are popular especially among the Catholic laity. Until now, alternative civilian service is available only to small religious groups in Hungary (Nazarines, Jehovah's Witnesses) and there is no precedent for such service being offered to mainline denominations.

The founder of the base community movement in Hungary is György Bulányi, and he has many followers, mostly among young Catholics. There are priests involved in this movement, but the higher clergy have several times condemned their activities. At least one priest, Laszlo Kovács, was condemned by his superiors for his anti-militarist sermons.

These base communities follow the non-violent philosophy of Gandhi and Martin Luther King.

At present there is no relationship between these base

communities and other peace groups. One reason for this is that these communities have been primarily interested in religious renewal and have not expressed themselves on other problems. But the participation of persons from these base communities in the movement for disarmament is one sign that what is developing in Hungary is a truly comprehensive phenomenon.

II

We will now turn our attention to the pressing problems which face the new peace movement in Hungary. The most pressing is the problem of cooption and manipulation.

There are three important forces which would want to coopt and manipulate the new peace movement. The first is the official Hungarian nation-wide Peace Council. Although this organisation has been relatively successful in the past, it has recently lost influence among the young. When the new wave of peace concern crossed the Hungarian border, the Peace Council was quite bewildered. Their confusion was quickly seen by the youth. It was very disillusioning for the youth representatives when they pressed to organise peace rallies that the Council could not answer until it had consulted with the Communist Party. This crippled the Council's credibility in the eyes of the young.

It is noteworthy that there was in early 1982 a shake-up in the leadership of the Council, and a group of young and enthusiastic persons took control of the helm. But this was too late in terms of the new peace movement, which was already well under way. As a result, the Council had no choice but to try to ally itself to the already existing peace movement.

Nevertheless, it must be said that there are common goals between the Council and the new peace movement: total disarmament, creation of a nuclear-free zone in Europe, and the protest against the deployment of Pershing II and SS-20 missiles. The division is mostly one of methods. The Council is a bit clumsy and bureaucratic, and this turns off the young. It also does not really comprehend the deep anti-militarist sentiments of the youth.

In this year the Council has tried several times to coopt

the initiatives of the young. Students' attempts at organising a spontaneous event always ended in the Council's 'official' sponsorship and institutionalisation of the event. Often the youth could hardly distinguish between what was 'their own' action and what was that of the Council.

There is indeed room for cooperation between the new peace movement and the Peace Council. This can in fact be beneficial to the new movement. But the distinctions must also be held. It may be that, in the end, the appearance of this new movement will accomplish nothing other than the revitalisation of the Peace Council. But then, that already is a result of some worth.

The second manipulating force is the so-called 'opposition' or more exactly, the dissidents. In this connection we refer back to our allusions about the contradictions present in the new movement in the universities. Until now, the dissident or opposition elements have been indifferent to the new movement, and took no significant part in its formation. But lately they have been stirred from that indifference by the fact that it seems that 'the masses' are behind this movement. They hope to enlarge their base by means of this movement. What I am saying here applies only to the Hungarian situation, and is my own observation at that. I am not implying that the same holds true for peace movements in other East-European countries. The attempts of the opposition elements to gain prominent places in the emerging movement could be of great danger to the movement itself. If the movement gets itself identified as being primarily or even secondarily a movement of political opposition, this would surely mean a decline in support for it among the larger population.

The slogan Peace *and* Freedom is a valid one, but not in the sense of political opposition. What is meant in this context by Freedom is the freedom to choose our fate with regards to nuclear destruction. The one link that unites the new peace movement is the desire for an enduring peace. The new movement has developed into a force which cannot be identified with either the Peace Council or with political opposition. It is and must remain an open and public movement, resisting all attempts at cooption and manipulation.

The third force of manipulation is the State itself, or more exactly Hungarian Constitutional Law. As a formally organised group, the new peace movement has no chance of survival. Constitutional rights are elastic, and it is extremely difficult to claim these rights in any given situation. It is for this reason, among others, that we hesitate to speak of a peace 'movement' as such, but continue to speak only of small and loosely organised groups and/or individuals who feel themselves responsible for the cause of peace. In terms of the Hungarian Constitution, even a group like the ANC is on very shaky ground. Until now, the fact that the group has emphasised peace as its main theme has been its sole protection. There has been until now no direct interference from the authorities in the actions of this group, but there is no assurance that this 'hands off' policy will continue.

But since the socialist countries are officially supporting the peace movement in Western countries, it would be most embarrassing if they were to openly prohibit such developments in their own country. Were the government to move against the new peace movement, this would be a great blow to the peace movement in the Western countries as well, giving the forces of militarism a powerful propaganda weapon with which to influence public opinion. This is a very significant example of how there in fact already exists an interlocking relationship between the peace movements East and West.

The greatest danger in terms of manipulation from this third force focuses on its propaganda efforts. This propaganda steadily discredits all peace movements. In terms of this propaganda, only US armaments exist. This one-sidedness is in itself enough to create indifference towards the peace movement in the eyes of the average Hungarian. As an example of this one-sided propaganda, the Hungarian Foreign Minister stated in a recent speech that:

> We have to disintegrate the social base of the militarist circles of imperialism; at the same time we must strengthen those forces which are for peace.

But then he went on to say that:

> . . . it is necessary to increase the effectiveness of the strength of the armed forces of peace.[5]

This whole line of argument is rotten at its roots because it is entirely clear from our past experience that increased military spending only heightens the prospects of war. In reality, it is exactly these forces which are working against peace. This is the theory of deterrence, but as E.P. Thompson has said: '. . . deterrence might itself be defined as the biggest and most expensive lie in history.' In a recent Peace Council publication, a Hungarian Army officer stated that:

> . . . the doctrine of the socialist military is that if the forces of imperialism unleash a war against socialism, it must inescapably be a world war, a crucial and final clash in which the main aim of both regimes would be the total destruction of the other. This war, by its very nature, would be an intercontinental, global and cosmic atomic war.[6]

Yes, it would indeed be a final clash, but hardly a decisive one, since there would be no winner!

In short, the new peace movement must steer clear of all forces which do not themselves have the characteristic of mass support.

III

> We are looking for a political step which can open up new forms of public pressure, and bring into the field of forces new moral resources. Partly this is a matter of ending superpower domination of the most important negotiations.[8]

This statement by Ken Coates states concisely the need to transform the nearly-universal moral and intuitive revulsion against nuclear war and weapons into a political force which will address itself to the powers-that-be. It would be great if this new peace movement could be secure in its own existence.

Let us now summarise briefly.

The peace movement has to formulate its own political profile independent of both the official and the opposition

line. The new movement must take its own stands on the related questions of disarmament, the arms race, and a new economic order with respect to the third world.

The new peace movement has to stand firmly on a pan-European platform. It must seek counterparts in both the East and the West, which could later be expanded between continents. But the transcontinental course is our only course for the time being.

'We must commence to act as if a united, neutral and pacific Europe already exists. We must learn to be loyal, not to "East" or "West", but to each other, and we must disregard the prohibitions and limitations imposed by any national state.'[9]

Third, this transnational course will lead to a renewal in other fields as well. It will help to loosen the ideological rigidity of the East. There is a great demand everywhere in Europe 'for greater openness of exchange, both of persons and of ideas'. In the long run it is not enough only to aim at disarmament. The world is too complex to suppose that disarmament, perhaps the most immediate problem, will suddenly solve every problem we face. The arms race is but one link in the chain, and we must fight equally against fascist and militarist trends. In his *Beyond the Cold War* Thompson states that:

> We have to be, in every moment, critics of the adversary posture of the powers. For we are threatened, not only by weapons, but by the ideological and security structures which divide our continent and which turn us into adversaries.[10]

Beyond this, there are urgent and important tasks facing the new peace movement in Hungary. We must first of all create a communications network between our various groups. At present these connections are tentative. Such continual connections are necessary in order to mobilise public opinion. In this connection it is intolerable that it is not possible to write and publish articles and news-items concerning this new movement. Urgently needed is a newspaper or bulletin to inform, advise, and be a forum for the new movement.

It is extremely important to wage a campaign against the 'blissful ignorance' of the public in terms of the realities of nuclear war. In Hungary this is especially acute. This can be attributed to the fact that Hungarians, like other peoples, do not really believe that they can change things. And besides that, they think that a nuclear death is quick and relatively clean. Paralleling this attitude is a sort of Armageddon mood. In the past, Hungarians have got used to the idea that their fate is decided outside of their own country. It is important therefore to emphasise the role that can be played in the peace processes by small countries. Against the cynics and sceptics, the new peace movement must develop its own trains of thought and reasoning.

This programme is likely to be opposed both by the Council and by the political opposition. But it is only such a broad-based programme that has any chance of success. What I have outlined here of course is not a manifesto. It should rather be seen as a working-paper, open to amendments, additions and deletions.

IV

In the 'conference' mentioned in our opening section of this paper, several proposals were made in the context of Western initiatives. These are as follows:

1. A nuclear-free Eastern Europe as a direct step towards a nuclear-free world.
2. There has been no success with disarmament talks between the blocs. It will be useful then to initiate *individual disarmament* voluntarily. This means that individuals from the blocs would voluntarily disarm themselves, so that for example, one Hungarian soldier would leave the army if one Belgian soldier did the same. It would be a sort of 'soldier's exchange' programme! This would help to emphasise the responsibility of the individual and could be controlled by an international task-force set up for that purpose.
3. Perhaps the cause of peace will be the first opportunity for Europeans to unite themselves into a close partnership. It is urgent to set up a task-force for the purpose of exploiting this opportunity. We expect that our mutual concerns will grow more numerous.

NOTES

1. Tony Benn: *Towards a United Democratic and Socialist Europe,* END Papers Two, Spokesman, 1982, p. 97.
2. *Berlin Appeal.*
3. *Népszabadság,* 1982, May 11.
4. For a closer examination, see Ferenc Köszegi and István Szt. Iványi: 'Struggle Around an Idea', *New Society,* 21 & 28 October, 1982.
5. *Az Enyhülésért,* Scientific Conference in Kecskemét, Budapest 1981, p. 13.
6. E.P. Thompson: *Protest and Survive,* Penguin Books, 1981, p. 19.
7. *A Tudomány felelössége a nukleáris katasztrófa elhárításában,* Országos Béketanács Tudomanyos Bizottsága, Budapest 1982, p. 61.
8. Ken Coates, 'For a Nuclear-free Europe', in Thompson/Smith (eds.) *Protest and Survive,* Penguin Books, 1981, pp. 231–32.
9. E.P. Thompson: *Beyond the Cold War,* Merlin Press, London, 1982, p. 26.
10. *Ibid.,* p. 33.

THE 'PEACE GROUP FOR DIALOGUE' IN HUNGARY

by Ferenc Köszegi

Perhaps there is no other peace movement in Europe, which is as anxious to restrict itself, to hold itself back, or to try to underrate itself as does the new Hungarian peace movement. If other political forces in East Europe should be able to align a similar support, then maybe they might aim for more ambitious objectives.

A few months ago there was only a bare possibility of forming a new peace movement. At that time everybody knew everybody within it, and this was not difficult to do because of the slight interest in this matter. Despite all external difficulties, and despite all the problems of keeping communications, it seems to be fair to say that the new Hungarian peace movement has grown by leaps and bounds into a force which can confer with the state Peace Council on equal terms, which can organise meetings, where leading official and dissident personalities are present together, which can bring together different opinions and groups which in other circumstances would be wholly opposed to each other.

András Hegedús, who was a Prime Minister in the fifties, in one of his recent articles had dealt with this phenomenon at length.[1] (He classifies this new peace movement as 'a constructive force of opposition'; in some respects his analysis fails to make a definitive examination, but his interest is in itself significant.) Austrian and West German journalists are looking for the spokespersons of these new initiatives in order to get some hard information, and there is even a rumour in Hungary that Hungarian (naturally official) newspapers are contemplating publishing some commentary about it.

Yet nothing can be further from the truth or more danger-

ous for the peace groups than to say that everything is running well and that every dark cloud has passed. The new peace movement in Hungary remains on shaky grounds. For all the advantages of the present Hungarian political system in comparison with other socialist countries, there is no guarantee against aggressive intrusion on the part of the authorities. There are also efforts at provocation and some signs of intolerance. Notwithstanding all this, Peace is an invincible slogan and it is worth taking some risks, even by those who otherwise are little interested in political matters.

This sentiment was noticeable amongst those attending a meeting in a private apartment on 23 July 1982, where about 40 representatives of some of the new peace groups, as well as individuals, held a long workshop. Amongst them there were a variety of people, whose presence at the same meeting was of great significance. By the invitation of the organisers there were present: Eva Ancsel (a leading official marxist philosopher), Mr. András Hegedús, Mr. Radnóti Sándor (a well-known dissident in Hungary) and a representative of the state Peace Council. Two members of the East-German 'Schwerter zu Pflugscharen' were also present, an event of great importance.

This was the first attempt to expound the aims and examine the problems of the new Hungarian peace movement, in reaching a broader public opinion in this country. The arrangement of this meeting was also eloquent testimony to the openness and straightforwardness of recent peace initiatives in Hungary. There is no secret organisation, there are no illegal activities: people can convince themselves about it by taking part, there is no condition for participation.

This is our fixed determination, and neither provocations nor persons of ill-will can deter us. Against charges that these new peace groups are consciously or unconsciously parts of the conspiracy of the rancorous imperialist bugbear it would be easy to bring counter-arguments. It is enough to refer to the early fifties, when persons were harshly condemned because they were allegedly agents of world imperialism or of Zionism. After some years they were rehabilitated as national heroes. Perhaps the comparison is excessive, but the analogy is valid.

There are several totally independent peace groups in Hungary, which are maintaining loose contacts with each other, and they lay particular stress on their autonomy. Recently initiatives were taken by them to form a broad platform which endorses the common objectives of these groups. However, no substantial progress was made in this respect. The main cause of this was that the participants did not wish to impose their particular aims and concepts on each other and they tried to continue to work without any tedious consensus. One of the participants at our workshop explained it in this way: 'The only safeguard of our lasting existence is the very diversity amongst us.'

The wide tolerance of disagreements among the representatives of various peace groups was assessed by some participants as a sign of weakness. They wanted some sort of governing body, which would decide every detail and would outline the main lines of common action. (There are interesting similarities with the problems of the Western peace movements as described by E.P. Thompson.[2]) But it would be a serious error to enforce such a universal platform; there are different approaches towards peace, and abstract generalisations might signal the beginning of political one-sidedness. The present flexible heads of agreement serve better as a platform. Sándor Radnóti has discussed this question, too: in his view, amongst intellectuals—in Hungary —there is a tendency to avoid responsibility for giving a definite programme even if they have one. This spiritual dubiety or uncertainty is due to past experiences, and is a logical consequence of present power relations. For nearly 40 years the intellectuals have learnt to hate every directive, every resolution, etc. At the same time this has had a negative effect upon their capacity to give concrete form to their own ideas and aspirations.

Reports about the activities of various groups

It was surprising and at the same time encouraging to hear about the different actions and activities carried out by these peace groups. The Anti-Nuclear Campaign (ANC) for instance has begun to distribute leaflets in the streets against nuclear weapons and they give out flowers with these leaflets. In one

of the so-called green areas of the city (Budapest) they have 'occupied' a park, which they have called 'ANC-park'. They hold their gatherings and meetings there. Their influence amongst youth is steadily growing and they now have a national network. They also seek to establish twinnings in the West with students from secondary schools. (They can exchange badges, posters and other materials.)

It seems fair to say that this organisation is one of the most conspicuous peace groups in East Europe alongside the 'Schwerter zu Pflugscharen'. Even the official representative of the state Peace Council was ready to admit the spontaneity and the candid intentions of this group. 'One has to believe in their commitment'—as Eva Ancsel said.

As regards other representatives of this age-group, they are less organised. Amongst them there are some members of the Communist Youth Organisation (KISZ). Their political standpoint is strictly limited to the issue of Peace: at present they see no direct connections between the arms race, militarism and freedom. However, their point of view is highly respected by others and they are by no means only temporary fellows in this movement. Moreover, it was significant that in informal discussion they have mentioned an interesting fact: when they organised a peace march in early May of this year, the authorities forbade them to invite students from the universities. Their very attendance is evidence of their personal courage.

As for activities at the universities, it was interesting to talk with Eva Ancsel, the leading professor of the Marxist department of Budapest University, who last year sharply condemned the initiative for a peace march. She said at that time: the students from Budapest University in 23 October 1956 forfeited their honour for ever. (In '56 after their march there were serious clashes between insurgents and the security forces.) Now, at this meeting, she had changed her view: she expressed her distrust of the spontaneous character of these initiatives, but at the same time she admitted everybody's right to act for peace.

Eva Ancsel called the attention of the participants to the fact that the Soviet Union is a socialist country, while the United States of America is a capitalist one. She questioned

the motivations behind any peace movement which is not for the existing political balance: for her the preservation of the present *status quo* is pre-eminently necessary –if it must be with nuclear, then with nuclear weapons. 'Yalta is not a matter for debate'—she said, like the editorial of the Soviet weekly, *New Times*.[3] Perhaps the very appearance of the new peace movement would destabilise the European order, and thus bring about the opposite of what it intends; instead of a lasting peace there will be a greater possibility of war, she continued.

Recently some young artists have formed an art-group, which has some interest in peace. This group, whose name is 'Indigo', is maintaining links both with the state Peace Council and with the new peace movement. Its representative spoke about their practical activities: their main concern is to transform military things into useful consumer goods. At the same time they offered their help in making posters, badges, etc.

After these reports there was a report on the Brussels Convention. This issue raised some questions in connection with the internal discussions in the European peace movement. The lecturer was in an embarrassing situation, because some of the participants confused END with the World Peace Council: in the Hungarian media END has a relatively good image and consequently the average Hungarian is a little bit suspicious of such organisations.

However, after some more precise information and after informing the workshop about the 'Appeal for a Nuclear-free Europe', the misinformations were cleared. For the participants it was refreshing to hear that in West Europe there is a resolute determination to build fruitful co-operation between East and West, as the 'Appeal' says: 'We appeal to our friends in Europe, of every faith and persuasion, to consider urgently the ways in which we can work together for these common objectives. We envisage a European-wide campaign, in which every kind of exchange takes place; in which representatives of different nations and opinions confer and co-ordinate their activities. . .'[4]

At the same time Sándor Radnóti voiced his disagreements with the Western peace movement. According to him this

immense movement is only the expression of the fear of nuclear war on the part of the Western *petty bourgeois.* This Western sort of *petty bourgeois* wants to isolate himself from the external world, for him it is a matter of indifference what happens in the far-away remoteness of East Europe: for instance, human rights in Czechoslovakia. 'Any disarmament movement is meaningful and hopeful only in the sense of the realisation of its objectives as a human rights movement',[5] –as V. Racek argued in his polemic with E.P. Thompson.

Mr. Radnóti increased the sharpness of Racek's criticism when he referred to an 'isolationist tendency' within the Western peace movement. Finally he concluded that 'for an Eastern peace movement it was of paramount importance to give a critique of the present Western peace movement'. In his opinion a really creative peace movement will grow primarily in East Europe. At the same time, he emphasised that Western newspapers overrate the significance of the 'Schwerter zu Pflugscharen'. He referred to his personal experience: he had been in Dresden, when this East German peace movement commenced its activity, and in his view the Western media overrated the whole matter. We have to work, not for publication in Western papers, but for internal results, he said.

As regards his opinion about the Western peace movement, it rests on misinformation. In Hungarian papers END generally is described as an organisation which follows a one-sided, pro-Soviet and sharply anti-American policy. From this obvious falsification even some prominent intellectuals have drawn defective conclusions. Besides, as the present situation proves, END has negligible contacts with East Europe, working channels are occasional, and this is a *terra incognita.* In the long run this weakness might prove fateful for the Western peace movement itself: the deep silence and ignorance in the East will justify the logic of the Western authorities: that the whole peace movement is playing into the Russians' hands. They can then make gigantic armament plans and have not the slightest disquiet about it.

It is true also that for the Western peace movement it is a delicate matter to take a harder line towards the Eastern

authorities. For two reasons: first, that East Europe is not a monolithic tomb, as it was in the fifties; every country has its own character. And the second reason is that even the official Peace Councils can serve as useful channels of communication. It would be foolish to ask the Western peace movement to break all contacts with state-funded peace organisations.

Perhaps in this respect the new Eastern peace movement has to take the first step, namely to sort out its problems with the official institutions. The new Hungarian peace groups have commenced to act in this spirit, although at this stage it would be premature to estimate the results. In the solution of this problem the Western peace movement cannot help and it would not be good if it were to intervene. For the Western peace movement there is 'only' one important task: they really 'must defend and extend the right of all citizens, East or West, to take part in this common movement and to engage in every kind of exchange'.[6]

Proposals and Projects

In addition to these reports and debates there were other issues on the agenda. The most controversial problem was of an organisational character: what options are open for the peace groups? To form a single broad movement with a co-ordinating body or council? To preserve the actual situation, namely to remain in small autonomous groups? Most of the groups opted for the second alternative, for political and identity reasons: they are very jealous about their independent status, they do not want to give it up even if this broader movement should be an autonomous one.

At the same time the representative agreed on two important projects: first, to form a *Peace Centre,* where there will be a club, a library and the headquarters of the peace groups; second to edit a *Peace Journal.* In connection with these projects there were many proposals: the practical tasks revived the strength of purpose of the participants, who were exhausted after the preceding discussions.

It was a great good fortune to learn of an opportunity to get appropriate premises for a *Peace Centre.* At the same

time, there were disagreements about the aims of the *Peace Journal:* will it be a theoretical or a political journal? What will be the conditions in connection with co-operation with the state Peace Council, which has a voice in granting a permission to publish such a journal in Hungary? At this point the representative of the Peace Council, who had remained silent, interrupted the debate and quite patriarchially said: 'It is very difficult to negotiate with you because not all of your are on the same platform, and there is no hope of forming a broad consensus.' This statement posed some questions about problems of future co-operation.

The representative of the Peace Council was in an awkward situation: he represented not only the Peace Council but also the interests of the Hungarian government (amongst them military interests) and above all the interests of the Soviet Union. From such a position it is hard to discuss with independent-minded people, for whom there is no other datum point but the *pure* desire for lasting peace. It was also embarrassing for the representative of the Peace Council to admit that they follow a schizophrenic policy towards peace: to welcome and to hate actions for peace, depending on where they come from, East or West.

But what is the difference between people either in East or in West, who want peace and who want to do something about it? Moreover, what are the criteria in the East which decide who may represent the cause of peace? Who has the right to judge which people may actively desire peace and which may not? Who can say that 'I am sure that you only dissemble aims of peace, when this is only a means for you to achieve other political objectives?' These questions were not answered by the representative of the state Peace Council. At the same time there were constructive elements in this sharp debate. There was a vague promise for help both with a *Peace Centre* and with the *Peace Journal.*

Finally the participants expressed their regret for non-attendance at the forthcoming Vienna Peace Festival. However, they cannot change the existing passport restrictions. It is tragic that Vienna is so near geographically to Budapest (only a few hours by train), but is so far away for political

reasons of the authorities. Such Festivals are very important for the creation of a united, independent Europe. However, both the attendance of East Europeans at these festivals and the notion of a united Europe seem at present to be utopian hopes.

Peace Group for Dialogue

In the present situation it is very important to find channels through which East and West can continue a reasonable dialogue. It will be hard work and 'the work would have to be done, at least in the first stages, *beneath* the level of states'.[7] Spontaneous twinnings and well-planned workshops for special themes are important.

There are many possible forms of these contacts. Let us take an example: the so-called 'Peace March '82' which was initiated by Scandinavian women did not fulfill this requirement. It was a mere puppet march for Soviet Propaganda. These Scandinavian marchers probably did not know how their march was being made use of, or else their status was the same as that of other marchers from the socialist countries, who were designated to march by the state Peace Councils and for whom the event (the relatively great luxury, travel, etc.) was a prize for their loyalty to one-sided policies which in other respects have many militarist aspects (see editorial comment below).

When I am talking about 'Peace Groups for Dialogue' I do really mean Dialogue: dialogues which are not sponsored by states but by voluntary decision. The states have other forums to establish useful contacts with each other. If state institutions are interested in matters which have no direct connection with them, in that case it is understandable to look for dissembled motives.

We, in East and West, have the means to establish contacts. We have to make every possible effort till this can be done. The threatening cloud of a new Cold War is now menacing us. At least in Europe there are many signs, which forebode this phenomenon. There is not much time. It is very important to set up a Peace Group for Dialogue. It has some symbolic significance that this initiative has been taken in the East, that is in Hungary. It is only a symbolic step, but its meaning is great.

NOTES

1. Hegedús András: 'Lehetséges-e konstruktív ellenzékiség Kelet-Európában' (manuscript).
2. E.P. Thompson: *Zero Option,* The Merlin Press, London 1982, (Introduction).
3. *New Times,* 19th May, 1982.
4. 'Appeal for a Nuclear-free Europe', (END).
5. *Human Rights and Disarmament* (an exchange of letters between E.P. Thompson and Vaclav Racek), Spokesman, for END, Nottingham, 1981, p. 7.
6. 'Appeal for a Nuclear-free Europe', (END).
7. E.P. Thompson: 'Deterrence and Addiction', in *Zero Option,* p. 23.

Editorial Comment–

The Scandinavian Women's March

The Scandinavian Peacemarch was–and was only intended to be–from Stockholm to Minsk. The Soviet Peace Committee urged the marchers to continue to Vienna, by way of Bratislava and Budapest, but the Scandinavian marchers declined. In the event, nearly all the marchers returned home from Minsk, and only a small number (including some Finnish Communists) continued. But in Moscow the march was joined by new contingents from the Soviet Peace Committee, as well as supporters of the World Peace Council from other countries; substantial contingents from Eastern bloc nations, including Czechoslovakia, were later to join in. The 'luxury' referred to by Köszegi was a feature not of the earlier (Stockholm–Helsinki) but of the later stages of the march.

This (essentially new) march, calling itself 'Peacemarch '82', presented itself as a continuation of the Scandinavian march and was given massive and favourable media treatment in the East. This explains Ferenc Köszegi's sharp comments. It is also the background to the action of two 'oppositional' supporters of peace and of human rights, who handed out leaflets to the marchers as they passed through Budapest city centre on August 4th.

TO THE PARTICIPANTS IN THE PEACE MARCH 82

You have been invited here to testify to the peace-loving nature of the policies of the Hungarian Government. But you should know that many Hungarians are dissatisfied with their country's efforts in the cause of peace. At the same time they have not right to express their dissatisfaction.

In 1968 our Government took part in the armed occupation of Czechoslovakia, and today it supports the military dictatorship in Poland. At any one time, more than a hundred young Hungarians are serving heavy prison sentences for trying to exercise their constitutionally guaranteed freedom of conscience by refusing military service—and the law provides no possibility for any civil, social alternative to military service. Military expenditure is a state secret—and the press can't criticise the armed forces. A hundred thousand foreign soldiers are stationed in Hungary, and our Government doesn't even ask to become a full partner in the Central European talks to reduce armed forces. Our neighbours are friendly countries, yet Soviet rockets designed for attack are deployed here. In this way Hungary is made into a possible target for nuclear warfare. But none of this can be debated in public.

We appeal to you not to assist in the misusing of the cause of peace. And we ask you to remember that there can be no peace without freedom.

László Rajk
architect

Miklós Haraszti
writer

Budapest, 4th August 1982.

Miklós Haraszti, the writer, and author of *A Worker in a Worker's State* (Penguin, 1977) first became prominent when he organised unofficial protests against the American war in Vietnam. László Rajk, architect, is the son of the Communist leader of the same name who was executed after a framed-up show trial (as an 'Anglo-American imperialist agent') in the Stalinist purge of 1949.

The police contented themselves with taking down Haraszti's and Rajk's names. We have heard of no further actions taken against them.

The best account in English of the Stockholm-Minsk (i.e. genuine) Peacemarch is by Jean Stead, the Assistant Editor of the *Guardian*, who accompanied the marchers. Her reports in the paper were concluded by a major article (13 August 1982) setting down her conclusions: these are republished in END pamphlet 'Moscow Independent Peace Group'.

THE 'NORMALISATION' OF EUROPE

A Lecture delivered in a private apartment in Budapest,
23 September 1982.

Friends and colleagues,

It is an honour to meet you today and to discuss our common problems. I had hoped to be able to give this lecture on the premises of the university or in some public place. But in the event this has not proved to be possible. I am a stranger to your country and to its forms and proprieties, and I am not clear as to the reasons why the proposed arrangement proved to be difficult. I trust that I have not given offence to any institution. That has not been my intention. I have met with courtesy on every side. It has even been suggested to me that I might give the lecture, in some form, on the premises of the National Peace Council before an invited audience. I would have had no difficulty with this if I had also been able to give the same lecture in a more public place under the auspices of the independent peace movement who are my hosts in Budapest. I was unable to accept the offer of the Hungarian Peace Council, without this condition, but I wish again to thank the officers of the Council for the courtesy they have shown me and for their helpful and interesting exchanges of views. The reasons why I have proved to be so awkward and uncommodating will become plain in my lecture. But, in brief, I am pledged to my section of the Western peace movement to a strict and non-aligned code of conduct: and to present my views in the East only if they can be as fully and openly presented here as in the West. We have to act as citizens of a healed continent. We have to act as if the Cold War is already at an end.

It is a responsibility to be here. There is an artificial ideological chasm across our continent, and voices cannot

* A Lecture delivered in a private apartment in Budapest, 23 September 1982.

always be heard across it. I will meet this responsibility in the only way proper. I ask your permission to speak with complete frankness. I will not waste your time on platitudes. It is probable that we will have a nuclear war, which will utterly devastate your country and mine, in the next twenty years. This war will bring to an end European civilisation.

Yet expressions of horror or goodwill alone will not prevent this outcome. Goodwill may even be a mask behind which other motives and other interests are at work. We must identify these motives and interests. And we must do so, not as partisans of one 'side' or the other 'side': we must do so together. And then we must find ways of acting together. First of all we must take off our masks. We must be ready for difficult, uncomfortable arguments. As Gulya Illyes wrote in his 'Ode to Bartok':

> Let there be harmony!
> Order, but true order, lest the world perish
> O, if the world is not to perish
> the people must be free
> to speak, majestically![1]

I must first explain briefly my personal position. I am not an absolute pacifist. There are circumstances in which I think it to be right to take arms in self-defence.

But on nuclear weapons I am an absolutist. A civilisation which rests upon the constant daily threat of mutual extermination is a barbarism. We, in the majority tradition of the Western peace movement, do not just refuse particular weapons—the cruise missile, MX and Trident, the SS20. We refuse them all. And we ask for this refusal on both sides. There are not good democratic Western bombs and evil communist ones: or good proletarian bombs and evil Western imperialist ones. What is the purpose of discussing the 'balance' or 'parity' of two absolute evils?

Nor does talk of 'balance' make for any kind of military sense. For nuclear weapons are not weapons of defence. They are weapons of menace or threat: and, in the same moment, of suicide. A nuclear 'deterrent' is like a pistol which, in the very same moment that it is pointed at an

antagonist, is also pointed at one's own head. It is to say, 'Don't move, or we will blow us both up!' That is not a credible defence, even though it is what may in the end happen. Meanwhile this fearful threat has rather little effect on the actual behaviour of armed states.

There is a second personal point. I happen to distrust all armed states, for reasons which go beyond the matter of weaponry itself. William Blake wrote, when the French Revolution had passed into its Napoleonic imperial era—

> The strongest poison ever known
> Came from Caesar's laurel crown.

This poison does not come only in the form of plutonium. It is generally true in history that—except in moments of aroused national self-defence—a state of war, or of high military preparedness, is also a degenerative condition in the political and social life of a nation. A military definition of reality is superimposed upon all other human intentions and needs and rights. Certainly—but here I can speak only from Western experience—the long-protracted state of Cold War has encouraged diseases in the body politic—priority given to arms industries over services (education, health, welfare), the strengthening of security services and police, the imposition of ideological conformity and stupidity, 'official secrecy'—which in Britain means keeping secret from the British people facts which are perfectly well-known to the intelligence services of the Warsaw Treaty powers—and all the rest. I used to jest at our own peace meetings that the only growth area of the British economy today is telephone-tapping. Now we have had the Falklands War, and the growth area is building replacements for sunken battleships.

If the present Cold War—or adversary posture of the two blocs—is protracted for a further 20 years, it will not inevitably lead to the final holocaust, although it will probably do so: but it will, very certainly, give rise to two profoundly distorted economies and damaged cultures—to two opposed warlike societies, ruled by leaders who are intolerant security-minded persons: and hence to a diminution of every citizen's

freedom and right as against the demands of the rival armed states.

That is a dismal outlook. But we must be plain about it. We must not avert our eyes. It gives to this moment of rising peace consciousness, in East and West, a special urgency: this opportunity may be our last before the trap finally closes upon us. Forgive me if I cause offence. I am not talking about the *intentions* of leaders, on your side or on mine. To predict the course of history from the intentions of individual leaders is futile. I am indicating a deep process, quite beyond the intentions of individuals, by which the overfat military establishments of one side continually feed and further fatten the other.

A strange propaganda duel took place in the world's forum in the past year. Caspar Weinberger, the US Secretary for Defense, issued with an immense sound of tin trumpets, a book prepared in the Pentagon entitled *Soviet Military Power.* This showed a fearsome growth in recent years of Soviet forces–tanks, missiles, aircraft, naval power. The size and technical proficiency of Soviet and Warsaw Pact military resources were shown with graphs, diagrams and alarming pictures, to be without precedent.

This goulash was not all made up of lies, although there were some ugly lies within it. What it neglected to do was present any means of comparison: that is, any comparable information on US and NATO military power. This was at once repaired by the Military Publishing House of the USSR Ministry of Defence which issued its own glossy illustrated handbook, *Whence the Threat to Peace?* If anything, the pictures in this one were better–since they are more easy to obtain from Western than from Soviet sources–and they were more alarming. They showed a fearsome build-up in recent years of United States and NATO forces.

At the time of the French Revolution the leading exponent in England of *The Rights of Man* was Thomas Paine, and the leading critic was Edmund Burke, author of *Reflections on the French Revolution.* One philosophical British reformer sent both books to be bound together as one: he said that, when read together, they made up a very good book. In the same way, *Soviet Military Power* and *Whence the Threat*

to Peace? should be bound in a common volume. But they do not make a very good book. They make together a book so fearsome that the mind and the emotions recoil before it. It is the most barbaric catalogue of the ingenuity of the instruments of murder ever known in the human record. It is an inventory of twin matched evils, a balance-sheet in which every item is loss. This book is a confession of absolute human failure.

But the general shape of the facts is true. I mention this in case there should be anyone here who reads the newspapers upside-down. And the facts of Western military build-up are true not only of the USA. Let me cite the case of my own country. In 1982, a year in which the productive sectors of the British economy have been experiencing great difficulties, in which money for education and services has been cut, in which there are over three millions unemployed, Mrs Thatcher's government has been able to fight an expensive war in the South Atlantic and has also agreed to replace the ageing group of Polaris missile submarines with the most expensive of all options possible, the American-designed Trident D5. The British Ministry of Defence reported proudly last week that the quantity of multiple independently-targeted warheads on the Trident missiles is such that Britain will have 672 warheads to deliver on targets in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union instead of the 96 in the present Polaris fleet. The new missiles will have a range of 6,000 miles as compared with 2,800 miles for Polaris. And each additional mile will bring 15,000 new square miles into the target area. Britain will therefore be able to target about seven times as many cities and bases as before. And by what analysis have Mrs Thatcher and her military advisors decided that, in fifteen years time, it will be necessary for my country to have forces of extermination seven times more hideous and more menacing? It would seem to me to be a pessimistic deduction. It might even be thought to be unneighbourly. Meanwhile, these Tridents will cost Britain's ailing economy some ten thousand million pounds: and this, with the additions for rebuilding sunken battleships, telephone-tapping and the rest, will perhaps destroy my country without any need for Soviet intervention.

I cannot cite with equal accuracy details from the other side of the chasm since matters are not so openly published in the Soviet Union. But we have it on the best authority that, if the growth of weaponry in NATO in the past 20 years has been fearsome, it has been fearsome in the Warsaw Pact also. For President Brezhnev has on several occasions spoken of 'rough parity' in the opposed nuclear weapons systems. If one side is hideous, and the other side is in 'rough parity', then it must follow that the other side is hideous also. There is a reciprocal, mutually-accelerating state of ferocity. The weapons-systems are now the leading sectors of the economy on both sides of the world, and in their interactive stimulation, and in the priority awarded to military needs over all other needs, we may begin, as Zdenek Mlynar has suggested, to discern a 'new mode' of development'.

It is against this mode, which is developing a universal death, and which is enforcing—in the increasing sale of arms by both WTO and NATO powers to the Third World—its own diseased forms upon the poorer nations of the 'South', that the peace movement has risen—and continues to rise—in the West. It has been epidemic in character, moving swiftly across frontiers like a benign infection: now Holland, now Britain: next Scandinavia, Germany, Italy: and then across the Atlantic. It commenced as a refusal: as Erhard Eppler declared, 'the chain of armaments must be cut through'. But it is more than a refusal. There is, I have been told, some misunderstanding over on this side as to the position of the Western peace movement: or, I should say, that part of the Western peace movement to which I belong. I think I may say that this position is becoming the majority tendency in West Europe and the USA, although there are other minority positions: for example, absolute pacifism, or in some countries pro-Soviet sympathisers. The position which I will explain to you is very widely held in the British Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, which is an association of the mass peace movement in Britain: I have found it widely supported in Ireland, in Iceland, and in Norway. It has been elaborated by the experienced Inter-church Peace Council (IKV) in Holland: by an influential section of the

movement in Austria: it is strongly present, for example among the Greens, in the debates now going on in West Germany: and similar arguments are found in Southern Europe, especially in the eurocommunist Italian Communist Party and independent ecological, feminist, and left groups.

First, our position on nuclear weapons is absolutist. We refuse them. The human species, the planet itself, cannot afford them. It is essential to the morale of our movement that we should not compromise this refusal by behaving like politicians and arguing about 'numbers'. Now, in many parts of West and South Europe, from Stornoway in the Western Isles of Scotland to Comiso in Sicily, many people are preparing for peaceful direct action: sit-downs, peace camps outside bases, blockades, hunger strikes. I ask you to give your solidarity to these people!

How is this to be done? I do not know your circumstances. I do not wish to intervene in your proper national affairs. But if the destruction of our continent is at stake, then we must consult together and act as Europeans: we must discard narrow national or ideological views. You must know, if you reflect, that this is so, and even for very practical political reasons. The Western peace movement is strong but it is not yet strong enough to impose its will upon states or military organisations. And it is now reaching the limits of certain ideological/political barriers. What is the question that we are asked most frequently by hostile critics in our countries? 'We agree that disarmament is good', these critics say, 'but where is the peace movement on the other side?' And if it is answered that the Soviet Peace Committee, and certain other national peace committees and councils in the East have organised their own demonstrations and petitions, the critic replies: 'Yes, but these were directed against NATO weapons, not against the weapons and militarism of their own states.' I was present at the great demonstration in Bonn last October which saw the West German movement come to maturity. All afternoon a hostile plane circled overhead drawing behind it a streamer inscribed 'Wer demonstriert in Moscau?' (Who is demonstrating in Moscow?). If the Western peace movement is to break through this barrier, then we must be able to clasp hands with a non-

aligned movement, totally independent of the state, on your side also. What has been epidemic must become pandemic.

Yet our own position remains absolutist. Whether an independent movement gains strength on your side or not, we will maintain our absolute refusal. This is unconditional. We are not politicians engaged in clever trading negotiations. Our stand is misinterpreted, not only by hostile critics in the West, but also by some observers in the East. They suppose our stand to be motivated by fear or defeatism—or perhaps by pro-Soviet and anti-American emotions: perhaps the response to Soviet military and diplomatic pressure of a nervous Western intelligentsia and 'petty bourgeoisie'?

No! Of course there may be such minority elements, here and there. But the majority position is grounded not only upon an absolute moral premise. It is also grounded in political logic. Our logic remains one of negotiation: but negotiation *by action*, in which the nations of Europe, East and West, resume an autonomous role. For twenty years the superpowers have imposed their hegemony upon other European nations—have taken all negotiations into their own hands: and all the time the weaponry has gone up and up. Today, once again, negotiations are proceeding behind closed doors at Geneva, on a matter which could scarcely concern all Europeans more—intermediate European 'theatre' weapons, the instruments of a 'limited nuclear war'—and yet there are no European seats at the negotiating table. To refuse these weapons any place on our territory—to refuse any forward launching or air bases from which these weapons might be deployed—is the only option for autonomy left to your people or to mine: the autonomy of survival.

But I spoke of 'negotiating by action'. CND in Britain, like the Dutch peace movement, support unilateral measures of disarmament. If Holland or Britain refuse any weapons system—and the Dutch and British Labour Parties are pledged to do so—it is not supposed that the matter will end there. It will be the first step in a process of direct negotiation. We hope to come back then, as better neighbours, to your side—perhaps to the Soviet Union, perhaps to Hungary or Poland—and say: 'We have stopped that system and removed these

bases of the United States military from our territory. Now, then, which system will you stop in exchange, which bases of the Soviet forces will you (politely of course) remove?'

We are tired of leaving our fate in the hands of the politicians of the superpowers, most of whom are locked into the inertia of the *status quo.* Nor would our actions endanger in any way our own nation's legitimate defence. I have already explained that these are not defensive weapons: and that bases can only invite attack. But there is another point. These systems are grossly in excess of any military 'needs' in even the maddest of strategic scenarios. This is not just the view of some utopian 'pacifist'. It is the clear judgement of senior military men and arms advisors from both sides, although they tell us this only when they have retired and are free to speak. There is a long list of such expert witnesses. A recent one is Field Marshal Lord Carver, the retired chief of the British military staff, who published three weeks ago a book called *A Policy for Peace.* Lord Carver says clearly that 'the number and variety of weapons systems of the USA and USSR is grossly in excess of what is needed' for deterrence, and additional systems are 'superfluous.'

Both sides are as fat with weapons systems as a goose being prepared for Christmas dinner. Sir Martin Ryle, the British astronomer royal, has said that there is already enough nuclear weaponry on our continent to destroy Europe totally more than 20 times. How can it matter whether one side can do this 11 times and the other only 9 times? Once is enough. So that even on the premises of military 'deterrence' there is fat enough to be cut out without any risk.

This is only the first part of our logic. The second part can only be confirmed, or rejected, by you on this side. Your generosity in inviting me to speak openly here tonight, perhaps even in the face of the disapproval of some misinformed persons in influential places, moves me very deeply. We also, in our movement in the West, organise, argue and act in the face of official disapproval and misunderstanding: and despite the many, and real, and important, freedoms of press and opinion in my own country, we often have

difficulty in gaining expression for any full statement of our views in the most popular television or newspaper media. But your generosity here tonight makes me have confidence that the logic of our position may be correct. We believe that if we continue to act—even if unilaterally—in this way: and that if we can force one or more Western governments to take these actions of unilateral refusal: then we will meet, over on this side, with an equivalent response, equivalent popular pressure, and action.

I will go further. To suppose that the majority Western peace movement is motivated by fear or by pro-Soviet ideological premises is a very great mistake. It could be a tragic mistake. It could prevent us from gaining the response, from your side, which is urgent and essential to complete the logic of the movement for peace and against the armed states of the world. Soviet leaders must come to understand that there are now millions in the West whose beliefs and ideas they would describe as 'anti-Soviet'—that is, who are severe critics of aspects of Soviet actuality, who are supporters of intellectual and civil rights, who support as a matter of principle the rights of conscientious objection from military service, or who are—as the majority trade union and Labour movements of the West are—sympathisers with Solidarnosc and the Polish renewal—there are millions of such people, who also support the peace movement, precisely because they believe that a condition of militarism, a state of preparedness for war, brings out the worst features of both opposed social and political systems.

Good friends, these people wish to talk with you! How much they wish to talk, to show goodwill, to defy the absurd legacies of an old, bad and dead history, to defy the antique security and ideological barriers on both sides which hold us apart! But they wish to talk with you directly as I am privileged to talk with you now. They do not wish to talk with you in *any* way and on *any* terms. They wish to talk with you as human neighbours, on an endangered continent, and yet not in such a way as to give advantage or propaganda points to either military bloc. They wish to talk with you honestly and directly, *beneath* the level of the armed states and their ideological caretakers.

This is the reason why many parts of the Western peace movement, including END—the committee for European Nuclear Disarmament of which I am a member—have been shy of direct linkages with national peace councils and committees on your side. To be plain: we do not like the World Peace Council, and we are wary of its affiliated organisations. The WPC has endorsed some good causes in the past, but it has always or very often acted one-sidedly, as a partisan and sometimes as a captive of Soviet diplomatic interests. It appears to us sometimes as Soviet state interests, wearing the mask of peace and goodwill. We do not suppose the interests of the Soviet state to be inherently aggressive or expansionist, although there have been occasions when—for 'reasons of state' or national 'defence'—aggressions and expansions have taken place. But we cannot accept a situation in which we are contesting, with all our energy and in every moment of our work, the military policies and ideologies of our own states: but we are told that the only permissable channel for communication with fellow workers for peace on your side must be committees or councils which in most respects *support* the military policies and ideologies of their own states. That is a bad, unequal, even deceptive relationship between movements and peoples.

Of course, if one side was wholly blameworthy and the other side wholly innocent, there might be some reason in this. But no-one—and certainly no-one of influence in the majority Western peace movement—believes that sort of fairy-tale any more. What are we to make of a Peace Committee' which, in the past few weeks, apologised for the harrassment of a small independent group of peace workers in Moscow, and did not protest when their leader, Sergei Batovrin, was forcibly sent to a mental hospital and administered depressant drugs? That has become, in the British and American peace movements, an occasion for scandal. The hooligans who acted in this way against this small group are as dangerous to our work for peace as are the manufacturers of nuclear arms.

I am not here criticising the Hungarian Peace Council. This Council has been present, as an observer, at several of our conferences in the West: its representatives have made

constructive contributions and have attended to criticisms of WTO military policies with courtesy. We are glad to acknowledge their more tolerant and flexible approach. But I wish to explain why it is that—whenever the question of co-operation with organisations on your side comes up, our supporters always ask us at once: 'Is that movement truly independent and non-aligned? Has it criticised the weapons and strategies of its own bloc as well as those of the West?'

At the same time, and all the time, our own supporters do wish to talk with you, so long as the talk is honest, the communication is free and open, and not only what is permitted to be poured through some official funnel into the correct official bottles. I will give you an example. Last Saturday, less than a week ago, I was speaking at a meeting of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament at Blaenau Ffestiniog, a small town in North Wales. There were some 500 persons at the meeting and many more hundreds of young people at a festival of music and theatre outside. The population of this town is only some 6,000 people, but many had come from the nearby region. The speakers included the MP for the region, the President of the Welsh National Party, the deputy Archdruid—a leader of Welsh national culture—a Catholic priest, and a member of the Scandinavian Womens Peacemarch who had also visited Mr Batovrin's independent group while in Moscow.[2]

I must explain one further matter. On 23 February 1982 the whole of Wales was proclaimed a 'nuclear free zone'. This was the culmination of a year-long campaign, in which many thousands took part, and in which by democratic votes and after much discussion every major city and every county council in Wales voted to be nuclear free. This means that they refused to have nuclear weapons based on their territory, manufactured within it, and refused also to take part in useless 'cosmetic' gestures at civil defence since reputable authorities agree that there is no defence for populations against these weapons. When the final county in Wales—Clwyd—passed this resolution, there was issued a Clwyd Declaration on behalf of the whole country of Wales:

> . . . the whole of Wales, through its democratically elected representatives, has declared itself a nuclear free zone. By this action Wales has given a moral lead to the other countries of Europe and the world.
>
> In passing on to them our message of hope and inspiration, we call upon the other nations of Europe to make known their deep concern for the culture of civilisation. We call upon them to commit themselves to the cause of redeeming Europe from total destruction by taking the initial step of declaring their homelands nuclear free zones.

When I told the meeting that I was coming to Budapest, I was asked to take this message with me. But matters went further. I told them that I had heard that there was a rising spirit of peace-consciousness in your country and new movements taking their own independent positions, willing to act impartially in order to restrain the militarism not only of the West but also of your own side. And it was decided then to place a message in the hall for those present to sign.[3]

This message comes to you with the warmest feelings, with the greatest goodwill to all people committed to peace activity in Hungary. I was asked to pass it on to the new Peace Centre which you will form in Budapest.

And this is the most important thing I wish to say about the new peace movement, West or East. They are movements which may have commenced in fear, but they are now movements of hope. They are not only contesting particular missiles—cruise and SS20. They are engaged also in the recreation of internationalism, by hundreds of different exchanges between peace activists. They are moving forward from missiles to contesting the bloc system itself, from whose antagonism the rival militarisms arise. They are setting themselves an astonishing objective: to break down, not in some distant future which may never arrive, but in the next ten years the Cold War itself. The practical objective must now be the dissolution of both blocs, with intermediate measures for regional nuclear free zones—the Balkans, the Baltic, Central Europe—linked to the progressive demilitarisation, with the withdrawal of contentional forces also, of the whole continent: that is, the 'normalisation' of Europe.

Friends, our situation today is not only perilous. It is

abnormal and absurd. Here we are, a few hours away from each other by train or car or plane. We share many elements of common history and culture. There is no geological chasm which keeps us apart. The people—and the young people of both sides especially—share common interests, styles of dress, tastes in music, concern for the environment and for the Third World. What keeps us apart is not a line on the ground but a line inside our heads. Or it is the weight of old and bad history, which 'weighs like an alp upon the living'. This unnatural state is the legacy of a particular moment, a particular balance of forces, at the end of World War II, which has protracted its moment long after the reasons for that moment have passed away. A new generation has arisen on both sides, in Bonn or in Budapest, for whom this artificial segregation—this *apartheid* imposed by senile ideologies—is an obscenity.

In every moment that we accept the false divisions of the Cold War in our heads we are guilty of treason to each other. We allow the armed states—from the inertia of the past—to arrange us according to military, and not according to human, definitions of reality. We allow the senescent ideologies to say that anyone acting for disarmament by direct unilateral action in the West is somehow 'pro-Soviet', a conscious or unconscious agent of communist power. And we allow them to say that anyone in the East who is critical of your own militarism or who demands certain rights of free communication or expression is a conscious or unconscious agent of Western imperialism. In this way we are held apart from each other, and our strength is bent against each other. The abnormalities of our split civilisation are legitimated and extended into the future, in which this state of fission will destroy us all.

But if only we could find some way of bending our strengths together—some force of cultural and political fusion—with difficulties and with risks we could enforce our will upon both armed blocs. How could this be done? This is what the Western peace movement wishes to talk with you about—to consult and take your advice. We are clear only on a few matters. First, the Cold War can never be ended by the victory of one side over the other side:

there can be no such victory without war. It can be ended only as a result of a 'people's détente'—a détente beneath the level of states—created by popular initiative, above all by the young. Second, no peace movement has any chance of success which serves the interests of only one side: the peace movement must be resolutely non-aligned. Third, it is no part of the peace movement's work to intervene in the complicated questions of the national political life on the other side. The Western peace movement ought not to intervene in your affairs—although, since we are an undisciplined movement of 'individualists' I cannot promise that no-one will try to do so. And independent peace movements in the East do not exist to create little moments of drama in the Western press, nor even to give legitimacy to the independent peace movement of the West, but to work steadily for peace according to national conditions and needs, offering their own proposals, and with the single objective of the success of our common work.

I have said, in other places, that the Western peace movement and the forces making for democratisation in the East are natural allies: that the causes of peace and of freedom go together. I believe that this is true, in a profound historical way: here is the force which will combine our strengths. Let us say that the movements should 'recognise' each other. But the Western peace movement is not in the business of being an export agency, seeking to export into the East, along with the ideas of peace, a whole set of other ideas and demands, some of which may be appropriate to your national conditions and some of which may not. And I hope that peace movements on your side will show a similar self-restraint. I will go further. I think the peace movements—our joint peace movements together—should exert their influence as a stabilising force, not as a force making for dramas and emergencies. We may wish to 'de-stabilise' the military structures of both sides, but this does not mean that we wish to throw political life into a turmoil.

I will give you a sensitive example. If the Polish renewal should advance once more and if martial law could be lifted, this would be welcomed by the Western peace movement. We are, after all, most of us trade unionists ourselves: and

the British trade union movement has just had its own day of Solidarity with our health workers, on September 22nd. But if the Polish renewal should afford to the Polish nation more space for autonomy then it should be the business of the Western peace movement to use all its strength to hold back those militarist elements in the USA or NATO who might wish to press into these spaces and secure some advantage for NATO from what they might perceive as a 'weakness' in the WTO. This is an example of what I mean by a 'stabilising force'. The proper response of the Western peace movement to the Polish situation ought to be to enforce a relaxation of military tension in Central Europe, to enable there to be space for the Polish people to work out their problems internally and with their neighbours without interference. How can Pershing II missiles, sited on the rim of West Germany, bring freedom or renewal to anyone?

I will be frank. The Western peace movement is not strong enough yet to give any guarantees that it can restrain NATO adventurers. We are in our childhood still. We must grow stronger. But we have reached a point when we can only gain this strength if we are part of a transcontinental movement, a non-aligned movement stretching across the whole of Europe. And I will not disguise my own advice as to a proper and normal objective. It is time, after 37 years, that World War II was concluded with a normal peace treaty in the Germanies. And this would bring about, as no kind of provocation but as a normal event, the entire withdrawal of foreign military presence and bases, first from Central Europe (including West Germany), and next from our continent: to be specific, forces and bases from the West. We should invite this withdrawal with courtesy: we should thank these forces for their acts of liberation, we should say goodbye with flowers. But thirty-seven years is a long time. It is long enough.

Excuse one anecdote. I was engaged in a radio programme on a United States network, when I was interviewed by President Carter's former press secretary, Jody Powell. He enquired as to the reasons for our movement's refusal of cruise missiles which the USA was so generous as to be

sending for our protection. At a certain point he became indignant at my replies: I had had the ill manners to remind him that the American people had themselves once issued a Declaration of Independence. And he warned me that if Europeans were so truculent, then the American people might take offence and become isolationist once more and withdraw all their forces from Europe. I replied, with great courtesy, that this was very good thinking on the part of the American people, that the American military presence in Europe was a heavy charge on their taxes, and that while Americans were very welcome in my country as tourists or in any civil capacity, many of us would be happy to see their forces go home. Mr Powell exploded at me with a story attributed to the moment when General de Gaulle decided to break with NATO military arrangements, and invited the United States Ambassador to his presence, with a request that by a certain date all American forces should be withdrawn from France. According to this story, the Ambassador received this message impassively, and then withdrew: but at the door he turned and said: 'I understand, General. But there is one thing I must tell my President. Are we also to remove all the graves of American servicemen killed in the liberation of France?'

Mr Jody Powell supposed that he had knocked me flat on the ground, without any possible reply. But then, as is the custom on American radio, there was a commercial break to advertise deoderants, cookies and Kleenex tissues, with little bits of pop music, and I had time to think of an answer. When he came back on the air I told him that, however generous the act of liberation had been, it did not bring with it the right to perpetual occupation. And that, as it happened, I had myself taken part in the war of liberation in Italy and that there were many graves of my own comrades left behind in Italian soil. But that I did not for that reason wish to occupy Italy today. I preferred to live in Worcester in England. I might have added, but I did not, that my brother has a grave, alongside partisans' graves, in Bulgaria. But that I did not suppose that for this reason Bulgaria today should be under British occupation.

Of course the foreign forces in Europe today are not

forces of occupation. But they are still the testimony to an abnormal and unresolved state of affairs, and a heavy burden upon the resources of both superpowers. It is in the direct interests of both that this situation should now be ended, and it is our business—the business of a transcontinental peace movement—to provide the conditions in which with the least possible risk, or advantage to one side against the other, this can be done.

To conclude. I hope that I have not exceeded the limits of your courtesy or intervened with provocative questions. There is only one kind of intervention which I could never make apology for: I, and any other member of the trans-continental peace movement, East or West, have a plain duty to support the initiatives of fellow workers for peace in any part of Europe, if they should meet with any kind of difficulties or interference. I—and END and CND—are vigorously supporting members of the Turkish Peace Association now on trial in Ankara: and we have supported Mr Sergie Batovrin and the small independent peace group recently formed in Moscow against the harrassment of security-minded authorities. We insist that we cannot succeed —that our common future is put in peril—if there is not the most open communication of ideas between those who work for peace, East and West: and we insist upon defending the right of independent groups to meet, to publish, to organise, to discuss and to act, in any part of the continent, whether the authorities favour them or not.

We cannot succeed unless there arise in Europe a new kind of 'peace people' whose allegiance is to the repair of our continent: who refuse to acknowledge the Cold War in their hearts or their heads: who aid each other: who refuse to acknowledge prohibitions of security or ideology: who act already today as free citizens of the continent in peace, a new Europe which renounces all recourse to the weapons of barbarism, and which permits controversy about social systems and ideologies to be contested only by normal political and cultural means. It is because I find the same vision of a transcontinental movement in the minds of the new 'Peace Group for Dialogue' that it is a privilege to speak here today. Friends, you are already a sign of the

special peace people, the free citizens of Europe's future. I express my thanks to our hosts, my real humility before you. May we, together, succeed!

NOTES

1. Gyula Illyes, 'Ode to Bartok', *New Reasoner,* no. 5. Summer 1958.
2. The speakers at the Blaenau Ffestiniog CND Festival for Peace included Dafydd Elis Thomas, M.P., Dr. Gwynfor Evans, Dr. Geraint Bowen, Father Owen Hardwicke and Ms Danielle R. Grünberg.
3. The message, inscribed in Welsh and English, read: 'At a public meeting of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament in Blaenau Ffestiniog in nuclear-free Wales, we, the undersigned, resolved to send this message of friendship and greetings to our fellow workers for peace in Budapest at the new Peace Centre. May all Europe be reunited in peace! By our common efforts we will bring the cold war to an end!' No count was made of the final number of signatories which was several hundreds. The meeting also sent a beautiful slate ornament to the Peace Centre (which may open shortly) and some Welsh daffodil bulbs to the anti-nuclear movement in the Hungarian schools.



Cover of the 'samizdat' Hungarian translation of E.P. Thompson's pamphlet 'Beyond the Cold War'

What is END?

END means European Nuclear Disarmament. It works together with CND and other grass-roots campaigning groups in Europe, both East and West, toward a single objective. . . a nuclear free Europe.

The campaign works for disarmament both through unilateral initiatives and international co-operation. Its supporters work for nuclear-free zones in towns, regions and nations. And to unite people striving for disarmament, peace groups, and nuclear free zone groups twinning with like-minded campaigns in Europe and America.

The eventual aim is a treaty banning all so-called European theatre weapons (including those in Western Russia and on American submarines), together with a guarantee not to use nuclear weapons against any part of the political territory of Europe.

Since its beginning, support for the idea of END and nuclear disarmament throughout Europe has been growing rapidly. In the last few years, millions of people have taken to the streets of major cities throughout the world to show their concerted opposition to the plans to deploy cruise and Pershing II missiles and the neutron bomb in Western Europe and the build-up of SS20s in Eastern Europe.

Underneath this massive protest is a structure of European support for peace initiatives that is making its weight felt in both the Pentagon and the Kremlin.

Nuclear disarmament groups have formed in most western European countries, each growing as it sees fit each in contact with similar groups in other countries. We are now receiving news of the exciting spread of independent peace groups in eastern Europe. All this together with the amazing growth of the peace movement in the US, Japan and the Pacific, means we are part of the biggest mass movement in modern history.

In appealing to fellow Europeans, we are not turning our backs on the world. In working for the peace of Europe we are working for the peace of the world. Twice in this century Europe has disgraced its claims to civilisation by engendering world war. This time we must repay our debts to the world by engendering peace.

Joint END/Merlin pamphlets

The new Hungarian peace movement
One of the main movers of the new autonomous Hungarian peace movement, Ferenc Köszegi, outlines the fascinating growth of cells of peace activists in schools and universities. With an introduction by E.P. Thompson, this exciting publication describes in detail the ideas behind this important phenomenon and its struggle to avoid co-option by the state, official peace council and dissidents, and remain a mass movement. Also included is E.P. Thompson's lecture given in Budapest on 'The normalisation of Europe'.

ISBN 0850362946 price: 90p

Moscow independent peace group
Since the news hit the western press that a peace group independent of the official peace committee had been formed, END has received many inquiries for more information on that group. We now have first hand accounts from Jean Stead (Assistant Editor of *The Guardian*) and END supporter Danielle Grünberg who were on the Scandinavian women's march and visited the group while passing through Moscow. The pamphlet also presents additional documents and invites debate from the peace movement.

ISBN 0850362954 price: 75p

Comiso
As part of the militarisation of NATO's southern flank, the small Sicilian town of Comiso is threatened with a cruise missile base in December '83. But over half the adult population of Sicily have pledged themselves against it and the island is now the focus for the European peace movement. Ben Thompson examines the background of Italian politics and gives a first-hand account of the Sicilian struggle.

ISBN 0850362962 price: 60p

Turkey
Jailing the leaders of Turkey's peace movement is just part of the military regime's campaign to suppress all opposition. Representatives of END have been to Turkey to monitor the drawn-out trial of the peace association, who are receiving support from peace groups all over Europe. In this pamphlet Mehmet Ali Dikerdem and John Mepham look at the history and work of the Turkish Peace Association and analyse why a state based terror wins Western approval.

ISBN 0850362970

END SPECIAL REPORT:

MOSCOW INDEPENDENT PEACE GROUP

Jean Stead * Danielle Grünberg * Documents



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

Moscow's Police Arrest Founder of Peace Group

MOSCOW, Aug. 6 (AP) — The police arrested a founder of the Soviet Union's only independent peace group today and put him in a psychiatric hospital against his will, fellow group members reported.

They said Sergei Batovrin, a 25-year-old artist who spent time in a psychiatric hospital seven years ago, was taken from the apartment of Yuri Medvedkov, a fellow group member, shortly after noon. Colleagues said the police accused him of evading military service.

The peace group, numbering about 15 intellectuals, has faced continuous police harassment since announcing its formation in June.

8/4/82

New York Times, 8 July 1982

When the news first came to us early in June that an independent peace group had been formed in Moscow, and that it was sending urgent signals to the peace movements in the West, we were presented with difficulties. What should be our response?

The news came to us through the Western press, and sometimes through sources hostile to the peace movement. The first announcement of the group was made to a press conference by word of mouth in the flat of one of the group.

As the news trickled out, it appeared that several of the small group were 'refuseniks'—that is, they had applied in recent years for permits to emigrate from the USSR and their applications had been refused. The young artist, Sergei Batovrin, who helped to start the group, was the son of a Soviet diplomat at the United Nations and had spent some of his school years in New York.

This suggested one possible 'profile': a small group of refuseniks and dissidents, who were being made use of by Cold War propagandists in the West in order to deflate the Soviet leaders' professions of peaceful intent, to stir up dissension in the Western peace movement (and especially in the United States), and to provide a distraction at the time of the Peace March of the Scandinavian Women from Stockholm to Minsk.

Of course we had to take account of this possible profile. This kind of Cold War propaganda game has been going on for years, and on both sides, often defeating the intentions of sincere and disinterested people. At the same time we asked ourselves—How could a new, unofficial group get its message out without *recourse to the Western press? And why on earth should the Soviet authorities make such a fuss about a small group of this kind? If they had played it cool, what possible harm could have been done to Soviet-American relations? (A gesture of toleration would in fact have* improved *the Soviet image in the West.) The 'provocation'*

which Soviet official sources droned on about only arose because they themselves commenced to harass and slander the new group. Who are the 'hooligans' and provocateurs? A young artist (who had just had eighty-eight of his peace paintings seized by the KGB) and his friends? Or the security agents who have been pushing them about?

These considerations were strengthened when we received news of the programme of the group. But then an event of great importance took place. Jean Stead, the Assistant Editor of The Guardian*—a newspaper distinguished in the past two years by its well-informed treatment of the work of the Western peace movement, and by the space it has afforded for discussion of disarmament—had accompanied the Scandinavian Peacemarch on the full length of its course, sending back a series of valuable reports. Also with the March was Danielle Grünberg, a British marcher of part-Danish parentage—an active member of the Somerset peace movement, whose sponsors on the march included END, CND, and CND Western region.*

Danielle Grünberg and Jean Stead took the opportunity, when the March passed through Moscow, to visit the group. Their accounts are the heart of this pamphlet. Jean Stead's account is placed in the context of a retrospective view of the success (but also the limitations) of the Peacemarch, and also includes an analysis of the composition and aims of the official Soviet Peace Committee. It is a revised text of her article in The Guardian *of August 13, 1982. Danielle Grünberg's account appears here for the first time.*

END and CND have received many enquiries about this new initiative. We have decided to present a selection of the documents available to us now, in chronological sequence, to enable readers to form their own judgments. The documents drawn upon here come from very many sources—some which might be thought to be 'Cold War', some of an impartial stance, and some from the peace movement itself. We thank all the institutions, individuals, and newspapers drawn upon: our particular thanks to The Guardian *for permission to republish Jean Stead's major article and to the* New Yorker *for the excerpt from 'Talk of the Town'.*

11 Russians Open Antinuclear Drive

By JOHN F. BURNS
Special to The New York Times

MOSCOW, June 4 — The Soviet Union, a strong backer of peace campaigns in Western countries, found itself today with an embryonic peace movement of its own that aims to be as independent of Government control as groups in the United States and Western Europe.

The 11 members of the group who announced its formation at a news conference for Western reporters said their goal was a lowering of the danger of nuclear war without prejudice to the interests of the Soviet Union or the United States. They said that since this was also the professed object of the Soviet authorities they saw no reason why their initiative should be stifled.

But a spokesman for the founders, Sergei Batovrin, a 25-year-old artist, made it plain that the impetus for the group's establishment flowed from their perception of the official Soviet Committee for the Defense of Peace as an instrument of Soviet foreign policy, incapable of advancing disarmament proposals not previously sanctioned by the Kremlin.

Although the members of the group are not dissidents, Mr. Batovrin said, they believe that it is important that "the enormous creative potential" of ordinary people in the Soviet Union be harnessed in the quest for peace.

Street Canvass Planned

Mr. Batovrin said the group intended to canvass for new members among friends and by approaching people on the street, and to develop new ideas to complement the Kremlin's official "peace program." Another member of the group, Vladimir Fleishgakker, an engineer, acknowledged that this was a challenge of a kind to the authorities since it was "the Soviet tradition that nobody expresses his opinion until he is asked for it."

Nonetheless, Mr. Batovrin said the group hoped for tolerance. "We do not want to be a counterweight to the authorities, but to work alongside them," he said. "If they understand us correctly they will not apply repressive measures to us. Our press always says that everyone should take part in the peace movement, and we see no contradiction between that and what we are doing."

The group's anxiety that officials might see the matter differently was reflected in the care that was taken to summon reporters by word of mouth, avoiding use of telephones. K.G.B. surveillance that is commonly evident when foreign reporters meet with dissidents or other private groups was not apparent outside the cramped suburban apartment where the news conference was held, but past experience does not augur well for the group.

Generally, the Kremlin suppresses any private group that becomes active in an area of state interest, and the practice has been starkly evident in matters involving disarmament.

The unofficial group founded today signaled its desire to remain politically impartial by adopting a symbol that combines a Western-style "ban the bomb" emblem with a dove, the device of the official Soviet disarmament committee.

New York Times, 5 June 1982

Here are more details on the Independent Peace Group in Moscow. . .

So far they have made available three documents:

1. An Appeal to the Moscow City Council (Mossovet) suggesting to proclaim Moscow a Nuclear Free Zone.
2. An Appeal to the governments of the USA and USSR to stop all the nuclear tests.
3. Programme of Actions aimed at improving trust between the peoples of the USA and USSR, containing nine points:
   1. Organisation of an exchange programme for school children of the two countries.
   2. Open TV discussions between representatives of the two governments shown in full in both countries with possibility for the people to question the speakers by the 'phone.
   3. A common programme of peace propaganda obligatory in the Soviet and American schools and text-books.
   4. Opening of a Soviet Culture Centre in Washington and of American culture Centre in Moscow with a free access for the people.
   5. A creation of the Soviet-American mediatory bureau for those seeking to re-unite their families or to help those wishing to marry.
   6. A creation of the Soviet-American Medical centre for conducting joint research.
   7. A creation of a mediating organisation for those wishing to correspond (A Pen-Friends Bureau).
   8. Regular joint Soviet-American space flights and general cooperation in the field.
   9. A creation of the Soviet-American Institute of Public Opinion with authority to conduct public opinion polls independently in both countries, on the questions relating to peace and mutual trust.

Further on, the members of the Group publicised their telephone numbers inviting people to call them during weekends if they have any other suggestions. This latter was a reason why the Soviet authorities have cut their telephones so quickly.

(This information was provided by a Brussels-based organisation 'USSR News Brief on Human Rights').

Please circulate

American Friends Service Committee
U.S.A.

Moscow, July 8 1982

Dear colleagues,

We, supporters of the trust creation between the Soviet Union and the United States, have advanced on June 4 1982 our *'Appeal to the governments and the public of the USSR and the USA'*. We have got many proposals from the Soviet citizens after this call about starting grassroot initiatives for the trust creation. People understand that it is important to eradicate hatred as the feeding material of arm races.

Currently, we are trying to introduce our proposals into the activities of the *'Peace–82'* march (it starts in Sweden to be in Moscow by the end of this July). There are handicaps in our work, such as house arrests to isolate us. It was the case on June 27 1982, the day of our planned peace manifestation in Moscow. Please be vigilant regarding our fate during the Moscow phase of the *'Peace–82'* march.

In our specific conditions, with the lack of prior independent public activism, it is literally a vital matter for our cause to borrow from the experience of your peace efforts. Now our supporters here are in a dynamic phase of self-education; much depends on manifestations of solidarity.

We would welcome any forms of exploratory or working contacts. Please arrange messages and personal visits, circulate our documentation and comment it. Newsmen know how to find us, it is easy in fact. But now it is really urgent for the colleagues in the peace cause TO START KNOW EACH OTHER.

Various strata of the Soviet society are represented among our supporters: scientists and workers, artists and writers, clergy and laity, Russians, Jews and other ethnic minorities, etc.

Personal contacts from abroad seem to be the key element of moral support in the present initial phase of our activities. Obscurantists who are against us here can't suffocate us under the umbrella of publicity and visits. International solidarity as well as our own strict law-abiding conduct have already

resulted in some victories. On the wave of mass protests there are indications of the end of the house arrest for our colleague Sergei Batovrin, an artist and a co-author of the initial 'appeal' (the arrest is almost a month long).

There is a lot of important work ahead. We expect that some of our peace proposals may be acceptable for realisation by grassroot efforts, and not in too distant future. Your help is critical in it. To begin with, we have fixed August 6 1982 as THE DAY FOR OUR PUBLIC MANIFESTATION PLUS FOR ROUND TABLE TALKS ON THE TRUST ESTABLISHING. We invite you to join us: by messages, by similar activities in your cities, or, perhaps, by delegating participants who happen to be in Moscow on that day.

We hope to hear from you.

With our friendly handshakes and our open hearts

The group for establishing trust between the USSR and the USA.

[A list of sixteen names and addresses follows]:

P.S. The postal services are not always reliable and it is imperative for us to send several copies of this letter in various ways.

THE PEACEMARCH AND THE MOSCOW INDEPENDENT GROUP

Jean Stead

It was the late Eugenie Constantinovitch Fyodorov, first man across the North Pole, friend of President Brezhnev, president of the Soviet Peace Committee and Hero of the Soviet Union, who agreed last November to allow a group of Norwegian women to march against nuclear weapons through Soviet cities.

By the time five of the women arrived in Moscow in February to complete the arrangements, they were no longer so welcome. Fyodorov had died and the march, it seemed, was no longer on. Then, just before they were about to leave for home in defeat, the decision was reversed. Yuri Zhukov, political commentator of *Pravda* and a deputy of the Supreme Soviet, had won the battle to become the new president—and had used the idea of the women's peace march as one of his election programme attractions.

This illustration of the conflict within the Soviet Peace Committee is typical of the dilemma it faces in trying to relate to the Western European peace movement. The Peace Committee has only 450 members and in the past has been the final resting home for distinguished spacemen and women, for Arctic and Antarctic explorers, actors, writers and scientists, and for every distinguished name—including Shostakovitch—needing a post with honour that is not too onerous.

It is a sort of Russian version of the Royal Society, attached to the Academy of Science, a recognition that since the catastrophe of the Second World War nothing is more important to the average citizen than not repeating it.

But in 1979, the year when the NATO countries decided to modernise their theatre weapons and place cruise missiles in Western Europe—which alone would be capable of

delivering 5,500 Hiroshimas into the Soviet Union—a decision was made in the Soviet Union to bring the Peace Committee into the front line of international politics—in fact, to update it.

The praesidium of the Academy of Science decided with the Peace Committee, to found a scientific council on Research into the problems of Peace and Disarmament. Research is also carried out through the Institute of World Economy and International Relations, which has 200 members, one of them Fyodorov's son Yuri. The creation of a non-nuclear Nordic and northern Russian zone, the examination of United States and Canadian affairs through a special institute, the problems of disposal of nuclear arms under a disarmament programme are among the subjects of full-time research and academic publications.

At the same time, it was decided that the World Peace Council, founded in 1950 and later largely shrugged off by CND and the Committee of 100 because of its overtly Soviet bias, should be given a new image. It has a new secretary, Professor Tair Tairov, a cosmopolitan international lawyer, well informed on the West. Based in Helsinki, he was mainly responsible for securing the visas for the Norwegian women's march, and for smoothing out the arguments that the Scandinavians got involved in, both among themselves and with the Soviet Peace Committee.

When the five Norwegians returned home last February, they invited delegations from Sweden, Denmark and Finland to join them on the march that they were organising.

Most of the marchers—about 250—were liberal professional women, mostly Labour-voting with a few Communists from Finland. With them were about 20 men, mostly academics and students. Many of them were abysmally ignorant about the Soviet Union, but they were well boned-up on nuclear defence strategy and were able to argue forcefully the case for unilateral disarmament. Scandinavians have no nuclear weapons.

It was felt to be something of a compliment that the Soviets thought it worthwhile to put five of the leading members of the Soviet Peace Committee with the march right from its start in Stockholm, including the organising

secretary, Grigory Lokshyn, a man who would not look out of place as a trade union negotiator in this country.

The Russians found it difficult at first to deal with the women, who insisted on democratic participation and lengthy meetings on every detail of the pre-planning and on an inquest into every occasion when the Soviets appeared to break the agreements they had made on how the march should be conducted. The Danes even refused to have a leader, so that there was no-one for Lokshyn to negotiate with. But during the hot, thirsty marches, the long train rides, and the nights on the bare school floors in Finland, an uneasy sort of trust began to form between the Russians and the Scandinavians.

The Russians developed a respect for the women, who were uncompromising in their arguments, and uncomplaining about the physical hardship. But they also allowed them an unusual degree of tolerance in their eccentricities. For there is no doubt that the Soviets are pinning most of their hopes for an end to the nuclear arms race on the effectiveness of the Western European peace movement. Their domestic resources are seriously drained by weapons expenditure. They feel surrounded and threatened by the American bases. 'There are no Soviet military bases round the United States, but there are 2,000 hostile bases round our country. That is why we have to play with black figures', said Yakov Lomko, the deputy chairman of the Soviet Union of Journalists, at a meeting with a marchers' delegation in Moscow.

The weeping on the streets at the sight of the peace banners was testimony to the state of shock which much of the older generation is still in, many decades after the German occupation and 20 million deaths of the last war. They seem barely able to grasp the idea of another war, certainly not one with nuclear weapons. There are no Panorama programmes or newspaper reports to present or discuss the notion of unilateral nuclear disarmament. The food shortages (particularly acute this year), the housing difficulties, the deprivation of not being able to travel overseas, are all more important preoccupations, the Scandinavians discovered. One 20-year-old Norwegian student met an architect standing on the pavement during the march in

Leningrad and followed up his invitation to phone him. She went to his house for supper with his family—a fairly lavish event, like all Russian hospitality. There they explained that they were happy to join in demonstrations for peace, which everyone wanted. But they explained that people were far more concerned about getting more food and an easier life than in getting rid of the SS20s.

One English teacher in Moscow, also a sympathetic spectator, confessed, 'The truth is we are just too lazy to think about things that are wrong here. It is easier to ignore them because everyday life is so difficult.' A devotee of Iris Murdoch, she exemplified that curious Russian blend of extensive education and lack of curiosity about the world outside.

In spite of their research and their meetings with the Scandinavians, the Soviets still do not understand the Western peace movement. They see it as a movement that can be used to persuade NATO to call off the modernisation programme. They are not able to grasp that it is essentially a protest campaign that is joined in strength by the ecological movement. The last thing that Russians could cope with is a similar free-thinking ecological movement in their own country—yet they now have their own sizeable pollution problems.

So they are caught in a dilemma. They welcome a powerful peace movement, but only if it is like the Soviet Peace Committee which has an establishment voice and echoes anti-American opinions. In the Soviet Union there are over 100 local committees in various regions, all of them led by prominent public figures but, so far as is known, reflecting only standard views. It is rather like a peace movement which has its main sympathetic ties to the Ministry of Defence and the Department of Energy. Yet it is a movement of people whose feelings of fear of another war—feelings that the Scandinavians began at last to understand—make them glad that the Russians have nuclear weapons as a defence against the Americans. It was the United States they continually reminded the Scandinavian women who were the first to arm themselves with atomic weapons and the only people to actually drop atomic bombs.

The march, though it sometimes resembled a cultural delegation or a discussion group, can be considered a success —if for no other reason than it held out a hand of friendship with no strings attached. Its main failure lay in not securing a meeting with the 16 leaders of the unofficial peace movement in Moscow. This included two distinguished professors who were sent to a detention centre for 'alcoholics and hooligans' for 15 days while the marchers were in town, and two others who had been under intermittent house arrest.

Eva Nordland—an initiator of the march and a sociology lecturer at Oslo University—suggested a meeting and was told by members of the Soviet Peace Committee that it might be possible. These, after all, were a group people would be wanting to know about when they got home. Were they genuine or were they 'plants' to bring discord to the march? Grigory Lokshyn, the secretary of the Peace Committee, told them that they were drunks, 'anti-socials', provocateurs working for the CIA. At a stormy meeting just before leaving Moscow, two members of the Soviet Peace Committee gave different explanations for the arrests, one of them being that one of the professors had hit a conductor on a bus. The odds are that probably no one knew the exact details.

In the end, and time being short, the women decided not to seek a meeting with the unofficial group. They were under pressure, they were tired—but it seemed like a mistake then, and it still does. The Scandinavians put neutrality first in all questions except the banning of nuclear weapons, and it was this belief in the importance of neutrality that explained all their actions, or lack of them.

In the end, only one member of the march went to see the dissidents—Danielle Grünberg, half Danish, living in Britain and sponsored on the march by END and CND. The ten KGB men outside in cars were obviously on guard.

Mrs Olga Medvedkov is the wife of Professor Yuri Medvedkov. He was chief of the laboratory of human ecology at the Institute of Geography of the Academy of Science, formerly at the Chief Ecology Unit of the World Health Organisation in Geneva, and then subsequently in detention. She was the spokesman for the five members of the group.

They were living together in a single flat for security. The KGB men had told them to go no further than the end of the road. They made three points—that they were not dissidents, that they agreed with the Soviet policy on nuclear disarmament, and that they had been surprised and shocked by the KGB searches and seizure of documents which followed their launch of a petition on June 4. Their proposals, sent at the time to the Soviet Peace Committee, had received no acknowledgement or reply.

They asked us for contacts in the West European peace movement and seemed strangely naive about the varying politics of the organisation they had been in touch with. They said, for instance, that they had been most grateful for the interest in them shown by the 'Voice of America'.

Their aim was to secure greater trust between the Soviet Union and the United States, through the creation of an international independent peace group; the establishing of international groups of scientists for research and analysis on disarmament proposals; the abstention from mutual accusations from both sides; the guaranteeing of open exchange of opinion between Soviet people in the spheres of disarmament, the organisation of joint TV programmes, and the creation of a non-governmental Soviet-American commission to research public opinion. They also advocated the notion that Moscow itself should be declared a nuclear-free zone.

A group of ten of the world's leading geographers, two of them from Britain, met Dr Medvedkov when they were in Moscow for a conference in June. He was highly distinguished in his field, but they found him in severe trouble with the authorities because, he said, he had applied for an exit visa with his wife, who is Jewish. He had lost his job, had his professorship taken away from him, had been prevented from attending the conference and told them he was about to be stripped of his degrees. He was no longer allowed to teach. Dr Derek Diamond, of the London School of Economics, who went to see him at the flat of a friend, says that because his special interest was social geography, which would involve him comparing the quality of environment in rich and poor areas, he would automatically be in

disfavour. 'We were very disturbed by the way he was being treated. He just wanted out.'

Although the peace campaign had just been launched, he did not talk of it to Dr Diamond. But he told him that he thought the world was in terrible danger of nuclear war, that the Soviet Union was re-arming too heavily, and that he and some others were appealing to the Soviet Peace Committee for action.

In Geneva, Dr Medvedkov did research in epidemiology, now part of the communicable diseases division of the WHO. Colleagues in London who have worked with him on and off during the past ten years were surprised to hear he had been campaigning for peace. One, Professor David Smith, of Queen Mary College, University of London, said he had never mentioned the subject during two evening-long discussions in Moscow last June, during a conference of international geographers. I told the Peace Committee that we had been to see the group, and one of the Scandinavian leaders of the march said subsequently that they thought the Soviet attitude to the march changed completely from that day. It was the last day in Moscow—the rest of the party had been on a river boat trip. Certainly, for the first time, men were obviously on guard all over the Moscow hotel foyer. Women flying in to join the march were held up for three hours while all luggage was searched. Guards were obvious on the station platforms, within the trains, and on the marches for the remaining five days of the tour. The feeling of freedom and open exchange had gone.

Why had this happened? Had the KGB decided that things had gone too far and taken the matter out of the hands of the Soviet Peace Committee and into their own? Or had the Committee decided that for themselves? Had the women's march wandered into the crossfire of a situation they did not even know about? Why was this unofficial group of academics not allowed to join the march as they wanted to, when the Soviet Peace Committee had said repeatedly that all citizens were free to crusade for peace?

There are, as yet, no answers. The unofficial group said they had not timed their launching date to coincide with the march, but had sent copies of their proposals to the

Women for Peace headquarters in Oslo. The Norwegians said they had never received them. They returned home with two suspicions in their minds. One was that the reason for the importance of Professor Medvedkov was that, as an ecologist, he was probably already in trouble for campaigning on the dangers of nuclear pollution. The other was that even though the unofficial group appeared sincere in wanting to link up with other peace groups in the West, they might be being used by anti-Soviet organisations without their knowledge.

The leaders of the march said they had already had experience of attempts to disrupt their peace march from Copenhagen to Paris last year. The Russians may be anxious to stop independent peace campaigners coming into the open but the NATO countries also see their growing peace movements as a formidable threat to the stationing of cruise missiles in Europe next year—and are likely to do whatever they can to discredit them.

PEACE MARCH '82

Danielle R. Grünberg

'Why are you marching in the West? Go to Moscow!,' said the critics of last year's Peace March from Copenhagen to Paris. This was what started off the Nordic Peace March '82, organised by Women for Peace from Scandinavia, a three-week journey covering 3,000 miles by foot, boat and train, from Stockholm (via Helsinki, Leningrad and Moscow) to Minsk.

The main slogans: 'No to Nuclear Weapons in Europe, East and West!', 'No to Nuclear Weapons in the World!', 'Yes, to Disarmament and Peace!' had been easily agreed on between the Scandinavian women and the Russians More difficult to accommodate was the Scandinavian womens' wish to end the march in Moscow. 'This', the Russians said, 'would be seen as a direct threat to the Soviet Government', and so the march ended in Minsk instead. At a later stage in the negotiations the Russians insisted on linking Peace March '82 with a march organised by them, from Moscow to Vienna, but finally appeared to give in on this point. And so a compromise was reached.

The Russians had laid on a special 'Peace Train' for the long stretches between towns as there was no way 3,000 miles could be walked in three weeks.

The first meeting with Soviet people, in the small border town of Vyborg, was rapturous, warm and full of music, dancing and flowers. From then on the pattern was set. On arrival in the towns, mass meetings were held, mostly with 'invited people', followed by a march to the hotel where participants were staying (at their own cost).

Leningrad, was for me a particularly memorable occasion. A scorching hot Sunday in July, with many citizens obviously away enjoying the weekend pleasures of the countryside—and yet as we began walking up the central Kirov Street—

the 300 Scandinavians, forming the core of the march, seemed suddenly to disappear into a sea of Russian people—thronging the width and breadth of the street. Some older women, less inclined to participate, stood watching by the side of the pavement—crying at the sight of the peace banners, reviving the memory of their dead relatives. 'The people of our country want peace', said a Russian woman, 'but they feel surrounded and threatened by the United States. We only have nuclear weapons to protect ourselves.' Conversation rarely reached beyond this point.

In Moscow the spontaneity seemed to vanish and the marching was shorter and much subdued. Western correspondents, who initially claimed the march would never reach Moscow, now stated that Moscovites had not been informed of the marchers' arrival. There were certainly fewer people in evidence and more plain clothes police. But whatever the immediate shortcomings, the march was a breakthrough. It was the first time Soviet people had the chance to see an independent Peace March in their country.

The main failure lay in the marchers' unwillingness to make contact with the unofficial peace group. In Leningrad we had heard of the arrest of two members of the group and since no-one else seemed willing to go, I decided to meet them in Moscow, and went to their flat accompanied by Jean Stead of *The Guardian* and Cees van der Vel, a Dutch journalist.

The flat, in a high rise block on the outskirts of Moscow, was heavily guarded by KGB. We were greeted eagerly by five members of the group (mostly scientists and intellectuals).

Olga Medvedkov, doctor of Geographical Science, is the wife of Professor Yuri Medvedkov. Olga outlined the aims of the group. In their Appeal of June 4, which was sent to the Governments of the USA and USSR they suggest: the creation of private proposals to establish trust and disarmament; the creation of international independent peace groups; the establishing of international groups of scientists to research and analyse disarmament proposals; the abstention from mutual accusations, on both sides, in the press; the organising of open exchange of opinion between Soviet

people in the sphere of trust and disarmament.

She said they had received scores of proposals from Soviet people, some of which were: the creation of marriage agencies between citizens of the US and the USSR; the creation of joint cultural and medical centres; the organising of joint TV programmes; the establishing of a non governmental Soviet-American commission to research public opinion in the sphere of disarmament; and the declaration of Moscow as a nuclear-free zone. These proposals and their Appeal had been sent to the Soviet Peace Committee but remained unanswered. They had collected hundreds of signatures on a petition, mostly from students, but all their documents and papers had been confiscated by the KGB as anti-Soviet publications. This was followed by illegal house arrests, disconnection of telephones, searches were made and members constantly followed.

Here are the notes which I took of our conversation:

> Two well-known members of the group, both professors are in prison now as hooligans. When I [Olga Medvedkov] went down to buy some food I was followed by 8 men down to the shop. One week after the group was created three members were under house arrest, Vladimir Fleishgakker was under house arrest for three weeks and his telephone was disconnected. Sergei Rosenoer was under house arrest for two weeks.—Under Soviet law house arrest is illegal but privately it is done. They don't tell you anything but just come outside your door and stop you from going anywhere.—When I told a solicitor about this he said he knew nothing about it.
>
> On the 20 June Vladimir Fleishgakker went to vote at the Moscow election of members of the local Soviet. He was kept in his car by the KGB and could not vote.
>
> On 27 June the group was going to organise a peace demonstration near the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Moscow under the slogans—'No More Hiroshima's' and 'Peace through Trust not Fear' and they were kept in their flats.
>
> On 16 July two members of the group, Yuri Medvedkov and Yuri Hronopulo were arrested as hooligans in the street at midnight. They had left the flat at 10 o'clock and disappeared. As they didn't come back the others understood that they had been arrested. They

had wanted to join Peace March '82, in Leningrad. Olga Medvedkov phoned the main police station but they did not know where they were. She then went to the KGB but got nowhere. He had left the flat in his shirtsleeves and had no jacket with him. She wanted to make sure he had a jacket as he had just had pneumonia. She then took a car with some of the others and they found them approx. two kilometers outside Moscow in an alcoholic prison. They found out that they had been arrested on charges of hooliganism coming out of a station. Just before the arrest they had been on their way to meet other members of the group to discuss Peace March '82.

Two other members, Victor Block and Gennady Krochik were sent to Novosibirsk for the period 21-28 July. They are both physicists and were told they had to go there. No reason was given.

The group did not join the Soviet Peace Committee as it was organised by the government and is not independent. They had asked for their help but were ignored from the beginning. Peace and trust cannot only be on a political and government level. It must be discussed amongst ordinary people.—The Peace Committees are all controlled. It is not possible in the USSR for all people to come and meet Peace March '82. People don't want war but they can't discuss specific conditions of trust. The peace groups are fiction. All their work is support for the Soviet government, they don't work. At the Academy of Sciences in Moscow we have no meetings about peace. We did have a meeting to express support for the Argentine Junta during the Falkland war and to judge the UK as aggressors. There was no discussion just an official point of view.—There is a Soviet Peace Fund but what they do is not open in the press.

The group was asked how long they had been preparing their programme and they said that they had been discussing it through the winter.

They do not regard themselves as dissidents or against their government. Peace is a matter for everybody. They were surprised at the government's reaction and thought it fantastic. At first they thought they had been misunderstood. They had sent their proposals to groups in the US and to the Scandinavian Women. Nothing reaches them through the post. Through the Voice of America they had heard of support for their group at SSDII in a short mention by

Senator E. Kennedy.—They had also sent their Appeal to Geneva to the START negotiators.

Olga Medvedkov said that she had never experienced repression like this before. I asked her if they hadn't expected trouble when they started and she replied. 'It is difficult to live only the official way. The struggle for peace is so important and not against the government. It has to be dealt with despite repression.'—'We cannot raise our voices for peace quietly', she added.

They gave us the following 'Declaration to Peace March '82':

> We declare, it is not enough to meet on the streets. We want to discuss conditions of trust. We would like to work with peace groups in other countries. We would like to meet the participants of Peace March '82 and want to establish trust between peoples of our country.—We expect to express your attitude to our group and repression and hope you will raise your voices.

They added that they were disappointed that the peace marchers did not come and see them but at the same time they appreciated it was difficult.

The group had collected three hundred signatures, mostly from students, on a petition but this had been confiscated together with other papers and their typewriters.

They added that their peace work had nothing to do with the fact that some of them had asked for exit visas.

They don't just want discussion but to build a monument of trust for peace in different countries, first in the USA and USSR.

They didn't know what would happen to them when the peace marchers had left. But they hadn't done anything bad.—'It's our underground. We only struggle', said Olga Medvedkov.

Following our visit some of the Scandinavian women said that they thought the Soviet attitude to the march changed completely from then on. Certainly there seemed to be more problems. In Minsk three young pacifists were prevented from joining the march although a small group later managed to communicate with them. The Soviet organisers 'suddenly' decided to make official a visit to the Khatyn war memorial outside Minsk, where 186 villages were burned to the ground by the Nazis, easily confused in many peoples minds with Katyn (outside Smolensk) where 4,000-6,000 Polish officers were killed in 1941, probably by the Russians. The march nearly split at this stage but was saved by a quiet, dignified sit-down protest by those who refused to go. We also discovered that Peace March '82, in breach of the original agreement, was being linked by the Soviets with their own march from Moscow to Vienna (via Budapest and Bratislava). *Soviet Weekly* and the Hungarian party paper *Nepszabadsag* stated clearly that the Scandinavian women's march was continuing to Vienna.

In conclusion, most participants felt that the march was a success, a definite breakthrough in East-West relations. Despite many difficulties it had been possible for two widely different groups to work together for a common cause.

Through the initiative and hard work of a small group of dedicated Scandinavian women, a major breakthrough in East-West *peoples* relations had been achieved--and this--pleasing to the Russians--was done without bringing down the walls of the Kremlin.

Sergei Batovrin	26 years,	artist	followed
Victor Blok	36	physics DPH	is sent on a mission
Boris Kaluzhuy	37	physics DPH	
Genmady Krochik	33	physics DPH	is sent on a mission
Sergei Rosenoer	29	mathematician	
Oleg Radsinsky	26	philologist	serch; followed
Mark Reitman	50	mathematician DPH	
Igor Sobkov	33	physician	
Mary Fleishgakker	29	engineer	followed
Vladimir Fleishgakker	28	engineer	followed
Yuri Hronopulo	47	physics Professor	arest
Yuri Medvedkov	54	geographer Professor	arest
Olga Medvedkova	33	geographer DPH	followed
Valery Godyak	41	physics DPH	serch; followed
Vladimir Brodsky	38	physician	followed

N.B. This list of members of the group was written down and given to Danielle when she visited them at Mrs Medvedkov's flat. DPH is Doctor of Philosophy (Ph.D.): for 'serch' read 'searched'.

END London Group
227 Seven Sisters Road
London N4 2DA

29/6/82

Dear Mr Brezhnev,

We have been following closely the progress of the new independent peace group in Moscow.

We were very pleased to learn of their formation and agree with their reported aims of establishing nuclear-free zones, stopping nuclear weapons testing, and working towards detente between the USA and the USSR.

As you may know, the aims of END go further than this. We are campaigning to rid Britain and the rest of Europe of nuclear weapons. By 'Europe' we mean both East and West: one of our slogans is 'no cruise, no Pershing II, no SS20s'.

We very much appreciate the publicity given to our campaign in the USSR and we hope this letter will be positively reported in the Soviet press, as have previous END initiatives. We do believe that the USSR has made several moves recently towards detente and disarmament. However, it would detract from the credibility of these moves if the Soviet government were to stifle the activities of this new peace group.

We therefore appeal to you to allow the registration of this group with the Mos-Soviet, as requested, so that they may continue their activities. We were very concerned to read that the telephones of Sergei Batovrin and others have been cut off and that Mr Oleg Radzinski has been threatened with the termination of his studies unless he withdraws his support.

This contravenes the spirit of the Helsinki Final Act and also goes against Article 50 of the Soviet constitution, adopted in 1977. . . 'citizens of the USSR are guaranteed freedom of speech, of the press, and of assembly, meetings, street processions and demonstrations'. We note with consternation that the USSR is also violating the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which you have ratified, in particular Article 19 which states that. . .

'everyone has the right to hold opinions without interference' and Article 25. . . 'every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity. . . without unreasonable restrictions. . . to take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen representatives. . .'

We share the convictions of this newly formed peace group that the questions of war, peace, and disarmament are too important to be left to governments, and that citizens should have the right to participate in the search for peace. We therefore call on you to allow their voices to be heard throughout the Soviet Union and to listen to their requests.

Yours sincerely
Carol Freeman for
London END group

[We have received copies of a number of similar letters of protest or enquiry, from individuals or organisations in the peace movement. Some of them received replies similar to the one recorded by the London END group below.]

MR ROGER MANSER
LONDON END CONVENOR
CO 227 SEVEN SISTERS ROAD
LONDON 4 ENGLAND

EYE RECEIVED YOUR LETTER STOP YOU HAVE BEEN MISLED BY FALSE REPORTS OF WESTERN MASS MEDIA STOP NOT A SINGLE PERSON REPRESENTANG PEACE MOVEMENT IN SOVIET UNION IS BEING REPRESSED AND OF COURSE NOONE OF THEM HAS EVER BEEN ARRESTED STOP DURING ONLY TWO MONTHS IN CURRENT YEAR MAY AND JUNE SOVIET PEACE CHAMPIONS HELD ON OCCASION OF SECOND SPECIAL SESSION OF UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY WHICH HAS TAKEN PLACE IN NEWYORK USA OVER TWENTY THOUSAND RALLIES DEMONSTRATIONS MEETINGS MANIFESTATIONS WHICH WERE ATTENDED BY OVER SIHTY MILLION PEOPLE STOP FURTHER WHEN IN JULY MEMBERS OF 1982 PEACE MARCH FROM DANMARK NORWAY SWEDEN FINLAND AND SOVIET UNION WERE MARCHING THROUGH TERRITORY OF USSR FROM VYBORG UP TO MINSK VIA LENINGRAD KALININ MOSCOW AND SMOLENSK THEY WERE JOINED ALONG THEIR ROUTE BY OVER TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND SOVIET PEOPLE STOP OUR MOVEMENT IS FULLY INDEPENDENT AND IT DOES NOT NEED APPROVAL BY GOVERNMENT OF ANY SUCH WCTION FOR BENEFIT OF PEACE STOP AS FOR TINY GROUP OF ELEVEN PEOPLE PICTURED BY WESTERN PRESS AS INDEPENDENT PEACE MOVEMENT NOBODY OF THESE PEOPLE HAS EVER PARTICIPATED IN ABOVE LISTED ACTIONS OF PEACE ADVOCATES AND EYE AM NOT ACQUAINTED WITH ANY OF THEM STOP EYE WAS INFORMED THAT TWO OF THESE PEOPLE NAMELY YURI MEDVEDKOV AND YURI KHROPOPULO HAD BEATEN A WOMAN IN A BUS AND WERE SENTENCED BY DISTRICT PEOPLES COURT TO FIFITEEN DAYS ON CHARGE OF HOOLIGANISM STOP FURTHERMORE NOONE OF THEM HAS EVER REQUESTED REGISTRATION WITH MOSSOVIET WHICH IS ABSOLUTELY UNNECESSARY STOP THUS OUR SOVIET PEACE COMMITTEE HAD BEEN ELECTED BY ALLUNION PEACE CONFERENCE AND WE NEVER SOUGHT FOR ANY KIND OF OFFICIAL REGISTRATION STOP EYE SHALL SEND YOU BY AIRMAIL PICTURES OF SOME OF MENTIONED MASS ACTIONS OF SOVIET PEACE ADVOCATES HELD IN MAY AND JUNE THIS YEAR WHICH REFLECT BETTER THAN ANY WORDS GENUINE MASS MOVEMENT OF SOVIET PEACE CHAMPIONS STOP YOURS

YURI ZHUKOV CHAIRMANT SOVIET PEACE COMMITTEE

END PRESS RELEASE

Extract from telegram of END to Leonid Brezhnev, 19 July, 1982.

'. . . END is outraged by the jailing of Medvedkov and Khronopulo. Contact between all peace groups East and West is essential. Enjoin you to allow peace marchers to talk to *everyone* in peace work, release those in jail and end all harassment of independent group. . .'

(no reply as yet received).

CND PROTESTS OVER ARRESTS OF SOVIET PEACE ACTIVISTS

CND today endorsed in principle a letter of protest to Leonid Brezhnev by END (European Nuclear Disarmament) about reports that two members of an independent peace organisation in the USSR have been arrested.

We regret that these arrests coincide with the Scandinavian womens' peace march which is now crossing the USSR.

This would have been an ideal opportunity for representatives from a Western peace movement to meet with members of an independent peace movement in the USSR as well as members of the Soviet Peace Committee.

CND welcomed the formation of the new peace group and agreed with their reported aims of establishing nuclear-free zones, stopping nuclear weapons testing and working towards detente between the USA and the USSR.

With the threat of nuclear war facing us all, we believe that people everywhere have the right to put pressure on their governments to achieve nuclear disarmament.

CND's protest is in line with our previous protest to the Turkish Government over the arrest of members of the Turkish peace group.

CND will support initiatives either independent of governments, or government initiatives—both east and west—to achieve world peace through nuclear disarmament.

(CND Press Release, 20 July 1982)

AN APPEAL ON BEHALF OF SOVIET PEACE ACTIVISTS FROM THE AMERICAN PEACE MOVEMENT

To: Leonid I. Brezhnev, General Secretary, Central Committee, Communist Party of the Soviet Union

As activists in the American peace movement dedicated to the abolition of all nuclear weapons, we protest the actions of the Soviet government in detaining independent Soviet peace activists and seeking to prohibit their activities.

Such actions—taken even as the United Nations Special Session on Disarmament was unfolding and after hundreds of thousands rallied on June 12 for nuclear disarmament—are a violation of the Helsinki Accords guaranteeing freedom of expression to which the Soviet Union is a signatory. We welcome the recent Soviet renunciation of first-use of nuclear weapons. However, it belies the Soviet claim to be 'peace-loving' when independent peace activists—our brothers and sisters in the movement—are labelled 'provocative, illegal and anti-social'.

Unity in the struggle for disarmament requires that all citizens of the world have the right to form peace movements independent of governmental or quasi-governmental control. Such independent peace committees are essential to building the broadest possible movement against nuclear arms and calling all nuclear powers to account for their arsenals.

As activists opposed to actions by the Reagan Administration that would escalate the arms race, we the undersigned call upon you to release Sergei Batovrin, now interned in a psychiatric hospital, and to cease harassment of the other independent activists and allow their voices, too, to be heard on this most vital of issues—the issue of survival in the shadow of nuclear war.

ORGANISATIONS ENDORSING THIS APPEAL
(list in formation)

Fellowship of Reconciliation
WarResisters League,
Democratic Socialists of America

SANE (National)
Metropolitan SANE
Americans for Democratic Action
West/East Peace and Democracy Project
Coalition for a New Foreign and Military Policy
Greenpeace, USA
Humanitas
Mobilisation for Survival
Scientists and Engineers for Political Action
Socialist Party, USA
Council for a Liveable World
Sojourners
Pax Christi

THE NEW YORKER

THE TALK OF THE TOWN

For the last several weeks, Jeri Laber, over at the Helsinki Watch Committee, has been forwarding us copies of telegrams she's been receiving from disarmament groups all over the country—or, rather, copies of copies of cables *they've* been receiving from Yuri Zhukov, chairman of the official Soviet Peace Committee, in answer to their protests on behalf of the eleven Moscow citizens who formed an independent peace group early in June, only to be ruthlessly suppressed during the next few weeks. ("YOU HAVE BEEN MISLED BY FALSE REPORTS OF WESTERN MASS MEDIA STOP," Zhukov's form reply went. "NOT SINGLE PERSON REPRESENTING PEACE MOVEMENT IN SOVIET UNION IS BEING REPRESSED AND OF COURSE NO ONE OF THEM HAS EVER BEEN ARRESTED STOP MOSCOW IS NOT CHICAGO STOP," and so on, for several pages, and then, "EYE HAD TO ENQUIRE ABOUT THE ISSUE OF YOUR CONCERN AND FINALLY EYE WAS INFORMED THAT TWO OF THESE PEOPLE. . . WERE SENETENCED BY DISTRICT PEOPLE'S COURT ON CHARGE OF HOLLIGANISM FOR BEATING A WOMAN IN BUS STOP YOU QUALIFY THEIR BEHAVIOUR AS EXAMPLE OF INDEPENDENT STRUGGLE FOR PEACE STOP EYE WOULD CALL IT FLAGRANT BREACH OF PEACE BUT OF COURSE EYE CANNOT INSIST THAT YOUR VIEW OF WHAT IS GOOD AND WHAT IS EVIL COINCIDE WITH MINE STOP"—which is about where we did stop reading his endless cable.) Anyway, all this made us all the more interested when Jeri Laber called early last week to tell us that one of the eleven independent Moscow peace activists, Mikhail Ostrovsky, along with his wife and their two small children, had recently been expelled from the Soviet Union and had just surfaced in New York City, in her office, and to ask if we would like to meet him. We would, we assured her. Among more serious reasons, we

were curious to find out what a Soviet hooligan would look like.

Ostrovsky looked young—young and earnest. Something like a Donatello sculpture: tall, lanky body; large, triangular head on a long, powerful neck. He was dressed in an orange T-shirt and crinkly new bluejeans. His hair was dark and wavy, and he had a neatly trimmed full beard. His eyes were large and seemed to keep changing their colour—brown? hazel? green? blue?—with the changing of his mood. He told us—by way of a fine translator (Ostrovsky's voice was deep and his English nonexistent)—that he was twenty-six years old and had been a dental technician, like his father before him. His mother, a doctor, was a loyal Party member, and, he explained, he had undergone a typical Soviet upbringing. Although Jewish, his family was not religious, and he had grown up without any particularly negative feelings about his lot or that of his countrymen. He had begun to be disillusioned with the Soviet system, he said, only after starting work as a dental technician in a state clinic. His eagerness to research modern (Western) technology was constantly undercut by his staid and reactionary supervisors; his enthusiasm, he was warned, was "anti-Socialist". In 1978, after several years of such frustrations, he and his young wife decided to emigrate, filed their papers, and were refused an exit visa. The authorities explained that they had failed to procure the necessary permission from their parents—a frequent excuse in such cases. "My own parents had granted permission, and so had my wife's father, but her mother had refused," Ostrovsky said. "We begged and begged her. I don't know—she feared the public shame, perhaps. At any rate, she refused. It wasn't a happy time. Soon she and we stopped speaking to one another, though all of us lived in the same apartment building. After a while, if we passed her in the hall, we'd turn our faces aside, and she would do the same—this despite the fact that in the meantime we'd had our two children. They remained strangers to her."

Once a Soviet applicant is refused a visa, his life becomes progressively more difficult. The Ostrovskys had become *refuseniks.* "At my job, I found myself working three times as hard for half the pay," Ostrovsky recalled. Increasingly

isolated from regular social intercourse, *refuseniks* often end up seeking out each other's company. In this context, Sergei Batovrin proved an important figure. Ostrovsky's eyes shone a deep blue when he spoke of his friend Batovrin. "He is actually a year younger than I am," Ostrovsky said, "but I look up to him and see him as an ideal human being." Like the Ostrovskys, Batovrin and his wife (and now their six-month-old baby) are *refuseniks.* Batovrin, the son of a high-level Soviet diplomat, grew up partly in New York City, where his father was stationed at the Soviet Mission to the United Nations. In Moscow, he was something of a hippie during the early seventies. He let his hair grow long, and became a Pop-style painter. His work never received official sanction, and a few years ago he organised a show, in his small apartment, of his own and other disapproved art—an enterprise that did little to endear him to the authorities.

"Batovrin is tremendously generous," Ostrovsky explained. "Tremendously outgoing. He knows everyone, and everyone is drawn to his home by the quality of the friendship and the conversation. He knows physicists and mathematicians, artists, other former hippies, psychiatrists, other *refuseniks.* We would all gather at his home at all hours to talk about our own situation, our country's, the world's. During the last several months, we spoke increasingly of the perils of war, and this is how a group of us decided to form our committee. The Soviet people truly want peace. This is perhaps the fundamental fact of Soviet existence—the memory of the war and the twenty million dead, and the longing for peace. You can be standing in line and people will be complaining about this or that, but then someone will say, 'Still, the most important thing is that we never have another war,' and everyone will agree. It has achieved the level of a folk saying. People say it, but they don't *do* anything. And here's a contradiction, because the other lesson from the war was the horror of being invaded, so that people support a big defense program. And they don't see the contradiction. The entire Soviet system is built on contradictions of this kind, and is designed to prevent people from thinking about them. People live with their eyes closed, and we were hoping to start the process of opening them."

We asked Ostrovsky to what extent the military budget—and, specifically, its nuclear component—was public knowledge.

"Well, very little of it, of course," he replied. "But that's why people have brains in their head, isn't it—to read between the lines?"

The Group to Establish Trust Between the USSR and the USA announced itself to the world on June 4, 1982, from Batovrin's apartment. According to Ostrovsky, the eleven members (about half of them were *refuseniks*) felt that a precondition of disarmament is trust and understanding between peoples, and their initial proposals therefore included such things as cultural and medical exchanges, regular cooperation on space missions, and the establishment of pen-pal networks. In addition, they proposed "open discussion between representatives of the two governments, to be broadcast over television and shown in full, with the opportunity for people to phone in questions to the speakers" and "a joint program for peace education, compulsory in Soviet and American schools and textbooks." They also proposed the formation of a four-sided committee, with representatives of the governments *and the peoples* of the two countries. "And another proposal," Ostrovsky recalled, smiling, his eyes hazel, "was an exchange of children—especially the children of leaders. Perhaps leaders would think twice before starting a war if their children were in each other's capitals." In all, the group issued thirty proposals. The dissemination of these proposals became especially difficult after June 12th, which was the day of the huge anti-nuclear demonstration in Central Park and was also the day when the Soviet authorities began cracking down on the group. During the next several weeks, most of its work was semi-underground. The members had to steer clear of the police. They launched a peace petition and gathered signatures from at least five hundred courageous souls—this despite the fact that copies were continually being seized by the police. One by one, the members were nabbed, hauled in, warned, sometimes released, sometimes not.

And then, in early July, Ostrovsky and his wife received word that their visa had been granted, even though her

mother still refused to approve their emigration. "This presented us with a dilemma," Ostrovsky said. "We had decided, in joining the group, to give up our attempt to emigrate. Instead, we would stay and fight for peace. Now we—and we alone among them all—were being granted our visa. I don't know why we were singled out. It was a kind of psychological warfare, perhaps—to force a wedge between us and the others. I did not want to leave my friends, and at first I wasn't going to. They encouraged me, however. They insisted that I would be of more service outside, spreading our story and our proposals. So we decided to go, but it was all in a tremendous hurry." The Ostrovskys travelled first to Italy, and in mid-August they arrived in New York City.

We asked Ostrovsky about Zhukov and the official Soviet Peace Committee.

"Well, you have to understand that official peace demonstrations in the Soviet Union are not at all like those here or in Western Europe," he replied. "They are never spontaneous. One isn't allowed to take part unless one is invited, and if one is invited one isn't allowed not to take part. And, of course, they're never critical of the official Soviet line."

We asked him what he and his friends had thought of the June 12th rally here in New York City.

"We didn't hear about it at the time," he replied. "I heard about it only after I got out. Occasionally, the Soviet press will mention the peace marches in the West, but they show only brief images on TV. The reason is simple: I remember one day looking at such a TV image and being amazed at the obviously handmade quality of the signs the demonstrators were carrying. Signs are *never* handmade in Soviet peace marches. The Soviet media don't want to give Soviet citizens any ideas."

We asked about the situation of his friends.

"I am concerned about all of them," he said. "All of them are being harassed. But I am especially concerned for Sergei Batovrin. On August 5th, Sergei staged another apartment show, this time of eighty-eight anti-war paintings. The next day, he was arrested and placed, against his will, in a psychiatric hospital. No doubt they are doing with him what they have done with others—forcibly drugging him

alternately with stimulants and with tranquillizers. This procedure has bad physical side effects, but they aren't so much interested in causing one pain. They simply want to destroy one's personality. After several months of this kind of thing, one emerges lifeless, without anything of one's former vitality and former nature. It's a terrible situation. He's a great and vital man."

Ostrovsky was silent for a moment, his eyes almost brown. He sighed. "The peril of war is extremely real today, and we must find some way out of the disaster," he said. "But this will come only if citizens in the Soviet Union can demonstrate and put pressure on their leaders, just as yours do here. We did not, when we got started, see ourselves as a dissident movement or a human-rights movement. But these two issues are inseparable in the Soviet Union today. If there are human rights, people can and will struggle for peace. If not, not. That is why the American peace movement must support people like Batovrin."

New Yorker, 13 September 1982.

Guardian, 10 September 1982

'Peacenik' free

THE Soviet peace campaigner, Sergei Batovrin has been released from a Moscow psychiatric hospital after being held there for more than a month, friends reported yesterday. Mr Batovrin was a leading member of an unofficial peace group set up to try to develop trust between the Soviet Union and the US. — Reuter.

Soviet Hospital Said to Forc Drugs on Peace Group Leadt

MOSCOW, Aug. 8 (AP) — A co founder of Moscow's only independent disarmament group is being administered depressant drugs against his will in the psychiatric hospital where he is being held, his wife said today.

Natasha Batovrin said during a telephone interview that her husband, Sergei, was being given pills four times a day and had been threatened with electric shock treatments if he did not take the medication. She said she had spent four hours with him today in Hospital No. 14 and that he seemed very tired and subdued after swallowing the tablets.

Mr. Batovrin, a 25-year-old artist, was arrested Friday at the home of another member of the independent peace group.

8/9/82

New York Times, Moscow 8 August 1982

25 August 1982

STATEMENT BY MIKHAIL OSTROVSKY IN NEW YORK

My friends and I first began talking about forming a peace group about eight months ago. We were concerned about the impasse in efforts to bring about disarmament, and saw that governments are too greatly burdened with their own interests and political considerations to resolve disarmament conflicts. We felt that there was a need for the Soviet public to become involved, and our first priority was to inform people about these issues. We also believed that increased contact with Western citizens and exchange of information with them would contribute greatly to the cause of peace, and that in particular, mutual trust between the citizens of the US and the USSR would be the best basis for disarmament.

We timed the announcement of our group's formation to coincide with the June opening of the UN Special Session on Disarmament. At first we did not anticipate that we would be harassed, but our group acted freely for only a week before members began to be detained by the police. and that is my chief concern now—the safety of my colleagues. Members of the group, which include 15 scientists, engineers and other professionals have been repeatedly held by the police, interrogated, and threatened with dismissal from their jobs or expulsion from their academic institutions because of their work for peace.

I am most concerned for Sergei Batovrin, the leader of the group, who was interned in a psychiatric hospital on August 6 and is being threatened with electric shock therapy unless he continues to take depressant drugs. He is also threatened with permission to emigrate, but he turned it down, saying he wanted to stay in Moscow and keep working with the peace group.

I think the Soviet authorities have made a serious mistake in preventing our group from operating freely. By suppressing our group, the Soviet Union undermines its image as peacemaker, and is in danger of losing its credibility with the American peace movement.

I call on organisations in the American peace movement to press for the release of Sergei Batovrin, and appeal to Soviet authorities to cease harassing our peace group.

These documents have been presented as information to the British and European peace movements, and to assist them in their discussions.

It is too early for us to draw conclusions. We are glad to conclude our documents with the news of the release of Sergei Batovrin from psychiatric hospital, perhaps in response to representations to the Soviet authorities from European and American peace organisations. We hope that the group may now be free to continue with constructive work.

Here are some questions which this episode raises:

Do you think that Western peace movements should engage in discussions only with 'official', state-supported Peace Committees or Councils in the Warsaw Pact countries? Or only with 'independent', unofficial groups, even when these are small, and isolated as 'dissidents'? Or with anyone who wants to talk?

On this question, END has favoured the last course: talk with anyone, provided it is on honest terms and that difficult issues (like Afghanistan, Poland and the SS20s) are not swept under the carpet. In the case of the Soviet Union, we do not suppose that the members of this small Moscow group are the only Soviet citizens who care about peace. Very important exchanges have taken place recently between physicians and churches, various forms of 'twinning' are going on, and we have favoured contact—as direct and unbureaucratic as possible.

In relation to the official Soviet Peace Committee, END has had more reservations. We are directly opposed to the manipulation of the European peace movement by Soviet-controlled agencies, such as the World Peace Council. But several British peace delegations have visited the USSR in the past two years, as guests of the Soviet Peace Committee, sponsored by Quaker Peace Service, the Northern Friends Peace Board, and (recently) by CND. Their reports have suggested that at least some officials of the Soviet Peace Committee are taking a more flexible attitude, and are willing to listen to criticisms of Soviet military policies.

It is possible that behind-the-scenes debates are going on in the official committees, and that these may be influenced

by Western visitors.

But *how* are we to influence them? Should Western peace movements now boycott further discussion with the Soviet Peace Committee until the right of unofficial groups (like the Moscow one) to engage independent activity is guaranteed? Or would this be to play the Cold War game?

This episode certainly played into the hands of the Cold Warriors—and responsibility for this lies squarely on the shoulders of the Soviet authorities who reacted with such paranoia. The event could have been damaging if the American and British peace movements had not at once come to the support of the Moscow group and thereby demonstrated their non-aligned stance. But it should not pass without notice that much of the Western media (with honourable exceptions) showed no interest at all in the programme and proposals of the new group: indeed, these often went unreported. Some newspapers—and also President Reagan—simply made use of the episode as Cold War propaganda—as an example of Soviet 'hypocrisy' and intolerance.

Were END and CND right to protest? Or was this an intervention into Soviet affairs? Should the Scandinavian Peacemarchers have acted differently?

The Scandinavian Women were in a difficult position. The march from Helsinki to Minsk (when the true march ended) had been negotiated with difficulty with the Soviet authorities, and they had entered into mutual agreements to respect each others' wishes.

But END is grateful to Danielle Grünberg—our 'own' marcher sponsored by the British peace movement—for visiting the Moscow group and for bringing back the first of their badges to reach the West.

END has from its origin taken up a principled stand on exactly this issue. In the words of our initial Appeal, of April 1980:

. . . we must defend and extend the right of all citizens, East or West, to take part in this common movement and to engage in every kind of exchange.

We appeal to our friends in Europe, of every faith and persuasion, to consider urgently the ways in which we can work together for these common objectives. We envisage a European-wide campaign, in which every kind of exchange takes place; in which representatives of different nations and opinions confer and co-ordinate their activities; and in which less formal exchanges, between universities, churches, women's organisations, trade unions, youth organisations, professional groups and individuals, take place with the object of promoting a common object: to free all of Europe from nuclear weapons.

We must commence to act as if a united, neutral and pacific Europe already exists. We must learn to be loyal, not to 'East' or 'West', but to each other, and we must disregard the prohibitions and limitations imposed by any national state.

In our view, this principle is critical to the future success of the peace movement. If we are to break down the Cold War, we must insist on open communications East/West, and on full and free exchange.

The peace movements of the world must support each other and we must come to the aid of our own fellow-workers for peace. The worst example of the repression of peace workers at this moment is not in the Warsaw bloc but within NATO (see our pamphlet on the current trial in Ankara of members of the Turkish Peace Association).

As for the new Moscow group, we cannot know how the episode will conclude. It is too early to guess whether this is the first signal of a new kind of independent grass-roots movement in the Soviet Union: or whether this group will be isolated, its members encouraged or forced to emigrate, so that little more will be heard of their courageous stand. If further news of harassment should become known, here are some addresses to which you can write.

Addresses of members of the group: please note that mail may not get through–

Sergei Batovrin, spokesman
ulitsa Krupskoi No. 5, kv. 96
Moscow 117331, USSR

Yury Medvedkov
Leninsky prospekt No. 123, kv 318
proyezd 5
Moscow, USSR

Maria Fleishgakker
ulitsa Novoryazanskaya 36-28
Moscow, USSR

If there should be further harassment of the group, send enquiries or protests to–

Soviet Ambassador
18 Kensington Palace Gardens
London W8

Leonid I. Brezhnev, Chairman
Presidium of the Supreme Soviet
The Kremlin
Moscow, USSR

N.A. Shchelokov
Minister of Internal Affairs
ul. Ogarieva 6
Moscow 103009, USSR

Yury A. Zhukov, Chairman
Soviet Peace Committee
36 Prospekt Mira
Moscow, USSR

Moscow City Procurator:
SSSR
113184 Moskva
ul. Novokuznetskaya 27
Moskovaskaya Gorodskaya
Prokuratura
Prokuroru

Chairman of the Moscow City
Soviet of Workers' Deputies:
SSSR
g. Moskva
ul. Gorkogo 13
Moskovskoy Gorodskoy Sovet
Deputatov Trudyashchikhsya
Predsedatelyu

Latest News

While this Special Report was in the press, we have received more news of the Moscow Peace Group.

We have learned from Dr Yuri Medvedkov that the work of the group is continuing, despite harassment. An exhibition of Sergei Batovrin's anti-war paintings was prepared for Hiroshima Day (August 6th), but on August 5th 88 of these paintings were confiscated. By the end of August the group had experienced 90 man-days of house arrest, and 30 man-days of jail. Several members had been subjected to 24-hour surveillance and continual harassment. Dr Medvedkov asks for worldwide support for the group, and especially asks for the support of fellow scientists. The group felt that the Scandinavian Peacemarch was a disappointment. Dr Medvedkov adds that he and his wife, Olga, have entered a new and important phase of their lives. The work of the group has become more important to them than their previous applications to emigrate.

We have also learned from a supporter of the British peace movement who has had discussions with members of the group that they have just issued new proposals for establishing trust between Soviet and United States citizens. This call is also addressed to members of the European peace movement. These new proposals include–

* The setting up of libraries and cultural centres in all towns of over one million people in the Soviet Union and the USA.
* The use of films and audio-visual equipment to learn each others' languages.
* The free exchange of newspapers.
* The easy availability of tourist visas.
* Extending telephone communications.
* Guarantees that no embargo be placed on trade relating to agricultural products, medicines, and primary resources.

Although Soviet authorities claim that the group is tiny and mainly Moscow-based, a spokesperson from the group says that by early October they had collected the signatures

of 900 supporters from different parts of the Soviet Union. As the process of gathering signatures is not an easy one, it may be assumed that many more have not reached Moscow. There are also further details of the harassment to which members of the group have been subjected. The charges of 'hooliganism' against Dr Medvedkov and Dr Yury Khronopulo (a distinguished physicist) arose in this way. The two men were on the way to a station when they found that they were being followed by a woman and a group of loud youths. As they waited for the train, the woman came up to Dr Khronopulo, pushed him, and began shouting at him to take his hands off her. Khronopulo turned to people on the platform to witness that he was not molesting her. At length the two men went to the police-station to complain of the harassment. The police officer offered to drive them home in a police car. But officers from the KGB then brought them back and compelled the police to charge them with hooliganism.

The two were sent to a special prison for 15-day offenders. They slept on boards, without pillows or blankets. They were fed three times a day with different types of gruel. Only once were they allowed to stretch their legs in the prison-yard. Their wives were given no information and found them only after four days of searching.

Another member of the group, Viktor Blok, narrowly escaped being run down by a truck while cycling home with his son. Yuri Medvedkov was driving a car, which was in good condition, when a wheel flew off. Although Sergei Batovrin was released from the psychiatric institution early in September, he is still being treated as an 'outpatient'. His treatment was illegal, since he was confined on the orders of the Military Commissariat, which has no power over him since he had been exempted from the draft. He was compelled to take 21 pills a day of the strong drug, chlorproteksin. He was also given an electroencephalagram while under drugs, and threatened, if he misbehaved, with the stronger drug, sulphazin.

The Soviet peace group denies that they are 'dissidents'. The members say that they are reinforcing the official policy of peace and disarmament which is given almost daily coverage

in the newspapers. Their offence is that they are an independent group, seeking direct communication with Western peace movements. (They have sought, but have been denied, official status and recognition.)

The group wishes to emphasise its unity with the peace movements of the world, and it welcomes correspondence and visits from Western peace activists. Here are two addresses:

Yury Khronopulo
Likhocheveskoe shosse,
dom 20, k.3, Kv 77,
141700 Moskovskaya oblast,
g. Dolgoprudnyy,
USSR.

Viktor Blok
Likhocheveskoe schosse,
dom. 20, k.1, kv. 159,
141700 Moskovskaya oblast,
g. Dolgoprudnyy,
USSR.

STOP PRESS

According to a Reuter newsflash (*Guardian*, 29 October) another member of the group, Oleg Radzinsky, has been arrested. He is charged under article 70 of the criminal code, covering 'anti-Soviet propaganda'. The maximum sentence under this article is seven years imprisonment plus five years of exile. Mr Radzinsky, aged 26, is described in our information as a 'philologist' and as a 'teacher': we believe he is also a writer. He is the son of a well-known playwright.

As we go to press we have no more information on this case. We suggest that readers address their enquiries to the Soviet authorities.

We have just learned that new branches of the Peace Group have been formed in Odessa, Movosibirsk and Leningrad. There is also an 'Independent Initiative' of young people, already several hundreds strong. Here is the text of the latest Appeal–

ADDRESS TO PEACE SUPPORTERS

Today, when 25 million people are wearing military uniforms, and when stocks of nuclear arms can turn the world into radioactive ruins, no one can hope that the world will survive by itself, or through someone else's efforts. Nuclear arms have made every living being into a hostage of the relations between the East and West. The two opposing camps have a lot of suspicions and incomprehension towards each other and it leads to a very ominous character of the inter-dependence of the two sides.

Everyone shares responsibility. Neither geographical borders, nor political contradictions can be a handicap in realising this responsibility.

On the first of January 1983 at 15:00 GMT we propose holding TEN MINUTES of silence, prayer and universal reflections on peace, disarmament and removal of mistrust among nations.

We call for:

- everyone to break routine daily activities for ten minutes, to devote these minutes to reflection on peace
- all the sides in all military clashes and conflicts to stop their military actions by announcing de-facto cease-fire for at least ten minutes
- everyone who is taking part in violence to give up at least ten minutes.

Ten minutes is little. But ten minutes of universal reflection on peace is ten minutes of solid peace which can turn into a destructive handful of sand thrown into the machinery of war.

We appeal for ten minutes of stable peace.

Moscow, USSR
October 16, 1982

The Group to Establish Trust
Between the USA and the USSR

Signed: Sergei Batovrin, Maria Fleishgakker, Vladimir Fleishgakker, Igor Sobkov, Gennady Krochik, Viktor Blok, Yury Khronopulo, Sergei Rosenoer, Boris Kalyuzhny, Yury Medvedkov, Olga Medvedkova, Valery Godyak, Vladimir Brodsky, Oleg Radzinsky, Mark Reitman

Biographical Notes

Jean Stead was born in Yorkshire and started life as a reporter on the *Yorkshire Post.* From there she joined the news team of *The Guardian,* where she has now been working for nearly 20 years. In 1969 she became the first woman News Editor on Fleet Street. After nine years she was appointed Assistant Editor responsible for News and Special Features and it was then that she became particularly interested in writing about the renaissance of the peace movement.

Danielle Rose Grünberg was born 1940 in the UK, of an Austrian father and Danish mother and was educated in France/Scandinavia. She worked in television in Copenhagen before studying to become a theatre director. She has worked for six years with the Emerging Dragon theatre group in Somerset and has for the past year been national coordinator of the Women's Peace Alliance in the UK.

Women's Peace Alliance
Box 240,
8, Elm Avenue,
Nottingham.



Sergie Batovrin in Moscow Psych. Hospital No 14, August 1982.
Photo by courtesy Aid to Russian Christians – Peter Reddaway.

Joint END/Merlin pamphlets

The new Hungarian peace movement
One of the main movers of the new autonomous Hungarian peace movement, Ferenc Köszegi, outlines the fascinating growth of cells of peace activists in schools and universities. With an introduction by E.P. Thompson, this exciting publication describes in detail the ideas behind this important phenomenon and its struggle to avoid co-option by the state, official peace council and dissidents, and remain a mass movement. Also included is E.P. Thompson's lecture given in Budapest on 'The normalisation of Europe'.

ISBN 0850362946 price: 90p

Moscow independent peace group
Since the news hit the western press that a peace group independent of the official peace committee had been formed, END has received many inquiries for more information on that group. We now have first hand accounts from Jean Stead (Assistant Editor of *The Guardian*) and END supporter Danielle Grünberg who were on the Scandinavian women's march and visited the group while passing through Moscow. The pamphlet also presents additional documents and invites debate from the peace movement.

ISBN 0850362954 price: 75p

Comiso
As part of the militarisation of NATO's southern flank, the small Sicilian town of Comiso is threatened with a cruise missile base in December '83. But over half the adult population of Sicily have pledged themselves against it and the island is now the focus for the European peace movement. Ben Thompson examines the background of Italian politics and gives a first-hand account of the Sicilian struggle.

ISBN 0850362962 price: 60p

Turkey
Jailing the leaders of Turkey's peace movement is just part of the military regime's campaign to suppress all opposition. Representatives of END have been to Turkey to monitor the drawn-out trial of the peace association, who are receiving support from peace groups all over Europe. In this pamphlet Mehmet Ali Dikerdem and John Mepham look at the history and work of the Turkish Peace Association and analyse why a state based terror wins Western approval.

ISBN 0850362970

END SPECIAL REPORT:

THE NUCLEAR NORTH ATLANTIC

Olafur Grímsson * Angus McCormack



Introduction by E P THOMPSON

THE NORTH ATLANTIC AS A NUCLEAR-FREE ZONE

ARTICLES FROM
GLASGOW END CONFERENCE
OF APRIL 1982
"THE DISARMING OF EUROPE"

OLAFUR GRIMSSON
ANGUS McCORMACK

AND AN INTRODUCTION BY
E.P. THOMPSON

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FOREWORD

This booklet is based on the speeches made at the first Scottish conference of European Nuclear Disarmament (END) in Glasgow in April 1982.

The contributions of Olafur Grimsson and Angus McCormack to the conference highlight the way in which NATO has sought to expand its influence in the North Atlantic shorewards by further build-up of military bases and facilities throughout north-west Europe. Edward Thompson's introduction sets the particular experiences of Iceland and Stornoway in their wider context, showing that the concerns of the peace movement should be as wide-ranging as the superpowers' military planning; otherwise there may be a danger of successful disarmament pressure in continental Europe being cancelled out by the shifting of Cruise missiles and other weapons to submarines, ships and aircraft patrolling the North Atlantic.

The aim of this pamphlet is to set the scene for a growing awareness amongst disarmament groups in north-west Europe that the military use of the North Atlantic is growing apace, is a major destabilising influence on relations between the superpowers, and may well become the region where a nuclear war starts. At the same time, military use of the North Atlantic in peace time is already creating heavy political pressure on most of the countries in the region, particularly those with more independent foreign policies, to accept more and more militarisation. As Olafur Grimsson shows, the same arguments and pressures are used by the militarists to justify more bases and weapons in Iceland and Scandinavia as in Scotland. We hope this will be a stimulus to groups throughout the region to co-ordinate their activities with the aim of reducing and ultimately eliminating the military threat to the people of the North Atlantic.

To this end Glasgow END is organising a North Atlantic Conference in the spring of 1983 which will build on the interests and concerns of the first conference, and will bring together the ideas and activities of peace campaigners from all corners of the North Atlantic – North America, Greenland, Iceland, the Faroes, Norway, Denmark, Scotland and Ireland. The aim of the conference, in addition to establishing contact between these groups and exchanging information on the nuclear build-up and opposition to it, would be to work towards a campaign to establish a North Atlantic Nuclear-Free Zone.

In addition, Scottish CND is publishing a book in spring 1983 which analyses the military build-up in the North Atlantic, and sets out the pattern of Scottish military bases in their North Atlantic context.

European Nuclear Disarmament
Glasgow
November 1982

"THE WET GATE"
AN INTRODUCTION TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC

E.P. Thompson

United States' nuclear-weapons strategy (sometimes known, by courtesy, as NATO's) stands upon a tripod, whose three 'legs' rest on land, sea, and air. In the past two years public attention in Europe has been chiefly preoccupied with the first leg only – the so-called European 'theatre' weapons – the ground-launched medium-range missiles, Cruise and Pershing II, promised by NATO for 1983.

But in the next few years the second and third 'legs' are likely to acquire even more importance. Scottish opinion has already been alerted to this, in resistance to Britain's absurd, unwanted and expensive 'independent' addition to the world's sum of danger in Trident. But these two legs stand on more than Trident or Polaris, or the F-111s and other aircraft which are or will be based on the British Isles. There are also elaborate communication and tracking systems, and a growing need for fuelling, servicing and transit facilities.

Ballistic missiles and supersonic aircraft have shrunk the strategist's globe to the size of a shrivelled gourd: Greenland, Iceland, Scotland, Norway, the Soviet Kola peninsula are now all next-door neighbours, within a few minutes' missile flight-time of each other. A missile can pass from one to the other in less time than it would take for any of us to walk down to the local corner-shop or watch the 10 o'clock news.

Already, now – and for several years past – the North Atlantic ocean has been one of the most sensitive strategic areas in the world, because (in the way that strategists think) a sensitive area is not just an undefended and populous area which might be targeted and obliterated, such as Clydeside: it is, far more, a place where the missiles of the other side may be stationed, a place where one might be hit *from*. And for some time the North Atlantic has been such a place, as both NATO and Soviet missile-launching submarines patrol the cold and stormy seas between Norway, the Shetlands, the Faroes and Iceland.

There, already, in the wide spaces of the North Atlantic they hide and they seek. In NATO's strategic thinking the Soviet navy is waiting to press through the 'gate' between Norway and Iceland, while Soviet 'Backfire' bombers might slip through the same'gate', pass down to the west of Scotland and Ireland, and then turn sharp left and strike at Western Europe through the 'back-door'. In Soviet strategic thinking, NATO's air and sea-launched missiles serviced from bases in Scotland or Iceland, could strike at Leningrad or the Kola peninsula, or even strike across the Arctic cap.

All these are of course fictional 'scenarios' or 'contingency' plans, imagined in the war-games rooms of strategists. They have little to do with political or military realities. Some of this is a propaganda game which the cold warriors play to frighten their own publics.. For example, these people have long been telling us that only the very large and expensive British contribution to NATO's naval forces in the North Atlantic prevents the Soviet navy from swarming down upon our shores and playing like a school of porpoises in every Scottish sea-loch. Yet during the Falklands War the withdrawal of British warships for service in the remote South Atlantic depleted NATO's naval forces in the North by some two-thirds . The supposed 'gate' was left open and swinging on its hinges for some three months. Yet British waters were not overrun: if they had been, I am sure that Winston Churchill, Junior, would have let us know.

Some of these stories, then, are lies or 'worst-case' fictions. But the trouble with this kind of contingency thinking is that it does not stay put as fiction in the head. It gets out of the head and it gets into budgets. Hundreds of millions of pounds and billions of dollars and roubles are spent upon building weapons and bases which are justified as 'defence' or 'deterrence' against imaginary threats: these new developments are seen by the other side as threatening, and provoke it to build up new weaponry and bases in response: and so on . . . and on. In this way both sides hurry

on the 'worst-case' contingencies their measures were designed to meet.

Another reason why the North Atlantic is becoming so sensitive an area is an ironical one. The successes of the European peace movements, in bringing within reach the expulsion of ground-launched missiles from their lands, are forcing NATO strategists to look with favour on the sea. The political cost of forcing Britain, Holland, Belgium, West Germany and Italy to accept cruise and Pershing missiles upon their territories is so high that the counsels of NATO are now divided. Mrs Thatcher is eager to take the missiles as well as anything else (such as neutron bombs or nerve-gas artillery) that the Americans choose to send. But the Dutch and Belgian governments are not eager at all, and Chancellor Schmidt would be happy if the Geneva arms talks should give rise to any compromise which would get him off his own political hook. One possible 'compromise' would be to abandon plans for stationing the ground-launched missiles in Europe –a 'concession' to be paid for by the Soviet withdrawal of the highest possible number of SS-20s. While the Western media maunfactured an immense self-congratulatory hoo-ha about NATO's peaceful dispositions, the United States would fall quietly back upon the other two legs of the tripod instead – on sea and air. Missiles pressed by public opinion out of Europe would be squeezed sideways and reappear, in even greater numbers, in the North Atlantic – launched from bombers, submarines, or the floating launch-platforms which are already entering service.

One can easily see the arguments in favour of this course. Weapons at sea are more mobile, less easy to target, and, above all, less politically visible than are bases at Greenham Common or Comiso. No-one can set up a peace camp in the seas off Rockall, and even if we all had water-wings it would be a wet business to sit down in the middle of the 'gate' between Norway and Iceland.

Yet this development will bring no security whatsoever to either 'the West' or 'the East', and it will make some beautiful and remote parts of Northern Europe into some of the most dangerous places on the earth. And not dangerous only if or when a nuclear

war occurs – they are (as Dr Grimsson reminds us) already dangerous *now*. With all that heavy nuclear plant moving around the ocean bed, sooner or later a *major* accident has to happen.

This is the threat which visits both Iceland and Scotland today, and Dr Grimsson – a highly-respected member of the Icelandic parliament (or Althing) – and Mr McCormack, the able and well-informed leader of the opposition to NATO's plans in the Western Isles – add other explanations for the growing militarisation of the North Atlantic zone. And as both make clear, the only possible response to this, of adequate force, must be the internationalisation of peaceful resistance among the peoples of the countries within the strategic zone.

We live in very ugly times, when there are good reasons for taking the most pessimistic view of human expectations. On the credit side there is little optimistic to be seen save in the rapid growth of the peace movement itself – and in the brotherhood and sisterhood of that common movement of resistance. 'Peace' is not just the absence of war – it is a real state or force only if it is made up of the affirmatives of understanding, exchange, common action, made possible by the international networking of movements and persons.

In the North Atlantic zone, all the elements of this international network are now present – in all the most threatened nations there are active movements built on similar principles of alliance between persons of differing party and faith – the Icelandic Campaign against Military Bases, Irish CND, the Norwegian 'No to Nuclear Weapons', the Scottish Campaign against Trident, CND and END. I have been exceptionally fortunate in the past year in being able to visit Norway, Ireland and Iceland – and even far-distant Glasgow. In each country I found strong and representative movements, deeply involved in the national and political life – in the labout movements, the churches, the women's movements, among ecologists and cultural workers, poets and musicians – movements which cherished the national traditions of their own countries (the Gaelic of the Western Isles, the ancient democratic institutions of the Icelanders) and which for that reason defended

the 'gate' between the people's past and the people's future.

Glasgow's END conference last May marked an important new stage in this international networking. This network must now be extended and strengthened, drawing together the peace workers of other nations – Ireland, Norway, the Faroes, Denmark – who share a common objective: to make the whole North Atlantic zone nuclear-free.

ICELAND AND THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY

Olafur Grimsson

I bring you greetings from Iceland Peace Campaigners, who are encouraged by the meeting here today and by knowing that you will be discussing the peace movements of the North Atlantic area.

In Iceland we have fought against the nuclear military stations in the North Atlantic and against the American military bases in our country which play a key role in that militarisation.

It has been a long and testing struggle, but in recent months we have been greatly encouraged by the emerging solidarity among the peace movements in the smaller countries in the North Atlantic area. Only four weeks ago, Edward Thompson, who is also with us here today, addressed the largest ever anti nuclear rally that has been held in Iceland in the last few years. He gave greetings from the CND in Britain and the Welsh Anti Nuclear Alliance and related the success of the Alliance who had just managed to make Wales a nuclear-free country. And that message from the Welsh people was greeted with tremendous applause in the Icelandic Hall.

Everyone realises that a new era could be in the making. We are no longer alone. And we in Iceland are no longer alone out there in the North Atlantic. We are supported by the active workers of the same cause in Scotland, Wales, England and in other Scandinavian countries. We must realise, and must emphasise, a new solidarity which is emerging especially among the young people of our countries – along with a determination to bring about a consolidation of our joint public and political strengths.

This determination is especially significant because the military establishment, the nuclear barons, are already trying to execute extensive plans for further military annexation of the oceans surrounding our countries. We will hear today of plans for this strategy of militarisation, when Angus McCormack of the Keep NATO

Out Campaign speaks on the Stornoway experiences. We must remember that oceans can be part of the military build-up, for nuclear submarines, with ever greater strengths in warheads and destruction capabilities, are planned to sail in our waters. And battleships are now being transformed to carry hundreds of Cruise missiles on their decks. These battleships are intended to sail between Iceland, Scotland and Norway; as floating arsenals of nuclear and conventional weapons.

It is only with massive strength, and a determined demonstration of public opinion, that the people in our countries can halt these plans. Therefore we in Iceland are determined to seek your help and to give you our help. We must reinforce each other, because our adversaries in this campaign have, for a long time, maintained a network of systematic deception of public opinion. To give you just one example: last week an admiral of the British Navy attended a Conference in Iceland. He spoke on the TV and Radio and to press reporters about the importance of future nuclear submarine activities in the North Atlantic. He praised the Trident. He described the excellence of US bases in Iceland. It was quite clear, listening to him, that this officer of the British Navy had come to Iceland in a fighting spirit. But he was not fighting the Russians; he was fighting us. He was fighting the people in the peace movements who are opposing his plans. All his arguments were directed against the arguments of the peace movement.

It is significant that the military establishment of all countries of the North Atlantic have realised the importance of the public debate we have initiated. They realise that successful democratic movements can bring about a nuclear-freeze. We can make the North Atlantic a nuclear-free zone. And what is more, we can make the nuclear barons, the Lords of the Admiralty, landless, sea-less, and what is even worse for them, we can make them unemployed.

It is therefore quite clear that in the coming months the co-operation of the peace movements in the North Atlantic countries is a priority for all of us. We must learn from our friends on the European continent, and get help from the Dutch, Belgians, Germans and all other continental peace movements, so that we successfully threaten the NATO plans for imposing Cruise missiles.

We must build a similar popular force in North Europe. We must learn from our continental friends, but we must also learn from each other. And I think I am quite right in saying that the Icelandic experience will be of use to people in Scotland and Stornoway in particular. We have many lessons to offer. Our experience will show how the superpowers have systematically deceived and tricked a small island nation. These lessons can help you who are now fighting against plans for new bases off the Scottish Coast. And we must not let the extremely successful campaign against Trident overshadow the equally important fight in Stornoway. Because if they succeed in building their bases in Stornoway, then in a few short years Scotland will become a key in the nuclear militarisation of the North Atlantic. It is therefore important to fight against the Stornoway plans along with the fight against Trident.

When the US government after World War Two bluntly requested permission to have military bases on Iceland for 99 years, all the political parties unanimously refused this request. The Icelandic nation was, and still is, unique in that it has never borne arms. No Icelandic military force has ever existed. We gained independence, established a sovereign state, and developed a highly advanced modern so' 'ty without any struggle whatsoever taking place. To diversify for a moment: we are the nation which successfully defeated the British Navy three years ago. We had no battleships, we had no navy, we had only three small gunboats manned with civilian sailors. The British Navy sent many warships, some of them the pride of the British Navy; but on every occasion, as you know, we won. And we won because our arguments, our democratic will, were so strong, and so right, that the British might could not, in the end, defeat our arguments. And that is why I know that in the end the arguments of the campaign against nuclear weapons will win; if we are sufficiently strong and sufficiently democratic in our campaign.
(I note with some irony that the same British Ministries we fought some years ago are using our arguments in their debate about Common Market fishing policy.)

But I did not come here to talk about old times. Rather, let us return to the time when the US request for NATO bases on Iceland was turned down. They learnt a lesson. They learnt a lesson which they are applying at Stornoway today. Because the Stornoway base, although it is called a NATO base, is in fact an American base. They learnt a lesson they will never forget; never to be blunt or frank about plans. Instead, go step by step in order to achieve the ultimate goal. It has regrettably succeeded in Iceland; but it must not succeed at Stornoway.

It succeeded in Iceland because after their initial rejection, the Americans managed through sophisticated political manoeuverings to take Iceland, a nation which had never had any armed forces and never intended to have any such forces, into a military alliance in NATO. This was hotly debated in Iceland at the time, and the government had to issue a declaration stating the conditions for NATO membership. It promised that no foreign military forces would be accepted in Iceland in peacetime. And many people trusted this declaration. But the very term 'peacetime' turned out to be the key to further deception. Who could believe in the peace movement today, that the word 'peace' would be the key to further military efforts ?

This happened because two years later, in 1951, the Americans used a war in Asia, a war that most people will now have forgotten, to take a step to further their own plans for acquiring military bases in Iceland. You might not recall much about the war in Korea; it was after all thirty years ago. But the Americans used the war in Korea to execute a scare campaign in Iceland. Korea, far away at the other side of the world, was the reason for Icelandic acceptance of NATO bases. The Americans said the Russians are coming into Korea today, and it could be Iceland tomorrow. It served the superpowers' purposes. The majority of Icelandic MPs were called into a secret one-day session, and were informed by respected American diplomats, "If the Russians are coming into Korea, why not also into Iceland ?' And in a few days the American soldiers had arrived.

The old plans for bases in Iceland were first described in 1941, in

a Pentagon memo, which has now come out of the historical archives. Now 10 years later in 1951, the plans had succeeded. Now the war in Korea is almost forgotten. New generations of Icelanders only learn about it in history books, as you do. But the American soldiers, the military bases, are still in my country, and the initial justification has entirely disappeared, although new ones have been invented. The very same ones we will hear about as justification for the base at Stornoway: I have heard about the Soviet Submarines and Soviet Bombers before. We will also hear that they are justifying the base at Stornoway because they might lose the bases on Iceland; and they are justifying the Icelandic bases because they might not get a Stornoway base.

In Iceland, the American Airforce came and built runways, like they intend to do in Stornoway. Then in the early 1960's the American Navy took over and installed various technical devices related to emergence of the nuclear submarine branch of the arms race. From there on, one escalation in the military situation followed another, all tying the country into the network of nuclear weaponry in the North Atlantic. There are conflicting reports on whether or not warheads themselves have been stored in Iceland. But these stories are not the key issue. The significant fact is the gradual installation of the supporting technical facilities which enable the US to maintain vast nuclear arsenals at sea, in the North Atlantic region, and which have brought about massive counter responses by the Soviet Fleet in that North Atlantic area.

Thus the fate of my country, a country which as I have already described to you, has never experienced any armed forces whatsoever, has been to play a significant although disguised part, in the North Atlantic arms race. Through complex counter action, it has helped to encourage the enlargement of American, Soviet, British and French nuclear submarine fleets in Northern oceans. This modern network ties together Iceland, Scotland, and Norway and also brings in the Faroes and Greenland. We are all part of this same nuclear maritime system. The deepwater spying network goes from Greenland to Iceland and from there to Scotland. And I understand from Peter Segger of the Welsh Anti Nuclear Alliance speaking here today, that it was also discovered at a secret base in

Wales last year.

Through coastal links and ground satellite stations, the spying network sends messages about the movement of the deep water nuclear arsenal to the global computer centre, which last year, as you may remember, gave false alarms indicating that a nuclear war should immediately commence. The Orion and Phantom planes from Iceland and Norway serve the nuclear navy, and new runways on the islands off the Scottish coast, on Stornoway or on other islands would serve the same purpose. The story of the escalation in our countries is long and complex, but it has, regrettably, in recent years reached new heights. At the end of the 1970's Iceland was the first, and for a few years, the only country outside the US where AWACS planes were permanently stationed. Once again my nation was deceived. Even the Icelandic Foreign Minister was told by the Americans that the AWACS planes were only a slight improvement, a minor change, from the old radar planes. They were nothing special, not worth speaking about, or even mentioning. But when two years later, the selling of AWACS to Saudi Arabia caused a political explosion in the US, and the worst political crisis in the relationship between the Reagan Administration and Congress, the Icelandic people suddenly awoke to a nightmare. Our country had become the permanent site of the most advanced attack control instruments in the American airforce. The AWACS constitute a revolution in military technology: they can control a fleet of over 100 attack planes, and guide such massive attacks with a shocking accuracy. We then realised that there were only two countries in the whole world where the Americans permanently stationed these new military wonders; Iceland and Saudi Arabia. The latter you will know is in the heat of the Middle East conflict, the former in the centre of the ocean between Scotland, Norway and Greenland.

When airborne, the AWACS control the whole region from the Scottish coast right up to Greenland. Their operation in our area proves, by their very being there, the emphasis which the superpowers put on the military section of the waters between our countries. We, and the Middle East, are the only areas where the AWACS are in operation. But the military section regrettably

keeps on escalating. You are fighting Trident, and you are fighting Stornoway. We in Iceland have been fighting new plans which came out two months ago, for a new launch harbour for the American Navy, and more sophisticated fuel facilities which will enable the American Navy to keep operating in the area for months without having to return back to the US. And similar things have happened in Norway.

The plans for Scotland, for Iceland and for Norway are linked to the decision made by the Reagan government to give priority to strengthen the Navy arm of the American nuclear arsenal; increase the submarine strength in the North Atlantic; and transform battleships into floating carrier stations of Cruise missiles. Therefore we, the people of these countries, and especially we in the peace movement, face a gruesome reality. We are in the centre of a region which is being developed into a major oceanic nuclear arsenal. And Trident, Stornoway, Iceland and Norway are just pawns on the same chessboard.

In the late 1970's it was decided to make continental Europe the site for a new nuclear escalation; and we all know the campaign which followed, a campaign which has become so strong that it might succeed in reversing that decision.

But the logic of what has been happening in recent months and years in Scotland, in Iceland, and in Norway, means that in the early 1980's, the oceans off our coasts will be the key site of the future nuclear arsenal. All our coasts, and the islands off these coasts, will be used to keep nuclear navies supplied. It is our immediate task to join hands in fighting these plans: to raise the demand for a nuclear-free Northern Europe, both on land and at sea. We must work to obtain the same public support as our friends in Holland, in Germany and in Belgium have obtained. And we, the peaceworkers of Scotland, Iceland and Norway, Wales and other countries, must achieve the same degree of co-operation and co-ordination of our efforts as our friends on the Continent have achieved.

I therefore want to put forward the suggestion here today, that we

resolve to hold, next summer or perhaps this autumn, a conference of the North European Peace Movements, and discuss the specific tasks facing us in the North coastal countries. We should invite participation from Norway, Denmark, from Greenland, Faroes, as well as from Scotland, Wales, Ireland and Iceland, and any others who are concerned about the developments in the North Atlantic Ocean and lands. Scotland would be a suitable home for such a conference. The programme could include an analysis of the existing military system, which links our countries and oceans into a unified nuclear network. And we could increase the information about the future plans of the superpowers to strengthen this network. We must explain to people why nuclear-free zones must not only cover land, but also sea. And I believe that we have a golden source of convincing arguments. For there is great danger from the nuclear submarine fleet sailing close to our land masses, even if war doesn't break out. The danger also exists in peacetime. The danger from nuclear accidents in our oceans, creating radioactivity in the strong oceanic currents which criss-cross the North Atlantic and which will pollute the fishing stocks in our waters as well as harming the general environment of every country in Northern Europe.

We have not pointed out to the public that every day there are a number of floating deep sea nuclear plants in our waters, moving between Scotland, Iceland, Norway and Greenland. The Three Mile Island accident in America taught the public a valuable lesson about the dangers of radioactivity. And it has been proved that these floating monsters are not safe in peacetime. They therefore constitute, here and now, not only in war, a tremendous danger. We must make this danger of a peacetime nuclear accident in our coastal waters a major part of our campaign. By their very existence, the nuclear submarines constitute not a deterrence, but a threat, not against the Russians, but against ourselves. If and when such an accident occurs in peacetime, in the 200 miles of fishing zones around Scotland, or Iceland, or around Norway, it will be too late to learn from the fate of the American Three Mile Island experience.

Let us, dear friends, resolve here today to link the people of Scot-

land and England and Wales with those of Iceland, Norway, Denmark, Faroes and Greenland. We must resolve to link them into a strong popular front which will successfully stop this future nuclear nightmare. We must institute a joint campaign and agree on a common programme; turning the oceans as well as the lands into nuclear-free zones. We must prevent the transportation of the nuclear arsenal from the continent into the ocean. We must cooperate with our continental friends in making all of Europe free of nuclear weapons.

We have, as we say in Iceland, raised the call for a nuclear-free Europe, not only from Poland to Portugal, but also from Iceland to Italy; from the North Sea to the Mediterranean.

STORNOWAY: KEEP NATO OUT

Angus McCormack

Sandwick, the village in which I live, wraps itself unwillingly around the southern end of the main runway at Stornoway airport. In 1977 the Community Council discovered that the Western Isles Islands Council had approved an application for planning clearance from the Ministry of Defence to lengthen the runway at Stornoway and add fuel facilities. The Western Isles Islands Council did not realise the implications of the Ministry of Defence plan but Sandwick Community Council did and it resolved to oppose the plan. Immediately a campaign was launched to have the Islands Council reverse its decision. Sandwick Community Council was joined by Loch A' Tuath Community Council from the north end of the runway and together they organised a thorough and vigorous campaign gaining the support of the local Labour, Scottish National and Liberal parties, the Free Church, many other island community councils, the local MP and finally after a blanket lobby of all local councillors and much local publicity, the Western Isles Islands Council was persuaded to change its decision and oppose the Ministry of Defence on 29 June 1978 – almost a year after the campaign was started.

It was following this initial success that Keep NATO Out was formed with the remit to oppose by all means open to it the extension of MoD/NATO activity at Stornoway Airport in whatever form such extension of activity be proposed and in particular where these proposals seriously affected the island way of life.

The KNO committee was formed at a packed public meeting held in Stornoway on 29 October 1979. This meeting was the culmination of steadily increasing opposition to the siting of a NATO base at Stornoway, which had begun two years beforehand.

Because of the total and vigorous opposition to the MoD plan, KNO had a broad-based local support on which to build. The committee had three priorities:–

(1) to establish the local support and increase it

(2) to continue to support the WIIC in its opposition to the MoD/NATO plans and

(3) to persuade the Secretary of State for Scotland that the plans for Stornoway were a violation of the rights of the local people and strategically irrelevant.

The commitment to these tasks was astonishing. The KNO committee numbered ten initially and five more individuals were co-opted. The committee met several times per week if necessary and at least weekly. Plans were laid and carried through with total dedication, and local support was tapped to assist in a door-to-door canvass of the villages nearest to the airport. This resulted in a petition of 4,300 signatures and 2,000 written individual objections were collected and lodged with the Secretary of State for Scotland. Simultaneously information was collected, collated and disseminated to the local people, and further afield, stating the case against the base and highlighting the devious nature of the MoD whose brief "runway" plans had escalated to:–

(1) 2 twin runways
(2) a mile long under sea pipe
(3) massive new storage tanks
(4) hardened aircraft shelters –

in short a NATO base configuration. At the same time the cost had risen from £6 million in 1977 to £40 million in 1980.

Considerable energy was directed into sustaining the WIIC stance of opposition to the MoD. Much underhand letter writing and pressure was placed on the Islands Council by the MoD, and KNO used the information ruthlessly to bolster the islanders and in particular the councillors in their resolve. On 22 May 1980 the WIIC threw out the renewed plans of the MoD by 28 votes to 2, a considerable success for our lobby and a great credit to the tenacity of the WIIC who were under considerable pressure to capitulate.

Finally KNO plagued the Secretary of State with evidence of local objections to the plans and counter strategic arguments. That together with the splendid opposition of the WIIC led to the calling of a Public Planning Inquiry on 16 March 1981. By now the KNO had gained the support of the Scottish Council of the Labour Party, the Scottish National Party, the STUC, the Church and Nation Committee of the Church of Scotland, CND and END. Many of these bodies contributed to the written evidence to the Public Inquiry and the KNO produced a lengthy submission detailing its case against the base. The case presented by the WIIC at the Public Inquiry was irrefutable on Planning grounds alone. The MoD had no case. Many independent observers commented that the WIIC had won the inquiry hands down and indeed they did. The reporter to the inquiry concluded, "I therefore consider that the Islands Council was quite justified in reaching their decision not to approve the development".

George Younger, the Scottish Secretary's decision to overturn the result of the Public Inquiry is of course entirely undemocratic and was rejected by the Islands Council at an emergency meeting on 7 December 1981 when the Council called for a Public Inquiry into the strategic necessity for having a major NATO base at Stornoway. That same evening KNO called a public meeting. A packed Town Hall was addressed by eight well-known local figures representing politics, peace groups, the church and cultural groups. The meeting gave KNO a unanimous mandate to reject the Secretary of State's decision and to carry forward the fight.

Immediately KNO expanded its organisation and formed 5 subcommittees to further its campaign. At the moment KNO is conducting a massive lobby of all MPs and consituency parties and it is our endeavour to have the withdrawal of the plans for Stornoway made Labour Party Policy at this year's conference in Blackpool.

A blanket canvass of all Trade Unions and Trades Council has taken place and support is gradually building in this area.

KNO is determined to win. Never has there been a more determined group, supported by such a united people. In the islands we are fighting to support our way of life. We see it threatened by alien presence. The peace will be shattered with medically injurious effect, the language will be eroded and another minority culture will be lost. Not if we can help it.

The Real Reason for the Stornoway Plans

KNO's concern is not just selfish and insular. The fight against the MoD's plans for Stornoway should be seen as a vital part of the fight against nuclear war and for peace in the UK. The future of Stornoway Airpost is really about the ability of the United States to fight a 'theatre' nuclear war in Europe.

The MoD would have us believe that Stornoway's new NATO base is essential to the UK defence. The base is necessary, they tell us, to help plug the Iceland-Faroes Gap through which flow substantial numbers of Soviet warships, mainly submarines, and aircraft. The MoD state that these aircraft, and particularly the "Backfire Bomber", pose a very real threat to the UK since they can come at us from behind, that is the North West, and using stand-off missiles obliterate the Holy Loch etc. before we know what has hit us. That is rubbish!

Like most arguments of the MoD and the UK government only the facts necessary to hoodwink the local populace are put forward, and similar types of subterfuge are being used at Molesworth, Greenham Common and Coulport and indeed many other locations of lesser magnitude. The argument for not releasing the true facts is that Defence matters cannot be understood by ordinary mortals like you and me and hence are best kept secret for our national security. Meanwhile they stick a NATO base or a Cruise missile in our back gardens and they expect us to say nothing. It is this kind of closed-minded deviousness that CND has had to deal with all these years and the enormous growth in the CND movement is evidence of a population no longer prepared to accept the lies of government after government. I welcome this growing resolve to withstand the secret state and to demand a voice in how we live and die.

In the Western Isles KNO could have accepted the MoD arguments. They put a great deal of effort into their PR job. They took over the front page of the *Stornoway Gazette* and sent a high-ranking delegation to the islands to subdue the natives. KNO rejected their arguments and fought back with facts. Here are a few of them:—

> No Soviet aircraft or submarine leaves the Kola peninsula without NATO knowing about it in a very short time. Aircraft are tracked down from the time they leave base by the Norwegian airforce, by radar, by satellite, by the USAF and our own airforce. Submarines pass through a network of undersea surveillance systems and are then tracked by aircraft, ships and NATO submarines. In short no aircraft nor ship could reach UK territory without interception and indeed such interceptions take place every week of the year.

Defence from the "Backfire", or a new Soviet Target?

And what of the Backfire Bomber — this threat to the UK that makes Stornoway so essential?

(1) It is substantially slower than the Phantom or F14 or the new Tornado. Its maximum speed at low level is only 560 knots. A Tornado can do 800 knots.

(2) It is a very large aircraft like the Vulcan and an easy target, and any flying at top speed to avoid NATO fighters dramatically shortens its range.

(3) The new AS-6 Kingfish missile has not yet come into use, suggesting problems in its development.

(4) Not *one* Backfire has penetrated or indeed come anywhere near UK airspace since their deployment.

In other words there is no need for Stornoway's additional facilities to combat the threat from the Backfire. Indeed if we examine the details of war strategies for the North Atlantic, NATO's plans for Stornoway merely create a *new* individual target for a Warsaw

Pact strike, *without* contributing anything to maritime defence.

The Backfires concerned are for anti-shipping (i.e. they're the USSR's attempt at redressing the huge NATO superiority in surface ships). They do not carry weapons which could be used for strikes on mainland targets. All Naval Backfires seen by NATO so far have been carrying a single AS-4 "Kitchen" missile. This is a "stand-off" missile which is fired from up to 150 miles away from the target. It may carry a nuclear warhead, but no confirmation of this has yet been published. Even if an attempt to attack the UK with an AS-4 was made, the likelihood of getting within 150 miles of any UK target — even Stornoway or Shetland — undetected would be very slim indeed.

Nor does Backfire have any anti-aircraft capability, so with the current reduction in emphasis on reinforcement from USA by sea and increased emphasis on *air* reinforcement, the reinforcement of Europe is actually moving towards immunity from Soviet attack. There is not a single Soviet fighter aircraft, nor are any under development, which has the range to attack transport aircraft in the Eastern Atlantic. Backfire, and some of the older Soviet maritime patrol aircraft, have the range, but no anti-aircraft capability. So Backfire has only a limited, and declining, range of targets, none of which are targets on the UK mainland (or islands).

The important point, however, is the effect that NATO's superiority in anti-submarine warfare has on the way in which the Soviet Union would be expected to react to NATO in the North Atlantic. NATO has superiority in *all* weapons systems in the Eastern Atlantic and Channel. This is further borne out in an article in *Defence*, June 1980, p. 436 — "The Western nations claim that none of their SSBNs (nuclear-powered, nuclear-armed strategic missile submarines) have ever been detected by Soviet ASW forces while on patrol".

The result of all this is that, since the USSR has only limited ability to operate its submarine forces freely in the Atlantic, and since its own ability to counter NATO submarines is very weak, it is forced into a strategy of attacking the shore-based facilities

which support NATO anti-submarine operations – i.e. all airfields designated for use by Long Range Marine Patrol Aircraft (Kinloss, Machrihanish, Stornoway) and the shore bases of hunter-killer submarines and anti-submarine ships (Faslane, Loch Ewe, Campbeltown Loch, etc.). In other words, even though Stornoway may not be used much by such aircraft, NATO's *superiority* in Anti-Submarine Warfare leads *directly* to Stornoway becoming a Soviet target. If NATO *didn't* have such superiority, there would be less likelihood of the USSR attacking Stornoway!

NATO actually applies the same philosophy in Central Europe as the USSR is expected to in the North Atlantic – faced with considerable superiority of Warsaw Pact strike aircraft in Central Europe, NATO's strategy is not to concentrate on shooting them all down as they come across the border, but to launch waves of air strikes against airfields and other support facilities well behind the front line, so that the Warsaw Pact air offensive cannot be a *sustained* one. In the case of Stornoway, the USSR would be likely to act very quickly – if a "limited" war broke out, the USSR would want to preserve its ability to launch a strategic missile attack on the USA, so it would want to reduce NATO's ability to detect and track Soviet SSBN's as quickly as possible. Since they are outnumbered in aircraft, an air strike on Stornoway, Kinloss etc. by Backfires would be unlikely to succeed, and anyway would be too slow, and might lack accuracy. So the likelihood would be a strike with missiles – most likely a one-megaton warhead carried on an SS-4, SS-5 or SS-20 missile.

In other words in terms of UK defence Stornoway is overdefence. So of course is the Cruise missile deployment and the ultimate lunacy TRIDENT. All three are part of an appalling misuse of resources further eroding an economy bled dry by spending on armaments. In 1981–82 the UK government will spend in excess of £12.6 Billion on the military – proportionately more than any other European government.

American Plans for Europe

Now let us take another MoD claim. **Stornoway is essential for the**

new breed of modern aircraft. That is the Tornado. A new larger runway is necessary plus a back-up runway, parking pads, hardened aircraft shelters, new electronics and so on. Permit me to quote from an article by Group Captain R.A. Mason, Director of Defence Studies at the RAF Staff College Bracknell. He speaks with great pride of the wonderful death machine the Tornado is, but crucially for Stornoway he says, "The final advantage is its ability to operate with a full weapon and fuel load from less than 1,000 yards of concrete." Stornoway's present runway is in excess of 2,000 yards.

Now let me look at the real need for Stornoway's upgrading. Here I enter the European theatre.

Nils Orvik, Professor of Political Studies at Queens University, Kingston, Canada propounded the idea that a new NATO base be established in the NW UK in the NATO review of April 1980. Indeed the plan existed for some time before that in the military mind. There are two theories attached to the need for the NATO base at Stornoway in the European context.

It is essential as a fall-back base should the Icelanders kick the Americans out of Keflavik. There is an ever present fear of such a happening and perhaps Olafur will have something to say on the subject. And we know that the US Navy considers Stornoway a suitable base even now for the P3C Orion submarine surveillance aircraft presently using Keflavik.

However, the second theory is much more credible to KNO. This is that Stornoway is being upgraded to cope with the huge USAF transport aircraft that will be needed to transfer reinforcements to Europe in the event of America's "limited Nuclear war", and for replenishing over 1,500 US combat aircraft crossing the Atlantic to reinforce Europe.

This ties in, of course, with the deployment of Cruise missiles in Europe, with the substantial prepositioning of supplies and armaments in Europe and with the American insistence on European governments increasing the NATO Infrastructure programme fin-

ance for the year by £3.2 Billion.

This last financial programme has real significance for Stornoway because £38.5 million of the £40 million to be spent at Stornoway is to come from the Infrastructure fund. At the moment NATO is funding only high priority works for "use by all NATO forces", and in order to ensure that these go ahead the US is increasing its 27.4 per cent contributions for projects like Stornoway to one third.

In other words the development at Stornoway is largely American funded. Indeed Congress directed the US Defence Department to use infrastructure programmes "to the maximum end" to fund US construction requirements in Europe.

A further interesting point about Stornoway is that control there lies in the hands of SACLANT (Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic) rather than SACEUR (Supreme Allied Commander Europe). SACLANT has, as the name suggests, responsibility for the protection of sea and air routes for reinforcements coming from America. In contrast, RAF fighters which defend the British mainland are controlled by SACEUR, not SACLANT.

As NATO has committed itself to the strategy of flexible response, i.e. a European war-fighting strategy, the USA has realised increasingly that, with the speed at which any European conflict would escalate, and with increasing economic problems leading to inability of most European members to commit more resources to defence, the US would have to send enormous reinforcements within a few days. This has meant an increasing emphasis on:

(1) Prepositioning of supplies and equipment in Europe, particularly weapons — to save transporting them from the USA in a hurry. Current prepositioned stocks are reckoned to save 800 flights from the USA by C-141 Starlifter transports.

(2) Air reinforcement rather than sea reinforcement. This means not only the entire resources of the USAF Military Aircraft Command, but also the requisitioning of virtually all available

wide-bodied airliners in the USA.

The air reinforcement is planned to involve well over a million men (including one entire US Army Corps) and in addition, at least 60 squadrons of US tactical combat aircraft — i.e. around 1,500 aircraft (Phantoms, A-10s, F-111s, F-15s, F-16s, A-7s). The annual 'Reforger' (REturn of FORces to GERmany) exercises are designed to exercise and demonstrate the USA's ability to reinforce Europe; and the 'Coronet' and 'Crested Cap' exercises, which are carried out throughout the year, with deployments of tactical combat aircraft from the USA to Europe for several weeks at a time. Deployments of B-52 bombers to the UK recommenced in 1979 after a gap of about 15 years. With this vast number of aircraft crossing the Atlantic, first of all to practise fighting a war in Europe, and ultimately to actually fight one, there can be no doubt that *all* airfields in the UK with the right facilities will be used. Stornoway is in *the* prime position to support these deployments, as it was during World War 2.

It is clear therefore that Stornoway is part of the great NATO plan to fight its nuclear war in Europe. It is further evidence of the overdefence and overkill situation that exists in the world today. It is further evidence of the escalation of armaments production and war preparations.

Of course the most heinous crime of all is the steady, nay increasing, deployment of nuclear weapons both strategic and theatre. The idea of a Nuclear-Free Zone in Europe is one which KNO espouses and KNO congratulates the initiative of END in calling for such a zone with vigour and increasing effectiveness.

These campaigns must be concerted and sustained. Never let any hurdle dissuade you in your search for peace. Pursue any legal avenue that will advance the movement one step. KNO has shown that by vigorous and determined resistance delay can be achieved and time bought is useful.

KNO has fought from strength. It is well-informed and has strong local support. But I have travelled afar in gathering support. With

the help of CND and END I, and others, marched across Europe last summer to Paris. On our way we spoke to groups of UK peace loving people. I was struck forcibly by the strong bond that peace seeking brings and the friendliness it creates. And in Paris the feeling was of happy, determined people.

George Lansbery, 20th century socialist and pacifist, wrote in his will:—

> "I am a convinced internationalist and like to feel I am just a tiny part of universal life which will one day break down all divisions and make mankind one great eternal unit both in life and death."

I feel as he; the European Peace Movement grows East and West. Let us cleave a zone of peace between war-mongers that will grow in friendship.

Remember peace is not a day's commitment, not a week's nor a year's but a lifetime's. One of our tasks within that commitment must be to fight the growing militarisation of the North Atlantic as part of NATO's plans to turn Britain into a giant airstrip from which to launch its 'flexible' nuclear war.

CONCLUSION:
THE PROSPECTS FOR A NUCLEAR-FREE NORTH ATLANTIC

Both Olafur Grimsson and Angus McCormack have spoken about the importance of their countries for NATO in the North Atlantic. It is apparent that this ocean has been defined by both superpowers as a territory to be fought over. The fact that the territory is water is not so important for superpowers' expansionist policies. We in the peace movements of Europe are only now coming to recognise that the dangers of nuclear conflict exist over sea or land: weapons do not recognise coast-lines nor end-of-conflict zones. Such demarcation is up to pressure from peace groups.

The difficulties of peace movement influence on sea areas are immense, but even the most sophisticated of weapons require shore facilities. Without the developments in Iceland, at Stornoway and elsewhere around the North Atlantic, there would be no possibility of these waters serving as a deployment area for nuclear weapons on a massive scale. Successful opposition to nuclear bases ashore is therefore a vital first step in reducing the nuclear threat in the North Atlantic.

The prospects for peace are also greatly improved by the long tradition of independent foreign policy in the Nordic countries. Norway and Denmark have successfully maintained a non-nuclear stance despite remaining in NATO, and notwithstanding the presence of American nuclear-capable aircraft at Keflavik, the Icelanders have rejected the storage of nuclear weapons in peacetime. Moreover, initiatives for a Nordic nuclear weapon-free zone from Sweden, Finland, Norway, and, it must be said, the Soviet Union over the past two decades, place the countries bordering the North Atlantic in a prominent position in the quest for a European nuclear-free zone.

The rapid expansion into the North Atlantic of the means to wage nuclear war makes it vital that the positive aspects of Nordic foreign policy, and the successes of the peace movement in north west Europe, be built on, and extended to encompass the North

Atlantic Ocean itself.
As the peace movement in continental Europe gathers strength in opposing the deployment of Cruise, Pershing II, SS-20, Trident and the neutron bomb, it is imperative that the superpowers should not be allowed to shift their war plans to the North Atlantic. It is for this reason that Glasgow END calls on all North Atlantic countries to support its Conference for a Nuclear-Free North Atlantic in April 1983. The objective is to draw together peace groups from all Northern countries, to exchange information on the nuclear militarisation of the region, and to co-ordinate activities opposing it throughout Northern Europe.

Volume 9. Two Germanies, 1961-1989
Young Christians Propose a “Social Peace Service” as an Alternative to Military Service (December 7, 1982)

Taking the peace propaganda of the SED at face value, young Christians proposed a “social peace service” as an alternative to compulsory military service. They wanted to express opposition to the arms race and the militarization of East German society while trying to initiate a political dialogue with the ruling party on a local level.

A World without the Military – that Would Be an Alternative

In the spring of 1981, when three church workers from Dresden drafted a text demanding the introduction of civilian service as an alternative to military service in the GDR, they were probably unaware that they had provided the impetus to the most significant peace initiative in the GDR (both in terms of numbers and political impact) since the debate on military instruction in schools. Their demands were actually nothing new; time and again, young conscripts had written letters and petitions that criticized the options for unarmed military service in the National People’s Army as insufficient.

It was only in March [of this year] that the leadership of the [Protestant] state church of the province of Saxony considered a letter by students in Naumburg that “mentioned the possibility of a civilian alternative to military service in the context of the larger question of concrete steps toward promoting peace. This letter was forwarded to the Church Leadership Conference.”

The Dresden initiative differed from similar attempts in the 1960s and 1970s, however, in that it aimed from the outset at a broader public within the church. Up to that point, petitions by individuals or small groups had always ended up with the state authorities or the church leadership, without having had any tangible effect. The Social Peace Service [*Sozialer Friedensdienst*] Initiative, which quickly became known by its abbreviation SoFd, was set up differently, so that many people could lend their support to the initiative through signatures without it becoming the type of signature collection subject to authorization in the GDR. Also, it was not addressed to the church leadership or state agencies but was supposed to be sent to the synods that convene in the fall. They were supposed to take up the matter and forward it to the government.

The Dresden text spread quickly throughout the entire GDR. It was read aloud, discussed, and signed at events and community evenings organized by Protestant youth groups [*Junge Gemeinde*] and student groups. Most copies of the appeal were duplicated by typewriter. In June 1981, the proposal circulated at public church congresses in Görlitz, Stralsund, and Dessau. At a "question and answer session with church personalities," young people asked church representatives to take a stance on the issue. Although it was primarily younger people who participated in the initiative, the proposal met with general acceptance in all church circles. The strongly Protestant, almost pietistic basic understanding of the appeal, which probably could have emerged in this form only in the Saxon part of the GDR, virtually ruled out any possible Christian argument for rejecting the proposal.

A basic characteristic of the concept is that its focus is not on protecting the conscience of the individual but on fulfilling a societal duty. Peace should not only be demanded but also practiced, starting today, through "emblematic" personal sacrifice, and help should be given to those who, according to Christian understanding, need it the most. "Regarding the present proposal," wrote the church leadership of the province of Saxony in November 1981, "two things should be emphasized as particularly important:

a) the connection between an expressed commitment to peace and peace service
b) the connection between disarmament and responsibility for the socially weak."

Because the paper was limited to proposals that appeared feasible and were not deemed futile from the outset, it found broad resonance among the church public, and the church leadership even made it the subject of negotiations between the church and the state. But this "realism" brought the authors criticism from other supporters of the cause.

One member of an East Berlin peace group said: "I didn't sign, because I simply see some things differently. For example, living in barracks – I spent a year and a half living in one of those structures, and I know what that means. This is exactly how they break people down; they tear you away from your social ties and prohibit all contact with the outside world. That wears you down; it is an essential part of the structural violence. Now, whether I stoke up the stove in the barracks or care for patients, there isn't really much of a difference for me." And a conscientious objector to all forms of mandated service explained: "I refuse to accept this heteronomy. Social action cannot be prescribed. I have to practice it all the time."

During the summer of 1981, supporters of the initiative made numerous attempts to introduce their demands into discussions with state representatives. There were opportunities to do so at the voter gatherings in June of that year, since those gatherings were always held in the lead-up to the *Volkskammer* elections. Such meetings have no direct influence on decisions, and they generally inspire just as little interest as the rest of this hollow political ritual, but sometimes critical questions did manage to shake them up. One person involved reported on such a meeting:

“Of the twenty-five young people, only three showed up aside from me. Even the *Volkskammer* candidate who was supposed to introduce herself failed to come, so we could only speak with one representative from the municipal district, the party secretary of the residential district, and the residential district chairman, who was a career officer. After we had spent an hour debating the poor quality of the streets and the sidewalk lighting, and the terrible rolls and miserable sausage in the market, I started discussing my problems:

1. Legal regulations for young people under eighteen who want to become construction soldiers [*Bausoldaten*] but who still have to participate in pre-military training in school and vocational instruction.
2. The labor shortage in health and social service professions, including care for the elderly, and the proposal to introduce a social peace service, that is, a civilian alternative to military service.
3. How can I nominate candidates for election who represent my own interests?”

[. . .]

Source: “Eine Welt ohne Militär – das wäre eine Alternative” [“A World without the Military – that Would Be an Alternative”], *Frankfurter Rundschau,* December 7, 1982, p. 14.

Translation: Allison Brown

END SPEC

TURK

PEACE ON

Edited by Jean





TURKEY:
PEACE ON TRIAL



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THE MILITARISATION OF TURKEY

Turkey's strategic position

From the point of view of international politics, the most important thing about Turkey is where it is. It is in a position of vital strategic importance and great instability. Turkey is the only NATO power with a substantial land border with the Soviet Union. It is packed with vast amounts of US military and surveillance equipment. It is positioned on the edge of a frightening whirlpool of conflict, instability and open warfare in Iran, Iraq, Syria and the Lebanon. It is an area of vital oil wealth, of rebellious ethnic minorities (the Kurds), of ferocious struggle between the fractions of Islam, and an area in which Israeli and Arab conflicts regularly explode into bitter and protracted fighting. Third, to the West, Turkey faces a fellow NATO state, Greece, in a posture of unrelieved hostility. In this region NATO itself threatens to fly apart.

These geopolitical facts lead some NATO governments to assume that it is above all important that there should be in Turkey a strong, reliable, stable regime, dedicated to the pursuit of the Cold War and prepared to make its territory available without question to US military planning. All other considerations are put aside. Turkey's economic and social development, its internal political arrangements, its record on human rights, are all to be judged solely in the light of how they fit in with Turkey's strategic, geopolitical role. The Thatcher government is among those which see things in this way. Whereas other European governments (the French and the Danish) planned to take Turkey to the European Commission on Human Rights, the British government (along with the newly installed Christian Democrat government in West Germany and, of course, the Americans) argue in favour of restoring economic aid to Turkey despite the military

regime's massive defiance of human rights commitments as laid down in its treaties with the Council of Europe, the EEC and NATO.

The September 1980 military coup in Turkey was designed to protect and preserve Turkey's strategic role in the era of the new Cold War. It reinstates a situation in Turkey in which the military leaders are able to pursue these designs free of interference by public discussion and criticism. It is a situation with which Turkey is familiar. Turkey joined NATO with no public debate and since the 1950s has signed a series of bi-lateral, military agreements with the USA which are outside the NATO framework and which are kept secret. Turkey participated energetically in John Foster Dulles' crusade against Arab and Iranian nationalism, creating an internal political climate in which anyone who dared to criticise, however mildly, this unwavering support for US foreign policy risked imprisonment for subversion. During the Korean war, there was no consultation with the National Assembly before 5,000 Turkish troops were despatched to join UN forces. Until the founding of the Turkish Peace Association in 1977, successive governments enforced an unwritten law effectively banning any peace movement. Since the coup, the people of Turkey are once again totally excluded from any discussion of their country's slavish subordination to US policy. Some 11 new secret bi-lateral treaties have been signed between the Pentagon and Ankara. This is no doubt what Reagan had in mind when he declared that he expected the relations between the two countries to be 'brought back to the period of the 1950s'.

Before the coup, Turkey already had the dubious distinction of being ranked *fourth* in the world in terms of the percentage of its gross national product spent on arms. With a conscript army of 600,000 Turkey still has the largest land force in NATO. As Christopher Hitchens reported in the *New Statesman* (11 August 1978) the Turkish army also controls an enormous slice of Turkish capital and business. 'The bizarrely named Armed Forces Mutual Aid Fund has assets of £89 million (in 1977) and is the third largest conglomerate in the country. Large chunks of the Goodyear and International Harvester plants (and the country's second

largest motorcar assembly plant, OYAK-Renault) for instance, belong to it. It is financed by a 10 per cent levy on the pay of 80,000 officers and extends through cement, property, petrol and vehicle manufacturing to provide considerable returns for the officer class.'

For over 30 years Turkey has provided land, air and naval installations for NATO and US forces. Monitoring facilities in Turkey provide roughly one quarter of all hard US military intelligence on Soviet missile launches. According to official information some 1,500 US personnel were in charge of 29 military bases dotted across Turkey.

Since the coup all NATO and non-NATO bases in Turkey have been enlarged, re-equipped and up-graded. A coordinating and planning body (the High Level Group) was set up and is chaired by Richard Perle, the US Assistant Secretary of Defence for International Security Policy. The main aim of this body is to 'provide for joint action in times of crisis'. Following hard on the heels of Weinberger's 1981 visit, these developments signal a new role for Turkey in the 'new international situation' created by the Iranian revolution and events in Afghanistan. At a recent NATO seminar in Istanbul, American officials emphasised Turkey's vital importance for the defence of the Gulf (the main source of the West's oil supplies) and the major role expected from Turkey in 'restoring stability' in the event of a power vacuum in neighbouring Iran. Hence the allocation of US funds for bases in Eastern Turkey for the new US Rapid Deployment Force.

A more dangerous development from the European point of view is the inclusion of Turkey in US plans to encircle the Soviet Union with 'nuclear deterrents'. In the late '70s Turkey was chosen as a site for the proposed neutron bomb. (This prompted the TPA's most successful mass campaign.) It is expected that cruise and Pershing II missiles will be deployed in US bases in Turkey in due course. Despite mounting protests from the Congress over the Turkish government's abysmal human rights record, the Reagan Administration is going ahead with its plans to up-grade the nuclear arsenals in Turkey. 'German money is to be pumped into an American scheme for building outposts in Eastern Turkey from which the latest in US nuclear armament—the

B-52G bomber equipped with air-launched cruise missiles–can be fired at the Soviet Union's soft underbelly' (*New Statesman* 12 November 1982). Storage depots for US nuclear warheads have recently been constructed in Erzurum, a base for B-52s.

Equally important are recent US-backed plans to extend the armaments industry in Turkey, to provide the material basis for the country's role as the US's 'deputy sheriff' in the Middle East and the Balkans. Some $4 billion has been earmarked for the assembly of F-L6 and F-L8 fighter jets in Turkey. Added to this are plans for manufacturing tanks and landing craft. The militarisation of Turkish society in the current Cold War climate has inevitably encouraged tendencies towards an aggressive foreign policy based on a readiness to resort to force. Some hard right elements in the armed forces are reported to be considering whether the Iran-Iraq conflict can be exploited to regain the oil-rich Northern Iraqi provinces ceded by the Ottomans to the British at the end of the First World War, 'thus ending the Turkish economy's most serious weakness, and provide an answer (to the Kurdish question)' (*New Statesman* 14 May 1982). The Turkish 'Peace Keeping Force' has been installed in Cyprus for seven years. The Turkish government has declared that any attempt by the Greek government to extend its territorial waters to 12 miles in the Aegean will be considered a *causus belli.* The Greek islands facing Turkey are bristling with weapons. 100,000 Turkish troops amassed on the Aegean coast protect the country's weatern flank from its NATO partner. Turkey's socialist neighbours are disturbed, to put it mildly, by the extent of the US nuclear build-up which is transforming this outpost of NATO into a springboard for nuclear attack.

In Turkey the very active and influential peace movement which watched these developments with alarm is now silenced. Their country is now the one place in Europe where the US can pursue its policy of nuclear rearmament without the inconvenience of massive public revulsion. In Spain and Greece social democratic governments are readjusting their relations with NATO. In Italy, West Germany and Britain vast numbers of people engage in ever louder protest at the

introduction of cruise and Pershing II. In Holland and Belgium governments have not yet finally agreed to accept the missiles. In Turkey US defence plans can be pursued without the interference of 'democratic' complaint. A motion passed at the CND Sheffield Conference noted that, 'the repression of the peace movement in Turkey provides the USA with an enclave free from peace protests, enabling the USA to site nuclear weapons which may be rejected by the rest of Europe.' Beneath the cruel farce of charging the elderly establishment figures of the TPA executive with 'attempting to overthrow the State', is a chilling reality–the nightmarish prospect of an unstable Turkey sparking off the Third, and final, World War.

Democracy swept away

In the relatively liberal decade before the 1980 coup, Turkish society developed social and political forms of democratic involvement through trade unions, women's and youth organisations, the peace movement, and so on. These elements of democratic life have all been swept away by the new regime, in the most systematic wave of repression ever experienced in the modern history of the country. The 1961 Constitution has been abolished, political parties have been suppressed, trade unions and associations have been banned. 170,000 people were arrested, of whom some 30,000 are still in prison two-and-a-half years later. Amnesty International has documented 70 cases of prisoners tortured to death.

Attention in the West has focused on four trials in which the military authorities have been particularly blatant in their disregard of legal rights to which Turkey is committed by international treaties. The biggest of these is the trial of leaders of the DISK confederation of trade unions (Turkey's second largest trade union confederation founded in the late 1960s). These union leaders, who were arrested immediately after the coup and who have certainly been tortured, are charged with attempting to overthrow the Constitution by force, a charge carrying the death penalty.

Second, there is the case of Mr Ahmet Isvan (whose wife is a defendant in the TPA trial). He was Social Democrat mayor of Istanbul and is accused of having rented municipal lorries to DISK for use in a political rally. This is a clear case of a trumped up charge being used as a weapon to punish and silence political opinions. He has also been tortured.

The third trial which has become a focus for attention in Europe, is the trial of the leaders of the Turkish Peace Association—the subject of this pamphlet. A fourth trial was more recently added to the list when military authorities arrested 18 writers charged with turning the Turkish Union of Writers into an 'illegal' organisation—identical with the charge against the TPA.

Whereas the Turkish government has got away with the arrest, torture and imprisonment of many thousands of unknown union members, students and other anonymous democrats without attracting too much high level complaint from Western governments, these trials of internationally known and respected figures are harder to conceal. They make it very difficult for the Turkish military leaders to convincingly present themselves as guardians of democracy. The whole world has witnessed some of the country's most prominent and distinguished figures, among them diplomats, lawyers, parliamentarians, writers and scientists, paraded before military courts in convicts clothing, with shaven heads and branded as criminals. In the glare of this publicity, only the most cynical of Europe's political leaders, Thatcher among them, could fail to raise a cry of protest.

THE TURKISH PEACE ASSOCIATION

In 1950 academics and intellectuals founded The Peace-lovers Society in an attempt to break through the secrecy which surrounds foreign and defence policy in Turkey. It was suppressed almost immediately. It was not until the founding of the Turkish Peace Association in April 1977 that there existed in Turkey an organisation committed to campaigning for peace and disarmament. The TPA was founded during a period in modern Turkish history which witnessed the most impressive democratisation of the country's social and political life. Individual liberties and freedoms of association and assembly, enshrined in the liberal 1961 Constitution, were actually being exercised by large numbers of people. Great strides were made by the trade union movement and by women's and youth organisations.

The TPA is a direct progeny of the Helsinki Conference and the spirit of detente endorsed by the Final Act. The initiative for a peace organisation was made in 1976 by the Istanbul Bar Association, one of the most prestigious institutions in the country. It was under the auspices of this organisation that a founding conference was held in April 1977. Three years and five months later, in September 1980, the Turkish Peace Association was crushed immediately following the military coup.

TPA activities were concentrated on three issues. First, it publicised and promoted the Helsinki Agreement. Second, the TPA campaigned for nuclear disarmament, and in particular against the proposal to site the neutron bomb, cruise and Pershing II missiles in NATO and US bases in Turkey. Third, the TPA brought to public attention the economically crippling arms race between Turkey and Greece and campaigned for a just and peaceful solution to conflicts in the Middle East.

THE AIMS OF THE TPA

The founding conference of the TPA declared its tasks as forming public opinion and initiating debate on the following basic principles adopted as its aims:

—The abolition of nuclear weapons and all weapons of mass destruction; a stop to the arms race, the dissolution of all military alliances; the removal from all countries of foreign bases and foreign troops.
—An end to resorting to force in international disputes and their resolution by negotiation.
—Peaceful co-existence between nations with different political systems; rejection of interference in the internal affairs of nations; respect for the independence and sovereignty of nations.
—The development of economic and cultural ties between nations within a framework of friendship and mutually beneficial co-operation.
—An immediate end to all forms of racism and colonialism.
—The re-allocation of the enormous funds reserved for armament to the eradication of disease and human misery.
—Respect for human rights; the possession and control by the people of their national resources and the freedom of the people to determine, according to forms chosen by themselves, social and economic reforms.
—The implementation of United Nations resolutions concerning matters of peace and security.

In the annual general meeting of the TPA convened between 3rd and 5th April 1980, the general secretary of the Association, Enis Coskun, further emphasised the following objectives:

—The endorsement of the ending of the Cold War, full support for the process of detente inaugurated by the Helsinki Final Act of 1975.
—Greater contribution to enforcing the possibilities of developing peace and security in the region.
—Greater effort to contribute to the movement for democracy encompassing all sections of society and solidarity with anti-fascist mobilisation of all democratic forces.

It will be seen that these aims corresponded both with the revival of peace movements throughout the world as well as the specific struggles within Turkey for peace and democracy.

The public response to the TPA was very large and enthusiastic. It gained the support of an impressive number of academic experts who served on its committees of inquiry on disarmament, economic and cultural cooperation in the Balkans, human rights, peace research, and so on. Moreover, very large numbers of people joined in its activities and attended its meetings. Within the first year of its existence the TPA:

- organised over 40 public meetings in the country's major cities;
- published a monthly journal called *Peace News*;
- set up a large stand in the Izmir International Fair which was visited by over one million people;
- organised ten peace symposia;
- participated in a Conference on Human Rights jointly organised by UNESCO and the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs;
- was officially received by Professor Gunduz Okcun, the new Foreign Minister appointed by the Ecevit administration following the collapse of the ultra right-wing National Front coalition;
- was officially delegated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to represent Turkey in the Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference convened in Addis Ababa;
- sent two delegations abroad to attend international peace conferences.

Perhaps the most significant meeting attended by the TPA was the International Conference for Peace, Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean held in Athens from 9–12 February 1978. The TPA participated with 53 delegates representing a broad spectrum of the country's professional and mass organisations as well as including some of the country's best known writers, artists, scientists and a former senator. The Turkish and Greek delegations to the Conference signed a joint declaration; for this act the Turkish military prosecutor after the coup demanded fifteen-year gaol sentences for the signatories on the grounds that the declaration 'slanders the Turkish State'.

JOINT DECLARATION OF THE GREEK AND TURKISH DELEGATIONS TO THE MEDITERRANEAN CONFERENCE

Representatives of the peace forces of Turkey and Greece. . . share the opinion that the existing relations between the two countries give cause for grave concern for the peace loving peoples of Greece and Turkey. . . The known circles. . . employing chauvinist and militarist forces are creating problems between our countries; they provoke a permanent situation of tension; they are pushing our countries towards an accelerating arms race. This is a great threat for peace and security in our region which, at the same time, is devouring enormous resources of vital importance for the welfare and prosperity of both peoples. . . the peace forces (of Greece and Turkey) demand the implementation of the UN Resolutions on Cyprus providing respect for independence, sovereignty and the territorial integrity of the island and call for the immediate withdrawal of all foreign military forces and bases, as well as the implementation in the Aegean Sea of internationally accepted legal conventions.

12 February 1978

With the formation of the Social Democratic Ecevit administration in 1978, the TPA became one of the country's most respected pressure groups. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs started sending observers and representatives to many of the seminars and international symposia organised by the Association. TPA representatives were delegated by the new government to attend international conferences. Statements and declarations issued by TPA members found a ready response in the media. Their views were sought after each major world event or important foreign policy decisions.

In acknowledgement of these successes and to register the growing international reputation of the Turkish peace movement, half a dozen TPA members were included in an invitation extended to prominent Turks inviting them to

From left to right: Enis Coşkun, General Secretary of TPA; Mahmut Dikerdem, President; Mrs. Reha Isvan during May Day 1978.

join the World Peace Council. Guided by the principle that 'peace is one and indivisible and belongs to all' the TPA sought to develop links with peace movements across the world. In all its international dealings the TPA maintained its independence and actively worked for the unity of the world peace movement.

In Turkey members of the TPA executive became honoured speakers at meetings of virtually every major democratic organisation in the country. By September 1980 over 50 mass organisations were represented on the General Council of the TPA. The TPA executive, arrested in February 1982, includes many prominent personalities and represents a wide spectrum of Turkish social, cultural and political life.

ARRESTED MEMBERS OF THE TPA EXECUTIVE

Mahmut Dikerdem — TPA President, a career diplomat for 40 years, with one half of this period as ambassador. Honorary Professor of International Relations, author of two works on the Third World. Aged 67.

Orhan Apaydin — Member of Turkish Parliament 1961-5. Veteran lawyer and human rights campaigner. Elected three times to the Presidency of the Istanbul Bar Association. Columnist in the daily newspaper *Cumhuriyet*. Honorary doctorate from the University of Paris Law Faculty. Aged 56.

Mrs Reha Isvan — Women's rights campaigner, educationalist and agriculturalist. Member of executive of World Village Women's Federation. Married to former mayor of Istanbul, Ahmet Isvan, gaoled since September 1980. Aged 57.

Dr Erdal Atabek — President of the Turkish Medical Association. Executive member of the Balkan Medical Association. Consultant to the Ministry of Health. Member of staff, University of Istanbul Medical Faculty. Aged 52.

Ataol Behramoglu — Poet. General Secretary, Turkish Writers Union. Translator of works by Turgenev, Gorki and Pushkin. Editor of literary journals. Author of a dozen books of poetry. Recipient of this year's Lotus Prize given by the Afro-Asian Writers Union. Aged 40.

Prof. Metin Ozek — Medical doctor and psychiatrist. Professor at the University of Istanbul Faculty of Medicine. Executive member of World Psychiatrists Association. Apart from scientific books, has contributed to UNICEF research on children's books. Aged 52.

Prof. Melih Tumer — Dean of the Istanbul Faculty of Political Science. Doctorate from the Sorbonne. Director for International Harvester and Machinen Fabrik Augusburg-Nurenberg. Expert on business administration. Aged 58.

Nedim Tarhan — President of the Rural Cooperatives Association. Member of Parliament, Republican Peoples Party (sister party of the British Labour Party). Member of many international parliamentary commissions. Aged 40.

Ismail Hakki Oztorun — Member of Parliament, Republican Peoples Party. Aged 37.

Kemal Anadol — Member of Parliament, Republican Peoples Party. Former President of the RPP Youth Section. Aged 42.

Mustafa Gazalci — Member of Parliament, Republican Peoples Party. Aged 37.

Nurettin Yilmaz — Member of Parliament, Republican Peoples Party. Presidential candidate in 1980. Aged 47.

Dr Gencay Saylan — Senior Lecturer in Public Administration, Middle East Technical University, Ankara. Many publications on the structure of Turkish bureaucracy. Former General Secretary of Turkish University Teachers Association. National team volley ball coach. Aged 42.

Dr Haluk Tosun — Doctorate from Imperial College, London. Head of Department of Electrical Engineering, Middle East Technical University, Ankara. Aged 34.

Ali Sirmen — Foreign Affairs columnist in the prestigious daily newspaper *Cumhuriyet*. Member of a number of international journalists organisations. Author of books on Turkish and world affairs. Aged 42.

Huseyin Bas — Journalist, author, parliamentary candidate. Aged 54.

Ali Taygun — Graduate of Yale Drama School. Director of Yale Drama Company, 1970. Director of the State Theatre Company of Istanbul. Worked with the National Opera in Ankara. Aged 39.

Orhan Taylan — One of Turkey's foremost painters; has held exhibitions and received awards in Europe. Aged 41.

Aykut Goker — President of the Turkish Engineers and Technicians union. Mechanical Engineer. Technical consultant, civil servant. Aged 35.

Ugur Kokten — Former university lecturer. Construction engineer, author. Aged 48.

Aybars Ungan — Electrical engineer. Consultant civil servant. Aged 42.

Sefik Asan — Educationalist, literature teacher, headmaster of Lycée Maltepe, Istanbul. Aged 41.

Tahsin Usluoglu — Graduate of Middle East Technical University. Planning expert. Aged 32.

THE DENIAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE TPA TRIAL

> Very rarely can one find another indictment in the annals of jurisprudence wherein such grave charges are laid with such impunity on the basis of such flimsy and contentious evidence.
>
> *Mahmut Dikerdem, President of the TPA, 17 August 1982*

At the time of the coup the generals sought to minimise European criticism by declaring that they would be 'even-handed' in dealing with 'terrorists who brought Turkey to the brink of civil war', and that they would preserve civilian judiciary proceedings, only resorting to 'state of emergency martial law procedures' in cases involving armed political violence. These guarantees have proved worthless.

Some five months after the coup, in January 1981, the then Military Prosecutor General of the Istanbul Martial Law Command Colonel Suleyman Takkeci (variously referred in the British press as a 'fascist sympathiser', 'hard-liner' and 'right-winger' and who has since been moved to a 'backroom job in Ankara' because of his excesses) called for the arrest of all the officials of the TPA elected in the last AGM held in April 1980. This request was turned down by the Second Military Court of the Istanbul Martial Law Command on grounds of 'insufficient evidence to warrant arrests'. Colonel Takkeci did not challenge this decision and thus technically forfeited the right to call for arrests on the same grounds. This procedure was however infringed when the prosecution renewed its demands some nine months later during October 1981. Once again, the higher military court ruled that since the 'request was refused previously' and that 'no new evidence or strong indications that a crime has been committed can be established', it refused to issue arrest warrants.

By this time, the TPA had been under investigation for over a year. All its files and documents were held by the martial law authorities. Since no evidence of illegality had been found in the files or in the public speeches and statements of the executive, the military prosecutor proceeded to

fabricate new evidence. First, he commissioned an 'experts report' from three right-wing academics in the Istanbul Law Faculty, claiming that the TPA was in breach of articles 141 and 142 of the Turkish Penal Code. The report based its case on a document which had not been discovered previously in the TPA's files and which was, it was claimed, a letter from a member of the Turkish Communist Party in East Germany. The second piece of 'new evidence' was a confession allegedly made by a Turkish Communist stating that there were links between the TPA and the Communist Party. This 'confession' was withdrawn by the defendant in court. He claimed that it had been obtained as a result of police brutality and torture. According to the British press this person 'was taken to a military hospital a week after his arrest. The authorities claimed he had jumped from a fourth floor window during an interrogation. After several further interrogation sessions he was again in hospital.' He later walked into the court on crutches. This was the sum of the 'new evidence' brought forward by the prosecutor in his third attempt to have the TPA executive arrested. This time he was successful.

The prosecution's methods of concocting 'evidence' have subsequently been revealed to be not only sinister, as in the above example, but also extremely stupid. The indictment bases its case on 'concrete evidence' of links between the TPA and 'illegal political centres'. Listed as the 'evidence' for these links are 'articles and publications sent by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to the TPA'. It turns out that these consist of a statement by Brezhnev on world peace. This statement was in fact also sent to the Turkish Radio and Television Corporation and was broadcast in full *nine months after the coup* on 23 June 1981! A second such item of 'evidence' is described as 'left-wing subversive literature. . . such as Lenin's *On Education and Pedagogy*'. It is now established that this was part of a publication by the Soviet Academy of Sciences concerning peace education in the Soviet Union. Like the other items of 'proof', listed as 'subversive periodicals published in Turkish abroad', these publications were unsolicited and appeared through the mail. The latter two items were in fact published in 1981, i.e., *twelve months after the TPA offices had been sealed by*

martial law authorities and all possessions and documents confiscated! This is the ludicrous evidence presented by the prosecution for its charge that the TPA was conducting a 'coordinated conspiracy'.

The charge against the TPA is that it constituted an 'illegal organisation' which attempted 'to overthrow the established constitutional order', thereby infringing articles 141 and 142 of the Turkish Penal Code. These articles, which derive from Mussolini, were incorporated into Turkish law in 1926. They prohibit organisations which aim 'to establish the supremacy of one class over another class by force or in any way attempt to overthrow by force the economic and social order of the State'. They were amended in 1938 to include 'propaganda. . . against the principles of the State or to undermine national solidarity'. This amendment was directly related to securing a conviction against the poet Nazim Hikmet who had been court-martialled for what subsequently turned out to be fabricated charges of inciting naval cadets to mutiny. (More information about Hikmet is on page 00 of this pamphlet.)

After four amendments in as many decades, articles 141 and 142 have the kind of generality whereby any utterance or text which challenges government policy or which criticises any 'institution of the republic' can be deemed to be 'communist propaganda'. The undemocratic and catch-all nature of these articles have been repeatedly criticised by members of parliament, Constitutional Court judges and Bar Associations in Turkey as well as by Western European jurists.

The gist of the indictment is that the TPA executive have expressed views contrary to 'national interests' and 'national security'. It is alleged that the TPA worked 'in parallel' with an 'illegal political party' and thus became an instrument for the dissemination of 'subversion'. By calling for the implementation of UN Resolutions on Cyprus and thus the withdrawal of all foreign troops from the island, the TPA has damaged the 'international standing and integrity of the State'. Predictably, the main accusation is that the 'TPA has continually opposed the bi-lateral military treaties to which Turkey is a party, as well as the military bases founded

under the auspices of Turkey's membership to NATO'.

The trial opened on 24 June 1982 in a converted basketball stadium, some four months after the arrests. The military judges, who have been changed *three times*, are appointed by the General Chief of Staff. The martial law court is being held under *'war-time emergency conditions'* with their attendant restrictions on defence rights. (There is, of course, no jury.) The prisoners are allowed 20 minutes each week with their lawyers. They cannot speak with their lawyers during the sittings. Rows of armed guards separate the lawyers from the defendants. The lawyers are not allowed to confer with each other during the hearing. In the sixth session for example, five lawyers were manhandled and ejected from the courtroom for 'conferring without permission'.

The *Guardian* correspondent noted that by late August 'there have only been four hearings. . . Even by the snail's pace of Turkish court procedures, this is most unusual.' The END observer reported that '. . . it would appear that it is in the interest of the authorities to spin the proceedings out for as long as possible, until public attention is diverted from the issue.' It has taken the court *five months* to read the indictment and cross-examine 19 defendants. Thus, contrary to the assurances given by the military administration to their Western allies, the TPA arrests and trial constitute a *prima facie* case of contravention of legality and human rights. The institution of arrest has been transformed in effect into punishment.

Both the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the European Convention on Human Rights, which are endorsed by Turkey, clearly stipulate that, 'No one shall be held guilty of any penal offence. . . which did not constitute a penal offence, under national or international law, at the time it was committed.' Other clauses of international conventions of which Turkey is a co-signatory clearly indicate that individuals can only be brought to courts which are competent to try them. By charging the TPA executive retroactively and by invoking 'war-time emergency conditions' in a military tribunal, the Turkish government is in clear breach of its international undertakings.

NAZIM HIKMET

Celebrating the birthday of Nazim Hikmet is judged by the Turkish military authorities to be a crime, and figures as such in the indictment of the leaders of the TPA.

Nazim Hikmet (1902-63) was the greatest Turkish poet of modern times. He spent periods in prison in 1928 and 1933. In 1938 he was sentenced by military courts to 35 years, on a fabricated charge of inciting naval cadets to spread communism. The proceedings at his trial were so grotesque that they caused a wave of protest. In 1949 there was an unsuccessful international campaign for Hikmet's release. He went on hunger strike in 1950 and was released in a general amnesty in 1951. He died in Moscow in 1963. His work is widely known in continental Europe where he is regarded as having the same stature as Neruda and Lorca. A small part of his work is available in English, in *Selected Poems* (1967, Cape), *The Moscow Symphony* (1970, André Deutsch) and in the magazine *Arena* (Sept/Oct 1950) from which the following poem is taken.

OF LIFE

by Nazim Hikmet

This life is not a joke
You must treat it as a serious thing,
As a squirrel does, if you like,
Without expecting a Beyond or a Hereafter–
Then you'll have nothing else to do but live.

This life is not a joke
You must take it seriously,
Seriously enough to find yourself
Up against a wall, maybe, with your wrists bound,
Or in a white laboratory coat
And thick spectacles
About to die that other men may live
Men whose faces you have never even seen–
And you will die in the full consciousness
That there is nothing so fine, so sure as Life.

You must take it seriously
But serious up to the point where you start
Planting olives at three score years and ten
Not in the least because they will grow for your children
But simply because you don't believe in death
And the root of your disbelief
Is the overriding preciousness of Life.

NOTES FROM A JOURNEY TO ISTANBUL

by Erik Stinus

It is the season when the streets of Istanbul smell strongly and sweetly of apricots. The main topic of conversation and in the news is the bankruptcy or fraud of a wealthy banker and his flight abroad.

On Thursday the 24th of June the twenty-six imprisoned members of the Peace Committee appear before a military tribunal in a barracks area on the western edge of Istanbul. Strict security measures have been taken around the gym, now turned into a court. The daylong session occupied itself with the identification of the prisoners and a rather clumsy recitation of a small part of the indictment. In addition, the spokesman for the counsel for the defence, Burhan Apaydin, a brother to Orhan Apaydin, delivered an angry protest against a newspaper interview given the day before by the military prosecutor Colonel Takkeci, as well as a demand that the accused be set free for the duration of the trial. This was immediately rejected, the protest was apparently entered into the books by a female secretary who sat behind a typewriter on a platform just below the presiding judge.

The indictment maintains that trade unions, peace movements and the like are the inventions of Lenin. Besides speaking and writing on the necessity of disarmament and even against the deployment of atomic weapons in their country, thereby demonstrating their collusion with the Communist Party (the Communist Party of Turkey has been prohibited for almost two generations), the accused have among other things supported the right of the Turkish Kurds to their own language and institutions and expressed themselves on the question of reconciliation with Greece and the recall of Turkish troops from Cyprus.

The three officers who for the occasion have donned the

black cape of justice over their uniforms can hardly have any doubt about the seriousness of the charges. The fact that the Peace Committee celebrated the birthday of the Turkish Communist poet Nazim Hikmet, but not the anniversary of the saintly poet Mevlanas, is a point of grave issue. The prosecutor portrays Hikmet as the Turkish writer who lived in the Soviet Union and constantly wrote against his own fatherland. He fails to mention that Hikmet was repeatedly put before courts like this one and accused on account of his poems and opinions, earning himself sentences of more than thirty years. When one of the accused is questioned as to his parents' names he answers: father's name–Nazim, mother's name–Hikmet. Careful smiles among the listening public and in the press gallery. The secretary rattles the information down on the judge's orders.

The prisoners are placed on benches behind bars and soldiers with helmets and white gloves stand everywhere. Despite the sombre atmosphere the relatives of the prisoners could be pleased that they appear to be in good spirits ('apparently stronger than we are' remarked the wife of the painter Orhan Taylan), and that they, as an elderly Turkish journalist whispered to me, were able to stand up without the assistance of soldiers on the entrance of their judges.

In the homes of the accused life goes on. The children have summer holidays, the older ones are awaiting the results of the examinations, all are busy putting on their finest clothes in the bedroom, the youngest girl is having her hair braided, their uncle is coming shortly to take them to town to a puppet show. The mother shops hurriedly in the neighbourhood, cuts up the vegetables, makes slightly absent-minded plans for the evening meal, offers mulberries, apricots and peaches to the guests. Tidies up, reads, writes letters, prepares the work of many days to come.

The sound of laughter and song as the children return and tell all about Punch. A woman cleaning the staircase is invited in to a cup of coffee and a cigarette. Until yesterday her son and his comrades were on hunger strike in prison. The dead were quietly driven away in the night, she says. Her son has been in prison for a year now, still without trial. Her other son completed his studies last year but is unemployed. Now

she has to go to the theatre to enquire about the dates of the entrance examination to the Opera School; her daughter of fourteen wants to be a singer. She can neither read or write herself. If I was nineteen, she sighs, if only I was nineteen. . . and she ties the scarf tightly about her chin, says goodbye in the doorway and goes down the stairs.

On the wall hangs a portrait of Ataol Behramoglu drawn by his friend Orhan Taylan in prison.

On the 29th of June the prosecutor succeeds in completing his recitation of the indictment. According to articles 141 and 142 of the penal code which apply to acts against the established order and which are usually interpreted in accordance with the needs of the powerful, the accused can be sentenced to between eight and thirty years in gaol. The next hearing takes place on Tuesday the 27th of July with a new batch of judges. Here it was announced under protest from the counsel for the defence that 'in order to avoid unnecessary costs in connection with the trial. . . the prisoners would not be cross-examined within the courtroom'. This has not yet actually been put into practice but the protest was overruled.

On the 17th of August the trial is resumed and seems to be going to last until the referendum on the military government's new constitution in November. The defence is of the opinion that the generals, by these means, seek to ensure that none of the accused will be able to participate in a debate which scarcely can be repressed completely.

In the meantime the President of the Peace Association, Mahmut Dikerdem, has fallen seriously ill. The authorities refused him medical care but after approaches to the junta leader Kenan Evren by, among others, the Council of Europe, Dikerdem was transferred to a military hospital. His defence lawyer wished to demand his release but Dikerdem has declined release on grounds of health. The demand for release, he says, must apply to all members of the Peace Committee, none of whom have committed any crime.

. . . From the balcony we can see ships from all over the world glide past each other on the Bosphoros. There have been no collisions since the new regulation keeping all traffic to the right, or so I am told here in a sunset over Istanbul.

Translation: Patrick Mac Manus

Erik Stinus is a prominent Danish poet and peace activist.

END OBSERVERS REPORT ON THE TRIAL OF THE TURKISH PEACE ASSOCIATION

This is a shortened version of a report written for END and the Committee for the Defence of the Turkish Peace Association by two English barristers, *Lesley Orme* and *Nicholas Blake*, who visited Istanbul from 23–30 July 1982.

During our visit we spoke to various lawyers, relatives, the Information Secretary at the British Consulate, the Captain responsible for civilian liaison at the Martial Law Court, and a Turkish journalist. We attended the headquarters of the Martial Law Commander at the Selinye Barracks in Istanbul, in an attempt to obtain permission to visit the prisoners, but were unsuccessful. We were similarly unable to meet the prosecutor in charge of the trial, as he did not attend the hearing on 27 July. The restrictions of Turkish law forbidding the passing of information to foreigners, prevent us identifying those to whom we talked.

Background to the trial

It takes an extraordinary state of affairs for any country to bring criminal charges against a former ambassador, the President of its most prestigious Bar Association, the President of its Medical Association and a host of other distinguished academics, writers and members of Parliament. It is more extraordinary still when the allegation, for which the prosecutor is demanding prison terms of up to 30 years, consists solely in membership of a peace association, founded in 1977 in accordance with Turkish law, and every one of whose objects is in accordance with the founding documents of the United Nations.

The essential allegations of the prosecutor are that the members of the TPA used their constitutional freedom to

express opinions and associate in a manner that weakens the resistance of the Turkish state to communism. A call for the removal of the American bases and nuclear missiles from Turkey and withdrawal from NATO is seen as direct support for the Soviet Union, and therefore a grave crime threatening the existence of the Turkish state. Again, calls for an end to exploitation and support for a radical trade union movement are deemed to be contraventions of those provisions of the Penal Code which prevent the establishment of hegemony of one class over another. Under Turkey's peculiar historical and geographical circumstances, a politically conscious pacifism itself, the prosecution contends, is illegal.

Links between the TPA trial and the trial of DISK

Two months before the arrest of the TPA defendants the trial of the leaders of the DISK confederation of radical trade unions had begun. There are important connections and similarities between the two trials, although the TPA trial is perhaps the more outstanding example of an attempt to outlaw 'opinion'.

At the time of the dissolution on 12 September 1980, the DISK confederation had achieved a membership of some 600,000 workers since its foundation in the late 1960s. It was thus Turkey's second largest confederation, next to TURK/IS which it was rapidly rivalling in terms of membership and influence. DISK had a class-conscious ideology and certainly regarded the legitimate function of a trade union to extend to broader considerations than the negotiation of wages. It also agitated for the improvement of social conditions; it organised May Day marches; published trade union papers and built holiday camps and seaside resorts; many of its affiliates provided health and pension schemes; when its dynamic founding General Secretary was murdered by fascist gunmen in 1980, DISK organised a mass demonstration against terrorism. All these activities are deemed by the military to be in excess of the proper function of trade unions, and consequently form part of the indictment in the Istanbul Martial Law Courts against the 90 or so trade

union leaders. The prosecutor is asking for the death penalty against those leaders under the provisions of the Penal Code which prohibit *inter alia* conspiracy to usurp the function of a national assembly, and intending by propaganda or action to bring about the hegemony of one class over another. There are no allegations of terrorist activities by DISK; it is essentially the class-conscious ideology that is on trial.

The indictment against the TPA defendants includes the allegation of being in solidarity with DISK. The solidarity includes mutual telegrams of support and mutual attendances at conferences and public meetings. Apaydin in particular was a guest of honour at some DISK conventions, when he called for the repeal of Articles 141 and 142 of the Turkish Penal Code which was modelled on Mussolini's Fascist Code. It is under these Articles that both lawyer and client are now being charged.

Until the arrest of the TPA defendants it was with the DISK trial that European human rights organisations were primarily concerned. There was some difference of opinion between the various foreign ministers and the Council of Europe whether to report Turkey to the European Commission of Human Rights. Some of the European governments have now done this unilaterally. The pressure on the government to adopt this course has increased since the arrest of the TPA defendants. A committee of the European Parliament voted in March to recommend that the Council of Ministers take action against Turkey with particular reference to the DISK and TPA trials.

The prosecution of the TPA

We have not seen a full translation of the indictment, but we have had translated the full decision of the court in March 1982. From this decision it appears that the gravamen of the accusations against the TPA may be summarised as follows: (i) Sending a delegation to attend the anniversary of the October Revolution in Bulgaria. (ii) Receiving a letter of solidarity from the Turkish Communist Party (the TPA denied that such a letter was found in their files). (iii) Expressing themselves to be in solidarity with DISK. (iv) Attending a World Peace Council conference in Athens which called for the removal of Turkish troops from Cyprus. (v) 'In a conference in London in solidarity with Cyprus. . . interpreted the action realised by the Turkish Army solely to establish peace, as an alien intervention prepared by American imperialism.' (vi) Opposing Turkish membership of NATO and bi-lateral agreements with the USA. (vii) Having pamphlets stating 'a world without exploitation and (with) peace has ceased to be an abstract wish or utopia and has become a banner symbolising the historic mission of the working class'. (viii) Being in possession of a report stating that the USSR is a 'bastion of world peace'. (ix) Calling for the repeal of Articles 141 and 142 of the Turkish Penal Code. (x) In a meeting commemorating the birthday of a pacifist poet, the judgment notes that members of the audience shouted, 'All peoples are brothers', and 'End national oppression in the East'. Further 'Long live Soviet Union'-type of slogans were shouted. (xi) The closure of the TPA headquarters was strongly condemned by the Turkish Communist Party radio. (xii) 'Thus,' the judgment concludes, 'all these, and other different and new evidence after the first demands for arrests, as well as the fact that some of the accused are abroad, indicates strong ground that the accused have committed the crimes attributed to them.'

The proceedings on 27 July 1982

The TPA trial was held in the Ataturk Ogrenci Sitesi, a basketball court in a students' complex in the suburb of Topkapi, some miles from the centre of Istanbul. A marquee had been erected at the entrance to the complex which was manned by military personnel for the processing of lawyers, relatives, the press, foreign consular officials and observers like ourselves. Once our identities had been checked and a body search conducted, we had no difficulty in being allowed through.

After waiting some 40 minutes outside on a well-worn piece of lawn, the army bus carrying the defendants arrived,

flanked by two army lorries full of accompanying troops. The 21 defendants looked smart in jackets and ties, in marked contrast to the legal personnel, who wore casual clothes under their simple black robes; the judges, indeed, were both dressed in T-shirts, and put on their robes in front of the assembled multitudes.

The scene inside the basketball court was a somewhat unusual setting for a judicial proceedings, in the spectators' gallery, ranked above the well of the court, were seated the families and friends of the accused, including several small children. The visiting delegations were also seated in this area, but kept apart from the relatives, by a line of three military police standing in the aisles.

Below us the basketball court itself, where, enclosed within crash barriers, sat the defendants. Four were absent, through ill health including TPA President Mahmut Dikerdem. The defendants' arena was divided into three aisles, so was the upstairs public gallery. In each aisle stood three military policemen, young boys who appeared to have been conscripted from Turkey's vast Asiatic peasantry. They maintained a stiff posture throughout the day, with their white gloves, lanyards, holsters, helmets and khaki uniforms. This guard was changed at regular intervals. They performed no apparent security function, but seemed to serve as some metaphor for the determination and resolution of the army; the stiff backbone of the nation when confronted with the squabbling subversives of the civilians on trial.

The chief judge commenced the session by setting out the five matters for the decision of the court that day. These were: (i) Whether to continue with the basketball court as the place of trial or transfer proceedings across the Bosphoros to the Selinye Barracks, which was nearer where the defendants were imprisoned. (ii) Whether the defendants should be tried in alphabetical order or in the order set out in the indictment. (iii) Whether they should be released on bail, and the judge specifically invited renewed submissions to this effect which was to cruelly raise the hopes of the families. (iv) Whether the proceedings should be taped or typewritten, which was of significance since the procedure is that every submission addressed to the court is laboriously

repeated by the judge to the stenographer, who takes it down on a manual typewriter. (v) Whether the indictment should be severed at this stage and each individual examined by him or herself. A new military rule no. 2657 provided for this. This issue was related to the first, as the grounds for such severance were overcrowding in the case of mass trials.

The defendants were then invited to address the court on these issues. They spoke in turn, the lawyers and former MPs amongst them speaking the longest and marshalling the arguments. The defendants were all adamant that they should be tried together and were opposed to alphabetical listing. All wanted release on bail except for the former Republican Party MP Tarhan. The burden of his submission was that he did not accept the legality of the detention and therefore to apply for bail at all would be to accept the jurisdiction of the court.

When Orhan Apaydin came to address the court, he took up a position before the lectern in front of the court. As leader of the Istanbul Bar Association he made a lengthy and authoritative submission. He dealt with the new rule no. 2657, stating that it was brought in to deal with the 2,000-3,000 outstanding cases, where there were not enough large places for mass trials to take place. By the standards of some of these cases (there are some 500 defendants in the National Action Party trial) this was a small case, with some 26 defendants in prison; for this reason the rule was inapplicable.

Turning to the wider issues raised by the trial, Apaydin observed that Turkey herself could be brought to trial as a member of the Council of Europe. He made reference to Article 6 of the Charter as a basic constitutional right which could not be ignored, and the right of a defendant to defend himself in a free and unbiased court. He said that for months he was unable to know what he was accused of. The indictment had been prepared three months after his detention. The TPA, he informed the court, had been formed to promote peace in the world, and hundreds and thousands of people were working for peace in all kinds of social systems and there were many peace committees. There was no provision for arresting people for their aims rather than

their acts.

The lengthy submissions by the defence, and the long adjournment that followed, raised an atmosphere of considerable hope among relatives and lawyers. Two hours went by. Then, late in the day, about 6.45 p.m. the court was called to order again. The judge read out the decision. The positions on place of trial, tape recording and separate trials were all reserved, the same system as had been adopted in the past would continue but the matter could be reviewed in the future. The list of the defendants would be as in the indictment and not, as the prosecutor had asked, in alphabetical order. Bail was refused to all defendants with no reasons given. A new date was set for the hearing. The summary denial of bail was very disappointing to the relatives after such a lengthy hearing, and after such hopes had been raised. The defendants lined up outside the court to await the van which would return them to the prison. They were separated from their relatives by a cordon of military. The families tried to pass cigarettes to them, but were forbidden. Just then the small daughter of the poet Vehramoglu, General Secretary of the Writers Union, ran between the soldiers' legs and jumped into her father's arms before she could be stopped. Her name was Baris, which means 'Peace'. The ranks of the soldiers broke and there was embracing all round allowed by the military. Peace had at least won this round.

Freedoms of expression and association denied

We are not competent to form any opinion of the reasons behind the TPA prosecution and do not attempt to do so now. We are awaiting a full translation of the indictment, but even then it is difficult to ascertain how far Turkish criminal procedure, particularly martial law procedure, allows a challenge to the facts. As we understand it, the trial is likely to consist of the interrogation of the accused and the calling of witnesses by the accused, if permitted by the courts. There appears to be no obligation on the prosecution to submit its witnesses to cross-examination.

The defence submissions are therefore likely to be what inferences can legitimately be made from the possession, for example, of pro-Soviet literature. It seems fairly likely that any peace association trying to foster good relations with its neighbours in the Warsaw Pact is likely to include members who are positively friendly to these countries as well as those who simply do not want to go to war with them. It seems that the leaders of the Peace Association are deemed to be implicated in the political aspirations of any of its members, and thus the prosecution is able to confuse pro-Soviet views with anti-nuclear ones.

At its very highest, the worst allegation made by the prosecutor is that the TPA is an attempt to circumvent the proscription of the Communist Party in Turkish law. Even if that were the issue, it would seem difficult to reconcile such a proscription and such an allegation with the freedoms of expression and association guaranteed by the European Convention.

There are substantial grounds to consider, however, that under the guise of anti-communism and anti-terrorism, the military are taking the opportunity to remove from circulation some of their most distinguished critics. It has been stressed to us, that the prevailing ideology of the TPA defendants, was that of Mr Ecevit's Republican Party.

The next hearing

The next hearing was set for 17 August, at the same location. It is to be hoped that on this occasion the trial proper will commence. The medical condition of Mr Dikerdem gives cause for concern. The continuing detention of Apaydin deprives the DISK defendants of their leading advocate. Mrs Isvan, the sole woman defendant, is kept in a women's prison, with right-wing detainees and other ordinary criminals, in contra-distinction from the male defendants, who are all together. For these reasons, as well as the inevitable strain upon the relatives, it is to be hoped that the trial will proceed swiftly from now onwards. By Turkish standards, the trial has commenced reasonably promptly,

and this may be a response to international criticism. On the other hand, it would appear that it is in the interests of the authorities to spin the proceedings out for as long as possible, until public attention is diverted from the issue. Certainly, we understand that the Turkish Government intends to make no prompt response to the inquiries of the European Commission to allegations of contravention of the European Convention on Human Rights.

TPA LEADERS DEFIANT IN COURT

The speeches of the TPA leaders in court have been remarkable for their courageous and forthright condemnation of the military authorities who sit in judgment over them, and for the pride with which they declare their commitment to peace. Even after many months in prison they remain defiant and uncowed. They proclaim their right and their duty to campaign for disarmament. We can give here only short extracts from their impressive testimony for peace.

MAHMUT DIKERDEM*

Those before you in the dock have served the Turkish state with distinction for a total of 406 years. The prosecutor however asks for gaol sentences totalling 500 years. The persons before you do not even share the same political convictions. . . There can be no freedom or guarantee of human rights in a society where the kind of outlook prevailing in the indictment were to dominate political life. . . The underlying intention of this indictment is to deter Turkish intellectuals from espousing the cause of peace and nuclear disarmament by making examples of us and attempting to teach us a lesson for exercising our democratic rights. I can think of no worse damage to our country's standing and image abroad. . . Those who are in favour of a just and enduring peace are conscious of the fact that disarmament cannot be achieved under conditions of a 'balance of terror' between military blocs. . . It is perfectly true that as the Peace Association we oppose *all military pacts* and support their mutually agreed disbandment. . . As in the case of the famous scientist who was brought before a medieval tribunal

*Mahmut Dikerdem's long statement, "In Defence of Peace", is published in full by the Campaign for the Defence of the Turkish Peace Association (Amsterdam, 1982) and is available from 32 Ickburgh Rd., London E.5.

for claiming that the world revolved around the sun, only to persist, 'But it does move', please do not force us to exclaim *'But the peoples of the world do want peace!'*

Mrs REHA ISVAN

The prosecutor has implied that some sinister directive made us form and lead a peace movement in Turkey. This is far from the truth. Peace concerns all human beings. Besides, as a woman I have given birth to life; as a teacher, I have nurtured new generations of human beings; and as an agriculturalist, I love nature and want to enrich it. Wars destroy all that is cherished in culture and nature. I do not want my life's work to be destroyed by war. This is why I am proud to be a founding member of the Peace Association, and this is why I oppose war and take my place on the side of peace. . .

. . . The indictment accuses us of "championing peace and democracy". This is true and we are proud of it. The Peace Association did not conduct a single activity which was not out in the open. Our Association was founded with the official permission of the State and was continually monitored by the appropriate State officials. All our proposed meetings, congresses and visits were first cleared with the authorities. From the day of our founding to the day of the coup when the Association was banned, not a single investigation or prosecution was launched against any one of our members or the Association as such.

How can activities which were not regarded as crimes prior to 12 September be conceived as crimes now? If the intention was to keep silent in those days so as to spring this trap on us, then this attitude will result in the loss of faith of all citizens in the continuity of the rule of law and the integrity of the State. If we are an 'illegal' organisation, why were we allowed to continue our activities and why did the authorities turn a blind eye to us? Besides, from 1978 onwards virtually all our activities were carried out under the gaze not only of the State but of martial law authorities as well. In all this time, there was not the slightest hint that we might be considered to be an 'illegal' organisation. . .

There is not a single shred of material evidence in this indictment. Allow me to declare to you that I firmly believe in a political order based on respect for human rights and liberties and a State founded on the principles of social justice. This is in the preamble of our 1961 Constitution. I categorically reject and oppose any form of dictatorship, repression and the use of violence. So does the Peace Association. I hope that the universal principles of justice will prevail and that our total innocence will be established. . .



Mrs. Reha Isvan addressing the military tribunal.

. . . Yes, I was amongst the founders of the Peace Association. This is because I believe that peace is the foremost question facing humanity today. In fact, any person who is conscious of the world we live in, who has some awareness of history, who can grasp the future of humanity, is bound to embrace the cause of peace. We founded the Peace Association in the wake of the Helsinki Final Accord which was received with jubiliation across the world and which was also endorsed by the Turkish government. The Helsinki Agreement set out to link the desire to break out of inter-

national tension and crisis with the growing adoption by all peoples of the world of the need for peace. And for the first time the task of establishing and protecting world peace went beyond high state officials and devolved to non-governmental organisations formed by ordinary people. We volunteered to serve world peace. As I read in my prison cell about the huge international dimensions attained by the peace movement, I am even more honoured to have participated in the foundation of our Association and to have been in its executive until our activities were banned.

Mr ORHAN APAYDIN

There is no question of the Peace Association being in favour of the United States or the Soviets. We are only in favour of peace, democracy and human rights; we are for human values and decency. In this dock, we are engaged in a struggle for the realisation of these principles.

. . . The real reason why I am before you is because I have disturbed and indeed incurred the wrath of certain circles with my activities in defence of our 1961 Constitution, our democracy and my attempts to ensure that human rights did not remain on paper and became a reality in our country. The wave of terror preceeding the coup was aimed at destroying our constitutional order. I took part in the struggle against this terror to the best of my ability. I was a target for terrorists and my life was in constant jeopardy for years. However, today, I am being tried for attempting to install an authoritarian and totalitarian regime instead of a Western-type democracy. I have no doubt that this trial will find its place in history. At this stage, I cannot hold myself back from this insight: it is a tragic paradox that the President of the Istanbul Bar Association who prior to the coup was included in the death-lists of terrorists because of his defence of the democratic constitutional order should now find himself being subjected to such accusations. . .

. . . It is the honour-bound duty of scientists, jurists, or plain citizens—regardless of whatever world-view they subscribe to—to alert public opinion to the dangers of nuclear

war. The idea which led to the founding of the Peace Association is a necessary consequence of the obligations of being a thinking person.

. . . It is impossible for the Turkish people to remain unconcerned in the face of the threat of nuclear war. Every thinking person is entitled to consider the extent of the destruction which can be caused as a result of Turkey's military commitments in NATO. We lived through these dangers during the Cuban missile crisis when we were in the front line of the nuclear holocaust. A Rand Corporation report published at the time indicates that at least 7.5 million Turks could have perished during such a confrontation. I believe that peace and security are complementary concepts. Of course we are entitled to hold public debates on whether Turkey's security lies with NATO or not.

. . . I am honoured and privileged to acclaim that I was the person who organised the initial meeting which resulted in the foundation of this Association. I can tell you that no political organisation, not even the most authoritarian governments, could ever dare to 'influence' or 'control' the Istanbul Bar Association. I want to repeat this once again before your tribunal and before world opinion at large. The Istanbul Bar Association, of which I have been the President for the last six years, has an unblemished history spanning 104 years in which it has maintained the highest principles of integrity. I therefore return the accusations of 'forming an illegal organisation' and 'subversion' with my profound regret and revulsion to whence these emanated from.

Dr ERDAL ATABEK

All human beings can be tried before three kinds of tribunal. Firstly, and above all, they are answerable to their own conscience. I am at peace with myself. I am convinced that not only in the activities mentioned here, but at no stage in my life and career have I committed a crime. Secondly, I am here before you. You have the right to decide. Whatever the accusations, justice will be on the side of those who believe in truth. Lastly, people are judged by history. But history is not

a tribune only of the accused, it passes judgments on all. . .

. . . It is not only an insult to us but to all world peoples and nations to assert that a single country or a centre is behind those who talk of peace, all the peace meetings in the world, the million people assembled in New York, the millions of signatures collected in Japan, and the millions gathering and marching in the great cities of Europe. Nobody has the right to claim that the universal desire for peace can be detached from humanity as a whole and made into a sinister tactic of one state or political system. . .

For medical doctors like me who have taken the Hippocratic oath and pledged themselves to save people from disease and disablement, to protect human health and well-being from the moment of birth onwards, support for peace is a professional duty. We must not forget for one moment that if we do not leave our children a legacy of peace, they shall inherit death, various forms of cancer from radioactivity, genetic mutations and an army of cripples. Even at present, given the levels of radiation and radioactivity generated by nuclear tests, it is not too difficult to predict higher incidences of leukaemia and hereditary diseases. It is clear that a nuclear war will be the end of humanity. Life is being threatened. People everywhere do not want to live under constant danger. Peace is no longer a symbolic dream but a realistic and universal demand. . .

I have never joined a political party in my life. I have always held independent political views. Personally, as well as for my country, I have always valued true independence. This is why I regard the allegations of belonging to 'front organisations' or 'acting according to directives of a political party' or 'aiding and abetting the intentions of a foreign power' not only unjust and unfounded but equally as an insult to my life's work and proven commitments.

Our Peace Association has never been a 'front organisation'. The fact that representatives of different organisations came together to form the executive is simply due to the exigency of carrying out peace work amongst the different sections of our society. Besides, the very condition that people from different sections of society, from different political persuasions can come together in this way is surely

the best means of guaranteeing that the peace movement is not monopolised by narrow, sectarian interests. This is why all the activities of our Association attempted to draw in as many people as possible and our meetings were opened to non-members as well. . .

What am I accused of? Of speaking in the Annual General Meeting of the Confederation of Progressive Trade Unions of Turkey, in the AGM of the Metalworkers Union, and in the AGMs of our Association. What did I say in these meetings that gives so much offence? I spoke of democracy, of escalating terror, of the importance of finding solutions to peoples' housing and nutritional problems, I warned people of the dangers to their health. For example, I asked the trade unionists to oppose conditions which result in work accidents, to demand milk for their growing children and an income to ensure a sufficient intake of animal proteins. These are the realities of our country. We have one of the lowest per capita rates of animal protein intake in the whole world. At the height of industrial unrest in our country more days were lost from industrial accidents than strikes. How can these statements be regarded as a crime, as 'actions' designed to 'establish the supremacy of one class over another'? In what way do any of my speeches given and received in the protocol of such AGMs constitute an offence under articles 141 and 142 of the Penal Code? Yes, throughout my life I have opposed imperialism, chauvinism and fascism, as I did in those speeches. The Turkish Republic was forged in a struggle against foreign invaders. And from the day of its foundation it has rejected fascism and given no credence to chauvinism. Is it a crime to criticise these afflictions of civilisation? I submit that the said speeches for which I am being tried should be considered as defence evidence.

ALI TAYGUN

. . . An underlying accusation of the indictment is 'what have professors, scientists, artists, writers and so on got to do with the peace movement'? It is as if all of us were

'ordered' to join the Peace Association by some sinister centre. Yes, not only was I actually given 'directives' but was actually 'ordered' to join the Peace Association by someone. Her name is Ceren. She is eight-and-a-half years old. She goes to primary school. I joined the Peace Association because of her. I became a member to ensure that neither she nor her friends would ever experience war and devastation. I joined so that she and her friends would be able to watch the war scenes, genocides and massacres which we encounter each day on our television screens with the same amazement as when we watch a documentary on cannibalism.

I do not want children to experience the horrors of the anxiety of war. This is why I am in the service of peace. I am an artist. And like all those who have been oppressed and kicked about, I came to this world not to destroy it but to change it, and add to it and to help create. I believe in humanity, in the Turkish people and in truth. I am on the side of the creator not the destroyer. This is all I intended.

HALUK TOSUN

In the struggle for peace scientists have to be particularly active. Since the Second World War the status of scientists has changed radically. They are no longer the blinkered functionaries carrying out orders from on high; they are producers of ideas who are aware of their responsibilities and therefore want a say in how their findings are put to use. It is possible that you are hearing the thoughts of an academic scientist on questions of world peace for the first time in your life. I wish this discussion could have been held under different circumstances. You have asked me why I, as a scientist with all the academic resources available to me to carry out peaceful research, felt the need to join the Peace Association. My answer is both simple and obvious: I am in the Peace Association precisely because it is my duty as a scientist to follow Albert Einstein who said: 'As long as people do not declare war on war, nothing will abolish war. I am not only a believer in peace, I am a *peace fighter*.'

ALI SIRMEN

Geo-politics places us in the position of an advanced post and flank of Western defence. Indeed, this location means that our territory is first in line for the deployment of all theatre and tactical nuclear weapons, including the neutron bomb. The theory of 'limited nuclear response' espoused by the current US administration is of vital concern to the Turkish people. In an article he wrote in 1973, Sulzberger, the *New York Times* writer known to have access to the State Department, claimed somewhat irresponsibly that his Turkish friends were pleased that Turkey would be one of the first areas for the deployment of the neutron bomb. In this respect, the idea of 'limited nuclear war', which originated during the Carter administration before gaining such wide currency under the present Reagan administration, is of far greater importance for those living in Turkey than in other countries of the globe.

These are some of the reasons why I participated in the foundation of the Peace Association. Under these conditions, I am more than ever convinced that joining the peace movement is not only a duty to humanity but, for Turks, it is an essential part of genuine patriotism. History will record 1982 as the year when the world peace movement reached a new pinnacle. And in 1982, only in a single country in the entire world, in Turkey, has the peace movement been put on trial. The indictment denies the Turkish people rights and liberties which are common currency in all other countries of the NATO alliance. This indictment asserts that the freedom to express our views about war and peace should be withheld from us.

A TRAVESTY OF JUSTICE

Eleven months after the arrests of the TPA leaders in February 1982, the trial is still proceeding at a snail's pace in a way deliberately calculated to humiliate and punish the defendants, and with total lack of concern for their health or for normal forms of legal process.

At the end of July 1982, the END observers to the trial remarked that 'the medical condition of Mr Dikerdem gives cause for concern'. The President of the TPA was due to have a biopsy performed on the day of his arrest. This was delayed for over five months and his condition deteriorated. Despite the pain caused by cancer of the prostate, Mr Dikerdem stood in the dock for eleven hours on four occasions to deliver his testimony and face cross-examination. He underwent major surgery at the end of September. Throughout November permission from the martial law authorities to receive a scanner test at a civilian hospital was not forthcoming and three appointments had to be cancelled.

At the beginning of November, in a ceremony held in Lisbon, the former President of Portugal Marshal Costa Gomes presented the Salvador Allende gold medal for peace and democracy, awarded to Mahmut Dikerdem, to a TPA delegation.

In the opening session of the TPA trial on 24 June 1982, 95 lawyers were present and 1,500 lawyers belonging to Bar Associations all over Turkey indicated that they were ready to take up defence. This gesture, made at considerable risk to personal safety, was intended as a collective tribute to Mr Orhan Apaydin, President of the Istanbul Bar Association, the oldest, largest and most prestigious association of jurists in the country.

In the fifth session of the trial held at the end of August (note that the TPA executive had been in gaol now for some six months) the defence team expressed 'astonishment

and horror' at the way the trial was being conducted and argued that the presiding judge's attitude was an indication that 'the case has already been pre-judged and that the military tribunal is not independent'. The lawyer petitioned for a new panel of judges of proven integrity. The motion of 'no confidence' passed by the lawyers was based on the following legal arguments: (i) The judges had assumed the functions of the prosecutor by sanctioning the collection of further evidence *against* the defendants while excluding documents presented by the lawyers; (ii) Captain Atilla Ulku is a known sympathiser of the Nationalist Action Party (the neo-fascist political cum para-military organisation disbanded after the coup) and previously volunteered to serve in the controversial State Security Courts before these were ruled out by the country's Constitutional Court prior to the coup.

At the next session, the presiding judge Captain Atilla Ulku declared that since the martial law court was held under 'war-time emergency conditions' the defence request would be rejected. The brother of Orhan Apaydin, Mr Burhan Apaydin, also a veteran lawyer and human rights campaigner, is under indictment for a press statement and faces 18 years in gaol if convicted. Two other defence lawyers, Professor Cetin Ozek (brother of Professor Metin Ozek) and O.I. Kok are also charged with 'insulting the judge'. Defendants Ali Sirmen and Ataol Behramoglu face similar charges.

As the months pass the bizarre ramifications of the proceedings and the absurd legal entanglements of the defendants and their lawyers have grown into a monstrous web of repression. The military judges are inventive in devising ways of ensuring that justice will not be done. On 9 October the Turkish daily *Milliyet* reported that the Istanbul Martial Law Command had ordered the launching of a second inquiry, this to involve the investigation of 160 members of the TPA. Former regional officials and members have reported to the authorities for interrogation. These include Mrs Gulcin Cayligil, who is a leading defence lawyer in the TPA trial. Meanwhile, the General Secretary of the Turkish Writers Union, the poet Ataol Behramoglu, who was recently awarded the Lotus Prize of the Afro-Asian Writers

Union, and Mr Orhan Apaydin, who are, of course, among the arrested TPA leaders, were taken to a military barracks and interrogated in connection with the prosecution of the Writers Union.

On 5 November, two days before the constitutional referendum and presidential election (with a single candidate, General Evren), the TPA detainees were removed from the special detention unit of the Istanbul 2nd Armoured Division HQ where they had been held since their arrest, and transferred to Istanbul's Bayrampasa prison which holds convicted criminals. According to a *Guardian* report on 13 November 1982:

> Newspapers meanwhile carried sardonic headlines below photographs of the latest session of the controversial Peace Association trial. . . Turkey's prison code allows prisoners to keep their own clothing even in cases involving terrorism. . . (but on arrival at the prison the defendants) were forced to put on convicts' clothing and had their heads shaved. They were then dispersed in pairs to cells containing up to 100 convicts.

On 21 November 1982 the *New York Times* reported:

> Defence lawyers took part in a temporary walkout to protest the treatment of their clients as 'common criminals' . . . There was widespread shock when pictures of prisoners were published in newspapers around the country. . . Burhan Apaydin. . . sent a telegram to the Minister of Justice, saying, 'These people are not terrorists; they are men of science, law and the arts'. . .

Having been subjected to this unprecedented humiliation and intimidation, Mr Orhan Apaydin, who has only one functioning kidney, a heart condition and an ulcer, collapsed and had to be rushed to hospital. The average age of the TPA detainees is around 50.

More recently, the military authorities have ordered the Istanbul and Ankara Bar Associations to postpone elections of their officers. As the *Guardian* of 25 November 1982 noted, 'The main target of the orders (given by telephone) appears to be the president of the Istanbul Bar Association,

The defendants in prison clothes.

Mr Orhan Apaydin, a human rights campaigner. . .'

The treatment of the TPA prisoners and the authorities' unabashed intervention in the affairs of the country's jurists are further indication of the infringement of human rights and the due processes of law under the current regime. This hardening of attitudes is a calculated snub to international criticism of the TPA trial especially in Western Europe. It is also the authorities' response to the collective and principled stance taken by the defendants following President Dikerdem's defence testimony in the trial in which he attacked, and defied the mentality behind an indictment which has put peace on trial.

THE NEW CONSTITUTION

Cartoon by courtesy of Hackney CND

On 7 November a referendum resulted in a vote for the adoption of a new constitution and the installation of General Evren as President of Turkey. Because of the conditions in which it was held, with no opposition activity permitted, much scepticism as to the validity of this referendum was voiced in the press in the West. It was depicted, in a leader in the London *Times* (9 November 1982), as tainted with illegitimacy. The *Financial Times* (25 October 1982) commented: 'By stipulating that a vote for the constitution means a vote for him to become president for seven years, (General Evren) has turned the referendum on the constitution into an instrument to perpetuate his personal power.' According to military authorities the referendum resulted in a 91 per cent vote in favour of the new constitution.

The new constitution is an extraordinary document. It gives the president unprecedented powers including the authority to appoint the prime minister and the chief of staff, to dissolve parliament, to appoint top judges, control key appointments in the civil service and the universities and to appoint the head of the country's radio and television. Life-long immunity from prosecution has been

granted to all the generals who participated in the coup. They will now be coopted onto non-elected bodies such as the State Council, the High Arbitration Board for Labour, the Higher Education Board, the State Inspectorate, and so on. They will effectively control legislation and in any case the president has powers to block or veto legislation. This will result in a rubber-stamp parliament dominated by a military-civilian executive which will 'shut Turkey society firmly inside a cage of tight bureaucratic controls' (*Guardian* 3 November).

Individual liberties, freedom of the press, trade union rights and the democratic rights to assembly and association have all been disposed of. The 'Mussolini Laws' mentioned above have been incorporated almost verbatim into a section of the constitution which, rubbing salt into the grievous wounds inflicted on Turkish democracy, is entitled 'Fundamental Rights and Duties'. The constitution specifies that trade unions will not 'engage in politics', that lock-out is a constitutional right, that strikes will be permitted if these do not contravene 'good will or the public interest' or result in the 'destruction of national wealth'.

Any association (including trade unions and peace organisations) deemed to be engaging in politics *can be suspended indefinitely without a court order* at the instigation of a local civil servant or law enforcement officer. A law which prohibits a peace association from engaging in politics is in effect a law which makes campaigning for peace illegal. A peace association would not be permitted to call for the abolition of Turkey's military pacts, for disarmament, for reductions in the defence budget. It would not be permitted to call for mass demonstrations to publicise its demands. Any such acts would be deemed to contravene the 'security and integrity of the State'. Mass mobilisation for peace now comes under the heading of 'subversive insurrection against the integrity of the state'. Criticism of government defence strategy or foreign policy, or of individual statements of state functionaries, is now regarded as criminal activity.

The mentality and values on which the indictment of the TPA was based, and which give rise to the prosecution demand for thirty-year sentences for the TPA executive, are

now codified and institutionalised as the law of the land. The 'geo-political constraints' to Western-type pluralist democracy in Turkey lead to the denial of the right to organise and mobilise for peace. *Turkey is the only member of the NATO alliance in which the peace movement has in effect been criminalised.*

STOP-PRESS: THE TPA EXECUTIVE RELEASED ON BAIL

As we go to press we hear the extremely good news that the President of the TPA and his executive have been released on bail, after ten months in prison. Confirming this unexpexted turn of events, Mehmet Ali Dikerdem, the son of the TPA President and secretary of the Campaign for the defence of the TPA said:

> Due to mounting international pressure, my father and his 23 colleagues were released from gaol on 17th and 24th December respectively. The four Social Democratic MPs also involved in the TPA trial were released ten days later by the Ankara Martial Law authorities who were trying them separately.
>
> At long last, the military tribunal conceded that 'no grounds remained for continued detention' of the TPA accused. The trial however continues: the executive still face 30-year sentences if convicted. More disturbingly, a few days after their release, new arrest warrants were issued against Ataol Behramoglu the General Secretary of the Turkish Writers Union, Mr Sefik Asan and Mr Ali Taylan. Such cat-and-mouse games are unnecessary as well as being cruel.
>
> On 6th January, on my father's 67th birthday, the last of the interrogations were completed. It has taken the military court almost eight months to complete the first stage of the trial. Now that he can finally receive cancer treatment in a civilian hospital, I hope that my father makes a speedy recovery after his ten month ordeal.
>
> I wish to thank the hundreds of people involved with the END for all they have done during these sad and trying months. Their cards and messages of support were of tremendous importance in conveying this simple but profoundly important message: 'You are not alone, we care for you'.

In the next stage of the trial, the military court will consider the 'evidence' presented by the prosecution. Meanwhile, proceedings against 160 members of the TPA continue in Ankara, Istanbul and Izmir. Writers, poets and playwrights with both TPA and Writers Union memberships are in a particularly difficult situation.

END SUPPORT FOR THE TPA

END has been actively involved in the international campaign to secure the release of the TPA executive. The TPA arrests and trial raised two interlinked issues. First, repression of the peace movement in a member state of the Council of Europe, and second, the related issue of human rights at the periphery of Europe. The plight of the TPA was taken up during the END Supporters' Conference held on 16 May 1982 in the GLC County Hall. Remembering the early days of the TPA campaign, Mehmet Ali Dikerdem says, 'I will never forget the understanding and support shown on that day by E.P. Thompson, Jane Dibblin, Stuart Holland MP and Dan Smith'. The Conference decided to ask for the help of END and CND activists for publicising the arrests.

Soon after this, END financed a briefing paper called the *Turkish Military Junta Turns its Guns on the Peace Movement* which was widely distributed during the mammoth peace rally in Hyde Park on 6th June. This publication became one of the main sources of information on the TPA trial throughout Europe. Mehmet Ali adds, '6th June was a vindication of what the TPA sought to achieve in Turkey as well. What made the day doubly special to us was E.P. Thompson's full and eloquent defence of the Turkish peace movement before that magnificent gathering.' The TPA issue was raised a month later in the Brussels Convention. 'There we reached a European audience' says Mehmet Ali and recalls the solidarity extended by Ken Coates, 'the marvellous' Luciana Castellina, Marten van Traa and Lord Brockway. 'Another very important outcome of the Brussels Convention was the articles in the END journal and *Peace News* which opened the way for grass-roots support both in the UK and abroad, not to mention the informal contacts during the conference.'

END also participated in a press conference organised in

the House of Commons and chaired by Stuart Holland to mark the opening of the TPA trial. Mehmet Ali claims that one of the most important acts of support concerns the END observers sent to the trial. He also emphasises that the recent releases do not in any way mean acquittal and that European peace movements should continue to monitor events as closely as possible.

Mehmet Ali however is quick to add: 'Without the grass-roots support, the campaign would have not been nearly so effective. Literally hundreds of letters poured in to the dark, damp cells where the detainees were kept. Imagine the comforting effect of people sharing your concerns about peace and disarmament from thousands of miles away. Special mention must be made of the Glasgow CND group who kept at it for months and boosted morale during the most difficult days. Mention should also be made of the fantastic people in Exeter who raised a petition to the Foreign Office containing hundreds of signatures, of the groups in Bridgend, Telford, Halifax and Hackney who mobilised a veritable avalanche of letters, petitions and statements. . . Of individuals who were so disturbed by what they read in *Peace News* and the *Guardian* that they got into touch with us through END. Of END and CND groups up and down the country, particularly the London END groups, who petitioned the authorities and continually kept up the pressure. . . The list is endless. But one thing which struck me most and deeply moved me was the basic humanity and decency of all these good people quite independent of political or other considerations. I think that this is a wonderful trait in British culture, something which was also so movingly demonstrated in Greenham Common.'

What is END?

END means European Nuclear Disarmament. It works together with CND and other grass-roots campaigning groups in Europe, both East and West, toward a single objective. . . a nuclear free Europe.

The campaign works for disarmament both through unilateral initiatives and international co-operation. Its supporters work for nuclear-free zones in towns, regions and nations. And to unite people striving for disarmament, peace groups, and nuclear free zone groups twinning with like-minded campaigns in Europe and America.

The eventual aim is a treaty banning all so-called European theatre weapons (including those in Western Russia and on American submarines), together with a guarantee not to use nuclear weapons against any part of the political territory of Europe.

Since its beginning, support for the idea of END and nuclear disarmament throughout Europe has been growing rapidly. In the last few years, millions of people have taken to the streets of major cities throughout the world to show their concerted opposition to the plans to deploy cruise and Pershing II missiles and the neutron bomb in Western Europe and the build-up of SS20s in Eastern Europe.

Underneath this massive protest is a structure of European support for peace initiatives that is making its weight felt in both the Pentagon and the Kremlin.

Nuclear disarmament groups have formed in most western European countries, each growing as it sees fit each in contact with similar groups in other countries. We are now receiving news of the exciting spread of independent peace groups in eastern Europe. All this together with the amazing growth of the peace movement in the US, Japan and the Pacific, means we are part of the biggest mass movement in modern history.

In appealing to fellow Europeans, we are not turning our backs on the world. In working for the peace of Europe we are working for the peace of the world. Twice in this century Europe has disgraced its claims to civilisation by engendering world war. This time we must repay our debts to the world by engendering peace.

Joint END/Merlin pamphlets

The new Hungarian peace movement
One of the main movers of the new autonomous Hungarian peace movement, Ferenc Köszegi, outlines the fascinating growth of cells of peace activists in schools and universities. With an introduction by E.P. Thompson, this exciting publication describes in detail the ideas behind this important phenomenon and its struggle to avoid co-option by the state, official peace council and dissidents, and remain a mass movement. Also included is E.P. Thompson's lecture given in Budapest on 'The normalisation of Europe'.

ISBN 0850362946 price: 90p

Moscow independent peace group
Since the news hit the western press that a peace group independent of the official peace committee had been formed, END has received many inquiries for more information on that group. We now have first hand accounts from Jean Stead (Assistant Editor of *The Guardian*) and END supporter Danielle Grünberg who were on the Scandinavian women's march and visited the group while passing through Moscow. The pamphlet also presents additional documents and invites debate from the peace movement.

ISBN 0850362954 price: 75p

Comiso
As part of the militarisation of NATO's southern flank, the small Sicilian town of Comiso is threatened with a cruise missile base in December '83. But over half the adult population of Sicily have pledged themselves against it and the island is now the focus for the European peace movement. Ben Thompson examines the background of Italian politics and gives a first-hand account of the Sicilian struggle.

ISBN 0850362962 price: 60p

Turkey
Jailing the leaders of Turkey's peace movement is just part of the military regime's campaign to suppress all opposition. Representatives of END have been to Turkey to monitor the drawn-out trial of the peace association, who are receiving support from peace groups all over Europe. In this pamphlet Mehmet Ali Dikerdem and John Mepham look at the history and work of the Turkish Peace Association and analyse why a state based terror wins Western approval.

ISBN 0850362970

90p

Volume 9. Two Germanies, 1961-1989
An Expelled East German Dissident Explains the Peace Movement (July 21, 1983)

In an interview published in the *Tageszeitung*, a leftist West Berlin newspaper, the expelled Jena dissident Roland Jahn describes the East German peace movement: its motivations, activities, and hopes for the future. The movement aimed to end the nuclear arms race and to create space for political alternatives within the GDR.

"Personally, I am not a Pacifist"

Why is the GDR bureaucracy so allergic to the autonomous peace movement that, as we saw in your case, it doesn't even stop short of forced expulsion? The Peace Community [Friedensgemeinschaft] in Jena also supports the official government proposals. So where's the problem for the GDR?

Jahn: The problem is that we don't hold back, that we put our ideas into practice, delve into what takes place in daily life. And there we see the contradiction between the militarism in social life and the officially pronounced desire for peace. The state authorities think that this movement could produce something that calls the entire social structure into question. The system is set up in a way that disciplines people and takes away their right to make decisions, just like in the military: orders – obedience. There's no democracy but rather a despotic militarism. And we're turning against militarism, militarism all over the world, and so of course we start here at home, where we feel it every day, and we point it out. In doing so, we debunk the official peace pronouncements and thus become dangerous. Threats and restrictions are felt everywhere, but they don't always express themselves outwardly. The movement itself is everywhere inside the people. But when someone breaks ranks publicly, more and more people find courage and suddenly realize how restricted they are, how little say they have, and they start to express themselves and resist things. This generates movement and the authorities want to counteract that. But it's not that we're protesting just for the sake of opposition. We simply want peaceful coexistence with respect for the individual and for human dignity, the kind of conditions under which an individual can develop fully.

What role does the church play for [all of] you?

The Protestant church in the GDR contributes significantly in that it gives autonomous peace work a chance to develop at all. Of course, there are lots of problems that go beyond the scope of the present conversation. But just a short remark: the conflicts we had in Jena led to our going public as a peace community, independent of state and church, for the first time.

I'm thinking of the Pentecost meeting of the FDJ [Free German Youth], of the striking television images. What is this thing that presents itself as the "official" peace movement? Is it only bureaucratically decreed mobilizations?

Yes, on the one hand, that's what it is. But I don't deny that the people who attend those gatherings have genuine emotions. It's a very natural thing to oppose the NATO Dual-Track Decision.

The forms in which protests happens are prescribed. But other things come into play as well. It's a Pentecost youth meeting and there's everything that accompanies that, having a good time and so on. . . . You could certainly say that some people are manipulated, but most of them are just speaking out for the cause of peace. The problem is that no one is allowed to go beyond the officially prescribed slogans. Western depictions sometimes make it look as though everything here were decreed, for example: Maybe they aren't even against it. That's nonsense. I don't know anyone in the GDR who supports the NATO Dual-Track Decision. Because when a weapon is aimed at you, you don't support that weapon being aimed at you. And the Pershing II weapons are aimed at us in the GDR.

[. . .]

To what extent are the autonomous peace circles an isolated group in the GDR? Do they radiate outward into the rest of society, into organizations like the FDJ, for example?

That which is understood as autonomous peace work is supported predominantly by the Protestant church. And from there it radiates outward into the general population; there are, after all, many Christians.

With respect to those of us in Jena – and we also worked outside of the church – the reaction was quite varied. First of all, it was noticed. I'd like to mention three public actions: the moment of silence on Christmas, the rally on the anniversary of the bombing of Jena, and the FDJ peace demonstration on Pentecost Day. (For us, the content aspect of our work is also important, but I'll explain that in a minute.) During public actions, there's definitely a radiation outward into the population. The term "population" is actually too broad, since it's mostly the cheering types [*die Jubler*] who go to the official rallies; the broad masses don't really come out, except for the FDJ,

since it's mandatory for them. But many of the 15- to 16-year-olds in the FDJ are looking for something new, and they're open to engaging with all kinds of ideas.

At the moment of silence on Christmas the population noticed that something was going on because of the large number of security forces. Some people say, "Oh, they're crazy;" others participate in slandering us: they say that we're anti-social. But a large segment knows what it's all about and what we're protesting. They know, but they still say there's no point in protesting – because that's the attitude of the opposition in the GDR, to say there's no point. And another group of people say: that should be supported, what they're doing is good.

Do people talk about it, say, at work?

Yes, of course, whenever it becomes public, whenever the security forces strike down hard. Here's one very clear example. In November a moment of silence was held. Afterwards, passersby spoke with the participants; there were small group discussions. And then it was over. Then another moment of silence was supposed to be held on December 24, but a large number of security forces and combat groups, etc, were on hand. Although the moment of silence didn't take place, because it was prevented, it immediately became the talk of the town in Jena. And then there was our rally on March 18. We came in with posters and were beaten up. News of it spread everywhere immediately.

So on Pentecost Day we were tolerated in some places; people thus engaged with us. In a very cautious way, of course, but at least they made an attempt. Then our posters were torn down again and a few discussions started, there was a large group of very young FDJ youths standing around and some of them said: "Yeah, we're on your side." And in Schwerin some FDJ youths picked up posters of ours that had been torn down. At these moments, you can feel the movement, you can feel what's going on inside people and that it's mostly a matter of getting the word out. For us it was the same thing. We didn't stop with the demand for disarmament; rather, we also saw the contradictions in everyday life. This becomes the main issue the moment you delve deeper, the moment you don't just say, yes, there are missiles that they're aiming at us, but when you precisely analyze everything that threatens us. You see that the things happening in our army don't advance education toward peace. The same is true for what's being taught in school in military training, and this also extends to war toys; that's where you have to start. But of course it's the missiles that are most visible. But then you come far enough to realize that this militarization characterizes certain life patterns: subordination, not having a say, and then you develop yourself further. You're no longer concerned just with disarmament, but also with democratic freedoms, with human rights.

What role does the call for unilateral disarmament play for [all of] you in the GDR?

There are different opinions. I personally think that disarmament has to occur on both sides, but you have to set an example at each step along the way; you have to take measures that make the other side follow suit.

Would you make this demand in the GDR? Even though you have a very clear position on NATO's attempt to catch up in the arms race?

Yes, you have to take steps that set an example. All the calculations about weapons potential is nonsense; that's why I don't pay too much attention to balancing one side against the other. I don't regard the talks in Geneva as senseless but rather as fruitless. For that reason, disarmament that cuts across blocs and proceeds from the bottom up is becoming more and more important, and ways to achieve this need to be found. That's where the exchange of ideas is important, as is the willingness of individuals to adopt a stance of resistance. Those in power in the East and West have no interest in disarmament. The one earns his profits in the armaments industry; the other needs militarism and armaments to maintain the power structures. Not only power for power's sake in a psychological sense, but also in a concrete, material sense, since everyone here is anchored in this military system. The officers or those who have good positions in the arms industry are earning well. They're making profits – in a different way than in capitalism, namely, through their position in the hierarchy of the system. The officer, the general who carries the sword, golden and gleaming, and who has a good life – he's not eager to pull a ploughshare and sweat. That's why he won't support the slogan: swords to ploughshares.

This is why the peace movement always has to be driven forward from the grass roots. People have to refuse to go along with the system. Put in a totally naïve way: there won't be any missiles if no missiles are produced. And who produces them? Workers. That's where we have to start, and there I think the question of unilateral disarmament is good. To start unilaterally with yourself: don't go to the army, don't produce armaments or [war] toys, contribute to teaching peace, starting with very simple things. Wars cannot be prevented by preparing for them, but rather by teaching peace.

[. . .]

What effect did the events in Poland have on the GDR?

That was very complex. It generated a lot of hope, especially among the younger generation. A large segment of the peace movement sees itself as an alternative movement with respect to all aspects of society. The people are prepared to forego the normal path, careers, etc., simply because of the threat. Then that develops further into a drive to develop one's own personality,

which is only possible under democratic conditions. And any change in this direction is of course welcomed. Poland was like the GDR: elections results of 99 percent [for the Communist party]. And then suddenly the people learn to express themselves. That made a lot of people here optimistic and made it possible for people to feel hopeful for the GDR. On the other hand, of course, people saw that the GDR is not Poland. They are still doing well, in material terms, that is.

What will happen now in Jena? The Peace Community has lost a lot of its members.

There are enough people to continue the work. Although it is a community, and not an organization with a president, etc., there is still a structure there. We gave ourselves a concept. For us, peace is not the absence of war; rather, it is action that can be lived all the time in concrete situations. That also means trying to deal with the issues, having an effect on society. It's not that we're a bunch of people who just want to do spectacular things.

We began working in groups. Initially, the issue was the problem of militarism. Then came questions about its cause, where it started: in how we are raised and educated. So an education group formed. Then we asked ourselves: what else do we feel threatened by? Of course, the relationship between humanity and nature/the environment, so an ecology group formed. Then: many wound up in jail, were subjected to the arbitrariness of the state. They don't know the laws, so a group formed and concerned itself with legal problems. Or we asked ourselves, are we alone in the GDR? There are groups like this all over, we have to build up contacts and exchange information. Everyone contributed whatever they could to our work. That included artistic work. For example, we worked a lot with different photo-techniques; we made postcards about peace and then sent them throughout the GDR.

All of that exists as before. Some people left, including some very significant individuals, but everything continues to exist. Even if we cannot determine quantitatively how many people belong to the peace movement, we know that there is something inside people, that the increasing arms build-up and militarization, the increasing violence by the state, and very concrete things like my expulsion make a difference. So people are looking for ways to work together to do something to oppose the threat. That's how these communities will form, and new people will continue to find their way to them.

Source: Traude Ratsch, Interview with Roland Jahn: „Ich persönlich bin kein Pazifist“ [“Personally, I am not a Pacifist”], *tageszeitung*, July 21, 1983, p. 9.

Translation: Allison Brown

S T A T U T O

della

"UNIONE DEGLI SCIENZIATI PER IL DISARMO"

Art. 1

E' costituita la "Unione degli scienziati per il disarmo", con sede in Roma.

Essa è una associazione di scienziati, indipendente da partiti e organizzazioni politiche, che sorge in risposta alla nuova spinta per il riarmo nucleare ed all'accresciuto rischio di guerra nucleare.

Possono aderire alla Unione gli studiosi di tutte le discipline che condividono i suoi obiettivi generali e assumono gli obblighi conseguenti.

Art. 2

L'obiettivo principale dell'Unione è quello di promuovere e coordinare le attività degli scienziati per contribuire ad arrestare la corsa agli armamenti, a ridurre il pericolo di guerra e a realizzare il disarmo generale e controllato.

L'Unione si propone di far crescere fra i membri della comunità scientifica la consapevolezza della loro particolare responsabilità rispetto al rischio di guerra nucleare.

L'Unione fa proprio il documento dei Fisici Italiani contro le Armi nucleari sottoscritto nell'autunno

1981 da più di 800 fisici.

L'Unione si propone di sviluppare analisi e fornire informazioni aggiornate ai vari movimenti per la pace e il disarmo, al Parlamento e al Governo, agli organi di stampa e più in generale alla opinione pubblica, su vari argomenti e in particolare sui seguenti:

a) nuovi sviluppi tecnologici nel campo degli armamenti nucleari, chimici, batteriologici e convenzionali; impatto delle nuove tecnologie sulla corsa agli armamenti e conseguente responsabilità sociale degli scienziati;

b) rischi reali di guerra nucleare;

c) situazione attuale degli arsenali nucleari;

d) evoluzione degli indirizzi e delle dottrine strategiche dei due blocchi (NATO e Patto di Varsavia);

e) riconversione dell'apparato militare-industriale;

f) analisi delle proposte di disarmo e stato dei negoziati.

L'obiettivo del disarmo nucleare è quello principale dell'Unione, la quale tuttavia ritiene che esso non possa essere considerato un problema isolato dalla necessità di altre forme di disarmo e controllo, per quanto concerne le altre armi di distruzione di massa (armi chimiche e batteriologiche),

e le armi convenzionali.

Data la dimensione internazionale del problema del disarmo, l'Unione ritiene essenziale la collaborazione con gli altri gruppi di scienziati che, all'estero, si muovono su obiettivi simili.

L'Unione ritiene che la propria attività debba in qualche modo contribuire a colmare una grave lacuna della situazione dell'Italia, che è uno dei pochi paesi occidentali in cui è quasi assente ogni ricerca sui problemi della pace e del disarmo.

Art. 3

L'Unione si articola in sezioni locali, la cui costituzione viene approvata dal Comitato di Coordinamento Nazionale (C.C.N.).

Ogni sezione elegge tra gli iscritti un segretario responsabile e un vice segretario (che lo sostituisce in caso di assenza o impedimento) che durano in carica un anno.

L'assemblea degli iscritti, convocata dal segretario o a richiesta di un decimo degli associati, si riunisce almeno una volta all'anno per le dette elezioni, per la ammissione dei nuovi iscritti, per la approvazione del bilancio e del rendiconto, e per la deliberazione del programma di massima delle iniziative.

Ciascuna sezione è responsabile della raccolta e diffusione di informazioni, della preparazione di esperti che prendano parte a conferenze e dibattiti per l'area geografica a cui essa sezione faccia capo, della promozione di studi e ricerche sui temi della pace e di disarmo, e più in generale, di tutte le iniziative locali adottate in accordo con i fini dell'Unione.

Ogni sezione ha autonomia patrimoniale.

Una parte delle entrate derivante dalle quote associative deve essere destinata al C.C.N. nella misura da questo annualmente fissata.

Art. 4

I segretari delle sezioni locali constituiscono il Comitato di Coordinamento Nazionale (C.C.N.) dell'Unione.

Alle riunioni del C.C.N. in caso di impedimento del segretario partecipa il vice-segretario della relativa Sezione. Il C.C.N. elegge un Segretario Nazionale ed un Vice-Segretario che lo sostituisca in ogni incombenza e potere, anche nel Comitato Scientifico; essi restano in carica due anni.

Convocato dal segretario o a richiesta di un decimo dei suoi componenti, il Comitato si riunisce almeno una volta all'anno, per la detta elezione, per la determinazione della misura delle quote associative e della parte di esse che le sezioni locali de-

vono destinare al Comitato stesso, per la approvazione del bilancio e del rendiconto, per la deliberazione del programma di massima delle iniziative, nonchè per la ratifica delle proposte del Comitato Scientifico.

Il C.C.N. provvede al coordinamento dell'attività delle sezioni locali, raccoglie informazioni sui problemi della pace e del disarmo e le distribuisce alle sezioni locali, se possibile attraverso un bollettino periodico, mantiene i contatti con le associazioni e i gruppi affini all'Estero.

Art. 5

Il C.C.N. è affiancato da un Consiglio Scientifico (C.S.) composto da persone competenti sui problemi del controllo degli armamenti e in genere sui temi di cui al precedente art. 2

Esso è formato oltre che dal segretario dell'Unione, da 7 membri, uno dei quali ne viene eletto Presidente. Il C.S. dura in carica 2 anni.

Alla sua scadenza, il C.S. uscente propone i nomi dei componenti il nuovo C.S., da sottoporre per la approvazione, al C.C.N..

Il C.S. ha il compito di vagliare le proposte provenienti dalle sezioni locali o dal C.C.N. in materia di iniziative e di prese di posizione sui temi di in-

teresse dell'Unione, di formulare documenti, di impostare studi e ricerche sui problemi connessi col disarmo, e di proporli al C.C.N.

Ogni presa di posizione pubblica di rilevanza nazionale dovrà essere preventivamente approvata dal C.S.

Art. 6

La rappresentanza legale di ciascuna sezione spetta al segretario pro tempore; compete al segretario del C.C.N. la rappresentanza legale della Unione.

Art. 7

Il patrimonio della Unione è costituito dalle quote associative, nonchè dagli eventuali versamenti volontari di enti pubblici e soggetti privati.

Art. 8

Per le deliberazioni di modifica del presente statuto, nonchè per quelle di scioglimento della associazione e di devoluzione del suo patrimonio, in prima convocazione occorrerà la presenza di almeno la metà degli associati e il voto favorevole della maggioranza dei presenti.

In seconda convocazione, le deliberazioni adottate dalla maggioranza saranno valide qualunque sia il numero dei presenti.

Art. 9

Per tutto quanto non previsto dal presente statuto valgono le norme di cui agli artt. 36 e segg. del C.C.

NORMA TRANSITORIA

Il segretario nazionale nonchè il Comitato Scientifico designati nell'atto costitutivo restano in carica fino alla prima riunione del C.C.N., che avverrà quando siano state costituite almeno 10 sezioni locali.

F.to: Michelangelo De Maria

Carlo Schaerf

Giovanni Gilardoni, Notaio

Copia conforme all'originale che si rilascia per uso di PARTE

Roma, lì 14 APR 1983

Giovanni Gilardoni

Reagan, Ronald. The Reagan Diaries. Ed. Douglas Brinkley. New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 2007, p. 247.

Saturday, June 9 [1984]

Another briefing breakfast 8:30 A.M. Then back to Lancaster house. The morning meeting went long – more protests by Pierre & Francois. We didn't get to lunch until 2 P.M. There was blood on the floor – but not ours. As usual, Margaret, Helmut, Yasu & I stayed together & for the most part prevailed. It was a good summit & we did make progress on trade matters, East-West, plans if the Iran-Iraq war creates an oil crisis & agreements on 3rd world matters & handling the tremendous international debt.

We were further delayed in getting to Guild Hall for the finale – the presentation of statements to the press, by 40,000 anti-nuke demonstrators who fouled up traffic. Before leaving we displayed a model of our proposed space station & I extended an invitation to all of them to join us.

Into black tie & on to Buckingham for the dinner give by the Queen. It was a very nice affair & an experience to be in that historic palace dining with the Royal family & others. I was between the Queen & the Queen Mother who is a delightful person. Across the table was Nancy between Prince Phillip & Prince Charles.

And so the Summit ends.

RETURN ADDRESS: MOSCOW

ISSUE . VOL. 1
TEMBER 1984.
E GROUP FOR
STABLISHING TRUST.
1

INTERNATIONAL NEWS BULLETIN ON INDEPENDENT PEACE ACTIVITY IN USSR.



Appeal

TO THE GOVERNMENTS AND PUBLICS OF THE USSR AND THE USA

The USSR and the USA have the means to kill in such proportions that would end the history of mankind.

A balance of terror cannot be a reliable guarantee of safety in the world. Only trust between peoples can create a firm assurance of the future.

Today, when elementary trust between the two nations has been completely lost, the problem of trust has ceased to be simply a question of bilateral relations. This is the question: Will mankind be wiped out by its own destructive capabilities or will it survive?

This problem demands immediate action today. It is, however, very obvious that political leaders of both sides are incapable of coming to any sort of agreement about significant arms limitations in the near future . . . to say nothing of genuine disarmament.

Due to their political interests and circumstances, politicians find it difficult to be objective on disarmament issues.

Recognizing this, we do not wish to accuse one side or the other of not wishing to promote the peace process, nor certainly of any aggressive designs for the future. We are convinced of their genuine desire for peace and curtailment of the nuclear threat. However, the search for the path to disarmament has become difficult.

We all share an equal responsibility for the future. The active peace movement among citizens of many countries proves that this is understood by millions of people.

But our common desire for peace must not be blind. It must be perceived and expressed in concrete terms. It must be presented in the context of actual conditions.

The world is concerned about its future. Everyone understands that there must be dialogue if the threat is to be removed.

The prevailing principles of conducting bilateral dialogue must be changed immediately.

We are convinced that the time has come for the public not only to confront decision makers with the issue of disarmament, but also to participate in the decision-making process with the politicians.

We are in favor of a four-sided dialogue -- for dialogue in which average Soviet and American citizens are included on an equal footing with political figures.

We favor consistent and ultimately complete destruction of stockpiles of nuclear weapons and other forms of mass destruction, and for limitations of conventional weapons.

We view the present program for the search for peace as the following:

1. As a first step to abolish the nuclear threat, we appeal to everyone who does not desire the death of his neighbor to submit his own specific proposals on bilateral limitations and cutbacks of weaponry, and, most of all, for the establishment of trust. We call for each such proposal to be forwarded simultaneously to the governments of both countries and to representatives of independent public peace groups.

We hope especially that our call will be heeded by the peoples of the Soviet Union and the United States, whose governments bear the main responsibility for maintaining the safety of the world.

2. We call upon the citizens of both countries to create combined international public groups, based on the principles of independence. Their functions would include: the receipt and analysis of individual proposals on disarmament and promoting trust between nations; the selection of the most interesting and realistic proposals; bringing these proposals to the attention of the respective populations about the possible consequences of the use of nuclear arms, and about all issues concerning disarmament.

3. We appeal to the scientific community, particularly to independent international scientific organizations involved in the campaign for peace, to work on scientific problems directly connected with the preservation of peace. For instance, at the present stage, it is extremely important to develop a unified mathematical method for evaluating the weaponry of the opposing sides. We call upon scientists to create independent research groups to scientifically analyze citizen proposals.

4. We call upon political leaders and the media of both countries to refrain from mutual accusations about intentions to use nuclear weapons for aggressive purposes. We are convinced that such accusations only inflame distrust between the sides and thus make any constructive dialogue impossible.

5. We view as necessary guarantees of the establishment of trust that the USSR and the USA must create conditions for the open exchange of opinions and to inform the publics of both nations on all issues on the process of disarmament.

We appeal to the governments of the USSR and the USA to create a special international bulletin (with a governmental guarantee of distribution in both countries) in which both sides would conduct a dialogue, hold discussions, and would make public reports on the following issues, among others:

a. An analysis of disarmament negotiations and the documents of negotiations

b. An exchange of opinions and proposals on possible ways to limit arms, and on disarmament

c. An exchange of proposals on the establishment of trust

d. An exchange of information on the possible consequences of using nuclear arms.

Such a bulletin would provide an opportunity for independent citizens' peace groups to participate in general discussions, publish uncensored materials, especially proposals on disarmament and trust and information on (various) peace movements and the steps they have taken.

We appeal to the governments and public opinion of the USSR and the USA since we are convinced that everyone who understands that the future needs to be defended must have a genuine opportunity to defend it!

MOSCOW, USSR
JUNE 4, 1982

THE GROUP FOR ESTABLISHING TRUST BETWEEN THE USSR AND THE USA

UPDATE UPDATE UPDATE UPDATE UPDATE

UPDATE СОБЫТИЯ

UPDATE UPDATE UPDATE UPDATE UPDATE

THE PEACE GARDEN

At the end of April, the Trust Group planted a garden in Moscow opposite the station of the 70th police precinct. They used seeds sent to the USSR as a gesture of peace from the American Fellowship of Reconciliation. Eleven Group members helped prepare the soil and sowed the seeds so as to form the words "Ban the Bomb" in two languages. The garden had been intended as a symbolic spot where peace activists from all countries would come to plant flowers when visiting Moscow. Signs in the hands of the activists made clear their intentions to passers-by. While preparing the garden, the Group was joined by a number of people living in a neighbouring building. The police in the 70th police district didn't at first understand what was going on, or how they were supposed to react. The seeds were already planted, and placards with peace slogans, explanations, and the inscription 'Flowers instead of Bombs' set up, when the police finally receiv- orders and intervened. Participants in the action were held for interrogation and the posters confiscated. But the garden itself remained untouched. The Garden of Peace was destroyed completely only two weeks later after the flowers had come up forming clearly the words BAN THE BOMB. The Group is going to plant a new Peace Garden in a different part of Moscow, and hopes that members of the Western peace movement will also join in. Contact: Vladimir and Maria Fleishgakker, SSSR, Moscow, ul. Malaya Kommunisticheskaya, dom 18, kv. 14. Perhaps in this case the garden will prove more long-lived.

ANTI-WAR TRADITION

June 1, in Moscow, the Independent Initiative group and the Group of Good Will held three antinuclear demonstrations. At least 500 people took part in the demonstrations which took place at Moscow's Tsaritsino Park, the River Train Station, and at metro station "October Field." According to approximate counts, some 400 people were held, including both demonstrators and a number of chance passers-by. In Tsaritsino Park, about 100 people participated in a meeting almost free from harassment. It seems the police had depleted their forces by concentrating on preventing the demonstrations at the locations within city boundaries. Most of the demonstrators taken into custody were released the same day. At present, nothing concrete is known about those who are still being held.

Last year, also on June 1, the Independent Initiative group held its first anti-nuclear protest at Tsaritsino Park. About 200 people were taken in by the police. Despite the arrests, about 40 participants managed to make it through police lines and into the forest where they held a meeting. The choice of June 1 as a demonstration date is not by chance. It was on June 1, 1971, when 1500 people from the Moscow counter-culture held an unsanctioned protest against the war in Vietnam at 'Manezh' Square, next to the Kremlin. The demonstration was cruelly supressed. The protestors were surrounded by bus-loads of policemen and truck-loads of soldiers from the internal army; they were then beaten mercilessly and arrested.

Around 200 of the "hippies" were thrown for several months into psychiatric hospitals; a comparable number served 15 days in jail. Many members of the Independent Initiative and Good Will groups participated in the events of 1971; twelve years later, they chose this date for holding annual anti-nuclear demonstrations. Aside from anti-nuclear slogans, this years rally included a number of signs protesting the war in Afghanistan and service in the army.

THOSE WHO MADE IT THROUGH POLICE LINES: members of Independent Initiative demonstrating on June 1 1983 in Tsaritsino park. In the center /under BAN THE BOMB/Popov & Troyansky - both are held now in mental hospital.

CONVERSION 1984

On the 12 April, the Moscow Trust Group attempted to hold a seminar conference on the theme of conversion —the transfer of East West military expenditures to peaceful applications. For presentation and discussion, the scientific-research section of the Group prepared two reports: 'Towards a Theoretical Foundation to the Question of Conversion,' and 'An Econometric Model of the Process of Conversion.' The discussion materials included a list of proposed humanitarian projects according to which the resources liberated from military budgets could be most efficiently put to use serving the world's needs. Some examples: programs for the elimination of epidemic diseases, exploring global ocean resources, fighting world hunger, resolving the problem of insufficient fresh water supplies, finding alternative energy resources. The reports stressed the economic efficiency with which resources from military budgets could be used to serve peaceful goals: thus (for example), funds sufficient for the eradication of malaria, a disease from which some 1 billion people suffer, would equal the cost of two strategic bombers.

The group invited to the seminar both Soviet and Western journalists, foreign diplomats, as well as representatives of the Soviet official Peace Council, including its president, the political columnist and

editor for 'Pravda', Yurii Zhukov. Representatives from Trust Groups in other cities also planned to attend. The event was to have taken place at the MEDVEDKOV'S apartment.

Representatives of local unofficial peace groups were stopped and held by the KGB on their way to Moscow. Yurii Zhukov and other invited Soviet officials did not come. In their place, towards the beginning of the seminar, a brigade of KGB operatives showed up. 40 agents cordoned off the house, blockaded the apartment, and prevented Western jounalists and diplomats from entering the conference. 14 members of the Moscow Group for Trust were held by the KGB and interrogated at a police station for 8 hours. During the interogation, KGB officers cynically confided to seminar chairperson, Mark Reitman, their gratitude for the invitation to the Soviet Peace Committee, asking them to be sure to invite [the Committee] to all future events, so that the KGB might always know in advance about the groups activities. The KGB agents were happy to joke on this subject, arresting the seminar participants with the words, "Yurii Zhukov asked us to say 'hi' for him." Three members of the peace movement from Gorky who had managed to get to Moscow were also arrested at the seminar: their fate is not known.

KROCHIK'S TRAGEDY

It has recently become known why the physicist, Gennady Krochik, left the Group for Trust in January 1984. In June 1982 (the time of the international peace march in Moscow), having been sent out of Moscow on a forced business trip to Novosibirsk, the two Trust Group members Krochik and Blok were grabbed by KGB agents in the Novosibirsk airport as they were attempting to fly back to the capitol city. The two men were terrorized by the KGB for a twenty-four hour period.

In November of 1983, as he was returning from Riga to Moscow, Gennady Krochik was seized with a sudden paranoic psychosis: he believed he was again in Novosibirsk and that the KGB were terrorizing him. It is clear that this formerly healthy man suffered a mental breakdown as the result of the extreme mental strain under which he had been living for a year and a half.

In connection with his peace activities, Krochik was constantly subjected to intense KGB persecutions. In Fall 1982, for example, he underwent exhausting interrogations up to four times a week over a period of several months. A member of the Trust Group, psychiatrist Igor Sobkov, had not formerly noticed in Krochik a tendency toward mental disorders, but often had noted that after interrogations or searches Gennady was left in a state of shock. After Krochik's bout with illness in the Riga airport, his family was forced to hospitalize him. Undergoing a course of treatment, and aware of his fragile state, Gennady Krochik announced his departure from the group and moved from Moscow to Kishinev. At present, Krochik is once again hospitalized as a result of attempts by KGB agents to force him to publicly denounce the group.

PRISONERS OF PEACE

LIDIA LATSIS-DORONINA

57-year old Lidia Latsis-Doronina, who was arrested in January 1983 for distribution of the Group for Trust's proposals in Riga, and who was sentenced to 5 years in the camps and 3 years exile, is presently located at a camp in Mordovia. She suffers from tuberculosis, as well as diseases of the heart and liver. Her ADDRESS: 431200 SSSR, Mordovskaya ASSR, Tengushevski Raion, pos. Barashevo, uchr. ZH-X-385/3-4

ALEKSANDER VORONA

According to the latest information, Aleksandr Vorona, an activist in the Soviet independent peace movement, has been transferred to Dnepropetrovsk Special Psychiatric hospital where he is undergoing forced treatment with neuroleptic drugs. Aleksandr Vorona was arrested in 1983 in Novosibirsk in connection with his distribution of the Group for Trust's peace proposals. The thirty-two year old Aleksandr Vorona has already served 9 years as a political prisoner in psychiatric hospitals as punishment for having, in 1969, written a letter to a radio station with the request that they give some information on the attempt which was made on Leonid Brezhnev's life in that year. As a result of torture and forced 'treatment', Aleksandr Vorona has been crippled for life. His latest incarceration may prove fatal: VORONA's ADDRESS: SSSR, 320006, g. Dnepropetrovsk, ul. Chicherina, 101, uchr. YaE-308/PB

OLEG RADZINSKY

Group for Trust activist, Oleg Radzinsky, who has been exiled to the Tomsk Region, continues to be denied medical attention and has been transferred to hard labor at felling logs. His wife, Elena, who has followed him into exile, is expecting a child. In recent months the KGB is threatening him with an extension of his term in exile.

His exile address: SSSR, Tomskaya obl., Asino, Do vosstrebovania

OLEG RADZINSKY

POPOV AND TROYANSKY

Yurii Popov and Sergei Troyanskii, activists in the Independent Initiative Group who were arrested for organizing an anti-nuclear demonstration in the Moscow park 'Tsaritsino' in December 1983, are being given sulfazine shocks and forced treatment with neuroleptics.

Sulfazine shocks are widely used for punishment in Soviet Psychiatric Hospitals. Sulfazine causes shock, and then extreme pain, sharp fluctuations in body temperature from extreme minimum to extreme maximum, and an overall diseased state for a 48-hour period. The use of sulfazine was forbidden in 1940.

Yurii Popov is located at the 14th psychiatric hospital in Moscow.

VLADIMIR GERSHUNY

Vladimir Gershuni, who was among the first 74 signers of the Group for Trusts original declaration, before the Group's existence had been made public, is at present being held at a special psychiatric hospital in Alma-Ata. He was arrested in June 1982. He has formerly been held in psychiatric hospitals as a political prisoner. In 1978, Dr. Gary Low-Beer of the British Royal College of Psychiatrists examined him, and pronounced him to be in good mental health: his results were published in the British medical journal "Lancet" in May 1978. Gershuni has no relatives.

His Address: SSSR, 483310, KazSSR, Alma-Atinskaya Obl., g. Talgar, pos. Alekseyeva, uchr. LA-155/7.

"HOOLIGANS" FOR SURVIVAL

" . . As before, so also today, we hold that not one opportunity, not one chance should be let to slip by to return to the path of negotiation. An ever more significant role in this matter must be played by . . broad circles of society."

K. U. Chernenko, head of the Soviet Government, First Secretary of the CPSU

On the 10th of May, the Moscow Group for Trust made an announcement to the governments of the USSR and the USA calling for the re-establishment of disarmament negotiations.

May 12, the Group sent to leaders of the USSR and USA an appeal that the two countries initiate contacts at the highest levels.

May 18, the group collected 428 signatures under a petition calling for renewal of negotiations without preconditions.

May 19, the coordinating committee of the Group for Trust took on responsability for collecting signatures on the streets of Moscow. Committee members Aleksei Lusnikov, Mark Reitman, Nikolai Khramov, Olga Lusnikova and Alexander Rubchenko went to Arbat Street —one of Moscow's main boulevards—to collect signatures under a petition requesting renewal of superpower

MARK REITMAN (CENTER) COLLECTING SIGNATURES

negotiations. They held in their hands official Soviet posters (bought in a political poster shop on Arbat St.) stating PEACE IS EVERBODY'S BUSINESS. In the minutes before their arrest they managed to collect 350 signatures. Passers-by were cueing up in lines in order to sign. The people in line reacted angrily when the Group members were arrested, even attempting to prevent the police from shoving Group members in the waiting police car.

After 7 hours of interrogations with the KGB at the 22d police precinct, four members were released, while a fifth, Alexander Rubchenko, was accused of petty hooliganism. The court gave him 15 days for petty hooliganism. In his sentence, the essence of his hooliganism was put as follows: " . . was standing on

KHRAMOV (CENTER) SURROUNDED BY THE PLAINCLOTHES KGB-MEN. POSTER IS CONFISCATED.

PETITION IS CONFISCATED

POLICEMAN ARRESTING LUSNIKOV

a street corner holding a poster printed by 'Plakat' publishers stating PEACE IS EVERYBODY'S BUSINESS and collecting signatures under some sort of appeal."

Rubchenko responded to his arrest with a hunger strike. After 3 days, Rubchenko, who is a severely handicapped person, lost consciousness. The police attempted to have him admitted to a hospital for force feeding, but the attendant doctors, noting his dangerous condition, didn't dare take responsability for him.

Disregarding his dangerously ill condition, two days after Rubchenko's release, the authorities arrested him again. Policemen pryed their way into his apartment through a window. Rubchenko had just enough time to call friends to let them know he would continue his hunger strike. At present, having served his second 15 day sentence, Alexander Rubchenko is again free.

On the 3 of June, Group for Trust activists once again went out onto Moscow streets to collect signatures. This time they stood on Peace Avenue, near the general headquarters of the official Soviet Peace Council. As soon as Aleksei Lusnikov and Nikolai Khramov were seized by Police, Mark Reitman and Lev Dudkin came in to take their place. Just as happened on May 19, people wanting to sign the petition began to form lines, and during arrrests expressed their anger to the police. A curious side-note: As police were stuffing Mark Reitman and Lev Dudkin into their car, several people ran up from out of the crowd, shoved aside the policemen, and, grabbing the petition out of Reitman's hands, dramatically signed their names to it, then returned it to Reitman through the gate of the police vehicle.

Two members of an American anti-nuclear group were present at the scene and witnessed the arrests. After questioning, all of those held were released.

June 4, another series of arrests and interrogations took place. Nikolai Khramov was expelled from Moscow University. June 6, the Group again attempted to collect signatures on the street. The Group informed the Soviet Peace Council of their plans beforehand, inviting representatives of the Council, including its president, Yurii Zhukov, to participate. As a result, the KGB blockaded the apartments of Group activists. Eighteen people were put under house arrest.

Soviet law does not legally sanction use of house arrests, considering it, to the contrary, a criminal offense.

KHRAMOV:

On June 6, agents of the KGB beat up Nikolai Khramov in the courtyard of his apartment building. June 7, he was arested at his home, accused of "resisting the authorities," and was immediately put on trial. All the same, the People's Court of the Kalinin district of Moscow declared him innocent: a unique event. Apparently, his arrest had not been planned on, and the KGB failed to work out the decision with the judge. Immediately after the court declared Khramov to be innocent, police returned him to their headquarters, locked him in a room, and left him there, without food, for one week. After what had happened became known,he was taken to a court in a different district of Moscow and sentenced to 15 days in jail. This time Khramov was offered food, but he declared a hunger strike.

IMMEDIATLY AFTER HIS RELEASE NIKOLAI KHRAMOV WAS DRAFTED. PREVIOUSLY HE WAS EXEMPTED FROM MILLITARY SERVICE DUE TO POOR VISION.
HE SAID THAT PREFERS JAIL TO SERVING IN THE ARMY.

PEACE EDUCATION

In May, the Moscow Group for Trust came out with the first issue of their journal "Trust." The Group's thick, quarterly journal contains articles, documents, and photographs which reflect the Group's activities, and also its point of view on questions of peace, disarmament, and the humanization of relations between East and West. Supporters of the Group reproduce the journal using regular photo cameras. It is distributed in cities throughout the USSR.

SEMINARS:

The group continues to hold its weekly seminars in Moscow. The international seminar on questions of peace, which the group holds on Fridays, normally takes place without incident. No doubt this can be explained by the regular participation of Western peace activists who are visiting the USSR; the KGB wishes to avoid displaying in front of them its normal manner of dealing with Soviet peace activists. At the same time, the scientific research seminars on questions of peace, and the social anti-nuclear seminar, both of which are held weekly, often fall victim to KGB blockades. The weekly gathering of the Group for Trust's coordinating committee take place under siege by the KGB, and under intensive surveillance. Despite the difficult conditions, the group still manages to hold regular meetings--at least one per week.

According to the group's estimates, no less than 2000 people in 18 cities of the USSR participate in distribution of the Group's written materials.

INFORMATION:

In May, the Group began widespread distribution of its new selection of materials on the medical effects of nuclear weapons. Comparable materials do not exist in official publications. The possible exception might be academician Chazov's book, which came out for propogandistic reasons in a tiny printing of 7,000 copies, and which is not to be found on sale in Soviet bookstores.

Among other materials being distributed by the group for Trust in the Soviet Union are a collection of humanitarian proposals for normalizing relations between East and West submitted by Soviet citizens, and a collection of articles by Mark Reitman on problems of peace and war in literature, history, and contemporary reality. The Group has received many responses from Soviet citizens to the Group's theoretical articles on the conversion of military budgets toward peaceful ends. Maria Fleishgakker's articles on establishing personal contacts between East and West have been widely circulated.

In Riga, despite difficult underground conditions, participants in the independent peace movement are continuing performances of pacifist plays. The internal exhibit of anti-war posters which the Group for Trust held in Moscow last Fall has been sent to other cities of the USSR.

HOSTAGE

The KGB is attempting to prevent Sergei Batovrin from continuing his work for peace. A founder of the Moscow Group for Trust, Batovrin was forced out of the Soviet Union in May 1983 after years of harassment, including forced internment in a psychiatric hospital, house arrest, and death threats. At the present time he is living in New York and is the foreign representative of the independent peace movement in the USSR.

Since April of this year, the KGB has been making attempts to hamper his peace activity in the West. Among other measures, the KGB is pressuring him by taking hostage in Moscow his wife's mother, Mrs. B. Faibishev. After Sergei Batovrin and his family was sent out of the USSR, Mrs. Faibishev submitted an application for emigration in order to reunite with her daughter, Natalia Batovrina. In April, the Soviet authorities denied her an exit visa, and made clear to her that she would never see her daughter or grand-daughter again as long as her son-in-law continued his peace activities. Since May, the police have begun to terrorize Mrs. Faibishev with police raids and interrogations. The actions against Faibishev were presented to her as directly related to Batovrin's peace activities. Mrs. Faibishev has no other relatives in the USSR. She is being threatened with dismissal from her work. Her hostage status was conceived of by the KGB as a means of severing the ties between the Soviet and Western peace movements.

The fate of Mrs. Faibishev is not a private matter concerning only the Batovrin family: It is a question of principle concerning a person's right to work for peace, a right which, in the final analysis, will determine the fate of the world.

Mrs. Faibishev's address: SSSR, 127322, Moscow, ul. Milashenkova, d. 13, korp. 2, kv. 48.

ALEKSANDR SHATRAVKA

MESSAGE FROM UCHR. 158/3

Volya Shatravka, the mother of Alexander Shatravka, an imprisoned member of the Group for Trust, was able to meet with her son for the first time this April after two years of separation. Alexander was arrested in July of 1982, accused of distributing the peace proposals of the Group for Trust, and sentenced in April 1983 to three years in the camps. His wife, Anna Gordienko, was unable to visit him at the prison camp for lack of funds to make the trip.

After the visit, Alexander Shatravka's mother transmitted to the Group a message from her son. He stated that after his sentencing he has been subjected to constant pressure from the KGB and prison administration to come out publicly against the Group, to denounce it and assert that "only the government of the USSR can concern itself with questions of peace." Shatravka said that he considers himself an active member of the Group, and is continuing his peace activities in the camp, spreading peace information among the inmates. It has become known that Shatravka is being threatened with an extension of his prison term. According to a law which was introduced in the Soviet Union December of last year, the camp administration is allowed to lengthen the term of imprisonment without trial for a term up to five years if it considers that the prisoner has violated camp regime.

Alexander's mother said that, as before, her son is morally firm, but that his health has deteriorated alarmingly. That he has been cruelly treated was already known. When, for example, on 1 January 1983, at the Sverdlovsk Transfer Prison, guards found a note addressed to Western peace activists in Shatravka's cell, they led him out into the prison yard, stripped him, and beat him with clubs and rubber hoses. Subsequently, in prisons and camps, he has been beaten frequently. In August 1983 he felt forced to declare a 25-day hunger strike to protest the beatings, other cruel punishments, and the denial of correspondence priviledges. As a result of the fast, he fell ill with dysentery. Though severely ill, he was deprived of any medical assistance and barely survived. He subsequently developed a severe form of asthma, but is still denied even elementary medical help. In recent months, as a result of the protests of Western members of the anti-nuclear movement, the beatings have halted. Nonetheless, the hunger, cold, absence of medical help, and heavy labor—he has to weave wire fences by hand in freezing conditions—replace for Shatravka other forms of torture.

Since February of this year, the Moscow Trust Group has appealed three times to the head of the Soviet government, Konstantine Chernenko, requesting an investigation into violation of article 69 of the Soviet constitution in connection with the Shatravka affair, and also demanding his immediate release. Article 69 not only guarrantees the right, but obliges the Soviet citizen, to work for peace. In his sentence, Alexander Shatravka was accused of calling for the creation of independent peace groups and a dialogue between East and West. Further evidence against him was his call for creating an international bulletin in which people from the East and the West could exchange points of view on questions of peace and disarmament.

Shatravka's address in camp: SSSR Dzhambulskaya obl., g. Zhanatas, uchr. 158/3. His mother, Volya Petrovna Shatravka's address: SSSR, Moscow, Chistoprudny bulvar, dom 13, kv. 3A

OFFICIAL RESPONSE

At the end of May, the Moscow Trust Group contacted the Moscow city council in an effort to get permission from the city authorities for an anti-nuclear demonstration.

In response, on the 6th of June, Vladimir Fleishgakker was taken into custody and sent before the city prosecutor. At the prosecutor's office he was received by deputy-chief prosecutor Golubev, who cynically announced, " You may demonstrate, but only if you have permission." When Fleishgakker inquired about receiving permission, Golubev simply angrily repeated his previous statement. Golubev stressed further that the present conversation was the official "response" to the group's request for permission to hold a demonstration.

This was the Group's fourth attempt to receive permission to hold an anti-nuclear demonstration. The three previous attempts had resulted in mass house arrests by way of offical response. The Group made its first attempt to receive permission for a demonstration in June 1982: 50 Group members were put under house arrest.



DRAWING BY SERGEY BATOVRIN MADE IN MOSCOW PSYCHIATRIC HOSPITAL IN AUGUST 1982.

Prisoner of peace of 21 century

Valerii Senderov, an imprisoned independent peace activist in the USSR, has been transferred to a punishment cell. Senderov was arrested in June 1982, and sentenced to 12 years deprivation of liberty for his participation in the peace and workers' movements. In March of this year the camp administration extended his sentence—without trial—for another 5 years. By the time Valerii Senderov gets free it will already be the year 2000. Will the world survive that long, if today a peace worker in the Soviet Union can be sentenced to 17 years in prison?

NEW LAW IN USSR: BAN ON HOSPITALITY

A number of new laws have appeared in the Soviet Union aimed at limiting contacts and exchange of information between Soviet citizens and foreign visitors. The latest in the new wave of laws threatens Soviet citizens with punishment if they allow a foreigner to spend the night in their home, or give them a ride in a car, or give them "other sorts of assistance." A citizen guilty of such an offense may be fined 50 rubles, given an official warning, or undergo criminal prosecution. This new law, in effect, makes hospitality a criminal offense.

article 70

Earlier this year, article 70 of the Soviet legal code was expanded by two new points. One of these makes it a criminal offense to hold materials critical of the regime in "written or printed form." Thus, a note scribbled on a scrap of paper containing critical comments directed at the regime puts its owner in danger of spending 7 years in the camps and 5 years exile.

The other new addition to article 70 provides for 10 years in prison to be followed by 5 years in exile for receipt of "articles of value" from foreign organizations or from individuals acting in the interests of these organizations." In practice, this means that Soviet authorities may arrest at will any Soviet citizen receiving a package from friends or relatives living in the West. It also means that a Soviet citizen who receives a package from a Western peace organization, for example, a package of marigold seeds from the Fellowship of Reconciliation (such as they have been sending all this past year), could, at the governments whim, be given 15 years in prison and exile. The new law goes into effect starting August of this year.

In December of last year article 13-1 of the Soviet criminal code was put into effect making communication to a foreigner of economic, scientific-technical, or other professional (job-related) information a crime punishable by 8 years in prison. As a result, Soviet scientists may no longer print their research in foreign journals without permission from the government. The law's fuzzy-edged wording gives Soviet authorities the opportunity to classify as an offense not only any professional conversation of a Soviet citizen with a foreigner, but also, if they so desire, any contact at all of a professional with a foreigner as an "attempt to transfer professional information."

The Group for Trust sees in these new laws the unhealthy tendency of Soviet leaders to put the maximum limit possible on contacts between ordinary citizens of the East and the West. Nonetheless, the Group believes that the new laws will not make contacts impossible, and that they primarily reflect the authorities' fear in the face of rising international contacts between ordinary people. Commenting on the latest of the new laws, the Group for Trust noted that the law forbidding Soviet citizens to help foreigners may, for the first time, force them into civil-disobedience, if only because many of the peace activists who visit them in Moscow are often spending the night in one of the members' apartments, and the group has no intention of denying them common hospitality, even if Soviet authorities see fit to punish people for hospitality.

LATEST NEWS:

- NIKOLAY KHRAMOV WAS ARRESTED ON AUGUST 3
- VLADIMIR & MARIA FLEISHGAKKER ARE UNDER HOUSE ARREST SINCE AUGUST 5
- 50 PEACE ACTIVISTS ARRESTED IN MOSCOW ON HIROSHIMA DAY AUGUST 6

YOU CAN HELP: PROTEST & DEMONSTRATE !!!

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DOCUMENT

ДОКУМЕНТ

Appeal to peace activists in Europe

The fight for peace, for the removal, once and for all, of the technology that destroys people, especially nuclear weapons, is an undisputed moral imperative of our time. The contribution of the European peace movement in this struggle is enormous: it has a direct influence on the politics and the mood not only of our continent, but also of the whole world. And we must remember that Europe extends to the Ural Mountains and a considerable part of it is occupied by a state in which the numerous statements make by its leaders on defending peace and on the need for disarmament are in sharp contrast to their deeds, which are aimed at speeding the buildup of military and nuclear power. Even before you began your impressive peace marches in protest against the stationing in Europe of the "Pershing" and "Cruise" missiles, SS-20 missiles, which are capable of striking any point in Europe with a nuclear blow, and which are aimed not only at your cities and factories but at your very opportunity to conduct these marches, to express your opinion freely and to take part in important decision making in the democratic way, were already deployed in the USSR. At that time, when thousands of you were freely jumping over national boundaries with your peace marches, people in Moscow who simply spoke out in favor of establishing trust between nations as a pledge for peace (The Group for Trust), could not even leave their own homes to join the peace march made by Scandinavian peace advocates (Summer 1982) through the territory of the USSR. They are being kept under illegal house arrest, their telephones are disconnected, they are threatened with prosecution; in a word, the suppressive machinery of a totalitarian state is directed against them. All this cannot be passed over in silence, when peace in Europe is under discussion.

You have the opportunity and the right to request disarmament from your governments. Here there is no such opportunity. Therefore, include in your peace march programs also request directed to the Soviet government to dismantle all the SS-20s, to stop persecuting peace advocates in the USSR. After all, it is only by clearing all nuclear weapons out of Europe that we can hope for peace and preservation of your rights and freedom.

LENINGRAD TRUST GROUP.

LEAFLET:

Appeal to Soviet Citizens to enter into a correspondence with supporters of peace in other countries

Dear Friend!

The time has come when every man must reflect on how he can improve life on our planet.

In our opinion, the sole path to peace and disarmament is friendship and love between all people on the earth. If each of us has a friend in America, England, or Germany, then this means that each of us, even by one millionth, lessens the probability of a nuclear catastrophe.

We must get to know one another and understand one another.

We are giving you the addresses of the largest of the anti-war organizations in the different countries of the world. You can send your letter to any one of these addressing it to any ordinary supporter of peace (underline this request in your letter).

Get to know him (or her), write about yourself, share with your pen-pal your thoughts about the world. Perhaps you will become friends. If our children grow up as friends, we can rest easy about the future of peace.

(These "appeals" were dropped into mailboxes at random by the Trust Group)

LETTER:

Proposals to Trust Group from Elena Sannikova

To the Moscow Trust Group

Dear Friends:

Your group has received many proposals for the establishment of contacts based on trust between citizens of the USSR and the USA, which you have suggested as a way of solving the problem of international tension, and the threat of nuclear war.

For my part, I would like to submit a few suggestions.

1. Organize a network of international labor unions, whose members could be persons from analogous professions in the USSR and USA, along with other countries.

2. Organize an extensive exchange program between institutions of higher learning from various countries, contacts between specialist, exchanges between professors and students. For instance, a group of Soviet students might go to study at Oxford, and a group for Oxford, to Moscow State University. Friendship would be developed among young people of various nations, there would arise common interests among the students and teachers.

3. The group has already proposed an exchange program for children. One might organize childrens' vacations on an international scope: expand the network of childrens' hostels, vacation lodges for children, where children from all countries would be free to

visit. For instance, allow any family in the USSR to send their children to the USA or another country for their summer vacations.

4. Organize contacts between soldiers in the armed forces: correspondence, gatherings, meetings. Eliminate from the military lexicon the word "enemy", since calling anyone an enemy during peace time only provokes conflicts.

5. Organize wide professional exchanges among nations in the field of medicine. Allow Soviet citizens to travel freely to the USA and other nations for medical treatment, and vice versa. Organize international clinics, asnd extensive professional exchanges between specialists.

6. Expand the network of cultural exchanges among countries, increase the number of traveling exhibitions, visiting entertainers, organize an international book exchange. Expand the network of educational institutions for the study of foreign languages, organize groups and clubs for the study of languages.

I want to suggest that the Trust Group collect all the proposals that have been sent to the Group and publish the most interesting in a separate volume. This collection would become, insofar as possible, accessible to the widest circle of readers not only in the USSR, but also in the USA. This would help citizens of both nations to initiate actions toward establishing contacts based on trust.

Present circumstances in our country, I think, will not be a serious hinderence to establishing contacts among citizens of various nations, if the overwhelming majority of the population of our country responds to your proposals.

It is very much to be hoped that your noble cause should attract an ever increasing number of supporters, no matter what.

Elena Sannikova
RSFSR 125047/Moscow
25 Oruzheny pereulok, kv. 134
tel. 250-24-68

THIS LETTER WAS RECIEVED BY THE GROUP IN NOVEMBER 1983. ON JANUARY 19, 1984 ELENA SANNIKOVA WAS ARRESTED.
AS YOU ARE READING THIS, SHE IS AWAITING TRAIL...

"Children just like the swastika"

On April 20, in Moscow, Donetsk, Ufa, Leningrad, and other cities of the USSR, young neo-fascists held demonstrations commemorating Hitler's birthday. The policemen present did not disperse and did not arrest the demonstrators, which contrasts starkly with the mass arrests carried out by the police during anti-nuclear rallies in June. Neo-fascists have been holding demonstrations in the USSR for the past five years.

In 1982 (also on April 20) 900 neo-fascists demonstrated on Pushkin Square in Moscow for over three hours while encircled by busses filled with police. No arrests were made. The demonstrators chanted "Heil Hitler." Afterward, the regional committees of the Communist Party sent bulletins to Moscow high school teachers informing them that "the children just like the swastikas and brown shirts," and "this is not a serious tendency," though "ideological work must be intensified; children should be instructed in Communist ideals."

PEACE

DRAWING BY SERGEY BATOVRIN MADE IN MOSCOW PSYCHIATRIC HOSPITAL IN AUGUST 1982

Proposal

THE MOSCOW TRUST GROUP

Dear Colleagues:

We participants of the independent peace movement in the USSR, the "trust-builders," feel that, among various ways and means for real progress towards disarmament and stable peace, the following are of constructive value:

- To organize American cultural centers in the USSR and Soviet centers in the USA with libraries and movie theaters in the biggest cities of both countries. The libraries are to have newspapers and magazines, books of contemporary writers, popular science books, textbooks for studying English and Russian, audio-visual language learning equipment, etc.
- To ensure the free sale of, and subscription to, American periodicals in the USSR and Soviet periodicals in the USA.
- To bring the practice of enforcing mail delivery into conformity with the International postal rules.
- To guarantee the embargo-free export of agricultural products, of medicine and medical equipment.

We would like to hear your comments and, if possible, to get your cooperation in further promotional steps.

Moscow

Summer 1982

Sergei Batourin



TWO YEARS AGO - IN AUGUST 1982-HE WAS BEHIND THE BARS OF MENTAL HOSPITAL FOR HIS PEACE ACTIVITY.
THANKS TO YOUR PROTESTS - NOW HE IS FREE AND WILL ANSWER YOUR QUESTIONS

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

Question: Article 69 of the Soviet Constitution not only guarrantees the right of Soviet citizens to work for peace, it even obliges them to do so. Participants in the Independent Peace Movement in the USSR never break Soviet laws. Why do independent peace advocates in the USSR suffer persecution from Soviet authorities?

Answer: In the Soviet Union it has become the tradition to suppress any and every independent activity and initiative. The appeal of the independent peace movement in the USSR for direct contacts, exchanges, and dialogue between regular citizens of the West and East contradicts the nature of the closed Soviet society and is looked upon as a threat by the authorities. The Group for Trust assigns responsibility for the arms race to both superpowers. This whole complex of factors accounts for the unceasing repressions of peace activities in the USSR.

Question: Do exchanges and cooperative projects involving Western peace organizations and the official Soviet Peace Council serve the cause of improving mutual understanding between East and West?

Answer: Unfortunately they do not. Exchanges and joint activities in which the Soviet side is filled with Soviet officials only create the illusion that something is happening. Western participants in exchanges often do not realize this, being insufficiently familiar with the nature of Soviet society.

But one needs only to look facts squarely in the face: Western demonstrations in the USSR take place primarily in busses and trains, and limit to the absolute minimum any chance encounters with uncoached ordinary Soviet citizens. "Meetings with the Soviet public" are invariably meetings with specially approved people who have been instructed on what to say in such situations.

The materials sent to the Soviet Union for exhibit and distribution are never exhibited or distributed. Letters sent to Soviet elementary and high schools or colleges get answered in words expressing not what the students actually think, but what they are supposed to think. Those who understand the urgency of establishing direct contacts between regular citizens of East and West can easily solve this problem. Contact regular Soviet citizens, not their unasked-for official "representatives." For citizens from the East and West to get to know one another, they don't have to ask permission from the authorities—all they have to do is meet together (Soviet law does not forbid it).

Question: The Soviet Peace Council states that it has 80 million memebers among Soviet citizens. Doesn't this prove that it represents Soviet people?

Answer: This argument often serves as a justification for those Western peace organizations who ignore the Independent Peace Movement in the USSR. "They have 80 million people while you have 10 people. Why should we complicate our relations with them for the sake of a handful of people?" But doesn't this miss the more important point? It is not a question of arithmetic that we are talking about here, but a question of principle: until every person has the right to work for peace, nuclear catastophe just looms closer and closer for all of us. All the same, if someone happens to get a kick out of looking at this question arithmetically, this is also possible, and this presents a different picture. According to the annual report of the Soviet Committee for the Defense of Peace (The Soviet Peace Council) they have 450 members. What happened to the other 79,999,550 members? (You can check the figures in Kharkhardin, O. Mir i Razoruzhenie, Moscow: 'Nauka', 1982, p. 206). According to the Group for Trust's last count in December 1983, participants in activities of the Independent Peace Movement in the USSR numbered over 2,000 people in 9 groups living in 16 cities across the USSR. Which makes the Independent Peace Movement almost 5 times larger than the official Committee. Where did the figure of eighty million come from? Eighty million Soviet citizens contribute yearly

to the Soviet Peace Fund (a separate organization). These contributions are not voluntary, but are deducted from the salary as a matter of course—another of the peculiar Soviet forms of taxation. Using this figure to calculate membership in the Soviet Peace Council would be equivalent to calculating the number of Reagan supporters by counting up American tax-payers.

Since the Soviet Peace Committee was founded by Stalin in 1949 it has yet to make a peace proposal and has not even acquired a membership. The 450 members of the Soviet Peace Council are highly-payed government clerks. Where then do those "mass demonstrations" by Soviet citizens come from?

Since the Soviet Peace Committee was founded by Stalin in 1949 it has yet to make a peace proposal and has not even acquired a membership. The 450 members of the Soviet Peace Council are highly-payed government clerks. Where then do those "mass demonstrations" by Soviet citizens come from?

Until the appearance of the **Group for Trust** in June 1982, there weren't any. The independent peace initiative of Soviet citizens put the Soviet authorities in the position of having to prove the "mass popular nature" of their government organization, the Committee for the Defense of Peace (the Soviet Peace Council). The Committee received the directive to hold mass demonstrations.

The first was held in Moscow, at Lenin Stadium. In the whole crowd you couldn't find a single home-made sign, nor, at this "anti-nuclear rally", could you find a single anti-nuclear slogan. "We Approve the Policies of the CPSU!", "We Will Carry Out the Decisions of the Party!", or "Shame on American War-Mongers!", the signs read. One detail captures the spontaneous spirit of this workers' demonstration particularly eloquently: not a single sign was put in the hands of a demonstrator—the signs were all screwed in place at the seats beforehand.

Subsequent demonstrations have differed little from the first.

This is not to say that people in the USSR do not want peace. In a country that has experienced so much bloodshed, no one wants war. Still, not many Soviet citizens are willing to risk imprisonment in order to take part in peace activities. Hence, thus far, in the Soviet Independent Peace Movement there are still only 2,000 participants. On the other hand, how many people would be taking part in the Western anti-nuclear movement if, for coming out with peace proposals, holding seminars and exhibits, or distributing information on the medical effects of nuclear weapons' use, they were thrown into concentration camps and psychiatric hospitals?

We hope that your participation in the dialogue with Soviet citizens will expand the ranks of Soviet fighters for peace.

Notes ON HISTORY OF PEACE ACTIVISM IN USSR

The first call for an independent peace movement in the USSR came in the mid-1960's, in Moscow, with the actions of poet Yuri Galanskov. Galanskov not only called for the creation of such a movement, he also held the Soviet Union's first unsanctioned peace demonstration: When American marine forces landed in the Dominican Republic in 1966, he held a protest demonstration before the U.S. embassy in Moscow.

Galanskov was arrested in January 1977 for compiling an uncensored collection of works on literary and religious themes titled 'Phoenix 66'. He was given seven years imprisonment. Galanskov died November 2, 1972, in a Mordovian prison camp, as the result of inhuman prison conditions and the denial of medical care. He was 33 years old.

At present, in the same Mordovian prison camp where Yuri Galanskov perished, is interned mathematician Vadim Yankov, member of the independent peace movement. He was arrested in June 1982—one week after signing his name to the Group for Trust's declaration of principles—and was sentenced to 4 years in the camps and 3 years in exile. [Yankov's address in prison camp: SSSR, 431200 Mordovskaya ASSR, Tengushevsky raion, pos. Barashevo, uchr. ZhKh-385/3-5.]

In July 1968, historian Andrei Amalrik and his wife, Gyuzel, held a demonstration in front of the British embassy in Moscow to protest British and Soviet military aid to Nigeria during its blockade of Biafra. After two terms in the camps and in exile, Amalrik was forced to leave the USSR. He was killed during a car accident in Spain, under unexplained circumstances, as he was on his way to attend the opening session of the Madrid conference.

In August of 1968, 7 people demonstrated on Red Square to protest Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia: Babitsky, Litvinov, and Bogoraz were sentenced to 4 years 5 years exile; Delone and Dremlyuga—3 years prison; Fainberg was placed in a psychiatric hospital.

These were the first peace demonstrations in Soviet history.

Sakharov

The first call for nuclear disarmament to be heard in the Soviet came when **academician Andrei Sakharov**, inventor of the hydrogen bomb, appealed to Soviet authorities in 1955 to put an end to nuclear testing.

At the same time he completed and published the world's first research documenting the dangers of nuclear testing to the environment.

In 1963, the Moscow nuclear test-ban treaty was signed thanks to the initiative of academician Sakharov who managed to lead negotiations out of a dead-end. In 1968, Sakharov wrote his essay **"Thoughts on Progress, Peaceful Co-Existence, and Intellectual Freedom,"** in which he analyzed the connection between peace and human rights, pointing out the inseparability of progress in arms control and the overcoming of the closedness of Soviet society via contacts and exchange of information between East and West. In following years he has produced many works on this theme In 1975, Sakharov received the Nobel peace prize. For the past four years he has been held under house arrest in the closed city of Gorky where he was sent in 1980, though he has never been tried for any crime, nor even have any criminal proceedings been brought against him.

On the second of May he declared an open-ended hunger strike. His fate remains unknown.



PORTRAIT OF SAKHAROV - FRAGMENT OF PAINTING BY BATOVRIN (CONFISCATED)

"Fostering Love for the Army"

(Following are excerpts from a lengthy front-page editorial in the June 9, 1984 issue of **Pravda**. Such front page statements voice the thoughts of the paper's political editorial board, the head of which for Pravda is Yurii Zhukov, who also chairs the Soviet Peace Council. The title is as it appeared (in Russian) in Pravda.)

Fostering Love for the Army

Today, the Armed Forces of the USSR are quite well prepared to secure the defense of our Fatherland, to serve the cause of socialism and peace. Today, more than ever, we recall the words of Lenin: "We must accompany our steps toward peace with the maximum of military preparedness."

Thanks to the progressive development of our economy, the quickening of scientific and technical progress, the Soviet Army and Navy are able to constantly increase their defense power. Nonetheless, however mighty and advanced a technology these forces might wield, their main strength remains in people . . Even though, in the age of nuclear missile weaponry, a soldier may never, as they say, "meet his enemy face to face", this not only doesn't reduce, it even heightens his need for knowing his duties, for having a high level of moral-psychological qualities, a firm discipline in executing orders, endurance, bravery, straining of will, and well-coordinated activities. As it was pointed out at the June (1983) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, soldiers acquire these qualities all the faster, the more actively young people are nurtured with love for the Army and Navy, the more fully and properly the traditions and military experience of the armed forces are used to improve mass defense work.

. . . C. U. Chernenko noted: "As we move towards the banner jubilee—the 40th anniversary of the Soviet people's victory during the Great Patriotic War—we must further expand our work of military-patriotic training. It is necessary to even more insistently foster in young people love for the Fatherland and hate for its enemies, a high political and class vigilance, constant readiness for heroic deeds."

Taking into account the nature of the current international situation, Party, Komsomol, Soviet, Trade Union, D.O.S.A.A.F. [volunteer army-navy-airforce support societies] organizations have begun to give more attention to training young citizens in the habits of military life, the formation of a conscious attitude toward the fulfillment of their constitutional obligation—defense of the Socialist Fatherland. .

As it expands its military-patriotic and defense work among the masses, the Party pays particular attention to the formation of patriotic feelings and political consciousness in the minds of teen-agers and younger pupils. . The trick is in finding forms of activities which are accessible to children: organizing various types of military games and sports; making good use of the lessons from elementary school military preparation classes, the stories of veterans . . In these ways we inculcate in every young person a passionate love for the Fatherland and its army; we inspire the striving to become a model soldier, develop psychological preparedness for observing the strictest discipline and order in army, navy, and airforce units. In the [Party's] over-all system of military-patriotic work, an important place is given to the orientations presented to high school seniors with a mind to their entering the military academies. . .

One of the urgent tasks before all social organizations is the strengthening of lines of command between military units and both labor and school collectives. . . In the interests of heightening the readiness of young citizens to defend the Fatherland, we

Вдохновляясь мирными задачами,
Твердо говорит Страна труда:

Западные «головы горячие»
Охладить сумеем мы всегда.

Рис. Бор. ЕФИМОВА. Стихи Ник. ЭНТЕЛИСА.

DRAWING FROM JULY 5, 1984 ISSUE OF KRASNAYA ZVEZDA. THE SIGN READS: "INSPIRED BY ITS PEACEFUL TASKS THE LAND OF LABOUR PUTS IT FIRMLY: WE CAN ALWAYS COOL OFF THOSE WESTERN HOT-HEADS"

must by all means cultivate in them love for the technical and applied military forms of sport. . And special attention must also be taken to insure that all young men filling the ranks of army and navy collectives should have good command of the Russian language, which helps them . . to successfully fulfill their military duty. . .

In the cultivating of an active love for military affairs in our young generation, in fostering in them the habit of overcoming the difficulties which accompany army and naval service—therin lie our guarantees of further strengthening the fighting readiness of the armed forces of the USSR, our readiness to defend the gains of socialism and overall peace.

Soviet press: NEW TARGETS

An unprecedentedly harsh Soviet press campaign against Western peace activists has surfaced recently, which is notable not only for the strong words used, but the unlikeliness of its targets.

The Soviet authors concentrated their strongest words on the leading activists and organizations in the Western Peace Movement: E.P. Thompson, M. Faber, Tromp, E.N.D., I.K.V., The Bertrand Russell Peace Fund. The leading forces in the European anti-nuclear struggle were presented to readers of the Soviet articles as "agents of NATO and Imperialism," "infiltrated by Western Secret Services" into the peace movement for "ideological terrorism" against the Soviet bloc.

Among the articles were several written by prominent figures in the Soviet Peace Committee, for instance, Yuri Zhukov and I. Melnikov's article in International Life (Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn, No. 6, June 1984, pp. 105-116), and G. Lokshin's in the same journal (No. 5, May 1984, pp. 71-80). Some of the articles on the same subject appearing in the Soviet press were written by Western authors William Pomproy, a London correspondent for the Communist newspaper "Daily World" ("International Life," no. 4, April 1984, pp. 82-90), and Mark Solomon, writing for "Twentieth Century and Peace" ("Dvadtsatyi vek i mir," no. 4, April 1984). All these articles are mirror images of one another and repeat the same formulations. Most typical is the article by G. Lokshin:

> "In NATO's arsenal of methods of subversion directed against the anti-war movement, an ever greater place is being given to ideological warfare. This is carried out partly with the help of various front organizations and groups that insinuate themselves into the anti-war movement. Particularly active in this sphere are the English Bertrand Russell Peace Fund and its off-shoot, the European Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament. . . . In competition with the latter is the Amsterdam-based independent editorial board of the 'Campaign for Disarmament' of the so-called International Peace Communications Center (the I.P.C.C.). . . . E. P. Thompson, an English historian and sociologist, widely publicized of late, a former professor at Oxford University, is the noisiest mouthpiece of these anti-Soviet conceptions. As to the views of this Thompson concerning the internal political situation in the USSR -- views which he strenuously advertises on any convenient occasion — these are simply a mixture of absolute ignorance with the basest of lies spread by Cold War professional . Many other 'mentors' of the anti-war movement are happy to join in with similar exercises on this theme. One of those to turn up in their ranks is the general secretary of the Inter-Church Council for Peace (I.K.V.) in Holland, Mr. M. Faber. . . . In the same context one can observe the rebirth of a revanchist [fascist] mood among the population of West Germany hidden by talk about the 'unsolved German question,' and the necessity for German reunification. It is no accident that lately the attention of the above-mentioned gentlemen has, in fact, been taken up not with anti-war statements to the public of their countries, but with attempts to pull this movement into an authentic 'crusade' against the socialist fraternity, while cynically hiding themselves behind stolen banners of peace.
>
> "E. Thompson incites his listeners by saying: 'We have to begin acting as if a unified, neutral and peaceful Europe already existed.'"

That is how Lokshin writes. For his part, Yuri Zhukov completes this bizarre picture with the following: "Having made a painful reappraisal of the current situation, U.S. and NATO psychological warfare units are attempting to sabotage some of the anti-nuclear movements from the inside, smuggling their own instructions and ideas into them . . . . Participants at the Athens Conference were forced to meet with such a maneuver . . . carried out by E. Thompson. . . . Attempts are being made to isolate the anti-war movements in the West, to place them under a new leadership which would stand in opposition to the World Peace Council."

How did Western anti-nuclear activists manage to excite such irritation in Moscow, where only yesterday they were still greeted with applause?

The Soviet articles answer this question directly: to the Western protests against the deployment of American rockets in Europe were added protests against the deployment of new Soviet nuclear missiles. And this does not suit the Moscow authorities.

Yury Zhukov writes: "Success of the cause of preserving the peace to a significant degree depends on the extent of influence of the Socialist nations on the world arena." He regards this matter optimistically, and quotes an appeal from the Central Committee: "The nerves of the Soviet people are strong. We have enough strength and means to defend the interests of the USSR, its friends and allies."

G. Lokshin expresses the displeasure of the Soviet authorities vis-a-vis the protests of the anti-nuclear movement against deployment of Soviet missiles, as follows: "Under cover of talk about [the equal responsibility of the super powers] the activists at E.N.D. have started lately to push some anti-war organizations in the West to criticize the deployment of Soviet nuclear missiles in Europe. These measures they describe in categorical terms as being superfluous." The simultaneous appearance of all these articles in the Soviet press -- a press controlled by Soviet authorities -- indicates that the decision to permit them was taken by the Soviet leadership. Considering that these articles appeared in Soviet journals which, in addition to Russian, also appear in German, French and English, one can only surmise that their goal is the following: to convince the Western anti-nuclear movement that a few hundred extra nuclear missiles in Europe are not at all superfluous -- so long as they are Soviet.

Radzinsky on the line

Radzinskiy: That was generally awful. I was transported terribly. I was placed with the general convoy, that is, you understand, it seemed terrible not in the sense that everyone is transported that way, but I was unprepared. In general, when they took me, you know, it would have been all right... But I was simply hungry. Because I couldn't eat the stuff they gave us. That dry ration. That rotten herring with black bread. Those are things I can't eat. And in Lefortovo they wouldn't give me the food my relatives brought me. But in general, after vague dissatisfaction with me by the committee, as I understood it, they changed the transport date. So I left with an entirely different transport. I went to a terrible transfer prison. It's so awful here! I went to Sverdlovsk. And In Sverdlovsk they kept me for 10 days in solitary confinement on the death row... I probably weigh now, well, I don't know, the devil knows, 59 or 58, but after the transport I weighed 48 kilograms. You can imagine my state... You know, I was such a sight that when they took me from jail, "they"--the local committee--they were simply frightened. They placed me on minimum security, because they thought I would, in general... I was in such a state of shock from hunger... I didn't eat hardly anything at all. All that time--18 days. In the transfer jail the food is such that it's generally hard for me to eat, if you don't want to kick the bucket. I tried towards the end of my starving in Sverdlovsk to eat some bread. After that during the whole journey from Sverdlovsk to Tomsk I had bloody diarrhea. That's the worst thing. Because they let you out to relieve yourself twice a day. And you've got to do it, excuse me, at the count of one, two, three. So that... It's impossible to explain, but I must say that I understood for the first time what it means to be in prison... Especially, you know, when my smart relatives brought me two huge knapsacks which I could hardly lift, and I had to carry them on my back. That's the worst thing that can happen during a transport. You know how it is there? They unloaded us from the Black Maria. Everyone had to squat. Your things on your back. Holding hands. In groups of three, running. Across the tracks to the Stolypin car. Well, and one step to the right or a step to the left is considered an attempted escape. They fire without warning. I even asked them, "Are you serious, boys?" Quite, they told me, judging by appearances. I stumbled with the knapsacks. They fell on me. They slowed down the whole transport. Again we all had to squat. You understand: a phantasmagoria. Night. Railroad tracks. Switches. And a hundred squatting men, with their belongings, in quilted jackets. What a scene! Those dogs, you're afraid they'll bite you... In general, it was awful, awful! In general, a nightmare! You understand, I'm telling you only a fraction of what I could have.

RADZINSKY'S VOICE WAS RECORDED ON DECEMBER 21st 1983 DURING PHONE CONVERSATION WITH BATOVRIN

DIALOGUE:

WHAT YOU CAN DO TO ACHIEVE THE WIDEST ONE POSSIBLE WITH SOVIET CITIZENS

1.) Get access to the already existing means of mass communication—the Western radio stations broadcasting to the Soviet Union in Russian and other languages of the national minorities of the USSR. Radio "Liberty", BBC, Voice of America, Deutsche Welle, Radio Canada . . have a listening audience in the Soviet Union of some 20 to 30 million. You should not be put off because these are government radio stations; after all, the Western peace movement makes every effort to get coverage in the mainstream Western press, even though its point of view usually dovetails with that of the government. As long as your broadcasts are being transmitted to tens of millions of Soviets—without censorship, distortion, or unnecessary commentary— there is no reason to disdain this resource. Other, non-governmental radio stations broadcasting to the Soviet Union as yet do not exist; for the sake of peace and mutual understanding, you should use those means of communication which do exist.

Your broadcasts to the USSR on Western radio stations would not at all mean that you are in ideological harmony with these stations: it simply gives you the opportunity to be heard. Nor would it be any great difficulty for you to get access to the microphones of these stations and thereby reach millions of Soviet listeners without censorship or distortion.

What would be more difficult—but try to convince the radio stations anyway—would be arranging for a regular broadcast: Peace dialogue between citizens of East and West. At any rate, it would not be reasonable to use Soviet means of mass communication, as there has yet to be a case where an announcement by a Western peace organization was not either censored or distorted by them.

At the same time, remember that the united resources of Western peace organizations—of which there are thousands—could afford to produce their own radio station for broadcasts to the USSR and Eastern Europe.

2.) Print materials in Russian and send them to the Soviet Union. Every year, hundreds of thousands of tourists visit the Soviet Union. Many of them are members of the Western peace movement: these are your postmen. Peace, disarmament, human rights, preservation of the natural environment: share with Soviet citizens your thoughts on these and other topics.

3.) Take part in the international humanitarian projects proposed by the Independent Peace Movement in the USSR. For their part, independent peace activists in the Soviet Union are waiting for your suggestions on contacts and exchanges in order to consider and help realize them. **The time has come for people of West and East to listen to one another, to get to know and understand one another. The dialogue cannot be limited only to joint discussions on the necessity for dialogue.**

4.) While visiting the USSR, socialize with ordinary Soviet citizens, with people on the street, with members of the independent peace movement. Don't get carried away with contacts with Soviet official persons. Behind their hospitality hides their real work: spreading disinformation.

The Group for Trust is not calling for a boycott of Soviet officials and organizations. Nonetheless, one must not forget that these officials are not representatives of the people—the people represent themselves. No contacts in the USSR can replace contacts with ordinary people.

PEACE GARDEN

MEMBERS OF MOSCOW TRUST GROUP PLANTING THE PEACE GARDEN IN FRONT OF POLICE OFFICE.

THE SIGN ON THE POSTER READS: FLOWERS INSTEAD OF BOMBS

WHAT YOU CAN DO FOR

HUMANIZING EAST-WEST RELATIONS

The Group for Trust has worked out all the details (taking into consideration the specifics of Soviet culture), and is now ready to carry out a number of international humanitarian projects. The Group calls on Western peace organizations to join in with the Group for Trust in realizing these programs dedicated to putting East-West relations on a more human level. The basic principles behind these proposed exchanges and projects can ben seen in, for example, the following project—an exchange of photo-documents between the Trust Group and any interested peace group in the West.

The Group for Trust would welcome any peace organization's decision to exhibit in Moscow photographs depicting the medical effects of nuclear weapons' use. For its part, the Group for Trust is ready to send for exhibit in the West photographs on any theme the partner in exchange feels would deserve attention and serve the cause of peace. (Possible themes of interest to the West might include photo-documents about people and life in the USSR.)

To facilitate holding an exhibit in Moscow , the Group for Trust would: provide space for the showing, prepare the exhibit from the materials sent, publicize it to the Western press, insure a large viewing among the Soviet public. For the same exhibit, the contributions from the Western side of the exchange would be to: prepare the materials to be sent, bring them to Moscow, introduce the exhibit during the first days of the showing (for this purpose, from one to three representatives would suffice), have information ready for distribution to the Soviet press.

The group cannot guarantee that the exhibit will not be closed by the KGB. At the same time, judging from past experience—as well as from familiarity with Soviet custom—the Group can guarantee that active participation in the exhibit by a Western organization will ensure the event a longer life than it would have enjoyed if conceived and carried out by the Group for Trust alone. Perhaps two weeks. Furthermore (also based on past experience) the Group can promise that, however many days the exhibit functions, it will be seen by thousands of Soviet citizens, and will send ripples through wide circles of the Moscow public, and many other cities. After Moscow, the exhibit will be sent to other Soviet cities.

Conditions for our half of the exchange may be outlined by the Western side.

According to analogous principles and guidelines, the Group for Trust proposes and is ready to realize the following humanitarian projects:

1) . . An exchange of exhibits of anti-war posters and graphic art.
2) . . An exchange of films.
3) . . A joint international exhibit of childrens' drawings on the theme of peace for showings in Moscow and Western capitals.
4) . . Exchange of slide shows on the themes of peace, disarmament, and life and culture in our two countries.
5) . . Jointly conducted public opinion polls on questions of peace and disarmament in the USSR and the West.
6) . . An exchange of lecturés on themes of peace, disarmament, and life in our two countries.
7) . . Expansion of our international seminars on questions of peace in Moscow.
8) . . Planting "peace gardens" in Moscow and in capital cities of Western countries.
9) . . An exchange of exhibits of family portraits, as well as pictures of ordinary citizens of the USSR and the West.
10) . . A "Peace Almanac": a joint publication of a collection of paintings, graphics, poetry, photography, and prose by young authors of the USSR and the West published simultaneously in Russian and English. For distribution in the USSR and the West.
11) . . Exchange of cultural centers: Soviet in the West; Western in the USSR.
12) . . Mass exchange of letters between citizens of the USSR and the West. The Group has thought of several ways to send letters which overcome the tendency of the Soviet mail system to not deliver mail.
13) . . Ten minutes of silent meditation, and reflection on peace, as a silent simultaneous demonstration to be held in the USSR, the West, and all over the world on January 1st, 1985, at 18:00 hours (6 P.M.) Greenwich Time.
14) . . Computer ties allowing discussions by computer between the USSR and the West.
15) . . Trans-continental chess matches between Soviets and Westerners by computer or phone.
16) . . Monuments to victims of nuclear testing; identical memorials to be erected in the capitals of all countries possessing nuclear weapons.
17) . . Joint public discussions to be held in parks of Moscow, New York, Paris, etc.; joint demonstrations . .
18) . . Joint publication of bulletins on questions of disarmament, in two languages, to be distributed in the USSR and the West.
19) . . Group peace discussions by telephone hook-up (allowing an entire audience to hear and participate at once).
20) . . Joint collection of signatures on petitions addressed to the leaders of the Superpowers on questions of: reductions of Soviet and American nuclear arsenals, renewal of negotiations on disarmament, bilateral conversion of military expenditures to the service of peaceful aims, measures aimed at the rapprochement of West and East on the governmental level, a halt to persecution of peace activists.

DIRECT QUESTIONS CONCERNING COORDINATION OF ACTIVITIES AND EXCHANGES, AS WELL AS REQUESTS FOR FURTHER INFORMATION TO:

SERGEI BATOVRIN (foreign representative of the Independent Peace Movement in the USSR)
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LATE NEWS:

ALEKSANDR SHATRAVKA ATTEMPTED TO KILL HIMSELF BECAUSE OF BEATINGS AND TORTURES IN THE LABOR CAMP. IN DESPERATION HE HAD STABBED HIMSELF WITH A KNIFE. SHATRAVKA WAS PUT IN THE PRISON HOSPITAL AND WAS WARNED THAT HE WILL FACE AN EXTENTION OF HIS SENTENCE IF HE WILL SURVIVE.

SUPPORTERS: THEY WISH TO CORRESPOND

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KIRIL POPOV: USSR, MOSCOW, UL. GARIBALDY, DOM 17, KORP. 4, KV.48
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PEOPLE WHO STARTED THE INDEPENDENT PEACE MOVEMENT IN USSR

LEFT TO RIGHT:BATOVRIN, REITMAN, V.FLEISHGAKKER M. FLEISHGAKKER, BRODSKY,YU.MEDVEDKOV,GODYAK, OLGA MEDVEDKOVA WITH HER SON MISHA.

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POST-CARD DESIGNED BY FORMER SOVIET POLITICAL PRISONER LEONID LAMM

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THE GROUP FOR ESTABLISHING TRUST 2



DOCUMENT

APPEAL TO THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE USSR AND THE USA

The Moscow Group for the Establishment of Trust Between the USSR and the USA proposes that the governments of both countries enter into talks on the removal of their armed forces from the territories of all other countries. The ultimate goal of such talks would be the conclusion of bi-lateral agreements obliging the Superpowers to remove, within a reasonable time period, their armed forces from foreign territories, after which time the presence of armed forces beyond one's territory would be considered equivalent to an act of armed intervention.

We see the positive impact of such an accord in at least the following three areas:

1. Such an agreement would, in effect, be equivalent to an arms control agreement, if not in a quantitative sense, then at least in a territorial sense.

2. In practice it would virtually eliminate the possibility of a nuclear war starting as the result of a regional conflict in one of the countries of the third world.

3. Its acceptance would facilitate the establishment of trust since:

   a. the presence of the armed forces of the Superpowers beyond their own borders is actively used by the mass media in order to point to the aggressiveness of the (other) country;

   b. any territorial increase in the deployment area of the armed forces of one of the powers meets with extreme hostility from the other side;

   c. (given realization of such an agreement), in order to influence the course of events in countries of the third world, the Superpowers would be obliged to try to find a common perspective, and to act within the framework of the armed forces of the U.N. or by means of other methods provided for by agreements.

We would welcome support for this (proposed) agreement from countries that are permanent members of the U.N. Security Council, and also from any other countries.

August 6, 1983

MOSCOW TRUST GROUP

Nikolai Khramov between arrests

KHRAMOV KIDNAPPED INTO ARMY, THEN ARRESTED

On October 24, an activist of the Group for Trust, NIKOLAI KHRAMOV was seized on the street in Moscow and taken to an unknown destination. This happened three days before he was to appear at the military commisariat for draft procedures. It was assumed that on October 27 NIKOLAI KHRAMOV would anounce to the draft board his refusal to enter military service. However, on October 24 he was kidnaped. Later it became known that on the same day he was taken to the airport and forcibly sent on a plane to a military base in the soviet Far East where he refused to carry out orders and to hold a weapon in his hands. Under this charge he was arrested several days later. KHRAMOVS actions did not contradict Soviet law since he had previously been exempted from military service due to extremely poor vision. Furthermore he was taken to a military base without having gone through draft procedures.

NIKOLAI KHRAMOV was constantly harassed and arrested since joining the Moscow Trust Group in May 1984. His kidnapping and illegal induction into the army, and subsequent arrest is no doubt planned by KGB as a lesson to those young people who are now by the thousands joining independent peace activities in the USSR. NIKOLAI KHRAMOV is faced with seven years in prison camps.

UPDATE UPDATE UPDATE

PEACE MARCH 1984

During the week of August 5-9, the Trust Group intended to conduct a Peace March in the suburbs of Moscow in memory of Hiroshima Day. Approximately 400 people expressed a desire to participate in the March. The program prepared for the March included rallies and speeches on the topic of the consequences of the use of nuclear weapons, lectures, seminars, and distribution of antinuclear literature to local residents along the route the march was to take.

The Peace March was to conclude with an anti-nuclear festival on August 9th, Nagasaki Day. Rock musicians had prepared a concert, photographers and artists had prepared an art exhibit, actors had prepared a performance; and all this was to take place in the woods near Moscow. It took 3 months to prepare for the March. People had written songs and poems especially for the occasion, hand-made buttons, posters, and painted tee-shirts had all been prepared. The participants of the March also planned to hand out to passers-by flower seeds and literature from Western peace and Anti-nuke groups. On the basis of past experience collecting signatures on the streets of Moscow, the participants of the March expected that residents of the sub-

...e of the 88 paintings
...Batovrin confiscated
...on Hiroshima Day

urbs of Moscow would also join the March. During its public activities the Group has always met with sympathy from ordinary citizens.

Organizers of the March had planned to meet at the apartment of Maria and Vladimir Fleishgacker, activists of the Trust Group, on August 3 to make final preparations.

On August 3rd, in the courtyard of the Fleishgacker's home, the 36 organizers of the Peace March were arrested as they were gathering for the meeting. The house was surrounded by KGB agents and police. Those arrested were placed in various police stations and subjected to threats and interrogation. Vladimir Brodsky and Kirill Popov, for example, were threatened with a forced placement in a psychiatric hospital. (The KGB made good on their promise to Kirill Popov after only two weeks.) The KGB agent in charge of the operation shouted at those being held: "What's the point in talking with them? The only way to reeducate these guys is with a machine gun!" The agents declared that, under the guise of peace activity, "drug dealers" were gathering at the Fleishgacker's home, adding that the Fleishgackers would "soon be standing before a judge."

The majority of those arrested on August 3rd were released after 2 days. Several were placed under house arrest. The Peace March which had been planned was ruined. Vladimir and Maria Fleishgacker, together with their 10 month old daughter, Elena, were placed under house arrest beginning August 3.

On August 8, in Moscow, nearly 50 participants of the Independent Peace Movement were arrested while attempting to attend a seminar on Hiroshima Day. Vladimir and Maria Fleishgacker, at whose apartment the seminar was supposed to have taken place, had been under house arrest since August 3. In many ways, the arrests of August 8 were reminiscent of the arrests from the week before. Among the peace activists arrested were Alexsander Rubchenko, Vladimir Brodsky, Marina Cherdakova and Kirill Popov. KGB demanded that the arrested sign a written pledge not to commemorate Hiroshima Day and to not attend seminars at the Fleishgackers. No one signed. They were threatened with beatings, prison sentences, and forced internment in a psychiatric hospital. "We'll create such a Hiroshima for you that you'll envy the victims of Hiroshima!" Some were beaten up even as they were being arrested. Others were beaten at the police station. The majority were released after interrogation.

■■■■■

THE SOVIET AUTHORITIES "STRONGLY SUGGESTED" THAT THE FLEISHGACKERS LEAVE THE USSR

■THEY LEFT NOV. 14...

Starting in August, the home of the Fleishgackers was almost constantly surrounded by KGB agents. In this way, the KGB tried to put an end to the weekly anti-nuclear seminars which were conducted at the Fleishgackers' apartment since March 1984. (This is one of the regular weekly seminars conducted by the Trust Group in Moscow.)

Since the beginning of August a number of interrogations have taken place in Moscow during which KGB agents demand from those being questioned any information that can be used against Vladimir Fleishgacker.

Twenty-nine year old chemical engineer Vladimir Fleishgacker and his wife, also a chemical engineer, Maria Fleishgacker (age thirty), were both among the founders of the Moscow Trust Group. After the announcement on June 4, 1982, of the existence of the Independent Peace Movement in the USSR, both have been subjected to constant and intensive harassment. Already on the seventh day of the Group's existence Vladimir Fleishgacker was arrested, interrogated, received a warning by the public prosecutor and was placed for three weeks under house arrest. Subsequently both were repeatedly dismissed from their jobs and subjected to house arrests, unconcealed twenty four hour surveillance, numerous arrests, detainments, threats, interrogations, and brief fifteen day prison sentences. (Maria Fleishgacker - once; Vladimir Fleishgacker - twice).

Vladimir Fleishgacker was arrested and imprisoned for fifteen days during the destruction by KGB agents of the exhibit of photo-documents about the activity of the Western Anti-nuclear Movement, which the Trust Group was trying to hold in February 1983. During the imprisonment, for six days they refused to give him food and he was regularly denied sleep. The second time Vladimir Fleishgacker was arrested was in September 1983. Police officials seized him from his home while he was seriously ill. His wife Maria was in her ninth month of pregnancy at the time. She gave birth to a daughter, Elena, on the fifth day of her husband's arrest.

Excerpts from documents about the hard times of the Fleishgackers:



Fleishgakkers and Khramov

". . . It took them 30 minutes to break down the door. When the police burst in, a man in civilian clothes who later identified himself as police captain Alferov seized Fleishgacker by the throat shouting 'I'll throttle this swine' and began to choke him."

". . . Maria Fleishgacker was detained in front of the apartment of Sergei Batovrin, who was under house arrest at the time, and was taken to the 114th department of the police, where for three hours they tried to interrogate and threaten her - 'And are you aware that we're in a Cold War now? And do you know that calls for peace during a war are punishable right up to execution by firing squad? Well, we hope that it won't come to that.'"

". . . Beginning July 15, Vladimir Fleishgacker was under 'demonstrative' surveillance; six - eight persons, men and women, day and night, on foot and in cars accompanied him everywhere, not letting him free for one step. They pushed him and threatened him. When he attempted to run they caught him and, having twisted his arms behind his back, took him off to the police department where they held him for three hours and warned: 'If you try to run we'll

break your arms and legs. This first surveillance continued until October 1982; the same process was repeated on many occasions." "Maria Fleishgacker took part in group activities right up until the day of giving birth. On September 29, she took part in readings of anti-war literature

On October 2 she gave birth. On October 13, Maria was arrested with her 11 day old daughter, Elena, and Vladimir, who had been released from prison just the day before. The arrest took place one half kilometer from the court house where Oleg Radzinsky's trial was beginning. The three were escorted to the 103rd police precinct.

EXCERPTS FROM DOCUMENTS

"... On June 20, at 12:30, I, Vladimir Fleishgakker, tried to go to vote. Plainclothesmen blocked my way. They refused to show me any documents. They forced me into a car and drove me to the 70th police precinct where I was detained for 5 hours. The police refused to explain on what grounds they had prevented me from exercising my constitutional right to vote. However they informed me that KGB men were blockading my apartment. After this I was driven home and again placed in a blockaded apartment..." From V.Fleishgakker's statement to the Zhdanov Procurator's office.

"... Your statement about the activities of the 70th precinct police were checked out. Neither on the 20th of June nor on any other dates in June of 1982 were you taken to that division..." The Zhdanov Procurator's answer.

■■■■■

KHRAMOV'S SECOND ARREST

On August 3 in Moscow, Group for Trust activist, Nikolai Khramov was arrested in his apartment and sentenced

Continued p.18

Aleksandr Shatravka, an activist of the independent peace organization Group to Establish Trust, is serving a 3-year sentence for disseminating peace proposals. He has been in a prison hospital recovering from a knife wound; Shatravka tried to commit suicide as a result of repeated beatings and torture inflicted upon him in the prison camp. Prison camp authorities have warned him that the period of his incarceration may be lengthened by an additional five years. If he leaves the hospital alive, that is.

The aspects of Aleksandr Shatravka's life in prison camp that induced him to attempt suicide have become known through a letter he wrote to friends. This letter had a long and difficult course before it reached its destination. Now the tragic circumstances of Shatravka's life in camp can be made known.

Shatravka writes: "I want to make known what kind of situation I am in as a prisoner. Remaining silent about this any longer would be stupid, for continued silence will make the prison workers even more unrestrained in their treatment of prisoners."

Shatravka's letter is a chronological record made up of bits of information testifying to his experience in prison camp. Behind his spare words is the painful and horrible experience of a prisoner whose only "wrongdoing" consisted of appealing for worldwide disarmament and having contacts with people for the cause of peace. His testimony about life in prison camp begins with a short account of his arrival in camp No. I 58-3 located in Kazakhstan:

"I arrived at the camp on February 3, 1984, in perfect health. On February 4, they took us, a new group of 36 men, to the Camp Correctional Clinic, where 'prisoner-activists' with the permission of prison camp authorities control everything. From the first day there they beat us, taking us one at a time or in groups of five. On February 4, I was kicked merely because I could not lift my feet high enough (30 centimenters) in the marching drill (this was after being in prison 19 months). I was summoned to prison camp headquarters on February 7 and subjected to a degrading interrogation by prison officials."

The prison camp in which Aleksandr Shatravka was confined was not an ordinary one. Aware that Shatravka was a stalwart pacifist, the KGB put him in a camp where elements of military regimentation and army discipline are prevalent, and where punishments have a military slant. It has been learned from sources other than Shatravka's letter that from the very beginning of his time in prison camp, authorities forbade him to tell other prisoners why he was imprisoned and what the charges against him were. Prison authorities threatened to try him for "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda" if he did not conceal the essence of the official accusations on the basis of which he was sentenced. When the KGB learned that the text of his sentence had been published in the West,

ALEXANDR SHATRAVKA:

"...I HAVE DECIDED THAT I MUST NOT KEEP QUIET ABOUT IT ANY LONGER..."

the following took place: "On February 8, the head of camp operation work, Senior Lieutenant Dulatbaev, summoned me to prison camp headquarters. In his office I was severely beaten for taking documents relating to my trial. The documents had been composed by the Office of the Procurator in the village of Soviet. Dulatbaev dragged me by the ears and banged my head against the wall. My face was livid from the beating. During all this, Dulatbaev kept saying that he was ready to kill me and cut me into pieces. He called me a traitor and other demeaning names. Then they shut me up in a penal isolation cell where I remained for two days and became very sick. From the 13th to the 27th of February, I was in the camp hospital suffering from pneumonia. And then as early as March 4, I was forced with all the others to stand outside at the command of "at ease" without a hat or warm clothing for more than 3 hours. It was dark out, there was a strong wind, and snow was coming down. The camp administdration had ordered this as a punishment . . . In February a young member of our group, Pavel Latsko, age 21, died. He was healthy when he arrived at the prison camp with us."

Aleksandr Shatravka gives the following description of his every-day life: "Since March 14 I have been in Detachment 9. It is over-loaded with prisoners so that we have to sleep three to a bed. A cult of violence rages in the prison camp. Prisoners are beaten for any trifle. Beatings are especially common for not fulfilling work norms. . . . There are also combat exercizes that often take the form of punishments. After work, they make us stand at attention on a marching field and then they order us to stand at ease. They make us raise our legs for several minutes, first the left leg, then the right. Whoever can't do it gets beaten. In the Camp Correctional Clinic I was made to stand with my head against the wall and my arms spread over the wall in such a way that there was a lot of pressure on my head. I stood that way for a long time in severe cold."

Much time in prison camp is spent on slave labor. Aleksandr Shatravka describes his work as follows: "I wound up in Brigade 94 assigned to making nylon nets for vegetables. The work quota was six nets in eight hours. We worked from 6:00 p.m. to 10:00 a.m. The quota was very high. Most of had to work during the time set aside for sleep. For not meeting the work quota the brigade leader several times took away our time for sleep, making us work during those hours. When another prisoner and I spoke out about this to the brigade leader, I was sent to the captain of brigade leaders, Dosnatov, who regarded my complaint as anti-Soviet agitation. As he put it, I live in the USSR and not in the USA, and while I am in the USSR, I am to make nets and shut up. Those of us who did not fulfill the work quota were usually beaten by the boss of our detachment, Nazarov, who was also a prisoner. He acted with the authorization of

the prison camp administration, which had ordered, "the quota is six nets --get it done!" After Nazarov, Dosnatov would beat us. Many times I appealed to the prison camp administration with a request to be transferred to any other work. Each time my request was denied."

Working 16 hours a day and sometimes back-to-back shifts of such length seemed to be insufficient punishment to the prison camp administration. The torture of being deprived of sleep became frequent for Aleksandr Shatravka: "From the seven of March they put me under surveillance. There were checks every two hours supposedly because I was 'inclined to escape'". In practice, that meant that after working 16 hours through the night, Shatravka had to wake up every hour and a half and go to mark down on a piece of paper that he still had not run away. This was his regimen during the day when he was supposed to be entitled to sleep. Anyone who has seen what a camp looks like --the three rows of barbed-wire fences, the towers manned by guards with machine guns, the broad tract of empty land surrounding the camp -- knows that the mere thought of escape is ludicrous.

In the letter, Aleksandr Shatravka describes the circumstances that led him to attempt suicide: "On May 31, 1984, the assistant to the director of our detachment called me into his office. He locked the door and began to beat me badly. He knocked the wind out of me. He kicked me in the groin and then in the face. Then he went on beating me for a long time. He let me know that I would now be given this treatment every day until I met the work quota (which was made undoable in advance). After leaving the assistant's office, I met with the prison camp director, Colonel Bakhaev. He refused to transfer me to other work . . . With my nerves wracked and seeing no way out of my situation I stabbed myself in the side with a knife."

Had the situation gone far enough for the prison camp administrators? No, it wouldn't do. It did not suit them that Shatravka was still alive. In the letter, Shatravka describes in a few words what happened after his suicide attempt: "After the attempt to kill myself, medical help was denied to me. I ended up in the hands of Dulatbaev, deputy to the prison camp director. He knew the most vulnerable spots on a person's body. He began to beat me. He hit me on the neck, making me fall and lose consciousness. Later, he slapped me on the ears with both hands and choked me. He kicked me and punched me in the most painful spots --in the kidneys and in places where other body organs are. As he assaulted me he insulted me verbally. After all that, they put me in a punishment cell where I stayed for 15 days. In spite of the filth, the lice, the scant food and the limited ration of water, I had what might be called a psychological rest. All that had happened to me resembled a film about torture in a fascist camp or the Gestapo. When I got out of the punishment cell, I began to cough blood. I spit up a lot of blood. Doctors said it was aggravated pneumonia. Thanks to the doctors, I am now in the camp hospital. But my condition is still alarming, seeing as in the prison camp, tuberculosis is a large percentage of all the illnesses.

That's how things stand with me. I have decided that I must not keep quiet about it any longer. Letters do not reach me, except those from home. How things will go for me in camp from now on I do not know. They constantly threaten to lengthen my sentence."

It is not known exactly when this letter was written. The Trust Group received it at the end of August. What is happening now with Aleksandr Shatravka, whether he is alive or not, is not known.

Remember: by refusing to remain silent, by writing this letter to friends who are free, Aleksandr Shatravka has risked his life. His life depends on your protesting today! The five minutes that you spend writing a letter of protest to Soviet authorities could save the life of a fighter for peace. Shatravka has devoted his life to the cause of our living in a world at peace. The time has come for everyone to devote five minutes of his life to Shatravka!

ALEXANDR SHATRAVKA'S LETTER TO PEACE SUPPORTERS

April 1984

"My dear friends. I am happy to greet you and send you my best wishes. I am deeply grateful for the great moral support you have given me by fighting for my release. As regards my imprisonment for activities connected with the Trust Group and for my membership in that group, I can only consider it a gross violation of Soviet criminal law and basic rights.

Since my arrest, those who work in the Office of the Procurator and in investigative agencies, workers in hospital isolation wards, professors in the Serbsky Institute of Forensic Psychiatry, and currently, workers in the correctional labor camp, often ask me the same questions: 'Why do you do such work? Do you really think that our Party and government give too little attention to the problems of preserving peace and controlling the arms race?' Yes, they pay attention to these problems, but I cannot concede that the defense of peace is only a matter for the leaders of the State.

To admit guilt now would be to refuse to work for peace, to remain passive toward the problem of keeping peace on our planet. Therefore, admitting guilt would be a repudiation of my beliefs in these matters. I would consider such a repudiation an immoral act. Far from repudiating my membership in the Moscow Trust Group, I am proud of it. No prison bars have the force to break my beliet in the rightness of my goal, which is the attainment of peace and trust between the Soviet and American governments and between the people of the Soviet Union and the United States."

Aleksandr Shatravka

HE HAS DEDICATED HIS WHOLE LIFE TO OPPOSING THE WAR MACHINE

In 1971, Shatravka refused to serve in the army because of his pacifist convictions. For his refusal, he was put in a psychiatric hospital. In 1973, he was drafted once again and once more refused to serve in the army. This time he was put in a psychiatric hospital and forcibly subjected to treatment with large doses of levomepromazine. He was given shock treatment with sulfazine, which is a prohibited form of treatment.

(Sulfazine causes shock and puts the patient into a coma; when the patient comes out of the coma and convulsions end, there is unbearable pain, and body temperature fluctuates drastically.) Upon his release from the psychiatric hospital, Shatravka was given three choices: again being committed to a psychiatric hospital, going to prison for refusing military service, or entering the army. Seeing no way out of the situation, he resolved to flee the country.

On June 11, 1974, Aleksandr Shatravka and his brother Mikhail succeeded in crossing the zone of dangerious barriers on the Finnish-Soviet border. They turned up on Finnish territory and headed on foot through the Finnish forests toward Sweden. Already far from the Finnish-Soviet border, deep in Finnish territory, they were arrested on July 14 by Finnish border-guards who had been hunting for them. The Finns handed them over to Soviet authorities. Aleksandr and Mikhail were put in the Dnepropetrovsk Special Psychiatric Hospital. They were forced to undergo a "cure" with psychotropic medication (in particular, Aleksandr received large doses of levomepromazine, chlorpromazine, and chloroproteksin) and subjected to other torments as well. Two years later, Aleksandr Shatravka was transferred from the Dnepropetrovsk hospital to the Chernyakhovsky Special Psychiatric Hospital. His brother Mikhail was released in 1978, but as a result of the torturous treatment with psychotropic medication his mental health was undermined; he began to hear things and suffer from bouts of depression.

Aleksandr Shatravka was released from the psychiatric hospital in 1979. By virtue of his hearty constitution, five years in a psychiatric hospital did not damage his psyche. The psychiatrist and dissident Dr. A. Voloshanovich, a consulant to the independent Moscow Working Commission to Investigate the Use of Psychiatry for Political Purposes (a group broken up after two years by the KGB) examined Shatravka in 1979 and found no symptoms of past or present mental disorder.

Immediately after his release in 1979, Shatravka began writing a book about his experiences and about the experience of political prisoners whom he met in the psychiatric hospitals. He entitled the book Out of the Belly of the Cannibal. In 1980, the unfinished 400-page manuscript turned up in samizdat and then made it to the West. (The manuscript has not yet been published in the West, although it has been highly regarded by experts.) Meanwhile, articles by Shatravka began appearing in samizdat.

In October 1979, several months after his release from the psychiatric hospital, Aleksandr Shatravka was summoned by the KGB in the city of Krivoy Rog. During the interrogation, they threatened to confine him again in a psychiatric hospital. When he returned home from the interrogation, medical orderlies arrived for him in an ambulance. He noticed it coming and managed to get away.

In May 1980, a samizdat copy of his book was confiscated when the KGB arrested and searched Tatyana Osipova, a member of the Moscow Helsinki Watch Group. Shatravka was summoned to a psychiatric hospital for an "examination." To hide from them, Shatravka took summer work in the taiga. In July, three unidentified men showed up in the taiga region where Shatravka was working, looking for him. He eluded them and fled to Moscow, where he went into hiding. When it became dangerous for him to stay in Moscow, he set out for Karelia with the hope of hiding from the KGB by taking work in the Karelian forests. He was arrested on the train on the way to Karelia on September 12, 1980. KGB agents took him off the train and tried to kill him, beating him in the face

and on the head with a hammer. He tried to protect his head with his hands and his hands were smashed. A stroke of luck saved him: workers inspecting train rails saw what was happened and rushed to help him. The KGB agents, worried about unnecessary witnesses, left Shatravka and ran off.

With fractured hands and other serious injuries, Shatravka was taken to the hospital. On September 17, 1980, KGB agents appeared at the hospital, took Shatravka out, and brought him to a psychiatric hospital in Murmansk. There, Shatravka underwent forced "treatment" with psychotropic drugs. He was released from the Murmansk hospital on October 16, 1980, with his injuries (suffered in the KGB assault) still unhealed. Only when he reached home did a doctor discover that his hand had been broken not in one, but in two places. Shatravka was again forced to enter a psychiatric hospital on October 24, 1980. This time, they let him go at the end of November 1980. The whole time, under difficult circumstances, he continued his literary work, writing articles and stories, which were later published in samizdat and in the West.

While he was visiting friends in Moscow in the summer of 1981, police, medical orderlies, and an ambulance came for him. While they were breaking down the door, Shatravka jumped out of the third-story window. This time he succeeded in hiding from them, concealing himself by lying on the overhanging above the entranceway.

In the winter and spring of 1982, Shatravka took an active part in creating the first independent peace organization in the USSR -- the Moscow Trust Group. In addition, he was one of the authors of "An Appeal to the Governments and Peoples of the USSR and the USA," the Trust Group's first declaration of their intent and function. In May of 1980, two weeks before a press conference in the apartment of Sergei Batovrin, at which the establishment of the Trust Group was announced, Aleksandr Shatravka left Moscow to work in the taiga in the Tyumen Oblast of Siberia. He hoped to organize a similar peace group among the workers there.

On the 14th of July, 1982, Aleksandr Shatravka and a friend, Vladimir Mishchenko, were arrested in Tyumen Oblast and accused of trying to collect signatures for the Trust Group's peace proposals. In December 1982, Shatravka was taken from prison in Tyumen to the Serbsky Institute of Forensic Psychiatry in Moscow. On this occasion, a group of experts pronounced his mental health perfect (luckily for Shatravka, at the time of his examination, the USSR, under the pressure of accusations of using psychiatry for political purposes, announced its withdrawal from the International Psychiatric Association; world attention was attracted by the question.) Back in prison in Tyumen on January 1, 1983, authorities found a letter in Shatravka's cell addressed to an anti-nuclear group in the West. Shatravka was taken to a prison yard, stripped naked, and beaten with clubs.

On April 23, 1983, his trial took place in the Siberian village of Soviet. Shatravka received the maximum sentence for the offense with which he was charged: three years in labor camp. Vladimir Mishchenko was sentenced to one year of labor camp.

After 19 months of imprisonment, Shatravka was transferred on February 3, 1984, to prison camp I 58-3 in Kazakhstan. Since that time, he has been subject to regular beating and torture in the prison camp.

EXCERPTS FROM THE COURT TESTIMONY OF A COMMISSION OF EXPERTS

1. Appealing to the Soviet people "over the head' of the Party and government amounts to discrediting the government. . . .

2. In the document "An Appeal to the Governments and Peoples of the USSR and the USA," the Communist Party of the Soviet Union is equated with political parties in the United States . . . equal responsibility is attributed to both . . . "

3. "The appeal to unite social forces in a struggle for peace is a harmful cosmopolitan doctine. . . ."

4. Authors of the document "An Appeal. . . " slander the actual policy of the USSR, the government of the USSR, and the leadership of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, when they declare that, "it is completely clear that politicians on both sides are incapable in the near future of reaching an agreement on any noteworthy reduction of arms; they are even more incapable of reaching an agreement on substantial disarmament" . . . .

5. The foreign orientation of the document "An Appeal. . . " undermines the authority of the Soviet state and its leadership in the eyes of thosed international forces that are regarded by the Soviet leadership as reserves in the struggle against imperialism and militarism and can be effectively used in such a way."

Members of the commission of experts:

Prof. G.V. Ignatenko of the R.A. Rudenko Institute; Prof. K.N. Lyubishkin, Dept. of History and Philosophy of the State University of the Urals; Prof. G.P. Orlov, Dept. of Historical Materialism of the State University of the Urals; Prof. G.F. Kutsev, Rector of Tyumen University; Asst. Prof. V.A. Danilov, Dept. of History of Tyumen State University.

Chernyakhovsky special psychiatric hospital

EXCERPTS FROM THE SENTENCE OF SHATRAVKA AND MISHCHENKO:

"... In June and July of 1982, Shatravka and Mishchenko, in collusion with one another beforehand, having the intention of disseminating deliberately false ideas that denigrate the Soviet political and social system, acquainted workers with the document 'An Appeal to the Governments and Peoples of the USSR and the USA.' This document is of an anti-Soviet nature and maintains positions that denigrate the Soviet political and social system, the foreign policy of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and the Soviet State. The document contains an appeal to create independent social groups in the USSR for the organization of a dialogue between the USSR and the USA. This means creating groups separate from the struggle for the salvation of humanity that the Party and the government leads. . . ."

"... In addition, in 1980, with the intention of deliberately using false ideas to denigrate the Soviet system, Mishchenko carved with an ax on the log wall of the cottage where he lived the following inscription: 'The USSR is the prison of peoples."

"... On the basis of what has been said in summary form the court has resolved to mete out the following sentences:"

"Aleksandr Ivanovich Shatravka, found guilty under Article 190-1 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic, is sentenced to three years of imprisonment with confinement to a correctional labor camp."

"Vladimir Stepanovich Mishchenko, found guilty under Article 190-1 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic, is sentenced to one year of imprisonment with confinement in a correctional labor camp. The material evidence --the piece of timber with the inscription 'the USSR is the prison of peoples' --is to be destroyed as soon as the sentence goes into effect."

Khanty-Mansiisky District Court, Village of Soviet, Tyument Oblast, Judge T.I. Kondakov, Jurors L.I. Sukhareva, P.P. Basov.



Drawing by Leonid Lamm

WORKING FOR THE FREEDOM OF A PEACEWORKER IS A WORK OF PEACE!

IN SEARCH OF THE PEACE FORMULA



The Moscow group for establishing trust between the USSR and the USA was created in June 1982. It proclaimed building trust in the world as its main goal: well intentioned treaties are of no use without trust between states and peoples. The talks between nations about the number of missiles are also doomed without this component; for instance, the NATO Cruise missiles cannot be either counted by a potential enemy, (they are too small), or checked (their radar image is like the image of a sea-gull), or intercepted (they fly too close to the earth surface).

The group has collected, discussed and released many positive peace-building proposals (some of them are already realized now). Moreover, the group maintains personal contacts with several dozens of Western peace organizations and has conducted some exhibits and lectures. These kinds of activities are well known to the public. Here we want to emphasize another direction of the group's activity which is not broadly known: scientific peace research.

The use of research is a matter of some debate: some experts think that the subject is too shapeless to be expressed by formuli and syllogisms, that its scientific character is too artificial or even speculative. This is partially true: the subject is less structured than physics and even economics. But one must not exagerate the level of rigor in some branches of physics (for instance, in seismology or meteorology). And one must not underestimate the level of structurization of some humanitarian problems (including the problems of peace when they accord with conclusions achieved by common sense; say, the opinion that the present level of nuclear arms in the world is too high to provide secure deterrence. The problem was broadly discussed at the seminar of the group.

The seminar cycle was opened by an educational report by M. Reitman on the application of mathematical techniques to the problems of peace. Several mathematical methods were observed including probability theory, game theory, and so on, in the publication of L. F. Richardson, T.L.Saaty, J.G.Lambelet et, D.Ruloff, H.Starr, B.A.Most, J.Hart, K.E.Boulding, T.Hoivik, R.P.Abelson, R.Axelrod, A.Isnard, W.Buckley , etc. The participants in the seminar were invited to participate in this research. M.Reitman devoted a special report to the works and person of L.F.Richardson (1881-1953) whose contribution to peace science (as well as to computational methods and meteorology)was dramatically underestimated by his contemporary colleagues.

The seminar did not concentrate only on mathematical aspects: one of the reports dealt with the book "The Fate of the Earth" by J.Shell (the report was brilliantly developed by Yu.Medvedkov, a geographer and a member of the group. Due to the report, the participants of the seminar were led to the ideas of one of the most prominent thinkers in the field of peace defence. The report caused a fruitful discussion since the listeners felt that Soviet thinking needed a different approach to some peace problems.

As a rule, the researchers were newcomers in the field, but they had been working earlier with similar problems. For example, M.Reitman who has experience in the field of applied mathematics and computer science tried to analyse some optimization problems in peace defence. First he considered the control problem for disarmament in a two country system: one wants to find an optimal way from one level to another arms level in a minimal time. The system was described by the two Richardson differential equations in which the control variables were inserted. The Pontryagin maximum principle has been used to find the optimal level of human migration between two countries so that the level of migration is the single control variable. Two qualitative conclusions were drawn from the studies: 1) the arms levels could not be defined arbitrarily, they must be solutions of the Richardson equations, since they are phase, not control variables; 2) in some cases, the optimal path in the phase space demands the growth of arms on one side of the conflict. This can explain failures in some disarmament talks from the point of control theory. They may be an attempt to control phase variables directly and neglect the control variables.

Another communication of M.Reitman was devoted to the optimal level of nuclear arms in the world as a whole under criterion of minimal discounted integral war probability for the future starting at the present time. Using the calculus of variations, the author has shown that the optimal level of nuclear arms is not nil. It should be estimated by a formula, since the nil arms level is dangerous from the point of deliberate start of war, however too high a level threatens an accidental start. The optimum lies much lower than the present state and appeals for disarmament. The solution shows how nuclear deterrence could be replaced by the peace movement. This is in contradiction with the belief of many peace movement participants who think that the level must be nil a priori, so that the paper was rejected by them.

Another study of the same author has proposed a way of optimal planning of the peaceful activity of an independant peace group. The criterion of lowering of the "hostility index" by a set of peaceful actions (meetings, manifestations, appeals, personal contacts with foreign colleagues, etc). The optimum must meet a set of the resource constraints of the group (people, money, phones, etc). The problem is reduced to the linear programming problem; that gives a sense to some mathematical statements. The approaches mentioned could be considered as the three levels of a hierarchy system.

L.Dudkin, an eminent Soviet economist, developed the study of an economically ideal society which brings an internal peaceful economy to a stable state. The examples of the Marxist simple and extended reproductions patterns for the economy have been discussed and compared with the existant economic systems (capitalist, socialist - Soviet-like and Hungarian-like).

Some reports of the seminar participants were unfinished, but preliminarily delivered to the seminar. These cases were the result of members leaving the group. A programmer was developing a probabilistic type model for conflict between two states. The conflict involved both military and economic matters inside the countries. The work was not yet finished by 5 January 1983 - the day the author left the group. In a similar way, an interesting work by a pair of researchers on the semantics of political texts from the point of view of war and peace was not polished up.

The developments discussed were rather academic, since they did not give

direct profit to the peace movements. As a successful result, they usually offered ways to support some peaceful trends which were already quite clear from mere common sense. But one research field was evidently fruitful and practical. It was recently conducted by the whole group under the methodical guidance of L.Dudkin and dealt with conversion of the world militarized economy and military personnel onto peaceful tracks.

Peace between the Superpowers was never so stable as during the development and the realisation of the "Appollo-Soyuz" project. The key precondition of the project was the participation of the military personnel of two Superpowerswers - this fact made the project a real example of conversion. As a result, the project contributed more to the security of both states than the projects SS-20 and Pershing II combined. The problem is how to find many such projects. This suggests a need to re-evaluate some already rejected projects, for instance the project of the dam and power station in the Bering straits. It is not efficient from the point of pure economy. But it can force the USA and the USSR to work together many years using their military personnel and resources which otherwise would be spent on deadly missiles. Finally the existence of the common real estate will make the superpowers more cautious and strengthen peace on Earth.

Two members of the group, V.Brodsky and I.Sobkov, devoted their reports at the seminar to the links between the fear of war and prewar troubles on the one hand, and cardiovascular and psychological diseases on the other. They presented and discussed the published data in this field and provided proofs of the "indirect damage to health" caused by war, even if it does not break out and causes no "direct damage". The research, when finished, should be an interesting addition to the works of the Soviet and American associations "Doctors for Peace" which were predominantly devoted to the study of the direct damage of war.

All the authors mentioned were members of the "Trust Group". But sometimes out-of-group donors were invited. Moreover, not all the reports were directly linked with war and peace: in some cases the message of a communication was to learn something from tangential fields or from problems which are challenging nuclear war as the main trouble-maker for mankind. For example, V.Soyfer, a biologist, submitted a report on the "Ominous Power of Mutations". The problem is that mankind will perish in 15-20 generations due to dangerous mutations, if we neither identify nor find a way to counter them. In the subsequent lively discussion, the author could not convince the participants of the seminar that this trouble may rival the threat of nuclear holocaust: certainly, mankind in its present situation has no 15-20 generations at its disposal (400-500 years). But the participants came to the conclusion that such reports are sometimes useful, since they serve as a catalyst for thinking.

The personal meetings with foreign colleagues in peace science were very spontaneous and rare, although the seminar was often visited by non-scholar activists of the Western peace movement. Only once in one and a half years the seminar was presented with a talk by a British colleague S. (we are not sure that he wants to be mentioned) on the dangers of the various neclear strategies of the NATO rulers and in favour of unilateral nuclear disarmament.

The trend towards using highly structurized approaches (for instance, mathematical) to peace research was defined by the professional backgrounds of the seminar participants. It does not mean that the humanitarian aspects of peace defence were ruled out in either educational or research fields. Since the begining of the group, one participant has been studying the expression of peace motives in some novels by Kurt Vonnegut and Chingiz Aitmatov (a popular contemporary Soviet writer from the Central Asian Republic of Kirghiziac). But this research was interupted by the arrest and accusation of the researcher formally not linked with this activity

Another approach to this theme was recently given by M.Reitman and backed by the compositions of Euripidus (480-406 B.C.) and F.M. Dostoyevsky (1821-1879). Both authors were highly interested in the problems of war and peace. But while the first one was, in some way, a founder of present day pacifism, the second was a typical representative of the ideology of Russian-Tsarist militarism and chauvinism. It was shown that the controversy between these two principles in literature has been represented in all epochs of human civilisation and was first documented by a poetic duel between the Greek authors Homer and Gesiodus (7th century before Christ) - the first praised war heroes, the second praised peace-loving peasants. In later times as well, military issues have been more conspicuous, talented and attractive than peaceful ones - that is the whole problem!

The sessions of the seminar gathered at the private apartments of the participants, mostly without any troubles. Only several times, out of about thirty sessions, the houses were blocked by the militia and by plainclothesmen; they were polite and recommended the people go home without any explanation. Probably they did not know the explanation themselves (once a plainclothesman mentioned a "law seminar", although the problems of law or human rights were never discussed at the seminar).

The audience of the seminar (6-20 people strong) has now changed. New people have come and brought new ideas substituting the tired, the exiled and those who were losing the nerve. We want to continue both trends of the seminar - the mathematical and the humanitarian ones. Moreover, we hope to maintain personal contacts with Western scientists in this field of research, to hear their views and to exchange thoughts.

Our attempts to establish contacts with the Academy of Science of the USSR

Peace-research organiser Dr. Mark Reitman

were not successful. We sent some letters there and a paper, but we did not receive a reply. It seems the messages went to another address...

At last, wishing to encourage our Western and Eastern colleagues, scientists, scholars and writers, we announce the annual competition for the best scientific research in peace science. The best work submitted to the competition before 1st June, 1985, will be rewarded by a prize of 250 rubles in the name of L.F.Richardson. The work must be published or prepared for publication in Russian or in English and sent to one of our addresses. The result will be announced on the 1st October, 1985.

The several above-mentioned peace researchers from the USSR have several main targets. Some of them are purely scientific (for example, the study of the simulation of conflicts), others are organizational (the coordination of researches conducted by provincial groups). But the main task is to prove that science does really work for peace: many people still mistrust scientists, "You invented murderous weapons - that is your real product. As for your peace activity, you come to it when you are converted from geniuses to ill old men". Although this complaint is partially true, we see the challenge in this mistrust and we will try to remove it.

PROPOSALS TO ESTABLISH TRUST RECEIVED FROM ORDINARY SOVIET CITIZENS BY MOSCOW TRUST GROUP.....

- Develop an agreement on a program for a broad exchange of children (for instance, during school vacations) between Soviet and American families, including the families of government leaders and those in positions of authority in government. Such a form of simple human contact would not only provide a guarantee against sudden nuclear attack, but would establish trust and guarantee mutual understanding in the future.

- Regular presentation of joint Soviet-American television discussions (transmitted simultaneously in the USSR and the USA) in which high-ranking political figures and scientific and cultural leaders from one of the countries would answer telephone questions by viewers from the other country.

- Develop joint recommendations for the propagation of peace in school textbooks. This would promote trust for the present time and guarantee it in the future.

- Creation in the USSR and the USA of permanent American and Soviet cultural centers respectively.

- Creation of a Soviet-American marriage bureau. An increase in the number of marriages between Soviet and American citizens would promote rapprochement between peoples.

- Creation on the territories of the USSR and the USA of Soviet-American medical centers, in which physicians of both nations would apply the most advanced methods and equipment of Soviet and American medical practice for the effective treatment of patients from both countries.

- Forbid the use of zoological weapons, for instance, dogs and dolphins to convey explosive materials.

- Name a number of streets in new areas after well-known American figures who have contributed to the cause of justice and democracy, and also to the rapprochement of the USSR and the USA (Washington, Lincoln, Twain, Franklin, Roosevelt), providing an example for the USA.

- Publish articles on the lives and works of American scientific and cultural figures whose lives are to an equal degree a credit to both countries (scientists and engineers, Sikorsky, Timoshenko, Ryabushinsky, Gamov, the musician Rakhaminov, the writer Nabokob).

- Forbid war games among children presently sanctioned by the administration.

- Organize regular public discussions of works of film and art, in which anti-war ideas which restore trust between the superpowers are put forward (in this category are suggested the novel by Lenin Prize Winner Ch. Aitmatov, "The Snow Storm and the Station" and K Vonnegut's "Slaughterhouse 5" or "The Voyage of Billy Pilgrim").

- Organize a converging relay race of trust between Moscow and Washington.

- Cease the production and sale of childrens' toys modeled on contemporary types of weaponry.

- Lower the rates for international mail and telephone service. (At the moment, a Soviet citizen who earns the average wage must work two hours to pay for an air-mail registered letter, seven hours for one minute of telephone conversation).

- Simplify the procedure for going on tourist trips and lower their cost, so that they might be accessible to the average wage earner.

- Employ for commercial trade marks some words used by peace advocates: "Peace" (the radio with this name is no longer produced), "trust", "lessening of tension", "detente", "parity".

- Organize an exchange of television programs on a regular basis (for example, once every two weeks) explaining the history and culture of both countries and their contemporary life. For instance, a showing of documentary and feature films, reports of official events (7th of November, Independence Day, etc.).

Members of Moscow Trust Group discussing proposals.

- Include within school curricula the study of legislative and state documents of both countries (the Soviet Constitution, the American Bill of Rights), artistic works, including contemporary, that are a national legacy and reflect the spirit of both peoples.

- Introduce at several schools the study of the American English, to facilitate personal contact between citizens of both countries.

- Open simultaneously in the USSR and the USA a memorial for peace. Announce at this very moment in the USSR and USA a competition for the design for this memorial.

- Allow physicians who wish to do so an opportunity to spend their vacations in the hospitals and clinics of the other country and thus raise their professional competence.

- Organize a tradition of sports competition (in soccer, volleyball, chess tournaments, etc.) between employees of similar enterprises and institutions; for instance, doctors from a hospital in the USSR against doctors from a hospital in the USA.

- A peace march around the world. ■ ■ ■

AN APPEAL TO THE POLITICAL LEADERS OF THE USSR AND THE USA

CONCERNING AN AGREEMENT TO DEVELOP LONG-TERM INTERGOVERNMENTAL PROGRAMS

The long-standing arms race brings mankind ever closer to the edge of the precipice.

At the same time, the great powers advance arms-limitations proposals which the opposite side finds unacceptable. The escalation of mutual criticism torpedoes chances for productive high-level meetings on disarmament questions.

Our own research and discussion indicates that the current situation is not necessarily a dead end. A resolution to the current situation, which threatens the entire world with destruction, may be found in meetings taking place at the highest levels, not with the aim of concluding arms control agreements, but in order to reach accords in those areas where agreement is already quite possible. Having settled these other questions, the ground will be prepared for more productive talks on disarmament.

Toward this end, we propose the conclusion of an Agreement to Develop Long-Term Intergovernmental programs that would have as their aim the resolution of major ecological, energy-related, economic and other problems concerning the parties to the accords.

We consider that the accords should entail the following:

- subsequent conversion of equal portions of arms personnel and military industries, as well as equal resources normally devoted to military aims as the basis for the realization of the proposed projects.

- guarantees defending the social and material interests of those individuals depending on the military and military-industrial fields in the process of peace conversion.

- the possibility for other nations to become participants in the accords such that their contribution of human and material resources to the intergovernmental projects would be proportional to the size of their armed forces.

- a plan for immediate implementation of these joint projects that do not require substantial prior development or significant financing.

- the creation of a permanent commission, composed of scientists and other specialists, government officials, representatives of the military and of military-industrial circles, that would be given the task of planning and control over the realization of the program. It would also develop plans for peaceful conversion of the armies and military industries of the states participating in the accords.

In the course of the collaborating between scientists and government officials, representatives of the military and military-industrial circles, and in the process of realization of the program, the preconditions for mutual trust will be established between the great superpowers.

The practicality of the accords is assured by the provision that the transfer of military industry resources and army personnel for the realization of the long-term inter-governmental programs be carried out in strict parity, as well as by the measures taken to defend the interests of the personel of the army and military industries, and the goal of immediate implementation of a number of uncomplicated joint projects.

Governmental and popular support is assured owing to the general interest in furthering the resolution of the contemporary problems that are addressed by the accords, and due to the possibility for widespread participation in the accords.

For the above stated reasons, the conclusion of an Agreement on Long-term Intergovernmental Programs would serve as an effective policy of peace as opposed to a policy of mutual accusation.

Meetings at the highest level for the conclusion of such an agreement would put an end to the era of confrontation and would mark the begining of an enduring detente.

We urge you to become the saviours of mankind, rather than the last statesmen of history.

Participants in Development of the Proposal: V.Barbash, Candidate of Geographic Sciences; L.Dudkin, Doctor of Economic Science; V.Lemberskiy, Candidate of Technical Sciences; V.Lusnikov, Candidate of Physical and Mathematical Sciences; O.Lusnikov, Engineer; O.Medvedkova, Candidate of Geographic Sciences; Yu.Medvedkov, Doctor of Geographic Sciences; M Reitman, Candidate of Technical Sciences.

Dr. Medvedkov Olga Lusnikova



Dr. Dudkin



to 15 days imprisonment. This was Khramov's second prison term. He was imprisoned for the first time this June, shortly after he joined the Group. He was arrested for his active participation in organizing the Peace March. At the time of his arrest, Khramov showed passive resistance by sitting on the floor. When the KGB men and police carried him away to their car by his hands and feet, they banged his head against the wall. In the police car they held him by the hair and beat him mercilessly. During his imprisonment, KGB men regularly interrogated and bullied him.

■■■■■

KIRILL POPOV

On August 23 in Moscow, the active peace advocate, Kirill Popov, was committed to a psychiatric hospital. He was placed in psychiatric hospital No 14 where Sergei Batovrin was confined in 1982 and where one of the leaders of Independent Initiative, Yuri Popov (same last name) has been interred since December of 1983. Kirill Popov has been subjected to intensive forced doses of psychotropic medicines. For his attention to peace issues, the 34 year old scientist at the Chemistry Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences has undergone 6 searches and numerous interrogations. In August of this year he had planned to join the Peace March.

Kirill Popov's address: USSR, Moscow, U1, Garibaldi 17, korp 4, kv 48.

The address of the psychiatric hospital: USSR, Moscow U1, Bekhtereva 15, p/b no 14.

■■■■■

VLADIMIR BRODSKY

On August 20, Group for Trust activist, Vladimir Brodsky, was arrested and sentenced to 15 days imprisonment. The surgeon, Vladimir Brodsky, age 40, has twice served 15 day prison terms. Brodsky was beaten mercilessly at the time of his arrests and in prison. As a result of being beaten in the kidneys, there is blood in his urine. Brodsky declared a hunger strike while in prison. This is his third one.

AUGUST 20TH, 1984

On the 20th August in Moscow, for the third time this summer, Group for Trust activist Nikolai Khramov was arrested and sentenced to 15 days imprisonment. He was arrested two days after he was released from his previous term. At the same time, Alexander Rubchenko, for the third time this summer was arrested and sentenced to 15 days. All three declared a hunger strike.

The arrests were preceded by the following events:

On the 18th August, KGB men burst into the apartment of a Group for Trust supporter in which Rubchenko and Cherdakova were found. A search ensued, without warrant, witness, or the observance of any of the other established formalities. During the search, notebooks containing addresses were unlawfully confiscated from those present. Cherdakov and Rubchenko were detained and brought to the police precinct. The police and KGB men terrorized the three peace advocates non-stop throughout the entire day, until midnight. The following is Alexander Rubchenko's description of his experiences of the 19th August in his statement to the Moscow Procurator's office written in prison on August 25th.

"... detained during the day on the 19th August on Ulianovskaya Street. I was escorted to the 70th precinct and held there for three hours, after which time I was released. As soon as I left the precinct house I was detained a second time by individuals who showed me no documents. I know some of their names only because they had shadowed me before. I would like to mention these names: Orlov and Rakitin. This time I was taken to the 64th precinct. When I left after about three hours, plain clothesmen were waiting for me in a car.

They jeered, "What's new? Now you're in again." They took me to the 84th precinct and on the way threatened that I would be taken 180 kilometers from Moscow and thrown into the woods. At the precinct station I was searched in the absence of witnesses, with warrant, and not according to established protocol. At 12:30 at night I was released and immediately encountered three individuals walking unsteadily and obviously drunk. These strangers started to pursue me in an official car with no number. They informed me that tomorrow I would "tour" the Moscow precincts. When I reached Kirill Popov's apartment late at night with two of my friends who had been pursued with me during the day (Khramov and Cherdakov), the people who had been following us tried to break in, but Popov decisively prevented it."

The names Orlov and Rakitin - the KGB men mentioned in this excerpt from Alexander Rubchenko's statement, have long been known to members of the Group for Trust. This Orlov mercilessly beat Olga Medvedkov in the 103rd precinct station on October 13th, 1983 at the time of Oleg Radzinsky's trial. With 3 other KGB men, he arrested Mark Reitman on October 13th, 1983 (each time detaining him for a few hours at the precinct station). This same Orlov was one of the men who mercilessly beat Reitman and his wife Tamara. On the 19th August he led the KGB men's jeering.

On the following morning, August 20th, Rubchenko, Khramov and Cherdakov were arrested at Kirill Popov's apartment (Popov himself was arrested three days later). Rubchenko describes the arrest in a statement to the procurator's office from prison.

"... on the 20th August, my friends Khramov, Cherdakov and I heard persistent knocking at the door followed by pounding. Since we were in a strange apartment, we did not go to the door. Popov was at work at the time. By the time we were ready to phone the militia, the door gave way under pressure. When they burst into the room they broke the

Rubchenko (right)

door chain. I saw two men in civilian clothes and a policeman who refused to give any kind of explanation about what had transpired. Not one of them showed official identification, let alone a warrant permitting them to break down the door. We nonetheless left the apartment without argument and were escorted to the 134th precinct. Immediately after we left, the door to Popov's apartment was crudely nailed shut from the inside, after which the locksmith climbed out the window (it was a first floor apartment). Both on the way to the 134th precinct and in the station itself, KGB agents systematically and cruelly beat Nikolai Khramov mercilessly, notwithstanding the fact that not one of the arrested parties offered any resistance or attempted to defend themselves. Signs of the beating and scratches on his arms and legs were noticeable even two weeks later when he was released from prison. At the police station three KGB men undressed Marina Cherdakova and subjected her to a humiliating personal search. Two men held her, the third searched. The statement in support of the Group for Trust, found on her person, was confiscated."

After three hours at the police station, Khramov, Cherdakova and Rubchenko were brought to court. Rubchenko describes the trial in his statement to the procurator.

"... After three hours in the police station we were brought to the People's Court in the Brezhnev region of Moscow in the car driven by our pursuers of the previous day who came to the precinct to pick us up. They reached an agreement with the judge and escorted us through the court.

Based on the report of the policeman who had been present during our detainment as well as a statement by a

certain Gracheva (incidentally, not a single woman had been "on the scene") the judge, Blaksin, without examining the witnesses (Gracheva was not even in the courthouse), and paying no heed at all to my explanations, sentenced me to 15 days.

In his report, the police official declared that I had refused, when detained, to show my papers and showed malicious resistance as well. At my objection the judge, showing sincere cynicism, stopped me with the following words: "Maybe." Neither did he react to my statement that I had tuberculosis, with documentation to prove it, and that I was an invalid, on pension. I was informed of the Court's verdict only on the following day, thanks to the kindness of the police officer who escorted me. All that transpired seems to be in outright violation of the judicial process...

The KGB officials knew well that Rubchenko was an invalid and seriously ill. They knew that he had lost consciousness on the third day of his previous arrest and was in such a severe state that hospitals refused to admit him, not wishing to assume any responsibility for his life. However, they deliberately used this as a means of punishment. Rubchenko writes:

"... I was kept in prison in the village of Severny, in spite of established laws on arresting the very ill. On the fourth day of my administrative arrest, in a cell teeming with lice and dirt, I started to get sicker as a result of the cold cell and the cold covering of the planks on which I slept. On the 24th August I was taken by ambulance to the hospital. However they didn't admit me because of a shortage of beds and suggested I be hospitalized through the tuberculosis center."

■■■■■

STRANGE INTERVIEW

At the end of July an unprecedented meeting took place between participants in the Independent Peace Movement in the USSR and a Soviet journalist. Litaraturnaya Gazeta correspondent, Theodore Gladkov visited Group for Trust activists, Olga and Aleksei Lunikov. Never before have participants of any group or organization unsanctioned by the authorities managed to obtain an official visit from a Soviet journalist. However this incident does not mean that there has been any change for the better in relations between the official Soviet press and participants in unofficial movements. Unfortunately this event was, in all likelihood, one of the steps in the KGB's planned provocation against the Group for Trust.

Theodore Gladkov confines his Literaturnaya Gazeta articles to the theme of the "valiant work" of the KGB. This aspect of the journalist's "work" unerringly indicates his collaboration with the Soviet secret police. At the Lusnikov's, Gladkov subjected the Group for Trust activists to two hours of frank interrogation which he tried in vain to cover up as an interview. The reason for Gladkov's unexpected interest in the Group for Trust is obvious.

Articles containing absurd accusations and slanderously attacking participants in the Independent Peace Movement in the USSR have frequently appeared in the Soviet press. However the lies in these articles were extremely apparent and the accusations did not ring true. The journalist's meeting with members of the Group for Trust was no doubt necessary for the KGB so that the accusations in the press would appear convincing. Evidently the KGB hopes that in his upcoming article, Gladkov will refer to his "interview" and suceed in convincing readers of the "authenticity" of any drummed up accusation. The Lusnikovs consented to the interview only after Gladkov had been pressured into agreeing that they could record it. As far as the KGB knows, the tape of the interview is already in the West. It is therefore unlikely that Gladkov's article will ever be printed. However, in any case, this instance shows that the KGB is looking for the chance to take judicial reprisals against the Group for Trust activists and would like to prepare public opinion for this.

DOCUMENT

TO THE GOVERNMENT OF THE TURKISH REPUBLIC

Dear Gentlemen:

As you undoubtedly know, the countries of the NATO and Warsaw blocs are at present in a state of dangerous confrontation. It would be enough for some small incident, some sort of new Sarajevo to take place, in order to set off the threat of a world catastrophe so great that it would bring about the defeat and destruction of every country. In these conditions, the efforts of people who actively support, in whatever way, the cause of peace in the world, take on special significance.

Our group for the establishment of trust between the USSR and USA endeavors to work for peace by means of the collection, development and distribution of proposals capable of strengthening peace in the world. At the same time, we try to avoid any criticism of the governments of the East or the West: there is already too much criticism in the world.

We have learned from the mass media that some Turkish citizens were sentenced to various jail terms for their activities directed at establishing peace. (It is possible that, nominally, their sentences made use of some wording that does not at all reflect their working for peace as their crime--such a practice during trials of peace activists has already been witnessed in other countries.)

In this connection, we ask the government of Turkey to amnesty the persons referred to and to give them freedom. Such a step would strenghten the authority of the Turkish government and would facilitate the reduction of tensions in the world, all the more so as Turkey belongs to the NATO pact. We ask you to consider our appeal as one of our group's constructive proposals.

MOSCOW TRUST GROUP

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ART
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To our subscribers; please accept our sincerest apologies over the delay in publication of issue No. 2 due to the editor's two-month absence during his European tour . . .

Issue No. 3 will be published toward the end of January. Subscriptions: $18 yr US & Canada; $25 yr Europe, $35 yr Institutions. Please make cheques payable to Sergey Batrovrin.

LITTLE BROTHER IS WATCHING BACK



RETURN ADDRESS: MOSCOW

INTERNATIONAL NEWS BULLETIN ON INDEPENDENT PEACE ACTIVITY IN USSR

THE GROUP FOR ESTABLISHING TRUST

3

A STATEMENT FOR YOUNG PEOPLE IN THE USA

We feel close to young people in America. They are understandable to us, infinitely so. We are united by common hopes and common paths, even though these often take forms that seem absurd to our older generations.

We believe that America's youth, like us, honestly forsees a future free of the organized violence that thrives in an atmosphere of fear and mutual distrust.

We call upon young people in America, whether they are students or workers or unemployed to support non-governmental peace initiatives and to actively help to establish personal contacts between ordinary people in our countries. We see this as the only way to overcome that barrier of stiff formality in our relations which inevitably comes up when we are forced to communciate by means of the middle-man of the mass media.

It is obvious that the only way to make a real friend is by bringing one heart closer to another.

We have much in common—first of all the world pacifist movement which was born and raised on American soil. Today we find it especially easy to understand the meaning of the words of John Lennon, who died so tragically:

"All we need is love." Only love will save us all.

INDEPENDENT INITIATIVE

UPDATE UPDATE UPDATE

On February 11, 1985, peace activist Alexander Shatravka, who is serving a three year prison sentence for distributing the trust group's documents, had his term extended another two and a half years. Alexander Shatravka has already served nearly ten years in jails and psychiatric prisons for his pacifist convictions (see issues number one and two for additional information on Shatravka)

In Moscow, on the 12th October, Group for Trust member Dr Mark Reitman opened in his apartment an anti-nuclear exhibit of graphics entitled "Tomorrow Will Be Too late". The graphic works presented at the exhibit were contributed by artists belonging to Independent Initiative peace group, and illustrated the effects of use of nuclear weapons. Music played as visitors walked through the exhibit and several times a day, explanatory lectures organized by the Group for Trust were held for the benefit of the public.

This was the most successful of the exhibits yet to be held by the Group for Trust. There were no arrest nor significant interference.

The exhibit got good reviews from Moscovites and aroused a great deal of interest, particularly among young people. A number of the many visitors to the exhibition came from other cities. The exhibit remained open until the end of October. However, when it turned out that people kept coming even after the exhibit had been closed, the Group decided to re-open it.

After Maria and Vladimir Fleishgakker left the USRR in November, the co-ordinating committee of the Group for Trust brought in several new members. One of these was the artist Yuri Kiselev, who has long been well-known and respected in the USSR for his services to society. In the 1970's, Mr Kiselev helped organize and then served as president for the Handicapped Persons Defense Group. This is the only organization in the Soviet Union which brings together handicapped people and helps stand up for their rights (only the societies for the deaf and the blind are officially recognised). As a result of his independent activity in defense of rights for the handicapped, Yuri Kiselev has suffered for many years from persecution by State Security, despite his especially severe condition (he has lost both of his legs).

Members of the Handicapped Persons Defense Group were among the first to respond to the initiative of the Group for Trust, having got in touch with the Group only days after its founding. Mr Kiselev considers his participation

in the co-ordinating committee of the Group for Trust and the independent peace movement to be a logical continuation of his other humanitarian activities.

Yuri Kiselev has in the past already contributed a number of valuable initiatives to the work of the Group for Trust: at the present time, the Group is looking forward to developing links with Western organizations for handicapped persons.

Please contact the Group for Trust in Moscow or other members of the Trust Group in the West if you are able to help in this project or if you would like more information on handicapped people in the USSR.

A. LUSNIKOV



Doctor Yuri Khronopulo, Dr Boris Kalyuzhni and Dr Victor Blok—all of whom withdrew from participation in the Group for Trust a year ago this January as a result of pressure from the authorities—have once again returned to their work for peace. They have organized and are now carrying out a series of seminars in the city of Dolgoprudny (Long Pond). The scientists are expanding the sphere of their activities despite the disencouragement of the local KGB employees. Their resumption of activities marks the return to the Group for Trust of the only members to have withdrawn from the group.

A peace center has been operating in the apartment of Group for Trust members Olga and Aleksei Lusnikov since the end of November. A new series of seminars has been going on, and included, up to February 1985, the following:

20 November	"Nuclear Winter" Yuri Medvedkov
27 November	"Analysis of Peace Proposals" Mark Reitman
4 December	"The Activities of the UK Trustbuilders" Peter Murphy
11 December	"Peace Activism and the Rights of Man" A Lusnikov
18 December	"Alternative Defense"
25 December	"Gandhi and his Views on Civil Disobedience"
1 January	"The Teachings of Leo Tolstoy"
7 January	"Conversion of Military Industry to Peaceful Uses
14 January	"Conversion of Military Industry to Peaceful Uses"
21 January	"The Viewpoint of the Greens"
28 January	"Peace in the Work of (the Balladeer) Vladimir Vysotrsky"

The seminars continue. Every Tuesday, from 6:30 to 9:30 pm, the Peace Center is also open for the English Club, which offers everyone the opportunity to study English.

On the 6th January, the Peace Center opened a joint exhibit with the UK Trustbuilders titled "In Place of Weapons—Trust". Among the materials on display are photographic illustrations of the medical effects of use of nuclear weapons; photos about the activities of peace activists in the West, East Europe and the USSR.

At the same time in the peace center an exhibit has been opened of children's paintings on the theme of peace; there are also materials on display concerning conversion. The center also has a small library of mostly Western publications on questions of peace and disarmament, but there is a real shortage of materials.

The Group for Trust would very much like, in future, to show Western films and slide-shows on appropriate topics. There again the Group has a problem due to the lack of projectors or video equipment. Any benevolent help would really be appreciated on this score as well.

Address of the Peace Center:
Moscow, Varshavskoe Shosse 154, korp 2, kv 202

LENNON
~~Lenin~~ Memorial Day in Estonia; Young people waiting for the start: Police waiting for orders

On December 11th, in Moscow's Lenin Hills Park, an anti-war demonstration took place dedicated to the memory of John Lennon. The demonstration was organized by the young people's anti-war group *Independent Initiative* and several hundred persons participated.

Police sealed off the area and made some 150 arrests (the exact number is not known). Some of those held were beaten by the police, but all those arrested were released by evening of the same day.

Anti-war demonstrations dedicated to the memory of John Lennon have been organized by the *Independent Initiative* group for the past several years.

The founder of this group, Yuri Popov has been in a psychiatric hospital since June 1983. During the night of May 31st, 1983, *Independent Initiative* organized a peace demonstration in Moscow's Tsaritsyno Park. During the demonstration, people handed out leaflets calling for nuclear disarmament, for doing away with the death penalty, and an end to the war in Afghanistan. About two hundred people were held and Yuri Popov, to whom the KGB assigned responsibility for writing the leaflet, was arrested and placed in psychiatric hospital no 14 in Moscow. He has been there ever since and is undergoing intense forced "thearpy", including sulfazine shocks,
His address: USSR, Moscow, Bekhtereva 15, PB no 14.

YURI POPOV

Oleg Radzinsky, who is still serving his term in exile, in Tomsk Oblast, Siberia, and who was sentenced in October 1983 to a years imprisonment and four years exile for his independent peace activities, has fallen seriously ill with tuberculosis. There is still no news as to the fate of Odesssa Trust Group activists, Vladimir Kornev, who was arrested in April 1983.

Members of the Moscow counter-culture: Hundreds of young people are joining peace groups such as Independent Initiative.

THE MECHANISM OF A SHOW-TRIAL

On February 11, 1985, Group for Trust activist Alexander Shatravka was re-tried in his prison camp and had his term extended another two and one half years. Also in February 1985, Alexlander Rubchenko received an official warning from State Security agents that he will be tried for "anti-Soviet propaganda and agitation" (article 70 of the USSR Criminal Code, which carries a sentence of seven years imprisonment, five years exile) if he doesn't cease his peace-activism. Readers who wish to familiarize themselves with the mechanism of how false charges are fabricated against innocent individuals will find the following transcript of part of the trial against Olga Medvedkova to be of special interest. This trial transcript is unique in its detail and accuracy.

CRIMINAL CASE No. 58362:

DECLARATION OF 25 November 1983

Based on the materials submitted by the 103d police precinct of the Lyublinsky R.U.V.D. (Regional Bureau of Internal Affairs) in regard to O.L. Medvedkova, it is evident that on the 13 October 1983, after having been brought to the 103d precinct police station for verification of her identity, O.L. Medvedkova committed petty hooliganism, and afterwards was disobedient to the police personnel, and committed violent acts against the agent of the 103d precinct N.I. Potapov as he was carrying out his duties.

TEXT OF ARTICLE 193, CHAPTER 2(Ya), Criminal Code RSFSR

Causing physical harm to, beating, or otherwise acting violently against official persons or social functionaries in connection with the carrying out of their official or social duties, and also against a citizen in connection with his participation in deterring or halting a criminal or anti-social act. Punishable by deprivation of freedom for a term up to three years, or correctional labour for a term up to two years. (From the edition of the CC RSFSR of 4 August 1966 and 3 December 1982, no. 49, page 1821.)

CONCLUSIONS OF THE PROSECUTION
8 December 1983 Case No. 58362

A.G. Nemkova, Senior Investigator, Lyblinskaia Section of the Moscow Procurator's office, having considered the evidence in criminal case No. 58362 has ESTABLISHED:

MEDVEDKOVA, O.L. is accused of, on the 13 October 1983, beating and otherwise violently assaulting an official who was in the course of carrying out his official duties. Namely, having been brought to the 103d Police Precinct headquarters of the Lyublinsky R.U.V.D. at 10:30 A.M. in order to have her identify verified, MEDVEDKOVA acted in an aggressive manner, shouted, interfered with the work of the officer on duty, GROMOV, V.G., did not react to his reproaches, insulted him using uncensored language; as a result of which it was decided to have her held by administrative process for petty hooliganism. While escorting her towards the 3d police precinct station for temporary detainment, MEDVEDKOVA inflicted a beating on and committed other violent acts against Inspector N.I. Potapov of the 103d police precinct who had been entrusted with escorting her to the 3d precinct. Refusing to proceed to the other police precinct, MEDVEDKOVA pushed Potapov away, waved her arms, attempting to beat him, and when she was put into a police car by force, kicked Potapov in the chest. At the 3d precinct building MEDVEDKOVA refused to exit the car, continued to disobey the commands of the police personnel, continued to resist, trying to kick him with her foot in the groin, scratched his face and arms.

RESOLUTION TO INITIATE CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS
8 December 1983 No. 58362

Senior Investigator A.G. Nemkova of the Moscow Lyublinsky district procurator's office declares on the basis of information gathered the following:

Namely: When MEDVEDKOVA was brought to the on-duty section of the 103d precinct police station at 10:30 A.M. for the purpose of verifying her identity, she acted in an aggressive manner, shouted, interfered with the work of the on-duty officer GROMOV, V.G., ignored his reproaches, insulted him using foul language. As a result of this behaviour, a protocol was drawn up to have her held by administrative order (i.e. without trial—trans.) on the charge of petty hooliganism. Upon directing her for temporary detention toward the 3d precinct police station, MEDVEDKOVA actively resisted the policemen N.I. Potapov who had been given responsibility for accompanying Medvedkova. She tried to break away, waved her arms and kicked her legs, attempted to strike Potapov in the stomach, scratched his face, and expressed herself using uncensored words.

THE TRANSCRIPT OF THE HEARING IN THE CASE ACCUSING OLGA LVOVNA MEDVEDKOVA in accordance with Article 193, Section 2 of the Criminal Codex of the RSFSR THE CITY COURT OF MOSCOW, LYUBLINSKY DISTRICT, MARCH 23, 1984. MEDVEDKOVA'S testimony

JUDGE Yu V GRINYUKOV (presiding): Describe the events of the 13th of October 1983.
MEDVEDKOVA: What happened on the 13th of October of 1983 and how I ended up near the building where your case against Radzinsky was being heard? I had had a chance to meet Radzinsky no more than two or three times. But the workers of the Committee for State Security (KGB) of the USSR had conducted a search in my apartment in conjunction with the case of Radzinsky. The search really had nothing to do with Radzinsky, still that's how it was formulated. I should mention that at the time there was an exhibition in our apartment dedicated to the victims of Hiroshima.
JUDGE (interrupting): Medvedkova, I have to . . .
M: I am explaining what I was doing near the courthouse on October 13th.
JUDGE: Wait a second! When I speak, everyone must stop!
M: Everything I have said is essential to establish the truth. I am only saying things that are directly related to the hearing that took place here on October 13th, 1983. I am not trying to say anything unrelated to the case.
JUDGE: I am not interested in your reasons for appearing near the Lyublinsky court.
M. I came to the courthouse on October 13th in order to find out how Radzinsky's case was related to the search of my apartment. After all, they confiscated 80 paintings that dealt with the tragedy after the atom bomb explosion. How could that have been related to the criminal case against Radzinsky which was heard here on October 13th of last year? The exhibition was put together and organized at my apartment . . .
JUDGE: I am telling you once again that I am not interested about hearing your reasons for coming to the courthouse.
M: It is very difficult for me to speak when I am interrupted in the middle of every sentence.
JUDGE: It is being explained to you that the court is only dealing with the events of October 13th. We are explaining to you what the court is interested in.
M: There is no other way for me to explain the events that took place on October 13th. I have to explain to you why the testimonies of the witnesses for one side and the other are are so contradictory. If the court is not interested in establishing the truth, I can keep quiet.
JUDGE: We are interested in the truth, so tell about the events of October 13th. If you do not concentrate on that, I shall be forced to ask questions. You had good reason to come to Radzinsky's hearing, that is clear to us. But now we suggest you tell us the details of October 13th.
M: Oleg Radzinsky is a member of the GROUP FOR ESTABLISHING TRUST BETWEEN THE USSR AND THE USA. My husband, Dr of Geography Yury Vladimirovich Medvedkov, who is present here, and I are also members of the group. Since he works with the problems of human ecology and is an internationally known specialist in this area, the anti-nuclear exhibition was held at our apartment, because human ecology is directly related to the problems that occur after nuclear explosions.
JUDGE: Medvedkova! You either don't understand . . .
M: After the search . . .
JUDGE: The court is not concerned with the problems of ecology!
M: I understand. After the search the workers of KGB started following us constantly—this was after we joined the group. They followed us for days; telephones of the members of the group were disconnected. My husband was arrested for 15 days on a charge that was fabricated in the same way as the charge that now threatens me with three years in labor camps. He was arrested at the time of the Scandinavian "Peace March" here, the summer of 1982. The KGB workers were putting enormous pressure on all members of the group, using arguments like: If you don't terminate your activities, we'll put you behind bars anyway. We won't charge you with fighting for peace, that's not illegal. In fact, Article 69 of the Soviet Constitution declares it every citizen's obligation. They said "The Criminal Codex is big . . ."
JUDGE: Medvedkova! You have to stop when I speak. You must not interrupt me! I have already told you that we have heard enough about your reasons for coming to court.
M: "Oh, the Codex is big," they said. "We'll find some criminal artlcle that we can put you behind bars with."

JUDGE: I already told you, do you refuse to tell us about the 13th of October?
M: Oh, no, I'm not refusing! *My appearance in this courtroom, it just so happens, is the result of the efforts by the workers of the KGB to try me in a criminal case.* I got the Article 193, SEction 2, and they are getting another one ready for someone else. Moreover, so that everything goes quietly, smoothly and calmly . . . (the JUDGE rises to interrupt) . . . I'm speaking about documents that are among the documents of the case, so you can't tell me it has nothing to do with the case. Don't bother to stop me! The KGB this time has used the hands not only of the police, like they're more accustomed to, but also, unfortunately, the hands of scholars. They tried to send my husband away for a month on a business trip. Inasmuch as he has attained international notoriety he could make a lot of noise if his wife were sent to jail. My husband received two reprimands because he didn't go on that business trip.

The cruelty with which one is proscuted for fighting for peace, calling for trust between nations, is totally amazing. For some reason, the KGB workers found our group undesirable, even though it has never advocated anti-Sovietism or said a word against the government. Two of the members of the group, Shatravka and Radzinsky, are already behind bars. I am the third.
JUDGE: MEDVEDKOVA:
M: Anyway, approaching the courthouse on October 13th of last year, I saw that access to the building was blocked. Only recently, just a short while ago, did I find out what color your building was. Here everything was cordoned off. There are no contradictions in the witnesses' testimonies concerning the time of the meeting, because everyone came at a different time. I remember that witness BARBASH came with me. We got to the street corner and told the policeman that we wanted to go through to Radzinsky's hearing. What's so strange about that? I mean, it's an open hearing! Everyone knows that. The policeman told us that unfortunately there were no more seats in the courtroom. But that often happens. There aren't many seats in the courtroom. So we walked off to think about it for a minute, and we were standing about two hundred meters away from the policeman, waiting for our friends, not really knowing what to do. Should we come back later? We decided to wait for our friends. This is when GODYAK and REITMAN arrived; they did not even ask to be let into the courtroom.
JUDGE: Pause for a minute! Don't hurry! You are not giving us enough time to record what you are saying.
M (after a pause): They realized that there was no way to get into the hearing. We were standing and waiting for our friends to arrive, so that we could show at least some kind of support for Oleg Radzinsky and his mother, whom we could see. About 20 minutes later . . .
JUDGE: Wait a minute!
M (after the secretary has recorded her words, continuing): Suddenly, an automobile stopped next to us and some people in plainclothes pushed us into it and drove off. Everything happened very fast, and we ended up at the 103rd police division, where we were told that we had been detained for identification; they demanded to see our passports. We quietly handed them to them. We were all very familiar with the procedure of being detained at the police station for three hours for identification. At the time of getting the reply from Ms Thatcher concerning the arrests of peace activists in England, we had been repeatedly picked up near the British Embassy and detained for three hours in the same way. We know that the policemen were going to behave properly, as usual. Everybody was sitting quietly on the bench and reading. I remember I was reading a novel by Kurt Vonnegutt. All of us were together, sitting next to each other, for three hours. We all saw everything. Only BARBASH was briefly asked to the second floor to 'talk' with KGB worker Mikheyev, aka Kovalyov, aka Nikolayev. He informed BARBASH that he'd be in trouble if he remained with the Trust Group. BARBASH returned, and all of us continued sitting quietly on the bench in front of the offier on duty awaiting the end of our three-hour detention.

Our friends came by the police station to make sure everything was going smoothly, with no conflicts. Prof Dudkin came by, LUSNIKOVA came by, then later she was brought in—detained for identification. Even some Western reporters came by, for example Mr. Martin Nezirsky. Everybody saw that we were just quietly waiting, that there were no conflicts. Around 1pm, Office GROMOV returned all of our passports, including mine, and said that we could go, that they had no questions for any of us. When we left the building of the 103rd police division, we saw that there was an automobile blocking the exit—a van with an open door—and there was no way to get around that RAF (Riga Automobile Factory) wagon.

JUDGE: Was it a RAF wagon or an UAZ (Ukrainian Automobile Factory) one?
M: I can't tell the difference, I drive a "Zhiguli". It was some dark green wagon, might have been an UAZ. There were people in plainclothes around the wagon, who, without presenting their ID's or warrants, started dragging us into the van. LUSNIKOVA AND REITMAN were dragged in first. GODYAK lay down on the ground in front of the van—now they are attributing that to me. He resorted to passive resistance, the kind we see, for example, in the practice of British fighters for peace. Why do we have to get into some automobile, which we are forcefully being dragged into, when we have been told by the police that we are free to go! I, and later BARBASH, went back inside the 103rd police division. There I addressed officer GROMOV, for the first time with notes of displeasure in my voice: Why is someone trying to detain us if, according to Gromov, we are free? We are going to sit inside the station until we can leave on our own. He shrugged his shoulders, "What can I do?", he seemed to be saying. Barbash and I sat down on the bench that by now was already familiar to us and sat there for about 15 minutes, not less. People in civilian clothes were nervously running around, smoking, probably calling on the phone, awaiting instructions. Then two people in civilian clothes ran up to me, grabbed my arms and legs, picked me up in the air, and dragged me to the van which already had Lusnikova, Reitman and Godyak in it. Then they forced Barbash in the same fashion. Those two people in civilian clothes got in the van. It was very crowded and there were not enough seats. Potapov showed up last—this was the first time he was up close; he had not participated in our forced boarding of the van. He spent the entire trip scrunched up with back to us—there was no room in the wagon. Off they drove. Where they were taking us they didn't say. We could see that we were on the outskirts of Moscow, on the circular highway. I was worried about Reitman, knowing that because of diabetes he had to observe an eating schedule. I asked him if he had any food on him. He said he did. The plainclothesmen who were escorting us (Potapov was also in plainclothes and did not present his documents) heard my conversation with Reitman. The van stopped, and one of the people in civilian clothes grabbed Reitman rudely by the collar and dragged him out of the van onto the road. They left him on the road and drove on. At first

it seemed they might do that with all of us; drop us off one by one on the highway. But they drove us to some old two-storey building which had no sign on it. We got out of the crunch in the van which was difficult to bear any longer. Two of us tried to go around the building, look around the corner to try to figure out where we were; they were immediately and rudely stopped by the men in plainclothes. They quickly started dragging us up a stairway full of trash to the second floor, then into the second floor corridor. There was trash and signs of ongoing renovations all around us. I was again dragged through the air by two people, in front of the room on the second floor that they were dragging us all into, I was swung and thrown through the door. Luckily, I managed to grab the doorknob and thus ease the fall; otherwise, I would have hurt myself on the floor. All of us, Barbash, Godyak, Lusnikova and myself were dragged through the door and locked in .
A bit later we realized that there were two chairs by the door on the outside of the room—with two policemen sitting in them. That day we were all on a hunger strike protesting the hearing of Radzinsky's case; we were drinking only water. Olga Lusnikova and I asked the policemen for permission to go and get some water. They allowed us that. While we were getting water from the faucet, we got a chance to look around. If seemed the building was a dormitory that was being vacated. There were women with frying pans running up and down the corridor, babies' carriages standing around. We started demanding that the policemen tell us who was in charge, that they take our passports and register them so that we could let our families know were we were. They just kept quiet; could not explain why they were guarding us. They kept us until 6:30 pm, until Radzinsky's case was over. Lusnikova was released a bit earlier; she walked around the building and across the road. On the corner she saw the sign of the 3rd police division. She realised that the building where we were kept

under custody was connected to the 3rd police division. There is another entrance, and a main wall separates one part of the building from the other, and the police were only on the first floor.

She called my husband, and he immediately called the 3rd police division. The answer was "We have arrested no such persons, do not have anyone under those names in custody and don't know anything." We were released at 6:30 p.m. in a very peculiar fashion. A total stranger in civilan clothes, whom we were seeing for the first time, came into the room and said. "What are you doing here? This is an official institution. You know what the consequences of your coming here can be. Get out of here right away!" We went out of the door; the chairs and the policemen were gone. The corridors were empty. Trash everywhere. All of us were very tired. We, of course, took a walk around the building to see where we were. We also saw that the building was connected to the 3rd police division. The most persistant and meticulous of us was Godyak. It was for these qualities of his that he was expelled from the USRR just before my trial, so that he could not be a witness to everything pertaining to my case. Godyak insisted on writing a letter to the District Attorney about our unlawful kidnapping by persons in civilian clothes. But we were concerned about helping Radzinsky; we had no time for letters of complaint. Besides, we had written numerous letters of complaint concerning the persecution of members of our group by the KGB. We never received any response to our complaints. So why waste our energy on useless writing! However, my husband received his first degree in law. So, he demonstrated the same kind of persistence as Godyak. My husband wrote an indignant letter to the President of the Institute of Geography of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, Dr. Garasimov, in which he described my kidnapping in front of the 103rd police division and unlawful custody of me and my friends. He described all of this to show; how can we talk about a business trip when this is what happens to my wife, who works at the same institute; she is kidnapped in broad daylight by unidentified persons in civilian clothes—right in front of a police station. A copy of this letter was notarized at the Institute of Geography (the stamp is on the page which describes the events of October 13th, and this document is included among other documents of my case. Now I would like to ask for a five minute recess to confer with my attorney.

JUDGE: The court declares a five minute recess.

AFTER THE RECESS:
M: For a few months nothing reminded me of the events of October 13th. Then, suddenly, on December 8th of last year, I was taken from work and transported to the office of the DA of Lyublinsky District—supposedly as a witness—yet with a policeman present. I believe now the court understands why I had to present a short preamble. Otherwise, it would not be clear for whose benefit this is all for.

On December 8th, in the course of a 6 hour long interrogation, which was conducted by Senior Investigatgor NOMKOVA and District Attorney USHKOV, I was presented the charge which you have heard—Article 193, Part 2 of the Criminal Codex of the RSFSR, the meaning of which essentially is that I resisted the police and battered POTAPOV. But never on that day did I resist the authorities or come into contact with POTAPOV. Moreover, intereaction with POTAPOV was impossible since he did not participate in the forceful dragging of me into an automobile in front of the 103rd police division. POTAPOV quicky disappeared after his van stopped at the vacant dormitory, where other persons, not POTAPOV, dragged me and three of my friends (this time without Reitman) to the second floor to lock us up until 6:30 pm I did not commit any acts of "hooliganism" at the 103rd police division, were, for the entire 3 hours the police behaved properly and we patiently waited. I, as well as the others, was released at 1.00 pm, when I was given my passport and told, "We do not have any questions for you". No one presented me a citation of petty hooliganism. In the course of the investigation, December 8th, 1983, there was a confrontation at which I saw POTAPOV up close for the first time. I could recall that he was around on October 13th but did not participate in the attack on us. It was at the confrontation that I first heard of the citation for petty hooliganism. I asked GROMOV how come I hadn't seen the statement. He looked me right in the eye and said, "You were shown it but refused to sign". I asked him, "Who showed me the statement?" He said, "I did". Here I was flabbergasted for the first time. I mean, GROMOV had been behaving properly on October 13th. It even seemed he might have sympathised with us when he saw that we were unable to leave the police station. All the charges are FABRICATED. This is all I have say.

THE DEFENSE IN THE CASE OF MEDVEDKOVA, MARCH 23, 1984, City Court of Moscoew, Lyubinsky District, Attorney David Markovich Akselbant, member, Moscow Board of Attorneys.

"When I saw that the seat across from me was empty (he points to the prosecutor's stand) I became uneasy—there's no prosecutor to prove the charges against the defendant. I am used to reaching the truth by argument. When there's a state Prosecutor, the argument between the prosecution and the defense is more visible. The prosecutor's resolution, which I hold in my hand, accuses MEDVEDKOVA of a serious crime: Article 193, Section 2, Criminal Codes of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic, punishable by up to three years imprisonment. The document states that MEDVEDKOVA, on the 13th of October 1983, was guilty of hooliganism, which was basis for writing up a citation with intent to prosecute. When, by the rights of this document, Ms. MEDVEDKOVA was being taken to the 3rd police division from the patrol force of the 103rd police division, the document confirms, she was guilty of resistance and battery of an officer of the law. Now we are able to present the results of the investigation of this case. As we all know, the court must decide on the evidence on the basis of facts presented during the hearing of the case. But what did we hear?

There are two contridictory verisons of the events that took place. During the preliminary investigation and during the main hearing, two versions were presented. The court has to decide whose account is untrue; the eye-witnesses on behalf of MEDVEDKOVA or those speaking on behalf of POTAPOV the plaintiff.

The author of the prosecutor's resolution offers a simple solution. According to him it is the witnesses who are friends and colleagues of MEDVEDKOVA who are lying: they are interested in a propitious outcome for MEDVEDKOVA's case. But if we are to approach this case and act on it in that light then we can't disregard the fact that all the witnesses for the prosecution were workers of the 103rd police division, friends and colleagues of POTAPOV, the plaintiff. These people, too, are interested in a ruling propitious for POTAPOV. Obviously, to approach this case from that perspective would be incorrect.

There are, however, more meaningful standards by which to judge the case—the documents of the case and character investigation. Let's take a look at these factors, checking them for contradictions.

All the workers of the 103rd police division connected in the accusation of MEDVEDKOVA say that in the 103rd patrol division MEDVEDKOVA used indecent language. But this a stock accusation, which does not fit the personality of MEDVEDKOVA. I am convinced that, referring to MEDVEDKOVA, the charge of indecent language is incorrect. I am convinced that the workers of the 103rd police division were applying their usual accusation, an accusation of an infraction they often observe, without any regard for appropriateness or justification. There is no convincing evidence of indecent language, either in MEDVEDKOVA's profession or in her academic career or in her comportment, which we are able to see at the trial. It doesn't even figure in the derogatory character reference we received from the academician GERASIMOV of the Institute of Geography of the Soviet Academy of Sciences.

Let's try to recreate the events of the case and let's begin with that small succession of events which is presented in the prosectution's version. MEDVEDKOVA allegedly participated in hooliganism: the citation has been drawn on this; she is detained, but all her colleagues are released, then she commits another, more serious, infraction. POTAPOV and GROMOV both support this verison. One made up the report, the other the citation. But did they carry out their duties properly, these two workers, POTAPOV and GROMOV?

The citation was written by GROMOV, as he asserts, before 1:00 P.M. October 13th, 1983. GROMOV asserts in this citation that MEDVEDKOVA committed an infration of the law and refused to sign the citation. If there arose a conflict between a person suspected of committing a crime and the police, then the corresponding document, such as this citation, should have been drawn up impeccably. But this was not the case. Acting as witnesses to MEDVEDKOVA's refusal to sign the citation we have POTAPOV and BORISHEV. It was the same POTAPOV who submitted the report of MEDVEDKOVA's infraction of the law and the same BORISHEV who prepared the report. I regret that the court was occupied at 1:00 P.M. October 13th, 1983, so that Judge ROGOZIN, who was mentioned in the case, made no decision regarding the citation, which was drawn up entirely improperly and later served as the basis upon which, as the author of the charge maintains, MEDVEDKOVA was transferred from the 103rd to the 3rd police division. Thus, the citation itself was totally improper. Now, as to the

reports by POTAPOV—there are two of them—one on her conduct at the 103rd police divison, and the other on her conduct at the time she was being transported to the 3rd police division

The instructions on the second report say: "please have registered and reported to the Prosecutor. Pivnitsky. October 13, 1983." The date is October 13, 1983, and GROMOV's testimony, according to which Senior Assistant Chief of Police, 103rd division, PIVNITSKY was ill and absent from work on that day, is a glaring contradiction. *The document is obviously backdated.* This give me reason to claim that everything pertaining to GROMOV's report, which accuses MEDVEDKOVA of resisting the police, as well as everything pertaining to POTAPOV's report, including the claims of battery, is untrue. The contradiction is in the instructions, written by an absent person, and this fact has been established in a court of law. It is clear that the date of these instructions could not have been October 13, 1983. But this means that MEDVEDKOVA and the witnesses for the defense are telling the truth! There are still more facts to support this.

The documents of the case show that the 103rd police division mailed the documents accusing MEDVEDKOVA in accordance with article 193, Section 2, of the Criminal Codex of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic to the office of the Public Prosecutor of the Lyublinsky District of the City of Moscow on the 22nd of October 1983, but the Public Prosecutor, whose office is located right in the neighborhood, practically across the street from the police headquarters, claims that the documents arrived *a month later*—on November 23rd, 1983. That the papers spent a month in the mail is impossible. I think that the office of the Public Prosecutor really did not receive the papers until November 23, 1983, and the police sent them not earlier than two or three days beforehand. This way everything is clear. PIVNITSKY's instructions become clear, too: they came long after October 13, 1983, when he had forgotten that on October 13, 1983, he was ill and could not work. Thus, MEDVEDKOVA is telling the truth.

Let us now take a look at the *Register of Arrested Persons* of the 103rd police division. There we have a contradiction: it indicates that MEDVEDKOVA was *released* at 1:00 P.M., and what follows is an obvious later addition: "a case for administrative penalty has been initiated." But if a case concerning administrative responsibility is initiated, and the passport of the suspect is in possession of the police, then it is not returned to the owner, but becomes one of the documents in the case. POTAPOV confirmed this at the court hearing, whereas GROMOV maintained that the passport may be withheld within 24 hours. That is true for cases when the passport was not withheld in advance, but MEDVEDKOVA's was, and GROMOV retained it to confirm MEDVEDKOVA's identity until 1:00 P.M., at which time he returned the passport to MEDVEDKOVA. It is recorded that MEDVEDKOVA was "released" at 1:00 P.M. Her arrest was entered on a different line and clearly later. Here we have another, documented, piece of proof that no accustion of petty hooliganism was brought against MEDVEDKOVA; therefore, there was no reason for transporting MEDVEDKOVA from the 103rd to the 3rd police division after her identity had been confirmed. MEDVEDKOVA says she and her colleagues behaved calmly in the 103rd police divison: they sat, read, and quietly waited. This in agreement with the entry in the *Register of Arrested Persons* which indicates that MEDVEDKOVA was released at 1:00 P.M., and her colleagues were released at the same time or slightly earlier. As to the version offered by the prosecution, it is documented by an improperly drawn-up statement, as we have just seen. There is a note in that statement made by a person named S. Gromov (no relation to police officer Gromov). Unfortunately, he was not called in as a witness. His testimony recorded in the statement of October 13, 1983, and his testimony given during the preliminary investigation are very different. It would be easy to show his contradictions in court. Was he an eye-witness?

Finally, the transportation of MEDVEDKOVA to the 3rd police division. If she ws lawfully transported to the 3rd police division, then she committed an infraction of the law by offering resistence while boarding the van, exiting the van, and being escorted upstairs to the second floor. However, other colleagues of MEDVEDKOVA were also transported from the 103rd police division to the 3rd police division. And this is clearly unlawful: there were no grounds for their arrest. The author of the statement of the prosecution maintains that the other colleagues of MEDVEDKOVA were not arrested, but expressed the desire to go voluntarily. But we know very well that the police never take friends of the arrested person with them, and certainly can never place them in custody "on their own volution" at the same time as their arrested friend. Yet, the documents of the case clearly show that for many hours MEDVEDKOVA was kept in custody together with LUSNIKOVA, BARBASH, and GODYAK on the second floor of the 3rd police division. Now, to the persons in plainclothes, whom MEDVEDKOVA and her colleagues mention.

In the patrol section of the 103rd police divsion there are police officers in uniform: GROMOV and BORISHEV. Why, then, when leaving the 103rd division did the detainment have to be carried out by plainclothesmen? Lawful demands can only be made, when possible, by officers of the law in uniform, leaving no doubt to the people concerned of their identity. GROMOV, officer on duty in uniform, released the witnesses GODYAK, BARBAH, LUSNIKOVA, and REITMAN. That no one denies. Three of these persons are in the automobile enroute to the 3rd police division earlier than MEDVEDKOVA and BARBASH, so they could not have asked to accompany MEDVEDKOVA. Here again we have facts, giving us cause to see that the witnesses testifying for the innocence of MEDVEDKOVA are telling the truth. During the trial I asked permission to interrogate the witnesses POROZHIKH and ZEMTSOV, policemen from the 3rd division. Their testimony was significant in that it established whether MEDVEDKOVA was detained alone or whether her colleagues were detained with her. In their testimony in the preliminary investigation, both these policemen declared that they had to hold *them all*, not just MEDVEDKOVA. Let's assume that POTAPOV was telling the truth. He transported documentments to the 3rd division for the holding of MEDVEDKOVA there, dispatched both the documents and MEDVEDKOVA and left. However, the arrival of neither the documents nor of MEDVEDKOVA was entered into the records of the 3rd police division. At first POTAPOV didn't even admit that he was carrying any documents concerning MEDVEDKOVA when he went to the 3rd division. Later, during the interrogation at the trial, he "remembered". Where, then, after all, were MEDVEDKOVA and the three witnesses, BARBASH, GODYAK, and LUSNIKOVA, sent? On the building where they were taken, there must have been signs indicating that it was the police station. The officer on duty at the 3rd division had the responsibility of receiving and guarding them. But all of them were not taken to the entrance of the 3rd division, but to a dormitory. This fact has been established incontrovertibly. Even the witnesses for the prosecution don't deny it. Consequently, the rules for detaining citizens were grossly violated. It is not clear whether these acts were lawful or who perpetrated them.

During the trial we heard the testimony of two witnesses who were personally near the 3rd police division. In addition, two testimonies of similar persons were read aloud by the court. Today the defense has, on the basis of gross violations of the procedures for recognizing persons, reasons to declare that these testimonies were *not trustworthy*. These witnesses should have been made, during the preliminary investigation, to establish the identity of the woman against whom they were testifying without help from outside sources.

Nothing of the kind was in fact done. Today it would be easy for a witness from the ranks of "innocent bystanders" to point out MEDVEDKOVA—she sits alone in the defendant's area. With regard to these witnesses the demands of the law were not carried out. There were no lineups. There is no basis on which to consider that the witnesses, who allegedly saw MEDVEDKOVA near the 3rd division were telling the truth. They describe her clothing in different ways.

One of the witnesses is not sure that MEDVEDKOVA is the same face that he saw. MEDVEDKOVA says that from the window of the room where they were all kept under guard she saw these persons who are now "eye-witnesses" arrived later. From this it is easy to understand why the "eye-witnesses" did not see any van near the dormitory transporting MEDVEDKOVA and her colleagues BARBASH, GODYAK, and LUSNIKOVA. Furthermore, there are some other flaws in the version of the prosecution. The author of the prosecution's statement qualifies MEDVEDKOVA's alleged infraction of the law as Article 193, Section 2, Criminal Code of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic. But who seconds the assigning of the crimes corresponding to this article? Who other than POTAPOV, the plaintiff? The officer on duty at the 103rd police division GROMOV did not see this. The students of the Poly-Technical Institute who happened to be near the 3rd division do not confirm this. There are rules of legal-medical expertise regarding what to consider battery, what to consider a blow, and what to consider a scratch. Article 79, Point 1, Criminal-Procedural Codex of the RSFSR declares that an expert legal-medical examination must be conducted when one is making claims of the kind POTAPOV has made of MEDVEDKOVA, that she be accused according to Article 193, Section 2. POTAPOV, however, did not consult any doctors, although, as a worker on the police force, as a criminal investigator, he knows very well about his obligation to undergo an examination by experts. Thus the investigator chose Article 193 of the Criminal Codex of the RSFSR without fulfilling the exigencies of the law and without presenting do-
comments of legal-medical examination.

IT IS MY OPINION THAT THE DOCUMENTS OF THE CASE REVIEWED IN COURT DO NOT PROVIDE SUFFICIENT GROUNDS FOR THE CONVICTION OF MS. MEDVEDKOVA UNDER ANY ARTICLE OF THE CRIMINAL CODE. I CONSIDER THAT THE ACCUSATION IS NOT PROVEN, AND FOR THAT REASON IT IS MY OPINION THAT THE COURT WILL ACT FAIRLY IN ACQUITTING MEDVEDKOVA.

Member of the Moscow Board of Defenders,
attorney D.M. Akselbant, Kandidat of Law

After some brief last words by the defendant (She spoke about her innocence, about the fabrication of the whole case in revenge for her participation in the group "For the establishment of trust between the USSR and the USA") there followed the conference of the court which lasted 2 hours. The sentence: conviction of MEDVEDKOVA to 2½ years imprisonment. Sentence, considering her pregnancy and her 8-year-old son, commuted to three years probation.

"The Trial" Ball-point pen on paper. One of 88 works by Sergei Batovrin confiscated by the KGB in August 1982 during the break-up of the exhibit in memory of victims of Hiroshima held at the apartment of Olga and Yurii Medvedkov.

APPEAL TO THE JUDGES

Citizen judges! In the history of Soviet judisprudence one can count millions and even tens of millions of cases in which perfectly innocent people have been condemned to longterm imprisonment or death. Subsequently many of them have been rehabilitated. The crime of many of these people was merely that their way of thinking differed in some way from the party line, which, we are supposed to believe, is infallible and always faithfully follows the principles of Marxism-Leninism.

In retrospect we can say that things have not been exactly as they were put in the governments special address to the twentieth convention of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. As judges, you must be wellacquainted with the trials preceding World War II, when your very colleagues were sentencing people to various terms of imprisonment on the charge of so called "anti-German sentiment", a charge which seems particularly absurd today.The crime of these people was that they had their own opinion, which contradicted that of the Party and the "Soviet people", who enthusiastically approved the Nazi-Soviet pact and condemned those governments (the "Franco-English imperialists" which dared to declare war on the Fascists in 1939.

Today we can declare with total certainty that the prosecution of those people in those years (whose "guilt" was "proven", though the facts spoke differently,) was absurd. By participating in the trials, the judges themselves obediently became the instruments of arbitrariness, and we can now unreservedly identify them as abettors of criminals and of crime itself--of that tragic crime which began on Poland in 1939 and which reached the Soviet Union and many other countries of the world in 1941.

History indeed repeats itself, and today in front of you on the defendants' bench instead of anti-Fascists are people whose opinion on such a complex question as peace and disarmament differs from fundamental party principles. I am profoundly certain that any position of a person or group, their political views or sense of the world notwithstanding, which is directed toward the elimination of a thermonuclear conflict cannot be considered a crime. Today you, the judges, must prove the opposite, and, as in past years, I m sure, you will rly only on the opinion of the Soviet government on this question.For that reason I suggest to you now that you either approach this case objectively or refuse to hear the case, which, like all past cases, will itself be of a criminal character and where you, the judges, will become the instrument and abettors of a crime.

ALEKSANDR SHATRAVKA

EURIPEDES ON WAR AND PEACE

BY MARK REITMAN

Mark Reitman, one of the key activists in the Soviet independent peace movement, mathematician, philosopher, writer, was forced out of the Soviet Union in February 1985. He is the author of numerous articles on war and peace which were widely distributed by peace activists in the Soviet Union. We present here an article on Euripedes in which Mark Reitman, much in the same tradition as Euripedes—and similarly motivated—makes abundant use of Aesopian language. (Aesopian language is the name of a literary device whereby an author says allegorically what he otherwise could not say at all, for fear of the consequences).

We don't look for wisdom in the old people still living among us. Still less do we expect to find great wisdom in the 'wise men' who have reached such great antiquity that by comparison even Shakespeare feels like someone of our own generation. This is time chauvinism. At bottom, just about everyone is vain about his own day and thinks poorly of times previous.

About ten years ago, in a fit of popularizer's mischievousness, I wrote a little article about 'dynamic programming' (a fashionable mathematic technique) in which I related this invention to the times of the ancient Egyptians. More cautious authorities had been making references to workd 'circa 1950'. I argued, however, that there was nothing in this super-modern idea that would be inaccessible to an educated Egyptian. Some chided me for having set up my hypothesis too lightheartedly; others for committing errors of historical fact (the Pharaoh and Ethiopia did not exist contemporaneously—all I can do now is confess my guilt).

As it turned out, though, in subsequent years math historians discovered that credit for the idea of dynamic programming should be granted to the Scotsman McLoren (1698–1746). And when I acquainted myself with the works of Archimedes (287–212 BC) I became convinced that he had as good a command of the method under discussion as did McLoren. What is more, Archimedes had a clearer and better understanding of the technique than do many modern mathematicians. His mind was less layered with the clutter of centuries that often leads one astray. What it comes down to is that even modern mathematics has roots going back into the ancient world; what, then, should one expect when discussing the humanities!

Nonetheless, time chauvinism keeps cropping up. You find it lurking even in the sort of people who like to bemoan the decline in moral standards, people you wouldn't have expected would fall prey to a blind devotion to their own thing, or of national chauvinism, or pride of profession. In the privacy of our thoughts, we are patriots of our own time; envious sorts even get irritated about the successes of other times. It might then seem especially peculiar to consult the ancients on questions of war and peace. What did Euripides know about nuclear missiles? Or his fellow compatriots about neutron weapons? But that incident with dynamic programming somewhat dimmed my pride of time. It may well be that we, proud inhabitants of the 20th century, have lost some primal quality and for that very reason are sliding towards the nuclear abyss, although no one of us would want our self-forgetful century to acquire the unglorious title "and also the last." At some point it became the accepted thing to consider the current world situation as being unique. To some extent, this is true; every historical moment is unique and always avenges itself when attempts are made to try it on the Procrustean bed of historical formulae. Add to this the unheard of power of modern weapons. But the totality of destruction for the ancient Greek meant no less psychologically than it does in our own day. Until the campaigns of Alexander, his world extended no further than a thousand kilometers from the Peloponessian peninsula. Try to fit yourself into the tunic of an ancient Greek, one familiar with the new and the old books, who saw the danger of Greece being conquered by aliens (for example the Persians). Add that this danger looked no sweeter to him than does the present nuclear threat: it meant the slaughter of nearly his entire people, and a pitiful state of slavery for the few survivors. It often happened that after such an invasion, an entire nation would disappear without a trace.

And let's suppose that this same Greek, whose tunic you have borrowed, is endowed with literary talent, but deprived of an overabundance of wealth, strength and beauty; and note that a fortunate person of those times needed the latter two qualities even more than one does in our own time. Suppose, furthermore, that the owner of your clothes has an inclination for scepticism and analysis, and for this reason is not the sort to get inflamed by cheap patriotic fervor, or infected by the epidemic xenophobia, or blinded with fury by the sight of the blood of his neighbour. Finally, suppose that he wishes passionately to live, and to create something that can't be corrupted, and that no one can force him to believe in the gods just because unbelief can be punished. Of course the playwright Euripedes (circa 48–46 BC) was not simply the sum of these traits just listed, but, without a doubt, they all lived within him, now helping, now hindering him in the attainment of the goals he set for himself. Euripedes' contemporaries - at any rate the Athenians—know him well but they liked him little, and selecteively at that. As with any other great person, he wore on his face the traces of dangerous free-thinking, even when zealously (if awkwardly) swearing devotion to the authorities. Plato, who was Euripedes' junior, hinted in his *Dialogues* that Euripedes did not believe in the sacredness of the oracle of Delphi: that's the same as to doubt today that the Academy of Sciences is scientific! In truth, Euripedes wasn't always able to keep to himself his opinion that the oracular expression of the will of the gods was manipualted by clever high priests (a denunication?)

Euripedes wrote tragedies, serious dramatic plays that developed the traditional plots using the traditional stage decrees. What distinguishes his creative work from that of other greek playwrights is the frequent presence of arguments on abstract themes. Often these debates put a stop to all other action in the play. His productions were not meant to be read: they should be seen on the stage from the fresh sun-filled gaze of an ancient Greek. Such a view is already closed to us. Our perception has been spoiled by cinema, and in part even by modern theatre which is going to seed.

I have seen a performance of "Medea" only once. Today it looks clumsy. People come in hordes to see it though! They come to enjoy the hints about modern reality. A mother kills her children in order to cause pain to the husband who abandoned her. What do I need to sit there for three hours for while they try to explicate the circumstances of the crime? Such a mother could never be pardoned, even by reason of insecurity. Is the plot so distant from us? In principle not really. A reliable eyewitness told me about a case of insanity that took place in the Ukraine in 1933. But there, the mother having killed her children also ate them. Even Medea wouldn't have gone that far. Even in the early blossoming of Greek pre-Homeric literature the only ones devouring their children were fathers; run-ins

between fathers and sons were no rarity. Nonetheless, to the modern reader, this Greco-Ukrainian subject would not be a legitimate theme for art; Euripedes finds it entirely to his taste. On the other hand I believe that if we were to go through all of Euripedes' plays, we would find more to disagree with.

This however makes it all the nicer to find myself in agreement with him on questions of war and peace. His handling of the questions has the sharpness of the modern analysis and the depth of the ancient.

There were quite a few ancient authors who were interested in the theme of peace, including the comedian Aristophanes, a junior and competitor of Euripedes who had a mean and mocking pen. All the same, Aristophanes' main goal was to get a laugh. He touched truth only in passing. Laughter is a shotgun with sights attached; say what you like, it degrades the object portrayed. And at the same time it threatens to turn criticism of militarism into harmless bantering. What's the point of avoiding war if it's so funny? Sometimes laughter makes one forget that war walks hand in hand with death. That is what happened in the case of the great poem, 'Vassily Terkin' by A Tvardovsky for which I have great respect, but all the same it is written by someone located behind the lines.

SHARPENING SWORDS

Euripedes enjoyed portraying tragic absurdities, the very thing that always accompanies wars, whether they be modern, ancient, civil, liberation, Punic . . . Wherein lies the modernity of Euripedes's approach to war? The author was not a non-resister, blind and deaf to all arguments in his opposition to violence. Euripedes did not negate the necessity of wars in certain extraordinary situations. What's more, he praised wars of liberation and of defense: he praised the young men of Athens who fell in such wars. He did denounce wars of acquisition and unjust wars, even when they were waged by his own land of Athens. The latter he had to do, of course, by allegory using Aesopian language in order to avoid being called a traitor. For example, Euripedes criticized the Athenian warring on distant Sicily only allegorically. This was no doubt not to the taste of the Athenian authorities,

their fairly democratic leanings notwithstanding, and Euripedes had to emigrate. In Athens, no barriers were put in the way of emigration. The threat of mass flight of their population did not number among their fears.

Of course, the main scourges of war are death, mutilation and destruction. But war also coarsens morals; it resurrects dormant discords, and increases the number of rear-guard scoundrels.

CONTINUATION OF EURIPEDES ON WAR AND PEACE

Anyway, let's give the floor to Euripedes, or rather to Glashatai of Thebes, propagandist for the opposing side:

Hope is a harmful business.
Reciprocally exciting the spirit
it plunges countries into abuse,
raising its voice for war
Each hopes the other will perish.
If they thought of their own death
While they cast their pebbles,
Hellas would not have perished from the wars.

Cleverly noted is the connection between prewar propaganda and the degeneration of a cold war into a hot one. It has occurred this way more than once even in our millenium. The Second World War was the inveitable result of an inhuman ideology; the First, however, was the fruit of the ambitions and miscalculations of the leaders of that time. As became clear much later, at the moment of the Sarajevo assassination neither side wanted to begin a war—everything just happened by itself, like a reflex, without any contribution from the intellect. In this electronic century, the most important decisions are usually made by machines without souls, to whom fear is unknown. True, the speeches of Euripedes' characters can be far from reflecting the opinions of the author—he often reveals his own opinions through a negative character. Apparently this happens with Glashatai as well, which adds a multilayered quality to his image.

Of course, not everyone agrees with Glashatai; many affirm that it is precisely fear, not hope, that engenders war. ("There is nothing to fear but fear itself"—F D Roosevelt.) Who is right? In fact both are right, for hope of survival, though the antithesis of fear, is actually akin to it to the extent that they easily flow one into the other. The tyrants of the Greek cities of Sparta and Thebes used fear as an instrument to manipulate their citizens. At the necessary moment, the moment of initiating the war, they would insinuate into their citizens' fear the hope for salvation through a pre-emptive strike.

The last step on the road to war is especially important:

An intelligent helmsman
Knows how to restrain himself at the right moment,

thinks Glashatai, probably bearing in mind the ruler of athens, Theseus the Just. Our times as well provide a number of examples of prudent restraint—although such a decision, needless to say, does not increase the power of the helmsman himself. Humanity should be forever grateful to N S Khrushchev, who during the 60's Cuban missile crisis did not turn his back on the ultimatum of John F. Kennedy. Historians argue over the magnitude of the role of this decision in the events that ensued—the power of Khrushchev could not survive any more.

The ideas of Theseus and Glashatai differ in many respects, and the latter closes the argument with this resume:

On the subject of this argument
You think one way, I will think another.

Often one can only guess at Euripedes' relation to one or the other side of the argument (the heroes of his tragedy argue incessantly). Without doubt Euripedes is not an advocate of unanimity. Verbal struggles should thunder while swords keep silent in their scabbards. Recognition of the right to hold differing opinions, according to Euripedes, is an important guarantee of peace, though not always an effective one. If "the 300 Spartans" had been Athenian philosophers, they would have had no less than 300 opinions and could not have stood against the Persians. But they had only one opinion—the opinion of Emperor Leonid—so they did not discuss; they fought instead. Only at the end of the 18th century did democratic armies begin at times to defeat authoritarian ones, but this was somehow accompanied by the fall in the democracy level to that of "absolutism."

The tragedy of "The Suppliants" is constructed around the mothers who come after a defeat to ask the victors for their sons' corpses. Euripedes sympathizes with their request (it happens that even irrational sons cannot be resurrected). But he definitely condemns their leader Adrast who does not restrain himself at the "necessary moment" and who has unleashed the war.

The tragedy ends with a scene in which the goddess Athena proposes that the conquered take a vow that they will not begin a new assault. The conquered usually did not withhold such oaths, and sometimes these were even written into the constitutions of conquered countries. But these promises, as a rule, do not survive longer than a generation. The practical Euripedes knew well the value of such vows. Here is the typical speech of the conquered Adrast:

People, a pitiful race!
Why do you sharpen your spears for reciprocal murder?
Enough! Without anxiety
Peacefully guard your cities.

Alas, such speeches are rarely found in the conquered. Only later and in other lands does one find the Emperor Ashoka, who gave the pledge of peace after a lost war—this, if seems, is the only ruler in all of history who did such a thing. There should be a monument to him in every capital of the world—however, such a monument does not stand even in the capital of India, his homeland and not by any means the most warlike of nations. The call to "peacefully guard one's own cities" too often remains without response—it's so much more fun to pillage the cities of others!

Do Wars Restore Justice?

During the long centuries before Euripedes, in his own time and after him, people have supposed that through war the justice that has been trampled on could be restored. Euripedes did not think so. The cause of the Trojan war, Helen (she is presented as such in "The Trojan Women") goes unpunished. On the other hand, many people did suffer who bore no responsibilityi for bloodshed. (Hecuba, for example, lost a son and a daughter—but what is Hecuba to Helen?) And what do the gods think on this subject? Most likely Euripedes thought that the gods were an empty fiction, though it was dangerous to assert this directly. However, by way of compensation for the gods, criticism was allowed. Here is how the wise Athena behaves in the tragedy "The Trojan Women," after having decided the fate of the Greek victors:

Athena: As they sail home from Ilion
Zeus will send them a shower of unheard-of hail . . .

Poseidon: Yes, it will be so. But the power to take Troy
Was given by you.

Athena: I want to punish them, allied with you.

Here the mechanism of decision-making by the world's powerful is presented in parodic form. It turns out that the gods are not omnipotent! They, as it were, set up draft committees to prepare dirty tricks for people, both large and small, then pass these along for the approval of Zeus. He then carries them out using the full strength of his power. The fact is not suppressed that even from the very beginning the Greeks acted with Athena's approval. Pointing to this, the scoundrel Poseidon chuckles, apparently with malicious pleasure—which does not keep him, however, from approving this proposal of Athena. By the way, the act of transferring to the gods the responsibility for dirty business is one of the main characteristics of the morality of that time. More than one rascal was comforted by the thought that he was created by the gods and that the latter bear the responsibility for his own scoundrel sins. But a believer in the gods would not have written in this way—this is the attitude of an atheist with a good share of cynicism, in no way that of a believer. The Biblical Job at the height of his diatribes ventures much less abuse—and is punished for his effrontery. Whereas in Euripedes, the gods arrange vile deeds like a bunch of swindlers. By the way, it is no better to look at those mortals who rule the world—emperors, tyrants, warriors, heroes. Even the great Herakles in Euripedes is wanting in intellect and is not overburdened with nobleness. And several tragedies are in general populated only with villains. Where, here, could one speak of justice!

Part II of *Euripedes* will follow in issue number 4.

Send letters objecting to the persecution of the independent Soviet peace movement to the following addresses:

SSSR, Moscow
Prospect Mira 36
Sovetskii Komitet Mira
Yurii Zhukov

SSSR, Moscow
Kremlin
General Secretary of C.P.S.U.

SEMINAR REPORT: CONVERSION, CONTINUED...

Text of Dr. Dudkin's presentation, at a seminar in Moscow

This document of the Group to Establish Trust between the USSR and the USA, 'Key to Peace,' presents two basic propositions.

The first proposition: the fundamental reason for the disappointing results of disarmament efforts can be traced to the absense of a personal interest in disarmament among military-industrial circles, the pressure of these circles on governments and their fostering of conditions of distrust between countries.

The second proposition: the way out of this dead-end situation for the world lies in the development and acceptance of the Project for Inter-Governmental Peaceful Conversion, established by means of the step-by-step transfer of the military-industrial personnel of both super-powers over to the development and implementation of global peace projects.

In connection with the first of these propositions, the following supporting arguments are made:

a) Military and other professionals working in the defence field would not be able to fulfill their current duties conscientiously if they did not believe in the unconditional importance of this work for their country. Any projects for agreements (between rival countries) are therefore looked upon them with particular prejudice;
b) Disarmament threatens their position in society;
c) The influence of the military-industrial personnel on the political leadership of the superpowers has unavoidably grown together with the increase in the military-industrial activities of the superpowers;
d) In recent years, time and again we have witnessed a historically unprecedented circumstance, whereby agreements already virtually concluded between countries are then rejected by the political leadership for extremely superficial reasons;
e) Even the leaders of the superpowers have noted the pressure exerted on them by the military-industrial circles in order to obtain increases in military expenditures.

There does not seem to be an urgent need to develop each of these points in detail (given of course that I and the other authors of this document do not find ourselves beset by questions concerning them). During the course of numerous private discussions on this question, we have found that doubts are raised not concerning these above enumerated points, nor concerning the basic thesis that the military-industrial complex exerts a negative influence on the process of disarmament. What has called forth doubts is the assertion that the military-industrial circles' lack of interest in disarmament can be called the fundamental root cause for the failure of peace efforts to achieve marked results. (The term 'military circles' here includes those living in the capitalist countries for whom detente may mean the threat of unemployment.)

Certain opponents of this position have asserted that the root cause belongs rather to the sphere of ideology and political economy and some of the latter believe that the ideology and practice of communism somehow require an arms race in connection with the following two basic reasons:

a) The internationalist ideology of communism presupposes that direct assistance be given to all friends of communist ideology and to opponents of the leading capitalist states. But in order to fearlessly assist pro-communist and anti-imperialist (as they are called) movements, it is necessary to have military superiority;
b) The state of military confrontation allows the leadership of the socialist countries to explain the difficulties of daily life and the relatively lower standard of living in the socialist as compared with the leading capitalist countries by pointing to the necessity for large military expenditures in order to keep pace with the arms race imposed on them by the opposing superpower. In conditions of detente, the governments of the socialist countries would no longer be able to point to the arms race imposed upon them and would not be able to make the same excuses before their population which would have already discovered the relative inefficiency of the socialist economic system.

To our mind, these arguments for all their seeming significance and reasonableness appear absolutely false. It is true that the ideology and practice of communism presupposes the extension of assistance to all long-standing as well as incidental allies. But such help can be extended even under conditions of detente. Moreover, experience shows that in conditions of a run-away arms race, it becomes more and more problematic to extend such help, inasmuch as each further step in this direction brings the human race closer and closer to the brink.

As to the second 'economic' argument, it works on the questionable assumption that the leaders of the socialist countries are aware of the comparative inefficiencies of the socialist system and feel a need to somehow justify to the population their comparative economic deficiencies in comparison with the developed capitalist countries.

But isn't it clear, after all, that detente and the effects of the joint intergovernmental projects will lead to a significant, steady rise in the standard of living, which will clearly be welcomed by the population? As to the comparative deficiencies in the standard of living; even if we assume that the leadership of the socialist countries in fact need to 'justify themselves before their populations,' they can still find other justifications. They can, for example, point to the consequences of the previous (and present) long period of the arms race. In this way, one can see that the ideological explanation whereby the leadership of the socialist countries are assumed to have a personal stake in the continuation of the arms race does not hold up under close examination.

As regards the efforts to explain the cause of the capitalist governments' motivation for maintaining the arms race by reference to socio-economic factors, this position usually appeals to the following two arguments:

a) Large monopolies have a personal interest in receiving large military orders and therefore exert pressure on the political stance of their respective governments;
b) The governments of the capitalist countries have their own motivation to keep up the arms race so as to halt the rise in unemployment, or to lower the rate of unemployment.

We will not try to contradict these arguments, inasmuch as they already completely coincide with our own arguments concerning the reasons why military-industrial circles find the disarmament process not to be in their own interest. Be that as it may, I would prefer to consider the main thesis of this presentation to be the following: independently of whether we consider the fundamental reason for the arms-race to be the military industry's personal stake in seeing it continue (ie lack of a personal interest in disarmament), or ideological disputes, or the existing state of distrust, or yet another reason, the path out of the global nuclear dead-end proposed by us in our document may in any case serve as the key to eliminating, or dramatically lowering, the danger of a nuclear catastrophe.

Actual realization of the ideas presented in the proposed agreements for shifting the military-industrial personnel of the superpowers over the work on development and implementation of joint inter-governmental peace projects will have a many-sided result. In fact the realization of these ideas will:

a) Eliminate the problem of the military-industrial complex not having a personal interest in encouraging disarmament;
b) Bring into being a fundamentally new groundwork upon which can be constructed an atmosphere of trust and co-operation between the people of the superpowers;
c) Create conditions in which co-operation towards elimination of the ecological, bio-chemical and other dangers threatening mankind will become possible;
d) Create conditions in which the superpowers can better take advantage of the constructive aspects of the other side's experience in resolving the economic and social problems within their respective countries.

It would seem that even the extreme pessimists, who believe that due to ideological dif-

ferences the destruction of mankind is already inevitable, would have to admit that the acceptance of our proposals would at any rate postpone the day of nuclear conflict. What's more, such a postponement might give mankind the time it needs to rationally resolve ideological and other sources of conflict in an atmosphere of greater trust and co-operation.

Based on this assumption, I would like to call upon those involved in this debate not to take their example from my essay but instead to concentrate on discussion of the following:

a) A more detailed elaboration of possible directions which inter-governmental projects, to be implemented by the joint efforts of the military-industrial personnel of the superpowers, could take;

b) Possible organizational forms which would allow the most rapid implementation of joint conversion.

L Dutkin

EAST EUROPE:

JOINT DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENT PEACE DEFENDERS IN THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC AND IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA

It is now a year since, in both our countries, new Soviet missiles were deployed. This step was alleged to contribute to the 'balancing' of the nuclear strength of both superpowers. In reality peace was even more endangered and the arms race continues.

This criticism is addressed to all states which are preparing for a new world war, which threaten their neighbours and often order about their own citizens to whom, however, they deny participation in decisions about truly fundamental questions of their own lives. In this way two more countries—our own countries—have become not only bases for nuclear missiles but also much more likely targets for nuclear revenge. We therefore protest once again against the siting and extension of nuclear complexes on our territory. We are therefore in solidarity with the peace movements in the West which, in their own countries, protest against militarism and nuclear armament.

We regard the following step as the first and important one: No missiles in Europe from the Ural Mountains to the Atlantic! Together with the Polish, Soviet and Hungarian independent peace movements, we believe that nuclear armament is not the reason for the present international crisis. Today's state of affairs is the result of the practices of power politics, that is, of the pursuit of particular, often selfish, interests.

Those who think in terms of 'blocs' and 'enemies' render an honest dialogue impossible. Those who tolerate social inequality or even widen the gap are responsible for hunger and poverty. Those who deny the dignity of individual human beings, who deny freedom of opinion, necessarily also tend to resolve national and international problems by means of violence.

Peace is indivisibly linked to the implementation and observance of all human rights. We want to live in an open society which respects its men and women. The road to such a society does not lead through military barracks, a polluted environment, and missile-launching ramps.

Czechs, Slovaks and Germans from the GDR are jointly signing this declaration as evidence of a continuous alliance and cooperation. Our common solidarity cannot be threatened by any historical resentment nor by any political police. Above all, we are united in the following idea: *Peace in Europe and nuclear disarmament in the world!* We appeal to independent peace movements and to independent citizens' initiatives to join this declaration.

Signed by:
From Czechoslovakia: Peter Cibulka, Jiri Dienstbier, Karel Freund, Vaclav Havel, Eva Kanturkova, Jan Kozlik, Ladislav Lis, Vaclav Maly, Anna Marvanova, Jaroslav Meznik, Radim Palous, Jan Ruml, Jaroslav Sabata, Anna Sabatova jn, Petruska Sustrova, Peter Uhl.
From the German Democratic Republic: Barbel Bohley, Antje Dotkger, Martin Dotkger, Werner Fischer, Elisabeth Gubbes, Catja Havemann, Irena Kukotz, Traudel Kulikowsky, Gisela Metz, Stefan Pickhart, Ulrike Poppe, Jutta Seidl, Anna Quasdorf.

Prague and Berlin, 22 November 1984
(Text and translation from Palach Press)

Original of KGB summons to an interrogation in Lefortoro prison received by Oleg Radzinsky in 1982. He is expected home in 1989.


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This is not a target. It is a peace symbol on the back of a young Muscovite.

Volume 9. Two Germanies, 1961-1989
Peace and Human Rights (1986)

In November 1985, after a human rights seminar planned by various East Berlin peace groups was canceled at the last minute under pressure from the Ministry for State Security [the Stasi], preparation committee members Wolfgang Templin, Ralph Hirsch, and Peter Grimm decided to issue a call for a general discussion of human rights. In doing so, they took a decisive step away from a narrowly focused peace movement toward a more general opposition to the GDR dictatorship. Templin, Hirsch, and Grimm were active in the "Peace and Human Rights" Initiative, which, in the following years, became one of the most important opposition groups in the GDR. Within the peace movement, however, there were differences, most of which, as the second text shows, concerned the manner in which the movement was to be organized and represented.

I. Speaker of the "Peace and Human Rights" Initiative (Human Rights Seminar)

Dear Friends!

Within the peace movement there is a growing consciousness of the close connection between peace and human rights. Many experiences in recent years prove that the goals of peace initiatives depend upon the implementation of basic democratic rights and freedoms. There is a tense continuation of the arms build-up in both political blocs, negotiations are being held behind closed doors, and peace movement activists are being prosecuted and sometimes criminalized, without any regard for those affected. As far as these practices are concerned, the "Western democracies" are right up there with our governing leaders. That's the state of our experience – we didn't know how to deal with it. We have yet to do any real work in the area of human rights, aside from reacting to isolated cases and spontaneously expressing concern. Last summer, people in various Berlin peace groups proposed the organization of a human rights seminar. At the first meeting, common experiences were to be discussed, ways of working on human rights issues reviewed, and contacts made. The proposed subjects and focal points were regarded as an impetus to discussion and were to aid in the later results of our work. Our statement regarding the postponement of the human rights seminar of November 16, 1985, and our letter to the synods of the Berlin-Brandenburg state church document the debates on the prohibition of the seminar.

This situation did not relieve us of our responsibility to organize a human rights seminar and to do further work in this area. In the preparation committee, additional agenda points were discussed and devised; working groups were formed to address them. In these groups, members of different church and autonomous peace groups worked together. We would like to

inform you of the current state of our work.

Main subject areas and working groups:

- Peace and human rights
- The right to employment as a basic human right
- Human rights and society (historical development)
- Human rights and the justice system
- Church and human rights
- Human rights and education/childrearing – youth
- Prospects for human rights work in the GDR
- Environment, health, and human rights
- Human rights in the military sphere

In all these subject areas, we want to concentrate on the situation and on development in our own country; this does not rule out a discussion of human rights problems and cooperation and solidarity with human rights initiatives in other countries.

We aspire for our work to spread throughout the GDR. Presently, representatives of all the above-mentioned subject areas and working groups are active in a preparatory committee that meets in Berlin and coordinates the content-related and organizational work on a regular basis.

The “Peace and Human Rights” preparation committee will be represented publicly by three spokespersons who will rotate annually. We wish and hope for your ideas, criticisms, materials, and participation. The current spokespersons are Wolfgang Templin, Ralph Hirsch, and Peter Grimm.

II. Expression of Protest by the Opposing Faction: Statement Regarding the Preparations for the “Peace and Human Rights Seminar”

[. . .]

There was agreement to continue work on a seminar, to form working groups on various subjects, to have an editorial committee draft a new petition whose contents are more specific than the present one and to submit this to the synods of the Protestant state churches, and to appoint a group of three spokespersons. The spokespersons’ sole function will be to inform the church leadership and the hosts of the parochial church council of the status of our work and to represent the opinions of the preparation committee. Content-related and organizational work in the preparation phase should finally be better coordinated. March 1986 was fixed as the target date for a new seminar. Also, the working groups were nominally constituted, and it was agreed that the entire group of people organizing the seminar should be convened for all important decisions and in special situations.

At a later meeting in December 1985, the preparation committee sent the aforementioned petition to the synods.

At the next meeting on January 9, 1986, several interested people were told that their presence

had not been intended, since a coordinating group comprising the three speakers and the conveners of the working groups had already been formed on November 23, 1985, and they were not part of that group. But since such a decision obviously contradicts grassroots democratic principles – also in the view of the coordinating group – those people were allowed to stay. At this meeting, the decision was made to draft an informational letter to peace groups and friends [here] in the GDR who are interested in the seminar. The text was to have an exclusively informal character and to provide information on the status of preparations for the seminar.

On February 3, RIAS and SFB[1] announced that representatives of various peace groups had met in East Berlin and decided to make human rights the focus of GDR-wide peace work. The basis of this was a so-called Document III of a "Peace and Human Rights Initiative." This was how most people involved in organizing the seminar found out that such a "document" existed, since it was not delivered to the Berlin peace groups. This omission constitutes a violation of the instructions given on January 9, 1986. Attempts were made later to shift responsibility for this onto others.

The lone authors of this letter are the three speakers, who showed the letter – mind you, already in duplicated form – to only five members of the coordinating group prior to its dissemination.

The high-handed, autocratic actions of the speakers' group in composing the so-called Document III constitute a major breach of trust. The portions of the text that had not been agreed upon pertain to:

1. political assessments that anticipate the possible results of the seminar, which has yet to be held;
2. the announcement of intentions for GDR-wide human rights work,
3. the labeling of the statement of November 16, 1985, the petition of December 1985, and the "information" of January 24, 1986, as "Documents I to III";
4. the pretension of an "annually rotating" group of speakers to represent the group publicly;
5. the transformation of the preparation committee involved in organizing the seminar into a "Peace and Human Rights Initiative."

With this, the reservations of the Treptow parochial church council and the representatives of the church leadership, which had led to the postponement of the seminar, were indirectly confirmed. In the text, the seminar's role as the aim of the undertaking retreats into the background.

The contents of the so-called Document III represent a political threat to the preparations for the seminar, create a sectarian separation between human rights and peace work, and harm the peace movement.

When the speakers were first confronted about this so-called Document III, they either made light of the criticism or did not respond at all. Their comments included: this is the agreed upon informational letter; there was no reason to convene the preparation committee; the passages to which there is objection include approved terms; the interpretations feared by those who intervened represent nothing but panic-mongering; the critics are actually obstructionists who

[1] RIAS [Radio in the American Sector] and SFB [Sender Freies Berlin] were two radio stations in West Berlin – trans.

waste time by constantly raising provocative discussions of fundamental issues and hamper the work being done.

When – contrary to the expectations of the speakers' group – reservations were voiced more loudly and pressure to convene a meeting of the entire preparation committee grew, massive efforts were made up front to exclude critics from this meeting and to prevent their attendance. Some members of the preparation committee were given false information about the time and date of the meeting; some claimed that everyone had already been invited to it – though this can be proven untrue – and, up to the last minute, attempts were made to keep critics of the so-called Document III away from the meeting on February 24, 1986. One of the speakers even said at the meeting itself that the presence of some of the people there was contrary to what had been agreed upon, though invitations were extended to friends who belonged neither to the coordinating group nor to the critics.

Consequently, the meeting was very emotionally charged from the outset. The spokespersons tried to shift the blame to the people who attended the meeting of January 9, 1986, by once again claiming that the contents of Document III corresponded with what had been agreed upon at that meeting, and that whoever was unaware of that must have been sleeping. The charge of sabotage and pressure for a discussion of fundamental principles was reiterated. But since a majority, even among those friends who had initially remained impartial, had expressed criticism, and since no convincing arguments for the so-called Document III were presented, a vague disclaimer representing the minimum consensus on defusing the criticized text was drafted after four hours of discussion. This result was immediately undermined by assurances that the conditions in the preparation committee would repeatedly lead to the same old conflicts. On the very same evening, some participants reported that they did not feel bound by the minimum consensus.

This makes it clear to us that any hope of working toward a joint seminar in the present group is illusory. Therefore we have come to the following conclusions:

We declare:

- that the preparation of a human rights seminar, in particular, requires democratic conduct and organizational structures. The moral integrity of those involved is a prerequisite for working together in a trusting relationship. Dirty tricks cannot be tolerated.
- that, for us, this subject is an integral part of peace work, and we want to continue to work toward this end;
- that our political responsibility forces us to stop participating in this preparation committee as of the present meeting.
- that we intend to organize a seminar in Berlin and we invite anyone interested to help organize it. One possible theme is: "Human rights – the individual and society."

The following subjects could be addressed as part of this:

- different ideas of democracy and other forms of rule (e.g., grassroots, commissar republic, pre-bourgeois, bourgeois, and socialist democracies);
- development and differentiation of legal terms
- experience with socialist law and social practice in the GDR
- questions of concrete solidarity

This is not a firm program, but instead is open for any subject-related modifications.
This paper is intended for use in the GDR.

Signed: Vera and Knud Wollenberger, Silvia Müller, Thomas Klein, Reinhard Schult, and Wolfgang Wolf

Source: „Sprecher der Initiative ‚Frieden und Menschenrechte' (Menschenrechtsseminar)" ["Spokespersons of the 'Peace and Human Rights' Initiative (Human Rights Seminar)"] and „Erklärung zur Vorbereitung eines Seminars ‚Frieden und Menschenrechte'" ["Explanation of Preparations for the 'Peace and Human Rights Seminar'"]; reprinted in Wolfgang Rüddenklau, ed., *Störenfried. DDR-Opposition in Texten 1986-1989* [*Troublemaker. The GDR Opposition in Texts 1986-1989*]. Berlin, 1992, pp. 56-57.

Translation: Allison Brown

have the right to withdraw from this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests. It shall give notice of its decision to withdraw to the other Party six months prior to withdrawal from this Treaty. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events the notifying Party regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

Article XVI

Each Party may propose amendments to this Treaty. Agreed amendments shall enter into force in accordance with the procedures set forth in Article XVII governing the entry into force of this Treaty.

Article XVII

1. This Treaty, including the Memorandum of Understanding and Protocol which form an integral part thereof, shall be subject to ratification in accordance with the constitutional procedures of each Party. This Treaty shall enter into force on the date of the exchange of instruments of ratification.

2. This Treaty shall be registered pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

DONE at Washington on December 8, 1987, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:

Ronald Reagan

President of the United States of America

FOR THE UNION SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS:

M. Gorbachev

General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU

Inscription reads: "Dear Bernard! I want to thank you for your enormous contribution to preventing nuclear war. Without it and other powerful anti-nuclear initiatives it is unlikely that this Treaty would have come about. I wish you all the best. Mikhail Gorbachev."