



## Section II

US-Soviet Summit  
May 1972



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MEMORAN

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT  
FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER  
SUBJECT: The Soviet Leaders

This memorandum seeks to capture the flavor and style of the principal Soviet leaders with whom you will be dealing, Brezhnev in particular, as well as Kosygin and Gromyko, based largely on personal encounters. Your background book already contains much useful biographic and historical information on these men and their colleagues.

Brezhnev

For Brezhnev, the meeting with you is a long-sought goal, both politically and psychologically. Ever since Stalin, Soviet leaders have seen an encounter with the American President as a boost to their authority and a recognition of their stature. Brezhnev, like his predecessor Khrushchev, finds this useful in terms of the never-ending power struggle within the leadership. And whether he admits it to himself or not, to be seen in your company fills a deepseated personal need to be accepted as an equal.

In Brezhnev's case, other impulses have lately come to the surface. He resents his image as a brutal, unrefined person; he is trying to live down his long history of drunkenness. He has come to enjoy the perquisites of office -- he enjoys fancy cars, natty clothes and a certain elevated life-style. He is self-conscious of his looks, heavy eyebrows, for example, and has made an effort to look after his grooming. In short, he has some of the characteristics of the parvenue and the nouveau-riche. Yet he is proud, as Khrushchev was, of his proletarian background and of his successful march up the ladder of power.

Like many Russians, Brezhnev is a mixture of crudeness and warmth. Yet, self-conscious about his background and his past, he eschews Khrushchevian excursions into profanity. His anecdotes and imagery, to which he resorts frequently, avoid the languages of the barnyard. His humor is heavy, sometimes cynical, frequently earthy, but -- in your presence at least -- not obscene. His impulses are elemental, but he

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tries to keep his demeanor and his words within the decorous limits of a middle-class drawing room.

He is nervous, partly because of his personal insecurity, partly for physiological reasons traced to his consumption of alcohol and tobacco, his history of heart disease and the pressures of his job. You will find his hands perpetually in motion, twirling his watch chain (gold), flicking ashes from his ever-present cigarette, clanging his cigarette-holder against an ash tray. From time to time, he may stand up behind his chair or walk about. He is likely to interrupt himself or you by offering food and drink. His colleagues obviously humor him in these somewhat irritating habits.

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Brezhnev is obviously intelligent and shrewd but probably not as acute in these respects as Khrushchev. Like the latter he is alert to any real or imagined polemical thrust and, though less combative than Khrushchev, is not likely to let it pass. For example, when I said (in not uncomplimentary fashion) that we noticed that when he moved, he moved massively, he immediately took this as a thrust at his Czechoslovakian invasion and felt compelled to comment.

Brezhnev's reputation was one of laziness and impatience with details. We know from intercepts that in years past he liked to sneak off to soccer games or other diversions, and in Khrushchev's day would get other Politburo members to cover up for him. But he clearly masters the significant issues and understands Soviet interests. He has stopped his earlier practice of bringing copious notes to meetings, except for formal documents he plans to hand over. Although these are obviously drafted by his staff, he is familiar with their contents, presumably having participated in Politburo discussions of them.

Although top dog, Brezhnev still gives the impression of being on a relatively short leash. He is free to expound an agreed position of the collective, perhaps adding some nuances and emphases of his own, but once he has exhausted his guidance he evidently is required to go back for more, as well as for any changes necessitated by the course of negotiations. He also seems to be under some obligation to report back. At the same time, if Brezhnev believes a particular change in position is necessary, it appears he has the authority to persuade the Politburo to agree to it. In any case, situations could well arise where Brezhnev will say that he must check back with his colleagues. This may be a tactic, but it may also reflect the actual situation.

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Typically Russian, when Brezhnev wants something, he will resort to the bearhug. He will be voluble in explaining how much in your own interest a certain position is; he may intimate that it took a great deal of effort to get his colleagues to agree to a concession; he may even brag that he over-ruled this or that bureaucratic interest group -- he likes to poke fun at his Foreign Ministry, although in fact Gromyko and several of its members do a great deal of Brezhnev's backstopping. He will invite you to "improve" on his own efforts and tell you how much the history books will praise you for the effort. This was the ploy he tried on me when he handed over their draft of principles in U.S. -Soviet relations. He urged me to "strengthen" it, assuring me plaudits if I did so; on the other hand, historians would censure me if I weakened his draft.

Again, typically Russian, when Brezhnev thinks he has made a major concession or breakthrough, he will get impatient to get the matter wrapped up. He may stall for days, but once he moves he will want things settled at once so as to take up the next subject. He almost certainly will not want to get involved in drafting exercises or the shaping of precise formulations himself, preferring to delegate this to his associates, probably Gromyko. (Brezhnev, the politician/party bureaucrat, has little in common with Gromyko, the expert/diplomat. He likes to tease him, à la Khrushchev, but like the latter, he obviously respects the durable Foreign Minister's talents and relies on him.)

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Brezhnev will probably remind you of a tough and shrewd union boss, conscious of his position and his interests, alert to slights. He will be polite sometimes to the point of excessive warmth, including physical contact. He may lapse into orations, sometimes standing up to deliver them. He will be knowledgeable, but uninterested in detail (though his underlings will be extremely careful with fine print.) He may try to test you at some point with a vigorous and ideologically-tinged statement of his position, but he will let you do the same, though perhaps trying to get you off-stride by offering you tea and sandwiches when you break for interpretation.

He will try to flatter you, usually when he wants you to be "statesmanlike" and "generous", and in fact he sometimes betrays an almost reverential view of "the President." He will tell you that he wants you re-elected.

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By NARA Date 7/19/02SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY

4

As he has gotten older, he has permitted himself to wonder aloud about his reputation. He wants a "good" image, although he probably does not mind in some respects the older image of a brutal man, and he wants to be seen as good for Russia in the history books. He will talk about his family, being especially proud and fond of his granddaughter (married while I was in Moscow) who grew up in his house.

As with other Russians, the War remains an earthshaking experience for him. He has lately taken to having his role inflated in publicity. He is proud of his service, of having been a general, of being a veteran. He knows something of the human disaster of war -- one should credit him with genuine abhorrence of it, though, of course, he uses fear of war in others to obtain political ends.

He clearly enjoys power, telling me that in recent years he feels like he's forty years old. He revels in the role of leading a great power and believes that great powers have certain privileges. Though he will never admit to the legitimacy of what we do in Vietnam, he is not without some sympathy for it. He certainly has no conscience pangs about what he did in Czechoslovakia.

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One final aspect of the man; he deeply resents the Chinese. There is an ethnic element, a deepseated folk-suspicion and contempt of another people. He evidently finds them baffling and enigmatic. In private, at least he may appeal to the similarities that Russians and Americans have, compared to the Orientals. Some of the things he will say are, of course, intended to stir up one's own resentments. As a political leader, he will do business with Peking when it suits his purposes. But the antagonism runs deep, fed no doubt by the knowledge that the Chinese regard him as a crude thug who has no right to claim Lenin's or even Stalin's inheritance.

#### Chou and Brezhnev

The Chinese and Russian styles, as exemplified by Chou En-lai and Leonid Brezhnev, make for a fascinating contrast.

Chou is Mandarin - cool; Brezhnev is Slavic - warm. Chou is subtle, refined and indirect. Brezhnev is obvious, elemental and head-on. The Chinese has an intellect at home in universities and drawing rooms. The Russian has the ruthless intelligence of a labor leader earned from brawls on the docks. Chou's mind and body are elegant and disciplined, a coiled spring. Brezhnev is stocky and spontaneous, restless and fidgety.

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Both men have been brutal when necessary, but Chou's charm makes you forget this quality, while Brezhnev's heavy-handedness constantly recalls it. The one is sophisticated and proper; the other gruff and gregarious. Chou masks his cunning with his polished demeanor. Brezhnev doesn't mind reminding you of his shrewdness. Chou, while charismatic and cordial, keeps his distance, stays cool and hides his emotions. Brezhnev with his own animal magnetism, crowds you, easily changes temperature, and wears his emotions openly.

Indeed, one can say that the contrasting styles of Chou and Brezhnev are reflected in Chinese and Russian food. Chinese cuisine is delicate, meticulous and infinitely varied. Russian meals are heavy, straight forward, predictable. You eat Chinese food gracefully with chopsticks, you could eat most Russian food with your hands. One walks away from a Chinese meal satisfied but not satiated, and looking forward to your next experience. After a Russian meal one is stuffed, if not logy.

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All of this suggests that dealing with the Russians is less pleasurable than with the Chinese, depending on one's taste. It should not suggest, however, that it is any less challenging.

Brezhnev and his colleagues will not have the place in history that Mao and Chou are assured. But they have survived their own long marches through savage infighting that takes place among Soviet leaders. They have clawed their way to the top and pushed aside (and put away) formidable men in the process. If the Chinese Communist leaders have been sustained in their struggles by their vision of the future, the Russian leaders have prevailed through tough jockeying and canny maneuvering. Mao and Chou may have matchless strategic vision; Brezhnev and his cohorts have clearly displayed great tactical skills.

Furthermore, Brezhnev and company lead a superpower, one equal in many respects to our own nation. They speak with the weight of current strategic equality, while the Chinese strength derives from a combination of their long past and their inevitable future.

Brezhnev has important business to do with you now. He cannot afford to show patience on some issues, like Chou can. On the West, he has put his

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6

personal stamp on detente efforts; the sinking of the German Treaties and a souring of U.S. -Soviet relations would almost certainly invite internal challenges to his leadership position. On the East, he faces deep historical and personal antagonism, the spectre of 800 million talented and dedicated people, a growing nuclear arsenal, ideological rivalry, and territorial disputes. Moscow has to get a grip on the Teutonic past so it can deal with a Mongolian future.

Given the stage of our bilateral relations and personal inclination, Chou could spend time with us on history and philosophy. Brezhnev will want to talk about concrete issues - the format of a European Security Conference, the major elements of a SALT agreement, the mines in Haiphong Harbor, the drawing of lines in the Middle East. Although he obviously won't know all the details like Gromyko, he will be well briefed and in command of his material, prepared to press you on specific questions. He will want results and agreements, and he will not hesitate to do some tactical elbowing in the process.

Finally, while Chou must invoke Mao's authority and on major issues actually consult, he is at present in complete operational command. Brezhnev, on the other hand, while the dominant leader, still must lean on his colleagues for assistance. For your visit, the two most important will probably be Kosygin and Gromyko. Some brief comments on them therefore are in order.

#### Kosygin

Kosygin is clearly subordinate to Brezhnev in power and authority; he will not be charged with conducting conclusive talks on sensitive issues, but he will speak on them. His forte is in the economic area, though he is fully informed on all other questions. Indeed he almost certainly masters the details more completely than Brezhnev.

Kosygin has the reputation of being more liberal than Brezhnev. This is a superficial judgment. He is a manager-type and therefore tends to be pragmatic on operational questions. He wants to get things done and gets impatient with interference from party watchdogs and bureaucrats. He is fascinated by technology and economic issues and for that reason favors trade and other exchanges with the West. But in other respects, Kosygin is rigid and orthodox. It is almost as though he compensates for his managerial pragmatism with an almost theological orthodoxy on ideological matters. Moreover, on questions such as Vietnam, Kosygin has often been far more polemical than Brezhnev.

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7

In connection with Kosygin's greater polish, it is worth keeping in mind that he has been accustomed to function at the upper reaches of power for more than thirty years and has been exposed to many outside contacts. Brezhnev was still clawing his way to the top when Kosygin was among the top twenty or so leaders.

One of Kosygin's strengths has been that he probably never aspired to the very summit of power. (In any event he has never had the power base within the Party machine.) Successive leaders beginning with Stalin have valued his competence. This does not, of course, mean that he has not participated in Kremlin politics. Obviously, he played a role in the coup that overthrew Khrushchev and he probably would not hesitate to participate in one against Brezhnev, but not out of personal ambition. His past friction with Brezhnev was probably due in part to temperament, but more likely to Kosygin's impatience with clumsy Party interference in management of the country and to Brezhnev's irritation about Kosygin's circumvention of Party apparatchiks, including himself.

Kosygin is a very hard worker, despite various health problems. He is almost puritanical in his personal life and conservative in personal habits. His commitment to duty was illustrated when his wife was near death some years ago. Kosygin went ahead with his day's chores, standing on the tomb to review a Red Square parade. The message of her death reached him there. Since being widowed he has, if anything, spent even more time at work.

Kosygin is shrewd in his perception of other people's character. While Brezhnev can instinctively play to people's weaknesses, hopes and ambitions, Kosygin does it with skillful calculation. He knew, for example, that Secretary Stans was greatly interested in certain commercial deals and Kosygin managed their conversations with that interest in mind. When Kosygin met Harriman in 1965, he shrewdly played on the latter's interest in various arms control agreements, holding out lush prospects if only we were reasonable on Vietnam. He sees innumerable American businessmen and has them salivating for the prospect of huge contracts, knowing that they will return to the U.S. to put the heat on the Administration to grant credits and export licenses.

Kosygin has the reputation of being dour. In fact, he can smile engagingly, where Brezhnev tends to leer. Where Brezhnev fidgets, Kosygin is composed. Where Brezhnev may gesticulate expansively, Kosygin seems more contained. Where Brezhnev can be effusively friendly and crudely intimate,

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By NARA Date 11/19/02

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8

Kosygin is more reserved. But he is capable of warmth and occasionally unbends to make personal remarks. When he does so, it is with far more grace than Brezhnev.

Kosygin speaks with precision (his Russian is the purest, as is typical of Leningraders) although he can of course be ambiguous if the situation demands. He has the respect of his colleagues; his subordinates, in particular, speak of him with considerable admiration.

Although Brezhnev's temperament is more voluble, Kosygin probably has more deepseated convictions. Kosygin is imbued with his ideology. He will mince no words when he states a position. And when he thinks and feels that justice is on his side he will speak with great vigor and bluntness. On foreign policy, this applies especially to Vietnam and Germany. However, he is unlikely to personalize such issues the way Brezhnev tends to do. And he will put his case in rational and concrete terms, where Brezhnev will let more subjective prejudices show through.

#### Gromyko

You have known Gromyko for many years. He is, of course, not on a par with Brezhnev or Kosygin in terms of power, responsibilities and stature. In their presence he will defer to them, though not with the kind of servility that lesser Soviet leaders often display to their senior comrades.

Above all, Gromyko is a skilled and knowledgeable foreign affairs expert. He is on top of the issues and knows them backward. Although the butt of their jokes -- he often acts as straight man -- he undoubtedly has the respect of the top leaders, Brezhnev especially.

He has no power to make decisions, but he frequently knows fallbacks already decided on by the top leaders (in contrast to other Soviet negotiators who know only the day's instructions) and hence can display a good deal of flexibility in negotiations.

Gromyko is very intelligent and a smart debater. He has a satirical humor, sometimes biting, though he can be as heavy-handed as any of the leaders if that happens to be the style of the moment.

If Brezhnev has the choice of an advisor in his meetings with you, he may well pick Gromyko as the man who not only has known you the longest but has known every President since Roosevelt and every Secretary of State since Hull.

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E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

*John Luce*

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May 21, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR:

~~THE PRESIDENT HAS REQUESTED~~  
THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

HENRY A. KISSINGER *HK* *1*

SUBJECT:

Your Moscow Discussions  
Tuesday, May 23, 1972

This memorandum summarizes the issues that will come up in the first set of your discussions on Tuesday and provides talking points.

I. EUROPE

1. German Treaties. These treaties have now completed parliamentary action in Bonn and await formalities of signature and deposit. Passage of the treaties is a significant success for Brezhnev who has staked considerable personal prestige on his German policy, apparently in the face of considerable skepticism among the CPSU leaders. (The reputed leader of the opposition, Ukrainian Party boss Shelest has been given a Government job over the weekend, suggesting his demotion.)

Brezhnev may not, under the circumstances, have much to say about the treaties. He might possibly make some critical remarks about our not having exerted enough influence on the Germans during the weeks of acrimonious debate and close votes in Bonn. In my talks last month he urged intervention by us in the German local elections in Baden Wuerttemberg and subsequently there were a number of pleas through Dobrynin that we make a statement.

Early last week we did publicly indicate our interest in treaty passage by implication: We noted the linkage to the Berlin agreement in which we are interested and we welcomed the bipartisan efforts in Bonn to achieve a common policy on the treaties. But we stressed that basically the treaties were a national question for the Germans themselves to resolve since their own future was at stake.

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E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

PRMFA

By i KW NARA, Date 5-6-02 BY

- 2 -

Key Points to Emphasize

If Brezhnev should raise the treaties, you should:

-- Point out that our interest in ratification was always clear, especially since all concerned knew that the Berlin agreement, which we had worked so hard with the USSR to achieve, depended on it;

-- We felt that direct intervention might be counter-productive in provoking a nationalist response in Germany;

-- We did make a careful, favorable public statement during the last, crucial week, responding to Soviet suggestions in the confidential channel;

-- In any event, we, like the Soviets, welcome the fact that the treaties are now ratified, awaiting only routine formalities for their final entry into force.

2. Berlin. The Soviets had made the final step that completes last year's four power Berlin agreement (the so-called Final Quadrupartite Protocol) dependent on Bonn's ratification of the treaties.

We had taken the position that the Berlin agreement should be handled on its merits and implemented independently, but we had no alternative to acquiescing in Soviet refusal to take this action.

Brezhnev may now press for early completion of the Berlin agreement since we and NATO, in turn, had made the beginning of multilateral preparations for the Soviet-proposed European Security Conference (CSCE) dependent on the Berlin agreement. Moscow is eager to get this process started.

Looked at cold-bloodedly, we could now take our time on the Berlin agreement; the Soviets are not likely to start a Berlin crisis under current conditions and we have little interest in rapid progress toward a European conference. There certainly is no reason for us to take the initiative for a hasty signature of the Berlin agreement.

Key Points to Emphasize

In the discussions with Brezhnev, and if he should press for rapid signature, you should:

SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY



PRMFA

by KW NARA, Date 5-6-02

YES ONLY

- 3 -

-- Note that we of course consider the Berlin agreement a good one, both intrinsically and because it illustrates that progress can be made on difficult problems when the US and USSR cooperate to that end;

-- Point out that we have always been ready to sign the Berlin agreement, but understood the reasons why this has not so far been possible;

-- Agree that signature should now take place as promptly as feasible;

-- Suggest that the procedural aspects of signature (e.g. time, place and level) should be taken up at the foreign ministers level to ensure that all the participants find the arrangements mutually convenient and suitable.

NOTE: We should not face the British and French with a fait accompli.

3. Admission of the two Germanies into the UN. As part of Moscow's priority objective of achieving full-scale recognition for the GDR, Brezhnev has been pressing for joint US-Soviet endorsement of early admission of the FRG and GDR to the UN.

Brandt, and even more his opposition, regard the GDR's admission to the UN as the most important symbolic step in the GDR's quest for recognition as a separate state. They wish to accede to it only as the last step of a general normalization of FRG-GDR relations which is to be embodied in a general treaty now being negotiated. (By normalization the FRG means, inter alia, increased freedom of movement between the GDR and the FRG, as well as other measures that would highlight the fact that the two German states have a special relationship reflecting their still being "one nation.") Thus Bonn does not object in principle, but wants to use eventual UN admission for bargaining purposes to achieve its other objectives.

#### Key Points to Emphasize

We have long been committed to Brandt to support his position. In responding to Brezhnev on this issue, you should:

-- State that we support our German ally on this question;

-- State that we believe that the admission of the two German states to the UN should be considered when both of them agree that the time has come; at that time we would endorse it.

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E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

PRMPA

By i KW NARA, Date 5-6-02

S ONLY - 4 -

NOTE: We retain rights, along with the UK, France and the USSR, for Germany as a whole, rights stemming from World War II. Our position in Berlin derives from these retained rights. Consequently, we must ensure that GDR admission to the UN and its consequent virtual recognition as a sovereign state by us does not undermine our rights with respect to all of Germany. The West Germans, British and French -- and probably the Soviets too -- are extremely sensitive on this point. It will require clarification and agreement prior to the actual admission of the two Germanies to the UN.

Additional Point

To show your readiness in principle to endorse German UN membership at the right time, you could tell Brezhnev that:

-- We should in the near future contact our other two World War II allies, the UK and France, to discuss the manner in which quadripartite rights with respect to Germany as a whole and Berlin will be safeguarded upon the admission of the FRG and the GDR to the UN.

4. European Security Conference. (Our title: Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe -- CSCE)

This is Brezhnev's major European initiative and he intends to get your commitment to prompt beginning of preparations and to the holding of the actual conference as early as this year.

We have long been on record as agreeing to a properly prepared and substantive conference (though, in fact, the problems of getting a mutually agreed agenda for a substantive conference are considerable). Our reservations have stemmed from our concern that the conference will be a propaganda circus, produce false euphoria and open up differences among NATO allies. We and the NATO allies have been working intensively on more substantive positions to present at a conference, especially proposals that would stimulate freedom of movement and undercut Soviet pretensions to hegemony in Eastern Europe (Brezhnev Doctrine).

Although Brezhnev has frequently suggested through the private channel that we jointly develop a position, and you have indicated a willingness to explore the objectives of a meaningful conference, little of substance has in fact occurred.

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E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

PRMPA

By i KW NARA, Date 5-6-02

YES ONLY - 5 -

We and the Allies are committed to begin "multilateral" explorations on a conference once the Berlin agreement is in effect. Nevertheless, you should use our agreement on the timing of these preparatory explorations to get Brezhnev's agreement to early explorations on European troop reductions (MBFR), in which we are interested. You should also take into account the sensitivities of our Allies to anything that smacks of US-Soviet collusion against them.

Key Points to Emphasize

In response to Brezhnev's urgings for early preparations and a conference this year, you should:

-- Agree to the beginning of multilateral preparations later this year, subject to agreement among all countries concerned;

-- Note that you cannot visualize preparations for a truly meaningful conference to be completed rapidly and you believe that it would be soundest to consider holding a conference some time in 1973.

As regards substance, you should indicate that:

-- We would agree that a conference should deal with the principles of relations among European states; such principles would include:

- . sovereign equality, political independence and territorial integrity;
- . non-intervention and non-interference in internal affairs;
- . the right of people in each country to shape their own destiny.

-- There could be certain agreed measures to improve physical security, such as restraints on movements of armed forces, exchanges of observers, notification of maneuvers. (NOTE: We want to keep MBFR as such out of a conference because we would only want countries concerned to be involved in negotiations.)

-- There should be expanded cultural exchange and concrete arrangements for increased economic and technological cooperation.

The Soviets advocate some sort of permanent machinery to come out of the conference. You should:

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E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

PRMFA

By i KW NARA, Date 5-6-08

ES ONLY - 6 -

-- Stress that if new institutions are to be created they should have carefully worked out terms of reference;

-- Note that military questions are highly complex and delicate and could best be dealt with directly by the countries concerned.

Finally, if Brezhnev stalls on MBFR and suggests that this subject should only be dealt with after a conference has met, you should:

-- Press our desire to move ahead in parallel on a conference and MBFR.

5. MBFR. Your discussion of this topic, on which the Soviets have remained reluctant, should be largely procedural. We have a need, for Congressional reasons, to have a process of negotiations underway; but we are less certain that early positive results are achievable. The Soviets, apart from showing reluctance to begin talks (e. g. their refusal to receive Brosio, the NATO explorer), have so far given little evidence that they have done any substantive homework comparable to the massive studies undertaken by NATO and ourselves.

The Soviets are aware that geography confers advantages on them. On the other hand, their forces in Eastern Europe have internal security functions. Consequently, while the Soviets might be interested in reductions that would enable them to shift forces eastward, they have displayed much hesitation. They may of course hope that they will be spared "mutual" cuts by growing pressures in the West for unilateral ones. In addition, the Soviets have shown great sensitivity to the term "balanced," the B in MBFR, because they see in it a Western effort to obtain larger Soviet reductions as a compensation for our geographic disadvantage.

It is possible that in Moscow, as a "concession," Brezhnev might propose quick and symbolic equal reductions and try to get a joint US-Soviet agreement to this effect. Our studies have shown this to be of questionable desirability (it would not be verifiable and would tend to accentuate present Soviet military advantages); moreover, a US-Soviet fait accompli on this subject would damage our Alliance relationship.

Key Points to Emphasize

In these circumstances you should:

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E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

PRMFA

By J KW NARA, Date 5-6-02

EYES ONLY - 7 -

-- Seek Brezhnev's agreement to MBFR explorations by countries concerned in parallel with the preparatory work on the CSCE.

-- Agree that there can be private US-Soviet contact on this, but that the specific exploratory work should not be purely bilateral.

On substance, you should indicate that:

-- Reductions should involve both foreign and local forces in Central Europe, although an initial phase could concentrate on foreign (ie. US and Soviet) forces;

-- It would be best to concentrate in the first instance on ground forces;

-- Nuclear weapons may present too complex a problem in the first stage of talks.

-- There should be verification so that an agreement will not lead to misunderstandings and bickering (this could involve inspection, or, as in SALT, measures that are arranged in a way that each side can observe them by its unilateral means).

NOTE: As regards the European questions you could refer to the fact that the final communique on which there has already been considerable work by both sides will, of course, deal at some length with European questions.

One matter, not covered above, relates to frontiers in Europe. The Soviets are anxious to have us recognize their "inviolability." But since they interpret this word as meaning "unchangeable" even by negotiation there is a problem for us in accepting it. We have no intention ourselves to see frontiers changed but because we maintain that the ultimate frontiers of a united Germany should be set in a peace treaty we have no maintain flexibility. Consequently, when Brezhnev raises this matter, you should

-- State that we are quite willing to recognize the principle of "territorial integrity," but do not wish to infringe on the right of sovereign states to seek peaceful arrangements concerning their frontiers.

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By i KW NARA, Date 5-6-02

YES ONLY

- 8 -

## II. SALT

There are two ABM and two offensive issues that you may have to address in Moscow, subject to last minute changes in the negotiations. Some could be resolved by Tuesday, but you may want to familiarize yourself with the basic points.

There is a section on the follow-on phase of SALT, and some remarks concluding your SALT presentation.

### A. Unresolved ABM Issues. The two remaining issues are:

-- The specific location of the second Soviet ABM site (for ICBM defense): For Congressional reasons and to avoid any later misunderstandings, we need a firm assurance that it will not be in the populated areas of European Russia. We insist that it be East of the Urals, so there is no capability for linking it to the Moscow system as a population defense. Brezhnev hinted he would disclose the location, but for some reason the Soviets at Helsinki are refusing to specify the location.

- . They now propose that we declare our understanding that the second Soviet site is to be East of the Urals, and they will not contest our statement.
- . This is an acceptable resolution.

-- Other large Phased Array Radars. In addition to ABM radars, large radars also exist or could be built for other purposes, i. e., space tracking, for monitoring the SALT agreement, and for early warning. The last named has been settled, but there is a disagreement on how to limit the size of other large phased array radars, known by the acronym, OLPARS.

We propose the size be no greater than our smaller radar at Grand Forks. The Soviets propose a size limit that is more than three times our limit. This would be highly dangerous. Radars are the longest lead-time item; interceptors, small radar and other equipment can be quickly added if the large radars exist.

A possible compromise is: No specific treaty limitations, but agreement that each side will consult regarding construction of large (undefined) phased array radars, other than those designated for space-tracking or for national means of detection (for SALT or follow on agreements).

PRMFA

3y: KW NARA, Date 5-6-08

ES ONLY

- 9 -

Your Talking Points

1. ABM Location:

-- You believe it important there be no ambiguities or misunderstandings in the treaty;

-- We have had reason to believe the second Soviet site would be East of the Urals;

-- We will make a statement to that effect; if not contested by the Soviet side, the matter can be considered settled.

2. Large Radars

-- Our two delegations cannot agree on definitions for large non-ABM radars;

-- It is too technical to discuss at this level;

-- Could we settle it by relying on the treaty provisions that prohibit territorial defense, and by agreeing to consult each other before building these large radars, other than for space-trading or national detector systems;

-- If agreed, our negotiators can find suitable language.

B. Offensive Issues. There are two issues still outstanding:

-- The base point for the current Soviet level of SLBMs.

. The Soviets have proposed that they be allowed to build up to 62 "modern submarines," with up to 950 launchers.

. This is acceptable, but,

. The Soviets claim they have 48 "modern submarines" operational or under construction, and they define "modern" to exclude all older classes.

. We seriously doubt this figure as they define it; it is an attempt to gain 6 - 7 submarines over their real level.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

PRMFA

By J KW NARA, Date 5-6-02

EYES ONLY

- 10 -

- . We insist on the real base line of about 41 - 42, so that in building up to 62 (and 950 launchers) they have to retire some of their land-based ICBMs and older submarines.
- . Otherwise, the Soviets would actually have 62 plus 30 older boats, and about 1150 launchers.

It is important for Congressional reasons, that the Soviets retire some of their older submarines and ICBMs.

If this is not resolved at Helsinki a compromise would be to count, at least, the newer class (H-Class) which are nuclear powered in their totals of submarines and launchers.

-- Light and Heavy ICBMs. We have long insisted that light ICBMs not be converted to heavy ones, such as the SS-9. The Soviets agree, but there is a stalemate in defining the terms.

We propose that the dividing line be no larger than the existing Soviet SS-11 ICBM, about 70 cm<sup>3</sup> in volume. They say no strict definition is needed. In fact, it now appears that the Soviets intend to replace or modernize the smaller SS-11 with a somewhat bigger missile. Our definition would exclude this.

A possible compromise is to agree that a heavy ICBM would be a missile significantly greater in volume than the existing "light" missiles deployed on each side, and leave it to the monitoring mechanism to work out any problems.

#### Your Talking Points

##### 1. SLBM Limits

-- We believe that the Soviet proposal of a ceiling of 62 modern submarines and 950 launchers is acceptable.

-- However, we could not exclude from this any submarines that carry ballistic missiles, regardless of their age.

-- There submarines should be counted in the starting point of Soviet submarines operational and under construction.

SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY



PRMPA

By: KW NARA, Date 5-6-08

ES ONLY

- 11 -

-- They can be replaced in achieving the Soviet goal of 62 boats and 950 launchers.

-- You hope this problem will be given serious study by the Soviet leaders.

## 2. Light Versus Heavy ICBMs

-- The Soviet side is aware of our concern over the heavy ICBM in the Soviet arsenal.

-- We need some clear dividing line between heavy and light.

-- We can be flexible in resolving the problem, but some agreed definition is required.

C. - Interpretations of the Current Agreements. Both of the current agreements provide the standard clause for withdrawal if supreme interests are jeopardized. Such circumstances, of course, cannot be precisely defined in advance, but it is clear that if the Soviets were now to embark on a concerted program that would jeopardize the survivability of our strategic retaliatory forces, we would have to invoke this clause.

In Moscow you may want to clarify our position so that the Soviets will be on notice. Our interpretation may play a role in the Congressional debates on the treaty ratification.

### Your Talking Points.

-- In reaching these agreements both sides expect to contribute to strategic stability.

-- If these expectations are not fulfilled and the threat to the strategic retaliatory forces of the US substantially increases, you would consider this jeopardizing our supreme interests.

-- In such a case, we could withdraw from the current agreements under the supreme interests clause.

-- You would expect the USSR to do the same.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

PRMPA

By KW NARA, Date 5-6-02

SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY

- 12 -

-- You wanted this to be clearly understood, since this interpretation will be given to the Congress as the question arises during Congressional hearings.

D. Phase Two of SALT. The outlines of the next phase are undefined, but we can be sure that the Soviets want to raise our aircraft at bases abroad and on carriers, and our submarine bases abroad.

Your Talking Points

We will want to go into questions of:

-- A more permanent resolution of the level of offensive forces for all systems; i. e., equal aggregates of land and sea based missiles and bombers;

-- Reductions of the most threatening offensive systems.

-- An exploration of qualitative controls on missiles, for example controlling their accuracy, size, and possibly a limit on MIRVs, i. e., no more than certain number of specified ICBMs.

-- As for ABMs, we regard this as settled.

-- As for timing, we want to push for an early ratification this summer and resume SALT in the late fall if this is agreeable.

-- In the interim you will be open to any Soviet thoughts in the confidential channels.

E. Concluding Remarks

-- The Soviet leaders and the Soviet delegation are to be congratulated on their contribution to the agreements.

-- Your negotiators are instructed to complete their work for signature of the final agreements in Moscow.

-- These agreements can mark a turning point in our relations.

-- Never before have nations limited the weapons on which their survival depends.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

PRMPA

By i KW NARA, Date 5-6-02

YES ONLY

- 13 -

- This is a commitment to a new concept of mutual security.
- It is a profound statement of intention.
- We both have a significant stake in preserving what has been accomplished, and every incentive to build on them in the future.

SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY



DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

PRMPA

KW NARA, Date 5-6-08

THE WHITE HOUSE  
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THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN... *A*

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May 22, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

HENRY A. KISSINGER *HK*

SUBJECT:

Moscow Politics and Brezhnev's  
Position

Very recent developments in Moscow indicate that Brezhnev has encountered certain problems regarding his foreign policy, but he has apparently maneuvered successfully to overcome them for the moment.

-- The full Central Committee was called into special plenary to hear a report by Brezhnev. The list of speakers in the debate contained mostly his cronies and Marshal Grechko. There is a suggestion in a sensitive intercept that Brezhnev used his friend Grechko to justify his military policies, including SALT.

-- A Brezhnev associate who is in charge of foreign policy in the Party machine, Ponomarev, was elevated to the Politburo as a "candidate" member.

-- The man reputedly the chief critic of Brezhnev's Western policies has been given the job of deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers (deputy premier, one of several). This man, Shelest, is currently the powerful party boss of the Ukraine, and it is highly doubtful that he will retain that position. He may even lose his seat on the Politburo since no deputy premier has such a seat.

This, there has clearly been last-minute maneuvering in Moscow, in which Brezhnev has succeeded in bolstering his position. This will not mean that he is a free agent. But he currently seems stronger than ever. Passage of the German treaty undoubtedly also helped him. Almost certainly, he views his encounters with you, in which he will be the dominant Soviet participant, as a further boost. He should be quite self-confident and act very much the boss.

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PRMFA

KW NARA, Date 5-6-02

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Leonid I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of  
the Central Committee of the CPSU  
The President  
Viktor Sukhodrev, Soviet Interpreter (notetaker)

DATE & TIME: Monday, May 22, 1972  
6:15 p.m. - 8:10 p.m.

PLACE: The General Secretary's Office  
The Kremlin, Moscow

General Secretary Brezhnev: I should like first of all to greet you, Mr. President, on the occasion of this visit to our country and to express gratification that as a result of protracted preparatory work the summit talks between our two countries have begun.

Before setting out several considerations on the substance of the questions that we will be discussing with you, I should like to ask you how you feel. Are you tired?

The President: I am fine. The hardest thing in these trips is the time difference. The first says you simply don't know when to get up and when to go to bed.

General Secretary Brezhnev: I certainly know what that feeling is. I have experienced it on many occasions too. For that matter, I don't even have to leave the Soviet Union to experience it. After all the time difference between say Moscow and Khabarovsk is seven hours.

The President: We experience that in our own country when we fly from Washington to California, though there the time difference is only five hours.

General Secretary Brezhnev: I should like to observe that I have known you for a long time, Mr. President, ever since your visit to the Soviet

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/



DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

PRMFA

By KW NARA, Date 5-6-02

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/  
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

2

Union in connection with the U. S. exhibit. There is even a photograph that shows me among others during your conversation with Khrushchev.

The President: I have seen that photograph. I must say the General Secretary has not changed at all since then. But on that occasion you didn't have a chance to speak.

General Secretary Brezhnev: That's right. On that occasion I took no part in the conversation at all. But of course even apart from that meeting you and I know one another as politicians. And politicians usually know one another through the policies they pursue.

Let me now tell you, Mr. President, that we attach great importance to our talks with you and we intend to conduct these talks regardless of the questions that come up for discussion in a spirit of complete frankness, of an open and honest expression of our position and our views. We are hoping that you for your part will respond in kind. Only this, only such mutual frankness can create the necessary prerequisites for mutual understanding and a favorable atmosphere for the development of our cooperation.

As regards the substance of our talks, I believe we should bring to the fore those questions which would serve the cause of improving relations between our countries. I believe that it is this that both the American and the Soviet peoples are expecting of us. Moreover, the achievement between us of agreements which would promote the improvement of Soviet-American relations would undoubtedly be welcomed not only by your own peoples but also by the peoples of other countries.

I should like further to say the following. Obviously, Mr. President, you know as well as we do that there is in the world no small number of opponents of the strengthening of cooperation between the USSR and the USA. There is no need for me to name them -- this is easily understood even without that. They are acting under various guises and pretexts -- but they are acting vigorously. The fact that we are conducting negotiations with you and the very fact of our meeting is a worthy rebuff to such circles.

We attach great importance to our discussions also by virtue of the fact that objectively the Soviet Union and the United States hold a very prominent place in the world. We proceed from the assumption that the

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/  
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PRMPA

KW NARA, Date 5-6-02

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/  
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

3

achievement of a certain measure of accord between us in the case of these negotiations would have a most serious significance for the shaping of the international situation and for determining the direction which the development of international relations will take toward a lasting peace or toward a new war. I should like to say outright (and you probably know this perfectly well yourself) that the organizing of such a meeting as the one that has now commenced between us was not an easy thing.

I do not wish to be insincere: For us, the organizing of such a meeting was greatly complicated by the actions of the United States in Vietnam. The war which the United States has for many years now been waging in Vietnam has left a deep imprint in the soul of our people and in the hearts of all Soviet people. To take in these circumstances serious steps to develop Soviet-American relations was for us not at all an easy thing.

However, I do not intend, at this time especially, to dwell on the Vietnam issue. We will probably have some more time for this later.

A great deal of complexity is also brought in by the situation in the Middle East in connection with the Israeli aggression against the Arab countries, the unwillingness of Israel to carry out the decisions of the United Nations and to vacate the captured Arab territory, and in connection with the extensive assistance rendered to Israel by the United States in the form of supplies of offensive weapons and through other means.

But this question also has another side to it. The preliminary contacts and discussions that we have had on this problem give certain grounds to believe that we can reach some kind of common approach and even now to formalize some kind of understanding relating to the Middle East.

And it is necessary to achieve such understanding, for the situation in the Middle East is an explosive one. If we let the events run their course war may start anew. And all of the good work that we want to do with you may turn out to be thrown far back. Do you or we need that? Obviously we don't. That means we have to reach agreement.

But this question too is not one on which I should like at this time to dwell in a concrete manner. For this too we shall probably have some time later.

At this moment we can state with gratification that in spite of everything, thanks to the constructive efforts made by both sides -- the Soviet and the

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/  
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DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

PRM/A

By KW NARA, Date 5-6-02

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/  
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

4

American -- and thanks to the certain restraint and realism in these situations (and there have been such situations) we have succeeded in preparing this meeting and the Soviet-American summit talks have begun.

On the whole, summarizing the above, I should like to tell you, Mr. President, that without cancelling our sharply critical attitude to several points in the present American policy, we do see nonetheless in our talks with you a possibility to exert fruitful influence on the entire international situation, a possibility to clear a road leading to the settlement of several complex problems and to strengthen the peace that all nations require so much.

Turning now to the concrete content and probable results of our talks as they appear to us at this time, I should like first of all to say how highly we value the great, many-sided, and fruitful work that has been done by both sides and the course of a long period of time in order to elaborate and reach agreement on Soviet-American relations in many important questions.

Rarely has it been the case in the past that summit talks of this kind have been so carefully prepared in advance.

And here I want first of all to say that a very great achievement has been the elaboration of the document on "The Basic Principles of Relations Between the USSR and the USA." This is a principled and fundamental document. If it is treated not as a formal piece of paper but as the basic document regulating the development of our relations (and we conceive of no other approach) this document can become, as it were, a foundation of a new era in relations between the USSR and the USA.

In my conversations with Dr. Kissinger I have already said, and I should like to repeat this to you, that the name of President Roosevelt who was linked with the normalization of relations between the United States and the Soviet state in 1934 and with the fighting collaboration of our peoples in the struggle against the Nazi aggressors in World War II is warmly cherished in the memory of Soviet people. I believe that no less appreciation among the peoples would be enjoyed also by statesmen who in the present complex situation mustered sufficient courage, realism and good will to lead Soviet-American relations into the channel of broad and many-

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/  
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PRMFA

KW NARA, Date 5-6-02

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/  
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

5

sided cooperation to the good of the Soviet and the American peoples, to the good of all peoples, to the good of universal peace.

It is not to be ruled out that in the future when we shall have passed on to the practical implementation of the good principles and good intentions set out in our joint document on "The Basic Principles of Relations" there may arise a need for more frequent and regular contacts and exchanges of views on one level or another -- particularly in the event of some acute or crisis-like situations. Maybe it would be worthwhile thinking over the form that such regular contacts could assume.

Out of the remaining and quite impressive list of elaborated bilateral agreements, I think we should emphasize the agreements relating to the limitation of strategic arms. We are both fully aware, Mr. President, of the immense effort that was required in order to prepare these agreements. I am sure that we are both fully aware of how useful it has been from the standpoint of the direct national interests of our two states and in terms of their influence on the general international climate.

I have received a report to the effect that two or three specific points now remain unresolved. Our delegates in Helsinki have not succeeded in keeping with them. I should like to express confidence that you and we will be able to bring this matter to a logical and successful outcome.

The President: This is something that you and I have to do, Mr. General Secretary. It is we who should settle the really difficult questions.

General Secretary Brezhnev: I believe that perhaps it is simply a case of some misunderstanding arising between our representatives in Helsinki. All that has already been done should enable us to successfully complete the job. Perhaps indeed you and we should look into the matter.

The President: The positions seem to be very close right now. As for those two or three points that remain outstanding, we should try and see whether we can find a way of breaking the deadlock.

I have studied the history of the relationships between Stalin and Roosevelt, and also to a lesser extent, between Stalin and Churchill, and I have found that during the war differences would arise between their subordinates, but then at top level these differences were usually overcome. It is that kind of relationship that I should like to establish with the General Secretary.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/  
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DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

PRMFA

By KW NARA, Date 5-6-02

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/  
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

6

General Secretary Brezhnev: I would be only too happy and I am perfectly ready on my side.

The President: If we leave all the decisions to the bureaucrats we will never achieve any progress.

General Secretary Brezhnev: Then we would simply perish.

The President: They would simply bury us in paper.

General Secretary Brezhnev: I should now like, so to say, in a particularly confidential way, to express one thought. Despite all the positive significance of the agreements achieved on ABM systems and on offensive types of arms, we have to admit that by themselves such agreements do not lessen the danger of the outbreak of nuclear war. And such a danger cannot fail to cause concern in the minds of many millions of people both in your country and in ours. In the agreements that have now been elaborated by us jointly and will be signed people will not find an answer to this question which is causing them concern. I am now giving you these observations so to say as food for thought, and not for public discussion.

The President: Even with those limitations that we are assuming we still have enough arms to kill one another many times over.

General Secretary Brezhnev: Exactly. That is why when we looked into the meaning of all that we have already done, we came to the conclusion that although all this is very useful we ought to raise before you the question of achieving agreement on the non-use against one another of nuclear arms. We placed this question before you in a preliminary way hoping that you would give us your view on this matter. I should like to hope for a positive attitude on your part. I believe that an obligation of this kind could serve as a good example for others and promote the invigoration of the international situation.

You may of course say that the situation is complicated by the fact that you and we have our allies. But I believe that all this can be settled for the sake of delivering our peoples from the threat of nuclear war. An agreement of this kind would have an important and indeed an epoch-making significance. Naturally, I am not asking you to reply to my question right now. I merely wanted to emphasize the importance of an agreement of this kind. Such an agreement would provide an impetus

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

PRMFA

by: KW NARA, Date 5-6-08

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/  
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

7

for the further advance along the road on the physical reduction of the volumes of armaments. I trust you will agree Mr. President that only a radical solution of the problem -- the destruction of nuclear weapons -- can really rid the peoples of the threat of nuclear war. This would be a tremendous achievement. Our position is that this is what we should strive for.

The President: I think you told Kissinger that this would be a peaceful bomb. As you admit, there does exist a very serious problem concerning consultations with our allies. But after recently receiving a personal message from you at Camp David, I asked Kissinger quietly to work on this problem with some of my White House staff so that a little later we could discuss the matter to see where we could go. For the time being we do not want to put this question into the hands of our bureaucracy who would immediately find lots of difficulties and obstacles in it. In the early stages we would like to study the matter quietly. I would like to take up this matter a little later but not at a plenary meeting.

General Secretary Brezhnev: Very well. We have almost a full week at our disposal. During the forthcoming negotiations which I trust will proceed normally and in a good way we shall certainly be able to come back to this matter.

The President: I do not mean that you and I should waste our time on various words and phrases; that is something that Kissinger, Dobrynin and Gromyko can do. We could give them some general ideas to work on. This applies both to this particular matter and to others.

General Secretary Brezhnev: We shall seek to achieve agreement in principle and then we could entrust the concrete formulations to others.

I should like further to say a few words about Europe. I would very much like you to be very clear in your mind, Mr. President, that the Europe policy of the Soviet Union pursues the most honest and constructive goals and is devoid of any subterfuges -- even though there is certainly no lack in the wide world of people who want to muddy the water and propound all sorts of pernicious fabrications. The Russian people and all the other peoples of the Soviet Union have suffered quite enough from wars that have originated on the European soil. We do not want this to be

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/  
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DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

PRMIA

By KW NARA, Date 5-6-08

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/  
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

8

repeated anew. We want to rule out such a possibility. That is the objective of our Europe policy. I believe that the United States too cannot be interested in a repetition of all that has happened in the past. We believe that the United States is in sympathy with the achievement of detente in Europe and the strengthening of European peace. If that is so then you and we have before us a vast scope for cooperation to these ends. And we are hoping that it will be carried into effect under the hallmark of good will and a constructive approach. This hope of ours rests on a certain degree of practical experience. We do genuinely value the cooperation that we had with you at the time of the preparation of the agreement on West Berlin. We also value the steps taken by the American side to promote the ratification of the treaties signed by the Federal Republic of Germany with the Soviet Union and Poland. Permit me to express the hope that you and we will continue that good practice in matters including the preparation of the all-Europe conference.

As regards that conference I should like to say the following. This question too we seek to approach as realists. It is obvious that it will not prove possible to solve all the complex problems existing in Europe at one go. But we would think that such a conference if it passes successfully can lay a good foundation for cooperation between all European states.

I believe there is nothing in this that could be opposed by the United States or Canada.

We have on many occasions spoken publicly on this matter and I should not like to take up your time with a repetition of what has already been said. I believe we could discuss this matter in greater detail later and find mutual understanding.

I believe it would be a good thing to register our common positive attitude to the conference in the joint communique which will reflect the results of our talks. Such mutual understanding would have great meaning and significance.

The President: This is more a matter of form than substance. I was discussing this question on my way to Moscow with Kissinger and Rogers. I think we could reach understanding and that includes the question of timing. The other European countries will certainly be expecting us to mention this subject in our communique so we have to find a way of doing it.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/  
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PRMPA

KW NARA, Date 5-6-02

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/  
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

9

General Secretary Brezhnev: I believe they will certainly be expecting us to do so. I also feel that we could agree without any public announcement to begin consultations on matters relating to the all-Europe conference on a bilateral basis.

I will not now go into the details of other matters of interest to us. There are many of them and of course they all have great significance for the development of cooperation between us. I want to say that I highly appreciate the fact that the President has agreed personally to sign many of the bilateral agreements that have been prepared. This will be of very great significance.

The President: I think the most important agreements are the ones relating to SALT. I feel they should be signed by the two of us. Also important will be the agreements on space, the environment and trade. I would be prepared to sign all of them. But I understand that you may want some of them to be signed by Kosygin or Podgorny.

General Secretary Brezhnev: I would say that the most important document will be "The Basic Principles of Relations between the USSR and the USA."

The President: Yes, of course. And that's a document that should also be signed by us both. As for the SALT agreements, as I see it, you have the same responsibility in your country for military matters as I have in mine as Commander-in-Chief.

General Secretary Brezhnev: Some agreements on our side will be signed by Comrade Podgorny and Comrade Kosygin.

Permit me in conclusion to say a few words on the procedure of our further talks. On our side the plenary meetings will be conducted by myself, Podgorny and Kosygin. Naturally, if the President should wish to meet separately with Podgorny, Kosygin, or myself, such meetings can be arranged.

The President: I feel it would be important for me to have an early meeting with the General Secretary to consider unresolved issues such as, for instance, the outstanding points relating to the SALT agreements and also to have a confidential talk on the Vietnam problem. That question is one that you and I should discuss between the two of us. But on the whole, I am ready to follow your advice.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/

PRMFA

By KW NARA, Date 5-6-08

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/  
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

10

We would not like the question of "The Basic Principles" to be brought up at a plenary meeting because many of our side have simply not been informed of it. I trust we can make to appear as if this question arose and was settled in the course of the discussions during this week. I hope you will help us play this out in this way. We would not like to say openly tomorrow that you and we have arranged everything in advance.

General Secretary Brezhnev: Then perhaps tomorrow we could mention the questions of limiting strategic armaments and several others. As regards the question of "The Basic Principles" it would be a bit awkward for me to discuss it without Podgorny and Kosygin.

The President: No, you can certainly feel free to discuss it with your colleagues any time. I was merely mentioning the difficulties on your side. We've not said anything yet to our Secretary of State for instance.

General Secretary Brezhnev: Maybe we could then start out by saying that it would be a good thing to find some form of registering our common desire to achieve an improvement in our relations. In other words, we could sort of raise the matter in general terms.

The President: I agree. On the whole, I would say that where we face the most difficult questions it's best to have a discussion between two people and where the questions are easy to take in a broader group. I would suggest that kind of division of labor.

General Secretary Brezhnev: I will consult with my comrades and give you a reply tomorrow.

I would now like to express the hope that your visit to Moscow, Leningrad and Kiev will be interesting, pleasant and useful.

The President: We appreciate very much the wonderful welcome and the beautiful quarters we have been given.

Like you, Mr. General Secretary, I have met with the leaders of many states. But like you I too am aware that this meeting is of the greatest importance because you and I represent the two most powerful nations of the world. Of course, we have our differences, but the important thing in terms of the future of our two peoples and the future of the world is for the leaders of the two most powerful nations to be able to meet one another face to face. If we achieve a situation where such meetings become possible

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

PRMPA

KW NARA, Date 5-6-08

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/  
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

11

we shall be able to move forward toward mutual understanding on important issues. And then even if we still have differences on some other matters they will not lead to violence. This will be a great achievement. I believe it is true that peace is at least as important as war, and if the leaders of our two countries could cooperate in time of war it is surely even more important for us to cooperate in time of peace.

General Secretary Brezhnev: We must not only cooperate, we must act in such a way as to prevent the possibility of war breaking out anywhere and not just between us.

The President: I believe the greatest danger is not in a war directly between our two countries, but in a situation where we would be dragged against our will into wars breaking out in completely different areas of the world. That is what we should try to avoid.

General Secretary Brezhnev: I think we should try and avoid all that is linked with war.

[The meeting then adjourned.]

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E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

PRMPA

KW NARA, Date 5-6-02

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

FIRST PLENARY SESSION                      Tuesday, May 23, 1972  
11:00 a.m. - 1:00 p.m. - St. Catherine's Hall,  
Grand Kremlin Palace

Participants: US

The President  
The Secretary of State  
Ambassador Beam  
Dr. Kissinger  
Mr. Flanigan  
Mr. Hillenbrand  
Mr. Ziegler  
Mr. Sonnenfeldt  
Mr. Hyland  
Mr. Matlock  
Mr. Krimer, interpreter

USSR

Leonid T. Brezhnev, Secretary General,  
Communist Party of the Soviet Union  
Nikolai V. Podgorny, Chairman, Presidium  
of USSR Supreme Soviet  
Aleksei N. Kosygin, Chairman, USSR Council  
of Ministers  
Andrei A. Gromyko, Minister of Foreign  
Affairs  
Vasily V. Kuznetsov, First Deputy Minister  
of Foreign Affairs  
Anatoly F. Dobrynin, Ambassador to the US  
Leonid M. Zamyatin, Director General, TASS  
Andrei M. Aleksandrov-Agentov, Aide to  
Brezhnev  
Georgy M. Korniyenko, Chief, USA Division,  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
Viktor M. Sukhodrev, Interpreter  
German Gventsadze, Note taker

Drafted:WKrimer:sdd:dg

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E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

PRMPA

3y KW NARA, Date 5-6-02

SECRET/NODIS

2

Brezhnev welcomed the President and his colleagues to the Kremlin for the first plenary meeting and expressed the hope that the talks, which he had begun with the President the day before, would be successful.

The range of questions for discussion during the President's official visit to the Soviet Union had been set forth generally in the President's and Podgorny's speeches at dinner the evening before, and also during the private talks he had with the President. Brezhnev wished to emphasize again that the Soviet Union attaches great importance to this meeting and is deeply aware of the responsibility both sides bear. The meeting is being held under very complicated circumstances, at a time when many issues between us have not been resolved. This imposes a very great responsibility on all participants. Bilateral relations will be an important, even dominant, part of the talks. The preparatory work has been well done. However, he wished to emphasize that we cannot conduct the talks without regard for the present international situation, and indeed have no right to do so. The whole world, and above all the peoples of the two countries, expect tangible results from these talks, results which will produce not increased tension but a real detente, not only between our nations, but also throughout the world. Both sides are duty-bound to take this into account.

In touching upon the international situation, Brezhnev recalled his conversation with the President the day before, in which he had emphasized that in the present situation, which had been particularly complicated in recent weeks, it had not been easy for the Soviet Union to make the decision to proceed with the summit meeting. However, proceeding from its desire to settle all matters by negotiation rather than by confrontation, the Soviet Union had decided to go ahead with the summit meeting and is prepared to engage in businesslike discussions leading to successful results.

Podgorny's speech at the May 22 dinner in the President's honor and also the President's response provide grounds for hope -- and indeed for confidence -- that the talks will be constructive and will result in mutually acceptable decisions. The Soviet Union is

SECRET/NODIS

PRMFA

KW NARA, Date 5-6-02

SECRET/NODIS

3

is approaching these talks prepared to discuss all problems -- even the most acute ones -- in a frank and honest way in order to achieve a better understanding and move ahead to appropriate solutions. He hopes the President will follow the same approach.

The Soviet Union values highly the cooperation of the two countries exhibited recently in a number of fields, which has enabled us to settle several important issues. He believes this provides a good example for our future relations. He has in mind the cooperation of the two countries in working out an agreement on West Berlin. He appreciates the help rendered in support of West German ratification of its treaties with the Soviet Union and Poland. These are indeed good examples of cooperation between us. Brezhnev also emphasized that this kind of cooperation was greatly appreciated not only by his colleagues present at the table, but also by his Party and by the Soviet people.

In addition, he paid tribute to the President and to those on both sides who have taken part in preparing this meeting. A great deal of work has already been done to bring our positions closer to final agreement on such important matters as strategic arms limitations, which have been the subject of negotiations for more than two years, and also on other questions which will probably be completed at these talks. Finally, he again urged an effort to find satisfactory solutions to outstanding problems in order to justify the hopes for this meeting held by the Soviet people, the American people, and the people of the whole world. The eyes of the whole world are on these discussions.

Proceeding to practical matters, Brezhnev suggested that he and the President each agree to instruct a representative to draw up a working plan for the rest of the discussions, indicating the questions to be discussed each day, and thus providing a schedule for each meeting. There are many questions to be discussed, some of which are already at a final stage, while others require additional discussion and clarification. Therefore, he proposed that a

SECRET/NODIS



PRMFA

By KW NARA, Date 5-6-02

SECRET/NODIS

4

representative of each side meet to draw up a working plan, Brezhnev had in mind not simply an agenda, but also such matters as scheduling the signing of documents.

Brezhnev then asked the President for his views on the forthcoming talks and the questions he had raised.

The President said he first wished to express appreciation for the hospitality we have received, and for the cooperative spirit of the people on both sides in preparing for the present meeting. The President approved the idea of breaking into smaller groups, since some problems require a great deal of additional discussion and finally hard decisions. As he had told the General Secretary the day before, it will be much easier for two or three or four people to hold these discussions and arrive at decisions, than for a group of, say, twenty. The President added that both Brezhnev and he would doubtless wish to consult with their colleagues before making decisions.

Regarding procedure, the President suggested that Dr. Kissinger meet with whomever the General Secretary selected to set up an agenda for the talks and then submit it for final approval to the General Secretary and himself.

Brezhnev said that he would appoint Foreign Minister Gromyko to meet with Dr. Kissinger.

The President said that he considered it a good idea to get the various proposals ready for signing or announcement. We can proceed to sign those agreements which have been reached and announce them day by day as they are concluded.

Brezhnev agreed that it would be good to take these matters in turn.

The President said they might then be able to announce at the end of each day that the sides had met and had completed certain agreements. This could be reported in the morning papers here and would also fit the press situation in our country.

SECRET/NODIS

PRMPA

KW NARA, Date 5-6-02

SECRET/NODIS

5

Brezhnev said he agreed in principle to this procedure.

The President said that if the General Secretary could designate appropriate persons for signing the various documents, he would also do the same for the U.S.

Brezhnev agreed, saying that this can be worked out in the meetings as they proceed.

The President said that he would sign some agreements and some would be appropriate for Secretary Rogers to sign. As he had told the General Secretary, he was particularly interested in signing some of the agreements himself.

The President reviewed where we stand. As the General Secretary had indicated yesterday and had said again today, we are fortunate in that a great deal of progress has been made in a number of fields. There are still some questions, however, requiring discussion, and that will take time. Sometimes these final decisions are the most time consuming. Therefore, the idea of dividing into smaller groups is a good one. Then in another full session we can sum up for all concerned what has been discussed in the smaller groups.

The President thought it worth noting that in most meetings between heads of government or heads of state it was difficult to get enough substance to agreement and to announce at the conclusion. That is why those who work on communiqués have difficulty finding enough words to say nothing. But, in our case here, we are fortunate to have matters of great substance not only to discuss but also to decide. That is as it should be between Great Powers.

If it is possible at the summit meeting to work out and announce agreements on cooperation in space, cooperation in improving the environment, a commercial agreement, and one on arms limitation, these alone will make the meeting quite successful. We have the possibility of reaching all of these agreements and more, provided it is possible to work out differences in some other areas.

SECRET/NODIS

PRMFA

By KW NARA, Date 5-6-08

SECRET/NODIS

6

The President recalled the point made by the General Secretary during their talk the previous day that this meeting is only a beginning, a beginning of reaching agreements on important matters, but still only a beginning. Important as these agreements are, they are only a foundation. Are we to build a great room like the one we are sitting in, or only a foundation? For example, as he and the General Secretary had agreed yesterday, an arms limitation agreement between our two countries will be of historic significance for the entire world, because it will be the first time in history that the two strongest nations in the world have made an agreement limiting their arms. However, even after an arms limitation agreement each of us would still have enough weapons left to destroy each other many times over.

Brezhnev remarked that yesterday the President had said seven or ten times over.

The President then mentioned a field in which Kosygin is particularly expert. We are talking about trade between our countries amounting to several hundred million dollars. But the GNP's of our countries total one and a half trillion dollars. Our trade should be in the billions. The President urged that we not think only in limited terms of what we may negotiate here this week, but also in terms of where we go from here to build on the foundation we have laid.

The President wished to put in a proper framework the reason he believes we have come together and the reason he sees real chances of progress. First, he believes we are fortunate that our representatives, have established good personal relations. For example, Ambassador Dobrynin and Foreign Minister Gromyko, Secretary Rogers and Dr. Kissinger all know each other well and have a friendly relationship. Even though the President does not know the three major leaders of the Soviet Union as well, he believes he has friendly and respectful relations with each of them. In addition, other people in our government, such as the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of

SECRET/NODIS

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*KW* NARA, Date *5-6-02*

SECRET/NODIS

7

Agriculture, the Science Advisor and the Director of NASA have established a good working relationship with their Soviet counterparts. This is good and will help us work out our problems, even though it is not the heart of the matter.

The second important factor is that whatever agreements we work out will be of much greater importance than agreements with smaller countries. Without meaning in any way to disparage smaller countries, he would point out that we have good relations with the leaders of, say, Bolivia. Yet the agreements we work out with that country will not make much difference to the peoples of the world. What brings us here is the fact that we are both strong, have mutual respect, and recognize on both sides that neither will allow the other to get an advantage in terms of military power. There will be times when one country will move ahead of the other in a particular field, when one will make a breakthrough before the other does. But two peoples as strong and large as ours are destined to deal with each other on an equal basis in the years to come.

The President said he would like to think that each person at the table is a sentimental man to a certain degree, but we are meeting here not because of sentiment, but because we are pragmatic men. As practical and honest men we recognize that our systems are different and that in many parts of the world our interests conflict. But as practical men, we have learned the lessons of history and will not allow ourselves to be dragged into conflict in areas peripheral to our interests. These problems may seem important at the time, but cannot compare in importance with the need to have good relations between the two most powerful countries in the world.

So we see that the time has come when our two nations have an opportunity which perhaps has not come to nations in history up to this point. That

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E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

PRMPA  
By KW NARA, Date 5-6-08

SECRET/NODIS

8

time means that we must find ways to work together to limit arms, to expand our economic relations for our mutual benefit and also to work together in other fields such as improvement of the environment, cooperation in outer space and others. We would continue to compete, but it can be a friendly competition in which each side would gain rather than lose, and we can both work for the mutual good.

This does not mean that settlement of differences will always be easy. Differences are settled easily only under the dictation of the strong to the weak. We had reached the stage in our relations -- and the President believes this was fortunate -- where we consider ourselves to be equally strong. Therefore, we feel this opportunity is one which is unique, not only because of what we do here on these agreements which are important in themselves, but even more so because of the way we view the future.

Good relations between the Soviet Union and the United States can have an enormous effect for the good of the people of the whole world and above all for the good of the people of our two countries. It is his hope that this week the personal relationships between us will become better. We can begin the process of exploring future progress which could make these agreements seem small in terms of what can be accomplished in the future.

The President said he wished to close his remarks by saying what his Soviet friends may be too polite to say. He said his reputation is of being very hard-line and cold-war oriented.

Kosygin remarked that he had heard this sometime back.

The President said that he has a strong belief in our system but at the same time he respects those who believe just as strongly in their system. There must be room in this world for two great nations with different systems to live together and work together. We cannot do this however, by mushy sentimentality

SECRET/NODIS

PRMFA

KW NARA, Date 5-6-02

SECRET/NODIS

9

or by glossing over differences which exist. We can do it only by working out real problems in a concrete fashion, determined to place our common interests above our differences.

For example, the President wished to see the discussions on trade produce some options for the future. The results of the talks should not be limited to what he would call nit-picking agreements with limited objectives. They should look ahead to long-range goals.

Brezhnev said that in general on all the questions that would be discussed here, he anticipates far-reaching decisions worthy of the stature of our two nations, and not just short-term arrangements. He hopes that we will be able to sign some agreements here that would be tangible and really be felt by the peoples of our two countries. For example, if we can talk in terms of a 3-4 billion dollar credit for 25 years at 2 percent per annum, things will move along very rapidly indeed. This will also make it possible to solve major problems for the US in terms of large supplies of gas and oil, timber and other products.

Kosygin interjected "not to mention vodka."

Brezhnev concluded by saying that an agreement for 20-25 years on gas, for example, would really constitute a major long-term step.

Podgorny took up the vodka theme, remarking that as for vodka, the US produces an ersatz product. Smirnov may have been a Russian vodka years ago, but now it is an imitation.

Brezhnev remarked that America is indeed backward in vodka. Perhaps someone in America could be given a monopoly right to sell Russian vodka and suggested that perhaps he and Dr. Kissinger could found a company for that purpose.

The President said Dr. Kissinger already makes enough money at his job.

SECRET/NODIS

PRMFA

By KW NARA, Date 5-6-02

SECRET/NODIS

10

The President then raised a matter on which he wished Secretary Rogers to comment since he meets with Congress a great deal. The President said, in regard to commercial relations, there must be a beginning and such questions as interest rates and credit terms must be discussed. But this is a matter for specialists. The SALT negotiations going on for more than two years have shown how hard it is to negotiate. However, the very reputation to which he had alluded earlier -- and which Kosygin had confirmed -- would help him get support of Congress for mutually beneficial matters, assuming there is progress in other areas.

The President added that the reputation which Kosygin had confirmed had certainly no basis in fact since he became President.

Kosygin said that each agreement, particularly an economic agreement, is just a frame for the canvas on which the painting would have to be filled in subsequently. This would require mutual trust and an unswerving desire to implement the provisions of these agreements. He would emphasize that everyone here and especially himself, Brezhnev, and Podgorny, adhered to the firm policy of always strictly observing the terms of any agreement signed by the Soviet Union. This is an important factor in the relations between our countries and this is also why it is at the same time difficult and very easy to negotiate with the USSR.

The President said that he knows that and respects the Soviet leaders for it.

Brezhnev said that the fact that our countries do not trade with each other represents an enormous loss for each of us and he cannot understand why this waste has been permitted to continue. In terms of commerce, the Soviet Union is not a country like Norway or Sweden or Finland or Holland or even Bolivia. It is the Soviet Union, a country with a vast territory and enormous economic wealth, a stable market and a steadily developing economy. It always has something to buy and sell.

SECRET/NODIS



PRMPA

KW NARA, Date 5-6-08

SECRET/NODIS

11

It is hard to say why we have wasted opportunities and not traded with each other more. He is gratified to hear what the President said on these matters and thinks that we should discuss the subject further.

Podgorny referred to the President's remark that in two years of SALT we had learned how difficult it is to negotiate. He believes there is no comparison between SALT and the other matters under discussion. SALT deals with a very special set of problems which are considerably more complicated and of greater importance for the US and the Soviet Union, and for other countries, than the problems involved in working out agreements on cooperation in space or on improving the environment or on trade. For this reason these questions can be resolved more easily. Yet at the same time, they too are issues of importance and he mentions this only to put SALT into proper perspective.

Brezhnev remarked that while they are less important than the security issues involved in SALT, they are very close to the hearts of our people.

Podgorny repeated that SALT involved questions of national security and therefore it is more difficult to deal with.

The President agreed that any matter which involves national survival must come first. That is why SALT must be approached with care.

Secretary Rogers referred to Podgorny's suggestion that trade is an easy problem. Actually trade is not such an easy matter since the approval of Congress is necessary. Here, a general improvement of the political climate is necessary. In some ways an increase in trade in large amounts is almost as difficult as arms limitation. If, as a result of this meeting, the political climate could change in such a way that the US people and the Congress understood this, the Congress would follow the President's leadership and act. In the absence of political improvement, this would be difficult.

SECRET/NODIS

PRMPA

By KW NARA, Date 5-6-02

SECRET/NODIS

12

Podgorny agreed with the Secretary that increasing trade is also an important problem and will not be easy. However, trade is a bilateral matter of mutual benefit. It promises advantages to both countries. It is not as vital and important as the issues involved in SALT, which affect not just our two countries but all countries.

Kosygin said that on the question of limiting strategic arms and more generally, nuclear arms, he felt that we are under an obligation to resolve the issues between us. It is easier to do so now rather than later, for the simple reason that so far our two countries have a practical monopoly in the nuclear field. Also, there is really no other alternative to a positive and radical solution of this problem. If we cannot find it now, it is inevitable that others after us will find the solution. If, however, our two countries dump in the ocean the results of the enormous efforts of our peoples -- and this is what would be involved in another spurt of the arms race -- history and our peoples will never forgive us. On the other hand, if we do find the right solution, this will be a great achievement for our countries and indeed for the whole world. Therefore, no matter what difficulties we are facing, we must and can overcome them. If both sides genuinely desire, we can overcome these difficulties and it is imperative to do so now while our two countries have a monopoly on nuclear weapons for all practical purposes. Imagine the situation in the future if dozens of countries have nuclear weapons in their arsenals.

The President observed that there are potential great powers who, if they decide to produce nuclear weapons, can do so. Within 20 or 25 years they could make such advances in nuclear weaponry as to be a threat to both the US and the Soviet Union. He has in mind powers in the East, particularly China and Japan. When we view this prospect, the importance of reaching agreement now becomes even more obvious.

SECRET/NODIS

PRMFA

KW NARA, Date 5-6-02

SECRET/NODIS

13

There are those in our country -- as well as some critics in the world -- who say that the US should renounce its Mutual Defense Treaty with Japan in the interests of peace. This is a fashionable argument. But let us be realistic. If we consider what Japan would do in the absence of a defense commitment from the US, we come to a different conclusion. If Japan, a country with the third largest economy in the world, with all its frustrations, with the memory of defeat and with its drive, is left alone, it is unlikely to go neutral -- it would go nuclear. This is a practical consideration we must bear in mind, although what we say in public has to be different.

The President raised another issue, which so far neither he nor the General Secretary had mentioned as a subject for our agenda: European questions generally, and particularly European security. He suggested that Secretary Rogers and Gromyko discuss these matters, possibly with some others. Mr. Gromyko touched on this subject when he talked with the President in Washington, and, incidentally, Chancellor Kreisky of Austria also raised it.

Brezhnev said that at this beginning stage of the talks it has become quite clear what great and important questions required discussion in the next few days, and how this could change the political climate for the better in the entire world. It therefore seems to him that the instructions to Dr. Kissinger and Minister Gromyko be reiterated to start promptly working out some of the things we had agreed on, to complete the work on the Freeze Agreement and the Treaty on the Limitation of ABM Systems. It would also be necessary to give some thought to the general principles which should lie at the basis of the relations between our two countries. All this would contribute to changing the political climate for the better. As the President has quite correctly said, much in the future depends upon such a change.

SECRET/NODIS

PRMFA

By KW NARA, Date 5-6-02

SECRET/NODIS

14

Brezhnev pointed out that in addition we already have a number of agreed positions on several questions which will also serve to improve the general climate. There is the agreement on improving the environment. This is an issue very close to the hearts of people everywhere. People in Europe, in the US, in Latin America and elsewhere have devoted a great deal of attention and attached importance to this issue. The same could be said about cooperation in medical sciences and public health -- joint efforts to combat such diseases as cancer -- this, too, is close to the people and well understood by them. The same applies to cooperation in space. Perhaps even though Gromyko and Kissinger have not yet prepared the agenda, we can proceed to signing agreements on these matters. If we can begin by signing these agreements, it will gladden the hearts of the public in the Soviet Union, in the US and in fact the world over. Something can be signed today, something else tomorrow, and announcing these agreements in the press will provide additional impetus to get on to larger issues.

The President concurred and repeated that there were some agreements which he wishes to sign personally, like the agreement on the environment and that some others, such as the agreements on public health and maritime matters, will be signed by the Secretary of State.

Brezhnev welcomed the President's desire to sign the environmental agreement personally. Turning to another matter, he said it appears that our colleagues in Helsinki are unable to reach agreement on two or three points. Perhaps he and the President should take up these matters here, then possibly call in their colleagues from Helsinki to resolve the difficulties.

The President said that he would prefer to discuss this in a very small forum, directly with the General Secretary and with anyone he would designate.

SECRET/NODIS

PRMPA

KW NARA, Date 5-6-02

SECRET/NODIS

15

It must be the kind of an agreement that not only preserves security, but also can be justified to Congress. Thus this is not only a question of security, but a political question as well. Brezhnev agreed.

The President said that he had not meant that he and Brezhnev would actually write the agreement. Specialists must do the drafting since the subject is highly technical and in such an agreement even the position of commas are important. He recalled Brezhnev's story about the King who intended to pardon a condemned man. He wrote the words "Execution Impossible Pardon" on a slip of paper and handed it to his Aide. The Aide, however, placed the comma between Execution and Impossible rather than between Impossible and Pardon, and the man was executed.

Brezhnev said it was clear that the leaders should agree on principles and leave drafting to the specialists. Kissinger and Gromyko will arrange the program.

The President asked which day the signing of the SALT agreements has been scheduled.

Gromyko said that SALT is scheduled tentatively for Friday.

Kosygin said that there had been so much talk about SALT all over the world that if a final settlement is not achieved during this visit, people everywhere will have an unfavorable impression.

The President suggested that this question be discussed this afternoon or tomorrow morning. Kosygin thought it should be today. Brezhnev suggested that he and the President meet at 4:00 p.m. and then arrange a signing ceremony for the health and environment agreements for 6:00 p.m. The President agreed and thought it would be good if photographers were admitted to the signing ceremony. Brezhnev assured him that there would be full media coverage.

The meeting ended about 1:00 p.m.

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E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

PRMFA

KW NARA, Date 5-6-02

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:

Leonid I. Brezhnev, General Secretary  
of the Central Committee of the CPSU  
Andrei M. Aleksandrov-Agentov,  
Assistant to the General Secretary  
Viktor M. Sukhodrev, Interpreter

The President  
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to  
the President for National Security  
Affairs

DATE AND TIME:

Tuesday, May 23, 1972  
4:00 - 6:00 p. m.

PLACE

St. Catherine's Hall  
Grand Kremlin Palace, Moscow

SUBJECT:

SALT

Gen Secy Brezhnev: What do you consider to be the outstanding issues?

Dr. Kissinger: There are four areas: (1) the location of the second Soviet ABM site, (2) the definition of "heavy" ICBM, (3) the SLBM limits, and (4) mobile land-based ICBMs.

Gen Secy Brezhnev: Then Dr. Kissinger is behind events. They have already been settled.

Dr. Kissinger: Only on the external dimensions of the silos, not what is inside.

Gen Secy Brezhnev: [very irritably] You cannot put large missiles into small holes.

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E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

PRMPA

By KW NARA, Date 5-6-02

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2

Dr. Kissinger: It is more complicated than that. It is nevertheless possible.

Gen Secy Brezhnev: No. Any change does not involve modification of the size of the silos. Thickening the walls may look like a change of the character of the missile but it isn't. All the changes are within existing procedures. Why do you raise this issue?

Dr. Kissinger: With new launch procedures it is possible to increase the size of the missile inside the existing silos.

Gen Secy Brezhnev: [drawing diagrams] This is impossible. There are no prospects in the foreseeable future that we will engage in activities of this kind. We will not change the diameter of the missile. But we change the weight/yield ratio.

We are prepared to drop the word "significant" from the phrase "no significant increase" [in the interpretive statement on Article II].

The President: Our concern is not the provision of silos but modernization leading to a change in the volume of these missiles. Anyway, a change in volume cannot be verified.

Gen Secy Brezhnev: If we are trying to trick one another, why do we need a piece of paper? We are playing clean. Of course, any modification involves improvement. Therefore, why do you raise the issue? The approach of "catching each other out" is quite inadmissible. The best they can do is improve the efficiency of existing missiles.

I will make another proposal. We will accept the 1500-kilometer distance provision [the requirement that the second Soviet ABM site be at least 1500 kilometers from the national capital]. We will have the same number of sites. But ours will cover few ICBMs. We can also move it elsewhere. We had wanted to move it to European Russia. We have the same kind of ICBM centers as you have.

On submarines, because of the territorial differences between the two sides, we have asked for a larger figure. If you promise not to build new submarines, we accept your right to do so [right to convert Titans to SLBMs].

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PRMFA  
by KW NARA, Date 5-6-02

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3

Dr. Kissinger: I propose counting at least the number of H-Class submarines in the Soviet figure. [He recites the figures.]

Gen Secy Brezhnev: [irritated] So you have the information on the number of submarines we have. The U.S. proposal means that you can build submarines to replace your old ones. You want complete freedom to reconstruct your entire fleet, and substitute Poseidons for Polaris. But we cannot accept replacement of your entire fleet.

I would agree to the following version: not to name 48 in the agreement but to agree that the replacement figure is 48. It is hard to explain to our military men if we don't get a 7-number advantage. If you want me to say our military men are very pleased by this method, then we can only say that they are not.

Speaking man to man, since we know the implications of these armaments and since we are both civilized men, we know these weapons must never be used. Perhaps we shall not be able to achieve agreement here on the non-use of nuclear weapons; we can reach accord when Dr. Kissinger comes back to Moscow in September. This would overlap all other considerations. How can I contemplate it [the use of nuclear weapons]? We are now conducting negotiations with the present as well as the future President of the United States.

Transcribed from Dr. Kissinger's notes.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PAR TICIPANTS:

Leonid I. Brezhnev, General Secretary  
of the Central Committee of the CPSU  
Andrei M. Aleksandrov-Agentov,  
Assistant to the General Secretary  
Viktor M. Sukhodrev, Interpreter

The President  
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the  
President for National Security Affairs  
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Senior NSC Staff  
Member (Notetaker)

DATE & TIME:

Tuesday, May 23, 1972  
7:20 - 9:55 p. m.

PLACE:

The General Secretary's Office  
The Kremlin

SUBJECT:

SALT; Vietnam (briefly at end)

[The meeting began with some light exchanges between Brezhnev and the President concerning Dr. Kissinger's previous visit to Moscow and the conversations at that time. The President also mentioned that he had shown Ambassador Dobrynin where Brezhnev would stay when he comes to the United States. The President said that Camp David was not as nice as the Kremlin. He went on to say that Franklin Roosevelt, who was crippled, fished in a pond sitting on a carved-out log, and they would put fish in this pond for Mr. Brezhnev. Mr. Brezhnev thanked the President and said that the Ambassador had spoken warmly about the conversation on that subject. Brezhnev said he was grateful for the President's consideration.]

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By KW NARA, Date 5-6-02

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2

Gen Sec'y Brezhnev: I was held up because I had to consult with a small group of my colleagues. Mr. Kissinger should sit and be quiet and the President and I will finalize all the outstanding points. On the other hand, on his last visit Dr. Kissinger was very nice and we had nice talks. But that must have been because he spent three days in Moscow and benefited from its good atmosphere. Then after he returned to America he was contaminated.

The President: The trouble was that he gave everything away to the General Secretary and now I will have to take it back again.

Gen Sec'y Brezhnev: That reminds me of the proverb about the crayfish walking backwards -- but we, of course, are only joking.

The President: The general principles that were worked out when Dr. Kissinger was here are very important.

Gen Sec'y Brezhnev: I and my colleagues agree. It is an important and useful document.

The President: Let us clearly understand, because of our bureaucratic problems, that we worked this out while I was here in Moscow.

Gen Sec'y Brezhnev: You heard how I put it this morning. I was just "initiating" something; I took account of our talk yesterday, but I had to say something so it would not come out of thin air. But now we will follow the script.

As regards the ABM question, this now appears to be cleared up. Twelve hundred is OK with us.

The President: Fifteen hundred kilometers.

Gen Sec'y Brezhnev: You mean we should put it in China?

The President: Well, as the General Secretary will find out, I never nitpick.

Gen Sec'y Brezhnev: Fifteen hundred kilometers is all right. The most important point is not the mileage. You wanted us to move eastward and so now we agree. It would be easier for us to accept twelve hundred but fifteen hundred is all right too, and we won't speak of it anymore.

As regards land-based missiles, how do you view the agreement yesterday in Helsinki?

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KW NARA, Date 5-6-02

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3

Dr. Kissinger: On what issue?

Sukhodrev: He is referring to the formula I read out [in the earlier meeting].

Gen Sedy Brezhnev: I had just read the cable a half hour before.

The President: I have no doubt about the General Secretary's attitude about the use of implements of destruction. As long as we are around I have no fear. But there are two matters of importance. One, we have to deal not only with present but future leaders. I hope they are practical men and will not engage in acts of madness. But madmen do come to power; the best example is Hitler. We don't expect one in our country or in your country, but it is still best to have an agreement that is as balanced as possible. Second, I realize the General Secretary has to sell his position to his military. We have a similar problem but I can control ours. But the Representatives and Senators in our Armed Services Committees will watch every line of the agreement to see if we were placed at a disadvantage or who gained an advantage. I would like to make the agreement as balanced as possible to avoid that kind of problem. And it has been raised already. In fact, I was on the phone at 4:00 a. m. this morning to Washington to arrange steps to quiet the opposition if we should sign on Friday.

This is not a matter of lack of trust but a problem of dealing with an opposition. What really would solve the problem for us would be the recognition of the right of modernization, no increase in the size of silos, as already discussed, but where we would unilaterally point out that modernization would not be used significantly to increase the payload size.

Dr. Kissinger: The missile size.

The President:  
/We would spell out "significantly" to be 15%. Otherwise a critic could say on the floor of the Senate that through modernization one could double the size of the missile. Whether this would really be so I don't know, but it would still have to be answered.

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PRMPA

By KW NARA, Date 5-6-08

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4

Gen Sec'y Brezhnev: Mr. President, if you have completed your thought I should like to say this. We would agree that under the agreement both sides would be entitled to modernization without replacing small missiles with bigger ones, that is to say converting them. Also this would be on the understanding that in the process of modernization of every type there should be no significant increase of either silo or missile. Then there would be no need for a unilateral statement. Because if there are going to be questions, they would also be asked in the Soviet Union: "What kind of an agreement is this if unilateral statements have to be made about it?" You should have a freeze: no new missiles; lesser ones cannot be changed into big ones; and modernization permitted only with insignificant increases in the size of the silos. Of course, the word "insignificant" is very vague, and I don't mind seeing it refined. It is relative. For example, what is insignificant in the case of a big missile? Perhaps we should define it in terms of a percentage. In short, we could reach an understanding to avoid doubts by Senators and legislators in either country. So we would have an agreement to avoid doubts. As for what Mr. Kissinger suggested at the outset, I don't understand it and I don't think we should revert to it.

Now the experts in Helsinki are very literate and competent people, and we should have trust in them. I am sure they know more of the finer points than I because they have studied them more than I. We should agree to accept their formula even without "significant." The sides could modify missiles without changing dimensions of silos or missiles so both sides would be in the same position. But if you want to keep "significant," that would be all right too because we are very flexible.

I would like to add that there is also another political aspect to the question of land-based missiles, and that is that we commit ourselves not only to freezing but to reducing strategic arms. We are ready to proceed to bilateral consultations with you and to continue the arduous work so that by an important date in the history of the United States [presumably the Bicentennial Anniversary], or even earlier, we could solve this problem of reducing. So I suggest we stick to the formula worked out in Helsinki. I would not like to see a unilateral statement. It would look like one kind of an agreement in Moscow and another in Washington. What kind of an agreement would it be if it leads to interpretations? The

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PRMPA

KW NARA, Date 5-6-02

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE  
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5

obligation should be reciprocal and the President and I should be responsible for what was signed.

The President: I agree. We prefer a joint agreement. That is, modernization is permitted but the size of the silo and of the missiles could not be significantly increased. With the details to be worked out by professors.

Gen Sec'y Brezhnev: [Pause] As I see it, this is almost the same wording as in Helsinki but the wording includes missile modernization.

Dr. Kissinger: We would add that the size of the volume of the missile and the silo would not be increased significantly. Other modernization would be permitted.

Gen Sec'y Brezhnev: You would allow "insignificant" modernization.

The President: Modernization would be permitted according to what the scientists develop and design, but there could be no increase in silo or missile size beyond the insignificant. Otherwise, it is not a limitation.

Gen Sec'y Brezhnev: We can agree on this if we elaborate the meaning of the word. What is it -- 5%? 10%? What percentage?

The President: We had better work out a figure -- 10%, 15%. It can't be too big or it won't be a limitation. We must keep it in the realm of 15%. And, of course, this works for both sides.

Gen Sec'y Brezhnev: In short, I would sum up then. There is the first part of the agreement that states that both sides freeze the number of missiles. Then there is the second part that says they are not allowed to increase significantly the size of silos and missiles. Then "significantly" could be worked out to say it means not more than X%. But on the exact number of this percentage I would like to consult with my colleagues. So the first part is agreed, but "significant" I have to think over until tomorrow. Also, we have the question of whether this is in the agreement or on the way.

The President: The smaller the percentage the better. The people would understand 10% but not 30%. We are prepared to negotiate. The General Secretary should consult and we will do the same.

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By KW NARA, Date 5-6-02

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6

Gen Sec'y Brezhnev: Another question has arisen in my mind in the course of our discussion today. As I look at the formula we received from Helsinki I notice two words: "modernization" and "replacement." Modernization is one thing but replacement is another. It appears that both sides are permitted to replace one type of missile for another, and it would have greater volume. It would be better for public opinion if we restrained this, if we had both sides should be permitted to improve existing types of missiles and have insignificant increases in sizes. Our experts say you are replacing Poseidon with God knows what -- it was a good thing I am not on our delegation! When we agree to replacement, this entails the possibility that military men will say we should replace one missile with a more powerful one and then the factories would work full blast. But if we say "modernization and perfection" this would not happen. If we say "replacement" we could mean new types and this would just mean the continuation of the arms race. We really should endeavor to take a drastic step.

The President: This only involves land-based missiles. You can't increase the volume simply by replacing the missile. But this was a Soviet proposal anyway.

Dr. Kissinger: The replacement language has existed since January of 1971. It has long since been agreed.

Gen Sec'y Brezhnev: OK. I will leave it at that.

The President: I think we have covered it. Now let me see if I can understand the submarine question correctly. We have 950 SLBMs and 62 boats for you and 44 boats and 710 SLBMs for us. But, of course, we actually have only 41 boats and 656 missiles. That's where we start.

Gen Sec'y Brezhnev: If I might just sum up that both sides expect that in the process of modernization and replacement, there will be no significant increase in the size of silos and missiles. The remaining task is to find a reasonable interpretation of "significant."

The President: We will be reasonable. I agree.

What we were discussing earlier was the H- and G-Class submarines. How many are there?

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PRMPA

KW NARA, Date 5-6-02

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7

Dr. Kissinger: I won't tell the General Secretary or he will get angry again.

General Sec'y Brezhnev: On the figures of the submarines: As I said earlier, we have a certain group of submarines dating back to before 1964 with only three missiles each. They have all sorts of defects in their engines and so on. We have agreed to scrap them and replace them with new ones. They are no good to us.

Then we also have a considerable territorial disadvantage. The President was fair enough to say that we could have seven submarines more than the United States. We wanted more but we agreed to 48. That means we build 48 under the agreement and you 44 so the difference is really only four. I want to inject complete clarity. Forty-eight need not be mentioned in the main agreement but in the additional agreement it would state that we are entitled to 48. And then whatever else we build would be simultaneous with the removal of old ICBMs and old submarines. So, if for reasons of your own, for example Congress, you think you would not want to mention this in the agreement we can put it into the additional agreement.

Now you say you have no intention to build the three submarines. We have no problem about this. But I have here a report from the Washington Post quoting your Secretary of Defense Laird that the United States is planning to build 10 big new submarines and that \$10 billion have already been appropriated and that each is to carry 24 missiles and will become operational by the end of the '70s. Now, this is incompatible with our agreement, so how are we to understand it? We accepted the 44/710 and the 62/950. But now we are confronted with a new issue. Because by the end of the period the United States will have 10 new submarines with 24 missiles and much more modern than now. This is not an evening out, but on the contrary, the United States will get an advantage.

Dr. Kissinger: First, we had always told your Ambassador when discussing these programs about the new submarine; he had always known that it was going on. Secondly, it won't be operational until the late 70's. The first, as I understand it, will be in 1979; two in 1980, and then it won't be till 1982 or '83 that we will have 10. If we have a permanent agreement it would apply at that point. If the new ones come in during the freeze, we would retire the same number of tubes -- for every two ULMs, three Polaris. The ceiling would apply.

PRMIA

By KW NARA, Date 5-6-02

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE  
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8

The President: If you get a permanent agreement this becomes moot; this is the main point. The alternative is that both -- and this shows why the agreement is so important -- will pour billions more into submarines.

Dr. Kissinger: [To the President] You had intended a big speed-up of our submarine program but then cancelled it because of the SALT agreement.

The President: Yes. Because of the Soviet speed-up I had tentatively ordered the Navy to speed up the submarines, but I stopped it. But if we can get permanent agreement, we wouldn't pour money into the program. Of course, they would only be replacements under the numbers you are giving here, or lower numbers if we later agree on them.

Gen Sec'y Brezhnev: I think that approach makes it more difficult for me to take a decision. I now understand why the President won't build the three submarines since you have initiated a new program. I would have done the same thing. This changes the whole principle. We discussed the principle of evening out. But now you have a new program for new submarines of new size and with new range. You could even shoot rockets from territorial waters or from your home base. This requires earnest thinking on my part. It would be one thing if you built just one pilot boat. Or if it involves withdrawal of two or one-and-a-half boats for every new one. That would make sense and then our figure -- 950 -- would make sense. In fact, I am not even sure that we can build this figure in the present Five-Year Plan. It may be beyond our economic capacity. But in the meantime, you will make a leap forward in range and capacity. I don't know what you told our Ambassador; I may have forgotten it. But this creates a serious problem.

I do want to reach understanding and bring this matter to completion, but to be frank and speaking with all the respect I have for you, if this program is carried out, you will have a significant superiority.

The President: You have to look at it in two time frames. First, there is no program during the freeze. We would not put any new submarines into the fleet. The first one would be in 1979 and then two in 1980. Now, secondly, if in this period we have a new agreement on the same number, or a lower number, these submarines would be substituted for older ones and the numbers would not be affected. It would mean retiring old submarines with an equivalent number of missiles. There is no advantage intended and none certainly that affects this agreement.

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PRMPA

KW NARA, Date 5-6-02

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE  
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9

Gen Sec'y Brezhnev: You mean if we agree to 950?

The President: Yes, we would be frozen.  
You have the same right.

One argument we hear -- and we had many discussions over the months -- is that the Soviet Union's missiles are much larger than ours. So you have a significant advantage there. But we are here as reasonable men to work out a balanced program and that requires some give and take on both sides.

Gen Sec'y Brezhnev: With all the missiles and all the secrecy you think our missiles are bigger and we think yours are, and a lot of propaganda is raised.

The President: I wish you were right, but I am afraid I am. Actually, they are all too big. That's my view.

Gen Sec'y Brezhnev: I am sure you have probably either attended or seen demonstrations and know that the smallest missile is enough to destroy a city. Even a small bomb can paralyze and destroy everything -- water, electricity, gas and the rest. And then, of course, there is the pollution.

The President: That's why agreement is so important.

Gen Sec'y Brezhnev: What do you think about the idea of converting the submarine agreement into a permanent one, I mean the figures? And you and we would be entitled to modernize.

The President: Not now. I would have to go back to consult and that would take some months. It can be considered later, but not now. People can count: 950 -- 710 -- the United States is behind. No, not now.

Gen Sec'y Brezhnev: But your productive capacity is much greater. It makes no difference if the earliest date for you is 1979; the main thing is the pilot boat and then they go through the assembly line like pancakes.

The President: We must recognize that we each have great capabilities and if there is a race both lose. Now, for example, you talk about the size of the U.S. economy. In 1960, when Khrushchev was in the United States, we had an advantage in missiles of 10 to 1. Today, it's even. We respect your power. We are both strong now and neither will leave the other as a

PRMFA

by KW NARA, Date 5-6-02

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE  
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

10

Gen Sec'y Brezhnev: I value your frankness, but doesn't that testify that by 1979, at the end of the agreement, the U.S. wants superiority? But frankly, we won't let you.

The President: We would be labeled fools if we don't reach agreement by then.

Gen Sec'y Brezhnev: It's not a question of labels.

The President: I would consider this agreement a great achievement for us and all the world. I want to reach a permanent agreement but my time is limited -- less than five years. After then, I am out -- swimming in the Pacific. Maybe even before.

Gen Sec'y Brezhnev: Don't go out before that, Mr. President.

The President: I want the General Secretary and myself to meet again, perhaps in the U.S. or here.

Gen Sec'y Brezhnev: I have no objection to more than one meeting. In fact, they should become routine events in the natural course of developments.

The President: This agreement is the hors d'oeuvre. Next comes the main course.

Gen. Sec'y Brezhnev: If I might just throw in another idea. Make the agreement last 10, not five, years. In fact, why have we chosen five years?

Dr. Kissinger: You started at 18 months.

Gen Sec'y Brezhnev: No, first it was three years, then we suggested five.

Dr. Kissinger: No, I think you started with 18 months.

Gen Sec'y Brezhnev: Now we are bolder, more venturesome. But I am saying things that have not even been discussed in my own circle. I am just thinking aloud.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE  
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PRMFA

by KW NARA, Date 5-6-08

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE  
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11

The President: We should do that -- thinking aloud. I may do it too in the next few days. It took a long time to get this far. I know the General Secretary had to sell this agreement to his people, as I had to sell it to mine.

Gen Sec'y Brezhnev: On the basis of what has already been achieved, we are growing bolder. If at first it seemed to involve great risk, now it looks feasible.

The President: I make this commitment to the General Secretary: Once we make this agreement we will move aggressively to the next phase. Dr. Kissinger will tell you I generally do more than I say.

Gen Sec'y Brezhnev: I would like to see three examples.

The President: Well, for example, next spring in Washington might be a good time to take the next step.

Gen Sec'y Brezhnev: It would make no sense leaving Washington empty-handed. You will carry much baggage from Moscow.

The President: I will give him a golf cart if he likes it.

Gen Sec'y Brezhnev: But I don't play.

The President: You don't have to. You can use it on the sidewalk.

Anyway, let's get a good agreement.

Gen Sec'y Brezhnev: To sum up: I cannot give you a final answer this morning, but I will endeavor to do it tomorrow morning. You get 41 plus three and 710. But you give us the private assurance not to build three. We get 62 and 950. This is all logical. It's also agreed we get 48 submarines which we build to compensate for our territorial disadvantage. Whatever other submarines we build will be only to replace older missiles.

But we have to report to my colleagues that you have this other program. They all read this story from the Washington Post too -- this program with one submarine operational by 1979, two by 1980 and all ten by 1983. You have indicated that if any of them become operational before 1979 it would only be as replacement for older submarines with an equivalent number of missiles. And if it is after the end of the freeze, you will

PRMFA

By KW NARA, Date 5-6-02

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE  
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12

The President: That depends on the agreement. It should also be said that if you put modern missiles on your older submarines, they count in your 950, just as we have a limit of 710.

Gen Sec'y Brezhnev: Even in the event of your new subs becoming operational.

The President: That is a moot question. None will become operational in five years -- no chance. Also, as our technology goes forward, so will yours. So it is important to get a permanent agreement.

Gen Sec'y Brezhnev: I understand the situation and will report to my colleagues. You do confirm 48, on which we agreed?

The President: Forty-eight new ones; actually 62.

Gen Sec'y Brezhnev: Any built above it will require dismantling of old missiles.

The President: The top is 950. Our own number is really 41.

Gen Sec'y Brezhnev: We accept what you say, though in the final analysis an extra three won't make any difference.

The President: But we won't do it.

Gen Sec'y Brezhnev: But you will have a good statement to make. The number 48 need not be mentioned in the main agreement, but in the supplemental one.

The President: Fine.

Dr. Kissinger: So -- no figures in the main agreement, but figures in the supplement.

Gen Sec'y Brezhnev: Therefore, it is correct to say we have no other issues on strategic arms. Right?

The President: On the mobiles. We had raised this but since we worked out the situation with regard to the size of missiles, let's throw it out. Of course, some of our people think you have them.

PRMPA

KW NARA, Date 5-6-02

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE  
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

13

Gen Sec'y Brezhnev: We've got plenty, haven't you seen them rolling around the Kremlin? Mr. President, then I'll consult with my colleagues. I do believe we have reached an understanding, and I will give you an answer in the morning. We could then give instructions to Helsinki or have them come here.

The President: Well, it is better to give them to Helsinki so we can get on with the other things we have here.

Gen Sec'y Brezhnev: We ought to agree on common instructions.

Dr. Kissinger: How about the first item?

Gen Sec'y Brezhnev: Which one is that?

Dr. Kissinger: Well, the definition of heavy missiles. Can we send instruction that the size of the silo and the size of the missile cannot be changed?

The President: We will check the notes and take it from the notes.

[Brezhnev gets up to make phone call which goes on for about four minutes.]

Gen Sec'y Brezhnev: Maybe we should leave it till morning because I can only reach one. For now we should leave it as it was in the message received from Helsinki, the one that deals with silos only. In the morning I can give you a package deal.

Dr. Kissinger: So we won't send instructions.

Gen Sec'y Brezhnev: You and I have agreed in principle, but we can leave the situation as it is as far as Helsinki is concerned.

[Brezhnev reads brief announcement:

"On 23 May a meeting took place in the Kremlin between General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, L. I. Brezhnev, and President of the USA, Richard M. Nixon. The talks continued between L. I. Brezhnev and R. Nixon on questions of Soviet-American relations." ]

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by KW NARA, Date 5-6-02

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE  
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14

Anyway the 950 and 710 will last until 1978, the end of this agreement. Incidentally, I would like to ask how do you see the end of the limitation agreement?

Dr. Kissinger: Five years after ratification.

Gen Sec'y Brezhnev: When do you contemplate ratification?

Dr. Kissinger: The plan is to put the offensive agreement to Congress but we expect no problem.

Gen Sec'y Brezhnev: You have no doubts.

The President: Unless you drive too hard a bargain.

Gen Sec'y Brezhnev: This is not a point of principle. The important thing is to get ratification.

The President: That is why I met with the leaders of Congress and this morning called them on the phone. We are working on the Congressional business already.

Gen Sec'y Brezhnev: We have reached an understanding on almost all questions and will give you an answer in the morning. One more point. I just got a TASS report from Paris saying that today the delegation of the PRG of Vietnam sent a message to the U. S. and South Vietnamese to resume the work of the conference -- the 150th session on May 25. And there is also a similar message from the DRV.

The President: We will have an opportunity to discuss this later. We have had 149 sessions and no progress. When we have concrete assurance of progress then we can consider this.

Gen Sec'y Brezhnev: Well, I was just thinking along the line that while you are here there might be significance in your making a response -- a positive response. But I am just thinking out loud.

[After closing pleasantries, the meeting adjourned.]

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By KW NARA, Date 5-6-02

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Date: May 24, 1972  
Time: 11:00 a.m.  
Place: The Kremlin

Subject: European Problems

Participants: US

The President  
Secretary Rogers  
Mr. Kissinger  
Mr. Hillenbrand  
Mr. Sonnenfeldt  
Mr. Lord

USSR

General Secretary Brezhnev  
Chairman Kosygin  
Chairman Podgorny  
Foreign Minister Gromyko  
Ambassador Dobrynin  
Mr. Alexandrov-Agentov

Drafted: <sup>MH</sup> Martin J. Hillenbrand:dg:sdd  
5/24/72

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By KW NARA, Date 5-6-02 SECRET/NODIS

2

Brezhnev began the discussion of European questions by saying he wished to make an initial presentation of Soviet views. A discussion of European problems was important for reasons which both sides would understand. Europe was one of the most densely populated areas in the world with great economic potential, an ancient culture and great scientific capacity. But it was also an area where many large-scale wars have originated. The USSR. was dragged into the last world war which involved much human suffering and sacrifice, and has had a long-term effect on Europe. The question, therefore, was how to make this area one of peace and tranquillity so that all the peoples of Europe could live in conditions of security and confidence which would not deteriorate. This would not be an easy thing to achieve but it was the focal point of Soviet attention.

In Europe, Brezhnev continued, we have had a sufficient and rich experience of cooperation in various matters. There was the cooperation of the United States and the USSR during the war and immediately thereafter in the Potsdam Agreement and postwar activities. The Soviet Union valued highly the cooperation achieved in the recent talks on West Berlin and in connection with the ratification of the Soviet and Polish treaties. However, much the Soviet Union might value this cooperation, the importance of the US-USSR role in solving the problems of the future should not be belittled. The security not only of the Soviet Union and of the United States but of Europe as a whole would depend on a large measure on our policies. He wanted to say frankly that if the United States were prepared to take measures to remove the surviving remnants of cold war, this would lead to general improvement in the relations between the US and the USSR. This was an important aspect of the problem. He said he would like to emphasize the significance of the concerted policies both countries had pursued with respect to West Berlin and ratification of the German treaties. The Soviet line vis-a-vis the Federal

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SECRET/NODIS

3

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/ did not have an anti-American character. He had said this frankly to Chancellor Brandt and the Soviet Union would abide very strictly by such an approach. As a practical step, the Supreme Soviet would on May 31 ratify the treaty with the Federal Republic of Germany. As the Soviets had pointed out in the past, immediately thereafter they would sign the Final Berlin Protocol so that the Berlin Treaty would also come into effect. In the Soviet view that would not only serve to improve the legal relations between the FRG and the USSR but their general relations.

The Secretary commented that he had suggested June 3 as a possible date for the signing of the Final Berlin Protocol.

Brezhnev said that seemed an acceptable date. The Soviet Union had promised it would sign immediately after the ratification of the Moscow Treaty.

The Secretary said that someone had suggested June 16 as a possible date for signing the Berlin Protocol. He thought that June 3 would be preferable.

Brezhnev, seconded by Podgorny, said the sooner the better. The Soviet position was that the two should come into effect simultaneously.

The Secretary said we would try to work this out with the French and the British.

Gromyko said yes, indicating he would be available for a June 3 signature.

Brezhnev resumed his presentation by saying that, in our common policy in Europe, it was most important to continue to pursue a firm line not to permit any violation of European boundaries as they have taken shape in postwar Europe. That was a task of our common policy. He would like now to tell the President that there have been and are erroneous interpretations of

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E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

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SECRET/NODIS

4

of the European policy of the USSR. Sometimes these have been due to lack of true knowledge, but more frequently, rumors are deliberately spread that we want to break the ties that the United States has developed with the European states. That was very far from the truth. The initiatives the Soviets were taking in Europe were in pursuit of a different goal directed toward ensuring the interests not only of the European states, but of maintaining and protecting the interests of the USSR and the US in Europe, if, of course, like the Soviet Union, the United States seeks to make Europe tranquil and secure. Taking into account the role played by the United States and the cooperation between the United States and the USSR in World War II and especially in connection with the West Berlin talks and the Moscow Treaty ratification, he believed it normal, in all matters relating to the European continent, that the United States should participate on an equal footing, even though the US was not a European nation. This attitude was evidence of the fact that the Soviet Union was willing to let the United States defend its own interests in Europe.

Another question to which the Soviet Union attached great importance was the preparation and convening of an all-European Conference. The reason is that the Soviet Union does not see this conference as an end in itself but as a possible means that can bring to fruition the trend in Europe toward normalization and the securing of lasting peace in Europe. He should like to add, despite the differing approaches of the US and the USSR to several matters affecting European politics, the strengthening of security in Europe would serve the long-term interests of both the United States and the USSR. If both countries acted in the direction of constructing guarantees for the security of the European states, this would ensure that there would be no nuclear war and preserve that tranquillity in Europe which might be endangered through the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union believed that

SECRET/NODIS

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

CRMPA  
By KW NARA, Date 5-6-02

SECRET/NODIS

5

a turn for the better has become discernible today, and that it would be useful to take advantage of this fact to strengthen security and to make joint efforts to convene a European Security Conference. We should begin preliminary bilateral conversations on this subject, and might say some things in a preliminary way at this meeting, assuming a positive US attitude on the subject. The Soviet Union has expressed its views publicly on this matter on many occasions, and so have many European states. As the President knew, the Soviets favor convening this conference even as early as the end of this year. It was quite clear that it would perhaps not be possible to solve all the important problems of Europe, but it was essential to get the conference going. It might be necessary to prolong the conference, but it was important to begin the work of the conference. As in any question, such preparations could assume different forms, but as a first suggestion, he proposed that the consultations be started in Helsinki. Then the first stage of the conference itself would involve the Foreign Ministers of the countries of Europe as well as the United States and Canada. They could work out an agenda and create the necessary commissions, bodies and secretariat, which would elaborate specific proposals for governmental consideration. Certainly this was not the only possible way of addressing the problem; others could be discussed, but the Soviet view was that nothing in this approach would run contrary to the interests of the participants. Whatever conversations we have on this topic, he continued, we would like to emphasize the desirability of saying something in principle about the European Conference at the conclusion of our meeting here. In principle, he noted, the President had given his consent to this at their first meeting. If some mention was not made, then there would be all sorts of wrong opinions and misunderstandings. People would say that the United States and the USSR had changed policies. Since that was not so, such a reference would justify the hopes placed in these talks by the people of Europe and our own people.

SECRET/NODIS

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

PRMPA  
By KW NARA, Date 5-6-02

SECRET/NODIS

6

Brezhnev went on to say that now that we have, through cooperation, assured ratification of the Moscow Treaty and taken care of the West Berlin question, another important matter arises -- the simultaneous admission to the UN of the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic. A positive solution to this question would resolve much of the tension in Europe and a source of friction between us. The Soviets felt that they should be able to count on a positive attitude on the part of the United States; this subject related also to the bilateral relationship between the United States and the USSR. UN admission of the FRG and GDR would create a better political climate between us. He noted that he had referred frequently to this subject during the visit.

Another major issue, Brezhnev continued, concerns not only improving the political climate between the US and the USSR and the relations between our two countries, but all the other states of Europe as well and the general improvement of the world situation. This was the question of military-political groupings in Europe. The Soviet Union was prepared, together with its allies, to reach an agreement disbanding these groupings, or as a first step agreement to disbanding their military organizations. The Soviet Union was prepared to initiate talks with the United States on this subject.

These, Brezhnev concluded, are in the Soviet view the basic issues we should discuss with respect to Europe.

The President commented that Brezhnev had correctly pointed out that our position was one of agreeing in principle to the European Security Conference, or as it is called, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Yet, as Brezhnev knew, we have, and the Soviets have, the problem of not deciding at this meeting the future of Europe. It was important that we consult

SECRET/NODIS

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

CRMPA  
By KW NARA, Date 5-6-02

SECRET/NODIS

7

our allies, important that what we state here be understood to be our opinions. We will follow through with consultations with our allies. Brezhnev commented that this was quite natural. Kosygin asked whether the President thought a time would come when the US would have no allies and the USSR no allies, but all would be "our allies." As long as we talked about our allies we would be at loggerheads. The President observed that this could come in the future but would take time. We must recognize that the small nations are very sensitive about having their fate determined by the large nations. Brezhnev said we should not offend them, and Kosygin commented that that, in fact, was why the Soviet Union was so categorically opposed to Chinese allegations that the two super powers were now combining to settle all the questions of the world. Our attitude is (he was interrupted by Brezhnev at this point and never finished his sentence).

There ensued some banter about who should go on the first manned mission to Mars, with Gromyko suggesting finally that the Foreign Ministers should make a preliminary first flight and the President commenting that, if the Foreign Ministers did not return, then he and Kosygin would not go. Brezhnev added that, if the Foreign Ministers did not return, there would be no problems left.

Getting down to practical points, the President resumed, he saw a number of problems. To have the European Security Conference meet this year would not be possible. It would pose serious problems for us, since this autumn we would be having our elections and their aftermath. This would complicate the problems of preparation. We could talk realistically in terms of a meeting in 1973 and of preliminary discussions in the fall of this year. One of the reasons this meeting in Moscow was producing such results was that it was well prepared. With all of the European countries involved in the conference, preparations would be important. We might agree upon an agenda but other countries would have their own ideas. Therefore, we should realistically aim at 1973. The Secretary noted that some of our allies such as Canada also have elections this fall.

SECRET/NODIS

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

PRMCA

By KW NARA, Date 5-6-02

SECRET/NODIS

8

The President said the Soviet Union would want to know whether it is dealing with a government that has survived, or is gone. Preliminary or exploratory discussions could begin at the proper level, and could go forward at a time to be agreed. He believed it was the Soviet thought that they should take place at Helsinki. Brezhnev responded that that is what has now come to light. Some work has already begun, and Gromyko added that the general trend of public opinion favored Helsinki. Almost all countries had given their consent to it and he understood the US had no objection. The Secretary observed we were talking about Helsinki for the preliminary talks, not the conference itself. Both Brezhnev and Kosygin said yes to this.

With respect to the representation of East Germany in the UN, the President continued, this is a problem where we will have to be guided by the attitude of the FRG. When the Federal Republic indicates it is ready to move forward on this, we will cooperate. We are prepared to study with the British and French the very sensitive problem of four-power rights that might be affected by such action.

The situation with regard to blocs and military forces was much more difficult, the President said. It would require a great deal of time. As Brezhnev and the Soviet government were aware, there has been considerable discussion in NATO of mutual and balanced force reductions. This was not a matter which could be decided at a large conference involving a number of nations that do not have forces. That is why we have suggested that there be parallel discussions on force reductions, going forward at the same time as the discussions on the European Conference. Brezhnev said he agreed that such states as Luxembourg with ninety policemen did not have a large interest. He wondered how the President visualized this in practice. If the Foreign Ministers met in Helsinki at the first stage of the conference, set up an agenda, and various working parties, should they then study the force question in parallel fashion. The President responded that this was the point he was making. The countries with forces involved should have these discussions.

SECRET/NODIS



DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

PRMPA  
By KW NARA, Date 5-6-02

SECRET/NODIS

9

This was also a point Henry Kissinger had made in his previous discussions with Brezhnev. Kosygin said he understood the President to be saying they should be proceeding in parallel fashion. Brezhnev interrupted to say, "But in different bodies."

The Secretary said there might be an item on the agenda dealing generally with the subject, with separate discussions in the smaller group at the same time or thereafter. Brezhnev, Podgorny and Kosygin all made the point that it perhaps should not be done in parallel fashion. Perhaps it was better to get the European conference subjects out of the way and then move on to force reductions. One problem might get in the way of the other. The President commented that if we waited until the end of the conference we might never get to force reductions. Brezhnev then said the discussions could be conducted in parallel but in different bodies. The President added we support the earliest possible discussions of the question but are against hinging the two. Gromyko said it was important not to tie up the two subjects in a substantive way.

The Secretary commented that, if we were going to have a conference dealing with security, any conference that did not at least refer to this subject will be considered lacking in something.

The President said he wanted to suggest a procedure for consideration. He would like to do some thinking about how we handled this tactically, and about dates. If Secretary Rogers and Foreign Minister Gromyko could discuss this question and report back, perhaps on Friday, they could give us some options as to how the subject could be handled. Brezhnev said "O.K.," (an expression which he has now acquired for the Russian "khorosho"). Kosygin commented that it would be a good thing if the Secretary and Gromyko could work on this and make some suggestions on the basis of which future discussions could be held. This might help to remove questions that would otherwise take months to solve. The President reiterated that the Secretary and Gromyko should provide several options.

SECRET/NODIS

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

PRMPA

By KW NARA, Date 5-6-02

SECRET/NODIS

10

Kosygin noted that it was also true that many people in Europe seemed to be laboring under the impression that the US was holding up the conference. The President said, that while we can agree in principle, we must be careful to state this in such a way as to not irritate our friends. And he meant Soviet friends here as well. For example, we did not want to anger the Albanians. Brezhnev observed that the USSR heeded the voice of Luxembourg as well. Gromyko said this was indeed a very noble intention, and Brezhnev added that if the Soviets told the Albanians we regarded them as best friends they would be pleased. Podgorny said it would be hard to heed the voice of the Albanians. Brezhnev asked if a country doesn't want to take part, what do you do? The President added that a country like Austria was small but it should be listened to.

Brezhnev jokingly summarized, in conclusion, that Secretary Rogers and Foreign Minister Gromyko should get together and work throughout the night, and present the group with some options while the principals enjoyed their sleep.

SECRET/NODIS

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

CRMPA  
By KW NARA, Date 5-6-02

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TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/  
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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Leonid I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the  
Central Committee of the CPSU  
Nikolai V. Podgorny, Chairman of the Presidium  
of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR  
Aleksi N. Kosygin, Chairman of the Council of  
Ministers of the USSR  
Andrei A. Gromyko, Minister of Foreign Affairs  
Anatoli F. Dobrynin, Ambassador to the USA  
Andrei M. Aleksandrov-Agentov, Assistant to  
the General Secretary  
Viktor M. Sukhodrev, Interpreter  
Leonid Zamyatin, Director of TASS

The President  
William P. Rogers, Secretary of State  
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the  
President for National Security Affairs  
Martin Hillenbrand, Assistant Secretary of  
State for European Affairs  
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, NSC Senior Staff Member  
Winston Lord, Special Assistant to Dr. Kissinger

DATE & TIME: Wednesday, May 24, 1972  
11:40 a.m. - 1:30 p.m.

PLACE: St. Catherine's Hall  
Grand Kremlin Palace, Moscow

SUBJECTS: Economic Relations; Europe

[In informal conversation before the meeting began, the Soviet leaders, in particular Kosygin, emphasized the importance of Most-Favored-Nation treatment for the Soviet Union, citing the very high U. S. tariff rates for many Soviet products. The President essentially listened without committing himself.]

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

PRMPA  
By KW NARA, Date 5-6-02

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/  
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2

[The Soviet side then said that the meeting would take up European issues. The U. S. side had thought that SALT would be the principal item, and when he heard that Europe would be discussed the President said that he wanted Secretary Rogers and Assistant Secretary Hillenbrand present. He pointed out to the Soviet leaders that Secretary Rogers would have to describe the discussions to the European countries and at home. Dr. Kissinger left the room to call Secretary Rogers.]

#### ECONOMIC RELATIONS

The President: I was talking to Prime Minister Kosygin on MFN. As I told the General Secretary yesterday, I will handle that. I already indicated this to Ambassador Dobrynin at Camp David. I have to get this through the Congress. I have already discussed it with the leaders; if we can get Congressional agreement I will take responsibility.

Chairman Kosygin: That would be a very good thing. I can see that then we will really have a solid basis for the development of our economic ties, because otherwise there can be nothing but talk on this subject and nothing concrete. In fact, we can sell commodities 40% dearer in European markets. So why should we sell to the United States if we can get 40% more in Europe?

The President: That makes sense.

Chairman Kosygin: While we are waiting I can give you some comparable examples: all sorts of heavy equipment, like machine tools and parts of metal cutting machines, power stations, diesels, in short most of the products of the engineering industry that we could sell to the United States would be taxed up to 40%.

Chairman Podgorny: There are some that are even higher.

Chairman Kosygin: Compared to that the general tax [tariff] on goods in other nations is 5% or 7% compared to that of 40% in the United States. There are other examples. On optical equipment, for example, the tax is 50%. On electrical measuring devices and instruments it goes as high as 90%. Can anyone do trade on that sort of basis?

For example, with Canada recently we had a sale of turbines and generators and it was a normal situation where the delegation came over and crossed

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

CRMPA  
By KW NARA, Date 5-6-02

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/  
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3

Siberia and saw our equipment at work and bought very important machinery in the electrical power field, and the tax rates were quite normal.

The President: On the whole economic matter, Patolichev, Rogers and Flanigan had discussions yesterday. We have no problem so far as Export-Import Bank credits are concerned. I can do that unilaterally as President. On MFN I have to go to Congress.

It would be helpful, Mr. General Secretary, if whomever you designate, perhaps Prime Minister Kosygin, could talk to Rogers about this so he can sell it to Congress when he gets there. Don't you agree, Mr. Ambassador [Dobrynin]?

Ambassador Dobrynin: [Gestures to Kosygin]

General Secretary Brezhnev: Very well.

Chairman Kosygin: Well, of course, the solution of the question of Export-Import Bank credits will provide the opportunity to achieve some progress, but ways must be found to get over the MFN problem and seek ways to increase trade.

I have already put this to some American representatives. When we really get trade going it will be quite useful for us to have a bank of our own in the United States, as we do in various countries, such as France, Great Britain, Iran and Turkey, like in many parts of the world. We should either have a bank of our own, or it could take the form of a joint U. S. -Soviet venture.

General Secretary Brezhnev: One specific matter. I think on two occasions an important delegation of American businessmen visited this country. Among the questions discussed was a possible large scale agreement on a joint venture in gas, building in the northern areas of our country special liquid gas plants. This could be a very important project for U. S. -Soviet cooperation. Are you familiar with this, Mr. President, and if so how do you view this matter? Because this would be a question involving both vast quantities and also it would be on a long term basis.

[Secretary Rogers and Assistant Secretary Hillenbrand arrived.]

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

PRMFA

By KW NARA, Date 5-6-02

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE  
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4

Chairman Kosygin: The situation right now is this. The representatives of American business circles are suggesting where some of these could be built. We reached preliminary agreement on a gas pipeline in Siberia from Tyumen. The initial duration will be for a period of twenty years and the cost would be somewhere close to \$5 billion. The Americans who came here were quite confident that they had almost agreed on this matter with their authorities in the U.S. I don't know if it has come to your attention. They are quite sure that the total amounts of gas involved would be 25 billion cubic meters, or liquid gas would be 25 million tons. They gave us preliminary projections, a preliminary plan of action which they elaborated for our experts. I made a suggestion to have not just one pipeline but two parallel pipes. Then they made their own additional suggestions. They seemed quite sure a bargain could be struck.

To sum up, I am quite sure there is a basis to study this matter. We are also quite sure that there are enough gas desposits in this area to arrange for a business deal. There is a very important project that could be carried into effect. On account of the credit that would be extended by the American side to us to carry the project into effect, we could place very significant orders, for example for 3 million tons of sheet steel and important orders in the field of compressors. We would thereby, contribute to a fuller scale of operations important to American industry. We would contribute to a lower American unemployment rate. If correctly presented to the Congress it would be welcomed.

The President: [to Secretary Rogers] Would you say a word on the gas project?

Secretary Rogers: This is a very large project, and we have to consider carefully its feasibility. We as a government have not taken a position as yet. We recognize the point that Premier Kosygin has made. We talked to private parties, and we indicated that we would want to consider any proposals that they make. Up to this time we haven't taken a position as a government on it.

Chairman Kosygin: That is exactly what the American businessmen said. But they are interested and confirmed what you said, that the U.S. Government has not taken a position yet.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/  
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DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

PRMCA  
By KW NARA, Date 5-6-02

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/  
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5

The President: [to Secretary Rogers] Before you came I said that I thought it would be helpful if you could meet with Mr. Kosygin and discuss the specifics on this. They also raised the points of MFN which I said we were prepared to move on with the Congress. Would you like to say a word about that?

Secretary Rogers: I would be happy to meet with Mr. Kosygin and Mr. Flanigan at your convenience. As you know, Mr. President, this involves huge amounts of credits and we have to consider it carefully. Concerning natural gas, actually if we were to extend that amount of credit, we would have to work out the lend-lease settlement. Natural gas involves a very substantial amount of credit, about one-third of what the Export-Import Bank has available.

The President: It also involves MFN?

Secretary Rogers: Credit.

The President: That doesn't mean that it isn't possible.

Chairman Kosygin: But this is not just something in our interest alone. It is something of a mutual advantage to both sides.

The President: Oh no.

Chairman Kosygin: This should reflect a mutual desire on our part to develop a cooperation in this field; it is not something that is unilaterally to our advantage.

The President: We would like to work it out altogether, including lend lease, the resolution of that problem. I can move on Export-Import Bank matters, but in regard to MFN I have to go back to the Congress on that. I believe that Kosygin/Rogers discussions would be useful because we get the side of the businessmen, and I would like to hear directly what you have in mind.

Secretary Rogers: I have talked to the businessmen. I will be very happy to talk to Premier Kosygin.

Chairman Kosygin: Well, just adding to what has been said now, we have large agreements on the sale of gas with Austria and the Federal Republic

of Germany and all the Socialist countries and Italy. In short, we have almost more potential consumers of our gas than we need. This should be in the nature of a serious business deal between our two countries.

On the question of lend lease, we think we should set aside a time to discuss that so we know where we are. We should not just float in air so that we can come to a concrete solution on the basis of your proposal and the ones that we have. Certainly that issue is long overdue.

The President: That certainly would help the political climate that we need to get Most-Favored-Nation.

Chairman Kosygin: And here, of course, we must both take a really realistic view of things and remember that after all more than 25 years have passed since the end of the war. None of us can expect very great figures or sums to be involved in solving this matter. On the other hand many in this world want to exploit this matter in their own selfish interest.

Secretary Rogers: The President suggested I say a word about MFN. If we have a satisfactory outcome of the lend lease negotiations and the general relations between the Soviet Union and the United States improve as a result of this visit, and the President supports MFN, then Congress, I think, will follow the President's lead. It is not an easy matter, but I think whatever the President recommends to the Congress under these circumstances, I think that they would do.

#### EUROPE

General Secretary Brezhnev: Shall we now turn to the subject that has been suggested we discuss this morning, Europe? If you have no objections, I would like to make a few opening remarks on that question. A discussion of the problems relating to Europe is a very important one indeed, and I believe the reasons for that are understood perfectly well on both sides. Europe is indeed an area which is one of the most densely populated ones in the world. It is an area of enormous economic potential; an area of ancient culture and science. All of these are important matters.

On the other hand, it is also an area where in the past many large-scale wars originated. I need only to mention two world wars and especially the last one which the U.S. was dragged into also. And those wars, particularly the last one, involved very much human suffering and sacrifice. It had a very bad aftermath and had a long term effect on the situation



TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/  
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7

The question therefore is how to make this area an area of peace and tranquility so that all the peoples of Europe can live in conditions of security, so that we too, and both of us, can be confident that the situation in Europe would not deteriorate. This is certainly not an easy thing to achieve, but it is something that should be the focus of our attention.

In Europe, we have sufficient and quite rich experience of cooperation on various matters. There has been the fighting cooperation of our two nations during the Second World War. There was the fruitful cooperation at the time of the Potsdam Agreement. There has been comparable experience in the post-war period. We regard particularly highly the cooperation of our two nations in the talks on the Berlin agreement and in the matters of the Soviet Union-Federal Republic of Germany and Poland-Federal Republic of Germany Treaties.

However much we value the cooperation in the past, we should not belittle the importance of our role in ensuring the future of Europe, because there are still in Europe the unresolved problems. Very much in the policies of the United States and Soviet Union about Europe would favor not only the interests of Europeans, but also the interests of your country and ours. I should like to say quite frankly that if the U.S. is prepared to take measures to remove the survivals of the past policies of the cold war, the outcome would be an improvement of relations between the Soviet Union and the United States. That, too, is a very important aspect of this problem.

And I would like at this point to emphasize again the significance of the concerted policies we both pursued with regard to the problems of West Berlin and the ratification of the treaty. At the same time I wish to state firmly that our line with regard to the Federal Republic of Germany would not be anti-American in character. This is something we said in all frankness to Chancellor Brandt, and this is something we will abide by very strictly. And as a practical step let me say that on May 31 our Supreme Soviet will be ratifying the treaty with the Federal Republic of Germany. As we pointed out in the past, immediately after that we will sign the final protocol on West Berlin so that can be put into effect too. In our view that will not only serve to improve the legal relations between the Federal Republic of Germany, the German Democratic Republic and Poland. It will also have a beneficial effect on the general atmosphere in Europe.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/  
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8

Secretary Rogers: I suggested to Mr. Gromyko that we make the signing on June 3.

General Secretary Brezhnev: I think that seems to be a very acceptable date. We have promised to sign it immediately after ratifying; that is something expected by the Federal Republic of Germany.

Secretary Rogers: There is some suggestion that we delay until June 16, but June 3 is better for us.

General Secretary Brezhnev: We feel the sooner the better. We promised they would come into force at the same time, so it seems logical to do it on June 3.

Secretary Rogers: We will try to work it out with the others.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: Good, the British and the French.

General Secretary Brezhnev: That would be a very good thing indeed. In our common policy in Europe it will also be most important to continue to pursue a firm line and not even conceive of the possibility of the violation of boundaries of Europe as they have taken shape in the post-war period. That also is one of the paramount tasks of current foreign policies.

And I would now like to tell you frankly, Mr. President, there have been erroneous, fallacious interpretations of our policy with respect to Europe. Sometimes this is a lack of true knowledge, but more frequently it is deliberate rumors spread to the effect that the goal of our policies is to break the ties that the U.S. has developed with European states. We wish to state in these negotiations that this is very far from the truth. The initiatives that we are taking in Europe, and particularly on the question of European security, pursue a goal that is totally different. We pursue our objective in the interest of not only the European states; we pursue it also with the goal of maintaining and protecting the interest of the Soviet Union and the United States in Europe, if of course, like ourselves, the United States seeks to make Europe tranquil and secure.

In confirmation with what I have said with regard to the goal of the Soviet policy in Europe, we will take into account the role played by the U.S. and and U.S. - Soviet cooperation both during World War II and the post-war

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/  
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

9

period, particularly in the earlier talks on the problem of West Berlin and the matter of the ratification of the treaties. We believe it quite normal that in all matters relating to the European Conference and the solution of all serious problems relating to Europe, the United States should participate on an equal footing, even though the United States is not an European nation. This review is confirmation of our views and attitude to the U. S. and to the U. S. being able to defend its own interests in Europe.

Another question to which we attach great importance is the question of preparing and convening an all-European Security Conference. The reasons why we attach importance to this is as follows: We do not see the Conference as an aim in itself. We regard it as one of the possible means that can help bring to fruition the turn that has been discernible toward the normalization of the situation and strengthening of the prospects of securing lasting peace in the continent.

I should like to add the following. Despite the different approaches taken by the U. S. and the Soviet Union to several matters affecting European politics, the strengthening of security in Europe does in our view correspond to the long-term interests of both the Soviet Union and the United States. And if we both act in that direction -- in a direction of building up the guarantee of security of European states -- that will insure that there will be no more nuclear war and there will be tranquility in Europe to a far greater extent than attempts to insure that tranquility through the use or threat of nuclear weapons.

We believe that a turn for the better has become discernible in Europe today, and it will be in our view useful if we could take advantage of that fact in order to strengthen that feeling of security and begin a joint effort to prepare for the convening of a European Security Conference. We should therefore endeavor to begin preliminary bilateral consultations on those matters and in a preliminary way we might say a few words about that at this meeting. And we are counting on the positive attitude of the United States toward this matter. We have expressed our views publicly on this question on many occasions and so have quite a few other European states.

As you know, we have spoken in favor of convening this conference even as early as the end of this year. It is quite clear that in one blow it may

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

CRMPA

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/  
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10

certainly not prove possible to resolve all the complex problems of Europe, but the important thing is to launch the conference, to get the conference going. It might prove expedient to prolong its work. The important thing is to begin the work, to begin the preparations for the conference.

As in any question such preparations can assume a different form, but as a first suggestion perhaps we could discuss the following: we first begin multilateral consultations in Helsinki. Then, in the first stage of the conference itself the Foreign Ministers of the European states and the United States and Canada could meet to work out an agenda of the conference, to create the necessary bodies, commissions, secretariat and so forth. And then those bodies could get to work in order to elaborate and submit various specific proposals for the consideration of the governments of the European states and the United States and Canada.

Certainly this is not the one and only possible form of addressing ourselves to this problem. Other forms can also be discussed. We are just submitting our own view. This form has in it nothing that can be construed as running against any participants in the conference. Whatever conversations we have on this topic, we should certainly like to emphasize the significance for future developments of our two sides publicly saying something in principle on the problem relating to the European Conference at the conclusion of our meetings here. And you have in principle given your consent to that first meeting. I wish to emphasize that it would be very important indeed to say something at the conclusion on these subjects because if we don't there might be all sorts of wrong opinions and misunderstandings in Europe. People would start saying that the U. S. or the Soviet Union was changing their policy. Even if so, by making public reference we would be doing a very good thing and therefore justify the hopes the people in Europe have placed in these talks and in the people of our countries.

And now we have through joint cooperation settled the matter of the ratification of the treaties and the question of West Berlin, another important matter arises and that is a simultaneous admission of the two German states, the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic, to the United Nations. The possible solution to this question would certainly remove much tension in Europe and the sources of friction between us on those grounds. This is a major issue, and we feel we should be entitled to count on the positive attitude of your part on this also.

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

*PRM/A*

Rev. 11.1 NADA Date 6-6-02

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/  
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

11

Although it is an international problem, it also relates to bilateral relations between our two countries. It would help to create a better climate for the relations between us. And that is something to which you made frequent reference during this visit, Mr. President.

Another major issue which concerns not only improving the general climate and relations between our two countries and the relations of our two countries with the states of Europe, but also in line with the interest of generally improving the situation in the world, is the question of the military/political groupings in Europe. You are, I trust, familiar with our position on these matters. We are prepared, together with our allies, to disband military/political groupings in Europe towards a first step to really disbanding military organizations, and we are prepared to initiate consultations with you on this subject.

Those, Mr. President, are in our view just the basic issues we could discuss and talk about with relation to Europe.

The President: Mr. General Secretary, you correctly pointed out our position of agreeing in principle to a European Security Conference, or a European Security and Cooperation Conference. As you know, we have, and you have, the problem of not deciding at this meeting the future of Europe. It is very important, while we agree in principle, that we consult with our allies, you with yours and we with ours. Therefore it is very important that whatever we state here, we will follow through with consultations with our allies.

General Secretary Brezhnev: That's quite natural.

Chairman Kosygin: Do you think the time will come when there are no allies on your part or on ours, that we are common allies?

The President: Surely. It will take time.

Chairman Kosygin: That's what we want to achieve. As long as you have your allies and we ours, we are at loggerheads.

The President: It is very important we recognize that smaller nations are very sensitive about the relations between the two great powers. Small nations object to having their fate decided by larger ones.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

PRM/A

By: K.L. NADA Date: 6-1-77

General Secretary Brezhnev: It should not offend them.

Chairman Kosygin: That in fact is why we are so categorically opposed to allegations, these Chinese allegations, about the two superpowers combining to settle all the questions of the world, the affairs of smaller countries. We, for our part, have the immutable position that we respect other countries. And that is our attitude.

[There was a brief discussion about Kosygin and a Deputy Prime Minister for Science.]

The President: He is making a private deal with Mr. Kosygin. As the first nation to send a manned mission to Mars, I will go along.

Chairman Kosygin: I can stand it, can you?

The President: It will take nine months. We will get to know each other very well.

Chairman Kosygin: We will take cognac.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: How could you go without the Foreign Ministers?

Chairman Podgorny: This is not a private deal. We have to give honest thought to who flies.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: Perhaps first there should be a preliminary flight of foreign ministers.

The President: If the foreign ministers don't come back, we won't go.

General Secretary Brezhnev: We call Dr. Kissinger to order -- keep him away from submarines.

Chairman Kosygin: If we don't come back, everything will be clear.

The President: Getting to the practical points, as I know the General Secretary likes to do, stated frankly, I see these problems. First to have a meeting this year, 1972, the first meeting of the European Security Conference, would not be possible. It poses for us rather considerable problems. We have elections and the aftermath, and it also poses the

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

PRMPA

Rv Kw) NARA Date 5-6-02

problem of participation. We can talk in terms of a meeting in 1973. We can have preliminary discussions take place in the fall of this year. That is realistic. One of the reasons that this meeting we are having now is producing such solid results is because it was well prepared. In a meeting involving all the countries of Europe, the preparations, of course, would be very important. Whereas we two might agree on an agenda, smaller nations have various ideas, and it will take time. 1973 is the time for the meeting to aim for rather than trying to compress it and get it done in 1972.

Secretary Rogers: Our allies agree with this. Some of them have elections this fall, like Canada.

The President: You have to know whether you are dealing with a government that will survive or one that's gone. Preliminary discussions at the proper level, the exploratory discussions, could go forward at the times the European nations and all of us agree.

It's your thought that these should take place at Helsinki?

General Secretary Brezhnev: That's where the idea of a conference came to life. Some work has already begun. Since Finland was the initiator we feel that Helsinki should be the city. That seems the general trend of public opinion, that it should be held in Helsinki.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: In fact practically all the countries concerned have indicated their preference for Helsinki, and the U. S. has not in fact registered a negative attitude.

Secretary Rogers: We are talking about preliminary talks, not the conference itself.

General Secretary Brezhnev: That's exactly our understanding.

The President: The second point, with regard to UN representation of East Germany, this is a problem where we, of course, will have to be guided by the attitude of the Federal Republic. And when the Federal Republic has discussed this matter and indicated it is ready to move forward, we will, of course, cooperate. We will be prepared to discuss it with the British and the French. There is the very sensitive problem of four-power rights that might be affected by this action.

The situation with regard to what the General Secretary was referring to concerning military forces and military blocs is of course much more difficult and is going to require a great deal of time. As the General Secretary and all the representatives here of the Soviet Government are aware, there have been considerable discussions in the NATO community in regard to the possibility of mutual balanced force reductions. This is naturally a matter that cannot be decided in a large conference involving a number of nations that do not have forces. That is why we are suggesting, I know this is a matter of previous discussion . . . .

General Secretary Brezhnev: Of course, there are such states as Luxembourg, with 90 policemen.

The President: . . . we have suggested that there should be parallel discussions on the problem of force reductions, parallel discussions at the time going forward with discussions on the European Conference.

General Secretary Brezhnev: Well, how do you visualize that in practice? Let us assume that we have the procedure on the conference that I have suggested, the Foreign Ministers' meeting in Helsinki to discuss matters on the agenda, working bodies, the secretariat, etc. In your view they would also discuss the question of force reductions in parallel? Is that your thinking generally?

The President: No. That was the point I was making. We thought that is too large a body for that. Let the countries involved, with forces involved, have discussions; that is the point Dr. Kissinger made in discussions with the General Secretary before.

Chairman Kosygin: But they should proceed in parallel.

General Secretary Brezhnev: In parallel, but different bodies discussing the two different subjects.

Secretary Rogers: We might have the subjects on the agenda and agree to discuss maybe, simultaneously, maybe shortly thereafter.

General Secretary Brezhnev: Or perhaps we really need not have them in parallel, perhaps first agree to getting the question of the European Conference out of the way, and then force reductions. But if we discuss the

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

PRM/A

Bv. KW NARA Date 5-6-02



two very important matters of the European Security Conference and force reductions in parallel, perhaps they would get in the way of each other.

The President: If we wait until a multilateral conference, we may never get to parallel discussions.

General Secretary Brezhnev: That matter could be dealt with in parallel but different bodies altogether. We support the earliest possible discussion of that but without hinging these questions together. The crux lies in not tying up these two problems as far as substance is concerned.

Secretary Rogers: I think that as a matter of logic if you are going to have a conference dealing with security certainly one of the most important aspects is forces. Certainly any conference that didn't cover forces would be lacking something.

The President: Let me suggest, Mr. General Secretary, a procedure for your consideration. I would like to do some thinking on how we do this tactically, the date and so forth. If we could have Rogers and Gromyko have a discussion also and then report back to us, maybe Friday, and by Friday then we can consider this question. They could give us some options.

[General Secretary Brezhnev stands up.]

Chairman Kosygin/General Secretary Brezhnev: Okay.

Chairman Kosygin: Because indeed it would be a very good thing if Secretary Rogers and Gromyko could work on this for our consideration, a kind of program for both of us working toward a European Conference. This would indeed help us remove many questions that otherwise would take months of time.

The President: This is too big a group for technical matters.

Chairman Kosygin: Although certainly there are many people in Europe who live under the impression, perhaps false, that we are holding back preparations for the Conference. If we come to an agreement on this, it would be very useful to remove this impression.

General Secretary Brezhnev: Many people in Europe think you oppose the Conference.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/  
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

16

The President: Let me emphasize again that although we come to agreement, we must be careful not to irritate our friends -- all our friends, we consider all Europe our friends. For example, we wouldn't want to anger Albania. (Laughter) We don't want to anger them.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: That is a very noble intention.

Secretary Rogers: We don't want to make Luxembourg mad.

Chairman Kosygin: We heed the words of Luxembourg too.

If, for example, we tell Albania that you regard them as best friend, they will be very glad.

Chairman Podgorny: We are prepared to heed the voice of Luxembourg but Albania takes a different view.

Chairman Kosygin: No exceptions. If they don't want to take part, what can we do?

The President: Take a country like Austria. It is very important. It is small but in the heart of Europe. We should heed its voice.

General Secretary Brezhnev: The voice of every country should be heeded.

I think we can accept as a basis the view by the President to make Secretary Rogers and Comrade Gromyko get to work, perhaps throughout the night. While we enjoy our sleep they will do work. We have to cherish our time.

The President: They will not see the ballet.

General Secretary Brezhnev: I am sure he's seen "Swan Lake."

Secretary Rogers: Not here. I am looking forward to it.

General Secretary Brezhnev: Well, Mr. President, that I feel completes the discussion.

The President: I think we have a direction set. Also on the trade side there will be further discussions with Flanigan and Kosygin.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

PRMPA

Bv KW NARA Date 5-6-02

P/  
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DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

PRM/A  
By KW NARA, Date 5-6-02

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TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/  
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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Leonid I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central  
Committee of the CPSU  
Nikolai V. Podgorny, Chairman of the Presidium of  
the Supreme Soviet  
Aleksei N. Kosygin, Chairman of the Council of Ministers  
of the USSR  
Andrei M. Aleksandrov-Agentov, Assistant to the  
General Secretary  
Viktor M. Sukhodrev, Interpreter  
A Second Soviet Interpreter/Notetaker

The President  
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President  
for National Security Affairs  
Winston Lord, Special Assistant to Dr. Kissinger  
John Negroponte, NSC Staff Member

DATE & TIME: Wednesday, May 24, 1972  
7:50 - 11:00 p. m.

PLACE: The General Secretary's Dacha  
Zarech'ye, Moscow

SUBJECT: Vietnam

General Secretary Brezhnev: We can continue our discussion. What is the  
plan for tonight?

The President: Of course, there is some unfinished business on SALT which  
I hope can be resolved at the working level. If not, we will have to finish it  
in the morning.

General Secretary Brezhnev: After our discussion of yesterday I believe we  
agreed in the main on some acceptable points on SALT. Gromyko and Smirnov

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE  
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DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

PRMFA  
By KW NARA, Date 5-6-02

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE  
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

2

on our side will talk to Dr. Kissinger, and both sides agree to instruct our delegation in Helsinki.

I did learn that Gromyko was not able to meet with Kissinger because Kissinger was busy, so perhaps after tonight's meeting they can get together, unless, of course, Dr. Kissinger thinks up something more to complicate matters.

The President: That discussion, of course, has been very difficult because on both sides it involves our vital interests. We have to be very careful and you have to be very careful to make an agreement we can both live with. I think we have a basic understanding, but it is important to get it cleared up so that we can proceed with the signing on Friday.

General Secretary Brezhnev: That is how it looks.

The President: I think we have made a good start on European matters and we should be able to discuss it further at one of our meetings, probably Friday. Then tomorrow we should have further discussions on trade. If we could get that wrapped up we could have some announcement on Saturday. We could at least announce the Commission tomorrow and whatever else we can agree to on Saturday.

General Secretary Brezhnev: Of course it is quite true we must bring to a conclusion all that we have been discussing. Of course, in the international field there is the Middle East and Vietnam. These are acute questions but nevertheless it is necessary to discuss them.

The President: I think it is important to discuss both these subjects in this small forum because these are issues where we have some basic disagreements. It is important to discuss where we disagree and where we can find agreement.

Several times during the course of our meetings, General Secretary Brezhnev has mentioned that Vietnam is a difficult issue and that because of developments that have occurred there the possibility of constructive progress at this meeting might have been jeopardized. I know it was very difficult for the Soviet leaders to look at the situation in Vietnam and make a decision nevertheless to continue our discussion as we have continued it at the highest level on other matters.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

PRMMA

By KW NARA, Date 5-6-02

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE  
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

3

On the other hand, I believe one of the rules that both our countries must bear in mind in the future is that we must at all costs avoid what may be very important but what is essentially a collateral issue preventing progress on other issues that are overriding in our relations. We certainly did not choose this particular time to have the Vietnam situation flare up. The choice was by the North Vietnamese. Under the circumstances I was left with no choice but to react as we did react. I realized this posed a very difficult problem for the Soviet leadership.

We were faced with a situation where 60,000 U. S. troops would have been endangered had not strong action been taken. We were also faced with the continuing problem where as many as 1,000 or more are missing in action and not accounted for, most or many of whom are known to be prisoners of war. And despite the withdrawal of 500,000 United States soldiers since I took office and after offer after offer in the negotiations, 149 public meetings in Paris and 13 private meetings which Dr. Kissinger conducted produced absolutely nothing from the North Vietnamese except for an ultimatum for us to get out under conditions which we will not accept.

Our position now is very forthcoming. We believe it is fair. As a matter of fact, the General Secretary in his conversations with Dr. Kissinger in his visit a few weeks ago suggested the consideration of a ceasefire. All we ask now is a return of and an accounting for our prisoners of war and a ceasefire. Once that is agreed to, we will withdraw all Americans within four months and cease military actions. We cannot go any further than that. Nothing further is negotiable on that point.

We could talk at great length about the wisdom of the American position in Vietnam. I know the views of the Soviet leaders. You know ours. No useful purpose would be served by going over past history. We now confront the fact that we have taken every step to bring an end to what is the only major international issue which clouds relations between the United States and the USSR. It is our intention to end the war by negotiations; but negotiations must be fair to both sides. There cannot be an ultimatum to us to impose on the South Vietnamese a government the North Vietnamese cannot impose by themselves. If the North Vietnamese are unwilling to end the war that way [by negotiations], then I will do whatever I must to bring the war to an end. Anything we do we will have in mind our desire not to exacerbate the relations between us. To this end we rejected the idea of a blockade which would have involved Soviet ships. During this meeting, for example, we stopped bombing

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/  
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

CRMPA  
By KW NARA, Date 5-6-02

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/  
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

4

the Hanoi area because of our desire to avoid any incidents embarrassing these talks. We have now reached the point where we see no way to deal with the North Vietnamese except the course I have chosen. Now the choice is theirs. They can have a peace which respects their independence and ends the conflict throughout Southeast Asia. Or we will have to use the military means available to us to bring the war to an end.

Let me be very frank. I am aware of the fact that the Soviet Union has an alliance with North Vietnam. I am aware that the Soviet Union supports the ideological views of the North Vietnamese. Of course, I am also aware that the Soviet Union has supplied military equipment to North Vietnam. All of this I understand as an international fact of life. We happen to disagree about that area. On the other hand, as two great powers which have at present so many positive considerations moving in the right direction, it seems to me that the mutual interest of both the United States and the USSR would be served by our doing what we can to bring the war to an end. Candidly, I realize that the Soviet Union, because it does have an alliance with North Vietnam and because it supplies military equipment, might be able to influence them to negotiate reasonably. But up to this point, looking at the evidence, I would have to say we have run into a blank wall on the negotiations front. So the situation is one where we have to continue our military actions until we get some assurance that going back to the negotiating table would produce some negotiating progress. If we can get that, then we might reconsider our present policy.

Let me conclude that I don't suggest the Soviet Union is responsible for the fact that the offensive took place at this time. I only say that it did take place and we had to react the way we did. So we can see how this kind of situation can be very embarrassing to our relations in the future where the irresponsible acts of an ally could be supplied with arms and get out of control at some future time. I want you to know that I'm very frank on this subject because I know that our Soviet friends disagree with me, but I know they'd want me to express myself very frankly and I have.

We could, of course, welcome any suggestions, but we would respectfully suggest that each of us in such a situation must put ourselves in the position of the other one. There may have been other times when the Soviet Union has felt it had to act decisively to protect what it believed were its interests. We may not have approved with the action, but we have not allowed incidents to mar our relationship. Now in this instance, we ought to get this out of the way as quickly as possible so we can have progress in other fields. That

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

CRMPA  
By KW NARA, Date 5-6-02

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/  
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

5

progress will go forward anyway, but it will go forward faster if Vietnam is not clouding our relationship.

In the final analysis we must recognize that when people say stop the war, we don't want to continue the war. They do. We want the war to stop now if they stop. It takes two to stop a war. We have been ready for three years. Now they must decide whether they want to stop the war or to take the consequences of not stopping it.

I have finished.

General Secretary Brezhnev: Well, Mr. President, we have indeed touched upon a very very acute and serious problem, because this is a problem of war. More especially it is a problem of a war which is poisoning the general international situation as a whole and because it is having an effect on relations between the U. S. and the Soviet Union. I wish to emphasize it is particularly important to note this at this precise moment when cruel bombing has been resumed and where once again very cruel military actions have been taken against North Vietnam. I had occasion to talk about this with Dr. Kissinger, but we want to take this opportunity now to emphasize that not only we but most of the nations of the world are calling this a shameful war and quite rightly calling it aggression.

There is perhaps indeed no need for us to go into all the details of the past, but there is one point that we should like to emphasize and that is the new escalation of the war, particularly the bombing of North Vietnam started by you at the very time when the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, our Prime Minister, was in Hanoi [1965]. At that time, North Vietnam wasn't doing anything.

You have just given your own assessment of this war and your own explanation for the war. We must most resolutely and forthrightly tell you, Mr. President, that our assessment is of a fundamentally different nature. You have heard on more than one occasion our assessment of this war in the statement of all the leaders of the Soviet Union. Perhaps we do not wish at this time to engage in polemics here on this subject, but we must say that we shall not depart from our assessment because we are profoundly convinced that it is right.

I agree, as I have said before, that we should not delve deep into the past; but certainly the fact is that the Geneva Accords which established the basis

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

PRMPA  
By KW NARA, Date 5-6-02

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/  
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

6

for peace in Indochina were grossly violated. And it would be appropriate to mention where these agreements were violated. It is a fact that the elections in South Vietnam envisaged by the Geneva Accords were not held, and it is no secret why this was not done. It was quite clear at that time who would win the election and on which side lay the support of the Vietnamese people.

The question arises why shouldn't the Vietnamese and not someone else determine who leads the government of South Vietnam? Why is it that recipes for a solution of the question in Vietnam do not come from the Vietnamese themselves but instead come from Washington? Now that is certainly rather strange logic. After all, no one invited the U.S. into Vietnam; you went into Vietnam with an enormous army and then the Americans started saying they were defending themselves. Actually the fact is they went into a country not belonging to them and then said it was self-defense. That is very strange. On what laws was this based? There are no such laws. And this can be qualified as nothing short of pure aggression.

Now you say you want to end this war and quite calmly put forward the idea. But this is at a time when you are carrying out cruel bombing raids not only in the direct theater of battle but also against the peaceful civilian population. All this you say is your method of ending the war. Surely there is nothing in common between these actions and ending the war. They can only amount to a deliberate effort to destroy a country and kill off thousands, millions of innocent people. For what sake is this, by what right is this being done? It would certainly be interesting to hear for the sake of what the U.S. invaded Vietnam. Why is it waging the longest war in the history of the United States? It is a war against a very small country far from the U.S. which does not threaten the U.S. in any way whatsoever. What country could justify such actions? I am sure no nation could find any just explanation for what is being done. And that is probably why all countries call the U.S. the aggressor and probably rightly so. I don't want to hurl more epithets on you. There have been quite enough epithets heaped on you as it is. But how can the methods you use now be called a method of ending the war in Vietnam? Today is not the time for such acts.

All of this is not to mention the fact that your actions affect some of our interests directly.

Chairman Kosygin: Just today I contacted the Minister of Merchant Marine, and I received a report around 2:00 p. m. that one American bomb fell 120



DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

PRMPA  
By KW NARA, Date 5-6-02

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/  
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

7

meters away from one Soviet vessel, in another case 350 meters away and another no more than 500 meters away from Soviet ships. In fact, your planes are blatantly buzzing and bombing near Soviet ships, and all of this at a time when you are here in Moscow conducting negotiations with us.

General Secretary Brezhnev: If underlying your explanation in which you try to show us your desire to end the war was a genuine intent on the part of the U. S., we are sure that a power of the stature of the U. S. with a big and able diplomatic apparatus could find a way to come to terms with the Vietnamese to end the war. But if we now look into the process of negotiations to date we see that you have emphasized one idea: that Vietnam must accept your conditions for settlement. Why? Why should the Vietnamese accept American ideas for a settlement? After all, they are not demanding part of American territory as part of a settlement and they are not demanding any other benefit as a price for a settlement. They suggest the war be ended and a coalition government with the participation of all three forces be established in the area and that be followed by the free expression of the will of the South Vietnamese people. But all that has not been accepted.

Just recently, I saw a proposal on the Vietnamese side that the Paris negotiations be continued, but the U. S. together with Saigon rejected the idea of further negotiations on a settlement in Vietnam. Surely this doesn't reflect the desire of seriously trying to end the war. It is manifest of the new aggressive aspirations on the part of the U. S. in Vietnam and that is done in the way that all nations in the world reject the positions taken by the U. S. But, of course, if the U. S. and the President of the United States is willing to be branded everywhere in the world as an aggressor, then of course there is practically no way the matter can be discussed.

Then again on the other hand you are here and we conduct discussions on many issues to try to reach agreements. You yourself admitted how difficult it was for us to decide to hold these talks in such conditions. It is certainly true we are allies of the DRV and we are meeting our international duty and that is something we will continue to do to the hilt. Here I want to emphasize that no bombing can ever resolve the war in Vietnam.

It does seem to appear the U. S. is upholding some interests of its own in Vietnam. Because I certainly don't think if the U. S. earnestly desired negotiations on the basis of realistic conditions, if the conditions were right for negotiations, I don't believe the Vietnamese would not agree to return the prisoners of war. It is certainly a fact in the normal course of things that prisoners of war are returned after the end of a war. That's the way we

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

PRMPA  
By KW NARA, Date 5-6-02

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/  
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

8

acted at the end of World War II. When the war ended we returned the prisoners we had on our hands.

Surely Vietnam is a heavy burden on the hearts of all people, and perhaps particularly so the Soviet people who went through a sad period and lost 20 million in World War II. Of course, the U.S. had an easier time in World War II. I believe if the U.S. had suffered the way the Soviet people had, then perhaps you would look at matters about Vietnam differently than at present, but of course God forbid that you ever have to suffer what the Soviet people suffered in World War II.

You were quite right; it was certainly difficult for us to agree to hold this meeting under present circumstances. And yet we did agree to hold it. I want to explain why. We felt that preliminary work prior to the meeting warranted the hope that two powers with such economic might and such a high level of civilization and all the other necessary prerequisites could come together to promote better relations between our two nations. And we could also use our beneficial influence to lessen tensions everywhere in the world, to counteract crisis situations in the world in the future and ones that may already exist. This is why we are holding our meetings and we felt this could also apply to problems such as Vietnam. At first we felt the latest measures taken by you in Vietnam were by accident or in irritation. But after hearing your explanation we feel our views beginning to change because it seems to us on the one hand the U.S. wants to improve relations with us and improve the international climate generally, but while continuing the cruel conflict in Vietnam. Surely these two things are quite incompatible.

Now what I would like to say now is this. I don't think it is realistic to believe we could register in our joint document that the two sides set out their respective views on Vietnam because that would not be understood by many countries. Countries would think either you registered your own views to continue the war of aggression endlessly or people would think we acquiesced. I know you did this in China in the communique, and you wrote the clause that "the two sides set forth their views." It certainly is a fact that China does not have a principled foreign policy of its own. It wants to set various countries at loggerheads. It acts in its own interests and does not really pursue a principled foreign policy. I'm sure you understand that as we do. But the fact is that we are not China.

We have said on many occasions, and notably in our exchange of letters, that the war in Vietnam can never bring any laurels to the United States --

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

PRMPA  
By KW NARA, Date 5-6-02

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/  
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

9

never. If you personally, Mr. President, did want earnestly to end the war I have no doubt that without any assistance on our part you could come to terms with the other side without any loss of prestige. You could reach a peaceful settlement.

This is how matters stand at the present time. We want to sign important documents with you in which we say we want to solve all differences through negotiation, not war, and advise others to follow that path. At the same time you will be continuing the war in Vietnam, continuing to kill innocent people, killing women and children. Now could that be understood? All this is when we continue a policy to lessen tensions in the world and ensure peaceful conditions. In order to achieve these goals, we want to extend a hand to you and accept your hand offered in cooperation. How can we advise other countries to follow a policy along these lines when you are doing what you do in Vietnam? Why are all the peaceful civilians being killed in Vietnam? Both our governments condemned Hitler when we fought together as allies. Now 29 years since the end of that war there is another war. One is simply hard pressed to fathom this.

It's surely doubtful that all of the American people are unanimously supporting the war in Vietnam. Certainly I doubt the families of those who were killed or those who were maimed and remain crippled support the war. In the name of what is that being done? Could the prestige of the U. S. fall if the U. S. imposed a peaceful settlement on Vietnam? Certainly not. The prestige of the U. S. would rise if you took this course. And I believe that line would be earnestly welcomed and saluted by the whole world.

I am sure if the U. S. Government, the U. S. President, applied what I call a true spirit of genius and if you could impose peace on the area, I repeat emphatically that U. S. prestige would soar. Look at the situation of DeGaulle when he ended the war in Algeria. When he came to power the war had been going on for seven years without giving France any laurels. When he extricated France from the war he immediately became a national hero.

We are speaking quite frankly because we are politicians and must be frank. We don't put forward any conditions. We only ask that the war be ended. We have no proposals of our own regarding a government in Vietnam. We feel that's for the Vietnamese to decide. They have proposed a coalition government. We believe it is entirely their own business, not ours. So we make no demands on you on you on this matter. We don't say there has to be

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E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

PRMPA  
By KW NARA, Date 5-6-02

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/  
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

10

a communist government in Vietnam. Whether their government is communist or non-communist, that is their business.

Dr. Kissinger told me that if there was a peaceful settlement in Vietnam you would be agreeable to the Vietnamese doing whatever they want, having whatever they want after a period of time, say 18 months. If that is indeed true, and if the Vietnamese knew this, and it was true, they would be sympathetic on that basis. Even from the point of view of the election in the United States I submit that the end of the war at this particular time would play a positive role whereas escalation will not. As for sending in new waves of bombers against Vietnam, they cannot solve the problem and never can.

Another factor to take account of is that outside of Vietnam there are other states, some small, some big, which will not accept the defeat of Vietnam. That too is something that should be foreseen. We are after all mere human beings and cannot vouch at all times for the situation. We cannot foresee in detail everything that will happen tomorrow. Our heads are not electronic computers, which will always be absolutely precise in calculations to the smallest degree. Who can guarantee that we can foresee all the twists and turns of policy a thousand years ahead? Certain things are perhaps eternal. Who will decide personally who will kill whom? After all, Hitler started the war for living space but ended up with no space at all. I told Dr. Kissinger that logic was a science and asked him to convey this though to President Nixon. And in these discussions of the situation, logic too must have a part to play.

Chairman Kosygin: Mr. President, I fully associate myself with what Comrade Brezhnev said on the most important question of Vietnam. Some six years or so ago our present interpreter translated at my conversation with President Johnson at Glassboro, and I must say I am reminded of my conversation there by today's meeting. President Johnson also told me he wanted to end the war in Vietnam and he too advanced many conditions for ending the war. After two days of discussion at Glassboro I remember telling him my opinion, "You don't want to end the war; you want to do more fighting. Well, try it," I said. "Let's see what it comes to." He said he would strangle Vietnam and see what happens. In short, he spoke from a position of strength. I am sad to say that I must point out today you are also conducting the war from a position of strength, speaking from a position of strength.

Well as I say, six years have passed since that meeting with President Johnson. Since then something in the vicinity of one million Vietnamese have been

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

PRMPA  
By KW NARA, Date 5-6-02

11

killed in that war. Perhaps you have lost one hundred thousand of your own men and spent hundreds of billions of dollars. What has all that led to? What have you achieved? And here we are again around a table with a U. S. President and the conversation is very similar as it was with President Johnson six years ago. To be very frank, you are acting even more cruelly than was Johnson. But this certainly won't result in any success.

The North Vietnamese could have easily invited other nations to come to their help. There were many proposals from various quarters to help the Vietnamese militarily. The Chinese were very anxious to go into Vietnam to fight against the U. S. Despite all the problems, despite their predicaments, the Vietnamese have never agreed to let others intervene in the war. That surely should be analyzed from the point of view of its historical significance. If the U. S. went in at the request of no one but mercenaries as head of that country, North Vietnam, despite the insistence of China to send in troops and other countries to send in volunteers -- both socialist and non-socialist countries-- never gave consent to that. Now that is a very significant fact and should be analyzed. It is certainly in favor of Vietnam.

General Secretary Brezhnev: Their attitude is motivated by a desire to lead matters to a peaceful settlement and their unwillingness to let the situation develop into a major war, to let themselves be led into a major war.

Chairman Kosygin: Mr. President, I believe you overestimate the possibility in present circumstances of resolving problems from a position of strength. There may come a critical moment for the Vietnamese when they will not refuse to let in forces of other countries to act on their own side.

The President: That threat doesn't frighten us a bit, but go ahead and make it.

Chairman Kosygin: Don't think you are right in thinking what we say is a threat and what you say is not a threat. This is a question of a major war, and we say this, we don't say it as a threat. This is an analysis of what may happen and that is much more serious than a threat.

Mr. President, when you came to office we were of the opinion you as a politician of long-standing would take advantage of the possibilities, and we think the possibility is still there since you were not a party to unleashing the war. We still think there is something you can do in order to end the war and to bring peace to that area. And if an attempt is made to resolve the matter as you explained, that is to say if they do not agree and you do use strength, in short you would simply destroy Vietnam; that is something quite frankly that would entail no glory either for the United States or yourself, Mr. President.

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By W NARA Date 5/1/02

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Now wherein lies the basic issue? You say you are prepared to withdraw your troops and this the Vietnamese are now welcoming. Now you say you want to secure the return of American prisoners of war. Quite recently, Premier Pham Van Dong made a statement that as soon as the war is over the Vietnamese are quite ready to release all prisoners. So there is a solution to that problem too.

The third question is that of a government. They say they are willing to set up a government of three elements. Dr. Kissinger knows just several days ago Pham Van Dong's statement was made public, and that is what he told me when I spoke to him. So one thing remains. You still need to retain the so-called President in South Vietnam, someone you call President, who has not been chosen by anyone.

The President: Who chose the President of North Vietnam?

Chairman Kosygin: The entire people.

The President: Go ahead.

Chairman Podgorny: As for the President in North Vietnam, the late President Ho Chi Minh of North Vietnam was even admired by the South Vietnamese and regarded as their President.

Chairman Kosygin: For the sake of him [Thieu], you want to send under the axe hundreds of thousands of Vietnamese, maybe even a million, and your own soldiers, simply to save the skin of a mercenary President, so-called. We have known the Vietnamese leaders for many years very well -- Ho Chi Minh, Pham Van Dong, Le Duan. They are all very serious-minded and dedicated and with great experience in the struggle and devotion to their people.

General Secretary Brezhnev: Of all the proposals, of every point put forward by the Vietnamese, in none of them did the PRG or DRV pose as a condition that they want to secure the reunification of North and South Vietnam; never have they said so. In fact they are ready to formalize this in an appropriate agreement and give a pledge to this effect. If this is so, for what sake are they still being killed?

Chairman Kosygin: Mr. President, perhaps just to conclude this subject, you demand that they give their constructive proposals and they expect your constructive proposals. That's where the difficulty is created. Why not try while in Moscow to formulate some constructive proposals we could pass

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

PRMPA  
By KW NARA, Date 5-6-02

EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

13

on to the Vietnamese.

[The President offers cigarillos to the Soviet leaders who politely decline. There is some light banter.]

If instead of continuing to support the so-called President, you could formulate proposals which would really enable to bring the war to an end, would that not be a veritable triumph for you on your return to your country from this visit? Think how much both of us would contribute to mankind. We proceed on the assumption that you have another four years ahead of you as President. We believe that you do have another four years. From the point of view of history this is a brief period, but if you could find a constructive solution you would go down in history as a man who succeeded in cutting through this knot which so many American Presidents have been unable to disentangle. Then think of the prospects opened up for our two countries, our joint ventures in many areas of the world? Isn't it worth achieving this by sacrificing the rot that is the present government in Saigon?

Chairman Podgorny: If I might just take a few minutes. Today we have had very frank discussions, but perhaps they have been more acute than others.

The President: That's good.

Chairman Podgorny: But it is always better to hear directly from a statesman his views on the world rather than hearing what radio and TV have to say on what he has to say. Of all my colleagues here I am the one who has been in Vietnam most recently, while there I discussed a variety of subjects, both international and bilateral. It was at that time the news came of your forthcoming visit to China. It was only from me that the Vietnamese learned about our understanding on your present visit to Moscow and when they heard you were coming to Moscow they were very favorably inclined because they felt the Soviet leaders could have a completely frank talk with the President and they thought that perhaps the two sides could find some ways to promote a solution to the Vietnam problem although there was no thought that just we two could jointly solve the entire problem. But it was felt something might come out of these discussions which could in some ways be helpful and conducive to finding a solution at the Paris talks.

Now I don't want to repeat what my colleagues said. It is certainly true that Pham Van Dong and Le Duan, the present leaders of North Vietnam, are men of common sense. They lay no claims, and said so to me, to

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

CRMPA

By KW NARA, Date 5-6-02

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/  
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

14

unification with South Vietnam. They only want the freedom and the independence of South Vietnam, the freedom of the Vietnamese people themselves, to settle all their own problems. As they put it, they felt it would be good to set up a three-element government there and prepare conditions for free elections in South Vietnam.

There is certainly no need for me to say that although it is a small nation the Vietnamese are a heroic people, and I trust that you also recognize that they are a freedom-loving and heroic people. Regardless of the number of your planes and naval forces which have been brought to their shores, they will never give up their fight for independence. They have in fact been fighting throughout their lifetime and throughout history for freedom and independence. For a long time they fought China. For many years they fought France. At long last in 1954 after the Geneva Accords the dream appeared that they could enjoy freedom and independence and decide how to live by themselves and what form of government to choose. It is sad that their dream did not come true.

The most recent measures taken by the United States against Vietnam, of course, are as Comrades Brezhnev and Kosygin have already said -- they are unlawful. They constitute nothing but aggression, as they are considered everywhere. It's hard to find any country in the world which supports these measures. What's more, these measures are not only against Vietnam but also against other countries which have friendly relations with Vietnam and these countries cannot react calmly to what goes on. The new escalation of the United States cannot resolve the issue, the bringing in of new air and naval forces. So surely some other methods must be sought to end the war, methods based on negotiations aimed at solving the problem and ending the war going on.

I don't think anyone could really believe that these new drastic measures in North Vietnam can be aimed at protecting 60,000 Americans in Vietnam or to secure the freedom of prisoners of war in Vietnam. I don't think many people are convinced that these are indeed the true reasons for these measures.

Mr. President, you explained your position and motives for taking these measures in Vietnam. We have set out our own position and attitudes on this question. I am afraid we have not convinced you we are right. You may rest assured you have not convinced us you were right in taking those measures. But since your visit is taking place in circumstances when all

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/



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E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

PRMFA

By KW NARA, Date 5-6-02

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/  
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15

questions are taken up with a desire to soften the situation in all areas, perhaps it would be worthwhile for you to give more thought to possible measures the United States could take to end the situation in Vietnam, a situation which at the present time becomes more grave and intolerable daily. In the context of these talks the events of Vietnam certainly place us in a very awkward position.

In conclusion may I just say we don't doubt that if instead the United States really took resolute measures to end this war and bring about a peaceful solution, no country would ever think, and that includes the Vietnamese, the United States had capitulated in Vietnam.

General Secretary Brezhnev: Mr. President, I feel perhaps it is a good thing to end the discussion for today. We have probably on both sides spoken out our views on the substance.

I for one want to close with the following thought. You are quite familiar, Mr. President, with the wrath of our people in connection with Vietnam and the demands of socialist countries. You are familiar with their indignation at your aggression and the war in Vietnam. They demand that the bombing end and a peaceful solution be found. I must say frankly that wrath is still in the hearts of the Soviet people, and no order given to the people eradicate this sentiment. We certainly have on both sides taken this into account in our discussions at such a high level, and we cannot abstract this from all other questions because after all we agreed prior to the meeting not simply to discuss bilateral matters but also international problems. Now the other day you yourself said the most difficult problem between us were Vietnam and the Middle East, and I feel today we have said some sharp things to one another. And that is natural because the subject itself is very acute. Also a lot of things said were useful and reasonable.

Man is a creature endowed by nature with a wonderful quality of intelligence. If a man approaches a matter not from a selfish point of view, but objectively looks at all that has been discussed between two statesmen, he can find a reasonable way out of any predicament. I think we can both agree that today we cannot say we have completed discussion of this problem or found a solution for it. Therefore perhaps it would be expedient to end this discussion now and have dinner. I shall say the night brings counsel. Perhaps we can return to this subject tomorrow or the day after. We should try to make a new effort to find a solution.

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E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

PRMPA  
By KW NARA, Date 5-6-02

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/  
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16

Chairman Kosygin: At least we should try to engage in a constructive search for a solution.

The President: Let me add I think our discussions have been very helpful in setting forth our points of view. I appreciate the fact that our hosts have been so direct and honest and candid about what they don't like about our policy and why. Because that's the kind of discussions we should have at this level. Even after Vietnam is settled -- and I trust it will be settled soon -- we will perhaps have to have discussions like this about other subjects, either we or our successors. I can assure you on our part we will continue our search for a negotiated end to the war as we have been searching in the past three and one-half years.

As you know we were somewhat disappointed after Dr. Kissinger visited here in April and the Soviet leaders were instrumental in getting North Vietnam to meet with him privately. But rather than being more reasonable, the North Vietnamese were more intransigent than ever before. We find that hard to understand. As a matter of fact, to show our own position, the General Secretary will note I picked up directly his suggestion of a ceasefire and proposed that we would withdraw all forces within four months and discontinue all military actions in exchange for a simple ceasefire. They rejected this out of hand. I think, however, the General Secretary's suggestion was a good one and we will continue to pursue it.

I would just like to leave one thought regarding what our motive really is. I know I won't impress our hosts with any sentimental diplomatic doubletalk, and I never indulge in that. But as men who have come up the hard way, as I have, as practical men and honest men, you will have to take into account the record. As President Podgorny pointed out, I didn't send 550,000 men to Vietnam. They were sent by President Johnson and President Kennedy. I have withdrawn over 500,000 men from Vietnam. That is certainly not an act of war. It is an act of moving toward peace. By Easter of this year I had cut out air sorties in Vietnam by 40% despite evidence of a very big buildup which I know did threaten our forces, many of which are stationed in the northern part of the country. Because I didn't want an incident to occur before the meeting with Soviet leaders, I used total restraint and did not react strongly on the military front.

Then the North Vietnamese on Easter weekend, in violation of the 1954 Accords, to which reference was made, and the 1968 understand on the bombing halt, massively moved across the DMZ, and under those circumstances

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

PRMFA  
By KW NARA, Date 5-6-02

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE  
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

17

I had to take the actions I considered necessary as Commander-In-Chief to stop the invading forces. I would simply emphasize the point suggested earlier of the possibility that the action I took was because of irritation; if that were the case, I would be a very dangerous man in the position I am in. The decision was taken in cold objectivity. That is the way I always act, having in mind the consequences, the risks politically.

Our people want peace. I want it too. I want the Soviet leaders to know how seriously I view this threat of new North Vietnamese escalation. One of our great Civil War generals, General Sherman, said "War is hell." No people know this better than the Soviet people. We are deeply aware of the bitter tragedy visited upon upon the Soviet nation in World Wars I and II. By those standards this is just a small war. But it has cost the U. S. 50,000 dead and 200,000 wounded. And since this offensive began, 30,000 South Vietnamese civilians, men, women and children have been killed by the North Vietnamese, using Soviet equipment.

I would not for one moment suggest that the leaders of the Soviet Union wanted that to happen. What I am simply suggesting at this high level and very critical time in history, our goal is the same as yours. We are not trying to impose a settlement, government, on anybody. We are trying by a simple ceasefire to end the war, in other words, to impose a peace.

I would say finally that Prime Minister Kosygin's suggestion that we think matters over is one we will take under consideration. I think we might well discuss it again, perhaps Thursday or Friday. But the main consideration must be this: We cannot -- and I don't think the Soviet leaders seriously recommend we do so -- send Dr. Kissinger to Paris for a private meeting with the knowledge that nothing is going to happen. We have to have an indication that they will talk, something they have never done with us. We don't mean they have to come to surrender. We just want them to come and talk, as we are doing. They have never done that in any meetings with Dr. Kissinger, let alone the public meetings. If we can break that impasse, then we will end the war quickly at the negotiating table. That's the problem.

We don't ask the Soviet leaders to find a formula for bringing the war to and end, but your influence with your allies could be considerable. I am trying to indicate we will be reasonable at the negotiating table, but we cannot go there and be dictated <sup>to</sup> by the other side. That's all we've had so far.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/  
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E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

CRMPA

By KW NARA, Date 5-6-02

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/  
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18

But we will think it over, and maybe Dr. Kissinger out of his brain will come up with a new proposal.

Chairman Kosygin: He's got to find one. Given the desire, it can be done.

The President: Maybe you can help us.

Chairman Kosygin: What kind of brain is it that does not produce a new proposal?

The President: I think we have held up our hosts too long with this discussion.

General Secretary Brezhnev: Well, we have certainly had a most serious discussion on a problem of world importance. I wish to reemphasize that what's been said is useful, taking into account the level of our discussion and the frankness of both sides. I do believe it is correct that this will not end our discussion of this topic; think things over in an endeavor to find a solution. After all there is more than one solution to any problem. One must find the most reasonable solution. We understand by your last remark that you are prepared to look at this and we understand you are prepared to do this.

The President: No question.

General Secretary Brezhnev: Mr. President, on the eve of coming to this country we did note that you had decided not to harden your position on bombing during your visit here. But unfortunately that has not been the case and I hope you can appreciate our attitude toward this and its significance.

Dr. Kissinger: To what does the General Secretary refer?

General Secretary Brezhnev: Haiphong and Hanoi.

Dr. Kissinger: We told your Ambassador we would not bomb in a certain radius of Hanoi, a certain number of miles from Hanoi. And I am not aware that this has been done, and if so you should tell us about it.

The President: We made a commitment.

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E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

PRMPA  
By KW NARA, Date 5-6-02

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/  
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19

General Secretary Brezhnev: It has been in the TASS communication.

Chairman Kosygin: I refer once again to the Minister of Marines' report on our ships being buzzed and bombs being dropped near them and American aircraft imitating bombing dives against our ships.

The President: We will check. That's against our orders.

General Secretary Brezhnev: You can appreciate our feeling on this matter, because when one of our ships was damaged and some people were wounded before your visit we lodged a protest with you, but we didn't say one word about this in the Soviet press. The entire world knew about it.

Chairman Kosygin: Another thing, there is not a single ship on the way to Vietnam now carrying military equipment -- not one shell -- only flour and foodstuffs, no armaments whatever.

[The meeting ended at 11:00 p. m. and the party went upstairs to dinner, where the conversation was devoted entirely to non-substantive matters.]



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MEMORANDUM

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Leonid V. Smirnov, Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR  
Andrei A. Gromyko, Minister of Foreign Affairs  
Anatoli F. Dobrynin, Ambassador to USA  
Soviet Interpreter

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs  
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, NSC Senior Staff Member  
William G. Hyland, NSC Staff Member

DATE & TIME: Thursday, May 25, 1972 - 1:15 - 3:45 a.m.

PLACE: Conference Room, Foreign Minister's Office  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Moscow

Mr. Gromyko: The President and General Secretary Brezhnev discussed a number of SALT questions yesterday. There are still a number of questions to resolve and we have some formulas to hand over. The first formula is a joint statement on Article III [of the ABM treaty]. [Hands over to Dr. Kissinger and English and Russian text -- Tab A.]

Dr. Kissinger: [After looking at the document] I thought that we had agreed [with Brezhnev] on 1500 kilometers, not 1300.

Mr. Gromyko: Let us give you all of the formulas first before you attack. Next we have a joint statement on the problem of conversion of light and heavy missiles [hands over a document -- Tab B]. Next is a text of the joint statement on dismantling in connection with replacement of submarine launchers [hands over document -- Tab C]. Next is the text of Article III of the Interim Agreement, and the text of the Protocol to this Article [hands over documents -- Tabs D and E].

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-2-

Dr. Kissinger: Let us take them one by one, although we did not discuss dismantling with Brezhnev.

Mr. Gromyko: You should have your way -- let us proceed.

Dr. Kissinger: The best way to proceed is for you to submit documents to our delegation and they can accept them if we agree.

Mr. Gromyko: If we reach agreement here they can finalize it and we will call Helsinki.

Dr. Kissinger: (Referring to the dismantling proposal) It is best to do it in Helsinki, if this is the proposal of our delegation.

Mr. Gromyko: And we will instruct our delegation accordingly.

Mr. Smirnov: The original Soviet position was dismantling would begin when submarines become operational but we have now changed this to when submarines begin sea-going trials, as you proposed.

Dr. Kissinger: I would want our delegation to take a look at it. You should get Semyonov to submit it to them. On the ABM article I thought we had agreed yesterday on 1500 kilometers, but now you propose 1300 kilometers.

Mr. Smirnov: In the working group in Helsinki -- the Soviet-American working group -- yesterday we reached agreement on 1300 kilometers.

Dr. Kissinger: You should resubmit it in Helsinki and they will solve the problem. It looks all right for now.

Mr. Gromyko: We accepted what the American delegation proposed in Helsinki.

Dr. Kissinger: We can regard these two -- dismantling and ABM -- as settled. But now we come to the proposal concerning silo launchers. I don't understand the Soviet position. It deals with silo dimensions only. The discussions yesterday between the President and Brezhnev dealt with missile volumes as well.

Mr. Smirnov (interrupting): But this is the accepted formula.

Dr. Kissinger: But you dropped out the word "significantly" from the agreement in Helsinki.



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 By DP NARA Date 7/11/02

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-3-

Mr. Smirnov: Yes we did that.

Dr. Kissinger: There were two discussions at the highest level -- one on the size of the silo launchers, and the other on the volume of the missiles. My impression of that conversation was there was agreement that neither should be increased or at least agreement that the silo launcher size should not be increased. My impression was that Brezhnev had agreed to deal with both subjects.

Mr. Smirnov: Comrade Brezhnev has informed me of the substance of these talks. He said that in these discussions he had said the Soviet side would not depart from what had been proposed (in Helsinki) not to increase the size of silo launchers.

Dr. Kissinger: Our understanding was he would discuss the issue with the Politburo -- he mentioned it was too late to discuss it last evening, but this proposal you have given me tonight represents no change. This is not my understanding of what had been agreed.

Mr. Gromyko: Today we discussed it and came to the conclusion that we should accept your proposal on no increase (in silo dimensions).

Dr. Kissinger: This has already been agreed. There was no reason to call a meeting for this purpose. What is the new point here?

Mr. Gromyko: We had to weigh all the considerations and come to a final conclusion.

Dr. Kissinger: So what you are saying is that after full consideration you came to the conclusion that regardless of what had been discussed between General Secretary Brezhnev and President Nixon you decided to return to the original dropping the word "significantly." Otherwise there is no change on the question of missile volume.

Mr. Smirnov: I would like it plain from the outset we proposed a limit only on the silos. We never proposed anything on limitation of the size of the missiles. It was the U.S. side that made various proposals, for example, 70 cubic meters or 10 to 15 percent. And the latest information from Helsinki is that the substance concerns only silo launchers. This is the information we got on the 22nd of May. And in view of the previous discussions here and in Helsinki we proceeded from the former position.

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-4-

Dr. Kissinger: But we want to combine the two issues, the restrictions on silo launchers and the restrictions on missile size.

Mr. Smirnov (interrupting): But this is the latest from Helsinki.

Dr. Kissinger: Nevertheless our delegation will take its ideas from the President. We have to go by what the President said to Brezhnev and what was discussed at that level. We are not satisfied with what you have given us this evening. Despite the fact that the leaders spent over three hours on this subject you do not seem to be bound by these discussions.

Mr. Gromyko: I would like to say that we will take into account what has been said, but that we attach significance to this issue and want an understanding. It goes without saying that we will gain no unilateral advantage.

Dr. Kissinger: You will gain a unilateral advantage if you put a bigger missile into the silos. If you are not planning to do so you would agree to our proposal for a separate limit on missile volume.

Mr. Smirnov: The question arises whether we have the right to modernize. From what has been agreed in the past, both sides agree that there is the right of modernization. But now you raise a question. What about your replacing the Minuteman I with the Minuteman III? Up to now we have not questioned this. And then there is the other question of not converting light to heavy missiles. The question is how to be certain that light missiles will not be turned into heavy missiles and it seems that we have agreed on May 22 in Helsinki not to increase the size of silos. This is a good enough criteria. But if you go back to the question of what missile can be put in a silo then many items already agreed will drop out. Your right to convert Minuteman I to Minuteman III would be in question. We would have the right to go back on this understanding. So far you have the right to replace Minuteman I with Minuteman III and Polaris with Poseidon. If this is justifiable why are you now raising the question of a limit on the increase of missile volume?

Dr. Kissinger: Our problem is not with modernization but with the limitation on the increase in missile volumes.

Mr. Smirnov (interrupting): I know quite well the sections.

Dr. Kissinger (continuing): We have discussed with Brezhnev...

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-5-

Mr. Smirnov (interrupting): He told you that we had agreed in Helsinki as far as the substance of the issue is concerned. You will be able to know if silo launchers are changed or not. It is good enough to ...

Dr. Kissinger: Mr. Deputy Minister, you are a scientist and you know well it is possible to put a heavier missile in an existing silo. Since you know this is possible the question is whether we are going to establish some control over this process.

Mr. Smirnov: The question you are addressing is what criteria to set for establishing that light missiles not become heavy ones. You have the Titan and the Minuteman and we have discussed this in Helsinki and we have agreed on how to proceed. If you take up now the question of putting what missile in the silo you are then putting a limit on modernization.

Dr. Kissinger: No, we are making the right to modernization an even more effective provision by defining it precisely.

Mr. Gromyko: I have one question. Do you think we are trying to gain a unilateral advantage? You can do the same as we.

Dr. Kissinger: But there is a big difference. We have no intention of putting a heavy missile into our silos and we suspect that you are going to.

Mr. Gromyko: But the same could be said of many items in the agreements.

Dr. Kissinger: I do not want to waste any more time on this because I have far more important items to raise. I do not yield easily and never gracefully [motioning to Dobrynin] and particularly when I think that there has already been an agreement. You know that the SS-11 is bigger than the Minuteman III so your approach to the issue is more useful to your side. The Minuteman III is already a further modification and this is limited in terms of what can be done in the future. So in this regard, you can gain a unilateral advantage. We are trying to solve the SALT issues. We are not dealing with you ~~frivolously~~ and the President was not wasting the General Secretary's time when he raised this issue.

Mr. Smirnov: We do not think it worthwhile discussing this issue in detail and in specifics it is one that should be solved by scientists. We have an agreement in principle and there is no limit on modernization. You already used this right when you converted Minuteman I to Minuteman III and now

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-6-

we want the same right for our side to put in the kind of missiles they (meaning the scientists) want. You already have this right. Do you now propose to stop Minuteman III conversion?

Dr. Kissinger: Let me put your proposal to the President, but let me say this first. I am not sure whether to drop the word "significantly" or not and I will check this with the President. If we decide to retain the phrase "not significantly increased" then what Brezhnev said is that we need to define it as meaning about 10% - 15% as discussed with Brezhnev.

Mr. Smirnov: You want to call attention to your concern that light ICBMs not become heavy ICBMs. On the other hand, because the word "significantly" has no meaning we suggest dropping it as agreed in Helsinki.

Dr. Kissinger: You cannot invoke Helsinki when it serves your purposes and disregard Helsinki when it does not. I frankly do not know whether we intend to make some small changes in our missiles. I will need technical advice on this. If we decide to go back to the previous statement which includes "significantly" in the text then we would want to define it as being between 10% and 15% as was discussed with Brezhnev. We want to have the right to think this over. We will either accept it as written or add the word "significantly" and then define "significantly" to mean between 10% and 15% but we cannot decide this without technical advice.

Mr. Gromyko: Will you give the answer here or through your delegation? They (the delegation) would need to know at 10 o'clock tomorrow.

Dr. Kissinger: Will you accept either formula?

Mr. Gromyko: As I said we discussed this today and we have only this conclusion (pointing to text).

Dr. Kissinger: Are you then withdrawing the old proposal?

Mr. Gromyko: No, no, no. But we have expressed our position here today.

Dr. Kissinger: You are giving up the prior agreement in Helsinki and the agreement between Brezhnev and the President.

Mr. Smirnov: There is some misunderstanding. I discussed this with Comrade Brezhnev but there was no agreement to change our position.

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-7-

Dr. Kissinger: Our impression was not the same. Are you now withdrawing from the agreement of the day before?

Mr. Gromyko: Our position is that our proposal of today goes even further. This is now happening so you should not check for ulterior motives. We both have the same position.

Dr. Kissinger: This would be extremely difficult for me to explain this point. I have to explain something that was discussed and agreed between the President and Brezhnev yet is not reflected in your proposal and second why you have dropped the word "significantly." If we do not accept what you have now proposed then we should go back to the agreement already made. It seems as if we would have been better off had the discussion with Brezhnev never taken place.

Mr. Smirnov: What is your understanding of the discussion?

Dr. Kissinger: My understanding is the following: First, it was agreed that there would be no significant increase in the silo dimensions and second there would be no significant increase in the volume of the largest light missile on either side. Brezhnev said he wanted to wait to discuss these issues and others with the Politburo but it was too late to do so that evening. Therefore, if for whatever reason we decide to drop the issue of missile volume we still must decide how to define what is meant by the word significantly.

Mr. Smirnov: I understand. Let me clarify our position. Brezhnev told me that he responded to questions put by you on both the silo size and the missile volume but as a result of those discussions he did not agree to make any limitations as regards missiles because that would entail certain problems for modernization on our side. Therefore our position is if you consider it necessary to make proposals on limitations on silo launchers we could consider ~~them~~, but not the missiles themselves and then we could go back to the delegations in Helsinki with our agreement. But they have already decided in Helsinki.

Dr. Kissinger: It makes no sense to quote subordinates against the President. The President was not satisfied or he would not have raised the issue with General Secretary Brezhnev. We are now at this point that we either accept this formula you have given us which drops the word "significantly" or we add "significantly" and provide a figure to explain what it means. In this case we would make a unilateral statement about silo volume.

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-8-

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Mr. Gromyko: So you will take the initiative?

Dr. Kissinger: Now that we have settled the easy work, we will not be so accommodating. We can go on to the next problem.

Mr. Gromyko: Submarines? Meeting our position?

Dr. Kissinger: I will tell you frankly what our problem is. We have no interest nor would it make any sense, in making a treaty it takes two years to ratify. We have had major consultations in Washington in the Congress and in the Defense Department with our military leaders and with those academic figures who would be likely to testify on these agreements. We have their reactions to our propositions. Let me read to you some cables so you will know what the reaction is. This cable is from my Deputy who has been making calls on my behalf, an unusual procedure. He has just received a call from Admiral Moorer, the Chairman of our Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Admiral said the Joint Chiefs could not support an agreement that would not require some replacement of older submarines. Secretary Laird and the academic figures he mentioned take the same position. Now under your present proposal our estimate is that you do not have 48 modern submarines. Under your proposal you would not have to begin destroying older missiles a year from now (goes back to cable). Senator Goldwater has said the treaty could be a disaster and he will fight it. Representative Wayne Hayes said that he would be opposed. Senator Jackson said that he will go into all-out opposition. What we are trying to do is avoid a situation similar to the one that confronted you in Germany with your treaty. As you know, the ABM Treaty requires a two-thirds vote in the Senate so we are facing a difficult and serious problem.

Mr. Gromyko: (Makes a long presentation in English and Russian combined and not fully translated.) What would be Goldwater's position? We showed them our position. The position which really exists which must be taken into account is the overall position. How would that make Goldwater feel? You must evaluate it but it is inadmissible. You allow differences to strike out three years of painstaking efforts. All factors must be calculated. You have your overseas bases. Goldwater cannot close his eyes to them.

Dr. Kissinger: You must understand that the internal position inside the Administration is the important one.

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-9-

Mr. Gromyko: But we have interests that are unchecked. You must take into account our interests because there is the geographical factor and your bases so there is no equal footing. Nevertheless we are prepared to sign during the President's visit.

Ambassador Dobrynin: The figures involved were not the ones we proposed. We did not mention 48 submarines in our proposal. You remember how this was derived in my conversations with you.

Dr. Kissinger: At any rate there is no question of 950 missiles and 62 modern submarines. This has been accepted. What we are talking about is the base point of 48 submarines.

Mr. Gromyko: Could you sum up your position?

Dr. Kissinger: In terms of deriving 48 we understood at that time that you had about 41-43 Y-Class submarines plus some H-Class submarines. You would raise yours to 48 and then you could add 14 more to reach 62 but you would have to replace ICBMs to do this.

Ambassador Dobrynin: Do you have a proposal to make?

Dr. Kissinger: You should accept our delegation's proposal of a base line of 740 SLBMs. On the other hand you could count the H-Class submarines. So I have two proposals. First to forget the base line of 48 modern submarines and use the 740 missile base line our delegation proposed. My second proposal is to keep the number 48, if you prefer, but to define it as including H-Class submarines, say 6 H-Class since there are some test submarines in this category and to reach the 950 ceiling you will then have to replace the H-Class. In the United States we could sell such a position as formal equivalence otherwise it is going to be difficult to convince the Congress that you do not have an advantage.

Mr. Smirnov: We agreed to the proposal that really is the President's proposal. You said to compensate for geographic factors you would concede 6-7 submarines to us.

Dr. Kissinger: I admire the Deputy Minister's ingenuity in taking two separate proposals and combining them into one. The first proposal was that you must convert all H-Class into modern. This would explain the 48. We thought you had 90 or so missiles on G and H-Class which you could convert into Y-Class equivalents and add to the 42 or 43 you may have. In this way we came to a figure of 48.

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-10-

Ambassador Dobrynin (interrupting): But you remember when I asked you why you were giving us an advantage in 48 you said it was to compensate for geography.

Dr. Kissinger: I do not recall answering in that way. I said if in addition you convert land-based missiles you could reach the level of 62 but you have taken the numbers 48 and 62 together and dropped both the G and H-Class missiles. My present suggestion would be somewhat more favorable to you because it includes only the H-Class missiles.

Mr. Gromyko: We may have some questions but I suggest a 4 or 5 minute break.

(The meeting broke for a brief period and resumed at 3:12.)

Mr. Gromyko: We cannot go on much longer. It is either too early or too late. I have a question to put to you. If you are prepared to accept our remaining proposals without reservations we could consider favorably your proposal for 740 missiles.

Dr. Kissinger: We have already made concessions in dropping the question of limitations in volume of light missiles. I would be prepared to confirm that except for our SLBM proposal. Even though I don't trust the intentions of the Deputy Minister (jocularly). My second point is with respect to the silos. We will need to take technical advice to determine whether it is acceptable. If it is not, I would return to the formula that includes "significantly" and define it as 10% - 15% which should be more favorable to your position since such a definition is closer to zero. We could drop the reservation about volume and make a unilateral statement.

Ambassador Dobrynin: When will you give an answer on the silos?

Dr. Kissinger: We are not bargaining. We need technical advice.

Mr. Gromyko: On the first one -- dismantling?

Dr. Kissinger: I am practically certain my answer will be positive. We will give you an answer on the 1300 km. We can accept what the delegation agreed to. On the 1300 we accept. On the second issue we may drop our reservation. On the third we need to get an answer. I think we may be able to accept.

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Mr. Gromyko: And the fourth one, Article III?

Dr. Kissinger: This is no problem especially since it is our delegation's text, I believe, but it depends on your answer on the numbers. Article III is meaningless without a definition of the procedure.

Mr. Gromyko: And on the next? (Confusion and simultaneous talking. It appeared that Gromyko had in front of him another piece of paper which he was referring to. Dr. Kissinger said that these documents were all he had been given. Gromyko said "No, you have another," but looking at his papers, Gromyko realized that he had not handed one document over. He then handed it to Dr. Kissinger.)

Mr. Gromyko: I will read it out to you. It says there will be no definition of ballistic missile launches on submarines under construction given in the document. (Tab F)

Mr. Smirnov: This is only connected with the mentioning of 48 submarines and 768 launchers.

(Dr. Kissinger asked when we would meet next. Gromyko suggested 10 o'clock.)

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

SALT PROPOSALS  
HANDED TO HAK  
by FMin Geromyko  
May 25.

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Text of Joint Statement on Article III  
of the Treaty on the Limitation of ABM  
Systems:

"The Parties understand that the center of ABM system deployment area centered on the national capital, and the center of the ABM system deployment area wherein ICBM silo launchers are located shall for each Party be at a distance of no less than 1300 kilometres".

The American side will also make a unilateral statement to the effect that the center of the ABM system deployment area for ICBM silo launchers in the USA will be located in the ICBM silo launchers deployment area at Grand Forks, North Dakota.

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Формулировка совместного заявления к статье 3 Договора по ограничению систем ПРО:

"Стороны исходят из того понимания, что центр района размещения систем ПРО с центром, находящимся в столице стороны, и центр района размещения системы ПРО, в котором расположены шахтные пусковые установки МБР, для каждой Стороны будут отстоять друг от друга не менее чем на 1300 километров".

При этом американская сторона сделает одностороннее заявление о том, что центр района размещения систем ПРО шахтных пусковых установок МБР в США будет находиться в районе размещения шахтных ПУ МБР в Гранд Форксе, штат Северная Дакота.

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Text of the Joint Statement on the prohibition  
of the conversion of light ICBMs into heavy ICBMs

"The Parties understand that in the process of moderniza-  
tion and replacement the size of land-based ICBM silo launchers  
will not be <sup>significantly</sup> increased".

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Формулировка совместного заявления относительно запрещения переоборудования легких МБР в тяжелые:

"Стороны исходят из того понимания, что в процессе модернизации и замены не увеличивались бы размеры шахтных пусковых установок МБР наземного базирования".

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Text of the joint statement on procedures for the dismantling or destruction of launchers for older ICBM and launchers/older submarines:

"The dismantling or destruction of launchers for ICBMs of older types constructed before 1964 and launchers for ballistic missiles of older submarines being replaced by new launchers of modern submarines shall start simultaneously with the beginning of sea-going tests of a submarine intended as replacement and shall be completed within the shortest possible agreed period of time. Such dismantling or destruction, as well as timely notification thereof, shall be carried out in accordance with procedures to be agreed in the Standing Consultative Commission."



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Формулировка совместного заявления относительно процедуры демонтажа или уничтожения ПУ старых МБР и ПУ старых подводных лодок:

"Демонтаж или уничтожение ПУ МБР старых типов, построенны до 1964 года, и ПУ БР старых подводных лодок, заменяемых новыми ПУ современных подводных лодок, будут начинаться одновременно с началом мореходных испытаний подводной лодки, предназначенной в качестве замены, и будут завершены в течение возможно короткого согласованного периода времени. Такие демонтаж или уничтожение, а также своевременное уведомление об этом будут осуществляться в соответствии с процедурами, подлежащими согласованию в Постоянной консультативной комиссии".

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Text of Article III of the Interim Agreement  
on Certain Measures with respect to the  
Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms:

"The Parties undertake to limit submarine-launched ballistic missile launchers and modern submarines with ballistic missiles to the number operational and under construction on the date of signature of this Agreement, and also to launchers and submarines constructed additionally, provided that their construction will be carried out in a manner prescribed for the sides as replacements for equal numbers of launchers for ICBMs of older types constructed before 1964, or launchers of older submarines."

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Текст статьи третьей Временного соглашения о некоторых мерах в области ограничения стратегических наступательных вооружений:

"Стороны обязуются ограничить ПУ БР подводных лодок и современные подводные лодки с баллистическими ракетами числом находящихся в боевом составе и в стадии строительства на дату подписания настоящего соглашения, а также дополнительно построенными ПУ и ПЛ при том условии, что их строительство будет осуществляться в определенном для сторон порядке в качестве замены равного числа ПУ МБР старых типов, построенных до 1964 года, или пусковых установок старых подводных лодок".

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Text of the Protocol to the Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms:

"The Parties understand that in accordance with Article II of the Interim Agreement, for the period during which this Agreement remains in force:

The USA may have not more than 710 submarine-launched ballistic missile launchers and not more than 44 modern submarines with BMs. The Soviet Union may have not more than 950 submarine-launched ballistic missile launchers and not more than 62 modern submarines with ballistic missiles.

Additional submarine-launched ballistic missile launchers for the USA in excess of 41 and for the USSR in excess of 48 modern submarines, operational and under construction, may become operational as replacements for equal numbers of ICBM launchers of older types constructed before 1964, or of missile launchers of older submarines.

"This Protocol shall be regarded as an integral part of the Interim Agreement".

The US side will take an obligation in a written form not to construct additionally 3 submarines in excess of 41. The text of the undertaking shall be agreed with the Soviet side.

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Текст протокола к Временному соглашению о некоторых мерах в области ограничения стратегических наступательных вооружений

"Стороны исходят из того понимания, что согласно статье I Временного соглашения на период, в течение которого это соглашение остается в силе:

США могут иметь не более 710 ПУ БР на подводных лодках и не более 44 современных подводных лодок с БР. Советский Союз может иметь не более 950 ПУ БР на подводных лодках и не более 62 современных подводных лодок с баллистическими ракетами.

Ввод в боевой состав дополнительных пусковых установок баллистических ракет на подводных лодках в США - сверх 41 и в СССР - сверх 48 современных подводных лодок, находящихся в боевом составе и в стадии строительства, может осуществляться в качестве замены равного числа пусковых установок МБР старых типов, построенных до 1964 года, или пусковых установок баллистических ракет старых подводных лодок.

Настоящий протокол будет рассматриваться как неотъемлемая часть Временного соглашения".

Американская сторона дает письменное обязательство не строить дополнительно 3 подводные лодки сверх 41, текст которого подлежит согласованию с советской стороной.



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SOVIET  
PROPOSAL  
SLBM  
definition

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No definition of ballistic missile launchers on submarines  
under construction shall be given in the documents.

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Text of the Protocol to the Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms:

"The Parties understand that in accordance with Article III of the Interim Agreement, for the period during which this Agreement remains in force:

The USA may have not more than 710 submarine-launched ballistic missile launchers and not more than 44 modern submarines with BMs. The Soviet Union may have not more than 950 submarine-launched ballistic missile launchers and not more than 62 modern submarines with ballistic missiles.

Additional submarine-launched ballistic missile launchers, <sup>up to the above mentioned levels</sup> for the U.S.A. - in excess of 656 nuclear submarine-launched ballistic missile launchers and for the U.S.S.R. - in excess of 740 nuclear submarine-launched ballistic missile launchers, operational and under construction, may become operational as replacements for equal numbers of launchers for ICBMs of older types constructed before 1964 or of ballistic missile launchers of older submarines.

"This Protocol shall be regarded as an integral part of the Interim Agreement".

The US side will take an obligation in a written form not to construct additionally 3 submarines in excess of 41. The text of the undertaking shall be agreed with the Soviet side.



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Текст Протокола к Временному соглашению:

"Стороны исходят из того понимания, что согласно статье III Временного соглашения на период, в течение которого это соглашение остается в силе:

США могут иметь не более 710 ПУ БР на подводных лодках и не более 44 современных подводных лодок с БР. Советский Союз может иметь не более 950 ПУ БР на подводных лодках и не более 62 современных подводных лодок с баллистическими ракетами.

Ввод в боевой состав дополнительных пусковых установок баллистических ракет <sup>на указанный выше уровень</sup> на подводных лодках в США - сверх 656 ПУ баллистических ракет на атомных подводных лодках и в СССР - сверх 740 пусковых установок баллистических ракет на атомных подводных лодках, находящихся в боевом составе и в стадии строительства, может осуществляться в качестве замены равного числа пусковых установок МБР старых типов, построенных до 1964 года, или пусковых установок баллистических ракет старых подводных лодок.

Настоящий протокол будет рассматриваться как неотъемлемая часть Временного соглашения".

При этом американская сторона даст письменное обязательство не строить дополнительно трех подводных лодок сверх 41.

Текст такого обязательства должен быть заранее согласован с советской стороной.



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E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

PRMPA

By KW NARA, Date 5-6-02

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:

Nikolai V. Podgorny, Chairman of the Presidium  
of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR  
Aleksi N. Kosygin, Chairman of the Council  
of Ministers of the USSR  
Nikolai K. Baibakov, Deputy Chairman of the  
Council of Ministers and Chairman of the  
State Planning Commission  
Andrei A. Gromyko, Minister of Foreign Affairs  
Nikolai S. Patolichev, Minister of Foreign Trade  
Georgi M. Korniyenko, Chief of USA Division,  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
Anatoli F. Dobrynin, Ambassador to the USA  
Mr. Ivanov, Chairman of the Foreign Trade Bank  
Leonid Zamyatin, Director of TASS  
Viktor M. Sukhodrev, Interpreter  
Notetaker

The President  
William P. Rogers, Secretary of State  
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the  
President for National Security Affairs  
Peter M. Flanigan, Assistant to the President  
for International Economic Affairs  
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Senior NSC Staff Member  
Winston Lord, Special Assistant to Dr. Kissinger  
Ronald L. Ziegler, Press Secretary to the  
President

DATE AND TIME:

Thursday, May 25, 1972 2:10-3:50 p. m.

PLACE:

St. Catherine's Hall  
Grand Kremlin Palace, Moscow

SUBJECT:

Economic Relations

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

PRMFA

By KW NARA, Date 5-6-02

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/  
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- 2 -

Chairman Kosygin: Mr. President, Secretary Rogers and your Assistant for Economic Affairs were not able to finalize anything because they just did not have enough time. So, Mr. President, do you have any views or plans as to what we should take up for discussion now? After all, the general range of economic problems is very broad.

The President: I think it would be very well if we could get some agreement on Lend-Lease and get that out of the way, and then go on to other matters.

Chairman Kosygin: Certainly.

The President: We've been haggling over the amount. It has been hanging around for many years. There comes a time when you have to break the impasse and decide what a fair solution is. As I understand it, the difference is very substantial, \$300 million on your side and \$800 million on our side.

Chairman Kosygin: You actually named a figure of \$751 million as the debt itself and you also named another \$200 million interest on something we don't know. Before we do begin the actual discussion of this perhaps we might reach some understanding on this basis. If we delve into prior history and start digging up all of the past deliberations we will never reach a final settlement. Of course, it is true that we have all the material on Lend-Lease from beginning to end. I am quite sure the same goes for you, even up to the point that we have all the bills, checks that you gave us at the time, just as you have all the bills of lading and receipts which we handed to you. And since at the time the Lend-Lease Agreement was effected I occupied the post of Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, I was closely associated with this personally, so I am deeply aware of these problems. Therefore it is very easy to flounder on all these questions and perhaps it is not so easy to rise to the surface from underwater.

I already said to Secretary Rogers that we cannot recognize the \$200 million named by your side as interest. Because we feel this is a completely artificial figure that you arrived at, taking the original sum of \$750 million which in any case we never recognized, and calculated the interest starting from 1960, 12 years. And that's

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E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

CRMPA

By KW NARA, Date 5-6-02

EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

- 3 -

where you get the \$200 million from. We would nonetheless like to reach an understanding and the final resolution of all questions concerning Lend-Lease.

The President: As I understand the problem really is \$750 million plus \$200 million, or \$950 million.

Chairman Kosygin: \$951 million. That is what I have in my brief.

The President: But your figure is \$300 million.

Chairman Kosygin: That is right, \$300 million. How you distribute [justify] that figure, \$300 million, notably in relation to the Congressional situation, is certainly up to you. But also another thing which we have to determine is the duration of the repayment period. As regards the British, I know you reached a settlement after the war on the basis of the duration of repayment of 50 years at an interest rate of 2% per annum. Generally speaking, you named a small, in effect a symbolic sum, and you said 2001. I guess they are still doing that.

The President: We'll all be dead by then.

Chairman Kosygin/ Chairman Podgorny: Who knows?

Chairman Podgorny: There will be some people around to pay.

The President: We will go to Mars together. Stick around.

Chairman Kosygin: Maybe. But you know that even today we have a man--Petrov--an old Bolshevik, now 98 years old, and still very much alive and working on the Encyclopedia. He is a very educated man, respected by all of us. He is a professor, an historian and scientist, very industrious. As soon as a man gets the title "professor", he gets the responsibility of living a long life.

The President: He doesn't have to work.

Chairman Kosygin: That's your system, is it? That's not true in our case. In this country, as soon as a man becomes an Academician then life becomes easy for him, because then he gets paid a large sum whether he works or not.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/  
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DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

PRMPA  
By KW NARA, Date 5-6-02

EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

- 4 -

Foreign Minister Gromyko: A vacation.

The President: That's why he [Dr. Kissinger] wants to come here.

Chairman Kosygin: It is hard to become an Academician in the United States?

Dr. Kissinger: We don't have that title at all. We don't have an equivalent position.

Chairman Kosygin: It's a tough situation for scientists then. I think that one might want to organize an Academy in the United States.

The President: What is needed now, particularly at this high level, is a reasonable attitude on both sides. You cannot accept \$950 million. We cannot accept \$300 million. So under the circumstances we should negotiate something in between.

Chairman Kosygin: Name your figure.

The President: Why do we not go half-way?

Chairman Kosygin: \$450 million.

The President: That's not the way I learned mathematics.

Chairman Kosygin: Yes, you learned American math. Our mathematics is different.

The President: New mathematics. The new math.

Chairman Kosygin: No.

The President: Why don't we say one-half between, and that would be \$600 million?

Chairman Podgorny: That doesn't seem to me to be a very acceptable kind of mathematics, even if it is half-way.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/  
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DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

PRM/A  
By KW NARA, Date 5-6-02

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/  
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

- 5 -

Chairman Kosygin: Why not approach it this way? The figure \$750 million named by you, why not halve that? And then we'd get our arithmetic right. Because then we could certainly agree with that basis and reach a final settlement of this entire matter. I believe it is a figure that can be justified, and then we consider the matter finally closed.

Mr. President, if I were at this point to go into the story of what we suffered in the war I am sure you probably might even give up the whole figure altogether if we reached an understanding on that basis. If it were put to Congress in this fashion and you provided relevant documents, I think that would be enough to induce any legislative body. We did set up a special commission in 1941 during the war headed by Shvernik. The task of the commission was to collect all the documents, all the dossiers concerning human and material losses caused by the war. We have all the documents but haven't even published them in full to this date. If we did so you would then see the full scale of the damage caused to this country.

The President: We don't want to haggle on this. After all, we are dealing at a high level and we both want to reach a reasonable settlement. You object to interest and of course our people disagree. Let's take \$750 million as our figure--without the interest--and take the figure \$300 million as your figure and then split the difference and that would be \$525 million. That is half-way between the two figures without interest on either side. [Foreign Minister Gromyko corrects the interpreter and Premier Kosygin does figures on a pad.]

Chairman Kosygin: \$525 million would be something we couldn't give. Well, let's indeed endeavor to meet each other half-way. I fully agree we are not rug merchants. Let me suggest a constructive figure of \$450 million and end the matter in that way. That would be the final settlement and we believe a fair one.

The President: You've come up \$150 million to \$450 million. We've come down \$300 million. That would be very hard for us to justify.

Chairman Kosygin: We raised 50 percent.

The President: We came down 150 percent.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

PRMPA

By KW NARA, Date 5-6-02

TE/

EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

- 6 -

Chairman Kosygin: You lowered your figure by 30 percent; we raised ours by 50 percent. You know we simply don't have any other possible approach to a solution to this matter. We simply won't be able to. You could say to Congress 30 years after the end of the war you have made us pay you for Lend-Lease. We have to say 30 years after the war we have to pay out a sum that you agree to. We would be in a very difficult position with our people.

The President: What we are talking about is a spirit, a climate in which both sides are forthcoming on an agreement. It seems to me we are so close together. The problem is that you've come from \$300 to \$450. We have come from \$750 to \$450. We have come two times as far as you have. It doesn't sound as if we did very well.

Chairman Kosygin: I don't see really where you have had to come so much further than us. Let me say very frankly we simply do not have the possibility of going further. We do not have either the power to negotiate a larger figure or the physical possibility. Even with this figure it would still be very hard to justify.

The President: Have you discussed \$33 million on merchant ships?

Chairman Kosygin: No, we didn't discuss that. They are included in the \$750 million.

Secretary Rogers/Mr. Flanigan: Not in ours.

Secretary Rogers: We always considered that a separate item. You agreed to pay that before.

Mr. Ivanov: Well, with regard to the figure of \$750. It is broken down like this. 580 is compensation for goods at the end of the war. 100 is for use of naval vessels. Another 30 million is for use of small naval vessels. 33 for merchant ships. Another 7 million for minor floating facilities, barges and cranes makes a \$750 million total.

The President: Is the pipeline included?

Mr. Ivanov: That is a separate question because of the credit agreement at the end of the war. There is no question up to now because during the negotiations this was settled in Washington.

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DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

PRMPA  
By KW NARA, Date 5-6-02

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/  
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

- 7 -

Secretary Rogers: [To the President] They paid on the pipeline for account.

Mr. Ivanov: You have an understanding to add the rest of our debts to the total and to pay during the repayment period specified for the total time.

The President: Let me suggest a solution. If you agree to \$450 million on Lend-Lease--that is the figure you suggest, and then the pipeline is \$46 million....

Chairman Kosygin: Yes, we suggested that.

Mr. Ivanov: You are quite right, Mr. President, the sum of \$450 million is on the same basis as the \$750 million sum. It includes no pipeline.

The President: Or ships?

Mr. Ivanov: Ships are included in the \$750 million sum.

The President: Why not get the round figure, 450 + 46 (pipeline)?

Mr. Ivanov: Right.

The President: Take 450 plus 46 which is approximately 500 and that covers everything.

Chairman Kosygin: Mr. President, we just don't have the possibility of doing that. We have given you all our possibilities in this matter, all that we have in our soul.

Chairman Podgorny: Up to now we have been very firm in putting forward the figure 300. Now we take it upon ourselves to increase the sum to 450 in the hope that when we present the matter to our government we will get approval.

The President: 450 plus 46 when adding the pipeline.

Mr. Ivanov: Yes, you mean it is better to include the pipeline in order to reach 500?

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/  
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DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

PRMPA  
By KW NARA, Date 5-6-02

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/  
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

- 8 -

The President: Yes, it is better to have a round figure.

[There followed a discussion among Messrs. Ivanov, Podgorny and Kosygin.]

Chairman Kosygin: Mr. President, don't take us by the throat. We think the best thing is to include the pipeline in the \$450 million. Agree?

The President: No.

Chairman Kosygin: I'd much rather you'd said okay, instead of no.

The President: It seems to me that's fair. You have 450. Certainly that is the lowest figure possible. With the pipeline already 46, I think if we'd just get a round figure of 500 that would be a good settlement. We have come down a lot more than you've come up.

Chairman Kosygin: All Americans are like that.

The President: It's a good deal. It's a good round figure and includes everything.

Chairman Kosygin: Mr. President, if you just think what other benefits you could offer us to get this 30-year-old problem out of the way. I am sure you will get your figures. You have gained here or something there. Especially when trade gets going between the two countries, there are lots of chances to compensate for this figure.

The President: Since we can't agree, let's talk about the grain deal.

Chairman Kosygin: I'd like to get this question settled, nonetheless, particularly since our positions are very close.

Chairman Podgorny: We are close.

The President: We are only \$40 million dollars apart.

Chairman Kosygin: No, \$50 million.

The President: \$40 million.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

PRMPA

By KW NARA, Date 5-6-02

EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

- 9 -

Chairman Kosygin: 50. We are \$50 million apart because you want to consider the two figures apart and I want to consider them together. We accept your proposal on the condition we agree on the duration of the payment. We proceed from a duration of payment of 50 years. That's the period you gave the British, to all these countries to which you extended Lend-Lease you gave a period of repayment of 50 years. Why discriminate against us?

The President: Not 100?

Chairman Kosygin: That's what you gave the British [50 years].

Secretary Rogers: I explained to the Prime Minister that would be totally out of the question. The conditions have totally changed since the end of the war.

Chairman Podgorny: But they have changed for everyone, for you and for us. You gave all other countries 50 years.

The President: You are much richer now.

Chairman Podgorny: You are too.

Chairman Kosygin: The ratio that existed at that time has changed in your favor and not ours, unfortunately.

The President [to Mr. Flanigan]: You want to discuss the interest rate now?

Mr. Flanigan: We haven't yet, but we can, Mr. President.

The President: You have not discussed yet?

Mr. Flanigan: No.

Chairman Kosygin: Two percent is the normal rate.

The President: It is best to have discussion among the experts.

Chairman Kosygin: Certainly there is no objection to the experts discussing it but we should give them very precise instructions.

TOP SECRET / SENSITIVE  
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DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

PRMPA  
By KW NARA, Date 5-6-02

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/  
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

- 10 -

The President: We'll make the decision.

Chairman Kosygin: Because I think we should really reach agreement on this. Otherwise the experts drag it out to another year of discussions.

The President: I have a suggestion, Mr. Prime Minister. The Prime Minister is an expert in this field and I am not. The Prime Minister is a banker and I am not. He has me at a disadvantage. It would be helpful if the Prime Minister could discuss with Mr. Flanigan and Mr. Rogers and make recommendations and you and I decide. We want to be fair.

Chairman Kosygin: I have no objection.

The President: We want to be fair. It is too complicated to talk about the rate and the length of the terms.

Chairman Kosygin: On one understanding. I agree to meet anybody designated. But I cannot accept any percentage higher than the one you gave to all the other countries. But we certainly have no objection to discussing this with the experts you designate, Secretary Rogers and Mr. Flanigan.

I want to add that we really have gone to the limit of what we can offer. It would be entirely to your advantage to accept this. You leave after the visit having received money from us, while we are giving. That will be difficult to explain.

The President: As far as the figure is concerned, what have we agreed on?

Chairman Kosygin: \$500 million including the pipeline, and that we agreed to on the condition that the duration of repayment is 50 years at two percent per annum. Even so we have to pay a very large amount of money annually because that alone will involve us paying \$10 million the first year, that is, the percentage. That, Mr. President, will be in our own lifetime. Fifty years hence is a matter of conjecture-- whether we will still be around. We have to pay now.

Secretary Rogers: From our standpoint it doesn't make sense. You are paying us over \$11 million on the pipeline, so we are reducing the payments. You are paying us less than now.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

PRMPA  
By KW NARA, Date 5-6-02

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/  
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

- 11 -

Chairman Kosygin: But that's just interest. But on this basis there will be principal, so the sum is double. We are paying no less than \$20 million all told. We have to pay about \$25 million annually on the basic sum, principal. So all told it will amount to about \$25 million per year, which is a big sum of money, no laughing matter.

The President: Then we can have further discussion of the technical things tomorrow. We will see where we stand.

Chairman Kosygin: We agree. Let's do that.

The President: Could we have a report on where we stand on grain?

Chairman Kosygin: Certainly. Just one point. I have asked Mr. Patolichev, our Foreign Trade Minister, to come here. Before he comes perhaps we can turn to other matters. What else is on your list?

The President: The next thing on the list is the Joint Economic Commission.

Chairman Kosygin: We discussed that matter with "Comrade" Rogers and your assistant.

Secretary Rogers: Alright.

The President: Is it acceptable if it is announced Saturday?

Chairman Kosygin: Yes.

The President: Mr. Peterson will come over in July.

Chairman Kosygin: Yes, we are quite willing. The chairmanship question we can decide later. You decide yours, and we decide ours. But I will give you a document on the principles of setting up the commission for your consideration.

The President: The announcement will be Saturday.

Chairman Kosygin: Certainly. We agree. We will give you our draft on this.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

PRMPA

By KW NARA, Date 5-6-02

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/  
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

- 12 -

Secretary Rogers: We have been working on it. It's all right. At noon. We will have it corrected.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: It has been corrected. The Prime Minister can read it out to you.

Secretary Rogers: We have it. When should we announce it on Saturday?

Chairman Kosygin: We can hand it to the press in the morning.

Dr. Kissinger: We plan our press briefing at 7:00 in the morning. Right, Ron? Because they are going to Leningrad. Because of the papers.

Chairman Kosygin: That means only in Sunday's morning papers and the evening papers Saturday and on radio.

The President: Saturday night on TV.

Chairman Kosygin: There is also the question of credits. We can take that up before Mr. Patolichev comes, that is, the credits extended by the United States to us.

Secretary Rogers: Export-Import Bank credits.

Chairman Kosygin: Yes, Export-Import Bank credits.

[Mr. Ivanov explains the question of Presidential authority to his colleagues.]

Chairman Kosygin: So on the matter of credits by the Export-Import Bank--as our "Comrade" was telling us--for the Export-Import Bank to extend credits requires a Presidential order to the effect that it is in line with the interest of the U.S. So we would like you to issue the order so we could begin using the credits. Unless that is done, as you know, there can be no real trade between us.

The President: I am prepared to take that action but the action should be taken concurrently with the settlement of Lend-Lease. It is easier that way. That is why it is important to discuss these two together. Since we have made progress on Lend-Lease this should be possible.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE  
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

PRMPA

By KW NARA, Date 5-6-02

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/  
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

- 13 -

Chairman Kosygin: On the matter of Lend-Lease, how do you think we should go about having a public statement? Or should we just include something at the end of the visit?

The President: It seems to me --I haven't thought this through-- but we ought to have Lend-Lease included in Saturday's announcement.

Chairman Kosygin: I am thinking perhaps if it is better if we included in the final communique.

The President: That is alright, if you prefer that.

Chairman Kosygin: I think we best indicate it in the communique along the following lines: The two sides have achieved agreement on the issue of Lend-Lease, without going into the details in the communique. So Mr. President we could then suggest the following procedures.

[Mr. Patolichev arrives.]

In the final communique, in that section dealing with all agreements and economic questions, we could have a line that the two sides reached agreement on the question of Lend-Lease without spelling out the details of the question. It is difficult for us.

The President: The important thing is to have Lend-Lease. We want to be forthcoming on credit because it is essential to increase trade in both countries. But we have promised the Congressional leaders that Lend-Lease would be settled first. They don't have to be in the same document necessarily, but it should be mentioned.

Chairman Kosygin: So then we proceed from this understanding. Following the final elaboration and settlement of Lend-Lease issue, you are prepared to issue the order to the Export-Import Bank to extend credits to us which we can then begin using. [President Nixon nods yes.]

Good. Agreed.

Now Minister Patolichev is here. I would like first to say that we do agree to buy American grain and for a long-term period. But for this we will need credit and we will need to have long-term credit--longer

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/  
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DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

PRMMA  
By KW NARA, Date 5-6-02

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/  
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

- 14 -

term credit than the three-year credit to which you are so far referring. A three-year credit is not of interest to us.

If this is difficult for your side, we could perhaps circumvent the issue in the following way. We could put forth the following proposal. You would instruct the Export-Import Bank to extend to us a certain limit of credit, and we would make use of that credit to purchase grains from the United States. So we could then reach an understanding on this formulation? We could have an exchange of letters or simply an agreement among ourselves. Then we could simply bypass the question of what might be difficult for you.

On the question of transportation, well, what we can carry ourselves we will and what we cannot carry, for that we will charter ships at the prevailing rates for freighters existing in the world. And then we could have longer-term prospects regarding purchases. Let's say that there could be an agreement extended to five years.

The President: The problem we have is with the authority. Your idea of a long-term arrangement of course is appealing. But we do not have the legislative authority to make that kind of arrangement.

Chairman Kosygin: You have no legislative authority in what particular aspect?

Mr. Flanigan: May I, Mr. President? The Grains Financing Authority prohibits credits in excess of three years to developed countries. The Export-Import Bank credits prohibits long-term credits for consumables, such as grain.

Chairman Kosygin: The Export-Import Bank does not generally extend money for grain?

Mr. Flanigan: That is correct.

Chairman Kosygin: Then perhaps we should let this question filter through the experts once again. Let them look into it, and maybe they can come up with ideas. I will certainly instruct our banking authorities to look into possibilities for entering into some arrangement with your banks and to see how the purchase of grains could be financed for a longer period. Maybe we might find some solution along these lines. We are certainly prepared to look into this most carefully. Maybe

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/  
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DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

PRMMA

By KW NARA, Date 5-6-02

EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

- 15 -

some arrangement could be made for some kind of banking operation involving one of your banks and one of our banks in one of the countries in Europe and arrange purchasing that way. Comrade Ivanov is chairman of the Foreign Trade Bank. We will instruct him to look into this most carefully. Perhaps you can look into it together with him to see if there is some possible arrangement for some kind of financial backing of a deal.

Mr. Flanigan: Fine. We will do it with pleasure.

The President: Secretary Rogers will sit in too and discuss this and give a legal view.

Chairman Kosygin: Certainly. Mr. Patolichev and Mr. Ivanov from our side.

The President: Four on each side. And they will put their heads together and look into this matter.

Chairman Podgorny: A very authoritative group.

Chairman Kosygin: If they don't come up with a solution acceptable to us it will be bad for them.

The President: Did Secretary Rogers and Mr. Flanigan and Mr. Kosygin have a chance to meet on the other question?

Chairman Kosygin: No, we didn't have time yet.

The President: On natural gas.

Chairman Kosygin: No. We didn't discuss that with the Secretary, but we want to find the time, perhaps tomorrow with the Secretary.

The President: I think it would be good if Flanigan is also on our side. You can have anyone else you want.

Chairman Kosygin: Certainly. We will have Comrade Baibakov, the Chairman of State Planning Commission. He could sit in for me. He is my deputy at the same time; he is deputy Prime Minister. He can handle this.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/  
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DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

PRMPA  
By KW NARA, Date 5-6-02

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/  
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

- 16 -

The President: I am not sure we can solve it now but we will look into it. It is a massive deal. It involves one-third of all the Export-Import Bank's credit authority.

Chairman Kosygin: I am quite sure we will not be able to reach a final settlement. As the President said, it is a very complex problem. I think what is required now, Mr. President, is your consent to release the companies in the United States for going ahead on planning this elaborate project. In fact, they have already given us a preliminary project. We met with them. If you give the go-ahead to get the work going, they could go ahead. It requires very careful work to identify with your side where your interests lie and where our interests lie.

Mr. Flanigan: We have instructed the consortia that they are free to go ahead with studies and calculations. We have received some studies, but they are not approved on the credit aspects. With regard to studies and calculation they are entirely free to make those. As the President has already said, they have the right to make those studies.

Chairman Kosygin: That is very good. It is a step forward, but, of course, without finally settling the financial aspects nothing can come of this consortium. That I am sure you are fully aware of. I am sure they are already working on this project. They told me, when I received them, they would put it in the hands of the White House. At the same time they continue to work on this project. They were eager when they talked to me. That is a very good system in your country: any responsibility anyone has can be easily shifted to the White House and that is that.

The last thing I would like to mention is the fact, of course, that a very great positive sign of the development of economic relations between our two countries generally would be a solution of the problem of Most-Favored-Nation treatment. Let me say that we do not look at this from the standpoint of some kind of exception being made for us. Because if after the visit such as this we put out a communique and announce all sorts of agreements in the economic field and at the same time discriminating practices against us continue, it would sow doubt that this would be misunderstood by the public. All the more so

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- 17 -

since this [MFN] is quite common throughout the world. After all we don't discriminate against the U. S. and had it [MFN] once. As I said yesterday, because of the present tariffs the trade between our two countries is quite negligible. We can be sure that if they remain, there will be no trade at all.

The President: As I pointed out to the Prime Minister, this is a matter in which we have to have Congressional approval. I think Congressional approval can be brought about, provided we can make significant progress in other matters being discussed today. But I am keenly aware of the fact that this is essential if we are going to develop a healthy relationship in the future in the field of trade.

Chairman Kosygin: Not even healthy, but simply for normal relations, this is necessary.

The President: We understand the Soviet Union has a special interest. But anytime Congressional action is required it does also entail the necessity of getting votes from the Congress and the Senate. That is why what we are able to accomplish, --if we can make significant accords during the visit, --it would be helpful to move on that as well.

Chairman Kosygin: Because under the existing situation it is more to our advantage, more profitable, to sell to the British and have them resell to you, and we get a higher profit than if we sold directly to you. Why should we have an intermediary on what we intended to sell to you?

The President: We are aware of this.

Chairman Kosygin: Maybe some situation in the U. S. will change, and it will not be Congress but someone else that decides these matters. I am not making any formal proposal. You wouldn't accept it anyway.

The President: What I am suggesting and I want to be frank--I want to be candid on what I can do myself--is that we can move on an Export-Import credit--I have the authority. On MFN, I have to get Congressional approval. I believe I can get it if I go back. [I am just pointing out that I do not want to leave the impression I can do that right now. It still takes Congressional action.

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PRMPA  
By KW NARA, Date 5-6-02

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- 18 -

Chairman Kosygin: This we are keenly aware of, too.

The President: I can indicate it as my goal. I cannot indicate it as a reality until I can deliver.

Chairman Kosygin: Well, both of us have to act within limits on certain things. That applies to both of us.

The President: We have made progress today. We will continue to make progress that will help do the job, when I return, with Congress.

Chairman Podgorny: Well, with your persistent efforts I feel that this will become a realistic possibility.

Chairman Kosygin: In the field of trade generally I think we still have many untapped possibilities. Perhaps we don't have the skill or you don't have the interest. We ought to have the skill of selling commodities. Perhaps in others we have no real interest with the other side.

Let me just give a few examples. I have looked into this. I have been given a brief on the structure of your imports. I see you are buying very many items from abroad. I am surprised to see you get half your footwear from abroad; radios about one third; motorcycles 90%; and many bicycles.

At first glance these are very small items. We could especially adapt several plants and factories in this country for the requirements of the American market. For this, what we need is that American companies give us the specifications required. Certain component parts are needed for the equipment. These could be supplied by the U.S. and turned out as finished products. We could look at this in a serious way and could sign contracts totalling billions of rubles. Then we could extend trade to a broader range of items. Not just primary goods like we have so far. That would require no credits.

In short, there are great opportunities ahead.

The President: I think the plan we develop for the Commission is to explore all the possibilities, what we can do. It is difficult, as the

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- 19 -

Prime Minister knows, to arrange for trade between two economies based on different financial systems and other significant differences. On the other hand this only means that we need to think more creatively, more imaginatively, so that our two economies complement each other.

Mr. Peterson is a very able man. He will have a broad charter to discuss this whole range of matters with whomever is designated on your side. He will make recommendations on how the trade of the two sides can be expanded. I hope before he comes your experts will come up with suggestions, and we will have some. From that we can generate new vistas of trade--new horizons--that we have not had before.

In addition, some of our businessmen have considerable expertise in dealing with socialist countries in setting up various schemes resulting in beneficial trade to both countries. They will be encouraged to come up with ideas as well.

I will simply say that as far as my position is concerned, I believe that more trade between the Soviet Union and the United States is good for both countries. I think it is good economically. I also think there are definite benefits in terms of creating better relations in other fields. I am prepared to give every encouragement and support that we can on the government's side for new initiatives in the field of trade.

Chairman Kosygin: What you said about differences in the systems of financing, I don't think that should present any great problems. We are not complex as regards banking systems or things like that. You will recall long ago with American assistance we built the Gorky Auto Plant and the Volgograd Tractor Plant. And you know, about three years ago we entered into a contract with the Italian Fiat Company which built a very big project in this country. It is safe to say that there was not the slightest difficulty or hitch in cooperating with them in this venture. You know that certain American companies also took part in building that plant.

And I just recently visited the Volgograd Plant which is now producing over a thousand cars a day and it is still going up. I saw with my own eyes U.S. equipment sold to us by the Italians. It is an enormous plant. There was never the slightest hitch. Everything went off very smoothly, without a hitch. The President of Fiat who is now dead,

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- 20 -

Signor Vellati, was a very able man. I knew him very well. He was very able.

[Chairman Kosygin then read a suggested announcement on the meeting of the day. The two sides discussed that there would be the theater that night and that they would let other officials sign agreements.]

The Soviet Side: Okay?

American Side: Okay.

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Leonid V. Smirnov, Deputy Chairman,  
Council of Ministers of the USSR  
Andrei A. Gromyko, Minister of Foreign  
Affairs  
Anatoli F. Dobrynin, Ambassador to the USA  
Georgi M. Korniyenko, Chief of USA Division,  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
Eduard Zaitsev, Interpreter (afternoon)  
Mr. Bratchikov, Interpreter (late evening)

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the  
President for National Security Affairs  
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Senior Staff Member, NSC  
William G. Hyland, NSC Staff Member  
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff (notetaker)

DATE & TIME: Thursday, May 25, 1972  
5:20-6:35 p. m. -- 11:30 p. m. - 12:32 a. m.

PLACE: St. Catherine's Hall  
Grand Kremlin Palace, Moscow

SUBJECT: SALT

Dr. Kissinger: On the subjects we discussed yesterday [Tab A], to get them out of the way, let me give you our answers:

Point #1, the "Text of a Joint Statement on Article III of the Treaty on the Limitation of ABM Systems," is accepted in your formulation.

Point #2, "The Parties understand that in the process of modernization and replacement the size of land-based ICBM silo launchers will not be increased," is accepted in your formulation.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: I would like to say on this point that we are ready to make a concession in your favor.

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2

Dr. Kissinger: No, we don't want your concession.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: But it is in your favor.

Dr. Kissinger: What is the concession?

Foreign Minister Gromyko: "The Parties understand that in the process of modernization and replacement the size of land-based ICBM silo launchers will not be substantially increased."

Dr. Kissinger: What is the concession?

Foreign Minister Gromyko: We accept your formulation.

Dr. Kissinger: Look, we can't do this every eight hours, after getting agreement in our government. Yesterday, you said "significantly." Today we got agreement with everybody in our government and informed you only this morning. You're not making a concession, you are withdrawing from an agreed position.

Are you prepared to say 10-15%?

Foreign Minister Gromyko: In general, we are.

Dr. Kissinger: In other words, we have wasted three hours of conversation with Mr. Brezhnev and two hours with you.

Deputy Chairman Smirnov: We would prefer the formula you suggested and which was accepted in Helsinki.

Dr. Kissinger: If we are going to do this, we can give it all to Helsinki. To summarize: The President was unsatisfied with what was done in Helsinki. He therefore raised it with Mr. Brezhnev.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: Yesterday we discussed one possibility, and another possibility. Yesterday we decided to convince you of ours. But the Americans were reluctant to accept ours. Our experts said it made little difference, and we put it to Mr. Brezhnev and he agreed.

Dr. Kissinger: But Mr. Brezhnev said the word "significantly" is meaningless and that we should go back to 10-15%.

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3

[Smirnov spoke in Russian and was not translated.]

Foreign Minister Gromyko: We have only changed three words -- "not substantially increased."

Dr. Kissinger: But that's what we . . . Let's see what else we've got, because we may not have an agreement. I am not accepting this, any way, since if we don't settle the submarine point it doesn't make any difference what we do here.

Should I mention the other two points? [Points #3 and #4 at Tab A] The other two points are agreed to, except for minor editorial points, which they can do in Helsinki.

Deputy Chairman Smirnov: On submarines, yesterday we agreed that our position on 48 was discussed, and we also spoke about replacements. We are in agreement on that because we had an exchange on that in March. But if you want to determine this level through the total number of launchers, then we agree with this. If you are more satisfied with translating it into the number of launchers, if you multiply 48 boats by 16 launchers, then you have 768. That would be a figure that we would specify, that we would write down. This is not because we insist on 28 starts but because we would have an even number for each of the submarines. What is your opinion?

Your proposal is 740. We subdivide it by the number of launchers.

Dr. Kissinger: I understand the arithmetic. The arithmetic is not hard, the politics is hard. Policy decisions are hard.

Deputy Chairman Smirnov: Yes, we are for taking that political decision.

Dr. Kissinger: What I tried to explain last night is the following. The problem, Mr. Deputy Minister, is as follows: First of all, I totally reject the proposition by which you arrive at 48. The figure 48, to repeat for the record, is the figure 41-43 which we think you have, plus G-and H-class which you will convert to Y to 48, plus the SS-7s and SS-8s converted to submarines, which gives you 62. This is how the 62 originated with us. It makes no difference to us how you arrived at 62.

Then when Mr. Brezhnev gave me a paper which listed 62 boats and 950 launchers, I thought we were operating on the basis of the figures I gave to your Ambassador.

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4

Our problem is this. I repeat: We can accept 62 and 950. We can accept it, although it will present us with enormous difficulties in explaining to the American public why the Soviet Union should have more submarines than we.

What has become apparent over the past few weeks, particularly over the last week is, if we let you build over the next few years without any obligation of retiring anything, then the treaty cannot be ratified. Because we don't believe you have 48 Y-class boats.

So, there are a number of practical solutions. The only way the treaty can be defended in the U.S. is this: We start at an equal base, but we allow the Soviet Union to transform old missiles and old submarine-launched missiles into modern submarines and modern submarine-launched missiles, up to a figure of 62.

Therefore there are only two practical solutions to the problem, in my view: Solution one, is that we don't say anything about the number of submarines you now have. If you like to say you have 48, that's your privilege. But we only say that the next submarine you build after this agreement is signed will lead to the retirement of old missiles, either submarine-or land-based.

Actually there are three possible solutions. The second possibility is: That we accept the figure of 48 but include in it all your nuclear-powered submarines which have missiles on them. A third possibility is that we take the figure 740, or maybe even 768, and include in it 100 missiles you have on G- and H-class submarines. In either event, you will end up with 62 subs and 950 missiles. And since the Deputy Minister is so enamored of our delegation in Helsinki, I will show him the latest formula of our delegation in Helsinki which omits all numbers, which takes the first possibility.

I would merely like to add the following. I sent a cable to Washington today because you asked me if we could drop submarines altogether.

Ambassador Dobrynin: It was my private question.

Dr. Kissinger: Private but nonetheless. [Shows cables HAKTO 32 and TOHAK 147, at Tab B, to Dobrynin.] You will know we can't possibly pass the treaty through the Senate with all these people opposing it. The

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BOX 73 Folder: 3SECRET/SENSITIVE

5

Defense Department has come up with an even tougher request, which I won't even show you.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: What is your conclusion?

Dr. Kissinger: The conclusion I make, Mr. Foreign Minister, is that we should find a solution which includes one of the three possibilities, otherwise we'll have a treaty that won't be ratified.

Deputy Chairman Smirnov: We've got to come to some conclusion finally. As far as I could gather from the previous conversations, I could understand that the formula with the numbers 740 was most convenient for you.

Dr. Kissinger: If it included G- and H-class submarine missiles.

Deputy Chairman Smirnov: Yesterday that wasn't the question.

Dr. Kissinger: It wasn't discussed.

Deputy Chairman Smirnov: I want to specify the term. By H-class you mean the old atom submarines?

Dr. Kissinger: With three missiles each.

Deputy Chairman Smirnov: And by G-class you mean the old diesel-powered submarines.

Dr. Kissinger: With three missiles each. It's as old as Polaris.

Deputy Chairman Smirnov: I don't think it's worthwhile. I take it as a joke.

Dr. Kissinger: Of course, Polaris is a better weapon. I agree with you.

Deputy Chairman Smirnov: Yesterday we did discuss the figure 740 but yesterday we did not include these in the figure; we discussed only modern submarines.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: Mr. Kissinger, this element is a new one. It has never been introduced in Helsinki or Vienna. They spoke about the modern submarines, never about the old ones. We cannot accept this.

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6

Dr. Kissinger: But the protocol I was working from, which was the protocol of May 19, doesn't have the word "nuclear." If you drop the word "nuclear," we're in business. You added the word "nuclear" to our May 19th protocol. We submitted it to your delegation. We didn't mislead you.

I have always said with the 48 we included G- H-class.

Ambassador Dobrynin: Not with me. With 740 yes, but not with the 48.

Dr. Kissinger: Our problem is: We have no difficulty about where we will conclude: 950 and 62. What we have problems with is with the interim. We absolutely require domestically that we be able to say that new boats are replacements and that we did not give you a unilateral advantage.

I am not bargaining with you. We have a massive problem. Our military people in the Department of Defense -- we'll take care of this; we haven't even shown this to them -- propose that we replace SS-9s with subs.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: Repeat that last idea about SS-9s.

Dr. Kissinger: [laughs] It's not a serious proposal. I showed your Ambassador the telegram I sent to Washington this morning. I said this, so that you know what we're up against. I said, "Given the present state of SLBM discussions and Smith cable, would Laird, Rush, Helms and Moorer prefer that offensive agreement not include submarines? . . . Under what conditions should we proceed?"

[Dobrynin at this point gets up and leaves.]

Dr. Kissinger: We've driven your Ambassador away?

Foreign Minister Gromyko: According to protocol, the Ambassador has to escort the President to the theater. This is our concern for the President.

Dr. Kissinger: I understand. Your hospitality has been excellent. We are all grateful. We thank you.

[Reads second cable:] "Have discussed your message with Rush, Helms, and Moorer. All agree that an agreement which limits Soviets to not

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By DP/NARA Date 7/11/02NIXON NS  
BOX 73  
Folder: 3SECRET/SENSITIVE

7

more than 950 SLBM launchers of any type on any submarine (including G, H-and Y-class) is essential.

"If such provisions are not acceptable to the Soviets, we recommend a delay in reaching any agreement.

"The alternatives of an ABM agreement alone, an agreement limited to ABM and ICBM, or allowing more than 950 SLBM launchers, is not acceptable."

Then the military have an even more exalted position, but I won't bother with them. They want you to trade in modern missiles. . .

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We cannot pass this treaty in/Senate with the opposition of all these people.

Deputy Chairman Smirnov: If we start considering the opinions of individual persons, even from very high positions, then we are bound to return to the very start of the negotiations. I can tell you the opinion of our military, that your position -- both geography and the availability of forward bases -- gives you a very big advantage. Therefore, our navy people tell us our figures are extremely small, given your advantages. That question has already been discussed.

We received information March 17 that your President was agreeable to the proposal of 48, without including diesel or other submarines. Yesterday you said we should calculate missiles or submarines equally. You mentioned 48, that's your proposal.

But I can assure you that we are more criticized by our military than you are by yours. If you start citing the opinions of the military, citing pluses and minuses of the positions we find ourselves in, we'll have to go back to the beginning of the negotiations.

Dr. Kissinger: But that is what we are facing now.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: I have to say, Mr. Kissinger, that what you say today introduces something new into our conversation. We seem to come to agreement that we are receiving certain partial inequalities, certain advantages with respect to number, but we did have a different understanding of the situation. We understood we were dealing with modern submarines and modern launchers. Now it seems we have toys that produce certain sounds and we are stuck with them.

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8

Dr. Kissinger: If you accept our proposal you'll have 62 submarines -- that's 50% more than we have -- and 300 more missiles. That is a compensation for geographic inequality.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: That is the quantitative side.

Dr. Kissinger: That's right. On the qualitative side, those 62 submarines and 950 missiles can all be modern. All we ask you to do is to destroy old toy submarines you have in order to reach this total of 950. The Deputy Prime Minister knows very well that the missiles on those submarines are antiquated and aren't very useful. We are giving you a margin of 50% in both missiles and boats. And in ICBMs we're giving you a margin of 40%. This will be a very difficult agreement to present to Congress even in the form we are proposing, and impossible in the form you are proposing.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: Your argument may be convincing to your military people but it cannot be satisfactory to us. If you are including there all the forms we are dealing with, then we would have to start speaking about bases and aircraft and all other initial conditions. It is clear today you are trying to include obsolete units even though those obsolete units have been excluded from the parties long ago. We have been following the negotiations a long time, and today's formulation is a surprise to us. You know our possibilities; what you propose today puts us in a difficult situation. If we were asked to put forward a list of what is demanded by our military, that list is longer than what you have.

We should come to a decision without crossing out what we did before and the political decisions taken in the past by our leaders and your leaders.

Dr. Kissinger: We are not asking you to keep obsolete systems. You can replace the old systems with new ones. We want you to replace them, not keep them. That is the point.

Deputy Chairman Smirnov: Whether it's worthwhile, we will decide ourselves.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, we are just trying to explain our proposal. We are not trying to tell you what to do.

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Deputy Chairman Smirnov: It seems we are deviating from the specific question that was on the agenda yesterday. The essence of the agreement was that you have 41 submarines plus three according to the letter -- plus three you would not use; for us, 950 starts and 62 submarines. Yesterday, no problem was raised with this; nor today. It is known that the number of submarines and ICBMs was determined, as well as the number of replacements. Yesterday, only one question was raised: What is the initial point from which to start counting? It was also raised in Helsinki. The figure was 48 modern submarines.

[The clock chime rang at 6:30 p.m.]

Dr. Kissinger: We have to go.

[Gromyko leaves the room]

Deputy Chairman Smirnov: Yesterday we came to the following results: You told us it was more convenient for you not to fix any number of submarines, that is omit the 48. You considered it more convenient to calculate the number of launchers, and you put forward 740. This is what we should discuss, not the evaluations of your military.

[Gromyko returns.]

Dr. Kissinger: I have a problem. I have to go with the President to the ballet. Could we meet after the ballet?

Foreign Minister Gromyko: Good. Yes.  
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Dr. Kissinger: May I ask for/explanation here? You said [in your Protocol draft, Tab C] "in excess of 740 nuclear submarine-launched ballistic missiles." Strictly, that would include H-class. If this were true, it would give us a certain symmetry with the 710 we have, and would permit me to talk to the President.

Deputy Chairman Smirnov: Did you ask whether the 740 includes all nuclear submarines?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes.

Deputy Chairman Smirnov: On all atomic submarines.

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10

Dr. Kissinger: Including H-class?

Deputy Chairman Smirnov: Yes.

Dr. Kissinger: Let me talk to the President. I think we have a possible  
. . .

Deputy Chairman Smirnov: That was always our position. That is why  
your new position about the diesel submarines surprises us.

Dr. Kissinger: I understand. That is why I think we may have a solution  
. . . Let me talk to the President.

[The meeting broke up at 6:35 p.m. for the Bolshoi performance of  
"Swan Lake." The meeting then reconvened at 11:30 p.m. after the  
ballet.]

Foreign Minister Gromyko: Where have you been?

Dr. Kissinger: I was looking for the ballerina.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: You needed a helping hand?

Dr. Kissinger: A helping hand is no good if I don't have the time.

I spent the time talking to the President, and also to Washington. I hope  
General Antonov reports promptly to you the substance of my conversations!

Ambassador Dobrynin: We want to hear from you personally!

Dr. Kissinger: Let me sum up my understanding of what this protocol  
means.

The number of 740 ballistic-missiles includes the number of missiles on  
any nuclear submarine no matter when it was built. You said this in your  
proposal.

Deputy Chairman Smirnov: Any nuclear submarine.

Dr. Kissinger: Including H-class submarines.

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Deputy Chairman Smirnov: If you classify our appropriate submarines as H.

Dr. Kissinger: We know what we're talking about. This is clear enough.

So, what divides us is 70 missiles on G-class submarines. Is that correct? You don't have to confirm the figure, just the number of missiles on G-class.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: This is right. They have never been included.

Dr. Kissinger: That is the issue that divides us. I included it in my arithmetic with your Ambassador and our delegation had it in its May 19 proposal.

Ambassador Dobrynin: But you didn't mention the G-class.

Dr. Kissinger: [to Dobrynin] I mentioned the G and H together, five submarines -- but you didn't pretend to know all the details.

We understand each other. Does the Minister have any possible compromise in mind?

Deputy Chairman Smirnov: Yesterday you made this proposal and we decided to assess the situation to make everything clear. We accepted your proposal to include all nuclear submarines.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: There is no room for additional compromise.

Dr. Kissinger: Then this makes it impossible to reach agreement.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: We should put everything in its right place. Yesterday we finished by saying we won't mention 48 submarines and we will restrict ourselves to launchers, numbering 740.

Deputy Chairman Smirnov: The question was put by your side and we promised to answer today. We moved to meet your position today, and we gave you a positive answer. That is, we accepted 740, including all atomic submarines, including older submarines.

Dr. Kissinger: May I offer a compromise? As follows: We can accept this figure if you will meet one of our concerns, namely putting modern

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12

missiles on your G-class submarines. Therefore add a sentence to the protocol: If any modern missiles are put on any nuclear submarines, we will count them against the 950.

Ambassador Dobrynin: Only G-class submarines?

Dr. Kissinger: What I propose is this. You of course have the right to convert G-class to Y-class under this agreement. Into modern subs. That's part of the protocol. But secondly, those that you don't convert, if you put modern missiles on them, they will count in the 950 modern missiles you are permitted.

[Smirnov has trouble understanding; Korniyenko repeats Dr. Kissinger's suggestion.]

Dr. Kissinger: This would be added to the protocol. I have it written here. [Hands over text Tab D.]

Foreign Minister Gromyko: You don't mention G-type in this paper, but actually you mean G-type?

Dr. Kissinger: If you put it on another submarine, naturally it counts too -- but I don't think you have any other. What we are saying is that neither side should be able to evade the agreement by putting modern missiles on another submarine.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: In fact it means G.

Dr. Kissinger: In fact it means G.

Ambassador Dobrynin: Don't you have a Russian text?

Dr. Kissinger: I don't have a Russian expert on my staff!

[Gromyko and Smirnov confer.]

Ambassador Dobrynin: [to HAK] Really, personally, do you think there is a possibility to put modern missiles on G-class?

Dr. Kissinger: I don't think it's worthwhile, but it's technically possible. Really, you should know we need this for our concerns. You're making the same mistake as in Germany, you'll end up making the concessions and making them to the wrong people. The Navy won't accept any agreement

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13

Foreign Minister Gromyko: What else do you have?

Dr. Kissinger: That would take care of the submarine issue -- with the proviso that we have to let the delegations work out the language more elegantly. But the substance we accept.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: Do you have the other consideration?

Dr. Kissinger: On the other point I have raised with the Foreign Minister, it is of some sensitivity, because the President believes he was given some assurances on silo dimensions. I would suggest a compromise as I suggested last night. That you accept the word "significantly" and that you say that this means 10-15%.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: Where would that be said?

Dr. Kissinger: We could have an agreed interpretive statement. We can say 15%.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: It is extremely complicated.

Dr. Kissinger: For the same reason, on our side.

Deputy Chairman Smirnov: In such a big document, being over-specific will not be too appropriate. It is already accepted that we won't turn light missiles into heavy ones and there will be no expansion of silos. And if we have, say 15-1/2%, what do we do about that? Do we have to be that specific? Different variants were proposed. You used those cables: I also can use our cables.

Dr. Kissinger: That would be a good beginning to our mutual cooperation. I hope your cables are written in better Russian than ours are in English.

Deputy Chairman Smirnov: This time unfortunately I have fewer cables than you do, but next time I will bring more.

You will recall that up to recently the position of the Soviet delegation in Helsinki, where the principal talks were held, was "not to increase significantly." The American side proposed several variants, including figures, in terms both of cubic metres and of percentages. I won't enumerate all the variants; they are well known. I would like to draw your attention to the fact that beginning May 20 our positions began to come closer. On

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14

May 20, Vorontsov said that General Haig told him that on Sunday Presidential instructions would be sent to Helsinki. As we understand it, on the basis of those instructions, on May 22 in Helsinki there was a meeting of the Working Group (Grinevsky, Kishilev, Garthoff and Parsons) which arrived at a formula. This was only the Working Group's formula . . .

Dr. Kissinger: I know the formula.

Deputy Chairman Smirnov: Today, May 25, we received confirmation that the proposal of the four had been considered by the delegations as approved, and presented as a formal proposal of American side. It seems we now have an agreed text.

Dr. Kissinger: Let me explain why Haig talked to Vorontsov. I was traveling; normally I and your Ambassador handle this. General Haig was not familiar with all the details. He wanted only to fill the gap of one day while I was en route here. In our first formal meeting with Mr. Brezhnev we raised the issue. We would not have raised it if we were satisfied with what the delegation had done. So it does no good to tell me how many times our delegation approved it. We are not satisfied with it.

And we have not insisted on the volume limitation [only the dimension of silos], even though that too was discussed. We are willing to go back to the word "significantly," if we can have some specification.

That really is my last proposal.

[There was a break from 12:12-12:26 a.m.]

Foreign Minister Gromyko: The situation, in general, is very complicated. If there are no additional considerations, I think we can stop for the time being. We could continue tomorrow, but let's not fix a time.

I think it will depend on the meeting at the highest level. If there is a high-level meeting tomorrow morning, we could meet tomorrow afternoon.

Dr. Kissinger: So I can inform the President, [can you tell me] which provision is the obstacle?

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By PP NARA Date 7/11/02NIXON NSC  
Box 73 Folder: 3SECRET/SENSITIVE

15

Foreign Minister Gromyko: It is becoming discernible that, first, the provision on launchers, and second, the question that was raised in that last formula that was given us.

Ambassador Dobrynin: To think it over.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: On the other issues we discussed yesterday, you have given us a reply and we think it as settled.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes. No signing tomorrow then.

Ambassador Dobrynin: Right.

Dr. Kissinger: When could there be a signing? It has to be Sunday.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: I think we won't be able to sign before Sunday, but we won't have to interrupt the Saturday schedule, because the President is going to Leningrad and Sunday is free.

Dr. Kissinger: Fine. We can do it Sunday.

We will meet tomorrow.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: At a time to be specified tomorrow.

Dr. Kissinger: You owe us an answer on the two propositions. We have no other considerations. If you accept those, it will be completed as far as we are concerned. We will raise no other issues.

Deputy Chairman Smirnov: After the ballet, have nice dreams. Swans, not evil forces.

[The meeting then ended at 12:32 a.m.]

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E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

CRMPA

By KW NARA, Date 5-6-02

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Leonid I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of  
the Central Committee of the CPSU  
Nikolai V. Podgorny, Chairman of the  
Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the  
USSR  
Aleksey N. Kosygin, Chairman of the Council  
of Ministers of the USSR  
Andrey A. Gromyko, Minister of Foreign Affairs  
Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, Soviet Ambassador to  
the USA  
Andrei M. Aleksandrov-Agentov, Assistant to  
the General Secretary  
Viktor M. Sukhodrev, Interpreter  
Mr. Gavilov, Notetaker

The President  
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the  
President for National Security Affairs  
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff, Notetaker

DATE AND TIME: Friday, May 26, 1972  
3:10-5:40 p.m.

PLACE: St. Catherine's Hall  
Grand Kremlin Palace, Moscow

SUBJECT: The Middle East.

Secretary Brezhnev: Did your wife enjoy the ballet?

The President: Oh, everybody is raving about it. It was so good it  
almost spoils everything else. We both like the theater, and classical  
theater much better than modern.

Secy. Brezhnev: Was that your first visit to the Bolshoi?

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2

President: Yes.

Secy. Brezhnev: It's cozy and impressive. And how is Dr. Kissinger? Has he been thinking, as usual?

The President: I don't know, I never see him.

Secy. Brezhnev: He should be kept under constant surveillance.

Dr. Kissinger: Your Foreign Minister is watching me all the time.

The President: He hasn't been sleeping much.

Secy. Brezhnev: And nobody knows where he really spends his time.

The President: I haven't asked his secretary.

Chairman Podgorny: He has a secretary? She is the one to ask.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: I must speak in defense of Kissinger.

Secy. Brezhnev: [to Gromyko]: You and Kissinger have had a long and dubious record of contacts.

[to the President]: And how are you generally? Do you get time for rest?

The President: I'm fine. There is not much time for rest. Like the General Secretary and his colleagues, this takes priority. I have to call Washington about programs--the welfare program, the tax program, all domestic programs. This takes up the morning.

Secy. Brezhnev: Since that is so, we must all take care to save our time. Let us now begin on substantive matters. We should proceed as closely as possible to the program worked out by Kissinger and Gromyko. On the list of fairly acute problems we should take up, we have the Middle East. And perhaps we can say a few words on Korea and Cuba. At the dinner we had, I said that the Middle East is a difficult problem for us both. We proceed from the assumption that regardless of the complexity of problems we must make efforts to find solutions to the problems. It is not worthy of states simply to make reference to the complexity of problems. I think we should note at the outset, and perhaps take as a basis, that both you and we as



DECLASSIFIED

O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

PRMPA

By KW NARA, Date 5-6-02

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY

3

Permanent Members of the UN Security Council adopted in concert the well-known Resolution of November 22, 1967, that calls for the Israeli invaders to vacate Arab territory they have occupied. You are aware that our attitude toward the UN and the Security Council is one of respect. If we allow anyone on the outside to feel we are in any measure ignoring that important world organization and aren't doing our utmost to defend the organization, that means we would be discrediting that organization. And particularly during this summit, even the slightest lack of clarity about our position on the UN would have a most serious negative effect on the world.

But the fact is that though much time has elapsed, Israel is still not showing any signs of implementing the Security Council Resolution. As of this moment, we might appear to some people to be taking an indifferent stand toward this attitude of Israel toward the Security Council Resolution. Whatever words or speeches we make or letters we exchange or statements we make, reasoning through the science of logic, I feel that is the way things look. There are, of course, and quite naturally, different attitudes on the part of Israel and the Arabs to the position taken by us both. Israel is very pleased with the situation; the Arabs are evincing legitimate indignation. It is impossible not to say that practically all of the states of the world are taking a negative not a positive view of the existing situation.

We are quite sure you are familiar with the situation in that part of the world. We should both proceed from the fact that the situation is explosive [opasno]. If you take the Arab World and Israel as an area, you will see that in this comparatively small part of the world there are now concentrated over a million troops. If we add to that the feelings of wrath, and other moral factors of no small importance, we would be right in taking a serious view of this in our discussion. Unless some joint efforts are made, it is hard to visualize what direction developments may take. No one can really foresee, unless such efforts are made, how the situation will end.

We would suggest that we should place at the very basis of our discussion all these factors, and proceeding from them we should try to find a solution capable of bringing a settlement in the interests of all countries in the area, without privileges or advantages for any country. One can easily imagine how highly our efforts would be valued all over the world if that solution could guarantee peace and

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E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

PRMPA  
By KW NARA, Date 5-6-02

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY

4

tranquillity in the region. Our prestige would certainly grow.

If you agree with me, Mr. President, we could begin discussions on this basis, which in our view is the only correct one. There has been a copious exchange of communications between us on this, official and confidential, and we would welcome any observations you may have.

The President: The difficulty is to find a permanent solution, which we can sell to both sides. It is there that we need to find some different formula from what we've considered up to date. The UN Resolution, which we also support, would seem to offer such a formula, but in view of the difficulties that have occurred, the Israelis insist on some guarantee for their own defense. They will not agree to total withdrawal [as required by the Resolution\*] unless there are guarantees for their defense.

Another problem: As arms are poured into that area by both sides, the chances for conflict are increased. I know the Soviet Union has shown restraint in this respect, and we've tried to show some restraint, despite congressional pressures. Foreign Minister Gromyko discussed this with us and displayed the Soviet interest in trying to cut the arms flow in this area.

As I pointed out to Prime Minister Kosygin last night, the Middle East, while not in the immediate sense as urgent a problem as Vietnam, in the long term is much more serious because it involves a potential conflict of our vital interests, those of the US, the USSR and other nations in the Mediterranean.

I know there is an assumption that it's impossible for any American President to be reasonable about the Middle East because of the political situation in the US. I emphasized that that is not a consideration which will influence me in my decision in this matter. But we face here a very difficult practical problem. You may believe you have difficulties with some of your friends in the area; our ability to influence the Israelis, particularly since they've been so successful in their wars up to this point, is very limited. And I would further point out that, looking at it in a practical sense, if the US is tied totally

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\* The bracketed phrase was, for some reason, omitted in Sukhodrev's translation into Russian.

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E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

CRMPA

By KW NARA, Date 5-6-02

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY

5

to Israel and the Soviet Union has its relations with most of Israel's neighbors better than the US, this is certainly not in our interest.

I say these things only to indicate that it is our desire--because we believe it is in our interest and because I believe it is in the long-term interests of Israel itself--to use our influence to bring about a permanent settlement. The problem is to find a formula which both sides will accept. Up to now we haven't been able to find that formula.

We had thought at one time that the specific wording of the UN Resolution--which requires not total withdrawal but withdrawal to secure and recognized borders-- might provide a formula, but neither side has been willing to be reasonable to find a formula.

I think the attitude of the Soviet Union has been very constructive. When Mr. Gromyko reported to me that if the other circumstances worked out the Soviet Union would be willing to withdraw its military forces--as distinct from advisers--(I haven't worked out the whole details) that was very constructive. But that requires something from Israel that they simply have not done.

To put it very simply, our ties with Israel poison our relations with Israel's major neighbors--with the UAR, Syria and many others in the Moslem world who side against Israel.

Now we have prepared a paper on this matter which I will submit to the General Secretary and his colleagues, in response to one that your have prepared. I would not suggest that this is a paper that will solve the problem, but it does indicate our thinking at this point.

I simply want to close by saying that I have determined that the interests of the United States are being very seriously damaged by the continuation of the Arab-Israeli conflict. I favor action in any form to--not to end it, but to cool it. The only question really open to us for tactics is how and when can we move to act. If we can discuss these tactics and find a formula, we may be able to make a breakthrough.

I had thought that one approach might be to try an interim measure at this time, to make some progress. But I've been reading Dr. Kissinger's conversations with the General Secretary and Foreign

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

CRMPA  
By KW NARA, Date 5-6-02

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY

6

Minister in Moscow, and as I understand the Soviet position, you must have a total understanding on the final settlement before an interim step. To reach a total understanding at this time, for example, on this day, would be extremely difficult.

Secy. Brezhnev: Mr. President, to make myself absolutely clear, you are correct in recalling our conversations with Dr. Kissinger, we did not rule out all interim arrangements altogether, namely the clearing of the Suez Canal, the crossing of Egyptian forces to the other side, etc. But the agreement is in the final package. Certainly if you have a final settlement all at once, you don't need an interim solution at all. So I said we should reach some understanding on the final settlement and could then proceed to an interim solution, having in mind the final goal.

The President: There is another problem. I will be asked on my return what, if anything, was decided secretly on the Arab-Israeli problem. There will be questions from many sides, the Congress, etc. But I believe we could discuss where we feel we should come out; on that point, as I said, we have prepared our principles here which respond to yours.

I suggest we hand you this. It's in reply to the paper you gave to us. You could study it, we could come back to it Sunday or Monday. Obviously if we don't finish it now, we could finish it in the special channel.

I simply want to assure all concerned that I feel very strongly that the issue has to be settled. We are not in a position to settle it today because frankly we're not in a position to deliver the Israelis on anything so far proposed. But we simply cannot allow that festering sore to continue. It is dangerous to us both--frankly it is more dangerous to us than to you.

Henry, is there anything you want to add? [The President then hands over the US draft of "Basic Provisions for a Final Settlement in the Middle East," at Tab A.]

Dr. Kissinger: The paper covers exactly the same points in your paper [the Soviet proposal of April 22 in Moscow], and states our position on those points. We propose to see to what extent they can be reconciled in further discussions over the summer.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

PRMPA

By KW NARA, Date 5-6-02

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY

7

Secy. Brezhnev: The difficulty, of course, Mr. President, is that we don't know the content of this because it is in English. So I suggest some break before we can return to the matter. But that is not the crux of the matter. By the gist of your remarks, I see a certain element of hopelessness in your judgment. I don't think we should be so pessimistic and balk at taking active steps. As I see it, you are saying we are up against a blank wall. Both should see it as an explosive situation.

Chairman Kosygin: Mr. President, I have just one question. However much we discuss this matter, we still come back to the basic point, which is the question, "Will Israel vacate the territories it has occupied or not? With full guarantees that the old frontiers will not be violated and that Israel as a state will be recognized by all Arab nations. This means under all conditions, Israel will come out from this conflict with advantages not disadvantages. Because Israel will then have come out of the conflict having achieved the goals it set before the conflict. Its goals will be met. Unless both sides take steps to prevent this conflict, matters can get out of hand, despite our best efforts.

The President: I don't want to leave the impression I consider the situation hopeless. As a matter of fact, I am only raising a problem of timing, which is now difficult for us, if we are to affect the Israelis. As Dr. Kissinger will tell you, I have emphasized on occasion after occasion that I will not allow political considerations to influence our decision. We are interested in the survival of Israel and so forth, but we are also interested in developing good ties with Israel's neighbors. We want a fair settlement, a fast settlement. The Prime Minister is correct to describe withdrawal to secure and recognized borders as the main issue. The question is how to make it happen when. That is what this discussion is aimed at trying to find.

Chairman Kosygin: But where do you see the possibility for us both to join our efforts to achieve the settlement?

The President: I think both of us would have a great problem if we were to join in any kind of arrangement that was not approved by those we represent on both sides. While the two great nations, the Soviet Union and the United States, can and must play a major role in pressing the parties to reach a settlement and having discussions, and have a role in guaranteeing a settlement, there is a problem if we were to try to determine what this settlement should be. For us

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

CRMPA  
By KW NARA, Date 5-6-02

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY

8

to attempt at this time to impose a settlement on Israel would be an insurmountable problem.

For example, before we came here we talked to representatives of the Israel government just as you talked to the UAR. Perhaps Dr. Kissinger can give you a rundown of what we find, of what is practical and what is not practical.

Secy. Brezhnev: We would not object to that, but if I might make a few observations first.

The President: Sure.

Secy. Brezhnev: We want you to understand, Mr. President, we are not imagining that we are meeting here to write out the text of an agreement between the Arab states and Israel, a text we can hand to them and say "There's the text, now you have to sign." That is not what we mean. We feel we can cooperate to act on the basis of the Security Council Resolution and work out the principles that could be achieved. We are not saying something has to be done today, or tomorrow, or the day after. But as important major powers, we can make an effort so that both sides can reach tranquillity on the basis of guaranteeing the interests of all states. We can talk about a peaceful settlement in the region on the basis of the Security Council Resolution and can act in in accord with one another. This doesn't mean we want to impede the ties of the US to any of the states in the region. Of course, we cannot deprive you of the right to have good and normal relations with countries like Syria, Egypt and Iraq just as you can't deprive us of the right. Each state in the region is entitled to have good and normal relations with any state.

What we want is to put an end to the hot bed, to get the respect of all.

Chairman Kosygin: It is also wrong to say you are representing one side and we another. We seek to find a solution fair to all parties.

Secy. Brezhnev: We're not assuming we can inscribe into some joint document, for example, a joint communique, that "On Friday we can do something on the Middle East, on Saturday this, or Sunday that, etc." But we can endeavor to find ways to act in accord, in order to secure an agreed settlement. If we start injecting irrelevant

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

PRMMA

By KW NARA, Date 5-6-02

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY

9

elements into our thinking, we won't get very far. Because on both sides we could talk about US military aid to Israel and ours to the Arabs. It would get us nowhere. What we must do is act on the basis of the Security Council Resolution, in full accord with the parties concerned.

Chairman Kosygin: If we acted as representatives of the two sides, we would quickly find between ourselves the same problems that now divide the Arabs and Israel. What we want, as Comrade Brezhnev has correctly put it, is to bring about a solution to this problem, which has in many ways been artificially created and to which we think there is a basis for solution, a solution to this festering sore.

Secy. Brezhnev: It is well known that your ties with these countries in the economic and other fields are of longer standing than ours. We don't buy oil, or have concessions, or important business interests. The only thing we lay claim to is the establishment of peace in the Middle East and we certainly don't wish to deprive you of your ties. It is wrong of you to be under that misapprehension. We should conduct our discussions on this topic as on others--in a frank and open spirit. We should discuss one underlying topic--how to bring peace with justice for all the parties, naturally including Israel. We supported the founding of Israel and voted for it. We stand by that.

The President: [interrupting the translation]: And many Israel leaders are proud of their Russian background.

Secy. Brezhnev: But even that wasn't our main consideration. We favored Israel as an independent state. If we severed diplomatic relations, it was only as a token of our indignation at Israel's aggression. We are certainly in favor of Israel's being secure as a state, and of joining in giving guarantees.

Chairman Podgorny: Even when the Arabs were overcome by belligerence, when there were utterances that Israel should be liquidated as a state, we said plainly to Nasser that this stand ran counter to our position and our ideology. We told him we favored the constitution of Israel as a state. Nasser withdrew the slogan of the destruction of Israel as a state, and he went on to say he accepted the existence of Israel as a state.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

PRMFA

By KW NARA, Date 5-6-02

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY

10

Secy. Brezhnev: You are right in believing we would participate in providing Israel with guarantees of its secure existence. But at the same time, the other states in the region should have equally strong guarantees against a repetition of aggression.

Both of us have the necessary strength and rights to reach an understanding. We could reach an understanding on what could be our final goals, on what we could come out and say openly. We could reach an understanding on the timing of what could be done. But if we both say we have one general goal but don't want to talk of methods, then the entire thing is placed in doubt.

We made a good agreement at the start to talk in a frank, forthright and honest way. This was a wonderful agreement; it makes for better mutual understanding. In this context, our discussion on this subject has a particular importance. There are in the world today many who are eager to depict the confrontation as not between Israel and Arabs but between the Soviet Union and the US. I'm sure you understand our words. Israel is the aggressor, not the US or USSR. But many seek to depict it as a war between us. If we gloss over this, Israel will stay in the shade, and the whole question of the Security Council Resolution will be clouded over, but there will be a cold war and confrontation between our two nations.

On the position of the Soviet Government, let me say a couple of words. Comrade Podgorny signed a treaty with Egypt. It was not a military treaty but a treaty of friendship and collaboration. There is no clause calling for military intervention. This is the best reflection of the true position of the Soviet Union.

We should talk with frankness and forthrightness. We should talk about where we want to go. The physical registering [of our accord], of course, is another matter. The political position in the US is clear, and we are perfectly willing to take electoral circumstances in the US into account.

Our position in the Middle East is not offensive. As you know, the [formal] time limits of the ceasefire have long since passed without any firing. That was not without our influence.

Chairman Podgorny: We've urged restraint on all countries.

Chairman Kosygin: The restraining position taken by the Soviet Union is the basis of the whole peace.



DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

PRMPA

By KW NARA, Date 5-6-02

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY

11

The President: Let me remind you frankly of the method I think we ought to follow. It is okay to write this down, but it could be very embarrassing to others in our government.

Secy. Brezhnev: We won't write it.

The President: It is okay to write it; it is important in order to understand it.

First, the ceasefire was a public operation. But actions since then in the public forum have been a miserable flop. I don't mean that our Secretary of State and Assistant Secretary of State Sisco haven't worked hard, but this issue is so inflamed, it will not be settled by debating it in the UN and by each side's firing verbal broadsides at each other and exchanging papers. What we must do is continue to have these public movements, to cool the situation as much as possible, and to avoid the breaking of the ceasefire.

But, to be very frank, the way the issue will be settled--and that's why we have this meeting, is for the US and Soviet Union privately and with discretion to use their influence to bring the parties together to make a settlement. We must be careful because both sides, Israel and the Arabs, are very sensitive if they feel the big powers are seeking to impose a settlement.

But putting it cold turkey, if you continue to help the UAR and we continue to help Israel, there won't be a settlement; there will be a war. And we know that while we aren't directly involved, it will involve us. In 1967 it required Mr. Kosygin to come to the UN.

What I am prepared to do is this: I am prepared to have Kissinger as my special representative. He knows more about it than anyone else. Let me be very candid. We talk about religion. Kissinger is supposed to be Jewish--but he's an American. I'm a Quaker, but I know you think I am warlike. As an aside, between our friends on the Soviet side, I'm a Quaker first, like my mother. The point is that Kissinger has the total confidence of the Israeli government and the Israeli Ambassador who Dobrynin knows is very influential with the Israeli government. I propose that Kissinger and Dobrynin talk in the special channel on the basis of your paper and our paper, to see if we can set a time. By September, after the conventions are over--at the latest by September--we can try to get to the nutcutting part of the problem. (I don't know if that will translate !\*)

\*Subhedrov translated it literally (do neckalivaniya orakhor)

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

PRMFA  
By KW NARA, Date 5-6-02

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY

12

Dr. Kissinger: The question is whose are being cut.

The President: By then, if we have something, Kissinger can come here, or Gromyko can come to the U.S. I think the achievement of a settlement is of the highest importance.

It may be necessary to take two bites of the apple--one in September, one afterward. The important thing is to get a general understanding in principle on where we want to go.

Let me add one other thing. I consider the matter so important that if the General Secretary and his colleagues want to send a message to me, I will discuss it directly with Dobrynin--if it's a matter that requires my attention.

Candidly, we can't settle it before the election, but after that we can make progress, in a fair way.

Secy. Brezhnev: Mr. President, I and my colleagues have listened with great attention to all you have said. We agree it is important to reach an understanding on time limits on when we can reach certain things and do certain things. The questions of form and methods too are important. It is also important that you are prepared to look personally into it whenever it is required.

But there is another important matter. You say we should make efforts to bring both sides together. That is correct in general. But we should have clear in our minds what are the principles on which there shall be a solution. If we don't, we won't know where we want to go. If we do have agreed principles, then it doesn't matter if we have to wait several months before taking certain steps. We can wait some months, then act vigorously. Also, of course, whatever we do, the bedrock foundation of what we do should be the decision of the Security Council. Otherwise the sides might never agree.

Chairman Podgorny: This is especially necessary in view of the tense situation in the area, where tensions may some times get out of hand.

Secy. Brezhnev: Of course, apart from the basic principles, it is necessary also to meet the concern of both the Israelis and Arab states for their security; that is we should also look at some point into the way the security of all states can be guaranteed. This can

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

PRMMA

By KW NARA, Date 5-6-02

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY

13

all be overcome. We can consider demilitarized zones, UN personnel, guarantees secured by the Security Council or the great powers. So if we succeed in giving guarantees as strong as that . . . But these are all details we shouldn't talk about now, not until we reach agreement on basic principles.

[Dr. Kissinger is called out of the room.]

The President: The best procedure is this. We can't decide it now. We will work on the problem through the Kissinger-Dobrynin channel, and contacts directly to the extent they are desired, and try to find a solution.

Secy. Brezhnev: Mr. President, can you tell us three--we can kick the others out to smoke outside--what are the basic principles of a settlement? To secure complete confidence, we can put the interpreter in prison for a year in a comfortable cell!

Dr. Kissinger: [returning] May I interrupt? It is a problem about SALT about the signature. [The President and Dr. Kissinger confer.]

Secy. Brezhnev: Kissinger always has to throw another complicated problem into your lap.

Dr. Kissinger: It is a problem about the signature of the Treaty.

Secy. Brezhnev: Dr. Kissinger agreed with us to have the signing tomorrow.

Dr. Kissinger: Our problem is that the delegation may not get here until 8:00 p.m. Mr. Gromyko was wondering whether to have the signing after the dinner.

Chairman Kosygin: They haven't left Helsinki yet?

Dr. Kissinger: Mr. Gromyko is checking now.

Chairman Kosygin: Part of the problem is TV coverage.

The President: No. The damn delegation has a piston plane, which takes 2-1/2 hours. Television is all the same. It is not prime time in any event.

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PRMFA  
By KW NARA, Date 5-6-02

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14

The President: I have an idea to suggest to the General Secretary. You know we had moved the dinner back an hour. If convenient, we should move the dinner to where it was in the first instance, 7:30, and then immediately after dinner, drive back here for the signing.

Chairman Podgorny: Right.

Secy. Brezhnev: Agreed.

For. Min. Gromyko: So far it's not the text that's being handed over to the Press, just the announcement.

Secy. Brezhnev: Then in the toasts we make, we could say that agreement has been reached.

The President: We could say that because of that we are making the toasts very brief.

Chairman Kosygin: Will you be reading your toast?

The President: No. We'd better go. Could we meet again Monday?

Secy. Brezhnev: Yes. We have our draft of today's announcement of these meetings.

Sukhodrev: [reading] "On May 26, talks continued in the Kremlin between L. I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the CC CPSU, N. V. Podgorny, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, A. N. Kosygin, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, and Richard Nixon, President of the USA. They concluded the discussion of the question of strategic arms limitation and agreed to sign the agreement on that question. There was also an exchange of views on certain international problems. As at previous meetings and discussions, the exchange of views proceeded in a constructive businesslike atmosphere."

The President: Fine.

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By KW NARA, Date 5-6-02

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Date: May 26, 1972  
Time: 7:15  
Place: US Embassy, Moscow

Subject: Conversation Between the President  
and Chairman Podgorny

In a conversation with Podgorny just before dinner, Podgorny pointed out the high quality of Soviet vodka, brandy, and wine and champagnes and said that while some private commercial attempts had been made to import these into the United States, due to the inexperience of his people in international trade, most efforts have come to nothing. He pointed out that if an effort were made, these Soviet products could be imported into the US and the Soviet Union would use the total of the proceeds from their sale to buy US grain products. Thus, there would be no foreign exchange loss for the US involved in these transactions.

Drafted by: Wm. D. Krimer, Interpreter, ACDA  
May 27, 1972



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PRMPA

By KW NARA, Date 5-6-02

SECRET/NODIS

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Date: May 26, 1972  
Time: 7:15 - 7:20 p.m.  
Place: US Embassy, Moscow

Subject: Conversation Between the President  
and Chairman Kosygin

In a brief conversation with Kosygin just before dinner, Kosygin told the President that both sides had reached complete agreement on the lend-lease matter, including a schedule of payments and the principal amount, but that the United States insistence on 5-1/2% per annum would increase the total amount of repayment from \$500 million to \$914 million, almost \$1 billion. He said that he could not in good faith report to his Council of Ministers (of whom there were about 90) and justify such a high figure. He stressed that he would not want to pressure the President, that if this problem was not settled during the current meeting, the Soviet Union would not be the loser. In fact, it might be possible that this loan would continue to be carried on the books of the US for some ten more years but eventually it would be written off just like the debts of the Czarist Russian Government had been written off. The President said he would discuss this matter with his advisors and that we would do what we could.

Drafted by: Wm.D. Krimer, Interpreter, ACDA  
May 27, 1972





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E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

CRMPA

By KW NARA, Date 5-6-02

SECRET/NODIS

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Date: May 26, 1972  
Time: 7:30 - 9:30 p.m.  
Place: US Embassy, Moscow

Subject: Dinner Conversation Between the  
President and General Secretary  
Brezhnev

Yugoslavia

During a conversation on the heavy workload faced by the President and Brezhnev, the President asked about Tito's forthcoming visit to Moscow. Brezhnev said that he expected Tito here for about five days in June. The President asked about the general political situation in Yugoslavia and asked Brezhnev for his views on who might be Tito's successor. Brezhnev replied that while the situation was somewhat complex, he believed Kardelj appeared to be coming to the fore.

Hungary

The President inquired as to the current economic situation in Hungary. Brezhnev pointed out that Hungary was a small country with few natural resources, almost none except for bauxite. He said that Hungary's industry and economy had been structured to take this fact into account. Thus, Hungary produced telephone equipment, refrigerators, medical equipment and apparatus and pharmaceutical products. While they were facing some difficulties, the trade with both COMECON and the Western countries was on the increase and the overall economic situation was good.

Poland

The President inquired as to the economic situation in Poland and the whereabouts of Gomulka. Brezhnev replied that Gomulka was living in retirement and went

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2

on to say that the Polish leadership under Gomulka had evidently made some serious mistakes in that they raised prices of a wide spectrum of consumer goods by substantial amounts. This had led to popular dissatisfaction and to dissatisfaction within the leadership which in turn had led to Gomulka's retirement.

### China

The President asked Brezhnev what he thought about Mao. Brezhnev replied that Mao had assumed the stature of a living god, had completely removed himself from public view and Brezhnev recalled that Mao had not made any public statements for the past approximately fifteen years. All one could hear was, "Mao said." As for succession, after the death of Lin Piao, no one appeared to be in sight other than Chou En Lai and he pointed out that Chou En Lai was getting on in years. He recalled an occasion a few years ago, at a time when Chou En Lai was under heavy supervision by Mao. Mao had attached trusted people of his own to Chou En Lai's office, and on one occasion it had been reported to Brezhnev that after Chou had stated the official position of his country on a certain problem, one of these trusted Mao men by the name of Kang Sheng had taken the floor to say that Chou had meant to say the following. He then proceeded to say the exact opposite of what Chou had stated as his country's position. Chou deferred in silence. This indicated the control Mao had exercised over Chou at that time. All in all, Brezhnev repeatedly referred to himself and the President as Europeans and said that it was very difficult for Europeans to really know what was going on in the minds of the Chinese leadership. He scoffed at the so-called cultural revolution, recalling such features as public beheadings before thousands of people and dozens of "camps" where people were being "re-educated."

The President remarked that China was a factor that both our countries would have to continue to deal with because of its large population and potential.

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3

Brezhnev said that the Soviet Union was maintaining some sort of relations with China, that in recent times trade had been increasing, and economic delegations were visiting each other's countries, but overall relations were not what they should be.

FRG-GDR UN Membership

Brezhnev inquired about the prospects for membership of the two German states in the UN. The President replied that the initiative as far as we are concerned would have to come from the Federal Republic, that we would follow its leadership in this respect. Brezhnev remarked that the issue was becoming more topical now that China had been admitted to the United Nations with US support. He thought it was time for the two Germanies to increase their activities in the international arena. As for his relations with Brandt, he remarked that they were businesslike and constructive, although for certain reasons (Brandt's being a Social Democrat) the President would understand that Brezhnev's party position made the situation somewhat difficult for him.

Brezhnev Visit to US

The President said that by the middle of next year the Vietnam problem would have disappeared. The relationship between our two countries would undoubtedly have improved as a result of the accords reached at this summit meeting; and it would be good if Brezhnev could visit the US sometime during the month of May or early June of next year.

Brezhnev said that he would very much like to visit the US and while there would like to see as much as possible. The timing of his visit suggested by the President appeared to be good. He would want to avoid hot weather.

The President suggested that Brezhnev might stay in Washington for two or three days, then visit Florida, the mountains in Colorado and go on to California, the President's home state. He repeated that May would be a particularly suitable time because the weather in Washington later on would be too hot.

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4

Brezhnev said he thought that as a result of the improved relations between our countries he believed his visit would meet with favorable response among the people of the United States.

The President assured him that he need not worry about demonstrations; demonstrators were always with us, but we knew how to handle them and he was sure that Brezhnev would have a good reception. He suggested that they explore the issue further through the private channel between them. Brezhnev agreed.

In this connection the President remarked that the Great Alliance during World War II had been particularly effective because of the direct contacts maintained between Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin, and said he believed he and Brezhnev should also keep in touch with each other by use of a private channel. This would contribute to the development of the relations between our countries. Brezhnev agreed.

#### North Korea

The President asked Brezhnev if he had visited North Korea. Brezhnev replied that he had done so many years ago, but also had met Kim Il Sung in Vladivostok once and had received him on state visits to Moscow three times. The President remarked that North Korea appeared to be taking a more reasonable course in recent times and Brezhnev agreed that this was so.

#### Political Advice

Brezhnev said that seventeen years ago a leading statesman of his country, still living today, who had been both Head of Party and Head of State had advised him as follows: In view of Brezhnev's then beginning political ascent, he had stressed to Brezhnev the importance of establishing good personal relations with political and government leaders not only for political reasons but also for successful diplomatic activity. The President agreed this had been wise advice.

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5

World War II

In connection with the President's visit to Leningrad the next day, Brezhnev said that the Piscarev Cemetery there still had a strong emotional impact on him personally. This was a result of the fact that he had been on the front lines from the very first day of war until he finished by participating in the victory parade in Red Square. For this reason he still could not read novels or view films dealing with the war with equanimity. He was an emotional man in this respect, although in political matters he could be hard as iron.

SALT

The President and Brezhnev both expressed their great satisfaction that agreement had been reached and that the treaty and agreement would be signed at 11:00 p.m. tonight. The President remarked that this was just a first step, a beginning, and that by the time Brezhnev visited the United States next year there might be a follow-on agreement to sign at that time.

Drafted by: Wm. D. Krimer, Interpreter, ACDA  
May 27, 1972

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

**SECRET**

-2- MOSCOW 5041, MAY 27 (SECTION 1 OF 2)

FOR THE "CONFERENCE ON EUROPEAN SECURITY." THE SECRETARY SAID THAT WE FEEL THE CSCE MUST BE PREPARED CAREFULLY AND WE CANNOT TAKE PART IN IT UNTIL 1973 IN VIEW OF OUR ELECTIONS. WE CAN, HOWEVER, PARTICIPATE IN A MULTILATERAL PRELIMINARY CONFERENCE IN LATE NOVEMBER. WE HAVE NO OBJECTION TO INCREASED BILATERAL TALKS IN THE INTERIM BUT BELIEVE THAT THERE IS NO POINT IN TRYING TO HOLD THE PRELIMINARY CONFERENCE BEFORE THE LATTER PART OF NOVEMBER BECAUSE OF UPCOMING ELECTIONS IN SEVERAL COUNTRIES INVOLVED, INCLUDING OUR OWN.

SUBSEQUENTLY IN THE CONVERSATION, GROMYKO ASKED WHETHER WE HAVE IN MIND EARLY 1973 FOR THE EUROPEAN CONFERENCE. THE SECRETARY SAID THAT IT IS PREFERABLE TO WAIT TO SEE HOW THE PRELIMINARY CONFERENCE GOES AND THAT IN ANY CASE THE TIMING IS SOMETHING FOR ALL PARTICIPANTS TO DECIDE.

GROMYKO INQUIRED AT WHAT LEVEL THE SECRETARY EN-VISAGES THE CONFERENCE. THE SECRETARY REPLIED THAT THE CSCE ITSELF WOULD PRESUMABLY BE AT THE FOREIGN MINISTER LEVEL. GROMYKO ASKED WHETHER WE HAVE IN MIND A HIGHER LEVEL MEETING FOLLOWING THE CONFERENCE OF FOREIGN MINISTERS. THE SECRETARY INFORMED HIM WE HAD NOT BEEN THINKING IN THOSE TERMS. GROMYKO THEN ASKED ABOUT THE BRITISH VIEW ON THE FORMAT OF THE CONFERENCE AND WAS TOLD THAT THE BRITISH ARE FLEXIBLE AND APPARENTLY WOULD ACCEPT EITHER THE U. S. POSITION (A SINGLE MEETING OF FOREIGN MINISTERS) OR THE FRENCH POSITION (TWO MEETINGS OF FOREIGN MINISTERS). GROMYKO PRESSED AS TO WHETHER THE U. S. WOULD SUPPORT A HEADS OF STATE MEETING. THE SECRETARY REPLIED THAT THIS IS NOT RULED OUT, BUT HE FEELS WE WOULD PROBABLY NOT SUPPORT IT. THIS IS ONE OF THE SUBJECTS WE CAN TALK ABOUT IN HELSINKI. HE ASKED WHETHER THE SOVIETS ARE THINKING IN THESE TERMS. GROMYKO ANSWERED THAT HIS GOVERNMENT IS WEIGHING ALL POSSIBILITIES. A HEADS OF STATE MEETING IS NOT EXCLUDED -- IT COULD BE A GOOD IDEA.

THE SECRETARY GAVE GROMYKO OUR DRAFT COMMUNIQUE LANGUAGE ON CSCE (ATTACHED). GROMYKO REA IT WITHOUT COMMENT, THEN RETURNED TO HIS EARLIER QUESTION AS TO

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-3- MOSCOW 5041, MAY 27 (SECTION 1 OF 2)

WHETHER WE CAN HAVE A PRELIMINARY EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON THE CSCE. THE SECRETARY AGREED THAT WE CAN, BUT POINTED OUT THE NECESSITY OF OBTAINING THE VIEWS OF OTHER PARTICIPANTS, SINCE WE MUST NOT MAKE IT LOOK AS IF WE ARE IMPOSING A DECISION ON THE OTHERS.

THE SECRETARY REQUESTED GROMYKO'S VIEWS ON THE TOPICS TO BE DEALT WITH IN A CSCE. GROMYKO SAID THAT ANY QUESTIONS COULD BE DISCUSSED, THEN LISTED THE FOLLOWING WHICH THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT CONSIDERS DESIRABLE:

- GENERAL IMPROVEMENT OF RELATIONS (POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND OTHER) AMONG THE EUROPEAN COUNTRIES.
- TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY (I.E., STATUS QUO), THE INVIOABILITY OF BORDERS (E.G., AS IN THE FRG-USSR TREATY).
- NON-APPLICATION OF FORCE IN RELATIONS AMONG EUROPEAN COUNTRIES.
- IMPROVEMENT OF ECONOMIC RELATIONS.
- TECHNICAL AND SCIENTIFIC COOPERATION.
- CULTURAL RELATIONS.

THE SECRETARY COMMENTED THAT, AS THE PRESIDENT HAD SAID, IT IS IMPORTANT FOR THE CONFERENCE TO HAVE CONCRETE RESULTS. IT SHOULD NOT AIM JUST AT CREATING AN ATMOSPHERE, ALTHOUGH THAT HAS OSOME VALUE. HE AGREED THAT THERE SHOULD BE PRINCIPLES GOVERNING RELATIONS BETWEEN STATES, SO LONG AS THESE APPLY UNIFORMLY. WE CONSIDER THE FREER MOVEMENT O PEOPLE, IDEAS AND INFORMATION IMPORTANT. HE NOTED THE REFERENCE TO MUTUALLY ADVANTAGEOUS CONTACTS IN THE WARSAW PACT STATEMENT AND SAID HE ASSUMED THAT IT REFERRED TO SUCH MOVEMENT. ENVIRONMENT IS ANOTHER IMPORTANT TOPIC.

GROMYKO OBSERVED THAT ENVIROMNET SHOULD BE INCLUDED AND ASKED HOW WE FEEL ABOUT A PERMANENT ORGAN ESTABLISHED

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-4 - MOSCOW 5041, MAY 27 (SECTION 1 OF 2)

BY THE CSCE. THE SECRETARY SAID WE NEED TIME TO THINK ABOUT THIS. GROMYKO EXPLAINED THAT HE WAS NOT PROPOSING AN ORGANIZATION WITH A LARGE PERMANENT APPARATUS, BUT MERELY A CONSULTATIVE ORGAN. THE SECRETARY SAID WE HAVE NOT EXCLUDED THIS POSSIBILITY, BUT WE HAVE QUESTIONS ABOUT IT. NEW ORGANIZATIONS TEND TO GROW LIKE THE UN AND RESULT IN MUCH TALK AND LITTLE ACTION.

GROMYKO THEN ASKED ABOUT THE TERRITORIAL QUESTION AND RENUNCIATION OF FORCE. THE SECRETARY OBSERVED THAT RENUNCIATION OF FORCE IS FINE, BUT IF ONE TALKS ABOUT BORDERS, ONE MUST ASK WHICH BORDERS, SINCE WE DO NOT CONSIDER IT APPROPRIATE TO BE INVOLVED IN TERRITORIAL DISPUTES. GROMYKO SAID THEY ARE THINKING OF TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND THE INVIOABILITY OF BORDERS AS A PRINCIPLE, NOT WITH SPECIFIC APPLICATION TO BORDER DISPUTES.

DOBRYNIN ASKED WHETHER THE SECRETARY MEANT IN HIS EARLIER COMMENTS THAT THERE IS NOTHING TO TALK ABOUT UNTIL NOVEMBER. THE SECRETARY REPLIED THAT WE ARE PREPARED TO HAVE BILATERAL CONVERSATIONS, BUT FOR THE REASON HE HAD STATED, WE FELT MULTILATERAL CONSULTATIONS SHOULD NOT BEGIN UNTIL LATE NOVEMBER.

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THE SECRETARY REFERRED TO THE PRESIDENT'S REQUEST THE PREVIOUS DAY FOR OPTIONS AS TO HOW WE MIGHT PROCEED WITH MBFR. HE SAID WE REGRETTED THAT THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT HAD NOT SEEN FIT TO RECEIVE BROSIO AND WONDERED IF WE COULD NOT START EXPLORATORY TALKS BY DESIGNATING SOMEONE TO CONDUCT THEM. GROMYKO ASKED WHO WOULD DESIGNATE THE REPRESENTATIVE, AND THE SECRETARY REPLIED THAT, SO FAR AS OUR SIDE IS CONCERNED, NATO WOULD. GROMYKO SAID THAT IN THAT CASE THE SITUATION WOULD BE THE SAME AS WITH BROSIO: THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT WAS OPPOSED TO BROSIO BECAUSE HE REPRESENTED A GROUP. THE SAME WOULD BE THE CASE WITH ANY OTHER NATO REPRESENTATIVE. THE SECRETARY OBSERVED THAT THE ONLY WAY TO AVOID HAVING A REPRESENTATIVE OF GROUPS IS TO USE THE ENTIRE INTERESTED GROUP, THAT IS HOLD A CONFERENCE.

GROMYKO ASKED WHETHER THE UNITED STATES COULD DESIGNATE A REPRESENTATIVE WHO COULD SPEAK FOR OUR GROUP. IT IS DIFFICULT FOR THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT TO DEAL WITH A REPRESENTATIVE WHO REPRESENTS A BLOC OR AN ALLIANCE. MENTIONING FRANCE, HE NOTED THAT SOME OTHER COUNTRIES HAVE THE SAME OPINION. HE REALIZES THAT DEVELOPMENTS MAY OCCUR IN THE NEGOTIATION OF FORCE REDUCTIONS IN SUCH A WAY THAT GROUPS MAY FORM. BUT THE SOVIET UNION REMAINS OPPOSED TO BLOC-TO-BLOC NEGOTIATION IN THE JURIDICAL SENSE.

THE SECRETARY SAID HE SEES NO OTHER WAY TO APPROACH THE QUESTION SINCE THE UNITED STATES CANNOT LEAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT IS MAKING PLANS FOR OTHER COUNTRIES. GROMYKO SAID THAT BREZHNEV TOLD THE PRESIDENT YESTERDAY THAT WE CAN PERHAPS EXCHANGE VIEWS ON

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TELEGRAM

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-4- MOSCOW 5041, MAY 27 (SECTION 2 OF 2)

CONCERNED AFTER THE SIGNATURE OF THE FINAL QUADRI-PARTITE PROTOCOL ON BERLIN. THE TWO GOVERNMENTS AGREE THAT THE CONFERENCE SHOULD BE CAREFULLY PREPARED IN ORDER THAT IT MAY DEAL IN A CONCRETE WAY WITH SPECIFIC PROBLEMS OF SECURITY AND COOPERATION AND THUS CONTRIBUTE TO THE PROGRESSIVE REDUCTION OF THE UNDERLYING CAUSES OF TENSION IN EUROPE.

ATTACHMENT NO. 2.

COMMUNIQUE LANGUAGE FOR MBFR  
(PRELIMINARY DRAFT)

RECOGNIZING THAT THE MILITARY SITUATION IN EUROPE HAS BEEN RELATIVELY STABLE FOR THE PAST SEVERAL YEARS, AND THAT THIS SITUATION HAS FAVORED THE DEVELOPMENT OF RELATIONS BETWEEN EAST AND WEST, THE TWO SIDES ADDRESSED CURRENT ASPECTS OF MILITARY SECURITY IN EUROPE. PARTICULARLY, THEY DISCUSSED FURTHER CONTRIBUTIONS TO STABILITY AND SECURITY THAT COULD BE ACHIEVED THROUGH THE RECIPROCAL REDUCTIONS OF FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE. ANY AGREEMENT MUST BE CONSISTENT WITH THE PRINCIPLE OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY FOR ALL PARTIES.

THEY AGREED THAT, SUBJECT TO THE CONCURRENCE OF THEIR ALLIES, EXPLORATIONS LOOKING TOWARD NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD BEGIN AS SOON AS PRACTICAL BE. IF THEY ARE NOT INITIATED SOONER, EXPLORATIONS COULD OPEN CONCURRENTLY WITH INITIAL MULTILATERAL TALKS PREPARATORY TO A CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE. DISCUSSIONS ON FORCE REDUCTIONS COULD INITIALLY CLARIFY THE VIEWS OF BOTH SIDES ON KEY ISSUES, INCLUDING A WORK PROGRAM FOR NEGOTIATIONS COVERING SUCH MATTERS AS GENERAL GUIDELINES AND COLLATERAL CONSTRAINTS, AS WELL AS ASPECTS OF REDUCTIONS.

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:

Andrei A. Gromyko, Minister of  
Foreign Affairs  
Georgi M. Korniyenko, Chief of  
USA Division, Ministry of Foreign  
Affairs  
Mr. Shevchenko (Interpreter)

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger  
Winston Lord, Special Assistant to  
Dr. Kissinger  
John Negroponte, NSC Staff Member

PLACE:

St. Catherine's Hall  
Grand Kremlin Palace  
Moscow

DATE AND TIME:

Saturday, May 27, 1972  
4:30 - 6:00 p. m.

SUBJECT:

Vietnam

Dr. Kissinger: I wanted to ask a question. Are you under the impression that perhaps we could make a joint statement on Vietnam?

Foreign Minister Gromyko: We would prefer it that way.

Dr. Kissinger: How would you visualize it?

Foreign Minister Gromyko: I don't have any idea yet. Today I spoke on the phone with the General Secretary and he said it would be very good if in the continuation of the talks with the President you could express any additional considerations. He said it would be very good to have something joint in the Communique and that we should express

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thoughts common to both sides. Well, if we don't succeed in getting a joint statement in the Communique then certainly each side will have to make a unilateral statement on substance because we will have no other way out.

Well, could you perhaps clarify whether you could make something that would facilitate a political solution of the question, taking into account the complexities in light of the real situation on the ground in Vietnam? Do you have any possibilities to make political steps which might facilitate the situation? We have the impression, especially as a result of contacts with the Vietnamese, that the most acute question for them now is the political question, the question of power in South Vietnam. And we came to the conclusion that they agree now -- at least it's our conviction -- that during a certain period there should be a coalition government. Secondly -- as you are well aware -- they also agree to the neutrality of South Vietnam as a result and after the settlement of the question of the withdrawal of American forces.

All these ideas are probably known to you, and I think they contain great potentialities.

Dr. Kissinger: Why?

Foreign Minister Gromyko: Well, I think it's because it's not a matter of indifference to you what the political and international status of South Vietnam will be -- that is, whether it will be neutral or not. Of course, if you are indifferent then that is another matter, but it is my opinion that it should be of interest to you. But, of course, you know better.

Everything you are going to tell me, if you are prepared, I will report immediately to Comrade Brezhnev, because he said he would be most attentive to your considerations.

Dr. Kissinger: First, with respect to the last point, the neutrality of South Vietnam is in principle acceptable to us, and we have some ideas as to how it can be brought about. So that is not an issue between us and North Vietnam. That is a positive idea.

Secondly, with respect to the political problem, I believe your leaders are under a misapprehension about what North Vietnam has asked from us. Your leaders seem to be under the impression that it is only the

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matter of the personality of Thieu. That is not the case. What North Vietnam proposes is this. Thieu has to resign; what they call his machine of repression has to be dismantled and Vietnamization must stop, which means American economic and military aid must cease. In other words, the U.S. would side with North Vietnam in forming a three-segment government of peace, independence and neutrality. But only they know who meets these criteria. They won't tell us. So the objective consequence of their proposal would first be that the government resigns, the political machinery is disbanded, outside support ceases. Under these conditions, the only organized political force in South Vietnam has to be the PRG. We interpret their proposal as a demand that we turn power over to them. I am being very candid.

The big problem is that the North Vietnamese are heroic people and personally very attractive people. On the other hand, they will not rely at all on the historical process. They want everything written down and today. In our relations between the Soviet Union and U.S. the most significant thing is that we started. We've signed some agreements. I think the evolution is even more important than the agreements. If North Vietnam were wise -- I'm being candid -- it would make an agreement with us now and not haggle about every detail, because one year after the agreement there would be a new condition, a new reality.

For example, last year, on May 31, 1971, we proposed in a private meeting withdrawal of American troops over a nine-month period in exchange for a ceasefire and prisoners of war. They said, no, we must overthrow Thieu too. Suppose they had accepted our withdrawal then. Don't you think they might be better off today? Do you believe we can go back in after U.S. forces are withdrawn?

So they never look at the political dimension created. They ask us what as a great power we cannot do. We cannot overthrow the people we have worked with over eight years. You wouldn't do this. We won't do it. We are prepared to start a political process, without a guaranteed outcome, but which has possible outcomes. Why should we invest all American foreign policy in one little corner of Asia, out of which we are withdrawing anyway?

When I saw Le Duc Tho on May 2, he had no new proposals, he had nothing at all. They brought upon themselves these consequences. We have no interest in defeating them. From a long-term historical view

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4

we have an interest similar to yours. We want a strong Southeast Asia strong enough to stand on its own feet and not a vacuum there. That is our interest. Therefore the major problem is to get the war ended without all the conditions written out in every last detail. This is my analysis of the situation.

If you analyze our political proposal of January 25th -- and I know what the North Vietnamese said -- but it involves the U.S. withdrawal of American forces in a short period of time and President Thieu would withdraw one month before the election. He also said publicly on three occasions that once peace is achieved he would withdraw from public life altogether.

For. Min. Gromyko: Who said that?

Dr. Kissinger: President Thieu said it publicly. The last time was three weeks ago.

Mr. Korniyenko: But after a settlement.

Dr. Kissinger: After a settlement. But he would resign before the election. So it's at least theoretically possible to put these two proposals together. Speaking aloud -- this is not a formal idea -- the primary thing now is to get the war ended so that will create a new political reality.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: So you have no new considerations?

Dr. Kissinger: I don't have anything very specific this evening to propose except to call to your attention some features of our old proposals on which we can build.

For example, the electoral commission would have all parties represented including the PRG. We are prepared to listen to new political proposals from the DRV except the one they have made, which is too one-sided.

For. Min. Gromyko: Well, I presume that so far today you have no new proposals which could be brought to the attention of the Vietnamese.

Dr. Kissinger: That is correct. I have no specific proposals.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: The situation is rather strange, I should say. You would like, as the President and yourself said, to end the war

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5

and withdraw American troops, but on the other hand, you resolutely oppose a political solution under the conditions that the situation will be settled not under the presence of American troops but by the Vietnamese themselves. So you don't want such a situation. Your idea on Thieu and the machinery under his control is to have them preserved for an indefinite period of time. You know our position on Thieu. I will not use strong language. The Vietnamese oppose a situation where this regime would be maintained through foreign assistance and foreign troops. If your position is to settle the situation, your military steps don't correspond. I think there is a certain inconsistency on that point. If the President and the American government decide to leave Vietnam do you not have enough resolution to see that this is done? Why should every effort be made to preserve the Thieu regime? That is the question.

Dr. Kissinger: Are you finished?

For. Min. Gromyko: Yes.

Dr. Kissinger: The situation is even more curious because we do want to leave but the North Vietnamese are trying to keep us there to blackmail us into overthrowing the Saigon government. If the issue were only withdrawal of American forces, it could be settled very quickly. It is their position on political conditions that makes it difficult.

After we withdraw, a number of conditions exist. First of all, we would be prepared to limit military aid to South Vietnam after our withdrawal in proportion to the aid the North Vietnamese receive from their allies. Or if they are not prepared, we would be glad to agree directly with you about limiting aid to the area so North Vietnam does not have to put themselves on the same level as Saigon under the conditions of peace. I have difficulty understanding, if North Vietnam is so self-confident, why it insists that we overthrow the political structure of South Vietnam for them. Why must we do it?

For. Min. Gromyko: That is not quite correct, I think. You say they would like to make you overthrow the South Vietnamese government. But we believe their position is not like that. They would like you not to support the regime and not to take any steps for the artificial continuation of its acts, [a government] which has no popular support. That is our opinion.

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6

Dr. Kissinger: There is no sense in debating. I would point out that they have armed one million of their own people, and if there were no support at all this would be a very dangerous course.

For. Min. Gromyko: Well, I don't think so and you have hardly convinced me that the Vietnamese wholeheartedly fight for Thieu. Why is Thieu so necessary for the U.S. that the U.S. is prepared to continue the war in order to preserve his regime? Of course, it is for not only a question of Thieu himself, but rather the regime he represents. Is it for this reason that you like to have the war continued, you keep troops in Vietnam to shed blood? Don't think I'm talking you into something. We are seeking an objective analysis and conclusions from that analysis, and since we are now engaged in negotiations, it is advisable to share our views.

Dr. Kissinger: Mr. Foreign Minister, the issue to us is not the preservation of any particular government. The issue is that we cannot cooperate with those whom we have fought for eight years to help them achieve their objective against people with whom we have cooperated. We are prepared to adopt a position of neutrality toward political life in South Vietnam. We are not prepared to move from a position of support for one side to, in effect, a position of support for the other side. This is the dilemma. We are willing to withdraw military forces; we are willing to stop military operations. And we are prepared to reduce aid if the war stops; we are prepared to reduce aid if our opponents are willing to reduce aid. This would then leave the struggle to the Vietnamese. If North Vietnam had accepted our proposal of last year they would objectively be in a much better position today.

For. Min. Gromyko: Could you tell in a nutshell your point of view? Your program? How do you see an end to the war, taking into account the present circumstances?

Dr. Kissinger: I can see two approaches. One, the overall approach we made in January, which I want to interpret to you from our point of view. It is this. We would agree to a ceasefire and withdrawal --

For. Min. Gromyko: Of your troops?

Dr. Kissinger: All our forces. Simultaneously, we would agree to certain principles of a political settlement -- the neutrality of South Vietnam, abiding by whatever political process the Vietnamese themselves

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7

agree upon. While these details are being worked out, we would already start withdrawing our forces from the time of the agreement in principle. One month before the elections, Thieu would resign.

Now, North Vietnam says in this proposal we tried to separate military and political issues. We are trying to keep Saigon from having a veto on our withdrawals. We are prepared to support no candidate. We will abide by the outcome of the political process, and we are prepared to see a South Vietnam with a policy of neutrality.

That is that program. I personally believe if the DRV were creative it would have great possibilities.

But if they don't want a political settlement on this basis, a comprehensive settlement, then let us agree on a ceasefire, let us agree to exchange prisoners of war, and we would withdraw all our forces, and let them work out a political solution with the South Vietnamese. We would then guarantee, except for economic and military aid, to keep our hands out of it; we would be neutral in the political process. We would be prepared to go either road. We are prepared to hear reasonable proposals from the other side.

If I could say a personal note, Mr. Minister, you have dealt with me for several years. I believe we are difficult negotiators, but we are honest and have always kept our word. We have never tricked you, or anyone else. We would not trick North Vietnam. If we would, then the fighting would start again. That is not in our interest.

All we ask is a degree of time so as to leave Vietnam for Americans in a better perspective. They want everything simultaneously. This is the dilemma that faces us. I believe they have worsened their situation as a result of their actions. We had no intention of increasing our forces; we had every intention of pulling out this year more and more. We had no intention of such massive operations. They are worse off now objectively in our view. Had they accepted terms last year, they could have had a good chance to prevail now.

Least of all do we wish to trick you. We have an interest in dealing honestly over a long period with you. We do not want to embarrass you.

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8

For. Min. Gromyko: It is clear that the Paris talks have produced no results. We sympathize with success and would do everything necessary for it and are doing so now, but when you come to the political aspects you Americans tried to make everything possible to support and maintain the present regime. Well, suppose you are right. The Vietnamese don't want such a government but prefer, as they say, a more progressive government, one which was left of center, which would ensure political neutrality for the country as far as foreign policy is concerned. But why should there be such a solution in the presence of U.S. forces and why should it involve the presence of the existing regime and even personally President Thieu. Last year, you hinted in Washington...

Dr. Kissinger: When we talked.

For. Min. Gromyko: that there could be a suitable solution and you expressed certain thoughts regarding Thieu and the transitory period...

Dr. Kissinger: [interrupting] that he would resign in a transitory period.

For. Min. Gromyko: Well, the term "resign" was not used. You admitted he wouldn't be in power during a certain transitory period.

Mr. Korniyenko: There would be some kind of interim government, not just a commission.

Dr. Kissinger: I was thinking of our proposal that he resign one month before the election and an interim government takes his place. That was what I had in mind.

For. Min. Gromyko: [continues interpretation from interruption.] But the way you put the question now I don't think is acceptable to the Vietnamese. Is it worth, in order to achieve political aims, continuing the war, maintaining troops in Vietnam and destroying cities? Perhaps some plans could be advanced on your part. I don't know. I think your side has ample political resources not put into operation yet. Maybe you know better. We don't know if you are going to bring this into the open.

Dr. Kissinger: Of course.

For. Min. Gromyko: Our wish... if you have any ideas for political

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9

steps which could facilitate a political solution, that acute and serious matter. If there is anything for the USSR to do, at least you should not prevent us from making any positive steps to bring about an end to the war. If during your stay in Moscow there are any additional steps, any proposals at any time, I will transmit them to the General Secretary. I don't know if President Nixon and the General Secretary will have an opportunity to discuss the matter again. If you have any ideas, I would be glad to meet you anytime.

Dr. Kissinger: I can assure you we are not interested in new military bases in South Vietnam or any particular government in South Vietnam. That is not our principal objective. We will honor whatever political change that comes about as a result of the South Vietnamese political process and not as a result of our direct actions.

We have therefore tried to get the North Vietnamese to understand they should work with us in developing a political process of this kind. We believe if we, together with them, declare that our common objective is a neutral South Vietnam, that the U.S. will remain completely neutral in the political contest in South Vietnam, that the U.S. accepts the outcome of any election, that the U.S. is prepared to limit its economic and military aid, and is prepared as part of an agreement to accept whatever political process emerges, we believe that this creates a new political reality in South Vietnam by the simple fact of these declarations.

I must tell you that their dealings with us are impossible. They have wasted 13 meetings with me. I am not sure all our ideas are the best ones. You remember our dealings on Berlin and we made efforts. They never do. Even this week on SALT, a much easier problem, we had many differences and advanced various solutions before a settlement. We never had serious negotiations with them. There are two problems. One is procedural, how to talk seriously, and the other is what we are trying to accomplish. We have two objectives: first, withdrawal; second to develop a political process which gives every political force a chance to express itself, and let the political process shape the future, whatever happens.

Now the North Vietnamese say this was done in 1954 and they were tricked. They are probably right. On the other hand, if you and we can guarantee a settlement. . . . We are a different government and any possible [U.S.] government's attitude would be different. We are not like Dulles. We are not looking for an excuse to go in. We are attempting to establish an important relationship with you. We are not looking to trick you.

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10

For what purpose? We are stuck now because the North Vietnamese are too unimaginative or inflexible to solve the political problem. That's the dilemma. They cannot win by their present offensive. In the process the whole international atmosphere is being poisoned. If you and we are going to quarrel about something it shouldn't be about our area where we are withdrawing anyway.

For. Min. Gromyko: Have you any contacts along any channel?

Dr. Kissinger: We told you we were ready to meet on the 21st. I don't know if you got an answer. I think the best procedure is for Le Duc Tho and me to meet honestly for once, without any papers, and just talk about how to work out a program for settlement. I would work seriously and honestly with him. As long as there is progress in the private channel, then we can assemble plenaries again.

For. Min. Gromyko: Suppose we say... The first question I anticipate from the North Vietnamese is, if there is a private meeting, what is Mr. Kissinger going to tell us? Just what he already said in Paris? What should we [the Soviets] say? "Their [the U. S. ] position is known. They will probably say one thing or another. We don't know if they have something new to say." It is not so easy for us just to convey this to the North Vietnamese. Of course, we may, but that is up to you... for example, if we could say we were told such and such things and there are better prospects.

Dr. Kissinger: If they would once be prepared to consider that I am not coming to these negotiations to maintain any particular government. Maybe we don't have the right imagination. I come there to develop a fair political process. I am not saying our proposal is the fairest. It is a strange area for us. I know their proposal is very one-sided. The question is why can't they be patient for awhile and let things develop a little more slowly. Their impatience to get everything at once has the objective consequence of getting nothing. Counting on our domestic collapse won't happen. You met the President. He won't yield to political pressure. Where will they be next year?

For. Min. Gromyko: If you met Le Duc Tho, what would happen?

Dr. Kissinger: I will make a serious effort to see if we can find a new approach. If they said to me, all right, we will try to find a political process for everybody, then there would be a chance for talking seriously, to look at various possibilities. Our proposal is not an ultimatum. If we talk, I will talk with them in a forthcoming spirit and with the



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11

attitude of finding a fair and rapid conclusion. That would be my intention. They are a great people and we have no interest in humiliating them.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: They may ask us, well, how about the official negotiations?

Dr. Kissinger: It is not in our mutual interest unless there is some understanding as to what will happen. We could go and make an announcement here. If after two or three meetings the plenaries break down, then we will be accused of having been tricked by you, and the situation would worsen. We see no sense in official meetings until there is a framework.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: Suppose there is an unofficial meeting. Will you tell them something new, or just what you told them before? Maybe it's not right to ask; it's just for our orientation.

Dr. Kissinger: The trouble is I would try to come up with some new approach to the same objective. The difficulty is that we have already made so many proposals with no response.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: There are no limits to good things.

Dr. Kissinger: If you sat opposite us and we said you had not been concrete because you had not accepted our eight points, there would be little discussion. Something must be put in by the other side for meaningful negotiations. For example, suppose we met last November or January about our eight points. If we went over our proposals point by point, there would have been many possibilities -- in any negotiation you get a qualitative change by accumulating a series of nuances. It is not a good negotiating technique to demand a qualitative change as a first step. They keep making demands. Unilaterally, it is very hard to do anything enormous.

We will certainly look at your program with the attitude of seeing what could be done to bring about a rapid conclusion.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: The first question is if we can inform them that if they met with you what will you tell them? Or perhaps even a more modest question: would you have anything new at all or not? If we could say as far as we know there was nothing new, but we don't exclude the possibility that there is grounds for talking. We think it would be best if we could say that we have grounds for believing that there is something new. Of course, we would not negotiate this, we would say this is to be discussed between you and the Americans.

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Dr. Kissinger: Let me ask you this. Is it totally excluded that you could explain your negotiating experience with us to them? You must have formed some opinion about their attitude toward us and tactics. Is it totally excluded you could tell them that you have had this experience with the Americans? Why not try our system for awhile. It is a very un-Leninist approach to insist they must have everything right away. You had some difficulty in trusting me at first, which is natural.

For. Min. Gromyko: How would you formulate your thoughts which in your opinion we would convey to them with reference to our conversation?

Dr. Kissinger: Let me think about it overnight to be precise.

For. Min. Gromyko: Every word has a certain significance.

Dr. Kissinger: How did we settle the Berlin question? We decided among ourselves to try to settle within a certain time frame. Then we decided on this approach: You do something on access and we will do something on Federal presence. I have a difficult problem trying to tell you about precise proposals. Once the approach was settled, we could think concretely. Le Duc Tho and I, if we follow this process, would have enough to talk about. We should make a work program. What do we have to have? What do they have to have? We have never done this. We gave them proposals and they gave us proposals.

For. Min. Gromyko: An exchange of speeches.

Dr. Kissinger: If they say here is something we must have, we would do all we could; it's better than giving you proposals.

For. Min. Gromyko: You never analyzed the points with them in detail?

Dr. Kissinger: Not really in this way. Last summer we were close. I gave them some points, very abstract and always somewhat theoretical.

For. Min. Gromyko: May I ask you about Thieu? When are you ready to withdraw Thieu in relation to the withdrawal of your troops?

Dr. Kissinger: We have never said we are ready to secure his withdrawal from the political picture. He has said he would resign one month before the election. In addition, he has said publicly that once a peace settlement is attained, he would withdraw altogether. Whether these two positions could be put together in one realistic formula would remain to be seen.

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For. Min. Gromyko: What about timing? There is a distance between now and complete withdrawal of U.S. troops. Somewhere in that time there is the removal of President Thieu. At what point will this happen in terms of your proposal?

Dr. Kissinger: In terms of the proposal we have made this could occur as early as five months after signature of a statement of principles, depending on how quickly they agree on a political process.

For. Min. Gromyko: The duration of the withdrawal of your troops?

Dr. Kissinger: It was six months. Now it is four months.

For. Min. Gromyko: That means Thieu would resign one month after your withdrawal.

Dr. Kissinger: Those were the terms of the January proposal; it was in their context of our comprehensive proposal, their agreeing to an election.

For. Min. Gromyko: Before the election.

Dr. Kissinger: He would withdraw.

For. Min. Gromyko: But what is the period between the election and his withdrawal?

Dr. Kissinger: Our proposal said one month before the election but that is negotiable.

For. Min. Gromyko: What about the composition of the government between his withdrawal and the election, in concrete terms, as far as this is possible?

Dr. Kissinger: Under our proposal, as the South Vietnamese constitution provides, the caretaker government would be headed by the President of the Senate.

For. Min. Gromyko: It would be a working government?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes.

For. Min. Gromyko: Formed by whom? There would still be the presence of Thieu. This is an important point.

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14

For. Min. Gromyko: Who would prepare the elections?

Dr. Kissinger: An electoral commission in which the PRG, Saigon Administration, and other forces in the country would have equal representation. And the election commission is very close to a government of national concord proposed by the PRG. Therefore, one possibility is to give more power to the electoral commission and therefore give a de facto status in some areas to the national concord idea. It is a complex system but both sides have to adjust to existing realities.

For. Min. Gromyko: My impression sometimes from the President and Dr. Kissinger, the official position of the United States is that it is impossible to leave Vietnam to some kind of Communist or Socialist government. This by itself throws a shadow on statements. Is your main preoccupation the character of the government?

Dr. Kissinger: That is a good question when it is posed by reasonable people. What we mean is that we will not leave in such a way that a Communist victory is guaranteed. However, we are prepared to leave so that a Communist victory is not excluded, though not guaranteed. I don't know if this distinction is meaningful to you.

For. Min. Gromyko: Until now our view is that your main preoccupation is to prevent the establishment of a regime you don't like politically. Later maybe you could face this.

Dr. Kissinger: There is no question that is true. Our position is we want a political solution which does not guarantee a Communist victory, but also, we emphasize, that does not exclude it.

For. Min. Gromyko: That is official?

Dr. Kissinger: You can communicate this to the North Vietnamese.

For. Min. Gromyko: On the basis of official American statements, the U.S. main preoccupation is to do all in order to preclude the possibility of a government not liked by the United States. That makes it more difficult.

Dr. Kissinger: It is an absurdity to pretend we would not prefer it if Communists would not win in South Vietnam.

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For. Min Gromyko: That is another matter.

Dr. Kissinger: But you have faced many situations in the world where Communist parties would not prevail and you put limits on your intervention. This is the issue we are talking about. In case of the solution of the war, the policy would be to encourage whatever political process is agreed upon but not to exclude North Vietnamese or a Communist or Socialist forces from having a measure of power.

For. Min. Gromyko: If you think there is anything new, let us talk again.

Dr. Kissinger: Let me think. We will meet again tomorrow anyway on the communique.

For. Min. Gromyko: If there is a need, probably we can discuss the Middle East and Vietnam. Anyway on the Middle East we would like to talk briefly.

Dr. Kissinger: Tomorrow.

For. Min. Gromyko: Tomorrow. On the Middle East we are, frankly speaking, discouraged.

[At this point Mr. Gromyko left the meeting for about five minutes to take a phone call.]

For. Min. Gromyko: You have already published the treaty and the agreement.

Dr. Kissinger: I am very embarrassed. I will have to look into it.

For. Min. Gromyko: I just talked to Comrade Brezhnev. He asked my opinion. I said we would have to publish the treaty. I don't know about the protocol. I'll let you know.

Dr. Kissinger: We will let Mr. Korniyenko know, I am embarrassed. I didn't know there was an agreement not to publish.

Mr. Korniyenko: You suggested that we publish everything at once all at the end, as an enclosure to the Communique.

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16

Dr. Kissinger: We could still in any event publish them all together. There was a confusion. I don't know how it happened.

For. Min. Gromyko: Tomorrow we will discuss the Middle East and Vietnam.

Dr. Kissinger: We will see if there is anything more concrete. You contact me and let me know when you are ready.

For. Min. Gromyko: Maybe we should set it now.

Dr. Kissinger: Suppose we meet at 11:00 on the Middle East and Vietnam? What about Monday -- will there be a plenary?

For. Min. Gromyko: It depends on concluding the negotiation. There will be a plenary unless you wish to have a more narrow meeting.

Dr. Kissinger: Good. I shall miss the Foreign Minister when we leave Moscow.

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Andrei A. Gromyko, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR  
 Anatoli F. Dobrynin, Ambassador to USA  
 Georgi M. Korniyenko, Chief of USA Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
 Mr. Bratchikov, Interpreter

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President  
 Helmut Sonnenfeldt, NSC Senior Staff Member  
 Winston Lord, Special Assistant to Dr. Kissinger  
 John D. Negroponte, NSC Staff Member  
 Peter W. Rodman NSC Staff Member (notetaker)

DATE AND TIME: Sunday, May 28, 1972  
 10:45 a.m. - 1:00 p.m.

PLACE: Conference Room - Foreign Minister's Office  
 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Moscow

SUBJECTS: Communique (briefly at beginning); Vietnam

The Communique

Dr. Kissinger: We thought we would have a quick run through of the communique.

For. Min. Gromyko: Soon the communique will shine like a diamond. Polishing and polishing . . . .

Dr. Kissinger: We agree to put into the European section, unless you object, the phrase "inviolability of frontiers."

For. Min. Gromyko: Good, very good.

Dr. Kissinger: Here is the retyped version [Tab A]. But we recommend writing in on page 10 to make it "principles of territorial integrity and inviolability of frontiers." I was just talking to the President. This is why I was delayed. In view of the importance you attach to it. We thought it was the right thing to do.

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- 8 -

Dr. Kissinger: I notice Pravda has clipped me out of the picture twice. I'm very angry. My father will be angry.

Mr. Korniyenko: You should try to get more to the center.

Ambassador Dobrynin: You stand too far to the right!

Dr. Kissinger: Always.

Ambassador Dobrynin: You are too modest.

Mr. Lord: An unlikely hypothesis.

Dr. Kissinger: Mr. Lord will enjoy unemployment this summer. He will meet his family.

So, the Communique will be unsigned and the Principles will be signed. They will be released at the same time.

For. Min. Gromyko: Right.

Vietnam

Dr. Kissinger: So now let us take the easy matters.

For. Min. Gromyko: We have a Russian proverb: Morning is wiser than evening.

Dr. Kissinger: When I came here once in 1967 for a scientific conference, I told what I thought was a Russian proverb. Someone came running for help: "Vladimir is stuck in the mud up to his ankles!" He was asked why is that so alarming? The answer was, "He dived in head first." Is that Russian?

Ambassador Dobrynin: No, it's just an anecdote.

Dr. Kissinger: Now we discuss. . . .

For. Min. Gromyko: How to end the war.

Dr. Kissinger: Exactly. That is the principal question.

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- 9 -

For. Min. Gromyko: I would like to hear as far as possible to go. [sic] Full progress -- what should be done first, then second, and the inter-connection. Please be as specific as possible. A matter of prestige should not be as important for the US, a big country. For us in such matters we discount this aspect. It should be the same with you.

Dr. Kissinger: I understand this point about prestige. But let me pick up the discussion.

First we believe that a useful first step would be if North Vietnam and we on a private basis could have the sort of discussion we have never had. As I told you before, we would be prepared to have it in Moscow. That is if we could say honestly to each other what we must have immediately and what we could have over a period of time. Then we could work out concrete progress.

The overwhelming problem is to distinguish matters which can be settled immediately and some to be left to an historical process. Some problems solve themselves if you don't force them to a resolution. You can create objective conditions. If you analyze our specific proposals in terms of precise present conditions, they have one meaning, and they mean another thing, in terms of other conditions. It is possible to interpret our political proposal as meaning we want to preserve the present government at all costs. It is also possible to interpret them as meaning we want a military solution alone. And once we have gone, there are new objective conditions.

We are not committed to maintaining a particular government in South Vietnam at all costs for all eternity, as the President said. We do not exclude that other political forces will play a large role. For this reason, while we are prepared to discuss a political solution, this will take a longer period. Therefore our basic idea as expressed by the President on May 8, to concentrate first on a ceasefire, is the best solution. I know the North Vietnamese are not interested. But we would be prepared as part of a ceasefire to state with the North Vietnamese some point principles for the political future of South Vietnam, for example:

- that ultimately South Vietnam should be neutral.
- that the U.S. will remain neutral with respect to the political process.

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- 10 -

-- that the U. S. is prepared to define certain limits to its military and economic assistance as part of an overall settlement.

Fon. Min. Gromyko: Please repeat the last one.

Dr. Kissinger: The U.S. is prepared to define certain limits to its military and economic assistance as part of an overall settlement. In other words, we are prepared to set some limits.

Fon. Min. Gromyko: What does military assistance involve?

Dr. Kissinger: To us, military assistance means delivery of supplies, not military operations. In other words we believe the best way to proceed is to have a ceasefire, an exchange of prisoners, and withdrawal of American forces -- together with a statement of principles on the objectives of a settlement.

Fon. Min. Gromyko: And the sequence with respect to the ceasefire and exchange of prisoners?

Dr. Kissinger: They should be simultaneous.

Fon. Min. Gromyko: So the exchange first.

Dr. Kissinger: Well, we could relate the exchange to the withdrawal of forces.

Fon. Min. Gromyko: At the completion of withdrawal.

Dr. Kissinger: Well, I would have to check. There is some flexibility.

Our judgment is that such a procedure would create new political realities. It would remove our military forces, it would commit us to a certain political evolution without being specific as to the composition, and it leaves the South Vietnamese to settle the political issue. We would be prepared to participate in the solution on the basis of these principles, but if we want to bring a rapid end to the war, this is the way to do it. If we talk about the political composition, we will talk until the end of the year.

Fon. Min. Gromyko: Could you be more specific with respect to the present President and government machinery? And elections?

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11

Dr. Kissinger: This approach I have given here is not specific. If we wanted a more comprehensive settlement, we could have elections, say, six months after the signature of the final document. President Thieu would resign one month before the elections. The elections would be run not by the government but by the electoral commissions. The electoral commissions would begin functioning on the day the agreement is signed, or immediately thereafter.

On these commissions each of the parties will be represented. It will have a three-part character, with the PRG, other elements, and the government.

Fon. Min. Gromyko: So, one-third for each.

Dr. Kissinger: Well, we would like to leave open the exact composition because we have not studied it. But the three-part part is established. These commissions will have responsibility for ensuring free elections, and should be given those functions necessary to ensure the freedom of the elections.

One month before the elections, Thieu and his Vice President will resign. This is our idea. In addition we are prepared to bring about an international guarantee to ensure that these commissions have the ability to assure freedom. We are prepared to join with you and other countries to ensure this. So the electoral commission is not dependent totally on the existing structure.

Fon. Min. Gromyko: What kind of international supervision?

Dr. Kissinger: Suppose we agree on an international commission. We are prepared to have an international presence in Vietnam to ensure that the commission can operate freely.

Fon. Min. Gromyko: In what form?

Dr. Kissinger: Composed of countries to which both sides agree. We are prepared to discuss it with you; we do not exclude a significant role for the socialist countries.

We believe that the combination of our withdrawal, the public declaration of principles, plus the imminent resignation of Thieu all combine to produce new political conditions to ensure a freer evolution of political life in

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12

South Vietnam -- and the more rapidly it is done the more this is true.

Fon. Min. Gromyko: About your latest measures. The mines, etc. Is it correct to suppose that the abolition of all this will be first, before a cease-fire?

Dr. Kissinger: It will be simultaneous with the ceasefire. As soon as all these are agreed, we will stop military operations.

Fon. Min. Gromyko: Not before.

Dr. Kissinger: Not before. The first step after a ceasefire. And we are prepared, as soon as a ceasefire is signed, to help sweep the mines or at least give advice on how to do it.

Fon. Min. Gromyko: In a ceasefire, do you provide for the possibility of no formal agreement or an "in-fact"? Must it be solemn and formal?

Dr. Kissinger: At the moment, we are thinking of a formal one. I am thinking out loud: we cannot accept delphic assurances of the ambiguous type the North Vietnamese specialize in -- but if we received a formal assurance from you, that is something we would take extremely seriously. It depends on the form, but we do not exclude it.

We prefer a formal agreement. It is easier for us, and we think that is what we should aim for.

Fon. Min. Gromyko: What is the place for a transitory [sic] coalition government?

Dr. Kissinger: Of course, in some respect the electoral commission represents a form of coalition.

Fon. Min. Gromyko: Of course it is limited to the election.

Dr. Kissinger: But for a month before the election, there is only a caretaker government. We do not exclude a coalition emerging from the election.

Fon. Min. Gromyko: Before the election, it is a commission.

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13

Dr. Kissinger: But before the election, we do not exclude giving the electoral commission a somewhat greater role. It would be better if left somewhat vague. But that is a subject for more precise negotiation. I am giving you only a perspective now.

Fon. Min. Gromyko: The international status of the government, neutrality. At what point would it be expressed?

Dr. Kissinger: I repeat, at the ceasefire, the U. S. is prepared to state certain principles. One is that the government that emerges from the process will be neutral.

Fon. Min. Gromyko: Only the U. S. Government? That is one-sided.

Dr. Kissinger: We are prepared to say it can be agreed by all parties. The way we are phrasing it is "a foreign policy in accordance with the 1954 Geneva Accords." As we said,

- (1) The U. S. will support no candidate and remain completely neutral in the election.
- (2) The U. S. will abide by the outcome of the election and of any other political process the South Vietnamese devise by themselves. We will state this unilaterally.
- (3) The U. S. is prepared to define its military and economic relations with any government that exists in South Vietnam as part of an over-all settlement.

We are prepared, together with these unilateral principles, to propose that South Vietnam and the other countries of Indochina should adopt a foreign policy consistent with the 1954 Geneva Accords, and secondly, that reunification should be decided by North and South Vietnam without outside interference. This is from Madame Binh's 7 points. I think they will accept their own point.

I repeat, Mr. Foreign Minister, they will of course be suspicious.

Fon. Min. Gromyko: The Vietnamese?

Dr. Kissinger: The North Vietnamese. I sometimes say they are more afraid of being deceived than of being defeated. I can only say that if we gave

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14

you these assurances, we would face the consequences of not only deceiving them but of deceiving you, with whom we are trying to start a new relationship.

Secondly, any observer of the American scene will confirm that the U. S. is not looking for excuses to reenter Indochina. Therefore the problem is to find ways to create new political conditions.

Fon. Min. Gromyko: Which elements of what you have said are unknown to the Vietnamese?

Dr. Kissinger: The explanation is unknown, the rationale of what we are trying to do, is unknown to them. They know only the formal points. Secondly, we have never related our political proposals to our May 8 proposal. We have never related the ceasefire to the political process of May 8 before.

Fon. Min. Gromyko: Separately, but not in interdependent form.

Dr. Kissinger: Another new element: we are prepared to have the release of POWs related to the withdrawal.

Fon. Min. Gromyko: Now, release and troops, completion of one and completion of the other.

Dr. Kissinger: Right. But the beginning of the process should be simultaneous.

Fon. Min. Gromyko: From the movement of the signing of the agreement.

Dr. Kissinger: Right.

Fon. Min. Gromyko: On the calendar, say, June to October.

Dr. Kissinger: By the end of October, all our forces would be out, and all our prisoners would be released. Of course, if we begin in June, it all slips by a month.

Fon. Min. Gromyko: May I ask, is it possible for you to meet officially? Maybe it is a matter of prestige. They are a small country. Suppose they are reluctant for an informal meeting, why not make this officially first? If official, then it is made easier.

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15

Dr. Kissinger: First, the North Vietnamese have a tendency to give the impression they are doing us a great favor to meet privately.

Fon. Min. Gromyko: Maybe you are right. But it is only a part of this matter of prestige.

Dr. Kissinger: They always say they are meeting with a spirit of goodwill. I ask how this is manifest; they say by coming here. Therefore I don't consider it a concession.

Secondly, if there is a public meeting without any assurances of what will happen, it is exactly foreseeable what will happen: after two or three, we will walk out again.

Fon. Min. Gromyko: You miss one thing. You cannot negotiate that way. It is almost unpalatable for your vis-a-vis to agree beforehand what the outcome will be. They are a small country. Even a small country cannot accept preconditions for a meeting. The Ivory Coast, Guatemala.

Dr. Kissinger: Our condition is not that they accept what we propose but that they discuss what we propose. They put forward 7 or 9 points and refuse to discuss anything else. It is they who impose conditions. They say, be more concrete. What does "more concrete" mean? It means to accept their 7 points.

Fon. Min. Gromyko: Suppose we tell the Vietnamese of our discussion here in Moscow, and we decide both sides' proposals will be discussed. Suppose we say the only precondition of the Americans is that their proposals should not be excluded from the discussion. If they are told both sides are free to submit . . . .

Dr. Kissinger: They never refuse our right to submit them, they refuse to discuss them. They say the only correct solution is the 7 points of the PRG and the two amendments of February.

Fon. Min. Gromyko: But you did it the same way, perhaps, but without the gestures?

Dr. Kissinger: No, there are some of theirs we can accept. The way to negotiate seriously is to put ours next to theirs and see what can be reconciled.

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16

Fon. Min. Gromyko: But what matters is the outcome of the meeting. Suppose they are polite and the form is good.

Dr. Kissinger: May I make a counterproposal? Let them be impolite and be willing to discuss our 8 points! There should be a real negotiation.

Fon. Min. Gromyko: What if they reject discussing your proposals but out of the discussion something emerges that reaches an understanding? It should be discussed, but the matter of prestige and form is disproportionate.

Dr. Kissinger: That isn't the issue. In 149 meetings, nothing serious has happened, neither procedure nor substance. I understand their strategy -- which has now failed. They are trying to bring such a sense of hopelessness in the U. S. that it will undermine the President in the U. S. They want to use the plenaries to create the impression of total deadlock and to generate tremendous pressures on us to yield. But it is too late for that now.

Fon. Min. Gromyko: For 27 years the U. S. and USSR exchanged notes and messages with plenty of "eagles" [hawks?] and with West Germany. But suddenly the treaty is reached. Each note had plenty of "eagles." Why do you exclude that?

Dr. Kissinger: But the big difference is that there is a war going on. If we have a ceasefire, we would be delighted to negotiate for 27 years on the political future.

We cannot tolerate any longer that they are directing their entire policy against the domestic structure of the United States. It is not prestige but substance.

Fon. Min. Gromyko: You exaggerate, to say it is directed against the Presidency as an institution and the domestic structure.

Dr. Kissinger: If there is a possibility of serious negotiations, if you said to us that on the basis of these considerations -- not that they accept every detail -- but that this framework is of interest to them, then we are prepared to resume.

Fon. Min. Gromyko: What if at the meetings both sides are free to submit proposals? Don't take every statement they take seriously.

Dr. Kissinger: When we were in Moscow in April, we accepted your proposal not to make this a question of prestige. There were two plenaries



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17

and a private meeting. They used the plenary -- after pressing for six weeks -- to make a statement they could make unilaterally but which the plenary gives them a forum for. Then at the private meeting, they only read the published text of the two points. I asked if there was anything new. They insisted on them in the private meeting in the form of an ultimatum. I would have preferred -- I will tell you my strategy -- that they had something new. They didn't think we would take strong military measures. They wanted to create the impression of deadlock, to create pressures in the U.S., to repeat 1968. You know, if you want to keep negotiations going it is easy to offer something to create the right impression -- you can always say you have something to explore. They were determined to break up the meeting on May 2.

Fon. Min. Gromyko: This is all in the past. What if we could tell them the Americans are ready to take part in the full meeting but only if both sides' proposals can be discussed?

Dr. Kissinger: If they want to settle quickly, the private sessions are the best. The White House is in the best position to do it. We are the party to talk to. We give Porter his instructions. It is not just more authority, but we are more flexible than the bureaucracy can possibly be, and I hope more farsighted.

I am not looking for an excuse to break up the private meetings but to keep them going.

Fon. Min. Gromyko: If official meetings take place, it is much easier then to have a private meeting.

Dr. Kissinger: Why?

Fon. Min. Gromyko: It is a matter of prestige. It is easier for you to give way.

Dr. Kissinger: No, you are wrong. Right now the meetings are suspended. We are in a defensible position. If we meet again and nothing happens, we will be under fire. We will be criticized in the U.S. for having missed an opportunity, etc. Last year, we were attacked for six months. We are in a good position. It is a matter of protecting our public position, not just prestige. We will negotiate if they give us some perspective.

If they are serious, why don't they say they are ready to talk privately? We will go immediately to the plenary sessions.

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18

Fon. Min. Gromyko: It stops on the same spot. We cannot understand that: "Tell us in advance that you are serious." To us it is tantamount to saying they have to accept your position first.

Dr. Kissinger: We are not asking that. We are asking for a private meeting to discuss what the plenaries will discuss.

Fon. Min. Gromyko: I hope you don't mean in advance of the meetings.

Dr. Kissinger: They don't have to agree to our proposal. Just an approximate agenda should be agreed to, and an approximate procedure. Then we would go to a plenary.

What is your opinion?

Fon. Min. Gromyko: Formalization creates additional difficulties. I would say to them, first, of what you said yesterday and today. With respect to official meetings, the Americans are ready having in mind that the two sides are free to submit suggestions and both sides' suggestions will be considered and discussed. Under such conditions the U.S. agrees. This is what we would say. In our opinion, we think if you have an official meeting -- it is difficult to imagine it is not possible -- a more favorable opportunity would be created for the closed meeting as well.

Dr. Kissinger: I absolutely reject the proposition that we have to pay any price for a private meeting.

Fon. Min. Gromyko: It is not a price.

Dr. Kissinger: It is more of a sacrifice for me. If they are interested in settling the war quickly, the most efficient method is to discuss with me privately.

Fon. Min. Gromyko: Let us not talk about the unofficial, only the official.

Dr. Kissinger: What do you think their position is?

Fon. Min. Gromyko: On the basis of their statements, we have the impression that they consider that their proposals will be the basis of discussion. The idea of both sides having equal status has not entered their ideas. This would be something important. There will be light.

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19

Dr. Kissinger: Last time, after my visit to Moscow and after our agreement to resume the plenaries, there was a great statement from Hanoi that this was a great victory for the progressive forces, and defeat for the U. S.

Fon. Min. Gromyko: Suppose you were "defeated"? A "great victory" undermining the U. S. !

Dr. Kissinger: This is an impossible procedure. If we accepted this framework -- could we agree that neither side will claim a victory and both sides will say publicly that the purpose of the meeting is to discuss the positions of each side?

Fon. Min. Gromyko: To agree on this.

Dr. Kissinger: I am just pessimistic.

It is impossible for them to win militarily, it is impossible for them to accomplish their domestic objectives in the U. S., it is impossible for them to succeed in this negotiating strategy. Moreover, they will be worse off in November, after the election. What we are asking is no ultimatum. We ask only that we discuss it with them in the most efficient forum, in the only forum where we can talk and rapidly and where we are alone with them. It is hard to discuss the replacement of the Government in a forum with that government.

With respect to the plenaries, we ask first that they stop using them for propaganda and second, that they seriously examine our proposals and we will seriously examine theirs.

Fon. Min. Gromyko: Whose position is propaganda is a matter of opinion. Who is the judge?

Dr. Kissinger: You will presumably communicate our proposal to them.

Fon. Min. Gromyko: But we want a ray of light.

Dr. Kissinger: Obviously if there is any chance, we are eager to negotiate. We want to negotiate seriously in an efficient forum.

Fon. Min. Gromyko: Can we say we have agreed with the Americans that they will consider the plenaries if both sides can freely submit proposals and both will be discussed?

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20

Dr. Kissinger: Can you explain to me. Why are they so eager for the official meetings?

Fon. Min. Gromyko: I can't say with 100% certainty.

Dr. Kissinger: But you must have an idea. You must have thought about it. For three and a half years there have been plenary meetings and not one issue has been settled.

Fon. Min. Gromyko: Why is it so important? Why do you insist on this?

Dr. Kissinger: Because the breakup of the meetings will be a serious political fact.

Fon. Min. Gromyko: But it is you who break up the meetings.

Dr. Kissinger: They will barrage us with ambiguous statements. Last year I saw Le Duc Tho on June 26 and he had 9 points. Four days later they published their 7 points. All summer long they kept attacking us publicly for not responding to their proposals, five of which we had already accepted. We had constantly to defend ourselves before Congress and the newspapers. You never did this when we negotiated on Berlin or anything else.

Fon. Min. Gromyko: Suppose we contact them, in a positive form, that if you agree to attend the official meetings, they would agree that each side's proposals will be discussed. If both sides' ideas are discussed in the meeting, the problem of strings attached is taken care of.

Dr. Kissinger: How can we avoid the problem we went through before?

Fon. Min. Gromyko: They will answer in the course of the meeting. This interval is being used for thinking, by them and by you. How can you say in advance what will happen?

Dr. Kissinger: It is one thing if they said to us, we want to settle quickly; then it is only a question of efficiency -- how to do it most effectively. That's one way. But if they make out of the fact of the meetings itself another political confrontation, that is another matter. Frankly, their strategy has failed. They cannot win militarily. They cannot defeat us politically, and we will be in a stronger position after November. That is our assessment. We want to settle the war. We have no interest in its continuation. We have

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21

no permanent interests [involved], and it hampers our relations with you and other countries.

One aspect of the plenaries -- if we resume them and fail, we will be attacked in America for having been fooled again by you. As your Ambassador knows, this happened last time. I don't believe we were fooled, but it is one of the criticisms that were made. I believe you were sincere. Why would you have an interest in doing something that will be found out in two weeks?

[The President called Dr. Kissinger and there was a ten minute break, from 12:45 - 12:55 p.m.]

Dr. Kissinger: We have now solved the problem of how to mention Mr. Brezhnev in the speech.

We believe the war must be ended rapidly. And therefore we have no interest in delaying the negotiations. But we have had a difficult experience. Vietnam is more difficult for us than Berlin is for you because Vietnam is an active major concern to many Americans day in and day out. I can assure you that as soon as North Vietnam indicates it is willing to settle, we will move -- the Ambassador tells me "generously" is a bad word in Russian -- in a forthcoming spirit.

Let me repeat my view, which I have to check with the President: If the other side confirms that both sides' programs will be discussed -- and if they do so in a way that gives us confidence, we don't exclude a return to the plenaries. There are provisos. If they are determined to make propaganda statements, I tell you frankly -- they must choose between dealing with our public domestic situation, with our opponents, or dealing with the Government. If the former, it is unacceptable. If the latter, we are prepared. If they attempt to create pressures, we will deal with the pressures. If they keep quiet for a few weeks, a return to the plenaries is not excluded -- especially if the assurances come through a government we take very seriously, such as yours. Another thing -- last time, as soon as we agreed to a plenary, they started three offensives. This would not be helpful. But we do not exclude the plenaries in the framework we discussed.

[At 1:00 p.m., Mr. Sonnenfeldt, Mr. Negroponte, and Mr. Korniyenko left. After a break, discussion resumed on the Middle East.]

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MEMORANDUM

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Andrei A. Gromyko, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR  
Anatoli F. Dobrynin, Ambassador to the USA  
Mr. Bratchikov, Interpreter

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs  
Winston Lord, Special Assistant to Dr. Kissinger  
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff Member (notetaker)

DATE & TIME: Sunday, May 28, 1972; 1:00 - 2:45 p.m.

PLACE: Conference Room, Foreign Minister's Office  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
Moscow

SUBJECTS: Basic Principles (briefly at beginning);  
Middle East

[This conversation was a continuation, in a more restricted group, of the meeting which had begun at 10:45 a.m.]

Basic Principles

Foreign Minister Gromyko: [Sampling the food on the table]: Down with cheese, long live caviar!

Dr. Kissinger: We should put that into the Principles.

I received more presents from the Soviet Foreign Ministry for my birthday than from the U.S. State Department.

Mr. Gromyko: I will say nothing on the US Foreign Office because non-interference is one of our principles.

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2

Dr. Kissinger: Concretely, how do we proceed now on the communique?

Mr. Gromyko: Verification should take place. Meanwhile, I will show it to Mr. Brezhnev.

Dr. Kissinger: The Principles are essentially agreed.

Mr. Gromyko: I have some comments on your document on the Middle East. [The US draft, "Basic Provisions for a Final Settlement," handed to Brezhnev by the President, May 26, at Tab A.]

Dr. Kissinger: Before we get to the Middle East, there is one point I meant to make. On the first page of the Principles it says, "to make every effort to remove the threat of nuclear war." Why only nuclear war? Why not "war"? We have put nuclear war into the second Principle. I recommend we eliminate "nuclear" here.

Mr. Gromyko: The idea is different. They should correspond. It is not repetition.

Dr. Kissinger: But we want to remove the threat of war altogether.

Mr. Gromyko: You said it was a good bridge to the next part.

Dr. Kissinger: Right, that's why we put it into the second Principle. You want to have a conventional war?

Mr. Gromyko: It seems to me it is all right as it now stands.

Dr. Kissinger: I'll talk again to the President. He called my attention to it. If it's a problem I will get in touch with you through your Foreign Office.

Mr. Gromyko: In the second Principle it is your suggestion; maybe remove it there.

Dr. Kissinger: Maybe. Let me check with the President.

Mr. Gromyko: You would prefer to remove it from the Preamble?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes.

Mr. Gromyko: Let's do it tentatively, and I will check.



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Middle East

Mr. Gromyko: Now, may I ask some questions?

Dr. Kissinger: Sure.

Mr. Gromyko: How do you visualize the matter of the sequence of different steps relative to a settlement? We always stressed the importance to approach this in such a way that any final settlement should embrace all matters, and should be interdependent. Frankly, we don't see the possibility of another approach. It is very unrealistic to separate out. It is not just us, but the Arabs feel this way.

The other question, the crucial one, is Israeli withdrawal. You gave a formula, a little more flexible than before, but charged with the same content as before. What do you mean by this? When we speak, we mean withdrawal from all occupied territory. But if, for example, Jordan wants to make small corrections, that is another matter.

The third question relates to the personnel of Israel, observers, presence -- Sharm el-Sheikh and Gaza are the two points mentioned specifically. It creates troubles. The security of Israel is not secured by the presence of troops. I think this proposal is meant -- not intentions but objectively -- it would create obstacles. We think we should take a more objective position on this. In Gaza, specifically, the suggestion is that Israel should take part in the observers; Sharm el-Sheikh is the same.

Jerusalem in fact is excluded from the general settlement because it is said that it is to be negotiated bilaterally between Jordan and Israel. How long will it take? It is not only a matter of interest to Jordan but to all Arab countries. We are not interested in that from the point of view of religion.

Dr. Kissinger: That accusation has not even been made by the Israelis!

Mr. Gromyko: Demilitarized zones can be established by mutual acceptance, on both sides of the border in each case. To be specific, I would like to put a question with respect to the Golan Heights.

Observers of the UN at Sharm el-Sheikh would be all right, preferably limited to a certain period according to a decision of the UN Security Council.

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International guarantees: We stand for the most effective that could be imagined.

The refugees problem must be solved. It may be hard, but if the principal questions are solved, I don't think this will be a bottleneck.

The ceasefire is not a problem as part of the settlement, if an understanding is reached.

The process of negotiations between the sides -- it seems to be meant as bilaterally -- we don't think this will work.

On the last point, the vote of the Soviet Union and the US, when I was in Washington we had a certain idea of working out a basic understanding on principles. We spoke of withdrawal from all territories; no one told me it was unacceptable. To divide all into parts, confidential and public, to take into account your internal situation, including elections -- When I came back and told Mr. Brezhnev, he said it was a good idea to work out. The President here at his last meeting here in Moscow said it is OK to work out, then he made the remark that it will not work.

Dr. Kissinger: To answer the last question first: If we are to proceed on this basis, we have to be scrupulously honest with each other or else it is a complete mess.

I have always told your Ambassador of our contacts with the Israelis. I spoke with the Israelis on the general ideas of a settlement, not about specifics. I did it this way: I said, we are going to the Summit. Each side is free to state whatever problems it wishes. It is probable that the Middle East will be raised. In order to prepare the President, I needed their views. I did not tell them of any specific proposals or negotiations. I just said, if Brezhnev or Gromyko raised a proposal, we would want to know the Israeli attitude. They do not know this proposal, and it would be an enormous embarrassment, to put it mildly, if they found out. I want to make some very special precautions.

The second purpose I have is to elicit from them some specific propositions. The President has to know what they really want in Sinai -- this doesn't mean we will support them -- it probably would be less than they now have. That is, if they say they want half of Sinai, we don't have to start at the Canal. The Israelis have confidence in me, but this does not have Israel's approval.

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5

What is our general conception? This is more important than Israeli approval. You have my complete assurance we won't discuss it with the Israelis unless it is with your advance approval. We may discuss general ideas, with respect to Rogers, etc., but nothing concrete. If they find we are talking concretely with you, they will start a tremendous publicity campaign.

Let me give you our analysis. Candidly, the previous negotiations between you and Rogers and Sisco failed because they dealt with theories, not with what concretely could happen. We expended all our capital debating theory with Israel. Therefore it is better to be as concrete as possible, and relate to events that could in fact occur. In addition to their theoretical nature, the difficulty with previous proposals was that they involved propositions we know Israel would never accept.

Our paper [at Tab A] represents our judgment of what it is possible to impel Israel to accept -- with pressure, but without war. Your paper Israel could be made to accept only with war. The Arabs cannot defeat Israel. Maybe you could. (The Israelis don't accept that.) Therefore we are trying to find a position which -- it would be very difficult -- but which could be possibly made by a cutoff of military aid and other pressures. We will not give Israel a veto over our actions, but we will keep in mind those things that would make them so desperate that they would accept only with a war.

My judgment is they only want to keep about half of Sinai, a good part of the West Bank, and all -- most of the Golan Heights. So this paper, difficult as it may be for you, is very difficult for Israel.

[More caviar was served.]

Mr. Gromyko: My questions are, how to understand.

Dr. Kissinger: Let me continue my analysis for a moment. I understand that it practically will not be possible to separate the problem into parts, but it is intellectually possible to look at it in different ways. I have the impression -- it may turn out to be wrong -- that perhaps the Jordan-Israel part could be settled, even directly. We have not exploited all the possibilities we think we have to promote it, because of our discussions. I have the impression from our discussions that you prefer the Jordan-Israel part to come second or concurrently.

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6

Mr. Gromyko: Very preferable.

Dr. Kissinger: So I put that aside.

The problem of Egypt is more difficult, because of the very strong Israeli security interest. Probably Golan Heights is the most difficult of the three.

Egypt. As I understand the real Israeli position, not the formal one, Israel probably wants about two-fifths of the peninsula and in the form of annexation. This has been made pretty clear to me now. They believe they must have the military possibilities this gives them for their defense. We don't agree to the principle of annexation at all -- except for some minor things, if to make negotiation easier. To them, the position of Sharm el-Sheikh and other territory is quite central. After five months, they finally showed me a map. It was not unambitious.

Our general strategy is to find a possibility perhaps of avoiding the formal territorial issue by dividing the problem into several components: first [dividing] the principle of where Egyptian sovereignty should be legally from where it is exercised, and using some ideas we have, for example the interim settlement as a first step, to be followed by other steps over a long period of time, therefore the idea of security zones.

I recognize the obstacle of this somewhat unilateral definition of security. But once sovereignty is defined, the evolution will be set, and one can visualize the retreat of the Israeli presence across Sinai -- whereas today one sees Israel permanently on the Suez Canal. I see no possibility now of Egypt, even with your equipment, driving Israel back. Should we not therefore try to promote a gradual withdrawal across Sinai?

Mr. Gromyko: Gradually, as provided in a possible eventual settlement.

Dr. Kissinger: Exactly. With provisions with respect to security zones that would last longer than other provisions.

In regard to the Golan Heights, we must be honest. Perhaps we can use ideas from the Egyptian-Israeli settlement, but I know the Israelis won't allow Syria to come up without war.

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7

We would be prepared to work with you to go through these two papers point by point to see what we could agree on, to see if it is possible to work out a process of getting something started and to give it concrete definition.

Mr. Gromyko: Something started in the sense of an agreement, or physical action?

Dr. Kissinger: Both.

Mr. Gromyko: Agreement should take place first.

Dr. Kissinger: Agreement between all parties, or between us?

Mr. Gromyko: Between us, then to convince the parties.

Dr. Kissinger: Total Israeli withdrawal in the sense of an ultimate objective is one thing, but it is not a practical thing without war in the immediate future, in my judgment. This has been my position consistently with your Ambassador since the beginning. We are looking for a way for the Arabs to get in the interim period three-quarters of what they want, and leave one-quarter for later.

Of these points here, many are soluble. Withdrawal and security are tough ones. Refugees, the Canal, demilitarized zones, end to the state of belligerency -- all these are soluble.

Mr. Gromyko: If the Golan Heights are left aside, I don't see how...

Dr. Kissinger: Perhaps the principle of security zones could be adapted to the Golan Heights, in the sense of dividing the issue of sovereignty from some form of military reassurance to Israel.

Mr. Gromyko: Demilitarized zones?

Dr. Kissinger: The Israelis have three or four nahals, they call them, semi-military settlements.

Amb. Dobrynin: How do you visualize this paper? The Minister was in Washington; we would like to work out an agreement with you. But this is more detailed than we talked. Now you split in two parts -- first you begin to recognize the principle of total withdrawal, and second, you

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8

try to divide sovereignty from presence. The second part does or does not imply total withdrawal? Will our agreement be an overall settlement, or an interim settlement that does not include the principle of overall withdrawal? If the latter, it will not be acceptable, you understand. Do you have an idea of the timing? Three to four years? Just to give us some idea.

Dr. Kissinger: I want a stupid Russian Ambassador -- and Minister too. Those are very good questions, Anatol. As for the time frame, I would like to think about it a little more. I can see you cannot go to the Arabs without extraordinary difficulty and say, "You can only get three-quarters." Therefore we have thought of the possible solution of separating sovereignty from security in special areas -- with the expectation that continuation of the discussion of security is almost inherent in the definition of sovereignty.

It is easier to accept the principle of total withdrawal if it is coupled with the security concept in some of the more disputed areas. What the Arabs would get in the immediate future is a very favorable change in the existing situation.

Ambassador Dobrynin: You have no timetable in your own mind?

Dr. Kissinger: I was thinking of withdrawal over the next year or two in the security zones, then in the next years...

Amb. Dobrynin: Security zones is a completely new issue.

Dr. Kissinger: I recognize that.

Mr. Gromyko: Let's approach the matter as follows: we think the separation of one question -- Syria, Jordan -- will not work. The Arabs will not agree; the Soviet Union will not agree. We think it won't work. Second, we think it is difficult and impossible to separate the question of sovereignty from security. It is impossible to agree to the presence of Israeli personnel on any Arab territory. International personnel is a different matter. In your paper, there are two places, Sharm el-Sheikh and Gaza.

On withdrawal, now you use language that is more flexible.

We don't think presence is really a matter of security for Israel. They want a prize. The Arabs and we share this view. A principle is involved.

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9

We are not just a distant observer. We -- and you -- have an interest in principles; that is why we had an agreement on Principles. So it is not just a matter of acceptability or unacceptability to the Arabs. It is intolerable to us to accept the principle of territorial aggrandizement, annexation.

Dr. Kissinger: Let me ask you this. Suppose we do not agree. What do you imagine will happen.

Mr. Gromyko: I don't know, but to a great extent, without its being under control from a distant influence, by the US and USSR, our leaders will go to bed not knowing what the next day will bring. All good things produced from the President's visit will be weakened to a great extent by the course of events, and our relations may be thrown back if war results. I informed Mr. Brezhnev of my conversations in Washington; he said it would be extremely good if we could agree.

Dr. Kissinger: That is our position.

Mr. Gromyko: The President said, "If we two agree, there will be an agreement."

Dr. Kissinger: Of course, I don't believe the President ever agreed to any specific solution. That is why we want to find a solution that can be implemented.

Mr. Gromyko: He said very strongly that, if the United States and the Soviet Union agree, then we will solve it.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, but that didn't mean he was going to agree to total withdrawal as the only possible solution.

But what I am wondering is if it isn't possible for us to start a process that continues. Why is it desirable to the Arabs to have Israel stay everywhere until an agreement is reached for total withdrawal? Why is it not better to start?

Mr. Gromyko: But what will be the end? It is one thing to start from concrete things; it is a different thing to start from the idea that the start should be part of the whole. It may be hard, physically, to take all the steps at the same time. It is quite possible to take one step first, for instance the Canal settlement.

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10

Dr. Kissinger: Over what period?

Mr. Gromyko: That is the subject of the agreement. The question of the duration of the interim settlement is another matter to discuss. The Suez Canal could be one of the first matters to be taken up physically, in practice. But each step should have its place in a worked-out schedule.

Dr. Kissinger: You have any approximate idea?

Mr. Gromyko: It depends on when we can start. Anyway it should be limited to a number of months. Not days, of course, maybe not weeks. We cannot understand Israel one iota. If they say security, security lies through understanding, a political decision. That is security.

Dr. Kissinger: It depends on both.

Amb. Dobrynin: What is our timetable? When the Minister was in Washington, the timetable was the beginning of next year. Then it was the first half of next year.

Dr. Kissinger: If we reach an understanding that we believe can be sold to the Israelis with great pressure - then it doesn't make a great difference. We would have to allow a certain number of months; it is a question of months, not a matter of principle. But if one concludes that there are some issues that can't be resolved immediately but have to be left for later, then it will take a more extended period.

Amb. Dobrynin: With the President, we had an understanding with respect to the first approach, not two approaches.

Dr. Kissinger: I discussed with the Minister only hypothetically how an agreement would be implemented. I did not agree to his proposal so that then the only thing left was implementation. In fact, we then had a long discussion of whether the problem was soluble. I understand what the Minister has in mind - early 1973. If it is possible on that basis, we could reach a substantial accomplishment in 1973 but leave some part for a longer period.

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11

Foreign Minister Gromyko: You mean on the basis of an agreement?  
The last half of 1973?

Dr. Kissinger: I mean to answer Anatol's question about how long  
would the security zones exist. I gave one possible answer.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: How would you summarize, trying to be as  
specific as possible?

Dr. Kissinger: There is some disagreement on the subject of withdrawal,  
partly on the issue of principle but largely on the issue of practicality.  
One way to proceed would be to go through these two papers provision-by-  
provision over the next weeks and months, and when that is completed,  
to see what is left. Another approach is to recognize that there are  
differences on that point. Do we then have to decide that nothing can be  
done? But a substantial part of the withdrawal issue we are agreed upon.  
We could get that done. To change the legal basis of what remains would  
be a major change in the situation.

That is the way it looks to me at this moment.

I do not think war is the solution. It will just exacerbate the situation  
and leave it unresolved.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: Tension too is undesirable.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, it is undesirable, also because it will hurt our  
relations. Though the Israelis will probably not attack, because they have  
what they want.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: Can you exclude war?

Dr. Kissinger: No. War is possible in the Middle East. I agree with you.

We believe that on the great majority of the issues we and you agree.  
We do not care where the Israeli border is; frankly, Soviet security isn't  
affected by where the Egyptian border is. But we can go up to a certain

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12

point in the pressures we could put. I can assure you this paper would create an explosion in Jerusalem.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: If submitted in Israel?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes. When we are thinking of a security zone in Sinai, we are thinking only of two bases; they are thinking of a line.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: On what can we agree here?

Dr. Kissinger: May I recommend this? That we work together on both these papers and see how much we can make joint. I think four or five can be. On what remains, we can make a great effort. Maybe our leaders can be in contact, or when I come in September, or when you come at the end of September or both, we can make this the principal item on the agenda.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: It looks like we cannot sign here a limited number of principles on which we agree?

Dr. Kissinger: For example?

Foreign Minister Gromyko: Withdrawal from all occupied territories.

Dr. Kissinger: I don't think in the time remaining. It is unlikely.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: That each part of the settlement is considered part of the whole.

Dr. Kissinger: That we could possibly agree to. It is not excluded.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: Third, we don't exclude the possibility of UN personnel at Sharm el-Sheikh and demilitarized zones. Could we say withdrawal from all occupied territories between Jordan and Israel according to mutual agreement?

Dr. Kissinger: In what form do you mean agreement here? In the Communiqué?

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13

Foreign Minister Gromyko: Maybe in the communique, maybe outside, two, three, four -- five is better -- principles which would facilitate further discussion, including the possible September meeting you mentioned.

Dr. Kissinger: We have no trouble about many of these things. The interrelationships between these, it depends on how you interpret them. If Jordan and Israel came to a separate agreement, how would you interpret the application of this principle?

Foreign Minister Gromyko: We think it is difficult for Jordan. You are right that [it can be] either at the same time or otherwise, but as part of the whole. The agreement should include parts but as parts of a whole. The order of carrying them out is another matter. Jordan should be a part.

About withdrawal, suppose it was a principle on which we agreed? Even in general. Annexation, as you said. As grounds for further discussion.

Dr. Kissinger: We have stated our position in here [in the paper].

What form do you envision? A paper to be signed?

Foreign Minister Gromyko: It could be formal, informal. It would be the best kind of paper to sign.

Dr. Kissinger: That is impossible.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: As some basis for further conversation. Something that could be squeezed from our paper and your paper.

Amb. Dobrynin: For example, that both sides agree no annexation.

Dr. Kissinger: I know. But it depends on what annexation means. It is agreed that annexation would not be acceptable. We have said we are in favor of withdrawal and that boundary changes should be by mutual agreement.

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14

Foreign Minister Gromyko: Would you say minor changes, and mention the inadmissibility of annexation? Or the principle of parts of a whole?

Dr. Kissinger: The only thing is, we, again, have done nothing to promote a settlement between Israel and Jordan, even though we had possibilities. What if they agreed? Would it be precluded by our understanding? I want to understand what you mean by these principles.

If it is a work program, saying what we will work on, that is one thing. But if we are to undertake an obligation, it is another. We have not promoted an Israeli-Jordanian settlement, but it is something else to oblige us to prevent it.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: Say an agreement, to be signed.

Dr. Kissinger: I can assure you it won't be signed.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: An understanding that the two sides agree on the inadmissibility of annexation.

Dr. Kissinger: What if they [Israel and Jordan] agree?

Foreign Minister Gromyko: The second principle, if the two sides want to make minor adjustments. . . . We may have Jordan in mind, but may not mention particular parties.

Third, settlements among the parties -- Israel and Egypt, Israel and Jordan, Israel and Syria -- should be considered in context, and a settlement between any two should be considered part of a whole. At the same time, concrete actions to carry out the agreement could take place according to a specially-worked-out schedule. This should be worked out in a settlement.

Duration: If we agree on this, it's still better. We do not mention the time now. It should be filled out. The subjects are of course linked. I think this is better for the American side. All the parts need not be implemented at the same time, on the first day. First a Suez Canal opening, then some security arrangement, demilitarized zones, UN personnel, to be decided on a mutually acceptable basis, on an equal basis.

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15

Dr. Kissinger: If you have 100 kilometers on each side, all of Israel will be demilitarized!

Foreign Minister Gromyko: It will be subject to future specification.

Dr. Kissinger: What would be the status of such principles? Something we have agreed to work with, you and us, or something we are obliged to work with on the parties?

Foreign Minister Gromyko: Something for us to work with. Then, the Soviet-American team would work. From your side, one brilliant person; from our side, we will have what we have!

Dr. Kissinger: You don't commit yourself to producing a brilliant person!

Foreign Minister Gromyko: We are modest people.

Dr. Kissinger: I would like to think about this. Can we meet after dinner, 8:30, 9:00?

Foreign Minister Gromyko: 8:30 better.

Dr. Kissinger: I should listen to the President's speech. The speech is at 8:30. We will meet at 9:15. Here?

Foreign Minister Gromyko: Here.

Dr. Kissinger: All right.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: St. Catherine's is too big.

Dr. Kissinger: I like the architecture. I'm going to rebuild the Situation Room.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: If anyone in Moscow now tried to build something like that [St. Catherine's], he would be severely reprimanded by our Central Committee!

Dr. Kissinger: I brought Anatol to the Situation Room. Our security people had a heart attack.

At 9:15 here, we can finish up the Communique and see where we stand on this. It gives me a chance to talk to the President.

[The meeting then adjourned.]



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MEMORANDUM

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Andrei A. Gromyko, Minister of Foreign Affairs of  
the USSR  
Anatoli F. Dobrynin, Ambassador to USA  
Georgi M. Korniyenko, Chief of USA Division,  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
Mr. Bratchikov, Interpreter

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President  
Winston Lord, Special Assistant to Dr. Kissinger  
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff Member (notetaker)

DATE AND TIME: Sunday, May 28, 1972  
9:35 - 11:55 p.m.

PLACE: Conference Room - Foreign Minister's Office  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Moscow

SUBJECTS: Communique; Middle East

The Communique

[The Foreign Minister first took Dr. Kissinger aside for about eight minutes of private conversation in the Foreign Minister's private office. They began on the subject of the phrase "inviolability of frontiers," as proposed by the Soviets for the communique section on Europe. They then joined the rest of the group in the conference room, resuming on the same subject.] [The working text of the Communique is at Tab A.]

Dr. Kissinger: There is one possible compromise suggested by  
Korniyenko: "inviolability of their frontiers."

For. Min. Gromyko: It is obvious whose are referred to.

Dr. Kissinger: Are we finished with the communique? Sonnenfeldt and  
Korniyenko are running the whole affair.

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2

Mr. Korniyenko: We will omit the parts about the maritime matters.

Dr. Kissinger: You want to say "agreed to continue the negotiations aimed at reaching an agreement on maritime and related matters. They believe that such an agreement would make a positive step...?" All right.

You want to say [in the commercial/economic section] "encouraging the conclusion of long-term contracts?"

Amb. Dobrynin: We supported your position and now you take it out.

Dr. Kissinger: Our economic expert Flanigan says the U.S. Government has no right to encourage contracts among private firms.

Amb. Dobrynin: Do you always listen to the experts?

Dr. Kissinger: Mr. Foreign Minister, Dobrynin was always under control until the last few meetings! Oh hell, I'll accept yours.

Amb. Dobrynin: I think you're splitting the hair.

Dr. Kissinger: No, I am accepting it. I will have trouble with Flanigan.

I have suggested that the English text use the phrase, "encouraging the conclusion of long-term contracts" and the Russian text refer to "the importance of long-term contracts" -- exactly the opposite of what is expected!

Are we all set on the communique? Anyone who has the ability to settle anything in one hour with Mr. Sonnenfeldt has my admiration.

Is the Middle East section set?

For. Min. Gromyko: On the Mid East, I sent it to Mr. Brezhnev. When he reads it I will communicate with you. Probably tomorrow morning.

Amb. Dobrynin: Before 10 o'clock.

Dr. Kissinger: We won't have much time tomorrow.

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3

For. Min. Gromyko: On Indochina, probably there will be separate statements.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes.

For. Min. Gromyko: On the Mideast, it maybe joint.

Dr. Kissinger: Mr. Foreign Minister, I will miss dealing with you. You are always precise.

All right, on Indochina, which will we use for our text if there are separate statements?

For. Min. Gromyko: Since it's one-sided, it's up to the sides to decide.

Dr. Kissinger: I have only one experience with two-sided communique.

For. Min. Gromyko: In Peking. What was your experience?

Dr. Kissinger: It is more time-consuming. What we did was use the formula that each side was free to say what it wanted but each was free to comment on the other's and each would take the other's comments seriously.

It is not in anybody's interest to have sections which give the impression of cosmic confrontation. Here too, particularly in view of the spirit of our conversations this morning.

For. Min. Gromyko: We will do this after we hear your formulation.

Dr. Kissinger: All right.

[Sausage is brought in.]

For. Min. Gromyko: A change.

Dr. Kissinger: I like sausage too, but I just ate.

On the principles, I have one change. You want to change "social systems" to "political systems." That's all right.

Mr. Lord: We'll say "political."

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Dr. Kissinger: On the fourth principle, our experts tell us that the language implies that the Warsaw pact is obligated to assure NATO's compliance with its obligations and vice versa. We should say, "agreements to which they are jointly parties."

For. Min. Gromyko: In Russian, there is no need.

Dr. Kissinger: In English, it could refer to multilateral agreements to which one but not the other is a party.

Mr. Dobrynin: Do you need this?

Dr. Kissinger: This is the one contribution the State Department has made to this document, literally.

For. Min. Gromyko: You are right in your interpretation, but in Russian it is not necessary.

Dr. Kissinger: I understand, Mr. Korniyenko, that you and our people will get together tomorrow to conform the texts.

Mr. Korniyenko: Yes.

For. Min. Gromyko: You may say "jointly."

Dr. Kissinger: I have no complaint about the Russian text. I must say my contribution on this is not what I have accomplished with you but what I have accomplished with our own people.

Mr. Korniyenko: Should I meet with State tomorrow?

Dr. Kissinger: But with Sonnenfeldt present.

Mr. Korniyenko: Yes.

Dr. Kissinger: Can we keep the plenary very general and brief?

For. Min. Gromyko: We are moving in that direction. It will be very brief.

Dr. Kissinger: The Indochina paper you have of ours is a long one.

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5

For. Min. Gromyko: A separate statement is more probable.

Dr. Kissinger: It would be sensational if we had a joint statement on that.

Middle East

For. Min. Gromyko: Have you thought about the principles [as we discussed this morning]?

Dr. Kissinger: I have written an outline for possible future discussion. [He hands the paper over at Tab B. Gromyko and Dobrynin read it. Gromyko takes out a pen.]

Dr. Kissinger: Are you signing it?

Mr. Foreign Minister, this is not a document every word of which has been fully weighed. I talked to the President after our conversation, and these are more "thinking points."

For. Min. Gromyko: In the first point, the phrase "on a priority basis" -- I think this does reflect...

Dr. Kissinger: It was an attempt to reflect your thinking.

For. Min. Gromyko: In the second principle, you need "the" Arab territories. You don't need "Arab;" it's not Indian or Japanese territories.

Amb. Dobrynin: We'll trade you "Arab" for "the."

For. Min. Gromyko: Why not "Egyptian, Syrian, and Jordanian territories"?

Dr. Kissinger: I don't mind saying that. I would like to avoid the article at this point.

Amb Dobrynin: What do you mean "at this point?"

Dr. Kissinger: Frankly, it is an issue on which we're not fully agreed. But substantially agreed. I tried to phrase it in a way that allows both.

For. Min. Gromyko: If I were you, I would accept "the" and would try to explain it, and then reflect your point in the third point.

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6

Dr. Kissinger: If I were you I'd try to have two ways of arguing, one in the second point and one in the third.

I must say I understand your point very clearly, very precisely.

For. Min. Gromyko: I have no doubt you understand, but you don't accept it.

Dr. Kissinger: I don't exclude it.

For. Min. Gromyko: Your third point covers it.

Amb. Dobrynin: It mentions border changes.

Dr. Kissinger: Let's reserve on the second and go to the third.

For. Min. Gromyko: In English is there a difference between "changes" and "rectification?" "Rectification" is more flexible.

Dr. Kissinger: No, it's less flexible.

For. Min. Gromyko: How about "minor rectifications are not excluded relative to some of the parties but, even if they take place, they should result from voluntary agreement --" but without saying "between the parties."

Dr. Kissinger: Suppose we say "border rectifications are not excluded between the parties but should be by voluntary agreement."

For. Min. Gromyko: You are against "minor."

Dr. Kissinger: Because "rectification" implies "minor."

For. Min. Gromyko: In Russian, "rectification" is utochnit'. I remember even the Israelis speak of "minor." Suppose we say "minor rectifications."

Dr. Kissinger: How about "minor changes?"

For. Min. Gromyko: In Russian, nyebol' shiyе izmenyeniya. Or "some rectifications are not excluded."

Mr. Korniyenko: "Any rectifications, which are not excluded, should be the result of voluntary agreement."

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7

For. Min. Gromyko: "Any border rectifications, which are not excluded...."

Dr. Kissinger: No, it has to be stated positively.

For. Min. Gromyko: "Which may take place, should result from voluntary agreement among the parties."

Dr. Kissinger: Are you considering this accepted on your side?

For. Min. Gromyko: More or less.

Dr. Kissinger: Tentatively let's use it as a working hypothesis.

For. Min. Gromyko: Fourth, you would like "Arrangements for security should include demilitarized zones and the most effective international guarantees."

Dr. Kissinger: Or "could include."

For. Min. Gromyko: Or rather, "Mutual arrangements for security could include demilitarized zones and the most effective international guarantees." We could say "with the participation of the Soviet Union and U.S." We would prefer this if you don't mind.

Dr. Kissinger: This is a working paper for us alone, not to show to anyone. What about "if appropriate, with the participation of the Soviet Union and the U.S.?" Or "as appropriate?" "As" is not so conditional.

For. Min. Gromyko: "With appropriate participation by."

Dr. Kissinger: All right. "Could" is a saving clause.

For. Min. Gromyko: Maybe we should mention here the special phrase "it may be provided that the UN Security Council should take part as a component of the security arrangements."

Dr. Kissinger: We're getting too detailed. Since this is between us, any side can raise this at any points. I was not too impressed by the Security Council last December.

For. Min. Gromyko: [Reading point 5:] "The agreements should lead to an end of a state of belligerency and the establishment of peace." Unquestionably... [Reading point 6:] "Freedom of navigation through the Straits of Tiran and the Suez Canal should be assured. Unquestionably... One thing I could say here, which would give matter [substance] to the

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8a

principles is, "This would not be detrimental to Egyptian sovereignty over the Canal."

Dr. Kissinger: I don't mind that. You want to put it in? Can we put it another way, so as not to be implying that in case of conflict sovereignty prevails? "This can be assured without impairing Egyptian sovereignty over the Canal."

For. Min. Gromyko: [Reads point 7:] "Completion of the agreements should at some stage involve negotiations among the signatories." This is politically unpalatable to us.

Dr. Kissinger: Why? Why can't you say "at some point?"

Amb. Dobrynin: Is it so important now?

Dr. Kissinger: It seems to me difficult on the part of the Arabs to say they are willing to live in peace with Israel and not be willing to talk to Israel about that peace. We're not saying "from the beginning."

For. Min. Gromyko: But Jarring will be shuttling back and forth.

Dr. Kissinger: With the energy for which he is known. [Gromyko laughs] This does not exclude indirect negotiations.

All we are saying is that before the agreements are finally concluded it will happen, that we can't complete the negotiations.

For. Min. Gromyko: I'm not sure it would be realistic. If the parties should at some point be willing to have contacts, it will be okay.

The UN General Assembly once had a list of recommended disarmament measures. It said the countries could do this, would do that, and then do this. It then had one line at the end: "if everything is all right!"

We'd prefer to cross this out. It would just harm it. It can hang in the air.

Dr. Kissinger: Can we say it another way? "It is recognized that the two sides cannot impose a solution."

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8

For. Min. Gromyko: Not just in theory but in practice it is impossible to settle without direct contact. If it depended on us, there would be no question -- only the substance would matter.

Dr. Kissinger: Is it your view that the Arabs would never talk to Israel? How can they get the document signed? How can they say they're willing to talk peace but not talk to each other?

For. Min Gromyko: Again, it is prestige. This is reality, part of life. "If the parties should consider it possible to be in touch before signing, it should not be precluded."

Amb. Dobrynin: [To Gromyko:] Put "could" instead of "should."

For. Min. Gromyko: "If the parties concerned find it possible to be directly in touch with one another before the signing of the agreement(s), it should not be excluded." Maybe it is clumsy. There could be different combinations of contacts.

Dr. Kissinger: We don't want to leave the impression that we can impose a settlement. Our principle says "negotiations;" we're not saying "direct negotiations." In a way, exchanges through Jarring are a form of negotiation. We are trying to find some role for the parties concerned. If the parties won't talk in any form, then these principles will have to be imposed.

Amb. Dobyrynin: They will sign together.

Dr. Kissinger: Then what will they do? Who would exclude it? You won't and we won't.

For. Min. Gromyko: It reflects our general mood. You and we are not against something. We cannot say to the Arabs that we agreed with you on this point. They would blame us at once. They may crucify us.

Dr. Kissinger: With music?

Amb. Dobrynin: Let's drop it for the time being.

For. Min.Gromyko: Can we say something about the possibility of including among the security arrangements the presence of UN Security Council personnel?

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9

Dr. Kissinger: Where?

Amb. Dobrynin: In point 4.

For. Min. Gromyko: At Sharm el-Sheikh

Dr. Kissinger: I have no objections.

For. Min. Gromyko: Just insert after "demilitarized zones," the phrase "placing UN Security Council personnel at Sharm el-Sheikh ." The Arabs will not like it, but I think we and you can do this. I think it would add something material to this.

[Pause] Do you have doubts?

Dr. Kissinger: No. I want to be candid. When we say "demilitarized zones," we don't exclude other things. I wanted to be sure you understood.

For. Min. Gromyko: "The temporary stationing of UN personnel at Sharm el-Sheikh " -- temporary, not until the Second Coming of the Christ!

Dr. Kissinger: An interesting formulation to put to the Jews and the Arabs: "These forces will stay until the Second Coming of the Christ!" -- signed by a Socialist country and the U. S. , and put to the Jews and Arabs! [Reads:] "Mutual arrangements for security could include demilitarized zones, the temporary stationing of UN personnel at Sharm el-Sheikh and the most effective international guarantees, with appropriate participation by the Soviet Union and the United States."

For. Min. Gromyko: "A limited number of UN personnel."

How about the Palestinians? I wonder who in the world could give a precise solution to this problem.

Dr. Kissinger: The way the Foreign Minister is going we will reach agreement tonight. [He picks up and reads the US draft of "Basic Provisions for a Final Settlement in the Middle East."]

What would you like to say about the Palestinians?

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10

For. Min. Gromyko: "The problem of the Palestinian refugees should be solved on the basis of the restitution of their legitimate rights and appropriate (or corresponding) UN decisions." -- as a principle.

Dr. Kissinger: But here we're describing very general principles. I don't mind saying "a settlement should include provision for the Palestinians." Frankly I would like to study the UN resolutions closely to see what your proposition means.

Amb. Dobrynin: You mean the UN resolutions for which the U.S. voted?

Dr. Kissinger: I have no difficulty in saying in any working program for us that there must be an appropriate section on the refugees. Our concern now is whether we want to expand on this and how.

For. Min. Gromyko: Would you not want to mention specifically the region of Gaza and say that one possible solution to its status would be to have a plebiscite?

Dr. Kissinger: I am reluctant, not because I disagree but because it's difficult to do this here at this table. It is not like SALT, in which I had the benefit of years of preparation and study.

What are we trying to do? We are just telling each other what we are prepared to do. On Gaza, I don't exclude the possibility of a plebiscite; in fact it may be useful.

For. Min. Gromyko: Suppose one more principle is added, maybe at the end. "Both the U.S. and Soviet Union recognize as one of the main principles relating to the situation in the Middle East that all states of the Middle East, including Israel, have the right to exist as sovereign independent states."

Dr. Kissinger: A very good principle, a very positive principle.

For. Min. Gromyko: We took this consistent principle ever since the creation of Israel as a state in 1947. "The U.S. and Soviet Union recognize that one of the most important principles relating to the situation in the Middle East is recognition of the right of all states, including Israel, to exist as sovereign independent states."

Dr. Kissinger: Read it back. "The U.S. and Soviet Union agree..." Just a stylistic point.

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11

For. Min. Gromyko: Can you imagine if we showed this now to the Syrians, what they would do?

Dr. Kissinger: Both of us are terrified of what our allies would do. This is the best guarantee of secrecy.

We don't have to say "agree," because the whole statement is joint.

For. Min. Gromyko: "Recognition of the independence and sovereignty of all states in the Middle East, including Israel, is one of the basic principles on which the settlement has to be based."

Dr. Kissinger: "One of the main principles of a stable peace."

For. Min. Gromyko: "On which the settlement must be based." This is the eighth point, then.

Dr. Kissinger: The ninth. Since we won't finish here, why not leave it for Anatol and me to finish?

For. Min. Gromyko: But we should have a rough agreement on principles here.

Dr. Kissinger: What was that principle again? [Bratchikov reads it again.] We accept that.

For. Min. Gromyko: On the Palestinians, do we have a formulation? Our suggestion was "the problem of the Palestinian refugees should be solved on the basis of the restitution of their legitimate rights and appropriate UN decisions."

Dr. Kissinger: What does "restitution of their legitimate rights" mean? Your proposal in the paper is more flexible and easier to deal with than a general principle.

For. Min. Gromyko: What would you prefer?

Dr. Kissinger: "Should be settled on an equitable basis?" "On a just basis?"

For. Min. Gromyko: Let us say, "on a just basis in accordance with the decisions of the UN."

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12

Dr. Kissinger: My problem is I don't remember what the UN decisions were.

"On a just basis and in accordance..." Is it possible for me to say that for tonight it is all right and get back to Anatol within a few days? I want to study the UN resolutions. You can't hold me to something we don't want to carry out. If you left out the UN, we would accept it immediately.

For. Min. Gromyko: Leave it subject to your confirmation. The U.S. not only supported these resolutions but prepared them.

Dr. Kissinger: From my present knowledge, it's all right. But I want to confirm. When will the Ambassador return?

Amb. Dobrynin: Sunday, if my Minister will permit it.

Dr. Kissinger: I won't be back from Key Biscayne until Monday night.

For. Min. Gromyko: Not later than Sunday he will return.

Dr. Kissinger: I won't be available until Tuesday. We return Thursday afternoon. I brief on Friday, then go to Key Biscayne or New York on the weekend -- I haven't decided.

Amb. Dobrynin: He missed Japan.

For. Min. Gromyko: You missed Japan twice!

Dr. Kissinger: If you get your allies to restrain themselves, I may get to Japan.

For. Min. Gromyko: It was a pleasure to visit Japan.

Dr. Kissinger: A pleasure? You were there.

For. Min. Gromyko: It was very interesting.

Dr. Kissinger: I've not been there in an official capacity. They have a very complex way of thinking. Can you tell what is in their minds?

For. Min. Gromyko: Like the Chinese.

Dr. Kissinger: It is not easy with the Chinese either, but they're not as formal as the Japanese.

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13

For. Min. Gromyko: For example, with us and in the West, the sooner something is done, the better. It is a sign of effectiveness. For the Chinese, it is a sign of inefficiency.

Amb. Dobrynin: Or weakness.

For. Min. Gromyko: Of a not-serious approach to a problem. If an answer is given the same day, they would be surprised.

Dr. Kissinger: Then they think they have made a bad proposal.

You're right. They have a much more complex way of thinking than the Western.

For. Min. Gromyko: It is because for centuries and centuries their general pace of life was too slow, as far as social phenomena, in terms of technique. Slowness became the norm. It can be explained, as a subject of social philosophy.

Dr. Kissinger: We have found that almost everything the Chinese say to us in any context, even social, has some meaning. We may not know it, but looking back it has some meaning they're trying to convey. It may not be immediately apparent, but three weeks later it all fits into a mosaic. Nothing is totally spontaneous.

For. Min. Gromyko: I think you're right. It is our deeply implanted impression.

Dr. Kissinger: You have much longer experience with them.

For. Min. Gromyko: Suppose they stay longer and verify the text.

Dr. Kissinger: You think we've finished with this? All except the one on negotiations.

For. Min. Gromyko:, Number 7: "Completion of the agreements should at some stage involve negotiations among the signatories."

Dr. Kissinger: My problem is, it is a tautology. Why would we object, if they wanted to be in touch? It is not a useful statement. May I say this? Why don't we, the U.S., say it unilaterally as an interpretive statement? I would rather state a meaningful statement.

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For. Min. Gromyko: Draw a line on the paper then and have your interpretive statement.

Dr. Kissinger: "The U.S. believes that..."

For. Min. Gromyko: What is the title of this document? "A Basis for Principles?" "Basic Working Principles?"

Dr. Kissinger: All right.

For. Min. Gromyko: Basic in the sense of limited to the most important points.

Dr. Kissinger: Why don't we copy out what we have, with the changes? [Dr. Kissinger asks Mr. Rodman to copy out the agreed language, and to coordinate with Mr. Korniyenko at the end of the meeting to conform the two sides' texts.]

Dr. Kissinger: How about "General Working Principles?"

For. Min. Gromyko: All right.

Dr. Kissinger: How do we handle this?

For. Min. Gromyko: We are at your disposal. We prefer to handle it in a general way. It would be without formalizing it, and [the document] would be at your disposal and our disposal.

Dr. Kissinger: As far as we are concerned, it will stay in the White House.

For. Min. Gromyko: We will guard it on our side as well.

Dr. Kissinger: We do not care what you do, but it will stay in Moscow at the highest level?

For. Min. Gromyko: Yes.

Ambassador Dobrynin: And in the Embassy in Washington, too.

For. Min. Gromyko: If the Minister sends it to the Embassy.

Dr. Kissinger: You put your interpretation in and we will not challenge it.

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For. Min. Gromyko: Oral interpretation.

Dr. Kissinger: We are putting down point seven as our interpretation and you put this down. We will not dispute it. We will not say we disagree.

Mr. Korniyenko: Putting such a sentence means that we do not agree.

Dr. Kissinger: You gave your consideration with respect to security zone; it is incorrect for us. Withdrawal from Arab territories [point 2] does not exclude all territories. It does not imply it, but it does not exclude it.

Amb. Dobrynin: We should add the word "the." This would underline the different interpretation.

For. Min. Gromyko: Orally you accept our interpretation and orally you do not dispute it.

Dr. Kissinger: I understand the subtle point. You say that paragraph 2 means, that the Soviet side interprets this to mean withdrawals from the Arab territories subject to considering it in context with paragraph 3. We do not dispute that this is your interpretation and we leave it open.

For. Min. Gromyko: This is the difference: we dispute the interpretation but are not disputing the context.

Dr. Kissinger: This is a terribly important point that I would like to fully discuss with the President.

There is one other point which I will confirm to the Ambassador at the first meeting; as soon as I get back to Washington I will confirm it to him. We will try to do what you propose on point 2; you are willing to leave the phrase as it is. You orally make your interpretation. There will be no written record.

For. Min. Gromyko: Right.

Dr. Kissinger: Orally, I say that I do not question your interpretation of the context. I would like to check this with the President and confirm with your Ambassador in a week.

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16

For. Min. Gromyko: We will leave it as it is.

Dr. Kissinger: If I don't confirm to your Ambassador, you are not bound by number 2.

Amb. Dobrynin: Or number 3 in this context.

Dr. Kissinger: I understand.

For. Min. Gromyko: We believe that your reservation is met by paragraph 3.

Dr. Kissinger: When I am back in Washington I would like to review previous exchanges on this subject, so when we do say something we can say it with confidence. I believe the combination of 2 and 3 should be satisfactory, and I consider the way you are handling paragraph 2 to be a fair way of meeting our concerns. But because it is so important, there is no sense in agreeing to it now. I would mean more to you if we accept it a week from now.

Mr. Korniyenko: The Foreign Minister is saying that the content of this phrase means the Arab territories.

For. Min. Gromyko: "All."

Dr. Kissinger: "The." I understand the content the Foreign Minister is giving this principle, and I do not contest it.

For. Min. Gromyko: Meanwhile we will leave the second and third points as they are without any revisions.

Dr. Kissinger: Plus this oral exchange.

For. Min. Gromyko: The third is as agreed. Yes. We will have further discussion.

[Dr. Kissinger reads through the principles.]

When I go back I will say that there are no secret agreements.

For. Min. Gromyko: We agree.

Dr. Kissinger: You will keep it as we discussed. You will not discuss it with Egypt.

For. Min. Gromyko: Right.

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17

[The Foreign Minister and Dr. Kissinger then adjourned to the Foreign Minister's private office for an extended discussion. It was 11:55 p.m.]

[In the meantime, Mr. Korniyenko, the Ambassador, and Mr. Rodman went over the "general working principles" to produce an agreed text. There was a dispute over point 6: Dr. Kissinger in the meeting had added, "This [freedom of navigation] can be achieved without impairing Egyptian sovereignty over the Canal." Mr. Korniyenko suggested, "Should be achieved." Mr. Rodman argued that this changed the meaning. Mr. Korniyenko and the Ambassador claimed that it did not. Mr. Rodman suggested they raise it with Dr. Kissinger and the Foreign Minister.]

[When Dr. Kissinger and Mr. Gromyko emerged, Dr. Kissinger insisted that Mr. Korniyenko's suggestion changed the meaning completely. The sentence was meant as a statement of fact, not as a statement of an objective. When Dr. Kissinger finished, the Foreign Minister -- rather quickly -- suggested "This is fully consistent with Egyptian sovereignty over the Canal." This was immediately agreed.]

[The "conformed text" of the "general working principles" as finally agreed upon is at Tab C.]

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RMPA

KW NARA, Date 5-6-02

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

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May 28, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT  
FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER  
SUBJECT: Your May 29, 1972 Private Meeting with Brezhnev

General Approach

In your final private meeting with Brezhnev you will want to strike a positive note. You should stress the general theme that solid achievements have been made this week and that continued progress will depend on both sides taking a broad view in our relations. You should make the following points:

-- You believe that a great deal of confidence has been established this past week. The frankness of the discussions between you and Brezhnev was as significant as the various agreements that have been signed.

-- It is important to keep in close personal touch in the future. If either side has a major concern it should tell the other. In this way many problems can be handled before they turn into major issues.

-- Both nations will continue to face the choice between pressing for narrow tactical gains at the other's expense and taking a larger perspective on relations between the world's two most powerful nations.

-- You think it is essential that we both conduct our policies in a generous spirit. This approach will guide your actions.

-- If we can both move ahead on this basis, the things we have in common will increasingly outweigh those that divide us. We can thus place US-Soviet relations on a fresh, positive footing.

*Gifts*  
*Established and continued*  
*Must keep in touch*  
*in private channel*  
*Seguy - Brezhnev's*  
*Nuclear Non Proliferation*  
*Summit (as it works)*  
*Michael*

*Walt*  
*Frank*  
*Chicom*

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2

### Nuclear Renunciation

The Soviets have been very interested in a declaration on nuclear weapons. We have turned this troublesome concept toward the safer grounds of changing their treaty draft into an understanding. At Tab A is a draft understanding on this subject that should strike a positive note without getting us into trouble with either our allies or the Chinese.

#### You can say:

- You know of the Soviets' interest in the subject of a treaty renouncing nuclear weapons.
- You have given a great deal of thought to this issue and wish to give them a draft for their consideration. (Hand over Tab A).

### Economics

- We should not look at economic issues in a strictly business deal fashion but rather in larger scope, as an important contribution to overall US-Soviet relations.
- You favor a comprehensive package including:
  - . The extension of Export-Import Bank financing.
  - . MFN treatment for the USSR (requires Congressional approval)
  - . Settlement of lend-lease.
- We will look hard at the natural gas project to find ways to encourage financing for a major arrangement that will benefit both countries.
- You are instructing all our negotiators to approach economic/commercial issues in a generous spirit with particular emphasis on the political aspect.

### Middle East

- You and the General Secretary and Kissinger-Gromyko have held useful talks on this subject.
- You hope we can make progress on this over the coming weeks.

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Your Visit to the Soviet Union

-- You and Mrs. Nixon want to thank the Soviet leaders for the warm hospitality and courtesies extended to you during this memorable visit.



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PRMMA

By KW NARA, Date 5-6-02

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:

Leonid I. Brezhnev, General Secretary  
of the Central Committee of the CPSU  
Andrei M. Aleksandrov-Agentov, Assistant  
to the General Secretary  
The President  
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the  
President for National Security Affairs

DATE & TIME:

Monday, May 29, 1972  
10:20 a.m. - 12:20 p.m.

PLACE:

The General Secretary's Office,  
The Kremlin

SUBJECTS:

Middle East; Vietnam; Nuclear Understanding;  
Economic Relations; Cuba; Korea

General Secretary Brezhnev: I saw you on TV last night and I have heard about your visit to Leningrad. Henry Kissinger is the only one who is resting. The trouble with him is that even when you give him a job he finds a way of avoiding it. [The General Secretary then told an anecdote about the sex life of older men.]

The President: I very much appreciate the opportunity of talking to you heart-to-heart. With respect to the communique and statement of principles, Kissinger and Gromyko have done very well. As you know, there are only two main points of difference remaining: the Mideast and Vietnam. I am willing to give on one: that is, the reference to maintaining the ceasefire in the Middle East section. It is important to maintain our channel of communication; the rhetoric in the statement does not mean so much. I will do my best to bring about a reasonable solution, and if the General Secretary does his best perhaps our experts can find a solution. I want

PRMCA  
3y KW NARA, Date 5-6-08

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

the General Secretary's consideration of our problem. We know our positions are different. And we have done useful work in the private channel to make progress. If you say it is a question of principle then there is no hope for solution.

On Vietnam, in the same vein, we would want to drop out the phrase "unconditionally." The Soviet statement is very strong. And I understand why it must be strong. And as the General Secretary knows, our position is also strong, as he found at the dacha the other day. Neither side publicly can be expected to change its position. As Dr. Kissinger in his long talk with Gromyko indicated, we are trying to bring our positions closer together. It would be counterproductive to suggest that these are all issues of principle. It is essential that we agree. These are the only points I have to make. Otherwise, I have no suggestion to make. It would certainly be helpful for our common goal if you can agree.

General Secretary Brezhnev: I would like to put one question to you. You, Mr. President, then Dr. Kissinger, have communicated to us that the U.S. would be willing to go back to the open meetings provided that the DRV affirms a constructive attitude towards negotiations and is willing to consider your positions as well as theirs as a basis for discussion. I would like to set out one consideration. How would you see it if we sent one of our highest leaders to talk to the Vietnamese? The visit of any responsible leader might make a difference. But you should stop the bombing first. We know -- and this is in confidence -- quite for sure that of late Vietnam has been visited by delegation after delegation from China. We don't know what they will discuss with you at the talks. We cannot absolutely guarantee complete success. But we would like to take this step to find the best solution. We do believe the President really wants to end the war. The Vietnamese attach greater importance to their fear of being tricked in a settlement.

Perhaps it would help if Thieu was willing to resign two months before election. I think this should be.

The President: If a top Soviet official goes there, you can be sure there will be no bombing of the Hanoi/Haiphong area. Unless he stays there for three months.

General Secretary Brezhnev: People like you and I and Kissinger can't stay there for three months.

The President: It would be very constructive to stop all the killing right now.

Dr. Kissinger: Up to now, of course, all we have agreed to is only one month for the resignation of Thieu.

General Secretary Brezhnev: We want to do the maximum of what is possible, and two months would help us. We will not try to make a unilateral benefit from this. We will send our top leader as quickly as possible. Then the Paris

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

PRMPA

By KW NARA, Date 5-6-02

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

3

meetings can start as quickly as possible. It is, of course, important to bear in mind another fact. According to their thinking a solution must be found between you and them directly.

The President: The procedure of a visit as you suggest is very constructive. After our meeting there may be a measure of progress. This is very important.

General Secretary Brezhnev: First, we must be clear about the assurances: we must have an assurance about the bombing and two months about Thieu.

The President: I will use my influence about the two months. But it must be kept absolutely secret.

General Secretary Brezhnev: Without going into the argument, I have already told my comrades that two months is possible. I don't want the whole matter to be swamped by a difference of one month.

Dr. Kissinger: If we can settle all the other issues and the only obstacle remaining is one or two months, we will not find it insuperable.

General Secretary Brezhnev: Can I tell my comrades two months? This is crucial.

The President: If you keep it in this room, as part of settlement, I can agree to two months.

General Secretary Brezhnev: On the communique, we can accept the two deletions.

The President: Here is a paper I want to give you on the matter of non-use of nuclear weapons. [Hands over U.S. draft at Tab A.] It is a response to your paper. I know of your interest in this matter. In April you said it would be a "peaceful bomb." I have given a great deal of thought to it, and we have this draft for your consideration. It should be discussed further in our confidential channel.

General Secretary Brezhnev: In principle I agree it will be a peaceful bomb. We will hold it strictly confidential. We should handle it in our special Washington-Moscow Kissinger-Dobrynin channel.

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DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

PRMPA  
By KW NARA, Date 5-6-02

TOP SECRET, EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

4

The President: I appreciate this personal contact we have had. It is very important.

Now, on economic matters, Peterson is coming here in July. He will have full authority.

General Secretary Brezhnev: Thank you. I too value very highly the work we have done here together. I want to reaffirm our cooperation. Now that we have established personal contact we can say it with greater confidence.

I would like to raise a few specific issues. First, there is the issue of Lend-Lease and MFN. We are prepared to continue consultation, though you must understand we must have MFN. As for Cuba, a matter of concern to you, we abide strictly by our understanding on Cuba. Even when there are submarine visits, we will strictly abide by the understanding.

On the subject of Korea, Kim Il-Sung has assured me. They have said that North Korea is in favor of peaceful unification. They are not interested in military field. They are prepared to establish good relations with you. Some thought should be given to how South Korea can take advantage of this. Of course, the question of the presence of U. S. troops in South Korea also arises. We want you to know our concern about resolving this. Let's continue our contacts on this.

Mr. President, this week you and I have signed an important document on strategic arms limitation. But France, the UK, and Peking haven't signed it. Therefore, we must closely follow their development to prevent any unfavorable developments.

I want to leave you with one thought about Peking. We really are not clear about what its policies and intentions are. This places on us an obligation for us to follow these policies and consult with each other.

In general, I must stress the importance of restraint in propaganda on both sides. Let us promote the atmosphere of this week.

The President: I will do the best I can about propaganda. Of course, I cannot control our right wing in the Senate and among some newsmen. But I agree. Let's keep the rhetoric cool.

General Secretary Brezhnev: Yes, we must keep the propaganda in line with the reality of foreign policy.

The President: We must keep in touch. I plan to keep the General Secretary informed on any major development.



DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

PRMFA

By KW NARA, Date 5-6-02 EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

5

General Secretary Brezhnev: I will certainly respond.

The President: I want to reiterate. You have my commitment that privately or publicly I shall take no steps directed against the interests of the Soviet Union. But the General Secretary should rely on what I say in the private channel, not on what anyone else tells him. There are not only certain forces in the world but also representatives of the press who are not interested in better relations between us.

[There were closing pleasantries. The President thanked the General Secretary and his colleagues for the warm hospitality and courtesies that were extended to him and Mrs. Nixon during their stay in Moscow. The General Secretary bade the President farewell and wished him and Mrs. Nixon a pleasant journey.]

Transcribed from Dr. Kissinger's notes.

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E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

PRMPA  
By KW NARA, Date 5-6-02

Guided by the objectives of strengthening world peace and international security;

Conscious that nuclear war would have devastating consequences for mankind;

Proceeding from the desire to bring about conditions in which the danger of an outbreak of nuclear war would be reduced and ultimately eliminated;

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States have agreed as follows:

- I. The Soviet Union and the United States agree to so conduct themselves in their international relations that conditions in which nuclear war might break out between them will not arise.
- II. The Soviet Union and United States agree to make every effort to ensure that actions by third countries will not create conditions leading to the outbreak of nuclear war between the Soviet Union and the United States.
- III. In the event of a military conflict involving states other than the parties to this understanding, the Soviet Union and the United States will make every effort to prevent the outbreak of nuclear war.
- IV. Nothing in this understanding shall affect the obligations undertaken by the Parties toward other countries nor any obligations under the Charter of the United Nations. It shall not affect the right of individual and collective self-defense.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

PRMFA  
By KW NARA, Date 5-6-02

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Leonid I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU  
Nikolai V. Podgorny, Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet  
Aleksei N. Kosygin, Chairman, Council of Ministers of the USSR  
Nikolai K. Baibakov, Deputy Chairman, Council of Ministers, and Chairman of the State Planning Commission  
Andrei A. Gromyko, Minister of Foreign Affairs  
Nikolai S. Patolichev, Minister of Foreign Trade  
Vasily V. Kuznetsov, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs  
Anatoli F. Dobrynin, Ambassador to the USA  
Andrei M. Alexandrov-Agentov, Assistant to Mr. Brezhnev  
Viktor M. Sukhodrev, Interpreter

The President  
William P. Rogers, Secretary of State  
Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs  
Peter M. Flanigan, Assistant to the President for International Economic Affairs  
Martin J. Hillenbrand, Assistant Secretary of State  
Jacob D. Beam, U.S. Ambassador to the USSR  
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Senior NSC Staff Member  
William G. Hyland, NSC Staff Member  
Jack F. Matlock, Department of State

DATE & TIME: Monday, May 29, 1972 - 12:55 p. m.

PLACE: St. Catherine's Hall  
Grand Kremlin Palace, Moscow

Brezhnev: This is our last formal meeting. We are all entitled to point out and emphasize not only that much work was done in preparing for these meetings, but also by both sides during this visit. We have endeavored to

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

PRMMA

By KW NARA, Date 5-6-02

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE  
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

-2-

give our work/<sup>a</sup>worthy spirit and to give worthy considerations to the meetings. This is reflected in the documents signed and to be signed. The same spirit was shown on your side, and this enabled us mutually to make decisions on several subjects. The subjects and decisions were primarily political and this lends them a particular weight. All the decisions were of prime importance. The peoples on both sides expect action to implement these decisions and this imposes on us a responsibility to implement them to the letter. Also it must be noted that a very important fact is the spirit of the agreements is aimed at detente and not at a heightening of tension. I feel sure that the American and Soviet people will take note of this aspect and will be closely following our actions in the future.

It is also important to note that none of the documents are aimed against any third country. This is of fundamental importance. This also imposes a great responsibility on us for our future behavior and policy.

We attach no small importance to economic and technological cooperation, and this is one of the most important aspects of our relations. Therefore, all the discussions on economics, technical cooperation and trade are very important.

It will be very important to preserve in the future the spirit that guided us in these last days. I would like to note that we talked frankly. We told each other straightforwardly all that need to be said. I would also note the great work of Henry Kissinger, Secretary Rogers and others during these talks.

We accept with gratification the desire to continue consultations on both bilateral and international matters that are not resolved, and I refer here to the situation in the Middle East and the ending of the war in Vietnam. The desire to bring about solutions impose responsibilities. Finally, we feel that the summit has been successful.

Podgorny: Mr. President, at the beginning of our talks, several days ago, I already pointed out the great hopes pinned on these meetings. It can now be said that the discussions and decisions have not deluded the hopes of the people, especially if we consider that this is the first meeting after 25 years of abnormal relations. The documents signed will lead to fuller progress in bilateral relations and relations on an international scale. Not all of the questions have been resolved fully, but even the documents signed require future efforts to implement them, and a great deal depends on how we go forward. But for a first meeting it is believed to be a success. Moreover,

DECLASSIFIED

O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

PRMPA

By KW NARA, Date 5-6-02

-3-

EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

there are grounds for hope that other questions, including trade, will be resolved. We have a responsibility for future moves. Relations will be built on principles and continue to improve without detriment to the other side. In short, we are gratified by the work of the last few days. Quite decent steps have been taken and I am referring here to your story (in the President's television speech) about measuring the length of our stride.

Kosygin: Our meetings were not fortuitous. The entire structure of our political and economic relations required these meetings. If there had not been meetings, additional great problems and difficulties might have occurred. All the people hold out great hope for these meetings. The preparations were done in a skillful way. It can be noted that on both sides we have justified hopes placed in these meetings.

Important political problems have been resolved. Now we are faced with the major task of giving practical implementation to the documents signed. We can say that this meeting will be continuing, even when we do not see each other. Because, if not, we will not have met our goal that we have set. I feel sure that it is the view of my colleagues, Comrades Podgorny and Brezhnev, that we want to ensure the result of these meetings.

There are, of course, questions that must eventually be resolved to give further hopes and beneficial results. In the first instance, we must do away with the hotbeds of war that exist. We must do our utmost that in areas where there is no hot war, but where tensions are growing, to ensure that the situation will be normalized. Then we will have justified the hopes of world public opinion.

In conclusion, we on our side will make every effort to increase contacts and relations with the US in the interest of all people. And we should not like history to be repeated. There were productive meetings at Yalta between FDR and Stalin, and then practical ties came to an end. We feel that these meetings will ensure better results.

The President said he was grateful for the boundless hospitality of his hosts, and, more important, that he was grateful for the frank talks. The results were significant because of the preparatory work by the experts both in Moscow and in the United States. We recognized at the outset that most summit conferences had been failures; since the end of World War II they had raised hopes and then failed. These meetings, on the other hand, had

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DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

CRMPA  
By KW NARA, Date 5-6-02

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE  
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

-4-

been successful because they were well prepared, and also because -- and this was important but quite difficult to measure -- because of an acceptance of mutual responsibility to respect the other side's viewpoint, and its right to disagree strongly, and, while respecting the equal strength of each side, finally to find a way to reach agreement on fundamental matters.

The President continued by noting that superficial observers, sometimes in the press, would judge the meeting only by the agreements signed. These are important, but as pointed out by the Soviet side the results will be determined more by how the agreements are implemented. By establishing a process for progress in all areas, this enabled us to reach agreement.

The President said that on the part of the United States he could assure the Soviet leaders that on all levels of the US Government there would be an intention to take a forthcoming attitude in working out problems that might arise. For example, there is the question of trade. The President noted that he had pointed out the great possibilities in this field. Even though we had not made the progress we would have liked, our differences were narrowed and we could be confident that we would see a blossoming of trade and a new relationship of enormous benefit to our peoples. The key to this, as well as other difficult issues, will be the continuation of frank contacts at all levels, including ambassadors and ministers, and, of course, at the summit level where that is the best way to break an impasse.

The President said he wanted to conclude his remarks by saying that history had been made by what had been signed, but the real test is what happens in the future. Now that we all know and respect each other, we have an opportunity to make even greater history for future generations.

(The President asked Secretary Rogers if he wanted to make any remarks.)

Secretary Rogers noted the excellent statements by the President and the Soviet leaders. All were very fortunate to take part in this historic event. It was made possible by thorough preparations and arrangements, and he wanted to thank his Soviet hosts for this, and for the spirit and atmosphere in which the meetings had been conducted.

The President added that he had only one complaint: The communique to be issued would be inviting the Soviet leaders to visit the United States at a mutually agreeable time in the future; but in the United States there were no rooms as grand as St. Catherine's Hall.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

PRMPA

By KW NARA, Date 5-6-02

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE  
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

-5-

Kosygin interjected that it would be difficult to wrap up the room and ship it to the United States.

The President replied that he would not ask, because Mr. Kosygin might well do just that. In any case, the President said, we will make your stay a memorable one.

Brezhnev replied that he had omitted one important point in his remarks. He wanted to express his gratification for the invitation, and to say that we accept this kind invitation and the dates will be arranged.

The President said that he would add one point. He had read that when Premier Kosygin was recently abroad there were demonstrations. The President had experienced much more and worse, and if this occurred while Mr. Kosygin was in the United States, the demonstrations would be against the President, not against Mr. Kosygin.

Kosygin said that at the Glassboro meeting the entire route had been lined with people, but they had signs for peace. The strength of this meeting in Moscow was that peace had been our prime goal.

The President replied that we will set that as our goal. Our next meeting will come at a time when there is peace in the world. This does not mean ten years or even ten months which would be too long. Peace is more urgent than that.

Brezhnev said he agreed. (At the President's prompting he said "OK" and the President said "khorosho")

Podgorny said this was a good goal.

Sukhodrev (the interpreter) read the Soviet announcement of the meeting and it was agreed.

The President added that Secretary Rogers would be leaving to attend a NATO meeting in Bonn, and he would be reporting on the Moscow meetings but would keep confidential the high-level talks.

Kosygin asked whether Secretary Rogers would be going there to do away with NATO.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

CRMPA  
By KW NARA, Date 5-6-02

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE  
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-6-

The President answered that maybe in about ten years, and Kosygin commented that was a long time.

The meeting adjourned.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE  
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