



Section VIII

Crisis and Responses: Restructuring NATO and the Warsaw Pact



CIMA
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White House ⁵⁷⁶¹

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October 16, 1963

12:30

Secretary's Conversation with Mr. Stikker on East-West Relations

United States

The Secretary

The Under Secretary

Ambassador Finletter, USRO

Mr. Schestak, Deputy Assistant Secretary, EUR

Mr. Pepper, EUR/RPM

Mr. Spielmann, EUR/RPM

NATO International Staff

Birk U. Stikker, Secretary General

John Getz, Social Assistant

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After a brief private meeting among the Secretary, Mr. Stikker and Ambassador Finletter, the other participants joined the group. The Secretary opened the discussion by raising the matter of East-West relations. He emphasized that we are not in a detente with the USSR, but merely have a hunting license to search for a detente. Thus far the US and USSR have agreed only on a hot line, limited test ban treaty, a wheat sale of undetermined amount, a U.N. resolution on bombs in orbit, and the exchange of two Soviet spies for two Americans held in the USSR. Although a bilateral consular convention was under discussion, no agreement had been reached.

The Secretary pointed out there were still four important unresolved problems: Laos, Cuba, Vietnam and Berlin. He said there was some improvement in the Cuba situation, with Soviet military units continuing to leave the island. He tended to believe there were no organized Soviet combat units there, but only technical and training personnel.

The Secretary expressed his admiration for the skill with which Mr. Stikker had handled the RAC discussion of the non-aggression pact (NAP). He said the Soviets had revealed a fatal flaw as concerned the application of NAP to

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Berlin, in that they declined to answer the question whether under NAF they would agree not to seek to alter by unilateral action the status of Berlin, or to give assurances that there would be no change in the status any except for agreement reached by peaceful means. It was important that we be able to tell the U.S. Senate that NAF applied to Berlin, and in view of Soviet ambiguity in this respect, no progress on NAF was in the offing.

As concerns observation posts, the Secretary noted that the Soviet attempt to link them with nuclear-free zones and reduction of foreign troops in Europe was unacceptable. On military budgets, we could not agree to the Khrushchev proposal as we did not see how we could have any assurance of compliance without inspection many times as thorough as that the Russians had rejected for a test ban. If Khrushchev actually reduces the size of his forces, as he has hinted he might do, we will draw appropriate conclusions. But as of now, we cannot see any usefulness in negotiating on military budgets. The Secretary noted, however, our continuing interest in an arrangement for mutual US-USSR destruction of B-47 bombers and Badgers. We are concerned that if nothing is done, these obsolescent aircraft may be turning up in trouble spots around the world. Although the Soviets were unwilling to accept such an agreement, they had asked if we would be interested in mutual destruction of other weapons, and we had signified our interest in considering any Soviet proposals.

The Secretary said that a bilateral civil air agreement with the USSR was possible. As for space cooperation, we might increase collaboration on space medicine. A joint trip to the moon seemed more remote, but the Soviets were not uninterested in other possible cooperative space programs. The Secretary noted that agreement in principle had been reached on tests in orbit, which was being handled through a UN General Assembly resolution. Concerning non-discrimination, the Soviets had claimed that creation of the NLF would pose an insuperable obstacle. In view of the present uncertain character of specific NLF arrangements, we cannot allay Soviet concerns to the extent that that concern is related to discrimination. However, the Secretary noted the main Soviet concern was that NLF would enhance the position of the Federal Republic, would give deBorja's points to the Chinese Communists, and would commit NATO's resources to a nuclear race. The Secretary said our concern with respect to non-discrimination was 95 per cent Communist China, but the Soviets were reluctant to talk about China. We have reason to believe China is very much on their minds, especially in connection with the nuclear problem. They therefore regard the limited test ban treaty in good part as a means of pressure on Peiping. Gromyko had said the US over-estimated what the USSR had given China in the nuclear field, and there appeared to be a difference in estimates as to when the Chinese would explode their first nuclear weapon, the Soviets believing this was further in the future than we. We believe our intelligence on this to be quite accurate.

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Mr. Stikker asked how Foreign Minister Spaak of Belgium reacted to the East-West discussions, and particularly the significance to Spaak's UNCTA speech. The Secretary pointed out the very serious danger that if a defensive mentality is built up in the West and an East-West crisis arises, the pendulum might swing rapidly and drastically to the other side. Most Americans would feel that they had been duped and would respond in anger. Therefore, he had told both Gromyko and Spaak that it would be unwise to build up too much popular expectation of a detente. The Secretary noted the Soviets did not appear to be in a hurry to negotiate on outstanding East-West problems. They regard Berlin as an important and acute problem, but do not deal with it with the same urgency or violent language as a year ago. In this respect the Berlin wall had apparently resolved much of their problem, the bleeding of population from the East. But we had not heard the rest of the Berlin problem, and the Soviets would undoubtedly want to discuss it in future.

Turning to the Autobahn blockage, the Secretary noted that Gromyko had said the Soviet military authorities had reacted at the Autobahn because they thought the US was trying to change the rules governing access. The Secretary said he believed Gromyko and Sobryain, and perhaps the Soviet foreign office, were unaware of the Autobahn blockage for some time after it had developed. He also doubted that Khrushchev knew of it at an early stage. In any event, Gromyko had insisted that the Soviets did not wish to create an incident. In due course we would gain a clearer view of Soviet intentions.

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Remarks by Mr. Schroeder (S-44)
on East-West Negotiations
NAC Ministerial Meeting, Paris, December 1955

East-West Negotiations - General

We regard the Moscow Test Ban Agreement as a symptom of progress for two reasons - on the one hand, because the dis-continuation of nuclear testing has freed mankind as a whole from damage by radioactive fallout and, on the other hand, because this is a beginning which, as we hope, might be followed by negotiations about concrete disarmament measures and perhaps even about those political problems which are at the root of international tension. ...

However, we must be constantly aware, that the Moscow Agreement covers only a peripheral problem and that the Soviets have up to now not shown any inclination to extend this reduction in tension to the central problems in clear contrast to their loudly-proclaimed policy of "peaceful coexistence". We believe, to take a concrete example, that Soviet interference with Allied access on the autobahn to Berlin in October and November served, among other things, primarily the purpose of finding out how far the West would be prepared in the interest of a policy of détente to put up with a further step-by-step restriction of its rights.

This separation of the German and Berlin problem from the policy of détente illustrates the true intentions behind this policy. It aims at sowing dissension between the partners of the Western Alliance and at playing off one against the other. For these purposes, "peaceful coexistence" is used as an effective propaganda slogan. However, it only seems that in this age of nuclear weapons, the Soviets no longer believe that they could further accomplish their aim of world revolution by means of war. It is interesting that Soviet propaganda should always present the so-called "relaxation of tension" as being Khrushchev's success, who had thus compelled the West to agree to his policy of peaceful coexistence. ...

Although constant vigilance in the face of Soviet intentions appears indicated, statements like the one I have just quoted do not cause me to draw the conclusion that we should now return to the methods of the Cold War. On the contrary, we should continue to work for a reduction of international tension. Even if the agreements concluded

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relate only to peripheral problems of international politics and disarmament, they can contribute to such a reduction of tension, provided that they do not alter the balance of power to the disadvantage of the West and that they do not worsen the status quo for the solution of central problems. We should, as far as possible, always try to find starting points for the solution of the central problems when we deal with peripheral ones.

Non-Aggression Pact (NAP)

Now a word or two about the concrete projects which play a certain part in our discussion. First of all, about the idea of a non-aggression arrangement. When examining the idea of a non-aggression arrangement it would be advisable in my opinion to find out what are the aims pursued by the Soviet Union in proposing such an arrangement. The Soviet Union obviously made this proposal in order to freeze the status quo and thus to improve its own position. The renunciation of force concerning Berlin, which Khrushchev proposed to the British Prime Minister, does not alter this in any way. It bypasses the essential problem which is the safeguarding of access to Berlin. As long as such decisive questions, which are among the causes of the present tension, are not solved, a non-aggression arrangement does not appear very meaningful to us. Such a project should rather represent the terminal point of a development which has led to a satisfactory solution of the open questions, or which has at least produced sufficient progress in this direction so that goodwill of the other side is beyond doubt.

Non-dissemination of nuclear weapons

Now, a word on the idea of the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons. This idea of setting limits to the national dissemination of nuclear weapons should certainly be welcomed. However, we have always assumed that an agreement on non-dissemination would only be meaningful if it is world-wide and, for example, also includes Communist China. As far as we are concerned, an agreement of this sort is subject to the condition that it does not represent an obstacle in the way of establishing a multilateral nuclear force, which we consider an important means for bringing about the necessary nuclear integration within our Alliance. The fact that the Soviet Union is using such strong polemic against the NWF shows us that it regards the non-dissemination agreement as a weapon against the NWF. It is evident that the Soviet Union merely wishes to prevent the Western defence posture from being thus strengthened. We should always keep this in mind.

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Observation Posts

Now a word on the matter of ground control posts. We would welcome measures for the prevention of surprise attacks. In the nuclear age the only practical possibility consists in controlling the preparation of conventional attacks if these involve the transportation of reinforcements. For this reason, ground control posts would have to be set up in great depth, in the areas of the two military blocs. Any arrangements made should of course not be to the disadvantage of the West.

Eastern Europe

Although Communist propaganda consistently describes the Federal Republic of Germany as the major trouble maker in Europe, accuses it of harbouring aggressive and revanchist intentions, and thus tries to drive a wedge between us and our Allies, we are on our part, just as consistently endeavouring to improve and to normalise our relations with the Communist countries in Eastern Europe. In the course of this year we have agreed on the exchange of commercial missions with Poland, Roumania and Hungary. Preliminary discussions about the same subject are at present being held with Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria. While it is true that these missions only have commercial tasks, we nevertheless hope that they will be able to extend their activities to other fields, such as for example, to the cultural field and that they will help to foster and intensify the human contacts between the inhabitants of the Federal Republic of Germany and those of the Eastern European countries. Perhaps this will also help to eliminate or at least to reduce the prejudices against the Federal Republic of Germany existing in some of these countries and the general anti-German resentment, and perhaps these efforts will in the long run also bear fruit politically.

In the eyes of Communist countries, foreign trade is not a commercial, but essentially a political affair. We have realised this, and in our negotiations with the Polish, Roumanian and Hungarian Governments we have adopted the same view and insisted that Berlin should be included in the agreements.

Credit Policies

I do not feel that we should put thumbscrews on the Soviet Union by means of our trade policy and that we should at this time drastically restrict our trade with Moscow. On the contrary, I consider it

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desirable that there should be a limited expansion of trade along the lines of the general development of our economies. It is, however, a different matter whether we should, in its present critical situation, grant the Soviet Union long-term credits which would, in reality, be tantamount to development aid, so as to enable it to overcome its difficulties as soon as possible and to resume its policy of threats, ultimatums and tension. If we did this we would be making Khrushchev a present which would only extract a smile from him and would certainly not oblige him to make any concessions in return. In short, we would be doing damage to our alliance while granting the Soviet Union a one-sided advantage.

In our opinion, the NATO countries should only play out one of the few trump cards which they hold in their hands vis-a-vis the Soviet Union if and when the Soviet leaders show a willingness to make substantial concessions in return. In this connection, I am thinking less in terms of economic concessions but rather in terms of a real détente and agreement about those political questions which weigh heavily on the relationship between the NATO countries and the Soviet Union and which invariably offer the Soviet Union an opportunity to make trouble.

Germany and Berlin

In regard to the German question as a whole, we shall maintain our position that the genuine relaxation of tension in the relationship between East and West will only be possible if the Soviet Union is prepared to grant the right of self-determination to the German people. ... On the other hand, the regime headed by the Soviet Union, is energetically pursuing its efforts to obtain admission into international organizations, particularly in the non-governmental sector. Greatest vigilance on the part of the West continues to be necessary in this respect.

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Remarks of Mr. Spaak (Belgium)
on East West Issues (Extract)
NAC Ministerial Meeting, Paris, December 1963
(Translated from French)

Situation in the Communist Bloc

I had occasion to go to the U.S.S.R. last June or July. I have just taken a trip to Poland, and I have had the feeling, which is very nearly the same as that of our Danish colleague, that at the present time the primary concern of the leaders of the Communist world, at least those with whom I have become acquainted, is their desire to have their economic and social experiment succeed. I think that this state of mind is very easily explained; I shall even say that it is historically natural. I think that it is a great mistake to look at things as though Communism were a kind of monolithic and unchangeable doctrine, and as though the Communism of 1963 were necessarily the Communism of 1912 and necessarily also the Communism of 1950. Of course, there are things that are still unchanged and that will continue to be unchanged. But in tactics, method, and the presentation of things, there are some very great changes that may be made, and no one can say that in France the spirit of 1793 was the same as that of 1814. Revolutions themselves evolve, and after a number of years those who started them show some signs of fatigue and wish to benefit from the improvements that they have made, or think that they have made, in the world. In my opinion, we have reached the time when the Communist revolution, except in China for easily explicable reasons because it is much more recent, would like very much to reap the benefits of what it has sown. The preoccupations of Mr. Khrushchev with internal policy, are the same as those that I have noted that both Mr. Gomułka and Mr. Brezhnev have. As their desire for more stability the fact is now added that they are experiencing great difficulties. There is no doubt now that the agricultural crisis is not only a crisis in the U.S.S.R. but one in nearly the whole Communist world, and I do not think that it is due to bad weather conditions, to too much sun or too much rain, it is due to the failure of a method of farming.

In Poland, the agricultural crisis has had an immediate and unquestionable effect on economic development. Since Polish agricultural exports have been greatly curtailed throughout this year, it has been necessary to re-examine the entire economic development plan very thoroughly. If the observation that I have made, and which I believe,

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that we have reached the time when the Communist leaders are primarily concerned with the success of their experiment is true, one may be safe in reaching the following conclusion: Not only can they not desire war, they can not even pursue throughout the world the policy of aggression which they were following six or seven years ago and which has so often caused us members of NATO concern. Consequently, they are likely to become involved in international complications that would not permit them to continue their economic program.

Last west Negotiations

If my evaluation is correct, what is it our duty to do, then? I shall state what our duty is very briefly: we must explore the situation tirelessly, and this is, if I may say so, where I differ completely with the evaluation of the situation that Mr. Couve de Murville has just made. As for me, I think that, if the situation is as I have stated, we must constantly endeavor to see what benefit we can derive from it. As a matter of fact, I had forgotten to say, and I shall add now, that in my opinion the Communist world, in order to solve its economic problems, intends to call to some extent upon the Western world. It has already done so in the case of wheat; there is every reason to believe that we shall be confronted with other proposals sooner or later.

We have, then, in our hand a whole series of trumps and other cards, and, if we do not play them now, I wonder when we shall play them. When there was a cold war, when the Communists were aggressive and dynamic, we drew together, we stuck together in order to protect ourselves from danger, but we found it impossible to take the initiative. Now the situation has changed considerably and a different atmosphere seems to prevail, yet apparently we are not only unable but unwilling to do anything whatever in order to try to resolve our problems!

Mr. Couve de Murville has stated that there will not be a relaxation of tensions until the question of Germany and the Berlin question are resolved. Please pardon me for disagreeing, but when Germany, the German question, and the Berlin question are resolved, as they are the only two political issues that still exist in Europe, there will not be a relaxation of tensions, there will be peace between the Communist world and the Western world. A relaxation-of-tension policy and a state of peace must not be confused. Relaxation of tensions is only a method; it is only a method that is in conflict

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with the cold war method, and I am certain that, if a relaxation-of-tension policy is to be followed, we must first attempt to resolve what Mr. Schroeder once called, and I believe he used the expression again this morning, "the peripheral questions".

We cannot believe and no one can suppose that, after ten or fifteen years of cold war, it would be possible to take up immediately the problems that it is the most difficult to resolve and to find a solution. What is necessary is to explore patiently -- I repeat the word "patiently" and I underscore it -- by means of talks with the Soviet leaders and the leaders of the countries that we call the satellites, what their true state of mind is and to seek to determine what we could propose, for our part, in order to reach a solution of the peripheral problems and perhaps some day the fundamental problems. We should expect the Soviets to take all the steps, and, above all, how can we suppose that, at the beginning of a relaxation-of-tension policy, it would be possible for the Soviets to submit to us immediately a proposal that would be tantamount to saying: "As regards the main problems, I support the positions that I have been attacking for fifteen years, which are the positions of my adversary, and I am giving up completely the struggle that I have carried on".

That appears to me to be as unfeasible from the Soviet point of view as for us to state some day that we are non-aligned, as far as Germany is concerned, the policy of self-determination or, as far as Berlin is concerned, the principles that we have always followed.

That is why, as regards the evaluation and the situation and policy implied therein, I cannot say that I agree with Mr. Couve de Murville and other ministers who have spoken previously and who probably do not see things as I see them. And I cannot say that I am entirely confident or entirely happy, since I have the impression that, for the past several months, within the Atlantic Alliance these problems concerning a positive policy have remained unresolved because there was no unanimity regarding them.

Mr. Luns has stated that we should still have hopes of resolving these problems at another ministerial meeting. Good, we can always have such hopes, but I wonder whether, by thus remaining in either a deliberate state of passivity or in a state of weakness, we may not be letting some opportunities slip by. Gentlemen, let us assume for an

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instant that it is I who am right -- that I, and with me, fortunately, a few others are right in believing that there is a chance, that an exploration is possible, and that we are not exploring the matter either because we are taking the theoretical position of remaining inactive, or because we cannot reach an agreement on positive steps to take; what a responsibility, Gentlemen, toward those who may come after us!

Observation Posts

Other questions were also discussed by the permanent representatives, particularly that of the observers or the observation posts. I have read the documents, Gentlemen. The least that one can say is that they are extremely disappointing, and that they are disappointing because there are basic contradictions. There are those who would like to do something and who are ready to study the question, and there are those who do not wish to do anything. And, of course, because of these contradictions, it is difficult to make any progress.

I should like to say a word in this connection. I do not understand what is happening very well. When I was the Secretary General of NATO, there was continual talk of a surprise attack; that was one of the favorite subjects of the military authorities. In order to persuade us to make a greater military effort, we were always told that the great danger with which we were threatened was a surprise attack that we might not be able to resist. Actually, if it were possible to have -- but not in Germany (let no one quote me as saying what I had never intended to say); I was one of those who were in all cases among the first to say that discriminatory measures should never be taken against Germany as far as defense was concerned -- but if it were possible for us to have, over a vast area, an organized system of observation posts, it appears to me, in spite of what I have read in certain documents, that it would be very probable that a surprise attack by conventional means could henceforth be prevented.

If we should succeed in establishing a system of observation posts by agreement with the Communist world, it would, then, no longer be a question of a purely symbolic gesture; it would be a question of an important step toward the establishment of peace and, I think, toward disarmament.

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The main argument against this that I find in the documents is that it would give the Western world a feeling of false security. I have frequently encountered that argument, and I ask you, Gentlemen, to reject it, because, if, whenever we do anything toward disarmament -- unless it is general and controlled disarmament, and it will be necessary to wait a little longer before that is achieved -- if, whenever we do anything toward disarmament or toward the establishment of peace, we are told "That will give you a feeling of false security, and you will take advantage of it to become weak whereas you should remain strong"; that is a policy which will never make it possible to do anything.

In any case, as far as my country is concerned, and I can look for it, I certainly do not think that the fact that progress is being made by practical measures, and measures that would be reasonable, toward an organization in agreement with the Communist world would be a factor that would hamper the defense effort.

Non-Aggression Pact

The same is true with respect to a nonaggression pact. I do not think that a nonaggression pact is a subject that should be discussed first. I have already stated, and I say again that I regard it as the culmination of a number of partial disarmament or control measures, but I no longer see any reason to oppose it in principle.

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Remarks by Secretary Rusk
on East West Relations
Ministerial Meeting, Paris, December 1963

Non-Aggression Pact (NAP)

A non-aggression pact does not appear to be particularly promising at this point because it should be connected with some serious improvement on a problem of substantial interest and danger. I am glad that the Soviets raised no question of form because I think we would have great difficulty in persuading our Senate to adopt a treaty of non-aggression which preceded the settlement of the problems which might prompt aggression. A bare declaration standing alone could lead to a sense of false security, without either reducing the danger of war, or reducing our defence needs. President Kennedy had said that it must be connected, as a minimum, with reliable guarantees with respect to Berlin, or an improvement in the Berlin situation. We would not oppose a non-aggression pact in the context of political improvement in East-west relations, but we do think that it ought to be associated with such improvement and not be used to stand simply as an empty expression.

The declaration on Berlin which Mr. Gromyko has suggested, the text of which has been circulated in the Permanent Council, seems to us to be too vague, that it does not improve the de facto situation and could be used by the Soviets to inhibit Allied rights. We ought to continue our consideration of that matter because it is just possible that a time would come when this idea of a non-aggression pact would be worth consideration in connection with other matters.

Observation Posts

I will not say anything at the moment about observation posts - I think that has been covered here. We would be willing, as far as we are concerned, to look at it carefully if it were disentangled from the idea of a nuclear-free zone or the unacceptable thinning-out of troops in Germany.

Non-Dissemination of Nuclear Weapons

You know the Soviets are resisting such an agreement because of the multilateral force. If their objection is that it involves dissemination of weapons to national military establishments, then

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their opposition is temporary because, when they know what they do not now know, that is what these arrangements actually are to be, it will be clear that that kind of dissemination is not involved, but they may have other reasons for opposing a multi-lateral force and are using the non-dissemination agreement as maximum leverage, quite apart from the issue of dissemination. For example, if they see in this force what we see in it, namely a stronger unity within the participating members of the Alliance, they might object to that. If they see in it an enhanced participation, in nuclear councils, of the Federal Republic of Germany, they may object to that. It may be that they object to the participation of the resources of various members of the Alliance in a nuclear arms race which they expect to continue. It may be that the multi-lateral force raises for them some difficult questions within their own Alliance. But in any event, we do not believe that the idea of the multilateral force can be abandoned merely to accommodate the Soviet Union on the issue of non-dissemination.

Far beyond that, as far as the United States is concerned, our interest in the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons is largely China. We see no prospect that China will sign such an arrangement. Therefore, we are not optimistic about an early formal agreement. I say early formal agreement, because I do believe that, underneath this discussion, lies an approximate coincidence of policy, because I do not believe that, in Moscow or in Paris or in London or in Washington, any government, now possessing nuclear weapons, intends to distribute these nuclear weapons to others. So that the coincidence of policy may be as important as the absence of an agreement.

Berlin and Germany

Now, on Berlin and Germany, we feel that we should continue to reiterate our conviction that a free and unified Germany is important to the achievement of a stable peace in Europe. We support the efforts of the Federal Republic to improve conditions which arise from the division of Germany. We should like to see success in the efforts made to overcome some of the harsh consequences of the war, such as the travel of West Berliners to East Berlin.

We see little immediate prospect for early progress on a Berlin settlement, because the Soviets continue to insist that the Allied position in West Berlin either be eliminated or drastically diluted. Nevertheless, it is a point on which occasional contact with the Soviet Union may be of some importance.

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Disarmament

On disarmament, we are reviewing our own situation in preparation for the resumption of the conference in late January in Geneva and if we develop any possible additional ideas there, we shall bring them to the attention of the North Atlantic Council. But we are inclined to think that progress is to be made on separate and rather limited steps, which themselves might develop a measure of confidence, but that a comprehensive agreement, far reaching agreement, is not likely to be achieved in the near future. Nor do we see any prospect of a comprehensive test ban agreement for the elimination of underground testing as well as atmospheric testing.

It is possible that the Soviets might respond at one point. We proposed, as the Permanent Representatives will recall, that we and the Soviet Union join in the mutual destruction of certain medium bombers, the B 47s and the Badgers. Although obsolescent in the East/West sophisticated confrontation, they are nevertheless a highly sophisticated weapon to be turning up in various parts of the world. The Soviets turned that down, but they did ask whether that was the only kind of weapon which could be subjected to that treatment, or whether this was a sample of an idea. Well, I told Mr. Gromyko that this was the only sample we had thought of and that if they had any ideas they could mention them. They have not come back on that, but he did seem to be completely disinterested in that problem.

U.S.-Soviet Bilateral Relations

Meanwhile, we have attempted to explore the bilateral side a bit. We are negotiating a consular convention, which would be helpful in the protection of citizens. We may, next Spring, undertake a civil air arrangement for the exchange of one or two flights a week between New York and Moscow. We have been keeping the North Atlantic Council informed about that. We have opened up our wheat market for Soviet purchase if they wish to do so under the terms which it is possible for us to offer. Thus, although they have not been able to work out agreements with our grain dealers, we frankly don't know whether those discussions will come to a successful conclusion.

Credit Policies

We are inclined to see some advantages to increased Soviet-Western trade in non-strategic goods and we shall be reviewing our own practice there, and we may find ourselves adopting some of the more open attitude of the rest of NATO on that particular subject. But we have considerable reservations about the terms of credit which might be offered to the Soviet Union. We think some of their stringencies

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are moderating influences on their policy and we believe that credit should not, be imperceptible stages, become aid and relieve them of their stringencies at a time when they might be trying to serve several appetites at once. But that is a matter which can be discussed further.

Cuba

I might just make a final comment on Cuba. What has been happening in Cuba is a concern to all of us in the Western hemisphere and can, at moments of critical danger, be of concern to the members of NATO as well. There has been a movement out of Soviet forces in recent months. However, there seems to be no real change in the Soviet commitment to Cuba and there has been an evident increase in Cuban subversive efforts in the Western Hemisphere.

But we in the Western Hemisphere must take with the greatest seriousness any effort by Cuba to interfere in the affairs of the other countries of that hemisphere. And so I would suppose that the Cuban problem becomes more rather than less serious in the next thirty to sixty days ahead of us. We would hope very much that our colleagues in NATO would look upon the Cuban problem as partly their own problem, and to consider whether there is anything which they can do to increase the pressures on that situation and make it quite clear to Castro that this course upon which he has embarked can have no possible future.

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REMARKS BY COUVE DE MURVILLE (FRANCE)
ON EAST-WEST ISSUES (EXTRACT)
MINISTERIAL MEETING, PARIS, DECEMBER 1963
(Translated from French)

Changes in the Communist Bloc

First of all, changes that we have known about for a number of years, which we have seen developing for several years, and then others that appeared overnight, or almost overnight, a year ago, even though they had been in preparation for some time. The first is a general shift, which is actually drawing us away from the over-simple concept of clear-cut ideological conflict between two blocs, a drawing away that has resulted from a diversification of the situations and positions of those on both sides and, in particular, from the reappearance nearly everywhere of the nationalist factor. This is particularly true and manifest in the Communist world. It has already been said several times here around this table that Russia's satellites, Russia's European satellites, seem to be more difficult to keep under control now than in the past. They are following an independent policy, as can be seen, particularly in the case of Rumania, and as we have seen, this is perhaps true of all of them in the negotiations they have just concluded with the Federal Republic (of Germany) for a certain resumption of relations, at least in the field of trade. If this -- I do not wish to use the word "liberalization"-- but at least this "beginning of a change," even though it is a small beginning, is discernible among the European satellites, it is much more evident in the relations between Russia and China. And this leads us to the second type of changes that have occurred, and which are more evident this year than they were in the past, changes that are constituted by this now very obvious conflict between China and Russia, and then the changes that have occurred in the economic situation of Russia itself, particularly its difficulties having to do with agriculture. All this has already been pointed out, naturally, by many.

We know now that the conflict between China and Russia has been in progress since 1957 or 1958, and that a long time ago, even though it remained secret, it had become very violent. This is obviously a fundamental occurrence from the standpoint of a general balance of power. And I think that it can be added that, obviously also, it is not unfortunate from the Western standpoint. For the Atlantic Alliance, for each of us individually, and, above all, naturally, for the European countries, Russia continues to be the principal, but not the only, threat. It is not a bad thing that Russia now has a new front to the east parallel to the one to the west that it created 15 years ago. As for agriculture, everyone knows that the existing crisis is the result of a kind of failure of the policy that had been pursued by Russia for many years, and which was known as the development of virgin land. It is

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obvious, and I completely agree with the opinion expressed a moment ago by Mr. Haekkerup, our Danish colleague, that this does not change basically either the balance of power between the East and West or even Russia's policy as a whole. It is likely, however, that for a few years, perhaps two or three, this situation will cause a certain number of difficulties, particularly payment difficulties, for the Soviet Union.

East-West Relations -- Prospects for Relaxation of Tension

Now that I have said -- or rather repeated -- all this, we must now see what inferences we can draw from this situation, these changes, these new prospects, concerning our policy. And this is tantamount to asking ourselves if there is a possibility of improving relations between East and West, that is to say, a possibility of what is commonly called a relaxation of tensions. It seems to me, in this respect, that one thing is obvious, one thing is certain from the outset, and that is that this possibility of a relaxation of tensions depends entirely and exclusively on Russia.....It is the question of whether, such being the case, we can facilitate for the Soviets the change on their part which is the only thing that can bring about a relaxation of tensions. In other words, whether we can assist them to enter on a course of better relations, for example by facilitating the position of those in Russia who have peaceful tendencies, as contrasted with those who have less peaceful tendencies, and hence, we repeat, whether we can facilitate this shift in their policy. I agree with Mr. Haekkerup that this idea is a rather naive illusion on our part, or rather, that if we had such an idea it would be a somewhat naive illusion. Mr. Khrushchev is indeed solidly established, everyone bears witness to this. Russia is a great country, which knows the art of politics and knows how to practice it.

I do not think that we can, ~~from~~ outside Russia, in any way either influence the policy of the Russian government or favor certain elements of the government with respect to certain others, or the government with respect to the opposition. All this appears to be again somewhat in the realm of illusion. We must therefore view the situation as calmly and objectively as possible and must not believe that we can, on our own authority, act with tremendous effectiveness.

Once again, in order to have a relaxation of tensions, the condition-- and in the last analysis the only condition -- is that the Russians must want one. For us to be sure that they wanted a relaxation of tensions, I think that it would suffice, in particular, if for a certain time there were no more threats or incidents. If, for example, nothing happened on the

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access routes between Western Germany and West Berlin for a rather long time; if, for example, no more speeches were heard from Moscow for a long time threatening us with the huge nuclear forces of Russia, that would very likely suffice to create the impression throughout the world that things were changing.

East-West Negotiations -- Germany; OPs; NAP; Non-dissemination of Nuclear Weapons

That has not yet happened, and I think that we must definitely find the reason for this in what is, from Russia's standpoint, the fundamental political problem -- and I would say, the only fundamental political problem. That problem, we all know, is Germany. The German problem is the only vital question -- or the only one the Russians consider vital -- that is still unsettled. Naturally, there are many other questions. We have discussed them this morning and this afternoon.

In this respect, we know the objectives of Soviet policy. These were announced, even proclaimed many years ago, and they consist of consolidating the status quo, that is to say, the division of Germany, by concluding a treaty of peace with the two German States and by creating in West Berlin a third German State which theoretically would be neutralized. This is the beginning of the end of the Soviet policy in the period of history in which we are living. It has not changed for a long time, and there is no indication that it has now changed.

To attain these purposes, until such time as the Western nations agree to conclude a peace treaty, the Russians are striving to do two things: first, to consolidate the status quo in Germany; that is to say, in reality, to have Communist East Germany recognized; and secondly, to prevent any consolidation of the thing that does not suit them in Germany, that is to say, the West Berlin regime. These are the two things that we find again and again, in very circumstance, when we talk to the Soviets, and this has not changed in the past six months.

Since July, a number of talks have been held with the Soviet Union on all sorts of subjects, and all with the exception of just one, were at the initiative of the Soviets. There were talks concerning a nonaggression pact, the establishment of control stations to prevent surprise attacks, and prevention of the spread of atomic weapons. Every time, during these discussions, all of us have noted that the Russians always come back to the German problem. If we are discussing a nonaggression pact, the Russian objective is to have the Communist Republic of East Germany recognized. If we are discussing control stations to prevent surprise

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attacks, the condition established concerns a certain reduction of troops on both sides of the line of demarcation, perhaps a beginning of the demuclearization of Germany; hence, it is a question of preparing the way for the neutralization of Germany.

When we speak of preventing the spread of atomic weapons -- and this is a question that is originated by, or at the initiative of, the West -- the problem that arises immediately is that of the multilateral force, not as such, but with respect to Germany's participation in it, and in so far as there could be, by virtue of that fact, a danger of Germany's obtaining possession of, or at least the use of, atomic weapons, or obtaining the right to decide to use them.

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Remarks by Mr. Martin (Canada)
on East West Relations
Ministerial Meeting, Paris, December 1963

East West Negotiations - General

The Soviet Union, while disappointed in its hopes of easy victories in Western Europe and the rest of the world has, at the same time, shown evidence of realising the risks of total war in the nuclear age. I subscribe strongly to the view expressed by Mr. Butler that there is an advantage in making contact.

We in the West must seek to build on this gradual and welcome change in Soviet thinking. The dialogue between East and West should, in our view, be continued with the aim of reducing the risks of war which could only have catastrophic results for all concerned, and I was pleased when Mr. Spaak visited Poland a week ago. What I have said about contacts with the Soviet bloc is also valid with respect to China.

Observation Posts

The first of these is the proposal for ground observation posts and related measures intended to guard against surprise attack and I noted with interest what Mr. Schroder had to say about this. In the opinion of the Canadian Government, these proposals could be developed into a valuable safeguard for peace. If suitable conditions for operating these observation posts and military missions can be negotiated with the Russians, the threat of a surprise attack by massive land forces might be eliminated. After all, NATO was created to guard against exactly that very threat. The North Atlantic Council, the Political Advisors Committee, as we know, have been dealing with this subject for some time, It is necessary to examine it in all aspects with care for we must be sure we do not make a bad bargain which would lessen the security of the Alliance or any member of it. It has become clear that there is a difference of opinion in the Council as to the usefulness of establishing ground observation posts, and also as to the method of arriving at a decision in the matter. However, the discussions, as I understand them, have made clear the basic interests of the Alliance and its members which must be safeguarded in any future negotiation on the subject.

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These are, briefly then, that an agreement on GGP should not enhance the status of the DDR; serve to perpetuate the division of Germany; discriminate against any particular country or establish a zone of special interest in Central Europe which might lead to arrangements envisaged by the Rapacki Plan; weaken Western defences by causing the evacuation of the most modern heavy armaments from the areas subject to inspection by Soviet observation posts; increase the Soviet capability in the fields of espionage, propaganda and subversion against the West.

It goes without saying, of course, that there would have to be close and continuous consultation in NATO as the negotiations proceed but I believe that there is ground for further improvement in the consultations between what goes on in this Committee in Geneva and NATO itself. As for the model or detailed specification of the siting, manning, freedom of movement and functions of the ground observation posts, spreading of this by the North Atlantic Council and the military staffs should continue and doubtless agreement on the main outlines will eventually be reached, but as the whole arrangement would have to be negotiated with the Soviet Union, it would not appear necessary or desirable at this time for the NATO study of this question to go into too great detail and no final arrangement can be reached with the Soviet Union without the concurrence of all members of NATO, whose territory or interests would be affected.

Non-Dissemination of Nuclear Weapons

Now, Sir, the other collateral measure which I wish to refer to is the preventing of the further dissemination of nuclear weapons. The danger which dissemination would create is well understood and there is no need, here, for me to enlarge on it. We have all agreed on the principle by accepting the Irish resolution at the United Nations on this subject at the Sixteenth General Assembly. It would seem particularly important for the West to continue to indicate a willingness to enter into an agreement on non-dissemination. There was very considerable interest in the concept of Nuclear Free Zones at the Eighteenth Session of the United Nations General Assembly and we expect to be addressing ourselves to this problem at Geneva. I believe that the Western countries were successful at New York in laying the groundwork for orderly consideration of these zones at Geneva, in a way best suited to protect the security of NATO members. To this end, particular emphasis was placed on the examination of the

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principles or criteria which should guide the establishment of Nuclear Free Zones. Since the creation of such zones, subject to proper safeguards in some areas of the world, could conceivably add to the security of the NATO area, even though patently out of the question within that area, it seemed best to adopt this flexible approach.

Disarmament Conference

We have also been attracted by the suggestion that the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Conference at Geneva should meet at regular times and for regular periods. We believe that, if a Disarmament Conference can be accepted as a regular part of the international calendar, many of the tactical problems concerned with the current conference might be overcome and, of course, it would become a great deal more difficult for the Soviet Union to bring the Disarmament Conference to an abrupt end. I think we are all agreed that its continuation, however slow the progress on substance may be, is a useful element in the preservation of a more relaxed international climate and, because our own peoples demand and because this is demanded by the peoples of the world, we would, I think be remiss in not patiently seeking to negotiate for some possible agreement in this area and, who knows that the international climate would so develop as to give us perhaps even a surprised opportunity for a further agreement with the Soviet Union.

Non-Aggression Pact (NAP)

While it is of interest that the Soviet Union has taken account in, the procedural sense, of the Western requirement to link Berlin access rights to any non-aggression arrangement, I refer to Gromyko's suggestion that a non-aggression pact be accompanied by a unilateral Soviet declaration on Berlin. The substance of this declaration is clearly unsatisfactory. It would appear that the Soviet Union has concluded that the chances for agreement on a non-aggression pact are poor and many of us will recall our own talks with Mr. Gromyko at the United Nations, when he hardly even raised the subject, notwithstanding the attention that was given to it in Moscow during the month of August. I do not see any particular advantage to the West, however, in taking direct steps to drop the subject of a non-aggression pact from the list of those matters capable of further exploratory discussion with the Soviet Union.

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Eastern Europe

Even if no settlement of European security problems is in the offing, the present atmosphere is one in which it should be possible to arrive at a number of bilateral agreements of mutual advantage in such areas as commercial relations, consular conventions and cultural exchanges.

I was interested in what Mr. Schroder had to say about trade with Eastern Europe. In Eastern Europe I think there are opportunities and advantages right now of increasing our contacts through commercial and other exchanges. These countries are displaying a growing individuality, a growing desire to assert their own interests in general policies and particularly in their foreign economic relations.

We cannot reasonably expect these countries to break away from their alliance with the Soviet Union, nor to assume divergent positions on important foreign policy issues. But we can encourage, by a judicious willingness to enter into closer exchanges with them, some reduction in their feeling of total dependence on the Soviet Union, some restoration of their traditional links with the West and some growth in internal liberalisation of the régimes which will make them less intolerable for the populations.

The possibilities open to individual NATO countries, vis-à-vis individual Warsaw Pact countries are too varied, of course, to permit of a single, tightly co-ordinated NATO policy towards the satellites. However, I believe we are generally in agreement in our assessments of developments in Eastern Europe and, provided we keep each other informed as to what we are doing, I am convinced that any individual initiatives we take to help these countries to have more normal contacts with the West are in the interests of all of us and in the interests of world peace.

Credit Policies

Certainly, Canadian policy generally, while it is to limit credit guarantees to Communist countries within the terms of the Berne Convention, nevertheless looks upon commercial contact with these countries as productive not only in economic, but in wide political terms. I need not say, of course, that Canada continues to observe the five-

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year limit rule. We have not extended credit over the three-year period, nor have we extended government-to-government credit at all, in recent years, to Communist countries. My Government intends to permit the development of trade in non-strategic goods with the Communist world, but we agree that credits and other techniques such as quota and barter arrangements sometimes used to influence the direction of Communist purchases in the West, should be kept under review by NATO.

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CONSEIL DE L'ATLANTIQUE NORD
NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL

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3rd June, 1964

NATO SECRET
SUMMARY RECORD
C-R(64)23

Summary record of a meeting of the Council held in
the Princess Juliana Building, The Hague, on Tuesday
12th May, 1964 at 3.30 p.m.

PRESENT

President: The Hon. Dean Rusk.
Chairman and Secretary General: Mr. D.U. Stikker.

BELGIUM

H.E. Mr. P. H. Spaak : Vice-President of the Council,
Minister for Foreign Affairs.
H.E. Mr. A. de Staercke : Permanent Representative.

CANADA

The Hon. Paul Martin : Secretary of State for External
Affairs.
H.E. Mr. G. Ignatieff : Permanent Representative.

DENMARK

H.E. Mr. Per Haekkerup : Minister for Foreign Affairs
H.E. Dr. E. Schram-Nielsen : Permanent Representative.

FRANCE

H.E. Mr. M. Couve de Murville : Minister for Foreign Affairs.
H.E. Mr. François Seydoux : Permanent Representative.

GERMANY

H.E. Dr. Gerhard Schröder : Federal Minister for Foreign
Affairs.
H.E. Mr. Wilhelm Grewe : Permanent Representative.

GREECE

H.E. Mr. Stavros Costopoulos : Minister for Foreign Affairs.
H.E. Mr. Christian X Palamas : Permanent Representative.

ICELAND

H.E. Mr. Henrik Sv. Björnsson : Ambassador to the Netherlands.
H.E. Mr. Petur Thorsteinsson : Permanent Representative.

NATO SECRET

ITALY

H.E. Mr. Giuseppe Saragat : Minister for Foreign Affairs.
H.E. Mr. Adolfo Alessandrini : Permanent Representative.

LUXEMBOURG

H.E. Mr. E. Schaus : Vice-President of the Government,
Minister for Foreign Affairs and
for the Armed Force.
H.E. Mr. Paul Reuter : Permanent Representative.

NETHERLANDS

H.E. Mr. J.M.A.H. Duns : Minister for Foreign Affairs.
H.E. Dr. H.N. Boon : Permanent Representative.

NORWAY

H.E. Mr. Halvard Lange : Minister for Foreign Affairs.
H.E. Mr. Georg Kristiansen : Permanent Representative.

PORTUGAL

H.E. Mr. A. Franco Nogueira : Minister for Foreign Affairs.
H.E. Mr. V. da Cunha : Permanent Representative.

TURKEY

H.E. Mr. Feridan Cemal Erkin : Minister for Foreign Affairs.
H.E. Mr. Nuri Birgi : Permanent Representative.

UNITED KINGDOM

The Rt.Hon. R.A. Butler : Secretary of State for Foreign
Affairs.
H.E. Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh : Permanent Representative.

UNITED STATES

The Hon. Dean Rusk : Secretary of State,
(President of the Council)
The Hon. Thomas K. Finletter : Permanent Representative.

INTERNATIONAL STAFF

Mr. G. Colonna : Deputy Secretary General.
Mr. F.D. Gregh : Deputy Secretary General -
Assistant Secretary General
for Economics and Finance.
Mr. R.W.J. Hooper : Assistant Secretary General
for Political Affairs.
The Lord Coleridge : Executive Secretary.

ALSO PRESENT

Maj.Gen. H.A. Twitchell : Standing Group Representative.

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I. REVIEW OF THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION (Contd)

1. Mr. MARTIN (Canada) agreed with Mr. Rusk and Mr. Butler that the Soviet policy of preserving a limited détente had remained unchanged during the last six months and might continue. On the other hand, the USSR had not taken any move on the central problems, such as Berlin, a European settlement and disarmament. It would, therefore, be unwise to permit a weakening of the military strength of the Alliance. Instead, he was firmly in agreement with Mr. Butler on the continuing need for the Alliance.
2. Commenting on the frustrating lack of further East-West agreements since the signature of the partial Test Ban Treaty in August 1963, he expressed the opinion that the Alliance should neither remain inactive nor undertake initiatives simply for initiatives' sake, which might lead to ill-advised concessions. The Western nations should make clear that they were constantly ready to enter into serious negotiations in the search for solutions which did not compromise vital interests by giving advantage to one side over the other.
3. Canada would look favourably upon serious moves to this end, and would consider it useful if proposals were put forward by those most directly concerned, especially with respect to the problems of Berlin and the reunification of Germany. It would be helpful at the present time to have an interim report on the progress of the Four Power Working Group in Washington which would give those members who had not been participating an opportunity to examine any proposals which might be under consideration.
4. He urged the Western nations to take advantage of present Soviet policy by seeking agreements on secondary issues and improving their bilateral contacts with the members of the Eastern bloc. It was generally acknowledged that great changes were taking place in Eastern Europe and that the détente and the Sino-Soviet dispute were tending to increase the diversity of views and interests of the Eastern European countries and to loosen their ties with the Soviet Union. Contacts and trade which might encourage these trends and further in any way the liberalisation of the régimes in Eastern Europe would surely be of advantage to NATO.
5. In the past, there had been a tendency to stress the negative aspects of East-West trade even though the policies of the NATO Governments towards trade in non-strategic goods remained basically unrestrictive. The communist countries should certainly not receive preferential treatment. Canada had no desire for a credit race either with the Western countries, the developing nations or the communist bloc. However, changes

in trade relations with both communist and non-communist trade partners would inevitably require adjustments as dictated by changing national economic circumstances. No beneficial political and economic effects could accrue to the West if a rigid position were adopted on trade relations only with the communists.

6. The apparent readiness of Poland and Yugoslavia to take a serious part in the forthcoming tariff negotiations in GATT were indicative of some new favourable elements which were now emerging. The West, by assisting them to any extent practicable, could create a more favourable atmosphere within which to develop trade in non-strategic goods with the communist countries.

7. Canada had recently extended significantly her trade relations with the communist countries and proposed to develop this trade as being of benefit both to herself and to the Free World.

8. Turning to the Geneva talks, he expressed agreement with Mr. Rusk that consultation within the Alliance on the negotiations at Geneva had improved of late. The recent discussions in the NATO Council and the Committee of Political Advisers had been encouraging and had provided to those Western countries not represented at Geneva a clearer appreciation of the progress of negotiations there. This close liaison must continue in order to discourage cynicism with regard to the apparent lack of progress on disarmament measures. Some advances had been made in the field of arms control although it had been difficult, in spite of the Moscow Treaty of August 1963, to avoid a feeling of frustration in view of the repetitive and routine nature of the daily meetings.

9. Although the negotiation of agreements on controlled disarmament remained the long-term objective, it was clear that this could not be achieved without the participation of China and that both at Geneva and within the Alliance, a different attitude towards arms control measures could contribute to Western security and to the reduction of tension. The United States-Soviet-British Agreement on limiting the production of fissionable material for weapons was a useful step and it was in the interest of the West to keep the initiative which it had gained largely as a result of President Johnson's proposals for arms limitations agreements.

10. The crisis in Cyprus was of critical concern to the Alliance as hostilities in the Eastern Mediterranean involving two of the allies could destroy the South-Eastern flank of NATO. Canada had felt an obligation to take part in the United Nations peace-keeping operation, both in the name of

Alliance solidarity and because Cyprus was a member of the Commonwealth which he agreed still had an important rôle to play in international affairs. For this reason, Canada had urged Australia and New Zealand to provide detachments for the peace-keeping force which would also have extended the multinational character of the United Nations units in Cyprus.

11. In company with other countries, Canada had been ready to provide peace-keeping contingents under the auspices of NATO even though some link with the United Nations would have been desired. Canada's recognition from the first of her obligations explained her lively interest in current developments in Cyprus, the changing posture of the two member nations concerned, and the progress of the United Nations mediator and police contingents in carrying out their difficult responsibilities.

12. Although primary responsibility remained with the two Cypriot communities, all possible pressure must now be brought to bear to urge them to reach a peaceful settlement. Such influence could best be exerted by the two members of the Alliance which had a special relationship to and responsibility for the two Cypriot communities. Although the island was outside the Treaty area, the Canadian Government and Parliament felt strongly that the Alliance had a collective responsibility in respect of Cyprus. A serious conflict of views between two members of the Alliance now existed, the continuation of which would undoubtedly result in serious compromise to the security of the South-East flank of NATO, and he strongly believed that Ministers at this meeting should take some effective action to improve relations between the two allies and to re-establish an atmosphere of mutual accommodation and understanding which should normally characterise relations between allies. He hoped that the communiqué of the meeting would record a clear undertaking by Greece and Turkey not to allow their differences over this problem to jeopardise the solidarity of the Alliance.

13. Specific provision for this kind of situation within the Treaty itself and the procedures suggested in the Committee of Three Report provided the means with which the NATO Organization might help to resolve the difficulties of the two Allies. He urged the two countries concerned, with the help of the other member nations, to take advantage of these provisions, both in their own national interests and to the preservation of the unity of the Atlantic Alliance.

14. Expanding further on the Canadian view of the rôle of the Alliance in the settlement of the Cyprus problem, he reaffirmed that his country believed strongly in the United Nations peace-keeping operation and was prepared to meet the financial cost of her contribution. He stressed that the United Nations mediator had full authority to propose a solution to a problem which was now juridically the full concern of the United Nations alone. He had sought to urge

upon Greece and Turkey the need to find a solution to their differences, using if necessary the framework of the Alliance to help them to do so and to stabilise the situation in Cyprus, thus enabling the United Nations mediator and peace-keeping forces to go about their difficult tasks.

15. The Cyprus situation had focused attention once again on the broader question of international peace-keeping. Since the very success of NATO in Europe had resulted in the re-direction of the communist threat to other parts of the world, it could reasonably be expected that occasions would arise where neither the Alliance nor national forces would be adequate to keep the peace and where United Nations peace-keeping operations would be in the interests of the member countries. Although he did not consider a United Nations force to be the automatic answer to all critical situations, it should be recognised that it could be a valid method of meeting the threat of communist encroachment.

16. Organizational difficulties encountered in the creation of the international force in Cyprus had again demonstrated the need for advanced planning, organization and training by national military establishments if United Nations action were to be prompt and effective. Significantly, those countries which had responded were those having prior experience of United Nations peace-keeping operations. The value of standby contingents, preferably comprised of units of regular national armed forces earmarked for United Nations service, had clearly been illustrated.

17. In addition to the detailed practical proposals which Canada had advanced in the United Nations, he felt that an informal pooling of experience on the military problems which had been encountered in past and present operations would be of great value. Canada had invited those nations which had earmarked forces for United Nations service to attend a preparatory conference to be held shortly in Canada. If successful, this might be followed by a further conference to which all nations which had participated in United Nations peace-keeping operations might be invited.

18. Turning to the situation in the Far East, he noted that recent Chinese statements and actions had emphasised the expansionist aims of Peking and he expressed interest in the experience of the French Government since the reopening of diplomatic relations between France and Communist China. The problem of Western relations with Communist China, of major importance to the Alliance could not be ignored since it seemed inevitable that the latter would eventually again become prominent on the international scene.

19. The coming session of the United Nations General Assembly could be a difficult one, especially in the light of the important changes which had taken place in the tactical situation at the United Nations and which might make a showdown on Communist Chinese representation unavoidable. Some departure from the present static position might be essential if any chance were to be retained of making adequate provision for the future of Formosa.

20. Views did not coincide on the best way to meet the acknowledged danger to world peace represented by a Communist China at present undergoing a nationalistic and expansionistic period of development. Although each country must determine, in its own national interest, the nature of its relations with Communist China, he believed strongly in the value of consultation to determine how best to protect and achieve Western aims in the light of the problem of Chinese representation in the United Nations.

21. Concerning the situation in South-East Asia, he said that Canada accepted the principle of neutrality as the best solution in Laos and Cambodia. Since Canada was not in favour of partition in Laos, she had been gratified by the rapid and unequivocal expressions of support given by the Western powers to the neutralist leader, Souvanna Phouma, during the recent coup d'état.

22. In Cambodia, every effort must be made to keep Sihanouk from committing himself even more openly to China, particularly because of the effect that such a development would have on the war in Vietnam. Canada would favour another Geneva conference on Cambodia on condition that bilateral agreements confirming the present borders, as requested by Sihanouk, were first reached with Thailand and South Vietnam. The risk of a total communist takeover in Vietnam, with its accompanying threat to the stability of Thailand and Malaysia and the neutrality of Laos and Cambodia, would evidently be aggravated by talk of neutralisation of Vietnam as long as the North remained determined to take over the South. A useful contribution to stability in South-East Asia would be made by any proposal which made possible the creation of neutralised status without such negative consequences.

23. Dr. SCHRODER (Germany) reviewed developments in the international situation since the discussions held at the meeting of Ministers in December 1963, to determine whether the analyses and conclusions made at that time required reappraisal.

24. It had been stated in the communiqué of 17th December, 1963 that the unity and military strength of the Alliance had substantially contributed to the fact that there had been no major crises since the confrontation over Cuba, and emphasis was laid on the necessity not only to seek agreement on limited measures to reduce tension, but to aim at a genuine

and fundamental improvement in East-West relations. The hope had been expressed that Soviet policy would not impede progress in these matters, nor prevent solutions being found to those problems which constituted true causes of tension in the world, particularly the Berlin and German problem.

25. While potential sources of crises in Cyprus, Vietnam, Malaysia, Laos, Cuba, Africa and Latin America continued to exist and should not be underestimated, the statement that no major crises had arisen since the Cuban affair still applied today. Whether the international atmosphere assessed in December 1963 with some optimism still prevailed was less certain.

26. The question whether the Western Powers were being successful in their efforts to achieve further improvement in East-West relations could hardly be answered with a clear "yes". There had recently been a new element of agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States, welcomed by the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, to reduce the production of fissionable material. On the other hand, President Johnson's proposals of the 21st January, 1964 with regard to the freezing of large categories of nuclear weapon carriers, and the other points of the same proposal, had met with no, or at best a negative, reply. The suggestions made at Geneva by Mr. Butler in February 1964 and by Mr. Martin in March 1964 had also been given a cool reception, while the British proposal made on 26th March, 1964 at Geneva for the setting-up of ground observation posts had been categorically rejected. It was obvious that the Soviet Government was not prepared to uphold the basic principle of all disarmament policy agreed upon in December 1961, i.e. that it should not unilaterally alter the balance of forces to the disadvantage of the other side. Finally, it should be noted that General Lemnitzer had stated before the United States House Foreign Affairs Committee, on 27th April, 1964, that "this threat becomes more formidable each year as the Soviets develop more mobile and modernised forces".

27. Any suggestion that the East, too, had made proposals for the relaxation of tension which had not been accepted by the West could be refuted on the grounds that these proposals all too obviously bore the stamp of propaganda, e.g. Mr. Khrushchev's New Year Message proposing the general renunciation of force, and Mr. Gomulka's suggestion regarding the freezing of nuclear weapons in those countries which would simultaneously constitute the zone envisaged in the Rapacki plan.

28. Shortly before Christmas, Mr. Ulbricht's offer to grant passes to West Berlin citizens to enter the Eastern Section of Berlin had been accepted by the Federal Republic of Germany, and as a result, between three and four million people from East and West had been able to meet in East Berlin. This had once again demonstrated the will of the German people to live

as one nation; but the East German Authorities wished to exploit the situation to acquire recognition of their thesis of Berlin being an independent political entity and to upgrade their own status as well as to seize the opportunity to establish agencies in West Berlin.

29. The Federal German Authorities believe that the concessions made in respect of the Christmas Holiday arrangement were compensated by the political success which resulted from it, but any repetition of such concessions would weaken the argument (which was one of the main foundations of the status and freedom of Berlin) that the city is represented in international affairs by the Federal Republic of Germany alone.

30. Critical situations in the last five months had been skillfully exploited by the Soviet Union, e.g. in Cyprus the dispute between the Greek and Turkish communities had been fanned and a solution rendered more difficult, while in Zanzibar, Soviet activities in connection with the revolution had been restricted only by competition from Chinese communists and the struggle for national independence pursued by African political leaders.

31. Doubts about Soviet policy regarding relaxation of tension between East and West were also evoked by the efforts made to separate the Federal Republic of Germany from its allies and to defame it as a stronghold of revanchism and militarism. Blatant propaganda attacks against the Federal Republic of Germany, such as the statement published by the Soviet News Agency, TASS, on 7th March, 1964, had been met objectively and with self-determination, since it had been noted that in non-public contacts the Soviet Union used a more moderate tone and pretended genuine interest in improving German-Soviet relations. It was obvious that the pressure of propaganda and the engaging language behind the scenes were two sides of the same endeavour to turn world opinion against the Federal Republic of Germany and to cut her off from her allies. The same endeavour prompted the unfounded formal protest in February 1964 over the alleged production of missiles by a German firm and the arbitrary expulsion from Moscow in March of a member of the German Embassy. This picture confirmed that the Soviet Union, from the outset, excluded Germany from their policy of relaxation as did their repeatedly proclaimed aim to conclude a peace treaty between the two German States and to transform West Berlin into a "free city".

32. The propaganda attacks by the Soviet Union, their unacceptable demands and the untenable conditions imposed by them along the wall in Berlin and the zonal border impaired the readiness of the Federal German Authorities to participate in the policy of détente to which they earnestly desired to contribute.

33. The policy of improvement and institutionalisation of Federal German contacts with the communist states of Eastern Europe, reported on at the December meeting, had been consistently pursued. So far, good results had been obtained and the policy would be continued. Although the Soviet Union had, on account of the inclusion of Berlin, refused to renew existing commercial and cultural agreements, there had been some success in negotiations with other Eastern European states in enforcing Federal German views on the position of Berlin. It was felt that such measures contributed towards a policy of relaxation worthy of the name, and to which the Federal Republic could subscribe, although it was one which required from the East a certain flexibility and readiness to reach an understanding which would include, not isolate, Germany.

34. There appeared to be a large measure of agreement on the general principles of such a realistic policy of detente, e.g. Mr. Martin, Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs, had made the following statement at the December meeting in connection with ground observation posts, which could also be taken as a general guiding line:

"It was thus generally recognised that an agreement on ground observation posts should not:

- enhance the status of the DDR;
- serve to perpetuate the division of Germany;
- discriminate against any particular country or establish a zone of special interest in Central Europe which might lead to arrangements envisaged by the Rapacki plan;
- weaken Western defences by causing the evacuation of the most modern heavy armaments from the areas subject to inspection by Soviet observation posts;
- increase the Soviet capability in the fields of espionage, propaganda and subversion against the West."

35. Two papers on the problem of ground observation posts prepared by the Secretary General (PO/63/38 and PO/64/88) and which largely reflected the same opinions, contained in a phrase of great importance, i.e. that there was agreement within the Alliance that the Soviet Union, in order effectively to foster a climate of confidence, would have to accept the principle that such a measure could not be divorced from concrete progress in the solving of political problems existing between the East and West. The Soviet Union should not be permitted to avoid genuine disarmament measures by diverting attention to all possible collateral measures, particularly when measures were involved, the nature of which did not allow them to be treated separately, but which could only be dealt with in connection

with the solution of substantial political problems. Since a number of relaxation measures were purposeful only in connection with simultaneous progress towards a solution of the German problem, the principle that every one of these should first be examined to see whether it contributed to a solution of basic political or disarmament questions, was of immense importance.

36. The Federal Republic of Germany believed that a policy of relaxation in that sense should be pursued and efforts towards a controlled and balanced disarmament intensified at Geneva or by any other suitable means.

37. Initiative and activity should be shown by the West in the German problem in order to correct the idea, systematically being propagated by the Soviet Union throughout the world, that Germany's allies did not really desire the reunification of Germany and were content with the status quo of the divided Germany. The DASS statement of 7th March and Mr. Khrushchev's remark of 15th April in Moscow made this very point. The effect of such statements on the German people and on the Soviet Government, if left unchallenged, could easily be imagined, and continued silence might be interpreted as consent.

38. Exactly five years had passed since the West had jointly put to the Soviet Union a single comprehensive plan for the unification of Germany - namely the Western peace plan submitted on 14th May, 1959 at the Conference of Foreign Ministers in Geneva. The Federal Government therefore felt that the time had come to make it clear that Soviet hopes for the sanction of the status quo in Germany, and for the further isolation of West Berlin from the Federal Republic, were futile. It should be stressed that the West adhered to the concept of one Germany and that until such a situation was realised, it would not permit the status of West Berlin to deteriorate.

39. Even although it was known that the Soviet Union would not enter into negotiations on a basis acceptable to the West, the political, moral and legal claim to restore the unity of Germany should be reaffirmed, in order to prevent the forfeiture of those rights by long years of inactivity. The Federal Government could not share the view that interrupting the inactivity in this field in the present period of hope for détente would worsen the international situation, as had been argued repeatedly in the past when there had been periods of tension. Instead, it hoped that deliberations leading to a new initiative in the German problem would be continued and that, with the Three Powers who hold a special responsibility in the matter, joint resolutions would soon be reached.

40. The Minister then made a few remarks which reflected the philosophy of his Government's policy. In the West today, there were voices which demanded a new realistic policy, basing themselves on a new image of the Soviet Union and its leader, on the possibility of and the necessity for accommodation, and on hopes about the "evolution" of communist countries. Nobody was more interested in accommodation and peaceful evolution than the Federal Republic of Germany, but for nobody could it be more disastrous than for Germany, to confuse wishful thinking with reality. The reality was that the communists were still striving after a communist-controlled world. The presence of offensive guided missiles in Cuba, the presence of radioactive fallout in the atmosphere and the presence of guerillas in Vietnam all had been, and still were, facts, and in the hermetic sealing-off of 17 million Germans behind walls, barbed wire, minefields and other fortifications, the West was faced with a fact which could not be overlooked.

41. Events behind the Iron Curtain were less dramatic than those recently witnessed in Cyprus, but the West should not delude itself about the danger of what happened daily along the Iron Curtain in Germany. On 7th April, Mr. Rusk, the American Secretary of State, said in New York: "We should not forget that the division of Germany is a continuing obstacle to permanent peace in Central Europe." To that constant danger, there was but one answer - to establish conditions which were in conformity with the law. The Federal Republic of Germany asked for nothing more, and hoped that the right conclusions would be drawn from Mr. Rusk's statement.

42. Mr. SARAGAT (Italy) began by reporting his Government's views on current international questions and NATO's political and moral responsibilities as a whole. He emphasised that the problems involved in adapting the Alliance to new international circumstances were such that the frankest possible discussion was needed in order to work, step by step, towards an Atlantic partnership. The Italian Government had always attached the utmost importance to political consultation within the Alliance. Such consultation should be developed systematically, in order that the broad guide-lines of Western policy and united strategic principles could be worked out jointly, particularly in the nuclear field. In this context, the Italian Government was considering with interest the new, more flexible strategic concepts which were aimed at meeting more realistically the problems raised by the new nuclear strategy. In the light of the development of these doctrines, he considered the participation of the European countries in the formulation of a common strategy to be particularly necessary at the present time.

43. He recalled that NATO's final aim was to ensure peace and security, well-being and economic and social development for all peoples. For this reason, he considered that talks with Moscow should be encouraged, with a view to achieving a real detente and disarmament. He added that these two aims, which were closely inter-related, were linked, inter alia, to military and political factors and to a balance of conventional forces in Europe.

44. With respect to disarmament, the conclusion of agreements on arms control presupposed, in his view, that the present margin of safety would be maintained; in this case, the coming years might prove extremely fruitful not only for international detente but also because considerable resources could be freed for purposes which were not strictly military and because promising political talks could at last be initiated. It was for this reason that Italy had welcomed the recent statements by the United States President and by the Soviet and United Kingdom leaders announcing an appreciable reduction in the production of fissionable materials for military purposes.

45. Until broader disarmament measures, accompanied of course by the necessary controls, could be taken, he thought that action should continue to be taken in limited sectors in which differences were less acute. He recalled in this connection that the Geneva Conference had progressively concentrated its attention on collateral disarmament measures and that its efforts had been followed by the simultaneous statement by the three nuclear powers which he had mentioned. He expressed satisfaction that, as a result of frequent consultations, the members of the Alliance had been able to follow the initiatives taken by both sides and to present a common front.

46. In the present situation, he hoped, therefore, that the Alliance would continue to seek together sectors in which West and East might find some field of agreement, and he considered the Committee of Eighteen to be the best forum for future negotiations. He thought it would therefore be unwise to jeopardise its cohesion by rash changes, particularly in view of the fact that countries of the Third World were members of it. He also thought that, insofar as this Committee enabled the West to keep the initiative in the field of disarmament, every effort should be made to identify it with the process of achieving a detente. The West must take into account the psychological factor that the countries of the Third World expected of disarmament a solution to the vital problems of their economic development. It would be beneficial to the Alliance to show that it was prepared to negotiate on any reasonable and sound disarmament measure.

47. The communist bloc crisis had provided the Alliance with greater possibilities of political initiative. He considered, in fact, that the dispute between Moscow and Peking constituted one of the decisive factors in the current international situation -- even if it did not result in a complete break. He thought, however, that it would be dangerous to attempt to take advantage of this antagonism for purposes other than those of peace, or to interfere in these internal quarrels. However, because of the political implications of these events, not only should the members of the Alliance continue to exchange information in this respect, but they should also endeavour to formulate some common political guidance, particularly in connection with their relations with the countries of Eastern Europe and with China. He considered that the countries of Eastern Europe who were showing some impatience at Soviet policy and attaching increasing importance to establishing closer cultural and trade ties with the West, constituted a particularly promising field of action; and that a consolidation of the above trends might well lead to the development of polycentric communism similar to the present Yugoslav form of communism.

48. He considered it essential to recognise that the unity of the Western world might be affected by the crisis in the communist world. In view of the changing pattern of nuclear strategy, such a development would constitute a danger as great as the lack of a defensive organization would have been at the time of the Stalin threat.

49. Pointing out that the military resources of the United States, taken alone, could ensure the balance of armed forces between East and West, he stressed that only close co-operation between all the members of NATO would make possible any global political action aimed at providing a permanent solution to current major problems. That was why his Government was opposed to national proliferation of nuclear weapons, which would weaken Atlantic solidarity. It was also with this in mind that the Italian Government was actively participating in the talks on the constitution of a multilateral nuclear force. This initiative could, in his opinion, lead to achieving three vital aims: the strengthening of NATO, cessation of the dissemination of nuclear weapons and the granting to the European countries of greater responsibility in determining the global nuclear strategy of the West. This initiative might even provide a very valuable example of international collaboration, which could have a positive effect on the process of European unification. His Government continued to work unceasingly to achieve a united, democratic and outward-looking Europe, capable of forming one of the two pillars of the Atlantic Community.

50. Lastly, although the danger of a direct military aggression had gradually diminished, the West had further duties and serious historic responsibilities towards the

peoples of the Third World and of the communist countries themselves. In view of the magnitude of these problems, he considered it essential that solutions in the best general interests of humanity be worked out together. He added that the Economic Conference in Geneva had confirmed the magnitude of the problems involved in the development of the countries of the Third World. He thought that, after having given these countries political independence and preventing communist hegemony over the world, the West must now help to co-ordinate the vast financial and technical resources which could eventually be made available through disarmament and were needed for their economic and social progress. He proposed that the Committee of Political Advisers might study this important problem with a view to recommending an overall solution which would enable the future action of the allied governments in this field to be unified. Thus divided, efforts would be prevented and the action, in the eyes of the world, would appear as the result of a common doctrine of the West.

51. He concluded by stressing that this historic responsibility represented more than a free choice; it was a duty which proceeded directly from the great principles of Western civilisation and one which the West could not refuse to assume without abdicating the moral leadership which history had conferred upon it.

52. Mr. LUNS (Netherlands), after recognising that Soviet policy was conditioned by external as well as internal factors, stressed the significant part played by Western firmness and solidarity in moderating Soviet aggressiveness.

53. The West should beware of overestimating the importance of certain internal conditions in the Soviet world, such as the economic setbacks of the Soviet Union and the present trends towards change in Soviet society; it would, however, be well advised to seize the opportunities offered by the far-reaching Sino-Soviet schism, and by the apparent Soviet acceptance of a pragmatic and more moderate foreign policy.

54. The West should, in consequence, maintain and intensify its present contacts with Moscow, in order to explore new areas of mutual interest. While the potentialities of the Geneva Disarmament Conference should not be neglected, recent experience indicated that the most positive results were liable to be achieved by discreet and informal contacts between Eastern and Western statesmen. In this connection, he informed Ministers that, at the invitation of the Soviet Government, he would himself pay an official visit to the Soviet Union during the coming months. Discussions during this visit would be limited to an exchange of views, in the course of which he would stress his country's complete support of the Western Alliance and its firm stand on questions essential to Western freedom and security, in particular the problem of German reunification.

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DRAFT #1 (2nd draft of draft #1)

For Internal S/P
Consideration

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POLICY PLANNING COUNCIL

US POLICY TOWARD EUROPE

October 9, 1964

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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

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parochial national concerns, has tended to revive in Europe, including Germany. Failing further progress toward Western unity, this revival will likely continue. This could:

- (a) increase the risks associated with the present unstable situation in Central Europe;
- (b) pose a continuing obstacle to the collective effort required for Europe to play its full role in other areas;
- (c) affect American public and Congressional attitudes in ways that would cause the US and Europe to drift increasingly apart from each other.

This growth in nationalism will not be averted by rhetoric about our long-term goals. It might be averted by tangible progress toward unity on the only basis that is now possible, i.e., one which includes the US and those European countries that are ready to go forward.

This paper proposes specific actions to this end in the economic, defense, and political fields.

The opportunity to move in this direction is as evident as the need. General de Gaulle's effort to establish his leadership on the Continent has been largely rejected outside France's borders. In Germany and Italy governments exist which are wholeheartedly committed to a collective approach to Atlantic problems; Spaak and Luns are of the same view. In the US a new administration with an emphatic mandate will have a domestic base that has not existed since 1956 for new steps toward Western unity. The Atlantic countries' growing prosperity increases both their stake in collective policies and their ability to pursue such policies.

3. East-West Evolution. There is also need and opportunity for steps which look to constructive evolution in East-West relations.

Forces making for change are beginning to make themselves

felt

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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

US Policy Toward Europe

Part One: Basic Policy

1. Introduction. We are at a turning point in US policy toward Europe which is comparable, in some ways, to the period 1947-1950.

In that period, Europe's economy and security were restored through great ventures which created a framework for European unity and Atlantic partnership: the Marshall Plan, NATO, and the Schuman Plan.

We made clear that the end goal of all this was to strengthen peace not only by enhancing Western unity but also by eventually reuniting Europe within what General Marshall called its historic frontiers.

Dramatic progress has been made since 1950. The forces then set in motion have produced far-reaching results.

Now we face new needs and new opportunities in pursuing both our objectives: unity in the West and evolution in the East.

We cannot meet these needs simply by coasting on past successes--although we inherit the large assets and constructive momentum that these successes generated.

We must strike out with courses of action geared both to the broad principles that have served us well in the past and to the present tactical situation--actions that will, like those begun in 1947-50, create a new framework for further progress in the years ahead.

2. Western Unity. Progress toward European integration and Atlantic partnership has been slowed, partly by General de Gaulle's policies. Nationalism, in the sense of a growing focus on

parochial

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felt in the Communist world.

The policies that the Atlantic nations follow in the period ahead can have a major bearing on the direction that these forces take.

This paper proposes that political, military, and economic steps toward greater unity in the West be paralleled by steps, in these same fields, which will encourage constructive evolution in the East.

4. Inter-Relation. These two goals of our European policy--unity in the West and evolution in the East--are mutually reinforcing. Efforts to achieve these goals interact--most notably in helping to sustain moderate political leadership in Germany.

The survival of this leadership may be the single most important variable in the European equation: Few developments would do as much to set back both Western unity and constructive evolution in East-West relations as the coming to power of nationalist leadership in Germany--even though its policies would be a far cry from the aggressive policies of the past.

If moderate German leadership is to survive, it will need to be able to offer its constituents a viable alternative to the Gaullist policies being urged by Strauss, Guttenberg, et al. This means progress toward both our goals: steps toward Western unity which will permit German aspirations to be subsumed in a larger framework, and policies that the Germans believe offer some hope of eventual peaceful evolutionary change in the Central European status quo.

The general view set forth above is elaborated in Tab A.

Part Two: Specific Program

This paper suggests the following concrete initiatives, to move toward both unity in the West and evolution in the East, in dealing with four broad areas: economic policy, the nuclear

issue,

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issue, NATO forces on the Central Front, and political policy.

I. Economic

A. Steps Toward Western Unity

1. Trade and Agriculture. We should, in the Kennedy Round, seek tariff cuts which would maintain the momentum toward a more open and productive world economy. We should recognize that the problem of surplus agricultural production in the Atlantic nations cannot be resolved at this time - that it must be addressed within a larger framework: the world-wide problem posed by the growing gap between food requirements and availabilities in the less developed areas.

To this end, the Atlantic nations should propose, following the Kennedy Round, an International Conference to consider how the industrial and developing countries could act together to increase agricultural production in the food-deficit countries of the Southern Hemisphere and how food surpluses generated in the Northern Hemisphere can most effectively be used to this end.

2. Monetary Policy. We should increasingly recognize the Committee of Ten as a main forum for common monetary action. We should seek, in that Committee, an understanding that the Atlantic nations will extend medium term (4-5 year) credits to each other, as needed to meet medium term structural imbalances in their international payments. Assurance that such credits will be forthcoming is essential if these countries are to go forward with policies that look to expanded trade and economic activity and to needed aid and defense efforts.

3. Aid. We should work increasingly to multilateralize the Atlantic nations' aid to less developed countries, in order to ensure both that aid is effectively used and that its burden is equitably shared. To this end:

(a) We should seek to strengthen the role of the IBRD and IDA, and to encourage the creation of international

consortia

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consortia to meet specific aid needs.

(b) We should encourage the parliamentary meeting on aid, which is likely to take place in Bonn early next year, to propose that the DAC appoint a Wise Men's Group to examine the requirements for aid over the long term and to assess the current level, coordination, and uses of Western aid in the light of these requirements. If this initial "Wise Men" group makes useful recommendations to the DAC and member governments, it might be transformed into a Permanent Commission of the DAC, reporting periodically to that organization--as the existing DAC Business and Labor Advisory Committees do.

B. East-West Evolution. We should work toward expanding economic relations with the USSR and Eastern Europe by:

(a) bilateral negotiations with Eastern European countries,

(b) encouraging parallel economic contacts between other Atlantic nations and Eastern Europe,

(c) making more active use of specialized multi-lateral Western organizations, insofar as this can be done without detracting from their main purpose: generating increased strength and unity in the West.

We should make clear, in discussing these moves with our allies that their purpose is not East-West "togetherness" for its own sake, but evolution in the Communist world which can eventually increase the chances of German unity.

II. The Nuclear Issue

A. Steps Toward Western Unity. We should set up MLF in a way which will foreshadow evolution toward:

(a) eventual inclusion of additional weapons systems;

(b) an increasing European role in nuclear consultation and possibly in R&D and production;

(c)

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(c) eventual European participation in MLF via collective, rather than national, representation - if the Europeans so desire.

In all of this our object should be to create a sufficiently attractive framework for US-European nuclear cooperation to "defuse" desires to move toward a separate European force, to offer a long-term alternative to national programs, and to strengthen the political basis for European unity and Atlantic partnership.

B. East-West Evolution. To underline its consistency with constructive evolution in East-West relations, MLF should be presented as part of a non-proliferation package that would also include:

(a) non-dissemination and non-acquisition declarations by MLF members;

(b) repeal of 1958 amendment to Atomic Energy Act (which permits expanded bilateral aid to national nuclear forces);

(c) encouragement of any tendency which may develop in the UK to put its Polaris submarines into MLF, and thus phase out its post-V Bomber national program.

III. NATO Strategy in Central Europe

A. Western Unity. We should seek to create on the Central Front a mixed manned mobile Special Force, on the order of 3-4 divisions, which would be trained and equipped primarily to cope with unintended or limited conflict (e.g., Berlin), although it would retain its general war role under present SACEUR plans. Such a force could be constituted largely by integrating some of the US, German, and UK forces which are already deployed to the Central Front; its nuclear capable weapons would be separated out into special support

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units - instead of being integrated into regular units, as at present. It might be conceptually regarded as an outgrowth of the existing ACE Mobile Force; the other members of that Force (Italy, Belgium, Holland, and Canada) might contribute specialized units or personnel.

Such an integrated force would not only have some of the same political advantage as the MLF in creating a common trans-Atlantic defense institution, in which Europe could eventually take part as a collective entity. It would also serve as a concrete practical step toward reorienting NATO's force posture away from the past concentration on all-out attack and toward the major threat we now face on the Central Front: that of unintended conflict arising out of the politically unstable situation in Central Europe. Joint planning regarding such a Force would be a useful way of educating our allies to this need, and could lead to further de facto change in the missions of present US, FRG, and UK forces on the Central Front - without involving sterile debate of NATO "strategic doctrine" within the alliance as a whole.

B. East-West Relations. To this same end, i.e., to create greater military stability on the Central Front, we should consider with our allies the possibility of East-West agreement on safeguards against war by miscalculation in Europe, e.g., a "hot line" and exchange of military missions between NATO and Warsaw Pact headquarters, which would permit both sides to exchange information about their respective dispositions quickly in a crisis - thus avoiding any unnecessary pressures for pre-emptive action.

IV. Political Discussions

A. Steps Toward Western Unity

1. NATO Reorganization. We should favor an eventual NATO reorganization that would set up the posts of NATO Political Minister and NATO Defense Minister and that would create a standing commission of Wise Men to advise the

alliance

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alliances on matters of common concern. It is unlikely that General de Gaulle would buy such an upgrading of NATO's international superstructure; we should not push a sterile confrontation with the French on this issue, but simply lay out the scheme as a long-term goal.

2. Ministerial Meetings. In the period immediately ahead, we should concentrate on more effective use of existing instruments. We should try to get the NATO SYG to propose that the Deputy Foreign Ministers meet four or six times a year, to promote political coordination. At these times, all interested NATO Ministers would get together to review general problems; smaller groups would address specific issues. To prepare for and to follow up on these meetings, lower ranking officials responsible for handling these problems in home governments should get together more frequently.

3. Atlantic Parliamentary Assembly. We should propose creation of an Atlantic Assembly, made up of responsible members of national Atlantic parliaments. The Assembly should have authority to question the NATO and OECD Secretaries General, to receive reports from NATO and OECD, and to make recommendations to these organizations. Without such an Assembly, Ministers of the Atlantic nations are in danger of getting too far in advance of parliamentary troops as they move toward closer cooperation.

B. East-West Evolution

1. Four Power Commission. We should be receptive to the FRG's apparent disposition to favor creation of a Four Power Council to discuss the German question on a continuing basis. The agenda would probably have to be widened to include Central European security, if there were to be any chance of Soviet acceptance. Such a Council's or Commission's discussion of German unity and Central European security would proceed at a pace such as characterized the Austrian State Treaty discussions - year in and year out, without any fixed deadline.

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This would respond, in some degree, to German desires for Western activity in this area; it might also pave the way (as in the Austrian case) for such time as changing Soviet attitudes permitted really useful discussions of German unity.

Under the auspices of this Four Power Council or Commission, the FRG has indicated that it might favor technical committees to promote closer human and cultural contacts between West and East Germany. Such contacts could help to generate pressures for constructive change within the GDR.

2. Consultation. Close consultation with the Germans in support of discussions in such a Council or Commission would be essential. Unless they played a leading role in developing Western positions, the whole scheme would be counterproductive (like the Berlin 1962 discussions). The existing Quadripartite Group should be the forum for such consultation. The difficulties which would be associated with widening this Group's agenda might be mitigated if this were done in support of a specific negotiation.

The proposals described under I-IV, above, are elaborated in Tab B.

Part Three: Execution

1. Beginning. Like the actions that were taken in 1947-50, the programs suggested above will not only meet specific immediate problems; they will also set constructive forces in motion and provide a framework for further progress by these forces.

It will be useful to make this basic purpose clear.

A major administration speech after the election would be useful to this end. Such a speech could set forth the

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general view outlined in Part One, stressing that we are now entering on a new phase in European policy, and underlining the two respects in which a novel approach is intended:

(a) Our desire to move ahead now with concrete practical steps toward Atlantic partnership with those European nations that are ready to proceed, instead of waiting on the whole alliance or on further progress toward European unity.

(b) Our desire to take mutually reinforcing initiatives toward Western unity and East-West evolution, - making clear that the end purpose of both is to reunite Europe within its historic frontiers.

Such a speech could give some specifics (Kennedy Round, MLF) as to our initial targets, but it would not go far into the details of the other proposals outlined in Part Two, since prior allied consultation will be required - and in some cases we may want to leave the initiative to others. But it could be made clear that we do have a specific program in mind for the coming four year period (within which it seems reasonable to expect that most of the initiatives outlined in Part Two could be gotten off the ground).

2. Execution. Our object in all this should be to focus attention on constructive programs, which can be carried out by interested countries, rather than on issues (e.g., NATO strategy and organization) which can only be resolved by unanimity and which are, therefore, unlikely to be resolved.

We should invite French participation in the programs suggested in this paper. We should leave an empty chair for France, if she decides not to join initially - without dramatizing or criticizing French non-participation. Progress in carrying out these programs may make it possible to place Franco-American relations in better perspective. To this end we should, in our dealings with France, avoid either petty irritations or any indication that we would

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consider changes in policy that would undercut our constructive programs, by appearing to sanction President de Gaulle's nationalist approach to the nuclear and other problems, as an example for other countries to follow.

3. Conclusion. To dramatize the new phase in our European policy outlined above, we may want to consider not only an opening speech but also later periodic reports to the American people on the program's execution and high level involvement in that execution - e.g., at the MLF signing.

We should not feel any need to apologize for a certain amount of showmanship in these respects.

Progress in the programs described above will only achieve its political purpose, if it is not only substantial but also evident. Political leaders committed to closer Western unity need to be able to dramatize that progress to their peoples.

The Marshall Plan was a success not only by reason of its economic effect but also because it succeeded for a time in giving to the peoples of Western Europe and the United States a new sense of direction and purpose in their common political and economic life. It should be a major purpose, in executing the measures proposed in this paper, to help the Western countries rediscover that sense of forward movement in building a stronger Western community.

Attached are: A discussion of the underlying rationale. Tab A.
An elaboration of the specific program. Tab B.

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July 8, 1965

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SUBJECT: Ferguson Report

I talked with John Ferguson about his report, making it clear that I was giving him my personal views and not in any way committing you. As a matter of fact, he promised to get copies of his final report to you and the Secretaries of State and Defense by the end of this week, after incorporating some points I had suggested.

I told him his report could be an extremely useful vehicle for taking decisions -- after it had been discussed and broken up into workable components, each with a meaningful time frame for decision making.

On the substantive side, I suggested his "courses of action" needed a context to justify his catalogue of specific recommendations, indicating what we thought we were about in Europe (politically, economically, militarily), and the requirements this imposed, separating the essential from the non-essential.

I felt John's view of the continent was too narrow, focussed too exclusively on the Europe of the 7, with little or no cognizance of Moscow's existence or that of the other parts of Eastern Europe.

I thought the view taken of Paris was a little out of focus. Its power was magnified; its negative role given a disproportionate amount of attention and bile.

Finally, it was my impression that Britain was not adequately dealt with, either in terms of our bilateral relations or the UK's own role in Europe - West or East.

On the more specific points, I was struck by the following:

1. Germany. I fully agreed with John on the need to enhance Germany's political stature and responsibility. I also thought his point well taken that in the absence of reunification, our continued public support of German aspirations was most important. But

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this in turn meant that we had to get off our present kick of insisting we could only do something about the German problem vis-a-vis the Soviets if the Germans took a more realistic and sensible stance. Personally, I tend to agree with the Germans, that in the absence of real reunification possibilities, there is little political point in putting all one's negotiating cards on the table. That just is not the way one handles that kind of a situation and the Germans consequently, and with some justification, either have concluded we are double talking or suspect that we are doing something underhanded. I, for one, see no gain in this kind of a stance -- it buys us nothing from the Soviets; it takes the Soviets off a hook too cheaply; and complicates our life with the Germans. I would therefore hope for a more sensible U.S. posture. And this paper - Ferguson's - could be a useful vehicle for that purpose.

In this same connection, I tried to make the point that it made all kinds of sense to get German movement orchestrated with ours, the British, et al, in Eastern Europe a la Brzezinski. If carried out sensibly, this could make for a healthier situation in Central Europe. While it would not accelerate reunification, it would not hinder it either. Moreover, if handled properly, it could give the Germans another legitimate outlet for their energies and, in a real sense, prepare the groundwork for an ultimate solution to the German question.

2. France. I considered it essential to keep the empty chair available and in evidence and avoid a growing tendency to think in terms of a tripartite directorate of Washington, London and Bonn - an idea that curiously enough is being pushed by those who earlier argued eloquently and forcibly against a Gaullist type of tripartite directorate.

3. Britain. Careful consideration had to be given to its economic and defense problems (in which we were in one way or other deeply involved), as well as to the ways and means for bringing Britain onto the continent, if not via Brussels, then, in the shorter term, via Bonn.

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4. East-West Relations. I did not think we could ignore the significant developments in Eastern Europe. This was a matter of current interest to Western Europe. It was not a "distant" or "remote" factor as the report seemed to suggest. It would be a mistake to leave the field exclusively to the General or any other European or any group of Europeans. Even Monnet was beginning to think about the area, and while the time for a reconstituted Europe was not at hand, it was not too soon to begin to think in "Schumann-Monnet" terms about Eastern Europe -- with an eye toward bringing that part of the world and the USSR closer to the West, and by the same token, avoiding any suspicion we intended to pit the Eastern European Communist states against the Soviets.

5. The Alliance. I told John I also had some questions about his handling of this question. He called for speeded up integration, arguing that everyone except the French wanted it; it required U.S. leadership; without U.S. leadership, it would probably not take place since the Europeans alone could not be expected to take the initiative or face the risks entailed. Frankly, I did not think the argument held together, for if everyone wanted as much integration as John suggested they did, why did the burden have to fall so completely on the U.S.? Where were the others? Moreover, were we really all this certain about how much of an unmixed blessing accelerated integration would be? I, for one, was not sure we had factored this one out, and therefore preferred to see a few ifs, buts and maybes added. For in the end we might find the present situation more desirable than that produced by accelerated integration.

In this connection, I said, Acheson's argument about the concept of partnership made increasing sense to me. For the foreseeable future, our relations with Europe would be a multilateral one. A partnership of two equals was not on the horizon. And while I saw no harm in talking about that ideal state of man, I did not think we ought to delude ourselves about its imminence in planning our next steps.

6. MLF/ANF. I thought much had already been expended on this project and had doubts that it would ever come off, and if it did, that it would produce all the alleged miracles. Were we, the U.S., prepared to yield on the control issue, as our planners seemed to

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- 4 -

persist in suggesting? If not, was the MLF/ANF really a salable commodity? Frankly, I doubted this. More important, the trouble with something like the MLF is that it is too much of a widget, and widgets by definition cannot give alliances the kind of dynamism that everyone allegedly wants for NATO. It was not gimmickry that gave the Alliance its dynamism in the first place. There was a real and demonstrable need and a meaningful enterprise to deal with it. Artificial systems costing lots of money will not take us very far. After the experience of the last five years, we ought to have had enough to get us off this track. Therefore, more interesting and more useful, in my view, was something like the McNamara committee. It had the advantage of being less elaborate, less costly, less intricate and less difficult to negotiate than MLF/ANFs. It also had the additional advantage of providing the basis for building something meaningful. The Secretary of Defense was an interesting guy. He had interesting things to say. Committee participation would be useful and prestigious to other Ministers of Defense. The select committee might zig and zag, but then most political programs which succeeded have zigged and zagged. They have rarely come into bloom in one full swoop. So I would prefer to take my chances on the McNamara approach rather than on warmed over MLF/ANF requiring, as everyone admits, a major U.S. effort, a risk I am not sure the powers-that-be are prepared to take.

On that note, I rested my case.

David Klein

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Document No. 3
Memorandum by Polish Foreign Minister Adam
Rapacki, 21 January 1966

Secret

57/Rap./66 21 January 1966

AN URGENT NOTE
Exclusively to the person concerned

-/ Majchrzak⁵⁵

Addressees:

Comr. Gomułka	Comr. Szyr
Comr. Cyrankiewicz	Comr. Waniołka
Comr. Gierek	Comr. Jagielski
Comr. Jędrzychowski	Comr. Jaroszewicz
Comr. Kliszko	Comr. Jaszczuk
Comr. Loga-Sowiński	Comr. Jaroński
Comr. Ochab	Comr. Starewicz
Comr. Rapacki	Comr. Tejchma
Comr. Spychański	Comr. Wicha
Comr. Strzelecki	Comr. Czesak

In connection with a letter of Comrade Brezhnev to Comrade Gomułka dealing with the provision of a better elasticity and efficiency for the Warsaw Pact organization, I am hereby presenting some remarks and conclusions:

I. The Warsaw Pact organization comprises two sets of questions that require separate treatment:

1) Improvement of operating instruments in the military area, which relates to the proposal of holding a meeting of defense ministers. Improvement in coordination is required particularly in this area, where the chief responsibility rests overwhelmingly upon the Soviet Union.

2) Coordination in the area of political activities of the Pact, which requires a steady consultative effort, an

exchange of views in order to reach common grounds not only on major issues, but often also on current policy matters.

II. We appraise the USSR's initiative positively. It meets the basic need to define and improve the organization of the Warsaw Pact. So far the Warsaw Pact organization has not been precisely defined, its forms of work were volatile and dependent on extemporaneous initiatives, mostly by the USSR. This situation has created loopholes in the coordination of policies and actions of Pact members with regard to the Pact itself, as well as in relations among its members. It also did not ensure the proper system of consultations, which would enable to take into consideration the positions of all member states. This condition was shaped at a time when the Warsaw Pact Treaty was concluded and when its forms of operation were just emerging. It does not meet its current needs.

III. The Soviet initiative to improve the instruments of the Pact's operation is coming at the right time, when a greater need to strengthen the unity of actions of the member states is emerging. In the present circumstances elaboration of a common political line of the Pact, which would take into account positions of all interested parties calls for systematic and frequent consultations and contacts.

IV. The Warsaw Pact Treaty has created a Political Consultative Committee for consultations among member states and for consideration of questions arising from the Pact's operation. According to the Pact's provisions each state is to be represented in the Consultative Committee by a government's member or another especially appointed representative. The Committee may set up such auxiliary bodies as are deemed necessary. In practice, however, that Committee has been transformed into summit meetings, called up sporadically, generally not properly prepared, which adopt spectacular resolutions (declarations, communiqués).

In fact, this is inconsistent with either the consultative tasks of the Committee, or with its originally intended composition (Government members), or with its name (to whom a gathering of top party and government leaders is to be advisory?). In such circumstances meetings of the Political Consultative Committee cannot be held with proper frequency, as meetings of the Party and Government leaders by their very nature are held when there are very important matters to be considered or decided upon (reminder: a resolution of the Committee from January 1956 was calling for meetings of the Committee at least twice a year, not counting extraordinary meetings).

Thus, as the Committee has transformed itself into a Council, there is no body which would ensure the opportunity for systematic and frequent consultations

among member countries, despite the fact that they were suggesting such need.

V. To improve and rationalize the operation of the Pact consistent with the existing needs, it would be proper to specify the decision-making organs, as well as consultative and advisory bodies.

1. This objective could be achieved by setting up a Pact's Council, which would take over functions heretofore exercised by the Political Consultative Committee. The Council would be holding meetings at a summit level; it would decide on key issues, with the rule of unanimity. It would be hearing and approving reports of the Unified Command. It would be meeting whenever needed.

2. The Political Consultative Committee should be restored to its original character provided for in the Pact. It could thus become an elastic forum for consultations of foreign ministers. In some cases, when needed, with the participation of defense ministers. In particular cases the ministers might delegate their deputies. This Committee would become a consultative and advisory body, preparing positions for the governments, or the Council. The Committee should be meeting at least 2-3 times a year. In this way consultations which are now difficult to hold or which are held only as a result of arduous procedures, would obtain an institutional character.

3. A Permanent Secretariat of the Pact should be set up at a proper level and with a proper composition. It is necessary to properly prepare meetings of the Council and the Political Consultative Committee, to ensure regular liaison among member countries during the intersession periods, for providing continuity of coordination and information on matters related to the decisions adopted, or the ones that should be submitted for discussion. The shortcomings resulting from the lack of such body have been felt frequently. To be sure, according to the Resolution adopted by the Political Consultative Committee in 1956 (Prague), a United Secretariat of the Committee, composed of a General Secretary and his deputies, one from each country, has been set up. This Secretariat, according to the Resolution, is functioning only during the meetings of the Political Consultative Committee. In practice, deputy minister of foreign affairs of the USSR served as Secretary General. His activity as a Secretary General was limited to organizational functions and only during the sessions of the Political Consultative Committee. During the inter-session periods neither the Secretary General nor the Secretariat are in practice performing any functions. The fact that up to now the Secretary General was not disconnected from state functions in his own country was in some situations causing even political difficulties (e.g. in case of inviting Albania to the meeting of the Political Consultative Committee in Warsaw in January 1964, Poland took over functions which should have normally belonged to the Secretary General). To satisfy the needs mentioned earlier

in pt. 3, the institution of the Secretary General and the Permanent Secretariat should be organized and set to be able to:

- a) provide a steady organizational link among member countries during the inter-session periods;
- b) perform functions connected with the preparation and servicing of meetings of the Council and the Political Consultative Committee;
- c) provide current information to the member states on the implementation of adopted resolutions and decisions, as well as on matters calling for consideration. Circulate documents relating to the activities of the Pact;
- d) submit to the member governments motions regarding consultations, convening meetings of the Consultative Committee and in exceptional cases also the Council;
- e) submit proposals for consultations on working levels regarding matters of lesser importance (e.g. preparations for U.N. sessions, the Disarmament Conference in Geneva, etc.);
- f) organize an exchange of information among foreign ministries of the member states regarding the assessment of political situation, in the area of analytical and research work carried out by the foreign ministries of member states.

The position of the Secretary General should be situated in such a way that he would be able to stay in touch with member governments at the highest levels (prime ministers, foreign ministers) and obtain the necessary information. He should not be combining this function with any other state function in his own country. He should be nominated by a resolution of the Council for a period of 2-3 years. The headquarters of the Permanent Secretariat should be in Moscow. The Permanent Secretariat should be staffed by representatives from all member states, including the country of the Secretary General. They would be cooperating and fulfilling the role of liaison officers between the Secretariat and member governments (foreign ministries) and the Secretary General. Such representatives could be responsible employees of member countries' embassies. The Permanent Secretariat should also have its own small, but indispensable and qualified staff.

VI. In our opinion the new measures in the area of organizational improvement of the Pact should be made public (published). It would emphasize the political vitality of the of the Warsaw Pact.

On the other hand, similar measures undertaken in the military area should be published at the proper time and in the proper form, so as not to be exploited by NATO states, interested in counteracting the current process of NATO's disintegration, but quite the contrary, they should evoke a desired effect in the given political situation.

/-/ A. RAPACKI

[Source: KC PZPR 2948/48-53, Archiwum Akt Nowych, Warsaw. Translated by Jan Chowaniec.]

Document No. 4
Memorandum by the Polish Ministry of National
Defense, 26 January 1966

Ministry of National Defense

Secret of special significance

Copy No. 3

A NOTE

In connection with a letter by Comrade Brezhnev to Comrade Gomułka regarding the improving and ameliorating the bodies set up by the Warsaw Pact and proposing to call up a conference of defense ministers on the reorganization of the command and general staff, it is known to us that the Soviet side—unwilling to impose its proposals upon the leadership of other countries—does not intend to put forward any preliminary proposals on the organization of the command and general staff of the Unified Armed Forces, but instead expects such proposals from the countries concerned.

From unofficial talks with Soviet comrades it looks that their position can be outlined as follows:

1. There is no intention to either change or amend the Warsaw Pact provisions, but rather to base [any changes] on its art. 5 and 6.
2. The intention is to set up a command and general staff of the Unified Armed Forces with the prerogatives and real possibilities of coordinating defense efforts of member states relating to forces assigned to the Unified Armed Forces in the operational, training, organization and technical area.

It is intended to position more properly than up to now the status of the Supreme Commander and the general staff of the Unified Armed Forces, and to define the place of commanders of troops assigned to these forces. A need is also seen for a different, more independent positioning of defense ministers of member countries vis-à-vis the Supreme Commander of the Unified Armed Forces.

3. It is also expected that a Military Advisory Council is to be established within the Political Consultative Committee—as an advisory body to the Committee.

Such Council would be composed of defense ministers and the Supreme Commander of the Unified Armed Forces, on equal footing. Secretary of the Council would be the chief of staff of the Unified Forces. Chairmanship of the Council meetings will be rotated consecutively among all its members. The Council would be considering general questions of development and readiness of the Unified Armed Forces, preparing

proposals for the Political Committee and recommendations for the national military commands. The issues will be dealt with according to the rule of full equality.

4. The Supreme Commander of the Unified Armed Forces would coordinate operational-training preparedness of the Unified Armed Forces, as well as matters relating to the enhancement of their development and military readiness.

The Supreme Commander and the chief of staff of the Unified Armed Forces would be relieved of their functions in the Soviet Army.

5. Strategic weapons will not be included in the Unified Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact, and operational plans will be developed by the General Staff of the Soviet Army, as well as by general staffs of member countries in the areas of concern to them.

6. It is envisaged that in peacetime the staff of the Unified Armed Forces, employing about 600 people, will be in charge of coordinating preparations of the military to the realization of tasks assigned to them.

However, the position of the general staff of the Unified Armed Forces as a command organ in war time is still a matter too premature to be considered, as there is, among other things, a need to maintain the current procedure of working out strategic and operational plans, the rules for using strategic weapons, as well as to maneuver forces and equipment from one war theater to another.

7. The general staff of the Unified Armed Forces will be composed of the representatives of all armies in proportion to the number of forces assigned to them. It is assumed that Soviet participation in the staff will be percentage-wise smaller than their actual contribution to the Pact.

8. The following are projections of a new percentage share in the command budget of the Unified Armed Forces:

Countries	Percentage share in the budget	
	currently	Proposed
Bulgaria	7 %	9 %
Czechoslovakia	13 %	13.5 %
GDR	6 %	10 %
Poland	13.5 %	16.5 %
Romania	10 %	11 %
Hungary	6 %	9 %
USSR	44.5 %	31 %
	100 %	100 %

9. In the organizational structure of the command and general staff the following positions are envisaged: supreme commander, first deputy, chief of staff, air force commander, two deputies for naval operations (for the Baltic and the Black Seas), deputy chief of air force, an inspector and a quartermaster in the rank of deputies, a

deputy for technical questions and chiefs of military formations: rocket and artillery, engineering and chemical. Also included into the command as deputies to the supreme commander would be commanders of assigned forces of member countries.

Key positions, such as supreme commander, chief of staff, chief of air defense, deputy chief of air force, quartermaster, deputy for technical questions, would be staffed by representatives of the Soviet Army.

In view of this purely tentative recognition, one can state the following:

The Soviet side, initiating the question of improvement of the bodies set up by the Warsaw Pact, has not presented so far any specific and official preliminary materials in this regard.

Therefore, during the forthcoming conference of ministers of national defense it would be useful to obtain in the first place the Soviet position on the following questions:

a) Defining the role and competence of chief command of the Unified Armed Forces for a threat of war and war period;

b) The scope of participation of member countries' political-military leadership in drawing up strategic-operational plans for particular war theaters;

c) The subordination of the supreme commander of the Unified Armed Forces.

It is now difficult to foresee what kind of position will the Soviet side and other interested countries take on the above questions. Nevertheless, the Ministry of National Defense is presenting the following point of view, which, if accepted, might be the basis for our position at the conference of Defense Ministers and for further works on proposals for detailed solutions:

1. It is proposed to set up an Advisory Committee for Defense as a body of the Council, which is the top organ of the party and government leadership.

The Advisory Committee should be composed of ministers of national defense of the Pact members, the supreme commander and the chief of staff of the Unified Armed Forces as its secretary.

The rule of rotation should be introduced in chairing Committee meetings.

In addition, it would also be advisable to set up a Consultative Commission of the Chiefs of Staff, which would deal with operational planning and the resulting tasks for preparing the armed forces.

2. The Supreme Commander of the Unified Armed Forces, his deputies and the chief of staff should be appointed by the Pact's Council, with the Supreme Commander and the chief of staff being relieved of their duties in the armed forces of their country.

The Supreme Commander is to be subordinated to the Council and carries out its decisions. In the intersession periods he personally coordinates with members of the Council basic questions requiring joint decisions, or does this within the Advisory Committee for Defense.

In peace time, the command and chief of staff of the Unified Armed Forces should play the role of a coordinating body, preparing the designated military forces, while in a war time they should take command of those forces on the European War Theater. The Supreme Commander and the staff of the Unified Armed Forces should participate, based on a common defense strategy of Pact members and jointly with their general staffs, in developing plans for the particular strategic directions of the European War Theater. On the basis of such plans the Supreme Commander is coordinating and preparing the staff of the Unified Armed Forces and the designated forces to the execution of tasks faced by them. Thus, he is carrying on proper operational and training activities, as well as coordinating organizational, technical-manufacturing and scientific-research activities.

The internal structure of the command and general staff should correspond to the needs of directing activities in the particular strategic areas. The position of Polish representatives in the chain of command and the general staff of the Unified Armed Forces on the Western front should correspond with the place and tasks of the Polish armed forces scheduled to be deployed in that area.

Organizational structure of the staff of the Unified Armed Forces should ensure realization of the above tasks in peace time and constitute a nucleus of proper organs envisioned for a period of war. A preliminary assumption is that these tasks could be tackled by a staff of approximately 200 professional workers. But, it should be assumed that most of the key positions will be staffed by representatives of the Soviet Army.

Development of the command and the general staff of the Unified Armed Forces for a war period should be carried out through the inclusion of the proper chains from the general staff and other institutions of the Soviet Army, provided for in the operational plan for use in the European War Theater. It is also assumed that the backup and support units for the command and general staff of the Unified Armed Forces should be assigned from the Soviet Army within their peacetime activities and consistent with a plan of their deployment in case of war. The command and the general staff of the Unified Armed Forces should continue to be headquartered in Moscow.

3. There is a need in all Warsaw Pact countries, without exception, for a clear-cut definition of commands being in charge of forces assigned to the Unified Armed Forces, as well to define both the formations and size of those forces.

The strategic assault forces are still to be at the disposal of the Soviet Army. Their use is being planned by the general staff of the Soviet Army. However, commander of the Unified Armed Forces should be inducted in planning their use in favor of forces entrusted to his command. It also seems necessary to define an obligatory scope and method for use of the strategic assault forces for the common defense of the Pact members.

Ministers of national defense and the general staffs of the Warsaw Pact countries are to fully exercise their superior command and leadership role with regard to formations assigned to the Unified Armed Forces. They are to be held responsible for their moral-political condition, their mobilization and fighting readiness, for their operational and tactical preparedness and completeness in terms of numbers, arms and equipment.

4. Together with establishing broader tasks and new organizational structures of the command and general staff of the Unified Armed Forces there is a need to fix the size and percentage share of contributions borne by the USSR and other countries of the Warsaw Pact.

It is suggested that this question should be considered in terms of proportional efforts resulting from a threat that we face the European War Theater.

The population, economic and military potential of the NATO countries in Europe is, in comparison with the potential of the people's democracies, clearly unfavorable to us. Creation of the indispensable superiority for defense and defeat of the enemy—can be ensured by the engagement in this theater of the proper Soviet forces in the dimension of approximately two-thirds of the total Warsaw Pact potential.

The above indicator of indispensable USSR's share corresponds with the real place and potential of that country. It reflects both a probable size of its armed forces provided for the European war theater, as well as its population potential (counted for the European area of the USSR) and its share in the production of basic raw materials and strategic materials. The share of the above factors can roughly be estimated at 65-90 % in relation to the total potential of all other Warsaw Pact countries.

Besides, the relative weight of the USSR is determined by its strategic assault power on behalf of the whole Warsaw Pact.

In view of the above statements it does not seem feasible to accept unofficial suggestions regarding the percentage share of the USSR in the budget of the command of the Unified Armed Forces (merely about 31%).

In the opinion of the Ministry of National Defense the share of member countries in the command of the Unified Armed Forces should:

- correspond percentage-wise to the share of positions held in the command and the general staff the Unified Armed Forces (this indicator with regard to the Soviet Army representatives should be 50 % as a minimum);
- remain basically within the actual percentage share kept in the budget up to now;
- take into consideration national income per capita in the particular countries;
- take into consideration a particular country's effort in the development of its territorial defense and its contribution to securing the redeployment of allied forces and thus bringing a relief to operational forces.

Taking into consideration these premises, Poland's

share should not exceed the present 13.5 %, and we should be trying to obtain from our point of view more justified numbers—e.g. a minimum of 50 % for the Soviet Union, and for the remaining Pact members also about 50 %. With this assumption our share would amount to 1/5 of the share of all people's democracies, which would be about 10 % of the total budget.

However, this proposal may encounter strong opposition, based, among other things, on current membership contributions to the CMEA⁵⁶, which for the USSR amounts to only 32.25 %.

Independently of the ultimate settlement of percentage shares, one should assume that that budget of the Unified Armed Forces should cover exclusively the costs of the staff and accommodation facilities, administrative expenses of the staff, participation of employees in joint exercises and partial defraying of their remuneration, etc. This budget, however, should not be designed to cover expenses related to preparations for military operations, building up inventories, constructing facilities, etc.

5. Besides the above mentioned problems there is also a need is to clarify and then to decide in the forthcoming talks on the following questions:

the rules for party and political activism within the general staff and a possible creation of a political body of the Unified Armed Forces;

the legal status of the staff employees (duration of service, mode of rotation, remuneration, promotion, etc.);

defining the scope of cooperation of the reorganized staff of the Unified Armed Forces with the proper bodies of the CMEA in the area of armaments and military equipment, research and experimental-construction activities.

x x x

According to the present orientation, the conference of the Ministers of National Defense is to be held in the first days of February of this year. The conference is to set up a working body with a task of developing within the next two-three weeks a specific draft of organizational structure of the command and the staff of the Unified Armed Forces.

Submitting for approval the setting up of the above working body, the Ministry of National Defense considers it advisable that the guidelines for our representatives in that body should be the proposals set out in this note.

In case that in the course of further works a situation arises where other proposals will need to be considered, the Ministry of National Defense will submit to the leadership additional motions.

Warsaw, 26 January 1966.

[Source: KC PZPR 2948/27-36, Archiwum Akt Nowych,

Warsaw. Translated by Jan Chowaniec.]

Document No. 5

Informal remarks by Czechoslovak Chief of General Staff, Gen. Otakar Rytíř, at a Confidential Meeting of General Staff Officials, Prague, 13 March 1968

... Finally, there is our foreign policy. It has been said that while staying loyal to our friendship with the Soviet Union and proletarian internationalism we must show greater independence. This also concerns our armed forces, and quite considerably so. I am going to spend some time on this, because it is at the root of the problem that you, too, have touched upon in your presentations.

What is it about, comrades? The thing is, to tell you the truth, we are in a bind today, we have no room, no material means, no people. We've got into a situation when our task, as it has been set, is beyond the means of our state—both human and economic. What's the reason, comrades? The reason is, I think, at the heart of the Warsaw Treaty. We've been talking for ten years and can't agree about creating an organ, a military organ of the Warsaw Treaty, the staff and the military council that is, which would work out the military concept of the Warsaw Treaty as its top priority.

We can't do without a concept. But the concept must not only come out of the General Staff of the Soviet army. Since it is a coalition concept it must come out of the coalition. This means that the members of the Warsaw Treaty must take part. It's a fundamental question, comrades. I'm sorry I can't talk much about it in any great detail, it would lead me too far; it would get me into the area of strategic operational plans, and this I can't do no matter how much I am trying, and believe me I am sincerely trying, to make the complexity of this problem clearer to you.

This is the thing, comrades. If there were an organ we could agree on this matter. Through that organ, we would be able to make our voice heard, so that we would be listened to. Today our voice comes through as our views or opinions but certainly not as pressure. That's because we have no legal grounds for being effective. And so we are getting the assignment for our army in case of war from the joint command, which does not really exist except as some transmission office. I have no doubt, of course, that, as far as the Soviet army is concerned, this assignment is backed by the economic and human potential of the Soviet Union. But it does not reflect our economic and human possibilities. And this applies not only to us but to our neighbors as well.

This is a situation we can't tolerate any longer; we have to act on it. We have called it to the attention of both our leaders and the Soviet leaders, but so far we've had no solution. Just take the following question, comrades. Look, once there used to be a doctrine—maybe for some of you, comrades, this will sound a bit complicated, but allow me

to say it. Under Khrushchev, there used to be a doctrine: if there is a war, seven strikes at Germany, and Germany is liquidated. Eight, not seven, they said; I made a mistake. Count another number of strikes to destroy America. Comrades, it's hard to say it was bad, hard to say. Just look, comrades, maybe I'm wrong, but I would characterize the situation like this: thank God we have nuclear weapons. In my view, thanks to them there has been no World War III. I think—and here, mind you, I am telling you my opinion, and I have told this opinion to our Soviet comrades, too—that this point has also been noticed over there, by our potential enemies. And what have they done? They came up with the theory of limited war.⁵⁷ Because for them the threat of a nuclear strike was a real threat. They were really scared. There was panic. Not only among the public. There was panic in the staffs. And they realized what it meant, they took Khrushchev at his word; maybe what Khrushchev was saying was eighty-nine per cent propaganda, but they took him at his word, and said: Well, if you do this to us, we shall go at you another way—with the theory of limited war. The limited war theory allows for the possibility of conducting war without nuclear weapons. And with this theory, it seems to me, they a little bit, to put it plainly, cheated and misled our Soviet comrades, who took the bait—the limited war theory, that is. Maybe the theory suits the Soviet Union from its point of view. But from the point of view of our republic, it doesn't suit us. Why doesn't it suit us, comrades? Because the limited war theory means—what? Orientation toward classical warfare. And classical warfare means—what? It means saturating the troops with high technology and high manpower. In today's situation, in today's economic situation of the capitalist and the socialist camps, this is something that the capitalist system can afford. Because its economy, like it or not, is superior, has greater possibilities. That's today. Maybe ten years from now it will be different. But today, that's the way it is. This means that we have agreed to—what, comrades? If we have accepted the limited war theory we have agreed to arming our units in competition with the West. Well, comrades, such a competition we can't win. Because their economy is vastly more powerful than ours. Today we say: careful, we must not stay behind. Of course, we can use the slogan: catch up and overtake the West in technology. But if we try to do that, comrades, we would be walking in *lapti* [Russian peasant footwear], or else barefooted.

Because we are not capable of keeping up in this competition. This, comrades, is the most vital question if you take the position of our republic. And we, the general staff and the ministry of defense, we must defend the interests of our army, even if we acknowledge our duties to international friendship under the Warsaw Treaty. But we must defend our interests.

I don't want to scare you, comrades, but we have made calculations, of course, what would happen in a possible conflict in a normal, classical war. This is not

advantageous for us. I myself, comrades, am not for any kind of war, also not for nuclear war—it's clear to me, that would mean destruction of the world, destruction of mankind, even though the threat worked, it really did, under Khrushchev. Now, because of that threat—and this is my opinion but I can prove it—our Soviet comrades are going to push us to speed up the arming and buildup of our units; this was proved last year in the signing of the protocol.⁵⁸ I had sharp clashes with the unified command when they came up with the demand to increase the number of our divisions. It took two days, two days it took, before I managed to convince one army general what is the economic and human potential of our republic. Unfortunately, comrades, I have to say that our political representatives do not pay enough attention to these questions. And yet these are fundamental questions. And this point, that is, more independence in foreign policy, I see, in a way, as being relevant to the Warsaw Treaty politics, not only in relation to the West, to West Germany.

We have to struggle to get a position of equality within the Warsaw Treaty.

[Source: Antonín Benčík, Jaromír Navrátil, and Jan Paulík, ed., *Vojenské otázky československé reformy, 1967-1970: Vojenská varianta řešení čs. krize (1967-1968)* [*Military Problems of the Czechoslovak Reform, 1967-1970: The Military Option in the Solution of the Czechoslovak Crisis*], (Brno: Doplňák, 1996), pp. 78-80. Translated by Vojtech Mastny.]

Document No. 6

Memorandum by Thirty Scholarly Associates of the Military Political Academy and Military Technical Academy for the Czechoslovak Communist Party Central Committee, 4 June 1968

Formulation and Constitution of Czechoslovak State Interests in the Military Area

The draft of the action program of the Czechoslovak People's Army poses with a particular urgency the question of elaborating the state military doctrine of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic. In our opinion, the point of departure ought to be the state interests of Czechoslovakia in the military area which, however, have not yet been formulated and constituted.

The signatories of this memorandum, who are scholarly associates working for the Czechoslovak armed forces, wish to contribute to the scientific examination and formulation of those state interests. In sections 1 and 2, they express their position concerning the present state of our military doctrine and military policy. In sections 3 and 4, they outline the procedure for a theoretical examination of the data aimed at the formulation of doctrinal conclusions. In section 5, they justify the necessity of

using scientific methods to solve these problems.

They are sending this memorandum to provide the basis for an exchange of opinion. They consider a dialogue necessary for the development of scientific research.

Prague, May 1968

1. Political and Military Doctrine

1.1. The political doctrine of a socialist state is primarily influenced by the choice of wider goals within the international community and its relationship with the diverse forces representative of social progress.

The principle of socialist internationalism is organically linked with the national responsibility of a sovereign state. This is normally the more important as well as more difficult the smaller is the physical power of the state. The choice cannot solely depend on "national interest," which cannot be defined in a pure form—neither as an interest of one's own state, nor as an interest of the leading state of a coalition. Decisive is the interest of the societal movement, of which sovereign states are part, specifically the interest of European socialism and its dynamic development. Mere defense of what has been accomplished fosters stagnation and degeneration; wrong choice of an offensive strategy has destructive effect on the progress of the whole societal movement.

1.2. Military policy as an aggregate of actions in military matters implements military interests and needs through a chosen strategy. In regard to national interest, the military doctrine of the state can be described as a comprehensive formulation of its military interests and needs.

The doctrine is a binding theoretical and ideological base for the formulation of military policy and the resulting measures as well as for negotiations with the alliance partners. It amounts to a compromise between the maximum requirements and actual resources, between the dynamics of the evolving military knowledge and the findings of the social sciences, between the development of technology and the requirement of an effective defense system corresponding to the military circumstances at any given time.

1.3. The formulation of the state's military doctrine influences retroactively its political doctrine and strategy. It substantially affects its capability to project itself internationally by nonmilitary means. Giving up one's own military doctrine means giving up responsibility for one's own national and international action. A surrender to spontaneity, this entails depoliticization of military thought, which in turn leads to a paralysis of the army. It is the fundamental source of crisis of the army organism by tearing it out of society. It disrupts the metabolism between the army and the society. It deprives the army of its *raison d'être* for the national community by limiting the interaction between national goals and the goals of the socialist community.

2. The Past, Present, and Future of Czechoslovakia's Military Policy

2.1. The foundations of Czechoslovakia's present defense systems were laid at the beginning of the nineteen-fifties, at which time the responsible political actors of the socialist countries assumed that a military conflict in Europe was imminent. It was a strategy based on the slogan of defense against imperialist aggression, but at the same time assuming the possibility of transition to strategic offensive with the goal of achieving complete Soviet hegemony in Europe. No explicit reassessment of this coalition strategy by taking into account the potential of nuclear missiles has ever taken place.

2.2. The Czechoslovak army, created with great urgency and extraordinary exertion, became a substantial strategic force by the time when Europe's political and military situation had fundamentally changed. Although in 1953 we noted a relaxation of international tension and in 1956 introduced the new strategy of peaceful coexistence, no formulation of Czechoslovakia's own military doctrine or reform of its army took place. Invoking the threat of German aggression, the alliance continued to be tightened up. Increasingly the threat of German aggression has taken on the role of an extraneous factor employed with the intent to strengthen the cohesion of the socialist community. Once the original notions about the applicability of a universal economic and political model had to be revised, military cooperation was supposed to compensate for insufficient economic cooperation and the inadequacy of other relationships among the socialist countries.

2.3. In politics, there is a lack of clarity about the probable trends of development in the progressive movement to which we belong. There is a prevailing tendency to cling to the obsolete notions that have become part of the ideological legacy of the socialist countries. There is a prevailing tendency to try to influence all the segments of the movement, regardless of the sharply growing differences in their respective needs resulting from social and economic development.

In 1956 and 1961²⁹ we proved by our deeds that we were ready to bear any global risks without claiming a share of responsibility for the political decisions and their implementation. By doing so, we proved that we did not understand even the European situation and were guided not by sober analysis but by political and ideological stereotypes. (Hence also the surprise with regard to Hungary in 1956 and the inadequate response in 1961.)

2.4. Our military policy did not rest on an analysis of our own national needs and interests. It did not rest on our own military doctrine. Instead it was a reflection of the former sectarian party leadership, which prevented the party from conducting a realistic policy of harmonizing the interests of different groups with national and international interests for the benefit of socialism. The development of the army was deprived of both rational criteria and an institutionalized opposition. Military policy

was reduced to the search for optimally matching our resources with the demands of the alliance. Devoid of principles, it was bound to create contradictions and crises within the army.

Inevitably the twenty years of deformed development affected the ability, or rather inability, of the cadres to overcome the deformations. Theoretical backwardness in military theory and the formulation of a military doctrine has been a great obstacle to the overcoming of the past errors.

2.5. Czechoslovakia's military policy will continue being built upon the alliance with other Warsaw Treaty partners, above all the U.S.S.R. At the same time, however, it will be a policy based on state sovereignty, and designed to provide our input into developing the alliance's common positions. A modern conception of the Warsaw Treaty can only have one meaning: increased external security of its member states to foster the development of both the socialist states and the states of Western Europe. Our military policy will not shun global risks, but only in the role of a partner rather than of a victim of a development that it cannot influence.

It will essentially be an European security policy, supportive of international détente in Europe, all-European cooperation, and Europe's progressive forces. It will serve as an instrument of a broader, but not self-serving policy. A military policy that needs to construe and exaggerate an enemy threat fosters conservative tendencies in both socialism and capitalism. While in the short run it may seem to "strengthen" socialism, in the long run it weakens it.

2.6. Czechoslovakia's military policy must rest on a scientific analysis of a whole range of possible war situations in Europe, formulate its own sovereign interests and needs accordingly, estimate its military capabilities in particular situations within the framework of the coalition, and act on its own scientifically elaborated strategic doctrine.

3. The Contemporary War-Peace Situation

3.1. The naively pragmatic realist approach considers relations among sovereign states from the point of view of either war or peace. In actuality there is a whole range of situations whose common denominator is the availability of instruments of armed violence but which differ in the manner of their use. As a result of substantive social and political changes and the scientific-technological revolution in military affairs, such a range of situations is considerably more complex and diverse not only in comparison with the situation before World War II but also with the situation in the early fifties.

Yet, at this very time of incipient gigantic transformations of social and political as well as scientific and technological nature, our military policy and doctrine applied the Soviet model as universally valid.

3.2. The above-mentioned range of possible situations may be summarized as follows:

- absolute war (in different variations),
- limited wars (of several types),
- situation between war and peace resulting from the long-term legalization of an originally temporary armistice as a result of which the adversaries are no longer fighting but peace treaties have not been concluded either,
- potential war, i.e. indirect use of instruments of armed violence as means of foreign policy,
- peace among potential adversaries,
- peace among allied sovereign states,
- peace among neutrals,
- absolute peace through general and complete disarmament.

This description is a distillation of specific situations, which are in turn combinations of an indefinite number of possible situations that make sovereign states and military coalitions implement their foreign and military policies.

3.3. The stereotype of class struggle, with its dichotomy of friends and foes, has reduced substantive political distinctions among sovereign states to basic class antagonism, with pernicious consequences for our political strategy and tactics. Yet the Leninist postulate of specific analysis of a concrete situation differentiates according to actual distinctions.

At the very least, the typology should consider:

- actual and potential allies,
- neutrals,
- potential adversaries,
- actual adversaries,
- war enemies.

Czechoslovakia's state interests and needs require giving justice to different situational variants while rejecting illusions and dangerous simplifications.

4. Possible Formulation of Czechoslovakia's Military Interests and Needs Related to the War-Peace Situation in Contemporary Europe

The doctrinal formulation and constitution of Czechoslovak military interests and needs first requires a substantive analysis of particular war-peace situations, especially in Europe. Our own military interests and needs should then be formulated accordingly. This should be the point of departure for practical measures in accordance with the doctrine. Following is a brief outline of how one might proceed in some of the basic situations.

4.1. Absolute war in Europe

Given the accumulation of nuclear missiles by both major military coalitions, the possible outbreak of such a war in Europe is wrought with catastrophic consequences for most of its European participants. At the same time, the permanent lead time in the offensive rather than the defensive deployment of nuclear missiles, as well our unfavorable geographical position, make it impossible to substantially limit the destructiveness of enemy first strikes against our territory to an extent compatible with the preservation of our national and state existence. It must

be said openly that the outbreak and conduct of a global nuclear war in the European theater would be tantamount to the national extinction and demise of state sovereignty especially of the frontline states, including Czechoslovakia. The futility of such a war as a means of settling European disputes, as demonstrated by the development of the so-called Berlin crisis of 1961, of course does not exclude its possibility.

In such a situation, we consider it appropriate to formulate Czechoslovakia's military interests and needs as a matter of primary existential importance:

- preventing the conduct of a nuclear war on our territory is a fundamental existential need of our society;
- Czechoslovakia has a strategic interest in actively contributing to the reduction of the real possibility of absolute war in Europe.

Our fundamental needs and interests in the event of such a war should determine a foreign policy aimed at limiting the possibility of a nuclear attack against Czechoslovakia. The appropriate measures are, for example, the conclusion of a nuclear non-proliferation treaty, the creation of a nuclear-free zone in Central Europe, and supplementary guarantees of the status quo in Europe.

4.2. Limited war in Europe

The analysis of the possible scenarios in Europe obviously starts with the recognition of a growing danger of such a war and its growing strategic and political significance.

In recognizing the futility of limited war as a means of Czechoslovak foreign policy and in emphasizing our interest in eliminating it as a means of settlement of European disputes, we assume the necessity of purposefully waging war against an attack in a fashion conducive to limiting its destructive effects on our territory and population.

The formulation and constitution of Czechoslovakia's particular interests and needs will determine the practical measures to be taken:

- Preparation of Czechoslovakia's armed forces and its entire defense system within the framework of the Warsaw Treaty for the different variants of enemy attack with the goal of repelling it, defeating the adversary, and compelling him to settle peacefully.
- Reduction of the real possibility of war by reciprocal military and political acts of peaceful coexistence aimed at eliminating the use of force as a means of the settlement of disputes.

4.3. Situation between war and peace in Europe

This is the situation resulting from the failure to conclude a peace treaty with Germany and from the great-power status of Berlin inside the territory of the GDR. Herein is the possibility of a sudden deterioration leading to severe military and political crisis. At the present time, such a crisis would have catastrophic consequences for our economy, as had happened during the 1961 Berlin and 1962 Cuban crises. This would substantially worsen our

strained economic situation, with too negative consequences for our development in a progressive direction.

These characteristics determine our approach to the formulation of Czechoslovakia's interests and needs, namely:

- our primary strategic and political need to prevent such a military and political crisis at the present time,
- our interest in reducing the possibility of a transition from the absence of war to a limited war while searching for a solution of the German question as the key question of contemporary Europe.

This further postulates measures to be taken in both military and foreign policy, above all through the Warsaw Pact, with the goal of normalizing relations between Czechoslovakia and the Federal Republic of Germany.

4.4. Potential war in Europe

At issue is the indirect use of the potential for armed violence as an instrument of foreign policy, as implied in the policy of deterrence, practiced especially by the nuclear powers. Czechoslovakia cannot use deterrence against the Western powers. Its deterrence posture is declaratory and politically ineffective if it is not supported by strategic measures against potential adversaries geographically distant from us. At the same time, the use of deterrence against Czechoslovakia by some of its potential adversaries forces us to respond in kind.

These characteristics determine the formulation of Czechoslovakia's needs and interests, namely:

- our temporary need to use the potential for armed violence against the adversary that uses it against us,
- our lack of interest in using it as a matter of equivalent reciprocity, i.e. our interest in its exclusion as an instrument of foreign policy.

In this situation, we aim at the conclusion of legally binding agreements with potential adversaries that would ban the use of the threat of force in mutual relations. This can be realized in the relations between Czechoslovakia and Austria, Czechoslovakia and France, and Czechoslovakia and the Federal Republic of Germany.

4.5. Peace among potential adversaries in Europe

This is the situation obtaining in Europe among potential adversaries who have no mutually exclusive interests and do not apply the policy of deterrence against one another.

Here Czechoslovakia's interests and needs lay in the legal codification of the state of peace with a growing number of potential adversaries.

Our practical goals should be the conclusion with such partners of non-aggression treaties and arms limitation agreements. In this way, we can contribute to the reduction of tensions between potential adversaries, the growth of peace in Europe, and the reciprocal gradual neutralization of instruments of armed violence.

4.6. In other possible peace situations in Europe, as enumerated earlier, military interests and needs represent a share in Czechoslovakia's overall interests and needs. The

closer the peace, of course, the lower the share. Absolute peace entails the abolition of the material and technological base for war, and thus also of the base for the military interests and needs.

In view of Czechoslovakia's current foreign and military policy predicament, our main task is the formulation and constitution of its military interests and needs pertinent to the situations referred to in points 4.2 through 4.5.

If the formulation of Czechoslovak military doctrine is to be more scientific, the main question is that of choosing the right approach and avoiding the wrong ones.

5. Systems Analysis and the Use of Modern Research Methods

5.1. In constituting a Czechoslovak military doctrine, the most dangerous and precarious approach is the one-sided use of simple logic and old-fashioned working habits.

If Czechoslovakia is to be preserved as an entity, giving absolute priority to the possibility of a general war in Europe that involves the massive use of nuclear weapons makes no sense, for this entails a high probability of our country's physical liquidation regardless of how much money and resources are spent on its armed forces and regardless even of the final outcome of the war.

5.2. For each of the variants under 4.2, 4.3, 4.4, and 4.5, systems analysis and other modern methods of research allow us to determine the correlation between, on the one hand, the material, financial, and personnel expenditures on the armed forces (assuming perfect rationality of their development) and, on the other hand, the degree of risk of the state's physical destruction and the loss of its sovereignty, while taking into account the chances of a further advance of socialism, or even the elimination of the threat of war.

At issue is the attainment of pragmatic stability in national defense and army development, corresponding to political needs and related to foreign policy by striving to avert war by increasing the risks for the potential adversary while preserving the sovereign existence of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, thus giving substance to its contribution to the coalition in fulfillment of its internationalist duty.

Managing the development of our armed forces solely on the basis of simple logic, empiricism, and historical analogy, perhaps solely in the interest of the coalition without regard to one's own sovereign interests, is in its final effect inappropriate and contradicts the coalition's interests.

Besides the reconciliation of our own and the coalition's interests in our military doctrine, we consider it necessary to utilize systems analysis and all other available methods of scientific prognosis, including model-building. Thus the preparedness of our armed forces in different variants can be assessed and related to the evolving political needs and economic possibilities. This concerns

not so much tactical, operational, and organizational issues as the confrontation of political and doctrinal problems with the reality.

We regard systems analysis as the new quality that can raise the effectiveness of our armed forces above the current level.

5.3. At the most general level, we can see two possible ways of managing our army's development:

—The first way is proceeding from the recognition of the personnel, technological, and financial limitations imposed by society upon the armed forces toward the evaluation of the risks resulting from the failure to achieve desirable political goals under the different variants of European development described in the preceding section. The decision about the extent of acceptable risk must be made by the supreme political organ of the state.

—The second way is proceeding from the recognition of the acceptable risk as set by the political leadership toward the provision of the necessary personnel, technological, and financial means corresponding to the different variants of European development.

Either of these ways presupposes elaboration of less than optimal models of army development for each of the variants, applying the requirements of national defense regardless of the existing structure of the system. Confrontation of the model with the available resources should then determine the specific measures to be taken in managing the development of the armed forces and their components.

The proposed procedure would not make sense if we were to keep the non-systemic, compartmentalized approach to building our armed forces without being able to prove to the political leadership that the available personnel, financial, and technological means are being used with maximum effectiveness to prepare our armed forces for any of the different variants of European development rather than merely show their apparent preparedness at parades and exercises organized according to a prepared scenario.

5.4. Increasingly strategic thought has been shifting away from seeking the overall destruction of all enemy assets to the disruption of the enemy defense system by destroying its selected elements, thus leading to its collapse. In some cases, such as in the Israeli-Arab war, the theory proved its superiority in practice as well. Its application in developing our army, elaborating our strategy, and designing our operational plans can result not only in substantial military savings but also increased effectiveness of our defense system. In case of a relative (but scientifically arrived at and justified) decrease of those expenditures, it may help limit the consequences of the exponential growth of the prices of the new combat and management technology. Most importantly, it may help impress on the armed forces command and the political leadership the best way of discharging their responsibilities toward both the state and the coalition.

5.5. The proposed procedures and methods toward the constitution of Czechoslovak military doctrine can of course be implemented only through a qualitatively new utilization of our state's scientific potential. We regard science as being critically conducive to working methods that practitioners are inhibited from using because of their particular way of thinking, their time limitations, and for reasons of expediency. We regard science as a counterweight that could block and balance arbitrary tendencies in the conduct of the armed forces command and the political leadership. In this we see the fundamental prerequisite for a qualitatively new Czechoslovak military doctrine and the corresponding management of our armed forces.

[Source: Antonín Benčík, Jaromír Navrátil, and Jan Paulík, ed., *Vojenské otázky československé reformy, 1967-1970: Vojenská varianta řešení čs. krize (1967-1968)* [*Military Problems of the Czechoslovak Reform, 1967-1970: The Military Option in the Solution of the Czechoslovak Crisis*], (Brno: Doplněk, 1996), pp. 137-44. Translated by Vojtech Mastny.]

Dr. Vojtech Mastny is currently a Senior Research Scholar with CWIHP. As NATO's first Manfred Woerner Fellow and a Research Fellow with the Institute for Advanced Studies in Essen (Germany), Dr. Mastny is engaged in a larger research project on the history of the Warsaw Pact.

⁵⁵ Ryszard Majchrzak, at the time Director of Minister Rapacki's Secretariat.

⁵⁶ Council of Mutual Economic Assistance, the Soviet bloc's organization for economic cooperation.

⁵⁷ In the original, the term "local war" is used.

⁵⁸ Three-year agreement on the development of the Czechoslovak armed forces, signed in 1967.

⁵⁹ The Hungarian and Berlin crises.

TELEGRAM

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United States of America

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1. FOLLOWING SUMMARIZES MARCH 22 INR INTELLIGENCE NOTE ON
RESIGNATION OF CZECHOSLOVAK PRESIDENT NOVOTNY.

2. THE MARCH 22 RESIGNATION CLIMAXED WEEKS' LONG PRESSURE
CAMPAIGN BY PARTY MEMBERS, STUDENTS, MASS ORGANIZATIONS, ETC.,
TO REMOVE HIM FROM POWER AND INFLUENCE, ON CHARGES OF MISUSE
OF OFFICE, LACK OF CONFIDENCE ON PART OF POPULATION, AND IMPEDIMENT
TO "DEMOCRATIZATION" OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA. WHILE SOME OF NOVOTNY'S
OPONENTS APPEAR ORIGINALLY TO HAVE BEEN WILLING TO HAVE HIM
RETAIN PRESIDENCY WHEN HE LOST PARTY FIRST SECRETARY POSITION
IN JANUARY, NOVOTNY'S ATTEMPTS TO RALLY WORKERS AGAINST NEW
LEADERSHIP PROGRAMS AND DEFECTION OF MAJOR GENERAL SEJNA
EVIDENTLY FORCED THESE OPONENTS TO ACCELERATE OR FORCE NOVOTNY'S
POLITICAL DEMISE. NOVOTNY'S RESIGNATION AS PRESIDENT ALMOST
CERTAIN TO BE FOLLOWED BY HIS OUSTER AS PARTY PRESIDUM MEMBER
AT PARTY CENTRAL COMMITTEE PLENUM AT END OF MONTH.

3. NOVOTNY'S FALL WILL DIVEST CONSERVATIVES OF LAST-REMAINING
SYMBOL AROUND WHICH TO RALLY AND ONLY LEADER WHO COULD HAVE
BEEN EXPECTED TO ARGUE THEIR CASE IN HIERARCHY. WITH EXPECTED
OUSTER OF MOST REMAINING CONSERVATIVES AND/OR NOVOTNY ASSOCIATES
IN PRESIDUM AND CABINET IMMINENT, VICTORY OF PROGRESSIVES
APPEARS VIRTUALLY COMPLETE.

4. MINISTER OF FORSTRY AND WATER CONSERVATION SMRKOVSKY,
THE MOST FORCEFUL PROPONENT OF "DEMOCRATIZATION" AMONG NEW
LEADERS, AND RETIRED GENERAL SVOBODA TWO LIKELY CANDIDATES
FOR PRESIDENCY. BOTH FELL INTO DISFAVOR DURING STALINIST
ERA; THE ONCE-IMPRISONED SMRKOVSKY WOULD BE LIVING SYMBOL
OF PAST STALINIST REPRESSION-- IN CONTRAST TO NOVOTNY, WHO
CHARGED BY SOME OPONENTS WITH SYMBOLIZING WORST EXCESSES OF
STALINISM IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA. PREMIER LENART ENTRUSTED WITH
EXECUTION OF FUNCTIONS OF PRESIDENT, INCLUDING SUPREME COMMAND
OVER THE ARMED FORCES, UNTIL NEW PRESIDENT ELECTED AND SWORN
IN OFFICE. ELECTION LIKELY TO BE HELD SOON.

EXEMPTIONS
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5. WHILE NEW LEADERSHIP OBVIOUSLY RELIEVED NOVOTNY RESIGNED WITHOUT PRECIPITATING GOVERNMENT CRISIS, SOME LEADERS LIKELY TO VIEW WITH DISFAVOR MEANS USED TO BRING ABOUT RESIGNATION--POPULAR DEMAND AND PRESSURE, SOME OF IT EVEN IN DEFIANCE OF LEADERS' EXHORTATIONS AGAINST "EXCESSIVE DEMANDS" AND NOT ALLOW INTRA-PARTY MATTERS BE RESOLVED IN PUBLIC FORUM. IN VIEW POPULAR PRESSURES, PARTY PRESIDUM HAD VIRTUALLY NO RECOURSE BUT TO "RECOMMEND" NOVOTNY RESIGNATION. POSSIBILITY THAT FUTURE UNPOPULAR LEADERS WILL BE CALLED TO PUBLIC ACCOUNT BY DISSIDENT PARTY MEMBERS, STUDENTS, INTELLECTUALS, ETC., ZR COULD HARDLY BE CONSIDERED SATISFACTORY BY HIERARCY.

6. FOR USNATC: FOREGOING MAY BE DRAWN ON IN MARCH 26 POLAD MEETING. GP-3. RUSK

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NATUS

US NATO DELIVER WILSON AND SONNENFELDT OPENING OF BUSINESS TUESDAY MARCH 26.

FOLLOWING IS SUMMARY OF INR INTELLIGENCE NOTE SENT SECRETARY MARCH 25 ON DRESDEN MEETING OF COMMUNIST LEADERS.

1. MARCH 25 DRESDEN MEETING OF BULGARIAN, CZECHOSLOVAK, EAST GERMAN, HUNGARIAN, POLISH, AND SOVIET LEADERS MARKS FURTHER STEP IN MOSCOW'S EFFORTS TO OBTAIN CONSENSUS FROM A DWINDLING BAND OF SUPPORTERS. WHILE COMMUNIQUE SUGGESTS STEPS MAY SOON BE TAKEN WITHOUT ROMANIA TO ENHANCE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC COOPERATION, SUBSTANTIVE DIFFERENCES ON BASIC ISSUES WILL CONTINUE TO INHIBIT COOPERATION AND POLICY COORDINATION.

2. DRESDEN COMMUNIQUE STATED THAT PARTICIPANTS WILL SOON TAKE STEPS TO CONSOLIDATE WARSAW PACT AND TO IMPROVE ECONOMIC COOPERATION. NO SPECIFICS GIVEN EXCEPT THAT THERE WILL SOON BE SUMMIT ECONOMIC CONF

ERENCE. THIS CONFERENCE WILL PROBABLY DEAL WITH CZECHOSLOVAK REQUESTS FOR ASSISTANCE IN REVIVING ECONOMY AND MAY DISCUSS COOPERATIVE VENTURES OUTSIDE PRESENT CEMA INSTITUTIONS. PRESENCE OF STATE PLANNING ORGANIZATION HEADS SUGGESTS THAT COORDINATION OF PLANS MAY HAVE BEEN DISCUSSED.

3. COMMUNIQUE SOUGHT TO GIVE IMPRESSION THAT PARTICIPANTS HAD AFFIRMED AGREEMENT ON BROAD RANGE OF POLITICAL QUESTIONS WHICH HAD BEEN BLOCKED BY ROMANIA AT SOFIA WARSAW PACT MEETING. UNCLEAR, HOWEVER, WHETHER AGREEMENT WAS REACHED ON BASIC QUESTIONS OF EUROPEAN SECURITY OR APPROACH TO GERMAN QUESTION.

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4. RADIO MOSCOW BROADCAST OF MARCH 24 ON DRESDEN MEETING CITED NEED FOR "MONOLITHIC STATE" OF UNITY AMONG SOCIALIST STATES. COMMUNIQUE SOUGHT TO GIVE IMPRESSION OF SUCH UNITY ON GERMAN ISSUE, BUT ITS WORDING SUGGESTS UNEASY COMPROMISE WHICH DID NOT COMMIT CZECHOSLOVAKS OR OTHERS TO AN INTRANSIGENT ANTI-BONN POLICY.

5. RECENT CZECHOSLOVAK EVENTS ALSO DISCUSSED AT DRESDEN. COMMUNIQUE VOICED CONFIDENCE THAT COMMUNIST PARTY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA WOULD LEAD COUNTRY TO "FURTHER PROGRESS" IN CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIALISM. MAJOR SOVIET AND EE CONCERN OVER EVENTS IN PRAGUE APPEARS TO BE THAT TRANSITION TO NEW LEADERSHIP NOT DILUTE POWER OF CP IN COUNTRY. COMMUNIQUE IMPLICITLY MAKES POINT THAT PARTY, AS IT ATTEMPTS TO BROADEN APPEAL OF REGIME, SHOULD NOT WEAKEN ITS POWER BY DRAWING NON-PARTY MEMBERS INTO POSITIONS OF POLITICAL RESPONSIBILITY.

6. UNCLEAR WHETHER ROMANIANS NOT INVITED OR INVITED IN MANNER CALCULATED TO EVOKE REJECTION. IN EITHER EVENT SOVIETS AND EE'S WANTED TO UNDERLINE DETERMINATION TO ENHANCE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC COOPERATION DESPITE ROMANIA. THIS DOES NOT MEAN BUCHAREST NOW OR SOON TO BE EXCLUDED FROM WARSAW PACT OR CEMA BUT RATHER THAT OTHERS SEEK NEW FORMS OF COOPERATION NOT INVOLVING ROMANIA. PALPABLE ELEMENT OF PRESSURE ON BUCHAREST IN SUCH STEPS, WHICH ALSO CONTAIN ELEMENT OF DANGER TO THOSE APPLYING PRESSURE THAT BUCHAREST WILL SUCCESSFULLY EMULATE YUGOSLAV EFFORTS TO ENHANCE INDEPENDENCE THROUGH EXPANDED ECONOMIC TIES WITH WEST.

7. CONTINUING SOVIET CONCERN OVER CZECH AND EE DEVELOPMENTS MANIFESTED IN ESPECIALLY HEAVYWEIGHTED SOVIET DELEGATION, WHICH IN ADDITION TO PARTY GOVERNMENT CHIEFS AND SECONDARY PERSONNEL, INCLUDED POLITBURO MEMBERS KIRILENKO AND SHELEST. HOWEVER, NO EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT PRESS STORIES FROM PRAGUE AND BELGRADE TO EFFECT SOVIET POLICY IN EE DETERMINED BY "LIBERAL" KOSYGIN GROUP OVER BITTER OPPOSITION IN LEADERSHIP.

8. EE SITUATION NEVERTHELESS CONFRONTS POST-KHRUSHCHEV LEADERSHIP ONE OF POTENTIALLY MOST DIVISIVE ISSUES YET FACED SINCE DEVELOPMENTS THERE--THREAT TO PARTY'S ROLE, INTELLECTUAL DRIVE FOR FREEDOM, CAMPAIGN FOR MORE VIGOROUS ECONOMIC REFORM--CANNOT BUT GIVE IMPETUS TO SIMILAR TRENDS WITHIN SOVIET UNION.
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Control: 560

11 MAY 68 162

Please Note Action Taken Recd:

Date *7/2* Initials *ll*

FROM PRAGUE 2061 10 MAY 68

ACTION DEPT INFO BELGRADE BERLIN BONN BUDAPEST BUCHAREST BRUS
MOSCOW MUNICH USUN PARIS ROME SOFIA WARSAW LONDON

SUBJ: SOVIET-CZECH RELATIONS

1. SOVIET SABRE RATTLING OR ANY OTHER ATTEMPTS TO INTIMIDATE
NEW LEADERSHIP WOULD BE SERIOUS BLUNDER IN TERMS OF ITS EFFECT
ON CZECHOSLOVAK INTERNAL SITUATION AND PERHAPS ALSO IN
INTER-CP RELATIONSHIPS.

2. WHILE MOSCOW, PANKOW, WARSAW AND OTHERS MIGHT THINK
OTHERWISE, WE SEE NO INDICATION HERE THAT SITUATION IS
SLIPPING OUT OF CONTROL IN THE SENSE THAT COMMUNIST PARTY
IS IN DANGER OF LOSING REINS OF POWER ABANDONING LEADING
ROLE OR SEEKING TO DISTANCE ITSELF FROM PRESENT ALLIANCE
SYSTEM. MOST INTERNAL PRESSURE ON DUBCEK COMES NOT FROM
ANTI-COMMUNISTS GROUPING BUT RATHER FROM PARTY

PROGRESSIVES WHO APPEAR TO HAVE WON BATTLE FOR EARLY
EXTRAORDINARY PARTY CONGRESS AIMED AT OUSTER CC CONSERVATIVES
WE DO NOT REGARD THIS AS THREAT TO HIS CONTROL.
IT WOULD EVEN IMPROVE HIS ABILITY TO RESIST DOMESTIC
CONSERVATIVE COUNTER THRUST. FACT REMAINS, HOWEVER, THAT
EVEN WITHOUT GOING FURTHER THAN EMBODIED IN PARTY AND GOVERNMENT
ACTION PROGRAM CZECH LIBERALIZATION CONSTITUTES DANGEROUS
PRECEDENT FOR OTHER MORE ORTHODOX PARTIES.

3. ADDITIONAL FACTOR IN SITUATION IS AROUSED SENSE OF
NATIONAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND PRIDE OVER POST-JANUARY DEVELOPMENTS
WHICH COULD REDOUBT TO DUBCEK'S ADVANTAGE SHOULD POLEMICS
WITH MOSCOW ERUPT IN EARNEST.

4. WE EXPECT CZECHS WILL CONTINUE TO MAKE PROPER NOISES
IN MOSCOW'S DIRECTION WHILE AT THE SAME TIME BUILDING WITH
SOME SUCCESS A CONSTITUENCY OF THEIR OWN (YUGOSLAV, ITALIAN
AND ROMANIAN PARTIES). SEVERE MOSCOW PRESSURE, WE BELIEVE,
WOULD FURTHER WEAKEN WHATEVER UNITY REMAINS IN COMMUNIST
WORLD.

5. IN SHORT, WE SEE LITTLE SHORT OF PHYSICAL INTERVENTION

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WHICH MOSCOW CAN DO TO PLACE THE CZECHS BACK IN THEIR PRE-
JANUARY NICHE. EVEN ECONOMIC PRESSURE PARTICULARLY IF CRUDELY
APPLIED COULD WELL HAVE OPPOSITE RESULT TO THAT
INTENDED SINCE IT MIGHT SERVE TO DRIVE CZECHS WESTWARD.

GP-3

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Recd: 23 MAY 2340

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FROM: PRAGUE 2187, 23MAY68

ACTION: DEPT INFO BERLIN BELGRADE BONN BUDAPEST BUCHAREST LONDON
MOSCOW PARIS SOFIA WARSAW ROME MUNICH NATO

SUBJECT: CZECH-BLOC RELATIONS

1. RUDE PRAVO TODAY REPORTS FRG GOVERNMENT STATEMENT ON PLANS FOR STATIONING WARSAW PACT UNITS COMPRISING TEN TO TWELVE THOUSAND MEN IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA, REFERRING TO DIEHL PRESS CNFERENCE AND BRANDT COMMENTS AT GOVERNMENT MEETING WEDNESDAY. DIEHL REPORTEDLY TOLD CTK REPORTER THAT GERMAN GOVERNMENT IS TAKING RESTRAINED POSITION ON DEVELOPMENTS IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA ALTHOUGH AS NEIGHOR IT HAS LIVELY INTEREST. DEFMIN DZUR TOLD PRESS YESTERDAY "NEVER AND NOWHERE HAVE THERE BEEN TALK ABOUT STATIONING OF SUCH TROOPS. NEITHER SOVIET NOR CZECH SIDE HAS SAID ONE WORD ABOUT IT." GOVERNMENT POKESMAN KOURIL CHARACTERIZED BONN STATEMENT AS INTENDED CONFUSE CZECH PUBLIC AND SAID HE EXPECTED "OUR AUHORITY" TO COMMENT ON IT.

2. SVOBODNE SLOVO COMMENTARY TODAY REFERS TO ABOVE REPORT FROM BONN AND OINTS OUT THAT IN PAST BONN HAS DISSEMINATED ACCURATE INFORMATION ABOUT CZECHOSLOVAKIA EARLER THAN OFFICIAL SOURCES HERE. ARTICLE NOTES DEFMIN DENIAL WHICH "NATURALLY" SHOULD BE BELIEVE, BUT ADDS THERE IS STILL "BUT." ARTICLE THEN ADDUCES ARGUEMENTS WHY FOREIGN TROOPS NOT NECESSARY ZECHOSLOVAKIA "UNLESS SOMEBODY FEELS THAT ANOTHER--THOUGH FRIENDLY--ARMY COULD RETURN FEAR INTO MIDS AND DEALINGS OF OUR PEOPLE, WHICH OUR FRIENDS IN USSR WOULD NOT WANT." ARTICLE CONCLUDED WITH HOP THAT BONN SOURCES NOT CORRECT THIS TIME.

3. GRECHKO-YEPISHEV DELEGATION LEFT FOR HOME YESTERAY. COMMUNIQUE STATES DELEGATIONS EXCHANGED INFORMATION ON THEIR ARMIES, ACTIVITIES, AGREED ON SPECIFIC MEASURES TO STRENGTHEN FRIENDSHIP BETWEEN TWO ARMIES AND COOPERATION IN WARSAW PACT, AND THAT TAKS CONFIRMED

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IDENTITY OF VIEWS ON ALL FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES. ASKED BY PRESS YESTERDAY WHETHER CONCRETE AGREEMENT HAD BEEN REACHED, DZUR SAID THAT SOVIET REPRESENTATIVES HAD AVOIDED ANY QUESTIONS WHICH COULD ARISE IMPRESSION THEY MIGHT WANT INTERFERE IN CZECHOSLOVAK PROBLEMS OR GIVE EXCESSIVE ADVICE.

4. SVOBODNE SLOVO REPORTS SHUB ARTICLE WASHINGTON POST TO EFFECT SOVIET ARMED FORCES HIGH COMMAND EMERGING AS FACTOR FAVORING COOPERATION WITH NEW LIBERAL LEADERSHIP CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND REJECTING DEMANDS FOR INTERVENTION, CITING FRIENDLY TONE IN ARMY PAPER KRASNAYA ZVEZDA.

5. DUBCEK AND CERNIK WENT TO KARLOVY VARY YESTERDAY TO SEE KOSYGIN. ASKED BY CTK REPORTER ABOUT PURPOSE OF VISIT, DUBCEK REPLIED "AS GOOD HOSTS WE ARE COMING FOR VISIT." KOSYGIN APPEARED YESTERDAY IN INFORMAL TELEVISION INTERVIEW TOTALLY DEVOID OF POLITICAL CONTENT; HE APPEARED RELAXED AND MADE COMPLIMENTARY AND PRESUMABLY SOOTHING REMARKS ABOUT CZECHOSLOVAKIA.

6. OTHER ITEMS:

A. PRESIDENT SVOBODA, CONTINUING TOUR OF SLOVAKIA, REITERATED IMPORTANCE OF TIES WITH USSR.

B. RUDE PRAVO TODAY REPORTS TITO INTERVIEW WITH NY TIMES UNDER HEADLINE "DEVELOPMENT IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA OPEN NEW POSSIBILITIES FOR SOV SOCIALISM."

C. RUDE PRAVO BERLIN CORRESPONDENT KRAUS TODAY CRITICIZES CURRENT GDR SATIRICAL WEEKLY EUENSPIEGEL FOR FRONT-PAGE CARTOON SHOWING FRATERNIZATION BETWEEN REICH EAGLE AND DOVE WITH CZECHOSLOVAK FLAG UNDER ITS WING, CALLING IT "BLATANT ATTACK AGAINST FRIENDLY COUNTRY AND ITS FLAG." HE NOTES GDR FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIALS REFER TO "SOVEREIGNTY, INTERNATIONALISM, FRIENDSHIP TREATIES AND WHO KNOWS WHAT ELSE" WHEN THEY DISLIKE VIEWS EXPRESSED IN CZECH PRESS, BUT WHEN "GDR PRES INSULTS OUR COUNTRY THEN EVERYBODY KEEPS MUM."

D. PRESS REPORTS FONMIN HAJOK IN BUDAPEST FOR TALK WITH PETER ON "SOME QUESTIONS CONCERNING RELATIONS BETWEEN TWO COUNTRIES."

E. MODEST COMMENT HUS FAR BY PERIPHERAL PRESS ON DEGAULLE VISIT TO ROMANIA. SVOBODNE SLOVO SAW IT AS MEETING

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OFTWO
COUNTRIES PRACTICING SIGNIFICANTLY INDEPENDENT FOREIGN
POLICY, NOTING THERE ARE ALSO TRENDS IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA
AIMING AT REINFORCING IDEA OF INDEPENDENCE AND EQUALITY
IN MUTUAL RELATIONS; SAME COMMENTARY ON DE GAULLE'S
REALISM AS SHOWN BY STATEMENTS EMPHASIZING IMPORTANCE
GEOGRAPHICAL POSITION AND BONDS OF ALLIANCE.
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Date: May 24, 1968
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ACTION: Secstate WASHDC PRIORITY

INFO : Amcongen MUNICH

Amembassy MOSCOW

PRAGUE 2200

Critical Decisions

SUBJ: Internal Situation Heading for ~~showdown~~

Exemptions

() EXECUTIVE

() LEGAL

() POLICY

() FINANCE

() PERSONNEL

() PUBLIC AFFAIRS

() SECURITY

() TELETYPE

() TELEVISION

() TRAINING

() VISITATION

() WORKING PAPERS

1. Summary. Amidst rumors that Kosygin quietly re-
turned to Prague last night, political forces of varying
stripes seem to be girding for showdown at CC plenum
scheduled convene May 29. Svoboda preaching Czech-Slovak
unity and eternal friendship with Moscow, Smrkovsky
cautioning that struggle for democracy is not over,
Slovak Communists still warning against anti-Socialist
Presidium member
forces and Piller weakly echoing same line. Breakdown of
present coalition is distinct possibility, though not likely.
In any case coalition urgently needs to settle question of
CC composition either with definite decision on extraordinary
Party Congress or resignations of conservative CC members or
both. End Summary.

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Approved Date: 11/1/71

Drafted by: POLEC:MGarrison:ar

Approving Officer: DCM:EWBurgess

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2. CC Presidium in May 21-22 meeting took up following:

A. CC plenum will convene May 29 to discuss political situation, rehabilitation, Sejna case and personnel changes.

B. Presidium members directed to discuss work of National Front with other political parties and social organizations.

C. Relations with foreign Communist parties discussed, with emphasis on bilateral contacts; CSCP will take "active part in clarifying basic questions" of world movement prior to Moscow world conference.

D. Presidium discussed establishment various new organizations, including "sporadic attempts" form new political parties, and particularly condemned attempts by small group to renew activities of Social Democratic party.

E. Presidium praised activity of youth in revitalization process and supported independence of youth movement but urged federation and came out against formation of youth organizations by political parties.

F. Presidium discussed Rude Pravo situation on basis report presented by Svestka and directed paper to express viewpoints

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2200

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reflecting Party policy. (Embassy learned today from Czech journalist source that Svestka's antagonist Jiri Hochman has been fired from Rude Pravo.)

3. Slovak CP CC plenum continued yesterday. Accents still on caution and conservatism, judging from press summaries of speeches, which condemned demagogic attacks on Party's leading role and alliance with USSR and urged that danger from activation of anti-Socialist forces should not be underestimated.

4. Leaders offering variety of viewpoints:

A. President Svoboda returned to Prague yesterday after barnstorming tour of Slovakia aimed at courting Slovaks and reassuring all sides that ties with USSR are unbreakable.

B. Smrkovsky, speaking to Scientific-Technical Society, warned that "everything is not yet decided and great struggle for a democratic, humanistic and socialist republic has not ended yet". At same meeting Cernik said "we understand that our friends are disturbed by anti-socialist phenomena which have doubtless been occurring, especially recently, but we are not dramatizing these phenomena and do not intend misuse them against democratization process".

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C. Presidium member Piller, who is generally regarded as leaning toward conservatives, warned Central Bohemian regional committee (of which he is leading Secretary) against "those who non-democratically speculate on reversion to capitalist system".

5. Press today shows some signs of being inhibited by Cisar warning yesterday (Prague 2191), but Prace nevertheless published demand by Charles University students that Czechoslovakia should restore diplomatic relations with Israel and students' suggestion that public send petitions to this effect to Foreign Ministry. Radio Prague official last night downplayed importance of Cisar warning which he implied did not go much further than similar effort May 13; he added however that if regime did go too far this direction it would lose one of its best allies.

6. Press yesterday reported that leaflets were released by slight explosion downtown Wednesday night ~~appearing~~ appealing in "faulty Czech" to workers to oppose attempts to remove "experienced personnel" from CC and to revert to days of Masaryk and Hacha.

7. Western correspondents have passed on rumor that Kosygin

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returned to Prague last night from Karlony Vary, but we have no confirmation.

8. Comment: May 29 plenum ~~progressive~~ ^{could} be crucial turning point for this regime. If current Soviet pressures succeed in stiffening resistance conservative holdovers in CC and if Slovak Communists, who have been displaying conservative inclinations, were to defect from present progressive-moderate-Slovak coalition, progressives and moderates could well find ~~themselves~~ themselves in minority and thus forced into ~~an~~ extensive programmatic retreat if not turnaround. In any case, failure to move significantly ahead with plans to rejuvenate CC membership or at least to retire bulk of conservative holdovers would seriously hurt progressive wing. Media liberals seem cautiously optimistic and several suggest conservative resignations from CC still good possibility.

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Recd: 31 JUNE 1963

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FM AMEMBASSY PRAGUE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3900
INFO RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 421
STATE GRNC
BT
CONFIDENTIAL PRAGUE 2257

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6/3/63*

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PASS DIA

SUBJ: REPORTED EXPULSION OF SOVIET GENERAL

1. NY TIMES BUREAU CHIEF SZULC TODAY INFORMED EMBASSY HE HAS BEEN GIVEN FOLLOWING STORY BY UNNAMED QGH CZECH AUTHORICP AND HAS BEEN PROMISED DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE WITHIN TWO DAYS TO BACK IT UP:

A. DURING SOVIET MARSHAL GRECHKO'S RECENT VISIT, DEFMIN DZUR REQUESTED GRECHKO QUIETLY TO REMOVE GENERAL A.M. KUSHCHEV WARSAW PACT REPRESENTATIVE IN PRAGUE, FROM CZECHOSLOVAKIA BECAUSE HE HAD INTERFERED IN CZECHOSLOVAK INTERNAL AFFAIRS.

B. DZUR TOLD GRECHKO THAT CZECH GOVERNMENT HAS DOCUMENTS LINKING KUSHCHEV WITH EFFORTS BY GENERAL SEJNA AND GENERAL JANKO TO ORGANIZE MILITARY MOVEMENTS INTENDED TO INFLUENCE DELIBERATIONS OF CENTRAL COMMITTEE IN DECEMBER.

C. DOCUMENTS ESO #92 (7 #CHEV PREVAILED UPON CZECH AUTHORITIES TO GIVE SEJNA PASSPORT.

D. GRECHKO TOOK KUSHCHEV WITH HIM WHEN HE DEPARTED PRAGUE MAY 23.

2. EMBASSY NOTES THAT PRESS REPORTED KUSCHEV WAS AT AIRPORT TO SEE GRECHKO OFF ON MAY 23, BUT HAS NO INDICATION HE HAS BEEN SEEN IN PRAGUE SINCE THEN. EMBASSY JOURNALIST SOURCE ALSO HAS REPORT TO EFFECT THAT SENIOR RESIDENT WARSAW PACT OFFICIAL WAS INVOLVED IN SEJNA PASSPORT ISSUANCE AND HAD BEEN ORDERED RETURN TO SOVIET UNION.

3. IN DISCUSSING MATTER WITH SZULC, EMBASSY POINTED OUT POSSIBILITY HE IS BEING FED STORY FOR ULTERIOR PURPOSES BY PERSONS WHO WOULD BE HAPPY TO GIVE SOVIETS CAUSE FWR FURTHER NEGATIVE REACTION TO DEVELOPMENTS HERZON I.E. BY

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ULTRA-CONSERVATIVES. HE ACKNOWLEDGED THIS IS POSSIBILITY
BUT SEEMED INCLINED TO USE STORY ANYWAY IF PROMISED DOCUMENTS
ARE FORTHCOMING.

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C P 201525Z JUL 68 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY PRAGUE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4249
INFO RUFIRB/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PRIORITY 272
RUFHJA/USMISSION BERLIN 276
RUFIRH/AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST 272
RUFIDA/AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST 291
RUFHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN 345
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 455
RUFHOL/AMCONGEN MUNICH 553
RUFHNA/USMISSION NATO 44
RUFIRG/AMEMBASSY SOFIA 255
RUDKRW/AMEMBASSY WARSAW 377
STATE GRNC
BT

CONFIDENTIAL PRAGUE 2676

SUBJ: CZECHOSLOVAK-SOVIET RELATIONS

1. SPECIALIST ON INTRA-BLOC AFFAIRS AT INSTITUTE INTERNATIONALE POLITICS AND ECONOMICS, WHO HAS REGULARLY SUPPLIED EMBASSY WITH ACCURATE INFORMATION ON MATTERS WITHIN HIS COMPETENCE, TODAY PROVIDED FOLLOWING DETAILS AND OPINION:
- A. AT WARSAW MEETING OF VIE, ULBRICHT PROPOSED IMMEDIATE MILITARY INTERVENTION, BREZHNEV WAS WILLING CONSIDER INTERVENTION BUT KOSYGIN, KADAR AND GOMULKA OPPOSED.
 - B. ALTHOUGH CZECHS DO NOT HAVE FULL INFORMATION ABOUT CPSU CC PLENUM, THEY UNDERSTAND SOME VOICES WERE RAISED AGAINST HARD LINE WITH CZECHOSLOVAKIA.
 - C. OUTCOME OF CZECHOSLOVAK CC PLENUM YESTERDAY WAS SURPRISE TO PROGRESSIVES AND MODERATES, EVEN MORE OF SURPRISE TO SOVIETS. SOME MEMBERS, NOTABLY KOLDER AND FIERLINGER, ATTEMPTED TO SUGGEST THAT FAULT FOR DIFFERENCES WITH SOVIETS LIE ON BOTH SIDES, BUT EVENTUALLY WENT ALONG WITH UNANIMOUS OPINION. SOME TWENTY MEMBERS OF CC WERE ABSENT, HAVING BEEN INVITED TO SOCHI IN USSR.
 - D. BREZHNEV LETTER TO DURCEV ON THURSDAY PROPOSED THAT CZECHOSLOVAK LEADERSHIP COME TO USSR (MOSCOW, KIEV OR LVOV) AND SET FORTH CONDITIONS FOR SUCCESSFUL MEETING GENERALLY ALONG LINES OF RECOMMENDATION IN LETTER FROM WARSAW FIVE, PARTICULARLY BEARING DOWN ON MEET TO CONTROL MEDIA. SPECIFICS NOT MENTIONED, BUT SOURCE SAID CONTROL OF MEDIA WOULD MEAN CHANGING PERSONNEL,

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D.G. PELIKAN, HEAD OF CZECH TV. IN SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSIONS, PRAGUE REJECTED PROPOSED VENUE, SAYING LEADERS CANNOT LEAVE CZECHOSLOVAKIA, AND AGAIN INVITED SOVIET LEADERS HERE. SOVIETS AGAIN REJECTED MEETING HERE AND MATTER IS STILL NOT SETTLED, SOURCE EXPECTS THAT MEETING WILL NOT BE HELD SOON. ASKED IF SOVIETS HAD MADE ANY CONCILIATORY PROPOSALS EITHER IN BREZHNEV LETTER OR OTHERWISE, SOURCE REPLIED IN NEGATIVE. E. FRENCH PROPOSAL FOR WIDER MEETING OF PARTIES IS BEING EXPLORED IN TALKS WITH BOCKET, BUT CZECHS ARE NOT ENTHUSIASTIC. (DURCEK SPEECH YESTERDAY WAS COOL TO PROPOSAL.) F. CZECHOSLOVAK LEADERSHIP PREPARED TO MAKE SOME COMPROMISES TO MAKE IT EASIER FOR SOVIETS TO CHANGE THEIR POSITION. FOR EXAMPLE, EMBARGO ON INDEPENDENT FOREIGN POLICY MOVES FOR TIME BEING, RESTRAINT IN TREATMENT OF SOVIET ROLE IN CONNECTION WITH REOPENING OF CASES OF STALINIST AND NOVOTNY EXCESSES. LEADERSHIP CANNOT ALTER BASIC POLICIES HOWEVER. G. CRITICISM OF WARSAW PACT COMMAND ARRANGEMENTS WILL CEASE. CC SECURITY-DEFENSE CHIEF PROCHLIK WAS SHARPLY CRITICIZED BY PRESIDIUM FOR HIS PUBLIC COMMENTS ON THIS SUBJECT AND HIS TENURE IN PRESENT JOB WILL BE SHORT. H. MILITARY INTERVENTION BY SOVIETS IMPOSSIBLE BECAUSE OF DAMAGE THIS WOULD DO TO SOVIET WORLD POSITION. EARLY GRECHKO RETURN FROM ALGIERS PRESUMABLY CONNECTED WITH HIGH-LEVEL SOVIET DISCUSSIONS ABOUT CZECHOSLOVAKIA; SOVIET MILITARY MUST PARTICIPATE IN THIS AS IN ALL MAJOR POLITICAL DISCUSSIONS AND THEIR PARTICIPATION DOES NOT ITSELF MEAN THAT MILITARY SOLUTION ENVISAGED. SOURCE THOUGHT THAT CZECHOSLOVAK SITUATION COULD HAVE IMPORTANT IMPACT ON SOVIET LEADERSHIP SITUATION.

2. AT ROMANIAN RECEPTION LAST NIGHT:

- A. CZECH OFFICIALS CLANKED UP ON DETAILS OF TALKS THEY ARE HAVING WITH OTHER COMMUNIST LEADERS.
- B. SOVIET AMBASSADOR CONFIRMED TO GROUP OF NON-ALIGNED COMS THAT HE HAD DELIVERED LETTER THURSDAY FROM SOVIET CC SUGGESTING TOP LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE EARLY NEXT WEEK.
- C. WELL-INFORMED CZECH SAID DURCEK IN TOUCH WITH BREZHNEV AT THAT MOMENT RE TIME AND PLACE. ORIGINAL CZECH INVITATION HAD SUGGESTED KRASICE WHEREAS SOVIETS PROPOSED LVOV, MINSK OR UZMGOROD. SOVIETS WANTED TALKS ON HIGHEST GOVERNMENT AND PARTY LEVEL.
- D. FOREIGN OFFICE OFFICIAL DEPRECATED FRENCH COMMUNIST IDEA OF WIDER CONFERENCE OF PARTIES. CZECHS WISH TO AVOID ANY MOVE WHICH COULD BE CONSTRUED AS SPLITTING TACTIC. FOR SAME REASON

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INFORMATION

PAGE THREE
KXCN: 342

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Recd:

HAD DEFERRED VISITS HERE OF TITO AND CEAUSESCU. DESIRED FIRST TO SEEK CONCILIATION WITH SOVIETS ALTHOUGH THIS ACKNOWLEDGED MORE DIFFICULT IN LIGHT OF CONFRONTATION BROUGHT ABOUT BY JULY 19 PRAVDA ARTICLE AND ALLEGATIONS ABOUT CACHE OF AMERICAN ARMS, ETC.

3. COMMENT. LEADERSHIP'S DOMESTIC POSITION HAS CLEARLY IMPROVED SIGNIFICANTLY, LARGELY AS RESULT POPULAR SUPPORT IN REACTION TO SOVIET PRESSURE. POPULAR ATTITUDES SEEM TO BE TINGED FOR FIRST TIME BY GROWTH OF DISTINCT ANTI-SOVIET FEELINGS. RESULTS OF YESTERDAYS PLENUM DEMONSTRATED THAT SOVIETS CANNOT ACHIEVE OBJECTIVES BY WORKING WITH EXISTING INTERNAL POLITICAL FRAMEWORK. SOVIET EFFORTS TO BRING CZECHOSLOVAKIA TO HEEL HAVE VISIBLY FAILED THUS FAR, AND REMAINING POSSIBILITIES FOR IMMEDIATE REVERSAL HAVE NARROWED DOWN TO ECONOMIC BLOCKADE OR MILITARY INTERVENTION IN SUPPORT OF SMALL GROUP OF PUPPETS; BOTH HAVE OBVIOUS DRAWBACKS FROM SOVIET POINT OF VIEW. POLITICAL ALTERNATIVES ARE TO CONTINUE PRESENT UNDERMINING TACTICS OR TO REACH COMPROMISE SOLUTION WITH CZECHS WHICH WOULD BASICALLY LEAVE INTACT CZECH DOMESTIC REFORM POLICIES. LATTER WOULD BE OBVIOUS COMEDOWN FOR SOVIET LEADERSHIP. WE ARE UNABLE COMMENT ON RAMIFICATIONS OF THIS SITUATION FOR SOVIET LEADERSHIP SITUATION, AND VICE VERSA, BUT FROM THIS VANTAGE POINT IT WOULD SEEM THAT NONE OF ABOVE POSSIBILITIES CAN BE RULED OUT FOR TIME BEING. BEAN
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Control: 912
Recd: 23 JULY 68

C P 231125Z JUL 68 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY PRAGUE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4263
INFO RUFIRB/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PRIORITY 215
RUFIRH/AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST 275
RUFIDA/AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST 294
RUFHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN 349
RUFHJA/USMISSION BERLIN 279
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 457
RUFHOL/AMCONGEN MUNICH 556
RUFIRG/AMEMBASSY SOFIA 258
RUEHDT/USUN NEW YORK 57
RUFHNA/USMISSION NATO 47
RUDKRW/AMEMBASSY WARSAW 383
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SUBJ: CZECHOSLOVAK-SOVIET SITUATION

1. ANNOUNCEMENT LAST NIGHT THAT AGREEMENT REACHED ON BILATERAL PRESIDUM-POLITBURO TALKS IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA, TOGETHER WITH ANNOUNCEMENT YESTERDAY THAT LARGE SOVIET MILITARY CONVOY HAD FINALLY EXITED NIGHT OF JULY 22-23, SEEMS TO HAVE TAKEN SOME OF EDGE OFF TENSE SITUATION.

2. POLISH NATIONAL DAY RECEPTION LAST NIGHT ATTENDED BY SMRKOVSKY, CERNIK, SIX, LENART, DZUR AND OTHER TOP BRASS. SMRKOVSKY TOLD WESTERN DIPLOMAT "ONE ROUND OVER BUT WE MUST REMAIN VIGILANT," AND CERNIK SPENT NEARLY HOUR WITH SOVIET AMBASSADOR, MOSTLY LISTENING. HAJEK TOLD DCM THAT SITUATION NOW CLAMER.

3. WE ARE UNCERTAIN AS TO EXTENT PRESSURE ON CZECHS HAS EASED. SOVIET AMBASSADOR LAST NIGHT SAID TIME, PLACE AND ARRANGEMENTS FOR MEETING STILL BEING DISCUSSED. PRESIDUM ANNOUNCEMENT MERELY SAID MEETING WOULD BE AT PRESIDUM-POLITBURO LEVEL AND DID NOT CONTAIN LINE IN TASS ANNOUNCEMENT CARRIED BY ONE PAPER HERE THAT FULL MEMBERSHIP ON BOTH SIDES
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WOULD PARTICIPATE. SMRKOVSKY HOWEVER, TOLD JOURNALISTS THAT MEETING WOULD BE ON BASIS OF SIX ON EACH SIDE.

4. DAO HAS HAD CLEAR INDICATION FROM OFFICIAL CZECH SOURCE THAT 5000 OR 6000 SOVIET TROOPS STILL REMAIN (SEPTEL). WE HAVE NO INFORMATION YET ON WESTERN RADIO REPORT THAT SOVIETS DELIVERED NOTE HERE YESTERDAY DEMANDING STATIONING OF SOVIET TROOPS ALONG WEST GERMAN BORDER. THERE WAS SOME FEELING AT POLISH EMBASSY RECEPTION LAS NIGHT THAT SITUATION WAS TENSE DURING DAY (POSSIBLY ARISING FROM RECEIPT OF SOVIET NOTE) THEN EASED WITH ANNOUNCEMENT ON BILATERAL MEETING. QUESTION NATURALLY IS WHAT SOVIETS WILL PRESS FOR IN CONCEDED TO COME TO CZECHOSLOVAKIA.

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 FM AMEMBASSY PRAGUE
 TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4272
 INFO RUFIRB/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PRIORITY 276
 RUFHJA/USMISSION BERLIN 280
 RUFIRH/AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST 276
 RUFIDA/AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST 296
 RUFHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN 351
 RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 453
 RUFHOL/AMCONGEN MUNICH 553
 RUFHNA/USMISSION NATO 48
 RUFIRG/AMEMBASSY SOFIA 259
 RUDKRW/AMEMBASSY WARSAW 381
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SUBJ: CZECH-SOVIET RELATIONS

1. CZECH JOURNALIST, LONG TIME EMBASSY SOURCE, TODAY TOLD US THAT SOVIET NOTE DELIVERED YESTERDAY DEALT WITH ARMS CACHE FOUND IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA. HE ASSERTED THAT THERE WAS NO SOVIET NOTE PROPOSING TO STATION SOVIET TROOPS IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA AS RUMORED BY WESTERN JOURNALIST CIRCLES.
2. SOURCE ALSO ASSERTED THAT MEETING BETWEEN SOVIET AND CZECHOSLOVAK LEADERSHIPS WILL BE HELD NEXT WEEK AT EARLIEST. HE SAID THAT CZECHOSLOVAK SIDE WISHES TO PREPARE ITS POSITION CAREFULLY. INCIDENTALLY HE HAD READ CZECH ANNOUNCEMENT THAT MEETING WOULD BE "AT PRESIDUM LEVEL" AS MEANING FULL MEMBERSHIP ON BOTH SIDES WOULD TAKE PART.
3. COMMENT. SOVIET TACTIC ON MEETING MAY BE TO INSIST ON FULL MEMBERSHIP OF CSCP PRESIDUM IN ORDER TO BE ABLE TO PROBE FOR WEAK SPOTS IN CZECHOSLOVAK LEADERSHIP. WE HAVE NO SPECIFIC CONFIRMATION TATU LE MONDE STORY JULY 20 THAT KOLDER, SVETIKA, BILAK AND BARBIREK HAD FAVORED GOING TO WARSAW. HOWEVER, WE WERE EARLIER TOLD BY GOOD SOURCE THAT IN CONSIDERING INDIVIDUAL LETTERS FROM FIVE PARTIES PROPOSING IDEAL OF MULTILATERAL MEETING, INITIAL REACTION OF MAJORITY OF PRESIDUM FAVORED ACCEDING TO PROPOSAL

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PROPOSAL; ONLY AFTER MINORITY HAD ADVANCED STRONG ARGUMENTS BASED ON UNACCEPTABILITY TO PARTY AND COUNTRY AT LARGE OF SUCH WEAK APPROACH DID MAJORITY COME TO POSITION OF FAVORING BILATERAL MEETINGS IN ADVANCE OF ANY MULTILATERAL MEETING. SINCE THAT TIME PRESIDUM'S RESOLVE PRESUMABLY HAS BEEN STRENGTHENED BY SUPPORT WHICH COUNTRY HAS GIVEN TO LEADERSHIP'S STAND.

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A LETTER TO BREZHNEV:

THE CZECH HARDLINERS' "REQUEST" FOR SOVIET INTERVENTION, AUGUST 1968

Translated and Introduced Mark Kramer

Esteemed Leonid Ilich,

Conscious of the full responsibility for our decision, we appeal to you with the following statement.

The basically correct post-January democratic process, the correction of mistakes and shortcomings from the past, as well as the overall political management of society, have gradually eluded the control of the Party's Central Committee. The press, radio, and television, which are effectively in the hands of right-wing forces, have influenced popular opinion to such an extent that elements hostile to the Party have begun to take part in the political life of our country, without any opposition from the public. These elements are fomenting a wave of nationalism and chauvinism, and are provoking an anti-Communist and anti-Soviet psychosis. Our collective -- the Party leadership -- has made a number of mistakes. We have not properly defended or put into effect the Marxist-Leninist norms of party work and above all the principles of democratic centralism. The Party leadership is no longer able to defend itself successfully against attacks on socialism, and it is unable to organize either ideological or political resistance against the right-wing forces. The very existence of socialism in our country is under threat. At present, all political instruments and the instruments of state power are paralyzed to a considerable degree. The right-wing forces have created conditions suitable for a counterrevolutionary coup.

In such trying circumstances we are appealing to you, Soviet Communists, the lending representatives of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, with a request for you to lend support and assistance with all the means at your disposal. Only with your assistance can the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic be extricated from the imminent danger of counterrevolution. We realize that for both the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Soviet government, this ultimate step to preserve socialism in the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic will not be easy. Therefore, we will struggle with all our power and all our means. But if our strength and capabilities are depleted or fail to bring positive results, then our statement should be regarded as an urgent request and plea for your intervention and all-round assistance.

In connection with the complex and dangerous course of the situation in our country, we request that you treat our statement with the utmost secrecy, and for that reason we are writing to you, personally, in Russian.

Alois Indra Drahomir Kolder Antonin Kapek Oldrich Svestka Vasil Bilak



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Recd: 22 AUG 68 0430

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TO ALL EUROPEAN DIPLOMATIC POSTS PRIORITY
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BT
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1. CZECH AMBASSADOR DUDA ASKED TO SEE ASSISTANT SECRETARY LEDDY IMMEDIATELY ON AUGUST 21. STATED HE HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED BY MFA TO TELL US GOVERNMENT THAT SOVIET, EAST GERMAN, POLISH, HUNGARIAN, AND BULGARIAN TROOPS ENTERED CZECHOSLOVAKIA ABOUT 2300 HOURS AUGUST 20. THEY ENTERED COUNTRY WITHOUT PERMISSION OR KNOWLEDGE OF CZECHOSLOVAK GOVERNMENT. PARTY PRESIDUM, WHICH WAS IN SESSION CONSIDERING AGENDA OF UPCOMING CONGRESS, APPEALED TO PUBLIC, ASKING THEM TO BE CALM BECAUSE, IN FACE OF FORCES ENTERING CZECHOSLOVAKIA, THE ARMY, SECURITY FORCES, AND PEOPLE'S MILITIA COULD OFFER NO MEANINGFUL RESISTANCE. PRESIDUM CONSIDERS ACTION BY THESE COUNTRIES IN CONTRADICTION TO RELATIONS AMONG SOCIALIST NATIONS AND CONTRARY TO FUNDAMENTALS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW. (DUDA USED AS HIS TEXT HIS PORTION STATEMENT, ANNOUNCEMENT OF RADIO PRAGUE SERVICE NIGHT AUGUST 20 AND EARLY MORNING AUGUST 21.)

2. DUDA SAID PRESIDENT SVOBODA HAD IN EARLY MORNING HOUR APPEALED TO POPULATION TO BE CALM, AVOID TAKING ANY PRECIPITOUS ACTION AND AWAIT FURTHER STEPS. (COMPLETE TEXT THIS APPEAL ALSO BROADCAST BY RADIO PRAGUE EARLY AUGUST 21.)

3. DUDA FURTHER POINTED TO APPEAL OF NATIONAL ASSEMBLY WHICH HAS ALSO BEEN WIDELY BROADCAST AND WHICH IN SUMMARY STATES THAT LEGAL GOVERNMENT OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA IS THAT GOVERNMENT WHICH WAS DULY ELECTED UNDER THE LAW. IT SUPPORTS PRESIDENT SVOBODA, FIRST SECRETARY DUBCEK, PREMIER CERNIK, AND PRESIDENT NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SMRKOVSKY. IT MAINTAINS THAT FIVE WARSAW PACT NATIONS WHOSE TROOPS HAVE ENTERED CZECHOSLOVAKIA HAVE DONE SO IN VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND DEMANDS THEIR IMMEDIATE WITHDRAWAL. IT MAINTAINS THAT THESE TROOPS ARE PREVENTING LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA FROM FULFILLING ITS DUTIES AND DEMANDS ITS FREEDOM OF ACTION, MOVEMENT, AND ASSEMBLY. CATEGORICALLY REITERATES ITS DEMAND FOR WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN TROOPS AND APPEALS TO ALL PARLIAMENTS OF THE WORLD TO SUPPORT THIS DEMAND. APPEALS TO CITIZENS TO REFRAIN FROM

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VIOLENT ACTION WHICH WOULD BE USED AS PRETEXT BY THESE FORCES AS JUSTIFICATION FOR OCCUPATION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA. CONCLUDES BY APPEALING TO WORKING PEOPLE TO REMAIN AT THEIR PLACES OF WORK, TO PROTECT THEIR FACTORIES AND AWAIT FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS. SAYS CZECHOSLOVAKIA WILL LIVE BRAVELY THROUGH THESE DIFFICULT HOURS WITH HONOR.

4. LEDDY GAVE DUDA COPY OF PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT ON CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND EXPRESSED OUR DEEPEST SYMPATHY FOR CZECHS IN THIS HOUR. DUDA PROMISED TO MAKE AVAILABLE TO DEPARTMENT PRESS RELEASE WHICH HE IS ISSUING TODAY. PROMISED TO KEEP IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH DEPARTMENT.

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TO ALL EUROPEAN DIPLOMATIC POSTS PRIORITY
RUFHOL/AMCONSUL MUNICH 0549
RUEHDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 5603
STATE GRNC
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CONFIDENTIAL STATE 225440

SUBJECT: CZECHOSLOVAKIA

FOLLOWING SUMS UP SITUATION AS KNOWN TO DEPT AS OF COB AUGUST 21:

1. SOVIET MILITARY FORCES MOVED QUICKLY INTO CZECHOSLOVAKIA ON AUGUST 20. FULL EXTENT OF THESE FORCES NOT YET KNOWN, BUT IT IS CLEAR THAT THEY CONTROL PRAGUE AND OTHER MAJOR CITIES. OCCUPATION OCCURRED WITHOUT ORGANIZED RESISTANCE. BULGARIAN PARTICIPATION IN OPERATION EVIDENTLY ONLY TOKEN, AND SIZE OF EAST GERMAN, POLISH AND HUNGARIAN CONTINGENTS REMAINS TO BE DETERMINED.

2. PARADOXICALLY, APPARENT SOVIET MILITARY CONTROL NOT FOLLOWED UP PROMPTLY BY ANNOUNCEMENT OF SUCCESSOR GOVERNMENT. PERHAPS THIS WAS BECAUSE SOME POLITICAL MACHINATION WITHIN CZECHOSLOVAKIA WENT AWRY -- FIRST SOVIET DIPLOMATIC DEMARCHES CLAIMED USSR HAD BEEN ASKED FOR HELP BY CZECHOSLOVAK "GOVERNMENT," BUT LATER PUBLIC STATEMENTS BY SOVIETS AND OTHERS REFERRED TO SUCH REQUESTS FROM "OFFICIALS" OF PARTY AND GOVERNMENT. MAY ALSO BE THAT SOVIETS STILL HOPE TO SALVAGE SOME OF PRESENT CZECHOSLOVAK LEADERSHIP AS CORE OF NEW SETUP. LATTER HYPOTHESIS CONSISTENT WITH SEEMING RELUCTANCE OF SOVIETS TO RISK PROVOKING RESISTANCE BY PRESSING CAPTURE OF RADIO STATIONS.

3. CZECHOSLOVAK NATION THUS FAR -- AS IN CONFRONTATION WITH SOVIETS AT END OF JULY -- HAS SHOWN AMAZING UNITY AND DETERMINATION TO DEFEND ITS SOVEREIGNTY AND TO RALLY AROUND DUBCEK LEADERSHIP. PARTY AND GOVERNMENT ORGANS HAVE UNEQUIVOCALLY

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REJECTED SOVIET-WARSAW PACE OCCUPATION OF NATION AND HAVE CONCENTRATED ON ATTEMPTS TO SOMEHOW FORCE WITHDRAWAL OF OCCUPATION TROOPS SHORT OF VIOLENCE AND PROVOCATION. NATIONAL ASSEMBLY DECLARATION AUGUST 21 DEMANDS THAT CZECHOSLOVAK PARTY-GOVERNMENT LEADERS (INCLUDING PRESIDENT SVOBODA, PREMIER CERNIK, NATIONAL ASSEMBLY CHAIRMAN SMRKOVSKY, PARTY FIRST SECRETARY DUBCEK, NATIONAL FRONT CHAIRMAN KRIEGL, AND PARTY SECRETARY CISAR) BE RELEASED FROM "INTERMENT" IN ORDER TO CARRY OUT THEIR "CONSTITUTIONAL FUNCTIONS." DECLARATION HOLDS OUT PROSPECT OF GENERAL STRIKE BY WORKERS TO INSURE NATION'S DEMANDS.

4. SHOW OF NATIONAL UNITY AND OF DETERMINATION OF LEADERSHIP TO RESIST OCCUPATION HAVE OBVIOUSLY COMPLICATED SOVIET TACTICS. THUS FAR, NO CZECHOSLOVAK HAS COME FORWARD TO IDENTIFY HIMSELF WITH PURPORTED APPEAL BROADCAST BY MOSCOW OF UNNAMED PARTY AND GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS WHO CALLED FOR SOVIET-WARSAW PACT NATIONS INTERVENTION TO PREVENT "ANTI-SOCIALISTS" FROM DESTROYING SOCIALISM IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA. MOSCOW'S PUBLICATION OF THE APPEAL SUGGESTS IT HOPES TO ENHANCE PROSPECTS OF POPULAR ACCEPTANCE OF THIS REGIME BY ASSERTING IT WILL IMPLEMENT MANY OF REFORMS PROMISED SINCE REFORMERS CAME TO POWER IN JANUARY. SOVIETS THUS APPEAR TO BE WORKING ON DUBCEK AND OTHER LEADERS TO ACCEPT THEIR DEMANDS FOR RESTORING ORDERLY REGIME, WITH PROMISE THAT LEADERSHIP COULD BE LEFT RELATIVELY INTACT (MINUS PERHAPS SUCH "LIBERALS" AS CISAR, SMRKOVSKY, SIK, ETC); HOWEVER, IT IS QUESTIONABLE WHETHER DUBCEK WOULD AGREE TO REMAIN IN ANY LEADERSHIP ROLE IN SUCH A COMPROMISED POSITION. POSSIBILITY THAT OTHER PARTY LEADERS (KOLDER, INDR, SVETKA, BILAK) MIGHT AGREE TO WORK WITH SOVIETS CANNOT BE EXCLUDED. HOWEVER ALL THIS IS SPECULATION. LATE REPORT THAT DUBCEK, SMRKOVSKY AND OTHER REFORM LEADERS REMOVED TO UNKNOWN PLACE BY SOVIETS REMAINS TO BE CONFIRMED.

5. ROMANIA RESPONDED TO SOVIET ACTION WITH ALACRITY AND FORCEFULNESS. PARTY CENTRAL COMMITTEE, STATE COUNCIL, COUNCIL OF MINISTERS, AND MASS ORGANIZATIONS ON AUGUST 21 HELD JOINT PLENUM IMMEDIATELY AFTER WORD REACHED BUCHAREST OF THE INVASION. CEAUDESCU ANNOUNCED PLENUM "UNANIMOUSLY DECIDED TO EXPRESS COMPLETE SOLIDARITY WITH THE CZECHOSLOVAK PEOPLE AND WITH THE CZECHOSLOVAK COMMUNIST PARTY," EMPHATICALLY DENOUNCED THE ATTACK AND REITERATED THAT "THERE IS NO JUSTIFICATION WHATSOEVER" FOR "INTERVENTION IN AFFAIRS OF A FRATERNAL SOCIALIST

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STATE." HE ANNOUNCED FORMATION OF NEW, ARMED "WORKER-INTELLECTUAL-PEASANT GUARD" UNITS AND ASKED FOR "COMPLETE UNITY" BEHIND AN UNWAVERING PARTY-STATE LEADERSHIP "TO BE READY AT ANY MOMENT TO DEFEND OUR SOCIALIST FATHERLAND." WITH ARMED INTERVENTION IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA FAIL ACCOMPLISH ROMANIAN LEADERSHIP NOW APPARENTLY "PROFOUNDLY CONCERNED" OVER THE POSSIBILITY THAT ROMANIA, TOO, COULD BE A VICTIM OF AN OVERWHELMING POWER PLAY.

6. MAIN YUGOSLAV REACTION CAME IN FROM TITO WHO DECLARED THAT INVASION "WITHOUT INVITATION OR APPROVAL FROM THE LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT HAS MADE US DEEPLY CONCERNED," THAT SOVEREIGNTY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA WAS "VIOLATED AND TRAMPLED," CONSTITUTING A "HEAVY BLOW" TO WORLD SOCIALIST AND PROGRESSIVE FORCES. HE ADDED BRATISLAVA DECISIONS "UNILATERALLY ANNULLED" AND THAT THE INVASION WILL HAVE "FAR-REACHING AND VERY NEGATIVE EFFECTS" ON THE ENTIRE WORLD REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT. TITO RULED OUT "MANIFESTATIONS AND DEMONSTRATIONS," PRESUMABLY IN SUPPORT OF THE CZECHOSLOVAKS AND AGAINST THE INTERVENTION OF THE SOVIETS AND COHORTS, NO DOUBT HAVING IN MIND THE STUDENT REVOLT LAST JUNE AND POSSIBLY NOT TO ALLOW ANY ACTIONS IRRITATING MOSCOW, AT LEAST NOT UNTIL HE DETERMINED THE CONSENSUS PREVAILING AT THE SESSION OF THE PRESIDUM.

7. THREAT OF INVASION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA HAD BEEN IMPLICIT IN SOVIET MILITARY POSTURE SINCE JULY WHEN SOVIET TROOPS DEPLOYED IN LARGER NUMBERS ON CZECHOSLOVAK BORDERS. NEVERTHELESS, PRECISE MOMENT WHEN SOVIETS DECIDED TO CARRY OUT THEIR THREAT AND REASONS FOR FINAL DECISION REMAIN OPEN QUESTIONS. WE INCLINED TO DOUBT THOUGH CANNOT EXCLUDE THAT DECISION TAKEN AT LAST MOMENT OR IN DISARRAY. COMPLEX MILITARY AND DIPLOMATIC MACHINERY SEEMS TO HAVE MOVED TOO SMOOTHLY TO HAVE BEEN SET OFF ON SPUR OF MOMENT. THUS FINAL DECISION MUST HAVE BEEN TAKEN AT LEAST A FEW DAYS BEFORE EVENT AND POSSIBLY EARLIER.

8. NOTHING VISIBLE ON POLITICAL SCENE EITHER IN MOSCOW OR PRAGUE TO DEMONSTRATE CLEARLY WHAT TRIGGERING EVENT MAY HAVE BEEN. PERHAPS COMBINATION OF FACTORS -- SUCH AS GROWING PERCEPTION THAT IT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE TO FORCE CZECHOSLOVAK PARTY CONGRESS TO SWERVE FROM ITS COURSE, SHIFTS AMONG DIFFERING VIEWS IN KREMLIN, AND INCREASING CONCERN ON PART OF GOMULKA AND ULBRICHT --

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COULD HAVE SWUNG THE BALANCE.

9. WHILE CC CPSU PLENUM WOULD BE EXPECTED CONCOMITANT TO SOVIET ACTION THERE IS STILL NO OFFICIAL CONFIRMATION OF REPORTED MEETINGS OF SOVIET LEADERS LAST TWO DAYS AND "SUDDEN" INTERRUPTION OF BREZHNEV AND PODGORNYY SOUTHERN VACATIONS. ENTIRE SOVIET POLITBURO HAS BEEN OUT OF SIGHT SINCE AROUND AUGUST 9 WITH EXCEPTION KIRILENKO, MAZUROV, AND FEW LESSER CANDIDATE MEMBERS AND CC SECRETARIES. PRAGUE BROADCASTS ALLEGING RESIGNATION KOSYGIN AND GRECHKO HAVE BEEN DENIED BY MOSCOW AND AT THIS POINT APPEAR TO BE PROPAGANDA GAMBIT AIMED AT SOVIET TROOPS. PRESS REPORTS OF RESUMPTION SOVIET JAMMING OF WESTERN BROADCASTS COULD INDICATE REGIME'S DESIRE TO GET TO HOME AUDIENCE FIRST WITH THEIR VERSION AND ALSO BAR AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE SUBSEQUENT WESTERN REPORTING.

10. IN DRAWING ON FOREGOING POST SHOULD SEEK ELICIT INFORMATION AND ASSESSMENTS FROM HOST GOVERNMENTS.

11. FOR USNATO YOU MAY USE FOREGOING IN POLADS, NAC OR OTHERWISE AS APPROPRIATE. GP-3. RUSK

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RUFHOL/AMCONSUL MUNICH 0563
STATE GRNC

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CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 1 OF 2 STATE 226215/1

SUBJ: CZECHOSLOVAKIA

FOLLOWING IS DEPTS SUMMATION AND ASSESSMENT OF DEVELOPMENTS AS OF COB AUG 22.

1. AGAINST BACKDROP OF REPORTED ADDITIONAL ARRESTS OF PROMINENT CZECHOSLOVAKS OPPOSED TO OCCUPATION AND SOVIET ATTEMPTS TO FORM NEW REGIME, CZECHOSLOVAK RUMP PARTY AND GOVT ORGANS AND POPULATION CONTINUE TO DEFY OCCUPATION. IT MUST BE EMPHASIZED, HOWEVER, THAT SOVIET INTERDICTION OF MEDIA SUPPORTING DUBCEK LEADERSHIP HAS MADE IT EXTREMELY DIFFICULT TO MAKE CONSIDERED ASSESSMENTS. THE FEW REMAINING FREE TRANSMITTERS OPERATE FROM MAKESHIFT LOCATION SITUATION IN CZECHOSLOVAK REMAINS EXTREMELY FLUID AND CONFUSING, WITH INFORMATION OFTEN CONTRADICTORY.

2. DUBCEK SUPPORTERS REPORTED TO HAVE CONVENED EXTRAORDINARY PARTY CONGRESS IN PRAGUE (CONGRESS HAD BEEN SCHEDULED FOR SEPT 9), WITH SOME 1,000 OF 1,500 DELEGATES PRESENT. (MANY SLOVAK DELEGATES SAID TO HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO REACH PRAGUE.) CONGRESS REPORTEDLY PROCLAIMED IT RECOGNIZED NO PARTY OR GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVES OTHER THAN THOSE ELECTED BY "PROPER DEMOCRATIC PROCEDURES," I.E., INCUMBENTS. CONGRESS SAID TO DEMAND RELEASE OF ALL THOSE INTERNED OR PROHIBITED FROM EXERCISING THEIR FUNCTIONS THE SPEEDY WITHDRAWAL OF THE OCCUPATION FORCES, AND IMMEDIATE RESTORATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS. CONGRESS ALSO REPORTED TO THREATEN GENERAL STRIKE ON AUG 23 UNLESS NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN OCCUPATION AUTHORITIES AND DUBCEK LEADERSHIP ARE BEGUN WITHIN 24 HOURS AND UNLESS DUBCEK SPEAKS TO NATION. (AT SAME TIME, SOVIETS REPORTEDLY HAVE ISSUED ULTIMATUM TO DUBCEK THAT HE MUST MAKE NATIONAL RADIO ADDRESS TERMING OCCUPATION TROOPS "LIBERATORS OF CAECHOSLOVAKIA." THIS INFO SUPPOSEDLY IS BEING DISSEMINATED BY TRANSMITTERS OF SOVIET TROOPS.)

3. DUBCEK AND OTHER

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3. DUBCEK AND OTHER LEADERS INTERNED BY SOVIETS YESTERDAY APPARENTLY BEING HELD INCOMMUNICADO. IN ADDITION, PREMIER CERNIK REPORTEDLY FLOWN OUT OF PRAGUE WITH OTHER UNIDENTIFIED OFFICIALS TO UNKNOWN LOCATION. DEFENSE MINISTER DZUR, WHO ENJOINED MILITARY TO OBEY ONLY PRESIDENT SVOBODA, SAID TO HAVE BEEN ARRESTED TODAY. ANOTHER REPORT DECLARES DZUR CONFERRED TODAY WITH PRESIDENT SVOBODA TO TELL HIM THAT CZECHOSLOVAK ARMY FIRMLY SUPPORTS DUBCEK LEADERSHIP.

4. SOVIETS APPEAR TO HAVE NO SUCCESS THUS FAR IN ORGANIZING REGIME WHICH COULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO POPULATION AND NOT BE IMMEDIATELY BRANDED AS SOVIET TOOL. AT THIS MOMENT, SOVIETS APPARENTLY SEEKING TO USE CONSERVATIVE-INCLINED MEMBERS OF DUBCEK LEADERSHIP AS NUCLEUS OF NEW REGIME--ONE WHICH PROMISES TO CARRY OUT VARIOUS REFORMS BEGUN AFTER FALL OF NOVOTNY IN JANUARY. (DISCREDITED FOLLOWERS OF NOVOTNY APPARENTLY BEING CONTEMPLATED ONLY AS A LAST RESORT.) AMONG THOSE RUMORED AS WILLING TO SERVE IN SOVIET-APPOINTED REGIME ARE BILAK, KOLDER, INDRA, BARBIREK, AND SVESTKA. HOWEVER, IT REMAINS UNCLEAR WHETHER EVEN THESE LEADERS WOULD CONSENT TO SERVE IN ANY SUCH REGIME: BILAK AND BARBIREK ARE SAID TO HAVE DISSOCIATED THEMSELVES FROM THE PURPORTED APPEAL OF CZECHOSLOVAK OFFICIALS CALLING FOR SOVIET INTERVENTION, WHILE SVESTKA REPORTEDLY WAS ARRESTED BY SOVIETS YESTERDAY, THEN RELEASED.

5. SOVIETS REPORTED TO HAVE DELIVERED ULTIMATUM TO THOSE MEMBERS OF PARTY HIERARCHY NOT UNDER ARREST OR DETAINED TO FORM NEW PARTY LEADERSHIP AND THEN COMPOSE NEW GOVERNMENT. DUBCEK, SMR KOVSKY, SPACEK, KRIEGEL, CISAR, AND CERNIK ARE TO BE EXCLUDED FROM LEADERSHIP, WHILE BILAK, INDRA, FORMER PREMIER LENART, FORMER ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF RYTIS, AND FORMER CZECHOSLOVAK AMBASSADOR TO USSR PAVLOVSKY ARE RECOMMENDED. IF ULTIMATUM, WHICH REPORTEDLY WOULD EXPIRE EVENING AUG 22, WAS NOT ACCEPTED, SOVIETS TO IMPOSE OCCUPATION REGIME DEPENDENT DIRECTLY ON SOVIET TROOPS. SOVIETS REPORTEDLY ON VERGE OF IMPOSING MARTIAL LAW.

6. PRESIDENT SVOBODA NOW LOOMS AS THE KEY FIGURE IN SOVIET PLANS TO LEGITIMIZE THEIR REGIME. UNDER CONSTITUTION, SVOBODA IS EMPOWERED TO DISMISS AND APPOINT CABINET. IF HE REJECTS THOSE MINISTERS WILLING TO SERVE SOVIETS, NATION MAY BE PLUNGED INTO EVEN DEEPER CRISIS AND OUTBREAK OF DEMONSTRATIONS AND PROTESTS. SVOBODA UNDER EXTREME PRESSURES FROM BOTH SOVIETS AND CZECHOSLOVAK SUPPORTERS OF DUBCEK; THUS FAR, HE HAS ESCHEWED COOPERATION WITH SOVIETS. IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT SOVIET MEDIA

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HAVE CALLED FROM TWO ADDRESSES BY SVOBODA HIS APPEALS FOR CALM, POSSIBLY IN AN EFFORT TO IMPLY SVOBODA POSITION NOT UNFAVORABLE TO SOVIETS.

7. NO ORGANIZED ARMED RESISTANCE HAS OCCURRED, AND SOVIETS EVIDENTLY MAKING EFFORT TO AVOID INCIDENTS. COUNTRY OCCUPIED BY LARGE SOVIET FORCES TOGETHER WITH SMALL CONTINGENTS OF ALLIED TROOPS (REFERENCES IN ATTACHE REPORTING AND IN PRESS TO FIGURES OF 150,000 AND 200,000 MEN SEEM TO BE REASONABLE INDICATIONS OF ORDER OF MAGNITUDE OF OCCUPATION FORCES).

3. AUG 22 PRAVDA TREATMENT CZECH SITUATION GIVES MOST SPECIFIC EXPLANATION YET IN SOVIET MEDIA FOR INTERVENTION, CHARGING CZECH LEADERS AT CIERNA AND BRATISLAVA "PLEGGED TO TAKE URGENT AND CONCRETE MEASURES" BUT THEN DID NOTHING. AFTER CATALOGING DANGEROUS CZECH TENDENCIES BEFORE INTERVENTION, WITH RATHER FRANK ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF VARIOUS SOVIET CONCERNS SUCH AS POSSIBLE CSSR ECONOMIC REORIENTATION TOWARD WEST, PRAVDA STATES CZECHS AT CIERNA SPLIT INTO TWO GROUPS, DUBCEK MINORITY "SPOKE FROM OPENLY RIGHTWING OPPORTUNIST POSITIONS," WHILE MAJORITY WANTED TO BRING COUNTRY BACK ONTO CORRECT PATH (ARTICLE GLOSSES OVER FACT THAT SOVIETS ESSENTIALLY MADE THEIR AGREEMENT AT CIERNA WITH SO-CALLED DUBCEK MINORITY). "CERTAIN LEADERS" AFTER CIERNA-BRATISLAVA "THWARTED FULFILMENT OF AGREEMENTS" REACHED AT THESE MEETINGS.

9. OTHER SOVIET MEDIA COVERAGE OF CZECH SITUATION, TO EXTENT MONITORED, LIMITED TO ASSERTIONS THAT COUNTERREVOLUTIONARIES SEIZED RUDE PRAVO EDITOR SVESTKA BUT SOVIET TROOPS FREED HIM, SITUATION IN COUNTRY MOSTLY CALM, AND CONTINUING OPERATION OF CLANDESTINE RADIO STATIONS IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA HAS BEEN FRUIT OF COUNTERREVOLUTIONARIES' ADVANCE PLANNING.

10. TASS HAS TWICE MENTIONED AUG 21 STATEMENT OF CSSR "FOREIGN MINISTRY" REJECTING COMPETENCE OF UN IN CZECH SITUATION AS BEING AN INTERNAL MATTER FOR SOCIALIST COMMONWEALTH. WE HAVE NOT SEEN OTHER REFERENCES TO STATEMENT OR TO A FUNCTIONING MFA IN PRAGUE, BUT HAVE REASON TO BELIEVE CZECH REP MUZIK AT UN MAY HAVE BEEN IN TOUCH WITH SOME PRAGUE AUTHORITIES, IN ADDITION TO FONMIN HAJEK IN BELGRADE. TASS ALSO CRITICIZED MUZIK FOR ACCEPTING INSTRUCTIONS FROM HAJEK, WHO "OUT OF TOUCH" WITH CSSR GOVT.

11. IN UN SECURITY COUNCIL SOVIETS AUG 22 ENGAGED IN DELAYING TACTICS WITH HELP OF HUNGARIANS AND ALGERIANS, BUT FAILED TO

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PREVENT 5 PM RECONVENING. MALIK READ TASS DESPATCH RE AUG 21 PRAGUE "MFA" STATEMENT REJECTING UN COMPETENCE, AND HUNGARIAN NOTED ABSENCE OF MUZIK FROM MIDDAY SESSION (HE ATTENDED AUG 21 AND DENOUNCED INVASION) AS EVIDENCE CSSR OPPOSED TO PROCEEDINGS (FYI MUZIK NOW HOLED UP IN NYC AND AUG 22 TOLD ALGERIAN DIPLOMAT HE AWAITING "DEVELOPMENTS," WHICH COULD MEAN EITHER HAJEK'S ARRIVAL AUG 23 OR FORMATION NEW PRAGUE GOVT.) SOVIETS PRESUMABLY ALSO HOPING NEW PRAGUE GOVT WILL GIVE CSSR UN DELEGATION FIRM INSTRUCTION TO OPPOSE UN DISCUSSION.

12. MOSCOW CONTINUES COMPLETELY SILENT ON WHERE SOVIET LEADERS ARE OR WHETHER ANY CC-CPSU PLENUM WAS CONVENED THIS WEEK. VARIOUS RUMORS OF KREMLIN SHAKEUPS REMAIN UNCONFIRMED AND STRIKE US AS IMPLAUSIBLE.

13. UPI REPORT FROM VIENNA THAT CEAUSESCU ON AUG 22 ANNOUNCED THAT ROMANIA IS "NOW IN STATE OF FULL MOBILIZATION" REMAINS UNREPORTED FROM ANY OTHER SOURCE ALTHOUGH SOME WESTERN DIPLOMATIC QUARTERS REFER TO AN "ALERT" OF ROMANIAN FORCES. MEANTIME CEAUSESCU AGAIN TODAY FIRMLY DENOUNCED INTERVENTION AT GRAND NATIONAL ASSEMBLY MEETING.

14. POSTS MAY DRAW ON FOREGOING WITH HOST GOVERNMENTS AS WARRANTED. USNATO MAY USE IN NAC, POLADS AND SITCEN. RUSK
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SUBJ: CZECHOSLOVAKIA

FOLLOWING IS DEPTS SUMMATION AND ASSESSMENT OF SITUATION AS
OC COB AUG 23.

1. WHILE MILITARY PHASES OF MOSCOW'S OPERATION AGAINST
CZECHOSLOVAKIA WERE EFFICIENT, COORDINATED, AND SUCCESSFUL,
SOVIETS EVIDENTLY AGAIN MISCALCULATED POLITICAL SITUATION OBTAINING
IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND RESOLVE OF CZECHOSLOVAK PARTY AND POPULATION
TO SUPPORT DUBCEK LEADERSHIP. WHILE SOVIETS SEEK TO GIVE IMPRESSIO
THAT THEIR AIMS ARE REASONABLE AND TO KEEP USE OF FORCE TO MINIMUM
POPULAR RESENTMENTS AGAINST OCCUPATION AND PASSIVE RESISTANCE
ARE INCREASING. AS RESULT, SOVIETS MAY BE COMPELLED TO TAKE MORE
FORCEFUL MEASURES TO CONTROL SECURITY SITUATION.

2. INABILITY OF SOVIETS TO FORM NEW REGIME REFLECTS EXTENT TO
WHICH KREMLIN HAD MISJUDGED MOOD AND TEMPER OF CZECHOSLOVAK
POPULATION, EVEN AMONG THOSE ELEMENTS IN PARTY CRITICAL OF VARIOUS
FEATURES OF DUBCEK'S DEMOCRATIZATION PROCESS. PRESIDENT
(GENERAL) SVOBODA, WHOSE ELEVATION TO PRESIDENCY IN APRIL WAS
EVIDENT ATTEMPT TO PLACATE SOVIETS, MAY HAVE BEEN SO OUTRAGED
BY SOVIET INVASION AND ACTIONS IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA SINCE THEN THAT
HE HAS REPORTEDLY TWICE REFUSED TO APPROVE REGIME SPONSORED BY
SOVIETS. SVOBODA REPORTEDLY ALSO INSISTS THAT ANY NEW REGIME
MUST INCLUDE THOSE LEADERS INTERNED BY SOVIETS (INCLUDING
DUBCEK, PREMIER CERNIK, NATIONAL ASSEMBLY CHAIRMAN SMRKOVSKY,
NATIONAL FRONT CHAIRMAN KRIEGL), AND THAT OCCUPATION FORCES
MUST WITHDRAW. ACCORDING TO MOSCOW TELEVISION, DISCUSSIONS
BETWEEN CZECHOSLOVAK DELEGATION LED BY SVOBODA AND KREMLIN LEADERS
TOOK PLACE TODAY IN "FRANK ATMOSPHERE" AND WILL BE CONTINUED AUG
24. FACT THAT SVOBODA HAD STATED ON HIS DEPARTURE FROM PRAGUE
THAT HE EXPECTED TO RETURN HOME IN ONE DAY AND THAT DISCUSSIONS
WERE CHARACTERIZED AS "FRANK" SUGGEST THAT BARGAINING HARD AND

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DIFFICULT AND CZECHOSLOVAK SIDE UNWILLING TO COMPROMISE. SVOBODA WENT TO MOSCOW ONLY AFTER HE WAS UNABLE TO REACH ANY ACCORD WITH SOVIET OCCUPATION AUTHORITIES IN PRAGUE. THIS CONFIRMED TODAY BY STATEMENTS TO DEPT IN CALL BY CZECH CHARGE WHICH HE REQUESTED ON INSTRUCTION FROM PRAGUE.

3. ACCOMMODATION AT THIS TIME APPEARS MOST DIFFICULTY. DEMANDS OF DUBCEK FORCES FOR WITHDRAWAL OF OCCUPATION TROOPS AND RELEASE OF INTERNED LEADERS--WITH RESTORATION OF THEIR FUNCTIONS--CAN HARDLY BE MET BY SOVIETS, WHO HAVE PUBLICLY CONDEMNED THESE LEADERS FOR THEIR ACTIVITIES. MOREOVER, DUBCEK FORCES SEEM EVER MORE DETERMINED TO RID PARTY AND GOVERNMENT APPARATUS OF ALL "CONSERVATIVES," NOT ONLY THOSE WHO SUPPORTED NOVOTNY BUT ALSO THOSE WHO SUSPECTED OF SYMPATHIZING WITH SOVIETS. SIX OF ELEVEN MEMBERS OF PARTY PRESIDUM WERE NOT ELECTED TO CENTRAL COMMITTEE AT AUG 22 SESSION "EXTRAORDINARY" PARTY CONGRESS HELD SOMEWHERE IN PRAGUE. NAMES OF 28 NEWLY ELECTED PRESIDUM AND 144 CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEMBERS UNDER FIRST SECRETARY DUBCEK WERE PUBLICIZED BY FREE CZECH MEDIA. VANEK SILHAN NAMED ACTING FIRST SECRETARY WHILE DUBCEK "ABSENT."

4. PASSIVE RESISTANCE TO OCCUPATION IS STEADILY INCREASING, WITH RESULT THAT SOVIETS, WHO HAVE THUS FAR BEEN RESTRAINED AND APPEARED INTENT TO AVOID PROVOCATION, MAY SOON BE FORCED TO APPLY MORE DRASTIC MEASURES TO INSURE INTERNAL SECURITY. REPORTED DECLARATION OF MARTIAL LAW IN PRAGUE (FIRST SUCH MEASURE TAKEN EARLIER IN KOSICE)--SEVERAL HOURS AFTER THE SECOND ONE-HOUR GENERAL STRIKE THERE IN TWO DAYS--COULD HERALD SIMILAR DECLARATIONS IN OTHER AREAS. REPORTS OF CURFEWS IN VARIOUS LOCALITIES, OF NEW TROOP MOVEMENTS INTO SLOVAKIA FROM HUNGARY AND THE USSR, AND OF ARRESTS OF LIBERAL INTELLECTUALS AS WELL AS ESCAPE OF LIBERAL SECRETARY CISAR FROM CZECH SECURITY FORCES DETENTION CANNOT BE CONFIRMED.

5. SOVIET PRESS AND RADIO CONTINUE TO JUSTIFY INTERVENTION IN TERMS OF IMMINENCE OF COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY COUP. SOVIET PROPAGANDISTS SHOWING CONSIDERABLE SENSITIVITY TO HOSTILE RECEPTION GIVEN INTERVENTION FORCES AND TRYING TO BLAME THIS ON RIGHTIST FORCES IN COUNTRY AND FOREIGN PROPAGANDA. TWO BROADCASTS HAVE ALLEGED THAT AN ILLEGAL RADIO TRANSMITTING ANTI-SOVIET STATEMENTS IS LOCATED ON THE GROUNDS OF A WESTERN EMBASSY IN PRAGUE.

6. MOSCOW IS ALSO SENSITIVE TO FOREIGN COMMUNIST REACTION. PRAVDA TODAY INCLUDES ARTICLE BY ZHUKOV CRITICAL OF THE

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"INEXPLICABLE LACK OF UNDERSTANDING" ON THE PART OF UNNAMED FOREIGN COMMUNIST LEADERS.

7. ANNUAL AUG 23 ROMANIAN NATIONAL DAY PARADE FEATURED MARCH-BY OF ARMED WORKER-PEASANT-INTELLECTUAL GUARD UNITS, FORMATION OF WHICH CEAUSESCU ANNOUNCED IN AFTERMATH OF CZECHOSLOVAK INVASTION. SOME MARCHERS REPORTEDLY YELLED "DUBCEK" AND "SVOBODA" AS THEY PARADED BY ROMANIAN LEADERSHIP AND ASSEMBLED DIPLOMATIC CORPS. FIRST PERHAPS SPONTANEOUS DEMONSTRATION SINCE COMMUNIST TAKEOVER REPORTEDLY GATHERED AT SOVIET EMBASSY TODAY TO PROTEST INVASTION. AT ROMANIAN EMB RECEPTION IN PEKING, CHOU EN-LAI WARMLY CONGRATULATED ROMANIANS, THEN LAUNCHED SHARP ATTACK ON SOVIET INVASTION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, EQUATING IT TO NAZI MOVE ON SUDETENLAND AND US INTERVENTION IN VIETNAM. ROMANIANS MAY REACT WITH MIXED FEELINGS TO CHOU STATEMENT, AS THEY STRONGLY EMPHASIZE DESIRE FOR COMITY WITH SOVIETS ALONG WITH CONDEMNATION OF INVASTION MOVE. CEAUSESCU NO DOUBT PLEASSED TO RECEIVE CONGRATULATORY WISHES FROM MOSCOW ON NATIONAL DAY CELEBRATIONS, DESPITE HIS STAND ON CZECH EVENTS. CEAUSESCU AND MAURER RECEIVED CZECH DEPUTY PREMIER OTA SIK FOR "WARM AND COMRADELY" TALKS WHICH FOLLOW SIK MEETING WITH TITO. DEPT RECEIVING VARIOUS REPORTS OF SOVIET TROOP MOVEMENTS AROUND ROMANIA AND IS CHECKING.

8. UN SECURITY COUNCIL SCHEDULED TO RECONVENE THIS EVENING, AUG 23, TO CONSIDER CANADIAN-SPONSORED RESOLUTION CALLING ON SYG TO SEND PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE TO PRAGUE IN ORDER TO ASSURE SAFETY OF CZECH LEADERS. CZECH FONMIN HAJEK DUE TO ARRIVE IN NEW YORK IN TIME FOR SC SESSION AND PRESUMABLY WILL TAKE A FIRM STAND ON ILLEGALITY OF MILITARY INTERVENTION BUT AVOID COLD WAR POLEMICS.

9. POSTS MAY USE FOREGOING WITH HOST GOVTS AS WARRANTED.
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SUBJ: CZECHOSLOVAKIA

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FOLLOWING SUMMARIZES DEPARTMENT'S ASSESSMENT AS OF AUGUST 24.
POSTS MAY USE WITH HOST GOVERNMENTS AS WARRANTED. USNATO MAY
USE IN NAC POLADS AND SITCEN. POSTS SHOULD BEAR IN MIND THAT
SITUATION HIGHLY FLUID AND INFORMATION, ESPECIALLY FROM
WITHIN CZECHOSLOVAKIA, IS INCOMPLETE AND BY THE TIME IT
REACHES OUTSIDE WORLD FREQUENTLY OVERTAKEN BY EVENTS. SITUATION
ALSO OBVIOUSLY LENDS ITSELF TO RUMORS, DISINFORMATION AND
SPECULATION. ASSESSMENTS CONSEQUENTLY NECESSARILY TENTATIVE
AND DEPT NOT ATTEMPTING TO PROVIDE EXHAUSTIVE REVIEW OF AVAILABLE
REPORTING.

1. MOSCOW TALKS BETWEEN SOVIET LEADERS AND SVOBODA DELEGATION
STILL NOT CONCLUDED AND TASS OFFICIALLY ANNOUNCED THEIR
EXTENSION TO AUGUST 25. PROLONGATION OF NEGOTIATIONS NOT
SURPRISING IN VIEW OF COMPLEXITY OF ISSUES BETWEEN PARTIES.
MOSCOW EVIDENTLY STILL HOPING TO FIND CAST OF CHARACTERS FOR
CZECHOSLOVAK LEADERSHIP THAT HAS SOME HOPE OF RESONANCE
WITHIN CZECHOSLOVAKIA. THROUGHOUT AUGUST 24 THERE
HAVE BEEN NUMEROUS REPORTS THAT DUBCEK AND PERHAPS ALSO PREMIER
CERNIK IN MOSCOW AND PARTICIPATING IN TALKS. WE CANNOT CONFIRM
BUT WOULD NOT EXCLUDE. WHATEVER SOVIETS WILL BRING THEMSELVES
TO ACCEPT WITH RESPECT TO FUTURE ROLE FOR DUBCEK AND ASSOCIATES,
IT IS CLEAR THAT WITHIN CZECHOSLOVAKIA ANY ARRANGEMENT
THAT DOES NOT AT LEAST INCLUDE THEIR PERSONAL SAFETY AND RETURN
TO COUNTRY WILL LACK UTTERLY IN CREDIBILITY.

2. WITHIN CZECHOSLOVAKIA, VOLATILE SITUATION DUE TO
PRESENCE OF SOVIET ARMED FORCES CONTINUES AND INCIDENTS
SUCH AS OUTBREAK OF FIRING IN PRAGUE IN AREA NEAR U S
EMBASSY ON AUGUST 23 CONTINUE. SOVIET FORCES CONTINUE MOVING
AGAINST RADIO AND TV BROADCASTING INSTALLATIONS, BUT
STILL MAKING SOME EFFORTS TO AVOID INCIDENTS (FOR EXAMPLE, |

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REPORTS THAT IN SOME AREAS SOVIET TROOPS HAVE MOVED TO LESS CONSPICUOUS LOCATIONS). NEVERTHELESS, POPULAR RESENTMENT RUNS HIGH, FREE- WHEELING INDEPENDENT CZECHOSLOVAK STATIONS URGE RESISTANCE, AND IN ABSENCE OF POLITICAL SETTLEMENT POTENTIAL FOR SERIOUS INCIDENTS RUNS HIGH.

3. SOVIET MEDIA SHOWING NO SIGNS OF GIVE IN JUSTIFYING INTERVENTION OR ATTACKS ON "COUNTERREVOLUTIONARIES." EVEN LEAST SOPHISTICATED SOVIET AUDIENCES MUST DISCERN THAT DEFIANCE TO SOVIETS WIDESPREAD (SOVIET MEDIA NOW ACKNOWLEDGING CASUALTIES AMONG SOVIET FORCES) AND SOVIET REPORTING SHOWING HIGH DEGREE OF DEFENSIVENESS. WORTH NOTING HOWEVER, IN VIEW OF REPORTS CONCERNING DUBCEK'S ROLE IN MOSCOW NEGOTIATIONS, THAT DIRECT ATTACKS ON HIM ABSENT FROM SOVIET PRESS SINCE AUGUST 23.

4. CZECH FOREIGN MINISTER HAJEK IS IN NEW YORK AND IS SPEAKING TO SECURITY COUNCIL SESSION AUGUST 24. HE APPERAS TO BE IN TOUCH WITH LEGAL GOVERNMENT ORGANS FUNCTIONING WITHIN CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND SVOBODA GROUP IN MOSCOW. WE WOULD ASSUME THAT WHEN SOME SORT OF ARRANGEMENT EMERGES IN MOSCOW TALKS, HAJEK WILL AVOID FURTHER CZECHOSLOVAK SUPPORT FOR CURRENT SC MOVES.

5. LATEST EVIDENCE OF TENSION IN SOVIET- ROMANIAN POLITICAL RELATIONS WAS IZVESTIYA CRITICISM (AUG 24) OF CEAUSESCU BY NAME AS ENCOURAGING CZECHOSLOVAK COUNTER- REVOLUTIONARIES. RUMORS OF TROOP MOVEMENTS (SOVIET, HUNGARIAN, BULGARIAN) DIRECTED AGAINST ROMANIA CONTINUE TO REVERBERATE, BUT CANNOT BE CONFIRMED. ROMANIANS, WHO FIRST DISSEMINATED REPORTS OF TROOP MOVEMENTS, NOW DISPOSED TO ATTRIBUTE THESE REPORTS TO CZECHOSLOVAK SITUATION AND NOT TO PLANS AGAINST THEMSELVES. OFFICIAL BULGARIAN NEWS AGENCY ON AUG 23, WITHOUT REFERRING DIRECTLY TO RUMORS OF POSSIBLE PREPARATIONS AGAINST ROMANIA, ISSUED DENIAL THAT ANY " ABNORMAL SITUATION" PREVAILED IN BULGARIA. ROMANIAN FORCES APPEAR TO BE IN SOME CONDITION OF ALERT (RELATIVELY LOW), AND ROMANIAN NEWS AGENCY HAS DENIED THAT PARTS OF ARMY HAVE BEEN MOBILIZED. EXPRESSIONS OF CONCERN WHICH ROMANIAN DIPLOMATS HAVE EXPRESSED TO OTHER GOVERNMENTS HAVE NOT BEEN REPEATED IN CONVERSATIONS WITH U S OFFICIALS, AND ONE ROMANIAN OFFICIAL TOLD U S AMBASSADOR THAT DANGER OF INVASION DECLINES WITH EACH PASSING DAY.

6. SOVIETS PLAINLY ANGERED BY YUGOSLAV POSITION AND MOSCOW MEDIA TAKING OFF GLOVES IN ATTACKING "YUGOSLAV PROTECTORS OF ANTO-SOCIALIST FORCES." THERE ARE SOME SIGNS OF UNEASINESS WITHIN EE COUNTRIES INVOLVED IN INVASION, INCLUDING NORMALLY PLACID BULGARIA WHERE OUR EMBASSY REPORTS MUTED BUT WIDE DISAPPROVAL. REPORTS OF POPULAR SYMPATHY WITH CZECHS
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EAST GERMANY SEEM PLAUSIBLE AND REGIME TAKING PAINS TO
COUNTERACT "CZECH PROPAGANDA." UNEASINESS LIKELY TO DEEPEN
THROUGHOUT AREA AND IN USSR ITSELF IF SOME SORT OF
DENOUNCEMENT OF CZECHOSLOVAK SITUATION DOES NOT SOON MATERIALIZE.
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Intelligence Memorandum

*The USSR's International Position
After Czechoslovakia*

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19 September 1968
No. 0623/68

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
19 September 1968

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

The USSR's International Position
After Czechoslovakia

Summary

Moscow intervened in Czechoslovakia because it feared for its hold over Eastern Europe. Calculations of profit and loss with respect to Soviet international policy in general were secondary. The decision to invade meant that the Soviet determination to preserve the status quo in Eastern Europe overrode any urge that Moscow might have had to seek advantage in limited accommodations with the non-Communist world. In this sense, the Soviet leadership behaved characteristically. Intervention was, at the same time, the most difficult decision ever made by the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime and may turn out to be its most fateful one.

Although the Soviets would like to regard the Czechoslovak affair as essentially internal business and to have the rest of the world so regard it, the issue inevitably raises additional issues for them: relations between East and West and between Communist parties, the trend of Soviet defense spending, the development of the Soviet economy and internal discipline. Only time can tell whether the Soviets were right in concluding that intervention was the lesser of two evils. It will depend, among other things, on whether and for how long the pressures for reform in Czechoslovakia and elsewhere in the Soviet bloc can be contained; whether the collective

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leadership can master its own internal conflicts, and how the policies of others, especially the US, are influenced by what has happened in Czechoslovakia.

Increased distrust of the USSR in the US and Soviet defensiveness and insecurity revealed by the invasion do not bode well for US-Soviet relations in the near future. The possibility should not be excluded, however, that Moscow will see some need after Czechoslovakia for taking steps to keep US-Soviet relations from settling into a total freeze. There is, at any rate, no present indication that Moscow's interest in missile talks with the US is less than before.

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1. It will be months before the "fall-out" from the invasion of Czechoslovakia has settled to earth. What this does to Soviet policy will have to be seen. It seems almost certain, however, that Moscow did not mean its intervention to mark a turning point in its policies generally. The Russian leaders would prefer to think of it, and to have others think of it, as a regrettable but necessary disciplinary action within its own family.

2. Intervention was the most difficult decision made by the Soviet collective leadership during its four years of rule, and probably its most fateful one. Moscow invaded Czechoslovakia because it was afraid not to. The signal to intervene was given because a conclusion had been reached that the cost of nonintervention was unbearable. It presumably also reckoned that, though there would be damage from intervention, it would be damage which could be tolerated. The decision stemmed from anxiety and insecurity, but it also rested on the rational calculation that there was virtually no risk of nuclear confrontation. Whether, in fact, the Soviets chose the lesser or the greater of two evils will only become evident in time. It will depend on several unknowns: if and for how long the pressures for reform in Czechoslovakia and elsewhere in the Soviet bloc can be contained; whether the collective leadership can master its own internal conflicts; and how the policies of others, especially the US, are influenced by what has happened in Czechoslovakia.

3. The occupation of Czechoslovakia reveals that Moscow is not ready to tolerate anywhere in Eastern Europe a weakening of the system of centralized, one-party rule it practices at home. It cannot permit the lesser states in the Warsaw Pact alliance to come to think that they can devise their own blueprints for the reform of the Communist system or that they can serve as pathfinders in a search for a reconciliation of the opposing systems in Europe. The Soviets' anxiety about their security in Eastern Europe is all the greater because of their uncertainty about the security--in both political and physical terms--of their other flank, on the Chinese side.

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4. For a dozen years--ever since Hungary--the Soviets have been groping for a means of ensuring a more or less voluntary acceptance by Eastern Europe of their leadership. The goals of a "socialist commonwealth" and of a reconsolidation of the Communist movement around Moscow on the basis of common interests were probably never attainable on Moscow's terms, but these were more than just propaganda slogans. Although the goals are a shambles now, the tortuous course followed by the Russians before intervention and their backing and filling since then both suggest that they do not want to have to hold Eastern Europe down solely by force if there is any other way. As soon as Czechoslovakia is "normalized," the Soviets must begin again the search for a non-Stalinist dispensation for Eastern Europe.

4. There is every reason to suppose that the Soviet leadership will remain preoccupied, and painfully so, with the problems of Eastern Europe for some time to come, as it has for the better part of the last nine months. And with the problem of Czechoslovakia there arise such attendant questions as the future of relations between East and West and between Communist parties, defense spending, the development of the Soviet economy, and internal discipline. It would not be surprising if the collective leadership failed to weather in its present form the conflict which these issues seem likely to produce.

6. Intervention need not, and probably does not, mean that a faction of "hawks" has got the better of a faction of "doves" in the Politburo. From its first days, the present ruling committee has consistently shown more concern for the Soviet position among other Communist parties and within the Warsaw Pact than for "detente." While caution and compromise have been the most notable characteristics of the collective leadership's behavior, its alarm about the spreading diversity in Communist ranks and the flouting of Moscow's authority within its own orbit have been apparent. Also evident, side by side with a recognition of the indispensability of "peaceful coexistence," has been a constantly rising alarm

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over the hazards for the USSR of exposure to outside influences. With Czechoslovakia, this concern rose to the level of fright. The decision went finally in favor of a primitive, neo-Stalinist attitude which has never, in the past four years, been far from the surface. What is not known, and may not be known for some time, is to what extent this attitude will color Soviet behavior elsewhere.

7. Moscow is now playing for time--time, in the first place, to assure itself that Czechoslovakia is safely back in the fold; to absorb, if it can, the impact of intervention on its own leadership; to sort out the effects on the Soviet position among foreign parties; and to assess the consequences of intervention for its international objectives. It has probably already offered the non-Communist world the only justification it intends to give for its invasion of Czechoslovakia, namely, that Moscow considered its national interests to be threatened and that, like it or not, the world must accept its decision. Foreign Communist parties were clearly expected to respond to the cue of "counterrevolution," but the great majority have not done so. They have seen instead that where Czechoslovakia was concerned, the USSR put its own interests first, and that is what most of the parties have themselves done. The November conference of Communist parties, if now it takes place at all, cannot possibly do what the Soviets intended it to do: develop a new pro-Soviet, anti-Chinese front of Communist parties. Having discovered this, Moscow is likely to value all the more loyal allies like Ulbricht and to consider it all the more necessary to remain sturdy in its support of North Vietnam.

8. There is, in addition, some obvious damage, in the short term, to goals Moscow was pursuing beyond the frontiers of the Communist world. A brake has been put on the momentum which the USSR, together with the US, had succeeded in building up behind the NPT, and considerable diplomatic effort will have to be spent in restoring it. It remains to be seen whether Czechoslovakia has breathed new life into NATO, but the Soviets must now reckon with this possibility. In general, however, the main effects will be in the "psychological" realm and will

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depend on whether and how soon Moscow can persuade others to think of Czechoslovakia as an unfortunate episode. In concrete terms, the direct consequences will be slight. Moscow's recurrent expressions of interest in multilateral projects looking toward a lowering of the barriers between East and West in Europe, such as a European security conference, have always seemed more propagandistic than genuine, and it will be no catastrophe for the Russians if these projects are pushed further into the future. Moscow has all along been following a policy of expediency toward Western Europe, hoping that, with some encouragement, the Western alliance would begin to come apart while its own alliance was still more or less intact. But the Russians have always been more concerned with preserving the status quo in Eastern Europe than in undermining it in Western Europe. Moscow would no doubt have liked to have had it both ways, but Czechoslovakia has made this more difficult. Soviet influence in Western Europe is bound to recede, temporarily at least. But as between the two--influence in Western Europe and authority in Eastern Europe--the Kremlin decided it had only one choice.

9. West Germany is a case apart. Moscow depends on a fear of resurgent German power in Europe--to which it is itself far from immune--to help hold the Warsaw Pact together. It realizes, at the same time, that Bonn will have some say about the shape of a future "European settlement." The Russians have wanted to be able, until that time comes, to keep open a line of communication with the West Germans in order to influence their views on a settlement. They have dangled the prospect of a brighter future before them in private, while inveighing against them publicly. The use of this tactic is now temporarily denied the Russians, and it may turn out that, partly out of their own fear of the impact of Bonn's Eastern policy, they have revived fears in West Germany which will be slow to subside. If this has happened, it will complicate Western pursuit of detente after the Czechoslovak dust has settled.

10. Against the background of heightened Soviet concern for the preservation of the status quo in Eastern Europe, the issue of Berlin will remain a

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sensitive one. Moscow is aware, however, that Berlin, unlike Czechoslovakia, could readily become the scene of a dangerous East-West confrontation. How the Russians deal with the problem in coming months-- when there will be occasion for a test of the positions of East and West in the city--could be a good gauge of the USSR's intentions in general.

11. The Soviet action will have the least impact in the nonaligned world. The USSR may be damaged in those places where its standing has depended to some extent on the validity of its "anti-imperialist" credentials, but those places are probably few. In the Third World, the Soviet position is not likely to be much weakened where it is now strong, as among the Arab states. By and large, the leaders of the nonaligned nations will want to treat the Czechoslovak issue as none of their business. The abstention of India, Pakistan, and Algeria in the vote on the Czechoslovak question in the Security Council is a good sign that recipients of Soviet economic and military assistance will not want to deny themselves future benefits for the sake of what they are likely to think of as a remote and largely irrelevant issue.

12. Finally, where the future of US-Soviet relations is concerned, the outlook depends to some degree on the US attitude. It will probably cause the Soviets little pain if the US cuts back on cultural exchanges, for which they had no great enthusiasm anyway. The idea of a mutual reduction of forces in central Europe, as a first step toward a solution of the problems of European security, is already a casualty; but this will be regretted more in Washington than in Moscow. Such hopes as there were for cooperation between the US and USSR in removing some of the sources of tension in the Middle East seem dimmer, although it may be all the more in the USSR's interest to see that the conflict there remains mainly in the political arena. Moscow seems likely, moreover, to be more determined than ever to remain strictly in line with Hanoi with respect to the Paris negotiations. But, on the question of the Soviet position on nuclear weapons control, it cannot be said with certainty what Soviet behavior toward Czechoslovakia portends. The

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present indications are that Soviet interest in discussions has not been diminished by Czechoslovakia. It may be that the economic and technological arguments for an agreement with the US are apparent to one or another degree across the whole spectrum of Soviet opinion, from militant to pragmatic. Not to be excluded also is the possibility that Moscow will see the need as greater after Czechoslovakia for offsetting steps to keep US-Soviet relations from settling into a total freeze.

13. US-Soviet missile talks, however, have all along promised to be difficult. Distrust of the USSR in the US, which is bound to grow as a result of Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia, combined with the defensiveness and insecurity on the part of the Russians which that action represented, may mean that any talks will now face still harder going.

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SUBJECT: SITUATION IN EASTERN EUROPE

FOLLOWING IS DEPARTMENT'S CURRENT ASSESSMENT FOR USE BY POSTS AS WARRANTED:

1. IN WAKE OF NOVEMBER 6-7 ANTI-SOVIET DEMONSTRATIONS -- THE MOST SERIOUS SINCE AUGUST INVASION, DUBCEK LEADERSHIP MAY BE INCREASINGLY HARD-PRESSED TO COUNTER ATTACKS FROM CZECHOSLOVAK CONSERVATIVES AND INVASION POWERS THAT IT IS AGAIN LOSING CONTROL OF SITUATION AND THAT FURTHER PUNITIVE MEASURES MUST NOW BE TAKEN AGAINST DISSIDENTS. NOVEMBER 7 CABINET ANNOUNCEMENT THAT "CERTAIN DECISIONS" TAKEN TO HAVE COMMUNICATIONS MEDIA BETTER SUPPORT REGIME'S FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC POLICIES THAN HITHERTO INDICATES TIGHTER CENSORSHIP CONTROLS TO BE IMPOSED: ANY SUCH CONTROLS SEEM CERTAIN TO DIMINISH SUPPORT FOR LEADERSHIP AMONG LIBERALS, YOUTHS, AND WORKERS OPPOSED TO SOVIET PRESSURES TO BRING ABOUT "NORMALIZATION." FORTHCOMING PARTY CENTRAL COMMITTEE PLENUM (EXPECTED SOMETIME NEXT WEEK) MAY RESULT IN DIRECT CHALLENGE TO DUBCEK LEADERSHIP FROM CONSERVATIVES OVER FUTURE COURSE PARTY AND NATION SHOULD TAKE. WHILE CLEARLY OUTNUMBERED IN CENTRAL COMMITTEE AND IN PARTY, CONSERVATIVES APPEAR INCREASINGLY CONFIDENT (WITH SOVIET SUPPORT) THEY CAN FORCE LEADERSHIP TO ALTER POLICIES. LEADERSHIP'S AWARENESS OF THREAT POSED BY CONSERVATIVES MANIFESTED IN ITS EFFORTS TO MAINTAIN SUPPORT AMONG YOUTH, WORKERS, AND INTELLECTUALS -- I.E., AMONG THOSE VERY GROUPS MOST ACTIVE RECENTLY IN OPPOSING SOVIET OCCUPATION. THUS, AS IN PRE-INVASION PERIOD, DUBCEK LEADERSHIP FORCED TO COPE WITH MOUNTING ATTACKS FROM CONSERVATIVES ON ONE HAND AND LIBERALS ON OTHER.

2. WITHDRAWAL OF WARSAW PACT FORCES, BEGUN SHORTLY AFTER RATIFICATION OF SOVIET-CZECH STATUS-OF-FORCES TREATY ON 18 OCTOBER, CONTINUES. ALL EASTERN EUROPEAN FORCES, WITH POSSIBLE

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EXCEPTION OF SMALL ADMINISTRATIVE ELEMENTS, HAVE NOW LEFT CZECHOSLOVAKIA AS HAVE THOSE SOVIET FORCES THAT MOVED FROM HUNGARY. ALTHOUGH EVIDENCE INCONCLUSIVE ON RETURN OF SOVIET TROOPS DEPLOYED FROM POLAND, ALMOST ALL, IF NOT ALL, SOVIET FORCES FROM EAST GERMANY WILL PROBABLY HAVE RETURNED TO EAST GERMANY BY MID-NOVEMBER. SEVEN OR EIGHT OF THE EL

CFN SOVIET

DIVISIONS CONFIRMED AS HAVING MOVED FROM THE WESTERN USSR AT THE HEIGHT OF SOVIET OCCUPATION HAVE PROBABLY RETURNED TO THE USSR.

3. AUGMENTATION OF SOVIET FORCE LEVELS IN EASTERN EUROPE TEN WEEKS AFTER INVASION WOULD THUS APPEAR TO AMOUNT TO THREE OR FOUR DIVISIONS. HOWEVER, IT IS POSSIBLE THAT SOME SOVIET FORCES HAVE REMAINED IN THE COUNTRY UNDETECTED, OR THAT ADDITIONAL SOVIET FORCES WILL BE MOVED INTO CZECHOSLOVAKIA. THERE IS ONE REPORT THAT A CONVOY OF SOVIET VEHICLES, EQUIVALENT TO ONE MOTORIZED RIFLE REGIMENT, WAS SEEN MOVING FROM EAST GERMANY TO CZECHOSLOVAKIA TOWARD THE KARLOVY VARY AREA ON 26 OCTOBER.

4. FINAL DISPOSITION OF FORCES EQUALLY DIFFICULT TO ASCERTAIN. EARLY REPORTS PROMPTED ORIGINAL ESTIMATE THAT MOST OF SOVIET FORCE WOULD BE DEPLOYED ALONG CZECH-WEST GERMAN BORDER WHILE LATER REPORTS INDICATED HEAVY SOUTHERN CONCENTRATIONS ALONG CZECH-HUNGARIAN BORDER. LATEST ANALYSIS POINTS TOWARD SOVIET FORCE DEPLOYMENT IN THREE MAIN AREAS -- IN PRAGUE AREA, IN NORTH-CENTRAL MORAVIAN AREA OF OSTRAVA AND OLMOUC AND IN SOUTH-CENTRAL AREA OF BRATISLAVA WITH LITTLE IF ANY DEPLOYMENT ALONG CZECH-GERMAN BORDER. FINAL DEPLOYMENT OF TROOPS PRESUMABLY WILL INDICATE TRUE PURPOSE OF FORCE. FLUIDITY OF SITUATION AT THIS TIME, HOWEVER, PRECLUDES ACCURATE ASSESSMENT AS TO SIZE, DEPLOYMENT OR MISSION OF SOVIET FORCE THAT IS TO REMAIN IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA.

5. IN GENERAL, ANY FIRM JUDGMENT REGARDING NATURE OF "THREAT" IN CENTRAL EUROPE WILL HAVE TO AWAIT NOT ONLY DISPOSITION OF FORCES IN EAST GERMANY, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, POLAND AND HUNGARY BUT ALSO SIZE AND STATUS OF RESERVE FORCES IN MILITARY DISTRICTS OF USSR RELEVANT TO CENTRAL FRONT. PROCESS OF EVALUATING THIS SITUATION IS LIKELY TO TAKE SOME TIME.

6. BEGIN FYI. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY REVIEWING ENTIRE SOVIET

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GROUND FORCE PICTURE IN FORTHCOMING WIE ON SOVIET GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES. RECENT SWIE 11-17-63, CA-11656 NOTAL, REMAINS VALID AS OF DATE OF ISSUANCE. END FYI.

7. A WEEK BEFORE NOVEMBER 11 OPENING OF POLISH PARTY CONGRESS, THE PARTY PAPER TRYBUNA LUDU HAS COME OUT WITH MAJOR ARTICLE EXPLAINING WHAT CZECHOSLOVAK LEADERSHIP HAD DONE WRONG IN BOTH THEORY AND PRACTICE SINCE COMING TO POWER LAST JANUARY. INTENDED AS POLISH CONTRIBUTION TO "OPEN AND FRIENDLY DISCUSSION" BETWEEN PRESS ORGANS OF POLISH AND CZECHOSLOVAK PARTIES WHICH GOMULKA HAD PROPOSED IN HIS SPEECH ON OCTOBER 3, ARTICLE BLAMES DUBCEK PERSONALLY FOR HAVING CONCENTRATED ON A FIGHT AGAINST PARTY CONSERVATIVES, RATHER THAN AGAINST THE CLASS ENEMY. CLAIMING THAT DUBCEK'S ATTITUDE WAS "DECISIVE FOR THE NEGATIVE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SITUATION," THE ARTICLE MAKES HIM INTO A DEVIATIONIST, BEARING MAIN RESPONSIBILITY FOR MAKING INTERVENTION NECESSARY.

8. WHILE SOVIET PARTY HAS FOR SOME TIME NOW BEEN MOVING TOWARD LABELING NATIONALISM "MAIN DANGER" TO COMMUNIST MOVEMENT, POLISH PARTY HAS IN RECENT MONTHS BEEN EMPHASIZING REVISIONISM AS MAIN THREAT, SHOWING NO INCLINATION TO COMPROMISE AND ACCEPT BOTH. THIS STANCE CONFIRMED IN CURRENT ARTICLE WHICH ALSO DOES NOT PLACE ANY EMPHASIS ON PROLETARIAN CHARACTER OF A COMMUNIST PARTY, AS EAST GERMANS AND GOMULKA HAVE DONE LATELY. THUS, ARTICLE APPEARS A COMPROMISE BETWEEN THE MORE ORTHODOX GOMULKA AND THE NEW (MIDDLE) CLASS FORCES WHICH BEGINNING EXERT INFLUENCE ON PARTY POLICY. THE COMING GENERATION OF POLISH PARTY LEADERS, LED BY PARTY SECRETARY AND CANDIDATE POLITBUREO MEMBER HOCZAR, CANNOT AND APPARENTLY DOES NOT INTEND TO OUST GOMULKA FROM POWER AT NEXT WEEK'S PARTY CONGRESS. HOWEVER, IT EVIDENTLY HAS GOTTEN TO THE POINT AT WHICH IT CAN AND DOES INFLUENCE BASIC PARTY POSITIONS. THESE MEN ARE TOUGH, BUT THEY ARE LESS DOCTRINAIRE AND MORE NATIONALISTIC THAN GOMULKA, AND MUCH MORE NATIONALISTIC THAN SOME OF THE OLD COMMUNIST INTERNATIONALISTS GOMULKA HAD BEEN SURROUNDED BY THROUGHOUT HIS CAREER. THEY ARE WILLING TO MUTE THEIR NATIONALISM IN ORDER NOT TO ALARM USSR, BUT THEY WILL NOT RUN THE RISK OF UNDERMINING THEIR DOMESTIC SUPPORT BY CONDEMNING IT.

9. IN RECONSTRUCTING RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN WARSAW PACT, DEPARTMENT SEES EVIDENCE OF DESIRE BY BOTH BUCHAREST AND MOSCOW TO REINVIGORATE ROMANIAN ROLE IN PACT. FOLLOWING SEPTEMBER 27-29 YAKUBOVSKY VISIT TO BUCHAREST, ROMANIANS REPORTEDLY AGREED "IN PRINCIPLE" TO MUCH DISCUSSED JOINT PACT MANEUVERS

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IN ROMANIA NEXT YEAR -- WITH PROVISOS THAT DETAILS ^{Recd:} BE SPELLED OUT ON NUMBERS OF TROOPS INVOLVED, DATES OF ENTRY AND EXIT OF FOREIGN UNITS, ETC. ROMANIA DOUBTLESS MADE DECISION TO REDUCE STRAINS WITH "THE FIVE" HARD CORE PACT STATES AND ITS ISOLATION FROM PACT ACTIVITIES OVER PREVIOUS SEVERAL MONTHS. DECISION PROBABLY TAKEN JUST BEFORE MID-OCTOBER CEAUSESCU SPEAKING TOUR NEAR MOLDAVIAN-SOVIET BORDER, THUS REDUCING CEAUSESCU INHIBITIONS ABOUT EMPHASIZING NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE THEMES AT THAT TIME. (DEPTTEL 259257)

10. SOVIETS' EVIDENT SATISFACTION WITH INCREASING CONSENSUS WITHIN PACT, OCCASIONED BY CHANGED ROMANIAN ATTITUDE ON MANEUVERS AND POSSIBLE RESOLUTION OF LONG-PENDING ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGES REFLECTED IN ANNOUNCEMENT OF "COMPLETE MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING" AND "IDENTITY OF VIEWS" AT OCTOBER 29-30 PACT DEFENSE MINISTERS MEETING IN MOSCOW. THIS MEETING SEEMED TO PICK UP PACT CONSULTATIONS WHERE THEY WERE LEFT OVER FROM SOFIA SUMMIT MEETING LAST MARCH, SUBSEQUENT TO WHICH "THE FIVE" EVIDENTLY DECIDED TO SHUNT TROUBLESOME ROMANIANS ASIDE IN COMING TO GRIPS WITH NPT, CZECHOSLOVAK AND OTHER PROBLEMS. REPORTS OF SOFIA MEETING HAD SUGGESTED FURTHER PACT DISCUSSIONS WITHIN SIX MONTHS, BUT THIS TIMETABLE APPARENTLY UPSET BY CZECHOSLOVAK INTERVENTION. INCREASED MOSCOW APPRECIATION OF RECENT ROMANIAN BEHAVIOR MAY ALSO LIE BEHIND APPARENT LATE-OCTOBER DELIVERIES OF MIG-21 AIRCRAFT AND PERHAPS OTHER MATERIEL TO ROMANIAN ARMED FORCES. FACT THAT AIRCRAFT ARRIVED WITH SOVIET MARKINGS RAISES QUESTION, HOWEVER, WHETHER THEY DEFINITELY MEANT FOR ROMANIAN AIR FORCE OR MIGHT BE USED BY SOVIETS FOR OTHER PURPOSES. (ONE SOURCE SUGGESTS, BUT WE THINK UNLIKELY, THEY MIGHT BE RELATED TO SOVIET MIDDLE EAST ACTIONS; ANOTHER INDICATES THEY MIGHT BE USED IN FUTURE JOINT MANEUVERS IN DOBROGEA.) REPORTS OF SOVIET, POLISH, BULGARIAN, AND HUNGARIAN OFFICERS VISITING ROMANIA IN RECENT DAYS ALSO SUGGEST TREND TOWARD RAPPROCHEMENT. NOT YET CLEAR WHETHER THESE OFFICERS IN BUCHAREST IN CONNECTION WITH NOVEMBER 7 OCTOBER REVOLUTION ACTIVITIES (AS ACTING FOREIGN MINISTER MACOVESCU ASSERTED), DISCUSSIONS ON FUTURE MANEUVERS, OR RUMORED PACT INTELLIGENCE MEETING. BUT THEIR PRESENCE, FOR FIRST TIME IN YEARS, REFLECTS CURRENT REACTIVATION OF ROMANIAN MULTILATERAL CONTACTS WITH PACT MEMBERS.

11. ROMANIA HAS NOT, HOWEVER, RECONCILED ITSELF TO ANY BASIC CHANGE IN NATIONAL POLICIES. KINDS OF AGREEMENTS RECENTLY MENTIONED (E.G., JOINT MANEUVERS, UPGRADING PACT STAFF WITH

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INCREASED EAST EUROPEAN VOTE, CREATION OF NEW LOGISTICS AND OPERATIONS COMMITTEES WHEN MEMBER STATES HOST OTHER MEMBERS' FORCES) SEEM TO PROJECT RATHER FAR-REACHING FORMS OF MILITARY COOPERATION, BUT IT APPEARS QUITE UNLIKELY THAT ROMANIANS WILL BE EAGER PARTICIPANTS OVER LONG HAUL IN INSTITUTIONAL TIGHTENING OF WARSAW PACT. INDEED REPORTED AGREEMENTS THEMSELVES SEEM TO CONTAIN SEEDS OF FUTURE DISPUTES, WHICH COULD ULTIMATELY LEAD TO SERIOUS PROPORTIONS AS ROMANIANS ARE CALLED ON TO HONOR PROMISES SOVIETS MAY BELIEVE THEY HAVE ELICITED FROM CEAUSESCU.

12. MOSCOW'S MOST EXPLICIT ATTACK IN SOME TIME ON THE SLOWNESS WITH WHICH CZECHOSLOVAK OFFICIALS ARE ACCEDING TO SOVIET DEMANDS WAS CONTAINED IN A NOVEMBER 4 PRAVDA ARTICLE CONDEMNING "SOME OFFICIALS" WHO OPPOSE PRO-SOVIET ELEMENTS WITHIN THE CZECHOSLOVAK PARTY. MOSCOW HAS USED AGRICULTURAL PLENUM OF OCTOBER 30-31 TO GIVE POLITBURO FULL CENTRAL COMMITTEE APPROVAL FOR CZECHOSLOVAK POLICIES. PRAVDA EDITORIAL ON PLENUM ON NOVEMBER 3 REASSERTS LINE THAT INTERNAL COUNTER-REVOLUTION AND EXTERNAL REACTION HAD THREATENED SOCIALIST GAINS IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND JUSTIFIED INTERVENTION AS "FRATERNAL INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE TO THE COMMUNIST PARTY AND PEOPLE OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA." NOVEMBER 6 OCTOBER REVOLUTION ANNIVERSARY SPEECH OF POLITBURO MEMBER MAZUROV ASSERTED "MOST IMPORTANT TASK" OF SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY IS TO DEFEND "COMMON GAINS OF SOCIALISM" AND JUSTIFIED INVASION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA AS STEP INTENDED TO PRESERVE THESE GAINS IN THAT COUNTRY.

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THE COMMITTEE FOR STATE
SECURITY OF THE COUNCIL
OF MINISTERS OF THE USSR
5 November 1968

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A document has been received at the Committee for State Security in which a number of judgments are set forth about contemporary students and youth.

The author of the document is a college student who has been in the company of many young poets, artists, and performers, and who has taken part in the competitions of the "Club for the Happy and Quick-Witted" (GHQ). [The GHQ was a popular television program--M.K.]

Despite the immaturity of the author and his obvious subjectivism when analyzing certain matters, the document, in our view, merits close attention, since many of the propositions in it coincide with the views of our other sources.

Taking account of this information, the KGB is adopting measures to study negative processes and to prevent politically harmful developments among our youth that might arise from these processes.

Attachment: Document numbering 33 pages.

CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE FOR STATE SECURITY

[signed] Andropov

ATTACHMENTThe concept of a "student" in our country encompasses an extraordinarily large number of people. However, the present essay is intended to describe and analyze the behavior of full-time undergraduate students, who are potentially, by virtue of a number of factors, the most socially unstable and most easily swayed group in the population. These factors include the group's relative youthfulness, the daily contacts the members have with others like themselves, the members' lack of material obligations (for the most part) before their families, and so forth. STUDENTS AND THE EVENTS IN CZECHOSLOVAKIAStudents' attitudes toward the ongoing situation in Czechoslovakia are of two main types. On the one hand, indignation is expressed toward the "brothers," whom we "have been subsidizing for so many years" and who are now responding with vile ingratitude. This group of students, among whom are participants in the Hungarian events, demand decisive measures and the use of military force. However, this group is small in number.

The rest of the students, who generally take pleasure in anything that causes problems for or conflicts with the official line, are watching the ongoing situation in Czechoslovakia with benevolent curiosity. They have no real sense of what all this can lead to. They are impressed by the Czech students, who have become a major social force. Some even contemplate (albeit hypothetically) the possibility of repeating the Czech experience in our own country. In a discussion with the author of this review, a third-year student said: "It's interesting to think whether such events could take place here. I personally would take part if they did."

What has attracted especially great interest is the creation of opposition parties. The very word "opposition" is something students find appealing, and even the most thoughtful of them regard the creation of an opposition party as a solution to the paradox they have encountered: "The struggle for the Soviet regime is against the Soviet regime." Hence, they are following events in Czechoslovakia with great interest. The excesses cited in the Soviet press seem largely harmless

to them, and the official commentaries seem too pointed.

The place where students are afraid of the situation that has unfolded is China....

The events in Poland, given their brief duration, did not attract special attention. From time to time, rumors circulate about anti-Semitic purges in Poland. The Russian segment of the students and the Ukrainians would welcome such developments.

(Source: TsKhSD, F. 5, Op. 60, D. 48, Ll. 120-153.)

Document introduced, translated, and provided by Mark Kramer, Center for Foreign Policy Development, Brown University, and Russian Research Center, Harvard University.

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

DATE 1 March 1969

PLACE GRAND TRIANON PALACE, VERSAILLES
AFTERNOON CONVERSATION

PRESENT

The President
General de Gaulle
Prime Minister Couve de Murville
Mr. Andronikov
MG Walters

This conversation followed the morning one which was reported upon separately. This is the report of the talks that occurred after lunch.

The President said that on Tuesday after his return the National Security Council would meet on the matter of an anti ballistic missile system. Subsequently he would meet with our legislative leaders and it was probable that his decision would be announced on Tuesday evening or Wednesday morning. He was speaking in great confidence.

General de Gaulle said that the President would be confident that there would be no indiscretion on the French side.

The President said that this was a difficult decision, there had been a lot of speculation concerning it and it had many political overtones and was related to possible talks with the Soviets in respect to limiting missiles. The General would remember that the Soviets had developed a limited anti ballistic missile system and they had deployed it only around Moscow. It was our understanding that they were delaying deploying it further around other cities hoping for further developments in this field. He was speaking to the General in great confidence as no one knew what his decision would be, and there was great speculation concerning it. After the Soviets had deployed their system last year the US had decided to go ahead with a limited system known as the Sentinel. This would be deployed around our major cities.

General De Gaulle repeated his assurances that no one would talk on the French side.

The President said that since the election and his inauguration great political pressures had been brought on the administration on two grounds. Some felt that we should wait until after we saw how things went in talks with the Soviets and the second ground was the fear expressed that in some of the protected cities that the presence of the missiles might endanger them. The 2nd ground was totally fictitious. The first ground had some basis of relevance. The argument had also been made that from the bargaining point of view that the US should also have something on the counter and since the Soviets already have something we should too. A third argument relates to the capabilities of the system. A thin Anti Ballistic Missile system would be effective only against an attack by a minor nuclear power like China and would not be effective against a major nuclear power like Russia which could launch enough missiles to penetrate it. Even between the US and the USSR whatever advantage no matter how small makes an attack by the other more difficult. It means more targets to take out. If missiles are deployed to protect cities then the argument can be made that the prime purpose of the system is to provide some assurance to a nation that might make a first strike. Today for example if another Cuban missile crisis were to occur and as a result the US struck first. The man making such a decision would be very heartened to know that no matter how many weapons the USSR launched that there would be a second strike. The argument could be made that it would increase the credibility of a US strike.

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On the other hand if the US did not go forward with at least a minimal program the possibility exists that before the time of an agreement the Soviets might make significant technical breakthroughs that would give them a definite advantage. Credibility was both political and military. A majority of public opinion in the US would probably oppose the deployment of such a system because there was a trend of opinion against military costs and this combined with false fears. Another reason would be that some might fear that this would escalate the arms race. Actually he was leaning towards, though his mind was not definitely made up a limited system but in a sense different from the defense of cities. This involved planning to build an ABM system for the purpose of protecting the deterrent and our second strike such as the Minuteman sited and other non hardened sites. This would also avoid the risk of falling behind in ~~technical~~ development of the art. Secondly it would improve our bargaining position and thirdly it would not be provocative to the Soviet Union because it would bear no relationship to a first strike but would only be effective in protecting our capability for a second strike in reply to a first strike by the USSR. Pending any agreement the US must at all costs maintain the ability to make a second strike. Another good reason to choose this program rather than to deploy the system around cities was that the unprotected cities would complain that others were protected but not them. The Europeans would say this also.

General De Gaulle said that this would also avoid having to choose which cities would be protected. The system would cover only those organisms essential to assure a US second strike so that the adversary would know that there would be a second strike. When Kosygin had gone to the US and seen President Johnson at Glassboro he had stopped in Paris on his way back to Moscow. He said that Pres. Johnson had told him that an ABM system would be ruinous for both of them and they should reach an agreement not to build them. Kosygin said that maybe what was needed was an agreement against missiles rather than against anti missiles.

The President said that since 1962 the Soviets had widened the advantage in conventional forces between the forces of the Warsaw pact and those of the Western countries. and they had in great measure closed the gap in strategic weapons. Until an agreement was reached we had no choice but to maintain our credibility. General De Gaulle thanked the President for telling him about this.

The President said that to return to the question of Western Europe as he had indicated there were great political pressures for a substantial reduction of US forces in Europe and more particularly in Germany. Before the invasion of Czechoslovakia, Senators Fullbright and Mansfield had present bills requiring the return to the US of two divisions. These would certainly have passed without Czechoslovakia. In the US people's memory was short and Czechoslovakia was nearly forgotten. Amidst the talk of detente people would probably favor a lessening of the US presence in Europe. The same kind of talk would lead some of our people to favor reducing our arms budget by substantial amounts. This is why it would be dangerous if the idea prevailed in the US that the only option was a nuclear exchange between the US and the USSR. People would jump to conclusions and feel that all of our problems were over. They would start asking why it was necessary to maintain forces in Europe.

General De Gaulle said that if a detente was achieved with the Soviet Union that where the situation would end anyhow. He did wish to point out one thing. If the US decided to make substantial reductions in US strength in Europe that was the US business, but there was one thing he must point out. It would not be good if the idea arose that the departing US forces should be replaced with German units. This would have serious consequences. Even if the US decided to withdraw some of its forces in Europe it should still maintain a real military presence.

The President said that one thing he wanted to emphasize to the General was the fact that we have not decided when the talks may begin, we want to get a little more out of the other side, on political matters. It was a delicate situation which might easily set off a precipitate demand to reduce our effort in Europe and in strategic weapons. He believed like the general that we should welcome a detente in Europe with the USSR. They may well want it because of their primary concern regarding China, but of this we cannot be sure until we see what they do in negotiations. Until then those of us who had responsibility for maintaining the ~~instrument~~ primary deterrent had to see that it was maintained.

General De Gaulle said that he would permit himself to tell the President that he was quite right.

The President said that he would tell the general that he was surprised after his election when he saw the classified figures at how close the Soviet Union was to us in strategic missiles. We were still ahead but not by much. This did not mean however that the deterrent lacked credibility. Each side had a capability for a second strike, which meant that a decision would have to be taken in less than 20 minutes for something that could kill 60 or 70 million people. We were sure that the Soviets had the same concern and that therefore the deterrent was credible.

General de Gaulle said that there were two points related to the deterrent at the present time. The Russian government was obviously aware of its responsibilities, so was the US government. Neither believes that the other will strike first. However changes could take place in Russia and less probably in the US which would make this situation no longer true. This was why the French were holding onto their weapons and refusing to sign the Non Proliferation Treaty. They were however favorable to as large a number of countries as possible signing the treaty. Quite frankly they hoped that neither the Germans nor the Israelis would acquire nuclear weapons.

The President said that when we think of men making these decisions we normally think of normal men but a man we would not consider normal-- Hitler-- started World War II. we must therefore also plan for the madman. He felt as he had expressed earlier that it was important for the good of the US that not only France should have nuclear weapons but in a broader sense that in the economic political and military fields that the European community have independent power and existence. This was one of the reasons why he had favored what is generally called integration but he was not wedded to any particular method. He felt that from the point of view of the United States that there be some collective power which can be a major economic political and military force apart from the US but with it we hope, was very important.

General De Gaulle said that this opinion was also theirs.

The President said that he had been talking to the Prime Minister at lunch and while the approaches to the Major Powers to which the general had referred were not along the line we had previously approved we would welcome them if they could get things done. He wanted to emphasize that on European problems including those of the UK we would express our views at times but that things in Europe should be allowed to develop in their own way. Times had changed. 22 years ago Europe was prostrate, economically, militarily and spiritually. They had been thinking in terms of a military alliance and fear of invasion had brought them together. Times had required American leadership as the US had power and Europe did not. The US was still ahead in economic and military power, but the nations of Europe were stable and had developed political strength and substance and in some cases nuclear capabilities. He felt that the period in which the US could effectively exert leadership is no longer here. He did not mean by this that we would not assume our responsibilities for the common defense. We would continue our role in NATO and

do everything we could to draw the nations of Europe together. Political realities had changed and we would expect initiatives to come from Europeans. This was the way he meant to conduct the foreign policy of the United States.

General De Gaulle said that they took note of this and shared this feeling. Changes that would come were such that they would take time. The French will not oppose them. They are not opposed to rapprochement and even union. Because they were favorable to these ideas they were hostile to false appearances. They did not feel that Europeans should resign themselves to a subordinate position but rather that they should take over their own responsibilities. The US could do a great deal to help.

The President said he felt that we should seek areas where we can work together. He had the impression in his mind that in Europe and in the US there existed an idea that France and the US were at odds and this was mistaken. We did not always agree on everything but from these conversations it seemed that we were moving towards the same goals even though we might select different speeds and different roads. He felt that a good starting point might be if we could find in an appropriate way a common ground to work together in the Middle East. This would be a good start. We should seek something concrete, not something to put in a communique. That is not the way to do things. But if we could find a way through our experts to a symbolic act and a practical move. General de Gaulle said that we should try and find an agreement on the Middle East and make it prevail in the talks of the 4. The President then asked whether General de Gaulle believed that talks on Middle East would best be handled in framework of 4 working withing United Nations and De Gaulle said that this was his view. The Four should actively seek to agree on a solution. It would not be enough merely to encourage Jarring to go on with his task. The French had outlined a solution and believed that the Soviets were not far from this. If the four could agree this would be important. If the French and US agreed it would be difficult for the Soviet to disagree said the President. De Gaulle concurred and the President said that the Soviet might be as alarmed about the situation in the Middle East as we were. Prime Minister Couve de Murville said that they might be even more frightened.

The President said that in the matter of monetary problems he felt that the most responsible way to handle this would be to have one of our experts talk to their experts to see what could be done in common. General de Gaulle commented that he was glad to hear that we recognized that there was a monetary problem. He did not believe that a large conference would be useful it would only engender speculation. We should talk on these matters with extreme discretion. French might find one person on their side to talk with our expert and they could advance cautiously and clarify the problems. The President said that whenever the French thought that this was the best way to handle things he hoped that they would let him know. He thought that if anything in recent years there had been too much speculation and publicity. Big meetings were rarely productive. General De Gaulle said that the monetary system had been set up at a time when the US had overwhelming financial and economic power. The French did not say that the monetary system is no good but times have changed and this should be considered. The French were ready to look into this matter with us with the greatest discretion and would study to see what person might be indicated to work with our expert. This could be done unofficially and without committing the countries in advance.

The President said that he had greatly appreciated this chance to talk with the General in such depth. He looked forward to seeing him again at dinner later and a on Sunday. He would like to ask one other question. He was going to see the Pope on Sunday. He had seen him twice before. The main problem in Italy was the strength of the communist vote this was the main cause of concern not only for the Christian Democrats but also for someone like President Saragat who was a socialist. He did not mean to be indiscreet

but could the Pope exercise influence on that very sensitive sector of the Italian electorate. This had in fact been done in 1948 and it had been very significant. Now the Church was opening to the left partly because of the ferment inside the Church and partly because of a feeling of detente etc.

General de Gaulle said that it was true that the Pope had great authority everywhere and in Italy above all. To the Italians he was a sovereign and the actions of the Pope, Episcopate and clergy had great political significance. Presently the Pope was being attacked from within the Church and that of course weakened his position. He has not however lost his authority and he will not let the communists win in Italy. There is a limit beyond which he will not let them go. General de Gaulle thought that the Italian Communists had reached the high tide mark and would go no further. The Communist Party of Italy was in fact drawing away from Moscow and was even condemning it on occasion something that would never have happened only a few years ago. He hoped that the President would tell the Pope what he had told him and would mention that they had talked about these things. He hoped that the President would encourage the Pope as the Pope would undoubtedly encourage him that all was not lost and that freedom will triumph. He believes that the US is not far from him and what the President was doing was an ecumenical gesture and a good one. General de Gaulle then said that in Italy there is a joke which says that it does not matter if there is no government there is the Pope, and for law and order there is the Corps of Carabinieri,

The meeting then concluded.



Memorandum of Conversation

Place General de Gaulle's office in the Elysee Palace, Paris

Date: 28 March 1969
-at-

Present The President
 General De Gaulle
 Mr. Andronikov
 MC Walters

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After expressing his satisfaction at the president's visit General de Gaulle said that he was entirely at the President's disposal to discuss anything he wished.

The President thanked him and said that he hoped that they would be able to discuss the whole range of East West problems, then they might discuss such matters as the Middle East, Viet Nam and economic matters even though a great deal of the latter were purely technical.

The President said that one of his major concerns was that as a new president in any talks which we may have with the Soviet Union he wanted to be sure that the position which the United States takes is the best one to achieve our common objectives. He would like to have the General's advice and suggestions as to what talks the US should have with the Soviet Union and his views on what other initiatives should be taken in this regard by the new administration. He would also like to talk about bilateral matters of interest to France and the United States on which they might take some action. He would also appreciate the General's evaluation of the situation in Eastern Europe after the invasion of Czechoslovakia and the Soviet declaration concerning Sovereignty over the other countries of Eastern Europe. He would also like to know the General's evaluation on China. What policy did he feel was most adapted to the requirements of the situation. He hopes that the General would talk to him frankly and directly. His purpose was not to talk for any public declaration and what would be said would not be put on the normal diplomatic circuit. General de Gaulle said that the President could count on him for this. He would certainly maintain the matters discussed in close confidence. The President said that he would appreciate the General's personal advice.

General de Gaulle recalled that he had already discussed some of these matters with the President in 1967. He felt that we must realize that there was Russia and there was Communism and that they were not always the same thing. France did not want Communism. He did not feel that the communists were advancing any longer. Certainly they were no longer advancing in France and in Italy, certainly not in Germany, not in Poland Hungary and Czechoslovakia, not even in the USSR. He did not think that the danger of communism was over, it may last many years still but it can no longer conquer the world. It is too late for that. The dynamic is gone.

Russia said the General is a vast country with a long history with great resources, pride and ambitions which are not necessarily communist. It is a fact that it is a country which suffered greatly during the war which they feel that they won and there is some truth in this. It was the Russian Army that broke the back of the German Army. Russia is a country filled with ambition resources and drive. With difficulty they have made progress and they are aware of this. If the President could place himself in the position of the Soviet leaders he would find that his principal concern for tomorrow would be China. This is an enormous country which has a common frontier thousands of miles long with Russia. The Chinese have always detested the Russians and probably detest them more now than at any other time in the

Chinese ambitions are directed mainly against Russia, against Manchuria, Siberia and Central Asia. The Russians know this and China is their main preoccupation. With Communism stopped this becomes even more important. They see their relationship with the West and with the US in the light of the problems they expect to have with China tomorrow. They are thinking in terms of a possible clash with China tomorrow. They cannot face both China and the West (the US in particular) at the same time. Thus he believed that with prudence and with some steps forwards and some backwards they may well opt for a policy of rapprochement with the West. When he said rapprochement he did not mean that he expected that the Russians would enter into full trust and confidence with the West but that they would like in the light of their growing quarrel with China to be sure that the West would not act against their back. They know that you and they are rivals, but they might want an arrangement, as sort of modus vivendi that would ensure that they would not be attacked in the back. This was true for their relations with the US, with the West and with Germany. They had always suffered greatly at the hands of the Germans but more particularly during the Second World War. The Germans had done terrible things in Russia, they had gone all the way to the Caucasus and had almost overthrown the Soviets. The Russians have not forgotten this and a perpetual concern of theirs was the thought that if they one day have trouble with China they do not want the Germans to be able to harm them or to drag the West against them. This is an idee fixe of their policy.

The President said he would like to ask whether the General felt that the Russians also had as a goal a modus vivendi with the US while tightening their control over the peoples of Eastern Europe so as to weaken the will of the peoples of Western Europe to build up their defenses. Some of the people to whom the President had talked believed that while the Russians were willing to meet with the US to secure a detente, it was partly because of the fear of China which the General had described also because one of their major objectives was to consolidate their hold over the peoples of the countries of Eastern Europe and induce the peoples of Western Europe to lessen their defensive efforts.

General De Gaulle said that the Russians would of course be delighted if the countries of the West and the US were to diminish their defense efforts as thus their relative power would be greater but he did not think that the Russians intended to "march West". They knew that this would lead to a general war. The US might not react at once with all its means but such a move would inevitably to General War and he did not believe that the Soviets wanted this. Their leaders know that they could not win such a war. He repeated that he did not believe that they wanted to march west. They would certainly like it if the US and the Western countries were to become weaker but that would still not induce them to move in Europe. It is too late for that. The Soviets do not want their satellites to leave them. They want to maintain power over Poland, East Germany, Hungary Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria and if possible over Romania. It is already too late for them to do this in the case of Yugoslavia. They had occupied Czechoslovakia because they were afraid that the Czechs would leave them and "go elsewhere". They would not let themselves be weakened in the West but had given up the idea of conquering the West. They might some day make a move at Berlin but this is a small affair. With their growing concern about China he felt that they were sincere in their desire for a detente with the West. When the French had made first move in this direction, despite the fact that they had made no political concessions to the Soviets they had been treated with great politeness and amiability. When the US arrived at some arrangement with the USSR on Strategic Missiles or ABMs they would also be amiable to the US. Nikita Khrushchev had wanted to do this but had not been able to do it, nor had the US, Vietnam had arisen. General de Gaulle felt working towards a detente was a good idea, in fact if the US was not prepared to go to War or to break down the Wall then there was no alternative policy that was acceptable.

To work towards a detente was a matter of good sense. The US should take all precautions even as the French had in talking to them it was good sense if you were not ready to make war to make peace. He felt that the Soviets were not strong enough to enlarge their conquests and in view of their fear of China they might well be disposed towards a detente with the West and the US in particular. They had already moved in this direction in coming to an agreement with the US on the non proliferation treaty.

The President then asked whether the General believed that the Russians consider the American nuclear deterrent as credible. The balance of power in the world had changed markedly since 1962 when President Kennedy with the much appreciated support of General de Gaulle had stood firm in the Cuban crisis. At that time the US had a superiority in strategic missiles on the order of five to one, not just in number but in capability of first and second strikes. Since that time the Soviet Union had made remarkable progress in the field of missiles and though the US might still be slightly ahead there was a rough parity in strategic arms. In conventional forces the advantage enjoyed by the forces of the Warsaw pact had also been significantly increased in relation to the West including France. As things now stood they were way ahead in conventional forces. Some had suggested that if the Russians tried to move politically and diplomatically, the president was inclined to agree with General de Gaulle that they would not march on the Rhine. General de Gaulle interjected "except possibly at Berlin". The President continued saying that if the Russians moved did the Russians believe that the US would react with strategic weapons, did the Europeans have confidence that the US would move in answer to ~~xxxx~~ an attack or the threat of an attack by massive conventional ground forces.

General de Gaulle said he could answer for the French not the Europeans as Europe was made up of all sorts of people. He felt that the French believed that the Russians knew that if they moved west they would have an initial advantage in conventional arms the knew that the US would eventually, if not immediately, at least after a certain time be obliged to commit atomic weapons. The Russians knew that the US could not accept or allow the Russians to conquer Europe for that would also mean the conquest of Africa and the isolation of the United States on the American continent. Though they might have initial success with tactical weapons they knew that it would not stop there and that the US would eventually have to use all of its power and destroy the USSR. The USSR of course also had the power to destroy the US. He did not believe that the Russian wanted everybody to be dead, themselves included. It was not natural for living beings to harbor such ideas. The death of everyone was not a policy. Europeans and French believed that if the Russians marched the US would not use nuclear weapons right away as this would imply a total effort of each side to kill the other who could also kill you. It would take time and if this was true the situation of Europe would indeed be tragic. If the US were to use tactical nuclear weapons and the Soviets also Europe would be destroyed. Western Europe and the UK by Soviet tactical weapons and East Germany, Poland Czechoslovakia and Hungary would be destroyed by US tactical weapons and meanwhile the USSR and the US would not really be harmed. He was sure that neither side wanted the common death as this was not a policy. If this was so then we must do something else as Cold War prepared Hot War A situation in which blocs always opposed one another led nowhere and prevented progress and even liberty. In a world of detente liberty would be the gainer, it would gain points in Poland Hungary and Czechoslovakia. Such a process had already started in Czechoslovakia and might even spread to Russia. That is why he felt that with all precautions the west should move in the direction of a detente that would benefit the Eastern Europeans.

The President then asked how it was that if Freedom gained in an atmosphere of detente that the Russians would be willing to go along. Would they do so because their primary fear is China ?

Would they be willing to take the risk that detente would weaken their hold on their Eastern European neighbors ?

General de Gaulle then said that he had pointed out that there was communism and Russia and even if Communism did not want this Russia might. A detente meant relations, contacts, trips, movement of papers and goods, exchanges of states of mind. One could try and see if one could get together in difficult matters. What the Soviets had done to try and regain their hold in Eastern Europe was because they felt weakened. The Czechs were certainly not in the same state of mind as they were ten years ago. He was not speaking of their unfortunate leaders or their wretched papers but the Czechs were much closer to us than they were ten years ago. Contacts and exchanges led to hope, hope reappeared. He had travelled in Eastern Europe last year in Poland and he had been struck by the warmth with which he had been received by the people. In Romania he had received a similar impression, there was of course an element of curiosity to see General de Gaulle and so forth but there was also a desire to get out of the straitjacket in which they found themselves. He had felt this even in the USSR itself. They still remain men no matter how much they are painted over with ideology. They are still men. The trend towards freedom and dignity is not dead and it can develop in an atmosphere of detente. This was not possible in tension such that people felt that they were at the edge of war. What he had said was philosophy but it was also practical. What else could be done, if one did not want to make war there was nothing else to do except to do nothing at all and that was always the words possible policy.

The President said that he would like to indicate his reasons for announcing his policy up to this point. When he was inaugurated six weeks ago if he had announced that on the next day he was going to meet Kosygin and Brezhnev at the summit, the US press and the world would have applauded and said that now progress was really being made. He had not done this because he felt it was necessary to have very careful planning for a meeting at the summit, there had been the spirit of Glassboro, of Vienna and of Camp David and these hopes had been dashed. It was different when we were meeting with our friends and people who were basically like us. He felt that it would be a mistake for the President of the United States to go to a meeting without knowing what we were going to talk about or where we were going. This would simply raise hopes that would subsequently be dashed. Consequently he believed that we should have talks first with our friends and allies including France. The Soviets had interest in talks on the limitation of strategic weapons. This was a matter that could affect the capability of the US forces in Europe. Another reason for not rushing into arms talks was that it was generally claimed that an arms race increased the risk of war. He thought it was clear that both the USSR and the US would like to reduce the financial burden on themselves. He wished to make clear that on this matter he would not make the decision in this matter on a financial basis, the US had to be able to afford whatever security required. One had to recognize a historical fact that wars also were caused by political tensions. If a freeze on strategic arms were to take place an explosion would still occur in the Middle East at Berlin or in Vietnam and this could lead to war. He felt that this opportunity should be seized by the new administration and he shared the General's view that detente was desirable. However we should be hard and pragmatic in dealing with the Soviets. They knew what they wanted and we must know what we want. While we would not make talks on the Middle East and other matters a condition for talks on limitation of strategic weapons, we do feel that it was proper to suggest at Ambassadorial level as indeed we had that we felt that we should try and make progress on all fronts to achieve a detente. We should talk in the UN in the framework of the Four Powers on the Middle East and discuss later what could be done there. We would like the Soviets help on solving the Vietnamese problem, we realized that their situation in this matter was delicate with the Chinese but the Soviets did have great influence on the North Vietnamese. After all 85 percent of their weapons came from the Soviet Union. Perhaps we could also make some progress

in the Central area on Berlin. Not of course a solution as neither side could give enough to settle the matter, we could perhaps make some progress. The President said he would like to know the General's opinion whether he thought we were correct in proceeding cautiously in asking the Soviets to talk on several areas rather than discussing only limitation of strategic weapons with them. The reason why the President was opposed to an agreement on Arms limitation only without progress on political issues such as the Middle East, Europe and Vietnam was because such an agreement would create a sort of euphoria of peace.

General De Gaulle said he felt that the President was quite right. A detente was the only acceptable policy. One must be cautious and not speak of everything at once, nor should one be overly polite and make concessions to them. The French who had started the policy of detente with them had never made any concessions even on Germany and they certainly had reasons to do so but had not. Now France was on much better terms with the Soviets and had made no concessions to them. Practically if the US were to start conversations on political subjects as well as on strategic missiles ABM's and so forth and if contact could be made with them on other subjects such as Vietnam and the Middle East he felt that the US could do this with all prudence and dignity. He believed that the President should not rush to Moscow and lay out the red carpet before Brezhnev but that the President was quite right in seeking to have adequate preparations made in advance.

The President then said that the question of the Middle East following the French initiative preliminary talks were taking place between the Four Powers. What did the General feel concerning the question of parallel talks between the US and the USSR bilaterally providing always for consultation within the Four while recognizing that any final settlement should be on the basis of the Four Powers rather than something arrived at bilaterally. This would be to the advantage of all concerned. The question in fact was broader. Sometimes we pay lip service to multilateral discussions in the UN, Four Powers etc but when interests of major powers are at stake progress cannot be achieved unless there are bilateral contacts to hammer out differences. The question therefore was did General De Gaulle approve the US having bilateral discussions at the same time as the Four were meeting at the UN.

General De Gaulle said that he felt that if the US entered on the only road to a settlement it was the path of an arrangement between the Four powers which could be implemented then it would be natural to have bilateral talks with the Soviets just as the French had bilateral talks with the Soviets and with the US. He felt that the Four Powers should show that they wanted to agree and were not in favor of indefinite negotiations. It would serve no useful purpose to have a meeting to tell Mr. Jarring to go on with his mission. Even before the 1967 conflict France had proposed Four power talks to tell both the Israelis and the Arabs that they should not attack and that the one who did would be blamed. Had we done that we might have prevented the Israeli attack. France and the US had agreed and the British naturally had done what the Americans wanted (touch of condescending sarcasm). The Russians had not agreed, they had thought that the Arabs were stronger than they really were and wanted an excuse to continue expanding their influence and sending arms to the Arabs. Now on the contrary the Soviets would like to see an end to the conflict and the US would also. This matter should be solved quickly, if it were not solved quickly the situation would grow worse. He felt that the Four should meet to see how the Security Council resolution of November 1967 could be implemented. This would involve the withdrawal of the Israelis to their original borders, Security for Israel and freedom of navigation for all including the Israelis in the Gulf of Aqaba and the Suez Canal and a return of the refugees insofar as this could be done. After that some arrangements could be made on the frontiers if the four powers agreed. If this was not done quickly then it would

never be done and the situation would constantly grow worse. The Israelis would become more and more imperialistic. Dayan would become the Grand Master of the Israelis and he would want war, to go to the Nile, to Beirut and to Damascus and he could do it for he was better armed than the disorganized Arabs but then he would have trouble not just with occupied Jordan but he would face colossal difficulties with the population of Egypt, Iraq and Syria. There would be assassinations and concentration camps, the Pipe lines would be blown up, the Arab governments would fall, Nasser and the Beirut government would fall and the Enragés (Madmen) would replace the existing Arab governments. Who would lead these madmen, certainly not the US nor the Soviets. This would not be good for anyone.

The President then said that this process applies not only to the Middle East but also elsewhere. It was vital that the US not engage in bilateral discussions with the Soviets when such negotiations involved the interests or derogate in any way our major friends. There might be times when two major powers such as the US and USSR who influenced the Israelis and Arabs respectively might find it useful to talk bilaterally within the framework of the Four Power negotiations but it would be better from all standpoints to move as 4 rather than as 2. To return to his question did the General feel that bilateral discussions with the Soviets on the Middle East could be appropriate if the opportunity ~~was~~ provided that it is clearly understood that we would be talking to the French and British at the same time.

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General de Gaulle said that he would repeat what he had said earlier on this subject, that it was normal to talk to everyone. The Russians had given the French their memorandum bilaterally and had done so with the US also, an exchange of views was normal. But as the present had said it would be better for the matter not to appear as though it had been decided in a private US USSR deal. This would not be sufficient. As powerful as the Russians and the US might be they could not lead the Arabs and the Israelis to accept as solution in this manner. A solution must be reached as a group. This was why the French had proposed that the four propose a solution to the Security Council. If the 4 agree the Security Council will agree and this must be implemented. Now there is a decision but it is not being implemented. To be applied it must carry general agreement. The US had influence and power with the Israelis and the Soviets had the same with the Arabs. France did not have the same resources and power but she did have ways of making herself heard, particularly with the Arabs who wanted the French to participate in any settlement. This was natural and one of the reasons why he felt solution should be on basis of Four Powers. He felt that if a solution was proposed to the Council by the US and the USSR there might be difficulties but that if it was proposed by the Four there would be no difficulties in the Council.

The President said that he felt it was much better for the US to have company when we make an agreement on the Middle East rather than to have what some people call a Yalta idea of the US and the USSR making decisions on the Middle East. Also on the Middle East situation it was bad for the Soviet Union to appear to be the Arabs only friend. If the US, France, the USSR and in some measure the UK with Jordan moved together it would give a much greater appearance of even handedness.

General de Gaulle then said that if US and France could agree on a practical solution on the terms they could easily obtain Soviet agreement as they were anxious for conflict there to end. He was not reassured by what might happen in the way of anarchy. If France and US agreed on a solution the Soviets would agree willingly.

The President said that he had read of some of the discussions that had taken place and it was his impression that French and US views in principle were moving in the same channels and he would hope that Foreign Minister Debre and

Secretary of State Rogers could talk while they were here because in principle it seemed that we agreed on what to say.

General De Gaulle said that Frankly France had been very favorable to Israel, and still favored its existence. They had been very favorable until June 1967 and then France had changed her attitude. Previously she had always supported Israel had sold her all the arms she wanted and she had wanted a lot. It was true that the Israelis paid for them. They had had very good relations. She had received Ben Gurion, Levi Eshkol and ~~Abba~~ Eban had often been there. But from June 1967 on France had changed her attitude. She had told the Israelis not to attack, that if they did they would have initial successes but later it would be difficult and they would create difficulties for everyone. France had told them that if they were attacked they would contribute to the defense of Israel. They had attacked and seized Sinai and parts of Jordan. Now the situation had become more and more difficult. France feels that the Israelis must return to their line of departure. After that steps may be taken to improve their frontiers. They must give up their conquests. Their existence must be recognized and they must have guaranteed. France was ready to see that they got freedom of navigation at Aqaba and Suez. We could not let things stand as they are. They will continually get worse and that will be bad for all.

The President recalled that General De Gaulle had talked along these same lines to him in 1967. He wished to clarify one matter in regard to Israel. Most people assume that US Presidents make decisions in regard to Israel under the influence of the political power of the Jewish vote in the US. He was not in that position. General de Gaulle said that he followed the US elections and knew that this was not the case with Mr. Nixon. The President said that he would make his decisions on the Middle East as on Strategic Weapons apart from political considerations within the US. Regarding Israel as a state and apart from any question of Jewish votes in the US will have to use its influence with Israel to get it to accept a settlement. This was a delicate matter and there must not be an imposed settlement, but one that the Israelis agreed to. As a practical matter General de Gaulle knew as well as he did that the Four Powers must agree as to what they would guarantee. A settlement would be of no value unless it was guaranteed. Israel was very sensitive about an imposed settlement. They would not accept a settlement imposed from outside. He believed that Israel could agree to the general outlines of what had been discussed today.

General de Gaulle said that if the Four powers agree and the Security Council does likewise they will have to have the means to implement such a settlement. If the Four agree the Israelis will have to accept, imposed is a word but the Israelis could not afford to be alone. It will be an imposed settlement otherwise the Israelis would not return to their line of departure. They would accept the settlement rather than face the troubles and possibly sanctions of the Security Council. The President said that we knew that.

The President then said that he tended to be somewhat pessimistic on the Middle East even if we get a settlement. Radical Forces such as the Fedayeen and others are operating in Egypt, Syria and perhaps Algeria and the Palestinians in Jordan. They are so strong that any settlement will be fragile and we would only be buying time. The President said that he felt it would be in the interest of Israel, France the US and UK and to some extent the Italians to strengthen the forces of stability in the Arab countries. We need even Nasser, compared to his possible successors he appears much better. We should certainly strengthen what some call the conservative forces such as Saudi Arabia and the Jordanians and further over Libya and Tunisia. After a settlement we would need a policy whereby the nations interested in stability in the area would give aid and support to existing governments who will abide by a settlement and prevent the revolutionary forces from taking over.

General de Gaulle said that this was quite right and that they would meet the following day to discuss these matters further and the meeting then concluded.





NATO, the Warsaw Pact and the Rise of Detente, 1965-1972

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