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By Wp NARA Date 2-4-03

January 8, 1969

SECRETOfficial - Informal

Honorable William J. Porter  
American Ambassador  
Seoul, Korea

Dear Bill:

You will recall that the day following your sudden departure from Washington you were scheduled to meet with the SIG Study Group which has been conducting the follow-up study to the Yager paper. They have been plowing ahead and now have a good bit done on alternative US and ROK force structures and on the implications for the ROK economy of these various alternatives. There has not been, however, any real political component to this follow-on study, something which has bothered us in EA and the SIG Study Group itself.

Arrangements have just been made to do something about this gap. We have arranged for Don MacDonald, who has been on the INR Coordination Staff for the last two years, to be detached for about three months of full-time work, starting this week. He will be assisted by Dick Hile. Don is preparing a working outline for this political study and hopes to send it to you early next week. He feels (correctly) that the expertise of the Embassy will be the principal resource for this study and he would like to leave January 17 for Seoul and spend the week of January 20 there. He would plan to have Hile come out also, arriving about the time he departs to follow up on whatever field work may seem appropriate. Don hopes to have a first draft of the report by March 10 and then to circulate it for comment here and to you with a final deadline of March 28.

The rationale for this study is to form some preliminary views on the political implications of the various alternatives that the SIG Study Group is considering. We all recognize that three months is not adequate for any sort of a definitive answer on a problem of this sort and that in fact it may not be possible to develop definitive answers no matter how much time is invested on this question, but the problem is certainly one that we will want to ponder and I feel that Don will be able to establish a framework and get the task off to a good start.

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Having served in Seoul, Don is very mindful of the burden visitors can be to the Embassy and will do everything he can to avoid this. We feel, however, that, with the background he and Hile already have, they should be able to supplement in a very effective way the Embassy reporting. Since they will be free of other responsibilities, they may be able to get down on paper a great deal of what is in the air around you and your staff.

We naturally hope that the Koreans do not learn of the study and its framework. Don can not, however, come to Korea without his presence being known to the Embassy here and to a number of his old friends. When asked, he plans to say that he is going to Seoul in connection with problems of interagency coordination in the intelligence field. This has in fact been his work for the past two years in INR and, by coincidence, Dick Stuart from the same office will be in Seoul part of the time that Don is there, so that the cover story looks rather plausible. Don is also enrolled in a doctoral program at George Washington University and plans to do his doctoral dissertation on Korean-American relations. He will, in talking with his Korean friends, refer to this dissertation as one reason for his current interest in the sort of subjects that will naturally come up with them. He will, of course, be guided by yourself and your staff in all his activities in Seoul. If these cover stories and plans seem to you to create any problems, please let me know and we will make appropriate adjustments.

Sincerely yours,

Winthrop G. Brown  
Deputy Assistant Secretary  
East Asian and Pacific Affairs

EA/K:JFLeonard:lm

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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By JW, NARA, Date 8-7-92

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INFO /030 R

DRAFTED BY: EA/K: HBARDACH  
APPROVED BY: EA: MABASSADOR BROWN  
S/S: MR: BROWN  
S/NL: AMBASSADOR LEONHART  
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EXDIS:

FOR: AMBASSADOR FROM BROWN:

SUBJECT: ROK GOODWILL MISSION AND PATO

1.3(a)(5)

1. [REDACTED] REPORTS THAT ROKG WILL SEND A SPECIAL GOODWILL MISSION TO THE US AFTER MR. NIXON'S INAUGURATION HAVE PROMPTED US TO REFLECT ON THE EXTENT TO WHICH WE CAN OR SHOULD DISCOURAGE ROKG TO EMBARK ON SUCH VENTURE DURING EARLY PHASE OF NEW ADMINISTRATION. IT WOULD OF COURSE BE MOST DIFFICULT TO TREAT SUCH A VISIT, IF LED BY THE PRIME MINISTER, AS ANYTHING LESS THAN AN OFFICIAL VISIT AND I QUESTION WHETHER SUCH A VISIT WOULD BE BENEFICIAL FROM EITHER US OR ROK VIEWPOINTS IF IT TAKES PLACE TOO SOON.

1.3(a)(5)

[REDACTED]

AND I DO NOT DOUBT THAT ROKG WILL LOSE LITTLE TIME IN GENERATING PRESSURE ON NEW ADMINISTRATION ON SUCH SUNDRY ITEMS AS VIET-NAM NEGOTIATIONS, BROWN MEMORANDUM, MILITARY ASSISTANCE, ROK/US DEFENSE TREATY, TRADE CONTROLS, AND THE STEEL MILL PROJECT, THROUGH AMBASSADOR KIM, LETTERS FROM PRESIDENT PAK AND THT LIKE. FURTHERMORE, I AM CONCERNED WITH A MISSION WITH AN AMBITIOUS "SHOPPING LIST" OF THE TYPE

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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APPARENTLY BEIN CONTEMPLATED IN BLUE HOUSE WOULD CREATE UNFAVORABLE IMPRESSION AND COULD IN FACT BE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE TO BEST INTEREST US-ROK RELATIONS. WE ARE OF COURSE NOT PREJUDGING EITHER OUR OR ROK DESIRES AND PLANNING FOR FUTURE STATE OR OFFICIAL VISITS, BUT SIMPLY FEEL THAT ROKG SHOULD REALIZE THAT NEW ADMINISTRATION SHOULD HAVE OPPORTUNITY TO GET FEET ON GROUND AND SIGHTS SET.

2. SIMILARLY, I DO NOT BELIEVE ROKG WISE IN LAUNCHING PREMATURELY NEW AMBITIOUS AND FAR REACHING CONCEPTS SUCH AS PATO(SEOUL 11364), AND YOU WERE QUITE RIGHT IN NOT ENCOURAGING PRIME MINISTER TO BELIEVE THAT THERE WOULD BE A REPLY ON ITS SUBSTANCE IN NEAR FUTURE. YOU MAY WISH REPEAT THIS POINT IF SUBJECT RAISED AGAIN. I WOULD ALSO ADD THAT THIS DOES NOT MEAN US SHUTTING ITS EARS TO NEW IDEAS PUT FORTH BY ROKS ON SECURITY PROBLEMS OF EAST ASIAN AREA AND POINT OUT THAT US-ROK ANNUAL DEFENSE MINISTERS MEETINGS PROVIES A MEANS FOR EXCHANGES OF VIEWS ON THESE PROBLEMS AND ON VARIOUS APPROACHES TO DEAL WITH THEM.

3. LET US HAVE YOUR THOUGHTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON HOW WE CAN BEST COUNSEL ROK TO EXERCISE MODERATION AND RESTRAINT IN PURSUING NOTION OF AN EARLY GOODWILL MISSION.  
RUSK

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Executive Registry  
69-473

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

DD/ST# 326-69

JAN 23 1969

NSC REVIEW  
COMPLETED

National Security Study Memorandum 9

TO:           The Secretary of State  
              The Secretary of Defense  
              The Secretary of the Treasury  
              ✓The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT:    Review of the International Situation

The President has directed the preparation of an "inventory" of the international situation as of January 20, 1969. He wishes the review to provide a current assessment of the political, economic and security situation and the major problems relevant to U.S. security interests and U.S. bilateral and multilateral relations. In order to put this review into effect he wishes to consider responses to the attached set of questions along with other material considered relevant. The review should include a discussion, where appropriate, of the data upon which judgments are based, uncertainties regarding the data, and alternative possible interpretations of the data.

The responses should be forwarded to the President by February 20, 1969.

Attachment



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KOREA

1. Does President Park enjoy popular support? What are the attitudes toward the Park administration of key groups, such as intellectuals, public opinion leaders, labor, students? Is there rural dissatisfaction? What is the government doing about it?
2. What are the attitudes and plans of political opposition groups? Are any of these strong enough to challenge Park successfully? How serious is corruption? What measures has the government taken to control it?
3. Is the 1971 Presidential Election likely to come off peacefully without undermining political stability? Will Park run and win? Who are the most likely successors to Park?
4. Is there any prospect of a relaxation of tension in Korea? Will sustained harrassment on the part of North Korea over a long period weaken the stability or resolve of ROK leaders and political parties? Leaving aside the security aspects, would attitudes toward the nation's future be affected by the withdrawal of US ground forces?
5. Is coordination of ROK military and other security forces adequate, or do relations among the security forces pose problems?
6. Can we rely on assurances by ROK leaders that public threats of retaliation against North Korea are made for political purposes? What is the risk of the US being drawn into hostilities as a result of ROK actions? Could ROK front-line defense be weakened by concurrent landings on the order of the Unchin landing?
7. What are ROK attitudes toward Japan? Has the government become more willing to accept Japanese help? Will it be possible over the next 1-3-5 years to develop closer defense cooperation, e. g. , air defense and naval defense of the Sea of Japan, between the ROK and Japan.

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8. What are the present U. S. -Korean command relationships? How much Korean pressure is there to reduce U. S. operational control over ROK military forces?

9. What is the state and prospects for Korean economy? How much external assistance is being provided to it at present? How much will be required in the future and for how long?

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By GW NARA Date 6-6-08

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

# AIRGRAM

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TO : Department of State  
INFO : TOKYO, CINCPAC FOR POLAD

HANDLING INDICATOR

FROM : Amembassy SEOUL  
SUBJECT : National Unification Institute

DATE: January 29, 1969

REF :  
After several long delays it appears that the National Unification Institute will finally come into being. President Park, in his January 10 press conference promised that the Institute would be formed early this year. A few days after the conference, the press reported the details of the organization plan and budget drawn up by the Ministry of General Administration. At that time the papers reported the target date for inauguration of the Institute would be February 1. No further announcements have been made.

The history of the proposed Institute's formation is rather long. The genesis of the Institute in the form it is now assuming was a "Unification White Paper" prepared by the National Assembly Special Committee for Research on Territorial Unification in early 1967. Acting on the recommendations contained in the report, the National Assembly in July 1968 passed a bill authorizing the establishment of the Institute as part of a general government reorganization bill. It was rumored that the Institute was to open in the fall of 1968, but the establishment was delayed when funds authorized for the establishment were diverted to relief.

### Organization

As presently proposed the Institute will be headed by a Director with the rank of Cabinet Minister. Under the Director will be...

GRO: IV  
Downgraded at 3 year intervals.  
Declassified 12 years after date of origin.

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By GW NARA Date 6-6-08

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a Deputy with Vice Minister rank, three office chiefs of Vice Minister rank, and a Chief of the General Affairs Section.

A policy Planning Office will be charged with studying unification formulas, setting policy goals, establishing economic policies for the post-unification period, and coordinating social and cultural policies with other agencies. The Research Office will collect and analyze data on North Korea's internal affairs. It will also study the handling of the unification issue by other divided countries. The Education and Public Relations Office will, in addition to their information activities, handle "coordination of anti-Communist psychological warfare, and measures for refugees."

Altogether it will consist of thirty-one officials and only fourteen regular employees, an arrangement totally inconsistent with Parkinsonian theories of management.

While testifying before the Assembly, General Administration Minister Yi Sok-chaе alluded to a bipartisan advisory board, but there has been no recent indication that such a board is being planned.

#### Role of the Institute

The need for a Unification Institute is widely accepted. President Park first pledged such a step back in 1963 and various opposition figures have put forth similar proposals. Despite general agreement on its desirability, there has been little said about the actual function of the Institute. At this point it is not clear whether it is to be an academic research center, a coordinating agency with real executive powers or simply a gesture acknowledging the public desire for some positive action.

Some weight to the last interpretation has been lent by the fate of the original staffing pattern prepared and sent to the Blue House for approval. That pattern called for seventy-five positions. It was returned for reduction with the observation that seventy-five was far too many since there would be little for them to do anyway.

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Correspondence

Speaker: Judd, Councilor of U.S. Embassy in South Korea

Speaker: Ha Jung Yoon, Director of Europe and U.S. Bureau.

Time: 29, January 1969 11:30 AM

1. Military assistance for Republic of Korea in 1969

Councilor Judd is the (temporary) chief of the U.S. Joint Military Assistance Advisory Group.

(Chief, Joint Military Assistance Advisory Group (Provisional)-PROVMAAG-K)

A Major General Livingston N. Taylor recently visited the joint headquarters of U.S. Pacific Region (Hawaii) and discussed programs related to ROK military assistance. After returning to his post, he informed Defense Minister Choong Sik Lim of the meeting.

2. Issues related to the 2<sup>nd</sup> ROK-U.S. Defense Cabinet Conference

Director Yoon suggested opening the 2<sup>nd</sup> Defense Cabinet Conference in the near future in Seoul, as it was agreed to last May at the 1<sup>st</sup> ROK-U.S. Defense Cabinet Conference. He claimed a need for the meeting because of the ROK's military situation and because of an urgent need for military aid. Also, he inquired about the U.S. government's opinion on holding a conference. Councilor Judd said that he would report to Washington authorities and get back as soon as he receives a response.

Correspondence between Director Yoon and Councilor Judd.

Time: 19 February 1969

Title: 2<sup>nd</sup> ROK-U.S. Cabinet Conference

Councilor Judd: According to an announcement from the State Department:

- 1. Vice Minister "Pakard" accepted the invitation to the 2<sup>nd</sup> ROK-U.S. Defense Cabinet Conference.
- 2. Minister of Defense "Mayard" ca not visit the ROK in the upcoming March.

Director Yoon: Does March mean after visiting Vietnam?

Councilor Judd: Yes, it does.

Director Yoon: Is Vice Minister 'Pakard' coming as the chief delegate?

Councilor Judd: As far as I am aware, yes.

Director Yoon; No specific delegate was nominated when Ambassador Dong Jo Kim was informed of it.

According to Ambassador Dong Jo Kim's report on the meeting with Vice Minister "Parkard", Dong had expressed a willingness to come to South Korea for the conference.

Secret, Second Degree

If Vice Minister Dong comes to Korea as the chief delegate, it will differ from the object of the report from ambassador Kim.

If Defense Minister "Rayard" can visit South Korea when he visits Vietnam, the possibility of opening the 2<sup>nd</sup> ROK-U.S. cabinet meeting early can be discussed.

Councilor Judd: Then I have no idea what went wrong. But as I told you before, the message from the State Department was brief.

Director Yoon: Did the U.S. side respond to South Korea's desire to hold the meeting as soon as possible?

Councilor Judd: Not yet. Why doesn't the South Korean government suggest a specific date?

Director Yoon: We were just trying to take circumstances and convenience of the U.S. government into consideration. If you think it would be better for us to suggest a specific date, we will propose a specific date for the conference to the concerned authorities at the next level.

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E.O. 12958, unclassified, Sect 3.5

By NSA / Sources to Smith Date 01/20/07

09/06/2002

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

March 21, 1969

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
National Security Study Memorandum 34

TO: The Secretary of State  
The Secretary of Defense  
The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Contingency Planning for Korea

The President has directed the preparation of a contingency planning study for Korea. This study should examine possible U.S. actions in light of an outbreak of hostilities due to limited or full scale attacks by North Korea or unilateral South Korean responses to North Korean provocation. As directed in the guidelines for contingency planning, this paper should include a careful orchestration of political and military actions.

The East Asian Interdepartmental Group should perform this study and forward it to the Review Group by April 25, 1969.



Henry A. Kissinger

cc: The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff  
The Director, United States Information Agency

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By *BJ* NARA Date *4/3/08*

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US/ROK Relations

EA - Ambassador Brown

March 27, 1969

EA/K - Henry Bardach

Focus Retina and Consultations in Seoul

The following are comments and observations about my trip to Seoul in connection with Focus Retina. Tom Brown (J/PM) and I are preparing a separate evaluation of Focus Retina. During my stay I had the opportunity to talk with the Prime Minister, the DPM, the Foreign Minister, as well as MOFA, EPB, and military officials.

Focus Retina and US-ROK Relations

On balance, Focus Retina was a definite boost to ROK morale, a kind of military handshake which was certainly appreciated by most Koreans. The emphasis on the "joint combined" nature of the maneuver was good. Moreover, coming at a time where there is considerable doubt in Korea about future US objectives in Asia Focus Retina was reassuring to the ROKs, although the feeling of reassurance was mixed with some concern about what its future implications for our military presence may be. In a broader context the exercise could not help but focus on our present military establishment in the ROK, on the matter of joint control, and the question of adequacy of our bases and airfields to handle airborne deployments in actual combat situations. Focus Retina certainly provided food for thought to the ROK leaders and thus may have been useful as a first step in the long road of solving the question of our military presence in Korea.

Focus Retina and Okinawa

The exercise highlighted the Okinawa question and brought into sharp relief the utility of our bases in Okinawa. It stirred some ROK anxieties about the future of our Okinawa bases but this was more a reaction by the ROK press than by the ROKG. I do not believe that this somewhat premature public airing of this issue is particularly harmful to US objectives in the area and in fact may have been useful in drawing the GOJ's attention to the importance of air bases for logistic support for the rapid long-range deployment of US forces. Ambassador Porter is

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confident that he can keep the ROKs from making too much noise about Okinawa and he will proceed to do so as the situation requires.

Since I departed the Foreign Minister has raised the subject at a press conference. The Embassy is undertaking a handholding exercise at the MOFA and PM levels designed to keep ROK handling of these subjects in a low key.

#### Pueblo Sequel

Ambassador Porter feels that basically we should be guided by the climate and anticipated reactions in the US. He disagrees with General Bonesteel's view that using Panmunjom would endanger the UN umbrella. Porter feels that an open meeting would be better than a private one and that an open meeting would be the most spectacular way of handling the sequel. There is no assurance of course that the North Koreans would respond in any useful way or that they would not walk out. Accordingly, the UN might be a better venue. The Ambassador said he would write a letter to you commenting on the various options.

My impression is that the ROKs seem much more relaxed on the Pueblo affair (none of the ROK officials I met raised the subject with me). However, an unsuccessful sequel at Panmunjom could easily open up old wounds in the ROK and lead to disillusionment about our stance vis-a-vis North Korea. Since so much time has passed since the release of the crew, it would be useful to take another close look at how, and particularly where, we follow through on the sequel.

#### The DMZ

The defenses are visibly in much better shape than when I was there in the fall of 1967. The fence is better constructed, there are better lights, more guard posts and systematic patrols. However, sound-detecting devices are still not effective.

The marker incident of March 15 dramatically highlights the problem for the US of continuing to man the line. We do not know for certain whether Focus Retina prompted the incident; the Second Division CG thought it did and I am inclined to agree. In any case, it seems apparent that the North Koreans are making renewed attempts to provoke us, although it is not clear whether they are singling out the western (US) sector in favor of the eastern (ROK) sector. The implication of

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further US marker patrols and of a firmer and more flexible application of the CINCUNC's rule of engagement in dealing with the NK provocations (as proposed by General Bonesteel) demonstrates clearly the dangers of escalation which would not be as acute if our troops were not immediately on the line. There is some feeling in the Embassy that the risk of withdrawal from the line might be more than offset by a decline in tensions, since there would be no direct exposure of US forces on the DMZ.

Internal Security

There are visible signs of vigilance and of steady improvement in the ROK's counter-infiltration capability. Uniformed personnel are seen both in the cities and on the roads and bridges. The Chumunjin incident was a good test case for the Homeland Reserve force which reached the scene of the incident within 20 minutes. Relative to the DMZ, which is being "plugged" as much as possible, the coast is now the porous element in the ROK defense and the major problem for the ROKG. The Prime Minister felt that the North Koreans would attempt to infiltrate into the ports and that Chumunjin was a test for such North Korean operations. In charting our military assistance, high priority should be given to improvement of internal mobility (helicopters) and improvement of coastal defenses through a comprehensive radar system.

Military Assistance and CIGFIR\*

ROK expectations on MAP and CIGFIR are very high indeed. Much of this has been prompted by steady correspondence and discussions between our military and their ROK counterparts who have been told in this manner what their top priorities and requirements for military hardware and equipment are. No matter how valid these priorities are, this approach complicates our position vis-a-vis the ROKG which, in seeking more military assistance from us, is in a position to cite the strong recommendations made by their US military advisers. Ambassador Porter feels strongly that we should try to develop an overall package approach on the full range of military assistance items and issues, i.e., CIGFIR, M-16 plant, and MAP transfer. Moreover, he feels that the time has come to use our assistance to stimulate some joint US-ROK planning on the future of our troops in Korea. He considers timing to be of essence since

\* Counter Infiltration Guerrilla Force Improvement Requirements



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the longer we wait the greater the chance that the fundamental issues will become interwoven with the ROK internal political situation, particularly President Park's own future and the third term issue.

Third Term

At lunch on March 19, the Prime Minister commented briefly that there was "nothing new" from the Blue House on this subject. The way he said this gave me the impression that the Prime Minister is watching from the wings, cautiously but closely.

The Embassy had unconfirmed reports last week that an unidentified student group was distributing pro-third-term leaflets in certain areas of Seoul. The Embassy is probing the situation discreetly.

High Level Contacts

Pressure by President Park to see President Nixon will increase in the coming months. Ambassador Porter believes that such a meeting should not take place too close to the 1971 elections and not too close to any announcement by Park that he is a candidate. Park will obviously use a meeting with our President to enhance his own position.

Some Conclusions

The current year could well be a starting point to begin a gradual shift away from our military status quo in Korea. The confluence of a new administration, the forthcoming NSC review of our options and the appointment of a new CINCUNC later in the year could well set the stage to initiate planning discussions with the ROKs. However, sizeable trade-offs will be required in the form of military assistance and CIGFIR items.

It may be too early to initiate longer-range planning discussions at the June Defense Ministers' Meeting but we should at least be ready to offer the Koreans at that time some assistance with the M-16 plant, rifles for the Homeland Reserve and items in the CIGFIR that deal with coastal security. The more fundamental question of reducing our forces in the ROK could well be a subject of discussion between President Nixon and President Park if such a meeting were to take place within the next year, but

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this assumes that the Viet-Nam situation will have progressed to the point where the return of at least one ROK division to Korea can be effected.

Comments on economic matters will be contained in a separate memorandum.

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3/28/69

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Authority E.O. 12958  
By [Signature] NARA Date 7/14/08

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(TRANSLATION) PARK CHUNG HEE  
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA

To His Excellency Richard M. Nixon  
President of the United States of America

Excellency,

It is with pleasure and honor to present to you Mr. Choong Hoon Park, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Economic Planning Board, who is visiting your great country to have negotiations with the authorities concerned of your Government with a view to strengthening the existing ties of friendship and economic cooperation between the Republic of Korea and the United States of America.

As I have full confidence that Mr. Park will do his best in fulfilling the important mission I have invested in him, it is my sincere wish that you will receive him favorably and give full credence to what he shall say for the Republic of Korea.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest esteem and of the friendship entertained for you and for the Government and people of the United States of America by the Government and people of the Republic of Korea.

Most cordially,  
/Sgd./ Park Chung Hee

Seoul, April 8 , 1969

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By SC NARA Date 7-10-08 at of State

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Classification

**OUTGOING TELEGRAM**

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DECLASSIFICATION DATE 2/12/76

PER M Smith OFFICE EAIP

STATE

FADRC FOI CASE NO. 5-C-310 Simmons

North Korean's have announced shootdown of US aircraft quote

~~quote~~/which intruded into DPRK airspace ~~quote~~ unquote.

An EC-121 is missing over Sea of Japan at approximately 41 degrees 12 minutes north and 131 degrees 48 minutes

east. It was under orders not to approach closer than

50 nautical miles to Korea and was apparently attacked

at least that far from coast, tho details still lacking.

Search underway for crew of 31 rpt. 31. Please ask

Soviets to alert any ships they may have nearby to pick

up ~~any~~ possible survivors.

End

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ROGERS

Drafted by: AR EA/K:JLeonard Tel. Ext. \_\_\_\_\_ Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: S/S/O:HLHeymann

Clearances: WLD

**UNCLASSIFIED**  
Classification

F760007-0334 April 15, 1969

To : The Secretary  
Through: S/S  
From : INR - Thomas L. Hughes *TLH*

Subject: North Korea: Estimated Reactions of Selected East Asian Countries and the Soviet Union to Possible US Courses of Action

In this IN we estimate the probable reactions of Communist China, the USSR, North Korea, South Korea and Japan to two alternative courses of action which the US may consider in connection with the shootdown of a US reconnaissance aircraft by the North Koreans in the Sea of Japan on April 15, 1969. One alternative considered is a mild US reaction employing diplomacy and foregoing the use of force; the other alternative is a stronger US reaction including the use of force.

Communist China. If the incident results in diplomatic rather than military action, Peking may well respond in a fashion similar to its handling of the Pueblo affair in January 1968. At that time Peking took a relatively cautious approach which gave support to North Korea but avoided any resounding public commitment to Pyongyang.

A somewhat stronger Chinese propaganda reaction can be expected in the event that the US retaliates militarily against North Korea or if rescue operations result in a clash between North Korean and US forces. However, the Chinese undoubtedly would wish to avoid a widening of the conflict, particularly at a time when Peking is in the final stages of its Party Congress and concerned with a Soviet threat along the Sino-Manchurian border.

Though Peking would probably take certain defense measures such as increased

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air patrols, Chinese military backing to the North Koreans seems unlikely unless Peking perceives a direct threat to its own security.

The Soviet Union. In response to a US diplomatic offensive the USSR will render Pyongyang full support, as it did at the time of the Pueblo crisis. Whatever it may think of the justness of the North Korean case, the USSR will publicly deride US claims. Moreover, because of its desire to preserve its role as protector of other communist states, the USSR (although it could not prevent UN discussion of the issue) would veto any UN resolution calling for an international investigation, as it did in 1960 in the case of the shoot-down of the RB-47 off the Soviet coast. Any step the US might take in the diplomatic realm would probably not be regarded by Moscow as a threat to its interests and any such step would be unlikely to have an adverse effect on bilateral US-Soviet relations.

As it demonstrated at the time of the Pueblo incident, the USSR regards any US military presence near its borders as a potential threat to itself. Moscow will probably take steps through private channels to dissuade the US from taking military action against North Korea, warning inter alia of the dangers of provoking Chinese intervention.

Any military action against a target in the upper half of North Korea would be regarded as posing a possible threat to Soviet airspace and perhaps territory. Any action elsewhere in North Korea would be vigorously condemned by the USSR. In neither instance, however, would a Soviet military response be likely unless Soviet airspace was violated, although the intensity of Soviet reactions may be determined in part by Peking's response. Moscow would, under any circumstance, replenish any losses of materiel Pyongyang might suffer.

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To add force to its condemnation of the US for military actions against North Korea, the USSR would probably take some steps to reduce contacts with the US, perhaps in the area of cultural exchanges and would exploit US actions to draw world attention away from its actions in Czechoslovakia. Only in the event that the US engaged in repeated attacks on North Korea or that general war broke out in Korea would the USSR be likely to curtail for more than a short period those contacts with the US which it regards as important.

Japan. If the US limits itself to a rescue operation and diplomatic measures such as a protest to Pyongyang, the impact in Japan will be minimal. A short-lived show of force and no further engagement with the North Koreans, e.g., the retention of naval and air forces in the Sea of Japan for three or four days after the rescue operation, would cause a more intense reaction, reflecting Japanese popular fear of involvement in war.

The longer and stronger the US military response, the less the Sato government will welcome it, because of the catalysing effect on opposition campaigns against the Security Treaty even if bases in Japan and Okinawa were not involved. The left wing opposition (the JCP and JSP) would welcome a US military response. It would come just as Sohyo's spring wage struggle is peaking and provide an emotional curtain raiser for Okinawan reversion demonstrations planned for April 28. By linking the plane incident and its aftermath with other issues, the left wing would hope to raise the level of public anxiety and excitement sufficiently to compel demonstrations by Komeito, the Democratic Socialist Party, and the conservative labor federation, Domei. The immediate objective would be to force Sato's resignation.

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Should the US response come from units based in Okinawa, local reversionists could be expected to cover up their differences and pump life into their plans for the annual April 28 reversion rally. Use of Okinawa would also enhance opposition efforts for reversion in Japan, and embarrass the Sato government.

Should the US make a military response from bases in Japan, the Sato government would presumably state publicly that it had been consulted under the Security Treaty and had agreed. However, GOJ embarrassment would be acute and would probably be leaked to the press. Sato would probably come under fire from those in his own party who would like to replace him and he might be forced to step down.

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Authority NNS 96 900  
By SL NARA Date 7-10-08 **SECRET**

North Korea. Any protests or demands we raise through diplomatic channels directly with the North Koreans are likely to be brushed aside in a flood of counter-charges about alleged American provocations. The North Koreans have already laid the groundwork to deal with our accusations by requesting a Military Armistice Commission (MAC) meeting for April 18. Pyongyang Radio's announcement of the plane downing claimed that the aircraft had intruded deep into North Korean airspace and added without elaboration a charge of simultaneous US provocation on the DMZ. The North Koreans obviously intend to press these charges if we accept the MAC meeting.

Protests or demarches through third countries or in the UN are not likely to have any effect on Pyongyang, judging by their handling of the Pueblo incident.

The North Koreans probably do not expect military retaliation by the United States. They probably chose the EC 121 as a target in the belief -- buttressed by the Pueblo experience -- that they could humiliate the United States at minimum risk. Had they desired a direct confrontation, an attack across the DMZ would have been the simplest provocation.

Nevertheless, the North Koreans have the will and the capability to defend themselves vigorously and at considerable cost to an attacking force. As an indication of North Korean reaction, the Pyongyang announcement of the plane downing warned that the North Korean People's Army would "retaliate immediately to any provocative acts of the U.S. imperialist aggressors with a hundredfold revenge." This broad deterrent statement parallels other North Korean warnings to the US recently, for example in connection with the joint US/ROK mobile

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By SC NARA Date 7-10-08 SECRET

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exercise conducted in March. Its operational meaning has never been tested, but it suggests at the minimum a readiness to deal with retaliatory efforts with all the military means available.

The possibility of less rational action by the North Koreans cannot be dismissed, including counter-measures against US installations in South Korea either along the DMZ or bases in the ROK interior. However, they probably recognize that they are in no position to undertake prolonged hostilities with the United States, unless they are backed by either the Soviet Union or Communist China. They cannot be sure of support from either at this stage.

Republic of Korea. A low-key US response would meet with strong ROK disapproval and a sharp decline in South Korean confidence in the United States. Coming after what they regard as a weak response to the Pueblo and DMZ incidents, they would regard such a response as an open invitation to further and stronger North Korean provocation. Fear of such actions could lead the government to impose stricter internal security controls.

Conversely, of course, the ROK would welcome a strong US response, which would not only bolster their own confidence but be regarded by them also as enhancing US stature and position in East Asia.

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Authority EO 12958  
By MM NARA Date 08/14/03

Halperin

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

April 15, 1969

SECRET

TO: EA - Ambassador Brown

FROM: L - George H. Aldrich GHA

SUBJECT: Relationship of Armistice Agreement to the North Korean Shooting Down of a U.S. Reconnaissance Aircraft

1. The question has been raised whether the North Korean shooting down of a United States reconnaissance plane over international waters off Korea involves a violation of the Armistice Agreement. This question is not free from doubt, and a reasonable argument can be made for both conclusions. The Agreement requires each side to "order and enforce complete cessation of all hostilities in Korea by all armed forces under their control." With respect to air forces, paragraph 16 provided:

"This Armistice Agreement shall apply to all opposing air forces, which air forces shall respect the air space over the Demilitarized Zone and over the area of Korea under the military control of the opposing side, and over the waters contiguous to both."

It was clearly understood during the negotiations of the Armistice Agreement that the phrase "contiguous waters" referred to a twelve-mile side strip adjacent to the coasts of Korea and that normal air and naval activity outside of twelve miles would be permitted. However, it is not clear from either the text or the negotiating history whether attacks outside of the twelve-mile limit would constitute violations of the Armistice. Clearly attacks unrelated to the security of Korea would not involve Armistice violations, but for attacks on a ship or aircraft whose function is clearly related to the support of the U.N. Command, there is no clear answer.

A second problem in the present case is the fact that the aircraft was not operationally under the U.N. Command and flew out of Japan. A technical reading of the Armistice Agreement could easily result in the conclusion that attacks on non-U.N. Command aircraft were not violations. On the other hand, since the states involved in the Korean War

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Authority EOI 2958  
By NN NARA Date 08/14/03

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were, in effect, bound by the Agreement signed by their military representatives, it is probably more reasonable to consider that all armed forces of these states are bound, at least insofar as they are operating in direct support of one side in Korea.

2. The question has also been asked whether any forceful response by the United States would involve a violation by us of the Armistice Agreement. I believe that it would, at least unless limited to an action against a ship or aircraft found more than twelve miles from the Korean coast. As noted above, the Agreement applies to all forces of the opposing sides. That should be understood to cover forces in Korea or other forces with a direct functional relationship to those forces. Attacks within Korea by our side or by the other must be considered Armistice violations without regard to the command structure of these forces. Thus, a responsive use of force in Korea would inevitably involve an Armistice violation. However, use of force by one side against the other outside the twelve-mile limit may arguably be either a violation of the Armistice Agreement or not. If that responsive use of force is related to hostile acts within Korea, the better conclusion probably is that it constitutes an Armistice violation.

In conclusion, I would point out that, as a matter of law, little if anything turns on the question of armistice violations. A violation by one side gives rise to no right for the other side to use force in response. Any resort to force must be justified under general international law. As you know, within the framework of the U.N. Charter, states are generally prohibited from using force against another state except in self-defense or when authorized by appropriate U.N. organs or by a regional organization.

L - Mr. Aldrich:lm

SECRET

By KW NARA, Date 5/13/04

TELCON  
Secy Rogers  
Mr. Kissinger  
4-15-69 10:00 AM

K said he wanted to tell him that specific orders given by the President that these planes cannot fire on anything unless they are attacked. K said it was a very strong point of R's and he told the President immediately.

R said he was going to have Dobrynin in at 12:00. K said President does not want any protest to anyone. R said he was not going to protest - he wanted to talk to Dobrynin about helping to save the men. R said he was coming over soon and would talk to the ~~Pres~~ President. K said he thinks the ~~Pres~~ President is inclined to play this in low key and to say nothing to anyone until we know where we are headed. R repeated that he is going to talk to Dobrynin about helping to save the men. R said he might also tell him we have asked that no ships engaged in rescue mission be fired on. K said he saw no harm in that.

jm

By KLU NARA, Date 5/13/04

TELCON  
The President  
Mr. Kissinger  
4/15/69 5:40 p. m.

P: Anything further on the plane?

K: Nothing further yet, no.

P: It should be daylight there pretty soon.

K: We should be getting word within two hours.

P: Probably no survivors.

K: Or picked up -- strong probability no survivors.  
We are getting reports on North Korean assets abroad and they're very discouraging. One Korean ship which is sailing with Dutch registry, and Dutch crew and flag--so it's almost impossible to seize that.

P: Check with the Dutch; they ought to want to help us.  
It's a question of doing that or something else.  
~~Yxxxxx~~ Why not pick up a half-dozen fishing boats?

K: They don't come out in the open seas.

P: No North Korean ships on the high seas at all?

K: The largest ship is the PUEBLO and of course they're keeping that in the port. It hasn't been out at all since they captured it.

P: Well, the more I think about it--there has to be some reaction here.  
I have a feeling they're testing us.

K: That's clearly true.

P: I'm not among those who think that this matter may not be pretty directly related to the other side.

K: It could be related. Domestically, there will be among the intellectuals considerable heat if we do the other thing. Curiously enough, some of the members of my staff feel we ought to do what you and I were talking about earlier. They feel to let this one go again will be taken very seriously. There was an intelligence report of Nasser's conversation with Hussein to the effect, "After all, it isn't so risky  
xxx

By KMLW NARA, Date 5/13/04

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to defy the United States -- look at North Korea and the PUEBLO."

P: And look at Peru. No, I think that's right. OK, I certainly lean in that direction.

K: I'm going to have a complete plan for this over to you this evening.

P: I wonder what the situation is on...

K: And we won't present it to the NSC.

P: Rogers is going to be before the press tomorrow--editors -- at noon. Don't put this before the NSC.

K: We will present to the NSC what happened and a whole list of actions on what could be taken, but with no emphasis on any one, and no details.

K: I talked to Rogers about Cleveland and he would prefer him as Ambassador to Italy.

P: That wouldn't bother me.

By KLU NARA, Date 5/13/04

Telecon  
The President  
April 14<sup>15</sup>, 1969 6:30 p. m.

The President wanted to know what the situation on the Dutch ship and crew was. HAK said they still haven't located it yet. It has been reported to be in the high seas. The P said he would assume HAK has checked with the lawyers but not the State lawyers. The P said his view would be to pick up the ship. As soon as it has been paid for, is that impossible? HAK said the first reports were that it was. After their discussions, he told them that another look had to be taken. The President said it was impossible to pick up the Pueblo too but they did. We should pick up the crew and take them back to Holland. When they give us the Pueblo, we'll give them their ship. He asked what kind of ship it was. HAK said it was one of their largest fishing ships. The President said O. K., "I think we should just pick the darn thing up." We should check with the Dutch to see where it is and all the circumstances. He said he would be willing to take heavy criticism for this.

HAK said he had already put this on a high priority basis. The President said to find a way that international law can be breached. The U.S. became a great nation by breaking international law. The President said we certainly have concluded that we won't just ~~sit~~ sit here and do nothing. HAK agreed. The President said even if the peaceniks on HAK's staff didn't agree. HAK said he didn't have any peaceniks on his staff. The President said he was just kidding. HAK said the State Department had a paper on diplomatic actions. The President said the ~~the~~ price is too high to pay not to do anything. He said you recall Nasser's statement and said "I just think we have to do something here. If we don't face up to the Dutch, we have to face the Navy action." HAK said the Navy was coming in with a plan and that we would suffer little or no losses. They would come in low. The President said (someone) is trying to pursue the line that recon plans are fair game. This was not a regular recon plan, was it? HAK said it definitely was not. This plane has been doing the same thing for 15 years without protest. It had been a deliberate plan to get it ~~and they never~~ They were moving two mig 21s which would not signal anything in particular to us about their intentions. The President wanted to know what Defense has said. HAK said they have just put out the facts. That the closest point was 15 miles and that it was attacked 100 miles out. The President said Rogers would have to say something tomorrow to the editors he is meeting with and that he probably wouldn't be able to attend the NSC meeting. HAK said the President wouldn't be making any decision on this tomorrow anyway. The President said, "no, no, I won't even discuss it, just listen."



By KML NARA, Date 5/13/04

The President said that ship must not get to North Korea. We'll just tell the Dutch we'll buy the darn ship. HAK said he would run it through again.

The President wanted to know if HAK had any lawyers on ~~his~~ his staff. HAK said no and that he would have to work through State. The President wanted to know if Justice would do anything. HAK said yes, I'll try them. The President said, I just happened to have Mitchell here in my office. "I'll let you talk to him".

Mitchell wanted to know what the problem was. HAK said he didn't have the full facts. There is this ship (North Korean) sailing under Dutch crew. The N. K. sent the ship to the Netherlands and when we made some point about picking it up because of the Pueblo, they changed their crew. The President wants to know if its illegal to pick up the ship. Mitchell asked if we knew the contractual arrangements between the Dutch and North Korea. HAK said we have very sketchy facts. Mitchell said we should contact the proper Embassy in Holland; they must have the information on the legal arrangements. HAK said he would get all the facts together. The reports have been very bad. Mitchell said do we know where the ship is. HAK said it is reported to be on the high seas but that hasn't been confirmed as yet.

The President came back on and said we will do all we can do here but he has determined in his ownmind that we are going to do something "even if I have to ~~override~~ <sup>override</sup> everybody in the State Department."

HAK said when we move the carrier to another position, we should make it public. If we try to keep it a secret, they will think we are serious, otherwise it might come off as a bluff.

The President wanted to know if HAK had anything good to tell him. HAK said ~~no~~ no. The President said he thought HAK's conversation with Dobrynin was good. HAK said he was concerned; that we should look dangerous. The President said how about doing the lunch plan and getting caught. They took the ship so we get Cambodia. HAK said the lunch plan would be used only if they turned us down on the other. The President said he wanted every plane into South Korea. HAK said they were all ready to go but that we should go careful on this. The President agreed. The President said it should be easy to pick up that ship. Just go out and get it. HAK said Defense and CIA were working on the location.

The President called back to say that HAK should call Loyds of London; they should know where the ship is. If not, call that man in the Hauge and tell him we have this problem and want to know where the ship is. HAK said he would follow through.

By KLV NARA, Date 5/13/04

TELCON  
The President  
Mr. Kissinger  
4-15-69 10:00 PM

President said another option had occurred to him with greater symbolic meaning - a Navy blockade of the one port of significance. K said he was sure it could be done. President referred to Cuban blockade and said question is how long can it be maintained. K said that is the problem. President said he was thinking of the impact. President said people say it does not mean anything, but it means a lot to a lot of people. President said it is good when there is something specific that you want to get done - there is nothing they can do to get the blockade lifted. K said except to pay damages. President said that is what he meant - we want that and the return of the Pueblo. President said it would not take a lot to blockade that place. K said on the other hand there is not much going in or out either so it may be an empty gesture. President said they have to live so there is something going in and out. President referred to three Polish ships which have to come in - they could be kept out. K said they could unload elsewhere and ship down by ~~Spain~~. K said he would have it looked into. President said he wants to get something that has symbolism - that is what we are talking about. President said it could be signal of what we are going to do down below. President said we could keep it for a few months and then lift it but not say anything. K said if they wanted to play it nastily, we could get hit with it every day - harrasing us, etc. K said he would look at it and give the President pros and cons tomorrow.

K said he has some more information on ship - it is in the area of Capetown and supposed to reach Hong Kong on April 23 and go on to Korea. Told President about payment breakdown - 20% down payment had been made by Koreans and they owe 80%; loan has been guaranteed by Dutch government. President asked about title. K said we do not think it has passed, it is still a Dutch ship. K said we would have to compensate the Dutch Government 5 1/2 million dollars. President said that is awful small compared to risks taken in other areas. President said there is a lot of symbolism in that.

K said we have assigned State to come up with legal opinion supporting President if he decides to seize ship. President said throw the blockade one at them too. K said o.k. - all of this will be discussed at 3:00 meeting tomorrow. K said the Cuban blockade worked because they thought we were heading for an invasion. President said he knows it is not on all fours at all.

By KML NARA, Date 5/13/04

President said he was just looking over military plans. They want to hit two other air fields because they are not so close to the Soviet border. President said there is something to be said about fields not so close to Soviet border. K said he told them to make a plan and give the President all reasons why they are opposed to it and then President can choose - K said we will throw blockade into it too. President said he thought blockade was better than mining.

President said he would like to make meeting in the morning relatively brief. K agreed.

jm



By KLU NAFA, Date 5/13/04

TELECON

Dr. Kissinger to

Dr. Kramer

11:00 p. m. , 4/15/69

K -- Asked Kramer how much he would press for strong action in the current situation.

Kramer -- Recommends immediate reaction in the strongest possible fashion in order that it would avoid that this would be repeated. Believe that any indication of our not immediately reacting strongly will only lead to further action on the other side.

K -- My worry is the domestic situation.

Kr -- The nation will essentially follow strong leadership ~~regardless~~ regardless of what certain people or certain groups will do. Sixty-five per cent will follow the President of the United States if he goes before the people and says, 'this is the situation -- I had to act.' Thirty-five per cent will be against the President. I don't think we can take it because otherwise we will be involved in the Mid-East, in Korea, in South Vietnam, in Berlin and in Latin America by more or less coordinated action against us. I feel we should react immediately and strongly. Have you talked to General Woodward?

K -- I know what to do. My problem is, is it psychologically wise?

Kr -- You will find the NY Times and the Washington Post against you, but not the nation. Talk, for example, to Meany. People like that have untold members, who will endorse strong action. There will not be a reaction in this country that will be averse to the President except for that small percentage which would be averse anyway. I would not be afraid of that, and I don't say it because of my well-known prejudices, but based on an objective analysis of the situation. Even if you read today's NY Times, the nation will follow a strong leadership. The President doesn't have anything to fear. He will only find the same critics who would criticize him anyway. I recommend you talk with M/Gen Woodward who for years has negotiated with the North Koreans. He is a cynic, but unbelievably brilliant. He is very unpleasant but very bright and realistic. In this country, nobody will be able to do any harm to the Commander-in-Chief. I, for instance, have been of the opinion that if, in Vietnam, you should be relatively statesmanlike, we would have a crisis in Korea. It is one of the crises I have predicted -- next the Middle East. These are interconnected. North Korea might hit, but they

By KW NARA, Date 5/13/04

can't continue it. Talk with General Yarborough. I'm sure you will get the same answer as from me. I assure you of one thing. If ever we seem willing to give in one area, we will immediately be in greater difficulties than ever in all others.

K -- However, there is a domestic problem here which I think Haig has explained to you.

Kr -- Referenced the NYTimes article again -- concerning various members of Congress -- everybody is willing to give President Nixon some time to think it over. Even the most hostile members of Congress. The nation would definitely go along. If you do not react immediately, then these probing actions from the other side will finally lead to something that goes beyond probing action -- then you are in a real crisis. I will be here at Ft. Benning for the next two or three days -- please feel free to call me.

*[Handwritten initials]*

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# TELEGRAM

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Authority *MNS 96 900*  
By *SC* NARA Date *7-10-08*



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LIMDIS

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

1. THE FOLLOWING ESTIMATE OF NK MOTIVES IN ATTACKING PLANE AND THEIR POSSIBLE REACTIONS TO VARIOUS COURSES OF ACTION, AND SOME SUGGESTIONS ARE PRESENTED IN EFFORT TO CONTRIBUTE TO CONSIDERATION OF THIS VEXING PROBLEM.

2. FIRST, WE ASSUME THAT THE "GO" ORDER FOR THE NK INTERCEPTORS CAME FROM THE HIGHEST LEVELS AND THAT THERE WAS LITTLE LIKELIHOOD OF SPONTANEITY IN VIEW OF REPETITIVE NATURE OF THE FLIGHTS. (WE ASSUME THEY WERE REPETITIVE.) A FURTHER ASSUMPTION IS THAT NORTH KOREA, HAVING MADE THE DECISION, ANTICIPATED EITHER NO MILITARY RESPONSE OR ONLY A LIMITED ONE. THEIR EXPERIENCE IN THE PUEBLO AND BLUE HOUSE AFFAIRS WOULD JUSTIFY THIS ASSUMPTION ON THEIR PART.

3. AS WE CITE MOTIVES AND GUESS AT REASONING WE ARE AWARE THAT SOME OF OUR IDEAS MAY BE CONSIDERED IN WASHINGTON AS "WAY OUT", BUT WE SHOULD ALL KEEP IN MIND THAT NK REGIME HAS LONG BEEN THAT FAR OUT AND IS ACCUSTOMED TO ACCEPT RISKS AND BRAZEN ITS WAY THROUGH THEM. MOREOVER, WE BELIEVE THAT EACH OF THESE "VICTORIES" MAKES THEIR LEADER WHOM THEY NOW CALL "THE RED SUN OF ASIA" AND "THE EVER-VICTORIOUS IRON-WILLED GENIUS" MORE DANGEROUS. HOPEFULLY, BY NOW WE UNDERSTAND THAT LEGAL NICETIES WILL NOT PROTECT SHIPS AND AIRCRAFT WHICH VENTURE WITHIN HIS REACH.

4. AS TO NK MOTIVES AND REASONING:

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A. IF THE US RESPONSE TAKES THE FORM OF A MILITARY THREAT OR A LIMITED STRIKE, THE BENEFITS TO NK WILL BE MANIFOLD. DOMESTICALLY, A VERY TOUGH POPULACE WILL BE SPURRED ON TO GREATER FEATS OF PRODUCTION THAT MAY NOW BE CRUCIAL. ADDITIONALLY, THE DISPUTES IN NK WHATEVER THEY ARE, THAT HAVE BEEN HINTED AT IN RECENT NK PRONOUNCEMENTS MAY BE STILLED IN THE FACE OF TANGIBLE EXTERNAL PRESSURE. SUCH GAINS TO THE REGIME WOULD OUTWEIGH THE PHYSICAL LOSSES ANTICIPATED FROM A LIMITED U.S. STRIKE.

B. REPORTS OF U.S. WAR-WEARINESS OVER VIET-NAM AND OF A GROWING UNEASINESS ABOUT OUR MILITARY WISDOM MAY HAVE LED THE NK LEADERSHIP TO THINK SUCH AN ACT WOULD ENCOURAGE THE US PUBLIC TO WASH THEIR HANDS OF THE KOREAN PROBLEM. THEY MAY FEEL THE PUEBLO HEARINGS HAVE DONE MUCH TO EXPEDITE THIS SENTIMENT AND HOPE THAT YESTERDAY'S STRAW WILL PROVE THE FINAL ONE.

C. REGARDLESS OF WHAT FOLLOWS, THE FACT THAT A CLAIMED INTRUDER BELONGING TO THE MIGHTIEST AIR FORCE IN THE WORLD WAS SHOT DOWN IS A PROPAGANDA TRIUMPH NOT TO BE DISPARAGED, ESPECIALLY WHEN ACHIEVED IN CLOSE CONJUNCTION WITH THE LEADER'S BIRTHDAY, AND PARTICULARLY SO IN THE CASE OF A REGIME WHICH BASES ITS PHILOSOPHY ON THE THEORY THAT THE U.S. GIANT CAN BE BROUGHT DOWN BY THE CONCERTED ATTACKS OF THE REVOLUTIONARY LILLIPUTIANS. INCONCLUSIVE RETALIATION BY THE U.S. WOULD ONLY ENHANCE THE DESIRED IMAGE.

D. THE ABSENCE OF FORCEFUL RETALIATION WILL OF COURSE INCREASE RESENTMENT AND FRUSTRATION IN THE ROK. ON THE OTHER HAND, FROM THE NK POINT OF VIEW, ESCALATION RESULTING FROM RETALIATION CAN ONLY LEAD LARGE AND INFLUENTIAL SEGMENTS OF THE US TO QUESTION WHY WE ARE GETTING INVOLVED IN AN ACTION AS A RESULT OF THE POSITION OF A U.S. AIRCRAFT WHOSE LOCATION IS DISPUTED.

E. THE WORLD CONF. OF COMMUNIST PARTIES IS DUE SOON. NK RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIETS HAVE GROWN WARMER AFTER A BRIEF CHILL FOLLOWING PUEBLO. HOWEVER, THERE IS NO DOUBT THE CHINESE ARE THE MORE COMPATIBLE IDEOLOGICAL BEDFELLOWS. AT THIS POINT IN TIME WITH A GROWING AND MILITANT ROK/US PRESENCE IN THE SOUTH THE SPECTER OF A DEEP AND PERHAPS IRREVOCABLE CPR/USSR SPLIT MUST BE PARTICULARLY FOREBODING. IF A THREAT TO NK COULD FORESTALL A FINAL SPLIT ITS PROVOCATION MIGHT BE WORTHWHILE.

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# TELEGRAM



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F. N.K. UNDOUBTEDLY KNEW THE PLANES FLEW OUT OF JAPAN. THEY HAVE NEVER MADE ANY SECRET OF THEIR DISTRUST FOR, OR FEAR OF, US/JAPAN MILITARY COOPERATION. CREATING AN INCIDENT INVOLVING U.S. PLANES EX-JAPAN MAY HAVE BEEN SEEN AS AN OPPORTUNITY TO THROW MORE SAND INTO AN ALREADY CONGESTED MACHINE.

G. U.S. OPPOSITION TO RETALIATORY POLICES AS CURRENTLY PRACTICED IN THE M.E. MAY WELL INHIBIT U.S. REACTION.

H. AN EFFECTIVE NO-RESCUE SHOOT-DOWN AT SEA, WHICH THEY APPEAR TO HAVE ACHIEVED, WOULD PUT THEM IN A SATISFACTORY POSITION FROM THEIR VIEWPOINT TO CONTEST U.S. CLAIMS THAT THE INCIDENT OCCURRED IN INTERNATIONAL AIRSPACE.

5. MY CONCLUSION IS THAT THE ADVANTAGES TO NK IN TAKING THE RISK APPEAR TO THEM TO OUTWEIGH OURS IN RESPONDING MILITARILY. THE ONLY IMMEDIATELY USEFUL OPTION APPEARS TO BE THAT IMPLIED BY YOUR ACTION THUS FAR--ADOPTION OF A POSTURE OF CALM AND OBJECTIVE INQUIRY AND ATTEMPT TO OBTAIN A DISINTERESTED SOVIET INVOLVEMENT BY SEEKING COOPERATION IN AN AIR-SEA RESCUE OPERATION. HERE WITHIN THE ROK, IF WE NOTE AN EXCESSIVE REACTION, WE CAN IF WE DESIRE MAKE CERTAIN POINTS TO WHICH I BELIEVE THE ROKG WOULD BE ATTENTIVE. WE WOULD OF COURSE HAVE THE LOCAL PRESS ON OUR BACKS, FOR A TIME, BUT THAT IS NOT AN UNBEARABLE BURDEN.

6. IF LEVERAGE ON NK IS BEING SOUGH, I REGRET TO SAY THAT IT APPEARS TO EXIST ONLY IN THE FORM OF THEIR GREAT ATTACHMENT TO THE MAC MEETINGS, TO WHICH THEY SUMMON THE UN/US REGULARLY, AND I CANNOT SAY WITH CERTAINTY WHAT EFFECT OUR RELUCTANCE TO MEET THEIR SUMMONS WOULD PRODUCE. ALSO, THERE IS THE POSSIBLE EFFECT THAT U.S. INTEREST IN THE MOVEMENT OF THEIR SHIPSSD BUILDING IN EUROPEAN YARDS AND THEIR FREEDOM OF THE SEAS WOULD HAVE ON THEM. MAXIMUM ISOLATION AND QUARANTINE, TO THE EXTENT THE JAPANESE AND OTHERS TRADING WITH THEM WOULD COOPERATE, IS ANOTHER RESPONSE WORTH CONSIDERING BUT I THINK WE KNOW THE ANSWERS WE WOULD GET TO PROPOSALS OF THAT NATURE.

7. ALL OF THE FOREGOING IS APART FROM THE VALUE OF SUCH AIR MISSIONS AND EXERCISES NEAR THEIR COASTS, WHICH I HAVE CONSISTENTLY CHALLENGED, AND TO WHICH I SHALL RETURN IN A SEPARATE TELEGRAM.

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8\* IN CONSIDERING HOW TO DEAL WITH A REGIME OF THIS NATURE I  
 TEND TO REDUCE MY CHOICE TO THE DESIRABILITY OF ISOLATING THEM  
 IN EVERY POSSIBLE WAY, INCLUDING OF COURSE NOT PLACING  
 UNPROTECTED TUBS AND ANTIQUATED AIRCRAFT WITHIN THEIR REACH  
 WHILE AT THE SAME TIME UNDERTAKING AN EFFORT TO AFFECT THE  
 ENTRAILS OF THE REGIME BY INDUCING OUR ROK FRIENDS TO MAKE GESTURES  
 TOWARD POSTAL EXCHANGE, CULTURAL EXCHANGE, AND FAMILY CONTACTS,  
 WHICH I HAVE ALREADY PROPOSED TO DEPARTMENT.

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

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April 16, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger

SUBJECT: NSC Meeting on Korea, April 16, 1969 -- 10:00 a. m.

Attached are draft talking points and a paper produced by the Review Group for the NSC meeting on Korea.

I have informed Secretary Laird that you do not wish to have any detailed discussion of military options at this meeting. I am sending you separately an analysis of the pros and cons of various military options.

Attachments

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TALKING POINTS - NSC MEETING

April 16, 1969

KOREA

- I. At this meeting I would like to have a discussion for perhaps one hour of what our specific options and alternatives are.
- II. We might begin with the briefings that have been requested:
  - A. A briefing by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, on the EC121 operation (5 minutes).
  - B. A briefing by the Director of Central Intelligence on the enemy situation (5 minutes).
  - C. A briefing by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, on the full range of available military options (15 minutes).
  - D. A briefing by the Secretary of State on political considerations and options (15 minutes).
- III. Call on Dr. Kissinger to open the discussion.

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HAK TALKING POINTS - NSC MEETING

April 16, 1969

KOREA

- I. The paper prepared by the Review Group assumed that the North Koreans have not captured any survivors. It also assumed that this was action dictated by the North Koreans and was not part of a Soviet or Asian Communist plan.
- II. The paper then lists the possible objectives of actions we might take as follows:
  - A. Maintain our right to use international airspace.
  - B. Deter similar hostile actions by North Korea or other countries.
  - C. Exact retribution by retaliation or compensation.
  - D. Maintain an acceptable international image.
  - E. Maintain domestic support for our overseas security commitments, including Vietnam.
- III. The alternative possible courses of action are then evaluated in terms of achieving one or more of these objectives and in terms of the risk of military escalation and the military costs of each operation.
- IV. General Wheeler has already discussed the military courses of action and I will not try to summarize these. The paper presents some of

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the pros and cons of the alternatives which Gen. Wheeler has also discussed. It also presents a package of diplomatic actions which could accompany various levels of force and discusses the purposes of diplomatic action.

A. Should we engage in a military show of force, the purposes of diplomacy would be:

- 1. To underline seriousness with which we view North Korean action.
- 2. To demonstrate responsibility and restraint of U. S. reaction.
- 3. To establish legal basis for U. S. position.
- 4. To promote international acceptance of U. S. military action.
- 5. To secure domestic support for U. S. military action.

B. If we engage in single strikes or broader military action, the purposes of diplomacy would be:

- 1. To establish the legal basis for the U. S. action.
- 2. To neutralize international criticism and censure and to develop a modicum of international support for the action.
- 3. To seek public support for the U. S. action in Korea and for continued U. S. commitments elsewhere in Asia, particularly in Vietnam.

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- V. The first options presented assume no military action and considered two basic alternative diplomatic postures.
- A. A high posture designed to seek a maximum of publicity and to mobilize public opinion.
  - B. A low posture of working behind the scenes to achieve some accommodation.
- VI. With a high or low posture we could seek to convey privately our genuine determination to react militarily to any future provocation.
- A. Diplomatic steps might include one or more of such objectives as:
    1. Conveying an explicit warning that the next incident would be responded to militarily.
    2. Conveying a maximum warning for deterrent purposes without being precise on military action ensuing.
    3. Demanding compensation for the lives of the men involved and for the plane.
    4. Maximizing international opprobrium against North Korea for its action.
    5. Seeking to reduce the level of international tension by treating the matter in relatively calm form (having already decided not to react militarily).

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The paper also considered options with regard to the following:

A. Talks at Panmunjom

1. Accept the North Korean call for April 18 meeting, listen to their complaint, present our own position in a few sentences and then walk out. This has the advantage of maintaining the Panmunjom forum while walking out implies that we will not continue to accept Panmunjom as a forum for propaganda. It has the disadvantage of putting us in the apparent position of coming to hear North Korean charges.
2. Call our own meeting for an earlier date. This has the advantage of making us the plaintiff and having us speak first. The North Koreans would probably press their claim to convene the meeting and a procedural hassle could ensue.
3. Call for a closed meeting on the Pueblo model. This has the advantage of a forum for making a serious warning. However, it is not necessary and the ROK public would probably be angered.
4. Boycott Panmunjom. This has the advantage of being dramatic and denying the North Koreans a propaganda forum. But the disadvantages are that we would lose our only channel for direct contact.

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B. UN Options

- 1. Calling a Security Council Meeting. This would gain maximum publicity but we could not obtain any action and we would force the Soviets to defend the North Koreans.
- 2. Present a letter to the Security Council. This gets our position on the record but with little publicity and appears perfunctory.

C. Approach to the Soviets. We could approach the Soviets in a more pressing fashion, depending on their apparent interest in avoiding a military conflict. However, the Soviets are unlikely to press Pyongyang very hard on this situation.

VII. Perhaps we should first discuss the overall pros and cons of taking any military action and then consider the diplomacy which we might pursue in the absence of military action and then in support of alternate courses of military action.

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MEMORANDUM

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

PARTICIPANTS: President Nixon  
 Vice President Agnew  
 William Rogers, Secretary of State  
 Melvin R. Laird, Secretary of Defense  
 Gen. George A. Lincoln, Director,  
 Office of Emergency Preparedness  
 Elliot Richardson, Under Secretary of State  
 Gen. Earle G. Wheeler, Chairman,  
 Joint Chiefs of Staff  
 Richard Helms, Director of Central Intelligence  
 Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the  
 President for National Security Affairs  
 Winthrop Brown, Deputy Assistant Secretary  
 of State  
 Col. Alexander Haig, NSC Staff  
 Richard Sneider, NSC Staff  
 Brig. General Ralph Douglas Steakley, USAF,  
 Deputy Director (Operations) for Reconnaissance,  
 Joint Staff

DATE AND TIME: Wednesday, April 16, 1969

PLACE: The Cabinet Room

SUBJECT: NSC Meeting on North Korean Downing of  
U.S. EC-121 Reconnaissance Aircraft

[The following is a transcription of Col. Haig's notes.]

Helms: No North Korean claim of being in their air space. Only a limited North Korean military reaction. Possible strip alert, plus air defense alert. No ground alert.

Few incidents surpassed this one, the Pueblo excepted. Increased provocations.

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Soviet ships in area of search - no indication of survivors.

Wrap-up of North Korean Navy: 10 Komars.

Army comparisons: About even in ground force. With U.S. air support, they have about even capabilities.

The President: 1965 incident. We escorted for six months during daylight, but went to . . .

Get me the history on incidents in this area, especially since 1953 through 1955 period.

Steakley: Route of mission -- inconsistencies; speeds.

The closest point was 38 nautical miles. Not consistent that it went in.

Maybe exploratory signal. North Korean fighters went airborne. Advisory warning signal went to aircraft. Condition 3 -- fighters airborne -- heads up. Three minutes later, second track picked up on conversion tracks. Condition 5 alert -- plane turned. Third message sent but probably after shutdown.

Fix of shutdown has remained consistent. Soviet track consistent with our track.

Mission flown nine times since November. [Reviewed typical mission.] Soviet tracking normal. Seldom done by North Koreans.

The President:

General Wheeler: Review of military options:

- The drone option.
- Escort reconnaissance flights in the future with combat aircraft.
- Show of air and naval force -- 48 hours -- with coordinated diplomatic efforts. Had no effect after the Pueblo (got mixed up afterwards with the Soviet.)

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-- Air strikes against North Korean air defenses. Could cause insecurity. Might cause attack and result in loss.

-- We could blockade North Korean ports -- within 48 hours. Act of war -- little effect. They have no sea-going shipping. We could commandeer some North Korean ships. There is one now at sea with Dutch flag and crew.

-- Attempt to destroy a North Korean aircraft off North Korea. Chances slim of getting one. Same little effect.

-- Sea to shore bombardment. 48 hours. We would need air cover, however. West coast ports offer little -- East coast better. Inchon area is best but it's in too far.

-- Attack targets adjacent to the DMZ, with Honest John or conventional artillery. But the Honest John is inaccurate at extreme range. Violation of the Armistice Agreement would trigger retaliation.

-- Ground raid across the DMZ. Violation of the Armistice. It could trigger the ROKs to do the same. It would need very heavy fire support -- they have some.

-- We have the capability of an infinite permutation of air attacks -- one, two or many airfields. Air defense targets. We'll need between 24 and 250 US aircraft. We would use Guam, Okinawa, or carriers. The chances of success are excellent. The loss rate would vary with the tactics -- 2% to 8% losses. Probably between both of these ranges.

This is the menu of military options. Some would have effect; some no effect.

Rogers: Diplomatic options:

The Panmunjom talks are a forum. The North would talk first and would make their claims. They could talk and walk. We would look silly. They have already stated their case. I want to reject.

The UN is a possibility. We would present our case in letter form, but ask for no action. If we do ask, we will get none. Most won't support us. They will ask why the flight is necessary.

We can use diplomatic contacts with friends and allies.

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We could use a combination of all these: diplomatic, UN and Panmunjom. We would be able to help generate domestic support in the event of military action. But all of these are marginal.

Maybe we don't have to move immediately. Watch for a change.

Don't fall into trap about where it happened -- when we say we should say so but not if . . .

The President: Don't say equivocally. They'll lie.

There is a major difference with the Pueblo. This is a routine mission. That is why there was no air cover. Why did they do this after Pueblo?

Rogers: Unusual tracking. As the General pointed out.

The President: There is no international law as regards air space.

Steakley: It was not unusual, in the sense of its past pattern -- only in sense of its scheduled pattern.

The President: Oh, this is normal in the past? His rule to do so?

Steakley: Yes.

Vice President: I see no uncertainty. We know where it was hit and the Soviets picked up here.

Rogers: This is what they will say. I don't agree.

The Vice President: We always take the other guy's position.

Laird: This is helpful but they have control of the . They can deny.

Wheeler: We have photographed with their okay. It picks up even a wheel.

Laird: Mileage is correct -- yesterday -- no problem.

Richardson: What will the Soviets say about their own?

Rogers: They can't lie.

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April 16, 1969

To : The Secretary  
Through: S/S  
From : INR - Thomas L. Hughes *tlm*

Subject: Pyongyang's Motivations in Downing US Reconnaissance Plane

North Korean fighters shot down an American <sup>✓</sup>EC-121 reconnaissance plane with a crew of 31 over the Sea of Japan in the early afternoon of April 15, Korean time. Within two hours of the event, Radio Pyongyang broadcast a report of the downing which claimed that the plane had intruded deep into North Korean airspace for a reconnaissance "provocation." For good measure, the broadcast accused the US of a serious provocation in the DMZ the same morning. The North Korean representative to the Panmunjon Military Amistice Commission (MAC) proposed a meeting on April 18, presumably to discuss the alleged provocations.

Intrusion Charge Fabricated. Although the North Koreans asserted that the plane had violated their airspace, the aircraft was under orders to remain at least 50 nautical miles from North Korean territory. The wreckage of the plane has been sighted 90 miles off the coast of North Korea. The intrusion charge, nevertheless, is difficult to refute because Pyongyang can and probably will claim that it chased the intruder out of its airspace into the Sea of Japan.

Birthday Present for Kim? It is probably more than coincidence that the downing occurred on Kim Il-song's 57th birthday. The swift announcement of the North Korean action and the coordinated follow-through at Panmunjon

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have the earmarks of a planned action. Although the North Koreans probably would not have known in advance of the US reconnaissance mission, the frequency of such missions off the North Korean coast would permit them to pick any date they desired with a good chance of intercepting an American aircraft.

The attack on the US plane fits in with Kim Il-song's domestic and international strategies. It dramatizes for home consumption the allegation that the US is creating a tense situation in Korea which must be met by heavy North Korean defense expenditures, and it diverts attention from the lack of North Korean success in reunifying the country through a revolution in the South. It demonstrates to the world the wisdom of Kim's thesis which holds that small countries can defeat US "imperialism" piecemeal if they keep up the struggle.

No Specific Link to US Actions. Pyongyang has singled out no American action which might justify an attack on a US reconnaissance plane over international waters. North Korean propaganda has condemned a US/ROK joint military exercise in South Korea during March, has criticized congressional testimony of Secretaries Rogers and Laird, and denounced the South Korean Prime Minister's discussions in Washington in early April. But thus far North Korea has drawn no clear relationship between these American activities and the downing of the plane.

The most likely North Korean motivation, then, is self-gratification and increased prestige for Kim Il-song at the expense of the United States, following a plan based on Pyongyang's Pueblo experience. Secondly, the

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North Koreans may have wished to halt American reconnaissance operations, for reasons of "face" or military security.

Pyongyang may also believe that its hostile act against an American reconnaissance plane based in Japan serves the foreign policy goal of adding to the controversy over renewal of the US-Japan security treaty and use of Okinawa. It has given considerable propaganda attention in recent months to the necessity of opposing both Japan and the US in Asia, fully aware that the American defense commitment to South Korea is closely related to Japanese-US military cooperation.

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Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: April 16, 1969

SUBJECT: EC-121 Incident

PARTICIPANTS: Sangjin CHYUN, Minister, Charge' d'Affaires a.e., ROK  
 Embassy  
 Kwang Soo CHOI, Counselor for Political Affairs, ROK  
 Embassy  
 Honorable Winthrop G. Brown, Deputy Assistant Secretary, EA  
 Mr. Leroy E. Debold, Country Officer, EA/K

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Mr. Chyun conveyed the ROKG's deep interest in possible US actions against North Korea for the shooting down of the EC-121, noting that whatever actions the US takes will have significant security and psychological effects in Korea. It was not clear whether Mr. Chyun was expressing his own personal opinions or ROKG official thinking, but he did suggest a military retaliation against North Korea or possibly a demonstration of force such as followed the Pueblo seizure. He also made it clear that he did not believe the MAC was the proper forum for discussing the plane incident with the NK's since the plane and its mission were not directly related to the UN. The Security Council, he thought, would be a better forum. Mr. Chyun also inquired whether any decisions had been reached at the NSC meeting.

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Ambassador Brown told Mr. Chyun that there had been a general discussion of the EC-121 incident at the NSC meeting, that no decision had been reached on a course of action, and that the President is considering the problem carefully and will announce his decision when he has made it. He assured Mr. Chyun that the plane was well outside NK territory and explained how the plane's mission was in fact related to the UN in Korea and to Korea's security. Ambassador Brown also ticked off the advantages and disadvantages of the several possible actions the US might take that Mr. Chyun had suggested. He emphasized, however, that ultimately the decision as to what should be done rests with the President. He also assured Mr. Chyun that

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we are keeping the ROKG as fully informed of the situation as possible and that we will continue to do so.

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By SC NARA Date 7-10-08

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PER M Smith OFFICE EAP  
FADRC FOI CASE NO. 5-C-310 Simmons

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If you should have opportunity for private talk with Podgorny at time of presentation of credentials, you might say that your Government was gratified to note that in response to our request Soviet vessels in area where our aircraft was shot down assisted in search for possible survivors and cooperated

in other ways with US elements in area. ~~You could add xxxxxxxx~~ <sup>/If Podgorny replies,</sup> you

Government is deeply concerned at irresponsible behavior of North Koreans of which shoot-down of our aircraft is only most recent example. ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~

~~XX~~  
~~XX~~  
~~XX~~  
~~XX~~

~~XX~~ You should not, repeat not, comment ~~xxxxxxx~~ further.

GP-1.

END

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Drafted by: EUR:MrToon:llp 4/16/69 Tel. No. 6696 Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: EUR - Mr. Toon

Classified by: EA - Amb. Brown U - Mr. Richardson S/S - O:LK:lday

White House - Mr.

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**16 APR 1969: U.S. Military Reconnaissance Aircraft Downing Incident Regarding the North Korean Puppet Regime.**

Report by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Woe mie ho

16 April 1969

Recipient: Mr. President

Title: The U.S. Military Reconnaissance Aircraft Downing Incident by the North Korean Puppet Regime

Reported as follows:

With regard to the U.S. military reconnaissance aircraft downing incident by the North Korean Puppet Regime on 15 April 1969, the reports by the U.S. Embassy in South Korea, the Embassy of the Republic of Korea in the U.S., and the Republic of Korea Ambassador to the United Nations are as followed in the attachments. Accordingly, the Republic of Korea Ambassador to the U.S., the Republic of Korea Ambassador to Japan and the Republic of Korea Ambassador to the United Nations are instructed to make every effort to contact the governments of foreign countries and the United Nations agencies and expected to report the investigations, countermeasures and security situations regarding the incident. At the same time, the heads of embassies in foreign countries are instructed to report the response of the governments and the press of other countries.

Attachments: 1. Report by telephone from Counselor Judd, American Embassy  
2. Report by a charge d'affaire of the South Korean Embassy in the U.S.  
3. Report by the Republic of Korea Ambassador to the United Nations

The End

Minister

Telephone Conversation

Addressor: Counselor Judd, U.S. Embassy in Korea

Recipient: Director General of the Europe and Americas Bureau, Yoon, Ha-Jeong

Time: 15 April 1969, at 20:15

Counselor Judd: Reported as follows:

1. The U.S. reconnaissance aircraft has been missing approximately 50 miles from the south of Chung Jin Dong, with 31 attendants aboard. The aircraft was under a strict instruction to approach no closer than 50 miles to the coast of North Korea.
2. The aircraft has been missing from 15 April 1969, 2:00 p.m., and the U.S. military was in search of the aircraft at the moment. Meanwhile, according to the North Korean Puppet Regime's broadcast, the North Korean Puppet Regime insisted that the North's aircraft has shot down the U.S. aircraft.
3. We are waiting for more information and instructions from Washington regarding the incident, and the government of South Korea instructed to refrain from taking any measures.
4. I will report to you as soon as more information is collected.

Director General Yoon: Was the U.S. reconnaissance aircraft shot down within the territorial airspace of North Korea? And, are there any survivors from the aircraft?

Counselor Judd: As of now the U.S. does not have information regarding your inquiries. We will inform you as soon as possible once the information is obtained.

Telephone Conversation

Addressor: 1<sup>st</sup> Secretary Kribel, the U.S. Embassy in Korea

Recipient: Director General of the Europe and Americas Bureau, Yoon, Ha-Jeong

Time: 16 April 1969 at 17:40

Kreibel: There is no further information regarding the incident. It seems that examination and countermeasures regarding the incident may be set up in the Security Council, which will be held on 16 April at 10:00.

Director General Yoon: The following article of Joongang Daily newspaper report on 16 April is a speculation by the press and not based on facts: "Consultation on stout and punitive countermeasures regarding the incident by South Korea and United States, and deliberate provocation violating international law."

Debris from Missing U.S. Aircraft Reportedly Found

4/16/69

Washington -- The Department of Defense has reported that a Soviet vessel has recovered what are described as airplane parts but no report of survivors from the missing American aircraft that North Korea claims to have downed in the Sea of Japan.

The debris was first sighted by a U.S. Navy T-3 patrol plane in international waters, 95 nautical miles (176 kilometers) from the North Korean coastline. The Defense Department said it had been found in an area given as 41 degrees 14 minutes north and 131 degrees 50 minutes east, which corresponds to the general location where the airplane was last heard from.

The debris appeared to be a wheel and a ladder.

In a statement, Defense Department spokesman Daniel Z. Henkin said April 16 that "all evidence now available to us, including North Korean claims and debris sightings, leads us to believe that the aircraft was shot down by North Korean aircraft."

Earlier, at 1330 GMT, the Defense Department announced that "as of this hour, regrettably there is no report of any survivors being found from the missing EC121 aircraft lost in the Sea of Japan yesterday. Extensive search efforts are continuing."

At the White House, Press Secretary Ronald Ziegler told inquiring newsmen that President Nixon was following the situation closely and discussing it with his advisers. An hour-long meeting of the National Security Council the morning of April 16 was devoted "primarily" to the plane incident, Mr. Ziegler reported.

During the missing plane's mission, the Pentagon spokesman's statement said, "There were communications between the aircraft and its base. From a variety of sources, some of them sensitive, we are able to confirm that at all times during its mission, the aircraft was far outside any claimed territorial airspace of north Korea."

The unarmed four-engine propeller-driven aircraft, with 30 Navy and one U.S. Marine personnel aboard, was on a "routine reconnaissance track over international waters," the Pentagon statement said. It added that during the first three months of this year, there were 190 flights similar in nature flown in the same general area.

"Standing instructions for this kind of mission were that the aircraft was not rpt not to approach closer than 40 nautical miles (74 kilometers) to the coast of north Korea. In this particular instance, the aircraft commander was under orders from CINCPAC fleet to approach no rpt no closer than 50 nautical miles (93 kilometers) to the coast of north Korea."

At 0625 GMT, the Defense Department said, a U.S. plane parachuted a radio to one of the two Soviet vessels that was on the scene--at U.S. request--helping in the search. When contact was established, the aircraft dropped smoke markers on the wreckage it had spotted, and the Soviet vessels then collected the debris.

"The Soviet ship said in response to questions that it had not rpt not recovered or seen any survivors but that it had picked up what it reported to be aircraft parts," the Pentagon statement said.

U.S. aircraft flew low over the Soviet ship and photographed the wreckage.

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In its statement, the Defense Department asserted that reconnaissance missions of this type "have been flown for more than 20 years in the Sea of Japan. There was nothing unusual about this mission. In recent years, these missions have been approved by high Government authorities in the State and Defense Departments, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the White House. Each of these missions constitutes a lawful use of international airspace."

During a noon briefing at the State Department, Spokesman Robert J. McCloskey said he knew of nothing to indicate any crewmen of the plane had been taken captive by the north Koreans.

In response to a question whether the matter might be taken before the UN Security Council, Mr. McCloskey said he could not confirm that and, as far as he knew, no decision had been reached on what the next step might be.

Asked to comment on cooperative efforts of the United States and the Soviet Union in the search for the plane, Mr. McCloskey replied that the United States had made two requests of Moscow for assistance April 15. "What has happened speaks for itself," he added.

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Asked if the United States had made any direct contact with the north Koreans in their capital, Mr. McCloskey answered negatively. He said word that the north Koreans wanted a meeting of the Armistice Commission at Panmunjom was received through regular channels. He added no rpt no decision has been made on whether to meet with the north Koreans. ITEM

4/10/69/JN

### North Korean Violations of the Armistice Agreement

The North Korean regime has, in the period between the signing of the Armistice Agreement on July 27, 1953 and January 1, 1969, violated the Armistice on no less than 6696 occasions. These represent only those violations which have been detected by the United Nations Command and with which the North Koreans have been charged in the Military Armistice Commission. These charges range from simple acts of improper identification, to more serious matters, such as construction of illegal fortifications, ambushes of United Nations Command personnel, to infiltrations of the Republic of Korea for the purposes of assassination.

It is a matter of record that the North Koreans have denied all of these charges except two. They have refused repeatedly to use the Joint Observer Teams, set up in the Armistice Agreement to investigate violations of the Agreement, to look into the charges. They have, furthermore, refused to allow the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission to conduct impartial investigations.

Until 1965 the North Korean Armistice violations did not involve a high degree of violence or a large number of casualties. In early 1966, however, the North Koreans intensified their harassing activity in and near the Demilitarized Zone. The tactics used by armed agents grew bolder. There was a marked increase in infiltration by sea. Casualties mounted. In 1967 and 1968 the North Koreans further increased their already high level of activity and early in 1968 staged two outrageous acts of aggression, the attempted assassination of President Park Chung Hee by a team of 31 specially-trained commandos on January 21 and, two days later, the seizure of the Pueblo.

Major violations of the Armistice continued throughout the summer and fall of 1968 and in November of that year, in the largest North Korean intrusion since the end of the Korean War, 120 heavily-armed commandos landed at points near Ulchin on the east coast midway down the peninsula. These commandos attempted to propagandize villagers and terrorize them into cooperating. Through the counter-measures taken by military and civilian citizens of the Republic of Korea, these tactics failed.

The most recent serious violation of the Armistice Agreement occurred on March 15, 1969, when a ten-man work

party of the United Nations Command was fired upon without provocation by North Korean guard posts and patrols. One UNC soldier was killed and four wounded as a result of this attack.

Following are statistics which demonstrate the rising level of North Korean aggressions and concomitant violations of the Armistice:

	<u>1965</u>	<u>1966</u>	<u>1967</u>	<u>1968</u>
Significant Incidents:				
DMZ - South of the Military Demarcation Line	42	37	445	542
Interior of ROK	17	13	121	219
Exchanges of Fire:				
DMZ - South of the Military Demarcation Line	23	19	122	236
Interior of ROK	6	11	96	120
North Koreans killed in ROK	4	43	228	321
UNC Military killed in ROK	21	35	131	162
ROK National Police and other civilians killed in ROK	19	4	22	35

All of the foregoing, with the exception of the last two incidents described, have already been reported to the United Nations. Copies of the pertinent United Nations Command reports are attached, together with a report on 1968 and early 1969 violations which has been prepared for submission.

April 17, 1969



DECLASSIFIED Authority *MNS 96 900* By *SC NARA* Date *7-10-88*

ent of State *DEF 12 215* **TELEGRAM**

F760007-0307

*DEF 9 215*

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PAGE 01 MOSCOW 01628 171600Z

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50 ACTION EA 15

INFO EUR 15, IO 13, CIAE 00, DODE 00, NSAE 00, NSCE 00, SSO 00, USIE 00,

JPM 04, HI 02, INR 07, LI 03, NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SPI 02, SS 20, U5W 01,

NIC 01, RSRI 01, /099 W

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Z 171510Z APR 69  
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 1947  
INFO USMISSION USUN  
AMEMBASSY TOKYO  
AMEMBASSY SEOUL  
CINCPAC

DECLASSIFICATION DATE *2/12/76*  
PER *Memo* OFFICE *EAIP*  
FADRC FOI CASE NO. *5-C-310 Summary*

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE MOSCOW 1628.

SUBJECT: MISSING EC 121

1. DIRECTOR USA SECTION FOREIGN MINISTRY KORNIENKO HAS JUST TELEPHONED DCM TO REPORT THAT IN ACCORDANCE OUR REQUEST TO SOVIET AUTHORITIES (MOSCOW 1570) SOVIET SHIPS IN SEA OF JAPAN HAVE BEEN SEARCHING FOR POSSIBLE SURVIVORS OF MISSING EC 121 BUT HAVE FOUND NONE.

2. KORNIENKO FURTHER STATED THAT SEVERAL OBJECTS HAVE BEEN TAKEN ABOARD SOVIET SHIP WHICH COULD BE WRECKAGE OF AIRCRAFT AND WHICH SOVIETS PREPARED AT OUR REQUEST TO TRANSFER TO ANY DESIGNATED US SHIP LOCATED IN SEA OF JAPAN. OBJECTS INCLUDE SEVERAL PENCILS, A RUBBER INFLATABLE BOAT, A LEATHER JACKET AND PIECES OF THE SKIN OF THE AIRCRAFT AND SOME FOAM RUBBER. KORNIENKO UNABLE TO IDENTIFY SOVIET SHIP OR GIVE ITS PRESENT LOCATION. HE ASKED FOR IMMEDIATE RESPONSE.

3. DCM EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR ASSISTANCE GIVEN BY SOVIETS, SAYING HE WOULD PROMPTLY REPORT SOVIET OFFER TO WASHINGTON.

4. WE STAND READY TO TRANSMIT TO FONMIN ANY PARTICULARS OUR AUTHORITIES MAY WISH TO COMMUNICATE.

BEAM

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Authority NND 96 9600  
By SC NARA Date 7-10-08

POL 31-1 KOR N-45  
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17 APR 69 16 19z

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

**UNCLASSIFIED**  
Classification

INDICATE:  collect  
 CHARGE TO

Origin ACTION: Amembassy MOSCOW IMMEDIATE

Info: Amembassy SEOUL PRIORITY  
Amembassy TOKYO PRIORITY  
USUN PRIORITY  
CINCPAC IMMEDIATE  
CINCPACAF IMMEDIATE  
COMSEVENTHFLT PRIORITY  
COMUSKOREA PRIORITY  
CINCUSARPAC PRIORITY  
JCS  
DOD/ISA  
SAF FUCHU JAPAN PRIORITY

12

59030

DECLASSIFICATION DATE 2/12/76  
PER M Smith OFFICE EAIP  
FADRC FOI CASE NO. S-C-310  
Summers

STATE    
SUBJECT: EC-121 Rescue Operations

Please inform Soviet authorities on urgent basis that we are continuing search and rescue operations in connection EC-121 and that thus far three bodies have been recovered. We are informed by U.S. rescue participants that winds and currents are drifting debris from downed aircraft to the North and that any rafts released from plane could be considerably North of crash scene. USG would therefore appreciate having Soviets engage in search for any rafts, bodies or debris in immediate vicinity of coastline and territorial waters.

(a)

GP-3

END

Drafted by: erk EUR:SOV:ADubs:erk 4/17/69 Tel. Ext. 6906 Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: EUR - Malcolm Toon MT

Clearance: EA - Amb. Brown EB DOD/ISA - Admiral Shepard AS

**UNCLASSIFIED**  
Classification

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Authority MNS 969003  
By SA NARA Date 7-10-08

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nt of State

OUTGOING TELEGRAM

INDICATE:  COLLECT  
 CHARGE TO

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Classification

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DEF 925  
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FOR OCIT USE ONLY

Origin

ACTION: Amembassy MOSCOW FLASH

Info

INFO: USMISSION USUN  
Amembassy ~~XXXX~~ SEOUL  
Amembassy ~~XXXX~~ TOKYO  
CINCPAC

U

STATE

REF: MOSCOW 1628

SUBJ: Missing EC-121

DECLASSIFICATION DATE 2/12/76  
PER m/m OFFICE EAIP  
FADRC FOI CASE NO. 5-C-310

59266

~~XX~~  
You may inform Kornienko determining  
~~XX~~ that Department of Defense urgently determine  
most suitable method for transferring articles identified to US vessel or  
helicopter in area. Would be helpful to know as soon as possible identity  
and location of Soviet vessel involved.

END

27

ROBRS

Drafted by: EUR/SOV:ADubs:llp 4/17/69 Tel. Ext. 6906 Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: EUR - Mr. Toon

Clearances: DOD - Capt. Davidson (subs) S/S - Mr. ~~XXXX~~

White House EA/K Miss Rowberg (subs) Walsh  
Mr. Kissinger

UNCLASSIFIED

Classification

**17 APR 1969: Foreign Minister's Statement Regarding the U.S. Reconnaissance Aircraft Downing Incident.**

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Sent telegram  
Copy

Number: AM- 0607      Date: 171455  
Recipient: South Korea Embassies in Foreign Countries  
Addressor: Minister

Minister of Foreign Affairs, Choi Gyu Ha announced the following statement regarding the U.S. military reconnaissance aircraft EC-121 downing incident by the North Korean Puppet Regime on 15 April, at 2 p.m. (local time in South Korea) in the East Sea, for the use in public relations activities.

17 April 10:00 a.m. ....(한문 알아볼 수 없음) OK  
17 April 11:00 a.m. Announced by the Spokesperson of the Blue House



Foreign Minister's Statement  
Regarding the U.S. Reconnaissance Aircraft Downing Incident

17 April 1969

1. The government was informed by the U.S. Embassy on 15 April 1969 in the evening that a U.S. reconnaissance aircraft (EC 121) in the mission of reconnaissance had gone missing since 14:00 p.m. of the same day. With regard to the incident, the evidences found so far in the investigations by the governments of South Korea and the U.S., as well as the "official" announcement by the North indicate that the so-called military aircraft of the North Korean Puppet Regime shot down the aircraft.
2. The incident of downing the unarmed U.S. aircraft in the international airspace is a piratical action explicitly violating international law, and it is a deliberate and definite provocation that endangers the region.
3. While peace-loving countries are seeking ways to resolve the Vietnam War, the North Korean Puppet Regime is destroying peace in this region and raising tension through the reckless and provocative actions.
4. The North Korean Puppet Regime must be held fully accountable for their aggression and its consequences, and especially so, considering the North's recent unlawful and aggressive actions against the Republic of Korea.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority *MNS 96 900*

By *SC* NARA Date *7-10-08*

Department of State

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18 APR 69 23 42z

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM

INDICATE  COLLECT  
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SECRET

Classification

Origin ACTION: Amembassy SEOUL IMMEDIATE  
" TOKYO IMMEDIATE

Info: INFO: CINCPAC  
~~STATE~~ CINCPAC for PDLAD  
STATE  
FOR AMBASSADOR AND CHARGÉ

Subject: EC-121

1. You may advise President Park and Prime Minister Sato that President Nixon has ordered resumption of normal pattern of reconnaissance flights in Sea of Japan area. These flights will be given adequate protection.

2. Reconnaissance planes will fly from Japan as usual. However, any escort that may be required will come from outside Japan, probably Korea.

3. No further public announcement will be made before flights are resumed.

4. FOR SEOUL: FYI - COMUS Korea will be informed of operations. Question of whether ROKs can also be informed is under consideration here. END FYI. You should not raise this question with ROKs, and if they raise it say you will refer question to Washington.

5. If ROKs raise question of whether any further measures are contemplated, you should refer them to President Nixon's

*66561*

*3*

Drafted by: *WCB*  
EA:WCBrown:11/4/18/69  
Tel. Ext. 6684  
Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: EA - Winthrop/*WCB* G. Brown

Clearances:  
EA/K - Mr. Leonard (draft) J - Ambassador Johnson (draft) *Ufi*  
EA/J - Mr. Finn (draft) *WCB* WH - Dr. Kissinger through Amb. Johnson (dr)  
SECRET S/S -Mr. ~~Walsh~~ *WCB* *Walsh*

Classification

OUTGOING TELEGRAM

Department of State

INDICATE:  COLLECT  
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SECRET

Classification

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Origin  
Info

ACTION:

CONTINUATION

2

statement in his press conference.

6. FOR TOKYO: If GOJ raises question of consultation you should reply that we agree with FonMin Aichi and PriMin Sato that no consultation is necessary with respect to launching of reconnaissance flights which are legitimate and can under no circumstances be considered to be combat operations. There was no consultation with regard to escorted flights after Pueblo incident. Question of consultation with respect to escorts does not arise, as any that may be required will be provided from U.S. resources outside of Japan. If questioned, Sato may say that escorts will not be provided from Japan.

7. In response to press inquiries you should refer questioners to President Nixon's press conference statement without further comment.

8. We are conveying substance of above to Ambassador Shimoda and Chargé Chyun.

GP-3

END

Drafted by:	Tel. Ext.	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:	ROGERS
Clearances:			

SECRET

Classification

Authority MNS 96 900 CONFIDENTIAL  
By SL NARA Date 7-10-08 IT OF STATE

F780007-0460

**Memorandum of Conversation**

DATE: April 18, 1969

SUBJECT: EC-121 Incident

PARTICIPANTS: Sangjin CHYUN, Minister, Charge' d'Affaires a.e., ROK  
Embassy  
Kwang Soo CHOI, Counselor for Political Affairs, ROK  
Embassy  
Honorable Winthrop G. Brown, Deputy Assistant Secretary, EA  
Mr. Leroy E. Debold, Country Officer, EA/K

APR 21 1969

COPIES TO: EA 2 Amembassy SEOUL 2  
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EA/P 1  
INR 10

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APR 21 1969

POL 31-1 KOR N-45

Ambassador Brown had called Mr. Chyun in to explain the meaning of President Nixon's decision regarding the EC-121 incident. He told Mr. Chyun that the US intends to resume regular air reconnaissance operations in the Sea of Japan, but that the reconnaissance planes would be protected by fighter escort. No further announcement or public statements will be made about the resumption of the flights. Ambassador Brown said that the fighter escort planes would most probably be based in Korea or at a minimum would stop and refuel in Korea after flying up from Okinawa. The reconnaissance planes would come from Japan, but the fighter escort would not. Ambassador Brown emphasized that although the basing plans for the escort fighters would eventually become known, it is now classified information. He told Mr. Chyun that Ambassador Porter, if he had not already done so, would be talking to President Park about President Nixon's announcement.

In reply to questions by Mr. Chyun, Ambassador Brown said that we plan no further protest of this incident and do not expect to raise it again at future MAC meetings. The text of our protest to the North Koreans delivered at the MAC meeting had been sent to the President of the United Nations Security Council, but we do not plan to call for a resolution condemning the North Koreans. The Ambassador gave Mr. Chyun three reasons why we had decided against

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(Drafting Office and Officer)

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further action in the Security Council: (1) the Russians would exercise their veto, (2) the North Koreans might be invited to the United Nations, and (3) the shutdown issue would probably be obfuscated by arguments on the pros and cons of intelligence operations in general.

Mr. Chyun asked if "protection" beyond the fighter escorts would be provided for the air reconnaissance operations, mentioning the possibility of naval operations along the North Korean coast. Ambassador Brown pointed out that surface operations along the North Korean coast could give no protection to air reconnaissance missions.

When Mr. Chyun asked if in the light of this latest North Korean aggressive action additional means would be provided to the ROK so that it could better protect itself, Ambassador Brown admitted frankly that the idea had not even occurred to him. He pointed out that the ROK defenses are already formidable and that the ground situation had not been altered in the least by the plane incident, noting that in fact the ground situation over the past year had been remarkably quiet with the exception of the Ulchin, Chumunjin, and MDL incidents. He also referred to the assistance programs that are already being considered.

Mr. Chyun took the opportunity to ask that a call on President Nixon by the DPM be arranged, saying that now would seem to be an appropriate time for a high-level meeting. Ambassador Brown agreed wholeheartedly with Mr. Chyun that now would be a most propitious time for such a meeting and said that the Department would recommend it. He said, however, that the biggest obstacle would be the physical limitations on the President's time because of his extremely heavy schedule. Nevertheless, he said, he would try to arrange the meeting. Mr. Chyun said that he understood the problem and that he was sure that the DPM would rearrange his own schedule if a meeting could be arranged.

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Authority MNS 96 9000

By SC NARA Date 7-10-08

Department of State

# TELEGRAM



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## ACTION COPY

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4-18-69*

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FM AMEMBASSY SEUL  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5822

SECRET SEUL 1940

EXDIS

CORRECTED COPY

1. PRESIDENT PARK ASKED ME TO CALL THIS MORNING TO DISCUSS PLANE INCIDENT AND TO INQUIRE CONCERNING MOVES THAT WE INTENDED TO MAKE. I INFORMED HIM THAT WE HAD BEEN IN CONTACT WITH FONOFF ON MATTER OF MAC MEETING AND GAVE HIM GENERAL OUTLINE OF OUR INTENTIONS, WHICH WAS ALL THAT WAS POSSIBLE BECAUSE WE HAD NOT YET RECEIVED FINAL TEXT OF STATEMENT KNAPP WOULD MAKE. PRESIDENT SAID HE WANTS TO CONVEY TO PRESIDENT NIXON HIS FIRM BELIEF THAT THIS INCIDENT WILL BE REPEATED AGAIN AS SOON AS NORTH KOREANS HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY. CHOICE SEEMS TO LIE BETWEEN MAKING THEM UNDERSTAND BY A COUNTERBLOW THAT THEY CANNOT COUNT ON CONTINUED PATIENCE AND RESTRAINT AS THEY PURSUE THEIR AGGRESSIVE POLICY; OR WE CAN GIVE UP OUR RIGHT TO OPERATE ON AND OVER INTERNATIONAL WATERS.

2. HE SAID THAT AFTER BLUE HOUSE/PUEBLO INCIDENTS OF LAST YEAR HE HAD STRONGLY URGED VANCE AND ME TO AGREE TO A STRONG WARNING TO NORTH KOREANS THAT ANY ADDITIONAL INCIDENT WOULD BRING IMMEDIATE RETALIATION, BUT WE HAD REFUSED TO GO ALONG WITH THAT IDEA AND AS RESULT US HAS THIS NEW INCIDENT TO DEAL WITH. I COMMENTED THAT THERE WERE SOME ADDITIONAL FACTORS WHICH AFFECT OUR ATTITUDE TOWARD THIS PROBLEM. NO ONE COULD SAY IN ADVANCE WHAT KIND OF IMMEDIATE RETALIATION WOULD BE CALLED FOR AND IT DOES NOT SEEM AT ALL DESIRABLE SIMPLY TO REACT WITHOUT CAREFUL THOUGHT AND CONSULTATION. MOREOVER, EVERYONE KNOWS THAT WE COULD STRIKE NORTH KOREANS AND THAT THEY DO NOT HAVE THE POWER TO STRIKE BACK AT UNITED STATES. THIS MADE IT INEVITABLE THAT THEIR COUNTERBLOW WOULD PROBABLY ESCALATE MATTERS CONSIDERABLY

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Authority MN3969002  
By SC NARA Date 7-10-08

Department of State

TELEGRAM

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
SECRET

PAGE 02 SEUL 01940 180659Z

BECAUSE IT WOULD BE AGAINST REPUBLIC OF KOREA, PERHAPS CITIES OR MAJOR INSTALLATIONS. AT THIS POINT PRESIDENT WAS SILENT FOR AWHILE. HE THEN SAID HE NEVERTHELESS WISHED TO CONVEY TO PRESIDENT NIXON HIS BELIEF THAT THIS INCIDENT WILL BE FOLLOWED BY OTHERS UNLESS SOME STRONG REPLY IS MADE.

3. PRESIDENT PARK IS MOST ANXIOUS TO KNOW WHAT LINE PRESIDENT NIXON WILL TAKE IN HIS PRESS CONFERENCE. IT WILL HELP MATTERS HERE IF WE COULD CONVEY WHATEVER YOU MAY FEEL ABLE TO PROVIDE IN THAT RESPECT PRIOR TO PRESS CONFERENCE. I BELIEVE YOU CAN RELY ON HIM TO KEEP MATTER STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL UNTIL PRESS CONFERENCE.

GP-3 PORTER



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U.S. DEPARTMENT OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

DECLASSIFIED AUTHORITY MMS 96 9000 BY SP-2 NARA DATE 7-10-08

Intelligence Note - 279

F7E0027-0429 April 18, 1969

To : The Secretary
Through: S/S
From : INR - Thomas L. Hughes
Subject: USSR-NORTH KOREA: Moscow's Ambiguous Position

MEMORANDUM OF AUTHORITY ATTACHED

Since the downing of the US EC-121 aircraft on April 15 the USSR has been attempting to prevent the effects of this incident from undermining its relations with either the US or North Korea. On the one hand, the USSR has, in response to a US request, helped collect debris from the aircraft, in part presumably in hopes of obtaining sensitive equipment. At the same time, however, Moscow has given propaganda support to Pyongyang's allegations that the aircraft violated its airspace. The USSR appears to hope that it can continue to pursue the contradictory objectives of good relations with Pyongyang and expanded contacts on selected issues with the US but recognizes that either or both can be jeopardized by actions over which it has no control.

Vertical handwritten notes on the right margin: POL 31-1 KIR N - US, etc.

Propaganda Support for Pyongyang. In reporting the incident the Soviet press has quoted the North Korean news agency, headlining the brief account, "American aircraft shot down over the DPRK." There has not yet been any editorial comment on the incident in the Soviet press. On April 17 a Radio Moscow broadcast directed specifically at Korea alleged that the US "has had to confess" that the EC-121 aircraft had "invaded DPRK territory."

This report was produced by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research. Aside from normal substantive exchange with other agencies at the working level, it has not been coordinated elsewhere.

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Authority MNS 96 900  
By S.L. NARA Date 7-10-08~~CONFIDENTIAL USE~~

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This broadcast repeated North Korean claims that the US has undertaken "dangerous provocations against People's Korea," and appears to have been intended to assure Pyongyang of continued Soviet support.

Soviet Assistance to the US. Moscow may have regarded this statement as a necessary antidote to the publicity given Soviet participation in search and rescue operations after the EC-121 was shot down. The search activities of the Soviet ships and the prompt return of wreckage and effects found in the Sea of Japan may have been intended as a silent rebuke to North Korea and as an effort to dissuade the US from a military reprisal. If so, Moscow now appears to feel that it must balance these gestures with verbal support for Pyongyang's position on the EC-121 and on the US presence in Korea.

The Balancing Act Goes On. The USSR probably has had serious reservations about North Korean conduct in seizing the Pueblo and shooting down a US aircraft. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union has maintained a public stance of support for its ally, calculating that US restraint would prevent either incident from reaching such a critical state that the USSR would be forced to forgo objectives in relations with either the US or the DPRK.

Limited Options as Seen From Moscow. The Soviets recognize that, in the event of renewed fighting in Korea, they would have to support Pyongyang and understand therefore that the continued

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- 3 -

success of their policy of fence-sitting is dependent on factors over which they have no control. Given Moscow's extremely limited leverage in North Korea, the Soviet leaders have probably decided that there is little they can do to restrain Pyongyang beyond letting it be known discretely that the 1961 Treaty does not commit Moscow to more than the provision of aid in the event of war in Korea. As for the US, Moscow certainly prefers that its contacts on matters such as strategic arms and the Middle East continue to advance undisturbed by the actions of its North Korean ally. Accordingly, the USSR is likely to continue its present policy of attempting to placate both the US and the DPRK, recognizing, however, that the success or failure of this policy will be determined not by what it does but by what the US and North Korea decide to do.

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Conversation by telephone

Addressor: Counselor Judd

Recipient: Yoon, Ha Jeong, Director General of the Europe and Americas Bureau

Date: 18 April 1969 at 11:30

Counselor Judd: 1. Military Armistice Commission was held at 11:00, as arranged.  
 2. North Korean Puppet Regime uttered first, without mentioning the U.S. military reconnaissance aircraft downing incident at all.  
 3. Then, the head delegate of U.S. mentioned the incident in his utterance.  
 4. Afterward, the North Korean Puppet Regime requested to make "an additional utterance."

(Regarding this: the head delegate "Naef" was instructed to "leave" and conclude the conference as soon as possible subject to the response of the North Korean Puppet Regime)

5. The result of the conference will be informed afterward.

.....  
 18 April 1969 16:20

Counselor Judd: 1. Military Armistice Conference was held at 11:00 am for 42 minutes.  
 2. The head delegate of the North Korean Puppet Regime reportedly mentioned the shooting incident in DMZ only.  
 3. The head delegate of U.S. only mentioned the reconnaissance aircraft downing incident in his utterance.  
 4. In response, the head delegate of the North Korean Puppet Regime asked: "What kind of aircraft is it? Which country's aircraft are you talking about? And where does it come from?"  
 (Regarding this, the head delegate of U.S. left and the conference was concluded.)

**18 APR 1969: Summary of President Park Chung Hee's Meeting With U.S. Ambassador to South Korea Porter. (#15 영문 번역본 있음)**

Summary of Interview between the President of the Republic of Korea and United States Ambassador to Republic of Korea William J. Porter (Summon)

Time: 10:00 – 11:00, 18 April 1969 (Friday)

Venue: The Main Building of the Blue House

Attendants: Chief Presidential Secretary Lee Hu Rok  
President's Special Adviser Kim Seong Eun  
Protocol Secretary Cho Sang Ho

[...]

President: Which measures is the United States going to take about this issue?

Ambassador: As you know, a National Security Council was held in Washington D.C. The North Korean Communists called a Military Armistice Conference two hours after the shooting down of the scout plane. As the United States decided not to accept it, I informed the Foreign Minister in his official residence that the United States declined the call by the North Korean Communists. However, the position of the United States changed and the United States government issued instructions to accept the call last night. Accordingly, the Chief Delegate, General Naef, will attend the conference, and the announcement that he will present to the North Korean Communists is currently being drawn up. Once it has been drawn up, its copy will be provided for the Republic of Korea. Because the United States had no intention to attend the conference, it is not very clear if the conference can be held this morning with General Naef's attending. My communication with Washington came to an end at 5:45 a.m. this morning. I informed Director General of the European and American Bureau Yoon of the changed position of the United States and of the plan to hold a Military Armistice Conference this morning. General Naef has been instructed to speak only about the shooting down of the scout plane, and to leave the conference if the North Korean Communists use it for their propaganda purpose. From 6 a.m. this morning to the present, a statement of the United States has been modified several times, and has not been completed yet. Of course, once it has been completed, its copy will be provided for the Republic of Korea. I have told you about the procedural aspect so far. On the 18<sup>th</sup> (Saturday morning in the Korea time), President Nixon will announce in a press conference which actions the United States will take. I have no idea about it until then.

President: Has the investigation confirmed that the scout plane was shot down by the North Korean Communists outside the territorial sky of North Korea?

Ambassador: Yes, I understand that the shoot-down spot is far away from the territorial sky of North Korean Communists. As there is no eyewitness, it is difficult to say with certainty. However, given that the North Korean Communists are claiming they shot down the plane, it is likely to be true that the North Korean Communists shot down the plane. As you know, President Nixon expressed a stout attitude regarding the USS Pueblo incident during the last presidential campaign. Yet, in this time, a USS Pueblo incident broke out in the air. As a result, President Nixon is in the difficult situation.

President: I can see that President Nixon is dealing with this incident prudently, as shown in the efforts to attain clear evidence to show if the shoot down point was outside or inside the territorial sky of North Korea, etc.... Anyway, As President Nixon will announce his measures tomorrow morning, I cannot know them until then. However, I am anxious that such an incident would recur if this incident is resolved without any decisive actions, as was the cas of the USS Pueblo. Nobody knows what the North Korean Communists will do in the future if the United States does not take actions despite the seizure of a United States vessel in the open sea and the shoot down of a United States plane outside the territorial sky of North Korea. In such a case, the North Korean Communists will take similar actions against Republic of Korea ships and industrial facilities near the coastline, but deny that they did, taking such actions more and more. In order to avoid the expansion of war, it is important to exercise restraint and be patient. However, if such a behavior goes too far that the enemy misjudges our intention, it will cause a bigger problem.

Ambassador: Interestingly, given that two planes flew in the same air route as that of the shot-down scout plane a few days before its shoot-down and that such a flight took place regularly, the North Korean Communists seemed to know when the next flight would take place. In addition, although it is not sure if this is related with the shoot-down, the day of the shoot-down was Kim Il Sung's birthday. I agree on your point that another incident will break out successively if the United States take a lukewarm attitude. Accordingly, there may be two options for the United States: to take a prompt appropriate retaliatory action or to leave the region with the possibility of trouble to avoid such a trouble. But the problem is how far the United States should go away, giving up the rights prescribed in international law, given the North Korean Communists commit such a crime in the open sea and outside its territorial sky. In my opinion, the communists are testing the Nixon administration. Unless the United States takes an action, they will bring more danger in this region. Anyhow, we need to wait for President Nixon's announcement. I will report the United States government what I spoke to you, and I will report you if there is its response or instructions. Within the United States, there are people who are opposed to stout measures by the United States government. This is because a measure such as bombing may give the North Korean Communists a pretense to attack the Republic of Korea, and because, even if the United States is able to attack the North Korean Communists, it may harm the Republic of Korea. Such a way of thinking existed even in previous cases.

President: Of course, there is such concern. But we cannot be struck one-sidedly!

Ambassador: The questions is that of degree. To deal with this case as did with the USS Pueblo case may avoid the expansion of war, while preventing attacks against the major cities and industrial establishments in the Republic of Korea. The United States has two ways: to avoid entering a dangerous zone to prevent the recurrence of such an incident and to take a prompt appropriate action right after the outbreak of an incident. As you know, since the United States is conducting war in Vietnam, it does not want to expand war.

President: If this incident had been accidental, I would tolerate it. But it is obvious that the North Korean Communists deliberately committed this crime. In this situation, if we do not take countermeasures, a bigger incident will occur. If it is not followed by countermeasures, another big incident will occur. Eventually, a full-scale collision will be unavoidable at some point!

Ambassador: You are right. But, if we take a countermeasure promptly, the North Korean Communists will call for aid from the Soviet Union and Communist China, which have mutual defense treaties with it, under color of our retaliation. If we do not take any actions, the North Korean Communists may conduct infiltration operations like the previous attack on the Blue House. But, if we take a countermeasure, there is a possibility to drag the Soviet Union and Communist China into this incident. At the moment, there is a strong public opinion within the United States about the loss of 31 lives in the plane. It is so because it is right after the end of the investigation on the USS Pueblo case by the Press Investigation Commission. A question is to which way the United States public opinion and the pressure from the Congress will lead the Executive. That is, if they will lead the United States to be away from the North Korean Communists to avoid the recurrence of such an incident, if they will lead the United States to stop such an operation with outdated equipment and without guard by fighters, or if they will lead the United States take prompt retaliatory measures...

President: When Special Envoy Bans came last year, I suggested to issue a warning on the North Korean Communists that we will take prompt proper countermeasures if such an

incident recur. But he requested to delete such a clause in a joint-statement, saying that it would irritate the North Korean Communists. So, I conceded to his opinion. However, if we had then warned the North Korean Communists that we would take prompt retaliatory actions when such an incident occurs again, the North Korean Communist may have restrained itself. In addition, I do not think that the Soviet Union or Communist China will engage even though we take a partial retaliatory action. Anyhow, the United States and I hold a different view of these matters. Even in this case, the Soviet Union may recognize that the scout plane was shot down outside the territorial sky of North Korea, and everyone knows that it was not armed. In these circumstances, I do not believe that Communist China or the Soviet Union will engage even if we had taken a retaliatory action.

Ambassador: When Special Envoy Bans came, there was a harsh debate in the United States Congress about the range of measures the United States should take. We know that Communist China or the Soviet Union does not wish to engage in a trouble caused by the North Korean Communists. But, if we retaliate, the North Korean Communists will argue that they did so because the United States plane invaded their territory, and will call for aid from Communist China or the Soviet Union. Then, they may be difficult to turn down the North Korean Communists' request due to their mutual defense treaties. Therefore, we are concerned about what would happen if we take countermeasures. But if we do not take any action, the North Korean Communists may do the same thing whenever possible. Therefore, the problem is if we should take countermeasures or we should duck a tough decision. President Nixon understands well that our inaction will increase risks in confronting with the communist bloc. However, the Vietnam War and international problems should be considered. In a sense, the North Korean Communists acted tactfully. That is to say, when Japan is demanding for the return of Okinawa, the North Korean Communists may have exploited the time when in the Middle East the United States had been suggesting Israel and Arab countries not to take a retaliatory action. That is to say, because the incident occurred in the air and there is no eyewitness, it is not possible to prove definitely if it occurred outside the territorial sky.

President: It is impossible to know the policy of the United States until President Nixon makes an announcement. But, if we do not take proper countermeasures, such an incident will recur successively.



Ambassador: I will report your opinion to the United States government. The North Korean Communists' tactics in the USS Pueblo case and in this case of the shoot down of the plane take the same form. This incident is an important matter the United States should deal with seriously. I will report you as soon as information is collected.

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Authority *MNS 969003*

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*XR Ref 1245*

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By *SEC. NARA* Date *7-10-08*

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ACTION: CIRCULAR TO ALL POSTS PRIORITY

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PER *M. Smith* OFFICE *EAP*

STATE *INFORM CONSULS*

FADRC FOI CASE NO. *5-C-310*

Subject: President's Decision on Reconnaissance Aircraft

1. Wireless File will provide you with text of President's press conference statements on Korea. You should not RPT not go beyond these statements in any comments.

2. With respect to President's interim decision authorizing resumption of reconnaissance operations in Korean area, you may draw upon following background.

3. USG has operated surface and air reconnaissance patrols in this area for many years. Such reconnaissance of potentially hostile forces is elementary military precaution in areas where our forces stationed. The North Korean attack of 1950 demonstrated all too graphically the compelling need for maximum possible information about military capabilities and intentions of regime like that of Kim Il Sung. Need for alert posture on our part has regrettably not diminished in recent years.

4. In fact since 1966 tempo of hostile threats and actions by North Koreans has very substantially increased. Significant

Drafted by: *JFL*  
EA/K:JFL Leonard:lm:111 Tel. Ext. 2839 Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: *WFB* EA - Winthrop G. Brown

Clearance: *4/18/69*  
J - Amb. Johnson (draft) S/S - Mr. *WALSH*  
WH - Amb. Johnson (draft)  
DOD/ISA - Through Amb. Johnson

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incidents against UN forces along DMZ numbered 37 in 1966 and 445 in 1967, while January 1968 saw most dangerous and provocative acts since June 1950: attempt to assassinate President Park and seizure of Pueblo. In November 1968 North Koreans sent south largest force since end of Korean War, some 120 guerrillas who infiltrated east coast and were only rounded up after weeks of search and substantial military and civilian casualties.

5. Clearly we must keep close tabs on any regime capable of such irresponsible actions. It would be highly irrational for them to launch major attack against ROK which has well-trained, well-armed forces of its own and whose security is also guaranteed by treaty with U.S. and by presence of over 50,000 U.S. troops in United Nations Command. Nevertheless, irrational component in North Korean decisions has been high (from our viewpoint) in past and we cannot ~~rely~~ rely on their common sense to ensure against even more serious disturbances of the peace. For proper fulfillment of our security commitments in area and as basic obligation of USG toward our soldiers stationed there, we must

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have all information we can legitimately gather about activities of Pyongyang regime.

6. Data gathered by reconnaissance operations such as Pueblo and EG-121 are in fact of great utility in assessing capabilities and intentions of North Koreans. From such operations we can gather vital information on their military dispositions and posture. We also obtain information on actions which might indicate a plan to attack. Such warning obviously would have been of highest importance in 1950. Reconnaissance flights are not sole source of info on such matters but are an extremely important component.

7. All military powers, including North Koreans, conduct such intelligence operations in proportion to their capabilities, both from their own territory and, when they can, from international waters and airspace.

8. In addition to military need for info gained from these reconnaissance operations, there is an important general principle

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involved: Freedom of the seas, and its corollary, freedom of the airspace above international waters. We cannot allow ourselves to be intimidated, by bellicose behavior of this irresponsible regime, into relinquishing our right to use international waters and airspace in all legitimate ways. Other nations, especially but not exclusively major maritime powers, share with us interest in ensuring that these rights are not infringed.

9. Since North Koreans have repeatedly demonstrated that principle of immunity from attack in international waters and airspace means nothing to them, we have no alternative but to protect our operations.

10. We hope all governments and people will support us in this.

EXEMPT.

END



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By KW NARA, Date 5/13/04

Telecon  
Secretary Rogers  
9:25 a.m., April 19, 1969

HAK said he had talked to the President and the P has decided not to proceed with the strike but to keep the carriers going to the launch point and then turn around. He is not happy about it though.

Rogers said he thought it was a good idea not to. If the occasion does arise later we could make a gesture then and it would look better to the public. He thought the overall results of the press conference was good.

He asked if HAK had a chance to look at his comments yet. HAK said he hadn't received them. R said they would be right over.

Telecon  
Secretary Rogers  
10:10 a.m., April 19, 1969

HAK said the President wanted to keep the task force moving, not to do anything and then after they have reached the launch point come back. Whatever public statements should keep that impression alive. We want to see what ~~may~~ may elicit from the Russians.

Rogers mentioned his speech again. HAK said he still didn't have it.

**19 APR 1969: South Korean Government Measures Regarding the Downing Incident by the North Korean Puppet Regime of a U.S. Reconnaissance Aircraft, and the Incident's Progression.** (#16 번역본 일부 있음, 번역본 제외한 부분만 번역)

The Third Class Secrecy - Confidential  
Report by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

File number: 496

Woe Mie ho

19 April 1969

Recipient: Mr. President

Title: U.S. military reconnaissance aircraft downing incident by the North Korean Puppet Regime

Reported as follows:

Yeon: mi yi 6220 (16 April 1969)

Government measures with regard to the incident of the shoot down of a United States scout plane, which was reported by yeonho, and the progress of the incident are as follows:

1. Government measures
  - a. The government examined and analyzed the incident through its own investigations and its information exchange with the United States Embassy in the Republic of Korea. The government concluded that the incident was the North Korean Communists' explicit piratical and provocative action violating international law, threatening security in this region, destructing peace, and raising tensions. On 17 April, the government announced its position regarding the incident in a form of statement by the Minister of Foreign Affairs.
  - b. The statement has been promptly forwarded to South Korean embassies in foreign countries and with an instruction to develop active external relations in accordance with the statement.

- c. Meanwhile, the information will also be reported to foreign embassies in South Korea, to request for cooperation with the government's position and the progressions of the situation.
  - d. Particularly to UNCURK, we requested to reflect this information to the United Nations Report. Secretary General "Kusbari" reported the contents of the statement to the UN Secretary General by telegram.
  - e. Minister of Foreign Affairs attended a closed meeting at the National Assembly and explained circumstances, government measures, the position of U.S. and the prospects regarding the incident.
  - f. Minister of Foreign Affairs contacted the U.S. Ambassador to South Korea on 19 April morning, and confirmed that the government policy that Mr. President spoke to the U.S. Ambassador was immediately reported to President "Nixon". At the same time, the Ambassador said that the response from President "Nixon" will be forwarded to South Korean government as soon as received.
  - g. Minister of Foreign Affairs will have an additional meeting with U.S. Ambassador on 21 April regarding this.
2. The positions of the U.S.
- a. With regard to the incident, the general position of the Congress and the press is that they recognize the critical state of the incident. However, they maintain the prudent position to get more exact understanding about the situation. The U.S. Security Council also maintains the same position and decided to continue examining the situation in the council meeting on 16 April morning (local time in Washington).
  - b. Although there was no official announcement by the State Department about the incident, the United States conducted a prompt rescue operation for the crew of the sho-down plane, and requested the Soviet Union to cooperate for it.
  - c. With regard to the incident, the notable first measure by the United States was the opening of a Military Armistice Conference which was called for by the North Korean Communists. The conference was held on 18 April (at 15:00). In the conference, the United States argued that the incident was a breach of international law and that



reconnaissance was necessary under successive acts of aggression by the North Korean Communists; and the United States demanded appropriate measures to prevent such an incident.

d. U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations submitted the contents of the protest to the United Nations Security Council and requested to announce it as the United Nations Security Council's document to member states.

e. At 01:30 on 19 April, in a press conference, President Nixon stated as regards the incident as follows (the full statement was reported by a charge d'affaires of the United States embassy)

(1) The reconnaissance aircraft was shot down 90 nautical miles from the south of Chung Jin Dong, North Korea. The aircraft was an unarmed reconnaissance aircraft and never approached closer than 40 nautical miles to the coast of North Korea. Therefore the aggression by the North Korean Puppet Regime was a deliberate aggression toward the U.S. aircraft.

(2) The mission of reconnaissance will be continued under protective measures, because it is an indispensable measure to ensure the safety of 56,000 United States Forces in South Korea and the country itself. Threats and aggressive actions by the North Korean Puppet Regime threaten not only South Korea, but also the United States Forces.

(3) The United States lodged a protest with the North Korean Communists at Panmunjeom. The protection of a scout flight is an "interim" measure. The future measures by the United States depend on the response by the North Korean communists to the protest and the following progresses.

3. The Response of the United Nations

Ga. The Secretary General's "comment" at the press conference is as follows.

(1) It is not appropriate to comment on the incident based on the insufficient information provided by the U.S. whose prudent watch is encouraging.

(2) With regard to taking the issue to the United Nations of the incident, one of the countries involved in the incident is not a United Nations member state; therefore, it is invalid.

4. The prospect

It is anticipated that the United States government will hold a position able to deal with any direction of the future progresses, while keeping scouting flights under

proper protective measures. It is also expected that the United States will take relative measures to the North Korean Communists according to their response to the United States scout flight and the United States protest.

Attachments: 1. Copy of Foreign Minister's statement

2. Copy of the request to announce the protest document as the United Nations Security Council's document

3. Copy of the contents of the United Nation's Secretary General's press conference

4. Translation of the contents of President "Nixon's" press conference

5. Copy of the Talks between Diplomatic Minister to U.S., Jeon, Sang-Jin and U.S. Deputy Undersecretary of State

Attachments are missed

Conversation by telephone

Date and Time: 19 April 1969 at 08:30

Addressor: Minister of Foreign Affairs

Recipient: U.S. Ambassador to South Korea, Mr. Porter

Contents

Minister Choi: Have you received the full text regarding the press conference of President Nixon?

Ambassador: Not yet, but I will forward it to you as soon as it is collected.

Minister Choi: If so, is there any instruction from your country after that? If there is any, please let me know.

Ambassador: I will inform you as soon as the instructions are given.

Minister Choi: I know that you had a meeting with Mr. President yesterday. Have you reported the message from Mr. President to President Nixon?

Ambassador: I immediately reported the message from Mr. President to President Nixon by telegram.

Minister Choi: Then, have you received any response from President Nixon regarding the message? If the response has been received, please forward it to Mr. President or me.

Ambassador: The response from President Nixon has not been received yet, but I will forward it directly to Mr. President or I will let you know as soon as it is collected.

And also, with regard to this issue, I would like to discuss various aspects. If possible, I would like to have a meeting with you on next Monday. What do you think?

Minister Choi: On next Monday morning, there will be a conference for promotion and expansion of export and I will escort Mr. President. I am afraid that I cannot make it. However, if the meeting is in the afternoon, or if it is urgent, today's afternoon works, or tomorrow is okay even though it is holiday.

Ambassador: Tentatively, let's make it to have a meeting on Monday afternoon, 21 April, and if urgent, I will contact you today's afternoon or Sunday.

Minister Choi: That's great.

End.

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH  
Authority MMS 96 900  
By SCL NARA Date 7-10-08

# Intelligence Note - 289

F760027-0574

April 21, 1969

To : The Secretary  
Through: S/S  
From : INR - Thomas L. Hughes *TLH*  
Subject: North Korea: Pyongyang Ponders

Pyongyang's tactics in the wake of the North Korean attack on an American plane have been obtuse and surprisingly low key. Uncertainty over possible US responses, and the attitude of the Soviet Union, may have led Pyongyang to ponder its moves more carefully.

Follow-up Comment Slow to Appear. Pyongyang's initial actions following the April 15 attack were swift and decisive. Within two hours the North Koreans had announced publicly their version of the incident and proposed through the usual channel a Military Armistice Commission (MAC) meeting for April 18. Subsequently, however, the regime said nothing more about the plane until early on April 17, when Pyongyang radio broadcast a Defense Ministry order commending the unit which shot down the plane. There has been no government statement, as there was following the Pueblo, and Pyongyang's treatment has been far below that for the Pueblo incident.

Pyongyang's first major commentary on the plane incident was the Nodong Simun editorial of April 18 which charged that the US had violated the Korean Armistice Agreement by sending a "spy plane" deep into North Korean territory. It described the incident as but the most recent in a long series of provocative US acts (including the recently concluded "Operation Focus Retina"), and promised a "still more miserable defeat next time" if the US continued to aggravate the situation.

POL 31-1 KOR N- US  
XR POL 27-14 KOR/UN  
XR POL KOR N- USSR  
POL US- USSR

(4)

This report was produced by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research. Aside from normal selective exchange with other agencies at the working level, it has not been disseminated elsewhere.

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- 2 -

Odd Confrontation at Panmunjon.

The editorial appeared designed as a deterrent message to the US and a rallying point for domestic sentiment; it sounded much like the position we would have expected the North Koreans to take at the MAC meeting. But North Korean senior representative, General Yi, ignored the plane downing in his opening statement, enabling the US side to lodge its protest first. Yi then asked cryptically about the "belonging" of the plane; it is unclear whether he was referring to the plane's unit, nationality, or point of origin. Any comment he may have intended to make later was foreclosed by the US walk-out, which evidently caught the North Koreans completely off balance. Radio Pyongyang, which normally reports on MAC meetings while they are still in progress, delayed its account of the meeting until 14 hours after the session ended. (Their obvious loss for words was illustrated by their lame explanation later that the US representative had "fled" the meeting.) The radio later broadcast a post-meeting statement issued by Yi on April 18 which charged that the US walk-out was a "violation of the armistice agreement and a criminal act of wrecking the normal function of the MAC meeting." The statement went on to justify Pyongyang's downing of the plane as a "self-defense measure" but, unlike the Pueblo case, gave no precise location for the plane either at its point of closest approach or at the point of shoot-down.

Regime's Footing Not Firm. Pyongyang's obtuse and relatively low-key handling of the incident may reflect less confidence in its ability to gather international support than was the case with the Pueblo. North Korean caution may also stem from uncertainty over 1) our initial silence, followed by the late-notice decision to accept the proposed MAC meeting; 2) evidence

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of US naval forces proceeding towards Korea; and 3) the President's announcement that reconnaissance flights will continue, protected. Unlike the Pueblo incident, the North Koreans have no hostages to help deter the US this time, and thus may feel that the danger of retaliation remains high.

Moscow in the North Korean Equation. The attitude and behavior of the Soviet Union after the incident may also have complicated Pyongyang's calculations. Although Moscow has provided standard propaganda support for the North Korean position, the Soviets may privately have disapproved of the shoot-down and made representations aimed at heading off rash decisions which might heighten the chance of US retaliation. At the time of the Pueblo incident the Soviets, while making the correct militant noises, are thought to have conveyed to Pyongyang that there are limits to Soviet support. The same pattern might easily hold true now.

More dramatically, the phenomenon of the Soviet Navy aiding the US in search and rescue operations, confirming the location of the wreckage miles outside of North Korean territorial waters, and finally expressing "sincere condolences" for American losses, would be more than enough to give Pyongyang leaders pause. Although there is no direct confirmation of this, there are reports of considerable dissatisfaction over the Soviet actions among pro-Pyongyang Koreans in Japan.

Authority *MNS 96 900*  
By *SEC* NARA Date *7-10-08*

Department of State

TELEGRAM

*DEF 12 43*



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CONFIDENTIAL 234

PAGE 01 MOSCOW 01684 212024Z

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ACTION: EUR 22

INFO CIAE 00, DODE 00, NSAE 00, NSCE 00, SSO 00, USIE 00, IO 13, JPM 04, H 00

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CONFIDENTIAL MOSCOW 1684

REF# MOSCOW 1677 *POL 31-1 KORN-US*

1. FOLLOWING IS AN INFORMAL TRANSLATION OF THE TEXT OF THE ORIL STATEMENT MADE TO ME BY DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER KUZNETSOV APRIL 21, REGARDING A US MILITARY BUILDUP IN THE JAPAN SEA.

2. QUOTE ACCORDING TO INFORMATION COMING TO MOSCOW, GREAT US NAVAL AND AIR FORCES ARE BEING MOVED TO THE SEA OF JAPAN, AND IN GENERAL A HEATING UP OF THE SITUATION IS TAKING PLACE. SOME ARE TALKING ABOUT TAKING "ANSWERING" MEASURES AGAINST THE KDPR IN CONNECTION WITH THE BRINGING DOWN OF AN AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE AIRCRAFT.

3. WE HAVE ALREADY EARLIER EXPRESSED TO THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT OUR NEGATIVE ATTITUDE TOWARD THE CONDUCT OF BROAD INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES BY SPECIAL SERVICES AND ARMED FORCES OF THE USA USING PLANES AND VESSELS OFF KOREAN SHORES, NEAR TO THE TERRITORY OF THE SOVIET UNION. WE WARNED THAT SUCH ACTIVITY COULD NOT LEAD TO ANY GOOD. THE LATEST INCIDENT WITH AN AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE AIRCRAFT ONCE AGAIN AFFIRMS THE CORRECTNESS OF THESE WARNINGS.

② 4. WE OF COURSE, DO NOT KNOW WHAT IN REALITY IS THE INTENTION OF THE USA AND WHY IT IS CONCENTRATING AMERICAN NAVAL AND AIR FORCES IN THE REGION OF THE SEA OF JAPAN. BUT ALREADY THESE ACTIONS BY THEMSELVES HAVE INCREASED TENSION AROUND KOREA, NOT FAR FROM SOVIET BORDERS, AND WE ARE CONVINCED DO NOT SERVE THE INTERESTS OF OUR TWO COUNTRIES BOTH IMMEDIATELY IN THIS REGION AND ALSO FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION IN GENERAL. NEITHER

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Authority *MNS 96 9000*By *SC* NARA Date *7-10-08*

Department of State

**TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 02 MOSCOW 01684 212024Z

DOES IT CORRESPOND TO THE TASK OF IMPROVING RELATIONS BETWEEN THE USSR AND THE US, TO WHICH WE HAVE ALWAYS GIVEN GREAT SIGNIFICANCE AND IN FAVOR OF WHICH PRESIDENT NIXON HAS ALSO SPOKEN.

5. GUIDED IN MOSCOW BY PRECISELY THESE CONSIDERATIONS, WE ADDRESS OURSELVES TO THE GOVERNMENT OF THE USA AND EXPRESS THE HOPE THAT THE AMERICAN SIDE WILL DISPLAY REASON AND RESTRAIN IN CONNECTION WITH THE INCIDENT OFF THE SHORE OF THE K DPR. UNQUOTE.

6. I REPLIED I WOULD TRANSMIT STATEMENT TO WASHINGTON WHERE I KNEW IT WOULD BE RECEIVED WITH MUCH DISAPPOINTMENT. I SAID THE PRESIDENT HAD EXPLAINED AND JUSTIFIED THE NEED FOR THE STEPS WE HAD TAKEN. WE HAD BEEN FACED WITH A DELIBERATE AND CRUEL ACT OF THE NORTH KOREANS AND OUR LATEST MEASURES WERE TAKEN IN SELF DEFENSE, AS THE PRESIDENT HAD POINTED OUT, WE OWED AN OBLIGATION TO OUR SERVICEMEN WHO WERE ON WATCH AGAINST NORTH KOREAN AGGRESSION AND IRRESPONSIBILITY. THE FLIGHT OF THE PLANE WHICH HAD BEEN SHOT DOWN CORRESPONDED WITH THE OBSERVATION ACTIVITIES OF OTHERS NEAR TO OUR OWN SHORES. OUR PLANE WAS ON A LEGITIMATE MISSION OVER INTERNATIONAL WATERS AND HAD NOT VIOLATED ANY COUNTRY'S TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY. WE WERE THE VICTIMS OF AGGRESSION AND HAD ACTED WITH A MAXIMUM OF RESTRAINT IN A MANNER WHICH WAS UNPROVOCATIVE AND ENTIRELY PROPER. THE BASIS FOR THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT'S OBSERVATIONS COULD NOT BE UNDERSTOOD.

7. I THEN POINTED OUT THAT WE HAD EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR THE ASSISTANCE RENDERED BY SOVIET SHIPS ON THE SPOT AND HAD TRIED TO MAKE THE SOVIET POSITION EASIER BY DRAWING NO POLITICAL CONCLUSIONS FROM THE HUMANITARIAN HELP THEY HAD TRIED TO FURNISH TO OUR PEOPLE IN DISTRESS.

8. ADDING ONLY THAT THERE SEEMED NO NEED FOR PUBLICITY, KUSNETSOV STRESSED HIS DESIRE TO BE OF SERVICE IN THE CAUSE OF IMPROVING US-USSR RELATIONS. BEAM

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Government will do what it can to persuade the North Koreans to behave in a more responsible manner and to bring to an end the dangerous activities in which they have been engaged.

5. Dobrynin will see Under Secretary ~~XXXX~~ at his request 1900 this evening, presumably to repeat representations made to you by Kuznetsov. If so, Richardson will respond along above lines.

END

[ROGERS]

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Classification

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN, ✓

ACTION

April 21, 1969 ✓

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger *HK*

SUBJECT: PUEBLO

During the Friday press conference, in explaining the difference between PUEBLO and the EC-121 incident, you stated "... in the case of the PUEBLO, the North Koreans had warned and threatened the PUEBLO for a period of several weeks before they seized it." Because subsequent questions may be raised concerning the matter of these "warnings" I have summarized our previous position on this issue.

The PUEBLO sailed from Japan on January 11, 1968, arrived off the North Korean coast on January 12, and was seized on January 23. Immediately upon her capture, there was press speculation that there had been a "warning." Subsequent investigations did not confirm any specific warning, particularly against the PUEBLO. There had been a long history of North Korean charges against "U. S. imperialist aggressors and reckless provocations, "associated mainly with South Korean fishing boat and DMZ incidents.

When Dick Helms appeared before the committee on March 5, he refuted the allegation that we had been specifically warned about the PUEBLO operation. An extract of his statement follows:

"Shortly after the seizure of the PUEBLO, the allegation was made that the North Koreans had warned they would seize such reconnaissance ships, and that the warning had been disregarded.

- A. We immediately ordered the Foreign Broadcast Information Service to make a complete review of any North Korean statements which might be susceptible of such an interpretation, from the time of President Johnson's visit to South Korea in November 1966, until the time of the PUEBLO's seizure.

SECRET

"B. During those 15 months, there were dozens of North Korean references to incursions into their waters, but the review showed only statements which applied broadly to South Korean naval and fishing boats.

- "1. A reference to 'reconnaissance' in January, 1967 for example, one year prior to the PUEBLO incident, concerned a South Korean patrol boat sunk two days earlier by a North Korean shore battery.
- "2. In the two months preceding the start of the PUEBLO'S mission, all remarks were generalized referring to 'spy boats' or 'agent boats.'
- "3. On January 11, 1968, as the PUEBLO reached North Korean waters, North Korea charged that 'U. S. imperialist aggressor troops early this morning again dispatched hundreds of fishing boats and spy boats into the coastal waters on our side.'
- "4. Such references require further explanation. A correlation of North Korean propaganda with the actual events referred to shows that the communists routinely described incursions by South Korean ships -- whether fishermen, naval ships, or actual agent infiltrations -- as 'provocations by U. S. imperialism' or by 'the U. S. aggressor.'
- "5. The repeated assertions that North Korea had issued a warning in regard to the PUEBLO mission, as far as we can determine, must have arisen from the January 11 broadcast which definitely referred to movement by a South Korean fishing fleet into waters north of the dividing line.

"C. At this time, the North Koreans had not observed or identified the PUEBLO.

Authority E.O. 12958  
By [Signature] NARA Date 7/14/08

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SECRET

"D. As a matter fact, the PUEBLO was not approached by communist ships until the evening of January 20, less than three days before the actual seizure, when a submarine chaser passed within about two miles without incident."

In view of the foregoing, you may wish, if subsequently asked, to refer to those warnings as generalized in nature.

SECRET



Authority MAN 96 9002  
By SC NARA Date 7-10-88

Department of State

# TELEGRAM

F760007-0552

**UNCLASSIFIED**  
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PAGE 01 HONG K 02173 221105Z

DECLASSIFICATION DATE 2/12/76  
PER Smith OFFICE EAIP

19  
ACTION EA 15

FADRC FOI CASE NO. 5-C-310 Summers

INFO EUR 17, CIAE 00, DODE 00, JPH 04, H 02, INR 17, L 03, NSAE 00, RSC 17  
P 04, RSC 01, SP 02, SS 20, USIA 12, NIC 01, IO 13, UPW 01, RSR 01, 113  
004300

P R 220933Z APR 69  
FM AMCONSUL HONG KONG  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6634  
INFO AMEMBASSY BANGKOK  
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW  
AMEMBASSY SAIGON  
AMEMBASSY SEOUL  
AMEMBASSY TAIPEI  
AMEMBASSY TOKYO  
AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE  
CINCPAC

*Handwritten:*  
Shang Hong  
4 Apr 69  
2173

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE HONG KONG 2173

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

SUBJ: PEKING RADIO REPORTS APRIL 15 DOWNING US RECONNAISSANCE PLANE

①

1. FIRST CHICOM MEDIA MENTION OF EC-131 CONTAINED IN NCNA DESPATCH ENTITLED "SOVIET REVISIONISTS' NEW FARCE" BROADCAST BY PEKING RADIO APRIL 21. NCNA QUOTES "A NEWS REPORT" TO EFFECT THAT AT "GIGANTIC" US RECONNAISSANCE PLANE "INTRODUCED" INTO NORTH KOREAN AIRSPACE APRIL 15 "AND WAS SHOT DOWN AT 1350 HOURS ON SAME DAY." REPORT DEVOTED TO PORTRAYAL OF USSR AS "ACCOMPLICE AND VASSAL OF US IMPERIALISM", DETAILING SOVIET COOPERATION IN SEARCH FOR WRECKAGE AND SURVIVORS; NCNA CITES ROGERS MEETING WITH DOBRYNIN; DISPATCH OF TWO SOVIET DESTROYERS WHICH "OUTSTRIPPED" US SHIPS IN REACHING SCENE; US AIR COVER FOR SOVIET RESCUE OPERATIONS; AND PRESIDENT'S EXPRESSION OF APPRECIATION FOR SOVIET ASSISTANCE AT HIS PRESS CONFERENCE APRIL 12.

2. VILIFICATION OF SOVIET ROLE CARRIED BY IMPLIED CHARGE

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02 HONG K 02173 221105Z

THAT USSR SUPPORTS US CLAIM THAT PLANE DOWNED OVER INTERNATIONAL WATERS. ACCORDING CHICOMS, SOVIET PRESS QUOTED DEFENSE DEPARTMENT STATEMENT ON INCIDENT, THUS "CHANTING SAME TUNE AS US IMPERIALISTS."

3. COMMENT: BY CHOOSING TO FOCUS ON SOVIET WRONGDOING RATHER THAN HIGHLIGHT INCIDENT AS LATEST EVIDENCE US THREAT IN ASIA, CHICOMS AGAIN REVEAL THEIR CONTINUING PREOCCUPATION WITH USSR AS THEIR MOST DANGEROUS ADVERSARY. ONLY MENTION OF NORTH KOREA WAS IN CONNECTION ALLEGED VIOLATION THEIR AIRSPACE BY US PLANE. PLANE WAS "SHOT DOWN"? NCNA DID NOT SAY BY WHOM, AND THUS MANAGED AVOID ANY EXPRESSION OF SUPPORT FOR NORTH KOREAN ACTION. NCNA REPORT CONSTITUTES SOLE PEKING REACTION TO DATE, BUT IS VERY MUCH IN LINE WITH EARLIER EDITORIALS, COMMENTARY APPEARING IN HONG KONG COMMUNIST PRESS (HK 2079, 2135 NOTAL).

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*Intelligence Note* - 296

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

F760007-0545

April 22, 1969

(U)

To : The Secretary  
Through: S/S  
From : INR - Thomas L. Hughes *tlh*  
DECLASSIFICATION DATE 2/12/76  
PER MSmith OFFICE EALP  
FADRC FOI CASE NO. 5-C-310 *Simmons*

Subject: Peking Breaks Silence on EC-121, Charges US-Soviet Collusion

After more than six days of silence on the downing of the American EC-121, Peking on April 21 condemned US-Soviet "collusion" after the incident but offered no praise or support for Pyongyang's attack on the plane.

Delay Reflects Poor Sino-North Korean Relations. Peking's belated blast -- a low-level NCNA commentary -- implicitly accepted the North Korean version of the incident by asserting that the US plane had intruded into North Korean airspace, but it cited no Korean statements as its source. While noting that the plane had been shot down, it left the reader to draw his own conclusions about who did the shooting.

Peking's delay in reporting the incident and avoidance of any support for Pyongyang exceeds the disapproval implied by Chinese reaction to the Pueblo incident. At that time, Peking waited three days to report the seizure and eventually issued a cautious government statement backing North Korea. Chinese lack of enthusiasm then and now probably stems from Peking's desire not to abet North Korean adventurism and from the generally poor state of relations between the two countries.

Continuing Scorn for Ugly Revisionists. The NCNA commentary supported its claim of US-Soviet collusion by citing Soviet cooperation in rescue operations, Soviet media reference to the Pentagon's statement that the plane had gone down "over the sea of Japan" (conveniently ignoring other Moscow

*POL 31-1 KOR N - US  
XR DEF 9 US  
XR DEF 12 US  
XR POL CHICOM - KOR N  
XR POL US - USSR  
XR POL - CHICOM - USSR*

(6)

This report was produced by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research. Aside from normal substantive exchange with other agencies at the working level, it has not been coordinated elsewhere.

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broadcasts which repeated the North Korean claim of intrusion), and President Nixon's expressed appreciation for Soviet help. It concluded on a familiar note with the charge that the Soviet "revisionists...have once again fully exposed their ugly features as accomplices and vassals of US imperialism." The commentary thus laid to rest speculation that the low volume of propaganda attacking the Soviet Union since the opening of the Chinese Ninth Party Congress might foreshadow a change in the Chinese appraisal of the Soviet Union.

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Authority *MNS 96900*

By *SC* NARA Date *7-10-08*

nt of State

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM

INDICATE:  COLLECT  
 CHARGE TO

*POL 31-1 KORU-45*  
*POL 1275 061672*  
*POL 925 17B*

FOR DCIT USE ONLY

22 APR 69 0110Z

ACTION: AmEmbassy MOSCOW IMMEDIATE ~~XXXXXXXX~~

STATE

DECLASSIFICATION DATE *2/12/76*  
PER *M Smith* OFFICE *EAP*  
FADRC FOI CASE NO. *S-C-310*  
*Simmons*

REF: State 061431

SUBJ: US Forces in Sea of Japan

*61672*

1. Ambassador Dobrynin's call on Under Secretary early evening of April 21 was made to parallel representation made to you by Kuznetsov regarding buildup of US forces in Sea of Japan.

2. Under Secretary <sup>set forth</sup> ~~XXXXXXXX~~ points made in ref tel and handed Dobrynin a copy of talking points paper to facilitate his reporting of conversation.

3. Following Under Secretary's remarks, Dobrynin reread last portion of Soviet statement which expresses hope that American side will display reasonableness and restraint in connection with incident off shore of KDPR. He added that U.S. ships may <sup>come</sup> ~~be~~ very close to Soviet frontiers and USSR couldn't help but look cautiously and with some concern

*3*

Prepared by: EUR/SOV:ADubs:mfd

Tel. Ext. 6906

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: EUR/SOV - Mr. Dubs *TD*

Clearances: SS - Mr. Brown *RMB*

U - Mr. Abromowitz *AB*

**UNCLASSIFIED**  
Classification

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Authority *MN96900*

F760007-0244

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Page *2* of tele By *SC* NARA Date *7-10-08* SCOW*Classification***UNCLASSIFIED**

at this development.

4. Under Secretary stressed situation had arisen as result of North Korean actions and that we hoped Soviet Government in a position to moderate tensions through contacts with Government of North Korea. He added that USG was interested in continuing to improve relations <sup>our</sup> between/two countries and hoped current situation would not impede this process.

GP-3

END

[ROGERS]

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*POL 31-1 KOR N-45*

Department of State

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*21*



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*XP DEF 12 25*

CONFIDENTIAL 517

PAGE 01 MOSCOW 01688 221452Z

53 40  
ACTION SS 20

INFO EUR 17, EA 10, CIAE 00, DODE 00, JPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSAF 00,

NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SP 02, USIA 12, ACDA 16, IO 13, RSR 01, /122 W  
----- 005421

P 221420Z APR 69

FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1990

CONFIDENTIAL MOSCOW 1688

SUBJECT: US REPLY TO SOVIET GOVERNMENT ON SHOOT-DOWN OF US PLANE

REF: STATE 061431

1. EARLY THIS AFTERNOON I PRESENTED OUR STATEMENT TO KUSNETSOV WHO MADE FOLLOWING EXTEMPORANEOUS REPLY:

2. HE WISHED TO REITERATE HIS OBSERVATIONS OF LAST EVENING. SHOULD THE TWO GOVERNMENTS PROCEED WITH THE SAME AIR OF IMPROVING RELATIONS, ANY WORSENING SHOULD BE AVOIDED IN CONNECTION WITH THE INCIDENT IN THE SEA OF JAPAN.

3. KUSNETSOV CONTINUED THAT THE SOVIET ATTITUDE TOWARD FLIGHTS NEAR ITS TERRITORY WAS WELL KNOWN, AS WAS ALSO ITS POSITION REGARDING THE PRESENCE OF U.S. FORCES IN SOUTH KOREA. HE SAID THE PRESENT CONCENTRATION OF US FORCES NEAR SOVIET BORDERS NATURALLY AROUSE SOVIET CONCERN. HE ADDED THE SOVIET AUTHORITIES ARE WAITING TO SEE WHAT HAPPENS IN THIS REGARD AND HE STRESSED THAT THE SOVIET SIDE HOPES FOR ALL NECESSARY RESTRAINT ON THE PART OF THE UNITED STATES.

4. I TOLD KUSNETSOV I WOULD COMMUNICATE HIS OBSERVATIONS AND WOULD CALL ATTENTION TO THE POINTS HE MADE. AT THE SAME TIME HE SHOULD REALIZE THAT OUR COUNTRY HAD LOST LIVES AS A RESULT OF UNPROVOKED NORTH KOREAN AGGRESSION AND OUR REACTIONS WERE KEYED TO THE ATTACKS AND THREATS DIRECTED AGAINST US FROM NORTH KOREA. WE WERE PROCEEDING IN A FIRM BUT RESPONSIBLE MANNER.

5. COMMENT. I DID NOT CONSIDER MYSELF AUTHORIZED TO DEAL MORE SPECIFICALLY WITH THE QUESTION OF FORCE CONCENTRATIONS NEAR SOVIET

CONFIDENTIAL *27*

*1688*  
*4-22-69*  
*Moscow*

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Authority *NND 96 900*

By *SC* NARA Date *7-10-08*



F760007-0555

Department of State

TELEGRAM

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CONFIDENTIAL

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TERRITORY BUT I REPEATED TO HIM THE UNDER SECRETARY'S STATEMENT IN  
PARA 4 OF STATE 061431.

GP-3. BEAM

CONFIDENTIAL

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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DEF 12 US

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ACTION: EUR 22

INFO: EA 10, IO 13, NIC 01, CIAE 00, DODE 00, JPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 08, NSAE 00, NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SPI 02, SS 20, USIA 12, RSR 01, 112 W  
019590

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1725  
4/24/69

R 241335Z APR 69  
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2023  
INFO AMCONGEN HONG KONG  
AMEMBASSY LONDON  
AMEMBASSY SEOUL  
AMEMBASSY TOKYO

DECLASSIFICATION DATE 2/12/76  
PER Smith OFFICE EAP  
FADRC FOI CASE NO. 5-C-310 Summers

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE MOSCOW 1725

SUBJ: NORTH KOREAN AIRCRAFT INCIDENT

1. SOVIET PRESS CONTINUES TO GIVE MINIMUM ATTENTION TO THE EC-121 SHOOT-DOWN OFF KOREA AND TO TASK FORCE 71. MOST NEWSPAPERS APRIL 23 CARRIED A BRIEF TASS ITEM REPORTING CREATION OF A TASK FORCE, CALLING IT EVIDENCE THAT THE US DOES NOT RPT NOT INTEND TO DESIST FROM INTERNATIONAL ADVENTURES WHICH IN THE PAST HAVE MORE THAN ONCE ENDED IN SHAMEFUL FAILURE.
2. MOST NEWSPAPERS APRIL 24 CARRY A TASS REPORT OF THE KPDR'S STATEMENT OF APRIL 23. IN ADDITION, PRAVDA PRINTED A CARTOON AND ALSO SUMMARIZED ARTICLES FROM THE NEW YORK DAILY WORLD AND CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR WHICH DEPICTED AND PROTESTED THE US ROLE AS WORLD POLICEMAN.
3. NOTHING HAS BEEN REPORTED IN THE SOVIET PRESS ON SOVIET SEARCH ASSISTANCE TO THE USA, THE CHICOM PROPAGANDA ATTACK OVER THIS, OR SOVIET DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATIONS TO THE US OVER TASK FORCE 71.
4. COMMENT: THE SOVIETS CONTINUE TO APPEAR RELUCTANT PUBLICLY TO INVOLVE THEMSELVES TOO DEEPLY IN THIS AFFAIR. THEY HAVE NOT TO DATE MADE ANY EDITORIAL COMMENT ON THE INCIDENT IN THE PRESS AND HAVE TENDED TO KEEP SPOT REPORTING ON THE ISSUE IN VERY LOW KEY. SOVIET JOURNALISTS AT A SPA50 HOUSE RECEPTION APRIL 23 APPEARED

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Authority NND 96 900  
By SC NARA Date 7-10-08



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

F760007-0544

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PAGE 02 MOSCOW 01725 241417Z

RELUCTANT TO DISCUSS THE SUBJECT GENERALLY, BUT DID COMMENT FAVOR-  
ABLY ON SOVIET SEARCH ASSISTANCE AND US EXPRESSIONS OF GRATITUDE.  
BEAM

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**22 APR 1969: South Korean Government's Diplomatic Measures and the Response of the Governments and the Press of Other Countries (15 APR-21 MAY).** (목차 수정 요망, 목차에 22 April-12 May로 되어 있음)

Third Class Secrecy - Confidential  
Report by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Mie 772 ho  
(#772)

22 April 1969

Preservation Period: 3 years

Recipient: Mr. President

Title: The U.S. Military Reconnaissance Aircraft Downing Incident

Reported as follows:

With regard to the incident of the U.S. military reconnaissance aircraft downing incident on 15 April, the following documents are a collection of South Korean government's diplomatic measures and responses of the governments and the press of other countries from 15 April to 21 April. Please refer to the attachments. End.

Reclassified as ordinary documents after detached from the attachments

Minister

Third Class Secrecy - Confidential  
Report by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Mie 772 ho

22 April 1969

Preservation Period: 3 years

Recipient: Prime Minister

Title: U.S. Military Reconnaissance Aircraft Downing Incident

Reported as follows:

With regard to U.S. military reconnaissance aircraft downing incident regarding the North Korean Puppet Regime on 15 April, South Korean government's diplomatic measures and the response of the governments and the press of other countries collected from 15 April to 21 April are as followed. Please refer to the attachments. End.

Reclassified as ordinary documents after detached from the attachments

Minister

Report by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Mie 391

23 April 1969

Recipient: The Heads of South Korea Embassies in Foreign Countries

Title: The U.S. Military Reconnaissance Aircraft Downing Incident

Reported as follows:

With regard to U.S. military reconnaissance aircraft downing incident by the North Korean Puppet Regime on 15 April, South Korean government's diplomatic measures and the response of the governments and the press of other countries collected from 15 April to 21 April are as followed. Please refer to the attachments. End.

Reclassified as ordinary documents after detached from the attachments

Minister

Report by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Mie 772

23 April 1969

Recipient: Director of Central Intelligence Agency  
Minister of National Defense

Title: The U.S. Military Reconnaissance Aircraft Downing Incident

Reported as follows:

With regard to U.S. military reconnaissance aircraft downing incident regarding the North Korean Puppet Regime on 15 April, South Korean government's diplomatic measures and the response of the governments and the press of other countries collected from 15 April to 21 April are as followed. Please refer to the attachments. End.

Reclassified as ordinary documents after detached from the attachments

Minister

Third Class Secrecy

72/100

U.S. Reconnaissance Aircraft Downing Incident

From 15 April 1969

To 21 April 1969

Notice: 31 December 1970 - Reclassified as ordinary documents

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Europe and Americas Bureau

North America Division 2

Third Class Secrecy

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    Other Countries -----36

**The Progress of the Incident**

The Progress of the Incident

- (1) One U.S. reconnaissance aircraft EC-121(4 shots SUPER-CONSTELLATION, a 「propeller)plane) had gone missing during the reconnaissance flight mission.
- (a) The time of occurrence: On 15 April, around 14:00 pm (The North Korean Puppet Regime insisted that they shot down one U.S. reconnaissance aircraft)
- (b) Location: The U.S. reconnaissance aircraft was pursued by the North Korean

Puppet Regime's combat aircraft in the area 50~60 miles from the south of Chung Jin Dong and was shot down in an area 90~100 miles south of Chung Jin Song (given as 41 degrees and 12 minutes north latitude, 131 degrees and 48 minutes east longitude).

(c) The Number of Flight Crews: 31 people

(d) Miscellaneous: The aircraft was under a strict instruction to approach no closer than 50 miles to the coast of North Korea. In addition, there was no direct report from the aircraft at the moment of downing. However, according to communication with Japan "Atzme" by the computer, the aircraft suddenly deviated the route to Japan at the moment of downing in an area 50~60 miles from the coast of North Korean Puppet Regime.

(2) Starting rescue operations: South Korea, U.S., and Japan called for aid to USSR

(3) On 16 April, 08:45

Alleged debris from the aircraft was found approximately 100 miles on the sea from the south of Chung Jin Dong and rescue operations are proceeding at the moment. However it is alleged that there is no survivor (the Pentagon announced)

(4) On 17 April, the Pentagon announced the recovery of 2 bodies

(a) An officer and a man

(b) Without wearing lifeguard 「jacket」

(c) In an area 120 miles from the southeast coast of the North Korean Puppet Regime (repor by South Korean Embassy in U.S.)

## South Korean Government Measures

### South Korean Government Measures

16 April

- (1) Required each embassy in foreign countries (at 11:50 am) to investigate and report the details regarding the incident, such as:
  - Ga. The positions of the governments of other countries (opinions, response and so on);
  - Na. The tone of the press and the general opinion of other countries;
  - Da. The position of the North Korean Puppet Regime and the Communist Bloc Countries regarding the incident.
  
- (2) Instructed the South Korean Ambassador to the U.S., Japan and the United Nations to grasp and report the incident in separate ways (the representatives to the United Nations were required to contact the U.S. representatives and each representative of other countries to the United Nations), including:
  - Ga. Opinions and the position regarding the incident;
  - Na. Opinions and measures regarding the affect on the security of the Korean Peninsula;
  - Da. Measures expected to be taken in response to the incident;
  - La. Analysis and judgment regarding provocative actions and their importance.
- (3) Minister of Foreign Affairs had a telephone conversation with U.S. Ambassador 「Porter」 (at 12:15)
- (4) Director General of the Europe and Americas Bureau had a telephone conversation with the 1<sup>st</sup> Secretary Kribel in U.S. Embassy. (at 17:40)

It was informed that there was no further information regarding the progress of the incident until then and countermeasures would be set up in the urgent Security Council Conference which was confirmed to be held on 16 April 10 a.m. In the meantime, it was informed to U.S. Embassy that the Minister Choi's statement in the article of Joong-ang Daily Newspaper was speculative.



On 17 April

- (1) Announcement of the Foreign Minister's statement regarding the incident (at 11:00)  
(The whole statement was published in the New York Times, the Washington Post and so on, and quoted and reported by other countries)
- (2) The statement was forwarded to each South Korean embassy in foreign countries and it was instructed to make publicity activities accordingly with that.)
- (3) The statement was distributed to UNCURK and foreign embassies in Korea. Secretary General 「Kusbari」 reported it to UN by telegram.
- (4) Director General of the Europe and Americas Bureau contacted Counselor 「Judd」 in U.S. Embassy regarding the announcement of the Minister's statement.
- (5) Minister of Foreign Affairs, Choi contacted U.S. Ambassador 「Porter」 (at 9:30)

Foreign Minister's Statement as it Relates to the U.S. Reconnaissance Aircraft Downing Incident (17 April 1969)

1. The government was informed by the U.S. Embassy on 15 April 1969 evening that a U.S. reconnaissance aircraft (EC 121) in the mission of reconnaissance had been missing from 14:00 p.m. at the same day. With regard to the incident, the investigations by the South Korean government authorities, the evidence verified from the search of the United States authorities so far, and their so-called public announcement by the North Korean Puppet Regime convinced the South Korean government that the aircraft had been shot down by the so-called military aircraft of the North Korean Puppet Regime.
2. The incident of downing unarmed U.S. aircraft in the international airspace is a piratical action explicitly violating international law, and it is a deliberate and definite provocative action, which brings danger to the security in this region.
3. While peace-loving states are seeking ways to resolve the Vietnam War, the North Korean Puppet Regime is destroying peace in this region and raising tension a lot more through the reckless provocative actions.

4. The North Korean Puppet Regime must be held fully accountable for the aggression and its consequences, and especially so, considering the North's recent unlawful and aggressive actions against the Republic of Korea.

With regard to the situation, the North Korean Puppet Regime will certainly be censured by peace-loving citizens of all countries and South Korean government will be on a high alert and keep a watch over the progress of the incident to make appropriate measures in close cooperation with the U.S. against the belligerent and provocative North Korean Puppet Regime.

5. In conclusion, we express sincere sympathy for the soldiers of our ally U.S. who were sacrificed due to the brutal actions by the North Korean Puppet Regime.

(6) The announcement of the Pentagon and the Department of State (regarding the incident) and the copy of the record on the Pentagon's press conference were forwarded from the U.S. Embassy.

(7) The U.S. Security Council did not reach to make a decision on taking the issue to the United Nations Security Council. The local public opinion considers that the U.N. Security Council's discussion will not be very effective.

(8) Diplomatic Minister to the U.S., Jeon Sang-Jin, requested a visit to the Deputy Undersecretary Brown.

Brown (a) Only the President Nixon's decision is left regarding the discussion in the U.S. Security Conference;

(b) The difficulty of taking the issue to the United Nations Security Council is that it may "invite the North Korean Puppet Regime (to the United Nations);"

(c) Expressed the opinion that a military action would "accompany great danger."

Diplomatic Minister Jeon

(a) Measures that the U.S. would take from now on would greatly affect the Korean Peninsula's security issue;

(b) Urged U.S. positive countermeasures to re-prevent the provocative actions.

18 April

- (1) Contact by telephone from Secretary Kent in the U.S. Embassy to Director General of the Europe and Americas Bureau Yoon (at 05:50)
- (2) U.S. Ambassador 「Porter」 visited Mr. President (at 10:00)
- (3) Contact from Counselor 「Judd」 to Director General of the Europe and Americas Bureau Yoon (11:30)
  - (a) Military Armistice Conference was held at 11:00 as arranged;
  - (b) The North Korean Puppet Regime uttered first, however, there was no mention regarding the incident.
  - (c) Then, U.S. mentioned the incident in its utterance.
  - (d) After that, the North Korean Puppet Regime requested an additional utterance. (Regarding this: the head delegate "Naef" was instructed to "leave" and conclude the conference as soon as possible subject to the response of the North Korean Puppet Regime) (Additional information at 16:20)
  - (e) Military Armistice Conference was held for 42 minutes at 11:00.
  - (f) The head delegate of the North Korean Puppet Regime reportedly mentioned the shooting incident in DMZ only.
  - (g) The head delegate of U.S. mentioned the reconnaissance aircraft downing incident only.
  - (Aa) Regarding this, the head delegate of the North Korean Puppet Regime asked in turn, "What kind of aircraft, which country's aircraft, and where does it come from?" (Regarding this, the head delegate of U.S. left.)

On 19 April

- (1) Foreign Minister Choi contacted Ambassador 「Porter」 . (at 08:30) It is confirmed that the message regarding the Korean government's policy that President Park spoke to Ambassador 「Porter」 on 18 April was immediately reported to President Nixon by Ambassador 「Porter」 , and he promised that he would forward the response from President Nixon to the government as soon as collected. Foreign Minister Choi and Ambassador 「Porter」 decided to have a meeting on 21 April Monday afternoon to discuss this issue.
- (2) Director General of the European and American Bureau Yoon contacted Secretary

「Kribel」 in U.S. Embassy. (at 09:30) They exchanged information regarding the recent general opinion.

- (3) Foreign Minister Choi reported to Mr. President (at 10:30)
- (4) Foreign Minister Choi reported by document to Mr. President (at 14:00)
- (5) Diplomatic Minister to U.S. Jeon, Sang-Jin visited and had an interview by the request of Deputy Undersecretary of the State Brown. (On 18 April, at 17:50, On 19 April, at 07:50 Local time in Korea)

Brown: (a) President Nixon instructed to resume performing the regular reconnaissance flight mission the same as before.

(b) The reconnaissance flight will be exercised under appropriate protective measures (the protection by combat aircraft)

(c) The reconnaissance aircraft will be dispatched from the base in Japan, but the combat aircraft for protection will be the U. S. aircraft dispatched from the base in Okinawa and refueled by the base in Korea.

[Report by the South Korean Embassy in U.S]

On 21 April

- (1) Counselor 「Judd」 in the U.S. Embassy contacted Director General of the Europe and Americas Bureau Yoon. (at 09:30)  
Counselor 「Judd」, the U.S. Navy mobile troops are moving to General Area of Korea.

On 21 April

- (1) Counselor 「Judd」 informed:
  - (a) The U.S. Navy mobile troops arrived in the General Area of Korea yesterday. (Time unknown)
  - (b) It was appointed that one F-4 「Phantom」 troop would arrive from Okinawa to Gunsan the next day (on 22 April, 1969).
  - (c) Measures are taken as following.
- (2) Foreign Minister Choi requested to summon Ambassador 「Porter」 (at 15:30)  
Ambassador Porter agreed that there would be an advance consultation regarding measures that U.S. would take because the counterattack by the North Korean Puppet Regime directly to South Korea is expected if this Korean situation is

getting worse. Foreign Minister Choi assured the U.S. close consultation.

- (3) Counselor 「Judd」 informed to Director General of the Europe and Americas Bureau Yoon (at 15:40)

The U.S. Navy troops in the East Sea are appointed to go southward after going up north to Uljin. Subsequent actions are unsettled yet.

## The Position of the United States (Government)

### The Position of the United States (Government)

On 15 April

- (1) Occurrence of the incident was reported to President Nixon. (Time was not stated.)
- (2) Requested to rescue attendants through the U.S. Embassy in 「Moscow」
- (3) Deputy Chief of Navy Operations (Vice Admiral Colwell), an explicit piratical action
- (4) U.S. Congress regards the incident important, but keeps the prudent position  
Utterance in Congress:
  - (a) Chairperson of Senate Committee on Armed Services...Causing extremely critical situation
  - (b) Chairperson of House Committee on Armed Services...Emphasized retaliatory measures against the North Korean Puppet Regime

On 15 April

- (1) The Department of State has kept watch over the situation and reported to President Nixon often.
- (2) Secretary of State 「Rogers」 invited USSR Ambassador 「Dobrynin」 and called for aid to rescue, but did not express warning.

On 16 April

- (1) On 16 April morning (local time in U.S.) until now, there has been no public comment from the Department of State regarding the incident. However, the Pentagon (at 08:45, local time in U.S.) announced that alleged debris from the plane was found on the sea approximately 100 miles from the south of Chung Jin Dong and under rescue operations. Announced that it was alleged that there is no survivor.
- (2) President Nixon keeps prudent and composed position when reported to grasp exact situation.
- (3) Local opinion regarding the position of U.S. Congress is that it is better to take more moderate position than the 「Pueblo」 incident.

- (4) Chairperson of House Committee on Armed Services was the only one who insisted prompt military retaliation.
- (5) U.S. National Security Council was held (at 10:00, on 17 April midnight – local time in Korea) (proceeded for 61 minutes)
  - (a) The contents of the conference and measures were not announced.
  - (b) Keep watch over and continuously examine the situation
- (6) Public announcement of the Pentagon
  - (a) Downing by the North Korean Puppet Regime combat aircraft
  - (b) There was no incident to go inside the territorial airspace of the North Korean Puppet Regime.
- (7) Secretary of the Department of State declared that the weak one takes a reckless action, but the strong one always takes a composed action with self-control. (at the U.S. Newspaper Publishers Association)
- (8) Congressman 「Fulbright」 declared
  - (a) The incident “has been turning to the extremely critical issue.”
  - (b) Requested the 「briefing」 in the Senate to both the Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense.
  - (c) It is premature to take countermeasures before grasping the truth.
- (9) On 15 April, the Pentagon announced that alleged debris from downed reconnaissance aircraft was found.
- (10) With regard to the countermeasures that President Nixon would take, there is no ???(한문 번역 X), however, the Administration considers that the public response is that a strong protest would be expressed to the North Korean Puppet Regime through Panmunjeom.

On 17 April (Report by the Ambassador to the United Nations)

- (1) Taking the issue to the United Nations has not been decided in the U.S. Security Council Conference.
- (2) According to local public opinion, the discussion in the United Nations Security Council would not be that effective.

- (3) Announcement by the Pentagon, the aircraft carrier vessel Bonhomme Richard moved from the Philippines to the coast of South Korea.
- (4) Other known facts:
  - (a) Alert order to fighter bombers
  - (b) ?? 한문번역x aircraft of the base in South Korea is ready to be dispatched.
  - (c) Preliminary inspection of mobilization preparation such as examination on the pre-stocking of military ammunition in Korea or the mobilizing capacity of vessels
- (5) Announcement by Spokesperson Baek, Sung ?한문번역 X (the first one after the occurrence of the incident)
  - (a) "It is appeared as an evident fact that the no armed aircraft performing the regular reconnaissance mission has been shot down in international airspace. Since the aircraft has never flied in the territorial airspace of the North Korean Puppet Regime before and at that time as well, there could not be an error of judgment regarding the location in the territorial airspace of the North Korean Puppet Regime coast."
  - (b) Taking the issue to the United Nations is undecided yet.
- (6) Secretary of the Department of Defense 「Laird」
 

"U.S. Naval reconnaissance aircraft performed the essential mission for the U.S. security" (Speech at the U.S. Newspaper Publishers Association)

On 18 April

- (1) Military Armistice Commission was held (at 11:00)
  - (a) The head of the U.S. delegates condemned the U.S. reconnaissance aircraft downing incident.
  - (b) Left the conference in response to the insincere position of the head delegate of the North Korean Puppet Regime. (Refer to the South Korean government measures)
- (2) The U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations: the U.S. head delegate submitted the protest to the Chairperson of the U.N. Security Council in the Armed Forces and Military Staffs Committee and required to distribute it to the Security Council Member States as a Security Council document. Outline of the contents:



- (a) U.S. aircraft was in the international airspace and there was no incident to violate the territorial airspace of the North Korean Puppet Regime;
- (b) Reconnaissance flight in international airspace is legitimate and there is no right for the North Korean Puppet Regime to intervene;
- (c) Only a single unarmed 「propeller」 aircraft cannot be seen as a threat to the North Korean Puppet Regime. Therefore, the downing action by the North Korean Puppet Regime is not a self-defense action;
- (d) The action by the North Korean Puppet Regime is explicitly violating international law;
- (e) The action by the North Korean Puppet Regime this time is not an accident and the North Korean Puppet Regime has continuously violated the truce determination and international laws; e.i. the assassination attempt on South Korean President, the 「Pueblo」 seizure incident and countless provocative attempts on South Korea.

19 April

(1) President Nixon's press conference (at 01:30, local time in Korea)

1. The U.S. reconnaissance aircraft has been shot down in the area southwest 90 miles from the coast of the North Korean Puppet Regime. This aircraft was an unarmed reconnaissance aircraft and it did not fly closer than 40 miles to the coast of the North Korean Puppet Regime. The North Korean Puppet Regime's aggression to the aircraft is not due to a provocation, but a deliberate one, performed without a warning.
2. The mission of reconnaissance will be continued under protective measures, because it is an indispensable measure to ensure the safety of 56,000 United States Forces in South Korea and the country itself. Threats and aggressive actions by the North Korean Puppet Regime threaten not only South Korea, but also the United States Forces.
3. The U.S. expressed a protest to the North Korean Puppet Regime regarding the incident through Panmunjeom. However, there was no response at all. U.S. future countermeasures depend on the future response of the North Korean Puppet Regime and the progress of the future situation.

(2) Deputy Undersecretary Brown invited Diplomatic Minister to U.S. Jeon, Sang-Jin

and discussed the President Nixon's press conference (on 18 April, at 17:50, local time in Korea on 19 April at 07:50)

- (a) Refer to South Korean government measures;
- (b) Instructions were given to the Ambassador to the United Nations in U.S. to deliver the same contents as the KNAPP representative's utterance to the Chairperson of the U.N. Security Council and to distribute to Member States as a Security Council document;
- (c) It should be explicitly kept on the record of the U.S. government's position regarding the incident and make it clarify internationally. However, it is not expected to discuss it in U.N.;
- (d) There are no additional remarks to President Nixon's declaration on the press conference. However, an additional public statement or resuming the Panmunjeom conference is not considered at this moment (report by the Embassy in U.S.)

## The Position of the United States (Press, Others)

### The Position of the United States (Press, Others)

16 April

- (1) Newspapers consider that this incident is the most critical trial to President Nixon since the inauguration and it is the momentum to make an important policy decision. (Critical comments on campaigns have been widely reminded that stout measures should have been taken to the 「Pueblo」 incident.)
- (2) Local newspapers mainly focused on the facts of the incident: The New York Times recommended taking prudent position for exact understanding of the incident and raised a doubt over the necessity of the reconnaissance action.
- (3) The provocative action by the North Korean Puppet Regime is considered as follows;
  - (a) Not considered as a provocation of all-out war;
  - (b) Countermeasures against the Focus Retina;
  - (c) Demonstration effect for Kim, Il-Sung's birthday;
  - (d) To test crisis countermeasures of Nixon Administration.

17 April (Washington Post, Morning edition of NYT)

1. Main points of newspapers
  - (a) There are many diplomatic measures that can be taken as countermeasures. (Based on the contents of Secretary of State 「Rogers」's speech)
  - (b) For measures:
    - (a) Protesting against the North Korean Puppet Regime through Panmunjeom;
    - (b) Taking the issue to the U.N. Security Council, which will put the USSR in a troubled position since it gives aid to rescue operations;
    - (c) In the case of attending the Panmunjeom conference, there is likelihood to be manipulated by the Communists.
2. It is known that the Pentagon has been suggesting following four proposals as

military measures that can be taken. However, all of these involve risks.

- (a) Naval blockade;
  - (b) Partial bombing attack to the North Korean Puppet Regime air base;
  - (c) All-out bombing attack to the North Korean Puppet Regime air base;
  - (d) Decoy and attack North Korean Puppet Regime aircraft or vessels.
- (Report by the Embassy in U.S.)

18 April (NYT)

The analysis and the response of South Korean government regarding the incident are reported as follows:

- (1) It advocates taking the same alerts that immediately followed the 「Pueblo」 incident.
- (2) Intentions of the North Korean Puppet Regime behind the aggression are assumed to be as follows:
  - (a) To entice the U.S. to an act of war by provocative actions, since the North Korean Puppet Regime has completed the preparation for war;
  - (b) To test the degree of fulfillment of the Nixon Administration's sworn commitment to Asia. If the response is negative, it will attempt to exercise military force in the region;
  - (c) To conceal the economic failure, distract the people's attention outside and promote awareness;
  - (d) To make it inevitable the partial withdrawal of the U.S. Army from Vietnam and lessen the pressure by the U.S. toward its ally 「Hanoi」 ;.
  - (e) The North Korean Puppet Regime will misuse the U.S. passiveness if U.S. does not take the retaliatory action. Strict retaliatory measures should be taken to discourage the North from attempting an all-out guerilla war.

## The Position of the Communist Bloc

### Communist Bloc

On 15 April, North Korean Puppet Regime Central Channel 1

- (1) The North Korean Puppet Regime Air Force combat aircraft has shot down a U.S. reconnaissance aircraft performing the reconnaissance mission (at 13:50).

On 16 April, 「Moscow」 broadcast

- (1) Reported that the North Korean Puppet Regime Air Force has shot down a U.S. reconnaissance aircraft on 15 April, while quoting the U.S. News.

「Hanoi」 broadcast

- (1) The North Korean Puppet Regime Air Force has shot down a U.S. reconnaissance aircraft.
- (2) Violating the commitment to the 「Pueblo」 incident.
- (3) The North Korean Puppet Regime advertised its self-defense capacity

## The Response of Other Countries

### Japan (Government)

#### 15 April night

- (1) The U.S. Charge d'affaires to Japan 「Osborne」 urgently informed the incident to the Deputy Minister of the Foreign Ministry.

#### 16 April afternoon

- (1) The U.S. Charge d'affaires to Japan 「Osborne」 visited Foreign Minister Aichi.
  - (a) Explained the incident and emphasized that the U.S. is blameless in the incident;
  - (b) In this regard, Minister Aichi expressed Japan's expectation for U.S. not to take an act of war or retaliatory measures regarding the incident (On 17 April, Chosun Daily Newspaper).

#### 17 April

- (1) Condemned the action by the North Korean Puppet Regime that it is a violation of international law.
- (2) The North Korean Puppet Regime is frenzied for the unification through communizing the whole Korea.
- (3) (The North Korean Puppet Regime is) provoking a series of military conflicts on the Military Demarcation Line and the incident has occurred under these backgrounds.
- (4) Expects to resolve the situation in a peaceful way as soon as possible.  
(Prime Minister Sato's utterance in the House of Representatives general meeting)

### Japanese Press

#### 16 April, Japan main newspapers

- (1) Characterized the incident as the second 「Pueblo」 (the 「Pueblo」 incident in airspace)

- (a) If the flight was performed in the territorial airspace, the U.S. would lose its international prestige;
  - (b) however, if it was performed within the international airspace, the North Korean position in relation to the U.S. is very sensitive.
- (2) Concerned that the situation in Korea and the East Sea will stiffen.
  - (3) Expected that if all people on board were killed, the U.S. general opinion would have enormous impact;
    - (a) tough retaliatory measures by the Conservatives;
    - (b) criticism on the cold-war system by the Liberals.
  - (4) Regarded as a tough position by the North Korean Puppet Regime toward the U.S.
  - (5) Expected that the Korean and the East Sea situation would 「escalate」 accordingly, with the U.S.' countermeasures against the North Korean Puppet Regime.
  - (6) Expects to raise ???(한문번역 X) discussion with regard to managing Security Treaty between the U.S. and Japan.

## The United Kingdom

16 April, Newspaper reports

- (1) Judged from arguing stout measures taken in the 「Pueblo」 incident of President Nixon, the future measures dealing with the downing incident and the progress are under a close attention.
- (2) If the attendants in the aircraft survive and are taken hostage to the North Korean Puppet Regime, it is apprehended to follow the course of the 「Pueblo」 incident in which the U.S. government was affronted to release the attendants.
- (3) A strong response is expected if it is revealed that the location of downing was the airspace outside 50 miles from the coast of North Korean Puppet Regime.
- (4) In the age of nuclear weapons, the reconnaissance mission is inevitable and it is a well-known fact that the Trawler of USSR exercises the same mission all over the world.
- (5) To avoid further damage, it is desirable to make appropriate use of satellite and other methods (above from London Times).
- (6) Actions by the North Korean Puppet Regime are the evidences of its preparedness for a new war. Since the North Korean Puppet Regime doubts that the USSR will cooperate with the U.S. for the resolution of the Vietnam War, the downing incident can be considered as a new alienating measure between U.S. and USSR. (Daily Telegraph)



## France

15 April, at 08:00

- (1) Every newspaper, broadcast, television reported the downing incident as a top item;
  - (a) consider as a repetition of the 「Pueblo」 incident;
  - (b) concentrate on a prompt retaliation, which was Nixon's election promise.

## Italy

15 April

- (1) The North Korean Puppet Regime intended to intensify the troublesome circumstances and President Nixon has faced political difficulty.

## West Germany

16 April, newspapers

- (1) The first critical crisis regarding the President Nixon's Far East policy

17 April (TRIBUNE DE GENEVA)

- (1) Analyze the intentions of the North Korean Puppet Regime behind the incident;
  - (a) The North Korean Puppet Regime perceived the minute diplomatic relationship with the USSR and Chinese Communists, and deliberately used the incident to assert its own independent existence among these three countries with the intention of preventing the adverse compromise for the North Korean Puppet Regime among three countries;
  - (b) The North Korean Puppet Regime became aware of the U.S. weaknesses from the 「Pueblo」 incident. The North intends to successfully impair and damage the U.S.' international prestige while testing the decision making capacity of the Nixon administration, manipulating the criticism of President Nixon from the 「Pueblo」 incident during the campaign;
  - (c) It is regarded that the North Korean Puppet Regime considered Nixon Administration as a destabilized government, which cannot take retaliatory measures.

Federation of Arab Republics

(1) Egyptian Gazette (On 17 April)

(a) Refutation of the U.S. major figure's utterance that considered the North Korean Puppet Regime's action as a provocation.

(b) Based on the U.S. spy action, it can be assented that the North Korean Puppet Regime argument that the incident was a legitimate self-defense can be legitimized.

(c) Urged the U.S. to manage the incident based on reason.

## Thailand

- (1) No governmental public opinion
- (2) 「Bangkok World」 Newspaper editorial;
  - (a) It is a distinct and irrational threat by the North Korean Puppet Regime toward the Asian security;
  - (b) Attacking unarmed aircraft is an provocative action equivalent to the 「Pueblo」 incident;
  - (c) An explicit indication of its belligerent ambition, even the Chinese Communists regards the North Korean Puppet Regime as A Collection of Interior Personalities and Minds;
  - (d) The North Korean Puppet Regime is a batch of savages that cannot even be compared with Vietnam;
  - (e) The incident is one of the series of frenzied hostile actions by the North Korean Puppet Regime;
  - (f) A prudent confrontation by the Nixon Administration is the most appropriate action. However, sanctions should be taken in diplomatic and economic aspects.

## Taiwan

17 April

- (1) No governmental public opinion
- (2) The editorial of a daily newspaper
  - (a) The downing incident is a repetition of the 「Pueblo」 incident, a provocation toward the U.S.;
  - (b) The USSR must not be called for aid to resolve the incident;
  - (c) If the lukewarm position is taken regarding the incident, the Communists will cause more damages in future. Therefore, a stout position should be taken regarding the North Korean Puppet Regime.

### Other Countries

Burma: No comments at first, and ended up reporting facts by quoting from foreign presses.

Malaysia: No comments at first, and end up reporting facts by quoting from foreign presses.

Philippines: (a) The downing incident is a new aggression to foreign countries and must be confronted with the same measures as the 「Pueblo」 incident.  
 (b) It is a proof of the completion of war preparation of the North Korean Puppet Regime and the possession of the information establishment superior to the U.S. Navy.  
 (c) The North Korean Puppet Regime will not make further progress that repeats the Korean War.  
 (d) President Nixon will attempt to find a diplomatic solution. (17th, Manila 「Chronicle」 newspaper)

India: No comments at first, and end up reporting facts by quoting from foreign presses.

Hong Kong: Ended up reporting facts by quoting from foreign presses.

Iran: (a) The difference from the 「Pueblo」 incident is the sacrifice of 31 people's lives.  
 (b) Further measures of President Nixon are being watched.  
 (c) Japan does not want military outbreak or conflicts; the U.S. will not censure the USSR as long as the prospects of disarmament talks are improved. Therefore, it is expected that the North Korean Puppet Regime is in a favorable situation.  
 (d) North Korean Puppet Regime will not respond to diplomatic pressures. Therefore 「Kremle」 must persuade its ally to observe the least international norms. (Teheran Journal)

Turkey: (a) Reminded the 「Pueblo」 and "U-2" aircraft incidents and requested that stout countermeasures do not create make international 「scandal」. (Cunhuriyet newspaper)

(b) Assumed the downing incident as a sort of demonstration to celebrate Kim Il-Sung's birthday. ( 「Ankara」 broadcast)

Pakistan: Ended up reporting facts by quoting from foreign presses.

한문번역X: (a) Test Nixon Administration's influence  
 (b) U.S. should not consider it as an outbreak of war, with respect international law and prestige.  
 (c) President Nixon's control ?? 할만하다(한문번역X).  
 (d) Aid for the rescue operations from the USSR is a significant fact.

Sweden: (a) The USSR's aid for rescuing attendants is important for the release of tension among the great powers.  
 (b) According to the announcement by the North Korean Puppet Regime regarding the U.S. reconnaissance aircraft downing incident, it is considered that the North Korean Puppet Regime has been performing autonomous and independent policy.  
 (c) It is true that the U.S. will protest against the incident. Military measures will be strongly opposed by U.S. citizens. (Dagens Nyheter newspaper)

Algeria: Ended up reporting facts by quoting from foreign presses.

Morocco: Ended up reporting facts by quoting from foreign presses.

The Ivory Coast: Ended up reporting facts by quoting from foreign presses.

Uganda: Ended up reporting facts by quoting from foreign presses.

Cameroon: Ended up reporting facts by quoting from foreign presses.

류니시아: Ended up reporting facts by quoting from foreign presses.



Ethiopia: No comments at first and ended reporting facts by quoting from foreign presses. .  
However, the contents of the report are as follows:

- (a) There is no evidence that the U.S. reconnaissance aircraft violated the territorial airspace of the North Korean Puppet Regime.
- (b) It is an excessive defense by the North Korean Puppet Regime, and such extreme actions cannot be occurred in respect to the international law.
- (c) The U.S. will launch a diplomatic offensive rather than actual retaliation.
- (d) If the U.S. takes military retaliation, the North Korean Puppet Regime will respond with military actions.

Mexico: Ended up reporting facts by quoting from foreign presses.

Brazil: Ended up reporting facts by quoting from foreign presses.

Canada: Ended up reporting facts by quoting from foreign presses.

Australia: (a) The action of the North Korean Puppet Regime is reckless and illegitimate.  
(b) Reconnaissance mission is necessary for the security of the Southeast Asian region.  
(c) President Nixon is expected to provide protection for the reconnaissance flight by combat planes.

Interview between Foreign Minister Choi and U.S. Ambassador "Porter"

Time: 25 April 1969 15: 40-16:15

Venue: Office of Foreign Minister

(The negotiation with the U.S. for the establishment of a fire extinguisher factory)

Foreign Minister Choi handed over a verbal note on 25 April 1969 to propose a negotiation to the U.S. regarding the issues including a loan for the establishment of fire extinguisher factory and ammunition factory,

Minister: Detailed conditions will be proposed in further negotiations. However, it is requested to provide a loan without interest considering our country's financial and economic conditions. In addition, to realize the urgency of the issue, it is expected to start the negotiation as soon as possible. On our side, we completed the preparation regarding the constitution of the delegates including the representatives of the Ministry of Defense.

Ambassador: The Minister's utterance and the proposal document of the government will be immediately reported to Washington by telegram, and I will let you know as soon as the response is collected.

(Mr. President's press interview)

Ambassador: Mr. President Park's utterance in the press conference in this morning was wholly translated into English and immediately reported to Washington. I reported that the content was great.

(Contacts between U.S. and USSR regarding the situation)

Ambassador: 21 April 69, "Moscow" local time, Foreign Minister of the First Department "Kerzhenets" summoned the U.S. Ambassador to the USSR "Wim" and verbally informed as follows:

"A large U.S. Naval and Air Forces are moving to the Sea of Japan. The situation is generally heating up."

"The USSR does not know the real U.S. intentions in concentrating such forces in the region. But the U.S. actions have already increased tensions around Korea, not far from the Soviet border."

On the same day, the USSR Ambassador to the U.S. "Dobrynin" visited Undersecretary of State "Richardson" and uttered the same contents above. Undersecretary "Richardson" spoke to Ambassador "Dobrynin" as follows.

"The President is determined to protect our aircraft engaged in lawful pursuits in the international airspace. The increased tension is not in the interest between the U.S. and the USSR, and we hope that the situation will not affect the relationship between the U.S. and the USSR. And we hope that the Soviet Government would be helpful in this matter through its contact with North Korea."

After the utterance above was exchanged, the U.S. Defense authorities determined to augment the number of destroyers by deploying 4 more vessels in the East Sea.

Minister: What do you think of the response of the USSR regarding this? And which position do you think the Chinese Communists would take?

Ambassador: The Chinese Communists have not expressed particular opinion regarding this situation. Rather, they have condemned the USSR for supporting the rescue operations for the downed reconnaissance aircraft. In addition, the USSR is busy with its own situation such as the Czech Republic problem and the dispute between China and the USSR, therefore, the USSR, itself, is not expected to raise another military conflict in the Far East. But it is the matter to be carefully watched over. End.

Conversation by Telephone

Time: 28 April 1969 10:30

Director General Yoon: I read from the foreign press of the U.S. Department of Defense's announcement that the 71<sup>st</sup> fleet will withdraw from the East Sea and it is supposed to move to the West Sea, is that true?

1<sup>st</sup> Secretary Kribel: I think so. Regarding this, I know that Ambassador "Porter" informed to Prime Minister Jeong on Saturday (26 April) afternoon.

Director Yoon: I haven't heard anything, what was it about?

1<sup>st</sup> Secretary Kribel: It was about the transferring the 71<sup>st</sup> fleet will move from the East Sea to the West Sea.

Director Yoon: So does that mean a total withdrawal from the East Sea?

1<sup>st</sup> Secretary Kribel: Yes. However, I do not know where exactly they moved to. It is not stated in the instructions that we have been given.

Director Yoon: Can you let me know the reason for withdrawal?

1<sup>st</sup> Secretary Kribel: It is not mentioned either.

Director Yoon: Anyway, is it okay to consider that the U.S. military is not withdrawing from the Korean region?

1<sup>st</sup> Secretary Kribel: Yes. It is not withdrawing from the Korean region.

Director Yoon: Though the U.S. government measures is the a so-called interi, recently, as you know, both the National Assembly and Koreans people should understand that the 71<sup>st</sup> fleet will stay at the Korean region for a considerable period of time. I think the U.S.

government should fully consider the point. In sum, if it is the interim measure, a subsequent permanent measure subsequent to this measure is expected. Isn't it reasonable that the fleet leave after the permanent measure is taken?

1<sup>st</sup> Secretary Kribel: I agree. Undoubtedly, I will report the position of Koreans and the National Assembly, and I will keep you informed regarding the progress of the 71<sup>st</sup> fleet. (Counselor Judd departed to Philippines this morning on business.)

SECRET

# Intelligence Note - 305

**U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE**  
DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH  
**F760007-0562**

April 24, 1969

To : The Secretary  
Through: S/S  
From : INR - Thomas L. Hughes *Aug 17, 1969*  
Subject: **Pyongyang Reacts to President's Decision on Reconnaissance Flights**

Pyongyang's initial reaction to President Nixon's decision to resume reconnaissance flights under protective cover predictably denounces the action, warns of wider war growing out of possible future incidents and calls upon sympathetic governments and peoples to support North Korea's "righteous cause." Though as bellicose as any on the subject written during the Pueblo crisis, the statement has plaintive and defensive undertones, which betray a lower degree of confidence than Pyongyang displayed during the 1968 crisis.

Decision Linked to Standard Portrayal of US. The Pyongyang statement, published on April 23, calls President Nixon's decision a "new provocation" and "nothing but a threat and blackmail." It charges that reconnaissance flights are a "link in the chain" of actions aimed at North Korea and are directed "solely at making preparations to launch a war of aggression." The statement reiterates briefly Pyongyang's assertion that the EC-121 "intruded deep" into North Korean airspace and that its downing by North Korea was in "self-defense" and "fully" in accord with international law. *See Air Force J. 51921*

*xe DEF 12 US  
POL 31-1 KOR N-US  
xe POL KOR N-US*

4

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Danger of Escalation Noted. The statement describes President Nixon's promise that future flights will be provided protective cover as "very dangerous playing with fire." Outlining a threatening scenario for future escalation, the statement raises the possibility that another US "intrusion" will occur, North Korean will again act "resolutely," and the US will then use this as a pretext to commit "full scale armed attack against us." Thus, it claims, the President's remarks are "an open declaration that he is taking a step further to the brink of war." It refers to the task force assembled in the area and gives special mention to the aircraft carriers and a battleship (presumably the USS NEW JERSEY, which has been ordered to await further instructions upon reaching a point about 200 miles east-southeast of Yokosuka).

Propaganda Support Requested. Despite the bellicosity of its remarks about US intentions, the statement asks only that sympathetic governments and peoples "pay due attention" to the situation and "resolutely condemn" the US. Somewhat plaintively, it expresses the hope that all "peoples" will support North Korea's "righteous cause." This may be a reflection of Pyongyang's concern about the lukewarm support North Korea has received from both Peking and Moscow since the April 15 incident. The April 23 statement may thus be intended to rally flagging

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international support for Pyongyang as well as to warn the US of the dangers of the decision to protect reconnaissance flights.

Belligerent Tone Could Hide Doubts. While the tone of the April 23 statement is vitriolic, its contents betray less confidence than Pyongyang displayed in handling the Pueblo crisis in early 1968. In addition to its rather plaintive request for additional international support, the statement appears somewhat defensive in stressing that North Korean actions will be in reaction to possible future American measures.

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## Autographed Paper

25 April 1969  
(Director General Yoon)

1. Meanwhile, the North Korean Puppet Regime has been preparing war by fortifying the whole country and the expanding armaments. Simultaneously they forsook the so-call peaceful unification, which they have propagandized in the public since 1967. The North Korean Puppet Regime explicitly advocates the communist activities Korea and the unification by arms.
2. The brutal and aggressive actions by the North are a part of the North's attempt to unify the country by arms. The U.S. military reconnaissance aircraft downing incident by the North Korean Puppet Regime is one of the deliberate actions by the North. Further intentions of this provocative action as follows:
  - 1) To hinder economic and social development, the North Korean Puppet Regime is raising various anxieties and disturbances through provocations, which will ultimately provoke the collapse of South Korea by destabilizing political conditions.
  - 2) To estrange the relationship between the U.S. and South Korea and destruct the mutual trust and allies. To make the U.S. government to be wary of the commitment in the Asia and ultimately leave South Korea.
  - 3) To irritate both South Korea and U.S., and disguise it as a pre-emptive strike of the United Nations Army and call for an aid to the USSR and with the help, attempt to break out an all-out war in Korea.
3. The North Korean Puppet Regime's misjudgment poses a constant threat of an all-out war in the Korean peninsula. The North has 380,000 regular army and 1,300,00 militias. The entire North Korea is fortified, and they have a considerable number of war vessels including submarines.

It is highly probable that the North Korean Puppet Regime will provoke an all-out war if the USSR provides aid and the South Korean defense capability proves to be weak. Moreover, it should be deeply recognized that armed conflicts in the Korean peninsula and aggressive actions by the North Korean Puppet Regime will spread over the whole country and develop into another war. Therefore, measures should

be taken before long to prevent the enemy from making misjudgments.

4. It is not true that South Korea and the U.S. want a war, without a doubt. However, it will be difficult to avoid the war that the North Korean Puppet Regime begins to attack.
5. In the case of an all-out war once the North Korean Puppet Regime without sufficient preventive measures and preparation, South Korea will have to face heavy expenses economically, and further damages beyond money.
6. Therefore, taking preventive measures in economic and social aspects and equipping South Korea with sufficient defense capability are the most effective ways to prevent war.

The South Korean government's repeated reports concerning the North Korean Puppet Regime's military capability and reckless attempts are factual truth, not menace.

7. The South Korean citizens and the government clearly recognize all these potential threats. South Korea will strengthen solidity and the military capacity to be ready in case of a crisis, so that it is always ready and determined.

For the U.S., with regard to the military aid, it is the most urgent matter to promote the military aid to South Korea as soon as possible, to maintain a favorable stance in the Korean situation. In this regard, it is urged for the U.S. government to take particular consideration and special measures.



Office of the President  
Republic of Korea

32 67-  
32 366

(Translation)

26th April, 1969

Dear President Nixon,

On behalf of the Government and people of the Republic of Korea, I wish to express my profound regret over the incident where a United States Navy reconnaissance plane was shot down by north Korean communists over the international waters in the Eastern Sea on 15th April, 1969, and, at the same time, I pray for the peaceful repose of 31-man crew who lost their lives because of the incident.

My Government and people can hardly suppress the unbearable hatred and anger at such barbarous acts of provocation as the north Korean communists attempted attack directed at the Official Residence of the President of the Republic of Korea on 21st January, 1968, the illegal seizure of USS Pueblo on 23rd of the same month and, again this time, the downing of your naval reconnaissance plane which were perpetrated by north Korean communists in a most inhumane way and in utter violation of the international law. I believe that north Korean communists who repeatedly committed such provocations deserve condemnation by the peace-loving free nations of the whole world.

Several days ago, I was informed through Ambassador William J. Porter that the reconnaissance flight would continue under armed protection as an interim measure of your Government, that appropriate

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1992-12-30 새해인문회  
기재 (1992. 6. 30.) 24

검토필 (1975. 12. 31.) 9

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counter-measures would depend on the enemy's future responses and that a part of a naval task force is proceeding into the Eastern Sea in accordance with a decision made by your Government.

I think that these decisions and measures were taken after full consideration of security problems in the Far Eastern region including Korea and of various circumstances in which the United States is placed at the moment. In my view, this is a wise course of actions which the United States can take immediately under the present circumstances. I wish to express my sincere respect in this regard.

I do not doubt that appropriate second-phase measures will shortly be taken following these interim measures. I believe, however, that, should the present measures end up with a mere demonstration or temporizing action, should we seek only temporary measures in the face of north Korean communists' unpredictable acts of provocation without preparing any lasting counter-measures in advance, or should we indulge only in low posture of tolerance as in the case of the USS Pueblo incident, we would be unable to prevent any possible north Korean communists' provocation in the future. It is apprehended that north Korean communists' stepped-up acts of provocation led by their misguided confidence and miscalculation will all the more increase the tension in the Far Eastern region including Korea.

Taking this opportunity, I wish to present some of my views as to ways and means in countering north Korean communists' acts of provocation, which are henceforth expected to sharply increase, for the sake of maintenance of peace and security of this region.

As you are well aware, north Korean communists are extreme radicals even within the communist camp and the most difficult ones to deal with who seek so-called independent line without being controlled and

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restrained by either the U.S.S.R. or Red China and who take a neutral position as to the U.S.S.R. and Red Chinese disputes.

North Korean communists have not given up their basic strategy to communize the whole of Korea by force as in 1950, but have rather become more fanatical in their scheme.

Ever since the Korean armistice in 1953, north Korean communists have intensively been engaged in strengthening their military power and in preparing for war. They now possess 16 well-fortified air-bases with 600 MIG fighter-bombers. Thus, their strength has become far superior to the combined strength of both the Republic of Korea Air Force and the United States Air Force stationed in Korea. Judging from the strength of north Korean communist ground forces equipped with modern weapons and also from 1,300,000-man Red militia forces who can immediately be activated as regular forces in wartime, plus scores of bases of radar and ground-to-air missiles they now possess, the strength of north Korean communists is deemed far superior to that of the Republic of Korea ground forces.

I think that north Korean communists have now completed their war preparations and are waiting only for the opportune moment. Upon a judgement that they cannot rely solely on the change of world situation for the opportunity of aggression, north Korean communists are fanatically pursuing such an opportunity through impatient, hasty and deliberate acts of provocation.

They persistently demanded the dissolution of United Nations forces in Korea and the withdrawal of United States forces through the representative of U.S.S.R. at the United Nations General Assembly. They dared to commit frequent surprise attacks on the members of the United States forces in Korea near

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the Demilitarized Zone, which resulted in the loss of many of American lives. Furthermore, by causing such instances as the seizure of USS Pueblo and the downing of US Navy reconnaissance plane, they have tried very hard to damage United States international prestige. They attempt to accelerate the earlier arrival of the opportunity for aggression by infiltrating highly trained armed raiders into the Republic of Korea to repeat acts of murder and subversion.

They must have judged that, as a result of the repetition of such acts of provocation, they might be able to create a cleavage between the Republic of Korea and the United States, to assist north Vietnam indirectly by diverting the efforts of the United States in Vietnam to this area, to slow down the economic growth of the Republic of Korea by causing uneasiness in Korea, and also to incite mistrust to the Government of the Republic of Korea among the Korean people and that they, thus, could lay a groundwork of communizing the whole of Korea by force. North Korean communists may also have judged that the United States, which is engaged in the Vietnam War, can not take any retaliatory actions, which may accompany the risk of war, against their repeated provocations even if they play such a dangerous game. North Korean communists may have judged that Republic of Korea forces who are far inferior in their weapons and equipments and far behind in war preparation, are absolutely incapable of carrying out military retaliation for themselves. I think that these are some of the motives of north Korean communists provocations against us.

If we always respond passively to these north Korean acts which are prompted by such misguided concepts with only concession, patience and one-sided sufferings, we can not but be faced, in the near future, with north Korean provocations far more ruthless and much larger in scale.

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We Korean people firmly believe that, in order to forestall such provocative acts by north Korean communists, the manifestation of firm determination by the United States should be made and that every accompanying counter-measure should be fully prepared for.

This we say, because we know too well through our past experiences that only actions backed by strength would succeed in stopping aggression by the communists.

We understand very well your position and prudent self-restraint. However, you will agree with me that your Government's sincere intention and patience to refrain as much as possible from taking such measures as having high degree of risks which may lead to war, may invite the enemy to committing a miscalculation and the more serious provocations.

I do not entertain any doubt that permanent measures which can thoroughly prevent enemy's acts of provocation will certainly be set up under your outstanding leadership. The permanent measures should mean the strengthening of Republic of Korea and United States military power in Korea to be far superior to that of the enemy. As I have already pointed out, the enemy is able to stage an armed aggression because our combined military strength in Korea is considered weaker than theirs and will attempt reckless aggression because they believe they are capable of it.

Therefore, we should rather strengthen both Republic of Korea and United States forces in Korea everytime they commit provocation, so that the enemy may realize that such acts of provocation themselves might become meaningless and absurd. And we should respond to them through positive actions in a way that will bring forth adverse effect to their expectations.

IF the military strength of our two countries in

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Korea is increased to such an extent as to overwhelm that of north Korean communists, the enemy will come to know that their scheme of armed aggression to the south would be futile and will also realize that provocations are unnecessary.

The Republic of Korea has excellent armed forces. Their weapons and equipments (especially of the Air Force) are far inferior to those of north Korean communists.

I have instructed my defense officials concerned to work out a plan for strengthening defense capability of Republic of Korea armed forces with a view to reinforcing our military strength at least to the level equal to that of north Korean communists, so that we would be able to prevent the enemy's acts of provocation to be caused by our military unbalance with the enemy and that we could also block the enemy's attempt to diversify United States efforts in Vietnam War to this area. This plan, which can hardly be materialized without the concerted efforts of our two Governments, will be sent to you as soon as it is drawn up. I sincerely hope that you will examine the plan, and I would appreciate very much your views on it.

In the meantime, I am of the opinion that the reinforcement of United States forces (especially Air Force) in Korea which are capable of instantly countering enemy's acts of provocation is absolutely necessary. The presence of overwhelmingly powerful United States Air Force in Korea will make the enemy realize that, whenever they attempt provocations, they may possibly meet with military retaliations by the United States Air Force in Korea. If such provocations still continue, both Republic of Korea and United States Air Forces based in Korea will always be able to take instant counter-actions including retaliation even in advance of the move of the United States Seventh Fleet into the area of Korea.

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My dear Mr. President,

My Government and people hold strong desire for peace. However, the peace we aspire for has always been breached and lost by the communists who repeatedly persist in the acts of aggression.

I am firmly convinced that only through strength can the communists' ambition be suppressed and that in building such strength considerable sacrifices, efforts and materials are required. We learned through our own experiences in both Vietnamese and Korean Wars that, if we neglected to keep up our strength constantly, we would have to suffer an unwanted war at the cost of countless human lives and tremendous amount of expenditures. I firmly believe that, if the Republic of Korea surpass the enemy in her military strength, and if her economy is also markedly superior to that of the enemy, another war in Korea can surely be prevented. This is considered the only way by which we can preclude the greatest sacrifices with the least expenses.

Sincerely yours,

/S/ Park Chung Hee  
President

His Excellency  
Richard M. Nixon  
President of the  
United States of America

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By DL NARA Date 6-4-08

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~~TOP SECRET~~*Mr Kearney*OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

April 30, 1969

*PK*  
*File's*

## MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Contingency Plans for Strikes on North Korea

1. Col. Al Haig called the Secretary of Defense's office on the White House secure telephone at 0745 hrs, 30 April, and informed me that Dr. Kissinger would be presenting Secretary Laird with a requirement for two additional contingency military plans to strike North Korea. Dr. Kissinger plans to present the requirement to Secretary Laird at the 1015 NSC Meeting this morning.

2. The requirements for the Contingency Plans are as follows:

- a. Two complete military plans
  - (1) Strike on North Korea using B-52s
  - (2) Strike on North Korea using carrier based a/c
- b. Each plan to consider three different targets
  - (1) Single airfield
  - (2) Airfield complex of 2, 3 or 4 airfields
  - (3) Complex of other remunerative military targets which will result in NO civilian casualties
- c. Each plan to include:
  - (1) Task organization
  - (2) Reaction time once decision to strike is made
  - (3) Loss estimate of strike force for each target complex
  - (4) Effect of strike on Southeast Asia operations
  - (5) Departure airfields for B-52s in that plan only.
- d. No coordination outside Defense
- e. Plans to be completed within 48 hours.

*Robert C. Hixon*  
Robert C. Hixon  
Colonel, USA

*091 Korea (30 Apr 69)*

Document Number: 479

Third Class Secrecy  
Report by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

mie ho

1 May 1969  
Preservation period: 3 years

Recipient: Mr. President

Title: The U. S. Military Reconnaissance Aircraft Downing Incident by the North Korean Puppet Regime (The Third Report)

Reported as follows:

Yeon: mie 6220(16 April 1969), mie sent directly (19 April 1969)

With regard to the U. S. military reconnaissance aircraft downing incident, as reported by Yeonho, measures taken by the government so far and the progress of the incident are as follows:

1. Government measures

(1) It is already reported that the South Korean government's policy had been immediately reported to President "Nixon". On 19 April, Diplomatic Minister to the U.S., Jeon, Sang-Jin, had a talks with the U. S. Deputy Undersecretary of the State Department "Brown" on request, and the contents of the meeting were reported by the South Korean Embassy in the U.S.:

- (a) There were instructions from President "Nixon" to resume the reconnaissance flight mission,
- (b) The reconnaissance flight will be exercised under appropriate protective measures (the protection of combat aircraft)
- (c) The reconnaissance aircraft will be dispatched from the base in Japan, but

the combat aircraft for protection will be the U. S. aircrafts dispatched from the base in Korea or "Okinawa".

- (2) On 20 April, the Director General of the Europe and Americas Bureau was informed by an official in the U. S. Embassy in South Korea that the U. S. Navy mobile troops were moving into the General Area of Korea.
- (3) In the morning of 21 April morning, the official in the U. S. Embassy in South Korea informed to the Director General of the Europe and Americas Bureau that the U. S. Navy mobile troops arrived in Korea and it was appointed that one F-4 "Phantom" troop would arrive from Okinawa to Gunsan on 22 April.
- (4) The official in the U. S. Embassy in South Korea informed to the Director General of the Europe and Americas Bureau that the dispatched U. S. Navy mobile troops would move to the south after they arrived in the coast near Uljin.
- (5) On the same day afternoon, I summoned the U.S. Ambassador and inquired about the U. S. government's measures. The U.S. Ambassador said that the U. S. Navy mobile troops arrived in the East Sea near Uljin at that moment, and one F-4 "Phantom" troops was appointed to arrive in Korea, and expected that the reconnaissance flight would be exercised under the protection by the combat aircrafts. Also, he said that additional aggressions by the North Korean Puppet Regime would aggravate the situation a lot more. Therefore, there would be a close consultation on the South Korean government if the U.S. takes certain actions.
- (6) On 23 April, the ministry released a document analyzing South Korean government's diplomatic measures and the response of the governments and the press of other countries from 15 April to 21 April to South Korean Embassies in foreign countries to be used as a reference in public relations activities. At the same time, it was forwarded to the relevant authorities within South Korea.
- (7) On 25 April, after the Mr. President's press conference, it was confirmed in the talks with the U.S. Ambassador to Korea that the contents of the press conference was reported to "Washington. Te USSR government's position toward U.S. regarding the augmentation of the U. S. Navy and Air Force in the East Sea and the response of the U.S. regarding this were discussed. Ambassador "Porter" highly admired that the contents of the Mr. President's press conference was excellent.

According to Ambassador Porter, on 21 April 1969, local time in Moscow, Foreign Minister of the First Department "Kerzhenets" summoned the U.S. Ambassador "Wim" and verbally informed as follows:

"The U. S. Navy and the Air Force troops are moving to the East Sea (the sea of Japan). By and large, the situation has been turning overheated.

The USSR has centralized military force. However, it is difficult to catch the drift of South Korea. Meanwhile, the U.S.' action has already raised tension since it happened near the Korean Peninsula, not far from the USSR.

On the same day, USSR Ambassador "Dobrynin" visited the Undersecretary of the State "Richardson" and made an utterance same as the above. The Undersecretary of the State "Richardson" spoke to "Dobrynin" as follows:

"The President determined to protect our (U.S.) aircraft which perform legitimate duties in the international airspace. It is not beneficial for both the U.S. and the USSR to intensify the tension. Moreover, it is desirable that this situation does not affect the relationship between the U.S. and the USSR. In addition, it is expected for the USSR government to give aid to (resolve) the situation through communications between the USSR government and the North Korean Puppet Regime."

After the conversation, the U.S. Defense authorities determined to deploy four more vessels (4 vessels) deployed to the East Sea, according to Ambassador "Porter's" informing to me.

- (8) On 28 April, the Director General of the Europe and Americas Bureau contacted the official in the U.S. Embassy in Korea and confirmed that the 71<sup>st</sup> U.S. mobile fleet moved from the East Sea to the West Sea. Regarding the movement, South Korea expressed its view that the U.S. should fully consider the National Assembly and Koreans have understood and expected that the mobile troops to stay at the Korean territorial waters for a considerable period of time. In this regard, the official in the U.S. Embassy in Korea said that the positions of the Korean National Assembly and Koreans regarding this issue would be reported to the U.S. government.

- (9) On 29 April, the letter from Mr. President to President "Nixon" was sent by the special "pouch," so that it could be forwarded through the U.S. Ambassador to South Korea.
- (10) On the same day, after Mr. President gave a copy of this letter to the U.S. Ambassador's own hands. It was confirmed that the copy of the letter was immediately reported to "Washington."
- (11) After the delivery of the letter from Mr. President. On 1 May;
- (a) A basic guide of the South Korean government's position
  - (b) The master plan of strengthening the South Korean defense capacity was sent to the South Korean Ambassador to U.S., who was instructed to reflect the South Korea's position to the U.S. government and carry our points.
- (12) On 1 May, I sent the telegram to Deputy Prime Minister visiting the U.S. at the moment to persuade the U.S. government in accordance to the government's position in the Mr. President's letter, especially for the acquisition of the special U.S. military aid to strengthen South Korean military force.
- (13) With regard to the South Korean government's position, measures were taken through the United Nations to proclaim our government's opinion internationally regarding the incident through the distribution as a form of "the United Nations" notice.
- (14) On 28 April, Deputy Prime Minister visiting the U.S. visited the South Korea Ambassador to the U.S. and Secretary of State "Rogers" and had talks in the afternoon. At the talks, with regard to the U. S. military reconnaissance aircraft downing incident, Deputy Prime Minister uttered that the mobile fleet for reconnaissance flight cannot stay within the Korean neighboring waters without a time limit. However, it is necessary to stay for a considerable period of time. If it is true that the fleet has partially withdrawn, it is considered to be premature. In this regard, Secretary of State "Rogers" said that he appreciated understanding and support from President Park and Koreans regarding the measures President "Nixon" has taken and the U.S.' reconnaissance flight would be continued and protected at any place and the U.S. would maintain the

“commitment” that had been already made, according to the report by the South Korean Embassy in U.S.

## 2. The Position of the U.S.:

- (1) With regard to measures regarding the incident that President “Nixon” has mentioned in the press conference, there was a criticism on President “Nixon’s” measures from both so-called the hard-liners and the moderates in the U.S.
- (2) In this regard, the general opinion in the U.S. commented that measures were taken based on ideal, logical and sober judgments.
- (3) However, there were comments that South Korea expressed disappointment for the lukewarm measures of President Nixon regarding the incident, and South Korea would demand strengthening Korean military force to cope with the aggressive provocations by the North Korean Puppet Regime. Accordingly, military aid would be promoted.
- (4) On 21 April, the Pentagon announced that the 71<sup>st</sup> U.S. mobile fleet for the protection of reconnaissance flight was organized, composed of 4 aircraft carriers (1 of them is an antisubmarine aircraft carrier), 3 cruisers, and 16 destroyers.
- (5) On 24 April, the Pentagon announced that the fleet is strengthened with an addition of 6 destroyers.
- (6) On 28 April, the U.S. government announced through the spokesperson of the Pentagon that the strengthened fleet was scaled down and reorganized as 1 aircraft carrier and 7 destroyers and it was ordered to move from the East Sea to the south-southwest sea of the Korean Peninsula, “the Yellow Sea-the East China Sea.” Meanwhile, 3 F-4 fighter bomber squadrons were built up in Korea.
- (7) There is no public announcement regarding the fleet’s scaling down and the reason for the movement. However, some in the U.S. considered a scaling down and movement possible because:
  - (a) The reconnaissance flight in the coast of the North Korean Puppet Regime has to be continued.
  - (b) It achieved the goal of showing off that the U.S. can centralize powerful military force in other areas besides Vietnam.

**01 MAY 1969: South Korean Government's Position Regarding the U.S. Reconnaissance Aircraft Downing Incident, Basic Guide.**

Draft

Document Number: Mico

Drafter: North America Division 2

Approval: Minister

1 May 1979

Reservation Period: Permanent

Assistant Agencies: Deputy Secretary, Assistant Secretary, Director General of the Europe and Americas Bureau, Director of the North America Division 2

Recipient: South Korean Ambassador to U.S.

Title: South Korean Government's Position Regarding the U.S. Reconnaissance Aircraft Incident, Basic Guide

1. The letter sent from Mr. President to President "Nixon", forwarded by mie-413 on 28 April 1969, is South Korean government's position regarding the U.S. reconnaissance aircraft downing incident. You are expected to make every effort to promote the future negotiations with the U.S., in accordance with the letter.
2. "Autographed Paper" in the attachments is a complementary to the letter above and it is a basic guide to the South Korean government's position. You are expected to make efforts to provide information relevant to the guide when you explain to the U.S. government officials.

Attachments: A copy of the "Autographed Paper," translated into English.

The End



Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Mie

1 May 1969

Recipient: South Korean Ambassador to U.S.

Title: South Korean Government's Position Regarding the U.S. Reconnaissance Aircraft Downing Incident, Basic Guide

1. The letter sent from Mr. President to President "Nixon", forwarded by mie-413 on 28 April 1969, is South Korean government's position regarding the U.S. reconnaissance aircraft downing incident. You are expected to make every effort to promote the future negotiations with the U.S., in accordance with the letter.
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Attachments: A copy of the "Autographed Paper, " translated into English.

End.

Minister

The Third Class Secrecy – Confidential

Report from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Receiver: Ambassadors

Date: May 15, 1969

Title: The US Reconnaissance Aircraft Downing Incident (the 2<sup>nd</sup> collection)

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The report on the above matter is as follows.

For your reference, please see the attached papers that explain the South Korean Government's diplomatic measures and the responses of foreign countries' governments and press, from 22 April to 12 May regarding the US Reconnaissance aircraft-downing incident.

Attachments:

1. The US Reconnaissance Aircraft Downing Incident (the 2<sup>nd</sup> collection)
2. Related papers

The End

The Minister of the Foreign Affairs

The Third Class Secrecy – Confidential

The US Reconnaissance Aircraft Downing Incident

From April 21, 1969

To May 12, 1969

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## South Korean Government Measures

April 21

- (1) Dialogue between the South Korean Minister of Foreign Affairs , Choi, and the US's Ambassador Porter (15:30-16:10)

Porter: The US mobile troops sent to South Korea arrived in the East Coast near Uljin and a F-4 Phantom troop will be arriving today in South Korea.

Choi: What will the US government do from now on?

Porter: I do not know.

Choi: You told that you[the US] will keep reconnoitering and protecting us, how are you going to do it?

Porter: I am not sure about the technicalities, but if we protect you, we will do it by jets. If North Korean Puppet Regime attacks again, the situation would go worse. Whatever actions the US takes will be conducted upon the approval from the South Korean government.

Choi: Please keep me informed as things go.

- (2) Dialogue between Chief official of the America Department in South Korea, Youn, and Councilor of the US embassy to Korea, Jad (15:40-16:00)

Jad: I am informed that the US mobile troops that left the US yesterday have arrived at Uljin and been moving southward since then.

Youn: Do you mean that they stay in somewhere in the East Coast? Or do you mean that they would move to somewhere else?

Jad: I am not sure but I do not think that they will stay longer in the East Coast. It is because it costs too much to protect the reconnaissance troops there.

Youn: If the North Korean troops attack again against the continuous armament of the US reconnaissance aircrafts, the whole situation would be escalated to the level of attacking South Korea and the Korean peninsula will be a lot more intensified for war. I took a notice on the words addressed by President Nixon in his press conference, "This is not a threat, it is simply a statement of fact."

Jad: I agree with you. I will keep you informed on the situation.

#### April 23.

- (1) Distribution of the report on diplomatic measures of the South Korean Government and the responses of the governments and the press of other countries from 15 to 21 April regarding the US Reconnaissance aircraft-downing incident.
- (2) Minister of Foreign Affairs, Choi attended the Blue House Meeting with the agenda of national security (11:00)

#### April 25

- (1) Press Conference of Your Excellency President Park Jung-Hee (10:00-11:10)
  - a. The US Reconnaissance aircraft-downing incident was inflicted by the North Korean fighting flight and it is a barbarian and invasive action that ignores the international laws.
  - b. This incidence was occurred outside of the UN military tactics region. Nevertheless, taking South Korea's security into account, this incident must be taken seriously.
  - c. The reactions that President Nixon has so far taken are judged as reasonable and appropriate.
  - d. The problem is the future action plans, which will be subject to the measures North Korean Puppet Regime takes.
  - e. We have so far had countless attacks and infiltrations from North Korean Puppet Regime but have dealt with them with a high level of endurance and perseverance. We must not fall into North Korean Puppet Regime's tactic that

induces conflicts.

- f. However, there is a limit in patience and we are afraid that Kim Il-Sung would take it wrong and bring bigger calamity and misfortune to the Korean peninsula.
- g. Aggravation of the Korean situation will cause a war in the East Asian region. Therefore, people in these countries should take this issue more seriously and deeply.
- h. Apart from the retrocession of Okinawa island, the issue of military basis in the Okinawa Island does not belong solely to the US and Japan.

(2) Dialogue between South Korean Minister of Foreign Affairs, Choi, and the US Ambassador, Porter (15:40~16:15)

- a. Reported on the Press Conference of Ambassador Porter and President Park
- b. Discussion on the USSR's position announcement towards the US's reinforcement of American naval and air forces and the US's repulsion on this regard.

April 28

(1) Phone call between Director General of the Europe and Americas Bureau, Youn, and the first secretary of the US Embassy, Kribel, regarding the withdrawal of the no. 71 mobile fleet

Youn: Is the foreign report from the United States Department of States true that the no. 71 mobile fleet will be withdrawing from the East Coast of South Korea?

Kribel: Yes, I believe so. Regarding this matter, I believe that Ambassador Porter reported to the Prime Minister Jung on Saturday afternoon (26th).

Youn: What was it about?

Kribel: It was that the no. 71 mobile fleet will be moving from the East Coast to the West Coast.

Youn: All of them?

Kribel: Yes. I do not know the exact destination in the West Coast. It is not written in the instructions.

Youn: What is the reason?

Kribel: Reason was not stated.

Youn: Does it mean that they are not withdrawn from South Korea?

Kribel: Yes, I believe so.

Youn: Even though it is told that this measure is a midway one, both the South Korean National Assembly and people have believed that the East side formation of fleets would be staying in Korea for a longer time. The US government should take this point seriously. Shouldn't it be more reasonable to set up some other alternative measures before letting the East side formation of fleets move out?

Kribel: I agree with you. I will report on the responses of the South Korean National Assembly and people and keep you informed about changes in the formations of the fleets.

**April 29.**

- (1) Submitted an autographed letter from the Your Excellency President Park to President Nixon (through Korean Ambassador in the US)
- (2) Gave the US Ambassador, Porter, a copy of the autographed letter and had him report (15:00)
- (3) Submission of the government resolution on national security prepared by the National Assembly Committee for foreign affairs.
  - a. In case North Korean Puppet Regime commits any provocative actions, it is agreed to take countermeasure based on practical capability without any prior



notice

- b. In order to support it,
  - 1) Reinforcement of both South Korea and the US defense capability
  - 2) Modernization of military armament in order to help the Korean armies fulfill their missions of defending the country and to realize the US plan to support the South Korean military.
  - 3) Mutual and cooperative network among the East Asia and Southeast Asian countries for regional peace
  - 4) Diplomatic efforts to prohibit the strategic value of Okinawa Island from diminishing
  - 5) Adherence to and fulfillment of the principles adopted in the Summit Talk of Vietnam supporting countries for honorable settlement of the Vietnam War.
  
- (4) Dialogue among the Deputy Prime Minister, Park, American Ambassador, and Secretary of Defense, Leoard (16:00~17:00) English name spelling needs to be checked.
  - a. Announcement about the South Korean support for the measures taken by the US in response to the US renaissance aircrafts-downing incident
  - b. Strong countermeasures must be carried out against such provocative acts of North Korean Puppet Regime
  - c. How is the no.71 moving fleet group organized to cover the reconnaissance aircrafts? Regarding this matter, Leoard Secretary of Defense said that:
  - d. The moving fleet group will go on a cruise in the Korean waters for rather a long time to cover the reconnaissance aircrafts and in the future, it will be also covered by the American fighting flights by using the Korean air basis. It is understood that the use of the Korean air base is being negotiated and discussed in Seoul.
  - e. Acknowledging the urgent prioritization of improving and extending air stations above other things including the improvement of air force planes, in regard to the reinforcement of Korean armies, especially air force.
  - f. Taking into account the necessity of the US army to reside in Korea, he agrees with the above points.

**May 1st.**

- (1) A. South Korean Government's Basic Instruction
  - B. Ordered the Korean Ambassador in the US to carry through the basic plan of increasing defense capacity of the South Korea by influencing the US government
  
- (2) Telegraphed the Deputy Prime Minister, Park, who is currently residing in Washington D.C., the autographed letter from the President Park that emphasized the importance of persuading the US to provide special military aid program to intensify the South Korean capacities.
  
- (3) Distributed the South Korean government's document for the UN circulation and declared it internationally through the UN.
  
- (4) Dialogue between the Deputy Prime Minister, Park and the Secretary of the US Department of State, Rogers (Accompanied by Korean Ambassador in the US)
  - a. Park stated that the withdrawal of East Coast fleets would be too premature because the US armed forces are still highly needed to stay in the East Coast. For this, Rogers thanked him and President Park for their understanding, as well as Korean people's support towards the measures that President Nixon took. He also responded that the US's reconnaissance flights would not be ceased and the US would not break their commitment. (Report from the Korean Ambassador in the US)
  
- (5) Dialogue among the Deputy Prime Minister, Park, Korean Ambassador in the US and the US President Nixon when the two Korean government officials made a visit to President Nixon and handed the autographed letter from the South Korean President Park to the US President Nixon

Deputy Park: President Park has been ceaselessly supportive of the measures taken by the US following the reconnaissance aircraft downing incident amid his difficult circumstances.

President Nixon: I appreciate President Park for supporting the US actions. I fully understand the difficult situation of South Korea. I also believe that reconnaissance should be continued in order to prepare for unexpected, immoral, sudden attack from North Korean Puppet Regime and to protect American soldiers based in South Korea. The future measures depend on how North Korean Puppet Regime act from now on.

Deputy Park: If North Korean Puppet Regime repeat its act of barbarism, the US should take a strong revanchist policy.

President Nixon: I am fully aware of it, and as of now, the measures are moderated. North Korean Puppet Regime is on notice. I will speak very softly but move firmly.

Deputy Park: It is necessary to give North Korean Puppet Regime a notice that they would be revenged if their provocative acts would continue, as it would be the way to reduce the possibility of North Korean's waging war due to their misunderstanding.

President Nixon: Do you think Kim Il-Sung would indeed wage war again?

Deputy Park: They have already completed the preparation for war.

President Nixon: South Korean armies are also well prepared for the battles. However, I am informed that it is not the case for the air force.

Deputy Park: South Korea has a fundamental policy of peaceful unification based on economic development while North Korean Puppet Regime proclaimed unification based on armed forces. To prevent it,

- a. Clearly state that any provocative acts will be revenged
- b. Continuously increase the US military aid, especially the air force
- c. Rapidly reinforce the Korean army capabilities especially that of air force and modernize armaments. In regard to this, under the order of President Park, a

comprehensive plan for South Korean military armies reinforcement is being prepared with the collaboration of the US commander in chief, Bonesteel.

President Nixon: I will fully examine the plan by making an order to Secretary of Defense, Leoard.

Deputy Park: North Korean Puppet Regime is scheming to make bad blood between the US and South Korea and that is why President Park's declaration for supporting the US measures carries a significant meaning.

President Nixon: I thank President Park and South Korean government again. South Korea and the US should always be united and this is the fundamental principle between the two countries. (reported from Deputy Park)

#### **May 4<sup>th</sup>**

- (1) Made an official order to Korean Ambassador in the US for keeping confidentiality regarding the autographed letter from the President Park that requested the military aid program for higher South Korean military capabilities.

The Third Class Secrecy

The US's Reaction (Government)

April 19. (Continued from the 1<sup>st</sup> Collection)

- (2) Neither moderates nor radicals in the US Congress criticize the actions taken by President Nixon (Report from Korean Ambassador in the US)

April 21. Announcement from the Pentagon

- (1) The no. 71 mobile fleets comprised of 23 ones that include 4 battle cruisers and 4 aircraft carriers (enterprise, Ticonderoga, ranger, hornet) carry out the mission of protecting patrolling aircrafts – under the command of vice admiral Malcom W. Cagle.
- (2) The Fleet New Jersey will return to the US (Report from Korean Ambassador in the US)

April 22.

- (1) Deployment of the US no. 71 mobile fleets (News from the Pentagon)
  - a. 4 pairs of Aircraft Carriers
    - 1) Confederation: Enterprise, Ticonderoga, Ranger
    - 2) Bigger Confederation: Hornet
  - b. 3 Cruisers: Chicago, Oklahoma, St. Paul
  - c. Destroyers: 16 pairs  
Sterrett, Dale, Manan, Tucker, Gurke, J. W. Weeks, L. Maccormick, Perry, Meredith, L.K. Swenson, Radford, Parsons, R.B. Anderson, Shelton, E.G. Small Davidon
  - d. Fighters and Bombers
    - 1) Between 250 and 280 (one thirds are F-4)  
(128 US planes in Korea, 50 US planes in Japan)
    - 2) EC-135 (same kind as Boeing 707) located in Okinawa airbase will be replaced for EC-121 from now on. Currently, Okinawa has 7 EC-135.

## (2) North Korean Military Capacity

- a. Fighting planes
  - 1) 444 Mig
  - 2) 80 IL-28
- b. 4 submarines
- c. 4 Guard boats (loaded with missiles)

(3) No mention about the deployment of above those planes in the East Coast (Military Confidential)

(4) It is expected that the US naval force supplied to Vietnam War would be reduced by one-third, having only Kitty Hawk and Bon Homme Richard for a while, due to the formation of the no. 71 fleets.

(5) A spokesperson for the Pentagon

Reconnoitering flights missions are being carried out by the order of President Nixon (Report from Korean Ambassador in the US)

**April 24.**

- (1) Reinforcement of the no. 71 mobile fleets (Announcement from the Pentagon)  
Increase by 6 pairs of destroyers (Rowan, Lofberg, Coontz, Buchanan, Duncan, Waddell)
  - Report from the Korean Ambassador in the US

**April 27.**

- (1) The no. 71 mobile fleets (Announcement from the Pentagon)
  - a. Return voyage within 24 hours
- (2) TV Interview with Henry Jackson, a member of the US Senate Armed Services Committee regarding this matter
  - a. Addressed to the no. 1 mobile fleet not to move to the West Coast but to move out of the South Korean waters
    - 1) It was made because of Japan or Soviet Union's pressures but because of

military strategy and decision that the South Korean East Coast does not need naval forces

- 2) Air force planes will be in charge of protecting reconnaissance flight and cruises. (Report from Korean Embassy in the US)

**April 28.**

- (1) No. 71 mobile fleets (A spokesperson of the Pentagon)
  - a. 1 pair of Aircraft Carrier (Enterprise)  
7 pairs of destroyers
  - b. Location: Southwest sea of Korean peninsula 'West Sea – East China Sea'
- (2) Increase 3 F-4 Bombers for South Korean military (Report from Korean Embassy in the US)

**April 30.**

- (1) Moving the location of F-4 Phantom fighter aircraft
  - a. Moving the location of F-4 Phantom fighter aircraft  
(Belong to the no. 33 tactical and fighting air wing and the no. 16 tactical and fighting battalion)
  - b. 2 F-4 Phantom battalion will move to South Korea in May and replace F-100 fighting crafts (report from Korean Embassy in the US)

**May 8.**

- (1) Report to the United Nations Command  
(Submission to the UN Security Council through the Korean Ambassador in the UN Headquarter)

## The Third Class Secrecy

### The US's Reaction (Press and Others)

#### April 19.

- (1) Regarding the measures for the incident, President Nixon addressed as below in his press conference
  - a. Under the current situation, it can be conceived as a measure taken based on idealistic, theoretic and practical decision. (Report from Korean Ambassador in the US)
  
- (2) Paying attention to the protection mission of the reconnaissance flights
  - a. Reported that there were many military difficulties if recruiting was based on confederation (W.P)
  
- (3) The measures taken by President Nixon marked the coldness of the US diplomatic policies and therefore, at the current stage, US people cannot help but accepting and trusting the US government decisions. (N.Y.T)

#### April 20.

- (1) Motivation behind North Korean Puppet Regime's provocative actions
  - a. Anti-Japan movement intensified
  - b. Taking into account that the head of military administration committee, Lee Chun-Seon, asked about the regiment of the reconnaissance flights at the Joint Security Area of Panmunjeom
    - 1) By calling Japanese people's attention, pressuring the US armies and military bases to be evacuated from South Korea
    - 2) Strategy to aim at concluding the security treaty between the US and Japan
    - 3) On the other hand, it was abandoned due to an internal power struggles in North Korean Puppet Regime and also in order to promote unity among the hard-liners. Also some quote that it might have been carried out solely by North Korean defense officer, Choi. (from the reporter W.P Selig Harrison)



- 4) South Korea disappointed the US at the President Nixon's lukewarm measures regarding this matter. However, military aid will be continued. (N.Y. T)

**April 21.**

- (1) This incident will influence to the issue of the 3<sup>rd</sup> revision of the Constitution that legally allows President Park to be reelected. (From the reporter Philip Shabecoff in the N.Y.T published in Seoul)

**April 22.**

- (1) Requested the US to assert North Korean Puppet Regime to accept the minimum conditions in response to the incident
- a. Damage compensation for downed aircrafts
  - b. North Korean's agreement on no more provocative actions
  - c. Maintenance of East Coast naval forces in an indefinite time period until North Korean Puppet Regime accepts the above conditions
- (2) As the above conditions would be least likely to be accepted by North Korean Puppet Regime, South Korea will
- a. Make South Korean naval force stronger in order to act for the US reconnaissance missions
  - b. South Korean air force
  - c. Request the US to reinforce armament in Jeju Island and many other areas through building air base etc. (W.P.)

**April 26.**

- (1) Press Conference of President Park (N.Y.T)

**April 29.**

- (1) Reasons for the reduction of the no. 71 mobile fleets
- a. Continued reconnoitering in the North Korea coastal areas
  - b. Accomplished the US's ostentation of its power that they could concentrate powerful military force in an other area even after the collapse at the Vietnam war

(N.Y.T)

(2) Public opinion on the US reconnaissance aircraft-downing incidents and South Korea defense capabilities

a. If the aircrafts or ships are attacked again,

1) South Korea would not hesitate to waging nuclear war against the USSR -----  
-- 21%

2) I do not consider it as a big issue -----  
--- 62%

3) Not yet decided -----  
--- 17%

b. Measures that can be taken for North Korean Puppet Regime's provocative actions

1) Warning ----- 21%

2) Water-edge program ----- 21%

3) Withdrawal of US air force ----- 16%

4) War against North Korean Puppet Regime ----- 8%

5) Not yet decided ----- 34%

c. If South Korea would be again invaded and attacked,

1) Measures without armed forces ----- 18%

2) Measures through armed forces ----- 33%

3) Withdrawal ----- 24%

4) Not yet decided ----- 25%

(Report from Korean Ambassador, Data from Time-Harris Poll)

### May 1'

(1) The withdrawal of the no. 71 mobile fleets from the East Coast is the second stage of deep consideration of Washington D.C.

a. The more serious threat regarding Korea is not the overt and official infiltrations or attacks from North Korean Puppet Regime, but the aggravated internal South Korean destructive activities.

b. The US armies would not be appropriately dealing with these activities

c. Therefore, South Korea's security relies on South Korean people themselves and

especially the politicians are most responsible in maintaining political peace in accordance with drastic changes in economic and social ones. Both South Korea and the US would never miss this necessity. (N.Y.T)

#### May 4

- 1) The reason for North Korean Puppet Regime hesitating to attack another US reconnaissance flights even with enough air force power is their fear of getting retaliated by the US and the US warning must have been delivered to North Korea or the third country. (N.Y.T)

#### May 6

- 1) Right after the aircraft-downing incident, President Nixon had proceeded with immediate revenging measures up to the level that they had chosen two North Korean air bases and considered the use of nuclear weapons, however,
  - a. Naval and air force could not be as immediately and abundantly deployed as retaliating measures needed in order to not only proceed but also defend South Korea against North Korean's extensive invasion after being attacked.
  - b. Many President Advisers especially, Rogers, the State Secretary, urged a measure that is more than just revenge.
  - c. Also, the military actions for revenge were rather actively supported by the Congress, and so President Nixon has changed his mind (N.Y.T)
  
- 2) Initially President Nixon injected the mobile fleets to the East Coast of South Korea under many purposes and plans, but due to the request from the USSR, he made the fleets evacuated from the East Coast. This indicates that the US and the USSR cooperates and conciliate between each other in many ways. (From W.P News)

## **The Third Class Secrecy**

### **Communist Bloc's Reaction**

#### **April 22.**

- (1) The USSR has addressed their attention to the assembly of American fleets for reconnaissance on the East Coast of South Korea (Announcement from a press secretary in the Department of State)
  - a. The USSR called up the US Ambassador in the USSR and warned them of danger.
  - b. The US Ambassador visited Undersecretary of State and delivered the USSR's message.
  - c. It was done only through words and there is no paper or report exchanged.
  
- (2) China criticized the USSR for their cooperation on the issue of aircraft-downing
  - a. The USSR's cooperation made the USSR become the servant or slave for the US imperialism.
  - b. China pinpointed that especially in the press release on the US reconnaissance aircraft-downing incident the USSR cited in the same way with the US, that the US aircrafts had been disappeared in the upper sky above East Sea of South Korea.
  - c. China did not mention anything about North Korean Puppet Regime's provocative actions. (China Beijing Broadcasting)

#### **April 23.**

- (1) North Korean Statement on the US reconnaissance aircraft-downing incident
  - a. The US has reinforced the reconnoitering programs after the incident of the cruise 'Pu.'
  - b. The US reconnaissance aircrafts invaded the North Korean territorial sky.
  - c. Destroying the aircraft is a self-defense action and it accords with international law

- d. Reconnoitering with armaments reveals the US's intension to invade.
  - e. If the US invaded the North Korean territorial sky again, other possible measures would be taken in order to protect national sovereignty.
  - f. The essential reason for war breaking in the Korean peninsula lies on the problem of the US military presence in South Korea.
  - g. Therefore, any of the foreign military forces should be evacuated from South Korea and the problems should be solved between two Koreas
- (2) The reaction of the USSR in regard to the US mobile fleets assembled in the East Coast of South Korea
- a. US mobile fleets assembled in East Coast
  - b. This was arranged after the incident of the US Reconnaissance aircrafts that invaded North Korean territorial sky and downed by North Korean fighting planes.
  - c. This is the preliminary announcement of the US that they would not give up on the role of international insurance. (Moscow Broadcasting)

## The Third Class Secrecy

### Reactions of Other Countries

#### Japan (Government)

##### April 18.

Speech of the Japanese Prime Minister about the US Reconnaissance aircraft-downing incident

- (1) Blamed the North Korean Puppet Regime's action for violating the international law
- (2) Frenzied North Korean Puppet Regime for communization
- (3) North Korean Puppet Regime causes series of armed conflicts and this incident happened under this backdrop
- (4) Quick and peaceful settlement is desired (General meeting of the House of Representatives)

##### April 22.

(1) The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a notification to the US for their cooperation in regard to the safety of Japanese fishing boats due to the dislocation of the US mobile fleets.

(2) The opposition parties including social, civil, consonant and communist ones made a decision to do an interrogation to the government regarding the resumption of escorting and reconnoitering aircrafts at the meetings of the House of Representatives and of the House of Councilors.

- a. Resumption of escorting and reconnoitering aircrafts would aggravate the tension in the East Coast, which would;
- b. Put Japan in danger of war
- c. Okinawa --- (Chinese was not fully translated)
- d. Hinder Japanese fishing industry in the East Coast.
- e. Taking the presence of escorting and reconnoitering aircrafts for granted is the attitude that came out of blind obedience to the US (Report from the Korean

Ambassador in the US)

**April 23.**

- (1) Speech of the Japanese Prime Minister about the US Reconnaissance aircraft-downing incident
  - a. I do not have any intentions to request the US to stop the reconnoitering activity as it helps secure the peace and security of the Far East Asia and prevents war from breaking out.
  - b. I do not intend to rethink about it because the reconnoitering is not subject to prior-negotiation or discussion.
  - c. It is not subject to prior discussion (Chinese was not fully translated)
- (2) Speech of Japanese defense chief, Arita:
  - a. The US Reconnaissance aircrafts were within the sphere of open air and therefore North Korean Puppet Regime should be blamed for the destruction (at the plenary session of the House of Councilors)

**Japan (Media)**

**April 21.**

- (1) The opinion of holding the negotiation with North Korean Puppet Regime on the issue of repatriation for a while, to avoid any troubles to the US and South Korea in order to receive Okinawa Island back (From the Newspaper Yomiuri)

**April 22.**

- (1) Broken pieces of airframes returned were shown to reporters at the airbase 'Hubon' (report from Korean Ambassador in Japan by collecting it from the Japanese news)
- (2) Since the US no. 71 fleets were deployed in the East Coast, the East Coast began to take on a more semi-war aspect (from each major newspaper).

**April 23.**

- (1) Remarks on the North Korean Puppet Regime's statement

- a. It seems that the USSR made North Korean Puppet Regime to be rather controlled and calm by the USSR's double-faced maneuvering activities
- b. At the bottom of North Korean Puppet Regime's intention, there seems to be an undying determination of confrontation against the world's most powerful country [the US].
- c. The tension in Korea would soon spread from East Coast to the demilitarized zone (From newspaper 'Haeil').
- d. It might be too soon to say that this incident would bring a war in full measure, but it at least reached a flash point (From the Newspaper Yomiuri).
- e. It is least likely for North Korean Puppet Regime to adopt any military action against the US by itself, as of now(from the newspaper Sankei).



## Free China

**April 17.**

- (1) No official government comment was made
- (2) Editorials from daily presses;
  - a. It is the reoccurrence of the incident 'Pu' cruise and the provocative actions to the US
  - b. It is least understandable that North Korean Puppet Regime asked help to the USSR for the settlement of the incident
  - c. The US should take uncompromising strong measures to this incident; otherwise, lukewarm reactions would put the US in a constantly abused situation by the communists.

**April 22.**

- (1) The reconnaissance mission is the natural and inevitable one for the mutual defense of the ASEAN region. (Comments from the spokesperson of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) (Report from Korean Ambassador in China)

**April 23.**

- (1) Media Comments on the continuation of reconnaissance mission
  - a. Expressed the determination on the collective security protection in the Asia-Pacific region
  - b. North Korean Puppet Regime's provocative action was intended to infuriate the US, in order to provoke war and invade South Korea. However, North Korean movement depends on the US attitude and reaction.
  - c. Increasing the capacity of South Korean armed forces is mandatory, in order to respond to any North Korean Puppet Regime attacks as they intend to invade South Korea whenever they have chances to do so.
  - d. Through this chance, it is learned never to hastily judge about the relationship between the USSR, China and North Korean Puppet Regime and never to expect the good will from the USSR. (Report from Korean Ambassador in China)

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

USW 0582

1. Mr. Young, a member of the U.S Senate Military committee, insisted on withdrawing U.S Armed Forces as soon as ROK armed forces in Vietnam return to Korea. Also he stated that the strength of Korean military, excluding air force, surpasses that of the North Korean puppet regime.
2. As his opinion didn't fully recognize or underestimated intentions and actions of the North Korean puppet regime, the South Korean government should hold a meeting to explain the Korean and Far East Asian situation. Also, it will have to explain the military strength of the ROK and the North Korean puppet regime and persuade [the U.S.] that his assertion didn't reflect reality.
3. When his assertion is dealt with in the newspaper, it should explain the unreality in the form of a letter to the editor.