

Number 220

**NATIONALISM AS A
TRANSNATIONAL QUESTION**
Political Analysis of Nationalism in Contemporary Argentina

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Introduction

The theme of nationalism is present today in intellectual debates, in political analyses, and in recent incidents that have upset national and international public life. And in many other ways, nationalism pervades the lives of all of us.

In the course of my lifetime, I have had occasion to speak about the force of contemporary ideologies, among other political topics, with some of the most important thinkers of our time. Among the French thinkers, who span the ideological spectrum from left to right, with whom I have had the fortune of forming a warm intellectual bond are André Malraux, Bertrand de Jouvenel, and Raymond Aron. The work of these intellectuals proceeds from distinct streams of thought. Their academic and public careers are extraordinary, to say the least.

These three French thinkers share the belief that nationalism is "the most vigorous idea-force of our time....The fact is evident though by no means foretold by thinkers of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries." This statement, converted into a topic worthy of university discourse, was revived and articulated by Jouvenel in Les débuts de l'état moderne, and taken up and explored further with unparalleled insight by Isaiah Berlin in Against the Current.

The revolution of 1989 in the former Soviet Union and subsequent events in that part of the world provide contemporary proof of the validity of such statements. The latest works of E.J. Hobsbawm, John Brueilly, and Ernst Gellner, to name some sources of varying inspiration, further confirm the French sentiment. The American Academy of Arts and Sciences dedicated its summer 1993 edition of Daedalus to the nationalist question, combining a number of significant contributions under the title Reconstructing Nations and States. Similarly, the March 1994 New York Review of Books contains an interesting exchange between Adam Michnik and Jürgen Habermas that was published first in the Polish weekly Polityka and later republished in Die Ziet in December 1993.

In Latin America, the theme of nationalism arises constantly. Nationalism emerges in various versions or reformulations -- as seen in an insightful book by Jorge Castañeda, Utopia Unarmed: The Latin American Left After the Cold War -- but it remains omnipresent. The Castañeda book serves as a leftist self-critique such as

the ultra-right never engages in and the anti-liberal right fails to achieve, through its refusal to seek out a correct political approach.

I do not belong to the spiritual family of nationalists. However, I could neither meet my responsibility to history nor provide a political analysis of the current Argentine experience without addressing the nationalist phenomenon, its versions and derivations.

Tulio Halperín Donghi discusses nationalism with respect to the origins of the Argentine nation, and Gustavo Ferrari and Ezequiel Gallo open the way to analysis of "liberal nationalism" in the nineteenth century. For my part, I maintain that serious analysis of the crisis of legitimacy that contemporary Argentina suffered between the 1930s and 1980s -- a period of almost sixty years -- is impossible without an explanation of what I term "anti-liberal nationalism."

The failure of a stable and legitimate democratic political regime, which is one of the causes of the "decadence" of contemporary Argentina, was in part the loathsome consequence of the conflict of legitimacies that confronted the "republican liberal tradition." I have called this the "nationalist tradition"--meaning the brief but intense tradition of anti-liberal nationalism.

One must consider not only the French and Anglo-Saxon influence, but also the Spanish, when examining the theme of nationalism. Anti-liberal nationalism emerged principally through the influence of the Spaniards, who incorporated the Maurrasians as well as the French. But this should not be a surprise; the application of the word "liberalism" to politics began with the Spanish. Also, the movement of liberalism into Argentina was along a Spanish road, during the era of independence, which coincided with the "traditional revolution" advanced by the Spanish liberals of Cadiz. I mention this because this road has not been explored by Anglo-Saxon authors who have focused on the history of Argentina, just as Argentine nationalists, largely Hispanophiles and Francophiles, with some exceptions, greatly ignore the contributions of North American and English scholars. I want to welcome the ideas of anyone who perceives or reconstructs aspects of Argentine reality with skill and academic honesty.

The objective of my work here is to take advantage of these distinct sources, using them to provide a political analysis of Argentine nationalism, paying particular attention to contemporary events. Naturally, the paper that follows is open to critique. I have striven to bring together literature from all of the most recent North American publications that are not easily accessible in Argentina. My goal has been to strike a balance among the opinions of all these writers.

This work was been made possible by an invitation of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, by the stimulating intellectual climate one enjoys at the Center, and by the bibliographic resources at one's disposal when in residence in the Smithsonian "Castle." Moreover, this paper greatly benefited from the ideal atmosphere presided over by the director of the Center, Charles Blitzer; the opportunity to interact closely with such senior scholars such as Seymour Martin Lipset and Joseph Tulchin, director of the Latin American Program; the Wilson Center's impressive administration and staff, which included my excellent research assistant, Cynthia Hawkins; the intelligent decision to equip a small dining room in the midst of the library to allow for uninterrupted study; and, finally, the other scholars and fellows in residence, who willingly shared their own intellectual experiences with me.

I should add that, if there was any doubt about the force of the nationalist theme, it was quickly washed away -- in dramatic and tragic fashion -- as soon as I arrived in Washington, D.C. I had hardly settled in at the Wilson Center when the Russian elections of December 1993 placed on the world stage a nationalist and populist party leader (to some a neofascist) named Vladimir Zhirinovskiy. More recently, the racist and fanatic appeals of Khalid Muhammad of the Nation of Islam have been added to the public record. The Nation of Islam is a relatively small but economically strong group fighting for black empowerment from a racist, anti-Semitic, and anti-Catholic posture. At a conference at Kean College in New Jersey, Muhammad attacked Jews, Pope John Paul II, and various other communities and churches. In the March 13, 1994 New York Times, the rise of nationalism in the former Yugoslavia appeared under the heading: "West's Fears in Bosnia: Chaos and Islam." Meanwhile, militant Hindu nationalism manifests itself through the harassment of the Muslim minority of some one million people in India. Only weeks before, James Schlesinger had written about nationalistic "American arrogance" in the Washington Post.

Across the Atlantic, the European Community regularly reports on national differences and how xenophobia is an instrumental element of political disputes. In addition, Japanese nationalism has been increasingly resistant to North American demands for fairer trade practices. In the Middle East, in the massacre at Hebron, an apparently lone assassin nearly destroyed the fragile peace between the Palestinians and the Israelis. The assassin was actually a member of the ultra-right Kach party who had taken part in the ethnic tensions that had rocked Brooklyn and who, in 1981, had written a letter to the New York Times arguing, among other things, that "Israel will soon have to choose between a Jewish state and a democratic one"

It was within this context that this work was written.

One insight gleaned from the experience of Berlin and the Third Reich is that nationalism has not returned; in fact, it never left. This explains a great deal, but is not in itself sufficient to understanding the nationalist's impulse. The phrase is clear and ingenious; however, it evokes only a certain type of nationalism and offers little about its potential. Examining nationalism, one sees the benign variety of the humane person as well as that of the perverse and desperate type. A number of these varieties of nationalism are considered in the reflections that follow. Almost all of them are enlightened; few versions are examined in an oppositional analysis intended to establish universalisms.

A poet once said, " In times of crisis, one has to be careful when walking. If one were to trample upon a seed what would be left?" In other words, who simply thinks of the action and who *acts*? One ought to know the difference. This working paper is only a "map" for understanding the terrain.

-- Carlos Floria, 1996



NATIONALISM AS A TRANSNATIONAL QUESTION
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Where is the wisdom we have lost in knowledge?
Where is the knowledge that we have lost in information?
-T.S. Eliot

One of the first dilemmas encountered as we examine the literature on nationalism is the critical distance maintained between historians and social scientists. This observation is not a new one. It arises as social scientists become impatient with historians' descriptive tendencies, while historians demand respect for their descriptive artistry.

More than 15 years ago, Gale Stokes expressed this impatience in a significant book which nourished the controversy surrounding the theories of nationalism published by Anthony Smith in 1972.¹ A possible justification for this slight ill will is that, as noted, many historians are devoted to the "description" of a phenomenon, while social scientists (an expression encompassing sociologists, political scientists, anthropologists and social psychologists) are more concerned with its "explanation" and interpretation. On the other side, Boyd C. Shafer, one of the main historians of nationalism still upholding the historians' tradition, argues that there is no single explanation of nationalism. Such explanation does not exist because it is not possible, and it is not possible because "the national feeling, nationalism itself" derives from several forces, including the pressures, motivations, aspirations and frustrations of a people, both as individuals and as a group.²

¹Gale Stokes. "The Undeveloped Theory of Nationalism." (*World Politics*. Vol. XXXI, No. 1. 1978, pp. 150-160). He particularly refers to Anthony Smith's book, *Theories of Nationalism*. (New York: Harper & Row, 1972). We will return to this later.

²Boyd C. Shafer. *Faces of Nationalism*. (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Jovanovich, 1972). The paraphrasing is mine. Shafer follows the steps of his teacher, Carlton J.H. Hayes, a renowned historian of nationalism, author of both *Essays on Nationalism*. (New York: Macmillan, 1928) and *Nationalism: A Religion*. (1960).

Despite the controversy, efforts continue toward articulating a sufficiently comprehensible theory of the nationalist phenomenon, although these notes, written in 1994, are based on the currently informing premise--admitted by most people--that there is not a single nationalism, but rather many.

My intention is to profit from the work of historians and social scientists without directly addressing the dilemma mentioned above, since, in my opinion, any attempt to explain politics implies the study of history, society and institutions, which is often unperformed by historians (although this does not mean that they give up their own mission), such study must be undertaken by social scientists, beginning with political scientists. Otherwise, no satisfactory political explanation may be achieved.

The Levels of Analysis

Debates are often locked in circles. Interpretations of the nationalist phenomenon can hardly converge if their proponents do not bear in mind the level of analysis adopted. By this I mean that much depends on the prevailing concept of nationalism, since that concept will then condition discourse: Is nationalism an idea, an ideology, a "form of politics" or a historical movement?

Further levels or perspectives of analysis may be added. However, an idea is not the same as an ideology, and neither is it the same as a form of politics or political system. Furthermore, a "movement" does not identify itself with an idea, nor with an ideology or a system, even when it relies on the former as doctrinal source, or occurs, overwhelmingly, within the latter.

Let me give an example taken from the research on an apparently distant subject; the Roman Catholic Church's social teaching and its incidence in what may be called the "Vatican's foreign policy."³

The nature of the main actors in this foreign policy, the popes of the Catholic Church, necessitates the study of their actions and their texts. Hehir warns about significant changes in the relations between the Vatican and the Soviet Union in

³ James Kurth. "The Vatican's Foreign Policy." (*The National Interest*, Summer, 1993, pp. 40-52) and especially J. Brian Hehir. "Papal Foreign Policy." (*Foreign Policy*, No. 78, Spring 1990, pp. 26-48).

times of Pope John XXIII, from contention to a sort of limited compromise. John XXIII established the intellectual grounds to justify the expansion of the dialogue between the Church and its adversaries. Until then, the theoretical ground for the Church's attitude toward Marxism abode by the terms of the encyclical *Divini Redemptoris*, of 1937, which stated that "communism is intrinsically wrong" and warned that "whoever is willing to save the Christian civilization" under no circumstances should collaborate with it. In 1963, in the best known encyclical of his papacy, *Pacem in Terris*, John XXIII expressed a counterpoint to this, Pius XI's earlier approach.

John XXIII proposes that the Church distinguish between false philosophical "ideas" about the nature and destiny of man that often initiate "historical movements" and the changes that might occur in such "movements" through time. Whoever can deny, the pope then said, that these movements, as they follow the dictates of a righteous conscience and interpret the genuine aspirations of the human person, may contain positive elements deserving approval? This passage stirred a significant controversy within the Catholic Church. Its consequences influenced Italy's internal affairs and the relationships between the Church of East and West. Though the issue falls beyond the scope of this paper, I believe this example illustrates the intellectual and active consequences of a distinction between different levels of analysis. The head of the Vatican State, distinguished between the ideas of Marxism-Leninism, the communists, communism, the historical movements nurtured by them, and the regimes or systems they operate.

Such distinction exists even in the Church's main documents, and when its presence is overlooked, the expression of speakers and leading characters of, in this case, a moral theology applied to the realities of our times is misunderstood. Heated debates around the Catholic Church's reflections and documents on "real socialism" and "capitalism" may lack sense because they usually do not occur at a level of "ideas" or "ideologies," but rather of "systems" and concrete behaviors. An editorial of The Economist once ironically expressed, apropos of one of these debates, that it often happens that we do not really judge the presence of Adam Smith's "invisible hand," but of the "visible hands" of those who exploit a system or regime for their own exclusive and excluding advantage, regardless of cost and means.

In short, nationalism is primarily a political ideology propelling and imposing a form of politics. Or is it? May one plausibly argue that in the last century liberal nationalism was one of the main ideological sources of the nation-state? And that the anti-liberal nationalism of this century is an antagonistic ideology questioning the principle of legitimacy of liberal democracy in most of the national states, at least in the Western world? May one accept that one of the extreme "political forms" of anti-liberal nationalism was the fascist state, and that the traditional political form of anti-liberal nationalism is dictatorship?

The reflections below sustain the plausibility of these hypotheses, with the assistance of recent intellectual proposals aimed at polishing or, at least, unsettling them.

Social Trajectory and Complementarity

An idea is in force whenever it is commonly expressed and invoked. When dealing with a political idea, the more it is expressed and invoked, the more probable it becomes that its profile blurs or that it turns into a militant ideology. As it develops into a militant ideology, it is no longer valued for its true worth but rather for its usefulness. In any time, there exist ideas that turn into militant ideologies and ideologies that give up and become, much to the concern of their advocates, traditional ideas.

A militant ideologist believes (for otherwise he or she would not be an ideologist) that the ideology he or she advocates is the last in the life of society. With it, history ends. Strictly speaking, one "militates" only when one believes this way. Otherwise, one is not a militant but rather an academician, an intellectual reluctant to name final justifications, a critical spirit observing with covert aloofness the rise, zenith and fall of ideologies.

History is a graveyard of ideologies. The sequence rise-zenith-fall is part of an inexorable process. There are ideologies today, though preachers of their decline argue otherwise. One or some of them seem healthy because each time bears its own dialectical tension between the militant opinion and the traditional one. The moment comes when a new militancy dislodges the former and sends it to the

corner of "traditionalism," made up not of living, aged ideas but rather of dead, old ones.

Ideas and ideologies travel through history and society,⁴ and are transformed by the social journey. They acquire apparently different physiognomies, undergo dissimilar forces and situations, yet they preserve the same "stony" core denouncing the root or revealing the nature of the original idea.

Naturally, nationalism is no exception. Apparently new phrases and slogans display a long, profound and usually intense history. Unless the reading of history is given due attention, things that are not new will appear fresh (though we assume that nationalism has to do with modernity, as we will see), or something bearing old expressions will be defended as original. As there are new lefts which a thorough consideration would reveal as neither new nor, perhaps, lefts, there are rights proclaimed new and yet grounded in styles and contents of the past.

When dealing with ideas and ideologies, which we will bear in mind, especially in the case of Argentina, we must consider a notion that explains otherwise bewildering consequences of those journeys.

Six hundred pages on doctrinary liberalism do not account for a definition of such movement. Rather, they are the explanation of the historical reason applied to acquaint us with that object.⁵

This is what Maravall, in a resurgence of logic, calls the "principle of complementarity." Reality always discloses itself by virtue of a system or set: The electron is a particle when traversing space, a wave when traversing substance. Contemporary systematic perspectives are not alien to the development of such logical reasoning. Feudalism may be understood either as a decomposition process or as a means of preserving unity. Rousseau's work may be interpreted as one of the intellectual origins of totalitarianism, yet it inspired a liberal revolution. Englishman Burke interpreted the French Revolution as, among other things, a

⁴The most intelligent remarks that I have read on the "social trajectory" of ideas belong to Bertrand de Jouvenel in his remarkable essay "Sovereignty."

⁵José Maria Maravall. *Teoría del Saber Histórico*. (Madrid: 1958). Maravall's phrase refers to a classic book of Diez del Corral on "doctrinary liberalism." (A tentative translation)

disintegrative, menacing movement, possibly leading toward the fragmentation of the French state. Still, the French republican democracy turned out to be one of the originals of the most compact form of political unity known ever since: the modern nation-state.

These are not the contradictions of historians, but rather perplexing complementarities because they arise at one time. Historical phenomena are not always ambiguous, but they are often twofold. Should the "social journey" of ideas and ideologies be combined with a distinction among levels of analysis and the principle of complementarity, then manifestations and consequences otherwise contradictory in an absolute logical sense may be accepted with less skepticism.

Nationalism may be simultaneously regarded as an integration factor (toward the inside) and as a de-integration factor (toward the outside). This is not propounded as a conclusion. So far, it is just a possible application of what we have been saying. Nationalism usually claims to be an "enfolding ideology" in terms of internal affairs and an "expansive"--thus aggressive--ideology in terms of foreign policy.

Nationalism manifests itself in one way when traversing through a restrictive and aristocratic society, differently when facing social transformations of an enlarged democracy, and finally, differently when associated with the right or left (better, as "rightism" or "leftism"), or as a form of integristism such as a party of the "pure."⁶

Historical Journey of "Liberal Nationalism"

The historical fate of liberal nationalism illustrates the significance of the social, but also historical, journeys of ideas and ideologies. Nationalism as a modern phenomenon accompanied the prime of the liberal era of the 19th century, when liberalism was a militant ideology in the sense already expressed. Thus, there

⁶Konstantin Symmons-Symonolewicz. Nationalist Movements: A Comparative View. (Meadville, Pa.: Maplewood Press, 1970). When examining "the psychological bases" of nationalism, he refers to Janus, the ancient two-faced Roman god. As any other complex social phenomenon, nationalist inspiration bears a twofold nature: a positive element, the love to one's own country and people, and a negative element leading to fanaticism and confrontation. "Both are... opposite faces of the same coin," he affirms, close to the remarks of C.J.H. Hayes, quoted above (K. Symmons-Symonolewicz, pp. 4 & 5).

had been a liberal nationalism as there would be, later in the 20th century, an anti-liberal nationalism. When the relationship between nationalism and liberalism seemed to have been discarded, recent studies recovered it as necessary to create proper conditions for international cooperation and regional and world peace.

At the level of ideas, there were "forefathers," or nationalist fathers in the terms of Salo Wittmayer Baron.⁷ Rousseau, Burke, Jefferson, Fichte, Mazzini: None of them belongs to this century. Their individual relationship with nationalism as subject of modern history is certain, so long as one is aware of the "equivocal nature" of some of their teachings whenever the historian fails to link in each case the consequences of the operating idea to the historical situation being studied. For instance, Rousseau is one of the sources of both romantic and revolutionary nationalism, depending on the era and atmosphere in which he is read.

Edmund Burke was also a proponent of a version of nationalism, although it was of a conservative kind. Nationalism was perceived by Burke to be nurtured by irrational ingredients, yet was so strong as to lead him to denounce the repressive policy of the English government toward the colonies, which government he defended in his famous presentation on Conciliation with America as an expression of family ties, of common names, which claim equal protection and privileges. When linked to his time and space, Burke has been as tricky a "forefather" in terms of the analysis of the history of ideas as Rousseau himself. Toward the middle of the last century, Burke's reputation was remarkable. He was praised by British parties, acknowledged by Marx (who rejected his ideas) as "the paragon of British statesmen"⁸ and admired by the Tories for his critiques and considerations on the French Revolution, despite his proposals on the North American Revolution (not to mention India and Ireland). Liberals did not feel comfortable with Burke's judgments on the French Revolution, which led to the breach between Burke and the Whigs in 1791. In practical terms, though, Burke's influence was more intense

⁷Salo Wittmayer Baron. Modern Nationalism and Religion. (New York: Meridian Books, The Jewish Publication Society of America and Philadelphia: Harper & Brothers, 1947). Where the author further examines what he calls "Catholic inter-territorialism," "Protestant Individualism," "Orthodox Cesaropapism" and "Jewish ethnicism" as antecedents of the challenges of World War II postwar period.

⁸In the New York Daily Tribune. (No. 4597, January 12, 1856). Reproduced in Karl Marx and Frederick Engels. Collected Works. (Vol. 14. London: 1980, p.587). Quoted by Conor Cruise O'Brien. The Great Melody: A Thematic Biography and Commented Anthology of Edmund Burke. (Chicago/London: The University Chicago Press, 1992/1993).

on liberals than on conservatives. Still, the left-wing of the liberal party was hostile toward Burke and trusted Paine. The debate goes on. This summary suffices for the sake of our reflections, because it affirms the complex nature of analysis when ideas are seen "rolling," or traveling, over concrete historical situations.

Jefferson's case further illustrates such complexity. As in the case of Burke, he was a product of the British Constitution, although far from its unconditional admirer. As a revolutionary leader, Jefferson adhered to the thoughts of the founders of the French constitution in terms of those "principles" befitting the North American revolution, rather than in terms of historical continuity. Jefferson parted from foreign models whenever they differed from the North American reality. His appeal as exponent of the path of nationalism lies in that he deemed each generation apt to freely adjust its constitutional life, without "undue reverence" to tradition and precedents. Yet at the same time, Jefferson regarded North America's constitution as a primary article of nationalist faith. He considered the new system of liberties an essential component of that faith, to distinguish the United States within the "human family," and in fact a major component of a historical assignment. He projected the nationalist ideals toward the future, even when they were not of an "expansive nationalist" kind. Baron accurately notes that Jefferson's nationalism was basically congruent, because he believed each people possessed its own mores, laws and culture-impacting changes, even though such belief bore the hope that eventually many of them would be influenced by North America's example. But he was not exempt from incongruities, implicit in the "imperialistic nature of his expectations" as to "the North American Anglo-Saxon civilization" which, from his standpoint, would embrace the whole Western hemisphere in a broad and singular republic. It is worth noting that he looked down on Latin America, expressing significant doubts on the self-governing capacity of Latin Americans. In any case, the expansion foreseen by him, without reviewing the incongruities in his ideas, ideals and their possible consequences, was pacific and achieved through worthiness or the acquisition of territory.⁹

⁹Jefferson's singular character is hardly mentioned here. However, let us recall the fact that he led a movement for the adoption of a sort of symbolic neoclassicism (a style regarded by him as representative of the United States' democratic qualities) as a way of "national architecture." This aspect of Jefferson's life is thoroughly explored in Gardner, *Art through the Ages*, 9th ed., Horst de la Croix, Richard and Diane Kirpatrick, eds. (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1991), especially pages 850-853.

In the midst of a world turbulence ignited by the North American and French revolutions, Fichte entered the stage of nationalism. If Rousseau's nationalism was inaccurate and contradictory, Burke's tense due to his attitude toward the North American and French revolutions, and Jefferson's ambivalent due to his demands concerning a sort of rising nationalism in a new country, Fichte's resulted from a gradual displacement from cosmopolitanism toward extreme nationalism. And Mazzini, along with Gioberti, as spiritual leaders of the Risorgimento, became the Italian counterpoint to German nationalists. The former was anti-Catholic and anti-clerical; the latter, in Moral and Civil Primacy (1843), postulated Italian unity under papal leadership. Mazzini, whose writings and preachings evidenced that eventually he was more anti-clerical than anti-religious, would end with what Ernst Haas calls "synthetic nationalism," with attributes of nationalist ideologies placed, in the last of Haas's works, among what he calls syncretistic nationalism.¹⁰

The "forefathers of nationalism," should they be acknowledged as such, advocated non-coincident ideas except for the fact that they all contributed to forge an ideology or, better to say, different and sometimes diverse versions of an ideology. But their thoughts around what would be a germinal ideology, the name of which was not even applied by most (Mazzini, for instance, abhorred the term "nationalism"), were expressed in crucial times.

Baron warns that more than one and a half centuries elapsed between Rousseau's birth (1712) and Mazzini's death (1872). Nevertheless, five writers linked those crucial times. When Rousseau died, Burke was nearly 49 years old, Jefferson 35 and Fichte 16; Mazzini was born in 1805, when Jefferson and Fichte were still alive. Yet, the chronological sequence does not prevent differences, weighted by the events of the new United States and France, but also by the proletariat's rise in Europe.

Baron perceives what he calls a "genuine correspondence" among the ideas of those thinkers, the peculiar historical experiences of their people, and the way in which events engraved certain outstanding features in those minds open to receive them and, to say it somehow, filter them.

¹⁰Ernst B. Haas. "Nationalism: An Instrumental Social Construction." (Millennium, Vol. 22, No. 3, Winter 1993, pp. 509, 548). We will later mention Ernst Haas's thinking and contributions to the historical and current study of nationalism.

The principle of complementarity, which I find useful and pertinent to apply, does not only refer to ideas in specific situations. It also refers to situations in which inspiration is projected into an operating ideal. Whether or not one acknowledges the "paternity" of Baron's eminent work (in one part devoted to the link between religion and politics), to read those writers from a historical perspective enables us to verify that the proposed method distinguishes in order to unify without confusing. We see that among those doctrinary "fathers" there were elements for the genesis of last century's "liberal nationalism," but also for the genesis of this century's "anti-liberal nationalism."

In political history, facts usually precede the words that baptize them. Such was the case of "political liberalism," according to Giovanni Sartori's consecrated remark in Teoría Democrática. It also applies to nationalism in its historical manifestations.

In this regard, Yael Tamir's recent book on "liberal nationalism" is worth reading.¹¹ The author does not write in the mid 19th century, when nationalism was one of the great liberal causes, or in times of Byron's dying to liberate the Greeks from the Turks, or of Chopin composing for Polish independence, or of Mazzini and Cavour preaching and striving to liberate Italians from Austrians.

Yael Tamir aims at proving that liberalism is not at odds with nationalism today. One may be liberal and nationalist, as much as one must be patriotic if one is liberal. The book is far from a pure academic exercise performed by an intellectual devoted to political philosophy in Oxford, with the necessarily attendant qualities and training. Yael Tamir is an Israeli, one of the founders of the "Peace Now" movement and an active defender of civil rights in Israel. The book is not just an intervention in the Anglo-American academic debate around liberalism. It is further--precisely for another level of analysis--a profound introspection from the perspective of Zionism.

¹¹Yael Tamir. Liberal Nationalism. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993).

Tamir's complex task is, thus, to reconcile liberalism and Zionism. From an inspiring quote of Isaiah Berlin¹² stems Mazzini's belief in the desirable consistency between the claim of all nationalisms and universal values. This leads her to the significant corollary by which the Jewish claim for the state of Israel cannot be grounded on the particular fact of Jewish suffering. Otherwise, suffering, a genuine ground for other considerations, becomes a title to obtain national rights. Whereby those people who have never suffered persecution, even when they are national groups, would be either less entitled or not at all, which Tamir deems unreasonable. Jews are as entitled to have their own land as any other group self-aware of this right. Every people, Tamir asserts, requires a national community in which to develop its potential, rooted in individuals, language and history. Thus, when she deals with the "Palestinian question," Tamir, based on a consistent liberalism, argues that a nationalist Jew cannot deny the validity of Palestinian nationalism. Regarding Tamir's conclusions, Michael Ignatieff¹³ remarks that the reconciliation between the nationalist argument from history and the liberal argument from human nature is produced through the most basic of human needs: security, which allows a people to exist without falling victim to violence.

The significance of Tamir's contribution lies in its intellectual courage.¹⁴ Here, it is a fitting demonstration of what is necessary for the application of our framework of analysis.

The Reading of History

Carlton J.H. Hayes (1882-1964) and Hans Kohn (1891-1971), both historians (the former from New York and the latter from Prague and Germany), were

¹²"The ideas of every philosopher concerned with human affairs in the end rest on his conception of what man is and can be. To understand such thinkers it is more important to grasp this central notion or image... than even the most forceful arguments with which they defended their views and refute actual and possible objections" (p.13).

¹³ Michael Ignatieff. "Boundaries of Pain." (The New Republic, November 1, 1993), commenting on Yael Tamir's book.

¹⁴While we are writing these reflections, the tragedy of Hebron is taking place. A Jewish fanatic of the Kach ultra nationalist party murdered dozens of Palestinians in a temple. The tragedy moved everyone and jeopardized peace conversations. As David Hoffmann quotes in The Washington Post of February 27, 1994, it is clear that the strife is not between Jews and Palestinians, but rather between integrist from one side and the other. He quotes something expressed by a Palestinian: "When a Jew murders he is called crazy: when we throw stones we are called terrorists." This does not apply to those Jews who have frankly reacted against the author of the massacre and his sectarian fanatics, but the complaint illustrates Tamir's intellectual courage.

pioneers in the subject of nationalism. Probably, our itinerary will lead us close to the fundamental classification of the two of them, above all as regards revolutionary nationalism, but we must stress the way in which they have organized historical knowledge to classify the nationalisms registered in their reading of history. Louis L. Snyder, a disciple of Hayes, distinguishes between Hayes's "vertical conceptualization" according to a chronological criterion, and Kohn's "horizontal conceptualization" in the comparison of Western and non-Western nationalism.¹⁵ Hayes makes a distinction among humanist nationalism, Jacobin nationalism, traditional nationalism, liberal nationalism, integral nationalism and economic nationalism.

Humanist nationalism (literally, "humanitarian") is the first systematic doctrine of modern nationalism, revealed for Hayes by the Enlightenment. Its ends were humanitarian: tolerance, respect for all nationalities, a universalism conciliated with particularisms according to the preachings of Bolingbroke, Rousseau and Herder, considering the special "genius" animating them.

Jacobin nationalism arises with the preaching of humanitarian goals and the preservation of freedom, equality and fraternity as promoted by the French Revolution. But it does not tolerate any kind of opposition, and is ready to use force in order to impose its ideals. It is fanatic in its victory determination, displaying a missionary zeal. It is a version, in the end, of the "party of the pure" according to certain features which I find applicable to sectarianisms whatever their source and original intention may be.

Traditional nationalism emerges from revolutionary times as an aristocratic defense that Hayes regards as, ultimately, conservative and at the same time reactionary in its criticisms of the Jacobins. Against revolution and reason as factors of national development, they set history and tradition. In arguable inclusion--due to the complex nature of their thought, as noted in my preceding reflections--Burke appears together with Schlegel and Ambroise.

Liberal nationalism is exposed as a sort of third way between Jacobins and traditionalists. Hayes finds it neither fully democratic nor fully aristocratic, though

¹⁵Louis L. Snyder. *Encyclopedia of Nationalism*. (New York: Paragon House, 1990. p. 240).

it has features of the democratic and aristocratic principle and above all of the experience embodied in liberal nationalism. Bentham is one of its main upholders, although not the only one, because liberal nationalism has spread throughout the European continent and reached other areas of the world. I dare mention, among these areas, the case of Latin America and of Argentina in particular. It emphasizes the absolute sovereignty of the national state, without yielding the principle of individual freedom. National states are thus responsible for international peace, for an order that would allow and sustain the independent national development.

However, the national states that nationalism helped forge during most of the 19th century would not establish a pacific international order, but rather, what we might call a domination order. Nationalism will thus be one of the sources of imperialism, from which hostile versions against liberalism and "humanitarianism" would derive--incorporated by liberal nationalism as part of its inner logic.

Integral nationalism will then arise: "jingoistic," militarist, imperialist, unifying, but above all expansive and opposed to freedoms whenever they interfere with the state's "national" aspirations. Loyalty toward the national state, the "statist" nation, rises over every other value and every other loyalty, an essential observation which ensures the vitality of Hayes's description. And I add, in a literally clerical key such as the one evoked by Charles Maurras, rises even over rooted religious loyalties. Spokesmen of integral nationalism are Barrés jointly with Maurras in France; Rhodes and Kipling in Great Britain, D'Anunzio and Mussolini in Italy; Treitschke, Stoeker, Wagner and Hitler in Germany, and Podedonostsev and Plehbe in Russia, even when Hayes's inventory leads then to necessary distinctions.

Finally, economic nationalism, which arises as a new kind of nationalism, is relatively different from the nationalism so far depicted through versions of a political nature. When Hayes extends the classification to embrace the economic dimension, he is impressed by the emergence of a commercial belligerence among the most powerful national states in the beginning of this century, which brings with it an extreme protectionism and the struggle for market control. Economic

nationalism and imperialism converge as important and powerful factors of the Western civilization.¹⁶

Hans Kohn experienced nationalism from his youth. He witnessed triumphs and failures of ideologies and political ways from the old Austrian-Hungarian monarchy, which was a victim of disruptive nationalism and incompetent governments. He was attracted by the German experience, which he came to describe as a path to national suicide. He witnessed nationalism as a product of a long historical process. Diverse political climates, different cultures and diverse social conditions eventually diverge into two kinds of nationalism: Western nationalism vs. non-Western nationalism (comprising Central and Eastern Europe and Asia). Both kinds contain, in turn, several peculiar cases.

According to Snyder, Kohn organizes his analyses along four lines: origins, historical motivations, distinctive features and development of major experiences. Kohn's difference between the primarily political origins of Western nationalism and the primarily socio-cultural path of non-Western nationalism is significant, even though later on it would be subject to strong criticism due to its excessive generalization, by which significant regions of the world laid outside the description. It follows nevertheless, that Kohn has observed the West with both nationalisms preceded by the formation of national states and those coinciding with such formation. In the East, nationalism was an ideal of protest (the expression is mine) against the existing state pattern; favorable encouragement stemmed from culture, and the political aspect played a significant, yet, in the end, secondary role in terms of such germinal encouragement. According to Kohn's descriptive scheme, Western nationalism results from the "Age of Reason": anarchic; egalitarian; brotherly; concomitant with constitutionalism, liberalism and democracy, and, in all, with an open society. In the East, illuminism was rejected, the authoritarian and narrow society became the general pattern of collective life. Nationalism resulting from this historical situation diverged from the Western one. At the earliest stages, Western nationalists evoked nations as a union of citizens; Eastern nationalists, as communitarian and folk units. This synthesis conceals Kohn's remarkable

¹⁶Carlton J.H. Hayes. The Historical Evolution of Modern Nationalism. (New York: R.R. Smith, Inc. 1931). The discrimination of nationalisms into "two kinds," a benign one and an evil one, was anticipated by Hayes--and never abandoned--in a former book: Essays on Nationalism. (New York: 1926).

historical explorations and his warning, somehow akin to that of Hayes, concerning the risks of integral nationalism, its aggressive force and its expansionistic logic-- distinctive features from those of nationalisms which conciliate national tradition and individual dignity.¹⁷

Let us add that there are regions of the world that fall outside the scope of the concern and knowledge of the pioneer historians of nationalism, and even of their eminent successors. Also obvious is that there is no systematic communication among historians exploring the subject from the Anglo-Saxon world, and those from France, Spain and Latin America or from other areas distant from the main academic centers--not precisely a novel remark, yet necessary to recall despite its obvious nature. European schools of thought, mainly the French, German and Spanish ones, have produced studies, the subtleties of which were disregarded by the Anglo-Saxon world, and vice versa. The clamor mounts when the Latin American, African, Asian and Middle Eastern realities are examined from the view of what are called (incorrectly, I believe) Latin Americanists, Africanists and Easternists, and the perspective of intellectuals producing as "situated" academicians, yet also "besieged" by the risk of reciprocal disregard.

This was a significant concern of historians such as Rupert Emerson, whose analysis of the empire's transition to nation combines erudition with masterly intuitions.¹⁸ The Soviet Empire's implosion had not yet occurred when Emerson began his best book with this phrase: "Empires have fallen on evil days and nations have risen to take their place."

Self-determination, just as had happened with the principles of equality and the rights of man, with which it keeps an uncertain relationship, was proclaimed as dogma of universal application. In practice, Western allies did not allow this to extend beyond the European boundaries or pierce into the winners' territory.

¹⁷Hans Kohn disclosed his ideas in an extensive bibliography. For our purposes, I think the best expressions of his typology and historical explanations are found in The Idea of Nationalism: A Study of Its Origins and Background. 8th ed. (New York: 1960), and Nationalism: Its Meaning and History. (Princeton: 1955). Also a clear evaluation, Ken Wolf. "Hans Kohn's Liberal Nationalism: The Historian as Prophet." (Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 37, No. 4, Dec. 1976, pp. 651-672).

¹⁸Rupert Emerson. From Empire to Nation: The Rise to Self-Assertion. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960, especially pp. 89-91 and subsequent).

Naturally, the revolution of 1989 was unsuspected by Emerson; yet, his remarks on the consequences of the transition from empire to nation convey common traits, suggesting the application of the principle of complementarity to ideas, ideologies and systems.

Emerson's work is remarkable, because a great part of the Third World--the Second World still existing then--entered into his examination: colonial policy and national movements; the nature of the nation, people, territory and state; language and cultures; Western and non-Western nationalism, and the culmination of the colonial nationalist as a democrat.

In the admirable third part of this work, entitled "Anatomy of the Nation," Emerson warns that "nationalism is so much with us, plays so large a role in shaping the setting of our daily lives, that it is often taken as a simple matter about which we know more or less as much as we need to know"¹⁹ when we actually ignore much. From which the historian has much more to say around the three vital areas, they are doubt and ignorance. First, which nations are such and how have they formed? Second, why has nationalism become what it is, and in what circumstances has it acted? Third, what will its destiny be? Are nations immersed in an internationalism that will enfold them all, or will there be a return of totalitarian nationalism?

Nationalist ideologies in their liberal and non-liberal, Western and Eastern versions cannot be adequately examined by social scientists without the reading of history as retold, with utmost quality, by Hayes, Emerson and Kohn.

For the reading of history, the first level of analysis toward a better political explanation, there are intellectuals who act as "academic fathers" in the nationalist subject. When Peter Alter, Ernst Gellner, E.J. Hobsbawm, Elie Kedourie, John Breuilly, Rene Remond, and more recently Ernst Haas attempt a substantive explanation of such a slippery subject as nationalism, they follow in the footsteps of seminal historians.

¹⁹Emerson , p. 89.

The latter pose audacious questions such as the quoted examples of Emerson. Our author explains that very few will deny that the nation and the national state seem anachronisms in the atomic era. Yet, after acknowledging nationalism's sins and short-sightedness, its sinister sides which render unsustainable its pretense of presenting an absolute ultimate good, the question remains whether, in a more limited framework of analysis in time and space, a cure for this illness, affecting millions of human beings, and the reason why so many other millions raise it as a banner may be found. The historian's examination is not restricted to Western Europe's calendar. He further examines the social and psychological transformation by which either revolutionary changes or reversion grant nationalism a role much too significant to be disdained.

Emerson's examination goes through the complex laboratory of experiences so far manifested in Asia and Africa. Over 30 years have elapsed since then; historians' concerns have multiplied, without the answers to old, yet intelligent questions having been found. Thus, nationalism has not come back; it never left.

Still, other questions arise today (without denying the sagacity of Berlin's assertion): Where are the traits that have never left those nationalisms manifest today? What can be expected from them, hounded as they are by the globalization of polity, economy and information?

Political Nationalism: The Evolution of an Idea

The history of ideas is a rich, inaccurate, rewarding field, untrustworthy and full of surprises. Berlin cautiously approaches the confirmation that there had been brilliant thinkers whose perturbing accuracy in certain anticipations nobody denies, even when other aspects of their proposals may be questionable. No one ignores de Tocqueville's capacity for analysis, or Karl Marx's skill (despite his mistakes) in tracking the fundamental operative factors of his era, not as obvious for his peers as is commonly believed. Nor does anyone ignore Bakunin's understanding of the causes of the big social uprisings, Lasalle's prediction of state socialism, Buckhard's forecast of the industrial-military complexes. Max Weber perceived and described the rising power of the bourgeoisie. Durkheim warned about the possibility of anomie, and the entire past century generated utopias and forecasts. Many fell into oblivion, others were reclaimed by Huxley and Orwell and overwhelmed by reality.

But there was one movement which was converging into an idea which was then projected until it transformed itself into an ideology, which in turn grew and, when familiar and strong, made a qualitative jump over to the dark side of reality.

This is the basis of Emerson's remark, which I rescued so as not to omit seminal intuitions. It is also the sense of Isaiah Berlin's reflection on nationalism. As strange as it may appear, in a century so much prone to utopias and prophecies, "no significantly renowned thinker, so far as I know, has anticipated a future where they would play a still more dominant role." With all, Berlin adds, he would not exaggerate when asserting that "it is one of the more powerful movements in our current world; even the most powerful in certain regions of the world." Such movement, nationalism, lacked an "adequately" foreseen future.²⁰

The journey explored by Berlin may be considered familiar, but there lies a suggestive insistence in the studies of the English thinker on the subject of our concern. "So far as I know," he says, "nobody has even insinuated that nationalism would manage to dominate the last third of our century to such an extent that few movements or revolutions would have any chance of success, except when going arm in arm with nationalism or, in any case, when not opposing it." Except, then, that they "journeyed" with nationalism along specific historical situations. This would account, I dare say quite naturally, for our being able to talk about "rightist" and "leftist" nationalisms, justifying different Western and Eastern legitimacies, or legitimacies in pursuit of nationalism to consolidate and expand themselves.

I consider Berlin's approach substantial for he correctly describes nationalism in its "evil" variant (Hayes) and "hostile ideologies" (Symmons-Symonolewicz). For Berlin, the term nationalism represents something more definite, ideologically important and dangerous: the conviction that men belong to a particular human group, and that such group has certain features defined in terms of common

²⁰ In "The Bent Twig: a Note on Nationalism." (*Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 51, 1972, pp. 11- 30), Issah Berlin takes as the exception Moses Hess, in his book *Rome and Jerusalem*, who in 1862 asserted that Jews had the "historical mission of unifying communism and nationality." The subject of nationalism was an object of study , but Berlin's most succinct analysis is in *Against the Current: Essays in the History of Ideas* (New York:Viking Press, 1980). Pertinent remarks will be found in *The Crooked Timber of Humanity: Chapters in the History of Ideas*, where Berlin devotes a remarkable chapter to Joseph De Maistre and the origins of fascism (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1991, pp. 91-174). (With reference to Hess, remember Yael Tamir's book *Liberal Nationalism* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993). In both cases, there are exhortations rather than prophecies.)

territory as well as habits, laws, remembrances, beliefs, language, artistic and religious expression, social institutions, common ways of life--perhaps also inheritance, family bonds, and race. Such factors structure an idiosyncrasy of human beings who perceive themselves to be different from others. Secondly, and I believe even more determinant in explaining certain contemporary versions of nationalism, and those versions evolving into fascism, the scheme of life of a society is similar to that of a biological organism. These "organic" models have their own ends and values, and in case of conflict these must prevail. They cannot be "artificially" formed by individuals or groups. Rather, individuals and groups "are" within what constitutes the national organism--the nation--whether it acquires the form of state or not. From there onwards, it proceeds to the end of a road that leads not to the person as the essential human unity or to a voluntary association, but to an organism standing as supreme value. Neither a society in Burke's sense, a people in Rousseau's sense, nor a state in Hegel's sense, but a nation in the nationalist sense. The values of "my" group, for the nationalist of "my" nation, must be observed for this and this alone, not because they are conducive to virtue or happiness, because they are ordered by God or by the church, the prince or parliament, nor because they are good and correct in themselves and thus valid of their own right, but rather because there is no option that may replace what the "national" organism claims as its own.

Such is the sense of what is called organic nationalism, the ideology of which will be later evoked with other names, names similar to each other, or already in historians' classifications, such as integralism, or, in my opinion, with a more deeply rooted tradition "integrism," which is contrary to "progressivism," according to the connotation provided by contemporary French history and its areas of influence--as a part of Argentine nationalism, for instance. Definable in itself, there is no need to outline it in detail by expressing what it is not.

We thus reach a definition of ideological nationalism, or an ideological definition of nationalism. The national idea has become an absolute, a temporal absolute.

As we all know, the term ideology has several definitions. But if I am proposing to understand by ideology a part of the truth which regards itself as the

absolute truth, or a part of the reality expressing itself as if it were the entire reality, then I am saying that the ideology evokes a "temporal absolute."

Along this line of reasoning I place the nation as the supreme value, and when doing so, I am expressing the nation as an ideology. Such is, in the first place, nationalism: the "absolutized" national idea.

There are different gateways to this ideology, different motivations leading an idea along such a path. Some have looked at injuries and humiliations as conditions for the nationalist reaction (this is Kohn's defensive nationalism). Others have warned that the nationalist advent requires not only injuries but also thin skins to keep such injuries open, and that usually these are found in the minds of members who carry or project the "image" of a nation.²¹ Thus, nationalism has landed in the aesthetic and critical spheres of life, from which certain versions would rise, as in Italy and Germany in the last century, or in France and Argentina this century.

Last century's liberal thought was carefully yet positively approaching democracy when the nation-state was considered, or had historically become, "the normal unit of an independent and sovereign human society." Herder announced that multinational empires wrongly assembled and misshapen would give way to a society of sovereign national states: Mazzini's Young Italy, Young Germany, Young Poland, Young Russia, Echeverria's Young Argentina. Such nation-states, inspired by a healthy patriotism, would live in peace and harmony. According to Berlin, Durkheim was the only one to clearly perceive the destruction of hierarchies and traditional orders of social life, and to see the fabric of human loyalties torn by an industrial progress claiming centralization and bureaucratic rationalization. Alienation followed the "old order" and the vacuum was filled not so much with new myths, as was Sorel's wish, but rather with old myths, with fervors derived from the idea of the nation as supreme authority. Both parties and individuals exploited the power generated by the combination of alienation, humiliations, and the image of the nation as a society of living, dead and unborn. Yet, the power was there.

²¹Benedict Anderson's reasoning. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. (London: Verso Editions & NLB, 1983) follows suit.

This ideology might never have been born. The idea itself might have remained as it was, in its harmonic and non-aggressive liberal version. According to certain interpretations, the "Whig interpretation" spread by liberal and socialist historians, which opposed "darkness" to "*lumières*," thwarted the prevention of such an ideology. According to others, it stemmed from the "Eurocentrism" peculiar to the thought of the 19th and early 20th centuries--a capital remark by Berlin.

From a European standpoint, Asia, Africa and Latin America were regarded as derivatives where nationalism would develop only as a replica of that in Europe. Marx and Lenin thought in these terms, and Lenin speculated on the instrumental sense of nationalism for revolution. Americans did not recognize their nationalist vestiges folded back into the idea and reality of "nativism." The intellectual world was as surprised as the political and economic ones by "this particular offspring of the romantic rebellion," reborn in the early, middle and late 20th century. Nationalism is not subject exclusively to contemporary examination, but surely it will be one of the fundamental subjects of every 21st century historian when applying this selective perception.

The nationalism under consideration is a modern phenomenon, notwithstanding which historical explorations around its gestation pierce, sometimes profoundly, into the history of humanity.²² Therefore, we are talking about modern nationalism, the fundamental courses of which reveal themselves in Western Europe and the United States of the late 18th century. Most contemporary scholars devoted to nationalism place the subject around that date and in those regions of the world.

"Eurocentrism," denounced and acknowledged when dealing with the subject after the expansion of the ideology, does not reach the fact that nationalism emerges as a political force which turned out to be more significant for change in Europe and

²²Eugene Kamenka, in the preface and introductory article of the seminar on nationalism organized by The Australian National University in 1972, remarks that at the University of Prague, founded in 1348, students were divided into German, Czech and Polish nations. This also occurred among university students in Aberdeen, and in this way they were recognized in the University of Paris, where there were "nationals" of France, Picardy, Normandy and Germany, also Dante's Italy and the Florentine and Milanese "naziones." Eugene Kamenka, ed. "Nationalism: The Nature and Evolution of an Idea." (Aberdeen: The Australian National University, 1973).

the world in the last two centuries than the ideas of freedom, democracy and even communism.²³

Alter has advanced an initial conclusion where researchers on nationalism converge: Nationalism as such does not exist; rather, a series of manifestations bring nationalism into existence. Thus, it is more appropriate to talk about nationalisms in plural than about nationalism in singular. Such verification does not relieve the theory. But it does mitigate the hard task of building sufficiently skillful and clarifying typologies to interpret, precisely, evoked cases of the manifestations of a phenomenon with an immutable essence.

Perhaps "nationalism (is) today a flourishing intellectual industry." This judgment, which may lead to a derogatory perception even when it was stated as the cover of a significant collective work,²⁴ attempts to explain why what may be considered an archaic, anachronistic and dangerous force defeated by globalization, may upset situations which, until the revolution of 1989, seemed asleep because apparently the "apogee of nationalism" had altogether passed.²⁵

The term "nationalism" appeared in the general political language by the mid 19th century associated with modernity, but the earliest mention of the word is found in a work of German philosopher Johann Gottfried Herder.²⁶ Today, we are not dealing with the word but rather with the phenomenon and manifestations, its definition, classification, explanation and application to different historical and current situations. The sequence propounded by Peter Alter is applicable, and also

²³This is the starting point, among others, of Peter Alter. Nationalism. (London: Edward Arnold, 1985). Alter stands in the line of most historians of ideas, and then of theoreticians and political scientists. Alter's first reference mentions German historian Friedrich Meinecke, for whom nationalism and socialism are the two "main currents of the 19th century thinking," while in the 20th century nationalism had "unparalleled successes." Alter, p.4.

²⁴The judgment belongs to Stephen Graubard, editor of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and of Daedalus, the journal of the Academy. It heads the presentation of a special number devoted to nationalism, "Reconstructing Nations and States." (Daedalus, Summer 1993), containing presentations by Noel Annan, Ernst Gellner, Liah Greenfeld, John A. Hall, Stanley Hoffmann, Douglas B. Klusmeyer, Martin Kramer, Michael Mann, Tom Nairn, Benjamin L. Schwartz, Charles Tilly, Ashutosh Varshney and Katherin Verdery.

²⁵E.J. Hobsbawm. Nations and Nationalism Since 1780: Program, Myth, Reality. 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992). He dates the "apogee of nationalism" between 1918 and 1950.

²⁶As Peter Alter states, op. cit., p. 7, with express reference to Boyd C. Shafer. Faces of Nationalism: New Realities and Old Myths. (New York: 1972, p.16), op. cit.; Aira Kemilainen. Nationalism: Problems Concerning the Word, the Concept and Classification. (Jynaskyla, 1964) and Eugene Kamenka, ed., op. cit. (London: 1976), quoted.

not unique to him. It is in some ways observed by the contemporary and classic studies on nationalism. The propriety of Alter's sequence rests in the first question: What is nationalism?

Karl W. Deutsch defines it as "a mental state providing 'national' messages, memories and images a preferential 'status' in social communication [a pivotal idea of Deutsch's interpretation from the 1950s], and an increasing weight in the decision making processes." The definition is in accordance with Deutsch's central contribution about the symbols of social communication as pre-conditions for a national identity. Yet, it does not seem comprehensive enough to capture the last and this century's expressions of nationalism, where the state exists as well as where it does not.²⁷ Through Eugen Lemberg, the German school provides a sociological approach: "a system of ideas, values and rules, an image of the world and society," which forms the group delineating its boundaries. Nationalism appears in Lemberg as an ideology. Theodor Schieder provides a refined definition by asserting that nationalism is a specific integrative ideology which "always refers to a 'nation' in a sense or another, not merely to a group of the religious or social type."

Nationalism holds the nation as a central value. In the appropriate sequence, we must advance to propose a definition of a sufficiently valid nation--not an easy task. Alter understands it as a social group which, due to a variety of historically evolved relationships of a linguistic, cultural, religious and political nature, becomes aware of its coherence, unity and particular interests. It claims the right to political self-determination and usually acquires it through becoming a nation-state.²⁸ Historical experience shows that nationalism has served as an emancipation force and ideology, although in the 20th century, it would become a force of oppression.

The complementarity principle again applies to the compared synchronic and diachronic historical experience. As an ideology or organized movement,

²⁷Karl W. Deutsch. "Nation and World." Ithiel de Sola Pool, ed., Contemporary Political Science: Toward Empirical Theory. (New York: 1967, p. 208).

²⁸Alter, op. cit., pp. 18 and subsequent. Modern nationalism flourishes in Europe during the early 19th century as an emancipation force as well as a legitimating form of an emerging stability. The process of the "revolutions for independence" in Latin America--in Argentina, especially--may find an adequate interpretation in the explanation of the historical experience according to Alter.

nationalism gathers the nation and state identity into the nation-state principle. The nation is incomplete without a state, and vice versa.

The original idea journeyed its historical path--political, social, cultural, ethnic, even economic--underwent crystallization as an ideology and now blends into a "form of political organization": the national state, tensely experiencing the "globalization" process. Some consider it a crossroads reached by the nation-state. Others argue that it is a necessary tension that suits the lives of societies and of their particular men and women, provided that nationalist integrism does not return.

If we deal with the "rebirth of nationalism,"²⁹ the open debate focuses on its manifestations. Are these new versions or old demons?

One of the last expressions of the concern of those who "think as men of action and act as men of thought" is Stanley Hoffmann's work, "France: Keeping the Demons at Bay."³⁰ Hoffmann acknowledges the success of French liberal writers when discrediting the "myth of the revolution" as the necessary force of social change. But with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the crisis of the French left, French liberals "have been deprived of a clearly defined cause." This is a conclusion I am willing to endorse with regard to Argentina and many other national situations, especially in Europe.

The clear reasoning of Hoffmann is not finished here, so far as our subject is concerned. The end of the cold war together with the economic and social difficulties persisting in France, he adds, have dissolved many old alignments. Writers who were once purely at the left of the ideological spectrum are now splattered by the issues of the European integration and of Yugoslavia, as much as by questions of immigration and nationality. Moreover, some former communist intellectuals are involved in a close dialogue with extreme right ideologists, expressing "mutual affinity on the 'rediscovery' of the nation, anti-Americanism and even anti-Semitism."³¹

²⁹The expression is used by Peter Alter as the culmination of his book, op. cit.

³⁰ Stanley Hoffmann. "France: Keeping the Demons at Bay." (*The New York Review of Books*, Vol. 41 No. 5, March 3, 1994, pp. 10-17) .

³¹Hoffmann, op: cit, p.12. The following considerations on the French current situation are inspired in Hoffmann's incisive and remarkable--though brief--essay. Hoffmann is writing a book on French nationalism. One of the best contemporary political scientists, he resumes the subject when I was

During most of 1992 and 1993, French political life displayed a sort of regression toward a defensive and protectionist nationalism, reminiscent of episodes of chauvinism. In the 1880s (Hoffmann refers to *La France Juive* of Edouard Drumont), and from the 1930s to the Vichy regime, France is a fascinating laboratory, though uncomfortable where these regressions are found and the blame for its hardships is laid upon the foreign world.

In Hoffmann's description of the French experience (obviously he does not ignore this fact), several national contemporary situations may be recognized, as well as segments of history, in Argentina, certainly, reproduced with striking fidelity. Also identified is the "transnationality" of certain manifestations of the described situation, such as the consequences of unemployment and the invasion of foreign workers. The French do not want a "multiculturalism *à l'américaine*" (certainly, I would add, neither does the Argentine society) because such multiculturalism may "Balkanize" and dismantle the Republic--such is the sense that sets the tone of the protest. It includes the repulsion of the "new underdeveloped barbarians" and the threat of "super developed barbarians," which is a direct allusion to the United States according to an old complex from the second post-war period in the relationships with Americans. There are enough grounds to abhor a forced "Americanization," but what is worth mentioning is that even the genuine reasons on distinct matters--cinema and agriculture, for example--are nurtured by old demons rather than by new arguments. Stanley Hoffmann's intelligent and intelligible analysis on the Balladur administration gives a vivid and current example of how "the atavistic French need of a state with firm control over society and the equally strong French instinct to resist the state" coexist in tension. Only a former Gaullist may understand this and keep the demons at bay.

The Labyrinth of Political Analysis

I have refrained from entering the labyrinth of theory, a path disclosed by Motyl's study on Sovietology, which attempts to capture finally the subject of

nationalism in the Soviet Union.³² However, I do observe his recommendations, as well as the ones expressed by Giovanni Sartori in his exercise of conceptual analysis,³³ which offers advice on how to negotiate the equally disconcerting labyrinth of historical and political analysis.

Observing from the outside the labyrinth of theory, I recall some of Motyl's warnings: If we deal with nationalism as a collective action (or as a social movement or, in the basic level, as a behavior), the problem is that there is nothing intrinsically nationalist in the behavior of people who call themselves nationalists. Collective actions, as social movements, are coordinated activities of groups. A fascist collective action does not differ, as a collective action (the underlined is Motyl's), from a collective action of communists, Catholics or nationalists.³⁴

In this regard, and however controversial it might be from other approaches, Motyl's penetrating glance must go through the "labyrinth of theory" to reach with enough background the territory of Sovietologists who exist now for the purpose of social sciences, even though the Soviet Union may have perished. Such glance overlooks nationalism as a culture, a cultural identity, an ethnicity and an ethnic solidarity, because all its forms of "communal feeling" are universally accepted. To confine any of these to nationalism would mean "to turn all human beings into nationalists." Whereby the problem is now exactly the opposite of the preceding one: Nationalism as a collective action would lack references; nationalism as a culture would have everything and everybody as references.

If nationalism is discussed as a collective action and as a cultural identity, then we are facing systems of beliefs. This leads Motyl to a first conclusion: nationalism must be a specific kind of belief, idea, doctrine, ideology or ideal. In a word, something of the mind.

missing an intelligent, updated analysis in the remarkable way of Rene Remond, Raoul Girardet, Eugene Weber, for example.

³²Alexander J. Motyl. Sovietology, Rationality, Nationality: Coming to Grips with Nationalism in the USSR. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990).

³³Especially in Giovanni Sartori. "Totalitarianism: An Exercise in Conceptual Analysis." Presentation at the meeting of the Committee on Conceptual and Terminological Analysis, at the International Political Science Conference, held in Buenos Aires, in July 1991.

³⁴Motyl, op.cit., 49.

But, what sort of thing is it? According to this line of reasoning and referring to Mark Hagopian, it is an ideal, "a broad symbol embracing values and objectives," turning them amiable and acceptable. It is not, therefore, an ideology, because the ideology follows its own logic and reaches "a level of coherency constituting a system." Being an ideal rather than an ideology is why nationalism is "sometimes on the right, sometimes on the center, sometimes on the left." Ideals are minimalists; ideologies are maximalists. Ideals only imply ends; ideologies recommend means as well. Ideals are porous; ideologies are solid.

This position is arguable as it does not admit the possibility that the evolution of nationalism as an idea may derive from an ideal but also from an ideology. Yet, it is a firm and qualitatively important position. Motyl regards nationalism as a different, distinct ideal: it is a political ideal. Nationalism links the nations with the "essence" of the political sphere: states. Sooner or later nationalism claims that "every nation must have its own state." In short, nationalism is a political ideal that sees "statality," that builds the state in the most suitable form of political organization according to each nation.³⁵ At the exit of the labyrinth, the ideal meets the ideology--Motyl, for the present, meets Alter.

This is not the last definition of nationalism, nor is it the most widely shared. But it is consistent, even when a clear distinction between nation and nationalism remains pending. It suggests why nationalism may coexist with other doctrines and political behaviors, including communism.

One of my observations in this line of reasoning is that it explains the association of nationalism with other ideas, doctrines and ideologies as "co-existence." I believe coexistence is an ambiguous manifestation of a more complex phenomenon: nationalism does not coexist; it enfolds or pierces into other ideologies, parties and doctrines. Expressions such as "national right" and "national left," so frequent in Latin America, for instance, do not evoke an oscillatory ideal revealing nationalism in the right or in the left. They rather evoke a certain kind of right or left resulting from the entanglement or penetration of nationalism.

³⁵Motyl, *op.cit.*, pp. 48-53.

The reasoning of Motyl, like that of Hagopian, treads a path which crosses at a certain point the approach I proposed in the initial stages of this reflection. Motyl concludes, for example, the "inevitability of national communism" (Chapter 6). From my point of view, he would draw the same conclusion by way of the path of ideology, not from ideals, but from the principle of complementarity by which nationalism, when marching through the communist phenomenon, imposes the specific manifestation of a "national communism."

When Motyl applies his definition to the cases he examines in the realm of Sovietology, he attains remarkable results in terms of quality and expressiveness. Nationalism as a form of collective action was effaced with the destruction of the Lithuanian and Ukrainian guerrillas in the early 1950s. For over three decades, this form of nationalist action disappeared, until its return in 1988-1989. During the intermediate period, the dominant form of nationalist action was individual. Incipient states and organized guerrillas were replaced by the heroism of men and women who would gather in communities after having undergone repression, jail terms and time in concentration camps. The behavior of individual nationalism represents an analytical problem obviously different from the behavior of collective nationalism. Individual nationalism is inseparable from the broader phenomenon of dissent. The dissident transgresses official legality. Dissent requires a conscious election for its inner logic in a totalitarian regime, and for its consequences. In the Soviet Union, the dissident exposed a "rational nationalism" opposing not only, and not so much, the constitution or the legality in force in itself, but rather the "official" legality, the system.

The paradox in the labyrinth arises with the subject of Russian nationalism. It is so inextricably linked to Russian "centrality" that it evokes myth. When the non-Russians emerge and claim the outer boundaries mapped by Russia for itself, Russian chauvinism and imperialism are reactivated. If they are appeased, their reactivity recedes. Such dynamic relation was in the heart of the dilemma faced by Gorbachev in 1990. Eventually, the undesired consequences of the attempts of the last Soviet leader would subvert, in terms of Motyl, Lenin's Austrian-Marxist legacy. As Helene Carrere d'Encausse expresses, it is the "glory of the nations,"³⁶ but also the time of nationalism as an ideal, as an ideology and as an alibi.

³⁶Ibid., especially chapters 10 and 11. Helene Carrere d'Encausse's work explores other aspects and uses other premises. But Sovietology owes much to this author, above all from *L'Empire éclaté*. (Paris:

This is why Giovanni Sartori, for whom the rejection of totalitarianism as a concept attests to the "loss of logic" often suffered by the social sciences, places it within the typology of "dictatorship," which embraces totalitarian, authoritarian and simple dictators. Among seven criteria he places ideology first. Clearly, he states, this concept must be disaggregated from the very beginning, because it is the "legitimization factor" providing the major grounds and supports of totalitarian regimes. Within ideology, he distinguishes three major elements. It is a system of quasi-religious beliefs, a substantive interpretation of the world and a Gestalt and *forma mentis*. The first element leads to the concept of a "new man" or his reconstruction, which will never again be found, because there are no vestiges of the achievement of the "Soviet man"; I think, though this is another subject. The crucial element is, for Sartori, the second one, the "official" interpretation of the world. Sartori uses the example of Marxism as an official interpretation. A decisive fracture of that interpretation requires alternatives. Sartori considered nationalism the "easy substitute of Marxism."³⁷ Ernst Gellner would never protest this interpretation, and the populist and opportunistic demagogy (as his biography seems to attest) of Vladimir Zhirinovskiy is testimony to the quality of Sartori's, Gellner's and Hoffmann's analyses.³⁸

Let me go through other practices within the labyrinth of analysis. American political thought has been emphatically expressed in a practice explicitly examined by Hans Kohn, and neatly exposed by Charles C. Alexander in the expression "new nationalisms" of the Depression years. They involve the rediscovery of the United States in the literature of the 1930s, the search for a "national culture" through music, cinema, radio, journalism, and the definition of what for certain leaders of

Flammarion, 1978). La Gloire des Nations directly applies to our subject. There is a Spanish version. The English version: The End of the Soviet Empire: The Triumph of the Nations. (New York: New Republics, 1990).

³⁷Giovanni Sartori. Totalitarianism, op.cit. pp. 10-11. The ideology as a criterion operates as follows: it is strong and totalizing in the totalitarian dictatorship; it is weak and non-totalizing in an authoritarian dictatorship; and it is irrelevant or weak in a "simple" dictatorship. Historical experience proves him right.

³⁸Ernst Gellner had foreseen the irruption of a certain character of the kind of Zhirinovskiy in his collaboration in Daedalus, Summer 1993, op. cit. A brief and expressive biography of Zhirinovskiy, which noted presumptions converging in the idea that the so-called "Liberal Democratic Party" was encouraged by the KGB, was published by The Washington Post, March 6, 1994. Hoffmann's analysis of the French current political situation and the behavior of the former communists contains all I wish to say. Should it be necessary to add more along the same line, the case of Italy is most expressive.

opinion was the "American cause."³⁹ Part of the New Deal seemed to most people the apotheosis of planning. "Regionalism" arose as an intellectual fashion and almost an ideology for governmental and academic proponents. Nationalism found its expression in the national and regional movements in favor of planning and in the glorification of national tradition. Yet most Americans adhered to ideals and needs. Needs were displayed by economic and social crises. Ideals were not perceived as "nationalist" in the sense in which Motyl develops the subject, but rather as "patriotic." But from outside the United States, nationalists of other areas of the world denounced American nationalism and its "imperialistic" derivation. Not only did European and Latin American leftists support that militant protest, but also certain rightists would turn the United States into an object of the anti-imperialist struggle, which was informed by the "theory of a sole demon," according to the debates that, in zig-zag, appear, disappear and reappear ever since World War I.⁴⁰

If I am not suspected of using an analogy as a pretext not to think, I dare say that in a certain way nationalism in the United States may be examined as nationalism in Russia. If, in the face of external challenges, everybody reacted as nationalists, what would it mean to be a nationalist? In this sense, the phenomenon of the centrifugal multiculturalism besieging the melting pot consecrated by the American society poses one of the most significant internal challenges to the issue of the national identity in the United States. And multiculturalism (different from "cultural pluralism," which is centripetal) reopens the debate of cultural nationalism through minorities which, in borderline situations (the "Nation of the Islam" acts over one of them), conceal nationalisms behind the veil of multiculturalism. The versatile condition of nationalism as an ideology and even

³⁹ Charles C. Alexander. Nationalism in American Thought: 1930-1945. (Chicago: Rand McNally & Company, 1968).

⁴⁰The most interesting contribution among the recent entries relating to American nationalism, belongs to Jack Citrin, Ernst B. Haas, Christopher Muste and Beth Reingold. "Is American Nationalism Changing? Implications for Foreign Policy." (International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 38, 1994, pp. 1-31). The article identifies "cosmopolitan liberalism, nativism and multiculturalism" as three rival ideologies of American nationalism. The importance of the contribution lies in that it is backed by recent inquiries revealing the degree of support of those conceptions, which compete in the "American identity." In the analysis proposed by me, the subject of the implications of Argentine nationalism upon the foreign policy lies subjacent in most conclusions. I have outlined this in a work published by SAIS, Johns Hopkins University, on occasion of the war of the Malvinas/Falklands, and it will be the object of a specific article. In Argentina, it has been dealt with by Carlos Escudé and Roberto Russell, and by Joseph Tulchin in his publications on the international relations between Argentina and the United States, in substantive documentation and reflections.

as an ideal, if one prefers a route already explored, has led toward a search for a common quality. Upon this search, it was found that self-determination may represent such common quality.⁴¹

Yet this conclusion is not peacefully accepted, not so much because the subject of self-determination is disdained--which is not the case in history, in theory or in action--but rather because tricky phenomena discourage the dilettantes, preserve the indifference of those who had never bestowed such things with much importance, and stimulate the explorers of the labyrinth.

The debate remains open and is renewed. First, because there are still nationalists and nationalism, and even because new groups stem from old groups that had not meant to be (the case of the Bosnian Muslims is one of the most recent). Second, because there are good reasons to go on studying nationalism.⁴²

There is a sound reasoning beneath this contribution: nationalism is the most important, perplexing and encircling political ideology of the modern era.⁴³ And even though most writings on nationalism start with this assertion, or a similar one, they also contain the regret that the concept is as diffuse as the mental conditions it is intended to describe are diverse. Haas deals gracefully with the

⁴¹This perspective would not explain, for instance, the political and social aspects of Israeli and Arab nationalism examined by Shlomo Avineri in the book edited by Eugene Kamenka. Shlomo Avineri, Political and Social Aspects of Israeli and Arab Nationalism. (pp. 101-122). Martin Kramer. "Arab Nationalism: Mistaken Identity." (Daedalus, op. cit. Summer 1993). States that Arab nationalism has lost its historical momentum and does not resist the strength of the Islamic fundamentalist expansion. It only persists in certain intellectual redoubts and these, Kramer says, have more audience in European centers than among the Arab peoples.

⁴²Ernst B. Haas. "What is Nationalism and Why Should We Study It?" (International Organization, Vol. 40, No. 3, Summer 1986). The typology proposed by Haas will be developed pursuant to his last contribution when writing this work (March 1, 1994): "Nationalism: An Instrumental Social Construction." (Millennium, Vol. 22, No. 3, Winter 1993, pp. 509-548).

⁴³This assertion does not only head our work, it is found in every work on nationalism, since the subject was resumed this century. This evokes a petition of principle repeated in academic works that, as in my case, are authored by people who are neither "militants" nor intellectuals of nationalism. Among the most significant and recent ones is E.J. Hobsbawm. Nations and Nationalism Since 1780: Program, Myth, Reality. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), which stems from independent Marxism. Benedict Anderson in Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, op. cit., wishes, Haas says, "to instruct his fellow Marxists by telling them that nationalism is not inconsistent with revolutionary commitment..." etc. Dudley Seers. The Political Economy of Nationalism. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983) acknowledges to have reconsidered intellectual commitments to Marxism and Keynesianism, writing like a "heretic from the CEPAL."

subject, though later his work would be ravaged by criticism. Studies on nationalism pose the proverbial problem of the elephant: the appearance of the animal differs according to the portion of it felt by different blind individuals.

A second reason arises from the debate between historians and social scientists, and often among members of each field. This is important if, as Haas explains, competitors do not agree on the fate of the "legal-rational" way, in Weber's sense, associated with nationalism.

Besides, is nationalism, in its modern condition, its return and recovery, an internal and international factor tending toward harmony or conflict, cooperation or wars--political, military, and economic? If the author is concerned about rationalization processes in times of quick social changes, what are the limits of nationalism as a rationalizer, given the fact that it has been charged with this role during important stretches of the modern past? If everything leads to proclaim nationalism a "necessary stage" experienced by political man, isn't this enough to justify its study?

We must plunge into the labyrinth of analysis in order to consider the "particular histories of particular nationalisms" under the rules of political explanation, so far as we accept that we are dealing with the manifestations of a primarily political phenomenon. This is the sense of the writings of John Breuilly:⁴⁴ nationalism as a form of politics. His works focus on the argument that nationalism may be better understood as an especially appropriate form of political behavior in the context of the modern state and of the system of the modern state. Nationalism is treated, then, "primarily" as a form of politics, a position which distinguishes itself, or attempts to emphatically distinguish itself, from the more theoretical works focusing on other aspects of nationalism. These include nationalism as a mental state, as an expression of a national conscience, as a political doctrine devised by intellectuals, as a pursuit of national identity, as an expression of something more "profound," such as an interest of class, social or economic structure, or cultural formation. Contributions of every or almost every theory

⁴⁴Since the first edition of Nationalism and the State (1982) up to the most recent one: John Breuilly. Nationalism and the State. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1994). When averaging the dozen years between both editions, John Breuilly poured off his main thesis as to nationalism as a "form of politics." John Breuilly. "Reflections on Nationalism." (Philosophy of the Social Sciences, No. 15, 1985, pp. 65-75).

evoked by such expressions are born in mind by Breuille, though they do not summarize his "focus."

Approaches to nationalism through culture, ideology, identity, class or modernization are not ineffective, though they miss a vital point: nationalism exists primarily in politics, and politics deals with power. And power, in the modern world, basically means the control of the state. The main task proposed by this concrete approach is to link nationalism with the goal of obtaining and using the power of the state. Personally, I think this approach to the subject, not always accepted in the literature on nationalism, is not insubstantial. John Breuille's work, at the least erudite, examines the social and intellectual bases of nationalism as much as the sources and forms of the nationalist ideology. It describes the varieties of nationalism in a world without nation-states and then in a world of nation-states, and depicts most approaches, from the properly nationalist of nationalism, to the functional, through the Marxist, the communicational and the psychological nationalisms.

He does not develop a general theory to be applied to cases, because he claims to be skeptical on the use of such procedure in historical research. Rather, he draws a frame of analysis to be applied to particular cases. This requires two procedures: first, the development of a typology of nationalism; second, the research of each kind by applying the comparative method to history.

From this perspective, the term "nationalism" is applied to political movements in the quest, or exercise, of state power, which justify this action with nationalist arguments. A "nationalist argument" is a political doctrine built on three basic assertions: 1) there is a nation with an explicit and peculiar character; 2) the interests and values of this nation have priority over every other interest or value, and 3) the nation must be as independent as possible, which usually implies the acknowledgment and possession of political sovereignty.

The ultimate use of Breuille's definition, besides the consistency within its postulated framework of analysis, lies in the fact that it may contribute to a better political analysis of how nationalists justify their actions in a given national situation. At the same time, the definition does not object to the consideration of nationalism as an ideology. Actually, this position accepts nationalism as an

ideology. However, it explores why and how such ideology has developed, and its role within nationalist politics.

In these conditions, Breuilly's contribution is useful and applicable to the political explanation of nationalism operating in a given national situation, from an ideology that justifies certain means for the quest and exercise of power. Breuilly's proposal is most interesting when applied to the political analysis of history and of current procedures operating in Latin America and, pursuant to the ultimate purpose of this work, in Argentina. However, given its inner logic, this same proposal does not suffice for political movements claiming independence upon the basis of universal principles. "Universalistic" movements, such as those leading to the creation of the United States, are revolutions for independence grounded on the appeal to equality and universal human rights.

Most of Breuilly's fundamental book regards nationalism as significant opposition to a state. According to this remark, consequently nationalism of a government is confined to two specific situations. First, the exteriorization of territorial demands for those spaces considered to belong to the nation. This is "territorial nationalism," a common expression in the modern versions of nationalism, which may be as aggressive and disturbing as the nationalism embodied in Nazism, and is a constant in Latin American nationalisms, among which Argentina's is no exception.

The second nationalism of a government is nationalism as a form of politics, mainly of opposition politics. A nationalist opposition may seek rupture from the state (separation), reorientation in the direction desired by nationalism (reform), or else unity with other states (unification) or within one state. In this case, nationalism is a product rather than a cause. In the eyes of internal and external witnesses of the coordination capacity of the elites conducting the initial and thus most fragile stages of unification, it provides legitimacy to the process of unity, above all during the zenith of the 19th century's unifying nationalism.⁴⁵

⁴⁵Breuilly, *op. cit.* (pp. 29 and 96-122). Nationalism as an ideology is a predominantly intellectual phenomenon. The nationalist ideology leaves a trace of an intellectual response to the modern problem of the relationship between state and society. In this order of ideas, the nationalist ideology preserves the "power of legitimation."

Conflicting Typologies

From the description of nationalism proposed by Hans Kohn through the assertion that it is "a political creed that constitutes the main support for the cohesion of modern societies and legitimates their pretension of authority," up to John A. Hall's relatively recent one, which condenses nationalism in "the belief in the primacy of a particular nation, either real or built,"⁴⁶ or John Breuilly's quoted one, all of these descriptions search for guiding definitions for the analysis of the phenomenon and the discussion of its nature.

The pioneering classifications are still enlightening, but the question remains open because nationalism, once a national question, today has become a transnational question.

A condensed definition such as Hall's, however, evokes more than one school of thought and naturally more than a single approach. The concepts of belief, primacy, particular nation, reality and construction refer to "three great ages" of nationalism, to which a "fourth age" initiated by the collapse of the Soviet Empire should be added.

The first three contain the foundation of new states in Latin America during the early 19th century, the amplification of nationalistic ideals driven by Woodrow Wilson and summarized in Versailles, and the expansion of the international order generated by the de-colonization process. The development of those ages places this nationalism as a modern phenomenon; we have already mentioned that there is consensus over this.⁴⁷ When Ernst Gellner warns that nationalism is within the "logic of industry," no matter how much argued his stance has been even by those who respect him the most, he is inferring such modernity. The industrial society depends above all on a common culture and language, a common cultural code, or a "massive engineering." Gellner does not consider nationalism as the awakening of

⁴⁶John A. Hall. "Nationalisms: Classified and Explained." (*Daedalus*, op. cit., pp. 1-28).

⁴⁷Eugene Weber. *Peasants into Frenchmen*. (London: Chatto & Windows, 1979). The book sums up an exemplary demonstration.

sleeping nations to a sort of self-awareness; nationalism "invents nations where none exist" The reality is nationalism; he somehow says: Nation is an idea.⁴⁸

Modernizing leaders, militarisms pretending to be modernizing, and foundational autocracies attest the seeds of truth born in Gellner's "fierce" assertion (Hall).

Gellner's theory is criticized on the grounds that it is not universal. Where are the national feelings prior to the emergence of industry, such as those experienced in Great Britain and in France--only to quote the most widely known examples? Why not include what John Hall calls "asocial society" (an expression, I believe, which suggests a combination of words), considering that whoever builds states wages wars, and whoever wages wars usually builds states. Much of this applies to the Yugoslavian tragedy. For the Bosnian Muslims, the pursuit of the construction of a state was an absent idea before the 1989 revolution, a diffuse idea at the beginning of the Yugoslavian tragedy, and an increasing pretension in early 1994. The strife continues, and the foreign powers are unable to find the right military policy or concerted policy to stop the war. In between the Serbs and Croats, the Bosnian Muslims attempt not only to survive, but also to live as a nation.

In the nationalism of "asocial societies," continuous competition leads to conflict, to the increasing demand of funds for the arms race, to the reaction of the civil society wherever traits or any remnant of it exist, to the assertion of an identity at first alien to the "national" identity and, depending on each case, to the revolutions from above or below. The revolution "from above" is that encouraged by the Napoleon wars, Meiji reformers or Von Clausewitz's idea: War is an affair of the peoples, it is the "people up in arms," later agitated by nationalism to consolidate or expand the national state. The revolution "from below" succeeds

⁴⁸Ernst Gellner. Nations and Nationalism: Nationalism and Politics in Eastern Europe. (1991). More recently, with subtle changes noted by Hall, see "L'avvento del nazionalismo e la sua interpretazione. I miti della nazione e della classe." In Perry Anderson, ed. Storia d'Europa. (Torino: Einaudi, 1993). And even Ernst Gellner. Thought and Change. (Chicago:University of Chicago Press, 1965), and the contribution, "Homeland of the Revolution." (Daedalus; Summer, 1993). Even those who are engaged in the controversy admit that one must "traverse" Gellner, as well as Hayes, Kohn, Eugene Weber, Remond, in order to understand modern nationalism.

from the diffusion of popular education, economic development, and development of civic loyalty to the republic, as proposed by Mazzini's liberal nationalism.⁴⁹

Independent nationalism is another kind; it gathers desire together with fear and opportunity: desire for independence, fear of losing privileges or possessions acquired through conquest and trade by yielding to an ambitious metropolis, and opportunity arising from the crisis of the empires. The American Revolution, the liberating actions of Bolívar and San Martín and the revolutionary nationalisms emerging from the crisis of the Spanish Empire illustrate the equation desire-fear-opportunity.

Miroslav Hroch, in Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe, argues that nationalism travels from the cultural sphere to the political one, through the "blockade of social mobility."⁵⁰ Whenever the people have a "voice" and find no cause to yield or abandon loyalty to the system and to the society mediated and organized by such system, they do not "exit" the system (an application of Albert Hirschman's remarkable analysis). Blockade, instead, encourages nationalism. Peoples, communities, groups, strive to exit the system for good, as has been the case of the revolutions for independence in Latin America. This does not happen in the case of Switzerland's centripetal multiculturalism.

In this typological proposal, integral nationalism is the last of the classic nationalisms, which we have found in itineraries initiated at other starting points, and to which we will return. It is the most absolute of the classic types. As I will soon briefly show, it is the inspiring conscience of the conspiring consciences. It represents a qualitative change in the trajectory of modern nationalism. It is frankly "illiberal" or more categorically, "anti-liberal." Universalism is a "febrile myth;"

⁴⁹Almost no typology is peacefully accepted in this open-ended debate. When most Anglo-Saxon literature and part of Latin Europe accepts the placement of the "movimento risorgimentale italiano" as nationalist, Ludovico Incisa, in charge of the term "nationalism" in the Dizionario di Politica, directed by Norberto Bobbio and Nicola Matteucci (Torino: 1976), argues: "e improprio qualificare come nazionalista il movimento risorgimentale italiano che assume fin dagli inizi la rivendicazione nazionale in un contesto umanitario ed europeizante (Mazzini definisce 'nazionalisti' i paesi oppressori)," although it ends acknowledging the conciliation between a "latente nazionalismo con il liberalismo..." (op. cit. p. 629).

⁵⁰Miroslav Hroch. Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe: a comparative analysis of the social composition of patriotic groups among the smaller European nations. (New York:Cambridge University Press, 1985).

liberalism, an old demon; democracy, evil. I will resume this point when dealing with the last political tradition in contemporary Argentina.

Hall adds a new type: nationalism by trade. The elites have become internationalized, but the most powerful act from national states such as the United States, Japan and Germany. The Catalans and the Basques, the Quebecois, prosper if they act despite the rest, though without "separatism" because the "rest" is the national state which contains them.⁵¹ Personally, I think that nationalism by trade is an arguable denomination. It covers prospering regional realities which could tend toward separatism if they feel suffocated by the system, yet do not exit the national state that retains them through the legitimized or sound existence of federal or associative civil formulae appeasing or discouraging passions and disappointments, or national parties and military forces sustaining the unity of that state. Six counties in Northern Ireland, successful beyond the Catholic peasant counties; Catalans and Basques in Spain; Northern Italians; the Quebecois against the rest of Canada . . . What future do they have? They act separately and distinctly, yet stay within a great market. Nationalism by trade has a future in the cases of separation without separatism, of relative autonomy without secession. These are situations which allow the cultivation of cultural values of a nation embedded in a national state through which it has access to a great market. In the preceding cases, the "great markets" are Europe or North America.

The collapse of the Soviet Empire reveals situations interweaving old and new factors. What will happen to the "quasi-societies" without states, as in Africa? What is to be expected for those minorities which claim the need for foreign intervention to be saved, such as the Bosnians or the Kurds? Is it possible to conceive a world in which almost 250 minority populations erupt into small national states, gathering the nearly 8000 languages existing on Earth? Should states showing no willingness or ability to protect the rights or lives of minorities within their territory, and showing instead the intention of eliminating these minorities or "cleansing" the so-called national territory, be acknowledged, evoking the worst periods of our contemporary history?⁵²

⁵¹John H. Hall, op. cit. It is known that The University of Prince Edward Island publishes the Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism/ Revue Canadienne des Études sur le Nationalisme.

⁵²In the questions opened by Hall's proposal as well as by the literature on nationalism, we must add the literature on "internationalism" and globalization concerning our subject. Jane Jacobs, Cities and the Wealth of Nations: Principles of Economic Life. (New York: Random House, 1984). There, the

On the other hand, the common perception of international changes, due to the disappearance of the communist "threat," and the establishment of liberal democratic regimes based on market economies by all the active members of the inter-American system have allowed for the dissemination of the concept of the so-called cooperative security, conceived as a new strategic philosophy, which besides incorporating values such as the defense of democracy and human rights, is geared at establishing the conditions for security based on mutual trust among the states, "the regulation of the military capacity and predictability of the actions of its participants"⁷⁸ Cooperative security would include the concept of expanded collective security, where the use or threat to resort to the use of force gave way to understanding and to the peaceful solution of disputes.

Perception of the need for changes is shared by all the member states, however, the philosophy, forms and mechanisms which will be implemented is not, nor is the vision of the challenges which should be given priority. One can conclude that the continent should confront the challenges of demographic growth, "of poverty, of the protection of the environment and of non-renewable resources, of proliferation (particularly the challenges posed to peace and security) in order to overcome in the next century the realities of this one, during which Man has annihilated more than 200 million of his fellow beings."⁷⁹ Or stress can also be placed on an area of security where the struggle against terrorism, drugs, illegal international activities, the deterioration of civil peace, refugees, illegal immigration and arms trafficking will replace the struggle against communism in

⁷⁸ Statement by the Secretary General of the Organization of American States, Dr. Cesar Gaviria, at the inception of the Regional Conference on Measures to Foster Confidence and Security, Santiago, Chile, November 8, 1995, OAS Files.

⁷⁹ Intervention by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chile, Mr. José Manuel Insulza in *Ibid*, Santiago, Chile, November 8-10, 1995.

inter-American relations, as was expressed in the report of the Special Commission on Hemispheric Security at the OAS Permanent Council in 1992.

There is a general consensus in terms of the diagnosis of the problems and on the need to transform the legal and institutional mechanisms which sustained the former notion during the Cold War. However, there is no real and effective articulation between the problems that were diagnosed and the measures or resolutions to be implemented by the relevant OAS Commissions.

The subordination of the military to civil power is an area that reflects a lack of consensus both in its national expression and in the relations between the international bodies of the system, namely, between the IADB and the OAS.

For several years, the OAS General Assemblies have examined the links between the IDB and this institution, with the view of transforming the Board into a consultative body subordinated to political decisions and with restraining functions on issues such as those expressed at the Special Commission on Security, which would deal with secondary issues if those for which the Board was created for are to be considered primary.

Although created during World War II under the concept of collective defense generated by the policy of the U.S., once the war was over, the Bogota Conference in 1948 refused the motion to include the Board among the organs of the OAS Council, based on the peaceful nature of this organization and on the inappropriateness of incorporating a military entity into its structure. Its functions were restricted to the preparation and maintenance of military planning for

common defense and to directly submit these plans to the consideration of the governments, as stipulated by the Fourth Consultative Meeting in 1951.

In 1961, a note by the Board to the Directive Council of the OAS informed that its budget should be added without adjustments to that of what was then the Pan-American Union, currently the General Secretariat. The note was based on the Board's reliance on the governments and on the fact that this relationship would be established through delegations to the Board. Furthermore, a paper prepared by the Special Commission for the Amendment to the Charter in 1966 expressed: "The IADB is a standing military planning entity for the defense of the continent.

It has no organic relationship with the OAS and its components, but is directly linked to the governments in the Americas."⁸⁰

If one bears in mind that the current concepts of security imply the use of multilateral intervention mechanisms, instead of unilateral intervention, and that they should be used in situations inherent to civil life, the discussion on the subordination of the Board to the political institution will gather strength; also the differences in perceptions among the member states of the system will increase. Still, no conclusions have been drawn on these issues which involve, on the one hand, the civil-military relations at the national level and the tasks that the military will undertake and, on the other, the new activities of the Board and its traditional direct links with U.S. aggressive or subversive policies. "Then there is a special panoply of problems associated with the U.S.. This disproportion of power between the U.S. and its neighbors, which feared for the historic use of that power

⁸⁰ "Seguridad Hemisferica, Junta Interamericana de Defensa", report by the rapporteur Didier Opperi to the Twentysecond Session of the OAS General Assembly on May 18,1992, OAS Files.

to intervene militarily, has blocked a clear subordination of the regional military instrument (the IADB) to the political body (the OAS). One extreme formulation of this fear is that, with democracy and human rights as excuses, the U.S. seeks to turn the OAS and the IADB into instruments to put Latin American armed forces under U.S. command as enforcers of U.S. intervention."⁸¹

There are two aspects, among others, which define the *raison d'être* of the military which this new condition has challenged. First, the expansion of their functions to activities traditionally undertaken by other bodies, such as the police or other entities created to this effect, like the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), which would affect the armies of all the continent, including their structures, in order to carry out the new missions.⁸² Second, the different concerns of the Latin American and the U.S. armies. Under the current international situation there is no longer an extra continental threat and not even the uprisings or social revolts in the continent are considered significant, or at least they are not perceived as threats to continental security. However for several Latin American armies, the danger still exists, because not all armed incidents in their territories have come to an end.

The military alliance with the U.S. during the Cold War was seen by all them as a tactical measure in the event of a possible extracontinental threat. The true strategy for the Latin American armies was to ward off the threat posed by the U.S. itself, given its philosophy of domination and intervention which have

⁸¹ Einaudi, Luigi, "Security and Democracy in the Western Hemisphere", in *Advancing Democracy and Human Rights in America, What Role for the OAS?*, Inter-American Dialogue. A Conference Report, Washington D.C., May 1994, p. 67.

⁸² Serafino, Nina M. "US Military Activities in Latin America. Rationales and Perceptions" in *Security, Democracy and Development in US-Latin American Relations*, Schoultz *et al.*, comp.), North-South Center, Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick,, 1994. pp. 64-5.

always characterized it, aside from the dangers posed by the obvious imbalance in terms of the development, size and technology of its armed forces.⁸³

In the eyes of the military, these different perceptions increased with the new international trends which barely outlined the contour of national sovereignty. To restrict the field of action of the nation-states and the concept of sovereignty inherent to them would be tantamount to damaging the very nature of the armies. In spite of acknowledging the new realities, they tend to defend their old conceptions. "The nation-state remains the principal actor in international relations. The armed forces are a logical consequence of the primacy of the nation-state, ensuring, guaranteeing the state's vital interests. As we contemplate the new scenarios to be generated by the changing international order, the armed forces fulfil both their traditional role of defending the nation-state and the new role in which the military is an instrument used by the state, operating through international organizations, to design and attain its political objectives."⁸⁴

In 1995, the tasks of the OAS Special Commission on Security gave way to the Hemispheric Security Commission; however, its activities have left aside, at least for the time being, the discussion of the preeminence of the political body over the military, based on the perceived disagreement. On the other hand, as the Secretary General of the OAS himself explained at the Regional Conference on Security held in Santiago, Chile "... the Hemisphere is still lacking a sufficiently refined security agenda capable of replacing, in practice and in an explicit manner, the orientations which were imposed during the Cold War. Although we have

⁸³ Varas, Augusto, "Post-Cold War Security Interests and Perceptions of the Threats in the Western Hemisphere, in *Ibid*, p. 6-7.

⁸⁴ Zabala, Carlos Maria, general intervention in *Political-Military Relations within International Organizations*, simposium at the Inter-American Defense College (Margaret Daly Hayes, Rapporteur) September 28, 1995, p.7.

advanced in the identification of the values and bases of a new strategic vision, it would be an exaggeration to assert that we have achieved a consensus accepted or acceptable by all." The Inter-American institutions are a reflection of the states that conform them and in the international arena, these issues have still to be resolved. The performance of the military in traditionally civil activities has been sporadic and plagued with opportunism.

The work of the OAS Security Commission has been addressed at the implementation of the so-called measures for fostering trust, based on the transparency of operations and recently, in cooperation with the United Nations, in the deactivation of anti-personal mines, based on agreements adopted at the Geneva Conference in 1995 and faced with the reality that there are practically one million of such mines in the Hemisphere which have not been deactivated. Among the measures adopted at the Regional Conference at Santiago for the promotion of trust were: the prior notice of military exercises, the exchange of information and participation in the Conventional Arms Register, consultations for advancing the limitation of conventional weapons, the invitations of observers to military exercises as well as the exchange of military and civil personnel for training, and the cooperation in case of natural disasters and specific studies on the security issues of small states.

The latter was advanced mainly by the Caribbean states, at the beginning of the decade, based on the fact that the fragility of their economies could not resist the challenges that for other nations represented a normal part of their daily problems, such as drug trafficking, natural disasters or damages to the environment.

International circumstances forced real transformations on the institutions of the system, since they disturbed the U.S. conception of security and would therefore have an impact on those institutions created as a result of its need for hemispheric security. This is why TIAR disappeared and the existence of the Board was questioned. However, the weight of the difference in perception, in the asymmetry and reasons for belonging to the system, among Latin American and Caribbean countries with respect to the U.S., hindered the true transformations which the old bureaucracies required in this respect.

Conclusions

"... Today's society, even more than its predecessor sixty years ago, confronts the task of reconciling technological and economic integration with traditional political structures, national awareness, social needs, institutional arrangements and habitual ways of doing things."⁸⁵

This statement by a U.S. historian is the result of the analysis of the complexity of this global transitional stage of societies, where problems related to the ecological and social crisis and the overpopulation of the world, together with the depletion of natural resources associated to them, are some of the most pressing and urgent examples. As was previously pointed out, in 1993, 9 out every 20 inhabitants in Latin America and the Caribbean lived below the poverty line and in a public appeal published in *The New York Times*, a group of Latin American intellectuals, headed by the Noble Prize laureate Gabriel Garcia Marquez, alerted that by the year 2000 — within 4 years — three fourths of the tropical rain forests will have been cut down and 50% of the species will have been lost forever. "What took Nature millions of years to create will have been destroyed by man in little less than 40 years."⁸⁶

One of the most difficult problems to resolve is precisely to rise the individual and social awareness on the need to change the current economic and political models, "to reconcile technological changes and economic integration with the traditional political structures", in order to be able to confront the

⁸⁵ Kennedy, Paul, *Preparing for the Twenty-First Century*, Vintage Books, New York, 1993, p. 330.

⁸⁶ "A Latin American Ecological Alliance" (paid advertisement), *The New York Times*, July 22, 1991, quoted by Paul Kennedy, *op. cit.* p. 100.

challenges that mankind has before it. This post-Cold War period is not contributing to this aim, especially in the inter-American relations and among the institutions of the inter-American system.

The transition from industrial to cybernetic or telecommunication civilization, the change in the interconnection of human groups or nations, has had less impact on the OAS, IDB, IADB, or TIAR than the end of the Cold War. Transformations in these organizations have been advanced by the changes in the traditional perception of security instead of by the need for the historical consolidation we are experiencing. This process has followed similar parameters to the ones that took place after World War II, when the old concept of collective defense was adopted; the alliance of the Latin American and Caribbean power elites with the United States, who, with its hegemonic power, sets the paradigms. In this case the support of liberal democracy as a political model and to market economies, without any margin for alternatives, served as the basis for the new security of the continent.

This option leaves aside the typical practices of regional political and historical traditions, where caciquism, political leaders, nationalist governments, socialist governments, parliaments dominated by majority leftist coalitions, political parties emerged from revolutions or communist parties with a significant influence on the workers' movements and the governments, have enriched the Latin American and Caribbean political culture, not always with ominous results, in a way that the very different political history of the U.S. has not been enriched.⁸⁷ This is not only a case of the manichean binomial, liberal democracy

⁸⁷ Wiarda, Howard J., *The Democratic Revolution in Latin America. History, Politics and US Policy*, Holmes and Meir, New York, 1990, pp. 47-50.

According to the distinctions of our typologies, ultra-right nationalism-- "radical" nationalism in the Anglo-Saxon sense--is expressed in fascism. Such is Breuille's approach. He deems essential distinguishing "nationalism of the radical right" from the nationalist movements which may be described as traditional, conservative, reactionary or authoritarian. Yet, eventually traditionalism, reactionism and authoritarianism are from this perspective varieties of conservative nationalism. Given the fact that Breuille deals with nationalism insofar as it is modern and manifests itself as a form of politics, emerging from the opposition, it is only natural for him to conclude that the most important manifestation occurred in 1918. In the form of "fascist movements," such extreme nationalism emerged in numerous countries as a force to seize power. Even where it was relatively weak, such as in the Falange case, which Breuille calls "the Spanish fascist party," the quest for power is an explicit intention. The way nationalism serves fascism in seizing and exercising power is the subject of the work cited above. Let me add that he uses three case studies for this purpose: Italy, Germany and Rumania.⁵³ Breuille agrees with those who assert that one must not confuse nationalism defined in terms of ideas with that defined in terms of collective behavior or of culture (an explanation in line with my initial proposal as to the levels of analysis). But he protests against Motyl's criticism which, instead, sometimes yields confusion among the identification criteria, field-of-study definitions and theoretical procedures. This leads him to assert Anthony Smith's proposal by which fascism must not be regarded as a form of nationalism. National socialism has only been dealt with as a form of socialism, defining what must be understood as socialism. Why separate nationalism from national socialism? In the

possibility of multiplication of the nations is defended in the form of states or small and competitive units, so that globalization will not "expel them from the world" but rather profit from the revolution of computer science--and not because "small is beautiful." The problems of the big cities call for the reappearance of certain utopian proposals as conceivable possibilities for certain theoreticians of internationalism, such as Nairn.

⁵³Breuille, op. cit. (1994, pp. 288-316). The case of the Falange Española is less complex than Franco's Spain in itself. The speeches and writings of Jose Antonio Primo de Rivera (1903-1936), founder of the Falange Española, are gathered in four volumes which, however, fail to represent an articulated doctrine. He left a written "Norma Programática de la Falange." In the first paragraph he supports the "supreme reality of Spain" to which "inexorably the interests of individuals, groups and classes will have to adhere." He manifests the "will of the Empire" for Spain, rejects political parties, the capitalist system and Marxism, and proclaims "the National-Unionist State" to be organized through the "national revolution." On Franco's regime and its peculiarities, implicitly accepted by Breuille by not considering it a properly "fascist" regime, we refer to the remarkable works of Juan J. Linz.

end, and here Breuilly is right, the actions of national socialism based upon nationalism have been more significant than its invocations of socialism.⁵⁴

The conflict among typologies has been accurately explained by Ernst B. Haas. The metaphor of the elephant applies because scholars of nationalism do not always share the same purposes. Neither, I insist, do they always explore the historical antecedents of the cases with which they are deal. Nor do they profit from the most intelligent literature from languages and perspectives which remain distant from, if not insignificant to, them. The "(North) American complex" of the French, mentioned somehow ironically by Hoffmann, corresponds to the relative self-sufficiency of many (North) American and British authors concerning the literature from Latin countries. It is at least imprudent to ignore or fail to consider the French when dealing with "right" and "left" subjects. After all, they have devised this classification, which Seymour Martin Lipset refuses to abandon in a relatively recent article,⁵⁵ on the grounds that he attributes to it a long-lasting future.

Haas's comments result from a review of four authors (referred to in several passages of this work) who study nationalism: Benedict Anderson (1983), Ernst Gellner (1983), Dudley Seers (1983) and Anthony D. Smith (1979). The question remains whether nations, beliefs inspiring citizens, and policies deriving from these beliefs, are "good or evil." In the 19th century, liberals advocated nationalism as progressivist and Marxists criticized it as reactionary. So far, the roles have changed places many times, not just because nationalism itself changed but because the appreciation of the role that nationalism might play modified the classification or de-classification of liberals, conservatives and Marxists. This is also because, among

⁵⁴(The long note 3, p. 316). In this key, the author prefers the description and definition of Ian Kershaw, The Nazi Dictatorship: Problems and Perspectives of Interpretation (London: 1989) to those of Ernst Nolte, Three Faces of Fascism (New York: 1965), who overestimates the anti-Marxist content and underestimates the anti-bourgeoisie and anti-liberal traits of Fascism. A good portion of Breuilly's remarks might reach David Rock's treatment (in my opinion excessively simplifying) when dealing with "The Authoritarian Right" in the case of Argentina as well as in his share in "The Argentine Right." I will resume this at the end of these reflections.

⁵⁵Seymour Martin Lipset. "Reflections on Capitalism, Socialism & Democracy." (Journal of Democracy, Vol. 4, No. 2, April 1993, pp. 43-45). The Haas quotation refers to "What is Nationalism and Why Should We Study It?," op. cit. The following references throughout this chapter will consider "Nationalism: An Instrumental Social Construction." (Millennium, Vol. 22, No. 3, Winter 1993, pp. 509-548), which resumes definitions from the preceding chapter, of 1986, though perfecting the typology to be one of the most sophisticated among the circulating ones.

other reasons, nationalism has appeared to denounce dependency, imperialism, sometimes capitalism and other times fascisms (a mere aside). The ideological dimension is a confusing question due to the writers' preferences as well as their discrepancies on whether they refer to the "people" (whatever notion they may use) and whether they deal with beliefs, movements or parties. Haas's observation supports one of the approaches which I intend to clarify right away. Anthony Smith considers nationalism an ideology competing with liberalism, socialism and fascism, and he is not alone among those who consider them movements rivaling other movements. Others regard nationalism as encompassing or absorbing other ideologies. Anderson even shows that Marxists may be good nationalists in that they transcend the rigid classist analyses.

There is more, as we have seen throughout this work: There are structuralists, functionalists, objectivists, subjectivists, conflicts spreading from the classical cases of socialists vs. liberals, secularists vs. clericals, and aristocrats vs. populists (not to use the authoritarian-vs.-populist dichotomy, quoted by Haas, who apparently overlooks authoritarian populism). Apart from this, Haas denounces errors which I have attempted to mention in various passages on interpretations of nationalism. In Ernst Gellner (notwithstanding certain critics) Haas acknowledges a severe and active examiner of the nationalist phenomenon.

To start with, Gellner explains nationalism as a "consequence of the 'objective need' for industrial rationality." In this vital point, he considers the objective and subjective perspective of the theories of nationalism complementary. An agrarian society is, in this framework of analysis, neither rational nor national. Shaken by exogenous forces (foreign conquest, a new religion, technological changes), it undergoes a mobilization which changes cultural conditions and extends political participation. The nation arises as a consequence: "first the state, second the nation," which is the sequence of the Western European experience. There are also cases of nationalism emerging as a unifying force, and literally unifying the nation by force, as in Germany and Italy. In the cases of Eastern Europe, however, mobilizations lead to frustrations and to a rebellion under the shape of a nationalist challenge against those in command. The sequence is "first the nation; second the state." In situations such as those experienced by the Islamic world and Africa, both sequences live in the midst of constant turbulence because, among other reasons, nations and states, wherever they emerge, do not usually coexist.

Despite its explanatory power, Gellner's theory--sometimes a model, sometimes a scheme, other times a "piece of advice," Haas gracefully says--dismisses somewhere in the haze exceptions embracing a good portion of Africa and the Middle East. It further fails to show enthusiasm for those situations where nationalisms neither express nor conceal themselves, but exist in their own way in mobilized, assimilated, not necessarily frustrated peoples in whom the national sentiment persists. These cases comprise the British, the French, the United States, the Japanese and the Russian. In his last work, Out of Control, Brzezinski warns about this within his framework of analysis when he distinguishes between "catalytic" nations, or those whose values lend them the capacity for universal diffusion, and those which have never been so, or else have been and are no longer. Japan was not; the United States and France have been and what remains an issue is whether they will continue to be, above all in the American case; and China appears to see itself as sidling toward the future in the catalytic mode.⁵⁶

Haas's criticism is vehement and understandable when he warns of Gellner's scarce attention to doctrines and ideologies, and to the variety of symbols and liturgies which keep nationalism uncertain and by which nationalism holds entire societies or segments of national states suspended within the current political process.

Gellner's obstinacy, which he forsakes only when dealing with Islam, leads him to pay relatively little attention to the substantial ideological debate involving the national states of Western Europe and Japan around the identity, purpose and nature of the nation. On the other hand, the relevance of Gellner's work becomes evident when he describes "how religion may define an identity; how religious identities project themselves into cultural identities, and how ethnic identities acquire religious forms."⁵⁷

⁵⁶Zbigniew Brzezinski. Out of Control: Global Turmoil on the Eve of the Twenty-First Century. (New York; Maxwell Macmillan International, 1993)

⁵⁷ I agree with Haas's critical remarks and the consequent emphasis awarded to the study of ideology. I quote varied converging intellectual testimonies, although they proceed from different sources and schools. Linda Colley. "Whose Nation? Class and National Consciousness in Britain 1750-1830." (Past & Present, No. 113, November 1986, pp. 97-117); Alberto Flores Galindo. Buscando un Inca: Identidad y utopía en los Andes. (1986); Stephane Dion. "Tocqueville, Le Canada Francais et la Question Nationale." (Revue Francaise de Science Politique; Vol. 40, No. 4, August 1990), witnessing the importance of Tocqueville's observations as to a national sentiment compatible with liberal values in

I intend to resume Ernst Haas's analyses, taking into account the instrumentalist tradition of thought, in which he is explicitly enrolled, and the theories which advocate Karl Deutsch's pioneering work in the concept of "social mobilization." Haas emphasizes the role of ideas in the minds of the actors, that such ideas place them in one route instead of another, and that along such route they travel through history and present time. This emphasis leads me to conclude that there exist affinities between my preference for the treatment of the subject as stated in the first sections of these reflections (the importance of the "social path" of ideas, among other things), and the emergence, culmination and fall, or reanimation, of ideologies on the origin, function, place and mission of the nation according to the various futures, possible, probable, available or desired by the actors.

From this perspective, a nation is "a body of individuals socially mobilized, who believe themselves linked by a set of characteristics distinguishing them--in their minds--from the outside world, and who strive to either create or preserve their own state." Those individuals have a "collective conscience" given by their sense of collectivity, their uniqueness, and the nucleus of symbols that they share and project in an "imagined community" which expects complementary and predictable behavior of fellow nationals. A government is not considered legitimate unless, at the least, it represents a nation thus considered, assuming a group which desires self-determination.

In this regard, nationalism is a belief shared by a group of people supporting the construction of a nation, either as an intention or as an existing reality. And a nation-state is a political entity the inhabitants of which consider themselves a singular nation and wish to remain as such.⁵⁸

order to combat man's asocial individualism in democracy, and the current effect of such thought. Robert N. Bellah. The Broken Covenant: American Civil Religion in Time of Trial. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1986); Stevan K. Paviowitch. "L'heritage titiste: Des mythes de Tito aux demons de la nation." in De Sarajevo a Sarajevo: L'echec yougoslave. Jacques Rupnik. ed. (Paris: Complex, 1993).

⁵⁸Ernst B. Haas. "Nationalism: An Instrumental Social Construction," op.cit. (pp. 510-512). I have attempted to outline the author's operative concepts. Although the author gathers traditions and receives, accepts or rejects different perspectives as to their definitions, he wishes to transcend and dodge "semantic associations" usually evoked by the word "nationalism" in rights and lefts throughout the world.

Nationalism is regarded not just as a modern phenomenon, but also as a "form of rationality," as an effort to impose coherence in societies undergoing a modernization process. The central hypothesis is that one particular form of nationalism--liberal nationalism--would have revealed itself as the most successful form to integrate societies undergoing modernization processes.

This hypothesis (which I will resume later) may be confirmed by the performance of "liberal nationalism" in nineteenth century Argentina. It poses the question of whether "anti-liberal nationalism" as an alternate tradition in force in twentieth century Argentina further proclaims itself a form of alternate rationality.⁵⁹

In this line of ideas, that of nationalism as a "rationalization," the nationalist sees him- or herself as restricted, just like any other actor, to deliberate choices. Even nationalism as an ideology embodies a rational choice, although such rationality, I think, may differ according to the different versions of the ideology. It is not always "irrationalism" which has governed, or now governs the inspiration of nationalism, except in those cases where nationalists have chosen irrationalism as a program of individual or collective life. But then, even in this case, it reappears as a rational action of which the eventual perverse consequences (the demons evoked by Hoffmann) might be "undesired consequences." Moreover, if they are desired consequences, such as in the sense of fascism, they signify what I call deviated rationality.

Haas's suggested analytical exercise begins with indicators of rationalization and de-rationalization, including "political succession" and "legitimacy," along with 14 other indicators which incorporate the national myth of education, a religious dimension, cultural uniformity, language, the adherence or lack of adherence to peaceful procedures for change, and "acceptance or controversy regarding the conduct of foreign affairs."

⁵⁹In the case of Argentina, I rescue the hardly known, although foretelling, work of Gustavo Ferrari. "Esquema del nacionalismo liberal en la Argentina." (*Criterio*, No. 1856, Year LIV, March 26, 1981). On liberal nationalism, let us recall Yael Tamir's arguments in the recent book National Liberalism, already quoted in footnotes 11 and 19. It is opposing yet suggestive in that it regards fascism and nationalism *tout court* as alternatives to Marxism and liberalism. Zeev Sternhell, Mario Sznadjder and Maria Asheri. The Birth of Fascist Ideology. (Princeton, 1989). The original version is French (1986) and there is an Italian version (1993).

I will attempt to briefly illustrate why in the case of Argentina most indicators display an increasing degree of rationalization, especially in the process of democratic transition from the 1980s to today. Those indicators placed at the ends of the scale--"political succession" and "legitimacy"--are probably the most eloquent of the degree of conflict (and in this analysis framework, of de-rationalization) caused by the active opposition of anti-liberal nationalism ever since its militant emergence at the dawn of this century. If rationalization is linked to modernization, which has been exposed by Haas, Manning Nash and others as the Western way to attain rationalization, Argentina would have managed to face with relative success most of the "crises" confronted by every society since the Industrial Revolution. Also, whatever crisis may have returned as such after the activity of nineteenth century liberal nationalism, it made a national question or issue of identity, due to the formidable impact of immigration, and of distribution, given the extension of democratic participation in the political dimension.

Anti-liberal nationalism was rooted in, first, the questions in the aristocratic version of ideas inspired by Maurras, and second, the questions in the populist version.⁶⁰

Haas warns that in most Latin American regions, what is called the "national period" has encouraged changing processes, all of which have been slow, discontinuous or confined to enclaves within the state. Mexico, for instance, appears to have complete rationalization and incomplete modernization around the 1950s. Instead, both aspects are complete in France in the post-war period. Argentina advanced toward a partial combination, though close to complete, during the democratic transition of the last decade. This completion is nonetheless besieged by the relative fragility instilled by the existence of issues concerning the effective consolidation of the constitutional democratic process.

Nationalism from Ideology

⁶⁰This is a provisional nomenclature. This paragraph is meant to illustrate the possibilities in Haas's framework of analysis. The allusion to Manning Nash refers to his Unfinished Agenda. (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1984).

authoritarianism were, and often are, present. Historic Peronism was expressed in an authoritarian way ever since its first governing "diarchy"--Juan and Eva Perón. Their successors have never departed from that style.

When Stanley Hoffmann and Michel Crozier examine the "style of French authority," it is clear (above all in Hoffmann's remarkable works) that the republican "monarchy" exists as a style. In the case of Argentina, as in most Latin American countries (though not exclusively in them), the style of authority bears the stamp of the *caudillo*. This is not an anachronistic category, and the fact that the intellectual world often replaces it with apparently more precise expressions, referring to an excessive "personalization" of power, stirs up the deep waters where this style of authority in a society lies.

This does not seem to be the case of Argentine liberals. Most contemporary liberals have been, and are, "liberists" in the sense applied by the Italians at least from Benedetto Croce onwards, and refined by Giovanni Sartori. They are liberal with regard to the economy but ready for a political authoritarianism so far as it guards the market laws as they understand them. In the case of the opportunistic liberalism, which is far from unusual, the Argentine liberalist straightforwardly defends his or her sectorial or corporate interests. Political science acknowledges the existence of a "liberal neocorporativism," where not even the corporate subject may in itself describe the features and "geography" of nationalism and of the right in general. This explains why many liberals--liberists--have readily accompanied and justified the military regimes, and in turn why military governments have retained the political and education ministries while yielding those of the economy to the neoliberalism in force.

Along this line of ideas, I have my doubts concerning the Argentine Right as presented in the work headed by Rock's essay "Antecedents." Most of the facts and expressions gathered by the authors are true, above all, in the specific and documented work of Sandra McGee Deutsch, and in that of Leonardo Senkman and Paul Lewis, both of whom examine the "right" in the civil and military regimes, respectively. Yet, I believe the term "right," when restricted to the ultra-conservative version which derives from an organicist or holistic concept of society and from the anti-liberalism Rock uses to delimit his theme, deprives the work of a necessarily broad historic platform, with a rugged geography and a plurality of

expression of which organicist and anti-liberal ultra-nationalism was but one type.⁶⁹ The metamorphosis of the rights requires a painstaking but necessary examination.

"Entrism" (that is to say the tactics of ideological and militant minor groups which "penetrate" a major organization of a party of the masses to capture it from within) is often attributed only to certain leftists. This is partly true. It is true that some leftists, the so-called Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo (ERP) and sectors of the Montoneros, for example, attempted "entrism" in historic Peronism and were rejected or absorbed by a Peronist evolution after 1974. Still, one may wonder if such tactics must be confined to the left. I think that the invasion of the political vertex of Peronism governing today--"Menemismo"--by sectors of the liberist right represented among others by the leaders and groups of the small party Union del Centro Democrático (UCD) is a form of right-wing "entrism," rationalized by the relative identification with the economic program.

The folding of liberal nationalism towards the dawn of the century and the eruption of the question of the foreigner, and of the communist and fascist revolutions, gave way to two versions of nationalism, both distinct and diverse, according to each case, from liberal nationalism. The first version was democratic nationalism, which often goes unregistered but, though spasmodic, aims at the alliance of democracy with nationalism.

This experience (undergone decades later by the French in the "ideological distillery" of Gaullism) is given in Ricardo Rojas's cited work and is expressed in the figure of radical caudillo Hipólito Yrigoyen. Yrigoyen's radicalism evoked that kind of nationalism, difficult to resist in the 1920s. The emergence and impact of anti-liberal nationalism would explain the emergence in the 1930s of a version of nationalism to the left of the ideological spectrum, represented in the radical youth by FORJA, the Fuerza de Orientación Radical de la Joven Argentina.

The emergence and maturity of anti-liberal nationalism as a national question occurs with increasing sharpness after World War I. Carlos Waisman

⁶⁹A model of analysis which I deem outstanding and expressive of what I mean is Rene Remond's book *La Droite en France: De la Première restauration á la V^e République*. (Paris: Aubier, 1963). Research set in a specific expression of the French ultra-right, remarkably rebuilt, is Eugen Joseph Weber's book *Action Française: Royalism and Reaction in Twentieth-Century France*. (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1962).

points out that the nationalists to come "differed from the fascist model in their total rejection of political modernity . . . Their organicism was fully authoritarian and anti-mobilizationist."

Enrique Zuleta Alvarez distinguishes between doctrinal nationalism and republican nationalism. Both are versions of the right. The "republicans" founded a party and tended to the solution of practical problems. The "doctrinaires," in Zuleta Alvarez's classification, were dogmatic, utopian, imitators of European forms (read: fascism) and advocates of the coup d'état. Being a sympathizer of the Irazusta brothers, Zuleta Alvarez claims as theirs the preaching of "economic nationalism," which he does not recognize in the aristocratic precursors, who were less concerned with the subject of "imperialism," which is dominant in the work of the Irazustas. Cristián Buchrucker partially accepts this classification but places it as a subclass of restoring nationalism. This he considered together with populist nationalism, as the two fundamental kinds of anti-liberal nationalism in contemporary Argentina, although his analysis reaches the end of "historic Peronism," or 1955. Basically, Buchrucker asserts that the same nationalists who were smoothing the atmosphere for the 1930 crisis talked about "restoration" while the basic postulates of the nationalism born in radicalism after the coup d'état of that year were popular sovereignty and the "people."⁷⁰

If "Argentina has led all Latin America in the development of nationalism," according to the reasonable conclusion of Whitaker and Jordan,⁷¹ a reorganization of the historical explorations must be attempted through guiding typologies. Contemporary Argentine nationalism, as opposed to last century's liberal nationalism, may be better understood if the sequence of the reading of history, society, institutions and values is first clarified.

⁷⁰A life testimony of nationalism encouraging the action of the youth sectors of the 1930s is the autobiographic essay of Jose Luis de Imaz: *Promediados los Cuarenta*. (Buenos Aires: Editorial Sudamericana, 1977). Imaz recalls his teenage admiration for the postulates of Catholic nationalism, the Hispanic influence of his "inner" nationalism (for he would be an active "internationalist" even when opposing an armed conflict with Chile) and the "commiseratory disdain" that the advocates of the Irazusta brothers--Zuleta's republicans--showed towards the "classic nationalists" (p. 56). He also describes his passage through the Alianza Libertadora Nacionalista, which he abandons when he finds out that it had become a group of criminals. The essay, from a well-known sociologist trained with Gino Germani, is eloquent in reconstructing the epoch as it was being lived in Buenos Aires. Things did not differ much in Western Europe.

⁷¹Arthur P. Whitaker and David Jordan. *Nationalism in Contemporary Latin America*. (New York: The Free Press, Macmillan, 1966).

The reading of the history of anti-liberal nationalism is rooted in historic revisionism. Historic revisionism is not the revision propounded by Saldías, which the professional historian accepts as a permanent and national task. Historic revisionism was projected as an ideologization of history to serve as "counter history" in conflict with the one written, and to a greater extent attributed to liberal nationalism.

Therefore, from that point onwards, anti-liberal nationalism would find in the counter history the first step of an indispensable sequence for a better political explanation. The "politicization of history and the 'historicization' of politics"⁷² in contemporary Argentina transform the sequence, by analogy, into the first step toward the consolidation of the platform of anti-liberal nationalism. An autocrat from Buenos Aires, who is significant to an explanation of the Argentina of the first half of the nineteenth century, Juan Manuel de Rosas, becomes, in the eye of the revisionists, the governing archetype, the ideal of a government, and this estimate includes his political regime. Such counter history not only encourages anachronisms and canonizes complex situations regardless of their various shades, it also carries us down the path that ends in dictatorship as the best government, indicated by necessity and chosen by the "best."⁷³ Anti-liberal nationalism also did a selective reading of society. It was originally an interpretation of corporate Argentina, a demobilizing and aristocratic version. Among its ideological mentors were Barrés, Maurras, Ramiro de Maeztu and the influences evoked by their names.

Here, at least two warnings are needed. The first is that, from the ideological perspective, the path of the ideas that inspired it was subtle and contained ambiguous elements. The second is that a good portion of the Argentine nationalism of that moment, while recognizing influences of the French ultra-right,

⁷²The expression belongs to Diana Quattrocchi-Woisson. *A nationalisme de deracines. L'Argentine: pays malade de sa memoire*. (Paris: Éditions du Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, 1992).

⁷³Julio Irazusta, militant and fundamental inspirer of "republican" nationalism in Zuleta Alvarez's classification, warns about the absurd consequences of such projection. In his "Ensayo sobre Rosas," where he considers the governor of the Confederation as the best possible of his times, he adds: "But neither do I hesitate to declare that, today, here and now, to dream about dictatorships upon the basis of Rosas as antecedent is to fail to understand Argentina's past and present time." Buchrucker highlights that the good sense of those words was the exception, rather than the rule, among the restoring nationalists (op. cit., p. 132).

still displayed loyalty to the Spanish tradition. What is not always noticed is the presence of the "Spanish influence" on certain French ideas.

These remarks are related to the reading of all versions of the anti-liberal nationalism. It was not the same to read Barrés as to read and admire Maurras. Barrés's nationalism was twofold: on the one hand, questioning, "plebeian" and socializing, appealing to youth due to its energy and adventure; on the other hand, its conservative aspect claimed the support of the "fuerzas del orden" of the social hierarchy: the armed forces, the Church and other traditional institutions. However, in the doctrinal sphere it differed from Maurras's nationalism which so heavily influenced the Argentine anti-liberal nationalism. Both converged in an extensive reflection on decadence. Yet, Barrés would not forsake, emotionally or intellectually, the legacy of the French Revolution. He never questioned the republican way of government. The republican principle of legitimacy was for him indisputable, precisely in the name of France's foundation. This, remarkably dealt with by Eugene Weber and Raoul Girardet, leads to an explanation which I believe suitable to explain "Maurrasianism's" appeal for many anti-liberal nationalists in the Argentina of the 1920s, 1930s and 1940s.

I have always wondered why Charles Maurras, whose preaching had awarded the Catholic Church a fundamental role in France's life, witnessed the damnation of his most significant works by what was called the Holy Office on December 29, 1926. His thinking, the group and Maurras's political school had represented a great attempt, born from *l'affaire Dreyfus*, to instill the French right with a firm and coherent doctrine.⁷⁴ His thinking won the admiration of several Catholics among its many followers, whether believers or non-believers. It included most of the structure housing the nineteenth century's principal reactionaries, but amputated its core: God. Eventually, it would become a sort of atheistic clericalism, a theocracy without God. Such would be the ground for the Church's damnation of the works of an agnostic who placed it in a position of privilege, but as a "factor of [social and political] order."

I think that Charles Maurras, and the monarchical traditionalism that he evokes, through the aesthetic chord, is understood by Leopoldo Lugones, the poet

⁷⁴Jacques Juillard. "La politique religieuse de Charles Maurras." (*Esprit*, Paris: March 1958, pp. 359-384). Also Remond, op. cit., and Eugene Weber, *Action Francaise*.

whose confusion and political whimsies were proverbial. Still, Maurrasianism was simultaneously operating in the development of anti-liberal nationalism in its conspiratorial incarnation. This vests Maurrasianism with a strength or conviction that embraces even those who do not invoke it. Be they Francophiles or Hispanophiles, for anti-liberal nationalists who have been denouncing immigration and the democratic republic as an "obscene chaos" (Maurras's expression), the kindness of a country which receives foreigners leads to a further suspicion: the conviction that most private business firms are motivated by financial interests that conspire against the national interest. The "power of money" is infinite and suspicious, and the North American democracy is judged in the light of this prejudice. In the United States, Maurras would say, a plutocratic oligarchy reigns, summarized by Theodore Roosevelt, "the man of the trusts." Maurras's preaching, that shifted from hate of Germans to collaboration, bore a special appeal because in its defense of the monarchy it evokes a sort of political cathedral: the cross and the sword, the church and the militia, the clerical power and the military power.

There is decisive flection in the history of political ideas and feelings. For such "integral nationalism," which holds the nation and the national interest as absolutes (a provocative but doctrinally weak creed despite its being the offspring of the positivist rationalism of the previous century), monarchism was not a faith but rather the result of a "survey" of experience, of the "laws of the social physics." Being classicists, the ethics of integral nationalists were based on aesthetics. Even though they were not the sole inspiration of the Argentine anti-liberal nationalism of the 1920s and 1930s (traces of particular significance are being ignored in this aspect), they represented a case of special importance to understanding the "social path of an idea," to the application of the principle of complementarity invoked and to the explanation of how, due to a sort of natural path, the fascist and conservative versions of anti-liberal nationalism converged in the 1930 coup d'état.

The new element was not the military intervention in Argentine politics, something that had occurred in the last century's revolution for independence.⁷⁵ The new element was that for the first time in Argentine history, the military

⁷⁵Robert Potash's strict historical evaluation that commences by reconstructing the prologue of the 1930 crisis, ends with The Army and Politics in Argentina, 1962-1973: From Frondizi's Fall to the Peronist Restoration. (Stanford University Press, forthcoming). The Spanish version will appear in Argentina under the title El Ejército y la Política en la Argentina, 1962-1973: Desde la caída de Frondizi hasta la restauración peronista. (Buenos Aires: Ed. Sudamericana, 2 volumes (in process)).

intervention bore an ideological justification: that of anti-liberal nationalism and the enthusiastic, resigned or perplexed agreement of many civilians and most military men who witnessed the 1930 coup d'état (the first in a series of which the 1976 coup d'état would be the last). In the words of Lugones, "the time of the sword" had come, in a national and international milieu where the "cult of the leader" by fascism was a vital political element.

Just as liberal thinking was, as we have said, the "underlying theme," the main current in modern Western politics up to this century, in the case we are examining, anti-liberal thinking and the integralist⁷⁶ mentality turned nationalism into the underlying theme of politics, questioning the constitutional democratic principle of legitimacy.

In his most recent book,⁷⁷ Giovanni Sartori poses two questions relevant to our subject. The first one suggests the conditions in which a democracy must meet the challenge of nationalism and other demons, bringing forth a subtle yet decisive assertion: "It is more and more difficult to resist democracy; in turn, it is more and more difficult to resist (if so desired) within democracy" For his own purposes, Sartori modifies the assertion in this way: While it becomes increasingly difficult to resist democracy, will democracy manage to resist itself? In the old maps, Sartori recalls, the unknown lands were marked with *hic sunt leones*, 'here are the lions.' We have entered a world full of lions. Anti-liberal nationalism in its integrist versions is one of those lions lying in ambush. (This last extension of Sartori's analysis is not his doing, but rather mine.)

⁷⁶About "integrism" as a political mentality and style, see Joseph Folliet. "Progresismo e integrismo. Ensayo de análisis existencial." (*Criterio*, Nos. 1243 and 1244. Buenos Aires: 1955). Here, it is timely to add that *Criterio*, founded in 1928 by a group of Catholic nationalists, underwent a gradual change--free from inner crises--in its intellectual composition and its political, cultural and social preachings. From the late 1950s (known to the writer, who then joined the editorial staff of the review) *Criterio* shared the fundamental values of a pluralist and constitutional democracy. On the eve of 1976, it was among the few publications which declared their explicit opposition to the military coup d'état before it was carried out. On "Francheschi y el movimiento católico integral, 1930-1943" see Austen A. Ivereigh's thesis, Oxford, 1991. Gustavo J. Francheschi was director of *Criterio* in the second of its three stages, according to Jorge Mejía, quoted by Buchrucker, op.cit., p. 137, as a note. An expression of the Catholic "integrism," critical of the anti-liberal nationalism, though for "a certain nationalism capitalism is worse than communism," but also critical of democracy, see *Crusada* (Year X, No. 59, Buenos Aires: Nov. 1965). The review even published a special issue under the title "Contra Criterio," due to the non-integrist position of *Criterio*.

⁷⁷*La Democracia después del comunismo*. (Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 1993).

Sartori's second assertion is that for human beings, the experience of living without enemies is totally new. To sail in the politics of the masses, one must take a compass the north-south of which may become, politically speaking, right-left. It is true that "such [a] compass shifted diametrically around 1990, with a 'left' turning 180 degrees to the right" (communists are Russia's "conservatives") and a "right" which turned and placed itself on the left (Moscow's anti-communist are now the progressivists). Today's bewilderment of the left is understandable, but "which . . . new wine will fill the wineskins?" When the video power works, when one steps out of the world of "things read" to enter that of "things seen," after transiting the world of "things heard"--the radio--a key uncertainty is posed: What happens to *Homo Sapiens* in the face of the *Homo Videns*? Every ideology goes through this filter, yet filters let good and bad things pass through. And democracy will be ill ready to work and be believed if it is misunderstood. A hardly-able-to-work and misunderstood democracy was, precisely, the entity that allowed the intellectual diffusion of anti-liberal nationalism in the 1930s.

The Ideological "Precipitate" and the "Constellation of Power"

To examine the nationalist phenomenon in contemporary Argentina, two facts should be kept in mind: first, that anti-liberal nationalism in all its versions (but above all, that which is called "integral" or integrist) was, in historical reality, a "precipitate"⁷⁸ of external and internal influences at the level of ideas and ideologies. Several of the main characters, of the intellectual mentors and of those who turned the ideology into an instrument for action, adopted the "party-of-the-pure" attitude. I use the expression in the sense developed by Jean Guilton.⁷⁹

The anti-liberal nationalists were not the only ones who acted from the feeling or the intention of the "party of the pure." Ultra-rightists and -leftists, fundamentalists, and integrists of every sort act from this perspective. There are

⁷⁸I believe I owe the term "precipitate," in its chemical meaning applied to ideologies, to Carlos Strasser in a remote work which I assume is unpublished. For a final version of this work I may be able to confirm this assumption.

⁷⁹Jean Guilton. *L'Impur*. (Paris: Ed. Desclee de Brouwer, 1991). "I call 'party of the pure' every group born in the core of a society that it judges corrupt, impure, which aims at returning it to its lost pureness" (p. 19). This definition retrieves very different phenomena, from the political conjuration to the religious conjuration, after having been through the intermediate forms of certain parties and all sects.

two kinds of parties of the pure: the one acting to perfect society, cooperating with it, and the one moving in unfelt increments from collaboration to questioning opposition, from the party to the plot.

In the first case, the party of the pure has goals which are analogous to those of the governing authority. The core of the party of the pure coincides with the core of the community, such as the nobility and the clergy in the "old regime," the communist parties in the popular democracies of their time, or the anti-liberal nationalists in the initial period of most coups d'état, to which they have contributed in contemporary Argentina.

Thus, due to the fact that the joint work of two authorities with the same purpose is difficult to sustain, either the party of the pure fully masters the authority and reduces the latter to unity within itself, its ideology and its followers, or else it "unties" itself (or is vanquished by internal conflicts) from power and starts watching from the outside. In the first stage of this second alternative a critical view arises. Soon this view fails to satisfy the "pure," the new "Catharists" of politics. They will work to destroy the power they themselves have served, in order to replace it. The party of the pure eventually becomes the "party of the conspirators."

The nationalism of our concern, encouraged by the "inspiring conscience" of intellectuals, becomes a "conspiring conscience." Nationalism as a conspiring conscience inspired by the ideology of influential intellectuals, has its share of responsibility for the 1930, 1943, 1955 and 1966 coups d'état, not to mention those thwarted, nor to plunge into the complex analysis of the crisis which led to the overthrow of President Frondizi.

This "Catharist view"⁸⁰ of Argentine politics pierced the right, the left and the constellation of power in contemporary Argentina.

"The pure conscience tolerates a major evil in view of a greater good in mind." The issue of ends and means is unavoidable, but the party of the pure solves it from the "ultimate good" propounded as absolutely pure, on which grounds the

⁸⁰The term "Catharist" is a Greek term which designates a sect of dualist heretics in the West between the 11th and 12th centuries. Born in the core of Christianity, they represented an absolute prophetism and would later become completely sectarian. They had a tragic end.

"first means" may be absolutely impure. The rational societies that have known the sectarianism under the Terror, in France, Russia, Nazi Germany, Romania, and today's Bosnia, may be approached using this magnifying glass. The Argentine case under consideration did not reach such tragic dimensions; yet, when one reads certain ideologists of anti-liberal nationalism, they display the attributes of the "pure." The conspiring conscience lies in secret. Wherever there is light, there is no conspiracy. Together with secrecy is the sense of treachery. Should the secret be revealed through treachery, the traitor must perish. The party of the pure lives in constant alert, always ready to perform the repairing, "cleansing" task.

The party of the pure may perform the most heroic acts, but also the most infamous ones. Hitler, a former conspirator, knew better than anyone the machinery of plots and how to conjure conspiracies. In France, the Resistance's complex biography crosses through the divisions of the plotters.

The Argentina of the "military party," which derived from the pioneering inspiration of the anti-liberal nationalists who supported the military leader as the armed political hero representing pureness in a corrupted society, may be partly explained from such perspective. In the course of the century, the consequences would be both catastrophic and tragic.

The militant Argentina of the 1970s was one of the symmetrical answers creating for the first time a "revolutionary situation," as is well stated in Carlos Waisman's "Reversal." Still, most of its leaders were involved in helping to corrupt the means which corrupted the end.⁸¹

The trace of the anti-liberal nationalism through the "constellation of power"⁸² must be examined. Faithful to its ideological tradition, it rejected the political parties, acted from the "leagues" (one of which is being studied by Sara McGee Deutsch), or practiced "entrism" in the major popular parties. In the case of

⁸¹ See Richard Gillespie. Soldiers of Perón: Argentina's Montoneros. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982).

⁸²Jean Ladriere's expression. "Le Pouvoir." In A. Gilson. Pour une democratie efficace. (Louvain: Librairie Universitaire, 1965). "Each kind of society," writes Ladriere, "is featured by a certain configuration of the constellation of power" which has four stars: political, economic, military and moral. The dominant "star" is political power. But the star where the victory over an ideology is wielded is moral power (I am prolonging Ladriere's thought).

"historic" Peronism, its entrance was paved by the party's politically, economically and culturally anti-liberal nature, and by the presence of popular conservatism. This current was sufficiently significant to represent the most comprehensive profile of Perón and Peronism. It is not surprising that today Menemismo appears as a popular neoconservatism.⁸³

Anti-liberal nationalism penetrated the party system, and was mainly engraved on conservatism and, in the last half-century, on Peronism. It entered the military and nurtured the idea of the "national projects" propounded, yet never realized, by the military regimes to supplement the action of the "saviors by the sword." The idea of "national projects" is not exclusively Argentine.⁸⁴ It also trapped militants of parties of liberal origin such as the Union Cívica Radical. But the idea of a "national project" (an infrequent expression outside Argentina) embodied an authoritarian, if not totalitarian, internal logic. The national project emerged from a "prospective" exercise. Once the project was ratified, what was the sense and role of the opposition, political competition, pluralism, if the "ideal city" had been consecrated? Such internal logic was inevitable, but remained covered under the rhetoric of projects deserted by their authors. First, they usually lacked the political chapter of a pluralist democracy constantly promised by the military in order to attempt legitimizing their regime through the ends, and second, even when good-hearted or sincere intentions might have been recognized among their authors, the military regimes in Argentina, until what was called the Process of 1976-1982, either relinquished power or were doomed to failure.

A second topic linked to the political path of nationalism was expressed through what was called the "doctrine of national security." In national situations depending upon the leading characters of the international order, the concept of national security was applied in the 1960s, 1970s, and part of the 1980s as a way of absolutizing the value of security. Like every absolutization of a relative value, the

⁸³Carlos Floria and Luis Tonelli. "El menemismo: neoconservadorismo popular." (*La Nación*, Oct. 10, 1993). We analyze a grassroots social coalition of Menemismo as an extension of historic Peronism, from the electoral results of Oct. 3, 1993.

⁸⁴See Samuel Bailey. *Nationalism in Latin America*. (New York:Knopf, 1970) and in the same book David C. Jordan, "Argentina's Right-Wing Nationalists." Especially Helio Jaguaribe de Mattos, "A Succinct Analysis of Brazilian Nationalism," where Jaguaribe explains the relationship between economic nationalism and development, which turned *desarrollismo* into an ideology derived from nationalism, revealing a great appeal in Latin America and a piercing capacity in the military world. Candido Antonio Mendez de Almeida, *Nationalism e Desenvolvimento*. (Rio de Janeiro: 1963).

doctrine derived from the ideology of security inspired by nationalism. From the ideology of security, every other value--liberty, equality and justice--was buried in the midst of "Hobbes's state of nature," endured in Argentina during the 1970s and part of the 1980s.

To the left, what was called the "national left-wing" collected the influence of nationalism construed anew from its populist version. Within the moral power, Catholic sectors helped the formation of the right-wing nationalists who would later be one of the sources of the Montoneros. Their liturgy and mobilizing ability displayed traits of what was called, perhaps improperly, "left-wing fascism" due to intellectual neglect rather than conceptual adequacy, but also because of Liberation Theology. Among the latter there existed genuine theologians who bore an influence upon the Christian theology, as was acknowledged in fundamental documents of the Catholic Church and other churches. However, a sort of ideologization of theology also made up the climate of the times in all of Latin America. In Argentina, it added to the "militarization" of the political and social language.⁸⁵

By then, the social path of anti-liberal nationalism would reach its peak, as an ideology and as a counter ideology, as a justifier of the saviors by the sword and of the saviors by the revolution. Brethren-enemies would fall, embracing, into the abyss, just like in Stronheim's famous work, Les Rapaces. There existed many cynical leaders, but most followers were either whole-heartedly devoted to a cause or alienated by the ideologies. The "conspiring consciences" of integrism looked for the citadel of pureness with the dangerous insanity of the Catharists. As in the renowned film 2001: A Space Odyssey, the pure leave the planet toward a spatial void exceeding the speed of light. The daily tragedy is undergone by those remaining on the Earth, locked in a state of nature; *hic sunt leones*.

Within the moral power, some intellectuals, journalists and clergy were jointly responsible for the atmosphere and the justification of most coups d'état. In some cases, they were victims of the same demons they had helped to release. From right and left, the dangerous distinctions preached by anti-liberal nationalism were applied with some conviction and much frivolousness: the "real country" against

⁸⁵When I read a thesis from the Jesuit University entitled "La teología como táctica o estrategia," I understood that Hobbes's state of nature has even confounded some spiritual directors.

the "legal country." Democracy was disdained. The Marxist-Leninist left contributed by preaching against the "bourgeois democracy." This is no new story, nor is it exclusive to Argentina. There existed times when some ladies cultivated what Eugene Ionesco, with sour intelligence, described as *le vison progressiste*, 'progressive mink,' i.e. radical chic.⁸⁶ In contemporary Argentina the craze and pleasure for power have displaced such a view. *Le vison liberiste* has become more common.

The questions disclosed by comparative explorations, by new typologies and by the lessons drawn from daily experience in a changing world, suggest new conclusions which I add to those of the preceding reflections.

Ernst B. Haas, in his article "Nationalism: An Instrumental Social Construction," wonders where Chile and Argentina are likely to turn, after asserting that in France, for instance, liberals did not win until 1945. Until then, they had to compete with "syncretists" and "integralists."

Along this line of ideas, it might be said that liberals did not win in Argentina until 1983, when the Unión Cívica Radical--a national party historically rooted in political liberalism--beat previously undefeated Peronism, which was instilled with a political and cultural anti-liberalism as part of its tradition.

This leads to hypotheses ensuing from Haas's suggestive question, but also from nationalism's tactical victories and strategic hardships in Argentina.

First, an exercise of political analysis at the level of ideas, ideologies and historic movements (as I have been proposing all along) incorporating Haas's proposed typologies, would enable us to reconstruct the political and social path of nationalism discerning, within 19th century nationalism, two subclasses of revolutionary nationalism. "Jacobin" nationalism arose during the revolution for

⁸⁶A most appropriate description of certain Argentine intellectual sectors --nowadays apparently converted--but also of North American intellectual sectors, not to include similar Italians and Latin Americans, is found in Tony Judt, *Past Imperfect: French Intellectuals 1944-1956*, (University of California Press, 1992), where the moral and intellectual consistency of a Raymond Aron or a Francois Mauriac--and a few more--are spared. Not, certainly, Sartre, for instance. See the incisive comment of John Weightman, "Fatal Attraction," concerning the book of Judt, in *The New York Review of Books*, (Vol. XL, No. 4, Feb. 11, 1993, pp. 9-13).

independence, and "Whig" nationalism arose during the expansion of liberal nationalism after Pavón and the crisis of the Argentine Confederation instituted by Rosas. In the early 20th century, "democratic" nationalism emerged. It represented the bridge that the critics of liberal nationalism would cross in order to arrive at three versions of anti-liberal nationalism. The first, the "traditional syncretist" nationalism, assembled Maurrasians. The second, the "integralist revolutionary nationalism," gathered the advocates of fascism in all its versions, and of Marxism turned into the "national left." The third, not usually distinguished from the former due to its scarceness and yet not to be overlooked given the mentalities it evokes, is the "integrist restoring nationalism" represented, for instance, by the "crusaders" of *Tradición, Familia y Propiedad* (TFP), a movement linking kindred groups in Argentina and Brazil. The "golden age" they attempt to restore, pursuant to one of the indicators of Haas's chart, is a sort of Christianity resting upon pre-liberal values.

Second, considering the influence of Catholicism in Argentine nationalism, the latter invoked the "*politique d'abord*" in Maurras's sense, corporativism and the republic, ignoring democracy. It developed feasible interpretations due to the relative ambiguity of the Catholic Church's social teaching concerning the desirable principle of legitimacy. After the Second Vatican Council and the Encyclical *Centesimus Annus*, 'On the Hundredth Anniversary,' such ambiguity ceased to exist and the Catholic Church unambiguously postulated democracy and the right to a free economic initiative. Catholic nationalism was then confined to its dogmatic interpretations, doctrinary (in the sense proposed by Zuleta Alvarez) or ideological, but without the possibility of addressing the doctrine of a Church reconciled with democracy at the turn of the century, just as it had reconciled with the republic at the turn of prior century. These aspects, irrelevant for other cultures, are relevant for Latin America and for the diffusion of anti-liberal and antidemocratic nationalism in Chile and Argentina.

Third, anti-liberal nationalism became what I have long before called the nationalist tradition, in opposition to the liberal tradition that had shaped modern Argentina. It questioned the principle of legitimacy of the national constitution and of political democracy.

Fourth, since 1930, the year of the first coup d'état of contemporary Argentina, the country has been undergoing a crisis of legitimacy. The democratic transition, traumatically launched in 1983 upon the fall of the military regime and after the defeat in the Malvinas/Falklands war, requires time to be consolidated. For this consolidation to be considered achieved, there is a fundamental indicator which is not derived from the typologies of nationalism but rather from rationalization: political succession. Two constitutional successions without crises are not enough to talk seriously of a democratic consolidation. However, there exists a pending trial that no Peronist government has ever experienced: entering the competition for succession without using power to manipulate. The procedure for constitutional reform that Argentina is witnessing at this moment confirms my concern in at least three aspects. First, the constitutional reform is being performed primarily to modify the provision that prevents the immediate reelection of the President; the rest is secondary. Second, the procedure of constitutional reform sprang from a "deal" between President Menem and former President Alfonsín to which the delegates of both national parties, members of the Constituent Assembly in the sense of the national constitution, had to adhere. (This leads me back to what was said about the need to address the subject of the "style of authority.") Third, succession is primarily a complex question within Peronism, and at the same time, it is a national question. Peronism, from its very birth, is an onerous subject for classification and interpretation. Its identification with fascism is a simplification, although data about fascism exists in the movement and in the governing Peronist regime of 1946-1955. But data about a phenomenon do not constitute the whole phenomenon. Corporate traits in the French Fifth Republic, such as the Economic and Social Council, do not affect the nature of the regime as a democratic republic. In Argentina, Peronism is the sole political organization capable of projecting as a national issue an internal issue of the party or the movement. The "inner war" which shook Argentina in the 1970s broke out, first, within Peronism. No other existing party or political force has this potential, used for better or worse.

Fifth, nationalism, just like any other ideology, experiences what José Ortega y Gasset said of the individual. It is "he and his circumstance." Nationalism in the core of an empire is not the same as nationalism in the "margins" of the empire, or so the saying went in imperial Rome. In contemporary Argentina, nationalism pierced every party and embraced every rival ideology, as I have intended to show. However, the Peronist phenomenon disturbed it. When Peronism emerged and

was the "circumstance" of nationalism, briefly, the following happened: Peronism emerged and gradually reinforced itself in its basically anti-liberal political, economic and cultural nature. Nationalism contributed with its men and doctrines, though the nationalistic right prevailed. Perón's leadership style conveyed its pragmatism, realism and "in-corporate" capacity--not frequently found in other political parties. Nationalism was co-opted, except for its republican version, which resisted. Marcelo Sanchez Sorondo, a cultivated and honest nationalist whose last work, La Argentina por Dentro (1992), asserts that Argentina was born liberal with the revolution but was turned democratic with independence, joined Peronism in a part of his public life. Yet, nationalism endured with Peronism a turbulent relationship. It reached power with the Peronism of the 1940s. It sided with the opposition in the 1950s, and its traditional leaders contributed to the 1955 revolution that overturned Perón. It pierced into the "*desarrollismo*," but aided Frondizi's removal. It prompted the 1966 coup d'état against radical President Arturo Illia, seized control with the military, which divided political power, keeping nationalists in internal and foreign politics and in education, and summoning neo-liberals to conduct the economy. Left-wing nationalism practiced "entrism" during the 1970s, and with the nationalist ultra-right, it contended for the exploitation of Perón's death to obtain the movement's leadership. Peronism either swallowed or parted them. Those who did not assimilate were discharged.

Sixth, the versions of anti-liberal nationalism that used xenophobia and racism as grounds for strife were removed from Argentine society. This is pertinent to our reflections on the future of nationalism, which has fallen back into what Carlos Escude depicts as "territorial nationalism,"⁸⁷ into sprouts of economic nationalism and into "semi-loyal" parties of constitutional democracy. These are, so far, in the minority and lack a national structure (in the republican right-wing, but not necessarily democratic, are Modín and Fuerza Republicana). For decades, Argentine society has been, consistently and progressively, a melting pot in the sense in which the United States was and no longer is.⁸⁸ This applies to every

⁸⁷Among other writings of the promoter of what is called "peripheral realism." Carlos Escudé. "Argentine Territorial Nationalism." (Journal of Latin American Studies, 20, pp. 139-165. London: 1983).

⁸⁸The survey by Edgardo Catterberg on discrimination and anti-Semitism in current Argentina, upon the request of The American Jewish Committee in 1992/93. The survey shows that the level of discrimination and anti-Semitism is equally low or even lower in Argentina than in the lowest places in the world, and lower than in North America. This survey was exposed and commented upon in New

community and ethnic group, and is a factor that anti-liberal nationalism must bear in mind. Whenever it fails to accept this, it ends up defeated.

Seventh, anti-liberal nationalism lost its analytic capacity as regards to international changes. Policies termed nationalist became progressively negative for the national interest. This is no paradox; it is a spring of the political and economic process of contemporary Argentina, in domestic interests as well as in foreign policy.

Finally, at the level of ideas, it is stimulating that historians and political theorists should refine their analyses in order to grasp the differences and shades between their bearers, ideologists and historic experiences. I believe it significant that Haas and others should distinguish between Cavour and Mazzini, between Maurras and Mussolini, or between Jefferson and Mill, just to give a few examples. Besides the value judgment provoked by each thinker, ideologist or system, a distinction must be made between an aristocratic and anti-populist nationalism such as Maurras's, and fascism, which means a complex totalitarian revolution.⁸⁹

The fact that anti-liberal and integrist nationalism was not foreseen--above all, in its organicist versions--by the main thinkers of the 19th century, and that during the early 20th century some considered it a "pathological inflammation," does not excuse them from a deeper refinement in thinking and historic, theoretical and analytical prudence. Even Keynes, at a certain moment during his remarkable existence, thought that "Bolshevism was a temporary delirium like Jacobinism."⁹⁰

Nationalism, the National State, and Globalization

York in 1993. The presentation belongs to Edgardo Catterberg and the comments were argued by Carlos Weissman and myself.

⁸⁹Zeev Sternhell with Mario Sznajder and Maria Asheri. The Birth of Fascist Ideology: From Cultural Rebellion to Political Revolution. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993) op. cit. The authors do not consider fascism as a way of racism, biological determinism or anti-Semitism (there are many fascist Jews), nor a defensive reaction of the bourgeoisie; it is a synthesis of two strong ideologies, nationalism and socialism. The book is controversial and rests excessively upon the intellectuals who, according to Eugen Weber (The New York Book Review, Feb. 6, 1994), are heavily burdened. The book "will not convince those who are not convinced," but illustrates the complexity of such a phenomenon as fascism and is authored by a political science professor at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem.

⁹⁰Robert Skielsky's delightful and remarkable biography, John Maynard Keynes: The Economist as Savior. 1920-1937. (New York: Penguin Books, 1994, p. 108).

Nationalism is the subject of ongoing examination not just on academic grounds but also on political, economic and cultural ones. It is the thought for the action, as Bergson would say, which has been launched from very different intellectual, ideological and functional stances. It was foreseeable, as I hope to have made clear, that during these years, the Latin American left also would take up the subject of nationalism, although stripped of the violence that had corrupted it and of the intellectual parochialism that had prevented it from examining its ills. Systematic violence, revolution and parochialism scarcely ever produced the "liberation" of the peoples, but almost always led to the replacement of one way of oppression by another. This leftist reformulation of nationalism as a natural necessity has been decisively expounded by Jorge G. Castañeda in his work, Utopia Unarmed: The Latin American Left After the Cold War.⁹¹ Such conclusions incorporate the transnational dimension of the nationalist question as a subject in itself, currently trapping discourse and action.

When, in 1961, Elie Kedourie published the second edition of his book on nationalism, he included in the forward the beginning of an answer to his critics, who had stressed that he did not discuss whether nationalism "must be conciliated or resisted." A decision on this question, Kedourie then wrote, "is necessarily governed by the particular circumstances of each individual case, and whether its consequences will be fortunate or fatal will depend on the courage, the astuteness and the luck of those vested with the power to make it."⁹² In political life, especially in times of change, a combination of courage, astuteness and luck is needed, although it does not always accompany big or small leadership. Kedourie could have answered that his goal had not been to plunge into such a discussion. He chose to embark on it from the very beginning and rest with that sole assertion.

⁹¹Op. cit., (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1993). Especially chapter 10: "Reformulating Nationalism: Longitudinally and Regionally" that starts as follows: "Because nation-building in Latin America is incomplete, and the cause of social change inseparable from redeeming the nation for the people, the left in Latin America has no choice but to remain nationalistic..." (p.288; my emphasis). However, we are talking about "a new nationalism for the left" that must regard the United States as a power inhabited by persons, sectors and streams of thought that the Latin American left might have as allies. The old anti-imperialism must also be reformulated, according to the shrewd analysis and suggestive proposal contained in Castañeda.

⁹² Elie Kedourie, op. cit. Said paragraph is recalled in an introduction on Daniel Patrick Moynihan's book Pandemonium, (Oxford University Press, paperback, 1994), referring to the "ethnicity in international politics." Moynihan also quotes George Kennan in that he regards nationalism as "the largest emotional force of our era..." (p. 111).

Such assertion contains part of the truth. The remaining part is concerned with prudence, which in public life is a rare possession. Prudence needs experience in order to keep old and new demons at bay. Democracy was "a fragile flower sown in an infertile terrain," to use the expressive phrase of Ian Kershaw when he examines the prospects of the breakdown of the Weimar regime.⁹³

A perverse combination of factors--a scarce conviction, neglect of the requirements of a democracy, intellectual frivolousness, lack of caution to guard a fragile regime in the midst of the turbulence of a time of crisis, vested interests and conspiratorial behaviors--caused the breakdown of the Weimar Republic. Nothing prevents (indeed, everything advises) the addition of memory, prudence and a good deal of realism to courage, shrewdness and luck, in order to leave no entry for the old and new demons.

In contemporary academic thinking devoted to nationalism, it is accepted as "modern,"⁹⁴ and is seen as spread by new means such as the press, the cinema and the radio on the one hand, and by sport on the other. (The expansion of games, in which modern gladiators symbolize national states, has already occurred [in the Olympic Games even before 1914, for example] These were once a way to publicly celebrate national feelings, but are now seen as a way to channel popular passions, as a sort of "alibi" for transporting latent violence into competitive sports.) John Breuilly confines his arguments to the appeal of nationalism, which he claims concerns political identity rather than identity in a general sense. He claims that the "ultimate irrationality" of nationalism as a political ideology must be acknowledged, although he does not consider it necessarily and in itself a "way of [irrational] politics."

Is the nationalist mythology exhausted? This is what the advocates of a "post-moralistic nationalism" think they observe, where the cult of the motherland, the rhetoric of an austere duty, and maximalistic preachings are displaced by light ethics.

Perceptible in some places of the world, such as Western Europe, most nationalisms do not show exhaustion but rather fresh spirit and dangerous syndromes. "Patriotism loves what belongs to itself while valuing what belongs to

⁹³Ian Kershaw. *Weimar: Why did German Democracy Fail?* (New York: San Martin s Press, 1992).

⁹⁴That is what E.J. Hobsbawm does in *Nations and Nationalism* , op. cit.

the other. Nationalism, instead, is suspicious of everything that does not belong to itself. If it can't destroy what belongs to the other, it tries to seize it." These words belong to Pope John Paul II, for whom (such) nationalism is the denial of patriotism. Coming from a Polish pope, this is fairly significant. Knowing that the phrase has been written in a letter to the Archbishop of Vrhbosna on the occasion of a *triduum* joining the Muslim, Orthodox, Jewish and Catholic religious communities upon Yugoslavia's tragedy, the assertion allows no room for doubt.

Haas's analysis promises liberalism as a "global rationalizer," admits that there exist elites learning to seek new solutions, neither preaching the maintenance of the nation-state nor challenging it. These elites work for a regional integration and the establishment of international regimes. Their proposals often differ much from those re-formulated by the new mentors of the Latin American left, and yet, one of the presumptions of these proposals is the new role of the national state. I suggest that the transnational dimension of those questions be noticed.⁹⁵ The national state is and will be for a long time a generalizing and legitimizing concept. Just as Michel Mann remarks, national states are diversifying and developing, but not dying.⁹⁶ To the extent that the future may be predicted, the association between capitalism and the national state is dominant throughout the world, especially among the most advanced countries. Wherever the national state is in crisis, it does not display post-modernity "but rather insufficient modernity." If democracy is primarily the governing regime of a state, what effective democracy exists where the national state has not developed?

The dilemmas between national identities and the major regional communities usually emerge from wrongly posed discussions.⁹⁷ To use a religious analogy, which I trust will be reasonable, there exists ecumenism whenever one

⁹⁵This is what Haas does, and Kenneth H.F. Dyson, in The State Tradition in Western Europe: A Study of an Idea and Institution. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980). Personally, I agree with this approach: the idea that treads through society and is expressed in institutions.

⁹⁶Michael Mann. "Nation-States in Europe and Other Continents: Diversifying, Developing, Not Dying." (*Daedalus*, op. cit. pp. 115-142) and a previous version in a lecture on "The End of the Nation-State?," in the Instituto Juan March, Madrid, Dec. 11, 1992.

⁹⁷As is exposed in a well-posed discussion. Jean-Marc Ferry and Paul Thibaud. Discussion sur l'Europe. (Paris: Ed. Calmat-Levy, 1992). Thibaud approaches the subject from "Europe for the nations (and reciprocally)," and Ferry exposes "a philosophy of the community" which includes a culture of European citizenship but also the limits of communitarian power.

brings to it one's own religious identity. Otherwise, there is no ecumenism but rather reactionary syncretisms.

There is a globalization that befits humanity if, as Michael Camdessus eloquently states, the strategic, institutional, and "citizenship" deficits, which express a lack of sense of universality, are overcome. Yet, such sense of universality must be accompanied by a reform of the state which reestablishes "its dignity and...its role of public welfare guardian. There cannot exist a harmonic world growth if, throughout the world, the 'hand of justice' of the state is not firmly related to the 'invisible hand' of the market."⁹⁸

A final conclusion remains an open matter.

"Whether we like nationalism or not, it seems to be a necessary stage through which human societies must go." With this assertion, Ernst B. Haas closes his recent article on nationalism. But human societies are not indifferent to the kind of nationalism they either experience or must experience. Dominant nationalism cannot disregard, in turn, the quality and consistency of the political regime in which it is acting.

An anti-liberal and organicist, ethnic or fundamentalist nationalism prevents the rational reconciliation of nationalism, national state and globalization. Liberal nationalism presents itself as the most appropriate to achieve this goal. A reformulation from the left evokes a sort of social-democrat nationalism.

In all cases, nationalism, if it is to exist and not be born again as a reactionary and perverse phenomenon, should accept as a motto that man is the way of the nation. The worst experiences have taken place and occur today when the nation is postulated as the way of man.

This may be expressed as a personalist nationalism.

I neither claim nor predict it, and I am ready to consider that the expression in itself may contribute little, if any, to the classifications and typologies aimed at

⁹⁸ Michel Camdessus. "La Mundialización y el Reino." Lecture in Monterrey, Mexico, Oct. 1993.

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The introduction to this working paper was translated into English by Alberto Föhrig, a former graduate intern of the Latin American Program. Parts I and II were translated by Silvina Floria.