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TRANSITION TOWARD DEMOCRACY IN SPAIN:
OPINION MOOD AND ELITE BEHAVIOR

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ABSTRACT

Transition Toward Democracy in Spain: Opinion Mood and Elite Behavior

This paper is intended to give an explanation of the transition process from authoritarian rule to democracy in Spain. It focuses on the relationship between general states of public opinion and the behavior of the elite, both regime and opposition. A considerable amount of empirical information is provided to illustrate the socioeconomic situation of the country and the opinion mood during the transitional period.

Relying mostly on certain classical theorists--Machiavelli, De Tocqueville--an explanation of the Spanish transition is advanced along the following reasoning: The way in which transition toward democracy has taken place in Spain is as much a function of the internal dynamics of the ruling sectors of the Franco regime as it is of pressures from those sectors. The conjunction of both factors precipitated the change only within the presence of two catalytic elements: the natural passing of Franco, and the role of a King who had been appointed by Franco and enjoyed the loyalty of the armed forces. Against a societal background of decreasing social inequalities, increasing cultural secularization, economic crisis, and concern about the future, government and opposition would meet the democratic covenant--perhaps because the most staunch Francoists did not feel strong enough to maintain the authoritarian system without paying high costs, difficult to anticipate; while, on the other hand, the regime's political opponents also did not feel strong enough to attempt its overthrow without risking failure.

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Introduction

It is the aim of this paper to briefly describe the transition process from authoritarianism to a representative system of government in Spain.¹ The main focus of the paper will be to illustrate the Spanish public-opinion mood before and during the political transition, and its degree of consistency with elite movement.² This analysis will be placed within a more general interpretive framework of political change which has largely been advanced by other authors writing on transition.

Spain's system of government has evolved from dictatorship to democracy during a three-year period (1976-1978). Most importantly, parliamentary democracy in Spain has been built after a reform strategy, and without any formal--neither rapid nor violent--breakdown of the Franco regime.

It has been argued that successful political reform is an even rarer phenomenon than revolution.³ Hence, there has been no little surprise and much curiosity about contemporary Spanish politics. The increasing amount of literature and concern about Spanish politics among social scientists illustrates this fact⁴ (not to mention the attention that the Western mass media have been devoting to the Spanish political process after Franco). In dealing with this literature, a conclusion can be easily drawn: that description of recent political change in Spain does not fit properly into any of the grand theories of political change or development. Neither Marxian nor developmentalist theories of politics offer an acceptable explanation of the Spanish case.⁵ Some consolation, however, can be found in the more classical writings and in the writings of non-grand-theory-oriented contemporaries. Indeed, some classical ideas and hypotheses seem highly valuable in understanding the politics of post-Franco Spain. From this perspective, there are several guidelines of interest. First, the establishing of a given type of regime is as much a function of a certain necessity in the society as it is of a constellation of favorable events and circumstances, or of the capability of available leadership (nesessitá, fortuna, and virtú in Machiavelli).⁶ Second, a representative system of government is more likely to succeed in a society without much social inequality (Aristotle, Machiavelli).⁷ Third, the fear of reverting to a situation of generalized violence or civil war fosters the acceptance of a given type of regime (Hobbes, Machiavelli).⁸ Finally, when a society has reached a certain degree of complexity in its socio-economic structure and its State apparatus, the change of regime leaves largely untouched both the social structure and the State administration--mainly because previous important changes at both levels have helped to

remove the old regime; in other words, that main structural transformations have already taken place and have undermined the regime (De Tocqueville).⁹ As will be shown in this paper, the Spanish process of transition toward democracy is more illustrative of these classical theoretical statements than of general theories of class struggle or the relationship between industrialization and political development.¹⁰

As for the advantage of looking to contemporary non-grand-theory-oriented writers, there are several approaches of interest in studying the Spanish case. On the one hand, it is fruitful for political analysis to identify major political actors, the kind and amount of their resources, their strategies, and the constraints existing on the viability of different political alternatives. These factors have been conceptualized in a different manner by such authors as Hirschman and Dahl.¹¹ On the other hand, it may be pertinent to look at the interplay of different political actors within the broader net of relationships between the powerful, the power-seekers, the political stratum, and the apolitical stratum of a given system.¹² There is the axiom that political opposition will be permitted if the government feels that an attempt to repress it would fail, or that, even if it succeeds, the cost of coercion would be higher than the benefits.¹³ Once the barriers to opposition are reduced, organized political pluralism will spring up to the extent that there are latent groups and subcultures in the polity striking to get into the open. In a sense, "organizational pluralism is ordinarily a concomitant, both as a cause and effect, of the liberalization and democratization of hegemonic regimes."¹⁴ At the same time, once political pluralism is institutionalized, it does not necessarily follow a high degree of equality in the distribution of resources--political, economic, or any other kind. Hence a change toward democracy, or the stabilization of a pluralistic polity, is not a sufficient condition for a society to enter a path of uninterrupted progress toward equality.¹⁵

In shifting from these conceptual considerations toward Spanish political reality, a main thesis of this paper will be that the way in which the transition toward democracy has taken place in Spain (non-violent, reformist, and legalistically oriented) is as much a function of the internal dynamics of the ruling sectors of the Franco regime as it is of pressures from outside these sectors. The conjunction of both sets of factors precipitated the change of regime only in the presence of two catalytic elements without which Spain's transition could hardly be understood: the natural passing of General Franco, and the role of a King who had been appointed by Franco and enjoyed the loyalty of the armed forces--all within a society which had been undergoing profound structural transformations since the 1950s and had rapidly reduced its traditional levels of inequality, and which had passively accepted the Franco regime and was highly depoliticized. Against a recent historical background of civil war, repression, and absence of civil rights, the majority of Spaniards were going to witness--not without some fear and anxiety--how government and opposition would more or less peacefully meet the democratic covenant; perhaps largely because the most staunch Francoists (civil and military) did not feel strong enough to maintain the authoritarian system without paying high costs, hard to anticipate; while, on the other hand, the regime's political opponents also did not feel strong enough to attempt its overthrow without risking failure.¹⁶

The Calendar of Transition

It seems appropriate here to list the main institutional signposts defining the process of transition to democracy in Spain.¹⁷ An explanation will then be advanced touching the different dimensions stated above: structural changes in society, mass political aspirations and mobilization, and internal conflicts of the Francoist elite, all mediated by the event of Franco's death and the performance of King Juan Carlos.

The calendar of change can be reconstructed in the following terms:

- November 1975: The passing of Franco, and the oath-taking of King Juan Carlos as prescribed under Franco's law.
- March 1976: All major forces of opposition to the Franco regime united in Coordinación Democrática (an opposition platform broader than the former Junta Democrática, set up in Paris in 1974).
- July 1976: Premier Carlos Arias--who served as premier under Franco--dismissed by the King after failing to gain acceptance of his proposals for limited democracy. Adolfo Suárez appointed new premier. First limited amnesty decreed.
- November 1976: The Francoist Assembly (Cortes), on the initiative of the Suárez government, passes Law for Political Reform, which dissolves the Assembly, formally opening the way for free general elections.
- December 1976: Disavowing the campaign for mass abstention waged by most opposition forces (and the campaign for a negative vote waged by the most reactionary opposition forces), more than 70 percent of the Spanish electorate backs the Reform Law in referendum.
- February to April 1977: Most political parties are legalized. The Movimiento and official unions are dissolved. An electoral coalition of 14 minor parties (Unión de Centro Democrático) is formed under the leadership of Prime Minister A. Suárez.
- March and October 1977: Second and third amnesties decreed.
- June 1977: First general election of a Parliament (consisting of a Congress of Deputies and a Senate), meant to be "ordinary," but in fact bound to draft a Constitution as its main endeavor. In this sense, it serves as a constituent assembly.

- December 1978: A Constitution approved in Parliament, and voted in referendum.
- March 1979: First general election takes place under the new Constitution.
- April 1979: First free local election under the new system of government.

All of these events took place without any formal breakdown of previous authoritarian legislation or any important political denunciation of the Franco regime--although it must also be said that they occurred in an atmosphere in which neither localized violence nor a certain amount of general suspense were absent. Why was it that the Spanish people--both the elites and the public--chose this way to transform their polity? The following pages attempt to shed some light on this question.

Structural Changes In Contemporary Spanish Society

It would require excessive space to describe the socioeconomic and cultural transformations undergone by Spanish society in the last two decades.¹⁸ Yet some facts may be pointed out as relevant to the political questions being posed in this paper.

First, brief mention needs to be made of some of the structural changes undergone by Spanish society during the second half of the Franco regime and under rapid industrialization. This is not to imply that these changes happened because of the authoritarian regime, although they were obviously promoted by, and concomitant to, it (rapid industrialization would have taken place 10-15 years earlier had Spain joined the Allies in World War II, as was the case in other European countries). The point is that these changes have reduced social inequalities largely to a question of historical significance. And they had a positive effect on the maintenance and at least passive legitimation of the Franco regime, as well as affecting the kind of political change occurring after Franco.

By the mid-1970s, Spanish society was less inequalitarian than ever before in contemporary history. Perhaps more social sectors were concerned with keeping what they had gained than ever before. In addition, most Spaniards had little interest in politics, but rather strong socioeconomic concerns. Given these circumstances, the society at large offered an appropriate cushion to the maneuvering of the political elites (government and opposition) to settle their historical differences amicably, since most of the people were not prepared to become involved in risky actions either to maintain the authoritarian regime or to topple it. They would even suffer patiently the violence of minority groups of the extreme right or left. The aim of most people was to maintain a rather affluent society, with open opportunities of all kinds.

This hypothesis concerning the political effects of reduced inequalities is closer to the thought of Aristotle and Machiavelli than to the theories of Tocqueville, Marx, or modern political-development theorists such as Lerner, Deutsch, etc. On the one hand, it is not being proposed

that economic development need have a linear relationship to the growth of democracy (Lerner, Deutsch, etc.). Nor is it proposed here that the enlargement of the Spanish proletariat accompanying industrialization was likely to foster a classical Marxian revolution. On the other hand, the relative-deprivation theory of revolution (Tocqueville) might have applied to Spain had the Franco regime remained in existence until the present day, when economic recession is having a strong impact on the prosperity of individuals, who currently feel that they have less now than they had before. The hypothesis is closer to Aristotle and Machiavelli in the sense that democracy is more likely to be successfully established and maintained when there is little social inequality than under opposite conditions.¹⁹ This is a rather modest proposition, but one which--in today's industrial Spain, as in preindustrial history--might be a fruitful one.

Although the industrialization of the Spanish economy began in the last quarter of the 19th century, it stalled several times due to internal and international crises--the last, and most significant of which, for our purposes, was the world crisis of the 1930s, followed by civil war, and an international blockade lasting into the early 1950s. From this point until the present international economic crisis, rapid industrialization took place in Spain, affecting the country's social structure to the most significant extent in modern history. To mention some conventional economic indicators, per capita income increased from about \$500 in the early 1960s to more than \$3,000 in the late 1970s.²⁰ Agricultural labor, which accounted for almost 50 percent of total employment in 1950, fell to 42 percent in 1960, and is less than 20 percent today.²¹ Obviously, this has been accompanied by a rapid increase in urbanization: in 1960, 34 percent of the people were living in towns of more than 100,000 inhabitants; this figure had increased to 44 percent by 1970.²²

These socioeconomic changes implied higher standards of living as well as a better distribution of resources among Spaniards. After the expansion of the industrial and service sectors of the economy, the middle strata of society became the majority.

It is our hypothesis that these changes fostered the legitimation (at least of a passive variety) of the regime under which they occurred, and relegated political discontent to minor segments of the society--the better informed, and largely the better-off.²³ Actually, the Spanish economy began to deteriorate at the end of the Franco regime as a consequence of the oil crisis. Spaniards became aware of the economic crisis, but by the time of Franco's death, they did not seem to think that the regime under which they had prospered was to blame for it. The opinion surveys of that time reflect the objective decrease of consumption standards, but express a rather hopeful outlook that things were going to get better, both for the country and for the individual. In contrast, the Spanish people currently seem less optimistic, but there is not now an authoritarian regime to be toppled nor a political force--either in government or opposition--that can credibly offer the people a rapid and successful way out of the economic crisis.

TABLE 1

INDICATORS OF WELLBEING AND INCOME DISTRIBUTION IN SPAIN

| Year | A. Intergenerational occupational mobility (from manual to nonmanual), Percent | B. Wages and salaries as percent of total national income | C. Percent of house- holds with: | | | D. Percent of people saying they are better off or worse off than 5 years earlier | |
|------|---|--|--|-------------------|-----|---|-------|
| | | | T.V. | Refri- gerator | Car | better | worse |
| 1960 | - | - | 1 | 4 | 4 | - | - |
| 1966 | 27.6 | 53 | - | - | - | - | - |
| 1970 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| 1973 | 34.3 | 58 | 85 | 82 | 38 | - | - |
| 1976 | - | - | - | - | - | 42 | 14 |
| 1977 | - | 64 | - | - | - | - | - |
| 1979 | - | - | - | - | - | 36 | 20 |

- SOURCES: A. Informe Sociológico sobre la Situación Social de España 1970 (Madrid: Euramérica, 1970), pp. 586-588; Estudios Sociológicos sobre la Situación Social de España 1975 (Madrid: Euramérica, 1976), p. 740.
- B. Estudios Sociológicos. . .1975, p. 959; Informe Mensual, Abril 1980 (Caja de Pensiones "La Caixa"), p. 23.
- C. Estudios Sociológicos. . .1975, p. 975.
- D. Data for 1976 are from the Instituto de Opinión Pública, and belong to a national survey conducted in May. Data of 1979 are from a national survey by the Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas, and were published in Revista Española de Investigaciones Sociológicas, N. 6 (April-June 1979), p. 239. In both surveys the question was: "En comparación a como Vd. vivía hace cinco años ¿diría Vd. que hoy vive más satisfecho, igual de satisfecho o menos satisfecho"?

TABLE 2

OBJECTIVE INDICATORS OF SPANISH ECONOMIC CONDITIONS, 1970-1979

| Year | A. Annual rates of increase in GNP per capita (con- stant prices, 1970) | B. Annual rates of increase in national consumption (constant prices, 1970) | | | C. Annual rates of increase in the cost of living (consumption prices constant, 1970) | D. Annual rates of average increase in wages and salaries per hour (monthly, 1970 = 100) | E. Wage increase over inflation rates (percent constant prices, 1970) |
|------|--|---|---------|--------|---|--|--|
| | | Total | Private | Public | | | |
| 1970 | - | - | - | - | 100 | 100 | - |
| 1971 | - | - | - | - | 109.7 | 113.9 | 3 |
| 1972 | 7.0 | 7.5 | 7.8 | 5.5 | 117.6 | 133.7 | 9 |
| 1973 | 7.0 | 7.7 | 7.8 | 6.7 | 134.1 | 160.5 | 5 |
| 1974 | 4.7 | 4.6 | 4.1 | 8.3 | 158.1 | 203.5 | 8 |
| 1975 | 0.0 | 2.3 | 2.0 | 5.2 | 180.4 | 256.5 | 10 |
| 1976 | 2.0 | 4.4 | 4.3 | 5.3 | 216.1 | 334.5 | 8 |
| 1977 | 1.3 | 2.1 | 1.9 | 3.7 | 273.1 | 435.4 | 3 |
| 1978 | - | - | - | - | 318.4 | 549.5 | 8 |
| 1979 | - | - | - | - | 367.9 | 675.3 | 6 |

SOURCES: A, B: España, Anuario Estadístico 1979 (Madrid: INE, 1979), p. 295.

C, D: Boletín Mensual de Estadística, several issues (Madrid: INE, 1979).

E: These figures come from C and D after the formula $\frac{D_1}{D_2} \cdot \frac{C_1}{C_2} \cdot 100 - 100$ where D_1 represents

wage increase in a given year and D_2 is the increase in the previous year; C_1 and C_2 represent cost-of-living increase rates for a given year and previous year.

Most significant figures are put in boxes.

TABLE 3

SUBJECTIVE INDICATORS OF SPANISH ECONOMIC CONDITIONS (percent of national samples)

| Year | A. % of people saying economic situation of the country is: "very good" "very bad" or "good" or "bad" | | B. % saying economic future of the country will be: better worse | | C. % saying their individual eco- nomic situation has not changed or is better | D. % of people optimistic and pessimistic toward their individual future Optimistic Pessimistic | |
|------|---|----|--|----|---|--|----|
| | 1968 | 56 | 24 | - | - | - | - |
| 1973 | - | - | - | - | - | 49 | 6 |
| 1974 | 32 | 22 | - | - | - | - | - |
| 1975 | 25 | 24 | 40 | 25 | 62 | - | - |
| 1976 | 27 | 27 | 42 | 9 | 61 | 54 | 9 |
| 1979 | 6 | 41 | 27 | 12 | - | 40 | 13 |

- SOURCES: A. Data for 1968, 1974, 1975, and 1976 belong to the Instituto de la Opinión Pública, and were published in REOP, No. 14 (1968), p. 186 and No. 44 (1976), p. 283. Data for 1979 belong to the Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas, and were published in REIS, No. 6 (1979), p. 304.
- B. Data for 1975 and 1976 were published by REOP, No. 44 (1976), p. 283. Data for 1979 were published by REIS, No. 6 (1979), p. 305. In 1975 and 1976 the wording of the question was: "Vd. cree que en general el futuro económico del país será igual, peor o mejor que el presente?" In 1979 the question was: "Y cree Vd. que dentro de un año esta situación será mejor, igual o peor que ahora?"
- C. REOP, No. 44 (1976), p. 285.
- D. Data for 1973 were published by REOP, No. 36 (1974), p. 249. Data for 1976 belong to the Instituto de la Opinión Pública and have not been published. Data for 1979 were published in REOP, No. 6 (1979), p. 305. In the 1973 survey the question was: "Cómo ve Vd. su futuro personal en el aspecto económico: muy bueno, bueno, regular, malo o muy malo?" The question in the two later surveys was: "Vd. cree que en los próximos dos años su vida va a mejorar, va a seguir igual o va a empeorar?" For the purpose of this table, we have considered "optimistic" those people saying their personal future is going to be good or their lives are going to be better. By "pessimistic" we take those people saying their future is going to be "bad" or their lives are going to be "worse."

Information in Tables 1-3 clearly shows two important facts. First, that during the transitional period, even when consumption rates and the wealth of the nation had been increasing at a lower pace than in previous years, average wages and salaries kept rising above inflation rates. Second, and most important for political analysis, although the public's perception of the economic condition of the country had been deteriorating throughout this period, the people tended to think of their own situation in better terms than that of the country. And concerning both the country and themselves, many people were relatively optimistic and hopeful about the future rather than pessimistic.²⁴

All of this supports the hypothesis that, by the end of the Franco regime and during the transitional period, there was more conformity and concern about maintaining hard-won gains than relative deprivation to be translated into the political arena.

Political Aspirations and Expectations

A number of reasons have frequently been cited to explain the fact that under Franco the Spanish people were largely depoliticized: the specific nature of the regime, which contrary to the fascist regimes of Hitler and Mussolini, was particularly concerned with keeping the people uninvolved in politics; a certain historical dose of political skepticism and cynicism; the fact that 70 percent of Spain's population had lived under no other kind of political system; and the traditional backwardness of the country.²⁵ To this could be added a certain degree of political anomie as a part of the general cultural anomie springing up from the above-mentioned rapid structural changes in the economy and society. It should be kept in mind that almost half of the adult population is composed of internal migrants of either the first or second generation.

This low level of political interest among the "silent majority" of Spaniards coexisted with the increasing politicization of some social segments: the younger, the more educated, skilled and professional labor, etc. The hypothesis here is that for most Spaniards the Franco regime was taken as a given, with neither much enthusiasm nor animosity. Yet, at the same time, democratic ideas were being progressively seen as the more reasonable alternative, more suited to the times and to unfolding circumstances. After all, democracy was the system prevailing in surrounding more developed nations, and was also the banner increasingly being held by the younger generation, professionals and intellectuals, the Church, and even businessmen--in a word, "those who know better."

As stated above, for the majority the Franco regime was taken more as a given than as something to be strongly in favor of or against. Some opinion data are highly illustrative of this phenomenon. A few years before Franco's death, only minority sectors of people would express opinions openly against his person (students and professionals much more frequently than employees, workers, or housewives). (See Table 4.)

TABLE 4

ATTITUDES TOWARD FRANCO AS A PERSON BY DIFFERENT SECTORS OF THE SPANISH POPULATION (percentages, from strategic samples, 1969)

Question: "What would you say to Franco if you had the opportunity to talk to him freely?"

| Response codes(*) | High-school students | University students | Professionals | Employees | Workers | Housewives |
|-------------------------------------|----------------------|---------------------|---------------|-----------|---------|------------|
| Discontent, insults | 23% | 20% | 15% | 12% | 8% | 2% |
| Political change, democracy | 16 | 15 | 20 | 8 | 7 | 20 |
| Conformity | 10 | 4 | 15 | 22 | 16 | 1 |
| Personal needs (house, wages, etc.) | 32 | 32 | 22 | 39 | 56 | 51 |
| N.A./D.K. | 19 | 29 | 28 | 19 | 13 | 26 |
| TOTAL | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |

(*) The question being posed was open.

SOURCE: These data belong to an unpublished chapter intended for the Informe Sociológico sobre la Situación Social de España 1970 (Madrid: Euramérica, 1970). The housewives' sample was national, the others were strategic samples from Madrid.

It might be argued that the people under survey scrutiny were intimidated by the regime's repressive action, which by the end of the 1960s was particularly focused on the labor movement. To some extent, this might have been the case. But, at the same time, it should be pointed out that the opinion outlook was not particularly negative in the aftermath of Franco's death, or even in the retrospect of later years (see Tables 5 and 6). By 1978, for example, the retrospective evaluation of Franco as a ruler--even when the regime had already disappeared--was much lower than that of the principal present leaders but higher than that of the main leader from the right, Mr. Fraga (see Table 7).

On the even of Franco's death, most of the people were worried about the future, and they remained anxious during the transitional period (see Table 8). The uncertainty of the public is also reflected in the people's negative evaluation of the country's political conditions. The rather high level of political confidence exhibited by the public after the appointment of Premier Suárez in 1976 had not previously existed since 1973, two years before Franco's death. This opinion mood was accompanied by an increase in political interest and in the expression of democratic aspirations.

TABLE 5

ATTITUDES TOWARD FRANCO'S DEATH (percentages of national sample, November, 1975)

Franco's death has meant to you:

| | |
|----------------------|-----|
| - Pain, sorrow | 53% |
| - Irretrievable loss | 29 |
| - Worry about future | 5 |
| - Indifference | 7 |
| - Other | 6 |

SOURCE: Survey by ICSA-Gallup, published in Nuevo Diario (November 22, 1975).

TABLE 6

ATTITUDES ON THE POLITICAL CONDITIONS OF THE COUNTRY BEFORE AND AFTER FRANCO (percentages of national sample, November 1976)

| | <u>There is more now</u> | <u>There is less now</u> | <u>D.K. D.A.</u> | <u>Total</u> |
|-----------|------------------------------|------------------------------|----------------------|--------------|
| Freedom | 65% | 3% | 32% | 100% |
| Democracy | 51 | 4 | 45 | 100 |
| Security | 18 | 31 | 51 | 100 |
| Wellbeing | 17 | 30 | 53 | 100 |

SOURCE: National survey by Metra-Seis, published in Opinión (November 20, 1976), p. 13.

TABLE 7

LEVEL OF POPULARITY OF SOME CURRENT LEADERS AND OF FRANCO AS A RULER
(scale from 0 to 10; average scores from national survey, June 1978)

| <u>Leaders</u> | <u>Mean score</u> |
|-------------------|-------------------|
| King | 6.4 |
| Felipe González | 5.6 |
| Adolfo Suárez | 5.4 |
| Santiago Carrillo | 4.3 |
| Manuel Fraga | 3.3 |
| Franco | 3.6 |

SOURCE: P. McDonough, S. M. Barnes, and A. López Pina, "The Spanish Public and the Transition to Democracy," paper delivered at the 1979 annual meeting of APSA, Washington, D.C., September 1979.

TABLE 8

INDICATORS OF CONCERN TOWARD THE FUTURE (percentages, national samples)

Percent of people saying they look at the future:

| | <u>With worry</u> | <u>With tranquility</u> | <u>DK/DA</u> |
|--------------|-------------------|-------------------------|--------------|
| March 1975 | 58 | 39 | 3 |
| June 1975 | 57 | 31 | 12 |
| January 1976 | 54 | 34 | 12 |

SOURCE: Surveys from the Instituto de Opinión Pública.

Tables 9, 10, and 11 are highly illustrative of this phenomenon, but are not used here as evidence that democratic ideals were springing automatically from the society at large. Much to the contrary, there was an increasing interaction between power-holders, power-seekers, the politicized strata, and the depoliticized public. Each political actor was looking at the others and anticipating reactions. A climax of uncertainty --with a considerable amount of violence--was reached in the last months of the Arias government due to generalized rejection of his timid reform proposals; and again during the first semester of the first Suárez government. There were strikes, mass demonstrations, political murder and kidnapping, mounting pressures by the press, visible signs of a split

TABLE 9

SOME INDICATORS OF POLITICAL CONCERN, POLITICAL INTEREST, AND DEMOCRATIC ASPIRATIONS OF SPANISH PEOPLE BEFORE AND AFTER FRANCO'S DEATH (percentages of national samples and of electorate)

| | A. People saying the political situation of the country is "very good" or "good" | B. People in favor of: | | C. People saying they do not have any interest in politics | D. Voting turnout in referenda and elections | |
|-------------|--|------------------------|---------------------------|--|--|----|
| | | one-man rule | democratic representation | | | |
| 1966 | - | 11 | 35 | - | | |
| 1971 | - | - | - | 51 | | |
| 1973 | 54 | - | - | 62 | | |
| 1974 | 42 | 18 | 60 | - | | |
| 1975 | 32 | - | - | - | | |
| 1976 (May) | 29 | 8 | 78 | 35 | | |
| 1976 (Dec.) | 52 | - | - | - | Dec. 1976 | 77 |
| | | | | | June 1977 | 78 |
| | | | | | Dec. 1978 | 68 |
| | | | | | Mar. 1979 | 69 |
| | | | | | Apr. 1979 | 61 |
| 1979 (June) | - | 9 | 76 | 36 | | |

- SOURCES: A. Data from IOP, published in REOP, No. 44 (1976), p. 290. Data for December 1976 from Consulta, published by Cambio 16 (January 9, 1977), p. 14.
- B. Data for 1966 and 1976 belong to the Instituto de la Opinión Pública, and have not been published. Those for 1974 belong to Consulta S.A. and were published by Cambio 16 (June 3, 1974). Data for 1979 belong to the Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas and were published in REIS, No. 6 (1979), p. 275. The wording of the question in all these surveys was not strictly the same, though basically comparable. In all surveys, the subjects were asked if, in politics, they would prefer an outstanding person to make all important decisions or the people's representatives to make these decisions.
- C. Data for 1971 and 1973 belong to ICSA/Gallup and were published by Informaciones (February 15, 1974). Data for 1976 and 1979 belong to the Instituto de la Opinión Pública and Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas, respectively. The wording of the question in all these surveys was basically the same: "How much interest do you have in politics: very much, somewhat, little, none."
- D. Data from the records of the Ministry of the Interior.

TABLE 10

ATTITUDES ON ACCEPTANCE OF POLITICAL PARTIES BEFORE AND AFTER FRANCO
(percentages of samples, national and largest cities)

| | | |
|--|--|-----|
| A. <u>1971 (National sample)</u> . Percent of people saying the existence of political parties would be: | | |
| . Beneficial | | 12% |
| . Neither beneficial nor harmful | | 9 |
| . Harmful | | 23 |
| . DK/DA | | 56 |
| B. <u>1973 (National sample)</u> . Percent of people saying they are: | | |
| . In favor of the existence of freedom for political parties | | 37% |
| . Against it | | 34 |
| . DK/DA | | 29 |
| C. <u>April 1975 (National sample)</u> . Percent of people saying that parties: | | |
| . Should be permitted in Spain | | 56% |
| . Should not be permitted | | 22 |
| . DK/DA | | 22 |
| D. <u>January 1976 (National sample)</u> . Percent of people saying that political parties: | | |
| . Should exist in Spain | | 41% |
| . Should not exist | | 25 |
| . DK/DA | | 35 |
| E. <u>May 1976 (Sample of 4 major cities)</u> . Percent of people saying political parties: | | |
| . Should exist in Spain | | 67% |
| . Should not exist | | 3 |
| . DK/DA | | 30 |

SOURCES: A, B: Estudios Sociológicos sobre la Situación Social de España 1975, pp. 1259, 1277.
 C: El Europeo (April 19, 1975); data from Consulta S.A.
 D, E: Instituto de la Opinión Pública.

TABLE 11

ATTITUDES ON DESIRABILITY OF DEMOCRACY IN THE AFTERMATH OF FRANCO'S DEATH (percentages of samples, national and largest cities)

| | |
|--|-----|
| <u>December 1975 (national survey)</u> . Percent of people saying they would like the King to grant: | |
| . More freedom of speech | 72% |
| . Universal suffrage | 70 |
| . More regional autonomy | 61 |
| . Amnesty | 61 |
| . More political freedom | 58 |
| . Follow more democratic policies than previously existed | 58 |
| <u>May 1975 (sample of 7 larger cities)</u> . Percent of people saying: | |
| . The system should evolve toward a democracy of the Western kind | 74% |
| . This evolution is not possible without reforming Fundamental Laws | 60 |

SOURCES: Data for December belong to Consulta and were published by Cambio 16 (December 1, 1975).

Data for May belong to Metra Seis and were published by Informaciones (May 31, 1975).

in the military and in the elite of the ailing regime, etc.²⁶ This was a period in which it became particularly evident that at no time is a regime weaker than when it starts reforming itself.²⁷ Theoretically, the situation could be envisaged as one leading to either a revolution or a coup d'etat. Why did neither happen? Why did the government not lose control of the situation? Why did every major actor run a risk, but never attempt to play a last card? Of course, these are questions which are being answered a posteriori, and responses are not exempt of an ex post facto bias.

In looking at the state of Spanish society, the hypothesis which has been advanced is that decreasing social inequality fostered both passive support for the Franco regime and an unriskey way out of it upon Franco's death. At the same time, however, the democratic alternative was becoming more popular among the public at large, with an increasing commitment from the younger, more cultivated, and more politicized sectors of the society which were undermining the regime both from within and from outside (from universities, unions--legal and illegal--the press and publications, the Church, and some sectors of the administration and of the business community).²⁸ As to the way in which this changing opinion mood could affect the emergence of democracy after Franco's death--nobody thought democracy could emerge before--permit me to quote myself in the spring of 1975 in order to partly correct the ex post facto bias:

Is this emerging democratically oriented generation a guarantee for a coming democratic future in Spain? On the long term, an affirmative answer could be adventured. On the short term, this would seem more than problematic. The possibility for a democratic evolution may arise from two main sorts of circumstances: well planned reform--what the regime does call 'apertura'--or uncontrolled disintegration of the regime. From a mass culture perspective it is hard to foresee which way the Spanish future will go. In the opening, it will mostly depend on elite factors--particularly conflicts within the authoritarian coalition, and attacks from radical opponents. Yet, since the regime active social basis is a rather limited one, any important crisis may work as a catalyst for the mobilization of opponents, and also of previously passive supporters who will not identify anymore the regime with the person of Franco.

The Portuguese experience is highly illustrative of how fast a regime structure may disintegrate without even any dead shot. Though it also illustrates how difficult it is to build up a democracy upon the debris of a long-lived authoritarian regime.²⁹

The Mobilization of the Politicized
and the Interplay between Power Holders
and Power Seekers

A description of mass mobilization and elite maneuvering has been provided by various authors,³⁰ although there are still important vacuums to be filled (such as a press-content analysis of the period, looking as much at editorial viewpoints as at declarations by relevant individual actors). The point to be stressed here is that the most staunch Francoists chose not to play their card of a coup d'etat to preserve the regime nor did the opposition play its card of revolution--because neither side was sure of success. For both, there was the state of the society, rather conformist and apathetic, and the final uncertainty of how much social support they could obtain. For both, there was also fear--either of uncontrollable social violence and protest (the Francoists) or of indiscriminate repression (the opposition).³¹

For the most adamant rightists, the contradictions of the regime had obscured the visibility of civil society.³² And in regard to the more politicized sectors, these Francoists knew from experience in government how difficult and costly it was to mobilize a few thousand people on occasions. They also knew from experience about the increasing organizational capacity of the nonofficial unions. Finally, they perceived enough of the state-of-mind of intellectuals, public officials, professionals, and businessmen to be at least suspicious that the people in decision-making positions in and out of the government administration no longer constituted an authoritarian bloc as they had in the 1940s and 1950s.

TABLE 12

DEATHS FROM POLITICAL VIOLENCE

| <u>Year</u> | <u>Killings by ETA (Basque leftist separatists)</u> | <u>Killings by GRAPO (Marxist-Leninist group)</u> | <u>Killings by groups of the extreme right</u> | <u>Killings by Police and Civil Guard</u> | <u>Total</u> |
|-------------|---|---|--|---|--------------|
| 1968 | 2 | - | - | - | 2 |
| 1969 | 1 | - | - | - | 1 |
| 1971 | - | - | - | 1 | 1 |
| 1972 | 1 | - | - | 2 | 3 |
| 1973 | 6* | - | - | 1 | 7 |
| 1974 | 18 | - | - | - | 18 |
| 1975 | 14 | 7 | - | 2 | 23 |
| 1976 | 18 | 2 | 1 | 22 | 43 |
| 1977 | 11 | 8 | 8 | 23 | 50 |
| 1978 | 64 | 6 | 4 | 15 | 89 |
| 1979 | 67 | 29 | 10 | 20 | 126 |
| TOTAL: | 202 | 52 | 23 | 86 | 363 |

* In 1973 the President of Government L. Carrero Blanco was killed by ETA. Consistently, the largest percent of killings by ETA were policemen and Civil Guards. The largest percent of killings by police and paramilitary forces were people engaging in public demonstrations and protests.

SOURCE: This table has been compounded with information made available from the files of the daily newspaper, EL PAIS. An assistant of the Centro de Investigaciones Sociologicas, Emilia Nasarre, is to be recognized for her patient work.

For the opposition forces as well, uncertainty existed with regard to the amount of mass support obtainable, and even with regard to the support available from individuals in the educated middle class with liberal leanings, if tested in a final confrontation. And, most importantly, the opposition was afraid of sheer repression.

This is not to suggest that the democratic covenant was an easy one, or that there was a well-planned blueprint shared by government and opposition which decided to adhere to it after signature. This was partly the case on some occasions and concerning some specific issues, but on the whole, there was much trial and error by both government and opposition.

There were some visible signs of splits within the Francoist civil and military elites. These have been described elsewhere,³³ but some of the most apparent may be mentioned here. First, and most important, the reform leadership was taken by men who had served as Ministers under Franco. There were also politicians who had served under Franco who joined the opposition platform Coordinación Democrática. And there were, of course, leading actors of the Franco regime who strongly opposed reform and continued to campaign against it in open elections. Yet this split was numerically disproportionate (for instance, only 15 percent of the deputies in the Francoist Assembly did not vote in favor of the Law for Political Reform in 1976). As for the military, there were dismissals and resignations affecting the higher positions, as well as public statements against reform after certain governmental decisions were made (notably the announcement of the Suárez bill for reform in 1976, or the legalization of the Communist party in 1977). Yet, on the whole, the military stressed allegiance to the King, who was the overseer and final individual master of the process.³⁴

King Juan Carlos chose Premier Suárez and inspired his program, playing his role as a connecting mechanism between past and future. He was in the position to legitimately demand the allegiance of Franco's loyalists (the General had appointed him and had left rather loose institutional arrangements), and at the same time to expect the support of the opposition forces since he was letting them enter the political game.³⁵ The King's performance is crucial to understanding the how of the whole process of change. If there is any individual actor who has been in the position, and with the capacity, to make the process turn one way or another, it is King Juan Carlos. Although this is not intended to be a value statement, it is hard to imagine a breakdown of the Spanish authoritarian regime under the conditions of the time without the mediating role of the monarch, both as an institution and as a person. It should not be forgotten that in 1970 Spain lacked some of the most important features present in the recent collapse of other European authoritarian systems (notably external war, which can undermine the cohesiveness of the military: e.g., Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy, Greece under the colonels, and Caetano's Portugal). The King seems to have been riding a horse for which both the Spanish people and the surrounding world were ready to bid.

Once Franco had died and the reform process was launched--a process that occurred in a certain atmosphere of violence and uncertainty, but

with the King massively acclaimed in his almost continuous trips throughout the country--the Spanish people anticipated that Franco's nondemocratic Cortes was going to pass the Bill of Political Reform. The people would massively support it later on in referendum, not only because it was the best thing for the country and because there was a need for change and democracy. Some people consciously, and most of them unconsciously, might have felt that in voting for reform they were saving themselves from the unknown.³⁶

TABLE 13

ATTITUDES TOWARD THE BILL OF POLITICAL REFORM (percentages of national samples)

| | |
|--|-----|
| <u>November 1976.</u> Percent of people saying that the Reform Bill: | |
| . Will be passed by the Cortes | 58% |
| . Will not be passed | 6 |
| . DK/DA | 36 |
| | |
| <u>December 1976.</u> Percent of people saying they voted YES in the reform referendum because: | |
| . It was the best thing to do | 29% |
| . For the good of the country | 10 |
| . There is need for change and democracy. | 29 |
| . On influence by P.V. and the Government | 10 |
| . On influence by others (spouse, friends) | 3 |
| . Other | 3 |
| . DK/DA | 16 |

SOURCE: Estudios del CIS, La Reforma Política (Madrid: Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas, 1977), pp. 17, 34. The November poll was conducted on days 16 and 17 from a sample of 976 individuals. The December poll was conducted after the referendum on the 16th and 18th from a sample of 1,008 individuals.

By this time, most of the citizens of the Western democracies also thought Spain was moving toward democracy, and they made it known through their political and opinion leaders and in their opinion polls (see Table 14).

At Franco's funeral there was but one foreign head of state (Pinochet). A few days later, at King Juan Carlos' inauguration ceremony, there were heads of state or high-ranking representatives of the most important Western democracies. For those who wanted to understand, it was clear that a new era was opening to Spanish politics.

TABLE 14

ATTITUDES TOWARD DEMOCRACY IN SPAIN FROM 13 WESTERN NATIONS
(percentages of national samples, 1976)

| Country | Do you think Spain is moving toward a democracy of the Western type? | | Position of Spain on the path to democracy (mean score on a scale from 0 to 10) | |
|---------------|---|-----|---|-----------------------------|
| | YES | NO* | Where it is now | Will be 3 years from now |
| West Germany | 79% | 18% | 3.9 | 5.9 |
| Belgium | 24 | 6 | 3.8 | 5.7 |
| France | 46 | 16 | 4.0 | 6.2 |
| Great Britain | 56 | 17 | 3.9 | 5.3 |
| Holland | 29 | 9 | 3.3 | 5.2 |
| Ireland | 70 | 11 | 4.1 | 5.7 |
| Italy | 52 | 13 | 3.6 | 5.9 |
| Norway | 64 | 9 | 3.4 | 5.4 |
| Denmark | 66 | 24 | 3.3 | 5.0 |
| Finland | 51 | 14 | 4.1 | 6.1 |
| Sweden | 65 | 16 | 3.2 | 5.2 |
| Portugal | 40 | 4 | 4.0 | 6.4 |
| U.S.A. | 41 | 35 | 4.0 | 5.6 |

* Percentages missing up to one hundred belong to those who do not answer or have doubts. All these surveys were conducted by the Gallup organization in December 1976 before the Referendum on the Law for Political Reform, except the cases of Italy and Norway where they were conducted in January 1977.

SOURCE: Estudios del CIS, La Reforma Política (Madrid: Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas, 1977), pp. 42, 83-99.

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¹The content of the present draft of this paper has been limited by two main sources of constraint. On the one hand, the author was interested in illustrating some aspects of transition which have been dealt with less extensively by other writers in a growing literature on the Spanish case; also, with regard to the Woodrow Wilson Center's conference, a certain division of labor was requested of the Spanish participants. On the other hand, and except for some general conceptual guidelines provided by the conference organizers, papers by Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe Schmitter, and Adam Przeworski became available only after this draft was practically concluded. This posed an additional intellectual difficulty: that of either re-writing the paper anew in order to make it better fit the organizers' purposes, or leaving it in its original state and introducing some appropriate references to guiding papers. The second alternative was chosen. After all, the theoretical reasoning as well as the data provided by this paper largely fit into the broader theoretical framework of the above-mentioned papers. As for the saliency of Machiavelli in understanding transitions, I would join Schmitter in the "rediscovery" of the Florentine writer, and must confess that Machiavelli's Discourses was the single intellectual piece which has most pervasively affected my own reasoning.

²Opinion research has been developing in Spain during the last 15 years, and has particularly been flourishing during the last 5 years. Although newspapers, magazines, and professional publications are often exhibiting survey data, very little diachronic analysis has yet been undertaken on opinion information. A main contribution of this paper is that of illustrating empirically, within the realm of opinion, some theoretical statements about the process of political transition in Spain.

³Samuel Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), ch. 3.

⁴Among the growing literature on the Spanish transition should be mentioned: Juan J. Linz, "La Frontera del Sur de Europa: Tendencias Evolutivas," Revista Española de Investigaciones Sociológicas, 9 (January-March 1980), 7-53; John F. Coverdale, The Political Transformation of Spain after Franco (New York: Praeger, 1979); Peter McDonough, et al., "The Spanish Public and the Transition to Democracy" (paper delivered at the 1979 annual meeting of APSA, Washington, D.C., August-September 1979); José M. Maravall, "Transición a la Democracia: Alineamientos Políticos y Elecciones en España," Sistema 36 (May 1980), 65-105; Carlos Huneeus, "Transition to Democracy in Spain: Unión de Centro Democrático as a Con-sociational Party--An Exploratory Analysis" (paper delivered at a workshop of the European Consortium for Political Research, Brussels, April 1979); Salvador Giner, "Political Economy and Cultural Legitimation in the Origins of Parliamentary Democracy: The Southern European Case" (paper delivered at a workshop of the Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas, Madrid, December 1979); Giuseppe Di Palma, "¿Derecha, Izquierda o Centro? Sobre la Legitimación de los Partidos y Coaliciones en el Sur de Europa," Revista del Departamento de Derecho Político 4 (Fall 1979), 125-145; Michael Roskin, "Spain tries Democracy again," Political Science Quarterly, 93:4 (Winter 1978), 629-646; and Jonathan Story, "Spanish Political Parties: Before and After the Election," Government and Opposition, 12 (1977), 474-495.

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⁵This has been recently pointed out by Maravall, op. cit., pp. 66, 67.

⁶Machiavelli, The Discourses (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin, 1970), book one, 16-18, 25-27, 38, 39, 46-55, and book three, 1-9.

⁷Aristotle, The Politics (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin, 1966), book four, ch. 11, pp. 171-174; Machiavelli, op. cit., book one, 55, pp. 243-248.

⁸A Spanish version of Hobbes' Leviathan has recently been edited amidst the transition atmosphere of today's Spain. In a 100-page introduction, chief editor Carlos Moya repeatedly states--as if with therapeutic purposes--an argument clearly summarized in the opening paragraph: "Volver a pensar radicalmente el Estado es un imperativo teórico en un país cuya historia nacional desemboca ahora en la conclusión democrática de doscientos años de guerra civil. De ahí la absoluta oportunidad de una nueva lectura del Leviatán de Hobbes, aquel lugar en que el discurso objetivo del Estado se ha convertido en pensamiento absoluto de su Última Razón Física: La cancelación de la Guerra Civil como fundación colectiva de aquel Poder Soberano cuyo universal respeto y temor produce la paz de los ciudadanos en una Sociedad Civil asegurada finalmente frente a la violencia universal de la Guerra. Haber entendido la substancia política del Estado Nacional--y del Estado Nacional y no de otra cosa trata la trágica historia colectiva de los españoles en estos últimos cincuenta años--es haber entendido el argumento objetivo de la Guerra Civil y, así, la propia sobredeterminación ritual de lo que aquí sucedió hasta ahora." See Carlos Moya, "Thomas Hobbes: Leviatán o la Invención Moderna de la Razón," in Carlos Moya and A. Escobedo (eds.), Thomas Hobbes, Leviatán (Madrid: Editora Nacional, 1979), p. 9. Fear is frequently dealt with as a political factor in Machiavelli's works, both The Prince and The Discourses, and--as Schmitter has pointed out--can be considered a component of necessity. See Philippe C. Schmitter, "Speculations about the Prospective Demise of Authoritarian Regimes and its Possible Consequences," Latin American Program Working Paper No. 60 (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 1980).

⁹It was De Tocqueville's argument that, after the Revolution, so many things remained unchanged, particularly within the State administration; and also that so many things had changed under the Ancien Régime in a path which was to be fully opened by the revolutionary events. See Alexis De Tocqueville, L'Ancien Régime et la Révolution (Paris: Gallimard, 1967), book I.5, book II.2-6, book III.1, 3, 4, 5, and 8.

¹⁰A review of these latter theories in relation to the Spanish case can be found in Maravall, op. cit., pp. 66, 67.

¹¹Albert O. Hirschman, Journeys toward Progress: Studies of Economic Policy-Making in Latin America (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1965), chs. 1 and 5; Robert Dahl, Modern Political Analysis (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1967), chs. 3, 4, and 5; Charles Anderson, "Toward a Theory of Latin American Politics," (Graduate Center for Latin American Studies, Vanderbilt University, 1963).

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- ¹² Dahl, op. cit., p. 78.
- ¹³ Robert Dahl (ed.), Political Oppositions in Western Democracies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), preface.
- ¹⁴ Robert Dahl, "Pluralism Revisited," Comparative Politics, 10:2 (January 1978), 196, 197.
- ¹⁵ Ibid., p. 199.
- ¹⁶ As is apparent, the opposition to Franco was not able to overthrow him while he lived. Before the referendum to the Law for Political Reform, in December 1976, the opposition forces asked voters to abstain from voting, but voter turnout was 77.4 percent, of which 94 percent was for approval. The leader of the Spanish Socialist Party, Felipe González, has publicly stated more than once that the people should not forget that the Franco regime ended only after the natural passing of its founder.
- ¹⁷ Although there is a clear overlap between the dismantling of the authoritarian regime and the establishing of democracy--as two different processes to be discerned, at least theoretically--the transition period can be considered to have been opened by the death of Franco, and definitely closed by the time of the second general election.
- ¹⁸ The literature on socioeconomic changes in contemporary Spain is more abundant than might be expected. Some of the most significant products are the voluminous Informes FOESSA on the social situation of Spain, published every five years since 1966 by the Fundación FOESSA.
- ¹⁹ See note 7.
- ²⁰ Fundación FOESSA, Estudios Sociológicos sobre la Situación Social de España 1975 (Madrid: Euramérica, 1976), p. 1976; Anuario Estadístico de España 1979 (Madrid: INE, 1979), p. 294.
- ²¹ Encuesta de Población Activa 1980 (Madrid: INE, 1980), p. 143.
- ²² Anuario Estadístico de España 1979 (Madrid: INE, 1979), p. 56.
- ²³ As has been illustrated by many surveys, the opinions most critical of the Franco regime and most favorable to democracy were found among the younger generation, mostly educated middle and upper-middle class and a smaller segment of skilled labor. To mention but a few sources, see the Informes FOESSA on the social situation of Spain (1966, 1970, 1975), or the survey research appendices in the Revista Española de la Opinión Pública and Revista Española de Investigaciones Sociológicas (the former running from 1965 to 1977; the latter from 1978 to the present). A typological construction of cultural outlooks--political included--among urban Spaniards under the Franco regime can be found in Rafael López Pintor and Ricardo Buceta, Los Españoles de los Años 70: Una Versión Sociológica (Madrid: Tecnos, 1975).

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²⁴ These facts can help to explain what Przeworski considers a "striking feature of the Spanish transition...that not even a redistribution of income took place," or what is considered "astonishing...that those who were satisfied with the Franco regime are also likely to be satisfied with the new democratic government." See Adam Przeworski, "Some Problems in the Study of the Transition to Democracy," Latin American Program Working Paper No. 61 (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 1980). Actually, the pattern of income distribution prior to Franco's death was less regressive than might be expected, and it does not seem to have been perceived as basically harmful by the population. Moreover, with the recession providing an economic background to the transition, opposition forces found themselves constrained to limit these redistributive demands. It must be added that from 1973 to 1977, in spite of the economic crisis, wage increases were less "frozen" in Spain than in other European countries (see O.I.T. reports of the time)--as if Franco's government were afraid of labor unrest and political instability, and as if the reform government were avoiding unpopularity in the face of coming elections. It should be noted that during the campaign prior to the first general election, the economic issue was hardly presented as an issue at all either by government or opposition.

²⁵ On the nature of the Franco regime, see Juan J. Linz, "Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes," in Handbook of Political Science, eds. Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1975), vol. 3, pp. 175-411; Eduardo Sevilla-Guzmán, Manuel Pérez Yruela, and Salvador Giner, "Despotismo Moderno y Dominación de Clase: Para una Sociología del Régimen Franquista," Revista de Sociología 8 (1978): 103-141. The skepticism component of Spanish political culture has recently been pointed out by Maravall, op. cit., p. 27, and McDonough, et al., op. cit., pp. 13, 14.

²⁶ The most detailed account of these events that I have found is in John F. Coverdale, The Political Transformation of Spain after Franco (New York: Praeger, 1979), chs. 3 and 4. See also Maravall, op. cit., pp. 65-105.

²⁷ Under different historical circumstances, the point has been clearly stated by Machiavelli and De Tocqueville: "It should, however, be noted that they [states with a capacity for improvement] will never introduce order without incurring danger, because few men ever welcome new laws setting up a new order in the state unless necessity makes it clear to them that there is need for such laws; and since such a necessity cannot arise without danger, the state may easily be ruined before the new order has been brought to completion." Machiavelli, The Discourses, op. cit., pp. 105, 106. "L'expérience apprend que le moment le plus dangereux pour un mauvais gouvernement est d'ordinaire celui où il commence à se réformer. Il n'y a qu'un grand génie qui puisse sauver un prince qui entreprend de soulager ses sujets après une oppression longue. Le mal qu'on souffrait patiemment comme inévitable semble insupportable dès qu'on conçoit l'idée de s'y soustraire. Tout ce qu'on ôte alors des abus semble mieux découvrir ce qui en reste et en rend le sentiment plus cuisant: le mal est devenu moindre, il est vrai, mais la sensibilité est plus vive." Alexis De Tocqueville, L'Ancient Regime..., op. cit., pp. 277, 278.

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²⁸ Changes in these sectors--largely springing up from the nature and contradictions of the authoritarian regime--have been described by different authors. Among others, see Sevilla-Guzmán, et al., op. cit., pp. 121-141; Salvador Giner, "Political Economy and Cultural Legitimation in the Origins of Parliamentary Democracy: The Southern European Case," op. cit., pp. 31-37; Coverdale, op. cit., ch. 1; Amando De Miguel, 40 Millones de Españoles 40 Años Después (Barcelona: Grijalbo, 1976).

²⁹ Rafael López Pintor, "The Political Beliefs of Spaniards: The Rising of a More Democratic Generation," paper delivered at the LASA national convention, Atlanta, Spring 1975.

³⁰ Coverdale, op. cit., chs. 1, 3, 4; Maravall, op. cit., pp. 13-22.

³¹ On the political saliency of fear, see note 8.

³² The point has been stressed by Guillermo O'Donnell in his "Tensiones en el Estado Burocrático Autoritario y la Cuestión de la Democracia," (Buenos Aires, CLACSO, 1978). In a different paper, the same author deals with the political resurrection of the civil society, which accompanies the downfall of authoritarian regimes. See his "Notas para el Estudio de Procesos de Democratización Política a partir del Estado Burocrático-Autoritario," (Rio de Janeiro: FUPERJ, mimeographed copy). In the Spanish case, such a political resurrection of the civil society has actually taken place, though with a rather limited character. This limited extent of political mobilization may help to explain why was it that the "moderate opposition" could keep under control its own followers; among other reasons, because they seemed to be hard to engage in protest activities. At the time, such was also the case for the "duros," and would it have been for the "blandos" had they tried to call the people to the streets. Indeed, this situation was crucial to the outcome of reform.

³³ See Coverdale, op. cit., and Maravall, op. cit.

³⁴ There is no study that I know of on relations between the monarch and the military, even at the level of formalized public communications such as speeches. Yet a few facts can be mentioned here. First, the King pays the greatest attention to cultivating his personal contacts with the military at all levels. Second, high military officials were very parsimonious in their public declarations concerning the political process up to the first general election. From then on, they have been more expressive, almost always in the sense of re-emphasizing their manifest support for the Constitution and for the people's will, as well as of stressing their loyalty and obedience to the King, and their independence from party politics. Finally, as far as the monarch himself is concerned, King Juan Carlos' speeches at the Pascua Militar (January 6) constitute the best formal indicator of his messages to the military. Insofar as the political process is given consideration in those speeches--and it always is--there is a leitmotif in the King's words over all these years: unity and discipline. But, on different occasions, the King has talked of different matters which seem to have been particularly salient to military relations at the time. In 1976, he appeared to the military

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at the Pascua Militar to be mostly concerned with the future. In 1977, he asked them not to pay attention to those who sought their demoralization and disunity. In 1978, he referred to political change as necessary and part of the course of history ("marcha de la Historia"); he considered it "absurd" not to move, and defended the depolitization of the military. In 1978, he acknowledged the cooperation by the military in the political process, which was "necessary." In 1980, he expressed his deep identification with the military institutions, and asked the military not to let themselves become excited with the idea of protagonisms, which were "inopportune." This brief account has been based on a perusal of Madrid newspapers, and it is intended as merely an outline for a more formalized content-analysis of available published material.

³⁵ Giuseppe Di Palma has seen the leadership function in the Spanish transition as one of building up legitimacy toward the past as well as toward the future. See his "¿Derecha, Izquierda o Centro? Sobre la Legitimación de los Partidos y Coaliciones en el Sur de Europa," Revista del Departamento de Derecho Político 4 (fall 1979), 134-137.

³⁶ By this time, and under the constraints of socioeconomic factors, all the signals of loss of legitimacy which have been pointed out by Przeworski were apparent, and a preferable alternative had crystallized for the mass public to join: the death of the founder of the authoritarian regime, an existing economic crisis, mass unrest, and clear messages that something would have to be done (King Juan Carlos speeches, different reform proposals, etc.). See Przeworski, op. cit., pp. 11-15.