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February 1, 1968

Report on Meeting of Advisory Group, January 29, 1968

Advisors present: Messrs. George Ball, McGeorge Bundy, Henry Cabot Lodge, Cyrus Vance, and General Maxwell D. Taylor.

Others present: Secretary Rusk, Under Secretary Katzenbach, Joseph Sisco, Samuel Berger, Director Richard Helms, W. W. Rostow, and Bromley Smith.

Having been fully briefed by the Secretaries of State and Defense yesterday, Sunday, January 28 (except for Mr. McGeorge Bundy), the group met at noon to consider the operational alternatives immediately ahead of us and, perhaps, further down the road. The meeting opened by bringing them up to date with the latest word of the Panmunjom contact and Gromyko's reaction to Sec. Rusk's message.

It was universally agreed that we should make no further diplomatic or military moves, beyond those already undertaken and possible action under paragraph 11, until we could form a judgment as to whether the Panmunjom contact might be fruitful. *Possible courses considered were*

The first substantive issue addressed was whether and at what stage the President might offer arbitration via the World Court, or some other "suitable international tribunal" after the men and the ship were returned. After examining the problems posed by the World Court formula (implicit recognition of North Korea as a state) and the precedent represented by the RB-47 in 1960, it was agreed that some such offer might well be made if the Panmunjom exercise doesn't work or is bottlenecked.

The group then examined the following 11 possible courses of action.

1. Advising Soviets of actual or possible military moves. In the light of Tommy Thompson's cable, it was agreed we should not proceed now with an informal contact, although we might consider in the future the use of the hot line with the proviso about the press, laid down by Thompson. In general, it was judged, however, that communications with the USSR were in pretty good shape.

2. Conduct airborne reconnaissance. It was agreed that for the next several days no recce of North Korea should be conducted; if it were judged that recce was desirable at a later time, BLACK SHIELD, rather than DRONE, photography was recommended.

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
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By CS, NARA Date 7-27-99

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3. Sail USS Banner into area where Pueblo was seized. For the time being it was felt unwise to put the Banner on station. When the incident has been settled, it was agreed the U. S. would wish to assert its rights in international waters off Wonsan Bay. Depending on the situation at that time, we might wish to assert our rights in that area via an armed vessel -- perhaps a destroyer -- rather than via a communications monitoring ship like the USS Banner.

4. Action to recover crypto material jettisoned from the Pueblo. It was agreed that the recovery of the crypto material jettisoned from the Pueblo was an almost impossible task which would put no significant pressure on the North Koreans. Therefore, it should not be undertaken.

5. Mine Wonsan Harbor. The proposal presented involved 17 sorties dropping 83 mines. The operation would have to be repeated as necessary to insure full denial of harbor use. It was agreed that the impact of this operation on the North Korean economy and on North Korean military capabilities would be minor. The prospects of recovery of the Pueblo and the crew might be impeded. Air combat over the area would be likely; and the risk of escalation would increase if mining were maintained over an protracted period.

6. Seize North Korean vessels. Although our intelligence does not yet give us a firm basis for seizing North Korean vessels on the high seas, it was pointed out that should the men and the ship -- or even the ship alone -- not be returned, the seizure of North Korean vessels from the high seas was a punishment that fitted the crime; that is, the North Koreans had violated the rules governing behavior in international waters and could be legitimately denied access to international waters. It was agreed to explore this suggestion with further staff work directed to establish what North Korean vessels might be accessible to seizure on the high seas.

7. Selected air strikes on North Korea. It was agreed that such strikes would be an act of retaliation; large forces required for success might give the appearance of large-scale hostilities initiated by the U. S.; it would be unpopular internationally; and would diminish the prospects for early release of the Pueblo and its crew.

8. Raid across the DMZ. As with respect to 7, above, such punitive operations were judged to be risky, capable of leading to unsought sustained hostilities, and counter-productive with respect to the return of the Pueblo and its crew.

9. Naval blockade of Wonsan. The military and economic effects would be limited; the risks of escalation would be high; once undertaken, we would be committed for an indefinite period to inconclusive, politically awkward, and potentially escalatory operations.

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10. Free World economic pressures on North Korea. The Free World's trade with North Korea is limited. And the impact of increased controls of trade and shipping with the Free World would, therefore, be small. With respect to a total embargo on trade with North Korea, we would certainly meet important opposition from France, the United Kingdom, Japan, and West Germany. Taken together, the small scale of the inconvenience involved and the political and diplomatic difficulties within the Free World make this line of action unattractive, on present evidence.

11. U.S. bombing practice in South Korea. This suggestion, from a member of the group, was examined as an additional contribution to a sense of seriousness about the U.S. military build up in the area. Although it was thought that, in general, our present build up offered a satisfactory background for diplomacy, it was agreed that the technical possibility of this line of action should be staffed out and we would take a further look at it.

What they
At lunch today (January 29, 1968) with the President, the group examined with the President certain lines of action that might be taken up with Congress a future time. In particular:

- (1) Provision to the President of the right to extend the period of enlistment;
- (2) The maintenance in the area of forces sufficient to give the South Koreans a sense of security and provision of sufficient additional military aid so that they go forward with their plan to provide an extra division to the struggle in South Vietnam.

-- It was the universal judgment of the group that we should keep our eye on the major objectives in this crisis:

- Get the men of the Pueblo and, if possible, the ship itself returned;
- Keep the confidence of the South Koreans and, especially, their willingness to provide an increment of force in South Vietnam;
- Avoid a second front in Asia.

W. W. Rostow

01 FEB 1968: Normal Situation Report (Jan 26- Feb 1) (section #: 729.55, record #: 2662)

Normal Situation Report (January 26- February 1)

I. United States counter moves to recent situations in Asia

A) Incident of the PUEBLO, seized by the North Korean puppet regime last January 23, a strenuous situation in South Korea caused by the infiltration of armed communist guerillas into Seoul, terrorist acts by Vietnamese communists, perpetrated during the armistice on the Lunar New Year as well as the concentration of Vietnamese troops south of the armistice line, and especially, the attack on the U.S. Embassy in Saigon are continuing to create tensions in the political society this week and high-level policymakers of the Administration including President Johnson and leaders of the House are making the utmost effort to make a correct judgment on the situations occurring in both South Korea and Vietnam and to find a solution.

On the other hand, broadcasts and every newspaper is giving as much time and space as possible and posting changing situations of the incident and advice and criticism needed for the establishment of the measures.

B) Following is a weekly report regarding the South Korean situation, focusing on the PUEBLO Incident, and the Vietnamese situation caused by the violation of the Armistice Agreement, including terrorist acts by Vietnamese communists.

I. PUEBLO Incident

A) The United Nations Security Council, called on January 26 upon request of the United States, continued proceeding meetings in the morning and the afternoon of the same day and in the morning of January 27 and proposed measures and positions of each country for the repatriation of the PUEBLO.

While the United States claimed through their Ambassador Goldberg to the United Nations that the United Nations must take proper actions as prescribed by the UN Charters because the seizure incident is piracy in international waters, the armed communist guerillas' infiltration into Seoul violated the Armistice Agreement, and because of the aggressive nature of the North Korean puppet regime against South Korea, countries such as the Soviet Union, Hungary and Algeria, who support the North Korean puppet regime, repeated the claims that actions of the

North Korean puppet regime were legitimate, both sides thus revealed a considerable gap between their opinions, and concerning the expectation that an effective conclusion will come out in this Council, its prospect was in doubt since the beginning. During the meeting, Mekonnen, representative of Ethiopia, one of the non-permanent members, made a remark suggesting the attendance of the representative of the North Korean puppet regime in the Council, however, the likelihood seems to be vague due to the statement by the North Korean puppet regime on January 29 that they will not admit the effect of any resolution of the Security Council.

Concerning the proposal of Canadian Ambassador Ignatieff to realize the negotiation between two relevant parties by arbitration in a neutral nation or through an individual or organization in a neutral state, representatives of the Council showed comparatively encouraging responses.

The Council was scheduled to resume at 15:00PM of January 29, but unofficial contacts among representatives of each country during the weekend did not result in satisfactory advances, so the meeting was postponed indefinitely and it considerably darkened the prospect to settle down the issue through the United Nations.

There was a report that a swap of the PUEBLO's crew for arrested armed guerillas in the South in the form of the Prisoner of War Exchange Pact was considered in the consulate of the North Korean puppet regime in New Delhi, but it ended up as a mere proposal due to the negative responses of relevant governments.

Since the discussion in the Security Council stopped, attempts to settle the issue outside of the United Nations, including a Canadian proposal, became animated, and representatives of 10 non-permanent members of the United Nations Security Council began to seek a solution on their own through unofficial contacts. Finally, on January 31, representatives of 5 Asian and African countries, India, Pakistan, Senegal, Ethiopia and Algeria, made a joint proposal that they will meet a representative of the North Korean puppet regime in Geneva and talk about how to invite them to the Security Council to discuss the release of PUEBLO's crew and other issues.

The U.S. government, which is demanding the immediate release of the vessel and crew, has not expressed any particular interest in the proposal by 5 Asian and African representatives to have talks with the North Korean puppet regime in Geneva because there is a concern that the talks in Geneva can be suspended for a long time and the North Korean puppet regime is likely to bring an improper "deal" to the table, and it is reported that the Soviet Union side is also having a

discontent attitude because this proposal implies the unconditional release of the crew without so-called trade-off, therefore, all possible ways to achieve a settlement of the issue are being blocked and a settlement is expected to take time.

B) After the request for the release upon the Panmunjum Military Armistice Commission on January 24 failed, the United States found direct contact with the North Korean puppet regime useless and was focusing on settlement through a third party, including the Soviet Union, but began considering a second attempt to negotiate at Panmunjum because of the statement of January 31 by Kim Gwang-hyup, a member of Standing Committee of Workers' Party of North Korea with a title of General Secretary, which implied a negotiation.

On the occasion of the Romanian delegation's Pyongyang visit, Kim Gwang-hyup suggested that a negotiation at Panmunjum is possible and it is said that the Hungarian Ambassador to the United Nations, who is known to keep close contacts with the North Korean puppet regime, also unofficially informed the U.S. representatives of the intent of the North Korean puppet regime to negotiate.

The spokesman of the U.S. Department of State declared that the United States is intent on resuming negotiations through the Military Armistice Commission and it is reported that the Chief Delegate of the United Nations side is preparing to resume the meeting.

It appears that, in general, a less-serious incident by the North Korean puppet regime, armed communist guerilla infiltration into Seoul and, even though most broadcasts and newspapers are covering the further countermeasures against the infiltration by the armed agents, supply of the counterespionage equipment, the insecurity that South Korean people are feeling, and the aggressive activities of the North Korean puppet regime, it is less important than the PUEBLO Incident.

2) Vietnam Issue

The impression is that a new state of South Vietnam where President Thieu declared a state of martial law, followed by Vietnamese communists' massive assault, in violation of the armistice on the Lunar New Year, targeting densely populated major cities of the South Vietnam and, especially in the capital Saigon, destroying the U.S. Embassy and several sites, as well as a large-scale concentration of Vietnamese troops on the south of armistice line and a report of the upcoming full-scale attack, drew the attention of the public which has been focused on the

PUEBLO Incident, and created a tense atmosphere along with the incident in South Korea.

Regarding desperate terrorist actions by the Vietnamese communists, there are two opinions: To see it as a artifice, in a military view, to conceal the activities of nearly 60,000 Vietnamese communist regular army soldiers who gathered south of the armistice line and are preparing a large-scale attack, or as a part of an allied strategy of the Communist side to drive the United States into a corner in South Korea and Vietnam as Republican Senator Dirksen asserted, and the massive concentration of the Vietnamese communists is seen as an attempt to secure a better position for further negotiations to realize another battle of Dien Bien Phu, and that they have the goal of stimulating public opinion in the United States regarding the heavy casualties deriving from the decisive battle, and the terrorist actions of the Vietnamese communists are viewed as deep desperation put into action.

That a violation of the armistice by the Communist side and intensively perpetrated terrorist acts shall affect the on-going discussion concerning the possibility of negotiations was hinted by the spokesman of the U.S. Department of State, and the White House Press Secretary McCloskey clearly stated that, unless the communist side ceases such terrorist acts and violations of the armistice, the United States may reconsider the policy for the negotiation itself, which showed that the United States is viewing this recent situation with much importance.

3) On January 26, President Johnson warned the North Korean puppet regime on the television broadcast where he announced the position of the United States with respect to the PUEBLO Incident said that the North Korean puppet regime should be aware of the graveness of the current situation and cease aggressive acts against both South Korea and the United States immediately and demonstrated their determination for this situation by clarifying that the United States seeks to resolve the problem through diplomatic negotiations, including the United Nations, while the precautionary military moves to act against any crisis are under way at present.

On the other hand, in the evening and the morning of January 31 when the terrorist acts of the Vietnamese communists were turning harsh in Vietnam, the President held a conference on the evaluation of the situation developing in South Korea and Vietnam and the following actions in the presence of the leaders of both parties, particularly, important members of the both the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on the Budget, and Rusk, Secretary of State, McNamara, Secretary of Defense, Wheeler, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Helms,

Director of Central Intelligence, Clifford, an incoming Secretary of Defense, and Taylor, the former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

No official announcement was made regarding the contents of the conference, but, according to one of the participants in the conference, the possibility of additional reserve call-ups of the U.S. Army following the previous reserve call-up of the U.S. Air Force and Navy was thoroughly examined as a detailed plan to cope with further crisis in Asia along with a general investigation of current conditions, and measures to increase military support to Korea, who is facing a continuous provocative actions by the North Korean puppet regime were also studied.

After the conference, White House Press Secretary Christian announced that though President Johnson discussed the issue of taking certain measures which require the consent of Congress with the participants at the breakfast conference and requested to them that the Congress should cooperate regardless of parties when these measures are taken, the President did not offer any detailed measures, but it was a general discussion requesting the cooperation from all parties.

Measures which the President may take with the consent of the Congress can be anticipated to be the reserve call-up of particular technical agents, military reinforcement in South Korea, including increased military force, and the security of the relevant additional revenue and, considering the fact that the members participated in this conference belong to Committees on Armed Services and the Budget, this anticipation is reasonable.

Consequently, this PUEBLO Incident and new situations in Vietnam convinced the United States that the defense system in Southeastern Asia needs to be reexamined and also, to the United States who have only focused in the Vietnam War, the incident in South Korea this time ~~~~ communist aggressive activities ~~~ not only in Vietnam.

01 FEB 1968: U.S.' Reaction and South Korean Government's Response Regarding Panmunjum Meetings.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea

Number: UNW-0204

Date: 001930

Recipient: Minister

Addressor: Ambassador to the United Nations

(Prime Minister, Chief Presidential Secretary, and Director of the Korea Central Intelligence Agency)

Special Report Number 28

1. The United States showed an amicable response with respect to a meeting at Panmunjum. (reference: UNW-0201)
2. As a meeting at Panmunjum is based on the Armistice Agreement, (Ga) issues such as the invitation of the North Korean Puppet Regime in the United Nations will not be discussed; and (Na) neutral states will not come into contact with the North Korean Puppet Regime.

Therefore, the Republic of Korea government does not need to worry about these issues. Also, the fact that the North Korean Puppet Regime's attitude toward the United Nations has become clear is not against the Republic of Korea.

3. Meanwhile, the meeting is estranged from the initial intention that the United States shall censure the North Korean Puppet Regime through the Security Council.

If agreements are reached in a Panmunjum meeting, they are likely to be limited to the repatriation of the vessel and her crew.

4. However, even though it is judged that the Republic of Korea has no need to object a Panmunjum meeting, the country should strongly request the United States to resolve the seizure of the USS Pueblo, and should pay close attention to the conditions of the repatriation of the vessel and her crew.

The Republic of Korea should keep strict watch on the attempts by the North

Korean Puppet Regime to approach to the United Nations after the repatriations of vessel and her crew. It is necessary for the Republic of Korea government to have detailed information of relevant negotiations. (Banyeon)

Reclassified as common documents (after the completion of the incident)



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FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8738
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~~SECRET~~ SEOUL 3863

CN 389Q
February 2, 1967
12:27 a.m.

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BMC

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NODIS/CACTUS

1. WE ARE MAINTAINING CLOSE CONTACT WITH HIGHEST ROK LEVELS IN EFFORT TO CALM RECURRENT FEARS THAT PUEBLO/CREW ASPECT OF PROBLEM WITH NORTH KOREANS WILL SOON BE SETTLED, LEAVING ROKG ONLY UNSATISFIED PARTY. PRESIDENTIAL SECRETARY GENERAL INFORMED ME THIS MORNING THAT ROKS INTERPRET NK STATEMENT THAT UN MACHINERY NOT ACCEPTABLE BUT NK PREPARED TO USE MAC AT PANMUNJOM TO MEAN THAT NK'S ARE PREPARED TO MAKE CONCESSIONS ON PUEBLO AND CREW. THIS LED TO USUAL DISCUSSION OF AFTERMATH, IF ROK SUPPOSITION PROVES TO BE CORRECT.

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2. PSG EXPRESSED UNEASINESS ABOUT THIS MORNING'S MEETING BUT WAS REASSURED BY SCENARIO REALTED STATE 108330, PARTICULARLY OUR DESIRE TO HAVE ROKG ISSUE STATEMENT CONFIRMING THAT MEETING ARRANGED AFTER CONSULTATION WITH THEM AND THAT THEY COMPLETELY INFORMED AND IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH USG THESE MATTERS. IN ADDITION TO STRESS ON FACT THAT MAC MACHINERY BEING UTILIZED TO DEAL WITH AGGRESSIVE NK ACTIONS AGAINST ROK, I SAID THEY COULD TAKE LINE WITH PRESS IF NECESSARY THAT PRIVATE MEETINGS ON THIS OR THAT ASPECT OF PROBLEM MIGHT BE HELD FROM TIME TO TIME AND THAT USG AND ROKG CONFER IN THIS CONNECTION. HE SAID THEY WOULD ISSUE STATEMENT TO ABOVE EFFECT AFTER HEARING FROM US (OR BY OTHER MEANS) THAT PYONGYANG HAD ANNOUNCED FACT OF MEETING.

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Authority FRUS 64-68 XXIX Korea 1st

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By *[initials]* NARA Date 11-12-57



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-2- SEOUL 3863 NODIS 2/2/68 CACTUS

3. DURING CONVERSATION WITH PSG THIS MORNING HE BROUGHT OUT FACT THAT ROKS HAVE DONE SUBSTANTIAL AMOUNT OF MILITARY PLANNING. I AVOIDED DISCUSSION

PAGE 3 3863E ~~SECRET~~

ON THIS BY SAYING WE STILL VERY MUCH IN DIPLOMATIC STAGE OF OUR EFFORT AND THAT PRESENT NOT GOOD TIME FOR DISCUSSION OF MILITARY ASPECTS. I REMINDED THIM THAT WE WERE PLEASED TO HAVE PRESENT PARK'S ASSURANCE THAT THERE WOULD BE NO UNILATERAL REACTION BY ROKS. LEE HURAK SAID HE UNDERSTOOD BUT TIME MAY BE APPROACHING FOR SERIOUS DISCUSSION OF MILITARY MATTERS.

4. WHILE THEY HAVE THUS FAR BEEN AMENABLE TO INTENSIVE PERSUASION AND HAVE ACCEPTED OUR TACTICS, IT WILL BE APPARENT TO YOU THAT DESIRABILITY OF MILITARY ACTION AGAINST NK'S RUNS PERSISTENTLY THROUGH THEIR THOUGHTS AND UTTERANCES.

GP-3. PORTER
BT

Y. H. Park

NNNN

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PAGE 01 SEOUL 03894 021309Z

A2
ACTION EA 15

INFO CIAE 00, DODE 00, GPM 03, H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSAE 00, NSC 10, P 04,
RSC 01, SC 01, SP 02, SS 20, USIA 12, AID 28, SAH 03, IO 13, RSR 01,
MM 01, /126 W

R 021028Z FEB 68
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8763
INFO CINCPAC

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CINCPAC FOR POLAD

SUBJECT: PRESIDENT PARK SPEAKS ON KOREAN CRISIS

1. IN GROUND BREAKING CEREMONY FOR SEOUL-PUSAN EXPRESSWAY FEB 1, PRESIDENT PARK TOLD NATIONWIDE RADIO AND TV AUDIENCE THERE IS LIMIT TO ROK PATIENCE, TOLERANCE AND RESTRAINT IN FACE OF INCREASING NK PROVOCATIONS. SPEAKING PUBLICLY FOR FIRST TIME SINCE BLUE HOUSE RAID, PARK

PAGE 2 RUALOS 3894E ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
SAID COMMUNISTS SHOULD KNOW HE IS MAKING THIS WARNING RESOLUTELY AND CLEARLY.

2. PARK SAID ROK ARMED FORCES PREPARED HEAD OFF PROMPTLY ANY COMMUNIST AGGRESSIVE ATTEMPTS UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES AT ANY TIME, THERE WOULD BE NO

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REPETITION OF 1950 COMMUNIST VICTORY, AND NK SUBVERSIVE TACTICS WOULD NOT SUCCEED. ROK WISHED EARLY UNIFICATION BUT DID NOT WANT HOSTILITIES BETWEEN BROTHERS TO BE MEAN THEREFOR. PARK REAFFIRMED ROKG UNIFICATION POLICY CONTINUES TO FOLLOW UN FORMULA FOR PEACEFUL ELECTIONS THROUGHOUT ALL KOREA AND AT SAME TIME CALLED FOR CONTINUED ECONOMIC CONSTRUCTION AS PATHWAY TOWARD UNIFICATION.

3. IN REVIEW NK INTENTIONS AND MOTIVATIONS, PARK SAID NK WILL INTENSIFY RASH AND ILL-ADVISED PROVOCATIVE ACTIONS, TAKING ADVANTAGE OF TOKG POLICY NOT TO RESORT TO ARMS TO ACHIEVE UNIFICATION. COMMUNISTS HAVE PLOTTED SABOTAGE BECAUSE FEEL THREATENED.

PAGE 3 RUALOS 3894E ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
IRRITATED AND JEALOUS OF ROK SUCCESSSES AND ARE LOOKING FOR OPPORTUNITY GENERATE ANOTHER KOREAN WAR TRYING TO FOMENT SOCIAL CHAOS IN SOUTH.
NK ALSO AIMS AT BLOCKING FOREIGN COOPERATION WITH ROK, PARTICULARLY FOREIGN INVESTMENT.

4. COMMENT: PARKS TOUGH PUBLIC REMARKS, TAKEN WITH EVEN TOUGHER STATEMENT OF PRIMIN TO NATIONAL ASSEMBLY (SEPTEL), DOUBTLESS MATCHES MOOD OF PEOPLE AND DESIGNED IN PART REASSURE THEM OF GOVERNMENT DETERMINATION FACE CRISIS HEAD-ON, BUT ARE CAREFULLY BALANCED BY REAFFIRMATION OF CONTINUING ROK ADHERENCE TO UN OBJECTIVE OF PEACEFUL UNIFICATION. AT SAME TIME, SPEECH IS CLEAR WARNING TO WHOEVER IS LISTENING THAT ROK NOT PREPARED TOLERATE CONTINUED TERRORIST RAIS OR SUBVERSIVE ACTIONS WITHOUT STRIKING BACK.

EXEMPT. PORTER

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ACTION EA 15

INFO CIAE 00, DODE 00, GPM 03, H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSAE 00, NSC 10, P 04,
RSC 01, SC 01, SP 02, SS 20, USIA 12, SAH 03, NIC 01, ACDA 16, IO 13,
AID 28, RSR 01, MM 01, 143 W

R 021010Z FEB 68
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8764
INFO CINCPAC
USUN NEW YORK 272

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SUBJECT: NATIONAL ASSEMBLY MEETS/PUBLIC REACTION

REF: SEOUL 3811

1. NATIONAL ASSEMBLY HEARD REPORTS FROM PRIMIN, FONMIN, MND AND YXME MINISTER FEB 1 ON SINGLE AGENDA ITEM NORTH KOREAN INTRUSION.

2. PRIMIN TOLD ASSEMBLY ROK HAS ENTERED ONE OF MOST

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PAGE 2 RUALOS 3895E ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
CRITICAL PHASES. IT FACED WITH CRUCIAL QUESTION WHETHER
ROK SHOULD MAINTAIN PASSIVE ATTITUDE AS NORTH KOREA CONTINUES
SEND ARMED AGENTS TO SOUTH AND ATTEMPTS UNIFY LAND BY FORCE.
ARE WE, HE ASKED, "SUPPOSED TO HONOR ONE-SIDELY THE ARMISTICE
AGREEMENT AND ONLY CAPTURE THOSE INFILTRATING COMMUNIST
BADITS?" HE "IS FULL OF THOUGHTS." PRIMIN SAID, "TO GIVE

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WITHOUT DELAY THE COMMUNISTS A LESSON... IF CIRCUMSTANCES ALLOW AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION CAN BE REALIZED."

3. PRIMIN ALSO OUTLINED PRECAUTIONARY MEASURES ROKG TAKING AGAINST FURTHER INFILTRATION: (A) REPLACING WORN-OUT EQUIPMENT WITH SOME ALREADY BEING AIRLIFTED FROM US; (B) EXPEDITING INTRODUCTION OF EQUIPMENT FOR PROTECTION OF MAJOR INDUSTRIAL FACILITIES; AND (C) WITH US COOPERATION AND UNDERSTANDING, ORGANIZING AND TRAINING SPECIAL TASK FORCES.

4. PRIMIN APOLOGIZED ON BEHALF OF CABINET FOR FAILING TO PREVENT ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT ON CHIEF OF STATE AND SAID PRESIDENT HAD REJECTED INTENTION OF ALL MINISTERS TO RESIGN OVER INCIDENT.

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5. FONMIN RECITED CONTENTS OF STATEMENT HE RELEASED TO PRESS JAN 31. HOME MINISTER BRIEFLY REPORTED ON POLICE ACTIVITIES.

6. MND PRESENTED LONG REPORT ON NK PREPARATIONS FOR CONTINUED AGGRESSIVE ACTIONS AND OUTLINED PLANS TO COUNTER NK INCLUDING ENACTMENT OF CIVIL DEFENSE BILL AND EXPEDITING MODERNIZATION OF ROKA. MND SAID SOME COUNTER-ESPIONAGE EQUIPMENT RECEIVED ALREADY FROM US, BUT NOT ENOUGH. HE DESCRIBED MILITARY ACTIONS TO APPREHEND NK AGENTS AND EXPLAINED THAT PUBLICITY ON SIGHTED AGENTS WAS SUPPRESSED FOR FEAR OF DISTURBING PUBLIC AND ALSO BECAUSE ROKA/POLICE ESTIMATED THAT AGENTS, HAVING BEEN DISCOVERED, MIGHT NOT RPT NOT TRY TO ENTER SEOUL. MND ALSO CALIMED THAT "8TH ARMY AUTHORITIES" HESITATED TO PERMIT ROK DIVISION BE PLACED BEHIND 2ND INF DIV DURING SWEEP OPERATION FOR FEAR OF UNILATERAL ROKA RETALIATORY ACTION. HOWEVER, MND CLAIMED THAT HE PERSUADED 8TH ARMY AUTHORITIES OTHERWISE. BOTH FONMIN AND MND OFFERED TO PROVIDE ADDITIONAL DATA ON ROKG

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PAGE 03 SEOUL 03895 021335Z

PAGE 4 RUALDS 3895E ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
POLICIES AT CLOSED DOOR SESSIONS OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND
NATIONAL DEFENSE COMMITTEES. INTERPELLATIONS WILL BEGIN
FEB 2, AND ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION ON CURRENT SITUATION, FOR
WHICH ASSEMBLY WAS CONVENED, PROBABLY WILL BE PASSED EARLY
NEXT WEEK.

7. FOLLOWING STRONG JAN 31 PRESS STATEMENT BY FONMIN
(REFTEL), PRESS REEMPHASIZED NEED FOR "RESOLUTE ACTION"
AGAINST NORTH KOREANS AND TERMED US POSTURE OF SEEKING
DIPLOMATIC SETTLEMENT AS "APPEASEMENT, INDECISIVE,
DISAPPOINTING, WISHFUL THINKING, AND NONSENSTCAL." RALLIES
OF LAST FEW DAYS ALSO PROMPTED PRESS TO NOTE MASS PROTEST MOVEMENT
THROUGHOUT COUNTRY. ONLY EXCLUSIVELY ADULT RALLY, HOWEVER,
IS ONE PLANNED BY TRADE UNION THIS WEEKEND; OTHERS HAVE
BEEN CONSPICUOUS BY PRESENCE OF HIGH SCHOOL STUDENTS
COLLEGES ON VACATION UNTIL EARLY MARCH.

8. DECON FOLLOWING ONE YEAR.

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PAGE 01 SEOUL 23896 021346Z

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ACTION EA 15

INFO IO 13, CIAE 00, DODE 00, GPM 03, H 12, INR 07, L 23, NSAE 00, NSC 10,
P 04, RSC 01, SC 01, SP 02, SS 20, USIA 12, SAH 03, EUR 15, AID 28,
NIC 01, RSR 01, MM 01, /142 W

R 021020Z FEB 68
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8765
INFO CINCPAC
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 273

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SEOUL 3896

SUBJECT: PUBLIC REACTION TO NK INTRUSION AND PUEBLO SEIZURE

1. NATIONAL ASSEMBLY. NDP LEADER YU-CHIN-O AND DRP ASSEMBLYMAN YI MAN-SOP INTERPELLATED PM, HND, FONMIN AND HOME MIN FEB 2. ENTIRE RANGE OF ISSUES RAISED WITH NO CLEAR FOCAL POINT OF INTEREST. FULFILLMENT OF BROWN MEMORANDUM, MODERNIZATION OF ROKA, RESPONSIBILITY

PAGE 2 RUALOS 3896E ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ LIMITED OFFICIAL USE FOR NK INTRUSION AND OPERATIONAL CONTROL OVER ROK FORCES WERE AMONG QUERIES. HND RESPONDED THAT DELAY IN EXECUTION OF BROWN MEMO MEANS DELAY IN MODERNIZATION OF ROKA AND SUPPLY OF COUNTER-ESPIONAGE EQUIPMENT. PM REVEALED THAT CONSTRUCTION OF SMALL

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Department of State

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TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02 SEOUL 03896 021346Z

ARMS MUNITIONS PLANT IS PLANNED;
FONMIN TOLD ASSEMBLY THAT USG IS GIVING EQUAL
WEIGHT TO NK INTRUSION AND PUEBLO SEIZURE (QUOTES
PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S JAN 25 STATEMENT). FONMIN ALSO
SAID THAT US AND 14 NATIONS OF KOREAN WAR WILL
COORDINATE WITH ROKG IN DEFENSE OF ROK; HND SAID
WITHDRAWAL OF AUGMENTED US FORCES AFTER PUEBLO
RETURNED DEPENDS ON SITUATION AND THAT NO PROBLEMS
ENCOUNTERED BY HAVING ROK FORCES UNDER UNC OPERATIONAL
CONTROL; FINALLY, FONMIN SAID ROKG WILL NOT BLINDLY
SUPPORT PANMUNJOM TALKS BECAUSE OF OWN EXPERIENCES
THERE. INTERPELLATIONS CONTINUE FEB. 3.

2. PUEBLO AT PANMUNJOM. GRUDING APPROVAL MARKED
BOTH OFFICIAL AND PRESS INITIAL REACTION TO USG

PAGE 3 RUALOS 3896 ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
ANNOUNCEMENT THAT US WILLING TO DISCUSS PUEBLO CASE
AT PANMUNJOM. MOFA VICE MINISTER CHIN PIL-SIK QUOTED
IN PRESS SAYING "IT IS MORE FAVORABLE (TOHLOI) TO HAVE
SEIZURE DISCUSSED AT PANMUNJOM THAN AT UN OR IN THIRD
COUNTRY; HOWEVER, DOUBTFUL THAT PRODUCTIVE RESULTS
WILL EMERGE." INDEPENDENT CHUNGANG ILBOECHOED
THIS LINE SAYING MILITARY ACTION IS ONLY
SOLUTION; ARMISTICE COMMISSION HISTORICALLY INEF-
FECTIVE AND NK INTRUSION INCIDENT PLAYED DOWN AS
RESULT THIS DECISION.

3. TWO MORE US DIVISIONS? ALL PAPERS FEATURED FEB 2 N
Y TIMES STORY THAT US RUMORS OF CALLING UP RESERVES
COULD MEAN US WILL SEND TWO MORE COMBAT DIVISIONS TO
ROK.

** ANOTHER RALLY. SEOUL TREATED TO ANOTHER "SPONTANEOUS"
RALLY FEB 2 AT CITIZENS HALL OF ARTISTS AND ACTORS GUILD.
GROUP OF 300, AFTER PRONOUNCEMENTS VILLIFYING
NORTH KOREANS, PARADED PEACEFULLY THROUGH DOWNTOWN

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TELEGRAM

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PAGE 4 RUALOS 3896E ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
STREETS AND PAST EMBASSY.

S. PRESS. GENERAL EDITORIAL TONE HAS SHIFTED SOMEWHAT FROM SHRILL, FRUSTRATED CALLS FOR IMMEDIATE RETALIATION TO MORE CONSIDERED ANALYSES OF BROADER ISSUES. HEIGHTENED TENSION IN VIET-NAM AND SUSPICION THAT COMMUNIST TACTICS THERE AND IN ROK MAY BE PART OF OVERALL COMMUNIST STRATEGY PLUS GROWING AWARENESS OF US MILITARY BUILD-UP PROBABLY ACCOUNTS FOR CHANGED MOOD.

EXEMPT. PORTER

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

50

SECRET/NODIS/CACTUS

February 2, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROSTOW

SUBJECT: Next Korean Moves

Berger and Doherty were encouraged by the first meeting, saying that the North Koreans obviously wanted to keep the door open. I am not. It was completely negative. Berger feels that the North Koreans find themselves in a box and want a fairly prompt out. I think nothing of the sort. I think they will want to prolong ~~meetings~~ meetings because:

- the status quo is a victory for them;
- prolonged meetings without result will greatly exacerbate our relations with ROA (already worrisome);
- ^{for} further exploitation of ship and crew;
- enormous prestige from keeping the great United States on the hook longer;
- the Soviets have reportedly predicted to the North Koreans that our reaction to the Pueblo seizure would be mild and so far the North Koreans may feel that this has been the case, despite our show of force; *hence rope is prolonged;*
- in addition to prestige arising from keeping us on the hook, there is also prestige arising from "equality" in bilateral talks under less than UNC auspices.

We must carefully watch people at State who tend to think of next steps at Panmunjom chiefly in terms of valid arguments. It is important to remember that we tend to talk from Aristotelian, syllogistic logic, whereas the North Koreans think only in terms of Communist dialectic "logic." That difference was never more apparent than from the verbatim account of last night's meeting. The entire meeting was completely in character.

I do not believe we will budge these people short of a careful, reasoned raising of the temperature. However, I think it probable that we should wait 48 hours after the last meeting to see whether there will be a prompt second meeting at which we can take their temperature better. We could not expect any reading from this first encounter. We should not wait much

longer before... (faint, illegible text)

[Handwritten signature]
Richard [illegible]

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-318
By iso, NARA Date 9-21-97

~~SECRET~~

February 2, 1968.

DEVELOPMENTS BEYOND THE NEXT MEETING IN PANMUNJOM

The North Korean representative at the February 2 meeting implied the possibility of release for the PUEBLO and crew if the United States were to accept the North Korean version of the facts and acknowledge that an act of aggression had occurred involving a US violation of the Korean Armistice Agreement. The North Koreans might also press for an apology and an assurance that there would be no repetition. Release might be obtained if the United States were prepared to sign a statement or receipt incorporating the above elements.

Our scenario for the next meeting has been prepared for the purpose of setting forth fully the US position. We do not suppose that it will induce any release by North Korea. It contains one forthcoming element, in the form of a proposal to hold a US investigation and to express regret publicly if that investigation bears out the North Korean version of the facts. There are a number of other moves that can be made by the two sides in subsequent meetings.

The North Koreans, for example, may peel off various of the elements from their package. Or they might propose that any release be in exchange for North Koreans held prisoner in the ROK. They might conceivably agree to release of the officers and crew while retaining the vessel. Or they might agree to release of the officers and crew minus the captain, whom they might wish to hold for a further period as they did in 1967 with the captain of a Japanese fishing vessel.

Other North Korean positions are also conceivable, and should surface in the next meetings.

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-3-

5. Still another variant would be release accompanied by a statement that the decision to effect release was made by North Korea without prejudice to its right to demand satisfaction.

6. Still another possibility would be a statement recounting that the PUEBLO had been taken into custody by North Korea on January 23 and that release was being effected on the understanding that the United States would ensure that its vessels do not enter into the territorial sea of North Korea. [This statement would be phrased in a way that could not properly be interpreted as an admission of guilt.]

7. We might want to consider, as a move to be made by the United States at some point, the withdrawal of naval units currently operating south of the 38th parallel, if such an action would be decisive in obtaining release.

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SANITIZED

DOS
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Korean

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55a

MEMORANDUM

February 2, 1968

1485

Subject: Third Country Approaches to North Korea on the Pueblo Incident

With the possible exception of the USSR, which is treated separately, there are few countries which could be expected to serve as effective channels to North Korea either for the relay of messages from the US or for support in the advocacy of courses of action.

Romania, Japan, Indonesia, and the NNSC nations (Switzerland, Sweden, Czechoslovakia, Poland) are possible candidates. The potential of each is discussed in the attached pages with a brief description of what these countries have already done along this line and such indications as we have of their willingness to undertake further steps.

We doubt that these countries, either collectively or separately, can have any decisive influence on North Korea. Their potential is greater for the transmission of messages in confidence than for effective advocacy. The Swiss or the Swedes would probably serve best as confidential messengers through their roles as members of the NNSC.

SANITIZED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 97-318

By is, NARA Date 7-21-97

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ROMANIA - NORTH KOREA

Romanian Foreign Ministry officials reacted noncommittally to our request that they impress on the North Koreans the gravity of the situation created by the seizure of the Pueblo. However, our charge got the impression the Romanians were genuinely concerned and might make some useful expression to North Korea -- probably independently of any Russian approaches. We have no information as to whether they have done so, but they certainly have at least discussed the situation, since the powerful RCP Permanent Presidium Member Apostol is now visiting Pyongyang.

Romania has close relations with North Korea and fair potential as a channel of communication -- provided the contents of the communication meet with the Romanian's approval and they see some real prospect of influencing the situation.

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(b)

JAPAN - NORTH KOREA

The GOJ has made no formal approaches to the North Korean authorities, and has told us it is unable to do so because of the absence of diplomatic relations.

SANITIZED

Negotiations in Colombo on Korean repatriation between the Japanese Red Cross and the North Korean Red Cross were broken off on January 24 --- according to Foreign Minister Miki, by the North Koreans who abruptly presented demands which they knew the Japanese could not accept. The GOJ has been in touch with the Japanese Red Cross to determine if they could do anything through their North Korean contacts, without apparent result so far. There appears to be little prospect for successful Japanese approaches through the Red Cross, especially in view of the likelihood that the Colombo talks were purposely broken off by the North Koreans in order to forestall such approaches.

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INDONESIA - NORTH KOREA

Foreign Minister Malik, with alacrity and in apparent genuine support for the U.S. position, agreed to cable the Indonesian Ambassador in Pyongyang instructing him to inform the North Korean authorities of Indonesia's concern and to urge immediate release of the Pueblo and crew to prevent further deterioration of the situation. He saw no point in raising the matter with the North Korean Ambassador in Djakarta, but promised to take the same line with him if he brought it up.

Indonesia's potential as a channel of communication to North Korea is fair to poor. Relations between the two countries have progressively cooled as Indonesia has drawn closer to South Korea, sending delegations to Seoul and recently allowing the ROK to establish a Consulate General in Djakarta.

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NNSC NATIONS - NORTH KOREA

Switzerland - Switzerland offered the U.S. its "good offices" in delivering messages to North Korea, after inquiring from North Korea if it would receive such messages and contingent upon the direct contact with North Korea. In the NNSC, the Swiss member indicated that he was under firm instructions from his Government to avoid any moves which could possibly be construed as political dealings with North Korea. Nevertheless, in view of the Swiss tradition of using its good offices (e.g. they are looking after our interests in Cuba) it appears that, if we desire, the Swiss would try to help at least to the extent of transmitting messages.

Sweden - Foreign Minister Nilsson issued a bland statement to the effect:

- 1) None of the parties want a military confrontation.
- 2) He hopes the Security Council can solve the problem. If it does not, the Great Powers should.
- 3) If parties want a solution, Sweden is prepared to help.

Czechoslovakia - We have as yet no indication that the Czechs have approached Pyongyang. They have given us no encouragement to believe that they will do so, beyond saying that they too take a serious view of the matter and that the Foreign Minister would "initiate immediate action" on a request for information about the welfare of the crew. The Czechs have told our Embassy in Prague that they regard the United States as being entirely to blame for the Pueblo incident.

Poland - Vice Minister Winiewicz informed our Embassy that Poland's influence is "extremely restricted" and he could see no possibility of being helpful. He said it was doubtful the Supervisory Commission could do more at this time to identify the wounded crew members, but this needed study. He added that he hoped the US would not take steps that everyone would regret.

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MEMORANDUM

February 2, 1968

Subject: Third Country Approaches to the USSR on the Pueblo Incident

Many countries have made contact with the USSR to express their concern over developments in Korea or to advocate Soviet intercession with Pyongyang. Their limited ability to influence the USSR has been largely expended and another round of US-stimulated approaches would be counterproductive. For those countries sympathetic to our cause, our best course is to encourage support for the US at the UN and by public statement.

Because of their special relationship with the USSR, Japan, India, France and Romania could speak with influence in Moscow. Their activities thus far in the Korean crisis are discussed on the separate pages attached. Of these nations, only Japan shares our view of the North Korean behavior and could be relied upon at present to be our unambiguous advocate in Moscow.


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(b)

JAPAN - USSR



SANITIZED

Ambassador

Johnson considers it possible that, by playing on the theme of common GOJ - Soviet interests in the Sea of Japan and the Soviets' interest in their relations with Japan, Miki might conceivably be able to bring some useful influence to bear on the USSR.

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~~SECRET/LIMDIS~~

INDIA - USSR

Foreign Secretary Dayal seemed much impressed by Ambassador Bowles' approach on January 26, and said he was sure Mrs. Gandhi would make a strong pitch to Kosygin, then in Delhi, to persuade North Korea to cease and desist. We do not know how strong a pitch Mrs. Gandhi made; we have only a report of Kosygin's calm and evasive reaction.

In the UN, the Indian Permanent Representative told a USUN officer on January 30 that India is anxious not to do anything unhelpful to the U.S. on the Pueblo question. He said that unless the U.S. has other channels to North Korea, the Afro-Asian members of the Security Council do not understand the U.S. opposition to extending an invitation to North Korea, feeling that such contact might be helpful.

Thus far India has not committed itself on the incident, but Mrs. Gandhi took the occasion of her conversation with the Shah on January 29 to say that Kosygin had contended that the Pueblo was in fact in North Korean territorial waters and that the ship's log proved it.

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FRANCE - USSR

In view of the likelihood of a refusal and the dim prospect of any favorable result, Ambassador Bohlen did not ask the French to approach the Soviets. A high Foreign Office official speculated that the French response to our demarche would depend on whether the government considered the event an isolated incident or part of the broader Southeast Asian conflict. In the latter (and far more likely) case, France would not alienate Hanoi by voting against North Korea in the Security Council.

Ambassador Bohlen subsequently emphasized to De Gaulle the importance with which we view acts of piracy in international waters, and told him how we handled Soviet vessels on comparable missions which strayed into our territorial waters. De Gaulle expressed no opinion, and confined himself to saying there did not seem to be much that France could do in the situation.

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ROMANIA - USSR

The independent-minded Romanians, whose relations with the Soviets have been under considerable strain, would not likely seek to influence Moscow toward any specific action. Deputy Foreign Minister Burlacu told the Israeli Minister in Bucharest on January 27 that he doubted any "socialist republic" would undertake intercession on behalf of the U.S. Romanian Permanent Presidium Member Apostol, who arrived in Pyongyang January 30, no doubt has discussed Pueblo with the North Koreans, who utilized a reception for Apostol to make their offer to talk with the U.S. at Panmunjom. Romanian official commentary has been cautiously phrased, quoting acerbic Korean statements, but also noting U.S. explanations and calling for "calm" in resolving the crisis.

~~SECRET~~

from the journal
of S. P. Kozyrev,

2 February 1968
N° 140/GS-ns

Record of a conversation with Canadian Ambassador to the USSR R. Ford

2 February 1968

I received Ford at his request.

Referring to our conversation of 28 January about the detention of the American ship by the DPRK Ford said that he would like to continue the discussion of this issue. If he correctly understood the point of view of the Soviet side it basically comes down to the following: 1) the US should not yield to emotion and should examine the issues associated with this incident in a calm businesslike atmosphere; 2) the US should abandon the threat to use force in order to settle the incident; 3) there should be direct talks about this issue between the Americans and the North Koreans; 4) it is necessary to eliminate the fever of propaganda and the campaign and uproar around the discussion of this matter in the Security Council.

The Ambassador noted that the government of Canada is grateful with respect to these ideas and, for its part, has used its influence both in Washington and New York for the quickest possible settlement of the incident by customary peaceful means. At the present time it seems that there is an opportunity to begin direct talks between the Americans and the North Koreans within the framework of the Armistice Observation Commission [Translator's note: SIC, probably the Military Armistice Commission] in Korea and this opportunity ought not be lost.

Ford then reported that the Canadian government was especially interested in the Americans purpose in sending the aircraft carrier Eisenhower and other American warships to the shores of the DPRK. The Americans, in the Ambassador's words, replied in the sense that the interested sides themselves can determine with what purpose the American ships were sent to this region, especially since the Eisenhower is located 290 miles from Pusan and not Wonsan, which substantially changes the matter.

The Ambassador noted that the Soviet side of course cannot verify the reliability of this information and expressed a desire to hear possible additional views of the Soviet side with respect the prospects for settling the incident with the American ship Pueblo.

I promised to report to the Minister about the ideas expressed by the Ambassador.

I then said that the position of the Soviet Union about the incident was described in detail during the last conversation.

As regards the Ambassador's comment regarding American attempts to discuss this issue in the Security Council, the Soviet Union has always opposed and does oppose putting the Korean issue on the Security Council's agenda. Right now the issue concerning this incident is about reasons of principle and not just because this promotes the spreading the uproar around the incident with the Pueblo which has begun in the US. I expressed satisfaction about the favorable attitude of the Canadian government toward the position of the Soviet Union with regard to the issue about the Pueblo incident and the efforts undertaken by Canada in order to settle this incident with the methods which are customary and generally accepted in international practice. I stressed the importance of settling this question through direct talks between the interested countries, that is, between the US and the DPRK.

As regards the aircraft carrier Eisenhower and the other American warships then they were undoubtedly sent to the shores of Korea with the object of placing pressure on the DPRK. The transfer of combat aircraft to South Korea is being done for these same purposes. It stands to reason that the DPRK will not agree to a settlement under the threat of their use of force or pressure in any form whatsoever.

Having noted that he was expressing his personal opinion, Ford tried to make a link between the latest serious attacks against the Americans by South Vietnamese patriots and the incident with the ship Pueblo. Personally he, the Ambassador, does not believe that such a connection exists but if it does this undoubtedly complicates the position of the Americans and, in particular, the withdrawal of their troops from Korea. The Ambassador was then interested in whether talks between the Koreans and the Americans would lead to positive results.

I replied that there really is a connection between the events in Vietnam and Korea in the sense that the US is pursuing the same policy of aggression and interference in the internal affairs of Vietnam, Korea, and other countries. The Americans love to talk of their desire for peace and a easing of tensions, however the facts and their deeds are evidence of the opposite. The US does not want to withdraw its troops from Korea and other countries and continues provocative acts against the peoples of these countries, leading matters to a worsening of the situation. The Canadian government knows very well the point of settlement of the Soviet side with regard to US foreign policy. As regards the actions of the South Vietnamese patriots, we understand these actions for no people can live under the bayonets of occupiers.

I told the Ambassador about a statement of a senior DPRK leader, in which it clearly said that the DPRK government is not willing to talk with the US under

pressure or threats but will be ready to talk with the Americans if they want a settlement by the customary means accepted in international practice. In this event, it is the US which is violating international law and the sovereignty of the DPRK, and it ought to take steps in the direction of settling this matter. The ball is now in their court.

In connection with the Ambassador's statement with regard to a so-called stage-by-stage solution of the problems in this region, namely first settling the Pueblo incident and then the Vietnamese problem, I said that here, too, everything depends on the US and its approaches to these problems. If the US really wants a peaceful settlement of these problems then they ought to act in a different manner. However, their words about a desire for peace do not match their deeds. Instead of settling the Pueblo incident by customary peaceful means the US has begun to concentrate its naval forces along the shores of Korea and has increased its air forces in South Korea, thereby aggravating the already tense situation in this region further. The Americans are pursuing the same policy in Vietnam. Not without reason a few days ago P[aul] Martin, the Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs, called the US position with respect to settling the Vietnam conflict "inflexible"! However, Martin is evidently conscientiously mistaken for the Americans, judging from everything, are not trying to settle this problem at all and are pursuing the matter toward a further escalation of the war, refusing to stop the bombing and other military actions against the DRV, and are ignoring the proposals of the DRV and NFOYuV [National Front for the Liberation of Vietnam] with regard to ways to peacefully settle the Vietnam problem.

The Ambassador thanked [me] for the explanations.

Ye. N. Makeyev, Deputy Chief of the 2nd European Department, and V. I. Dolgov, 3rd Secretary of the Department, were present at the conversation.

DEPUTY MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS (S. Kozyrev)

Send to CPSU CC Politburo members and candidate members

27 February 1968. A. Gromyko

AVPRF. f. 102, op. 28, pap. 55, d. 2

Memorandum on an Information of 1 February 1968

[Source: MfAA C 1023/73; translated by Karen Riechert]

Embassy of the GDR in the DPRK, Pyongyang

2 February 1968

Stamped: confidential matter

On the day the "Pueblo" had been seized, there was no light in North Korea in the evening, for they were obviously afraid of serious consequences. Ever since, there are permanently jets in the air. Massive defense forces are concentrated in the harbor area. Although we believe the situation already being stabilized, there are rumors that people still expect the outbreak of a war. According to public talk, in case that South Korea should not attack, the DPRK would be required to do it. The situation should be ripe for that. A clear indication would be that workers in South Korea had risen up for armed struggle. There was much talk in this context, the DPRK would possess nuclear weapons. People are said to be convinced, that in case of war, the Soviet Union would fight on the side of the DPRK using nuclear weapons. China would also do so, because the "Pueblo" had invaded territorial waters of the DPRK and China would take sides in the wake of such an outrageous provocation.

A relative, who had already been called to the mountains for several months in summer to dig bunkers, is said to be assigned there again. Recently, the militias have exercises every Saturday and Sunday in larger groups, whereby they practice in particular long marches. All Koreans, starting at the age of five, have to carry their necessities in a backpack all the time.

[...]

Signed: Herrmann

302 FEB 1968: The Opening of Panmunjum Meetings Regarding Armed Communist Guerilla Incident and Pueblo Incident, and the South Korean Government's Position.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea
Urgent

Number: WUS-0214
Date: 022040

Recipient: Ambassador to the United States and Ambassador to the United Nations

Dae: USW-0205
UNW-0201

Through the followings and an aide-memoire, the government notified the United States embassy of its view of the Panmunjum meeting related with the recent incidents of the infiltration of the North Korean Puppet Regime armed agents and the seizure of the USS Pueblo. You are expected to inform the U.S Department of State and the United States Mission to the United Nations of the view of the Republic fo Korea and negotiate with them to realize it. (미일)(방교)

Minister

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CONFIDENTIAL

AIDE - MEMOIRE

162

With reference to the proposed discussions at the Military Armistice Commission meetings at Panmunjom regarding the issues currently pending at the United Nations Security Council, of which the Korean Ambassador in Washington was informed by Mr. Samuel D. Berger, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, on 1st February 1966, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea wishes to inform the Ambassador of the United States of America that the Government of the Republic of Korea interposes no objection to such discussions with the understanding that the two issues should be taken up simultaneously with equal importance attached thereto.

In this connection, the Korean Government takes the following position:

1. The Korean Government wishes to be assured that a series of north Korean Communists' armed infiltration to southern part of Korea, including the recent case of their dispatch of 31 armed terrorists into Seoul and the seizure of USS Pueblo by the north Korean Communists on the high seas off Wonsan, shall be simultaneously dealt with under the same agenda binding the two issues together.

It is reminded that the United States Government has repeatedly assured the Korean Government that the two issues will be treated with equal importance. It is also noted that the two questions have been dealt with

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simultaneously at recent sessions of the United Nations Security Council.

2. Regarding the case of north Korean Communists' armed intrusion into the southern part of Korea, the Korean Government sets forth the following requisities:

(a) North Korean Communists should admit that they committed the violations of the Armistice Agreement by sending large number of espionage agents in the past and particularly armed infiltration team to the southern part of Korea on or about January 19, 1968.

(b) The United Nations Command should be given by the Communist side an explicit assurance that the north Korean puppet regime will not repeat in the future the similar violation of the Armistice Agreement and will not cause threat to the security of the Republic of Korea.

3. Concerning the case of USS Pueblo, it is the strong desire of the Korean Government that the United States Government will take firm stand in handling this matter and see to it that the crew and the vessel be regained as soon as possible in an honourable way.

4. In view of the graveness of north Korean Communists' aggressive acts and the serious concern of the Korean public, it is strongly requested that the Military Armistice Commission meetings ON THESE ISSUES should be held in open session.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Seoul, February 2, 1968.

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Memorandum (section #: 729.55, record #: 2663)

02 FEB 1968: The Opening of Panmunjum Meetings Regarding Armed Communist Guerilla Incident and Pueblo Incident, and the South Korean Government's Position.

With regard to the trial of the Panmunjum Military Armistice Commission to bring all issues suspended on the United Nations Security Council into discussion, since the Ambassador to the United States in Washington was informed by Samuel D. Berger, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the U.S. Department of State, on February 1, 1968, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea informs the U.S. Ambassador to South Korea that the South Korean government does not raise any objection to the discussion under the conditions that equal importance will be given to both issues and dealt with simultaneously. The position of South Korean government is as follows;

1. The South Korean government wishes to be guaranteed that both issues, a series of armed infiltrations by the North Korean puppet regime into the South, including the recent incident that 31 armed communist guerillas dispatched to the South reached Seoul, and the seizure of the PUEBLO, the U.S. Navy intelligence collection ship, by the North Korean puppet regime in the international waters nearby Wonsan. Let me recall that the U.S. government repeatedly confirmed to the South Korean government that they will take both issues mentioned above with equally importance and deal with them, and also indicate that the United Nations Security Council has discussed two issues mentioned above together in recent meetings.
2. Concerning the aggressive acts of the North Korean puppet regime toward South Korea, the South Korean government gives necessary directions as follows;
 - (a) Admit that the North Korean puppet regime the violation of the Armistice Agreement by having dispatched a number of spies to the South in the past and sent, especially, armed communist guerrilla to the South on January 19, 1968.
 - (b) The Communist side must make an explicit guarantee to the United Nations Security Council that the North Korean puppet regime shall not repeat the same violation of the Armistice Agreement in the future and shall not threaten the security of Republic of Korea.
3. Regarding the PUEBLO Incident, the South Korean government has a strong

desire that the U.S. government takes the firm actions and regains all crew onboard and the vessel back in an honorable way as soon as possible.

4. Considering the importance of the provocative acts of the North Korean puppet regime and serious concern of South Korean people, we strongly requests that the Military Armistice Commission meeting should take place as an open session about these issues.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Seoul, February 2, 1968

II 3 4 5

With reference to the proposed discussions at the Military Armistice Commission meetings at Panmunjom regarding the issues currently pending at the United Nations Security Council, of which the Korean Ambassador in Washington was informed by Mr. Samuel D. Berger, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, on 1st February 1968, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea wishes to inform the Ambassador of the United States of America that the Government of the Republic of Korea interposes no objection to such discussions with the understanding that the two issues should be taken up simultaneously with equal importance attached thereto.

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II 3 4 5

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2. Regarding the case of north Korean Communists' armed intrusion into the southern part of Korea, the Korean Government sets forth the following requisites:

(a) North Korean Communists should admit that they committed the violations of the Armistice Agreement by sending large number of espionage agents in the past and particularly armed infiltration team to the southern part of Korea on or about January 19, 1968.

(b) The United Nations Command should be given by the Communist side an explicit assurance that the north Korean puppet regime will not repeat in the future the similar violation of the Armistice Agreement and will not cause threat to the security of the Republic of Korea.

3. Concerning the case of USS Pueblo, it is the strong desire of the Korean Government that the United States Government will take firm stand in handling this matter and see to it that the crew and the vessel be regained as soon as possible in an honourable way.

4. In view of the graveness of north Korean Communists' aggressive acts and the serious concern of the Korean public, it is strongly requested that the Military Armistice Commission meetings ON THESE ISSUES should be held in open session.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Seoul, February 2, 1968.

II 급 비 밀

68-3-127



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

21
ACTION COPY

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DE RUALOS 3901 0315
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 030245Z FEB 68
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8870
STATE GRNC
BT
~~SECRET~~ SEOUL 3901

CN-842Q
February 3, 1967,
12:53 a.m.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority FRUS, 64-68, xxix, Korea 1st

By yw, NARA, Date 11-12-97

NODIS/CACTUS

REF: STATE 106085

1. PRINCIPAL ITEM DISCUSSED BY PRESIDENT PARK DURING MY CALL ON HIM (AT HIS REQUEST) YESTERDAY EVENING WAS ALONG LINES PREVIOUSLY CONVEYED TO YOU, I.E. THEIR PESSIMISTIC VIEW OF LIKELIHOOD THAT THEY, AND PERHAPS U.S. AS WELL, WILL GET NO SATISFACTION FROM NORTH KOREANS. THIS TIME, HOWEVER, SOMETHING NEW WAS ADDED: HE SAID THAT IF ROKG DOES NOT GET GUARANTEE THAT NK'S WILL DESIST FROM THEIR AGGRESSIVE ACTIVITIES, AND

✓ MK
Get memo let
then P. [unclear] think
[unclear]
[unclear]

PAGE 2 RUALOS 3901 ~~SECRET~~
THERE IS ANOTHER INCIDENT. ROKG WILL TAKE RETALIATORY MEASURES.

2. PARK SAID HE KNEW THAT THE COMMUNIST SIDE IS HOPING TO BRING ABOUT A SPLIT BETWEEN US-ROKG COOPERATION, AND THAT UNCOORDINATED MEASURES WOULD MAKE AMERICAN CONGRESS AND PEOPLE UNHAPPY, BUT BASIC FACT OF MATTER IS THAT UNLESS AND UNTIL NORTH KOREANS ARE HIT SHARPLY THEY WILL CONTINUE TO CREATE DISTURBED CONDITIONS AND KILL HIS PEOPLE.

3. I SAID HE KNOWS MY GOVERNMENT IS TAKING MANY STEPS TO STRENGTHEN THE POSITION HERE, WHATEVER CIRCUMSTANCES MAY PREVAIL, AND REGARDLESS OF VERY REAL PROVOCATION TO WHICH ROKG HAS BEEN AND MAY YET BE SUBJECTED, WE ARE COUNTING ON FULL AND COMPLETE CONSISTATION WITH HIM AND HIS GOVERNMENT PRIOR TO ANY ACTIN THEY MIGHT BE CONSIDERING. THIS WAS WHAT WE HAD BEEN CAREFUL TO DO WITH THEM IN THE PRESENT CRISIS AND WE EXPECT NO LESS FROM THEM.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

2- SEOUL 3901 NODIS CACTUS 2/3/68

PAGE-3 RUALOS 3901 ~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~
THE SERIOUSNESS OF UNCOORDINATED ACTION LAY IN FACT THAT IT WOULD UNDERMINE MUTUAL CONFIDENCE AND ITS BAD EFFECTS COULD OUTLAST THAT OF ANY PARTICULAR INCIDENT. (PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S STATEMENT ON PARK TO PRESS YESTERDAY JUST RECEIVED. IT IS MOST USEFUL AT THIS POINT AND IS BEING TAKEN TO PARK IMMEDIATELY.)

4. PARK SAID HE DID NOT MEAN TO IMPART DOUBT OF HIS CLOSEST ALLY IN ANY WAY, BUT HE DOES HAVE WORRIES AS TO THE POSITION ROKG WILL BE IN, PARTICULARLY IF PUEBLO AND CREW RETURNED AND NORTH KOREANS CONTINUE THEIR RAIDS ON THE SOUTH. I REMINDED HIM OF STATEMENT I HAD MADE TO HIM (WHICH WAS BASED ON PARA SIX OF REFTTEL), NK'S WILL CLEARLY UNDERSTAND THAT PUEBLO AND CREW ARE NOT END OF PROBLEM AND THAT WE WILL REMAIN EQUALLY CONCERNED ABOUT GRAVITY OF ARMY'S VIOLATIONS. I SAID I HOPED HIS ARMY HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED TO AVOID INCIDENTS ALONG DMZ. HE SAID THAT ARMY HAS STRICT INSTRUCTIONS IN THAT SENSE AND THAT WE HAVE HIS

PAGE-4 RUALOS 3901 ~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~
ASSURANCE THAT THERE WILL BE NO RPT NO ROK UNILATERAL ACTION IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES. THE REMARKS HE HAD JUST MADE APPLY TO THE FUTURE POSITION, I SAID I HAD MADE OUR POSITION AS CLEAR AS I POSSIBLY COULD.

5. COMMENT: THIS EXCHANGE WAS VERY FIRM, BUT WITHOUT HEAT. HE WAS TELLING ME AND I WAS TELLING HIM. HIS REMARKS REFLECT HARD LINE OF MANY OF HIS MINISTERS, PARTY ELEMENTS AND THE GENERALS. WE ARE THE COUNTERWEIGHT TO THE TYPE OF PRESSURE THEY ARE EXERTING. I EXPECT OUR VIEWS WILL CONTINUE TO PREVAIL UNLESS THERE IS ANOTHER SEVERE RAID THOUGH THERE IS ALWAYS DANGER THAT ROK UNIT WILL MAKE -UNAUTHORIZED- THRUST ACROSS DMZ. THERE MAY BE A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF BAD HUMOR AND DISCONTENT HERE LATER, BUT THAT SHOULD PASS AS WE IMPLEMENT MAP AND OTHER PROGRAMS ALREADY UNDER WAY.

GP-2
PORTER
BT

~~SECRET~~

03 FEB 1968: Personal Letter from President Park Chung Hee to U.S. President Johnson.)
(section #: 729.55, record #: 2662)

His Excellence President Johnson of the United States

A Personal Letter from the President Park (draft)

Dear Mr. President,

I, together with the Korean people, cannot suppress anger that lately the North Korean puppet regime committed brutal acts sending a group of armed spies to infiltrate into Seoul and to commit murders as well as seizing the naval ship of the United States, and would like to express my gratitude for your efforts and cooperation with respect to this issue.

It is viewed that a series of the most serious provocative acts since the armistice intends to create an insecure state in South Korea and interfere with our economic development and check the allied military actions of both the United States and South Korea in Vietnam, however, such provocative acts of the North Korean puppet regime is enlarging threats not only over the Korean Peninsula but also over the Far East and the Pacific region at the same time. In this situation, that we are not able to rule out the possibility that such aggressive acts of the enemy will continue on a larger scale, I think we must necessarily block an attempt of massive aggression of the enemy that may occur in the future, by taking firm joint actions of the United States and Korea.

Communists avoid confrontation with the strong and always watch for the weak points. For the security of the whole Pacific Region, we should not allow communists create a vacuum of power in the Far East and invade in South Korea.

In this phase, the discussion of this issue in the United Nations Security Council has not reached any effective measures so far, and I would like to stress that it is urgent to drastically readjust and strengthen the defense posture in the Pacific Region of both the United States and South Korea.

Only by establishing a firm defense posture in South Korea can we maintain the high morale of the Korean forces fighting in Vietnam, and by assuring Korean people of the security in South

Korea, the South Korean government can reinforce mutual efforts in all subjects with your country, such as politics and military affairs in Vietnam.

I think it beneficial to hold immediate high-ranking political talks between the United States and South Korea to discuss all relevant issues and thier solutions. I believe that it will be the most appropriate action if you can dispatch your envoy to Korea.

109821
85

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE COLLECT
 CHARGE

~~SECRET~~

2055

Origin ACTION: Amembassy: SEOUL PRIORITY

Info STATE 109821

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

V. P. M. C.

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NODIS

NLJ 97-344

By us, NARA Date 8-20-98

XX Please deliver following message dated February 3, 1968,
from President Johnson to President Park:

BEGIN TEXT:

Dear Mr. President: The attempt to assassinate you and your family
and our Ambassador
is the latest and most shocking act against your country by the
North Korean communists. ~~These ministers will not stop working
to destroy the Republic of Korea.~~ I thank God that this unspeak-
able attempt has failed.

Pyongyang

That the leaders in/~~Pyongyang~~ would order such a desperate
measure shows their awareness of what your courageous leadership
has meant to your country. I doubt that their failure will bring
any respite in their efforts ~~to~~ to introduce armed agents into
your Republic, and to cause as much trouble as possible.

These attacks on your country have greatly increased during
the past year, and you and I have done a lot to improve your

Drafted by EA - Korean Task Force	Tel. Lt.	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by The Secretary
--------------------------------------	----------	---

S/S - Mr. Read

White House - Mr. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

ability to deal with them. I know you have given much thought to new ways in which this infiltration can best be met, and I, too, have been thinking of more ways to help you. Several of my top advisors have been working on this matter with even greater urgency than before, and I hope to be able to share our specific ideas with you at an early date.

I want you to know that we are urgently considering how to strengthen the equipment of your forces to meet this increased campaign from the North. I am giving this my personal attention and expect to be in touch with you soon about this matter.

You have been kept fully informed of the details of the recent seizure by the North Koreans of our naval ship; the Pueblo, and its crew. I know you share our concern. We shall continue to press hard for the earliest possible ~~XXXXXX~~ release of these men and their vessel. If progress toward this end is not soon forthcoming, we shall have to consider what additional measures will be necessary and appropriate.

I have no doubt that the increased incidents along the Demilitarized Zone, the seizure of our ship and the recent effort to attack you, are part of North Korea's program to create maximum tension in the area. They may hope, thereby, to help their friends in Hanoi. They

~~SECRET~~

Page 3 of telegram to Amembassy SEOUL

~~SECRET~~

may think that by raising tension in Korea they can force us to divert our attention from the campaign of aggression against South Viet-Nam. ~~They~~ will not succeed in that effort. The ~~movements~~ of ~~planes~~ and ships to the Republic of Korea in these last days have been from our active forces in the United States and in the Pacific. None has been taken from Viet-Nam.

The events of this past week in Viet-Nam have demonstrated anew how important it is for us all to remain strong there and to stand fast. I have no doubt we shall continue to do so. And we shall continue to stand strong and together in your country against any efforts, however ~~desperate~~ ever desperate, by the regime in the North.

Our mutual objectives of peace, security and progress in Asia require us to make it entirely clear to the men in Pyongyang and in Hanoi that terror and lawlessness will not succeed and that their diversionary tactics will have no effect.

I am particularly grateful that we have been able to keep in such ~~close~~ close contact through Ambassador Porter, who has been able to keep me current with your views. In these difficult days for both our countries, it is good to be able to share one's thoughts with a trusted friend and ally. Sincerely, Lyndon B. Johnson

END TEXT

RUSK

END

~~SECRET~~

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~~SECRET~~

SECRET

COPY

WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON, D. C.

February 3, 1968

Dear Mr. President:

The attempt to assassinate you and your family and our Ambassador is the latest and most shocking act against your country by the North Korean Communists. I thank God that this unspeakable attempt has failed.

That the leaders in Pyongyang would order such a desperate measure shows their awareness of what your courageous leadership has meant to your country. I doubt that their failure will bring any respite in their efforts to introduce armed agents into your Republic, and to cause as much trouble as possible.

These attacks on your country have greatly increased during the past year, and you and I have done a lot to improve your ability to deal with them. I know you have given much thought to new ways in which this infiltration can best be met, and I, too, have been thinking of more ways to help you. Several of my top advisors have working on this matter with even greater urgency than before, and I hope to be able to share our specific ideas with you at an early date.

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~~SECRET~~

SECRET

62

去北 大統領 -

Handwritten notes and stamps, including the number 249.

The events of this past week in Vietnam have demonstrated anew how important it is for us all to remain strong there and to stand fast. I have no doubt we shall continue to do so. And we shall continue to stand strong and together in your country against any efforts, however degenerate, by the regime in the North.

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Sincerely,

/s/ Lyndon B. Johnson

검토필 (1966 6. 30) 10

1966년 6월 30일
미국 국무부
외교부

~~SECRET~~ (1966 6. 30) 12

검토필 (1966 3. 3) 24

검토필 (1962 12. 30) 16

04 FEB 1968: South Korean Government's Position Regarding Secret Meetings between the U.S. and the North Korean Puppet Regime.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea
Utmost Urgent

Number: WUS-0218
WUN-0211
Date: 041620

Recipient: Ambassador to the United States and Ambassador to the United Nations

Dae: USW-0217
UNW-0207

1. A prompt reply from the United States about its response to the view of the Republic of Korea of the Panmunjum meeting is being expected.
2. There was a secret discussion between the United States and the North Korean Puppet Regime in the Panmunjum meeting for the main agenda (on February 2). This has been arousing great suspicion of Republic of Korea people.
3. If the response of the United States is delayed, the Republic of Korea government may be in a position to open this note to the public in order to resolve their suspicion. Thus, you are expected to seek the United States' understanding and urge its amicable response. (미일, 방연)

1156



*Office of the President
Republic of Korea*

(Translation)

February 5, 1968

Dear Mr. President:

I received an advance copy of your letter of February 3 through Ambassador Porter yesterday and I thank you sincerely for your keeping me informed of your views through your Ambassador here.

The recent seizure by the north Korea of the USS Pueblo and the infiltration of the armed Communist raiders into Seoul have demonstrated to the world anew the aggressiveness and lawlessness of the Communists. These acts have also arisen a serious problem to our prestige and a grave threat to our security.

I would like to take this opportunity to extend once again my expressions of sincere sympathy to Your Excellency, the people of the United States and the families of the crew of the Pueblo.

Also, I would like to express my great admiration and deep respect for your perseverance shown in seeking diplomatic solution to the problem and for your resolute determination as evident in your outright action taken in the movements of the United States forces.

I am very grateful that you are urgently considering measures to strengthen the defense capabilities of the Republic of Korea.

Mr. President,

In the wake of these incidents, we have made our views known to each other through Ambassador Porter.

~~SECRET~~

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Authority FRUS 64-68, 10/29/55

By JC NARA. Date 3/27/01

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~~SECRET~~

And I quite agree with you that our two countries, at these difficult hours, should stand in closer unity and deal with the situation with concerted might. The traditional friendship between our two countries and the unchangeable, particular relations between our two peoples should bid us to do so.

What we should do first will be to have the vessel and the crew back and to seek a gurantee that the north Korcans cease their aggressive acts against the Republic of Korea.

These, if devoid of one of the two, will not be complete in attaining our common goal.

How long our efforts for peaceful and diplomatic settlement should be kept going will, as you have pointed out, be our problem.

However, I sincerely hope that you understand my conviction that the problems should be solved by all means before the public opinions of the world which have stood with us may cool down.

It has been fifteen years since the Armistice Agreement was concluded and during this span of time, the north Koreans have constantly threatened us, their violation of the Agreement totalling some 5,000 cases. The threat has become even more serious during the past sixteen months, culminating in the aggressive intrusion into Seoul on January 21.

I should mention that in dealing with the Communists, indefinite efforts for peaceful solution will only bring advantages to them rather than to us. I can say through our own experiences that the Communists should be taught a lesson that any aggressive action cannot escape due punitive action.

If we had taken any punitive action whenever the north Koreans violated the Armistice Agreement in the past, we could have forestalled the situation which has ensued on these breaches.

In other words, I think the situation which we are facing today has resulted from our inaction to meet effectively the violation of the Agreement by the north Koreans.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

To the north Koreans, therefore, we should show our resolute stand and determination that they cannot commit an aggressive act free of punishment. It should be remembered this alone will provide a corrective measure for the habitual aggressiveness of the north Koreans.

I have already made my views known to you on the secret negotiations between the United States and north Korea through Ambassador Porter and I am not repeating them here.

Please accept, Your Excellency, my best wishes for a full measure of success in your endeavors.

With my kindest personal regards,

Sincerely,

/s/ Park Chung Hee

His Excellency
Lyndon B. Johnson
President of the United States of America
The White House
Washington, D. C.

~~SECRET~~

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Document # 22

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~~Top Secret~~



The Pueblo Incident

Briefing Materials
for
Ambassador Ball's Committee

Approved for Release
Date NOV 1990

~~Top Secret~~

5 February 1968

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

~~TOP SECRET~~

NORTH KOREAN SEIZURE OF THE PUEBLO--PLAN OR OPPORTUNITY?

Summary

The seizure of the USS Pueblo by units of the North Korean navy was almost certainly taken as a result of a decision at the highest levels of the North Korean government. The evidence does not permit a conclusive finding on when this decision was made--while the Pueblo was being investigated off Wonsan or some time prior to her first actual encounter with the North Korean ships. It seems likely, however, that the North Koreans had identified the ship and her mission at least a day in advance, if not sooner and had made some plans to deal with her. It is possible that the original intent was only to harass and drive off the Pueblo; the final decision to take the ship into Wonsan may have only been taken when it eventually appeared that US forces were not coming to assist the Pueblo.

1.

(b)
(1)

Following a short period of initial uncertainty, the North Koreans acted boldly and did not hesitate to fire warning shots or to actually board the vessel.

but in general they seemed sure of themselves and prepared to take whatever action was necessary to achieve their objective.

2. It is less clear, however, how much--if any--preplanning was involved in the seizure.

(b)
(1)

it is more likely than not that they were aware of the Pueblo's presence for at least 24 hours prior to the seizure.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

1.5(c)

3.4

(b)(1)

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

TOP SECRET [REDACTED]

3.4 (b)(1)

[REDACTED]

7. It is likely that a decision to seize the Pueblo was taken at a very high level in the North Korean armed forces or government, although there is no direct evidence to support this supposition. The naval officers afloat and the controlling shore authority probably would not make such a decision on their own, especially since the Pueblo had not actually violated North Korean territorial waters at the time and no on-the-spot decision was called for.

8 [REDACTED]

The report which the crewers probably made would have been enough to justify making plans to deal with the Pueblo and sending a naval vessel out on patrol, although it would not necessarily be enough to warrant giving precise instructions to the subchaser beyond, for example, ordering her to halt the Pueblo while she was identified and a final decision made.

-3-
TOP SECRET [REDACTED]

TOP SECRET [REDACTED]

NORTH KOREAN PROPAGANDA ON
ALLEGED US-ROK NAVAL "INTRUSIONS"

1. North Korean policy toward all vessels in nearby waters has been uniformly hostile. Ever since the Korean War Pyongyang's propaganda has used a variety of epithets to denounce these vessels' activities. In December 1964, for example, North Korean representatives at the Military Armistice Commission in Panmunjom accused the "US side" of engaging in "hostile" and "provocative" acts through the "dispatch . . . of its naval vessels on a big scale into the territorial waters of our side along the east coast."

2. The term "spy boats," which has stimulated considerable press speculation since the Pueblo's capture, is merely the latest variant and has been in use for over two months. Charges have recurred again and again in contexts that clearly indicate Pyongyang equates the "US side" and "US imperialists" with South Koreans. (For examples during the two weeks before seizure of the Pueblo see annex.)

3. Since both US and South Korean government ships traditionally make it a point to steer clear of North Korean waters, Pyongyang's main target has been privately owned South Korean fishing vessels which follow the fish northward during certain seasons and do not observe Pyongyang's unilateral seaward extension of the Military Demarcation Line. The South Korean government sometimes dispatches armed patrol-boat escorts to try to keep these vessels from straying into Pyongyang-claimed waters; one of these was sunk in January 1967. It is to the escorts that Pyongyang is clearly referring in its use of the term "spy boats." [REDACTED]

4. Pyongyang's actual treatment of captured fishing-vessel crews shows clearly that it does not consider them spies, although a few recent crews--to lend credibility to the "spy boats" charge--have been forced to "confess" to such activities before returning home. Most captured crews are taken on a "Cook's Tour" of North Korea, wined and dined, shown propaganda films, given new clothing, and sent back home.

5. [REDACTED]

TOP SECRET [REDACTED]

TOP SECRET [REDACTED]

Annex

On 8 January Pyongyang radio charged that "the US imperialist aggressor troops, who had lately been engaged in ceaseless provocations on the east coast, infiltrated many armed boats mingled with fishing boats, under the escort of armed warships, into the coastal waters of our side off the east coast on 6 January and perpetrated provocative acts. . . . The provocations of the US imperialist aggressors are becoming ever more frequent and growing in scope as the days go by."

Minju Choson, the second-ranking newspaper, on 9 January also referred to the 6 January "infiltrating" of "many armed boats" and commented that "the US imperialist aggressors have all along been engaged in provocative, hostile acts and lately have gone so far as to unhesitatingly perpetrate the vicious criminal act of infiltrating into the coastal waters of our side boats carrying espionage and subversive elements, mingled with fishing boats of South Korea."

On 11 January Pyongyang radio accused "US imperialist aggressor troops of dispatching hundreds of fishing boats and spy boats into the coastal waters of our side."

At a Military Armistice Commission meeting on 20 January, commented on by the Pyongyang's International Service the same day, it was charged that "In the period from 23 December last year to 20 January this year, the US imperialist aggressors openly perpetrated the provocative act of infiltrating a total of over 5,400 South Korean fishing boats and armed spy boats on 24 occasions into the coastal waters of our side along the eastern coast." North Korean Maj. Gen. Pak Chung-kuk demanded that the "enemy side take immediate measures for stopping the hostile acts of infiltrating fishing boats including armed vessels and spy boats into the coastal waters of our side."

TOP SECRET [REDACTED]


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North Korea's Military Establishment

General

1. North Korea's military forces total 373,000. These force levels have been maintained at levels up to 4 percent of the population despite North Korea's chronic manpower shortage. They are a major limiting factor on contingency mobilization plans and economic development plans. All North Korean military units are being maintained at full authorized strength levels, and there is no known capability for immediate expansion of these forces except by augmentation with personnel of the country's paramilitary forces, and mobilization of its limited reserves.

2. North Korea is dependent upon Soviet armament and equipment, although Communist China provides some limited aid, to maintain and increase its inventory of sophisticated weapons.



3.4
(b)(1)

The Army

3. The North Korean Army is an effective, modern, well-balanced, rigidly disciplined force of 345,000 men organized into 19 Active Infantry Divisions, a tank division, and five infantry brigades which are considered division equivalents. They are armed with tanks and assault guns, and some artillery pieces above 75-mm., including about 1,400 120-mm. and 160-mm. mortars considered as artillery by the North Koreans. Its current primary mission is defense of the Korean peninsula and

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the coastal areas from the DMZ northward to the borders of Communist China and the Soviet Far East. Its combat effectiveness is considered to be good.

4. During 1966 the army underwent a major reorganization, in which the corps headquarters concept was eliminated, and five army groups were created. The development of this force structure, which is similar to the Soviet Army group concept, permits personnel savings in the elimination of unnecessary headquarters units. It also gives greater flexibility of command since each army group is now capable of executing independent tactical missions.

5.

3.4(b)
(1)

[REDACTED]

Recent organizational changes in the howitzer and mortar units have reduced total strengths but have increased weapons inventories in individual battalions. Airborne training has received greater attention and a parachute battalion has been organized.

[REDACTED]

The Air Force

6. The North Korean Air Force is a self-contained, highly proficient, well-manned, and well-equipped small tactical jet air force of 18,400 personnel and [REDACTED] aircraft. It is organized into five fighter divisions, two independent bomber regiments, an air transport battalion, a Civil Air Bureau, and an air school.

The aircraft inventory comprises [REDACTED] supersonic fighters in the MIG-21/MIG-19 class, [REDACTED] MIG-17 all-weather fighters, [REDACTED] MIG-15/17 daytime fighters, [REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

IL-28 jet light bombers, IL-18 and AN-24 turboprop transports, IL-14, and IL-2 transports, MI-4 helicopters, YAK-18 trainers, AN-2s, and miscellaneous aircraft.

7. The primary mission of the North Korean Air Force is to provide air defense for the mainland and for coastal waters, support ground forces, and conduct bombing missions. It is a modern air force capable of fulfilling its assigned missions, of defending against hostile intruders, and having a limited ability to launch attacks against South Korea.

8. The North Korean air defense posture has been improved with the activation of more SAM sites,

3.4
(b)(1)

[REDACTED]

9. The majority of the equipment used by the air force is of Soviet origin, and much of the technical training for this force has been provided in Soviet technical training centers. Communist China still provides some limited support in the provision of less sophisticated equipment; it is believed that China is presently in the process of transferring up to 30 AN-2 propeller driven transports to North Korea.

10. The North Korean Air Force began current modernization training in 1965. It has concentrated on extensive mobility exercises, the development of intercept techniques against intruding--notably US reconnaissance--aircraft off the coasts of North Korea, and more recently the firing of air-to-air missiles. Air units have thus reached a high degree of combat effectiveness in their fighter forces. While the North Korean Air Force is essentially targeted for defense, with adequate outside logistical support it would be possible for it to engage in offensive operations with little difficulty.

3-
~~TOP SECRET~~

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The Navy

11. The North Korean Navy is a small defensive force closely integrated into the over-all defense structure. It has two major fleets: one assigned to the defense of the east coast, and one assigned to the defense of the west coast. There are approximately 10,200 personnel manning vessels including "W"-class submarines, Komar guided-missile patrol boats, Ghermen-class PTFs, or more modified Soviet Artillerist-class submarine chasers, units of the Soviet P-2, P-4, P-6 class motor-torpedo boats, Soviet SO-1 class submarine chasers, YUK-TO and Soviet MO-1 class motor-boat submarine chasers, K-48 and Chicom Swatow-class motor gunboats, Chicom modified Shanghai-class fast torpedo boats, and approximately miscellaneous units including minesweepers, amphibious warfare craft and service vessels. The North Korean Navy operates from four main bases and eight subsidiary stations about equally divided on the two coasts.

12. The navy in the past year has begun a modernization program of its minor combat patrol units previously received from the USSR and Communist China,

3.4
(b)(1)

[REDACTED]

13. Although the North Korean Navy is essentially a defensive force, some of the boats in the North Korean inventory have limited antisubmarine warfare capability. It appears, however, that a lack of adequate training by the "W"-class submarines limits these units as an effective force. Finally, the North Korean Navy is not a deep water navy, and its operations are limited to coastal operations.

- 4 -
~~TOP SECRET~~

[Redacted]

1.5(e)
3.4 (b)(1)

-5-

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

316

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~
No Foreign Dissem

Comment: South Korean ground forces are superior in size and probably are about equal in training, morale, and equipment to North Korean force. The South Korean Air Force is heavily outnumbered and hampered by inadequate aircraft control and warning radar system. North Korean Navy is better equipped, but unlikely to play a major role.

No Foreign Dissem
~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

DECLASSIFIED
Authority VND 941293
By PL NARA Date 6-4-08

RESERVED FOR COMMUNICATION CENTER

JOINT MESSAGEFORM

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL

TYPE MSG: BOOK MULTIPLE X

PRECEDENCE: CONFIDENTIAL

ACTION: CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY: CONFIDENTIAL

INFO: CONFIDENTIAL

FROM: General Wheeler, CJCS

TO: Admiral Sharp, CINCPAC

~~SECRET~~ NODIS/CACTUS - EYES ONLY - JCS 01344Z Feb 68

AmEmb Seoul NODIS message to State 3935, DTG 041344Z Feb 68, is transmitted for your information:

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS
DIST:
CJCS
CSA
CSAF
CNO
CMC
DJS
D,J-3
D,J-5

ZFP-1

DATE	TIME
5	
MONTH	YEAR
Feb	1968
PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS

RELEASER: CONFIDENTIAL

SIGNATURE: Paul M. Kearney

TYPED (or stamped) NAME AND TITLE: Admin Dsst to CJCS

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL

REGRADE INSTRUCTIONS:

091 Korea - 5 Feb 68

NODIS

Downgraded to CONFIDENTIAL

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EYES ONLY

EYES ONLY

DECLASSIFIED

Authority VND 941293
By *DL* NARA Date 6-4-08



Department of State

TELEGRAM

Downgraded to ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

CONTROL: 1108Q
RECD: FEBRUARY 4, 1968
10:49 A.M.

OO RUEHC
DE RUALOS 3935E 035 1405
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 041344Z FEB 68 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO EECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8304
STATE GRNC
BT
SECRET SEUL 3935

NODIS

NODIS/CACTUS

REF: STATE 109821

SEARCHED	
SERIALIZED	
INDEXED	
FILED	
FEB 4 1968	
STATE DEPT	

1. PRESIDENT PARK WAS CLEARLY MOVED BY MESSAGE CONTAINED REFTEL. I HAVE NOT SEEN HIM AFFECTED IN THIS WAY BEFORE NOW AND HE MADE NO EFFORT TO TIDE HIS FEELINGS AS HE HEARD PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S SOLICITUDE FOR HIM AND HIS FAMILY, LENGTHY DISCUSSION OF MUTUAL PROBLEMS AND FINALLY THE WARM REFERENCE TO HIM AS TRUSTED FRIEND AND ALLY. ONE MAY OCCASIONALLY MAKE HIM SMILE AND EVEN LAUGH, BUT IT IS A VERY RARE THING TO SEE HIS EMOTIONS STIRRED AS THEY WERE BY THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE.

PAGE 2 RUALOS-3935E SECRET

2. HE KEPT ME FOR ALMOST TWO HOURS, DURING WHICH I TOOK OCCASION TO BRIEF HIM ON THE US/NK MEETING THIS MORNING. HE WAS GREATLY INTERESTED IN FACT THAT NK REP PUT QUESTIONS TO US CONCERNING AUGMENTATION OF OUR AIR AND NAVAL FORCES, AND TROOP ALERT. HE SAID THIS ANOTHER INDICATION OF THEIR PREOCCUPATION WITH STRENGTH AND THEIR NEED TO ASCERTAIN WHETHER IT MIGHT BE USED AGAINST THEM. HE FEELS THEY WILL PROBE TO DETERMINE OUR INTENTIONS AND IF AND WHEN THEY BELIEVE WE HAVE ADDITIONAL MEASURES IN MIND, THEY WILL MEET OUR DEMANDS FOR RETURN OF PUESLO AND CREW. THEY WILL NOT ALTER THEIR POLICY OF DELIBERATE HUMILIATION OF US, HE SAID, IF THEY DO NOT SENSE DETERMINATION ON OUR SIDE.

3. HE ASKED ME WHAT I THOUGHT. I SAID IT LOOKED TO ME AS THOUGH THE NK'S MAY BE APPROACHING SOMETHING LIKE THE NORTH VIETNAMESE "YOU-STOP-THE-BOMBING-AND-WE'LL-TALK" PLOY. IN THEIR CASE THE NK'S MAY TELL US "YOU-

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
 Authority UND 941293
 By DL NARA Date 6-4-08

Downgraded to ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~SECRET~~

-2- SEOUL 3935, FEBRUARY 4 (NODIS/CACTUS)

PAGE 3 RUALOS 3935E S E C R E T
 WITHDRAW-YOUR-NAVAL-AND-AIR-STRENGTH-FROM-ROK-AND-WE'LL-TALK-ABOUT-YOUR-SHIP-AND-CREW." IN NEITHER CASE, OF COURSE, WAS THERE MUCH PROSPECT OF ANYTHING SUBSTANTIAL. I SAID THIS WAS MY OFF-THE-CUFF REACTION AND WAS NOT AN OFFICIAL ESTIMATE, AS I HAD NOT YET HEARD FROM YOU ON THE SUBJECT.

4. PARK SAID WE MUST BE CAREFUL, THAT THEY HAD PROVED TIME AND AGAIN THAT THEY CANNOT BE TRUSTED. HUMILIATION OF THE US IS THEIR GOAL, HE SAID, AND "YOUR PRESTIGE IS ROK PRESTIGE."

5. HE THEN TOOK UP MATTER OF PUBLIC OPINION, AND THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY VIEW OF THE SITUATION, ALL OF THIS ALONG LINES KNOWN TO YOU, BUT WITH CERTAIN IDEAS ADDED. HE REMARKED THAT THE NK/US PRIVATE MEETINGS ARE STIRRING UP ADVERSE COMMENT HERE AND EXPRESSED A PREFERENCE (I WOULD NOT SAY IT WAS STRONGER THAN THAT) FOR FUTURE MEETINGS IN PUBLIC, OR, IF CLOSED MEETINGS CONTINUE TO BE NECESSARY, A ROK REPRESENTATIVE SHOULD BE PRESENT.

PAGE 4 RUALOS 3935E S E C R E T
 PUBLIC MEETINGS, OR CLOSED MEETINGS WITH A ROK OFFICER PRESENT, WOULD DO MUCH TO REASSURE THE PUBLIC. FACT OF MATTER, HE SAID, IS THAT ROK SIDE OF PROBLEM, I.E. DMZ VIOLATIONS AND RAIDS BY NK, NOT BEING DISCUSSED IN ANY FORUM AT PRESENT.

6. I SAID THAT HE KNEW WE DEEPLY APPRECIATED HIS PATIENCE IN ALL THESE MATTERS, AND HIS CONCURRENCE IN MEETINGS WE FOUND IT DESIRABLE TO HAVE. HE CAN SEE KEY POSITION OCCUPIED BY MEN OF PUEBLO IN THIS PROBLEM AND HIS UNDERSTANDING OF THAT ENABLED US TO SOUND OUT THE ADVERSARY WHEN OTHER CHANNELS HAD FAILED. IT IS SOMETIMES NECESSARY, I WENT ON, FOR PRESIDENTS TO WITHHOLD INFORMATION TEMPORARILY IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST, TO FACE PRESS AND PUBLIC CRITICISM WHILE THEY ARE DOING SO, AND THIS SEEMED TO BE ONE SUCH CASE. I WOULD OF COURSE TRANSMIT HIS COMMENTS AND, AS HE KNEW, THEY WOULD COMMAND ATTENTION AT OUR HIGHEST LEVELS.

7. I SAID I WOULD COMMENT NOW, HOWEVER, ON THE MATTER OF A PUBLIC MAC MEETING. THESE USUALLY TURN INTO PROPAGANDA DISPLAYS AND AS SUCH CAUSE IMPORTANT MATTERS TO BE DRAWN OUT FOR WEEKS AND MONTHS LONGER THAN MIGHT BE NECESSARY WERE THEY DEALT WITH

DECLASSIFIED
Authority VND 941293
By DL NARA Date 6-4-08

~~Downgraded to CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

-3- SEOUL 3935, FEBRUARY 4, (NODIS/CACTUS)

PAGE 5 RUALOS 3935E S E C R E T

IN CLOSED SESSION. TRUE, AS HE SAID, THE CORRESPONDENTS COULD BE PRESENT AND COULD AT LEAST PUBLICIZE OUR STATEMENTS. TROUBLE IS, THEY USUALLY GIVE AS MUCH TIME AND SPACE TO THE PROPAGANDA OF THE ADVERSARY AND WE END UP NO BETTER OFF. I WOULD SOUND OUT MY PEOPLE ON THIS GENERAL SUBJECT AND WOULD COME BACK TO HIM. (SEE COMMENT BELOW ON ADVISABILITY OF TRYING TO SET UP OPEN MAC MEETING TO DISCUSS DMZ VIOLATIONS ONLY.)

8. I DID NOT COMMENT ON SUGGESTION THAT ROK MIGHT BE PRESENT AT CLOSED MEETINGS. WE ARE LIKELY TO MAKE MORE PROGRESS WITH NK'S IF THER IS NO ROK PRESENCE AT THESE MEETINGS.

9. COMMENT: PLEASE GIVE ME YOUR VIEWS ON DESIRABILITY OF ANOTHER OPEN MAC MEETING ON DMZ VIOLATIONS ONLY. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT SUCH A MEETING WOULD EVOKE NK RIPOSTE WITH PUEBLO STATEMENT, BUY ALSO POSSIBLE, IF WE MADE NO MENTION OF PUEBLO, THAT THEY WOULD TAKE THAT AS INDICATION WE WISH CONTINUE PRIVATE TALKS WITH THEM ON THAT SUBJECT. WHAT I AM TRYING TO DO IS FIND DEVICE WHICH WILL MEET PARK'S PUBLIC OPINION (ASSEMBLY, PARTY, INTELLECTUALS, MILITARY) PROBLEM HERE WITHOUT INTERFERING WITH OUR NK CONTACT

PAGE 6 RUALOS 3935E S E C R E T
ON PUEBLO.

10. IT WOULD ALSO HELP US GREATLY IF YOU COULD ARRANGE EARLY DELIVERY TO KIMPO AIRPORT BY LARGEST AIRPLANES AVAILABLE OF SUBSTANTIAL AMOUNT OF COUNTERINSURGENCY ITEMS ALREADY PROMISED ROK, IF THEY ARE PRESENTLY AVAILABLE. WE WOULD TAKE CARE TO HAVE ADEQUATE PRESENCE OF ELEMENTS MENTIONED ABOVE, AS WELL AS ALL ELEMENTS OF LOCAL AND FOREIGN PRESS. THIS KIND OF THING, IF PROPERLY HANDLED, MIGHT ALSO AID US IN OUR PALAVER WITH THE NK'S. PLEASE COMMENT SOONEST ON THIS POSSIBILITY.

11. THE EXCELLENT SUPPORT YOU HAVE GIVEN ME HAS MADE ALL THE DIFFERENCE AT THIS END. GP-3. PORTER
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 5 FEB 1968: Regarding the Pueblo Incident, Press Report. (section #: 729.55, record #: 2663)

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Urgent

Number: USW-0229

Date: 051130

Recipient: Minister, the Blue House, Prime Minister, National Defense, Public Information, Korea Central National Intelligence, Joint Chiefs of Staff
 Addressor: Ambassador to the United States

Special Report (the 28th issue)

1. Today at 8:30AM here, in an article in the Chosun Ilbo it was widely reported that the United States admitted the intrusion into the territorial waters of the North Korean puppet regime and the North Korean puppet regime agreed to repatriate the entire 83-man crew of the PUEBLO.
 Regarding this report, at 9:30AM today, Bundy, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Department of State, denied the article mentioned above. He said he cannot confirm this article and, though the talks are continuing till this hour, there is no progress to be reported and he does not know any ground of that report. He made additional comments that the ambulance of the Red Cross being at Panmunjum is a PRECAUTIONARY MEASURE.
2. Earlier, in the television conference yesterday, Rusk, Secretary of State, and McNamara, Secretary of Defense, suggested the possibility that the United States may apologize to the North Korean puppet regime if it is essential to regain the vessel and the crew of the PUEBLO.
 Both secretaries said that they believe that the PUEBLO did not enter because there is no proof of intrusion, but that it is not 1,000% certain that it did not enter. Both secretaries said that even later, if there was an intrusion, the United States shall admit it and consider the transit actions of the captain and added that, before that, the North Korean puppet regime should return the PUEBLO and her crew so that the United States can confirm the facts as to whether or not there

was an intrusion.

3. Today's Washington Post commented in an editorial that the PUEBLO may have intruded into the territorial waters of the North Korean puppet regime before the seizure, but it was definitely located in international waters when it was seized, as Ambassador Goldberg to the United Nations stated in the United Nations Security Council and it is thus good that there is a hope for the crew's return, the utterance of both secretaries neither raises the confidence of people for the Administration nor provides the United States of any possibility for diplomatic negotiation.
4. During the conference mentioned above, while Secretary of State Rusk said that equal importance is being given to the PUEBLO Incident and the incident of 31 armed spies of the North Korean puppet regime, he also said that those spies had attempted to assassinate the U.S. Ambassador to Korea (refer to WU-01139). (미일, 미이, Northeastern Asia, Information)

05 FEB 1968: Contents of the 3rd Closed Meeting between the U.S. and the North Korean puppet regime. (section #: 729.55, record #: 2663)

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Number: USW-0234

Date: 051800

Recipient: Minister, the Blue House, Prime Minister, National Defense, Public Information, Korea Central National Intelligence, Joint Chiefs of Staff

Addressor: Ambassador to the United States

Special Report (the 30th issue)

1. With respect to the rumor in the news from Seoul (Kyodo News) that an agreement to release the crew of the PUEBLO had been made between the United States and the North Korean Puppet Regime, McCloskey, the U.S. State Department spokesman, said today in the afternoon that there is no basis to believe that a breakthrough was made and the only progress is that there was a meeting held between both representative. He made additional announcements as follows;

A). Closed meetings between the United States and the North Korean puppet regime only were held three times at Panmunjum so far.

(1) February 1, (Thursday) 9:00PM (Washington), Friday 11:00AM (Korea)

(2) February 3, (Saturday) 7:00PM (Washington), Sunday 9:00AM (Korea)

(3) February 5, (Monday) 2:00AM (Washington), Monday 4:00PM (Korea).

These meetings ended in approximately 30 minutes. The United States will continue such efforts.

B) As Secretary Rusk and Secretary McNamara previously mentioned, there is no reason to assume there was an intrusion, however, we will know it correctly only after we talk with the captain and the crew.

C) Regarding further meetings, we are having close discussions with the South Korean government.

D) What Secretary Rusk and Secretary McNamara meant is that, if additional facts are revealed after the release of the crew, it would be made public, and there was no suggestion that the United States would apologize in advance.

E) The United States is studying actively on the necessary things for the defense

of South Korea and has increased a support for South Korea to strengthen their defense forces.

2. It is reported that tensions derived from this unilateral secret negotiation of the United States with the North Korean puppet regime can be eased by diplomatic moves such as a memorandum or a dispatch of a special envoy, according to the message by the intelligence source.
3. Congressman Ford, Republican Minority Leader of the U.S House of Representatives, presupposed today that it is certain that the Administration is preparing a confession of the PUEBLO's intrusion into territorial waters of the North Korean puppet regime and said that, if it turns out to be true, it will be a shock to congressmen who have believed the statement of the Administration and Ambassador Goldberg to the United Nations, and mentioned that in a sufficient investigation (some congressmen have claimed the investigation already), the captain and crew of the PUEBLO should be included in the list of testifiers when they are released. (미일, 미이, Northeastern Asia, Information)

Memo(handwritten) (section #: 729.55, record #: 2663)

With regard to the AP on the 7th (a rumor of the 4th closed meetings between the chief delegates at Panmunjum), the spokesman for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs said, "Today there were meetings of chief delegates and secretaries, however, according to the report that government received, it is not true that the U.S. side delivered a Statement of Apology."

(handwriting)

With regard to the AP on 7th (a rumor of the 4th closed meetings between the chief delegates at Panmunjum), the spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs said, "today there were meetings of chief delegates and secretaries, however, according to the report that government received, it is not true that the U.S. side delivered a Statement of Apology."

機 密 文 件

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83

5. 对 美 策 書

CONFIDENTIAL

1963年2月5日

OMY-72

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs presents its compliments to the Embassy of the United States and, further to the Aide-Memoire of February 2, 1968, has the honor to invite the latter's attention to the growing apprehension of the Korean public in connection with the current secret meetings of the Military Armistice Commission at Panmunjom for the discussions of the issues which were referred to in the said Aide-Memoire.

It is noted that mounting and wide-spread suspicion and apprehension among the Korean public on the United States intention, arising from the reported secret talks with the north Korean communists on these issues in question, might seriously damage the confidence of the Korean people in the United States' firm stand against the aggressive acts of the communists.

In view of the urgent need to clear such suspi-

機 密 文 件

Ⅲ 급 비 밀

cion and apprehension on the part of the Korean public, thereby forestalling any eventuality that might adversely affect the common interests of the two countries, it is strongly requested that the meetings of the Military Armistice Commission on these issues be held in regular open session with the Republic of Korea military representative thereto participating in accordance with its normal practice.

Immediate and favorable response of the United States Government hereto as well as to the above mentioned Aide-Memoire of February 2, 1968 are awaited.

The Ministry avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Embassy the assurances of its highest consideration.

Seoul, February 5, 1968

2月5日 对英口上書

英閣長이 ERIGSON 參事 閣外서 手交 (밤 9 時 40 分)

Ⅲ 급 비 밀

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PRESIDIUM OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF CPCZ

3750/25

CONFIDENTIAL!

(stamp)

STATE CENTRAL ARCHIVE IN PRAGUE
DEGREE OF SECRECY CANCELED

Number of Agenda: 15

Reason: 490/2000-NB4/8C

Date: 01/16/03 Alena Noskova, Ph.D.
Signature: (illegible)

Topic: Information about the situation in Korea

Information about the situation in Korea submitted. The material was discussed with c. (comrade) V. Koucky and c. B. Lomsky.

Attachment No. I

Proposal of a Resolution

Attachment No. III


a/ Information about the situation in Korea.

b/ Study of the tension in the Korean area (military part)

Submitted by: c. V. David

February 5th, 1968

Number of pages: 29



(Archive – Central Committee of CPCZ)

This material has to be returned to the Secretariat of the First Deputy of the CC CPC no later than in one month.

Information about the situation in Korea

- c. Kolder – (illegible) - some differences in assessment!
 = MFA (Minister of Foreign Affairs) studied,
 and notified Soviet comrades.
- c. Koucky – agrees with the conclusions but not for now
 ((not to accept from our initiative; (illegible) !
- c. Lenart – (illegible) deputy CC but MFA!
 (illegible) Holub so that he, too, informs Soviet
 comrades about the steps (illegible) Korean
 (illegible) = not to inform only us.
- c. Dubcek - from the conversation with Brezhnev: he said they
 were assured by KIS that they (Koreans) will
 not take any steps towards increased tension!
 Rather concerned about PRC (provocation) – they
 pay more attention to it.
- c. David - is complementing information from Korea
 - will continue to do so.

c. Dubcek : - correction, MFA accepts; later
 - also review publicity of our party as for the
 government directives

(stamp)

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File No.: P 3750

ACCEPTED RESOLUTION

Resolution

from the 58th meeting of the CPCZ CC Presidium on January 6th, 1968

For topic 15: Information about the situation in Korea
(c. V. David)

Agreed that:

CPCZ CC Presidium

- I. is aware of the situation in Korea;
- II. agrees with the suggested approach, provided that item 3. (attachment III/a, page 15) is rephrased to say that the DPRK diplomatic envoy will be first received by the Minister of Foreign Affairs and only later, depending how the situation develops, by the CPCZ CC Deputy.

Carried out by: c. V. Koucky
c. V. David
c. B. Lomsky
c. J. Kudrna

File No.: P 3750

Yes
rephrase

Attachment I

Resolution

(stamp)
STATE CENTRAL ARCHIVE IN PRAGUE
DEGREE OF SECRECY CANCELED
Reason: 490/2000-NB4/8C
Date: 01/16/03 Alena Noskova, Ph.D.
Signature: (illegible)

For topic

Information about the situation in Korea
(c. V. David)

Agreed that:

CPCZ CC Presidium

- III. is aware of the situation in Korea;
- IV. agrees with the suggested approach, provided that item 3. (attachment III/a, page 15) is rephrased to say that the DPRK diplomatic envoy will be first received by the Minister of Foreign Affairs and only later, depending how the situation develops, by the CPCZ CC Deputy.

Carried out by:

- c. V. Koucky
- c. V. David
- c. B. Lomsky
- c. J. Kudrna

3750 /25

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

File no.: 020.873/68-3

Attachment III a/

Classified

(stamp)

STATE CENTRAL ARCHIVE IN PRAGUE
DEGREE OF SECRECY CANCELED

Reason: 267261/01-020

(OZU = Section for Special Assignments)

Date: 01/16/03 Alena Noskova, Ph.D.

Signature: (illegible)

No. of copies: 46

Print no.: 13

No. of sheets: 16

Information about the situation in Korea

Tension in the Far East dangerously escalated due to the detention of the American spy ship Pueblo by the Korean People's Army patrol boats at the DPRK coast and due to armed actions taken by our Korean patriots in South Korea. These events brought the situation on the Korean Peninsula to a head and threatened to create another center of military conflict in this area.

Development of the situation on the Korean Peninsula is characterized in the presented information.

I.

- 2 -

The main source and cause of persistent tension on the Korean Peninsula is the fact that Korea remains a divided country, and strong American and South Korean armies with state-of-the-art weapons are positioned in the South. This circumstance has a profound influence on all life in the DPRK, and is reflected in the political direction of the Korean Worker's Party. With growing anxiety, the leadership of the KWP is following the development in South Korea where younger, more flexible state leadership was able to bring the country from the brink of total collapse after the fall of Syngman Rhee to more or less stabilizing conditions with the help of foreign capital, mainly from US, Japan and West Germany. It seems that this relative stabilization of the South Korean regime, accompanied by strong anticommunist propaganda and police terror, has paralyzed revolutionary sentiments in the country and is skillfully discrediting the authority of the DPRK

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7

and diminishing her influence among South Korean population. This is also somewhat supported lately by the US troops' more tactful behavior towards the South Korean public. On the other hand, the initial political and mainly economic supremacy of the DPRK, still noticeable at the beginning of the 60's, has been gradually eroding due to economic stagnation, characteristic for the period of close cooperation of the DPRK with the PRC (People's Republic of China). With no less anxiety, the DPRK is also following South Korea's extensive foreign affairs and military activity which involves gaining international authority as well as sustaining and strengthening the positions of world imperialism in Asia, pointed mainly against socialist countries.

The latest development in South Korea is also connected with many visits to Seoul from representatives of world capitalism, culminating with a visit from President Johnson in 1966. Most of these visits contributed to further stimulation of the South Korean economy, the buildup and modernization of the South Korean army, and the strengthening of "Asian-Oceanic Alliances" under the sponsorship of the US.

All this is increasing restlessness on the Korean Peninsula and diminishing chances for a peaceful unification of the country in the near future. The leadership of the DPRK is concerned with aggression from the South and even expects it, and is preparing the Korean people for a unification of the country through an armed struggle by the Korean people.

This process in the policy of the KWP CC has taken shape during the last year. In the declaration of **Kim Il Sung** on the nationwide conference of the KWP in October 1966 a thesis was put forth proclaiming that the unification of the country would be a long-term process requiring mainly a creation of a Marxist party in South Korea, and establishing close cooperation with non-selective organizations. In contrast, the current doctrine of the KWP calls for a liberation of the southern part of the country by force, as soon as the conditions are favorable. This new feature is manifested even in the slogan, coined in January 1967 by **Kim Il Sung**, about the necessity to unify Korea during the life of this generation. The

expression "peaceful and democratic unification of the country" disappeared from Korean propaganda. Even the Korean press does not deny that it is a preparation for the defeat of American imperialists. The inescapability of war is theoretically explained, its consequences are played down, and the fear of war is countered as a display of bourgeois pacifism and revisionism.

While the doctrine of a parallel build-up and defense of the country was declared on the October conference of the KWP in 1966, it is more and more obvious that the defense gained priority. This was reflected even in last year's budget of the DPRK, which appropriated more than 30% of expenditures for defense (excluding the free of charge Soviet military assistance). The real nature of military measures of the DPRK is discussed in many essays. For instance, in an article in the periodical "Korean People's Army," from November 1967, where it was written: "The military course of our party, drawn by Marshal **Kim Il Sung**, enables us to protect reliably our socialist homeland by way of preferential strengthening of the defensive military power, and to handle, based on our own initiative, the great revolutionary event - unification of the country.

The Korean propaganda makes every effort to convince citizens of the DPRK as well as the world public that the situation is quite similar to that just before the outbreak of the Korean War. Military training of civilians, including women and children, was justified by the thesis of "turning the DPRK into a steel, impregnable fortress," and reached unprecedented magnitude in the DPRK.

We cannot also underestimate the fact that the spreading of military psychosis had other functions, like distracting people from the existing economic difficulties, "justifying" stagnation of the standard of living, demanding the strictest discipline and obedience, and preventing any criticism.

Especially in the last year, the personality cult of **Kim Il Sung** reached unprecedented magnitude. Attributes attached to his name often run into several lines. **Kim Il Sung** is credited with all successes and victories past and present without regard to historical facts. Even his parents and grandparents are becoming the objects of celebrations. Korean propaganda places an equal sign between **Kim Il Sung** and Korea, while Korea is presented as an example for other countries. The new phase in the intensification of **Kim Il Sung's** personality cult displays is inseparable namely from two other issues – the importance of DPRK example for struggling nations of Asia, Africa and Latin America, and the embellishment of **Kim Il Sung's** role in the context of the international communist and workers' movement.

Excerpts from the Cuban press, which continually publishes his addresses, are mainly used as evidence supporting the importance of his theoretical works.

Collected writings of **Kim Il Sung** also constitute the basic and, actually, the only source for study of Marx-Leninism today. Korean citizens get only very limited information about the life in other socialist countries or about the situation in the world, while all news in the press and radio are bent to the line of the KWP. This practice results in increased isolation of the DPRK from the outside world.

Displays of personality cult in the DPRK are enhanced by a strong nationalism. All problems involving the DPRK are exaggerated and placed before other international problems.

The personality cult is also supported by personnel policy of the KWP. In the summer months of 1967, number of influential and mid-level party officials was

removed. According to some information, members of politburo **Bak Geumcheol** and **Rhee Che-sun/Yi Che-sun** were arrested during last year's June conference of the KWP CC. **Bak Geumcheol** allegedly asked **Kim Il Sung** for more realistic domestic policy, including improvement in the standard of living and more realistic approach to the problems of South Korea where the most decisive factor was supposed to be an upsurge of the internal revolutionary forces. According to an assessment of his friends, **Bak Geumcheol** was considered as one of the most capable functionaries of the KWP and the DPRK, and **Rhee Che-sun/Yi Che-sun** was engaged in the politburo of the KWP CC with South Korean issues for number of years. During the same period, other deputies and officials of the KWP CC and non-selective organizations were removed, such as a chairman of the (Workers) Unions CC, a leader of the YO (Youth Organization) of the KWP CC, a chairman of a youth organization CC, a director of the DPRK press agency, and many others. Demoted functionaries are sometimes replaced with graduates of military institutes.

The leadership of the KWP and DPRK differs in its opinions from the position of most of the fraternal parties, especially in the most pressing current issues – war and peace.

The difference in opinions among Korean comrades is the most pronounced in the approach to fighting world imperialism. The KWP calls in this case for a frontal drive for final and immediate destruction of capitalism. According to the Korean concept, fight against imperialism can be done only by strong verbal attacks or war.

Positions of the KWP on issues of war and peace, peaceful coexistence and approach to struggle with imperialism are very strongly influenced by problems of the unification of the country. Naturally, these positions shape also the attitude of the KWP to the international communist movement. The leadership of the KWP expresses support for unity of the ICWM (International Communist Workers Movement) in the struggle with imperialism and for coordination of aid to Vietnam from fraternal countries, but the leadership expects building of this unity only on

the foundation of its own approach to the fight against imperialism, and from the point of view of its own interests and goals. Fraternal parties are indirectly reproached for attacking imperialism only verbally while in reality, they are afraid of it and are giving ground to it. Korean comrades put their positions forth as the only correct interpretation of Marxism-Leninism.

Countries of the Third World are considered especially important for their pivotal role in increasing the authority and prestige of the DPRK in international affairs. At the same time, the DPRK strives to promote its own example for these countries and to exert influence there by doctrines of "building with own resources", of "independence from big countries", and by radicalism of Korean positions.

So far, the DPRK did not take its position to the consultative meeting of fraternal parties, held in Budapest this year in February. According to the opinion of Bak Seungeheol, member of the KWP CC, Deputy of the Council of Ministers and the DPRK Minister of Foreign Affairs, as expressed to the Ambassador of the GDR (German Democratic Republic), conditions for meetings of fraternal parties are worse now than a year ago. In the situation when the rift between the CPSU (Communist Party of Soviet Union) and the CP of China grew wider, and there are not even any diplomatic contacts between the USSR and the APR (Albanian People's Republic), meetings are said to contribute to worsening of the discord. So far the only published reference in the DPRK press about planned meetings is the information taken from the central body of the CP of Cuba about the latest session of the Cuban CP CC plenum and its decision not to attend the meeting in Budapest.

Moreover, it is quite usual that in relations of the DPRK to fraternal parties and countries, Korean comrades strive to have their opinions fully accepted and supported. The DPRK is also issuing imperative instructions to socialist countries what they can and cannot do in their politics and in relations with imperialist countries. The article "Let Us Point Our Fight Against the American Imperialism" published in journal Nodon Sinmun on October 16, 1967 in commemoration of the 10th anniversary of Moscow meetings, calls for tougher stance against the

American imperialism and for active support of the struggle of nations of Asia, Africa and Latin America, and warns other socialist countries to be aware as well of the danger of Japanese militarism in Asia and fight against it. At the same time, a wish of the KWP to achieve an unconditional support for the Korean course by all socialist countries is expressed as well in the request "each socialist country must respect the policy of the Cuban CP, and is obligated only to support the struggle of the Cuban people".

Similar practices are also characteristic for the approach of Korean comrades towards international organizations where they often try to push unrealistic requirements and, on top of that, demand that their socialist partners support them thoroughly without regard to the common interests of the whole socialist community.

II.

By pressing forward with the current doctrine, the KWP is also contributing to the increase of restlessness especially in the demilitarized zone, and to dangerous escalation of tension there, which was quite noticeable last year. Incidents in the zone and to the south of it reached an unprecedented number. Incidents result in many casualties. Official sources in the DPRK blame the Americans and the South Korean regime of importing new kinds of weapons into South Korea and of shooting from the demilitarized zone against the North, and they assert that incidents on the territory of South Korea are the result of growing struggle of South Korean patriots for national liberation. Contrary to that, Americans and South Koreans blame the DPRK of continuously increasing infiltration to the South and of supplying new kinds of weapons.

In a memorandum submitted to members of the political committee of the UN outlining the situation in Korea from October of last year, the DPRK government points out the danger of a new Korean war flaring up as a consequence of American provocations and the necessity to withdraw the US

troops immediately from South Korea. A letter from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the South Korean regime, containing number of attacks against the DPRK and its policy (especially in connection with an "infiltration from the North"), was distributed in the committee as well.

According to the opinion of the Czechoslovak delegation with the Supervisory Commission of the Non-Aligned States, as well as to the opinion of our Embassy in Pchjongjang, the number of circumstances indicates that the incidents in the demilitarized zone and to the south of it are intentionally and purposefully provoked mostly by the DPRK, although it is difficult to judge which side to blame in such cases. However, increasing tension on the 38th parallel of latitude and the growing number of incidents corresponds with the Korean concept of fight against imperialism and with support of the revolutionary struggle of the people of South Korea. Officials of the DPRK strive to attract attention from the world public to the Korean problem, and try to gain support of socialist countries for their policies.

The rapidly deteriorating situation in the demilitarized zone and the danger of a possible new conflict was reflected in the negotiations of the Military Commission for Truce in Panmunjon. At Commission's meetings, both sides accuse each other of violating the treaty, and the negotiations lead to nowhere. For the Korean side, the Military Commission for Truce is a place where they can confront Americans face to face, and they take full advantage of this opportunity. Speeches made by the Korean delegate are mostly propaganda in nature, and are used namely for the DPRK's internal propaganda. Consistently negative attitude to participating in joint investigation of the discussed incidents, as stipulated in the Truce Treaty, is a shortcoming of Korean comrades in their dealing with the Commission.

The DPRK authorities are pressuring the Czechoslovak and Polish delegations with the Supervisory Commission of the Non-Aligned States into making the SCNAS a platform for anti-imperialistic struggle in the Korean style, without regard to the mandate of the Commission given by the Truce Treaty. At

the same time, Korean comrades inform the Czechoslovak and Polish delegations about the problems in the demilitarized zone only sporadically and inaccurately. The Czechoslovak delegation with the SCNAS conducts its activities in agreement with the directive currently in force of the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

The situation in Korea underwent a very dangerous development lately. On January 23rd this year, patrol boats of the DPRK detained an American spy ship Pueblo with 83 men, and escorted it to the North Korean port Wonsan. According to the DPRK information, the American ship was captured 10 miles away from Wonsan and 7.6 miles from the Jodo Island. The ship was collecting data about water depth, location of troops, and defenses of the DPRK coast.

On January 19th of this year, this incident was preceded by an attempt of an armed group of 30 to infiltrate the residence of the South Korean president in Seoul, with an objective to assassinate the President and other government officials. There was an exchange of fire for several hours between that group and the South Korean police, with dead and injured on both sides. The South Korean regime mobilized armed forces that, together with the American Army, destroyed most of the members of the group.

On January 24th, Americans accused the DPRK of an attempt to assassinate the President and high officials of the South Korean regime, and of capturing an American ship in international waters at the Military Commission for Truce. A spokesman of the US said that the capturing of the ship could have grave consequences and endanger peace in the DPRK. He demanded immediate return of the ship with the crew as well as an apology. He also asked that a serious warning be passed on to Kim Il Sung. The Korean side rejected the accusation.

President Johnson and Minister Rusk characterized the situation as very serious. The United States representative at the UN Goldberg expressed to U Thant concerns of the American government about the consequences of the incident, and asked for a meeting of the Security Council regarding the capture of the American ship. The US presented the issue of the ship as a part of a

continuous violation of the demilitarized zone and as a provocation against South Korea. The US asked the USSR to intervene with the Korean side for the release of the captured ship. The USSR declined to intervene and warned the US against any rash actions.

The United States, South Korean regime and the DPRK introduced a number of military measures in order to increase the combat readiness of armed forces. These measures together with the psychological conditioning of the population in the both parts of Korea create, on their own, a situation where any serious incident incited by one of the parties could escalate into a larger scale military conflict.

According to the international law, the DPRK course of action would be legal if the American vessel were engaged in a hostile activity in the coastal waters of the DPRK, and offered resistance when ordered to leave. If the incident happened in the open sea, the DPRK intervention was not legal. It is difficult to judge this matter now. We assume the position of the DPRK that the ship Pueblo was in the DPRK coastal waters. From this point of view, detention of the ship appears to be an act of defense of the DPRK sovereignty.

Soviet ships with aid for the DRVN (Democratic Republic of Vietnam) and with military aid and substantial part of commercial supplies for the DPRK are passing through the area where the ship Pueblo was detained. From this corridor, the ship could have monitored the movement of part of the DPRK naval forces, including the submarines, one of the main air force bases, a zone of security defense installations of the DPRK, and movement in the area that, as the US obviously believes, is used for transportation of North Korean groups to South Korea. It seems that considering the importance of this area and the growing tension at the 38th parallel of latitude, the ship's mission was to determine the level of readiness of the Korean People's Army, or when possible, how imminent the danger is of carrying out the slogans for the unification of the country by force.

It is necessary to view the current conflict in a wider context because the DPRK has alliance treaties with the Soviet Union as well as with the PRC, in which both countries pledged to help the DPRK if attacked and drawn into a military conflict.

The presentation of the US delegate at the Security Council basically consisted of their previously published accusations. The Soviet delegate reacted with a strong accusation of the US policy of intervention in Korea, and in the case of the ship Pueblo, he namely used the deposition of the ship's captain to counter the American arguments. Discussion in the Security Council did not result in support for the American version which was decisively opposed by the USSR. So far, the American delegation has not presented any resolution to the Security Council. The development of discussion of the matter in the Security Council was characterized by a proposal from the Soviet delegate to immediately invite the DPRK into the Security Council. The US rejected the proposal, saying that they would be willing to admit the DPRK delegation to the Security Council only if the ship and the crew were released. There was also an effort especially by developing countries to mediate between the US and the DPRK. The fact that the issue was discussed in the Security Council turned out in the present situation to be positive; it helped to calm military hysteria in the US and bought time for the search of a diplomatic solution to the conflict. Due to the offensive of the NLF (National Liberation Front) of South Vietnam, the US was forced to tone down its response to the DPRK regarding the Pueblo ship incident.

The DPRK preferred direct talks with the US. Since February 2nd, negotiation is going on in the Military Commission for Truce in Panmunjon between representatives of the US and the DPRK. According to the reports from our Embassy, the negotiation is conducted in a calm manner. According to the press release from the AP in Seoul, representatives of the DPRK negotiating in Panmunjon expressed a willingness to return the wounded and killed crew members of Pueblo to the United States. According to another report from Reuters in Tokyo referring to the news from the South Korean pressroom, the US and the

DPRK reached a basic agreement in Panmunjon on February 5th about the release of the Pueblo crew. The same source reported that the US in essence accepted North Korean conditions and they will admit that Pueblo entered North Korean sovereign waters. The US allegedly promised a public apology as well. As per the report by the Reuters agency in Washington, the US State Department allegedly made a statement on February 5th that it has no information confirming the report of the basic agreement with the DPRK about the release of the Pueblo crew. These reports are not officially confirmed yet. Even if they turn out to be true, we still cannot expect a radical decrease in tension as long as the military measures implemented in connection with the Pueblo ship incident are not revoked.

III.

The acceleration of the dangerous development on the Korean Peninsula and the complex situation were the subject of the talks of the KPCZ CC 1st Secretary, c. A. Dubcek with the representatives of the CPSU CC while he was recently in Moscow. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs consulted with the Ministry of Foreign Affaires of the USSR in December of last year regarding this matter. The following consultation happened through our Ambassador in Moscow in the last few days. In both instances, were Soviet comrades were made familiar with our assessment of the development in Korea and informed about our concern with some dangerous aspects of the problem. Soviet comrades identified themselves fully with our opinions, but stressed that the DPRK representatives assured the Soviet side that the DPRK would not take any steps that could result in a military conflict. During the recent developments with the ship Pueblo, the Ministry of Foreign Affaires also received from the Soviet party two pieces of information for the Czechoslovak government, along with a description of concrete steps the USSR is taking.

According to the last information, which the Soviet Ambassador relayed to c. V. David on February 2nd of this year, Korean comrades agree with the position of the Soviet representative during discussion about the US complaint to the Security Council of the UN. They think it is necessary to stretch the proceedings of the "Pueblo" issue in the Security Council.

Various ideas about mediating the settlement of the incident are unofficially being suggested in the Security Council of the UN. The Soviet side informed Korean comrades about it. Since our Korean comrades are able to deal with Americans directly in Panmunjon, they feel that mediation of third countries is not, in principle, necessary. As for the concrete proposals for mediation, Korea's friends believe it is possible to choose tactics according to future development.

In conversations with the Soviet ambassador from January 28th to January 31st, concerning further possible steps the DPRK may take in connection with the incident, Korean comrades were saying only that the DPRK was not going to succumb to provocations and was ready to work towards easing the tension.

On January 29th, Rusk sent a letter to c. A. A. Gromyko. In this letter, Americans reiterated their version that the ship, "Pueblo," was in international waters at the moment of interception. Rusk maintains that Johnson exercises restraint in the matter and believes that settling the issue as quickly as possible would be in the interest of both parties.

During unofficial consultations among members of the Security Council, US representative Goldberg approached the USSR representatives with a declaration that the US is trying to find a diplomatic solution to the conflict in such a way that would include repatriation of the ship and its crew, without damaging the positions of either party.

In the response to Rusk, as well as in the conversation between the Soviet and American representative in the Security Council, it was stressed, as Korean comrades requested, that the incident could be settled if tension in the area did not increase, national dignity of the DPRK was not insulted by making it responsible for the incident, and the policy of threats was abandoned; the US must stop pressuring and threatening the DPRK.

On January 31st, the USSR representative told Korean comrades that by adopting tough measures for defense of its sovereignty, the DPRK had politically won. Now it would be desirable to solidify these results and simultaneously demonstrate the peaceful character of the DPRK course in connection with the incident which could be achieved by returning the "Pueblo" crew. Korean comrades were told that such a step from their side would not be interpreted as weakness; on the contrary, it would be appreciated everywhere as a show of a responsible approach, and it would further strengthen the DPRK's international position.

As far as it is up to the Soviet government, it will see to it that events around the incident do not surpass certain boundaries and escalate into an armed conflict.

Soviet comrades also expressed conviction that their Czechoslovak friends share this position, because it follows our shared objective on international issues. They would be grateful to the government of Czechoslovakia if it could, if at all possible, share information it has as well as its comments about the matter.

We consider the USSR approach as correct and thoughtful because it leads to preventing a wider conflict and to transferring its solution to the diplomatic arena. On January 31st of this year, Czechoslovak government was informed about the DPRK government's declaration from February 27th of this year

concerning the incursion of the American spy ship, Pueblo, into the DPRK's sovereign waters. The Czechoslovak government condemned the violation of the DPRK's sovereignty and expressed support for the defense of their territory and legal rights. The Czechoslovak press, radio and television condemn the American provocation against the DPRK and inform the Czechoslovak public about the progress of events. However, the Korean side protested against our press reprinting western information without comments, and resolutely demanded that it publish only information released by the DPRK. Our press was notified of some inaccuracies that happened when news from western press agencies were used.

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According to the assessment of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as well as Ministry of National Defense, even if the issue of the ship Pueblo is settled peacefully, situation in the Korean area will remain dangerous due to the military measures implemented by both sides.

In current situation, it would be suitable to proceed this way:

1. To permanently stay in constant contact with Soviet comrades: keep them up to date about our findings, consult with them about the development of the situation, and coordinate our actions with them.
2. To support the DPRK politically, in defense of its territorial sovereignty and legal rights, and to condemn the provocations against the DPRK from the US and South Korean regime.
3. To be in contact with the DPRK MFA and with the DPRK Embassy in Prague, and to request from them information about the DPRK's positions. To influence the DPRK towards peaceful resolution of the conflict. To that end it is suggested for the KPCZ CC Secretary to receive as soon as possible a diplomatic representative of the DPRK and to convey to him our position in a suitable way.

4. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of National Defense Ministry of the Interior will continue to inform the KPCZ CC Presidium and the Czechoslovak government.

On February 4th, 1968

Classified

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(stamp)

STATE CENTRAL ARCHIVE IN PRAGUE
DEGREE OF SECRECY CANCELED

Reason: 267261/01-070

(OZÚ = Section for Special Assignments)

Date: 01/16/03 Alena Noskova, Ph.D.

Signature: (illegible)

3750 /25

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

File no.: 020.873/68-3

Attachment III b/

No. of copies: 46

Print no.: 13

No. of sheets: 11

Study of tension in the Korean area (military part)

February 4th, 1968

1. General Situation

From the beginning of 1967, the number of incidents in the demilitarized corridor has been growing, which significantly increased tension in the Korean area. This tension grew by the end of the year 1967, and on January 19th of this year, an armed group of 30 attempted to assassinate the South Korean president and other government officials.

Tension increased after detention of the American ship of radio-technical survey "Pueblo" by the DPRK Navy on January 23rd, 1968.

According to the communiqué of the DPRK government, the ship was captured 10 miles away from the port Wonsan, which was in the territorial waters of the DPRK. The American side denies this claim and demands repatriation of the ship and crew. So far, neither side proved its assertion about the distance of the ship from the Korean shore at the time of capture.

This incident triggered number of diplomatic actions from the US, accompanied by military measures. At the same time, military measures were implemented on both sides of Korea. The military measures put in place by the interested parties after January 23, 1968 increased the number of armed forces in this area and lead to a change in balance of power.

Military measures of the US involve both forces deployed in the Far East as well as armed forces and reserves on the territory of the US.

In the Far East:

- The American armed forces were put on elevated combat alert.
- Part of the Air Force was moved from the Vietnamese area to the Korean area and the number of aircraft increased in the Korean area by planes flown from the US.

Findings about military measures of the US:

- a) From the island of Okinawa and from Philippines, 5 squadrons totaling 108 tactical planes (50 F-105, 18 F-4, 40 F-102) and HQ of the 18th tactical fighter jet wing were relocated to South Korea.
- b) From the US were relocated to
 - South Korea: 2 squadrons of tactical aircraft totaling 48 planes (24 F-4, 24 of unidentified type) and 16 transport planes (C 141, C 130, C 124) with aviation technical personnel and military material,
 - the island of Guam: 2 squadrons of tactical aircraft (33 planes F-105).
- c) From Navy Air Force in the area of Vietnam, an attack aircraft carrier RANGER was relocated to the Korean area, and by regrouping the Pacific fleet, an attack formation of 30 ships whose core consists of 2 attack aircraft carriers, 1 antisubmarine aircraft carrier and three missile cruisers, was created in the Korean zone.
- d) Mobilization measures of the US

In order to satisfy possible further strengthening of armed forces in the area of Far East, about 14, 700 reservists were called to active duty and 28 squadrons were mobilized in the US in the first round, itemized as:

- 8 squadrons of tactical aircraft from the Air Force National Guard with total of 200 planes F-100,

- 3 tactical reconnaissance squadrons from the Air Force National Guard with total of 54 planes RF-101,
- 5 squadrons of military air transport from the Air Force Reserves with total of 48 planes C-119 and 32 planes C-124,
- 1 rescue squadron from the Air Force Reserves with 4 planes HU-16B ALBATROS,
- 3 attack squadrons from Navy Reserves with 35 planes,
- 3 tactical fighter squadrons from Navy Reserves with 35 planes,
- 5 unspecified squadrons.

Strengthening of the US ground forces in the Far East did not happen yet but steps were taken towards mobilization of two divisions and six brigades of reservists on the territory of the US.

As for South Korean forces, they were put on elevated combat alert; no further mobilization measures were noticed. However, according to some reports, the South Korean government is considering possibly withdrawing two South Korean divisions from South Vietnam.

In response to the military measures of the US and South Korea, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea put its forces on combat alert and is mobilizing 16 reserve divisions. It also simultaneously strengthened the formation of its troops along the demilitarized zone. It is said that the military measures of the DPRK are materially supported by the PRC.

Looking at the development of the situation and the available news, it is not yet possible to determine unambiguously the motives leading up to the current situation as well as the interests served by the prolongation of it.

Even though we carefully monitor the development of the situation in Korea, due to the lack of credible reports, namely about the intentions of the DPRK and the PRC, we are not able to objectively assess possible consequences of implemented military and political measures. Due to the mobilization measures in the DPRK, movement of diplomats, including our military attaché, has been limited, and the Korean side does not inform him of its steps and intentions.

Even our representatives in the SCNAS (Supervisory Commission of the Non-Aligned States) in Panmunjon do not have an opportunity to receive objective information. However, the extent of military steps taken and the intensive military propaganda in the DPRK indicate strong tendencies towards a military solution.

Nevertheless, we can say that the US utilized the increased tension in the Korean area to push further measures through Congress for strengthening the American troops in this zone. Once the tension in Korea is resolved, the US can use the bolstered troops to increase pressure in Vietnam.

It is more difficult for the United States to further strengthen their troops in Vietnam due to the steps taken by the DPRK because these tie down considerable US forces in the Korean zone, limit freedom of maneuvering of armed forces of the US in the Far East, and can lead to the transferring of two South Korean divisions from South Vietnam to South Korea. Tying considerable US forces down to the Korean zone makes the situation of the NLF and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam easier and thus creates conditions for a successful liberation fight in Vietnam.

The tense situation in the Korean zone and in the Far East generally suits the current policy of the PRC who is thus able to exert more of its superpower influence.

II. State of Armed Forces and Mutual Balance of Power

Military measures of the US and the DPRK are carried out in order to equalize the mutual balance of power in the Korean zone, as it follows from the data below: 1/

Numbers of main branches of armed forces and armaments up to January 23rd, 1968

Branch	South Korea	USA	Total	DPRK	Ratio
Ground Forces (in thousands)	660	45	705	340	2 : 1
Divisions of Ground Forces	20	2	22	20	1.1 : 1
Tanks	1750	280	2030	600	3.3 : 1
Fighter Jets	214	-	214	^{2/} 700	1 : 3.5

Numbers up to February 4th, 1968 after implemented mobilization steps and Strengthening

Ground Forces (in thousands)	660	45	705	540	1.3 : 1
Divisions of Ground Forces	20	2	22	36	1 : 1.6
Tanks	1750	280	2030	Not known	?
(Fighter) Jets	214	(?) 180 156	550	700	1 : 1.3

Before the military measures were introduced, the ratio of power in the Korean zone was favorable to the DPRK in air force (3.5 : 1), for South Korea and the USA in ground forces, as to the number of people (2 : 1), and in tanks even 3.3 : 1.

1/ Displayed data is taken from public sources and it does not include worker peasant militias who in the DPRK are militarily trained mainly for defensive purposes.

2/ Part of the members of the DPRK Air Force gained considerable experience in combat on the DRVN side.

After measures were introduced to both sides by February 4th, 1968, supremacy of the Korean Air Force decreased to 1.3 : 1, and the ratio of ground forces as for personnel and light armament more less equalized. The possibly remaining superiority of South Korean and American ground forces in heavy equipment, namely tanks, is not a decisive factor due to the terrain conditions in the Korean war theatre.

Substantial supremacy of the South Korean and the US military force remains in the Navy. The United States is also able, if necessary, to equalize on short notice (in 48 hours) the current unfavorable ratio in Air Force and gain in it even considerable superiority. It is the capability to add about 300 to 500 fighter planes from the 12th Air Force unit and from the mobilized Air Force; however, the problem is the lack of suitable bases, and a permission from the Japanese government would be needed for use of airfields on the territory of Japan.

More substantial strengthening of ground forces cannot be done in short time, and transfer of combat-ready or possibly mobilized units from the US would take 1 month or more.

Current balance of power does not give any side a substantial superiority for conducting an extensive offensive.

III. Consequences of Possible Scenarios of Solution to the Conflict

Scenario 1 – solution by peaceful settlement in rather short time (2 to 3 weeks)

This scenario assumes a diplomatic solution with mutual concessions.

In case a peaceful settlement of the incident with the ship Pueblo is achieved within 2 to 3 weeks, and the course of diplomatic negotiations will give hope for a peaceful solution, armed forces of the US will remain positioned in the Far East in two areas: Vietnam and Korea.

In this case, we can expect only an increase of numbers of the American Air Force in the Far East.

They can be combat-ready on the territory of the US during this period:

- up to 500 planes from the 12th Air Force unit, deployed in the western part of the US, and up to 350 fighter planes mobilized from reserves,
- up to 8 divisions of ground forces and 2 divisions of Marines,
- part of the 1st Navy fleet from the Pacific fleet.

In the DPRK during this period, mobilization steps can be finished, especially in material and technical procurement (also with the help of the allies).

In the case of a peaceful settlement and if demobilization steps are not taken by the DPRK and tension does not decrease substantially, considerable part of the US forces will remain tied down to the Korean zone, which diminish combat capability of the US in Vietnam. On the other hand, should the DPRK demobilize, we have to expect that part of the freed up US forces, both from the US and from the Korean zone, would be used in South Vietnam, which would change the power ratio in NLF's disadvantage.

Scenario II. - solution by peaceful settlement after longer negotiation (more than 2 to 3 weeks)

In this scenario, the Korean zone would tie down a relatively large number of US forces and it is probable that these forces would be further strengthened, especially the Air Force and the Navy.

Contrary to the former scenario, 3 more divisions from the reserves could be ready on the US territory within 30 days for strengthening the ground forces in the Far East and on top of that, we cannot rule out mobilization complement of the 1st, 3rd and 5th Navy fleet.

From 5 to 6 ground force divisions may be brought from the US to the Korean zone within 30days.

The DPRK would continue complementing its armed forces namely with weaponry supplied by the allies.

During the resolution of the conflict, more forces would be tied to the Korean area than now but after that, a good part of the forces would probably be transferred to Vietnam and thus the ratio of power would worsen for the NLF.

Scenario III. – solution through military conflict

This scenario leads to development of two fronts in the Far East. New forces will enter the war on both sides. US armed forces in the Far East will grow substantially, but they will be divided between two war theatres. As a result of that, the American forces in Vietnam would not strengthen as required. The consequence presents a smaller chance of resolving the conflict soon in US favor and objectively worse situation of US troops in Vietnam.

The current (and projected) power ratio does not offer a clear chance for quick resolution of the conflict to either side, and it appears that it would have to be changed.

Build up of US forces can be accomplished with 82nd paratrooper division (in 3 days), 2nd and 4th marine divisions (in 3 weeks), 5th mechanized division, three mobilized divisions and six mobilized brigades (in 1 month), which is total 9 divisions. 12th Air Force army can add about 300 fighter planes to the US forces in the Far East. Such steps will result in power ratio advantageous for the US. Besides these forces, we can expect strengthening with 3 more divisions in 50 days and with akk portion of the mobilized forces, 1st, 3rd and 5th fleets.

Build up of the DPRK armed forces requires technical aid of outside armed forces. Without it, successful conduct of even the defense variant is substantially diminished. The extent of aid to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea must be proportionate to intentions; the variant of offensive operations would require quite extensive aid (40 to 50 divisions). Such aid would also lead to the danger of the US using nuclear weapons (if the DPRK forces are successful).

The direct consequence of this variant for the United States will be a substantial increase in required means for conducting the war in the Far East (armed forces, expenses, means of transportation). It will also result in limited possibilities for growth of other armed forces and in decreased capability to transfer armed forces to different war theatres.

We can conclude that even strengthening of the US armed forces in the Far East does not offer hope for quick resolution of both conflicts. The United States are thus confronted with the prospect of a long war that would limit their maneuverability.

Another significant change in the ratio of power would be possible with limited use of nuclear weapons. However, this creates danger of mutual use (PRC). It also leads to the danger of escalation and a possibility of a direct conflict between the United States and the PRC (attacks against PRC nuclear capabilities) and to the increase of the international activity to stop the war. Nevertheless, use of nuclear weapons does not guarantee the United States a victory in an escalated conflict.

IV. Conclusions

1. Increased tension in the Korean zone is forcing the United States to keep a larger number of forces in the Korean area, which limits their use on the Vietnamese front.
2. The crisis in the Korean area makes it possible for the United States to strengthen armed forces in the Far East. A peaceful settlement of the incident can make it possible for the US to strengthen armed forces in the Vietnam War theatre, and thus, increase chances for a successful military solution.

Starting a military conflict confronts the US with these alternatives:

- conventional warfare means protracted war on two fronts (with all political, economic and military consequences),
- limited nuclear war means danger of escalation of the war and direct conflict with the People's Republic of China (while the result of the war cannot be predicted with any certainty), and a situation when the world public opinion would be polarized against the US (efforts to stop the war).

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The most advantageous variant for the United States appears to be peaceful resolution of the conflict because it allows proceeding with planned steps during further negotiations for strengthening the armed forces in the Far East. Peace negotiations make it possible for the United States to regroup their forces in favor of the Vietnam war theatre and to conduct their operations successfully. The extent of regrouping will depend whether the DPRK will demobilize or not.

3. Increased tension in the Korean zone draws part the US military effort from Vietnam and is objectively helping the National Liberation Front and the People's Republic of Vietnam.

An early solution in the Korean zone can lead to renewed use of forces transferred from the Korean area to the Vietnamese War theatre, and to diminished possibility of transfer of the mobilized US forces to the Far East. In

case they are transferred to the Far East, they would probably be used in the Vietnamese War theatre.

Peaceful settlement after longer negotiation will result in tying of part of the US forces down to the Korean area, which will make it easier for the NLF and DRVN. At the same time, the US will be more likely to transfer their armed forces to the Far East into the Korean zone. Peaceful settlement will allow the US to deploy in the Vietnamese zone larger forces than in the previous variant, and thus it will substantially influence the course of the conflict in favor of the US.

4. In the case of military solution of the conflict in Korea, there is little chance that the US would decide to get engaged in a protracted war with conventional weapons like in Vietnam. Requests made by some senators from the American Congress as well as proposals made by top military officials for solving a contingent conflict with nuclear weapons (for instance the Chief of Staff of the 8th American Army in Korea) indicate a dangerous development of a possible military confrontation.

Military solution brings for socialist countries an increase in military aid and probably also some measures in the armed forces for possible escalation, and in general, increased military spending. In addition, it is necessary to take into account the possibility of limited nuclear war, and to think of measures to counter such a situation.



Department of State

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TELEGRAM

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OO RUENC
DE RUALOS 4008E 0370910
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 060850Z FEB 68 ZFF1
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8865
STATE GRNC
BT

1078

CN 1616
Feb 6, 1967

6:03 ~~am~~ **DECLASSIFIED**

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLI 98-17

By *us*, NARA Date 3-18-97

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 1 OF 2 SEOUL 4008

NODIS

1. BONESTEEL AND I WERE CALLED TO MEET WITH PRIME MINISTER, MINISTERS OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, DEFENSE, INFORMATION AND CHIEF OF JCS THIS MORFZNG. MEETING LAST APPROXIMATELY ONE HOUR TWENTY MINUTES.
2. PRIMIN OPENED BY SAYING HE WANTED TO MAKE CLEAR THE ATTITUDE OF ROK GOVERNMENT, THAT THIS WAS THE TIME TO THINK CALMLY AND CONSIDER ALL THE FACTS. AT PRESENT TIME FEELINGS OF POPULATION QUITE DIFFERENT FROM PERIODS OF NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS

PAGE 2 RUALOS 4008/1E ~~SECRET~~

WITH JAPAN OR WHEN TROOPS FOR VIETNAM MATTER BEING CONSIDERED. THE GOVERNMENT HAD ADOPTED A CAUTIOUS ATTITUDE TO AVOID HELPING THE ENEMY OR EXCITING THE PEOPLE. THEY HAD LET NO ONE KNOW MEETING WITH US BEING HELD. (WHEN WE ARRIVED THERE WERE AT LEAST 100 CORRESPONDENTS IN ANTEROOM OUTSIDE PRIMIN'S OFFICE.)

3. PRIMIN SAID CLOSED OR SECRET MEETINGS AT PANMUNJOM HAVE BEEN TAKING PLACE. HE IS AWARE THAT AMBASSADOR HAD BEEN REPORTING TO PRESIDENT PARK ON ALL THESE MATTERS. PUBLIC UNDERSTANDING, HOWEVER, WAS LACKING. PEOPLE BELIEVED THAT UNITED NATIONS WOULD CONTINUE TO PROTECT SOVEREIGNTY AND SECURITY OF ROK. NK'S HAD SENT RAIDERS TRYING TO OVERTHROW ROK GOVERNMENT. NEVERTHELESS MEETINGS WERE GOING ON BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND NORTH KOREA AT PANMUNJOM WHICH IS ROK TERRITORY. IS IT REASONABLE THAT TALKS SHOULD BE HELD IN SUCH A PLACE BETWEEN US AND NK? PARTIES MUST ABIDE BY AGREEMENTS WHERE

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 3 RUALOS 4008/1E ~~SECRET~~
INTERNATION LAW IS NONEXISTENT.

4. THERE HAD BEEN INNUMERABLE VIOLATIONS BY NK AND ONLY ROK IS ABIDING BY INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS, AS ALL THE WORLD KNOWS. BUT ROK HAS NO MEANS OF RETALIATION BECAUSE UN COMMAND TIES ROK GOVERNMENT'S HANDS AND ROK TROOPS CANNOT RETALIATE. THIS IS FAR FROM IDEAL SITUATION, PRIMIN SAID.

5. MEETINGS BETWEEN US AND NK CREATE PUBLIC SUSPICION. PUBLIC FEELS THAT ROK SOVEREIGNTY IS BEING DISCUSSED WITHOUT ROK'S PRESENCE. SO FAR THE GOVERNMENT HAS BEEN QUIET IN ORDER NOT TO AROUSE PUBLIC ON THIS SCORE. IF CUBA RAIDED WASHINGTON AND ATTACKED WHITE HOUSE AND ROK THEN BEGAN SEPARATE TALKS WITH CUBA, WHAT WOULD BE THE US ATTITUDE IN SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES?

6. AMBASSADOR PORTER GOT PERMISSION OF PRESIDENT PARK FOR THE TALKS AND HAS REPORTED REGULARLY TO THE PRESIDENT ON THEM. PRESIDENT'S AGREEMENT WAS

PAGE 4 RUALOS 4008/1 ~~SECRET~~
ONLY IN PRINCIPLE FOR HUMANITARIAN PURPOSES, AND EVEN THOUGH PRESIDENT CONSENTED IN PRINCIPLE, CLOSE COOPERATION IS NECESSARY. PRIMIN WOULD LIKE TO MAKE RECOMMENDATIONS.

7. CHONG THEN SAID THAT IF ONE OR TWO MORE CLOSED MEETINGS ARE NECESSARY US SHOULD TRY TO INCLUDE ROK REPRESENTATIVES, EVEN THOUGH ROK IS NOT SIGNATORY TO ARMISTICE AGREEMENT. THERE SHOULD AT LEAST BE CONSULTATION WITH ROK REPRESENTATIVE AFTER WHICH US REPRESENTATIVE SHOULD ACT ACCORDINGLY. IF SECRET MEETINGS CONTINUE AND SUSPICION CONTINUES THAT MATTERS PERTAINING TO ROK SOVEREIGNTY ARE DISCUSSED, THERE WILL BE COMPLICATIONS IN OUR RELATIONSHIPS. AMBASSADOR AND GENERAL BONESTEEL WOULD BE REPORTING IN STRONGEST POSSIBLE TERMS OF REAL FEELINGS OF ROK PUBLIC. ANY KOREAN QUESTIONED ABOUT MEETINGS AT PANMUNJOM WILL GIVE ONE ANSWER ONLY AND IT WILL BE AGAINST SUCH NEGOTIATIONS. INSTEAD OF CLOSED OR SECRET MEETINGS ROK GOVERNMENT FEELS

PAGE 5 RUALOS 4008/1 ~~SECRET~~
OPEN MEETING SHOULD BE HELD. IT IS TRUE THAT BOTH SIDES WOULD BE MILITANT IN SUCH MEETINGS BUT PEOPLE WOULD KNOW WHAT WAS HAPPENING. THEY SUPPORT THEIR GOVERNMENT IN THIS MOST CRITICAL PROBLEM SINCE THE ARMISTICE, EVEN IF CLOSED MEETINGS SUCCEED IN BRINGING

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-3- SEOUL 4008 1 of 2

ABOUT RETURN OF PUEBLO AND CREW, THERE MAY BE
AD AFTER EFFECT. MUCH ILL FEELING HAD BEEN CREATED
BY DIVISION OF THE COUNTRY YEARS AGO AND CURRENT US
TALKS WITH NK TOUCHING ON SOVEREIGNTY OF THE COUNTRY
MAKE IT IMPOSSIBLE TO PREDICT HOW ROK PEOPLE WILL REACT.
PRIMIN WANTED TO BE FRANK ABOUT ALL THIS. IF US IS
FORCED TO BOW TO NORTH KOREA TO SAVE OUR SOLDIERS,
NK WOULD CONTINUE TO TRY TO DECREASE US INFLUENCE
AND PRESTIGE.

8. UNITED NATIONS HAS CONDEMNED NK, PRIMIN
CONTINUED, AND UN FORCES ARE HERE TO ACT AS POLICE
MEN, BUT IF THEY FAIL TO DO JOB, WHAT WILL BE RESULT?
PRIMIN WAS NOT SAYING THAT THERE SHOULD BE CLOSED
OR OPEN MEETINGS OR THAT JOINT MEETINGS SHOULD NOT

PAGE 6 RUALOS 4008/1 ~~SECRET~~

GO ON. THE GOVERNMENT'S PREFERENCE WAS FOR OPEN
MEETING BUT IF IT ESSENTIAL TO HAVE CLOSED MEETINGS
THEY SHOULD BE IN COOPERATION WITH ROK REPRESENTATIVES.
TOPICS OF DISCUSSION SHOULD NOT BE LIMITED TO PUEBLO
BUT ALSO TO RAID ON BLUE HOUSE WHICH HAPPENED PRIOR
TO PUEBLO AND SHOULD BE GIVEN PRIORITY IN DISCUSSION.
RESIDENT PARK HAS ASKED ABOUT GUARANTEES FOR THE
FUTURE. AMERICANS SHOULD KNOW THAT IF PRESIDENT HAD
NOT GIVEN ORDER AGAINST IT, ROK FORCES WOULD HAVE
RETALIATED ON LIMITED BASIS. IF NORTH KOREANS HAD
SUCCEEDED IN HITTING BLUE HOUSE THERE WOULD HAVE
BEEN ALL-OUT WAR. UN OPEATIONAL CONTROL IS FOR
PURPOSE OF PROTECTING ROK SECURITY. IF UN REMAINS
PASSIVE, PRIMIN ASKED, IS THIS THE WISEST COURSE? ALL
ROK MINISTERS PRESENT HAD STRONG IMPULSE AFTER RAID
TO BOMB KIM IL SUNG WHERE HE STOOD. WITHOUT GUARANTEE
OF SECURITY SHOULD THE ROK'S SIMPLY TRY TO PROLONG
THEIR EXISTANCE OR FACE UP TO A SHOWDOWN? THEY HAVE
CONSIDERED THIS MORE SERIOUSLY THAN ANYONE ELSE. IF
THERE IS ANOTHER INCIDENT SHOULD THEY STAND STILL?
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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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OO RUEHC
DE RUALOS 4008/2E 0370930
ZNY SSSSS ZZH CN: 1639Q
O 060850Z FEB 68 ZFFI
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL 1968 FEB 6 7:28AM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 886
STATE GRNC

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~~SECRET~~ SECTION 2 OF 2 SEOUL 4008

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLI 98-17

By , NARA Date 3-18-59

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9. CONSIDERING RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN US, BASIC POLICY REMAINED UNCHANGED. IF THERE IS ANOTHER INCIDENT, HOWEVER, ROK WILL HAVE TO ACT. THEY ARE PREPARING LIMITED RETALIATION MEASURES.

10. I THEN REPLIED BY SAYING THAT WE WILL DISCUSS CAREFULLY WITH OUR PEOPLE IDEAS WHICH PRIMIN PUT FORTH CONCERNING MEETINGS AT PANMUNJOM AND I WOULD HOPE TO COME BACK TO HIS (#) IN NEAR FUTURE. HE WAS ENTIRELY CORRECT IN SAYING THAT I HAVE REPORTED FULLY BOTH IN ADVANCE AND

PAGE 2 RUALOS 4008/2E ~~SECRET~~
AFTER THE FACT ON THE MEETINGS. I RECOGNIZE THAT BECAUSE OF UNUSUAL ASPECTS OF THIS PROBLEM THE MINISTERS ARE HAVING A DIFFICULT TIME WITH ASSEMBLY AND THE PRESS, AND WE ARE SEARCHING FOR WAYS TO HELP THEM. HOWEVER, IT WAS NOT WITHIN MY AUTHORITY TO CARRY ON ORDINARY TYPE DISCUSSIONS, THOUGH I WISH TO BE OF HELP AND DO EVERYTHING I COULD TO EASE THE MINISTERS' SITUATION. WITH REGARD TO FEELING THAT ONLY PUEBLO HAS BEEN DISCUSSED AT THE MEETINGS, THIS IS NOT CORRECT. AS RECENTLY AS YESTERDAY WE HAD MENTIONED FIRST AGGRESSIVE NORTH KOREAN ACTIONS AGAINST THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA AS BEING RESPONSIBLE FOR SITUATION THAT HAD BEEN CREATED.

1. FINALLY, IN MY COMMENT, I SAID THAT WE RECOGNIZE THAT THEY ARE UNDER GREAT PROVOCATION. WE HAVE EXPRESSED COMPLETE SOLIDARITY WITH THEM IN CURRENT SITUATION. REGARDLESS OF NATURE OF ANY PROVOCATION WHICH THEY MAY YET EXPERIENCE, I WANTED TO MAKE IT CLEAR THAT WE EXPECT COMPLETE CONSULTATION IN

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ADVANCE OF ANY ACTION THEY MAY CONTEMPLATE. THIS IS WHAT WE HAD GIVEN AND THIS IS WHAT WE EXPECT. THE ADVERSE EFFECT OF UNCOORDINATED ACTION COULD FAR OUTLAST THAT OF ANY INCIDENT AND IT IS ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY FOR US TO REMAIN IN FULL CONSULTATION REGARDLESS OF TYPE OF PROVOCATION, TO WHICH THEY MIGHT BE SUBJECTED.

12. PRIMIN THEN SAID THAT TWO WEEKS HAVE PASSED SINCE RAID ON SEOUL. BECAUSE OF THEIR DEPENDENCE AND TRUST HE WOULD REQUEST GENERAL BONESTEEL TO TAKE UP PROTECTION OF THE COUNTRY. HOWEVER, IT LOOKED TO PRIMIN THAT US IS SO INVOLVED WITH PUEBLO AS NOT TO BE CONCERNED WITH ROK SECURITY.

1.3 GEN BONESTEEL RECOUNTED AT LENGTH (SEE BONESTEEL'S MESSAGE KRA0451 TO SHARP AND WHEELER) MEASURES TAKEN BY UNC IN COOPERATION WITH MINISTRY OF DEFENSE AGAINST INFILTRATION AND TO PROTECT COUNTRY. THERE ARE MANY MATTERS UNDER CONSIDERATION

PAGE 4 RUALOS 4008/2E ~~SECRET~~

HE SAID WHICH WOULD REASSURE THEM ALTHOUGH IT IS STILL PREMATURE TO GET INTO DETAIL UNTIL THEY FULLY CONSIDERED. BONESTEEL ALSO LAID GREAT EMPHASIS ON REQUIREMENT FOR COMPLETE CONSULTATION WITH US ON THEIR PLANS AND INTENTIONS.

14. FOREIGN MINISTER THEN MADE BRIEF STATEMENT TO EFFECT PROBLEM IS TO AVOID PUBLIC SUSPICION OF WHAT IS GOING ON, THAT OPEN MEETINGS AT PANMUNJOM WERE THE ANSWER. UNTIL NOW HE DID NOT KNOW THAT THERE WAS ANY DISCUSSION OF NK VIOLATIONS OF ARMISTICE AND PUBLIC BELIEVES THERE IS NONE. I COMMENTED THAT IN ADDITION TO ASSURANCE I HAD JUST GIVEN HIM THAT MATTER WAS MENTIONED YESTERDAY AT PANMUNJOM BY US, THERE WAS SUBSTANTIAL HISTORY OF OUR STATEMENTS GIVING PROPER EMPHASIS TO RAID ON SEOUL AND NK VIOLATION OF DMZ, WHICH IF PROPERLY USED IN DEALING WITH PUBLIC AND ASSEMBLY WOULD DO MUCH TO CORRECT IMPRESSIONS AND ALLAY SUSPICIONS HE MENTIONED. I CITED STATEMENTS IN US, PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S STATEMENT ON TELEVISION ON

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PAGE 5 RUALOS 4008/2E ~~SECRET~~
THIS SUBJECT, AND SAID THERE WAS MUCH ADDITIONAL
MATERIAL IF THEY WOULD BUT USE IT.

15. PRIMIN THEN SAID THEY WOULD SAY TO PRESS AND
ASSEMBLY ONLY THAO MEETING HAD BEEN HELD AND THAT
THEY HAD MADE THEIR VIEWPOINT CLEAR TO US. WE
THEN ADJOINED FROM THIS "SECRET MEETING" AND
DEPARTED THROUGH MOST DISORDERLY PRESS GATHERING
I HAVE SEEN HERE, WHICH IS SAYING A LOT.

16. COMMENT: MEETING WAS OF COURSE STATED IN PART
TO SHOW ASSEMBLY, PRESS AND MILITARY THAT GOVERNMENT
TELLING US THE SCORE. DESPITE THREATS OF UNILATERAL
RETALIATORY ACTION IT DOES NOT CHANGE MY OPINION THAT
AT THIS POINT PARK AND CLOSEST ADVISORS, DESPITE CLEAR
NATURAL INCLINATION, RECOGNIZE NEED TO RESTRAIN
HOTHEADS, AMONG WHOM I INCLUDE MND. THEY HAVE
(#) AND PROBABLY ENCOURAGED, SOME TURBULENCE
IN ASSEMBLY AND AMONG PUBGAC, HOWEVER, WHICH MAY
SWEEP THEM ALONG TOWARD RETALIATORY ACTION IF ANOTHER
INCIDENT OCCURS. UNDERLYING FACT THAT THEY
HAVE NOT USED MATERIAL WE HAVE PROVIDED TO SAVE THEIR

PAGE 6 RUALOS 4008/2E ~~SECRET~~
FACE IN CONNECTION WITH PANMUNJOM MEETINGS IS, WE
BELIEVE, DEEP DOWN FEELING THAT THIS MAY BE MOMENT
TO REUNIFY THE COUNTRY AND THAT IF OPPORTUNITY IS
LOST, IT MAY NOT COME AGAIN. PRESIDENT PARK'S
PERSONAL REGARD FOR PRESIDENT JOHNSON, RESTRAINTS
WE HAVE BUILT INTO SYSTEM OF COMMAND CONTROL HERE,
AS WELL AS THOSE WE ARE EXERTING CURRENTLY, HAVE
THUS FAR PAID OFF, BUT AT THIS POINT ROK'S NEED
CAREFULLY WATCHING.

17. WITHIN DAY OR TWO, OR SOONER, DEPENDING ON HOW
MATTERS DEVELOP, I MAY GIVE YOU SOME COMMENT
CONCERNING DESIRABILITY OF SPECIAL ENVOY.

GP-3 PORTER

(#) OMISSION, CORRECTION TO FOLLOW

~~SECRET~~

06 FEB 1968: Progression of the Closed Meetings between the U.S. and the North Korean Puppet Regime. (section #: 729.55, record #: 2663)

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Number: UNW-0223

Date: 061830

Recipient: Minister, Director of Korea Central National Intelligence

Addressor: Ambassador to the United Nations

Reference: WUN-0121

1. Concerning the official response of the U.S. government, the U.S. representatives to the United Nations said that there was no contact from Washington.
2. On the 5th, Ambassador Peterson spoke of the fact that chief delegates of the North Korean puppet regime and the United States had meetings three times, but said that there was no progress so far, unlike the reports of press.
3. Also, he said he knew that contents of the meetings were reported to the South Korean government in detail and, in particular, it was reported in detail to the President.
4. Whether or not the United Nations Security Council resumes will be decided only after seeing the conclusion of Panmunjum meetings, and there will be a sufficient discussion between South Korea and the United States. (미일, 방연)

Reclassified as common document (after the termination of the incident)

DECLASSIFIED
Authority VND 941293
By DL NARA Date 6-4-08

JOINT MESSAGEFORM

RESERVED FOR COMMUNICATION CENTER

~~SECRET~~ EYES ONLY RECEIVED

7 FEB 68 13 20z

NODIS COMMUNICATIONS

TYPE MSG	FOR	MULTI	SINGLE
			X
PRECEDENCE			
ACTION PRIORITY			
INFO			

FROM: General Wheeler, CJCS

TO: Admiral Sharp, CINCPAC

~~SECRET~~ NODIS/CACTUS - EYES ONLY - JCS 01472 Feb 68

State NODIS message to AmEmb Seoul 111264, dtd 7 Feb 68, is transmitted for your information:

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

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SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS

DATE	TIME
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Feb	1968
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PHONE	SIGNATURE
	<i>Paul Kearney</i>
	TYPED (or stamped) NAME AND TITLE
	Paul M. Kearney
	Admin Asst to CJCS
	REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS

~~SECRET~~

091 Korea - 7 Feb 68

DECLASSIFIED

Authority VND 941293
By DL NARA Date 6-4-08

111264

Department of State

INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHANGE TO

~~SECRET~~

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Classification

SEC DEF	
DUP/IC	
SEC	
ASD/ISA	
SEC ASST	
MIL ASST	

Origin ACTION: AmEmbassy SEOUL IMMEDIATE

Info STATE 111264

NODIS/CACTUS

NODIS NODIS

You are authorized convey following message from President Park Dear Johnson to President/~~Raid~~: QUOTE ~~Myndess~~/Mr. President:

Ambassador Porter has transmitted to me the text of your thoughtful letter of February 5.

He has also given me your views, expressed orally to him, on the conduct of the negotiations between the United Nations Command and the North Korean Senior Members of the Military Armistice Commission.

I am keenly aware of your desire that the Pueblo seizure and ROK complaints against North Korea not be treated as unrelated matters. I agree fully that a solution of the one without a solution of the other would be incomplete. I would like, ~~zkaxf~~ therefore, to give you my further views as to how the two problems should be related. I believe that we can separate the short ~~kn~~ question of negotiating tactics from the

Drafted by: Text rec'd fm White House

Tel. No. 5381

Telegraphic transmission and Classification approved by:

S/S - Mr. Walsh *BS*

WH - Bromley Smith *BS*

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DECLASSIFIED
Authority UND 741293
By DL NARA Date 6-4-08

Page 2 of telegram to SEOUL . IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET/RODIS~~
Classification

longer run and continuing problem of ensuring the security of the Republic of Korea against attack from the north.

First, let me ~~xxxx~~ refer to the negotiating problem. Delicate negotiations of this kind cannot hope to succeed if conducted in public they would degenerate to the level of ^{propaganda} ~~propaganda~~ exchanges ~~x~~ characteristic of Military Armistice Commission meetings in the past.

We do not object in principle to your other suggestion, that the ~~xxxxxx~~ ^{xxxxxx} joined UNC Senior Member be ~~xxxxxx~~ by a ROK member in future meetings with the North Korean Senior Member; however, we doubt very much that the North Korean side would agree, and we do not wish to risk a breakdown in these discussions.

At the same time, I realize that the method of private discussion between the UNC and the North Korean Senior Members has created a political and public relations problem for you. The Korean public, the ~~xxx~~ press, government officials, military officers and even members of your ~~xxx~~ cabinet, have concluded that the US is engaging in those private discussions in order to reach an ~~agxxxx~~ agreement on the problem of the Pueblo seizure separately and to neglect the broader range of problems posed for the Republic of Korea by North Korean violations of the Armistice Agreement.

Our reasons for wanting private discussions, moreover, are not-

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~~SECRET/NODIS~~

Classification

easy to explain to the Korean public, and they do not suffice to allay the suspicions that are mounting and that threaten to impair our usually close and friendly cooperation. It is clearly not enough for your government and mine to explain that the success of the current negotiations for the release of the Pueblo and crew will depend on secrecy. It is important that the immediate problem of the Pueblo seizure and the longer run problem of ensuring the security of the Republic of Korea against attack from the north be presented in somewhat different perspectives.

The seizure of the Pueblo presents an immediate challenge to the United States which must be dealt with promptly and decisively. The measures to deal with this problem are not necessarily the same as the measures to deal with North Korean aggressive actions against the Republic of Korea. The United States will not, I assure you, humiliate itself or the ROKG to obtain redress. But we cannot leave unexplored the possibility that secret negotiations, against the backdrop of increased military strength in the area, will achieve our immediate goal.

Unlike the Pueblo problem, for which we must have an immediate solution, the security of the Republic of Korea against attack is a continuing problem. It will still exist after the Pueblo and its crew have been released. It will not be solved by angry words uttered in the Military Armistice Commission, or by negotiations. It will require

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Authority VND 941293
By DL NARA Date 6-4-08

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~~SECRET/NODIS~~
Classification

tangible and continuing measures to strengthen the Republic of Korea militarily. And if the Republic of Korea, as a result of North Korean threats against it, is visibly strengthened in its military stance, by the kind of measures I have already indicated to you, and which I shall outline in detail below, the North Koreans will have suffered a moral and psychological defeat in the current crisis.

If we succeed both in obtaining redress in the Pueblo seizure and in strengthening the security of the Republic of Korea, then we will indeed, in your words, have completely attained our common goal.

I am confident that you will see that the long run interest of your country in strengthening itself against possible attack is more important to you than the immediate problems of negotiating tactics and propaganda. I therefore want to give you more complete information on the measures I am proposing for the permanent strengthening of your military posture.

Ambassador Porter already has discussed with you our willingness to provide certain equipment to ROK forces in Korea in conjunction with the deployment to Viet-Nam of additional ROK forces. The equipment includes.

1. A \$32.9 million counterinfiltration "package" which was jointly devised by your Chiefs of Staff and General Bonesteel. Certain key

Page 5 of telegram to SEOUL

~~SECRET/FODIS~~
Classification

Items in this counter-infiltration package have been ~~amxxx~~ authorized for air delivery and many of these items will arrive in Korea within ~~gku~~ the next 15 days.

2. Two additional destroyers for the ROK Navy, one of which will come from the active US Navy fleet. This destroyer is now undergoing overhaul, and will be delivered to the ROK Navy no later than ~~amxxx~~ April 30. The other is being activated from the US Navy reserve fleet and will be delivered after overhaul in 12 months or less.

- 3. A self-propelled 8 in. Howitzer artillery battalion.
- 4. A company of 12 UH-1-D Helicopters.

In order to provide new programs of help, I have decided to increase military assistance to your forces in the current fiscal year by an additional \$100 million. This further amount will fund other items of equipment which should leave no doubt either in the minds of your people or in those of the North Koreans of our determination to see that you are in an even stronger position to withstand and ~~repel~~ repel further aggressive acts they might contemplate.

I trust, Mr. President, that the foregoing will amplify and support my previous assurances to you that my government's vital concern for the security of your country is undiminished. I hope that with this tangible evidence of support you will redouble your efforts to allay the suspicion of some of your countrymen that in the current crisis the United States

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Authority JND 941293

By DL NARA Date 6-4-08

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Page 6 of telegram to SEOUL IMMEDIATE

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is selfishly pursuing its own ends and neglecting its long standing commitments to the people and the government of the Republic of Korea.

Ambassador Porter and General Bonesteel stand ready, I am sure, to assist in this effort through their normal channels to the appropriate officials of your government.

With my warmest personal regards,

~~Sincerely,~~ Sincerely, ~~FOR MR~~

LYNDON B. JOHNSON

END QUOTE

END