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Department of State

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TELEGRAM

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PP RUEHC
DE RUALOS 4034E 0380510
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 070346Z FEB 68
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8889
STATE GRNC

CONTROL : 1945Q
RECEIVED : Feb. 7, 1968
1:35AM

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 98-17

By wa, NARA Date 3-18-99

Wor

~~SECRET~~ SEOUL 4034

NODIS

PERSONAL AND EYES ONLY FOR THE SECRETARY

REF: STATE 110828

1. WE ARE CONTINUING TO HAMMER HOME THOUGHTS YOU EXPRESSED. THESE ARE INDEED VOLATILE AND ESPECIALLY SENSITIVE PEOPLE. THEIR LEADERS DO NOT YET DISPLAY MUCH POLITICAL SOPHISTICATION AND ALLOW THEMSELVES TO BE WHIPSAWED EVEN BY ELEMENTS THEIR OWN PARTY AND OF COURSE BY THE PRESS.

PAGE 2 RUALOS 4034E ~~SECRET~~

2. I HAD SESSIONS WITH PRIME MINISTER THIS MORNING AND, PLAYING ON HIS POLITICAL AMBITIONS, I TOLD HIM THAT HE AND HIS CABINET HAVE SIMPLY GOT TO DISPLAY SOME LEADERSHIP IN THIS SITUATION AND TRY TO FORM RATHER THAN FOLLOW PUBLIC OPINION. OUR OWN LEADERS, I SAID, HAD PROVIDED HIM AND GOVERNMENT WITH LARGE AND CONSISTENT MASS OF MATERIAL TO WORK WITH IN SUCH AN EFFORT, QUITE APART FROM THE CONFIDENTIAL MATTERS DISCUSSED WITH PRESIDENT PARK. WHAT CAN BE DONE WHEN THEY SET THEIR MINDS TO IT IS REFLECTED IN KOREA TIMES FEATURE HEADLINE OF TODAY "U.S. ASSURANCES BRING SOFTENING OF GOVERNMENT POSITION," AND CHANGE OF TONE IN TONGA RADIO BROADCAST THIS MORNING. THESE CHANGES FOLLOWED OUR MEETING YESTERDAY (REPORTED SEOUL 4008) BUT THE COMMENT DISSEMINATED TO PRESS YESTERDAY SHOULD HAVE AND COULD HAVE BEEN MADE BEFORE AGITATION REACHED ITS PRESENT LEVEL. I WILL BE COMING TO HIM IN FUTURE ON THIS MATTER OF PANMUNJOM, I SAID, WHICH REPRESENTS OUR ONLY DIRECT CONTACT WITH THE

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-2-Page, SEOUL 4034 February 7, 1968 NODIS

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ADVERSARY AND ONE WHICH WE DO NOT INTEND TO GIVE UP.
WE LOOK TO HIM FOR LEADERSHIP REQUIRED.

3. CHONG TOLD ME AT THIS POINT THAT THEY HAVE PUT THE WORD OUT TO DAMPEN PUBLIC AGITATION AND PRESS COMMENT AND THAT WE WILL SEE A GRADUAL IMPROVEMENT. THEY HAD CALLED IN UNIVERSITY PRESIDENTS AND GIVEN WORD THAT STUDENT AGITATION MUST SUBSIDE. I SAID I KNOW WHAT THEY CAN DO WHEN THEY WANT TO DO IT.

4. IN ADDITION TO LACK OF GOVERNMENT LEADERSHIP, WE HAVE OF COURSE AS USUAL BEEN PLAGUED BY UPI AND OTHER PRESS DISPATCHES FROM HOME WHICH DELIBERATELY DISTORTED YOUR STATEMENTS AND THOSE OF SECRETARY MACNAMARA. EVERYBODY WE CAN THINK OF HERE HAS BEEN SUPPLIED WITH VERBATIM TEXT WHICH GIVE NO BASIS WHATSOEVER FOR SUCH MISINTERPRETATIONS.

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5. PRIME MINISTER WILL LUNCH WITH ME TOMORROW AND I AM GOING TO GET ACROSS TO HIM CLEARLY THAT HIGHEST LEVELS IN WASHINGTON ARE WATCHING HIS PERFORMANCE IN THESE MATTERS. WE ARE ALSO GETTING AT KEY MEMBERS OF ASSEMBLY. AND I AM GIVING PRESS BACKGROUNDEERS AS PART OF EFFORT TO BRING THINGS INTO DECENT FOCUS. PART OF MY PROBLEM HAS BEEN THAT THERE ARE TWO SELF-SERVING MINISTERS HERE IN KEY POSITIONS OF NATIONAL DEFENSE AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS WHO ARE WORSE THAN NO HELP AT ALL. AS ALWAYS YOU HAVE CERTAINLY GIVEN ME EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO DEAL WITH THIS UNNECESSARILY CHARGED ATMOSPHERE AND I AM HOPEFUL AT THIS POINT THAT MATTERS WILL IMPROVE FROM HERE ON OUT.

GP-2. PORTER
BT

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106 46

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE 885

PAGE 01 SEOUL 04061 071503Z

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SI
ACTION EA 15

INFO IO 13, EUR 15, SSO 00, SAH 03, SAL 01, ACDA 16, DODE 00, GPM 03, H 02,
INR 07, L 03, NSAE 00, NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SC 01, SP 02, SS 20, USIA 12,
CIA 04, RSR 01, MM 01, /134 W

R 071251Z FEB 68
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8915
INFO CINCPAC
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 290

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SEOUL 4061

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

SUBJECT: NK INTRUSION/PUEBLO; NATIONAL ASSEMBLY
ADOPTS STRONG STANCE

- 1. IN LATE EVENING FEB 6, NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SPECIAL
- 1. IN LATE EVENING FEB 6, NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SPECIAL SESSION UNANIMOUSLY ADOPTED NINE-POINT RESOLUTION CALLING UPON PRESIDENT PARK TO TAKE "PROPER AND COURAGEOUS" COUNTERMEASURES AGAINST NK PROVOCATIONS.

PAGE 2 RUALOS 4061 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
RESOLUTION FOLLOWED THREE DAYS OF BITTER WRANGLING DURING WHICH, ACCORDING TO WELL-INFORMED NKP SOURCE, OF OPPOSITION PARTY LEADERS TONED DOWN MUCH STRONGER

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DEMANDS OF GOVERNMENT PARTY. THOUGH TEXT UNAVAILABLE,
RESOLUTION CONTAINED FOLLOWING MAIN POINTS AS TAKEN
FROM PRESS REPORTS.

A. NO KOREAN CAN TOLERATE BRUTAL ACTIVITIES
OF ARMED COMMUNIST AGENTS.

B. INTRUSION INCIDENT MORE IMPORTANT THAN
PUEBLO SEIZURE.

C. SECRET PANMUNJOM TALKS, WITHOUT ROK
PARTICIPATION, OF GRAVE CONCERN TO KOREAN PEOPLE.
"WHO ENRAGED AT MEETINGS."

D. GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, RESPONSIBLE FOR
NEGLIGENCE IN PREVENTING INTRUSION, SHOULD BE
PUNISHED.

E. ROKG SHOULD STRENGTHEN ITS DEFENSE POSTURE
TO PRECLUDE FURTHER POSSIBLE INFILTRATION OF
COMMUNIST AGENTS.

F. ROKG SHOULD TAKE MEASURES TO MAINTAIN

PAGE 3 RUALOS 4061 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
MILITARY SUPERIORITY OVER THAT OF NORTH KOREA.

G. ROKG SHOULD BE RE-EXAMINE ALL OF KOREA'S
INTERNATIONAL TREATIES TO INSURE NATION'S PEACE
AND SECURITY.

H. ROKG SHOULD REVAMP POLICE EQUIPMENT AND
ORGANIZATION TO COPE WITH COMMUNIST ATTACKS.

I. ROKG SHOULD DEVELOP SELF-DEFENSE PLAN
SO IMPORTANT FACILITIES CAN BE PROTECTED IN EVENT
OF COMMUNIST ASSAULTS.

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2. FOLLOWING MORNING (FEB 7) NATIONAL ASSEMBLY INTERPELLED GOVT MINISTERS ON PUEBLO SEIZURE. NDP ASSEMBLYMAN KIM TAE-CHUNG POSED ALL QUERIES DURING TENSE MORNING SESSION. IN RESPONSE, MND SAID PUEBLO WAS IN INTERNATIONAL WATERS AT TIME OF SEIZURE AND THAT ROKG WOULD NOT RPT NOT ATTEMPT TO OBTAIN APOLOGY FROM NK OVER BLUE HOUSE RAID AS SUCH WOULD BE MEANINGLESS. FONMIN SAID US AND NK REPRESENTATIVES MEETING AS SENIOR MEMBERS RESPECTIVELY OF TWO SIDES ARMISTICE COMMISSION. FONMIN ALSO STATED THAT ROKG FROM BEGINNING DID NOT RPT NOT OPPOSE PANMUNJOM

PAGE 4 RUALOS 4061 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

TALKS OUT OF HUMANITARIAN AND POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS, BUT DECLINED TO DISCLOSE CONTENT OF TALKS AS AGREED WITH USG. FONMIN CONTINUED THAT PROTEST WAS DELIVERED TO USG TO POINT OUT THAT PROLONGED TALKS WITH NORTH KOREANS WOULD PROVE FRUITLESS. FONMIN ALSO REPORTEDLY SAID THAT US-ROK RELATIONS WOULD NOT RPT NOT BE IMPAIRED AS RESULT OF PUEBLO CASE. PM ALSO PRESENT, BUT ANSWERED QUESTIONS ON WITHDRAWING ROK TROOPS FROM VIET-NAM AND ON "CORRECTING LOW ROKG POSTURE WITH US" BEHIND CLOSED DOORS. DURING AFTERNOON SESSION, TWO NDP AND ONE DRP ASSEMBLYMEN QUERIED PM PRIMARILY ON DEFENSE MATTERS. PM REPORTEDLY SAID US NAVY AND AIR FORCE UNITS IN KOREA HAVE BEEN AUGMENTED AND THAT, SINCE UNC FORCES ON FRONT LINE, THERE NO NEED TO SUPPLEMENT US-ROK DEFENSE PACT.

3. COMMENT: SPECIAL SESSION CONVENED ON JAN 31 SPECIFICALLY TO CONSIDER NK INTRUSION INCIDENT AND STRONG, UNCOMPROMISING RESOLUTION WAS EXPECTED. NDP POLICY COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN CHONG-HAE-YONG TOLD EMBOFF FEB 7 THAT NDP-DRP CONTROVERSY CENTERED OVER DESIRE

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OF DRP "AT REQUEST OF BLUE HOUSE" TO INCLUDE

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THREAT TO WITHDRAW TROOPS FROM VIET-NAM AND TO WITHDRAW
ROKA FROM CINCUNC OPERATIONAL CONTROL SHOULD US FAIL
TO PUNISH NORTH KOREANS. THIS DEMAND FINALLY
WAS BALANCED OFF AGAINST NDP EFFORT TO FORCE
HOME MINISTER AND MND TO RESIGN OVER INCIDENT.
BOTH DEMANDS AS RESULT WERE TONED DOWN, BUT
OVERALL RESOLUTION REFLECTS PUBLIC ATTITUDES ON
CASE. INTERPELLATION ON PUEBLO CASE ENDED FEB 7
AND ASSEMBLY RECESSED UNTIL NEXT MONDAY. NO
RESOLUTION ON PUEBLO IS PLANNED.
EXEMPT. PORTER

PAGE 5
BUT DECLINED TO DISCUSS

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REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

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FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0916
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BT
SECRET SEOUL 4062

SECRET

CONTROL: 2089Q
RECD: FEBRUARY 7, 1968
10:35 A.M.

MODIS/CACTUS

SUBJ: FUTURE OF PUEBLO NEGOTIATIONS

1. FOLLOWING ARE MY COMMENTS ON TODAY'S MEETING AT PANMUNJOM AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE OF NEGOTIATIONS.
2. NORTH KOREANS PUT THE ISSUE SQUARELY TO US AT TODAY'S CLOSED MEETING. THEY GAVE US NAMES OF DEAD AND WOUNDED AND BY DOING SO AT THIS MEETING RATHER THAN AT SUBSEQUENT PRO FORMA SECRETARIES MEETING, CLEARLY DREW LINE OF DISTINCTION BETWEEN NORMAL MAC OPERATIONS AS EXEMPLIFIED BY SECRETARIES MEETING AND SPECIAL NATURE OF CLOSED MEETING BETWEEN SENIOR MEMBERS. THE TEXT OF THE MEETING ITSELF CLEARLY INDICATES WHAT THEY WANT, WHICH IS CONTINUATION OF MEETINGS AT PANMUNJOM WITH ENLARGED TEAMS TO INCLUDE DIPLOMATIC ADVISERS, JOINTLY APPROVED PRESS RELEASES,

PAGE 2 RUALOS 4062 SECRET
CLOSED SESSIONS, AND THE FULL PANOPLY OF FORMAL GOVT-TO-GOVT NEGOTIATIONS. BY PROVIDING NAMES OF DEAD AND WOUNDED, WHICH THEY COULD EASILY DO AT NO COST TO THEMSELVES, THEY MAY FEEL THEY HAVE RAISED HOPES AMONG US PUBLIC AND WITHIN USG THAT FURTHER MEETINGS ON THEIR TERMS WILL PRODUCE EVENTUAL RELEASE OF PUEBLO AND ITS CREW.

3. THEIR OBJECTIVES ARE MANY AND COMPLEX, BUT IF THEY CAN FORCE US INTO GOVT-TO-GOVT NEGOTIATIONS, THEY WILL HAVE GONE LONG WAY TO ACHIEVING WHAT THEY DESIRE. EFFECT ON ROKS AND US/ROK RELATIONS OF CLOSED MEETINGS WITHIN MAC CONTEXT IS ALREADY APPARENT, TO PUT IT MILDLY, BUT NK'S MAY ALSO HAVE IN MIND MUCH BROADER GOALS AS WELL IN TERMS WHOLE RANGE OF PROBLEMS INVOLVING THEIR INTERNATIONAL STATURE.

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-2- SEOUL 4062, FEBRUARY 7 (NODIS/CACTUS)

4. AGREEMENT ON GOVT-TO-GOVT NEGOTIATIONS ALONE, EVEN IF END RESULT WERE SATISFACTORY TO US, WOULD BE SUBSTANTIAL PRICE TO PAY, AND WASHINGTON WILL HAVE TO DETERMINE WHETHER WE SHOULD PAY IT. HOWEVER, ATMOSPHERE IN ROX, AS REFLECTED BY TROUBLE TODAY AT FREEDOM BRIDGE AND AT OSAN, LEADS ME TO CONCLUSION THAT IF WE MUST GO ALONG

PAGE 3 RUALOS 4062 S E C R E T
WITH NK PROPOSAL, WE SHOULD GIVE SOME THOUGHT TO REMOVING NEGOTIATIONS ENTIRELY FROM MAC CONTEXT AND FROM PANKUNJON AS WELL.

5. WE HAVE THUS FAR FUZZED ISSUE OF WHETHER PUEBLO CASE COMES UNDER ARMISTICE AGREEMENT (WHEREAS NK'S HAVE BEEN WILLING TO REGARD IT AS SUCH). SITUATION IS SUCH, HOWEVER, THAT IF WE ARE TO CONSIDER ACCEPTING NK PROPOSAL FOR GOVT-TO-GOVT NEGOTIATIONS, IT WOULD SEEM VERY DIFFICULT TO DO SO AT PANKUNJON UNDER MAC COVER; AND IF WE INSIST ON MAINTAINING MAC COVER FOR CLOSED MEETINGS, WE ARE GOING TO HAVE INCREASINGLY GRAVE DIFFICULTIES WITH OUR KOREAN FRIENDS. CERTAINLY OUR AGREEMENT TO MEETINGS AT PANKUNJON--ON KOREAN TERRITORY--ON TERMS ANYTHING LIKE NK'S HAVE PROPOSED WOULD BE INTOLERABLE TO ROXS.

6. IN LIGHT OF FOREGOING, YOU MAY WISH TO CONSIDER COUNTER-PROPOSAL INVOLVING CHANGE OF VENUE AND FORMULA ON MARGAY PATTERN OF OUR TALKS WITH CHICOMS. WHILE ROXS WOULD NOT WISH TO SEE US NEGOTIATING DIRECTLY WITH NK ON ANY TERMS, THERE ARE SOME INDICATIONS THAT THEY HAVE BEGUN TO THINK IN THESE TERMS THEMSELVES. FOR EXAMPLE,

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OPPOSITION LEADER YU CHIN-O TOLD ONE OF MY OFFICERS THIS AFTERNOON THAT PUEBLO CASE HAS NOTHING TO DO WITH MAC, THE UNCO OR PANKUNJON. HE SAID PUEBLO IS STRICTLY US/NK PROBLEM AND SHOULD HAVE BEEN HANDLED OUTSIDE KOREA. SIMILARLY, TODAY'S KYUNCHYANG SINMU, IN WHICH ROXS HAS MAJOR INTEREST, SAID PUEBLO CASE SHOULD BE HANDLED IN THIRD COUNTRY. IF VENUE WERE CHANGED, WE COULD, OF COURSE, AMELIORATE PROBLEM WITH ROXS BY INVITING THEM TO SEND REP TO MAINTAIN SPECIAL LIAISON WITH US DURING PERIOD OF DISCUSSION, ESPECIALLY IF THEY TAKE PLACE IN NON-COMMUNIST CAPITAL.

-3- SEOUL 4062, FEBRUARY 7 (NODIS/CACTUS)

7. IT GOES WITHOUT SAYING THAT NEGOTIATION ELSEWHERE WOULD BE MORE MANAGEABLE THAN THOSE CARRIED ON IN SUPERHEATED ATMOSPHERE OF SEOUL, ALTHOUGH THERE WOULD BE LOGISTICAL AND COMMUNICATIONS PROBLEMS FOR NK SIDE WHICH WOULD PROBABLY SLOW PROCEEDINGS DOWN. ON OTHER HAND, CHANGE OF VENUE WOULD FREE MAC FOR ITS NORMAL BUSINESS, AND CERTAINLY MAKE THE ROKS MORE TRACTABLE.

8. THERE WOULD OBVIOUSLY BE TIE-IN BETWEEN REACTION OF NK SIDE TO SUGGESTION OF CHANGE IN VENUE AND TIMING OF

PAGE 5 RUALOS 4062 S E C R E T
ANNOUNCEMENT OF NEW PACKAGE WHICH WE ARE OFFERING ROKS IN LATEST LETTER FROM PRESIDENT JOHNSON TO PARK. WE HAVE NOT THOUGHT THIS THROUGH FULLY AS YET, BUT IT IS SOMETHING TO BEAR IN MIND.

9. IF ALTERNATE VENUE IS TO BE CONSIDERED, PERHAPS DJAKARTA WOULD BE SUITABLE (ALTHOUGH OUR PREFERENCE SHOULDN'T BE PUT FORWARD TO THEM INITIALLY). IDEA MIGHT WELL APPEAL TO NEUTRALITY OF INDONESIANS AND ROKS HAVE CONGEN IN DJAKARTA MANNED BY CAPABLE INDIVIDUAL WHO COULD BE THEIR LIAISON OFFICER.

10. GP-3. PORTER
BT



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VV CHANGE
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27 FEB 68 AM 5 23

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 1 OF 2 SEOUL 4083

RODIS/CACTUS

DECLASSIFIED

- REF: A. STATE 111264
- B. STATE 111263

Authority State Declassification/5/3
By Jan NARA. Date 11-12-97

1. I CONVEYED MESSAGE CONTAINED REFA TO PRESIDENT PARK THIS MORNING. HE EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR THE INCREASED MILITARY AID WHICH HE SAID WOULD BE USEFUL IN PRESENT SITUATION. HE IS CONVINCED THAT MILITARY BUILDUP ALONE, HOWEVER, IS USELESS WHEN DEALING WITH PERSON LIKE KIM IL-SUNG. HE SAID AMERICAN POLICY SEEMED TO CONSIST OF EFFORTS TO EXTRACT

PAGE 2 RUALOS 4083/1E ~~SECRET~~
PUEBLO AND CREW AND BUILDUP ON ROK SIDE, WHICH MEANS ROKS MUST REMAIN PASSIVE HERE IN FACE OF CONTINUAL PROVOCATION. SO FAR THE ANGER OF THE ROK PEOPLE HAS BEEN CONTAINED BECAUSE HIS GOVERNMENT DOES NOT WANT WAR, BUT IT WILL BE IMPOSSIBLE TO REMAIN PASSIVE WHEN ANOTHER INCIDENT OCCURS AND HE FEELS THIS IS MOST LIKELY. THAT WILL START A WAR IN KOREA AGAIN.

2. HE HAD EXAMINED CLOSELY MILITARY POSTURE AND READINESS OF ROK AND UN FORCES AND THEY ARE CERTAINLY NOT READY FOR WAR AS COMPARED TO NORTH KOREANS. THIS MEANS THEY WOULD PERHAPS SUFFER HEAVY DAMAGE INITIALLY BUT THEY WOULD SUFFER EVEN MORE IF THEY ADJUST ATTACK AND DO NOT TAKE PREVENTIVE MEASURES. HE HAS GIVEN US ASSURANCE THAT HE WOULD NOT TAKE UNILATERAL ACTION AND HE WANTS PRIOR CONSULTATION WITH THE UNITED STATES. HE ALSO HAS FAITH IN COMPETENCE AND AUTHORITY OF UN COMMAND, BUT LACK OF COMBAT READINESS DISTURBS HIM. HE REALIZES THAT

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GENERAL BOWESTEEL HAS NOT BEEN GIVEN A WAR MISSION BUT FACT REMAINS THAT ENTIRE POSITION ON OUR SIDE NOW IS SUCH AS TO ENCOURAGE KIM IL-SUNG. HE SAID AN EXAMPLE OF OUR UNPREPAREDNESS IS THAT APPROXIMATELY 200 US MILITARY AIRCRAFT HAD COME INTO COUNTRY AND CANNOT BE ACCOMMODATED. THERE IS EVEN A PROBLEM OF TAKEOFF, AND ROKAF PLANES WERE INFERIOR TO NK PLANES. A MIG-21 NEEDS ONLY TO HAVE A BUTTON PUSHED TO TAKE OFF, WHEREAS THE F-5 CANNOT START WITHOUT AUXILIARY ASSISTANCE. IT IS BAD THING TO HAVE TO SIT AND AWAIT ATTACK. WHAT WOULD UNITED STATES HAVE DONE IF HE AND HIS FAMILY HAD BEEN ASSASSINATED? WOULD WE HAVE PROCEEDED TO NEGOTIATE?

5. FOREGOING INDICATES PENT-UP EMOTIONS OF ROK PRESIDENT AT THIS POINT AND HE GAVE ME TWO AND A HALF HOURS OF IT. I REPLIED TO HIS VARIOUS POINTS, EMPHASIZING AS I HAD DONE TWICE BEFORE THAT WE DEPENDED ON HIS LEADERSHIP, RESTRAINT OF BOTH SIDES

PAGE 4 RUALOS 4083/1E ~~SECRET~~

AND UNDERTAKING CONSULTATIONS IN ADVANCE WITH US REGARDLESS OF CIRCUMSTANCES. ON QUESTION ON KIM IL-SUNG I GAVE HIM REPORT OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS TO BE REPORTED SEPARATELY.

4. BEFORE I GOT TO SUBJECT HE LAUNCHED INTO STRONG DENUNCIATION OF OUR MOVE OF ENTERPRISE SOUTHWARD. ENTERPRISE SHOULD HAVE BEEN MOVED NORTHWARD, HE SAID, WITH OTHER CARRIERS AND PLACED OFF PORT OF WONSAN. WE SHOULD HAVE ANNOUNCED PORT WAS CLOSED UNTIL WE GOT MEN AND SHIP BACK. IF THIS BROUGHT NO ACTION WE SHOULD GO IN AND TAKE SHIP, AND NEITHER RUSSIANS NOR CHINESE WOULD INTERFERE.

5. WHEN HE FINISHED THIS ASPECT OF HIS STATEMENT I GAVE HIM PARA SEVEN OF REF 8. HE BRUSHED THIS ASIDE, SAYING THAT ROK CLOSEST ALLY OF UNITED STATES BUT OUR RECENT NEGOTIATING TACTICS ARE ONLY ENCOURAGING KIM IL-SUNG AND CREATING DISTRESS AMONG KOREAN PEOPLE. KIM IL-SUNG IS A PIRATE AND A THIEF, AND HE TOOK A SHIP AND RAIDED SEOUL IN A

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PAGE 2 RUALOS 4083/1E ~~SECRET~~
CRIMINAL MANNER, AND NOW THE US EXPECTS TO GET RESULTS BY TALKING TO HIM. WHAT MAKES US THINK SUCH TACTICS WILL WORK?

6. I SAID I KNOW HE UNDERSTANDS THAT OUR COMMITMENT IN ROK IS TO PROTECT THE INTEGRITY AND SECURITY OF SOUTH KOREA. THAT WE ARE INTENT ON DOING, AS HE COULD SEE FROM THE VERY GENEROUS MEASURES BEING TAKEN, BUT WE ARE NOT GOING TO GIVE UP POSSIBILITY OF ACHIEVING SETTLEMENT OF PUEBLO INCIDENT THROUGH PEACEFUL MEANS. IF POPULATION HERE IS DISTURBED IT IS, AS I TOLD PRIME MINISTER AND OTHER MINISTERS, BECAUSE PROPER USE HAD NOT BEEN MADE OF ALL OF THE STATEMENTS OF SOLIDARITY AND SUPPORT AND ALL OF THE EVIDENCE OF IT PROVIDED BY UNITED STATES SINCE THIS CRISIS DEVELOPED.

7. THERE WAS A GREAT DEAL OF REPETITIVE MATERIAL OF SIMILAR NATURE IN HIS REMARKS, AND HE MADE A

PAGE 1

47-09 4083/1E ~~SECRET~~

SPECIAL POINT OF ASKING THAT THEY BE TRANSMITTED TO PRESIDENT JOHNSON. I SAID THE PRESIDENT HAD MADE IT CLEAR IN PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENTS THAT PRESIDENT PARK'S VIEWS ARE HEARD AND CONSIDERED AND ACTED UPON ON A DAILY BASIS. AND HE COULD REST ASSURED THAT THIS WOULD CONTINUE TO BE THE CASE. HOWEVER WE DO EXPECT HIM TO UNDERSTAND, AS THE MESSAGE SAID, THAT THE TWO MATTERS OF DMZ VIOLATIONS AND THE PUEBLO HAVE TO BE HANDLED SEPARATELY. WE ARE CONVINCED THAT THIS IS ONLY RATIONAL WAY TO GO ABOUT IT. PORTER
BT

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 96-196

NARA Date 9-25-97

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VV CR0910 By *see* NARA Date 9-25-97
*****ZZ RUEHC
DE RUALOS 4083/2E 0390935
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STATE GRNC
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~~SECRET~~ SECTION 2 OF 2 SEOU 4083

NODIS/CACTUS

1967 FEB 8 AM 5 29

REF: A. STATE 111264

B. STATE 111764

8. INTERVIEW TERMINATED AND I LEFT PRESIDENT'S OFFICE TO FIND THAT PRIME MINISTER AND MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS HAD BEEN SITTING OUTSIDE WITH RATHER OBVIOUS ILL HUMOR FOR AN HOUR. SHORTLY THEREAFTER I RECEIVED PHONE CALL FROM CONFIDENTIAL INTERPRETER CHO WHO STATED THAT PRESIDENT, AFTER REREADING PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S LETTER, WISHED TO MAKE IT CLEAR

PAGE 2 RUALOS 4083/2E ~~SECRET~~
THAT HE IS AGAINST CLOSED MEETINGS AT PANMUNJOM. I SAID I TOOK NOTE OF THIS.

9. HE HAD MADE NO MENTION OF THIS EXCEPT IN GENERAL TERMS OF OUR MEETINGS AT PANMUNJOM AND DID NOT VOICE TO ME HIS OPPOSITION TO CLOSED MEETINGS. I DID SAY TO HIM AT BEGINNING OF OUR INTERVIEW THAT THERE WOULD BE MENTION OF PANMUNJOM IN MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT BUT, AS HE KNEW, I WOULD BE DISCUSSING THIS MATTER AS NECESSARY WITH PRIME MINISTER AND DID NOT INTEND TO GET INTO IT UNLESS HE WISHED TO DO SO HIMSELF. OF COURSE DURING MESSAGE ITSELF AND SUBSEQUENT CONVERSATION DEALING WITH OUR GENERAL NEGOTIATING TACTICS HE MADE FREQUENT REFERENCE TO PANMUNJOM AND, AS HE PUT IT, THE DISTRUST AROUSED LOCALLY BY OUR TACTICS.

10. I AM SEEING PRIME MINISTER SHORTLY, WHO WILL PROBABLY REITERATE THEIR OPPOSITION TO CLOSED MEETINGS. I INTEND TO MAKE IT CLEAR THAT WE CANNOT

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PAGE 3 RUALOS 4083/2E ~~SECRET~~
 SEE OUR ONLY LINE OF CONTACT CUT ON THIS SUBJECT.
 COMMENT: WE HAVE HAD SUGGESTIONS FROM VARIOUS
 QUARTERS THAT IF WE COULD ACCEPT ROX OFFICER AT
 PANMUNJOM, NOT TO PARTICIPATE BUT FOR SHOW PURPOSES,
 THIS WOULD DO MUCH TO ALLAY THEIR SUSPICIONS AND
 WOULD HELP WITH PUBLIC. I AM NOT CERTAIN OF VALUE
 OF THIS ARGUMENT BECAUSE UNDERLYING ALL THE HEAVING
 ABOUT IS SOMETHING ELSE WHICH WE HAVE DESCRIBED TOO
 YO, WHICH IS THEIR HUNGERING DESIRE, WHICH PARK
 SHARES, TO CLOSE WITH THE NORTH KOREANS. HOWEVER,
 IF YOU FEEL YOU CAN AUTHORIZE THIS ON AN ABSOLUTELY
 NON-VETO, NON-DELAY BASIS, I WOULD LIKE TO OFFER IT
 TO THEM.

11. YOUR REF B SUGGESTS MEETING BE SET UP TOMORROW.
 WE CAN DO THIS BUT I WOULD LIKE YOUR COMMENTS ON
 THIS MESSAGE IF POSSIBLE BEFORE PROCEEDING BECAUSE
 IT IS QUITE POSSIBLE THAT WE MAY BE APPROACHING
 SHOWDOWN STAGE WITH ROX'S ON ISSUE OF CLOSED MEETINGS
 AT PANMUNJOM.

PAGE 4 RUALOS 4083/2E ~~SECRET~~
 12. ON MOST IMPORTANT MATTER OF RESTRAINING ROXS,
 WE MAY WELL BE AT POINT WHERE WE SHOULD REPEAT
 INJUNCTION TO SYNGMAN RHEE WHO AT ONE TIME ALSO
 FELT NEED TO GO NORTH. THERE IS ENOUGH DANGER NOW
 WITHOUT MORE PROVOCATION FROM NK'S BUT SITUATION WILL
 BECOME VERY MUCH WORSE IF THAT HAPPENS. GP-2 PORTER
 ST

NNNN

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Department of State

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TELEGRAM

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~~SECRET~~ 055

*Love
Hase*

PAGE 01 TAIPEI 02089 080719Z

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ACTION EA 15

INFO EUR 15, MM 01, CIAE 00, DODE 00, GPM 03, H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSAE 00,
NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SC 01, SP 02, SS 20, USIA 12, SAH 03, USUE 00,
RSR 01, 7100 W

R 080610Z FEB 68
FM AMEMBASSY TAIPEI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4669
INFO AMEMBASSY TOKYO 526
CINCPAC
AMCONSUL HONG KONG 546
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 23
AMEMBASSY SAIGON 977
AMEMBASSY SEOUL 314

~~SECRET~~ TAIPEI 2089

REF A. TAIPEI 1993
B. TAIPEI 1965

I. FOREIGN MINISTER WEI HAS INFORMED ME THAT IN RESPONSE TO MY SUGGESTION (SEE REF A) CHINESE AMBASSADOR IN TOKYO APPROACHED JAPANESE FONOFF TO USE ITS INFLUENCE ON SOVIETS TO ASSIST IN OBTAINING RELEASE OF PUEBLE AND

PAGE 2 RUASTP 2089 ~~SECRET~~
CREW. WEI SAID GRC WAS SOMEWHAT DISAPPOINTED BY JAPANESE ATTITUDE. JAPANESE, WHILE SYMPATHETIC TO U.S. POSITION, APPARENTLY FELT SOVIETS PROBABLY NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR PUEBLE INCIDENT AND MAY HAVE HAD NO FOREKNOWLEDGE ABOUT IT. JAPANESE DID NOT GIVE CHINESE AMBASSADOR ANY DEFINITE

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLI 98-355

By CB, NARA Date 9-29-99

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PAGE 02 TAIPEI 02089 080719Z

INDICATION OF ANYTHING THEY MIGHT FEEL ABLE TO DO.

2. PRIVATELY TOP GRC OFFICIALS CONSIDER THAT SOVIETS ALMOST CERTAINLY BEHIND NORTH KOREAN SEIZURE OF PUEBLO, ALTHOUGH SOME CHINESE ANALYSTS BELIEVE NORTH KOREA MAY HAVE INITIATED SEIZURE UNILATERALLY. PUBLICLY, HOWEVER, GRC HAS ADHERED TO EXPECTABLE OFFICIAL LINE THAT PEKING INSTIGATED NORTH KOREAN ACTION. THIS IS IN KEEPING WITH TRADITIONAL GRC PRACTICE OF MAINTAINING THAT PEKING IS PRINCIPAL ROOT CAUSE OF VIETNAM AND ALL OTHER MAJOR PROBLEMS THREATENING SECURITY AND STABILITY IN FAR EAST.

3. GRC ATTITUDE TOWARDS PUEBLO INCIDENT CONTINUES TO BE ONE OF URGING U.S. TO ADOPT TEMPERED BUT FIRM ATTITUDE. (SEE MY CONVERSATION WITH PRESIDENT CHIANG, REF B).

PAGE 3 RUASTP 2089 ~~SECRET~~
SEVERAL TOP RANKING MILITARY OFFICERS HAVE TOLD US THAT THEY FEEL THAT ONCE PUEBLO REACHED PORT OF WONSAN, U.S. HAD NO COURSE OF ACTION OPEN OTHER THAN DIPLOMATIC NEGOTIATIONS.

4. FEBRUARY 7 EDITORIAL IN ENGLISH LANGUAGE CHINA NEWS REJECTED USE OF FORCE TO RECOVER PUEBLO. "THE HAWKS WANT TO FIGHT AT EVERY DROPPED GAUNTLET. DOVES WANT TO WALK AWAY AND LET COMMUNISTS HAVE EVERYTHING THEY WANT. BOTH ARE WRONG. GIVEN THE WORLD WE HAVE AND NOT ONE WE WOULD LIKE TO HAVE, IT IS NECESSARY TO KEEP OUR COOL AND FIGHT WARS ON BASIS OF PRINCIPLE RATHER THAN BECAUSE OF TACTICAL ERROR OR ACCIDENT. THE U.S. SEEMS TO BE DOING THAT IN ITS CONFRONTATION WITH PYONGYANG."
MCCONAUGHY

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Intelligence Information Cable

ROUTINE
IN

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

STATE/INR DIA NMCC/MC (SECDEF JCS ARMY NAVY AIR) CIA/NMCC NIC NSA SOF ONE CRS
EXO DDI XOEZ FBIS DCS X Y Z W V U T S R Q P O N M L K J I H G F E D C B A

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~~GROUP 1~~
~~EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION~~

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

~~SECRET~~

CITE [REDACTED] 1.5(e)
3.4(b)(1)

DIST 9 FEBRUARY 1968

COUNTRY USSR/NORTH KOREA

DOI UP TO 30 JANUARY 1968

SUBJECT SOVIET CIRCULAR TELEGRAM ON THE PUEBLO INCIDENT

SANTIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-200

By us, NARA Date 7-10-98

ACQ (EARLY FEBRUARY 1968)

FIELD NO.

SOURCE

[REDACTED]

1.5(e)
3.4(b)(1)

1. ON ABOUT 30 JANUARY 1968 THE SOVIET MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS SENT OUT A CIRCULAR TELEGRAM TO INFORM SOVIET AMBASSADORS ABOUT THE PUEBLO INCIDENT. THIS TELEGRAM STATED THAT THE VESSEL HAD BEEN SEIZED BY NORTH KOREA AND THAT ON 23 JANUARY THE U.S. AMBASSADOR IN MOSCOW HAD REQUESTED SOVIET ASSISTANCE TO OBTAIN RELEASE OF THE VESSEL. THE SOVIETS REPLIED THAT NORTH KOREA WAS A SOVEREIGN STATE AND THAT THE USSR COULD NOT RENDER ANY ASSISTANCE.

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2. THE TELEGRAM WENT ON TO SAY THAT A FEW DAYS LATER PRESIDENT JOHNSON SENT A LETTER ON THE MATTER TO PREMIER KOSYGIN. THIS LETTER

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(classification) (dissem controls)

ALSO REQUESTED SOVIET ASSISTANCE IN GETTING THE VESSEL RELEASED.
THE USSR FORWARDED THE CONTENTS OF THIS LETTER TO THE NORTH KOREANS
AND ASKED THEM TO PROVIDE DETAILED INFORMATION ON THE CIRCUMSTANCES
SURROUNDING SEIZURE OF THE VESSEL. THE NORTH KOREANS DID NOT PROVIDE
THIS INFORMATION, SO SOVIET REACTION TO THE INCIDENT HAD TO BE BASED
ON INFORMATION WHICH APPEARED IN THE INTERNATIONAL PRESS.

1.5(e)
3.4(b)(1)

3. THE SOVIET APPROACH TO THE MATTER AS OUTLINED IN THE
TELEGRAM IS TO PREVENT DISCUSSION OF THE INCIDENT IN THE UN SECURITY
COUNCIL. IF IT IS DISCUSSED IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL THE SOVIET
REPRESENTATIVE WILL SPEAK ALONG THE LINE OF UNMASKING U.S. POLICY IN
KOREA, SUPPORTING NORTH KOREA IN EVERY RESPECT. THIS IS THE SAME
POSITION WHICH HAS BEEN TAKEN IN THE SOVIET PRESS.

1.5(e)
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[REDACTED]

4. [REDACTED]

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE

WEEKLY SUMMARY

AGENCY TO WHICH THIS SUMMARY CENTER
CORRELATES WITH THE
JOB 797927 63

~~Secret~~

47

9 February 1968
No. 0006/68

20 P533/1

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COMMUNISTS IMPROVE ROADS IN LAOS PANHANDLE



The Communists are responding to heavy US air attacks on truck traffic in the Laos panhandle with a construction program that is adding flexibility to the system and maintaining a margin of surplus capacity as insurance against future needs.

In recent months, at least five major bypasses and shortcuts have been added to the already elaborate road network in the northern panhandle--between Mu Gia Pass and Tchepone--through which all trucks from North Vietnam must pass. South of Tchepone, a new road branching off Route 92 has been more than half completed to the Khe Sanh area near the western end of the Demilitarized Zone, and construction has been resumed on another road north from Route 9 toward the zone. Farther south, roads crossing the border are being extended to link up with South Vietnamese roads

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KOREAN CONFRONTATION CONTINUES UNRESOLVED

The talks between North Korean and US representatives at Panmunjom appear to have made no progress toward resolving the confrontation over the Pueblo incident.

Pyeongyang is clearly intent on prolonging tensions by dragging out negotiations. North Korean propaganda has concentrated on publicizing "confessions" by the Pueblo's crew. A lengthening parade of officers and crewmen al-

legedly have expressed guilt and "apologized" for the ship's intrusion into North Korean waters.

The South Korean Government's initial dissatisfaction over US handling of the Pueblo incident soon broadened, with official encouragement, into widespread public resentment. The South Koreans feared the Panmunjom talks were ignoring the raid on Seoul and were pushing South Korean national

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interests into the background. The press complained that the Panmunjom talks undermined South Korean sovereignty and elevated the status of the North Korean regime. Some politicians urged diplomatic pressure to stop the "secret" talks and demanded unilateral retaliatory action against the Communist North. The National Assembly unanimously passed a resolution protesting US - North Korean talks without South Korean participation.

Students have demonstrated at the US Embassy in Seoul, in Pusan, and near the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). Prior official hints that public agitation might lead to demonstrations suggest the government probably approved.

The South Korean leaders, however, realize the dangers to their own position if popular emotions get out of hand. They may also now believe that the lack of progress at Panmunjom reduces the possibility the US might make compromises that would undercut Seoul. Thus, after officially protesting on 5 February, the government moved to damp down public indignation.

A high-level spokesman assured press representatives on 6 February that President Pak has in fact been

fully informed on the talks and that the assassination attempt against him had been discussed at one meeting. The next day while speaking to the National Assembly, the foreign minister conceded that discussion of the Pueblo crewmen's release might be given priority "from a humanitarian point of view." This change in official position has been reflected in the shift of the Seoul press to a more moderate stance.

Soviet propaganda is playing the Pueblo incident in low key and Soviet officials have for the most part been maintaining that the Pueblo intruded into territorial waters. Moscow continues to emphasize that direct US - North Korean meetings offer the best chance for resolving the issue. The most authoritative public statement on the crisis, a Pravda "Observer" article on 4 February, concluded by advising the US that if it really desired a solution it should respect North Korea's sovereignty and stop "threatening" the Koreans.

Since China's official statement of support on 28 January, Peking propaganda has given only sparse and low-level coverage to the Pueblo incident. [redacted]

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THE EMBASSY OF CZECHOSLOVAK SOCIALIST REPUBLIC

SM - 021712/68

(other notes illegible)

No. 031/68

Pchjongjang, February 9th, 1968

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Classified

By courier!

Declassified per file no. 267.261/2001- OZÚ

(OZÚ = Section for Special Assignments)

Date: May 22nd, 2001

Processed by: (initial illegible)

Prague

Pueblo and American - South Korean relations

Political report no. 11
Written by: B. Schindler
7 x

When Pueblo was detained the night of January 23rd, all of the South Korean propaganda was still fully involved with the case from January 21st involving 31 armed persons who, according to a captured member of the group, were supposed to kill the South Korean president and other key representatives of South Korea. They are still being pursued in the area mainly between Seoul and the demilitarized zone.

The Seoul incident from January 21st of this year revealed shortcomings in the security system between the position of the 2nd US infantry division in the western part of the demilitarized zone and Seoul. In addition, it showed poor readiness of the South Korean armed units to counter a similar larger scale action as the January 21st incident.

The inefficiency of South Korean troops and police, proven by the incident, raised a wave of dissatisfaction that was reflected in the South Korean press just when Pueblo was detained. South Korean propaganda found some counter arguments against these reproaches of its own press, and soon was able to distract the public and turn its attention to three issues: the Japanese press interpretation of the January 21st incident, the US position to the Seoul incident and the detention of Pueblo, and to internal political issues concerning the relations between the ruling Republican Party and the New Democratic Party.

The very first reports of the Japanese press about the Seoul incident caused concern and soon agitation, because of the way the news was presented; it almost immediately resulted in small demonstrations against Japanese journalists accredited in South Korea, even calling for their immediate expulsion. Until today, these demonstrations were followed by larger demonstrations and protest gatherings against the Seoul incident. They were distinctly anti-North Korean in nature with all the signs of anti-communist hysteria, complete with burning straw effigies of Kim Il Sung. Most participants were students, intelligentsia and artists; however, South Korean authorities managed to get labor unions involved as well. Despite the selectivity of the South Korean educational system, especially when it comes to admissions to secondary schools, South Korean authorities did not even have to apply direct pressure to ensure participation in these demonstrations. Their main purpose has been achieved: to turn public attention from criticizing the government, army and police to a more acceptable matter – against the DPRK, which was a complete success. These tendencies were further strengthened when an underground group of 32 (directed from the DPRK, according to the South Korean press) was arrested, as well as a group of fishermen who returned to South Korea after staying in the DPRK.

The South Korean government was able to accomplish all its aims; in fact, a South Korean flying squad, with active help from civilians, killed the last of the 31 armed insurgents, even though we cannot say that it was a direct consequence of this propaganda.

South Korean propaganda was able to sustain the wave of anti-communism on the same level by other events as well, like a funeral ceremony for police personnel killed on January 21st and for other South Korean soldiers who were shot while pursuing "armed guerilla groups of South Korean patriots and revolutionaries". Namely two funerals were exploited exceptionally: a funeral of a higher commander of the South Korean army, and a funeral of a school child who was killed during the armed group's attack on the access road to the presidential palace. Widely publicized testimony of the only captive from this armed group alleged that "we were

supposed to cut Bak Jeong-hui 's head off" and so on. He also claimed threats made by the armed group members to peasants: "If you don't help us and report us, we will take revenge on you and your family members when the country is united soon" had its intended effect. The last ones killed from the group of thirty one were physically weak and hungry, which among other things showed that by the very first appeals, South Korean propaganda was able to deter civilians from helping the armed group in any way.

These propaganda efforts of South Korean ruling circles were also accompanied by internal measures that were aimed at practically every South Korean and strictly limited possibilities to provide meaningful assistance to members of the armed group.

Some later news also raise speculation that a three-member group seen far south-east of the city Taegu had its own mission, not necessarily connected with the mission of the main group in Seoul. That is to say, Jeong-hui's villa is near Taegu.

Measures of the South Korean government – accelerated arming of segments of population (protection of important private production facilities) as well as fast modernization of South Korean coast guard – further intensified the anti-infiltration and anti-communist propaganda so much that it, at least initially, overshadowed the propaganda around the detention of Pueblo.

During the Seoul incident, there were disagreements between the ruling and opposition parties; however, right after January 21st, the opposition party showed maximum willingness to cooperate with the ruling party "in light of serious danger to the security of the South Korean state from North Korean infiltrators." The incident was portrayed as not just an isolated action of thirty-one armed men but a systematic and planned activity of the DPRK with the final objective of "armed aggression against South Korea."

Therefore, one of the consequences of the Seoul incident is, among other things, that the ruling and opposition parties achieved certain degree of unity.

Initially, South Korean propaganda accepted the detention of Pueblo as a vindication of its warning that the USA is underestimating the danger that manifests itself in the speech of Kim Il-song on December 16th, 1967, and that the former DPRK

KCPA deputy warned against as early as the beginning of summer after he defected to the South. The first responses to the Pueblo incident then indicated several facts that must have been unpleasant to Americans, to say the least. One of them was an argument that by crossing the unnoticed DMZ (Demilitarized Zone) in the section of the US 2nd infantry division, the armed group revealed not only that the US Command in South Korea underestimated the possibility of infiltration from North Korea but that it was satisfied with declarations about impenetrability of the electronic barrier that was already fully functional in the section of this American unit. At the same time, South Korean officials argued against American practice of arming South Korean forces in both South Korea and South Vietnam with dated American weapons, some of which the American Army used already in World War II. As evidence they pointed out comments made by some key South Korean political and military officials about what happened last year when South Korean soldiers in South Vietnam refused to fight with obsolete rifles M-1. As a result, they were issued new, lighter and shorter rifles M-6 with much more effective shooting frequency increasing not only their fight capability not also producing concrete results in combat against armed forces of South Vietnam National Liberation Front.

The request for expedient modernization of all South Korean units was accompanied by two warnings addressed directly and indirectly to the US: South Korean Foreign Affairs Committee Deputy talked about a possible withdrawal of all South Korean troops (48,000) from South Vietnam even before the commencement of the South Vietnamese NLF offensive, and the Parliament asked that South Korean armed forces be removed from the US command (of the UN armed forces in South Korea).

Effectiveness of these two threats was visible almost immediately: modern weaponry for South Korean units that was originally planned for delivery by the end of March, was immediately airlifted to South Korea, and the designated units are scheduled to receive it by the end of February. Johnson's message to Bak Jeong-hui

and the trip of his special envoy to Seoul were supposed to explain to the South Korean government why the US rejected the military approach in cooperation with the South Korean armed forces in the first phase of Pueblo detention, and why Smith negotiates with Bak Jeong -guk in Panmunjon behind closed door without the presence of a South Korean representative. Americans also had to explain to the South Korean government why they do not make any connection between the Pueblo and Seoul incidents at the negotiations in Panmunjon. South Korea's pressure on Johnson had its desired effect. Regardless of the precarious situation Americans faced due to the South Vietnam NLF offensive, the mere thought of Koreans pulling out their troops, which Americans themselves consider as the best of all the satellite armies and which, after the Americans, are the most numerous, was dangerous even more so because of the NLF armed force offensive.

The effectiveness of the South Korean threats manifested itself not only in Johnson's message and in an expedited shipment of modern weapons to the South Korean army but also in an additional hundred million US dollars. These provisions on the part of the US came after South Korean officials openly said, in connection with their disapproval that the US is negotiating about Pueblo with the DPRK in Panmunjon behind closed doors without South Korean representatives, that they do not approve of the US approach. First of all, the South Koreans claimed the Pueblo incident could not be separated from the Seoul incident. Second, the US pledged to discuss all their measures in South Korea with the South Korean government. Third, the US cannot expect to stop "North Korean aggressive behavior" with several ships, older weapons and their own existence.

After Johnson's message, the special envoy, additional 100 million dollars, accelerated military aid and a change of the US position to Pueblo (the USA through Smith in his negotiations with the DPRK started to honor the South Korean request not to separate the Seoul incident from the Seoul one), there was no more talk about withdrawing the South Korean units from South Vietnam nor about removing South

Korean units from the UN command in South Korea. The objective was reached; the subjective pressure from the South Korean government

- 6 -

met with the objective pressure of the South Vietnamese reality – therefore, South Korean government circles could accept with satisfaction the words of Johnson's message that the South Korea is one of the US best allies, and could continue to press the US to further concessions namely in shipments of modern weapons and military equipment. Reports were proliferating that the Seoul incident showed organizational incompetence of South Korean military and police units and their inadequate equipment (M-1 rifles have many disadvantages like they are too heavy and bulky for the small South Koreans and thus less suitable for anti-infiltration activity in the mountains and in the less accessible terrain, they are less suitable compared to automatic rifles that the armed infiltrators had). All this points to a South Korean request to arm all anti-infiltration units with modern rifles M-6 that all South Korean units in South Vietnam already have, and to arm with these weapons also police units and special anti-infiltration units. However, judging from comments of some top South Korean military representatives, South Korea wants to exploit the Seoul and Pueblo incidents to the maximum in the shortest possible time: additional requests were expressed for the USA to help with replacement of communication equipment on all levels of the South Korean army, with reference to shortcomings in communication that appeared last few weeks due to old radio relays and telephone switchboxes. Based on experience from the last days of January, South Korean authorities also strongly criticized the kinds of food unsuitable for the anti-infiltration units, pointing out that there are already talks going on with the US command in South Korea that rice cans are not suitable and that they will be replaced with other kinds of food, along with the necessary kitchen material for preparation of warm meals in field conditions.

The DPRK press is correct in saying that Americans ran into a dead end in South Korea when the last developments in South Vietnam almost coincided with the "revolt" of the South Korean government, who wanted to exploit this extremely advantageous situation to the maximum, and is so far succeeding.

It may sound like irony but the fact is that the Seoul incident together with the Pueblo incident made it possible for South Korean ruling circles to solve, by pressuring the USA, some problems of military nature they always blamed on US

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dilatoriness. Since South Korea is quickly getting new equipment and arms in exchange for assurances that it will not pull its troops from South Vietnam, the questions of war and peace are reaching a higher level. Certainly, these successes of South Korean politics will not remain without response from the DPRK who, as we can judge not only from the confidential monitor, KCPA, is closely following especially the South Korean military problems and can be expected to make further effort to counter the latest South Korean measures with new requests to socialist countries, and thus neutralize the "results" of the Seoul and Pueblo incidents that were far more beneficial to South Korea than to the DPRK.

We can therefore assume that the arms buildup efforts will only increase on both sides of the demilitarized zone. Because of intensified propaganda on both sides, more pointed conflicts could develop on land and sea or near the demilitarized zone. These prospects cannot, in any case, mean a decrease of tension; on the contrary: the mutual race to modernize the equipment of armed forces can only exacerbate the already strained atmosphere on the Korean Peninsula, and that the danger of words becoming reality will continue to grow.

Today, when it is already clear that the DPRK cannot expect to surpass South Korea economically in the near future – and everything shows the DPRK abandoned these goals for good – the possibility of peaceful unification of the country is disappearing. Also hindering reunification is South Korea's anti-communism, which will continue to grow after the Seoul and Pueblo incidents and will also prevent the founding of a Marx-Lenin party in the South for a long time, as was outlined at the national conference of the KWP last year. On the contrary, all development in this part of the world suggests that the DPRK definitively gave up everything not related to the military solution of the Korean issue, even at the expense of lowering the living

standard of Korean people to an extreme degree and taxing the relations with the fraternal socialist parties and the PRC for only one end - intensive preparation for country unification with the help of weapons.

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We think that a lot will depend on the position of the USSR and the European socialist countries to this problem in a complicated situation. We cannot rule out that the Korean Worker's Party is already counting on more active aid of the People's Republic of China, whose arms potential could play a role on the Korean Peninsula in a Korean Worker's Party solution that is, as we believe, unrealistic.

Ambassador:

Holub



Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PAGE 01 SEOUL 04135 100708Z

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ACTION EA 15

INFO CIAE 00, DODE 00, NSAE 00, NSCE 00, SSO 00, USIE 00, CCO 00, GPM 03,
NSC 10, SC 01, SP 02, SS 20, RSC 01, SAH 03, L 03, H 02, PI 04, INR 07,
AID 28, MC 01, GDP 01, ACDA 16, TRSY 08, CU 04, OPR 02, RSR 01, /132 W

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CINCPAC FOR POLAD

SUBJ: PUBLIC REACTION TO US MOVES

I. BOTH ENGLISH AND KOREAN LANGUAGE PAPERS MORNING
FEB 10 HEADLINE REACTION OF "AUTHORITATIVE GOVT SOURCES"
TO PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S REQUEST FOR \$100 MILLION OF
ADDITIONAL MILITARY AID TO KOREA. IN GENERAL, SOURCES
QUOTED TO EFFECT THAT ADDITIONAL MILITARY AID, EVEN IF

PAGE 2 RUALOS 4135E ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
GRANTED. WOULD NOT RPT NOT FULLY SATISFY ROK DEMANDS AND
WOULD BE ONLY PATCHWORK IN IMPROVING ROK DEFENSE
CAPABILITY. SPECIFICALLY, PRESIDENT PARK REPORTEDLY
APPRECIATES PROMISE FOR MORE AID, BUT CONSIDERS CONCRETE
MEASURES FOR TRANSLATING PLEDGE INTO ACTION AS MORE
IMPORTANT. SAME SOURCES SAID SUCH MEASURES INCLUDE

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TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02 SEOUL 04135 100708Z

MOST URGENTLY A GUARANTEE THAT US TAKE IMMEDIATE MILITARY ACTION TO REPULSE ANY NK AGGRESSION, AND FONMIN QUOTED AS TELLING AMB PORTER FEB 9 THAT US-ROK DEFENSE PACT SHOULD BE AMENDED TO THAT EFFECT. AS FOR MILITARY AID, SOURCES SAID THAT NOT ONLY SMALL WEAPONS ARE NEEDED, BUT SHIPS AND AIRCRAFT.

2. REGARDING PANMUNJOM TALKS, GOVT SOURCES REPORTEDLY TOLD US SIDE THAT US SHOULD AT LEAST SET DEADLINE FOR PRIVATE MEETINGS WITH NORTH KOREANS OVER PUEBLO CREW. PRESS ITEMS INCLUDE REPORT, ACCORDING RELIABLE MILITARY SOURCES, THAT ANOTHER PRIVATE PANMUNJOM MEETING WILL BE HELD FEB 10 AND THAT PREPARATIONS UNDERWAY FOR HOLDING REGULAR MAC MEETING.

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3. KOREAN LANGUAGE PAPERS FEB 10 CARRIED STORY THAT 20-30 STUDENTS STAGED CANDLELIGHT DEMONSTRATION PREVIOUS EVENING AT AMBASSADOR'S RESIDENCE AND CHANTED SLOGANS CALLING FOR FUFILLMENT OF BROWN NOTE, CESSATION OF NEGOTIATIONS WITH NORTH KOREANS AND TAKING RETALIATORY ACTION AGAINST NORTH. POLICE DISPERSED AFTER TWENTY MINUTES. MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SOURCES REPORT THAT MORE DEMONSTRATIONS EXPECTED IN SEOUL TODAY. OPPOSITION LEADERS HAVE TOLD EMBOFF SEVERAL TIMES LAST FEW DAYS THAT YOUNG GOVT PARTY MEMBERS ARE INSPIRING THESE DEMONSTRATIONS IN EFFORT TO DEMONSTRATE THEIR LOYALTY

TO PRESIDENT PARK.

4. PAPERS FEB 10 EDITORALLY READ IN LUKEWARM FASHION

TO US PROMISE OF ADDITIONAL MILITARY AID, SAYING THAT USG FINALLY REACTED TO URGENT ROKG APPEALS.

5. ALL NEWS MEDIA QUOTING WHITE HOUSE ANNOUNCEMENT REPORT THAT PRESIDENTIAL ENVOY CYRUS VANCE WILL ARRIVE

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
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PAGE 4 RUALOS 4135E ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
KOREA FEB 11 TO SETTLE STRAINS IN ROK-US RELATIONS.



6. COMMENT: EVIDENT THAT GOVT IS UTILIZING PRESS CHANNELS TO INFORM USG BEFORE ARRIVAL OF PRESIDENTIAL ENVOY THAT PROMISES OF MILITARY AID ALONE RPT NOT ENOUGH AND THAT THIS TIME CLEAR-CUT ASSURANCES THAT US WILL RESPOND TO CONTINUED INTRUSIONS AS ROKS WISH US TO RESPOND ARE WHAT IS REALLY NEEDED.

EXEMPT PORTER

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 98-17

By isa, NARA Date 3-18-99

CYRUS VANCE ACCOMPANIED BY AMBASSADOR PORTER, GENERAL BONESTEEL AND JOHN WALSH CALLED ON PRIME MINISTER CHUNG-IL KWON AT 0930. FOREIGN, DEFENSE AND INFORMATION MINISTERS ALSO PARTICIPATED.

CHUNG WARMLY GREETED VANCE AND UNDERScoreD SIGNIFICANT ECONOMIC CHANGES IN ROK SINCE VANCE'S LAST VISIT IN 1964. HE THEN MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS: A) ONLY THE ROKG HAD RESPECTED THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT. THE DPRK HAD VIOLATED THE AGREEMENT.

PAGE 2 RUALOS 4170E ~~SECRET~~
THE BLUE HOUSE AND PUEBLO INCIDENTS WERE AMPLE EVIDENCE; B) FURTHER, SOME 300 ROK FISHERMEN HAD BEEN KILLED OR DETAINED BY THE DPRK. ONE ROK MOTOR LAUNCH HAD BEEN SUNK. CHUNG REMARKED THAT THE ROKG AND THE USG HAVE TRIED TO MAINTAIN PEACE, AND THE ROKG STRONGLY SUPPORTS GENERAL BONESTEEL AND THE CONCEPT OF A CINCINNATI ARRANGEMENT. HOWEVER, THE BLUE HOUSE RAID AND THE SEIZURE OF THE PUEBLO ON THE HIGH SEAS HAVE CHANGED THE GROUND RULES. YET THE BLUE HOUSE AND PUEBLO INCIDENTS ARE NOT THE REAL ISSUES. THE REAL ISSUE IS TO DETERMINE WHAT LIES BEHIND THESE TWO NORTH KOREAN ACTIONS.

PRIMIN CHUNG THEN SAID THAT THE CRITICAL QUESTION IS WHETHER THE ROKG SHOULD DELAY MAKING AN APPROPRIATE RESPONSE OR WHETHER IT SHOULD "STRIKE NOW AT THE SOURCE OF THE PROBLEM."

CHUNG THEN SUGGESTED THAT THE PEOPLE OF THE US MIGHT NOT VIEW THE PROBLEM AS SERIOUSLY AS THE PEOPLE OF THE ROK. THE US PEOPLE MAY CONCENTRATE ONLY ON THE PUEBLO INCIDENT. THUS, ANOTHER BASIC QUESTION IS WHETHER THE USG TOGETHER WITH THE ROKG SHOULD TAKE ACTION NOW, OR HOLD ACTION IN ABEYANCE WHILE

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PAGE 3 RUALOS 4170E ~~SECRET~~
DECIDING SPECIFICALLY WHAT THE TWO GOVERNMENTS SHOULD DO IN
THE EVENT OF ANOTHER SERIOUS ATTACK BY THE DPRK.

THE PRESIDENT WOULD SUBSEQUENTLY EXPLAIN WHY THE SITUATION
IS SO CRITICAL AT THIS TIME.

VANCE OPENED HIS REMARKS BY NOTING THAT HE WAS VERY PLEASED
TO RETURN TO SEOUL AND TO HAVE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO SEE SO MANY
OLD FRIENDS. PRESIDENT JOHNSON AND HE BOTH REGRETTED THE CIR-
CUMSTANCES WHICH PROMPTED HIS TRIP. VANCE WAS IMPRESSED WITH THE
EVIDENCE OF ECONOMIC ADVANCEMENT HE HAS SEEN IN THE ROK. HE
LIMITED HIS SUBSTANTIVE COMMENTS TO NOTING THAT THE USG HAD SENT
HIM TO SEOUL TO FIND COMMON SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEMS FACING
THE TWO COUNTRIES.

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Department of State

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DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 98-17

By isa, NARA Date 3-18-99

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VANTO 04

CYRUS VANCE, ACCOMPANIED BY PORTER, WALSH, AND GREENLEAF MET WITH FONMIN CHOI KYU HAH IN HIS OFFICE AT THE CAPITOL.

CHOI WARMLY GREETED VANCE AND UNDERScoreD THAT THE BLUE HOUSE RAID AND THE PUEBLO INCIDENTS WERE MATTERS OF COMMON CONCERN. HE NOTED THAT IN RECENT YEARS WHILE THE ROKG HAD EMPHASIZED ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, THE NORTH KOREAN REGIME HAD EMPHASIZED MILITARY PREPAREDNESS AND HAD INITIATED A MAJOR MILITARY BUILD-UP. KIM IL-SONG HAD PUBLICLY DECLARED THAT BY

PAGE 2 RUALOS 417IE ~~SECRET~~

1971 NORTH KOREA WOULD TAKE OVER THE ROK BY FORCE. CHOI AND HIS FELLOW MINISTERS CONSIDERED THE BLUE HOUSE RAID AS THE FIRST NORTH KOREAN STEP TOWARD THIS GOAL.

CHOI STATED THAT THE BLUE HOUSE AND PUEBLO INCIDENTS WERE SO SERIOUS THAT THEY COULD BE VIEWED AS CONSTITUTING A BASIS FOR INVOKING THE PROVISIONS OF THE US/ROK MUTUAL DEFENSE TREATY. CHOI'S PHRASE WAS THAT THESE INCIDENTS WERE "TANTAMOUNT TO INVOKING THE MUTUAL DEFENSE TREATY." TO SUPPORT HIS ASSERTION THAT THE NORTH KOREAN ACTIONS WERE DIRECTED AGAINST BOTH THE ROKG AND THE USG, CHOI SEEMINGLY ATTACHED GREAT IMPORTANCE TO THE COMMON COMMITMENT OF U.S. AND ROKG MILITARY FORCES IN 1950-53 AND TODAY IN THE RVN. HE SPOKE EMOTIONALLY WHEN HE RECALLED THAT AMERICAN AND KOREAN SOLDIERS HAD FOUGHT WIDE BY SIDE AND HAD DIED TOGETHER IN KOREA AND SOUTH VIET-NAM.

IN REPLY, VANCE NOTED HOW PLEASED HE WAS TO RETURN TO SEOUL. HE SAID THAT THE USG AGREED WITH THE ROKG ON THE IMPORTANCE OF THE TWO GOVERNMENTS TOGETHER LOOKING AT THE PROBLEMS CAUSED BY THE DPRK ACTIONS. VANCE STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF DEVELOPING

PAGE 3 RUALOS 417IE ~~SECRET~~

A COMMON APPROACH IN MEETING THIS PROBLEM.

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Department of State

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By *is*, NARA Date 3-18-99

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VANTO 05

CYRUS VANCE, ACCOMPANIED BY AMBASSADOR PORTER, GENERAL BONESTEEL, AND JOHN WALSH, CONFERRED WITH PRESIDENT PARK FOR 5 1/2 HOURS TODAY. PRIME MINISTER, FOREIGN MINISTER, DEFENSE MINISTER AND CIA DIRECTOR ALSO PARTICIPATED.

LENGTHY SESSION PROVIDED USEFUL RELIEF VALVE FOR ROK EMOTIONS. TENSIONS GRADUALLY EASED AS DIALOGUE WAS ESTABLISHED. PARK REITERATED AT LENGTH THEMES MADE FAMILIAR BY REPORTS OF AMBASSADOR PORTER AND GENERAL BONESTEEL IN FATALISTIC AND

PAGE 2 RUALOS 4176E ~~SECRET~~
SIMPLISTIC TERMS. WHILE THE PRESIDENT'S SINCERITY WAS NOT IN DOUBT IT WAS EVIDENT THAT HIS SPECIFIC PROPOSALS WERE THE PRODUCT OF EMOTION RATHER THAN FINISHED STAFF WORK.

is
Park CHARGED WITH DEEP CONVICTION THAT KIM IL SUNG IS ON PATH OF WAR. THE RATE OF VIOLATION OF THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT HAS INCREASED MARKEDLY. THE ATTACK ON THE BLUE HOUSE DESIGNED TO KILL HIM AND HIS FAMILY AND THE SEIZURE OF THE PUEBLO WERE ACTS OF WAR. THE NORTH KOREANS HAVE THOUSANDS OF TRAINED INFILTRATORS AND FURTHER SERIOUS PENETRATIONS ARE INEVITABLE IN THE SPRING. THEY INTEND TO HARASS THE SOUTH KOREAN PEOPLE, DISRUPT THE ECONOMY AND, WHEN THE COUNTRY IS SUFFICIENTLY WEAKENED, RESORT TO ALL OUT WAR. THEY WILL ONLY RESPECT COUNTER-FORCE. THEY SHOULD BE WARNED OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF FURTHER VIOLATIONS, ASKED TO APOLOGIZE FOR PAST ACTIONS, AND REQUESTED TO PROMISE NOT TO VIOLATE THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT IN THE FUTURE. IN ADDITION WE SHOULD PUBLICLY STATE THAT ANY FUTURE VIOLATIONS WILL BE MET BY IMMEDIATE RETALIATION. ALL COURSES OF ACTION IN THE PRESENT SITUATION ARE DANGEROUS BUT PARK DID NOT BELIEVE THAT RETALIATION WOULD PROVOKE THE DRNK TO WAR. FIRMNESS AND

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PAGE 3 RAULSO 4172E ~~SECRET~~
RESOLUTION ARE IMPERATIVE IN THE PRESENT SITUATION. THE US
WORLD POSITION DEPENDS UPON FIRMNESS IN FACE OF COMMUNIST PRESSURE.
 IF WE ARE WEAK HERE WE WILL PAY FOR IT IN THE FORM OF COMMUNIST
 AGGRESSION ELSEWHERE.

ON THE PANMUNJOM ISSUE, PARK FEARED KIM IL SUNG WOULD
DELAY AND STALL THE NEGOTIATIONS IN ORDER TO HUMILIATE THE US
AND THEREFORE ROK. HE WISHED TO KNOW WHAT THE US WOULD DO UNDER
THOSE CIRCUMSTANCES IN ORDER TO CALM HIS PEOPLE. HE WAS WORRIED
AND DISPLEASED BY THE INDICATIONS BY HIGH OFFICIALS THAT THE PUEBLO
COULD HAVE BEEN IN NORTH KOREAN TERRITORIAL WATERS AND BY SENATOR
MANSFIELD'S RECOMMENDATIONS THAT THE ISSUE BE SUBMITTED TO THE ICJ.
THESE STATEMENTS AND THE ABSENCE OF ROK PARTICIPATION AT PANMUNJOM
AROUSED ROK SUSPICIONS ABOUT THE NEGOTIATIONS. NEVERTHELESS, HE
WOULD NOT OPPOSE THE CONTINUATION OF SECRET TALKS PROVIDING HE
HAD AN ASSURANCE THAT INFILTRATION WOULD STOP.

THROUGHOUT THE LENGTHY DISCUSSION VANCE CALMLY AND SYMPATHET-
ICALLY STROVE FOR A DIALOGUE WITH THE PRESIDENT, PROBED FOR SPECI-
ICITY, POINTED OUT THE WEAKNESS AND DANGERS OF PARK'S OPTIONS,

PAGE 4 RUALOS 4172E ~~SECRET~~
EXPLAINED US POLICY, REITERATED THE COMMONALITY OF US-ROK INTERESTS,
WARNED OF THE DANGERS OF PRECIPITATE AND UNILYERAL ACTION, AND
SOUGHT FOR A COMMON, SATISFACTORY COURSE OF ACTION.

WHILE THE JURY REMAINED OUT AT THE END OF THE SESSION, THE
ATMOSPHERE WAS FRIENDLY AND THE ROKS APPEARED TO RECOGNIZE THAT
WE WOULD NOT AGREE TO A POLICY OF RETALIATION. DESPITE PRESS
REPORTS TO THE CONTRARY, THE ROKS DID NOT RAISE ISSUE OF REVISION
OF MUTUAL DEFENSE TREATY OR OF SEEKING TO DISENGAGE FROM THE
OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF CINCPAC. CLEARLY, HOWEVER, WE HAVE MUCH
SERIOUS TALK AHEAD OF US BEFORE WE WILL KNOW THE OUTCOME OF THIS
MISSION. WE WILL SUBMIT A DRAFT COMMUNIQUE TONIGHT. TOMORROW
MORNING WE WILL MEET WITH THE FOREIGN AND OTHER MINISTERS AND
PROBABLY IN THE LATE AFTERNOON WITH THE PRESIDENT.

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-346

By us, NARA Date 9-21-98

1. We assume that major North Korean purposes in stepping up DMZ incidents, infiltration and sabotage, and staging Blue House raid ~~were~~ were to unnerve South ~~KOREA~~ Koreans, get them to return their forces, or some of them, from Viet-Nam or inhibit them from sending additional forces.

2. If these assumptions correct, North Koreans would crow with victory if South Koreans fell into this trap. North Koreans would propagandize that rising popular dissension in South Korea forced the Pak government to give up plans to send more troops to Viet-Nam and even forced them to bring back South Korean forces to put down a popular uprising.

3. It follows from this thread of argument that when things settle down in South Korea, Pak could win a moral and psychological victory over Kim Il-sung, show his contempt for Kim, and confidence in himself and his country, if he could announce that additional forces will be sent to

Drafted by: KTF:SDBerger/mam 2/12/68

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Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by

U - The Under Secretary

Mr. Read BKR

DOD/ISA - Mr. Steadman

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in Korea
 Viet-Nam. If Pak stands firm in Viet-Nam, and avoids precipitate action/ all
 that North Koreans will have achieved will be greatly ~~high~~ heightened worldwide
 understanding of North Korean harassment of ROK, large increase in US military
 assistance to ROK with resultant strengthening of ROK military and anti-infiltration
 forces, and augmentation of US deterrent forces in South Korea,

4. A second purpose of Kim Il-sung in stepping up violence against North Korea
 was to interrupt its social and economic progress. Since South Korean people
 support Park and are active in informing police and military of presence of strangers,
 the North Koreans have no chance of successfully establishing guerrilla units in
 south. Raiders are nasty business, but no real threat to the stability of South
 Korea, since most of them are killed or captured.

5. The temptation to strike back in reprisal is understandable, but it will produce
no decisive outcome. The danger in retaliatory or punitive air attacks against
North Korea is that they could invite air attacks against the South. If Pyongyang
 or other NK site is hit, what is to prevent an attack against Seoul or some other
 site? Action and counter-action could lead to resumed fighting along the DMZ,
 but both sides are too strong to move successfully against each other in this area.
The end result would be to call off the reprisal policy, after physical damage had
been done to both sides and a period of fighting in the DMZ with no decisive result

(^{None} would not end infiltration), or move to full scale war. ~~None~~ of these outcomes

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is in the South Korean or our interest,

6. We may in the end be forced to take reprisal actions, but they should be deliberate, not hasty, and South Korea's defenses and cities should be prepared for the possible consequences.

7. South Korea has made magnificent economic, social and political progress in these last years. All this would be interrupted and endangered by an escalation of violence due to reprisals or limited war. Private American investors are already hesitating to move into South Korea until the situation clarifies. It is not the best course, therefore, to return to the uneasy situation that existed prior to the seizure of the Pueblo and the Blue House raid, strengthen further the ROK capacity to deal with raiders, and make it even more costly to the North, strengthen the military arm of the ROK, keep a stronger US force in the area/as an additional warning and deterrent, send the new Korean forces into Viet-Nam, and continue with South Korea's economic and social progress.

8. Assume you are thinking along the same lines, but we pass them to you for your consideration.

GP-3.

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Department of State TELEGRAM

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8:53 AM

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-197

NO DIS/CATUS

By sig, NARA Date 12-4-96

VANTO 8

CYRUS VANCE, ACCOMPANIED BY AMBASSADOR PORTER, GENERAL BONESTEEL, JOHN WALSH AND COLONEL GREENLEAF MET FOR 2 AND 1/2 HOURS THIS MORNING WITH THE PRIME MINISTER, FOREIGN MINISTER, DEFENSE MINISTER, INFORMATION MINISTER, CIA DIRECTOR, AND CHIEF JCS. SESSION WAS INTENSE, FRANK, SPIRITED, AND WE BELIEVE HELPFUL TO BOTH SIDES. UNDER EXISTING CIRCUMSTANCES EACH SIDE FELT CONSTRAINED TO GET CERTAIN ISSUES OUT ON THE TABLE. THIS WAS DONE WITHOUT EXCESSIVE RANCOR.

THE DISCUSSION, WHICH WAS IDENTIFIED BY THE MINISTERS AD

PAGE 3 RUALOS 4207E ~~SECRET~~
CONSULTATIONS UNDER OUR JOINT MUTUAL SECURITY TREATY, RANGED WIDELY OVER VARIED ASPECTS OF US COMMITMENTS AND PERFORMANCE IN THE POSTWAR WORLD, THE ORIGINS OF THE KOREAN WAR, US-KOREAN RELATIONS, US ASSISTANCE TO KOREA, KOREAN PARTICIPATION IN THE VIETNAM STRUGGLE, PROBLEMS OF KOREAN PUBLIC OPINION, PANMUNJOM COMMUNIST OBJECTIVES, OVERT AND COVERT COMMUNIST THREATS TO KOREA, AND THE TACTICS OF DEALING WITH INDIRECT NORTH KOREAN AGGRESSION. AFTER SEVERAL HOURS OF GIVE-AND-TAKE, THE KORS EXPRESSED FULL CONFIDENCE THAT THE US WOULD RESPOND IN THE EVENT OF OVERT AGGRESSION AND THAT FURTHER DISCUSSIONS WOULD BE LIMITED TO THE PROBLEM OF INDIRECT AGGRESSION AND THE METHOD OF DEALING WITH IT.

VANCE AT THIS POINT SAID THE NEXT QUESTION TO BE ADDRESSED WAS WHETHER IT WAS POSSIBLE TO DEFINE IN ADVANCE WHAT DEGREE OF INDIRECT AGGRESSION REQUIRED COUNTER REACTION WHICH OF COURSE CARRIES WITH IT THE RISK OF WAR. VANCE SAID HE HAD LONG REFLECTED ON THIS PROBLEM AND HAD CONCLUDED THAT IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE TO DO SO. HE HAD THEREFORE CONCLUDED THAT THE BEST COURSE TO PURSUE IN THE EVENT OF

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-2- SEOUL 4207, FEBRUARY 13

FURTHER INCIDENTS OF INDIRECT AGGRESSION IS TO CONSULT AND THEN JOINTLY DETERMINE WHAT ACTION SHOULD BE TAKEN

PAGE 3 RUALOS 4207E ~~SECRET~~
IN LIGHT OF ALL EXISTING CIRCUMSTANCES. FURTHERMORE, HE SAID, IN OUR DEMOCRACY WE MUST OPERATE UNDER THE ACTUAL DEFENSE TREATY RATIFIED BY CONGRESS. PRESIDENT CAN ONLY TAKE ACTION UNDER THIS TREATY. FOR THE MOMENT, AT LEAST, THE KOREANS SEEMED TO AGREE.

AT THE END OF THE MEETING THE FOREIGN MINISTER PRESENTED TWO DOCUMENTS TO VANCE, AN "AGREED MINUTES" AND A "JOINT DEFENSE DECLARATION". THESE DOCUMENTS WHICH ARE TRANSMITTED IN SEPTEL RAISE MOST SERIOUS LEGAL AND FUNDING ISSUES. AFTER POINTING OUT THE SERIOUS LEGAL PROBLEMS EMBODIED IN THESE DOCUMENTS, VANCE AGREED TO STUDY THEM AND DISCUSS THEM IN A MEETING SCHEDULED FOR TOMORROW. WE INTEND REJECT THESE DOCUMENTS FOR THE REASONS CITED AND ENDEAVOR REACH AGREEMENT ON THE DRAFT COMMUNIQUE CONTAINED STATE'S 114006--VANTO 7. WE WOULD LIKE YOUR VIEWS BY 0900 LOCAL TOMORROW WHETHER, IF NECESSARY FOR REACHING AGREEMENT ON OUR COMMUNIQUE, WE COULD AGREE TO AN ANNUAL DEFENSE MEETING AT THE MINISTERIAL LEVEL WITH FIRST MEETING BEGINNING 1969.

A DETAILED REPORT ON THIS MEETING WILL BE SUBMITTED SEPARATELY. PORTER
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To 114006 (TSUAN 20)
FR 4178 (VANTO 8)

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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~~SECRET~~ SECTION 1 OF 2 SEOUL 4208

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VANTO 09

REF: SEOUL'S 4207 VANTO 08

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-197
By 410, NARA Date 12-4-96

AS MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER AND OTHER CABINET MINISTERS REPORTED REFTEL DREW TO CLOSE, FONMIN PRESENTED TO VANCE TWO DOCUMENTS, AN "AGREED MINUTES" AND A "JOINT DEFENSE DECLARATION". AFTER A QUICK READING, VANCE TOLD THE MINISTERS WE WOULD CAREFULLY STUDY THEM AND COMMENT AT OUR NEXT MEETING SCHEDULED TOMORROW MORNING. HOWEVER, HE DID WISH THEM TO KNOW THAT HE THOUGHT THEY WOULD RAISE GRAVE LEGAL PROBLEMS. HAVING PLANTED

PAGE 2 RUALOS 4208E/1 ~~SECRET~~
THIS SEED OF LEGAL DOUBT, AMBASSADOR PORTER THEN ASKED, WITHOUT SUBSTANTIVE ROK RESPONSE, WHAT THE LEGAL STATUS OF THE "MINUTES" WOULD BE IN RESPECT TO THE KOREAN ASSEMBLY. THE MATTER WAS LEFT REST AT THIS POINT.

WE COULD NOT JUDGE FROM MANNER OF PRESENTATION OR REACTIONS TO VANCE/PORTER COMMENTS HOW SERIOUS THE MINISTER'S WERE ABOUT THESE DOCUMENTS. FOR OUR PART WE INTEND REJECT THESE DOCUMENTS ON LEGAL GROUNDS.

BEGIN TEXT:

JOINT DEFENSE DECLARATION (JOINT WARNING STATEMENT) (DRAFT)
FEBRUARY , 1968

1. EVER SINCE THE KOREAN ARMISTICE AGREEMENT WAS SIGNED IN 1953, THE NORTH KOREAN PUPPET REGIME, IN WANTON DISREGARD OF THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT, HAS REPEATEDLY PERPETUATED FLAGRANT ACTS OF AGGRESSION AGAINST THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA.

THESE ACTS OF LAWLESSNESS AND ATROCITY BY THE NORTH KOREAN

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SEOUL 4208, FEBRUARY 13 SECTION 1 OF 2

PAGE 3 RUMLOS 4208E/1 ~~SECRET~~
COMMUNISTS CULMINATED IN SUCH VICIOUS ACTS AS THERECENT DISPATCH OF 31 ARMED TERRORISTS INTO SEOUL IN AN ATTEMPT TO ASSAULT THE OFFICIAL RESIDENCE OF THE PRESIDENT AND THE PIRATIC SEIZURE OF USS PUEBLO ON THE HIGH SEAS, WHICH CLEARLY CONSTITUTE ACTS OF OPEN AGGRESSION.

2. IN SPITE OF THE ABOVE, THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA, ALTHOUGH NOT BOUND BY THE SAID ARMISTICE AGREEMENT AS SHE IS NOT A SIGNATORY THEREOF, HAS DEMONSTRATED UTMOST PATIENCE AND SELF-RESTRAINT BY REFRAINING ITSELF FROM TAKING ANY RETALIATORY MEASURE. IT HAS DONE SO IN ITS RESPECT FOR THE SPIRIT AND PRINCIPLES OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS IN MAINTAINING THE PEACE AND SECURITY OF THE WORLD, AND IN ITS EARNEST ASPIRATION FOR ATTAINING PEACEFUL UNIFICATION OF KOREA.

3. IT IS NOTED THAT THE NORTH KOREAN PUPPET REGIME, HOWEVER, IN PREPARATION FOR SUCH SCHEME OF AGGRESSION, AGAINST THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA, SET UP GROUPS OF SPECIAL COMMANDO FORCES COMPRISING OF SOME 20,000 "REGULAR ARMY OFFICERS" WHO HAVE BEEN TRAINED IN SPECIAL GUERRILLA WARFARE, AND THAT THE NORTH KOREAN PUPPET REGIME

PAGE 4 RUMLOS 4208E/1 ~~SECRET~~ /
IS OBVIOUSLY PLANNING TO FURTHER INTENSIFY SUCH PATTERN OF AGGRESSION.

4. UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA AND THE UNITED STATES DO HEREBY SOLEMNLY ISSUE A STERN WARNING TO THE NORTH KOREAN PUPPET REGIME IN UNEQUIVOCAL TERMS THAT, UNLESS THE NORTH KOREAN PUPPET REGIME SHOULD CEASE TO COMMIT SUCH ACTS OF AGGRESSION, IT WILL BE COUNTERED BY CORRESPONDING AND COMMENSURATE PUNITIVE ACTIONS BY THE JOINT FORCES OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA AND THE UNITED STATES DEFENDING THE SECURITY OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA END TEXT

BEGIN TEXT:

AGREED MINUTES BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (DRAFT)

WHEREAS THE NORTH KOREAN COMMUNIST REGIME HAS, FOR THE LAST ONE AND A HALF YEARS, DISPATCHED AN INCREASED NUMBER OF ARMED INFILTRATORS TO THE SOUTHERN PART OF KOREA, SUCH INFILTRATIONS CULMINATING IN THE INTRUSION INTO SEOUL OF A PARTY OF 31

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SEOUL 4208, FEBRUARY 13

SECTION 1 OF 2

PAGE 5 RUALOS 4208E ~~SECRET~~

NORTH KOREAN ARMED INFILTRATORS ON JANUARY 21, 1968 AND IN THE WANTON SEIZURE OF USS PUEBLO ON THE HIGH SEAS ON JANUARY 23, 1968;

WHEREAS BOTH THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA RECOGNIZE THAT SUCH AN ACT AS THE CASE OF THE ARMED INTRUSION INTO SEOUL BY THE NORTH KOREAN COMMUNIST REGIME ON JANUARY 21, 1968, CONSTITUTES A SERIOUS MENACE TO THE SECURITY OF THE ROK:

WHEREAS THE AVOWED FINAL OBJECTIVE OF THE NORTH KOREAN COMMUNISTS IS TO COMMUNIZE THE WHOLE OF KOREA BY INTENSIFYING SUCH AGGRESSIVE MILITARY ACTIVITIES:

AND WHEREAS THE NORTH KOREAN COMMUNIST REGIME IS INTENT TO CARRY OUT SUCH SCHEME:

CONSIDERING THAT STRENGTHENING FURTHER THE DEFENSE CAPABILITIES OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA AGAINST POSSIBLE FUTURE INTRUSION INTO THE SOUTH OF THE NORTH KOREAN COMMUNISTS WHICH WILL HEREAFTER CONTINUE, IS A MATTER OF URGENT NECESSITY, AND

PAGE 6 RUALOS 4208E/1 ~~SECRET~~

BY SO DOING, THE NORTH KOREAN COMMUNISTS' INTENTION TO INVADE TO THE SOUTH COULD BE CHECKED:

WITH A VIEW TO REAFFIRMING THE SPIRIT OF THE MUTUAL DEFENSE TREATY SIGNED ON OCTOBER 1, 1953, AND TO SUPPLEMENTING THE AGREE MINUTES SIGNED BETWEEN THE TWO NATIONS ON NOVEMBER 17, 1954;

THE PLENIPOTENTIARIES OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA AND THE UNITED STATES, MEETING IN SEOUL FROM FEBRUARY TO FEBRUARY

AGREED AS FOLLOWS:

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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Rv jw NARA Date 11-12-97

MODIS/CACTUS
VANTO 12

REF: SEOUL 4207 AND 4208, VANTO 8 AND 9

SUBJECT: VANCE MEETING WITH KOREAN CABINET: 1200,
FEBRUARY 14, 1968

CYRUS VANCE, ACCOMPANIED BY AMBASSADOR PORTER, GENERAL HONESTEEL, JOHN WALSH, AND COLONEL GREENLEAF MET THIS MORNING FOR 1-1/2 HOURS WITH PRIME MINISTER CHUNG, FOREIGN MINISTER CHOI, DEFENSE MINISTER KIM, INFORMATION MINISTER HONG, PRINCIPAL PRESIDENTIAL SECRETARY YI HU-RAK, DIRECTOR ROK CIA KIM, GENERAL IM, CJCS, AND SEVERAL OF THEIR STAFF ASSISTANTS. THE MEETING, WHICH WAS AGAIN FRANK AND CANDID, SEEMED TO RESULT IN TACIT AGREEMENT BY THE KOREANS THAT THE "JOINT DEFENSE STATEMENT" AND "AGREED MINUTES" WHICH THEY TABLED YESTERDAY WERE NOT NEGOTIABLE (SEE SEOUL 4208). ALTHOUGH THEIR REACTION WAS SUBDUED WHEN VANCE TABLED OUR DRAFT COMMUNIQUE (STATE 114006), THEY DID NOT TAKE ISSUE WITH ITS SUBSTANCE IN PART BECAUSE THE PRIME MINISTER CLEARLY INTENDS TO SUBMIT IT TO PRESIDENT PARK.

THE MOST SIGNIFICANT EXCHANGES TOOK PLACE IN A SHORT PRIVATE SESSION BETWEEN VANCE, PORTER, PRIME MINISTER AND PRINCIPAL PRESIDENTIAL SECRETARY YI HU-RAK. AT THIS SESSION, PRIME MINISTER RECOMMENDED THAT VANCE MEET ALONE WITH PRESIDENT PARK AND EXPLAIN TO HIM THAT PRESIDENT JOHNSON HAS GRAVE DOMESTIC PROBLEMS, SIMILAR TO PARK'S, AND TWO PRESIDENT'S SHOULD STAND TOGETHER AT THIS TIME. YI HU-RAK AND CHUNG URGED VANCE TO MAKE CLEAR TO PARK THAT HE MUST NOT TAKE UNILATERAL ACTION AGAINST NORTH KOREA. SUCH ACTION WOULD ONLY DESTROY THE ECONOMY AND HOPES OF KOREA. FURTHERMORE, VANCE SHOULD EMPHASIZE TO PARK THAT UNILATERAL ACTION WOULD SERIOUSLY ENDANGER CONTINUING US SUPPORT.

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-2- SEOUL 4215, FEBRUARY 14. N O D I S/CACTUS

✓ WHEN CHUNG STATED THAT NATIONAL ASSEMBLY PRESSURE MIGHT FORCE HIS GOVERNMENT TO WITHDRAW THEIR TROOPS FROM VIETNAM, VANCE TOLD HIM FLAINTY WE WOULD RECIPROCATE BY WITHDRAWING OUR TROOPS FROM KOREA. HE GASPED, SPUTTERED AND IMMEDIATELY WENT OUT AND BROUGHT YI HU-RAK INTO THE MEETING. * VANCE ALSO MADE IT QUITE CLEAR TO THE PRIME MINISTER THAT, IF WE FAIL TO REACH AGREEMENT ON THE ISSUES BEFORE US, THERE WOULD BE SERIOUS US DOMESTIC REACTIONS IN RESPECT TO KOREA.

AFTER RETURNING TO THE FULL SESSION, IT WAS AGREED THAT THE FOREIGN MINISTER WOULD CONVEY THIS AFTERNOON TO THE MISSION THE CABINET'S REACTION TO THE COMMUNIQUE. IT WAS ALSO AGREED THAT VANCE, ACCOMPANIED BY PORTER, WOULD MEET WITH PRESIDENT PARK TOMORROW MORNING, HOPEFULLY AT 1000 HOURS.

A DETAILED REPORT FOLLOWS SEPTEL. PORTER
BT

* YI HU-RAK ACC. TO REST
OF TEXT, ALREADY IN
MEETING.

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NOTES OF THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING
WITH CYRUS VANCE

February 15, 1968
Cabinet Room

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 92-142
By CG, NARA Date 9-16-99

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The President: All of us are deeply grateful to you, Cy, for all you have done.

Mr. Vance: The Joint Communique was issued at 1 o'clock today Seoul time. In the meeting this morning, I had difficulty with President Pak about issuing a joint communique. He was against a communique.

Meeting with President Pak, the Prime Minister and others this morning was in dramatic contrast with the meeting I had with Pak and the Cabinet when I arrived in Seoul. Tensions were high when I arrived. When I left, Pak put his arm around me and thanked me for coming. In terms of the basic objectives of easing tension and getting a friendly relationship re-established, the mission was a success. This was in evidence even with the press at the airport when I left.

In the long run, however, the picture is very dangerous.

The President: Before we get any further, what did we do to provoke the anger and hostility?

Mr. Vance: Because we did not permit any retaliatory action on the attack on Blue House. The depth of feeling over that is very deep. It was considered a personal affront and a loss of face. They considered it very serious that the raiders got within 300 yards of Blue House bent upon killing the President and his family.

The President: Does Pak blame us for that?

Mr. Vance: Yes, to some extent, because they got through the guards.

Pak wanted to react violently against North Korea. Ambassador Porter prevented this.

Blue House is now covered with guards and there is strict orders that any plane, no matter what its designation, will be shot down if it flies anywhere

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over or around Blue House.

They are also angry about the Pueblo. They wanted us to take out Wonsan and not doing so was in their opinion a loss of face.

One of their guys, the Defense Minister, is an absolute menace. He has organized a very elite anti-infiltration unit under his command which has been conducting raids across the border against North Korea.

So there is blame on all sides.

There is a very strong danger of unilateral action by Pak.

Pak controls the whole country. Nobody will tell him what he does not want to hear. He is moody, volatile and has been drinking heavily. He is a danger and rather unsafe.

The Prime Minister is a force for restraint. General Bonesteel called in the ROK Joint Chiefs and made it completely clear to them that if any unilateral action is taken that it would necessitate him recommending that U. S. troops be withdrawn. The Chiefs took this very calmly. The Prime Minister told me to make it clear to President Pak that he can't take unilateral action. There are a few men at the top who are aware of this danger.

Pak presents us with some problems. I do not know whether he will stand still. We went into some gut issues in our meeting with Porter and Pak. We got some commitments:

1. That they will take action to quiet their people.
2. They will stand by during the closed door sessions with North Korea as long as it doesn't go on for a long period of time.
3. There will be no reprisals for the Blue House or Pueblo.
4. There will be no reprisals in the future without consulting us if they are significant.
5. The most serious thing was this. They said they will go through the formality if another serious act occurs, but the consultations will be only formalities. They will act

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if another serious act occurs.

There was an understanding that they would keep their troops in South Vietnam. I did not raise the question of the committed troops since General Westmoreland's cable did not reach me until after my meeting had ended.

I made it very clear to Pak that were they even to consider removing troops from South Vietnam we would pull ours out of Korea.

In summary, the prospects for the future are not good.

- North Korea may try to get South Korea to take some unilateral action against the North to further divide us.
- There is an unstable political situation with Pak's mood and attitude as it is.
- There could be a serious problem raised with the possibility of unilateral action.
- I do not know if Pak will last.

In the past, South Korea has been a showcase for the United States, but we must look at the cold hard facts. There is no longer a perfect showcase.

I would recommend that a good, small group be put together to determine how we proceed in the days ahead.

That is my report in capsule form.

The President: Is Pak's drinking irrationally something new?

Mr. Vance: No, this has been going on for some time. He hit his wife with an ash tray. He has thrown ash trays at several of his assistants and I was fully prepared for that.

The President: What does he want us to give him?

Mr. Vance: He has a large shopping list. He wants:

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- Six squadrons of F-4s.
- One million dollars to augment his anti-guerilla forces.
- Four new air fields.
- Expansion of existing air bases.
- A large increase in the amount of aid.
- A promise to remove none of the air craft now in South Korea until the new ones he has requested are in place.

I told him I would pass this on to you. The amount comes to about \$1 1/2 billion.

The President: What do you think the consequences are of the 600 raids that have taken place this year? Have they hurt the South Koreans much?

Mr. Vance: No, not except for the Blue House raid.

The President: Was the Blue House raid intended for our Ambassador too?

Mr. Vance: No. The one infiltrator who was captured was told to say that he was after Ambassador Porter. But he really wasn't. He was told that [redacted] in order to put a little more political pressure on us to act.

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The President: Did the South Koreans say what brought the Pueblo attack on?

Mr. Vance: Nothing more than they thought this was part of a North Korean political plan to destroy morale and to harm us and the South Koreans.

The President: Have they asked for any more U.S. troops?

Mr. Vance: No.

The President: Did they say anything about Vietnam?

Mr. Vance: No, they did not.

The President: Was there any criticism about Vietnam?

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Mr. Vance: No, they said their resolve was the same as it had always been.

Secretary Rusk: Did Ambassador Porter say we would pull out our troops in South Korea if they pull out their troops from Vietnam?

Mr. Vance: No, I do not know if Porter said that. I made it clear to Pak that he should not persist in that attitude. I told him that any talk of that would have grave impact on the future of relations of our two countries.

Secretary Rusk: If we had started this consultation earlier, could we have had all these problems? Or were they inherent in Pak before this happened?

Mr. Vance: They were inherent in the situation with Pak.

Under Secretary Katzenbach: Do they continue to think we should take Wonsan?

Mr. Vance: Yes, they went through a list of things with me that they would do if certain events were to happen.

The President: Doesn't Pak worry about what the Soviets or the Chinese might do?

Mr. Vance: Pak thinks the Soviets and the Chinese will stand aside. I told him that our judgment and his judgment on this matter were vastly different.

Pak is convinced that the North Koreans are going to try to take over South Korea by 1970. He said that if they tried to attack Blue House again that he would retaliate and that much blood would be shed and that there would be much pain and suffering.

Secretary McNamara: How about our raids into the North?

Mr. Vance: They are conducting about two a month.

The President: Do we have a clear idea of what they have done?

Mr. Vance: They have been operating two a month raids recently. The anti-infiltration units are under the command of the Defense Minister. They took out a division headquarters in recent attacks. An attack no later than March is planned across the DMZ again.

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There is much talk in military circles about this.

The numbers are not clear. They have about 200 anti-infiltration troops trained with each division upon the DMZ and have an additional group being trained by these men now.

On the other side, there are some highly trained guerilla units. They estimate there are 2400 of these in 30 man teams. They are well trained and tough, but they have been chopped up in the past. 80 to 90% of them have been eliminated, since the South Koreans turned them in quickly.

They have excellent cooperation from the people in turning these guerillas in. The exact number of South Koreans trained is a very closely held secret.

The President: Is there any connection in your mind between the Pueblo and the attacks in Vietnam? Is there one man calling the dance?

Mr. Vance: I am not clear as to the case.

Secretary Rusk: Now that we have made a case of the 570 raids across the DMZ aren't we in a difficult position if any of this information comes to light about South Korean raids into the North?

Secretary McNamara: We do not have adequate knowledge of this.

Mr. Vance: Here is a list of items right here. There have been eleven raids between 26 October and December.

The Vice President: When did they start?

Mr. Vance: I do not know, although I think it has been at least a year.

General Wheeler: General Bonesteel had rumors of this from his advisors who are with the Korean units. Hard information is difficult to get.

The President: What is the purpose of these raids?

General Wheeler: They are punitive.

The President: Are any of our soldiers doing any of this?

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General Wheeler: No, sir. It is routine that battalions go into the DMZ and behind the DMZ under the Armistice Agreement. General Bonesteel has talked to the Senior ROK Commanders about the dangers of this action.

We could not even prove these raids have taken place.

The President: I would just as soon not prove it.

Mr. Vance: There are going to be some problems. Only recently a unit took an M-79 grenade launcher with them. If the North Koreans have it, they may make some propaganda out of it.

The President: Have there been any complaints from the North Koreans?

Secretary Rusk: There have been some on the radio and at the meetings at Panmunjon.

General Wheeler: What about the public unrest?

Mr. Vance: The unrest is deep and real.

The people are personally offended. In the ^{South} ~~North~~ Korean General Assembly, there is talk that we do not have as strong a mutual security pact with South Korea as we do with the Philippines. This particularly relates to incident response. They wanted a commitment from me on that. They feel like they have a second class arrangement. The ROKs also feel their hands are tied since they are under the UN Command.

I met with the Speaker and the leaders of their Congress. They brought this up. There is some feeling in the populace about this issue.

The President: Is there any estimate of what you would recommend in the additional assistance?

Mr. Vance: For next year, I would think about \$200 million would be required. They need to increase their capability to take care of guerilla-type raids in order to contain things rapidly.

General Bonesteel believes more can be done. In addition, we have to give them some F-4s. They must have this for public consumption.

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But I made it clear that there was nothing in the woods beyond the \$100 million this year.

They do need strengthening in a number of areas. The dilemma we face is how much we build them up, how much we build up their strike capacity.

Secretary Rusk: We had the same problem with Syngman Rhee 20 years ago. How much do we give him when he is having to strike the North?

Clark Clifford: I am most distressed about President Pak's instability. Does he have power to start major action on his own?

Mr. Vance: The generals would let us know and would drag their feet. But if he said go, they would have to go.

One general told General Bonesteel that he was terrified of the possibility of unilateral action, but he said that if he is given the order, they will have to respond.

Clark Clifford: This is a weak reed we are leaning on. We must watch this with the greatest care. We have got to find a means to disengage ourselves from any possibility of unilateral action.

Mr. Vance: President Pak will issue all sorts of orders when he begins drinking. His generals will delay any action on them until the next morning. If he says nothing about those orders the following morning then they just forget what he had told them the night before.

The President: Where do we get this information from?

Mr. Vance: General Bonesteel gets it. The military have the greatest amount of respect for the UN Commander and for his position.

Clark Clifford: Is there any quarrel between Pak and his Congress?

Mr. Vance: Not that I know of.

Mr. Clifford: Are the South Koreans developing their own teams?

Mr. Vance: They are called AIUs (anti-infiltration units.) They have 2400 men. Beyond that, they have one airborne battalion with jump

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capability. They could be dropped in for guerilla activity, if a war starts, they would be parachuted in to harass the movement of supplies and munitions.

They have teams for each Province.

Clark Clifford: Did you get any threat at all, even a veiled threat, about withdrawing troops from South Vietnam?

Mr. Vance: The Prime Minister mentioned that the legislature might ask for that. I told him very bluntly that we would remove our troops from South Korea if that happened. The Prime Minister turned ashen. It really shook him.

Clark Clifford: Then you think they are clear on that?

Mr. Vance: Yes.

The President: Walt, do you have anything?

Walt Rostow: No.

The Vice President: What is the status of their Naval craft?

Mr. Vance: They need more to impede infiltration. Most of the infiltration comes in from the sea.

The Vice President: Did you detect any political rivalry between Pak and the Defense Minister?

Mr. Vance: No.

The President: Who is watching the situation on our behalf?

Mr. Vance: Ambassador Porter is watching the President. General Bonesteel will step in at any time.

General Wheeler: As I understand it, General Bonesteel focuses on the Defense Minister and the ROK Joint Chiefs.

General Taylor: It goes back 20 years when the military was a restraining force against Syngman Rhee. The senior military will talk frankly.

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Mr. Vance: That is why we meet with them.

Secretary Rusk: I got a reassuring feeling from your meeting this morning.

Mr. Vance: They did say what I consider a very serious thing. If there is a serious incident, they will consult but they will go ahead and take action.

The President: Then you feel pretty well about it all?

Mr. Vance: Except for that last point.

The President: Do our people feel that they are pretty well prepared out there?

General Wheeler: Yes, sir, but we will be doing several things to improve our situation. But, with our Air Force out there, with their ground troops, and with the improvements in the ammunition supplies, the troops in South Korean could do quite well.

The President: Are you ready to go to South Vietnam?

General Wheeler: Yes, sir, I will go on Saturday.

The President: OK, if you want to. The sooner the better.

Secretary McNamara: We have one problem with testimony on the Tonkin Gulf that is scheduled for Tuesday. I can handle it myself, however.

The President sent Jim Jones out to get a memorandum he had sent to the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense.

Secretary McNamara read the memorandum. It follows:

February 15, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR

Honorable Robert S. McNamara
Secretary of Defense

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You are directed to review security measures and practices in your Department or Agency to make certain that everything possible is done to maintain the integrity of classified information. In addition, similar precautions are to be taken whenever you or one of your subordinates testifies before a congressional committee in executive session in relation to classified matter. More particularly, you or your subordinate should satisfy himself that everyone present or able to read the testimony to be given, except members of Congress, has a security clearance commensurate with the highest classification of the information that may possibly come up for discussion.

The President asked for a report from General Wheeler on Vietnam.

General Wheeler: There is nothing new since the memo this morning. There were no attacks except for a mortar attack on an airfield. A report on that action is not in yet.

The President: How about the 1,000 marching on Hue?

General Wheeler: There is nothing sufficiently firm on this to take immediate action.

The President: What is your feeling about the next meeting on our forces in Vietnam and what action we take to strengthen them?

Secretary McNamara: I think we should wait until Buzz goes out there first, unless Westmoreland calls for more men.

General Westmoreland was rather calm and assured in his discussions with General Wheeler this morning, wasn't he, Buzz?

General Wheeler: Yes, he was.

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He indicated things were picking up and going well. The command and control centers of the Viet Cong were disrupted in the vicinity of Saigon.

General Taylor: The Intelligence Board raised today that there had been very few main force units in the attacks on the cities. They said most of the VC were Province units.

General Wheeler: That is not my information. With the exception of few cases, most of these were main force units.

General Taylor: This was a DIA-CIA briefing.

General Wheeler: We know that the 9th VC Division was in the Saigon area. I cannot understand that.

Secretary Rusk: I think all of us are grateful to Cy for the job he has done.

The President: We do appreciate what you have done, Cy. Thank you very much for an excellent report.

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Some Aspects of the Political Line of the Korean Workers' Party after the January Events

Political Report No. 12

[Source: Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Prague. Translated by Vojtech Mastny]

[written by] B. Schindler

Pyongyang. 15 February 1968

To the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Prague

As happened at the time of the recent 20th anniversary of the founding of the Korean People's Army, when the Korean comrades did all they could to trace not only the ideological but also the organizational origins of the army to the 1930's, the Korean Workers' Party has recently tried all the more to prove a direct and uninterrupted line in the development of the Korean Workers' Party from the 1930's to the present. Both in memoirs and in historical literature, great effort has been made to ignore and distort the period comprising approximately World War II. Recent speeches of Kim Il Sung himself arguing continuity between the 1930's and the origins of the DPRK, show that some historical factors from the years antedating the liberation and the origins of the Korean Democratic People's Republic have not ceased to be effective and are still problems that are being addressed internally by the Korean party.

The core of the present and past leadership of the Korean Workers' Party was formed mainly from among active fighters against the Japanese fascists, organizers of and participants in the anti-Japanese resistance. Considering that this resistance was centered mainly in the territory of Manchuria outside of occupied Korea, the far from negligible factor of separation from one's own people was inevitably in effect already before the liberation of the Korean people. Although a Korean minority used to live and is still living in the territory of Manchuria, we believe that this fact in no way undermines the hypothesis that during the period of anti-Japanese resistance before World War II, contacts between guerilla groups and the people in Korea itself were not extensive.

Indeed, Korean historical sources identify all the localities where clashes with the Japanese occupiers took place as being in the northern parts of Korea and in Manchuria, thus showing that even the Korean sources cannot show an influence of the struggle of the guerilla groups on the entire Korean people.

The internal development of the guerilla movement during World War II amounts to further and deeper separation of the guerilla movement and its leaders from the Korean people. This factor began to take effect in several stages from the very origins of the Korean Democratic People's Republic onwards and is to a certain extent one of the reasons why the Korean Worker's Party today maintains "independent" positions precisely in the fundamental questions of war and peace, the international communist movement, and so on.

In the period of its consolidation from 1945-1956, the young Korean Workers' Party had to cope with many phenomena that are historically rooted in the fact that a portion of the party leadership—the very segment whose importance and power kept increasing—was bound by its various historical experiences to China and the Soviet Union more than it was bound by the experience of the struggle of the Korean people. The long absence from the country played a role in the thinking of these leaders.

This first period culminated in 1956 when certain internal measures taken by the party began to create tendencies leading to the diminution of "dependence" on the Soviet Union and China. In this year, the first strike against some of the former anti-Japanese fighters took place, leading to their removal and the formation of the basis for all the main ideological and practical theses and methods that currently determine the line of the Korean Workers' Party. Once the disagreements between CPSU and CPC became evident, the Korean Workers' Party first, as is well known, openly supported the Chinese views. Later on, when events in Indonesia, Ghana, and other countries exerted their influence on the KWP, the KWP began to distance itself from direct support of the Chinese leadership and came closer to the CPSU and the fraternal parties of the European socialist countries. To what extent this change may have been prompted by subjective

factors within the KWP and to what extent objective factors played their role is impossible to tell exactly. In any case, however, the process of the KWP's rapprochement with the USSR and the European socialist countries was closely connected with the internal economic problems of the DPRK and the awareness of the sinister effects of the Chinese ideas on the national liberation struggle.

As evident in 1966, and from the extensive personnel changes in the following year, the problems of so-called pro-Chinese and pro-Soviet tendencies within the KWP are far from having been resolved. On the contrary, influenced by the rise of the cult of the leading personalities in the party, who—regardless of whether they might later be branded by Korean historians as kowtowing to this or that—represented the more cautious forces beneficial for the development of Korean unification. Therefore, they inevitably had to clash with all that represents today a cross-section of the Korean Workers' Party—an extraordinarily strong cult of personality in all of its manifestations, adventurism, striving for even greater isolation in the thinking of the DPRK's population, and especially of the membership of the Korean Workers' Party, ignoring of new factors in world development, and so on. In the end, they have become so much of an obstacle marking retreat from the October 1966 conference of the KWP in the key question of the country's unification.

All internal propaganda of the KWP and the DPRK is aimed at fully ignoring some new developments in South Korea that entail for the DPRK the loss of its economic lead over South Korea. Today's South Korea is in effect depicted as if it were Syngman Rhee's South Korea of years ago. This is a serious mistake, however, which means departure from one of the tenets of the conference, namely, the building of a Marxist-Leninist party in South Korea, and posits in effect forcible unification as the only way.

This shows not only that the leadership of the Korean party is fully aware of the DPRK economically lagging behind South Korea, in the sense that the economic growth in the South corresponds to economic stagnation in the North. Accordingly, among others, attempts have been made to stop South Korea's economic growth by cutting its main

lifeline—the influx of foreign capital into South Korea. Already in the last year, the interests of investors from the capitalist world has sharply decreased thanks to the armed sabotage in South Korea, as the increased danger of a new war on the Korean peninsula temporarily had a negative effect on the influx of capital. The situation had become stabilized until the events of the first of January 1968 again created the possibility of a war breaking out. It is no longer possible to speak of attempts to influence adversely the economic development in South Korea, but about a more dangerous effort to come to terms with the adverse economic development in the two divided parts of the country, which favors the South. The January events have shown that the Korean Workers' Party has given up on the possibility of making the DPRK into an economic model for South Korea and has fully entered a path close to the Chinese ideas. Retreat from the path of [becoming] an economic model and [of pursuing] peaceful unification had also been foreshadowed by giving new content to the old policy of parallel development of the DPRK's economy and defense. The whole economy is being effectively subordinated to armament requirements—an area in which the DPRK has a lead over South Korea, which only plans to build its first armament plans this year. The current tendencies in the Korean Workers' Party confirm the continued validity of some factors that have effectively influenced it from its origins until today, and that have exerted their influence on the frame of mind of the party leadership. One of these factors is, in our opinion, the fact that from the beginning until the present time, the KWP has been intimately linked with all military matters, with the tradition of struggle against Japan, with the Korean War, and with the whole postwar development. It therefore put military issues in first place. Before and during World War II, Korea had been a brutally exploited Japanese colony in which the brutality of the occupiers exceeded that of the German fascists; the KWP never had any experience of bourgeois democracy, of struggle for the economic rights of the workers, and, in our opinion, is therefore not ready at the present time to either understand or influence the economic struggle of the South Korean workers. The only path in which it is richly experienced is the military one, the path of arms.

The Korean Workers' Party has no experience with democratic centralism within the party. If there had been any possibilities in that direction, they are now fully blocked by

the monstrous cult of Kim Il Sung's personality. More than ever before, the situation within the Korean Workers' Party prevents criticism and self-criticism from becoming a dynamic force in party life. Military experiences, which in the past were always closely interconnected with party work, have grown into a system of organization that resembles military organization and discipline. All this has become characteristic, even before the recent events, not only of party life but also of the economic and public life of the country.

Are there forces within the party that might evaluate and correct this situation? There is no class or group of people in the DPRK who would have concrete experiences with democracy in the country and the party. Moreover, the KWP has been doing all it could to block the entry of such ideas into the country and the working class and the peasantry have never had such experiences. Finally, the proletarianization of the intelligentsia, which is part of the KWP's policy, along with the strictly regulated flow of information, prevent any such ideas from appearing in any coherent form. And even if they appeared, there would be no possibility for them to be published, affirmed, or explained. There are so many slogans used by the Korean Workers' party (kowtowing before great powers, *chuche*, with our own forces, and so on) that the application of even one of these slogans would amount to a total failure of any such [democratizing] attempt.



Department of State

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TELEGRAM

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February 17, 1968
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NODIS

FOR THE SECRETARY

SUBJ: US-KOREAN TALKS: FINAL VANCE MEETING
WITH PRESIDENT PARK

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 98-17
By W, NARA Date 3-18-99

1. THIS MEETING TOOK PLACE AT 10:30 AM SEOUL TIME FEBRUARY 15. IT WAS PRECEDED BY BRIEF DISCUSSION WITH FOREIGN MINISTER AND SECRETARY GENERAL OF PRESIDENCY IN ANTEROOM. THESE OFFICIALS TOLD US THAT THE PRESIDENT HAD DECIDED TO REJECT THE COMMUNIQUE ON GROUNDS THAT IT WAS NOT STRONG ENOUGH AND GAVE NO INDICATION THAT THERE WOULD BE IMMEDIATE RETALIATION IF NORTH KOREA CREATED NEW INCIDENT. BOTH OFFICIALS ASKED VANCE TO DO EVERYTHING HE COULD TO REVERSE THIS PRESIDENTIAL DECISION WHICH THEY FELT WAS A MISTAKE. MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENSE WAS

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ALSO PRESENT IN ANTEROOM BUT TOOK NO PART IN THIS CONVERSATION. AFTER INDICATION THAT MINISTERS INTENDED TO COME INTO CONFERENCE WITH US, VANCE DECIDED IT HAD TO BE MORE PRIVATE THAN THAT, AND WE PREVAILED UPON SECRETARY GENERAL TO SET IT UP WITH ONLY VANCE, PORTER AND SECRETARY GENERAL PRESENT.

2. AFTER GREETING PRESIDENT PARK, VANCE OPENED WITH APPEAL FOR UNDERSTANDING OF PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S PROBLEMS. PARK IS PRESIDENT OF A GREAT COUNTRY AND WOULD UNDERSTAND DOMESTIC PRESSURES GENERATED IN AN ELECTION YEAR, VANCE SAID. IN ADDITION, THERE IS VIETNAM WAR WHICH IS MADE MORE DIFFICULT BECAUSE OF VIEWS OF SOME OF THE POPULATION IN UNITED STATES. SUCH VIEWS DO NOT AFFECT PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S RESOLUTION AND HE HAS RECENTLY SHOWN THIS BY ADDING TWO MORE REGIMENTS TO THE FORCES IN VIETNAM. HE WILL STAND FIRM ON THIS ISSUE BUT HAS GREAT PROBLEMS ALSO BECAUSE VERY LARGE MILITARY BUDGET HAS CAUSED HIM TO CUT DEEPLY INTO HIS DOMESTIC PROGRAMS.

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-2- SEOUL 1 OF 4 ST IL 4315 CN 5371

PAGE 3 RUALOS 4315/1 ~~SECRET~~

WHICH IS SOURCE OF DIFFICULTY FOR HIM. THERE ARE ALSO PROBLEMS OF BALANCE OF PAYMENTS AND THOSE CREATED BY CIVIL DISORDERS WHICH ARE VERY DIVISIVE AND SOURCE OF GREAT PAIN TO OUR PRESIDENT. THEREFORE, VANCE CONTINUED, PRESIDENT JOHNSON COUNTS ON PARK'S UNDERSTANDING. AS TO CLOSED MEETINGS AT PANMUNJOM THE PRESIDENT DOES NOT INTEND TO DRAG THEM OUT INDEFINITELY BUT BELIEVES THAT AN EARNEST EFFORT MUST BE MADE BEFORE OTHER METHODS ARE USED. HE ALSO URGED THAT ROK OFFICERS NOT BE PERMITTED TO ENGAGE IN RASH ACTS AND ASKS PARK'S ASSURANCE THAT THERE WOULD BE NO UNILATERAL ACTION AGAINST NORTH KOREA. IN THIS CONNECTION VANCE WOULD BE GLAD TO CARRY A SHORT NOTE BACK TO PRESIDENT JOHNSON IF PRESIDENT PARK WISHED TO SEND ONE.

3. WITH RESPECT TO MILITARY ASSISTANCE VANCE SAID HE HAD DECIDED TO RECOMMEND THAT PAST LEVELS BE EXCEEDED. HE WOULD ALSO MAKE HIS RECOMMENDATIONS ON SPECIFIC ITEMS MENTIONED IN LETTER GIVEN TO HIM BY FOREIGN MINISTER.

PAGE 4 RUALOS 4315/1 ~~SECRET~~

4. FINALLY, VANCE SAID WE HAD WORKED THROUGH THE NIGHT AND WHILE THE COMMUNIQUE DID NOT CONTAIN EVERYTHING WE WOULD LIKE, WE URGED THAT IT BE ISSUED. OTHERWISE, SILENCE WOULD NOT BE UNDERSTOOD BY THE PEOPLE, AND WOULD BE USED BY ENEMY TO CREATE DIVISIONS BETWEEN US.

5. PARK REPLIED THAT HE FULLY APPRECIATED AND UNDERSTOOD GREAT WORLDWIDE PROBLEMS THAT PRESIDENT JOHNSON MUST COPE WITH. THESE INVOLVED MUCH MORE THAN KOREAN AND HE ALSO HAD CIRCUMSTANCES OF PRESIDENT JOHNSON IN MIND IN THIS ELECTION YEAR. IN APPRECIATION OF PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S EFFORTS, ROK GOVERNMENT WILL EMPHASIZE SELF-RESTRAINT AND WILL CONTROL INDIGNATION OF THE PEOPLE. IN TACKLING THE PROBLEM OF NORTH KOREAN AGGRESSION PARK EXPRESSED BELIEF THAT US/ROK VIEWS ARE SAME IN PRINCIPLE. THESE ARE THAT THERE IS GREAT DANGER OF WAR IF NORTH KOREA CONTINUES TO RESORT TO SUCH ACTIONS. THE JOINT COMMUNIQUE DOES NOT MENTION THIS WITH SUFFICIENT FORCE. PARK HAS AN HONEST DESIRE TO INSURE THAT WAR

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-3- SEOUL 1 OF 4 SOUL 4315 CN 5371 NODIS

PAGE 5 RUALOS 4315/1 ~~SECRET~~
 WILL NOT RECUR AND THESE IDEAS ARE SHARED WITH THE UNITED STATES. HE APPRECIATES AND UNDERSTANDS WHY U.S. WANTS NO WAR IN KOREA, AND HE AND HIS PEOPLE WISH ONLY TO PREVENT FUTURE RECURRENCE. BUT THERE IS A DIFFERENCE OF OPINION BETWEEN US AS TO HOW TO DEAL WITH THE PROBLEM. AT THIS JUNCTURE WHEN U.S. AND ROK ARE MAKING EFFORT TO PREVENT FUTURE WAR IT IS ESSENTIAL TO HAVE FIRM DETERMINATION AND TO SHOW A RESOLUTE ATTITUDE. AS PREVENTIVE MEASURE WE SHOULD DECIDE TO TAKE APPROPRIATE RETALIATORY ACTION TO STOP FUTURE NK AGGRESSION. IF WE TOLERATE RECENT NK ACTS AND DO NOT RETALIATE WE SHOULD AT LEAST COME OUT WITH STRONG PUBLIC WARNING THEY CANNOT IN FUTURE DO SUCH THINGS WITHOUT RETALIATION FROM OUR SIDE AND WE SHOULD BE FULLY PREPARED TO SUPPORT SUCH A WARNING.

6. IN CASE SUCH A WARNING IS CONSIDERED TOO STRONG, PRESIDENT PARK CONTINUED, BECAUSE IT IS FELT UNWISE TO IRRITATE THEM WITH AN OPEN DECLARATION, THERE SHOULD BE A CONFIDENTIAL DETERMINATION BETWEEN OUR BY FOREIGN MINISTERS.

PAGE 6 RUALOS 4315/1 ~~SECRET~~
 LEADERS THAT RETALIATORY MEASURES WILL BE TAKEN AND THAT WE MUST BE FULLY PREPARED TO TAKE THEM. DURING PAST FEW DAYS, PARK SAID, "THERE HAD BEEN SERIOUS AND LENGTHY CONFERENCES. SUMMING THEM UP THE PRESIDENT HAD CONCLUDED THAT THE U.S. GOVERNMENT DOES NOT WISH TO HAVE RETAILIATORY ACTION TAKEN NOW. ALSO, U.S. DOES NOT AGREE ABOUT NEED FOR STRONG WARNING, AND YET WE HAD DEVELOPED NO CONCRETE MEASURES TO PREVENT FUTURE AGGRESSIVE ACTS BY THE ENEMY SUCH AS REINVASION OF ROK. THE JOINT COMMUNIQUE SHOULD CONTAIN A PROVISION THAT SHOULD AGGRESSION RECUR THERE WOULD BE THREAT OF WAR AND WE ARE THEREFORE PREPARING TO MEET THAT THREAT, BUT IT DOES NOT CONTAIN ANYTHING LIKE THAT. PRESIDENT WISHED TO SAY SINCERELY AND FRANKLY HE HAD NO INTENTION OF MAKING THE UNITED STATES POSITION OR PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S POSITION IN AN ELECTION YEAR UNTEXABLE, NOR WAS HE INTERESTED IN SHAKING US DOWN FOR MORE MILITARY AID. HIS CHIEF CONCERN IS FOR MEASURES AND ACTIONS TO PREVENT WAR. ANY FRANK

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Department of State

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FM ANEMBASSY SEOUL
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9135
STATE GRNC
BT

CN-5377Q
February 17, 1968
4:22 a.m.

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 2 OF 4 SEOUL 4315

NODIS

ASSESSMENT OR EXCHANGE OF VIEWS CONCERNING WHAT WE FACE HERE IN ROK WOULD SHOW THAT WAR NOT VERY FAR OFF. HOW CAN WAR BE PREVENTED WITHOUT PROPER ACTION AT THIS TIME?

7. PRESIDENT PARK ALSO WISHED TO SAY MOST FRANKLY THAT AFTER RAID ON BLUE HOUSE HE HAD BURNED ALL OF THE MOST SECRET DOCUMENTS BECAUSE OF POSSIBILITY OF FUTURE BOMBING. HE CANNOT TELL THE PUBLIC THIS BECAUSE THERE WOULD BE UNREST. IF WAR SHOULD OCCUR THERE WOULD BE CHAOS IN THE ROK AND THE GREAT ECONOMIC PROGRESS ACHIEVED WITH U.S. HELP WOULD BE RUINED. THEREFORE HE CANNOT AFFORD TO TAKE ACTIONS WHICH WOULD AROUSE THE PUBLIC BUT HE IS VERY CONCERNED ABOUT THE NEED FOR DECISION AND ACTIONS. AS HE READ

PAGE 2 RUALOS 4315/2 ~~SECRET~~

THE COMMUNIQUE HE FELT IT WAS BETTER NOT TO MAKE IT PUBLIC BECAUSE ITS CONTENTS WOULD ONLY CREATE APPREHENSION. THE TEXT LACKED FIRM AND RESOLUTE EXPRESSION OF INTENTION TO DEAL WITH FUTURE AGGRESSION. A SPECIAL ENVOY HAD BEEN SENT AND JOINT CONVERSATIONS HAD OCCURRED, AND WAS THAT ALL THAT COULD BE DONE? THE TEXT GIVES THE IDEA THAT THE UNITED STATES WILL NOT ENGAGE IN WAR OR RETALIATORY ACTION IF THERE IS FUTURE AGGRESSION. NORTH KOREA MAY MISCALCULATE OUR DETERMINATIONS AND THE POSITION IS THEREFORE VERY DANGEROUS. THE PRESIDENT THOUGHT THE JOINT COMMUNIQUE SHOULD NOT BE MADE PUBLIC BUT THAT WE SHOULD MAKE ANNOUNCEMENT THAT THERE WAS AN AGREED MINUTE ON PROBLEMS TO BE SOLVED AND COMMUNIQUE SHOULD BE HELD UNTIL APPROPRIATE. TO THE PUBLIC WE SHOULD SAY THAT WE HAVE AGREED THERE IS THREAT OF WAR IF NORTH KOREAN ACTIONS CONTINUE AND THAT WE HAVE DISCUSSED APPROPRIATE MEASURES. WE SHOULD ALSO ANNOUNCE DISCUSSIONS ON ADDITIONAL EQUIPMENT AND THE PUBLIC WOULD SEE IN THIS DETERMINATION

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PAGE 3 RUALOS 4315/2 ~~SECRET~~
ON OUR PART. THE COMMUNIQUE, ON THE OTHER HAND, WOULD DISAPPOINT THE PUBLIC AND WOULD CREATE MISUNDERSTANDING ON THE ENEMY SIDE OF OUR TRUE CAPABILITY.

8. AS TO PANMUNJOM, PRESIDENT PARK COULD UNDERSTAND THAT PRESIDENT JOHNSON DOES NOT DESIRE TO PROLONG INDEFINITELY. HOWEVER IF CLOSED CONFERENCE CONTINUES FOR ANY LENGTH OF TIME OR FOUR MONTHS, LOSS OF U.S. PRESTIGE WILL BE GREAT AND WILL CAUSE EMOTION AMONG THE ROK PEOPLE.

9. VANCE SAID HE WOULD CONVEY ACCURATELY TO PRESIDENT JOHNSON EVERYTHING THAT HAD BEEN SAID PREVIOUSLY AS WELL AS ON THIS OCCASION. HE HAD A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THE FEELINGS OF THE PEOPLE AS A RESULT OF THIS VISIT. AS TO OUR VIEWS, PRESIDENT PARK WAS CORRECT IN STATING THAT WE FEEL THERE SHOULD BE NO RETALIATORY ACTION AT THIS TIME. AS TO THE WARNING; THE JOINT COMMUNIQUE CONTAINS A CLEAR WARNING AND IS ONE OF THE STRONGEST DOCUMENTS HE HAD SEEN SIGNED BY U.S. REPRESENTATIVE. WHERE THERE IS A DIFFERENCE OF OPINION IS ON THE QUESTION

PAGE 4 RUALOS 4315/2 ~~SECRET~~
OF THE AUTOMATIC NATURE OF RETALIATION TO POSSIBLE ACTS IN FUTURE. VANCE DID NOT RULE OUT RETALIATORY ACTIONS BUT INSISTED THESE MUST BE DETERMINED AT TIME AGGRESSIVE ACTIONS OCCUR AND IN LIGHT OF EXISTING FACTS. HE PERSONALLY BELIEVED IT WAS A MISTAKE NOT TO ISSUE THE JOINT COMMUNIQUE, BUT HE DID NOT BELIEVE IT WOULD BE WISE TO DEVELOP OR MENTION SECRET MINUTE WHICH WOULD INVOLVE US IN DIFFICULTIES AT HOME, ESPECIALLY WITH CONGRESS. IT WOULD BE BETTER TO SAY THERE HAD BEEN A SERIES OF DISCUSSIONS IN RECENT DAYS AND STRESS OUR SOLIDARITY.

9. AS TO CLOSED DOOR MEETINGS AT PANMUNJOM, VANCE SAID HE DOES NOT FORESEE THAT THEY WILL GO ON FOR MONTHS. IF THEY ARE PROLONGED WE WILL HAVE TO CONSIDER WHAT OTHER ACTION CAN BE TAKEN. BEFORE TAKING ACTION WE WOULD CONSULT WITH PRESIDENT PARK AND HE WOULD LIKE TO ASK WHETHER HE COULD ASSURE PRESIDENT JOHNSON THAT ROK FORCES WILL NOT TAKE ANY ACTION PRIOR TO CONSULTATION WITH US.

10. PARK REPLIED THAT HE HAD NO STRONG OBJECTION TO

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PAGE 5 RUALOS 4315/2 ~~SECRET~~
ANNOUNCING THE JOINT COMMUNIQUE BUT IT HAD NO CONTENT. HE SAID THAT VANCE MIGHT SAY IT CONTAINED A STRONG WARNING BUT NOTHING WOULD BE EFFECTIVE UNTIL AFTER CONSULTATION AND APPROVAL OF CONGRESS. PRESIDENT PARK DID NOT CARE WHETHER JOINT COMMUNIQUE WAS ANNOUNCED OR NOT AT THIS MOMENT. AS TO OTHER ACTION IF MEETINGS DEADLOCKED PARK ASKED WHAT THOSE ACTIONS WOULD BE. HE HAD NOT BEEN GIVEN ANYTHING ON THIS YET BUT WE ARE INSISTING THAT NO UNILATERAL ACTION BE TAKEN BY HIS FORCES.

11. AS TO PANNUNJOM MEETINGS HE ALSO HAD NO ASSURANCE HOW LONG THEY WOULD GO ON AND HOW WE WOULD PROCEED IF THEY FAILED: HE SIMPLY NOT INFORMED ABOUT THESE MATTERS. IF HE HAD BEEN GIVEN INFORMATION AS TO WHAT WE INTEND HE WOULD HAVE NO OBJECTION TO WAITING BUT HE IS WITHOUT INFORMATION AND U.S. IS ASKING ONLY THAT HE NOT TAKE UNILATERAL ACTION, WHICH IS RATHER DIFFICULT TO UNDERSTAND.

12. VANCE SAID THAT THERE ARE MANY KINDS OF POSSIBLE ACTION INCLUDING MILITARY ACTION, BLOCKADE, STRIKES

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AT TARGETS, SEIZURE OF SHIP, POSSIBLE ECONOMIC ACTIONS. A WHOLE SERIES OF SUCH MATTERS IS BEING STUDIED. WHETHER ONE KIND OR ANOTHER WILL BE TAKEN IS NOT YET DETERMINED AND WILL DEPEND ON EVENTS, AND WHEN WE FEEL DISCUSSIONS HAVE DRAGGED ALONG UNSATISFACTORILY.

13. PARK SAID SUPPOSE THERE ARE FURTHER INCIDENTS IN FUTURE HERE. AMBASSADOR PORTER WILL COME IN IMMEDIATELY REQUESTING PATIENCE AND NO RETALIATION. COULD VANCE GUARANTEE THAT WE WILL NOT BE MERELY ASKING FOR PATIENCE?

14. VANCE SAID THERE COULD BE NO GUARANTEE IN THIS SENSE. HE DID NOT WISH TO MISLEAD THE PRESIDENT, BUT AS GOOD ALLIES WE MUST CONSULT EACH OTHER ABOUT ACTIONS WHICH AFFECT THE OTHER. VANCE SAID THE U.S. COULD EASILY HAVE TAKEN MILITARY ACTION IN RESPONSE TO PUEBLO INCIDENT BUT THERE WAS GREAT DANGER THAT WOULD DRAG ROK INTO WAR. WHICH WE WOULD NOT DO WITHOUT CONSULTATION IN ADVANCE, AND HE HOPED PRESIDENT PARK WOULD DO THE SAME FOR US.

15. PARK SAID THAT WHEN NORTH KOREANS CAME TO SEOUL
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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9136
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BY

CN-5380Q
FEBRUARY 17, 1968
4:29 am.

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 3 OF 4 SEOUL 4315

NODIS

PRESIDENT ALERTED ROK FORCES FOR RETALIATION BUT BEFORE ORDER WAS GIVEN AMBASSADOR PORTER CAME TO HIM AND REPORTED STRENGTHENING OF U.S. FORCES AND STATED U.S. WANTED TO SEEK DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION AND REQUESTED PARK TO REFRAIN FROM UNILATERAL ACTION. THAT WAS UNDERSTANDABLE BUT OUR DETERMINATION TO ACT IN FUTURE HAS NOT BEEN MADE CLEAR. IF WE ARE NOT ABLE TO MAKE OUR INTENTIONS KNOWN, THE PRESIDENT SHOULD BE INFORMED OF THEM IF WE ARE GOING TO INSIST THAT HE NOT TAKE UNILATERAL ACTION.

15. VANCE SAID THAT HE BELIEVED HE HAD ADEQUATELY ASSURED PRESIDENT PARK OF UNITED STATES SOLIDARITY WITH THE ROK. HE COULD NOT SAY IN ADVANCE THAT

PAGE 2 RUALOS 4315/3 ~~SECRET~~
PARTICULAR ACTION WOULD BE TAKEN. THIS IS NOT POSSIBLE UNDER OUR FORM OF GOVERNMENT. THIS DOES NOT AFFECT OUR RESOLUTION OR OUR STRENGTH BUT UNDER OUR CONSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS THAT IS HOW WE MUST OPERATE.

17. PRESIDENT PARK SAID HE COULD ASSURE VANCE THAT THERE WOULD BE NO UNILATERAL ACTION BY ROK FORCES "AT THIS TIME." IF SIMILAR AGGRESSIVE ACTS ARE COMMITTED BY NORTH KOREA, HOWEVER, THERE WOULD BE NO ALTERNATIVE TO UNILATERAL ACTION. IF UNITED STATES JOINS ROK THAT WOULD BE FINE, BUT UNILATERAL ACTION WILL HAVE TO BE TAKEN WHETHER OR NOT THE U.S.M JOINS. HE BELIEVES THE ROK CAN OVERCOME NORTH KOREA. HE FULLY REALIZED, PARK WENT ON, THAT HUMAN CASUALTIES WOULD BE GREAT BUT THE COST MUST BE BORNE IN ORDER TO PERMIT ROK PEOPLE TO SURVIVE. PEOPLE HAVE A RIGHT TO PROTECT THEIR NATIONAL SECURITY AND WHEN DAMAGE IS DONE TO THEM THEY HAVE A NATURAL RIGHT TO PROTECT THEMSELVES AND DETER THE AGGRESSOR. CASE OF ROK AGAINST THE COMMIES IS SAME AS THAT OF THE FREE WORLD,

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SECTION 3 of 4 SEQUL 4315 NODIS 5380Q

PAGE 3 RUALOS 4315/3 ~~SECRET~~

WHICH IS THE PRESERVATION OF PEACE. THERE IS A LIMIT TO ROK PATIENCE. NO ONE SHOULD ASK FOR ENDLESS PATIENCE IN THE FACE OF ENDLESS AGGRESSIVE ACTS BY THE OTHER SIDE. LACK OF RESOLUTE DETERMINATION ON OUR SIDE WOULD MEAN THAT WE WOULD BE SURRENDERING OURSELVES, THE PRESIDENT SAID.

18. VANCE SAID HE WOULD CONVINCE PRESIDENT JOHNSON THESE VIEWS CONCERNING UNILATERAL ACTION IN THE FUTURE.

WHAT PRESIDENT PARK HAD SAID WOULD CREATE VERY GRAVE PROBLEMS BECAUSE OF THE IMPLICATIONS AND MAY ADVERSELY AFFECT RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES, BUT HE WOULD CONVEY THEM TO PRESIDENT JOHNSON.

19. (AT THIS POINT SECRETARY GENERAL, WHO WAS OBVIOUSLY PROFOUNDLY DISTURBED BY THE EXCHANGE, INTERRUPTED CONVERSATION AND IN RAPID KOREAN ATTEMPTED TO REMONSTRATE WITH PRESIDENT.) PRESIDENT PARK THEN SAID HE HAD NO INTENTION OR DESIRE TO SEE STRAINS DEVELOP BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES BUT U.S. MUST UNDERSTAND THAT IN SELF-DEFENSE HE HAD NO OTHER CHOICE.

26. VANCE REPLIED THAT THERE IS GREAT DIFFERENCE

PAGE 4 RUALOS 4315/3 ~~SECRET~~

IN DETERRING AND IN TAKING ACTION WHICH COULD START A WAR, WHICH WOULD INVOLVE BOTH NATIONS.

21. PRESIDENT SAID HE WISHED TO MAKE CLEAR THAT HE WOULD DULY CONSULT IN ADVANCE BUT IF UNITED STATES TAKES SAME ATTITUDE OF COUNSELING MORE PATIENCE AND NO UNILATERAL ACTION, ROKS WOULD HAVE TO TAKE UNILATERAL ACTION THEN.

22. VANCE INQUIRED WHETHER THE PRESIDENT WAS SAYING THAT IN THOSE CIRCUMSTANCES THAT HE WOULD CONSULT BUT THAT UNILATERAL ACTION WOULD BE TAKEN EVEN IF HE FELT IT SHOULD NOT. HE INQUIRED WHETHER IT WOULD BE AUTOMATICALLY SO.

23. PARK REPLIED THAT IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES HE WOULD CONSULT. IF DURING CONSULTATIONS U.S. TRIED ONLY TO STOP ROKS HE WOULD NOT GUARANTEE THAT HE WOULD NOT TAKE UNILATERAL ACTION.

24. VANCE INQUIRED WHETHER THE PRESIDENT WAS SAYING THAT IF A FUTURE INCIDENT OCCURS THE PRESIDENT HAD MADE UP HIS MIND THAT THERE WOULD BE RETALIATORY ACTION.

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-3- SECTION 3 of 4 FOUL 4315 NODIS 5380Q

PAGE 5 RUALOS 4315ZXE ~~SECRET~~

25. PARK REPLIED THAT IF WE PERSISTENTLY OPPOSED ACTION HE WOULD BE FORCED TO TAKE UNILATERAL ACTION.

26. VANCE ASKED IF DETERMINATION HAD BEEN MADE ALREADY THAT THERE WOULD BE RETALIATORY ACTION IF FUTURE PROVOCATION OCCURS.

27. PARK REPLIED THAT HE FIRMLY BELIEVES RETALIATORY ACTION SHOULD BE TAKEN IF SERIOUS INCIDENT OCCURS.

28. VANCE ASKED WHETHER ATTACK BY A SQUAD ON AN AIRFIELD WOULD BE AN OCCASION FOR RETALIATORY ACTION.

29. PARK SAID THAT EACH INCIDENT MUST BE CONSIDERED AT THE TIME TO DETERMINE ACTION. YOU CANNOT SAY IN ADVANCE WHAT WILL BE NEEDED.

30. (AT THIS POINT SECRETARY GENERAL TOLD PRESIDENT THAT HE HAD ADMITTED AMERICAN POSITION IN MAKING THAT STATEMENT. PARK LAUGHED AND AGREED THAT IN EFFECT HE HAD.) VANCE SAID THAT WAS THE POINT HE WAS MAKING THE OTHER DAY. HE UNDERSTOOD PRESIDENT'S VIEWS FULLY IN THIS FUNDAMENTAL AND VITAL MATTER.

31. PRESIDENT PARK SAID HE ALSO UNDERSTANDS THE VIEWS AND OPINIONS OF PRESIDENT JOHNSON AND APPRECIATED BT

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Department of State

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~~SECRET~~ SECTION 4 OF 4 SEOUL 4315

CN-5380Q
 FEBRUARY 17, 1968
 4:28 a.m.

NODIS

VANCE'S EXPRESSION OF UNDERSTANDING. HE THEN WENT ON TO SUGGEST THAT THE JOINT COMMUNIQUE BE ISSUED. VANCE REPLIED THAT IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONVERSATION HE WOULD LIKE TO REFLECT ON THE MATTER BUT WOULD DO SO PROMPTLY.

32. THIS ENDED THE CONVERSATION AND THE GROUP WENT TO VIEW THE GIFT PRESIDENT JOHNSON HAD SENT TO PRESIDENT PARK.

33. AS VANCE WAS LEAVING BLUE HOUSE, SECRETARY GENERAL TOOK PORTER ASIDE AND STRONGLY URGED IMMEDIATE ISSUANCE OF THE COMMUNIQUE. PORTER PROMISED TO PHONE HIM PROMPTLY ON THIS MATTER. AFTER CONSIDERING SUBSTANCE OF CONVERSATION JUST HELD WITH PARK,

PAGE 2 RUALOS 4315/4 ~~SECRET~~
 VANCE AND PORTER CONCLUDED THAT IT WOULD BE WELL TO TIE THE PRESIDENT PUBLICLY TO CONSULTATION UNDER THE MUTUAL DEFENSE TREATY; THAT THERE WOULD BE CONSIDERABLE UNEASINESS AMONG THE PUBLIC IF NO COMMUNIQUE WERE ISSUED; AND THAT THE NORTH KOREANS WOULD DRAW CONSIDERABLE PROPAGANDA ADVANTAGE BY SILENCE IN SEOUL ON OUTCOME OF VANCE MISSION. WE THEREFORE NOTIFIED SECRETARY GENERAL THAT WE AGREED TO ISSUANCE OF THE COMMUNIQUE.
 GP-1. PORTER
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1968 FEB 18 PM 9 36

~~SECRET~~ SEOUL 4326

NODIS/CACTUS

1. I CALLED ON PRESIDENT SATURDAY WITH COSTANZO AND HIGHWAY CONSULTANT WILBUR SMITH, PURPOSE BEING TO PRESENT SMITH WHO HAD JUST FINISHED PRELIMINARY SURVEY OF PRESIDENT PARK'S FAVORITE PROJECT, I.E., SEOUL-PUSAN HIGHWAY.

2. EARLIER IN DAY I INQUIRED OF PRIME MINISTER CONCERNING PRESIDENT'S FRAME OF MIND AFTER DEPARTURE OF VANCE. PRIME MINISTER SAID PRESIDENT NOW FEELING VERY MUCH BETTER, HAD QUIETED DOWN CONSIDERABLY "AFTER GETTING HIS THOUGHTYQOFF HIS CHEST."

PAGE 2 RUALOS 4326E ~~SECRET~~

3. I FOUND PRESIDENT IN GOOD HUMOR HE RECEIVED SMITH WITH COURTESY AND COMMENTED APPRECIATIVELY ON HIS ADVICE CONCERNING HIGHWAY.

4. PRESS AND RADIO HAVE ALSO CONTINUED TO TAPER OFF, AND EVERYTHING CONSIDERED IT LOOKS AS THOUGH GOVERNMENT AND PUBLIC DREW CONSIDERABLE REASSURANCE FROM VANCE MISSION.

GP-4 PORTER
BT

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-213
By 124, NARA Date 8-22-97

UNCLASSIFIED

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Korean Task Force

14
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Situation Report, 1800 Hours EST, February 19, 1968

Views of ROK Diplomats in Washington

According to UPI, ROK diplomatic authorities here are convinced that the danger of a North Korean invasion is becoming more and more apparent as time goes by, and that the United States must be warned of this impending danger. These authorities also state that US-ROK relations have improved since the return of presidential envoy Vance. (UPI ticker 2:20 p.m., 2:24 p.m.) In a press interview here, ROK roving ambassador You Chan Yang said that North Korea would back down and release the Pueblo if confronted with an ultimatum from Washington; without strong American action, the world will think the U.S. is a "paper tiger." (UPI ticker, 4:21 p.m.)

Internal Security

Negative.

UNCLASSIFIED

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MEMORANDUM

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2. agenda*

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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Monday, February 19, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Status of Pueblo Case

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-344
By is, NARA Date 8-20-98

The following summary of the current status of the Pueblo case may be of use to you in your discussions with callers:

1. The Pueblo and its crew, seized by North Korea on January 23 in international waters, remain in North Korean custody. The North Koreans have informed us of the identity of one dead and three injured crewmen.
2. We have had seven private talks at Panmunjom on February 1, 3, 5, 6, 9, 14 and 16. North Korea has been represented by General Pak Chung-kuk and our side by Rear Admiral John V. Smith of the Military Armistice Commission. An eighth meeting will probably be held tonight at midnight Washington time, which is 2:00 p.m. tomorrow in Korea.
3. Each side has now stated its position. The North Korean position is that release of the crew will be considered only after the United States:
 - has apologized for sending into North Korean territorial waters an armed ship carrying out espionage and engaging in provocative acts; and
 - has promised not to repeat this intrusion.

The North Koreans have indicated that they have no intent of returning the ship.

4. To support their position, the North Koreans have published alleged "confessions" by Pueblo officers and crew members, including one alleged joint confession by the entire crew. These so-called "confessions" used phraseology and concepts which no American would use. The North Koreans have also released photographs of what they claim to be documents found on board the Pueblo, containing portions of the ship's log and its navigational plot. These allegedly show several penetrations into waters claimed by North Korea as territorial. The North Koreans have made known their intent to publish additional documents, including intelligence materials.

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5: Our position is that the Pueblo and crew must be released immediately. In support of this we have made the following points:

-- we have positive information both from the Pueblo and from a North Korean source that the seizure of the vessel occurred in international waters beyond the 12-mile limit, which North Korea seems to claim;

-- even if the Pueblo had been in North Korean territorial waters, seizing it, instead of escorting it from those waters, violates international law and practice;

-- the Pueblo's sailing orders were to stay at least 13 miles from land. We have no information indicating that those orders were violated. However, following release of the ship and crew, we are willing to hold an impartial inquiry and make public the results of that inquiry;

-- we have no evidence to support the North Korean claim that the Pueblo fired on North Korean patrol craft. Information from the Pueblo at the time of capture was that her two machine guns had not been uncovered and that she did not intend to resist.

6. At the last meeting we reiterated our offer to hold an inquiry following release of the crew and vessel and to express regret if justified by results of the inquiry, and we gave assurances that U.S. naval ships will continue to be ordered to remain more than 12 nautical miles from the coast. The North Korean representative characterized these as "preposterous assertions." Lack of progress after seven meetings seems to indicate that we are close to an impasse.

7. The regular series of open Military Armistice Commission meetings have continued, but the Pueblo case has been mentioned only in passing at these sessions.

8. Meanwhile, we have gone through a difficult period with our South Korean ally. During Vance's recent mission he applied his considerable skills toward gaining an understanding of our position on the part of President Park and his associates. He was largely successful in this and the atmosphere in Seoul is much less tense than it was a few days ago. The South Koreans continue to feel that we have placed

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emphasis upon the Pueblo case at the expense of attention to the North Korean raiders' attempts on President Park's life. They also feel that, in general, we are too patient in the face of North Korean provocations and that this is giving misleading and possibly very dangerous signals to North Korea and her allies. Vance and Park agreed that if North Korean aggression continued, our two countries would promptly determine what action should be taken under our Mutual Defense Treaty. We are also taking steps designed to strengthen South Korean forces. We have Park's promise that at least for the time being, he will not take unilateral action but will keep in close consultation with us.

9. We have engaged in a series of third country diplomatic efforts, particularly with the Soviet Union, in hopes of influencing favorably developments in the Pueblo case. So far, nothing of promise has come from these efforts.

10. We still have under consideration other moves which might be taken in the Pueblo affair. However, the hostile and potentially hostile forces ranged against us are formidable and it behooves us to exercise prudence.

Walt. Rostow

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Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Korea

Urgent

Reference No: USW-02176

Date: 191900

Recipient: Minister, the Blue House, Prime Minister, National Defense, Public Information, Korea Central Intelligence, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Addressor: Ambassador to the United States

Special Report (the 47th issue)

1. President Johnson, in the press conference held in the afternoon of February 16, mentioned the relationship with South Korea as follows: (a full text available in attachment).
2. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Unions, during the speech in Leningrad on February 16, mentioned the seizure of the PUEBLO by the North Korean puppet regime, saying, "the Soviet People are tightening their ties with Pyongyang guarding its sovereign authority and security."
3. Nixon, a Presidential candidate from the Republican Party, presupposed in the election campaign on February 16 that the PUEBLO would have not have been seized if the United States had taken firm actions on the occasion of the infiltration of armed communist guerillas, and claimed that a better way to avoid war is to immediately use the power to avoid it. He said that the actions of the United States had been late and it made the United Stated look vulnerable to the North Korean puppet regime, but avoided implying immediate acts of retaliation and implied actions taken at the time of 1958 Lebanon crisis instead.
4. The Washington Post, in editorials on February 18, quoted a speech of Vice President Humphrey in Korea on February 22, 1966 (one American soldier's being at the armistice line means a promise of the entire United States and its forces for the safety and security of Korea, etc.) and commented that giving an extensive promise

with no legal basis (which means a legal procedure in accordance with the defense treaty) should not throw themselves into confusion in practicing it when the actual problem occurs. A full text of the editorial is as follows: (a full text of editorial available in attachment).

(Dae: WUS-0292)

5. The Washington Post published an article addressed by a special correspondent Jack Anderson of Seoul on February 18 which urged the Defense authorities of the United States to awaken by listing in detail the preparation of the North Korean puppet regime for aggression against South Korea and pointing out that the U.S. forces paid little attention to South Korea (a full text to be sent later).
6. The Washington Post, addressed by a special correspondent Hartman(?) from Seoul, indicated on February 18 that as the Korean Crisis is stepping into the second phase, the North Korean puppet regime is mainly focusing on intensifying a disruption between the United States and South Korea and illustrated it with the threat of aggression and the negotiation of the PUEBLO Incident.
7. It is said that the U.S. Senate Committee on the Budget and Committee on Armed Services would begin the investigation on the seizure of the PUEBLO on February 20, so there would be testimony by the relevant officials.
8. Ambassador Goldberg to the United Nations argued against the editorials of the Washington Post on February 5 and 6 that criticized his speech with regard to the seizure of the PUEBLO in the United Nations Security Council (a full text to be sent later).
9. The New York Times featured a column, supporting our country, in WEEKLY REVIEW and MAGAZINE on February 18 (a full text to be sent later).
10. It was reported on February 18 that Kosigyn, Premier of the Soviet Union, mentioned in the regional council at Minsk (February 14) that he is taking all necessary actions to prevent the PUEBLO Incident from expanding into a new Korean War. This utterance is the first one to suggest that the Soviet Union is in direct intervention in the PUEBLO Incident and he reportedly supported the position of the North Korean puppet regime, ie that the PUEBLO intruded into their territorial waters.
11. Today's Washington Post reported that Rusk, Secretary of State, compared the

Koreans to the Irish in the secret testimony of the U.S. House of Representatives and did several interpretations on its original intention.

- 12. Today's Christian Science Monitor featured a long column, supporting the position of our country (Concerned authorities from our embassy have negotiated about it).
- 13. This week's edition of US NEWS AND WORLD REPORT (February 26) published a comprehensive column with respect to the recent Korean situation and took up the modernization of equipment as the preparation of the North Korean puppet regime for aggression, which shows the dissatisfaction of South Korea to be reasonable, and commented that the United States had not taken active actions in the modernization of equipment of the Navy and the Air Force, operational commands, their own capability to produce weapons, or security after the military mobilization to Vietnam.
- 14. The Department of State warned the North Korean puppet regime last Sunday that charging the crew of the PUEBLO as war criminals would deliberately aggravate an already serious situation. It is a comment on the so-called 'joint apology' of the crew, and even today, authorities concerned with the Department of State expressed their indignation on this matter. The spokesman said that, if there was a mistake, they would make apology, however, they had not apologized for the PUEBLO, and mentioned that it would be an answer to the North Korean Puppet Regime on the PUEBLO. (미일, 밀이, North Asia, Information)

SANITIZED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 97-348

By js, NARA Date 3-23-97

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February 20, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The Objectives of My Mission

Under the broad delegation of authority given me, I formulated the specific objectives of my Mission in the following terms:

"The objective of my Mission is to persuade President Park, and through him the Korean Government, that we intend to stand firmly with them in the current crisis and that our policy for handling the developing situation is soundly based. It is necessary to establish a sufficient level of Korean confidence in the United States to permit the ROKG to provide the Mission with adequate assurances that (1) the ROKG will take no independent military actions against North Korea; (2) the ROKG will dampen down public agitation for retaliatory actions; and (3) the ROKG will consent to our private bilateral discussions with the North Koreans of the Pueblo issue in order that the crew and ship will be promptly released.

I believe that these objectives were essentially realized. I have no illusions, however, of the necessity of wise and painstaking follow-up action by our able representatives in Seoul, working in closest coordination with Washington. We must not permit the Communists to separate us from President Park and his Government--that is the publicly stated objective of Pyongyang. The situation in Korea remains acutely dangerous to our national interest and to peace in that area.

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The Situation in Seoul

When I arrived in Seoul on 11 February, I found a fragile and serious political situation, pockmarked with tension, suspicion, and distrust.

President Park was in a highly emotional state. He was incensed over the North Korean raid on 21 January against the Presidential Mansion (the Blue House) and the seizure of the USS Pueblo on 23 January. He held the United States partially to blame for the Blue House raid since the North Korean strike team had infiltrated across the DMZ in an area defended by U.S. forces. He considered the seizure of the Pueblo as an affront to the ROK since, to him, it demonstrated the impotence of the U.S. and South Korea to thwart such actions.

Park doubted both the resolve of the United States and her commitment in Korea, partially because of U.S. involvement in SEA and partially because of alleged delays in providing military equipment to ROK military forces and in modernizing those forces. He objected to the bilateral discussions at Panmunjom between U.S. and North Korean representatives since he considered them demeaning to the U.S. and therefore to the ROKG. He also felt that the discussions infringed on ROK sovereignty.

Park is a distinctive leader who has wrought much good for his people. However, the raid on the Blue House had unfortunate psychological effects on him. He felt that both he and his country had lost face and his fears for his own safety and that of his family were markedly increased.

[redacted] This 3.4(b)(6) is not a new development but it may be having cumulative effects. Highly emotional, volatile, frustrated and introspective, Park wanted to obtain from me a pledge for the United States to join his Government in instant, punitive, and retaliatory actions against North Korea in the event of another Blue House raid or comparable attack on some other important South Korean economic, governmental, or military facility. He wanted my assurance of an "automatic" U.S. response in the event of another serious raid against

the ROK. I refused to give any such assurance. Park's views were mirrored by almost every member of his Cabinet, who, while now civilians, are mostly retired colonels and generals.

Meetings with Koreans

In my meetings with the Koreans, I included Ambassador Porter and General Bonesteel as members of my Mission not only in recognition of their high competence but also in hope of emphasizing the importance of their positions and their stature as your representatives.

In subsequent days, I had two meetings with President Park (which took about seven hours); two meetings with the Prime Minister and other key members of the Government (Foreign Minister, Minister of National Defense, Minister of Public Information, Director of the ROK CIA, Chairman of the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff, and their principal staff assistants); and two meetings with the Foreign Minister and members of his staff, including a ten-hour meeting over the wording and contents of the final Joint Communique, a copy of which is attached. In all of our meetings with the Koreans, we listened attentively to everything they had to say and endeavored to draw out of them the totality of their views, opinions, and concerns.

With one significant exception, we placed the onus on them to raise topics for discussion. [redacted]

34(b)(6)

This information was news to most members of the Cabinet since the South Korean [redacted] units are under the personal control of Minister of National Defense Kim and their activities are closely held secrets within the ROKG.

34(b)(6)

[redacted]

34(b)(6)

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[Redacted text block]

3.4(b)(6)

Just prior to my departure President Park, the Prime Minister, and the Foreign Minister were most pleasant and friendly. The Foreign Minister, his principal staff assistants, the Secretary General of the Office of the President, and the Chief of Protocol also came to bid me goodby at Kimpo in a complete reversal of the cool reception which greeted me on my arrival.

Observations and Results

I believe that the limited objectives of my mission were realized. President Park will not retaliate for the Blue House raid. The bilateral discussions between the U.S. and North Korea at Panmunjom will not be impeded by the ROKG, providing they do not drag on for months. Korean press agitation against the U.S. will be dampened. No request was made for removing ROK forces in Korea from under the operational control of General Bonesteel as Commander in Chief of the United Nations Command. The ROKG has been assured that we intend to help South Korea in modernizing its counterinsurgency and counter-infiltration forces and facilities.

I believe that a necessary measure of confidence and trust has been re-established. The immediate threat of a serious dispute between the United States and the Republic of Korea has been eased. The prospects of the South Koreans initiating in the near future unilateral retaliatory actions against North Korea in response to infiltration of suicide or strike teams by boat and across the DMZ into South Korea have diminished. Yet, in the longer term, the prospects of the ROKG initiating a unilateral attack against North Korea are troublesome, ominous, and dangerous.

While President Park assured me that he would first consult with the United States before taking any action

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if North Korea again mounts an attack on the Presidential Mansion, or against some equally important South Korean facility, he would not guarantee to heed our counsel if we recommended against retaliation. If counter-actions by the Republic of Korea resulted in the outbreak of war with North Korea, the lives of some 12,000 American civilians (most of whom are located in the vicinity of Seoul) would be immediately endangered. Similarly, since U.S. aircraft are parked wing to wing on the six ROK airfields and American military forces are deployed along a key portion of the DMZ -- to the West and North of Seoul and across two of the most likely attack routes into South Korea -- the prospects of American troops becoming immediately involved in combat with North Korean forces are extremely high.

The outbreak of war in Korea could thus be ignited either by a serious North Korean incursion into the South or by a South Korean foray into the North.

ROKG officials are preoccupied with the North Korean threat as they see it. Some of them believe that the situation today is very similar to that which existed in June 1950. While the ROK has emphasized economic development over the last few years, the North Koreans have emphasized military preparedness. The North Koreans have taken a number of steps to improve their offensive and defensive military capabilities. Underground facilities have been built for munitions storage and ammunition production. North Korean airfields have been expanded and revetments constructed for the protection of aircraft. Civil defense exercises are regularly held and a well-trained Red Guard has been formed. Food stocks have been augmented. With the help of the Soviets, military equipment has been modernized and new armored vehicles, aircraft, SAM's and artillery weapons introduced into the operational inventory.

But perhaps more important to understanding the current attitudes of ROKG officials, North Korean Premier Kim Il-Sung has intensified his propagandea campaign against the ROK and has publically declared that by 1970 he will reunite Korea by force.

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As a companion effort to his anti-ROK propaganda campaign, Kim Il-Sung has established an infiltration force of some 20,000 men, including 2400 specially trained soldiers who operate in small reconnaissance/strike teams of seven to thirty-one men each. Last year a number of these teams were landed along the East and West coasts of the ROK by high speed (35 to 40 knots) infiltration boats which can carry up to 40 equipped men each. North Korea presently has 25 to 40 of these boats.

The ROKG, in turn, is organizing and training its own infiltration force, and, as noted earlier, has made a number of forays across the DMZ into North Korea. In this connection we were impressed with the thought that ethnic Koreans comprise the populations of both Koreas and that there are few "doves" or "hawks" among them; most appear to be "tigers". It also appears true that a substantial percentage of Koreans, north and south, share a latent and compulsive desire to reunite their country.

The ROKG is controlled by one man -- Park. With the possible exception of Secretary General Yi Hu Rak, no governmental official seems willing to challenge Park or offer him tempered advice. Minister of National Defense Kim is impulsive and has little capacity to think through the possible political and military consequences of his policies and actions.

Throughout our meetings with the Koreans we often heard them comment on their inability to contain North Korean infiltration teams. The South Koreans are fearful that a North Korean strike/reconnaissance team will destroy some major economic facility, e.g., a refinery or a dam. It seemed to us that the Koreans lack confidence in their own political, economic and military achievements. Whatever the cause, be it their short history as a nation or their relative inexperience with economic development, the Koreans time and time again demonstrated their insecurity and lack of self-confidence.

We should consider what steps we could take to bolster their confidence in themselves. For example, we should strive to maintain the private investment momentum generated by the Ball Mission. We should push ahead with the task of strengthening their anti-infiltration system by expediting the flow of equipment, making available to General Bonesteel our most competent military personnel and techniques in the anti-infiltration field, continue modernization of the ROK armed forces, and call an early meeting of the Defense Ministries as provided for in the Joint Communique.

The appetite of the ROKG for additional U.S. military assistance is very large as evidenced by my attached letter to Foreign Minister Choi which notes the requirements for MAP as Park and his ministers see them. My specific recommendations in respect to these Korean requests are also attached.

A major possible restraining force in the ROK today is the military whose chiefs understand the dangers inherent in the ROKG initiating unilateral action against North Korea. Yet, these same chiefs, while willing to keep General Bonesteel apprised of the orders received from Park, would probably comply with President Park's orders.

By agreeing to the issuance of a Joint Communique, after initial resistance, President Park is now committed to consult with us whenever he considers his country has been threatened. His freedom of action has therefore been somewhat reduced. However, his position on retaliation remains unsatisfactory. While he has been clearly warned of the grave consequences of taking retaliatory action, he has not accepted the full significance of this warning, nor does he, in my judgment, attach adequate importance to the Mutual Defense Treaties which North Korea has with Communist China and the Soviet Union.

I must also add that Park and his ministers made a number of demands which I rejected. I refused to commit the United States to an "agreed retaliation policy" involving

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"instant, punitive, retaliatory action" against future North Korean violations of the Armistice Agreement. I also refused to extend or modify the terms of the US/ROK Mutual Defense Treaty, and I refused to agree to a suggested secret minute that would have committed the U.S. to an "automatic retaliatory response," as the Koreans repeatedly asserted Secretary Dulles had promised the Philippines in 1958.

Further, I refused to endorse the ROK request that U.S. military assistance program to Korea should be greatly expanded. I insisted on reserving the responsibility of determining what recommendations I would submit to you. I made it clear that I attached a far higher priority to improving the counter-infiltration capabilities of the ROK military forces than purchasing six squadrons of F-4s or other high performance aircraft. Furthermore, I warned the President, the Cabinet and the Chairman of the JCS of the severe financial consequences and the disruptive effect on balanced force structures of the introduction of this magnitude of advanced aircraft into their inventory.

While I did not raise the issue of dispatching additional ROK forces to Vietnam, I made it clear that we expected the ROK forces to remain in the RVN. President Park personally assured me that he would not withdraw any ROK forces. I in turn reassured the Koreans that the obligation of the United States under the Mutual Security Treaty would be met.

In my discussions with Ambassador Porter and General Bonesteel concerning the Pueblo negotiations, I was told of the great problems involved in passing messages between the Embassy, General Bonesteel's headquarters and the U.S. element at Panmunjom. Instructions to our Panmunjom delegation received at the Embassy must be immediately translated into Korean so that Admiral Smith's interpreter can read them into the official record. When weather permits the use of a helicopter from Seoul to Panmunjom, the total time from receipt of the message at the Embassy to delivery to Admiral Smith averages 2½ hours. Again, with good flying weather, it normally takes about 3 hours from the end of a

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negotiation session until a message can be dispatched to Washington. When bad weather prevents helicopter flight, another two or three hours must be added to the processing of both incoming and outgoing messages.

In addition, I found a highly unsatisfactory communication system in Seoul and between Seoul and Washington. With the approval of Secretary McNamara and Under Secretary Katzenbach, we have now installed full teleconferencing and secure telephone facilities between the two capitals and within Seoul.

Before closing this report, I have certain recommendations I would like to make.

First, I believe that a small State/Defense/CIA/White House study group should be established to undertake an independent assessment of our current policy toward the ROK and to identify what our political, economic and military objectives in Korea should be over the next several years. This study effort should also assess the current and future policies of North Korea vis-a-vis the ROK. I consider it extremely important that this study group should be formed at a level in Government where its recommendations can be reviewed first-hand by our most senior policy-makers.

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Second, I believe that serious consideration should be given to apprising the Soviets of the dangerous political situation that exists in Korea on both sides of the DMZ and the pitfalls it offers for our two countries should North or South Korea sponsor a major raid which could result in war.

Third, I believe that consideration should be given to exposing at the UN and through bilateral exchanges the full dimensions of Kim Il-Sung's actions against South Korea and their implications for area and world peace. I must point out, however, that this course of action is not without danger

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Fourth, I believe that beginning in FY-1969 the basic military assistance program to Korea should be increased from \$160 to \$200 or \$210 million per year. Approximately 85 per cent of the Korean MAP program is expended for the maintenance of existing Korean forces and these costs are rising. The amount of MAP funding available for investment or force modernization is therefore but a fraction of the total program. A sizeable portion of these additional funds, as well as of the \$100 million supplemental assistance you have requested of the Congress for FY-1968, should be used for improving the counter-insurgency and counter-infiltration capabilities of ROK military forces.

Fifth, I believe that consideration should be given to the problem of providing additional protection [redacted]

[redacted] 3.4(b)(6)(9)

3.4(b)(6)

*Secret
1/18/68
Attache
Energy
4 Oct 68*

Sixth, I believe that consistent with the Joint Communiqué, Ministerial meetings between the ROK Ministry of National Defense and the Department of Defense should be promptly arranged. Similarly, Ambassador Porter should be given standby authority to extend an invitation to Prime Minister Chung to visit the United States later this year if, in his judgment, such a visit would be useful.

Seventh, I believe that consideration should be given to improving the Korean DMZ barrier.

Eighth, I strongly recommend that arrangements should be instituted which would permit General Bonesteel to apprise Ambassador Porter monthly of all approved U.S. reconnaissance activities scheduled for the vicinity of Korea. Ambassador Porter did not know of the Pueblo mission.


My final comments concern Ambassador Porter, General Bonesteel, and the members of my mission, Mr. John P. Walsh, Colonel Abbott C. Greenleaf and Mr. Daniel O'Donohue.

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Both Ambassador Porter and General Bonesteel are outstanding public servants. They are highly competent and are working very hard and courageously in a very difficult political situation which could turn sour overnight. They are entitled to commendation and our full support.

As for the members of my Mission, I cannot praise too highly the truly outstanding performance of Mr. John Walsh and Colonel Abbott Greenleaf under very difficult conditions. Their ever wise counsel and tireless efforts were indispensable. I also wish to commend the performance of Mr. Daniel O'Donohue and Miss Maria Gardosik.

Respectfully,



Cyrus R. Vance

Attachments:

- 1. Joint Communique
- 2. February 15 Vance Letter to Foreign Minister Choi
- 3. Comments and Recommendations in Response to Korean requests Cited in Vance letter

KOREAN-U.S. JOINT COMMUNIQUE

Issued at Seoul February 15, 1968

President Park received Mr. Cyrus R. Vance, Special Envoy of the President of the United States of America, on February 12 and February 15, 1968. Mr. Vance conveyed to President Park the very warm greetings of President Johnson. The cordial and sincere conversations between President Park and Mr. Vance were carried on with the participation of the Prime Minister, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Minister of National Defense, and other high officials of the government. The American Ambassador William J. Porter and General C. H. Bonesteel, Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations Command, also participated. Mr. Vance had a series of talks with the Prime Minister, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Minister of National Defense, the Minister of Public Information, and other high officials of the Korean government.

President Park and Mr. Vance fully exchanged views concerning the grave situation that has arisen as a result of the increasingly aggressive and violent actions of the North Korean Communists over the past fourteen months in violation of the Armistice Agreement, and most recently the attack directed at the official residence of the President and the illegal seizure of the USS Pueblo in international waters. They agreed that these actions must be condemned by all civilized peoples. They also agreed that these aggressive actions seriously jeopardize the security of this area and, if persisted in, can lead to renewed hostilities in Korea. While reaffirming the sincere desire of their countries for a peaceful solution to these problems in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter, they agreed that, if such aggression continued, the two countries would promptly determine what action should be taken under the Mutual Defense Treaty between the Republic of Korea and the United States. They reaffirmed the commitment of the two countries to undertake immediate consultations whenever the security of the Republic of Korea is threatened. They noted the extraordinary measures which have been and are being taken to strengthen the Korean and American Forces in this area so as to leave them in a state of readiness to deal with any contingency which might arise.

The two governments agreed that annual meetings would be held at the ministerial level of the Ministry of National Defense of the Republic of Korea and the Department of Defense of the United States to discuss and consult on defense and security matters of mutual interest and common concern.

President Park expressed his appreciation to President Johnson for his quick action in recommending to the United States Congress an additional 100,000,000 dollars of United States military assistance to the Republic of Korea. President Park and Mr. Vance recognized the need for continuing modernization of the armed forces of the Republic of Korea. They also discussed the subject of supplying small arms to the Korean veterans forces in order to strengthen further the defense capabilities of the Republic of Korea. They agreed that a meeting of Republic of Korea and United States military experts should be held in the near future to discuss the specific items to be included within the amount mentioned above and military assistance matters in general.

**Excerpt from a Personal Letter of the Acting Ambassador of the GDR
in Pyongyang, Comrade Jarck**

[Source: MfAA C1093/70, translated by Karen Riechert]

[Attachment to a letter of Comrade Hegen, GDR Foreign Ministry, to Comrades Ulbricht, Stoph, Honecker, and Mattern; 23 February 1968]

stamped: personal, strictly confidential

[...] First to the events in South Korea, as I believe they will be of greater importance for our future work than the incident with the American spy ship *Pueblo*. Given all the facts that became known here about the events in South Korea, one has to draw the conclusion that it is a carefully planned and long prepared action of the DPRK aiming at the elimination of South Korean President Park Chung Hee. By January 29 twenty- five men had been killed from this group of thirty-one, which had consisted of superbly conditioned and well trained young officers of the Korean People's Army. After his arrest, one of them killed himself and some policemen with a hand grenade. Only one of them was captured alive and gave a statement on the preparation of the attack, the assignments of the group, etc. It can be assumed that there will be serious attempts undertaken from here to liberate South Korea under the pretext of a coup d'etat. Therefore the recurrence of similar events can be expected. Thus the tensions, which are also created by other factors, will certainly not diminish, but rather will increase.

Concerning the seizure of the U.S. spy ship, there is in our opinion no direct link to the aforementioned events. The only link, though unproven, might be that they used the invasion of such a ship, which certainly didn't occur for the first time, as a pretext to seize it and divert attention from the events in the South. Such a scenario is taken into consideration at the Soviet embassy, although at the same time it is noted that such an aggravation of the situation, as has happened, had not been expected.

There could hardly be any doubt, by applying the principle of international law that defines a bay as part of the territorial waters of the state bordering that bay, that the ship was seized within the territorial waters of the DPRK. There is no doubt whatsoever that

the ship was on a spying mission. The subsequent deployment of the American navy, the increase of American air force units in South Korea, the placing of the South Korean army on alert, and the silence here about the further fate of the ship and the crew created an extremely contentious situation. At the moment, emotions seemed to have cooled down after having been running high, but there is still much risk of an outbreak of armed conflict. Primarily I have in mind the possible failure of all attempts to establish direct contact, or the possibility that direct talks between the USA and the DPRK in Panmunjom or at any other location take a course such that none of the parties involved can give way without losing face.

The question of what the DPRK aimed at with this action in South Korea is extremely important. Was it really about reunifying Korea by these means? If that is the case, and one assumes all military preconditions (nationally and internationally) are already set, then the incident with the *Pueblo* could be a convenient occasion.

The following facts could support the thesis that all those requirements are already in place:

- The correct assumption that the U.S. aggression in Vietnam ties up the majority of the American military potential in Asia
- The beginning of mobilization in the DPRK, which is already ongoing.

These facts are contradictory:

- The DPRK's indication of willingness to hold talks with the USA in Panmunjom and the willingness to send a delegation to the meeting of the Security Council
- That the Soviet arms shipments are not sufficient for a military liberation of South Korea (the opinion of the local Soviet military attaché during a talk with our military attaché).

In this context the attitude of the PRC towards the DPRK is of great importance. There have been indications recently that a certain improvement of relations between the two

countries is underway. There are indications within the diplomatic corps that the Romanian comrades disseminated the following opinions of Chinese Acting Ambassador Wang Feng in various conversations:

- China respects the independent policy of the KWP
- The Communist Party of China does not object to the KWP joining the consultative meeting in Budapest
- Economic relations are developing normally. Early in 1968 the PRC will meet the 1967 trade agreement despite its own difficulties. (This is also the opinion of the first secretary of the Czechoslovak embassy, who allegedly has checked numbers that he wants to inform me about.)

A Romanian comrade pointed out to us (on December 16) that Wang Feng told him:

- He doesn't expect the South to attack the North or the North to attack the South
- If war did break out, the PRC would help the Korean people, regardless of whether there had been differences of opinion beforehand.

The Romanian military attaché remarked that the Chinese military attaché told him a few days ago that in his view the situation was good. The Korean people wanted to fight against the USA and the PRC would be willing to support the Korean people with everything they want – weapons and people. One would not pay attention to the differences of opinion in political matters. The Romanian military attaché supposedly also has information that the PRC recently has shipped tanks and guns to the DPRK.

The Czechoslovak comrades reported that for some time the Chinese representatives in Panmunjom had been treated preferentially in terms of protocol. At many joint occasions with the Korean, Chinese, Czechoslovak and Polish comrades, they now first translate into Chinese and afterwards into Russian. Previously it had been the other way around.

[...]

24 FEB 1968: Contents of the Meeting Between the Ambassador to the United States and Assistant Secretary Bundy Regarding the Current Security Issue. (Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs)) (section #: 729.55, record #: 2662)

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Korea

Reference No: USW-02211

Date: 242200

TO: Minister, the Blue House, Prime Minister, Korea Central Intelligence (copy:
National Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff)
FROM: Ambassador to the United States

Yeon USW-02198

On February 24, I visited Assistant Secretary of State Bundy and had talks for approximately 1 hour with respect to pending issues, therefore, I hereby report the summary as follows:

1. The issue of the reconfirmation of the joint declaration for the defense of South Korea by the 16 countries that participated in the Korean War
 - A). Assistant Secretary Bundy presented the view that he does not have any particular comment to add to what the U.S. side said in the meeting on February 23 with Assistant Secretary (not readable) and I that the United States fully supports an offer of the South Korean side, however, reflecting that some other countries that participated in the Korean War are showing reluctant attitudes in general, it would rather weaken our position by announcing a joint declaration in the absence of several countries. It is certain that other countries have pity on Korea with regard to the present situation, but they are hesitating to announce a joint declaration and their attitude toward the joint declaration can possibly change if the aspects of provocation of the North Korean puppet regime take more serious

steps, thus, it is fine to seek possibilities and feel out the intentions of other countries who participated in the War, though the United States does not think it appropriate to strongly request their participation.

B) Given the response of the U.S. side, I think a timely and necessary direction of the South Korean government should be to cope with the present crisis caused by the provocation of the North Korean puppet regime and reconfirm the spirit of the joint declaration, dating back to July 27, 1953, and I pointed out that, since the incident of armed communist guerilla and the seizure of the PUEBLO having been taken up in the United Nations Security Council as interrelated incidents, making 16 countries announce the declaration relating to the PUEBLO Incident will strengthen not only the position of South Korea but that of the United States, and Assistant Secretary Bundy expressed a positive reaction and promised to confer with this matter with Secretary of State Rusk. According to Assistant Secretary Bundy, the United States views with certainty that the participation of all 16 countries in the declaration is the best, but had seen it hard since the beginning, so they will select countries who have more influence internationally and whose positive supports are expected as especially close friends and allies of both the United States and South Korea, and contact them first. He also said that a manifestation of the support by the internationally influential countries is believed to be significant and, since the South Korean side is already proceeding with negotiations with 16 countries, it is proper for both South Korea and the United States to continue intimate discussions regarding their reaction and prepare the final actions.

C) Consequently, though it seems to take some time, I will continue to discuss intimately with the U.S. side and report the progress. I kindly request that the headquarters frequently inform me of the reactions of each country.

2. A result of the visit of Special Envoy Vance

Concerning the results of the visit of Vance, a special envoy, the U.S. side stated that they are satisfied with reconfirming the basic ties between South Korea and the United States. As for the meeting between the DOD authorities of both the United State and South Korea, since the Secretary of Defense will be changed within next week, it seems the issue will proceed after the new Secretary comes in, so he said that it was early to discuss it in detail and he had not received any report from Seoul.

3. The issue of the Vietnamese negotiations

On February 21, U Thant, Secretary-General of the United Nations, had talks with President Johnson with respect to the issue of the Vietnamese negotiations. However, definitely no new conclusion was found in the results of U Thant to Vietnam and the attitude of the Hanoi side was identical with the particulars of the statement of the First Deputy Foreign Minister Tran, as a result, the Hanoi was not more than seeking a propaganda with Secretary-General U Thant, but with no progress. On the other hand, a large-scale concentration and mobilization of the Communists is vigorous everywhere in Vietnam, so it is important for our side to achieve victory in the military confrontation in addition to secure the support of the Vietnamese, and the next 2 or 3 weeks will be a serious phase and it is of absolute importance to deal a crippling blow this time.

4. The issue of the change of Berger, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State

Berger, Deputy Assistant Secretary, said that he would depart on March 9, have a few days off in Hawaii and go directly to Vietnam and made a verbal promise to me today that he would continue supporting South Korea even after starting his new post in Vietnam. Assistant Secretary Bundy informed me that former Ambassador to South Korea Brown would be in charge of the KOREAN CRISIS TASK FORCE from February 26, but it has not been determined who would succeed the Deputy Assistant Secretary.

5. The issue of the Foreign Ministers' Meeting of 8 countries participating in the Vietnam War

Concerning the issue of holding a Foreign Ministers' Meeting of the countries participating in the Vietnam War on April 4, following the SEATO Foreign Ministers' Meeting, held in Wellington, New Zealand, on both April 2 and 3, the New Zealand government has sent an invitation to South Korea and Assistant Secretary Bundy said that he would accompany Secretary of State Rusk to participate. (방연, 미일, 아이)

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Authority NND 013011

By K7 NARA Date 6-4-05

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~~TOP SECRET~~ WDC 2831 EYES ONLY

I AM RETRANSMITTING FOLLOWING MESSAGE FOR YOUR INFORMATION:

QUOTE

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FM BEACH CINCUSARPAC TDY RVN

TO DOLEMAN DCINCUSARPAC HAWAII

INFO SHARP CINCPAC HAWAII

JOHNSON CSA WASHINGTON

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~~TOP SECRET~~ ARV 481

1. MY OBSERVATIONS DURING THE THREE DAYS I HAVE JUST SPENT IN KOREA, I THINK, WILL BE OF INTEREST TO YOU.
2. KOREA IS A POWDER KEG WITH A SHORT FUSE THAT COULD EASILY BE IGNITED. AT THE PRESENT TIME THE SITUATION IS QUIET DUE TO THE VANCE VISIT. HOWEVER, ANOTHER INCURSION FROM NORTH KOREA INTO THE ROK OR OTHER INCIDENTS, I BELIEVE, WOULD QUICKLY LIGHT THE FUSE.

~~TOP SECRET~~

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Authority NND 013011

By Ly NARA Date 6-4-08

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EYES ONLY

THE ROK'S IN GENERAL BELIEVE THAT KIM IL SUNG IS DETERMINED TO GO TO WAR, IF NECESSARY, TO UNIFY KOREA ON HIS TERMS. HE CURRENTLY HAS BROUGHT NORTH KOREA TO A HIGH STATE OF READINESS ALTHOUGH INTELLIGENCE INDICATES HE IS NOT IN AN ATTACK POSTURE. IT IS DOUBTFUL HE CAN MAINTAIN THIS STATE OF READINESS FOR ANY EXTENDED PERIOD -- TWO YEARS IS PROBABLY THE UPPER LIMIT. THEREFORE, 1968 OR 1969 IS LIKELY TO BE THE YEAR OF DECISION. MANY ROK'S ARE CONVINCED THAT NORTH KOREA WILL ATTACK. IF YOU ACCEPT THIS PREMISE AS A FACT THEN THEIR RECENT ACTIONS MAKE SENSE. AT THE PRESENT TIME WE HAVE MORE FORCES IN KOREA THAN WE HAVE HAD SINCE THE DEMOBILIZATION AFTER THE ARMISTICE. THE AVERAGE KOREAN BELIEVES WAR IS INEVITABLE AND THEREFORE NOW IS THE BEST TIME TO STRIKE. THE TOP ROK MILITARY LEADERS -- ARMY, NAVY AND AIR FORCE -- UNDERSTAND THE SITUATION AND REALIZE THE RESULTS TO KOREA OF OVERT WAR WITHOUT OUR COMPLETE BACKING. HOWEVER, THEY ARE SOLDIERS AND WILL OBEY WHAT THEIR GOVERNMENT DIRECTS.

3. THE PROFESSIONAL, IMPRESSIVE BUILD-UP OF THE US AIR FORCE IN KOREA AND THE QUICK REACTION OF OUR NAVAL CARRIER TASK FORCES HAVE GIVEN KIM IL SUNG FOOD FOR THOUGHT. THE FACT THAT THESE FORCES CAN DEPART AS QUICKLY AS THEY ARRIVED HAS NOT BEEN LOST ON THE ROK'S. MOREOVER, THERE HAS BEEN NO DISCERNIBLE INCREASE IN GROUND STRENGTH WHICH IS NECESSARY IF WE MEAN OUR POSITION TO BE REALLY CREDIBLE. AS A MINIMUM, THIS MEANS BRINGING EIGHTH ARMY UP TO SOME SEMBLANCE OF TOE STRENGTH AND AUGMENTING ITS SUPPORT FORCES FOR SUSTAINED COMBAT. ANYTHING LESS IS FLIRTING WITH AN ESCALATORY CYCLE WHICH

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Authority XXND 013011

By K7 NARA Date 6-4-08

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EYES ONLY

COULD INVOLVE US IN A SHOOTING WAR WHETHER WE WANT IT OR NOT.

4. SEVERAL THINGS HAVE HAPPENED DURING THE RECENT CRISIS WHICH HAVE NOT HELPED OUR RELATIONS WITH THE ROK'S AND WHICH WE COULD HAVE AVOIDED:

A. EXCLUDING THE ROK'S FROM DISCUSSIONS ON THE RETURN OF THE PUEBLO WAS A MISTAKE AS IT HAS MADE THE ROK'S SUSPICIOUS OF US INTENTIONS. WE COULD WELL HAVE TAKEN THEM INTO OUR CONFIDENCE WITHOUT ANY DEGRADATION OF OUR POSITION.

B. WHILE WE HAVE OPCON OF ROK FORCES WE HAVE BEEN PROHIBITED FROM DISCUSSING ANY OF OUR OWN PLANS WITH THEM. I BELIEVE IF WE HAD TOLD THEM WHAT WE INTENDED TO DO THEY WOULD HAVE HEARTILY COOPERATED WITH US. OUR FAILURE TO TAKE THEM INTO OUR CONFIDENCE HAS ALSO HURT OUR STANDING WITH THEM.

C. OUR FAILURE TO AUGMENT OUR GROUND STRENGTH COINCIDENT WITH OUR BUILD-UP OF AIR AND NAVAL STRENGTH HAS LEFT A LINGERING DOUBT IN THE MINDS OF THE KOREANS AS TO WHAT WE REALLY INTEND TO DO.

5. IT IS THE OPINION OF EVERYONE I HAVE TALKED TO, EXCEPT AMBASSADOR PORTER, THAT THE PROVISION OF THE LIGHT DIVISION FROM KOREA TO VIETNAM IS VERY DOUBTFUL AND THAT NOW IS THE WORST POSSIBLE TIME TO EVEN RAISE THE ISSUE. HOWEVER, AMBASSADOR PORTER TOLD ME THAT HE WAS GOING TO RAISE THE ISSUE WITHIN THE WEEK. I BELIEVE THIS WILL FURTHER AGGRAVATE THE ROK RESENTMENT OF OUR ACTIONS WITH NO HOPE WHATEVER OF GETTING ANY FURTHER SUPPORT TO VIETNAM.

6. SEVERAL THINGS CAN BE DONE NOW THAT WOULD IMPROVE OUR POSITION:

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Authority NND 013011
By JG NARA Date 6-4-08

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~~TOP SECRET~~
EYES ONLY

A. THE US AIR FORCE SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO DISCUSS WITH THE ROK'S WHERE THEY WOULD LIKE TO BUILD AND/OR IMPROVE AIR BASES IN SOUTH KOREA.

B. EIGHTH US ARMY SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO DISCUSS WITH THE ROK'S THE POSSIBLE LOCATION OF ADDITIONAL HAWK UNITS.

C. THE ACUTE SHORTAGES WITHIN EIGHTH ARMY TOE UNITS SHOULD BE ALLEVIATED BY THE IMMEDIATE INCREASE OF 8,500 SPACES AND EIGHTH ARMY SUPPORT FORCES SHOULD BE AUGMENTED FOR SUSTAINED COMBAT.

7. KOREA IS STABILIZED FOR THE MOMENT. THE SETTLEMENT OF THE PUEBLO CASE OR THE LACK THEREOF OR FURTHER NORTH KOREAN INSTIGATED INCIDENTS IN SOUTH KOREA COULD IMMEDIATELY CREATE A VERY GRAVE SITUATION. AT BEST THE US IS IN FOR AN UNDETERMINED PERIOD OF TENSION THAT AT ANY TIME COULD TURN INTO A MAJOR CRISIS.

UNQUOTE

~~TOP SECRET~~

25 FEB 1968: Letter President Park Chung Hee Sent to President Johnson.) (section #: 729.55, record #: 2662)

~~SECRET~~

February 28, 1968

Dear Mr. President:

Your letter of February 9, 1968 reached me immediately before my personal representative, Mr. Cyrus Vance, left Washington for Seoul to confer with you on our common problems and to convey to you my views on the matters raised. I have delayed replying to your letter until after Mr. Vance had returned and reported to me on his talks with you.

Immediately upon his return I met at some length with Mr. Vance, who reported the thoroughness with which the points raised in your letter were gone into during his visit, and the common positions which were reached.

I want you to know how much I appreciate the frank and productive exchange of views which Mr. Vance had with you and senior officials of your Government. This is the type of meaningful consultation which should always mark our relationship as friends and allies.

Mr. Vance reported to me in detail about your concerns and views with respect to the situation created by the threats and aggressive action of the Pyongyang Government. As you know, I am also deeply concerned over this situation. There are many things which we must consider in connection with it. I am studying carefully Mr. Vance's recommendations, and wish to remain in close contact with you through Ambassador Porter about these matters.

With warm personal regards,

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

His Excellency
Park Chung Hee
President of the
Republic of Korea
Seoul

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

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Info: STATE: 120759

~~ADK~~ NODIS/CACTUS
SUBJECT: Navy Analysis of Pueblo "Documents"

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ NLJ 98-12
By id NARA Date 10-30-98

Ref: Yager-Ericson Telecon, February 24.

1. Following three types of documents have been produced by North Koreans to support their charge that Pueblo intruded into their territorial waters:

- a. Confessions by captain and crew specifying times and places.
- b. Two photographs of a chart with alleged track of Pueblo plotting six claimed intrusions.
- c. One photograph of two pages of ship's Position Log showing times and coordinates of two alleged intrusions, as well as one photograph of spread of other documents, one of which is the Visual Contact Log.

2. Regarding l.a., confessions state North Korean case but do not prove it. It is not certain that voices were those of persons named; handwriting and signatures are not clearly genuine; signatures could have been affixed to a document written by someone else. Even if voices, handwriting and signatures are genuine, possibility of coercion is obvious. Moreover, numerous phrases and passages in confessions were clearly written

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Drafters KTF - BCRowberg:lm 2/26/68	6067	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: KTF - Benjamin A. Rucker
Clearances KTF - Captain Mayo DOD/ISA - Captain Grojean (in substance)		S/S - Mr. Meehan KTF Walsh

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admission

by someone unfamiliar with US Navy practice and not a native English speaker.

3. Regarding l.b. and c., documents contain discrepancies which discredit five of six alleged intrusions. Analysis of "intrusions" follows:

a. Jan. 16, 1841 hours, position 41-51N 130-10E, 9.8 nautical miles from Kai Tan. This is least implausible of alleged intrusions. Only inconsistency so far discovered is that chart dates it Jan. 16 while one confession places it on Jan. 14.

b. Jan. 15, 0845 (0745) hours, position 41-25N 130-03E, 11.2 nautical miles from Orang Dan. While this point is listed on chart at 0845 on Jan. 15 it appears on Position Log (North Korean photo 25), in sequence, at 0745 between readings at 0640 and 0810. This equates to a speed of 17.6 knots whereas Pueblo's maximum speed was 12.2 knots. Last digit of longitude entry in log appears to have been altered to move position within 12-mile limit, simultaneously moving speed well over 12-knot limit.

c. Jan. 18, 0325 hours, position 40-28.1N 129-33.7 E, 10.75 nautical miles from Nam Do, and

d. Jan. 18, 0432 hours, position 40-27.3N 129-30.0E, 11.3 nautical miles from Nam Do. These points are plotted in way that they can neither be supported nor disproved by reference to neighboring points. Chart gives some indication of forged positions, but more damning evidence is provided by spread photo described para l.c., where exposed page of Visual Contact Log places Pueblo on night of 17-18 January some 40 miles northeast of "intrusion" plotted on chart.

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e. Jan. 21, 1830 hours, position 39-48.9N 128-01.9E, 8.2 nautical miles from Ansonggap. Like point b. above makes an impossible track. On photograph of log it appears, in sequence, at 1830 between position at 1800 and 1905. Distance from 1800 to alleged intrusion at 1830 position is 9 nautical miles, or an impossible 18 knots. From 1830 to 1905 position is 15 nautical miles or 25.7 knots. Latitude entry in log photograph appears to have been altered from 40.9 to 48.9 degrees, or quartermaster may have recorded 48.9 instead of 38.9. In latter case log would show position within 12-mile limit which North Koreans may have publicized without having analyzed its incompatibility with ship's maximum speed.

f. Jan. 23, position 39-17.4N 127-46.9E, 7.6 nautical miles from Yo Do, alleged point of seizure. From Pueblo's reporting and that of North Korean patrol craft we know seizure occurred at more than double claimed distance from Yo Do.

4. Other inconsistencies:

a. Pueblo's 220600Z position (39-14.8N 128-07.0E) is not on chart although it must have been plotted in order to be reported. Its absence suggests that North Koreans used blank chart to plot track matching their allegation.

b. Pueblo's position during attack from 0300 to 0428Z (39-25.2N 127-55.0E) is not shown on plot although position would have been plotted quite accurately because ship was making a Nansen cast at this time.

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5. Above analysis is being closely held, since some of internal inconsistencies noted in photographs may have been deliberately contrived by Pueblo crew members. Revealing what they may have done could place them in jeopardy.

End

RUSK

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**Reception of
US Ambassador to the USSR Llewellyn E. Thompson
by AAG [A. A. Gromyko]**

26 February 1968

I received Ambassador Thompson today at his request.

Thompson said that more than a month had passed since North Korean patrol boats seized the ship Pueblo by force in international waters. In spite of the undoubtedly illegal nature of the North Korean actions and the indignation of the public in the US the American side has displayed considerable restraint and has sought a favorable resolution of the issue. Following the advice of the Soviet side, the American side has made some changes in the deployment of its forces.

Thompson then said that the eighth meeting of the two sides had already been held in Panmunjeom. Seeking for the Soviet side to be informed of the talks being held the minutes of all eight meetings were made available to A. F. Dobrynin, the Soviet Ambassador in Washington. During the talks the American side promised to conduct a comprehensive investigation of the incident after the return of the crew of the Pueblo and the ship itself and also expressed readiness to express regret in the event that the fact of a violation of the territorial waters of the DPRK was established. The North Korean side rejected these proposals by the Americans.

Thompson continued, in spite of attempts by the American side to find a mutually acceptable solution the situation has not changed, as a result of which tension remains in the area of Korea. The present tension is increasing, primarily as a result of the malicious activity of North Korea with respect to South Korea which, in particular, has found every manifestation in the attack on the Blue House, the residence of the President of South Korea and the infiltration of North Korean agents across the Demilitarized Zone. The increase in tension has also been fostered by the irresponsible threats of punishment, retaliation, and war against "American imperialism" and its "henchmen" in South Korea which were made by the senior North Korean representative at the talks in Panmunjeom and the North Korean Prime Minister. An increase in tension also cannot fail to be promoted by the statement of the North Korean chargé in Moscow that members of the Pueblo crew will be punished, Thompson continued.

Thompson then said that Cyrus Vance, the special representative of the US President, who had returned from Seoul confirmed the reports of the American Embassy in South Korea that the patience of the South Koreans is at its limit as a result of the clearly malicious actions of the North Koreans. Captured North Korean prisoners informed South Korean authorities about the increased training of saboteurs to conduct a North Korean program of infiltration, sabotage, and murder in South Korea.

Both our sides ought to pay great attention to an issue which might lead to a continuation of the above actions by the North Koreans, said Thompson. We constantly call for restraint from the South Korean authorities, Thompson continued, and hope that for your part that you will exert the same influence on North Korea.

Thompson further noted that in accordance with his instructions he characterized the situation which has ensued as a result of the eight meetings in Panmunjeom. He then reported that as the next step the American side intended to propose to the North Koreans that an investigation of the incident be conducted in order to establish whether the ship Pueblo actually violated the territorial waters of the DPRK. Thompson continued, the American side will propose that this investigation be conducted "by a completely impartial" group and in that event that the fact of a violation of the 12-mile zone of territorial waters is established the US will be ready to offer its apologies to North Korea.

AAG asked the Ambassador whether he thinks that all the meetings held in Panmunjeom (including the latest, the ninth, which was held on 21 February) had brought any progress and was also interested in whether the Americans had given replies to all the questions raised by the North Korean side.

Thompson replied that no progress has been achieved at the talks in Panmunjeom. As for the questions of the North Korean side, in his opinion, replies had been given to them. Thompson added that as he knows the North Koreans demanded from the very beginning that the American side offer apologies in connection with the incident. However, they have been told that an investigation was necessary to do this.

AAG said that Thompson's report added very little to what we already know from other sources. Our assessment of the US actions which led to the incident with their ship Pueblo was described in the messages of A. N. Kosygin, Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, to US President L. Johnson and also in previous conversations with the Ambassador, said AAG. Therefore there is hardly a need to describe it in detail again. AAG then expressed the hope that this incident would be settled and the sooner the better. AAG noted that we are not confident that the American side is using all opportunities to solve the problem caused as a result of its own actions. The search for such a solution is in no way helped by the one-sided interpretation to which, as before, the US is subscribing, classifying the detention of the Pueblo as "an illegal act".

Thompson said that in the opinion of the American side at the present moment the main thing in connection with incident with the Pueblo is the different interpretation of the facts, in view of which they also intend to propose an impartial investigation of these facts. Thompson added that the American side cannot agree with the interpretation of what happened which the North Koreans

are giving. AAG said that the position of the Soviet side on the issue of the Pueblo incident remains the same as was described before. We think that the faster this issue is decided the better. As regards the American side, then obviously it ought to display greater objectivity in the assessment of the facts, more flexibility in the approach to a solution of the problem, and not proceed from what the Ambassador said at the beginning of his statement, that the action of the DPRK was "illegal" and to repeat this endlessly. In our view, AAG continued, the appropriate US military branches also ought to receive instructions to not create such dangerous situations in the future and to not carry out provocations against other countries. As regards the US intention to propose conducting an investigation with Pueblo with some "impartial" group at the talks in Panmunjeom then we cannot say what the attitude of the Korean side will be to this proposal.

A. [Akalovsky], 1st Secretary of the US Embassy to the USSR, was present at the conversation from the American side. G. M. Korniyenko, Chief of the USA Department of the USSR MFA, was present on our side. The conversation was recorded by O. Krokhaliev, 3rd Secretary of the USA Department.

AVPRF. f. 102, op. 28, pap. 55, d. 2

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Excerpts from a conversation between A. Gromyko and US Ambassador Thompson (5 June 1968), send to members and candidate members of the Politburo

[Thompson complains about the SRV position at the talks in Paris]

Thompson then switched to the issue of the Pueblo, noting that this question has been at a complete deadlock for a long time now. Thompson said, we are ready for the Pueblo crew to be transferred to any country with which North Korea maintains good relations. The Soviet Union might be the first of such countries. Thompson then said that the US cannot admit that the Pueblo was engaged in espionage inasmuch as legally such language would give the authorities an opportunity to deal with the crew of this ship as they saw fit. At one time it was also proposed by the American side that an investigation of an occurrence of a violation of territorial waters be conducted by impartial persons and in the event that this group confirmed that the Pueblo violated the territorial waters of North Korea the US would be ready to offer its apologies. As everyone knows, North Korea did not agree to this proposal.

AAG said that we are confident that the Korean side is justifiably accusing the US of a violation of [its] territorial waters. From the very beginning we have said that we have information confirming the occurrence of such a violation. A reasonable step from the American side to solve the problem would be to admit the occurrence of a violation and to apologize for the illegal act. Such a step would not be too difficult and awkward for the US. Evidently the advisers of the US government have overestimated the importance for US prestige of admitting to a

violation of territorial waters by many times, mentioning what negative consequences would ensue for the US from this.

Thompson said that at the moment of the incident the US was not confident that a violation of territorial waters had occurred and if such a violation really occurred then this fact could be fully established by a group of impartial persons. As regards the confession of members of the ship's crew then possibly it was made under pressure. Thompson then said that if the confidence of the side that a violation of the territorial waters of North Korea by the ship Pueblo took place is not just based on statements acquired under pressure then the American side would like to receive such information.

AAG said that the US ought not cast doubt on our statement inasmuch as we are not interested in distorting the actual events and are not receiving any "political percentage" from the persistence of tension in connection with the Pueblo issue.

AVPRF, f.102, op. 28, pap. 55, d. 2

**Memorandum on an Information [Informational Report] of 24
February and 26 February 1968**

[Source: MfAA C 1023/73; translated by Karen Riechert]

Embassy of the GDR in the DPRK, Pyongyang
27 February 1968

stamped: confidential matter

On 24 February I was informed that the population of Pyongyang was put on highest alert for 25 February. Residence wardens and other people reported that everything has to be prepared for defense until February 25, since the Americans in Panmunjom had ultimately requested the return of the *Pueblo* and its crew for this day. On 26 February the statement as changed to the effect that everything has to be prepared until the end of February, though there was no further talk about the ultimatum.) Citizens of the city of Pyongyang with relatives in the countryside are said to have been requested to send their families to these relatives. Students are said to have already been taken out of school. The woman I talked to asked in view of this situation for support from the embassy, especially as the whole planned evacuation is organized by the factories of the husbands, and her husband was not in Pyongyang. Moreover she asked for organizing her and her kids' return to the GDR in case of a war.

I told her that we don't have any official information on such an aggravation of the situation and that the Korean side would certainly inform us about such basic questions. Her feelings were running very high but I think I calmed her down somewhat. Moreover I promised her we would take care of her in case of war, but drew her attention at the same time to the fact that of course we'll have to hinge everything upon the specific situation at that time. The question of her return to the GDR would be discussed.

Signed:

Helga Picht

3. Secretary

Copies:

1xFO/2 (Far East Department, Foreign Ministry)

1xCentral Committee/IV

MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE
REPUBLIC OF KOREA
Seoul, Korea

28 February 1968

Dear Mr. Speaker:

Permit me to bring to your attention the two most recent incidents: the North Korean commando team infiltrating into Seoul on 21 January 1968 to assassinate President Park, and the high-jacking of the USS PUEBLO and her entire crew by the North Koreans on 23 January 1968.

These incidents or provocations are not just happenings without premeditation. These incidents have been done under a complete plan by the North Koreans.

The North Korean intention for the communization of the Republic of Korea(ROK) is backed up by plans for guerrilla operations in the rear area of ROK to join with their (North Korean) overt armed attack against ROK in 1970. These two incidents are merely preliminaries to such intentions.

We should know more about how North Koreans are preparing for war and how they are conducting their infiltration activities since the 1953 Armistice was signed.

To highlight the major areas of concern in connection with the North Korean war preparations:

- a. Significant quantity of both conventional and sophisticated equipment received from USSR: The North Korean military strength includes approximately 500 fighter aircraft including over 30 MIG-21 supersonic fighter bombers, 24 well-camouflaged and covered air bases (14 operational, 6 in reserve, 4 underground), 186 sea craft (including 4 submarines and 60 high-speed torpedo boats), 66 surface-to-air missile sites, 3 surface-to-surface(ship) missile sites, 13 radar sites, a total of 14,814 artillery pieces including 2,016 field artillery pieces (24 203mm cannons included), 3,459 mortars, 7,768 anti-tank guns, and 1,571 anti-aircraft guns, 886 tanks including T-54 type, 19 well-equipped infantry

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divisions supported by 28 artillery, tank and other support units (brigade or regimental size each).

b. Incountry arsenal for production of weapons: The North Koreans have converted a significant portion of civilian factories to production of military hardware such as rifles, machine guns, mortars, artillery pieces, grenades, etc.

c. Red Guard Militia of 1.2 million - organized and trained: This militia constitutes a reserve strength to augment the 400,000 regular forces of North Korea and are trained periodically. In addition, all government officials up to the level of vice minister are undergoing combat training several days each week.

d. Reorganization of military structure - completed: The North Korean military structure has been changed into a war time system. Each unit commander is being trained to have capabilities required for commanders two or three levels higher, i.e., a platoon leader is being trained for duty as company and battalion commander, or a battalion commander for regimental or division command duties.

e. Military installations hardened: To the best of our knowledge, all of the North Korean aircraft are placed in underground shelters without loss of their operational capability and all ammunition and fuel supplies are stored underground. The fortification of positions along the De-Militarized Zone (DMZ) and along the east and west coasts are also hardened. In addition, second and third defense lines north of the DMZ are being constructed underground.

f. Dispersion of cities: The 1.2 million population of Pyongyang (Capital of North Korea) was cut down to 700,000 with the dispersion of even educational institutions not to mention other facilities. The North Koreans established many shelter facilities which can accommodate 50,000 persons each. The emergency food and other materials for one year operations are stored in many places throughout North Korea.

g. Civil industries underground: In view of anticipated air and coastal bombardment, almost all industrial facilities have been located inland and placed underground without regard to the production costs involved.

h. Training: Until 1965, North Korea conducted training primarily for defense but since 1966 they have been conducting command post exercises, field training exercises, aerial combat exercises, on a 24-hour basis, with the assumption of overt armed attack on ROK.

Guerrilla operations have been characterized by:

a. Organization: North Koreans have recently unified their entire anti-ROK guerrilla operations structure placing it under command of General Huh Bong Hak (North Korean Regular Army). One guerrilla battalion at each base in North Korea is being trained for complete harassment in one province in ROK. One battalion has a strength of 300 men and there are a total 8 battalions since there are 8 provinces in ROK. These 8 battalions comprise the 124th Guerrilla Unit which sent the 31-man armed commando team into Seoul to raid the residence of President Park, known as Blue House. In addition, there are 283rd Guerrilla Unit and 17th Foot Reconnaissance Brigade with similar missions. The total of these units including the 124th Guerrilla Unit is 15,000 men, who have completed their training.

b. Training: Personnel of guerrilla units, dedicated Communists, are selected from the North Korean units and are undergoing rigid physical fitness training such as wrestling, Karate, boxing, etc. Those who have received special training can run 10 kilometers per hour at night while carrying a pack weighing 66 pounds. They make up commando teams sometimes to conduct training in company and battalion level guerrilla operations which are designed for subversive activities and psychological warfare in rear areas of ROK, airborne operations (with gliders, etc.) to prevent movement along main supply route and block sea ports along ROK south coast, harassment in rear areas, raids against atomic munitions storage areas as well as missile sites, and jungle warfare.

c. Objective: We must note that having failed in their attempts at takeover of ROK by long term underground operations, the North Koreans shifted tactics to secure bases in ROK rear areas for short term guerrilla harassing activities. This is an indication of their preliminary efforts in their attempts to communize ROK in 1970. By that time, their efforts will be continuously strengthened to make ROK into a second Vietnam.

d. Ways and means: There has been a change in training and operations from individual training to group training, from individual infiltration to group infiltration, with a corresponding change in quantity and quality of equipment, and from long term underground operations to

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short term build-up of guerrilla base areas. The composition of the guerrilla force is 30 percent born in ROK and 70 percent born in North Korea. For sea infiltration, well camouflaged high speed boats are used effectively.

North Korean preparations for conventional and guerrilla warfare are completed or are being completed. Their schedule is as follows:

1967 - Testing stage: By infiltrating armed agents into ROK they tested our reactions as well as their tactics. During 1967, there were 319 violations in the DMZ area and 37 infiltrations within the rear area of ROK. Notable incidents occurring during 1967 included sinking of the ROK Navy ship PE 56 on 19 January, blowing up of 2nd US Division barracks near the Imjin River on 22 May, two incidents of railway destruction which caused derailing of railroad cars on 5 September and 13 September, machine gunning of US Engineer troops in their camp located immediately south of Panmunjom on 28 August, etc. A total of 126 ROK and US personnel were killed and 265 ROK and US personnel were wounded as a result of these and other incidents.

1968 - 1969 Harrassing and subversion stage: By creating a situation resembling Vietnam at a time when the United States was becoming actively involved in the war in 1965, North Koreans are seeking an opportunity to launch an overt armed attack upon ROK in 1970.

1970 - Completion stage: Within 1970, North Koreans plan to communize the entire ROK by means of both all-out war and guerrilla war.

The Republic of Korea is a nation restored from Communist hands by the blood of so many youngmen from America and other allies. Its security and independence is now being challenged anew by vicious Communist provocations steadily on the increase. If this situation is left alone, we should expect another Korean War within two or three years.

I take this opportunity to express my heartiest appreciation for the priceless assistance so generously rendered us by our American friends. I am keenly aware that such assistance has contributed vitally to the preservation of freedom and peace in Korea.

Certainly, I am reluctant to ask for additional burden to be borne by our American friends to whom we are already indebted so much. But I am sure you will understand that under the existing circumstances, I feel


I must solicit your timely support and assistance in meeting those intensified, tangible challenges threatening our survival, so that our mutual efforts in the cause of freedom may prove worthy in the end. In this connection, President Johnson's recent measure calling for an immediate Congressional approval of \$100 million additional military aid to Korea is a source of inspiration.

In view of the fact that 80 to 90% of the MAP are spent for operating costs, plus an annual increase in prices by 4 to 6 percent, an overall increase in MAP level should be considered in order to provide for the increased requirements due to stepped-up communist activities against ROK.

I am confident that after carefully considering all the facts, you will do what is necessary to prevent another VIETNAM from occurring here in Korea.

Thank you for your attention given to this statement. Please accept my high personal regard and best wishes,

Yours very sincerely,


KIM SUNG EUN
Minister of National Defense

The Honorable John W. McCormack
House of Representatives
Washington, D. C. 20515

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

March 7, 1968

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Paul Nitze and I are impressed with the continuing dangers of the Korean situation. With the improvement of weather at the onset of spring, the North Koreans may well launch further infiltration forays with serious material and psychological consequences. Furthermore, any likely settlement formula at Panmunjom would probably be resented by the sensitive ROKs. We therefore believe that we should push ahead with the implementation of the Vance Recommendations, improving our own posture in respect to Korea and endeavoring to build upon the degree of trust and confidence re-established by his Mission. His recommendations fall into four broad categories which I believe can be approached as follows:

1. U.S. Posture

A. Reassessment of our policies and goals toward Korea -

With the assistance of a small inter-agency group I am taking a very close look at where we are and where we should go in respect to both Koreas. I intend to submit a report on this matter by 1 May.

B. Protecting our nuclear weapon sites -

Recommendations by the Joint Chiefs of Staff concerning personnel requirements for improving the security of our nuclear weapons sites are currently under review in the DOD. Study by the Joint Chiefs of Staff is continuing to determine whether additional physical security measures should be taken. This study will be completed by 1 April 1968.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 99-9
By isa NARA Date 1-10-00

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-2-

C. Improving the Korean DMZ Barrier -

Additional counterinfiltration items are being delivered to Korea with airlift of most critical items authorized. Many critical items are already in Korea. An operations analysis study in support of DMZ security and counterinfiltration efforts is in progress. Included in the FY 1968 supplement of \$100 million is an additional sum, yet unspecified, for counterinfiltration items.

D. Reconnaissance Activities in Korea -

General Bonesteel has been authorized to keep Ambassador Porter fully informed of all reconnaissance activities scheduled for the vicinity of Korea.

E. Communications -

To improve our secure communications between Washington and Seoul, on Saturday, 20 February, a secure teleconferencing system was established connecting the Departments of State and Defense with the American Embassy and General Bonesteel's headquarters. Also, on 20 February, the Department of Defense dispatched by air the necessary equipments and technical engineering personnel to establish a secure voice system to connect several key State and Defense facilities in Seoul, and these, in turn, with Washington.

2. Influencing South Korea

A. Defense Ministerial Meetings -

We wish to arrange promptly a meeting between the ROK Ministry of National Defense and our Department of Defense, preferably in April in Hawaii. Paul Nitze plans to head our delegation and CINCPAC would be directly involved. This would be portrayed as a direct follow-up on the Vance Mission and would be designed to pull the ROKs closer to us and to keep the ROKG calmed down. Their desire to retaliate will inevitably increase if the North Koreans step up their raids as the weather improves.

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-3-

B. Visit of Korean Prime Minister -

In accordance with Vance's recommendations, and if you approve, I wish to authorize Ambassador Porter to invite Prime Minister Chung to visit the United States this spring. Approve Disapprove

C. Under Secretary Baird's Visit -

Under Secretary of the Navy Baird plans to visit a number of East Asian countries in April. We will include Seoul on his schedule as an additional political input.

D. American Investment -

The North Korean's have already accomplished part of their objective of diverting the ROKs from their economic effort and frightening-off foreign investment. In continuation of Vance's efforts, we are attempting to keep the ROKs focussed on economic development and endeavoring to buttress up American investment intentions. I will be in touch with George Ball on this subject.

E. Protection for President Park -

The Air Force's Office of Special Investigations (OSI) has trained and equipped the personal Presidential guards of the Heads of State of the Philippines, Bolivia, Thailand, and the Republic of Vietnam. In view of President Park's intense fear over his own safety, and that of his family, we asked Ambassador Porter to offer OSI training to President Park's personal protective force. President Park was highly appreciative of the offer and arrangements are now being made to initiate the OSI training and equippage program within the next three weeks.

3. Influencing North Korea

The Pyongyang Government is difficult to influence under any circumstances but the problem is compounded while they hold the Pueblo crew as hostages. Yet, as Vance recommended, we must endeavor to bring political pressure to bear on them. We have already approached the Russians about the dangers of the current Pyongyang course

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
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-4-

and our difficulties in restraining the South Koreans in face of continuing provocation. We have urged them to use what influence they have to persuade the North Koreans to agree to a reasonable settlement of the Pueblo issue and to ease tensions in the area. We have made somewhat similar approaches to the Japanese and British and will endeavor to expand our bilateral approaches to other countries. If we can obtain the release of the crew, we would be in a better position to peel off our political gloves in an effort to indict Pyongyang as a threat to peace. This might include calling a Security Council Meeting on the subject.

4. Military Assistance

Vance has made a number of military assistance recommendations including increased MAP levels in the next few years. These are under study and we will report in a separate memorandum our recommendations regarding future military assistance programs for Korea.


Nicholas deB. Katzenbach

~~SECRET/NODIS~~



Department of State

TELEGRAM

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ORIGIN EA 15

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ARA 08, EUR 15, NEA 13, SCS 04, SCA 02, NIC 01, /149 R

DRAFTED BY: KTF:JLEONARD/JAYAGER
APPROVED BY: KTF:WGBROWN
EA/P:MR. ARMSTRONG(DRAFT), S/S-MR. MEEHAND, L-MR. ALDRICH,
P/PG:MR. SHEEHAN, OASD(PA); COL. STAU, USIA; MR. SORKIN(SUBS)
ISA: CAPT GROJEAN

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ALL DIPLOMATIC POSTS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 130623

SUBJ: PUEBLO CASE

REF: LUSAKA 1478 (NOTAL)

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 98-12
By WJ, NARA Date 10-30-98

1. SINCE SEIZING THE PUEBLO, PYONGYANG HAS PUBLISHED SEVERAL DOCUMENTS TO BOLSTER ITS CHARGES THAT PUEBLO CONDUCTED "ILLEGAL ESPIONAGE" AND REPEATEDLY VIOLATED NORTH KOREA'S TERRITORIAL WATERS. NORTH KOREANS MAY BELIEVE THESE DOCUMENTS WILL GAIN MORE CREDENCE THAN CONFESSIONS, OPEN LETTERS OF CREW, ETC., WHICH MAY BE DISCOUNTED AS EXTORTED FROM CAPTIVES.
2. BEGIN FYI: SOME OF THE PUBLISHED DOCUMENTS ARE VALID AND WERE EVIDENTLY CAPTURED DESPITE THE CREW'S EFFORTS TO DESTROY

PAGE 2 RUEHC 130623 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
CLASSIFIED MATERIAL. NONE, HOWEVER, PROVE EITHER THAT PUEBLO'S MISSION WAS "ILLEGAL" OR THAT SHE VIOLATED ORDERS NOT TO APPROACH CLOSER THAN 13 NAUTICAL MILES TO NORTH KOREA. SOME DOCUMENTS -- CHARTS, LOG SHEETS -- WERE PROBABLY CAPTURED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 2 STATE 130623

IN BLANK AND FILLED IN BY NORTH KOREANS. ONE PHOTO OF LOG SHEETS SUGGESTS ENTRIES ALTERED BY NORTH KOREANS. DETAILED REFUTATION, HOWEVER, NOT RPT NOT ADVISABLE AT THIS TIME. END FYI.

3. OUR PUBLIC COMMENTS HAVE DELIBERATELY BEEN RESTRICTED TO NOTING SUCH DOCUMENTS COULD BE FORGED AND CANNOT BE VERIFIED WHILE CREW STILL IN COMMUNIST HANDS. WHERE NORTH KOREAN DOCUMENTS NOT WIDELY CREDITED, BEST POLICY CLEARLY IS TO IGNORE THEM. IF THEY ARE PROBLEM YOUR AREA, HOWEVER, YOU MAY DRAW ON FOLLOWING PARAS AS NEEDED IN PRIVATE DISCUSSION WITH GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS. WHILE WE HAVE NO DESIRE TO STIMULATE PUBLICITY OR SPECULATION IN THIS MATTER, THE FOLLOWING POINTS (BUT NOT THE PRECEDING) MAY BE DRAWN UPON A BACKGROUND BASIS AT THE DISCRETION OF THE POST IN ANSWERING PRESS QUERIES. THIS SHOULD BE DONE ONLY IF NECESSARY, AS WE ARE PREPARED TO DO HERE.

PAGE 3 RUEHC 130623 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

4. CONFESSIONS, APPEALS, LETTERS, ETC., FROM PRISONERS IN COMMUNIST HANDS ARE OBVIOUSLY WORTHLESS AS EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF PYONGYANG'S CHARGES. LONG HISTORY OF EXTORTED "CONFESSIONS" AND STAGED "NEWS CONFERENCES" ONE OF BLACKEST CHAPTERS IN COMMUNIST RECORD. INHUMAN TREATMENT BY NORTH KOREA OF PRISONERS IN KOREAN WAR LONG SINCE SPREAD ON PUBLIC RECORD. WORLD OPINION JOINS US IN DEMANDING RELEASE OF CAPTIVES FROM SUCH SITUATION AND GIVES NO CREDIT TO STATEMENTS PURPORTEDLY EMANATING FROM MEN UNDER DURESS OF THIS SORT.

5. OTHER "DOCUMENTS" MAY AT FIRST GLANCE APPEAR MORE CREDITWORTHY EVIDENCE FOR PYONGYANG'S CHARGES. CLOSER LOOK, HOWEVER, SHOWS EITHER THAT THEY INDICATE ONLY WHAT WE HAVE PUBLICLY ANNOUNCED -- THAT PUEBLO ENGAGED IN GATHERING INTELLIGENCE IN INTERNATIONAL WATERS -- OR THAT THEY COULD EASILY BE FORGED, USING BLANK CHARTS, ETC. CAPTURED ON SHIP, AND PERHAPS COMPELLING CREW MEMBERS TO ASSIST IN FORGERY OPERATION.

6. US GOVT HAS REPEATEDLY PUBLICLY STATED IT HAS NO WAY OF

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Department of State

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PAGE 03 STATE 130623

PAGE 4 RUEHC 130623 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
 ASCERTAINING EXACT LOCATION OF PUEBLO AT ANY MOMENT FROM TIME SHE LEFT PORT UNTIL HER FIRST REPORTED POSITION SOME TEN DAYS LATER. WE HAVE FIRM EVIDENCE, INCLUDING INTERCEPTED NORTH KOREAN MESSAGES, THAT SHIP WAS IN INTERNATIONAL WATERS WHEN SIZED. AFTER CREW IS RETURNED, WE WILL EXAMINE ALL EVIDENCE, INCLUDING NORTH KOREAN "DOCUMENTS", FOR INDICATION OF ANY VIOLATION OF SHIP'S ORDERS NOT TO APPROACH CLOSER THAN 13 NAUTICAL MILES TO NORTH KOREA. WE HAVE STATED THAT IF THIS EXAMINATION REVEALED NEW FACTS BEARING ON NORTH KOREAN "INTRUSION" CHARGE, WE WILL MAKE THEM PUBLIC.

7. WE CATEGORICALLY REJECT ALLEGATION THAT INTELLIGENCE GATHERING SUCH AS PUEBLO'S MISSION IS ILLEGAL, IMMORAL, OR EVEN UNUSUAL. SOVIET GOVERNMENT PIONEERED IN THIS TYPE OF ACTIVITY AND ENGAGES IN IT ON A LARGER SCALE THAN ANY OTHER GOVERNMENT. US EFFORTS TO LEARN WHAT IS GOING ON IN NORTH KOREA REPRESENTS NO MORE THAN PRUDENT PRECAUTION, IN LIGHT OF HIGHLY BELLIGERENT PUBLIC STATEMENTS EMANATING FROM PONGYANG AND GREATLY STEPPED-UP RAIDS BY NORTH KOREAN SABOTAGE AND ASSASSINATION TEAMS AGAINST SOUTH KOREA.

PAGE 5 RUEHC 130623 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

8. NONE OF THE "EVIDENCE" PRODUCED BY NORTH KOREA CAN OBSCURE TOTALLY ILLEGAL CHARACTER THEIR ACTION IN SEIZING PUEBLO. EVEN IF PUEBLO HAD BEEN WITHIN RECOGNIZED TERRITORIAL SEAS, ONLY LEGALLY DEFENSIBLE ACTION BY NORTH KOREANS WOULD HAVE BEEN TO ESCORT HER TO INTERNATIONAL WATERS. FYI: IN DISCUSSING THIS POINT, CARE MUST BE TAKEN NOT TO IMPLY THAT WE DO RECOGNIZE NORTH KOREAN TERRITORIAL SEAS, SINCE WE DO NOT RECOGNIZE PONGYANG AS LEGAL GOVERNMENT AND SINCE WE RECOGNIZE THREE MILE LIMIT ONLY IN ANY CASE. END FYI. CONTINUED DETENTION OF CREW IS COMPOUNDING ORIGINAL CRIME. IN ABSENCE OF RELIABLE EVIDENCE TO CONTRARY, WE CONTINUE BELIEVE PUEBLO COMMITTED NO ILLEGAL ACT AND AT NO TIME PENETRATED WITHIN TWELVE MILES OF NORTH KOREA. RUSK

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EMBASSY
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Seoul, Korea

April 2, 1968

Honorable Winthrop G. Brown
Director, Korean Task Force
Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

In response to State 139928 I am sending you some of the graphics which Rear Admiral Smith has displayed at the open MAC meetings at Panmunjom in his discussions of the Blue House raid.

The route map clipped under Item 1 was used at the 261st MAC meeting on January 24 and describes the route taken to Seoul by the 31-man gang. Rear Admiral Smith also showed the enclosed photographs of the dead raiders clipped under Item 2, the photograph of the weapons and equipment clipped under Item 3, and the picture of the captured Lt. Kim Sin-cho clipped under Item 4. The raiders pictured were the first ones killed. The picture of Lt. Kim was taken during his television broadcast on the evening of January 22. Text of the 261st MAC meeting, which you hold, contains further details. The chart clipped under Item 5 shows in chronological order the points at which the raiders were killed and was used at the 262nd MAC meeting on February 14. An additional chart showing the point at which the body of the 29th raider was found was shown at the 263rd MAC meeting on February 19 and was appended to the official report. These charts clearly show that the raiders withdrew along their line of penetration.

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
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I cannot say that I recommend that all of these photographs be included in your White Paper, but I hope that the rest of the material will be useful. If there is anything else we can supply, please let us know.

With best personal regards.

Sincerely,





Richard A. Ericson, Jr.
Counselor of Embassy
for Political Affairs

Enclosure:
Items 1 through 5 as stated

SECRET/NODIS/CACTUS

암살 사명을 띤 북한 간첩들이 취한 경로
 ROUTE OF NORTH KOREAN AGENTS ON THEIR MISSION OF ASSASSINATION





**THE FATE OF
NORTH KOREA
ASSASSINS**
북한 암살자들의 말로



Department of State

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PAGE 01 SEOUL 05437 021037Z

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FXDIS

SUBJECT: OFFICIAL REACTION TO PRESIDENT'S SPEECH

REF: (A) STATE 139599; (B) STATE 139431

1. SINCE PRESIDENT PARK WAS IN TAEJON FOR CEREMONY ESTABLISHING HOMELAND RESERVE FORCE, PRIMIN ASKED ME TO SEE HIM THIS MORNING CONCERNING PRESIDENT'S SPEECH. NOT CLEAR WHETHER HE WAS CONVEYING HIS OWN FEELINGS OR ACTING ON INSTRUCTIONS OF PRESIDENT.

2. GENERAL SENSE OF HIS APPROACH WAS BEWILDERMENT

PAGE 2 RUMLOS 5437E ~~SECRET~~
OVER PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S ANNOUNCEMENT THAT HE WOULD NOT ACCEPT NOMINATION AND WHAT COULD BEST BE CHARACTERIZED AS MILD REMONSTRANCE OVER VIETNAM ASPECTS OF SPEECH.

3. PRIMIN EXPRESSED DEEP CONCERN OVER PRESIDENT'S PERSONAL SITUATION AND CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH HAD LED HIM TO RENOUNCE CANDIDACY. IN THIS, HE DOUBTLESS ALSO EXPRESSING CONCERN FOR FUTURE OF US/ROK RELATIONS UNDER ANY OTHER US LEADERSHIP, AND THIS IN TURN DOUBTLESS REFLECTS FEAR THAT KOREANS MAY NOT IN FUTURE BE ABLE TO RELY UPON UNDERSTANDING AND SYMPATHY FOR KOREAN PROBLEMS WHICH ACCOMPANIED CLOSE PERSONAL RELATIONS BETWEEN PRESIDENTS JOHNSON AND PARK.

4. PRIMIN ALSO REFLECTED FEELING THAT OUR PRIOR

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines

By *ju* NARA, Date 10-13-98



Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02 SEOUL 05437 021037Z

CONSULTATION HAD NOT OUTLINED FULL DIMENSIONS OF POSITION PRESIDENT WOULD TAKE ON VIETNAM OR PROVIDED ROKG WITH ADEQUATE TIME TO MAKE ITS VIEWS KNOWN. PRIMIN NOTED THAT PRESIDENT JOHNSON HAD REFERRED TO MANILA COMMUNIQUE PROVISIONS WITH RESPECT TO EVENTUAL WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN MILITARY FORCES, BUT FELT THAT PROVISION IN SAME COMMUNIQUE

PAGE 3 RUALOS 5437E ~~SECRET~~

WITH RESPECT TO PRIOR CONSULTATION AMONG ALLIES ON MAJOR POLICY MATTERS HAD NOT BEEN ADEQUATELY OBSERVED. HE OBVIOUSLY FELT THAT ANNOUNCEMENT OF BOMBING CESSATION SHOULD FALL WITHIN LATTER CATEGORY. I POINTED OUT TO HIM THAT WHEN I BRIEFED PRESIDENT PARK ON CONTENTS REF (B) WE HAD HAD LENGTHY CONVERSATION, DURING WHICH I OFFERED TO CONVEY PARK'S COMMENTS ON ANY PART OF MESSAGE I DELIVERED. PRESIDENT HAD OFFERED HIS VIEWS ON CONDUCT OF WAR, WHICH I HAD FULLY REPORTED TO WASHINGTON.

5. OTHER OFFICIAL REACTIONS TO PRESIDENT'S SPEECH ARE BEING REPORTED SEPTEL.

6. COMMENT: MUCH OF PRIMIN'S CONCERN DOUBTLESS STEMS FROM FACT THAT PRESIDENT'S ANNOUNCEMENT ON BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM RUNS COUNTER TO POSITION WHICH ROK HAS WIDELY PUBLICIZED THAT IT WILL TAKE AT WELLINGTON MEETING. PRESS HAS BEEN REPORTING, AND THIS HAS BEEN VERIFIED BY OFFICIAL SOURCES, THAT ROK WOULD URGE CONTINUED MILITARY PRESSURE ON NORTH VIETNAM AND OPPOSE CESSATION OF BOMBING.

PAGE 4 RUALOS 5437E ~~SECRET~~

AT LAST REPORT, FONMIN CHOI WAS SAYING PRIOR TO HIS DEPARTURE FOR WELLINGTON THAT HE WOULD STICK TO HIS GUNS.

GP-3 PORTER

~~SECRET~~

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Intelligence Information Cable

ROUTINE

IN 24033

PAGE 1 OF 2

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STATE/DIR DIA NSC/NSC (SECDEF) JCS ARMY NAVY AIRS CIA/INCC NSC NCA ODD OIC
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[REDACTED]

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

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CITE [REDACTED]

DIST 3 APRIL 1968

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

COUNTRY: NORTH KOREA/CHINA/USSR 16 Z

DOI: FEBRUARY 1968

86-356-3

SUBJECT: COMMENTS BY [REDACTED] NORTH KOREAN [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] ON THE PEUSLO AFFAIR, FUTURE
HOSTILITIES BY NORTH KOREA, AND RELATIONS
BETWEEN NORTH KOREA, COMMUNIST CHINA, AND
THE USSR

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

ACQ: [REDACTED]

SOURCE: [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

1. IN FEBRUARY 1968, [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] THE NORTH KOREAN [REDACTED] STATED THAT
NORTH KOREA WAS DISPOSED TO RELEASE THE PRISONERS FROM
THE USS PEUSLO IF THE UNITED STATES WOULD ADMIT OFFICIALLY

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

SANITIZED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 97-360

By us, NARA Date 5-1-98

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[REDACTED]

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

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[REDACTED]

IN ANY HOSTILITIES TAKING PLACE IN KOREA.

3. ON THE SUBJECT OF NORTH KOREA'S RELATIONS WITH
COMMUNIST CHINA [REDACTED] THE NORTH KOREANS LEAN
MORE HEAVILY TOWARDS THE USSR BUT THEY DO NOT WANT TO
DISAVOW THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS BECAUSE THEY SHARE A
COMMON FRONTIER.

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

4. [REDACTED] DISSEM: STATE ARMY NAVY AIR USNACTHAI
CINCPAC PACFLT ARPAC PACAF [REDACTED]

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

[REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

**Excerpt from Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev's speech
at the April (1968) CC CPSU Plenum.**

**“On the current problems of the international situation and on the
struggle of the CPSU for the unity of the international communist
movement” (9 April 1968)**

Remarks concerning the Pueblo crisis

[RGANI: fond 2, opis 3, delo 95, listy 50-58. Obtained and translated for CWIHP by
Sergey Radchenko]

[...] In the international life of the last several months, the events in the Far East draw [particular] attention in connection with the incursion in the Korean [territorial] waters of an American military vessel “Pueblo”. Despite the limited scale of these events, they had principal importance, both from the point of view of rebuffing aggressive actions of the USA and in terms of our attitude towards certain peculiarities of the policy of the Korean friends. The Politburo has reported many times to the CC Plenum regarding our line in relations with the KWP [Korean Workers' Party] and the DPRK. The essence of this line is to consistently strengthen friendly relations with the KWP and the DPRK despite the existence of different approaches between us and the Korean comrades on a series of questions of the international communist movement and other [problems].

On the whole, the situation in the course of the entire preceding [in the text, mistakenly, “subsequent”] period developed precisely along these lines. We developed contacts with the Koreans in various spheres and above all in the economic [sphere]. Trade was developing; we concluded a series of agreements on co-operation in timber clearing, on building an oil refinery, etc. We continued to provide aid in defending the DPRK. The Korean press stopped publishing unfriendly statements addressed to the CPSU and the Soviet Union.

One should remark in particular that during his meetings with us, comrade Kim Il Sung assured that the friends do not intend to solve the problem of uniting North and South Korea by military means, and in this connection [do not intend] to unleash a war with the Americans, whose forces, as one knows, are stationed in South Korea.

However several indications appeared in the recent time, which, seemingly, suggested that the leaders of the DPRK began to take a more militant road. This became particularly noticeable at the time of the incident with the American vessel “Pueblo”.

You know, comrades, the factual side of things. I am talking about the incursion of the American military vessel “Pueblo” in Korean territorial waters. On 23 January of this year this vessel was detained by the military naval forces of the DPRK (as the friends assert, detained in their territorial waters) and, after a fire fight, taken to a port, where it came under arrest. One should say that the measures taken in this case by the government

of the DPRK appear unusually harsh: as a rule in the practice of international relations, in case of incursion on a foreign military vessel in the territorial waters of any state, it is simply advised to leave these waters or forced to do so.

Washington's reaction was fierce, rude and aggressive. The government of the USA made accusations and threats addressed to the DPRK; considerable military naval forces and air forces were deployed near North Korea's shores, including the flag carrier of the 7th fleet, the atomic aircraft carrier "Enterprise". Calls for the bombardment of Korean ports, forced return of "Pueblo", etc were heard in the USA. The Americans clearly counted on forcing DPRK's retreat before the cannon barrows of their ships. Besides this, President Johnson used this incident in order to further increase military preparations and heat up military hysteria on the international scale. New categories of the reserves were mobilised into the army in the USA, demonstrative measures were taken to increase military preparedness in Europe.

Under these circumstances, the CC CPSU and the Soviet government found it necessary to voice public support for the DPRK, a socialist country, with which we are moreover tied by a treaty of friendship and mutual help. We did it, supporting the right of the DPRK to defend its security and censuring the aggressive behaviour of the USA.

Besides this, the Politburo and the Soviet government considered it useful to exert direct pressure on the leadership of the USA in order to lessen its urge and desire to inflame provocations in the immediate proximity of the borders of the USSR and in relation to countries allied with us. In this connection, a decision was made to send a communication to President Johnson on behalf of the Soviet government.

The 3 February [1968] letter to Johnson drew attention to the fact that the USA is conducting a concentration of military fleet and aviation on an unprecedented scale in the immediate proximity of the Far Eastern regions of the Soviet Union. The American President was told that "in our actions we must take into consideration what is happening near our borders and touches on the interests of the security of the Soviet Union." At the same time it was stressed that efforts to act with regard to the DPRK by means of threats and pressure can only lead to a dead end and to further complications, fraught with far reaching consequences.

At the same time, we took certain measures to increase the military preparedness of the Soviet military forces in the Far East in order to protect the country in case of complications and to let the Americans understand that we are not joking, but approach this matter seriously. The adopted measures worked. On 6 February [1968] Johnson sent a reply, in which he tried to explain the amassment of military forces of the USA in the Sea of Japan area by references to militant statements and actions of the DPRK and assured that "prompt settlement [of the crisis] serves our common interests". The President's message said in the end that he "gave an order to stop any further amassment of our naval and air forces at the present time" and decreed to pull out one of the aircraft carriers with accompanying vessels from the region of the incident. Indeed, aircraft carrier "Enterprise" was pulled out from the DPRK's shores.

At the same time we insistently advised the Korean comrades, with whom we maintained systematic contact throughout this period, to show reserve, not to give the Americans an excuse for widening provocations, to settle the incident by political means. When it became clear to the entire world that the attempts of the USA to make the DPRK retreat before blackmail and military threats failed, when the government of the USA was forced to conduct talks with the representatives of the DPRK in Panmunjom regarding "Pueblo", we expressed an opinion to the Korean leadership, that now, without any harm and even with political advantage for the DPRK, one could finish this affair by disgraceful deportation of the crew of the USA spy vessel from the territory of North Korea.

But the Korean comrades maintained fairly extreme position and did not show any inclination towards the settlement of the incident. The DPRK propaganda took on a fairly militant character, the population was told that a war could begin any day, that the military forces of the DPRK are "ready to smash the American imperialism". In effect, a full mobilisation was declared in the country; life, especially in the cities, was changed in a military fashion; there began an evacuation of the population, administrative institutions, industries and factories of P'yongyang.

At the same time the leadership of the DPRK took one more step which made us alarmed. On 31 January [1968] Kim Il Sung addressed an official letter to comrade Kosygin, as the head of the Council of Ministers of the DPRK. This letter said that "Johnson's clique could at any time engage in a military adventure in Korea", that the policy of the American imperialists "is a rude challenge to the DPRK and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, bound together by allied relations according to the treaty of friendship, co-operation and mutual help between the DPRK and the USSR; [it is] a serious threat to the security of all socialist countries and to peace in the entire world".

Further this message officially informed the Soviet government on behalf of the government of the DPRK that they are "forced to conduct preparations in order to give the aggression an appropriate rebuff" and [the letter] expressed confidence that "in case of the creation of the state of war in Korea as a result of a military attack of the American imperialists, the Soviet government and the fraternal Soviet people will fight together with us against the aggressors..."

Kim Il Sung's letter ended with a proposal: in case such situation materialised, "[you should] provide us without delay with military and other aid and support, to mobilize all means available".

The matters took a serious turn.

An official communication along the government lines, bypassing usual in such cases comradely consultations along the party lines, spoke to the intentions [of the Korean leadership] to bind the Soviet Union somehow, using the existence of the treaty between the USSR and the DPRK [as a pretext to] involve us in supporting such plans of the Koreans friends, about which we knew nothing. Politburo of the CC believed that the

time had come to state our attitude clearly to the Korean comrades regarding these questions and certain peculiarities of their policies, which touch on our country.

We, without giving an official reply to Kim Il Sung's message, addressed a communication to him to come to Moscow for a comprehensive exchange of opinions regarding the situation which has emerged. Comrade Kim Il Sung replied that at the present time circumstances do not permit him to leave the country. Member of the KWP CC Politburo, deputy premier and minister of defence Kim Ch'ang Bong was [instead] despatched to Moscow for the celebrations of the 50th anniversary of the Soviet Army.

On the Politburo's instructions I received Kim Ch'ang Bong on 26 February [1968] and had a long discussion with him, in the course of which [I] expressed in all earnestness our position on a series of important questions.

He was told that we still depart from the assumption that the Korean comrades maintain the course of a peaceful unification of Korea, for we are not aware of [any] changes [to this course]. In any case, under the current circumstances we are against taking the matter towards unleashing a war, though we fully understand the desire of the DPRK to strengthen its own defence and we actively support this. We do not understand the meaning of the information that reached us regarding the evacuation of P'yongyang. We have no information from friends regarding their talks with the Americans, and regarding aims, which these talks pursue.

As far as the question of the Soviet-Korean treaty, and Kim Il Sung's letter regarding this question are concerned, Kim Ch'ang Bong was told literally the following: "Indeed, we have a treaty. Its essence is known to both you and us. We would like to stress that it has a defensive character and is an instrument of defending peace loving position of North Korea. Since comrade Kim Il Sung did not put the circumstances and the details of the current situation in a concrete form, we consider it very important to conduct serious consultations with him on this question. The problem of military actions is a very difficult question, especially under the current circumstances, when the entire world struggles against the war. It is impossible to talk about a military situation, much less about some kind of military actions, by means of short letters. This is a very serious question and it demands serious consultations."

At the same time, an opinion was expressed again that the question of the "Pueblo" crew, this whole incident, should be settled by political means without much delay, because otherwise the DPRK could lose a serious political gain, obtained at the early stage of the incident.

There are reasons to think that the measures taken by the Politburo bore fruit. In any case, one could note the following facts:

1. Soon after the conversation with Kim Ch'ang Bong the Foreign Ministry of the DPRK published a statement, which stressed that "the government of the DPRK both in the past and now has not changed its policy directed at the preservation of

peace in Korea and the peaceful solution of the question of the unification of Korea”.

2. The Koreans informed our ambassador regarding the progress of talks with the Americans. One should say that these talks have taken on a fairly protracted character. The Koreans are demanding official apologies from the USA, the Americans are offering various compromises, but an agreement has not yet been reached.
3. The Korean comrades made it known to the United States through neutral countries that they are prepared to exchange the “Pueblo” crew for patriots arrested in South Korea, and that in this case will not demand apologies from the USA.
4. On 1 March [1968] Kim Il Sung invited the ambassador of the USSR and asked him to pass to Moscow his gratitude for the conversation with Kim Ch’ang Bong, for the sincere exposition of the opinion of the CC CPSU. At the same time Kim Il Sung assured that some evacuation activities conducted in P’yongyang did not have an emergency character, that measures have been taken to stop panicky rumours and corrections are being made to the statements of the DPRK press. In conclusion Kim Il Sung said: “we have no intention of raising military hysteria”. Indeed, the tone of the Korean press has recently become calmer.
5. There is also information that the local authorities in the DPRK have been instructed not to overdo various kinds of mobilisation-related activities: evacuation of people, industries and factories. “War is not a question of tomorrow”, Kim Il Sung declared at one of the closed meetings in P’yongyang at the beginning of March.

This is how the incident with the vessel “Pueblo” is developing. It [the incident], as one knows, is not yet finished, and the situation might deteriorate again. However, the atmosphere has relaxed somewhat, the passions on the Korean and on the American sides have calmed down. On the whole one might say that by pursuing in this affair our consistent [and] principled line, we managed, first of all, to chip away at the American arrogance [*sbit spes*], to rebuff their blackmail and threats and, secondly, to exert considerable dissuading influence on the leadership of the DPRK, especially in connection with the question of the treaty, which has important meaning for the state interests of the Soviet Union. [...]

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Honolulu Meeting with President Park

Major Topics

Park has three things on his mind:

- A. Your personal decision and its effect on US policy in Asia.
- B. Korean defense and other problems.
- C. The Viet-Nam situation and negotiations.

A. US Policy in Asia

Park has shown great unhappiness over your personal decision and has even expressed the feeling that he should have been consulted, as an old and true friend. Above all, he fears that without your leadership the US may abandon the Asian policies it has been following.

Thus, he would deeply appreciate your full comment on the political situation at home and what it means for our policy in Asia.

B. Korean Problems

1. Retaliation for Further North Korean Incidents.
Although the North Koreans have not engaged in significant incidents since mid-February (when an upsurge did occur last year), Park and all the Koreans remain anxious. You will recall that Park pressed Vance very hard indeed for a general undertaking that we would join him in immediate retaliation in kind. He strongly implied the ROKs would go it alone if we did not join.

Suggest you stick to Vance's position--that we are prepared for joint discussion in the light of the facts of each case. However, we cannot get away from the fact that

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any reprisals could build up rapidly and even threaten major hostilities. You understand how the Koreans feel, but they must reckon that any major hostilities are not in their interest any more than ours, and that, in view of our major responsibility to help in their defense, we must be fully consulted.

2. Building Up ROK Defenses. Park will probably describe significant and recognized defects in the equipment of his armed forces and counter-infiltration agencies. We are in fact proceeding rapidly under the MAP program, and have worked out agreement on the uses for the \$100 million pending supplemental appropriation. These take into account his expressed desires. In addition, we have now moved approximately 150 US aircraft to Korea.

Suggest you be prepared to go over these actions, on which we will have details.

3. Maintenance of US Forces in Korea. Park may request assurance that US forces, including the additional aircraft, will not be withdrawn from Korea without his consent. We have told them many times that we have no plan to reduce the general level of our ground forces--by implication as long as they have forces in Viet-Nam. We have given no assurance on the additional aircraft.

Suggest you repeat that we have no plan to reduce our ground forces under present circumstances, but avoid going further than promising full consultation both on the aircraft and on any later plan concerning ground forces.

4. Amendment of Defense Treaty. Park and other Koreans have pressed us for an amendment of the treaty to make it automatic in the event of aggression. They have drawn a parallel with declarations we have made in the Philippines--that an attack there would necessarily involve our forces at the outset.

Suggest you point out flatly that any amendment of the

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C. Viet-Nam Issues

1. Additional ROK Forces. Thieu has now formally asked the Koreans for more forces. We have been discussing a light division with them since last fall, and also 5,000 additional civilians.

Park is prepared to discuss these matters, but does not want them in the communique--and we have agreed.

We are uncertain at this point what position to recommend. Both the 5,000 civilians and the light division make sense from a military standpoint, and would have major political advantages for us. However, the DOD tentatively thinks that providing the equipment for these forces may cut across our top priority for ARVN, at least this summer. We need to hammer this out before you leave.

2. General Situation. Park has just had an optimistic report on the military situation from his own General Chae. He will want to compare notes across the board.

3. Negotiations and ROK Participation. We have assured the Koreans that they will be fully consulted both in contacts and talks. They have no plan to be at the site of contacts, but will certainly send a representative to the site of the talks and will be looking for some form of participation at that stage. We have not yet discussed with them our position during the contacts, nor have we gone into any detail on our substantive position in the talks.


Suggest that:

a. You be prepared to go over the instructions to Ambassador Harriman fully, but without showing him the actual document (which does not refer to ROK participation being nailed down in the contacts).

b. You assure him categorically that our position in the talks will be based on the Manila Communique and the 14 Points. We stand on the Geneva Accords for both Viet-Nam and Laos, and on conditions for free choice in the South.

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treaty is out of the question, and that any declaration would have the same Senate problems. At the same time, you can tell them flatly that they can count on us if aggression actually takes place.

5. 16-Nation Declaration. Park and other Koreans have pressed us to join them in getting a reaffirmation of the declaration made in 1953 by 16 nations--that they would act in the event of aggression and that hostilities would not necessarily be confined to Korean territory. We have told them that we ourselves fully support that declaration, but that others--such as the French and even the British--would not go along with reaffirming it today. We have pointed out that, in the absence of unanimity or very close to it, a strong effort to get reaffirmation would be a net minus.

Suggest you stick to this position. (Our soundings, even with such as the Thai, confirm our fears that we don't have the votes.)

6. Pueblo Case. As you know, Park is worried that our private meetings could imply recognition of the North Korean regime. He is worried that we may go too far in the direction of apology. And he regrets that we did not take tougher action after the seizure.

Suggest you calm his fears about recognition--tell him that we will continue to keep him fully informed--and be prepared to review with him our proposed conditional apology, to which he has not objected. Repeat at the same time that we are not going to apologize for any alleged actions which we cannot independently confirm.

As to more forceful action, suggest that you note that we have examined many actions, but have concluded that little ones would be mere pinpricks, and that any major action (for example, against the North Korean Air Force) would almost certainly mean major hostilities. He understands this bind, even though he does not like it.

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 By RW WARA Date 6/24/08 PARK Chung Hee
 APR 11 1966

BUILDING UP ROK DEFENSES

Background:

The major problem facing the ROK armed forces is the replacement of worn-out or obsolescent equipment, most of which is of World War II or Korean War vintage. The Army has significant shortages and problems of obsolescence in artillery weapons, engineer equipment, vehicles, maintenance facilities, and signal equipment. Tanks, vehicles, and rifles are all of Korean War vintage. The Air Force lacks all-weather fighters. Its transport squadrons need to be modernized and airfield improvement is necessary. A large number of the Navy's patrol craft and minesweepers require replacement or equipment improvement.

In addition to improvement of conventional warfare capabilities, the effectiveness of ROK counter-infiltration efforts requires strengthening through the provision of training, weapons, and communications equipment.

ROK Position:

President Park will probably confine his discussion of this subject to a general request for maximum speed in carrying out modernization of the ROK armed forces. Through various channels, other ROKG officials have specifically asked for such items as six F-4 squadrons, small arms for one million members of the Homeland Reserve Force, one destroyer division (eight ships), and construction of four additional tactical airfields.

U.S. Position:

We are proceeding with modernization of the ROK armed forces as speedily as possible within available resources of money and equipment. Under the regular Military Assistance Program, the \$100 million supplemental appropriation for FY 68 MAP, and in conjunction with the promised deployment of the light division to Viet-Nam, we are providing major items, including a squadron of F-4D aircraft, mobile communications equipment, patrol craft, armored personnel carriers, M-16 rifles, helicopters, two destroyers, artillery pieces and ammunition.

FYI. Mr. Vance has recommended that the current level of the Korean MAP (\$160 million per year) be raised substantially. This and other matters are being reviewed by an interagency study group. End FYI.

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Honolulu Meeting with President PARK Chung Hee
April 1968

STATUS OF PUEBLO CASE

No progress has been made in our effort to obtain release of the PUEBLO and its crew through private talks at Panmunjom.

At the 12th meeting on March 21, Admiral Smith proposed the following basis for settling the PUEBLO case. He said that at the time of release of the crew he is prepared to:

"1. Acknowledge that the PUEBLO was on an intelligence-gathering mission when the ship was seized by North Korean armed forces.

"2. Provide assurance that ships of the United States Navy will continue to be ordered to remain more than 12 nautical miles from North Korea.

"3. Express regret for any violation of orders by the USS PUEBLO which may have resulted in the ship's approaching closer than 12 nautical miles to North Korea."

At the 13th meeting on March 28, General Pak took the following positions on Admiral Smith's three-point proposal:

1. The PUEBLO was not only on an intelligence-gathering mission, as admitted by the U.S., but was captured in North Korean territorial waters while engaged in "espionage" and the U.S. "must take precisely this point into account."

2. He took "notice" of Admiral Smith's assurance that U.S. Navy ships would continue to be ordered to remain more than 12 nautical miles from the "Democratic People's Republic of Korea."

3. The conditional expression of regret contained in Smith's proposal is "nothing else but phrase-making, using slippery ambiguous phrases." A "proper" rather than a "hypothetical" apology is necessary.

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At the 14th meeting on April 11, Admiral Smith replied as follows:

1. If the North Korean side objects to the first point of our proposal we are willing to drop it.
2. In light of Pak's remarks at the 13th meeting, we assume that no further discussion of our second point is necessary.
3. Concerning our proposed conditional expression of regret, Pak should clearly understand that we cannot unqualifiedly affirm the validity of evidence which we are in no position to confirm independently.

At the 14th meeting, Pak reiterated his previous position, and restated in stronger terms his objection to Admiral Smith's referring to North Korea rather than to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

We believe that the three-point proposal which Admiral Smith made at the 12th meeting is about as far as we can or should go, even though our adhering to this position may cause the North Koreans to break off the talks or put the crew on trial or both.

In handing over the transcripts of the 12th and 13th meetings to Ambassador Dobrynin, Ambassador Bohlen pointed out that we had gone very far and indeed as far as we could go in apology. Ambassador Dobrynin replied that he had noted the extent of our offer and we could be sure it would be reported to his Government.

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By RW WARA Date 6/24/08Honolulu Meeting with President PARK Chung Hee
April 1968ROK VIEWS ON PUEBLO CASEROK Position

1. President Park feels that we reacted more strongly to the seizure of the PUEBLO than to the attack on the Blue House. He feels that we should give as much attention to dealing with North Korean attacks on the ROK as we do to seizure of the PUEBLO.

2. President Park is worried about our private meetings with the North Koreans. He feels that this puts us in a "low posture" vis-a-vis the North Korean regime and gives it undue legitimacy. He fears that we may be "too soft" in dealing with it.

U.S. Position

1. We regard the North Korean seizure of the PUEBLO as only one manifestation of the general problem of aggressive North Korean behavior. We raised the North Korean aggressive actions against the ROK, including the raid on Seoul, at the open meeting of the Military Armistice Commission on January 24. Ambassador Goldberg has given full attention to these problems in his private discussions at the United Nations and in his speech to the Security Council on January 26. Our concern has also been made quite clear in our public statements, including the President's public statement of January 24 and his press conference of February 2.

2. The North Koreans won't talk with anyone else present.

3. We have kept President Park fully informed about the talks. For example, we told him about our proposed "conditional apology" before we presented it at Panmunjom and he raised no objection.

4. We have assured President Park that we will not admit the validity of North Korean evidence which we are in no position to confirm independently, and that we will not apologize for acts which we consider unproven.

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Honolulu Meeting with President PARK Chung Hee
April 1968

POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVE COURSES OF ACTION IN PUEBLO CASE

The U.S. is pressing diplomatic efforts to obtain the release of the crew, through talks at Panmunjom, discussions with the USSR, etc.

Other possibilities have been considered and rejected as mere pin-pricks or counter-productive.

Among these are:

- a. Aerial reconnaissance.
- b. Sailing another elint ship, with escort, near point of seizure.
- c. Mine or blockade Wonsan Harbor.
- d. Seize North Korean vessels.
- e. Selected air strikes.
- f. Raids across the DMZ.
- g. Feints by air or naval units towards North Korean territory.

It is felt that none of these, either singly or in combination, would be likely to induce the North Koreans to change their behavior, and might jeopardize the crew.

To make a real impression would probably require a major military effort, such as an attempt to neutralize the North Korean air force, with all the consequences which such action would carry.

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Honolulu Meeting with President PARK Chung Hee
April 1968

PRESIDENT PARK'S PROBABLE CONCERNS

President Park is a worried man in a state of some frustration.

His overriding concern will be with the dependability of the U.S. commitment to support and defend Korea in the face of renewed hostility from the North.

Doubt on this point is a latent anxiety which always lies close beneath the surface of Korean thinking and which requires constant reassurance.

It is heightened in this case by several factors, among them

(a) Concern lest U.S. resolve in South Viet-Nam be weakening, e.g., division in U.S. public opinion, partial suspension of bombing, talk of a coalition government.

(b) What Park considers a "too soft" U.S. attitude towards North Korea, e.g., talk rather than action about Pueblo, refusal to support retaliation for North Korean raids.

(c) Unwillingness of Mr. Vance to commit the U.S. to an "automatic retaliatory response" rather than consultation in case of further North Korean incursions.

President Park will expect a very full and candid expression of your views on these subjects.

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Honolulu Meeting with President PARK Chung Hee
April 1968

ROK PRIME MINISTER'S IDEA OF
TWO ADDITIONAL ROK DIVISIONS FOR VIET-NAM

ROK Position

ROK Prime Minister Chung has suggested privately to Ambassador Porter the possibility that, as part of a massive increase in effort in Viet-Nam by the U.S. and its allies, the ROK might be persuaded to send two additional combat divisions to Viet-Nam, over and above the light division already promised, in return for additional U.S. assistance. Such assistance might include: financing of the mobilization in Korea of three Ready Reserve divisions; provision of additional equipment to seven rear area security divisions; and construction of a large air base on Cheju Island (as a possible eventual substitute for Okinawa). It is not known whether President Park has approved the Prime Minister's proposal or even is aware of it.

U.S. Position

This proposal would increase the combat forces in Viet-Nam, strengthen the ROK forces in Korea, and demonstrate vividly to the North Koreans that they had failed to prevent increased ROK participation in Viet-Nam. On the other hand, it would strain equipment availability for US and GVN forces in Viet-Nam, require a major augmentation of U.S. logistical personnel in Viet-Nam, and greatly strengthen ROK demands and expectations for active participation in strategic planning in Viet-Nam, in planning for peace negotiations, and in the negotiations themselves.

Thus, while there would be definite advantages if this proposal could be realized, it would also raise real problems of equipment and support. In any event, the fact that the U.S. is not substantially increasing its forces in Viet-Nam would probably rule this out.

In fact, President Park is worried about his ability in terms of domestic Korean politics to send even the additional light division which he has promised and for which we have already begun to provide the quid pro quo.

We therefore believe that this matter should not be raised with President Park.

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By 4-2, NARA, Date 2-7-94

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III D 7NUCLEAR WEAPONS*I. Roles

Our tactical nuclear weapons in Korea and the Pacific essentially serve two roles. First, they are one element of our military posture to deter communist aggression. Secondly, they provide a hedge against failure of allied conventional defense with an option short of strategic nuclear war.

A. Deterrence

Deterrence has been defined as "a state of mind brought about by a credible threat of unacceptable counteraction." Our nuclear capability for Korea and our willingness to use it if necessary have been sufficiently clear to constitute a credible threat to North Korea and China. For them the damage of a U.S. nuclear response would represent unacceptable counteraction. However, the deterrent value of our nuclear weapons has most likely been eroded in recent years.

Enemy belief that we might use nuclear weapons in Korea is nurtured by several factors. Our global policy on the use of nuclear weapons relays the message that while we prefer not to cross the nuclear threshold, we are prepared to do so if conventional war cannot protect vital national interests. This policy is purposefully ambiguous, and the shift from a strategy of massive retaliation to one of flexible response does not change the basic message. We have not renounced first use of nuclear weapons as the Chinese have urged. Our consistent policy to neither confirm nor deny the presence of nuclear weapons contributes to the calculated ambiguity of our over-all nuclear policy.

*J-5, at the staff officer level, enters a general reservation on this paper at this time.

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The communists must be aware that we have tactical nuclear weapons in South Korea as well as elsewhere in the Pacific and that our troops undergo training for nuclear warfare.^{1/} Finally, there is at least the suggestion of nuclear response in the July 1953 Declaration of the Sixteen Nations that if communist aggression should reoccur "in all probability, it would not be possible to confine hostilities within the frontiers of Korea."

We can assume that enemy fear of the effect of nuclear weapons has not diminished. Indeed it may be increasing for China, because of the sobering experience of possession and the vulnerability of her nuclear capability. However, the enemy belief that we would actually employ nuclear weapons has in all probability lessened since 1965. Self-denial in Vietnam caps 23 years of non-use since 1945. We have taken the lead in negotiating a Non-Proliferation Treaty and have just signed Protocol II of a Latin American Nuclear Free Zone Treaty that renounces first use of nuclear weapons in that area, although our interpretive statement left the door open for such use if an aggressor is supported by a nuclear power. Increasing Russian strategic strength has established effective mutual deterrence and budding Chinese capabilities have prompted the decision to deploy SENTINEL. The Pueblo affair produced no military response, partly because our available QRA aircraft were only outfitted for nuclear action. The indefinite retention of our key Pacific nuclear base, Okinawa, is no longer assured.

Admittedly some of the above factors are more atmospheric than real. But their cumulative impact on our potential adversaries in Korea has almost certainly diluted the deterrent value of our nuclear weapons.

^{1/} The ROK has never been officially informed of the presence of nuclear weapons on its soil. High government officials clearly must surmise that they are there because of our ambiguous policy and special security arrangements. The 1967 base rights and SOFA carefully did not preclude storage or transit of nuclear weapons.

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A new factor in coming years will be the deterrent impact of growing Chinese nuclear capabilities. This will affect us to a limited extent, but its major significance may be in dissuading possible unilateral ROK action.

B. Use for Defense

1. Current Concept of Use

The employment of nuclear weapons in Korea would only be necessary if the enemy introduced them first or if conventional US-ROK defenses were crumbling under a massive North Korean-Chinese offensive. ^{1/} Chinese first use of nuclear weapons is highly unlikely. In addition, to air-delivered weapons they may begin deploying MRBMS this year and have substantial numbers by 1970. On the other hand, they will probably not have a real battlefield capability for 5-10 years, their nuclear installations will be vulnerable and we will continue to have overwhelming superiority. With U.S. air and naval support, the ROK should be able to handle on its own an attack by North Korea. Against a combined North Korean-Chinese assault, the ROK is capable of a vigorous initial defense, and with greater war reserve stocks than are presently available it might be able to mount a sustained defense. (In either case US land forces as presently deployed would almost inevitably be involved.) China currently has a limited logistic capability to attack beyond its borders and improved ROK forces alone have a better manpower ratio than was needed to stop the Chinese and North Koreans during the Korean War. The extent of Russian supplies and logistic support would be an important factor, and manpower ratios are not always reliable indicators.

Thus the basic US policy on use of nuclear weapons in defense of Korea,

^{1/} It is assumed that Russian forces would not become directly involved.

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as defined in the 1965 NPP, remains valid: "meet nuclear aggression with appropriate and probably nuclear response; and "basic reliance upon capability for successful conventional defense, but prepared to use nuclear weapons when vital US interests cannot be defended at the non-nuclear level." They should be employed "only if conventional defense fails and only after the most careful consideration of the circumstances and conditions prevailing at the time, in the light of over-all US interests."

Present CINCPAC operational plans stipulate that a conventional-only defense against massive overt North Korean-Chinese attack would require a timely augmentation force of 6-2/3 divisions. The plans indicate that the authority to use nuclear weapons would be requested if sufficient reinforcements are not available in time. The earmarked reinforcement divisions are currently committed to Vietnam demands. CINCPAC plans envision redeployment of necessary troops from Vietnam to Korea, implying both a higher priority for the latter and the preference to avoid using nuclear weapons if at all possible.

2. Alternative Concepts of Use

It is very unlikely that in the next few years we would move away from current doctrine on defending Korea toward one of exclusive or primary reliance on nuclear weapons on the one hand or ^{of explicit} renunciation of first use of nuclear weapons on the other.

The principal argument for increased emphasis on nuclear defense would be that this would maintain our commitments while preventing another Vietnam experience of US forces fighting on the Asian mainland. Exclusive

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reliance on nuclear weapons, including strategic response if necessary, would eliminate the need for a US defense presence in Korea except for a token trip-wire force. Primary reliance on tactical nuclear defense, including for example the early use of ADMS, would allow significant reductions in the current levels of conventional forces. The economic savings of either concept would be drowned by the unacceptable political and strategic costs. We would have to enunciate a clear policy of massive or tactical nuclear retaliation with all its damaging political repercussions throughout Asia, including, not least, South Korea itself. There would be greater risks of miscalculation. Ambiguous or limited aggressions would face us with the choice of accepting tactical losses or over-response. More open or pronounced aggressions would force us to choose between withdrawal from Korea or climbing the first rung(s) of the nuclear ladder. The lessons of the 60s, the need for flexible response and our NATO nuclear policy, the risks of Soviet involvement and global conflict, the likelihood of less-than massive challenges to South Korea, and the feasibility of in-depth conventional response all rule out moving toward exclusive or primary reliance on nuclear weapons.

Abjuration of first use of nuclear weapons in Korea (Asia) is a more conceivable alternative in coming years, but still remote. We are in fact generally more reluctant today than ever before to use nuclear weapons first. This trend will probably continue, abetted by growing Soviet and Chinese nuclear capabilities. The Chinese have renounced first use and pressed others to do likewise. We have of course consistently refused to rule out our nuclear option in the face of Asian

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communist manpower superiority. This superiority would be even more pronounced in a two Asian front situation, such as Vietnam and Korea. As already noted, even in the Latin American Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, we have kept open the possibility of nuclear response to aggression aided by a nuclear power, a formulation that fits well with Korean contingencies. A massive, overt conventional attack such as might occur in Korea would make a US nuclear retort militarily more appropriate and politically easier than in Vietnam. The needs of deterrence and prudent military planning rule out absolute forswearing of the nuclear alternative in Korea at least until we can see our way clear to a greatly altered political relationship with China.

A variant on present and alternative uses for defense would be to offer to share nuclear weapons with the ROK on a NATO-type basis, retaining our control. The Koreans already have nuclear-capable armament, and would probably welcome the move as improving their defense capabilities and further tightening our commitment. The US forces could probably be reduced. Such a step would have unacceptable political and military disadvantages, however. It would be considered provocative in many Asian quarters. Nuclear-sensitive Japan might have second thoughts about undertaking further responsibilities for Asian security. It could be construed as contrary to the spirit, though not the letter, of the NPT. The Koreans would have an entree into our nuclear policy, and our flexibility on use or non-use would be correspondingly reduced. Other Asian allies might start pressing us for similar arrangements.

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II. Deployments in Korea

No one has been able to determine satisfactorily the number of nuclear weapons in Korea adequate to serve the two roles of deterrence and ^{of} use for defense if conventional forces fail.

A. Current and Projected Deployments

As of mid-March, an average total of 975 tactical nuclear weapons were currently deployed to Korea. This compares with total deployments of 605 in 1961, 773 in 1965 and 945 in 1966. The authorized deployment ceiling through FY 1968 is 1048 weapons, the requested ceiling for FY 1969 is 884, and the projection for FY 1970 is 912. The breakdown of types of weapons for FY 1968-1970 is as follows:

	Current Deployments March 1968	Approved Ceiling FY 1968	Requested Ceiling FY 1969	Projected Ceiling FY 1970
TACTICAL OFFENSIVE				
Artillery	305	325	305	305
Bombs	176	181	180	164
Missiles	345	395	242	286
Total	826	901	727	755
TACTICAL DEFENSIVE -				
Surface-to-air Missiles	108	108	110	110
Atomic Demolition Munitions	41	39	47	47
Total	149	147	157	157
TOTAL	975	1048	884	912

The major planned change in the above table is the removal (already underway) by the end of FY 1969 of all 120 Davy Crockett warheads, for which there are now no delivery units in Korea. In addition the JCS is considering recommending a reduction of 42 Nike Hercules from authorized levels.

The only nuclear weapons deployed north of Seoul are 78 ground support weapons collocated with delivery units in five Maximum Security Areas. Remaining ground support weapons are dispersed to other locations with the majority retained at the two Special Ammunition Depots. Tactical bombs are located at Osan and Kunsan Air Bases. There are six nuclear air defense weapons at each of six sites, with the rest at the two Depots.

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B. Security of Nuclear Weapons

The deployments of nuclear weapons, particularly those in the forward areas near the DMZ, naturally pose certain security risks. The most likely threats are the seizure or destruction of nuclear weapons sites by infiltrators or guerilla units. While a raiding party or saboteurs would have other reasons for attacking particular installations, nuclear weapons are targets whose capture or destruction would be costly politically and psychologically. In addition a conventional thrust by North Korean forces could overrun, at least temporarily, the I Corps area sites north of Seoul which are within about 25 kms air distance of the DMZ. Lastly, there remains the remote possibility of unauthorized use of nuclear weapons by US or allied forces despite present security, discipline and doctrinal restraints.

Various measures to reduce these risks are in force or planned. There are specific weapon evacuation plans, and all weapons can be destroyed within a two hour emergency time. CINCPAC has authorized consolidation of the five forward maximum security sites into three; the JCS and USAF have requested the detailing of increased security personnel to Korea; other limited steps, such as improved construction at certain storage sites, have been taken.

Further measures that could be implemented to reduce security risks must be weighed against probable operational needs. The installation of PAL (permissive action links) devices at the forward deployment sites would cut down the dangers of unauthorized use and could be done at little cost. They would not prevent seizure, and they could reduce operational reliability and responsiveness. Reduction of numbers and/or redeployment to the south of

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nuclear weapons would of course carry security benefits. These must be measured against any impact on the deterrent and operational roles of nuclear weapons in the defense of South Korea. The proximity of weapons to delivery units, the likelihood of their early employment in a conflict, and other factors such as vulnerability, costs, and logistic problems must all be considered.

C. Alternative Levels and Deployments

Various alternative positionings of nuclear weapons are available to us. Given the current unavailability of the needed conventional reinforcements in the face of large scale North Korean-Chinese attack, a case might be made for increasing the number of nuclear weapons in Korea at least until Vietnam requirements phase down. Future reductions in ROK and/or US conventional forces also might prompt suggestions for greater numbers of nuclear weapons. However, the number of such weapons now in Korea, augmented by deployments elsewhere in the Pacific area, would appear more than adequate for foreseeable needs in a Korean conflict. An increase in storage in Korea would mean breaking the present US freeze on levels of overseas nuclear deployment. It would bring greater security risks and require more security personnel.

There are several arguments for reduction in the number of nuclear weapons in Korea and/or redeployments within Korea away from forward areas. The strength of the ROK-US conventional forces plus our last-resort doctrine makes unlikely the early use of nuclear weapons. A lesser number of weapons and/or redeployment southwards should suffice for initial lucrative targets until new weapons are introduced from our offshore island bases and

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carriers. In any event once hostilities have broken out target acquisition would be difficult. A reduction/redeployment of weapons would reduce security risks and costs. There are counter-arguments with regard to both weapons requirements and location. Either the current unavailability of planned conventional reinforcements or possible future reductions in ROK and/or US forces stationed in Korea might suggest an earlier need to turn to nuclear weapons. The importance of holding Seoul and its proximity to the DMZ could call for prompt use of nuclear weapons. The uncertain future status of Okinawa precludes heavy reliance on that base. In a large scale conflict we might face logistic problems in reintroducing weapons into the country and moving them to their delivery units. And any substantial reduction/redeployment would be difficult to conceal and might have undesirable political impact on both the ROK and our potential adversaries.

Total withdrawal of nuclear weapons to Pacific bases, CVAs and CONUS *from other bases, rapid use*
 would be based upon the unlikelihood of early use of nuclear weapons. It might be justified as removing a provocative mainland presence without preventing timely use of nuclear weapons if necessary. All security risks would naturally be eliminated. However, the adverse aspects of the reduction/redeployment alternative noted above would apply with more force. In particular, there would be even greater psychological impact on the ROK (doubt about our commitment) and the enemy (erosion of deterrence value). Total withdrawal would hamper rapid response and might run the risk of our effectively losing the nuclear option altogether.

III. The Next Decade

The most important of the many factors shaping American nuclear policy in Korea in the 1970's will be the triangular political relationship among

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the three Pacific nuclear powers. Assuming continued hostile partition of then Korea, the alignments among China, the Soviet Union and the US will heavily influence the role of nuclear weapons and consequently their deployments.

A. The NPT and Security Assurances

Certain assumptions seem reasonable.

There is little chance that there will be new nuclear powers among the major protagonists in any Korean scenario in the coming decade. North and South Korea are technically and economically unequipped to acquire a nuclear capability. Japan surely has the ability to join the nuclear club, but political and psychological blocks to such a move should remain certainly as long as she can count upon the American shield. Japan and the ROK both plan to sign the NPT.

The US-UK-USSR resolution on security assurances accompanying the NPT lays a political, moral, and legal base for assisting (through action of the UN Security Council) non-nuclear states, in the event they are victims of aggression by nuclear weapons or the threat of such aggression. It remains to be seen, of course, how much political weight these imprecise assurances take on in the coming years. It is highly unlikely, for example, that we will reach the point where the USSR feels forced to guarantee the security of South Korea against Chinese nuclear aggression. In any event Chinese moves would most likely be strictly with conventional forces and thus outside the purview of the security assurances resolution. We of course do not need the resolution to prompt us to defend the ROK against conventional or nuclear aggression. And notwithstanding a possible Soviet definition of US "aggression," we would not need to employ or threaten nuclear weapons against non-nuclear North Korea and thus possibly involve the USSR.

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In short the practical effect on the Korean situation of the security assurances to non-nuclear states should not be very great. Nevertheless the Chinese do find in these assurances further evidence of growing US-USSR "collusion" and this might give them added reason for pause before undertaking Korean or other adventures.

B. The Political Framework

Of the possible political line-ups among the Pacific nuclear states in the next decade, harmonious accommodation or even solid peaceful coexistence among all three seems utopian. Such a development would relieve not only the Korean problem but almost all major foreign policy headaches. A US-China axis against the Russians appears at least equally remote, and it too would probably spell a Korean solution.

We are left with the three most likely political frameworks, the common theme being US-Chinese opposition, and the Russian variations being as:

1) informal or tacit American ally, 2) Chinese ally, or 3) adversary of both (the current situation). In each instance the Russian factor in the triangle would argue for a restrained US nuclear posture. 1) A China opposed by possible US-USSR joint action would be so boxed in by both nuclear and conventional power that it could hardly risk Korean adventures. With ROK forces in front of China and Russian forces behind her, the need for US nuclear weapons would be greatly reduced. Our weapons could be safely withdrawn to Guam and further East. 2) A healing of the Communist split on essentially Chinese militant terms would enhance the possibility of direct Russian involvement in a US-Chinese confrontation in Korea, especially if nuclear weapons were employed. The military advantages of nuclear riposte to China alone would therefore be lost and a global war more likely. This situation too would argue for a circumscribed role for nuclear weapons and consequent reductions or redeployments. 3) A continuation

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of essentially the current Russian attitude toward the US and China would serve as some rein on Chinese designs and would probably mean Russian non-involvement in a conflict. The one factor that might force the USSR into a fray, however, would be our employment of nuclear weapons. Thus even in this context the use of nuclear weapons would be a reluctant last resort, and this suggests some redeployment of weapons.

This third Russian position is not only the most likely but also the least persuasive for diminishing the role we assign to nuclear weapons in Korea. A crucial factor therefore in determining the doctrine and deployment of nuclear weapons will be the nature of the US-Chinese adversary relationship. Here imponderables, such as the nature of the post-Mao leadership, cloud the picture. We could opt for a tighter containment policy toward China and for an increased reliance on mainland-based nuclear weapons to inhibit Chinese actions. This would include new nuclear emphasis in our public discussion of defense of Korea, as well as possible sharing of nuclear weapons with the South Koreans or increasing deployments of weapons to Korea. We could continue our present general policy toward China, including our purposefully ambiguous nuclear posture. This would probably mean only minor redeployments of weapons, although significant redeployments would not necessarily be inconsistent. Finally, we could move toward a looser posture toward China, a maintenance of our basic commitments but with more nuclear breathing space. This would suggest at least substantial reductions and/or redeployments of weapons.

The current Vietnam and Korean situations rule out major short-term shifts in our Korean nuclear posture or weapons deployment. However, a

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central question is whether we can afford to wait on any significant changes until the late 1970s when the Chinese will have a considerable nuclear capability. It appears that the time for any turns in our Korean nuclear policy will be in the 1970-75 period between large scale US-RCK involvement in Vietnam and substantial Chinese nuclear power. It is also in this period that we shall probably be sorting out the major features of the US-USSR-China triangular relationship.

IV. Summary of Major Issues

A. The deterrence and defense roles of our tactical nuclear weapons in Korea will continue to be important. Their deterrent value has probably lessened in recent years but remains significant. Our political willingness to employ nuclear weapons similarly has declined somewhat. This militates against moving toward primary or exclusive reliance upon nuclear weapons for defense of Korea, but it does not argue for abjuration of first use.

B. We still do not know how many nuclear weapons are adequate to serve their two primary roles in Korea. Present deployments pose security risks, which we are already seeking to mitigate. We need to consider alternative levels and deployments of weapons in light of military requirements and political factors. Increased numbers of weapons appear unnecessary, while total withdrawal seems inadvisable so long as a hostile US-China relationship backstops Korean partition. Attention should therefore be focused on the advisability of reducing the numbers of weapons in Korea as well as redeploying them within the country.

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C. The political relationship among the Pacific nuclear powers will heavily influence the roles and redeployments of nuclear weapons in Korea. US-Chinese antagonism and Soviet avoidance of direct involvement in Korea seems the most likely scenario. Whatever the Soviet role, the crucial time for any shifts in our nuclear policy should be in the early 1970s, before China has a substantial nuclear capability.

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