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AFRICA AND TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY DEVELOPMENT CHALLENGES

THE NORTH-SOUTH DEVELOPMENT AGENDA RECONSIDERED

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A BRIEF OUTLINE OF THE RESEARCH

This paper examines issues critical to the development of Africa in the twenty-first century. The aim is to interrogate issues of governance, democracy and economic development which are of common concern to the continent, without identifying country-level challenges or drawing any country-specific conclusions. The issues were structured and framed around three broad themes. The first engages with the issue of 'development' and the capacity of the state in Africa to engender development. The discourse transcends the well-researched Northern development models that have been imposed on Africa since independence, and recently, through the 'Washington Consensus,' and instead engages in critical questions of development throughout the continent, such as the capacity of the African state to chart an alternative and autonomous developmental path. The second grapples with issues of governance, with specific reference to the quality of democracy on the continent. This calls for a rethink of the governance agenda in a manner that makes actual meaning and impacts positively on the quality of lives of African peoples, and strengthens the critical constituencies in the African community. The third examines issues that underpin social development and human well being, such as, poverty reduction, global inequality, and the MDGs as critical perspectives to development in Africa.

The global economic crisis provides a broad-based social, economic and ideological context within which Africa's twenty-first century development challenges are examined. The objective of the paper is not to present a step-by-step account of the crisis. Rather, the purpose is to present the context within which development thinking thrived prior to the crisis, and then to examine some of the underlying assumptions about development and their adequacy in the light of the actual course of events since the onset of the crisis. In the analysis, the tools and methods that help us to understand these changes and processes are both qualitative and quantitative. The research for the first two sections of the paper was conducted by the lead author, Dr. Godwin Onuoha of the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC). These sections are extensively qualitative and draw on existing literature to examine the relevance and utility of development paradigms and policy outcomes imposed on the continent from the North, and how these have changed since the onset of the crisis. The third section of the paper is primarily quantitative, and was conducted by the contributing author, Dr. Mzukisi Qobo of the Centre for Politics and Research (CPR). It eschews the mixed commentaries about the state of Africa's development, but draws on available quantitative data and indexes to compare human development, education, health and income in Sub-Saharan Africa vis-à-vis other regions of the world.

INTRODUCTION

Since the end of the millennium, the reform of the contemporary global order has been a central issue on the global agenda. Imperative to this is the need to shape an agenda that tackles the core governance and development-related challenges confronting the African continent through new policy proposals. Closely linked to the global reform process is the context it provides for revisiting the North-South dialogue, specifically the initiation of a global discourse on how the North-South framework can be made to provide relevant solutions to Africa's challenges in the twenty-first century. The paper argues that the rapidly changing global order, epitomized by the rapid acceleration of globalization processes, the emergence and growth of economies in the Global South, and the decline and low growth of economies in the global North, calls for a nuanced discussion of North-South engagement. While the North and South both agree to the necessity of reforming the contemporary global governance architecture, they differ in terms of the key areas of interest and concern. This underscores the need for Africans to generate policy proposals and platforms on issues of economic development, governance, democracy and other issues that highlight a human and social perspective to development, and bring African voices to bear on these issues.

The first objective of this paper is to engage with the idea of 'development' and the role of the state of development in Africa, by transcending the debate on the well-researched Northern development models that have been imposed on Africa since independence, and recently through the 'Washington Consensus' that is now deeply immersed in crisis. Some critical questions of development in the global South include: Should Africa abandon the market-led Washington Consensus and embrace the state-guided Beijing or Delhi path of development? What are the prospects, opportunities and challenges inherent in this for African development? Can Africa chart an alternative and autonomous developmental model? What will these include? Secondly, the paper grapples with issues of governance with specific reference to the quality of democracy on the continent. It argues for a rethink of the governance agenda in a manner that makes actual meaning and impacts positively on the quality of lives of African peoples and strengthens the critical constituencies in the African community. This means that the development agenda must incorporate not just 'political democracy,' but 'economic democracy' (equal economic opportunities and a redistribution of wealth within Africa) and 'social democracy' (empowerment, inclusion and participation). Thirdly, this paper examines issues that underpin social development and human well-being, such as, poverty reduction, global inequality and the MDGs as critical perspectives to development in Africa.

THE CONTEXT AND PREMISE OF THE CONTEMPORARY GLOBAL ORDER

Africa in the Twenty–First Century

The continent's long-term interests in development will depend largely on how the international governance reform agenda is shaped, and whether it is done so in a manner that will have direct implications for governance in Africa. This realization arises from the fact that Africa still demonstrates a lack of capacity to break free from the challenges of development that have characterized previous centuries. The weight of the past, as depicted by the slave trade, colonialism and neo-colonialism, still remains a strong underlying current throughout the continent. Events in Africa, particularly in the last two decades, have been marked by some dramatic and significant changes, which have been diverse and sometimes contradictory. There is a general lack of consensus on the appropriate approach for articulating these changes, as they account for the restructuring of social, economic and political developments on the continent. Differing remarkably from the decade of independence in the 1960s, the challenges confronting Africa today are a combination of those from both past and present. This includes a host of unresolved issues like endemic poverty, unresolved national question, violent political conflicts, fragmented political terrain, challenges of regional integration and a host of other issues that reinforces its subaltern position in the global arena.

After five decades of independence, these issues have gained renewed prominence and relevance, and presents Africa as a continent with mixed records. Beginning from the 1990s, there have been several political, social and economic gains, as well as the restructuring of the terrain of political competition and governance on several fronts. These developments were spurred by global changes that had lasting impacts on the continent, including the end of the Cold War, disintegration of large federations and multi-ethnic states like USSR and Yugoslavia, and the resurgence of hitherto suppressed currents of nationalism on a global scale. Such waves of transformations furnished the global template on which the forces of national and local changes played themselves out.

In the face of a virtual disappearance of super-power rivalries and global political wakening, Africa’s reputation of prolonged crises of state legitimacy and governance had to be addressed. These developments spawned the de-legitimisation of one-party rule and military regimes and the opening up of the political space to accommodate hitherto suppressed groups and forces. There were interstices of democracy which threw up contending forces, both revolutionary and reactionary. Under this banner, the principle of self-determination was invoked in support of the struggles of the oppressed African racial majority in apartheid South Africa, ushering in the first multi-party elections in the country in 1994. Two decades later, the recent uprisings and political transformations in Egypt, Tunisia and Libya, which have displaced long-standing authoritarian regimes, have made the prospects of democracy much more real. Despite these advances, the continent still faces a host of development and governance issues, a paradox of poverty amidst plenty, widening inequality and concentration of wealth in very few hands. In Africa, processes of exclusion and marginalization of individual, groups and social classes are still deep-rooted, and these lie at the heart of several potential and ongoing conflicts which exacerbates underdevelopment, dependence and the growing center-periphery divide.

What Role for the North-South Framework?

Africa and the Global North appear not to share the same concerns and interests, or even a similar sense of urgency in the need to reform the workings and operations of the international system. International law has hitherto played a crucial role in reinforcing, legitimizing and sustaining unequal structures and processes that manifest themselves in the North-South relations. International law, accompanied by globalization, has emerged as one of the principal means through which domination and inequality is systematically perpetuated. The geo-political regulation of governance shapes national developments in a manner that reinforces a neo-liberal agenda and threatens to reduce the 'meaning' of democracy to electing representatives who are compelled to pursue policies that are harmful to civil society, and dictated by global interests and the institutions they control. There is a pressing need to transcend the regulatory instruments imposed on Africa and the kind of neo-liberal and productivist logic they project. The assault on the development concerns, which formed the core of the post-1945 Keynesian global order, has fundamentally transformed the World Bank and IMF from institutions oriented towards the management of liberal peace through multilateralism and international Keynesianism, to organizations reoriented towards financialization after the capitalist crises of the 1970s and 1980s (Stiglitz 2002; Arrighi 1994). These institutions, despite their failures, have been the prime enforcers of narrow market ideologies that have had devastating consequences for most of Africa. Critical to this is the wrong reading or engagement with the development problems of the continent through the prism of the developed countries of the North; the failure to adequately relate with the internal dynamics of African countries and the historical contexts that shape them; and the failure to engage with the intellectual production and realities of African countries.

The need for medium- and long-term international governance reform has further been pushed to the forefront of global discourse by the ongoing financial crisis and the rise of new players in the international system. The growing influence of these players is already driving a redistribution of power with direct implications for weaker zones in the global system. Of particular importance is the fact that these changes are occurring in a context where the international system is predicated and reinforced by power endowments that fail to meaningfully address the myriad of challenges confronting Africa. The quest for reform is primarily predicated on the need to address the fundamental imbalances in the procedures, rules and operations of the system.

The discontent in the contemporary international governance regime has its roots in a system that emerged when most of Africa was under colonial rule. However, a lot has changed since then and the reform of the international system has increasingly become both necessary and unavoidable. As observed in the 2012 World Economic Forum 'Global Risk Assessment,' severe economic imbalances and social inequality were cited as existential risks that could lead to the emergence of critically fragile states. The 2011 Human Development Report also highlights the need to address urgent challenges of sustainability and equity both at the national and global levels. Africa and other regions of the world have sketched and advanced their proposals for the reform of the United Nations and the Bretton Woods Institutions. It is self-evident that there is a desire for some form of restructuring in the international system, but the interests, concerns and approach of regions in the South cannot merely be mistaken to represent those of Africa.

AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT IN A CHANGING INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT

The unraveling of the economic crisis in 2008 and the Keynesian riposte it engendered appears to be prompting an emergence among regulators, policymakers and academics to revisit and reconsider much of the dominant thinking on development economics. As Ferguson (2005: 44) observes, after nearly two decades of neo-liberal ascendancy in socio-economic policymaking and management, and the attendant effects of structural adjustment and privatization on the continent, development thinking on the African continent 'has a better idea of what it is against than what it is for.' Even within the Bretton Woods Institutions (BWIs), there are calls to go beyond the 'Washington Consensus,' 'second generation reform programmes' and other attempts to 'stimulate state capacity' and return to the idea of development that has been pushed by a wide range of scholars and institutions (Mkandawire 2001a: 4). Critics and proponents may differ, but there is an overarching consensus that the policies spawned by the Washington Consensus have failed to deliver the desired results. The critical question now is not whether the Washington Consensus has failed or not? Rather, it is about what will replace it as a model of development? Against the backdrop of changing circumstances and emerging experiences, an important marker in this intellectual debate will involve taking on board a range of core issues specific to the continent. Two of the crucial issues include: (i) the role of the state in African development; and (ii) a rethink of the whole notion of development studies and development research.

The State and Development in Africa

The debate on the role of the state in economic development has consistently been at the heart of development studies. From market-led to state-led growth, or from market to state failure, the central canon in any development model is a theory about the role of the state in development. Despite the 'crisis of legitimacy,' which has characterized the neo-liberal paradigm leading to the most severe recession since the Great Depression of the 1930s, the ideological moorings of major Western countries and the multilateral financial/economic institutions which they control remain rooted in 'unfettered' market mechanism, 'free' enterprise and the myth of a 'self-regulating' economy. However, the ongoing global financial crisis and the sovereign debt crisis in Europe bring the role of the state to the front burner. The failure of these market-based policies to address Africa's economic crisis and revamp economic growth feeds into the growing demands to bring the state back into the agenda as the central actor in the development project on the continent. The tragedy of post-independence developmentalism was the assumption that only the state could drive economic development, national unity and liberation. The implementation of this idea provided the context for the restriction of political pluralism, single party states, military regimes and the eventual demise of the entire development programme (Olukoshi 2001: 4). Neo-liberalism was to gain prominence later on and took the position that the interventionist state would always get it wrong. After over two decades of neo-liberal ascendancy, it is arguable that the policies associated with idea have taken a detrimental toll on the continent.

The assessment of the role of the state in the developmental process in Africa must be based on specific historical trajectories. The state in most of Africa is a colonial project and a product of competition between colonial powers for access to resources, a development which has left some lasting impressions on the evolution of the post-colonial state in Africa (Arrighi 2002: 24). Post-colonial state formation in Africa was largely a product of certain historical and geopolitical developments which continues to inform the nature of politics, economics and society. In spite of these setbacks, most leaders of post-independence Africa in the first two decades of independence made efforts to give meaning to the social bargain that underpinned the struggle for independence. Irrespective of their ideological leanings (socialist, free-market or mixed economy orientation), post-independence governments in Africa invested a great deal in the expansion of the physical and social infrastructure of their countries in a manner which exceeded what colonialism offered, and they also reserved an important role for the state in this process. In the face of huge demands and expectations from post-colonial leadership in Africa, access to education, modern health facilities, transportation, housing and skills development in every sector was increasingly widened (Olukoshi 2002).

These developments were linked to the reasonably high levels of economic growth which most African states recorded in the first decade of independence. This growth rate placed virtually all African countries above their population growth and they were also sustained during this period (1960-1975) (Bangura 1992: 60-61; Mkandawire 2001a). Rodrik's (1998) analysis of the development experience in most developing countries during the same period (those that experienced at least a 3 percent GDP per capita growth) reveal that 11 of the best performing 50 countries were in Africa, and 9 of them in Sub-Saharan Africa. The fastest growing country was in Africa (Gabon); and Botswana's growth rate (1960-1975) exceeded that of Hong Kong, Taiwan Province of China, Malaysia and Thailand. An observation of the growth performance of developing countries from 1967 to 1980 also yielded similar results. Out of 27 countries that achieved the annual growth rate of 6 percent over more than a decade during this period, more than a third (10) were African countries. Apart from the mineral-rich countries like Gabon, Nigeria, Botswana and Republic of Congo that recorded remarkable growth, other African countries like Kenya and Cote d'Ivoire performed better than Indonesia and Malaysia.

These developments occurred in a context marked by severe ethnic cleavages, strong domestic clientelist demands for spoils by the ruling elites and a broader context of the Cold War which was particularly unfavorable. What the neo-liberals did in their post-independence critique of African developmentalism was to adopt a perception of the African state which presents a somewhat distorted picture of the African reality by selecting some problematic episodes in the continent's history as a yardstick for their poor economic performances (Olukoshi 2002). Mkandawire (2001a: 294) links this to the 'ideological, paradigmatic and structural shifts in both domestic and international spheres' particularly associated with the anti-state rhetoric that characterized neo-liberalism in the 1980s and 90s. It is a rendition of African history based on ideological preferences as opposed to a careful analysis of the role of internal and external factors. Much of this assumption has its basis on the conclusion that African states were inherently corrupt and predatory, run by rent-seeking and kleptocratic state officials who advance their private interest over those of the state, and use the proceeds from rent for patronage politics (Onuoha 2008: 15). This view of the African state was prevalent in the literature and widespread among Africanist scholars and observers (Bates 1981; Rothchild 1994; Chabal and Daloz 1999; Bayart 1993).

The narrow ideological onslaught against the state and its role in the economy was captured in the World Bank's Berg Report (1981), which contained a brief history of Africa's post-colonial development process, portraying both post-colonial policy and performance as unmitigated and undifferentiated disasters. This report coincided with the increasing popularity of the neoliberals and the emergence of conservative right-wing governments in key countries of Europe and North America who influenced the dominant outlook within the Bank and the Fund at a time when the African development crisis dominated the debate within these institutions, leading to the uncritical acceptance of the Berg Report as the only alternative (Mkandawire 2001a; Arrighi 2002: 30-32). The Report's policy prescriptions held sway in the continent for almost three decades, with obvious consequences for the development agenda (UNCTAD 2002; Arrighi 2002: 32). Doubts have been expressed in Sub-Saharan Africa regarding the quality of its institutions and the capacity of the state to devise, execute and supervise complex and demanding policies which were at the core of the East Asian success (UNCTAD 2007: 74). As observed by several scholars (Bangura 1992; Mkandawire 2001a; and Arrighi 2002), a nuanced assessment of the political and economic history of the continent reveals a rather different picture from the dominant analytical tradition that insists on the impossibility of developmental states in Africa. Most arguments advanced by the 'impossibility thesis' are not firmly anchored in African historical experience, and so clearly, developmental states are not completely alien to African states (Mkandawire 2001a), and some writers have even characterized the post-colonial African state as 'developmentalist' by definition (Gibbon 1997).

Development Research in Africa

The interests represented in development research and policymaking remains an issue of critical concern in the continent. Do they reflect a 'Southern' or 'Northern' agenda and priorities? A whole range of factors account for this, such as power inequalities; the rootedness of development studies and research in colonial economics; inequalities in the resources Southern researchers and institutions have vis-à-vis the North; the overbearing influence of the North on shaping the research agenda after the image of the market. Analytical tools of development research have largely reflected dominant Northern perspectives, and have initiated policy outcomes that hinder the understanding of social processes in the South. While 'development research and development studies has continually reinvented itself over the past half-century' (Humphrey 2007: 14), there is still the need for a broad reinvention of the discipline. The intellectual project of reinvention must interrogate or reject out-rightly dominant perceptions of developing countries and critically chart a more constructive role for development research in Africa. Apart from the over-arching consequences that the definition and development of research agendas have on the continent, Humphrey (2007: 16) points out the increasing role of Northern donors in directing development research and finance activities, while simultaneously occupying the research space in both the North and South.

Far from being settled, post-1945 development concerns that were shaped by Keynesian thinking was to be to attacked and replaced by free market economic thinking. This was compounded by the long-drawn economic crises in the 1970s and 80s, the emergence of new leaders in key Western countries who were favourably disposed to monetarist policies and the re-orientation of the Bank and Fund away from their post-1945 mandate. From the onset, the idea of development studies and development research was plagued by certain limitations which rendered it incapable of addressing the critical issues of development in the developing countries, let alone resolving it. Of specific importance in this regard is the 'North-South dichotomy' and the 'centre-periphery asymmetries' which were deeply entrenched in the 1960s and 70s, and provided the basis on which the underdevelopment/dependency schools launched their attack on the modernization theory (Olukoshi 2007: 21). Despite the perceived limitations of the underdevelopment/dependency school of thought, its singular most important contribution to the development discourse is the intellectual challenge it mounted against the idea propounded by Walter Rostow's (1960) 'modernization paradigm' which relegated developing countries to chart or repeat the same paths that developed countries trod in the past. The challenge of this notion of development paved the way for articulating and projecting the concerns of developing countries onto the international arena laden with power relations that were structured against it. Policymakers, heads of governments and leaders of thought in the developing world began to push for a new international order that would accommodate their desires and aspirations, social movements like environmentalists, gender/feminist activists and trade unionists began to push for change, and concepts like 'Another Development' began to emerge from the Nordic countries, but all these yielded little result due to the overt reliance on the United Nations system to push the frontiers of change in an era characterized by inter-state rivalries and diplomacy (Olukoshi 2007: 21).

While development research in Africa was largely vested in the discipline of economics, other disciplines like anthropology, political science, sociology, history and international relations also fed into development research. Critical in this regard is how these disciplines brought into development research biases about Africa which formed the core of their disciplines. The last three decades of the twentieth century witnessed increased involvement of anthropologist with processes of development in erstwhile colonial territories, leading to the emergence of a new sub-field, known as 'development anthropology' (Smith 2012). Reminiscent of its parent discipline, Africa was perceived as the 'other', and development concerns involved the incorporation of the continent into the process of development through the transfer of technology, funds, knowledge and expertise from developed countries of the industrial North to developing countries of the South through various agencies. This notion informed the idea of incorporating the developing countries into the global economic system in a manner that meant that crisis and contradictions in the Western capitalist system were imported into developing countries. While the theoretical premise and practice of this thinking remains flawed and replete with contradictions, it has further exacerbated the existing problems it was supposed to solve and has created new ones in its wake. Cosmopolitan illusions about the benefits of neo-liberal policies in a globalised world have been replaced by severe inequality, local social dislocations and a global political awakening and backlash against the global capital.

Certainly, different regions of the world have been impacted by neo-liberal policies in different ways. While some have been able to adapt themselves to the challenges arising from globalization, others have not been able to adjust. Perhaps, one of the greatest contributions of development anthropology at the turn of the twenty-first century is the deepening of research activities which began to define development, not just in terms of growth and gross national product per capita as neo-liberal economists would prefer, but as improving the overall wellbeing and equity in society.

(i) The Rise of the East and Development Research

Taking China, India and East Asian experiences as points of departure, there appears to be a consensus on the role of the state as a catalyst for growth and development. Referred to as 'the most successful case of economic development in human history' by the *Newsweek Magazine (6 March 2006)*, China has consistently registered a yearly average growth rate of 9 per cent in thirty years (Schmitz 2007: 51). Several writers have observed attempts to extract and apply the lessons of the East Asian countries to other parts of the developing world, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa (Mkandawire 2001a; UNCTAD 1996; 1997; 1998; Akyuz, Chang and Kozul-Wright 1998; Sindzingre 2004). Beyond this, there were attempts at a neo-liberal 'makeover' aimed at denying or distorting the well-established role of the state in the East Asian developmental trajectory. This involved an effort to 'refract the performance of the 'Four Asian Tigers' through the 'prism of neo-liberalism' as 'irrefutable evidence of the superiority of essentially laissez-faire policies', and play down the role of the state in the 'Asian miracle' (Mkandawire 2001a). This attempt failed to succeed on the basis of the fact that performances of East Asian developmental states and their high levels of economic growth were tied to state-led developmentalism. The rebounding of the East Asian economies after the economic crisis of the 1990s and the emergence of India and China as global economic powers, both on the basis of state-led intervention, are all indicative of the viability of state-led intervention as an alternative to the neo-liberal economic orthodoxy that has pervaded African economies for some two decades. The Asian experience presents ample evidence to suggest that the state is very critical in the development process.

Despite the remarkable advances recorded by the East Asian countries, analysis in development studies and research still privilege the practice of adopting Western lenses, which have been influential since the 1950s. Developments in East Asia have been challenged on the grounds that they do not conform with certain parameters that marks the evolution of traditional to modern societies, such as achievement society, the market economy, parliamentary and innovation system (Schmitz 2007: 53). There is a perception that Western-style models of development and democracy are superior to other forms or practices elsewhere, even when the conditions and practices in those societies have proved to be more meaningful to their specific contexts and history (Schmitz 2007: 53). This practice jettisons the idea that context matters, and ultimately, repeats the errors of the modernization paradigm by trying to shape the developing economies in the image of the West. Apart from this, the legitimacy of adopting Western-style approaches to development has always been hinged on the supposed superior performances of Western economies and societies. This assumption has become increasingly questionable for two reasons. First, after two decades of economic mal-adjustments in most developing countries in Latin America and Africa, and the onset of on-going global economic and financial crisis, it is clear that the Western model of development is deeply immersed in crisis. Secondly, the growth of China in the last thirty years far exceeds anything Western countries have achieved in their history, and the growth we have witnessed in the last twenty years in East Asia have been driven by a very centralized state structure instead of a non-state, free market model. As Schmitz (2007: 54) points out, now that the locus of growth and development has moved from the West to the East, the idea that 'West is best... which has long been suspect, has now lost its last bit of legitimacy…using the Western model as a reference point or the model to live up to is hard to justify… The burial is overdue'.

More so, the shift from the West to the East poses a challenge to traditional categorizations and distinctions. On the one hand, Schmitz (2007: 54) argues that the body of literature in development discourse leaning to the right has always emphasized the conventional wisdom and the need for developing countries to move towards an idealized Western model. On the other hand, the literature leaning to the left includes the classical theories of imperialism, neo-Marxist theories of underdevelopment, dependency theories, world systems theory and anti-globalization theories regarding the interaction with the West as the main obstacles to development. For Schmitz, this sharp distinction may be obsolete, redundant and moribund when one considers the fact that China's growth would not have been possible without a deep integration into the global economy and opening of the entrepreneurial space domestically, making it one of the largest trading countries with any bloc or region, receiving more foreign direct investment from the West, absorbing more Western design and technology, and sending more students to Western universities. In an effort to understand the model currently in operation in the country, efforts have been made to characterize China as practicing 'state capitalism', 'communism with a profit motive', or 'simply adapting Marxism to the imperatives of global capitalism'. Contrary to the thesis that the accelerated processes of globalization erodes state capacity, and renders the nation-state irrelevant, trends in China and East Asia show that the state remains relevant in shaping economic choices and building better or worse development paths in the context of local and global networks (Onuoha 2008: 5).

Charting a distinctive path for development, a tendency which Schmitz (2007: 55) refers to as 'finding your own way,' has been the key marker of development strategies in China and East Asia. This idea was developed by Alexander Gerschenkron (1960) who persuasively argued for the need to chart a distinctive path in his study of late developers to the industrialization process. Drawing on Gerschenkron, Schmitz (2007: 55) points out that rehashing what others have done may not be possible because of the unique internal conditions specific to every state, and the perceived influence the external context characterized by the presence of early developers may have on the development process. Several studies have highlighted the highly experimental nature of the East Asian transition (Haggard 2004); and how diversity, rather than uniformity in the institutional, technological and development policy arenas characterized the experience of East Asia (Hobday 2003). The task of overcoming the bulk of the challenges of the socialist economy in China meant that the system had to be dismantled in a manner that would not cause social, political and economic distortion (Arthur Kroeber 1987, cited in Napoleoni 2011: 52). Quian (2002) points out the role of 'transitional institutions rather than best practices institutions', 'the creation of the market through a dual track approach to liberalization', and 'pragmatic innovation' that aligned the interests of empowered decentralized actors with the strategic intent of the central government'. Far from recommending a replication of the East Asian or Chinese experiences in Africa, what this means for development studies and research is that each country needs to find its way forward based on the understanding of its strengths and weaknesses, and the extant external context that influences it (Schmitz 2007: 56).

(ii) The Research Agenda in Development Research

As already stated, one of the main weaknesses of development research as presently constituted is the impact in which certain policy interests in the late colonial period exerted on it (Olukoshi 2007; Humphrey 2007). Progress can only be made if the limitations and contradictions that undermined development research efforts in the past are critically addressed. Implicit in previous development research agendas and disciplinary foundations is the dominant perception that development research is the study of the 'other', an assumption which was increasingly entrenched, and consequently, became the stuff of development research. Rostow's five stages of development which sought to make developing countries like developed ones was an extreme version of this discourse, but was no exception (Olukoshi 2007: 24). As Olukoshi (2007: 24) vividly points out, the recourse to historical developments in the West as a basis for measuring the performances and experiences of developing countries produced two outcomes for development research. One strand of development research was engrossed with development in the West; while the other strand which was Western-driven drew on a stylized and unproblematized rendition of the historical experiences of the West, to interpret and pronounce on development in the South.

The degree and consequences of recent global restructuring prompted by changes in economic growth, climate change, inequality, political wakening and increased information availability creates uncertainties at different levels which forces a rethink of development research. In the same vein, there has been popular discontent and challenges against the neo-liberal free-market model, particularly with the content of the model and the manner it was pushed, making Africa 'a place to experiment without accountability' (Haddad 2007: 6). Demographic issues like urbanization, youth and migration are increasingly becoming development-related issues. Migration has recently featured as a key area of concern in North-South development agenda, owing to its impacts on other issues like security, rights and sovereignty, livelihoods and citizenship (Haddad 2007: 7; Obi 2010). Issues of global commons are experienced in multiple regions of the world, and this renders the notion of a dichotomy between two development stories redundant and obsolete. Development research can no longer be about buzzwords and clichés; rather there has to be a process of learning across a broad spectrum of ideas.

The agenda in development studies and research fails to engage with context-specific approaches which has increasingly been observed and proposed overtime. Findings based on the Institute for Development Studies Roundtables in Africa points to the fact that: ‘democracy could have been a really good thing had we built it ourselves. Instead, it has fallen from above onto our heads against the background of an asymmetric power relationship’ (Dakar AFD Roundtable 2006); while another point relates to the fact that ‘economic and political powers are fused and this compromises accountability (Kenya-Youth Agenda Roundtable 2006). The dearth of research in development has also gone hand-in-hand with the under-investment in African universities which was a key feature of the structural adjustment programmes of the Bank and the Fund. This served to relegate African research to the background, and undermine their research activities, knowledge production, capacities, constructs, analyses and conclusions.

The changing nature of development research and studies in terms of what constitutes its scope, priorities, methods, actors and relations has to be reinvented. Haddad (2007) raises a series of critical issues relating to why development research is done in the first instance; who conducts the research; how researchers are held accountable; where the research is conducted; who sets the agenda and develops the tools of research; and identifying whose agency development research serves. Many believe that development research furthers the interests and agency of researchers to the detriment of other stakeholders. This emanates from the perception that the Bank and Fund, as well as countries in the global North and their research institutions, exert an extensive influence in determining the research agenda. Haddad (2007: 9) points to the crucial need to integrate Southern input into both Southern and Northern research agendas, the failure of which will perpetuate the existence of incompatible development spaces – one donor-driven and the other popular-based, both disconnected from each other. For the most part, the complexities and challenges of development in most developing states are such that ‘donors tend to take the easy way out’ by pushing simple solutions to tackle complex problems.

The mutual exclusivity that shapes development research has become inadequate as events continue to prove that ‘development research is not about two stories’ (Dakar-CODESRIA Roundtable 2006). It was registered by the Roundtable that ‘the North does not have a monopoly on solutions, and nor does the South have a monopoly on problems’. Research collaboration efforts between Northern and Southern institutions still reflect some failings in the area of comparative development studies, inability to connect the origin of issues with the context in which they emerged from, and the stifling of multiple perspectives (Dakar-CODESRIA Roundtable 2006; Nairobi-IDS Roundtable 2006; Dublin Roundtable 2006; Oslo Roundtable 2006). To develop a superior development research model, emphasis must be placed on a comparative understanding of development in a manner that reinforces balanced learning between research partners in the North and South, and interconnectedness between analysis across a broad spectrum (Haddad 2007: 10). The IDS-Copenhagen Roundtable (2006) raises the critical issue of the self-serving nature of development research, while doing little to address the urgency of reducing poverty and inequality.

Issues of independence in research are highlighted in a context where 'the market has become the god of development research' (Dakar-CODESRIA Roundtable 2006). The overwhelming perspective here is that development research has to be as independent as possible in order to address issues that cannot be addressed ordinarily in development agencies. As the Dar es Salaam Roundtable (2006) put it, 'he who pays the piper dictates the tune,' remains more relevant than ever in development funding and research. This connects directly to the issue of policy-relevance. As Haddad (2007: 11) argues, poor quality research may provide immediate gratification, but cannot be policy-relevant in the long run. The task remains how to connect good quality research to the appropriate policy community through formulating a research model that is rigorous, intensive and addresses central concerns of development research.

Despite its multi-disciplinarity, development research still tends to be driven by specific disciplinary concerns, and this makes a robust and integrated discourse difficult (Olukoshi 2007: 24). Inherent limitations in specific disciplines which poses hindrances to coherently articulating development research and development-related must be addressed in order to harness insights that exist in other disciplines. Understanding human development needs and developing policy-oriented solutions is fully inscribed in history, culture, psychology, geography, law and the environment, but the delineation of disciplines into specific categories undermines the articulation of shared understandings, concepts and paradigms that would have provided a full-fledged understanding of any issue (Olukoshi 2007: 24; Haddad 2007: 12).

AFRICA AND THE CHALLENGE OF GLOBAL GOVERNANCE REFORM

The turn of the century and the beginning of a new one signaled the quest for global governance reform as a critical component of the contemporary global order. The increasing demand for global governance reform has necessitated several additions to the principles of deregulation, privatization and liberalization. These additions, codified as the 'Post-Washington Consensus,' include civil society, social capital, capacity-building, governance, transparency, a new international economic architecture, institution-building and safety nets (Higgott 2000: 431). Several authors (Gowan 1999; Kalb 2005; Arrighi 1994; McMichael 2003; Harvey 2003; Panitch 2000; and Wood 2003) have pointed to an expanding array of multilateral institutions – like the UN, IMF, World Bank, WTO, G8 (now G-20), OECD and the World Economic Forum – that gradually undertake transnational governance structures and state-like functions, and align to the interests of some states far more than others. The need to incorporate social concerns into mainstream national and international policy discourse was expressed in 'second generation' initiatives, and informed a series of socially-oriented reforms to the development agenda of the international financial institutions (Rittich 2004: 200). This policy shift reflected a sharp distinction between social concerns and economic concerns, recognizing the need to coexist with the social dimensions of development (Rittich 2004: 200). Some of the convenient markers of this shift include the World Bank's *Comprehensive Development Framework* which identified two sides to the development agenda (Wolfensohn 1999); the UN's *Global Compact* geared towards promoting human rights, raising labour and environmental standards; and the *Millennium Development Goals,* which received broad endorsement internationally by paying greater attention to concrete social objectives (UN Millennium Development Goals). Global political transformations and exigencies related to the increasing wave of democratization spawned the demand for economic policies that would be socially-inclusive. Global rights discourses are currently pushing for an agenda that advocates the inclusion of social rights, which had hitherto been secondary, passive and peripheral to issues of growth and development, into economic development discourses (Mkandawire 2001c: 1). With reference to Africa, the social question remains salient, owing to the fact that it invokes claims which are driven by socio-economic disparities and social rights of the populace, some of which have degenerated into violent conflagrations and have threatened the survival of the state.

Enormous attention has been paid to the social question since September 11, 2001. This has been informed by security concerns and is not unconnected to the notion of 'collapsed', 'rogue' or 'failing' states across the globe that lack the capacity to effectively govern their territories, thereby promoting a conducive environment that acts as an incubator for terrorism or a space from which terrorist can strike (Obi 2006: 91-92; Mkandawire 2007: 3). Recent domestic and international conflicts have been characterized as terrorism, failed states, crisis of nation-building and natural resource conflicts. But it is important to bear in mind that the actors in these conflicts do not only contest existing state institutions and structures or seek a radical reconfiguration of state power, but also seek to reconstitute the state in order to achieve certain social and economic rights.

The interrogation of the social question or the pursuit of social citizenship is tied to the renewed interest in contemporary global governance that advances the need for greater distributive justice for the poor at the global, regional and national levels. This 'mood swing', marks a shift in the theory and practice of global governance, international political economy and international relations in general (Higgott 2000: 426). The onset of the global economic crisis has initiated a prompting among regulators, policymakers and academics to revisit and reconsider a more meaningful social-oriented approach to development policy that radically differs from what obtained in the more fundamentalist free-market regime of the last three decades. The transition from this practice or thinking was driven by the desire in some quarters to tackle the ethical questions of justice, fairness and inequality, and the need to reconstitute the global governance structures in a manner that will provide for the conditions and values of sustainable life in terms of public goods, social equity and protection (UN Report of the Commission of Experts 2009). The global economic crisis exposed fundamental and deep-seated problems that are related to the economy and have been felt in the social sector, prompting the UN Commission of Experts to conclude that this is not only an economic crisis but a social crisis too.

There are different ways to explain the changing climate of opinion regarding the salience of the social question and its importance to development policy making in nation-states. A critical aspect of any of these explanations is that it brings to the fore the affinities between nation building and social policies. There is a sense in which nation building policies targeted at resolving the national question are permeated by policies that have extensive social resonance. Adejumobi and Momoh (2002: 246) further affirm that while the national question differs from one context to another, it critically constitutes the fundamental issue of social existence. This paper embraces an obvious point of departure, which conceptualizes the social question, as noted by Mkandawire (2007: 3), to include in its broadest sense issues and problems engendered by social differentiation along class, ethnic, gender and other social cleavages that emanate or remain unresolved within a nation. The obvious challenge that confronted post-independent African states was the task of consolidating political independence and resolution of the national question. Critical to that endeavour were clear signs of the social question which resonated in the form of growing inequality; persistent ignorance, poverty and disease; escalating urban poverty; the agrarian crisis; and the growing ethnic tension driven by uneven development and political manipulation (Mkandawire 2007: 8). The policy framework enacted to tackle these challenges had political salience and resonated with the social questions at stake.

Despite the attention paid to the social question in post-independent Africa, the argument expressed here is that the social question was always seen as having a secondary importance and was often subordinated to the national question. Hopes of imminent redistribution of social goods and opportunities which were all tied to the social question gradually filtered away, while the growing differentiation and inequalities between citizens within the nation-state persisted. The national question, in its very essence, embodied both political and social policies and programs. The political was meant to accomplish the task of political independence, while the social was meant to deploy a redistributive stance in bridging gaps between ethnic groups, mobilizing human capacity for development and transferring resources from a one disadvantaged group to another (Mkandawire 2007: 9).

One of the major failings of the post-colonial African state was that attempts to resolve the national question, purely in its political form, were so overarching that they proceeded to override other socially-oriented grassroots and popular concerns. The failure to resolve the national question by incorporating critical aspects of the social question was aptly captured in the artificiality of the nation-state project in Africa. When it became apparent that independence was on the horizon, post-independent African leaders became consumed in the struggle for state power. Little or no attention was paid to the transformation of the pre-existing social and economic order, let alone dismantling the structures that reinforced it (Mkandawire 2007: 5).

Propelled as it is by the democratization of African societies, the resurgence of the social question is linked to the separation of distributive social and economic concerns from the political agenda. Depending on the context, the emergence of the social question has led to mass mobilizations based on ethnic claims, cultural peculiarities and religious differences, or simply based on socio-economic disparities. The politics of identity facilitates the erosion of faith in the nation-state state project, ushers in a crisis of state legitimacy and re-asserts the citizenship question in Africa. The failure to address the social question, either on its own terms or as part of the national question, compounds the challenge of nation-building. The African version of this crisis currently unfolds in a context where political democracy and the opening up of the democratic space have been achieved, while the social transformation of society and the social conditions conducive to that democracy remain elusive (Ake 2000: 167).

The New Governance Agenda

Mkandawire (2001b: 8) identifies three major challenges that have confronted the state in Africa: 1) the lack of developmental policy that facilitates and promotes economic growth and structural transformation; 2) lack of development programmes that are democratic in a manner that makes it derive legitimacy through popular participation and electoral processes; and 3) the absence of social inclusiveness that ensures equitable entitlements to citizens leading to the exclusion of critical capacities and constituencies of the African population. Amartya Sen (1999) summarizes the centrality of these values and concerns in his influential thesis titled, 'Development as Freedom.'

In a neoliberal era, issues pertaining to social democracy necessary to elicit tendencies of empowerment, inclusion and participation have been consigned to the market. These issues, as important as they were perceived to be to the formulation of social policy, were seen as having the likely effect of distorting the workings of the market or capable of being inimical to investment (Mkandawire 2001b: 8). But empirical evidence and theoretical arguments suggest that this notion is not based on hard facts. The literature on late industrializers, it is evident that social policies were harnessed and deployed as key instruments of development (Mkandawire 2001b: 8). The challenge that presently confronts the African continent is one in which the new approach to development must necessarily incorporate social equity, empowerment of the people, inclusion and participation for it to make any meaning to the continent. Unlike earlier versions of development that are excessively devoted to the market, and ignores its existence as a product of structured power relations, issues of social equity must be closely integrated in any policy agenda. The articulation of social policies that do not only address the content and rhetoric of development, but embody bold and pragmatic steps for development, must be integrated into the new governance agenda.

Closely related to this is the issue of economic democracy, equal economic opportunities and a redistribution of the wealth within Africa. The apathy to democratic rule is particularly demonstrated in the implementation of the structural adjustment programmes across the continent. Little interest was shown towards popular participation in the development discourse and practice, and the preference for authoritarian rule was overtly demonstrated in the fact that most countries that came under the rubric of the adjustment programme in most of Sub-Saharan Africa did so with authoritarian regimes. The logic behind this was not far-fetched, as Mkandawire (2001b: 8) points out, the perception was that 'development was the "steep ascent" that needed tough measures, which would be unpopular, and therefore, unlikely to be pursued by democratic rule'. This, for him, has resulted in sacrificing other values for development, consequently undermining development efforts on the continent. Over the years, there have been popular agitations to integrate democratic values, emergent political opinions and human rights issues into the development agenda in order to better address these issues in concrete terms, as opposed to treating them as an inhibition to the project of development.

QUALITY OF HUMAN AND SOCIAL WELL-BEING

There is abundance of mixed commentaries on the state of Africa's develop-ment. These range from pessimistic views that still regard Africa as a dark continent with very little chance to succeed in the world economy. Such views have been largely shaped by the hesitant start of the continent in its post-colonial journey in the late 1950s and early 1960s. The initial era of hope that came with independence for most African countries was short-lived and was to be quickly eclipsed by a wave of violence, ethnic strife, coups, and famine in large parts of the continent. This was compounded by the long period of world recession that began with the 1973 oil crisis, spiraling into debt crisis for the African continent. The period between 1970 and 1980 came to be known as the 'lost decade', and was followed by a series of policy experiments with structural reforms by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, often with unfruitful outcomes.

Quite apart from inheriting political and economic structures that were not viable, one of the major weaknesses that, perhaps, explained lack of social and economic progress in the continent was failure to build a solid infrastructure of governance. The institutional framework necessary to run the government and create a healthy interface between the governors and the governed took a long time to emerge. As a result of weak bureaucratic machinery, domestic policy failures and poor institutional capacity undermined the basis for social and economic progress. Another factor that contributed to Africa's lack of progress was its dependence on a few primary exports. These are highly susceptible to price fluctuations, with adverse effects on foreign exchange earnings.

As Jeffrey Frieden (2006: 450) points out, 'The colonial political economies had relied on exporting primary products to the mother country: copper from Congo to Belgium, coffee from Kenya to Britain, Cocoa from Cote d'Ivoire to France, petroleum from Angola to Portugal.' Countries such as Benin, Burundi, Cameroon, Cote d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, the Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Mozambique, Niger, Senegal, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda and Zimbabwe have also shown a strong predilection towards export of primary commodities (Martin Wolf, 2004: 205). These primary product exports are mainly destined for Europe. Despite decades of trade and aid relationship with Europe, Africa's economies have not achieved diversification.

These colonial ties had cemented Africa's dependence on traditional markets, and reinforced Africa's static comparative advantage in primary products rather than ensuring their transformation into value-added products. Postcolonial rulers did not concern themselves with strategies aimed at transforming Africa's social and productive structures. Levels of education remain below those found in other developing countries outside of the continent.

The state of the African continent has since changed for the better. This is, in large part, due to political liberalization, macro- and micro-economic reforms, and commodity boom which has mainly been driven by Asia's emerging economies. The discourse about Africa's development has taken a different and more positive tone. This changing face of the African continent is also evident in efforts directed at improving its infrastructure, as well as reflected in the rise in foreign direct investment from other developing countries.

There remain serious challenges, however, related to areas such as human development, as measured by the United Nations' Human Development Index (HDI), which we rely on in this paper for assessing the continent's performance. Although in absolute terms, Africa is turning the corner on measures of human development, it still lags far behind other regions. The simplest manner in which to investigate these currents would be to compare the data available on Sub-Saharan Africa over the past fifteen years from the Human Development Index – taking into account the effects on human development from the financial crisis (Bakanria & Lucas 2009: 7-8).

Socio-Economic Indicators and Barriers to Development

HDI is a composite index that measures average achievement in three basic dimensions of human development—a long and healthy life, knowledge, and a decent standard of living. These indices simply portray the standard of living relative to other areas in decimals. They are, however, not the precise value denoted by their figures. According to the index, the well-being of people in Sub-Saharan Africa has increased from 0.395 to 0.463 between 1995 and 2011 (graph 1.1). This 0.068 growth is more than twice as great as the 0.03 growth curve for the fifteen years preceding 1995.

It is on the basis of this measure of progress that Africa's rate of development could be said to be accelerating. Various countries have demonstrated different degree of performance: Seychelles (0.773), Mauritius (0.728), Gabon (0.674), Botswana (0.633), Namibia (0.625), and South Africa (0.619) as the better performers in this category. On the contrary, laggards are: the Democratic Republic of the Congo (0.286), Niger (0.295), Mozambique (0.322), Liberia (0.329), Guinea (0.344), and Guinea-Bissau (0.349), (noting that Somalia was not ranked) (table 1.1).

However, of the top performers, only two (Mauritius at 77 and the Seychelles at 52) were ranked in the top 100 of the world, while the rest of the continent occupies spots below the 100 mark, which is a marker for poor human living conditions relative to the rest of the world. In other areas, Arab states increased by 0.096 since 1995 to an HDI score of 0.641 (graph 1.2); East Asian and Pacific nations moved up 0.127 points to 0.671 (graph 1.3), Europe and Central Asia are up by 0.079 to 0.751 (graph 1.4), Latin American and the Caribbean countries have reached 0.731 by a 0.081 increase (graph1.5); South Asia is up to 0.548 with a 0.104 point rise (graph 1.6); and the OECD countries have had the lowest gross increase over the last 15 years with a growth of 0.057 points but with the greatest HDI average at 0.873 (graph 1.7).

What this shows is that using HDI scores, relative to the rest of the world, Africa is performing poorly. But there is a noticeable improvement in absolute terms. To examine this further, we disaggregate HDI scores into its three component indices: education, health, and income. The education index is built on two variables: the mean years of education for adults and the expected years of schooling for children. Sub-Saharan Africa's education index has only increased by 0.08 points in the last fifteen years to 0.428 (graph 2.1).

The only countries to make it into the top 100 on education scoring this time were the Seychelles (62), South Africa (82), and Botswana (87) (table 2.1). The OECD countries went up by the same 0.08 although to a much higher 0.865; every other region achieved a more impressive growth rate (graph 2.2). This leaves Sub-Saharan Africa with the worst growth and gross education index in the world. Education is, in many ways, the most useful development indicator, as it is a determinant for future success or access to opportunities.

The health index measures life expectancy at birth with a minimum of 20 years and a maximum value observed over the 1980-2010 period. Sub-Saharan Africa's health index rose by 0.082 to 0.543 and only pushed three countries into the top 100: Cape Verde (75), the Seychelles (82), and Mauritius (87) (graph 3.1; table 3.1). The next was Madagascar at 137 clearly showing the lack of competitive healthcare south of the Sahara. On the other hand, only South Asia was able to achieve a greater rate of growth than Sub-Saharan Africa but its gross healthcare index was far behind (graph 3.2).

The income index is the Gross National Income per capita of a country using 2005 Purchasing Power Parity International dollars, and utilizing the natural logarithm with a minimum value of $100 and a maximum value observed between 1980 and 2011. Sub-Saharan Africa went through a dip in income distribution prior to 1995, but then managed a 0.043 upturn to reach 0.427 by 2011 (graph 4.1). Seven countries make it to the top 100 income bracket namely Equatorial Guinea (45), the Seychelles (48), Botswana (62), Mauritius (63), Gabon (66), South Africa (79), and Namibia (99) (table 4.1). The Latin American and Caribbean countries did not get much further ahead with a 0.045 points boost and South Asia only improvement up to 0.507 (graphs 4.2 and 4.3). The OECD countries marginally increased by the lowest growth ratio of 0.036 to average at 0.82 which left Sub-Saharan Africa at the second lowest growth curve and last on its average income index.

Such an analysis of the HDI provides some useful insight into the growth and development patterns of Sub-Saharan Africa as a region with indices measuring observable variables. The obvious limitation with this approach is that it could mask in-country income inequalities. On the positive side, income, its distribution, schooling completion, hospital services, and many other variables can be measured to give an idea of what life is really like and how is it improving for the average citizen.

Sub-Saharan Africa has also witnessed fall in infant mortality. According to the World Bank research, 16 of the 20 countries surveyed on living standards in the continent since 2005 have improved in child mortality rates. Countries such as Senegal, Rwanda and Kenya registered falls of more than 8 percent a year. The average fall in Sub-Saharan Africa's mortality rate is said to be faster than it was in China in the 1980s. Decline in infant mortality rate in the continent is widespread with successes in east, west and central Africa (Economist, 19 May 2012: 40).

Level of Poverty and Inequality: Policy interventions since 1995 and their weaknesses

The previous section focused on the quality of living in Sub-Saharan Africa, and how the continent is improving its human development profile, but still behind other regions. More interventions are required in the social sector, but these hinge mostly on the quality of institutions in place and the capacities of the state to implement policy measures that could help dent poverty and social marginalization. In this section, we analyze the means adopted to relieve Sub-Saharan economies of under-performance and inequality using two country case studies that have implemented models that address poverty, either positively or negatively. We take one case from East Africa and another from Southern Africa.

A combination of interventions was put in place in the case of Uganda. The country liberalized its trade, including implementing an automatic licensing scheme and removed all nontariff barriers in 1991. In the past, its tariff rates were wedged between 10% and 30% rates. By late 1990s these had come down to no more than 15% on consumer goods and 7% for intermediate ones, in large part to stimulate competitiveness in its economy. This had a profound effect on its economy and witnessed increase in exports to 15% in the 1990s. The country managed to sustain 6.9% of economic growth in the same period, while also boosting non-coffee exports five-fold. This is one of the examples of how a landlocked country has marshalled policy instruments to increase its trade and boost its growth.

In Southern Africa, Mozambique was recorded as the world's poorest country in 1995 with a per capita income level of just $80 annually. Of Mozambique's people who lived in poverty (close to 70% of the population), 80% lived in rural areas. Thus, the implementation of its GAPVU programme, which was a cash injection (mis)directed at the poor living in cities, could only reach about a fifth of its national poverty policy subjects. Mozambique enjoyed total economic growth to a per capita figure of $143 but this was mostly due to Foreign Direct Investment and aid.

In order to mobilize whatever government resources were available at this stage, GAPVU transferred cash to poor farmers who were displaced, disabled, or widowed by the civil war and looking for work in the cities. It hoped to minimize administration and programme costs in order to greater supplement the beneficiaries. However, inefficient monitoring systems were introduced which allowed irregularities and considerable leakages to ineligible beneficiaries, community leaders, and GAPVU officials. This diversion of programme funds led to a counterproductive system of misallocating resources that excluded the (rural) poor who deserved it (Devereux 2000: 32-63). This is one clear example of how poor institutions can misallocate resources, and reduce the scope for more targeted social redistributive interventions.

Overall, the weaknesses seen in the two cases that are discussed above have to do with a range of structural weaknesses – some of which are the legacy of Africa's poor economic performance in the postcolonial era - with weak comparative advantage or narrow production structures and absence of sustained economic opportunities to benefit the poor. Importantly, they point to the importance of institutions' ability to enable the state to deliver social programmes more effectively.

Against this background, and in the context of stunted growth in Africa's economies, the key challenge faced by a majority of countries in Sub-Saharan Africa has to do with social development in all its facets, including economic growth and development of productive supply capacity, food security, public health concerns, literacy and employment. It is a task that can best be accomplished through strengthening the capacities of the state domestically and opening up space for greater civil society involvement.

Even today, Sub-Saharan Africa's economies remain very small, poorly integrated amongst each other and, with the exception of mineral-rich and oil-dependent economies, heavily reliant on European markets.

Africa's Performance Regarding the MDGs

Adopted by the United Nations in 2001 as key targets for the developing world, the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) were aimed at reducing extreme poverty by 2015. These goals are also commonly accepted as a framework for measuring development progress, i.e., how far countries are to improve quality of life dimensions. Africa's backward political and economic development reality was recognized by the world leaders when they met at the United Nations' Millennium Summit in 2000 to agree to international partnerships that would ensure the achievement of Millennium Development Goals (MDG).

Eight commitments were made by the world leaders: (i) to eradicate extreme poverty and hunger; (ii) achieve universal primary education; (iii) promote gender equality and empower women; (iv) reduce child mortality rate; (v) improve maternal health; (vi) combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases; (vii) ensure environmental sustainability; and (viii) develop a global partnership for development. There was very little contestation on the importance of the MDG commitments, especially as this was seen as a developmental compact between North and South, and cast on the promise of increased support by the North to facilitate the meeting of these objectives.

Five years later, world leaders met under the auspices of the G8 at a meeting held in Gleneagles and hosted by then British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, to make further commitments on advancing the goal of Africa's development, with yet more pledges. What was unique about the G8 Gleneagles meeting in July 2005 is that it sought to structure a solid platform for development partnership between Africa and Europe, with the New Economic Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) as an instrument that African leaders used as a basis of dialogue.

Wealthy countries made a collective pledge of doubling overseas development assistance from 2004 levels at US$25 billion to US$67bn, with 50 percent of this allocated to Sub-Saharan Africa. It is now commonly accepted that these targets have not been reached, with the gap between delivery in 2009 and the 2010 target standing at US$26bn, and with aid expected to fall at least US$20bn short of the target. Figures for ODA are expected to come in at US$41bn for Africa in 2010, and this would represent a shortfall of US$16bn relative to Gleneagles target.

It is noteworthy that Africa continues to receive the lion's share at 36% of aid transfer from advanced industrial countries compared with other regions in the world (OECD 2010:1). In the past four decades, aid to Africa has quadrupled from US$11bn to just over US$40bn. Despite starting from a very low initial level, substantial progress has been made in many African countries.

In a subsequent initiative by the then British Prime Minister Tony Blair under the rubric of Commission for Africa, further pledges were made by developed countries to increase aid to support Africa's efforts to promote growth and development; encourage fair trading relations between advanced industrial nations and Africa; promote mutually beneficial partnerships; helping to build capable and accountable governments as essential for growth and transparency; unleashing greater investment in teachers and schools in order to enable Africa to improve access to high quality education; and encourage investment in infrastructure (Commission for Africa Report, 2010).

Although there is positive news about Africa today compared to the past four decades, poverty remains a major challenge. The average proportion of people living in poverty (less than $1 a day) dropped from 52% in 1990 to 40% in 2008. The disparity between countries is still troubling though, as Ethiopia's poverty decreased from 60% to 16 % in the eighteen years, whereas Nigeria's poverty has increased from 49% to 77%.

More disturbingly, the lower classes are not enjoying equitable distribution of their countries' economic progresses. Ghana decreased its hunger levels by 75% by 2004. In the same period, the DRC almost doubled its own (Africa Development Indicators 2011: 46-49). Under-nourishment still troubles Sub-Saharan Africa as it only succeeded in decreasing the percentage of its population that are under-nourished from 31% to 28% in 2004; compared to the 18% average drop in other low- and middle-income countries. (NEPAD MDG report 2011: 4-24).

Nine of the top ten performers on education are in Sub-Saharan Africa and enrolment ratios have increased from 52% to 74% between 1991 and 2007 across the continent. (NEPAD MDG report 2011: 24-32) However, Djibouti only manages 44% primary education enrollment while Madagascar succeeds with 99%. With the exceptions of Mauritius, Namibia, and the Seychelles, every African country has increased its primary education completion rate demonstrating a greater demand for and success in primary education. Statistics for Swaziland and Zimbabwe in 2009 were not available.

Relatively minor (5-10%) increases were seen in Sao Tome *and* Principe, Djibouti, and Burundi while Benin, Guinea, and Madagascar have increased their completion rates by about 40% each since 1990. (Africa Development Indicators 2011: 49-50) This demonstrates how Sub-Saharan Africa has raised its primary education rates with varying success.

Gender parity has registered impressive results, and almost exclusively in Sub-Saharan Africa and especially in West Africa. Still, of the available data, only five countries (Cape Verde, Lesotho, Sao Tome et Principe, Mauritius, and the Seychelles) had more girls than boys in primary school in 2009. Of the countries whose numbers declined, none receded by more than 1%, while the rest of Sub-Saharan Africa inflated its primary education access to females.

Of these poor performers, though, Mali, Guinea, Chad, and Niger registered improvements above 15% since 1990. (NEPAD MDG report 2011: 32-41) Sub-Saharan Africa's ratio of literate women to literate men only has 6 countries below the 80% mark (Benin, Central African Republic, Chad, Guinea, Senegal, and Sierra Leone) – many of which have improved remarkably – while the rest of the countries are an even spread above and below 100% in 2009. In contrast to impressive literacy ratios, the percentage of seats in parliament that belong to women is well below 50% in almost all countries with only eight states having greater than 25% belonging to females (Africa Development Indicators 2011: 50-51). Clearly this goal needs more attention in specific areas.

Absolute under-5 infant mortality rates are down, mostly in Eastern and Western Africa –Niger and Angola reduced their infant mortalities by over 100 per 1000 births. Thirty-five countries, still have an under-five mortality rate of over 100 per 1000 live births, of which only two are not from Africa (Africa Development Indicators 2011: 51-52). Child immunization rates for measles are dismal in Chad, Somalia, and Nigeria whereas the rest of Africa is above 50% immunization of children between 12 and 23 months (NEPAD MDG report 2011: 41-50).

North Africa also enjoys greater access to maternal healthcare; but again, wide variations remain a problem with access to maternal healthcare which ranges from 98% in Mauritius to 6% in Ethiopia. Much of Sub-Saharan Africa has experienced an increase in maternal deaths per 100,000 live births while the percentage of births attended by skilled health staff showed similarly mixed bags of results. Only a handful of countries, such as, Benin, Burkina Faso, and Guinea-Bissau were consistently building their effectiveness in the maternal healthcare sector (NEPAD MDG report 2011: 50-62).

Almost all countries in the Sub-Saharan African region are struggling with a widespread increase in HIV/AIDS amongst people between the ages of 15 and 50. With the exceptions of Togo, Sudan, Nigeria, Ivory Coast, Chad, and Angola, all of the region's contraception usage has gone up in the last two decades raising questions of the efficiency of the contraceptive method of fighting STDs. This disease, in particular, can devastate economies by crippling the size of the economically active and productive workforce. If Africa not only wants to reach this goal but also make itself competitive in global production markets, anti-disease strategies need to be adapted. (Africa Development Indicators 2011: 53-55)

More than half of Africa has been included in the Highly Indebted Poor Countries Initiative Debt Relief which makes partnerships with African countries difficult. With the number of countries (17) committed to billions of dollars in debt servicing, very few funds are available to begin new economic and developmental projects with other countries (NEPAD MDG report 2011: 88-100). The Seychelles, Zambia, South Africa, Zimbabwe, and Ethiopia all have more than 20% of their population between 15 and 24 unemployed. Africa's performance regarding the MDGs is on a standstill in most countries, and some are regressing.

There has been unevenness across the developing world with respect to implementation record. One of the major weaknesses to be found, especially, amongst African countries has to do with weak institutional mechanisms needed to manage implementation. For African countries to achieve some of the MDG measures, they first need to reform the public service, train or attract skilled personnel, and strengthen institutions. Even for countries that have registered positive growth rates, this has not immediately bore fruit in the improvement of the quality of living standards. Institutions provide framework for managing social and economic change, and without them countries will fail to meet their targets.

Countries such as China and India, for example, could advantage of their rapid economic development and almost halved poverty (especially in the case of China) because of relatively better quality of institutions. Sub-Saharan Africa remains a laggard with only 1 per cent of its people emerging out of the poverty line in the last twelve years. There is serious doubt over whether the region will reach the goals by 2015. Performances on the reversal of the loss of forests and the criteria under MDG 3 (Gender equality) are somewhat reasonable but the rest display the region as the worst overall performer so far.

There are, however, some positive examples. One is primary school enrolment where Ban Ki Moon has noted that the region has made the best overall improvement. A large number of countries (Mauritius, Mozambique, Zambia, Kenya, and Ethiopia) have increased their enrolment rates by between four and six per cent so that a corresponding portion now sits between the 40 and 80 per cent marks. Interestingly, some of these countries (Burundi, Rwanda, and Mauritania) are from very low initial enrolment rates and some are not. Cape Verde, Eritrea and Djibouti are still struggling.

Malaria interventions in Sub-Saharan Africa have also been extremely successful as 11 countries have reduced malaria cases and deaths by over 50 per cent with the provision of insecticide-treated mosquito nets.

An Assessment of Africa’s External Engagement with ‘’New” Partners

Africa’s growth prospects have been significantly boosted by the involvement of emerging economies such as China, India and Brazil in infrastructure and commodities. This signifies a break with the historical pattern of reliance on northern partnerships with the US and Europe. While much of the relationship between Africa and Europe, in particular, centered on trade preferences and aid towards the social sector, the new partners are pushing significant amounts of investments towards infrastructure, commodities, and the productive sector. There is certainly a change in the terms of engagement between Africa and external partners, and reorientation towards commerce rather than the social sector.

In his autobiography, *The Journey* (2011), Tony Blair suggests that in the past the obsession of Western countries has largely been about assuaging their guilty conscience rather than perceiving opportunities in Africa. As Blair puts it, “[for Western countries] giving money was a moral imperative, but there was little real belief in it delivering the outcome, which in turn led to ‘donor fatigue’.” In other words, Western countries saw Africa as an outlet of charitable work or an extension of their welfare programmes back at home. This was also self-serving for the West as it played into the dynamic of unequal power relations and perpetuated Africa’s dependence on the West. Africa’s elites milked this for all it was worth, and to the detriment of the continent’s future prosperity.

On the upside, China’s continued growth and its demand for Africa’s resources provide much needed foreign exchange earnings which, if utilized wisely, could be ploughed towards diversifying the production structure in African countries. Importantly, China has shown a strong commitment to invest in Africa’s infrastructure and the creation of special economic zones in select African countries.

According to a 2010 UNCTAD report, China’s growing economic activism in Africa has unsettled Western European states, which traditionally viewed African countries as their client states. China-Africa trade grew from US$8bn in 2000 to US$90bn in 2008 (UNCTAD 2010). China’s official sources have suggested that the value of trade has to US114bn (Chinese Government, 2010). Concessional loans and grants, support for infrastructure, generous debt relief and opening up of markets to Africa’s goods and products are some of the forms of development engagement characterizing China’s approach to Africa (UNCTAD, 2010). This departs quite significantly from how developed countries in general, and Europe in particular, engaged with Africa in the past, which could change the patterns of national development and subsequently that of the African continent.

The positive dimension of this engagement lies in its comprehensive approach: building trade relations, and deploying loans infrastructure and social support. The decisive factor is how African countries utilize this support and their approach to maximize this positive force for domestic economic development and regional integration processes that generate developmental dividends.

The increase in trade between China and Africa adds pressure to increase infrastructure development, which can serve as a catalyst for economic growth in Africa, as well as strengthen intra-regional trade links. Further, China is in the process of establishing economic trade and cooperation zones in Zambia, Mauritius, Nigeria, Egypt and Ethiopia, with a total infrastructure investment reaching US$250 million in 2010. The value of China's trade and cooperation zones is found in its contribution towards industrialization and employment growth (World Investment Report, 2010).

Although it is too early to make conclusive observations about the contribution of emerging powers to Africa's development, improvements in infrastructure and supply-chain capacities in manufacturing can generate complementarities that stimulate intra-Africa trade. This could also change the pattern of production across the region and the continent over time. It is possible to imagine a relocation of Chinese simple manufacturing processes in these trade and economic zones in a manner that approximates Japan's flying geese model in East Asia, where latecomer industrialisers observed the production processes of Japan as it moved up the value chain. As China's level of productivity and wage levels rise in the future, Africa could potentially move up significantly on the production value-chain.

The positive outcomes of infrastructure development are apparent. The penetration of telecommunications in Africa, which is largely private sector-driven, has contributed to these improvements. Infrastructure also plays an important role in improving growth and competitiveness. Yet increased investment and rehabilitation of existing institutions are some of the main challenges facing the continent.

One sign of the gradual shift in Africa's engagement with external partners is the increase in non-OECD funding towards Africa's infrastructure. Between 1990 and 2000, ODA flows to Africa's infrastructure were at US$2bn a year. This witnessed a significant rise from US$4.1bn in 2004 to US$8.1bn in 2007 (Vivien Forster and Cecilia Briceno-Garmendia, 2010: 78).

Non-OECD financiers had, according to World Bank research, 'financed about US$2.6bn of African infrastructure annually between 2001 and 2006…[and] have been active primarily in oil-exporting countries (Angola, Nigeria, and Sudan)' (Vivien Forster and Cecilia Briceno-Garmendia, 2010: 78). China's strategy has differed to that of traditional Northern partners in that it tied its engagement to commercial interests, exchanging soft-loans and infrastructure development for long-term supply contracts in resources. Traditional partners distribute funding through budgetary support, mostly targeting the social sector, and often linking this to reform conditionality. India has recently borrowed from the China strategy. She committed to financing up to 1bn USD major infrastructure projects in Nigeria, including a 9 million-ton per year refinery, a 200 megawatt power plant, and a 1000 kilometer cross-country railway; as well as financing of 700km oil pipeline from Khartoum to Port Sudan.

Gulf States are also involved in infrastructure funding in countries such as Mali, Mauritania, Senegal, and Sudan (Vivien Forster and Cecilia Briceno-Garmendia, 2009: 79). Countries that are most reliant on non-OECD funding are largely oil producing, and include Angola, Gabon, Guinea, Mauritania and Sudan. Those that rely on public-private initiatives include Kenya (supplementing with ODA) and Nigeria (supplementing with non-OECD). Apart from China and India, the Gulf States too have increased their political and economic stake in Africa's development. Political and business elites from the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries - comprising Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates (UAE), Kuwait, Oman and Qatar - and their African counterparts met under the auspices of the Gulf-Africa Investment Conference in December 2010 in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. The commitments made at this event span infrastructure, agriculture and telecommunications development. Granted, the growing infrastructure developed by emerging powers does not bear fruit towards raising the profile of human development index in any direct sense, but serves to address the key constraints that have so far made it difficult for African countries to manage their development strategies.

At face value, and in view of the fact that Africa has 60 percent share of the world's total amount of uncultivated but arable land (Mckinsey Report, 2010), this new interest in Africa's agriculture can be seen as a boom for the continent in increasing its production capacities. But there are many points to ponder as agricultural land acquisitions raise complex and controversial issues in relation to food security, rural development and upstream and downstream development benefits. Still, the growing relationship between emerging powers and African countries could, at least, create the conditions necessary for structuring development partnership on different terms, and with a greater focus on improving supply side capacity. Notwithstanding the potential advantages, it is also possible that the goals of emerging powers may not be consistent with domestic and regional goals in Africa. Sub-regional entities lack a culture of conducting systematic reviews of their economic relations and whether they create an enabling environment for their industrialization and diversification of countries' economies production and export bases.

Food security in particular, and a theme that is explored in the next section, has emerged as one of the focal points for North-South realignment. It is an issue that predominates debates about development in Sub-Saharan Africa, and with clear perspectives from Africa's policy makers. Agriculture and food security cuts across the G8, the G20, Africa's multilateral institutions, and regional programmes. This is explored in greater detail against the backdrop of realignment of politics in global governance.

Africa continues to be confronted with an array set of challenges, first and foremost being poverty. Complicating Africa's growth and development prospects, especially to overcome the blight of the lost decade in the 1980s to the mid-1990s, has been the week infrastructure of governance. Apart from this, Africa's structural base is not sufficient to attract the levels of investments required to sustain high growth rates and ensure competitiveness. Apart from the need to explore alternative pathways to development – there have been plenty of initiatives from Europe to China - of greater significance is the need to empower the voice of the citizens so that they are able to hold their governments to account, and demand better provision of social services.

CONCLUSION: KEY OUTCOMES AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

Several policy outcomes and recommendations can be deduced from the foregoing analysis. For clarity and scholarly tidiness, this paper will outline these outcomes and recommendations based on the three thematic sessions into which the paper is divided. The most salient ones include the following:

Research, Development and the State in Africa

- There is a case for greater geographical representation in the tools and theories of development research in order to acknowledge intellectual production in the global South.
- Labels 'North'/'South' and 'developed/developing' countries are no longer clear-cut categories nor sufficient enough to capture current realities, given the level of paradigmic shifts in the contemporary global system. This calls for focusing on global-local linkages that drive differentiation; redrawing the geographic boundaries of development research; reinventing the roles of researchers; and reconfiguring how development research is conceived, conducted and implemented.
- Education and research in development studies must incorporate greater geographical representation in course and case-study material so as to present a broader and diverse view of global developments.
- The above provides the context within which teaching and scholarship will produce researchers, policy-makers and practioners of development who will offer a unique perspective on the practice and politics of development.
- There is the need for development research to transcend the 'unilinear' character which it has assumed overtime, and embrace the internal dynamics and workings of countries in the South and the historical contexts that shape them.
- This will facilitate the much needed engagement with the intellectual production of countries in the South whose experiences are being studied, and redefine development studies and research in a manner that connects with the histories and cultural contexts of different peoples, bearing in mind Olukoshi's (2007: 24) submission that 'no two routes to development are the same'.

- Investments in multi-disciplinary research perspectives that are capable of generating new perspectives to understanding common problems and challenges of global concern must be encouraged, as against the dominance of singular disciplinary anchor.

- Development studies and research must transcend the colonial origins on which it is anchored and embrace current realities. This tendency is still prevalent as current reinventions in development research remains anchored and driven by broader intellectual and political currents emanating predominantly from the North.

- Success stories from China and East Asia have reaffirmed the relevance of more state intervention, rather than less in any development project. State-led development has become so successful in the last two to three decades that it is now driving tremendous levels of change in the global system.

- Countries in the global South need to find and articulate their own path to development. The experiences of China and East Asia is captured by Schmitz (2007: 55) as 'find your own way', and it reiterates the fact the successes in China and East Asia did not follow models from elsewhere, but was based on pragmatic innovation, open-mindedness, intensive research and advice on what will or will not work.

- The state in the global South must develop the critical capacity to manage relationships which is not an end in itself, but crucial for securing peace, integrating different perspectives and cultures, accelerating private investments, delivering services to the poor and guaranteeing its legitimacy.

- The kind of development studies and research predominant in policy and academic debates need to transcend the analysis of growth, but engage with the implications of growth for inequality and poverty, redistribution of growth, and the initiation of policies and projects for the poor Africa, Asia and Latin America.

Africa and the Global Governance Reform Agenda

- There is a need for relevant, broad-based, inclusive and open system of global governance, decision-making and enforcement which takes into cognizance the concrete challenges on the continent.

- The North must recognize the absolute and intrinsic right of every country on the continent to determine and choose their own economic and social development path, and align these development paths with requisite policies of their own choosing.

- The fundamental rights of African states and peoples to develop democratic developmental states specific to the needs and circumstances of the continent must be recognized.

- There is a need to restructure institutions of global governance and re-focus such institutions to pursue policies that guarantee the long-term development needs and aspirations of the global commons.

- The institutionalization and re-affirmation of a developmental agenda and long-term development concerns that empower the African people and give them a choice to determine their future must be entrenched.

Quality of Human and Social Well-Being

- Consolidating democracy should remain a principal objective. The best possible driver for this are autonomous agencies of change in the form of non-governmental organizations and various not-for-profit entities that are both active in the social sector and the knowledge domains. As such, dialogue between the Northern voices and Southern voices should aim principally at building capacities for enhancing the agency power of Africans.

- The terms of relations between Africa and the external world in particular with Western countries are fast changing. Already initiatives such as the G8 Gleneagles and the subsequent Commission for Africa recognized the need for developmental approaches that are informed by Africa's own views and interests. Accordingly, supporting endogenously crafted strategies and approaches could achieve far better results than externally driven initiatives.

- There is a need to revisit the developmental approaches that were popular in the past, and that were narrowly focused on aid in the social sector, to explore alternative approaches that focus on infrastructure, export competitiveness, and boosting productivity and competitiveness in the real economy, in particular in agriculture, mining value chain, and manufacturing. This requires a great deal of harmonization or building of synergies between country-specific programmes, regional initiatives by development banks and regional economic communities, and those that are driven from the level of the African Union or African Development Bank.

- There is a room to improve Africa's human development index score. Apart from ongoing initiatives that are directed at budget support for the social sector, more attention should be directed at exploring ways to strengthen the infrastructure of governance. Essentially themes that should constitute North-South dialogue on development should entail: improving Africa's human development/quality of life index; recasting trading relations between Africa and the rest of the world; building capacities for governance; enhancing Africa's productive capacities and competitiveness; and strengthening the civil society.

- What is presently encouraging is the amount of progress that Africa has achieved in the past two decades or so. The continent is generally viewed as the last frontier of growth. There are many avenues in which this emerging, positive image of the continent can be enhanced. Civil society is a central pillar in driving Africa's development progress by exercising and increasing its agency power to push for more accountability in governance. Good policies depend on high quality institutions of governance. As such, promoting the emergence of capable and accountable states in Africa is good for growth and development.

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APPENDICES

Graphs: (1.1)



1.2)


Human Development Index (HDI) value (Arab States (RB))
Arab States (RB)
1.00
0.80
0.60
0.40
0.20
0.00
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
2011
0.444
0.481
0.516
0.545
0.578
0.609
0.641
Algeria
Arab States (RB)
Bahrain
Djibouti
Egypt
Iraq
Jordan
Kuwait
Lebanon
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya
Morocco
Occupied Palestinian Territory
Oman
Qatar
Saudi Arabia
Somalia
Sudan*
Syrian Arab Republic
Tunisia
United Arab Emirates
Yemen

1.3)

Human Development Index (HDI) value (East Asia and the Pacific (RB))



1.4)


Human Development Index (HDI) value (Europe and Central Asia (RB))
Europe and Central Asia (RB)
1.00
0.80
0.60
0.40
0.20
0.00
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
2011
0.644
0.665
0.680
0.672
0.695
0.728
0.751
Albania
Armenia
Azerbaijan
Belarus
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Bulgaria
Croatia
Cyprus
Czech Republic
Estonia
Europe and Central Asia (RB)
Georgia
Hungary
Kazakhstan
Kyrgyzstan
Latvia
Lithuania
Malta
Moldova (Republic of)
Montenegro
Poland
Romania
Russian Federation
Serbia
Slovakia
Slovenia
Tajikistan
The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
Turkey
Turkmenistan
Ukraine
Uzbekistan

1.5)

Human Development Index (HDI) value (Latin America and the Caribbean (RB))



1.6)

Human Development Index (HDI) value (South Asia (RB))



1.7)

Human Development Index (HDI) value (OECD)



Australia Austria Belgium Canada Chile
Czech Republic Denmark Finland France Germany
Greece Hungary Iceland Ireland Italy Japan
Korea (Republic of) Luxembourg Mexico Netherlands
New Zealand Norway OECD Poland Portugal
Slovakia Spain Sweden Switzerland Turkey
United Kingdom United States

2.1)


Education index (Sub-Saharan Africa (RB))
Sub-Saharan Africa (RB)
1.00
0.80
0.60
0.40
0.20
0.00
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
2011
0.251
0.283
0.306
0.348
0.359
0.401
0.428
Angola
Benin
Botswana
Burkina Faso
Burundi
Cameroon
Cape Verde
Central African Republic
Chad
Comoros
Congo
Congo (Democratic Republic of the)
Côte d'Ivoire
Equatorial Guinea
Eritrea
Ethiopia
Gabon
Gambia
Ghana
Guinea
Guinea-Bissau
Kenya
Lesotho
Liberia
Madagascar
Malawi
Mali
Mauritania
Mauritius
Mozambique
Namibia
Niger
Nigeria
Rwanda
Sao Tome and Principe
Senegal
Seychelles
Sierra Leone
South Africa
Sub-Saharan Africa (RB)
Swaziland
Tanzania (United Republic of)
Togo
Uganda
Zambia
Zimbabwe

2.2)



Education index (OECD)
OECD
1.00
0.80
0.60
0.40
0.20
0.00
0.680
0.707
0.738
0.785
0.818
0.846
0.865
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
2011
Australia
Austria
Belgium
Canada
Chile
Czech Republic
Denmark
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Hungary
Iceland
Ireland
Italy
Japan
Korea (Republic of)
Luxembourg
Mexico
Netherlands
New Zealand
Norway
OECD
Poland
Portugal
Slovakia
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
Turkey
United Kingdom
United States

3.1)



Health index (Sub-Saharan Africa (RB))
Sub-Saharan Africa (RB)
1.00
0.80
0.60
0.40
0.20
0.00
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
2011
0.444
0.462
0.466
0.461
0.465
0.494
0.543
Angola
Benin
Botswana
Burkina Faso
Burundi
Cameroon
Cape Verde
Central African Republic
Chad
Comoros
Congo
Congo (Democratic Republic of the)
Côte d'Ivoire
Equatorial Guinea
Eritrea
Ethiopia
Gabon
Gambia
Ghana
Guinea
Guinea-Bissau
Kenya
Lesotho
Liberia
Madagascar
Malawi
Mali
Mauritania
Mauritius
Mozambique
Namibia
Niger
Nigeria
Rwanda
Sao Tome and Principe
Senegal
Seychelles
Sierra Leone
South Africa
Sub-Saharan Africa (RB)
Swaziland
Tanzania (United Republic of)
Togo
Uganda
Zambia
Zimbabwe

3.2)



Health index (South Asia (RB))
South Asia (RB)
1.00
0.80
0.60
0.40
0.20
0.00
0.555
0.581
0.611
0.638
0.666
0.693
0.724
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
2011
Afghanistan
Bangladesh
Bhutan
India
Iran (Islamic Republic of)
Maldives
Nepal
Pakistan
South Asia (RB)
Sri Lanka

4.1)



Income index (Sub-Saharan Africa (RB))
1.00
0.80
0.60
0.40
0.20
0.00
Sub-Saharan Africa (RB)
0.435
0.401
0.395
0.384
0.387
0.403
0.427
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
2011
Angola
Benin
Botswana
Burkina Faso
Burundi
Cameroon
Cape Verde
Central African Republic
Chad
Comoros
Congo
Congo (Democratic Republic of the)
Côte d'Ivoire
Equatorial Guinea
Eritrea
Ethiopia
Gabon
Gambia
Ghana
Guinea
Guinea-Bissau
Kenya
Lesotho
Liberia
Madagascar
Malawi
Mali
Mauritania
Mauritius
Mozambique
Namibia
Niger
Nigeria
Rwanda
Sao Tome and Principe
Senegal
Seychelles
Sierra Leone
South Africa
Sub-Saharan Africa (RB)
Swaziland
Tanzania (United Republic of)
Togo
Uganda
Zambia
Zimbabwe

4.2)



Income index (Latin America and the Caribbean (RB))
Latin America and the Caribbean (RB)
1.00
0.80
0.60
0.40
0.20
0.00
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
2011
0.618
0.602
0.605
0.616
0.627
0.637
0.661
Antigua and Barbuda
Argentina
Bahamas
Barbados
Belize
Bolivia (Plurinational State of)
Brazil
Chile
Colombia
Costa Rica
Cuba
Dominica
Dominican Republic
Ecuador
El Salvador
Grenada
Guatemala
Guyana
Haiti
Honduras
Jamaica
Latin America and the Caribbean (RB)
Mexico
Nicaragua
Panama
Paraguay
Peru
Saint Kitts and Nevis
Saint Lucia
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines
Suriname
Trinidad and Tobago
Uruguay
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)

4.3)


Income index (South Asia (RB))
South Asia (RB)
1.00
0.80
0.60
0.40
0.20
0.00
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
2011
0.352
0.371
0.384
0.403
0.425
0.458
0.507
Afghanistan
Bangladesh
Bhutan
India
Iran (Islamic Republic of)
Maldives
Nepal
Pakistan
South Asia (RB)
Sri Lanka

Tables

1.1)

Country	Rank (Regional / Global)	Index
Sub-Saharan Africa (RB)		0.463
Angola	14 / 148	0.486
Benin	27 / 167	0.427
Botswana	4 / 118	0.633
Burkina Faso	39 / 181	0.331
Burundi	43 / 185	0.316
Cameroon	15 / 150	0.482
Cape Verde	7 / 133	0.568
Central African Republic	37 / 179	0.343
Chad	41 / 183	0.328
Comoros	24 / 163	0.433
Congo	10 / 137	0.533
Congo (Democratic Republic of the)	45 / 187	0.286
Côte d'Ivoire	29 / 170	0.4
Equatorial Guinea	9 / 136	0.537
Eritrea	35 / 177	0.349
Ethiopia	32 / 174	0.363
Gabon	3 / 106	0.674
Gambia	28 / 168	0.42
Ghana	8 / 135	0.541
Guinea	36 / 178	0.344
Guinea-Bissau	34 / 176	0.353
Kenya	12 / 143	0.509

Lesotho	21 / 160	0.45
Liberia	40 / 182	0.329
Madagascar	16 / 151	0.48
Malawi	30 / 171	0.4
Mali	33 / 175	0.359
Mauritania	20 / 159	0.453
Mauritius	2 / 77	0.728
Mozambique	42 / 184	0.322
Namibia	5 / 120	0.625
Niger	44 / 186	0.295
Nigeria	19 / 156	0.459
Rwanda	26 / 166	0.429
Sao Tome and Principe	13 / 144	0.509
Senegal	18 / 155	0.459
Seychelles	1 / 52	0.773
Sierra Leone	38 / 180	0.336
South Africa	6 / 123	0.619
Swaziland	11 / 140	0.522
Tanzania (United Republic of)	17 / 152	0.466
Togo	23 / 162	0.435
Uganda	22 / 161	0.446
Zambia	25 / 164	0.43
Zimbabwe	31 / 173	0.376

2.1)

Country	Mean years of schooling (of adults)	Rank (Regional / Global)	Index
Sub-Saharan Africa (RB)	4.5		0.428
Seychelles	9.4	1 / 62	0.747
South Africa	8.5	2 / 82	0.705
Botswana	8.9	3 / 87	0.693
Gabon	7.5	4 / 103	0.66
Mauritius	7.2	5 / 105	0.659
Namibia	7.4	6 / 116	0.617
Kenya	7	7 / 121	0.582
Swaziland	7.1	8 / 122	0.578
Ghana	7.1	9 / 124	0.574
Zimbabwe	7.2	10 / 127	0.566
Congo	5.9	11 / 133	0.523
Cameroon	5.9	12 / 134	0.52
Lesotho	5.9	13 / 135	0.507
Madagascar	5.2	14 / 138	0.497
Zambia	6.5	15 / 140	0.48
Uganda	4.7	16 / 141	0.475
Togo	5.3	17 / 142	0.473
Tanzania (United Republic of)	5.1	18 / 143	0.454
Sao Tome and Principe	4.2	19 / 144	0.452
Nigeria	5	20 / 147	0.442
Liberia	3.9	21 / 148	0.439
Equatorial Guinea	5.4	22 / 151	0.427
Cape Verde	3.5	23 / 153	0.425
Angola	4.4	24 / 154	0.422

Malawi	4.2	25 / 156	0.41
Rwanda	3.3	26 / 157	0.407
Senegal	4.5	27 / 161	0.385
Comoros	2.8	28 / 163	0.368
Mauritania	3.7	29 / 165	0.366
Benin	3.3	30 / 166	0.365
Congo (Democratic Republic of the)	3.5	31 / 168	0.356
Burundi	2.7	32 / 169	0.353
Gambia	2.8	33 / 172	0.334
Central African Republic	3.5	34 / 173	0.321
Côte d'Ivoire	3.3	35 / 175	0.304
Sierra Leone	2.9	36 / 176	0.304
Guinea-Bissau	2.3	37 / 177	0.302
Eritrea	3.4	38 / 179	0.271
Mali	2	39 / 180	0.27
Guinea	1.6	40 / 182	0.246
Ethiopia	1.5	41 / 183	0.237
Mozambique	1.2	42 / 184	0.222
Chad	1.5	43 / 185	0.219
Burkina Faso	1.3	44 / 186	0.187
Niger	1.4	45 / 187	0.177

3.1)

Country	Rank (Regional / Global)	Index
Sub-Saharan Africa (RB)		0.543
Cape Verde	1 / 75	0.854
Seychelles	2 / 84	0.845
Mauritius	3 / 89	0.842
Madagascar	4 / 139	0.737
Sao Tome and Principe	5 / 146	0.705
Ghana	6 / 147	0.698
Gabon	7 / 150	0.674
Namibia	8 / 152	0.67
Eritrea	9 / 154	0.656
Comoros	10 / 156	0.648
Senegal	11 / 157	0.62
Ethiopia	12 / 158	0.619
Mauritania	13 / 159	0.609
Gambia	14 / 160	0.607
Tanzania (United Republic of)	15 / 161	0.603
Congo	16 / 163	0.59
Kenya	17 / 164	0.586
Togo	18 / 165	0.585
Liberia	19 / 166	0.58
Benin	20 / 167	0.569
Rwanda	21 / 168	0.559
Burkina Faso	22 / 169	0.559
Côte d'Ivoire	23 / 170	0.558
Niger	24 / 171	0.547

Malawi	25 / 172	0.54
Uganda	26 / 173	0.538
Guinea	27 / 174	0.538
Botswana	28 / 175	0.523
South Africa	29 / 176	0.517
Nigeria	30 / 177	0.503
Cameroon	31 / 178	0.499
Mali	32 / 179	0.496
Zimbabwe	33 / 180	0.495
Angola	34 / 182	0.49
Equatorial Guinea	35 / 183	0.49
Burundi	36 / 184	0.48
Mozambique	37 / 185	0.477
Chad	38 / 186	0.466
Zambia	39 / 187	0.458
Swaziland	40 / 188	0.453
Central African Republic	41 / 190	0.448
Congo (Democratic Republic of the)	42 / 191	0.448
Lesotho	43 / 192	0.445
Guinea-Bissau	44 / 193	0.444
Sierra Leone	45 / 194	0.438

4.1)

Country	GNI per capita in PPP terms (constant 2005 international $)	Rank (Regional / Global)	Index
Sub-Saharan Africa (RB)	1966		0.427
Equatorial Guinea	17608	1 / 45	0.741
Seychelles	16729	2 / 48	0.733
Botswana	13049	3 / 62	0.698
Mauritius	12918	4 / 63	0.696
Gabon	12249	5 / 66	0.689
South Africa	9469	6 / 79	0.652
Namibia	6206	7 / 99	0.591
Angola	4874	8 / 110	0.557
Swaziland	4484	9 / 113	0.545
Cape Verde	3402	10 / 126	0.505
Congo	3066	11 / 131	0.49
Nigeria	2069	12 / 144	0.434
Cameroon	2031	13 / 146	0.431
Mauritania	1859	14 / 149	0.419
Sao Tome and Principe	1792	15 / 151	0.413
Senegal	1708	16 / 153	0.406
Lesotho	1664	17 / 154	0.403
Ghana	1584	18 / 155	0.396
Kenya	1492	19 / 158	0.387
Côte d'Ivoire	1387	20 / 160	0.377
Benin	1364	21 / 161	0.374
Tanzania (United Republic of)	1328	22 / 162	0.37
Gambia	1282	23 / 163	0.365
Zambia	1254	24 / 164	0.362

Burkina Faso	1141	25 / 166	0.349
Rwanda	1133	26 / 167	0.348
Uganda	1124	27 / 168	0.347
Mali	1123	28 / 169	0.346
Chad	1105	29 / 171	0.344
Comoros	1079	30 / 172	0.341
Guinea-Bissau	994	31 / 173	0.329
Ethiopia	971	32 / 174	0.326
Mozambique	898	33 / 175	0.314
Guinea	863	34 / 176	0.309
Madagascar	824	35 / 177	0.302
Togo	798	36 / 178	0.297
Malawi	753	37 / 179	0.289
Sierra Leone	737	38 / 180	0.286
Central African Republic	707	39 / 181	0.28
Niger	641	40 / 182	0.266
Eritrea	536	41 / 183	0.24
Zimbabwe	376	42 / 184	0.19
Burundi	368	43 / 185	0.186
Congo (Democratic Republic of the)	280	44 / 186	0.147
Liberia	265	45 / 187	0.14