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DEMOGRAPHY, MIGRATION, AND TOLERANCE: Comparing the Russian, Ukrainian, and U.S. Experience



Eurasian Migration Papers
Number 5

Edited by Nancy Popson

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AND TOLERANCE:
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and U.S. Experience**

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WOODROW WILSON INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR SCHOLARS

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Cover Photograph: Scene from street football tournament in Kyiv promoting diversity prior to FIFA-2010, organized by the East European Development Institute, jointly with the International Organization for Migration; United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees; Kyiv City Administration; and minority communities. Kyiv, Ukraine; 2010;
Photographed by Mridula Ghosh.

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Foreword

BLAIR A. RUBLE

This volume represents the fifth in the Eurasian Migration Papers—a series of reports produced jointly by the Kennan Institute and the Comparative Urban Studies Program of the Woodrow Wilson Center that examines migrant communities in Eurasian cities.

As Nancy Popson details in her report, this volume centers on a series of meetings organized in April 2010 with Mridula Ghosh (a former UN official who set up a center in Kyiv promoting tolerance towards migrants) and Marya Rozanova (a Galina Starovoitova Fellow in Human Rights and Conflict Resolution at the Kennan Institute and head of a similar center in St. Petersburg), as well as papers produced by Ghosh and Rozanova.

Both Russia and Ukraine are struggling with their status as world-leading destinations for migrants. Both nations suffer declining demographic trends and therefore need migrants to meet the labor demands of their growing economies. And while both nations have Soviet and pre-Soviet traditions of being multi-ethnic societies, both societies are experiencing varying degrees of hostility toward immigrants today.

The demand for migrant labor, and negative attitudes towards migrants themselves, are not unique to Russia and Ukraine. The United States wrestles with many of the same issues, and the purpose behind the meetings in April and this publication is to allow consideration of issues of tolerance towards and policy needs in an international context.

The meetings with Ghosh and Rozanova, as well as this publication, were made possible through the support of federal conference funds from the Woodrow Wilson Center, and I gratefully acknowledge this vital support.

Demography, Migration, and Tolerance: Eurasian Experience in Context

NANCY POPSON

According to the United Nations, the United States is the top net recipient of migrants in the world, followed by Russia and Germany. In 2005 Ukraine was fourth, and by 2009 was the tenth top net recipient.¹ While the United States and Germany have been dealing with migration and new migrant communities for decades, for Russia and Ukraine the issues are relatively new. Under the Soviet regime, population movement was highly regulated by the state. It was only after the collapse of the Soviet system that it became possible for people to move among the newly independent states of the region without state approval. At the same time, migrants from other parts of the world began to transit through or make a new home on former Soviet territory. Today, migrants to Russia and Ukraine come from many different areas of the world, including the former Soviet Union, Asia, and Africa. Laws regulating migration have been adapted from outdated Soviet norms or made from scratch. Both countries grapple with a large number of undocumented migrants and the need to integrate their communities into the mainstream society; both have also seen an increase in crime and intolerance towards these minorities. Policymakers and leaders of non-profits who deal with migrant issues in Russia and Ukraine could benefit from case studies and best practices that might be adapted to fit the unique needs of their countries.

With this goal in mind, in April 2010 the Kennan Institute organized a series of meetings to bring together experts on migration and tolerance in Ukraine and Russia with their counterparts in the United States. Participants included Mridula Ghosh, Board Chair of the East European Development Institute (EEDI) in Ukraine; Marya Rozanova, Associate Professor, Admiral Makarov State Maritime Academy and Head of the St. Petersburg non-profit organization “Center for Civil, Social, Scientific, and Cultural Initiatives ‘STRATEGIA’”, St. Petersburg; the Honorable J. Walter Tejada, Board Member of the Arlington County Board; Mary Giovagnoli, Director of the

Immigration Policy Center; Michele Waslin, Senior Policy Analyst at the Immigration Policy Center; and Blair A. Ruble, Andrew Selee, and Sonya Michel, all of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.² The meetings concluded with a public session titled “Demography, Migration, and Tolerance: Eurasian Experience in Context.”

Over the course of two days, the participants discussed a wide range of topics touching on migration in their countries. They learned about the situation in their colleagues’ home countries and found interesting points of comparison. The timing of the conference lent an extra poignancy to the discussions, as Arizona’s governor signed into law Arizona Senate Bill 1070—the controversial state law on illegal immigration—only five days before the start of the meetings. The Ukrainian and Russian experts left with much information to process as they returned to work with policymakers, migrants, and their local communities. While this report cannot hope to capture the breadth and depth of the two-day dialogue, it will seek to highlight the major themes that arose and particular issues that the participants found to be relevant across cultures.

TRENDS IN MIGRATION AND INTEGRATION: SIMILAR ISSUES IN DIFFERENT SOCIETIES

During the discussions, it quickly became apparent that the United States, Russia, and Ukraine are more similar than not with regards to immigration and integration of migrant communities. All three countries face a need for labor. Individuals moving there generally find employment, although that employment may be in the informal economic sector—in the United States through under-the-table employment and in Russia and Ukraine at marketplaces. The migrants are, for the most part, long-term residents; many bring their families and send their children to local schools. In all three countries migrant communities face restrictive legal regimes and varying degrees of discrimination from the local population. While the migrants to the United States, Ukraine, and Russia may organize within their own communities, there are little to no state-supported programs encouraging integration into the larger society.

Of course, each country has its own unique landscape that complicates direct comparisons. The history of migration is quite different in the United States than in Russia or Ukraine, both of whom spent years as part of the U.S.S.R. with strictly enforced controls over population move-

ment. Experts cited by Marya Rozanova predict a decrease in population in Russia from 145.2 million in 2002 to approximately 100 million by 2050 (see pg. 36). The projected population decrease for Ukraine, according to a United Nations report, is from 45.7 million in 2009 to 35 million in 2050.³ This dire demographic outlook suggests that immigrants may become an important source for workers needed to fuel the Russian and Ukrainian economy.

The intent of migrants may also differ by country. Ukraine is seen at least initially as a transit country for many migrants, as there are not as many employment opportunities there as in Russia or the United States. Its proximity to states belonging to the European Union makes it a desirable transit route to the West. However, difficulty crossing the Ukrainian border into the European Union leaves many stranded and struggling to make more permanent homes in Ukraine.

While there is some level of anti-immigrant sentiment in all three countries, the rate of outright violence toward migrants is highest in Ukraine, where attacks occur almost every month. The United States, on the other end of the spectrum, has seen a rise in hate speech and anti-immigrant groups but has not experienced the levels of violence found in Ukraine or Russia.

The education level of the migrants also varies by country. Surveys conducted by the Kennan Institute and EEDI in Ukraine show a migrant population more highly educated than the indigenous population.⁴ Many are professionals in their home countries but can find only work in the marketplaces in Ukraine. The U.S. experts noted that the migrant population in America also includes many with higher education. However, U.S. studies also show a large amount of migrants who are not educated. U.S. experts at the meeting noted that this U-curve is the opposite of the curve illustrating the education levels of the general U.S. population, which has the most people with middle levels of education, few highly educated people, and few uneducated people. By contrast, studies in Russia indicate that half of migrants have no professional education.⁵

Despite these differences, the participants in the conference noted several areas where similarities on the ground could open important avenues of policy discussion. As the conference took place during intense debate in the U.S. media and policy circles over the Arizona immigration law, the strengths and weaknesses of U.S. policy provided ample grounds for debate. The conversations touched on many different policies, approaches,

and theories, but kept returning to a few main themes: irregular or undocumented migration and its impact on migrant communities and the host society; strategies for integrating migrant communities; xenophobia in the host society exacerbated by pervasive myths about migrants; and the international impact of immigration policy in the United States.

UNDOCUMENTED MIGRATION

The participants discussed at length the complicated legal, social, and economic issues surrounding immigrants without proper legal documentation. As undocumented migrants were at the heart of Arizona Senate Bill 1070, this topic was both timely and well-debated in the U.S. press and policy community. The discussion revolved around the U.S. experience—in particular the causes for undocumented migration; the impact of programs aimed at legalizing undocumented migrants and the effect of legal status on integration or marginalization of migrants; and possible paths to reform the system and relieve the conditions leading to a large number of undocumented migrants.

It was noted that in the U.S. case, migrants—regardless of their documentation status—are coming into the country in search of a better life. Some come into the country through what is described as “illegal immigration,” but many come legally and then they become illegal through overstaying their visa or paperwork delays within the system. The U.S. experts agreed that there is a demand in the economy for people to work in the jobs that these migrants currently fill. However, the existing system of laws is not working to bring workers in to fill the demand legally.

One important question raised regarding undocumented migrants was the importance of legal status in helping migrants to integrate into their host society. It was noted that psychologically, the possibility of deportation at any moment marginalizes migrants. The participants pointed to a study by the Immigration Policy Center and the Center for American Progress⁶ that concluded that migrants who were able to take advantage of the U.S. legalization program begun in the late 1980s showed significant benefits for themselves and the society. They were able to learn English more efficiently and get a better education. This led to better jobs and the ability to buy homes and consume more, contributing positively to the local economy and to their communities. Moreover, their shift from the informal to the formal

economy led to more taxes paid into state and local coffers. Despite these studies, the experts suggested that such legalization or “amnesty” programs remain politically difficult to sell to the host population.

Finally, the participants debated the possible paths to change the system and relieve the pressure point of undocumented migration. The U.S. experts suggested that comprehensive reform is needed to deal with those who are currently living in the United States. That reform should not only adjust the status of those undocumented migrants who fulfill requirements for legalization (as was the case in the 1980s), but also eliminate backlogs in the system and create channels for people to come legally in the future to fulfill employment demand in the economy.

INTEGRATION OF MIGRANT COMMUNITIES

Integration of individual migrants and of their communities was highlighted as an important issue in all three countries. The participants noted that migrants often live in the country for years without speaking the national language, and that while they may be well integrated and socially active within their own diaspora community, those communities are often marginalized from the rest of the society. The discussion centered on different strategies for integration and the geographic variation in successful integration programs.

The participants found interesting commonalities between Russia and the United States in the geographic spread of migrants and resulting integration issues. While migrants were once more concentrated in certain states in America, they are now living all over the country. Moreover, in the past migrant communities were commonly found in larger cities. The latest wave of migration in the United States finds many migrants starting to move out into the suburbs. Reception has varied from community to community, with some welcoming the newcomers and others reacting with fear and uncertainty. Regardless, these communities are faced with a complicated web of issues related to integration, and they have little to no local institutional history to turn to for help.

Russia finds itself in a similar position. Like the United States, although Russia is a multinational country, many regions are not diverse. With the influx of new migrants, Russian regions that were once fairly homogeneous are now dealing with a more diverse population. These newly

diverse areas struggle with issues of integration and xenophobia even more so than Russian cities and regions with a longer tradition of migration.

In seeking to learn from the experience of the United States, the participants pointed to the fact that U.S. states and cities with a longer history of migrants have developed more successful integration programs. This is largely due to strong state organizations and non-profit organizations that have been working with migrant communities over the long term. While the U.S. experts triumphed the work of veteran organizations in historically migrant-heavy areas, some newly diverse communities were identified as success stories as well. This success was attributed to a very active non-profit network with a focus on education.

The participants noted that these networks are critical to integration, because in all three countries, there is no government integration program. While in Germany there are courses funded by the state to help migrants learn the German language, the legal system, and feel more comfortable in German culture, that is not the case in Russia or Ukraine. The U.S. experts pointed to individual localities or counties instituting programs to help citizens understand how local government works,⁷ but in general integration assistance in the United States is left to the non-profit sector.

The most successful U.S. integration programs involve local non-profits and community groups who start to work on integration and assistance issues—in particular shepherding migrants through the naturalization and residency status process—and then move on to a broader array of services and civic involvement. Since these non-profits are spearheading the effort, the participants noted the importance of initiatives aimed at strengthening them through volunteer recruitment and grant assistance. However, these programs do not exist in a vacuum. Ideally, the non-profits would work with local governments that are dedicated to making all citizens feel included in the community. The participants were clear that situations such as overly strict local laws or lack of translation services can keep people on the outside regardless of the laudable work of non-profit organizations.

Moreover, the participants agreed that successful integration must include civic engagement on the part of the migrant community itself. Here the discussion turned to the positive and negative aspects of migrant diasporas within the host society. While these diasporas provide a strong base of support for migrants, they can also be very insular, with their own unique sets of loyalties, hierarchies, and subcultures. A strong

diaspora makes it easier to live comfortably in a new country without interacting with the larger society. It is therefore important to encourage leaders of local diasporas to participate in local initiatives. Information about the benefits of civic participation can help a community find its voice in local politics and society. In this way the immigrants will be able to take part fully in the social, cultural, and political life of their new country.

XENOPHOBIA AND THE PREVALENCE OF MIGRANT MYTHS

Perhaps the most striking similarity among the United States, Russia, and Ukraine that was noted during the meetings was the prevalence of anti-immigrant rhetoric. While the level of violence in Russia and in particular Ukraine is far beyond what has been seen in the United States, anti-immigrant sentiment remains a problem. Migrants are profiled by police and by local business owners, in particular those who are visible minorities. In all three countries migrants have faced issues of harassment and rental discrimination (either outright, as in Russia and Ukraine, or through selective enforcement of housing ordinances in some communities in the United States). As migrants move into areas that have previously had little to no immigration in Russia and the United States, fear and uncertainties arise that can lead to anti-immigrant aggression.

This fear is reinforced by the prevalence in the media of myths about the migrant community. In Ukraine, the media has suggested that immigrants carry disease, are uneducated, and bring crime and drugs to the country. Data collected on the migrants do not support these assertions—in fact, according to studies conducted by EEDI, migrants have not had serious health issues, they are highly educated, and none are unemployed.⁸ Russia has seen tensions rise between indigenous people and newcomers, fueled in part by the myth that the newcomers will attack the indigenous people as the economy shifts and they lose their employment.

The most prevalent myth in the United States is that an influx of migrants will ruin the economy and be a drain on the community. The experience in the Washington metro area after the 9/11 terrorist attacks was one example discussed at the meetings. As fear of terrorism grew, so did fear of immigrants, with rumors being spread about their connection to drugs and crime and their negative effect on the local economy. When these

communities started to crack down on undocumented migrants, many—documented and undocumented—moved to more welcoming areas. The counties that targeted migrants lost taxes and economic stimulus from that community and are now in worse condition economically than their neighbors who were more welcoming.

The participants in all three countries lamented the need to spend much time and effort pushing back against these myths with facts. In each country, the experts and their colleagues work with many levels of society to counteract xenophobic myths. In addition to studies and publications produced by scholars and non-profit organizations, non-profit leaders discuss these issues with the media, with policymakers, with law enforcement officials, and even with groups of young people in order to get the truth about the migrant community out into the mainstream.

Important to the discussion of xenophobia and hate speech is an understanding of the limitations on speech in each society. This was touched on only briefly in the discussions. Freedom of speech issues as they relate to hate speech have been debated over years in U.S. courts. The U.S. experts were thus able to identify a clear line in U.S. law between speech and action—hate speech is protected on its own, but when it progresses to violence against a group or individual it becomes a hate crime and can be prosecuted as such. In Russia and Ukraine the area is far murkier. In Russia there are an abundance of laws to restrict “extremist” activity with little differentiation between speech and action. Ukraine has a department whose jurisdiction is “ethnic crime,” which is defined as crime both by and against foreigners. Yet it remains difficult to prosecute hate crime as the prosecution needs to prove that race was a factor in the crime. It was apparent from the discussions that hate crime and its relation to freedom of speech warrants further study and legislation to protect the rights of victims in Russia and Ukraine.

THE INTERNATIONAL IMPACT OF U.S. POLICYMAKING

Perhaps the most interesting conclusion from the discussions—at least in terms of possible impact on many other areas of policymaking—was the effect that changes in U.S. policy seem to have on domestic policy debates around the world. It became clear to the participants that not only did the terrorist attack in New York on September 11 significantly alter immigrant

policy in the United States, but those policy alterations were felt in Russia and Ukraine as well.

The U.S. experts noted that the mindset for immigration reform in the United States was positive with the start of George W. Bush's presidency, but that this changed after 9/11. In an attempt to find terrorists, the government cast a wider net and began to use immigration law to try to find anyone who should not be in the United States. The anti-terrorist sentiment in the United States shifted, becoming increasingly anti-immigrant, and true immigration reform moved off the agenda. This shift was mirrored in Russia, where before 9/11 the focus was on adapting the concept of migration policy. After the shift in U.S. policy, Russian policymakers turned instead to enforcement of migration laws and targeting undocumented migrants. Similarly, when the United States shifted its border enforcement focus to a border fence between Mexico and the United States, many Russian policymakers took notice. There was much discussion of the benefits of a border fence and debate over whether a similar fence would work along Russia's borders.

The participants went on to suggest that the debate in Arizona may be used as a justification for cracking down on migrants and visible minorities in Ukraine, Russia, and elsewhere. They predicted that debate over the deeper issues discussed above will be pushed aside and that the tension in the United States on the issue will be played up in the media and in policy circles. The fact that a U.S. state has decided that federal laws are not sufficient to handle the migrant situation can be highlighted and used as a plea for a heavier hand in dealing with migrants in other countries.

In this sense, the United States has become a beacon in both a positive and negative light. The participants were clear that regardless of the outcome, the continuing debate over immigration policy in the United States will be watched closely and its implications will be felt far outside of U.S. borders.

CONCLUSIONS: THE BENEFITS OF CONTINUED DIALOGUE

The two days of dialogue at the Kennan Institute uncovered a wide range of immigration issues that are shared by the United States, Russia, and Ukraine despite historical, geographic, and cultural differences. Immigrants around the world choose to leave their homes and travel long distances to

make a life in a new country for many of the same reasons; countries that find themselves hosts to these immigrants must all find ways to accommodate them within their legal, political, social, and cultural systems. It is therefore helpful to keep the lines of communication open among policymakers, non-profit activists, and scholars dealing with these issues, regardless of country of origin.

The participants in the Kennan Institute meetings found that Russia and Ukraine could learn much from the U.S. experience—both its successes and its failures. Moreover, as all three countries move forward in the coming years, there are areas where sharing of best practices might be beneficial for all. Nonprofit work in Russia with youth promoting tolerance, for example, might be a paradigm that would be successful in Ukraine and the United States; programs in Ukraine that use sports to bring diverse communities together could also have success in other countries.

It was apparent that experts in migrant receiving countries like Russia and Ukraine are paying attention to the current debate in the United States over immigration. The participants lamented the tendency of extremist groups and even the mainstream media to simplify U.S. discussions on the issues. Continued dialogue at all levels within the communities working on immigration issues—from policymakers down to local activists—would go far to flesh out the wide variety of ideas expressed within the U.S. community on immigration issues and thus enhance the understanding of these very complicated debates.

Ukraine: Migration, Diversity and Transformation

MRIDULA GHOSH

Like the migratory consequences of transition from peasant to urban industrialized societies, the migration trends generated by transition from a centrally planned, totalitarian system to a democracy and market economy have had deep impact on the evolution of these societies. Population movements are not coping mechanisms in transition societies, but a new systemic reality, bringing the benefits of globalization, integration, and diversity. Based on research data, national and international documents, and policy responses,⁹ the present paper attempts to analyze the migration trends in Ukraine and the impact of existing policies, and finally, how Ukraine can best face these challenges and opportunities.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Fifty years after the end of World War II, the breakdown of the communist bloc in 1989 and the USSR in 1991 led to unprecedented population movements in Europe. However, in just two decades, West Europe successfully restored European unity, introduced a common immigration policy and migration management, and widened the EU in 2004.¹⁰ On the contrary, the non-EU states of East Europe, such as Russia, Ukraine, and the rest of the CIS, while still in transition, face strong competition from European economies, human capital deficits, and demand for immigrants vis-à-vis intensified difficulties in migrant integration.

Within the USSR, Ukraine shared common demographic trends with other Soviet republics – a strong centrally controlled “propiska” (registration) system restricted internal migration and banned external migration.¹¹ Internally, Ukraine always had more immigration than emigration, which affected the age and ethnic composition of the population: young people moved to Siberia and the far north of the USSR to work, pensioners from Russia and other parts of the USSR returned, replacing the number of

ethnic Ukrainians by ethnic Russians.¹² The 1989 Soviet Census showed that 44 percent of Russians living in Ukraine were born outside its borders. Clearly, statistics on ethnic affiliation have ambiguities. Some analysts pointed out that the 1989 census showed a larger number of Russians because of a fear of discrimination against those declaring themselves as non-Russians.¹³ Secondly, there are no criteria for determining the nationality of children of mixed marriages among Russians and Ukrainians.¹⁴ Despite this, Ukraine was home to a multitude of peoples in the Soviet era, including Greeks near the Azov Sea, Bulgarians in the Odesa region, Hungarians and Romanians in the Transcarpathia, Moldovans in Odesa and Chernivtsi regions, and Poles in Zhytomir, Khmelnytskyi and Lviv regions. The pattern of settlements of ethnic minorities form a semi-circle, girdling Ukraine from the east to south and then from the south to the west, with respective groups living near the borders.

Major population movements of pre-independence Ukraine included the ecological displacement and mass resettlement of the population (about 20,000) of the town Prypyat and areas near the Chernobyl Atomic power station after the accident in 1986, and relaxation of Soviet emigration policies for the Jews during “perestroika.” By 1990, the number of Jews migrating to Israel reached 76,500.¹⁵

The first years after independence saw a large-scale spontaneous arrival of people in Ukraine from instability within the CIS and in other parts of the world, such as the 5,000 Meskhetian Turks during 1989-1991; the formerly deported peoples from Crimea, including the Crimean Tatars, numbering about 250,000 during 1989-1995;¹⁶ and people from Afghanistan, Iraq, Chechnya, Tajikistan, Somalia, Congo, Ethiopia and others. Immigration was the strongest in 1992, with 538,200 people entering Ukraine, followed by a decline due to the economic crisis of the mid-1990's. The emerging new post-Soviet states limited migration by introducing border controls, national currencies, and laws on citizenships. By the late 1990s Ukraine's economic recovery slightly increased immigration. According to the State Committee for Statistics of Ukraine, out of over one million immigrants to Ukraine during 1991-1992,¹⁷ 984,000 came from former Soviet republics and 81,000 from Central European countries (mostly Soviet army personnel and their family members).¹⁸ In 2004, 38,600 people entered — 32,600 from post-Soviet states and 6,000 from other countries.¹⁹ Between 1991 and 2004, 2,229,870 individuals im-

migrated to Ukraine (over two million from post-Soviet countries and 164,000 from other states).²⁰ Thus, when UN Department for Economic and Social Affairs data for 2006 views Ukraine as the fourth after the U.S., Russia, and Germany, with maximum number of foreign born residents (6.7 million), it should be said that they are ex-USSR citizens,²¹ who never crossed international borders.

CURRENT TRENDS IN DEMOGRAPHY AND MIGRATION

Against the backdrop of these developments, throughout two decades, Ukraine suffered a steady population decline (from 52 million in 1989 to estimated 45.8 million as of May 1, 2010), low birth rates, low life expectancies, high mortality, emigration, and an aging population.²² Population during January – April 2010 alone declined by 74.6 thousand people, or 4.9 persons per 1000 people.²³ The natural decline in population constituted 80.5 thousand people, while the net increase in migration was 5.9 thousand.²⁴ In comparison with the period of January – April 2009, the natural decline in population constituted 7 thousand people or 5.8 to 5.3 persons per 1000 people.²⁵ Birth rates during January–April 2010 declined compared to that of the previous year from 11.0 to 10.6 live births per 1000 people. The migration rate during the period of January – April 2010 remained almost the same as that of last year – 0.4 persons per 1000 people.²⁶ Emigration continued. The first survey of migrant households by the State Committee for Statistics and the Ukrainian Center for Social Reform shows that, from the beginning of 2005 till June 1, 2008, 1.5 million Ukrainians were abroad. Of these, 1.3 million were labor migrants from the beginning of 2007 till June 1, 2008.²⁷ Table 1 shows the countries of destination of Ukrainian labor migrants and the regions of Ukraine they originate from.

TABLE 1: LOCATION OF LABOR MIGRANTS FROM VARIOUS REGIONS OF UKRAINE IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES, 2005-2008

	Total (thousand persons)	From various regions of Ukraine (% of total)				
		North	Center	South	East	West
Total number of labor migrants	1476.1	5.7	9.2	8.9	18.8	57.4
Location in foreign countries						
Russian Federation	710.3	6.4	10.8	12.1	32.8	37.9
Italy	198.3	7.0	2.0	3.2	6.5	81.3
Czech Republic	175.1	0.3	7.5	1.8	2.6	87.8
Poland	118.1	-	10.0	10.5	4.0	75.5
Hungary	47.0	-	-	-	-	100.0
Spain	40.0	10.3	3.3	-	8.4	78.0
Portugal	39.0	-	11.8	2.6	-	85.6
Other countries	148.3	13.6	17.0	14.6	12.5	42.3

Source: *External Labor Migration of the Population of Ukraine. (Zovnishnya trudova migratsia naseleण्या Ukrainy)* (Kyiv: Ukrainian Center for Social Reform, State Statistics Committee of Ukraine, 2009), p. 33 (in Ukrainian)


Thus, net immigration was insufficient to supplement the outflow. In addition, the number of registered foreigners constituted 748,037 persons for all years up to 2008, as estimated by the Ministry of the Interior of Ukraine.²⁸ 71,223 undocumented migrants were registered during 2003-2007 as per Ministry of the Interior of Ukraine data.²⁹ However, 2009 data released by the State Committee for Statistics show an increase in immigration: 32,917 people came to Ukraine and 19,470 emigrated from Ukraine, so the net rise in the number of immigrants amounted to 13,447 persons.³⁰ Table 2 shows data on the arrival of foreigners in Ukraine during 2009.

Table 2: Arrival of Foreigners in Ukraine, 2009

	Total number of foreigners arriving in Ukraine (not including transit passengers or staff of international transportation companies)	Purpose of travel						
		Service, Business, Diplomatic	Tourism	Private	Study	Employment	Immigration (permanent residence)	Cultural, Religious, Sports exchange, others
Total	20,798,342	741,878	1,350,245	18,348,128	103,501	31,812	8,628	214,150

Source: State Committee for Statistics of Ukraine (based on State Border Control Guards data); http://www.ukrstat.gov.ua/operativ/operativ2010/tyr/tyr_u/vig2009_u.htm

FIGURE 1: MIGRATION TRENDS IN UKRAINE, 1991-2006



Source: *Shadow Migration Flows and Their Influence on the Economic Security of the State (Aspect of Labor Migration)*, Analytical Policy Note (Kyiv: National Institute For Strategic Studies, Department Of Economic And Social Strategies, 2008) <http://www.niss.gov.ua/Monitor/Marrch/13.htm>

At first glance, the figures are impressive, but they do not suggest that all those who arrived “immigrated.” As per immigration rules, only private visa holders have the option of continued stay in Ukraine or to change their visa and residency type. Figure 1 (on the left) shows the migration trends in Ukraine during 1991-2006.

Recent upward trends in immigration show that during January-May 2010, 5,304 persons emigrated, while 12,472 immigrated to Ukraine, raising the number of immigrants by 7,168 persons.³¹ Analytical policy notes of the National Institute For Strategic Studies point out that for compensation of demographic decline and labor shortage (as per Ministry of Labor and Social Policy data), the immigration needs of Ukraine reach 340 thousand working age people annually.³²

INSUFFICIENT POLICY RESPONSES

Among policy responses, one of the first was the “Law On Citizenship” (1991), promoting repatriation of individuals with historic roots in Ukraine, but not necessarily ethnic Ukrainians. A new version of the law in 2001 further simplified citizenship procedures for this category of “repatriated” immigrants, by relaxing the time restriction and by expanding the list of categories for defining legitimate family ties beyond the traditional parents-grandparents option. Additionally, the government, the UN, and international donors jointly implemented large scale programs in the Crimea for the resettlement of formerly deported peoples. Among adherence to international treaties the most important are the membership of Ukraine of the Council of Europe, adoption of the “Law On Refugees” by the Ukrainian parliament in December 1993, reflecting the principles of the 1951 Geneva Convention, annulment of the death penalty, and many others.

In 1994, a national migration service within the State Committee for Nationalities and Migration (now the State Committee for Nationalities and Religion) was set up to implement policies of granting refugee status. In 2001, a revised Law on Refugees was adopted, which allowed Ukraine to join the 1951 Geneva Convention on Refugees and the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees in 2002. To cope with external migration, the document “Legal status of Foreigners in Ukraine” was adopted in February 4, 1994, which was a revised version of the “Legal Status of Foreigners in the USSR.” This underwent several amendments and addi-

tions until 2007. Immigration is regulated by the “Law On Immigration” (2001), which foresees annual quotas defined by the national government and a preference system for those with historical roots in Ukraine and highly qualified professionals. A robust anti-trafficking program and state programs to combat irregular migration has been in place, with units set up in all departments and regional offices of the Ministry of the Interior.

To support internal migration and labor market flexibility, the system of “propiska” was replaced by registration, and independent Ukraine continued paying mothers in order to encourage high birth rates, which was a policy tradition in the former USSR after World War II. This policy received a major boost after the 2004 “Orange Revolution.” According to the Ministry of Labor and Social Policy of Ukraine, as of January 1, 2011, payments made to mothers for the birth of the first child will be 22 times the minimum salary approved by the budget for that year, for the second child 45 times the minimum salary for that year and for the third and subsequent children 90 times the minimum salary.³³

Among other steps taken are visa free regimes for CIS, West Europe, North America & Japan as of May 1, 2005, expecting investment and tourism inflow. On June 18, 2007, Ukraine signed a readmission agreement with the EU, which came into force on January 1, 2010. This agreement envisages the return of irregular migrants from bordering EU states to Ukraine if it is proven that they have been in Ukraine prior to entering the EU. EU assistance in the amount of Euro 33 million was given to Ukraine to cope with the possible influx of returnees through construction of temporary shelters in Chernyiv, Volyn, and other border regions.

Thus, Ukraine’s migration policy responded to emerging needs and relied on enforcement rather than addressing long term strategic, systemic, and institutional issues: shrinking labor market, economic growth, demographic challenges, and human rights. For this reason, any research, study, surveys, and media reports, related to migration, human rights, diversity, labor flexibility and social integration reveal several problems. First, publicly available systematized data is insufficient or absent, such as needs assessment studies of immigrants, background information on their countries of origin etc. The second is the ambiguity and imperfect enforcement of the existing legislation, leading to low adherence to international commitments. Third, six institutions deal with the issue of immigration and migration, namely, the State Committee for Nationalities and Religion and

the Department of Registration of Physical Entities (*Viddil z hromadyanskoj informatsii i reestratsia fizychnikh osib* – acronym *VHIRFO* in Ukrainian, equivalent to “*OVIR*” *otdel vis i reestratsii* during USSR) of the Ministry of the Interior deal with registration of immigrants; the Ministry of the Interior and the Security Service deal with irregular and undocumented migrants; the State Border Guards Service is in charge of deportation of irregular migrants; while the Ministry of Labor and Social Policy issues work permits and quotas for immigrants. Each of these institutions work independently with low or no coordination among them. Due to this, there is an utter lack of cross-sector public discourse (academia, civil society, and policy makers), which is the fourth problem. Growing levels of xenophobia, anti-Semitism and racism as a result of these myopic, enforcement-tilted policies is the fifth dimension.

ATTEMPTS TO IMPROVE POLICIES

Since 2007, the international community, donors, communities, and NGOs have been promoting tolerance, training police, improving media ethics etc. in Ukraine. In April 2007, the “Diversity Initiative” network was set up at the initiative of the IOM, UNHCR, Amnesty International, EEDI and others. Together with state institutions, such as the Ministry of the Interior, Office of the Ombudsman, State Committee for Nationalities and Religion, various embassies and NGOs, today this network consists of more than fifty institutions and is a platform for dialog and exchange of information.³⁴ Network members have started using the terms “visible minorities” (*in Ukrainian – pomitny menshyny*) to refer to immigrants and minorities and “diversity” in their working and policy documents. The notion of diversity as “diversity capital” is yet to be used. Inspired by the Diversity Initiative network, the government of Ukraine had set up national level coordination with branches in all regions (oblasts) of Ukraine called the Inter-agency Working Group against Manifestations of Xenophobia, Anti-Semitism and Racism in 2008. Apart from that there are working groups within ministries.

During the second half of 2007, one of the first steps of the President of Ukraine was to set up units monitoring xenophobia, racism and anti-Semitism in the Ministry of the Interior, the Security Service of Ukraine, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine. In 2008–2009, the Ministry of

Interior, following OSCE recommendations, started reforming its statistical database to reflect hate crimes according to European Union standards. The Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine by its Resolution No. 643 dated June 24, 2009 set up the State Migration Service as an independent unified central executive body dealing with all issues of migration,³⁵ citizenship, immigration and registration of physical entities, for citizens and aliens alike, and granting or refusing refugee status. On November 5, 2009 an amendment to legislation on hate crime was made, introducing more severe fines and penal measures for perpetrators.³⁶

Despite all positive steps, in 2010 some of the measures mentioned above were reversed on the grounds of fiscal constraints – the department for the Monitoring of Human Rights in the Ministry of the Interior of Ukraine was dissolved in April 2010 and the Ethnic Crime Investigating Unit was dissolved in July 2010. The second step was the annulment of the State Migration Service by Resolution No. 559 of the Cabinet of Ministers dated July 7, 2010.³⁷ This has been criticized by the opposition, arguing that annulment of the State Migration Service would weaken the state in fighting “illegal migration,” which is attaining a threatening character for Ukraine.³⁸ Thus, a fundamental understanding of the benefits of migration for social development is still lacking among those in power or in the opposition. The thrust is still on enforcement, be it irregular migration or trafficking in people or racism and xenophobia.

THE STATE OF IMMIGRANTS IN UKRAINE

Conceptually, ethnic minorities in Ukraine usually mean those settled for many centuries or those internal migrants within the USSR or the CIS—the terms used in the immigration debate relate to “near-foreign” (CIS) and “far-foreign” (non-CIS) lands. Although many of the immigrants from non-CIS are citizens or permanent residents of Ukraine, till today, serious policy documents mention them as “migrants,” “foreign students who never went home,”³⁹ or refugees and asylum seekers, clearly referring to their transitory and temporary status. In public awareness, this definition is applied to all visible minorities, irrespective of their legal or economic status (permanent residents, citizens or stateless persons, students, tourists, asylum seekers, diplomats, or entrepreneurs) and they face such common problems as: insecurity and legal protection; inaction and/or lack of action on the part of the authorities on meeting their basic human rights.

The lack or absence of dialog with the local authorities has left the needs assessment of these minorities to NGOs, community groups, and international organizations. Two works of research in this context deserve special mention. The first pioneering one is a survey and needs assessment of Kyiv-based “non-traditional immigrants” by a team of experts from the Kennan Institute.⁴⁰ Another study was released in 2008 by the East European Development Institute (EEDI), a Ukraine-based NGO. This study covered a survey conducted in January-March 2008 of 1,200 immigrants, refugees, asylum seekers, and all other minorities between 14–59 years in Kyiv, Kharkiv, and Odesa; 697 foreign students in 11 cities of Ukraine; and in-depth interviews with 50 persons.⁴¹ For immigrants, the survey sites chosen were all the markets (Troeshchina, Shuliavka, Svyatoshino, Nivky, Obolon) in Kyiv, Barabashovo market in Kharkiv, and 7th Kilometer and Pryvoz markets in Odesa. In Vinnytsya, the study revealed a compactly residing community of Somali asylum seekers. The respondents represented 43, 38, and 34 countries of origin, residing respectively in Kyiv, Kharkiv, and Odesa. By the year of arrival, 35 percent of respondents came before 1991; only 3 percent of respondents arrived between the years of instability and the economic crisis of 1991–1995; 30 percent of the respondents came during 1995–2004; and 32 percent came after 2004. Of the respondents, the majority were engaged in small businesses or self employed (Kyiv 88 percent, Kharkiv 57 percent, and Odesa 85 percent). Undocumented persons constituted 41 percent of the respondents in Kyiv, 31 percent in Odesa, and 15 percent in Kharkiv.


Another Kennan Institute study used focus groups to highlight the problems of diversity capital and immigration in the cities of Kyiv, Kharkiv and Odesa.⁴² This research pointed to the same trends: “Similarities among the experiences of migrants in these three cities are more troubling. A distinct rise in fear of attack by young thugs, verbal abuse, and of rapacious police runs through the recent surveys and discussions presented here.”⁴³ It further refers to the fact that the diversity capital of Ukraine remains unutilized and “the benefits of the most dynamic forces dominating the world today: globalization, migration, and urbanization”⁴⁴ are thereby locked.

Findings of all the studies above show that the immigrants have limited or no access to health care, social security, state supported housing, integration or skills development programs. In addition, there is an utter lack of transparency in access to the labor market. In the case of the foreign stu-

dents, emphasis is placed on the commercial aspect of education and there is also lack of transparency in students' selection criteria. With no dependence on the state, the highly educated immigrants (65 percent in Kyiv, 57 percent in Kharkiv, and 44 percent in Odesa have higher education) constitute a healthy work force, contributing to state revenue in terms of taxes (57 percent in Kyiv, 77 percent in Kharkiv, and 70 percent in Odesa were self employed small businesses).⁴⁵ At the same time, the capacity to organize themselves into community-based organizations was shown by 83 percent of Kyiv-based respondents, followed by 90 percent of Kharkiv and 92 percent of Odesa respondents.⁴⁶ In contrast to this, immigrants in Russia today are mainly laborers. Only in the early 1990s in Russia, 20 percent of immigrants were people with university degrees and another 35 percent were skilled specialists with professional school diplomas.⁴⁷ Unlike Russia, where the migrant laborers have “ethnic niches” for specific sectors—Armenians for road construction, Azeris in market trade, Moldovans in apartment renovation, Ukrainians in cottage building⁴⁸ —in Ukraine, the immigrant-trades do not have ethnic profiles.

FIGURE 2

Are you aware of the rights and duties of people living in Ukraine?




Source: *Unheeded Voices – Issues of Immigration, Human Rights and Freedoms in Ukraine* (Kyiv: East European Development Institute, 2008)

All of the above research shows low awareness of human rights among the immigrants. They face abuse of power by the police and are perceived differently by the surrounding people.⁴⁹ The figures below⁵⁰ show that in Kharkiv and Odesa as well as in Kyiv, the most negatively perceived were the local authorities and police. The most positive perceptions were from next door neighbors and colleagues at work.

FIGURE 3


How do the following categories of people in general relate to you and members of your family? (Kharkiv)



Source: *Unheeded Voices – Issues of Immigration, Human Rights and Freedoms in Ukraine* (Kyiv: East European Development Institute, 2008)

FIGURE 4


How do the following categories of people in general relate to you and members of your family? (Odesa)



Source: *Unheeded Voices – Issues of Immigration, Human Rights and Freedoms in Ukraine* (Kyiv: East European Development Institute, 2008)

FIGURE 5

How do the following categories of people in general relate to you and members of your family? (Kyiv)



Source: *Unheeded Voices – Issues of Immigration, Human Rights and Freedoms in Ukraine* (Kyiv: East European Development Institute, 2008)

Levels of abuse of power by police towards immigrants and visible minorities is high, as told by 73 percent of respondents in Kharkiv, 71 percent in Odesa, and 85 percent in Kyiv.⁵¹ Most of these were related to document checks, which affect all groups, irrespective of visa and residency status in Ukraine, constituting 95 percent in Kharkiv, 93 percent in Odesa, and 96 percent in Kyiv.⁵²

To add to that, immigration is used in politics by all, especially the radical right and the left alike. Politicians manipulate demographic estimates and state that “by 2050 one third of Ukraine will be inhabited by Asians and Africans if the authorities do not do anything.”⁵³ The media and several analysts also spread myths by politicians that the immigrants are ready to work for low pay for extended work hours and therefore their massive onslaught will lead to “catastrophic consequences” for the living standards of Ukrainians; that immigrants’ employment is bad for the economy as they transfer a large part of their earning abroad; that they are the sources of “exotic” and infectious diseases in Ukraine; and that the visible minorities do not like to integrate and live compactly within their own communities⁵⁴ and are future terrorist hubs. Kennan Institute research data and EEDI survey results refute all these myths. The EEDI study showed that there is great interest and willingness among all immigrant respondents to learn Ukrainian and they are even ready to pay for it. Even students, who pay for education, are not given due access to Ukrainian cultural and language training. To cope with these myriad problems, several proposals and recommendations are set forth by each of the above mentioned studies with regard to immigrants, refugees, and asylum seekers.

CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

A shift from the old paradigm is essential to achieve real reform in this area. Analysis shows that the Soviet concept of restricting migration is still a legacy in the CIS. Firstly, in Russia and Ukraine, the migration debate uses modifications of Soviet era terms – the “near-foreign” and “far-foreign” lands, meaning not geographic proximities, but CIS and non-CIS countries, somewhat reminiscent of the former “socialist brother nations” and non-socialist countries. Secondly, the institution of propiska, although abolished in its Soviet form, has been retained by the system of compulsory temporary registration, which the law enforcement agencies reckon very

much as the same old propiska. Thirdly, centralized control over “rospodil” or distribution of the work force within the country for purposes of a planned economy has been replaced by a system of immigration quotas, the implementation of which is neither public nor transparent. Fourthly, the administrative powers of the President are still the major driving force for change. So, a change in the Presidency affects people, institutions, and policies, thus impacting continuity.

Thus, we can distinguish four periods in the post-Soviet Russian and Ukrainian migration policies: 1) 1991-1995 – a period of adjustment migration, when the government had to develop an urgent legislation in response to migration, primarily for the sake of refugees and forced migrants; 2) 1996-2001 – further development of policies shifted to dominating economic migrations and streamlining migration within CIS; 3) 2002-2005 – inflows of irregular migration led to tough-enforcement based policy that, in turn, provoked further growth of irregular migration; 4) 2006-2008 – migration policy towards CIS citizens shifted towards liberalization, the pilot project on amnesty and regularization of undocumented migrants in Russia was not widened to other cities and talks of amnesty for undocumented migrants in Ukraine was never translated into action; 5) 2008 onwards – tendencies towards more control, despite rhetoric of reform, due to the economic crisis and budget deficit.

NEWER CONCEPTS

At par with the waning of the old concepts, the concept of “visible minorities” and “diversity capital” should be introduced into Ukrainian policy circles. This would help widen the immigration debate beyond CIS-based immigrants, help in the study of other experiences, update statistics and increase data availability. Possible research on designing the upcoming National Census 2011 will also be necessary for getting accurate data.

In addition, these concepts should be included in the mainstream human rights debate. For example, in official documents, exclusive reference is made to the word “citizen” (“hromadyanin/ka”), without mentioning aliens and stateless persons. Transition to a more inclusive parlance will largely be helped by using the concepts “diversity capital” and “visible minorities.”

Although in general, Ukrainian legislation in respect to national minorities meets international standards, it still remains general and declarative, and Ukraine cannot always guarantee the commitments it took upon itself with regard to rights of the minorities, their political representation etc. Guaranteeing these rights is only possible at the grassroots and local level. Herein, the introduction of the concept of “diversity capital” as the social, economic, and cultural potential of various ethnic communities residing in a particular place is extremely relevant. Research of “diversity capital” of specific sites, cities, and inhabitations will show the level of access to relevant institutions and realization of all rights by peoples of various ethnic and national identities—citizens and foreigners alike.

Another concept to be introduced is the “right to the city” by all who reside in it, providing success to the cities as centers where the potential of diversity capital has been fully realized. In the context of Ukraine’s co-hosting of the European Football Championship in 2012 (“Euro-2012”), tapping the best available “diversity capital” within the four major host cities (Donetsk, Kyiv, Lviv and Kharkiv) offers a unique opportunity for Ukraine.

ECONOMIC IMPERATIVE

To sustain the development and economic growth of Ukraine, potential benefits of immigration to Ukraine may be factored into long term demographic projections and development planning. Policy research on the economic benefits of migration reform must be based on several scenarios and mathematical models, ranging from regularization of undocumented immigrants, streamlining legal immigration, or introduction of an enforcement-only approach wherein all undocumented immigrants are deported.

Contrarily, there is evidence from origin countries in the post-Soviet territory that a certain part of migrant households tend to use the income from labor migration as start-up capital for small-scale businesses while the experience and the ‘market skills’ gained by migrants from overseas employment reinforces their business activity. In Ukraine, 60 percent of migrant households in which family members are engaged in business activity in Ukraine received their initial capital from cross-border circular trips or temporary labor migration.⁵⁵ In that case, revenue to the budget increases. Similarly, regularization of undocumented migrants will also bring them out of the shadow economy and add to the revenue of the state budget in

terms of taxes. That, in its turn, will be used for financing the pension system and social payments of the budget. Thus the scenario of regularization of undocumented migrants and a consistent policy of legal immigration will bring about an optimum level of sustainable economic growth for Ukraine. Not only revenue from foreign students' tuition fees (in 2006-2007 it constituted USD 80 million and has increased since then) but also their diversity capital should also be used for development of Ukraine.

FROM A CULTURE OF FEAR AND IGNORANCE TO THAT OF CONFIDENCE AND TRUST

The effectiveness of penal laws and actions to control migration should not be overestimated. While in the case of ordinary crime, detection or interception by the police terminates the illegal state, the seizure of an undocumented migrant, his/her fining or arrest, does not as such terminate his/her "illegal" stay in Ukraine. This distinction must be borne in mind in enforcement-based approaches.

Migration policy should not be restricted only to migration management (border control), combating trafficking in people ("illegal migration") and/or receiving very little number of refugees every year. Interaction of local authorities, academia, and the civil society (including immigrants), and policies of inclusion and integration – awarding of work permits giving more equal and fairer access to health and education and community development – are to be considered at the local level. Thus, emphasis on the economic imperative should also honor the human rights dimension through a newer system of relocation of people, immigration policy etc., something that the EU states and the U.S. have undergone.

Design of migration policy is a matter of political and public debate based on knowledge of the subject, something that the Ukrainian society and policy-makers do not possess. The call for stimulating birth rates and the return of compatriots to cope with the current demographic crisis in Russia and Ukraine is unrealistic. Nor in the current political structure are there any political parties or movements capable of articulating migration issues. There are remarkable similarities in the migration policies of Ukraine and Russia, despite the differences in the nature and scale of problems. There are aspects that deserve to be common among the two neighboring states, sharing open, porous, and large territorial borders. However,

unlike Russia, Ukraine is still not the highest migrant recipient state of the region, but has the potential to become one. Unlike Russia, it can make use of its vibrant media, civil society, and rising small and medium businesses for a multi-sector dialog that would safeguard migration policy from populist political claims and shape an appropriate migration management mode acceptable to all. Furthermore, Ukraine may also look into the experiences of the East European countries—Bulgaria, Romania, Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic and Slovakia—which also had a transition from controlled migration to open migration policy within the European Union.

Thus, Ukraine's migration policy should be strategic, aimed at integration of diverse people into one community through the development of a civic nationhood, where accepting *the situation of diversity* will be a *normal way of life*.

Migration Process, Tolerance and Migration Policy in Contemporary Russia⁵⁵

MARYA S. ROZANOVA

This interdisciplinary observation on migration processes and migration policy development in contemporary Russia consists of two main parts. The first is devoted to a description of the migration processes, federal migration policy and the problem of xenophobia in contemporary Russia. The second is focused on regional migration policy and the problem of migrant integration (illustrated through a case study of St. Petersburg).

PART 1. THE MIGRATION PROCESS AND MIGRATION POLICY IN CONTEMPORARY RUSSIA

a) Migration Trends and the Complexity of Ethnic Composition

Contemporary international migration is one of the most challenging and important phenomena taking place in Russia today. According to UN data, Russia ranks second after the U.S. as a top migrant receiving country.⁵⁷

Migration is vitally important to Russia due to demographic decline – the Russian population will decrease from 145.2 million people (Census, 2002⁵⁸) to approximately 100 million people by the year 2050 if the current rate of natural population decline continues.⁵⁹

Russia faced modern international migration for the first time only after the collapse of the USSR in 1991. However, at the very beginning of the functioning of the new Russian state, it had to accept large flows of refugees (mainly ethnic Russians). In addition, approximately after the mid 90s – the beginning of 2000s the new state was confronted with difficulties of regulating migration flows to Russia that were dramatically increasing and growing more complex. It was the beginning of the period of modern labor migration.

This situation was quite challenging – for the host society that had not experienced wide labor migration from the former USSR republics and foreign non-CIS countries, as well as for the post-Soviet government that

did not have a contemporary migration policy concept or the mechanisms for labor migration regulation.

The uniqueness of the historically asymmetrical federal administrative-territorial divisions and the complexity of the ethnic and religious composition of the population of Russia contain a potential for conflict in the ethnic, cultural, religious and political spheres. According to the 2002 census, 160 ethnic groups and about 30 sub-ethnic groups live in Russia (the proportion of ethnic Russians is almost 115.9 million, or 79.8 percent of the total population).⁶⁰ Geographically, the various ethnic groups are unevenly distributed - in addition to multinational entities such as Moscow and St. Petersburg, there are national republics named in honor of the titular nations (indigenous peoples who have traditionally lived in those areas), some of which are almost homogeneous, like the Republics of Chechnya and Ingushetia,⁶¹ while others, like Tatarstan, Komi, the Republic of Buryatia, etc., are multiethnic.

Despite the long-term coexistence of different ethnic groups within the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union, the modern post-Soviet state is facing new challenges in the field of ethnopolitics.⁶²

Russia is a multinational country, but that does not mean it is diverse. Indeed, it can partially be likened with the situation in the U.S., where in 2005 about 67 percent of immigrants lived in just 6 states (27 percent of them in California alone⁶³) and one can find nowadays many areas in the U.S. that have not experienced immigrants moving in⁶⁴ nor do they have the readiness or willingness and infrastructure to integrate them. Historically, much of the population of Russia did not experience a multiethnic and multicultural environment even within the framework of the multinational country. Many representatives of host communities did not gain intercultural communication skills, so many of them now have difficulty adapting to the new reality.

In addition to the complexities associated with the development of internal ethno-cultural composition in Russia, the fast growth of transnational migrant flows created multiple areas of social tension. Since the mid-2000's, over 2/3 of migrants coming into Russia are from the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).

**TABLE 1. OFFICIAL STATISTICS ON FOREIGN LABOR FORCE
IN RUSSIA, 2000-2008***

(NUMBER OF ISSUED WORK PERMITS, THOUSANDS)

	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008*
Total	213.3	283.7	359.5	377.9	460.4	702.5	1,014.0	1,717.1	2,157.0
Including:									
From CIS states:	106.4	148.6	204.6	186.5	221.2	343.7	537.7	1,152.8	1,596.0
Azerbaijan	3.3	4.4	15.0	6.0	9.8	17.3	28.3	57.6	69.6
Armenia	5.5	8.5	12.6	10.0	17.0	26.2	39.8	73.4	95.8
Georgia	5.2	4.9	6.8	3.2	3.8	4.3	4.9	4.7	3.8
Kazakhstan	2.9	3.6	7.6	4.0	4.2	4.1	4.9	7.6	8.6
Kyrgyzstan	0.9	1.7	6.4	4.8	8.0	16.2	33.0	109.6	160.2
Moldova	11.9	13.3	40.7	21.5	22.7	30.6	51.0	93.7	117.3
Tajikistan	6.2	10.0	16.8	13.6	23.3	52.6	98.7	250.2	347.5
Turkmenistan	0.2	0.1	7.0	0.2	0.3	1.5	0.7	2.1	2.8
Uzbekistan	6.1	10.1	15.5	14.6	24.1	49.0	105.1	344.6	563.2
Ukraine	64.1	91.9	61.0	102.6	108.6	141.8	171.3	209.3	227.1
From non-CIS states:	106.9	135.1	154.9	197.4	238.5	358.8	476.3	563.8	560.4
China	26.2	38.6	38.7	72.8	94.1	160.6	210.8	228.8	241.0
North Korea	8.7	9.9	12.7	13.2	14.7	20.1	27.7	32.6	31.7
Vietnam	13.3	20.1	26.7	35.2	41.8	55.6	69.1	79.8	76.1
Turkey	17.8	20.9	15.4	37.9	48.0	73.7	101.4	131.2	121.1


*Data for January-September 2008

Source: Irina Ivakhnyuk, "The Russian Migration Policy and Its Impact on Human Development: The Historical Perspective," *UNDP Human Development Reports Research Paper 2009/14* (April 2009)

The countries of Central Asia (especially Uzbekistan and Tajikistan) are now among the leading migrant sending countries (in 2008-2009 they provided close to 70 percent of all the migrants from the CIS). The religious composition of migrants is also changing—approximately 41 percent of migrants are Muslim or come from Muslim countries. Seventy percent of migrant workers come from small towns and villages, rather than large cities and capitals, and the educational level of migrants is rapidly decreasing, with half of the newcomers having no professional education. Most migrants are leaving behind poverty (84 percent of migrants in Russia are classified as poor (38 percent) and very poor (46 percent) before leaving for work in Russia); and the percentage of migrants who speak Russian at a basic level is declining (9 percent of migrants speak almost no Russian and 28 percent speak poor Russian).⁶⁵

Among the typical fields for migrants' occupation are the so-called “3D jobs” – those that are dirty, dangerous, and demeaning. Mainly these are low-skilled public-sector services (such as construction work, field work, dry cleaning, grocery store services, washing dishes at restaurants, etc.). Another large field is care and maintenance in the private sphere (such as cleaning and domestic work in private households, care for children and the elderly, etc.). In addition, some migrants find employment in the shadow sectors of the economy.⁶⁶

FIGURE 1. OFFICIAL STATISTICS ON LABOR MIGRANT EMPLOYMENT



Source: Ж.А. Зайончковская и Г.С. Витковская, ред., *Постсоветские трансформации: отражение в миграциях* (Москва: Центр миграционных исследований, Институт народнохозяйственного прогнозирования РАН, ИТ «АдамантЪ», 2009), p. 34.

Thus, the migrants typically occupy positions that locals do not want. Also, it can be said that there is a division of labor based on the country of origin of migrants (this refers to migrant professional qualifications) and migrant status.⁶⁷ Another important factor here is labor segregation. The new labor migrant groups very often lack communication with host society members. Unfortunately, one of the most effective channels for the socialization and integration of adults through the labor sphere does not really work now.

The reaction towards the tremendous changes in the post-Soviet era in the sphere of ethnic composition and social stratification was accompanied by a rising level of xenophobia⁶⁸ corresponding to the growth of the 'ethnic identity' among different ethnic groups, including the ethnic Russian majority.⁶⁹ In Russia in the 90s most titular nation republics were in the active stage of the process that is known as a "parade of sovereignties."⁷⁰ The weakening of the federal center and its inability to mobilize civil concord and solidarity naturally led to the willingness of a number of regional political leaders to construct their own regional ethnic identities. In many republics the search for ethnic identity was accompanied by increasing ethnocentrism and "Russophobia" in the form of "nationalist movements of titular peoples of the republics of Russia."⁷¹ As a reaction to complex issues, in the late 1990's anxiety among the ethnic Russians increased, and the formula of "Russia for the Russians" has become relevant (See Table 2).

TABLE 2. SURVEY RESULTS 1998-2009 (LEVADA-CENTER)

What is your attitude towards the idea of “Russia for the Russians”? (%)									
Possible answers	Aug. 1998	Nov. 2001	Aug. 2003	Dec. 2004	June 2005	Nov. 2006	Aug. 2007	Oct. 2008	Nov. 2009
I support it, it is overdue	15	16	21	16	19	15	14	15	18
It would be good to implement, but within reasonable limits	31	42	32	37	39	35	41	42	36
Negative, it is real fascism	32	20	18	25	23	26	27	25	32
I'm not interested	10	11	7	12	9	12	11	12	9
Never thought about it	5	6	14	5	7	8	-	-	-
No answer	7	5	8	4	3	4	7	6	5

Source: <http://www.levada.ru/press/2009120702.html>

Besides the complex internal interethnic relations in many receiving regions (with the emphasis on the people from North Caucasus⁷²), the rapid increase of mass labor migration in recent years led to a prevailing negative attitude towards these newcomers, in particular those from the Transcaucasian region (Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia) These transnational migrants are the least-welcomed migrants, migrants from the post-Soviet states of Central Asia occupy second place (See Table 3) Since the beginning of the economic crisis at the end of 2008, the targets

(mainly in the public sphere) of this negative attitude have become labor migrants,⁷³ and, in connection with this, one can speak of an increasing trend towards xenophobia not just in the form of ethnophobia, but also migrant-phobia.⁷⁴

TABLE 3: SURVEY RESULTS, 2005-2010

(RUSSIAN PUBLIC OPINION RESEARCH CENTER)

Please name the nations and peoples, the representatives of which cause you to have a sense of irritation or resentment? (Open question, any number of responses, %)				
	2005	2006	2009	2010
Caucasian (Azerbaijanians, Armenians, Georgians, Dagestanians, Ingush, Chechens, etc.)	23	29	29	29
The peoples of Central Asia (Tajiks, Uzbeks, Kazakhs)	4	2	6	6
Chinese	2	2	3	3
Jews	2	1	2	3
Gypsies	3	3	4	2
Asians	1	1	1	2
Arabs, Muslims	2	0	1	2
Americans	1	1	3	2
Ukrainians	1	2	3	2
Balts (Latvians, Lithuanians and Estonians)	3	2	3	1
Europeans (English, German)	1	0	2	1
Tatars	1	0	1	1
Africans	1	0	1	0
Moldovans	1	0	1	0
Turks	1	0	1	0
There are no such peoples	34	41	55	56
other	0	0	3	2
Hard to answer	30	20	8	9

Source: http://wciom.ru/arkhiv/tematicheskii-arkhiv/item/single/13515.html?no_cache=1&cHash=3a09c9a3bb

As a result, there was a growing social demand in major receiving regions to put high restrictions on migration flows - both inter-regional and international (See Table 4).⁷⁵

TABLE 4. SURVEY RESULTS 2002-2009 (LEVADA-CENTER)

What policy do you think the Russian Government should follow in relation to migrants?(%)							
Possible answers	Dec. 2002	Aug. 2004	Oct. 2005	Aug. 2006	Oct. 2007	Oct. 2008	Nov. 2009
It should limit the influx of migrants	45	54	59	52	57	52	61
It should not put administrative barriers in the way of immigrants and should try to use it for the benefit of Russia	44	38	36	39	32	35	30
No answer	11	8	5	9	11	13	9

Source: <http://www.levada.ru/press/2009120704.html>

b) The Transformation of Russian Migration Policy

As a relatively new phenomenon in Russia, migration policy is still developing. First, it is because migration is a dynamically changing process closely connected to the global economy and geopolitics; and second, because of changes in the political and public opinion spheres.

For the last two decades the concept of migration policy and its basic mechanisms were dramatically changed. In the early 1990s migration regulation was based on a highly liberal, laissez-faire approach. The govern-

ment professed noninterference with the scope and structure of migration inflows and out-flows; in 1992, a Bishkek Agreement on visa-free entry for the Commonwealth of Independent States citizens to the territories of the member countries was signed by the CIS governments. The new Law on Citizenship (Law of the RSFSR No. 1948-I “On RSFSR Citizenship”) was adopted in 1991. Compared with the generally accepted norms of foreign law in respect to citizenship, this Law was extremely liberal, especially in the sphere of obtaining Russian citizenship for former citizens of the USSR.

In the period of 2001–2005 there was a turn towards a primarily restrictive policy. After 9/11/2001 rising security concerns worldwide played a very significant role. This led toward a restrictionist policy in Russia, and uncontrolled irregular migration flows were considered a national security threat. In 2002 the Concept of Migration Processes Management in the Russian Federation was adopted with a core idea of fighting irregular migration. This became an official guideline for the purposes of Russian migration policy.⁷⁶ Also in 2002, a Federal Law on Russian Federation Citizenship⁷⁷ based on a restrictive concept of citizenship was approved. The legislation on citizenship can be interpreted as restrictive based on the following criteria: 1) in a comparative context with the previous Law on Citizenship of 1991; 2) analyzing the principle of *jus sanguinis*,⁷⁸ embedded in the law in the context of the critical demographic situation and the mass labor migration in modern Russia.

The 2002 Law approved the principle of *jus sanguinis* as a condition of acquisition of citizenship; required a waiver of other citizenship when applying for Russian citizenship; adopted a new requirement of command of the Russian language; required candidates to reside for five years without a break on the territory of the Russian Federation from the day when a residence permit was issued to the day when a candidate files a naturalization application; and abolished the practice of automatic reinstatement of nationality. The new law expanded the list of justified reasons for rejecting applications for citizenship and also approved the grounds for denial of surrender of Russian citizenship. However, the new law took into account the geopolitical realities and historical context and provided a simplified manner for acquisition citizenship for large categories of persons, primarily for the citizens of the former Soviet republics.

The Federal Law “On the Legal Status of Foreign Citizens on the Territory of the Russian Federation” (No. 115-FZ) – the major law in the migration sphere – was adopted in 2002. The core idea of the Law was to establish control over migrant flows. The Law included significant regulations for labor migrants, including those from CIS countries: foreign citizens arriving to Russia have to register within three days at their place of residence; accommodation (residence) has to be found before registration; temporary stay is limited to three months; temporary residence is possible within the administrative area where the permit was issued; employment for foreign citizens, temporary or permanently staying in Russia, is possible only with a valid work permit, etc.⁷⁹ The law also established quotas for labor migrants from non-CIS countries.⁸⁰ But all the restrictions on migration by means of administrative limitations, penalizations, and deportations intended to fight irregular migration in this period “in turn, provoked a further growth of irregular migration.”⁸¹

The further liberalization of migration policy towards CIS citizens began in 2006-2007. The changes led to simplified procedures of registration and employment—especially for migrants from CIS countries, who were granted entry without a visa, a notification-based registration, and simplified work permit procedures.⁸² One consequence of these liberal measures was the noticeably increased level of legalization of temporary migrant workers. In 2006 approximately 52 percent of migrants had an official registration, and 15-25 percent had a work permit; in 2007 – about 85 percent had an official registration, and about 75 percent had a work permit.⁸³ According to the investigation of Elena Turukanova, the proportion of legal migrants in 2007 rose sharply to 25-30 percent (in comparison with 10 percent at the beginning of the 2000s).⁸⁴

The essence of the liberal measures is presented briefly in the Table 5.

TABLE 5. MIGRATION REGULATIONS BEFORE AND AFTER 2007

Migration regulations before 2007	Migration regulations in 2007
Residence Registration of Migrants	
Process requiring authorization	Process requiring notification
Through militia authorization	Through notification of the host; authorization is not required
Requirement to register at the place of permanent residence	Requirement to register at the place of business, intermediary organizations, etc.
Registration in militia	Submitting a notice to the FMS or mailing via post-office
Complicated procedure, it requires: - Written confirmation of all the people permanently residing in a rented house and their personal appearance with the migrant at the militia office; - Compliance with the per capita standard for a residential area (in some regions in accordance with local legislation)	Simplified procedure, according to which a migrant need only find a host and send notification
Work permits (migrants from CIS-countries)	
Permission to hire a migrant is issued to the employer	Migrant receives the work permit (employment card) personally; The employer notifies the migration service on the hiring of a foreign worker
Long multi-stage procedure	Simplified procedure
Quotas	
Only for migrants who require visas	Separately for visa and visa-free workers

Source: А.Г. Вишнеvский и С.Н. Бобылев, ред., Доклад о развитии человеческого потенциала в Российской Федерации за 2008 г. (Москва: «Сити-Принт», 2009), с. 22 (Annual report for UNDP).

In reaction to the high unemployment level during the economic crisis a political movement towards more restrictions started in 2008–2009. This new period of migration policy was characterized by an increase in administrative regulations (mainly reduced quota of work permits) and complications for CIS citizens.⁸⁵

A new period of searching for priorities in migration policy began in 2009. It is closely connected with the attempts of the government to build up the economy based on innovations and advanced technologies, which requires the ability to attract highly qualified foreign specialists. These specialists are primarily needed for Skolkovo Innovation Centre⁸⁶ – an ultra-modern science community for the development and commercialization of new technologies. The new Law that came into force on July 1, 2010⁸⁷ contains very beneficial rules for the employment of highly qualified foreign specialists in Russia, including reduced salary taxes (13 percent), and no necessity to obtain a quota for work permits and visa invitations, to post vacancy information their the Employment Center, to apply for corporate permit to hire, or to prove qualifications or education credentials to the immigration officials. Also, under the new legislative initiative these specialists and their family members are able to apply for permanent residency permits almost immediately.

Another positive initiative of the Federal Migration Service is the approved new patent system⁸⁸. Potentially it is a very good possibility for legalization of migrants employed by individuals in the private sector (as nannies, caretakers, gardeners, etc.), and could be an effective measure for reducing irregular labor migration.

The adoption of this Law can open the “Golden Door” and widen the path towards legalization of millions of migrants. If this new legal regime is properly “introduced, Russia will move from having one of the least welcoming to one of the most positive immigration systems in the world.”⁸⁹

The Russian immigration system is currently based on the controversial combination of a liberal approach (a visa-free regime for migrants from CIS that make up of over 75 percent of all migration) and still many administrative restrictions that strategically do not promote or guarantee successful economic and social integration of migrants or prevent their exclusion.

As shown by a 2006 IOM survey, only 20 percent of migrants are seasonal (they stay in Russia for no more than six months of the year); more than half of migrant workers are focused on a long-term stay; and a third of

them are willing to be naturalized in Russia or to obtain residency.⁹⁰ This data confirms the general trend of global migration, in which temporary labor migration leads to immigration. However, in spite of the desire of migrants to acquire legal status and naturalization, there is still a problem with the integration of migrants into Russian society. At the theoretical level the contemporary Russian migration concept can be described as “immigration as contract.”⁹¹ The example of immigration as contract is close to the statement “play by our rules or leave.” Migrants can stay in Russia as long as they abide the terms. Should the terms be violated or changed the government can deport the migrants at any time. In addition, there are no effective programs that would admit migrant workers on a permanent basis and provide a path to naturalization and might lead to legal immigration.

To improve this situation, the Russian Government could implement the elements of the model “immigration as transition.”⁹² This model can be defined as an inclusive concept of immigration and citizenship that would provide effective legalization for irregular migrants who de-facto have settled permanently in Russia and encourage steps towards the final stage of naturalization –obtaining citizenship. By providing national citizenship or the status of permanent resident, a new strategy of inclusion could promote deeper social cooperation and political participation of migrants, as well as create incentives for civic engagement. Thus, “immigrants who become naturalized citizens are likely to become much more integrated into their new country than those who remain noncitizen residents, [...] naturalized citizens will tend to have better command of the national language, to experience more loyalty to the new country, and [...] enjoy the right not to be deported.”⁹³ Also citizenship is an institution that can play a significant role in creating a supra-ethnic identity⁹⁴ in the highly diverse and multicultural Russian society because “citizenship denotes the members of an intergenerational project, who are committed to honoring a past and promoting a better future for generations to follow.”⁹⁵ This way, it is not only in the migrants’ interest and initiative to obtain legal status, and citizenship in the long-term, but also in the strong interest of Russia as a receiving state. This interest should be strengthened by pro-active corresponding measures to encourage legalization for the newcomers.

As most migrant receiving countries with democratic regimes, Russia faces a typical dilemma between public opinion, which is mostly negative towards newcomers, and the desirable humane migration policy. This leads

to a paradox: “in terms of issues dealing with immigration and citizenship, a non-democratic, elite-driven process may lead to more liberal policy outcomes, whereas genuine popular involvement can result in more restrictive laws and institutions.”⁹⁶ To decrease this gap and avoid far-right political trends, mechanisms to restrain anti-migratory moods are necessary. Rather than focus on censorship and additional restrictions on freedom of speech, positive programs on migrant integration and tolerance for both host community members and migrants should be implemented.

The first official step in this direction at the federal level was made on June 25, 2010 when the special Department on Integration Assistance was organized within the Federal Migration Service. It is presupposed that Departments on Integration will be organized in all the regions of Russia. The concept of the new Department and its main directions are still forming. For now, the following tasks can be highlighted: monitoring of tolerance toward foreign migrants in Russia; implementation of the principles of tolerance in the everyday life of Russian society; prevention of various forms of discrimination and xenophobia; organization of complex measures aimed at establishing interaction with the representatives of ethnic communities (Diaspora) and migrant networks in Russia in order to promote integration; attraction of foreign students to study in Russian universities and secondary schools; elaboration and implementation of criteria for evaluating foreign applicants seeking work in Russia on the basis of a point system; establishment and maintenance of working contacts with the representatives of migration authorities and members of diplomatic institutions as well as other officials of migrant-sending countries in order to organize interaction and localization of possible negative processes in the sphere of immigration; investigation of the foreign experience in integrating labor migrants, the introduction of the principles of tolerance, combating xenophobia and discrimination, etc.

Besides that, in order to decrease inter-ethnic tensions in Russia different programs on tolerance were adopted in many regions that can be considered first steps towards the migrant inclusion. These programs are implemented at the regional level because of the uniqueness of Russia's federative composition. The migration system is highly centralized, but, to be effective, the migration policy at the regional level should reflect the diversity of different regions and be both comprehensive and multifaceted. The most productive program on promoting the tolerance in Russia started in St. Petersburg, and will be discussed below.

PART 2. REGIONAL MIGRATION POLICY AND PROMOTION OF TOLERANCE (A CASE STUDY OF ST. PETERSBURG)

St. Petersburg is one of largest cities in Europe, and it faces the major problems that accompany the development of most European cities with a multimillion-person population – a high level of mortality, a low birth rate, a high proportion of older people in the population, and growing economic labor needs which result in large migrant flows.

In accordance with the provisions of the Russian Federal Law “On the Legal Status of Foreign Citizens in Russia” (2002), the regional authorities of Russia are very limited in implementing their own projects in the field of migration policy.⁹⁷ Regions cannot independently determine the number of migrants they will accept and cannot change the legal status of migrants, etc. At the same time, regional authorities may provide suggestions to the federal government on the liberalization of immigration laws and migrant quota levels. It also is within their jurisdiction to decide the important task of their migration policy, take measures to combat xenophobia in the host society, contribute to the social adaptation and integration of migrants, and provide programs on teaching the basics of Russian language – both for migrants and migrants’ children.

The rapid changes in the ethno-cultural composition of the city have provoked high levels of intolerance.⁹⁸ In order to reduce the prevalence of ethno-cultural tensions and harmonize inter-ethnic and intercultural relations, the government of St. Petersburg approved a Government Decree on the program called “Tolerance,” (“The program on the harmonization of inter-ethnic and intercultural relations, the prevention of xenophobia, and the strengthening of tolerance in St. Petersburg, 2006-2010” adopted on 11 July 2006⁹⁹). This program is an example of the implementation of regional migration policy.

The program “Tolerance” determines government policy in the sphere of interethnic relations in St. Petersburg. It is aimed at consolidating the multiethnic population of St. Petersburg on the basis of a supra-ethnic Russian identity and the establishment of principle of tolerance in all areas of intercultural and interethnic collaboration. The main slogan of the program is “St. Petersburg unites people.”¹⁰⁰ Conceptually, the program is based on the principles of multiculturalism. The dominance of the mul-

ticultural model in the program confirms the fact that the target groups of the program do not really include migrants.¹⁰¹ The program is mostly aimed at providing a range of activities that promote a higher level of tolerance among the indigenous people in the city (with a focus on youth as the most flexible and, at the same time, in practice the most radical group). This approach is partially reasonable because the way the host society welcomes migrants determines their future behavior, while the latter, in turn, affects how a society meets new migrants.¹⁰²

The work within the Program was highly intensive – in 2007 it incorporated about 3,000 actions, in 2008 –more than 4,500, in 2009 over 4,000 events were organized. Most of these activities were cultural, social and scientific events (festivals, exhibitions, concerts, book publications, scientific conferences, round tables, posters on the streets of St. Petersburg, etc.).¹⁰³ Since 2007, lessons and workshops on tolerance have been taught in schools, and since 2009, in kindergarten classes. There are also courses organized for journalists, school teachers, university lecturers, kindergarten teachers, and government officials.

Consequently, although the Program does not pay proper attention to the basic mechanisms for the adaptation of migrants and their children, as a first experience with regional migration policy, it had a lot of new achievements and successful results. To be fair, and despite all the criticism that the Program deserves, it was a first big step towards a process on migrant inclusion.¹⁰⁴ The second logical step is migrant integration. Currently the St. Petersburg government is working on a new program on harmonization of ethno-cultural relations in St. Petersburg where the target group will be not only the host society but also the migrants themselves and their children.

As it turns out the harmonization of ethno-cultural relations is always a two-way process and depends on the positive attempts of host society members and newcomers. A lot of migrants themselves also contribute to low levels of integration by self-segregation. A large number of migrants have no experience living in a multiethnic environment because many come from more traditional, closed societies, or rural areas, where acceptance of alternative lifestyles, as well as respect for other cultures, is not always taught. Consequently, these groups keep to themselves within the city and contribute to the polarization of society. The proliferation of migrant networks is new for St. Petersburg society due to the fact that

these migrant networks are gradually transforming into new “Diasporas” and quasi-ethnic enclaves through (self) segregation, labor isolation, and a lack of social adaptation and integration into the host society. The marginal position of the new migrants contributes to their greater internal cohesion based mainly on ethnic, religious, and linguistic bases. In St. Petersburg, income inequality and social stratification have led to a tendency towards sustainable “micro ghettos” of labor migrants/immigrants. This process cannot proceed too quickly because of specific features of St. Petersburg – multi-story buildings and the low mobility of the population make the creation of isolated ethnic ghettos not yet possible.¹⁰⁵ However, due to certain low-status areas with cheaper housing, there are signs of a convergence on the map that reflects housing cost (a sign of residential segregation) and the resettlement of labor migrants/immigrants in those locations.

In practice, despite the efforts to improve the situation with migrants in St. Petersburg, this task of the integration of migrants can be achieved only in combination with efficient government migration policy at both the federal and regional levels. Without the federal government solving the problem of unauthorized migration/immigration and providing wider paths towards naturalization, regional governments cannot manage integration through organization of educational and Russian language courses, provision of extra financial support to schools teaching children of migrants, and other basic measures for naturalization preparation that will help to prevent the (self) segregation of new migrants.

Summary: The contemporary migration system, despite its liberal trend and new legal initiatives, contains many administrative restrictions. It is not based on positive concepts such as migrant inclusion, and does not promote or guarantee the successful economic and social integration of migrants or prevent their exclusion. As a result, without an efficient federal migration policy and high level of irregular migration, the regions in Russia are not capable of implementing productive models of migration policy either. Strategically, significant changes are required at the federal level, along with the combined effect of several factors: a stabilization of official migration policy; the improvement of the Russian immigration system by adoption of the elements of the inclusive model of migrants/immigrants and alteration of the concept of citizenship; empowerment of

regions to address issues of migration policy by implementing the programs of positive actions towards migrants; protection of migrants' basic rights; implementation of programs on tolerance (or other attempts to overcome xenophobia); and emphasis on the mechanisms for integration of migrants/immigrants and their children.

Notes

- ¹ *Trends in the Total Migrant Stock: The 2005 Revision* (United Nations, POP/DB/MIG/Rev.2005), data in digital form, 2006; *International Migration 2009* (United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division), 2009.
- ² For more information on the participants, please see Biographies.
- ³ United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2009). *World Population Prospects: The 2008 Revision, Highlights*, Working Paper No. ESA/P/WP.210: http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/wpp2008/wpp2008_highlights.pdf
- ⁴ Olena Braichevska, Halyna Volosiuk, Olena Malynovska, Yaroslav Pylynskyi, Nancy Popson, and Blair A. Ruble, *Nontraditional Immigrants in Kyiv* (Washington, DC: WWICS, 2004); *Unheeded Voices—Issues of Immigration, Human Rights, and Freedoms in Ukraine* (Kyiv: ICF “Sphera Publishers,” 2008).
- ⁵ Elena Tyuryukanova, “Trudovyye Migranty v Moskve: ‘Vtoroie’ Obshchestvo,” in: Zh. A. Zaiionchkovska, ed., *Immigranty v Moskve* (Moscow: Kennan Institute/Tri Kvadrata, 2009). <http://www.demoscope.ru/weekly/2009/0389/analit01.php>
- ⁶ Raul Hinojosa-Ojeda, *Raising the Floor for American Workers: The Economic Benefits of Comprehensive Immigration Reform* (Washington, DC: Immigration Policy Center/Center for American Progress, January 7, 2010).
- ⁷ For example, the Neighborhood College in Arlington County, VA.
- ⁸ *Unheeded Voices—Issues of Immigration, Human Rights, and Freedoms in Ukraine* (Kyiv: ICF “Sphera Publishers,” 2008).
- ⁹ Agnieszka Weinar and Anna Kicingier, (eds.), “State of the Art of the Migration Research in Poland,” *IMISCOE Working Paper*, no. 19 (November 2007): 10.
- ¹⁰ *Ibid.*
- ¹¹ Irina Ivakhnyuk, “The Russian Migration Policy and Its Impact on Human Development: The Historical Perspective,” *UNDP Human Development Research Paper* 2009/14 (April 2009): 9, 10.
- ¹² *Ukraine Human Development Report* (Kyiv: UNDP Ukraine, 1996), p. 80.
- ¹³ *Ibid.*
- ¹⁴ *Ibid.*
- ¹⁵ O. Osaulenko, ed. *Migration of the Population of Ukraine according to the Data of 2001 Ukrainian National Census* (Kyiv: The State Committee for

- Statistics of Ukraine, 2004), p. 322 (*in Ukrainian*).
- 16 *Ukraine Human Development Report* (1996), p. 82.
- 17 Osaulenko, p. 322.
- 18 Ibid.
- 19 Ibid.
- 20 Ibid.
- 21 Blair A. Ruble, “Establishing a New Right to the Ukrainian City,” *The Eurasian Migration Papers*, no. 1 (2008): 5.
- 22 www.ukrstat.gov.ua
- 23 Ibid.
- 24 Ibid.
- 25 www.ukrstat.gov.ua
- 26 Ibid.
- 27 *External Labor Migration of the Population of Ukraine (Zovnishnya trudova migratsia naselelnya Ukrainy)* (Kyiv: Ukrainian Center for Social Reform, State Statistics Committee of Ukraine, 2009), p. 25 (*in Ukrainian*).
- 28 *Unheeded Voices – Issues of Immigration, Human Rights and Freedoms in Ukraine. Report by East European Development Institute*. (Kyiv: ICF Sphera Publishers, 2008), p.15.
- 29 Ibid. p.16.
- 30 http://www.ukrstat.gov.ua/operativ/operativ2009/ds/mr/mr_u/mr1209_u.html
- 31 http://www.ukrstat.gov.ua/operativ/operativ2010/ds/mr/mr_u/mr0510_u.html
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- 40 O. Braichevska, H. Volosiuk, O. Malynovska, Y. Pylynskiyi, N. Popson, and B. Ruble, *Nontraditional Immigrants in Kyiv* (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2004).
- 41 *Unheeded Voices – Issues of Immigration, Human Rights and Freedoms in Ukraine*.
- 42 Ruble, “Establishing a New Right to the Ukrainian City.”
- 43 *Ibid.* p. 23.
- 44 *Ibid.* p. 24.
- 45 *Unheeded Voices – Issues of Immigration, Human Rights and Freedoms in Ukraine*.
- 46 *Ibid.*
- 47 Ivakhnyuk, p. 21.
- 48 *Ibid.* p. 50.
- 49 *Unheeded Voices – Issues of Immigration, Human Rights and Freedoms in Ukraine*, p. 63.
- 50 *Ibid.* pp. 64–65.
- 51 *Unheeded Voices – Issues of Immigration, Human Rights and Freedoms in Ukraine*, pp. 67–68.
- 52 *Ibid.* pp. 68–69.
- 53 “Till the Year 2050, Half of Ukraine’s Population Will Consist of Immigrants,” News posting from SPAS (Social Patriotic Assembly of the Slavs): <http://una.org.ua/do-2050-roku-polovinu-zhiteliv-ukra%D1%97ni-stanovitimut-immigranti/>
See also: Oleh Tyahnybok, “Instead of an Ukrainian Army – A Horde of Illegals!?” Comment posted on November 3, 2009: <http://www.tyahnybok.info/dopysy/dopysy/012573/>
- 54 Valentin Krysachenko, Head of the Department of Ethno-politics, National Institute of Strategic Studies, “Ukraine in Demographic Interaction of Civilization,” Analytical Paper 2007-02-09, *Ukrainsky Svit*: http://www.uvkr.com.ua/ua/analytics/ukr_v_demograf_vzajemodiji.html
- 55 Ivakhnyuk, p. 73.
- 56 I would like to express my deep appreciation and gratitude to Blair A. Ruble (Kennan Institute, Woodrow Wilson Center), Mary Giovagnoli (Immigration Policy Center), Michele L. Waslin (Immigration Policy Center), Sonya Michel (United States Studies, Woodrow Wilson Center), J. Walter Tejada (Arlington County Board), and Mridula Ghosh (East European Development Institute) for extremely helpful consultations and advice. Finally, I would like to thank Nancy Popson for extremely helpful comments and valid work on editing this paper.

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⁵⁷ The approximate number of immigrants in Russia is about 13.2 million people. It is close to 9 percent of the total population of the Russian Federation. See: *Report on International Migration 2009* (United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (www.unmigration.org), (Accessed on June 23, 2010).

⁵⁸ In accordance with data of the All-Russian Population Census of 2002, See: <http://www.perepis2002.ru/content.html?id=11&docid=10715289081460> (Russian), http://www.gks.ru/bgd/regl/b09_12/IssWWW.exe/stg/d01/05-01.htm (English) (accessed on July 27, 2010).

⁵⁹ This number is approximate. For example, the U.S. Census Bureau provides more optimistic results of about 118.2 million people by 2050 in Russia; the United Nations provides the number of about 116.97 million people by 2050 (medium variant); the most pessimistic population forecast of about 80 million was provided by the Russian Academy of Science. See: *Global Population Profile: 2002*, (U.S. Census Bureau, 2002) <http://www.census.gov/ipc/prod/wp02/tabA-04.pdf> (Accessed July 27, 2010); *World Population Prospects: The 2008 Revision* (United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, 2009) http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/wpp2008/wpp2008_highlights.pdf (Accessed May 29, 2010); А.Г. Вишневский, отв. ред., *Население России. 2002. Десятый ежегодный демографический доклад* (Москва: Институт народнохозяйственного прогнозирования РАН, Центр демографии и экологии человека, 2004) с. 187-188.

Also, it is important to say that according to the medium variant of the forecast of the Federal State Statistics Service the labor shortages for the period 2009–2025 will reach approximately 14 million people, while data for 2006 puts the total number of people employed in the Russian economy at about 67 million. See: А.Г. Вишневский и С.Н. Бобылев, ред., *Доклад о развитии человеческого потенциала в Российской Федерации за 2008 г.* (Москва: «Сити-Принт», 2009), с. 22 (*Annual report for UNDP*); Ж. А. Зайончковская, “Иммиграция: альтернативы

нет,” in В.И. Мукомель и Э.А. Паин, ред., *Нужны ли иммигранты российскому обществу?* (Москва: Фонд «Либеральная миссия», 2006), с. 10.

⁶⁰ In accordance with data of The All-Russian Population Census of 2002. See: <http://www.perepis2002.ru/content.html?id=11&docid=10715289081463> (Russian), (Accessed on July 27, 2010).

⁶¹ Since 1991 in these republics there was a massive outflow of the ethnic Russians and other non-titular ethnic groups mainly to the Central and Northern parts of the country. For instance, in accordance with data of the All-Russian Population Census of 1989 and 2002, in this short period of time in the Chechen Republic the number of ethnic Russians decreased from 25 percent to 4 percent, and the number of other ethnic groups decreased from 9 to 3 percent of the total population of the republic; in the Republic of Ingushetia the number of ethnic Russians decreased from 13 to 1 percent, and the number of other ethnic groups – from 2 to 1 percent of the total population of the republic. This situation upsets the established ethno-political and ethno-cultural balance by reducing cultural and ethnic diversity in these regions. See: С.Акопов, М. Розанова, *Идентичности в эпоху глобальных миграций* (Санкт-Петербург: ДЕАН, 2010), сс. 152-156.

⁶² After the Soviet Union collapsed, an ethnic and cultural transformation took place in different regions and the previous balance changed. This process of change is divided into two trends. The first trend can be seen in regions like the North Caucasus, the Volga region, and Siberia, and can be described as a trend towards monoethnicization (or homogenization) of the population. The second trend can be seen in places like St. Petersburg, Moscow, the Astrakhan Region, Krasnodar and Stavropol, Kaliningrad regions, and others, and is associated with an intense rise of ethno-cultural diversity.

⁶³ See: Elzbieta Gozdziaк, *New Immigrants, Changing Communities: Best Practices for a Better America* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2008), p. 7.

⁶⁴ William H. Frey, “The Diversity Myth,” *American Demographics* 20, no. 6 (June 1998): 38.

⁶⁵ Елена Тюрюканова, “Трудовые мигранты в Москве: ‘второе’ общество,” in Ж. А. Зайончковская, *Иммигранты в Москве* (Москва: Институт Кеннана/» Три квадрата», 2009) <http://www.demoscope.ru/weekly/2009/0389/analit01.php>

⁶⁶ See: Elena Tyuryukanova, “Labor Migration into Russia (Трудовая миграция в Россию),” *Демоскоп Weekly* № 315 – 316 (January 1 – 20,

2008) (See: http://www.demoscope.ru/weekly/2008/0315/tema01.php#_FNR_1) (Accessed on July 27, 2010).

⁶⁷ В.А. Михайлов, К.В. Калинин, А.Ф. Дашдамиров, и С.А. Пистрякова, Деятельность органов государственной власти и местного самоуправления по осуществлению адаптации и интеграции этнических мигрантов: Современные миграционные процессы: состояние, проблемы, опыт государственного регулирования (Ростов-на-Дону: Северо-Кавказская академия государственной службы, 2008), сс. 240-241.

⁶⁸ The highest probability for xenophobia and ethno-national extremism relates primarily to those regions that are in a transitional stage or in a crisis phase of development.

There are two main causes of xenophobia in the Russian society:

- 1) the rapid and dramatic transformations in the socio-economic sphere (the period of disintegration of the USSR was accompanied by a sharp decline in the quality of life of most citizens, as well as a sharp stratification and fragmentation of society that led to the emergence of a marginalized population. As St. Petersburg expert in ethno-sociology Zinaida V. Sikevich pointed out, “an archaic sense of ‘blood’ unity in the group naturally becomes almost the only self-worth, which alone can provide psychological stability in difficult social circumstances (because the main function of ethnic identity is protective);” against this background, there was a systematic lowering of the quality of primary, secondary and higher education that usually affects the level of tolerance in general). See: А. А. Козлов, Экстремизм в среде петербургской молодежи: анализ и проблемы профилактики (СПб: ХИМИЗДАТ, 2003), с. 124 and 118, respectively.
 - 2) Transformations in the political sphere and the crash of the supra-ethnic political identity and shared common values (the growth of xenophobia/ethnophobia in Russia was also due to the fracturing of the whole socio-political value system during the collapse of the USSR. The Soviet value system has undergone not just renovation but destruction in a few years. One of the basic Soviet values – supra-ethnic identity — vested in the concept of “friendship of nations” (“Druzhiba narodov”) was also destroyed.
- ⁶⁹ Increased anxiety among the ethnic Russians – who quantitatively are the most dominant group – is not easy to explain. For the first time in the long period of history of the Russian state, ethnic Russians have become the dominant ethnic group. In 2002, ethnic Russians made up almost 80% of the population. In contrast, in 1989 the share of Russians

in the Soviet Union did not exceed 51%, and in the Russian Empire the Russians were 44.7 % of the population in 1897, and 43.4% in 1719. See: Светлана Пистрякова Толерантность- не просто терпимость Российская миграция, №3-4 (2009), с. 43.

- ⁷⁰ On August 6, 1990, Boris Yeltsin made a statement in Kazan to the leaders of the titular republics: “Take as much sovereignty as you can swallow.” From August to October of that year the “parade of sovereignties” began: there were Declarations on State Sovereignty of the Karelian ASSR, the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, the Udmurt Republic and the Yakut-Sakha Soviet Socialist Republic, Chukotka Autonomous Okrug, the Buryat Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, the Bashkir Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, Kalmyk Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, Mari Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, Chuvash Autonomous Republic, Yamalo-Nenets and the Gorno-Altai autonomous districts of the Irkutsk region, etc.).
- ⁷¹ See: Э.А. Паин, Распутица: Полемиические размышления о предопределенности пути России (Москва: Российская политическая энциклопедия, 2009), с.140-141.
- ⁷² According to the poll of the Russian Public Opinion Research Center (VCIOM) in May 2010, respondents explained this negative attitude because of a threat of terrorist attacks (13 percent); because these internal migrants strongly intend to preserve their more traditional lifestyle and do not want to follow the traditions and customs of host community (11 percent of respondents); and because they look differently and have different manners (6 percent). (See: http://wciom.ru/arkhiv/tematicheskii-arkhiv/item/single/13515.html?no_cache=1&cHash=3a09c9a3bb) (Accessed on July 29, 2010)
- ⁷³ But it should be pointed out that not all the labor migrants are the objects of negative attitudes. For example, the migrants from Ukraine and Belarus that do not belong to “visible minorities” are more or less welcome in most migrant receiving regions of Russia. The explanation here is that among the major reasons for the negative attitude towards migrants, the respondents pointed out not competition in the labor market (only 4 percent of the respondents that did not like the migrants said that they took the jobs of locals), but rather other reasons are almost the same as with internal migrants – different behavior codes, strong intention to preserve their own traditions, and also lower cultural and educational level (See: http://wciom.ru/arkhiv/tematicheskii-arkhiv/item/single/13515.html?no_cache=1&cHash=3a09c9a3bb) (Accessed on July 29, 2010)

- 74 Indicators of the anti-migration crisis in 2008–2009 included authorized public actions (also actively promoted by the All-Russian public organization The Young Guard of the political party United Russia), pickets, sticker campaigns, and mass media alarmist publications against both legal and undocumented labor migrants.
- 75 According to the polls of Russian Public Opinion Research Center (VCIOM) in June 2008, Russian citizens are concerned about migration. About 55 percent of respondents believe that the government should limit the influx of foreign unskilled labor by tightening visa entry and registration requirements; another 26 percent believe that the government should prevent the high concentration of migrants in the cities and regions of Russia that might lead to isolated “ethnic ghettos”; 14 percent of respondents support the legalization of migrants and speak in support of increasing the legal protection for migrants, while only 13 percent support the improvement of labor conditions for migrants (See: [http://wciom.ru/arkhiv/tematicheskii-arkhiv/item/single/10319.html?no_cache=1 & cHash = e052ea171f](http://wciom.ru/arkhiv/tematicheskii-arkhiv/item/single/10319.html?no_cache=1&cHash=e052ea171f)) (Accessed on July 27, 2010).
- 76 See: Irina Ivakhnyuk, “The Russian Migration Policy and Its Impact on Human Development: The Historical Perspective,” UNDP Human Development Reports Research Paper 2009/14 (April 2009): 35–37.
- 77 Law №. 62-FZ of May 31, 2002 “On Russian Federation Citizenship” (See: <http://www.legislationline.org/documents/action/popup/id/4189>) (Accessed on July 24, 2010).
- 78 The *Jus sanguinis* principle is the principle that a person’s nationality at birth is the same as that of his natural parents (as opposed to *Jus soli*, which is the principle that a person’s nationality at birth is determined by the place of birth).
- 79 The law also included the following obligations (in addition to those noted above): “temporary residence permit holders and permanent residence permit holders must re-register every year in a territorial unit of the Ministry of Interior; ... on entering the Russian Federation, at the border passport control, a foreign citizen has to fill out a migrant card; the card is to be returned to a border guard officer.” Ivakhnyuk, p. 39–40.
- 80 The number of permits for temporary residence in Russia for foreign citizen was limited by a quota. For 2003, a quota of 530,000 invitations for foreign citizens to enter the Russian Federation was approved and because it was not fulfilled for 2004 it was reduced to 213,000 foreign workers. See: Ivakhnyuk, p. 40.
- 81 Before the economic crisis, the estimates of the number of irregular labor migrants in Russia provided by different experts and organizations

were very diverse –from 3–4 million up to 5–7 million and even more. See: Ivakhnyuk, p. 26, 43.

- ⁸² In this period the Government approved new immigration laws: Federal Law No. 110-FZ of July 18, 2006 on Amendments to the 2002 Federal Law on Legal Status of Foreign Citizens on the Territory of the Russian Federation, and Federal Law No. 109-FZ of July 18, 2006 on Registration of Foreign Citizens and Stateless Persons in the Russian Federation. The new features for CIS migrants included: “the term of permanent stay for foreign citizen was increased to 180 days (twice as much as earlier); the quota of permits for temporary residence to visa-free foreign citizen was cancelled; a new procedure was introduced providing issuance of the Russian work permit personally to the foreign citizen rather than to the employer while the employer can hire any foreign citizen with a work permit; a 10-day approval term for work permit applications by foreign citizens; a simplified registration procedure at the current address (rather than earlier requirement to register at the place of permanent residence) was introduced; but the registration procedure at the place of residence is maintained with somewhat simpler rules (the notion of a “host of the foreign citizen” was introduced, making a more flexible link between the residence in Russia and actual accommodations)...” (Ivakhnyuk, p. 55.) For 2007, Russia set a quota of 6 million work permits to foreign citizens from CIS countries.
- ⁸³ See: Новое иммиграционное законодательство в России: правоприменительная практика <http://www.migrocenter.ru/news/news045.php> (Accessed on July 29, 2010).
- ⁸⁴ Тюрюканова, “Трудовые мигранты”.
- ⁸⁵ Against 6 million for 2007, the quota was reduced to 1.8 million in 2008 but it was totally fulfilled within the first half of the year and was increased up to 3.4 million in Autumn 2008; for 2009 the quota was about 2 million, and in 2010 – about 1 million 300 thousand and another 600 thousand permits were provided as a reserve.
- ⁸⁶ For more information see: <http://eng.kremlin.ru/news/294> (Accessed on August 12, 2010)
- ⁸⁷ The amendments to the Federal Law “On the Legal Status of Foreign Citizens on the Territory of the Russian Federation” (No. 86-FZ) on May 19, 2010.
- ⁸⁸ The amendments to the Federal Law “On the Legal Status of Foreign Citizens on the Territory of the Russian Federation” (No. 86-FZ) on May 19, 2010.
- ⁸⁹ For more details see: <http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/>

- Alert_Russia_190510/\$FILE/Alert_Russia_190510.pdf (Accessed on July 29, 2010)
- ⁹⁰ Тюрюканова, “Трудовые мигранты”.
- ⁹¹ This is one the models of immigration, as presented by Hiroshi Motomura in the book *Americans in Waiting: The Lost Story of Immigration and Citizenship in the United States* (Oxford; New York, 2006), pp. 9–10.
- ⁹² *Ibid.*, pp. 11–14.
- ⁹³ Marc Morje Howard, “The Politics of Immigration and Citizenship in Europe,” in Carol M. Swain, ed., *Debating Immigration* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 243.
- ⁹⁴ See: Акопов и Розанова, сс. 218–221.
- ⁹⁵ T. Alexander Aleinikoff and Douglas Klusmeyer, *Citizenship Policies for an Age of Migration* (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2002), p.3
- ⁹⁶ Howard, p. 253.
- ⁹⁷ Federal Law “On the Legal Status of Foreign Citizens in Russia,” Article 3, “Legislation on the Legal Status of Foreign Citizens in Russia.” Legislation on the legal status of foreign citizens in Russia is based on the Constitution and consists of this Federal Law and other federal laws. In addition, the legal status of foreign citizens in Russia is determined by international treaties.
- ⁹⁸ According to the Russian Public Opinion Research Center (VCIOM) in 2008 in St. Petersburg, 75 percent of residents had negative attitudes towards migrants (See: http://wciom.ru/arkhiv/tematicheskii-arkhiv/item/single/10274.html?no_cache=1&cHash=cc908bf94a) (Accessed on July 27, 2010)
- ⁹⁹ See: Official web-site of the Program: <http://spbtolerance.ru/archives/790#>; <http://spbtolerance.ru/wp-content/uploads/2010/06/программа.doc> (Accessed on July 27, 2010)
- ¹⁰⁰ See speech by A.V. Prokhorenko, Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations of St. Petersburg, at a meeting of the Government of St. Petersburg (2 March 2010). Available at http://www.kvs.spb.ru/?p=fakti_i_tcifri_1075.
- ¹⁰¹ See: Акопов и Розанова, сс. 261–263.
- ¹⁰² See: Alexander Aleinikoff and Rubén Rumbaut, “Terms of Belonging: Are Models of Membership Self-Fulfilling Prophecies?” *Georgetown Immigration Law Journal* 13, Issue 1 (1998).
- ¹⁰³ For example, youth festivals and competitions at all the secondary schools of St. Petersburg called “The Culture of Peace for the Cultural Capital

of Russia;” “Firework of Cultures;” a round table “Saint Petersburg is Our Common Home;” exhibitions called “Multiethnic Petersburg;” “St. Petersburg Multiethnic Family;” “World Without Borders;” festival of international students “Golden Autumn;” mini-football tournaments among the youth ethno-cultural associations of St. Petersburg; conferences called “Tolerance, This Applies to Everyone” and “Tolerance and Intolerance in Contemporary Society: Perspectives and Reality;” the publication of “An Ethnic Calendar for St. Petersburg” including various ethnic celebrations; social commercials on the streets on cultural diversity and tolerance; special courses and workshops on tolerance for the youth in the libraries and museums of St. Petersburg; publication of the Alphabet of Tolerance; etc. A targeted approach through small group work in St. Petersburg on xenophobia and conflict prevention also took place. For example, the Round Table “Interethnic Dialogue: the Role of Youth” (October 19, 2007) was organized in St. Petersburg by the Center for Civil, Social, Scientific and Cultural Initiatives “STRATEGIA” for government officials, professors, experts, and the leaders of non-government social-political youth organizations (including pro-extremist organizations) and ethno-cultural organizations. The Round Table was organized with financial support from the Committee for Youth Policy and Cooperation with Public Organizations of the St. Petersburg Government within the program “Tolerance.” (See: www.org-strategia.org ; http://www.org-strategia.org/projects_03.html) (Accessed on July 29, 2010).

¹⁰⁴ Also in 2009 the Program was awarded an honorary mention from the UNESCO-MADANDJEET prize for promotion of tolerance and nonviolence.

¹⁰⁵ See: О. Вендина, Мигранты в Москве: грозит ли столице этническая сегрегация? (Москва, Центр миграционных исследований, Институт географии РАН, 2005), с. 57.

The Eurasian Migration Papers

The *Eurasian Migration Papers* is a series of reports—produced jointly by the Kennan Institute and the Comparative Urban Studies Program of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, D.C.—that examines migrant communities in Eurasian cities. The series features the results of Wilson Center-supported research examining the lives of migrants in contemporary Russia, Ukraine, and surrounding states.

According to the United Nations, the number of people living in countries other than their birth is approaching 200 million worldwide, up from 80 million three decades ago. While the scale of migration has grown, the nature of international population movements and patterns of migrant adaptation have changed. Migration movements have become part of the permanent fabric of modern society, and bring with them questions of economic, political, and social significance.

Migration is an especially pressing issue for the countries of Eurasia, in which large-scale international migration is a relatively new phenomenon. While the collapse of the Soviet state brought with it expanded freedom of movement, it also resulted in increased restrictions at many destination points for migrants, providing new administrative challenges. Some citizens are driven to leave their places of origin because of conflict, political ambiguity, or economic deprivation. As the region continues its integration into global economic networks, it becomes an increasingly desirable transit route and destination for migrants from Southeast Asia, Africa, and the Middle East.

The Kennan Institute has sponsored a number of activities—such as lectures, workshops, working groups, seminars, and survey research among different migrant communities, native-born populations, and officials—intended to explore the social and official reaction to the presence of migrants within Eurasian countries and to trace the evolving response of migrant communities to life in their new homes. The *Eurasian Migration Papers* publication series seeks to make the results of these efforts widely available to specialists, policymakers, and citizens in Russia, Ukraine, the United States, and elsewhere.

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Previous volumes of the Eurasian Migration Papers include:

- *No.1: Establishing a New Right to the Ukrainian City*, Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2008, by Blair A. Ruble
- *No.2: Translational Migration to New Regional Centers: Policy Challenges, Practices, and the Migrant Experience*, Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2009, edited by Lauren E. Herzer, Sarah Dixon Klump, and Mary Elizabeth Malinkin
- *No.3: Chinese Migration to Russia: Missed Opportunities*, Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2009, by Maria Repnikova and Harley Balzer
- *No.4: Remittances, Recession... Returning Home? The Effects of the 2008 Economic Crisis on Tajik Migrant Labor in Moscow*, Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2010, by Hilary Hemmings

In addition to the *Eurasian Migration Papers*, please also see the Kennan Institute's previous publications concerning migration and tolerance in Ukraine (available for download in PDF format):

- *Netradytsiini Mihranty u Kyievi* [Nontraditional Immigrants in Kyiv], Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2004, by Olena Braichevska, Halyna Volosiuk, Olena Malynovska, Yaroslav Pylynskyi, Nancy E. Popson, and Blair A. Ruble. [Available in English and Ukrainian; no longer available in printed form]
- *Mihratsiia i tolerantnist v Ukrainy* [Migration and Tolerance in Ukraine], Kyiv: Stylos Press, 2007, edited by Yaroslav Pylynskyi. [Ukrainian; no longer available in printed form]
- *Aktualno: Tolerantnist!* [Current Issue: Tolerance!], Kyiv: Stylos Press, 2008, edited by Yaroslav Pylynskyi. [Ukrainian]

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Panelist Biographies

Dr. Mridula Ghosh hails from Kolkata, India. After graduating in Political Science from Presidency College, Kolkata, she pursued her studies in international relations and foreign policy, in which she holds a Ph.D. With a wide expertise on East Europe and countries of the former Soviet Union and fluency in Russian, Ukrainian and other East European languages, her area of expertise include consultancy, policy advice on development, management and strategic research of media in transitional countries, human rights and social protection, human development, health care reform, environment, and poverty alleviation. She has managed large-scale projects and programs at the highest diplomatic and governmental levels during her long stay in East Europe for the past 20 years, including UN and UNDP programs. Currently, she is the Board chair of the East European Development Institute, a Ukraine-based international NGO that has received several awards of honor from the Ukrainian government and international organizations for excellence in projects. Author and editor of many UNDP publications, she has also authored 3 monographs and several articles, analytical policy papers. She has been an OSCE election observer in many national level elections in new democracies of East Europe. Her other interests are development of the Tagore Center, a cultural project of the EEDI, translation of poetry of Russia, Ukraine and East Europe into Bengali, her mother tongue, creative writing, journalism and active participation in all activities of the Indian community. She remains an Indian citizen.

Mary Giovagnoli is the Director of the Immigration Policy Center. Prior to joining the IPC, Ms. Giovagnoli served as Senior Director of Policy for the National Immigration Forum and practiced law as an attorney with the Departments of Justice and Homeland Security—serving first as a trial attorney and associate general counsel with INS, and, following the creation of the Department of Homeland Security, as an associate chief counsel for United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS). Ms. Giovagnoli specialized in asylum and refugee law, focusing on the impact of general immigration laws on asylees. In 2005, Ms. Giovagnoli became

the senior advisor to the Director of Congressional Relations at USCIS. She was also awarded a Congressional Fellowship from USCIS to serve for a year in Senator Edward M. Kennedy's office where she worked on comprehensive immigration reform and refugee issues. Ms. Giovagnoli attended Drake University, graduating summa cum laude with a major in speech communication. She received a master's degree in rhetoric and completed additional graduate coursework in rhetoric at the University of Wisconsin, before receiving a J.D. from the University of Wisconsin Law School. She spent more than ten years teaching public speaking, argumentation and debate, and parliamentary procedure while pursuing her education.

Sonya Michel is Director of United States Studies at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. In addition, she is Professor of History and Director of the Miller Center for Historical Studies, University of Maryland, College Park; Professor of History and Director of Women's and Gender Studies at the University of Illinois at Chicago and at Urbana-Champaign; founding co-editor of the journal *Social Politics: International Studies in Gender, State and Society* (published by Oxford University Press); member, International Advisory Board for the Nordic Centre of Excellence Project on the Nordic Welfare State: Historical Foundations and Future Challenges. She received her M.A. and Ph.D. in American Civilization from Brown University and her B.A. in Philosophy from Barnard College. Recent publications include: *Civil Society and Gender Justice: Historical and Comparative Perspectives*, co-edited with Karen Hagemann and Gunilla Budde (Berghahn Books, 2008); *Child Care at the Crossroads: Gender and Welfare State Restructuring*, co-edited with Rianne Mahon (Routledge, 2002); and *Children's Interests / Mothers' Rights: The Shaping of America's Child Care Policy* (Yale University Press, 1999).

Nancy Popson was formerly Senior Associate (2003–2005) and Deputy Director (1999–2003) at the Kennan Institute of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. She coordinated the Institute's program on Ukraine from 1996–2005. She is co-editor of *Nontraditional Migrants in Kyiv* (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2003); and author of "Regionalism and Nation-Building in a Divided Society," in Paul D'Anieri and Taras Kuzio, eds., *Dilemmas of State-Led Nation Building in Ukraine* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002) and "Where

Does Europe End?" *The Wilson Quarterly*, Summer 2002. Ms. Popson received her M.A. from the Russian Area Studies Program of Georgetown University, where she specialized in comparative Russian and Ukrainian politics. She holds a B.A. in Post-Soviet Studies from Trinity College in Hartford, CT.

Marya Rozanova is an Associate Professor at Admiral Makarov State Maritime Academy (St. Petersburg, Russia), and a former Galina Starovoitova Fellow on Human Rights and Conflict Resolutions at the Kennan Institute of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, D.C. Since 2007, she has headed a St. Petersburg Non-Governmental Organization called the Center for Civil, Social, Scientific and Cultural Initiatives "STRATEGIA" that specializes in a wide variety of issues related to youth policy, xenophobia prevention, youth conflict resolution, analysis of migration processes in contemporary Russia, and migrant integration into host society of St. Petersburg. Ms. Rozanova holds a philosophy degree from St. Petersburg State University, a law degree from the North-West Academy of Public Administration, and a Ph.D. from St. Petersburg State University. Her last book - *Identities in the Era of Global Migrations* (St. Petersburg, 2010), written with co-author Sergey Akopov - was devoted to identity changes in a globalized world and migration processes in contemporary Russia.

Blair A. Ruble is currently Director of the Kennan Institute of the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington, D.C., where he also serves as Program Director for Comparative Urban Studies. He received his MA and PhD degrees in Political Science from the University of Toronto (1973, 1977), and an AB degree with Highest Honors in Political Science from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (1971). He has edited more than a dozen volumes, and is the author of six monographic studies. His book-length works include a trilogy examining the fate of Russian provincial cities during the twentieth century: *Leningrad. Shaping a Soviet City* (1990); *Money Sings! The Changing Politics of Urban Space in Post-Soviet Yaroslavl* (1995); and *Second Metropolis: Pragmatic Pluralism in Gilded Age Chicago, Silver Age Moscow, and Meiji Osaka* (2001) as well as *Creating Diversity Capital* (2005) examining the changes in such cities as Montreal, Washington, D.C., and Kyiv brought about by the recent arrival of large

transnational communities. His most recent monograph – *Washington’s U Street: A Biography* – will appear in 2010. A native of New York, Dr. Ruble worked previously at the Social Science Research Council in New York City (1985–1989) and the National Council for Soviet and East European Research (1982–1985).

Andrew Selee has been director of the Woodrow Wilson Center’s Mexico Institute since its inception in 2003. The Institute, which is part of the Center’s Latin American Program, focuses on promoting dialogue and original policy research on U.S.–Mexico relations. He is also an Adjunct Professor of Government at Johns Hopkins University. Selee served as Program Associate in the Center’s Latin American Program from 2000 to 2003. Prior to that he served as Professional Staff in the U.S. House of Representatives from 1999 to 2000. From 1992 to 1997 he worked in Tijuana, Mexico with migrant youth and low-income communities. His publications include *Mexico’s Democratic Challenges* (co-editor, 2010), *Participatory Innovation and Representative Democracy in Latin America* (co-editor, 2009), *The United States and Mexico: More Than Neighbors* (author, 2007); and *Invisible No More: Mexican Migrant Civic Participation in the United States* (co-editor, 2006). He is currently co-editing a volume on the civic and political participation of Latin American immigrants in nine U.S. cities. Selee served as a member of the Council on Foreign Relations’ Independent Task Force on Immigration and was a member of the Steering Committee of the Migration Policy Institute’s Task Force on Immigration and America’s Future. A long-time volunteer of the YMCA, he served for five years on the YMCA’s National Board and chaired its International Committee. He holds a Ph.D. in Policy Studies from the University of Maryland.

The Honorable J. Walter Tejada was elected to the County Board on March 11, 2003, in a Special Election. Mr. Tejada was re-elected on November 6, 2007. He served as Chairman to the Board in 2008 and Vice-Chairman in 2007. A community advocate, Mr. Tejada has distinguished himself as a leader committed to enhancing the diversity of Arlington and the region’s community voice. During his tenure, he has reached out to local communities and encouraged residents to be active participants in various efforts throughout the County and the Washington DC Metropolitan region. He has been instrumental in convening community stakeholders to

address a wide-range of issues such as affordable housing, civic engagement and volunteerism, community and economic development, education and employment, fiscal accountability, parks and recreation, tenant outreach and empowerment efforts, youth development programming, health and fitness, nonprofit initiatives and others. Relentless in his commitment to promote and support civic participation and representation, Mr. Tejada has been an instrumental visionary in the establishment of various initiatives and programs. Two such initiatives are the Community Volunteer Network (CVN - formerly known as the Community Role Models (CRM)), an initiative which provides leadership development, as well as educational and service opportunities for young adults; and the Shirlington Employment and Education Center which helps provide opportunities for workers.

Michele Waslin, Ph.D., is the Senior Policy Analyst at the Immigration Policy Center. She has authored several publications on immigration policy and post-9/11 immigration issues. Ms. Waslin appears regularly in English and Spanish-language media. Previously, she worked as Director of Immigration Policy Research at the National Council of La Raza (NCLR) and Policy Coordinator at the Illinois Coalition for Immigrant and Refugee Rights. She received her Ph.D. in 2002 in Government and International Studies from the University of Notre Dame, and holds an M.A. in International Relations from the University of Chicago and a B.A. in Political Science from Creighton University.

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