

U.S. vice minister of defense visits foreign minister

Conversation

Time: 2 June 1969, 10:00~10:20

Participants:

U.S. side: Vice Minister of Defense Mr. Pakard

Ambassador Porter

Admiral McCain (commander-in-chief of U.S. Pacific Region)

A U.S. Army commander in South Korea, Commander Vonsteal

Lieutenant General Ungez (Director of the U.S. joint chief planning section)

Additional two persons

ROK side: Minister

vice minister of defense

Assistant Deputy Minister Hyo Eul Lee

Director of the Europe and U.S. Bureau, Ha Jung Yoon

Contents of conversation

Minister: (Delivered welcoming message)

You must have listened to the briefing related to the South Korean case from both ambassador Porter and USFK authorities.

Mr. Pakard: This is my first visit to South Korea and this region. I came to hear your side of the story.

Minister: You must have listened to the presentation from ROK military authorities.

Mr. Pakard: The U.S. government, including Mr. Mayard, is gravely concerned about the South Korean case. And, because the U.S. government recognizes the South Korean case as one of the most significant issues, I came here to see things first hand.

Minister: We are always satisfied and grateful to U.S. authorities for providing South Korea with a U.S. joint defense system that can cope with provocation from North Korea. It will be crucial for South Korea to put efforts into the ROK defense system,

while focusing on economical development. We consider this a very difficult and tough issue to deal with, but we strongly feel the need to put our attention on it to protect freedom and independence. Furthermore, we are ready to take responsibility for the protection and security of this region.

Mr. Pakard: Military effort is very impressive and we thank you for dispatching the military to Vietnam.

When North Korean communists invaded South Korea 19 years ago, South Korea was at the most vulnerable and dangerous situation. At that time, the U.S. government helped South Korea both militarily and morally. As far as I know, the South Korean government made a quick decision to dispatch the military by remembering the great help from the U.S. government. The U.S. government assisted with economic development and somewhat supported it after the war.

And now we came to fight together with American young people. In other words, we paid yesterday's moral debt.

Mr. Pakard: We fully understand our responsibility.

Minister: How long are you planning to stay here?

Mr. Pakard: I'm planning to stay until the 4th, but I want to stay as long as I can. Yet, I will have to go back, because Minister Rayard will leave Washington soon. We can't both vacate Washington.

Minister: I am also planning to stay in Japan for the ASPAC conference until the 13th. I wish you would discuss the matter with defense authorities.

Mr. Pakard: I wish to deliberate issues related to mutual interests, including the Vietnam issue.

Minister: Kim Jong-il has been overriding international law and provoking South Korea since 1966. I believe that this topic will be one of the most important issues. I don't know how to check provocation from North Korea, but I think we should seek reasonable and best means to check provocation. They are very irrational and unpredictable. They could miscalculate our abilities and intentions. When I participated

in the conference held in Bangkok I was impressed by the briefing from admiral McCain. We will look out more strictly and we will work harder to maintain economic development.

Mr. Pakard: We will have to seek means to restrain the DPRK. The Republic of Korea has been doing great and made great achievements so far.

Ambassador Porter: Time is up so we should wrap it up here. Minister, thank you for organizing the meeting.

C.B. cap. 918

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PRECEDENCE
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Sub-0

FROM: GEN WHEELER, CJCS, WASH DC

To: ADM MC CAIN, CINCPAC, HAWAII
GEN HOLLOWAY, CINCSAC, OMAHA, NEB.

ABSOLUTELY FOR EYES OF ADDRESSEES ONLY
TOP SECRET EYES ONLY CJCS 08077 MAY 1969

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS
Distribution

GEN WHEELER, CJCS
VADM JOHNSON, DJS
LGEN MEYER, J3
J-3 (PAC DIV)

Subj: Retaliatory Strike Against the Changjin Power Plant in North Korea (S)

1. (S) Highest authority has requested a plan for retaliatory air strikes against the Changjin Power Plant complex in North Korea. Such a plan would be considered in the event of a future provocation by the North Koreans similar to the recent shoot down of the US EC-121.

2. (S) The plan should include:

- a. Designation of type aircraft best suited to such a mission.
- b. The point of departure for the aircraft.
- c. The number of aircraft needed to inflict moderate to heavy damage.
- d. The estimated risks of such a strike.

SECDEF	
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NSC/Sec	X

DATE	3	TIME	
MONTH	JUN	YEAR	1969
PAGE NO.	1	NO. OF PAGES	2

DRAPETER

TYPED NAME AND TITLE
LTCOL B. V. BROWN, USAF
Pacific Division, J-3

PHONE
74073

PRECEDENCE
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SIGNATURE
Richard R. Day

TYPED (or stamped) NAME AND TITLE
RICHARD R. DAY, Staff Assistant

Requesting Instructions from Chiefs of Staff

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REPLACE EDITION OF 1 MAY 64 WHICH WILL BE USED.

DECLASSIFIED
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By NARA Date 7/11/18

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and/or CONTINUATION SHEET

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PRECEDENCE	RELEASED BY	DRAFTED BY	PHONE
ACTION			
INITIALS			

- e. Estimated losses to US aircraft.
 - f. The time required to execute the mission following a decision to do so, and;
 - g. Estimate of probable enemy response.
3. (S) FOR ADMIRAL MC CAIN: Request you develop a detailed plan utilizing assigned aircraft necessary to accomplish mission objective.
4. (S) FOR GENERAL HOLLOWAY. Request you develop a detailed plan utilizing B-52s necessary to accomplish mission objective.
5. (U) Your plans should arrive here by 0800 Washington time 6 June 1969.
6. (U) Request that participation in preparation of these plans be limited to extent possible. Because of the sensitivity of this plan request all communications utilize this channel. Warm regards.
- GP-4

SSO NOTE: DELIVER UPON RECEIPT

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CONTROL NO.	TON/TOD	PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION	INITIALS
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DD FORM 173-1
NOV 63

REPLACES EDITION OF 1 MAY 59 WHICH WILL BE USED.

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Authority NND 947294
By NARA Date 7/14/08

The Second U.S.-ROK Ministerial Summit

Joint Statement

Joint Statement

1. The second annual U.S.-ROK Ministerial Summit was held in Seoul on June 3-4, 1969, as agreed upon at the U.S.-ROK Summit, which took place on April 17-18, 1968 in Honolulu.
2. Secretary General Lim Chung-Sik exchanged opinions with Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard and other high-ranking officials on the issues of South Korean national defense and related areas of common interests in a cooperative and friendly atmosphere.

- South Korean Situation -
3. The representatives of both countries agreed that the North's continuous violations of the armistice agreement, invasions by armed communist guerrillas (i.e. Uljin-Samcheok incident), the shooting down of a U.S. EC-121 aircraft and the recent increase in military buildup indicate a pronounced threat.
4. Depending on conditions of events, the representatives agreed to take active and immediate actions against future aggressions by the North since provocations such as these imperil the peace and security of South Korea and the East Asian region.

- Military Assistance -
5. The representatives reexamined the state of execution of the measures agreed in the first U.S.-ROK Ministerial Summit and the possible strategies that could advance South Korea's defense capability.
6. The representatives recognized that the only way to discourage the North from making reckless war is to overwhelm them with military superiority. Therefore,

the United States will continue effective military assistance to the South Korean national army and strengthen the U.S. armed forces stationed in Korea. Also, the United States and South Korea made a concrete agreement to keep the reserve army armed at all times and to provide modern equipment and reinforcement materials to counterespionage operations.

7. The representatives agreed to build production centers for fire extinguishers and ammunitions in order to improve armament conditions of the South Korean national army.

– East Asian and Vietnam Situation –

8. The representatives closely examined the political situations in South Korea as well as the East Asian region and agreed that U.S.-ROK military cooperation must continue in order to ensure the peace and stability in the region. Regarding Vietnam, both countries agreed to continue the support until invasions completely halt and peace is restored.
9. The representatives agreed to hold the 3rd U.S.-ROK Ministerial Summit in Washington D.C. in the year 1970.

- U.S. Helicopter Assault Incident -

1. Date: August 17, 1969
2. Helicopter: U.S. Army OH-23 Model ("harrycopter")
3. Pilots: 3 Personnel - David H. Crawford (Capt.), Malcolm V. Ropk (W.O.), Herman E. Hofstadter (Cpl).
4. Release negotiations: A secret chief delegate council met six times (the first meeting on Sept. 8, the second on Dec.3)
5. Release date: Dec. 3, 1969 (after 109 days)
6. Location of the assault: On Aug. 17, a three-seater OH-23 model unarmed helicopter ("harrycopter") that took off from Euijungbu at 10:30 A.M. for training at the southern boundary of the DMZ notified at 11:00 A.M that they were lost.

Drafting Paper

Class symbol Class number	MeI-	(number)	
Due date		Drafter	Approving Official
Operation date		North America Dept. 2 Kim Joon Mo	
Filing date		69. 7. 2	
Assisting organization			
Cooperation			
CC Recipient RE	American Ambassador		
Title	2 nd ROK-U.S Defense Cabinet Conference Summary		
	1. Refer to attached summary report of 2 nd ROK-U.S. Defense Conference held from 3 June to 4 June 1969.		
	2. One copy of corresponding report by the Ministry of Defense was distributed to the Military Office of the U.S. Embassy. Attachment: One copy of summary report /end/		

To the attention of: Mr. President

Title: Senator Stephen Young's speech recommending the withdrawal of U.S. Armed Forces from South Korea

1. On May 13, 1969, Senator Stephen Young (Dem., Ohio) made a speech in the upper house recommending the withdrawal of the U.S. Armed Forces from South Korea once the Vietnam War is concluded and 53,000 South Korean servicemen, roughly two army divisions, return to South Korea. The senator asserted that those armed forces will restore the South Korean defense capability against the Communist North sufficiently enough to significantly reduce the South's reliance on the U.S. Armed Forces. The senator also emphasized that removing the U.S. Armed Forces from South Korea will alleviate the hostile atmosphere in the region.
2. In response, I consulted with the U.S. ambassador to South Korea on May 15, 1969, and expressed the concern that the speech either does not realize or greatly undermines the Communist North's militaristic intentions and the tension it produces in the East Asian region. I requested that the ambassador explain to the senator the current situations of South Korea and the East Asian region as well as the military capability of the Communist North and persuade him that his assertions do not reflect the realities of South Korea and the East Asian region.
3. The U.S. Ambassador reported that he consulted with Senator Young on June 3, 1969 regarding his speech. The ambassador explained to the Senator the post-armistice Communist North's military build-up, especially the rapid arms modernization and augmentation in military personnel. The ambassador also emphasized the necessity of the continued presence of the U.S. Armed Forces in South Korea and modernization and augmentation of the Korean Armed Forces, especially the Republic of Korea Air Force (ROKAF), in order to sufficiently check the Communist North's military capability.
4. Senator Young responded that he, too, recognizes the necessity of modernizing and augmenting the Korean Armed Forces, especially the ROKAF. The Senator further explained his position that the speech aimed at bringing an end to the Vietnam War, which is causing massive casualties to the U.S., and redirecting

the funds for the Vietnam War to strengthen the East Asian defense for more effective use.

5. Aside of the discussion regarding the speech, Senator Young mentioned his visit to South Korea in 1965 and expressed his intention to revisit South Korea to witness the South Korean defense capability and the state of economic development. The ambassador suggested that the Senator participate in this year's Armed Forces Day ceremony.
6. Considering the Senator's influence on the policymaking of the U.S. Congress, I endorse the ambassador's suggestion and recommend arranging invitations to other influential members of the Congress who can exert positive influence on making South Korean policies. I will consult with relevant ministries and offices to arrange for the senators' visit to South Korea and participation in the Armed Forces Day ceremony so that they can observe the current state of the South Korean defense structure and economic development.

Appendix:

1. The speech by Senator Young (the original copy and Korean translation)
2. Senator Young's profile
3. A summary of Senator Young's previous speeches concerning the Republic of Korea

The Minister of Foreign Affairs

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 10, 1969

Dear Mr. President:

Thank you for your note of April 8 introducing Deputy Prime Minister Park and for your letter of April 26 which the Deputy Prime Minister delivered to me. I had a most useful and pleasant discussion with him.

As Ambassador Porter has already told you, I am glad that you consider the actions which I have taken in response to the unprovoked shooting down of the EC-121 over international waters to be wise and appropriate. I am most grateful for the support expressed both in your letter and in the public statements of officials of your government.

I agree with your view that one of North Korea's motives is to try to drive a wedge between the United States and the Republic of Korea. Thanks to the spirit of the Korean people and the close harmony between our two governments, these efforts have totally failed. I want to assure you of my personal dedication to strengthening the bonds between our two countries.

I am very much aware of the military capabilities of the North Korean regime and the threatening attitude of their leaders. I share your concern about it. I was therefore glad to get your views on ways to meet this continuing threat. I will keep them very much in mind and can assure you that they will receive most serious consideration by my Administration.

As you know, United States tactical air forces in Korea were substantially strengthened after the attempted raid on the Blue House and the Pueblo incident, and other measures have been taken to strengthen our defenses.

I look forward to your visit in August, when it will be possible for us to explore our mutual interests and problems together at length.

With warm regards,

Sincerely,

Richard Nixon

His Excellency
Park Chung Hee
President of the
Republic of Korea

North Korean Puppet Regime's Provocative Activities '1967-1968'

Report from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Recipient: Your Excellency, President

Date: June 25, 1969

Title: The Dissemination of the South Korean Government Note on the Recent North Korean Puppet Regime's Provocative Activities

The report on the above matter is as follows:

Regarding the aggravated North Korean puppet regime's provocative activities since last June that included armed guerrillas invading such areas as Bukpeong, Heuksando and Buan, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, having completed a fact-finding mission, disseminated the South Korean note dated June 24 1969 that censured the North Korean puppet regime's brutal atrocities as per enclosure to every diplomatic institution in South Korea, and also plans to distribute them to the representatives of UN member countries through the South Korean ambassador to the permanent mission of the UN. Further, the Ministry has also distributed the note to foreign embassies, governments and diplomatic institutions and requested them to actively engage in censuring the North Korean puppet regime's provocative activities as suggested in the note.

Attachment: 2 South Korean government notes.

/End/

The Minister of Foreign Affairs

Report from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Recipient: Prime Minister

Date: June 25, 1969

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Attachment: 2 Korean government notes.

/End/

The Minister of Foreign Affairs

South Korean Government Note

The first two weeks of June this year have seen several large-scaled infiltration attempts by North Korean armed guerrillas to the rear part of South Korea and it has brought forth substantial attention from the world to the Korean Peninsula. This infiltrating activity is a part of the North Korean puppet regime's aggravated and continuous plan to communize the whole Korean Peninsula through armed force.

At the dawn of June 8, 1969, a number of North Korean guerillas attempted to infiltrate the Bukpyeong area along the eastern coastline. When the infiltrating ship was approaching the coast, the convoy opened fire and bombarded the coastal area, which caused 5 people of a family to be mercilessly killed while sleeping. A South Korean anti-espionage force torpedoed the North Korean ships after a long battle, shot and killed one guerilla, and caught another alive. According to the one caught alive, it was revealed that this warfare plan from the communists was performed by those guerrillas who had already came down to South Korea.

At midnight on June 12, 1969, 15 North Korean guerrillas, by taking a 75-ton speedboat, attempted to land on Heuksan Island, 80 miles southwest of Mokpo on the West Coast, as there were already a few guerrillas who had previously arrived on that island. However, the group of guerrillas failed and was arrested, including their ship. 7 North Korean spies were shot to death during the battle and other 6 spies hidden in hermitages were found and killed by the South Korean armed forces, police and local defense forces within the next four days. The North Korean puppet regime's speedboat was found heavily armed with 82 millimeter-long recoilless rifles, 40 millimeter-long guns and 14.5 inch-long antiaircraft guns.

On June 14, 1969, another three North Korean armed guerrillas landed in the Buan region of the Jeonra Province in a disguised rubber boat, but they were detected by the South Korean police, who shot them to death after a brief battle.

The recent successive invasion attempts by the North Korean puppet regime are characterized as marine maneuvers. In regard to this, the North Korean puppet regime has focused on reinforcing and improving their naval force and as a result, their naval force has doubled over the course of one year from 1967 to 1968.

This type of infiltration by sea by the North Korean puppet regime was first attempted in August 21, 1968 on Jeju Island. In the period between October 30 to November 2, 1968, about 120 guerrillas who teamed up in groups of 15 arrived in Uljin and Samcheok on the east coast, and on March 16, 1969, eight North Korean guerrillas had landed in nearby Joomunjin on the east coast. All of these guerrillas were wiped out by the effective united operations of South Korean armed forces, policemen and local defense forces with the strong and voluntary support from the local people.

The North Korean puppet regime aimed to cause fear and disturbance among the local people through atrocious destruction, merciless murder and dehumanizing activities in every invasion. These horrible North Korean actions of killing innocent people are practiced under the name of their so-called 'revolution.' However, in every attempt, they ghastly failed and have never been able to approach our peaceful South Korean land, not even one single step.

The South Korean government and people firmly believe that this North Korean puppet regime's aggravated brutality and atrocity have to be stopped and resisted no matter what. The only way to reach the ultimate goal is through the complete interception and annihilation of the North Korean puppet regime's plan to occupy South Korea through armed force and to revolutionize the peaceful South Koreans to achieve their 'victory.'

In order to reach our goal, the South Korean government currently strives to strengthen the national defense and improve economic power. With the help of the national consolidated power, we are certain that we can destroy the North Korean puppet regime's atrocious myth of communizing the country and annihilate their ceaseless invasions into South Korea.

June 24 1969

Seoul

The Republic of South Korea

Foreign Ministry

Mei_

2 July 1969

Recipient: U.S. ambassador

Title: Summary report of 2nd ROK-U.S. Defense Cabinet Conference outcome

1. Refer to the enclosed attachment for outcome report of 2nd ROK-U.S. Defense Cabinet Conference held in Seoul from 3 June to 4 June, 1969.
2. A corresponding outcome report by Defense Ministry was distributed to U.S. embassy.

Attached file: One summary outcome report

/end/

Foreign Minister

If it is separated from attachment, re-sort as an ordinary document.

Report of 2nd ROK-U.S. Defense Cabinet Conference outcome (summary)

1. Discussed and agreed topics:
 - 1) Threat from enemy: Acknowledges the need to seek adequate restraint means as the Republic of Korea is anxious about the threat of invasion and continuous provocation from DPRK.
 - 2) South Korea's defense capability and problems: Agreed upon the idea of increasing ROK-U.S. military power.
 - 3) South Korean military operation expenses: Consented to continue discussion at the government level.
 - 4) CIGFIR plan: Agreed to contact anytime in order to deliberate specific details. Introduce 1 copy related to the armament of military reserves this or next week.
 - 5) M-16 Plant and ammunition plant construction plan: Representatives reached consensus.
 - 6) Plan to increase ROK military: United States promised to support as much as possible.
 - 7) The present conditions and prospects in Vietnam
 - i. War will be resolved by bringing victory to the Liberalist camp
 - ii. Active assistance with cooperation among South Korea, the U.S. and Vietnam will be necessary for economic collaboration that will foster the economic development of Republic of Korea.
 - 8) Liberalist camp East Asia strategy: South Korea. United States will have to continue focusing on research
2. Measures and proposals
 - 1) Specific plan should be made through close collaboration among related economic authorities in building M-16 rifle plants. Also we will have work on holding specific discussion with U.S. working level officials to establish plants in near future.
 - 2) Future armament of military reserves, CIGFIR plan, ROK-U.S. negotiations that can demand best effort from the U.S. to execute military empowerment plan should be strengthened. Additional supplements and requirements should be planned before.
 - 3) Regarding increasing military expenses, related ministries should work together through strong ROK-U.S. negotiations. Also, it should concentrate on promoting military aid for military expenses to prevent setbacks.

- 4) Following the Vietnam War, the South Korean military issue should be handled through cooperation with the Economic Planning Department of the Foreign Ministry. It requires promotion of forming foreign relations between South Korea and the United States and Japan, which can participate in economic cooperation.

By MW NARA Date 11/29/93

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

TOP SECRET SENSITIVE

July 3, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. HENRY A. KISSINGER

FROM: Colonel Robert M. Behr *RM*

THROUGH: Colonel Alexander M. Haig *AH*

SUBJECT: WSAG Meeting of July 2, 1969

Attached are the minutes of the initial meeting of the Washington Special Actions Group held in the White House Situation Room on July 2, 1969

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WASHINGTON SPECIAL ACTIONS GROUP (WSAG) MEETING
July 2, 1969

Time and Place: 11:42 A.M. - 12:28 P.M., White House Situation Room

Subject: Military Contingency Planning for Korea

Participation:

Henry A. Kissinger, Chairman	NSC Staff - Col. Alexander M. Haig Col. Robert M. Behr
State - U. Alexis Johnson	
Defense - G. Warren Nutter	
CIA - Cord Meyer	
JCS - Vice Adm. Nels C. Johnson	

SUMMARY OF DECISIONS

1. The WSAG will review the NSSM 34 Contingency Study for Korea instead of the NSC Review Group.
2. The NSSM 34 Contingency Study for Korea will be the agenda item for the next WSAG meeting on July 11, 1969.
3. The areas of immediate concern to the WSAG are Korea, Berlin and the Middle East. Following WSAG review of relevant inter-departmental and military contingency plans for these areas, further requirements will be met by task forces functioning as working groups under the WSAG. The existing Berlin and Korean Task Forces will be employed, and action initiated to form a similar element for the Middle East.
4. The contingency of actual Sino-Soviet hostilities will be an additional concern of the WSAG.

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 By MW NARA Date 11/29/93
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Kissinger opened the meeting stating that its purpose was primarily organizational although some time would be devoted to the "Red Books" (covering military plans for Korean contingencies) provided the Committee Members by the Joint Staff. He reviewed the President's thoughts on the need for updated and effective procedures for contingency planning, having in mind documents which would be useful for incidents similar to the EC-121 "shoot down". Kissinger said he envisioned the WSAG to have policy responsibility for the content of contingency plans but that the implementation of these plans would clearly rest with organizations such as those within the State Department that have already been structured to accept these responsibilities. Moreover he wished it to be clearly understood that actual operations during contingencies would not be run from the White House Situation Room. What has to be done now is to develop ways of interfacing military and political considerations and to answer the question "who does what"? He noted that military plans for contingencies are highly sensitive and that, for WSAG actions, only the principals should have access to the documents. They would not be reproduced and would be returned to the Joint Staff after having been worked in the WSAG. Ultimately, what will be required are contingency folders, approved by the WSAG, then kept on file in the White House Situation Room for use in possible emergencies. He then asked the group members for their comments.

Secretary Johnson immediately called to mind the comparison between the Berlin Task Force and the Korean Task Force under Ambassador Brown, which has prepared a plan for Korean contingencies in response to NSSM 34. He commended this plan to Kissinger saying that it covers much of the same ground as the "Red Books" sent to the Group by the Joint Staff. He remarked on the effectiveness of the "Live Oak" plans done by the Berlin Task Force. This is an on-going operation which has produced plans in great detail and with an underlying concept that the planning group would also be deeply involved in the emergency actions incident to Berlin contingencies. He stated that with respect to the Korean Task Force, much valuable work has already been done. What should now be done is to refine the work under the direction of the WSAG serving as a "Watch Dog" committee. Kissinger remarked that the President was not telling the WSAG how to organize, but that he desires the group to provide plans which will give him the same kind of assurance that he had during the EC-121 incident.

Secretary Johnson stated that the Korean Task Force work is now ready to be looked at by the NSC Review Group. Kissinger rejoined that the plan should not be handled by the Review Group but by the WSAG. He did not believe the Review Group could address the problems with the same precision that the President needs for decision making in contingency

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situations. Admiral Johnson concurred, stating that the military aspects of the contingency plans are highly sensitive and that the security aspects of these plans are of paramount importance. Kissinger added that whether the plan would eventually appear on the NSC Agenda was a decision the President would have to make at a later date.

Turning to Admiral Johnson, Kissinger asked whether the military participated in the Korean contingency plan. Admiral Johnson said that they had but he was not sure to what extent. He thought the document reflected military planning in outline form but not in the detail contained in the "Red Books" before the members. He then reported an exercise internal to the Joint Staff which resulted in a "Crisis Data Book". This effort visualized hypothetical contingency situations, how they could develop, predicted the reactions of other affected countries, then postulated reasonable US actions and their consequences.

Kissinger returned to the President's objectives with respect to contingency plans. The President wants, he said, no generalized statements, but instead courses of action which would be useful in specific situations. For example, if he wants three B-52s to strike a designated objective, what else would he have to do. He is interested in knowing the possible reactions of affected people and governments. What exactly is likely to happen in a political/military sense? He wants a check list of what he has to do -- not esoteric speculation about events that could lead to a crisis. Additionally, follow-on factors have to be considered such as how to deal with reinforcement levels. Secretary Johnson opined there was a need to amplify the contingency scenarios. Kissinger reflected on his own thought processes during the EC-121 incident and remarked that his initial reactions were probably naive. The main lesson he learned from the incident was that the trick in any action taken would be to preclude a counter blow. He reported some after-thoughts the President had on the EC-121 incident to the effect that if such an occasion arose in the future and a B-52 strike was believed necessary, the price you pay really isn't much greater for a strike with twenty-five aircraft than with three. The need is to look determined and, if the object is to prevent counter-responses, the action taken should be powerful blow. If a similar situation were to arise today, he (the President) would probably either do nothing or select an option toward the extreme of the range of possibilities. Admiral Johnson said that he agreed with the President's ideas as do the Joint Chiefs. For example, if you attack an airfield but don't take out the enemy's air order of battle, you are in deep trouble.

TOP SECRET By MW NARA Date 2/29/93

Nutter suggested a parallel between the President's philosophy and Golda Meir's "A Seven-fold Retaliation" policy. Secretary Johnson said that the military aspects had to be balanced by an understanding of their political implications. For example, when would we expect the Soviet Union to become involved? We had the Pueblo and the E-121 incidents but the next time it might be the political assassination of a US Ambassador or the President of South Korea, or it might be the destruction of a vital industrial facility such as an oil refinery. Kissinger thought that if any of the contingencies mentioned by Secretary Johnson were to occur today the President would probably take positive action.

Kissinger then turned the attention of the group to the "Red Books" containing representative military contingency plans for Korea. He expressed an opinion that it would be non-productive for the group to review each of the 25 plans in the book. There was basically a great similarity among the plans, and that probably what should be done would be to group them within categories of response. For instance, one group would contain responses similar to the destruction of the Chanjin Reservoir while another group might contain retaliatory strikes against selected airfields.

Admiral Johnson then displayed a graphic prepared by the Joint Staff -- a map on which was marked the objectives of the 25 plans contained in the "Red Book". Secretary Johnson remarked that the Chanjin reservoir was where US forces "got clobbered" in the Korean war. Adm. Johnson said that targets similar to the reservoir were on a prohibited list until very late in the Korean war, the idea apparently being that the facilities would be useful during the recovery phase after the war had ended.

Secretary Johnson then asked how the Group proposed to work the problem at hand? He suggested that the Korean Task Force work be referred to WSAG and not to the Review Group. Additionally, he thought it advisable that members of WSAG look carefully at the Korean Task Force plan in preparation for the next meeting. Kissinger agreed with the two courses of action but suggested that the Joint Staff also work on the "Red Books" to group the contingencies by challenges and responses. He inquired whether the work could be done within a week? Admiral Johnson thought this was possible. Secretary Johnson remarked that the "Red Books" contained no treatment of the political aspects of the various courses of actions suggested in them. Admiral Johnson agreed and said it was not their purpose to address the political issues. All members agreed there was a need for expanded scenarios to include their political ramifications.

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Secretary Johnson thought there was an additional requirement to examine the steps, from a political-military standpoint, that could be taken to confine the actions to a low level. Admiral Johnson remarked that a CIA assessment of possible enemy reactions would be needed. Secretary Johnson said he wanted Ambassador Brown in on the act. (It was not clear whether he meant representation on the WSAG or whether he meant in Brown's capacity as head of the Korean Task Force.) The group agreed that, with the work in front of them, frequent meetings would be required.

Secretary Johnson stated that, of all possible contingencies, Berlin problems had been dealt with more extensively than any of the others. Admiral Johnson remarked that no plan, however detailed, is any good if it is static. All contingency plans must undergo periodic review. Secretary Johnson agreed and recommended a standing Task Force working continuously, but not necessarily on a day-to-day basis, within each of the contingency areas. Meyer asked about the membership of the Korean Task Force? Secretary Johnson then gave a rundown of the task force membership under Ambassador Brown. Kissinger said he has no objection to the task force concept provided they have access to the kind of material necessary to work the problems effectively. Under any circumstances, he considered the WSAG as the proper reviewing authority for the type of planning being considered by the group. Admiral Johnson said it would be possible for the military to provide detailed briefings, giving the necessary background information, but omitting unnecessary operational detail.

Kissinger then inquired about the level of activity of the Berlin Task Force. Secretary Johnson said that its structure and mechanics were still in existence but that its recent activities have been limited. Kissinger stated his belief that, because of the pressure of other duties, the WSAG cannot function as a planning group but only as a reviewing agency.

Secretary Johnson then said the Korean Task Force plan was on its way but he was not really certain of its status within the NSC reporting process.

Kissinger said that for the next meeting the Joint Staff should attempt to group the plans in the "Red Books" and that the WSAG should be prepared to discuss what kinds of provocations would lead to what kinds of responses.

Secretary Johnson then outlined the six general contingency areas set forth in the NSSM 34 study.

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Kissinger remarked that, if the work of the Korean Task Force fits the objectives defined by the WSAG, the work should be used and people should not have to do it over again. After the WSAG looks over the Korean Task Force plan, the Korean Task Force could then be used as a Working Group for the WSAG to make whatever revisions will be required. Similarly, when Berlin contingencies are considered in the very near future the Berlin Task Force can assume responsibility for follow-on work. Moreover, because contingency planning is underway for the Middle East there is a need for a similar Task Force to handle those problems. He noted that the military contingency plans which deal with a confrontation with the Soviet Union in the Middle East are somewhat unrelated to politics and seem to be deficient in the logistic arrangements that are called for. Admiral Johnson replied that the military plans for the Middle East are undergoing revision at the present time and that part of the problem in making sense out of logistic requirements is the lack of military bases in the area.

Kissinger then asked whether the next WSAG meeting could be held on the 11th of July. The agenda would be the Korean Task Force plan. Nutter remarked that the members should also consider that plans other than those for the Middle East, Berlin, and Korea would probably be required. Secretary Johnson agreed, but said that further NSC directives were unnecessary because the current general instructions for contingency planning are sufficiently comprehensive. Nutter stated that there are grave problems associated with Berlin planning because of the tripartite and quadripartite character of those plans. There are very difficult security problems and almost insurmountable military problems. Secretary Johnson agreed that the Berlin plans were immensely complicated and represented years of work.

Kissinger recalled his participation in a 1961 Berlin War Game. The results of that game were comforting because they indicated we could not lose. Now the situation is somewhat different. He further questioned what we would do in the event of actual hostilities between the Soviet Union and Communist China. He noted that the President had inquired about this problem earlier in the morning. Early answers to this question are needed.

Kissinger asked Secretary Johnson to see what could be done bureaucratically to set up a Middle East planning element. Secretary Johnson replied that he would look into what has been done in Middle East planning in the recent past and under the former administration. He will report his findings to the Group at their next meeting. All agreed that, subject to the President's schedule, the next meeting will be held on Friday, July 11th at 1400 hours.

The meeting was adjourned at 12:28 P.M.

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Secretary's Visit to Korea*ROK/US
Relations*OBJECTIVES PAPERThe Setting

The Koreans are particularly anxious to establish close personal contact with top officials of the new Administration. Although there have been several high level contacts with the Koreans since the new Administration took office, they attach particular significance to receiving our Cabinet's first member.

Your visit comes at a time when Koreans are apprehensive that current U.S. policy in Viet-Nam, particularly "unilateral" withdrawals, heralds a general reduction of U.S. involvement in the defense of East Asia. This accentuates a Korean concern -- always close to the surface -- that the U.S. may withdraw troops from Korea and leave the ROK forces alone without equipment equal to that possessed by the North Koreans. They see this possibility evolving at a time when the threat from North Korea is getting more rather than less serious, as indicated by the Pueblo and EC-121 incidents, and the new North Korean concentration on infiltration.

Koreans are also concerned that U.S. trade restrictions may impair the Republic's tremendous economic growth of recent years which President Park recognizes to be as important to the Republic as military strength.

The domestic political scene at the time you are in Seoul will be dominated by strong partisan feelings of those who favor and those who oppose the possibility that President Park may seek an amendment to the constitution to permit him to seek election in 1971 to a third presidential term.

The visit will give you an opportunity to explain U.S. policies and help assure continued Korean support, particularly for the new Administration's Viet-Nam policy. You

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will also be able to strengthen the confidence of ROK Government leaders and the Korean people by reassuring them that the U.S. remains loyal to the commitment contained in our Mutual Defense Treaty (ratified in 1954), and will continue to assist Korea in the development of its economic and military strength. You will also be able to make the point that we expect Korea to assume an increasing share of its defense burden as its strength continues to grow.

Outstanding Issues

There are no major issues outstanding between us and the Republic of Korea and there is no significant anti-American sentiment among Koreans. There are, however, some points of concern on both sides.

On the American side:

a. Will the ROK assume a reasonable and increasing share of its defense burden as its economic strength continues to grow?

On the Korean side:

a. Will the U.S. become more reluctant to maintain or meet its defense commitments to Free Asia, particularly the Republic of Korea, or will it reduce its effective capability to meet commitments?

b. Will the U.S. continue military assistance at levels adequate to assure that ROK forces are as modernized and well equipped as the forces of North Korea -- of course, for defensive rather than offensive purposes?

c. What are the implications of U.S. policy on Viet-Nam for the future defense of Korea?

d. Will the U.S. impose import restrictions on ROK exports which will be prejudicial to continued growth of the Korean economy, and particularly the ROK's ability to service its external debt?

U.S. Objectives

- To assure that the ROK continues to support U.S. policy in Viet-Nam.

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- To reassure the ROK that we continue to have both the intention and the capability to meet our defense commitment to Korea, showing particularly that we share Korean concern about continued North Korean belligerence.

- To urge continued restraint by the ROK in reacting to North Korean provocations.

- To obtain ROK understanding of U.S. domestic problems, both economic and political, which limit the ability of the U.S. to import without restraint and which limit the size of economic and military assistance programs.

ROK Objectives

- To obtain a restatement, from the Secretary of State of the new Administration, and in the light of evolving Viet-Nam policy, of the U.S. commitment to the defense of Korea and of U.S. intention to retain a strong military presence in Asia.

You can be generally reassuring on this point.

- To obtain promises of additional military assistance in magnitudes which will modernize the weapons and equipment of the ROK forces to a level at least equal to the modern equipment of the North Korean forces.

We continue to provide military assistance and currently are considering additional assistance which will help in the modernization of ROK forces.

- To obtain a U.S. commitment to retain U.S. forces in Korea and perhaps even increase their numbers.

We have no plan at the present time to withdraw U.S. forces from Korea.

- To induce the U.S. to place new U.S. bases in Korea, particularly if U.S. bases in Japan are lost or their use is excessively circumscribed.

We have no plan to place new bases in Korea. Our current negotiations with Japan are concerned with the status of Okinawa and do not involve any change in the number of bases we have in Japan.

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- To obtain U.S. support for post-hostilities employment in Viet-Nam (at U.S. expense) of large numbers of Koreans discharged there.

This is a matter mainly for Korea and Viet-Nam to decide.

- To obtain assurances that U.S. import restrictions will not adversely affect ROK exports to the U.S. and the Korean growth rate.

The import arrangements we have considered would not cause any reduction in past levels of exports to the United States, but rather would limit Korean participation in expansion of the U.S. market.

The Means of Achieving Our Objectives

Your meetings with President Park and other ROKG leaders should be devoted principally to the Viet-Nam question and other security issues.

~~Other Cabinet members visiting Seoul after the Tokyo meetings can concentrate on issues -- especially economic -- appropriate to their responsibilities.~~

The Message

As a result of this visit, the Koreans should understand that:

1. Private

- We understand and expect that as Korea's independent strength grows it will want to assume, and should assume, an increasing share of responsibility for its own defense.

- The U.S. remains loyal to its defense commitments to the Republic of Korea, and shares Korean concern with respect to the belligerence of North Korea.

- If the U.S. does not always fully meet ROK expectations regarding military and economic assistance, that does not imply any lessening of our interest or commitment. We must, of course, meet our commitments within the framework of our

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own very considerable domestic political and economic problems and our other worldwide obligations.

2. Public

- We will hope to convey to the Korean public a renewed assurance of close ties between the United States and the Republic of Korea, and renewed assurance of our intention to assist as necessary in defense of the Republic.

- We want North Korean leaders to get the same message.

The Future and the Follow-Up

Your discussions with President Park and other ROK leaders will in part lay the groundwork for discussions during President Nixon's meeting with President Park on August 21 and 22.

Drafted by: EA/K - Mr. Peters
Cleared by: EA - Mr. Duemling
EA - Ambassador Brown
3/3-3:WWBrendt, Room 7239, Ext. 7552

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Infiltration
7/31/69

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
REPUBLIC OF KOREA

Memorandum

7/31/69

From
Ministry of Foreign Affairs

1. The shooting down by the north Korean Communists of an unarmed U.S. reconnaissance plane in international air-space on April 15, 1969 and a number of infiltrations attempted by the north Korean Communists into the rear areas of the Republic of Korea during the last several months of 1969 have once more focused the attention of the world to the grave threat to international peace posed by the pugnacious and ruthless totalitarian Communists in the northern part of Korea.

The Government and people of the Republic of Korea, which are most directly exposed to this threat and are in a most sensitive position to perceive it, have been asking the United States as well as all the peace-loving nations of the world and the United Nations to be alert and vigilant lest the north Korean Communists should misjudge the determination and the willingness of the peace-loving nations to take whatever actions necessary to preserve the peace of the world and the security of the Republic of Korea.

2. Ever since October, 1966, when Kim Il-Sung, so-called leader of the north Korean Communists, urged at the 14th Plenary meeting of the Fourth Central Committee of his

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party to achieve "revolution" through direct military actions and by "liberating south Korea", incidents of armistice violations have increased sharply both in number and in scale. Thus, the ensuing years have seen more than ten-fold rise in the number of significant incidents caused by the north Korean military provocations, namely from 42 and 37 in 1965 and 1966 to 445 and 542 in 1967 and 1968 respectively. There were 4 north Korean Communists killed in 1965, and 18 killed in 1966; but this figure rose to 228 in 1967, and to 321 in 1968. As will be described below, the incidents since the end of 1966 have shown a distinctly new pattern from the earlier ones. They represent not haphazard accidents or mistakes caused by low-level north Korean Communist military units, but deliberate and calculated acts of armed provocations against the Republic of Korea under the highest policy directives of the north Korean puppet regime.

According to information obtained through interrogation of fishermen who have been kidnapped by the north Korean communists and released to the Republic of Korea after several months of detention, the communist regime in the northern part of Korea asked them to cooperate in realization of the so-called "liberation of South Korea by force, which is expected around 1971".

3. To enumerate some of the more serious incidents since the beginning of 1968, there was the attempted assault on the Official Residence of the President of the Republic of Korea by a thirty-one member north Korean commando unit on January 21, 1968, with a mission to assassinate the President of the Republic. This commando unit was intercepted by the Republic of Korea security forces about one thousand yards from the Presidential Residence with a result of 27 killed and one captured.

Two days later, on January 23, when the Government and people of the Republic of Korea had hardly overcome their rage at the north Korean Communist barbarity, the United States naval vessel "Pueblo" was wantonly seized on the high seas by the north Korean Communists.

On August 21, the north Korean Communists dispatched an armed boat with 14 agents to Cheju Island off the southern coast of the Republic of Korea, resulting in the deaths of all but 2 infiltrators who were captured by the security forces of the Republic.

Nearly 500 violent and serious infiltration attempts or incidents, involving exchanges of gunfire, killing and capture of a number of north Korean Communist agents took place from January to October last year.

Between October 30 to November 2, about 120 north Korean commandoes organized into 8 units of 15 agents

each, landed on the east coast of the Republic of Korea in high speed boats. In the ensuing mopping-up operations, the Republic of Korea armed forces, national police and the homeland reserve forces (militia), with the active and effective cooperation of villagers, farmers and fishermen, killed 107 of them and captured 7 others.

4. After a couple of relatively quiet months in the beginning of 1969, the north Korean Communists have renewed the provocative incidents with increased ferocity.

On March 15, 1969, a ten-man work party of the United Nations Command was fired upon by the north Korean Communist forces while replacing a Military Demarcation Line marker, after normal prior notification to the north Korean Communists concerning the type of work and date of the work party's activity as in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Armistice Agreement of 1953.

On March 16, shortly after midnight, eight armed north Korean infiltrators landed Chumunjin port on the east coast of the Republic of Korea. They searched an inn at the port town and took away newly issued civilian identification and registration cards, killed one policeman and attempted to kidnap another. All eight agents were killed, while attempting to escape in a rubber boats by the joint security forces of police and the homeland reserve unit, assisted by house wives and other civilians of the Republic of Korea.

On April 15, the north Korean Communists shot down without any warning and in total contempt for the elementary rules of international law, an unarmed United States military reconnaissance plane in international airspace some 95 miles off the east coast of the northern part of Korea.

At dawn on 8 June, 1969, a band of north Korean communist armed infiltrators attempted to land on the eastern coast near Puk-pyong. As the infiltrators' landing boat was approaching towards the shore, a north Korean escort vessel shelled at the shore, killing hapless five members of a local family while they were sleeping in their house on the shore. The Republic of Korea counter-infiltration forces after an exchange of fire sank the landing boat of the communists. One of the 3 infiltrators on the landing boat was killed and another captured. The communist assault was attempted by armed infiltrators dispatched to the south under direct orders from Pyongyang for the infiltrations and guerrilla warfare against the Republic of Korea.

On the midnight of 12 June, 1969, a large armed high-speed boat, 15 communist infiltrators on board, intruded into the waters of Huk-san Islands, some 80 miles off south-west of Mokpo port on the west coast, in an attempt to land a team of infiltrators with a mission to join with another infiltrators who had

infiltrated earlier on the islands. Having been heavily damaged by a joint operation of ROK Navy and Air forces, the north Korean boat was captured. Seven of the infiltrators were killed in the engagement. The north Korean communist boat was heavily equipped with 82mm recoilless guns, 40mm guns, and 14.5 anti-aircraft guns as well as Maxim heavy machine-guns. For days later, six remnants of the 15 communists infiltrated were killed by the combined searching forces of the Korean Army, Combat Police and the Homeland Reserve units while hiding themselves in a rock cave on the island.

On 12 and 14 June 1969, two north Korean armed agents were captured in Seoul by the police respectively, who were later identified as Kim Chang-won and Oh Hyong-shik of the north Korean Worker's Party. It was disclosed that they were sent by the north Korean Communist regime in order to infiltrate into political parties and schools in the Republic of Korea.

On 14 June, 1969, three north Korean communist armed infiltrators in a rubber boat well camouflaged, landed on Puan area, the west coast of Cholla Pukto Province. The communist intruders were detected by a Korean policeman and killed by the Combat Police force after a brief engagement.

On 12 July 1969, ROK troops shot and killed one of two north Korean Communist armed infiltrators in the western frontline area, while they were trying to cut through a defense barrier.

On the same day, one armed north Korean Communist infiltrator was captured alive in Kochangmyon, Kimpo-gun, Kyonggido, some eight kilometers north of Seoul, by the combined forces of the military, police and the Homeland Reserve Forces after a four-day search following a report from villagers. He was identified as Yong Chol Kim from Pyong Yang.

On 25 July 1969, three north Korean Communist infiltrators who had sneaked ashore Huksan-do, an island off the coast of Cholla Namdo, were shot to death by the police and the Homeland Reserve Forces.

5. Recent infiltrations attempted by north Korean communists have been characterized by their sea-borne maneuvering. For such operation, Pyongyang has intensively been building up its naval forces. Its navy have been reinforced by nearly 100% during a period of twelve months in 1967-68.

Such sea-borne infiltration was first observed on 21 August, 1968 when an armed boat of north Korean communists attempted to land their armed agents on Cheju Island off the southern coast of the Peninsular. From 30 October, through 2 November, 1968, approximately 120 north Korean communist infiltrators, organized into several separate units of some 15 members, landed on the east coast near port cities of Uljin and Samchok. On 16 March, 1969, eight armed north Korean infiltrators

landed near the port city of Chumunjin on the east coast. In all these sea-borne infiltrations, the entire communist intruders were virtually mopped up by effective joint operation of ROK armed forces, National Police and elements of the Homeland Reserve Forces with active and spontaneous cooperation of local villagers.

In every incident, the communists attempted to stir terror and significant disturbances among local populace by wanton destruction, merciless murder and every act of inhumanity. Such acts of atrocity are typical of the communist maneuver in imposing their "revolution" upon the innocent populace. However, the communist infiltrators, in every incident, had only to experience disastrous failure having been unable to set even a foot on the peaceful rear area of the Republic of Korea.

6. All these deliberate acts of provocation have already severely strained the spirit of tolerance and patience on the part of the Government and people of the Republic of Korea. Without their confidence in the capability of the United Nations Command to defend the Republic of Korea, and without their ultimate trust in the courage, unity, and determination of the United Nations and all the peace-loving people of the world in condemning or repelling aggression, the Government and people of the Republic of Korea could not have remained so much self-restrained.

7. The north Korean Communist propaganda machines are blindly following their tradition of transparent falsification of facts and truths. They call those incidents caused by their armed infiltrators and commandoes as the "glorious patriotic armed struggle" or the "heroic revolutionary war of the Korean people in the south against their Government."

They also falsely claim that all incidents were caused by "military provocations" on the part of the Republic of Korea and the United Nations Forces and that the unarmed United States reconnaissance plane which was shot down on April 15 over international waters, some 90 miles from the 12 mile limit of the north Korean coast, "intruded" the so-called north Korean "territorial air." The falsehood of these claims of the north Korean Communists is so evident that it requires no refutation. They must know fully well that the prudent and peace-loving nations of the world will not be deceived by such propaganda. This kind of propaganda has no real object save for the oppressed Koreans in the north who have no freedom of press or speech.

8. The basic objectives of the north Korean Communists in perpetrating and intensifying acts of provocation seem to be :

- a) to create social turmoil and economic disruption

by means of guerrilla warfare carried out by armed infiltrators from the north;

b) to probe and test the capability and the determination of the United Nations Forces to defend the Republic of Korea at any cost;

c) to provoke the United Nations Forces and the Republic of Korea into retaliation that would give the north Korean Communists an excuse to launch an all-out attack against the south, which would throw responsibility on the government of the Republic of Korea and invite Chinese or Russian intervention in the war;

d) to measure the firmness and the extent of the United States commitment in Korea in the face of its involvement in the Viet Nam war;

e) to conceal their preparation for possible surprise attack by blocking intelligence gathering on their activities;

f) to divert the mounting internal pressure arising from the failure of the north Korean Communist economy through repeated military adventures against the Republic of Korea.

9. The fundamental and central motive of the north Korean Communist provocation, however, may be exposed by the words of their own propaganda. What they said

after the shooting down of the United States reconnaissance plane over international waters on April 15 seem to reveal much of their basic intentions. The north Korean Communists stated on April 23 that American "maneuvering to provoke a new war in Korea has now reached a very dangerous stage If the reconnaissance Planes of the U.S. imperialists intrude into the territorial air of our country, we will not sit with folded arms, but will take resolute measures for safe-guarding our sovereignty as ever. Then the U.S. imperialists will use this as a pretext to commit a fullscale armed attack against us, which may only lead to another total war in Korea in the end."

10. Such statement might well be a reverse projection of their own intention, which has very grave implications for the peace and security of the Republic of Korea and the Far East.

11. The Government and people of the Republic of Korea firmly believe that these reckless provocations of north Korean communists and any ominous scheme of renewed hostilities must be halted. The only way towards this end is to halt Pyongyang's illusion of military conquest on the Republic of Korea, its illusion of "revolutionizing" the peaceful citizens of the Republic of Korea and its illusion of communist "victory."

In order to achieve this, the Republic of Korea is striving hard to build up its defense and economy. Through a concerted position of strength thus obtained, the Government and people of the Republic of Korea are quite confident of crushing the flagrant illusion of north Korean communists and also their persistent aggressive scheme.

31 July, 1969

Seoul

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DIRECTORATE OF
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Intelligence Memorandum

North Korean Political Strategy

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
8 August 1969

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

North Korean Political Strategy

Introduction

Aggressive actions of the North Korean regime toward South Korea and the United States--exemplified by the capture of the Pueblo in January 1968 and the destruction of the EC-121 reconnaissance aircraft in April 1969

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Background

1. The seizure of the Pueblo in January 1968 and the attack on the US EC-121 reconnaissance aircraft in April 1969 were acts of political warfare. They form a key element of Premier Kim Il-song's strategy for advancing three major objectives: in the North to solidify further his political position and to stir the population to greater economic efforts; in the South to undermine confidence in the government and to exacerbate its relations with the US; in relationship to the US, to capitalize on the US public's disenchantment with the burdens and risks of military commitments in Asia and ultimately to force a retrenchment in American commitments, particularly the withdrawal of US forces from Korea.

2. Kim Il-song has been quoted as saying, "The Vietnam war is crucial. The defeat of the United States in Vietnam will mark the end of American power in Asia." Kim's view closely parallels Maoist China's evident conviction that the Vietnamese Communists must impose a defeat on US policy that would force the US to retract its power and commitments in East Asia. This, they believe, would remove the principal barrier to the achievement of Chinese aspirations in Southeast Asia and to North Korean objectives in the South.

North Korean Pressure Tactics

3. The eagerness with which Kim Il-song has attempted to exploit the US involvement in Vietnam stems partly from North Korea's increasingly bleak prospects in competing with South Korea. Prior to the military coup in South Korea in May 1961, Pyongyang relied on propaganda and political subversion against the South and a high economic growth rate in the North to set the stage for eventual unification of the peninsula under a Communist regime. Time appeared to be on the side of the North

[REDACTED] But throughout the 1960s, the South under President Pak's leadership

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has outpaced the North in terms of both international standing and economic growth. The South's rate of economic growth has been double that of the North for most of the past decade; it is now increasing almost three times as fast. There is little prospect that the North can unaided revive its lagging economy and avoid falling even further behind.

4. South Korea's normalization treaty with Japan in 1965 also represented a major setback for the North. Pyongyang's efforts to forestall and discredit this agreement underscored its fear that the treaty, which provided for \$800 million in Japanese economic assistance over a ten-year period, would lead to the re-establishment of strong Japanese influence in the South and would erect another formidable barrier to North Korea's long-term aim of extending its control over the entire peninsula.

5. Another reflection of Kim's decision that bold action was necessary to check South Korea's growing momentum and power was his abandonment of earlier proposals for the "peaceful reunification" of the country based on "democratic" elections. He has publicly set the goal of achieving unification "within our generation." In his October 1966 speech, Kim outlined a program for achieving this goal by stimulating a revolution of "patriotic forces" in the South which would unite with the North to expel US forces, overthrow the Seoul government, and establish a "peoples' government." He called for the development of a militant Communist party in the South to lead the revolution and to spearhead a broad anti-US "national salvation front."

6. Kim has acknowledged that North Korea has no prospect of achieving unification as long as US forces remain in the South. The "supreme national task" facing the Korean people, he has declared, is to "drive the US imperialist aggressors from our soil" and to overthrow their "stooges" in Seoul. Until this task is accomplished, unification is "unthinkable."

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The Pueblo Incident


10. As the US became even more heavily engaged in Vietnam, Kim evidently decided that he could stage

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more risky provocations with relative impunity. The Blue House raid and the seizure of the Pueblo followed. The North Koreans clearly calculated that their possession of the Pueblo and its crew would exert an additional powerful deterrent against retaliatory action. Pyongyang took pains to draw attention to its leverage by threatening to try and punish the Pueblo crew.



13. The overriding aims of humiliating the US, generating public opposition in the US to American military activities in the Korean area, and obtaining visible evidence for the Korean people of "victory" over the US guided Pyongyang to press for a formal US apology throughout the eleven-month period of negotiations. After the release of the Pueblo crew, the North Koreans portrayed the document signed by the US representative as a "confession" of guilt, claimed that

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North Korea had proved that a determined small nation could defeat a "mighty imperialist," and compared the US "humiliation" in the Pueblo affair to the "abject surrender" of the UN Command in the 1953 Korean armistice.

The EC-121 Incident

14. From the standpoint of advancing North Korean objectives against the US, the outcome of the EC-121 incident was a major disappointment for the Pyongyang regime. In contrast with the Pueblo affair, the initial uncertainty in international opinion about the location of the shootdown was quickly dispelled by the US and Soviet search operations 90 miles from the Korean coast and by President Nixon's announcement that both North Korean and Soviet radar tracking confirmed that the aircraft had never been closer than 40 miles to North Korean territory.

15. Pyongyang never overcame this inauspicious beginning. Its propaganda media devoted unusually light coverage to the incident, and much of this was geared to supporting domestic goals of the regime. The government withheld a formal pronouncement until five days after President Nixon had announced the resumption of reconnaissance flights under protection. The defensive tone of Pyongyang's statement indicated that the regime was well aware of its weak international position. It made a feeble attempt to link the EC-121 with the Pueblo and to arouse opposition to US activities by claiming there was no "guarantee" that continuing US reconnaissance flights "will not intrude again." Aside from a North Vietnamese expression of support and lukewarm, pro forma Soviet support, North Korea's isolation was complete. It was forced to resort to private appeals to its allies and friends abroad for some gestures of support.

16. North Korea's eight-day delay in issuing a formal statement on the EC-121 incident apparently was prompted not only by the regime's awareness of its vulnerable propaganda position but also by a

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desire to play for time in which to assess US intentions in deploying Task Force 71 to the Sea of Japan.
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Outlook

17. Kim Il-song's taste for risky ventures is sometimes attributed to wishful thinking and delusions of grandeur as a revolutionary leader. But these personal characteristics, however important, probably are less influential in shaping his decisions than the hard and unpromising facts of North Korea's objective situation and Kim's perception of opportunities to alter these conditions to his advantage. The North Korean Government is not only losing ground in the contest for power and prestige to an increasingly prosperous South Korea, but lacking any firm assurance of military protection and direct support in crisis situations from the USSR and China--support that would counterbalance the US role in the South--it confronts a highly uncertain future.

18. There is little prospect that Kim will abandon the political strategy that produced the Pueblo and EC-121 incidents. From Pyongyang's vantage point, neither the urgent pressures of competing with the South nor exploitable opportunities abroad have diminished. Even if the next year or so should witness a settlement in Vietnam or substantial reductions in the level of combat and the number of US forces involved, it is unlikely that such developments in themselves would bring a marked shift in North Korea's present policy. Much would depend on Kim's interpretation of the outcome in Vietnam, particularly its bearing on future American military posture and intentions throughout East Asia.

19. There are additional factors, both domestic and foreign, that will probably encourage Kim to persist in his tactics against South Korea and

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No Foreign Dissem
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No Foreign Dissem

the US. In the first place, Kim's deep personal commitment to a program of maximum military preparedness, described as "fortification of the whole country," and to the goal of reunification "within our generation" has generated a powerful momentum across the entire range of North Korean policies.

[REDACTED] His public demands for unquestioning and unconditional acceptance of his decisions and constant agitation to instill militant discipline in the population will make it difficult for Kim to reverse course over a short period of time. In addition, Kim Il-song, like Mao, relies heavily on the domestic tension and hatred generated by an "aggressive US imperialism" to motivate his people and to keep a social revolution alive in a nation where ancient attitudes die hard. Such tension and hatred must be fed periodically by fresh "evidence."

20. The political crisis in the South over amending the constitution to permit President Pak to run for a third term will be a strong incentive for the North Koreans to intensify infiltration and subversive operations. They may be tempted to exaggerate the opportunities for disruption presented by recent student demonstrations in Seoul protesting the third-term amendment. It was the students, after all, who spearheaded the drive to overthrow the Syngman Rhee regime in 1960.

21. Pyongyang, however, faces a dilemma in trying to exploit South Korean political unrest. A sharp upsurge in pressure and subversion would not only invite harsh repressive action by the Seoul government but would impair the North's ability to take advantage of the sentiment for early reunification among student and intellectual groups in the South. Such action could, indeed, backfire and improve Pak's third-term prospects. The great majority of South Koreans could well regard a sharp rise in the threat from the North as a compelling argument for keeping Pak in office.

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No Foreign Dissem

22. The limitations on the North's ability to intervene effectively in South Korean politics, combined with its poor chances for developing guerrilla bases and significant political support in the countryside, may prompt Pyongyang to concentrate its main attention on harassing actions against the US presence and attempting to shake South Korean confidence in US protection. In addition to further attacks on US ships or aircraft that may offer targets of opportunity, the North Koreans may attempt provocations against US personnel and installations in the South.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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No Foreign Dissem
~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]



Draft Minutes of NSC Meeting, August 14, 1969, Western White House

Subjects: Korea and China

Korea

The meeting began with a briefing by Director Helms which covered North Korea's armed forces, unconventional programs, and Kim Il Sung and his policies. (~~As you said that you were getting a copy of Helms' briefing and would attach it. A copy is attached.~~)

Mr. Kissinger: In April we saw the North Koreans' irrationality. We also saw it with the Pueblo incident. It seems to go up and then down.

Assistant Secretary Green: They are working on Africa in an effort to gain support for entrance into the UN. They are attempting to strengthen their cultural and trade contacts.

Mr. Kissinger: They are very calculating.

The President: Their economy must be suffering. They have an industrial complex, but South Korea's \$31 million dwarfs their \$13 million.

Secretary Rogers: It has been said that the North Koreans can't stand the comparison.

Director Helms: Kim Il Sung is vain but not irrational.

Secretary Rogers: ~~Think~~ He is smart as hell.

Secretary Laird: General Wheeler will talk about the ROK force structure. The ROK has an army of 350,000 men, 350 aircraft, and a small and not effective navy. The navy emphasizes guided missile boats for use against

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the fast boats employed for the guerrillas.

You US is committed
We are (committed?) by the US posture in the Pacific to assistance
The ROK Army is
and training for the ROK army. ~~It is~~ capable and can defend against attack
from the North with our air, sea and logistics support.

summed
There could be a combined North Korean and Chinese Communist attack *and*
The ROK could hold off such an attack *only* with our help.

disputed
General Wheeler will talk about the ROK force structure.

The President: I would like to make a comment *concerning* consisting of a question
I asked General Bonesteel. *earlier* I wonder if we put enough emphasis on sufficient
naval forces to combat North Korean threats? Are we making these too low
priority? This goes to the heart of the problem. Are our forces and ROK
forces properly equipped for the *character of the* threat they face?

Secretary Laird: We are going forward with *the purchase of* small fast boats in the 1970
budget.

The President: How long will it be?

Secretary Laird: Six months to a year.

The President: We should be very good at *producing this kind of* this. It's amazing we are not. *capability*

General Wheeler: ~~Mr. President,~~ *actually* in order to improve our capability
for South Vietnam, we had to buy swift boats from the Norwegian Government.

The President: The Coast Guard today is full of obsolete vintage swift
boats.

that is correct and
General Wheeler: ~~Right~~ We are giving the South Vietnamese these old
boats but we are also giving them problems because the boats are obsolete.

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manufacturing
The President: We are good at small boats. We should do better. I hope ~~you are~~ *Defense is* on top of this.

to South Koreans
General Wheeler: The other day ~~they~~ *do* intercepted a North Korean boat, opened fire and killed two of the enemy. But their boat took off at 30 knots. *and*
~~We should do as well.~~ *the engagement broke off.*

The President: How are their boats built, they have Russian engines *?*

General Wheeler: They probably have North Korean hulls *with PMSIP*

The President: Are Russian boats better? *PMSIP boats,*

General Wheeler: They are better because of the greater emphasis they have put on development for shallow water. *operations* The Russian Navy has been defensive until recently. *usually* Our Navy is blue water. We have never pushed coastal defense. There has never been a Coast Guard conflict. This requires a new look.

The President: Some Congressmen have raised this issue. They say we are musclebound. *recognizing the PMSIP* Their problem is different ~~but it's () to observe.~~

(Turning to the Attorney General): You were in on this, *John what's the*

General Mitchell: *the same program* They have just given more attention to the problem.

The President: *beliefs* I am thinking that despite our efforts to avoid brush fire wars, we must expect *them in the future,*

General Wheeler should look into this.

General Wheeler: With regard to the ROK force structure, they have 18 divisions including 515,000 men in the army. Their air force has 250 jets

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with 28,000 men. Their navy is composed of 230 ships with 19,000 men.

The President: How do their air forces compare?

General Wheeler: The North Korean pilots are top notch. I don't think the ROK's are better ~~and~~ the North has more modern types of aircraft.

The Vice President: Are the South Koreans fully mobilized?

General Wheeler: They have 2 1/3 divisions in () plus 3 reserve divisions which we equipped between the time of (), They have asked for equipment for (8?, 7?) more reserve divisions. The cost is \$2.3 billion.

The President: Bill, you have just come back from Korea, you have said Kim Il Sung is tough. What about the South Koreans?

Secretary Rogers: Morale is high. They are strong willed and practically matured. ~~They are weak in the air. They are also worried about infiltration by water. What they do is to ask for so much, and use scare stories to do this. For example, the 40 fishermen.~~ *They are weak in the air. They are also worried about infiltration by water. ~~What they do is to ask for so much, and use scare stories to do this.~~ ~~For example, the 40 fishermen.~~ ^{Humanity} ^{scare} ^{dramatize}*

General Mitchell: Radar will stop infiltration.

General Wheeler: We have given them ^{more} radar but they need more ^{as part of}.

Secretary Rogers: Their army is good and their economy is good, but the political situation is ^{fragile} ~~weak~~ (r). The young are concerned about the issue of amending the constitution to allow ^{presidential} a third term. ^{the structure} They are not anti-government but anti-authoritarian.

The President: ~~When is the election?~~

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Secretary Rogers: When the election comes, and before it, there will be ^{more} tension. Most ^{South Koreans} like Pak but the students worry about the constitution. ~~Most favor Pak but some do so with second thoughts.~~

General Wheeler: Following ^{the recent slip up in infiltration} the attack on the blue house and the Pueblo ^{incident} we helped them develop a better counter-infiltration capability. We worked on the DMZ forces, coastal radar, and coastal watch patrols. In the rear area, there is a 2.1 million man home defense force. This is a good force ^{which} works ^{closely} with the police.

The U.S. has 63,000 men in Korea. 52,000 are army personnel, and the rest Air Force. We have two infantry divisions. We ^{and added} put 137 tactical aircraft into Korea after the Pueblo.

~~They have a well trained army, well led. They can stem a North Korean attack, but it is short of heavy equipment and has limited logistics and staying power.~~ ^{It is tough} ^{South Koreans} ^{which is} ^{It} ^{They} ^{can} ^{stem} ^a ^{North} ^{Korean} ^{attack,} ^{but} ^{it} ^{is} ^{short} ^{of} ^{heavy} ^{equipment} ^{and} ^{has} ^{limited} ^{logistics} ^{and} ^{staying} ^{power.}

The Air Force ^{is} less capable than that of North Korea. Its fields are vulnerable. There would be a warning time of ^{only} 0 to 5 minutes. ^{therefore} ^{we} are making ^{aircraft} ^{at} ^{our} ^{bases.} ~~We also need~~

but more protection for our aircraft is needed.

The Navy emphasizes coastal defense, but is not ^{yet} good enough. It is ^{still} intimidated by the North.

Infiltration has dropped off. 761 infiltrators in 1968, of whom 542 crossed the DMZ and 219 came in below it. There were only 103 in 1969, of whom 83

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crossed the DMZ and 20 came in below. We are not sure of the reasons for the drop. It may be an improvement of ROK capability *over political decision*
The reserve forces and navy need more help through weapons and communications.

independent
In summary, the ROK army with air and logistics help could stem a North Korean attack and could hold for a time a combined North Korean and Chinese Communist attack. The air force is poor, the first six F4's are coming in on August 25. *independents* The total of 25 F4's will be a big help.

Secretary Rogers: ~~On the election:~~ *M* many fear a rigged election ~~referendum.~~

Mr. Kissinger: What can we do about it?

Secretary Rogers: Nothing.

The President: We can influence it.

Secretary Laird: We have given them \$190 million a year since 1966, plus \$100 million supporting assistance ~~and \$100 million~~

This year it was \$133 million. We have shifted from equipment emphasis *to equipment* ~~to~~ operations and maintenance.

In 1968 we only gave \$11 million for new equipment. In 1969 it will be \$34 million for new equipment. But the older equipment gets more maintenance. We need to look at this problem. The ROK wants to build its own M-16 plant, as a counter to North Korea's AK47 plant. The government was working on the M-16 plant, but Colt was *reluctant*.

The President: Why is Colt so tough?

Secretary Laird: Self-protection on the M-16.

The President: How much do we buy from Colt - 50% of our M-16's? ~~The hell with them.~~ Put the squeeze on them. ~~If~~ it is in our interest, ~~the hell with them.~~ Look hard at this. ~~If we can get our armament people to be forthcoming, put the squeeze on them.~~

Secretary Laird: We turned licenses down earlier.

General Wheeler: () developed weapons. ~~Colt bought him out after we turned him down. Colt has been tough and hard to deal with. We had to expand the base since Colt was tough.~~

The President: South Korea has a strong Congressional lobby. Push Colt on this if it is in our interest.

Secretary Laird: There is some question on need. Colt is \$17 cheaper per gun. This is a procurement problem. Up until 1975 we have several options. We need greater South Korean modernization -- "Koreanizing". We should get the Koreans to agree to resumption of the MAP transfer program. We supply them in Vietnam, which they like. We need to change the whole MAP program.

The President: With Sino-Soviet tension and the South Vietnam problem we have got to go easy, but by 1975 we will confront a situation requiring us to reexamine.

With regard to our 60,000 troops in Korea, Congress would love to see a reduction. We can't sit back through 1975 keeping all those forces over there.

Secretary Laird: Current projections assume this presence.

The President: We need a plan which changes the situation. Our interest requires it. Do we sit there forever?

Secretary Rogers: We have the same number ¹ in Korea as they have in South Vietnam. Why not switch them.

The President: We will give them air and naval support, ^{just} We should ~~reduce~~ ^{reduce} ~~get~~ the ground forces, ~~cut~~.

Secretary Laird: The Koreans say they will be glad to send two ~~million~~ more divisions to ~~XXXXXX~~ South Vietnam. They like this. They really ~~make~~ ^{benefit}.

Under Secretary Richardson: They get ten times the pay. They want to stay in South Vietnam as civilians.

The President: We must face up to this but in the five-year plan we have to look at ~~this problem~~ ^{ground force reductions - cut}, keeping up our air and naval presence.

Secretary Laird: Our Congressional support ^{is} wants some reduction ^{of} the U.S. presence.

The President: One reason we have to look at Europe is we can't say anything for the next year, but in Europe we must also look hard at our presence. ~~We have got to prepare the way on this.~~

~~In Korea, we have to listen and comment nothing with Pak. We have () to support our own troops.~~

Secretary Rogers: They don't need more ground forces ~~or our present strength~~ -- only air. Pak needs assurance, ~~of 50,000 at this time.~~ The fast ^{boat} ~~boat~~ ^{President} would help. Their Foreign Minister wants destroyers and their President wants small boats.

The President: What have we got in Taiwan?

General Wheeler: A large MAAG, a small fighter force, and no ground troops. We assist in air defense.

Secretary Laird: Our MAAG is too big.

Secretary Rogers: Ambassador Porter thinks we can cut fat in Korea.

Under Secretary Richardson: We are ^{now} looking at a 10% cut ~~base~~ of the backup apparatus.

Assistant Secretary Green: There are (260) bases there that can be cut.

~~This is (). We have no logistics to back up. Our divisions are full of katusas. We can always cut.~~

Under Secretary Richardson: I will summarize the NSSM 28 issues.

The NSSM papers are being reviewed for five issues, ^{First, on} ~~the~~ infiltration issues,

We have three options:

- expand counter infiltration at the cost of \$170 million a year.
- ^{initial} a partial expansion.
- a modest expansion.

Four postures have been examined in detail. The first is an increased readiness posture. This would include 18 modernized divisions, an increase in the air force to 389, modern frigates and new bases. The navy would also expand from 58 to 82 patrol craft ^{and} 20 mine sweepers.

There would be 8,500 additional U.S. troops. We would keep our aircraft ~~there~~ ^{unchanged.}

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cut
() is a problem here. Also if ~~they~~ *the* get too strong, they may move

North.

The President: I remember I had to tell Rhee that we ^won't tolerate this. He cried. ~~But~~ *Nevertheless* we want them on our side. They are tough.

Under Secretary Richardson: The second posture is the present program with limited modernization. There would be some increase. A U.S. division at 80% strength would stay, plus the air augmentation. *3*

The third posture is ROK self-defense forces, the modernization of 18 ROK divisions, and the withdrawal of 2 U.S. divisions after modernization. *2*

The fourth posture is modernization of one U.S. division and small modernization of ROK divisions. *2*

The ^{own} problem with losing two ^{U.S.} divisions is the ^{seems} reduction of ^{their} our deterrent effect *on the north Koreans*

~~The President: Except that our air () are to () them. Another thing is that the morale of our forces is a great () We don't want to () the () up, but we need a long term look. If they need Soviet support then they are looking at a new war.~~

Secretary Rogers: Ambassador Porter wants to pull U.S. troops off the DMZ.

~~(Haig Note: Get Porter out of there)~~

General Wheeler: *They are there* ~~The reason is~~ because of psychological factors.

The President: We must go slowly, supplement our air and draw down our ground forces.

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Under Secretary Richardson: With regard to the fourth alternative of leaving one U.S. division there, The only way we will ^{realize} get real savings is to deactivate the other.

General Wheeler: ~~Thexxxx~~ It costs more to keep them here than in Korea. ~~It costs \$250 million here, and \$6.3 billion over five years there, or 4.8 for 3 years and 5.1 for four years.~~

(Marg Note: Check figures.)

General Lincoln: In 1946 and 1947 I (dealt) with this problem. I argued that we should not take them out of Korea because the BOB would demobilize ^{did} them. We ~~would~~ take them out and North Korea attacked.

Under Secretary Richardson: Under our study, we would slowly draw down and keep our support for economic development, ~~growing smaller~~ ~~XXX~~ The ~~US would decline to 40 by 1974.~~ The risks are limited. Part of their increase is textiles.

Further more

barrier of nuclear weapons along the DMZ of 100 miles would delay an attack 4 and 1/2 days. We could relocate nuclear weapons back from the DMZ. But General Bonesteel says they are safer forward than elsewhere.

The President: We have a right to keep them there.

Let us have a real five-year study. Let's cold turkey this in the context of post-Vietnam. We need to () readily.

Secretary Rogers: We must not take any side on the election issue.

The President: Will it affect Pak's visit?

Secretary Rogers: No. Say nice things about Korea.

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Under Secretary Richardson: This is the first ~~real~~ ^{real} analysis ~~look~~ in depth of the Korean problem.

Secretary Rogers: When we have our next discussion on this subject we should get our Ambassador back.

The President: Let's bring back also the military ~~guy~~ ^{Commander}. ~~Ambassador~~ Porter is impressive.

China

The President: Let's have a briefing on China. I have ~~another~~ ^{to} ~~throw in~~.

Director Helms: ~~Will cut it down.~~ ^{Reviewed China's internal problems}

(Haig Net: ~~China~~)

The President: Did the convulsion take place with the cultural revolution?

Director Helms: From 1967-68 to the present.

The President: We have always assumed that the Chinese are hard liners and the Soviets are more reasonable. But I think this is open to question. Look at what actually happened. Can we sustain this ^{judgment?}

Director Helms: No. The facts don't support it.

The President: Ceausescu says that the Soviets are tougher and more aggressive than the Chinese. We must look at China on a long term basis. This must be very closely held. We must look at it in a bilateral context.

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China can't stay permanently isolated. To me, China uses the dispute with Russia for internal use. But to me the Soviets are more aggressive.

Director Helms: ^{border} Incidents don't prove anything, but the Soviets have ^{moved} ~~quit~~ ~~XXXXX~~ from 15 ~~to~~ ^{to} 30 divisions ^{to} ~~new~~ ^{to} ~~on~~ ^{the} border. They ^{have} 3 new missile sites with a range of 500 miles along the border. The Soviets ^{know} ~~know~~ they will soon lose their first strike capability vis-a-vis China.

The President: We must recall the Brezhnev doctrine and the invasion of Czechoslovakia. ^{The Soviets continue to move forward and act aggressively when purposes threatened}

~~They dispatch () () to detente. They are a tough group, () they just don't know for sure.~~ We should relook at our own estimates.

They may have a "knock them off now" policy developing ^{with respect to China} ~~not~~

Now, in terms of our role, I am/sure if it is in our long term interest to let the Soviets knock them off. We must think through whether it is a safer world with China down, or should we look to keeping China strong? These are rhetorical questions. The Asians fear the Soviets first, and don't want a collective security arrangement. They question this. They don't want the Soviets as their protector. We must look at China after Vietnam.

Director Helms: I think the Soviets are doing well. They are very active in Europe and also in the Middle East. They talk softer but act much tougher. The Chinese have been stalling.

Secretary Rogers: No one at State would favor a Soviet takeover of China. They also feel that the Chinese threat is greatly overemphasized. ^{his} ^{quest} ~~it~~ may mean an

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aggressive Soviet attitude but I think not *slam not certain*

Assistant Secretary Green: China is still feared by the Asians. It is their principal fear. They want us to remain but they might accept the Soviets as an alternative.

The President: I don't want to overdraw this, but these countries don't want the Soviets in.

Assistant Secretary Green: The Soviets are *certainly* probably tempted to surgically remove the ~~China~~ Chinese nuclear threat.

(The meeting ended at 12:10 P. M.)

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NSC MEETING
August 14, 1969

TALKING POINTS

KOREA

1. This session should prove very valuable in preparing us for President Park's visit next week.
2. I look on this meeting as primarily a briefing session so that we can be brought up to date on the current situation in Korea and the principal issues in US-Korean relations.
3. I don't plan to make any policy decisions prior to my discussion with President Park. I look forward to another NSC session on Korea early this fall which will focus on specific policy issues following this meeting today and the results of our talks next week.
I understand that by early fall we will be able to consider the NSSM 27 study on Korea, which is still being reviewed by the agencies concerned.
4. Call on the following for briefings:
Mr. Helms - The North Korean Military and Political Threat.
Secretary Laird - ROK Force Structure and U.S. /ROK Military Relationships.
Secretary Rogers - Major Issues and Options for U.S. -Korea Policy.
(We understand that Under Secretary Richardson will give the briefing.)

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U. S. Policy and Programs Toward Korea

The United States faces basic decisions about its relationships with the Republic of Korea (ROK) in the 1970s. While the U. S. cannot - and probably should not try - to change U. S. policy toward Korea abruptly, we need to look ahead to the early 70s to determine:

-- What are the US and ROK force requirements against a plausible range of military threats?

-- To what extent can we reasonably ask that these requirements be progressively met by the Koreans themselves?

-- What military and economic assistance do the Koreans need for this transfer of responsibility?

-- What role can East Asians play in the regional security of East Asia?

Under NSSM 27, the preparation of the key U. S. policy and program alternatives has been completed and is now being reviewed by the relevant agencies. The preliminary findings of this study are summarized below for a few key problems.

1. The Infiltration Problem

North Korea's campaign to harass and subvert the South began in 1966, reached a peak in 1968, and has declined greatly in 1969.

- The number of incidents of harassment to date in 1969 is much lower than during 1967 or 1968.

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- The number of U. S. and ROK casualties has fallen; the ratio of North Korean to US/ROK casualties has increased.

- The number of successful seaborne warships (1 per month in 1969) is very small.

However, Premier Kim Il-sons has said that he aims to develop a "revolutionary struggle" in South Korea leading eventually to reunification of Korea under Communist rule. Moreover, North Korean capabilities for further terrorism are large and increasing. In spite of the ROK's ability to invert the current infiltration threat, the U. S. could assist them by:

- A greatly-expanded counter-infiltration program costing \$170 million in U. S. assistance. This package could strengthen the DMZ defenses; coastal barriers (radar and sea patrol), and rear area defense forces.

- A partial program costing \$65 million. I would increase ROK capabilities for coastal surveillance and rear area defense but make few further improvements along the DMZ.

- A limited program costing \$30 million. It would provide a few radar stations and patrol craft to test the coastal barrier concept. A supplemental FY 70 appropriation can be sought such as the joint State/Defense proposal for a \$88 million MAP add-on.

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2. The US/ROK Force Posture Issue

When North Korea attacked the South in 1950, it had a 2 to 1 superiority in ground forces over the ROK; today the ROK army is much larger than its northern counterpart. The now-existing ROK ground and naval forces, with only U. S. logistical support would be capable of:

- Defeating an attack of the now existing 25 NK divisions supported logistically by the Chinese.
- Fighting a strong delaying action against NK/CPR attack.

On the other hand, the ROK air force could not, by itself, deal adequately with a NK air offensive and South Korean air bases remain vulnerable to a surprise attack.

Given present ROK force capabilities a continuing U. S. commitment to the ROK of Korea implies that:

- ROK will remain dependent on the U. S. for logistical and tactical air support in a NK attack and ground forces as well in a joint NK/Chinese attack.
- ROK will remain dependent on U. S. military assistance. All of the ROK's new weapons and equipment plus much of its maintenance costs comes from U. S. MAP.
- U. S. ground forces (2 divisions now in Korea) are not needed in South Korea for a defense against a NK attack. They do serve to help deter a NK attack and provide a hedge against a joint Chinese/NK attack.

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- Positioning of U. S. ground forces along the DMZ involves the U. S. automatically in a conflict regardless whether North or South Korea initiates it.

However, to allow withdrawal of part of all US forces and hedge against a joint NK/CPR attack, some modernization of the ROK forces may be needed. This modernization should be aimed at:

- Exploiting the ROK's comparative advantage at building ground forces. ROK ground forces, equipped to U. S. standards, are much cheaper. In contrast, ROK air or naval forces are nearly as expensive as the same U. S. forces.

- Reducing the cost of U. S. forces for Korea by substituting ROK forces. The current cost of the 2 U. S. divisions in Korea is over \$800 million per year. While these forces are held in a regional security mission, they have, de facto, been maintained exclusively for defense of the ROKs.

Given these considerations, three basic force postures for US/ROK forces have been developed for the next five years:

- An increased readiness posture to increase both ROK and U. S. force capabilities in Korea on the assumption that UK/Chinese belligerency will increase substantially.

- The present posture which permits only limited improvement in ROK forces but retains the two U. S. divisions in Korea.

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- A ROK self-defense posture to withdraw are or both U. S. divisions in the next five years after adequate improvement of ROK forces.

3. The Aid and Trade Problem

During the last five years, the ROK economy has grown at over 10 per cent annually. In spite of this rapid growth, the ROK economic situation is clouded by some fundamental problems:

- The ROK is still a poor country (GNP per capita of \$)
- ROK foreign exchange earnings will be the key constraint on future economic growth.

- Continued ROK foreign exchange earnings growth from capital inflows and exports is uncertain.

- The ROK derives substantial foreign exchange earnings (\$300 million per year) from its troop deployments to Vietnam, U. S. Vietnam-related purchases in Korea, and U. S. deployments to Korea.

- U. S. economic aid is now (FY 70) about \$110 million annually but is planned to decline rapidly to about \$40 million in FY 74.

Given these uncertainties, the U. S. cannot plan for the ROK to assume a large share of the cost of modernizing Korean forces. However, even if the U. S. phases out AID, the Koreans could almost certainly assume the cost(\$122 million) of certain military equipment now financed by the U. S.

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by producing them in Korea. Moreover, if ROK export performance and Vietnam-related earnings continue, the ROKs may be able to absorb themselves a greater share of their foreign exchange requirements. This could be accomplished by:

- Phasing out U.S. economic aid more rapidly than now planned.
- Continuing economic aid at a higher level than necessary for economic reasons, but ask the ROKs to pay for a larger part of their force modernization costs.
- Increase military and economic aid over planned levels to reduce the difficulties of Korean adjustment to U.S. force withdrawals or hedge against uncertainties of future Korean foreign exchange earnings growth.

4. The Third-Term Problem

Under the ROK constitution, President Park cannot serve a third term. Yet an intensive campaign is underway to amend the constitution. This would require two-thirds approval by the National Assembly and approval in a national referendum. A special National Assembly session is now in session, likely to complete its work in September, followed by a popular referendum in October.

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President Park has recently announced that he supports amendment of the constitution and that he will regard the referendum as a vote of confidence in his regime. If the voters reject the amendment, Park has threatened to resign. Park has not, however, committed himself to run for a third term if the amendment wins.

Park is widely respected for his outstanding achievements, although many informed South Koreans are skeptical of the depth of his commitment to individual freedoms and democratic methods. Park is also in virtually undisputed control of the ROK Government, and is supported by the ruling Democratic Republic Party (DRP).

Park's most important obstacle is widespread opposition by students and intellectuals. Disorders can probably be handled by security forces. However, an incident involving the killing of a few demonstrators could precipitate widespread and possibly prolonged turmoil.

Park is likely to win a third term in spite of some opposition and political turmoil in South Korea. However, there are other possible successor governments:

-- If Park were to decline re-election, after the amendment wins, his chosen candidate would be likely to win the presidency. A government backed by Park could initially be strong and probably more

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legitimate than a third Park presidency.

-- If the amendment were defeated and Park resigned, considerable political turbulence would result; a military coup would be a real possibility.

-- In the unlikely event that the opposition were to win the 1971 election, the general orientation of the government would probably change little. Its effectiveness, however, would depend on its leadership and the extent of its political support.

However, U. S. influence on the outcome of the internal political struggle in Korea will probably be slight unless there is widespread opposition to Park's third term in Korea itself. If Park is confident of his political position within South Korea he is unlikely to be receptive to U. S. pressure not to seek re-election. On the other hand, in the context of widespread opposition, an expression of U. S. dissatisfaction might be decisive to Park's withdrawal or a U. S. endorsement, either tacit or explicit, might strengthen Park's determination to override his opposition. Given this U. S. influence over Korean politics, the U. S. has the alternatives of:

- Remain Aloof from Korean Politics. Under this approach, the U. S. would avoid either encouragement of Park's third term effort or support of his opposition.

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- Encourage Park to Choose a Successor. Under this plan, the U.S. would privately pledge support to Park for a transition of power while publically maintaining a "hand off" attitude.

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

UNCLASSIFIED
Classification

FOR DCIT USE ONLY

Origin
Info

ACTION: PAGE 2 to ALL DIPLOMATIC POSTS

Armistice Commission reported the missing aircraft to the North Korean Senior Member and requested his assistance in returning the helicopter and personnel, if in fact the light helicopter is down in North Korean territory.

QUOTE Names of missing personnel were not released.

UNQUOTE.

END

JOHNSON.

Drafted by:	Tel. No.	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:
Clearances:		

UNCLASSIFIED
Classification

**SECRET
YES ONLY**

Downgraded to UNCLASSIFIED

996

IMMEDIATE

17 AUGUST 1969

O 170744Z ZYH ZFF-3

FM BONESTEEL COMUSK KOREA

TO ADM MCCAIN CINCPAC HAWAII

INFO GEN WHEELER CJCS WASHINGTON

GEN WESTMORELAND C/S ARMY WASHINGTON

GEN HAINES CINCUSARPAC TDY CAMP ZAMA JAPAN

ADM BRINGLE COMSEVENTH FLI YOKUSAKA JAPAN

LT GEN MOGEHEE COMFIFTHAF FUCHU JAPAN

ZEM

SECRET KRA 2873. EYES ONLY

AT 1117 I THIS MORNING FIFTH ROK MARINE BRIGADE ON KIMPO PENINSULA REPORTED SIGHTING AT 1045 I, AN OH-23 HELICOPTER FLYING NORTH ACROSS HAN ESTUARY TOWARDS NORTH KOREA AT BS 733897. LATER SIGHTED AT BS 740920 AND BS 795935, LATER POINT IN NK. VISIBILITY AND CEILING UNLIMITED.

PROMPT CHECK DETERMINED NO ROK HELICOPTERS IN AREA AND THAT AIRCRAFT WAS US, TAIL NUMBER 6415289, FROM 59TH AVIATION COMPANY, I CORPS (GP), UIJONGBU, CLEARED FOR TRAINING FLIGHT IN VICINTY DMZ. ON SUCH FLIGHTS PILOT REQUIRED REPORT BY RADIO EVERY FIFTEEN MINUTES AND MUST HAVE HAD DMZ ORIENTATION INSTRUCTION AND FLIGHTS. PILOT WO1 MALCOLM V. LOEPKE, SSN 303-32-6522 HAD HAD SUCH ORIENTATION, AND HAD BEEN IN KOREA SINCE 22 JULY 69; PASSENGERS WERE NEWLY-ARRIVED PILOT DAVID H. CRAWFORD, SSN 257-66-7797; AND CREW CHIEF SP4 HERMAN HOFSTATTER, SSN 350-44-2420. PILOT RADIOED IN AT APPROX 1108 HRS I THAT HE WAS DISORIENTED, WAS TAKING ROUNDS AND WAS ATTEMPTING TO SET DOWN.

JAH

SECDEF	
DEPSPC	
ISA	
CNA	
CSAF	/
CH	/
COM	/
J-8	/
J-4	
J-5	
SACPA	
DIAD	
PH	
STATE	
CIA	
<i>mcp/ra</i>	<i>*</i>

Downgraded to UNCLASSIFIED

**SECRET
EYES ONLY**

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 941294
By NARA Date 1/11/08

**SECRET
EYES ONLY**

Downgraded to UNCLASSIFIED

997

WE NOTIFIED NORTH KOREANS AT 1400 I THROUGH PANMUNJOM THAT A S OH-23 WHILE ON TRAINING FLIGHT APPARENTLY BECAME DISORIENTED AND MAY HAVE FLOWN NEAR OR OVER THEIR TERRITORY. MESSAGE REQUESTED THEIR ASSISTANCE IN RECOVERY OF AIRCRAFT AND RETURN OF PERSONNEL IF IN FACT THE AIRCRAFT LANDED IN NK TERRITORY.

NK RADIO PYONGYANG IS BEING MONITORED BUT THERE HAS BEEN NO MENTION OF INCIDENT IN BROADCASTS UP TO NOW.

US HELICOPTER WAS DUE TO RETURN TO UIJONGBU AT 1203 I. HENCE IS BEING OVERDUE AND NO FURTHER CONTACT WITH IT HAS BEEN REPORTED.

HIGHER HEADQUARTERS ARE BEING KEPT CURRENTLY INFORMED OF DEVELOPMENTS AS WELL AS EMBASSY AND ROKS. PRESS RELEASE BEING PREPARED WITH PACOM AND WASHINGTON AND COORDINATED WITH EMBASSY FOR USE AT TIME CONSIDERED APPROPRIATE HERE. IT APPEARS DESIRABLE, WHEN CLEAR THAT AIRCRAFT IS IN NORTH KOREAN HANDS, TO GET PRESS RELEASE OUT BEFORE NORTH KOREAN BROADCASTS, IF POSSIBLE, AND TO INFORM US PRESS. NOT CLEAR HOW NORTH KOREA WILL PLAY THIS INCIDENT.

WILL KEEP YOU INFORMED.

P-4

30 NOTE: DELIVER IMMEDIATELY.

3/11/78 - no message attached

Downgraded to UNCLASSIFIED

**SECRET
EYES ONLY**

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 941294
By NARA Date 7/11/18

Detailed Report on the U. S. Military Helicopter Downing Incident

1. Summary of the Incident

According to the announcement of the UN Forces Headquarters, at 10:30 A.M. 17 AUG, an unarmed U.S. military three-seater OH-23 helicopter took off from Uijeongbu City and headed toward the southern border of the DMZ for training flight. At 11:00 A.M., the helicopter went missing after the radio transmission of "lost direction. do not know location. firing. hit. going down."

2. Cause of the Incident

Captain Crawford, the pilot of the helicopter, was recently transferred on 14 AUG. Therefore, it seemed that he flew into the territory of the North Korean puppet regime as he was unfamiliar with the area.

3. Responses of the North Korean Puppet Regime

Pyongyang Broadcasting, the government broadcaster of the North Korean puppet regime, announced that a U.S. military helicopter had infiltrated deep into North Korean territorial airspace and was shot down by the military of the North Korean puppet regime. It does not mention the survival of the crew or the safety of the helicopter.

4. Responses of the U.S. Military Headquarters

U.S. military headquarters announced the missing helicopter on 17 AUG U.S.M.C. Major General Adams, the representative of the U.S. military in the Military Armistice Commission, requested the instant repatriation of the crew and the helicopter if they were shot down over the territory of the North Korean puppet regime, and he demanded the convocation of the 292nd Military Armistice Commission on 18 AUG.

The North Korean puppet regime insisted on delaying the commission until 21 AUG and U. S. military headquarters did not respond (4:00 P.M. 19 AUG).

5. Progress of the Incident

There was no detailed report from U. S. military headquarters. The Joint Chiefs of Staff and Korean representative of the Military Armistice Commission mentioned that they know nothing more than the newspapers (4:00 P.M. 19 AUG).

6. Miscellaneous

A. List of missing crew:

David Crawford, Captain

Malcom V, Warrant Officer

Herman E. Hoffstetter, Corporal

B. Capability of OH-23

Length: 8.99m, Height: 2.83m, Weight: 82Kg, Cruising Speed: 145Km

Max. Ascending Speed: 393m/min, Power: 304-340 HP

Assault on a Friendly Guard Post (GP) in DMZ from the Soldiers of the North Korean Puppet Regime

1. Summary of the Incident

An unknown number of soldiers of the North Korean puppet regime assaulted friendly forces that were patrolling the DMZ near northern Cheolwon at 10:30 A.M. 10 AUG, and friendly forces returned fire. At the same time, a GP from the North Korean puppet regime fired at a friendly GP using an 82mm mortar and 76.2mm cannon. The friendly GP returned fire. The engagement lasted until 2:40 P.M.

2. Enemy Loss

Unknown

3. Friendly Loss

1 killed, 2 wounded

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

No: USW-08219

Date: 261700

To: Minister

From: Korean Ambassador to the United States

Daily Situation

1. Today, Pastor Paul Lindstrom, the former chairman of the 'Remember the Pueblo Committee', insisted that the U.S. government should take immediate and resolute action in order to release 3 crewmembers of the downed helicopter from the detention of the North Korean puppet regime. After being refused an audience with the Secretary of State, he announced to the press that 'as Koreans warned before, if North Korea plans to invade South Korea in 1970 or 1971, the United States should strongly counterstrike based on the spirit of justice, not based on revenge.'

2. According to 'Time' magazine this week, Secretary Laird of the Department of Defense implied that if the Vietnam War is not advancing as the government planned, 250 thousand U.S. forces in Vietnam will be replaced with volunteer soldiers. But a spokesperson from the Department of Defense denied the news and explained that the policy of the Secretary of Defense had not been changed. The policy includes 1) the progress from the Paris Talks; 2) the status of the reinforcement of Vietnamese Armed forces; and 3) the downsizing of U.S. forces in Vietnam based on the combat activities of enemy.

3. Secretary Laird of the Department of Defense blamed the detractors in Congress as they persist in cutting the budget of the Department of Defense for 1970 despite the fact that President Johnson already reduced it by 4.1 billion dollars before his submission today. Also, he warned that such a demand is very dangerous. Secretary Laird promised to reduce the budget down to 77 billion dollars

and he mentioned that more budget cuts are not constructive and will lower the efficiency and will cost even more in the long term.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

No: USW-08251

Date: 291700

To: Minister

From: Korean Ambassador to the United States

Daily (8. 29)

1. Hearing the news that the 3 crewmembers from the downed helicopter are alive, U.S. government officials were delighted and then started to prepare actions for their return. The U.S. government is making a draft statement good enough to satisfy the North Korean puppet regime to release them but the contents of the statement seemed not to harm the U.S. government too much. In the mean time, Pastor Paul Lindstrom, the former chairman of the 'Remember the Pueblo Committee', declared he would go to Panmunjeom to take custody of the crew from the North Korean puppet regime on 18 SEP as the private negotiations ongoing since 18 AUG were completed. The State Department avoided instant comments.

2. Regarding the news that the Soviet Union was tapping the reactions of other countries about the plan to attack the atomic factory area in Red China, on 28 AUG, a spokesperson of the State Department said that he knows about the rumor and the news but it is not expected that the Soviet Union will attack the atomic factory area or attempt an all-out war. He also said that the U.S. government does not want a war between the Soviet Union and Red China, as it would be harmful for the whole world.

3. On 25 AUG, Secretary Rodgers of the State Department promised to the Foreign Minister Kuman of Thailand that the U.S. government would keep its defense pledge to Thailand according to the SEATO treaty. It seemed to relieve the opposition from Thailand caused from Defense Secretary Laird's comment on 23 AUG that the Nixon Administration did not authorized the secret

agreement to Thailand.

Summary of the Meeting between Vice Minister Jin, of Foreign Affairs, and the U.S. Charge d' affaires Lathram

Date: 1969.8.30. 10:00

Subject: U.S. Military Helicopter Downing Incident

1. According to U.S. Charge d' Affaires Lathram, Major General Lee Chunseon of the North Korean puppet regime confirmed at the open meeting at Panmunjeom regarding the helicopter downed on 17 AUG 1969 that 2 crewmembers, including Captain Crawford, are severely wounded and another crewmember is slightly wounded.
2. Major General Adams, the chief delegate of the U.S. side, questioned when the crew is going to be released. Major General Lee Chunseon, of the North Korean puppet regime, questioned back why the helicopter was sent to the North, then he insisted that was for spying activities.
3. U.S. Charge d' Affaires Lathram stated the U.S. side secretly proposed private talks to release the pilot and crew and is waiting for their response.
4. Vice Minister Jin responded that the North Korean puppet regime would use the helicopter crew as hostages in order to play hostage diplomacy for the upcoming UN General Assembly.
5. U.S. Charge d' Affaires Lathram said it could be possible, so he would try his best to release them as soon as possible before the UN General Assembly.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

No: UKW-0920

Date: 051710

To: Minister, Department Head

From: Korean Ambassador to the United Kingdom

1731-242-200

According to the telegraph on 5 SEP, quoting the correspondent in Tokyo, in order to release the crew of the helicopter, the UN side proposed that they will apologize as a U.S. military helicopter entered the territorial airspace of the North Korean puppet regime due to pilot error on 17 AUG. However, the North Korean puppet regime side turned that down and insisted on admission of criminal activities and required a written guarantee that there would be no reoccurrence of a similar incident.

Summary of the Meeting between Director Yoon of the Europe-America Bureau and Councilor Judd of the U.S. Embassy to South Korea

Date: 1969.9.8 11:00

1. Councilor Judd mentioned that the North Korean puppet regime has been interested in the suggestions from the U.S. military side regarding the release of the 3 crewmembers of the downed helicopter and that there would be a meeting in Panmunjeom before noon today.
2. Also, Councilor Judd said that the domestic press reported on the apology of the U.S. military side but the U.S. side only admitted the violation of the armistice truce as the helicopter passed the truce line.
3. Director Yoon asked if the North Korean puppet regime would agree with just admitting of the U.S. side. Councilor Judd answered that he predicts consent from the North Korean puppet regime side.
4. The North Korean puppet regime side did not yet mention anything regarding the admission of spying activities, which they had been insisting.
5. He was optimistic about the swift settlement according to the progress of the meeting and he will tell me about the results and prospects of today's meeting.

The Summary of a Telephone Conversation between Director Yoon of the Europe-America Bureau and Councilor Judd

Date: 1969.9.9. 11:00

1. Regarding the inquiry from Director Yoon about the results of the negotiation meeting, which was held in Panmunjeom, for the release of the crew of the helicopter.
2. Councilor Judd said that there had been a meeting for one and a half hours but there was no particular progress.

The Record of a Telephone Conversation between Councilor Judd and Director Yoon

69.9.15. 10:00

Councilor Judd – The Armistice Commission meeting was held at 11:00. I will notify you of the details later.

The Contents of a Telephone Conversation between Director Yoon of the Europe-America Bureau and Councilor Judd

Date: 1969.11.3. 09:30

Contents

1. Councilor Judd stated that there was a meeting of the Armistice Commission held in Panmunjeom on Thursday 30 OCT 1969. The release of 3 U.S. military helicopter crewmembers had been discussed but there was no particular progress.
2. Both sides had opinions regarding the manner of release. The communist side demanded the draft of a statement to the North Korean puppet regime side from the U.S. side. The U.S. side refused the demand, as it is at present just a draft. The U.S. side was not willing to apologize and it will only express regret about the unexpected incident.

The Contents of a Telephone Conversation between Director Yoon of the Europe-America Bureau and Councilor Judd

Date: 1969.11.18. 15:00

Subject: The release of the USFK helicopter crew

- Contents -

Councilor Judd:

There has been an Armistice Commission meeting at 11 A.M. 17 NOV 1967 held in Panmunjeom to negotiate the release of the 3 USFK helicopter crewmembers who have been shot down by the North Korean puppet regime. The North Korean puppet regime side suggested a counter version (better version) to the U.S. side. The U.S. side considered the suggestion as more progressed, and so thus reported that to, and requested instructions from, Washington.

Director Yoon:

About the inquiry regarding the apology of the U.S. side, there will not be an official apology. However, it is true that there was a violation during this incident and it was caused by the carelessness of the U.S. side, so the format of the signing ceremony before the release will be same as last time. About the inquiry regarding the possibility of releasing the crew before Thanksgiving in the U.S., Councilor Judd implied that the version of the North Korean puppet regime has been quite advanced so that is very much possible for the crew to be released in the course of time.

The Contents of a Telephone Conversation between Director Yoon of the Europe-America Bureau and Councilor Judd

Date: 1969. 11.24. 10:00

Subject: A closed meeting of the chief delegates of the Panmunjeom Military Armistice Commission (Release negotiations for the helicopter crew)

Councilor Judd:

A closed meeting has been held at 11:00 A.M. today. The suggestion from the North Korean puppet regime during the last meeting had been delivered to Washington. Today's meeting was held upon the request of the U.S. side as Washington sent instructions.

Director Yoon:

How are prospects for the negotiation according to the instructions from Washington, and the suggestions from the North Korean puppet regime?

Councilor Judd:

The prospect looks good, as the last suggestion from the North Korean puppet regime was 'interesting'. I will inform [you of] the results of today's meeting later.

The Contents of a Telephone Conversation between Director Yoon of the Europe-America Bureau and Councilor Judd

Date: 1969. 11.25. 10:00

Subject: Release negotiations for the helicopter crew

Councilor Judd:

I am not in a position to talk about this matter as Ambassador Porter directly meets the prime minister to talk about the progress regarding the closed meeting of the chief delegates of the Armistice Commission. However, this case looks like it will be resolved favorably.

The Contents of a Telephone Conversation between Director Yoon of the Europe-America Bureau and Councilor Judd

Date: 1969.12.2. 16:00

Councilor Judd:

They had stated that a closed meeting would be held at 11:00 A.M. 3 DEC 1969 in Panmunjeom regarding the release of the U.S. military helicopter crew.

Director Yoon:

About the inquiry regarding the possibility of the release of the crew, Councilor Judd said that there is a possibility of release but he can not announce it now, and I believe that the diplomatic minister Lathram will talk to the vice minister of foreign affairs.

Councilor Judd:

(about 20 minutes later) By telephone, stated that, as the U.S. side thought, the crew of the helicopter will be released tomorrow.

Director Yoon:

What type of apology was made?

Councilor Judd:

It was same as the last time. There was no 'apology' but just admitting of a 'mistake'.

Director Yoon:

Which side prepared the paper to sign?

Councilor Judd:

The paper to be signed is prepared by the North Korean puppet regime.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

No: USW-1224

Date: 021730

To: Minister

From: Korean Ambassador to the United States

05:00 P.M. today (2nd), the head of the Korea Section in the State Department stated as follows:.

1. 09:00 P.M. today (11:00 A.M. 3 DEC in Seoul), the U.S. side will have a meeting with the North Korean puppet regime side and will take custody of the 3 helicopter crewmembers kidnapped last August.
2. Ambassador Porter will deliver the information to related agencies of our government.
3. If the crewmembers are released as planned, the State Department will announce a statement. As soon as the statement has been announced, it will be forwarded, around 10:00 P.M. today.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

To: Korean Ambassador to the United States

From: Minister

- 1. You should contact the State Department immediately and express the following:
 - A. It is very fortunate that three helicopter crewmembers have been returned on 3 DEC.
 - B. During the negotiations for their release through the closed meetings, which were held in Panmunjeom among the chief delegates of the Military Armistice Commission, the ROK government had been fully cooperative with the U.S. side in the name of humanity to attain the release of crew, despite all the political consequences caused from the talks.
 - C. Within the so-called 'Statement of Apology' that Major General Adams signed, terms such as 'Sovereignty of the DPRK' and 'Territorial Air of the Northern Half of the DPRK' have been used.
 - D. According to the declaration Major General Adams announced with the release, he did not declare the absolute invalidation of the statement despite clearly repudiating several items mentioned in the statement. Also, he did not repudiate terms such as the 'Sovereignty of the DPRK' or the 'Territorial Air of the Northern Half of the DPRK'.
 - E. At the time of the release of the crew of the Pueblo on 23 DEC 1968, Major General Woodward signed the so-called 'Statement of Apology,' then announced a declaration which stated that the contents of the statement were entirely forged by the North Korean puppet regime and totally repudiated the validity of the statement. Compared to that case, the declaration of Major General Adams was not clear.
 - F. Also, the U.S. Embassy to South Korea had presented a note to us on 23 DEC 1968 and had clarified that the so-called 'Territorial Waters of the DPRK' within the so-called 'Statement of Apology' would not change the standpoint of the U.S. government and the statement is not valid (the note is attached at the end of this letter).

2. Express the opinions of our government as above. If the U.S. side responds that the so-called 'Statement of Apology' dated 3 DEC 1969 is not valid and the terms in Article 1-C above that 'the North Korean puppet regime mentioned' will not change the standpoint of the U.S. government, request a note which contains the standpoint of the U.S. government (same style as the one from the U.S. Embassy to South Korea on 23 DEC 1968 will be fine).

3. After the arrangement of this case, report the reactions of the U.S. side instantly.

Attachment: The note from the U.S. Embassy to South Korea dated 23 DEC 1968.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Report

To: President, Prime Minister

Subject: Release of the Helicopter Crew

Reporting as follows:

1. Three crewmembers of the unarmed U.S. military helicopter which was shot down by the North Korean puppet regime on 17 AUG 1969 have been released via Panmunjeom on 3 DEC 1969 as the result of 6 rounds of negotiations in the closed meetings between chief delegates of the Military Armistice Commission. The progress of the negotiations is expressed in attachment 1.
2. Major General Adams, as the chief delegate of the UN forces side of the Military Armistice Commission, had signed the so-called 'Statement of Apology' that the North Korean puppet regime side presented, and the reception note of the crew before the release.
3. At the same time, Major General Adams announced the declaration and then clarified the signing of the so-called 'Statement of Apology' and repudiated the statement. Regarding the expression of 'Criminal Activities' in the 'Statement of Apology', he said 'I have explained many times that the crew passed the DMZ carelessly without hostility according to some geographical mistakes'. Regarding the written expression of the helicopter having 'deeply infiltrated' into the North Korean puppet regime's territory in the 'Statement of Apology', he said 'the helicopter was shot down right after crossing the DMZ in front of the observers of the southern part'. Also, Major General Adams declared that he signed the statement in order to obtain humane benefits, that is, to secure the release of the crew.

4. Announcing a declaration to deny the statement after the signing of the statement was the same method Major General Woodward – the chief delegate of the UN forces side at that time – had used when he announced a declaration to deny the so-called ‘Statement of Apology’ that the North Korean puppet regime side presented after signing the statement in order to release the crew of the Pueblo on 23 DEC 1968.

5. Our government has not interfered with the actions of the U.S. side with the humane standpoint to rescue precious human lives despite the fact that vicious inhumane conduct and the provocative illegal activities of the North Korean puppet regime should be strictly impeached. But, even if the so-called ‘Statement of Apology’ has become invalidated through the repudiation declaration, an additional official repudiation from the U.S. government still is required because a U.S. government official had signed a document which contains the expressions of the ‘Sovereignty of the DPRK’ and its ‘Sovereign Airspace.’

6. Therefore, Vice Minister Jin Pil-sik of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has invited the diplomatic minister Latham of the U. S. Embassy regarding this matter today and demanded the official explanation of the U.S. government. Also, I have invited Ambassador Porter of the U. S. Embassy to South Korea to have a conversation which are attachments 4 and 5.

7. For the references, the English and Korean translations of the so-called ‘Statement of Apology’ (attachment 2) and the statement from the spokesman of the UN Command regarding the declaration of the major general are attached.

8. Also, Ambassador Porter of the U. S. Embassy to South Korea had officially concluded that the so-called ‘Statement of Apology’ is not valid on 4 DEC.

Attachments

1. The progress between the chief delegates of the Military Armistice Commission

2. The English and Korean versions of the so-called 'Statement of Apology' that Major General Adams, as the chief delegate of the U.S. side in the Military Armistice Commission, has signed
3. The statement from the spokesman of the UN Command regarding the declaration of Major General Adams as the chief delegate of the U.S. side in the Military Armistice Commission - English and Korean versions
4. The conversation records between the minister of foreign affairs and Ambassador Porter of the U. S. Embassy to South Korea
5. The conversation records between Vice Minister Jin Pil-sik, of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the diplomatic minister Latham, of the U. S. Embassy to South Korea

(Attachment 1)

The Progress Between the Chief Delegates of the Military Armistice Commission

The 1st conference (1969. 9. 8) Approximately 1 hour and 30 minutes

1. The U.S. side said that they will not apologize to the North Korean puppet regime but they will admit to the violation of the armistice truce as the helicopter entered the northern territories of the armistice line. (The utterance had been notified to us before the conference)
2. There had been no particular progress in the conference.

The 2nd conference (1969. 9. 15)

There had been no particular progress in the conference.

The 3rd conference (1969. 10. 30)

Both sides had their opinions for the manner of release. The communist side demanded the exchange of release documents but the U.S. side refused because it is just at the draft stage. The U.S. side said that they have no intension of apologizing but will only express their regret about the unexpected incident.

The 4th conference (1969. 11. 17)

1. The North Korean puppet regime side had presented a suggested document. The U.S. side had reported it to Washington and requested instructions.
2. It is implied that it is very much possible the crew could be released sooner or later as the suggestion of the North Korean puppet regime has been more advanced than in past.

The 5th conference (1969. 11. 24)

1. The U.S. side made an offer to the North Korean puppet regime side according to the instructions from Washington.
2. The prospect looks good, as the last suggestion from the North Korean puppet regime was 'interesting'
3. For the details of this conference, U. S. Ambassador to South Korea Porter directly meets the prime minister to talk about the progress (1969. 11. 25). And he mentioned that this case looks to be solved favorably

The 6th conference (1969. 12. 3.)

Three crewmembers are released as the so-called 'Statement of Apology' is signed.

Attachment 2

So-called 'Statement of Apology'

To the Joseon People's Army:

The UN Command seriously apologizes and will take the entire responsibility for the violations of the armistice truce when a military aircraft infiltrated daringly into the sovereign airspace of the northern half of Korea on 17 AUG 1969 as well as the severe infringement of the sovereignty of DPRK. The UNC will not commit such criminal activities in the future and will firmly guarantee the strict compliance of the armistice truce and then request the release of the crew of the OH-230 helicopter that was shot down in self-defense by the Joseon People's Army.

The Military Armistice Commission
Chief Delegation of the UN Command
United States Marine Corps Major General Arthur H. Adams

The Statement from the Spokesman of the UN Command Upon the Release of the Crew

For the release of 3 crewmembers of the helicopter, General Adams had been given the authority to sign a statement expressing that the UN Command executed 'criminal activities' by 'infiltrating' a helicopter 'deeply' to the territory of the North Korean puppet regime.

The UN Command has confirmed many times that the crew passed the DMZ carelessly according to some geographical mistakes.

The helicopter was shot down right after crossing the DMZ in front of observers of the southern part. It is clear that such a small and unarmed helicopter was not sent intentionally to hostile territory and it also is certain that there has not been any kind of criminal activities nor intentional infiltration.

Major General Adams has signed the troublesome paper in order to secure the release of the crew in terms of the humane benefits.

Attachment 4

The Conversation Records

Summary of the conversation between the Minister Choi and Ambassador Porter

Date: 4 DEC 1969 6:50 - 7:20

Minister:

I am sorry to invite you so late despite your dinner appointment. We will discuss two agenda items today. What are the contents of the statement of apology that the U.S. side had signed in order to release the crew of the OH-230 helicopter that had been kidnapped by the North Korean puppet regime on 17 AUG?

Ambassador Porter:

The communist side prepared the so-called 'Statement of Apology' and our side has signed, regardless of the contents, because of the standpoint to respect human lives and dignity, as they require the signing in return for the release of the helicopter crew. Immediately after the release of the crew, as you know, Major General Adams announced a contradictory declaration. The sovereignty of the DPRK and territorial airspace in the so-called 'Statement of Apology' just mean 'under the control of N.K.' and he declared that the signed paper is not valid because the signing is solely for the release of the helicopter crew, regardless of the contents. The signed paper, in fact, does not have any legal force, so we simply disregard it.

Minister:

When the crew of the Pueblo was released, the statement was between the U.S. government and the DPRK, but why was this statement between the Joseon People's Army and UNC?

Ambassador Porter:

It has been done like that because they just wanted to do so and I do not know what they are thinking about. The U. S. government does not recognize the so-called 'Statement of Apology' so we are not concerned with what was written there.

Minister:

According to the AP from Washington today, the U. S. tax and budget subcommittee cut down 50 million dollars in special military aid that already has been approved by the foreign affairs subcommittee of the House of Representatives.

Ambassador Porter:

I have no idea and I never heard anything from the home country. I will tell you if I hear from home.

Minister:

As you know, our government is very concerned about the military aid from the U. S. government and under the present circumstances, considering a 50 million dollar budget cut in special military aid does not make sense.

Ambassador Porter:

I will deliver your message to the home country, that the Korean government has great concerns on the matter of military aid and there should not be a budget cut of military aid.

Attachment 5

The Conversation Records

Summary of the conversation between the Vice Minister Jin and the diplomatic minister Lathram

Date: 4 DEC 1969 5:30-5:50

Vice Minister:

Congratulations on the release of the helicopter crew as well, as we also wished for their release as soon as possible. But, as I take a look at the paper that Major General Adams had signed, terms such as 'Sovereignty of the DPRK' and 'Territorial Airspace of the Northern Half of the DPRK' have been used. How could he sign a paper with such seditious terms being used?

Diplomatic Minister Lathram:

Major General Adams had signed the paper according to the humane standpoint in order to rescue human lives and then he contradicted the paper immediately after the signing. It is absolutely clear that the paper has been prepared by the North Korean puppet regime and there is no influence on the standpoint of the U. S. government that the Republic of Korea is the only legitimate government in Korea as well as that the North Korean puppet regime is an unlawful body.

Vice Minister:

Isn't this evident that the embassy will send us an official document containing such contents?

Diplomatic Minister Lathram:

I do not think that we need to present an official document containing such evident facts but I will discuss what you have told me with

Ambassador Porter. As I am explaining once again, it would be good enough that a military personnel signed a paper which the North Korean puppet regime prepared in terms of the humane standpoint then declare the invalidity of the paper by him in the same manner as the release of the Pueblo crew in the past. Therefore, it is so obvious that it does not affect the standpoint of the U. S. government recognizing the Republic of Korea as the only legitimate government in Korea as well as the North Korean puppet regime as an unlawful body. Is it necessary to mention only expressions on such a paper while considering the stationing of the U. S. Forces in Korea and the attitude of the United States in the UN regarding Korean matters this year as usual?

Vice Minister:

My opinion is not different from yours and I have no doubt about Korean-American relations. I just think it makes more sense to give us something in written format rather than in a verbal manner. Also, I think the U.S. Embassy does not have any difficulties to do so.

Diplomatic Minister Latham:

Anyway, I will discuss this with Ambassador Porter.

Reception Note

The UN Command has received the crew of the helicopter that was shot down in self-defense by the Joseon People's Army on 17 AUG 1969 as listed below.

Captain	David H. Crawford
Warrant Officer	Bernon Riffke
Corporal	Herman Edward Hoffsteter

The Military Armistice Commission
 Chief Delegation of the UN Command
 United States Marine Corps Major General
 Arthur H. Adams

Declaration of Major General Woodward, Chief Delegate of the Military Armistice Commission

The position of the United States Government with regard to the Pueblo, as consistently expressed in the negotiations at Panmunjeom talks in public, has been that the ship was not engaged in illegal activity, that there is no convincing evidence that the ship at any time intruded into the territorial waters claimed by North Korea, and that we could not apologize for actions which we did not believe took place. The document, which I am going to sign, was prepared by the North Koreans and is at variance with the above position, but my signature will not and cannot alter the facts.

I will sign the document to free the crew and only to free the crew.

Conversation Records of the Meeting between Director Ham of the Europe-America Bureau and Councilor Judd of the U. S. Embassy to South Korea

Date: 1969. 12. 5 330-4:10

Place: Office of the Europe-America Bureau

Subject: Matter of the Note from the U.S. Embassy regarding the so-called 'Statement of Apology' that Major General Adams had signed.

1. Position of our side

- (1) The note from the U.S. Embassy is necessary, just as in the Pueblo case last year.
- (2) Unlike last year, this declaration of Major General Adams has repudiated the whole paper, so, as a result, terms such as 'Sovereignty of the DPRK', 'Territorial Airspace', and 'Northern Part of the Peninsula' have not been contradicted.
- (3) As a new point at issue, the UN Command has become the counterpart. Under such circumstances, it looks like the UN Command as an organization of the UN, has accepted the claims of the North Korean puppet regime. The North Korean puppet regime can use these factors for the upcoming UN General Assembly.
- (4) A declaration of invalidity from the commander of the UNC could be one way to do it.

2. Response from the U. S. side

- (1) How about a note at the same level as last year? Of course, the permission of Ambassador Porter is required.
- (2)

-U. S. Military Helicopter Downning-

- 1. Date: 17 AUG 1969
- 2. Helicopter: U. S. Military OH-23 type Helicopter
- 3. Crew: 3
 David H. Crawford, Captain
 Malcom V Riffke, Warrant Officer
 Herman E. Hoffstetter, Corporal
- 4. Negotiations for release:
 6 rounds of closed meetings between Chief Delegates of the Military Armistice Commission have been held. (1st 8 SEP, 6th 2 DEC)
- 5. Date of Release: 3 DEC 1969 (109 days later)
- 6. Place of Incident:
 At 10:30 A.M., 17 AUG, an unarmed U.S. military OH-23 three-seater helicopter took off and headed toward the southern border of the DMZ for a training flight. At 11:00 A.M., the helicopter went missing after radioing, "lost direction. do not know the location. firing. hit. going down." All 3 were wounded.
- 7. Place of Release:
 They were released through the Panmunjeom on 3 DEC 1969, after 6 rounds of closed meetings between Chief Delegates of the Military Armistice Commission.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

No: WUS-1234

Date: 051030

To: Korean Ambassador to the United States.

From: Minister

According to the UPI report dated the 3rd, the U. S. State Department has announced that they made a 'false apology' in order to secure the release of 3 U.S. military helicopter crewmembers, and then invalidated the apology later on. Investigate and report the situations.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

No: USW-1270

Date: 051520

To: Minister

From: Korean Ambassador to the United States

Dae: WUS-1234

Yeon: USW-1234

1. Please refer the Yeon for the Dae and the declaration transferred through Yeon had been announced by the State Department simultaneously.
2. As clarified in the declaration, the U.S. side has repudiated the 'Statement of Apology' and has explained that the helicopter did not infiltrate intentionally, so there have been no criminal activities, and the signing of the 'Statement of Apology' was a humane standpoint in order to release them.

9. "North Korea's Provocation Incident, 1969"
(section #: 729.55, record #: 3146)

2) 31 OCT 1969: Current Situation of North Korean Puppet Regime's Armed Infiltrations Regarding South Korea.

1. Since Kim Il-sung, the so-called leader of the North Korean puppet regime, has urged the use of direct military activities to liberate South Korea during the 14th general assembly of 4th central committee in the labor party in October 1969, the scale and frequency of violations of the armistice truce have been rapidly increased. Therefore, the number of major incidents caused by military provocation of the North Korean puppet regime has increased 10-fold. In 1965 and 1966, there are 42 and 47, respectively, but in 1967 and 1968, there were 443 and 780. In 1965, 4 intruders from the North Korean puppet regime were killed and 18 were killed in 1966, but in 1967 and 1968, the numbers increased to 228 and 381. Since late 1966, the aspect of incidents has shown a new type that is totally different from previous ones. They have carried out precisely planned military provocations toward the Republic of Korea under the supreme political instructions from the North Korean puppet regime.

2. Several major incidents occurred in the beginning of 1968. On 21 JAN 1968, 31 commandos from the North Korean puppet regime attempted to attack the presidential residence on a mission to assassinate the president. The commandos were stopped by South Korean guards about 1,000 yards away from the presidential residence; 27 were killed and 1 has been captured. Two days later, on 23 JAN, even before the South Korean government and people cooled off from the anger about the brutality of the North Korean puppet regime, they illegally kidnapped the U.S.S. Pueblo. On 21 AUG, the North Korean puppet regime infiltrated on an armed boat with 14 spies aboard to Jeju Island, located in southern South Korea, but all but 2, who were captured, have been killed by South Korean guards. Between January and October last year, nearly 500 cases of major infiltration incidents have occurred, including a number of fire exchanges and deaths or captures of spies from the North Korean puppet regime. Between 30 OCT and 2 NOV, 120 commandos from the North Korean puppet regime have divided into 8 groups consisting of 15 men each and have landed on the east coast of the Republic of Korea by speedboats. During the mopping-up operations, military, police and homeland reserve forces have killed 107 and captured 7 with active cooperation from village people, peasants and fishermen.

3. The North Korean puppet regime was relatively quiet for 2-3 months in the beginning of 1969 but they have intensified their provocative activities.

On 15 MAR 1969, a work detail of the UN Command gave notice of the working contents and schedules to the North Korean puppet regime side according to the related clauses of the armistice truce of 1953, but they were fired upon by the North Korean puppet regime army while they were changing signs in the DMZ.

Around midnight on 16 MAR, 8 armed spies from the North Korean puppet regime landed at Port Jumunjin, located along the east coast of South Korea. They killed one police officer and attempted to kidnap another. They tried to escape in rubber boats but they have all been killed by the combined forces of police officers and homeland reserve forces, as they have mobilized according to the reports from women and civilians.

On 15 APR, the North Korean puppet regime shot down an unarmed U.S. military reconnaissance plane in international airspace 95 miles offshore, as they have disregarded basic principles of international law and gave no prior warning.

On 12 AUG 14:00, a speedboat of the North Korean puppet regime disguised as a fishing boat infiltrated the Wando shore, located to the south of Junranamdo. The speedboat had fired a machine gun at innocent fishing boats and killed 2 civilians and wounded 4. The infiltrators fled to the North after the piratical raid.

On 17 SEP 15:45, while a police patrol ship was executing a regular check-up near Wando, an unidentified vessel fired a machine gun at the patrol ship and fishing boats. This heavily armed vessel was an infiltration ship (about 50 tons) of the North Korean puppet regime disguised as a fishing boat, and as a result, 2 police officers, 2 civilians and 4 fishermen had been killed, and 2 fishermen were wounded.

On 20 SEP 20:00, onshore near Kunsan, Junrabukdo, Republic of Korea guards and homeland reserve forces engaged with 4 spies of the North Korean puppet regime. All 4 spies were killed and their ship, armed with 82mm recoilless rifles, machine guns and submachine guns, was captured.

On 23 SEP 22:00, a naval vessel of the Republic of Korea found an unidentified vessel cruising at high speed close to Imjido, near Mokpo Port. The vessel suddenly opened fire and fled to the west as the naval vessel was approaching to identify. The naval vessel chased and sunk the vessel near Huksando after 4 hours of pursuit.

4. The basic objectives of the North Korean puppet regime to carry out and intensify the provocative activities appear to be as follows:

- A. Promoting of social unrest and economic confusion through irregular warfare by armed guerrillas infiltrated from the north side.
- B. Searching and probing to ability and will to defend South Korea of the UN forces in South Korea.
- C. Obtaining excuses to carry out a full-scale war against South Korea by inducing retaliations from the South Korean and UN forces as well as to get Red China and the Soviet Union to intervene.
- D. Concealing their state of preparation for surprise attack as to disturb the information gathering regarding their activities.
- E. Avoiding the internal pressures from their own economic failure through the repetitive military provocations against the Republic of Korea.

5. As the government and people of the Republic of Korea are facing the threats against our freedom and independence, deep trust and confidence in the UN along with people and countries from all over the world is expected.

The decisive and prepared state of the UN member countries who love freedom and justice will help the North Korean puppet regime give up their plans for aggressive provocation of war and will contribute to establishing the peace and stability of the Far East and whole world.

Attachments

- 1. The North Korean puppet regime's basic strategy against the Republic of Korea
- 2. Current situation of the North Korean puppet regime's armed infiltration in 1969

Attachment: 1. The North Korean Puppet Regime's basic strategy against the Republic of Korea

1. Objectives and strategies

The ultimate objective of the North Korean puppet regime is the communized unification with South Korea. The North Korean puppet regime is driving the basic strategies as below in order to achieve such greed:

Promoting aggressive circumstances

- A. Scheming for estrangement between South Korea and the U.S. as well as the withdrawal of U. S. forces
- B. Weakening of military ability of South Korea
- C. Promoting of social unrest in South Korea
- D. Securing guerrilla bases
- E. Supporting revolutionary forces in South Korea

Fortification for revolution

- A. Instrumentalism of the whole land of North Korea, including the people, economy, social structure and organization, for military aggression against the Republic of Korea.
- B. Achievement of 7-year economic plan
- C. Reinforcement of capability for irregular warfare

2. Changes in provocative activities and patterns of infiltration to South Korea by the North Korean puppet regime

- A. As large-scale infiltration attempts to rear areas have failed, they have changed patterns to small-scale infiltrations with 1 to 3 guerrillas in waves to various areas.
- B. Previously, they used to focus on infiltration through the DMZ but, recently, they have changed the infiltration direction to rear

areas.

C. Previously, they used to infiltrate into remote villages but recently, they started to infiltrate to shore areas and remote islands. They are eager to gain conformity from students and laborers through underground organizations for anti-government activities.

D. Previously, infiltration strategies between the labor party and the reconnaissance bureau were totally different, but recently, both of them employ similar strategies, which include building underground organizations, kidnapping, murdering, and subversive activities.

3. Vicious infiltration operation styles

- A. The North Korean puppet regime is reinforcing the assaults on the GPs and other military facilities of the UN forces in DMZ.
- B. The North Korean puppet regime carries out the armed vessels' surprise firing on unarmed fishing boats and the artillery attacks on shores in South Korea.
- C. The instances of large-scale infiltration of armed guerrillas have been reduced but the number of cases of small-scale infiltration of armed guerrillas has increased.

4. Current situation of the armistice truce violations by the North Korean Puppet Regime.

Year	Number of cases of violation
1953 - 1967	5,957
1968	780
1969	266 (up to 25 SEP 1969)
Total	6,997

Cooperation Request

Subject: Reference request regarding provocations and aggressions of the North Korean puppet regime

To: Director of the Europe-America Bureau

From: Director of the Asia Bureau

1. On 22 MAY 1969, at the '3rd Foreign Ministers of Vietnam War-participating Nations Conference' held in Bangkok, the foreign ministers agreed with our government's intention to report progress situations regarding aggressions of the North Korean puppet regime to war participating nations and interested nations through ambassadors in Seoul.

2. Based on that, our bureau is planning a briefing and reference distribution regarding 'provocations and aggression situations of the North Korean puppet regime in 1969 and its prospects' to ambassadors in Seoul in early January 1970, so please prepare related references according to the instructions below:

- Below -

- A. Analysis and evaluation regarding provocations and aggressions of the North Korean puppet regime in 1969
- B. Contents regarding provocations and aggressions of the North Korean puppet regime in 1969 (in sequential order)
- C. Prospects and countermeasures against the provocations and the aggressions of the North Korean puppet regime in 1970

Drafting Form

Drafter: Park Yang-cheon, North America Section 2
 To: Minister of National Defense
 Re: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Head of Intelligence Department, Counterespionage Operations Headquarters)
 Subject: Request for reference forwarding

1. On 22 MAY 1969, at the '3rd Foreign Ministers of Vietnam War-participating Nations Conference' held on Bangkok, our government gained agreement from the foreign ministers about our intention to report progress regarding provocations of the North Korean puppet regime to war-participating nations and interested nations through ambassadors in Seoul

2. Based on that, our division is planning a briefing and reference distribution regarding 'provocations and aggression situations of the North Korean puppet regime in 1969 and its prospects' to ambassadors in Seoul in early January 1970, so please forward related references below:

- Below -

- A. Analysis and evaluation regarding provocations and aggressions of the North Korean puppet regime in 1969
 - B. Contents regarding provocations and aggressions of the North Korean puppet regime in 1969 (major stories only)
 - C. Prospects and counterplans against the provocations and the aggressions of the North Korean puppet regime in 1970
- /End/

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

1969. 12 19

To: Minister of National Defense
Re: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Head of Intelligence Department, Counterespionage Operations Headquarters)

1. On 22 MAY 1969, at the '3rd Foreign Ministers of Vietnam War-participating Nations Conference' held on Bangkok, our government gained agreement from the foreign ministers about our intention to report progress regarding provocations of the North Korean puppet regime to war-participating nations and interested nations through ambassadors in Seoul

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Minister of Foreign Affairs

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

1969. 12 19

To: Minister of National Defense
Re: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Head of Intelligence Department, Counterespionage Operations Headquarters)

1. On 22 MAY 1969, at the '3rd Foreign Ministers of Vietnam War-participating Nations Conference' held on Bangkok, our government gained agreement from the foreign ministers about our intention to report progress regarding provocations of the North Korean puppet regime to war-participating nations and interested nations through ambassadors in Seoul

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- B. Contents regarding provocations and aggressions of the North Korean puppet regime in 1969 (major stories only)
- C. Prospects and counterplans against the provocations and the aggressions of the North Korean puppet regime in 1970

Minister of Foreign Affairs

Cooperation Request

Subject: Forwarding of references

To: Director of the Asia Bureau

From: Director of the Europe-America Bureau

The following references are being forwarded as per your request in Aii 171:

Attachment: References 1 copy. /End/

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Authority MD 20080
By A NARA Date 4/2/64

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

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TO: The Secretary

THROUGH: S/S

FROM: EA - Marshall Green ^{mk}

SUBJECT: Your Participation in the Visit of President Park Chung Hee of the Republic of Korea August 21-22, 1969 - BRIEFING MEMORANDUM

President Park and his party will arrive by chartered aircraft at the Naval Air Station, Moffat Field, California, at 10:30 a.m. August 20 and will spend the day at Del Monte Lodge, Monterey.

August 21

-- Your first meeting with President Park will be at the official welcoming ceremony at the Presidio at 11:30 a.m.

-- Following the welcoming ceremony, President and Mrs. Nixon will receive the visiting party briefly at the Officers Club at the Presidio.

-- You are giving a luncheon in honor of President and Mrs. Park for approximately 300 guests at the Bohemian Club at 1:15 p.m. (Tab B)

-- You and Foreign Minister Choe will be co-chairmen of a ministerial level meeting at the St. Francis Hotel starting at 3:00 p.m. Attached to this memorandum are the Agenda (Tab H), Talking Points (Tab C), and a list of expected participants (Tab I). Biographic data on the principal Korean participants is shown in Tab J.

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BY S/S: CMS

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By	DA NARA Date 4/3/04

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-- President Nixon and President Park will have a private talk starting at 4:00 p.m. in the St. Francis Hotel. You and other advisors to the two Presidents will be asked to join the meeting at 5:30 p.m.

-- President Nixon is honoring President and Mrs. Park at a black tie dinner at the St. Francis Hotel at 8:00 p.m.

August 22

-- President Nixon will meet with President Park at the St. Francis Hotel at 10:00 a.m. Following the meeting the two Presidents will meet with the press.

-- President Park and his party are scheduled to leave the St. Francis Hotel at approximately 11:00 a.m.

-- You will depart with President Nixon for San Clemente.

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By *BJ* NARA Date *4/2/04*

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TALKING POINTS FOR MINISTERIAL LEVEL MEETINGS.

We have agreed with the ROKG on the subjects for discussions and on the agenda for the Ministerial Level Meetings outlined in Tab H. We have also agreed, however, that you and Foreign Minister Choe can be quite fluid in your handling of the subjects and the discussions. We envision this meeting as an opportunity for frank discussions on a number of problems, primarily security and defense, that are of concern to the ROKG and as an opportunity to give our best assessments of those problems.

The following talking points conform to the order of the Outline Agenda (Tab H):

A. Defense and Security of Korea

-- The Koreans will make a presentation on the defense and security of Korea. They will probably stress the need for continued and even increased U.S. military assistance (MAP) to strengthen and modernize the ROK armed forces so that they can meet the North Korean threat. They may refer to the ROK Armed Forces Development Objectives Plan (a five-year program recently presented to DOD and estimated by the Koreans to cost \$1.871 billion dollars), to counter-infiltration requirements (the Administration has been considering an \$88 million CI package), and to the need for an M-16 rifle production plant in Korea.

Secretary Packard and our Defense Department representatives at the meetings will carry the burden in responding on these subjects. Our positions are:

Military Assistance (MAP). We are conscious of the North Korean threat and of ROK defense needs and we plan to continue providing military assistance. Obviously, this must be done within the limits of the

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resources provided by Congress. One of the great problems is that only 20 percent of the annual MAP can be used for new hardware since 80 percent is required to sustain Operation and Maintenance costs.

It will be important for Korea to contribute all that it can to its own defense. For example, as Deputy Defense Secretary Packard pointed out in Seoul in June, if (despite the agreement in the Brown letter of March 4, 1966) Korea would take responsibility for items presently purchased with MAP dollars but locally available for local currency in Korea, about \$60 million annually would be freed for modernization hardware. (For example: \$6.5 million would buy 860 of the 2½ ton trucks you need; \$10 million would buy 20 of the UH-1 helicopters that you want; \$18 million would buy 18 more F-5 fighters.)

We have just received your Five Year Armed Forces Plan and will take full account of it.

Counter-infiltration. We have examined this question and continue to do so. Many questions arise. Is additional aid in that amount needed? Indications are that your defense against infiltration has been rather successful. If our resources are limited is this the best use of them in Korea? Would Congress vote the funds? It is true, of course, that the U.S. provided special amounts of assistance to meet counter-infiltration needs in 1968 (\$100 million supplemental appropriation and \$32 million service funded) -- in addition to large amounts of regular annual military assistance.

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M-16 Rifle Plant. Sharp differences in many aspects of this proposed project were revealed in July; we feel that much additional study of this project is required. We are pursuing these studies and will be in touch with ROK officials when they are completed. Deputy Secretary Packard has personally reviewed the project and feels that the costs would be much greater than earlier estimates indicated and that a considerably longer time than previously estimated will be required to establish the plant in Korea.

B. Viet-Nam

-- The U.S. military will present a 10 minute briefing on the military situation in Viet-Nam. This will be essentially the same presentation made at President Nixon's meeting with President Thieu at Midway Island. I suggest, and the Koreans expect, that you follow that with a statement of our assessment and outlook on the Paris talks.

The Koreans may raise the question of Korea's participation in the post hostilities situation in Viet-Nam.

-- You should be noncommittal on this subject. We are aware of the ROKG interest in this matter. It is mainly, however, an issue between Korea and Viet-Nam. We expect that Viet-Nam will want and need to maximize employment opportunities for Vietnamese.

C. Asia and the Pacific

-- I suggest, and the Koreans expect, that you make a ten or fifteen minute statement on U.S.

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policies in Asia. (If Dr. Kissinger attends the meetings, you may wish to call on him to add something to your remarks.)

D. Korean-U.S. Economic and Technical Cooperation

-- The Koreans will make a presentation on economic and technical cooperation. They will probably acknowledge that Korea is making great strides in economic development, but make a plea for continued U.S. assistance to get them over the top to a self-sustained economic growth. They may also stress the importance of exports to Korea's continued economic development and seek reassurance that U.S. import restrictions will not be imposed against ROK exports to the U.S.

You can refer to the background paper on economic assistance in the briefing book. We expect FY 1970 to be the last year of grant supporting assistance. No terminal dates have been set for development loans, technical assistance, and PL 480. On trade you can express our commitment to liberalization of world trade, but also note that textiles are a special problem in the U.S. Any import arrangements we might be forced to undertake would not cause a reduction of Korean exports to the U.S., but rather would limit the rate of future increases.

E. Korean Item in the UN

-- I suggest you make a brief presentation on the Korean item in the UN. You can draw on the background material on this contained in the

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By BA NARA Date 4/3/08

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briefing book. The situation regarding the Korean item in the UN, however, is changing daily. You will be provided with a further briefing paper on the day of the talks. Assistant Secretary Green will be prepared to assist in this discussion.

F. Other Questions

-- In the past, the Koreans have sought a U.S. commitment for annual ministerial meetings similar to those we have with Japan.

We have discouraged the Koreans on this possibility, and I suggest that you continue to be discouraging if the Koreans raise it at these meetings.

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Your Meeting with President Park
Chung Hee of Korea, August 21,
1969, 11:30 a.m.

President Park

Taciturn, aloof, lacking in charisma, President Park nevertheless has a "fire within him", a burning determination to keep his country moving. He completely dominates Koreans around him, not least because he has intensively studied every civil and military problem which Korea faces. Having served as his country's Chief Executive since 1961, he announced on July 25 his decision to proceed with the highly controversial proposal to amend the Constitution to permit him to serve a third term. Despite the strains of office, the President seems calm, but careful observers have detected signs of tension which can be expected to increase as the 1971 election campaign approaches.

The Setting

President Park's visit will follow several high level contacts between Korean officials and the new U.S. Administration, including Secretary Rogers' discussion with top Korean officials in Seoul on

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GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12 year intervals;
not automatically declassified

TOP SECRET/NODIS Addendum

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August 1. The emergence of significant new policy issues is not likely. The visit's importance is rather in the opportunity it affords for you to establish a personal relationship with President Park, and to have a direct exchange with him, particularly regarding Viet-Nam and your policies in Asia. You will recall the genesis of this meeting in May in relation to Viet-Nam.

Koreans are apprehensive that emerging U.S. policy for Asia heralds a general reduction of U.S. involvement in defense of East Asian countries. Policy in Viet-Nam, particularly "unilateral" withdrawal, is seen as the forerunner of disengagement. This accentuates a Korean concern -- always close to the surface -- that the U.S. may withdraw troops from Korea and leave the ROK alone without forces and modern equipment equal to those of North Korea. This foreboding possibility looms at a time when the Pueblo capture, the EC-121 incident, and the continuing infiltration effort confirm to them the basic intention of North Korea to unify the country under communist rule, by force if necessary.

Koreans are also concerned that the U.S. will impose trade restrictions and impair the Republic's tremendous economic growth of recent years which President Park recognizes to be as important as military strength.

The visit occurs at a time of tension in Korea's domestic political situation, precipitated by President Park's July 25 announcement of a decision to proceed on the highly controversial issue of amendment of the Constitution permitting him to seek election to a third term. Although President Park and his party almost certainly will not raise

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this subject during discussions with U.S. officials, he undoubtedly expects that his meeting with you will favor his case in the eyes of the Koreans. President Park's re-election is by no means assured, but there is a strong possibility that he will remain in a position of dominating influence whether in the Presidency or officially outside the government.

The North Koreans may try to stage an incident or a series of incidents (five erupted on the night of August 9 on the DMZ) to divert attention from the San Francisco meeting, to cast doubt on the strength and legitimacy of the Seoul government, and to draw international attention to the existence of a communist regime in Pyongyang.

Outstanding Issues

On the American side:

a. Will the ROK assume a reasonable and increasing share of its defense burden as its economic strength continues to grow?

b. The Seoul government has been more inflexible than Pyongyang in its refusal to consider contacts with North Koreans or any measure which would tend to lower the level of tension and hostility in the Korean peninsula. North Korea, which has proposed among other things postal exchanges and meetings in the DMZ of separated families, has a better public record in this regard.

On the Korean side:

a. Will the U.S. become more reluctant to maintain or meet its defense commitments to Free Asia, particularly the Republic of Korea, or will it reduce its effective capability to meet commitments?

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b. Will the U.S. continue military assistance at levels adequate to assure that ROK forces are as modernized and well equipped as the forces of North Korea -- of course, for defensive rather than offensive purposes?

c. What are the implications of U.S. policy on Viet-Nam for the future defense of Korea?

d. Will the U.S. impose import restrictions on ROK exports which will be prejudicial to continued growth of the Korean economy, and particularly the ROK's ability to service its external debt?

U.S. Objectives

-- To assure that the ROK continues to support U.S. policies in Asia, and especially current policy for Viet-Nam.

-- To assure the ROK that we continue to have both the intention and the capability to meet our defense commitment to Korea, and to show that we share Korean concern with North Korean belligerence.

-- To assure continued restraint by the ROK in reacting to North Korean provocations.

-- To obtain ROK understanding that U.S. domestic problems, both economic and political, limit the ability of the U.S. to import without restraint and limit the size of economic and military assistance programs.

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-- To stimulate President Park to examine if there is anything which might be done to lower the level of tension and hostility in the Korean peninsula.

ROK Objectives

-- To obtain a restatement from you, in the light of your Administration's Asian policy and Viet-Nam developments, of the U.S. commitment to the defense of Korea and of U.S. intention to retain a strong military presence in Asia.

-- To obtain promises of additional military assistance in magnitudes which will modernize the weapons and equipment of the ROK forces to a level at least equal to those of North Korea.

-- To obtain assurances that the U.S. will not impose import restrictions which would adversely affect ROK exports to the U.S. and the Korean growth rate.

-- To obtain a U.S. commitment to retain U.S. forces in Korea and perhaps even increase their numbers.

-- To obtain U.S. support for post-hostilities employment in Viet-Nam (at U.S. expense) of large numbers of Koreans discharged there.

-- To induce the U.S. to place new U.S. bases in Korea, particularly if U.S. bases in Japan and especially Okinawa are lost or their use is excessively circumscribed.

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Proposed Accomplishments

-- We want to convey to the Korean public a renewed assurance of close ties between the U.S. and the ROK, and renewed assurance of our intention to assist as necessary in defense of the Republic. We want the North Koreans to get the same message.

We want President Park and his party:

-- To have a full and sympathetic understanding of our outlook and our policy for Viet-Nam and the Paris negotiations.

-- To have a full and sympathetic understanding of your views on policy for Asia.

-- To feel assured that the U.S. remains loyal to its defense commitments to the ROK, and shares Korean concern with respect to the belligerent acts and attitude of North Korea.

-- To understand that we will expect Korea to assume an increasing share of responsibility for its defense as its economic strength continues to grow.

-- To understand that if the U.S. does not always fully meet ROK expectations regarding military and economic assistance, that does not imply any lessening of our interest or commitment. We must, of course, meet our commitments within the framework of our own very considerable domestic political and economic problems and our other worldwide obligations.

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In pursuing these objectives we should avoid any statements or action which would inadvertently appear to constitute an endorsement of President Park personally in the highly controversial domestic issue involving amendment of the Constitution and a possible third term for President Park. We will want the Koreans to recognize that we regard the meeting as one concerned with important issues of common concern and above partisan political contention.

William P. Rogers

Enclosure:
Talking Paper.

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TALKING POINTS

I suggest that you:

-- Outline Viet-Nam developments, including the Paris negotiations, emphasizing the importance we attach to continued ROK support for U.S. policy in Viet-Nam.

The Koreans remain concerned that we will make excessive concessions to Hanoi. In a U.S. News and World Report interview about to be published, President Park seemed more optimistic. He said he does not believe the U.S. is going to pull out of Viet-Nam regardless of communist actions. Korean public comment, however, including editorial comment, is far more bearish, and President Park's observation may have been tailored to the U.S. audience and his forthcoming meeting with you.

-- Give President Park a thorough exposition of your views on policies for Asia.

-- Reassure President Park that we can and will meet our defense commitments to Korea, showing particularly that we share Korean concern about North Korean belligerence.

-- Urge continued restraint by the ROK in reacting to North Korean provocations.

The Koreans have responded to our restraint in exemplary fashion for some time, but more out of dependence and loyalty to the U.S.-ROK alliance than out of conviction.

-- Congratulate President Park on the vigor of Korea's economic growth and on the skill and dedication of the Korean people in economic development.

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President Park is likely to say that rapid achievement of industrial goals is an essential ingredient to ROK defense, and that the U.S. should take no step which would impair economic growth.

-- Say frankly that constraints are imposed by U.S. domestic economic and political problems on the ability of the U.S. to import without restraint, and on the size of economic and military assistance programs. Observe that we understand and expect that as Korea's independent strength grows it will want to assume, and should assume, an increasing share of responsibility for its own defense.

President Park may agree politely, but is likely to ask for favored import and assistance treatment because of the "special relationship" between the ROK and the U.S.

-- On a very tentative basis, in pursuit of a delicate subject for the Koreans, wonder aloud whether there is anything which might be done to try to begin to lower the level of tension and hostility in the Korean peninsula. You recognize the problem of Korea as one of the world's most intractable, but also one of the most dangerous. The important strengths, however, lie on the side of the Seoul government -- more than double North Korea's population, a vigorous and growing economy, the institutions of a free society. These are more powerful and more insidious than communist assets, even their covert activities. Need the Republic fear the falsehoods of communist propaganda and communist contacts? Contact or a dialogue might therefore be far more advantageous to the ROK than to the communist North. Something of this kind

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might offer more promise at a time when the U.S.S.R. and Communist China are in a period of conflict. You are not proposing anything concrete, but only asking if any initiatives might be taken which would open contact on the one hand and perhaps expose the weaknesses of the communist North on the other. Would he think about it for a few months and give you his views later. The subject will not be raised at the ministerial level or publicly. You realize the public sensitivity of the question in Korea.

President Park will probably:

-- Press you for a restatement, in light of evolving Viet-Nam policy, of the U.S. commitment to assist in the defense of Korea and of U.S. intention to retain a strong military presence in Asia.

You can be generally reassuring on this point.

-- Seek promises of additional military assistance, pleading a need for replacement of outworn equipment (trucks, weapons, communications equipment). He may refer to a new Five Year Armed Forces Development and Objectives Plan just received by our military officials from the ROK Defense Ministry.

We are conscious of the North Korean threat and of ROK defense needs and we plan to continue providing military assistance. Obviously, this must be done within the limits of the resources provided by Congress. One of the great problems is that only 20 percent of the annual MAP can be used for new hardware since 80 percent is required to sustain Operation and Maintenance costs.

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It will be important for Korea to contribute all that it can to its own defense. For example, as Deputy Defense Secretary Packard pointed out in Seoul in June, if (despite the agreement in the Brown letter of March 4, 1966) Korea would take responsibility for items presently purchased with MAP dollars but locally available for local currency in Korea, about \$60 million annually would be freed for modernization hardware. (For example: \$6.5 million would buy 860 of the 2½ ton trucks you need; \$10 million would buy 20 of the UH-1 helicopters that you want; \$18 million would buy 18 more F-5 fighters.)

We have just received your Five Year Armed Forces Plan and will take full account of it.

-- Ask if the U.S. is planning to provide additional MAP for the counter-infiltration effort. (Word has leaked to the Koreans that a special supplemental request of about \$100 million -- the actual amount is \$88 million -- for this purpose has been considered.)

We have examined this question and continue to do so. Many questions arise. Is additional aid in that amount needed? Indications are that your defense against infiltration has been rather successful. If our resources are limited is this the best use of them in Korea? Would Congress vote the funds? It is true, of course, that the U.S. provided special amounts of

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assistance to meet counter-infiltration needs in 1968 (\$100 million supplemental appropriation and \$32 million service funded) -- in addition to large amounts of regular annual military assistance.

-- Seek a U.S. commitment to retain U.S. forces in Korea and perhaps even increase their numbers.

We have no plan at the present time to reduce or withdraw U.S. forces from Korea, but this question should be kept under continuous review. We would not undertake anything of that sort in any event without consulting with the ROK Government. In the wake of the Pueblo incident we substantially augmented the UNC military posture in Korea with about 150 aircraft of the U.S. Air Force.

-- Ask for reassurance that U.S. import restrictions will not be imposed against ROK exports to the U.S.

We appreciate and understand the importance of exports to the ROK's continued growth. You have expressed your commitment to liberalization of world trade, but you have also noted that textiles are a special problem in the U.S. The import arrangements that Secretary Stans discussed with the ROK would not cause any reduction of exports to the U.S., but rather would limit the rate of future increase.

-- Urge you to support the ROK in its proposal to establish an integrated steel mill in Korea.

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President Park is aware of our doubts that this project would be a wise investment. Our readiness to consider financial support would be influenced by an IBRD review of Korea's steel requirements, the impact of this investment upon Korea's external debt problems, and priorities for other economic development needs.

President Park may:

-- Request speedy U.S. action on the establishment of an M-16 plant in Korea.

As you agreed when sharp differences in many aspects of this proposed project were revealed in July, we feel that much additional study of this project is required. We are pursuing these studies and will be in touch with ROK officials when they are completed. Deputy Secretary Packard has personally reviewed the project and feels that the costs would be much greater than earlier estimates indicated and that a considerably longer time than previously estimated would be required to establish the plant in Korea.

-- Try to obtain assurances of U.S. support for Korean participation in Viet-Nam reconstruction after hostilities end, particularly employment of Koreans discharged there.

You should be noncommittal on this subject. We are aware of the ROKG interest in this matter. It is mainly, however, an issue between Korea and Viet-Nam. We expect that Viet-Nam will want and need to maximize employment opportunities for Vietnamese.

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-- Express concern regarding the Korean Item at the UNGA this year, particularly on seating the North Koreans.

As President Park knows, we would prefer to avoid debate on this item this year and are glad that the ROKG agrees. We recognize, however, that friends of North Korea may inscribe the Korean Question for debate. We will be prepared to handle the issues as before, if necessary, and we foresee no significant change in the outcome on the main substantive question. (If Korean officials press you on the seating question, you could acknowledge that this issue will undoubtedly be the most difficult to handle. We are, of course, consulting closely with your Observer Mission in New York, as we have in the past, on the best tactical handling.)

-- Try to induce you to agree to place new bases in Korea, particularly if bases in Japan are lost or their use greatly circumscribed.

We have no plan to place new bases in Korea. Our current negotiations with Japan are concerned with the status of Okinawa and do not involve any change in the number of U.S. bases in Japan and Okinawa.

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ADDENDUM

TALKING POINT ON U.S. TROOP REDUCTIONS IN VIET-NAM

President Park has been informed that after the completion of our review of possible timetables for reduction of U.S. forces in Viet-Nam (NSSM-36), we intend to consult with the ROK and the other TCC's concerning our own force reductions and the relationship to them of reductions in TCC forces in Viet-Nam. (We tentatively plan to hold these consultations in late September or October when the TCC Foreign Ministers are in New York for the UNGA.) He has also been told that we will inform him in advance of the timing and size of our next tranche of troop reductions.

President Park has expressed his concurrence in this procedure and has asked for as much advance notice as possible on the next announcement of troop reductions. The Koreans have stated publicly and privately they intend to maintain forces in Viet-Nam so long as the GVN requires them.

President Park can be counted to keep secret any information you give him in confidence, though the same cannot be said of other members of his staff, particularly his Foreign Minister.

We recommend that you tell President Park your intentions regarding the next announcement on troop reductions and explain to him your view on troop reductions over the longer term. We suggest you thank him for his statement that ROK forces will remain in Viet-Nam so long as the GVN needs them and reiterate that we expect to discuss with the ROK this fall the details of the relationship between our troop reductions and those of the other TCC's.

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Background PaperKOREAN FORCES IN VIET-NAMSummary:

The ROK has 50,000 men in its field forces in Viet-Nam organized into two army divisions, one marine brigade, and support elements. The ROK reportedly intends to keep troops in Viet-Nam and considers that ROK contributions entitle it to a major voice in the conduct of the war and the settlement of the conflict.

Discussion:

The Capital (Tiger) Division (two regiments) and the 2d ROK Marine Brigade landed in Viet-Nam in October 1965. Among the key measures taken in support of the ROK decision was the suspension of the MAP transfer program and approval of MAP offshore procurement from Korea for previously scheduled MAP transfer items. In February 1966, the Prime Minister of the Republic of Viet-Nam requested the ROK to dispatch additional combat troops. On March 3, 1966, the ROK Minister of National Defense sought legislative approval for the deployment. Despite strong objections from opposition parties, the National Assembly approved the deployment on

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March 30, 1966. In April 1966, a regimental combat team to round out the Capital Division was sent to Viet-Nam. By September 1966, the 9th (White Horse) Division had also joined the forces there. In mid-1967 the ROK augmented its forces by 3,000 men, bringing the total of ROK forces in Viet-Nam to about 50,000.

As of July 10, 1969, there were 50,343 ROK troops in Viet-Nam organized into the previously mentioned two divisions and marine brigade, a logistical command, a mobile surgical hospital, a construction support group and a transportation support group. The 2d ROK Marine Brigade is based west of Hoi An, the Capital (Tiger) Division is based near Qui Nhon, and the 9th (White Horse) Division is based west of Cam Ranh Bay. ROK forces casualties from 1965 to July 1969 number 2,669 killed in action and 5,397 wounded in action.

President Park is reported to have said on August 5, 1969, in an interview with the US News and World Report that ROK's would remain in Viet-Nam until requested to leave by the GVN or until an honorable peace is achieved.

The Koreans are proud of their contribution to the struggle in Viet-Nam and expect that contribution to entitle them to special consideration by the US Government in the military, political, and economic aspects of the conflict or the ensuing peace.

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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ACTION
August 20, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger
SUBJECT: Your Meetings with President Park

1. Schedule: Your schedule is at Tab A. You will greet President Park at the Presidio and accompany him to the St. Francis Hotel, where you will have a private meeting at 4:00 p.m. (The advisers' meetings will be held separately, and they will join you and President Park at the close of your meeting.) You will see President Park again at dinner, and will have a 45-minute farewell session with him the following day. Section II contains Secretary Rogers' memorandum to you on the visit and related background material.

2. Background:

a. ROK Concerns About U.S. Policy. More than any Asian leadership other than the Republic of China, the ROK likes the old "hard" line on Communism. The ROK reaction has been dubious or critical about your troop withdrawal from Vietnam, your recent China policy initiative, your lines concerning the new phase of "negotiations" and the need for Asian countries to take more of the responsibility for their own defense. In all of those initiatives, the ROK sees a possible diminution of U.S. support. The ROK remains seriously, and legitimately, concerned at the threat of North Korean aggression. Kim Il-Sung still openly proclaims his intention to re-unify Korea, and he is sustaining a campaign of military provocation, infiltration and attempted subversion against the ROK.

① ✓ The ROK was much put out at the mildness of the U.S. reaction to the Pueblo seizure, and less stridently unhappy over our handling of the EC-121 incident (concerning which President Park wrote to you on April 26, warning that North Korea would be emboldened to take more dramatic actions unless we took further and tougher countermeasures).

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② b. ROK exports and the textile problem. A 40 percent annual rise in exports, principally textiles, has been a dramatic feature of the Korean "economic miracle." Imports are still twice exports, however, and are covered only by AID and by invisibles such as remittances from Korean soldiers and civilian workers in Vietnam. The U.S. desire to limit textile imports strikes at the heart of Korean export efforts.

c. "The MAP transfer" problem. Our mutual interest in modernizing the ROK armed forces falls afoul of the circumstance that almost all of our current MAP program goes for expenditures in Korea. Since they impose no drain on Korean foreign exchange resources, we were working with the Koreans on a "MAP transfer" program, whereby the ROK picked up an increasing proportion, thus freeing U.S. MAP funds for modernization. As part of the deal under which the Koreans sent forces to Vietnam, we promised that we would not require the ROK to assume this burden. At some point, and particularly if we are to get maximum effect from an expanded MAP program, we shall need to address ourselves again to this process of persuading the Koreans to pick up more of the tab, as their economic situation improves.

d. Third Term Constitutional Amendment. Park wants to continue on as President and on July 25 called for the National Assembly to proceed with a highly controversial proposal to amend the constitution to permit him to serve a third term. This announcement affected the context of his visit here, by creating an opportunity for him to make it appear that your dealings with him constitute an endorsement of his bid for a third term. President Park more likely than not will win the amendment and re-election, but the struggle may become embittered, and Park's image and his style of governing may change as a result of the controversy.

3. What President Park will Want:

We have been told that Park wishes to discuss Vietnam, U.S. Asian Policy, and ROK security. He is undoubtedly concerned that emerging U.S. Asian policy will involve a reduction of the U.S. involvements in defense of East Asian countries, and may lead to reduction of U.S. forces in Korea and of U.S. military support to the ROK. President Park will be seeking answers to the following questions:

a. Vietnam. How fast does the U.S. plan to go? Would it withdraw troops even if this involved a reduction in security in Vietnam?

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b. U.S. Asian Policy. Park will probe to learn whether your new Asian policy does not actually involve a reduction in U.S. willingness to support Asian countries with military aid and to come to their defense if necessary. He will be concerned also about the North Korean and Communist Chinese reading of the new U.S. policy, and the consequent implications for his own security.

c. ROK Security. Park will probably make a strong pitch, perhaps along the lines of his April 26 letter, to the effect that the mildness of our behavior has increased the chances of North Korean aggression, and that he needs more military assistance and a tightened and more automatic U.S. defense commitment. He may cite the need for:

- modern aircraft to deal with MIG 21's.
- an expanded U.S./ROK counterinfiltration (CIGFIR) program to deal with North Korean infiltration.
- the continued presence of two U.S. divisions in Korea.
- (possibly) other military equipment, and/or a facility to produce M-16 rifles.

d. U.S. Textile Restraints. Park may make a general presentation of Korea's need to export to the U.S., and seek minimum U.S. restrictions on textile imports from Korea.

e. A Steel Mill for Korea. President Park is personally obsessed with the need for a modern, integrated steel mill. AID and the World Bank both have reservations as to its economic justification. Given the strength of his feeling, Park may possibly seek your favorable consideration for AID support to the steel mill.

f. Cheju-Do. Park may offer to make the Korean island of Cheju-Do available for a U.S. military base free of the restraints which will limit the use of Okinawa after reversion.

4. What We Want:

- a. Public Impression. You want to reassure Park and the Korean public that the United States:

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- values its alliance with Korea and will honor its commitment to assist in the defense of the Republic against aggression,
- recognizes the fact of North Korean belligerence.
- intends to continue to cooperate in maintaining and as necessary improving the ROK defense and counterinfiltration capability.

You will want the North Korean leaders to get the same message.

You will be endeavoring to promote the Korean sense of national self-confidence in its ability to deal with Korea's problems. (Economic self-confidence is growing almost too fast, but the ROK still displays a marked lack of confidence in its competition with North Korea.)

b. Private Message. Beyond the points above, you will want Park to understand that we expect the ROK to assume an increasing share of the burden of its own defense, as its economic condition improves.

You will also be trying to convince him that the new direction of your Asian policy does not portend a weakened resolve to resist Communist expansionism, and if possible to lead him to believe that, over time, Korea's own interests will be served by a situation in which the U.S. can deal with all Communist countries on the basis of reciprocity.

5. Points You Should Stress:

(There has been serious flooding in Korea this summer, with some 200 deaths and 20,000 houses damaged or destroyed. You may wish to begin your remarks with an expression of sympathy.)

a. Vietnam.

- You remain committed to an honorable settlement which permits a true choice by the South Vietnamese.
- The GVN and the U.S. have gone about as far as we should go. We believe it is up to the other side now to respond.

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- You have no particular interest in conciliating Hanoi. If no negotiation seems possible, you intend to re-examine our whole policy of negotiation.
- You are keeping the possibility of a further reduction of U.S. combat troops under review. Your decision will depend upon the GVN ability to fill the gap, the progress of negotiations at Paris, and the level of hostilities in Vietnam.
- The U.S. Government will be in touch with the ROK concerning any further decisions on troop withdrawals. (The ROK Foreign Ministry has pressed us for consultations in advance.)
- The ROK is making a substantial contribution to free world defense in Asia by its participation in Vietnam. This evidence that Asian nations themselves are making sacrifices to meet the Communist threat is one of the best arguments you have at home for continuing our efforts.

b. U.S. Asian Policy

- You wish to underline a point which the press has frequently ignored: That in describing your thoughts on ASIA, you have underlined our intention to continue to meet our commitments.
- You have been impressed by the remarkable growth of non-communist Asia in recent years. Economic growth, national pride, the development of governmental institutions and public confidence.
- Asian Communism has no such record. It has fallen behind and has lost most of its appeal in Asia.
- Communist military power remains formidable, and that is one reason you believe the U.S. should continue to play a role in Asia.
- Moreover, Communist subversion techniques are highly developed. You believe that these can best be met by the Asian Governments' development of broad social programs and counterinsurgency techniques fitted to their own situation, but you expect to assist and support them in this effort.

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-- By holding out the prospect that Communist China could benefit from more moderate policies and less hostility toward its neighbors, we may slowly induce the Chinese to move in that direction, particularly if they find direct aggression too risky and the support of subversion unprofitable. With China and the USSR in a state of mutual tension, there is some hope that the Chinese may decide to take a less bellicose stand against their non-Communist neighbors.

-- ~~You are not interested in any US/USSR "condominium" against Communist China.~~

c. South Korea/North Korea relations

-- You do not foresee any substantial change in relations on the Korean Peninsula ~~for the~~ foreseeable future.

-- You would like to have President Park's opinion on this.

-- You understand that the North Koreans since the 1950's have had a propaganda advantage in seeming to be more confident than the ROK by proposing postal exchanges, reunions among families, and so on. Given the ROK's remarkable recent performance and the slow-down in North Korean growth, the thought has arisen very tentatively in your mind that the ROK could profitably take the initiative by proposing steps in this direction. The North Koreans would probably back away from any actual South Korean proposals, and at the least the ROK would have demonstrated the falsity of their propaganda. Over the longer term, the ROK might possibly succeed in introducing some new and unsettling thoughts across the Iron Curtain. (NOTE: You would need to approach this thought very tentatively and privately, but it might prove useful in planting the seeds of a less timid ROK position in President Park's mind.)

d. The U.S./ROK Alliance.

-- You wish to underline the close ties between our countries and the constancy of the U.S. commitment toward the defense of Korea.

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- You agree that North Korean bellicosity represents a serious continuing problem which we must continue to plan together to meet.
 - You anticipate that MAP will remain at least at the levels of the recent past. (With supplementals and special non-MAP expenditures, our level of military AID to Korea has risen since the Pueblo incident.) You understand that rifles and cold weather gear are being made available to outfit militia and contribute to the counterinsurgency program. We are going ahead with a squadron of F-4 aircraft for the ROK.
 - In principle, you believe that there should be an increase in MAP for Korea, but the final shape of MAP program for this year has not been determined. We shall be giving it further consideration and will be consulting with the Koreans. (NOTE: You will be addressing a proposal for \$88 million in additional MAP, when the NSC meets on NSSM 27.)
 - At some point, you believe that the two sides should consider the nature of the MAP program. As the Korean economy flourishes, it should be in a position to pick up more of the operating and maintenance costs, thus freeing MAP funds for modernization and other purchases in the U.S. You hope that our two governments will be in further consultation on this question.
 - You wish to make clear that as we negotiate our military cooperation, we are keeping in mind the need to assure that, while Korea does everything that it legitimately can, our own aid remains adequate to enable Korea to meet the threat.
- e. Korean Achievements in Economic Development:
- As you made clear in welcoming President Park, we regard Korea's economic growth as a heartening example of Korean determination and of the results which can result from the imaginative uses of U.S. aid.
 - Our specialist will, of course, be looking to the time when aid will have finished its role. "Graduation" from the category of aid recipient will undoubtedly be a matter of pride to Korea, too.

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- We do not intend to rush into that decision under circumstances which would imperil the Korean economy.
- You believe that the Koreans have been wise in their very active pursuit of exports, and in turning to international lending institutions for more and more of the project aid.

f. Textiles. (Do not use unless Park raises.)

- You are dedicated to eliminating hinderances on international trade.
- The textile industry represents a special case which poses particular problems for you. It is a large employer in areas where alternative employment is frequently lacking, and an important source of employment for minority groups.
- We have come to believe that an effort to set up multilateral controls on the textile trade could cause problems for our allies. We will, however, be discussing a bilateral arrangement with the Koreans, at appropriate levels.
- The intent is not to close out the American market to Korean textiles, but to provide for an orderly and moderate long-term growth in the trade. It is to regulate the increase, not to bring about a decrease of textile imports.

g. Regional Cooperation.

- You believe that ASPAC represents a most promising beginning in Asian regional cooperation.
- You wish to congratulate the ROK for having set the idea in motion.
- The U.S., of course, does not play a direct role, but we wish ASPAC well and believe that it will be successful as a forum on economic and political subjects and as a means of reconciling differences among Asian nations.

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TOP SECRET/EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Date: August 21, 1969
Time: 1615-1815 hours
Place: St. Francis Hotel,
San Francisco

SUBJECT: Talks Between President Nixon and
President Pak

PARTICIPANTS: President Richard Nixon
President Pak of the Republic of Korea
Mr. Sang Ho Cho (Korean Interpreter)
Mr. Victor Lee (U. S. Interpreter)

President Nixon: Before we go into a detailed discussion today, I would like to explain a few items on my new policy toward Korea. Kim Il-Song's regime is one of the most aggressive and unreasonable Communist countries in the world. As you recall, the Pueblo incident occurred before I took over the Presidency. During my election campaign, I noted that to give a warning to North Korea once is sufficient. If North Korea provokes another provocative incident, we will react, are prepared to react and will take measures harsher than the enemy provocation. This message was given to the Soviet Ambassador in the U. S. and I believe it was conveyed to North Korea.

Now I would like to elaborate on my new policy toward Asia. The press overlooked my statement to the effect that the U. S. will fulfill its treaty obligations with the Asian countries concerned. We will honor the U. S. -ROK Defense Treaty. What we must think over is what would be the best way to keep these commitments. We have relaxed our travel restrictions and purchases with regard to Communist China, but we regard Communist China as an aggressive nation. U. S. policy toward Communist China has not changed, and we will not admit the country into the U. N. It is also necessary in this connection to pay attention to the Sino-Soviet conflict. As you know, the Soviet Union has not helped us in solving the issues concerning Communist China, North Korea, the Vietnam War and the Middle East. It is also one of the countries which provide military aid to North Korea.

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E.O. 12958, as amended, Sect 3.5
NND 02-5-11 per Hr. 14 Sep. 07
By [signature] Date 13 Oct 07 [p. 1 of 7]

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We cannot cooperate with the Soviet Union without the latter's reciprocal acts. Under these circumstances, a collective security with the Soviets against Communist China is meaningless. It is first necessary for the Soviets to act with sincerity.

I believe that the non-Communist countries located on the periphery of Communist China must be strengthened since they are threatened by Communist China, North Korea and North Vietnam. The Soviet Union will also become a greater threat than now if it is left alone.

Now with regard to Vietnam, we are aware of various efforts made by the ROK in South Vietnam. We are withdrawing our troops from SVN when we think that the South Vietnamese have built the ability to replace them. As we informed you in advance, I agreed with President Thieu at Midway to withdraw 25,000 troops. During my recent talks with him, we decided to replace more troops in August, but we have been withholding taking the measure due to the enemy offensive of two weeks ago. Probably within about 10 days, President Thieu, General Abrams and other leaders concerned will talk over the subject again. We will inform you in advance the number and time of these troop withdrawals, which will be carried out as long as they do not affect our combat capabilities.

In regard to the Paris talks, I just had a talk with Ambassador Lodge today, who informed me that there has been no progress. As you know, November 1 is the first anniversary of our bombing halt. If I had been the President last November, I would not have halted the bombing. This is just between us; if there is no further progress in the Paris talks, we will re-evaluate the situation about October 15.

I believe that your government's efforts toward military and economic self-reliance are the correct road to take. I hope that other countries in Asia will follow suit. It is necessary for the U.S. to continue to play a great role in Asia. I think that economic and military aid to those countries like the ROK which make self-reliance efforts should be continued. The self-reliance remarks you made this morning (at the Presidio of San Francisco), I think, were good ones for American public opinion to consume. As a private citizen and government official, I travelled a great deal in the Pacific region. I can assure you that we will not retreat from the Pacific area and we will not reduce our commitments, but I think we need intelligent policy, by giving aid to the countries who attempt to help themselves. I have just made a general statement. Do you have any questions on such subjects as military equipment and economic development?

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President Pak: I appreciate hearing your firm policy toward the ROK, Asia in general and the Communist Bloc. I would like to make my views clear on these subjects. As you know, Kim Il-Song during the past ten years or so has almost completed war preparations to unify the country by force. He is looking for an opportunity to invade the South. He has not done so because of the U.S. commitments to the ROK and the presence of American troops in our country. Kim will provoke a war if he believes that this American policy toward the ROK is going to change or has changed. Kim's objective in making various provocations is to have American troops stationed in the ROK withdraw as they have done in South Vietnam, alienate the ROK from the U.S. and have the U.S. not intervene when anything happens in Korea. The strengthening of ROK defense would check these provocations of Kim and have him give up the idea of invading the South by force. A way to achieve this objective is to strengthen the equipment and combat capability of the ROK forces rather than to strengthen U.S. forces in South Korea, to the extent that the ROK can singlehandedly resist North Korean invasion, since the U.S. has various commitments all over the world.

President Nixon: If the Soviets or the Chinese invade the ROK, it will be a different ball game. Since you were in the military, I would like to elaborate a little on my decision on the establishment of the ABM network. According to our intelligence, Communist China will have 25 to 50 ICBM's by 1976 which can hit targets in the U.S. We now have about 1,000 but without the ABM network a nuclear-armed China might be able to use nuclear blackmail against non-nuclear countries in Asia and pose a danger to the U.S. That is why this subject is so important for the defense and security of the Free World.

President Pak: To continue my views, the Korean War, anti-guerrilla operations (in the ROK) and Vietnamese War have been carried well with U.S. aid. Concerning Korea, I do not think you have to worry about the Korean problem if our equipment is further strengthened. I believe that we can meet North Korean threats without increasing the present level of U.S. forces in South Korea if (military) equipment is strengthened.

President Nixon: In this connection, we are now studying sympathetically the MAP and other proposals your side has made following Mr. Packard's recent visit to your country. I am aware of the fact that some of the ROK units are equipped with weapons of World War II.

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President Pak: I appreciate your explanation of the so-called Nixon doctrine on Asia. I agree in principle with your new policy, especially on the aspect of having those countries which have relied on the U. S. since the end of World War II try to help themselves. Some Asians, however, are apprehensive because of their misconception and misunderstanding of your policy, believing that the U. S. intends to wash its hands of Asia, leaving Asian problems to the Asians themselves. They will naturally dispel this apprehension when they fully understand your new policy. It will be necessary for us to give guidelines and study methods of gradually decreasing the U. S. burdens so as to have these Asian countries able to defend themselves. In this connection, I would like to have the U. S. guide various countries of Asia so they can share the responsibility and burdens in accordance with their respective ability. At present, some countries are sharing excessive burdens beyond their ability and vice versa. The Republic of Korea and Japan are good examples. Korea is not only divided but also is a developing country. Japan, despite its strong economy, is hardly carrying its share of the burdens in Asia. The Japanese are even trying to refuse to provide military bases to Okinawa when it is returned to Japan, thus hindering the unity of Asia. Several Asian countries as well as the people of South Korea are dissatisfied with such a Japanese posture. I do not have the details on the bilateral negotiations for the return of Okinawa to Japan, but I believe that if the island is to be reverted to Japan, the Japanese share of the burdens in Asia must be increased first, before Okinawa is actually returned.

President Nixon: This is a delicate issue because of the constitution of Japan which we helped draft. For a long time I have thought that Japan should play a much more significant role than the present in its defense and collective economic activity. Some progress has been made in the economic aspect. As you are aware, Prime Minister Sato is coming here in November, and we should make every effort to have him survive politically. Free Korea is very important to Free Japan. Japan spends only about one percent of its GNP in its defense, which I believe is too small.

President Pak: The Japanese say that the defense and security of South Korea and Japan are interrelated, but in practice they haven't done anything.

President Nixon: That is true.

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President Pak: They think that they do not have to do anything since they have South Korea in front of them and the U. S. in back of them. They need U. S. advice in this regard. For example, most of the "equipment" carried by North Korean guerrillas who have infiltrated into South Korea such as their radios and shoes are made in Japan. Although we made a protest against this, they continue to sell these items to make a profit. Thus the people of South Korea have no good feelings toward the Japanese. Incidentally, there have been reports to the effect that since American troops have been withdrawing, other allied troops might follow suit. It is my thinking that unless we are requested by South Vietnam or the U. S., we will continue to station our troops in Vietnam.

President Nixon: There has been no progress in the Paris talks, and November 1 is the first anniversary of our bombing halt. What do you think our tactics should be? Do you think we should reopen the bombings?

President Pak: It is up to your decision, but I think it is difficult (to reopen the bombings) because of your domestic public opinion. When I was informed by Ambassador Porter regarding the bombing halt, last November, I told him how we would be taking this action without reciprocal action or commitment on the part of North Vietnam.

President Nixon: In the event that we resume our bombings, what do you think the reactions of Asia would be?

President Pak: Free countries in Asia would welcome it. But it is up to your decision.

President Nixon: What is your view on the Sino-Soviet conflict? How deep do you think it is and how long do you believe it might last?

President Pak: We have analyzed the situation a great deal. There is a 50-50 chance a war might break out between the two countries. Some believe that a war will not be staged since both of them know they both would suffer a great deal of damage and a war might be a prolonged one. On the other hand, some interpret that the longer the present conflict continues, the harder for the Soviets to deal with Communist China. We also have information that the Soviet military takes a hawkish attitude. One thing is certain, though -- the present conflict will not be solved in the near future.

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President Nixon: I oppose the view that the U. S. and the U. S. S. R. should cooperate to restrain Communist China. Both the Soviet Union and China are our potential enemy, and this view does not make sense. If the Soviet Union sweeps over China, the former will get stronger, posing a greater threat to Asia.

President Pak: I agree with you.

President Nixon: This explains the reason why we have eased the travel restrictions and purchases. We are trying to dispel the Soviet idea of opposing China by cooperating with the U. S. But we will continue to support Free China, and our policy toward Communist China remains the same as before.

President Pak: It would be better for us to remove both powers than have one of the powers get stronger than the other.

President Nixon: The economic growth rate in such countries as South Korea, Japan, Singapore, Free China and Thailand has grown higher than other countries of the world, whereas the economic level of China and North Korea has been lowered. Now the danger is in an area of of subversion. This is acute in the ROK, for example, because of forces lying beyond the parallel. Although, as you know, public opinion here demands reduction of troops we have all over the world. I rejected the idea of decreasing the number of our men staying in the ROK. I will make this view clear to the public to warn Kim Il-Song. I had talks with General Bonesteel, and during the last Cabinet meeting we received a report that the supply of small ships to the ROK Navy has progressed at a fast tempo. Although our defense budget this year is tight, I think we will be able to meet some of the requests the ROK has made. I do not want to give a wrong notion to Kim Il-Song that the U. S. is lessening its responsibility for the defense of the ROK. Now, I know you have various economic programs under way. This will be known in two to three weeks, but I would like to inform you that today the Export-Import Bank has decided to give \$73 million to the ROK for the construction of one power plant and an atomic power plant. Since I heard that your country wants more private investment unlike some of the Asian countries, I plan to encourage this aspect.

President Pak: As I told you in the car (while proceeding to the St. Francis Hotel from the Presidio of San Francisco), the ROK is indebted to the U. S. for its economic growth. Our "financial independence rate" until a few years ago was about 50 percent. It will be 94.8 percent

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in the next fiscal year and almost 100 percent in the year after next. We will, however, need surplus agricultural products for the time being. We have encouraged exports to obtain more foreign currency and private investment. The South Korean people have been making efforts to achieve a self-independent economy, and I hope you would consider giving us assistance to achieve this target during the next several years.

President Nixon: I have held the same view since my first visit to your country in 1953. It is difficult with this year's budget, but the ROK is an exception.

President Pak: The U.S. has been imposing a restriction on its import of textiles, but I hope that you make the ROK an exception in the measure so as to help the country achieve its economic independence.

President Nixon: The matter on the textiles mainly concerns Japan. The ROK has entered the textile market only during the recent years. I hope that a reasonable solution can be found to satisfy both the ROK and Japan. We can discuss the matter in detail tomorrow, but this is not an easy problem to solve. I will try to deal with the ROK problem discreetly.

President Pak: I think I have told all the subjects I had in mind.

President Nixon: On the troop matter, I will inform you tomorrow if our government and President Thieu have decided on it. We are partners in our common struggle. I know that for the ROK population, South Korea has sent more troops in percentage than the U.S. has done. I will inform you of all the measures we plan to take on Vietnam as they occur.

President Pak: I appreciate listening to your views on various subjects. I am encouraged to hear your remarks on the Korean problem.

President Nixon: It is a little noisy outside, but please remember that 98 percent of the American people are Korea's friends.

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Summary of the 1st ROK-US Summit (August 21, 1969)

Time : August 21, 1969. Thursday 16:10 – 18:10

Place : 6th Floor, "Saint Francis Hotel" Saint Francisco, U.S.

Participants: Mr. President

President Nixon of the United States

Secretary Cho Sang Ho

Victor Lee (United States Embassy in Korea)

President Nixon

Prior to beginning the talk, I would like to explain two or three items in order to eliminate any misinterpretation about the policy I'm planning.

1) Kim Il-Sung's North Korea is the most aggressive and unreasonable communist state. The familiar examples are (1) the "Pueblo" incident, and (2) the "EC-121" incident. The first incident occurred before I took office as President, and the second incident happened after I came into the office. When the second incident broke out, for several considerations, I consciously acted with self-restraint. Throughout the incident, the President of the United States affirmed that the "warning" would be given only once. Because the United States and North Korea did not have diplomatic relations, we had asked the Soviet ambassador to convey our message to North Korea. I believe this was passed on to the North Korean puppet regime.

That is, if North Korea carries out such serious provocations in the future, the United States, (1) will take countermeasures, (2) is ready and has the plan for immediate countermeasures, and (3) such countermeasures will be more powerful than the provocation. I have recently announced a "New Asian Policy." Though the press took it inattentive, the U.S. will faithfully fulfill its treaties obligations in Asia. Especially, the US commitment to Korea will proceed with faithfulness. Regarding this, we should cooperate with each other on how we could jointly take this action efficiently.

We are going to relax our restrictions on travel to Communist China. This arrangement does not mean any change in basic US policy towards Communist China. At any rate, Communist China is an invader and the U.S. will not recognize it. The United States objects to Communist China's entry into the United Nations and this issue is held in reserve. Due to its disputes and differences with Communist China, the Soviet Union is relatively cooperative in reducing instability in Vietnam, Korea, and the Middle East. In return, Soviet Union looks forward for the U.S. to help isolating and checking Communist China, but this is a matter of difficulty. The Soviet Union still provides essential military equipment to North Korea. Although, in order to isolate Communist China, the Soviet Union seeks a collective security system in Asia, this will be objected by North Korea, Vietnam, and Communist China. Due to the likelihood of invasion by these countries, we cannot but consider countermeasures. Asia-Pacific region, especially the ones near Communist China such as Korea, Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, Vietnam, Singapore, and Thailand are constantly under the communist threat. Apart from Communist China, the North Korean puppet regime and Communist Vietnam will remain as threats. Furthermore, if the Soviet Union resolves its problem with Communist China and gains its composure, many free

nations in Asia will be even more threatened by the Soviet Union.

Regarding the Vietnam question, first of all, thank you for Korea's active support there. There will be no unilateral withdrawal of the troops in the future. It will be possible only when there is President Thieu's guarantee that such withdrawal of the U.S. troops will be substituted by the Vietnamese troops. At the last summit with President Thieu held in Midway, we came to an agreement of pulling out 25,000 U.S. troops. Also during the recent visit to "Asia", I have met President Thieu once more and agreed upon the arrangement of relocating (strictly speaking, not a pull-out) portion of the forces in August. However, the enemy launched an attack two weeks ago; hence the disposition has been put off. Present arrangement is for President Thieu and General Abraham to submit a conclusion of their mutual consent within 10 days. But even if this plan is put into practice, there will be no substantial reduction in troops. Mr. President, I first inform you that such things are in progress.

There is no progress in the Vietnam Peace Conference in Paris up to now. I have spoken with Ambassador Lodge today and there is no progress. November 1st is the first anniversary of bombing halt, which I did not decide. Not to level the criticism towards my predecessor and, in fact, I myself respect President Johnson personally. However, I believe it to be a fault to declare a bombing halt without asking for more rigid conditions from the adversary. Honestly speaking, it is unfeasible to fight if the conference is in progress recklessly. Now the first anniversary of bombing halt is drawing near, and we are passing aimlessly passing time, as it is hard to expect the prospects for peace at the conference. So I believe now is the time for a reassessment of the bombing halt. For that reason, I plan to prepare an alternative for this issue by the middle of this October. Please keep this matter classified.

I believe it is a correct approach for Korea to make efforts to obtain its military and economic self-reliance for Asia's common defense. I hope other free Asian countries also endeavor for their self-reliance like Korea. What I would like to explicitly speak to you about, your Excellency, is that the United States will continue its leading role in the Asian-Pacific region and, when necessary, will continue to provide Korea with military and economic support. For Korea, we hold the obligation to do so. I expect that all free Asian countries respectively endeavor for their self-reliance. This morning, I was profoundly moved by your address at the welcoming ceremony. That is, spoken directly by the leader of Korea, this remark of self-reliance will bring immense and beneficial influence within U.S. and its publicity activities. I appreciate it.

Your Excellency, as you are familiar with, I have visited the Asian-Pacific region more than any other Presidents of the United States, either officially or

unofficially. There is no intention at all to pull-out from the Pacific region. Nor is there a plan to reduce the U.S. role in the region. We are merely trying to give support to the efforts of self-reliance and of helping one's own. Mr. President, though I have spoken extensively up till now, it is your moment to speak a few words about particular issues such as military equipment, economic development, and export-import bank problems. which I'll be glad to listen to. Also if there are any questions, please raise them.

Mr. President

Thank you for your frank explanations about your policy towards Korea and Asia in general. Though, your Excellency, you have spoken and may well know, for your information I would like to say a few words about the Korean situation. Over the past decade, Kim Il Sung has been preparing for the unification under communist terms by force. I consider Kim Il Sung to be fully ready in this capacity. Therefore, I believe he would carry out such actions whenever there is an opportunity. Yet the reason for not doing so is the fact that the U.S. forces are stationed in Korea. If it is known that the U.S. troops will be pulled out by tomorrow or it is under consideration of doing so, I believe he will put such action into practice without delay. At this moment we clearly recognize what Kim Il Sung is aiming for. That is trying to stimulate the U.S. public opinion by saying there's no reason for the U.S. forces to be stationed in Korea while the US forces are being withdrawn from Vietnam. I believe the alienation of ROK- U.S. relations is the single objective he seeks.

I think the wisest way of preventing the danger of North Korean provocation is to reinforce the defense capacity of the Korean Forces, thereby making North Korea recognize the fact that, with their military forces, it cannot be possible to invade Korea. In order to reinforce the Korean defense capacity, I think it is better to build up Korea's military combat capability than it is to strengthen U.S. forces in Korea. As you have stressed, it will be good to lessen the US burdens of military assistance in the world by enabling Korea to defend itself. Of course, it would be a different matter in case the Soviet Union or Communist China intervenes. However, my suggestion is to reinforce ROK defense capacity, so that it can resist a North Korean attack by itself. When this is done, the United States will not have to worry about Korean defense.

President Nixon

Of course, the question becomes different if Communist China or the Soviet Union gets involved. This is classified information but I will tell you for your information. The "ABM" decision is remarkably important. First of all, there should be

a balance of power except with the Soviet Union. We ought to prepare against Communist China's possession of nuclear weapons. There is information that Communist China will hold 25-50 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) by 1976. Even if we suppose that the United States holds 1,000 intercontinental ballistic missiles, if there is no "ABM," then major cities like San Francisco, Los Angeles, and Saint Louis, not to mention Korea and Taiwan, will come under danger of being the target of attacks. Therefore, "ABM" installations will prevent destruction coming from these attacks and we must not allow Communist China to blackmail the U.S. by holding the Korean or "Asian" issue.

Mr. President

Thank you. As you know, the Korean military is relatively well-trained thanks to American assistance and training. Therefore, if the equipment is modernized and its capabilities are reinforced, I believe Korea will be able to defend itself on its own. Then the United States may also feel assured about this matter.

President Nixon

At this moment, the plan for military assistance to Korea is under consideration in the administration. I was informed that the last time Secretary of Defense Packard came back from his visit to Korea he was sympathetic with Korea's requests. I heard the Korean military still holds rifles used in World War II. I think these rifles should be replaced. At any rate, the matter of modernizing the Korean military is under consideration within the offices concerned.

Mr. President

Now I have a clear understanding about US policy toward Asia which is known as the "Nixon Doctrine." However, it is true that some people misunderstand it still. I've come to fully agree with you after hearing your plans. It is right to have the Asian problems handled by Asians themselves. After World War II, many Asians tend to overly rely upon the United States. It is right to make every effort to establish self-reliance. Nevertheless, some Asians are restless and holding groundless fears that the U.S. is now trying to disengage itself from Asia. Of course, if the people understand your policy, such misconceptions or anxieties will disappear. Even though many free Asian states may develop their own strength and stand together, it cannot settle all the problems right away. We do not have the ability to do so even if the states are strongly united now. What I would like to suggest here is that in order for every state in Asia to

reach their common objective, the United States should pertinently advise them to be in charge of their appropriate responsibilities and obligations. That is, while there are states in charge of heavy burdens with weak national power, there are states not taking its responsibilities or charges even with large capacity. Ultimately, this condition is considered [*one illegible word*] among Asians and is also becoming a hindering factor for solidarity. For example, although Korea is a developing country, it takes a heavy burden compared to its capability. On the other hand, with the second or third largest economy in the world, Japan does not share much for reaching the Asian common goal. Moreover, Koreans are discontented with Japan's refusal to offer military base in Okinawa. It is also seen as an obstacle in promoting the Asian solidarity. But the U.S. may have to advise or increase pressure upon Japan to take its appropriate responsibility in achieving this collective Asian goal. Though the problem of returning "Okinawa" is an issue between countries involved; I think, if the U.S. is to return "Okinawa" back to Japan, it is better to do so after Japan commits itself to taking charge of its appropriate burden for the collective Asian interest.

President Nixon

That is a very sound idea. Japan is restricted by its Constitution but it has long been aware of the necessity that it should contribute considerably in order to satisfy collective Asian interest. By the way, it is known that recently Japan has been willing to participate in cooperative economic activities in Asia. This November, I will meet Prime Minister Sato during his visit to the U.S., although it is a bit complicated and a sensitive issue. We should deal with it without making his political position awkward. It is important that Korea should be free for Japan to be free. It is inappropriate that Japan spends only one percent of its GDP in its national defense.

Mr. President

When talking to Japanese leaders individually, they say Japan's security is directly linked with Korea's security. But their actions are different. There is no consistency between their words and their actions.

President Nixon

I'm fully aware of it. For that reason, I am planning to work on this issue in the first place when we have the talk.

Mr. President

Japan considers efforts for its national security unnecessary because Korea, along with the U.N. forces, protects it at the front and the U.S. defends it from the back. Therefore, strong advice or pressure from the U.S. will be needed. Even the equipment of the North Korean armed agents in the South are mostly produced in Japan. When we protest this to Japan, they say that Japan will cooperate. Yet, I suppose they become blind when it comes to earning money. Japan, which is not contributing to the security of Asia at all, is even doing what it should not do. Our people consider this distasteful.

President Nixon

I also think that is bad.

Mr. President

Since your Excellency had already explained, I do not have many queries about the Vietnam War. But one thing I would like to have a word about is the issue of withdrawing troops from Vietnam. There are some opinions that the allied forces should be withdrawn because parts of the U.S. troops are being pulled out. However, we would continue to station the Korean forces unless requested by the U.S. or the South Vietnamese government.

President Nixon

If there are any fine suggestions for our strategy towards Vietnam, please have a word or so. November 1st is the first anniversary of our bombing halt. But still there is no progress in the peace talk at Paris at all..... Should we continue the bombing halt?

Mr. President

That shall be a matter that you must decide. I think it is a tough question. Last year, right before the announcement of the bombing halt, I had been informed of it via Ambassador Porter. At the time, I told him that it was unwise to unilaterally announce a bombing halt without guaranteed reciprocal actions by the enemy. But if the bombing of the North reopens now, I think it will be a difficult issue because of the problems in U.S. public opinion.

President Nixon

What will Asia think of, if bombings resume?

Mr. President

It will be welcomed.

President Nixon

In order to have it referred in our policy-making, we are hearing the views of many leaders about the Sino-Soviet conflict. I suppose you may be well aware of the conflict. How serious is it and how long will it last?

Mr. President

When analyzing the conflict between China and Soviet Union, I think there are considerable chances that a war breaks out. It is a 50- 50 possibility. The reason for the war not taking place is because both sides will be vastly damaged by a war which will be long and drawn-out, thus they will try to avoid it. The reason for the outbreak of a war is that as time goes by, the Chinese Communists are becoming harder to handle for the Soviet Union. When looking at the political structure of the Soviet Union, it is not the people's opinion that influences its policy. Only a few leaders decide policy. Especially, I think the pressure from the military will be strong.

President Nixon

Some had proposed to cooperate with the Soviet Union in order to isolate and contain Communist China. But I had refused to do so, because the U.S. is not close with the Soviet Union and because it is not right for the two essentially hostile powers to cooperate with each other temporarily. After all, Soviet Union is a communist state. If the U.S. assists the Soviet Union in isolating and containing Communist China, it will be letting the Soviet Union to take control of Communist China. Communist threats to Asia will not be diminished even if Communist China is gone. Thus we cannot cooperate with the Soviet Union.

Mr. President

I totally agree with you.

President Nixon

For that reason, as I told you previously, we are easing the travel restrictions to Communist China in order not to give an impression that we are assisting the Soviet Union's policy to isolate and contain Communist China. By no means, it is because we like Communist China. There is no change at all in our approach towards Communist

China. Also, there is no slightest degree of change in our support for a free China.

Mr. President

Ultimately, it will be best if both the Chinese Communists and the Soviet Union become ruined after a war between them. Even if one of them falls, the remaining one will become stronger.

President Nixon

Many Asian countries like Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, and Japan have the faster economic growth rates than any other parts of the world, especially when compared with the communist states within this region. Namely, there was no particular economic growth in Communist China last year and neither for North Korea. Consequently, the Free World has its advantage in terms of economic growth compared to the Communist camp. Now the problem is infiltrations and subversive activities, and this is a problem especially Korea is facing. There is no plan to withdraw the American troops stationed in Korea now, at the time when Kim Il Sung is indulging in provocative actions. No matter what the U.S. public opinion is, withdrawal of the U.S. forces from Korea would be considered as an exception. Every time there is an opportunity, I am planning to stress this point officially. I have discussed with General Bonesteel and I am well aware that Korea needs small speedboats to respond to sea infiltrations of the enemy. According to Under Secretary of Defense Laird's report, this work is in rapid progress. It seems our budget situation will be highly restricted this year. With exceptional considerations, however, we are holding the budget cuts on Korea. In any case and by any terms, we will do nothing that will improve Kim Il Sung's morale. Although it is not yet being publicly announced, I have been informed that the Export-Import Bank decided on a 73 million dollar loan for the construction of the two power plants including a nuclear power plant in Korea. I suppose this will be publicized after you return to your country. In Asia, private enterprises are constrained generally; however, in Korea, private enterprises are being encouraged and raised. I will encourage private enterprises to enter Korea.

Mr. President

The economic development of Korea is thanks to the assistance of U.S. until now. But we will not rely upon the U.S. boundlessly. Even just a few years ago, the rate of our economic independence was only 50 percent. But last year's rate was about 94.8 percent. Therefore, in several years, we will be able to support ourselves almost

completely. Of course, there will be no aids in resources except for surplus agricultural products. We will develop our economy by self-efforts to increase exports. So far our people's efforts have reaped good results. I would like to request U.S. support in the areas of development loans, private enterprises' entry to Korea, and trade relations with Korea, so that we can become self-reliant quickly. I believe that as the past help of the United States made today's Korean economy, US cooperation in these fields will help Korea achieving economic self-reliance quickly.

President Nixon

I have been promoting such ideas since 1953. Although we have many limitations in our budget, Korea will be treated exceptionally.

Mr. President

Though the restrictions on the import of textiles may be under pressure from the Congress or related industries, please take care of Korea, whose industry is in its infant stage.

President Nixon

The restrictions on textile imports are caused by Japan. Because Korean textile industries are in an infant stage, we will adequately and appropriately settle this matter considering special circumstances in Korea. I hope we will be able to speak more concretely at tomorrow's meeting. In any case, we will be concerned about Korea specially. If there comes any agreement between President Thieu and us within 10 days, we will inform you. In terms of the population-ratio, Korea is sending the largest troops to Vietnam. I would like to discuss the Vietnam issue with you in the future. I guess I have finished saying what should be told you.

Mr. President

I was inspired by the straight-forward explanations and having the knowledge of your ideas. Thank you.

President Nixon

I am sorry for the noisy crowd outside. They are only a minority of the American people and 98 percent of the people are fond of Korea.

Mr. President

It sounds to me like a welcoming sound.

President Nixon

As a matter of fact, they are welcoming your visit to the United States. Simply it is just the minorities who are being noisy. It is fortunate that it sounds like welcoming to you. Then, I will be receiving you at dinner.

2) Meeting of U.S. and ROK Cabinet Members
in Connection with President Park Chung Hee's Official Visit to the U.S.

Proceedings

1. Date: 21, AUG, 1969 (Thursday), 16:10 – 18.15

2. Venue: St. Francis Hotel, San Francisco, U.S.

3. Attendants:

ROK: Choi Kyu Ha, Minister of Foreign Affairs

Yim Chung Sik, Minister of National Defense

Lee Hu Rahk, Chief Secretary

Kim Dong Jo, Korean Ambassador in the U.S.

Kim Sung Eun, Special Assistant to the President.

Yoon Ha Jung, Director of U.S. Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Lee Bum Jun, Director of Military Equipment, Ministry of National Defense

Kim Min Sang, Security Adjutant of the Korean Embassy in the U.S.

Kim Dong Hui, Economic Councilor of the Korean Embassy in the U.S.

Choi Kwang Soo, State Affairs' Councilor of the Korean Embassy in the U.S.

Han Moon Sik, Special Assistant of Minister of National Defense

The U.S.: William P. Rogers, Secretary of State

David Packard, Undersecretary of Defense

Thomas H. Moorer, Chief of Naval Operations (Deputy for Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staffs)

Henry A. Kissinger, National Security Advisor

Marshall Green, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific Affairs

William J. Porter, U.S. Ambassador to Republic of Korea

John McCain Jr., Commander in Chief of Pacific Forces.

Ronald L. Ziegler, White House Press Secretary

Richard Peters, Director of ROK Department of State.

John Holdridge, Senior Staff Member for National Security Council

4. Meeting details

Secretary of State, Rogers--- Today we are glad to welcome the South Korean delegates, including Minister of Foreign Affairs Choi. I have had many opportunities to meet

Minister Choi since I took office as Secretary of State. Hence, it seems to me that I meet him more frequently than my colleagues and cabinet members. I believe all of the South Korean delegates understand our friendship and sincerity for the Republic of Korea. Members of Congress and public opinion in the U.S. are fortunately positive towards the Republic of Korea, and I am glad that South Korean and American ambassadors in Seoul and Washington fulfill their tasks in order to establish close relations between both countries. According to subjects for discussion that have been prepared for today's meeting, I would like to first discuss national defense and the security of Republic of Korea, including military aid.

Minister Choi--- It is my pleasure that President Park made an official visit to San Francisco and had a talk with President Nixon, and I appreciate the welcome we have received in the U.S. I do not hold any objection to your suggestion to have the first discussion about national defense and the security of the Republic of Korea, and Minister of National Defense in Republic of Korea, Yim Chung Sik who is in charge of this issue will present our standpoint.

Minister of National Defense Yim Chung Sik--- This issue was discussed in detail at the 2nd meeting of U.S. and Republic of Korea cabinet members, which was held in Seoul in early May. Hence, today I would like to propose that the U.S. side talk about the following three issues; (1) the plan to achieve the goal of South Korean army reinforcement; (2) the import of equipment for military operations against North Korean Communist espionage agents; (3) management and prospects of the U.S. government launching a small arms factory (M-16), which was discussed in the meeting between the Republic of Korea and U.S. minister of national defense.

Undersecretary of Defense Packard--- As the chief delegate of the U.S. at the last meeting of U.S. and Republic of Korea defense committee, I am glad to see delegates of the Republic of Korea again. I believe that the issue of national defense in the Republic of Korea is extremely important for peace in the world and the Asian region. Accordingly, I want to emphasize once more the strong and friendly relations and cooperation between the Republic of Korea and U.S. which Secretary Rogers mentioned. I think the three issues Minister Yim mentioned are very important, and I will begin with the equipment for military operations against espionage agents of the North Korean Communists. Related to this, I want to hear about the actual status of attempts of communist guerillas to invade South Korea. According to the government, these

occurrences have decreased recently, when compared with late 1967 and 1968.

Minister Yim--- These events do seem to have apparently decreased in more recent times; however, there have still been quite a lot of invasion attempts. Espionage agents of the North Korean Communists have recently been sent to infiltrate through coastal regions of the West and South Seas, aiming to establish an underground organization and to kidnap public figures to North Korea.

Undersecretary Packard--- Which channels did these spies take to invade and how many of them were captured?

Minister Yim--- They usually came down to the region in the East and South Sea by speed boat, and there has been a significant number of attempts as of late, which have become more frequent recently; however, the number of spies being sent on these missions has decreased. 246 spies from 107 different infiltration missions were captured as of late July, 1969.

Secretary Rogers--- Minister Yim said a little while ago that North Korean spies have tried to establish an underground organization. I just want to ask whether they took steps to try and infiltrate ordinary villages.

Minister Yim--- Regarding channels for espionage agents of the North Korean Communists to gain access into the Republic of Korea, there were a few cases of overland infiltration. But most infiltrations were made with the aid of speedboats. This year, the North Korean communists have sent espionage agents down deep to the South Sea region, covertly entering the Republic of Korea; many of the North Korean communist's crafts have been found. There have already been 12 more attempts to covertly enter the Republic of Korea from the sea in the first half of this year than in all of last year. The method of their clandestine operations is, firstly, to enter into remote mountain villages or outlying islands and to move gradually toward cities, and their primary mission is to create an economic crisis and social insecurity; therefore hindering economic development.

Secretary Rogers--- How successful have they been?

Minister Yim--- There have been very few cases where North Korean communist's

espionage agents have not yet been caught; most of them were discovered and intercepted by Republic of Korea agents before but they were able to set about their missions. However, they are making desperate efforts to try to create social insecurity and public antipathy against the government of Republic of Korea. In order to plan impeccable countermeasures, modern armed equipment is extremely essential for the Republic of Korea.

Undersecretary Packard--- What has been the capture rate?

Minister Yim--- I can say an average 80 percent.

National Security Advisor Kissinger--- How many of these espionage agents of North Korean Communists in each group, and how did they attempt to enter deep into the South Sea area?

Minister Yim--- Firstly, there were between 5 to 15 espionage agents of North Korean Communists in one group until last year, and since then, the number of agents has decreased to between 2 to 5 per group this year. The exact number of espionage agents of the North Korean Communists who entered into Uljin last year was 120, and they attempted covert entry in mid-sized groups. Attempts this year have used smaller group sizes to infiltrate in comparison with attempts made last year. Secondly, these espionage agents infiltrated through the sea lanes, disguising speedboats as fishing boats, these boats can reach speeds of 30 knots.

Undersecretary Packard--- According to what I've heard, these infiltration boats are specially manufactured and equipped with 2 or 3 large diesel engines. They are disguised as fishing boats during the day and travel southward to infiltrate, therefore I acknowledge that it is likely to be impossible to distinguish them. Regarding this fact, speedboats of the North Korean Communists are capable of high speeds, while most equipment, apart from the destroyers of the Republic of Korea, being used are outdated, dating back to World War 2 standards.

Secretary Rogers--- I think it might be almost impossible to defend from coastal infiltration as Republic of Korea has such a long coastline. In addition to this, citizens of Republic of Korea are cooperative and there are many retired soldiers in homeland defense armies, therefore I do not expect any serious problems in the ROK. The only

threat which we should be concerned about is explicit self-destruction of espionage agents.

Special Assistant to President Kim Sung Eun--- In relation to this, one thing I want to say is that this should be managed with great caution, as espionage agents who entered into Uljin last year took large amounts of cash with them, and some of villagers were bought over into cooperating with espionage agents. Up to now, over 300 fishing boats have been seajacked by North Korean Communists and the captives were forced to travel to North Korea and were brainwashed. Hence, I think circumstances which have occurred in Vietnam cannot be excluded from the situation in the Republic of Korea if we cannot entirely stop their infiltration.

Undersecretary Packard--- What are the procedures for investigating these fishermen when they are repatriated?

Minister Yim--- We have investigated them in accordance with lawful procedures and the ones who were assigned to special missions by North Korean Communists are under investigation.

Chief Secretary Lee Hu Rahk--- I want to talk about what we are discussing as I think this issue involves politics as well as military affairs. I should point out that the covert entry of espionage agents of the North Korean Communists into the Republic of Korea is not just a military issue, but a political issue as well. I do not think that the most serious issues have been touched on by what some American attendants have asked in this meeting; questions concerning whether attempts of infiltration have come to be less frequent, or how many agents in each group. What is more serious is the fact that North Korean Communists have the capacity to prepare and send mass espionage agents to infiltrate Republic of Korea, they can decide on whether to increase or decrease the number of agents. This trend is up to Kim Il Sung's attitude. The number of cases or number agents engaged in these efforts of infiltration is not actually the most serious problem. Moreover, I want to communicate President Park's opinion, and he expected higher frequencies of infiltration, even though this did not actually happen. I think the leaders of the North Korean Communists are aiming not to give the impression of necessity in their opponents who have knowledge of national defense and security in relation to their own political status, those who are highly experienced in military affairs. Furthermore, they acknowledge that citizens in the Republic of Korea can hold tightly

together when a political issue arises in the country, if they pose a more severe provocative threat. Hence, it is expected that there will be more attempts of infiltration after the constitution is amended in October this year. This can be proven by the fact that infiltration attempts have decreased since this year's constitutional amendment was discussed in earnest.

Undersecretary Packard--- The government in the U.S. acknowledges that it is urgent to reinforce the homeland reserve forces for defending against infiltration of espionage agents and we are trying to supply essential equipment to the Republic of Korea with the revised supplementary budget when the annual national defense and security budget passes. This equipment includes radars which will be set up along the coastline every 20 miles and they will be used for inspecting as many patrol boats as possible. The problem is whether this revised supplementary budget can be approved by Congress, so it is not possible to tell the prospects right now.

Minister of Foreign Affairs Choi Kyu Ha--- We should be primarily concerned about the intentions and ability of North Korean Communists. What we have acknowledged that they are ready to break out into all-out war anytime and for this, they have the potential to use circumstances of periphery regions and to wait until world opinion is in favor of them. I think this is the most serious concern.

Undersecretary Packard--- Next, regarding efforts to reinforce the army of the Republic of Korea, we are planning to maintain the present scale of U.S. forces and trying to find long term solutions for the future. The U.S. government fully recognizes the necessity for it and intends to cooperate with the Republic of Korea. I think we should find the intelligent way is to build up the Republic of Korea's military strength.

Minister Yim--- Could you please tell us in more detail about the revised supplementary budget, such as when it can be drawn upon?

Undersecretary Packard--- The total budget for the Pentagon has not been passed through Congress yet, so it is difficult to say anything in detail about the revised supplementary budget. Please understand that we are making efforts in cooperation with other governmental departments, including the State Department.

Minister Yim--- If there is a problem with the forming of the budget, what do you think

about the replacement of old military equipment; that is, to shift military equipment from other regions into the Republic of Korea? I think it would be possible without a new budget.

Undersecretary Packard--- Please understand it is impossible to say anything at the moment. The only thing I can say now in this meeting is that diverse alternative plans are being fully considered in cooperation with other departments.

Minister Choi--- Regarding the provocative threat of the North Korean Communists, we are pursuing two fundamental principles; firstly, in order to maintain military strength for national defense, our military equipment should be militarized and supplementary equipment should be secured; secondly, we should establish countermeasures at all times against all possibilities of an outbreak of all-out war from the North Korean Communists. These principles were explained well enough in the personal letter of April 20th from President Park to President Nixon. If the North Korean Communists misjudge our military capacity or determination against their provocative war, there is a possibility for them to instigate all-out war. Hence, we have to ensure we do not give them any room for misjudgment. The personal letter from President Park was supplemented with a detailed presentation about the development of our military capacity and Minister Yim sent it to Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird. I urge again to consider it and to arrange countermeasures.

Undersecretary Packard--- I fully understand what Minister Choi has just mentioned. Let me talk about the next subject, the M-16 factory. The U.S. government has basically considered it to be a good plan. Two teams from the U.S. visited the Republic of Korea last year and in the spring of this year for some ideas about the factory, and I also had the chance to visit the Republic of Korea and discuss it. Firstly, possibilities were found to establish the factory with less expense than we expected, therefore it is now under consideration. At the same time, means of financial support are being considered. Secondly, the Republic of Korea has a view that all parts should be domestically manufactured. However, the M-16 manufacturing company, Colt Firearms, does not produce most parts, but purchases them from subcontractors. Hence it would be difficult for the Republic of Korea to produce most parts. Thirdly, the machine for manufacturing M-16s should be installed, intending to use it for producing other military arms, as it is highly precise. Hence, I would like to recommend that it is installed mainly for producing general equipment and for manufacturing both M-16s

and other military arms. Finally, there will be several restraints on manufacturing M-16s, due to Colt Firearms property rights. It would be difficult to make an agreement basically between governments. If this agreement is made based on government-to-government principles, the U.S. government should revise all previous agreements which were made with other companies. Regarding these circumstances, it is inevitable to reconsider this issue.

Minister Yim--- I heard that official reports of officials in charge of it have been submitted to the State Department and the Pentagon. Is it true?

Undersecretary Packard--- It is under consideration. I believe that we will consider and make a decision as soon as possible.

Minister Yim--- I hope a decision will be made as soon as possible, as it has been two years since this issue was first proposed. Moreover, we are willing to make real moves for the domestic production of parts of M-16 assault rifles.

Undersecretary Packard--- I understand the position of the Republic of Korea. We will try to make a decision as soon as possible.

Secretary Rogers--- According to the subject under discussion, let us begin talking about Vietnam. I had a meeting with Minister Choi three weeks ago and discussed it. Hence, there is no progress to report here regarding a peace agreement. I request Commander in Chief of Pacific Forces McCain make a brief presentation of military issues in Vietnam.

[There was then a presentation by Commander in Chief of Pacific Forces McCain.]

Secretary Rogers--- There are no points to add about the military situation in Vietnam and I welcome the presentation of opinions, if any, from the side of the Republic of Korea.

Minister Choi--- Firstly, peaceful and honorable agreements should be made in Vietnam as soon as possible and I think it is necessary to put more political and military pressure on North Vietnam. I want to assure you that the Republic of Korea is willing to support actively all efforts for an honorable solution which the U.S. has recently made. Moreover, the government in the Republic of Korea does not consider withdrawing

troops from Vietnam without the request of the U.S. or Vietnamese government, or agreement at peace talks. Secondly, I think that the withdrawal of troops should be arranged under close cooperation between both countries from time to time as the issue arises.

Secretary Rogers--- I fully understand what you are saying. I want to express my gratitude for the cooperation and support of the government of the Republic of Korea regarding Vietnam.

Minister Choi--- Next, let me turn the subject of discussion towards the Pacific region. I acknowledge that President Nixon has recently established new policies for the Asian region. I want to emphasize that active intervention by the U.S. as one of the countries in the Pacific region is inevitable in Asia, in order to maintain long-term security and peace. Furthermore, the government of the Republic of Korea will make the most effort for the development of an organization for regional cooperation, as it played an initiative role in organizing the ASPAC. Hence, we will give high considerations to the ASPAC and endeavor to foster it. As the side of the U.S. has already recognized, there are numerous obstacles, and Japan, particularly, maintains a negative position on political and military cooperation. It might be unrealistic to make the ASPAC subservient to military command, therefore we realized that it is not a good idea to be in haste and we will deal with this issue in the range of our real capacity.

Secretary Rogers--- I understand. I believe that it is necessary to make steady efforts for gradual development of an organization for regional cooperation. I want to assure you that the idea that the U.S. wants to establish some organizations for military cooperation is not true.

Minister Choi--- I agree with your opinion and organization for regional cooperation should be fostered by degrees. We are proud to give direct support for security of our neighbor countries, such as Japan and the Republic of China (Taiwan), as well as domestic defense. Moreover, we will continue playing our role mentioned above in the future. Secretary Rogers said presidents of the Republic of Korea and the U.S. would discuss security issues. He also agreed on security when he finished his visit to Republic of Korea. I want to remind him again that we will definitely keep this agreement. Next, I want to make a point about Okinawa. The military status of Okinawa has a strong effect on security of the free Asian region as well as the Republic of Korea. Hence,

regarding of military role of Okinawa, it should be guaranteed that ever free country be permitted use of military bases in Okinawa without limit and to operate with it immediately in an emergency. Please keep us informed whenever Japan and the U.S. make discussions and agreements.

Secretary Rogers--- No such special agreement has been made. We are dealing with this issue with deep concern and it will take a long time to come to a final agreement. It is expected that an agreement can be made when the Japanese Prime Minister Sato visits the U.S. in November. We will inform the Republic of Korea if there is an earlier agreement.

Minister Choi--- We have already notified Japan of our status. Please let me begin by talking about the issue of the Republic of Korea in the UN. In order to prevent Korean issues from being proposed to the UN every year, last year we transformed our policies and established a scheme for automatic proposal. Hence the UNCURK report was submitted to the secretary general of the UN rather than the UN general assembly, so we expected that the issue of Korea would not be discussed this year in the UN. According to the UN ambassador for the Republic of Korea, issues about Korea were officially submitted as supplementary bills by Communist countries, including the Soviet Union and some neutral states on the 15th August this year. In order to resolve this problem, two ways can be considered. One is to submit the UNCURK report directly to the UN general assembly, and the other is that our friendly nations officially submit it. In order to avoid getting tied down in complications, it is expected that the UNCURK report will be submitted to the UN general assembly on the 5th or 6th of September. It is our political view on the UNCURK report that the U.S. army contingency which is stationed in the Republic of Korea provides the military strength for the security of the Republic of Korea. In order to reinforce it, all attempts of the Communists which are made in the U.N. should be annihilated. North Korean Communists should be prevented from dispatching delegations all around the world. We request that the U.S. government and diplomatic offices abroad mobilize their diplomatic capacities and support friendly delegations of the Republic of Korea in a constructive way, as they are dispatched to the Middle East, South East Asia and African nations in order to gain favored support for the Republic of Korea.

Secretary Rogers--- We will closely cooperate with the Republic of Korea on the UN issue and support it as much as possible.

Minister Choi--- Next, I would like to begin talking about economic issues. We are strongly promoting economic aspects of the military forces and of construction. For economic development, we should construct strong foundations for international trade, particularly export, and this will also reinforce our potential military forces. Hence, the government of the Republic of Korea makes the most effort for increasing exports. We request that the U.S. government gives us special consideration for improving exports from the Republic of Korea. We have heard that the U.S. has recently considered import restrictions, but I believe that it should not be applied to the Republic of Korea. As the U.S. established the principle of controlling foreign aid in accordance with an economic development table, financial aid for the Republic of Korea has reduced every year. It is necessary to maintain the appropriate loans and to gain both private and cooperative investments in order to sustain the level of economic development. We hope the U.S. government gives us active support for this.

Secretary Rogers--- We understand the position of the Republic of Korea and the U.S. government will make every effort to support public investments.

Minister Choi--- It is a great opportunity to express congratulations again with all my heart for the success of Apollo 11. We hope the U.S., which has the highest level of science and technology, continuously supports manufacturing industries, science and technology of the Republic of Korea.

Secretary Rogers--- Thank you, I take your comments on board.

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Summary of the 2nd ROK-US Summit (August 22, 1969)

Time : August 22, 1969. Friday 10:05 – 10:40

Place : 6th Floor, Saint Francis Hotel, Saint Francisco, U.S.

President Nixon's Reception Room

Participants : Mr. President

President Nixon of the United States

Secretary Cho Sang Ho

Victor Lee (United States Embassy in Korea)

President Nixon

Did you have a good rest last evening?

Mr. President

Thank you for calling us more than once and receiving us cordially.

President Nixon

Having a "state dinner" here in San Francisco instead of our capital Washington, your visit to the United States will be a historic one. Of course this is because you have been received at the White House in the past. With yesterday's discussions, I believe we have dealt with most of the discussion items. About our discussions, I have instructed Secretary of State Rogers and Ambassador Porter to check things to do after our discussions. It was impressive that you have shown keen interest and placed an emphasis on economic development plans. The Korean national per capita income is still not high. Perhaps we could say Korea is in its "take-off stage." Five years from now, an increase in national income per capita will be possible. Currently, funds for the banks are limited but we are planning to re-evaluate this. Regarding military affairs that you are mostly concerned about, the modernization of the Korean forces, especially replacement to M-16's rifles and the introduction of small speedboats, shall be carried out as quickly as possible. On the score of air power, I am fully aware of ROK's inferiority to North Korea. However, following the EC-121 incident, the US Air Force has been reinforced and this will be able to adjust the disparity. Your Excellency, what is the top priority for modernizing the Korean Forces?

Mr. President

When we speak of the modernization of Korean Forces we compare it with North Korea. And as you pointed out, our Air Force is inferior to North Korea. Of course it had been complemented with the enforcement of the U.S. Air Force. But because US Air Forces may be moved to Vietnam or other necessary places as occasion demands, please reinforce the Korean Air Force.

President Nixon

Do you mean reinforcing combat airplanes?

Mr. President

Yes. The next step should be to modernize Navy's equipments to prevent sea

infiltrations. Then, because the Army equipments are outmoded and deteriorated, they need to be improved also.

President Nixon

General Bonesteel is taking care of those matters. The US Air Force will be stationed in Korea for a considerable time in the future. As I told you yesterday, after the EC-121 incident, we have planned a massive retaliation for such provocation, and we are ready for it. Doesn't it seem that Kim Il Sung's demeanor has gotten milder recently?

Mr. President

I do not think Kim Il Sung's attitude is softened. The number of infiltrations is relatively low in winter and high in summer when trees grow thick. According to statistics so far, this year's number of infiltrations is lower than the last year. However, we cannot judge the enemy's intention only by those numbers. Perhaps they may act so strategically. It would be easier to confront North Korea which displays its intention conspicuously. On the contrary, if North Korea remain calm, it would be harder to know its intention, which makes the situation more difficult. Thus I consider it to be a more dangerous moment. If by any chance Kim Il Sung became somewhat quieter, it would be from the following reasons. One is a political reason to obtain international sympathy and supports by remaining silent. They are currently trying to appeal to the neutral countries and Communist China, so that the United Nations would request withdrawing U.S. forces from Korea. Secondly, it is to avoid the possible emergence of the opinion in my country that constitutional amendments are necessary in view of North Korean threats. Frequent North Korean provocations would only intensify threat perception among our people.

President Nixon

I do not consider that Kim Il Sung has changed his attitude by any means. Perhaps he may do so merely for a strategic reason. There has been no change within the Soviet Union's communist bloc, either. That is because there is not even the slightest change in their long-term expansionism. Some people say Kosygin is more generous and benign than Khrushchev but I believe there is no difference in their final aim. It is only that Kosygin is cleverer.

Mr. President

You pointed out the precise thing that I wanted to speak of. I fully agree with your opinion. It is easier to cope with Communists when they are emerging saliently. But when they appear moderate without being shown on the surface, it is hard to estimate their intentions which make us difficult to deal with them.

President Nixon

I believe it is more perilous to let the Soviet Union take control of Communist China. That is because even if the Chinese Communists threat has been removed, the Soviet power which has Communist China under its influence will certainly be stronger.

Mr. President

That is a sound judgment. The general public indifferently assumes if the U.S. and the Soviet Union collaborate, Communist China will be oppressed and a serious threat will be removed. But that is a mistaken idea.

President Nixon

The U.S. will never break its faith with Free China. We will keep the assurance under all circumstances. There is a population of 800 million in mainland China and it is impossible for a white man to have its control. This is a problem that should be considered not just for now or a few years ahead but with the prospects of 25 years to come. We have the acquaintance with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. By strongly supporting these relations, we must arrange some outlet so that many people in mainland China will not become desperate, thinking despairingly that there is no way but to rely upon the Soviet Union.

Mr. President

Having deep interest in Asian affairs, you may well know that historically China has invaded other countries dozens and hundreds of times. But the history of unified China has not been so long, lasting merely for several hundred years. When the internal situation was disrupted, there were no Chinese aggressions. Invasions were frequent when it became unified. I believe it would be difficult for Communist China to last long as it is now. And it is a good policy that would bring internal divisions. Ultimately, in order to settle its internal struggles they had pulled out troops stationed abroad when there were domestic disruptions. In China, ethnic groups are diverse and languages are also different according to its regions. Therefore, it is difficult for China to be unified because of its great diversity in terms of ethnicity and language.

Chinese are proud that China was the center of the world's civilization, so they are against the current institutions of Communist China which deny their traditional culture. Thus, if free China remains strong, it will bring the possibility of incurring disruptions within Communist China. After the current Communist regime had seized power, the economy of Communist China has retreated. This will be an additional cause which would cause divisions.

President Nixon

Policy to cause divisions would be good. (If so) It is time for you to leave for the airport. I was honored by your visit and I am grateful.

Mr. President

I know that you will be busy, but if situation permits, I look forward your visit to Korea. Then morale of Korean people will be uplifted. If this year is difficult, please visit Korea in the coming year.

President Nixon

Thank you. I would like to visit Korea, this time as the President.

3) Comprehensive Report of the United States of America-Republic of Korea Summit.
(San Francisco, 22-23 August 1969)

27 August 1969

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

1. Period of (official) visit to the U.S. and venue of summit.

August, 21st-22nd, 1969. (Departure- 20th, August, Return- 25th, August)
Saint Francis Hotel, San Francisco.

2. A suit of official attendants (accompanied by the first lady)

- Choi Kyu Ha, Minister of Foreign Affairs
- Yim Chung Sik, Minister of National Defense
- Lee Hu Rahk, Chief Secretary
- Kim Dong Jo, Korean Ambassador in the U.S. (accompanied by his wife)
- Kim Sung Eun, Special Assistant to the President.
- Park Dong Kyu, Chief Presidential Guard.
- Cho Sang Ho, Protocol Secretary.
- Lee Bum Scok, Chief Protocol Officer.

3. Schedule of Visit to the U.S.

20th, August (Wednesday)

- 13:30 (Seoul time) Departure from Kimpo Airport (the farewell ceremony with marching of ceremonial equipage)
- 03:10 (Local time) Arrival at Elmendorf Air Force Base (in Anchorage)
- 10:40 Arrival at Moffet Naval Air Station (nearby San Francisco) (welcoming ceremony from delegation of the State Department, mayor of San Francisco, 150 Korean-Americans)
- 11:15 Arrival at Del Monte Lodge (Accommodation) in Monroe

21st, August (Thursday)

- 09:40 Leaving Del Monte Lodge (by Helicopter)
- 11:30 Arrival at Presidio (the U.S. 6th Army Headquarters)
Received welcome from President Richard M. Nixon and the first lady, Secretary of State William P. Rogers and his wife, and other members of reception committee.
Welcoming Ceremony: marching of ceremonial equipage as an official protocol.
- 12: 35 Arrival at Saint Francis Hotel (Accommodation)
- 13:15 Luncheon Party hosted by Secretary of State, Rogers and his wife (at Bohemian Club).
- 16:10-18:10 Summit Meeting (at St. Francis Hotel)

16:00-18:15	Meeting of U.S. and ROK Cabinet Members (at St. Francis Hotel)
20:00	Dinner Party hosted by President Nixon and the first lady (at St. Francis Hotel California and Mural Room)
22 nd , August (Friday)	
08:30	Breakfast Meeting for Korean Americans. Venue: St. Francis Hotel California and Mural Room
10:05	The Second U.S. and ROK Summit Meeting (at St. Francis Hotel)
11:45	Press Conference of Presidents of the U.S. and ROK
12:00	Leaving for Yosemite National Park.
23 rd , August (Saturday)	
24 th , August (Sunday)	
11:30	Departure from Castle Airport
25 th , August (Monday)	
18:00	Arrival at Kimpo Airport

4. Official Events and Meetings

A. Welcoming Ceremony at Presidio (the U.S. 6th Army Headquarters) (Welcoming Crowd around 3,000 people including Korean Americans, Received by Secretary of State Rogers and Undersecretary of Defense Packard)

1) Welcoming ceremony including marching of ceremonial equipage was performed.

2) President Nixon gave a welcoming speech (See Appendix 2)

a) The significant meaning of President Park's visit to the U.S. was emphasized.

b) There is a significant difference between the present status of the Republic of Korea, and that of 1953 when President Nixon visited the Republic of Korea for the first time. The Republic of Korea has developed in a surprisingly prominent way and is respected throughout the entire world.

c) The Republic of Korea has an army which is strong enough to fulfill the duties of defending itself against the threat of the Communists in the Northern regions.

d) The Republic of Korea dispatched the second largest number of troops to Vietnam after the United States, and the United States of America deeply appreciates it.

e) The Republic of Korea has reached and nearly met the stage of economic self-sufficiency.

f) Due to reasons as I mentioned above, I want to express a welcome to President Park with warm hands.

g) Americans take pride in the fact that we have cooperated with the independent citizens of the Republic of Korea.

3) President Park delivered an address in reply (See Appendix 3).

B. The Luncheon Party hosted by Secretary of State Rogers (invited about 150 prominent figures)

1) The Secretary of State Rogers gave a "host" speech with the following points (See Appendix 4);

a) The Republic of Korea and the United States of America have a special relationship due to these five reasons:

Firstly, both countries cooperatively repulsed the Communist threat during the Korean War.

Secondly, the Republic of Korea has made the most efforts for economic development and the U.S. has supported it. As a consequence, the Republic of Korea has achieved the fastest economic development in the world.

Thirdly, the Republic of Korea appreciates the support of the U.S. and uses efficiently this support.

Fourthly, the Republic of Korea dispatched the second largest amount of troops to Vietnam, helped the South Vietnamese and U.S. armies and contributed to repelling the Communist threat, as it considered this repayment for U.S. aid and helping each other.

Finally, both countries will collaborate and fight against any enemies.

b) The United States of America promises to secure independence and sovereignty for the Republic of Korea.

c) Both countries have a mutual relationship and responsibility from the heart and are tied with a special friendship.

2) Mr. President delivered an address in reply with following points.

(1) I appreciate the support of the United States of America.

(2) Citizens in the Republic of Korea do not believe that they should always rely on this support, and the best way to repay it is to achieve economic independence and self-reliant security forces and to stop burdening American citizens.

(3) The reasons why the U.S. has established the strongest and richest country in the world is because of the pioneering spirit and diligence of its forefathers and efforts of American citizens for the development of the U.S., not only plentiful natural resources and conditions.

(4) The Republic of Korea will strive to establish a strong and rich country with all efforts.

C. The first Summit Meeting (16:00-18:00) (See Appendix 5)

Only Mr. President and President Nixon (with an interpreter) attended a summit meeting at the "Nixon Suite." They mainly discussed the security of the Republic of Korea, the Vietnam issue, and security and prospects for the Pacific region.

The Minutes of President Park and President Nixon Summit Meeting

1) Provocative Threat of North Korean Communists: (President Nixon's statement)

(1) North Korean Communists have lost their minds and become the most threatening Communist country.

(2) Incidents such as "Pueblo" and shooting down of the EC-121 stand as evidence to these facts. After the EC-121 was shot down, North Korean Communists were warned and these firm positions and messages of the U.S. were sent to them via the Soviet Union. If the North Korean Communists carry out seriously provocative threats afterwards, the U.S.;

a) will establish prompt countermeasures.

b) has been already ready to plan these prompt countermeasures.

c) these countermeasures will be much stronger than any provocative action of the North Korean Communists.

2) New Policies for the Asian Region: (President Nixon's statement)

(1) The U.S. will act sincerely on the agreement and commitment which has been made with the Asian region and, in particular, those with the Republic of Korea. The U.S. will play a leading role in the Asian region and if necessary, provide economic and military aid.

(2) (President Park's reply)

a) I fully understand President Nixon's new policies for the Asian region. I believe that it is reasonable Asians should technically resolve their own problems by themselves.

b) However, Asian nations are only worrying about insecurity as a result of the U.S. taking its hands away from Asian problems.

c) Even if each free country in Asia can develop their own strength and hold and stick together, it is impossible for them to resolve all problems right now. They do not actually have the capability.

d) Hence, I would like to suggest that the U.S. manages all countries in Asia to take full responsibilities and duties for their common purpose.

e) Although the Republic of Korea is a developing country, it takes too much burden beyond its ability. Japan, which has strength in its economy, does not take any

responsibility for Asia's common purpose. This unequal status is an obstacle for Asian countries to tie together.

f) The U.S. should put pressure on Japan to take reasonable duties in order to achieve the common purpose of Asian countries.

g) Regarding the Okinawa issue: It will be favorable to return Okinawa after Japan makes the firm commitment to take on reasonable duties, in order to achieve the common purpose of Asian countries.

(3) Issues of Japan: (President Nixon's reply)

a) I have thought for a long time that Japan should take reasonable duties, in order to achieve the common purpose of Asian countries. I will deal with it when Prime Minister Sato visits the U.S. in November. It is important to acknowledge that the freedom of the Republic of Korea should be secured for that of Japan. I will manage it in the first place during the meeting with Japan.

b) It is unreasonable that Japan executes only one percent of its GNP for national defense.

3) Issues of Chinese Communists: (President Nixon's statement)

The U.S. is recently willing to loosen the restriction of tourism for Chinese Communists. However, it does not mean changing fundamental policies against Chinese Communists and the U.S. will still not acknowledge them and be against their seating in the United Nations. We will maintain our support for the Republic of China (Taiwan).

4) Relationship between Chinese Communists and Soviet Union: (President Nixon's statement)

(1) The Soviet Union is reasonably cooperative with the issues of Vietnam, the Republic of Korea and the Middle East, due to its conflict with Chinese Communists.

(2) The Soviet Union rather wants the support and cooperation of the U.S. to restrain and sanction Chinese Communists.

(3) The Soviet Union pushes to establish a collective security system in Asia in order to restrain and sanction Chinese Communists. However, Vietnamese and North Korean Communists are still highly threatening, so it cannot help establishing countermeasures for them.

(4) If the Soviet Union reconciles with the Chinese Communists, it will be more threatening to Asian countries.

5) Issues of Vietnam: (President Nixon's statement)

(1) Withdrawal of the U.S. army:

a) The U.S. expresses gratitude for the active support of the Republic of Korea.

b) The U.S. may unilaterally withdraw its army from Vietnam in the future, but it will

happen only when President Liu can be secure in the fact that the Vietnamese army has enough capability to replace the U.S. army.

c) The agreement to withdraw 25,000 army personnel was made in the last "Midway" meeting and another agreement to relocate some forces in August was made during the last visit to the Asian region.

d) However, enemies attacked two weeks ago, so agreements above are on hold.

e) It is expected that there will be an agreement between President Liu and General Abraham within ten days and suggestions about this agreement. Even if it can be performed, it does not mean an actual decrease of forces.

f) (President Park's reply:) The withdrawal of the allied forces as well as that of the U.S. forces is being taken up for discussion, but the Republic of Korea forces will not leave Vietnam without the request for withdrawal from the government of the U.S. or Vietnam.

(2) The Paris Peace Accords

a) There is no progress up to now.

(3) Issues of halting the bombing

a) It is the one year anniversary this coming November 11 of the declaration to halt the bombing. As for halting the bombing, I think it was a blunder not to demand more terms from the enemy.

b) It is time to reexamine halting the bombing. Alternatives will be planned by October 15th.

c) (President Park's reply:) I have claimed it was not a wise decision to unilaterally halt the bombing without mutual agreement. If the U.S. restarts the bombing, it will be welcomed by the Republic of Korea. However, it is understandable that there are difficulties in making this decision, due to public opinion in the U.S.

6) U.S. aid for the Republic of Korea: (President Nixon's statement)

(1) The U.S. has the responsibility to provide economic and military support to the Republic of Korea.

(2) I was impressed by President Park's statement that the Republic of Korea will be self-sufficient and it will influence in a positive way many Asian countries as well as the U.S. I appreciate it.

(3) The U.S. makes no consideration at all that the U.S. would withdraw troops from the Asian region or reduce its duties. The U. S. will just support efforts of citizens in Asia to be independent.

7) Issues of Chinese Communists' threat of nuclear weapons: (President Nixon's statement)

(1) It was a critical decision to construct the ABM in the U.S. and provisions against the acquisition of nuclear power by Chinese Communists should be made.

(2) The information was obtained that Chinese Communists would possess 25-50 ICBMs by 1976 and without AMB, the Republic of Korea, Republic of China as well as main cities in the U.S. will be exposed to the menace of attack.

(3) Hence, with ABM facilities, the U.S. should stop the Chinese Communists from blackmailing on issues related to the Republic of Korea and other Asian countries.

8) Security of the Republic of Korea: (President Park's statement)

(1) North Korean Communists' Preparation for the War:

a) For more than ten years, North Korean Communists have prepared for breaking out into war.

b) If there are any chances, North Korean Communists will push forward their attack.

(2) As for the U.S. army stationed in the Republic of Korea:

a) The main reason why North Korean Communists hesitate in invading the Republic of Korea is that the U.S. army is stationed in the Republic of Korea.

b) Regarding this, North Korean Communists would go to all lengths to evoke the world's opinion or contrive the stratagem of alienation between the U.S. and the Republic of Korea in order to meet the purpose of withdrawal of the U.S. army from the Republic of Korea.

c) (President Nixon's reply)

The U.S. does not give consideration at all to pulling out the U.S. army from the Republic of Korea, as Kim Il Sung has committed provocative threats. It will always be dealt with as an exceptional case to withdraw the U.S. army from the Republic of Korea.

(3) Security of Republic of Korea (President Park's statement)

a) The best way to defend from an invasion of North Korean Communists is to reinforce battle forces and the security of the Republic of Korea, and consequently to make North Korean Communists not even consider using armed force.

b) The Republic of Korea will develop its own capability of national defense and relieve the burden of the U.S. military forces.

c) The Army of the Republic of Korea is well-trained; therefore they are going to have the ability to defend their nation if battle forces with modernized military equipment are reinforced.

d) (President Nixon's reply) The military plan for the Republic of Korea is under consideration at the U.S. public administration office. The modernization of military forces in the Republic of Korea is particularly under urgent consideration. After Undersecretary of Defense Packard visited the Republic of Korea, he presented a

positive opinion of requests asked from the Republic of Korea.

c) In order to defend from seaside infiltration, speed boats are essential and M-1 small guns which were used during the World War 2 should be replaced.

f) Even though aid for the Republic of Korea will be restrained due to the U.S. national budget this year, the Republic of Korea will be given special consideration, such as holding on the reduction of the budget for the Republic of Korea.

9) Economic Cooperation (President Nixon's statement)

(1) The decision at the Export-Import Bank of Washington has been made to grant 75 million U.S. dollars in loans to the Republic of Korea for constructing two power plants, including an atomic power plant.

(2) The Republic of Korea encourages and develops private enterprises while other countries in Asia generally restrain them. Hence it will be recommended to the U.S. private enterprises to cooperate in launching their business in the Republic of Korea.

(3) As textile industries in the Republic of Korea have developed under special circumstances, the restrictions on importing South Korean textiles will be under special arbitration and concern.

(4) The U.S. will give special consideration to the economic issues to the Republic of Korea.

(5) (President Park's reply)

a) The Republic of Korea will not rely infinitely on the USA. The rate of our economic independence was only 50 percent a few years ago. However, it was approximately 94.8 percent last year; therefore 100 percent economic self-sufficiency will be established within a few years.

b) I would like to request the special support of the U.S. in the form of a development loan, the launch of American private enterprise in the Republic of Korea, and trade and commerce with the Republic of Korea, in order to establish and preserve our own economic independence as soon as possible.

C. Meeting of U.S. and ROK Cabinet Members of Foreign Affairs and National Defense Department (16:00-18-15)

The U.S. and ROK cabinet members of Foreign Affairs and National Defense Department had a meeting in connection with the summit meeting and it was presided by Minister of Foreign Affairs Choi and Secretary of State Rogers. (See Appendix 6)

1) Subjects for discussion

A) Issues of security in the Republic of Korea (central theme)

B) Issues of Vietnam

C) Issues of security and prospects in the Asian Pacific region.

D) Other issues

a) Economic and technological cooperation between the U.S. and ROK and issues of commerce and trade.

b) Issues of the Republic of Korea at the United Nations.

2) The draft of the joint statement of both countries' presidents were negotiated alongside this meeting, reaching agreement on most subjects. (See Appendix 1)

3) The minutes of each discussed subjects.

A) Issues of security and national defense in the Republic of Korea (including military forces)

a) Minister of Defense Yim asked for the reinforcement of the South Korean army, and discussed countermeasures and prospects in the mean time which were discussed in detail at the 2nd meeting of U.S. and Republic of Korea National Defense cabinet members. Minister of Foreign Affairs Choi urged prompt countermeasures and plans for the provocative threat of the North Korean Communists and reinforcement of the ROK army, which was presented in detailed private letters which President Park sent to President Nixon on April, 28th, 1969 and Minister Yim sent to Secretary of Defense Packard on 7th, June, 1969.

Regarding these, the U.S. answered to maintain the size of present military forces, to make efforts of establishing long term plans and diverse countermeasures for it.

The U.S. government acknowledges the necessity of reinforcing the South Korean army and intends to cooperate with it. The U.S. is making efforts to ensure finances for this.

b) Strategies for espionage agents of North Korean Communists

Minister Yim explained in detail the circumstances of infiltration of espionage agents by North Korean Communists and emphasized the urgent need for military equipment. Special Assistant to the President Kim Sung Eun gave supplementary details in issues of South and North Korea regarding fishing boats. Chief Secretary Lee Hu Rak pointed out the political perspective regarding clandestine operations. He also argued that the real problem was not the frequency, size, or way of covertly entering, but the fact that espionage agents of North Korean Communists had enough capability to cause a threat and Kim Il Sung could control the frequency of clandestine operations. He demonstrated that the leaders of the North Korean Communists were aiming not to give the impression of necessity to their opponents who have knowledge of national defense and security in relation to their own political status, those who are highly experienced in military affairs. Hence, it is expecting that there will be more attempts of infiltration after the constitution is amended in October this year.

Replying to the side of the Republic of Korea, the U.S. acknowledges that the reinforcement of local reserve forces is urgent, and makes efforts to draw up the supplementary budget, in order to aid military equipment, radar facilities and speedboats to the Republic of Korea. However, it is difficult to predict whether the budget bill is going to be passed in Congress.

c) The U.S. gives consideration to the launch of small arms factories (M-16) and facilitate them, and it might be possible to launch them with an economical budget. However, difficulties were found with producing parts within the Republic of Korea. The U.S. recommended establishing factories which could produce general arms as well as M-16s. Moreover, there were another obstacles for this: that is making a contract with the company which holds the property rights for the M-16, including complex procedures involved in a government-to-government agreement. Hence, it will take 3-4 months more to reconsider it. However, the U.S. understands the situation of the Republic of Korea, so will try to make a decision as soon as possible.

B) Issues of Vietnam

a) The U.S. presented the situation of the Vietnam War in detail and commented that there was no progress on the peace agreement. (Commander McCain's special briefing)

b) Minister Choi ensured that the Republic of Korea would cooperate with efforts of the U.S. for peace and would not consider withdrawal of South Korean troops unless the government of the U.S. or Vietnam requested or a peace agreement was made. He expected that both countries would closely cooperate from time to time, regarding this issue.

C) Issues of the Asia-Pacific region

a) Minister Choi demonstrated that he understood the new U.S policy toward the Asia-Pacific, however it was inevitable that there be active intervention by the U.S. for security and peace in this region. He affirmed that because it would be unrealistic to militarize the ASPAC, the Republic of Korea should make efforts to gradually develop a regional organization for cooperation, in order to achieve regional security.

b) Secretary Rogers expressed his approval and suggested that it was more important to develop a reliable regional organization for security cooperation without haste.

c) Minister Choi gave his word that the Republic of Korea would carry out its duties to secure not only itself but neighbor states, including the Republic of China and Japan. He emphasized that agreements for security between the U.S. and the Republic of Korea should be fulfilled.

D) Issues of Okinawa

a) Minister Choi pointed out that Okinawa as a military base had a meaningful status for

regional security of Asia, therefore it should be allowed to be available for unlimited use for military purposes. He said he informed Japan of South Korea's position on this issue. He reported the progress of negotiation between the Republic of Korea and Japan and requested the support to the U.S.

b) Secretary Rogers suggested that it was under cautious consideration and might produce a resolution for it in the November summit meeting between President Nixon and Prime Minister Sato. He promised to inform South Korea of the progress of Okinawa issues.

E) Korean Issues within the United Nations.

a) Minister Choi reported that the Republic of Korea transformed policies for automatic proposal of a bill about Korean issues in order to prevent this bill from being proposed to the U.N.; however, communists proposed bills about withdrawal of foreign troops and removal of the UNCURK report as a supplementary bill, so we would like to confront it by submitting the UNCURK report. He requested U.S. support in gaining friendly nations' support, in order to annihilate all attempts of the North Korean Communists.

b) The U.S. promised to give active support with friendly nations' cooperation.

F) Economic Cooperation

a) Minister Choi reported on the policy of the Republic of Korea, which propels the development of both national defense and economic independence and emphasized efforts for increasing exports. He requested that the U.S. relieve the U.S. restrictions on imports, maintain the proper extent of aid loans, and provide support to gain private investment and aid advances in science and technology.

b) The U.S. gave its consent and particularly promised to make efforts for private investment.

E. The Dinner Party hosted by President Nixon (about 250 invitees)

1) President Nixon delivered a speech with the following points (See Appendix 7)

A) We are here tonight to try to deliver to California and all Americans a special emotion which I and American citizens have towards the Republic of Korea.

B) What does the Republic of Korea mean to the world as well as the United States of America? First of all, it means courage. There are no more courageous citizens than those of the Republic of Korea. It was proven by the fact that they confronted and fought against North Vietnamese enemies in the Vietnam War.

C) The U.S. and the Republic of Korea have not just friendship or allied relationship, but a friendly relationship working to construct an Asian cooperative system which is important for the peace in the Pacific region. The peaceful status in the Pacific region is

critical and it is proven by the fact that the three wars in which the U.S. fought for all broke out in the Pacific region.

D) Next, the Republic of Korea means self-reliance. It also means pride, confidence and independence. Even though the Republic of Korea has gained aid from the U.S., it has always sought for chances to develop independent capability.

E) The U.S. has learned through the experience of foreign aid that it is impossible to help nations which do not possess self-reliant capabilities. The Republic of Korea has developed, using most efficiently the aid of the U.S. and I believe that it will not take long for the Republic of Korea to achieve economic independence.

2) President Park delivered a reply address. (See Appendix 8)

F. Breakfast meeting with Korean Americans

A breakfast meeting for Korean Americans hosted by Mr. President (22nd, 08:30-09:30): About 250 Koreans who reside in California and Los Angeles were invited. A representative of Korean Americans gave a welcoming speech and Mr. President delivered words of encouragement. (See Appendix 9)

G. The Second Summit Meeting (10:30-11:40)

The exclusive summit meeting between presidents of both countries (at President Nixon's suite)

The Minutes of summit meeting between President Park and Nixon

1) Modernization of military equipment.

The U.S. will push to replace M-16 small arms and to supply speedboats for the security of seaside regions. It will also reinforce air forces of the U.S., therefore supplementing the air forces of the Republic of Korea, which are of a lower-level than that of the North Korean Communists. The U.S. presented two priorities of modernization in Korean forces; firstly, reinforcing our own air forces; secondly, improving equipment of the naval forces. The U.S. made commitments that the commander of the 8th U.S. army would push for and cooperate with them and that the U.S. air forces in the Republic of Korea will remain stationed there for a certain period. President Nixon said that the U.S. is planning for serious reprisal and actions if again faced with a provocative threat, such as the EC-121 downing.

2) The movement of North Korean Communists

According to President Park's explanation, the reason, apart from seasonal circumstances, that the number of threatening cases of espionage agents has decreased is that North Korean Communists control frequencies in order to demand the

withdrawal of the U.S. military from the Republic of Korea through Communist countries and neutral states and for citizens of the Republic of Korea not to push for amending the Constitution. President Nixon agreed with the assessment of these attitudes of North Korean Communists and demonstrated that he would not change any policies for them.

3) Issues of Soviet Union

President Nixon said that Soviet Union did not change its long term expansionism, therefore there was no change of the leadership. The fact that Kosygin is gentler than Khrushchov just means that he is smarter, and no difference of fundamental purpose was found between them. President Park agreed with it and said that it was more difficult to judge their intentions when they seemed to be moderate.

President Nixon demonstrated that the Soviet Union could be very dangerous if it took power over Chinese Communists, even if their threat could be removed. President Park fully supported this.

4) Issue of Chinese Communists

President Nixon said that the United States would never betray the Republic of China (Taiwan) and would give the leader of the Republic of China, Chiang Kai Shek, strong support. It could create hope, which does not make people in Chinese mainland desperate to think that there is no way except for relying on the Soviet Union.

President Park explained Chinese history, in which China had pillaged other countries when it was unified, while it had withdrawn troops from other countries when it was domestically disrupted. Hence it will be the overall policy to make them disrupted, for example keeping the Republic of China strong and causing economic recession of the Chinese Communists. He obtained President Nixon's assent about it.

H. Joint Press Conference of both countries' Presidents.

1) President Nixon had an opening speech with the following points:

- a) President Park and I exchanged frank and meaningful views about the security of the Republic of Korea, issues of Asian Pacific regions and other subjects.
- b) The United States of America and the Republic of Korea will maintain a friendly and close relationship.
- c) I appreciate the invitation of President Park to the Republic of Korea and will consider returning to South Korea during my term of office.

2) President Park delivered reply for it and made farewell address.

5. Comprehensive evaluation of each issue

A. The national defense and security of the Republic of Korea

1) There is no doubt that the U.S. is willing to maintain giving military and economic aid to the Republic of Korea. Despite of restraints of budget, the fact was ensured that the U.S. considered aid to the Republic of Korea to be its responsibility.

2) The U.S. responded in a positive way to the self-reliant and independent policy of the Republic of Korea

3) In spite of the North Korean Communists' preparation for warm the United States understands that the likelihood of a full-scale invasion by them is very low. The United States recognizes the urgent need for measures to counter infiltration activities by the North Korean Communists, and it appears to give priority to the issue.

A) The plan to reinforce the Republic of Korea Armed Forces

1) It has been confirmed that the plan to reinforce the Republic of Korea Armed Forces, which was mentioned in the autographed letter from Mr. President to President Nixon (dated 26 April 1969) and the letter from the Minister of National Defense to United States Secretary of Defense of the United States XXX (dated 7 June 1969), is under review by the United States government. (President Nixon spoke about the issue during the United States-Republic of Korea summit, and Deputy Secretary of Defense McCart answered to the issue during a minister-level conference).

2) The current level of military for this year and for some time. (The United States gave a hint during the United States-Republic of Korea summit and the United States-Republic of Korea minister-level conference).

3) It is true that the study of long-term military aid and the possibility of special military aid are under review by the Department of Defense of the United States. It is understood that there are some difficulties due to restrictions on the national defense budget and the amount of foreign aid in the United States. For these issues, steady negotiations are necessary in the future.

4) The modernization of Korean forces.

a) Replacement of the Republic of Korea Army's M-1 small guns (President Nixon's statement during the summit meeting)

b) improvement in equipment of Korean navy (President Nixon's statement during the summit meeting and the U.S. delegate's statement during the cabinet members' meeting)

c) expecting that construction of M-16 factory will be propelled as soon as possible (Undersecretary, Packard's statement during the cabinet members' meeting)

c) It will take 2-3 months to consider construction and facilitation of an M-16 small arms factory, due to some unexpected difficulties.

B) Espionage operations against the Republic of Korea

1) It is understood that the Department of Defense of the United States, recognizing the North Korean Communists' capability for infiltrative and provocative activities will present the congress a budget bill regarding the following items:

- a) speedboats;
- b) the equipment for operations against espionage agents, and coast-radars; and
- c) the strengthening and armament of the Homeland Reserve Forces (the supply of small arms). On this matter, the prospect that a budget bill will be passed in the Congress is not necessarily positive, and, therefore, steady contacts with the Congress and the Executive appear to be necessary.

C) The United States Armed Forces in the Republic of Korea

1) It has been confirmed that the size of the ground army of the United States Armed Forces will be maintained at the current level and their withdrawal or a reduction in their size is not considered being treated as an exception. (President Nixon's answer during the summit and Secretary of State Rodgers' statement).

2) Admitting the inferiority of the air power of the Republic of Korea to that of the North Korean Communists, the United States has promised the reinforcement of the United States Air Force in the Republic of Korea (President Nixon's statement during the summit).

3) The United States suggested that it had an intention to carry out a massive retaliation if the North Korean Communists would provoke an incident similar with that of the EC-121 again, and would be ready for such retaliation (President Nixon's statement during the summit).

B. Issues of Vietnam

1) Peace agreement:

a) There is no progress in the Paris Peace Accord (President Nixon's statement during the summit meeting and the U.S.' statement during the cabinet members' meeting)

b) The U.S. requested to make it under close cooperation of both countries. (Minister Choi's statement during the cabinet members' meeting)

2) Withdrawal of the U.S. troops from Vietnam:

a) The U.S. will not pull out its troops from Vietnam unless there is progress in the Paris Peace Accord, South Vietnamese army is reinforced, and it is secured that withdrawal in part will not result in a weakened Vietnamese force.

b) The U.S., in principle, is against unilateral withdrawal without any counter response.

c) The plan for partial withdrawal was put on hold due to recent offensives from

enemies. Considering the Vietnam War situation, withdrawal in part is expected next year and President Liu and General Abraham will negotiate this plan within a few days. (President Nixon's statement during the summit meeting)

3) Halting the bombing:

a) After the first year of halted bombing, it is suggested that the U.S. reexamines the event of halting the bombing and considers alternative plans for it (President Nixon's statement during the summit meeting)

C. Asian-Pacific issues

1) Commitment for Asia: The U.S. will fulfill the responsibilities which are presented in commitments to the Asian region, keep playing its leading role, and if necessary, carry out military and economic support. (President Nixon's statement during the summit meeting) However, it is expected that military and other intervention (particularly deploying U.S. troops) to Asian countries, except for the Republic of Korea will be minimized.

2) Militarization of the ASPAC: It is an unrealistic scheme. It is rather more important to develop the ASPAC with other organizations as a regional organization for cooperation without haste. (statement of both countries' delegations during the cabinet members' meeting)

3) Issues of Okinawa: The U.S. gives careful consideration to this issue and comprehends the situation of the Republic of Korea. This situation will be reflected on. There is nothing decisive between the U.S. and Japan, and some progress is expected when Prime Minister Sato visits the U.S. The U.S. is expecting to make necessary agreements with Japan. (The U.S. delegation's suggestion during the cabinet members' meeting)

4) Issues of Japan: President Park's opinion that Japan should make more contributions to the security and development of Asia-Pacific causes resonances with the U.S. The U.S. expressed consent with it and it is expecting to be reflected in the meeting between the U.S. and Japan.

5) Issues of the Chinese Communists: (President Nixon's statement during the summit meeting)

(1) The U.S. will continue to object to the approval and seating at the U.N. of Chinese Communists and the principle for the Republic of China will not be transformed.

(2) The U.S. acknowledges the threat of nuclear weapons from Chinese Communists (owned 25-50 ICBM by 1976), therefore countermeasures, such as ABM facilities, will be established. (The consideration to facilitate minimum ABM net for self-reliant defense against nuclear weapons would be requested to the U.S., as nuclear threats of

the Chinese Communists to the Republic of Korea are real and pressing).

6) Relationship between the Chinese Communists and Soviet Union:

(1) Soviet Union strives to sanction Chinese Communists in the World and requests the U.S. to cooperate with pressing on them.

(2) The U.S. will not respond to the request of the Soviet Union as the Soviet Union can strengthen its exclusive power and become more threatening if Chinese Communists are put under pressure by both countries. (President Nixon's statement during the summit meeting)

(3) Relieving restrictions of Americans' tourism in People's Republic of China is one of policies on which the U.S. does not cooperate with the Soviet Union.

(4) The Soviet Union demands the cooperation of the U.S., however the U.S. basically believes that the Soviet Union will not transform its fundamental expansionism.

(5) The Chinese Communists are being disrupted domestically; therefore they have no capability to expand their power outside of the state. (President Park's statement)

(6) The Republic of China should be supported, in order to restrain Chinese Communists.

D. Economic cooperation and increase of commerce and trade.

1) It is positive that the Export Import Bank of Washington will approve 75 million US dollars in loans to construct two power plants, including a nuclear power plant (President Nixon's suggestion during the summit meeting)

2) The special concern about South Korean textile products was mentioned, regarding restraints of the textile industry. (the U.S. delegation's statement during the cabinet members' meeting)

3) The plan for financial aid was not presented but it was suggested that the Republic of Korea would gain exclusive benefits for economic and technological cooperation. (President Nixon's statement during the summit meeting)

E. Issues of the Republic of Korea within the United Nations.

1) As a supplementary bill was proposed to the U.N by Communist countries, Korean issues would be brought up this year during the U.N. General Assembly. Hence, the U.S. government promised aid and support, in order to annihilate provocative threats of North Korean Communists; that is a common purpose of both countries.

6. Newspaper Commentaries about President Park's visit to the United States of America

A. National papers.

1) Regarding President Park's official visit to the U.S. from August 21st-22nd, 1969, national newspapers provided prominent pages on proceedings of the visit to the U.S.

and commented about achievements of it on the editorial page. The joint statement which was officially announced after the summit meeting was reported in most editorials and commentaries and details of discussion in the ROK-U.S. cabinet members' meeting were also commented on. The tone of the press was generally positive in the way which achievement of this official visit to the U.S. was commented on as having accomplished satisfactory results, although some shortcomings were pointed out. Editorials and commentaries can be summarized as follows:

2) The systemic security of Asia-Pacific regions was stated in the opening of the joint statement and it means both countries' presidents acknowledged the necessity of a system of collective security. However, the press expressed regrets about the fact that definite plans for it were not presented and the position of the U.S. was not stated in detail. A daily newspaper commented that the U.S. exaggerated the capability of Asian countries to be self-reliant as it revised policies for Asia. Most papers expressed great satisfaction with the fact that the Republic of Korea was excluded from new policies for Asia. Nixon's administration established and commented that it is the most prominent achievement of the official visit to the U.S.

3) In the commentaries about the U.S. support for South Korean forces, the commitment to maintain the U.S. army stationed in the Republic of Korea meant the inflexible decision of the U.S. for the security of the Republic of Korea, despite of the new U.S. policy to reduce overseas troops and it indicated "the special concern" for the Republic of Korea. There were different views about special military forces, as most papers pointed out that this was unsatisfactory that this was not mentioned in the joint statement, and some papers claimed that it should have been discussed during the cabinet members' meeting. According to some commentaries, the joint statement presented that "the U.S. confirmed necessity of long term efforts to reduce primary causes of tension on the Korean Peninsula" and it suggested implicitly that the U.S. supported long term plans for national defense which were established by the South Korean government. The U.S. commitment to support for homeland reserve forces was evaluated as the encouraging affair.

4) Issues of Vietnam were called 'disappointing', as the size and time of withdrawal of the allied forces from Vietnam and South Korean enterprises' joining in the battle industry were not mentioned on the joint statement. The press hoped for agreement with the allied forces about the Vietnam War.

5) There were not many significant commentaries about economic issues and most papers just quoted economic cooperation between the Republic of Korea and U.S. mentioned in the joint statement.

6) A large number of newspapers displayed great interest in the return of Okinawa, and in the commentaries, the reason why it was not referred to in the joint statement was that the Republic of Korea was not a party of the agreement, even though both presidents had a talk about it.

7) In conclusion, most newspapers demonstrated similar views that President Park's visit to the United States of America was a diplomatic success and a chance to ensure the friendly relationship between the Republic of Korea and United States of America. They also highly evaluated the achievement of the visit to the U.S. as it proved that the concerns over new U.S. policies toward Asian countries were only unnecessary anxieties.

B. Commentaries of international press.

Even though the international press provided different numbers of pages on it, depending on the region or the extent of the relationship with the Republic of Korea, it did not exclude news reports and commentaries about Mr. President's visit to the United States of America. Various countries' responses can be summarized in the following points:

1) The United States of America

Most news reports and editorials were filled with speculation of the purpose of President's Park's visit to the U.S. and subjects for discussion in the summit meeting, just before his visit. According to the U.S. News and World Report, subjects for discussion could be surmised as the date of President Park's visit was just after the Nixon administration announced a new policy toward Asia and the helicopter of the U.S. army stationed in the Republic of Korea was shot down just before his visit. It was reported that the Republic of Korea would provide the U.S. details of North Korean Communists' state of preparation for war and emphasize that security and development in the Asian region could not be expected without a cooperative security system between the U.S. and Asian countries, although the Republic of Korea agreed to the Nixon administration's new policy toward Asia, in which Asian issues should be managed by Asians themselves. In addition to this, issues were reported to be discussed during the summit meeting, including the security of the Asian region after the end of the Vietnam War, increase of U.S. troops stationed in the Republic of Korea, return of Okinawa, economic aid, and relieving import restrictions. A newspaper speculated that the plan for revision of the constitution which made President Park's third term possible could be discussed.

It was unique that the San Francisco Examiner and San Francisco Chronicle provided pages for special reports about the first lady of the Republic of Korea.

After President Park's visit to the U.S., commentaries were about the joint statement which was officially released after the summit meeting, every speech which was delivered by both presidents, and informal talks which were announced by delegations of both countries. Moreover, numerous papers reported the welcoming party hosted by President Nixon and the anti-war demonstrations around party venue. Two newspapers above gave most space on the front page to report and provide pictures of the summit meeting and it meant great interest in President Park's visit to the U.S.

It was unexceptionally emphasized in the commentaries that both Presidents made agreements to maintain the U.S. army stationing in the Republic of Korea. Some commentaries focused on President Nixon's acceptance of President Park's invitation to the Republic of Korea. The main point in commentaries was the opinion of both presidents about the security of the Republic of Korea and Asia. A little difference of opinion between both presidents was reported to be found; President Park emphasized role of the U.S. in the Pacific region as balanced efforts between Asian countries and the U.S. should be made for security in Asia. He also explained the North Korean Communists' plans and threats for breaking out into war against the Republic of Korea; President Nixon emphasized the self-reliance of national defense. He argued that circumstances have changed since the Korean War in 1950, due to the conflict between Soviet Union and Chinese Communists, but he acknowledged North Korean Communists were striving for Korean unification, using armed force. However, it was said that the most difficult and complex issue was to decide whether the Nixon administration's new policy for Asia should also be applied to the Republic of Korea, as the ROK has made rapid economic development with the largest U.S. aid for Asia and became a role model of the U.S. aid.

Regarding the revision of the constitution for President Park's third term, it was commented that the U.S. tried keeping a neutral position on it, and President Nixon took precautions not to give the impression that the U.S. government gave political support for it.

2) Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, the U.K. Switzerland, Austria and Sweden.

In commentaries in the European press, President Park would observe how the Nixon administration's new policy toward Asia was going to be executed, emphasize plans of North Korean Communists to invade the Republic of Korea, about which he had been anxious due to the incidents of the U.S. army helicopter downing, and make a pressing request to secure U.S. aid, including modern military equipment, reinforcing Korean forces and reconsidering the return of Okinawa. Moreover, the press pointed out that both presidents had a slightly different view of security in Asia. In some commentaries,

the Republic of Korea should counter against Nixon's new policy toward Asia (La Libre Belgique, Belgium), the Republic of Korea is the only country to cope with the U.S. new policy and unlike Vietnam, it was successful in defending against covert operations of North Korean communists (The Times, the U.K.), as the U.S. might make a decision to reduce the U.S. army stationed in the Republic of Korea, national defense of the Republic of Korea could be reinforced by withdrawal of Korean military personnel from Vietnam (Neue Zürcher Zeitung, Switzerland). The welcoming event at the airport for President Park was unexpectedly aired on Austrian Television and a few papers reported anti-war demonstrations coinciding with his visit.

3) Comparing with the U.S. and European press, there are not many different responses in the Asian press, including Japanese, Vietnamese, Thai, Philippine, and Malaysian papers. However, some different views were found; Yomiuri daily, of Japan, on August, 19th commented that diplomatic issues rather than economic issues would be mainly discussed, because economic men were not included among members of the delegation; the editorial of the Dien Tin newspaper, of Vietnam, expected that both presidents would discuss the border disputes between the Soviet Union and People's Republic of China. It was distinguishable from other Asian press that a Philippine newspaper reported details of President Park's visit to the U.S.

4) South American and Middle Eastern press only reported news, quoting from foreign news and emphasizing the remaining of the U.S. army stationed in the Republic of Korea.

7. Outcomes of President Park's visit to the United States of America.

a) The presidents of both countries, President Park and President Nixon, established a more solid friendship and fellowship.

b) It was the first official meeting between President Park and President Nixon. It ensures mutual relations and a blood alliance and makes a domestic and international display. It also promotes opportunities for cabinet members of both countries to cooperate more closely.

c) Commitments which were made between the Republic of Korea and the U.S. are reaffirmed and the U.S. can obtain better recognition of the provocative threat of the North Korean Communists. Therefore, the U.S. ensures it will reinforce the military alliance for national defense and the self-reliant security of the Republic of Korea, enlarge the South Korean army and sustain the U.S. army stationed in the Republic of Korea.

d) The knowledge about South Korean policies toward national defense and

construction and self-reliant security and economy were provided to President Nixon and his new administration. Moreover the Republic of Korea affirmed that it had no plan to request U.S. aid in the long term, therefore it could ensure more cooperative relations with the U.S. The U.S. highly evaluated the capability and reality of the Republic of Korea and ensured that the Republic of Korea would be excluded from the Nixon administration's new policy toward Asia. Both countries discussed security issues, prospects and security in Asia and the Vietnam War, and reaffirmed previous commitments. It can be reviewed as an historical event in which the Republic of Korea gained higher status and mutual relations between both countries were reinforced. The summit meeting caused a significant turning point where the relationship between the Republic of Korea and United States of America can be developed in more constructive ways, as the U.S. acknowledged the developed capability of the Republic of Korea, expressed gratitude for it, and gained more equal mutual confidence.