



*37* POL *31-1* KORN-US  
Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL 120

*Serial 4846  
9-4-69*

PAGE 01 SEOUL 04846 041119Z

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ACTION EA 15

INFO OCT 01, CIAE 00, JPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSAE 00, NSC 10, P 03,

RSC 01, PRS 01, SS 20, SSO 00, NSCE 00, CCO 00, USIE 00, IO 13, UPW 01,

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 4846

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

JOINT EMBASSY/UNC MESSAGE:

SUBJECT: DOWNED HELICOPTER -- RECOMMENDATIONS RESULTING FROM  
294TH MAC MEETING

REFERENCE: SEOUL 4833

*Pol 31-1 KORN US  
XP 0237-14 KOK/UN*

1. REVIEW OF 294TH MEETING WITH MAJOR GENERAL ADAHS ESTABLISHES  
THAT POSITION OF NK SIDE AT 294TH WAS AS REPORTED REFTEL WITH  
ONE EXCEPTION. GENERAL ADAHS DID NOT DEFINITELY STATE  
CREW WOULD BE RELEASED IF NK CONDITIONS MET AS INDICATED  
PARA 4 REFTEL BUT INSTEAD USED FORMULATION THAT QUESTION COULD  
BE RESOLVED. AGAIN WE SEE SIMILARITY TO PUEBLO NEGOTIATING  
HISTORY WHEN NK'S WERE WILLING TO CONVERT VAGUE ASSURANCE TO  
DEFINITE PROMISE ONLY WHEN THEY RECEIVED INDICATION WE CONSIDERED  
SIGNING THEIR DOCUMENT. ALONG SAME LINES, IN LAST SENTENCE  
PARA 5 REFTEL INFERENCE OF EASY SOLUTION MORE CORRECTLY BELIEVED  
TO BE THAT "QUESTION CAN BE RESOLVED".

2. NK SIDE HAS STATED THAT IF WE SUBMIT DOCUMENT ADMITTING CRIME,  
NOT YET PRECISELY DEFINED. ALTHOUGH WE NOTE NK'S HAVE NOT YET

CONFIDENTIAL

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 SEOUL 04846 041119Z

INCLUDED ESPIONAGE), APOLOGIZING, AND GIVING ASSURANCES THAT INCIDENT WILL NOT BE REPEATED, MATTER CAN BE SETTLED EXPEDITIOUSLY.

3. IN EFFECT, WE HAVE IN PRESENT CASE ARRIVED AT POINT REACHED ONLY AFTER MORE LENGTHY NEGOTIATIONS IN 1963 HELICOPTER AND IN PUEBLO CASES. THIS MAY BE SIMPLY BECAUSE PROCEDURES AND FORMS HAVE BY NOW BEEN WELL ESTABLISHED BUT WE ARE STILL INCLINED TO THINK THAT NK'S WOULD LIKE TO SETTLE EXPEDITIOUSLY. ON OTHER HAND, WE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE AS STATED SEOUL 4760 THAT NK SIDE HAS NO INTENTION SETTLING FOR LESS THAN CUSTOMARY POUND OF FLESH AS STATED PARA ONE ABOVE.

4. THE POINT HAS NOW BEEN REACHED WHERE CLOSED MEETING APPEARS DESIRABLE. WE WOULD PROPOSE TO CALL SUCH MEETING AS SOON AS INSTRUCTIONS RECEIVED. AT THAT MEETING, WE WOULD SUBMIT A DRAFT OF STATEMENT WHICH WE WOULD BE PREPARED TO SIGN SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH TRANSFER OF PERSONNEL. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF PROPOSED STATEMENT:

5. "I HEREBY STATE THAT CAPTAIN DAVID H. CRAWFORD, WARRANT OFFICER AND MALCOLM V. LOEPKE, AND SPECIALIST FOUR HERMAN E. HOFSTATTER BECAME DISORIENTED, LOST AND INADVERTENTLY INTRUDED INTO THE AIR SPACE UNDER THE CONTROL OF THE KOREAN PEOPLE'S ARMY ACROSS THE HAN RIVER ESTUARY WHILE ON A MILITARY TRAINING MISSION ON 17 AUGUST 1969, THEREBY VIOLATING THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT AND ACKNOWLEDGE THAT THESE PERSONNEL WERE CAPTURED BY THE SELF-DEFENSIVE MEASURES TAKEN BY THE KOREAN PEOPLE'S ARMY, EXPRESS SINCERE REGRET THAT SUCH A VIOLATION OCCURRED, AND GUARANTEE THAT ALL PRACTICAL MEASURES WILL BE TAKEN BY THE UNITED NATIONS COMMAND TO PREVENT A RECURRENCE OF AN INCIDENT OF THIS KIND IN THE FUTURE."

6. WE DO NOT BELIEVE THIS DRAFT DOCUMENT WILL BE ACCEPTABLE BUT IS A STARTING POINT IN ACCORDANCE WITH EXISTING GUIDANCE. EVENTUALLY WE WILL PROBABLY HAVE TO INCLUDE SPECIFIC ELEMENTS IDENTIFIED BY GENERAL RI NAMELY: "FORMALLY APOLOGIZES" ADMITS CRIMINAL ACT OF VIOLATION OF SOVEREIGNTY" OR "VIOLATION OF SOVEREIGN AIR SPACE OF DPRK", "ADMITS FLAGRANT VIOLATION OF AA", GUARANTEES TO TAKE EVERY PRECAUTION TO "PREVENT SIMILAR INCIDENTS IN FUTURE",

7. QUESTION OF HOW MANY STATEMENTS ARE REQUIRED AND WHEN THEY

CONFIDENTIAL 2



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 SEOUL 04846 041119Z

SHOULD BE SUBMITTED REMAINS. OUR IMPRESSION IS THAT NK SIDE WOULD AGREE TO SINGLE DOCUMENT AS IN OURS. BY SENIOR



Department of State

TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03. SEOUL 04846 041119Z

SHOULD BE SUBMITTED REMAINS. OUR IMPRESSION IS THAT NK SIDE WILL AGREE TO SINGLE DOCUMENT AS IN PUEBLO CASE, THAT IT CAN BE SIGNED BY SENIOR MAC MEMBER, AND THAT DOCUMENT SUBMITTED WILL BE SIGNED SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH RELEASE OF THE CREW. WE WOULD PROPOSE TO TAKE THIS LINE AT CLOSED MEETING.

8. PRESUME REACTION OF NK SIDE WILL BE TO DECLARE OUR DOCUMENT UNACCEPTABLE AND AT THAT TIME OR SUBSEQUENTLY, EITHER TO GIVE US TEXT ACCEPTABLE TO NK OR TO CONTINUE TO REFER US TO TEXT OF EARLIER APOLOGIES SUBMITTED BY US. WE WILL THEN BE IN FAMILIAR SITUATION.

9. OUR LINE OF REASONING IS OF COURSE BASED ON PAVLOVIAN CONCEPT THAT NK'S WILL REACT IN ESSENTIALLY SAME MANNER AS THEY HAVE IN PAST. WE ADMIT POSSIBILITY THAT THEY MAY NOT BE THIS PREDICTABLE AND THAT AT LEAST ONE CLOSED MEETING SHOULD BE DEVOTED TO EFFORT TO FIND OUT IF THEY PREPARED TO TAKE SOMETHING LESS. GP-4.  
LATHRAM

CONFIDENTIAL

~~EXDIS~~

*Ex file*  
*S/S Pending*  
*14718*  
*XR #14205*

(21)

THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

President approved recommendation.  
Walls to RLBrown 10/10/69.

*EA advised.*

October 2, 1969

*10/2/69*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Helicopter Crew Members Held by  
North Koreans

In three open meetings of the Military Armistice Commission and two private meetings with the North Koreans, we have refused to accede to the North Korean demand that the United States make humiliating and untrue statements to secure the release of the helicopter crew members. We have at the same time openly acknowledged that the helicopter inadvertently flew into North Korean air space and committed a technical violation of the Armistice Agreement.

It may be that the time has now come to reconsider our negotiating position. We see no indication that the North Koreans are interested in releasing the men soon and past experience strongly indicates that they will hold them until we sign the kind of document which they want. Two of the crew members are seriously wounded and family pressure is building up for us to follow the precedent established in the Pueblo and the 1963/64 helicopter cases. Probably we will be obliged to do that eventually and I feel that in the humanitarian interest of trying to get the men back as soon as possible, we should now consider a move in that direction. Ambassador Porter who was here recently for consultation concurs as well as the Department of Defense. He is also concerned that there may be future incidents of this kind and feels that fairly prompt signature will help discount the

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*KORN-45*  
*# DEF 975 X*

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
significance of such documents by giving them a routine character.

I would, however, attach two conditions:

a. We should sign only when assured that signature will secure early release of the crew members.

b. We should defer until after the Korean item debate in the General Assembly (late October to late November) signature of any language which goes beyond that suggested in the enclosed draft telegram in attributing the violations and an apology to the United Nations Command.

If after reconsideration you should decide on this course, I enclose a draft telegram incorporating new instructions.



William P. Rogers

Enclosure:

Draft telegram.

S/S *BA*  
A True Copy

SECRET/EXDIS

*A Phone Conversation between Judd, the Counselor of the U.S. Embassy, and Yoon, the Director-General of the Bureau of the U.S.*

Date: Oct. 10, 1969

A. The testimony of Melvin R. Laird, Secretary of Defense

The following phone conversation regards the recent media release of the secret testimony of Melvin R. Laird, Secretary of Defense, concerning the withdrawal of the U.S. Armed Forces from South Korea.

1. Even though Laird's testimony is assumed to be a faithful reflection of the U.S. policy toward South Korea, the press release provoked unrest among the South Korean public, who were already anxious over the potential withdrawal of U.S. Armed Forces. The public unrest is likely to be a sensitive issue at the national referendum and administrative inspection, which will be held in a few days.
2. The press release was made precisely when the Soviet Union demanded the withdrawal of the U.S. Armed Forces from South Korea in the United Nations General Assembly. The corresponding timeframe inevitably suggests the possibility of secret U.S.-Soviet deals or mutual understandings and poses a grave concern about the vote status of South Korea at the General Assembly.

B. The Vietnam Problem

Recently, Senator Frank Church and Senator Mark Hatfield submitted an aggressive resolution demanding a complete withdrawal from Vietnam to a Senate Committee. Though the resolution is in the process of consideration, its direct repulsion of the existing U.S. official principles regarding the Vietnam War, such as "the honorable settlement of the Vietnam War" and "respect for the Vietnam sovereignty," requires careful attention of the Republic of Korea on the Congress' further actions.

C. Future Prospects

The overall situation as well as the tension in the Republic of Korea will be ameliorated if the U.S. government directly rejects the statements from above to reflect the government's official positions on the issues.

1. The Republic of Korea will welcome any official U.S. statement that rejects the resolution as a clear reflection of the U.S. government's policy toward Vietnam.
2. Councillor Judd understands such a position of the Republic of Korea and will deliver the contents of the phone conversation to the U.S. government. The secretary of defense will contact the Republic of Korea once he gathers further information regarding the issue.

Rec'd S/S 10:25a  
10/14/69

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SECRET/EXDIS

October 14, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Mr. Theodore L. Eliot, Jr.  
State Secretariat

FROM: Jeanne W. Davis

SUBJECT: Helicopter Crew Members Held  
by North Korea (S/S 14718)

This is to confirm that the President  
has approved the course of action recommended  
in Secretary Rogers' memorandum of October 2,  
1969, concerning attempts to obtain the release  
of the helicopter crew men held by North Korea.

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S/S #14718  
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The Ministry of Foreign Affairs

No. WUS-1047

Date: 101500

To the attention of: Ambassador to the U.S.

1. According to the reports in various foreign newspapers, Secretary of Defense Laird expressed his intention of "Koreanizing" and fully withdrawing the U.S. Armed Forces in South Korea at a secret meeting of the House Appropriation Committee, held in last June.
2. Obtain the precise statements made in the meeting and report to the ministry.
3. Meanwhile, notify the position of the Republic of Korea to the State Department by means stated below, and report the U.S.' responses and explanations.
4. Domestic media is actively reporting and discussing Laird's statement, and is appalled that the statement is an exact reversal of the former one, and that it was made secret.
5. The government of the Republic of Korea believes the reports of such a statement to be false. However, should the statement be a true reflection of U.S.' policy, the Republic of Korea will inevitably be alarmed.
6. The government and people of the Republic of Korea have a great interest in the domestic and international impact Laird's statement has. Our gravest concern is that the statement may provoke discussions at the National Assembly or the media concerning the reduction of the U.S. Armed Forces in South Korea and further damage the defense capability of the Republic of Korea.
7. The statement is extremely volatile regarding the current trend within the United Nations, where the communist bloc is proposing withdrawal of all foreign troops. Therefore the press release of the contents of a secret meeting falls within a suspicious timeframe and inevitably raises a question whether the U.S. is endorsing the Soviet Union's intentions. The Republic of Korea demands the U.S.' clear explanation on the U.S. position and perspective on the issue.
8. Request the U.S. government to reveal its position clearly and with the responsibility regarding any impacts the secretary's statement may have in future. Report back to the ministry the U.S.' responses.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

RE: WUS 1047

I report issues related to testimony of Secretary of Defense Laird, delivered in a closed meeting of TaeHo House of Representatives held in June. This report was based on interviews with related personnel in the U.S. government.

1. The objective of the speech by Secretary of Defense Laird is to reduce American forces abroad and to make concerned countries take primary responsibility. This reflects the Nixon administration's basic policy and it is also applicable to U.S. Armed Forces in Korea.

2. Therefore, the American government's position is that as American forces can not permanently stay in the ROK, it will have to ultimately withdraw military forces. Some high-ranking officials strongly claimed that their position agrees with the South Korean government's 'self-reliant defense' principle.

3. Yet, the American government does not have specific plans to reduce or withdraw U.S. armed forces in Korea. MacCarther's proposal reflected this basic position, and it is regarded to assess various matters. In this assessment procedure, strengthened national defense, the North Korean puppet regime's direct and indirect threat and Red China's combined threat for security of Asia will be mainly dealt with. In particular, the treatment of the Vietnam War and withdrawal of combined forces will be the most important factors.

4. Regarding this, I will contact the American administration and leaders of Congress whenever possible. I will also continue reporting how to represent South Korea's situation. (마|ㅇ)

Advance: Re-classify as general document.



SECRET

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

Downgraded to UNCLASSIFIED

*Sammy*  
*7/22/69*

311

*Estates*  
*DG Smith*

DJSM-1640-69  
22 October 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Subject: Constraining the Arms Race between the ROK and North Korea (C)

1. Reference is made to the meeting between General Bonesteel and the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 24 September 1969, during which General Bonesteel suggested that an approach to the Soviet Union for the purpose of constraining the arms race might be productive.

2. The Joint Staff has developed a paper on the general subject of constraints on arms deliveries to the two sides in Korea. In accordance with the guidance expressed at the meeting with General Bonesteel, agencies outside the Joint Staff were not consulted.

3. The major conclusions of the paper are that:

a. Based on the results of recent approaches to the Soviet Union (such as in the Arab-Israeli dispute) a request to the Soviet Union for mutual constraints on the arms buildup in Korea probably would not be successful. In addition, it might well be counter-productive.

b. An agreement (whether public or private) by the Soviets to cut back on arms deliveries to NK probably would cause the North Koreans to turn to the Chinese communists for such aid, resulting in a decline of Soviet influence.

c. Reaching some sort of "constraint" agreement with North Korea and Communist China is highly improbable.

Downgraded to UNCLASSIFIED

GROUP - 2  
Downgraded at 3 year intervals; declassified

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Authority: NND 941294  
By: NARA Date: 1/11/85

**SECRET**  
Downgraded to UNCLASSIFIED

d. Present political and budgetary restraints on the delivery of arms to the two sides in Korea probably will continue to constrain the arms race without an overt agreement between the US and the Soviet Union.

e. US delivery of arms to the ROK should continue to be based on objectives which would provide forces adequate to stem a North Korean or a North Korean/Communist Chinese attack until appropriate assistance by the US can be rendered.

4. I recommend that no further action be taken on this issue at this time.

SIGNED

NELS C. JOHNSON  
Vice Admiral, USN  
Director, Joint Staff

PREPARED BY:

Captain W. S. Guthrie, USN  
Northeast Asia Br., J-5  
Extension 59924

cc: File  
Staff  
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RAIR  
J-5

Downgraded to UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 947294  
By NARA Date 7/11/08

#28

Selection from Minister of Foreign Affairs Choi's speech to the Korean-American Association.

23 October 1969

The Republic of Korea needs positive cooperation and aid from the United States to block power provocation and threats from the North Korean puppet regime. We need aid from America until ROK 's self-reliant military force becomes strong enough to overwhelm the North Korean puppet regime and cause it to abandon its plot to invade South Korea.

Recently there was a report that Washington is considering a reduction of the United States Armed Forces in the Republic of Korea. I need to strongly express the uneasiness of Koreans. You may remember that one peaceful Sunday, on 25th June 1950, right after the withdrawal of United States Armed Forces, the DPRK took advantage of the moment in attacking Republic of Korea.

To be sure, the DPRK will be examining the degree of defense resolution. Jumping into consideration of reduction of the United States Armed Forces under such circumstances will result in strengthening North Korea's aggressive movements to communize the entire peninsula by military force.

If an overt invasion and new war breaks out, we will have to face countless losses and casualties and misery again. Stationed American Armed Forces will promote morale substantially, as well as physical defense capacity.

Therefore, American Armed Forces remaining at at least the current level will be key in countering the adventures of communist invasion in this land.

Both states had very clear standing points related to the possibility of invasion from North Korea. We know that America has reaffirmed to keep and fulfill pledges related to the ROK.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs Report

Woe: XX764

Recipient: Mr President

Title: Interview with Ambassador Porter in the Republic of Korea

I report as follows:

U.S. Ambassador to South Korea Porter visited me from 10 am for 50 minutes on 28th October 1969, and discussed the issues related to the reduction of United States Armed Forces in the Republic of Korea. Issues related to import restrictions and the Vietnam War were also deliberated during the meeting.

Regarding reduction of the United States Armed Forces in the Republic of Korea, although the issue is frequently reported in some newspapers, the position of the United States, which is not reducing the United States Armed Forces and not withdrawing from Korea, has been reconfirmed. On the issue of import restrictions, the ROK government suggested the U.S. create an agreement between both countries, under which the ROK can control exports. Additionally, there was an exchange of opinions about the issues of the Vietnam War. These are reported, and the contents of the interview are attached.  
/End/

Minister of Foreign Affairs.

#### Issues related to reduction

Ambassador Porter: The U.S. government has no plan to reduce U.S. armed forces, which has been frequently reported in some news papers recently. Of course, American armed forces cannot stay in the ROK permanently, but American armed forces will not be reduced without counter-balancing power being created, because modern war requires a high level of science and technology.

Secretary Choi: I understand that issues related to reduction started from testimony of minister of defense in Congress. However after Secretary of State Rogers visited the ROK and also Mr. Yong Dae Park talked with President Nixon, it has been reconfirmend that American armed forces will neither be reduced nor withdrawn from the ROK. Therefore, the South Korean government is not anxious about this problem, yet it has raised problems because it has been reported in some newspapers.

This morning, an article said that there has been criticism about military economic aid to South Korea, especially an article related to advocacy of Congressman Desman stating that military aid to the ROK is unnecessary considering the fact that South Korea is buying government securities. Even if there were such criticism, it should not have been printed in the newspaper.

Ambassador Porter:

American press tends to pad up trivial things. We will work to prevent these issues from being printed. If the American government has any plan to reduce armed forces, we will let the South Korean government know before printing in newspapers.

#### 1. Issues related to restrictive import of fabrics

Ambassador Porter: Recently, proposals to restrict importing fabrics have been raised in the Congress. If this continues, certainly a bill that restricts imports will be passed in the Congress. The American government's solution to such a problem has been already proposed to the Ministry of Commerce.

As solving this problem through self-regulation can cash in on particularities of South Korea, I strongly recommend South Korea to use this type of method. This is because

South Korea is still a developing country, and it entered into the economic development process much later than Japan, Taiwan and Hong Kong. Therefore, self-regulation between the ROK and U.S. will be important for solving this problem, reflecting particularities of South Korea. South Korea is in a different situation with those of Japan, Hong Kong and Taiwan.

Secretary Choi: If an agreement is made related to self-regulation with a certain country, and a bill related to restricting importing fabric is passed in America, what will happen?

Ambassador Porter: A self-regulating country in compliance with bilateral agreements can be treated as an exceptional case even under the American municipal law.

Secretary Choi: Although I wish to resolve this problem peacefully by consulting with the American government to see things in a larger point of view, the Ministry of Commerce, which manages the fabric industry, should be persuaded to understand the American government's situation.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs will adequately examine this problem, and if needed, a director of the trade department will contact Superintendent Rosanzo to look through the negotiation draft.

Ambassador Porter: I will show the draft paper.

Secretary Choi: If we open negotiations, how would you like to open them?

Ambassador Porter: We will open a formal meeting and we are thinking of opening a preliminary session. It will be in Seoul or Washington, wherever the South Korean government wishes to hold it. If the Ministry of Foreign Affairs examines and approves the meeting, we will turn in an Aide-Memoire.

Secretary Choi: We will talk about presenting a paper next time. I will first order the director of the trade department to contact related personnel at the embassy and inquire into related issues.

Ambassador Porter: We have already agreed to solve this problem through self-regulation. As we don't have much time, we will have to hurry up. And considering



image the American Congress has of South Korea and military relations, the South Korean government should reach an agreement rather than maintaining hard line.

Secretary Choi: We will first work within the government and inform [the U.S. ] of standpoint of the South Korean government.

### 3. Issues related to Vietnam

Ambassador Porter: Many countries advised and recommended to the American government to end the war and to bring peace as soon as possible.. However, North Vietnamese and Vietgong haven't been showing any inferior correspondence. Considering this, American government has asked a few number of governments to point out to the North Vietnamese or Vietgong.

Secretary Choi: Which countries did you ask for favors?

Ambassador Porter: That is secret, but it asked Germany, Belgium, Rumania, Denmark, Finland, UK, India, Norway, Sweden, Japan, [two other countries].

Secretary Choi: How did they respond?

Ambassador Porter: They didn't respond.



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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CONFIDENTIAL 582

PAGE 01 SEUL 05957 291012Z

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*Seoul 5957  
10/29/69  
4/10/69*

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEUL 5957

EXDIS

SUBJECT: DOWNED HELICOPTER; THIRD CLOSED MEETING

1. FOLLOWING IS MAJOR GENERAL ADAMS REPORT ON THIRD CLOSED MEETING WHICH CONVENED AT 1100 HOURS, 29 OCTOBER 1969, AND RECESSED AT 1312 HOURS.
2. IN OPENING STATEMENT UNC SENIOR MEMBER REQUESTED NK'S COMMENT ON DRAFT RECEIPT DOCUMENT TABLED AT FIRST PRIVATE MEETING 8 SEPTEMBER 1969. AT SECOND PRIVATE MEETING NK'S HAD INDICATED THEY WOULD COMMENT ON RECEIPT DOCUMENT AT NEXT MEETING, HOWEVER RESPONSE TO UNC SENIOR MEMBER'S REQUEST RESULTED IN REPLY THAT CONTENTS OF RECEIPT WOULD BE DISCUSSED AFTER CONTENTS OF LETTER OF APOLOGY WAS SETTLED. NK'S ALSO STATED THAT DELAY IN PROGRESS WAS DUE TO UNC UNWARRANTED ATTITUDE AND THAT SETTLEMENT AWAITS UNC'S SUBMISSION OF DOCUMENT OF APOLOGY FOR OUR CRIMINAL ACT.
3. IN FIVE SUCCESSIVE STATEMENTS, UNC SENIOR MEMBER REQUESTED ASSURANCE THAT SIGNATURE OF THE DOCUMENT OF APOLOGY AGREED UPON WOULD RESULT IN SIMULTANEOUS RELEASE OF THREE PERSONNEL. GENERAL ADAMS REFERRED TO TWO NK STATEMENTS IN FIRST MEETING WHICH STATED THAT RECEIPT DOCUMENT WOULD BE REQUIRED IN CASE OF DELIVERY OF PERSONNEL, THUS INFERRING QUESTIONABLE INTENTIONS OF NK SIDE EVEN AFTER DOCUMENT OF APOLOGY SUBMITTED. UNC SENIOR MEMBER ALSO OUTLINED PROPOSED PROCEDURES IN DETAIL WHICH WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE FOR TRANSFER OF PERSONNEL TO UNC CUSTODY AFTER TEXT OF APOLOGY DOCUMENT HAD BEEN AGREED. IN EACH CASE NK'S REPLY TO UNC SENIOR MEMBER'S STATEMENT WAS TO THE EFFECT THAT PROCEDURES OF RECEIPT AND SPECIFIC ARRANGEMENTS OF DELIVERY OF PILOTS COULD BE EASILY REACHED AFTER AGREEMENT ON THE CONTENTS OF THE LETTER OF

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# Department of State TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02 SEOUL 05957 291012Z

APOLOGY WHICH NK SIDE HAD REPEATEDLY STATED WAS NECESSARY FOR FURTHER PROGRESS AND CONTENTS OF WHICH HAD BEEN OUTLINED.

- 4. IN FIFTH STATEMENT, GENERAL ADAMS INDICATED THAT IT WAS CLEAR THAT PROGRESS COULD NOT BE MADE UNTIL AN AGENDA FOR DISCUSSION WAS AGREED UPON AND AGAIN REITERATED THAT ASSURANCE OF DELIVERY OF PILOTS UPON SIGNATURE OF APOLOGY DOCUMENT WAS OF PRIMARY IMPORTANCE, AND THAT AFTER THIS ASSURANCE RECEIVED AGREEMENT ON TIMING AND PROCEDURES COULD THEN BE SETTLED AND TEXT OF APOLOGY DOCUMENT WOULD FOLLOW. THIS PROPOSAL WAS AGAIN REPEATED IN SIXTH STATEMENT ALONG WITH INDICATION THAT UNTIL NK'S WERE WILLING TO AGREE TO THESE ITEMS IT APPEARED THAT PROGRESS WAS STALEMATED. AT THIS TIME GENERAL ADAMS ALSO MADE A REQUEST FOR REPORT ON CONDITION OF THREE WOUNDED PERSONNEL SO THAT THEIR FAMILIES COULD BE INFORMED. NK REPLY FOLLOWED PREVIOUS PATTERN WITH STATEMENT THAT UNC SIDE WAS IN NO POSITION TO REQUEST INFORMATION ON CONDITION OF PILOTS AND SHOULD DIRECT ATTENTION TO MORE SUBSTANTIVE MATTERS AND STATED THAT UNC SIDE QUOTE WOULD BEAR RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE DISADVANTAGEOUS RESULTS WHICH MIGHT BE BROUGHT BY YOUR MISCONDUCT UNQUOTE.
- 5. GENERAL ADAMS' CLOSING STATEMENT REITERATED DEMAND FOR ASSURANCE AND DISCUSSION OF PROCEDURES AND PROPOSED RECESS WITHOUT REFERENCE TO NEXT MEETING. NK'S CLOSING STATEMENT INDICATED UNC OBVIOUSLY NOT PREPARED TO SUBMIT DOCUMENT AND THIS UNWARRANTED STAND WOULD MAKE PROGRESS IMPOSSIBLE WITH RESPONSIBILITY FOR SETTLEMENT RESTING UPON UNC ATTITUDE.
- 6. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS WILL BE SENT SEPTEL.
- 7. PRESS RELEASE ISSUED 1630 LOCAL TIME STATING TIME AND SUBJECT OF MEETING.
- 8. DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS TO JCS AND CINCPAC. GP-4. PORTER



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S/S-S-CMS 46, 47

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Current Situation of the North Korean Puppet Regime's Infiltrations into South Korea

Table of Contents

1. Characteristics of recent infiltration operations of the North Korean puppet regime
2. Appearance of suspicious fellows and military achievements
3. Summary of major incidents
4. Prospects of infiltration of the North Korean puppet regime in 1970

Characteristics of recent infiltration operations of the North Korean puppet regime

1. One-night operations to short-term operations
2. Many groups of small numbers
3. Infiltrating primarily shorelines
4. Use of heavy weapons (82mm recoilless rifle, antiaircraft gun, etc)
5. Most spies sent into the South belong to the Central Liaison Department
6. Building of guerrilla base and developing revolutionary forces
7. Crossing over into North Korea along with underground organizations and inducting persons, then repatriating them as espionage agents against the South.
8. Disturbance of public sentiment through the infiltration to remote islands and mountainous areas.

Appearance of suspicious fellows and military achievements

1969. 1. 1. ~ 12. 31.

	Appearance		Military achievements				Damage			
	Number of occurrences	Number of persons	Captured	Killed by gunfire	Voluntarily Surrendered	Investigations	Total	Classification	Killed	Wounded
Front	18	68	2	17	2		21	The Republic of Korea forces	10	32
	66	139		6				U. S. forces	11	4
2 <sup>nd</sup> level	23	90	4	70	2		76	Rear area	2	7
								The Republic of Korea forces		
Other investigations	52	77			3	70	73	Civilian	16	8
Other investigations	159	347	6	93	7	70	176	Total	46	57

Summary of major incidents

1. Jumunjin incident

(1) On 16 MAR 1969, 05:00, they have landed on Jumunjin and disguised as counterespionage agents, wearing Republic of Korea military uniforms. They have intruded into the Gangnam Inn to check the guests and have taken away their social security cards. They have killed a police officer of a shore GP while they escaped. The combat police troops and reserve forces mobilized then sunk their rubber boat by converging fire.

(2) Military achievements

7 killed, 4 carbine rifles, 3 submachine guns, 4 pistols, 11 hand grenades, 250 rounds of ammunition, 1 copy of 1/50,000 map, 4 outline maps of Jumunjin, 120,000 won in cash

2. Bukpyong Incident

(1) On 8 JUN 1969, 01:50, 3 armed guerrillas of the North Korean puppet regime were found by sentinels of a shore GP as they landed on the shore of Bukpyong in a rubber boat. The boat has been sunk. 1 enemy has been killed and 2 others have run away.

(2) The enemy mother ship has fired a 82mm recoilless rifle once. A family of 5 about 1.5 Km away has been killed.

(3) Military achievements

1 rifle, 1 pistol, 1 magazine, 2 hand grenades, 36 rounds of ammunition, 45,000 won of Korean currency

3. 1st Huksando Incident

(1) On 12 JUN 1969,

23:00, the Central Intelligence Agency posed to capture one enemy spy ship, which is expected to be sent to the south based on previous detection.

(2) The enemy spy ship showed up at the expected time and attempted to flee from the awaiting ground forces. The ship has been sunk by firing from the destroyers and aircraft.

(3) The combined search team of military and police killed the enemies who were hiding west of Huksando.

(4) Military achievements

6 killed, 7 dead bodies, 2 machine guns, 1 Soviet submachine gun, 1 hand grenade, other equipment, 30,000 won in South Korean currency

#### 4. Buan incident

(1) 14 JUN 1969, 15:40, a combat police squad has mobilized based on the report of a fisherman, and all of them have been killed under the support of the air force as the encircling net has been compressed.

#### (2) Military achievements

3 killed, 2 submachine guns, 1 pistol, 260 rounds of ammunition, 310,400 won in South Korean currency, other equipment

#### 5. Downing of a U. S. military helicopter incident

On 17 AUG 1969, an unarmed U. S. military helicopter crossed over the DMZ by mistake and was shot down by the firing of the North Korean puppet regime. 3 crewmembers were detained. Released on 2 DEC.

#### 6. Sinking of a Wando patrol boat incident

On 17 SEP 1969, our small patrol boat was sunk by indiscriminate firing from an armed spy ship in the south sea of Wando. 2 of our police officers have been killed.

#### 7. Kunsan Osikdo incident

(1) On 22 SEP 1969, an armed spy ship disguised as a fishing boat was been detected by police just before the landing on the Osikdo. All 4 men were killed as a result of the combined operation of the army, navy and air force.

#### (2) Military achievements

1 82mm recoilless rifle, 1 machine gun, 100,000 won in cash

#### 8. Eosado incident

On 23 SEP 1969, during a patrol mission near Eosado, ship number 93 found an armed operation ship then chased to sink.

#### 9. 2nd Huksando Incident

(1) 24 SEP 1969, an armed spy ship of the North Korean puppet regime approached Huksando for an infiltration of resident spies, then was found by the Republic of Korea Navy Busan and was sunk after a 4 hour-long chase.

#### (2) Military achievements

1 82mm recoilless rifle, 2 40mm rocket launchers, 2 antiaircraft machine guns, 1 machine gun



10. Kidnap to North Korea of a KAL airplane

On 11 DEC 1969, 12:25, the North Korean puppet regime hijacked an unarmed civilian airplane, YS-11, of the Republic of Korea. 4 crewmembers and 47 civilians have been detained until this moment.

Prospects of infiltration of the North Korean puppet regime in 1970

According to the reversion possibility of their espionage agents, the North Korean Puppet Regime's future plans to develop their advantageous positions including the false manipulated propaganda such as the provocative schemes are so-called 'executed by the revolutionary power of the South Korea', are as follows:

For the rear area,

First, the attempt to plan the sabotage and propaganda activities as well as to revolutionize primarily from the vulnerable shore areas (especially remote islands) extending the underground organizations through the massive dispatch to the south of long term resident spies.

Second, the indulgence to raid, destroy, murder, and kidnap single targets through the infiltration of armed guerrillas using the airborne infiltration ability that they already have secured.

Third, the attempt to induce or to kidnap fishing boats, passenger ships, naval vessels, and airplanes to the north in the sea near the armistice line and open sea.

Forth, the creation of the political, military and economic confusion throughout the kidnapping and assassination of the prominent figures and commander level high-ranking officers as well as the destruction of military and major industrial facilities by the simultaneous multi hit infiltration of small groups.

Fifth, the increasing of legal and illegal infiltration of the Jochongryon spies for long term concealment and the positiveness of indirect aggression as reinforcing the detoured operations and the psychological warfare activities through the 3rd countries.

Also, in the forward area, they will attempt to restore the ground routes and to develop new secret routes. They will carry out feint operations in order to support infiltration of the rear area along with the increase of provocative activities in the forward area and then especially, will reinforce the psychological warfare to the south.

The diplomatic offense in the name of peace will be reinforced to diverse countries including neutral countries in order to gain supporters in the UN and to improve its international position.

It is expected that induction operations will be reinforced caused by Japan's 'International Explosion' in 1970 and the attempt at political negotiations between the south and the north through the false manipulated propaganda and agitation mainly

about the early withdrawal of the USFK and the unification of the mother country.

Authority NND 20080

By DP NARA Date 2/20/08 | 11, 1969

Lot 73D360 Box 5062

1165

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POC - International Relations 1969

Important Questions  
presented on the Occasion of  
the Visit by the Congressional  
Delegation of the United States

Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
Republic of Korea

November 1, 1969  
Seoul

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1166

1. Security Problems for the Republic of Korea

A. Current situation and threats by north Korean communists:

1) The north Korean communists have been continuously increasing their provocative acts against the Republic of Korea through armed guerrilla infiltrations into the rear areas and through intrusions and disturbances over the Demilitarized Zone for the purpose of their so-called "communized unification of Korea by force in 1970s."

2) As was anticipated, armed guerrilla infiltrations which were in lull for the last few months have once again become more intensified and ever increasing since the national referendum was recently held in Korea and with the beginning of fall-harvest season. They maintain several thousands of specially trained military personnel solely for such purpose and fully capable of infiltrations by land, sea and air.

3) While the morale of Korean combat troops including those of the Homeland Reserve Force and Combat National Police Force deployed along the coast-line for counter-infiltration operations are very high, their

equipment are rather poor and insufficient especially in detection, transportation and communications.

4) In view of the fact that recently north Korean communists have been making more frequent and intensified infiltrations into the coast-line and rear areas, it has become acutely necessary to counter these situations on a long-term basis with specific and positive measures.

5) In order to prepare for such situation, the Korean Government is taking effective measures for counter-infiltration operations and, in this connection, positive assistance of the United States Government is also indispensable to counter effectively such communist provocative activities.

**B. Special military assistance:**

1) Since further increase of guerrilla infiltrations and provocative acts by north Korean communists is anticipated in early 1970s, it is urged that both the Republic of Korea and the United States should develop and maintain strong defense capabilities to counter such non-regular warfare.

2) In this regard, the Korean Government already

placed a request with the United States Government for assistance under special program which was jointly prepared by the Republic of Korea - United States military authorities. A prompt consideration by the United States Government should be given to this program so that necessary equipment could be delivered at the earliest possible time.

3) Up to now, two and a half million Homeland Reserve Force has proved itself indispensable for effective operations in detecting and destroying armed communist infiltration attempts.

The Homeland Reserve Force will have to be fully utilized in the future counter-guerrilla operations, and it is strongly hoped that the United States Government will extend positive support and expedite the sufficient supplies of arms and equipments.

4) The budgetary measures have been already taken on the side of the Korean Government for the implementation of the above-mentioned special programs.

C. Special military assistance (Republic of Korea Armed Forces Development Objective Plan):

1) The criteria of Korea's defense requirements are for maintenance of adequate degree of defense capabilities which could be a decisive deterrent to north Korean communist all-out attack against the Republic of Korea and, at the same time, is capable of countering intensified armed guerrilla infiltrations.

2) As a part of the modernization program of the Korean armed forces which was previously agreed upon between the two Governments, twelve (12) F-4D Phantom Fighter-Bombers out of a total of 18 as programmed have been delivered by the end of October, this year. The addition of the Phantom fighters to the Republic of Korea Air Force was the substantial boost to the Republic of Korea's defense capability as well as an encouragement to the people and the Government of the Republic of Korea and was greatly helpful to enhance its morale.

While expressing profound appreciations to the Government and people of the United States for the generous and expeditious actions, the Korean Government earnestly hopes that the rest of the Phantom fighters would be delivered at the earliest possible time.



1170

D. United States Forces in Korea:

1) The Korean Government and its people firmly believe that the continuous stationing of United States Forces in Korea is essential in view of ever-increasing threats created by north Korean communists, Communist China and the Soviet Union. It is also necessary to continue the presence of United States troops in Korea for maintaining the balance of power in the Far East.

2) The United States troops in Korea is the substantial element of the United Nations Forces in Korea and, therefore, the withdrawal of United States Forces from Korea would mean the virtual withdrawal of the United Nations presence in Korea, hence, abandonment of United Nations commitments to the Republic of Korea.

The result would merely be opening a new wide way for north Korean communists to provoke another all-out war against the Republic of Korea.

3) The Korean Government and its people are already concerned over the recent reports that the United

117-1

States Government is considering a long-range plan of United States troop level reduction in Korea.

4) It has to be pointed out that north Korean communists are now testing the firmness of the United States determination on the defense of Korea and that, under such circumstances, any hasty consideration on the reduction of the United States Forces in Korea would only serve to encourage north Korean communists to intensify their aggressive and provocative acts for the purpose of communizing the whole of Korea by force.

5) Therefore, United States air and naval forces in Korea should be reinforced and United States ground forces be maintained at the present level of strength since the Republic of Korea is still on the way to establishing her self-reliant defense capabilities to counter those of north Korean communists.

The continuous presence of United States forces in Korea would not only boost the defense strength

but also greatly enhance the morale of Korean people.

It should also be emphasized that the presence of United States forces which physically demonstrates the alliance of powers in Korea does serve as the most effective deterrent to any attempt of north Korean communists for an all-out attack.

6) The Korean Government is fully prepared to render every cooperation in maintaining strong tactical and strategical military bases in Korea.

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Seoul, Korea

November 5, 1969

OFFICIAL-INFORMAL

Curtis W. Kumman, Esquire  
Department of State - INR/REA  
Washington, D. C. 20520

Dear Curt:

I am writing at the request of Dr. Synn Seung Kwon (Sin Sung Kwon) who is a staff member of the newly established National Unification Board. Dr. Synn is a member of the ROK delegation to the UN. He expects to spend some time in Washington and asked me to suggest people with whom he might meet. I naturally thought of you first. The Unification Board is, as you know, just getting started and we are anxious to encourage it in whatever way we can. I think it is a hopeful sign that one of the staff members is being included in the delegation to the UN this year.

Incidentally, Dr. Synn got his Ph.D. in the field of Russian diplomatic history at Harvard so you and he may have some common interests.

Anything you can do to assist him or demonstrate our interest in his organization would be greatly appreciated. If you have time, you might introduce him to some of the fellows on the Korean Desk. He might be able to give them some picture of the present state of the Unification Board.

Still hope to see you early next year.

Sincerely,

Edmund H. Kelly  
Second Secretary

PS: What do you make of the recent four-day meeting of KPA unit commanders and party cadre? I find it intriguing that An Yong Hwan was not listed among those attending since he is the top dog in the KPA.

*political*

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Authority NND 20080 | Nov 11, 1969  
By DP NARA Date 7/10/08

*International  
Asst. Secretary*

1174

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M E M O R A N D U M

Presented  
by  
Chairman  
Foreign Relations Committee  
National Assembly  
Republic of Korea

November 6, 1969  
Seoul

Restricted

(I wish to solicit your understanding that what I say here does not necessarily reflect the thinking of the Government of the Republic of Korea. My views are, however, widely shared not only by my legislative colleagues but also by the Korean public as a whole. Nevertheless, I am on my own responsibility as I present the following views.)

A. Korean Defense and Security

Late in 1967, Kim Il Sung, so-called Premier of north Korean communists regime, publicly declared his aim of communizing the whole of the Republic of Korea by force by early 1970s. The communist subversive activities have since been sharply stepped up. Mass infiltrations of armed guerrillas into the rear areas of the Republic of Korea, intrusions and ambush attack on United Nations forces along the de-militarized zone are some of the major patterns of their provocative acts. In January 1968, they sent a group of regular army officers specifically trained with the professed objective of assassinating the President of the Republic and two days later provoked the "Pueblo" incident. Later in the year they landed more than one hundred armed guerrillas on the eastern coast of the Republic of Korea with the objective of organizing a Vietnam-style up-rising against the Government of the Republic of Korea. In April, this year, they shot down an unarmed US Navy reconnaissance plane over the high seas, killing the entire crew. In recent months, there were incidents in which communists provocations were conspicuously directed against the American soldiers. These

1177

are but a few examples of north Korean communists provocative acts being committed almost daily in flagrant violation of the armistice agreement of 1953.

Such persistent bellicose activities of north Korean communists are no doubt intended to weaken the combined defensive capabilities of the armed forces of the Republic of Korea and the United States, to cause cleavage in the ROK-US relations by inciting the public opinion of the United States to demand disengagement from Korea and to hinder economic development of the Republic of Korea, a source of their irritation and desperation, by creating social and political unrest and popular distrust against the Government of the Republic of Korea.

The ultimate aim of north Korean communists as publicly pronounced by Kim Il Sung is to press the United States to pull its forces out of the Republic of Korea so as to allow them to launch an all-out attack against the Republic of Korea. All indications are that north Korean communists will further intensify their tactics of harassment, with emphasis upon the United States forces to make their presence in Korea as painful as possible in the hope that the United States would eventually give in to the pressure to



1178

withdraw from Korea.

North Korean communists have completed their preparation for an all-out war through frenzied implementation of such programs as total fortification of the country, organization and training of 1.3 million Militia, and reinforcement of regular armed forces and modernization of their arms and equipments. They are also known to have trained 39,200-man regular army units for subversive operations necessary to mount guerrilla warfare across the D:2.

In face of the enemy's manifestation of such aggressive intentions and its growing offensive capability, it has become acutely necessary to effectively cope with this critical situation on a long-term basis.

So far, the majority of those intruders from the north have been successfully detected and eliminated owing to the well-concerted operation of the military, police and the Homeland Reserve Forces, coupled with the willing and positive cooperation of the public in general. The north Korean communists have also been deterred from launching a full-scale offensive against the Republic of Korea due largely to the strong defensive capability of the Republic of Korea armed forces backed up by the continued presence of US

1179

forces in Korea.

While strenuous efforts have been made by the Republic of Korea to be self-reliant both in economy and in the defense of her territory, the intensity of the communist provocations and their growing threats of an all-out war are greatly detrimental to the stable development of the Republic of Korea.

Such being the case, the need for positive cooperation and assistance of the United States to counteract the armed provocation and threat from the north Korean communists has never been more urgent. The continued presence of the United States troops in Korea is an absolute necessity for peace and security of this Republic and also of the freedom-loving countries of the region. The need of the United States presence in Korea does not necessarily entail a permanent stationing of U.S. forces in Korea. It will be required only until such time when Korea shall have built its self-sustaining national strength to over-whelm that of the north Korean communists, forcing them to give up their whole scheme of aggression against the Republic of Korea.

Even amid the trend of de-Americanization in Asia, United States stand in Korea has been quite reassuring and

unequivocal under its commitments in Korea. The United States determination to honour and uphold its commitments to defend the Republic of Korea has been reconfirmed at the Summit Meeting between the Presidents of the two countries in San Francisco last August.

The recent press reports indicating that the United States is considering to "Koreinize" the defense of Korea and possibly reduce the United States military strength in Korea is a cause of a grave apprehension for the Korean people, since the continued stationing of the United States forces in Korea has hitherto been repeatedly reassured by the United States Government. The presence of the United States forces in Korea has shored up the morale of Korean people in their struggle to stave off perennial threats from the north and to attain self-supporting economy.

United States forces in Korea are the major element of the United Nations Command. Thus, withdrawal of the United States forces from Korea would imply the withdrawal of the United Nations presence in Korea. This would be a severe blow to the Korean people who regard the United Nations as a source of their hope for the eventual unification

1181

of the country and a guarantee for their security. For these reasons, withdrawal or reduction of any contingent of the United Nations forces from Korea in the immediate future is utterly unthinkable in view of the possible danger to the integrity and independence of the Republic of Korea.

On the contrary, the present critical situation in Korea urgently demands further strengthening of defense postures of Korea and the United States forces in Korea. The armed forces of the Republic of Korea has to be modernized, its outdated equipment must be replaced, firepower and mobility be increased, and above all the air force, whose weakness was more than exposed at the moment of the "Pueblo" crisis, be strengthened. The capability of anti-guerrilla operations also has to be improved. In order to defend the long coastal lines from enemy infiltrations, the need for a better equipped navy is also urgent.

It leaves no doubt that, for the time being at least, the United States military assistance, coupled with the presence in Korea of United States forces under the United Nations Command are essential elements for the security of not only the Republic of Korea but also of the region as a whole.

Regional Collective Security System in this Region

The new administration of the United States has been reviewing its Asian policy with fresh appraisal of the situation in Asia. It was in this context that President Nixon made his first-hand observation trip to the seven nations in Asia in July 1969.

A scrupulous review of the situation in Asia may lead to the assumption that the region will sooner or later be placed under a new type of balance of power structure.

The Vietnam war which appears to maintain a military pull in recent days seems to be approaching a crucial moment of transition.

The communist China, which is generally expected to be in possession of strategic nuclear striking capabilities by the early 1970s, is attempting to spread the so-called liberation war into her neighboring countries in Asia with an ultimate goal of communizing all Asian nations. The expansionist Chinese communists are thus posing a continuous threat to the peace and security of Asia with its nuclear potentiality.

On the other hand, the Soviet Union has been very active in her attempt to gain a foothold in Asia and the Pacific

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Handwritten initials/signature

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INFO: Amembassy TOKYO  
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FOR AMBASSADOR FROM BROWN

SUBJECT: Limited ROK Contacts with North Korea

REF: Seoul 5954

1. I concur that we should encourage in whatever ways we can even limited first steps which might lead toward establishment of ROK-NK contacts and eventually a lessening of tensions in Korean peninsula. Also agree that mail exchange and other initiatives which ROKG might take would help offset ROK image of intransigence and help undermine propaganda advantage North Korea presently enjoys in these matters. With tremendous ROK economic progress, and political stability which we might reasonably expect to follow the orderly conduct and outcome of recent referendum, attractions of life in the South should outweigh NK attempts to utilize contacts for propaganda, political and intelligence purposes, with clear net benefit to ROK over period of time.

192891

DRAFTED BY: EA/K:RBPeters:lm      DRAFTING DATE: 11/14/69      TEL EXT: 20780      APPROVED BY: EA - Winthrop G. Brown

LEARANCES: EA/J - Mr. Sturgis      S/S - Mr. Lloy M.      J - Ambassador Johnson

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2. Accordingly, Department concurs your taking steps along lines outlined reftel at time and at ROKG level you consider appropriate. I am sure you are aware Pak's statement of intention do something along these lines recorded DCM's memcon on Wheeler-Pak October 2 meeting. We continue to believe of course that initiatives in this field should come mainly from ROKG. Reunification chapter in Annexes volume of June 15, 1968 "U.S. Policy Toward Korea" (Yager study) remains good statement on this subject.

3. Knowledgeable official of Post Office Department has given us informal view that most logical routing for mail between North and South Korea would be through Japan, which already has mail services to both areas. He also thought natural candidates for intermediary in any attempt to set up postal service between ROK and NK would be Japanese Postal Service or ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~ Asian-Oceanic Postal Union. Neither North nor South is member of latter, but as a neutral body (with headquarters in Manila) it might be able to assist. He questioned whether ICRC would be able to help. We note also that Pyongyang has been negative in past attitudes and relations with ICRC.

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TEL. EXT.

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4. We are continuing to research German experience, but indications are that conditions so different that German case not relevant to possible ROK/NK exchange.

END

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SEoul 6289

EXDIS

SUBJ: DOWNED HELICOPTER PILOTS

REF: STATE 189256

*Rec'd 6 9 89  
11/19/69*

1. FOURTH PRIVATE MEETING CONVENED AT 1100 HOURS, 17 NOVEMBER AND ADJOURNED AT 1315 HOURS.

2. IN OPENING STATEMENT, UNC SENIOR MEMBER REITERATED NECESSITY FOR ASSURANCE OF SIMULTANEOUS RELEASE OF PERSONNEL UPON SIGNATURE OF AGREED ON DOCUMENT. HE THEN STATED A DRAFT DOCUMENT CONTAINING THE NK DEMANDS AS WE UNDERSTOOD THEM, WOULD BE SUBMITTED WHICH CONTAINED A CLAUSE PROVIDING FOR ASSURANCE OF SIMULTANEOUS RELEASE. DRAFT DOCUMENT, PARA 4, REFTEL, AS MODIFIED, THEN PASSED TO KPA SECRETARY. DRAFT DOCUMENT MODIFIED TO EXTENT THAT IT WAS ADDRESSED TO SENIOR MEMBER, KPA SIDE OF MAC BY NAME AND POSITION. IF DOCUMENT HAD BEEN ADDRESSED TO SUPREME COMMANDER, KPA, IT MIGHT SUGGEST TO NK'S THAT UNC SIGNATURE SHOULD THEN BE BY CINSUNC AND NOT UNCHAC SENIOR MEMBER.

3. NK RESPONSE WAS TO REQUEST ONE HOUR RECESS TO STUDY DOCUMENT. GENERAL ADAMS AGREED. MEETING RECONVENED AT 1215 HOURS WITH NK'S STATING THEY HAD EXAMINED OUR DRAFT DOCUMENT AND FOUND THAT CONTENTS OF APOLOGY AND ASSURANCE MADE BY THE SIDE WHICH INFILTRATED THE HELICOPTER INTO THEIR TERRITORIAL AIR WAS NOT CLEARLY WRITTEN INTO THE DRAFT AND THAT A PROPER APOLOGY AMONG OTHER THINGS WAS REQUIRED. NK'S THEN STATED THEY HAD CONSIDERED OUR DRAFT DOCUMENT AND HAD PREPARED A DRAFT DOCUMENT FOR SUBMISSION TO UNC SIDE. NK SENIOR MEMBER STATED AS FOLLOWS: QUOTE IF YOUR SIDE AGREES TO SIGNING THIS DOCUMENT WE WILL BE ABLE TO GO INTO

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EXD-15



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PAGE 02 SEOUL 06289 170943Z

DISCUSSION ON THE SPECIFIC MATTERS RELATED TO THE SIGNING OF THE DOCUMENT AND TO THE DELIVERY AND RECEIPT OF THE PILOTS. UNQTE. TEXT OF NK DRAFT DOCUMENT IS AS FOLLOWS: QTE TO: KOREAN PEOPLES ARMY SIDE: "THE UNITED NATIONS COMMAND SIDE ASSUMES FULL RESPONSIBILITY, SOLEMNLY APOLOGIZES FOR HAVING VIOLATED THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT AND SERIOUSLY INFRINGED UPON THE SOVEREIGNTY OF THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA BY INFILTRATING ON AUGUST 17, 1969 A MILITARY AIRCRAFT DEEP INTO THE TERRITORIAL AIR OF THE NORTHERN HALF OF THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC, NORTH KOREA, AND FIRMLY GUARANTEES THAT IT WILL NOT COMMIT SUCH A CRIMINAL ACT AGAIN IN THE FUTURE AND THAT IT WILL STRICTLY ABIDE BY THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT, REQUESTING THE KOREAN PEOPLES ARMY SIDE TO SEND BACK THE PILOTS OF THE "OH-230" HELICOPTER WHICH WAS SHOT DOWN BY THE SELF DEFENSE MEASURES OF THE KOREAN PEOPLES ARMY. UNQTE.

4. AFTER EXAMINATION OF THE NK DRAFT DOCUMENT, GENERAL ADAMS NOTED THAT THE ASSURANCE OF SIMULTANEOUS RELEASE ON SIGNATURE CLAUSE WAS MISSING AND THAT THIS WAS ESSENTIAL IN EITHER THE DOCUMENT AGREED UPON OR IN A SEPARATE WRITTEN DOCUMENT WHICH WOULD GIVE ASSURANCE BY NK'S OF SIMULTANEOUS RETURN OF THREE PERSONNEL UPON SIGNATURE OF AGREED ON DOCUMENT OF APOLOGY.

5. NK SIDE THEN MADE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT: QTE "OUR SIDE STATED SEVERAL TIMES AT THE PREVIOUS MEETINGS THAT YOUR SIDE'S SUBMISSION OF A WRITTEN LETTER OF APOLOGY WITH THE CONTENTS ALREADY PUT FORTH BY US WOULD RESULT OF THE RETURN OF THE PILOTS. OUR SIDE'S STAND REMAINS UNCHANGED AND UNEQUIVOCAL THE SETTLEMENT OF THE MATTER IS UP TO WHETHER OR NOT YOUR SIDE MAKES A PROPER APOLOGY FOR THE CRIMINAL ACTS COMMITTED. I AGAIN UNMISTAKABLY TELL YOU, IF YOUR SIDE SUBMITS A WRITTEN APOLOGY WITH THE CONTENTS THAT WE HAVE PUT FORTH, OUR SIDE WILL SIMULTANEOUSLY TRANSFER THE PILOTS TO YOUR SIDE. THE MATTER TO BE SOLVED NOW IS: THAT YOUR SIDE SUBMITS A WRITTEN LETTER OF APOLOGY WITH THE CONTENTS OUR SIDE HAS PUT FORWARD? I AWAIT YOUR REPLY." UNQTE.

6. GENERAL ADAMS THEN ASKED FOR COMMENT ON DRAFT RECEIPT WHICH WAS TABLED AT FIRST PRIVATE MEETING ON 8 SEPT. NK REPLY WAS THAT RECEIPT COULD BE DISCUSSED WHEN PROCEDURES WERE DISCUSSED AND AGAIN ASKED IF UNC SIDE WAS READY TO AGREE TO NK DRAFT DOCUMENT OF APOLOGY. GEN ADAMS REPLIED THAT NK DRAFT DOCUMENT WOULD

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NEED TO BE STUDIED CAREFULLY BY UNC SIDE  
GIVE A CURRENT REPORT ON PHYSICAL CO  
PERSONNEL. MEETING HE THEN PROPOSED REC  
MENT AGREED WHEN ANALYSIS OF  
S) QTE  
THE HEALTH CO  
TREATMENT  
AL CON

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 03 SEUL 06289 170943Z

NEED TO BE STUDIED CAREFULLY BY UNC SIDE AND REQUESTED THAT NK'S GIVE A CURRENT REPORT ON PHYSICAL CONDITION OF THE THREE WOUNDED PERSONNEL. HE THEN PROPOSED RECESS AND STATED UNC SIDE WOULD CALL NEXT MEETING WHEN ANALYSIS OF NK DOCUMENT COMPLETED. NK FINAL STATEMENT AGREED TO RECESS AND REPORTED CONDITION OF PILOTS AS FOLLOWS: QTE:

"AS FOR THE HEALTH CONDITION OF THE PILOTS, THEY ARE ACCORDED MEDICAL TREATMENT AT AN APPROPRIATE MEDICAL ORGAN AND THEY ARE IN A NORMAL CONDITION." UNGTE.

7. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS WILL FOLLOW.

8. UNC ISSUED PRESS RELEASE 1700 LOCAL GIVING ONLY TIME PLACE AND SUBJECT OF MEETING. GP-4 PORTER

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6. GEN. WAS TABLE. RECEIPT COUL. AGAIN. ASKED. IF. OF. APOLOGY. GEN. ADAM. Authority MNS 96 9000 By SEC NARA Date 7-10-08



KOREAN DEPT  
Room 5310

~~235~~  
~~B~~  
~~SCR~~  
~~LED~~

*Unification*

OFFICIAL-INFORMAL  
UNCLASSIFIED

November 17, 1969

Edmund H. Kelly, Esquire,  
Second Secretary  
American Embassy  
Seoul, Korea

Dear Kelly:

Thank you for your letter of November 5 about the impending visit of Dr. Synn. I would be very happy to talk to Dr. Synn, and hope to discover from him what the ROK government has in mind in moving toward specific reunification proposals. I understand from Les Stermer that the Koreans are interested in a conference on this question to be held at the University of South Carolina later this year. I shall attempt to glean some information from Dr. Synn about the possibility of official ROK participation in this conference.

I have alerted Dick Peters, the country director for Korea, to Dr. Synn's plan to visit Washington, and will arrange an opportunity for all interested people to talk to him.

As you can see, I am no longer in INR but am still very much interested in Asia. I hope you will drop in when you are in Washington this winter.

Sincerely,

Curtis W. Kamman  
Member  
Planning and Coordination Staff

*POK 31-1 KOR 12-UKS*



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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CONFIDENTIAL 458

PAGE 01 SEUL 06312 181059Z

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ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 /046 W

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P 180930Z NOV 69  
FM AMEMBASSY SEUL  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9098

*44*  
*Seoul 6312*  
*11/18/69*

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEUL 6312

EXDIS

SUBJECT: DOWNED HELICOPTER

REFERENCE: SEUL 6289

1. OUR MAJOR IMPRESSION OF DRAFT NK DOCUMENT SUBMITTED AT FOURTH CLOSED MEETING (REFTEL) IS THAT IT IS SOMEWHAT LESS OFFENSIVE THAN WE HAD ANTICIPATED. IT DOES NOT RAISE QUESTION OF NATURE OF HELICOPTER MISSION OR ALLUDE TO RECONNAISSANCE OR ESPIONAGE. ON THE NEGATIVE SIDE, IT DOES NOT CONTAIN A RECEIPT CLAUSE AND USES THE WORD "CRIMINAL". TERMS SUCH AS "SOVEREIGNTY OF DPRK" AND PARTICULARLY "TERRITORIAL AIR OF THE NORTHERN HALF OF THE DPRK" WOULD BE DEEPLY OFFENSIVE TO ROK. IT WAS EXPRESSIONS SUCH AS THESE WHICH PROMPTED NEGATIVE ALTHOUGH SUBDUED ROK REACTION TO PUEBLO DOCUMENT. WE COULD EXPECT SIMILAR REACTION IN PRESENT CASE ALTHOUGH AGAIN, HUMANITARIAN CONSIDERATIONS AND "ROUTINE" ASPECTS WOULD SERVE TO MUTE EXPRESSIONS OF DISPLEASURE.

2. PROBABLE REASON FOR OMISSION OF RECEIPT CLAUSE IN NK DOCUMENT IS NK DESIRE TO AVOID OBVIOUS QUID PRO QUB IMPLICATIONS. IN CASE OF PUEBLO DOCUMENT, NK'S MASKED OUT RECEIPT ELEMENT BEFORE REPRODUCING THAT GENERAL PAK GAVE WRITTEN GUARANTEE ONLY AFTER GENERAL WOODWARD HAD SIGNED DOCUMENT. IN OTHER WORDS WE ARE, NOW AS THEN, ULTIMATELY DEPENDENT ON GOOD FAITH OF NK SIDE.

4. AS TO REPUDIATION, REQUEST CONFIRMATION THAT INSTRUCTIONS PARA 4 STATE 146974 STILL VALID.

5. IF WE CAN TAKE LANGUAGE OF DOCUMENT PROPOSED BY NK SIDE, RECOMMEND GENERAL ADAMS BE AUTHORIZED TO CALL NEXT MEETING AT EARLY

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*4*



# Department of State TELEGRAM

11

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PAGE 02 SEOUL 06312 181059Z

DATE AND INDICATE HIS AGREEMENT TO SIGN NK DOCUMENT PROVIDING NK ARRANGEMENTS FOR SIMULTANEOUS RELEASE OF CREW WITH SIGNATURE ARE ACCEPTABLE TO US.

6. WE WILL AT SOME POINT NEED GUIDANCE ON PUBLIC RELATIONS ASPECTS OF RELEASE OF CREW. 8TH ARMY PLAN IS TO TAKE CREW MEMBERS DIRECTLY TO 121ST EVACUATION HOSPITAL. ANY CONTACT WITH PRESS WOULD TAKE PLACE ONLY AFTER MEDICAL TREATMENT AND DEBRIEFING. GENERAL ADAMS MIGHT HOLD PRESS CONFERENCE AT ADVANCE CAMP AFTER CREW HAD LEFT AREA. WE ASSUME THERE WOULD BE SOME PROCEDURE FOR ADVANCE NOTIFICATION TO PRESS THAT RELEASE ANTICIPATED AS WAS DONE LAST XMAS. GP-4. PORTER

EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS



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**TELEGRAM**

*704 31-1 KOR N-45*

*196347*

*48B*

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EXDIS

JOINT STATE/DEFENSE MESSAGE.

SUBJECT: Downed Helicopter

REF: A. Seoul 6289 *704 31-1 KOR N-45*  
B. Seoul 6312

*69/10/19  
196347*

1. General Adams is authorized to sign document proposed by NKs (para 3 reftel A) when this will result in simultaneous release of three crew members in accordance NK statement at last meeting (para 5 ref A). If separate receipt document required General Adams authorized sign text para 6 Seoul 5128 or if changes proposed by NKs to go as far as apology document in formulating language. General Adams may call for and hold private meetings as soon and as often as you consider appropriate with view to securing release as promptly as possible.

2. We note that NK draft apparently excluded signature block. Preferable of course for General Adams to sign with name, rank and service only (as in Stuttz-Voltz and Pueblo cases), but if requested by NKs identification as UNC Senior Member

*1*

DRAFTED BY: *EA/K:RBPeters:lm:jcm* DRAFTING DATE: *11/18/69* TEL. EXT.: *20780* APPROVED BY: *J - Ambassador Johnson*

CLEARANCES: EA - Ambassador Green (substance) *WS*  
EA - Ambassador Brown *WS* WH - ~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~ Mr. Kissinger *WS*  
DOD/JCS - Admiral Epes (draft) *WS* S/S - Mr. Brown *WS*  
DOD/ISA - Admiral Shepard (draft) *WS*

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Authority *MNS 96 9000*  
By *SCC* NARA Date *7-10-08*

1193

Department of State

TELEGRAM

PAGE 2 - ACTION: Amembassy SEOUL; CINCUNC/COMUSK

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MAC may be included.

3. Immediately following signature and release of men, as in precedent Stutts-Voltz case, UNC spokesman should make low-key clarifying statement to press along following lines QUOTE To secure release of the three helicopter crew members, General Adams was authorized to sign a statement today that the UNC side had committed a "criminal act" by "infiltrating" the helicopter "deep" into the territory under the control of North Korea. The United Nations Command has consistently acknowledged that the helicopter inadvertently crossed the DMZ without hostile intent when the pilot became disoriented. It was fired upon immediately after crossing the DMZ within sight of observers on the south side. It is obvious that a small unarmed helicopter of this type would not be deliberately sent into hostile territory, and equally obvious that there was no ~~criminal act~~ criminal act or intentional infiltration. General Adams signed the document in question in the humanitarian interest

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PAGE 3 - ACTION: Amembassy SEOUL; CINCPAC/COMUSK

INSTRUCTIONS

~~ASST~~

of securing the release of the men. UNQUOTE. Unless subsequently instructed to contrary, statement should not rpt not be ~~rep~~ made for the record in MAC proceedings (para 4, State 146974).

4. Even though delivery of men will be public event, we believe that, as in Stutts-Voltz case, meeting for signature of document should be private. Among other considerations, this will keep apology document out of official permanent record of MAC meetings.

5. DOD considering question of crew members' contact with press, and instructions will follow.

6. Before signature of document (perhaps after agreement reached with NKs on timing and procedure for release) Ambassador should consult with appropriate level of ROKG regarding projected action. In doing so he should draw particular attention to humanitarian considerations involved, fact we have tested NKs over period of several months with strong indications NKs will not release men for anything less,

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1195

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ACTION

caution we have exercised to avoid adverse effect on Korean item debate, and indications that responsible world opinion sees and accepts documents of this kind which we have signed as result of North Korean blackmail.

END

ROGERS

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DRAFTING DATE TEL. EXT.

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*Page 31-1 KOR 72-445*



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PAGE 01 SEUL: 06382 250050Z

**ACTION COPY**

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*Seoul 6382*  
*11/24/69*

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ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CCD-00 /046 W  
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FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9148

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEUL 6382

EXDIS

C O R R E C T I D I C O P Y - TEXT-PARA NBRED 6

SUBJ: DOWNED HELICOPTER-FIFTH CLOSED MEETING

REF: STATE 196347

1. FIFTH CLOSED MEETING BEGAN AT 100 HOURS LOCAL NOV 24 AND ENDED 1545 HOURS LOCAL.

2. FOLLOWING OPENING STATEMENT BY GEN ADAMS IN WHICH HE STATED WE WERE PREPARED TO SIGN DOCUMENT HANDED TO HIM AT FOURTH PRIVATE MEETING PROVIDING SATISFACTORY ASSURANCES OF SIMULTANEOUS RELEASE OF CREW WERE FORTHCOMING, GEN RI GAVE HIM FOLLOWING PROPOSED SCENARIO FOR RELEASE OF CREW:

A. ON THE PROCEDURES FOR SIGNING THE DOCUMENT.  
YOUR SIDE WILL SIGN IN THIS ROOM THE DOCUMENT OF APOLOGY WITH THE CONTENT ALREADY AGREED UPON. YOUR SIDE WILL PREPARE ONE COPY OF THE DOCUMENT OF APOLOGY EACH IN KOREAN AND IN ENGLISH BEFORE COMING. OUR SIDE WILL FURNISH THE PEN TO BE USED WHEN YOUR SIDE ATTACHES ITS SIGNATURE. THE TIME OF AFFIXING THE SIGNATURES WILL BE AROUND 1100 HOURS IN THE MORNING ON THE DAY OF THE RETURN OF THE PILOTS. YOU WILL SIGN IN THIS ROOM AT THE TIME, EACH OF THE KOREAN AND ENGLISH VERSIONS PREPARED BY YOUR SIDE AND HAND THEM OVER TO ME. AFTER SIGNING THE DOCUMENT OF APOLOGY AND DELIVERING IT TO ME, YOU WILL SIGN EACH OF THE KOREAN AND ENGLISH VERSIONS OF THE RECEIPT WITH THE FOLLOWING CONTENTS:  
THE UNC SIDE RECEIVED FROM THE KOREAN PEOPLE'S ARMY SIDE THE FOLLOWING PILOTS OF THE "OH-23G" HELICOPTER WHICH WAS SHOT DOWN BY THE SELF DEFENSE MEASURE OF THE KPA ON AUGUST 17, 1969. CAPT DAVID

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PAGE 02 SEOUL 06382 250050Z

HODGES CRAWFORD, WARRENT OFF MALCOLM VERNON LOEPKE, S-4 HERMAN EDWARD HOFSTATTER, SIGN: ARTHUR H. ADAMS, MG, USMC, SENIOR MEMBER UNC SIDE, MAC.  
YOUR SIDE WILL ALSO COME WITH WRITTEN KOREAN AND ENGLISH VERSIONS OF THE RECEIPT OF THE CONTENTS MENTIONED ABOVE. YOUR SECRETARY WILL KEEP THE RECEIPT SIGNED BY YOU. BOTH SIDES WILL HAVE A CONVENIENT NUMBER OF PHOTOGRAPHERS AND CAMERMEN PRESENT IN THIS ROOM WHEN YOU SIGN THE DOCUMENT. WE WILL HAVE ABOUT THREE MEN PRESENT. YOUR SIDE MAY ALSO HAVE THE SAME NUMBER OF YOUR PERSONNEL IF NECESSARY. IN ORDER TO OFFER CONVENIENCE TO CAMERAMEN AND PHOTOGRAPHERS SO THAT THEY MAY FEEL FREE TO MOVE ABOUT IN THIS CONFERENCE ROOM OUR SIDE WILL ARRANGE ANOTHER TABLE SMALLER THAN THIS ONE WE ARE NOW USING. ON THE DATE OF SIGNING THE DOCUMENT THERE WILL BE PLACED ON THE TABLE ONLY THINGS NECESSARY FOR THE SIGNING OF THE DOCUMENT.

B. ON THE PROCEDURES FOR THE DELIVERY OF THE PILOTS.  
THE THREE (3) PILOTS OF YOUR SIDE WILL BE DELIVERED AND RECEIVED BETWEEN THE SECRETARIES OF BOTH SIDES AT THE YARD NORTH OF THE CONFERENCE ROOM OF THE MAC 30 MINUTES AFTER YOUR SIDE SIGNS THE LETTER OF APOLOGY. OUR SIDE WILL BRING THE THREE PILOTS TO THE YARD NORTH OF THE CONFERENCE ROOM OF THE MAC SO THAT THEY MAY BE DELIVERED TO YOUR SIDE 30 MINUTES AFTER YOUR SIDE SIGNS THE LETTER OF APOLOGY. AT THE TIME OF THE DELIVERY AND RECEIPT OF THE PILOTS OUR SIDE WILL HAVE ABOUT 10 STAFF MEMBERS ATTEND IN ADDITION TO THE PERSONNEL NOW PRESENT AT THIS TABLE. IF YOUR SIDE ALSO DEEMS IT NECESSARY IT MAY HAVE THE SAME NUMBER OF STAFF MEMBERS PRESENT. PRIOR TO THE DELIVERY AND RECEIPT OF THE PILOTS THE SECRETARIES OF BOTH SIDES WILL IDENTIFY THEM. WHEN THE PILOTS ARE IDENTIFIED THE SECRETARY OF YOUR SIDE WILL SUBMIT TO OUR SIDE THE RECEIPT ALREADY SIGNED BY YOU AND THIS WILL BE FOLLOWED BY THE DELIVERY OF THE PILOTS TO YOUR SIDE. WHEN THE PILOTS ARE DELIVERED AND RECEIVED OUR SIDE WILL HAVE ABOUT 10 PRESS REPRESENTATIVES ATTEND IN ADDITION TO THE ABOVE MENTIONED 3 CAMERAMEN OR PHOTOGRAPHERS. IF NECESSARY YOUR SIDE MAY ALSO HAVE ABOUT 10 PRESS REPRESENTATIVES MORE ATTEND. (END OF NK RELEASE SCENARIO)

3. FOLLOWING CONSULTATIONS WITH EMB AND UNC, GEN ADAMS NOTIFIED NK SIDE THAT ARRANGEMENTS FOR RELEASE OF CREW MEMBERS PROPOSED BY NK SIDE ACCEPTABLE TO US. NK SIDE STATED THAT IT WOULD CALL MEETING WHEN PREPARED TO RELEASE CREW. GEN ADAMS PRESSED FOR RELEASE ON NOV 26 BUT NK SIDE AGAIN STATED THAT IT WOULD CALL MEETING WHEN PREPARED TO RELEASE.

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PAGE 03 SEOUL 06382 250050Z

4. WE CONSIDER TIME GAP OF GHIRTY MINUTES BETWEEN SIGNATURE AND RELEASE TO BE ACCEPTABLE. WE ARE NOT DISTURBED AT REFUSAL GEN RI PROVIDE ANYTHING OTHER THAN ORAL ASSURANCES OF RELEASE AS NK'S HAVE CONSISTENTLY CARRIED OUT THEIR SIDE OF ARRANGEMENTS IN PAST ONCE AGREEMENT REACHED. WE AGAIN NOTE, AS STATED IN COMMENT OF FOURTH CLOSED MEETING (SEOUL 6312) THAT REGARDLESS OF WHAT KIND ASSURANCES WE RECEIVE WE ARE ULTIMATELY DEPENDENT ON GOOD FAITH NK SIDE.

5. DEPT WILL NOTE THAT RECEIPT DOCUMENT IS OF SIMPLE TYPE AND APPEARS WELL WITHIN BOUNDS OF WHAT GEN ADAMS' AUTHORIZED TO SIGN. SIGNATURE BLOCK DOES CONTAIN UNC ATTRIBUTION AS DOES OTHER DOCUMENT.

6. NK SIDE UNWILLING GIVE ANY FURTHER INFORMATION ON CONDITION OF CREW AND STATED THEY WOULD INFORM US WHETHER AMBULANCES NEEDED AT TIME THEY CALL NEXT MEETING.

7. GEN ADAMS INFORMED NK SIDE WE WOULD ANNOUNCE TO PRESS DATE AND TIME OF RELEASE OF CREW AT TIME WE NOTIFIED NK'S OF OUR ACCEPTANCE OF MEETING PROPOSED BY THEM TO EFFECTUATE RELEASE.

8. IN CLOSING STATEMENT, GEN ADAMS MADE APPEAL IN NAME OF HUMANITY FOR EARLIEST POSSIBLE RETURN OF THE THREE WOUNDED PERSONNEL. FOR THE THIRD TIME NK SENIOR MEMBER INDICATED THAT EFFORT WOULD BE MADE FOR EARLY RETURN.

9. UNLESS OBJECTION PERCEIVED, GEN ADAMS WILL, WHEN NK SIDE CALLS NEXT MEETING, SIGN BOTH DOCUMENTS TO OBTAIN PROMPT RELEASE OF CREW. GP-3.  
PORTER

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132 returning

Pls. refer to [Signature]  
C. J. Beatty

69 DEC 11 PM 5:00

WHITE HOUSE  
SITUATION ROOM

Draft Insert for Senate Appropriations Committee  
Subcommittee on Foreign Operations  
Hearing Transcript, 24 November 1969  
Page 235, line 12  
(Vice page 234, line 8)

Additional Money for the Republic of Korea and the Republic of China

The Executive Branch believes that the \$425 million requested for military assistance represents the minimum new obligational authority needed to carry out a most austere and selective program consistent with U.S. foreign policy objectives. This program could be severely jeopardized not only by the reduction apparently foreseen in actions on the authorization and appropriations already taken, but also by the possible inclusion by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee of an obligation to fund \$31.3 million for International Military Headquarters from the reduced total.

The \$50 million which the House of Representatives has voted (Section 504(d)) for Korea would help considerably in the modernization of the Republic of Korea forces. Although the Executive Branch believes this objective is important and therefore supports the appropriation of additional funds, it does not believe that it should have priority over the requirements

*returning*

-2-

originally presented.

With respect to the \$54.5 million which the House of Representatives has voted for the Republic of China, the Executive Branch believes that the provision of these particular aircraft does not have as high a priority as the requirements originally presented.

PH/PAS:R:athoron;zn/olm

2360

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority E.O. 12958  
By *REDA* Date 7-28-03

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

November 24, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR

Henry Kissinger

FROM THE PRESIDENT

I think the time has come to reduce our Korean presence. We could not do so because of the EC 121 at any earlier date but I do not want us to continue to temporize with this problem. What I have in mind is to maintain the air and sea presence at whatever level is necessary for the kind of retaliatory strike which we have planned. On the other hand, I think it is time to cut the number of Americans there in half and I want to see a plan which will implement this laid before me before the end of the year. It, of course, should be well worked out and sold to the Koreans on a proper basis.



2301

4653

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

INFORMATION  
November 25, 1969

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger *R*

SUBJECT: General Wheeler on his Conversation with President Park  
of Korea

Secretary Laird has sent you (Tab A) a memorandum in which General Wheeler describes his conversation with President Park during the Korean Armed Forces Day ceremonies on October 2.

Wheeler reports that Park was relaxed and cordial. He appeared to feel in control of the present situation but concerned at the prospect of a pull-out or substantial reduction in American troops in Korea.

President Park made the following principal points:

- he wants to build up the Home Reserve Forces to help forestall North Korean hit-and-run raids along the coasts.
- he wants to avoid extreme actions and does not intend to "march north."
- the North Koreans will not attempt all-out war if the South Korean economy prospers and US forces remain, but war is "inevitable" if US forces are withdrawn.
- therefore, the ROK needs to match North Korean armed forces to deter or defeat aggression, and must have an independent defense capability. (Note: this is somewhat contradictory with the previous point and seems to accept that at some future point the ROK will "go it alone.")

*9/1/70*

Attachment

*I want a plan developed now to bring about the ROK take over - U.S. to provide a trip wire + alert*  
*See report*

DEC 6 1969

SECRET

**TOP SECRET EYES ONLY**  
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*W*

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ISA	<input type="checkbox"/>
CSA	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
CSAF	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
CNO	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
CPD	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
CTM	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
CS	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
CSA	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
ACT	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
MC/PA	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>

*JAC*

ROUTINE

06 DECEMBER 1969

R 060355Z ZFF-6

FM ADM MCCAIN, CINCPAC, HAWAII

TO GEN WHEELER, CJCS

I FO GEN MICHAELIS, COMUSKOREA

ZEM

**T O P S E C R E T E Y E S O N L Y**

SUBJ: SUMMARY OF CONVERSATION WITH GEN MUN, ROK CJCS

A. SECSTATE 199796/290128Z NOV 69

B. SECDEF 04515/132109Z NOV 69

- (U) GEN MUN, CJCS OF THE ROK FORCES, VISITED ME YESTERDAY DURING HIS RETURN TRIP TO KOREA. KEY MATTERS DISCUSSED ARE OUTLINED BELOW.
- (S) I OPENED THE CONVERSATION BY ASKING HIM HIS VIEWS CONCERNING KIM III SONG'S PLANS. HE STATED HE BELIEVED KIM'S DECISION TO ATTACK WOULD BE BASED ON A CONSIDERATION OF FOUR POINTS (A) WITHDRAWAL U.S. TROOPS FROM KOREA (B) POLITICAL INSTABILITY IN THE ROK (C) THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM (D) EXTENT TO WHICH ROK FORCES ARE MODERNIZED. IN REPLY, I INDICATED WE DID NOT FEEL RUSSIA WOULD SUPPORT A NORTH KOREAN ATTACK ON THE ROK AT THIS TIME BECAUSE OF CURRENT PROBLEMS IN EASTERN EUROPE, THE MIDDLE EAST, VIETNAM, AND CHINA.

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**TOP SECRET EYES ONLY**

Declassified Authority: NND 947294 By: NARA Date: 1/11/88

**TOP SECRET** Downgraded to UNCLASSIFIED  
**EYES ONLY**

3. (S) GEN MUN ASKED IF WE FELT RUSSIA WAS CONSULTED BEFORE NORTH KOREA SEIZED THE PUEBLO AND SHOT DOWN THE EC-121 AIRCRAFT. I ANSWERED THAT WE DIDN'T KNOW, BUT I FELT THERE WAS SOME SIGNIFICANCE IN THE FACT THAT THERE WERE RUSSIAN DESTROYERS IN THE AREA WHEN THE AIRCRAFT WAS DESTROYED.

4. (S) THE CONVERSATION THEN TURNED TO THE IMPROVEMENT AND MODERNIZATION OF ROX FORCES. I POINTED OUT THE BASIC PROBLEM IN THIS CONNECTION WAS TO SECURE ADEQUATE CONGRESSIONAL APPROPRIATIONS FOR THIS PURPOSE WHEN THIS REQUIREMENT WAS CONSIDERED AGAINST COMPETING REQUIREMENTS FOR U.S. RESOURCES AND IN LIGHT OF THE CURRENT ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL SITUATION IN THE US, GEN MUN SPECIFICALLY ASKED ABOUT THE STATUS OF THE ROX ARMED FORCES DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVES PLAN. IN REPLY, I STATED WE HAD A NUMBER OF ALTERNATIVES FOR THE DEFENSE OF KOREA UNDER CONSIDERATION AT OUR NATIONAL LEVEL AT THIS TIME AND THIS PLAN WAS BEING CONSIDERED AS ONE OF THESE ALTERNATIVES. HE ALSO ASKED ABOUT THE STATUS OF THE FY 70 MAP PROGRAM FOR KOREA, TO INCLUDE THE STATUS OF THE BLOOMFIELD AMENDMENT. IN ANSWERING, I SUMMARIZED INFORMATION ON THIS MATTER IN REF A.

Downgraded to UNCLASSIFIED

**TOP SECRET**  
**EYES ONLY**

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 9412194  
By NARA Date 1/11/88

**TOP SECRET  
EYES ONLY**

Downgraded to UNCLASSIFIED

5. (S) GEN MUN NEXT BROUGHT UP KOREA'S COUNTERINFILTRATION REQUIREMENTS. HE MENTIONED THE URGENT NEED FOR SUCH CIGFIR ITEMS AS EQUIPMENT FOR COMMAND AND CONTROL, RADARS, AND FAST BOATS, EMPHASIZING THE NEED TO STOP SEABORNE INFILTRATORS BEFORE THEY REACHED THE SHORE. HE INDICATED THE SHORT RANGE ROKG SOLUTION WAS TO PURCHASE FOUR DESTROYERS FROM THE US AND THE LONG RANGE SOLUTION WAS TO BUILD FAST PATROL CRAFT IN-COUNTRY. HE ASKED IF I FELT THEY COULD BUY FOUR DESTROYERS. I REPLIED THAT I PROBABLY COULD SUPPORT TWO (FYI GEN MICHAELIS HAS JUST PROVIDED ME WITH HIS LATEST VIEW ON THIS MATTER. WHILE THERE IS NO MILITARY REASON TO PROVIDE ADDITIONAL DESTROYERS TO THE ROK'S, THE POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF NOT SELLING THEM TO THE ROK'S, WHILE SELLING THEM TO NUMEROUS OTHER COUNTRIES THROUGHOUT THE WORLDS, WOULD BE UNDESIRABLE; THEREFORE, IF THE ROKG MAKES A FORMAL REQUEST TO BUY DESTROYERS, HE RECOMMENDED, WITH THE CONCURRENCE OF AMEMB SEOUL, THE SALE OF TWO IN RETURN FOR A ROKG AGREEMENT TO INITIATE AN IN-COUNTRY FAST PATROL BOAT CONSTRUCTION PROGRAM. END FYI).

6. (S) GEN MUN ASKED ABOUT THE STATUS OF ACTION ON THE PROPOSED ROK MIG PLANT. IN ANSWER, I PARAPHRASED THE DATA CONTAINED IN PARAGRAPH 1, REF B. HE DID NOT FEEL THAT THE AR18 WOULD BE A GOOD WEAPON FOR ROK FORCES BECAUSE OF THE LACK OF STANDARDIZATION WITH US FORCES. IN CLOSING ON THIS MATTER, I ASSURED HIM HE HAD MY SUPPORT IN HIS EFFORTS TO MODERNIZE ROK FORCES' SMALL ARMS.

Downgraded to UNCLASSIFIED

**TOP SECRET  
EYES ONLY**

DECLASSIFIED  
 Authority NND 942294  
 By NARA Date 7/11/08

**TOP SECRET  
EYES ONLY**

*Downgraded to UNCLASSIFIED*

7. (S) THE CONVERSATION THEN TURNED TO THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM. GEN MUN ASKED IF NEWSPAPER REPORTS WERE TRUE THAT A DECISION HAD BEEN REACHED ON A SCHEDULE FOR THE REDEPLOYMENT FROM THE RVN OF SEVERAL HUNDRED THOUSAND U.S. TROOPS. I REPLIED EMPHATICALLY THAT THESE REPORTS WERE NOT TRUE; THE SCHEDULE FOR ADDITIONAL REDEPLOYMENTS WILL DEPEND ON THE ABILITY OF THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE TO ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY FOR THEIR OWN DEFENSE, ON ENEMY ACTION IN THE RVN, AND ON PROGRESS IN THE PEACE TALKS. I FURTHER STATED THAT THERE WERE SIGNIFICANT INDICATIONS THAT THE ENEMY WOULD LAUNCH A MAJOR OFFENSIVE IN THE NEAR FUTURE. I THEN ASKED WHAT HIS GOVERNMENT'S PLANS WERE CONCERNING REDEPLOYMENT OF ROK FORCES. HE OBSERVED THIS WAS A MATTER TO BE HANDLED BETWEEN THE ROK AND THE RVN.

8. (S) DURING THE COURSE OF THE CONVERSATION, GEN MUN ASKED ABOUT THE POSSIBLE USE OF SENSORS ON THE KOREAN DMZ, THE ISSUE OF RED EYE TO ROK FORCES, AND THE PROVISION OF ANY EXCESS FAST BOATS TO THE ROK. I COULD NOT ANSWER THESE QUESTIONS BUT TOLD HIM THAT I WOULD HAVE MY STAFF LOOK INTO THESE POSSIBILITIES AND THAT I WOULD WRITE HIM LATER.

9. (U) VERY RESPECTFULLY AND WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS

*Downgraded to UNCLASSIFIED*

**TOP SECRET  
EYES ONLY**

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 944794  
By NARA Date 1/14/88

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority E.O. 12958  
By SP8 Date 7-28-03

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65:3  
A

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

19963  
SECRET-NOFORN

December 30, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: FY 1970 Economic Assistance for Korea

Recommendation:

That you approve, subject to Congressional appropriation, an FY 1970 economic assistance program for Korea of \$128.2 million made up of the following types of assistance:

	(Millions US Dollars)	Comparable Levels	
		<u>FY 1969</u>	<u>FY 1968</u>
Supporting Assistance	10.0	20.0	35.0
Development Loans	20.0	20.0	32.0
Technical Assistance	4.8	4.2	6.7
PL 480 Title I (Sales Agreements)	<u>93.4</u>	<u>142.2</u>	<u>79.1</u>
Total Program	\$128.2	186.4	152.8

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

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Authority E.O. 12958  
By RR/DARA Date 7-28-03

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Discussion

Relation to NSSM-27

We are requesting your approval at this time of an "economic development" package in order to proceed with FY 1970 program and self-help negotiations with the Korean Government. The NSSM-27 will outline United States assistance options in the 1971-74 period. The levels we are currently recommending do not foreclose any of the options in NSSM-27.

Economic Performance

Korea's economic growth has been spectacular in recent years. Overall growth (GNP) averaged 11% a year in real terms from 1964 to 68. However, we are concerned by rising inflationary pressures, the overvaluation of the foreign exchange rate, and the rapid increase in external debt.

A.I.D. Strategy

The level of U.S. balance of payments support for Korean country uses recommended for FY 1970 is about 20% of the estimated balance of trade gap, which is about the same as in 1968. While we financed 27% of the gap in FY 1969, the aid level was abnormally high due to a drought.

While the total level of aid recommended for FY 1970 is lower than the FY 1969 level, we are requesting that development loans remain at the same level as last year.

We do not plan additional grant PL 480 or Supporting Assistance after FY 1970. This is in accordance with an understanding we have with the Koreans that we would support their military and economic development budgets with declining levels of grant assistance over the Second Five Year Plan period which ends in CY 1971.

- 3 -

SECRET-NOFORN

We have not established a firm phase-out date for development loans, PL 480 credit sales, or technical cooperation, but we have told the Congress that development loans will terminate in FY 1972 unless a compelling change in circumstances determines otherwise. We expect that PL 480 credit sales and technical assistance will be needed longer.

Supporting Assistance

We are requesting your approval of \$10 million of Supporting Assistance grant funds. This grant will finance essential industrial raw materials, machinery and equipment needed to support Korea's Second Five Year Plan. Procurement under the grant is tied to the United States and will not adversely affect the U.S. balance of payments. The local currency proceeds of the grant will be divided between support for the Korean military budget and Korean efforts in family planning and agricultural development.

Development Loans

We are planning to authorize \$20 million in development loans: \$10 million for a program loan and \$10 million for agricultural development.

The program loan will finance exports of U.S. machinery and equipment needed for the development of Korean small and medium industry. This sector has provided the major impetus for Korea's dramatic growth.

The agricultural development loan will be used for machinery (1) to support the Korean Government paddy expansion program; (2) to increase farm mechanization; and (3) to build feeder roads to link isolated areas with markets.

PL 480

We are proposing a PL 480 sales agreement with the Korean Government to provide approximately 650,000 metric tons of wheat, 160,000 bales of cotton, and 270,000 metric tons of rice. The export market value of these commodities will be approximately \$93.4 million.

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By SP-8/ARA Date 7-28-03

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Our objective is to offer the Koreans a package which will help support their military and economic development budgets and assist in stabilizing rice prices.

As was the case last year, we propose to split the agreement into two parts. The wheat and cotton, representing \$54.2 million of the sales, will be for local currency. Of this portion, \$32.5 million of the proceeds (60%) will be granted to Korea as military budget support, \$3.3 million (6%) will provide loans to private enterprise (Cooley Loans), and \$18.4 million (34%) will be retained for U.S. uses. This will enable us to help support the Korean military budget and raise U.S. uses from 29% last year to 34%.

The balance of the sales agreement for rice (\$39.2 million) will be financed under a 40-year convertible local currency credit (CLCC) on development loan terms, with no initial or currency use payment. We believe these same terms under which rice was sold to Korea last spring are necessary to meet Japanese competition for Korea's 500,000 metric ton import requirement for rice for CY 1970. Last year Japan also made rice available to Korea on forty year terms, repayable in kind with no interest payment. Japan has surplus rice stocks this year. The proceeds of the CLCC agreement will help finance the Korean Government economic development budget and rice stabilization program.

The proposal to furnish 650,000 metric tons of wheat under Title I and to require a Usual Marketing Requirement (UMR) of 270,000 tons would leave an unsatisfied import requirement estimated at up to 500,000 tons. The Title I program of 160,000 bales of cotton with a UMR of 60,000 bales would leave an unsatisfied import requirement estimated at up to 245,000 bales.

We expect as last year that the UMR for wheat and most of the cotton would be purchased in the United States. We plan to make available CLCC credits to purchase Korea's Usual Marketing Requirements and a portion of the additional commercial imports of wheat, cotton, and rice. Additional PL 480 import requirements of wheat and cotton could be considered later in CY 1970 depending on U.S. policy considerations.

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By RS/ARA Date 7-28-03

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In addition to the government to government sales programs described above, we will continue to enter into PL 480 private trade agreements and maintain a PL 480 Title II donations program.


Technical Assistance

In 1970 we are proposing a technical assistance program of \$4.8 million, placing the major emphasis on family planning, agriculture and internal security. Industrial development, economic planning and government administration will also receive attention.

Schedule of Implementation

We plan to offer an "economic assistance" package to the Koreans consisting of the PL 480 sales, Supporting Assistance and the program loan previously described, contingent on appropriate self-help policies. Such assistance in the past was tied to the negotiation of a stabilization program which outlined certain economic policies considered necessary for controlling inflation, while permitting rapid growth. We now feel the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank are in a position to take over the major role on stabilization. We will, therefore, concentrate on cooperating with them and supporting their policies as to inflation, foreign debt management and the foreign exchange rate. In addition, we will emphasize self-help measures in promoting agricultural development and family planning. (See enclosure)

The Secretaries of the Treasury and of Agriculture agree with our recommendation.

  
Acting Secretary

Enclosure:  
Self-help Measures

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By REDA Date 7-28-03

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SELF-HELP MEASURES

We plan to negotiate the following self-help measures in connection with the program package we offer Korea:

(1) In view of the importance of better agricultural performance, both in reducing the need for unusually large grain imports and in providing a better geographic distribution of national income in Korea, emphasis will be placed on self-help in this area. Preconditions to assistance will include arrangements for distribution of adequate lime and fertilizers; improvement in pricing policies; and expansion of credit.

(2) One of the preconditions to FY 1968 assistance was that the Koreans restore a cut in their proposed family planning budget to enable a 50% increase in expenditures over the prior year. This was done, and the Korean Government, with our encouragement, is now planning another 50% increase in the budget for 1970.

(3) Korea has assumed an excessive amount of debt, particularly on short terms, too rapidly. As last year, we will work with the IMF on this issue.

(4) We will also expect to support IMF efforts to encourage Korea to allow the exchange rate to continue to move to a realistic level.

We plan to make available all of the \$10 million Supporting Assistance and the \$93.4 million PL 480 government to government Title I program as soon as a satisfactory self-help agreement is negotiated, probably in January 1970. We plan to release the first half of the \$10 million program loan at the same time, but will reserve the balance for release depending on satisfactory fulfillment of agreed performance targets as of mid-year 1970. We feel that this timing provides a useful added check on Korean performance. These procedures are similar to those used successfully in previous years.

**Prospects on the North Korean Puppet Regime's Provocation and Invasion:**

North Korea's infiltration and destruction activities against South Korea during 1968 were completely and successfully resisted by the appropriate reaction of the South Korean government along with the quick and effective measures taken by the U.S. government.

However, since it is impossible to predict the future plans and actions of the North Korean puppet regime, it would be a very dangerous idea to positively think that the North Korean puppet regime would avoid taking further provocative and infiltrating actions without a new strategy.

Even if there is a 'Paris Peace Talk on Vietnam' in Paris and the Vietnam War has come to a lull, the Communist Bloc is still jointly conducting serious military exercises within the region. Hence, it is highly likely that it could raise a new military operation in any part of the Asian region. As of now, the most likely target is South Korea.

For example, right after the U.S. president announced the statement of ceasing bombardment on North Vietnam on Oct 31, 1968, the North Korean puppet regime carried out the attack on the east coast of South Korea on Nov. 2, 1968.

South Korean people have learned the noble lesson that we should be equipped with the indomitable spirit with a firm attitude and careful and strong preventable measures in order to effectively and successfully defeat the North Koreans, from the real-life struggles through the Korean War, Vietnam War and frequent encounters with communists throughout their lives.

**Military Aid to South Korea**

There are two types of South Korean defense methods – one is the defense against the entire invasion from the Communist Bloc and the other is the one against an individual attack in the rear part of South Korea.

In order to maintain the current South Korean military power and capacity, military aid worth 160 million dollars should be continuously provided.

Also, for the modernization of armament, increase in the firepower of the armed forces, and increase in the number of naval vessels and aircraft, a special military aid program is urgently needed. The special military aid provision is also immediately required to effectively defeat the North Korean puppet regime's infiltration operations.

As it is the time when the North Korean puppet regime's large-scale invasion is highly expected, especially those armaments used for the case of infiltration operations should be urgently and quickly brought in. The time factor is extremely important in the introduction of the military aid, so it is requested that [you] provide enough military aid in a short time period rather than providing small volumes of aid over a longer time span. If the aid gets delayed, its effectiveness would be significantly reduced.

In order to reinforce the defense capacity against the North Korean puppet regime's aggravated infiltration and destruction actions, local defense forces were established in each and every region throughout the country. They have already outperformed in quickly blocking any North Korean destruction actions and have defeated their invasions.

The South Korean government believes that if the local defense force could be equipped with higher level of armaments with greater firepower, their performance would be significantly improved. Therefore further U.S. further support and aid on this matter is strongly desired.

#### **Issues of the Vietnam War:**

It is the South Korean government's opinion that even after the Allied Power has concluded the Paris Peace Talk, it would be possible for the Communist Bloc to wage war by betraying any agreement. Hence it is important to be prepared both diplomatically and militarily. If the North Korean puppet regime abuses this event and ignores the efforts of the allied nations on peace building, or they cross the line drawn by allied nations, it is highly advised to implement appropriate retaliatory measures against the North Korean puppet regime.

The allied nations should take part in the actual discussion as they enlisted in the defense of the Republic of South Vietnam. The allied nations that provided military

force should also cooperate and support the restoration efforts of the Republic of South Vietnam.

The South Korean government wishes to be specially considered on the issue of South Korean participation in the restoration of South Vietnam, so that those Korean technicians currently working in Vietnam should be able to remain at work during the restoration period.

**Issues of Okinawa:**

Okinawa Island is playing a significant role in the maintenance of security in Far East Asia, especially with South Korea as a military base. Okinawa has been serving as an important base for military force that opposed the overt invasion and attack of the Communists, including North Korean guerrillas.

If the U.S. were not able to use Okinawa Island as freely and effectively as now, the military effectiveness between the U.S. and South Korea under the mutual security system would be significantly reduced.

The recent joint military training between South Korea and the U.S. has highlighted the strategic importance of Okinawa Island. Without Okinawa, this quick deployment of large-scale military forces would be impossible.

In light of Okinawa's strategic necessity in the defense of the Democratic Bloc in the Far East Asian Region, this is not only a matter for the U.S. and Japan, but also that of the entire Asian Region.

Hence, as long as the communist threat persists in the Asian Region, U.S. and South Korea's limitless use of the Okinawa base should be maintained and the importance of its strategic value should never be decreased.

South Korea, the direct target of Communism, has a strong interest in the future status of the Okinawa military base, which is closely related to the joint defense and mutual security system. Therefore South Korea should be rightly consulted whenever there would be changes in the status of the Okinawa base.

**Economic Aid to South Korea:**

U.S. economic aid has greatly contributed in South Korea's economic development and strengthened its defense capacity. Its impact is no less than military aid. For the smoother and further economic development of South Korea that is successfully implementing its 2<sup>nd</sup> 5-year economic development plan, the same level of UN economic aid should be provided until it can reach to the certain level of economic independence.

The South Korean government also expects the U.S. government to take active measures to stimulate U.S. private investment in South Korea and make it easier.

The U.S. seems to be restricting imports of several products such as textiles from South Korea. If the U.S. continues to carry out this kind of policy, this will deliver a fatal blow to the South Korean economy, halting its rapid growth.

Since the success of South Korean economic growth has deeply relied on trade with the U.S., the South Korean government earnestly expects the U.S. government not to take any restrictive measures that hinder trading between South Korea and the U.S.

Authority MND 969040  
By J NARA Date 8/24/08

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# AIRGRAM

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HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : Department of State

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RECEIVED  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
JAN 7 3 57 PM 1970  
ANALYSIS BRANCH  
DATE: January 2, 1970  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
ASIAN

FROM : Amembassy SECUL

SUBJECT: Conversation with General KIM Kyung Wook

REF :

Enclosed is a memorandum of conversation I had with former ROK CIA Director KIM Kyung Wook on December 29, 1969 at my Residence. The conversation focused mainly on the KAL plane incident, with discussion also on ROKG attitudes toward North Korean psychological initiatives.

PORTER

*11*

Action Assigned to H/K  
Action Taken Noted  
Date of Action Jan 1970  
Action Office Symbol EA 11C  
Name of Officer Richardson

*Beck*

SECRET - GROUP III

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In  Out

FORM 4-62 DS-323

Drafted by: AMB:WJPorter;let 12/31/69

Contents and Classification Approved by: SAA: Mr. Richardson;AMB:WJPorter

Clearances:

1970 JAN 7 PM 5 28

PUBLISHING & REPRO. SERVICES DIVISION



1 *Seoul*

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## MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

December 29, 1969

Participants: General Kim Kyung Wook, former Director, ROK CIA;  
Lt. Colonel Lee Young In, General Kim's Assistant.

Ambassador Porter;  
Mr. John Richardson, SAA.

Place: Ambassador's Residence, Seoul

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This meeting was arranged through CAS at General Kim's request, as  
latter indicated a desire for conversation with the Ambassador prior to  
Gen. Kim's departure for the United States. *E 7/12/1001  
Jan 23*

Most of the conversation concerned ROK Government tactics in connection with the KAL plane incident and ROK Government attitudes toward North Korean psychological initiatives. The Ambassador said that as Gen. Kim knew, we had agreed to ROK request to take the matter into a MAC Secretaries' meeting. When we did so the North Koreans informed us they would not discuss the matter in the MAC forum. Their next move was to make an announcement over Pyongyang Radio to the effect that the ROK Government should send representatives of private civic and labor organizations to Panmunjom to meet there with North Korean counterparts and negotiate the release of the passengers. The North Koreans had at the same time made clear their intention not to return the pilot and the co-pilot, whom they claim brought the plane to North Korea of their own volition. The ROKG reacted to this by asking us to call another MAC meeting at the Secretaries' level, and we had agreed to do this. A meeting had been requested for Tuesday, Dec. 30. At this meeting the ROKG wished us to raise the KAL plane issue again and request return of the plane, passengers and crew. If during this meeting the North Koreans repeated their Pyongyang Radio announcement, the Ambassador said he understands it is the Korean Government's intention later to counterpropose that instead of the private organizations the North Koreans agree to deal with the Korean Red Cross at Panmunjom on this subject. If the North Koreans reaffirmed their refusal to discuss the matter at the MAC Secretaries' level, it was unclear what course of action the ROKG would pursue.

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By J NARA Date 8/24/08

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While this matter was developing, the Ambassador continued, the Korean Government had not made any public announcement on the North Korean proposals and had not approved mention of them in any way by the information media. Consequently, Koreans were being informed by foreign radio and publications, families of the passengers are agitating the matter, and pressure among Assemblymen is said to be building up. The Ambassador asked Gen. Kim what he thought about the situation.

Gen. Kim launched into a statement which described his own concern when he was in office as CIA Director about the possibility of the hijacking of a KAL plane by the North Koreans. He said he thought the Government move to bring the Red Cross into the picture was the best way of proceeding. In answer to the question as to how he envisaged the future in this matter if the Red Cross and other means failed to bring contact with the North Koreans on the subject, Gen. Kim shook his head, said the problem was a very difficult one, and that he believed it would take two or three months before the North Koreans would be ready to release the passengers. He did not seem to feel that this would cause the Government any difficulty nor did he respond to a question as to whether he thought the Government should take notice of and counter North Korean statements on the subject.

In answer to Gen. Kim's request for suggestions, the Ambassador said he was not discussing the problem with a view to making suggestions but simply to ascertain how Gen. Kim, with his considerable past experience in government and his continued good relationship with President Park, envisaged future handling of this matter. The Ambassador did recall that during the Pueblo affair high-level elements of the RCKG, including Gen. Kim, had urged us to sign and get it over with. Gen. Kim laughed and said he remembered that advice very well since he had originated it.

The Ambassador then said the KAL affair and the handling of public opinion in connection with it seemed to fit into a pattern of North Korean initiatives in the psychological/propaganda field to which the RCKG does not wish to respond. Looking at the Republic of Korea today, its stable Government, its preponderance of population and military and industrial strength as compared to the North, the fact of United Nations backing and of United States presence, causes some friends of the RCKG to wonder why there is not more response to North Korean propaganda initiatives. The

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Ambassador asked Director Kim to give him such comment as he could on this, emphasizing again that his questions did not imply any suggested course of action, but merely indicate a desire to understand the thinking of Korean leaders in this field. As the Director was aware, other divided States, including Germany and Viet-Nam, have a different approach to their Communist antagonists which admits of at least direct discussions or negotiations with them. Could the General comment on the ROK Government's rather different approach, the Ambassador inquired.

Gen. Kim responded by saying that the situations of Germany and Viet-Nam are quite different from that of Korea in that the Koreans knew much more about Communists and had a much worse experience than either of them. He said that while the ROK looks good in view of all the military, industrial and other factors the Ambassador had mentioned, the fact of the matter is that the ROK could not yet stand any contact with the North in any form. The structure here is still too brittle for that and would disintegrate, the General said. If President Park were to agree to any contacts or talks with the Northerners on any subject, or on any basis official or unofficial, he would be accused by a great many people in South Korea of being pro-Communist and chaos would result.

In answer to a question as to when the ROK might be strong enough, in his opinion, to deal with the North in the psychological/propaganda field, Director Kim replied that he thought after 1973 the ROK might be able to do this, but he added, not before then.

The Ambassador inquired, in connection with the ROK Supreme Court decision in October against the Government in the matter of private correspondence between elements of families in the North and in the South, whether any kind of open family correspondence could be envisaged. He said if the Government saw any possibility in that connection it might be interesting to note the effect on the North Korean regime which up to now had been the only advocate of family contacts.

Gen. Kim replied at first that it would be impossible to permit such correspondence. If anyone from the South wrote a letter to a relative in the North, the latter would be at once subjected to pressure by the regime to use such correspondence for intelligence and propaganda purposes. Relatives of officials like himself would probably be imprisoned. The General then changed his mind somewhat by saying that

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Authority NND969040  
By JF NARA Date 8/24/08

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he thought it might be possible to consider such a matter as family correspondence after the election in 1971.

The conversation then turned to ROKG reaction to the Kim Il-Sung advertisement in the New York Times. The former Director said somewhat derisively that the RCK Government had reacted incorrectly in making a lot of noise and by firing people who had no control over such matters.

Finally, General Kim said he was looking forward to his trip to the United States. He hoped particularly to see Assistant Secretary Green and Ambassador Brown. Ambassador Porter said he was sure these old friends would be very pleased to see him. The General then said he would also be visiting Mexico and various South American countries. He had been invited to visit Israel, but was somewhat worried about the possibility of being aboard a plane which might be hijacked. !

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Authority E.O. 12958  
By [redacted] NARA Date 7-28-03

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B

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT  
BUREAU OF THE BUDGET  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

JAN 17 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Economic Assistance Program to Korea for FY 1970

Under Secretary Richardson, with the concurrence of the Secretaries of the Treasury and Agriculture, requests that you approve an FY 1970 economic assistance program for Korea of \$128 million. It includes

- \$93 million in P.L. 480 Title I agricultural commodity agreements,
- \$20 million in Development Loans,
- \$10 million in Supporting Assistance, and
- \$5 million in Technical Assistance

The recommended levels are within your budget and within the Foreign Assistance appropriation recommended by the Conference Committee of the Congress.

The economic assistance program to Korea is designed to support the large Korean defense effort and their economic development program. With the exception of concessional agricultural commodity sales (P.L. 480 Title I), our assistance to Korea has been declining in the last few years, and the proposed program continues that trend. Supporting assistance grants have been reduced from \$60 million in 1966 to \$10 million in 1970, the last year in which we expect to provide any economic grant assistance. Development loans have been reduced from \$80 million in 1966 to \$20 million in 1970. Concessional agricultural credit sales and grants have fluctuated between \$50 million and \$150 million (last year), depending in part on the Korean rice crop.

AID expects to negotiate appropriate self-help conditions with the Koreans as part of the proposed 1970 agreement. For the most part, the self-help conditions will support the economic stabilization measures recommended by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.

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Authority EO 12958

By PRO/PARA Date 7-28-03

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OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

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Next month the National Security Council is scheduled to consider the long range posture of the U.S. with respect to Korea. You will at that time have the benefit of an interagency study of all elements of U.S.-Korean relations, covering our military presence, our military and economic aid programs, and our trade policies. The program proposed here does not foreclose a decision to increase economic assistance as a quid pro quo for possible adjustments in U.S. military force levels. Such increases could be provided from AID's FY 1971 budget and from Agriculture's FY 1971 budget for P.L. 480 concessional sales.

You should be aware that the \$39 million credit rice sale, which is a part of the proposed program package, involves waiver of Korea's local currency down payment required by Section 103 of P.L. 480. The law permits a waiver of this requirement where you determine that it would be inconsistent with the objectives of the Act. In this case, no down payment has been recommended by the Secretary of Agriculture in order to meet the competition by the Japanese who are eager to reduce their own excess stocks of rice through concessional sales. On our side, there are strong pressures from the California rice growers, who are faced with a substantial surplus and a limited domestic market. While we are put in the position of undercutting potential Japanese food aid to Korea, the domestic reasons seems to make it desirable to offer the rice at minimum credit terms, as we did in 1969.

I recommend that you approve the Korean economic assistance program of \$128 million as proposed by Under Secretary Richardson.

*Robert P. Mayo*

Robert P. Mayo  
Director

Attachment \_\_\_\_\_

Approve ✓ \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

## MEMORANDUM

## THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

February 3, 1970

~~SECRET/NO DIS~~

## MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER

FROM: Laurence E. Lynn, Jr. *to (to 2.F.I.)*

SUBJECT: Review Group Meeting on Korea

As you know, we have had a program analysis of Korea underway for some time under NSSM 27. The progress of this study has been as follows:

-- In August 1969, the President and the NSC reviewed the preliminary NSSM 27 report prior to President Park's visit.

-- The report was revised in the light of guidance the President provided following the NSC meeting and reviewed by the IG/EA. By mid-December, this review was complete and the study's Steering Group issued their final report.

-- An issues paper was prepared based on the Study Group's final report. It represents an agreed statement of the analysis contained in NSSM 27.

While this study effort continued, a concern arose within the U.S. and Korean Governments over the future U.S. posture in Korea, particularly its combat forces:

-- In November 1969, President Nixon asked to see a plan for reducing the U.S. presence in Korea by half. He underscored this view later by commenting that a plan should be developed for an ROK take-over of its defense responsibilities with U.S. air and naval support continued as necessary.

-- In later 1969, the Koreans became concerned that a change in the U.S. posture was coming. During his December conversation, Vice President Agnew informed the ROKs that an NSC meeting would be held on Korea soon. In January, Secretary Laird let ROK Ambassador Kim know that the U.S. was contemplating a pull-out of some of the forces now in Korea.

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Thus, the NSSM 27 study has been completed at a time when both the U.S. and ROK governments anticipate long term decisions on U.S. policy and programs in Korea.

The Review Group Meeting

The principal purpose of the Review Group meeting should be to ensure that all agree that the issues for the President's consideration are fairly and effectively presented.

Your Talking Points focus the discussion on the issues paper:

- as a checklist of key questions to see if there are problems with the basic NSSM 27 report
- to see if the issues paper, as amended by Review Group discussion, might facilitate NSC consideration.

You would:

- lead a general discussion of the issues and alternatives with the intent of smoking out any residual agency disagreements with NSSM 27's treatment of their views and to identify the issues that are most suitable for Presidential consideration.
- ask DOD and State to discuss their planning for the implementation of a Presidential decision based on NSSM 27; [both agencies have started some planning but much more remains to be done before negotiations could be started].

This book also contains:

- the agreed Issues Paper based on the Study Group's Final Report, and the Report itself;
- an analytical summary of the issues;
- the guidance memorandum issued following the August NSC meeting; and
- NSSM 27.



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Authority E.O. 12958  
By: [redacted] NARA Date 7-28-03

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THE JOINT STAFF

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301  
PLANS AND POLICY DIRECTORATE (J-5)

17 February 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, NSC REVIEW GROUP

Subject: NSSM-27, US Policy for Korea (U)

1. (U) Reference is made to your request at the Review Group meeting on 6 February 1970, and to the revised Issues Paper, subject as above, which was provided to the Joint Staff by the NSC Staff on 16 February 1970. JCS comments are provided below, along with suggested revisions to the Issues Paper, attached hereto.

2. (S) The NSSM-27 paper raises the issue of the capabilities of the existing forces now in Korea and the appropriate level of US/ROK ground forces required to defend Korea against the potential threat. The JCS do not concur with the judgement in the Korea Study that 12 - 14 ROK divisions could hold an attack by North Korea. The current JCS objective for an adequate defense of Korea against North Korea, calls for 21 combat-ready divisions (19 ROK, 2 US). At some risk (which is increasing due to growing obsolescence of ROK equipment) the existing ground forces in Korea (17 ROKA, 1 ROKMC, and 2 US) have been able to deter an all-out attack and maintain a relatively stable situation in a tense environment. These forces are considered capable of stemming a North Korean attack and/or fighting a delaying action against a combined NK/CPR attack while awaiting additional support.

3. (S) The premise in NSSM-27 that a reduced number of improved and modernized divisions could equate to a somewhat larger number of unmodernized divisions is to some extent valid. However, it must be recognized that there are definite limits to which equipment improvement can offset reduction in force, particularly in the case of infantry divisions. The type of modernization required (high densities of air and ground mobility resources, advanced communications equipment) would be prohibitively expensive to acquire and support. Further, the modernization would be limited by time and the

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
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GROUP - 3  
Downgraded at 12 year  
intervals; not  
automatically...

technical capabilities of the ROK. Given the special circumstances in Korea (uneasy Armistice, difficult terrain, and proximity of Seoul to front lines), reductions in ROK ground forces below 18 divisions should not be considered, and substantial improvements should be made to existing forces including ROK air and naval forces. The JCS do not consider the NSSM-27 postures provide adequate funds for essential ROK air and naval improvements.

4. (S) The JCS believe that withdrawal, now, of US forces would be untimely. Should such withdrawals be directed, the JCS consider that the minimum posture necessary to maintain existing deterrence and stability in Korea is 1-1/3 US divisions and 18 improved ROK divisions, with improvements to the ROK air and naval forces (as outlined in the JSOP) and continued US tactical air support. (The JCS have forwarded a plan for a reduction to 1-1/3 US divisions to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (ISA). The JCS consider that 1/3 of a US division and 19 modernized ROK divisions would provide this same capability, but believe it would be imprudent to consider this reduction in US forces until the return of ROK forces from Vietnam.

5. (S) The above represents the JCS view of the military considerations concerning US/ROK posture in Korea. However, proposals for withdrawal of US troops must also address other important factors involved, including political, psychological and economic. US forces in Korea are a symbol of the US commitments to the defense of the Republic of Korea, and in fact to all of Northeast Asia. Any significant or rapid reduction in the US presence could cause anxiety to the Koreans and be regarded (by both allies and enemies) as evidence that the United States had lost interest in meeting its defense commitments in Korea. This would be particularly serious if US reductions were not fully offset by the completion of substantial improvements to ROK forces in advance of any US withdrawal.

  
F. T. UNGER  
Lieutenant General, USA  
Chairman, JCS Representative  
to NSC Review Group

Copies furnished:  
Members NSC Review Group

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TAB D

DRAFT INSTRUCTIONS TO AMBASSADOR PORTER

ACTION: Amembassy SEOUL

STATE \_\_\_\_\_

NODIS

FOR AMBASSADOR FROM SECRETARIES ROGERS AND LAIRD

SUBJECT: NSSM 27 - Possible Withdrawal of US Division

1. A review of NSSM 27 by the NSC has resulted in a preliminary decision that our objective should be to withdraw 20,000 men rapidly as possible, provided, repeat provided, that satisfactory agreement can be reached with the Koreans. This alternative contemplates the modernization of 16 ROK divisions to compensate for the withdrawn US forces.

2. Both in terms of the effect on Korea and upon our allies elsewhere in the region the question of how this is handled with the Koreans and their reaction is of crucial importance.

3. We realize that this proposal will cause great concern in Korea but will certainly not be wholly unexpected. We all feel that the central issue will be the question of timing and what compensating arrangements will be

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necessary. To educate our thinking here we urgently need a more authoritative idea of the ROK reaction and desires than we can develop in Washington.

4. It seems to us that the only way to get anything solid on this point is to discuss it directly with President Park. Therefore, unless you perceive objection, you should see President Park at the earliest date you think appropriate and try to elicit his reactions in as great detail as possible on the implications of such a move for the ROKs, particularly as to timing (of both initial announcement and eventual withdrawal), and offsetting arrangements which would need to be made.

5. You may stress that although this is an issue which we have to face in the not too distant future we have not wanted to make final decisions without full consultation with him.

6. You will, of course, present the matter in the way that you, with your knowledge of the man, think best. But in your presentation you may care to mention:

a. That he knows that the question of US forces in Korea is something which we have had to keep under review for a long time.

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3.

b. That Korea has made great progress in its economic development, defense, and political stability. The people have recently testified by an overwhelming vote to their support of his leadership.

c. That he has himself publicly acknowledged recently that we cannot be expected to keep two divisions in Korea indefinitely nor would that be desirable for either of us.

d. That the remaining US forces still constitute a major US presence, in terms of combat capability and deterrence, and that modernization of Korean divisions will greatly increase ROKA's strength.

e. That the proposal is consistent with the Guam Doctrine for which he has expressed his support.

f. That his Government's approval and support for this move could be a vivid affirmation of the new strength, independence and stability of the Republic of Korea. We recognize that he may want to present it as developing from his initiative.

g. That these consultations are motivated by the US desire to get his considered views before any positions are crystallized in Washington on a matter which will have to be dealt with some time and is becoming increasingly urgent.

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7. We cannot authorize you at this time to give any commitment to President Park regarding increased MAP and modernization of 16 active ROK divisions. That will require Congressional consultation which we will not undertake until we have the results of your initial consultations with Park. For the present, you should say only that the Administration regards such modernization as an integral feature of the proposal and necessary on military as well as other grounds--emphasizing, of course, that no commitment is possible at this stage and that MAP is dependent on Congressional appropriations.

8. We would, of course, fully understand that President Park will require some time to consider his reply.

9. You may assure the President that the fact that such a move is even being discussed is being carefully restricted in Washington and that we will do everything possible to prevent any leaks.

10. Important related issues in NSSM 27 listed below have also been considered, but decisions on these will be deferred until we have Park's reaction and further decisions are made on withdrawal.

a. Positioning remaining US forces in reserve behind DMZ;

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- b. Pursuit of MAP Transfer;
- c. Continuation of AID beyond FY 1972 in form of TC and PL 480;
- d. Counter-Infiltration Program options;
- e. Tactical nuclear weapons options;
- f. US Air Force deployments to Korea.

11. FYI. We have considered other assurances which we might offer to meet Korean security concerns aroused by this withdrawal proposal. These might include:

a. Assurance to President Park that we would hold mobility exercises (like Focus Retina) in Korea annually, using US-based units. As you know, the C-5 transport is entering the USAF inventory. This heavy-lift capability has particularly relevance to Korea, since it will permit rapid division-size reinforcement in a crisis. A major justification for its purchases, in fact, rests on Asian rather than European contingencies.

b. Although there will be some reduction of US force levels world-wide in the coming years, withdrawals from Vietnam are allowing reconstitution of the PACOM Reserve (the Marines in Okinawa and the 25th Division in Hawaii) and the CONUS-based reserve divisions, all of which were drawn down in 1965 for Vietnam. Thus,

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in terms of reinforcement capabilities for Korea, there will be a distinct improvement over the situation which has existed during the last five years. END FYI.

EA:Ambassador Brown:sla:2/25/70

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

INFORMATION  
February 26, 1970

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MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER

FROM: Laurence E. Lynn, Jr. *LEL*

SUBJECT: ROK Force Capabilities

The ROK force capabilities remain subject to considerable disagreement for postures which reduce both ROK and U.S. active forces in Korea. The JCS claim, for example, that Posture 3 outlined in the Korea "issues" paper, could neither "stem" a North Korean attack nor "delay" a combined NK/CPR attack.

This memo summarizes the Korea Study's assessment of this problem using historical experience, wargame simulation, and force effectiveness comparisons.

The conclusions are that:

-- a decision to withdraw a U.S. division and to maintain an 18 or 19 division ROK force structure involves no military risks of any significance,

-- we need not "modernize" the entire ROK 18 or 19 division force structure to enable them to defend themselves against the present or likely future North Korea force structure.

Posture 3

The ground forces included in Posture 3 are:

-- One U.S. infantry division with about 15,000 U.S. combat personnel and 15,000 support personnel in Korea.

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-- Sixteen ROK active divisions with modernized combat and support equipment. About 13,200 men per division. Including combat support, these divisions will yield a total combat force of 429,000 men.

-- Five ROK ready reserve divisions (3,000 fulltime personnel per division) and seven ROK rear area reserve divisions (1,500 fulltime personnel per division). When activated, which would take 15 days for the ready reserve and 30 days for the rear reserve, those divisions would add 135,000 men to the ROK force structure. In addition, the ROK have a 500,000 man armed militia which they plan to increase to 2,000,000 men in strength.

These forces would be deployed forward, with the U.S. division and 16 active ROK divisions positioned north of Seoul in prepared defensive positions along the invasion routes from North Korea. The reserve and rear area divisions would be largely south of Seoul and would not enter the conflict at its onset.

The threat to South Korea would consist of either:

-- Twenty-five North Korean infantry division equivalents (the North Koreans have only 19 organized infantry divisions) with a strength of 9,200 men per division. Including combat support, the North Koreans could field a total combat force of 281,000 men.

-- Forty-five NK/CPR division equivalents (including the 25 NK divisions) for a total combat and combat support force of 660,000 men.

Against North Korea, the attacking force, assuming careful prior planning and complete surprise, would consist at most of about half the North Korean force or 12 combat divisions. U.S. field commanders judge that this force would probably attack along the three principal invasion routes used in 1950 with the bulk of the force (about six divisions) targeted on Seoul.

Historical Experience

Our experience during the Korean War offers a few guides to assessing these U.S./ROK force capabilities and the force requirements for deterring a North Korean attack.

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In early 1950, the ROK forces consisted of eight light infantry divisions (85,000 combat personnel) poorly organized for defense against a conventional attack from North Korea:

-- The ROK forces were outnumbered 1.5 to 1 overall and 2.0 to 1 along the DMZ.

-- The ROK defenses were poorly prepared and about half of the ROK force was engaged in anti-guerrilla operations south of Seoul.

-- The total investment in ROK equipment totaled only \$50 million dollars. As a result, the North Korean force were stronger numerically than the ROK in nearly all categories of equipment. ROK logistical supplies were adequate for less than 15 days of combat operations.

With this numerical and qualitative superiority, the North Koreans were able to successfully defeat the ROK forces in 1950.

This force balance changed measurably during the remainder of the war. During 1951, the NK/CPR Spring offensive and the UN counter-offensive showed that:

-- The NK/CPR forces of over 800,000 men could be held by a UN force of 535,000 men including about 320,000 ROKs.

-- The UN forces successfully counter-attacked with a force of about 550,000 men against a combined NK/CPT force of about 700,000 men.

In both cases, the UN's combat forces engaged in the conflict were about equal to the enemy's in spite of the great disparity in the sizes of their overall forces. While the UN consistently supported over half of its forces in combat, the NK/CPR rarely kept more than one-third of its forces engaged because of its inferior logistical support. With equal combat manpower, the UN forces superior firepower and combat support gave it a substantial advantage.

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Judging from this experience, an ROK force with a comparable logistical and equipment advantage could hold an all-out North Korean attack with forces substantially smaller (10 ROK divisions would suffice) than the attacking force and defeat it with an equal-sized force. With a Posture 3-size force, the ROK could field 430,000 men north of Seoul of whom 215,000 could be engaged and supported in combat. Within a month, the ROKs could further increase this combat force to 275,000 men. The attacking NK force would be about 180,000 during the initial offensive but only 115,000 on a sustained (more than one month) basis.

Therefore, even with a Posture 3 force, the ROKs could maintain a clear superiority over North Korea's forces. The U.S. forces in Korea and reserve ROK divisions would not be needed; but, if engaged, would further enhance the ROK advantage.

Wargame Simulation

To draw the implications of this historical experience modified for current force capabilities, the Army has developed a wargame which simulates conflict in Korea under a variety of conditions. Because the JCS estimate that 21 U.S. or ROK divisions would be required to defend against a NK attack, the wargame was first used to test this estimate. The Army found that an initial attack by 21 of the 25 NK divisions supported at ROK standards could be held north of Seoul for at least 30 days by 20-2/3 ROK divisions and 1-1/3 U.S. divisions if the attack were a complete surprise and ROK forces were not in defensive positions. However, a number of the Army's assumptions were unrealistically conservative.

-- The NK could not attack with 21 of the divisions in their force structure. The NK could support no more than half (12 divisions) of their force in combat. Moreover, because of the North Korean's need for a reserve against amphibious attack, the intelligence community's estimate is that a NK attack would consist of only 6-9 divisions.

-- The logistical capabilities of the North Koreans are substantially less than the ROK or the U.S. forces. The average

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ROK combat soldier is backed by twice as much support manpower and would receive four times the logistical support of a NK soldier. The relative advantage of U.S. forces is even greater.

-- The ROK forces are now deployed in strong defensive positions along the invasion routes from North Korea. All 18 ROK divisions are now deployed north of Seoul.

Incorporating more realistic assumptions into the Army's wargame, it becomes apparent that about six ROK divisions could meet an NK attack initially and that as few as 9-12 divisions could hold on a sustained basis. Under Posture 3, the ROK's 16 active and modernized divisions could more than meet this requirement.

Force Comparisons

To check this analysis, the ROK capabilities were compared in detail with the expected NK and NK/CPR threat to determine if there were structural or equipment deficiencies in the ROK forces that would limit their performance or require modernization.

The force comparisons considered for each type of weapon:

-- The aggregate number of weapons by type in each combat force, i. e., the number of rifles held in the ROK and NK force structures.

-- The capabilities in combat of each major weapon, i. e., the relative effectiveness of a U.S. M-16 rifle and a NK AK-47 under combat conditions given the maintenance, supply, and doctrine governing use of the weapons.

-- The overall combat effectiveness ratio between ROK and NK or NK/CPR weapons systems considering the quantity, quality, and support of each major weapons systems.

From such comparisons, it was obvious that the present ROK force of 18 unmodernized divisions is stronger than the NK force in almost all major weapon categories. Moreover, this ROK superiority would

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be retained, even without modernization and with a considerably reduced active ROK force, for example, in Posture 3:

-- The ROKs have a definite edge in rifles, rockets, recoilless rifles, trucks, and communication equipment over the NK forces.

-- The ROKs are about equal in machine guns, mortars, artillery, tanks, and self-propelled assault guns.

Thus, without modernization, the ROK forces are more effectively equipped than the North Koreans. With the modernization envisaged under Postures 2 to 5, the ROK's relative edge would be greatly increased.

-- Replacement of the M-1 rifle with the M-16 would double ROK firepower and further increase their advantage over the North Koreans.

-- Provision of more artillery and tanks would give the ROK a definite edge whereas they are now only equal to the North Koreans.

-- Better transportation and communications would facilitate ROK redeployment of their forces following a surprise attack. Although the ROKs have 3.5 times as many trucks as the North Koreans, the terrain in Korea makes lateral movement difficult.

However, these improvements, while desirable, are not necessary to maintain adequate defenses against North Korea unless extensive Chinese support for the North Korean forces is expected or the Soviets (North Korea's chief supplier) prove willing to completely modernize the NK forces over the next five years.

#### Overall ROK Capabilities

These three independent analyses tended to corroborate each other in indicating that:

-- An ROK force of 12-14 unimproved divisions could probably hold an all-out North Korean attack. With a larger and improved ROK force now envisaged, the ROKs could defeat the North Koreans and at least attempt a march North.

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-- An ROK force of 16-18 improved divisions could hold a combined NK/CPR attack for at least 30 days north of Seoul.

Based on these estimates, Posture 3 with 16 improved ROK divisions could easily defeat a North Korean surprise attack and at least hold a combined NK/CPR attack in which the Chinese entered within 15 days the largest force they could field and support. Against either threat, there is little or no military need for U.S. ground forces in Korea, with even the current unimproved ROK force structure. If the ROK force were built up to the 19 division modernized level, as the JCS suggest, the ROKs could attack North Korea with complete confidence and expect to hold on even if China entered the conflict. If the U.S. then introduced substantial forces, the ROKs could hope to defeat even a combined NK/CPR force and reunify Korea.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

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February 24, 1970

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Highlights of Symington Subcommittee Session on Korea, February 24, 1970 (1)

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- EA/K - Mr. Peters
- L/EA - Mr. Futterman
- PM - Mr. Spiers
- PM/JW - Mr. Wolf
- S/PC - Mr. Cargo
- Mr. Seligmann
- Mr. Armacost
- H - Ambassador Torbert
- WH - Mr. Ehrlichman
- NSC - Mr. Lehman
- DOD - Mr. French
- Mr. Knaur /

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In addition to Senator Symington and Senator Fulbright, who were present throughout the afternoon, Senators Aiken and Javits sat in on parts of the hearings.

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After Ambassador Porter read those portions of his statement that related specifically to U.S. commitments in Korea, Counsel sought to establish whether the frequent reaffirmations of our commitment by the President and Vice-President tended to expand or inflate the commitment contained in the 1954 treaty. Ambassador Porter and Ambassador Brown denied that what Senator Fulbright referred to as the "extravagant" and "improvident" rhetoric of President Johnson (specifically his assurance that the U.S. would "act promptly to defeat" enemy aggression) extended our obligations beyond the legal commitment to consult with the ROK about actions designed to meet the common danger in accordance with our constitutional processes.

Senator Symington questioned whether U.S. troops poised on the DMZ had orders to counter-attack across the DMZ in the event of North Korean aggression. General Michaelis stated that U.S. forces were deployed along 18 miles of the 151 mile frontier, that a prudent commander naturally had contingency plans, but that he was not prepared to discuss them. Ambassador Porter explained that

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In the event of a North Korean attack, the U.S. authorities in the field would consult with the ROK and with the U.S. Government before determining an appropriate course of action. We are not obliged, he stated, to consult with any other governments.

Counsel asked whether the Sixteen Nation Declaration was still in effect, and if so, why there had been any necessity for a bilateral treaty. Ambassador Porter indicated that the Declaration had neither been denounced nor retracted; hence it is still in effect. It amounted to a policy statement, however, and not a legal commitment. Moreover, while the moral sanction of such a declaration was of some value to the South Koreans and to the U.S., it did not provide the sort of reassurance that the South Koreans needed in the aftermath of the 1950-53 War.

A number of questions were raised about the Brown letter, especially about the circumstances that prompted it to be written and the commitments it contained. Ambassador Porter and Ambassador Brown explained that the purpose of the letter was to clarify and reaffirm our commitment to the ROK at a time when they were considering the dispatch

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of troops to Vietnam and were naturally apprehensive regarding the possible consequences of this decision upon their own security. Thus the Brown letter was designed to allay governmental and public anxieties in Korea.

On this score, Senator Fulbright wished to know why, if the purpose was to generate public confidence, the letter had been classified.

As for what the South Korean government wanted, Ambassador Brown stated that they wanted assurances of a more automatic American response in case of attack and a pledge that we would not withdraw forces from Korea without their consent. They got neither, though we did agree not to significantly reduce our forces in Korea without consulting them.

Senator Fulbright wished to know why the South Koreans needed constant reaffirmations of our support. Ambassador Porter explained that their anxieties on this score were rooted in fears of North Korean aggression, suspicion of Russian and Chinese intentions,

a lack of confidence in Japanese support in a crisis, and a deep appreciation of the special relationship they enjoy with the United States and a natural desire to preserve it.

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Counsel wished to know whether, in Ambassador Porter's judgment, the treaty or American troops in Korea were a greater source of reassurance to the ROKG. Ambassador Porter indicated that he could not, of course, speak for the Koreans, but he believed that the treaty was more significant.

Several questions were asked about the degree to which our commitment to South Korea was affected by the ROK's dispatch of troops to Vietnam. Ambassador Porter explained that our commitment remained what it had been. While we agreed to prior consultations before withdrawing significant numbers of forces from Korea, we did not thereby preclude troop reductions. What, Counsel asked, do prior consultations mean in this context? Just what it says, Ambassador Porter replied.

Senator Symington inquired into the procedures through which the ROK troop contribution in Vietnam had been arranged. Ambassador Brown stated that we had relayed a written request from the government of Vietnam to Seoul, that President Johnson had discussed the matter orally with President Park, and that he (Ambassador Brown) had put the

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matter to the South Korean Government orally. The South Koreans then made a cabinet decision to send troops and secured the requisite approval for the decision from the National Assembly. This<sup>exchange</sup> was followed by a discussion of the timing of the various requests for ROK non-combatant and combat units, the U.S. role in encouraging and expediting South Korean compliance with the requests, and expressions of feigned amazement from several Senators that whereas we sent troops to Vietnam in response to oral entreaties, the South Koreans had received a written request.

Questions then focussed upon the benefits which accrued to the ROK in return for their troop contribution. Senator Fulbright elaborated on the "mercenary" theme and sought to establish by implication that the ROK contributions were inspired by the prospect of pecuniary benefits rather than gratitude for our past efforts on their behalf or genuine concern for the collective security of Asia. He was especially critical of the secrecy which surrounded the arrangements for financial subventions to ROK troops, intimating that this was designed to sustain the illusion that South Korea was sending troops out of the goodness of their hearts.

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General Michaelis suggested that secrecy was maintained in order to preserve our bargaining position in relation to other troop contributors. Ambassador Porter and Ambassador Brown acknowledged that the South Korean Government had sought the most favorable terms, but strongly defended ROK motives asserting that President Park and his colleagues were genuinely moved by a desire to repay obligations to those who had come to the ROK's defense. They also reminded Senators Symington and Fulbright, who expressed doubts about the returns we had received from our substantial aid investment in South Korea, that ROK has been transformed since 1953 from a state on the verge of economic collapse and physical exhaustion into one of the most vigorous economies in Asia.

Senator Fulbright inquired about the military strength of ROK relative to North Korea. General Michaelis indicated that the nature of terrain and airpower available to North Korea offset the disparity of numbers in ROK's favor. This led Senator Symington to comment on the relative merits of Soviet and American patterns of offering aid and U.S.

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dereliction for not putting additional sophisticated planes into production to match Soviet advanced models.

General Holderness assured the Senators that our planes were quite the match for any available to North Korea when one took pilot performance into account.

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February 27, 1970


MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Highlights of Symington Subcommittee Session on Korea (2), February 25, 1970

DISTRIBUTION:

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- EA - Ambassador Green
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- S/PC - Mr. Cargo
- Mr. Armacost
- Mr. Seligmann
- H - Ambassador Torbert
- WH - Mr. Ehrlichman
- NSC - Mr. Lehman
- DOD - Mr. French
- Mr. Knaur

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In addition to Senators Symington and Fulbright who were present throughout most of the morning session, Senators Gore, Case, and Javits made brief appearances.

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Counsel began by inquiring into the reasons behind the specific agreement of May 26, 1961, which placed ROK forces under CINCUNC. Ambassador Porter explained that during the period of the coup, ROK forces had been withdrawn from the UN command to defend the Capitol and had not responded to CINCUNC direction. Consequently it was thought desirable to reaffirm CINCUNC operational control over ROK forces and to clarify the procedures through which units could be temporarily withdrawn. General Michaelis defined those procedures, indicating that units could be removed from CINCUNC direction temporarily to deal with emergencies, e.g. fires and floods, on the basis of written requests approved by CINCUNC.

In response to further inquiries General Michaelis made clear the fact while he exercises operational control, ROKG has administrative and logistic responsibility for ROK forces. The operational control of CINCUNC, he added, has at no time been challenged since 1961. General Michaelis indicated that the retention of CINCUNC, by preserving our operational command over the ROK forces, enables us to exercise some restraint upon commanders tempted to authorize reprisals against North Korea.

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Senator Symington asked cryptically why we should wish to impose such restraints upon South Korea -- a theme to which he referred several times during the morning.

Senator Fulbright inquired about ROK infiltration, reprisals, and para-military activity in North Korea.

Ambassador Porter indicated that the ROK's had undertaken nothing as provocative as the 1968 Blue House raid; that they had not infiltrated men into North Korea as a matter of policy, and that the ROKG is fully aware that raids of any scope or consequence require consultation with the U.S. In response to further questioning on the frequency of ROK reprisals, General Michaelis indicated knowledge of one naval excursion that proved disastrous for the ROK's. Ambassador Brown recalled another incident.

Counsel asked about the comparability of the U.S.-ROK treaty and the bilateral Mutual Security Agreement between North Korea and Russia and China. Ambassador Porter indicated that while the treaties between the Communist states appeared to include a more definitive commitment, we do not know what precise meaning they attach to various critical phases in those treaties. He indicated, moreover, that while the Russians occasionally reaffirm

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publicly their bonds of friendship with North Korea, normally such declarations have been framed in general terms.

Counsel then asked what U.S. interests were served by our commitment to South Korea. Ambassador Porter referred in his answer to our historical experience in the Korean war; the importance of reassuring a stout ally, the South Koreans; and the significance of upholding the 1954 treaty in order to sustain the confidence of other peoples in Asia in the value of our word.

Senator Symington injected a long soliloquy on U.S. actions which have allegedly "split" various countries, and asked whether the State Department intended to "split" any other countries. This fishing expedition in which Senator Fulbright joined evoked a restrained response from Ambassador Porter who gingerly reminded the Senators that the division of Germany, Korea, Vietnam, and China was the result of historical circumstances and the actions of other third parties rather than the product of a United States design.

A number of questions focussed upon the relative military strength of North and South Korea. Senators Fulbright and Symington wondered, in view of the fact of the evident

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1252

superiority of South Korea in terms of population, GNP, and the size of its armed forces, why they appear unable to defend themselves without the continued deployment of large American forces. Why, Senator Symington asked, can't we "give them the stuff and let them do the job."

General Michaelis explained that the North Koreans possess a superiority in air power vis-a-vis the ROK. As the offensive power, he added, they enjoy the advantages of the initiative. We are not inclined to provide the ROK superior air power for fear they might assume the offensive. Senator Symington appeared to think this would not be a bad idea. General Michaelis indicated, however, that neither North or South Korea could long sustain operations without logistic support from their allies. Consequently, any major hostility might provoke a dangerous great power confrontation. In response to further questions General Michaelis indicated that ROK forces could probably handle North Korea if there was some further modernization of their armed forces, with particular emphasis upon improved mobility.

Ambassador Porter assured the committee that the South Koreans were already undertaking a larger share of the burdens

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1254

of defense by "Koreanizing the DMZ." In response to Symington's question as to whether we might remove one division, Ambassador Porter stated that the question of troop reductions was currently under review in the Department but that the outcome of this review could not as yet be anticipated.

Senator Fulbright asked whether we could avoid the prospect of involvement in hostilities in Korea by revoking the treaty. Ambassador Brown stated that were we to do so, we might offer considerable temptation to Kim Il Sung to attempt the achievement of his objectives by force.

Senator Fulbright then attempted to widen the scope of inquiry into broad questions of U.S. interests in the Far East. There was little disposition on the part of the witnesses and other Senators to stray so widely from the subject matter of these hearings.

Counsel asked a number of questions about North and South Korean order of battle figures, comparability of manpower, firepower, ratio of logistic combat forces, U.S. naval deployments in the Korean area, and numbers of U.S. aircraft deployed in Korea.

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Counsel then asked what South Korea wanted to do at the time of the Pueblo, Blue House, and EC-121 incidents. Ambassador Porter indicated that in the aftermath of those crises, the ROKG requested the additional modernization of their armed forces. Asked by Counsel whether the South Koreans were anxious at that time to retaliate, Ambassador Porter stated that the South Koreans had expressed anxiety that consultative procedures might take too much time in future emergencies. He added that the ROKG had not offered any assurances that they themselves would not retaliate in future emergencies, but that they did assure us that they would consult us in advance.

Counsel then inquired as to measures that had been taken to counter North Korean infiltration across the DMZ and along the coast line. These measures were described in detail by General Cagwin and General Michaelis. General Michaelis indicated that the North Korean objective seems now to have shifted from the infiltration of intelligence agents, terrorists, assassins, etc., to the infiltration of sophisticated and well-trained political cadre. Counsel asked why the infiltration seemed most extensive in the American sector of the DMZ. Ambassador Porter

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indicated that the U.S. had, of course, been a special target of the North Koreans over the years; that any incidents which occurred in the American Sector of the DMZ, however inconsequential, were widely reported; and that one could not be sure of the reliability with which incidents were reported on other sectors of the demilitarized zone.

Afternoon Session

Senator Symington opened the hearings and immediately left. Counsel continued the questioning for the record, asking first a series of questions about American involvement in ROK counter infiltration activities. General Michaelis explained that the U.S. had played no practical role in counter infiltration activities.

Counsel then inquired about the role of military forces in Korea. General Michaelis explained that the substantial American military presence serves as a useful deterrent to North Korea, a source of reassurance to the South Korean people, and occasionally a source of restraint upon the South Korean Government with respect to reprisals for North Korean provocations. Ambassador Brown added that without a large and visible military presence we could not maintain

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operational control over ROK forces. Counsel asked whether we could continue to perform these functions with a smaller MAAG and reduced force levels. Ambassador Porter indicated that our capacity to do so would be contingent upon other actions and the scope and manner of any force reductions.

Counsel inquired as to how the ROK could regain operational control over their forces. General Michaelis explained that a letter of request from the Minister of Defense would be sufficient to recover control. Counsel inquired as to whether we talk privately with the North Koreans. Ambassador Porter explained that we have dealt directly with the North Koreans during the Pueblo crisis. On such occasions, however, we have informed the ROKG fully and frankly on the progress of the talks.

Counsel then asked a series of questions on the internal situation in South Korea, e.g. the extent of corruption, the functions of the South Korean Central Intelligence Agency, and the degree of student discontent.

He then turned to the Military Assistance Program. General Taylor explained that one of our major problems is that virtually all of our MAP funds are committed to operations and maintenance. Thus MAP provides no leverage or subsidy for the modernization of ROK forces.

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There was some discussion of the quality of equipment available to ROK forces in Korea as compared to that used by South Koreans fighting in Vietnam. ROK forces in Vietnam, for example, are equipped with M-16's while the forces in Korea use M-1's. General Michaelis said that there is a plan to establish an M-16 production plant in South Korea. He seemed to acknowledge that much South Korean equipment is obsolescent or obsolete.

Counsel then asked about the magnitude of American POL and ammunition stores maintained in Korea, about the defensive and offensive capabilities of F-4 and F-5 aircraft, the rationale for a South Korean marine division, and the percentage of ROK budgetary expenses devoted to defense spending

In response to Counsel's questions about the organization of MAAG, General Michaelis explained the rationale for the two-tiered system in which PROVMAAG handles management functions while leaving the service units (K-MAAG) intact. The system had evolved historically and the creation of a consolidated JUSMAAG is now under study. The implication of most of Counsel's questions was that the size of MAAG is exorbitant.

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1259

Counsel asked whether South Korea was willing to accept military assistance from Japan. Ambassador Porter said that we had at one time approached the ROK Government about receiving from Japan non-lethal military items for their police, but had found the ROKG unresponsive.

Counsel then raised a number of questions about U.S. facilities and forces. He was especially interested in the ratio between U.S. combat and support personnel, the reasons for the deployment of American forces directly north of Seoul, and why we consider it necessary to maintain 2 divisions in Korea. Ambassador Porter explained that after the Korean war we scaled down our forces by 1955 to the point where only 2 divisions remained. Force levels have remained relatively constant since that time. One division is deployed along the DMZ and one is in reserve. Our forces were deployed north of Seoul in 1953 and have remained there ever since. They block the most logical route for North Korean invasion. They have not been moved because re-deployment would mean the construction of a new base complex whose cost is estimated at \$100 million.

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Counsel then inquired about rotation patterns for troops on the line. In effect he was asking whether American forces might be somewhat reduced and deployed away from the front lines. He asked if there was any political necessity for us to keep forces on the line. Ambassador Porter replied that the important point is that our presence remain visible, for it is the visibility of our presence that helps deter North Korean armed attack, and reassures the South Korean Government and people of the constancy of our support.

Counsel asked about Korean expectations regarding the continuance of our present force level in Korea. Ambassador Porter indicated that their concern is that a reduction of our forces not be executed precipitately, that it not occur without prior consultations, and that it not be undertaken without the prior modernization of ROK forces.

Counsel inquired as to the preferred way of affecting troop reductions, i.e., withdrawal of an entire division or the withdrawal of bits and pieces of various units. General Michaelis indicated that if we decided to reduce forces he would prefer to be given a figure on the number to be withdrawn and permitted discretion to determine where to make the cuts.

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Authority E.O. 12958  
By ME NARA Date 8-11-03

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

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March 3, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger *HK*

SUBJECT: NSC Meeting on Korea

An NSC meeting on Korea is scheduled for March 4 to review U.S. force deployments, U.S. support of the ROK forces, and U.S. assistance.

Background

The Korea Study (NSSM 27) was initiated in February 1969. Since then, you will recall that:

-- In August, the NSC met to review our Korean policy in preparation for President Park's visit. Following the meeting, you directed that an increase in U.S. ground forces above current levels in Korea should not be considered in peacetime.

-- In November, you asked that a plan be developed that would reduce the U.S. presence in Korea.

While staff work on a plan for Korea has been proceeding, the Koreans have become concerned about possible U.S. force withdrawals. In December, the Vice President informed them that an NSC meeting on Korea would be held in the near future. In January, Ambassador Porter reassured the ROKs that, while withdrawals were being considered, no decision had been made and the ROKs would be consulted before any withdrawals were carried out. Thus, the Koreans expect a U.S. decision shortly on our future force levels in Korea.

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The Korea Study

The Korea Study is probably the most comprehensive analysis of U.S. programs in a foreign country ever undertaken and is unique in attempting to lay the groundwork for an integrated five-year plan of U.S. policy toward Korea. The principal issues for decision and agency views on them are:

-- The U.S. forces to be retained in Korea over the next five years. State and OSD favor the withdrawal of one U.S. division and 20-30,000 U.S. personnel within a year or so. The JCS believe that any withdrawals now would be "untimely" and, if made, should be limited to two brigades of one U.S. division and about 10,000 personnel.

-- The ROK conventional force capability to be developed through U.S. support. State and OSD favor U.S. support for substantial improvements in 16 to 18 ROK divisions, while maintaining ROK air and naval forces at current levels. The JCS believe that this improvement in ROK ground forces would be adequate to maintain our current capability in Korea, but an adequate defense would require that ROK air and naval forces also be substantially improved over the long run and ROK ground forces be increased to 19-1/3 divisions when ROK forces return from Vietnam.

-- The U.S. military and economic assistance to be provided to the ROKs to maintain their rapid economic growth while allowing them to assume a larger defense burden. State and Defense find that military and economic assistance to Korea should be increased if substantial U.S. forces are withdrawn, but that the ROKs are able to assume a larger defense burden themselves through increased local production or purchase of military equipment.

In addition to these central issues, I have made preparations for you to decide on a wide variety of other aspects of U.S. policy toward Korea, such as the timing of U.S. withdrawal, the positioning of U.S. conventional and nuclear forces, and U.S. support of the ROK counter-infiltration effort. Once a basic decision on U.S. force deployments is reached, I will forward to you for your consideration the basic elements of a comprehensive five-year plan for U.S. policy and programs for Korea consistent with your decision.

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The NSC Meeting

Your talking points focus the discussion on the need for a comprehensive plan for your policy toward Korea. Following your opening remarks, Mr. Helms will give his assessment of the North Korean and Chinese threats to Korea.

Your Red Book Also Contains

- an analytical summary of the issues for decision;
- the NSSM 27 and NSDM 4 guidance on the preparation of a five-year plan for Korea.

Your Backup Book Contains

- an interagency Issues Paper on Korea;
- the report of the Korea Study Steering Group;
- the NSSM 27 guidance issued after the August NSC meeting on Korea;
- the JCS views on force requirements for Korea.

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TALKING POINTS FOR THE PRESIDENT

NSC MEETING - MARCH 4, 1970

Opening Comments

Over the last twenty years, our policy toward Korea has proven successful almost beyond belief.

-- A weak country where forces were rapidly defeated in 1950 has become strong and largely self-reliant.

-- A poor country which was war-ravaged and destitute in 1953 has made great strides in economic development and now promises to reach sustained growth without assistance.

In both economic and military spheres, Korea is a remarkable example of the ability of a nation to develop itself with our support. Moreover, throughout the post-war period, the Koreans have remained among our closest allies.

Because of this manifest past success, I asked last year for a thorough re-evaluation of our future policy and programs in Korea. We need now to match the wisdom of our predecessors in determining what U.S. policies and the programs consistent with them will best serve us and the Koreans over the next five years. Based on our discussion today, we can arrive at a policy that will serve to guide our day-to-day decisions for years to come.

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under provisions of E.O. 12958 *RTP*

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But, first let us hear about the potential threats to Korea from Dick Helms.

[Following Helms' presentation, you should call on Kissinger to present the substantive analysis and alternatives for discussion. This presentation should lead to a discussion by the State and Defense representatives of their views on the alternatives, particularly U.S. force deployments and the timing of any U.S. withdrawals.]

Concluding Remarks

I believe now that we have adequately covered the issues. However, before breaking up, I would like to stress the need for a series of comprehensive country plans for U.S. policy and programs overseas. I believe that the initiation of a series of country plans for our foreign policy is essential.

-- Unless we plan ahead in a systematic and orderly manner, we will become emerged in our day-to-day concerns and lose perspective.

-- Unless we plan and budget our resources carefully, we will be unable to match our programs and their resources with our policy goals.

Therefore, based on our discussion today, I hope shortly to decide on a comprehensive and integrated policy plan for Korea over the next

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3

five years. Though a great deal of work will remain to be done, I expect this basic plan to be the principal guide for all agencies in their management of day-to-day affairs regarding Korea.

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TABLE 1  
ROK AND U.S. COSTS FOR  
ALTERNATIVE FORCE POSTURES

Five Year Totals, 1971-1975  
(In billions of dollars at 1968 prices)

Posture	Force Level	ROK Costs (A)	U.S. Support Costs (B)	U.S. Force Costs (C)	Total U.S. Costs (D)=(B)+(C)
I	2 U.S. Divisions U.S. Presence of 64,000 18 ROK Active Div. (3-5)	2.0	1.7	4.6	6.3
II *	1-1/3 U.S. Divisions U.S. Presence of 54,000 18 ROK Active Div. (18)	2.2	2.4	4.0	6.4
III	1 U.S. Division U.S. Presence of 35,000 18 ROK Active Div. (18)	2.1	2.1	3.0	5.1
IV	1 U.S. Division U.S. Presence of 35,000 16 ROK Active Div. (16)	1.9	1.9	3.0	4.9
V	Residual U.S. Force U.S. Presence of 12,500 18 ROK Active Div. (18)	2.1	2.4	1.5	3.9

( ) the number of modernized ROK divisions for each posture is given in parenthesis.

\* The JCS believe that the U.S. presence might be reduced to 28,500 men, provided that 19 modernized ROK divisions are available in Korea. When ROK forces are returned from Vietnam, this reduction could be considered.

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# AIRGRAM

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NT	LAB	TAR
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RMT	CIA	NAVY
3	16	5
350	USIA	NSA
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A-126

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TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INFO: CINCPAC FOR POLAD, TOKYO

FROM : AMERICAN EMBASSY, SEOUL

SUBJECT: KOREAN PUBLIC OPINION POLL ON NATIONAL UNIFICATION

REF : SEOUL A-120 (not sent to Tokyo) Name of Officer

RECEIVED  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
Action assigned to

MAR 11 10 47 AM 1970  
Action Taken

RS/AN  
ANALYSTS BRANCH

Date of Action: March 30, 1970  
DATE: March 5, 1970

Office Symbol

Name of Officer

The summary results of a public opinion poll on attitudes concerning the Korean unification issue are enclosed. The poll was administered for the ROKG National Unification Board during September and October 1969, and part of the poll results was released to the press by Unification Minister SIN Tae-hwan on February 20.

For the most part, the poll yielded predictable results. An overwhelming majority expressed a strong desire for unification, but there was little optimism about achieving unification peacefully within the foreseeable future. Most of those polled think life in the south, both in economic terms and in terms of personal freedom, is better than life in the north, and they look forward to a better life in a Korea unified under a democratic government. A large majority reaffirmed the often expressed preference for freedom over economic sufficiency.

A notable feature of the poll is that it gave an opportunity for expression of opinions which normally are suppressed in the ROK. The most striking example of this is in the responses to two questions indicating that slightly over four percent of the sample group thought their life would improve under a communist government.

The poll results show two attitudes of particular interest to the U.S. Concerning the ROK chances in another war with the communist north, only a quarter of the sample group were confident the ROK could succeed alone while a small majority thought participation by the UN Forces

Exempt from automatic decontrol

Enclosure:  
Public Opinion Poll - summary results

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rafted by: POL: WPA [Signature] 3/5/70

Contents and Classification Approved by: POL: TMJudd

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1269

Seoul A-126

2

would be indispensable for ROK success. Concerning north-south contacts, a definite preference was shown for contacts of a formal rather than personal nature, although only a minority favored early north-south contacts of any kind.

About one-third of the poll results was not revealed to the press. The reasons why the Unification Board would consider the results which remain classified more sensitive than the results it released are not readily apparent.

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LIMITED OFFICIAL USEPUBLIC OPINION POLL ON NATIONAL UNIFICATIONSUMMARY RESULTS

<u>QUESTION</u>	<u>PERCENT RESPONSE</u>
*1. It is thought everybody wants unification. How do you feel ?	
a) Unification must be achieved	90.60%
b) It makes no difference whether or not unification is achieved	3.13%
c) Present situation is all right	6.20%
d) No answer	0.05%
*2. When do you think unification will be achieved ?	
a) Impossible within next 10 years	19.50%
b) Possibly within next 10 years	39.50%
c) Do not know	40.50%
d) No answer	0.34%
3. Do you think unification is possible without war against the communists ?	
a) Absolutely impossible	37.93%
b) Possible	21.79%
c) Difficult to say	20.20%
d) Do not know	19.76%
e) No answer	0.29%
4. If war broke out, do you think South Korea would win even if the UN Forces did not enter the conflict ?	
a) Definitely would win	25.07%
b) South Korea would win only with assistance of UN Forces	55.31%
c) Do not know	18.12%
d) No answer	0.39%
*5. What do you think the level of industrial development in North Korea is compared with South Korea ?	
a) South Korea is ahead	54.56%
b) North Korea is ahead	11.60%
c) About the same in South and North Korea	13.05%
d) Do not know	20.66%
e) No answer	0.10%

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Page 2 of  
Enclosure to  
Seoul A- 126

- \*6. What do you think the state of food, clothing and shelter in North Korea is compared with South Korea ?
- |                                     |        |
|-------------------------------------|--------|
| a) Better in South Korea            | 86.25% |
| b) Better in North Korea            | 1.54%  |
| c) Similar in South and North Korea | 3.67%  |
| d) Do not know                      | 8.49%  |
| e) No answer                        | 0.05%  |
7. What do you think the level of agricultural development in North Korea is compared with South Korea ?
- |  |        |
|--|--------|
| a) South Korea is ahead                    | 65.20% |
| b) North Korea is ahead                    | 4.70%  |
| c) About the same in South and North Korea | 9.10%  |
| d) Do not know                             | 20.80% |
| e) No answer                               | 0.10%  |
- \*8. What do you think the level of personal freedom in North Korea is compared with South Korea ?
- |                                     |        |
|-------------------------------------|--------|
| a) Better in South Korea            | 92.30% |
| b) Better in North Korea            | 0.74%  |
| c) Similar in South and North Korea | 1.59%  |
| d) Do not know                      | 4.97%  |
| e) No answer                        | 0.34%  |
- \*9. If unification were accomplished under communist domination, do you think there would be any change for you and your family ?
- |                                  |        |
|----------------------------------|--------|
| a) There would be change         | 55.22% |
| b) There would not be any change | 20.56% |
| c) Do not know                   | 23.88% |
| d) No answer                     | 0.34%  |
10. If Korea were unified under communism, what effect would it have on your employment ? (Answered only by those who checked 9.a)
- |  |        |
|--|--------|
| a) I would have to change my job                 | 38.67% |
| b) I would have to change my place of employment | 11.78% |
| c) The only effect would be on employment        | 20.41% |
| d) Do not know                                   | 28.15% |
| e) No answer                                     | 0.99%  |

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LIMITED OFFICIAL USEPage 3 of  
Enclosure to  
Seoul A-126

- \*11. How do you think living conditions would be under communist domination? (Answered by those who checked 9.a)
- |                             |        |
|-----------------------------|--------|
| a) Life would become worse  | 74.1%  |
| b) Life would become better | 7.55%  |
| c) About the same           | 3.87%  |
| d) Do not know              | 13.13% |
| e) No answer                | 1.35%  |
- \*12. What do you think about an exchange of letters with relatives and friends living in the communist north?
- |  |        |
|--|--------|
| a) It would be good  | 24.8%  |
| b) Not appropriate for the time being                      | 14.40% |
| c) Not appropriate before unification                      | 38.10% |
| d) It does not matter whether or not letters are exchanged | 5.40%  |
| e) No answer   | 0.20%  |
| f) Do not know   | 17.10% |
- \*13. What do you think about visits between families and friends separated between the communist side and South Korea?
- |   |        |
|---|--------|
| a) It would be good                                       | 14.20% |
| b) Not appropriate for the time being                     | 16.60% |
| c) Not appropriate before unification                     | 47.10% |
| d) It does not matter whether or not visits are exchanged | 4.60%  |
| e) Do not know  | 17.10% |
| f) No answer  | 0.40%  |
- \*14. What do you think about the mutual exchange of journalists?
- |  |        |
|--|--------|
| a) It would be good  | 29.34% |
| b) Not appropriate for the time being  | 11.67% |
| c) Not appropriate before unification  | 32.92% |
| d) It does not matter whether or not there is a mutual exchange of journalists | 5.16%  |
| e) Do not know   | 20.41% |
| f) No answer   | 0.50%  |
- \*15. What do you think about athletes from the communist side and athletes from the south meeting in athletic competitions?
- |                                       |        |
|---------------------------------------|--------|
| a) It would be good                   | 35.61% |
| b) Not appropriate for the time being | 10.20% |
| c) Not appropriate before unification | 28.30% |

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1273

## \*15 (continued)

- |  |        |
|--|--------|
| d) It does not matter whether athletic competitions are held | 6.20%  |
| e) Do not know   | 19.30% |
| f) No answer   | 0.60%  |
16. What do you think about direct discussions with representatives of the communist side on the unification problem ?
- |  |        |
|--|--------|
| a) It would be good  | 35.90% |
| b) Not appropriate for the time being                            | 11.20% |
| c) Not appropriate before unification                            | 24.20% |
| d) It does not matter whether or not direct discussions are held | 5.20%  |
| e) Cannot answer   | 23.10% |
| f) No answer   | 0.30%  |
- \*17. What do you think is the best program for achieving unification of south and north ?
- |  |        |
|--|--------|
| a) Carry out nation-wide general election under UN supervision   | 31.90% |
| b) Carry out election only in North Korea  | 1.40%  |
| c) Carry out nation-wide general election under neutral nation(s) supervision                            | 8.30%  |
| d) Impossible without military force   | 12.80% |
| e) Because of present international situation there is no program aside from present division of country | 10.30% |
| f) Must be accomplished by south-north discussions   | 9.50%  |
| g) Other   | 1.60%  |
| h) Do not know   | 23.70% |
- \*18. If Korea were unified under a democratic government in accordance with the position taken by the ROKG, what do you think life would be like ?
- |                   |        |
|-------------------|--------|
| a) Better         | 74.80% |
| b) About the same | 4.79%  |
| c) Worse          | 6.21%  |
| d) Do not know    | 13.6%  |
| e) No answer      | 0.39%  |



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Page 5 of  
Enclosure to  
Seoul A-126

19. Which of the following two conditions do you prefer ?

- |   |        |
|---|--------|
| a) Economic sufficiency, even if there were a little less freedom | 10.10% |
| b) Freedom, even if it meant some economic hardships              | 80.00% |
| c) Do not know  | 8.70%  |
| d) No answer  | 1.20%  |

20. Where do you think fault lies for the division of Korea ?

\*South Korea or North Korea

- |   |        |
|---|--------|
| a) North Korea is most at fault                           | 48.46% |
| b) South Korea is most at fault                           | 2.38%  |
| c) North Korea is a little more at fault than South Korea | 17.53% |
| d) South Korea is a little more at fault than North Korea | 1.29%  |
| e) Neither is at fault                                    | 4.62%  |
| f) Both share responsibility                              | 2.38%  |
| g) Do not know  | 22.69% |

\*The free world or the communist world

- |  |        |
|--|--------|
| a) The communist world is most at fault                              | 51.79% |
| b) The free world is most at fault                                   | 1.59%  |
| c) The communist world is a little more at fault than the free world | 15.19% |
| d) The free world is a little more at fault than the communist world | 1.89%  |
| e) Neither is at fault   | 1.44%  |
| f) Both share responsibility   | 4.92%  |
| g) Do not know   | 22.59% |

Inside or outside Korea

- |  |        |
|--|--------|
| a) Mostly inside Korea                     | 4.17%  |
| b) Mostly outside Korea                    | 43.84% |
| c) A little more inside Korea than outside | 2.73%  |
| d) A little more outside Korea than inside | 18.02% |
| e) Neither is at fault                     | 1.29%  |
| f) Both share responsibility               | 6.85%  |
| g) Do not know                             | 23.45% |

\*21. What was your emotional reaction on hearing of the numerous frequent incidents of armed infiltration ?

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Page 6 of  
Enclosure to  
Seoul A-126

## \*21 (continued)

a) Very angry	81.43%
b) A little angry	13.36%
c) No reaction	3.18%
d) Do not know about the incidents	0.39%
e) No answer	1.64%

## 22. How did you feel on hearing of these incidents ?

a) Very uneasy	49.40%
b) A little uneasy	23.58%
c) No feeling	5.01%
d) Thought they were nonsensical	20.26%
e) Do not know about the incidents	1.34%
f) No answer	0.39%

## \*23. What do you think the work of the National Unification Board should be ?

a) Research concerning unification	14.40%
b) Activities concerning unification	12.50%
c) Both research and activities concerning unification	55.40%
d) Do not know	16.80%
e) No answer	0.90%

## \*24. Who is responsible for unification work ?

a) The government	7.40%
b) The People	10.60%
c) The people and the government together	78.50%
d) Others	0.70%
e) Do not know	2.40%
f) No answer	0.40%

## Explanatory notes:

1. These summary results were translated and compiled by the Embassy from information provided confidentially by the National Unification Board. The questions are repeated as they appeared on the poll questionnaire, except the order has been changed slightly for logical sequence. The response choices and percentage results are taken directly from the poll reports.

2. The poll sample group consisted of 2,014 "opinion leaders" (household

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Page 7 of  
Enclosure to  
Seoul A-126

heads, family elders, community leaders) in 24 urban and 26 rural clusters in selected front-line, coastal and internal areas throughout South Korea. 50.40% of the respondents indicated they had experienced life under communism. The complete poll report further analyzes the results according to age, sex, education, and educational background of the respondents. The Seoul National University Graduate School of Business Administration administered the poll during September and October 1969 and compiled the results. The National Unification Board sponsorship of the poll was not mentioned on the poll questionnaire.

3. Results of the questions marked by asterisks were released to the press by the National Unification Board on February 20. The remaining questions and their results carry the ROKG classification equivalent to Limited Official Use.

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