

JOINT MESSAGEFORM

CLASSIFICATION

~~TOP SECRET~~

TYPE MSG	BOOK	MULTI	SINGLE
		X	

PRECEDENCE

ACTION IMMEDIATE

*LBTL, N5F*

*Country file*

*"Korea-Neylo Incident" Military Cables,*

*Vol. I, Box 263*

FROM JCS

REF 98-457

*By C/O, 1st Lt, 675-00*

TO: AIG 936

~~TOP SECRET~~

JB SENDS

SUBJECT: KOREAN SITUATION REPORT NUMBER TWO

1. TASK GROUP 70.6 LESS THE USS O'BANNON IS OPERATING IN THE VICINITY OF BLOON/BEUSE. O'BANNON REMAINS IN SASEBO, JAPAN, ETD UNKNOWN AT THIS TIME.

2. DDGS P/M 783 AND GIDROLOG REMAIN IN COMPANY WITH 70.6, MAINTAINING A RANGE OF 9-10 MILES.

3. TASK GROUP 70.0, CONSISTING OF THE USS YORKTOWN AND SIX DESTROYERS IS ENROUTE TO THE SEA OF JAPAN WITH AN ETA OF 30 JANUARY.

4. THE LATEST STATUS REPORT FROM CINCUNC INDICATES THAT THE INCREASED HOSTILE ACTIVITY WHICH BEGAN ON 21 JANUARY WITH AN ATTEMPTED ATTACK ON THE ROK PRESIDENTIAL MANSION HAS CONTINUED. INCREASED SECURITY MEASURES HAVE BEEN TAKEN IN ALL AREAS. ROK AIR FORCE IS ASSUMING A SELF-TERMED STATUS OF MAXIMUM ALERT. THERE ARE 215 US AND ROK AIR FORCE COMBAT AIRCRAFT IN KOREA

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

DISTRIBUTION:


- CJCS
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- NMCC

DATE	TIME
25	
MONTH	YEAR
JAN	1968
PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES
3	4

JOHN S. MAZE  
Colonel, USA  
Command Center  
Operations Chief

PHONE 78322

SIGNATURE



NAME AND TITLE

JAMES A. SHANNON  
Brigadier General, USAF

REGARD TO INSTRUCTIONS

ABBREVIATED JOINT MESSAGE FORM  
and/or CONTINUATION SHEET

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

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PRECEDENCE IMMEDIATE	RELEASED BY	DRAFTED BY	PHONE
ACTION INFO			

OF WHICH 101 ARE ON ALERT AS FOLLOWS:

	ROMAF	ROMAF	USAF	USAF	USAF
	F-105	F-105	F-105	F-105	F-105
AVAILABLE	134	57	12	8	4
ALERT	111	46	12	8	4

THE LOGISTIC SUPPORT SITUATION FOR THE ROK ARMY IS UNFAVORABLE BOTH FROM THE ASPECT OF THE CURRENT LEVEL OF OPERATIONS AND THE POSSIBILITY OF RAPID ESCALATION INTO LIMITED OR GENERAL WAR. U.S. FORCES HAVE SIMILAR PROBLEMS IN A GENERAL WAR SITUATION. CINCPAC REMAINS IN 7 CON 4 AND IS MAINTAINING A HIGH STATUS OF ALERT.

5. ON 25 JANUARY (EST), THE PRESIDENT CALLED UP THE FOLLOWING 26 READY RESERVE UNITS OF THE AIR NATIONAL GUARD, AIR FORCE RESERVE AND NAVY RESERVE (372 AIRCRAFT):

AIR NATIONAL GUARD

UNIT	HOME STATION	NO/TYPER ACFT
113TH TFW	ANDREWS AFB, MD.	--
133TH TFG	ANDREWS AFB, MD	25 F-100
177TH TFG	ATLANTIC CITY NAF, N.J.	25 F-100
107TH TFG	NIAGARA FALLS INTL APT, N.Y.	25 F-100
121ST TFG	LOCKBOURNE AFB, OHIO	25 F-100
140TH TFW	BUCKLEY ANGB, COLO.	--
140TH TFG	BUCKLEY ANGB, COLO.	25 F-100

CONTROL NO.	TO/FROM	PAGE NO.	TOTAL PAGES	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION	INITIALS
		2	4		

ABBREVIATION OF MESSAGE FORM AND/OR CONTINUATION SHEET

CLASSIFICATION  
~~TOP SECRET~~

PRECEDENCE	RELEASED BY	DRAFTED BY	PHONE
STIC			
NFO			

384TH TFG	MCCONNELL AFB, WICHITA, KAN.	25	F-100
388TH TFG	BILOXI CITY INTL AFB, LOUISIANA	25	F-100
350TH TFG	KIRTLAND AFB, ALBUQUERQUE, N.M.	25	F-100
123RD TRG	STANDIFORD FLD, LOUISVILLE, KY.	--	----
122RD TRG	STANDIFORD FLD, LOUISVILLE, KY.	18	RF-101
384TH TRG	LITTLE ROCK AFB, ARK.	18	RF-101
152ND TRG	RENO MUNICIPAL, NEV.	18	RF-101

AIR FORCE RESERVE

445TH MAW	DOBBINS AFB, MACON, GA.	--	----
510TH MAG	DOBBINS AFB, MACON, GA.	8	C-124
504TH MAG	STUART AFB, N.Y.	8	C-124
305TH AIR RES RESCUE SQDN	SELFDRIDGE AFB, MICH	8	HC-97
349TH MAW	HAMILTON AFB, CALIF.	--	----
538TH MAG	HAMILTON AFB, CALIF.	8	C-124
521ST MAG	KELLY AFB, TEX.	8	C-124
541ST MAG	MCCORD AFB, WASHINGTON	8	C-124

NAVAL RESERVE

276	NAS LOS ALAMITOS, CALIF	12	A-4B
-----	-------------------------	----	------

TOP/TOP	PAGE NO. OF SEGS	NO. OF PAGES	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION	INITIALS
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ADDITIONAL INSTRUCTIONS			SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	
<del>TOP SECRET</del>				

Department of State

TELEGRAM

16483

CONFIDENTIAL 663

PAGE 01 SEJUL 03631 251221Z

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
State Dept. Guidelines  
By ju, NARA, Date 11-5-97

47  
ACTION EA 15

INFO IO 13, CIAE 00, DODE 00, GPM 03, H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSAE 00, NSC 10,

P 04, RSC 01, SC 01, SP 02, SS 20, USIA 12, SAH 03, ACDA 16, RSR 01,

MM 01, EUR 15, /129 W

R 250902Z JAN 68  
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8548  
INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0237

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SEJUL 3631

SUBJECT: ROKG NOTE ON NORTH KOREAN ACTS

1. MOFA EUROPEAN AND US BUREAU DIRECTOR YUN HA-CHONG  
JAN 25 HANDED POL COUNSELOR NOTE DEEMING ATTEMPTED ATTACK  
UPON BLUE HOUSE AND USS PUEBLO SEIZURE PROOF OF NK PLAN  
TO LAUNCH "LARGE SCALE ACTS OF PROVOCATIONS AND SUBVERSIONS,"  
CHANGING PREVIOUS LIMITED TACTICS TO "VIOLENT AND DESTRUCTIVE  
ARMED OPERATIONS" IN ROK REAR AND CENTER. IMMEDIATE NK  
OBJECTIVE, ACCORDING NOTE, IS TO SUBVERT ROK THROUGH VIOLENCE  
AND DISTURB ARMISTICE AGREEMENT. LONG-RANGE OBJECTIVE IS  
COMMUNIZATION OF ENTIRE PENINSULA.

PAGE 2 RUALOS 3631E ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~  
2. IN THIS SITUATION, NOTE CONTINUES, USG AND ROKG  
"URGED" STRENGTHEN ROK DEFENSIVE CAPABILITIES AND "AUGMENT  
THEIR UNITED EFFORTS" DETER NK VENTURE. NOTE URGES  
IN PARTICULAR CLOSER COOPERATION BETWEEN ROK AND US  
FORCES IN ANTI-INFILTRATION OPERATIONS AND THAT  
"SUFFICIENT SUPPLY" OF EQUIPMENT BE EXPEDITED TO KOREAN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



Department of State

TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 SEOUL 03631 251221Z

POLICE AND MILITARY FORCES TO IMPROVE CAPABILITIES FOR THESE OPERATIONS. NOTE FINALLY SUGGESTS FULL COOPERATION IN PUBLIC CONDEMNATION OF NORTH KOREA.

3. POUCHING FULL TEXT.

4. COMMENT: YUN DID NOT INDICATE NOTE HAD SPECIAL SIGNIFICANCE OR REQUIRED SPECIFIC ACTION. WE VIEW IT AS MOFA EFFORT TO PLAY ROLE IN CURRENT CRISIS AND FULLY EXPECT IT WILL BE REFLECTED IN TOMORROW'S PRESS. GP-3, PORTER

CONFIDENTIAL



Department of State

118  
~~TOP SECRET~~ 21

~~SECRET~~ 309

PAGE 01 STATE 104496

DECLASSIFIED

83  
ORIGIN SS 34

Authority NLT 92-152  
By ju/yw NARA, Date 7-27-97 278

INFO SSO 00, NSCE 00, CCO 00, MM 01, / 031 R

DRAFTED BY: IO:JJSISCO  
APPROVED BY: THE SECRETARY  
AMB:GOLDBERG  
WHITE HOUSE-MR. ROSTON  
S/SI MR. WALSH

2-252107Z JAN 68 ZFF4  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO AMEMBASSY SEOUL FLASH 1318  
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1858

~~SECRET~~ STATE 104496

EXDIS

YOU SHOULD SEE PAK AND/OR FONMIN IMMEDIATELY TO DISCUSS WITH HIM FULLY GTE HEARINGS UNQTE ISSUE WHICH WAS RAISED WITH YOU RE SC MEETING ON KOREA. YOU SHOULD MAKE FOLLOWING POINTS AND REPORT ROK REPLY TO DEPARTMENT FLASH.

1. PRIME PURPOSE OF SC ACTION WOULD BE PUT NORTH KOREANS IN DOCK. IT IS IMPORTANT FOR POLITICAL REASONS AND IN ORDER INFLUENCE WORLD OPINION THAT NO IMPEDIMENT REGARDING HEARINGS BE USED TO DEFLECT SC FROM THIS PRIME PURPOSE. OUR JUDGMENT IS THAT MAJORITY OF SC MEMBERS, INCLUDING CLOSE FRIENDS AND

PAGE 2 RUEHC 104496 ~~SECRET~~  
SUPPORTERS OF ROK, WILL INSIST THAT BOTH NORTH AND SOUTH KOREA

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AUTHORITY OF THE SECRETARY  
OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY



~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 STATE 104496

BE INVITED TO SC PROCEEDINGS. THIS WAS THE CASE DURING SC CONSIDERATION OF TONKIN GULF INCIDENT IN AUGUST, 1964. IN ALL PROBABILITY, AS WAS NORTH VIETNAM REACTION IN AUGUST 1964, NORTH KOREANS WILL DECLINE AN INVITATION TO PARTICIPATE IN SC PROCEEDINGS PRECISELY BECAUSE THEY WOULD WISH TO AVOID BEING PUT ON TRIAL, AND ACCEPTANCE IMPLIES UN COMPETENCE TO DEAL WITH THIS SPECIFIC MATTER, EVEN IF THEY SHOULD DECIDE TO COME TO SC. WE BELIEVE OUR CASE VERY STRONG AND NORTH KOREA AND ITS SUPPORTERS WOULD BE CLEARLY ON THE DEFENSIVE.

2. ROK SHOULD NOT CONFUSE "HEARINGS" ISSUE IN SC WITH SITUATION IN GA. TWO SITUATIONS ARE NOT ANALOGOUS. HEARINGS ISSUE IN GA HAS IN THE PAST BEEN CLOSELY LINKED TO THE WHOLE QUESTION OF UN POSITION ON KOREAN QUESTION GENERALLY AND ON INTERNATIONAL STATUS. QUESTION IN SC IS ONE OF WILLINGNESS TO HAVE BOTH SIDES HEARD AND ALL POINTS OF VIEW EXPRESSED ON WHICH SC CAN MAKE JUDGMENT. IT WOULD BE IN CONTEXT OF NORTH KOREA BEING ON DEFENSIVE, NOT AS IN GA WHERE COMMUNISTS SOUGHT TO DISSOLVE UNCURK AND WEAKEN UN POSITION ON KOREA. INVITATION TO PARTICIPATE

PAGE 3 RUENK 104496 ~~SECRET~~

IN SC GIVES NO NEW STATUS TO NORTH KOREANS AND IN NO WAY WOULD UNDERMINE HISTORY OF DOZENS OF UN RESOLUTIONS IN SUPPORT OF ROK POSITION.

3. YOU SHOULD MAKE CLEAR TO ROK THAT WE WILL BE MAKING STRONG STATEMENT ON NORTH KOREAN ATTACKS AGAINST ROK AS WELL AS ON PUEBLO SEIZURES. IN CONNECTION WITH PUEBLO, WE SHOULD BE ASSURED THAT THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT NORTH KOREAN SEIZURE TOOK PLACE IN INTERNATIONAL WATERS. THIS, ALONG WITH FLAGRANT VIOLATIONS OF ARMISTICE AGREEMENT BY NORTH KOREA, WILL MAKE FOR A PARTICULARLY STRONG US AND ROK CASE AND GO A LONG WAY IN PUTTING NORTH KOREANS, WHETHER THEY DECIDE TO SHOW UP AT SC OR NOT, ON DEFENSIVE.

4. YOU SHOULD TELL ROK THAT AMB. GOLDBERG TODAY WILL BE DISCUSSING SPECIFIC FORMULA ON HEARINGS ISSUE WITH ROK UNDEL WHO SHOULD BE GIVEN BROADEST AUTHORITY AND FLEXIBILITY TO WORK CLOSELY WITH US. FORMULA WE HAVE IN MIND WHICH YOU CAN DESCRIBE

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~~SECRET~~

PAGE 03 STATE 104496

TO ROK IF NECESSARY. (THOUGH WE WOULD PREFER TO LEAVE THIS TO GOLDBERG) IS CITED HERE BELOW. IT IS BASED ON THE TONKINGULF

PAGE 4 RUEHC 104496 ~~SECRET~~

PRECEDENT OF AUGUST, 1964. AT THAT TIME SC PRESIDENT NIELSON REPORTED AS A "CONSENSUS" OF COUNCIL "THAT: QTE INFORMAL CONSULTATION

" AMONG THE MEMBERS HAD RESULTED IN AGREEMENT ON THE PARTICIPATION OF NORTH AND SOUTH VIET-NAM IN THE COUNCIL PROCEEDINGS. THE PRESIDENT NOTED THE "UNDERSTANDING" OF THE COUNCIL MEMBERS THAT "...THE SECURITY COUNCIL, WOULD WELCOME SUCH INFORMATION RELATING TO THIS COMPLAINT AS THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF VIET-NAM WOULD DESIRE TO MAKE AVAILABLE TO THE COUNCIL, EITHER THROUGH MAKING PART IN THE DISCUSSIONS OF THE COMPLAINT IN THE COUNCIL, OR IN THE FORM WHICH IT MIGHT PREFER. FURTHERMORE, THE SECURITY COUNCIL WOULD RECEIVE IN THE SAME MANNER SUCH INFORMATION RELATING TO THE COMPLAINT AS THE REPUBLIC OF VIET-NAM WOULD DESIRE TO MAKE AVAILABLE TO THE COUNCIL. UNQUOTE. THIS FORMULA DOES NOT RECOGNIZE NORTH KOREA'S EXISTENCE AS A STATE. IT BORROWS HEAVILY FROM RULE 39 OF SC UNDER WHICH ANY PERSON CAN BE INVITED BY SC TO SUPPLY INFORMATION. RUSK

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S-E-C-R-E-T

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0125 2

The Government of the United States concurs with the view expressed in the Foreign Ministry's note of January 25 that it and the Government of the Republic of Korea should cooperate to the fullest extent in the condemnation before world opinion of the recent actions of the North Korean regime. In this context, the prime purpose of the UN Security Council action which the U.S. Government contemplates is to provide an opportunity for world opinion to judge the North Korean regime's recent provocations.

In the view of the U.S. Government, a majority of Security Council members, including close friends and supporters of the Republic of Korea, will insist that both North and South Korea be invited to Security Council proceedings. This was the case during Security Council consideration of the Tonkin Gulf incident in August 1964, which North Vietnam declined to attend. In all probability, North Korea will similarly decline an invitation to participate in Security Council proceedings because it would wish to avoid being put on trial. Acceptance of such an invitation would of course imply that North Korea accepts UN competence to deal with this specific matter.

The U.S. Government, in its presentation to the Security Council, will make a strong statement on North Korean attacks against the Republic of Korea as well as on the seizure of the USS Pueblo. The flagrant violations of the Armistice Agreement by North Korea, together with the seizure of the Pueblo in international waters, will make a particularly strong case for the United States and the Republic of Korea.

S-E-C-R-E-T

27

Thus, even if North Korea should decide to come to the Security Council, that regime and its supporters would be clearly on the defensive.

An invitation to North Korea to participate in Security Council hearings is not analogous to the Korean issues in the General Assembly. The hearings issue in the General Assembly has in the past been closely linked to the whole question of the UN position on the Korean question in general, and on international status. The question in the Security Council is one of willingness to have both sides heard and all points of view expressed, in order that the Security Council can make a judgment. North Korea would be on the defensive, contrary to the situation in the General Assembly where the Communists have sought to dissolve UNCURK and weaken the UN position in Korea. An invitation to participate in the Security Council gives no new status to the North Korean regime and would not in any way undermine the history of the many UN resolutions in support of the position of the Republic of Korea.

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NOTES OF PRESIDENT'S FRIDAY  
MORNING MEETING ON THE  
PUEBLO INCIDENT

January 26, 1968

SANTITIZED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 92-142  
By cb, NARA Date 9-16-99

THOSE IN ATTENDANCE WERE:

- The President
- Secretary McNamara
- Under Secretary Katzenbach
- General Wheeler
- CIA Director Helms
- Secretary Nitze
- Clark Clifford
- Deputy Assistant Secretary Samuel D. Berger
- Walt Rostow
- Bromley Smith
- George Christian
- Tom Johnson

Prior to the President's arrival the following agenda was agreed upon:

1. An intelligence situation report by Richard Helms.
2. A diplomatic situation report by Under Secretary Katzenbach.
3. A summary of the military proposals on aircraft movement and other actions by Secretary McNamara and General Wheeler.
4. A discussion of the merits of a Presidential address to the Nation.
5. More discussion on Clark Clifford's question of Thursday, "How best to secure the return of the Pueblo if diplomacy fails."

Secretary McNamara: We should not plan on any military action in less than seven days.

General Wheeler: That is correct. That time will be required to get all of our units on the ground and make them combat effective.


Secretary McNamara: We should have working sessions periodically to discuss these matters. We may do this without the President. I suggest that we ask the State Department to call these meetings. We should have one a day. Let's work out a system like we had in the Cuban Missile Crisis.

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At 11:00 a.m. the President joined the meeting.

I. INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT

Director Helms:



3.4 (b)(1)

It is normal procedure to advise Senator Russell and Congressman Rivers. May I do that, Mr. President?

The President: Yes.

II. DIPLOMATIC SITUATION REPORT

Deputy Secretary Berger: The Goldberg text is now being worked on (Goldberg text attached as Appendix A).

- The Japanese were contacted. They replied that this is a very grave situation.
- We have no reply as yet about our notice that we would be sending additional B-52's to Okinawa.
- The Indonesians have told their Ambassador in North Korea to urge the release of our ship and crew.
- The Pakistanis have assured us of their support in the U.N. (The President asked if Berger is certain of this. The President said he had a different reading of the text. The President asked "Did he sign on?"). Berger said, not exactly.
- The tenor of most of the replies have been friendly. The President asked if there was any report on the nine members of the United Nations Security Council. Mr. Berger said there had been no report on their positions.

Walt Rostow: The Security Council meets at 3:30 p. m.

The President: Let me see the draft of the Goldberg statement.

Secretary McNamara: Has there been a response from Moscow yet?

Under Secretary Katzenbach: Yes, Gromyko was negative. They show some concern. He was less negative than Kuznetsov. They urge restraint. They said they hope we will not over-react to this.

The President: May I see the cable on the Soviet discussion? (Ambassador Thompson's cable is attached as Appendix B).

The President: Is there any chance whatever that this ship was in territorial waters?

Secretary McNamara: It is possible, but the chances are less than 50-50.

General Wheeler: The ship has the best navigational gear we have. North Korea has a rugged coastline. Because of this we can get a good fix by radar. Admiral Moorer has said that it is very improbable that the vessel was even a mile from where it ought to be.

In addition, the intercepts of North Korean radio traffic confirm that the North Korean ships which intercepted the Pueblo were in the same area the Pueblo reported as its location.

Secretary McNamara: The only thing which would have brought the Pueblo inside of the territorial waters was the possibility that they were getting a very good intercept and needed to move closer to get a better product.

The President: Do you have anything more to report on the men and the equipment.

Secretary McNamara: We have nothing more on this.

Director Helms: There is nothing either way.

General Wheeler: There was a North Korean press message which said that the crew should be tried and punished as criminals.

Under Secretary Katzenbach: We interpret this as their response to our calling up reserves.

~~TOP SECRET~~

The President: Do we harass Soviet ships?

Secretary McNamara: Yes, they harass us to. This is almost a way of life on the high seas.

The President: Let's be more careful about all of this.

Secretary McNamara: We will reassess the whole thing.

Under Secretary Katzenbach: I thought there was a case of our buzzing a ship in Haiphong Harbor.

Secretary McNamara: That was a photo reconnaissance mission to see if the ship was damaged as alleged.

III. MILITARY PROPOSALS

Secretary McNamara summarized in handwriting his schedule for aircraft movements. (Attached as Appendix C).

---	Sunday	13
	Monday	16 plus 66 from U. S. S. Ranger
	Tuesday	66
	Wednesday	30
	Thursday	24

--- Two days later, we will send in 18 aircraft from Vietnam. These are 18 aircraft which are being replaced and will not be sent from Vietnam until their replacements arrive in Vietnam.

The 26 B-52's will bring the total to 347 aircraft including those aboard the U. S. S. Enterprise. We would like a decision on this whole matter today.

This action will leak. We will try to hold it as tightly as possible, but when men and units begin to move the press gets wind of it.

Secretary McNamara reviewed with George Christian the proposed answers to questions concerning the aircraft movements. The President approved the answers. (Attached as Appendix D).

Secretary McNamara: We would like to alert the units today for movement.

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The President: Is this what you want now General Wheeler?

General Wheeler: Yes sir.

The President: Does State agree with this?

Under Secretary Katzenbach: Yes we do.

The President: Clark, do you agree with this?

Clark Clifford: I have no objection.

The President: What do we say now to the Congress?

Secretary McNamara: Mr. President you have before you a list of authority which we would like to require from the Congress in relation to the Pueblo incident. These are as follows:

1. Authorize the extension of all enlistments, appointments, periods active duty, and other periods of obligated service of Regular and Reserve members of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps and Air Force.

Reason required - Extension of tours of duty involuntarily is the quickest way to achieve any needed expansion of force strength. Such extension will add 2200 trained personnel per day. This can be authorized by Joint Resolution.

2. Authorize the call of all individual Reservists.

Reason required - Department of Defense Appropriation Act, 1967, authorizes the President to order units of the ready Reserve of an arm force to active duty. Authority to call individuals from units is required in order to fill gaps in units on active duty with personnel possessing special skills. Moreover, extension of tours of those presently on active duty would be inequitable unless individual Reservists are subject to call. This, too, can be accomplished by Joint Resolution.

3. Expand South Korean military assistance program by \$100,000,000

Reason required - The MAP request for Fiscal Year 1968 was cut 40% made it impossible to expand the military assistance given to South Korea although such expansion is warranted in view of their troop contribution in South Vietnam and the increased level of harassment by North Korea

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forces. A supplemental appropriation under the Foreign Assistance Act will permit the funding of destroyers, helicopters and artillery and facilities needed for counter-infiltration purposes, and the necessary modernization to increase the defense capabilities of ROK aircraft, vehicles, anti-aircraft equipment and patrol craft. In addition, it will fund the required increase in ammunition levels.

The President: How many times have we authorized the extension of enlistments and periods of active duty?

Secretary McNamara: Many times.

The President: Get me the number of times we have done it and the reasons for each.

Secretary McNamara: We will do that.

The President: We can only call units now?

Secretary McNamara: This is correct. We can only call units. This request would permit the authority to call individuals from units in order to fill any gaps in units on active duty with personnel possessing special skills.

The President: How many men does this affect?

Secretary McNamara: Roughly 150,000.

The President: How much was cut from the military assistance program?

Secretary McNamara: The Fiscal Year 1968 request was cut 40%.

The President: Nick (Under Secretary Katzenbach) how do we get an expression from the Congress on what our policy should be in regard to Korea? George (George Christian) we must make certain that in the future we notify the Congress before the press announcement is made. There are a few people who are mad because they were not advised of the call up action yesterday.

Secretary McNamara: Mendel Rivers is mad.

The President: Mansfield is also bellyaching about it.

Secretary McNamara: I called Mansfield.

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Under Secretary Katzenbach: If you go all the way down the road you need nothing short of a Tonkin Resolution.

The President: The Tonkin Resolution wasn't very effective. Fulbright is against a resolution of any kind. We should discretely show the Congress copies of the mutual security acts between North Korea and the Soviets. I thought we should have had a resolution on the Israel situation. We have a new ball game with the Foreign Relations Committee.

Let's do what we can to bring them along a little bit.

Let's give some thought to how we can get Congress in on it.

We need more than a toast --- that is all we have on the Israel situation. If they (the Congress) murder us on Vietnam with all those facts including SEATO and the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, what are we going to do in a situation like this.

Secretary McNamara: I agree. We need strong Congressional support.

The President: I have always tried to put Congress in on the take-off as well as on the landing. If the Dominican Republic means nothing, if the Tonkin Gulf means nothing, what do we do here. We do not want to exercise power and authority without the support and approval of the Congress.

Let's discuss with Senator Fulbright and Senator Russell what ways we should approach this matter.

At some point we are going to be called upon to put up or shut up. I want Secretary McNamara to set up a meeting with Senator Russell and take Buzz (General Wheeler) along with you. Nick (Under Secretary Katzenbach) you do the same with Senator Fulbright and Senator Mansfield. Also I want you (General Wheeler) to get General Goodpaster to go over this with President Eisenhower.

Get him to ask Ike what is our best constitutional way to proceed.

Paul, (Secretary Nitze) Do you have any thoughts on this?

Secretary Nitze: The key here is Senator Fulbright. He wants to put the Executive Branch in a position where they cannot make a move without

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the approval of his Committee.

The President: Bromley, (Bromley Smith) get me the dates and exactly what we did in the situations leading up to the Dominican Republic and the Tonkin Gulf. Get them to me right away.

Now let us address ourselves to the question of what we do if diplomacy fails.

Walt Rostow: We really cannot do that until we see what happens in the United Nations. In addition we need to get a read-out on photo reconnaissance.

The President: I want you to get your very best dreamers on this right away. Are there no economic sanctions we can take?

Walt Rostow: We will set up a special task force on this.

The President: Get your very best people working on this.

Secretary McNamara: Mr. President, we should remind you of something we pointed out before the President entered. It would not be appropriate to take any military action in less than seven days because of the need to get our units there and get them combat effective.

The President: We also should keep in close touch with the Korean Embassy. Park may be about to blow something and we would be involved.

The President: What about a television address to the Nation?

George Christian: The point of concern is that the President has said nothing publicly on this matter, although I would not recommend any television now, I would think the President might want to consider dropping something into a speech.

Under Secretary Katzenbach: We must remember that Goldberg is coming up on television for the next two or three days, so there will be plenty of Administration talk.

The President: I want you to give Rusk and Goldberg an outline of what to say in their speeches. All of you remember that we brought those Russian ships in a while back. They paid \$60 fine and were freed. Our ship, the Pueblo, was not in Korean territorial waters. We had no time to do anything to prevent it from being towed in in the one-and-a-half hour period. Let's be

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prepared to answer every question that is being raised by people like Time Magazine and answer them factually.

George Christian: One of the principal questions was why the ship was not protected.

The President: This is simple. We cannot provide an Armada over every ship we have. The Russians do not have their ships protected.

George Christian: Another question they are raising is why there was not more air power in Korea.

Secretary McNamara: We do not have planes assigned to protect these types of ships. This is an advantage that the initiator had. They also had MIGS overhead.

General Wheeler: We could pick up six Trawlers off our shores today if we wish. They don't protect their ships. This type of thing goes on all the time.

Clark Clifford: If these ships were covered by air, their effectiveness would be reduced substantially.

Walt Rostow: There are probably 50 incidents of harassment each year.

Secretary McNamara: The Pueblo would have been much more prepared if he had been inside territorial waters. The fact that he was unprepared reinforces the fact that he was outside territorial waters in international territory.

The President: All of you should meet regularly and get as well organized in this situation as we were in the Cuban Missile Crisis. Get your best people working on this. Let's not have us charged with failure to deal with the situation properly.

# # #

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 97-  
By lia, NARA Date 11-16-98

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EXDIS

REF: (A) STATE 104496; (B) A94460

1. PRESIDENTIAL SECRETARY

GENERAL YI HU-RAK CALLED ME TO BLUE HOUSE THIS MORNING TO DISCUSS PLANS FOR CONVENING SECURITY COUNCIL AND GENERAL SITUATION. IT IS CLEAR THAT WHAT HE HAD TO SAY REFLECTED PRESIDENT PARK'S FEELINGS, SINCE HE PRE-EMPTED TIME OF MY APPOINTMENT WITH FONGHIN AND MADE SPECIAL POINT OF DISCUSSING MATTERS WHICH, BECAUSE OF POSSIBLE EMBARRASSMENT, PRESIDENT HIMSELF WOULD NOT RAISE.

PAGE 2 RUALOS 3668E ~~SECRET~~

2. WITH REGARD HEARING ISSUE IN SC, YI ACCEPTED MY EXPLANATION OF OUR INTENTIONS AS OUTLINED REF (A), ALTHOUGH HE EXHIBITED SOME CONTINUING UNEASINESS OVER IMPLICATIONS OF THIS PROCEDURE FOR ROK POSITION ON ANNUAL KOREAN ITEM AND ON STATUS OF NORTH KOREAN REGIME. HE SAID ROKG HOPED STRONGLY THAT ANY INVITATION TO NK COULD BE COUCHED IN TERMS WHICH WOULD IN SOME MANNER FORCE NK REGIME ACKNOWLEDGE

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PAGE 02 SEOUL 03668 26095Z

ACCEPTANCE OF UN COMPETENCE IN KOREA. HE APPARENTLY WAS NOT COMPLETELY SATISFIED WITH IDEA THAT ACCEPTANCE OF

INVITATION WOULD IMPLY THAT NK ALSO ACCEPTS UN COMPETENCE TO DEAL WITH THIS SPECIFIC MATTER. ROKG WOULD OBVIOUSLY PREFER THAT THIS EFFORT CARRY SOME ACKNOWLEDGEMENT STRONGER THAN IMPLICATION AND BROADER THAN RESTRICTION TO THIS SPECIFIC MATTER. FURTHER HE EXPRESSED SKEPTICISM AS TO USEFULNESS OF UNSC DEBATE, SAYING IT WOULD BE LARGELY INCONCLUSIVE, DESPITE FACT THAT I STRESSED TO HIM THAT THIS IS EXERCISE WHICH WE MUST GO THROUGH FOR SAKE OF WORLDWIDE OPINION AND WHICH, IF PROPERLY HANDLED, COULD ENHANCE WORLDWIDE SUPPORT FOR ROK POSITION IN GENERAL.

PAGE 3 RUALOS 3668E ~~SECRET~~

3. HE THEN TURNED TO SUBJECT WHICH HAS BEEN OF MAJOR CONCERN TO HIGHEST LEVELS OF ROKG EVER SINCE PUEBLO INCIDENT TOOK PLACE BY REFERRING TO NEED TO GIVE EQUAL WEIGHT IN OUR PUBLIC STATEMENTS AND IN OUR SECURITY COUNCIL EFFORTS TO PUEBLO INCIDENT AND NK ATTEMPTS TO ASSASSINATE ROK CHIEF OF STATE. HE ADMITTED THAT PRESIDENT PARK AND HE UNDERSTOOD WE HAD DONE THIS, BUT WAS DISTURBED THAT MANY HERE STILL FELT THAT ONCE PUEBLO INCIDENT OCCURRED FOCUS WAS DIVERTED FROM MATTER WHICH ROKS CONSIDER AT LEAST EQUALLY IMPORTANT. I DO NOT KNOW WHAT MORE WE CAN DO TO SATISFY THEM ON THIS SCORE, BUT WE MIGHT CONSIDER: (A) PLACING THESE EVENTS IN CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER IN ANY OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS TO BE SUBMITTED TO UN, INCLUDING PROPOSED RESOLUTION, AND (B) STRENGTHENING LANGUAGE OF RESOLUTION TO REFLECT INTENTION OF TERRORISTS TO ASSASSINATE CHIEF OF STATE AND HIS FAMILY.

4. ON CLEARLY RELATED ISSUE, HE THEN MADE DIRECT PITCH ON SUBJECT OF PRESERVING PRESIDENT PARK'S FACE IN ALL THESE ACTIONS. HE SAID ROKG WORRIES THAT

PAGE 4 RUALOS 3668E ~~SECRET~~~~SECRET~~

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PAGE 03 SEOUL 03668 260956Z

WEIGHT OF US PRESSURE MAY BRING ABOUT RELEASE OF PUEBLO AND ITS CREW, WHICH WOULD BE DIPLOMATIC VICTORY FOR US, WITHOUT PARALLEL SUCCESS FOR ROK. IT VERY IMPORTANT THAT PRESIDENT PARK ALSO BE MADE TO LOOK GOOD, THROUGH NK GUARANTEE THAT IT WILL CEASE ALL SUBVERSIVE ACTIONS. OTHERWISE PARK'S PRESTIGE WILL BE DAMAGED. I GAVE HIM NEEDED ASSURANCES THAT WE ARE MINDFUL OF PRESIDENT'S PROBLEMS IN ALL OF THIS, THAT YOU HAVE THIS ASPECT OF MATTER UNDER CONSIDERATION WITH ALL OTHER FACTORS THOUGH IT IMPOSSIBLE TO SAY AT THIS POINT WHO WOULD AND WHO WOULD NOT EVENTUALLY GET SATISFACTION IN THIS AFFAIR.

5. PRIOR TO MAKING THIS PITCH, YI HAD POINTEDLY EXPRESSED CONCERN OVER WAY IN WHICH KOREAN PUBLIC WOULD INTERPRET FACT THAT ROK SOLDIERS ARE BEING SENT TO FIGHT COMMUNISM IN VIET-NAM BUT ARE NOT PERMITTED TO TAKE FORCEFUL REACTION AGAINST THREAT DIRECTED AT THEIR HOMELAND.

PAGE 5 RUALOS 3668E ~~SECRET~~

6. AT RESCHEDULED MEETING LATER, FONMIN SAID THAT ROK DEL AT UN WAS INSTRUCTED TO DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO PREVENT NK FROM ATTENDING SC MEETINGS "EVEN IF THIS MEANT ROK WITHDRAWAL". I URGED HIM TO COUNTERMAND THIS NEGATIVE SUGGESTION, AND SAID IT WOULD HAVE UNFORTUNATE RESULTS AT TIME WHEN ROK AND FRIENDS SEEM TO HAVE EXCELLENT CASE. HE DID NOT INDICATE WHAT HE WOULD DO. WE SUGGEST ROK DEL BE SOUNDED OUT AS TO EXACT NATURE OF SUCH INSTRUCTIONS AS THERE MAY BE MORE FLEXIBILITY IN THEM THAN HE INDICATED. GP-2. PORTER

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Moscow 2588, January 26, 1968

1. At a luncheon I gave for Senator Mondale today the Senator had a private conversation with Mr. Zinchuk, of the Soviet Foreign Ministry, concerning the North Korean seizure of the USS PUEBLO. He indicated that he was personally familiar with the matter and made the following points:

- a. The USSR did not know about or prompt the event;
- b. They regretted it;
- c. The vessel was apprehended within the Bay which had been declared territorial waters by North Korea;
- d. That the vessel had been approached by North Korean craft and told of the North Korean's version and asked to leave, but refused to do so;
- e. While he was not personally sure of the facts, he thought the wounded on the PUEBLO were wounded not by gunfire but probably as a result of an accident while destroying secret documents or something of that character.

2. He strongly counseled that the U. S. remain calm and strongly indicated that the Soviet Union wanted this matter to be amicably settled, and indicated some optimism that this was possible through diplomatic channels. He indicated that the use of the aircraft carrier as a direct show of force would detract from a diplomatic resolution of the problem.

3. Zinchuk was present during my meeting with Gromyko today.

Thompson

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 96-192  
By C6, NARA Date 3-2-97

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TAB II-I

26 Jan 68

prepared by Mr. Graham for use by D.I.A.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 97-308

By iso, NARA Date 5-4-98

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0906

SUBJECT: Communist Reactions to Various Possible Courses of Action With Respect to North Korea

1. The possible courses of action being considered with respect to North Korea can be grouped in two categories:

(1) Those that stop short of the direct use of force; and

(2) those that involve the actual use of force, but in varying degrees of intensity and duration. In the general discussion below of communist reactions we have grouped the courses in this manner; specific comments on each particular course has been incorporated with the operational discussions.

Course 1 - In general this course combines diplomatic pressures with military preparations and some show of force short of violent action. It might include warnings of violent US actions backed to the USSR, reconnaissance flights over North Korea, and the dispatch of another SIGINT ship to the PUEBLO's station off Wonsan with a back-up force over the horizon, as well as the diplomatic moves now in process.

2. The key element in this general course would be to convince the North Koreans and their Communist Allies that the US really meant to take punitive actions if the PUEBLO and its crew were not released fairly promptly. Such a result cannot be guaranteed; there is, however, a fair chance that a combination of these measures would lead to the release of at least part of the crew. After they have exploited the incident and the ship and crew, the North Korean would probably see little to be gained from detaining the entire crew.

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3. The problem with this general combination of actions is that it might fail to impress the North Koreans. Having observed that the US did not react immediately, they might be inclined to believe that the US was constrained by the requirement of the Vietnam war from any kind of action in Korea which would seriously open up the prospect of conflict on another front. They would also believe that their possession of the crew enforced restraint on the US.

4. In these general circumstances, neither the Soviets nor Chinese are likely to be very influential in Pyongyang. One of the principal features of Kim Il Sung's policy is a militant independence of both Moscow and Peking; indeed he would want to avoid any hint of yielding to Soviet overtures.

5. Even though the US might in time secure the release of some of the crew and even the ship, the effect of this policy on South Korea might be damaging. The South Koreans have already criticized the US preoccupation with the PUEBLO affair, as opposed to the Seoul attack, which they regard as far more serious. The ROK will almost certainly plan a retaliation: US attempts to discourage them will undermine their confidence to some extent. They may in fact carry out some fairly forcible retaliatory act across the DMZ, despite US urgings; this would probably complicate efforts to effect release of the PUEBLO and its crew under this course of action.

))

Course II - This course involves the early resort to force against North Korea. Some of the particular actions included would be the captured or sinking of a North Korean vessel, blockading Wonsan either by surface ships or by mines, air or naval gunfire attacks on sensitive North Korean targets, a ROK raid across the DMZ, or air strikes on North Korean guerrilla training camps.

- 6. The Communists would all hope to avoid these actions; they would probably make some move to dampen the crisis if they judged that the US was approaching the point of action. But there is no certainty that they would become convinced that the US would in fact carry through a retaliation.
- 7. With the possible exception of a surface or mining blockade which more directly affects Soviet rights and interests and a strike against a sensitive target, we see no major differences in the possible reactions whatever the precise target. Probably the Communists would initially regard the action as a one-time shot, mainly to even the score and assuage public opinion in the US. They might still doubt US determination to go further and they would probably wish to show their own mettle. One thing they could do would be to proceed with the trial and punishment of the crew forthwith, as they have already threatened. They might also counter by an air attack of their own against South Korean airfields or even against US carriers. In our view this latter seems unlikely since it would invite a rapid escalation of the action and run high risks of an eventual resumption of the ground war.

8. The attitude of the Soviets and Chinese in this situation would be of increasing importance to the North Koreans. Currently, Chinese-Korean relations are so strained and the situation in China so confused that the North Koreans would not count on Chinese support. While the Chinese are likely to take a hard propaganda line they would almost certainly refrain from any action against the US.

9. The North Koreans cannot afford to proceed very far in a confrontation with the US without some assurance of Soviet military support. We doubt any firm assurance would be given at this stage, despite Soviet obligations under the 1961 Mutual Assistance Treaty. We think the Soviet response to a US air strike in North Korea would include tough public support of Pyongyang, but they probably would go quite far in private pressures on the North Koreans to end the crisis.

10. Lacking Soviet assurance of full support and possibly fearing further US attacks, North Korea might seek to end the crisis. But they might be tempted, for reasons of face and because of a belief that the US would not go much further, to continue holding the crew and the ship.

11. If the US bombed a sensitive target, the Communists would probably view this more seriously. They would regard this type of action as looking less like a single retaliation than as the beginning of at least an air campaign against North Korea. They might be concerned that the US was setting in motion a train of events which could lead to a reopening of the Korean War.

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12. The net effect of such a retaliatory strike would be to reinforce both Soviet and Chinese concern to avoid a situation that could expand into major hostilities. They would both make further military preparations and demonstrations. The Soviets despite a tough public posture, would probably privately urge the Koreans to limit their own reactions and move to end the crisis. While the Chinese would seek for their own interest in relation to Vietnam to maintain tensions in Korea at a fairly high level, they would be increasingly concerned whether the US intended in fact to reopen the Korean War and, ultimately, to attack China. Thus, the Chinese would not retaliate.

13. However, the North Koreans might feel compelled to react, either against the South Koreans or Americans along the DMZ or by attacking airfields in South Korea. In these circumstances it might become increasingly difficult for the USSR and China to limit their own involvement. Both regard the area as one involving important security interests, and both have mutual assistance treaties with North Korea.

14. The closing of Wonsan by surface blockade or mining would not apply any serious pressure on Pyongyang. Access to this single port is not vital to the economy or to limited naval operations. It would, however, pose a challenge to the USSR since Soviet merchant vessels to frequent the harbor, and Moscow would fear that an unchallenged blockade of Wonsan might lead the US to similar action against Haiphong.

15. Thus, there would be risk of Soviet efforts to interfere with US surface ships or with mine laying aircraft; the danger of incidents would be high.

16. In general, it appears that the PUEBLO or at least its might be released fairly promptly in response to the threat of US retaliation. Actual retaliation appears less likely to produce this result and would produce greatly increased risks of an enlargement of the crisis.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Korea

Urgent

Recipient: Ambassador to the United Nations and Ambassador to the United States

Yeon: WUS-0114, WUN-0115

1. As mentioned in the instructions of Yeon's issue, our perspective is that the discussion regarding this issue proposed in the United Nations Security Council would not be effective.
2. Thus, one of our main interests in the United Nations Security Council is to prevent the North Korean puppet regime from being invited. In the worst case, we may not attend the discussion and you should make the utmost efforts to prevent the North Korean puppet regime from being invited.

Minister

- 1) 26 JAN 1968 Results of a Meeting with Ambassador Peterson Regarding the Issue of Participation in the United Nations by the Puppet Regime in North Korea. (#3)

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Korea

Extremely Urgent

Number: UNW-0148

Date: 261300

Recipient: Minister

Addressor: Republic of Korea Ambassador to the United Nations

Cc: the Blue House, Prime Minister and the Korea Central Intelligence Agency

Dae: WUW-0119

1. Related to Daeho message, I met Ambassador Peterson again on the 26th and discussed the issues of attendance for about 50 minutes, stressing the instructions by the Republic of Korea government. However, the view of the United States is the same as before. The ambassador has a view that it is difficult to prevent the attendance of the North Korean Puppet Regime, after his contact with each of Security Council member countries. He also repeated that it was difficult to refuse the attendance of the North Korean Puppet Regime in the current situation where the USS Pueblo was under detention.
2. Yet, the United States view is that it should make efforts to make a ceremonial difference in inviting the Republic of Korea and the North Korean Puppet Regime.
3. He said that there would be a high likelihood that India or Communist countries might raise the issue of attendance.
4. The reason why today's Security Council was postponed to this afternoon was that the Soviet Union objected to its opening in the morning as a directive was undelivered.
5. The ambassador said that he would deliver the United States view that it cannot refuse the attendance of the North Korean Puppet Regime to the Republic of Korea government through Ambassador Porter. (Bangyeon)

XXX: reclassified after the presentation to the Security Council

26 JAN 1968: Situation Report and Document Forwarding. (section #: 729.55, record #: 2662)

Embassy of the Republic of Korea in the United States

???(not readable): 778-157

Recipient: Minister of Foreign Affairs

Subject: Situation Report and Document Forwarding

I hereby forward the situation report regarding the PUEBLO Incident and documents related to the infiltration of armed communist guerillas to the South in the attachment.

Attachment: Situation report and document. /End/

The Situation and the Further Prospects Related to the PUEBLO Seizure Incident

I. Progress of the incident

The PUEBLO incident, in which the U.S Navy intelligence collection auxiliary vessel was seized and escorted to Wonsan port by 4 torpedo boats of the North Korean puppet regime during its mission to the East Sea on January 23 at 10:00PM (local time at noon) is a grave situation that has been hardly seen lately, which is causing serious repercussions here, no less than the Vietnam War, raising concerns that a new war may occur in Korea, depending on the progress of the incident, and creating a extremely tense atmosphere.

On January 23, the PUEBLO, during its mission in international waters, received a signal to verify its nationality from 1 torpedo boat of the North Korean puppet regime, and replied that she is an American and notified that they were in international waters. Afterwards, 3 more torpedo boats of the North Korean puppet regime under cover of 2 jet fighters appeared on site and approached the PUEBLO, menacing the gunfire. Then armed crew boarded the PUEBLO and towed it to Wonsan Port. Meanwhile, it is not clear if her crew defended themselves against the North Korean puppet regime during the seizure, and this became a subject of controversy.

The focus of controversy related to the PUEBLO's seizure is her location at the time of seizure.



According to the announcement of the U.S. Department of Defense, the PUEBLO was located in the high seas 26 miles from the coast of Wonsan, namely, 127 degrees 84.3 minutes of east longitude at 39 degrees 27 (not readable) minutes of north latitude, so it is certain that she was located in seas substantially far from the territorial waters within 12 nautical miles as the North Korean puppet regime claimed.

The captured PUEBLO this time is a U.S. Navy intelligence collection vessel, equipped with radar and the history of intelligence collection by radar developed simultaneously with that of wireless telegraph, and that is mostly engaged in intelligence collection activities through the embassy.

.(an entire page not readable)

The White House Press Secretary suggested that a diplomatic approach would continue, by declaring his expectation that this approach would bring a settlement of the incident before appealing to last resorts.

Though the first request for the cooperation to the Soviet Union was rejected, the United States repeatedly urged the Soviet Union to exercise its influence and cooperate in the return of the vessel, but it was rejected again. The Soviet Union indicated that the North Korean puppet regime is a sovereign nation, presented thus their position that they are not able to interfere with the issue, and such an attitude of the Soviet Union was made clear by Kosygin, Premier of the Soviet Union, who is visiting India now. On the other hand, the Tass official government news agency reported that the seizure by the North Korean puppet regime is proper, which enabled us to foresee that the Soviet Union side would not respond to the request of cooperation on this issue.

After all, the Soviet Union's continuous rejection of the cooperation forced the United States but to seek a settlement through the United Nations, so the United States on the 25th requested to call the United Nations Security Council through Ambassador Goldberg to the United Nations and on 28th ... (not readable).

To further propose this issue in the United Nations Security Council, various problems are expected, including an issues of inviting the representative of the North Korean puppet regime, the Soviet Union's veto and the campaign activities of some Communist countries to support the

North Korean puppet regime, and it is seen that it would take considerable time, though any conclusion can be anticipated in the United Nations Security Council. In a general view, concrete actions for the settlement of the issue in the United Nations Security Council are not possible.

## 2. Military actions

Immediately after the seizure of the PUEBLO, the United States moved a number of mobile troops, including the aircraft carrier USS Enterprise, which were dispatched to Vietnam, to the high seas of the East Sea and, on 24th, dispatched 2 squadrons of approximately 100 jet fighters from Okinawa to South Korea and took a strong preparatory posture against a possible state of emergency.

On the other hand, President Johnson lived up to his statement on January 25 that the U.S. would not allow this kind of brutal acts by assigning approximately 14,700 reserves of the U.S. Navy and the Air Force and 372 jet fighters to active duty. Reservists who are called up at this time are obliged to serve a maximum of 2 years if necessary, and recent examples of reserve force call-ups were the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 and the Berlin Crisis of 1961, respectively.

The spokesman for the U.S. Department of Defense clarified that this time's reserve call-up is an intensified precautionary action and the possibility of reserve call ups in the U.S. Army and Marines Corps, following the U.S Navy and the Air Force, was suggested by the White House Press Secretary.

With regard to the reserve call ups, Senator Russell of the U.S Senate Committee on Armed Services, Congressman Rivers and Senator Jackson have expressed their regret and propriety of this action in the House of Representatives, and Senator Mansfield and Senator Gruening expressed their concern that the war could be enlarged and a new dispute would arise in the Far East and MacCarthy, who sought a nomination in the presidential election, commented that the call-up of reserves is improper.

Such military actions of the United States can be understood as preparations to deal with the further provocative actions of the North Korean puppet regime that may occur. However, on the other hand, it is hard to deny that they are taking into account the effect of waning and the demonstration of power against the actions of the puppet regime in North Korea, which may turn into a factor for the development of a new situation in the Far East.

### 3. Media coverage

Each newspaper, television broadcaster and radio station in the United States is putting all its efforts into the coverage of the progress of the situation related to this seizure daily, and major newspapers are not only covering the incident but are asking that the incident be coped with more carefully, not stirred by emotion.

The New York Times claimed that if the PUEBLO had been seized in international waters, a proper punitive action should be taken against piracy by the North Korean puppet regime, and commented that if the ship had unfortunately entered territorial waters as the North Korean puppet regime insisted, then the United States has to take a certain level of responsibility, and appealed that the government and people should conduct smartly without any emotional turbulence and not make a hasty conclusion.

This newspaper continued to mention the fact that provocative actions by the North Korean puppet regime have been increasing recently, including the PUEBLO incident this time, and see this as an attempt by the Communist side to create a second battle line in Korea and find their way out of pressure that they are under from Vietnam, and warned that this kind of attempt would bring extensive ravages of war, rather than being a way to peace, as the propaganda of Communist side portends.

The stance of the Washington Post is also to appeal to people to keep calm until the real facts of the incident and conclusion concerning its progress become available and, to the government, it indicates that the explanation of government given in the U-2 Incident and the Tonkin Gulf Incident was not satisfactory and urges that the government should inform the public of the real facts in detail immediately so that people can make correct judgments. It also expresses a new interest concerning the threat of the North Korean puppet regime recently grown in Korea and warns that the puppet regime of North Korea must take responsibility for brutal acts derived from the misjudgement of the situation and the following results. (A full text of the editorials was reported earlier)

### 4. An attempt by the North Korean puppet regime and the progress of the new situation in the Far East

It is the united view that the PUEBLO Incident, along with the incident in which armed communist guerillas infiltrated into Seoul last Sunday and extensive provocative actions of the North Korean puppet regime related to the violation of the Armistice, which rapidly increased today, is a part of the attempt underway to create a new, tense situation in the Far East mentioned above.

If we limit the analysis in the North Korean puppet regime itself, the recent rapid economic development of South Korea and the consequent prosperity of people's living and its status in the international society are a transformation which the puppet regime in North Korea can hardly accept and, if this situation continues, it will become a serious threat to the existence of the North Korean puppet regime itself and they will be at a disadvantage in the issue of the unification to be discussed in a later stage, so it is the absolute task for the North Korean puppet regime to hinder the development of South Korea by all possible ways and means and this time, a series of happenings originated from their anxiety that they should arouse insecurity and confusion among people by creating a state of tension, and eventually realize the collapse of economy.

International Communism is now facing a critical threat in Vietnam, and failures revealed in the invasive activities in Vietnam and the increasing pressure from the U.S. and allied forces are becoming a critical threat to the communist side, including Vietnam. The Far East, especially Korea, in which there are sufficient factors of insecurity, appeared as an ideal target as a breakthrough to avoid this pressure, so new provocative actions have increased in this region and were leading up to this incident.

It appears that the reorganization of the internal hegemony structure of the North Korean puppet regime reportedly having happened lately, namely, the hard-liner military forces' taking initiative, functioned as an accelerant to realize the intent of the communist side as mentioned above. Even if the PUEBLO Incident settles down by chance, another similar incident is foreseen in the future and, at least, the tension in the Far East is expected to remain for the time being.

Therefore, what is considered important in the current situation is, through this incident, to make them understand that the strong of the Free World led by the United States will make every possible effort to protect peace, and the judgment here is that the United States showed a resolution to stop the conflicts with the North Korean puppet regime in the Far East, based on

this understanding.

26 JAN 1968: Report of the United Nations Command to the United Nations. (Original text written in English)

UNC ~~UN~~ UN

Following is the text of UNC Report transmitted to the President of the Security Council under cover of letter from Ambassador Goldberg in the evening January 26th, 1968 :

Report of the United Nations Command to the United Nations

The Government of the United States, representing the United Nations Command in Korea, deems it necessary to submit this special report of the United Nations Command to call the attention of the Security Council to the recent grave and serious violations by North Korea of the Military Armistice Agreement of 27 July 1953 and subsequent agreements. Far from having made any attempt to stop serious violations since the last United Nations Command Report issued on November 2, 1967, North Korea has continued to infiltrate armed agents into the Republic of Korea for the purpose of setting ambushes and performing raids in and near the Demilitarized Zone and engaging in subversive activities throughout the country. The most recent incidents, however, are of such magnitude as to create a grave threat to the maintenance of international peace and security.

68-3-112

151

Attempted Assassination of the President of the Republic of Korea.

On 18 January of this year the North Korean regime dispatched a specially trained team of 31 agents armed with sub-machine guns, grenades and explosives through the Demilitarized Zone into the Republic of Korea with orders to attack the residence of the President of the Republic of Korea in Seoul and to assassinate President Chung Hee Park. This team of commando-trained assassins penetrated to the very heart of the city of Seoul before the warnings of local citizens and the actions of the national police thwarted their attempt on the President's life. The team had reached within 800 meters of the President's residence when halted.

During their progress south through the territory of the Republic of Korea, the North Korean agents held four civilians prisoner for five hours. During this time, the North Koreans interrogated the civilians and threatened their lives and their village, should they inform the authorities of the presence of armed North Korean agents. Despite these threats, the four civilians promptly reported the encounter to the authorities of the Republic of Korea.

Through interrogation of a captured agent it was learned that the members of this team had been especially recruited from units of the North Korean army and trained for two years for missions of this type and for two weeks

for this specific mission of assassination and terror. This single agent also had knowledge of 2,400 similar agents being trained in eight specialized camps throughout North Korea to deliberately attack the Republic of Korea.

On January 22, a loudspeaker broadcast by the North Koreans in the DMZ boasted that "the North Korean combat unit advanced from Kyung-hok to Sudaemun. The unit killed a Korean national police-man and the chief of police and destroyed four military trucks .... The combat unit escaped from Park's clique and continued their mission." However, by January 24, the North Koreans had noticed their mistake and re-established their usual, improbable story that "the South Korean armed guerrillas attacked the desperately resisting enemies in Seoul."

As a result of this initial attack, and other attacks by armed aggressions from North Korea, 18 military and civilian persons were killed and 39 wounded by North Korean infiltrators, as shown by the following table of incidents and casualties.

<u>Incidents and casualties</u>	Jan 1 -	Oct 18, 1967
	06:00, Jan 26, 1968	Dec 31, 1967
Significant incidents, DMZ area	19	22
Significant incidents, interior of ROK	22	1
Exchanges of fire, DMZ area	8	5

68-3-114



Exchanges of fire, interior of ROK	17	1
Casualties, North Korean killed within ROK	21	4
Casualties, North Korean captured within ROK	1	7
UNC military casualties, killed within ROK	11	9
UNC military casualties, wounded within ROK	35	15
ROK national police and other civilians killed within ROK	7	0
Civilians wounded within ROK	4	0

The above figures, taken together with those contained in the last report of the United Nations Command issued November 2, 1967, show that in the entire year 1967 North Korea caused 566 significant incidents in which 153 individuals were killed by North Korean infiltrators.

#### Conclusions

The fact that this type of "porous war" has been planned and directed from the highest level of the North Korean regime has been illustrated on many occasions

by constant reference to those aggressive policies by leaders of the regime. The most recent, and blatantly open statement of this intentional aggression was in the December 16, 1967 speech by the regime premier, Il-sung Kim, who said "the northern half of the Republic is the revolutionary base for accomplishing the cause of national liberation on a nationwide scale" and who expects his people to "accomplish the revolutionary cause of unification of the country at all costs."

When the United Nations Command, in an attempt to negotiate this serious problem as prescribed by the Military Armistice Agreement and to restore peace and security to the area, raised the issue at the 261st meeting of the Military Armistice Commission on January 24, 1968, the representative of the North Korean side refused to address the incident in a serious and responsible manner. Concrete evidence, including a filmed interview of the captured North Korean agent and large quantities of North Korean arms and ammunitions, was dismissed by the representative of North Korea who claimed the attack on Seoul was perpetrated by South Korean citizens. In actual fact, the success of defensive measures taken by the Government of the Republic of Korea was in large part due to the wholehearted cooperation and participation of private South Korean citizens. This report clearly shows that North Korea is carrying out a program in deliberate violation of the Armistice

68-3-116

Agreement. The North Koreans have continued to refuse to cooperate in using the machinery established by the Armistice Agreement for the purpose of supervising the Armistice Agreement, making efforts to effect redress through this machinery so far futile.

68-7-119

Text of the statement delivered by General Charles M. Bonesteel III, Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations Forces in Korea, on January 29th, 1968

During this week, there have been two most serious provocations committed by North Korea. I refer, of course, to the January 29 attempt by 31 North Korean infiltrators to assassinate President Park and to the illegal and aggressive act on January 23 when North Korean patrol ships pirated the U.S. Navy ship Pueblo in international waters.

These actions are of grave concern to the Republic of Korea and the United States and to the United Nations Command.

The Korean police, along with Republic of Korea and U.S. Armed Forces, have exterminated nearly all of the 31 North Korean infiltrators who made the vicious and inexcusable abortive attack on January 21. Intensified actions are being taken by all concerned to guard against and to bring to a stop such uncivilized actions in the future.

Stopping of North Korean infiltration, along with the Pueblo incident, is being pressed with great urgency and action by the Government of the United States not only in the United Nations and with other governments, but by its

- x -

68-3-123

own actions to help and support the Republic of Korea.

In these trying days there is no question of the resoluteness and determination of the people of the Republic of Korea and its Armed Forces in the defense of their freedom and liberty.

With energetic actions under way, the people of Korea can rest assured that the United Nations Command is equally fully determined and fully resolute, and is capable of meeting the tests of the future with confidence, assurance and rapidly increasing effectiveness.



Department of State

TELEGRAM

2087

~~TOPSECRET~~

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6997Q  
1968 JAN 27 AM 1050

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NIJ 93-458  
By CS NARA Date 5-27-75

NODIS

1. FOLLOWING IS OUR TRANSLATION OF KOSYGIN'S REPLY TO PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE.
2. BEGIN TEXT. DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I HAVE RECEIVED THE TEXT OF YOUR MESSAGE WHICH WAS HANDED BY AMBASSADOR L. THOMPSON TO OUR MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS ON JANUARY 26, 1968, CONCERNING THE INCIDENT INVOLVING THE AMERICAN NAVAL INTELLIGENCE VESSEL "PUEBLO" NEAR THE SHORES OF THE KOREAN PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC.
3. ALLOW ME TO SAY WITH THE UTMOST DIRECTNESS THAT WE CANNOT SHARE THE INTERPRETATION OF EVENTS WHICH IS PRESENTED BY THE AMERICAN SIDE. INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO US ATTESTS TO THE FACT THAT THE AMERICAN NAVAL INTELLIGENCE VESSEL "PUEBLO" WAS DETAINED BY KOREAN AUTHORITIES NOT IN INTERNATIONAL WATERS BUT IN THE TERRITORIAL WATERS OF THE KPDR WHILE CARRYING OUT CERTAIN INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS. THIS IS THE MAIN THING, IT IS HERE WHERE

PAGE TWO RUEHCR 2604FD ~~TOP SECRET~~  
 THE ENTIRE ESSENCE OF THE AFFAIR LIES, AND THEREFORE THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE INCIDENT FALLS ENTIRELY ON THE AMERICAN MILITARY COMMAND, WHICH ACTED CONTRARY TO THE GENERALLY ACCEPTED NORMS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW PROTECTING THE INVIOABILITY OF THE TERRITORIES OF STATES AND THEIR TERRITORIAL WATERS.

4. BUT SINCE THIS IS SO, IT IS THE US WHICH MUST TAKE STEPS TO FIND WAYS OF SETTLING THE INCIDENT AND, IN ANY EVENT NOT DO ANYTHING THAT COULD ADD FUEL TO THE FIRE. YOU YOURSELF EXPRESSED IN YOUR MESSAGE THE CONVICTION THAT THE INTERESTS OF PRESERVING UNIVERSAL PEACE WOULD NOT BE SERVED BY INCREASED TENSION IN THAT AREA.
5. HOWEVER, HOW CAN THIS BE RECONCILED WITH THE FACT THAT DURING THE PAST FEW DAYS IN THE US THE SITUATION IS BEING HEATED UP BY IRRESPONSIBLE VOICES CALLING FOR A "RETURN STRIKE" AGAINST THE

~~TOPSECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

-2- MOSCOW 2604, JANUARY 27

KPDR AND CALLS FOR THE USE OF ARMS AND FORCE ARE BEING HEARD? THOSE WHO MAKE SUCH STATEMENTS ARE APPARENTLY LITTLE CONCERNED ABOUT WHAT ALL THIS CAN LEAD TO.

6. NOW THE AMERICAN MILITARY LOOK AT THE PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, AND IN PARTICULAR THE PRINCIPLE OF THE FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION, IS WELL KNOWN, IF ONLY BY THE FACT THAT U.S. MILITARY AIRCRAFT ARE BUZZING SYSTEMATICALLY SOVIET AND OTHER VESSELS ON THE HIGH SEAS. WE HAVE REPEATEDLY DRAWN THE ATTENTION OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT TO THE FACT THAT THIS IS FRAUGHT WITH THE POSSIBILITY OF MILITARY INCIDENTS, BUT THE BUZZING OPERATIONS HAVE CONTINUED TO THIS DAY. RECENTLY EVEN MORE SERIOUS CASES HAVE TAKEN PLACE WHERE AMERICAN AIRCRAFT SUBJECTED SOVIET MERCHANT VESSELS TO BOMBING AND STRAFING. AND, INCIDENTALLY, A VERY CALM ATTITUDE, TO PUT IT MILDLY WAS THEN DEMONSTRATED IN THE U.S. WITH RESPECT TO THESE FACTS, ALTHOUGH THEY INVOLVED HUMAN LOSSES AND MAJOR MATERIAL DAMAGE.

7. BUT NOW, WHEN AN AMERICAN NAVAL VESSEL HAS BEEN DETAINED BECAUSE IT PENETRATED FOREIGN TERRITORIAL WATERS, A NOSY CAMPAIGN IS BEING DEVELOPED IN THE U.S., WHICH, JUDGING BY EVERYTHING, HAS THE SUPPORT OF THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT. OTHERWISE, HOW CAN ONE UNDERSTAND THE REPORT THAT A SEVENTH FLEET DETACHMENT CONSISTING OF THE NUCLEAR CARRIER "ENTERPRISE", DESTROYERS AND OTHER VESSELS HAS BEEN ORDERED TO MOVE IN THE DIRECTION OF THE KPDR?

8. THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT BELIEVES THAT IN CONNECTION WITH THE INCIDENT WHICH HAS ARISEN NEAR THE KPDR COAST, IT IS MOST IMPORTANT TO ANALYZE THE SITUATION SOBERLY AND NOT TO SUCCEMB TO EMOTIONS WHICH CAN LEAD ONE TO WHERE PERHAPS HE DOES NOT EVEN INTEND TO GO.

9. YOU, MR. PRESIDENT, HAVE EXPRESSED A DESIRE THAT THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT RESPOND TO YOUR ANXIETY IN CONNECTION WITH THIS INCIDENT.

PAGE FOUR RUEHCR 2604FD ~~TOP SECRET~~

IN OUR VIEW, THE SHORTEST AND THE MOST RELIABLE WAY FOR SETTTLING IT IS NOT TO ALLOW PRECIPITOUS ACTIONS, AND THIS WOULD CREATE A MORE FAVORABLE ATMOSPHERE.

10. WE ARE CONVINCED THAT THE PROMPTTEST POSSIBLE SETTLEMENT OF THE SITUATION WOULD BE IN THE INTEREST OF ALL SIDES. SUCH SETTLEMENT MUST BE BASED, OF COURSE ON COMPLETE RESPECT FOR THE SOVEREIGNTY AND INDEPENDENCE OF THE KOREAN PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC. ANY ATTEMPTS TO APPLY METHODS OF PRESSURE WITH RESPECT TO THE KPDR CAN ONLY COMPLICATE THE POSSIBILITIES FOR A SETTLEMENT.

11. WE HAVE INFORMED THE GOVERNMENT OF THE KOREAN PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF YOUR MESSAGE.

12. RESPECTFULLY, A. KOSYGIN, JANUARY 27, 1968. END TEXT.  
GP-1 THOMPSON

~~TOP SECRET~~

INFORMATION

201  
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3546

~~SECRET~~

Saturday, January 27, 1968 -- 2:40 p. m.

Mr. President:

I am preparing an analysis of Kosygin's message; but one point is reasonably clear, especially in the light of yesterday's report from New Delhi: Kosygin is urging us to settle the matter bilaterally, as an affair between military men.

We discussed this idea this morning; for example, a meeting of the naval commander from our Japanese base and a North Korean naval man at Panmunjom.

As I was drafting, the attached came in. The North Koreans appear to be suggesting that they will return the men as "prisoners of war."

Something like this is probably the quickest track.

We would then have to satisfy Park and the South Koreans by:

- keeping some of the aircraft in South Korea;
- increasing military aid to deal with North Korean infiltration.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.4

REF: 72-148

W. W. Rostow

By 1-9, NARA, Date 6-22-93

Seoul 3702

Sir: This is the break. The problem is how to do it with maximum dignity.

w.

WWRostow:rla

~~SECRET~~

COPY LBJ LIBRARY



**27 JAN 1968: Efforts to Coordinate Handling of the Pueblo Incident and Invasion by Armed Spies of the North Korean Puppet Regime in Foreign Reports and the UN Security Council.**

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea

Very Urgent

Number: WUS-01129, WUN-0128

Date: 271400

Recipient: Ambassador to the United Nations and Ambassador to the United States

1. According to the foreign press, it is reported that only the incident of the USS Pueblo has been mainly discussed in the Security Council; the incident of the infiltration of the North Korean Puppet Regime's armed agents into the Republic of Korea has been rarely mentioned by the foreign press.
  2. From the perspective of the Republic of Korea, a series of brutal actions by the North Korean Puppet Regime against the country, including the armed infiltrators of 21 January, are most important events. Thus, those actions should be emphasized and closely observed equal to the USS Pueblo incident. Accordingly, there should be, at least, a balance in emphasizing those two incidents. You are expected to request the United States for this point strongly.
  3. The authorities of the Republic of Korea have already made a complaint to the United States embassy in Seoul about the fact that only the USS Pueblo incident has been reported lopsidedly.
  4. Also, Mr. President demands the utmost efforts to censure the infiltration incident by the North Korean Puppet Regime to the maximum extent through the media and other communication systems and to appeal to the international society.
- II. You are expected to contact the United States and other allies, have a meeting with the 16 countries that participated in the Korean War, search for a way to reconfirmation the

responsibilities for the defense of the Republic of Korea, and report about it. The same request has been made to the United States embassy in Seoul. (Banyeon)

Prior notice: reclassification as common documents (December 31, 1968)



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\*\*\*\*\* ZZ RUEHC RUEHDT  
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 ZNY SSSSS ZZH CN 7070Q  
 Z O 280923Z JAN 68 ZFF-6 1/28/68 5:40 adm.  
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 TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 8614  
 INFO RUEHDT/USMISSION USUN NEWYORK IMMEDIATE 0257  
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~~SECRET~~ SEOUL 3706

NODIS/CACTUS

COUNTRY TEAM MESSAGE

DECLASSIFIED  
 E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
 NLJ 97-317  
 By us, NARA Date 9-21-97

- REF: (A) STATE 106065 *attached*  
 (B) STATE 106066 *attached*  
 (C) STATE 126070  
 (D) USEK MESSAGE UK-50285 DTG 261115Z (searching)

1. WE DEEPLY CONCERNED OVER DAVERSE IMPACT PROCEDURE SUGGESTED REF (A) AND (B) WOULD HAVE ON US/ROK RELATIONS. AS WE HAVE REPORTED, ROKS FROM PRESIDENT ON DOWN ARE

PAGE 2 RUALOS 3706E ~~SECRET~~  
 CONVINCED THAT OUR ACTIONS AND STATEMENTS SINCE PUEBLO INCIDENT SIMPLY DO NOT RECOGNIZE EXTREME GRAVITY OF THREAT TO INTERNAL SECURITY AND POLITICAL POSITION OF ROKG REPRESENTED BY BLUE HOUSE RAID AND NORTH KOREAN DETERMINATION TO INCREASE SUBVERSIVE EFFORT.

2. WE HAVE NOT INFORMED ROKG OF EXCHANGE BETWEEN OURSELVES AND NORTH KOREA THROUGH NNSC MEMBERS. DESPITE SECURITY PRECAUTIONS WE CANNOT KEEP THIS FROM THEM FOR VERY LONG. WE HAVE ALREADY RECEIVED ANGUISHED APPROACH FROM FOREIGN MINISTRY VOICING SUSPICION THAT WE ARE ATTEMPTING TO CONTACT NK DIRECTLY AT OTHER LOCATIONS, NOTABLY WARSAW, AND THAT WE THEREFORE INTEND TO CONFINE NEGOTIATIONS TO RETREIVAL OF PUEBLO AND CREW. WE HAVE AMPLE EVIDENCE THAT SUSPICIONS ARE ALOS GROWING AT HIGHEST LEVELS THAT ONCE WE SUCCEED IN OBTAINING RELEASE OF SHIP AND CREW, WE WILL WITHDRAW FORCE AUGMENTATIONS AND LEAVE ROK PROBLEM IN STATUS QUO ANTE PUEBLO WITH NO IMPROVEMENT IN PRESIDENT PARK'S POLITICAL OR SECURITY

~~SECRET~~



169  
Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PAGE 2 SEOUL 3706, 280923Z

PROBLEMS. WE HAVE HAD BROAD HINTS THAT ROKS ARE TALKING

PAGE 3 RUALOS 3706E ~~SECRET~~

AMONG THEMSELVES OF POSSIBLE WITHDRAWAL ROK ARMED FORCES FROM OPERATIONAL CONTROL CINCUNC AND, BECAUSE OF CONCERN OVER REOPENING OF HOSTILITIES HERE, RETURN OF ROK TROOPS FROM VIETNAM. WE DO NOT BELIEVE THEY ARE SERIOUS, BUT FACT THAT SENIOR ROKS IMPLY SUCH CONSIDERATION IS INDICATIVE OF PSYCHOLOGICAL CLIMATE WE MUST DEAL WITH HERE. SHOULD ROKS LEARN THAT WE HAVE REQUESTED MEETING OF SENIOR MEMBERS MAC SOLELY TO DISCUSS PUEBLO INCIDENT, AS SUGGESTED REF (A) AND (B), WITHOUT PARALLEL EFFORT ON INTRUSION PROBLEM, RESULTS COULD BE EXPLOSIVE.

3. MOREOVER, WHATEVER SUBJECT MATTER, BELIEVE IT WOULD BE HIGHLY INADVISABLE TO EXPRESS WILLINGNESS TO HOLD OPEN MUC MEETING. PRESENCE OF PRESS AND OTHER WITNESSES AT OPEN MEETING WOULD IMPEL PAK TO PUT ON PROPAGANDA SHOW AND ATTEMPT TO PLACE US IN MOST HUMILIATING LIGHT POSSIBLE.

4. ACCORDINGLY, URGENTLY REQUEST WE BE AUTHORIZED TO FOLLOW PROCEDURE OUTLINED BELOW:

PAGE 4 RUALOS 3706E ~~SECRET~~

(A) IMMEDIATELY SEND KPA/CPV SENIOR MEMBER FIRST FOUR PARAS OF REPLY CONTAINED REF (A) PLUS PARA 5 ENDING AFTER WORDS "JOINT DUTY OFFICERS." SUCH REPLY IS CURRENTLY BEING TRANSLATED AND PREPOSITIONED FOR IMMEDIATE DELIVERY BY SECURE MEANS. BY LIMITING THIS REPLY TO REQUEST FOR INFORMATION ON CONDITION OF CREW MEMBERS, WE WOULD ALSO PROVIDE NNSC OPPORTUNITY TO FOLLOW THROUGH WITH LETTER THEY SUGGESTED TO US YESTERDAY (SEOUL 3697).

(B) AMBASSADOR WILL SEEK SOONEST POSSIBLE APPOINTMENT WITH PRESIDENT PARK TO INFORM HIM OF DEALINGS WHICH HAVE ALREADY TAKEN PLACE THROUGH NNSC AND OF REQUEST FOR INFORMATION ON CREW BY SENIOR MEMBER UNCMAC. AMBASSADOR WILL STATE THAT SENIOR MEMBER UNCMAC IS ALSO REQUESTING A PRIVATE SENIOR MEMBER MEETING TO DISCUSS PROBLEM OF OBTAINING RELEASE OF PUEBLO

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 31) SEOUL 3705, 280923Z

AND CREW AND TO IMPRESS ON NORTH KOREANS IN MOST FORCEFUL TERMS GRAVITY OF SITUATION POSED BY CONTINUING UNORTH KOREAN INFILTRATION. IF PRESIDENT INSISTS THAT UNCMAC SENIOR MEMBER DEMAND GUARANTEE FROM NORTH KOREAN THAT THERE WILL BE NO FURTHER INTRUSION, AMBASSADOR WILL

PAGE 5 RUALOS 3706E ~~SECRET~~

RESPOND THAT IT PROBABLY IMPOSSIBLE TO OBTAIN. HOWEVER, TO EASE PRESIDENT'S VERY REAL CONCERNS, REQUEST AMBASSADOR BE AUTHORIZED IF NECESSARY TO INFORM HIM THAT USG WILL DO FOLLOWING:

(1) RETAIN SUBSTANTIAL PROPORTION OF FORCE AUGMENTATION IN AND NEAR KOREA UNTIL SUCH TIME AS DEVELOPMENTS INDICATE INFILTRATION THREAT AND ITS ATTENDANT POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL PROBLEMS MATERIALLY LESSENED.

(2) TO PROVIDE TANGIBLE EVIDENCE THAT WE ARE DOING SOMETHING DIRECTLY FOR THE ROKS, USG WILL AIRLIFT AVAILABLE CIGCOREP ITEMS AS REQUESTED IN REF (D), WHICH USFK IS PASSING SEPARATELY DIRECTLY OO DEPT.

(3) ACKNOWLEDGE FIRM COMMITMENT ON SPRING DELIVERY FIRST DESTROYER, WHICH HERETOFORE HAS BEEN TIED TO ADDITIONAL DISPATCH OF ROK TROOPS TO VIETNAM.

WE ARE UNDER NO ILLUSIONS THAT THESE ITEMS, IF AGREED, WOULD ENTIRELY ELIMINATE PRESSURES ON US ARISING FROM

PAGE 6 RUALOS 3706E ~~SECRET~~

PARK'S INTERNAL POLITICAL POSITION. THEY MAY EASE PRESSURES FOR TIME BEING, HOWEVER, IF CAREFULLY PUBLICIZED.

(C) SENIOR MEMBER UNCMAN WILL THEN SEND SEPARATE MESSAGE TO SENIOR MEMBER KPA/CPV SIDE REQUESTING PRIVATE SENIOR MEMBER TO SENIOR MEMBER MAC MEETING. REQUEST UPDATE GUIDANCE CONTAINED REF (B).

4. AMBASSADOR WILL RAISE PROBLEM OF ROK ATTENDANCE AT UNSC (REF C) AT T)

ME HE MAKES APPROACH MENTIONED PARA 4(B) ABOVE. GP3. PORTER

BT

NOTE: PASSED USUB NEW YORK BY OC/T 1/28/68 WW

~~SECRET~~

PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S NOTES ON CONVERSATION WITH  
AMBASSADOR GOLDBERG at 11:38AM on Jan. 28, 1968

166  
12612  
12613

Relative to Puzbla -- return of ship and crew 00 submitting matter to International Court of Justice.

Ambassador Goldberg felt Pres. Johnson should say that he has said to the American people that he wants this matter settled by diplomatic means if possible. You have also said that the ship and crew must be returned, and Pres. J. stays with that statement. Say that Pres. J. is prepared, if the ship and crew are returned promptly, to then submit that on the basis of incontrovertible evidence which has been made public that the ship was in international waters; nevertheless Pres. J. would submit the entire matter -- after the ship and crew are returned -- to the International Court of Justice, and abide by the results. If our case is not what we say it is we would make appropriate reparations to them; if theirs isn't as they say, they would make reparations to us.

Said this will be turned down, although in one instance there was a situation in the Corfu (?) channel case where Britain and Albania got into a problem about intrusion on international waters and the Albanians mined the channel, and they agreed it should go to the court (the British ship was damaged), and the court ordered the Albanians to pay damages. All fair-minded people believe in submitting to courts and courts decide. Goldberg felt a proposition like that put by the President in a solemn declaration to the American people and to world opinion would have a tremendous impact. No one could say Pres. J. not acting with restraint.

Goldberg thought this was a far better proposal than Mike Mansfield's "silly proposal" that even though the ship was in international waters we ought to lie to get our men back. "That is just assinine."

Tell them to return the ship and crew and we will put the matter to the court -- we are prepared to do it promptly upon the return and we will abide the results of that decision. Goldberg pointed out that there is a Russian on the court so they can't say the court is stacked against them, and a Pole, but on the whole the court is not badly disposed. It has Latin Americans, the Australians, British judges -- Phil Jessup is a good Judge. I don't think we would do badly, Goldberg said and "our evidence -- the one we have been developing . . ." We would have to "invoke" the court, Goldberg said; "we would ask the court as a matter of urgency to make this determination."

President Johnson asked if Goldberg had talked to Rusk or Nick about it. Goldberg had not "because he didn't want to start anything," and President said he thought it was orth pursuing, and he wished Goldberg would talk to them later in the day. Goldberg said he would.

President Johnson asked Goldberg how things were going at UN and what were they doing. Goldberg said nothing. That he didn't want to submit the matter (the Pueblo and its crew) to the UN and get a veto. Said he was going to talk to the Russian there and see if he got anything different from Tommy's reports. He (Goldberg) said he would say "You don't have to have a resolution; let's get the counsel to propose that the ship and so on be returned and say the counsel will be prepared to carry on further, to consider the matter. But I know as I read the telegrams, I doubt the Russians would agree to anything. I don't want to risk a resolution. See we got a good vote on inscription and I think it is much better to let it be where everybody is trying individually to use some diplomatic pressure."

President asked if he lost 3 votes on the inscription and Goldberg said just three votes -- Russian, Hungary and Algeria, and he thought that was a pretty good posture to leave it in. He wouldn't want to lose support "as we go down the line."

President said we were going to have to do something when Goldberg got through at UN, so for him to talk to Rusk or Katzenback, and that we don't have "our people out there, can't do something militarily so we are going to have to do something in between."

Goldberg said "the best avenue out there to get our boys back is this Neutral Nations Supervisory Committee." Pres. said "they are working that carefully." Goldberg said that consists of the Swedes, Poles, Swiss and the Czechs; "we sent a wire last night to get them working. It is very important -- the North Koreans sent a message through that Commission. Get Walt to get it for you if you haven't seen it." Pres. said he had read it and the reply; that "we worked on it all afternoon." President read goldberg what he had just received kxxk which was brought to him while he was talking to Goldberg.

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1.5(c)  
3.4(b)(1)

~~SECRET~~  
Foreign Dissem

OCI No. 0631/68

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
Directorate of Intelligence  
28 January 1968

1229

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

SANITIZED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 92-548  
By CB, NARA Date 9-8-97

Pueblo Sitrep No. 16  
(As of 5 P.M. EST)

1. Pyongyang's latest statement on the Pueblo case came today from a deputy premier who told reporters at a Damascus airport that North Korea will "severely punish" the Pueblo crew. He charged that the US hopes to "cover up its espionage against our country and other barbaric acts it has committed" by taking the case to the UN Security Council, and warned that "if the American imperialists dare to commit aggression or a sudden attack on our country, we will repulse it completely." The deputy premier was on his way to Baghdad, where North Korea has a consulate, for six days of discussions with Iraqi officials.

2. North Korea's deputy foreign affairs minister, it has just been learned, convened all accredited missions in Pyongyang yesterday to deliver a declaration on the Pueblo seizure. Claiming that the capture was "a legitimate defense measure" against "overt aggression," he insisted North Korea "is not intimidated by reprisal measures and holds itself in readiness to face American provocation or invasion."

3. Peking has issued a new and stronger expression of support for Pyongyang. An official Chinese government statement said today that "the Chinese government and people firmly support the just stand" of North Korea. A New China News Agency report issued earlier today stated only that Peking was watching the Korean situation with "close attention." China is undoubtedly anxious that its support of North Korea appear as least as strong as that of the Soviet Union. The new statement from Peking attempted to depict the Pueblo incident as further evidence of US plans to expand the Vietnam war--a favorite theme of recent Chinese propaganda. The

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Foreign Dissem

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3.4(b)(1)



Chinese pronouncement strongly condemned the US military buildup in the Sea of Japan and concluded with a warning that "US imperialism has forgotten the lesson it was taught in the Korean War."

4. UN missions throughout New York City reportedly met behind closed doors today to prepare for tomorrow afternoon's Security Council meeting. One topic of discussion was known to be Canada's suggestion for the appointment of UN Secretary-General Thant or another neutral mediator.

5. The Forrestal-class attack carrier Ranger and three escorting destroyers are due to join the Enterprise task group on the morning of the 31st (EST).

ANNEX D

Department of State

100-5-170  
38

ACTION: AMBASSADOR MORROW PRIORITY  
STATE  
NODIS

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28 JAN 21 04

20 JAN 21 04

ONLY  
FOR AMBASSADOR MORROW

*me*

NODIS

1. It seems obvious from your meetings with Georgie and others that Sovs regard official contacts <sup>with Sovs</sup> ~~with Sovs~~ because <sup>of</sup> ~~of~~ <sup>the</sup> ~~the~~ <sup>close</sup> ~~close~~ and even annoying <sup>because</sup> ~~because~~ of inevitable attendant publicity. <sup>Sov</sup> ~~Sov~~ considerations would apply to contacts with charge here.

2. Nonetheless, it is essential we remain in <sup>close</sup> ~~close~~ communication with Sovs now to stress gravity of situation. While we are hopeful success diplomatic approaches, it is always possible that at <sup>repeat later</sup> ~~later~~ <sup>we</sup> ~~we~~ <sup>would</sup> ~~would <sup>wish</sup> ~~wish~~ to <sup>take</sup> ~~take~~ them of actions we may be compelled to take in order to obtain release of man and vessel. Purpose then would be to insure that Sovs understand limited objectives such action and thus avoid miscalculation by other side.~~

3. Hot line is, of course, secure <sup>private</sup> ~~secure~~ channel, but we believe this would be inappropriate for warnings of impending action as indicated para 2 since Sov prestige would be engaged

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 98-355

By *ca*, NARA Date 9-29-97

EUR/sov - Mr. Toon 6906 The Secretary

CIA - Mr. [unclear]  
S/S - Mr. [unclear]

~~SECRET~~  
and they would feel compelled respond. Its use subject daily inquiry here and confirmation would escalate public concern.

4. Accordingly, we now giving consideration to establishment, at appropriate time; of clandestine channel on <sup>Scali-Fomin</sup> pattern used during Cuban missile crises. <sup>(ORCIA)</sup> Helms has proposed we use Kulebiakin, <sup>KVL EBAI4N</sup> top <sup>KGB</sup> KGB official in US as well as Dep Sov UN. PermRep. Our spokesman would be reliable non-official, perhaps Wm. S. White, who would be carefully controlled and authorized inform Kulebiakin he acting on precise instructions and at specific request of Secretary on ~~our~~ behalf of President if this deemed necessary in light existing circumstances.

5. We do not believe necessary or appropriate officially to ~~and~~ inform Sovs in advance of establishment of contact. We can assume knowledge of contact will be relayed by Kulebiakin through his channels to top Sov officials. At some later point, it might be desirable for you to convey quietly to Gromyko your knowledge that channel exists and is operative, <sup>by opening of business Monday (EST)</sup>

6. Would appreciate ~~urgently~~ your views on desirability timing, such move and its/timing and if you concur in need, on modalities as set forth paras/4 and 5.

GP-1

28 January 1968

CIA/DIA/STATE MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Reactions to Certain US Actions

1. In this memorandum we consider some recent developments in North Korean, Soviet and Chinese policy in connection with the Korean crisis and the possible reactions of these countries to several US courses of action.

I. DEVELOPMENTS IN COMMUNIST POLICY

2. The attack on the Blue House in Seoul and the seizure of the Pueblo are the most flagrant and conspicuous manifestations of an aggressive policy of armed subversion against the ROK developed by Kim Il-Sung since the fall of 1966. This policy aims at the eventual reunification of Korea by revolutionary violence, and is designed to exploit the current US and ROK involvement in Vietnam to this end.

3. In the current crisis they have apparently acted independently and probably intend to keep the affair in their own hands insofar as they can. The influence of China in the

SANITIZED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NIJ/RAC 01-173 Appeal  
By J NARA, Date 5/5/93

present circumstances is marginal, and the influence of the Soviets in Pyongyang, though greater than Peking's, is not decisive. The Soviets have considerable potential leverage, but they would be unlikely to apply severe pressures on North Korea unless they thought hostilities on a continuing and extended scale were becoming likely. They would be reluctant to risk the recovery of their influence with the Asian Communist parties, a goal they have been seeking for several years, unless they believed that a major danger to their own security was developing.

4. In the last week, the North Koreans have maintained a consistently hard and unyielding public position. However, there is, in private statements through the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, some suggestion of a willingness to bargain for the release of the Pueblo's crew. We judge that the North Koreans wish to avoid military retaliation and a possible resumption of hostilities in Korea. Their primary concern is to manipulate the crisis so as to discredit the US and complicate US-ROK relations.

5. The USSR and China probably approve these immediate North Korean aims, though they may have concern over Pyongyang's tactical handling of the crisis. They may even be concerned

that a prolonged crisis or possible hostilities in Korea would adversely effect Communist prospects in Vietnam by encouraging a general hardening of US policy in Asia. Both the Soviets and Chinese have thus far refrained from involving themselves directly. The Chinese, after remaining virtually silent for several days, have offered only pro forma support, mainly because of their severely strained relations with Kim Il-Sung, and perhaps because of their own confused internal situation. In public the Soviets have maintained a general support for Pyongyang, but without adding to the tensions. They did pass a US message to Pyongyang and through calculated leaks they have endeavored to hint at the possibility that the Pueblo incident could be settled peacefully if the US made some concessions.

## II. POSSIBLE US COURSES OF ACTION

6. The possible US courses of action discussed below are grouped into two broad categories: first, those that are purely demonstrative in intent; second, those which are retaliatory or involve the use of force in some way. Under the first category, we also discuss the question of possible warnings to the North Koreans or through the USSR.


DEMONSTRATIVE ACTIONS

7. The demonstrative actions, discussed below, taken singly or even together, would not be likely to effect the release of the Pueblo or its crew. Probably they would not even convince the North Koreans that the US in fact intends to use military force if the crisis is not settled satisfactorily. The North Koreans might still feel their possession of the crew was strong insurance against US retaliation. They might also believe that the US was constrained from moving very far in the direction of military action by the requirements of Vietnam. But taken together with a further significant buildup of US military capabilities in the area these demonstrative actions would probably reenforce North Korean concern over US retaliation and raise apprehension in Moscow and in Peking over US intentions. While we cannot be sure, we believe there is a fair chance that some combination of demonstrative actions, diplomacy, and a force buildup would lead to the release of all or most of the crew, and possibly the ship.

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A. The US would deploy the USS Banner and a suitable escort and air cover to the general location of the Pueblo seizure, following the route of the Pueblo; the following day the Banner would retrace this route and the procedure would be repeated as long as desirable.


8. No direct military reaction to this move is likely. All of the Communists would recognize it as a demonstration, and as long as North Korean territorial waters were not violated, there would be no response. There would be further military alerts in North Korea and a Soviet vessel would probably shadow the US force. There would be the danger of incidents, particularly between the Banner's air cover and patrolling North Korean fighters. And such incidents would draw considerable international criticism of the US for deliberately seeking such encounters. This course of action probably and any incidents certainly would undercut US diplomatic efforts aimed at a peaceful solution of the Pueblo episode.



EO 12958 3.4(b)(5)-25Yrs  
EO 12958 3.4(D)(6)-25Yrs  
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- C. The US could move some ships to the site of the Pueblo seizure and begin salvage operations. (Assuming that the North Koreans were not already on the scene for this purpose.)

11. The Communists would see in this operation a marginal show of defiance and also an attempt to recover gear to support the US claim regarding the precise location of the Pueblo. The North Koreans would probably do nothing in response, except perhaps complain publicly that the US was trying to provoke another incident. If the US claimed to have recovered Pueblo gear, the North Koreans would deny US veracity and continue to insist that the incident had occurred in their territorial waters.

D. The US would convey indirectly a warning to the North Koreans that military reprisals were intended at an early date unless there was a satisfactory termination of the Pueblo affair.

12. The question here is one of credibility. The North Koreans would have some reason to believe that the US might be bluffing. At least they could not be sure. Presumably they would consult with the Soviets and ready their own defenses. If the US were simultaneously making significant military moves indicating an increased readiness for major hostilities in Korea, however, then the North Koreans would probably make some gesture to forestall US actions. They might make an acceptable offer to bargain; they might even release part of the crew. Any Soviet advice in these circumstances would probably run along this line.

13. If the US involved the Soviet Union as a channel to convey a warning to North Korea, the Soviets would almost certainly refuse to be a party to conveying officially an American ultimatum. Nevertheless, the Soviets would probably pass the warning to Pyongyang. It should be emphasized, however, that there is no guarantee that the Soviets could persuade the North Koreans to make concessions, even if they decided to try to do so. There is a good chance, however, that the Soviets

179

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might open up clandestine channels to the US, hoping to gain time while they explored further both US and North Korean positions and the possibility of a settlement.

RETALIATORY ACTIONS

14. As indicated above, there is a fair chance that a combination of demonstrative actions, diplomatic moves, and military reinforcement in Korea would persuade the Kim Il-Sung regime to end the current crisis by releasing the crew and perhaps the ship. Once the US took retaliatory actions involving the use of military force against North Korea, however, the chances of obtaining early release of the crew and ship would be virtually eliminated. Moreover, retaliation would probably bring the Chinese and Soviets more directly into the situation. They would probably still try to contain the crisis, but would feel compelled to take some steps to show they were prepared to aid North Korea's defense. Thus, the risks of an enlargement of the crisis and actual hostilities would be increased.

- 8 -

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A. The US would mine Wonsan harbor, preferably at night, by an air drop.

15. North Korea would, of course, defend against this action; it might also attempt some retaliation of its own, for example against US ships or forces. The USSR would assist in any efforts to remove the mines, if requested, and they would also begin to build up North Korean air defense capabilities around Wonsan and other major ports. Mining of Wonsan would be of special concern to the USSR, not only because Soviet ships use the harbor, but also because the action might be seen as a precedent to similar action against Haiphong.

B. The US would quarantine or blockade one or more ports, but limit the action to North Korean naval vessels. This would be a close in blockade with some US ships entering North Korean waters.

16. There would be a high risk that the North Koreans would challenge the blockade with their forces. The Soviets might ostentatiously move ships through the blockade line, possibly including some military vessels. Some move would probably be made by the Soviets at the UN; they would have good prospects for getting wide support. At this point the North Koreans and Soviets would conclude that further US military action might

follow; they would move ahead rapidly with defensive preparations. The Chinese too would probably begin some show of military activity in North China and Manchuria.

- C. The US would attempt to seize a North Korean vessel and hold it in return for the Pueblo and its crew.

17. If time and circumstances permitted, the North Koreans would defend against such a seizure, regardless of whether in international or territorial waters. Presumably, they are perspicacious enough not to expose a major ship to such action beyond the reaches of their air cover. In any case, the North Koreans would not be likely to bargain for an exchange. And the resulting propaganda would becloud the original US case against Pyongyang. No military retaliation would be likely, however.

- D. The US or the ROK would undertake a raid in reenforced battalion size across the DMZ.

18. The North Koreans are probably alert to this possibility; in any case the action could build up into a major battle involving reenforcements on both sides. It would certainly not bring about the return of the Pueblo's crew. Indeed it is possible that action on this scale would be tantamount to reopening the

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war. The Soviets would probably accelerate arms aid to North Korea, and the Chinese might make some gestures to indicate more support for Pyongyang.

E. The US and/or the ROK would conduct an air strike against one or more selected targets: a US air strike against Wonsan airfield and Mumpyong Ni naval base; the ROK AF would strike against guerrilla training centers in North Korea.

19. The North Koreans would of course defend themselves against the attack. They would weigh carefully the desirability of a retaliatory air strike of their own against South Korea. They would recognize that such action would invite a continuing exchange and a virtual air war. On balance, we believe they would probably not retaliate in this way unless they judged that the US intended to continue its attacks.\* At the same time, they would probably not be willing to accept the US and ROK actions. Probably they would immediately sentence the crew; perhaps they would hint at an execution.

20. The attitude of the Soviets and Chinese in this situation would be of increasing importance to the North Koreans.

\* The DIA representative believes that the North Koreans are likely to make such a retaliatory air strike, despite their concern about an expanding conflict, because the North Korean Air Force would be relatively untouched by the proposed attack. Regardless of any US statements to the contrary, North Korea would have no assurance that this was a one-time retaliatory action.

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Chinese-Korean relations are currently so strained and the situation in China so confused that the North Koreans would probably not count on Chinese support. While the Chinese would take a hard propaganda line, they would almost certainly refrain from any action against the US.

21. The North Koreans cannot afford to proceed very far in a confrontation with the US without some assurance of Soviet military support. We doubt that any firm Soviet assurance would be given at this stage, despite Soviet obligations under the 1961 Mutual Assistance Treaty. We think that the Soviets would initially respond to a US air strike by tough public support of Pyongyang, but probably they would also make private efforts to persuade North Korea and the US to end the crisis and for Pyongyang to restrain its own reactions.

22. Nevertheless, the Communists would be greatly concerned that the US might embark on a course of sustained air attacks. They would step up preparations to meet this contingency, including new measures to strengthen North Korean air defense, since both the USSR and China regard North Korea as an area of special security interests to them.

\* \* \* \* \*

23. International Reactions: If the US did resort to sanctions or punitive measures against North Korea, it would gain considerably among certain of its allies in Asia, but it would certainly draw criticism in those quarters already opposed to US policy in the Far East. Indeed, most Free World countries think that an early resort to military action would be unjustified. If, after a retaliatory action, there were no serious consequences, international concern and alarm would die down. The US position in the UN would deteriorate; charges would be made that the US was misusing forces operating under UN auspices.

24. Should the US try to marshal support for a break in trade between North Korea and the Free World, it would probably meet considerable resistance. Japan, the largest of North Korea's trading partners in the Free World, would be reluctant, because of domestic considerations, to join the US. Indeed, the Japanese left would exploit the Korean crisis to bring heavy pressure on the government, and among other things to harass and inhibit the use of US bases in the country. The Sato Government would be placed in a very uncomfortable position.



**28 JAN 1968: Expression of Opposition to Direct Contact by the United States and the North Korean Puppet Regime for the Release of the Pueblo Crew.**

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea  
Urgent

Number: WUS-01138  
Date: 281625

Recipient: Ambassador to the Unites States

1. There was a foreign news that the United States was indirectly contacting the North Korean Puppet Regime through the intermediation of the Polish government. Worried is a likelihood that such a contact may evolve to a direct contact between the United States and the North Korean Puppet Regime. Such a direct contact will be of no effect, regardless of its form, and it may make an impression of a rise in the North Korean Puppet Regime's status. In this sight, the Republic of Korea (to Councilor Erickson from the Director-General of European and American Bureau) on January 28, 1968 and the embassy replied that it would make it strongly reflected in the Unites States government policy.
2. As states above, you are expected to make the Republic of Korea's position that it is opposed to any direct contact between the United States and the North Korean Puppet Regime, regardless of its form, strongly reflected in the policy of the United States government.

Minister

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SANTIZED  
E.O: 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NIJ: 92-153

By JL, NARA, Date 7-2-93

192

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Confrontation in Korea .

The Pueblo incident and the assassination attempt on President Pak have created a confrontation which engages the interests of several parties other than the US and North Korea. The attitudes and actions of the USSR, China and the ROK, not to mention advice and pressures from others not so immediately involved, will complicate the course of events.

Probability of Chinese or Soviet Complicity

We are probably not dealing with a series of pre-planned coordinated actions on the Communist side. The Communist parties certainly have an interest, because of Viet-Nam, in bringing diversionary pressure on the U. S. It is also true that the military-political situation in Viet-Nam is one which might seem optimum for such actions now. However, present strained relations between the North Koreans and the Chinese seem to rule out serious collaboration between them. As for the Soviets, they would most clearly

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recognize the magnitude of the risks involved, and hence would wish to have control of the course of efforts. They probably do not believe that they could have that control over the North Koreans at present.

Treaty Obligations

Treaties between Korea and the USSR and between Korea and Communist China were signed in July 1961, calling in each case for the immediate extension of military and other assistance in case either party is subjected to armed attack by any state or by several states jointly.

Communist Intentions

Circumstances suggest that the Pueblo incident was fortuitous and may have been undertaken partly in order to cover the fiasco of the violent foray at Seoul. Whatever may be the truth concerning the origins of the present confrontation, all the communist parties will attempt to handle the affair so as to inflict maximum damage on the US position, particularly with reference to Viet-Nam. They would hope both to impel a diversion of forces and to increase pressures on the US Government, at home and abroad, to move toward a more accommodating position with respect to Viet-Nam negotiations.

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In attempting to magnify such pressures, however, account will be taken of risks. Non of the communist parties, we believe, would want the new focus of tension to develop into actual hostilities.

Probable Soviet Advice to Koreans

Undoubtedly, Moscow is now making its advice heard in Pyongyang.

Likely advice:

- to milk the situation for all the embarrassment and pressure it is possible to inflict on the US, but
- to avoid any further provocative action which might lead to US retaliation;
- the Koreans to talk but stand pat at the Military Armistice Commission table. and then after some interval to agree to return the Pueblo crew.

The North Koreans probably would be receptive to such advice. Should they be disposed to follow a more belligerent course, however, we cannot be sure that the Soviets would be able to control all of their moves.

Probable Chinese Advice

Peking is believed to have less weight in Pyongyang than Moscow. Chinese advice under present circumstances would probably be ambiguous, ~~concerned~~ concerned primarily not to be publicly less-venturesome than the Soviets. The Chinese would probably not urge Pyongyang to any

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course of undue risk at present. This belief derives from what we believe to be Chinese attitude toward Viet-Nam as well as from its internal situation.

The communist powers will be conscious that the ROK, with or without U. S. concurrence could balloon the crisis out of control. This consideration will probably argue for an additional ~~xxxxxx~~ measure of caution in designing further moves.

Summary of Communist Attitudes and Actions

It seems probably that at this stage the communist side will be in essential accord that:

- further moves should aim at forcing the US into humiliating acceptance of the North Korean affront;
- the stand-off should be prolonged until it appears that the US might resort to major retaliation;
- opportunities should be sought in this course to contribute to weakening of the US will in Viet-Nam;
- if the danger of a uncontrollable clash becomes great, take some partial step towards settling the Pueblo incident.

Obviously, the calculations on the communist side will be close ones and easily subject to error.

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The Confrontation to Date

Up to now, the North Koreans have indicated that they intend to keep the ship permanently. They have not indicated their intentions on the crew, however, and may plan to release them relatively soon, or at least to remain flexible on this issue.

Our approaches to the North Koreans through the Military Armistice Commission and to the Soviet Union have produced no satisfactory answers. We have asked the Good Offices of the Secretary General of the United Nations and Wilson.

Policy Alternatives

In general, our positions are:

A) to use what political and diplomatic pressure we can in hope of obtaining release of ship and crew. There is little hope this will succeed for the ship, but might for the crew after an extended period.


B) to accompany diplomatic moves by a show of force in an effort to affect return of ship and crew.

C) to engage in specific and military naval operations to force the issue.

We recommend starting with ~~course~~ course B, as follows:

Specific Recommendations

a.



1.3(a)(4)

b. As a general precaution - deploy U. S. Air and Navy to South Korea, and to international waters in the general area.

c. Order the speeding of delivery of equipment to the Republic of Korea to counter the raider campaign.

d. Strengthen the Republic of Korea Navy.

e. Continue efforts in the diplomatic field to obtain the release of the vessel and an end to harassment of South Korea.

f. If we do not succeed in these efforts, we shall consider further actions. I do not rule out the call up of air, navy and Army reserves to deal with this developing situation.

Scenario

If the foregoing is adopted, the following should be done forthwith:

- a. Consultation with Congressional leaders.
- b. Presidential statement or appearance at Congress.
- c. Letter to Pak. (Interim letter)
- d. Letter to Sato. (Interim letter)
- e. New approach to Kosygin.
- f. Approach to UN.
- g. Inform 16 nations.
- h. Letters to NATO leaders.
- i. Letters to SEATO and ANZUS leaders.
- j. Letters to selected leaders other than above.
- k. Cirtel to our Missions.



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U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

Intelligence Note - 75 2/a

RECEIVED N. S. C.

JAN 30 10 31 AM '68

January 29, 1968

To : The Secretary  
Through: S/S  
From : INR - Thomas L. Hughes *TH*

①

*Reston*

Subject: The Emerging Soviet Line on the Pueblo Incident

Soviet public and private remarks in recent days have thrown some light on how Moscow will be dealing with the Pueblo incident. The USSR appears anxious to preserve a public posture of non-involvement, while at the same time trying to dissipate any sense of urgency in the case and thereby to dissuade the US from taking any action against North Korea. In giving full public support to Pyongyang, the USSR has not committed itself to any specific course of action as the situation develops.

At the United Nations, The Security Council speech of Soviet representative Morozov on January 26 fully supported North Korean contentions that the Pueblo violated DPRK territorial waters. In private, Morozov has told Western representatives that although the USSR is not prepared to act as an intermediary or to come up with new ideas, it does favor a peaceful solution to the crisis and does not exclude the possibility of action in the UN. He told Amdassador Goldberg on January 28 that he desires to continue conversations with the US at the Security Council. He stated, however, that he was not authorized to conduct bilateral negotiations with the US on the problem.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NIJ 92-153

By *AW*, NARA, Date *3-26-93*

This report was produced by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research. Aside from normal substantive exchange with other agencies at the working level, it has not been coordinated elsewhere.

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GROUP 1  
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US "Aggravation of Tensions." Morozov and other Soviet representatives have claimed that US military moves in the area of Korea make a peaceful solution to the problem more difficult. The Soviet Ambassador in Brussels carried this further by stating that if US actions were less "threatening," it would be easier for the USSR to do something. Considerable Soviet propaganda has been devoted to the theme that the US is "aggravating tensions" in the Far East, and commentary on the reserve call-up announced on January 26 has charged that the US is "fanning war hysteria."

Playing Down the Incident. The general tenor of Soviet remarks thus far has been that the Pueblo incident is primarily a bilateral US-North Korean matter which should not be allowed to get out of hand. Kosygin is reported by Reuters to have told Indian Prime Minister Gandhi that the incident should be regarded as routine or unimportant. A Soviet official in New Delhi and the Soviet military attache in the US have asserted that the best solution might be for the US to acknowledge its guilt and pay a fine to North Korea. These spokesmen have sought to give the impression that North Korea might be amenable to such an arrangement, without, however, committing either Moscow or Pyongyang to any particular position on the return of the Pueblo or its crew.

The Emerging Line. At this point the USSR appears to continue to hope that it can avoid direct involvement in the Pueblo affair

and that it can draw out diplomatic discussions so that more distasteful steps can be avoided. By minimizing the importance of the incident and directing propaganda against the US military buildup in the Korean area, the Soviets are attempting to deter the US from taking military action. This position would also serve to enhance Soviet propaganda possibilities if the US did take military action by making the latter seem disproportionate to the seriousness of the incident. Despite their evident concern over the situation, the Soviets probably have not sought to influence the North Korean position, largely because they recognize the tenuousness of their position in Pyongyang and realize that advice tendered there would not be favorably received. Moscow is probably delaying as long as possible the proffering of unsolicited advice to its North Korean ally and for the present may be relying on North Korea's knowledge of the US military buildup in the area to be at least as influential in Pyongyang as any Soviet advice could be.

Long-Term Outlook. The Soviets are now maneuvering for time for the North Koreans. Ideally, the USSR probably hopes this time can be used to find a solution to the problem which will enable the North Koreans to avoid even the appearance of backing down. Moscow, moreover, probably hopes that it can point to its diplomatic efforts as contributing to this solution. At the same time, however, the USSR probably recognizes that in the end Pyongyang will have to show

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some flexibility; Moscow would probably regard this as a salutary development, since it might help to temper North Korea's intransigence and would prevent Pyongyang from drawing the conclusion that an aggressive policy is always a successful one.

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79

**MEMORANDUM**

**of a Conversation with the Ambassadors of the CSSR [Czechoslovak Socialist Republic],**

**Comrade Holub, and of the People's Republic of Poland, Comrade Naperei, on 28 January 1968, from 2.30 p.m. to 4.00 p.m.**

[Source: MfAA, G-A 360; translated by Karen Riechert]

Embassy of the GDR in the DPRK

Pyongyang, 29 January 1968

Stamped: Confidential Matter 5/68

Stamped: Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 5 February 1968

Stamped: Declassified, 1 October 1987

The meeting took place at the suggestion of the ambassador of the CSSR.

Comrade Ambassador Holub informed us that the chairman of the Korean component of the Military Commission had invited the acting head of the Czechoslovak and the Polish component of the Neutral [Nations] Supervisory Commission for a conversation in Kaesong on 27 January 1968. General Pak Chong-guk asked both comrades to pass on the following to the head of the Swiss component of the Neutral [Nations] Commission:

The incursion of the American ship constitutes a violation of the armistice treaty. How we will deal with the ship and the crew is exclusively a matter for the sovereignty of the DPRK. The American imperialists openly invaded the territorial waters of the DPRK and tried to solve the problem by force. But they should apologize, since otherwise we would also use force. If, however, U.S. imperialism attempts to threaten us and to intimidate us with nuclear weapons, then we say that the Korean people are prepared to destroy them in any given moment. If U.S. imperialism uses force, it must realize that it has to accept the consequences that will come from a further aggravation of the situation. It is an empty illusion if the American imperialists believe they can get back the ship and the crew by force. They will miscalculate if they believe they can solve the problem with the government of the DPRK by the use of force. If they use force, we cannot help but

answer with armed forces. In this case the American imperialists will get nothing but the dead bodies of their men, who are anyway nothing other than criminals. However, if the U.S. imperialists really want to solve the matter, it is impossible to do so by means of threats and intimidation. It would be better if they would concede that these criminals are prisoners of war, and if they would ask us to treat them as prisoners of war. The captain and crew admitted they had committed criminal activities. But the government of the DPRK nevertheless treats them in a humane way. The injured got medical attention and the corpse of the person killed while being arrested is still there. All other members of the crew are in good health and encounter no problems whatsoever.

Following this message, which Pak Chong-guk again asked us to pass on to the Swiss representative, he remarked further that if the Americans wish to get details on the crew, they should approach the Korean contingent of the Military Commission directly and not attempt to get this mediated through the Neutral Commission.

The Czechoslovak and Polish acting chairmen (the new chairman of the Polish contingent of the Commission will arrive here on 30 January. The chairman of the Czechoslovak contingent of the Neutral Commission, General Toman, was in Pyongyang at this time.) passed on this message from General Pak Chong-guk – which he later also transmitted in writing - to the chairman of the Swiss component of the Neutral Commission, Mr. Barbei, on 27 January 1968 around 11 p.m. Barbei immediately transmitted this message to the chairman of the American component of the Military Commission, Rear-Admiral Smith. During the subsequent discussion [handwritten addition: between Ambassador Holub, Naperei and myself] the following view was unanimously drafted: Altogether this answer by Pak Chong-guk to the American request to get more details about the injured and the dead, as well as the message by the Chief of Staff of the 8th Army, General Friedman, has to be considered as a positive moment, because it shows a way to establish direct contact between the American and the Korean side. Also the fact that the DPRK declared its willingness to consider the members of the crew of the American ship *Pueblo* as prisoners of war is to be appraised positively, since this excludes [the possibility that]

they will have to stand trial as spies. Such a view, on the other hand, implies of course that the USA would have to admit that they violated the armistice treaty.

The Polish ambassador emphasized that he considers this a spark of hope, although he is still viewing the situation as severe. I myself pointed to the fact that the decision of the government of the DPRK to send a delegation to the Security Council conference has to be considered as a similar spark of hope, since it shows the readiness of the DPRK to alleviate or even to solve the complicated situation by means of talks or negotiations. This also applies in case participation at the Security Council conference will not be possible. Ambassador Holub believes the situation currently has to be assessed, all in all, as follows: As long as there are talks or chances for talks, one cannot speak of an imminent outbreak of armed conflict.

Afterwards Ambassador Holub informed us about information available to him, according to which the American Ambassador in Warsaw has been conducting talks with a Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the PR of Poland on the issue of the incident with the American ship *Pueblo*. The same Deputy Foreign Minister met after this conversation with the acting ambassador of the DPRK in the PR of Poland. Comrade Naperei remarked that this information would be correct, but he did not yet have any further details about this conversation at this time.

Afterwards Comrade Naperei informed us that early next week a member of the Politburo of the Romanian Communist Party, Apostol, will be coming to Pyongyang to meet for talks with the KWP leadership. Comrade Holub said he had also heard about this and planned to talk with the local Romanian ambassador, Comrade Popa, about it.

Wrapping it up, it was agreed that Comrade Naperei would inform the Soviet ambassador, and Comrade Jarck the Hungarian ambassador, about the content of the conversation between the Polish and Czechoslovakian comrades in Kaesong and General Pak Chong-guk.

Signed: Jarck

Acting Ambassador

Distribution:

1x State Secretary Hegen

1x Central Committee, Comrade Markowski

1x Ambassador/Secretariate



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NOTES OF THE PRESIDENT'S  
LUNCHEON MEETING  
WITH  
SENIOR AMERICAN ADVISORS

January 29, 1968  
The Family Dining Room

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The President: How many intelligence ships do the Soviets have compared with the U. S. ?

Secretary McNamara: It depends on how you count them. The Soviets have 15 to 20. We have five.

The President: There should be an independent investigation of this incident and all of the complexities involved by a good panel. I would suggest Admiral McDonald, George Ball, General Ridgeway, an Army General, and a good Naval Admiral.

General Wheeler: I would recommend a later commander in career than General Ridgeway. I would suggest General Taylor.

The President: Before I select a lawyer I always look at the jury. We should have a man who will appeal to the various elements that will be judging us.

The GI Bill of Rights is educating 400,000 and enabling 200,000 to buy houses. (The President was reading from a proposed message to the Congress on Veterans which will be sent up on Tuesday.)

Secretary McNamara: Time Magazine said the reservists who were called up had good morale. Newsweek said many of them were grumbling.

George Ball: I have seen a cynical assertion that the reserves were called under the pretext of Korea but for actual use in Vietnam.

Secretary McNamara: That is untrue. We have 361 planes going to South Korea without pulling any away from Vietnam or Southeast Asia or Western Europe.

If we get the Pueblo and its crew back, we will de-activate the reservists in all probability. The Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed with this in a meeting we have just completed.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 92-142

By CG, NARA Date 9-10-99

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- 2 -

The President: There is no need to call up the reserves for Vietnam. In fact, General Westmoreland would rather go without reserves in Vietnam. We called the reserves to substitute in this country for units which are being sent to South Korea. Of course we could call up reserves at anytime without Korea if we wanted.

Walt, would you review where we stand with my outside counselors who are here today?

Walt Rostow: We have discussed three principal issues. Then we went through the ten military alternatives and added at least one suggestion.

We reported to the group that we have put our position in writing to the North Koreans at Panmunjon.

We have discussed the Rusk letter to Gromyko. In it, Gromyko said he knew for sure that we had entered Korean territorial waters because the ship's captain had said he had entered territorial waters in his own hand writing. We do not believe he did. But we cannot deny it because we do not have the captain's log.

The President: On that point, are we reasonably sure that we are right? What are my odds?

Secretary McNamara: The odds are three to one that we are right. We do not believe the commander got into territorial waters. We know both from our own messages and from the messages of the North Koreans that he was seized outside territorial waters. The captain's orders were clear. The conditions were precise. But as Nick Katzenbach has said, even if he did go into North Korean waters the action which the North Koreans took is not a very appropriate one.

Secretary Katzenbach: The evidence is quite good and quite strong that the detention was made in territorial waters. We have a fix on the Pueblo at 8:30 when he was 25 miles out. He must have been outside of that area several hours before.

Secretary Rusk: The ship was on radio silence. We do not have the log. The captain broke radio silence the day before and broke it when accosted by the North Koreans.

Secretary Katzenbach: We still would not know for sure if the ship had gone into territorial waters. We do not believe that it did. It would not show on the ship's log unless the captain had something special to report. Otherwise he would log items as he regularly does three times a day.

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- 3 -

Walt Rostow: What Gromyko has said is that the North Koreans have it in the captain's own hand writing that he did violate territorial waters.

The President: We do know at the times he gave fixes that he was not in territorial waters and could not have gotten there.

We should leave ourselves a loophole until we know precisely what happened. We do know what his orders were.

Clark Clifford: If we see something down the road which is attractive, we may want to leave ourselves a little room for a minor admission if that is what they want for return of the ship and the men.

Secretary Rusk: We gave him instructions not to go inside of the 13 mile limit. We must keep in mind there might have been a navigational error of one mile on our side and one mile on the North Korean side. If you assume for a moment that both made errors, that could place the ship 11 miles from shore. We still could not accept their claim of being only 7 miles away.

The President: All of you should get together and have your very best legal minds work out what we should say.

Secretary McNamara: I have five lawyers working on this now. We should have a defense briefing by tomorrow night.

The President: Let's make our own study to review the facts, ask all the questions and then present this information to the committee. We must make sure we don't do more damage with our own speeches.

Secretary Rusk: A public announcement of our own investigation would throw doubt on our own position.

The President: What about a private investigation?

Secretary Rusk: That is fine.

Secretary Katzenbach: This would be a broad investigation, not just limited to the position of the ship.

The President: Yes, that is right. It would answer all the questions which are being raised. I suggest all of you get together and decide on an impartial board.

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I would put on it Admiral McDonald, George Ball and General Mark Clark.

Secretary Rusk: Mundt said you had no business having the ship there anyway.

Walt Rostow: What about the questions of putting the problem before the World Court. Each side could select an arbitrator and let the President of the World Court select a third name.

There are ten items for possible military action:

- 1. Airborne reconnaissance.  
The group is against this. The photographic coverage has been excellent from the Oxcart and Black Shield missions.

For the moment we do not need it. The group is against the use of drones. To have one shot down would be very bad.

- 2. The build-up of aircraft in South Korea.  
The group thinks this action is good and that we need it to back up our diplomatic efforts.

- 3. Replacing the Pueblo with the U. S. S. Banner.  
The group feels we should not carry this out now. After the matter settles we may want to re-establish our position under international law and replace the Pueblo with an armed vessel.

- 4. Send divers to get the crypto gear.  
The group felt this was a fruitless effort which would not pay off. To do this would require armed escorts and risk a possible confrontation.

- 5. Mining Wonsan Harbor.  
This would require 17 sorties. It might lead to more trouble. It would not hurt them much.

Secretary Rusk interrupted to say that many of these alternatives had been deferred pending contacts with the North Koreans and contacts through the United Nations. The Secretary predicted there would be a meeting.

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6. Seizure of North Korean vessels.  
 This action would be taken only if we were to determine that the men and ships would not be returned promptly. This idea has certain appeal. McGeorge Bundy liked this as a sanction for them and to encourage them to let this ship and men go.

There is a difficulty on this, since it is unclear which ships to pick up and their value.

7. Selected air strikes over North Korea.  
 This was felt to be excessive. This would require a very substantial air engagement and would heighten the conflict.

8. Raids across the DMZ.  
 The group felt this to be too risky.

9. A naval blockade.  
 The group felt this to run a high risk of retaliatory action and we do not know when the blockade would end.

10. Application of free world economic pressure.  
 Korean trade is not great with the free world. We would have trouble getting many of the countries such as Japan aboard.

Walt Rostow said consideration was being given to advising the Soviets of actual or possible retaliatory action. Ambassador Thompson recommended against this.

It was generally agreed that no further reference to any use or non-use of the hot line should be made by George Christian or any other briefing officers.

Walt Rostow said that Ambassador Lodge had raised the question of having bombing practice in South Korea using bombing ranges there.

Rostow said the build-up that we are undertaking there now is impressive both to North Koreans and to the other countries involved.

Cyrus Vance: I would recommend further reconnaissance flights, particularly more Oxcart missions over the DMZ to determine any possible build-up of North Korean forces.

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Walt Rostow: The group also considered the type of statement the President might want to make. We will have a draft by the end of the day.

The President: I want to say as little as I can. That three-minute statement last week was re-assuring.

Goldberg thinks that the U. S. people and the world believe in a decision by a court.

After we run out all of our moves in the United Nations, we must consider if we are willing to go into an international world court. There, we could submit all of our evidence. They could submit theirs. Goldberg thinks we should prepared to do that.

George Ball: There are problems with a world court. It recognizes North Korea as a state. But we should consider the use of an impartial tribunal.

The President: Shouldn't we answer all these questions about our being spread too thin?

George Ball: I think Admiral McDonald can do this.

Cyrus Vance: You cannot submit this matter to a tribunal until you see what happens at the meeting in Panmunjon.

The President: I want you (Vance), and Mac Bundy to give me a statement to make in case there is one which should be made.

Secretary Rusk: This group is paralyzed because of the Panmunjon conference. They needed to know what will come out of that before they can make any kind of statement.

The President: I still want Bundy, George Ball and Cyrus Vance to get me a statement on what I might say, if anything.

McGeorge Bundy: You have a promising pair of contacts in the Soviets and in North Korea. I would say that my diplomats are at work and I am not going to say anything right now.

If you look at the courses available they are very unattractive. No one ever thought a small power such as North Korea would take offensive action against a major power in a situation such as this.

Any warfare will pin these boys in rather than get them out. We are too big a power to start a war over this. The punishment of picking up their ships fits the crime.

You do not know what happened precisely in the ten days the Pueblo was on station. As long as the commander is in hock you will not know. I would not be making any statements about the number of planes which we have moved to South Korea. Somebody will ask, O.K., what are you going to do now that you have them here?

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Secretary Rusk: In terms of parallels the shooting down of the RB-47 in 1960 is the closest. It took seven months to get those two fliers back.

General Taylor: You never know exactly what the motives of the North Koreans are in this matter. If it was to embarrass us, they have done that. If it was to inflict a loss on our intelligence, they have done that.

They may be seeking to cause trouble with our allies. They may want to interrupt the flow of Korean aid to Vietnam.

We should make every effort to keep South Korean plans going as scheduled in sending supplies to Vietnam.

The President then read a memo from a distinguished American. (The President later identified this as General Eisenhower.) This memo outlined what courses this "distinguished American thought were offered to us." (That memo is attached as appendix A.)

Clark Clifford: Any way you look at it this incident is a loser. We cannot come out even. We must cut our losses. I doubt we will ever want to use any one of the ten military alternatives. Of course one can never know what the exact situation was unless we talk with the captain. We must make some kind of disposition of the matter.

I believe consideration should be given to the idea of going to the world court. There are nine members on it, and they have some members friendly to them. In conclusion we end up having taken some sort of a bump. The next time they try it, let's be ready to give it back to them.

Secretary Rusk: Let's look at how we formulate this court matter.

Secretary Katzenbach: I am inclined to think the President should have the Leadership in.

~~TOP SECRET~~

- 8 -

The President: I am having the Leadership in for breakfast tomorrow.

Secretary Katzenbach: I do not think we should ask Congress for anything before we get all the facts.

Secretary McNamara: Within the next 72 hours we will announce an increase in our military aid to South Korea. This will show the North Koreans the price they will pay for this incident is heavy.

The President: Walt, will you take the questions we are getting asked most often and have them answered for me? We will tell them that we are still exploring the diplomatic alternatives; we do not want to add to our problems. We will have General Wheeler explain the military pitch. Secretary Rusk will discuss the diplomatic moves.

Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge: This situation has a lot of qualities of a kidnapping case. If you use force you kill the victim. We do not want to kill the boys or open up a second front. The reason I talked about bombing maneuvers in South Korea was to raise the feeling of awe.

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 96-192  
By us NARA Date 6-23-98

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 1 OF 2, STATE 106090

MODIS

GIVE TO AMBASSADOR THOMPSON JANUARY 29 AT 0700

PLEASE DELIVER SOONEST TO GROMYKO FOLLOWING LETTER DATED  
JANUARY 28, 1968 FROM SECRETARY RUSK:

BEGIN TEXT: QTE "DEAR MR. GROMYKO: I HAVE STUDIED CAREFULLY  
AMBASSADOR THOMPSONS REPORT OF HIS CONVERSATION WITH YOU ON  
FRIDAY AND I AM, OF COURSE, AWARE OF CHAIRMAN KOSYGIN'S REPLY TO  
PRESIDENT JOHNSON. I HAVE NO DOUBT THAT BOTH YOU AND I COULD DO  
WITHOUT THE KIND OF INCIDENT WHICH OCCURRED BY THE SEIZURE OF THE  
USS PUEBLO.

A CENTRAL POINT IN YOUR CONVERSATION WITH AMBASSADOR THOMPSON HAD  
TO DO WITH WHETHER THE USS PUEBLO WAS IN FACT SEIZED IN INTERNATIONAL  
WATERS.

PAGE 2 RUEHC 106090/1 ~~SECRET~~

THE CAPTAIN HAD THE MOST STRINGENT ORDERS TO STAY AT ALL  
TIMES MORE THAN THIRTEEN NAUTICAL MILES FROM THE NEAREST LAND  
(THE NORTH KOREANS CLAIM 12 NM TERRITORIAL WATERS)  
IN ORDER TO AVOID ANY INCIDENT. THERE IS NOT THE SLIGHTEST DOUBT  
IN OUR MINDS THAT HE WAS WELL OUTSIDE THAT TWELVE NAUTICAL MILE  
LIMIT AT THE TIME THE PUEBLO WAS SEIZED. I AM ATTACHING HERewith A MOST  
DETAILED EXPOSITION OF WHY WE ARE CONVINCED THAT THE INCIDENT  
OCCURRED IN INTERNATIONAL WATERS. WE WILL BE GLAD TO FURNISH  
YOU TAPES OR OTHER TANGIBLE EVIDENCE IF YOU WISH TO RECIEVE IT.

I SHOULD LIKE TO POINT OUT, IN ANY EVENT, THAT THE TREATMENT OF  
WARSHIPS WITH RESPECT TO TERRITORIAL WATERS IS DIFFERENT FROM  
TREATMENT WHICH MIGHT BE APPLICABLE TO OTHER TYPES OF VESSELS.  
ARTICLE 23 OF THE 1958 CONVENTION ON THE TERRITORIAL SEA AND  
THE CONTIGUOUS ZONE STATES: INNER QTE " IF ANY WARSHIP DOES NOT  
COMPLY WITH THE REGULATIONS OF THE COASTAL STATE CONCERNING  
PASSAGE THROUGH THE TERRITORIAL SEA AND DISREGARDS ANY REQUEST  
FOR COMPLIANCE WHICH IS MADE TO IT, THE COASTAL STATE MAY  
REQUIRE THE WARSHIP TO LEAVE THE TERRITORIAL SEA. END INNER QTE

IN CONNECTION WITH ARTICLE 23, THE USS PUEBLO ATTEMPTED TO  
LEAVE THE AREA AND WAS FORCIBLY PREVENTED FROM DOING SO BY NORTH  
KOREAN VESSELS.

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BEGIN TEXT OF ATTACHMENT

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS CONCERNING THE SEIZURE OF THE USS PUEBLO

KOREAN STANDARD  
TIME

-EVENT

10 JANUARY 1968

USS PUEBLO ARRIVED IN INTERNATIONAL WATERS OFF THE NORTH KOREAN COAST.

23/1000

PUEBLO REPORTED ITS POSITION AS 39-24N 127-59E

PAGE 3 RUENC 106090/2 ~~SECRET~~

INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM NORTH KOREAN NAVY COMMUNICATIONS CONCERNING THE NORTH KOREAN SUBMARINE CHASER NR. 35 WHILE SHE WAS CAPTURING THE PUEBLO ARE AS FOLLOWS:

23/1055  
23/1127  
23/1140  
23/1200  
23/1350  
23/1252

39-01N 128-11E  
39-11N 127-54E  
39-15N 128-00E  
39-25N 127-56E  
39-26N 128-02E

PUEBLO RADIOED TO THE US THAT HER POSITION AT 1200 WAS 39-25.2N 127-55E. (NOTE: THIS IS 17.6 NAUTICAL MILES TO THE NEAREST MAINLAND AND MORE THAN 15 NAUTICAL MILES FROM THE NEAREST NORTH KOREAN TERRITORY, UNG DO ISLAND- A POSITION APPROXIMATELY ONE MILE FURTHER WEST AND LANDWARD FROM THAT REPORTED BY NR. 35 AT 1200). PUEBLO REPORTED THAT SUBMARINE CHASER NR. 35 HAD CIRCLED HER AND HAD SENT FLAG SIGNALS, "HEAVE TO OR I WILL OPEN FIRE ON YOU." AFTER HOISTING THE UNITED STATES ENSIGN, PUEBLO SENT THE SIGNAL, "I AM IN INTERNATIONAL WATERS."

PAGE 4 RUEHC 106090/2 ~~SECRET~~  
23/1300

PUEBLO REPORTED THAT NORTH KOREAN SUBMARINE CHASER NO. 35, JOINED BY THREE OTHER CRAFT HOISTED SIGNAL TO "FOLLOW IN MY WAKE". TWO MIGS WERE OVERHEAD. PATROL CRAFT NO. 604 BACKED TOWARD PUEBLO'S BOW WITH FENDERS RIGGED. AN ARMED LANDING PARTY REPORTED ON BOW OF PUEBLO, WHICH DEPARTED AREA UNDER ESCORT.

23/1329

PUEBLO REPORTED IT WAS SURROUNDED BY NORTH KOREAN CRAFT.

23/1345

PUEBLO REPORTED BEING BOARDED BY NORTH KOREAN PERSONNEL. POSITION GIVEN AS 39-25N 127-54E. SOS SENT.

23/1350

PUEBLO REPORTED IT WAS PROBABLY BEING ESCORTED INTO WONSAN. NORTH KOREAN SUBCHASER NO. 35 REPORTED ITS POSITION AS 39-29N 126-08E (NOTE: THIS IS APPROXIMATELY 26.3 MILES OFF THE COAST AND ABOUT 25.6 MILES FROM THE NEAREST ISLAND). SUBCHASER INSTRUCTED OTHER PATROL CRAFT TO INFORM US VESSEL VIA HAND SIGNALS TO INCREASE SPEED.

PAGE 5 RUEHC 106090/2 ~~SECRET~~  
23/1410-1415

ONE NORTH KOREAN PATROL CRAFT INSTRUCTED ANOTHER TO WATCH FOR ATTEMPTS BY US PERSONNEL TO THROW THINGS INTO THE WATER. PUEBLO REPORTED THREE WOUNDED AND ONE MAN WITH LEG BLOWN OFF. THE REPORT STATED THAT THE NORTH KOREANS HAD ORDERED THE PUEBLO TO FOLLOW THEM INTO WONSAN; THAT THE PUEBLO HAD NOT USED ITS WEAPONS OR EVEN UNCOVERED THEM; AND THAT IT DID NOT INTEND TO OFFER ANY RESISTANCE.

23/1432

PUEBLO REPORTED, "HAVE BEEN DIRECTED TO COME TO FULL STOP." PUEBLO WENT OFF AIR.

END TEXT OF ATTACHMENT

RUSK

BT

PAGE 3 RUEHC 106090/1 ~~SECRET~~

UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCE, THERE WAS NOT THE RIGHT TO SEIZE THE SHIP AS DISTINCT FROM REQUIRING IT TO LEAVE.

I AM AWARE THAT NORTH KOREA IS NOT A PARTY TO THIS CONVENTION, BUT THIS PROVISION OF THE CONVENTION SIMPLY RESTATES THE CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA IN THIS REGARD--A LAW WHICH BOTH THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION ACCEPT AND RESPECT.

THERE IS SOUND REASON BEHIND THE PRACTICE CODIFIED IN ARTICLE 23. IT REFLECTS A CONSENSUS THAT HOSTILE ACTION TAKEN AGAINST A NAVAL VESSEL IS A PARTICULARLY SERIOUS AND SENSITIVE MATTER. TO SEIZE SUCH A VESSEL IS LIKELY TO AROUSE THE STRONGEST FEELINGS AND CREATE REAL DANGERS TO THE PEACE. THEREFORE, AS THE CONVENTION INDICATES, WARSHIPS ENTERING TERRITORIAL WATERS SHOULD BE DEALT WITH CAREFULLY AND PEACEFULLY--NOT VIOLENTLY AND FORCIBLY.

THIS REQUIREMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IS NO STRANGER TO US. OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS HAVE HAD SOME EXPERIENCE IN DEALING WITH PROBLEMS OF WARSHIPS ENTERING TERRITORIAL WATERS.

ON APRIL 7, 1965, THE SOVIET TRAWLER BAROMETER CAME WITHIN 2.3 MILES OF PUERTO RICO WHILE MANEUVERING TO REMAIN NEAR US NAVAL FORCES. WE PROTESTED THIS VIOLATION OF TERRITORIAL WATERS ON MAY 3; ON JULY 7 YOU DENIED THAT ANY VIOLATION HAD OCCURRED.

PAGE 4 RUEHC 106090/1 ~~SECRET~~

THE SOVIET SHIP ARBAN WAS INSIDE US TERRITORIAL WATERS OFF SAN PEDRO, CALIFORNIA, ON OCTOBER 23, 1965, FOR A PERIOD OF THIRTY-FOUR MINUTES. DURING THIS PERIOD THE ARBAN REFUSED TO RESPOND TO A CHALLENGE FROM ONE OF OUR SHIPS. IN RESPONSE TO OUR NOVEMBER 23 PROTEST, YOU REPLIED ON JANUARY 7, 1966, THAT THE ARBAN ENTERED US TERRITORIAL WATERS BRIEFLY WHILE FOLLOWING SAILING DIRECTIONS PUBLISHED BY THE US COAST GUARD.

DURING EXERCISES BY US NAVAL FORCES OFF PUERTO RICO ON DECEMBER 6, 1966, THE SOVIET VESSEL TEODOLIT VIOLATED OUR WATERS ON THREE SEPARATE OCCASIONS--ONCE FOR OVER TWO HOURS. BECAUSE OF THESE REPEATED INCURSIONS, A US DESTROYER WARNED THE TEODOLIT BY FLASHING LIGHT THAT IT WAS WITHIN US TERRITORIAL WATERS. IN OUR PROTEST NOTE OF JANUARY 10, 1967, WE SAID THAT THE VIOLATIONS COULD NOT BE ATTRIBUTED TO DISTRESS OR FORCE MAJEURE, AND THAT INNOCENT PASSAGE WAS OBVIOUSLY NOT INVOLVED. IN RESPONSE, THE SOVIET NOTE OF FEBRUARY 10, 1967, REJECTED THE ASSERTION OF "PROVOCATIVE" VIOLATIONS OF US TERRITORIAL WATERS, BUT IT DID NOT DISPUTE THAT A VIOLATION HAD OCCURRED.

IN ADDITION TO THE ABOVE, I AM AWARE OF AT LEAST THIRTY-THREE INCIDENTS IN WHICH SOVIET VESSELS OF VARIOUS TYPES ASKED FOR UNITED STATES ASSISTANCE IN AREAS RANGING FROM ALASKA, SEATTLE, SAN FRANCISCO, NEW YORK AND BOSTON.

PAGE 5 RUEHC 106090/1 ~~SECRET~~

SUCH ASSISTANCE INCLUDED OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE REPAIR OF VESSELS AND A LARGE NUMBER OF CASES REQUIRING MEDICAL ASSISTANCE TO SOVIET OFFICERS AND MEN.

I MENTION ALL OF THE ABOVE MATTERS MERELY TO INDICATE THE DESIRE OF THE UNITED STATES TO DEAL WITH SUCH PROBLEMS IN A REASONABLE WAY AND WITHOUT INCIDENTS LEADING TO TENSION.

I NOTE FURTHER THAT, TWO DAYS AGO, A NORTH KOREAN REPRESENTATIVE TOLD MEMBERS OF THE NEUTRAL NATIONS SUPERVISORY COMMISSION THAT "EVEN IF NOT IN TERRITORIAL WATERS THE SHIP WAS ACTING AGAINST US." TO USE SUCH AN IDEA AS THE BASIS FOR SEIZING A WARSHIP IS COMPLETELY UNACCEPTABLE BOTH TO THE SOVIET UNION AND TO THE UNITED STATES. IN THE 1958 CONVENTION ON THE HIGH SEAS, ARTICLE 8 STATES THAT:

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INFO RUEHEX/WHITE HOUSE  
STATE GRNC  
BT  
~~SECRET~~ SECTION 2 OF 2 STATE 106090

NO DIS

INNER QTE WARSHIPS ON THE HIGH SEAS HAVE COMPLETE IMMUNITY FROM THE JURISDICTION OF ANY STATE OTHER THAN THE FLAG STATE. END INNER QTE IT IS OF COURSE APPARENT THAT IF THIS PRINCIPLE WERE NOT GENERALLY A SCRUPULOUSLY ADHERED TO, THE GRAVEST CONSEQUENCE COULD ARISE FROM INCIDENTS ALL OVER THE WORLD.

CHAIRMAN KOSYGIN CALLED TO THE PRESIDENT'S ATTENTION THE QUESTION OF ALLEGED HARRASSMENT OF SOVIET AND OTHER VESSELS ON THE HIGH SEAS US MILITARY AIRCRAFT. AS YOU KNOW THE UNITED STATES HAS HAD MANY OCCASIONS TO COMPLAIN OF INCIDENTS CREATED BY SOVIET AIRCRAFT AND NAVAL VESSELS INVOLVING UNITED STATES SHIPS. IT MAY BE THAT WE SHOULD HAVE SOME PRIVATE DISCUSSION OF THESE MATTERS IN THE INTEREST OF AVOIDING UNNECESSARY INCIDENTS BUT IT COULD ONLY BE DISCUSSED CONSTRUCTIVELY AS A RECIPROCAL PROBLEM.

PAGE 2 RUEHC 106090/2 ~~SECRET~~  
IN RESPECT TO THE CARRIER ENTERPRISE AND OTHER US VESSELS, THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT IS FULLY AWARE OF THEIR NON-PROVOCATIVE LOCATION BECAUSE IT HAS ITS OWN SHIPS IN THE IMMEDIATE VICINITY.

WE AGREE WITH CHAIRMAN KOSYGIN THAT "THE PROMPTEST POSSIBLE SETTLEMENT OF THE SITUATION WOULD BE IN THE INTERESTS OF ALL SIDES."

WE DO HOPE THAT THE SOVIET UNION WILL EXERCISE ITS BEST EFFORTS TO BRING THIS ABOUT. PERMIT ME TO OBSERVE THAT PRESIDENT JOHNSON HAS BEEN ACTING WITH VERY CONSIDERABLE RESTRAINT IN THE FACE OF A SITUATION WHICH HAS CREATED A WAVE OF INTENSE INDIGNATION THROUGHOUT OUR COUNTRY.

SINCERELY YOURS, DEAN RUSK

END TEXT OF LETTER

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4. 對 美 見 解

1968年1月29日

AIDE-MEMOIRE

OMY - 70

Reference is made to an article carried in the January 28 issue of the "Washington Post" which, quoting its New Delhi Correspondent, indicated a possibility of exchanging the USS Pueblo and/or its crew for north Korean infiltrators under detention.

It is impossible and inconceivable to make such a dealing, and the Korean Government believes that the United States Government takes the same view with it on this matter.

The Korean Government strongly requests that the United States Government will not make any form of direct negotiation or contact with the north Korean communists on this question or on any other under any circumstances.

Seoul, January 29, 1968

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68-3-125



29

from the journal of  
S. P. Kozyrev

30 January 1968

N° 127/GS-ns

RECORD OF A CONVERSATION WITH J. [Rowland], AUSTRALIAN  
AMBASSADOR TO THE USSR

29 January 1968

I received Rowland at his request.

Referring to the instructions of his government Rowland touched on the issue of the development of events around Korea. In the opinion of the Australian government, he said, a dangerous situation has arisen and continues to develop in this region, especially in connection with the latest incident, the seizure of an American ship by the North Koreans. Serious military clashes have been occurring here for a considerable period of time as a result of actions of the North Koreans. For example, last week a subunit of North Korean troops landed on an island not far from South Korea. More than 20 South Korean officers and soldiers died during battles. Troop subunits regularly infiltrate the South from North Korea. On 21 January of this year 30 servicemen of the North Korean army infiltrated Seoul with the objective of killing the President of South Korea. In the opinion of the government of Australia, all the actions of the North Korean side create the impression of a premeditated campaign accompanied by attacks of sabotage and terrorism, acts of violence, attacks on South Korea in the press and radio calling for the overthrow of the South Korean government, etc. The object of this entire campaign is to create a trouble spot in this region. The following information is evidence of the desire of North Korea to create tension in this region: Whereas in 1966 North Korean troops entered the territory of South Korea 150 times, in the last 10 months of 1967 it was 543 times and the total for the year was 566 incursions in the course of which 153 people were killed. It is characteristic that the North Korean side refused to investigate these incidents in the Armistice Commission inasmuch as there is no doubt of the reasons why they arise.



Thus, the Ambassador noted, the current dangerous situation in the region of Korea has been developing for quite a long time. Finally, last week the North Koreans seized an American ship in international waters and several crew members were killed in the process and [the rest of] the crew were taken prisoner. Whereas before now, Rowland continued, the North Korean side would not have pursued matters to the point of inflaming the situation, one might have expected that their warships would have simply escorted the American warships out of their territorial waters. But in this case the actions of the North Koreans were clearly premeditated for they knew of the movements of the American ship in advance. This is also confirmed by the conversations and commands between the North Korean ships and North Korean authorities on shore which participated in the operation to seize the American ship which were intercepted by the Americans. Thus the actions of the North Koreans are difficult to regard other than conscious attempts to increase tension. These actions violate the Armistice Agreement and can have the most dangerous consequences for the cause of peace in this region. These actions, in the opinion of the Australian side, are in complete accordance with the "doctrines and practices of Asian communism" and are an expression of a policy of "revolutionary violence". In connection with the above and in accordance with the instructions of his government he, Rowland, would like to ask the Soviet government to use its influence on North Korea in order to avert future incursions into South Korea, halt violence (in the instructions for the conversation, noted the Ambassador, it spoke of the fantastic violence) in the area of the DMZ, observe the Armistice Agreement, and release the American ship and its crew. The North Korean side should understand how dangerous are these actions and the possible consequences associated with them.

I told Rowland that I can of course report to the Minister about the views the Ambassador expressed. However, both the form and content of what the Ambassador said provoke surprise. The Americans say all this in those very same expressions. However the whole world knows that the Armistice Agreement is being violated by the Americans and the South Koreans, that the incidents in the DMZ, like the other provocations against the DPRK, occur for one reason, namely because of the presence of the American troops

occupying South Korea. Nevertheless, in spite of the obvious facts the Ambassador is not hesitant about ascribing the "actions" of the DPRK to the struggle which the people of South Korea are waging against the occupiers and the puppet regime. We Soviet people, and not only ours, understand this struggle of the South Korean people. No people has ever agreed to live under foreign occupation. As regards the increase in tension in the region of Korea of which the Ambassador also spoke then this is really occurring. But this tension has been created by the Americans, and their aggressive policy in this as in other regions of the world, in particular in Southeast Asia. As regards the latest incident, the American ship was detained in the territorial waters of the DPRK and not in international waters as the Ambassador says, repeating the statements of the Americans. At any rate, one cannot help call strange the statement of the Ambassador about the so-called "doctrines and practices of Asian communism". It is not the DPRK which is waging a policy of aggression and violence in Southeast Asia but the US and their allies, including Australia; the DPRK did not violate the territorial waters of the US but the Americans who sent their ship into North Korean waters for special intelligence purposes. The DPRK has acted in accordance with the norms of international law which require respect for the sovereign rights of independent countries.

In connection with the Ambassador's comment that if the DPRK does not release the American ship and its crew then this would cause serious consequences, I said that this is the language of aggression. It is known that the Americans are specially fomenting a war hysteria around this incident to achieve certain goals of theirs. Sending US warships to the shores of the DPRK, the mobilization of reservists, threats by American leaders against the DPRK, all these actions have the purpose of exerting pressure on the DPRK and are calculated not on settling the issue but on aggravating the situation.

In these conditions it would be appropriate for the Australian government as an ally of the US to exert a certain influence on the Americans and advise the American government not to give in to emotion but to soberly assess the situation and search for the correct and customary ways of settling the incident with the ship. Pressure, intimidation, and threats cannot facilitate the achievement of this goal. In response, Rowland justified

the American action. He that according to all indications North Korea is trying to create a new breeding ground of war in order to pull American forces from Vietnam. All this is fraught with the danger of a renewal of the Korean War and the Americans are taking "precautionary measures" against North Korea in connection with this. The Ambassador again stated that the American ship was allegedly seized in international waters and that in fact a premeditated armed attack on this ship by the North Koreans had occurred. Rowland stressed the "genuine desire" of President Johnson to quickly settle the incident through diplomatic channels if, of course, this is possible. It is necessary to use this in order not to allow the creation of a new breeding ground of tension. In the words of the Ambassador, the Americans do not want to create a new breeding ground of tension and are trying to find a way to settle this issue through the Soviet Union, Poland, and other countries.

I replied that the Soviet Union, like other countries, cannot act as any intermediary. The DPRK is an independent country. If the US really wants to settle this incident while observing generally accepted norms of international law they can find a way to do this. I agreed with the Ambassador that there is no need to create yet one more breeding ground of tension in our already anxious world. I stressed that to do this it is first of all necessary to influence the US so that they abandon the method of pressure on the DPRK and engage in a settlement of the incident with the ship in the customary manner on the basis of respect for the sovereignty of the DPRK. It is necessary to create a suitably favorable atmosphere to settle this on this basis but threats and pressure will not help the matter. In connection with the Ambassador's argument about international law I pointed out that the Americans ought to strictly observe these norms and respect the sovereign right of all independent countries to the inviolability of their territory and territorial waters.

At the conclusion of the conversation I again stressed that the US government should not yield to emotion and not inflame the situation, that it cease threats and pressure on North Korea, and adopt a policy of a peaceful settlement of the incident on the basis of respect for the sovereign rights of the DPRK.

220

Ye. N. Makeyev, Deputy Chief of the 2<sup>nd</sup> European Department and V. I. Dolgov, 3<sup>rd</sup> Secretary of the 2<sup>nd</sup> European Department were present at the conversation. Third Secretary of the Embassy [Bowen] [was present] on the Australian side.

DEPUTY MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

(S. Kozyrev)

AVPRF. f. 102. op. 28. pap. 55, d. 2

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From the journal  
of S. P. Kozyrev

30 January 1968  
N° 128/GS-ns

Record of a conversation with Canadian Ambassador to the USSR R. Ford

29 January 1968

I received Ford at his request.

Referring to the instructions of his government the Ambassador raised the issue of the detention of the American ship by the DPRK. He said that the Canadians know about the mood and trends in Washington better than anyone. In connection with this incident the Canadian government is seriously concerned that the US Congress and the American public are beginning to put ever-growing pressure on President Johnson for him to make a decision about a retaliatory attack. It is quite evident to the Government of Canada, Ford continued, that the release of the ship and its crew are absolutely necessary for talks to begin to settle this entire issue. Regardless of the statements by both sides, whether the ship was seized in the territorial or international waters, the Ambassador stressed, it is necessary to release the ship's crew if only for humane reasons. Regardless of the legal aspect of the matter, right now it is politically important to do something for the release the ship and its crew. In this event the US will be ready, so they understand in Canada, to agree to the creation of a special international commission to investigate and settle this incident and possibly make compensation for material damages if the commission recognizes this is necessary. Considering the dangerous situation which has been created, the Canadian side would like to discuss this issue with the Soviet side in order to prevent a worsening of the situation in this region of the world. In this connection the Ambassador was interested in possible ideas from the Soviet side about how the tension could be eliminated and whether the Soviet government could make the settlement of the incident easier. To assist in the investigation at the site of the situation associated with this incident the Canadian side has already unofficially already proposed sending an

intermediary to Pyeongyang who could act as a representative of either the UN Secretary General or the Security Council or in some other capacity.

In expressing these ideas the Ambassador noted that he was not speaking on behalf of the US but, as they understand in Canada, the Americans would be ready to agree to this.

I promised to report to the Minister about the ideas the Ambassador expressed. I said that the USSR could not take on itself the role of an intermediary in settling this incident. The DPRK is an independent and sovereign country and the US should deal directly with the DPRK. The substance of the incident is that the US violated the norms of international law: the American ship was detained in the territorial waters of the DPRK and not in international waters as the Americans are asserting. As regards the concern of the Canadian side about what sort of pressure there is on Johnson then the problem is not that pressure is being put on the President of the United States but that the US itself is using the method of pressure and threats with regard to the DPRK. The Canadian government also ought to know well both Johnson's statement and the measures he has adopted in order to apply such pressure on the DPRK (calling up reservists, sending naval forces to the shores of the DPRK, and others). However it will be impossible to settle the incident with the help of the uproar, threats, and pressure being artificially fanned in the US, on which rests the entire responsibility for the incident, and it should soberly assess the situation which has been created and find an opportunity for a settlement by customary means on the basis of respect for the sovereign rights of the DPRK and an abandonment of the use of the method of pressure. From the ideas described by Ford it follows that Canada essentially supports the position of the Americans when he says that it is first necessary to release the ship and the crew and then investigate all other issues connected with the incident. A settlement can hardly be achieved on such a basis.

The Ambassador stressed that Canada does not always and does not automatically share the point of view of the Americans, especially regarding their actions in military issues. In accordance with the available information this time the American intelligence ship was actually detained in international waters. One can speculate that it was really in the

territorial waters, which is of course inexcusable. But even in this event it is necessary to settle the incident as quickly as possible. According to the assessments of the Canadian side, Ford stressed, a dangerous situation has been created and in Washington pressure is growing sharply in favor of a military solution to the incident. These sentiments are growing stronger inasmuch as in the last six months numerous provocative incidents have taken place in Korea. As regards Canada, it is a peace-loving country and its actions are completely dictated by a concern for maintaining peace and reducing international tension and a desire to prevent the dangerous consequences of developing events.

In connection with this comment by Ford I pointed out that attempts to place the blame on the DPRK for the situation in the area of Korea are directed at deceiving the world public opinion. Everyone knows that provocative acts are being made against the DPRK and that the presence of American troops in South Korea is the reason for the situation in this region.

If they are really inclined in the US to settle this incident by military means then it will be the worse for the US. They would thus again reveal themselves before the entire world as aggressors. The Canadian government would be doing a useful thing if it advised the US not to give in to emotion and not inflame the situation, and realistically assess this issue on the basis of respect for the sovereign rights of the DPRK. Such a decision would meet the interests of peace and it would be in the interests of all countries.

The Ambassador noted that in principle he agrees with this; however, right now it is important to settle the incident as soon as possible. He was interested in whether in this connection if, for example, such a measure as the withdrawal of the aircraft carrier Eisenhower and other American warships from the area of the incident would help. [I] again stressed that it is important right now not to inflame the situation, abandon pressure on the DPRK, and facilitate the establishment of a quiet atmosphere in which it would be easier to settle the incident by the customary ways and means accepted in international practice.

Ye. N. Makeyev, Deputy Chief of the 2<sup>nd</sup> European Department, and 3<sup>rd</sup> Secretary of the Department V. I. Dolgov were present at the conversation.

DEPUTY USSR MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

/signature/ (S. Kozyrev)

[reverse side] Distributed to:

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AVPRF, f. 102, op. 28, pap. 55, d. 2





**Report, Embassy of Hungary in the Soviet Union to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry, 30 January 1968.**

On the basis of the conversation our official [András Köves] had in the MID [Soviet Foreign Ministry], I report the following:

Following the disclosure of the incident and the related American steps, the Soviet side asked the DPRK for information about the incident. They did get that information. The Korean side informed the Soviet comrades that the *Pueblo* had been brought to in the territorial waters of the DPRK, within the 12-mile area measured from the shore (or the coastal island in question). (By the way, our Korean comrades remark, though publicly do not emphasize, that in principle they regard the whole East Korean Bay as the inland sea of the country – this concept is known in international law, the USA and the Soviet Union regard the Hudson Bay [*sic*] and the bay around Vladivostok respectively as such inland seas –, and actually the territorial waters of a country should be measured from the boundary of this inland sea, rather than from the shore ...) The *Pueblo* did not fly any flag while being in this area, and it did not reply to the first question of the DPRK's ships, which inquired about the nationality of the ship. Instead, the ship began to flee, but it was caught up with, encircled, and – as is well-known – captured by the fast coastal ships of the DPRK. Besides this information, the Korean side also says that they do not rule out that the *Pueblo*, while fleeing from the Korean ships, left the territorial waters [of the DPRK].

Accepting this description of the events, the Soviets, on their part, remark that they find it completely obvious that it was proper and necessary to take some steps against that obviously provocative American step, especially as the act of catching the Americans red-handed provided [the DPRK] with an excellent opportunity for propaganda.

However, the real issue is the nature of the steps to be taken, and with regard to that question, the Soviet side remarks that the 1958 Geneva Convention on Maritime Navigation deals with the measures to be taken against warships violating the territorial waters [of a country]. The 23th paragraph of the convention states that warships should be treated in a way that is different from the one applicable to civilian ships, and the [war]ships which violate one's territorial waters should be removed from these territorial

waters. True, the Soviet Union had reservations with regard to the 23th paragraph in the sense that it found it necessary to make a special declaration about that foreign warships could not be in the territorial waters of a given country without the consent of the state in question, but it is nevertheless obvious that, on the basis of international customs, the capture of the warship and its crew is such an excessively radical step that is out of proportion to the violation of laws committed by the Americans [i.e., by the *Pueblo*].

Nonetheless, the Soviets, on their part, find it necessary to give full support to the DPRK with regard to the case and to reveal the Americans.

The Soviet side asked the Korean comrades what sort of solution to the question they could imagine. The Koreans, on their part, expounded that they strove for a peaceful settlement, and if the Americans had not made such a provocative fuss about the issue, if they had not resorted to the method of utterly extreme threats against the country [the DPRK], they would have released the crew of the *Pueblo* long ago, in the same way as they had always done in comparable previous cases (e.g., South Korean fishing boats, American helicopters). But at present, facing the American threats, they cannot take such measures for the time being.

The Soviets, on their part, are of the opinion that by now the DPRK and the socialist countries have already achieved practically everything that could have been achieved at the expense of the USA, in the revealing of the aggressive foreign policy of the USA, etc., in the wake of the incident. The further prolongation of the crisis would be seriously dangerous, however, and therefore the Soviet side strives to induce the DPRK to find a right time for the handing over of the *Pueblo* and its crew (in the view of the Koreans, primarily the crew) so as to put an end to the crisis. With regard to that, our [Soviet] comrades say the following:

It seems obvious that the Johnson administration really strove, and still strives, for a diplomatic solution to the crisis. This is indicated by the contacts established between American official personages and socialist diplomats in Moscow, New York, and elsewhere, and also by the actions of the Americans, for one can hardly accept the explanation that it was only due to technical reasons that the Americans „allowed” the DPRK to capture the *Pueblo*. Evidently the Americans are seriously afraid of that if they took military steps, this would carry incalculable consequences. The Soviets, on their

part, repeatedly emphasized that now a new Korean War, let alone a greater possibility of some Soviet-American military confrontation, would hardly serve American interests.

However, the question is whether a possible prolongation of the crisis will bring forth circumstances which may induce the Johnson administration to head towards a military solution against its wishes. For instance, the question is how much [36th President of the U.S.] Johnson will be able – and willing – to resist the extremely provocative attitude of the Congress that demands immediate military actions against the DPRK, in the light of, for example, the considerations of the election struggle... On the other hand, the Johnson administration already made use of the Korean crisis to draft reservists, that is, to take a step it had not dared take for long years because of the [prospective] reaction of public opinion. In this sense one can hardly preclude that the Korean crisis reinforces the [position of the] hawks with regard to the further shaping of the American policies related to the Vietnam War.

Therefore the Soviet side considers that the next task is to strive to induce the Korean comrades to seek, and find, a „moment” that will be convenient for the solution of the crisis. As we mentioned before, the opinion they form of the Korean standpoint is that it will be possible to influence our Korean comrades in such a way. Another aspect of the question is that the Afro-Asian member states of the SC [the UN Security Council] extremely strongly press for a peaceful solution. Thus in case of the further prolongation of the affair the DPRK and – partly – the socialist countries, if they themselves do not take steps toward a settlement, will easily lose the political capital they have made.

[...]

[signature]

(Ambassador)

Source: MOL, XIX-J-1-j Korea, 1968, 58. doboz, 3, 00894/8/1968.

Translated by Balázs Szalontai

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NOTES OF THE PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN AFFAIRS LUNCHEON

January 30, 1968

THOSE ATTENDING THE MEETING WERE:

- Secretary Rusk
- Secretary McNamara
- Clark Clifford
- CIA Director Helms
- Walt Rostow
- George Christian
- Tom Johnson

Secretary Rusk: What was the President's reaction to the Leadership meeting this morning?

The President: I thought we did very little good, very little harm. General Brown was not a good briefer. He does not speak with authority. We need to take the toughest questions we get and answer them with authority with Senator Dirksen and Congressman Ford. We should say we have gone to the United Nations and to other nations with this matter and that we intend to go to Panmunjom. Military power will not get these men back, but we should list a few of the military alternatives to show them how unattractive they are.

Senator Edward Kennedy says the Vietnamese government steals about 50% of each dollar. He is about to release a report outlining corruption in Vietnam.

To what do you attribute the confession by Captain Bucher, General Wheeler?

General Wheeler: The North Koreans could have used drugs. They probably gave him something to copy and required him to write it out in his own hand. This may have been a deal to get the ship and the men released.

The President: What about the possibility of this Officer having turned?

Secretary McNamara: The possibilities are very small. We have made a thorough check of his background. There is very little instability in his background.

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General Wheeler: There is some worry at the United Nations that the Soviets are ready to surface portions of the ship's log showing it to be in territorial waters.

The President: Is it typical of the Soviets to be so firm on a thing such as this (Soviets have charged several times that the ship was inside territorial waters).

Secretary Rusk: The Soviets will say something knowing the facts to be to the contrary.

The President: I am jittery about the possibility of error. This Officer doesn't look like the normal, prudent, alert Officer I would have handle Air Force One if it were on alert. We must always bear in mind the possibility that we are in the wrong.

Clark Clifford: What is our position if we are wrong, Dean?

Secretary Rusk: If we are convinced we are wrong we would probably exchange a statement of regret.

The President: If we do not get the men back, what then?

Secretary Rusk: Even if the ship were to be found to have trespassed territorial waters, the North Koreans still had no right to do what they did.

The President: Where are we diplomatically?

Secretary Rusk: North Korea has accepted in writing our message. No date has been set for a meeting. North Korea has made no public statements on this, which is encouraging.

We do not know what will happen at Panmunjom. At the United Nations Ralph Bunche asked Ambassador Goldberg for permission to use the good offices of the Secretary General to send a Rumanian to North Korea. We advised Bunche that this did not bother us in principle. The Soviets may turn us down. The North Koreans said it was not the United Nation's business.

Gromyko has asked for a gesture to reduce pressure and the challenge. He suggested that we might want to send the Enterprise southward. I do not really see where this would accomplish much.

Secretary McNamara: The Joint Chiefs would want to leave the Enterprise on station. The Air Force is now working on a plan to expand the land-based air power.

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Walt Rostow: We may want to tell the Soviets we beefed up air power in the South not only because of the Pueblo incident but because of increased infiltration and the attack on Blue House. We could tell the Soviets that since they have a security pact with the North Koreans they may want to interest themselves more in this matter.

General Wheeler: (Talking to Walt Rostow). Somebody should talk with Drew Pearson about that article he had.

Walt Rostow: (To General Wheeler). Nobody is advising the President, to my knowledge who has been trigger-happy.

General Wheeler: Personally, I find none of the military courses of action particularly attractive.

Walt Rostow: We first had a message from the Soviets out of New Delhi that we should pretend that we had violated territorial waters.

Clark Clifford: What if we say the ship strayed by accident into territorial waters?

Secretary Rusk: We must look to the best facts of this matter. Even if the ship were in territorial waters it was not proper to seize it.

CIA Director Helms: Throughout the history of Soviet law, their interpretation of what is espionage is considerably different from our own. In Soviet law, walking down a particular street or looking at a certain installation is espionage per se.

The President: What about BUTTERCUP?

Secretary Rusk: The last BUTTERCUP messenger turned around because of particularly heavy activity around Hanoi. On his last report the message was not very clear. Ambassador Bunker wants it authenticated. Their people think we should release four additional prisoners. I think we should leave the details of this with Ambassador Bunker to work out with Thieu.

The President: What about PACKERS?

Secretary Rusk: Our man is expected in Bucharest on February 1. I think Hanoi is waiting to see how they come out in this offensive.

The President: General Wheeler, will you give us the most up to date information about Khesanh.

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General Wheeler: First reports indicate 700 enemy killed. U. S. and Vietnamese casualties are light. There have been rockets and mortars to hit Da Nang. The city of Da Nang was also attacked. Pleiku was attacked by a couple of hundred men. They terrorized the city and struck at the Pleiku air base. There have been at least two other acts, one against the 4th Infantry and one at Nha Trong and Kontum.

At Khesanh the situation is quiet and the weather is good. At 9:00 a. m. today EST General Westmoreland said that he had talked with his Commander at Khesanh and the situation is well in hand. At TET it is customary for many people from the countryside to come into town. It is easy for the Viet Cong to infiltrate these groups. They can bring in a mortar and a rocket easily. They assemble it at a prearranged time and attack these installations. We caught four trying to blow up a bridge. The enemy has lost quite heavily. The 4th Infantry captured 200 Viet Cong, most of whom were Montagnard Tribesmen. Twenty of them had North Vietnamese money.

Secretary McNamara: There are three military actions we would like to bring up at this time. Two of them will require the President's approval, and one is for the President's information.

General Wheeler: We would like approval of the Talos anti-aircraft missile for use south of the 20 degree south latitude. We have noticed recently that the MIG's are carrying wing tanks which give them greater range. They will be going after the B-52's in South Vietnam. They have been trying to shoot down a B-52 for psychological purposes for some time. (The President approved this action upon the recommendation of General Wheeler, Secretary Rusk and Secretary McNamara.)

The second item on which the President's approval is requested is the use of patrols in the DMZ. These patrols would be used to check on the disposition of supplies, troops and other developments inside the DMZ. Intelligence indicates a thickening of forces around Khesanh with a thinning in the Eastern end of the CMZ. As an alternative to use of U. S. patrols, we would suggest use of ARVN patrols with U. S. advisers.

Secretary Rusk: We will lose some men this way, but there is no political problem.

Secretary McNamara: I have no problem because of the Khesanh build-up. It is natural that we will want to know what is going on in the DMZ, particularly with Khesanh shaping up the way it is.

Secretary McNamara: The third action we proposed is to organize and mount a feint of a full scale landing above the DMZ. This would involve mounting naval gun fire, making air strikes along the coast and moving amphibious shipping north into the area.

The President: Is this about the same as the proposal I have heard once before?

General Wheeler: Yes, sir. There are some disadvantages. If we made such a feint, North Vietnam would claim a victory, but we request the President's approval to go ahead and prepare a plan. This plan would be submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and to the President for approval. We would pretend we were going to make a landing and we would let it leak to the South Vietnamese to make sure that the North Vietnamese would learn of it. We would use naval gunfire and martial the shipping as though we were going to load troops. The objective of this would be to make them believe that we were about to have a major landing. This would, if its purpose is realized, get them to move troops and lessen the pressure in the Khesanh area.

One advantage of this is that if it does break publicly, we have never made such a move.

Secretary McNamara: We would plan this on the basis that it would be brought to the attention of the North Vietnamese and not to the American public.

CIA Director Helms: It is a great thing if you can keep it out of the hands of the press.

Secretary McNamara: I agree.

Walt Rostow: I would not leak it to the ARVN. Once you do it will become known to the press. I would make the cover through the use of the most sophisticated electronic equipment we have.

Clark Clifford: Here is my uninformed reaction. If we go ahead and plan on this and it should become know, people would say we used this as an excuse for the real thing.

The President: Go ahead and plan it. I want to give weight to the Field Commanders recommendation in this case.

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Secretary McNamara: The independent panel will meet this Thursday, Friday and Saturday to review the Pueblo situation. George Ball will chair it. Admiral McDonald and General Mark Clark will meet as the other two members. Paul Nitze will coordinate it.

General Wheeler: General Clark is a hardliner whom you can count on.

The President: Should we have Senator Stennis and Congressman Rivers down for a briefing?

Secretary McNamara: Yes I believe this would be useful. I would also have Congressman Bates and Senator Margaret Chase Smith.

Director Helms: Congressman Rivers is more antagonistic than anyone.

Secretary Rusk: Who was on the Bay of Pigs investigation?

Secretary McNamara: General Taylor, Bobby Kennedy, and Allen Dulles.

Walt Rostow: What are we going to do about Ted Kennedy's report?

Secretary Rusk: He has used figures we cannot legitimately attack. Corruption is a tough one to deal with.

Secretary McNamara: There is no excuse for the Vietnamese not lowering their draft age to below 20.

The President: We should sit down with these people who have been to Vietnam and talk to them before they are turned loose on an unsuspecting public.

(At 2:35 Walt Rostow returned from a call he had taken from Bromley Smith. He reported to the meeting that "we have just been informed we are being heavily mortared in Saigon. The Presidential Palace, our BOQ's, the Embassy and the city itself have been hit. This flash was just received from the NMCC.")

The President: This could be very bad.

Secretary Rusk: Yes, I hope it is not Ambassador Bunker's residence.

The President: What can we do to shake them from this?

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This looks like where we came in. Remember it was at Pleiku that they hit our barracks and that we began to strike them in the north.

What comes to mind in the way of retaliation.

General Wheeler: It was the same type of thing before. You will remember that during the inauguration that the MACV headquarters was hit. In a city like Saigon people can infiltrate easily. They carry in rounds of ammunition and mortars. They fire and run.

It is impossible to stop this in its entirety. This is about as tough to stop as it is to protect against an individual mugging in Washington, D. C.

We have got to pacify all of this area and get rid of the Viet Cong infrastructure.

They are making a major effort to mount a series of these actions to make a big splurge at TET.

Secretary McNamara: I have two recommendations. This is a public relations problem not a military one. We need to keep General Wan in charge of the Saigon police. He should not be removed as some of our people in the State Department are suggesting. At least not until we find somebody better.

CIA Director Helms: I agree completely.

Secretary McNamara: He is the best security chief since Diem's time. He has cleaned up Saigon well.

Secretary Rusk: He is a good police chief, but he has been rather uncooperative with some of our people.

Secretary McNamara: The answer to the mortar attacks is success at Khesanh. We must get our story across. Phil Goulding called General Sidle this morning in Saigon. We are inflicting very heavy casualties on the enemy and we are not unprepared for the encounter.

Walt Rostow: Evron called me about the Suez Canal problem. This matter should be raised today. Evron said a crisis might arise out of the manner in which General Bull has slid from his position

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of clearing the southern end of the Canal to the north.

Israel feels this requires an agreement of both parties.

The Israelis want our support.

The President: What is our position?

Secretary Rusk: At the present, we need the consent of both sides.

Secretary McNamara: I agree.

General Wheeler: I agree.

The President: Then we should put pressure on the Egyptians to do this.

Secretary Rusk: I would suggest that we leave it in the United Nations machinery. If Evron's account is correct it will be harder to get a U.N. agreement later. We need to put on the pressure.

The President: Dean (Secretary Rusk) you talk to Goldberg to put the pressure on this.

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**30 JAN 1968: Korean Abandonment of Participation in the Security Council and, as a Substitute, Request to the U.S. Side the Inclusion of Three Articles in the Security Council's Resolution. (section #: 729.55, record #: 2662)**

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Korea

Very Urgent

Recipient: Ambassador to the United Nations and Ambassador to the United States

Dac: UNW-0160 and UNW-0161

1. With regard to the discussion of the North Korean armed guerilla infiltration and the PUEBLO Incident in the United Nations Security Council, the U.S. government strongly recommended through the memorandum that we should participate in the Security Council because we cannot avoid the North Korean puppet regime being invited to the Security Council and, in that case, that it would be better to disclose and censure the provocative infiltration in the international society, thus we did not turn it down until the end, and reluctantly decided to participate, knowing that the discussion in the United Nations Security Council would not be effective.
2. However, on January 29, the U.S. government made Ambassador Porter deliver the opinion of the United States to our President that we should give up the participation in the United Nations Security Council, on the grounds that the United States has to conclude the discussion in the United Nations Security Council quickly, and we cannot help seeing the attitude of the U.S. government as being very contradictory as they deter us from an opportunity to show the indignation of our people in the United Nations.
3. In this situation, towards the aroused public opinion and affirmative attitude of the National Assembly, the U.S. government has the responsibility to provide our government of a convincing solution.
4. Now our government expects the foregoing three articles to be realized and also agrees that we do not ultimately insist on participation in the United Nations Security Council

according to the request of the United States, under the condition that the United States guarantees to prevent the North Korean puppet regime from being invited to the Security Council.

5. In the case of the absence of both the United States and the North Korean Puppet Regime, negotiations are to include the following three articles, CONDEMNATION, PUNITIVE MEASURES, GUARANTEE FOR PREVENTION OF RECURRENCE OF SIMILAR NORTH KOREAN AGGRESSIVE ACTS AGAINST ROK in the resolution proposed to the United Nations Security Council.
6. Strongly push the U.S. representative to censure infiltration of the North Korean Puppet Regime in the United Nations Security Council by utilizing previously forwarded documents and photos to prove their infiltration.
7. As we will continue to give further directions about our expectation and requests regarding the three articles mentioned above, receive general comments of the United States side concerning these 3 articles.

Minister

**30 JAN 1968: Request to the U.S. State Department for a Correction Regarding the Actions of U.S. Diplomatic Offices in Their Host Nations That Are Focusing Only on the Pueblo Incident. (section #: 729.55, record #: 2662)**

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Korea

Urgent

Reference No: WUS-0115

Recipient: Ambassador to the United States

1. According to the report from our exterior agency, the U.S. ambassadors in foreign countries are in contact with the government of each host nation and negotiating, under the direction of the U.S. Department of State, to make relevant governments put pressure on the North Korean puppet regime concerning the PUEBLO Incident.
2. It is the mutual consensus and standard of action of both South Korean and U.S. governments that a series of happenings, including not only the PUEBLO incident but the infiltration of armed communist guerillas dispatched by the North Korcan puppet regime, are brutal acts committed by the North Korcan puppet regime.
3. However, the reports says that the activities of the U.S. diplomatic offices in their host nations are only focusing on the PUEBLO Incident, so please call this to the attention of the U.S. Department of State and request correction.

Minister

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLI 97-318  
By is, NARA Date 9-21-97

~~SECRET/LIMDIS~~  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
Korean Task Force

4  
✓  
JMS

Situation Report - 1800 Hours EST - January 31, 1968

INDICATION NORTH KOREA MAY WANT TO DEAL THROUGH MAC

DMZ ✓

Reuters has carried an item from the North Korean Central News Agency which quotes a statement made by Kim Kwang-Hyup, a member of the Central Committee of the North Korean Workers Party at a reception for a Romanian Communist Party Delegation in Pyongyang. Kim is quoted as saying "that the U.S. imperialists have illegally brought the Pueblo case to the United Nations-- although there is a precedent for the treatment of similar cases at the Korean Military Armistice Commission-- is a premeditated intrigue for covering up their criminal act and misleading world public opinion." (FBIS 86)

POSSIBILITY ONLY COMMANDER BUCHER WOULD BE TRIED

AP carries a statement by Pak Hang-Ki, Deputy Chief of the Foreign Affairs Section of the Federation of Korean Residents in Japan (pro-NK), giving his personal opinion that he believes the crew of the Pueblo would be released if the U.S. "apologizes, admits its guilt and promises not to repeat the violation." He believed, however, that the Captain should be tried "in accordance with the criminal laws of our country."

SOVIET EMBASSY OFFICIAL COMMENTS ON PUEBLO

Soviet Minister-Counselor Yuri N. Tcherniakov recently discussed the Pueblo case with Arthur Cox of the Brookings Institution. Tcherniakov urged that the U.S. treat the Pueblo incident as the Soviet Union had treated the Tuapse incident because the two cases were closely parallel. He said that in time the U.S. ought to be able to work out a trade of North Koreans held in South Korea for the Pueblo crew. (Memorandum of Conversation, CONFIDENTIAL, January 30)

DMZ INCIDENTS

No report of DMZ incidents has been received today.

~~SECRET/LIMDIS~~

2

FURTHER REACTIONS TO DEMARCHE

CHILE - Ambassador Korry approached the Foreign Ministry, Under Secretary Patricio Silva, on considering a follow-up to its demarche to the Soviet Ambassador by instructing its permanent UN representative to speak to his Soviet counterpart. Under Secretary Silva expressed interest in this suggestion and indicated he would take it up with higher authorities. He added that the Foreign Ministry has not received a report from the Soviet Ambassador on the Soviet reaction to the GOC demarche. (Santiago 2323, CONFIDENTIAL)

AUSTRIA - A Foreign Ministry official informed Ambassador MacArthur that the Foreign Ministry made a strong oral representation on January 31 to Soviet Ambassador Podzerob urging the return of the Pueblo and a peaceful settlement of this situation. (Vienna 2736, SECRET)

DEVELOPMENTS IN SEOUL

Following a meeting of the ruling Democratic-Republican Party National Assemblymen, a party spokesman said that the participants agreed to back whatever decisions President Park may make.

The opposition New Democratic Party Assemblymen met and decided to begin interpellation of Cabinet members, including the Defense Minister, on February 2. A Party spokesman said the party is considering introducing a non-confidence resolution.

A group of approximately 100 union members and students staged a demonstration in front of the Japanese Embassy demanding the expulsion of correspondents from the Japanese papers Asahi and Yomiuri. The demonstrators claimed the correspondents had reported the armed intrusion as though it were a part of a domestic insurgency. (FBIS 85)

MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS

We now have three carrier task groups operating in the



~~SECRET/LIMDIS~~

3

Sea of Japan; two are striking groups composed of USS Enterprise and USS Ranger plus escorts. The other is an anti-submarine group including USS Yorktown and escorts. All are operating in the vicinity of 36 degrees North and 131 degrees East.  
(Varied, ~~SECRET/LIMDIS~~)

LATE ITEM

The USS Rowan DD 782, operating with USS Ranger in the Sea of Japan, received minor damage in a collision with a Soviet merchant ship, Kapitan Vislobokov. The Vislobokov is a 10,044 gross ton cargo ship built in 1967; extent of its damage unknown. Its last port of call was in Japan, and it is bound for Vladivostok. (NMCC Telcon, CONFIDENTIAL).

~~SECRET/LIMDIS~~

CONFIDENTIAL

**RECORD OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN A.A. GROMKYO AND  
CHARGE D'AFFAIRES OF THE DPRK IN THE USSR KAN CHER  
GYN**

[Source: AVPRK, fond 102, opis 28, papka 55, delo 2. Translated by Sergey Radchenko]

"31" January 1968

N 129 / GS - NS

Kan Cher Gyn, having repeated the statement of the DPRK Government dated January 27, 1968, in connection with the capture of the American ship.

A.A. Gromkyo replied that the Soviet Union has already taken a series of measures in the support of the Korean friends. When approached by the Americans, the Soviet Union firmly declared that any pressure on the DPRK on the part of the USA is unacceptable. The Soviet representative in the Security Council spoke out resolutely in support of the position of the DPRK Government. The Soviet ambassador in Pyongyang informed comrade Kim Il Sung about all measures that had been taken.

A.A. Gromkyo asked comrade Kan Cher Gyn to explain how the Soviet side could use the copies of the confession by the captain of the *Pueblo* and the tape recording of his statement provided by the Korean comrades. Wide circulation of these materials would help expose the US position.

Kan Cher Gyn promised to clear up this question in Pyongyang and make a reply. He asked about the prospects of discussing the question of the "Pueblo" in the Security Council.

A.A. Gromkyo replied that one should not expect the Security Council to make a mutually acceptable decision. Probably, the veto will be used. Some members of the Council, in particular, representatives of the Afro-Asian countries (Algeria, Ethiopia, India, Pakistan, Senegal) may take certain measures in the direction of settling the conflict between the USA and the DPRK. The Afro-Asians pay the greatest attention to

the possibility of providing good will service or mediation in this or that form on either U Thant's part or his special representative or themselves, the Afro-Asian members of the Council. However, one could not say anything concrete about this at the moment.

Comrade Kan Cher Gyn asked us to continue informing him in the future about the work of the Security Council, and, in particular, about the possible steps by the Afro-Asian members of the council.

The meeting was attended by the deputy head of the FED [Far Eastern Department] A.I. Elizavetin, 2<sup>nd</sup> secretary of the FED Yu. D. Fadeev, 2<sup>nd</sup> secretary of the embassy of the DPRK comrade Son Gen Mo and interpreter comrade Kim Ham.

Correct: [Signature]

Sent to:

1. comrades Gromkyo
2. Kuznetsov
3. DVO
4. OMO
5. file

31 JAN 1968: Document on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Director Yoon Ha-jung Invitation, Explanation, and Friendly Relations With U.S. Embassy in Korea Political Councilor. (section #: 729.55, record #: 2662) (Original text written in English)

甲 高 長 官 閣 下 敬 啟  
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외국관 문화장 국장이  
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문화관을 둘러하여 설명  
후 국장 본인.

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III CONFIDENTIAL

AIDE-MEMOIRE

OMY - 70

Reference is made to an article carried in the January 29 issue of the "Washington Post" which, quoting its New Delhi Correspondent, indicated a possibility of exchanging the USS Pueblo and/or its crew for north Korean infiltrators under detention.

It is impossible and inconceivable to make such a dealing, and the Korean Government believes that the United States Government takes the same view with it on this matter.

The Korean Government strongly requests that the United States Government will not make any form of direct negotiation or contact with the north Korean communists on this question or on any other under any circumstances.

임바보러 록 제분음 (68.12.31.)

Seoul, January 29, 1968

검토필 (196.8 8 1.)

III CONFIDENTIAL

1968. 12. 31. 까지  
국외 발송을 사외-내부용임

**Our [South Korean Government] Position Regarding Military Armistice Commission Meetings at Panmunjum.**

The View of the Republic of Korea of the Military Armistice Commission Meeting at Panmunjum

1. The seizure of the USS Pueblo is a challenge to both the Republic of Korea and the United States by the North Korean Puppet Regime, an enemy to the two countries. Therefore, such a challenge is a matter of great concern of the Republic of Korea itself.
2. For the national prestige of the Republic of Korea and the United States, which are united for joint defense, for the purpose of censuring the brutal provocative activities by the North Korean Puppet Regime, and from an humanitarian point of view, the United States and the Republic of Korea share a common concern in making strong efforts to make the USS Pueblo and her crew repatriated in an honorable way at the earliest possible moment
3. Whenever their counterparts are the North Korean Puppet Regime in an affair, the Republic of Korea people take it very seriously as it has a great effect on their national interests. This is even more so when handling such an important problem related to both the Republic of Korea and the Unites States as this incident.
4. The infiltration of North Korean Puppet Regime armed agents into the Republic of Korea and the USS Pueblo incident broke out coincidentally. It would be a normal case that the Military Armistice Commission adopts the infiltration of the armed agents as a principal subject and the military representative of the Republic of Korea attends the meeting. However, what is actually happening is abnormal. The Republic of Korea people are discontented with it. Also, it is rather a matter of course that they have a suspicion about it.
5. If the USS Pueblo incident continues to be handled in the current way, it will result in fostering further provocative activities by the North Korean Puppet Regime.
6. The Republic of Korea people felt a terrible shock by the incident that the North Korean Puppet Regime infiltrated armed agents into Seoul under the elaborately-prearranged plan to assassinate the president and to overturn the

Republic of Korea. Accordingly, the Republic of Korea people think that convincing security measures to prevent the recurrence of such a grave incident should be established immediately. Yet, a military representative of the Republic of Korea cannot attend the Panmunjom meeting. The common idea of the Republic of Korea people of this situation is that it is a very regrettable matter for cooperation between the Republic of Korea and the United States.