Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars

Kennan Institute

Comparative Urban Studies Project

KENNAN INSTITUTE

TRANSNATIONAL MIGRATION TO NEW REGIONAL CENTERS:

Policy Challenges, Practice, and the Migrant Experience

Conference Proceedings

EDITED BY
Lauren Herzer,
Sarah Dixon Klump, and
Mary Elizabeth Malinkin

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Panelist Biographies

MIKHAIL ALEXSEEV

Mikhail Alexseev (Ph.D., University of Washington, 1996) is Associate Professor of Political Science at San Diego State University. He is the author of *Immigration Phobia and the Security Dilemma: Russia, Europe, and the United States* (Cambridge University Press, 2006) and *Without Warning: Threat Assessment, Intelligence, and Global Struggle* (St. Martin's Press, 1997) and is the editor of *A Federation Imperiled: Center-Periphery Conflict in Post-Soviet Russia* (St. Martin's Press, 1999). Alexseev has been the principal investigator of a multi-year international research project on migration and ethnoreligious violence in the Russian Federation funded by the National Science Foundation, the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, and the National Council for Eurasian and East European Research (Title VIII, U.S. Department of State). His previous projects have been funded by Reuters, NATO, the Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies, the U. S. Institute of Peace, the John W. Kluge Center of the Library of Congress, the National Council for Eurasian and East European Research, the Carnegie Corporation of New York, and the Pacific Basin Research Center at Harvard University. Alexseev has published articles in *Political Science Quarterly*, *Journal of Peace Research*, *Political Behavior*, *Political Communication*, *Europe-Asia Studies*, *Nationalities Papers*, *Post-Soviet Geography and Economics*, *The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs*, and *Pacific Focus*. His editorial opinion articles on Soviet and Post-Soviet affairs have appeared in *The New York Times*, *Newsweek*, *Toronto Globe and Mail*, *USA Today*, and *The Seattle Times*. His research project summaries and data are posted on http://www-rohan.sdsu.edu/~alexseev/migration_and_ethnic_conflict/.

CAROLINE BRETTELL

Caroline Brettell is the Dedman Family Distinguished Professor in the Department of Anthropology at Southern Methodist University. Brettell is currently completing a two year term as Dean ad Interim at Dedman College. She is an internationally known specialist on immigration and the anthropology of gender. Brettell is the author of *Men Who Migrate*, *Women*

Who Wait: Population and History in a Portuguese Parish (1986), *We Have Already Cried Many Tears: The Stories of Three Portuguese Migrant Women* (1982, 1995), *Writing Against the Wind: A Mother's Life History* (1999) and *Anthropology and Migration: Essays on Transnationalism, Ethnicity and Identity* (2003). She is the co-author of *Painters and Peasants in the 19th Century* (1983) and the editor of *When They Read What We Write: The Politics of Ethnography* (1993), and *Crossing Borders/Constructing Boundaries: Race, Ethnicity and Immigration* (2007). Brettell is the co-editor of *International Migration: The Female Experience* (1986), *Gender in Cross-Cultural Perspective* (1993, 1997, 2001, 2005, 2008), *Gender and Health: An International Perspective* (1996), *Migration Theory: Talking Across Disciplines* (2000, 2008), *21st Century Gateways: Immigrant Incorporation in Suburbia* (2008), and *Citizenship, Political Engagement, and Belonging: Immigrants in Europe and the United States* (2008). She is also the author of numerous book chapters and articles. Her recent research on new immigration to the Dallas–Fort Worth area has been funded by the National Science Foundation and the Russell Sage Foundation.

CYNTHIA BUCKLEY

Cynthia Buckley is the William Blakesmore III Endowed Fellow of the Innovation, Creativity and Capital (IC2) Institute, University of Texas, where she is also a faculty member of the Departments of Sociology and Eurasian Studies and a faculty affiliate of the Center for Women's and Gender Studies and the Population Research Center. Her research investigates issues of population, health, and development in the Southern Caucasus, Central Asia, and Russia. Buckley's current research projects include an examination of HIV/AIDS testing patterns, prevalence estimates, and stigma trends in Eurasia's southern tier (sponsored by the National Council for Russian East European and Eurasian Studies), and a mixed method evaluation of the effects of male labor migration on family health and economic stability in the Southern Caucasus (sponsored by a ACLS/ACTR Special Initiatives Grant). Professor Buckley is the lead editor of a forthcoming Kennan Institute volume investigating migration within Eurasia, and is widely published on issues of reproductive health, population aging, and migration. In the fall of 2008 she began a study of health differentials between natives and foreigners in the Russian Federation.

MANUEL ANGEL CASTILLO GARCIA

Manuel Angel Castillo Garcia is a Professor-Researcher at the Demographic, Urban, and Environmental Studies Center (CEDUA), El Colegio de Mexico. He is currently Director of CEDUA's journal, *Estudios Demograficos y Urbanos*, a Member of the Mexican Academy of Sciences (AMC), and the National System of Researchers (SNI), Mexico, a Member of the Directive Board, El Colegio de la Frontera Norte, and a member of the External Advisory Committee, El Colegio de la Frontera Sur, Mexico. He is also a member and former President of the Board of Sponsors, Sin Fronteras, Mexico, as well as a member of the Mexican Council of Foreign Affairs (COMEXI).

ALLISON GARLAND

Alllison Garland is a Program Associate with the Woodrow Wilson Center's Comparative Urban Studies Project. She served previously as Senior Program Associate in the Wilson Center's Latin American Program, where she worked from 1993–2000. Prior to joining the Wilson Center, Garland worked for the American Jewish World Service, an international development organization, and for the National Commission for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights in Managua, Nicaragua. She has conducted research and prepared publications for the U.S. Department of State Office of Research, the U.S. Agency for International Development and the United Nations Research Institute for Social Development. Her research interests focus on social policy and citizen security in Latin America. She received a B.A. in Political Science from Wellesley College and a M.A. in International Relations from The Johns Hopkins University, School of Advanced International Studies.

TIMOTHY HELENIAK

Timothy Heleniak is a Faculty Research Associate in the Department of Geography at the University of Maryland. He has researched and written extensively on migration, regional development, and demographic trends in Russia and the former Soviet Union. He is currently working on a National Science Foundation grant, conducting research on migration and regional development in Siberia and the Russian Far North. He previously worked at the World Bank and the U.S. Census Bureau, and taught as an adjunct

professor at Georgetown University. During the 2001–2002 academic year, he was a Title VIII–Sponsored Research Fellow at the Kennan Institute.

MICHAEL JONES-CORREA

Michael Jones-Correa is a Professor of Government and Director of the American Studies Program at Cornell University. Jones-Correa taught at Harvard University as an Assistant and Associate Professor of Government from 1994 to 2001, and was a visiting Fellow at the Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars from 2003 to 2004 and at the Russell Sage Foundation from 1998 to 1999. From 2004 to 2005, he served on the Committee on the Redesign of U.S. Naturalization Test for the National Academy of Sciences. Professor Jones-Correa is the author of *Between Two Nations: The Political Predicament of Latinos in New York City* (Cornell, 1998), and the editor of *Governing American Cities: Interethnic Coalitions, Competition and Conflict* (Russell Sage Foundation, 2001). He has also written more than two-dozen articles and book chapters on, among other things, the implementation of the Voting Rights Act, immigrant naturalization and voting, the diffusion of racial restrictive covenants, religion and political participation, Latino identity and politics, the role of gender in shaping immigrant politics, dual nationality, and Hispanics as a foreign policy lobby. Professor Jones-Correa is currently working on several major projects. One looks at increasing ethnic diversity of suburbs, and its implication for local and national politics. Another is a multi-authored analysis of the 2006 Latino National Survey, a national state-stratified survey of Latinos in the United States for which he was a principal investigator. He also conducts research on new fast-growing immigrant receiving areas, participates in collaborative workshops on immigrant political incorporation, and is writing a book looking at the re-negotiation of ethnic relations in the aftermath of civil disturbances in New York, Los Angeles, Miami, and Washington D.C.

DAVLAT KHUDONAZAROV

Davlat Khudonazarov graduated from the National Higher School of Cinema in Moscow (VGIK) in 1965. The screening of his first documentary film was forbidden as the Soviet authorities considered him a "suspect element," and all of his subsequent films had problems with censorship. In 1986, against the will of Communist Party leaders, he was elected president of the Association of Filmmakers of Tajikistan. In 1989, he was the

only elected USSR People's Deputy from Tajikistan, whose candidature was proposed by simple electors. Right after his election he entered into the Interregional Deputies Group headed by academician Andrei Sakharov. In June 1990, he was elected president of the Association of Filmmakers of the USSR, and one year later he became the candidate of the oppositional forces in Tajikistan's presidential elections: official statistics report that he received more that 30 percent of votes, and independent experts consider that he received about 40 percent (among 7 candidates that participated in the elections). He began his peacemaking activities during the civil war in Tajikistan. Since 1995, Mr. Khudonazarov has worked to defend the rights of migrants and provide them with humanitarian aid.

LOREN B. LANDAU

Loren B. Landau is Director of Wits University's Forced Migration Studies Programme in Johannesburg, South Africa. He is author of *The Humanitarian Hangover: Displacement, Aid, and Transformation*. His research focuses on the sociopolitical consequences of human mobility and responses to it. He is currently coordinating a post-graduate degree program in Forced Migration Studies and co-directing a comparative project on migration and urban transformation in Johannesburg, Maputo, Nairobi, and Lubumbashi. He holds degrees from the University of Washington, the London School of Economics, and the University of California, Berkeley.

PATRICIA LANDOLT

Professor Patricia Landolt's research examines immigrant economic and political incorporation processes from a transnational and comparative perspective. She currently has two Toronto-based research projects: A study of Latin American Immigrant Organizations understood as sites of political socialization and incorporation (http://www.yorku.ca/cohesion/ LARG/html/largindex2.htm); and a survey of Immigrants and Precarious Employment that examines how Latin American and Caribbean workers are faring in the "new economy." (http://www.arts.yorku.ca/research/ine/ index.php).

YAROSLAV PYLYNSKYI

Yaroslav Pylynskyi is Director of the Kennan Kyiv Project. He holds a Ph.D. in Philology. He was a Global Security Program Fellow (University of Cambridge, UK, 1994-1996), Secretary of the Division on Languages at the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, Literature and Art Studies (1991-1997), and a Visiting Researcher at the Institute on Interethnic Studies (University of Uppsala, Sweden, 1997). Dr. Pylynskyi has investigated Ukrainian-Russian bilingualism in Ukraine, the problem of Trans-Carpathian Rusyns, and interethnic relations in the Carpathian region. Currently, his research focuses on migration and tolerance in Ukraine and neighboring countries. Dr. Pylysnky's further plans include studying the influence of international migration on urban development in Ukraine.

BLAIR A. RUBLE

Blair Ruble serves as Director for both the Woodrow Wilson Center's Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies and for the Comparative Urban Studies Project. Prior to joining the Wilson Center, he worked as the Staff Associate at the Social Science Research Council and as the Assistant Executive Director for the National Council for Soviet and East European Research. His research interests focus on Russian domestic politics, urban patterns and urban management arrangements in post-Soviet Russia, and urban management and regional development. His major publications include *Creating Diversity Capital: Transnational Migrants in Montreal, Washington, and Kyiv* (Woodrow Wilson Center Press and Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005), *Second Metropolis: The Politics of Pragmatic Pluralism in Gilded Age Chicago, Silver Age Moscow, and Meiji Osaka* (Woodrow Wilson Center Press and Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001), *Money Sings: The Politics of Urban Space in Post-Soviet Yaroslavl* (Woodrow Wilson Center Press and Cambridge University Press, 1995), and *Leningrad: Shaping a Soviet City* (University of California Press, 1990). Ruble received an A.B. in Political Science from University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill and a M.A. and Ph.D. in Political Science from University of Toronto.

ANDREW SELEE

Andrew Selee is Director of the Woodrow Wilson Center's Mexico Institute, which promotes dialogue on U.S.-Mexico relations, and a Lecturer in

Government at Johns Hopkins University. He has also taught at George Washington University and was a Visiting Scholar at El Colegio de Mexico. Prior to joining the Wilson Center, he worked as professional staff in the U.S. House of Representatives and on community development programs on the U.S.-Mexico border. Selee is co-Director of the Wilson Center's project on Latino Immigrant Civic and Political Participation in the United States and co-editor of *Invisible No More: Mexican Migrant Civic Participation in the United States* (with Jonathan Fox and Xochitl Bada, 2006). He is also the author of *More Than Neighbors: An Overview of Mexico and U.S.-Mexico Relations* (2007) and editor or co-editor of numerous publications, including *Mexico's Politics and Society in Transition* (with Joseph Tulchin, 2003) and *Perceptions and Misconceptions in U.S.-Mexico Relations* (2005). Selee holds a Ph.D. in Policy Studies from the University of Maryland and an M.A. in Latin American Studies from the University of California, San Diego.

OXANA SHEVEL

Oxana Shevel is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at Tufts University. She received her Ph.D. in Government from Harvard University in 2003, has taught at Purdue University, and held post–doctoral appointments at the Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies and at the Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute. Shevel's research addresses issues of nation- and state-building in the post–Soviet space, the politics of citizenship and migration, and the influence of international institutions on democratization processes in the region. She is currently completing a book manuscript that examines how the politics of national identity and strategies of the UNHCR (United Nations High Commision for Refugees) shape refugee admission policies in Russia, Ukraine, the Czech Republic, and Poland. A chapter based on this project was recently published in Dominique Arel and Blair Ruble, eds, *Rebounding Identities: The Politics of Identity in Russia and Ukraine* (Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006). Shevel's article on the politics of citizenship policy in the post-Soviet region is forthcoming in *Comparative Politics.* She has previously published in *East European Politics and Societies, Political Science Quarterly,* and *Nationalities Papers.*

PEP SUBIROS

Pep Subiros is an author, philosopher, and exhibitions curator. He has been a Lecturer of Philosophy at the Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona (1972-

1979), Editor of the monthly journals *Transición* and *El Viejo Topo* (1979-1983), Director of Cultural Affairs for the City of Barcelona, and CEO of the Cultural Olympics from 1984 to 1991. He has been an independent scholar, writer, and curator since 1992, except in 1997, when he was Chief of Staff of Pasqual Maragall, Mayor of Barcelona. His books include *Myths and Challenges of Modernity* (1984), *The Left and the National Question, and Other Paradoxes* (1992), *Short Story of the Future* (1999), and *On Happiness and Other Worries* (2004). He has curated several exhibitions, including *Africas: the Artist and the City* (2001), and *Apartheid: The South African Mirror* (2007).

J. WALTER TEJADA

In his three terms as Chairman of the Arlington County Board, the Honorable J. Walter Tejada has distinguished himself as a leader committed to diversity. Mr. Tejada's work has earned the respect of both local and national leadership. In October 2006, Mr. Tejada was appointed by Governor Timothy Kaine to the Governor's Urban Policy Task Force. Former Virginia Governor Mark R. Warner appointed Mr. Tejada as the first Chairman of the Virginia Latino Advisory Commission. Mr. Tejada also serves as a member of the Hispanics for a Fair Judiciary Advisory Committee, the Smithsonian National Museum of American History Latino Advisory Council, and the D.C. United's Hispanic Advisory Committee—a testament to his efforts to honor the contributions of Latinos nationwide. Mr. Tejada is a former Virginia State Director of the League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC). He founded the Virginia Coalition of Latino Organizations (VACOLAO), the American Salvadoran Association of Virginia, and the Latino Democrats of Virginia.

OLGA I. VENDINA

Having received her Ph.D. in Geography from the Russian Academy of Sciences in 1990, Dr. Vendina is Senior Researcher and Project Director at the Institute of Geography, Russian Academy of Sciences. Her main research field is Human Geography, and her interests cover urban studies, Moscow, regional studies, and interethnic relations. She has published more than 150 articles in academic journals, including *Urban Studies*, *Eurasian Geography and Economics*, *GeoJournal*, *Herodote*, *Europe Regional*, *OstEurope*, and others. Her book *Migrants in Moscow* was published in 2004.

Welcoming Remarks

Blair A. Ruble
Director, Kennan Institute, and Comparative Urban Studies Project,
Woodrow Wilson Center

I want to welcome everyone to what we hope will be a stimulating and provocative meeting. I think when you take a look at the list of speakers you will see it cannot be anything but stimulating and provocative. We live in a world that is different from the one that has been inhabited by our ancestors in many profound ways. Among the most important changes in our existence from all human beings who have come before us is that for the first time, most human beings live in cities. According to the United Nations, the global urban population in 2008 reached 3.3 billion people. More than half of the humans living on the planet are city dwellers. We have gone from being a rural animal, with just 13 percent of the population living in cities a century ago and three percent a century before that, to being urban animals. But these cities are not only more numerous, not only larger, they are also more diverse, as we live in one of the most active periods of human migration. According to UN Habitat there are approximately 175 million official international migrants worldwide; this number does not include those who have fallen outside of official systems.

Robust migration networks have formed in nearly every corner of the world. For example, a vibrant migration system, perhaps the second most active in the world, focuses on the oil producing states of the Persian Gulf. In 2000 there were over 5 million Asian workers in Gulf States. Intraregional migration systems have emerged within South America. Its people have moved to Brazil and to the Southern cone countries of Argentina and Chile from relatively less well–off neighboring countries. In a moment, we will hear about similar patterns that have emerged from Central American countries to Mexico and beyond to the U.S. and Canada.

People are moving across borders and within nations throughout Asia. Somewhere around 200 million Chinese will leave their villages and rural settlements for the burgeoning cities along the Chinese coast over the next couple of decades. Once uprooted, many remain on the move. A recent

study of Moscow's Chinese community conducted by the Kennan Institute's Moscow affiliate suggests that many migrants arriving in Moscow from China are precisely those rural migrants who have failed to find an appropriate niche in coastal cities such as Shanghai. As this last trend reveals, many countries of the former Soviet Union have become fully integrated into transnational migration flows. Russia is second in the world behind the U.S. in the number of foreign-born residents. Ukraine is fourth behind number three Germany. The Kennan Institute has supported research in Ukraine which will be discussed shortly. This research has revealed some of the complex challenges that accompany the processes through which these countries and cities emerge as transnational migration destinations following years of state-imposed isolation.

All of these trends suggest that communities which have been traditionally thought of as ethnically and culturally homogenous are faced with challenges of managing heterogeneity. Cities worldwide are becoming larger, more diverse and more fluid. Furthermore, this new reality has emerged upon a backdrop of: expanding international terrorism; rampaging technological change that is restructuring everyday life; and a neo-liberal consensus that has counseled against government acceptance of responsibility for alleviating social problems.

The success of nations in such a global environment depends on the efficiency of their urban centers and of their workforces. Approaches to governing cities must become as dynamic as the cities themselves, overflowing rather than being contained within the conceptual boundaries of any single intellectual paradigm. Cities must develop the capacity for people of difference, however that difference is defined.

Tragic events of recent months underscore the importance of approaching migrant communities via policies which promote inclusion and tolerance. As one of this morning's panelists, Loren Landau, recently wrote: "The consequences of ineffective and inappropriate responses to migration include economic loss, threats to security and health, low degrees of social capital, and less livable cities. Appreciating how such policies might evolve in real life requires more extensive empirical work in a variety of global regions than is taking place to date." True, there is a growing body of research on the impact of migrants on the cities of North America and Western Europe. But less understood—and of critical importance—is how migration is shaping urban life in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the former Soviet

Union. As such, one goal of this conference is to begin a conversation that expands our understanding of the relationship between various migrant and host communities around the world, not in just one particular region.

The fluidity of the "urban" at present necessarily means that no single social, political, economic, or ethnic group can dominate local politics anywhere for long. Politics and governance necessarily becomes a forced accommodation for competing private interests requiring a spectrum of responses as policy choices are no long reducible to either/or choices. The task of rebuilding even the most dysfunctional urban community must begin house by house, business by business, block by block and neighborhood by neighborhood. These new challenges of 21st century migration and urbanization require a recalibration of our measures of success in order to permit a greater appreciation of human dignity. As Susan Parnell of the University of Cape Town has argued, the only evaluation that matters in judging an urban community is whether or not anyone would want their own children to live, study, or work in that community.

So we are gathered today to explore the challenges that the world faces by focusing on new centers of immigration. We will be examining specific case studies on a number of continents, and we will try to interrogate some of the larger concepts that frequently emerge in discussions of migration to see how suitable they are to this new context.

This is only possible because of the hard work of a number of individuals here at the Wilson Center. I would like to begin by thanking the Wilson Center for making federal conference funds available as well as support from George F. Kennan Fund. I would like to thank all of the participants, particularly those of you who spent far too long on airplanes to get here. But finally and most importantly I want to thank the people who are really responsible for getting everybody in the room this morning—Lauren Herzer from the Comparative Urban Studies Project, Renata Kosc-Harmatiy and Liz Malinkin from the Kennan Institute, and our colleagues from the Center's Mexico Institute, including Kate Brick, who sadly will be leaving the Wilson Center shortly, and Andrew Selee, Director of the Mexico Institute. With that I am turning the floor over.

Panel I: Migrant Integration: Identity, Citizenship, and Tolerance

Chair: Andrew Selee
Director, Mexico Institute, Woodrow Wilson Center

We are starting off with a really outstanding first panel here. I am not going to go through and introduce everyone in detail because you have the full bios in front of you. Let me just say it really is an outstanding and very diverse panel that we have to start off this discussion. You will see there are fabulous panels throughout the day here. Directly to my left is Pep Subiros, who is an old friend of the Center, one of our close colleagues. He is an author and a philosopher whose works are too many to name. Not only is he a thinker about urban issues and about citizenship and immigration, but he is also someone who has done a great deal about it in Barcelona and has been very involved in some of the restructuring of public space in that city.

To his left is Loren Landau, Director of the Forced Migration Studies Programme at the University of Witwatersrand in Johannesburg, South Africa. Those who have been following what is currently going on in South Africa know how timely his presentation will be. I am sure Loren will talk with us about both the broader context and the specifics of what is happening in South Africa.

To Loren's left is Walter Tejada, who is a hometown hero to many of us who are from the Washington, D.C. area. Walter is Chairman of the Arlington County Board. He is originally from El Salvador and is the highest authority in Arlington County, which is larger than Washington, D.C., if I am not mistaken. Walter, is that right?

Tejada: It is known to be larger in population.

Selee: He is really one of the most dynamic public servants in this city and a leader on trying to make our community more diverse.

To Walter's left is Manuel Angel Castillo Garcia, whose work I have managed to follow for many years, though we just met this morning. Originally

from Guatemala, and now based at Colegio de Mexico in Mexico, Mr. Garcia is an outstanding scholar of migration to Mexico. Those of us who are from the United States tend to think of Mexico as a sending country, a country from which many migrants come to the United States. It is also a country that receives many migrants, especially from Central America but also from the Caribbean, South America, and elsewhere around the world.

Without further ado each panelist will speak for 12 minutes so that we may have a chance to have a good discussion with the group. I will turn it over to Pep.

PEP SUBIROS, Author and Philosopher, Barcelona, Spain

Thanks very much Andrew. Thank you for this invitation to participate again in another exiting Wilson Center project. I feel very honored that I have the privilege of being the first speaker here. I will make some general comments on the topic of this panel, and especially on the Spanish and Catalan experience and I hope that this will integrate later with the general discussion. Perhaps the first thing to say is that until the 1970s, Spain was in fact an immigrant society—first to Latin America and, following the Second World War, to Europe. In the 1970s there were 2 million Spanish immigrants in Europe, mostly in France and Germany but also in Switzerland, Belgium and Holland. Part of this immigration had political causes, leading from Franco of course, but most of these immigrants were economic refugees. In the 1950s and 60s, Spain was an underdeveloped country. Apart from tourism, a significant part of the development under Franco in the 1960s was due to money remittances from Spanish immigrants to Europe.

The situation in Catalonia and Barcelona was slightly different. As the most industrially developed region of Spain, from the 1920s on, Catalonia received a considerable flow of immigrants from the rest of Spain. People came primarily from the south of Spain toward the north and what we would call the townships of Barcelona. If you go to Barcelona now you will not find any of this. Catalonia was also more developed than the rest of Spain. It had and still has a relatively distinct cultural division closely connected to European trends and aspirations. For instance, Barcelona's cultural elites felt closer to Paris, London, Milan, or now New York, than

to Madrid. Madrid was another world. Catalonia also had a distinct language, which created a strong and distinct identity. The influx of Spanish-speaking immigrants posed serious cultural integration problems. It was often felt as a threat to Catalan identity, already threatened by Franco's policies of cultural homogenization. The risk of a dual society was to a large extent overcome by the confluence of the mostly Spanish immigrant workers' clandestine trade union movements with Catalan political and cultural resistance movements against Franco. Freedom, amnesty, and Catalan autonomy became the model of the struggle against Franco in Catalonia and depended on both the Catalan movements and the Spanish-speaking workers' movements.

At the same time, the notion of Catalan identity was changed to be defined as those who live and work in Catalonia. That was the anti-Franco, politically correct notion of citizenship. It is very important to remember this when trying to understand current relation processes in Spain, in Catalonia, and in Barcelona, and especially the generally tolerant and relatively generous public policies toward immigration, as well as the generally convivial atmosphere in a radically changed demographic environment.

Do I mean that a recent history of immigration is a warranty, a vaccine against intolerance in public attitudes towards immigration? Certainly not. It is not a warranty, and it is not a vaccine, as unfortunately, events in Italy or in South Africa show these days. But it suggests that the problems of intolerance, of conflict, of xenophobia, lay not so much in deep rooted popular attitudes, but in political strategies that use immigration issues as a partisan tool. Anyway, that is history.

The situation has changed radically from Spain having 2 million workers working in Europe. Spain now has 4.5 million workers in Europe. In 1996, foreign-born made up about one percent of Spain's population; now Spain's population is more than 10 percent foreign-born. In just 10 years, the foreign population has multiplied tenfold. In Catalonia this is higher precisely because of Catalonia's tremendous development. Immigration has been intense in Catalonia and even more so in Barcelona. Again, from a population in 1996 of 1.9 percent of foreign population, Barcelona now has 17 percent and Catalonia has 13.5 percent. In the last 15 years, in Catalonia, the native population has been completely stagnant. All growth has been from foreign arrivals which has increased Catalonia's population from 6 million to 7 million in just 10 years.

How has this change come about, and why? There are many reasons. One reason is that in the period of 1996 to 2006 the growth of GNP in Spain was an average of 5.5 percent, the highest in the whole European Union. Now Spain is in the upper part of the European Union in development. Forty years ago it was more or less like Morocco. According to the World Bank, last year, in 2007, Spain officially became the eighth global economic power. There is much talk about what calls millions to a place; obviously, to Spain its economic growth has been the most powerful cause. The argument can be also made the other way around. If Spain had not experienced such high immigration, this radical growth would not have existed. Given this growth it is quite extraordinary that there have not been special problems up to now.

What can we say are the rules of engagement of integration? In Spain they are not generally very different from those of Europe. The rules of integration in Europe are very difficult and very tough. Someone has talked about the illiberal practices of liberal European governments. Well these illiberal practices affect mostly immigrants. There are very tough policies of entrance and very loose policies of expulsion. Immigrants are subjected to a continuous process of suspicion, when not of criminalization. And as you know the European Union is now debating the extension of up to 18 months without any sort of legal procedure, of illegal immigrants in special internment camps prior to deportation.

This especially affects the people who are in an illegal situation. But immigrants who are in an illegal situation are not only immigrants who arrive illegally to the European Union or to Spain. There are in many cases also people who have arrived legally but on a provisional basis with short-time contracts, with short-time permits of residence, who have overstayed these permits of residence, so that many people who have been in Europe or in Spain legally can easily become illegal after one year, after two years, after five years, depending on the kind of permit that they were granted.

Also the policies of family reunification are very tough now. Every day people are being subjected to things like DNA testing. These policies of reunification are only beneficial insomuch as they give legal residence to first degree relatives. But they do not include the benefit of a work permit, so that you have lots of immigrants with the permit to live but not the permit to work. What sort of integration is possible on that basis? And of course there are no political rights at all in terms of rights to vote, rights to form trade unions, and so on and so forth.

At the same time, we need immigrants and the economy, in particular, needs immigrants. Without them, there would not be development growth at all. At the same time that you have these very tough state policies at the national level and at the European level, you have quite soft policies at the local level in many cases; this is especially the case of Spain at the municipal level. You can be an illegal immigrant but if you go to the municipal office you automatically have the right to get an education for your kids, to healthcare, and to other social services. Is that just out of generosity, or humanitarian feelings? Partly. In Spain it has to do with this tradition of having been an immigrant country and knowing what this means. But it also has to do with the acknowledgement of the function and the importance of immigration.

I would like to make a final comment about integration. I am currently conducting research on immigration in Catalonia, looking especially at social and cultural capital. I am in the process of interviewing a lot of people – immigrants who have lived in Catalonia for a long time. In a recent interview with a Colombian woman living in a Barcelona neighborhood made up of 40 percent immigrants, mainly Moroccans, Pakistanis, and Latin Americans from all over, I asked about the social integration of recent immigrants. What was her experience? What was her view? She knows the neighborhood very well. She responded with "Integration of immigrants? No problem. We are perfectly integrated. We live here peacefully. We learn Catalan and Spanish. We take our children to public schools. We use the public health services. We use and enjoy public spaces. It is the natives who have an integration problem. They take children out of public schools, they go to private medical services, they desert public spaces, and they quit here to go to live in other neighborhoods." There are indeed worrying symptoms and trends in this regard—fear of loss of quality of public schools with a high index of immigrant population, complaints about the crowding of public medical services, complaints about the occupation of public spaces by immigrants, about the noise and primitive customs of the aliens. There is an increasing amount of stereotypes of other, disorder, chaos.

In fact it can be well said that at least in Spain, in Catalonia and in Barcelona, the style of life of immigrants is fully integrated with our traditional ways of life, especially public life.

LOREN LANDAU, Director, Forced Migration Studies Programme, University of Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa

Thank you. I welcome this opportunity. I want to thank the organizers for inviting me to be here to talk about these things because only now are the governance and development issues within African urbanization slowly creeping back onto the political agenda. For political reasons I will not go into, there has been a sort of bias against urban development as seen as promoting middle class development and the wealthy, whereas the real development issues are believed to be in rural areas. As Blair mentioned, the rapid rates of urbanization, the growth of townships and informal settlements, has brought these issues and the problems of urban development back to the fore, although most African leaders and development experts do not have the tools or the understanding to really engage with these issues. Urbanization and migration is almost prematurely determined to be a problem, and one for which we lack an understanding of what is really happening. Perhaps more worryingly, we also lack the recognition that we cannot stop it. What we need to do is actually engage with it and, as Sue Parnell says, try to make sure that these are communities where people would want to live, not just have to live. That is the challenge that I want to talk about today.

The presentation I am about to give will not focus on South Africa exclusively but will use what has happened recently in South Africa in order to provide a larger, continental perspective. In many ways, the issues I will address are similar to those that Pep has outlined. But rather than focusing exclusively on social and political rights for some, as we have seen in the last few months, what is at stake are various forms of economic and physical security for everyone.

The data I use comes from a larger project in four African cities, Johannesburg being one of them, but also Lubumbashi, Maputo and Nairobi. I will try to draw loosely from examples from all four cities, but because of recent events and because it is also where I live, I will focus on Johannesburg.

What I want to do over the next few minutes is to challenge three presumptions that often inform the literature about building inclusive cities, using data and research from the cities I have just mentioned. The first is this idea that there is a self-defined host community that needs to open up to

**Figure 1.1.
Language Groupings
in Johannesburg,
South Africa[1]**

Other 22.10%
Zulu 29.20%
Afrikaans 2.60%
English 6.80%
Tswana 7.90%
Sotho 11.50%
Xhosa 19.90%

**Figure 1.2.
Religious Groupings
in Johannesburg,
South Africa[2]**

Muslim 6.80%
Other 0.90%
Catholic 14.10%
Protestant 59.70%
No religion 18.50%

make space for and accommodate others, as one might find in Spain, Japan, or even France. Most African cities, at least in their current form, have emerged in the last 20 or 30 years with people coming from all sorts of different backgrounds and different places, primarily from within the country but also from outside. As a result, there is not usually a single dominant host culture.

The second point is that we often work from a model of trying to integrate people into cities on a permanent basis. The data I present suggests that even for citizens, permanency is not the objective and certainly not the reality. Rather than as a destination, cities are often places for protection, for

Figure 1.3. Integration and the Absent Host: Johannesburg[3]

- Cities may have no dominant group

- Only 31 percent of Johannesburg inhabitants have lived in the city for 10 years or more (compared to Nairobi, with 40 percent, and Maputo, with 51 percent)

- Johannesburg inhabitants move three times, on average, within the city; Thirty-two percent move more than four times

- Only 46 percent of inhabitants expect to be in Johannesburg in two years; Almost no one wants to raise children in the city

- At least 50 percent of inhabitants in many neighborhoods in Johannesburg are foreign-born

profit, or for passage elsewhere. We can not presume they are a place where people want to stay. Accepting this means changing how we think about development and promoting participation.

The last point I want to suggest is that across much of Africa, state capacity to affect change and regulate social or economic behavior is extremely limited. Its frailty is particularly evident in deep rural areas but is increasingly visible (or invisible) in some of the urban areas. What we have seen in the last few weeks within South Africa is the police being almost completely unable—or unwilling—to stop the violence that has erupted five miles away from the financial capital and the stock exchange. This is in a city that is responsible for almost 10 percent of sub-Saharan Africa's GDP. It is also the one place on the continent where the state more or less echoes institutional forms seen in Europe and North America. That the South African state is unable to regulate its cities is a very powerful illustrator of just how weak the states really are.

I will now return to the idea of integration and the absence of a host community. The data I am showing you now is from Johannesburg, which is not atypical of cities elsewhere on the continent. What you have here (see *Figure 1.1*) is the language people identify as their mother tongues – a good indicator of their ethnic background. As you can see, the largest single group

are Zulu speakers, but this is a plurality of under 30 percent. Similarly, there is not a single dominant religious group (see *Figure 1.2*). Even though 60 percent are Protestant, this hides extraordinary diversity and divisions between Pentecostal churches, Anglicans, and the conservative Dutch Reform Church. Some of these churches have 200 members and others have 2,000, and almost all of the churches do not get along very well. As such, religion also fails to serve as a source of community. As a final point, only about 30 percent of South African citizens have lived in the city for more than 10 years (see *Figure 1.3*). To talk about a host community that knows who it is, and can absorb other people is a fiction. In Nairobi, the number is slightly higher with about 40 percent, and even Maputo, which is the greatest in our sample, still has only about 50 percent of its citizens who have been there for more than 10 years.

In these sorts of contexts, the poor often have trouble establishing communities, as they move very quickly, trying to find rental housing, trying to build housing, getting knocked down by urban regeneration programs, and moving somewhere else. So building social capital is certainly a huge challenge. Perhaps most worrying is that only 46 percent of South Africans expect to be in the city for more than two years. This is the idea of the city as a point of passage. It is not a place where people want to stay and almost no one (less than 10 percent) said that they would want to raise a child in Johannesburg. It is seen in Malthusian terms: a place of moral depravity and danger. There is some truth to this, a possibility made all the more likely by people's desire to go elsewhere – often to "purer" rural areas, to smaller cities, or smaller towns to raise their kids. I think that the interactions of these different groups have in different cities produced very different and sometimes very dangerous interactions.

One of the consequences of these movements is that a sense of belonging or a sense that the city belongs to those who live in it is not emerging. As such, it is not a site of investment, social or material, but rather as a place that, as I said, you use or move through. Unlike what we have seen in Europe and North America, the kind of struggles for rights and the kind of participation that people do is not about claiming or reshaping the city's long term future. It is not about minority groups trying to influence the school board or to have their languages and histories taught in schools. Oftentimes, what they want is just a right to be in the city, not the right to own the city. It is a right to use the city and to extract from it, but at the

same time, to minimize the kind of investments, social and economic, that they want to make in it.

As a result of how people move, there are also extremely low levels of trust among people. If we accept Putnam's assertion that social capital is a prerequisite for development, most African cities are in bad shape. Even trust among citizens is extremely low. Migrants are often even more distrustful, of host communities but also of each other. Without this basis of trust, there are few groups who can organize to push for any kind of systemic change.

And lastly on this point, I just want to note that there are few secular institutions, government or other kinds of public institutions, that can act as bridges among the communities and help to build this trust. In many places, the government is largely discredited or irrelevant, even among citizenry. For many, the government is something to be feared. This robs us of an important agent for positive change and demands us to look elsewhere.

Here are two examples from people in Johannesburg to give you an idea of how they talk about being in a city. The first is very much in line with what I think Pep was saying about the locals as the ones with the problem, not us, suggesting that they are the ones who are damaged, who are stereotypical. We are happy to be here, we want to be friends, but the South Africans are the problem.

> *"I don't think any right thinking person would want to be South African. It is a very unhealthy environment. South Africans are very aggressive, even the way they talk—both black and white. I don't know what's the word, it is a degenerated façade they are putting up…They are just so contaminated."* —Sotho migrant, in Johannesburg five years

> *"Africa is shaped like a pistol and South Africa is the mouth from where you can shoot out the word of God."* —Nigerian pastor, Mountain of Fire and Miracles Church

The last I think is particularly powerful because this is someone from a church. Churches are organizations that are often seen as helping to fix people, helping to promote development, but here what you see with this Nigerian pastor is that even the church is seen as somehow transitory, that we are just here as a way to broadcast to the world. "Most of the people I have preached to do not plan to be here," the pastor said. "They all want to go to

Figure 1.4. Looted and Burned Somali-owned store, Motherwell Township, Port Elizabeth; Photographed by Hakima Haithar, February 2007

the U.S., they want to go home." They certainly do not see Johannesburg as their home. This kind of preaching also stops people from engaging with the locals and addressing very real problems that they face.

Now, I will talk about the kind of focus that we have had in development of the state and of state policies as promoting integration. As we have seen during the violence in South Africa over the last few weeks, it is not always the state that makes the decision of whether or not to accept people. States may have roles in promoting ideas of xenophobia, discrimination, or toler-ance, but it is the citizenry and actors outside (or on the periphery) of the state that make the decision of whether to accept or reject people.

The statistics I have and the practices implemented over the last decade show that South Africans have firmly made the decision to reject. About two-thirds of the people say there are too many foreigners and many, and as the violence demonstrates, are willing to support very drastic measures to get rid of foreigners. As we have seen, the 250,000 people that South Africa

deported last year is apparently not enough, and people are willing to go further to make sure that foreigners are not in their midst. You also see this idea that "we do not want them as part of us, that they should maintain their cultural customs," that "they should stay outside of us. If they are going to be here they should keep to themselves and not bother us too much."

Obviously, the reaction in South Africa has been a violent one. The past weeks' events are not the only examples of this. Since the mid-1990s there have been repeated incidents of people being thrown from trains, people having their houses burned. And what you see here is a picture from outside of Port Elizabeth on the coast, one of the townships where in the course of twenty-four hours about forty Somali-owned shops were looted and burned and about 400 people ethnically cleansed (see *Figure 1.4*). Almost all of these people have legal refugee status and have been recognized by the state as having a right to be there and are within a policy framework that promotes integration. So it is not the state that is making these decisions but rather people on the ground.

In Nairobi and elsewhere the state has been involved in addressing the foreigners but largely as a way of extorting money from them. They have an interest in keeping them there because they are extremely profitable, but not in integrating them or making them secure. Indeed, in doing so they may rob themselves of a major source of income. The odd instance here is in Maputo where almost all of the immigrants are illegal. According to law and policy, they are supposed to be in refugee camps or elsewhere in the country. Even so, the local population seems to tolerate them and there have been almost no instances of violence against them. This is a positive example that we are trying to understand to see if it is something that we can replicate elsewhere.

I want to reiterate the point that in South Africa and elsewhere, cities are growing at maybe four to six percent a year and large numbers of immigrants are moving into the cities (although most of this growth is due to natural increase). Despite its social and economic significance, this issue has been largely ignored because local officials tend to see this as an immigration issue to be dealt with at the national level. It is rarely understood as an urban developmental challenge. If anything, it is a task of the local police who should try to regulate the number of foreigners in the country. I think that the products of ignoring this will be fundamental. As we have seen in Johannesburg and elsewhere, divisions within communities can shape urban

Figure 1.5. Newly Registered Refugee, Denver Police Station, Johannesburg, South Africa, Loren Landau, May 2008

developmental trajectories. The real challenge now is to find ways of incorporating people, to get them to see the city as at least a place where they could stay and where they have an ability to stay without the risk of being extorted by the police or being attacked by neighbors. This will allow investment and trust to grow, which might provide some hope in promoting urban development. This, as Pep said, is going to be the development challenge for the majority of African citizens in years to come. Thank you.

J. WALTER TEJADA, Chairman, Arlington County Board

Thank you. Buenos Dias. I want to first thank everyone for inviting me to be part of this panel. It is really an honor and I see it as a very important occurrence. Thank you very much for your very kind introduction. I appreciate it. I will see if I can live up to that.

When I was asked to be part of a panel that had to do with migrant and immigration issues of identity, citizenship, and tolerance, I felt that this was something that I was really obligated to be part of and I appreciate having the privilege to be here with this panel. I have been to Barcelona, Spain. I was there for my honeymoon. Spain for Latinos is the motherland. Depending on your political views it can also be the great invader. People have different views on the conquest.

We have heard also about issues of immigrants in Africa and I am going to try to give you a sample of a moment in time, a location, a locality adjacent to the nation's capital. Right across the Potomac River, if you go across any of the bridges, Memorial, Roosevelt, 14th Street Bridge, you will find yourself in a place called Arlington County and I am very proud to live in that county. I always like to say two things up front when I am involved as a panelist. One is when we talk about issues of immigration, of course we need to have a legal and orderly immigration system in this country. I think most people who have a little knowledge on this subject know that the system today is broken and the people responsible for fixing it, the members of Congress and the president, have just simply failed. The other point I would like to make is that I have some very particular views and I never presume everyone agrees with me so we will respectfully agree to disagree on some of the points of view. I have the honor of being Chairman of the Arlington County Board and I have been asked to speak about the experiences of promoting immigration and tolerance of immigrants in Arlington County, perhaps in the region as well. Some of you may know that I was born and raised in El Salvador. I came here to these United States at age 13 and lived in Brooklyn in Bedford-Stuyvesant, a very tough neighborhood. But I eventually found my way through Trenton, New Jersey, and then in Washington, D.C., where I lived for five years.

I moved to Arlington County in 1992 and began an activist career. One of the things I found when I came to this area was that, unlike New Jersey, there were a lot of people who looked like me. My next compatriot in New Jersey was about twelve miles away in Princeton, whereas here there are a large number of Latinos living in the area. We have wonderful Bolivian, Peruvian, Colombian communities in all walks of life. We have people from the Caribbean in this Washington–Metro region. It is a very diverse community.

I became involved in the activism world of Arlington County and in the state of Virginia mainly to try to fight for the rights of and provide information to mainly Latino immigrants but in general to fight for equality. Now I am privileged to be an elected official in Arlington. I came to the board about five years ago and I think I have some unique experiences to share that you might find interesting on migrant issues and some of the things we have done. Obviously there is lot that still need to be done.

Our county mission statement says that Arlington will be a diverse and inclusive world class urban community where people unite to form a caring, learning, participating, and sustainable community, in which each person is important. That segment of the mission statement is particularly important to me and to a vast majority of Arlingtonians. This was reflected last year, at a time when the federal government failed to implement comprehensive immigration reform and instead felt that it was appropriate to pass and to incite a hostile environment through resolutions that sought to divide and exclude people from communities. Needless to say, I was particularly incensed and felt that we needed to do something in Arlington County. As a result, I proposed a resolution which was approved unanimously on September 18, 2007. I was never more proud to be an Arlingtonian when the county board passed a unanimous resolution in support of the positive contributions that our immigrants bring not only to our county but to the region and state. There are specific figures that show exactly how much the resolution costs. We needed to know the bottom line, so our county manager put out a statement that I will now share. You can look it up online as well at www.arlingtonva.us. Basically, at a time when not only surrounding jurisdictions but media also were using immigrants as scapegoats, we felt that we needed to put a check on the xenophobic political posturing that some people were doing and to tell people that policies of seeking exclusion from our community were wrong. We took a public stand for inclusion. The county board adopted a resolution supporting Arlington's immigrant community and indeed we endorsed the county manager's guiding principles.

There are some basic things that a community ought to do. Arlington has a long history of being a welcoming and inclusive community. It has been a gateway for not only immigrants but students right out of college, people starting careers, and more, and that is not going to change. We want to ensure that all people continue to have access to emergency, protective, and public health services. Protecting the public health relies in part on an

atmosphere of trust between the county government and the residents. The entire community benefits when anyone who lives in the community, including immigrants, can feel comfortable seeking certain services, such as health screenings. It is in our interest. The county does not deny a service when a denial could result in health and safety risks to the entire community. Why should we allow something to foster when we can prevent it?

The county aggressively prosecutes people who commit felonies and, as mandated by state and federal law, checks the immigration status of any person who commits a felony. Sometimes people say "Arlington County is allowing criminal activity, why is nobody checking immigration status?" If you commit a crime, you are just going to have to do time. That is just how it works. We do comply with all state and federal laws regarding immigration. It is the law and I am not ready to go to jail. We comply with the federal and state laws for the immigration status of those who commit felonies and serious crimes to be sent. It is not the first thing we do. It is not the first line for the police; they are not going to go around checking immigration status. That is a dangerous slippery slope; as you know, some people have entered in without evidence and now find themselves making all kinds of amendments and trying to wiggle their way out of some things that they have created themselves.

Arlington also complies with equal employment opportunity laws and federal regulations related to resident status of employees. The county does not enforce federal or state laws unless mandated by the law and it is not responsible for enforcing federal income tax laws. If we have to check immigration status, sometimes I wonder why we do not also check whether residents pay their taxes. Don't we all need to comply with that law?

If required by federal law, we withhold income taxes or applicable liens of county employees. We are not responsible for enforcing federal immigration laws; that is a task that belongs squarely to the federal government. We are not in the business of checking immigration status. In some cases, we have been required by law to check immigration status but for decades, Arlington has had a tradition of integration, tolerance, and of welcoming newcomers—from fighting to integrate schools in the 1940s, to opposing the segregation that plagued that commonwealth until the 1960s, to welcoming the wave of Vietnamese immigrants in the 70s and subsequent immigrants that have arrived of Latino, South Asian, Ethiopian, and Mongolian backgrounds.

You know folks, people simply come, as other immigrants have done before, for a chance to live the American dream. People come and work. Again, I am going to repeat what I said earlier. If you commit a crime, you are just going to have to do time. But working immigrants contribute to Arlington's community and so we promote the full inclusion of newcomers.

About one out of four Arlingtonians today was born in another country. 7.5 percent were naturalized citizens and almost 16 percent were non-citizens. In 2005, 10 percent of Virginia's population was foreign-born and 43 percent of those foreigners were naturalized citizens. There are children from 127 countries speaking 105 languages in our public schools in Arlington County. Arlington's work to maintain a diverse community includes affordable housing efforts, sponsoring cultural and ethnic events, and more. I strongly support cultural pride events. We have a wonderful community of Bolivian, Somalian, and Ethiopian immigrants. Why shouldn't they celebrate their roots? We support their aspirations to work and to begin small businesses, specifically targeted toward immigrant populations. We also provide specific programs to enable new residents to participate and succeed.

Let me give you some quick examples. We have an active community outreach program that promotes self-sufficiency and, if we need to provide the information in Spanish or another language, we do. These programs teach skills such as computer literacy, cooking, parenting, job training, apartment living, fire safety, how to dial 911 and deal with emergencies, and so on.

We have something called Neighborhood College. We provide an eight-week long interpretation program for people to learn about how Arlington County government works. The program answers questions like who is this county board? What does the county manager do? How many people work for the county? What are the county departments? How can I engage in civic participation in Arlington County?

One program, called Community Role Models, looks to engage the young adult population. Arlington has one of the largest young adult populations per capita in the region. The program entices and engages young adults in civic life. That is another successful program.

We have a detention prevention program that is about gang prevention and keeping youth from joining gangs or keeping them from youth violence. The program is referred to as a leadership development program in

order to remove the negative connotation that many times accompanies gangs. It is a difficult subject that needs to be tackled but needs to be tackled in a way that is humane and that respects the dignity of those kids who are actually working hard and are trying to do well. Many do not have the skills but they are wonderful kids and Arlington gives them a chance.

Arlington has many programs that seek to build language skills, including one of the best ESL programs in the country. Arlington schools have been ranked in the top one percent in the nation. One of our schools, H. B. Woodlawn, is ranked number 16 in the country. We have a model English as a second language program. I promoted an initiative of inclusion this year, which focuses on integrating our community citizenship classes and other things.

To conclude, I will just tell you one of the things that we will be doing in the future. We have created a diversity dialogue task force, where people from a variety of walks of life—immigrants, African-Americans, whites, young adults, the elderly, and gays are part of the task force. This program seeks to incorporate all points of view into a discussion of diversity and how we can continue, because we cannot sit on our laurels; we always need to see what we can do better. I am extremely proud to be a part of Arlington County. As someone who comes from a very limited economic background, I now find myself with the privilege of being the Chairman of the Arlington County Board. I recognize that privilege and I am deeply committed to the ideals and goals in Arlington's mission statement, to many programs that assist immigrants in promoting integration and tolerance, and to trying to keep Arlington a vibrant and diverse community. Thank you.

MANUEL ANGEL CASTILLO GARCIA, Professor-Researcher, Center of Demographic, Urban, and Environmental Studies, El Colegio de Mexico

First of all I want to thank you for the invitation and the honor to be on this panel with these distinguished colleagues. My presentation is focused mainly on what I call immigration and transmigration on the southern border of Mexico. The main purpose is to give an idea of the dimensions of place and people who move along this region.

You can see on this map what I call the North and Central American region (see *Figure 1.6*). This is the space where displaced people, espe-

Figure 1.6. The North and Central American Region

cially coming from Central America, make long journeys to reach their destinations.

On the next three maps I am going to try to contrast some characteristics of the north and south borders of Mexico. In the first one you can see the population of border and adjacent municipalities or counties around the northern and southern borders, which also shows the difference in population densities; the northern border is a more populated region in contrast to the southern border (see *Figure 1.7*).

The next slide shows the difference between urbanization in the northern region in contrast to the southern, where there are very few large towns relative to what one sees in the border between Mexico and the United States (see *Figure 1.8*). And the next slide contrasts the population density on both sides of the southern border, on the Mexican side and the Guatemalan side; the coastal area has the highest densities (see *Figure 1.9*). This is related to historically better conditions for transportation and infrastructure, which has supported and helped the main routes of recent transmigration across this border. The population mobility on the southern border of Mexico ex-

Figure 1.7. Population Density of Border and Adjacent Municipalities or Counties, North and South[4]

Figure 1.8. Difference between Northern and Southern Urbanization[5]

Figure 1.9. Contrast of Population Density of Southern Mexican Border[6]

hibits different kinds of movements. In the first case there has been a histori-
cal temporal movement of seasonal workers or non-skilled immigration in a
growing and diversified labor market. This migration is partially authorized
– there are documented migrants and also undocumented migrants. A large
proportion of these migrants has historically consisted of seasonal workers,
especially employed in agriculture, although recently migrants enter into
other labor markets, with different lengths of stay. You can see in the next
slide the number of agricultural visitors per year, recorded through docu-
mentation processes by migration authorities, for the period from 1999 to
2005 (see *Figure 1.10*). Notice the decreasing trend due mainly to the coffee
crisis, the main source of employment.

In recent years there has been an emergence of new flows of migrants
from Central America. In the 1980s refugees often moved out of the Central
American region to the north and to other countries on different conti-
nents. These migrants mainly went to the United States. A well known case
is Guatemalan peasants, who moved into the southern border of Mexico.
In recent years, however, this kind of displacement has evolved. These mi-

**Figure 1.10. Number of Agricultural Visitors
to Mexico per Year, 1999 to 2005[7]**

grants are no longer refugees but they are mainly workers who moved to other destinations.

Starting in the second half of the 1980s, we have been watching this new and growing flow. Individuals and families enter into Mexico to reach the northern border and cross it to enter the United States in mostly non–authorized modalities. That is the case of undocumented migrants who cross the Rio Grande or other crossing points of the U.S.–Mexico border. Initially they cross the river Suchiate, or more recently other crossing points of the somewhat extensive border between Guatemala and Mexico. Then they cross the Mexican territory, and finally they try to reach the northern border where they face the wall. However, Central American migration flows to the north and south. Many migrants head north, for we are also aware of the presence of South Americans and even people from out of the continent that have been moving, especially from Nicaragua, El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala. In the opposite direction, there is also a flow of Nicaraguans that moves south to Costa Rica. But the migration patterns have been changing radically because of the changing policies of receiving

**Figure 1.11. Deportations and Rejections of Unauthorized
Foreigners by Mexican Migration Authorities, 1990–2007[8]**

and transit countries, because of different means of transportation, and be-
cause of other conditions, such as the operation of smugglers who help mi-
grants evade controls. Some of the methods are very dangerous because of
accidents suffered in trying to evade the authority's control.

Statistics of apprehensions and deportations taken by the Mexican migra-
tion authorities report the number of deportations and rejections of non-
authorized foreigners by Mexican migrant authorities between 1990 and
2007 (see *Figure 1.11*). There has been a growing trend since 1990 and the
number peaks in 2005. Since that year there has been a decreasing trend.
The 2007 figure is around 100,000, but the trend is coming down and there
is some debate that authorities and scholars, analysts, etc. have not reached
consensus on what is going on with this trend. In the next slide we can see,
for instance, what happens in the period of 2007 with these deportation
figures, depending on their country of origin (see *Figure 1.12*). You can see
that those standing majorities come from Honduras. This is a composition
that has changed over time. The Honduran population has been growing
since 2000, while people from Guatemala and El Salvador have been di-
minishing all this time.

There are multiple dimensions and contrasts that are hard to address in
a short presentation regarding the characteristics of the southern border of

Figure 1.12. Number of Unauthorized Foreigners Sent Back from Mexico, by Country of Origin, January-December 2007[9]

Guatemala 27.9%

Honduras 48.0%

El Salvador 11.1%

Nicaragua 4.3%

Ecuador 2.0%

Brasil 1.5%

Otros 5.2%

Mexico and the case of the displacement of people, regardless of the fact that it is a shorter border than the northern one and is limited to Mexico, Guatemala, and Belize. This border is only 600 miles in contrast to the nearly 2,000 miles of the Mexico-U.S. border.

The difference also has to do with the fact that the southern Mexican border is divided between two nations, with different histories and relationships. As you well know, Guatemala links with the other Central American countries with Hispanic backgrounds, while Belize is more closely related to the Caribbean basin and belonged for a long time to the commonwealth and an Anglophone culture. Bordering [Mexico] is its regional link with Central America and more extensively with Latin American countries. Mexico is diverse in many senses: in geography, demography, ethnicity, environment, and natural resources. This has captured the attention of many institutions, both national Mexican institutions, as well as the international community.

I am going to end the presentation by making some remarks on the characteristics of population and mobility in the southern border of Mexico. There is an intense and strong relationship among some towns, regions, and sub-regions along this border. I am talking about sub-regions because regions are not always homogenous, geographically or ethnically. For a long time migration and, more generally, population mobility have occurred for a variety of purposes, like those related to family links. Other reasons deal with labor as I mentioned in the case of agricultural workers and trade. This is something that has increased in recent years, when demand for labor has diversified in terms of new occupations and different lengths of stay. For

instance, construction work has increased among jobs for migrants, as have services in small towns that employ women who work in domestic services and trade establishments.

It is a region with high levels of marginality and poverty. The southern border of Mexico is contrasted with other regions because of its high level of poverty described in terms of marginality indexes. And it is also a region that is highly vulnerable to natural phenomena, as evident with recent hurricanes and tropical storm events like hurricanes Stan, Wilma, and Mitch.

There are increasing risks and human rights abuses against migrants associated with the enhancement of migration policies and border management. In this case, in terms of tolerance and social attitudes of people located in settlements along migrant routes, intolerance is limited. In contrast, there have been many expressions of solidarity. This kind of abuse is a byproduct of policies more than of social attitudes. One concern deals with the high levels of impunity that people engaged in these kinds of abuses are granted, whether they are individual people or organized criminal gangs or authorities who are linked with criminals who abuse migrants in many forms of extortion.

There is also a problem with the construction of policies. They do not deal directly with labor migration and border management, but instead with national security and the struggle against terrorists in a region where migration—clearly a predominant kind of labor migration—does not influence national security.

Finally, I think that we are facing a future of uncertainty, as the effects of some free trade agreements are not clear regarding what will happen with population mobility in Central American countries, just as we do not know what will happen in Mexico in regards to the future of migration into the United States. Thank you.

Selee: Thank you Manuel. Thanks to all the panelists for such provocative presentations and also for leaving almost a half hour for us to have a discussion with the whole group. We have a very distinguished group. I see Michael Jones-Correa, who is a former fellow here and at Cornell and from whom we will hear later, as well as Manny Gonzalez, a good friend of the Center. Many of you are panelists and participants in frequent activities here and let's just open up to the audience. You can identify yourself by name and affiliation.

DISCUSSION

Question: I wanted to ask the first two speakers, Mr. Subiros and Mr. Landau, about social capital. I wonder if you could comment briefly on how social capital links into identity. Does it compromise the notion of assimilation or does it promote increased tolerance by making immigrants feel more comfortable? Thank you.

Subiros: This is an interesting and quite complex question. I have been trying to make some comments that relate more specifically to what we are talking about here. I think more is known, especially now that there have been some studies in Europe and in Spain, about social capital brought by immigration which is not acknowledged in everyday life and everyday work. About 30 percent of immigrants have high superior studies but only about 10 percent of these immigrants occupy positions related to their qualifications. So there is a big amount of social capital that is ignored, that is not acknowledged, that is not given the possibility of making contributions for the host society, and that does not give immigrants the opportunity to fulfill their expectations.

How does this relate to integration? Well, I think it is very clear that communities with rich social and cultural capital are also the most integrated communities. What's more, these host communities act as a bridge to establish fruitful relations between the host society and the communities. On the contrary, immigrants that have a high personal capacity which is not recognized are also normally the immigrants that are the most prone to having attitudes, situations of resistance, and of experiencing some sort of conflict with the host population.

Landau: From what I have seen, I think it really depends on the basis on which that social capital is formed. One of the things we have seen in the last few weeks in Johannesburg is a very strong level of social capital among certain groups, which has been extraordinarily exclusive. The basis of protecting our group means having to violently exclude others. I think this is partially because there is not a civic basis for social capital in most African cities. The kinds of public or secular forums, which are broadly legitimate across the social spectrum, do not exist. In South Africa, we have tried to create things like community policing forums or chambers of commerce.

They have often been highly nationalistic in the way in which they function, which has prevented the building of trust or a sense of common destiny among the different groups. So you can have high levels of social capital but a fragmented social capital which is presumably native. The trick is to build common nodes that can build a kind of social capital that is more inclusive.

Question: My question is also to Professor Landau. I found one of the things you mentioned in your talk to be very interesting. That is, the difficulty in determining even who is the native in these African cities. But you also mentioned later in your presentation that the locals have this negative attitude toward migrants and they want them to keep to themselves and not to integrate. My question is who did you define as a local given that there is this difficulty?

And a sort of brief question is: does formal citizenship make any difference? If a migrant acquires a citizenship of a country, does it change anything at all? Thank you.

Question: Are there nongovernmental organizations in your communities that you have studied or observed that are actually working toward assimilation or inclusion? What sort of things are they doing and have you observed them to be successful? To what degree?

Question: I want to thank you for your service and your courage. We have talked about the migration of human capital, also social capital in the United States, and we talk about civic engagement. The primary concern now is the physical capital, the infrastructure, the investment in our own roads, in our own networks. How do you envision integration when we have very aging infrastructure? Thank you.

Question: I have one question on sources of xenophobia and one on how politics affects xenophobia. Perhaps on sources of xenophobia, to Pep, do you think the Catalans are more or less xenophobic than other residents in Spain?

To Manuel, do you think from surveys or interviews or literature that Mexicans are generally less xenophobic than say, people in Europe or the United States, because they are themselves subject to xenophobia when they come to the United States?

To Loren, the question is, in your survey, did you see some patterns of variation by city, particularly on the question of those who say "too many foreigners" and comments like that? Do you see a pattern there?

And on policy effects I will disagree with your statement that it is not popular attitudes or not deep social attitudes but political rhetoric, etc. I was fortunate enough to be able to do a panel survey in the Russian Far East of 400 respondents polled twice with policy change and yes, policy change affects attitudes, but I would say 80 percent are still deeply rooted social attitudes. And with that effect I am wondering, what evidence did your base your conclusion on that it is primarily politics and policy and not deep social attitudes?

To Walter, since you are dealing with these issues as a government official and in government you often have to have benchmarks and policy effectiveness evaluations: did you have any evaluations of some of these policies that you mentioned that were quite exciting like reduction of gang activity and other things? Thanks.

Castillo Garcia: The first question dealt with the existence of NGO organizations and the answer is yes, they exist, especially on the southern border. There is a limited number of organizations that deal with the defense and the protection and assistance of migrants in transit. That is what I talked mainly about. But they also deal with the resolution of labor conflicts between agricultural workers—or workers in general—and employers. More important is the kind of organizations that work with migrants in transit, especially the already known case of the catholic priests, who run shelters for people in transit both to the north and also for those who are coming back.

There is also an outstanding case of a shelter run by a lady who won a human rights award two years ago, who takes care of people who suffer accidents on the train. People who fall down often lose arms, feet, legs, etc., and they require special care before they return to their communities of origin. Regarding the second question, it is difficult to determine the amount of the percentages from surveys. I only know about one survey which asked about the perception and attitudes of people regarding the presence of foreigners in the country. I do not remember the exact figures but I think that more than half of the respondents did not see it as a jeopardy. I am not sure of the methodology and the seriousness of this survey.

I think there are dispersed expressions of the solidarity I talked about, of people regarding the presence and the transit of foreigners in the country.

There is a film that documented the case of a town in southeastern Mexico where women in that town organized to feed people who were moving in the train. They throw food to migrants on the moving train. There is also the outstanding case of a county near Mexico City where the mayor declared that he would not permit the operation of migration authorities to take the upper hand and deport migrants. It is a sort of sanctuary, like the case of sanctuaries in the U.S. in a situation concerning refugees, and this is also important. That is why I would remark that the policies that shape attitudes and expressions of xenophobia are many times being fed by media. But I would say that most people do not have or support expressions like that. They share their concern of what all Mexicans also suffer when they cross the border.

Tejada: Let me try to respond to Bob's and Juanita's questions. Bob's question was about organizations not only in Arlington County but in the region that are working to integrate immigrants, to create civic engagement opportunities, and so on. On Thursday of last week, the region launched the New Americans Initiative. It is an effort that Casa de Maryland, Tenants Workers United, myself, and a number of other people have been involved with for over a year now to come up with an initiative that would seek to expedite the citizenship of about 470,000 legal permanent residents who are in the Washington Metro region. We want to create what are called integration centers throughout the region. The program will need some funding, so I want to put in a plug. If you know anyone or any foundation that will be willing to learn more about it, I would be happy to share the entire proposal and to encourage your help. This is specifically for people who, as some in the anti–immigrant movement like to call it, have "played by the rules." These are people who are legal permanent residents. There was an article in the *Post* discussing opposition to this initiative even though it is targeted at people who are legal permanent residents. It is amazing. I look at that stuff sometimes to get inspiration, to see all the comments, the reason why we took the fight even higher for equality and justice. If you do not have anything to do tomorrow at twelve noon, I am going to be on the Kojo Nnamdi Show on NPR and I will be talking about the program, expanding on it a little more.

The Expanding Committee of Virginia (HCV.org) is another very good organization that has many immigration programs. El Programa Hispano,

through the Catholic Charities, is another good organization. Ethiopian Community Development Council based in Arlington works across the region to help immigrants from all walks of life. In Washington, D.C., we have the Central American Resource Center. They have a website also and I encourage you to contact that organization. This organization helps all immigrants including non-Latinos.

There are other organizations that are based in Washington, D.C., such as the League of United Latin American Citizens (lulac.org). The oldest and largest Latino civil rights organization in the country is National Council of La Raza. It also has a web site NCLR.org. There is also MALDEF, Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund. These are just some. I can go on but let me get to the other question quickly.

I will respond to Juanita's question about infrastructure. Indeed, the Washington Metro region was built out some time ago and in northern Virginia we are dealing precisely now with issues of infrastructure. When I ran for reelection last year, I focused on two issues. One was fiscal responsibility and sustainability; the other one was infrastructure. We can have policies that integrate and assimilate people. That is part of having a citizenry. But we also need to take care of the basics. For instance, this year we provided some additional funding for Stone Water Management. We have a movement to replace our sewage pipes. It is not the most sexy or glamorous project, but we need to address it. Transportation is a conversation we are having in the whole state of Virginia. Some people think transportation will appear like magic and they think that raising taxes is the worst thing ever. We need to come up with additional funding for modernizing our roads, our infrastructure, so there is work in progress.

Everyone is paying their fair share. I will just give you one example. There is a Cassidy study that has just come out, which says that undocumented immigrants in the state of Virginia pay between $3 and $3.5 billion in taxes. I will be happy to give you the source for that.

On the benchmarks, I really like your question. We do need to mention what we are doing; in Arlington we have many challenges and we are not immune to some problems. But I think we are also doing a lot of good things. We have had a substantial reduction in gang activity. We have taken the attention and prevention approach where it is more difficult, a little more hectic, and tedious to prevent things. It calls for working with the schools and seeking community involvement. When I was elected I asked

the Council of Government to do a regional forum on gang prevention. We did that. We thought we would get about 200 people but 550 people showed up to focus on prevention. Prevention for some people is arresting and deporting everyone in the world. I disagree with that approach as prevention. Instead we need to provide funding for nonprofit organizations who already know the community. They do not need money to do a study to evaluate a survey to see if they can do something. They already know. What they need is more funding. We need to give organizations for young African-Americans funding so that they can go out and do their work. So we have had a substantial reduction in gang activity in Arlington County. Today Arlington has the lowest crime index since 1960. Remember folks, in the increase of diversity that I mentioned earlier that we have had, we have the lowest crime index since 1960 in Arlington County.

Our schools are ranked in the top one percent in the nation. H.B. Woodlawn, one of our schools, is 16th. Our high schools are usually in the top one percent. We have the strongest economy in the region. Again, we are not immune but we have had few foreclosures. We have not taken the approach to scare people out of our community. Instead we have embraced all residents. If they are working they pay taxes and that is good for our economy. I do not know anyone that goes to buy something at a drug store and says, "Look I am an undocumented immigrant, do not charge me taxes, I want to get a free ride." That does not happen. People are paying sales and property taxes if they own a car. If they rent property the landlord pays property tax to the county. Those are very important things.

And finally we do have the lowest unemployment rate in the entire state of Virginia and we have steadily had that benchmark in our county. I can go on to other things but I want to give my colleagues an opportunity to get something in. I will be happy to give more statistics on that but it is important to have benchmarks. I am looking forward to the Diversity Dialogue Task Force on the value of inclusion that I launched this year to see what our benchmarks are going to be. We are going to have a dialogue about diversity issues that is not limited to immigration. It is also about race relations. It is about the elderly, about age being a place and all those other things. I would be happy to give more information if we have time later on.

Landau: Thanks. I will just be quick because all of the questions you asked are actually huge questions. I will take the opportunity to answer very superficially.

Oxana [Shevel], I think that you are right. In trying to define who is the native I think that it is often seen as the foreigners and the locals and a kind of double-dealing where they are sitting around each other trying to figure out how they fit together. And I think amidst that huge diversity, the commonality among the locals is that they come from the place. This becomes sort of fetishized; it becomes the theme that brings them together and that is part of what is behind the exclusion. There is this kind of deficit of belonging and people do not know where they fit.

In terms of formal citizenship, I do not think it makes much difference. What we have seen across the board is that people with or without documents get services to the same degree, get attacked or harassed by the police to the same degree, and in South Africa you can still be deported quite easily with or without documents. It does have a very symbolic effect however. I think where the state is seen as legalizing people, it promotes the idea that these people have a right. It is not a direct relationship but I think the idea where the state continually keeps people extra legal or outside definitely makes them more exploitable and sort of seen as linked to crime and other illegal activities and I think that definitely promotes xenophobia.

Mikhail [Alexeev], in terms of the variations there are many, of course. I see two highlights; one, as mentioned in the presentation in Maputo, is seeing higher levels of inter-group trust than we saw elsewhere. And there seems to be this idea that the foreigners are not liked anymore than they are elsewhere, but the citizens do not see it as their job to police the city, whereas, in Johannesburg, they very much see it as their responsibility. I am not sure what accounts for that difference but I think that it is a very interesting thing.

In Lubumbashi and South Africa xenophobia exists mainly against foreigners, non-citizens. Most of the people moved into Lubumbashi as a result of the war in Eastern Congo. But, because of the history of ethnic fragmentation in the Congo, they are seen essentially as non-citizens; Zambians and others who come from mining tend to be treated with a greater degree of respect, whereas, the people who come from elsewhere in the country are seen as victims of war and dirty refugees. The Zambians are coming in as

workers, which is more respectable. There are also these interesting dynamics that I think deserve further explanation. I will just leave it at that.

Subiros: Many things have been said. I think that Walter said two very important things that spare me to develop more. I will talk about the question of physical capital which I think is a very crucial question. We too often discuss the problems of immigration as being basically cultural problems, problems about perception. There are very important problems of perception but, most importantly, there are the physical structural problems.

In Barcelona, there is a good atmosphere between the different Hispanic communities that live there, especially Catalan. During the 1980s, the neo-democratic local governments basically developed a policy of creating good infrastructure where immigrants lived. Hygienic facilities, public spaces, etc., are incredibly important to the success of communities. This policy is being continued now in terms of being very careful and responsible to create, renovate, or to extend the physical infrastructure facilities for immigrants so that there is not a situation by which there is a sector of population, foreign population, that is excluded from the physical system.

The second question that he mentioned is the importance of NGOs. As Walter said, in many cases NGOs know what the reality is on the ground. Most action taken by public administration in Spain is to intervene in everyday questions of health, education, language, and so on through NGOs. There is a good triangulation between public administration, NGOs, and immigrant communities. NGOs play a very important role.

I am probably forgetting a few other things but I cannot avoid disagreeing with Professor Mikhail [Alexeev], in a very civilized way. I think there are some anthropologists, such as Caroline Bledsoe, a fellow at the Wilson Center now, who would probably be able to respond better than myself. Oftentimes, the case has been made for the embedded feeling of fear, of rejection towards the others as an innate human feeling. At the same time, however, there are a lot of historical experiences and traditions giving the foreigner special consideration as someone who has to be especially respected. Both cases can be made.

On what evidence do I base what I say? The evidence is precisely the difference between what is happening in Spain and what is happening in Italy. Both countries share a very similar experience in terms of immigration pro-

cess. Both countries have been emigrant countries for a long time and have become immigrant countries in the last ten, fifteen years.

The social response to immigration has been, and still is, very different. [In Spain] there has not been any meaningful conflict, any meaningful process of exclusion towards immigration, with the exception of very small incidents. In Italy there have been continuous problems. What would I say is the main difference? In Italy you have had something like the League of the North which you probably have heard about. It is a political party of Northern Italy which has taken the immigration issue from the very beginning as a main political issue. The Italian political right has taken immigration as a whole as one of the most crucial issues. This has not been the case in Spain, on the contrary, for it would be complicated to develop. There is no time. But there has been a sort of political cordon in Spain even by the political right, even by the Aithnard governments, who have probably implemented processes of legalization of illegal immigrants because the economy needed them.

Language can be converted into a very powerful political tool. Tradition can be converted into a very powerful political tool. Immigration can be converted into a very powerful political tool, but not always. If there are no political forces that use policy as a strategy at the social level, these issues do not normally become crucial issues.

I think that the example of South Africa is very interesting in this case. And I have friends in South Africa who have this opinion. What is happening in South Africa is not so much a problem of xenophobia but the problem of misery caused by poverty. It is part of the legacy of upper faith. The ANC has not been able to resolve all the problems of poverty of South African populations, of the physical structures that we were mentioning and so on. And now, competitors—immigrants—from outside are making life more difficult for the ones who already have a difficult life. That can be rationalized as xenophobia but is not necessarily the real cause.

Panel I, Part II—Migration Integration: Identity, Citizenship, and Tolerance

Chair: Allison Garland
Program Associate, Comparative Urban Studies Project, Woodrow Wilson Center

That was a great start this morning. I do not know if Blair [Ruble] mentioned this before but we are really pleased to be launching a book today in conjunction with this meeting: *The Immigration and Integration in Urban Communities*. Some of the book's contributing authors are here today – Michael Jones-Correa and Caroline Brettell. I was just reading over the book, which is hot off the presses, and I was reading the chapter by Caroline Brettell again. In her chapter, which focuses on looking at migrant communities in Dallas, she talks about two forces at work. She talks about looking at immigrants as agents of the process of claiming space and "making place" or not, as Loren Landau pointed out this morning. In this chapter she also talks about the institutional structures that urban and suburban governments construct to receive and incorporate immigrants.

I think Walter Tejada gave some good examples of policies in Arlington County that are being used to promote tolerance.

I thought the comments that Pep Subiros made this morning were especially interesting. He was talking about how immigration has been used as a political tool and he pointed out the issue of conflicting state and national policies with local and municipal level policies. Manuel Angel Castillo Garcia also spoke about the influence of national security policies and their influence on population mobility. I think that this meeting and this book present good forums to talk about and look at the interplay between these two forces.

In the interest of time, I will just go through the panel and introduce the speakers. We are really pleased to have this morning Patricia Landolt, Assistant Professor of Sociology at the University of Toronto; Cynthia Buckley, Associate Professor of Sociology at the University of Texas at Austin; Oxana Shevel, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Tufts University; and Davlat Khudonazarov, Senior Research Fellow at the Russian Academy of Sciences. And I want to say that we are especially pleased to have Davlat here this morning. I understand this is your first speech in English and we are very glad to have you here.

PATRICIA LANDOLT, Assistant Professor of Sociology, University of Toronto

Thank you. It is an honor to be here. I am going to be speaking about a project that we have been developing over the last couple of years in Toronto looking at Latin American immigrants and particularly the political incorporation processes of Chileans, Salvadorans, Guatemalans, and Colombians. The overarching project is called "Places of Settlement, Projects of Return: Latin American Immigrants in Toronto." It is a project that we have developed with Luin Goldring at York University, also in Toronto.

The way we frame it and what I would really like to focus on here is the whole notion of immigrant political incorporation, which by now the literature defines as a context contingent process of political socialization that occurs in a variety of institutions. So those institutions might range from immigrant participation and political socialization in hometown associations, in unions, in community gardening projects, etc. The range is really quite broad and it points out the idea that political socialization in the process of political incorporation is about pathways and trajectories through institutions rather than any marked threshold of citizenship, such as naturalization or voting. Within that there are two tensions that we have tried to address in the project. One has to do with whether we should get at pathways of political incorporation by looking at the behavior of individuals or whether we should look at the range of organizations that an immigrant group or migrant wave develops to understand the variable outcomes. The other tension we are interested in looking at is the relationship between trajectories of incorporation, or institutions that are transnational in their logic, and others that are assimilative, and the relationship between these. In other words, we may see a hometown association which is a kind of transnational form that is quite common in the United States, although not in Canada, for Latin Americans. We might see that as something that would suggest a transnational trajectory of incorporation but over time see that organization involve people in more assimilative processes as they learn about a set of institutions in the city in which they are settled. So that is a tension we are interested in looking at.

In our discussion we look at the organizational trajectories of these four Latin American groups and we focus on the early settlement period and the kinds of organizations that groups develop. The reason we focus on settlement is that, as you may know, in Canada immigration policy includes not

only the issue of selection, who gets across the border, but also the issue of a strong government project to use the early settlement period as a pathway for political socialization. The Canadian Settlement Services model involves funding voluntary sector organizations to deliver a set of services that are considered key in the settlement process. Rather than chasing charities, which is what Walter Tejada talks about, in Canada the government offers funding to voluntary sector organizations to conduct a range of activities that in theory facilitate settlement.

When we look at the four groups that we are interested in—Chileans, Salvadorans, Guatemalans, and Colombians—we see that they represent three of five distinct waves of Latin American migration to Canada. Latin American migration to Canada is not a replenishing migration, unlike Latin American migration to the United States, where social networks and informal trajectories are kind of core to explaining movement and settlement. In Canada, each of the five waves of Latin American migration begins from a point of refugee migration with a Canadian state recognizing the population as being from a refugee-producing country. So in each case, we see at least 30 percent of the individuals from that country entering as refugees accepted by the government or as asylum seekers. That is an important difference.

In our project we conducted 18 thematic focus groups with community activists, beginning with country of origin community activists, and we basically asked them to chart their organizational trajectories from when they first arrived in the country. I will now talk specifically about Chileans. What we asked Chileans to do was to talk about Chilean organizational agendas, priorities, and basis for organizing, over time. Was it, for instance, partisan allegiance, religious identity, ethnic identity, migrant networks? What is it that put this organization together? What kinds of allies did your community develop for institutional interlocutors? Did alliances develop in Toronto, across Canada, in your country of origin, but also in Europe? This kind of charting exercise allowed us to establish longitudinal pictures of organizational trajectories for each country of origin group. So it allowed us to capture geographic reach of organizational networks, scalar reach, and their sectoral range. In other words, we could see, for instance, if a national origin group began with a focus on organizations that dealt with economic issues and then fanned out to deal with cultural, political, and religious issues or whether they moved across sectors over time. So in a sense we were able to construct institutional pathways of political incorporation.

Now I would like to talk about the four cases. In each of the case studies that I will talk about briefly, I am going to talk about the context of exit

that frames immigration and in particular the notion of political violence and how it affects the groups' expectations about their story, why they are in Canada, and how long they expect to be there. We also are interested in the relationship with host society institutions in that early settlement period. We talk about the ways of doing politics that the immigrant group brings with them and finally the range of institutional interlocutors. As I look at the dimensions and the variation across the groups, it will give you a sense of why we identify those as important factors to explain variation in pathways of political incorporation.

For Chileans, what we see is a migration that begins after 1973 and that continues through to the mid-eighties; it is a migration that obviously comes out of the coup that overthrows socialist President [Salvador] Allende and the dictatorship that follows that. This is a group that has an expectation, sees itself as an exile group that does not plan on settling in Canada, and where political violence is experienced, very targeted, and in a sense generates social cohesion. It is bound by solidarity based on party allegiances to different parties involved in the socialist project of Allende. That is the kind of basis for organizing in the early settlement period. So the Chilean settlement agenda in Toronto reflects the importance of partisan organizations and the predominance of the exiled agenda. Settlement concerns are that engagement with the host institutions emerge as part of the transnational political agenda that focuses on regime change in Chile. So for instance, the Toronto Chilean Society, which is an inter-party organization founded in about 1975, created something which is a school that basically focused on teaching kids Spanish and Chilean history but that also saw itself as developing Chilean kids' self-esteem, which was considered important for children's success in the Canadian school system. And what we see through that institutional moment is Chilean parents learning about the Canadian school system and eventually a trajectory that leads to the election of a Chilean woman as a school trustee in the city of Toronto. So that kind of a path is what we are trying to chart.

Another example is a socialist-run sports club, which on the one hand raised funds for the resistance in Chile for political prisoners but on the other hand ran several youth soccer leagues in the city. So in the Chilean settlement agenda what we see is the development of autonomous Chilean controlled organizations that define an agenda and then proceed to enter into dialogue with Canadian host institutions. So they see this as a dialogue of equals and the agenda is set by that exile project and not by Canadian institutions.

In the Central American case we look at political violence as both targeted and widespread and in the Guatemalan case as experienced as genocide. There are, on the one hand, pockets of cohesion that result from that violence and the kind of partisan education that was received in the countries of origin but, on the other hand, strong rivalries within the population, as in the Guatemalan case. And so there are mixed socially expected durations of how long immigrants will be in Toronto and in Canada. Some involved with the project return to countries of origin and others with the project remain due to violence. That is all many immigrants remember about their country of origin and many never want to return.

So in that context Central American settlement issues emerged discursively in a dialogue of transnational politics but are organizationally distinct from guerilla-linked transnational organizations that are present in the city of Toronto. Those organizations linked to the FMLN (Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front) and the URNG (Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity) tried to develop a settlement agenda but it is completely disconnected from Canadian institutions and basically petered out in the context of the signing of the peace accords.

A second set of settlement agendas for Central Americans emerges under the auspice of faith-based nongovernmental organizations that participate in the settlement process, such as the Quaker Refugee Committee and the Jesuit Centre for Social Faith and Injustice. In that context we see the emergence of mutual aid organizations that begin with very straightforward weekly meetings to share information and with a real emphasis on getting past the traumas of violence that refugees have gone through in countries of origin. From that, they develop a series of cross-sectoral initiatives. Women's organizations lead to soccer leagues, which lead to the school system. However in this case, all of those initiatives take place under the auspices of Canadian faith-based organizations, which is very different from the Chilean case where there is an autonomous dialogue.

The final case I am looking at involves Colombia, which is the most recent refugee initiated migration wave of Latin Americans to Toronto. It is a migration that begins in the mid-nineties and continues to the present. In the case of Colombia, political violence has been ongoing for the last 50 years and now, under [Alvaro] Uribe in particular, we see the paramilitarization of social life. So, political violence is not attached to a political project that people would be for or against. At this point it feels, at least for the Colombians in Toronto, uncertain, arbitrary, and that there is nothing they can do to oppose it. It is a question of just avoiding politics and the violence

that comes with it. Social capital in this group is thoroughly eroded. There is socialized elation and there is fragmentation. So when we see the emergence of a settlement agenda it is adamantly apolitical, and an issue-based friendship. Pragmatic concerns serve as the basis for generating a settlement agenda, so we see Colombians creating specific organizations across a series of sector-arena issues. This applies, for instance, to Colombian professionals concerned about accreditation and Colombian families concerned about speedy family reunification. Neither of these organizations spread out sectorally. They stick to one issue. There is no cross institutional overlapping or collaboration and the relationship with host society institutions, including the settlement institution, is perfunctory. The mentality is, "Give us a room, we want to meet." That is it. There is no ongoing dialogue.

Through this we are trying to get at the idea of mapping pathways of political incorporation. We talk about unpacking contextual factors. There is a classic article from the 1989 *International Migration Review*, and I am sure we are all familiar with it, by Alejandro Portes and George Borjas*,* where the authors ask a very basic question: why is it that people with similar levels of human capital end up on very different paths in terms of socioeconomic outcomes or modes of incorporation? In a sense what we are trying to get at is explaining why it is that groups end up with very different trajectories of political incorporation, starting out with what appear to be fairly similar situations in terms of the context of exit and context of reception. We would see these are very similar groups coming out of involuntary migration including a mix of educated and uneducated, with a certain degree of political socialization, etc.

What we are trying to do is unpack those contextual factors to identify what contextual factors are conceptually relevant that might explain variation in multi-political incorporation. So it is not simply about being voluntary or involuntary migrants because in these cases they can all be framed as involuntary refugee migrations. But rather to look at the rule of political violence and the modes that political violence takes to explain the constitution or the sources of social capital that the group has or does not have.

We are also interested in using those contextual variables to explain the differences in the ways of doing politics that each group has. Chileans have a way of doing politics that is all about political parties. Central Americans have much more of a social movement approach to doing politics and Colombians actually make an effort to avoid looking like they are doing anything that might be considered political.

So those paths are important for explaining, for instance, why a settlement agenda looks different, what issues emerge, and how the organizations

are constituted. But they also allow us to look at the relationship between an immigrant group and a set of host society institutions. We see the Chileans as having an autonomous dialogue, the Central Americans as embedded, and the Colombians as perfunctory. The original kind of paths of political incorporation would have tried to figure out how contexts of reception explain the types of organizations that immigrants create. That is not right. Instead, I think that recognizing that migrants create different kinds of organizations, and determining the ways and the modes and the basis for organizing, which vary from group to group, is only the first step. Given these types of organizations, the second step is to ask what kinds of dialogues migrants enter into with different kinds of host society organizations. So I think it is that organizational relationship which allows us to begin to chart variable pathways of incorporation over time. Thank you.

CYNTHIA BUCKLEY, Associate Professor of Sociology, University of Texas, Austin

In the last session, Pep Subiros closed with a very insightful comment concerning the importance of cultural resonance in determining the ability of host populations to use migrants as a mobilizer for xenophobic goals, even if these xenophobic goals are often a beard for other political or economic goals. I believe my research, and the case I will discuss, highlights a related issue of the use of migrants as a polarizing symbol. My talk will focus on the Eurasian migration system and two topics that have a lot of cultural, economic, and political traction right now: health and migration. Specifically, I will talk about the ways in which health has provided anti-migrant groups with a new form of traction. With high rates of economic growth and increasing economic stability in the Russian Federation, the economic argument, which highlighted the economic costs of migration, was starting to lose a bit of social resonance. Health concerns, which remain significant and growing, may well "come in and off the bench," as an extraordinarily effective backup topic for the negative framing of migration within the Federation.

I have three goals. I first want to talk about theoretical links and background literature concerning extant wisdom on the relationship between migration and health globally. Empirical research links health behaviors, health outcomes, and migration – much of it focusing on positive migrant health selectivity. Second, I want to contrast the current popular portrayals of labor migrants in Russia as carriers of disease, which occurs both in the

Russian Federation and upon return to countries of origin. Migrants who return home after living in Russia, especially those headed toward homes in Central Asia and the Caucasus, are often portrayed as potential harbingers of infectious disease, expressly in terms of Tuberculosis and HIV. Lastly, I will close with a call for increased attention to issues of migration and health within the Eurasian Migration System, talking about the importance of integrating evidence-based assessments of health into migration debates within the region.

In terms of framing migrants as a type of "diseased other," what we find, in Eurasia and elsewhere, is very similar to debates about economics. Empirical evidence on health and migration points to healthy migrant selectivity. To a certain extent, countries such as Ukraine, and especially Russia, accrue benefits to their overall health profiles from immigration, particularly given their dire demographic situations. The addition of healthy migrants, who tend to have lower rates of alcohol consumption, lower rates of smoking, and better health behaviors, can assist in revitalizing local populations.

But that is not the way the migration card is played in political and social discourse. Migrants are typically plagued with negative framing, if not presented as carriers of plague outright. Notably in the political sphere—and this has a lot of cultural traction in Russia at present—migrants are increasingly identified by the label of the "diseased other." Migrants are shown as an external threat, spreading communicable diseases in addition to economic dislocation and social unrest. This negative labeling is certainly evident in the U.S., where comments concerning immigration include claims that migrants bring plague and leprosy. Migrants are assumed to come from regions with poor health care, low immunization rates, and health threats not found in destination states. This is amplified by a focus on the unregulated, underground economies and marginal housing that migrants inhabit, which may foster illnesses such as Tuberculosis. For example, in a recent Moscow protest, posters addressed the threat of immigrants selling food in the streets that is unsafe for consumption, placing consumers at risk. It is similar to the recent demonization of goods from China in the US; we import our toxic goods from China, and they have immigrants come and make the toxic goods there within Russia.

Migrants are often seen as the embodiment of underdevelopment. They are seen as less modern, less civilized, and less educated. They are also often attributed with poor health practices: "they have not been immunized;" "they do not go to the doctor like we do;" "they live and work in poor con-

ditions;" "they might not have the same culturally defined ideas of health." In response to these attitudes, in terms of structure and infrastructure, they have very little access to health care at their destinations. Migrants are oftentimes employed in dangerous, dirty, and demeaning work. They are at health risk for injury and they have very little opportunity to seek treatment.

But it is not just at destinations that migrants are seen as the "diseased other." In work that I have just completed on migrant-sending families in the Caucasus, concerns over health emerged again and again. This project looked at labor migration, particularly male labor migration into Russia from the Southern Caucasus. This labor movement, important for family survival, was cast as the "exporting" of health resources by several sending families in Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia. As one respondent noted, "Our men worked like slaves, ate poorly, and endured horrible conditions. They returned ruined, selling their health for wages." Return migrants bring back the negative health impact of labor migration, sometimes having been injured and unable to acquire healthcare services, or simply having spent their physical capacity in incredibly physically demanding jobs in Russia or other destinations.

Structurally, from the political side, across the ministries of health in Central Asian and the Southern Caucasus, migrants returning from Russia in particular are targeted, both in terms of how statistics are kept and also in terms of general discourse about health. They are perceived to be the ones that bring in HIV and Tuberculosis infections. They are the ones that come back with various forms of hepatitis, mostly B and C. The notion is that this is the way in which Russia is still exploiting these colonies since it is where such diseases originate.

At both destination and origin, migrants are seen as a disease vector. Framing migrants as disease vectors is a rhetorical strategy used across political discussions as well as in the media. This framing is kind of ironic. If it is indeed the case that migrants are these "diseased others," then we really need to look at the Eurasian system because it seriously differs from the accumulated empirical existence of migrant movements across the globe.

Typically what we find in Western Europe and North America is that immigrants often exhibit significantly better physical and mental health than the native born. This is especially true for migrants who live in enclaves. In the United States, for example, Hispanic birth outcomes for the foreign-born are better than native born Hispanics and better than non-Hispanic whites, controlling for socioeconomic status.

There are several possible explanations for migrant health advantages, including the "salmon effect," positive selection, and culturally protective health behaviors among the foreign-born. One idea that has been offered, and supported by empirical research concerning Mexican migration into the U.S., is the "salmon effect." Healthy migrants move to a destination to work, but when they become sick they have no choice but to return home. The foreign-born at any given destination exhibit relatively strong health profiles, since they only include the best and the brightest. Those who become ill return home. Preliminary data points to the possibility of a "salmon effect" within the Eurasian Migration System. In both Azerbaijan and Georgia, migrant-sending families note that men will return from Russia when faced with health challenges that hinder their ability to work. According to sources within the ministries of health in Azerbaijan and Georgia, labor migrants are much more likely than non-migrants to suffer cardiovascular disease, drink heavily, and smoke heavily. Whether this reflects health trends that can be generalized versus further negative labeling of migrants is hard to say. However, charging that return migrants exhibit markedly poorer health than non-migrants is somewhat surprising, given evidence on positive migrant selectivity. Labor migrants tend to be selected from among the healthiest groups within sending communities. Clear data on health and migration histories is somewhat lacking across sending countries, but there is some evidence of this "salmon effect" influencing the situation in the Eurasian system.

Throughout the excellent presentations today, we have talked about assimilation and integration as something that is good for migrants. That is not always true, particularly in terms of health behaviors and particularly in terms of moving to what some scholars would call toxic health environments. Existing research highlights the negative influence of American health behaviors (fast food, lack of exercise, obesity) on many immigrants. I think that among scholars we could generate significant agreement with the idea that Russia also has a somewhat toxic health environment, in terms of wide spread prevalence, if not the normative support, of negative health behaviors and high levels of social stress. I do not think that this argument requires a big leap of faith. Documenting differences in health behaviors is problematic, for when we look at large-scale surveys like the RLMS (Russia Longitudinal Monitoring Survey), there are limited numbers of foreign-born respondents. However, on at least a few indicators, migrants display significantly lower levels of a lot of negative health behaviors. The foreign-born in Russia smoke and drink less than the native born. Preliminary anal-

yses of the 2005 Russian GGS (Russian Generations and Gender Survey), which had a larger sample of foreign-born respondents, indicate that the foreign-born exhibit markedly better health behaviors, but that the relationship is only significant for the non–Slavic foreign-born. Furthermore, for all ethnic groups this relationship tends to decline with increasing duration of residence in Russia.

If you flip your analytical frame around, to assess issues of wealth and infrastructure, you find a different pattern. The foreign-born are more likely to live in poor socioeconomic contexts, elevating their health risks. Labor migrants in Russia, as elsewhere, live in crowded conditions. They tend to have limited access to highly nutritious foods. Social stress, often linked to their unregistered status, amplifies the potential effect of structural influences on migrant health.

The issue of selectivity is especially important, although in this room I think I may be preaching to the choir. I am sure everyone in the room is sympathetic to the need to move beyond tendencies in policy discussions or in media framing discussions that talk about migrants as an undifferentiated sack of potatoes. Migrant selectivity is of central importance. Migrants tend to be concentrated in the younger working ages. They tend to be positively selected for health. They can assist in demographic revitalization in aging societies, and perhaps provide examples of positive health behaviors. The positive demographic effects of migration are certainly something that the European Union is acutely aware of, and the positive contribution of migrants is something that I would think most individuals involved with financial projections concerning Social Security in the United States would be happy to point out.

However, those sorts of ideas of positive selectivity and healthy migrants do not exist in terms of popular discourse, especially in terms of the media. In an investigation with one of my graduate students at Texas, Wilson Getchell, we found that in portrayals of migrants by major Russian national and regional newspapers over a three year period, 186 articles focused on issues of migrants as health threats. In other words, over one article per week evokes the idea of the "diseased other." One of the more egregious statements was in *Pravda* at the end of 2006, which reported that HIV infections were 15 times higher among migrants than among native born, but of course there was no primary source provided for this statistic. Health among migrant populations is certainly a hot button issue, and one with a lot of cultural resonance in the Russian Federation.

Our review of the media also highlighted issues of a variety of infectious disease, sexually transmitted diseases, immunization coverage, and leprosy. Leprosy is always a big one in terms of targeting the "diseased other." That holds true in the United States as well. What I find interesting is that in all of these 186 articles, there was never any differentiation between individual health behaviors and contextual health risks. When talking about Tuberculosis,—which can be linked directly to living in crowded conditions, or the prevalence of intestinal disease caused by bad water—discussions of the structural health threats migrants face are not mentioned.

Approximately 17 percent of the articles we analyzed brought up issues of demographic revitalization, but only two of these 186 articles even mention the idea of health in a positive way in terms of health revitalization. This is simply not something that is part of the popular discourse. The absence of health links to labor migration movements is also seen in the sending regions. In Tajikistan, the major national weeklies devote a section to migration, showing the importance of migration as a means of economic survival. While issues of violence against migrants are often covered, there is little on issues of migrant health selectivity. When the Central Asian press raises the issue of health in examinations of labor migration, it tends to focus on the idea that migrant health is spent in Russia, as part of the export of human capital. Several press reports emphasize that return migrants suffer severe detrimental health consequences.

More specifically, the national centers for HIV/AIDS in the Southern Caucasus also all note that returning migrants, chiefly from Ukraine and Russia, contribute significantly to increased HIV prevalence in the region. If you access their website data for individual countries and simply look at the general statistics, you will see that the AIDS centers very specifically point out that all migrant-related cases of HIV linked to labor migration are coming from Russia and Ukraine. In informal interviews in 2005, the then-director of the Azerbaijan AIDS center justified this form of presentation by saying that migrants always transit through Ukraine or Russia, and that is where infections occur. Alternatively, this might be a very clear way of painting the return migrant as a "diseased other," and putting blame for the spread of the pandemic on Russia and Ukraine.

In a related area deserving attention, discussions have recently emerged about pension and insurance issues in sending and receiving communities. In terms of press reports in the Southern Caucasus, only now are the individual ministries of health starting to consider the implications of state

responsibility for sick or infirm labor migrants coming back. Who will provide health care and old age pensions for these individuals?

I want to reiterate out that focusing on health and migration seems to make an enormous amount of sense in bringing together issues of transnationalism and migrant assimilation in the Eurasian Migration System. This is an increasingly important issue in Eurasia. While data are presently lacking, and deserve increased attention, health selectivity does occur. We need to study issues of health and migration in more depth within sending and receiving regions.

Our theme for this panel is tolerance, which depends on the characterization of migrants – both the characteristics they actually have as well as our perceptions of their characteristics. Given that health now provides a new frame for conceiving of the "other" in the Eurasian system, more attention to health would be wise. It is difficult to study health effects in this region, however, because there has been very little data collected on migration duration, as well as linking health records to foreign-born status. Linking health to citizenship status in the United States certainly has never proven effective, and would not be a prudent policy in Eurasia. However, it is extraordinarily important to encourage organizations in the region to view health as an important migration issue.

One well-known NGO in Moscow that works with Tajik migrants argues that Tajik migrants are actually in the worst position of all. Other migrant groups—predominantly Armenians—have local co-ethnics who are dentists and doctors, mainly in large metropolitan areas like Moscow and St. Petersburg. Tajiks, however, do not have many co-ethnic healthcare providers, reflecting their lower socioeconomic status. While in Russia, they are possibly at an elevated health risk, in comparison with other migrant groups.

Thinking about how migration networks, assimilation processes, and the existence of enclaves can facilitate access to healthcare—beyond legalistic approaches as to whether migrants have the right to go to clinics or not—could do much to unpack how health influences migration in this region. More and better health data is definitely needed. We need to think clearly about this issue if we are going to adequately measure the costs and benefits of migration both at the destination and the origin of migration.

This is the second session on tolerance, and one of the things I want to point out is that tolerance and ignorance are extraordinarily highly correlated. I think there has been quite a lot of discussion in the press in Russia and in the academic literature across Eurasia about the positive economic

contributions of migrants. Certainly that is the case in the United States as well. Unfortunately, I think both in the U.S. and in the Eurasian migration system, we seem to find a persistent ignorance about the positive health selectivity of migrants that does tend to lead toward ignorance and the framing of migrants as "diseased others." This could be a huge obstacle for developing more tolerant approaches to labor migrants both in the Eurasian migration system as well as here in the United States. Thanks.

OXANA SHEVEL, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Tufts University

Thank you very much. It is an honor to be here. In my comments today I will focus on my research surrounding the politics of policymaking, especially of refugee policymaking in the post–Soviet region and even more specifically in Russia and Ukraine. I am going to be talking about the importance of state policies relative to social perceptions so perhaps things that I will say might contribute to a discussion.

I want to begin with highlighting perhaps the obvious but also important way in which migrant and refugee policymaking in the post–Soviet region has been very different. Certainly this was different in the nineties and I would say it still is from migration refugee policymaking in more developed western countries. These differences involve the virtual absence of many of the so-called traditional sources of refugee policies. Say you want to analyze refugee politics and policies in the U.S. and Canada and Western Europe. Most scholars would look at things such as the position of major political parties. Parties on the left are sometimes perceived to be more receptive and more tolerant than right-wing parties. Also, the position of institutions, courts for example, have been known to be important. The courts have played a liberalizing influence on migration policies in Western Europe. In addition, there are so many institutional legislative legacies, entrenched interest groups, migrant interest groups, employers of foreign labor, and organizations that form migration and refugee policies in Western countries.

Now what is interesting about the post–Soviet case is that virtually all of these forces have been basically non–existent. The reason they have been non–existent is that when communism fell and the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991 and these countries basically faced global immigration, transnational immigration, and refugee movement for the first time, there was simply no legislative legacy or institutional legacy that existed. These countries did not have refugee laws or immigration legislation during the Communist

period. Because these countries were democratizing for the first time, there was no party system; there were no stable political parties that could have had a position on these issues. To give one piece of evidence from the research that I conducted in the late nineties, I talked to representatives of all political parties in the Czech Republic, which is considered to have one of the strongest and most well-established party systems. Each representative, without exception, said that their party had no view on migration refugee issues and did not enforce voting discipline on these rights. Again, looking at some of these traditional sources of policy has not been very helpful in understanding how these policies are being made.

On the other hand, what actually does influence migration and refugee policymaking in the post–Soviet region is debates about who actually constitutes the nation. Who is "us" and who is "the other." In the post–Soviet space, migrants and refugees began to come in as these countries emerged as independent states. The countries had to basically figure out who belonged to the nation at the same time that they had to decide whether to accept refugees and immigrants, and if so, whom to accept.

Professor Landau mentioned that in African cases, it is not always clear who constitutes "us" and who constitutes "the other." This is even truer in the post–Soviet region because it is impossible to define a foreigner. Is it the person who was born abroad? But what then is abroad? Is somebody who is born in Tajikistan or in the Baltic States a foreigner in Russia or in Ukraine in the same way that somebody who was born in China is? So, the question of who is a refugee and who is a foreigner was debated at the same time that the countries faced migration and refugee flows.

I would say that basically for the last 10 to 15 years, these debates about who actually constitutes the nation have been affecting the content of refugee and migration policies in these states. One could say that these debates about the nation and immigration policies are linked everywhere. But they are all the more linked and all the more consequential in the post–Soviet region because these other forces of refugee policies such as economic interest, party politics, courts, and so forth have been absent.

The ways in which these debates affected migration and refugees, debates about nations, and the ways in which they affected the content of migration and refugee policies have been interesting and oftentimes quite counterintuitive. Again I just want to give an example from the research that I have done comparing Russia and Ukraine. There was an interesting phenomenon in the 1990s. Both Russia and Ukraine faced tremendous migration, Russia more so in absolute terms. Relative to the population, per capita migration

from the other former Soviet republics to Russia and Ukraine have been quite comparable. Many of the so-called co-ethnics came in. A lot of ethnic Ukrainians returned to Ukraine, a lot of ethnic Russians returned to Russia from the other former Soviet republics. In addition, both countries faced so-called new foreign migration. The Afghans, the Africans, and people from Southeast Asia came to these countries, some of them as refugees.

The policies of these two countries have been quite different. In the 1990s, Russia had quite a generous migration policy towards migrants from the former Soviet republics, even though the lives of these people were still very difficult. But at least there was quite liberal and receptive legislation that enabled migrants from the former Soviet republics to obtain legal status in Russia as either refugees or forced migrants. At the same time, migrants from what in Russia is sometimes called "far abroad," from outside of the former Soviet Union, from the developing world, had a very difficult time obtaining refugee status.

In Ukraine it was completely the reverse. There was no preferential treatment for either ethnic Ukrainians or people from the former Soviet Union. In general, in the 1990s, Afghans were receiving refugee status in quite significant numbers. In fact, most of the refugees who have legal status in Ukraine are from Afghanistan. In my research, I found that this difference is attributed to the way the debate about the boundaries of the nation formed. More specifically, in Russia, there was general agreement that people from the former Soviet republics, especially Russians and Russian speakers, somehow constitute part of the "us." That translated into more receptive refugee and migrant policy toward this particular group. It does not mean that this demographic necessarily had a rosy life, but relatively speaking they were in a good place.

In Ukraine on the other hand, when there was no such agreement on just who belong to the nation, there was a hotly contested national identity issue. There was not really a political consensus at either the elite or the societal level on exactly who constitutes the nation, and this counter-intuitively opened a political space for more or less equal treatment for different migrant groups. This was not indicative of a more tolerant population or an enlightened political elite, but rather of the fact that there was no agreement on who was the "us." With no group singled out for preferential treatment by virtue of being a part of "us," all groups got treated equally.

I will now discuss the extent to which this kind of political space could be opened by contested politics of identity in the post-Soviet region and the

extent to which these policies would actually materialize. In the post–Soviet case, international institutions played a significant role in shaping refugee immigration politics. Today most studies would probably give primacy to domestic sources of these kinds of policies. These studies often conclude that the way in which countries respond to refugee and migration challenges has perhaps less to do with what international institutions or international law has to say but has more to do with domestic politics and domestic interests.

That is not to say that domestic issues did not matter in the post–Soviet regions, but I would say that in the post–Soviet case, international institutions definitely played a very important role. Why should international institutions and, in this case, the UN High Commission of Refugees (UNHCR) even be in a position to be influential in the post–Soviet region? I would say this has to do with the fact that the issues are so novel and domestic expertise is so limited and entrenched domestic interests are so few. When international organizations come in, they are the experts and they have the financial capacity. In the mid-nineties for example, the Ukrainian presidential administration's department that dealt with citizenship and migration was the only department fully staffed with computers. This money came from UNHCR. Maybe some would say that funding was not significant, but I think these bureaucrats appreciated things such as having better workspace than they would have had otherwise. So I would say that these international organizations have a potential to exert influence, and oftentimes a liberalizing influence in the case of the UN. Whether or not this potential is realized—that is to say, whether international organizations could succeed again—depends on the extent to which they are aware of how different migration refugee policy is in the context of the simultaneity of nation-building and dealing with refugee challenges.

If an international organization comes in and it has formed policy solely with international law in mind, international law defines a refugee as someone who crossed the international border. But in the post-Communist region international organizations approach countries where the question of who is a refugee is a lot more contested because borders essentially disappeared overnight. A lot of people who domestically are considered refugees within Russia, for example, would not fall under the international legal definition of refugee because they either did not cross an international border or because they are entitled to Russian citizenship. So the challenge comes in terms of promoting more liberal and receptive policies toward these groups. International organizations are challenged to recognize the specificity and complexity of the context of refugee policymaking in countries

that are simultaneously nation-building and experiencing the migration of refugees. In the cases that I looked at, I found that, initially in Russia, the UN was not able to think outside of its mandate restrictions, defined by international law, and so was not very successful. But in Ukraine, it took a different approach from the start and chose to assist a broader category of migrants, including those, such as the returning Crimean Tatars, who were not refugees in the sense of international law. So it sort of underwent this learning process on the basis of experience with Russia. As a result, the UNHCR in Ukraine had increased leverage with the national government as compared with Russia.

I have just a couple more points I want to mention. One is about temporal dimension. I began by saying how, initially, the refugee and migration policymaking context has been very different in these new states. This context has been changing over time as some of the more traditional actors of refugee migration policy are now at play in the post–Soviet space. Organizations such as courts have been known to play an important role and oftentimes have been able to champion migrant refugee rights quite successfully by providing legal support for poor decisions and outcomes. For example, if someone's refugee claim has been denied by the government, the courts have sometimes ruled in favor of the refugee. We are talking about ways in which migrant integration could be promoted. One would be this legal avenue that has proven successful in Western Europe.

NGOs are beginning to play a more important role in these countries, providing the kind of social services and integration support that they have been providing in Western Europe. This is still at the early stages but definitely worth keeping in mind.

Another important factor, which can also be controversial, is the impact of the European Union—Europeanization—on migration and refugee politics and what it means for places on the periphery such as Russia and Ukraine. Scholars that have been studying Europeanization, although not specifically with regard to migration issues but in general, have noted that Europeanization has not been uniformly positive in terms of fostering greater democratization. It seems that in order for a country to join the EU it has to be a democracy. This is fine, but some of the effects that the EU had on domestic politics of the candidate states stifled domestic discourse and domestic competition. Political parties did not even compete on the real issues.

I think one could make an argument that the impact of the EU in directing refugees and migration and on the content of refugee and migration

politics has not necessarily been in the liberalizing direction, even in countries that are not candidates for membership such as Russia and Ukraine. These countries have been very quick to adopt some of the more restrictive practices of the EU, such as the imposition of the notions of the "safe third country" and "safe country of origin," whereby people who came from a certain country or transited through a certain country are not even given a chance for a fair hearing but are channeled through accelerated procedures or down right not accepted at all. This is something that has been going on in the EU but when countries such as Russia and Ukraine adopt these policies, the result for the migrants and refugees is all the more detrimental because countries adopt these restrictive practices without accompanying them with the safeguards found in the legislation and practices in EU member states. As a result, in recent years in Ukraine, a majority of asylum applicants were not even permitted to have their claims heard. These applicants have been rejected upon submitting their claims because they came from supposedly "safe countries," failed to meet deadlines, etc.

In sum, the relationship between democratization and becoming closer to Europe, the expected democratizing effect of this process, and the tension it actually creates means that some of these effects are not actually that democratizing. I think its worth keeping in mind and maybe thinking more about how democracy and refugee policies are related. And if you look statistically at the levels of democracy and refugee recognition rates, there is not a clear negative relationship but there is certainly is not a clear positive relationship either. Even if you look at the case of Ukraine after the Orange Revolution, the country is supposedly more democratic, but if you actually look at what has been happening with the treatment of refugees, it is definitely not better and most would say it is probably worse than it had been pre-Orange Revolution. There have been cases of deportation to Uzbekistan, for example, of people who clearly would have been considered refugees under international law. Yet new governments, despite their democratic credentials, have not really lived up to obligations to refugees. I think this relationship between democracy, democratization, and refugee rights is worth exploring.

The last thing I want to mention goes back to the importance of state policies and the extent to which the law actually matters. I would say the law definitely matters, because if, for example, the law is permissive, then the law allows for the more tolerant interpretation, and there is a political space for all of these other actors and support for NGOs. I think state policies make this task of tolerance and promotion of non-discriminating poli-

cies easy. It does not mean that the law would automatically lead to inclusive and tolerant practices, but at least there would be a possibility that these kinds of practices would ensue.

One interesting piece of evidence from the legislative debates in Russia for example, is that despite the growing sentiment that all of the Tajiks, Georgians, Armenians, etc., are kind of undesirable as either disease carriers, criminals, and so forth, it has proven pretty much impossible to have anything to that effect reflected in the law. There have been several attempts to officially define *Russkii* (ethnic Russian) in explicitly ethnic terms, but none of them succeeded. Who exactly is Russian? The law "On Compatriots" offers pretty much the only official definition of the nation, but it is so vague that it includes Tajiks and all the others, although nobody wants them included. I think that is really interesting. [Vladimir] Putin's representative in the Duma during the debate over the citizenship law in 2002 specifically said that Russians would not welcome the Tajiks. So even though Russians would go as far as institutionalizing their sort of racist intolerant attitudes, they still cannot have them reflected in the law. I do not think that is insignificant because I think it does create at least a possibility for promoting more inclusive and tolerant immigration policies. Thank you.

DAVLAT KHUDONAZAROV,
Senior Research Fellow, Institute of Oriental Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences

Good afternoon. I would like to remind you of the main reasons for Tajik emigration out of their homeland. The first major immigration to Russia took place after the events of February 1990. Government troops shot demonstrators taking part in a protest in front of the Central Committee Building in Dushanbe. For Russians and Russian-speaking citizens, it was a signal of the coming instability that would force them from Tajikistan. Two years later the social unrest turned into civil war, accompanied by ethnic cleansing based on identity of origin. Russians as well as Tajiks started fleeing Tajikistan. Tajikistan officially reached a peace accord in 1997 but an economic crisis and unemployment still forced people to stay outside the borders of their motherland. Since that time, refugees have become labor migrants. The number of the migrants started to increase due to the inflow of new immigrants coming to Russia in search of work.

Note that the majority of immigrants came to Russia on a temporary basis to earn some income.

It is very important to understand the migrant level of integration into Russian reality. I believe that Tajik labor migrants were, and remain today, crucial to the long-term employment and economic improvement in Tajikistan. During the volatile times in Tajikistan, up to 40 percent of the Tajik economy was supported by Moscow. Money sent home by labor migrants could have revived the national economy if there had been favorable conditions for small and medium ranged business establishment. Instead, money sent back to migrant families was simply spent on food and did not catalyze any economic reforms.

Over the last five years, between 400,000 and 1.5 million Tajik labor migrants have arrived in Russia. I believe that the most realistic number is approximately 800,000. According to the 1989 census, the number of Tajiks was around 36,000 in Russia. However, according to a 2002 census, the number of Tajiks who have obtained Russian citizenship since 1992 increased to 20,000, and this happened within 13 years.

One would wonder why the number was so small compared to other ethnic groups from the former USSR. In the summer of 1996, Russia and Tajikistan ratified their agreement of dual citizenship. As a result, the number of Tajiks granted Russian citizenship has increased. There are several reasons explaining why a number of labor migrants still did not become Russian citizens. Psychological factors seem to be one of the most important indicators. First, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, many of the former USSR citizens believed that the country would reintegrate in one way or another and did not feel it necessary to become a citizen of another foreign country and adopt new living conditions only to face reintegration. Secondly, an overwhelming majority of Tajik labor migrants hoped that after the civil war and the establishment of peace in their motherland, their lives would return to the normal, pre-war Soviet life, the kind of condition which would allow them to return home. Third, the inner resistance of people to part with their motherland is very strong, particularly among Tajiks from the mountain area. Finally, the fourth reason explaining why labor migrants did not become Russian citizens was a series of barriers hindering migrant legalization in Russia. The long list of documents that immigrants had to submit to obtain legal status was not the main problem. The bigger issue was the level of humiliation labor migrants were subjected to in dealing with migration authorities.

At the very beginning, when powerful immigration flows consisted of hundreds of thousands of people, the immigrants became easy prey for mi-

gration officials. People began to face all kinds of barriers, starting in their own backyard as they had to bribe almost every official in their own country. The extortion of money from Central Asian migrants became a lucrative business. Labor migrants, while passing endless corridors of humiliation, started to lose their identity and very soon turned into social outcasts. Despite all of this, thousands of Tajiks became Russian citizens. These were people whose persistence enabled them to achieve their goals.

Ten years ago I recommended that families purchase cheap housing in Russian regions and apply for citizenship. I selected two regions to be used as fields for two pilot projects for Tajik families before they became permanent Russian residents. The first project had to be carried out in the village of Troitsk, in the Lev Tolstoi District of the Lipetsk region. The second one was in the settlement of Stavrovo, in the Vladimir region.

However, before recommending to people to move into any region, I conducted a needs assessment to determine the level of environmental pollution, including radioactive pollution, the locals' level of tolerance toward non–Slavic people, the level of infrastructure, the presence of secondary schools in the village, the presence of health centers or first aid stations, the presence of post offices, telegraphs, stationary phone lines, and the agricultural conditions.

What were the prospects for settlers? It is easy to register and obtain residence rights. Once a family buys a house and land in the region, it will be able to apply for and receive Russian citizenship and Russian passports at a minimal fee in accordance with the current citizenship laws. This will enable them to live in the Russian Federation permanently and enjoy all the rights of Russian citizens. Tajik migrants who obtain Russian citizenship will be able to retain their Tajik citizenship. However, it was also necessary for me to consider the Russian government's interests and the local population's interests. Immigrants had to not only abide by the Russian laws but also be culturally sensitive to the local population. I asked the settlers not to exceed the limit of twelve or thirteen families per district. I am not an advocate of compact living, though I fully realize it is important for retaining native language, culture, and tradition. Moreover, it is no less important to show respect toward the local culture and local residents as well. That should lower the risk of any potential ethnic conflicts and tensions.

Ten years passed and today I counted seventy Tajik families living in Troitsk and neighboring villages. More than 100 people became Russian citizens and regard this experience as a successful one.

At the same time, our settlement project was implemented in Stavrovo in the Vladimir region. We had difficulties with settlers' registration, and also had conflicts with local militia. However, after some negotiations with local authorities, we finally managed to overcome all the obstacles by simply explaining immigrants' reason for migrating to Russia and where they were coming from. At present, the settlers maintain friendly relations not only with their neighbors, but with all local administration. There are sixteen Tajik families and over 70 people became Russian citizens.

We had some bad experiences as well. This only happened in the Tver region. The settlement where the arriving families came was called "Burnt Old Settlement." The migrants decided to settle there without consulting with me. They partially paid for their houses and asked me to help them in funding interest-free credit to pay the rest of the price and finally, families settled in. In 2005 three houses were set on fire. No one was hurt, however the houses burned to the ground. Militia acted passively. Four families sold their houses and left.

One family of five remained but was constantly fined and humiliated as the authorities came up with all kinds of reasons not to process their residences in their community. At the end of January, a famous journalist and human rights activist wrote an article about this family and published it in the governmental Russian newspaper. The family still has a lot of difficulties but after the publication of the article, the elder daughter was granted permanent residency and I hope that the family will get the same status by September of this year. The family was advised to leave but they were determined to stay, despite the dire need for the mother to find money for urgent eye surgery. One of her family members had already taken a loan and invested in one of the daughter's education. I warned them that the publication of the article may worsen their situation but Shakhlo, the second daughter, said, "Let it become worse. At least now people know the truth. Is it fair that I won the Students' Olympics, and that my compositions in Russian are some of the best, but at the same time my parents have been fined because of me?"

When I asked what she wanted to do after finishing school, she told me that she would like to study at the juridical faculty to be able to protect honorable people. It seems to me she would be a very valuable addition to any Russian community.

DISCUSSION

Question: I cover Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. I have a couple of questions and both of them relate to gender. I am wondering what the gender factor is in constructions of the "diseased other?" While most of the migrants who come to Russia are men, my understanding is that the vast majority of labor migrants from Kyrgyzstan have been women, although that is starting to change as there have been crackdowns on markets and construction areas are increased. So I am just wondering how women are constructed—whether this makes any difference or whether it is just too abstract.

And then in terms of citizenship, my understanding is that Kyrgyz are becoming citizens at a faster rate than Tajiks. I am just wondering, given the factors that you gave, how this can be explained.

Buckley: Thank you for that question. The gender element is really important. And in terms of the way it manifests itself in health, most of the literature now does focus on male migrants, particularly in terms of the HIV links. The Spitzer Corollary, that you do not need to cross an international border to engage in risky behavior, has not really caught on there. So the focus is on male migrants and their risky health behaviors, although all the evidence we have from other countries points to internal migrants as well as international.

In terms of the gender effect, what is interesting, and this is again based on preliminary analyses because this is a project that is starting in the fall, is that obstetricians asked in Moscow very clearly talk about how non-Russian women have poor prenatal care and they do not follow instructions and they show up to the hospital late yet they still have better birth outcomes. So it does not really fit too well. I have not seen any of that literature. This is from work done by the Institute of Sociology. I do not know how that relates specifically to Kyrgyzstan.

The Kyrgyz case is different as most Kyrgyz women are working in factories. In the Moldovan case the idea of the female "diseased other" is that female migrants are all prostitutes, a shocking factor. I have been told this several times. And so that is the way in which the "diseased other" sort of gets manifested, so that people will actually say "well, no, it is okay to go to that brothel, they are not Moldovan."

Khudonazarov: About citizenship for Kyrgyz and Tajiks: for Kyrgyz people it is easy to obtain citizenship in Russia because they have an agreement. Kyrgyz citizens refuse their citizenship of Kyrgyzstan and fully accept Russian citizenship. It takes three months to get Russian citizenship.

Tajik people have an agreement which creates a barrier for them. There should also be an agreement between the Russian and Tajik governments although it is doubtful that Tajikistan would accept such an agreement.

Let me answer the first question. I am thinking generally about the status of women. It is one of the most painful issues. Between 70 and 80 percent of men, particularly young men aged 18 to 50, move to Russia and to an unfamiliar culture. They lose their identity and at the same time, their wives are in Tajikistan. The rate of children without fathers, as well as the marriage rate, decreases. I think that for the Russian government, there is a narrow window of opportunity to accept Central Asian migrants, because after 30 years, no one will be able to migrate because of the demographics. Every year now Russia is losing workers and during the next 10 years, Russia will have 10 million fewer workers and so of course Russia will need workers.

Question: I am the Kennan Institute representative in Kyiv and a scholar from Ukraine. I just want to know more about the sources you have used in speaking about the healthcare of migrants in Ukraine. Can you clarify this?

Buckley: Again, like I said, this is really preliminary. Most of the quotes and the press review were based on Russian sources. In the Ukraine situation, as Oxana [Shevel] had also mentioned, the more robust nature of the NGO sector that focuses on migrant rights in some ways does provide a lot of stop-gap care. And while certainly this idea of migrants as the "diseased other" does come into play, I really would leave that either to Blair [Ruble] or to Oxana [Shevel] to really talk about in terms of health in Ukraine.

In terms of how it is seen in receiving countries who send migrants to Ukraine and come back to the South Caucuses, what they argue is that it is just too expensive and so it is more of an economic cost in Ukraine. But I want to couch that by saying this was based on a small sample of forty-five families. And so when families sent workers to Ukraine, those workers would never go to the doctor upon their return, because they were trying to stay in the shadows as they had been there without work permits and also because it was too costly. Clearly much more work needs to be done.

Now I will say that the Ukrainian National Aid Center does not post their statistics by migrants and/or places of origin or destination so kudos to them on that front. I think it is an excellent question and I am sorry but at this point I do not have the empirical data to answer it. All indications point to economic barriers. As Oxana [Shevel] so clearly pointed out, it is a slightly better health environment.

Question: I study Moldovan women migrants who go to Turkey to work as domestic workers. My question does not have to do with gender migration, but actually with the fact that what has come out in this panel and in the last one too is the fact that integration is really a problem of xenophobia and intolerance and racism in the host countries. I am wondering if there is any NGO or legal activity that is targeted at the populations of those host countries' natives or locals. We talked a lot about NGO activity that services the migrant communities but not so much about those that target the host community to fight racism and xenophobia and also to help integration. Thank you.

Question: Is there a religious aspect to this also, say Muslim versus Russian Orthodox? It just has not been mentioned.

Shevel: Let me just say a little bit and Blair [Ruble] can probably add more because really all I know is more specifically about refugees than about migrants in general. One of the things that the UN has been involved in is precisely these kinds of activities you mentioned, promoting tolerance and knowledge of who the refugees are. They have done some television ad campaigning. There is Refugee Day, which I think is June 20 every year, and they will actually hold this in Ukraine. I think they even had a football game between refugees and the Ministry of Interior passport and visa officials. That was quite interesting. It actually does help. They do it in different towns. So that is really the only one that I am aware of and I will defer to others who might know about specific NGOs that are engaged in this kind of activity.

Can I ask Cynthia [Buckley] this health question? If you were a migrant in Russia or Ukraine, up until recently, *propiska* registration had been critically important. If you wanted to get any healthcare, you had to have a residency stamp in your passport, which assigned you to a specific clinic where you could go for medical attention. With the reforms of this *propiska* system,

in Ukraine it became really permissive. Now you just have to go and declare your address and there are no longer stringent requirements attached. I wonder if that affects the rate at which migrants seek care. A lot of them obviously do not register, but if they do register can they then go to the local clinic and get health services? What happens if they call an ambulance? Does it come? The UN has been providing a kind of ad hoc health service for the refugee population. They basically pay a local hospital to treat these people. So in the nineties refugees in Kyiv would be directed to the Clinic of Oil and Gas. And again, it was not anything official. It was just that the UN gave money to this hospital so that refugees could go there.

Khudonazarov: I do not have facts that show problems between Orthodox and Muslims in the regions, but it seems to me that the Orthodox people and priests should be more actively defending Muslims in the region. Before I started the two cases of Troitsk in the Lipetsk region and Stavrovo in the Vladimir region, I came and met priests and I informed them that we had an idea. They welcomed the idea without any problems.

We have several NGOs, including Tajik NGOs in Russia. My wife founded one of them, and she and her colleagues every day receive emergency phone calls. Migrants can call twenty-four hours a day and the staff is well-informed and trained to help; my wife more with police, with militia, and health and death issues. In the beginning it was very difficult, but now people are trying to create some unity and to build institutions to defend it.

Question: I have a question for Cynthia [Buckley]. I was wondering if you could talk about how the public perception of the "diseased other" has translated into both the receiving countries and sending countries. For example, how are returning migrants welcomed? Has it changed in the last couple of years in terms of how the community receives them? Are they discriminated against in employment if they are known as returned migrants? Has this shifted at all? Has this sort of trickled down into their day-to-day lives or is it still at a propaganda level?

Buckley: I have not come across any studies about how it translated into, for example, subsequent employment restrictions or maybe impediments on the marriage market or something like that. I would proffer that it is a complex propaganda situation because at the same time that you have the portrayal of the "diseased other," you also have economic incentives that are working the other way. So you are coming back and you are suspicious

because you might have picked up TB or an STD or you might now have a drinking problem but you may be the only person in the community with resources and those two things may balance out in different ways.

Erin [Trouth Hoffman], do you want to add anything about women migrants in Georgia?

Erin Trouth Hoffman, graduate student, University of Texas: From my own research it sort of seemed like there were associations between female migration and engaging in prostitution and coming back as an "other" but within women's own immediate social circles, the families and friends tended to make exceptions. The mentality was basically that all female migrants are prostitutes, but not *my* friends. There seemed to be a lot of protective factors in the immediate social circle.

Question: My question is for Patricia [Landolt]. You gave a very interesting window on different pathways based on certain experiences of the different distinct communities. These are communities that arrived in Canada at different times. I am wondering if the Canadian side of the equation entered into this as well. Did it make a difference if the Chileans came earlier and are there differences in perceptions among Canadians about the different groups? Is there any sort of Canadian part of the story?

Landolt: Length of residence in country in a host society is one of the indicators that is usually used to explain political behavior among immigrants, but we have tried to move away from that to say that there are differences in the host society or the reception in terms of political opportunity structure and institutional landscape that effect the way in which the different migrant organizations—whether its Chileans, Central Americans, or Colombians—are able to engage. But it is counterintuitive. Chileans enter a context in which upon arrival, there is no settlement landscape. By the time the Colombians arrived, in fact there was a very well established settlement landscape. On the other hand, Chileans enter into a context where no one speaks Spanish because they are the first Latin American group to arrive. There were Ecuadorians previously, but very small groups. No one speaks Spanish, no one knows what to do with this really militant, well organized refugee group that has a high degree of support among the Canadian left, so Canadian churches and unions receive these people with open arms. But in terms of settlement landscape, there is nothing there. By the time the Colombians arrive, it is like an industry or a machine. So in fact what we

are interested in is how do relations between migrant groups and this institutional landscape change over time and for us the importance is in getting at the ways in which immigrants organize and in explaining why they organize in the particular way that they do, whether it is through partisan groups or social movements or in a political fashion. It is really fundamental to understand the way they relate to Canadian institutions although we obviously see changes in the host society landscape over time.

One of the discussions we seem to be having is around whether xenophobia or tolerance or intolerance are innate or constituted through institutional processes. I think that the Canadian example simply shows that people know how to be tolerant. Well, maybe not. Actually there is a 40 year investment in making that a possibility through a set of institutions. If there is a Canadian model it is about funding and mediating institutions that allow for these spaces of dialogue between migrants and non-migrants.

Question: I am wondering about what is happening in the pan-Latino space? Even some part of the work that we are doing in Dallas is dealing with two Asian groups and pan-Asian space and whether people actually identify with the pan-Asian space. So, I am just wondering what it is like in a Canadian context. We have such a powerful model of pan-Latino space in the U.S. context but what is the Canadian counterpart?

Landolt: That is actually really interesting because every Latin American group that arrives in Toronto, and in all settlements across Canada, begins by organizing based on national origin. But Canada does not ethnicize states. It determines that if you want to be heard by the government you need to constitute yourself into a tolerable and coherent pan-ethnic group based on shared language or shared region. So we have the idea of South Asians, Hispanics/Latin Americans, etc. Latino is not really a context that is used very often. And so within that what is interesting are the very strong national origin-organizing trajectories and the constitution of the Center for Spanish Speaking People, the Hispanic Development Council, and other organizations that came in and out of the picture and how those country-of-origin-based agendas impose or demand and frame the kind of Hispanic project that gets constituted in Canada.

On the one hand, yes, there is this constitutional pan-ethnic that is necessary in order to be present in a funding structure and to be recognized by

the state because the state does not recognize just one little group. But on the other hand, that Hispanic or Latin American organizational trajectory requires dialogue with all of these other country-of-origin-based groups because they are very well organized and because no group (unlike here where Salvadorans dominate D.C. and are multi-Latino and multi-ethnic but come out of a history of Salvadoran organizing) in the Toronto context dominates and there is a juggling between the multiple countries of origin and the dialogue with the Canadian government.

Question: You talk about political socialization in Canada based on ethnicity and I was wondering if you could say something about space.

Question: This may be going back to the earlier half of this session but it was something I wanted to raise. There were some references to the use of open space and my question would go to any of the panelists from either session. What are your observations with respect to the nation or particular countries you have studied where migrants use open space.

Question: I also have a very short question for Patricia [Landolt]. I spoke with Chileans in Sweden and as far as I know, many of them go back to Chile. What is the situation in Canada? Do they return? Thank you.

Landolt: On race in Canada, let us be clear. There is racism in Canada and there is a racial hierarchy and there is racialization of poverty and the worst neighborhoods are the darker neighborhoods.

The question is why don't people organize around race? What kind of ethnic politics does multicultural Canada constitute that makes it so difficult for people to say "as people of color" or "as racialized groups we share things in common." Multiculturalism makes it very difficult. It demands that the constitution of the political subject is an ethnic, under-racialized subject. If you live in Toronto you see that the immigrant advocacy groups and the groups that are concerned with the living wage and with neighborhood issues are trying to push the idea of race and racism and racial hierarchy, but in the history of early settlement—of organizations of immigrant groups—that really does not come out. It comes out later and it is complicated. So I hope that partially answers the question.

Briefly on the notions of space: Toronto, unlike most American cities, is very residentially disbursed. You do not have huge concentrations of any

particular group in any particular location. First of all, 50 percent of the population of Toronto is foreign-born. There are 180 language groups. There is no ghetto of any sort and the issue of occupying space is thus rotating. Different groups—whether they are ethnic groups, religious groups, or whatever—occupy public spaces for moments and then all of a sudden you go, oh my gosh, I did not know there were so many people from Ghana in the city because all of a sudden they are all there. The use of space is not tied to that kind of ghettozation of newcomer populations.

In terms of Chileans, yes, there were projects of return, and we cannot count how many people stayed in Chile. We see people going back to Chile post-1986. With the lists of exiles, people were banned from Chile. In 1986, the lists of the exiles not allowed to return were lifted and people began to return. Some people returned previous to that to join the underground opposition. Most of them were killed. There is this kind of back and forth because reincorporation into Chile is very difficult as it is with most return migrations.

In Canada for the first 10 or 15 years, migrants lived out of suitcases. They did not bother to really learn the ropes for themselves. Their kids did but they did not. So that was preparation for going home after the unrest in Chile had ended.

Question: I am just curious about how Kazakhstan as a new and growing destination for migrants from Central Asia (I know less about the Caucasus) differs in terms of your work on the "diseased other" and wonder if you have any other comments on Kazakhstan as a growing migrant destination compared to Russia and on how they are being received there.

Question: I have a question about Canada. This is a very interesting topic. Did local government play any role in the process of integration and assimilation of immigrants in Toronto?

Landolt: No. You know, it is a real problem because integration policy is run at the federal level. Quebec has a provincial level immigration policy. But cities bear the brunt of the implications of dealing with immigrant populations. Toronto, Montreal, Vancouver, and to a growing extent Calgary, have no control over the budget that would be required. Toronto has recently signed an agreement with our current prime minister, a conservative government, Steve Harper, to say that any immigration policies Canada

talks about will be discussed with Toronto. But in fact last week there was a huge scandal because the Minister of Immigration came into city hall and met with the conservative city councilors and did not even tell Mayor Miller that he was showing up. So clearly there is bypassing on that relationship.

Buckley: Back to the Kazak case. Interestingly enough, given the very cold reception of Georgian migrants (and it is going to get colder all the time back into Russia), one would have expected that Georgian migrants would have been directed toward Kazakhstan and its growing economy, which makes it a prime destination. By all demographic estimates and all of the studies done by ILO (International Labor Organization), as well as by local scholars in Georgia, that is not the case. They instead have turned to Europe, especially to Turkey, even though oftentimes they have attempted to get out and to get into labor arrangements in that direction. The idea of going to Kazakhstan to work is just not something that the Georgians seem to take to.

There are a large number of Azeri migrants, particularly in the construction industry, who are working in Kazakhstan as well. One might explore issues of religious tolerance and that sort of shared cultural background. I am not really sure how that works.

In terms of Armenians, because of the incredible network in Russia, Armenians just are not going to Kazakhstan. They do not have a strong network there and so they are still going into Russia in large numbers.

From data that I have from Kazakhstan it does appear that in terms of education and age, the selectivity of Central Asian migrants going into Kazakhstan is slightly lower. They tend to be older and less educated than Central Asians from Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan going into Russia. But that is based on official statistics and I think that only gives us a very small number of the total migrant movement.

Khudonazarov: During the civil wars and ethnic cleansing, many people left Tajikistan. Some of them went to Kazakhstan. People going to Kazakhstan from Tajikistan were not looking for a job there, and they moved across Kazakhstan to Siberia. But a new tendency for labor from Uzbekistan is to go and work there.

Question: I want to ask a question. You mentioned a demographic issue— that Russia may have several years of more migration. I want to ask you about

the new legislation in Russia on the return of compatriots that was passed at the end of 1998. Are any of the Tajik migrant families or these new migrants taking advantage of this program? I understand from the numbers that I have seen that relatively few people came but I am not quite sure why that is the case or what the obstacles are, because for a long time the migrant-assisting organizations in Russia have been saying that Russia needs precisely this kind of program that would enable the people who are culturally similar given their shared Soviet backgrounds to come to Russia to help address the demographic concerns. And this program, on paper at least, says that that is precisely the goal. But I wonder in practice if you know how it is being used?

Khudonazarov: If you take the legislation at face value, then there is an open door for all former USSR citizens. But in reality they are encouraging Slavic people to come. Sometimes correspondents ask top level migration officers about the particulars and they say something like, "Oh, yes, for example if the Tajik is a professor of Russian language at the university, why not?"

Again, it depends on the top level policy. There were some people around Putin who had incredibly conservative positions on immigration. Right now it is not clear if people around [Dmitrii] Medvedev will take a more liberal position. It will probably depend on the situation.

In conclusion, I would like to draw your attention to some alarming social symptoms. This year, Moscow is witnessing a resurgence of skinheads. Over the first three months, the number of skinheads' victims, labor migrants, increased three times. We have compared this figure with last year during the same time. Six coffins have been shipped to just one town in Tajikistan from the Moscow region, with bodies of cruelly murdered migrants. According to incomplete statistical data, over the first three months, Tajikistan received 210 coffins shipped from Russia. The present social political process in Russia is not a monolith. The same is true for migration policy. We see changes from the ultra-reactionary of tendencies to the reformative ones. One of the reactionary tendencies can be exemplified by the case of Viacheslav Postavnin, the deputy of the head of immigration services in Russia, who was dismissed this last January. He stood for liberalization of migration policy in Russia and made tremendous progress during his short term on that post.

A continuous struggle is going on between these two forces. The world community should take those factors into account and make the adequate contribution bearing in mind Russia's relative potential. Thank you for your attention.

Panel II: Ukraine and Russia:
New Migration Destinations

Chair: Blair A. Ruble
Director, Kennan Institute, and Comparative Urban Studies Project,
Woodrow Wilson Center

This panel is going to be talking about the former Soviet Union. I think what is interesting about Russia and Ukraine is that in a way they are yet newer examples of the phenomena we talked about this morning in relation to Spain and Mexico. These are countries that in some ways are often thought of as countries of emigration but that are becoming countries of immigration as well. So there are peculiar challenges which emerge from that status.

We also are going to be showcasing two research projects which we have been funding. One is in Kyiv, and the other is in Moscow. But we are going to start, for those of you who have not been following the intricacies of migration in the former Soviet Union, with Tim Heleniak, who is from the University of Maryland. Tim has worked at the World Bank and the Census Bureaus and knows the numbers as well as anyone. He will give a general sense of the migration patterns in the region. And then we will hear from Yaroslav Pylynskyi about Kyiv and Olga Vendina about Moscow. So, Tim, the floor is yours.

TIMOTHY HELENIAK, Faculty Research Assistant, Department of Geography, University of Maryland

Thank you very much, Blair. As Blair said I am going to hopefully provide a nice broad overview and let the other two speakers talk about the intricacies of what is going on in terms of migration in Moscow and in Kyiv. I am going to start by talking about migration numbers which Blair has kindly said I do well. Hopefully I will do this well. Then I am going to talk a little bit about migration policy, particularly the evolution of migration policy in Russia over the last decade to decade and a half or so.

**Figure 2.1. Migration to Russia in an International Context in Total Numbers[10]**

Source: *UN Pop. Division*

I think Blair pointed out in his opening remarks that Russia has become one of the chief migration countries in the world. It is second after the United States in terms of the total migration stock. This is according to the UN definition of a migrant, who is defined as somebody who lives outside their country of birth. The breakup of the Soviet Union by itself caused the world migration stock to increase considerably—by some 28 million people (see *Figure 2.1*). About 10 percent of the population in the former Soviet Union lived outside of their republic of birth so they had made a migration move within one country. With the breakup of the country they became migrants and there was a question of how these people would react to finding themselves in this new situation.

In several countries, namely the United Arab Emirates, Singapore, and Israel, migration is part of the national ethos or development strategy. Russia actually has a much lower figure than these countries in terms of the percent of the population that is foreign-born (see *Figure 2.2*). You can see the

Figure 2.2. Migration to Russia in an International Context by Percent of Population[11]

Country	Percent of Total Population
United Arab Emirates	~71
Kuwait	~62
Singapore	~42
Israel	~40
Jordan	~39
Saudi Arabia	~26
Oman	~24
Switzerland	~23
Australia	~21
Latvia	~20
Canada	~19
Lebanon	~19
Gabon	~18
Kazakhstan	~17
New Zealand	~16
Gambia	~16
Estonia	~15
Ukraine	~15
Côte d'Ivoire	~13
USA	~13

Source: UN Pop. Division

Figure 2.3. Net Migration in Russia, 1960 to 2005[12]

**Figure 2.4. Net Migration in the Former Soviet Union, 1989 to 2004 in Total Numbers[13]**

Source: National statistical offices

United States is at the bottom. About 12 percent of our total population right now is foreign-born, and we are at or nearing the historical highs that we had in the early 20th century.

The title of my talk is "Russia: A New Migration Destination" and this chart shows the pattern of net migration into and out of Russia (see *Figure 2.3*). People have been migrating outward from Russia or Central Russia for centuries, commensurate with the expansion of the Russian state. In 1975 that pattern changed, and ever since then there has been a net positive migration back into Russia, mostly from the non-Russian states of the former Soviet Union. So in some ways Russia is not necessarily a new migration destination in terms of direction but in terms of the magnitude and composition it is actually a somewhat a new migration country. Certainly within the former Soviet region, Russia has become the migration magnet (see *Figure 2.4*). I show the number of net migrants into Russia in terms of

**Figure 2.5. Net Migration in the Former Soviet Union,
1989 to 2004 by Percent of Population[14]**

Source: National statistical offices

stock, in terms of percent of the 1989 population (see *Figure 2.5*). We take
that date oftentimes as a base because that was the date of the last Soviet
census. It is always good for a country verging on disintegration to conduct
a census so that demographers and researchers have some numbers with
which to work.

The other thing I want to highlight is that some of the former Soviet
countries, especially some of the smaller countries, experienced rather huge
population losses after the breakup. One caveat that I want to put on these
numbers and probably all the numbers that I have is that they are based on
legal, long-term, permanent, documented migration. There is certainly a
lot of migration across the region that is undocumented.

This chart depicts the net migration pattern between Russia and other
countries (See *Figure 2.6*). Russia is gaining people from most of the other
countries of the former Soviet Union and losing people to countries outside
of the former Soviet Union. There is some talk within Russia and people
who observe Russia that it is suffering from a brain drain. In certain sectors,

Figure 2.6. Net Migration to and From Russia , 1989–2005[15]

Source: Goskomstat Rossii (selected publications).

such as the information technology sector, Russia may certainly be losing people. Overall, however, Russia is gaining a lot of people, and certainly a lot of educated people from the other former Soviet states.

There are a lot of different numbers on illegal, undocumented migration. Some numbers are shown here (see *Figure 2.7*). Typical ranges are between 4 million and 7 million depending on how you define undocumented immigration. One carefully conducted though slightly dated study that documents these numbers still seems to be operative. You see all sorts of exaggerations by different people who report between 15 million to 20 million illegal immigrants. There are probably not that many. The consensus number is probably 4 million to 7 million, again, depending on how you define it.

The importance of the Russian economy to some of the other former Soviet states is undeniable. This was discussed in one of the previous presentations and I show just some examples here (see *Figure 2.8*). The point I want to emphasize is that there are rather large numbers of people who are working and living in Russia at least part of the time. Russia

Figure 2.7. Estimates of Illegal Migrants in Russia by Category, 1998[16]

IMMIGRANT CATEGORY	NUMBER OF PEOPLE
Foreign students who did not return	100,000
Foreigners who overstayed work contracts	100,000
Foreign citizens and stateless of concern to UNHCR	300,000
Transit migrants	100,000–200,000
Foreigners from non–CIS countries staying illegally in Russia	20,000
Foreigners from non–CIS countries staying legally in Russia but in violation of visa	1,500,000–2,000,000
Labor migrants from CIS countries who enter legally but do not register to work	1,800,000
Total	**4,000,000–4,500,000**
Total of which are illegally employed	**3,500,000–3,800,000**

Figure 2.8. The Importance of the Russian Economy to Labor Migrants (selected countries)[17]

COUNTRY	NUMBER OF LABOR MIGRANTS	PERCENT OF LABOR FORCE
Tajikistan	300,000–500,000	10–15
Armenia	Increased from 523,390 to 1,130,491 between censuses	25
Moldova	400,000	25

Figure 2.9. Net Migration of Russians into Russia, 1989–2005[18]

Migration as percent of 1989 population in non-Russian state

Source: Goskomstat Rossii (selected publications).

Figure 2.10. Net Migration into Russia by Nationality, including Russians[19]

Net migration as percent of 1989 population

Figure 2.11. Per Capita GDP in Former Soviet States, 1989 10 2005[20]

Russia=100

and the countries of the former Soviet Union are not unique in that re-
spect. Roughly 10 percent of the Mexican population lives or works in the
United States at any given time.

In terms of the ethnic composition, a lot of people speculated that when
the Soviet Union broke up the primary cause of migration would be diaspora
migration—people returning to what they perceived to be their homelands.
This might be an ethnic homeland, a place of birth homeland, or some
other type of homeland. At the time of the breakup of the Soviet Union
there were some 25 million Russians who lived outside of Russia and about
13 percent have returned. That is a net of 13 percent as some Russians have
actually left Russia. They have left different FSU states in different magni-
tudes and different numbers (see *Figure 2.9*). The next chart shows the net
migration of all ethnic groups, including Russians (see *Figure 2.10*). The
point is that there has been a huge increase in a lot of these groups and not
only Russians moving to Russia. Only about 58 percent of the migration is
of ethnic Russians over this period.

**Figure 2.12. Remittances as a Share of GDP
in the Former Soviet Union, 2004[21]**

This migration has the same causes of migration elsewhere in the world, mainly widening income differentials over the last decade and a half or so (see *Figure 2.11*). In the chart, Russian GDP per capita is 100 percent. The three Baltic States have a GDP per capita higher than Russia. Most of the countries have a GDP per capita much lower than Russia. Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus are at about 70 percent and most of the other countries' GDP per capita are only half or less than Russia's. Russia's GDP is eight times that of Tajikistan's GDP. The U.S. and Mexico provide a relevant comparison. The GDP differential between the U.S. and Mexico used to be 3.3 percent and that has actually steadily increased over time and now the U.S.'s GDP is four times that of Mexico's.

The main reason people migrated is obviously remittances, as evident from some IMF numbers on official remittances. This chart shows rather huge levels of remittances (this does not include all sorts of undocumented remittances) and there is clearly a negative correlation (see *Figure 2.12* and

Figure 2.13. Income Differentials between CIS Countries and Russia and Remittances, 2002*[22]

* for Belarus 1999; Source: IMF

**Figure 2.14. Net Migration by Region in Russia, 1989–2002[23]**

Figure 2.15. Net Migration in the Russian Far North, 1979–2005[24]

Figure 2.13). The lower a country's GDP is, relative to Russia's, the higher the level of remittances as a share of GDP in those countries.

I will now turn to internal migration trends. There has been a huge out-migration from Siberia, the Russian north, back into Central Russia. I show spatial and temporal trends of that migration (see *Figure 2.14* and *Figure 2.15*). The Russian north was both simultaneously overdeveloped and underdeveloped, meaning that relative to a market economy there were some resources, mainly oil and gas, that were undervalued, while economic activity in much of the north was overvalued. I have another project in which I am studying migration in the circumpolar north. If anybody is interested, I can talk about this.

There is considerable evidence of movement up the urban hierarchy within not just Russia but all the former Soviet states. The Soviet Union had a policy of trying to equalize the standard of living between urban and rural areas and among all regions. That has dissipated with the transition to market economies and increased regional income disparities. So it has become rather difficult to live in rural and remote areas. As a result, there has been a huge out-migration. The area in which I work in Siberia and the North has been essentially closing down of a lot of these smaller towns. On the other hand, you can see what has happened to Moscow (see *Figure 2.16*). As a percent of Russia's population, Moscow has grown and is expected to continue to grow.

Figure 2.16. Moscow City and Oblast as a Share of the Total Population of Russia[25]


Moscow has emerged, or maybe reemerged, as a global city, and commensurate with that it has become a migration magnet again. For anybody who has been to Moscow recently, they know that it is an incredibly expensive city. There are a lot of very wealthy people living there. Whenever you have a situation like that you need a large service sector that is oftentimes filled by immigrant labor.

I will now talk a little bit about migration policy and its evolution in Russia. The early post-Soviet period was primarily aimed at assistance to forced migrants. There was something called the Bishkek Agreement which was intended to turn migration among the former states into visa-free travel directly following the breakup of the Soviet Union. There was a lot of refugee migration in this initial period. There were a lot of IDP (Internally Displaced Persons) movements in and among these states and a lot of the migration was done on a rather free basis. There were not many restrictions on migration.

In 1992, Russia created its Federal Migration Service and began to pass various laws on refugees, voluntary migrants, and forced migrants, and it abolished the resident permit system in the country. In 1996 and in subsequent years the UNHCR and the IOM (International Organization for Migration) convened the CIS Migration Conference for the purpose of trying to deal with the consequences of migration following the breakup of the Soviet Union. There was a lot of capacity-building that came out of

**Figure 2.17. Population Size of Northern and
Southern FSU States, 1950 to 2050[26]**

Millions

Source: UN Pop Division, World Population Prospects: The 2002 Revision.

that conference and a lot of assistance to these countries and their migration organizations.

In May of 2000 the Federal Migration Service was dissolved. For a couple of years there was really no agency in charge of migration. Also in 2000, Russia withdrew from the Bishkek Agreement. Migration across the FSU at this time started to become more regulated, and Russia became less multilateral and much more bilateral in migration policy toward the other FSU states.

One of the other issues that was flagged in an earlier session was the differential in population growth among many of these countries. I think this is going to become a driver of migration in the future in the former Soviet Union. I show the kind of differences in terms of population growth over the past and in the future 50 years between northern FSU states (see *Figure 2.17*). The differences between Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, the Baltic States, which are declining, and Central Asia and the Caucuses, which continue to grow, are rather large.

Basically what has happened is that the Federal Migration Service was restored under the Ministry of Internal Affairs and has become much more

of a policing operation and has been using migration policy as an anti-terrorism measure, somewhat similar to the situation in the United States. Russia went through an internal debate about its citizenship policy and in 2002 Russia adopted a more restrictive policy. Russia passed a policy document that addressed the issue of replacement migration, or using migration to make up for the great population shortfall that Russia is expected to continue to experience. In 2002 the hardliners seemed to win the debate over replacement migration, but now the debate seems to be continuing. There seems to be a growing realization that Russia needs migrants, but there are increasing efforts to register and regulate these people. The debate about the proper place for migrants in the Russian economy and society continues on into the present. Thank you.

YAROSLAV PYLYNSKYI, Director, Kennan Kyiv Project, Ukraine

First of all I want to express my gratitude to Blair [Ruble] as a founder of Western style migration studies in Ukraine. I want to tell you in a few words about the migration situation in Ukraine in a broader context because it is impossible to speak about migration in Ukraine and understand it without understanding the general picture.

Discussion of migration and tolerance in Ukraine will remain just an intellectual exercise unless Ukrainian society realizes that both the communist and the post-communist periods of its development are in flux and that if Ukraine wishes to join the civilized world, Ukrainians need to treat each other in a civilized way.

I would like to draw your attention to an important component of our civilized identity, namely the attitude of the society and the state toward individual members as essential to the society's well-being. The emergence of individuals as citizens turned tribes or unions of families into states. The attitude toward each individual and his or her needs formed the stairs up which humankind climbed from the original primitive and savage customs to present civilized social structure. It is essentially the attitude toward each individual rather than fast railways or electronic communication that defines the degree of a society's development. This correlation was first observed and promoted back in the early 20th century by prominent Spanish philosopher Jose Ortega y Gasset in his famous book *The World of the Masses*.

Figure 2.18. Ukrainian Labor Migration to Italy by Occupation[27]

| OCCUPATION IN UKRAINE		OCCUPATION IN ITALY	
Wage worker	4%	Wage worker	15%
Office worker/specialist	62%	Office worker/specialist	8%
Merchant/salesperson	27%	Housekeeping (in family)	15%
Pensioner/housewife	8%	Housekeeping (hourly)	38%
		Babysitting	8%
		Elderly care	15%

So what is happening in contemporary Ukraine? According to the data published by the World Bank on migration and remittances, Ukraine is second on the list of countries with the largest migration flows. Last year [Pavlo] Haidutskyi calculated that about 4.5 million Ukrainian citizens reside abroad. Somewhat more realistic is [Ella] Libanova's data, which show that an average of 2.5 to 3 million Ukrainians work abroad for six month periods. Whatever the true numbers are, the study of Ukrainian migration to Europe, to where Ukrainians most often immigrate, is a relevant and even urgent pursuit.

Today Ukraine seems to maintain the tradition of the Soviet Union, whose leaders saw the country's population as an inexhaustible and self-reproducing resource that does not require any special attention. Several researchers have come to the sad conclusion that a significant part of our labor potential is already outside of the country.

According to a survey conducted in 2004 by the scholars of a leading national university, the majority of the respondents from the western region (over 55 percent) stated that among their family members and friends, some immigrated abroad for permanent residence and some for temporary employment. There is a significant difference in the external direction of labor migration for permanent residence. People go to America for good and to Europe (mostly Italy and Portugal) to undertake employment (see *Figure 2.18* and *Figure 2.19*).

The current demographic crisis and mass migration of the most active labor force prompts a question that must be examined in the near future. That is, will Ukraine be able to modernize its economy and become attractive to its own citizens not only as the country of their birth but also as a state with high standards of living? It is already evident that many cities,

Figure 2.19. Average Monthly Earnings of Ukrainian Labor Migrants in Italy, 2007[28]

with the exception of Kyiv, are experiencing population decline. With the population on the rise in many cities and regions globally, it is unlikely that Ukrainian cities will be able to compete for labor with foreign countries and neighboring regions. As Ukraine's territory can be crossed in a day, transportation cannot be an important consideration. Moreover, the distance from Lviv to Rome is almost the same as from Lviv to Luhansk. The population decline will inevitably lead to a residential property surplus. This trend can already be observed in some smaller cities in the Donetsk and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts.

To prevent these cities from disappearing, local authorities need to take urgent measures to attract citizens from other regions in all possible ways including free or subsidized housing, compensation for moving costs, attractive job offers, free training, higher wages, and general improvement of public services and urban security. Only with these reforms will Ukraine be able to not only retrieve the temporary loaned labor from abroad but also to increase it by transnational migration. If this occurs the country will inevitably attract immigrants from abroad, and Ukraine will have to master the skills of coexisting with foreign-born residents with foreign cultures and traditions. Therefore, Ukraine needs to plan for these changes and frame an appropriate model of immigration policy. Does Ukraine have an immigration policy at present? If one believes the information on the web site of the State Committee for Nationalities and Migration, then the answer is yes. But if you look at the problem in a wider context, the answer is no, no immigration policy exists at present. With the exception of the State

Figure 2.20. Contact with Migrants in Ukraine[29]

Answer	Did you encounter migrants?	Did you communicate with migrants?
At work	7.4%	5.7%
In a home	9.7%	6.4%
In a public place	32.2%	11.1%
At a market	25.3%	14.8%
At school	4.0%	2.3%
At a medical center	2.0%	1.2%
Other	0.5%	0.8%
No	48.0%	67.8%

Committee for Nationalities and Migration, the Ukrainian government has a limited understanding of the migration problem.

During the last year, the Kennan Kyiv Project has conducted several research projects. I want to introduce you to our latest findings from focus groups conducted in Ukraine. We have focus groups comprised of citizens ages 18 to 25 and 26 to 40. The objective was to explore their attitudes toward migrants and come up with a methodology for further surveys among Ukrainian citizens on tolerance and tolerant attitudes toward migrants. This study provided ground for some tentative generalizations.

The majority of respondents defined an immigrant as a person who comes to Ukraine from abroad to work and who is in search of a better life. The first association triggered by the words immigrant and immigration were this search for a better life. A newcomer from abroad was collectively defined as a person who has escaped from his or her life and is searching for a better life. Most respondents think that immigration is a relevant issue in Ukraine and that the state immigration policy is generally in favor of foreigners.

According to respondents, most immigrants in Kyiv and other cities of Ukraine originate from China, Vietnam, and Arab countries, and to a lesser extent, from Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Moldova, and Belarus.

Respondents shared the view that the number of immigrants of African origin has greatly diminished in comparison to what it was during the

Figure 2.21. Readiness of Kyivans to Accept Transnational Migrants[30]

Relationship	Yes	No
City residents	37.3%	40.9%
District residents	34.7%	43.1%
Colleagues	26.3%	51.3%
Neighbors	23.1%	57.9%
Friends	17.0%	66.5%
Family	5.0%	80.7%

Soviet times. Kyivans believe that migrants come to Ukraine for education and employment and divide the latter into two groups. One such group is the unskilled workers, who arrive in search of any job and agree to work under conditions that are not desirable to Ukrainians. Respondents believe that most of these types of migrants originate from Moldova, Belarus, and Tajikistan. The second group that comes for employment is educated and highly qualified persons invited by Ukrainian companies. These immigrants have much higher income and compete with skilled Ukrainian workers, especially university graduates. In addition there are some immigrants who move to Ukraine in order to launch their own businesses.

Respondents believe that most immigrants in Kyiv are staying in the country illegally. In general, respondents think that students, interpreters, and contracted high qualified specialists are legal migrants in Ukraine, while the majority of low qualified foreign workers who make up the cheap labor force group are illegal migrants.

Contrary to reality, most respondents are convinced that in the past five to 10 years, the number of migrants in the Ukrainian capital has increased dramatically and that these tendencies will persist. They explain such a prognosis by the fairly loyal policy of the country toward foreigners who stay in Ukraine because of the relatively favorable economic and political situation and absence of military and serious ethnic conflict in the country.

In general the respondents' attitudes toward immigrants are neutral and are best described by one respondent who said, "The main thing is that they

stay away from me. If they want to study, let them study. If they want to work, let them work. They have their life and I have mine."

It is also worth mentioning that middle-aged respondents are less tolerant toward immigrants than young people and often exhibit negative attitudes while discussing the immigrant situation. Young people, by contrast, tend to have many acquaintances among immigrant populations and study with them in Ukrainian universities. According to young respondents, in most cases, foreign students embrace Ukrainian society as they are grateful for the opportunity to receive an education in Ukraine.

Over the course of the discussion, the participants often referred to mass media and television in particular. This indicates that the mass media plays a crucial role in shaping Ukrainian views of migration-related problems. This topic calls for further, more detailed study and analysis.

The overwhelming majority of respondents believe that Kyivans have a tolerant mentality and treat newcomers without aggression so long as, "they don't bother us and we have nothing to do with them."

In terms of the different ethnic groups, immigrants from China, Turkey, and Arab countries received the most positive comments from the respondents. Ukrainians most often encounter immigrants in oriental restaurants and at flea markets. Only a few respondents communicate with immigrants at work as colleagues, hired workers, or sometimes competitors (see *Figure 2.20*). Against the background of a generally positive or neutral attitude toward immigrants from most countries, Ukrainians generally exhibit negative attitudes toward African immigrants.

In particular, several participants commented negatively about Pastor Sunday [Adelaja], a Nigerian pastor, and his church, which Ukrainians tend to associate with drugs. This is likely a result of the mass media and its propaganda. Some of the respondents referred to their own experiences, saying that often the salesmen at Shuliavka Market are aggressive, do not treat natives properly, make advances on girls, sell second hand items, and drive Mercedes. This is typical envy.

It can be said that at present, immigrants from Africa are the only immigrants whose presence in the city received explicitly negative assessments from the respondents. Among Africans who were surveyed this winter, over 100 people pointed to cases of unfriendly attitudes on the part of the local population and even cases of aggression and beating. We see these as a sign

of an alarming increase in aggression and intolerance in the city, and they require immediate analysis and prevention.

Respondents perceive the biggest problem to be relations between police and immigrants. Most respondents noted that policemen view immigrants as a source of money (through bribes) and thus focus too much time and too many resources on them. Younger participants turned out to be more knowledgeable about organizations that promote violence and aggression against foreigners, although some middle-aged respondents were also aware of them.

Skinheads are perceived as young people trying to be different. Some respondents said that as individuals, skinheads may be normal but as a group, they try to show their superiority. Immigrants, especially Africans, whose residence in the country is viewed as illegal by skinheads, are the least protected group. Our findings show skinheads not so much as conscious promoters of systematic racist beliefs but rather as young people attempting to assert themselves by humiliating the weakest. This needs attention from law enforcement, but there is no country in the world where police alone have been able to resolve the issue of youth violence. Therefore, we believe that this problem demands comprehensive attention from the whole of Ukrainian society.

Given that immigrants live in substandard conditions (for instance the 500,000 person immigrant communities in the Tryashena and Obolon districts of Kyiv, that do not have any public swimming pools or other sports facilities, but instead have countless pubs, casinos, and slot machines), it is no wonder that this environment produces aggressive youth.

To conclude I would like to state that only with cooperation from educational institutions, mass communication companies, national and local governments, and NGOs, as well as continued support from the international community and charitable foundations, can Ukrainian society become a desirable home both for its own citizens and potential immigrants. Thank you very much.

OLGA VENDINA, Geographer, Institute of Geography, Academy of Sciences, Moscow

Now we will turn to Moscow. I am lucky because the general situation in Russia has already been introduced, so I can skip ahead and focus on the local problem in Moscow.

In spite of all of the migration to Moscow, it remains predominantly a Russian city. Ethnic Russians compose more than 80 percent of the population.

Figure 2.22. Russian Advertisement for Labor, Moscow, Russia; Photographed by Olga Vendina, 2008

Another important thing is public opinion and discourse. Discourse can be even more important than the law because we can interpret the law in different ways. I will show you an advertisement (see *Figure 2.22*). It is written in Russian that Moscow needs a labor force but you can see how this labor force is depicted. It is just colorful buttons without any human peculiarities. It is saying that immigrants should come to Moscow, but they are not considered humans, just a source of labor.

Figure 2.23. Share of Russians by Neighborhood in Soviet Period Moscow[31]

**Figure 2.24. Share of Russians by Neighborhood in Post-Soviet Moscow**[32]

The questions I would like to deal with are how different ethnic groups are inscribed into the urban landscape and how city governments and public discourses deal with the increasing diversity of urban culture, especially when it results in high fragmentation in the urban landscape. This is quite a difficult question because you know that the availability of statistics and data is a huge problem in Moscow. I do not have much time to concentrate on the sources of my data, so I will just show you the results.

On this map you see the distribution of Russians by residential areas (see *Figure 2.23* and *Figure 2.24*). The darker colors indicate a higher proportion of Russians to immigrants. The yellow area in the center is the most diverse area with a low share of ethnic Russians. Notice the considerable shift from the Soviet to post–Soviet period as the central and southern areas became more diverse.

But the new ethnic groups are by no means homogenous. They are split by difference in income and social position. A comparison of the ethnic

2.25. A Graphical Comparison of Moscow Population with Housing Prices[33]

composition of the Moscow population with housing prices shows that the most expensive area is also the most ethnically diverse (see *Figure 2.25*). This is a bit strange but can be explained in part by the fact that during the Soviet period Moscow was on the receiving end of a kind of brain drain. Skilled professionals and ethnic elites flowed into the area. Following the breakup of the Soviet Union, economic migrants have been added to this group of incoming migrants.

But it is a not only income that divides the new ethnic population. In Russia cultures such as Ukrainian and Azerbaijani are considered completely different from Russian culture, even though similarities actually exist. Similar customs originate not only from the Soviet period but from prehistoric time, from a shared Byzantine heritage, from the Ottoman Empire heritage, and from the Russian Empire as well.

On this map you see that Ukrainian immigrants are dispersed around the city but this is not the case for the Azeri population (see *Figure 2.26*). In the Ukrainian case the social filters do not work, but they work very strongly in the Azeri case. So in this privileged central part of the city and the southwestern area, there are almost no Azerbaijani immigrants.

Should Russia assign minority status to a Ukrainian who was born and socialized in Moscow, is perfectly integrated into the city culture, and considers the Russian language as his or her native tongue? This is a question of ethnicity. The Ukrainian immigrant community lived primarily in the high status areas of Moscow as Ukrainians were very involved in business, science, and more. In post–Soviet Russia, there is a divide within the Ukrainian immigrant community. Those who speak Russian as a first language are quite dispersed around the city but those who consider Ukrainian to be their first language remain concentrated in the high-status area.

Figure 2.26. Concentrations of Ukrainians and Azerbaijanis in Moscow[34]

Пространственная интерполяция данных о местах проживания
в Москве граждан Украины (N = 9 500 адресов)

Сравнительная плотность

- Граждан Украины практически нет
- Средняя плотность
- в 1,5 - 2,0 раза выше средней
- в 2,0 - 3,5 раза выше средней
- в 3,5 - 13,0 раз выше средней

Источник: Департаментом федеральной регистрационной
базы данных ЗАГС за 1993-2003 гг. Карты построены на основе данных
о рождаемости за 1999-2003 гг.

Пространственная интерполяция данных о местах проживания
в Москве лиц, не имеющих российского гражданства (N = 9 500 адресов)

Сравнительная плотность

- Незастроенные территории
- Средняя плотность
- в 1,5 - 3,0 раза выше средней
- в 3,0 - 5,0 раза выше средней
- в 5,0 - 23,4 раза выше средней

Источник: Департаментом федеральной регистрационной
базы данных ЗАГС за 1993-2003 гг. Карты построены на основе данных
о рождаемости за 1999-2003 гг.

What is an ethnic minority? What kind of diasporas does Moscow have? I do not think we have diasporas in the formal sense of the word, but now the term is used so much in the media to talk about all ethnic groups.

If you consider this table you can see very few migrants are really new-comers to Moscow (see *Figure 2.27*). The overwhelming majority has lived in Moscow for extended periods of time and finds it really frustrating to be considered a minority or a diaspora.

Language is one of the most important indicators of integration in the culture of a city. Only three percent of Chinese immigrants consider Russian to be their first language. In the case of the Jewish, Ukrainian, Belarusian, Georgian, or Armenian populations, a huge percentage of the people consider Russian to be their first language.

I would like to turn from statistics to discourse. In looking at integration, we often speak about policy and the host society's efforts. We speak less often about cultural integration efforts—how immigrants create a culture and make their presence visible within the city. Moscow's government

2.27. Diasporas Present in Moscow[35]

	Born in Moscow	Old Residents	New Migrants
Russians	60%	25%	15%
Ukranians	78%	22%	
Tatars	45%	45%	10%
Armenians	24%	50%	26%
Georgians	22%	44%	34%
Azeris	14%	36%	50%

2.28. Advertisement for Parade for the Sexual Majority (Heterosexuals), Moscow, Russia; Photographed by Olga Vendina, 2008

primarily supports cultural diversity, but they divide it so that migrants are not some cultural experience, but only a problem. Culture, however, is our richness, our future, and so on.

In Moscow there is huge pressure from the majority on the minority. I really like this advertisement because it responds to the discourse on gay parades which have been forbidden until now in Moscow (see *Figure 2.28*). This advertised parade of the sexual majority exemplifies the kind of attitude that is very prevalent and very important not only for some social subculture but also for ethnic groups.

For me it is very important to use citations from academic books, not just magazines or newspapers. Subbotina Ostapenko writes that Moscow is predominantly a Russian city. Migrants living in Moscow should accept Russian lifestyle and disregard their ethnic and cultural heritage in order to blend in with other Moscow residents so as to avoid misunderstandings and conflicts.[36] This complete assimilation of ethnic groups is considered a normal way of integration.

In discussing public opinion there are some discrepancies between Russian public opinion and migrant public opinion. An overwhelming majority of Russians believe that migrants do not want integration but want to continue their own practices and in fact change the situation in Moscow. But this is not actually the case for migrants as almost 25 percent see few differences between their own culture and the culture of Muscovites. There is also the important point of view that almost a third of migrants consider themselves to be pariahs.

All of these contradictions prompt me to try to separate the different ways of integration from the integration process undertaken by ethnic minorities. I see four types of integration in Moscow:

The first type is maintaining ethnic traditions and resisting the pressure of the culture of the majority. There are formal and informal ways to be integrated. The formal way is clear – it is just a matter of putting on some folklore events. Informal, for example, are artists who organize performances to make their culture more known to the Russian population, to have more contact on a language level and on a cultural level.

The second way is the construction or reconstruction of ethnic identity, and not only in the political sense. For example I talked with one young girl, a singer. She was born in Kazan, the capital of the Tatar Republic. She was raised there and while she lived there she refused her Tatar identity

because she considered it to be very outdated, very traditional. She wanted to be modernized so she even refused to learn the Tatar language. But when this girl came to Moscow people appreciated her Tatar heritage. She quickly became a Tatar princess, with Tatar clothes, and now she sings a very strange mixture of Russian and foreign words with some Tatar finishing. It is broken Tatar, but for me it is an example of the attempt to preserve identity and to create a new ethnic identity in Moscow. But it was Moscow which provoked this necessity to create this ethnic identity. There are many, many examples of this kind.

The next type is the creation of ethnic institutions. We talked today about some ethnic associations and organizations. These develop in Moscow as ethnic groups try to create formal institutions, such as schools, with an ethnic agenda. Another way is to create a parallel world of socialization. It also creates problems with identity because on the one hand, the young generation follows an ethnically traditional way of life, but on the other hand their friends, their Muscovite friends, try to get them to be Muscovites.

One final way is the ethnic group tries to find some base or create an umbrella group for their ethnicity. In several Moscow regions there are ethnic leaders who would like to integrate different ethnic groups into one common group based on, for example, Islam. The same thing has happened with Christianity and even new forms of paganism. People are also trying to reunify the Russian population based on Old Russian traditions—the Christian tradition with the old styles of services and so on. It is the same thing with the umbrella groups with pan–Slavic, pan–Azerbaijani themes and so on. I will finish on this point. Thank you very much for your attention.

DISCUSSION

Question: Two questions. The first one is mainly for Tim [Heleniak]. You started out by saying that the main driver of migration has been economic differentials. Toward the end you suggested that in the future the driver was going to be population imbalances. Some of us with gray beards will remember a discussion in the Kennan Institute about 30 years ago between Bob Lewis and Murray Feshbach over whether the Uzbeks were all going to migrate into the Russian Republic because of the population imbalance. Is that necessarily a driver or does it have to be accompanied by economics?

Heleniak: For those of you who do not know I will bring you up to date very briefly. There was a debate when the Soviet Union existed as to whether there was a population imbalance in labor supply between the Slavs and the Central Asians. This was a debate that was going on 30 years ago, before Russia even had a population decline. They had a much slower population growth than Central Asia and to maintain the Soviet Union's long-term economic growth, there was a debate as to how to overcome the spatial mismatch between industrial facilities and sources of labor supply in the Soviet Union: do the Central Asians migrate to central Russia and work in the factories there or do you move the industry to Central Asia where the labor force is?

Bob Lewis thought that there were universal rules that govern migration and that the Central Asians would migrate out of Central Asia to central Russia. Murray thought that they would not migrate because of cultural reasons, they would want to stay in their homeland. I guess in the long run they are both right as the speaker from Tajikistan talked about. There is an economic necessity that causes a lot of these people to migrate out temporarily, although a lot of them would like to live in their homelands permanently. Right now, there are differences in labor supply and demand and currently the driver is economic, which translates oftentimes into GDP differentials or income differentials in the short run. One of the charts that I showed depicted differentials in population growth that are occurring in this region, which is a long-term driver of migration in many other parts of the world.

Vendina: Maybe I can add a small remark to your answer. We had an economic problem. There was also forced migration from the ethnic republics because there was huge tension between the Russian population and native eponyms. Many Russians were forced to return, not only from Kazakhstan or the Caucasian countries but also from the Baltic countries. My presentation did not deal with religious differences, but religion is just another way to be integrated.

Question: Last week I was at an OSCE conference on xenophobia and migration and there was a representative of a Ukrainian NGO who mentioned an interesting new phenomenon to me, which is that the EU signed an agreement with the Ukrainian government whereby four camps would be built at EU expense for migrants who have been expelled from EU countries. One of those camps reportedly will house 30,000 people. It is going to be in

a very isolated part of Ukraine and very mono-ethnic. Also, is Kazakhstan being seen as a country to receive migrants due to its economic prospects?

Question: If Dr. Vendina would comment on two aspects of ethnicity in Moscow from her presentation. I assume in your charts when you use the term Russian you are referring to Russian citizenship which of course in a place like Moscow includes a vast variety of ethnicity. Is it not the case that in attitudes, both public attitudes and sometimes governmental attitudes, ethnicity tends to break down? Is it not the case that people in Moscow would tend to think of a neighbor from Tatarstan or Dagestan as being sort of less *nashi* than somebody from Belarus or even Armenia? So there is a lot more ethnic complexity there because it does not just affect country of origin but ethnicity of origin which in the Russian Federation itself is very immense.

And second, I have heard that there is a problem increasingly for migrant laborers, particularly from Central Asia but also from Moldova, who went through schools in the post-Soviet period and so did not learn Russian, whereas their fathers and mothers all would have known Russian. You have a lot of people working in Moscow now who are in a functional sense illiterate because they went through school when they were not required to learn Russian. Is this a significant problem? Does it lead to particular forms of exploitation?

Pylynskyi: During recent years we have signed a couple of agreements with the European Union. We are preparing for admission which will be introduced after two years. According to this program Ukraine should prepare two or three camps, one in the Chernegy region and another near Odesa. Now we have only one such camp in Palshawa in Transcarpathia and it works. So this is just preparation work for cooperation with Europe. So we can say that we have problems with this camp.

Ruble: But the point that you were making is that the European Union is prompting Ukraine to build the camps.

Pylynskyi: I think that they give financial aid and so they demand that the camps are constructed in return.

Question: They do the building of the camps and after that everything is managed by the Ukrainian government, correct?

Ruble: Correct. But the idea is when people are detained in Europe they will be sent back to Ukraine, to the camp.

Question: But in many cases they have nothing to do with Ukraine as I understand it. Am I wrong?

Pylynskyi: Let me tell you what I know. According to the agreement on readmission, people detained in the European Union will be returned to Ukraine indefinitely. So the European Union financed the building of two camps in Chernegy and near Odesa where these people are to be held before they are legally addressed by the Ukrainian government.

Question: I wanted to ask if you know if there is a clause in the readmission agreement that applies to asylum seekers because that is the concern of the UNHCR in particular, that some of the people who are sent back are in fact eligible for refugee status and the danger is they might be sent further back. In some of the EU agreements, particularly with Albania I believe, there is a specific clause that calls for different treatment for people who are in an asylum situation. Is there such a clause for Ukraine?

Pylynskyi: As far as I know this agreement regards only illegal workers, not refugees and asylum seekers.

Subiros: This is not a Ukrainian problem. This is a policy that the European Union is taking ahead of externalizing the control of immigration. They are making agreements with different border countries—such as Morocco, Senegal, Mauritania, Ukraine, and others—and conditioning all sorts of help for economic development on the participation of these countries in preventive action against immigration. This includes undocumented people coming from these countries. These agreements stipulate that undocumented immigrants will be automatically deported back to the countries they have come from, regardless of their nationality. This is not just a problem in Ukraine.

Vendina: This question about diversity in Russia, about the Russian language is very important. From my point of view a very dangerous process of creating minorities is underway, or of creating diasporas. For example, Tatars were never considered a minority or a diaspora in Moscow but now they are considered such. The same is true for the Dagastani people. The Dagestanis in Moscow may consider themselves Dagestani but their group ethnic identity may be stronger than the Dagestani one and so on. So we try to create the world in spite of reality. From my point of view it is very dangerous because it creates this separation, this split in society, and after that we try to make some gestures. Nevertheless this problem of illiteracy among new migrants and the problem of learning the Russian language is very important in Moscow. It is a good thing, among the many bad things, that all children of migrants are accepted in school in spite of their nationality, in spite of their legal status. They can go to school, and they can be educated and socialized in Moscow. Now there are, I do not know, maybe more than 100 preparatory classes for migrant children just to give them beginning lessons in the Russian language, writing, and reading and so on. It is significant because there are two parallel processes and one is ultimately rather political. It is not Russification, it is political integration. But on the other hand, the ethnic minority, the ethnic group, promotes their own identity and struggles for specific ethnic schools. They argue for the necessity to preserve their culture, to preserve the culture of diversity. So this card is being played from both sides and it can produce some unexpected results. Ultimately in politics, especially the in politics of different groups, there are so many interests at play in a huge city, and we cannot predict what the outcome will be. There are also other discourses because there is politics, there is the law, and there are the meanings, what people think when they say one or another thing. So it is a very unstable situation.

Question: I think one of the things coming out of this discussion is how fluid the notion of ethnicity is in the context of global migration and I will give you the example of the United States. Who was an American in the 19th century versus the 20th century versus the 21st century? There is one thing I have not heard about, either in the morning session or right now, and that is the possibility of ultimate integration. Could any of you speak about ultimate integration through interethnic unions and marriages? Thank you.

Question: Tim raised the idea of the "global city," and that Moscow is a global city. Kyiv is one of many of the cities we have heard about today. Among others are Johannesburg, Barcelona, Washington, and Toronto, and it is very hard to separate global cities from places that simply get large amounts of immigrants. I think the two are really interconnected in important ways and are becoming more so. My question is, for Moscow or Kyiv, do they gain a greater global status in having diverse immigrants that are actually part of the mix in a positive way and not a negative way?

Heleniak: I will just talk briefly about the fluidity of ethnicity. That was certainly the case in the Soviet to post–Soviet context. First of all, in 1989 there was no question or concept of a Soviet citizenship. Everybody was a citizen. There was not migration into and out of the country, while there is now. One thing that the Soviet Union never did and none of the successor states did was allow dual ethnicity in the censuses. There were a lot of mixed marriages and there were a lot of people who had kind of a legitimate right to different citizenships when the country broke up. So there was a bit of shopping around for which citizenship would be the best one. And I think one of the earlier speakers said a lot of these people retained a Soviet citizenship or Soviet passport because they thought it was temporary and that the country was going to be reconstituted and so they put it off. A lot of the countries stipulated a date by which people had to commit to citizenship of Russia, Ukraine, or whatever country, but countries kept postponing this date.

Vendina: About marriage: you know I always talk about bad things. You know the problem is that we make this ethnic identity the priority because now it is considered the most important factor for social differentiation. But it is not. And for many, many people ethnic identity is just an unimportant factor and it is not a factor in many marriages. Of course there are some traditional fashions of life. People would like to marry a representative of the same group but there are a huge group of people who do not consider their ethnic identity very important. Especially during the Soviet period, we had this mixture of different people and this ethnic identity was just a choice. How can we see this in the example of Russia and Ukraine? People just easily changed their ethnic identity. Many Ukrainians became Russian and many Russians became Ukrainian. It is the same, for example, for some mixed marriages and children from mixed marriages. The people just cho-

ose. They make their choice based on a good thing because the bad thing would take all attention because it is more dangerous than the good. The good things are normal things, just normal standards, and we would like to achieve them.

Talking about the positive impact – I think this cultural infusion into Moscow is a very, very positive thing because really it makes people more flexible in a different way. I think it makes a huge impact on politics, and even on democratization, because it creates some pluralism in society. It is on a very basic level, on the level of everyday life: people should accept difference. So I think this is the most positive effect of this cultural diversity in Moscow.

Question: I want to go back to the dangerous side of the discussion we have been having and that is to return us to some of the roots of this increase in skinhead violence and to try to help us understand a little bit more. What do you think the increase is all about and is it connected to some of these issues of ethnic enclaving or fears about terrorism? How do we begin to think more deeply about the increase of the violence?

Question: I would like to hear from the participants about how they think social class plays into some of the results that they spoke about. We have support for the contact hypothesis, that is, the more host populations know immigrants the more positive their responses are. Does that only work for college students? Certainly with your maps Olga, it did seem that the schools that are being asked to have special courses in Russian and have special tutelage are not necessarily in the richest neighborhoods, they are going to be in the poorest. Drawing on the idea of tolerance, could you talk a little bit about the social class or the class status of immigrants and reactions to them?

Pylynskyi: I just want to say two words about globalization. I think not only Kyiv but such Ukrainian cities like Odesa and Donetsk became global. So, international migrants find their home in these cities. From this point of view Kyiv is even a better example than a metropolitan city.

Speaking about skinheads, this issue for Ukraine is very new first of all and very complicated because it is influenced not only by our domestic problem but also from outside, from our neighbors like from the European Union and from Russia. So I do not want to say that Ukrainians are so

good. This influence is now extremely important and so we are only beginning to work with this problem.

Heleniak: I am probably not equipped to speak to the origins of anti-immigrant skinhead violence. It has taken me a little bit by surprise but I believe that it has been confined to narrow segments of society. What I spoke about was kind of proposed legislation to prevent ethnic enclaves. One thing I do want to mention to those who do not study Russia is that Moscow has a reputation of being an anti-immigrant city, not just to people from outside of Russia but inside as well. This has a long history. Officially you should be able to move wherever you want in the country but unofficially [Yury] Luzhkov can say "I don't want immigrants." That may be reflected in some of this public opinion that we see going on.

Vendina: Talking about skinheads and about this "global city"—the appearance of skinheads is not only a reaction to ethnic diversity. It is first of all a reaction to modernization and globalization. It is just a way to represent their incapability to be modernized. It is just the appeal of traditional society. This argument against ethnic migrants is easy to make. Really it is Moscow's crucial question and I think it is a society which does not want to be modernized. It became dangerous because this aggression can be used in unknown ways.

Concerning social class and what factors are more important in this process of ethnic segregation: from my point of view social status and economic well-being or income is the first factor because before, when we created the housing market for poor, we could not create a housing market for different ethnic groups because normally they did not have enough money to live in big, expensive apartments.

At the same time ethnic groups are not homogeneous because there are the ethnic elites and there are very, very successful people from Azerbaijan and Georgia and Armenia. These people are very sensitive to their social status. Now with this Jewish inflow we can see how Jewish doctors, for example, are replaced by Caucasian people because they consider it a very important profession for their own status. It is also divided so simply by class because the new ethnic migrants are very active, they are very, very mobile in the social sense. Not only in terms of moving from one city to another one but also in terms of promoting themselves to a better social position.

Also it is interesting because very often some ethnic migrants do not consider their condition bad. They consider it to be normal and think that they have a better start for social mobility.

Pylynskyi: To treat skinheads as exclusively an anti-immigrant group is to over-simplify the situation. In fact, skinheads are a reserve of right forces in this society. So this is a very complicated question and to simplify it is dangerous.

Panel III: New Migrant Cities:
Cultural Transformation and New Urban Landscapes

Chair: Blair A. Ruble
Director, Kennan Institute, and Comparative Urban Studies Project,
Woodrow Wilson Center

MIKHAIL ALEXSEEV, Associate Professor of Political Science, San Diego State University

Thank you very much. I admire the perspicacity with which Blair [Ruble] formulated the names of these panels because many of presentations today, including mine, will focus on the inherent paradox, what I call the double-edged paradox, in migration research between what may be called cultural transformation and what is called here new urban landscapes. As we have heard and what has been concluded through systematic studies from California to Arlington County is that migrants contribute positively to the economy—with legal migrants often paying more taxes per capita than natives—and that immigrants do have the intent to integrate but the incumbent ethnic majorities think that it is the other way around. Host populations also perceive that immigrants commit disproportionately more crimes, but as the Public Policy Institute of California shows, immigrants actually commit disproportionately fewer crimes than natives. So we have that paradox on the one hand. I would also say that it is a double-edged paradox because the reverse is true – that despite all these kinds of xenophobic attitudes, urban landscapes change not just in negative ways but also in positive ways, probably more in the positive way on the aggregate than negatively.

I am going to give you a quick overview of this in Russia. I will focus first on this disproportionately strong rise of xenophobic views and expressions in the Russian Federation. Starting in the early nineties these expressions began to materialize. Shown here is some graffiti from Irkutsk. "Glory to the white victory!!!" says the top one (see *Figure 3.1*). The bottom one says "darkies out!" (see *Figure 3.2*). *Churki* is the Russian slang word for a burned–out log which denotes people of darker skin color. In my eight trips to Vladivostok between 1990 and 2005, I walked for miles around various

Figure 3.1. Graffiti in Irkutsk, Russia; Translation: "Glory to the white victory!!!" Photographed by Irkutsk anti-xenophobia activists, 2003

Figure 3.2. Graffiti in Irkutsk, Russia; Translation: "Darkies out!" Photographed by Irkutsk anti-xenophobia activists, 2003

Figure 3.3. Graffiti in Vladivostok, Russia; Translation: "Kill the darkie;" Photographed by Mikhail Alexeev, 2005

neighborhoods looking for anti-Chinese graffiti. I did not find any anti-Chinese graffiti on hours and hours and hours of these walks, but I did find one example of graffiti against other groups on a visit in 2005 which said "kill the darkie" and "glory to Russia" with a swastika (see *Figure 3.3* and *Figure 3.4*). You see a lot of this, and it makes you wonder because a country that lost 27 million to the Nazis is saying "glory to itself" with a swastika sign, so it must stand for something bigger than just that.

Movements such as the one colloquially known as *pni,* tree stumps,—the official name is DPNI, which is the Movement Against Illegal Immigration—have been staging public activities against immigration. Websites and e-mail forums especially are scary because you can read about anti-immigration views and the various techniques used to injure migrants so as to avoid arrest by the police and cause the maximum damage to the migrants.

Political campaigns reflect these anti-immigration sentiments as well. One campaign says that there are 2.5 million illegal immigrants in Moscow, which is completely off base (see *Figure 3.5*). Another shows that there is this

Figure 3.4. Graffiti in Vladivostok, Russia; Translation: "Glory to Russia;" Photographed by Mikhail Alexeev, 2005

Figure 3.5. Political Campaign Advertisement by the Rodina (Motherland) party, Moscow Duma elections, December 2007

Figure 3.6. Political Campaign Advertisement, by the Rodina (Motherland) party, Moscow Duma elections, December 2007

Figure 3.7. Campaign ad titled "The Flames of Paris" by the Rodina (Motherland) party, Moscow Duma elections, December 2007

and then bribes to criminal groups of illegal immigrants. The campaign alleges that 40 percent of the city budget in Moscow goes toward illegal immigrants (See *Figure 3.6*). So there is a very powerful combination of various concerns attached to immigration.

This is the Russian portrayal through the eyes of *Rodina* of the events in Paris in November 2005 (see *Figure 3.7*). One can see how innocent Paris citizens are running away from militant Arabs who are clubbing them left and right. Another scandalous ad shows a blonde woman dressed in red, symbolizing Mother Russia stumbling on watermelon rinds on the street. Then the watermelon is thrown into the street by the migrants who look like they are from the Caucasus. The ad concludes as the candidate asks the immigrants to get out of the street.

I conducted a series of systematic opinion surveys throughout the Russian Federation over the past two to three years. I surveyed almost 6,000 respondents, using Russian national samples and also representative samples from various Russian provinces. I asked a question that I stole from the Eurobarometer

surveys which is never asked in the United States surveys because it is viewed as too politically incorrect in the United States. But in Europe it is asked, and the question is, "Do you agree with the statement that all migrants, legal and illegal, and their children should be deported to wherever they came from?" In the European Union about 18 percent of respondents answered yes to that question in the early 2000s. In the Russian Federation about 45 percent of respondents answered yes. In cities like Moscow you had the highest rates of agreement, with a rate of over 50 percent. Moscow and Primorskii Krai were the two areas where that view was the strongest.

I asked another parallel question because sociologists are often skeptical of the first in that people will tell you that they support deportation but then they will say they support migration too.

I asked a second question on whether respondents agreed or disagreed with the statement that all immigrants should be granted permanent residency in Russia no matter what. The opposition to that was actually even stronger than the support for wholesale deportation. Moscow and Primorskii Krai again were the strongest by about 20 or 30 percent. About 80 percent of respondents said that under no circumstances would they choose to afford immigrants these rights.

Since we talked about Tajik migrants, I want to give you some insight on another manifestation of attitudes about immigration in Russia. I asked a specific question in the 2005 wave of surveys that dealt with reactions to the very brutal murder in downtown St. Petersburg of a nine year–old Tajik girl. She and her father were walking down the street in the middle of the day when about twenty skinheads attacked them. They killed the girl, and the father was hospitalized with serious injuries. I asked the respondents how they reacted when they heard these kinds of stories from the media. One of the options was "I wanted to defend members of ethnic minorities myself" and about 3.9 percent of respondents in the Russian Federation selected that response.

Another possible response was "help the police defend ethnic minorities and find the perpetrators of these crimes so they can be brought to court." About 12.6 percent selected this response.

About 30 percent of respondents said that they wanted to demand that the government spend more money to fund the police and security services to defend ethnic minorities. But the majority of respondents, 48.4 percent opted out of this. They instead responded that they demand that

Figure 3.8. Public Support for the Slogan "Russia for Ethnic Russians," September-December 2005[37]

the government make tougher rules for migrants' entry into the country and movement within the country. In other words, they blamed the victim. Respondents said that these gruesome episodes of violence occur because there are too many migrants and they move around too freely. Respondents also said that if migration and migrant movement is restricted, there will be less violence and that is the best way to protect the migrants.

I ran a quick test to see if there was any statistically significant correlation between the perception and views on migration between urban and rural residents. No statistically significant correlation exists. But if you run the same analysis by the population size then you actually see that there is some statistically significantly correlation (see *Figure 3.8*). It is more of an urban problem. More respondents living in larger cities are likely to say that Russia is meant for ethnic Russians, so the exclusionary sentiment is more prevalent in larger cities.

However, it is interesting that this correlation goes, on the ascending scale by population size of places where they live, from completely disagree to mostly agree. Responses drop off for "completely agree." However, smaller

Figure 3.9. Systemic, Community Level, Ethno-religious Violence in Russia, 2004-2005 (Excluding Chechnya, Ingushetia, and Dagestan)[38]

Type of Violence	Number of People
Murder/assassination	80
Grievous bodily harm	27
Bombing	8
Hostage taking/kidnapping	2
Arson	31
Pogrom	27
Criminal mischief/vandalism	67
Menacing	29
Assault	292
Robbery	10
Harrasment	21
Total events	**594**

Type of perpetrator	Number of events involved in
Individual/private citizen	34
Gang/mob	402
Police/military/security	27
Paramilitary	22

population areas have a disproportionately higher percentage of people saying they completely agree with that statement. So it seems that overall xenophobia and violence against migrants is more of an urban problem, but there is more potential for extreme acts of violence in smaller cities. Perhaps this is the Russian version of what some American sociologists called micro–urban areas which are not exactly metropolises like Washington, D.C. or rural areas in Montana, but places in between.

I think we can talk about the emergence of systemic, community level, ethno–religious violence in Russia. Between 2004 and 2005, 594 events resulted in assassination, murder, or grievous bodily harm (see *Figure 3.9*).

**Figure 3.10. "A Guide to Street Terrorism," found
in St. Petersburg, Russia by police**

This figure is of course just a fraction of the total number of events and is based on the two most systematic and reputable sources of this kind of data collection, the Sova Analytical Center and the Union of Councils of Soviet Jews' *Bigotry Monitor*. Both sources have networks of reporters in all regions of the Russian Federation that supply this data.

In St. Petersburg this kind of skinhead activity is often disjointed, but there has been some coordination. This became clear when the police uncovered a manual called "A Guide to Street Terrorism, which detailed specific acts of violence to be perpetrated against migrants and foreigners (see *Figure 3.10*). The police found that this guide correlated very strongly with the type of assaults and the type of physical bodily harm that was committed against the victims.

The economy certainly does have an effect on violence but not directly. This occurs for example, in comparing the views on Asian migrants in Russia—Chinese, Vietnamese, and Koreans—in five different provinces. In 2003, the city of Moscow had an unemployment rate of 1.3 percent and a per capita income of almost 17,000 rubles a year. Orenburg Oblast, in contrast, had an unemployment rate of 11 percent and per capita income was 3,000 rubles. The level of support for deportation of all migrants was

Figure 3.11. The "Chinese Wall," a mile long trading complex in Nakhodka, Russia; Photographed by Mikhail Alexeev, 2000

actually almost twice as high in Moscow as opposed to Orenburg. Economic prosperity does not necessarily drive down ethnic hostility. You find a lot of that in Russia. You find places that are not as prosperous, with more unemployment that are a lot less hostile than places with high economic rates of development and less unemployment.

I recently conducted 64 regression tests, looking at five regions and several Asian ethnic groups. I asked respondents how they viewed these ethnic groups and found only two variables that were remarkable. In nearly all 64 tests, 59 to 63 out of 64 tests, those two variables were statistically significant. The first question was "Do you think immigration makes Russia stronger or weaker?" This question addressed association of migration with the strength or weakness of the state.

The second question was "Do migrants take away jobs?" Somewhere at the juncture of the perceived efficacy of state institutions, state authority, and how that is translated into economic opportunity for the local population is the answer. The inter-activity of these factors probably drives a lot of these anti–migrant expressions of hostility. That is also related to demographics be–

Figure 3.12. Entryway to "Chinatown," built by locals in Ussuriisk, Russia; Photographed by Mikhail Alexeev, 2000

cause a lot of the time, the way people translate these things is by differential rates by ethnic groups of how ethnic composition in their provinces changes.

In spite of all of this, there is a positive side. The job market and the state's strength can work together, and if they do not weigh too heavily on the minds of respondents maybe we can get something going. Primorskii Krai is in the Russian Far East at the juncture of China, Korea, and Japan. It is a place which, according to many stories, has mass Chinese migration. I did not find this, despite all my best efforts. But there were actually very high levels, about 60 percent, of respondents that characterized these tour-ists as "creeping invaders," who will infiltrate and take over the Russian Far East. In 2001 the Security Council of Russia changed its view. It said that Chinese migration was not much of a threat and that it needed to pro-mote a more positive image of Chinese migration. Putin changed Governor Yevgeniy Nazdratenko. Sergey Darkin arrived on the scene, even though he was not the Kremlin protégé, at least at first, and he was promoting more of a businesslike approach. His approach was "We need to do business with Asia instead of warning that all these Chinese will seize all of our lands."

**Figure 3.13. Market in Vladivostok, Russia;
Photographed by Mikhail Alexeev, 2000**

**Figure 3.14. Trade Center in Vladivostok, Russia;
Photographed by Mikhail Alexeev, 2005**

**Figure 3.15.
"Life without Borders," a Russian street advertisement; Photographed by Mikhail Alexeev, 2005**

In 2005, I was able to poll 400 of the same people whom I polled in 2000. The view that the Chinese were "creeping invaders" had declined by about 19 percent. So there was a sizable reduction in negative images.

Even though there were very few Chinese migrants in Nakhodka around 2000, the expectation was that trade would grow. In anticipation of expanded trade, the locals built a mile long complex called the "Chinese Wall" with all kinds of trade facilities, even though most of the people trading there were Russians and Turks (see *Figure 3.11*). In Ussuriisk, the second largest city in Primorskii Krai, locals built a little entry called Chinatown even though there were no Chinese in sight, only occasional seasonal workers coming to work at the sugar factory (see *Figure 3.12*). Things like that started developing. Markets emerged in Vladivostok and people started trading shoddy goods, which they would sell and then buy Mercedes cars. Well, K–Mart owners do the same thing. Various kinds of chintz are sold. You can buy posters of Putin and TATU, the Russian lesbian pop group. But gradually these facilities started to develop. If you observe these facilities over the years, you will see a gradual build up. The containers where they used to be located are now re-placed by larger buildings. The kind of street market that you saw in the first slide is now looking like this, a trade center (see *Figure 3.13* and *Figure 3.14*). You see the same Chinese traders inside, but it is a different structure.

A colleague of mine, Yevgeniy Plaksen from Vladivostok with whom we conducted these surveys, kept saying, "You know what I think? We have all these problems, we have all this rhetoric, all this xenophobia, but when you observe this growth I always say, *rynok zhivet i pobezhdaet* – the market lives and wins." I emerged with a strong sense that the market, given a chance, will live and win. Perhaps we will even see the emergence of some interesting micro-urban communities in deeply rural areas in the Russian Far East driven by this market demand. One example is the Transborder Trade and Economic Complex (PTEK) that is built right on the border between Russia and China. The Russians built an Orthodox Church made of wood, first thing, just to make sure the territory would stay Russian. Perhaps one day, however, if the positive forces of the market and a stronger, more effective state prevail, we will see what this advertisement shows (see *Figure 3.15*). Give this process a chance. Thank you.

CAROLINE BRETTELL, Interim Dean of Dedman College and Professor of Anthropology, Southern Methodist University

Thank you, Blair, for inviting me back to the Center. It is always very stimulating to be here. I have been working for quite some time on immigration issues in the Dallas–Fort Worth metroplex, which is one of these new gateway cities of immigration. Some of you may know that I recently published a book with Audrey Singer and Susan Hardwick out of the Brookings Institution called *21st Century Gateways: Immigrant Incorporation in Suburban America.* Marie Price has coauthored an article with Audrey in that book. I have another essay in the book that was just announced this morning that Blair and his colleagues edited. So I have been thinking a lot about these new cities of immigration.

In immigration to the United States, new cities of immigration emerged particularly after 1965, but especially after 1980 and 1990. If we only look at the numbers then of course these traditional cities of immigration that date back to the 19th century if not earlier are still receiving areas. So in cities like New York, Chicago, Los Angeles, and Miami, which came to the fore after World War II, you see the proportion of the foreign-born, whether it is in the city itself or in the larger metropolitan area (see *Figure 3.16*).

Figure 3.16. Proportion of Foreign-Born in Major U.S. Cities, 2000[39]

| City	Foreign Born, by Percentage of Population
New York	36.9%
Chicago	21.8%
Los Angeles	40.0%
Miami	57.6%

But I think those of us who have been working on trends in U.S. immigration are very well aware that other things have been happening since 1990 so that you get a lot of new cities, which my colleague Audrey Singer at Brookings has labeled "emerging gateways." Dallas and Washington, D.C. are in that category, as well as Atlanta and Fort Worth. Actually, I find the comparisons between Atlanta and Dallas particularly interesting.

Among the 21st century gateways are also *pre*-emerging gateways, which by now have probably already emerged. These tend to be in the so-called "New South"—places like Charlotte—and they have a different trend. A third trend is the impact of all this on suburban America and the metropolitan areas like Dallas-Fort Worth, Atlanta, and the Washington, D.C. metro area. As Walter Tejada said this morning, of course the real impact of this has been in the suburban areas of these cities. Talking about Russian cities, the smaller or micro-metro areas, I think smaller towns in the United States have also seen this impact.

I will first provide an overview of the Dallas-Fort Worth area. Dallas-Fort Worth experienced a rapid rise in the number of foreign-born. The proportion of the foreign-born population doubled between 1990 and 2000. 9/11 was a little bit of a blip across the country in all these matters, but when you start looking at the ACS data from 2005 or 2006, immigrants as a proportion of the urban population picked back up pretty quickly. Although it may not be as dramatic because of what happened in the first few years of the 21st century, the growth trend has nevertheless continued. The big unknown is the impact of our current economic situation.

The Dallas-Fort Worth area has attracted both high and low human capital populations. The Indian, Chinese, and Korean populations are in the top six, and have more or less higher human capital in terms of education and

Figure 3.17. Foreign-Born by Percentage of Population in Dallas-Forth Worth[40]

- Mexico
- El Salvador
- India
- Vietnam
- Korea
- China excl HK & Taiwan
- Philippines
- Pakistan
- Guatemala
- Honduras
- Canada
- UK
- Iran
- Nigeria
- Peru
- Other

some in terms of income. Everything that everybody associates with Texas and Dallas is of course the large Hispanic population, particularly Mexican. I think it is particularly interesting to look at these cities. This relates back to the issue of why a Walter Tejada can move ahead as fast as he has in the Washington, D.C. area. Though much more spread out, Salvadorans are the largest immigrant population in the D.C. area. It is important to think about that in terms of how individuals enter the political process and then bring others along with them. Looking at the composition of these populations in different metropolitan areas is particularly interesting.

Naturally Mexicans comprise the largest percentage of the foreign-born population in the Dallas–Fort Worth area.It is fairly diverse, but the top four groups (Mexican, Salvadorian, Indian, and Vietnamese) truly comprise large proportions of the foreign-born in Dallas–Fort Worth (see *Figure 3.17*).

The way that we look at cities and think about the impact of these newcomers on composition is particularly important. I am not telling anybody a story they do not know. Of course we all know the history of the power that Cubans have in the Miami area in the political process, in the economic process, and in a lot of other things going on in that area.

Figure 3.18. Percentage of Foreign-Born in Selected Dallas-Fort Worth Suburbs, 2000[41]

Suburb	Foreign Born, by Percent of Population
Arlington	15.3%
Carrollton	19.9%
Farmers Branch	25.1%
Garland	20.2%
Irving	26.4%
Plano	17.0%
Richardson	18.8%

Chicago is another traditional gateway city. I am not certain that it is commonly known how large the Mexican population is in Chicago because I think we still live with a legacy of the history of Chicago. Second to the Mexicans are the Poles and of course post-1965, the Poles reentered Chicago. When I was living in Chicago in the eighties, Eddie Vrydoliak was an alderman, a very powerful alderman, from the Polish community. If you are interested in issues like political incorporation, I think it is important to look at these kinds of trends across cities.

There was a question this morning to Patricia [Landolt] about Toronto that had to do with ethnic enclaves, and this is the other issue that we need to pay attention to. The old Chicago model of settlement into cities during the 19th century migration shows immigrants coming into the center of the city. Over the course of time, first generation, then second generation, and then third generation immigrants move out into the suburbs. The important point that we certainly make in our book, *21st Century Gateways: Immigrant Incorporation in Suburban America*, is that what has been going on in the last 10 to 20 years is direct settlement in the suburbs. In the Dallas-Fort Worth area, Fort Worth and Dallas are the two major nodes, and there are a bunch of suburban communities around the metropolitan area. Farmers Branch is one of the communities that has been very much in the news in terms of the anti-immigrant legislation that it has been passing. Recently the Supreme

Figure 3.19. Residential Distribution of Mexican Immigrants in Dallas-Fort Worth, 2000[42]


Court threw it out and they have introduced a new piece of legislation.

Irving is another such group. If you look at the figures about the inner ring suburbs, particularly around the city of Dallas and Fort Worth, you see a quarter of the population of Farmers Branch is foreign-born (see *Figure 3.18*).

Again, just think about those numbers and then think about the reactions. The city councilman leading the anti-immigrant charge in Farmers Branch has just been elected mayor. I have been thinking about this, and Audrey Singer and I had some conversations about the importance of key individuals, of leaders in communities who can formulate the discourse. In the context of our larger discussion today about discourse, it is very interesting to watch this particular community and what has been happening as they have now elected the former city councilman as mayor. You can see in 2000 that Irving is slightly above a quarter of the population being foreign-born (see *Figure 3.18*).

Denton is a further out, outer-ring suburb, where the University of North Texas is. It is quite far away, but nevertheless, those outer ring suburbs have equally had very important growth in the foreign-born population in recent years. One theme today has been how local communities and local govern-

Figure 3.20. Residential Distribution of Indian Immigrants in Dallas-Fort Worth, 2000[43]

ments respond, and I have just talked a little bit about Farmers Branch. The responses are not all negative. The chapter I have in *21st Century Gateways* mentions a second case where there is a much more inclusive, enlightened response. Those of us working on this have found a lot of diversity in the ways that local communities have responded. We certainly can do more work on this topic.

I want to show you something else on this enclave and settlement theme today. This is based on the 2000 census: all the black [on the map] represents Mexicans (see *Figure 3.19*).

So they are pretty much all over the Dallas–Fort Worth metropolitan area, but concentrated on the southern side. There are development differences between north Dallas and south Dallas and that is reflected in the settlement pattern. Plano is a very interesting community and I discuss it as an example of a more inclusive local government response. There is a kind of arc of Indians in north Dallas, in Collin County which was one of the fastest growing counties in the United States in the 1990s (see *Figure 3.20*). It is a very wealthy suburb so it has attracted high human capital Asian populations.

**Figure 3.21. Residential Distribution of Salvadorian Immigrants in Dallas-Fort Worth, 2000[44]**

Figure 3.22. Residential Distribution of Vietnamese Immigrants in Dallas-Fort Worth, 2000[45]

Salvadorans are the second largest Hispanic group after Mexicans, but there is a big numerical difference (see *Figure 3.21*). Irving and Farmers Branch have pretty high proportions of Salvadorans.

The Vietnamese settlement pattern is particularly interesting (see *Figure 3.22*). There are really two concentrations of Vietnamese, and of the five groups that we looked at in the study funded by the National Science Foundation, Vietnamese are the most concentrated. I think that is a particularly interesting story in terms of the history of Vietnamese settlement. Dallas–Fort Worth also has an Arlington. It is a sort of mid-city between Dallas and Fort Worth and is one area of concentrated Vietnamese settlement. The other is in the inner-ring suburb of Garland to the east of the city of Dallas.

I want to discuss the notion of "making place" and how new populations make place, especially when they are dispersed. Where is the "there?" Where is the center? Where is the community? What does community even mean when you have that kind of dispersed settlement? And although we speak a lot today about globalization, we must also recognize the countertrend of localism as a way to reenter the concept of community. Something I have been working on recently with my colleague Deborah-Reed Danahay, another anthropologist, is dealing with concepts of civic engagement. I have found some concepts useful in drawing out literature and thinking about some of these things. Stephen Castles, a well-noted immigration scholar, has introduced the idea of "re-territorializing" identity. At the level of the city, how does one claim and indicate identity in relationship to place? I have found the concept of heterolocalism, formulated first by Wilbur Zelinsky and Barrett A. Lee, useful, especially in dealing with dispersed populations – like the Asian Indian population that creates centers in different ways.

Then from Renato Rosaldo and William Flores we have the concept of cultural citizenship. Aihwa Ong is somebody else who has weighed in on this idea of cultural citizenship. I prefer Rosaldo and Flores's understanding of cultural citizenship, which gets to this issue of the right to be different, the right to maintain ethnic or cultural difference. That does not mean, however, that people do not feel like they belong politically, but that they can become politically incorporated and yet still retain these cultural differences. We need to start separating ideas of cultural and political belonging and accept the fact that people can incorporate and maintain a distinct cultural identity at the same time. In other words, we need to get away from

straight line assimilation in order to think about processes of incorporation in more complex ways.

One of the ways that these new immigration populations with dispersed settlement patterns have "made place" is through strip shopping malls. You could do a tour of the city of Dallas and move from the Korean one to the Vietnamese one, to the Indian one, etc., but they are very definite markers on the urban landscape. They really changed the city in ways that I think half of Dallas does not really realize. People who live in what is commonly referred to as the Highland Park bubble of Dallas, which is the rich Republican zip code just north of downtown, do not know what has really happened in their city. They are in the center and they do not have a sense of what has been going on in the periphery.

We have had some discussion about the importance of associations. Again, this is something I have been working on much more recently. If you pay attention and you drive around the city you will see migrant organizations such as the India Association of North Texas, founded in 1963 and a very important institution for the Indian community in the area. Of course, there are also the religious institutions which are the forefront of what I call civic incorporation. It is through religious organizations that people really learn how to be civically involved. This is the first step toward some broader sense of incorporation. These are extremely important and all over the landscape.

Cultural events and festivals happen in a lot of the suburbs around the city. They happen in the city itself. Immigrant populations celebrate various holidays. For example, Indian Independence Day in the middle of August is celebrated at the Anand Bazaar in the Dallas–Fort Worth area. The Lone Star racetrack becomes Little India for an afternoon and evening and there are about 25,000 Indians who gather once a year there and feel like they are at home. But it has a commercial aspect. All the various entrepreneurs in the city and mainstream organizations come and have booths. I have seen voter registration going on at the Anand Bazaar. All kinds of things go on at these events that I think are important to pay attention to as we look at the impact on the urban landscape.

In looking at the impact of immigrants on cities, it is important to determine their cultural presence in such forms as festivals, their civic presence in such forms as organizations, and their political presence as they move from civic presence to political presence. This is something that I have been looking at more recently.

In thinking about dispersed settlement and immigration populations, it is important to think about new technology and the communities that can be created. These are internet neighborhoods that are not only local and national, but also transnational.

Ek-Nazar, which means "a glimpse," is an electronic bulletin board founded in Dallas which has evolved into a national Internet community and is absolutely vital to the incorporation process of Indian immigrants. Immigrants learn about this resource fairly quickly. Somebody who is returning to India and wants to sell their furniture can use the site. Cars are bought and sold on the site. Jobs are procured. Comments on events are posted. This technology is very important in terms of how it creates a community.

There are just a few religious institutions and voluntary associations that exist that are shared spaces or pan-ethnic spaces that involve more than one ethnic group, but it is also important to pay attention to them.

Finally, where I end my essay in Blair et al's book is to draw from an analysis by Joan Weibel-Orlando, who conducted a study of Native American Indians in the Los Angeles area that makes one think about what we mean when we talk about the concept of community. There are several ways to enter into that discussion and to enter into the sense of community and what an immigrant community is. Thank you.

MICHAEL JONES-CORREA, Professor of Government, Cornell University

I want to start off by returning to the point that Blair [Ruble] raised at the very beginning, which is that one of the central narratives of the 20th century going into the 21st century is of the migration of people into more densely settled areas. Two trends—urbanization and migration—are occurring simultaneously, and it is the analysis of these trends that ties the various presentations made here today together. Although these two trends are quite important, they are often overlooked, overshadowed, and ignored in many of the discussions about both national and international politics.

This is true in the United States as well. The U.S. experienced urbanization earlier perhaps than some of the places we have been talking about today, so that by the mid-20th century, the U.S. was largely urban. But 20th century urbanization in the U.S. has meant something slightly different:

it has been not only a concentration of people in cities, but also in part a dispersal away from larger central cities. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) recently did a ranking of urbanization and the U.S. has the least urban concentration among all OECD countries. The OECD is, however, defining urbanization as central city concentrations. So one of the things that is happening in the United States is that we are a very urban nation but we do not have urban concentrations in central cities in the way that some other countries do. So we are experiencing both concentration and dispersal. One sees this reflected in the figures about Americans living in suburbia. At present, about more than half of all Americans live outside of what the U.S. Census defines as central cities. These are thought of as stereotypically white middle class enclaves. But those stereotypically white middle class enclaves are becoming increasingly diverse, as Caroline pointed out earlier. The old patterns—in which immigrants and ethnic minorities would move first to central cities and then slowly disperse outwards—have changed dramatically since the 1980s, and these changes have only accelerated since, so that now more than half of immigrants live in suburbs. Thanks in no small part to immigrants one sees the increasing ethnic and racial diversity of suburbia. More than a third of African–Americans now live in suburbs. Just about half of Latinos and more than half of Asian–Americans also live in suburbia. So there is again this dual phenomenon of residential concentration, of increasing density but also of dispersal from central cities.

In some ways what you are seeing in the United States is a move to a donut model of urbanization where at least some central cities are becoming increasingly populated by the upper middle class. Outside the central city there is an inner ring of suburbs that are more middle- to working-class and then an outer ring of suburbs or ex-urban areas where these metro areas are expanding. For instance, the larger metropolitan area of Washington, D.C. now includes places as far away as parts of Pennsylvania and parts of West Virginia. People are commuting 150 to 200 miles to get to their place of work. So the conception of what we think of as urban is changing radically.

This raises all kinds of questions about what we mean by integration or incorporation. As you have these ethnic and racial minorities moving into these suburban areas that are much dispersed, how does this change their experience of politics, their political opportunities, and their opportunities for mobilization? One argument is that as these suburbs become more racially

and ethnically homogenous they become more city-like. These suburbs begin to grapple with the same kinds of issues that cities have historically grappled with: poverty, providing low-income housing, crime, or providing services in many languages. This leads to the rise of a more contentious, although some have argued, more actively engaged, citizenry.

But I would propose that although you have demographic changes that have in some ways begun to raise issues that echo those present in central cities, suburbia is a very different kind of physical space. Again, there is a pattern of dispersal, exemplified by strip malls that people typically drive by without noticing, in which shops and restaurants are increasingly owned, managed and staffed by the increasingly ethnically diverse residents of suburbia. Suburban sprawl allows increasing ethnic and racial diversity to remain relatively invisible.

Another result of suburban sprawl is political fragmentation, which is something we have not really talked about. We think of cities as being central political units, but again when you have this dispersal, particularly in the American system where a metropolitan area—say the county of Los Angeles which has almost one hundred different municipalities, the county of Miami Dade in Florida which has close to seventy municipalities, or even the D.C. metro area which has about twenty or so municipalities—we begin to see political fragmentation as well as spatial dispersal. This fragmentation has real effects on how we think about immigrant and ethnic pathways to integration.

The larger paper that my comments today are based on has three different themes: the incorporation of new actors in suburbia, the impact of these new actors on suburban politics, and the effects of suburbia itself on new actors or how actors think of themselves as ethnic groups. For example, how do you think about ethnic identity when your ethnic group is dispersed across a 150 mile-wide area, where there is not the same kind of residential concentration one thinks of in a case like old Polish neighborhoods in Chicago, where all the core institutions—churches, clubs, ethnic food stores, schools—were basically two blocks away? In suburbia we are talking about a different scale, in which your church is ten miles in one direction, and the ethnic food store you shop in is twenty miles in another direction. This is a complete physical dispersal of the ethnic community.

This has a number of implications. The first is that you will see a variation across policy arenas. That is, that new actors like immigrants are going

to experience politics and political incorporation differently, depending on the political arena in which they are engaged, whether it is through the school board, planning board, or electoral politics. The second theme is variation in the institutional location of suburbs by state. One example of this is Dillon's Rule states versus non–Dillon Rule states. Dillon's Rule refers to the authority granted by states to localities, say, to raise taxes. A strict Dillon's Rule state like Virginia allows very little leeway to its localities to raise its property taxes, whereas other states give quite a lot of leeway to its localities to raise taxes and shift spending. This varies widely in the United States. In a federal system like the U.S. there will be a lot of variation across localities. Third, there is going to be a lot of variation across different ethnic and racial groups, which is something we have talked a bit about today.

I want to talk briefly about the three types of variation: variation across policy arenas, variation across states and localities, and variation across ethnic groups. Political scientists tend to think about incorporation as entry into electoral politics. I am a political scientist so I often find myself accepting this definition. But electoral politics is, of course, only one of many arenas for civic and political incorporation. Caroline has already mentioned non–governmental institutions and churches. I have written quite a lot about bureaucratic incorporation, or the ways in which local bureaucracies incorporate immigrants, whether through health services, education, or public libraries (one of my favorites). How immigrant incorporation proceeds depends in part on how these different bureaucratic institutions see their mission and on the relationship they have built with their clients. There are some kinds of bureaucratic institutions that build longer-term relationships with their clients (again, libraries are a good example) versus other bureaucratic agencies that see their role as primarily regulatory or rule enforcing (like police, for instance). Immigrants experience integration differently through different types of bureaucratic institutions.

If you think about politics as directed at the redistribution of public goods, then immigrants can choose different means to accomplish ends. They can choose electoral politics, bureaucratic politics or mobilization through community organizations as distinct pathways to their political goals, and they can seek different actors in their new receiving context— whether in suburbs or cities—as partners. So we should not think about integration as simply being electoral participation. What an immigrant group or an individual immigrant group considers to be integration will

depend on what they want from institutions. They may just want symbolic recognition: to have a day of celebration for their ethnic group, or to have elected officials march in their yearly parade. That kind of recognition may be enough, at least in the short-term. Alternatively, immigrant groups may want to elect a representative, which of course leads to a very different pathway. They may want simply to have a certain policy put in place or some amount of public spending directed at their group, again leading to very different kinds of mobilization.

I mentioned variation across place briefly when I talked about Dillon's Rule. There is a whole other set of policies that are implemented differentially across the states and across localities. The U.S. Congress failed to pass broad legislative immigration reform in 2006 and 2007. As a result, a lot of decisions about how to handle immigration are being devolved *de facto* down to states and localities. Farmers Branch, Texas (mentioned earlier today), is one of them; Prince William County here in the D.C. area is another. For example, localities are making decisions on how to enforce national immigration law, deciding whether or not to enter into partnership with the Department of Homeland Security through Program 287(g) (basically an agreement between local law enforcement to become deputies of the DHS and apply and enforce immigration law). This again results in sizeable variation in the treatment of immigrants across localities, and how ethnically diverse residents are brought into civic and political life.

I want to conclude by raising three questions. I began by talking about suburbanization in the United States – about urbanization without cities or urbanization beyond cities. The world has been urbanizing, but is urbanization best captured by a focus on cities? Or would regions or provinces or broader metro areas be a more appropriate focus of study? The question is what do we mean by "urban?"

A second, related idea is that there are new patterns of migration to urban areas. We have been talking about Washington, D.C., Moscow, and Barcelona as global cities but we are seeing a great deal of migration as well to smaller locales. Both of my co-presenters on this panel mentioned these new patterns. Mikhail Alexeev talked about public opinion in smaller settlements in rural areas of Russia and Caroline Brettell mentioned the changes taking place in smaller municipalities around the Dallas-Fort Worth area.

I just came from North Carolina. The team of researchers I was working with was looking at Chatham County, which has three poultry processing

plants employing several thousand workers. By 1990 most of these workers working in these non-unionized low-paying jobs were Mexican. Siler City, the largest city in the county, became majority Latino sometime in the l990s, as a result of this migrant stream from Mexico to rural North Carolina. So when we talk about globalization and global cities, Siler City, North Carolina, which has 20,000 people, is in its way, also a global city. Chatham County is a fascinating place. You see there the overlay of immigration onto older relationships between blacks and whites, and simultaneously, because Chatham County is on the fringe of the larger Raleigh–Durham–Chapel Hill metro complex, you have yuppies, old Southern politics, and immigration all coming together in one place.

As we look at urbanization and integration we have to ask ourselves what exactly the importance of place is. The importance of place could be institutional – where decisions are made. It could also be a matter of physical infrastructure, where housing is located, housing segregation, access to transportation, location of schooling. The ways in which we think about space and locale can be conceptualized quite differently. We should ask ourselves how and why place matters.

Finally, I want to talk a little bit about pathways to incorporation, which I mentioned vary by group. If you think about pathways to incorporation as being linear and unidirectional, one moves from less integration to more integration. But I think there are other possibilities. One is that there may be cul-de-sacs to integration. In other words, there may be incomplete or partial membership, in which people get stuck for quite a long time. A very good example in the United States is Temporary Protected Status (TPS) for Central Americans. Those under TPS are here legally, but they cannot move to permanent citizenship. They are just stuck in a legal limbo. Another version of this incomplete or partial membership might be integration that is symbolic but not substantive. An example of this might be local efforts to offer cultural festivals for different ethnic groups or New York City's effort to recognize alternate side of the street parking for Hindu holidays. That might all be very nice, but it may not actually be what we think of as integration. It may be, rather, the political or civic parallel to what sociologists refer to as "segmented assimilation," in which immigrant groups' outcomes vary depending on immigrants' initial class status and the pathway they take to integration. In this view, immigrant groups eventually assimilate but with better and worse outcomes, with some groups downwardly assimilat-

ing, and others upwardly assimilating, in social and economic terms. We can argue about what results we should think of as being desirable and what we may think of as working better, but I do think that there is going to be variation in the kinds of outcomes that immigrants and immigrant groups experience. So again the larger question here is what do we mean by *integration*? We have been talking a lot about integration in this workshop without actually saying what we mean. I think there are lots of different ways to think about integration.

I raise these questions in a more general way based on my experience and research here in the U.S., in the Washington, D.C., area, but I do not think that these questions are specific to any one site and I think one of the useful things about getting a group like this together is that we bring people together who look at these questions from quite different perspectives and across cases. It really makes us think about what our starting assumptions are. I want to end by thanking Blair [Ruble] and others for bringing us here to talk about these issues.

DISCUSSION

Question: This is just a suggestion for Professor Brettell. You have very interesting potential cross-section of time series data on ethnic diversity. If you plug that into the Case–Shiller Equation to determine real estate values, you are going to get a lot of play and have a big effect, and boy this is the time to do it.

Question: I would like the last two speakers to comment a bit on the role of a factor that was not explicitly mentioned, which is congregations, meaning religious congregations, for immigrant groups. How do congregations, whether it be Hindu or another religion, play a role in providing community identity in these much dispersed communities? You mentioned the Internet, but it strikes me that religious congregations play an enormous and important role.

Also, how does community play a role in these urban multiplexes? Something I keep trying to explain to my European friends who simply cannot comprehend it is that you can have a religious congregation to which people come from all over an enormous area, and the only thing they have in common is the congregation. They come from different communities,

they come from different walks of life, they come from different socioeconomic statuses, but the congregation is an enormously important unifying factor. This is one of the reasons why the United States remains a much more religious country than most other developed countries. I have not heard that explicitly mentioned by any of the speakers and I wonder if you think it is as important as it seems to be to me.

Brettell: Absolutely. The religious institutions are, first of all, one kind of organization that solves the problem of heterolocalism, where you have a dispersed settlement. I have found the same things that Michael Jones–Correa has been talking about with these dispersed populations. By group it varies how far they come to congregate. There is also a transformation. If you take the Indian case, for example, there is not one specific temple day in India. In adapting to the U.S., Sunday becomes the day at the temple. People go on Sundays because they are leading their American lives otherwise. So yes, they come together. They will go individually during the week if there is some special holiday or some special prayer they want to say for somebody in their family. There are Buddhist and Christian organizations for the Vietnamese community. Obviously there are churches, whether they are Protestant, Fundamentalist, or Roman Catholic for Mexicans, but just as in previous waves of immigration, religious institutions are absolutely the key community centers.

I believe there was a study done on religious institutions by Michael W. Foley and Dean R. Hoge. There are a couple of really good books that have come out and maybe a half dozen of them really focus on this issue for the new immigrant populations. But we are trying to look at these as the front line of learning how to be civically engaged. In other words, when you build a religious institution you have to interface with local government. You have to buy the land and you have to learn how to file for 501c3 tax-exempt status. I agree with Michael Jones–Correa that we have much too narrow a definition of what political incorporation is, and we are trying to break it out as I gather he is. I just did not have time to do it, but I think it is fundamentally important.

Jones–Correa: I think these hub institutions that bring people together from widely dispersed areas differ by ethnic groups, so churches are central for a lot of different ethnic groups but not, for example, for the Chinese.

There are other institutions that also play this role. Soccer leagues play this role for Salvadorans. Churches and other religious institutions are key, but there are other hub institutions as well.

Question: I am glad Wayne [Merry] brought up religion because I was thinking of the Russian example. If one thinks of Vladimir Putin's administration obviously he is recentralizing. I think there are more and more indications that the Russian Orthodox Church is increasingly going to be deployed as a way to overcome what the government is obviously very well aware of, and that is the declining percentage of the Russian population being ethnic Russians. I think that membership in the Russian Orthodox Church will be a sort of key to being more equal in Russian society, and that it will not necessarily depend on ethnic background.

Question: I am wondering if the panelists could address how you would factor in the activities of the sending countries of these different migrant populations—as many of them are getting more engaged both in the U.S. and other countries—in trying to organize their diasporas, either by staying engaged with them or by getting them more engaged politically. Ten years ago when I did research with Ecuadorians in New York, the Ecuadorian government had basically created a partnership with the Catholic Church to try to use that as one way of promoting voter registration and English language education and other things, but also as a way of staying connected to the Ecuadorian community. I am wondering if you have seen that and if so, how it factors into how you are looking at these issues of assimilation and integration.

Jones–Correa: The success that sending countries have had in keeping in touch with building these kinds of partnerships with their communities abroad varies enormously. A lot of countries have paid lip service to this idea and put very different levels of resources into building up these ties. The case that has attracted a lot of attention is of course Mexico, which has built up a network of consulates across the U.S., many of them in new immigration destination areas. Raleigh-Durham in North Carolina, for instance, has a Mexican consulate. There are different points of view about how transnationalism intersects with assimilation. I tend to think, and from the data I have seen, that these transnational ties tend to fade across time

in the U.S. and across generations but it is a complicated debate. A second debate is around the relationship between transnationalism and assimilation, and whether these two are fundamentally at odds, or can be compatible. Again, from the evidence I have seen, I tend to think of transnationalism and assimilation as complementary, as you suggest, rather than as necessarily oppositional.

Brettell: I would say I have not looked at this systematically, but I started my career as an immigration scholar working with Portuguese in Canada and in France, and then spent a lot of time in Portugal. I worked with Portuguese in the sixties and seventies, and the Portuguese state was doing this very powerfully. But during the first part of my research, the Salazar regime under Caetano, at least when I entered into my research, was still very much alive. That was one of the early powerful remittance states and Portuguese banks were in Canada and in France, funneling those remittances. This has gone on for quite a long time in different immigrant populations, and perhaps certain states wake up to it faster than others in terms of its contribution to homeland prosperity.

The Indian government has stipulated that a dual citizen does not have voting rights in India, but they are at least permitted to keep property, which kept a lot of people from taking American citizenship. But they also have an NRI, non-resident Indian ambassador.

And then there is the consular card. That is, the Mexican consulate steps in and provides an identity card. It is a very important question. Some of it will be sustained. People who maintain interest or investment in their home country depend again on the group into the second and third generations. As long as there is new migration, it will be sustained.

I want to comment on Russia. It interested me all day that there was not more discussion, particularly in the European context and in the Russian context in cases when you are talking about the minority populations, about Islam and Islamic immigrants. That becomes a point of contention as it butts up against some countries that are 99 percent Christian, such as Spain.

The other thing we have not discussed today is what this presence is in terms of the challenge it posed to people's identity. This is a cultural question. I always ask my students, "What is American culture?" And I think the Farmers Branch conflict is not about Islam but about American culture. It is about middle class American culture being challenged.

Alexseev: That is a wonderful lead-up to my comment because I did want to comment on the Orthodox Church question. If I understand your question correctly, you say that the demographic situation is such that it is going to force the Orthodox Church to be more inclusive, right? I would just have to say that looking at my survey data, they still have a long way to go. There is a very strong correlation between the frequency of church attendance among the Russian Orthodox believers, and in the survey, about 66 percent of respondents said they are Orthodox believers in the general Russian population.

These questions on exclusionism, about supporting Russia for ethnic Russians and supporting deportation have quite a strong correlation. I only personally experienced anti-Americanism in Russia one time because I am a Russian-American. I am a hyphenated Russian when I go to Russia and usually people have no problem with that. I even had a wonderful conversation and drank vodka with Zhirinovsky supporters on a train once. But the only time that I experienced very strong anti-Americanism personally, eye-to-eye, was in the Pskov region in the Pechora Monastery, where I struck up a conversation with a local priest who was about to lead the tour of the caves. We had a wonderful chat until he asked, "Where are you from?"

I said, I am from Seattle in the United States.

He just looked at me as if I came from hell and never spoke to me again even though he conducted the entire tour.

In terms of Islam, I had a separate survey of minorities and Muslims in late 2006-early 2007 and how they view migrants and specifically how they view Muslim migrants and non-Muslim migrants. To make a long story short, if you control for ethnicity, the effect of Muslim versus non-Muslim practically disappears. The only difference is that the Muslim non-Russians are more likely to support wholesale deportation of migrants than non-Muslim non-Russians. That is a strong, statistically significant finding.

Somebody asked a question on sending states. I can just say that in my view, these things can go on parallel tracks. Consider the Russian-Chinese case. The perception that China is a rising power in Asia that can back up these migrants and use them as a vehicle for putting political economic pressure or even territorial claims on Russia has been strongly correlated with anti-Chinese sentiments in the Russian Far East. As one Russian governor summed it up, "…from a Chinese migrant laborer in Russia to a Chinese Cultural Center, from a Chinese Cultural Center to Chinese business, from a Chinese business to a Chinese soldier. Period." These sorts of views exist.

However on the other hand, there has been a lot of collaboration even under a very xenophobic government, such as Nazdratenko in the maritime Primorskii territory. They have police meetings and border guard meetings. They had a visa-free travel regime. They had lenient trading rules and that cross–border trade probably was twice as much as the officially accounted for interstate trade in that region. You see a lot of the same dichotomy and the same paradoxes with the sending states I think.

Question: This is a question to Mikhail [Alexseev]. In discussing U.S. migration, one of the things that has really come out today is how incredibly diverse the response to immigration has been – for example the difference between Farmers Branch and Arlington, Virginia. Some people get really angry and feel really threatened by immigrants and in other communities that sense of threat is just not so strong. In your discussion of Russia I did not really see that kind of community level variation in opposition to immigration. I am wondering if that exists in Russia. If it does not, then why do you think the U.S. and Russia are so different in this instance?

Question: I have a question for Misha [Alexseev], to sort of follow up on your research in the Vladivostok region. Regarding the Chinese, I am wondering if you have any data or have looked at the extent to which Chinese students are enrolling in programs in the Far East State University or some of the other universities there. Is there any hope that that might help offset some of this xenophobia and the red scare or the white scare or whatever is going on there? I also spent a lot of time in the Russian Far East and I know of that xenophobia.

I also wonder how you would compare, for example, the Vladivostok Primorskii region to other closed cities in the former Soviet Union. I wonder if that is sort of a marker of xenophobic societies, just ones that were closed.

Question: I have a question for the panel that concerns America. The United States, during its foundation, went through this definitional discussion about integration. The entire system is constructed so that individuals are allowed to have this cultural citizenship, as one would call it, while these independent feelings are prevented from threatening the integrity of commercial processes. I wonder whether, in talking about urbanization, which

now falls across county lines and state lines, the system is really capable of handling what we have today.

I am interested in the Islamic religion from the American side. I live in an area that has a large Muslim population and there is obviously theoretically the room to create liberalism for various religions but, in practice, it has not worked. Can that practice be corrected? It seems that the size of urban areas has fallen across the boundaries of what the old system was, and this might create problems. Religion is now interpreted as including Islam, Hindu, and Buddhism, but when religion was discussed at the founding of the United States this was not so.

Alexseev: I will answer the question on community level variation. I presented some aggregate numbers, but there is actually a lot of variation, and it is very similar to the United States. When I think of this variation I often think of the case in San Diego County where there is a city of Escondido that decided to enforce anti-immigrant rules and also the city called National City, which decided to be a migrant sanctuary. National City is a lot closer to the border, where a lot more people would actually complain saying "all these illegal immigrants are sleeping in my back yard." Escondido is removed and much harder to get to. But there is a lot more anti-migrant hostility in Escondido versus National City.

I found a very similar thing in Russia in Primorskii Krai, for example. If you stratify the sample, the locations closer to the border with China are less hostile than locations farther inland from the border. It is the people who are not aware of the real situation who in general tend to be more hostile.

To answer the question on Chinese students in Russia: there are not that many students, maybe 1,000 or so, in Primorskii Krai. However, it may not necessarily depend on whether they are students at the universities. If you have students they will not necessarily promote some kind of benign cross cultural understanding and environment. Some of the recent cases of violence in Primorskii Krai were against students. In Moscow also, at the Gubkin Oil and Gas Institute, clashes between the Cossacks and the Chechens have also involved students. Student populations can be very volatile anywhere because you deal with a lot of young people, especially males with high testosterone. At the same time I would say the context in which these student populations find themselves is probably the most important. The former vice governor of Primorskii Krai, who is in charge of the trans-

border trade complex I showed on the slides, also envisions establishing business schools and universities right where trade happens and where people go to restaurants and entertain themselves so they can learn each others' laws. He said to me, "Even if Primorskii Krai becomes 99 percent Chinese, as long as the Chinese understand and know the Russian rules and laws, I do not care. Let it be the Russian Hong Kong."

Brettell: Let me just make a few comments. This is going to sound really simplistic but in 1855, we had a party that was anti-Catholic because Catholics were not supposed to belong to the United States. The United States was white Anglo-Saxon Protestant; we got by on that and absorbed Roman Catholics into this country. That is really the history of this country. That is why we have been so successful. That is how we came to allow Hindus to come and practice their religion. We have allowed Syrian Orthodox Christians from Southern India to come and practice their religion. We have allowed Buddhist temples and whatever else.

It is interesting to think about the United States and its religious diversity in comparison with what we have been talking about a lot today, which are countries that are experiencing diversity and immigration for the first time and do not have the historical depth, concerning these issues, that the United States does. They could learn from us. I have thought about what the violence that erupted in the suburbs of Paris a few years ago means. This morning someone said that Russians do not want to ghettoize immigrants. The French said this in the 1960s. They dispersed them around the city in huge apartment buildings, and now they have created a ghetto problem in suburbs.

We need to hold on to the fact that we have had enormous success as a country. That is why I pose the question, what is American culture? You know there is a middle class culture that does not like pink houses in its suburban neighborhood: that is normative. American culture is an incredibly complex, fluid, and changing thing and that has helped with our success.

I think it is important to think about the processes of integration and incorporation as multi-faceted. To be a good American citizen does not mean you cannot go and pray at your Hindu temple. I am, by the way, a naturalized citizen from Canada. If you have never been to a citizenship ceremony, it is incredibly moving. Everybody who is anti-immigrant should just go to one of those ceremonies. In anthropology, we talk about situated identities;

we are all made up of different social locations. I am a gendered person, I am an aged person, and I am an immigrant person. We are all incredibly complex in that way and so we need think about identity in sophisticated theoretical ways. I am not sure how we can communicate that to the people on the street in Farmers Branch.

The thing that has fascinated me about the discourse in Farmers Branch and the discourse nationally is how much the phrase "rule of law" has emerged as what makes us American. I do not have any answers to that. It is absolutely fascinating how that has jumped to the forefront of what makes us American – being a nation of laws. You hear it from time to time, but it is very powerful right now and it has implications in terms of this debate on immigration.

Jones-Correa: I think you are referring to *Federalist No. 10* and the dangers of factions. But I think the dangers of factions pointed out in *Federalist No. 10* were basically the dangers of concentrated factions. What has been constructed in the United States is a federal system where power is dispersed throughout the federal government, states, and localities, in a way that is, designed to minimize the danger of factions.

To the extent that we have immigrants that are dispersed across metropolitan areas, they then live in 60 different municipalities. If you are thinking about this from the point of view of Madison's *Federalist No. 10,* the system works: we have a system that fragments communities and identities and disperses people. So if the danger of faction is your concern, then I think the way the system works should set your mind at ease.

I think, however, this raises again the question about place and where people end up, in one municipality rather than another, in one state rather than another. What is it about place that is important? What makes place matter? There are at least two or three different ways in which people here at this workshop have talked about place mattering – partly as ethnic concentration, physical infrastructure, or institutions. Institutions vary in the United States greatly across localities, and these differences lead to different kinds of outcomes. If you are an immigrant, institutions can make a place unfriendly or friendly. Consider the difference between sanctuary cities and cities that enforce national immigration law. It makes an enormous difference for immigrants. But the system in the United States is designed for fragmentation. But this is not only so in the United States. In other coun-

tries, local institutions and local fragmentation matters as much as it does in this country.

Ruble: I am going to bring this long day to a close more or less on time.

This has been a very rich discussion. On the one hand it is a very typical discussion because what we see is that the longer the conversation goes on, the more complex it becomes. I am struck at how the words tend towards abstraction, which is to be expected given that most of speakers—not all, but most of the speakers—are academics. Consider the visual images: the crowded Barcelona train station platform, the young Somali women in Johannesburg, and so on. People have chosen images that communicate the humanity of the problem and the challenges that are being faced in many different places around the world. I am most drawn to those powerful images that have been shown throughout the day.

To go back to Sue Parnell's point—Sue Parnell from the University of Capetown—the only evaluation that matters in judging a community is whether or not anyone would want their own children to live, to study, or to work in that community. I think the challenge that we have been talking about today is really the challenge of creating places in which people really would want their children to live, and that challenge is really going to be with us for a long time.

On that note I will bring the formal session to an end. I want to thank everybody for coming here, particularly those of you who have sat through the whole day, and I also want to again thank the people who put it together, Lauren Herzer, Liz Malinkin, Renata Kosc-Harmatiy, and other people here at the Center, and thank the speakers who traveled such a long way.

Notes

1. This data comes from the African Cities Project undertaken by the Wits Forced Migration Studies Programme together with Tufts University, Eduardo Mondlane University, the University of Nairobi, the French Institute of South Africa, and the University of Lubumbashi.

2. *Ibid.*

3. *Ibid.*

4. Map provided by El Colegio de la Frontera Norte.

5. *Ibid.*

6. Map provided by El Colegio de la Frontera Norte and El Colegio de Mexico.

7. This graph is based on official figures published by the Instituto Nacional de Migracion, Mexico.

8. *Ibid.*

9. *Ibid.*

10. Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat, *Trends in Total Migrant Stock: The 2005 Revision* , New York: United Nations, 2007.

11. *Ibid.*

12. Rosstat, *Demograficheskii ezhegodnik* [Demographic Yearbook], Moscow: Rosstat, various years.

13. United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), TransMONEE Database, Florence, Italy: Innocennti Research Centre, various years.

14. *Ibid.*

15. Rosstat, *Demograficheskii ezhegodnik* [Demographic Yearbook], Moscow: Rosstat, various years.

16. United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, Registration of International Migration in the Russian Federation, Joint ECE–EUROSTAT Work Session on Migration Statistics organized in cooperation with the UN Statistics Division (Geneva, 21–23 May 2001), *Working Paper No. 2*, 14 May 2001.

17. Mansoor, Ali and Bryce Quillin, eds. *Migration and Remittances: Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union,* Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 2007.

18. Rosstat, *Demograficheskii ezhegodnik* [Demographic Yearbook], Moscow: Rosstat, various years.

19. *Ibid.*

20. World Bank, World Development Indicators (CD-ROM), Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 2007.

21. *Ibid.*

22. World Bank, *Russian Economic Report No. 11,* Moscow: World Bank Moscow Office, November 2005.

23. Rosstat, *Demograficheskii ezhegodnik* [Demographic Yearbook], Moscow: Rosstat, various years.

24. *Ibid.*

25. Goskomstat Rossii, *Naseleniya Rossii za 100 let* [The Population of Russia Over 100 Years], 1998, pp. 50–53; Rosstat, *Demograficheskii ezhegodnik* [Demographic Yearbook], Moscow: Rosstat, various years; and Goskomstat Rossii, *Predpolozhitelnaia chislennost naseleniia Rossiiskoi Federatsii do 2026 goda* [The Projected Population of the Russian Federation to the Year 2026], Mocsow: Goskomstat Rossii, 2005.

26. United Nations Population Division, World Population Prospects: The 2002 Revision Population Database (http://www.un.org/esa/population/unpop.htm, accessed 15 November 2004).

27. The research for this project was conducted within the context of a multi–year effort on behalf of the Kennan Institute to record the experience of immigrants in Ukraine.

28. *Ibid.*

29. *Ibid.*

30. *Ibid.*

31. This map is based on information from Zapis aktov grazhdanskogo sostoianiia (ZAGS) [Civil Registration Office] and on the average of registered deaths from 1993-1998.

32. *Ibid.*

33. *Ibid.*

34. *Ibid.*

35. *Ibid.*

36. From Ostapenko, Subbotina, Moskva mnogonatsionalnaia, *Starozhily i migranty: vmeste ili riadom?* (Moscow: RUDN, 2007).

37. The information in this graph is based on surveys conducted by the Levada Center and the Vladivostok Institute of History on attitudes on immigration in Russia.

38. Based on systematic coding of all xenophobic acts reported from January 2004 through December 2005 by the SOVA Information-Analytical Center in Mosow (www.sova-center.ru) and the Union of the Councils of Soviet Jews, "Bigotry Monitor: A Weekly Human Rights Newsletter on Anti-Semitism, Xenophobia, and Religious Persecution in the Former Communist World and Western Europe" (http://ucsj.org/bigotry-monitor).

39. These percentages are based on the 2000 U.S. Census data on foreign-born.

40. These percentages are based on data from the Migration Policy Institute Data Hub, (www.migrationinformation.org/datahub).

41. These percentages are based on data from the 2000 US. Census, as well as 2005 and 2006 data from the American Community Survey.

42. This map is from Caroline Brettell, "'Big D' Incorporating New Immigrants in a Sunbelt Suburban Metropolis," in *21st Century Gateways: Immigrant Incorporation in Suburban America,* ed. Audrey

Singer, Susan W. Hardwick, and Caroline B. Brettell (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2008): 53–86.

43.   *Ibid.*

44.   *Ibid.*

45.   *Ibid.*

Osborn, The Honorable Jeanne Phillips, The Honorable Donald Quartel Jr., Mr. Thomas Reedy, Ms. Renate Rennie, Mr. Edwin Robbins Esq., Mr. Wayne Rogers, Ms. Nina Rosenwald, Mr. Anthony Scaramucci, Steven Schmidt Esq., Ms. Patricia Schramm, Rev. Timothy Scully C.S.C., Mr. Thomas Shuler Jr., The Honorable George Shultz, Mr. Raja Sidawi, Mr. John Sitilides, Mr. Mark Skolnik, Mr. William Slaughter, Mr. James Small Ph.D, Mr. Shawn Smeallie, Mr. Thomas Stephenson, Mr. Robert Stewart, Ms. Peggy Styer, The Honorable Peter Terpeluk Jr., Mrs. Norma Kline Tiefel, The Honorable Timothy Towell, Mr. Mark Treanor, Mr. Anthony Viscogliosi, Mr. Marc Viscogliosi, Mr. Michael Waldorf, Dr. Christine Warnke, The Honorable Peter Watson, The Honorable Pete Wilson, The Honorable Deborah Wince-Smith, Mr. Herbert Winokur, Mr. Richard Ziman, Mrs. Nancy Zirkin.

THE EURASIAN MIGRATION PAPERS

The *Eurasian Migration Papers* is a series of reports—produced jointly by the Kennan Institute and the Comparative Urban Studies Program of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, D.C.— that examines migrant communities in Eurasian cities. The series features the results of Wilson Center-supported research examining the lives of migrants in contemporary Russia, Ukraine, and surrounding states.

According to the United Nations, the number of people living in countries other than their birth is approaching 200 million worldwide, up from 80 million three decades ago. While the scale of migration has grown, the nature of international population movements and patterns of migrant adaptation have changed. Migration movements have become part of the permanent fabric of modern society, and bring with them questions of economic, political, and social significance.

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The Kennan Institute has sponsored a number of activities—such as lectures, workshops, working groups, seminars, and survey research among different migrant communities, native-born populations, and officials—intended to explore the social and official reaction to the presence of migrants within Eurasian countries and to trace the evolving response of migrant communities to life in their new homes. The *Eurasian Migration Papers* publication series seeks to make the results of these efforts widely available to specialists, policy-makers, and citizens in Russia, Ukraine, the United States, and elsewhere.

Printed copies of the *Eurasian Migration Papers* are available upon request from the Kennan Institute in Washington, D.C. They are also available for download in PDF format on the web pages of the Wilson Center:

Kennan Institute, **www.wilsoncenter.org/kennan**,
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and the Kennan Kyiv Project, **www.kennan.kiev.ua**.

Previous volumes of the Eurasian Migration Papers include:

• *No.1: Establishing a New Right to the Ukrainian City,* Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, early 2009, by Blair A. Ruble

Please also look for the forthcoming third volume of the *Eurasian Migration Papers*:

• *No.3: Chinese Migration to Russia: Missed Opportunities,* Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, early 2009, by Maria Repnikova and Harley Balzer

In addition to the *Eurasian Migration Papers*, please also see the Kennan Institute's previous publications concerning migration and tolerance in Ukraine (available for download in PDF format):

• *Netradytsiini Mihranty u Kyievi* [Nontraditional Immigrants in Kyiv], Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2004, by Olena Braichevska, Halyna Volosiuk, Olena Malynovska, Yaroslav Pylynskyi, Nancy E. Popson, and Blair A. Ruble. (Available in English and Ukrainian; no longer available in printed form)

• *Mihratsiia i tolerantnist v Ukrainy* [Migration and Tolerance in Ukraine], Kyiv: Stylos Press, 2007, edited by Yaroslav Pylynskyi. (Ukrainian; no longer available in printed form)

• *Aktualno: Tolerantnist!* [Current Issue: Tolerance!], Kyiv: Stylos Press, 2008, edited by Yaroslav Pylynskyi. (Ukrainian)

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