

To the Summit via Proxy-Summits: New Evidence from Soviet and Chinese Archives on Mao's Long March to Moscow, 1949

By Sergey Radchenko and David Wolff[◇]

Between December 1949 and February 1950 Mao visited Stalin in Moscow and the world waited in anxious anticipation. What would the communist giants decide? What great good (or evil, depending on your side) would result? In the mid 1990s, the declassification of these talks was one of the exciting highlights at the dawn of archive-based Cold War international history. Now a whole new tranche has emerged adding both length and depth to the telling of this dramatic story both from the Russian and Chinese sides.

It is common diplomatic practice to prepare a summit either through confidential talks conducted by the leaders' trusted advisors or foreign ministers. Also common is a variant where one leader dispatches an envoy to flesh out the agenda and then his counterpart sends a reply visitor to choreograph the meeting in greater detail. The latter route was chosen by Mao Zedong on 17 January 1949, when, after multiple postponements of his own trip to Moscow, Stalin again put him off. The eleven-month long preparation process that ensued has left us a rich record, much, but not all, of which has now leaked into the public sphere. Below, following several earlier CWIHP publications on this topic, is the latest installment for those who want to know what went wrong in the Mao-Stalin relationship and how it affected the whole course of Sino-Soviet relations thereafter.

Realizing that the visit would be a turning point for both, in the late 1940s Mao and Stalin each tried to control the timing of their eventual meeting, with one or the other putting the visit off time and again, with greater or lesser warning, with more or less convincing reasons. All these exchanges are well-preserved since they were precisely encoded by the Soviet doctor and GRU agent in China, Andrei Orlov (code name: Terebin). In Moscow, they were decoded and brought directly to Stalin. The exchanges appear more like a cat-and-mouse game than alliance formation.

Most of the documents reproduced below are ostensibly traceable to the *Arkhiv Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii*—the

Russian Presidential Archive, an institution notoriously unwelcoming of scholars. In fact, original documents in the archive are entirely inaccessible except to those on a short list of hand-picked Russian researchers who, over the last 15 years or so, have leaked certain “declassified” documents, showcasing them in memoirs, articles, and documentary collections. One such collection, Volume 5 of *Sovetsko-Kitaiskie Otnoshniia* (Soviet-Chinese Relations) edited by Andrei Ledovskii, Raisa Mirovitskaia and Vladimir Miasnikov—all heavyweights of Russian Sinology—appeared in print in Moscow in 2005. Volume 5 is the latest installment in a series on Sino-Soviet relations published under the auspices of the Russian Institute of the Far East (Institut Dalnego Vostoka). The present volume, made up of two books, includes documents from 1946 until February 1950 (Mao's visit to Moscow), with an unexpected addendum of 1952 talks between Stalin and Zhou Enlai.

Some of the documents included in Volume 5 (for example, Mao's visit to the Soviet Union and the aforementioned talks between Stalin and Zhou Enlai) have long been known in the West, and their translations have appeared in previous issues of this *Bulletin*. But some very interesting documents in Volume 5 have been put into circulation for the first time. Documents translated below came from three *fondi* and seven distinct *dela* of the Presidential Archive. These are cables between Mao Zedong and Stalin through Orlov, reports from Soviet representative to the CCP Ivan Kovalev (who replaced Orlov as liaison to Stalin in 1949), and Anastas Mikoyan's reports on his meetings with the Chinese leadership in Xibaipo in January-February 1949. A simple comparison of archival citations reveals that the editors of Volume 5 omitted a large number of documents (likely, further correspondence between Mao Zedong and Stalin, and possibly transcripts of Stalin-Liu Shaoqi meetings in Moscow), while several reprinted documents show obvious signs of tampering. In other words, Volume 5, and the translations below, still cannot be the final word on the making of the Sino-Soviet Alliance; yet these new

Sergey Radchenko is a visiting professor at Pittsburg State University and the author of The China Puzzle: Soviet Policy Towards the People's Republic of China, 1962-67, to be published by the Woodrow Wilson Center Press & Stanford University Press later this year. David Wolff is professor of Eurasian History at the Slavic Research Center at Hokkaido University in Sapporo, Japan, and a former director of the Cold War International History Project. He is also the author of CWIHP Working Paper #30 and To the Harbin Station: The Liberal Alternative in Russian Manchuria, 1898-1914 (Stanford University Press, 1999).

documents vastly enrich our understanding of this intricate process.

Two additional documents come from a Chinese documentary collection, *Jianguo Yilai Liu Shaoqi Wengao*. The first four volumes of this series appeared in 2005. Liu is, after Mao and Zhou, the number three man in Chinese Communist history, so it is no surprise that documents from his files held by the Central Archives and accessed with the authority of the Central Committee's Document Research Unit, would be of interest. For over thirty years, Liu served as the top expert on organization and administration inside the CCP Politburo, so it was logical that he should visit Moscow to take the measure of the Soviet model. And it was not Liu's first time. When Mao was visiting Beijing in 1920, learning about the exciting events taking place in Moscow and buying his first copy of *The Communist Manifesto*, knowledge that would make him a Marxist, Liu was already in Moscow. As we will see below, the most contentious moments of Liu's conversations with Stalin have been removed, so that neither Stalin's unwillingness to aid the CCP's planned campaign against Taiwan nor Stalin's fatal attentions toward Gao Gang, the Manchurian party boss and a member of Liu's delegation, would be revealed. Nonetheless, the parts of the conversations that have been printed are quite revealing, nicely complementing Russian materials on Liu's visit. There are still gaps, but they are getting smaller.

Mao postponed

Mao allegedly requested a meeting with Stalin in early 1947, though documentary evidence is still very scant on this point.¹ We can only speculate about Mao's reasons for insisting on such a meeting; Dieter Heinzig cites his pressing need for Soviet aid, especially weapons, while Odd Arne Westad adds to these practical concerns Mao's intention to re-order his long-term relationship with the Soviet ally.² But in the spring of 1947 the Chairman was in no position to travel to distant places; in March he had to abandon the long-time revolutionary base of Yan'an to the advancing Guomindang forces (a move later portrayed in Chinese historiography as work of a tactical genius, but at the time something of a setback for the CCP). Although the Guomindang offensive in Shaanxi stalled by the summer of 1947, Mao had little to take to Moscow except promises of future CCP victories.

Nevertheless, Stalin volunteered to receive the CCP Chairman in Moscow, secretly, in his message dated 15 June 1947, only to cancel this invitation two weeks later because, he claimed, Mao's absence might have a negative effect on the military situation in northern China. Stalin's about-face was almost certainly a reaction to Terebin's report (or reports) on the military situation, to which Stalin alludes in his second message (1 July). Interpreting Stalin's decision is complicated by the fact that apparently only a portion of that message has been released to the public, and over 20 pages of source text preceding Stalin's two messages remain classified, including a likely report by Terebin. The only declassified snippet from this batch is a 12 June report to Stalin by State Security official

P. Fedorov who related Gao Gang's urgent request for ammunition, desperately needed by the CCP forces for the planned offensive on the railroad town of Siping.³ There are good reasons to think that Stalin ignored this request. In the meantime, worn down by Du Yuming's forces, the PLA lifted the siege of Siping.⁴

It is not clear whether Stalin's decision to postpone Mao's visit had something to do with the Siping operation, or developments in Shaanxi, and whether it reflected Stalin's genuine concern about military prospects of the CCP in Mao's absence, or merely his unwillingness to make any promises to Mao while the outcome of the Civil War remained uncertain. In any case, the subject of Mao's visit to Moscow was shelved for several months until Mao asked again, possibly on 30 November, and Moscow confirmed his invitation in December 1947. Then Stalin did not write for four months.

A long report from Mao finally provoked Stalin's reply. Stalin casually apologized for his prolonged silence on the absurd pretext of having taken the time to "check the data" necessary for his reply. It is possible that Stalin wanted to see where the wind was blowing on the Civil War fronts, and his skeptical attitude is understandable—even Mao, in his 15 March 1948 report to Stalin predicted that the Guomindang would only be defeated in three or more years.⁵

In his letter Stalin took issue with Mao's plan to abolish other political parties once the CCP gained power and insisted that bourgeois parties would have to be included in the Chinese political process for the foreseeable future. Such advice was in line with Stalin's understanding of the character of the Chinese Revolution as essentially an anti-imperialist, not a communist revolution. Mao, on the contrary, peddled more radical policies in his communications with Stalin, whether out of sheer conviction or for tactical reasons, as a proof of his pro-Soviet orientation. Whether or not Mao was disappointed by Stalin's rebuke, in one important way the letter was very welcome news, for it mentioned the inevitable "victory of the people's liberation armies"—was this not sure indication that Stalin was coming down on the CCP side of the fence?

Mao must have thought so, for on 22 April, only two days after Stalin's letter, Zhou Enlai and Ren Bishi invited the Soviet radioman (Terebin/Orlov) to convey that Mao had announced his imminent departure for Moscow, by car and horse. At first Stalin agreed, but two weeks later, he was again suggesting a postponement presumably because safe transit through a war-ravaged country could not be guaranteed. These thin excuses can safely be dismissed. There are various deducible strategic explanations for Stalin's hesitance, or one may narrow Stalin's undecipherable tactics to a banality—by agreeing time and again, and then postponing Stalin may have wanted to show Mao who was the "boss."⁶

Whatever Stalin's reasons, he was at no loss for excuses because when Mao again applied for permission to visit in July 1948, Stalin asked him to postpone the trip until November, ostensibly because the leading comrades had gone to bring in the grain harvest. Stalin's motivations are once again unclear,

though we may be reasonably certain that Stalin was not in the fields in the summer of 1948. But even if he had gone to enjoy his annual vacation on the Black Sea, he could have received Mao there, as he had received many other foreign visitors.⁷ In fact, this would have been better from the point of view of secrecy. But Stalin demurred, possibly still uncertain about his strategic priorities in China. Indeed, there is some evidence to the effect that in the summer of 1948 the Soviet ambassador to China, Nikolai Roshchin, probed Guomindang officials about possibly mediating in the CCP-GMD conflict.⁸ It is possible that Stalin needed more time to define his position with respect to the CCP, the Guomindang, and their bitter confrontation.

Orlov, the radioman, transmitted Mao's agreement to yet another delay, but then wrote a separate dispatch expressing his view that Mao was deeply disappointed.

"As far as I know Mao Zedong, [which has been] for more than 6 years, his smile and words '*hao, hao*—good, good,' at the time when he was listening to the translation, do not at all suggest that he was happy with the telegram. This could be seen quite clearly...."

He was sure that he was going to go precisely now. Probably, the trip became necessary for him. He waited for a reply with great eagerness... He was ready for departure... Mao Zedong's suitcases were being packed, and even leather shoes were bought (like everybody here, he is wearing fabric slippers), and a thick wool coat was tailored... So now he is outwardly calm, polite and attentive, courteous in a purely Chinese manner. But it is hard to see his true soul."

But Mao, it appears, swallowed his soul. On 28 July Orlov reported on another conversation with Mao Zedong; this time Mao outlined an agenda for his talks with "comrade main master," as Mao now called Stalin. Sandwiched as points 4 and 5 of this agenda were Mao's concrete, urgent needs, e.g. rebuilding of Chinese industry and transport infrastructure. He also wanted a loan of thirty million dollars. Mao told Orlov that whereas he had previously "not [been] in a hurry" to visit Moscow, now he wanted to go as soon as possible. As Stalin's deadline approached, Mao reminded the Soviet leader that he was once again packing his suitcases. Unfortunately, only a small part of Mao's 28 September letter to Stalin has been declassified, leaving us some hope that future declassifications or leaks may yet make this story a little more coherent.

In the days that followed messages were exchanged between Mao's base and Moscow, discussing the logistics of the trip. But on 21 November it was Mao who cancelled the trip due to illness, possibly a fig leaf with which to avoid another suspected cancellation by Stalin, since no concrete transport plans had been made so close to the proposed date of visit.⁹ Six weeks later, though, Mao summoned his enthusiasm and proclaimed imminent departure for Moscow, naming Gao Gang and Ren Bishi as the leading figures in his retinue.

But this time, Stalin stepped forward to present the Guomindang request for USSR mediation between the GMD and CCP.¹⁰ Stalin argued the case for mediation, but Mao was adamantly against "any kind of participation of the CCP in the

negotiations," since such mediation would be accompanied by a ceasefire, preventing the PLA from continuing its successful military drive to unify China under CCP rule. Mao's messages to Stalin retained comradely civility, but let Orlov know that Mao was not happy with Stalin's meddling: "the Guomindang will agree to any conditions now, but this must not be allowed." Stalin argued, but then acquiesced, calling in the Guomindang ambassador to reject the request on the grounds that "the Soviet government is always loyal to the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries..."

Mikoyan at Xibaipo

But Stalin now found Mao's presence in China "essential," effectively cancelling the Chinese leader's trip. Instead a Politburo representative, Anastas Mikoyan, would visit the temporary CCP headquarters at Xibaipo and discuss key matters. Stenographic copies were kept, so Stalin would be able to review the answers to all questions he put on Mikoyan's list of topics. All present knew it would be so and spoke for Stalin's ears as well.

Until now we have only known of the Mikoyan visit from a short report penned by Mikoyan in 1960 and sent to the CC with a copy of the stenograms.¹¹ But the stenograms were not available until now. Here the Mao-Mikoyan conversations are presented in full.¹² Mao's list of six topics from July 1948 multiplied and the transcripts list 65 topic headings, some of which were discussed at great length.

In the first meeting, on 30 January 1949 Mao went out of his way to portray himself as a humble student of Stalin. He went on to say that China "has fallen far behind Russia," that the Chinese were "weak Marxists" who had committed many mistakes, and that "if one looks at our work with Russia's measure then it will turn out that we have nothing." Stalin was thanked effusively for all he had done for the Chinese Revolution. This must have been a fairly painful process for Mao, usually a law unto himself. Mao returned to CCP "mistakes" in another conversation, on 3 February, and then again on 5 February, when he recounted the history of Chinese communism since 1921. Mao predictably dwelled on the CCP struggle against the "leftist" and "rightist" deviations, and mistakes of Chen Duxiu, Li Lisan, Wang Ming and Mao's other real or imaginary past opponents. Wang Ming received the brunt of criticism, for though he spoke well of Li Lisan, Mao said that Wang Ming "still has not recognized his former mistakes."

The irony of the situation was that Wang Ming had been the recognized head of the Moscow faction and the Comintern man in the CCP. Mao, though, accused Wang Ming of nationalism and in effect acting contrary to Comintern instructions, which he, Mao, always held close to his heart. The consistency with which Mao brought up the question of Wang Ming, who no longer exercised any political power (he talked about Wang Ming's mistakes before Mikoyan's arrival in a conversation with Orlov, and returned to this problem after Mikoyan's departure in a conversation with Ivan Kovalev) suggests that Mao was at pains to make sure that Stalin recognized him as

the only legitimate authority in the Chinese Communist Party. To this end, he bent over backwards to explain his policies in the light of complete adherence to Stalin's instructions. Mao's account is especially interesting if compared to his later complaints of Stalin's obstruction of the Chinese Revolution.¹³

Mao and Mikoyan also discussed the problem of China's nationalities. Here Mikoyan walked a tight rope since he had to explain away Stalin's meddling in the Chinese border areas. In 1944 Stalin sponsored Uyghur and Kazakh nationalists in a general uprising against Chinese authority. The insurgents, with the help of Soviet advisers and weapons, consolidated control of northern Xinjiang and proclaimed a short-lived republic. In 1945 Stalin pressured the insurgents to compromise with the Guomintang government, as a part of his broader scheme of improving the Soviet relationship with Nanjing. Now Mikoyan related to Mao that one should not give independence to the national minorities.

Mao was "glad to hear this advice but you could tell by his face that he had no intention of giving independence to anybody whatsoever." The Chairman then questioned Mikoyan about Soviet involvement in Xinjiang and even cited GMD General Bai Chongxi's authority to claim that the insurgents had used Soviet-made artillery, tanks and planes (this was true). Mikoyan disclaimed any Soviet involvement, probably to Mao's relief.

Hopeful that Stalin's desistance from promoting Xinjiang's independence could be stretched a little further, Mao on his initiative raised the question of Outer Mongolia's independence. Though under *de facto* Soviet control since the 1920s, Outer Mongolia became *de jure* independent after the conclusion of the 1945 Sino-Soviet treaty. At the time Jiang Jieshi bitterly resisted Stalin's demands for Outer Mongolia's independence, but the Soviet leader finally squeezed out this concession from Nanjing. Now Mao proposed that Outer Mongolia rejoin China on the premise that the Mongols had nothing to fear from the Chinese communists. Mikoyan reported that Outer Mongolia would never agree to abandon its independence and issued an implicit warning for Mao to measure his appetites: "If it ever unites with Inner Mongolia it will surely be an independent Mongolia." Mao laughed off the issue and gave up the Mongolian issue for the time-being, though Liu Shaoqi again briefly resurrected it in Moscow in the summer of 1949 (with the same results).¹⁴

CCP foreign relations came up for discussion several times with Mao generally stressing that he was not in a hurry to establish diplomatic relations with Western countries but hinting time and again that the Western countries (especially the US and Britain) *were* willing to recognize China under CCP rule. Mao's casual reference to this prospect was meant to elicit Stalin's promise to recognize China, for this promise had been slow in coming. Instead, the Soviet ambassador in China, Nikolai Roshchin, followed the crumbling Guomintang government to Guangzhou after it fled from Nanjing—even as many ambassadors of Western countries remained in Nanjing! In a conversation with Zhou Enlai on 1 February, Mikoyan

offered an awkward explanation to the effect that Roshchin's move was a standard diplomatic practice. One has to wonder whether Zhou was convinced, for in retrospect Roshchin's departure for Guangzhou, while even the capitalist ambassadors remained in Nanjing, still appears inexplicable and might only mean that Stalin was exceptionally keen to avoid giving the Guomintang any pretext for concluding that he was interfering in the internal affairs of China (and the prospect of US intervention, which such interference might incur). It is hard to estimate whether Mao's use of the "US card" in winning concessions from Moscow succeeded at all, but he certainly was aware of this card, and played it to his presumed advantage not only in the meeting with Mikoyan, but a year later in Moscow, to alter Stalin's position on the treaty of alliance with China.

The Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1945 was also discussed at the meetings. At least initially Mao appeared content with the existing treaty (readers of the *CWIHP Bulletin* will remember that concluding a new treaty was Mao's chief concern in Moscow in 1950). Now, Mao said that though he had called for renunciation of Jiang's "treacherous treaties," these did not include the 1945 Sino-Soviet Treaty because it has a "patriotic character." Mikoyan was evidently surprised by this admission, asking Mao how he explained the patriotic character of the 1945 Sino-Soviet agreement on Port Arthur by which the Soviet Union obtained a military base on Chinese soil. In particular, Mikoyan wondered how the CCP's support for the Soviet base in Port Arthur squared with their opposition to the US base at Qingdao. Mao replied that whereas the Americans were in China for oppression, the Soviet forces were at Port Arthur for protection against Japanese fascism.

In subsequent negotiations with the Soviets, Mao continued to insist that the Soviet presence in Port Arthur was "beneficial," as a deterrent against imperialist aggression and a point of training for the nonexistent CCP Navy. Was Mao's enthusiasm for the Soviet military base in China genuine or was he opposed to Soviet withdrawal for tactical reasons? (To show his "pro-Soviet sentiments," as he put it.) One may judge from his reaction to Mikoyan's inquiry about the agreement that Mao was well aware of its unequal character: "Mao Zedong said, laughing, that it was not he, but Jiang Jieshi who signed this treaty." But now, that the agreement was in place, he may have wanted to keep it there, both as a token of recognition of Soviet interests and as a deterrent against US intervention in the Civil War. In other words, Mao stood to benefit from some aspects of the agreement while letting Jiang Jieshi take the blame for signing yet another unequal treaty with a foreign power.

Stalin may have sensed Mao's duplicity, for on 6 February (this would have given enough time for Mikoyan to send back his report to Stalin on the exchange on Port Arthur and receive instructions) the Soviet envoy brought up Port Arthur at the beginning of the conversation, saying right away that Moscow considered the agreement "an unequal treaty, concluded in order to prevent the Guomintang's collusion with Japan and the USA against the USSR and the liberation movement in

China.” Mikoyan records the Chinese reaction: “The appraisal of this treaty as unequal was so unexpected for Mao Zedong and the members of the Politburo that it caused their frank astonishment.” Mao asked to keep the base in Port Arthur, though this time he said, very importantly, that the Soviet Union could withdraw its troops after the defeat of “reactionaries” in China. He finished by saying: “When we become strong, then ‘you will leave China’ and we will conclude a Sino-Soviet mutual assistance treaty along the lines of the [April 1945] Soviet-Polish treaty.”

Mao did not set a specific timeframe for renegotiating the 1945 treaty, and his reference to a new treaty appears almost accidental, since in an earlier conversation with Mikoyan Mao explicitly spoke against the renunciation of the 1945 “patriotic” treaty. By his later remark he probed Stalin’s attitude to see how far Moscow would be willing to go in reordering its relationship with Communist China. Mikoyan did not challenge Mao’s long-term vision and therefore left doors open for Mao with respect to having a new treaty. In just under a year Mao’s long-term plan for signing a new treaty when China “becomes strong” took the shape of an immediate imperative and problem No. 1 on his agenda in Moscow in December 1949.

Finally, on 6 February 1949 Mao brought up the request of a loan of three hundred million dollars, insisting that China would pay every penny back with interest. Compared to his own figure of 30 million dollars suggested in July 1948, Mao’s appetite had increased by a factor of ten in six months.

Mikoyan’s memoranda of conversations with the Chinese leaders are exceptionally interesting for what they tell us about Moscow’s relations with the CCP in early 1949; they are even more interesting for what they do not tell us. For example, there is no mention anywhere of Mikoyan’s alleged proposal to divide China along the Yangzi River along the lines of the northern and southern dynasties of 420-581 AD. This allegation surfaced in the Chinese historiography of the Xibaipo talks and was explored at some length by Brian Murray in CWIHP Working Paper No. 12.¹⁵ Absence of any statement on Mikoyan’s part to this effect in the declassified stenograms does not yet amount to conclusive evidence to disprove the claims (there is no doubt that some documents in Volume 5 of *Sovetsko-Kitaiskie Otnosheniia* were arbitrarily cut and tampered with) but the spirit of discussions points away from this provocative proposition. Indeed, although some of the conversations were quite tense, Mikoyan succeeded in smoothing previous disagreements with the CCP over the mediation issue. Mao for his part agreed to let other parties and economic interests live on in China after the communist capture of state power.

At some point between 16 February and 13 March 1949 Orlov was replaced as liaison between Mao and Stalin by the Soviet economic adviser in China, Ivan Kovalev, the former People’s Transport Commissar.¹⁶ Kovalev’s first available report to Stalin, on 13 April recounts his lengthy conversation with Mao four days earlier. Mao emphasized PLA victories and voiced his confidence about the success of the impend-

ing crossing of the Yangzi River by the CCP forces. Kovalev took exception to Mao’s predictions and, citing Guomindang reinforcements south of the River, warned Stalin that the Chinese comrades were “too optimistically inclined.” One has to wonder whether previous reports on the military situation by Soviet agents in China were even more skeptical and pessimistic than Kovalev’s report which was written in the wake of remarkable PLA successes. If so, there is little wonder that Stalin was uncertain about the CCP victory in China until the very last moment.

Stalin continued to worry about the military situation in China even after the PLA had already obliterated Jiang Jieshi’s main armies and turned to mopping up the remnants of the Guomindang forces in poorly accessible southern provinces. In a cable to Kovalev on 26 May Stalin asked to convey to Mao to watch out for a potential Anglo-Franco-American intervention in the conflict. He urged Mao to take his time and prepare well for the final offensive in the south while leaving two armies in the rear to guard against a possible US invasion in Tianjin or Qingdao. If Stalin was in fact more concerned than Mao about the danger of US intervention in the Chinese Civil War, we may need to take a fresh look at the well-known argument in the historiography that one of Mao’s chief reasons for an alliance with the USSR was to seek cover under Stalin’s security umbrella.¹⁷

Relations with the United States made for another important topic in Mao-Stalin exchanges in the spring of 1949. Mao informed Stalin through Kovalev of the impending changes in CCP policy toward foreign diplomats in China; in place of non-recognition (policy of “free hands”), the CCP would establish *de facto* relations with foreign representatives (policy of “semi-free hands”). Mao likely intended to probe Stalin’s attitude toward establishment of CCP’s diplomatic relations with the West; if so, Stalin’s reply was encouraging, for on 19 April Stalin cabled Kovalev that he was not against the idea of CCP relations with Western countries, including the US, provided Washington renounced its support for the Guomindang. It was evidently with Stalin’s indirect blessing that in Nanjing, Huang Hua, the CCP Aliens Affairs Office chief, approached US ambassador John Leighton Stuart in early May, and then again in June to sound out Washington’s intentions with regard to the recognition of the communist government.

The first meeting between Huang Hua and Stuart (on 14 May) was discussed at a Politburo session on 22 May, with Kovalev present. The session was likely choreographed by Mao to make an impression (duly conveyed by Kovalev to Stalin) that Mao was taking a hard line on the Americans. Mao accused Washington of relentless support for the Guomindang, and of American military occupation of Qingdao and said that it was not in China’s interest to have Stuart in Nanjing in any case. The show paid off, for on 26 May Stalin replied with the approval of the CCP’s position with regard to the US. Mao apparently did not mention in the Politburo session that Huang Hua was the one to have initiated contacts with Stuart and that, as far as the US declassi-

fied documents suggest, his chief purpose was to make a case for US recognition of communist China.¹⁸ We do not know whether Kovalev was ever informed of Huang Hua's second meeting with Stuart (on 6 June), in which he called for ending US aid to the Guomindang, or of Huang Hua's invitation to Stuart on 28 June to visit Beijing. Mao dodged the subject of US relations in his report to Stalin on 11 June. Instead, he stressed CCP loyalty in the Soviet-led struggle against imperialism. To this end, he told Kovalev on 12 May:

If one were to depict imperialism as a lion, then in the current situation the body and the head of the lion are bound by the strong vises of the revolutionary forces, by the Soviet Union. The new democratic countries of Eastern Europe and the European Communist Parties help bind the head of this lion. We, the Chinese communists, pinched "the lion's tail and are trying to cut it off. We suppose that the cutting of the tail will in turn weaken the power of the imperialists, concentrated in the head of the lion."¹⁹

Available documents do not paint the full picture of CCP policy toward the US and Stalin's role in the triangular diplomacy. They indicate that Stalin was at least aware of some contacts between CCP representatives and Stuart, and that he was in agreement with Mao's "semi-free hands" policy. But Mao clearly played a double game, bringing Stalin's attention to the apparent US willingness to recognize his regime, all the while claiming lack of interest in such an outcome to prove his revolutionary credentials to the Soviet leader. In the meantime, Mao may have been actually interested in immediate US recognition of Communist China as a trading chip in his dealings with Stalin. There is still not enough evidence to conclude that Huang Hua's approaches to Stuart, or, for that matter, Zhou Enlai's alleged communication to American representatives on 31 May (concerning "liberal" attitudes with regard to the US within his CCP faction) were anything more than a part of Mao's careful strategizing to have a head-start in the negotiations with the Soviets.²⁰

Liu Shaoqi in Moscow

On 19 April, Stalin scheduled the return visit by writing to Mao, stating that the quick issuance of a loan to the CCP would require a signed agreement of representatives of the USSR and China. "Without such a document," argued Stalin, interpreting USSR constitutional law for Mao, "the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet does not have the right to give agreement to a loan." Stalin apparently already approved the loan to China (Mao thanked him for that on 9 April). Therefore, the real purpose of Stalin's bureaucratic move must have been to secure a return visit to Moscow by a Chinese delegation. Accordingly, Mao sent Liu Shaoqi, Gao Gang, and Wang Jiaxiang. The delegation spent most of the summer in Moscow, learning how a ruling party runs a country after capturing power. Although many things did not fit China's experience, the basic model for the political economy of the new China was adopted wholesale

from post-war Stalinism.

At several meetings with Stalin, from the informal banquet at Stalin's dacha to the Politburo session at which Liu, Gao, and Wang presented their report, topics initially discussed with Mikoyan resurfaced. At the very beginning of the first meeting on 27 June, Stalin made clear that the Chinese would get what they came for. The terms of the 300 million dollar credit were immediately clarified, all of it to be used for the purchase of Soviet goods and equipment at one percent interest to be repaid in ten years. Some Chinese commentators have considered these terms parsimonious on Stalin's part, but it was all in conformity with Mao's specific requests to Mikoyan. Maybe most striking in the 27 June transcript is Stalin's flirtation with Gao Gang, the Communist boss of Manchuria, who spoke Russian and seems to have had the best relationship with Kovalev.²¹ Manchuria could officially be the recipient of the loan, since it was already a real government. Military aid could then be passed to the CCP through Manchuria. Liu's study of the Soviet system would be easier if he was legalized as a member of the Manchurian trade delegation headed by Gao Gang. Stalin had certainly read Zhou's remark to Mikoyan about taking Manchuria "behind the Iron Curtain," but Liu probably sensed potential trouble.

Nonetheless, Zhou's report to Mao must have been basically positive, since on 30 June Mao published his "leaning to one side" article, essentially entering the Soviet camp. On 4 July, Liu followed up with a report to Stalin elaborating on one-sidedness, and on 6 July sent another letter with questions he wished to ask Stalin. This same letter requested the chance to meet with responsible cadres from a long list of institutions. Central and local organizations of the party, state, economy, and culture all fell in Liu's domain of interest, ranging from the State Bank to the MGB (Ministry of State Security, later renamed the KGB). He was clearly planning a long visit. The CCP knew how to fight, but now they needed to learn how to rule, especially in the cities where they had never held power in peacetime.

The second meeting on 11 July, according to Kovalev's unpublished memoirs, ran into trouble when Stalin refused to make commitments to aid the liberation of Taiwan.²² The version presented here from Liu's files (as well as the Chinese translator Shi Zhe's memoirs) makes no mention of this topic. Again according to Kovalev, Liu and Stalin agreed to continue discussion at their next meeting on 27 July. According to Liu's record of the 11 July meeting, Stalin continued with uncomfortable references to Manchuria's semi-autonomous status, asking with the Chinese Northeast as an example, whether the regions obeyed the center. Liu replied "Yes," but Stalin continued by suggesting that the Dairen issues be handled directly between the Soviet authorities there and Gao Gang's Northeast Bureau. Worse than irritating Liu, these encouragements seem to have gone to Gao Gang's head.

At the meeting on 27 July, seemingly in parallel with Liu's request for aid against Taiwan, Gao suggested Soviet southward military expansion in China toward that end, a goal that

had already been requested as part of air defense for Shanghai. Finally, he got carried away and although the exact context remains unclear, the phrase “17th Soviet Republic” was heard, although probably in some very hyperbolic or hypothetical sense.²³ The Soviet comrades applauded, Liu grew silent and furious, and Stalin tried to laugh off the *faux pas* by labeling Gao Gang as a second Zhang Zuolin, the warlord of a semi-autonomous Manchuria in the 1910s and 1920s. Liu telegraphed Beijing. Gao was recalled to China. Unfortunately, this is all that the new documents can tell us about the still sensitive “Gao Gang affair.”²⁴

Finally, although Stalin did not grant Liu’s request to visit a nuclear installation, he did conduct “atomic diplomacy” by implying that the Soviet Union had or soon would have nuclear weapons. Liu, claims Kovalev, was shown a filmed explosion, purported to be a Soviet atom test, although this was a full month before the “Joe One,” Stalin’s first bomb. At the 11 July meeting, Stalin also noted that the USSR was preparing “faster than them [the Americans]” to avoid nuclear blackmail. “If they use nuclear weapons, we will also use nuclear weapons.”

Several times Stalin tried to stop the obsequious groveling, as Mikoyan had also criticized the “shyness” of the CCP. Parties do not obey other parties, Stalin insisted to Liu, but Liu was under orders and probably Stalin was not convincing enough in his insistence. Stalin was used to flattery and could take it in stride. Stalin may also have been a little concerned by the patently false and pro-Stalin picture of inter-party relations in the 1920s that Mao had drawn for Mikoyan. On 27 July, he came out directly and asked Liu, if he [Stalin] had wronged the CCP. “No” was the answer. Having given the Chinese their chance to air grievances, Stalin may have considered this chapter behind him, but Liu’s forbearance was not necessarily enough to assuage Mao’s historical conscience. The question of what to do with the 1945 treaty was explicitly left undecided until Mao’s visit to be arranged immediately after the founding of the PRC. Stalin pushed for an early date and a 1 January 1950 plan became a 1 October 1949 reality.

Mao at Last

And yet, even then, after Mao had stood up on Tiananmen to declare that China had stood up, Stalin did not immediately issue an invitation. On 10 November 1949, Zhou visited Soviet Ambassador Roshchin and began the conversation by noting that “Mao Zedong has long cherished the hope of visiting the Soviet Union.” Kovalev had been approached on 5 November, a telegram had been sent to Moscow on 8 November, and on 10 November Zhou had been given “plenipotentiary rights” to pursue this goal, so that Mao could “personally congratulate Cde. Stalin on his [70th] birthday.”²⁵

A month later, on 9 December, Mao’s train (with Roshchin on board) crossed the Sino-Soviet border. Mao was on his way at last. In recent years an ever-larger body of material has illuminated the summit of communist titans, men whose absolute control of hundreds of millions gave them a historical stature, larger and harsher than anything we have seen before or since. Stalin

and Hitler meet only in the furnace of creative minds. Stalin and Mao really did meet, though only once. Russian memoranda of the two principal conversations as well as coded telegrams Mao sent back to Beijing have been published by CWIHP.²⁶ At the birthday celebration in the Bolshoi Theater, Mao stood beside Stalin and gave the first speech, both his special place and shared subordination reaffirmed by the same action. Again, Mao’s privileged position allowed for the re-negotiation of the 1945 Treaty, but only following the basic premises imposed by Stalin on Jiang—an anti-Japanese orientation, the independence of Mongolia, and exclusive, extensive Soviet influence in the northern borderlands, Xinjiang and Manchuria.

The airing of authoritative views on both sides by senior go-betweens made it easier to formulate common policies on a wide range of issues, but already some future problem areas can be discerned. The contentious July meetings made clear that Stalin hesitated to support a Taiwan invasion, the last necessary step to unify China. The 1945 Treaty would only be discussed by the bosses directly. It is no surprise that when Stalin and Mao meet on the very day of his arrival in Moscow, Mao raised the treaty issue almost immediately and shortly later the possibility of receiving Soviet aid to retake Taiwan. Stalin seemed unwilling to satisfy either agenda and did not schedule a next conversation until 22 January, leaving Mao, in his own words, nothing to do but “eat, shit (*lashi*), and sleep.”²⁷

The borderlands of Manchuria and Xinjiang would also remain a difficult subject of policy-planning and joint activity. The Russians had built a railway and port in China and still felt somewhat entitled to them. Although these did involve economic and strategic advantages as well, what the Chinese resented most was the Russian sense of entitlement. Stalin had excellent sensitivities for the psychological moments in international, interethnic and intercultural relations, but his solution was not to give up the Tsarist legacies, but to make the treaties look more equal. So, for example, just as the “secret” supplementary agreement to the friendship treaty gave Russians and Chinese the exclusive rights to invest in and manage ventures in Manchuria and Xinjiang, in identical language foreign influence is excluded from the Russian Far East and Soviet Central Asia.

For Mao, this was all window-dressing on another round of unequal treaties, but he would have to wait until Stalin was in his grave to voice his indignation.²⁸ The trip, long wished for, produced mixed results. The huge credit and the pledge of thousands of experts to rebuild China was a big success, with Stalin adding a symbolic regal touch to the aid plan by giving Mao a jet squadron, pilots and all, to be transported together with Mao’s personal train back to Beijing. The actual experience of Russia and Russians does not really seem to have been to Mao’s taste. He and Stalin were never able to find the right foot from which to start their partnership, nor did they succeed in having a single moment of informal connection, the only hope for confidence building. Mao would later argue that Stalin only began to trust the “Chinese Tito” when PRC troops began dying in Korea, but he himself, of course, would never

trust Stalin again.²⁹ Perhaps, the excessive time and contrived efforts necessary to arrange a first meeting soured both Stalin and Mao on each other, even before they met. The documents translated below fill in a few more blanks in this fateful and complicated puzzle.

◊. The authors thank Jim Hershberg for insightful comments.

1. Andrei Ledovskii, *SSSR i Stalin v Sudbakh Kitaiia* (Moskva: Pamiatniki Istoricheskoi Mysli, 1999), 50.
2. See Dieter Heinzig, *Die Sowjetunion und das kommunistische China 1945-1950: Der beschwerliche Weg zum Buendnis* (Nomos: Baden-Baden, 1998), 202-205; Odd Arne Westad, *Decisive Encounters: The Chinese Civil War, 1946-1950* (Stanford: Stanford UP, 2003), 166-7.
3. See Andrei Ledovskii, Raisa Mirovitskaya, and Vladimir Miasnikov, *Sovetsko-Kitaiskie Otmosheniia*, Vol. 5, Part 2 (Moscow: Pamiatniki Istoricheskoi Mysli, 2005), 509-510 for full text of the report or Brian Murray, "Stalin, the Cold War and the Division of China: A Multi-Archival Mystery," *CWIHP Working Paper No. 12* (Washington D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center, June 1995), 12, for discussion of the report.
4. Westad, *Decisive Encounters*, 157.
5. *Sovetsko-Kitaiskie Otmosheniia*, Vol. 5, Part 2, 402.
6. Westad makes this argument in *Decisive Encounters*, 233.
7. Among foreign visitors whom Stalin received while vacationing in the vicinity of the Black Sea were, for example, Averell Harriman (in August 1945), Khorloogiin Choibalsan (August 1947), and Zhou Enlai (October 1950).
8. Murray, *CWIHP Working Paper No. 12*, 9.
9. The illness may well have been real, but Mao's doctor also provides cases of Mao feigning sickness for political reasons. Li Zhisui, *The Private Life of Chairman Mao* (Arrow: London, 1994), 105-6.
10. The full exchange of notes between Mao and Stalin can be found in *Cold War International History Project Bulletin* 6-7 (Winter 1995/1996), 27-29.
11. Andrei Ledovskii, *SSSR i Stalin v sudbakh Kitaiia*, 54-65.
12. There were twelve talks in all, primarily with Mao and Zhou Enlai, but also with Liu Shaoqi, Ren Bishi and Zhu De, mainly dealing with economic issues (some of these are not included here). Shi Zhe, the Chinese leaders' Russian interpreter, has left us memoirs of the meetings that match in large part, although some parts, such as Mao's warning to Mikoyan about "false friends" do not appear in the Russian documents. In general, Mikoyan seems to have always had the last word in the Russian, while Mao is more verbally impressive in Chinese. Shi Zhe, *Zai Lishi Juren Shenbian: Shi Zhe Huiyilu (xiudingben)* (Revised Version) (Zhongyang Wenxian: Beijing, 1996), 372-388.
13. For samples of Mao's grievances see Zhang Shu Guang and Chen Jian, "The Emerging Disputes Between Beijing and Moscow: Ten Newly Available Chinese Documents, 1956-1958," *Cold War International History Project Bulletin* 6-7 (Winter 1995/1996), p. 148.
14. See Sergey Radchenko, "New Documents on Mongolia in the Cold War," in this issue of the *Cold War International History Project Bulletin*.
15. See, for example, argument to this effect in Liu Xiao, *Chu Shi Sulian Ba Nian* (Beijing: Zhonggong dangshi ziliao chubanshe, 1986).
16. Orlov was reportedly recalled to the USSR on a false accusa-

tion, and his subsequent fate is unknown. See *Sovetsko-Kitaiskie Otmosheniia*, Vol. 5, Part 2, 510.

17. For example, see Odd Arne Westad, "Fighting for Friendship: Mao, Stalin, and the Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1950," *Cold War International History Project Bulletin* 8-9 (Winter 1996/ 97), 224.
18. On Huang Hua's contacts with US diplomats see *Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1949*, Vol. VIII (Washington D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1978), 741-767. For the US perspective, see Nancy B. Tucker, *Patterns in the Dust: Chinese-American Relations and the Recognition Controversy, 1949-1950* (New York: Columbia UP, 1983), p. 47. For a recent discussion of these contacts with the benefit of Chinese sources see Chen Jian, *Mao's China and the Cold War* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2001), pp. 41-43."
19. The indented citation is from Kovalev with the quotation inside it a verbatim from Mao.
20. For Zhou Enlai's "demarche" to the Americans see *FRUS 1949*, Vol. VIII, 357-360.
21. On 9 March 1954, Liu Shaoqi and Zhou Enlai spoke to Soviet Ambassador Pavel F. Yudin about Gao Gang's past errors, including antagonistic relations with Liu and overly intimate relations with Kovalev. On this, see Yudin's May undated May diary entry located in the Russian Federation Foreign Policy Archive (AVPRF). The document can also be found in both Russian and English in the CWIHP Virtual Archive at <http://www.cwihip.org>.
22. On the Taiwan discussion and the Gao Gang affair as presented in Kovalev's unpublished memoirs, see Goncharov, Lewis, and Xue, *Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao and the Korean War* (Stanford University Press: Stanford, CA, 1993), 67-75.
23. Although most of us remember the Soviet Union with fifteen republics, in 1949 the Finno-Karelian republic brought the count to sixteen.
24. On the silence of Chinese memoir materials and other documents regarding these two incidents during the Liu visit to Moscow, see Heinzig, 348-358, especially 354.
25. David Wolff, "One Finger's Worth of Historical Events": New Russian and Chinese Evidence on the Sino-Soviet Alliance and Split, 1948-1959," *CWIHP Working Paper No. 30* (Washington D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center, August 2000), 38-9.
26. *Cold War International History Project Bulletin* 6-7 (Winter 1995/1996), 5-9; Zhang Shuguang and Chen Jian, eds. *Chinese Communist Foreign Policy and the Cold War in Asia: New Documentary Evidence, 1944-1950* Chicago: Imprint Publications, 1996, 128-142.
27. Shi Zhe, 437.
28. Mao expressed himself in this manner to Soviet Ambassador Pavel Yudin on 31 March 1956, his first reaction to Khrushchev's secret speech to the 20th Party Congress. *Cold War International History Project Bulletin* 6-7 (Winter 1995/ 96), 164-167.
29. Ibid.



DOCUMENT No. 1

Cable, Stalin [Kuznetsov] to Mao Zedong [via Terebin], 15 June 1947

[Source: *Arkhiv Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii (APRF), Fond (F.) 39, Opis (Op.) 1, Delo (D.) 31, List (L.) 23. Reprinted in Andrei Ledovskii, Raisa Mirovitskaia and Vladimir Miasnikov, Sovetsko-Kitaiskie Otnosheniia, Vol. 5, Book 1, 1946-February 1950 (Moscow: Pamiatniki Istoricheskoi Mysli, 2005), p. 327. Translated for CWIHP from Russian by Sergey S. Radchenko.]*

To Terebin¹

Convey to Mao Zedong that the VKP(b) CC² considers it desirable to have him come to Moscow without any kind of disclosure about it. If Mao Zedong also considers this necessary, then, it appears to us, it is better to do this through Harbin. If needed, [we] will send a plane.

Telegraph the results of the talk with Mao Zedong and his wishes.

F[yodor Fedotovich] Kuznetsov³

15.VI.1947

1. Terebin (real name Andrei Iakovlevich Orlov) was a Soviet doctor and Soviet operative in Mao's base in Yan'an.

2. Vsesoiuznaia Kommunisticheskaia Partiiia (bolshevikov), the All-Union Communist Party (of the Bolsheviks)—the Soviet Communist Party.

3. Chief of the GRU (Soviet military intelligence). Though Kuznetsov's signature appeared on several cables to and from Orlov, Stalin was the real sender and recipient of this correspondence.

**DOCUMENT No. 2**

Cable, Stalin [Kuznetsov] to Mao Zedong [via Terebin], 1 July 1947

[Source: *APRF: F. 39, Op. 1, D. 31, L. 24. Reprinted in Andrei Ledovskii, Raisa Mirovitskaia and Vladimir Miasnikov, Sovetsko-Kitaiskie Otnosheniia, Vol. 5, Book 1, 1946-February 1950 (Moscow: Pamiatniki Istoricheskoi Mysli, 2005), p. 333. Partly reprinted in Odd Arne Westad, Decisive Encounters: The Chinese Civil War, 1946-1950 (Stanford: Stanford UP, 2003), p. 167. Translated for CWIHP from Russian by Sergey Radchenko.]*

To Terebin:

All your pieces of information with regard to Mao Zedong, as well as on the situation on the fronts have been received.

1)¹ In view of the forthcoming operations and in view that Mao Zedong's absence might have an adverse affect on the transactions, we consider it appropriate to postpone Mao Zedong's trip temporarily.

[...]

F. Kuznetsov

1.VII.1947

1. "1)" indicates that probably this cable lists several (or at least two) points, either still classified or deliberately excluded by the editors of *Sovetsko-Kitaiskie Otnosheniia*.

**DOCUMENT No. 3**

Cable, Stalin [Kuznetsov] to Mao Zedong [via Terebin], 16 December 1947

[Source: *APRF: F. 39, Op. 1, D. 31, L. 25. Reprinted in Andrei Ledovskii, Raisa Mirovitskaia and Vladimir Miasnikov, Sovetsko-Kitaiskie Otnosheniia, Vol. 5, Book 1, 1946-February 1950 (Moscow: Pamiatniki Istoricheskoi Mysli, 2005), p. 378. Translated for CWIHP from Russian by Sergey Radchenko.]*

To Terebin:

In reply to the message about Mao Zedong's visit to Moscow in 1948, convey to Mao Zedong that

"The Soviet government will welcome the visit of Mao Zedong to the USSR and, naturally, will provide him connection with China and a personal radio."

Send by flash cable [*molniruite*] Mao Zedong's receipt and reaction to this telegram.

Kuznetsov

16.XII.1947





Mao Zedong in Moscow, December 1949 (courtesy PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs)

DOCUMENT No. 4

Cable, Terebin to Stalin [via Kuznetsov], 17 December 1947

[Source: APRF, F. 39, Op. 1, D. 31, L. 26. Reprinted in Andrei Ledovskii, Raisa Mirovitskaia and Vladimir Miasnikov, *Sovetsko-Kitaiskie Otnosheniia*, Vol. 5, Book 1, 1946-February 1950 (Moscow: Pamiatniki Istoricheskoi Mysli, 2005), p. 378. Translated for CWIHP from Russian by Sergey Radchenko.]

To Com[rade] F. Kuznetsov

Reporting:

1. Received the telegram at 00:35 on [17 December] local time (19:35 [16 December] Moscow).
2. On 17 December at 07:30 personally, without an interpreter, passed the received [information] to Mao Zedong.
3. Mao Zedong was exceedingly glad about the [information] conveyed. [He] immediately said: "Very good, now I will be able to live there for three months, half a year." Said that he is 54 years old, he has long wanted to go, almost all the leading persons had been there, naming many: [CCP CC Member] Zhou Enlai, [CCP CC Member] Ren Bishi, [CCP Deputy Commander in Chief] Peng Dehuai, [CCP General] Ye Jianying, [CCP CC Secretariat Member] Wang Ming and others. Asked me whether there are instructions that I go with him.

To my question what else should be inquired [from Moscow], [and] regarding his suggested dates for the trip, he said that there was no need to inquire about anything else.

Touching on the dates—after taking Pingsuilu, when one can get through. Now one cannot give a break to CKS [Jiang Jieshi], one should strike him. Then turned to the local questions. The conversation ended at this. During the conversation [he] was

fairly lively and very content. Offered me to stay here somewhat longer.

Terebin.

17.XII.1947



DOCUMENT No. 5

Cable, Stalin [Kuznetsov] to Mao Zedong [via Terebin], 20 April 1948

[Source: APRF, F. 39, Op. 1, D. 31, Ll. 28-29. Archival citation in accordance with Andrei Ledovskii, Raisa Mirovitskaia and Vladimir Miasnikov, *Sovetsko-Kitaiskie Otnosheniia*, Vol. 5, Book 1, 1946-February 1950 (Moscow: Pamiatniki Istoricheskoi Mysli, 2005), pp. 411-412. Published in translation in Odd Arne Westad (ed.), *Brothers in Arms*, pp. 298-299; translated for CWIHP from Russian by Sergey Radchenko.]

To Terebin to be passed to Mao Zedong.

We have received both letters from Comrade Mao Zedong from 30 November 1947, and 15 March 1948. We could not react to them immediately because we were checking some information necessary for our answer. Now that the facts are verified, we can answer both letters.

First. The answer to the letter of 30 November 1947. We are very grateful for the information from Comrade Mao Zedong. We agree with the assessment of the situation given by Comrade Mao Zedong. We have doubts only about one point in the letter, where it is said that "In the period of the final victory of the Chinese Revolution, following the example of the USSR and Yugoslavia, all political parties except the CCP should leave the political scene, which will significantly strengthen the Chinese Revolution."

We do not agree with this. We think that the various opposition parties in China which are representing the middle strata of the Chinese population and are opposing the Guomindang clique will exist for a long time. And the CCP will have to involve them in cooperation against the Chinese reactionary forces and imperialist powers, while keeping hegemony, i.e., the leading position, in its hands. It is possible that some representatives of these parties will have to be included into the Chinese people's democratic government and the government itself has to be proclaimed a coalition government in order to widen the basis of this government among the population and to isolate imperialists and their Guomindang agents. It is necessary to keep in mind that the Chinese government in its policy will be a national revolutionary-democratic government, not a communist one, after the victory of the People's

Liberation Armies of China, at any rate in the period immediately after the victory, the length of which is difficult to define now.

This means that nationalization of all land and abolition of private ownership of land, confiscation of the property of all industrial and trade bourgeoisie from petty to big, confiscation of property belonging not only to big landowners but to middle and small holders exploiting hired labor, will not be fulfilled for the present. These reforms have to wait for some time.

It has to be said for your information that there are other parties in Yugoslavia besides the communists which form part of the People's Front.

Second. The answer to the letter from Comrade Mao Zedong from 15 March 1948. We are very grateful to Comrade Mao Zedong for the detailed information on military and political questions. We agree with all the conclusions given by Comrade Mao Zedong in this letter. We consider as absolutely correct Comrade Mao Zedong's thoughts concerning the creation of a central government of China and including in it representatives of the liberal bourgeoisie.

With Communist greetings

Stalin

20 April 1948



DOCUMENT No. 6

Cable, Terebin to Stalin, 22 April 1948

[Source: APRF, F. 39, Op. 1, D. 31, Ll. 27. Reprinted in Andrei Ledovskii, Raisa Mirovitskaia and Vladimir Miasnikov, *Sovetsko-Kitaiskie Otnosheniia, Vol. 5, Book 1, 1946-February 1950 (Moscow: Pamiatniki Istoricheskoi Mysli, 2005), pp. 412-413. Translated for CWIHP from Russian by Sergey Radchenko.*]

From Cde. Terebin

Reporting: on the evening of 22 April Zhou Enlai and Ren Bishi invited me to [visit with] them and informed that in the beginning of May Mao Zedong will go to Moscow. Due to secrecy considerations Zhu De and Liu Shaoqi will not go.¹ On the pretext of illness and rest he [?] will, allegedly, rest here [?].

Mao Zedong will be accompanied by [his] wife [Jiang Qing] and daughter, as well as [interpreter] Shi Zhe. First [they] will go by car, [then] across the adversary's territory by horses for

10-15 days, and [then] again by car.

Probably [he] will not go to the capital of Manchuria [Harbin], but will stop nearby at one of the points, to which responsible people will be called for a meeting.

I was asked whether I had any instructions about the trip and whether I will be coming. Requested to inquire from you on my behalf.

To my question about Mao Zedong's opinion [as to whether I should come], [they] replied that he did not talk about this. Zhou Enlai and Ren Bishi consider that [I] should not go, [but] provide for connection with you [Stalin]; for Melnikov² to work here as a doctor; we need a doctor, and this is more convenient from the point of secrecy, they added.

The radio, which had already arrived, is urgently being moved here. Zhou Enlai and Ren Bishi are leaving to go to Liu Shaoqi in the nearest future.

Requesting your urgent instructions, for the departure is planned for 4-5 May.

Terebin.

22.IV.1948

1. *Editor's Note:* The meaning of this statement is unclear in the original, literally, it states "because of secrecy considerations [he] will not go to Zhu De and Liu Shaoqi."

2. Apparently, another Soviet doctor and operative in Yan'an; real name unknown.



DOCUMENT No. 7

Cable, Mao Zedong to Filippov [Stalin], 26 April 1948

[Source: APRF: F. 39, Op. 1, D. 31, Ll. 30-31. Archival citation in accordance with Andrei Ledovskii, Raisa Mirovitskaia and Vladimir Miasnikov, *Sovetsko-Kitaiskie Otnosheniia, Vol. 5, Book 1, 1946-February 1950 (Moscow: Pamiatniki Istoricheskoi Mysli, 2005), pp. 415-416. Also published in Odd Arne Westad (ed.), Brothers in Arms, pp. 299-300. Translated for CWIHP from Russian by Sergey Radchenko.*]

Com[rade] Filippov,¹

1. I have received the letter of 20 April. Completely agree with it.

2. Our CC [Central Committee] has already moved to an area

near Shijiazhuang in Hebei province. It has merged and united with the working committee of the CC which used to consist of Liu Shaoqi, Zhu De, [and] Dong Biwu.

3. We passed through the northern part of Shanxi province and the northwestern part of Hebei province, where we met and had conversations with the comrades from the Jinsui subbureau of the CCP CC and the comrades from the Jinchaji bureau of the CCP CC as well as with the masses. On our way we saw that the work with rectifying party ranks, carrying out land reform, reconstruction, and development of agriculture and industry, work on supplying the fronts, on helping victims of various disasters, work with non-party progressive gentry, and so on had moved in the right direction.

Leftist tendencies, which came into being in the provinces during the two years following the Japanese capitulation, have already been thoroughly corrected. A new work spirit can be felt everywhere.

4. I decided to move forward my visit [to] the USSR. I am planning to leave the Fobin district (100 km to the north of Shijiazhuang) in Hebei province in the beginning of the month and under cover of troops to cross the railway Beiping-Kalgan [Beijing-Zhangjiakou] (the Guomindang has concentrated around 100,000 troops on this railway). Possibly I will be able to arrive in Harbin in the beginning or in the middle of July. Then, from Harbin — to you.

I will be accompanied by Comrade Ren Bishi, member of the CCP CC Politburo. He has been to the USSR more than once, [and he] knows Russian. On my arrival at Harbin I am planning to invite to go with me another member of the Politburo, Comrade Chen Yun. He is now in charge of the industry and labor movement in Manchuria; he was in the USSR in 1936.

Besides them, I'll have with me two secretaries and several cipher officers and radio operators. I have organized such a big group for my trip to the USSR because I will ask for advice and guidance from the comrades in the VKP(b) CC on political, military, economic, and other important questions; besides, if you agree, we are planning to conduct studies in the USSR on military, economic, governmental, and party questions.

Besides, if possible, I would like to travel to the countries of Eastern and Southeastern Europe in order to study the work of the people's front and other kinds of work.

We are planning to travel for one to three months. If you agree with this plan, we will act according to it. If not, then, of course, there is only one way out — to come by myself.

5. My health is not good. I hope that the two Russian doctors who live here (one of them can speak Chinese) will accompany me to the USSR and then return here with me. Terebin's

radio station will go with us ("to be in touch on the way" [he] said but did not write. Terebin). On arrival in Harbin, we will leave the radio station there.

Please indicate to me whether we can do this.

Mao Zedong

26 April 1948

1. *Editor's Note:* 'Comrade Filippov' was Stalin's *nom de guerre*.



DOCUMENT No. 8

Cable, Stalin to Mao Zedong, 29 April 1948

[Source: APRF: F. 39, Op. 1, D. 31, L. 32. Reprinted in *Andrei Ledovskii, Raisa Mirovitskaia and Vladimir Miasnikov, Sovetsko-Kitaiskie Otnosheniia, Vol. 5, Book 1, 1946-February 1950 (Moscow: Pamiatniki Istoricheskoi Mysli, 2005), p. 417. Translated for CWIHP from Russian by Sergey Radchenko.*]

To Com[rade] Mao Zedong

Your letter dated 26 April has been received. [I] agree with your plan for the trip to the USSR. You may take along whom-ever and however many people you need. Both Russian doctors must depart with you. [I] agree with leaving one radio station in Harbin. Will talk about the rest at the meeting.

Stalin

29.IV.1948



DOCUMENT No. 9

Cable, Filippov [Stalin] to Mao Zedong, 10 May 1948

[Source: APRF: F. 39, Op. 1, D. 31, L. 33. Reprinted in *Andrei Ledovskii, Raisa Mirovitskaia and Vladimir Miasnikov, Sovetsko-Kitaiskie Otnosheniia, Vol. 5, Book 1, 1946-February 1950 (Moscow: Pamiatniki Istoricheskoi Mysli, 2005), p. 419. Translated for CWIHP from Russian by Sergey Radchenko.*]

To Com[rade] Mao Zedong

In connection with the possible development of events in the areas of your presence and, in particular, with the commenced

offensive of [prominent GMD General] Fu Zuoyi's forces on Yuxian, i.e. in the direction of those areas through which you plan to go to us, we are concerned whether your absence might influence the course of events, and also to what extent your passage is safe.

On this basis, should you not postpone your trip to visit us somewhat [?]

In case you decide not to postpone your departure, [we] ask to let us know what help we could offer you in your passage. Do you not consider it expedient that we send our plane to you [?] In this case [we] ask [you] to let us know where to send the plane and when.

Waiting for your reply.

Filippov

10.V.1948



DOCUMENT No. 10

Cable, Mao Zedong to Filippov [Stalin], 10 May 1948

[Source: APRF: F. 39, Op. 1, D. 31, L. 34. Reprinted in Andrei Ledovskii, Raisa Mirovitskaia and Vladimir Miasnikov, Sovetsko-Kitaiskie Otnosheniia, Vol. 5, Book 1, 1946-February 1950 (Moscow: Pamiatniki Istoricheskoi Mysli, 2005), p. 421. Translated for CWIHP from Russian by Sergey Radchenko.]

Com[rade] Filippov

Today received your letter. Very grateful to you.

Under the current circumstances it is expedient to postpone my trip to you for a short time.

Requesting that you send a plane or a boat to the Shandong peninsula for my trip to you. But in the nearest future in view of the fact that I feel unwell (dizziness, the brain is very weak), cannot tolerate the vibration of the motor in the plane. Need a rest for a short time, after which can fly by plane. [I] will tell about the place of the aerodrome and port after finding out.

Mao Zedong.

10.V.1948



DOCUMENT No. 11

Cable, Mao Zedong to Stalin, 4 July 1948

[Source: APRF: F. 39, Op. 1, D. 31, Ll. 35-36. Reprinted in Andrei Ledovskii, Raisa Mirovitskaia and Vladimir Miasnikov, Sovetsko-Kitaiskie Otnosheniia, Vol. 5, Book 1, 1946-February 1950 (Moscow: Pamiatniki Istoricheskoi Mysli, 2005), pp. 445-446. Translated for CWIHP from Russian by Sergey Radchenko.]

Com[rade] Stalin!

The condition of my health, in comparison with two months ago, is considerably better. I decided to go to you [Moscow] at the nearest time.

There are three ways of coming to you: by air, by sea, and by land. But in all cases we must pass through Harbin, as I need to speak to a number of responsible comrades from Manchuria.

I hope that it will be possible to fly by plane for this is the quickest and also suits me the best on account of my health. For flying by plane one may use aerodromes in Shijiazhuang and Weixian.

The aerodrome in Weixian is the closest to Dairen and the safest. This aerodrome is to the south of Weixian at the point of Ershilibu, between Weixian and Fangzi.

Aerodrome data: the length from north to south 2,224 meters, width from east to west 368 meters. The runway: length 2,000 meters, width 96 meters. But here, everyday, from the morning until the evening, 6-7 times a day, enemy transport planes fly from Qingdao, Jinan and back through Weixian and the zones closest to it.

Will you have any kind of difficulties in sending planes from Dairen to the aerodrome in Weixian to get us [?] (The plane upon arrival and landing at the aerodrome will remain there for 15-20 minutes, for the time necessary to board it).

If you consider that the aerodrome in Weixian is not suitable for transporting us from there, then the aerodrome in Shijiazhuang is even more complicated, for the distance from you is even greater, and the transport planes of the GMD also fly through here.

In this case [I] ask you to think about the possibility of sending a ship into one of the ports of the Shandong peninsula or to Rongcheng, Lidao, or Shidai for transporting us to Dairen.

If it is difficult to transport us by sea as well, then one is left with thinking of a land trip.

Using the moment when the main forces of Fu Zuoyi are drawn

into military operations in border areas of the eastern parts of Hebei and Rehe provinces, and [when] one senses relative desertedness at Pingsuilu, one could, under the cover of and in the company of military units, sneak through Pingsuilu, though the liberated areas of Rehe province to Harbin. But one will require about one month's time for this route. During the hot time obstacles may arise easily on the way due to my illness.

If it were possible to transport us by plane from the aerodrome in Weixian through Dairen (or other points) to Harbin, then we intend to leave a point near Shijiazhuang by car on about 15th of this month. After about a week [we] will reach Weixian, where [we] will stop for 2-3 days.

Hope the plane will fly into Weixian on about 25th of this month for transporting us.

The concrete time of the plane's arrival (day and hour) could be determined with you by radio after our arrival in Weixian.

If [you] decide to transport us by sea then we hope the ship will arrive at the end of this month at the appointed port. On about 15th of this month, we will leave from a point near Shijiazhuang.

If both the air and the sea routes are impossible for transporting us, we will in any case leave on the 15th of this month towards the north. But in this case one can only arrive in Harbin by the middle of August. We have a total of 20 (twenty) people (including Terebin, Melnikov, encoders, radio operators, secretaries). The total weight is over 3 (three) thousand kg (inclusive here of all the people).

Therefore, if [we] fly by air, it is necessary to send two transport (passenger) planes.

Request that you allow whichever of the aforementioned routes is suitable, and inform me.

Mao Zedong

4 July 1948.



DOCUMENT No. 12

Cable, Stalin to Mao Zedong [via Terebin], 14 July 1948

[Source: APRF: F. 39, Op. 1, D. 31, L. 37. Reprinted in *Andrei Ledovskii, Raisa Mirovitskaia and Vladimir Miasnikov, Sovetsko-Kitaiskie Otnosheniia, Vol. 5, Book 1, 1946-February 1950 (Moscow: Pamiatniki Istoricheskoi Mysli, 2005), p. 447. Translated for CWIHP from Russian by Sergey Radchenko.*]

To Terebin

Convey to Mao Zedong the following:

“In view of the commenced grain harvest work the leading comrades will leave for provinces in August, where they will remain until November. Therefore the VKP(b) CC is asking Cde. Mao Zedong to time his visit to Moscow by the end of November so as to have an opportunity to see all the leading comrades.”

Stalin.

14.VII.1948



DOCUMENT No. 13

Cable, Terebin to Stalin, 14 July 1948

[Source: APRF: F. 39, Op. 1, D. 31, L. 38. Reprinted in *Andrei Ledovskii, Raisa Mirovitskaia and Vladimir Miasnikov, Sovetsko-Kitaiskie Otnosheniia, Vol. 5, Book 1, 1946-February 1950 (Moscow: Pamiatniki Istoricheskoi Mysli, 2005), pp. 447-448. Translated for CWIHP from Russian by Sergey Radchenko.*]

Reporting:

14 [July] at 14:30 local time conveyed Stalin's telegram to Mao Zedong. Ren Bishi was translating. Mao Zedong listened with a subtle smile, said: “good, good” and then asked to convey to you the following text, dictated by him and translated by Ren Bishi:

“Com[rade] Stalin.

Agree with your opinion, related in the telegram dated 14 July. Will postpone trip to you to late October-early November.

Mao Zedong.

14 July.”

The small conversation, which took place afterwards, will be passed on as a separate issue.

Terebin

14.VII.1948



DOCUMENT No. 14

Cable, Terebin to Stalin [via Kuznetsov], 17 July 1948

[Source: APRF: F. 39, Op. 1, D. 31, Ll. 39-40. Reprinted in Andrei Ledovskii, Raisa Mirovitskaia and Vladimir Miasnikov, *Sovetsko-Kitaiskie Otnosheniia, Vol. 5, Book 1, 1946-February 1950 (Moscow: Pamiatniki Istoricheskoi Mysli, 2005), pp. 448-449. Translated for CWIHP from Russian by Sergey Radchenko.]*

To Comrade F. Kuznetsov

Reporting to you on my personal impressions and observations when conveying Stalin's telegram to Mao Zedong.

Having heard Ren Bishi's translation of Stalin's telegram to Mao Zedong, Mao Zedong asked: "is such attention really attributed to grain harvest work in the USSR that the leading persons of the party CC go out to do it?" I replied in the affirmative. Ren Bishi—as well. Mao Zedong asked again: "and what percent does the USSR gain from the agriculture, why, is it bigger than from industry, or smaller."

My reply: "Exactly what percent I do not know now, but in any case it is fairly big." And added that great significance is attributed to grain harvest work in the USSR."

Then Mao Zedong and Ren Bishi were saying that soon, probably, the main master [*glavnyi khoziain*] will go for rest. The conversation was in their language but I understood. After that Mao Zedong dictated a reply telegram to Stalin.

As far as I know Mao Zedong, [which has been] for more than 6 years, his smile and words "hao, hao—good, good," at the time when he was listening to the translation, do not at all suggest that he was happy with the telegram. This could be seen quite clearly.

My personal conviction is that Mao Zedong believed that in the worst case he will be denied having planes or a ship sent to him. But even this was improbable for him, especially since the plane was offered from Moscow.

He was sure that he was going to go right now. Probably the trip became necessary for him. He waited for a reply with great

eagerness.

On 13 July after he dictated his letter, in purely Chinese spirit, I asked when to send [it], perhaps to wait one more day, Mao Zedong replied that he had asked to send it on 13 July.

He was ready for departure.

As I learned in the last few days, they have been currently preparing a series of materials for Moscow, that is: maps of GMD positions at the fronts, data on the composition of the GMD forces, I think of their own as well, data on GMD intelligence, on its structure, some data on the CCP and other [materials]. Mao Zedong's suitcases were being packed, and even leather shoes were bought (like everybody here, he is wearing fabric slippers), and a thick wool coat was tailored. Not only the issue of the trip as such, but its timing, too, had already been decided by him. The only remaining issue was by which way to go.¹ So now he is outwardly calm, polite and attentive, courteous in a purely Chinese manner. But it is hard to see his true soul. One can judge from Ren Bishi's entire appearance that he did not expect the postponement of the visit.

Melnikov told me that on 15 July Mao Zedong put the same question to him about the grain harvest work.

Terebin

17.VII.1948

1. Translation of this sentence, with minor amendments, was taken from Westad, *Decisive Encounters*, p. 232.



DOCUMENT No. 15

Cable, Terebin to Stalin [via Kuznetsov], 28 July 1948

[Source: APRF: F. 39, Op. 1, D. 31, L. 41. Reprinted in Andrei Ledovskii, Raisa Mirovitskaia and Vladimír Miasnikov, *Sovetsko-Kitaiskie Otnosheniia, Vol. 5, Book 1, 1946-February 1950 (Moscow: Pamiatniki Istoricheskoi Mysli, 2005), pp. 451-452. Translated for CWIHP from Russian by Sergey Radchenko.]*

To Com[rade] F. Kuznetsov

Transmitting just a small part of the conversation, raised by Mao Zedong himself.

Mao Zedong was saying that whereas in 1947 he was not in a hurry to visit Moscow, now, in 1948, the situation had changed and he wanted to go to Moscow as soon as possible. [He]

wants to talk about many things there, to ask advice on some questions, on some—aid, within the bounds of the possible.

Questions about which Mao Zedong intends to talk in Moscow, are essentially:

1. On relations with small democratic parties and groups (and democratic figures).
On the calling of a political consultative council.
2. On the unification of the revolutionary forces of the East and on the contacts between the com[munist] parties of the East (and others).
3. On the strategic plan of struggle against the USA and Jiang Jieshi.
4. On the restoration and creation of industry in China, including (and in particular) military, mining, transport—railroad and highways. To say there [in Moscow] what we (the CCP) need.
5. On a silver loan in the amount of 30 million American dollars.
6. On the policy (line) with regard to the establishment of diplomatic relations with England and France.
7. On a series of other important questions.

Summing up the aforesaid Mao Zedong stressed: “one needs to come to an agreement so that our political course fully coincides with the USSR.”

Other parts of the conversations will be briefly transmitted separately.

Terebin.

28.VII.1948



DOCUMENT No. 16

Cable, Mao Zedong to Stalin, 28 September 1948

[Source: APRF: F. 39, Op. 1, D. 31, L. 42. Reprinted in Andrei Ledovskii, Raisa Mirovitskaia and Vladimir Miasnikov, *Sovetsko-Kitaiskie Otnosheniia, Vol. 5, Book 1, 1946-February 1950 (Moscow: Pamiatniki Istoricheskoi Mysli, 2005), p. 463. Translated for CWIHP from Russian by Sergey Radchenko.]*

[...]

9. On a series of questions it is necessary to report personally to the VKP(b) CC and to the main master (*glavnyi khoziain*). To receive instructions I agree to come to Moscow in accordance with the time pointed out in the previous telegram. Now, in general strokes, reporting the aforementioned, [I] ask you to convey this to the VKP(b) CC and to comrade main master. Sincerely hope that they will give us instructions.

Mao Zedong

28.IX.1948



DOCUMENT No. 17

Cable, Stalin to Mao Zedong [via Terebin], 17 October 1948

[Source: APRF: F. 39, Op. 1, D. 31, L. 43. Reprinted in Andrei Ledovskii, Raisa Mirovitskaia and Vladimir Miasnikov, *Sovetsko-Kitaiskie Otnosheniia, Vol. 5, Book 1, 1946-February 1950 (Moscow: Pamiatniki Istoricheskoi Mysli, 2005), p. 468. Translated for CWIHP from Russian by Sergey Radchenko.]*

To Terebin

Convey to Mao Zedong the following:

“[I] received your letter dated 28 September 1948.

The VKP(b) CC is informed about this letter. The leading comrades will be happy to meet with you in Moscow at the end of November, as it was agreed upon. Then it will be possible to exchange opinions on all questions.

Stalin

17.X.1948



DOCUMENT No. 18

Cable, Terebin to Stalin, 17 October 1948

[Source: APRF: F. 39, Op. 1, D. 31, Ll. 44-45. Reprinted in Andrei Ledovskii, Raisa Mirovitskaia and Vladimir Miasnikov, *Sovetsko-Kitaiskie Otnosheniia, Vol. 5, Book 1, 1946-February 1950* (Moscow: Pamiatniki Istoricheskoi Mysli, 2005), pp. 468-469. Translated for CWIHP from Russian by Sergey Radchenko.]

To Com[rade] Kuznetsov

Having read the translation by Shi Zhe, Mao Zedong immediately asked me: “Can one consider that the plane will be sent[?]”

After my reply that I do not know about this, that the telegram does not say so, Mao Zedong said that if there is no plane, he will not be able to come on time.

Further he said that in July he wrote about three routes, now two [of them]—by land and by sea—have fallen through. Only one remains—by air. Asked me to request from you [information as to] whether a plane will be sent.

[In reaction to] my attempt to avoid such a request on my behalf, with which he was not happy, he said so: “You write that Mao Zedong is asking to inform him whether a plane will be sent.” Right away he explained in detail why the two routes fell through.

Then he literally dictated, and Shi Zhe translated the following: “Write that in the conversation Comrade Mao Zedong asked me (Terebin) on my (Terebin’s) behalf to transmit the conversation with Mao Zedong about his trip to Moscow.

1. The land route, as before, is difficult, [it is] cut by the enemy and is very lengthy. The sea route in view of the fact that the GMD fleet strengthened control and intelligence, is also unsafe. Therefore [we] decided to ask for a plane to be sent.
2. The danger in the vicinity of the Jiaodong railroad is less, especially given that there is a good aerodrome there (Mao Zedong has Weixian in mind. Terebin). The time—the middle of November—most expedient.

When the planes are prepared [we] ask you to inform us and we will then leave from the area near Shijiazhuang toward the aerodrome. One does not have to stop in Harbin at all, but to fly to Moscow directly, since the situation there is more or less known to us now. [CCP CC member] Chen Yun can go to Moscow straight from there.”

In the conversation Mao Zedong said that military actions are taking place in the area of Pingsuilu, that the road is fairly lengthy and inconvenient, that the weather is unfavorable for the trip. [He] stressed that not only does he not have anything to do in Harbin, but it is not profitable to show up there, keeping in mind the non-party democratic politicians who are there.

[He] stressed that the day of the departure is set by You, on the basis of the preparedness of the planes, that he will be at the aerodrome at the appointed time.

[He] counted that in all 18 people had to fly. If there is one plane, then [they] will be compelled to take fewer people, which is less convenient, but [they] will fly anyhow.

[He] suggested to get the details of the quantity of people and cargo from Ren Bishi, Ren Bishi said that the quantity of people and cargo will remain the same, as pointed out in July. If there are any changes, and there will hardly be any, he will immediately inform [me]. It was decided not to take Chen Boda, but, perhaps, Ye Jianying will fly.

In general, in the last half-a-month Mao Zedong, during meetings, on every suitable occasion, stresses that he needs to go, that he is ready to go, that he will arrive on time.

Ren Bishi on the other hand asks directly: what do I think, will the plane arrive, and when[?] [He] says that Mao Zedong wrote that he will arrive by the set time, that [they] know there that without the plane they will not be able to arrive by that time, and so on.

The telegram dated 17 October strengthened their confidence even further, they consider the words “as it was agreed upon” that there will be a plane. Their questions and proposals that I request from you on my own behalf whether there will be a plane and when, place me right into an inconvenient position.

At the same time they are prepared to live the whole winter here, already heating had been installed at Mao Zedong’s and Ren Bishi’s. This, probably, can be understood in such a way that if there is no plane then they will not go by land in winter.

I am asking you again, if possible, to give me instructions about the line of my behavior in this question.

Terebin

17.X.1948



DOCUMENT No. 19

Cable, Stalin [via Kuznetsov] to Mao Zedong [via Terebin], 21 October 1948

[Source: APRF: F. 39, Op. 1, D. 31, L. 46. Reprinted in *Andrei Ledovskii, Raisa Mirovitskaia and Vladimir Miasnikov, Sovetsko-Kitaiskie Otnosheniia, Vol. 5, Book 1, 1946-February 1950 (Moscow: Pamiatniki Istoricheskoi Mysli, 2005), p. 472. Translated for CWIHP from Russian by Sergey Radchenko.]*

To Terebin

Convey to Mao Zedong that you have received an instruction from Moscow to tell him that two passenger planes will be sent to him in the latter half of November, by which he and his group will be transported to Moscow. Details of the timing of the planes' arrival, as well as the route, will be carried out in time.

Kuznetsov

21.X.1948



DOCUMENT No. 20

Cable, Mao to Stalin, 21 October 1948

[Source: APRF: F. 39, Op. 1, D. 31, Ll. 47. Reprinted in *Andrei Ledovskii, Raisa Mirovitskaia and Vladimir Miasnikov, Sovetsko-Kitaiskie Otnosheniia, Vol. 5, Book 1, 1946-February 1950 (Moscow: Pamiatniki Istoricheskoi Mysli, 2005), p. 482. Translated for CWIHP from Russian by Sergey Radchenko.]*

Com[rade] Stalin

Over the recent days I am suffering from a small disease.

With the help of the Soviet doctor I got somewhat better, but another several days will be needed for rest. Besides, military operations near Suizhou are at the most serious stage, and an operation is being organized in the area of Tangshan-Tianjin-Beiping [Beijing]. Therefore the date of my trip will have to be postponed.

Before it was planned to leave [this] place in mid-November and by the end of November to arrive in Moscow, and now it is being planned to leave [this] place in the first part of December, and in mid- or in the end of December to arrive in Moscow.

May one act this way [?]

Requesting your advice.

Mao Zedong

21.XI.1948



DOCUMENT No. 21

Cable, Stalin to Mao Zedong, 22 November 1948

[Source: APRF: F. 39, Op. 1, D. 31, L. 48. Reprinted in *Andrei Ledovskii, Raisa Mirovitskaia and Vladimir Miasnikov, Sovetsko-Kitaiskie Otnosheniia, Vol. 5, Book 1, 1946-February 1950 (Moscow: Pamiatniki Istoricheskoi Mysli, 2005), pp. 482-483. Translated for CWIHP from Russian by Sergey Radchenko.]*

Com[rade] Mao Zedong!

Received your telegram dated 21 November.

Your decision to postpone for some time your trip to us in connection with the circumstances which have materialized at the fronts of military actions appears, evidently, to be correct.

When the circumstances allow you to implement your intentions with regard to the trip to Moscow, [I] request that you, ahead of time, some days before that, inform us as to the date and the place where we should direct our planes for you.

Wishing you a rapid and full recovery.

Stalin

22 November 1948



DOCUMENT No. 22

Cable, Mao Zedong to Stalin, 30 December 1948

[Source: APRF: F. 39, Op. 1, D. 31, Ll. 49-52. Reprinted in *Andrei Ledovskii, Raisa Mirovitskaia and Vladimir Miasnikov, Sovetsko-Kitaiskie Otnosheniia, Vol. 5, Book 1, 1946-February 1950 (Moscow: Pamiatniki Istoricheskoi Mysli, 2005), pp. 495-497. Translated for CWIHP from Russian by Sergey Radchenko.]*

Comrade Stalin!

1. Received your telegram dated 28 [sic] November.

Will act in accordance with this telegram. When the currently ongoing two large military operations are finished, then I will go to Moscow.

2. The successes of the military operations near Suizhou are considerably greater than we expected them to be in the first place. At the present time we finished off 35 full divisions of the Guomintang army, including 4 divisions [which] started a rebellion and took our side. 19 divisions of the Guomintang remain, under the command of [GMD General] Du Yuming, which are encircled by us in the area to the southwest of Suizhou and do not have an opportunity to escape. About 2 weeks will be needed to finish them off entirely.

Army groups of the GMD forces, heading for the rescue in the direction of northwest from Bangbu, have already been thrown back by our forces and retreated in the region to the south of the Yangzi River. The remnants of the enemy in the area of Bangbu are preparing to flee.

Suizhou, Huaiying, as well as all cities and villages to the north of the Huaihe River are fully in the hands of our army.

The forces of Du Yuming, which number more than 100,000 people, are occupying a territory not greater than 10 square kilometers. They are encircled on all sides by our forces.

In this military operation we concentrated two groups of field forces of [CCP military commanders] Chen Yi and Liu Bocheng numbering 600,000 people, and forces from the servicing population at the forward fronts numbering 600,000 people, in all about 1,200,000 people. This is the biggest operation of all operations conducted previously on the southern front.

The units of the enemy, which are already defeated, and [those] in the process of being defeated, are strong and elite forces of the Guomintang. After [our] victory in this operation, Jiang Jieshi will no longer have first rate forces.

3. In order that the 48 divisions of Fu Zuoyi's group do not escape from the line of Beipinglu-Pingsui, we, without waiting for [troops to] finish resting and [before] bringing in order the Manchurian units, ordered them [the troops] to undertake an offensive against the south beforehand and cooperate with our forces in northern China in encircling and destroying the forces of Fu Zuoyi.

By the present time 15 divisions of Fu Zuoyi have been destroyed by us. [We] have returned: Shanhaiguan, Tangshan, Kalgan and other wide areas, encircled the main forces of Fu Zuoyi (33 divisions) in Beiping [Beijing], Tianjin and Tanggu (a sea port). Another month will be needed, then one can finish them off.

In this military operation we are using about 900,000 troops, and about 400,000 people of the forces of the servicing population at the forward fronts. This operation is one of the largest operations, ever conducted on the northern front.

In the last military operation, conducted in Manchuria in September-October, we used the forces of the servicing population numbering a total of 900,000 people.

4. At the present time the situation is developing considerably faster than it was predicted by us at a meeting of the CC at the beginning of the month of September. Now it is already no longer what was assumed before—mainly to overthrow the power of the Guomintang within 5 years (beginning from July 1946), but now one can for the most part overthrow the power of the Guomintang in the course of three and a half years. However, we still follow the measure of confident actions [sic].

After the end of the military operations near Suizhou, Beiping [Beijing] and Tianjin the main body of our forces must take a rest and be brought into order in the course of three months, and [must] capture an isolated city of Taiyuan, and then [they] will move into the basin of the Yangzi River and into the wide southern regions.

5. We recruited and are preparing 53,000 cadres for using them to work in new regions which will be captured next year. This preparation is being carried out in a planned manner, there is confidence in carrying out work of preparing the cadres.
6. Intensified [ideological] education work is being carried out among the party cadres to grasp the theory of Marx-Engels-Lenin-Stalin and a series of concrete political measures of the Chinese Revolution. The faster the Chinese Revolution is developing, the more we feel the extreme importance of this education work [among] the cadres.
7. The rule of the Guomintang is difficult to sustain. Degradation and division are occurring internally. The wide masses of the country more and more strive towards us. The liberal bourgeoisie are wob-

bling more and more, searching with us for a solution for themselves. The number of people following the Guomindang is shrinking from day to day.

8. In recent months we took a number of big cities. At the same time there was a very good order there. Our various political undertakings received approval on the part of the wide masses. This had a very good influence in the areas of the Guomindang rule.
9. The discipline of the People's Liberation Army has increased considerably, the military spirit has gone up, the commanders have greater confidence in the matter of taking power in the country. The discipline of the Guomindang is unruly. The number of defectors from the Guomindang forces is growing larger and larger.

After [we] finish the two military operations near Suizhou and Beiping [Beijing] the Guomindang will no longer possess cadre-strength forces. The number of forces will be decreased to 170 divisions. The majority of these—newly formed or with low battle capability.

10. Leading figures of the democratic parties and groups and people's organizations of Hong Kong, Shanghai, Beiping [Beijing], Tianjian and other large cities have come or will soon come to our areas under the banner of the political consultative meeting and the democratic coalition government. The majority of these people were invited by us to participate in the political consultative meeting.
11. The blatantly aggressive policy of the US government has already bankrupted itself. Now the Americans intend to move from active support of the Guomindang to the support of the local Guomindang and southern Chinese militarists, so as to resist the People's Liberation Army with their military forces. This is [the case] on the one hand, and on the other—to organize and send their lackeys so that they infiltrate the political consultative meeting and the democratic coalition government and could create an opposition bloc there and undermine from within the people's revolutionary front in order that the revolution could not be consistently implemented.

This latter intrigue has already manifested itself several times. For example, they sent their diplomatic workers and journalists to the leaders of the right wing of the democratic league—Luo Longji, Zhan Lan, Hua Nanshe, and to the leader of the revolutionary committee of the Guomindang Li Jishen (he is en route to the liberated areas), so as to conduct among

them provocative work and efforts to lure [them in]. We already paid attention to this and must do our best to make sure that the Americans will not achieve the aim of their intrigue.

12. We have already called a number of comrades to a meeting in the CC, that is—Gao Gang (secretary of the party committee of Manchuria), Yao Soushi (secretary of the party committee of eastern China), Bo Yibo (secretary of the party committee of northern China), Liu Bocheng (commander of the forces of central China), Chen Yi (commander of the forces of eastern China), Luo Yunhuan (political commissar of the Manchurian forces), Lin Bocui (chairman of the government of ShenGanYingXia [sic, possibly Shaanganning?]) so to discuss the questions of the whole strategy for 1949 (which units should be responsible for which line of advance, other preparatory works), [and] of the calling of the second plenum of the CCP CC in the spring of 1949, and others.

Soon after the end of the meeting I will be able to go to Moscow and discuss with you all the questions, and then after returning from Moscow conduct the second plenum of the CCP CC.

Around the summer of next year [we] will call the political consultative meeting of the representatives of various democratic parties, groups and people's organizations and create a democratic coalition government. Now it is extremely important to create such a government, all the conditions have become ripe for this.

[I] request that you report this telegram to comrade main master and to the VKP(b) CC.

Mao Zedong

30.XII.1948



DOCUMENT No. 23

Cable, Stalin to Mao Zedong [via Terebin], 6 January 1949

[Source: APRF: F. 39, Op. 1, D. 31, L. 53. Reprinted in Andrei Ledovskii, Raisa Mirovitskaia and Vladimir Miasnikov, Sovetsko-Kitaiskie Otnosheniia, Vol. 5, Book 2, 1946-February 1950 (Moscow: Pamiatniki Istoricheskoi Mysli, 2005), pp. 7-8. Translated for CWIHP from Russian by Sergey Radchenko.]

To Terebin

Reply to No. 1. Convey to Mao Zedong the following:

The VKP(b) CC and Cde. Stalin thank for the information about the situation in China and greet you in connection with the military successes of the People's Liberation Army of China. We agree that the question of the creation of the democratic coalition government is becoming a large and timely question. Creation of such a government in the present conditions would quicken the falling apart of the Guomindang government and would encourage a new, even more powerful surge of the democratic forces of China.

However, one circumstance causes us some doubt, namely that in your telegram the timing of creation of the democratic coalition government is set for the summer. Could it not turn out that, with the American cooperation, the Guomindang-ists will take the initiative of creating a coalition government into their hands, create their own coalition government before the summer, and, dragging into this affair some democratically disposed political figures of China, will thereby obstruct their rallying around the northern people's liberation forces of China. Such a step on the part of the Guomindang-ists is possible, especially, when they feel that their attempts to infiltrate their agents into the political consultative meeting, and then into the democratic coalition government, are failing.

Therefore would it not be better not to postpone the calling of the political consultative meeting and the formation of a democratic coalition government until the summer, but to carry out these activities immediately after the liberation of Beiping [Beijing] [?] This could confuse the cards of the Guomindang-ists and the Americans, who are preparing their plans of creation of a coalition government of China.

Telegraph the implementation.

Stalin
6.1.1949



DOCUMENT No. 24

Cable, Terebin to Stalin [via Kuznetsov], 10 January 1949

[Source: APRF: F. 39, Op. 1, D. 31, Ll. 54-58. Reprinted in Andrei Ledovskii, Raisa Mirovitskaia and Vladimir Miasnikov, Sovetsko-Kitaiskie Otnosheniia, Vol. 5, Book 2, 1946-February 1950 (Moscow: Pamiatniki Istoricheskoi Mysli, 2005), pp. 11-14. Translated for CWIHP from Russian by Sergey Radchenko.]

To Com[rade] F. Kuznetsov

Transmitting in a brief form the main content of a conversation with Mao Zedong on 7 January 1949.

After conveying to him the content of [telegram] No. 0100, after reading the written translation, Mao Zedong said that our plan is as follows:

After taking Beiping [Beijing], to call the consultative meeting and then to create a coalition government. This can also be done after the taking of Nanjing, Wuhan, Shanghai and a number of other cities, in the fall or next winter.

Now my intentions are as follows: the meeting of the CC will last for another 3-4 days, after which on 20 January [I] want to go to Moscow so as to be there by the end of January.

[I] want to stay one month in Moscow, talk about many questions, including a common line in foreign policy, trade and others.

At the end of February [I] want to come back so as to conduct the second plenum of the CCP CC in March, and then in April conduct the consultative meeting, but it is better to rest for one month, to prepare well and to conduct it in May, thereafter creating a coalition government in the summer.

Perhaps it is better to do this also after taking Nanjing, Wuhan, Shanghai and other cities. We have confidence that in the fall or next winter we will be able to do this.

In this case the government of the GMD will be no more, it will be compelled to run away, [and] the capital will be ours. Then everyone will see that only our government exists in China, [and] it will be considerably more convenient in diplomatic terms for the USSR to be the first to recognize our government. But [we] will finalize all of this in Moscow.

If the GMD creates its own coalition government, we are not afraid. Probably this would be even better. None of the democratic politicians will go over to them. The GMD will lay down all of its cards and open them, as it did also in 1946-1947, when it twice created the national assembly.

We will keep our cards hidden, no one knows anything about them. [They] will speculate, make guesses about our undertakings, but will not know anything for certain. We will keep our weapons behind our backs.

Currently the democratic organizations and their leaders do not support the peaceful howl of Jiang Jieshi, they are standing on the sidelines and [are] keeping silent.

At the present time the majority of the democratic politicians are in our areas, they themselves want to be there, and [come] to us. Whereas before we invited many but they did not go, now after the victories of our armies, it is enough to give them the smallest hint, and they immediately come.

Now in Shanghai only three politicians of the democratic wing remain—Zhan Lan, Luo Longji and Huan Yanpei, the latter two also want to come, but we are not yet calling them.

Now many noted Guomintang politicians, including, and in particular, the intelligence operatives, are looking for contact with us.

[GMD General] Bai Chongxi was asking our people—what will be the orders of the CCP, I will carry them out now and with precision. He was given an oral hint to keep his forces in the area of Hankou and not to obstruct our future offensive.

The commander of the 8th Army [GMD General] Liu Ruming was also told, orally, to stay in the place where the Guomintang ordered you [to be], and to allow our forces to pass during the offensive.

[GMD General] Tan [Tang] Enbo is looking for contact with us.

[GMD General] Zhong [Zheng?] Jiemin wants to establish contact with us.

Our radio station in the Xikang province did not transmit for a long time, but now the commander of the 24th army, Liu Wenkui [Wenhui], daily comes to our man and asks him if there are any instructions from the CCP.

[We] have contacts with many ships of the river fleet on the Yangzi River. During the offensive they will take our side (on Fu Zuoyi, see further and in more detail):

Many noted intelligence operatives, especially after the publication of the list of war criminals, are trying to save their lives, [and] pass to us valuable information.

The situation is such that if we now wanted to, and gave instructions, then there would be a massive uprising against the forces of Jiang Jieshi and their defection to our side. This is not profit-

able to us now. For in this case we would have too many forces of the GMD, and this is very worrisome. Especially that their commanders will want to occupy high positions, but they are not reliable.

Even the Americans are trying to establish contact with us, not even speaking of the fact that many American correspondents (and the English ones) in Hong Kong and [those who] came to us from Beijing [Beijing] asked us to allow them to come to the liberated areas just to take a look—we refuse everyone. But recently [US Ambassador John Leighton] Stuart, before bringing into Shanghai amphibious boats with US forces, sent his man to Hong Kong to our people.

This person, in words which could be understood as more than a hint, was in essence asking—will the CCP allow [them] to bring forces into Shanghai.

Our man refused to transmit an inquiry like this, replying that generally the CCP is on principle against the presence of foreign forces in China.

Mao Zedong was saying that now our forces are stronger than the forces of the GMD, especially the artillery.

Here I inserted, artillery is the god of war, as Comrade Stalin said. Mao Zedong immediately replied: we are learning from Comrade Stalin.

Once again returned to No. 0100. This is good that they are writing. It means, [they] care about us, want for us to form a government sooner. I will discuss this with the leaders—Zhou Enlai, Sif, Kutuz [nicknames, evidently referring to Liu Shaoqi and Zhu De] and Ren Bishi.

Talked about the aid to them from the USSR. Gave an example. [In] Manchuria the representative of the USSR fairly clearly hinted why don't you ask us to send you engineers and other workers for the railroads. As soon as [we] sent a telegram, people came. Probably they were already prepared. [They] think and care about us. (Here, I saw two new automobiles ZIS-150).

True, we rely on our own forces, but [we] need help and are grateful for it.

At the meeting I told everyone that [we should] trade with the USSR and the democratic countries. To sell to America, England and other countries only that which is not needed by the USSR.

About Fu Zuoyi (collected from the entire conversation in one place).

With Fu Zuoyi [we] had regular radio contacts. [We] are conducting negotiations with him and point out who should be sent to us to conduct them.

After [we] defeated 10 divisions of Fu Zuoyi, after [we] declared him to be a war criminal, Fu Zuoyi was in a fairly depressed mood. He believed that he fell into a trap, hit himself on the face, cursed himself as a fool (*hundun*). However, after we orally, without passing any scraps of paper, conveyed to him our 6 points (what these 6 points are Mao Zedong did not say), he calmed down.

We explained to him that we could not help [it] but [had to] include him in the list of war criminals.

Fu Zuoyi committed many evil deeds in northern China, the people hate him. If he were not included in the list, Jiang Jieshi would suspect that he has contacts with us.

However, if Fu Zuoyi implements our instructions, we will tell the people about his merits and the people can forgive him and then [we] will cross him off the list.

The main demands of the CCP.

Fu Zuoyi allows the CCP forces to enter Beiping [Beijing] through his forces, [they] will not destroy the city. After that his four remaining divisions are [to be] reorganized into one army and are [to be] taken from the city to a pre-determined place. His forces are not [to be] touched.

But Fu Zuoyi grabbed us by the weak point—we do not want to destroy the cities, he is bargaining with us. Therefore we are conducting negotiations with him for a long time. Tianjin is another matter—[we] will have to take it by force.

Mao Zedong supposes that the capture of Tianjin and the destruction of the encircled group of forces of Du Yuming will take place in January, and the taking of Beiping [Beijing]—in February. Then Mao Zedong turned to other questions. He said that he is called a dictator everywhere (this and the following he told me before as well)—yes, I am a dictator.

All the affairs are managed by me, Zhou Enlai, Sif, Kutuz, Ren Bishi. Mao said that after abandoning Yan'an, three people managed everything—he, Zhou Enlai and Ren Bishi.

After the supper talked a lot about the difficulties which the CCP went through in 1927 and 1931.

[He] said that as a result of the incorrect decisions of the 4th Plenum of the CCP CC, which was led by Wang Ming, 9/10th of the territory occupied by the CCP [and] a large part of the army were lost, that the membership of the party fell sharply after that.

Talked about attacks on him, about an attempt to arrest and kill him, about how [PLA Beijing Military Control Commission Chairman] Ye Jianying warned him about this.

Speaking of the intra-party struggle and disagreements within the party, said that not until the 7th Congress was unity reached, which has now become even firmer. When parting [he] thanked [me] for the message [and] said that [he] will discuss it with the leadership.

Koroleva [literally, “the Queen”—Jiang Qing—Mao’s wife] asked [me] to visit her. When I was listening to her various complaints about various diseases, I heard that Zhou Enlai came to Mao Zedong, and then Ren Bishi, and a meeting began there.

Terebin.

10.1.1949



DOCUMENT No. 25

Cable, Mao Zedong to Stalin, 8 January 1949

[Source: APRF: F. 39, Op. 1, D. 37, L. 1. Reprinted in Andrei Ledovskii, Raisa Mirovitskaia and Vladimir Miasnikov, *Sovetsko-Kitaiskie Otnosheniia, Vol. 5, Book 2, 1946-February 1950 (Moscow: Pamiatniki Istoricheskoi Mysli, 2005), p. 10. Translated for CWIHP from Russian by Sergey Radchenko.]*

Comrade Stalin!

We are very grateful to you that you sent to us Comrade [Ivan] Kovalev for helping us in restoring railroads and other economic work!

With the help of Comrade Kovalev and other Soviet comrades the transport lines of the railroads in Manchuria have mainly been restored. Now Cde. Kovalev, together with the Chinese comrades, developed a plan of restoring the railroads of all of northern China, i.e. in the region north of the Yangzi River with the length of more than three thousand kilometers, in 1949. If this plan is implemented by the winter of this year, then we will have 18,000 kilometers of railroads (inclusive here of the Manchurian railroads), which will be put into use. For the implementation of this plan a series of most necessary materials will be needed; also needed will be locomotives, machines, instruments, oil and other materials for restoring the railroads in northern China. But besides what we can provide for ourselves, we need urgent help on your part, i.e. to receive from you a large part of these materials—only then will we be able to begin the work to restore the railroads.

Attaching herewith two lists of requests for materials, to procure which we need your help, as pointed out above, [I] request that you look through these lists and if [we] are able to receive approval on your part, and also if you make orders to supply

[these materials] to us as soon as possible on credit with the fastest possible loading and dispatch, we will be very grateful to you.

With Bolshevik greetings and the best wishes for your health.

Mao Zedong
8 January 1949.



DOCUMENT No. 26

Cable, Mao to Stalin, 9 January 1949

[Source: APRF: F. 39, Op. 1, D. 36, L. 59. Reprinted in Andrei Ledovskii, Raisa Mirovitskaia and Vladimir Miasnikov, *Sovetsko-Kitaiskie Otnosheniia*, Vol. 5, Book 2, 1946-February 1950 (Moscow: Pamiatniki Istoricheskoi Mysli, 2005), pp. 10-11. Translated for CWIHP from Russian by Sergey Radchenko.]

Com[rade] Stalin!

The meeting of the CCP CC Politburo, conducted recently, is over.

I am ready to come to you.

To cut back the time I hope that you will send planes to Shijiazhuang—two planes, best if four-engine ones.

Planes may arrive on any of the three days—18, 19, 20 of this month to Shijiazhuang.

If you believe that there is not enough time for technical preparation one can postpone by several days. You decide yourself the concrete day of the planes' arrival and let me know.

For security reasons it is desirable that the planes arrive in the aforementioned place early in the morning.

21 people are coming with me.

Mao Zedong



DOCUMENT No. 27

Cable, Mao to Filippov [Stalin], 10 January 1949

[Source: APRF: F. 39, Op. 1, D. 31, Ll. 60-62. Reprinted in Andrei Ledovskii, Raisa Mirovitskaia and Vladimir Miasnikov, *Sovetsko-Kitaiskie Otnosheniia*, Vol. 5, Book 2, 1946-February 1950 (Moscow: Pamiatniki Istoricheskoi Mysli, 2005), p. 14-15. Translated for CWIHP from Russian by Sergey Radchenko.]

To Com[rade] Filippov

1. I received your telegram dated 6 January. American imperialism and the GMD have fully lost the trust of the people of China, therefore they have lost all real initiative. In case they create a coalition government, it will not have much influence. Our coalition government can be created in the summer, and can also be created somewhat earlier, that is in the spring—one [will] not meet with great obstacles in this.
2. Our units have already fully finished off the elite forces of the GMD numbering 19 divisions under the command of Du Yuming, which were encircled by our forces in the vicinity of Suizhou.
3. Preparatory work to capture the city of Tianjin is already done. It was decided: to begin advance on this city on 13 November. After the capture of Tianjin, advance on Beiping [Beijing] begins immediately, then on Taiyuan and Datong.
4. In the spring of this year the main forces of our army will be at rest and in [the process of] re-ordering, and in the summer it will be possible to begin movement toward the South. At the latest time [sic], i.e. at the end of July or in the beginning of August, 1,500,000 people of the regular forces of the People's Liberation Army will be shipped across the Yangzi River. They will exceed the GMD forces both in terms of their fighting spirit and in technical equipment.

In the fall and winter of this year we are 90 percent confident of the successful capture of the greater part of the ten provinces, that is—Jiangsu, Anhui, Zhejiang, Fujian, Jiangxi, Hubei, Hunan, Shaanxi and Gansu, of capturing cities—Nanjing, Wuhan, Yichang, Changsha, Hangzhou, Nanchang, Jujian, Anqing, Wuhu, Zhenjiang, Suzhou, Wuxi, Fuzhou, Xi'an.

As far as Shanghai is concerned, this is no longer a question in the military sense, we are confident that one can capture it in the winter of this year, but [the

question] exists as to supplying it with fuel and food. One will still have to think about whether we will capture it.

5. The delegation is composed of Mao Zedong, Ren Bishi, and Gao Gang and the rest are with them, going together, in all 21 people. Waiting for you to send planes for transporting us to Moscow. Now it is necessary for us to come to you without delay for a report to comrade main master (*glavnyi khoziain*)—VKP(b) CC, as well as to receive instructions on a number of questions of the Chinese Revolution.

Mao Zedong
10.1.49

[As the three waited, a new complication developed: a request by the Guomindang for Stalin's mediation in the civil war. Stalin asked Mao's opinion, implying his willingness to take on this new role, but Mao absolutely refused. The full exchange can be found in CWIHP Bulletin 6-7 (Winter 1995/96), pp. 27-29. No mediation was undertaken, but Mao's trip was cancelled, leading to Mikoyan's appearance three weeks later in Xibaipo as a high-level substitute —S.R. & D.W.]



DOCUMENT No. 28

Cable, Terebin to Stalin [via Kuznetsov], 13 January 1949

[Source: APRF: F. 39, Op. 1, D. 31, L.68. Reprinted in Andrei Ledovskii, Raisa Mirovitskaia and Vladimir Miasnikov, Sovetsko-Kitaiskie Otnosheniia, Vol. 5, Book 2, 1946-February 1950 (Moscow: Pamiatniki Istoricheskoi Mysli, 2005), p. 20. Translated for CWIHP by Sergey Radchenko.]

To Com[rade] F. Kuznetsov

This is the most important part of the reply.

Mao Zedong spoke more sharply. He is against any participation in the mediation, against any kind of participation by the CCP in the negotiations.

The Guomindang will agree to any conditions now, but this must not be allowed.

About Moscow.

Judging from everything, if Mao Zedong in the nearest future, no later than the end of January, is not able to go, then, probably he will not be able to go at all.

Shi Zhe spoke directly about this.

Terebin
13.1.1949



DOCUMENT No. 29

Cable, Mao Zedong to Filippov [Stalin], 17 January 1949

[Source: APRF: F. 39, Op. 1, D. 31, L. 75. Reprinted in Andrei Ledovskii, Raisa Mirovitskaia and Vladimir Miasnikov, Sovetsko-Kitaiskie Otnosheniia, Vol. 5, Book 2, 1946-February 1950 (Moscow: Pamiatniki Istoricheskoi Mysli, 2005), pp. 29-30. Translated for CWIHP from Russian by Sergey Radchenko.]

To Comrade Filippov

1. I received your two telegrams dated 14 and 15 January.
2. I decided to postpone [my] trip to Moscow temporarily.
3. We very much welcome you sending one comrade member of the Politburo to China.

The most suitable place for his arrival is Shijiazhuang. This is a relatively inconspicuous place and one can go from there straight to the location of our CC. Here one can speak with five comrades from the CC Secretariat on a number of questions (the main ones are presently the questions: of the political consultative meeting, of the coalition government, of the diplomatic policy and of the economic policy).

Railroad traffic from Shijiazhuang to Shanhaiguan has not been restored yet. It will take me at least 20 days to go from here to Harbin and back, and in Mukden live many representatives of the democratic parties. If I were to pass through this point, it would be difficult to maintain secrecy. Therefore it will be less secret than if your comrade were to fly in by a plane to Shijiazhuang.

If you agree with this option, then it is best if his arrival happened at the end of this or in the beginning of the next month.

Mao Zedong
17 January 1949

DOCUMENT No. 30

Memorandum of Conversation between Anastas Mikoyan and Mao Zedong, 30 January 1949

[Source: APRF: F. 39, Op. 1, D. 39, Ll. 1-6. Reprinted in Andrei Ledovskii, Raisa Mirovitskaia and Vladimir Miasnikov, *Sovetsko-Kitaiskie Otnosheniia, Vol. 5, Book 2, 1946-February 1950 (Moscow: Pamiatniki Istoricheskoi Mysli, 2005), p. 33-37. Translated for CWIHP from Russian by Sergey Radchenko.]*

The first conversation with Mao Zedong took place on 30 January 1949. Members of the CCP CC Politburo Zhou Enlai, Liu Shaoqi, Zhu De and Ren Bishi, as well as Mao Zedong's interpreter Shi Zhe participated in the conversation. From our side comrades I[van] Kovalev and E. Kovalev were present.

After short questioning and answers as to how [we] flew, Mao Zedong, at his initiative recounted in detail about the military situation in China.

ON THE MILITARY SITUATION IN CHINA

Mao Zedong stated that, in essence, the military stage of the Chinese Revolution must be considered complete. There is a 260 million population under the rule of the Guomindang, and a 210 million population—in the liberated regions. The CCP has 2 million 200 thousand people in the army, of them 1 million 200 thousand are in the area of Nanjing and 900 thousand (Lin Biao's forces) are in the Beiping [Beijing]-Tianjin area. The Guomindang altogether has 1 million 100 thousand people, scattered from Urumqi to Shanghai, and therefore poorly mobile. All of the Guomindang's divisions, with the exception of four, were defeated by us several times over, therefore their battle quality is low. The best Guomindang divisions, equipped by the Americans, have either been destroyed or captured. Bai Chongxi, who has his forces in the area of Wuhan, sent to the representatives of the CCP in three places his own representatives for talks, and an agreement has already been reached with him. Bai Chongxi is sending two of his divisions to Shanghai and Nanjing regions. He demanded that [Republic of China Acting President] Li Zongren remove [Legislative Yuan head] Sun Fo from the premiership. We know that Jiang Jieshi left Sun Fo as the premier so that, while in retirement, he could run the government in fact. The communists have documentary data to the effect that Jiang Jieshi, even after resigning, continues to control the Guomindang forces, for example in Xi'an. The Guomindang will organize resistance in the south in the coastal regions of Zhejiang. The Guomindang will not fight hard for Nanjing and Shanghai.

In Mao Zedong's opinion, judging by the mood of the capitalists and the public of Nanjing and Shanghai, these cities could take Beiping's [Beijing's] road, that is—surrender without a

fight under given conditions so as not to subject these cities to destruction. However, the communists make their plans expecting the worst. They are preparing after a short breather and preparation to take these cities by force. Peaceful resolution of events at Beiping [Beijing] cut the time for rest and preparation of these forces for the offensive. The time is needed not only for rest but:

- a) For digesting and educating three hundred thousand captured Guomindang-ists, who in the recent time joined the People's Liberation Army.
- b) For tightening up the rear and restoring the destroyed railroads, which feed the frontline;
- c) For accumulation of cartridges and shells from current production, since there is little in reserve. The matter is complicated by the fact that ammunition is needed for weapons of American, Japanese, Czechoslovak and Soviet types;
- d) Time is also needed to prepare cadres to manage the regions of Shanghai and Nanjing, for one cannot fully rely on the local cadres. 20 thousand people are being prepared. Efforts will also be needed to liquidate the Guomindang apparatus of managing forces of northern China, subordinate to Fu Zuoyi;
- e) Time is needed to prepare economic directorates of Shanghai and Nanjing regions—there is little food-stuff, one should stock up. We do not have enough time to print money for these regions.

The capture of Nanjing by the People's Liberation forces should be put off until April. Of course, at the present time one may also turn to the offensive, but in this case the chance of success will equal 80%. In the month of April, however, there will be all 100% chance of success. In order to win for sure in the Nanjing and Shanghai regions one will have to move Lin Biao's forces, which are the best, from the Beiping [Beijing] area to the South and the West so as to rid the Guomindang of an opportunity to throw in from there large reinforcements into the Nanjing-Shanghai area. The situation in the Beiping [Beijing] area is complicated and one will need some time to establish oneself firmly here.

Fu Zuoyi's forces have not left Beiping [Beijing] yet. [We] think that tomorrow-the day after tomorrow [they] will leave. The protection of warehouses and the order in the city is still managed by the Guomindang forces. In the next few days we will move four of our divisions into Beiping [Beijing] and gradually will replace the Guomindang guards. A unified city management has been appointed, composed of 7 people, of whom 4 are communists, including the chairman Ye Jianying (PLA Chief of Staff).

Fu Zuoyi's forces numbering more than 200 thousand people will be broken up into two groups—one will be moved out to the northeast of Nanjing, and the other—to the southwest, where they must reorganize. Inasmuch as these forces were not defeated in battle but surrendered to us peacefully on certain conditions, this process of reorganization is complex and is broken down into stages. The first stage will take a month, in the course of which no reorganization will take place, all efforts will be directed toward agitation and internal degradation. The second stage will come after that, when the most reactionary officer corps will be extracted from the divisions; the most diehard will be immediately expelled from the army, others will be directed to political education courses, then the majority will be sent home, and a part will be used for training the reserves. At the third stage a real organization will be conducted so as to mix up and dilute Guomintang-ists in the reorganized units of the People's Liberation Army. For every three former Guomintang-ists there would be 8 from the People's Liberation Army. Until this reorganization is for the most part complete it is dangerous to move out the main mass of our forces from the Beiping [Beijing] area.

To my question whether a pause in the attack for 2-3 months might give the Guomintang breathing space for overcoming panic, assembling and organization of resistance, since the agreement of the Nanjingers to peace talks shows how strongly they need breathing space, Mao Zedong replied the following: peaceful maneuver of the Guomintang-ists, instead of weakening the communists, strengthened their ranks and caused degradation in the ranks of the Guomintang to such an extent that the Guomintang cannot manage any longer. Resistance will be organized, but they will not succeed in anything serious. When the communists manage to finish preparation and strike with certainty, the remnants of the Guomintang forces will be obliterated.

ON THE ATTITUDE OF THE CCP TOWARD ITS MISTAKES

Furthermore, Mao Zedong stated that he would like to discuss with me questions of foreign policy, military questions, economic questions and questions of attitude toward the Guomintang. At the same time he was saying: "Please take into consideration that China has fallen far behind Russia, we are weak Marxists, make many mistakes and if one looks at our work with Russia's measure then it will turn out that we have nothing." I replied that these words, possibly, manifest the shyness of the leaders of the Chinese Com[munist] Party, but it is difficult to agree with them. One cannot manage a civil war in China for 20 years and lead it to such a victory while being a weak Marxist. As for mistakes, all active parties have them. Our party also makes mistakes but it firmly holds to the rule of ruthlessly uncovering its own mistakes so as not to repeat them and learn from them.

Mao Zedong added that they make mistakes frequently, and correct them frequently, and gave an example. In 1946 the CCP committed a mistake in the conduct of the land reform. When [they] began looking into it then it turned out that as far back as 1933 they wrote absolutely correctly about the land reform, which they forgot in 1946. If this were read again in 1946 these mistakes would not be committed. They once again reprinted in 1946 what had been written on the land reform in 1933 and openly declared this mistake of theirs to the peasants, taking full responsibility for mistakes, for the leadership is responsible for the mistakes of the low-level cadres, though the leadership itself did not commit these mistakes. I noted that one cannot agree with Mao Zedong's statement to the effect that if one looked at the Chinese Revolution with a Russian measure, then it would turn out that there is nothing. First of all, the Chinese Revolution represents a great historical event; secondly, it would be incorrect to apply the Russian measure to that concrete historical reality, in which the revolution in China is taking course. As if to confirm this Mao Zedong said that the CCP in 1936 in the Soviet regions manifested dogmatism, copying the Soviet methods, which led then to a serious defeat. Mao Zedong, half-jokingly, said the following phrase: "Despite China's backwardness in comparison with Russia I consider that the Chinese peasants are more conscious than all American workers and many English workers."

MARXIST EDUCATION OF THE CCP CADRES

He stated further that one of the big tasks of the CCP is the Marxist education of the cadres. They used to consider that the cadres must read all the Marxist literature. Now they convinced themselves that this is impossible, for their cadres are studying while simultaneously conducting a lot of practical work. Therefore they required from their cadres to read 12 Marxist works. Counting these works (*Manifesto, From Utopia to Science, The State and the Revolution, Questions of Leninism* etc.) he did not mention a single Chinese Marxist work. I then asked Mao Zedong whether he considers it correct that in the list of 12 books for party enlightenment of the CCP cadres there is not a single work of the CCP leaders, shedding light, theoretically, on the experience of the Chinese Revolution. Mao Zedong replied that he, as the leader of the party, brought nothing new to Marxism-Leninism, and cannot put himself on the same shelf with Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin. Raising a toast to the health of Comrade Stalin he stressed that at the basis of the current victories of the Chinese Revolution lies the teaching of Lenin-Stalin and that Stalin is not only the teacher of the peoples of the Sov[iet] Union but also the teacher of the Chinese people and the people of the whole world. Mao Zedong said about himself that he is a pupil of Stalin and does not attribute significance to his own theoretical works, that they merely implement the teaching of Marxism-Leninism, without enriching it with anything. Moreover, he personally sent a strict telegram to the localities, forbidding to list his surname together with the surnames of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin,

though he has to argue about this with his closest comrades.

I replied that this speaks to Mao Zedong's modesty, but one cannot agree with him. Marxism-Leninism is not applied in China mechanically, but on the basis of taking into account peculiarities of the specific conditions of China. The Chinese Revolution has its own road, which gives to it the look of an anti-imperialist revolution. Therefore shedding light on the experience of the CCP cannot help but be historically valuable, cannot help but enrich Marxist science. Can one deny also that the summing up of the Chinese experience has a theoretical value for the revolutionary movement of the countries of Asia? Of course, not. Mao Zedong remarked that with them it was the supporters of [CCP Deputy Commander in Chief] Wang Ming who laid the main stress on the peculiarity of China for struggle against the party line. I replied to this that usually nationalistic elements use concrete historical specifics of their country for diverting the party to the road of bourgeois transformation; Marxists, however, take these specifics into consideration so as to lead the revolution in a Marxist-Leninist way, with which [assertion] Mao Zedong chose not to argue.

At this the conversation ended.



DOCUMENT No. 31

Memorandum of Conversation between Anastas Mikoyan and Mao Zedong, 31 January 1949

[Source: APRF: F. 39, Op. 1, D. 39, Ll. 7-16. Reprinted in Andrei Ledovskii, Raisa Mirovitskaia and Vladimir Miasnikov, *Sovetsko-Kitaiskie Otnosheniia, Vol. 5, Book 2, 1946-February 1950 (Moscow: Pamiatniki Istoricheskoi Mysli, 2005), p. 37-43. Translated for CWIHP from Russian by Sergey Radchenko.*]

The second conversation with Mao Zedong took place on 31 January 1949 in the presence of CCP CC Politburo members Zhou Enlai, [Vice Chairman] Liu Shaoqi, [PLA Deputy Commander in Chief] Ren Bishi and [PLA Commander-in-Chief] Zhu De and interpreter Shi Zhe. Comrades I[van] Kovalev and E. Kovalev were present from our side.

Mao Zedong recounted the following:

ON THE PREPARATION FOR THE FORMATION OF A COALITION GOVERNMENT

Mao Zedong said that preparation for the formation of the government is connected with the cleansing of Beiping [Beijing] of the hostile elements, which requires about 3 weeks, after which in Beiping, as restored capital, one could organize a coalition government.

To my question would it not be better to organize the coalition government in Nanjing after its liberation, Mao Zedong replied in the negative, motivating this by the fact that, firstly, what would be the benefit of this, and, secondly, 9/10th of the figures who cling to their camp consider Beiping [Beijing] to be a better capital, and not Nanjing; thirdly, in the exchange with Comrade Stalin he received advice to which he will hold fast: not to put off this business and to form the government in Beiping [Beijing] after its liberation. I stated that I am aware of this exchange and that Comrade Stalin holds the opinion that if Comrade Mao Zedong agrees that it is better to organize the coalition government after the liberation of Nanjing than he will also agree to that. Therefore I asked Mao Zedong to express his opinion to the point. On my part I stated that though the successes achieved and the liberation of Beiping [Beijing] give sufficient basis for not waiting with the formation of the coalition government before the liberation of Nanjing, the moral authority of the coalition government may still be higher, when it is formed after the liberation of two capitals. This does not rule out that Beiping, and not Nanjing, can be the permanent capital.

Mao Zedong replied that personally [he] sides with the opinion that it is better to put off the formation of the coalition government until the liberation of Nanjing, and to form it in the month of June-July. I replied to him that if the formation of the government after the liberation of Nanjing increases its moral-political strength, then unnecessary delay of its formation weakens the force of the revolution and whatever great authority the Chinese Com[munist] Party has among the people. Its appeals cannot have the same force for (*ne imeiut takoi zhe sil'y*) non-party masses as the decision of state power, which can make laws, required for all. Mao Zedong agreed with these considerations and stated that Nanjing can be taken in April, and in the month of May or June the coalition government can be organized. Even if the Guomindang-ists tried to organize their own coalition government before that, this will not do harm to the communists and cannot obstruct the formation of a coalition government headed by the communists.

ON THE REPRESENTATIVE OFFICE OF THE VKP(b) CC WITH THE CCP CC

After a certain pause Mao Zedong raised the question about the creation of the representative office of the VKP(b) CC with the CCP CC. He asked to send a politically prepared comrade as a representative, with whom one could discuss questions, which interest them. He also spoke out in favor of this representative having a staff of 10 people, including persons who know the Chinese language, so that they study the materials, which the CCP CC will give to them.

I replied that our CC already gave its agreement in principle to the creation of such a representative office and now the selection of the personnel is under way.

Then Mao Zedong said that the length of my stay here of 4-5 days is short and that they would ask me to stay with them for up to 10 days. To this I replied that I hope to finish the discussion of all questions with them in the course of 5 days. At the same time I told Mao Zedong that two Soviet specialists in dealing with time-delay bombs and bugging equipment arrived with me to help the CCP. Mao Zedong was very content with this statement of mine and thanked Comrade Stalin for the care which he shows toward the CCP.

ON THE SITUATION ON THE CIVIL WAR FRONTS AND THE MILITARY FORCES OF THE CCP

Speaking of the forces of Bai Chongxi, located in the Hankou theater, he said that Bai Chongxi is the most crafty general and it is more difficult to fight with him than with Fu Zuoyi. However, we are preparing to overpower him as well, especially since Bai Chongxi is carrying out a policy of duplicity with respect to Jiang Jieshi. In order to save face he wants to leave Hankou in such a way that we would not think of him that he retreated or surrendered. Therefore before we encircle him he will vacate the Hankou area and retreat to Guangxi province. His representative is in touch with us and we know something about Bai Chongxi's thinking.

Further, showing the map, Mao Zedong told about the situation with the military operations at separate fronts, repeating the facts which he recounted in yesterday's conversation. He said that at the present time their military forces count more than 3 million men, and if one adds to this politically indoctrinated units from Fu Zuoyi's captured forces, then the total number of their military forces will reach 3 million 100 thousand people. From this number 2 million 200 thousand are regular units. [Beijing-Tianjin Front Commander] Lin Biao's forces, located in the Beijing-Tianjin area, count 900 thousand people and about 1 million 300 thousand are located at the Nanjing theater. To my question of when they plan to take Taiyuan, Mao Zedong replied that they will attack [GMD General] Yan Xishan's forces at the end of February this year.

To my question of when they plan to force [the attack] on Xi'an, Mao Zedong replied that they intend to begin an attack on this point after taking Taiyuan. He added that they could force attacks on separate sections of the front and take cities faster but this is complicated by the fact that they have a sharp shortfall of politically prepared cadres, with the help of which they could take over the new territories.

Mao Zedong said that they are preparing to cross the Yangzi River. They intend to move 900 thousand people to the Shanghai-Nanjing line of advance, the same to the Hankou line of advance and about 350 thousand people to Xi'an.

To my question of how they think to organize the military administration, Mao Zedong replied that they are carrying out

preparation for the creation of a war ministry.

Continuing, Mao Zedong stated that prior to now, they have had three fronts: north China, where Lin Biao's forces are active, Nanjing-Shanghai, headed by Chen Yi, and Xi'an, headed by Chen Geng.

To my question of which organization coordinates the fronts, Mao Zedong replied that they are coordinated by the military committee. The chairman of the military committee is Mao Zedong, and his deputies are Zhou Enlai, Liu Shaoqi and Zhu De.

Returning to the question of the fronts Mao Zedong said that [each of] the three fronts have four army units, which are comprised of 14 army groups or 56 armies. Each army group on average consists of 3 armies, each army has 3 divisions, with the exception of the Manchurian armies, which contain 4 divisions. There are a total of 181 divisions. Political work in the army is headed by the military committee. Each army has a party committee, the same in divisions and in companies. Approximately about 30% of our forces are members of the CCP. The political morale of the People's Liberation Army is healthy. Desertions to the Guomindang-ists' side have not been noted. Of course, there are shortcomings in the units as well, manifested in a lack of discipline and elements of anarchy. This is a reflection of the Guomindang influence. We energetically struggle against this. [We] call party meetings and subject to sharp criticism uncovered shortcomings, without respect for authority.

RUNNING THE MILITARY DISTRICTS

Mao Zedong said that they have 5 bureaus of the CCP CC:

1. Manchurian Bureau of the CCP CC
2. North China Bureau of the CCP CC
3. East China Bureau of the CCP CC
4. Central China Bureau of the CCP CC
5. Northwestern China Bureau of the CCP CC

In accordance with this separation of the party organization, 5 military districts have been created so that it is easier for the party to manage military affairs. Management of military affairs is included as a rule in the relevant bureau of the CCP CC.

GUOMINDANG NAVAL FORCES

To my question on the situation in Formosa [Taiwan] Mao Zedong replied that Jiang Jieshi, with the help of the USA, is creating a naval base there. However, this intention of Jiang Jieshi's is meeting with resistance on the part of the 6 million population of the island. In order to strengthen his influence Jiang Jieshi sent trusted people to the island, headed by the governor Chen Cheng. Mao Zedong expressed confidence that sooner or later the Guomindang fleet and air forces will

take the side of the People's Liberation Army. He said that the Guomindang's Navy is already sending their delegates to them, in particular from the fleet on the Yangzi River. 8 Guomindang planes flew over to us, of them one heavy B-34 bomber which landed in the area of Shijiazhuang. There were three communists among the bomber's crew.

To my question of whether there are Guomindang naval forces in Huludao, Mao Zedong replied in the negative and said that now the Guomindang naval forces are based out of Qingdao, Shanghai, Canton [Guangzhou], Formosa and Fuzhou.

CONDITIONS OF THE WORKERS AND THEIR ROLE

To my question whether they have covert cadres, Mao Zedong said that there are such cadres in Shanghai and Canton, but they are few.

To my question as to the conditions of the Shanghai workers and what their role was, Mao Zedong replied that the com[munist] party has boundless influence in the countryside; it has no competitors there. But cities are another thing: here, whereas among the students the com[munist] party has a strong influence, in the working class the Guomindang is stronger than the com[munist] party. For example, after the capitulation of Japan in Shanghai, when the com[munist] party started to work legally, its influence on the Shanghai workers was spread out as follows: from 500 thousand Shanghai workers 200 thousand people were under the influence of the com[munist] party and the remaining 300 thousand—under the Guomindang.

CADRES

Now the main question is the cadres. We are selecting about 53 thousand people, whom [we] plan to throw into the recently liberated areas. Because of the lack of cadres we cannot run the city economy, therefore one should not hurry to take Shanghai.

To my remark that he sees the difficulties in running Shanghai but does not see the huge profits from taking Shanghai when the communists will have working for them a half a million army of workers of a powerful industrial center of China, that he does not see that the working class of such a center will put forward from their midst many valuable workers committed to the party, strengthen the social base of the party and the revolution, [and] exert strong influence on the rest of China, Mao Zedong found nothing to reply.

PROFESSIONAL UNIONS

To my question as to who is running the professional unions, Mao Zedong replied that the chairman of the All-China Federation of the Professional Unions is Chen Yun, and his deputy—Li Lisan. Mao Zedong said that in the past Li Lisan was a Trotskyist and had his own fraction, but now he is behav-

ing well. Trotskyists, said Mao Zedong, now have no influence among us.

I remarked that one must keep in the leadership of the professional unions personnel absolutely loyal to the party and firmly connected with the workers, that one must not allow a single Trotskyist to run professional unions. The fact that some of them are presently behaving themselves well, I said, proves nothing, for the revolution in China is now on the rise and with the first difficulties from which no one is insured, Trotskyists can use the wavering of the backward elements among the workers and direct them against the com[munist] party. If the com[munist] party was able to win almost a monopoly position in the countryside, all the more must it achieve undivided influence on the workers, expelling from their midst Trotskyists and Guomindang thugs. My statement made a strong impression on Mao Zedong and members of the Politburo of the CCP CC.

WORK AMONG YOUTH AND WOMEN

I asked how the situation stands with the work among youth and women. Mao Zedong replied that these are the most backward sections of their work. Using this and referring to the experience of the Sov[iet] Union, I stressed what a great significance for the revolution carries the work among the youth and women. To this Mao Zedong and the members of the Politburo declared that they will take all measures to strengthen work among youth and women.

TALKS WITH THE GUOMINDANG GOVERNMENT

Then Mao Zedong touched upon the question of the forthcoming peace talks with the Nanjingers. As Mao Zedong said, they are not in a hurry with this business. The delegation has not been appointed yet and its composition has not been made known the Guomindang. Inasmuch as the place of talks was set at Beiping, therefore as the latter has not yet been cleaned of the capitulated forces of Fu Zuoyi, 2 weeks more will be needed to put the city in order. In fact talks with the Guomindang government may begin at the end of the month of February. The delegation will consist only of the communists but they intend to consult with parties, which will participate in the coalition government, regarding which there is a previous agreement. By approximately 20 February the CCP CC will move to Beiping.

Mao Zedong said that in November of last year they informed the VKP(b) CC that in the course of 2 ½ years the People's Liberation Army will finish off the Guomindang. But already in the course of the last six months, stated Mao Zedong, if we have not fully destroyed the Guomindang, then in any case it is on the brink of destruction. The Guomindang has completely broken off from the masses and its authority has been undermined. Its peace proposal is a forced breather, a maneuver to gather its forces against us. We, however, speak out

with eight sincere conditions for peace. They will not accept these conditions, the proof of which is the fact that Jiang Jieshi left for Fenghua, and Li Zongren remained in his stead. The Guomindang government exists nominally. All the leading members of the government have left, for example, Sun Fo, who is in Shanghai. The Guomindang public opinion is forcefully indoctrinated by the CC clique. As far as the Americans are concerned, one feels that they are not inclined to support Jiang Jieshi, and place their bets on Li Zongren, [GMD politician] Shao Lizi and [GMD military and political figure] Zhang Zhizhong. The fact that the Guomindang government has run off in different directions made England, USA and France declare their non-intervention and, moreover, the English and the Americans say that they are waiting for the People's Liberation Army. The leaders of the democratic parties are on our side.

Guomindang-ists are going for talks with us, but they are scared by the first condition of these talks, i.e. the question of war criminals, the list of which contains more than 100 people, and the list is not limited to these people. If they accept our 8 conditions, and Li Zongren said that he accepts them, then we will ask them to carry out these conditions. If they do not accept the point about the war criminals we will not talk to them.

In order to create an appearance of democracy and ingratiate himself with us, Li Zongren declared the freedom of press, but we cannot be fooled by this. It is clear to us that the struggle continues, and Jiang Jieshi, behind Li Zongren's back, continues to lead the war against us through Chief of Staff Gu Zhutong. Jiang Jieshi's forces headed by Tang Enbo are still located at the Shanghai-Nanjing theater, and Cheng Chen is equipping a base on the island of Formosa, the forces of [GMD General] Hu Zhongnan are located in the Xi'an area, and the forces of Bai Chongxi—at the Hankou theater. We understand that the Guomindang-ists will not be able to organize a strong front, but we cannot but take the situation into account and be prepared for any contingencies.

ON FOREIGN TRADE

Mao Zedong said that the question of trade stands before the future coalition government. We intend, he said, to conclude treaties with the Sov[iet] Union and the countries of new democracy [i.e. socialist countries].

I said that this intention is correct and added that it is necessary for us to provide mutual economic aid to each other. This question had not been raised before because we did not want for it to be interpreted as our intervention in the affairs of democratic countries. As a result democratic countries obstructed each other on the market until we approached them with a request to normalize trade relations by means of concluding mutual treaties. I briefly told about the results of the meeting of 6 powers in Moscow.¹

Returning to the question of trade Mao Zedong stressed that though the Chinese bourgeoisie does not desire a monopoly on foreign trade, it will be introduced. Trade will first and foremost be conducted with the USSR and the countries of people's democracy and only those things, which these countries do not need, will be exported to capitalist countries.



Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, and Stalin signing the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance, 14 February 1950
(Courtesy PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs)

QUESTIONS OF FOREIGN POLICY OF THE CCP

Then Mao Zedong turned to recounting some questions of foreign policy of the CCP. He said that its basic principle is the building of relations with other states on the basis of mutual equality and mutual help.

Talking about foreign connections of the party in the period of Japanese-Chinese war Mao Zedong said that at that time they were limited to forced communication with foreign, mainly American, journalists in Yan'an. But now the situation had changed, since the People's Liberation Army took such cities as Mukden, Tianjin and Beijing, where in practice the question was raised as to how to build one's relations with the foreign consulates located there [and] recognized by the Guomindang government. Up to now we have not considered them as representative organizations of states, which have certain diplomatic relations with us. Therefore we merely guarantee the safety of lives of the consulate workers, considering that they have the status of emigrants.

Then Mao Zedong turned to the intended limitations of the rights of foreign telegraph agencies and publications in China. Independent work by the agencies will be forbidden, the same with regard to free publication of foreign newspapers and journals. Currently existing foreign publications are subjected to mandatory government registration.

Mao Zedong remarked that these limitations touch upon the interests of Soviet publications in China and in this connection he would like to agree with us that our publications would

be nominally headed by the Chinese, while the factual work would be carried out by Soviet citizens.

Talking of foreign enterprises, Mao Zedong stressed that one must apply a careful position toward them since their capital is closely intertwined with the capital of the Chinese. He reminded that the 6th Congress of the CCP took the decision about the confiscation of foreign capital and property. In principle this decision remains in force now as well, but its implementation must be carried out in more flexible forms.

Mao Zedong said that foreigners, unquestionably, will be forbidden from using radios, but there may be exceptions in certain cases. As an example he pointed to the radio of the American consulate in Tianjin, the codes of which are known to them and the banning of which would be unprofitable to them.

Mao Zedong said that with the taking of Nanjing the question of the recognition of the new government by foreign powers will emerge. The question stands as follows: whether one should accept the recognition immediately, or to put it off for a term of no less than a year. Both paths have their pluses and minuses. Time delay is profitable to us in that it unties our hands in relations with states, gives us an opportunity to take a firmer grasp, and recognition eases subversive activities against us by the USA and England. It is acceptable for us to put off recognition of us on the part of the USA and England, so as to win time.

Continuing the thought about the possible recognition of the new government by foreign powers, Mao Zedong said that this question will also stand before the USSR and the countries of people's democracy. There is information, he added, that the USA is about to recognize us, and England will necessarily follow them. For these countries recognizing us is necessary to work against us and to trade with us. What is the benefit of this recognition? It will open for us the road to other countries and to the UN. In spite of this we are leaning toward the first way, that is—not to hurry to establish diplomatic relations, but, delaying them, to strengthen ourselves.

In conclusion Mao Zedong asked me, on the premise of the interests of the common cause, to shed light on the position of the USSR regarding the substance of the aforementioned questions of the foreign policy of the CCP.

The conversation ended at this.

1. *Editor's Note:* This is a reference to the founding of COMECON in Moscow at the beginning of January 1949.



DOCUMENT No. 32

Memorandum of Conversation between Anastas Mikoyan and Zhou Enlai, 1 February 1949 (Day)

[Source: APRF: F. 39, Op. 1, D. 39, Ll. 17-24. Reprinted in Andrei Ledovskii, Raisa Mirovitskaia and Vladimir Miasnikov, *Sovetsko-Kitaiskie Otnosheniia, Vol. 5, Book 2, 1946-February 1950 (Moscow: Pamiatniki Istoricheskoi Mysli, 2005), p. 43-48. Translated for CWIHP from Russian by Sergey Radchenko.*]

On 1 February 1949, during the day, Mao Zedong's deputy Zhou Enlai, member of the Politburo Zhu De and interpreter Shi Zhe visited me and informed me that yesterday's tense conversation very much exhausted Mao Zedong and he feels unwell and asks to have another conversation a day later, and today to continue discussion of foreign policy questions with Zhou Enlai, and of military questions in the evening.

In the course of 4 hours Zhou Enlai recounted the history of the CCP's relations with foreign powers, mainly with Americans, principles and practical questions of foreign policy with the exception of [relations with] the USSR and people's democracies, with which one must carry out a policy of friendship and cooperation on the basis of equality and mutuality.

From our sides comrades I[van] Kovalev and E. Kovalev were present at the conversation.

CONTACTS OF THE CCP WITH THE USA

In his detailed information about foreign relations of the CCP Zhou Enlai stated that during the war they had no foreign contacts until 1944. In 1944 American general [Joseph] Stilwell sent a group of American observers to Yan'an, which was there from April 1944 to March 1946, until the fall of Yan'an, and from that moment our contacts with the external world began. Already then, in accordance with Mao Zedong's instructions, we followed a policy of not allowing the Americans' intervention in our internal affairs. We followed the same policy with regard to [Truman's envoy to China George] Marshall. For example, we declined to participate in the Sino-American mediating commission, in which the decisive vote belonged to the USA. In this case we demanded to follow the decisions of the Council of Foreign Ministers' Moscow meeting in October 1945.

In the course of negotiations with Marshall we made out that the Americans wanted to establish control over our forces. We signed an agreement with the Americans on the reorganization of the army (February 1946), inasmuch as this was profitable to us. Subsequently the agreement was breached, the civil war flared up and our representative office left Nanjing. From that time we started to expose the USA vigorously. Although we broke relations with the Americans, they time and again

attempted to establish contacts with us through those persons who had something to do with us. But we limited ourselves to hearing about the Americans' decisions to establish contacts with us.

As for our relations with the UNRRA [United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration], despite the fact that we suffered more losses than the Guomintang-ists we received from it merely 2% (50 thousand tons) of all its supplies to China. In spite of this we received many valuable goods. The ammonia fertilizers supplied by the UNRRA were used by us to produce ammunition. There were many intelligence agents among the workers of the UNRRA, but there were also those who helped us.

Further Zhou Enlai said that the military clashes with the Americans had taught us a lot. It is known that even before Japan's capitulation Americans tried to create their own bases in China. With the arrival of the Sov[iet] forces in Manchuria Japan capitulated. The USA gradually began to recall their observers, and then forces from China, continuing however to help the Guomintang in the military respect. In the clashes with the Guomintang-ists we killed several Americans who participated in the Guomintang operations. The first case of such a nature dates back to the talks between Mao Zedong and Jiang Jieshi in Chongqing in 1945. [American forces in China Commander Albert Coady] Wedemeyer, having learned about the killing of an American soldier, presented us with an ultimatum, but we declared in reply that we knew nothing about the killing. The second case happened in the vicinity of Tianjin, when a group of Americans, under the pretext of looking for their lost people, conducted intelligence gathering. Our forces opened fire on the group. We immediately broadcasted this case on the radio but the Americans denied it. The third case happened on the road between Tianjin and Beijing [Beijing] when the Americans intentionally drove into our zone. In the firefight one American was killed. Marshall protested to us. The fourth case happened in the area of Qingdao, when, in a firefight with a group of intelligence agents, one American was killed and three were captured. Americans again protested to us, then came to negotiate and signed a document, recognizing their responsibility in this affair. The fifth case relates to last year, when an American intelligence plane wanted to land an American major general on the territory of the liberated area. We captured this general and he has been in Shandong since the month of May 1947, without admitting being a general. The Americans pretend that they don't know about this case. The sixth case of a clash with the Americans relates to the area of the Tianjin airfield, where the Americans worked as the Guomintang's instructors. Our guerrillas blew up military objects on the airfield. After this the Americans recalled their representatives.

Summarizing the aforesaid, Zhou Enlai said that we must not provoke the Americans, but if they come out against us we will deliver them decisive rebuffs. In our press we curse the USA

because this educates the masses (workers, peasants, students) in the spirit we need.

Further Zhou Enlai said that in the course of the 3 postwar years the USA undermined its authority in China. As a whole, the people hate the Americans, though there are some people, even among the progressive elements, who fear the powers of the USA.

Continuing, Zhou Enlai stated that, in relations with the Americans, a new problem emerged when our troops took Mukden [Shenyang] last year. The foreign consulates located there (American, English and French) hinted to us that they have no intention of evacuating and would like to establish *de facto* relations with us. We understand that these consulates remained for intelligence gathering against us and the USSR. We have no desire to see them in Mukden [Shenyang], therefore we are taking measures to isolate them, creating for them unbearable conditions, so as to force them to leave Mukden. In the future we will raise the question of a consular network on equal footing. Generally, Zhou Enlai said, we will grasp the Americans firmer because "we are fighting them, and not other powers." The Americans are undermining our regime and we should isolate the USA in our own country.

ON RECOGNIZING THE COALITION GOVERNMENT

Further Zhou Enlai turned to the question of the diplomatic recognition of the future coalition government headed by the communists, but before that he asked to explain why the Soviet Ambassador [Nikolai] Roshchin departed for Canton.

With regard to the question of Roshchin's move with the Guomintang government to Canton I explained that this is fairly reasonable since China so far only has one government, to which our ambassador is accredited and it is natural that he moved together with the Chinese government to Canton, having left a part of the Embassy personnel in Nanjing. In essence this will not only not hamper our common cause but, on the contrary, aid it.

Then Zhou Enlai continued on the question of recognition of the future coalition government by foreign powers. In accordance with the CCP data, received through the democratic leaders, the Americans and the English intend to recognize the new government headed by the communists. One of the cited proofs is the fact that, in their opinion, the ambassadors of the countries did not leave Nanjing and did not follow the Guomintang government, which moved to Canton.

The first option

The CCP strives toward immediate recognition of the new government by the main foreign powers. In this case it is necessary for the USSR to recognize the new government

first; according to their information, the Americans and the English want to get ahead of the Sov[iet] Union in this matter so as to put it into an unfavorable situation in the eyes of the Chinese public.

The second option

Not to strive toward immediate recognition of the new government. If a foreign government declares its desire to recognize, not to refute it and not to give agreement, continuing this tactic for approximately one year. After this, to strive toward recognition. The advantages of such an option are such that, having free hands, the new government could with more ease put pressure on all things foreign in China, ignoring the protests of foreign governments against the actions of the new government, aimed at limiting the rights and drawing [sic] foreign citizens and foreign governments. At the same time they would like to know the opinion of our CC whether one must establish diplomatic relations between the USSR and the new Chinese government after a year together with other countries or they could be established immediately after the formation of the coalition government.

I promised to report all of this to our CC, which will discuss it and reply.

ON THE ATTITUDE TOWARD FOREIGN PROPERTY

In yesterday's conversation, Zhou Enlai said, Mao Zedong, speaking about foreign enterprises, stressed that it is necessary to apply a cautious position with respect to them, inasmuch as their capital is closely intertwined with China's interests. He reminded that the 6th Congress of the CCP made the decision on the confiscation of foreign capital and property, which was then approved by the Comintern. In principle this decision also remains in force now, but its implementation must be conducted in more flexible forms. Zhou Enlai asked that I recount my attitude toward the position, put forward by Mao Zedong on this question.

I replied that on the question of foreign property we have an opinion that one should nationalize Japanese, French and, where possible, English property. With regard to the American property one must carry out a cautious policy, so as to create an impression among the Americans that their interests will be taken into account by the new government. When the government headed by the communists takes control over the situation in China, one could discuss this question again and resolve it depending on the situation and on the behavior of the Americans. After this statement of mine, Zhou Enlai recounted the preliminary draft of the CCP position, recounted above, in accordance with which, [they] do not intend to nationalize foreign property for the time being.

PRINCIPLES OF FOREIGN POLICY

Then Zhou Enlai, in accordance with the points expounded earlier by Mao Zedong, recounted the following principles of their foreign policy:

1. To conduct a policy of independence, without provoking foreign powers at the same time.
2. To protect the life and property of foreigners (keeping quiet for the time being about their privileges) with the exception of Japanese property, which has all been already confiscated by the Guomindang, this [provision] remaining in force.
3. With regard to the existing consulate and diplomatic representative offices before the establishment of diplomatic relations, to carry out a line of not liquidating them, protecting their life and property, taking away their right to conduct their activities, at the same time creating unbearable conditions for the consulates of the Western powers in Mukden so that they leave it and in the future not to allow them to be restored in Mukden and Harbin. As Zhou Enlai expressed himself, to strive for shutting off Manchuria with an Iron Curtain from the foreign powers except for the USSR and people's democracies. In order to create the appearance of equal attitude, Soviet consulate organizations also must formally end their activities, continuing their functions unofficially.
4. To close down all newspapers and journals published by foreigners. This means that the Soviet consulates in Tianjin and Shanghai, in order to continue the publication of their newspapers, must formally appoint as the heads of these publications some kind of democratic Chinese [persons].
5. To prohibit further entry of foreigners, missionaries and journalists into China (with the exception of [those] friendly-disposed), to introduce mandatory registration of missionary organizations, hospitals, schools, cultural and scientific institutions, foreign aid organizations, putting them under control and limiting their activities within a certain framework, protecting their life and property. To limit land property of foreign churches with their villas [sic, probably "to their villas"], confiscating the remaining land. In foreign missionary schools the directors must be Chinese, and the textbooks—from among the number approved by the government, religion must be taught on a voluntary basis. To deport foreigners accused of espionage and of breaking the law, and in some cases to send [them] to jail through the court.
6. To keep foreigners employed at Chinese state institutions, with the exception of reactionaries and

hostile persons.

7. To prohibit activity of foreign telegraph and information agencies inside of China. At the same time they ask us to hint to them what modus could be created for the [ITAR-]TASS, which, let's say, could exchange information with Chinese state agency on the basis of a treaty or otherwise taking into account our experience with the countries of people's democracies.
8. To forbid all foreigners to carry weapons, except for diplomatic workers.
9. To *de facto* isolate the American military attaches remaining in Beijing [Beijing] and Tianjin by supplying [our] own officers to them, take away their opportunity to move anywhere and take up any activities.
10. To encircle the Qingdao base, occupied by the Americans, breaking all of its contacts with the surrounding territory; without resorting to military actions to strive toward Americans' departure; to do the same with other coastal points where the Americans will leave behind or land their forces. In all cases when the Americans disturb the order or come out against [our] forces or authorities, to suppress them using weapons when necessary.
11. To put all of the customs under [our] own control, taking them completely from under the direction of foreign powers. To keep customs tariffs unchanged for the time being. To cancel the privileges, given to the Americans by the Guomindang, decreeing that entry of internal ports is allowed only with the government's permission.
12. To forbid foreigners to use radio stations on China's territory.
13. To establish control over foreign enterprises, banks and their accounting and in case of their breaching established laws, to make them bear responsibility, even as far as closing [them] down.

Talking about foreign trade Zhou Enlai said that first and foremost they will establish trade relations with the USSR and with the countries of people's democracies. They will give their goods to these countries in the first place, and the remnants—to the capitalist countries.

To my question whether they are considering trade with Japan, Zhou Enlai said that they had not discussed this question yet, but it should be thought through and we should be consulted.

To my question whether the party will take the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for itself Zhou Enlai answered in the affirmative, [saying] that the minister in any case will be a communist, and his deputies—one a communist and one non-party person. In this connection Zhou Enlai said that they have created a special commission in Tianjin, which studies various foreign political documents for the eventuality of [us] being prepared for [creating a] future Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The conversation ended at this.



DOCUMENT No. 33

Memorandum of Conversation between Anastas Mikoyan and Zhou Enlai, 1 February 1949 (Evening)

[Source: APRF: F. 39, Op. 1, D. 39, Ll. 25-30. Reprinted in Andrei Ledovskii, Raisa Mirovitskaia and Vladimir Miasnikov, *Sovetsko-Kitaiskie Otnosheniia*, Vol. 5, Book 2, 1946-February 1950 (Moscow: Pamiatniki Istoricheskoi Mysli, 2005), p. 48-51. Translated for CWIHP from Russian by Sergey Radchenko.]

On 1 February 1949 in the evening Zhou Enlai with Zhu De informed me for three hours regarding the military questions. Form their side interpreter Shi Zhe was also present, from our side—Comrades I[van] V. Kovalev and E.F. Kovalev

THE MUSLIM QUESTION

At the beginning of the conversation the question was raised about the Muslims of northwestern China and some Guomindang Muslim generals, in particular, Mao Bufan and Ma Hongkui.

To my question as to who supports them, Zhou Enlai replied that the Muslim generals are supported by Jiang Jieshi and the USA. The Americans want to penetrate the Muslim areas of Qinghai and Gansu. In connection with our victories the situation of the Muslim generals and their forces is becoming unstable.

To my question whether there are any demands on the part of the Chinese Muslims Zhou Enlai replied that the Muslims would want to acquire autonomy. They will cooperate with us, he said, if we give them autonomy and display caution with regard to their religion.

Zhou Enlai stressed that the Muslim question in China is a very complex one and this is reflected on the relationships within the forces of the Muslim generals. In these forces the command-

ing corps are Muslims, and the enlisted men are Chinese. Our policy with regard to the Muslim forces so far entails, firstly, saving them, and then gradually dismissing [them]. In any case at the present time we have no intention to form national forces from their units, it will be possible to talk about this only when deep political work had been carried out among them.

To my remark that the possibility is not ruled out that in case national Muslim forces were organized, the English could take them into their hands, Zhou Enlai expressed his solidarity with me and said that such Muslim units are unreliable.

Continuing to be interested in the Chinese Muslims I asked about their situation in southwestern China. Zhou Enlai replied that in this part of the country there are many small nationalities, which stand at a low level of development and only a few of them rise to high social levels. As an example he referred to the former governor of the Yunnan province Lun Yun, who originated from the Yi tribe. Now Lun Yun is in Hong Kong. At first he flirted with us but now we know that he works against us. We have a firm party organization in Hong Kong, a part of which has a semi-legal status.

POLICY IN INNER MONGOLIA

Talking about Fu Zuoyi, Zhou Enlai said that though he belongs to the group of northwestern militarists, his forces have more Chinese than nationals. Now he is negotiating with us in order to sell the surrender of Beiping [Beijing] more expensively.

Our policy in Inner Mongolia, continued Zhou Enlai, has been accepted well by the local Mongolian population. Gao Gang went there on special duty, [he] conducted great explanatory work in the party organization in connection with the mistakes, which the latter had committed. These mistakes amount to taking the "left" line with respect to the local Mongolian princes and *lamas*.¹ Land was confiscated from the top princes and at the present time they do not have great power and military forces. However, we consider it possible that under the current circumstances these princes take part in the local Mongolian governments, especially the representatives of young royalty. We even know that some young princes joined the CCP. Now Inner Mongolia exists with the rights of an autonomous region.

GUOMINDANG NAVY

Jiang Jieshi's fleet is located at the bases: Formosa (Governor Chen Cheng has about 20 thousand forces), Fuzhou, Canton. The fleet is composed of 271 ships presented to China by the USA.

From further questions about the Navy it became clear that they have no idea about the Navy's vessels in the ports and on the bases, have no plans in this regard, except for the Navy of

the Yangzi River, with which they have established contact. They are especially interested in this fleet because they believe that it must play a big role when the People's Liberation Army crosses the Yangzi River in the forthcoming attack. They do not have a single Navy vessel, there are no cases of desertions of Navy vessels to their side.

GUOMINDANG FORCES

Further Zhou Enlai gave a characterization of the Guomindang forces at different fronts. He said that the main forces of Jiang Jieshi are located in the Shanghai-Wuhu-Nanjing theater. About 58 divisions are concentrated here, about 380 thousand people. Jiang Jieshi has not retreated yet but intends to go south from here in the direction of Hankou and Nanchang. The commander of the forces of this theater, General Tang Enbo, is a trusted person of Jiang Jieshi.

The second theater of the Guomindang forces is in the Hankou area. It is headed by general Bai Chongxi. 32 divisions or about 210 thousand people are under his command. Bai Chongxi also intends to retreat to the south across the Yangzi River.

The third theater of the Guomindang forces, in Xi'an area, is headed by Hu Zhongnan. At his disposal are 36 divisions or 190 thousand people.

Jiang Jieshi relies on these army groups. In all he has 120 divisions or 800 thousand people. Therefore if we throw against Jiang Jieshi our 181 divisions, i.e. about 2 million 200 thousand people, the Guomindang forces will not withstand our pressure.

CHARACTERISTICS OF GUOMINDANG LEADERS (SUN ZIWEN, ZHANG ZHIZHONG, SHAO LIZI)

Talking about [prominent GMD politician] Sun Ziwun [T.V. Soong], Zhou Enlai said that he is sitting it out in Canton and, not being a military man, does not pose a great danger to us. We know that he intends to go the USA. He uses his official position well for personal enrichment. Jiang Jieshi is unhappy with him as he did not carry out his assignment regarding the formation of 6 divisions in southern China just as we created guerrilla areas on the island of Hainan and hold 5-7 counties there in our hands. There are also guerrilla bases in the provinces of Jiangsu, Anhui, and Zhejiang.

Characterizing General Zhang Zhizhong, Zhou Enlai said that he, of course, is Jiang Jieshi's man, but justice requires that one note that though he is his trusted person, he has a clear head and he cannot help but see the inevitable victory of the new forces. During Jiang Jieshi's counterrevolutionary coup d'état in 1927 he parted with him and openly declared that he would not struggle against the communists. After Japan's capitulation he once again confirmed this declaration, continuing his sup-

port for Jiang Jieshi. He takes into account the strength of the Sov[iet] Union and understands that it must not be irritated, and therefore flirts with you. His “pro-Soviet” sentiment is used by Jiang Jieshi in the talks with the CCP. We know that Zhang Zhizhong is in a hurry to go to Lanzhou so as to put his forces together there, make contact with us and bargain out a place for his participation in the formation of the forthcoming government. His participation in the government will depend on whether he transfers his forces to us or not. If he does, then, perhaps, we will involve him as the only one who had taken our side. We do not have illusions in his regard, we know that he is an orthodox Guomindang-ist and in case of his defection to our side one can expect that he will become the center of gravitation for all the discontented elements. One should take into consideration that he is trying to create a good impression of himself in the eyes of the Sov[iet] Union.

The former Ambassador in the USSR Shao Lizi is better than Zhang Zhizhong but he is also Jiang Jieshi’s running dog. He is familiar with the Sov[iet] Union but on the whole he is an unstable figure.

We do not have contacts with the Xinjiang democratic groups. Our former people there were arrested by [one time governor of Xinjiang] Sheng Shicai. Now we are sending there a small group of party comrades.

PLA ARMS

Talking about the PLA arms, Zhou Enlai said that they do not have a unified rear and unified logistics (*intendantstvo*) but they plan to put things in order here. First and foremost they will begin with the unification of the war industry, which has only grown since 1948 and even so primarily in Manchuria. Of the military arsenals Mukden’s takes the first place, followed by that in Taiyuan. We manufacture bombs, shells, explosive substances, mountain cannons, machine guns, shrapnel. The Mukden arsenal produces the most ammunition. In comparison with the previous years, production of ammunition increased by 50%. We receive some things from North Korea.

Now we have about 900 thousand rifles, more than 50 thousand light machine guns, about 80 thousand medium [*stankovykh*] machine guns and about 60 thousand automatic [heavy?] machine guns, more than 10 thousand mountain cannons, about 6 thousand rocket launchers. We feel a shortage of mountain weapons and anti-aircraft weapons; we only have 108 of the latter. In this connection we would like to ask the Sov[iet] Union to supply us with a certain amount of anti-aircraft weapons of Japanese, German, or Czechoslovak type with ammunition for the protection of Beiping [Beijing], Tianjin, Mukden and other cities.

PLA MILITARY REQUESTS

We, Zhou Enlai said, feel a great shortage of anti-tank weapons, of which we have only 150 pieces, in which connection we would like to ask the Sov[iet] Union to give us a certain amount of anti-tank weapons. We have an unfavorable situation with regard to the tanks as well. The available tanks are mainly light, the heaviest is 15 tons. Near Suizhou we captured up to 70 tanks, but in the main already considerably worn out ones. We are running short on materials and we would like to get from the Sov[iet] Union TNT for manufacturing ammunition. We would like to ask the Sov[iet] Union to give us also specialists and equipment for manufacture of arms, and also advisers on army reorganization, on military-educational institutions and organization of the rear, including the arms industry.

I replied that we in principle agree to help with the organization of arms manufacture and to give advisers; as to the question of anti-aircraft and anti-tank weapons, I cannot say anything and will pass [this] on to Moscow for consideration.

Further Zhou Enlai said that that they would like to obtain from us steel rails, gasoline, about 5,000 cars and a series of others machines and materials, to which I replied that with all these requests one needs to direct an application to our government.

PLA INTELLIGENCE

During the conversation Zhou Enlai stressed that intelligence plays a great role in the running of their military operations, in particular, radio interceptions. In this sphere we have substantial achievements in comparison with the Guomindang-ists. We, Zhou Enlai said, decipher the Guomindang and even American codes.

ON THE ORGANIZATION OF THE WAR MINISTRY

Regarding the war ministry Zhou Enlai said that they intend to place communists in it, but it is possible that the military committee will have, for appearance, some Guomindang generals. All military questions, Zhou Enlai said, must be discussed at the forthcoming 2nd Plenum of CCP CC in Beiping [Beijing].

The conversation ended at this.

1. *Editor’s Note:* Lamas are Buddhist monks.



DOCUMENT No. 34

Memorandum of Conversation between Anastas Mikoyan and Mao Zedong, 3 February 1949

[Source: APRF: F. 39, Op. 1, D. 39, Ll. 47-53. Reprinted in Andrei Ledovskii, Raisa Mirovitskaia and Vladimir Miasnikov, *Sovetsko-Kitaiskie Otnosheniia, Vol. 5, Book 2, 1946-February 1950 (Moscow: Pamiatniki Istoricheskoi Mysli, 2005), p. 62-66. Translated for CWIHP from Russian by Sergey Radchenko.]*

On the evening of 3 February 1949 another conversation took place with Mao Zedong, in which CCP CC Politburo members Zhou Enlai, Liu Shaoqi, Ren Bishi and Zhu De, as well as the interpreter Shi Zhe, took part. I[van] V. Kovalev. and [Soviet China specialist] E.F. Kovalev were present from our side.

ON THE FOREIGN MEDIATION IN THE TALKS BETWEEN THE GUOMINDANG AND THE CCP

After mutual greetings the conversation began with me stating that we know that England, America and France stood for taking up for themselves the functions of mediation between the Guomindang and the CCP. Later, having learned somehow that the USSR and the CCP are against foreign mediation, these powers, not wishing to shame themselves, changed their position and declined mediation. In this connection it is necessary to take up seriously the questions of conspiracy and take an interest in whether there are any babbling people around the CCP, through whom this information could reach the Americans. Mao Zedong absolutely ruled out this possibility for, as he stated, such serious questions and, in particular, communications with Moscow, are known only to the 5 present members of the CC, to one interpreter Shi Zhe and to Cde. Terebin. The aforementioned persons are completely reliable and he does not have any doubt in them. As for this case, he stated that the Anglo-Americans, even before our position had become known, openly wrote that the USSR and the CCP would be against mediation. I replied that then it could only be their speculation, however, the Western powers hurried to refuse mediation after they had received reliable information about our position. Mao Zedong reiterated that one cannot [sic, probably "can"] rule out the possibility of the leaking of information from the CCP circle.

THE YUGOSLAVIA QUESTION

Then, on Mao Zedong's request, I shed light on the question of Yugoslavia. Mao Zedong asked whether the Yugoslavs are obstructing the conduct of communist work in Europe. I replied that they cannot, for they are in complete isolation, and all communist parties without exception spoke out against the Yugoslav nationalist anti-Sovietists. To this Mao Zedong said that Tito is [like] Zhang Guotao, a former CCP CC member,

traitor, defector, and renegade.

ON THE COORDINATION OF ACTIVITIES AMONG THE COMMUNIST PARTIES OF THE ASIAN COUNTRIES

Further, to my question about the coordination of activities among the communist parties of the Asian countries, Mao Zedong said that on this account they still do not have a definite opinion. They maintain contacts with the parties of Indochina, Siam, Philippines, Indonesia, Burma, India, Malaya and Korea. The closest ties are with the com[munist] parties of Indochina and Korea, with the rest considerably weaker. There are no relations whatsoever with the Japanese Com[munist] Party. All work of liaison with com[munist] parties is carried out through a special comrade, located in Hong Kong, but it is conducted poorly. Therefore, as Mao Zedong stated, under these circumstances it is too early to create a bureau of com[munist] parties of Asian countries, like the bureau of com[munist] parties in Europe. One may return to this question when our forces take the south of the country and our position strengthens.

Continuing, Mao Zedong pointed out that the strongest com[munist] parties are the North Korean, Indian and Chinese ones, after which one could also count among the strong the Japanese Com[munist] Party. Speaking of the Japanese Com[munist] Party Mao Zedong said that they know that in 1946 a member of the Japanese Com[munist] Party Okano (Nozako Sanzo) [sic, should be Nosaka Sanzo] held the erroneous point of view that power may be captured through parliamentary struggle. The majority of the Politburo of the Japanese Com[munist] Party was against this point of view. Recently the situation of the Japanese Com[munist] Party is improving. In Japan, anti-American sentiments are growing among the people, though the Japanese bourgeoisie are supporting the USA.

Returning to the question of creation of a bureau of com[munist] parties of Asian countries, Mao Zedong informed that they know that the com[munist] parties of Siam and Indochina spoke out in favor of creation of such a bureau. It would be expedient to create at first a bureau from the representatives of com[munist] parties of not all but several Asian countries, for example, from the representatives of the Chinese, Korean, Indochinese and Philippine com[munist] parties. As far as the Japanese Com[munist] Party is concerned, its weight ratio in the communist movement is still not high and besides, we still do not have contacts with the Japanese communists. Regarding the participation of the Japanese com[munist] party in the bureau, Mao Zedong said that one should exchange opinions with it beforehand and receive its agreement.

I said that in the opinion of our party, the CCP CC should not join the Cominform, but should create a bureau of com[munist] parties of East Asia headed by the Chinese Com[munist] Party, In the beginning, composed of 3 parties—Chinese, Japanese,

and Korean. Subsequently one may gradually involve other com[munist] parties. Mao Zedong asked then whether contacts between the CCP and the com[munist] party of the USSR should be direct, to which I replied in the affirmative. Then I warned him that in the membership of the politburo of such com[munist] parties as those of the Philippines, Indonesia, Siam and Burma there are many American and English spies, therefore the CCP must be careful in relations with them. Mao Zedong agreed with this opinion and asked whether they could contact the com[munist] parties of Japan and Korea regarding the question of forming a bureau, to which I replied in the affirmative.

THE MAIN QUESTIONS OF HISTORY OF THE CCP

Then Mao Zedong turned to recounting the main questions of history of the com[munist] party of China. He separated the party history into 4 periods:

- 1) The Northern Expedition
- 2) The Soviet Movement
- 3) The Sino-Japanese War
- 4) Post-war Civil War

Speaking of the first period of party history Mao Zedong said that the CCP appeared in 1921 under the direct influence of the October revolution in the USSR and with the help of the VKP(b). Whereas the Russian Bolsheviks organized themselves at the London Congress in 1903, we were formed as Bolsheviks considerably later, i.e. only in 1921. We immediately took up the program of the Bolsheviks and of the democratic centralism. From 1921 to 1927 we cooperated with the Guomindang and conducted the Northern Expedition together with it. At this time the Sov[iet] Union helped us, until 1924 with Lenin's participation, and after his death—with the participation of Comrade Stalin. Comrade Stalin wrote a lot about China during this period. I knew very little then but I studied Marxism carefully. The CCP did not yet have a firm foundation though it struggled heroically enjoying the support of the Chinese workers and peasants. At that time there were opportunist elements in the leadership of the CCP, headed by [co-founder of the CCP] Chen Duxiu. This led to the defeat of the Chinese Revolution of that period. Only with the help of the Comintern was the opportunist leadership of the CCP removed in August 1927.

The second period of our history falls on years 1927-1936. During this period we took into account the lessons stemming from the defeat of the revolution of 1925-1927. Whereas during the first period (1921-1927) the ranks of the com[munist] party counted up to 50,000 people, then in 1928 the number of members of the party decreased to 10,000 people. An unstable part of the party membership jumped into the opponent's camp, others died in battles or simply abandoned party work. Nevertheless the party became stronger politically though during that time some mistakes were made. First and foremost

one should note the left opportunist mistakes in the questions of economic, political and cultural construction. Then the mistakes of the leftists were that they considered that everything was incorrect both inside and outside the party. Li Lisan followed this in 1930. It is known that the left opportunist line of Li Lisan was censured by the Comintern. The members of the CCP believed the Comintern and joined its decision on Li Lisan. Ren Bishi, Liu Shaoqi and Zhou Enlai spoke out against Li Lisan. After 1928 Zhou Enlai and Strakhov [Li Lisan] visited Moscow, learned a little there, and began to organize work in the CCP. Having come to China they called the 3rd plenum of CCP CC, which censured Li Lisan's line. The leftists did not agree with this and demanded to call the 4th plenum of the CCP CC. With this step they undermined their authority in the party, all the more so since they had no practical experience of revolutionary struggle and construction. To reach their aims they did not shun from the services of the right opportunist Chen Duxiu. They struggled against each and everyone, considering only themselves to be orthodox Bolsheviks. They called Liu Shaoqi an opportunist because he, as the leader of the professional unions movement, in the conditions of the then brutal Guomindang terror, with the aim of preserving the strength of the working class, demanded an organized retreat. In 1931-34 the leadership of the party was in the hands of these leftists. They even took into their hands the underground party organizations, blaming me, Mao Zedong said, for opportunism, considering me a representative of the rightist line of the party.

From the time of the 6th Congress of the CCP (1928) until the 7th Congress (1945) 17 years passed. Among the members of the CCP CC, elected at the 6th Congress at the present time only 3 persons remain, the rest were co-opted into the membership of the CCP CC at the 3rd and 4th plenums of the CCP CC. Among those co-opted were [former CCP CC Politburo member] Bo Gu and [former General Secretary of CCP CC] Luo Fu [Zhang Wentian] who sided with the Wang Ming group and sneaked into the CC illegally. In 1930-31 this group published a brochure, in which it claimed that Bolshevism in China begins with them. Subsequently, under the pressure of our criticism, this group corrected its mistakes, but not entirely. This did not prevent us, however, from electing them into the membership of the CCP CC at the 7th Party Congress.

In 1946 Bo Gu participated in the talks with the Guomindang in Chongqing, and in April of the same year he died in an air crash together with [former Communist military leader] Ye Ting and [former CCP representative in Chongqing] Wang Ruofei. Luo Fu is in Manchuria at the present time. His main shortcoming is the absence of practical experience and besides he is fairly loquacious.

As far as Wang Ming is concerned, Mao Zedong said, he still has not recognized his former mistakes. In his regard we conducted a soft policy, trying to influence him by methods of persuasion. He, Mao Zedong said, has bourgeois habits. During the

Sino-Japanese war Wang Ming proposed to reduce the CCP to the position of the Guomindang. He insisted on the joint management by the CCP and the Guomindang of the most imperative political tasks and therefore trusted the Guomindang and *de facto* liquidated the CCP's independent political line. Having arrived in China from Moscow in December 1937 he called a meeting in Wuhan without the permission of the CCP CC and wrote a brochure, published in March 1938, calling on the party to abandon the CC leadership. It is characteristic that, when in 1937 [now CCP CC member, future Ambassador to the USSR] Wang Jiaxiang returned to China from Moscow, he brought us the program guidelines of the Comintern, and when Wang Ming came from Moscow, he did not bring us anything, whereas what Wang Jiaxiang brought, turned out to be very valuable and useful. These program guidelines helped us in developing our own concrete tasks.

Continuing to characterize the second period of the party history, Mao Zedong said that during that time they had to struggle against renegade Zhang Guotao, as well as with other opportunistic tendencies. In this struggle, as well as subsequently, the Soviet party thinking helped us. For example, in 1946 Comrade Stalin wrote a letter to Colonel Razin on the questions of military history, which pointed out that retreat is a rational form of struggle.¹ But during the second period of our party's history, in the opinion of the leftists, retreat was considered an opportunistic undertaking. Now, one can see that they were deeply mistaken.

In January 1935 in Zunyi (Guizhou province) the CCP CC called a meeting to struggle against the leftist mistakes. The conditions of the meeting were most unfavorable since Zhang Guotao was attacking us with an army of 60,000 people. But we were not at a loss and destroyed more than 30,000 of his forces. At the same time it transpired that Zhang Guotao was a good friend of Wang Ming and when the latter was requested in Moscow to provide an explanation on this question, he delayed his answer.

By the beginning of the Sino-Japanese war we had suffered great losses in the military forces. We remained with only about 30,000 fighters and in this connection Wang Ming claimed that these forces are not sufficient for the struggle against Japan, insisting on having them diluted in the Guomindang forces. Now it is clear that this was a mistaken line, because 30,000 people made for the skeleton, upon which grew the current 3 million strong People's Liberation Army.

All of these mistakes by Wang Ming were known to the delegates of the 7th CCP Congress and they caused their sincere discontent. The delegates also knew about the mistakes of Li Lisan, Bo Gu and Luo Fu and they demanded not to elect them to the CC. However, by the time of the Congress the situation in China had changed. Many from those who had been mistaken understood their mistakes and went backstage.

Marxist-Leninist study, criticism and self-criticism unfolded in the party. And though there were many arguments at the Congress—whether or not to elect Wang Ming, Li Lisan, and Bo Gu, and Luo Fu into the CC, they were elected anyhow with the aim of consolidation of party forces.

Now Li Lisan works in the professional unions, he has great experience in this area and he is more deserving before the revolution than Wang Ming is. He, together with Liu Shaoqi, led the workers' movement in Shanghai. Having arrived from the Soviet Union in China he did not speak a single bad word about the Sov[iet] Union and now is trying to pay back the trust shown in him, while there is still a wedge hammered between the CCP CC and Wang Ming.

Further, Mao Zedong said that in 1936 the CCP counted up to 40,000 members, who mainly joined the party in the period of the Soviet movement. At the present time the party has more than 3 million members. There are 44 members of the CC, 33 candidate members.

To my question whether there is any wavering in the ranks of the party at the present time Mao Zedong replied that there were manifestations of this, but to a lesser extent, in the leadership of the party [sic].

The conversation ended at this.

1. Here, Mao refers to an exchange of letters between "Colonel Razin" and Stalin printed in 1947 in the Soviet journal *Bolshevik*. For English translation of Stalin's letter see "Stalin's Reply" in *Military Affairs*, Vol. 13, No. 2 (Summer 1949), pp. 77-78.



DOCUMENT No. 35

Memorandum of Conversation between Anastas Mikoyan and Mao Zedong, 4 February 1949

[Source: Translated for CWIHP from Russian by Sergey Radchenko. APRF: F. 39, Op. 1, D. 39, Ll. 54-62. Reprinted in Andrei Ledovskii, Raisa Mirovitskaia and Vladimir Miasnikov, *Sovetsko-Kitaiskie Otnosheniia, Vol. 5, Book 2, 1946-February 1950 (Moscow: Pamiatniki Istoricheskoi Mysli, 2005), pp. 66-72.*]

On 4 February 1949 another meeting with Mao Zedong took place in the presence of CCP CC Politburo members Zhou Enlai, Liu Shaoqi, Ren Bishi, Zhu De and the interpreter Shi Zhe. From our side Kovalev I[van]. V. and Kovalev E.F. were present.

THE NATIONAL QUESTION

I conveyed to Mao Zedong that our CC does not advise the Chinese Com[munist] Party to go overboard in the national question by means of providing independence to national minorities and thereby reducing the territory of the Chinese state in connection with the communists' take-over of power. One should give autonomy and not independence to the national minorities.

Mao Zedong was glad to hear this advice but you could tell by his face that he had no intention of giving independence to anybody whatsoever. Mao Zedong on his initiative asked how we feel about the unification of Outer and Inner Mongolia. I said that we do not support this proposition. Then he asked for our motives in not supporting this unification.

I replied that we do not support it because this unification would lead to the loss of substantial territory for China. Mao Zedong said that he considers that Outer and Inner Mongolia could unite and join the Chinese republic. Of course, this would be possible if the leaders of Outer and Inner Mongolia stood for this. He admits, such a possibility in, say, two years' time, when the power of communists in China strengthens sufficiently and everything achieves the desired normality. Then Outer Mongolia will declare that she seceded from the Chinese state because the Guomindang ruled the state. Now, however, when the communists have the power, Outer Mongolia desires to accede the Chinese state, by joining Inner Mongolia.

I replied that this is impossible because Outer Mongolia has long enjoyed independence. After the victory over Japan, the Chinese state, like the Soviet state, recognized the independence of Outer Mongolia. Outer Mongolia has its own army, its own culture, quickly follows the road of cultural and economic prosperity, she has long understood the taste of independence and will hardly ever voluntarily renounce independence. If it ever unites with Inner Mongolia it will surely be [within an] independent Mongolia.

Then Ren Bishi made a remark that the population of Inner Mongolia is 3 million, and Outer Mongolia—1 million.

The end result was that Mao Zedong laughed and stopped defending his opinion.

THE XINJIANG QUESTION

Since Mao Zedong earlier told me that he wanted to discuss with me the Xinjiang question I asked him what he had in mind. Mao Zedong stated that in the Yili district of Xinjiang, which is subordinate to the Urumqi government, there is a independence movement and that there is a communist party there. I replied that I do not know about the existence of a com[munist] party in the Yili district but I know about the national movement of the local nationalities. This movement was triggered by the incorrect policy of the Chinese government, which does

not want to take into account the national specifics of these nationalities, does not present rights of self-rule, does not permit the development of the national culture.

If the nationalities of Xinjiang were given autonomy, the soil for the independence movement would likely remain [sic]. We do not stand for the movement of independence of the Xinjiang nationalities and do not have any claims on Xinjiang territory, considering that Xinjiang is and must be a part of China. We stand for economic cooperation and trade with Xinjiang, like that which is taking place, and which the Guomindang government itself, in the person of its representative in Xinjiang, Zhang Zhizhong, proposes to formalize by a treaty.

Then Mao Zedong said that when in 1945 he met with Bai Chongxi in Chongqing the latter told him that the local insurgents in the Yili district have Soviet-made artillery, tanks and airplanes.

I replied to Mao Zedong that I do not know about this and cannot say anything, I only know that we did not give help to this movement, though it is a national movement against oppression.

Then Mao Zedong said that they have in mind giving Xinjiang autonomy in general, in the same manner as for Inner Mongolia, which is already an autonomous region.

Mao Zedong took a special interest in whether there is a lot of oil in Xinjiang or a little.

I said that in the times of [Xinjiang warlord] Sheng Shicai we pumped and processed oil in substantial quantity, which was used for the internal needs of Xinjiang for there is no transport for taking it out.

ON THE CONSTRUCTION OF A RAILROAD IN XINJIANG

Mao Zedong raised the question, and he was strongly supported by Ren Bishi, as to whether one couldn't build a railroad connecting the Chinese railroads with the Soviet railroads through Xinjiang. This would have great significance for joint defense in case of a new war.

In such a war China, of course, will be together with the Sov[iet] Union. In case if Manchuria were under a strike, such a railroad would be an important channel of supplying the fighting Chinese armies. This road would feed the provinces of Gansu, Shaanxi, Hebei and Sichuan, rich provinces with a mountainous landscape, which are greatly convenient for the organization of firm defense.

I said that, in my opinion, this idea is interesting, it has a future, but it will be very expensive to build and before it is decided to

build, one should carefully make calculations.

Then Ren Bishi raised the question of why not build a road connecting Ulaanbaatar with Kalgan. The distance is not great here, but it would have a great significance for connecting to northern China.

I said that this question deserves attention, but we have not thought about it.

ON CONTACTS BETWEEN THE CCP AND THE VKP(b)

Further, Mao Zedong turned to the question about the contacts between the CCP and the VKP(b).

He stressed that the CCP needs all-sided help from the VKP(b). We need two advisers, one on economic, the other on the financial questions.

Replying to this, I said that Comrade I[van] Kovalev is empowered by the Council of Ministers of the USSR regarding economic questions, and the sphere of his activity includes Manchuria and northern China. He, I added, is at the complete disposal of Cde. Mao Zedong. Although he is nominally listed under the Changchun Railroad, but his activity in fact embraces all of China.

Mao Zedong expressed thanks for placing Cde. I[van] Kovalev at his disposal and, continuing the conversation, said that when the CCP CC moves to Beijing, relations between us will develop in two directions—[on the] diplomatic and party [levels]. He spoke out in favor of having an adviser on party questions with the USSR Embassy.

Politburo member Zhou Enlai, who took part in the conversation, speaking of the party adviser for the CCP, expressed a wish for him to stand as close as possible to the Chinese Com[munist] Party so as to allow one to exchange opinions with him more often, though on the main questions the CCP would like to contact VKP(b) CC directly. As Zhou Enlai said, “the main questions will be solved in Moscow.”

ON THE CANDIDATE FOR THE AMBASSADOR IN THE USSR

Touching upon the question, raised by Zhou Enlai, Mao Zedong stated that periodically, for short period of time, the CCP will be sending its people to Moscow to receive relevant consultations, and the permanent job there, in the capacity of the future ambassador, will go to the CCP CC candidate member Wang Jiaxiang.

Characterizing Wang Jiaxiang, Mao Zedong said that in the past he committed mistakes together with the Wang Ming group. In 1937 he was treated in Moscow and carried out the

duties of the CCP representative in the Comintern. In July 1947 he returned to us with Comintern directives, which were in accordance with our political line. These directives helped us to overcome our own mistakes.

ON THE AID FROM THE USSR

Further, Mao Zedong stressed that the Sov[iet] Union provided and [continues to] provide great aid to the CCP and the latter is very grateful to the VKP(b) for this. The Chinese Revolution, Mao Zedong continued, is a part of the world revolution. In this connection, particular interests should be subordinate to the general [interest]. We always take this into account, when we turn to the Sov[iet] Union for aid. And if, suppose, the Sov[iet] Union did not give something, we will not harbor complaints in its regard. When, before his departure to Moscow, Luo Yunhuan asked me how to raise the question of aid to us on the part of the Sov[iet] Union, I told him that one should not depict the situation in such a way that we are dying, that that we have no capabilities of our own, but stressed that it would be desirable for us to receive from you relevant aid with regard to Manchuria. Since 1947 Lin Biao has also often requested Moscow to provide aid in this or that question. I, Mao Zedong said, gave instructions to Gao Gang, that everything we take from the USSR must be paid back and that, moreover, the shortage of these or those materials at the expense of the Guomintang areas [must] be solved. The Chinese comrades must rationally use the aid of the Sov[iet] Union. If there we no aid on the part of the Sov[iet] Union, Mao Zedong stressed, we would hardly be able to achieve the current victories. This does not mean, however, that we must not rely on our own forces. But one cannot help but take into account the fact, Mao Zedong said, that the military aid of the Sov[iet] Union in Manchuria, which makes up one fourth of all your aid to us, plays a fairly substantial role.

ON THE NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE GUOMINDANG GOVERNMENT

Then Mao Zedong turned to the questions of negotiations with the Guomintang government. He declared that the CCP is conducting negotiations not with the Guomintang, but with the Guomintang government. This is a new development in the political life of modern China. One should, Mao Zedong stressed, agree with the government, and not with the Guomintang, since negotiations with the latter would raise its authority in the eyes of the public opinion. In the future the Guomintang will be dissolved, and if at the present time we recognize it as a party to negotiations, it will inevitably claim to have a place in the future coalition government. Now we are strengthening the propaganda so as to expose the Guomintang, and then we will dissolve it, as in his time Lenin called the constituent assembly and then dissolved it.

We, Mao Zedong stated, raised before the Guomintang eight

conditions, which were accepted by the latter as the basis. If the Guomintang-ists agree with the first point of our conditions, then we will instruct them to arrest the war criminals. Our conditions entail reorganization of the Guomintang army, formation of a government without reactionaries, cancellation of the Guomintang laws and, in particular, the law on the party status of Guomintang. Of course, during the talks with us the Guomintang-ists will insist on joining the government, but the democratic parties are against this just as the entire Chinese people are. Now nobody will defend the Guomintang any longer. It also does not have the abilities for independent organization of the coalition government. In fact the Guomintang is isolated. Even America, France and England openly come out against it. Such a situation is objectively beneficial to us. As far as separate Guomintang leaders are concerned, then, for example, we can use in our interests Bai Chongxi, but his forces should be completely destroyed.

Many people, Mao Zedong said, think that our publication of the war criminal list isolates us from other political parties but we believe that this list delivers strong blows to the Guomintang. They will not unite in the face of this list, they are afraid for their skins. Bai Chongxi, for example, declared that he is for talks with us. Li Zongren also follows this position, intending to send his representatives to us. As is known, Fu Zuoyi surrendered his forces to us. We consider him to be a war criminal. If he helps us to reorganize these forces, we will have a basis for exonerating him in the eyes of the people.

Regarding Zhang Zhizhong, Mao Zedong said that we do not have a reason to include him on the list of war criminals despite the fact that he is a trusted person of Jiang Jieshi.

Talking of the tactics of negotiations with the Guomintang government Mao Zedong spoke out in favor of ruining the general negotiations with the central government, but supporting the local negotiations. Guomintang must be destroyed a part at a time. We know that the former ambassador in the Sov[iet] Union, Yan Huiqing, intends to come to Beiping [Beijing] for negotiations over peaceful resolution of the Shanghai question. All of this suggests, Mao Zedong said, that the Guomintang is suffering one defeat after another. Moreover, many local Guomintang authorities already are voluntarily beginning to establish contact with us. For example, when Fu Zuoyi conducted negotiations with us, a delegation composed of 10 people arrived from Beiping, among who was the city mayor, CC-ist¹, Huo Sheyuan and a member of the Legislative Yuan. We received them well and they were very satisfied with our reception.

Returning to the position of Zhang Zhizhong, Mao Zedong pointed out that the issue concerning him, and the issue concerning those like him, presents itself like this: should we draw them [to us]? If they accept our conditions then they will therefore betray the Guomintang and they can be drawn to us. For example, if Zhang Zhizhong passes his forces to us, one can

think of drawing him into our power [arrangements]. In case of the taking of our side by Shao Lizi, we think, he could be drawn to the work of the future coalition government. But, Mao Zedong stressed, all these persons are unpopular with the people, and the people do not like them.

PREPARATORY COMMISSION FOR CONVENING THE PCM [POLITICAL CONSULTATIVE MEETING]

Further, Mao Zedong turned to the question of creation of a preparatory commission for convening the PCM. A list of 23 organizations, included in the commission, has not been published yet, but has been agreed upon with the interested parties. The following organizations are included on the list:

1. CCP
2. PLA
3. The Revolutionary Committee of the Guomintang
4. The Union to Advance Democracy in China
5. The Democratic League of China
6. The Association for Saving the Motherland
7. The Third Party (Democratic Party of Workers and Peasants)
8. The Union to Advance Democracy in Shanghai
9. The Society for the Democratic Transformation of China
10. The Congress of Professional Unions of China
11. The Peasants' Union of China
12. The Youth Organization of China
13. The Student Union of China
14. The All-China Women's Union
15. The Association of Cultural Workers of China
16. The Association of the Industrial Enterprises of Shanghai
17. The Union of Workers in Education
18. Representatives of non-party figures (Guo Moruo)
19. Representatives of the national minorities
20. Representatives of the Chinese emigrants, living in South-East Asia (Chen Jiageng, etc.)
21. Representatives of the Chinese emigrants living in the USA
22. The Association for the Study of Sun Yatsen.

The membership of the preparatory commission will be composed of 3-4 people, delegated from each of the aforementioned groups, but irrespective of the number of delegates each organization will have only one vote. The communists will have 9 people on the commission, and 5 sympathizers. The rest of the seats are assigned to 4 centrists and 5 democrats. In the PCM 2/3 of the places will belong to the CCP. The commission will convene in the beginning of the month of March, prepare the composition of the political consultative meeting and the agenda of its sessions. The PCM will discuss two questions:

1. Approval of the general political program.

2. Formation of the coalition government.

Further, Mao Zedong said that before convening of the preparatory commission they conducted large explanatory work among the democrats. We openly explain our policy (foreign, land, internal and other). They like our frankness. This guarantees their support for us.

THE CHARACTER OF THE FUTURE RULE

Speaking of the character of the future rule, Mao Zedong said that this will be a people's democracy on the basis of a union between workers and peasants under the leadership of the proletariat.

The proletariat, Mao Zedong said, conducts its leadership through the communist party. We say that the people's democracy is based on the union between workers and peasants because 90% of the population of China is comprised of workers and peasants. This dictatorship is directed against imperialism and the bureaucratic capital, against the enemies of the Chinese people, and we explain this to our democrats, who are still afraid of the word dictatorship.

ON THE TREATIES WITH FOREIGN POWERS

Mao Zedong informed that in the conversations with the democratic leaders they explain what they mean by the renunciation of the treacherous treaties of Jiang Jieshi. They do not demand the cancellation of all of Jiang Jieshi's treaties, because among them there are such, which have patriotic character. The following, for example, belong to them:

1. Treaty on the cancellation of the extraterritorial rights of foreigners in China.
2. Cancellation of rights of the so called 8-power treaty.
3. The Sino-Soviet treaty on the Changchun Railroad and Port Arthur.

ON THE SINO-SOVIET TREATY

I asked Mao Zedong how he explains in the conversation the patriotic character of the Sino-Soviet treaties, to which Mao Zedong said, laughing, that it was not he, but Jiang Jieshi who signed this treaty. I explain to them, Mao Zedong said, that the Sov[iet] Union arrived in Port Arthur in order protect itself and China from Japanese fascism, for China is so weak that it cannot protect itself without help from the USSR. The USSR came to the Changchun Railroad and to Port Arthur not as an imperialist force, but as a socialist force for protection of common interests.

To my question as to why the communists speak out against the American naval base in Qingdao and defend the Soviet base in

Port Arthur, Mao Zedong replied that American imperialism sits in China for oppression, but the Sov[iet] Union, which has its forces in Port Arthur—for protection from Japanese fascism. When China becomes strong and will be in a position to defend itself independently from the Japanese danger, the Sov[iet] Union will not need its base in Port Arthur. With that, Mao Zedong said that one of the Chinese women, a member of the Legislative Yuan of the Guomindang, declared that if the communists are able to get Port Arthur back for China from the Russians, it will be a great deed. Mao Zedong said that this woman does not understand politics.

In conclusion Mao Zedong stressed that they openly speak about their pro-Soviet sentiments. He referred to the fact that on the day of celebration of the anniversary of the October Revolution they stressed that China must stand in the anti-imperialist camp headed by the Soviet Union. We do not have a middle way, concluded Mao Zedong.

The conversation ended at this.

1. CC clique, a political faction within the Guomindang.



DOCUMENT No. 36

Memorandum of Conversation between Anastas Mikoyan and Mao Zedong, 5 February 1949 (day)

[Source: APRF: F. 39, Op. 1, D. 39, Ll. 64-73. Reprinted in Andrei Ledovskii, Raisa Mirovitskaia and Vladimir Miasnikov, Sovetsko-Kitaiskie Otnosheniia, Vol. 5, Book 2, 1946-February 1950 (Moscow: Pamiatniki Istoricheskoi Mysli, 2005), pp. 72-78. Translated for CWIHP from Russian by Sergey Radchenko.]

On 5 February 1949 another conversation with Mao Zedong took place in the presence of CCP CC Politburo members Zhou Enlai, Liu Shaoqi, Ren Bishi, Zhu De and the interpreter Shi Zhe. Comrades I[van] V. Kovalev and E.F. Kovalev were present from our side.

ON THE ROLE OF FOREIGN CAPITAL IN CHINA

Mao Zedong said that China is the center of oppression on the part of foreign powers. Beginning from 1840 in the course of 100 years China was exploited by a series of foreign states in contrast to India, where England acts as the main oppressive country, and in contrast to Indochina, there France acts in the oppressor's role. During this period, Mao Zedong said, the Chinese people looked for a way out of the existing situation. The Taiping Rebellion [1851-1864], and later Sun Yat-sen aimed at freeing China from foreign oppression. However, the parties of that time did not stand the test before the face

of the people and only the communist party, in possession of Marxism-Leninism, is winning in our country.

ON THE CHINESE INTELLIGENTSIA

Speaking of the Chinese intelligentsia, Mao Zedong stated that they translated into Russian and will pass to us through Comrade Orlov the decision of the CCP CC Politburo dated 8 January 1949. Mao Zedong said that this decision in essence amounts to the political program of the CCP for the near future. Local party organizations demand an answer for a whole series of pertinent questions and in this connection we are calling another plenum of the CCP CC.

I said that, evidently, this plenum will have a turning-point character in the sense that it must prepare the party for new tasks, stemming from the current political situation of China.

Mao Zedong agreed with me and said that the last plenum of the CCP CC took place in June 1945. More than 3 years had passed since that time. Now preparatory work is being conducted for calling the plenum. Gao Gang, Lin Biao, Chen Yi, Liu Bocheng and Bo Yibo were present at a special meeting of the Politburo devoted to the question of the plenum. The meeting took 4 days. Now the participants in the meeting left and only Liu Bachong [Liu Bocheng] remained here. He is 63 years old, at one time he worked with Sun Yatsen. He was in Moscow, studied in the C[ommunist] U[niversity of the] T[oilers of the] E[ast]. His role, Mao Zedong said, is somewhat similar to the role of the late Comrade Kalinin. Liu Bocheng is a member of the CCP CC Politburo. Member of the Politburo Dong Biwu, the current chairman of the government of Nor[thern] China, also took part in the meeting. Gao Gang is also a member of the CCP CC Politburo. In all they have 13 members of the CCP CC PB.

THE ROLE OF CRITICISM AND SELF-CRITICISM IN THE PARTY

Touching upon questions of history of the communist party of China, Mao Zedong separated it into 4 periods:

1. The Northern Expedition.
2. The Agrarian revolution
3. The Sino-Japanese War
4. The Civil War

During these periods our party grew and developed. We, Mao Zedong said, in the course of all these periods paid particular attention to unveiling criticism and self-criticism in the ranks of the party, since we consider them to be the sharpest weapon of Marxism-Leninism. However, elements of nepotism and familiarity still exist in the party ranks, which is a legacy of the Guomindang ideology. In our army, officers sometimes beat the soldiers and in these cases we explain to these people, that

their behavior is not different from that of the Guomindang in any way. Our local cadres sometimes part from the masses, as the conduct of the agrarian reform confirmed. That is why we stand for all-sided unveiling of criticism and self-criticism in our ranks and for periodic scrutiny of party members along the lines of their ideological preparedness and their work style. At our party meetings we raise such questions, which would give an opportunity for the bottom to scrutinize the top.

I said that what Mao Zedong is talking about testifies to the presence of democratic centralism in the party, and this is its strength. Lively democratic centralism is the basis of Bolshevik scrutiny, and Comrade Stalin pointed this out time and again.

Mao Zedong said that the party obtained unity by the means of unveiling criticism and self-criticism inside the party.

I remarked that the party is under pressure from various petite bourgeois elements from without, and if criticism and self-criticism have been unveiled in the party at the appropriate level, the purity of its ranks is thereby guaranteed. If the party parts from the masses the danger arises of degradation of some of its ranks.

Mao Zedong said that he fully agrees with me and stated that in connection with the fact that in the recent time a series of large cities had been already captured by the People's Liberation Army, the reaction[aries] are becoming more active and try to pressure the party. He stressed that now the tasks of the party become more complicated since not only the countryside but also the city is coming within the sphere of its activity.

PARTY TASKS IN THE ARMY

Speaking of the tasks of the party in the army Mao Zedong said that in the course of the civil war we gradually democratize our military forces. Our lower commanding ranks are elected, but this is approved by the high command. Every company has a soldiers' committee, in which officers also take part. War requires prepared cadres. The Army is a good political school for the people and after the war we intend to use the army cadres in various branches of the people's economic and political work. In the main our army is a peasant one. Soldiers who received land during the agrarian reform provide a reliable foundation for our army. We also do not ignore the Guomindang soldiers, whom we try to influence politically as prisoners of war. At the meetings of the former Guomindang soldiers the fighters of the People's Liberation Army make presentations, telling about how they lived under the Guomindang regime, and how they live in our conditions. They make a special emphasis on the fact that the new democratic regime gave them land. This has a great impact on the former Guomindang soldiers. Along with that we publish various brochures, which provide comparative data on the situation in our and the Guomindang areas. We use every opportunity for stressing the

tyranny of the Guomindang. By these means we change the Guomindang soldiers to our tune.

Our democratic policy in the army, Mao Zedong further said, gives soldiers an opportunity to criticize the officers. For example, it happens that before beginning a battle operation a meeting of this or that low-level military unit is called, at which the plan of the forthcoming operation is discussed. At this meeting the commander sometimes offers a plan of retreat, and the soldiers, on the contrary, a plan of attack. Under the influence of critical remarks of the soldiers, the commander accepts the plan of attack.

Our army, Mao Zedong continued, enjoys great authority among the people. On 3 February 1949, when our forces entered Beijing [Beijing] almost all the city dwellers greeted our military units. Only one army, fully armed with American weapons, entered the city. On this occasion we took from this army all the Soviet arms and fully equipped it with the American arms so as to stress how Jiang Jieshi supplies us with American technology. The people also greeted the units of the People's Liberation Army advancing on Tianjin. This speaks to the fact that the population supports us and our army displays itself among the people from the better side.

THE LEVEL OF CHINA'S INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT

Then Mao Zedong turned to the question of the economic situation of China and stressed that the standard of living of the Chinese people is very low. He said that imperialism uses China as a raw resource base, and this reflects on the standard of living of the population.

I remarked that in China one observes economic contrasts, for example, [between] the big industrial center Shanghai and the backward village. At the beginning of the building of the Soviet state such contrasts could also be observed in the Soviet Union but after years of existence of Soviet power we substantially liquidated them.

Mao Zedong agreed with me and continued to characterize the economic situation of China. He said that the industry takes up 10% in the entire economy of China, with the exception of Manchuria, where it takes 53%.

Using a question raised by Mao Zedong I stressed that the basis for a modern state is the industry. With the developed industry it is easier to raise the standard of living of the population in the country. The agrarian reform liquidates the obstacles to the development of an agricultural economy, but does not yet resolve the question of technical and industrial development.

Mao Zedong agreed with this and said that in China the advance on the capital will take place more slowly than in the Sov[iet] Union.

I said that the process of the industrial development of China in the conditions of the existence of the Sov[iet] Union and the countries of people's democracy will take place considerably more easily in comparison with the industrial development of the Sov[iet] Union, which from the very beginning of its formation had to spend a huge portion of its means on defense from foreign interventionists.

Mao Zedong agreed with me and said that to a certain extent favorable conditions for the industrial development of China were created by the Guomindang itself. Mao Zedong said that the Japanese and the Guomindang-ists encouraged the concentration of capital in the state's hands. For example, in Manchuria industry takes up 53% of which 47% is in the hands of the state and 6% [belongs to] private capital. In general, Mao Zedong said, all main branches of the Chinese industry are in the state's hands.

ON THE ATTITUDE TOWARD FOREIGN PROPERTY

I asked if there are any plans for the nationalization of industry, to which Mao Zedong replied that they do not have such plans.

Using a question raised I shed light on our attitude toward the problem of foreign property in China. I said that with regard to the questions of foreign property we are of the opinion that one should nationalize Japanese and French property, and as far as possible, English [property] as well. With regard to American property one must carry out a cautious policy, so as to create an impression among the Americans that their interests will be taken into account by the new government.

ON THE ROAD AND THE CHARACTER OF THE CHINESE REVOLUTION

I stressed that the Chinese Revolution is anti-imperialist by character, which must undermine the positions of the imperialists in the country. The destruction of the landlords and the Guomindang does not yet solve the question of the destruction of imperialists, since the former (i.e. the landlords and the Guomindang) are agents of foreign imperialism. Undermining foreign positions in the country, you thereby, I said, ease the situation of the national bourgeoisie, which of course will be glad about this.

Then I explained the point of view of our CC about the road and the character of the Chinese Revolution and about its differences from the Russian Revolution and the revolutions in the countries of people's democracy.

I said that the road of the Russian Revolution and of those of the countries of the people's democracy do not suit China, since the conditions of China are different from the conditions of Russia and Europe. I pointed out that two factors facilitated the victory of people's democracy in the European countries:

1. The national bourgeoisie of these countries compromised themselves by their contacts with the German occupiers and, when the Red Army came to these countries, the bourgeoisie ran away.
2. The very coming of the Red Army and its liberation of these countries from the German yoke eased the establishment of a democratic regime for the communists.

I said that these factors are lacking in China. The Russian and the Chinese Revolutions moved forward by their internal force. One should also take in account another difference between China and Russia: Russia was not oppressed by the imperialists and therefore its revolution did not have an anti-imperialist character. In China imperialist oppression took on the character of a long-term factor and therefore the revolution in this country has an anti-imperialist character.

Speaking of the future regime in China I said that it will not represent the dictatorship of the proletariat. The future regime of China is a people's democracy, but without the Soviets. Lenin in February 1917 raised the question of the proletarian and peasant dictatorship but this regime did not work out in the pure form. Events developed in such a way that in October 1917 the question was raised about the dictatorship of the proletariat. Perhaps, China will succeed in the pure idea of a dictatorship of the proletariat and peasants but without the Soviets. The future coalition government of China must represent the dictatorship of the working class and peasants under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party.

In the countries of the new democracies, I said, the regime carries out the functions of the dictatorship of the proletariat, though not in the pure form. These functions are directed toward the suppression of the bourgeoisie. You do not have this. Dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry in a pure form suits you better. As I understood you, this is how you think about this.

Mao Zedong expressed full agreement with the opinion of our CC and said that it will be a great help in the final formulation of [their] own views on the character of the revolution and in determining the tasks of the Chinese Com[munist] Party and asked me to convey gratitude to our CC and Comrade Stalin for this help and any other help, provided to the Chi[nese] Com[munist] Party.

Further, Mao Zedong said that during the period of the Soviet movement in China the Chinese communists adopted the program of the workers' and peasants' dictatorship but at the same time mechanically transferred the attitude toward the national bourgeoisie in the European countries to the Chinese bourgeoisie. As a result of this, though the decisions of the 6th Congress of the CCP only talked about the confiscation of foreign capital, we carried out the policy of confiscation of all national capital.

At the present time, Mao Zedong said, we stand for the dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry under the leadership of the com[munist] party, and for the people's dictatorship because workers and peasants comprise 90% of the population of China. Such a regime guarantees democracy for the people and dictatorship with regard to the landlords, bureaucratic capital and the imperialists. We call our regime a new democracy, based on the union of workers and peasants under the leadership of the proletariat represented by its vanguard—the com[munist] party.

In the course of the last 10 years, continued Mao Zedong, we explained the character of the Chinese Revolution. In this explanation we pointed to the difference of the Chinese Revolution from the old bourgeois-democratic and socialist revolution. The bourgeois-democratic revolution is declining and we still cannot obtain the most perfect progressive democracy, i.e. of the Soviet type, therefore we call our regime a new democracy, i.e. a people's democracy. Our revolution by character is a people's [revolution], it is directed against imperialism, feudalism and the bureaucratic capital. And all of this takes place under the leadership of the proletariat. "This is all there is", as Mao Zedong expressed himself, "to our political program."

We have many people, Mao Zedong said, who advised us not to say and stress that the Chinese Revolution is going forward under the leadership of the proletariat, so as not to scare away the intelligentsia. As of late we do not take this into account and stress the point about the leadership of the proletariat represented by the com[munist] party, which is the vanguard of the proletariat. This gives good results. And even the liberal democratic representatives, who had arrived in Mukden from the South, announced in their statement that they are prepared to work under the leadership of the com[munist] party.

Then Mao Zedong said that he wrote about the aforementioned character of the modern stage of the Chinese Revolution as early as 1940, but at that time this formulation was not developed and he wants to return to it in the near future. With this he stressed that when developing the question about the character of the Chinese Revolution he based himself on the pronouncements of Comrade Stalin, relating to 1917 and on his latest work, relating to the character of the Chinese Revolution.

Mao Zedong said that for him the most valuable were Comrade Stalin's instructions that the Chinese Revolution is a part of the world revolution, as well as criticism of nationalism of Simic in Yugoslavia. Mao Zedong several times stressed that he is a pupil of Comrade Stalin and holds a "pro-Soviet orientation."

ON INCREASING THE THEORETICAL LEVEL OF THE MEMBERS OF THE CCP

Mao Zedong referred also to brochures written by him at different times, in particular—about military strategy, published

in [December] 1936, on the tasks of the party (1939), On New Democracy (1940), on the main direction of the Chinese Revolution (1945). Speaking of the last brochure, Mao Zedong said that he was very content to find in a letter from Comrade Stalin to Colonel Razin instructions to the effect that “retreat is a rational attack.” We immediately, said Mao Zedong, broadcasted this letter on the radio and went through it in the units. Further, Mao Zedong said that there was great significance for them in becoming familiar with the Soviet criticism of the mistaken philosophical views of [Abram] Deborin and [Nikolai] Bukharin for strengthening the ranks of the party.¹ This Soviet criticism raised Lenin and Stalin in the eyes of our party onto the level of the greatest theorists of Marxism-Leninism. Criticism of the philosophical views of Deborin helped us in the struggle with our idealists. In general, Mao Zedong said, we fall behind the requirements of party enlightenment because, when we took power into our hands, first and foremost we took up political and economic questions. However during the period of this war we conducted great work to raise the theoretical level of our ranks and thereby prepared for the 7th Congress of the CCP. I myself had a situation when, sitting in the apparatus of the CCP CC, I could not bring it under control. Each department of the CC had its own opinion. I warned our party and the CC about this situation, in particular in 1940, but did not achieve positive results. I understood that in order to unite the CC one should work in depth on this, which is what we did and thereby provided for the calling of the 7th Congress of the CCP. On the eve of the Congress we called a plenum of the CCP CC, at which a resolution on historical questions was adopted. In this resolution the political mistakes of the former in-party groups and currents (Chen Duxiu, Li Lisan, etc.) were recounted in the most detailed manner. Because of these groups and currents we lost 9/10 of the former Soviet territory under our control, and the same number of the members of our party. Why did this happen? This happened because some leaders of our party had ideological wavering. Subsequently, with regard to these leaders we began to follow the policy of principled ideological struggle with them, but we manifested caution about organizational conclusions with regard to them. We did not expel from the party for erroneous statements and this facilitated the fact that we met the post-war time united. Now there are no arguments in the party, though during the period of the recent agrarian reforms and in the cities some mistakes were made. The CC immediately corrects these mistakes. That it why we believe that the point of departure for our unity is criticism and self-criticism.

The conversation ended at this.

1. Marxist philosopher Abram Deborin fell into disgrace in the 1930s on account of his philosophical “idealism.” Nikolai Bukharin lost power in 1929 and died in the Great Purge.



DOCUMENT No. 37

Memorandum of Conversation between Anastas Mikoyan and Mao Zedong, 5 February 1949 (Evening)

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On the evening of 5 February 1949 another meeting with Mao Zedong took place in the presence of CCP CC Politburo members Zhou Enlai, Liu Shaoqi, Ren Bishi and Zhu De, and the interpreter Shi Zhe, c[omrade]s I[van]. V. Kovalev and E.F. Kovalev

ON THE SITUATION WITHIN THE PARTY

Mao Zedong continued the conversation begun earlier that day about the situation within the party. He stressed once again that during the period of in-party struggle with the leftists and rightist opportunists in the Soviet areas up to 9/10 of the territory and members of the com[munist] party were lost.

In the course of 1941-1945, the consciousness of the members of the party rose substantially and this prepared the ground for calling the united 7th Congress of the CCP in 1945. The political program, adopted by the Congress, is currently being implemented and on its basis the organizational, political and ideological unity of the CCP was reached. It is true, Mao Zedong said, one can still observe in the ranks of the party a lack of discipline and elements of anarchy, but these are merely rare instances, on the whole there are no competing opinions and groupings in the party. Thereby we prepared ourselves to come out onto the modern political arena as a unified party. Otherwise it would be difficult for us to work. The intelligentsia does not compete with us. The Guomindang is still competing with us but its weight ratio in politics is becoming smaller and smaller.

THE WORKERS' QUESTION

Using a pause I conveyed the content of the telegram from comrade Filippov on the workers' question. I said that one should not prohibit strikes, otherwise the CCP may lose the trust of workers. The significance of the working class in the revolution is determined not by its quantity, I said, but by the fact that it is a new class, the carrier of the most progressive ideas. The future belongs to the working class. Its significance in the society will grow unstopably.

The question that one should not prohibit strikes caused a noticeable bewilderment on the part of Mao Zedong and the present members of the CCP CC Politburo.

On the whole telegrams with recommendations on the work among workers, youth, women and on the preparation of the Chinese cadres, the content of which was conveyed by me to Mao Zedong and the Politburo members, made a good impression. When they were related, Mao Zedong and the members of the Politburo uniformly nodded in agreement, and Mao Zedong said that the suggestions will be carried out.

THE MILITARY SITUATION AND THE CCP'S TASKS

Then Mao Zedong turned to recounting the military situation and the tasks of the CCP. He separated the military situation into two stages.

1. The Civil War at the present time
2. Defense measures after the Civil War.

Speaking of the civil war at the present time, Mao Zedong said that the most terrible time has been left behind, the period of large operations may be considered finished. Now purely military operations are gradually being replaced by the peace offensive on large Guomindang centers. As an example he cited the peaceful resolution of the advance on Beiping, where Fu Zuoyi's forces were under offer to surrender. He said that we will not conduct large operations near Nanjing, Hankou, Shanghai and Canton. However, Mao Zedong said, this does not mean that we are not conducting any preparations at all for further offensive operations. We are facing great difficulties on this road, mainly of the financial character. Military expenses unfavorably reflect on the prices and lead to inflation. One should take into account that we never had such a huge army and never conducted such large operations as now. Of course this leads to great expenses, which reflect on the economy of the liberated areas. Nevertheless, all efforts must be directed at destroying the enemy, and then taking up the economy. As a result of this policy our People's Liberation Army since October 1948 to January 1949 destroyed 1 million 300 thousand of the elite Guomindang forces. Formally we have not yet won because we only have a half of China, but in fact the war is winding down.

After the end of the Civil War the main task of the party will amount to economic construction. In order to finally destroy the enemy, one should grow strong economically. Therefore, already now one should make relevant amendments to our plans, cut back expenses, strengthen the financial situation. We must finish the war with the least possible sacrifices, but it does not mean that we must not act. Our army must continue its offensive, take cities and be prepared for various contingencies. But one should also not forget that simultaneously with the military activities one should now prepare the cadres of political and economic workers, explain our political undertakings, be prepared for the resolution of the workers' question, market relations, prepare ourselves for work in the countryside in the new conditions. We say that our army must not

only fight but prepare itself for peaceful work.

Continuing to recount the military undertakings, Mao Zedong said that in the nearest 2-3 months one should prepare oneself in such a way so as to confidently move to southern China and take its wide and economically valuable regions. 1-2 years will be required for us to be capable to fully possess China politically and economically. Military operations must go on from Beiping [Beijing] to Canton.

In the future the focus of our work will move into the cities. In the course of the last 20 years we had little experience of work among the city population. In the recent times, when our army began to take large cities, the city question rose before us to its full height. The Red Army played a large role in the fact that now we have big industrial cities. Thank the Red Army for it regaining for us Harbin and other cities of Manchuria. The Soviet Army not only helped us to regain cities but helped us in their reconstruction. Now we must develop Changchun, Benxihu, Anshan, Kalgan, Chifu, Beiping, Tianjin and other cities. In the nearest future the same task will emerge with regard to Xi'an, Shanghai and Hankou. Possibly, our forces this winter will capture Canton and Guilin.

ON RITTERBERG AND MA HAIDE

Making use of a pause I recounted the content of the telegram regarding [US interpreter Sidney] Rittenberg. The telegram made a great impression on Mao Zedong and the members of the Politburo. [CCP CC Politburo Member] Ren Bishi who took part in the conversation stated that Rittenberg was recommended and left here by the journalist [Anna Louise] Strong. Mao Zedong informed [me] that since 1936 another American has been living with them by the name of Ma Haide [George Hatem], who had joined the Chinese Com[munist] Party. Ren Bishi added that Ma Haide was recommended and left here by the journalist [Edgar] Snow.

I remarked to Mao Zedong, wasn't it clear that this American as well is a resident of the American intelligence and he should be arrested[?]. The information on Rittenberg caused surprised exclamations—"Yes! Yes!"

In conclusion of the conversation Mao Zedong asked me to give information about the situation in the Sov[iet] Union and on the international situation. I satisfied his request. Information was heard with great attention on the part of Mao Zedong and the CCP CC Politburo members.

The conversation ended at this.



DOCUMENT No. 38

Memorandum of Conversation between Anastas Mikoyan and Mao Zedong, 6 February 1949

[Source: APRF: F. 39, Op. 1, D. 39, Ll. 78-88. Reprinted in Andrei Ledovskii, Raisa Mirovitskaia and Vladimir Miasnikov, *Sovetsko-Kitaiskie Otnosheniia, Vol. 5, Book 2, 1946-February 1950 (Moscow: Pamiatniki Istoricheskoi Mysli, 2005), pp. 81-87. Translated for CUIHP from Russian by Sergey Radchenko.]*

On 6 February 1949 another meeting took place with Mao Zedong and CCP CC Politburo members Zhou Enlai, Liu Shaoqi, Ren Bishi, Zhu De in the presence of the interpreter Shi Zhe and our comrades—I[van], V. Kovalev and E.F Kovalev

ON OUTER MONGOLIA

I conveyed to Mao Zedong the content of the telegram on Outer Mongolia and the Sino-Soviet treaty.

I said that the leaders of Outer Mongolia stand for the unification of all Mongolian regions of China with Outer Mongolia, though the Soviet government speaks out against this plan, as it means cutting away from China a number of regions, though this plan does not threaten the interests of the USSR. Continuing, I said that we do not think that Outer Mongolia would go for renunciation of its independence in favor of autonomy as a part of the Chinese state.

Mao Zedong said that they respect the wish of Outer Mongolia to remain a sovereign state, and if it does not want to unite with Inner Mongolia, then one must take this into account, and we are not against this. We, of course, do not defend the Chinese great power policy, added Mao Zedong.

ON THE SINO-SOVIET TREATY

On the question of the Sino-Soviet treaty I said that we consider the Sino-Soviet treaty on Port Arthur an unequal treaty, concluded in order to prevent the Guomindang's collusion with Japan and the USA against the USSR and the liberation movement in China. This treaty, I said, gave a certain benefit for the liberation movement in China, but now, with the coming to power of the Chinese communists, the situation in the country cardinally changes. In connection with this, I continued, the Soviet government has made a decision to cancel this unequal treaty and withdraw its forces from Port Arthur as soon as the peace with Japan had been signed. But if the Chinese Com[munist] Party, I said, considers it expedient to have the forces withdrawn immediately, the USSR is prepared to do this. As far as the treaty on the Changchun Railroad, we do not consider it as unequal treaty, because this road was built, mainly, with Russia's funds. Perhaps, I said, the principle

of equal rights has not been fully observed in that treaty but we are prepared to discuss this question and solve it with the Chinese comrades in a fraternal way.

The appraisal of this treaty as unequal was so unexpected for Mao Zedong and the members of the Politburo that it caused their frank astonishment. After this Mao Zedong and the members of the Politburo almost in unison spoke to the effect that now one should not withdraw Soviet forces from Liaodong and liquidate the base at Port Arthur because we would only help the USA this way. Mao Zedong stated that we will keep the question about withdrawal of forces from Liaodong in secret and that the treaty can be reviewed only when the political reaction[aries] had been destroyed in China, the people will be mobilized to attack the foreign capital with the aid of confiscating it, then with the help of the Soviet Union "we will put ourselves in order." The Chinese people, Mao Zedong said, are grateful to the Sov[iet] Union for this Treaty. When we become strong, then "you will leave China" and we will conclude a Sino-Soviet mutual help treaty along the lines of the Soviet-Polish treaty.

Further, Mao Zedong said that in determining the ownership over the property of the Changchun Railroad one can observe small glitches, which can be resolved locally. For example, the Guomindang took a part of the enterprises of the Changchun Railroad into their hands, and with the arrival of the PLA they were once again passed to the Changchun Railroad. The people say that the Guomindang-ists took these enterprises in accordance with the Sino-Soviet treaty, and the PLA, as if infringing the treaty, is returning them to Changchun Railroad. Mao Zedong expressed himself in favor of Gao Gang and Kovalev I[van], figuring out this question and reporting to the CCP and the VKP(b).

ON THE SITUATION OF THE NATIONAL MINORITIES IN CHINA

We recognize the Muslims, Mao Zedong said, as a nation. We never approved the Guomindang policy of oppressing the Chinese Muslims and therefore believe that we must provide them with autonomy in the framework of China. There are up to 30 million Muslims in China in total. They live mainly in the provinces of Ningxia, Qinghai, Gansu and Tibet. Their language is Chinese but their writing is different. Their religious books are written in the Arabic language.

Some national minorities live in the province of Xikang where they suffer from slave-like exploitation on the part of the local feudal lords.

We intend to give the autonomy rights to the Thais living in Southwestern China.

In the provinces of Guizhou and Yunnan live the Miao national

minority, with which the Chinese authorities have tense relations. In 1934-1935, when our army passed through these provinces, the Miao supported us. We believe that the Miao have a right to be represented in the provincial governments.

The Yao tribes are spread across the Guangxi and Hunan provinces. They constantly pose resistance to the Chinese.

Among the more than 50 million of the population in the Sichuan province there are small national groups, from which one can create separate national counties. The Li tribes counting from 3 to 4 million people populate the Hainan Island. A part of them are in the stage of barbarism.

On Formosa Island, from the 6 million population several hundred thousand are from the local nations.

About 2 million Koreans live in Manchuria.

The Tibet question is very complicated. In essence, it is a British colony, and only formally counts as China's. Recently the Americans have been flirting with the Tibetans by various means.

Xinjiang has about 14 nationalities, counting about 3 million. Xinjiang has a great strategic significance and economically connects us to the USSR. In accordance with our plan we will be there in 1951.

Returning to the question of Tibet, Mao Zedong said that once we finish the Civil War and resolve internal political questions inside the country and when the Tibetans feel that we do not threaten them with aggression and treat them equally, then we will solve the subsequent fate of this region. With regard to Tibet we must be careful and patient, taking into account the complex regional mix there and the power of Lamaism.

In resolving the national question in China, Mao Zedong said, we learn from the Russian Bolsheviks.

THE QUESTION OF ECONOMIC POLICY OF THE CCP

Further, Mao Zedong turned to relating the question of economic policy of the CCP. He said that the industry takes up 10% in the economy of China. Industry means that there is national proletariat and national bourgeoisie. If we do not take this into account we may commit mistakes. The remaining 90% of the economy of China comes under individual peasant households, which are under imperialist and feudal oppression. That is why this peasantry is a reliable ally of the proletariat. In all of China it amounts to 360 million population, or 90 million households, of which 67% is taken by poor households. In the liberated regions the peasants obtained land, they are led by the working class. But if we do not develop our industry, do not give industrial goods to the peasants, then we will not provide

for the leadership of the working class over the peasantry. The experience of Russia teaches us that one must give the countryside not only the land, but also city goods. In this respect we have had changes in the last three months: we began to work in the cities and develop their industry. We have no doubts that the USSR will help us in developing the industry, and then we will be able to give help to our countryside.

Returning to the question of the weight ratio of industry in the economy of China, Mao Zedong said that the 10% includes state monopolies and private capital. The bureaucratic capital takes up the largest part of this 10%. Roads, mines, shipping companies, etc.—all are in the hands of the bureaucratic capital.

Private capital takes a small portion of the 10%. Our policy with regard to private industrial enterprises must not repeat former mistakes, so as not to scare away the national bourgeoisie, therefore now we will not carry out the confiscation of private industrial capital and its enterprises. We explain that in Russia there was a socialist revolution, and our revolution is new democratic. But even in Russia after the October revolution NEP [New Economic Policy] was introduced and only after 12 years liquidation of the kulaks was begun. We have a different situation, and we must treat our bourgeoisie with more caution. We are not afraid of the capitalists and do not adjust to them, and in this case only Sun Yatsen's mottos about the limitation of capital and equalized land use are employed.

What should be limited?

Loan shark banks, jewelry and silk-producing enterprises, as not manufacturing goods of wide consumption.

Ore mining enterprises should be given the opportunity to export their products, but under the condition that export will be in the hands of the state. Free competition is allowed on the market, but the state control over it is also not allowed to slip. For example, if the state has a lot of grain it will always be able to regulate the market in the interests of workers and peasants. This control may also limit the growth of capitalism.

In the cities and in the countryside one should encourage the development of cooperative production and not allow excessive exploitation of workers and laborers on the part of the private capital and land lords. At private enterprises capitalists may obtain legal profits, but at the same time one should protect the rights of workers. In contrast with the former times to allow the capitalists and workers to have their own organizations. For example, we organize prof[essional] unions on the scale of all of China.

Permitting that the capitalists have profits from their enterprises we at the same time must regulate the development of these enterprises in such a way that it benefits the state. One should

develop those branches of the industry, which strengthen the country.

Therefore, Mao Zedong said, with our economic policy our economy is different from the Soviet economy, but we are also against taking the capitalist economies of England and the USA as the example. We stand for the strengthening of the elements of state and cooperative economy. The state economy will be socialist in character but we are not shouting about this so as not to scare someone away. The state economy will be strengthened because the communists have the power and the army is in their hands. This is why the state economy will be leading in the economy of new China.

Cooperative economy by character is semi-socialist. It is created on the basis of unification of private interests. Now we cannot take the road of *kolkhozes*, though many would like them. Conditions have not been created for them yet.

THE STRUCTURE OF STATE POWER

Turning to the question of the structure of state power Mao Zedong said that we do not intend to use the parliamentary form. The CCP is leading in the entire country, it has its own military forces. The Guomindang has been destroyed, and the small parties have no influence in the country. Therefore the question of the structure of power comes up differently. It will be different from the Soviets. We are calling a congress of people's representatives on the basis of a union between workers and peasants under the leadership of the proletariat. The government is elected at this congress. Governments of villages, regions, counties [and] provinces are elected at congresses, and the people's government of the Chinese Democratic Republic is elected at the All-China Congress of People's Representatives.

Departments will be created in the provincial governments. Ministries will be created in Manchuria, inasmuch as it unites 9 provinces. China will have 9 administrative regions or lines, that is:

1. The Northeastern, with the center in Mukden
2. North China—Beiping
3. Central China—Hankou
4. South—Canton
5. Southwestern—Kunming
6. Sichuan-Xikang—Chengdu
7. Northwestern—Xi'an
8. Xinjiang—Urumqi

The lines will not have ministries (with the exception of Manchuria).

We need such a structure, Mao Zedong said, in order to give the initiative to the localities and not concentrate everything in

the Central government. This system is also beneficial in that it raises the role of the communists at the localities in comparison with the democrats.

The North Chinese government has already been created and on its base will be prepared the central government with the capital—the city of Beiping [Beijing].

In the future government communists and leftist democrats will take probably 2/3 of all seats. Formally communists will not have that many seats, but in fact the majority of seats in the government will belong to them because a number of seats will be taken by covert communists. The rightist parties will also take part in the government, but in the minority.

ON THE HEAD OF GOVERNMENT

The structure of the central government is similar to the government of the USSR. It is headed by a presidium with a Chairman, the premier has not been confirmed yet but probably, Mao Zedong said, it will be Zhou Enlai.

As to himself Mao Zedong said that he will leave to himself the chairmanship of the CCP CC and will join the government with the rights of a member of the presidium.

Sun Yatsen's widow Sun Qinglin is intended as the chairman of the presidium. She, Mao Zedong said, is fully subordinate to us, and has a huge authority among the people.

Ren Bishi who participated in the conversation said that, in his opinion, it is better for Mao Zedong to be the chairman of the presidium; he was supported by Zhou Enlai who stated that Sun Yatsen's widow still makes them uncomfortable, though she is close to the communists and never revealed secret information, which came to her from them, in particular that at one time she passed to the CCP money from the Comintern. Zhou Enlai said that if Mao Zedong does not take up the post of the chairman of the presidium, this will not be understood by the people. Then, he continued, strict surveillance has been established over Sun Yatsen's widow and there are concerns that the Guomindang-ists will take her away by force. In any case, Zhou Enlai said, if Sun Yatsen's widow becomes the chairman of the presidium, Mao Zedong should take the premier's post.

Continuing, Mao Zedong said that there are three more candidates for the post of the chairman of the presidium: Zhu De, Dong Biwu and Liu Bocheng. The question of the chairman should be solved taking into account the internal and the international situation.

THE NEW SITUATION AND THE QUESTION OF CADRES

Speaking of the fact that in the nearest future the CCP will con-

vene the political consultative council Mao Zedong stressed it will take place in conditions under which the Civil War has not ended yet, the offensive must not be slackened, and Jiang Jieshi still has 1 million forces. Now, the situation is different and though it has not become entirely clear, it already requires an appraisal. The novelty is that whereas up to the present time we have had the territory north of the Yangzi, the countryside was at the first place for us, and then the cities, and usually we resorted to the tactic of encirclement, now with the move beyond the Yangzi we will have to take large cities, the scale of the military operations widens considerably, and before us rise to full height the questions of the industry, i.e. the city economies of Shanghai, Nanjing, Wuhu, Hankou, and other cities. In this connection the problem of the cadres is becoming more acute than ever. We are now preparing 53 thousand people. Our army is the source for the cadres. The demobilized will be directed to leadership work in the cities and villages. Kang Sheng has been entrusted with the work to prepare the cadres. If one took account of the fact that on the Shanghai-Nanjing line of advance we have employed 900 thousand people and on the Xi'an line of advance 300 thousand people, this mass of battle-trying and politically prepared people will give us the supply of the necessary cadres.

ON THE SOVIET LOAN TO CHINA

Then Mao Zedong turned to the financial questions and asked whether they could receive a loan and paper for printing banknotes. He said that they have no more than 5 million American dollars worth of silver. In the course of 3 years they would like to obtain a loan in silver (for possible emission of hard currency), oil, raw materials, equipment etc. to the amount of 300 million American dollars. They would like to receive this amount by equal parts beginning in 1949.

Talking about the loan Mao Zedong said that the 300 million is our need, we do not know whether you can give us such an amount, less or more of it, but even if you do not give, we will not hold it against you. We are not asking for gratis aid, because this would be exploitation of the Soviet Union on the part of China. We are asking for a returnable loan with the payment of relevant interest, which China will be able to pay in the future. The latter is important for the Chinese workers who will know that the loan should be repaid to the Soviet Union.

Until now, continued Mao Zedong, we received arms free of charge. But we know that the labor of the Soviet workers goes into the production of the Soviet arms, which should be paid for.

We will not widen for now the list of the arms needed by us. We have enough arms for the current operations. At the same time one should say that we need 3000 vehicles and gasoline. We have put together requests for these and other needed machines and materials, but we do not know how much it

all will cost and whether their full cost fits into the loan. We are not also clear about the question as to how we should pay for this loan. If the question of the loan is resolved positively, we will send our delegation to Moscow for signing a relevant agreement. In connection with the loan we would like to send a group of our cadres to the USSR for getting to know the work of the Soviet banks.

As for the paper for printing banknotes, our need of it amounts to 10 thousand tons.

CCP CC PLAN FOR THE MONTHS OF FEBRUARY – MARCH 1949

Further, Mao Zedong turned to recounting the CCP plans for February-March 1949. During this period control will be taken administratively over Tianjin and Beiping, Fu Zuoyi's army will be reorganized, movement of the leading organs to Beiping [Beijing] will be carried out, a plenum of the CCP CC will be called (first half of March), the preparatory commission for the calling of the political consultative council will begin work and possible negotiations with the Guomintang will begin, though [they] know ahead of time that our conditions are absolutely unacceptable to it, especially the question of war criminals. The latter list also includes Japanese war criminals.

The plan also stipulates that in April the 900 thousand strong army on the Shanghai-Nanjing line of advance will launch an offensive and take a number of cities near Nanjing. The capture of Nanjing is planned for April. It is possible that Lin Biao's forces will at the same time reach Hankou and capture it. At the same time Chen Yi's forces must capture Xi'an.

In March the women's congress will open, and in April—the congress of the new democratic union of the youth.

ON THE YOUTH MOVEMENT

As Mao Zedong said, the organization of the youth movement stipulates two stages: first, a congress of the union of the new democratic youth is called, then the All-China youth federation is created, which will be joined by youth organizations (student union, peasant union of the young people, etc.).

I raised a question that in the previous conversation they agreed with Cde. Filippov on the question of work among the youth, in particular, about the organization of a wide youth union like the union of the young patriots of China, and now from the plan recounted by them it transpires that such a union will not materialize, but there will be a federation of several youth unions—new democratic (like the Komsomol), Marxist, Christian, student and other youth unions.

With such organization it may turn out that the progressive

youth in the new democratic youth union will be isolated, and other unions will remain in the hands of the bourgeois parties and may become its reserves.

I asked whether they think about the membership of the youth in many unions. In reply to this, Mao Zedong, supported by Zhou Enlai and Ren Bishi, said that in the future they intend to liquidate the Christian federation of young people, and on the basis of the new democratic union of the youth to create a federation of a unified youth organization. The Student Union will be kept independent.

I told them that they, of course, know better how to go about the organization of the youth, but still [I] asked them to think it through well and discuss this question from all sides so as to correctly implement the advice of Comrade Stalin. Mao Zedong and his comrades agreed with that.

The conversation ended at this.



DOCUMENT No. 39

Cable, Kovalev to Filippov [Stalin], 13 April 1949

[Source: *APRF: F. 45, Op. 1, D. 331, Ll. 15-21. Reprinted in Andrei Ledovskii, Raisa Mirovitskaia and Vladimir Miasnikov, Sovetsko-Kitaiskie Otnosheniia, Vol. 5, Book 2, 1946-February 1950 (Moscow: Pamiatniki Istoricheskoi Mysli, 2005), pp. 116-120. Translated for CWIHP from Russian by Sergey Radchenko.*]

To Comrade Filippov

Reporting:

On 9 April a three hour conversation with Cde. Mao Zedong took place at which were present members of the CCP Politburo comrades Zhu De, Zhou Enlai and Liu Shaoqi.

During the conversation Cde. Mao Zedong briefly shed light on the following questions:

1. Gave an appraisal of the work and the decisions of the second plenum of the CCP CC.
2. On the loan, given by the USSR
3. About the military situation in China and the prospects of war against the Guomindang forces
4. About the city of Shanghai and its specifics.
5. About the course of the peace talks with the

Guomindang representatives

6. About the second Plenum of CCP CC.

The Plenum, Cde. Mao Zedong said, took place at a high level of political ideology. The statements of the members of the CC were active and rich in content with the exception of Wang Ming, who spoke more than once, but at the insistence of the members of the CC who demanded from him recognition of all of his former mistakes; until the end, however, his statements were unclear and unsatisfactory.

Com[rade] Mao Zedong expressed his particular satisfaction that the VKP(b) CC approved the decisions of the Plenum. He stressed his desire to acquaint the leading Russian communists in the liberated areas of China with the decisions of the plenum.

On the loan.

We are grateful, Cde. Mao Zedong said, to the VKP(b) CC and first and foremost to comrade Filippov for this big support for the CCP. This loan is the collateral of the victory of the Chinese Revolution and the realization of friendship of the two great peoples.

Comrade Mao Zedong asked to help them to make a plan of rational usage of the loan, first and foremost for the restoration of crucial branches of the industry and of the railroad transport. At the same time he added that we very badly need the soonest arrival in China of the Soviet specialists.

Comrade Mao Zedong informed that the American government through third persons (Citibank) is offering a loan to the amount from 100 to 300 million dollars. We look at this offer, Comrade Mao Zedong said, as an attempt to drag us into a deal not for providing aid to the Chinese people, but for saving American capitalism from a crisis (in accordance with the Marshall Plan) and for putting the Chinese people under the yoke, in the same way as they were able to do this under the Jiang Jieshi regime.

On the military situation in China and the prospects of war against the Guomindang forces.

We, Comrade Mao Zedong said, consider the victory over the Guomindang forces to be decided [and] the war—finished.

We do not expect large military operations with the Guomindang forces. The Yangzi River will probably be crossed without big battles.

We make this conclusion on the basis that, first of all, the Guomindang forces defending the Yangzi and cities of Nanjing, Shanghai and Hankou are two and a half times smaller than

our forces located on the Northern bank of the Yangzi.

Secondly, there is no unity among the Guomintang. Some generals, like Bai Chongxi who has at his disposal 32 divisions, have already established contacts with us so as to agree about settling the question by peaceful means like it was in Beiping [Beijing] with general Fu Zuoyi.

Thirdly, the leaders of the Guomintang government and first and foremost Li Zongren and [GMD General] He Yingqin do not have confidence in the strength of the Guomintang forces for beating back our attack when crossing the Yangzi and therefore they established contacts with us expressing an intention to fly into Beiping [Beijing] so as to agree on the transfer of the Central government into our hands and the transfer to us of the cities of Nanjing and Shanghai.

Further, Comrade Mao Zedong pointed out that the delegates of the Guomintang government who had arrived for the peace negotiations, after sharp criticism of them on the part of the CCP CC both at the meetings, and in the press, changed their arrogant behavior, to which they held in the beginning.

At official consultations they behave themselves seemingly in the same way as before, but at closed meetings with us in separate groups they in essence agree to all conditions put forward by us, limiting themselves merely to reservations, in particular, that one does not name concrete persons for now in the war criminal list.

They agree that the People's Liberation Army must cross the Yangzi and take Nanjing and Shanghai but request that it does so after the end of the peace negotiations.

On the city of Shanghai and its specifics

Comrade Mao Zedong dwelled particularly on this question. He said that if the Guomintang forces pose resistance when [the PLA] crosses the Yangzi, we will cross it anyhow and take Nanjing and Shanghai.

However, to take these cities will be easier than to run them. Shanghai is a special city, stressed Comrade Mao Zedong—this is the center of economic and political interests of foreign capitalists, the center of the Guomintang and foreign counter-revolution, espionage and intelligence.

More than 8 million people live in Shanghai and its suburban areas. Big industry, electricity stations (200 thousand kilowatts), water supply, tramways, buses—all of this almost fully belongs to the American capitalists. And we, he said, are apprehensive that in case of complications the Americans will paralyze the life of the city.

This apprehension of ours is connected with our lack of expe-

rience with running such a big city, we do not have specialists, capable of handling the management and usage of the electrical station, water supply, large textile and other enterprises.

We are apprehensive of this, said Comrade Mao Zedong, and therefore until now we have not firmly decided whether to take Shanghai into our hands.

We request the VKP(b) CC, if this is possible, to help us with specialists specifically meant for the city of Shanghai, sending them by the time of our capture of the city.

We request also to help us with specialists for struggle against espionage and intelligence. If for some reasons specialists are not sent we will not be offended, knowing that such a decision may only be taken in the interests of the revolution.

In case of capture of Nanjing and Shanghai, secretary of the bureau of the CC of Central China comrade Yao Raoshi will be appointed as the secretary of the city committee of Shanghai (strong party worker, studied in Moscow for two years). I met with him and will report on the conversation separately.

The [post of the] mayor of Shanghai is intended for general Chen Yi, the mayor of Nanjing—general Liu Bocheng.

Comrade Mao Zedong is concerned as to how to supply Shanghai with food and raw materials, for they will not be able to provide for delivery by railroad transport alone, and they do not have a Navy, and asked to report this to you.

On the course of peace negotiations with the Guomintang government.

Summing up the course of the peace negotiations, from which stems the possibility of the transfer by the Guomintang-ists to the CCP of the central power and all that, which is stipulated by the treaty relations between China and other countries (including communists' acceptance of diplomatic representative offices, embassies, consulates), as well as in connection with the special situation in Shanghai, Comrade Mao Zedong drew the conclusion that the CCP CC considers it possible to change the previously accepted point of view on the relations with the capitalist countries.

Whereas we formerly followed the course of non-recognition of capitalist countries and their diplomatic representative offices in China, i.e. the diplomacy of free hands, then now, with the taking of the central power into its own hands (as well as taking into account the special economic interests of the capitalist countries in Shanghai) we will be compelled to adopt the diplomacy of semi-free hands, i.e. on some occasions to enter into *de facto* relations with them, not allowing, however, the legal formalization of these diplomatic relations.

These relations of ours with the capitalist countries must be such that at any time we could change our point of view in the interests of the revolution.

This is still not the final decision but we are leaning toward a similar course of policy of our party in the sphere of diplomatic relations with the capitalist countries.

[I] consider it necessary to report to you some of my remarks on the related questions:

I. The Chinese comrades, both in the sphere of military operations, and in the sphere of peace negotiations, are too optimistically inclined. This concerns not only the Politburo but also other leading comrades, in particular the secretary of the bureau of the CC for Central China Cde. Yao Raoshi holds this position. He also stated that the Yangzi will be crossed without particular difficulties. Generals Liu Bocheng and Chen Yi have the same point of view.

In connection with the set conviction among the leading communists with regard to the success of the peace negotiations, the crossing of the Yangzi and the capture of Nanjing, Shanghai and Hankou without a battle, by the Beiping [Beijing] scenario, [I am] drawing your attention to some facts of the behavior of the Guomindang government and the command:

1. The Guomindang-ists are conducting intensive work to create defenses along the entire southern bank of the Yangzi, and to a great depth. Big and small steel-concrete defenses with appropriate garrisons are being constructed. Mobilization into the army and mandatory requisition of goods are being carried out.
2. All the mouths of the rivers that flow into the Yangzi from the North are blocked so as not to allow entry into the Yangzi of even the smallest boats, which could be used when crossing for getting over [to the other side.]
3. To the depth of 150 kilometers along the front intelligence, fighting and bombardment aviation of the Guomindang-ists is conducting vigorous activities, shoots and bomb the PLA forces and military objects, particularly going after means of crossing [the river], boats, and so on.
4. On the order of general Bai Chongxi (striving to establish contacts with the CCP allegedly for deciding the question by peaceful means) railroad bridges and tunnels are being destroyed.

In particular, a big bridge near Wushenchuan across the Huanghe River at the Beiping-Hankou stretch was destroyed. From the 14 sections of the bridge

with a total length of about 500 meters, 12 sections were destroyed. Also the bridge over a river near Xinan station was demolished, where all 9 sections were destroyed.

On 2 April during the period of the peace negotiations, which had already commenced in Beiping, a tunnel near Shengguang station was destroyed, inside of which two trains loaded with stones were sent toward each other. Colliding, they obstructed the tunnel, and the entry and exit to it were exploded.

In connection with the destruction of the bridges and the tunnel, carried out on the order of general Bai Chongxi, I asked comrade Zhu De how he appraises the behavior of Bai Chongxi.

Comrade Zhu De replied to this that this is one of the most reactionary and cunning Guomindang generals, there are two like these in China, said Cde. Zhu De, these are Fu Zuoyi and Bai Chongxi.

- II. Representatives of the Guomindang (according to Cde. Zhou Enlai's claim) at the official consultations on peace negotiations are afraid to express their real views, relating merely the directives assigned to them. In the press [they] make claims to the effect that [they] will not yield to the communists. However some groupings from the peace delegations at the meetings with the communists, which they secretly from each other insistently attempt [to arrange], behave themselves differently, in essence fully agreeing with the conditions put forward by the CCP.

The behavior of Li Zongren, He Yingqin, Bai Chongxi also testify that they, on the one hand, are afraid of Jiang Jieshi and the Americans and therefore officially carry out a policy of strong hand, but on the other hand secretly from each other flirt with the communists, trying to reserve with them special privileges for themselves in case of the Guomindang-ists' defeat.

- III. The American imperialists' attempts to establish contacts with the CCP are manifested not only in the proposal on the loan made by them through Citibank.

Thus, for example, on 9 April a telegram was received from Hong Kong, from 10 American trade cartels (allegedly on [former Vice President Henry?] Wallace's recommendation) with the request to receive representatives of the South Mills for trade talks. The CCP CC did not give a reply to this telegram.

Today and in the subsequent days [acting] on Mao Zedong's proposal for more in-depth investigation of the questions related by him in the conversation, I will have meetings with comrades Zhu De, Zhou Enlai, Ren Bishi, the secretary of underground city committee of the party of Shanghai Cde. Liu Xiao.

I will report separately on the content of each conversation.



DOCUMENT No. 40

Cable, Filippov [Stalin] to Mao [via Kovalev], 19 April 1949

[Source: APRF: F. 45, Op. 1, D. 331, Ll. 24-25. Reprinted in Andrei Ledovskii, Raisa Mirovitskaia and Vladimir Miasnikov, Sovetsko-Kitaiskie Otnosheniia, Vol. 5, Book 2, 1946-February 1950 (Moscow: Pamiatniki Istoricheskoi Mysli, 2005), pp. 120-121. Translated for CWIHP from Russian by Sergey Radchenko.]

To Kovalev

When meeting Mao Zedong, tell him the following:

First. We consider that the democratic government of China should not refuse establishing official relations with some capitalist states, including the USA, if these states officially renounce military, economic and political support of Jiang Jieshi and the Guomindang government.

This condition is absolutely necessary for the following motives. At the present time, the policy of the USA is directed toward breaking China up into southern, central, and northern China with three governments. At the same time, the USA is supporting the south-Chinese and central-Chinese governments of the Guomindang and, as one can see, do not mind supporting also the northern Chinese democratic government so that these governments fight among themselves and weaken China [as a whole], and the USA could extract benefit from that. Therefore, if you want a united China headed by the communists, one needs to restore diplomatic relations only with those capitalist governments which officially renounce support of the Canton and Nanjing groups of the Guomindang.

Second. We consider that one should not refuse a foreign loan and trade with capitalist countries under certain conditions. The issue is for the conditions of this loan and trade not to place such economic or financial responsibilities on China, which could be used to limit the national sovereignty of the democratic Chinese state and strangle Chinese national industry.

Third. As far as the loan on the part of the USSR to China is concerned, we must inform you of the following. We are conducting and will conduct trade with China on the principle of goods for goods. For this one does not need the permission of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. As for the loan, the government is not able to solve this question by itself, as the question of the loan is subject to the permission of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. And the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, not objecting to a loan to China, must nevertheless have a relevant document on an agreement about the loan, signed by the representative of China and the USSR. Without such a document the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet does not have a right to give agreement to a loan. If you are not able to send a delegation to Moscow to conclude the agreement on a loan, we could empower c[omrade] Kovalev to begin talks with the representatives of the CC CP China and develop a draft agreement, which in case of approval will be signed by the representatives of both sides. After this we will consider that the loan has been granted to you and you will receive both the equipment and the Russian specialists.

Filippov



DOCUMENT No. 41

Cable, Stalin to Kovalev, 26 April 1949

[Source: APRF: F. 45, Op. 1, D. 3331 [sic, probably 331], L. 3. Reprinted in Andrei Ledovskii, Raisa Mirovitskaia and Vladimir Miasnikov, Sovetsko-Kitaiskie Otnosheniia, Vol. 5, Book 2, 1946-February 1950 (Moscow: Pamiatniki Istoricheskoi Mysli, 2005), p. 126. Translated for CWIHP from Russian by Sergey Radchenko.]

Mukden

To Kovalev

To No. 43

Tell Chen Yun that we, the Russian communists, are in favor of the Chinese communists not pushing away the national bourgeoisie but drawing them to cooperation as a force capable of helping in the struggle against the imperialists. Therefore [we] advise to encourage the trading activities of the national bourgeoisie both inside of China and on the outside, let's say trade with Hong Kong and with other foreign capitalists. The Chinese communists must decide for themselves which goods to buy and which to sell.



DOCUMENT No. 42

Cable, Kovalev to Stalin, 17 May 1949

[Source: APRF: F. 45, Op. 1, D. 331, Ll. 50-55. Reprinted in *Andrei Ledovskii, Raisa Mirovitskaia and Vladimir Miasnikov, Sovetsko-Kitaiskie Otnosheniia, Vol. 5, Book 2, 1946-February 1950 (Moscow: Pamiatniki Istoricheskoi Mysli, 2005), pp. 128-132. Translated for CWHIP from Russian by Sergey Radchenko.*]

On 12 May a meeting with Mao Zedong took place and later that day with members of the Politburo in Mao Zedong's presence. Present at the meeting were comrades Zhu De, Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai, Chen Yun, and member of the CC Wang Jiaxiang.

Com[rade] Mao Zedong briefly recounted the course of the military operations. He said that General Chen Yi's army group alone took more than 100 thousand Guomintang forces as prisoners, having lost merely 6 thousand soldiers of the PLA, adding that: "the main body of our forces is moving unstopably to south [China] for annihilation of the active forces of the adversary, and then a part of them will turn in the direction of Shanghai for liquidating a Guomintang grouping, which has already been encircled by us. Forces of the PLA will come out to the mouth of the Yangzi River with the aim of cutting access to Shanghai from the sea side. After encirclement, the forces will adopt a waiting position." They do not intend to take Shanghai now for a month while the adversary is posing even slight resistance, though [they] already now could destroy the weak garrison protecting Shanghai without much effort.

[We] are not taking Shanghai, he said, consciously, so as to stir among the inhabitants of Shanghai the hatred toward the Guomintang forces and the Guomintang government, and at the same time prepare ourselves better for running the city.

Relative ease of our victories, he remarked, suggests that our estimates, expressed in the month of February to the effect that the main big battles against the Guomintang forces are already over, and that in the prospect one has only particular, small scale operations, have been justified.

The military situation materialized in such a way that the army of Cde. Lin Biao is crossing the Yangzi River 15-20 days earlier than planned. Before it was considered necessary to carry out the crossing of the Yangzi River by Lin Biao's forces only after their full concentration at the points of crossing. Now, when the adversary is retreating, and at the crossing points his forces are not substantial, the crossing of the river will be carried out by parts as Lin Biao's forces arrive to the crossing points. Before it was not planned to take the Southern provinces this year, now with the current situation they will be taken in the nearest three months.

The only province which is causing difficulties in terms of taking it is Xinjiang, but this is not because any resistance is expected there on the part of the forces of the adversary, but only because this province is far from the deployment of the PLA forces, and covering large distances across the sands poses big difficulties.

He said that we are close to completing the victory in the open military struggle with a very strong and cunning Guomintang reactionary Jiang Jieshi regime, which was actively supported and is still supported by the American imperialists. We owe these victories of ours to the international revolutionary movement, and first and foremost to the Soviet Union. If there were no Communist Party of the Bolsheviks, created by the great leaders Lenin and Stalin, if there were no Soviet Union, if there were no victory over the reaction in 1917-1921, if there were no defeat of the most terrible reaction represented by the German fascists and the Japanese militarists during the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945, there would be no Chinese Communist Party and victory of the Chinese Revolution.

We, and all fraternal communist parties owe to our elder brother—the All-Union Communist Party of the Bolsheviks, owe to its creators: great leaders—Lenin and Stalin; the high authority of the Communist Party of the Bolsheviks—is a sign of the power of the revolution, without this authority it would be impossible to lead, unite the revolutionary movement of all countries against the imperialists of all countries. Without this authority the forces of the revolution would lose, and the imperialists would win in the strengthening of the forces of reaction.

If one were to depict imperialism as a lion, then in the current situation the body and the head of the lion are bound by the strong vises of the revolutionary forces, by the Soviet Union. The new democratic countries of Eastern Europe and the European Communist Parties help bind the head of this lion.

We, the Chinese communists, pinched "the lion's tail and are trying to cut it off. We suppose that the cutting of the tail will in turn weaken the power of the imperialists, concentrated in the head of the lion."

Further, Cde. Mao Zedong turned to economic questions. He said that recently [he] spoke with the democrats who declared that "you, communists, have a political and military center—this is your strength, but you do not have an economic center—this is your weakness."

"We understand this weakness of ours, said Cde. Mao Zedong—we feel it. Not only we, the leaders, do not have the experience of running the economy, but our whole party.

We are like a girl who, when marrying, knowing that she will have to bear children, but not knowing how it will be, she still knows that it will be inevitable and so [she] marries.

We are like that, we know the general direction, how the economy of our country should develop, and we are going for it, but how it takes place, we cannot say this, because we do not know. We must create an economic center as soon as possible.

This leading economic center should have, from the CCP CC—secretary of the CC Liu Shaoqi, from the future democratic government—member of the managing board of the CCP, Cde. Chen Yun and you, as a representative of the Soviet government.”

“Through you, he says, I will interfere in the management of the economy and push [it].”

It is suggested to complete the work to develop the structure of the economic center in the course of a month, in order that no later than 2 June the delegation could depart for Moscow.

Comrade Mao Zedong further gave a characteristic to the comrades: Liu Shaoqi, Chen Yun, Bai Po, who will be the deputy of Cde. Chen Yun.

He said that “the secretary of the CCP CC Comrade Liu Shaoqi came out from the bottom, from the workers; in the course of 15 years he worked with the working class, [he is] theoretically prepared person. In the course of his entire work in the party [he] did not commit serious mistakes. Very thoughtful, careful, likes to look into details, into small things. Has a great authority. Was one of the first to visit the Soviet Union.

Com[rade] Chen Yun was formerly a manager for a big bookseller. Therefore he has an opportunity to study, received an education, cultured, thoughtful, capable, including economic questions, very careful in his actions, has authority.

Com[rade] Bai Po—secretary of the CC bureau of Northern China, honest, capable person but with little experience. [“]

Further Cde. Mao Zedong turned to characterization of comrades Wang Ming, Li Lisan and other comrades.

Turning to me he said:

“You will necessarily encounter professional union figures, including Li Lisan. With regard to Li Lisan, we received an explanation from Moscow, that if he maintains honesty at work and does not commit political mistakes, he could be left at leadership work. We know that Li Lisan in the past committed big political mistakes. He committed the first mistake in 1930, when [he] came to the leadership of the CC without elections, [and] took a Trotskyist position on the questions of the Chinese Revolution. After this big mistake of his, he was removed from [his] post and sent to the Soviet Union. He stayed in the Soviet Union until 1946, i.e. 16 years. There he was arrested for Trotskyism, but was freed from confinement

with a resolution that he does not have counterrevolutionary activities [on his hands]. After the arrival of Li Lisan to China, we studied him carefully. Li Lisan behaves himself honestly. [He] takes active part in work. His attitude toward the Soviet Union and toward the Soviet comrades is a good one. We suppose that he is an honest communist and may remain in the role of a deputy head of the professional unions. Com[rade] Chen Yun was elected by us to be the chairman of the professional unions, and the political leader of the professional unions is the secretary of the CC Cde. Liu Shaoqi. If we uncover the slightest mistakes on the part of Li Lisan, then comrades Liu Shaoqi and Chen Yun will immediately interfere and correct him.”

Com[rade] Mao Zedong requested that, as questions arise on the part of Li Lisan, or on my part to Li Lisan, to meet with him. [I] consider it necessary to report to you that Li Lisan is from the same place as Mao Zedong [*zemliak Mao Tzeduna*], they know each other from childhood, and therefore according to the traditions of common-place-origin [*zemliachestva*] and friendship, which are particularly strong in China, Cde. Mao Zedong consistently and insistently supports Li Lisan. Com[rade] Mao Zedong particularly touched on the role and behavior of Wang Ming. He said that “there were three deviations in the Chinese Revolution: the first, committed by Chen Duxiu, the second—is Strakhov (Li Lisan), the third—Wang Ming. During the first period, the period of the rightist deviation, as a result of Chen Duxiu’s actions, the party decreased from 50,000 to 10,000, the revolutionary forces suffered a great loss. The defeat of the Chen Duxiu group raised the authority of the party and it grew to 400,000 people, and the army—from 10,000 people to 300,000 people. The leftist activity of Wang Ming resulted in the ranks of the party shrinking from 400,000 people to 40,000 people, and the army—from 300,000 to 30,000, and from the 10 Soviet regions only one remained. The underground communist organization was completely ruined in the Guomindang regions, [and] since Wang Ming covered his actions by the Comintern’s name, claiming that “whoever is against me, [he] is against the Comintern,” therefore many communists, including Bo Gu, Luo Fu, Zhou Enlai, Wang Jiaxiang, supported him. His most active supporters were Bo Gu and Luo Fu.

Zhou Enlai, Wang Jiaxiang and Luo Fu honestly committed and honestly recognized their mistakes and now correct them in practice. Behavior of Wang Ming, however, in the course of the last 3-4 years, testifies to the fact that he has not learned much, has not understood much in the events, which are taking place. As a doctrine-man he probably continued to believe in his rightness, and his semi-recognition of his mistakes is a forced maneuver. Therefore at the second plenum of the CC, which took place in March 1949, members of the plenum demanded more than once from Wang Ming that he talk about his mistakes in a more consistent and frank fashion.

In his many statements, Wang Ming did not reveal his mis-

takes. Already after the plenum Wang Ming was offered [the opportunity] to express an appraisal of his incorrect activity in writing. He gave a promise to do this, and probably, after recovery, will write it.

Comrade Mao Zedong turned to me with a request, after Wang Ming sends his written statement, to study it and then to talk with Wang Ming.

1. In case Li Lisan or Wang Ming turned to me, may I meet with them.
2. In the course of 5 days from 12 until 17 May comrades Chen Yun, Wang Jiaxiang and I consulted with regard to the future administrative economic center. Not one of the Chinese comrades expressed concrete propositions, having turned [to me] with a request to give the structure of the future administrative center on the basis of the exchange of opinion.

[I] developed an approximate structure. Today, on 17 May it was discussed for 6 hours at the Politburo in the presence of comrades Mao Zedong, Zhu De, Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai, Dong Biwu, Chen Yun, Wang Jiaxiang, and Bai Po.

No substantial amendments were introduced. Decision was made to work on it for several more days. Comrades Mao Zedong expressed a wish to consult with Moscow with regard to the creation of the economic center.

The structure of the economic center is transmitted next. Request your instructions for advising the Chinese comrades.

Kovalev.



DOCUMENT No. 43

Cable, Kovalev to Stalin, Report on the 22 May CCP CC Politburo Discussion, 23 May 1949

[Source: APRF: F. 45, Op. 1, D. 331, Ll. 66-69. Reprinted in Andrei Ledovskii, Raisa Mirovitskaia and Vladimir Miasnikov, *Sovetsko-Kitaiskie Otnosheniia*, Vol. 5, Book 2, 1946-February 1950 (Moscow: Pamiatniki Istoricheskoi Mysli, 2005), pp. 132-134. Translated for CWIHP from Russian by Sergey Radchenko.]

Reporting: on 22 May the Politburo in the presence of Cde. Mao Zedong continued the discussion of the future economic center. My proposals were accepted:

1. For now to limit oneself to looking at the structure of

the central apparatus of the economic center, and to look separately at the structures of departments-ministries, proposing to the persons heading the departments, to develop the structure of departments and introduce it to the CC for discussion and approval.

2. The structure of the economic center and the departments may be considered a draft so as to have an opportunity to consult leading workers of the departments and democratic figures and only after this finally to approve it. After looking at the structure Cde. Mao Zedong briefly informed me about two questions:

1. On the course of military actions and
2. On the meeting and conversation of a representative of the CCP with American Ambassador [John Leighton] Stuart, which took place in Nanjing in the beginning of May.

1. About military actions Cde. Mao Zedong said that they are developing successfully, that no serious resistance is posed to the PLA forces. In connection with the successful military actions vice-president Li Zongren and General Bai Chongxi renewed attempts to begin negotiations with us about ending military actions and solving the questions of the spheres of influence by peaceful means. We, Cde. Mao Zedong said, will maintain radio contact with these persons in order to create an illusion on Bai Chongxi's party that it is possible to solve the question by peaceful means and so that he does not move his forces to the South and further, as he intended, to Indochina. In the case if we succeed at this, we will encircle and destroy his forces.

We do not intend to conduct any negotiations about the peaceful solution of the question with them (Li Zongren and Bai Chongxi). If he goes to Indochina we will have an excuse to invade Indochina and to destroy there both him and other reactionary forces. With this Mao Zedong said that two armies of Lin Biao, acting against the forces of Bai Chongxi, successfully crossed the Yangzi River and are quickly moving to the South, that by 15 June another six armies will have crossed the Yangzi. These main forces of Lin Biao will pursue the forces of Bai Chongxi until their complete annihilation.

Further he informed that Shanghai is encircled by the PLA forces, and, on 27 May, a storm of the city will be undertaken. As one can see, Shanghai will not be surrendered without a fight, as it was supposed earlier, 22 divisions of forces are concentrated here,

with the total number of 150 thousand soldiers and besides the entire Navy and aviation. Big defenses have been created, a lot of artillery and mine throwers are concentrated [there]. Jiang Jieshi personally commands the defense of Shanghai, [he] is on a ship, consulting with American advisers.

The English upgraded their military fleet by Shanghai with warships from Singapore. Two English warships have already taken part together with the Guomintang fleet in the military actions against the PLA forces. The artillery fire of three Guomintang and two English ships broke through the positions of two companies of the PLA forces, which suffered great losses. In this connection, Cde. Mao Zedong said, we issued an order to shoot without warning in the zone of military actions and along the entire Yangzi River, at any foreign ships, including non-military, which sailed along the Yangzi without our permission.

2. About a meeting and conversation, which took place in Nanjing at the beginning of May between CCP representative Huang Hua with the American Ambassador Stuart.

Com[rade] Mao Zedong said that an exchange of opinions took place on three questions:

On the support by the American government of the Jiang Jieshi regime—the Guomintang-ists;

On the withdrawal of American forces from China;

On the creation of a coalition government.

Stuart, Mao Zedong said, expressed his opinion that they—the Americans—have now stopped supporting the Guomintang regime, and testifying to this is the fact that the American embassy he headed remained in Nanjing; their example was followed by the English, French and other embassies.

About the American forces in China he said that as soon as the regiments of the People's Liberation Army enter the cities (Qingdao, Shanghai), the Americans will evacuate their forces and the Navy.

Stuart asked to take into account the circumstance that there was 200 million dollars worth of American property in Shanghai, and that to protect it the American government maintains warships and some force units of the forces in Shanghai.

Stuart expressed the desire for the future coalition government to represent all the democratic elements of the country as widely as possible.

After the formation of the coalition government, which must be supported by the entire people, said Stuart, this government will be recognized and diplomatic relations will be established with it.

Stuart informed that he intended to go to America in July and that his departure is related to the situation in China.

With regard to the conversation with Stuart, Mao Zedong said that the statements of Stuart contradict the actions of [American General Douglas] MacArthur, who recently landed two companies of American soldiers in Qingdao, and is also strengthening the Navy in Shanghai. Either Stuart is lying or the military (MacArthur) does not care about what the State Department says about anything.

Stuart also lied, said Cde. Mao Zedong, [by saying] that the Americans have allegedly stopped supporting the Guomintang regime. We know of the opposite, that this support continues actively.

As for Stuart's reference to the fact that the American and other embassies remained in Nanjing, this is once again not in our interests. We would be happy if all the embassies of the capitalist countries get out of China.

Kovalev.



DOCUMENT No. 44

Cable, Stalin to Mao Zedong [via Kovalev], 26 May 1949

[Source: APRF: F. 45, Op. 1, D. 331, Ll. 73-75. Reprinted in Andrei Ledovskii, Raisa Mirovitskaia and Vladimir Miasnikov, *Sovetsko-Kitaiskie Otnosheniia, Vol. 5, Book 2, 1946-February 1950 (Moscow: Pamiatniki Istoricheskoi Mysli, 2005), pp. 136-138. Translated for CWIHP from Russian by Sergey Radchenko.]*

Convey to Cde. Mao Zedong the following:

First. [We] consider correct the idea of creating the administrative economic center. We have some observations on the draft of the structure of the administrative economic center, chosen by the CCP CC Commission:

- a) The draft copies the Soviet construction of the administrative-planning center, and, besides, it is too bulky. This is not suitable for China now. It should be simplified and downsized.
- b) The customs business and the protection of boundaries by the border forces has a great significance

for China. Customs can give China large currency income. Therefore this business should be singled out into a separate department;

- c) Private Chinese enterprises should not be placed on one plank with foreign industrial and financial enterprises; they should be assigned to two separate departments. We suppose, however, that the CCP CC knows better which organizational forms for the administrative economic center of China are more suitable to the Chinese conditions.

Second. The administrative economic center of China must be composed, understandably, of only Chinese figures. Therefore Cde. Kovalev must not have the membership of this center. It would be better if Cde. Kovalev were in a position of an adviser with the CCP CC, and if needed, at the same time adviser with the economic center.

Third. We have still not received the list of those Soviet specialists, which the CCP CC needs for helping in the organization of the economic center and economic life of Shanghai. We request the CCP CC together with Cde. Kovalev to make such a list and transmit it to us, so that we could take practical measures with regard to sending Soviet specialists to China. We consider that these Soviet specialists must have the positions of experts with those Chinese figures, which will be appointed to the relevant posts.

Fourth. We do not consider the current moment suitable for broad demonstration of friendship between the USSR and Democratic China. This demonstration could be timed to the formation of the Chinese democratic government and establishment of diplomatic relations between it and the USSR.

Fifth. We do not have objections against sending to the USSR, as well as to the countries of people's democracy, of a delegation of Chinese democratic figures. One could include into this delegation also Zhang Zhizhong, Shao Lizi and Fu Zuoyi, if the CCP CC considers this expedient.

Sixth. We advise not to delay any longer the formation of the Chinese democratic government. Now there is no government in China. The CCP CC cannot be called a government. The Guomindang government has *de facto* ceased to be a government. China is left without a government. This is dangerous from the perspective of internal politics. [It is] also dangerous from the point of view of the international position of China. One cannot delay any longer the formation of a government.

Seventh. The successes of the PLA are brilliant, and we are very glad about these successes. We think, however, that one cannot consider the military campaign finished. Anglo-Franco-Americans cannot help but understand that the approach of the PLA to the borders of Indochina, Burma [and] India will cre-

ate a revolutionary situation in these countries, as well as in Indonesia and on the Philippine Islands. This is fraught with the danger of the loss of these countries for the imperialists. Therefore the imperialists will take all measures from blockade to military clashes with the PLA in order to keep South China under their influence. There is danger that the Anglo-Americans might land in Qingdao their forces in the rear of the main forces of the PLA, which had left for the South. This is a very serious danger. It is possible that the Anglo-Americans will use other ports, for example, the port of Tanggu near Tianjin for landing in the PLA's rear. We therefore advise:

- a) Not to hurry and seriously prepare the PLA's approach to the south for coming out to the borders of Indochina, Burma [and] India;
- b) To assign two good armies from the main forces of the PLA heading south, move them into the Tianjin and Qingdao region, replenish them and keep ready for preempting the landing of enemy forces;
- c) Not to cut back yet the number of PLA forces.

Eighth. We agree with the observations by Cde. Mao Zedong, which he made with regard to the questions of Korea, and also to the effect that one should not create an Eastern Cominform for now.

Ninth. We agree also with the observations of Cde. Mao Zedong, which he made with regard to American ambassador Stuart.

Tenth. The VKP(b) CC thanks Comrade Mao Zedong for the information.



DOCUMENT No. 45

Cable, Mao Zedong [via Kovalev] to Stalin, 14 June 1949

[Source: APRF: F. 45, Op. 1, D. 331, Ll. 101-111. Reprinted in Andrei Ledovskii, Raisa Mirovitskaia and Vladimir Miasnikov, Sovetsko-Kitaiskie Otnosheniia, Vol. 5, Book 2, 1946-February 1950 (Moscow: Pamiatniki Istoricheskoi Mysli, 2005), pp. 141-146. Translated for CWIHP from Russian by Sergey Radchenko.]

Reporting: on 12 June Cde. Mao Zedong gave me his report for transmitting to you. The text of the report follows:

- 1. I received your telegram dated 26 May through Cde. Kovalev.

Besides those points, which I conveyed to you through comrade Kovalev, I will write to you the

present report. From the time of the previous report, which I wrote to you on 19 and 21 March of this year, already two and a half months have passed. Now there are a number of questions, about which I must report to you and request your instructions.

2. Question on the creation of a government.

Now we decided to form a government in the months of August-September of this year. All the preparatory work must be completed before the middle of the month of August. In the middle or in the second half of the month of August one can call the political consultative meeting and form the government.

The preparatory work amounts to the following:

- a) At the all-China level there are 44 various parties, public organizations, groups and non-party figures. 500 delegates and personal invitees will be selected from these organizations [to take part] in the political consultative meeting.
- b) Development of the organizational position and rights of the consultative committee.
- c) Development of a draft of the general political program of the consultative meeting and its discussion.
- d) Development of the structure, of the organizational basis and the composition of the government with a preliminary exchange of opinions.

In view of the fact that a number of provinces in the area to the south of the Yangzi River will be quickly integrated into our territories, the number of the delegates, and of the organizations that send them to the political consultative meeting, will be greater than we previously supposed. Therefore, the consultative meeting will represent more than a half of the territory and the population of China.

In connection with the fact that the war is nearing its end, the general political program, developed earlier with the gravitation center of gaining victory in the war, must be reviewed and composed on the basis of restoring and developing the economy of China.

The organizational structure and the composition of the government must also be developed for solving this task. All of this preparatory work with a great exertion of effort can be implemented by the middle of August. Therefore the consultative meeting may be called in the middle or in the second half of September. Both from the point of view of internal and of external policy, this is a suitable time.

All circles hope that this meeting will go well and give positive results. Representatives of all circles place great hopes on this meeting. The opinion of some democratic figures, who believed that the meeting must be called after the taking of Canton and Chongqing, is no longer supported by them.

3. Judging by the internal and external situation, there is a possibility and the necessity for our army to take the [following] cities in winter of this year: Canton, Nanning, Kunming, Guiyang, Chongqing, Chengdu, Qinghai, Ningxia[.] [W]ith the aim of preventing a possible economic blockade and military intervention on the part of the imperialist powers, one should take the following measures:

- a) As quickly as possible to wipe out from the face of the earth the lackeys of imperialism—the remnants of the Guomindang. This is the main thing. If the Chinese mainland does not have lackeys of imperialism, then it will be difficult or almost impossible for the imperialists to carry out economic blockade and intervention.
- b) To create the defense of the coastal line.
- c) To prepare for economic self-sufficiency, so as not to be dependent on a possible economic blockade.

4. The development of events is occurring faster than we previously supposed. Difficulties, arising in the connection with the fact that units of our forces do not rely on the supply from the rear but are supplied from the local resources (human replenishment, ammunition, foodstuff, clothing and so on), which the PLA encountered in the Guomindang areas are also less than we previously estimated.

The resistance force of the Guomindang has lessened considerably; with the exception of a part of the Guomindang forces numbering more than 200 thousand people, who still have some battle capacity, the rest of the forces no longer have this battle capacity. The breaking up and the falling apart of the Guomindang forces is the characteristic trait.

In the course of military operations over 50 days, from 21 April until the present time, our army, at the price of 60 thousand killed and wounded destroyed 580 thousand Guomindang forces.

As a result of three years of the liberation war, our army killed in all 5 million 590 thousand people. The Guomindang army in general, including regular and

irregular units, apparatus of the rear service, military schools and others, now count no more than one and a half million people. These are insignificant remnants of the Guomindang forces. It will not take too much time to destroy them.

The discipline of the PLA, with the exception of some units, is on the whole very high. Our forces displayed people's heroism in a revolutionary upsurge, received the support of all levels of the population and were solemnly greeted by the people in the liberated areas, the battle capacity of our army has reached an unheard of level, the three months political and military preparation, which the PLA forces underwent in the spring of this year, gave positive results. The entire army with all seriousness and decisiveness, in complete order, moved forward and accomplished a great military march unheard of in Chinese history.

Workers, peasants, intelligentsia, national bourgeoisie (with the exception of some rightist elements, which are wavering) unanimously support our party, our army in the struggle against the Guomindang.

In places reached by our army, the majority of the Guomindang-ists move away from the reactionaries, remain at the places, protect the apparatus of the government, institutions, enterprises and cultural-enlightenment institutions, waiting for our arrival so as to pass them into our hands, so that we decide the question of their life and work.

Our underground party organizations and guerrilla regiments in the villages very effectively combined their activities with the military operations of the PLA and with work to take over the city economy. All of this allowed the PLA to solve comparatively successfully the difficult problem of supply at the localities, and not from the rear.

The present situation gives us an opportunity to exceed the scale of the military operations stipulated in the previous plan. In accordance with that plan, about which I personally told Cde. Andreev,¹ we intended to take 10 provinces this year: Jiangsu, Anhui, Zhejiang, Fujian, Hunan, Hubei, Jiangxi, Shaanxi, Gansu. However, in the 50 days from 21 April we already took five provinces: Jiangsu, Anhui, Zhejiang, Hubei and Shaanxi, and also a part of provinces Jiangxi and Fujian.

Considering the estimate of the time and military forces, another 8 provinces can be taken already in winter of this year: Guangdong, Guangxi, Yunnan, Guizhou, Sichuan, Gansu, Ningxia, Qinghai. The

ones that remain are only Xinjiang, Xikang (i.e. the Western part of the Sichuan province), Formosa and the Hainan Island, the taking of which will be put off until next year.

In case the Guangxi forces of Bai Chongxi retreat without a battle to Yunnan province, then the taking of this province possibly will also be put off until the spring of next year.

The situation in Tibet is special (*spetsyfucheskaia*); perhaps its question will still not be solved next year.

If we stick to this plan, this will shorten the length of war considerably and will allow to cleanse [ourselves] quickly from the lackeys of imperialism on the continent. Then the third part of the PLA in the fall and winter of this year will not be inactive and the question of the foodstuff for the regular army of 2 million 150 thousand people will be solved in better conditions as it will be supplied from 16 provinces, and not from 10 provinces as it was supposed by the previous plan.

[... Here follow details on military planning.]

9. At the present time not only can we not cut back the number of our forces—on the contrary, in all taken provinces one will have to create local forces in the process of implementing the land reform, the number of which will reach, perhaps, one and a half million forces.

Therefore, if one counts the regular army numbering 2 million 150 thousand people, forces directly responsible to the center and the local forces of the old northern areas, counting in total one and a half million people (including the military apparatus of the rear), then the full strength of our army at a certain stretch of time will reach 5 million people. When we reach this number, then one will be able to cut back gradually the number of our forces. Then it will be enough to have about 3 million forces (including regular and local forces—the protection regiments) in China. Now we are turning not to cutting the forces, but to cutting the military industry.

In old liberated areas to the north of Yangzi River we have 160 military industry enterprises, which employ 100 thousand workers and employees.

Considering the necessities of the Civil War we will not need now to manufacture arms and ammunition. Our field armies can fight using the trophies captured

in the battles and the military industry received from the Guomindang in order to satisfy the needs of war. If there is no intervention on the part of the imperialists, we will be able to gradually begin the preparation for cutback and transfer of the military industry to peaceful products. Otherwise, one will have to produce unnecessary products, which is very unprofitable for us.

With the aim of creating long-term defense of the country it will be necessary for us to stipulate and include into our general economic plan a suitable plan for creating new military industry, which would be suitable to the aims of protecting the state. In this we need help on the part of your specialists.

11. At the present time we still do not have a plan of wide propaganda and demonstration of friendly relations of China with the Soviet Union. Our opinion is to use the occasions of trips of various democratic parties on excursions to the USSR and the countries of new democracy of Eastern Europe in order that they see for themselves and sense the friendly relations of the USSR to China so as to dissipate some erroneous views, which some of them have on this account.

This will thereby ease the official formalization of treaties with the USSR on the loan and the Soviet specialists after the formation of a democratic government. At the same time this will help the Soviet specialists to work in China officially.

In view of the fact that the government will be formed in the month of August and, jointly with us, the democratic figures should complete in June-July the preparatory work to call the consultative meeting and the creation of the government (the work is very tense), their trip to the USSR therefore will have to be postponed and carried out only after the formation of the government. Now, as of yet, we have not exchanged opinions with them with regard to their trip to the USSR.

12. I fully agree with your observations that the structure of the economic center of the future Chinese government must not be bulky but flexible, suitable to the conditions in China.
13. The list of the number and the profile of the Soviet specialists, whom we need, was sent to you by a telegram dated 9 June.

With Bolshevik greetings,

Mao Zedong
11 June 1949

1. *Editor's Note:* Andreev is Mikoyan's *nom de guerre*.



DOCUMENT No. 46

Cable, Filippov [Stalin] to Mao Zedong [via Kovalev], 18 June 1949

[Source: APRF: F. 45, Op. 1, D. 331, Ll. 119. Reprinted in Andrei Ledovskii, Raisa Mirovitskaia and Vladimir Miasnikov, Sovetsko-Kitaiskie Otnosheniia, Vol. 5, Book 2, 1946-February 1950 (Moscow: Pamiatniki Istoricheskoi Mysli, 2005), p. 148. Translated for CWIHP from Russian by Sergey Radchenko.]

Convey to c[omrade] Mao Zedong the following telegram:

“We consider your plan of the organization of the government and the further campaign to take over the west and the south to be sensible and fairly expedient. If we still say that intervention and blockade cannot be ruled out, then it is because when making a plan one should take into consideration not only the good, but the worst as well, so as to hedge against accidents and not to be caught unawares.

2. [We] advise to pay serious attention to Xinjiang, where there is oil in the subsoil and where you will be able to obtain cotton. It will be difficult for you without your own oil. If one were to begin work soon in Xinjiang, then after 2-3 years one could have one's own oil.

One could lay an oil pipeline from the area of extraction and processing of oil to the Qinzhou station, and from Qinzhou you could ship oil around China both by water and by the railroad. Therefore you should not delay for a long time the taking of Xinjiang. One army will be needed for this business. You exaggerate the forces of Ma Bufan. In accordance with our information, he is not that strong.

Filippov.”

Telegraph implementation.



DOCUMENT No. 47

Memorandum of Conversation between Stalin and CCP Delegation, 27 June 1949

[Source: APRF: F. 45, Op. 1, D. 329, Ll. 1-7. Reprinted in Andrei Ledovskii, Raisa Mirovitskaia and Vladimir Miasnikov, *Sovetsko-Kitaiskie Otnosheniia, Vol. 5, Book 2, 1946-February 1950 (Moscow: Pamiatniki Istoricheskoi Mysli, 2005), pp. 148-151. Translated for CWIHP from Russian by Sergey Radchenko.*]

To Cde. V. M. Molotov personally.

Record of conversation of I.V. Stalin with a delegation of CCP CC about a credit from the USSR to China, possibility of sending Soviet specialists to China, and about other questions of Soviet aid to China.

The meeting [*priem*] took place on 27 June and continued from 23 hours until 24 hours.

Present at the meeting were: cdes. [Vyacheslav] Molotov, [Georgii] Malenkov, [Anastas] Mikoyan, Liu Shaoqi—secretary of the CCP CC, Gao Gang—member of the Politburo of the CCP CC, the same being the secretary of the Bureau of the CC and the chairman of the government of Manchuria, Wang Jiaxiang, member of the CCP CC, Karskii (Shi Zhe)—interpreter, and I[van] V. Kovalev.

After mutual greetings and handshakes with the delegation Cde. Stalin asked about the health of Cde. Mao Zedong.

Cde. Liu Shaoqi thanked Cde. Stalin for his attention to Cde. Mao Zedong and handed to him a letter from Cde. Mao Zedong, which expressed gratitude to Cde. Stalin for enormous aid, given to China by the Soviet Union and requested Cde. Stalin to receive the delegation.

Whereupon Cde. Stalin turned to the discussion of the questions raised by the delegation.

1. About the credit. Cde. Stalin said that the VKP(b) CC decided to provide to the CCP CC a credit of 300 million dollars. With this, he remarked that this is the first time in history that such an agreement is being concluded between [the] two parties.

A credit of 300 million dollars with one percent annual interest will be provided to China in the form of equipment, machines, and various kinds of materials and goods by equal parts of 60 million in the course of 5 years.

Repayment of the credit by China will take place in

the course of 10 years after the full appropriation of the credit. With regard to this Cde. Stalin said that Cde. Mao Zedong, in a telegram addressed to [Stalin], expressed the opinion that 1% annual interest is small for such a credit, that one should increase it.

Cde. Stalin explained to the delegation that the Soviet Union provided credits with 2% interest rate to the countries of Western democracy [Eastern Europe], while one percent is taken from China because there [in China], in comparison to the countries of Western democracy, where there is no war and their economy had already strengthened, the war continues, devastation continues, and by the force of this [circumstance] China needs greater help, on more privileged terms.

Then Cde. Stalin, laughing, said: “Well, if you insist on a bigger annual interest rate, this is your business, we can accept an increased interest rate.”

With regard to the signing of an agreement on credit, Cde. Stalin said that there are two options: the first—for the representatives of the VKP(b) CC and the CCP CC to sign the agreement, and the second—for the plenipotentiaries of the Soviet government and the government of Manchuria, which already exists [to sign it] so that later, when the all-Chinese democratic coalition government is created, to formalize the agreement by treaties between the governments of the Soviet Union and China.

2. About the specialists. As for the specialists, Cde. Stalin said, [we] will give them. We are prepared to send at the nearest time the first group, requested by you. But we should come to an agreement about the conditions of the specialists' livelihood. We consider that the pay, perhaps foodstuffs, if you give it to your specialists, must stand at the level of the highest pay for your best specialists, not lower, but also not higher. In connection to the fact that our specialists have high [pay] rates, we, if this is needed, will pay them extra at the expense of the Soviet state.

We ask you, Cde. Stalin said, that you report to us about bad behavior of our specific specialists, for, as they say, there is a black sheep in every family [*v sem'ie ne bez uroda*], there may be a bad one among the good ones.

Bad behavior will shame the honor of the Soviet state, therefore we will take measures of preemption, education, and, if needed, also punishment.

We will not allow the Soviet specialists to look down on the Chinese specialists and the Chinese people

and to slight them.

In response to these words of Cde. Stalin Cde. Liu Shaoqi said: in China there are foreign specialists, not connected with the activity of the imperialists, and that they receive rates much higher than the Chinese specialists. To this Cde. Stalin replied: we, the Soviet state, have [our] own judgments and practices different from the capitalist countries, and we want to stick to them.

3. About the sending of specialists to Shanghai. Cde. Stalin said that we have selected 15 specialists and can, on your demand, send them at any time. Discuss this and tell us. In general You should keep in mind that in large cities, and especially in Shanghai, there are many of your specialists and qualified workers, who are able to give you not less but more aid than the Soviet specialists, therefore You need to draw them to active work.

4. We, Cde. Stalin said, are also prepared to provide you with aid to demine waters near Shanghai, both in terms of specialists, of whom we have many, and in terms of minesweepers.

We could, for instance, sell several minesweepers to the government of Manchuria, train Chinese sailors in Dairen, Port Arthur or Vladivostok in the business of demining, and the Manchurian government, Cde. Stalin said laughing, can “sell” them to the Chinese government.

5. About Xinjiang. Cde. Stalin said that one should not put off occupation of Xinjiang, because a delay may lead to the interference by the English in the affairs of Xinjiang. They can activate the Muslims, including the Indian ones, to continue the civil war against the communists, which is undesirable, for there are large deposits of oil and cotton in Xinjiang, which China needs badly.

The Chinese population in Xinjiang does not exceed 5%, after taking Xinjiang one should bring the percentage of the Chinese population to 30% by means of resettling the Chinese for all-sided development of this huge and rich region and for strengthening China’s border protection.

In general, in the interests of strengthening the defense of China one should populate all the border regions by the Chinese.

You, Cde. Stalin said, exaggerate the forces of Ma Bufang. He has cavalry, which can be easily defeated

with artillery. If you want, we will give you 40 fighter planes, which will help destroy and scatter this cavalry very quickly.

6. About the fleet. China does not have its own fleet, Cde. Stalin said and immediately added: don’t you already have some number of ships captured from the Guomindang?

China must have a fleet and we are prepared to help you in the creation of a fleet. Now, for example, we can raise sunk military and merchant ships and help repair them.

As far as your request about the strengthening of defense of Qingdao is concerned, we can send our squadron to the port of Qingdao with a visit after the creation of all-China government.

- [7.] Cde. Liu Shaoqi thanked Cde. Stalin for the enormous aid, which is now being provided in all spheres of life and activity of China on exceptionally privileged conditions, which history has never seen.

He stressed right away that the CCP CC developed an instruction, which will be sent to the party organizations, to create such conditions of work for the Soviet specialists that nobody offends them.

8. Cde. Stalin said that we will also develop a detailed instruction for the Soviet specialists, that they also do not offend the Chinese specialists.
9. In reply to a request of the Chinese comrades to establish air links between Moscow and Beijing, Cde. Stalin said that we are already prepared now to undertake the organization of this air route.

We can help you build an assembly-repairs plane factory, we can give you fighter planes of the latest makes, Czechoslovak if you want, Russian if you want, so that you prepare your aviation cadres with them.

10. Cde. Stalin agreed to the delegation’s request to be heard at the Politburo with their reports about the military-political and economic situation of China and exchange opinions on a series of most important questions at the time when they are ready, after 3 or 4 days.
11. Cde. Stalin said that we are prepared to help you all-sidedly in studying the state apparatus, industry and all that you wish, but for this aim one should legalize you, naming [you] a trade delegation from Manchuria.

12. If it suits you, we will publish a report in the press that a trade delegation arrived in Moscow headed by Cde. Gao Gang, and then you will be provided with a wide opportunity to look at everything, including any spectator [zrelischchnye] activities.

The Chinese comrades asked to give them an opportunity to reply after they consult with Cde. Mao Zedong.

I. Kovalev
[signature]
Printed 1 copy.



DOCUMENT No. 48

Report, Kovalev to Stalin, 6 July 1949

[Source: APRF: F. 3, Op. 65, D. 363, Ll. 20-23. Reprinted in Andrei Ledovskii, Raisa Mirovitskaia and Vladimir Miasnikov, Sovetsko-Kitaiskie Otnosheniia, Vol. 5, Book 2, 1946-February 1950 (Moscow: Pamiatniki Istoricheskoi Mysli, 2005), pp. 163-164. Translated for CWIHP from Russian by Sergey Radchenko.]

To Comrade I.V. Stalin.

Reporting:

In conversations with me on 5 and 6 July Cdes. Liu Shaoqi, Gao Gang, and Wang Jiaxiang requested to report to you the following:

1. They want to receive from you instructions and advice on the questions, recounted in the report of c. Liu Shaoqi, provided to you.
2. They would like to familiarize themselves, while in Moscow:
 - a. With the structure of the VKP(b) and the work of the party organs;
 - b. With the structure of the Soviet state;
 - c. With the planning organs, the planning of people's economy and managing the economy of the country;
 - d. With the situation with enlightenment and cultural work in the country;
 - e. With the structure and work of mass organizations (professional unions, volunteer societies etc.)
 - f. To conduct excursions to plants, factories, kolk-

hozes, sovkhazes, institutions;

3. They ask to send to China Soviet professors of different branches of knowledge (including a professor of Marxism-Leninism) for teaching work in the Chinese higher educational institutions and, for their part, would like:
 - a. To send to the USSR a group of senior managers (heads of the directories, directors of plants) for 1.5—2 months for studying specific branches of the industry;
 - b. To organize in the Soviet Union a special educational institution for the Chinese, in which three categories of people could simultaneously study, to the total amount of 1,000 people. 1st category—leading cadres, engineers and technicians with a one year course of study, 2nd category—middle management ranks with a two year course of study, and the 3rd category is the youth with a 5 year course of study. This educational institution could prepare specialists—managers of industry, trade, finance, jurists etc.
 4. The delegation expressed a wish to resolve some questions concerning Manchuria:
 - a. About the provision of heavy machine for machine building plants, not on credit, but as reciprocal exchange, goods for goods;
 - b. They would like to clarify the prospects of trade between the USSR and Manchuria, the names of goods, prices, means of goods exchange and the timing;
 - c. They would like to receive for Manchuria no less than 300 specialists for various branches of industry, especially for replacing the Japanese, who work in the metallurgical, military, aviation industries, as well as at the power plants and as doctors in the hospitals.
- They also raised the question of Port Arthur, declaring that they wish that the Soviet forces stay there not for 30 years, as the treaty stipulates, but even 60 years, but they would like to change somewhat the existing situation in the mutual relations of Manchuria and Dairen:
1. To obtain free access to the port for taking out coal and salt and for receiving freight destined for Manchuria;

2. To establish one currency note for all of the Manchurian territory, without which they cannot support the activity of enterprises, which formerly worked solely for the war [effort], located in Dairen. [They] have to close them down, which causes unemployment and discontent of the workers. They would like to conduct this undertaking with regard to the currency note in September 1949.
5. They also turned [to us] with a request as to whether they can use 50% of the power of the power plant on the Yalujiang (its total power, in their words, is 400 thousand kilowatts). They reminded that at the time of the construction of this power plant China invested 75 million yen, and Korea 50 million yen. Their efforts to reach an agreement with Korea independently were not crowned with success. The Koreans set aside for them only 20 thousand kilowatts.
6. They are asking whether they can receive a Czechoslovak trade delegation, which the Czechoslovak government is asking them to receive. The delegation is composed of 5 people: 2 representatives of the Skoda plant, 2 from the Batia concern and one textile-man.
7. The delegation requested to convey Cde. Mao Zedong's request to you to inform the delegation regarding questions touching upon the international situation and, in particular, is war possible, and when is it possible?
8. The delegation received a telegram from Cde. Mao Zedong, in which he agrees to the creation of a commission to work out an agreement on supply of goods on credit. But in view of the fact that the financial-economic apparatus has not been created yet, and also the specialists, data and estimates of needed equipment are lacking, [he] requested to make the list of orders for equipment on the spot after the arrival in China of Soviet specialists and their study of the situation in industry. In his telegram he pointed out that the credit (50%) will be mainly utilized in Manchuria, then in northern China, and then in the northwest for the restoration of the metallurgical, coal industry, power plants, railroads, and for the organization of extraction and processing of oil. The delegation also expressed the opinion that it is empowered to sign the credit agreement without further consultation with the CCP CC.

Kovalev.



DOCUMENT No. 49

Cable, Liu Shaoqi to Mao Zedong, 19 July 1949

[Source: Jianguo Yilai Liu Shaoqi Wengao, co-edited by the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee's Document Research Unit and the Central Archives, Vol. 1, (Beijing, 2005) (pp. 30-37). Translated for CWIHP from Chinese by David Wolff, who thanks Chen Jian for his continuing guidance through this kind of material.]

A Telegram about the Meeting of Stalin with the Chinese Communist Party's Delegation (18 July 1949)

To the Center, to Chairman Mao:

I. After we had sent the Soviet Party Center's Stalin a written report and some other materials, on 11 July at 10 p.m. the Soviet Party's Politburo met in the Kremlin. We [Liu Shaoqi, Gao Gang, and Wang Jiaxiang] and Kovalev took part with Shi Zhe translating. [Others present were] Stalin, Molotov, Malenkov, [Lavrentii] Beria, Mikoyan, [Lazar] Kaganovich, [Nikolai] Bulganin, [Nikolai] Shvernik, [Vasilii] Sokolovskii, intelligence heads, and admirals. First Stalin explained that several of the Politburo members had already left for vacations and that several military men would participate, since the Chinese delegation's report had touched on military issues. Then Stalin asked us: Do you have your own naval officers? Does the airforce have its own pilots? Does each province have a provincial government? Is each provincial government and regional government like the northeast obeying the future central government? Does the future central government have the right to approve and dismiss the main personnel of provincial and regional governments? With Mao Zedong as the central government's chairman, is "chairman" the same as "president" [?]. What is the nature of the relations between the chairman and the cabinet? He also asked about bureaucratic capital? Would comprador¹ capital be included in bureaucratic capital? After we had answered every question, Stalin started to explain about the Chinese national bourgeoisie and answered all the questions we had raised in our report. At the end, at our request, he explained the present international situation. The other comrades spoke very little and the mood was completely serious. After the meeting Stalin asked if we were comfortable and everyone watched four movies that had been picked by Stalin. He gave a running commentary as we watched the movies.

II. During the meeting a committee to draft a loan agreement was constituted with Mikoyan and Kovalev participating on the Soviet side and we three on the Chinese side. We decided to have Gao Gang sign the loan agreement in the name of the Northeast Government, since the Soviet side considered this an appropriate procedure. They will now send it to the Supreme Soviet for approval and we can collect the loan at an early

date. Below is a summary report of Stalin's oral answers to the questions we asked in our report [to him].

- a. Regarding the CCP's policy towards the Chinese national bourgeoisie

Stalin said: The point of view that considers cooperation between you and the Chinese national bourgeoisie as the way of drawing them into the government is correct. The Chinese national bourgeoisie is not the same as the East European and German bourgeoisie, which cooperated with Hitler during the war, tarnishing itself, and were forced to leave with Hitler. They settled down in their enterprises, so in the period after the defeat of Hitler, all these countries focused on was their enterprises, and not on themselves. But the Chinese national bourgeoisie is different. They did not surrender to Japan during the war. So they didn't have to retreat with the Japanese. After the defeat of Japan, a part of this group supported Jiang Jieshi to get American recognition and support. But the Chinese-American Trade and Shipping Convention was extremely unfair, a big attack on the Chinese national bourgeoisie, which found itself dependent both in trade and in shipping. Therefore, the Chinese national bourgeoisie is against the US and Jiang Jieshi, against the relations between the US and Jiang Jieshi. That the Chinese Communist Party is using this anti-American feeling in order to establish a comparatively long-term cooperative tie with the Chinese national bourgeoisie is a correct policy. It is necessary to get the Chinese national bourgeoisie to stand in the anti-imperialist camp. You should undertake some kind of policy that is good for the national bourgeoisie, such as protective tariffs, preventing any imperialist goods from entering China, profitable for the national capitalists, while also giving infant national industry a chance to develop. This is a second advantage. After the October Revolution in Russia almost all the private capitalist enterprises were confiscated, while a [state] monopoly on foreign trade was introduced. In China, at the present time, it is very difficult to resist a trade monopoly, but we should institute a protective tariff policy.

The contradictions between the soviets and the capitalists is an objective (*keguan*) one, strikes can take place. For now we do not want to broaden the conflict between the soviets and the capitalists, but labor conflict is what might cause us trouble in our cooperation with the bourgeoisie. In order to prevent labor conflict from ruining our cooperation with the bourgeoisie, we should push for an agreement between the bourgeoisie and the workers. This agreement should protect workers' rights and we must persuade the capitalists to become civilized capitalists who take care of their workers. Such an agreement would allow cooperation between the capitalists and us to go on for a while.

- b. Regarding the matter of people's democratic dictatorship

Stalin said: Your implementation of a people's democratic dictatorship system of government is correct. Your citing Stalin's 1926 statement to the effect that "China's future revolutionary sovereignty will emphasize anti-imperialism" is also correct. After we had answered the questions about the central government's Chairman group and the relationship between the Chairman group and the cabinet (to the effect that, the Chairman's group is a collective presidency and the cabinet serves the Chairman's group as the central government's executive organ), Stalin said: It is possible that this system is very suitable to present-day China. When we answered the questions about whether each regional (for example, the northeast) and provincial government obeyed the central government and whether the central government had the right to approve or dismiss each regional or provincial government's choices of leaders, Stalin said: Your present point of view of avoiding excesses in carrying out central collectivism is correct. That is to say, on the condition that the local governments are obeying the central government, it is not necessary to implement excessive central collectivism. But Stalin pays much attention to the possibility of splits between the local and central governments. Furthermore, in the report we had not mentioned the comprador bourgeoisie, so Stalin asked if comprador capital was or was not included in bureaucratic capital. It seems that he is paying great attention not to mix up the comprador bourgeoisie and the [Chinese] national bourgeoisie.

- c. Regarding foreign policy issues

Stalin considers the foreign policy principles we mentioned in our report to be correct. These principles are the conflict with imperialist countries and cooperation with the Soviet Union and each new democratic country; making use of contradictions within capitalist countries; developing China's trade and commerce with all countries, in particular with the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe. Regarding the investments and enterprises in China of various imperialist countries, Stalin said: You can use the labor laws. Require each foreign enterprise to implement the labor laws strictly as a method for struggling with them. At the present, you don't want to expropriate the Chinese affairs of each imperialism, don't rush (*bumang*) into taking any other measures, wait a bit and see what happens. As to the question of whether we should strive for all of the imperialist countries to recognize China's new government, Stalin said: You should not rush into demanding recognition from all the imperialist countries, while you increase your observations, grasp the situation, see how they express themselves. You have a really good magic weapon (*fabao*), which is that imperialism wants to do business (*maimai*) with you. The imperialist countries' economic crisis has already begun. I think the powers could quickly decide to try and recognize you. You can first do good business with them and then discuss the recognition issue.

- d. Regarding Chinese-Soviet relations

Stalin said: As soon as the Chinese government is established, the Soviet Union will immediately recognize you. Regarding the Sino-Soviet Treaty, he said: There was already a statement about this in the exchange of cables with Mao Zedong, saying that this treaty is unequal, that it can't be otherwise, since the treaty was made with the Guomindang at that time. There are a lot of American soldiers in Japan; Jiang Jieshi is also collaborating with the Americans. The Soviet troops in Port Arthur [Lushun] prevent them having the freedom of action to make use of armed force; they protect the Soviet Union and at the same time, they also protect the interests of the Chinese Revolution. At the present time, the Soviet Communist Party has already decided to conclude a peace treaty with Japan. After the Americans remove their troops from Japan, the Soviet Union can consider withdrawing troops from Lushun. If the Chinese Communist Party considers it necessary that the Soviet troops leave Lushun immediately in order to give the Chinese Communist Party more room to maneuver in the political sphere, the Soviet troops can withdraw from Lushun and Dalian [*Luda*] right now. Stalin does not consider necessary [*yongbuzhao*] any of the three preliminary options (inherit the treaty without changes, sign a new treaty or announce that in a while a new treaty will be signed) for handling the Chinese-Soviet treaty that we presented in the report. He said to wait until Mao Zedong comes to Moscow to solve this matter. Regarding China's relations with the countries of Eastern Europe, Stalin said: You can negotiate with all the countries of Eastern Europe. We can help you, but it is best if you negotiate directly. Furthermore, he said, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary and Romania all can supply you with goods and help you. You can negotiate with them boldly. Regarding the question of relations between the Soviet and Chinese communist parties, Stalin said: when you said in the report that the Chinese Communist Party obeys the Soviet Communist Party, we felt strange. There has never been a case of one country's party obeying another country's party, because it is impermissible [*buxukede*]. The two parties are responsible to their own peoples. If there is a problem, we talk about it. If there is a difficulty, we help each other. It's not a matter of one party obeying another. Close party relations is correct. Today's Politburo meeting is such a kind of tie. Regarding Mao Zedong's coming to Moscow, Stalin said: When China's [new] government is established and relations are established between our countries, then Mao can come. If Mao still finds it inconvenient to come, the Soviet Union can send a delegation to China.

e. Other matters

1. Regarding Xinjiang, Stalin said: because in Xinjiang there are no runways, there is still no way to bring troops in to Xinjiang by air. As for sending fighter aircraft to beat Ma's cavalry², this is very simply done. We can send a detachment of 40-50 aircraft and we'll begin with Soviet pilots and then pass them over to Chinese pilots [as they are trained.] While we were watching films,

Stalin said: in the Second World War, cavalry was not of much use, because they feared the airplane, because they were such a big target, very easy to disperse.

2. Regarding Dalian, Stalin said: we could let the Northeast [Bureau of the Chinese Communist Party] and the Soviet comrades in Dalian discuss and reach agreement. Dalian's governing regime should be united with the Northeast [Bureau's]. While countries are not recognizing China, before the Japanese Peace Treaty is concluded, Dalian's harbor should only be used by Chinese and Soviets.
3. We had asked in the past about opening a Chinese university in Moscow for fewer than 1,000 students to train and build up China's construction and management personnel. Stalin said: this is a good thing. There are difficulties, but we can do it.
4. Stalin himself raised the question of building a railway from Outer Mongolia's Hulun [Buir] area to Zhangjiakou (because someone raised this idea during Andreev's visit to Xibaipo). He said, this is a good thing, we can do it. We asked: Can we build a railway from Shaanxi through Xinjiang to the Soviet Union? S[talin] said: It's too long. It's not as good as first building an oil pipeline that would cost less than a third of the railroad. Stalin also said: If you have tea, tung oil, husked rice, tungsten ore, pig bristles and other plant oils, we need them all. Furthermore, he said, you should expand the land area under cotton cultivation and raise cotton production. In order to do this, you should gradually make use of agricultural machinery. It would be very good to increase cotton production.
5. Stalin said: [They can] help us to set up a naval school at Lushun and help us to build maritime defense. Stalin asked us if a Soviet film crew could visit our frontlines and help us to make a film. They [the Soviets] could help us with film technology. We answered that this was possible and said that a film crew had visited Lin Biao's headquarters in the past. Stalin said: because they did a bad job of it there, we withdrew them. We say we want to shoot a film again. It could be good for our relations. Stalin said: We can make the film's contents completely according to your suggestions.

III. Regarding the international situation, after we raised the issue, Stalin replied as follows:

There is a main point for estimating the contemporary international situation and this is whether or not a war can break out. By looking at all manner of international and economic conditions and [deducing] from America's preparations for war (imperialism is always preparing well for war), we can see that at present it is disadvantageous [*buli*] for imperialism to make war on the Soviet Union. According to regular patterns of historical development, there should not be a war at the moment, but there are adventurers and lunatics (*jingshen shichang*) in history, so there is still a possibility of war break-

ing out. We are ready for this. They are even using the nuclear bomb to intimidate [*konghe*] us, but we are also preparing. We are preparing a bit more quickly than they are.

Some adventurers and lunatics propagandize and say: The Soviet Union wants to attack the US. Others believe this kind of talk, which gives ground for the emergence of adventurers. For example, if the US Secretary of Defense [James] Forrestal, although he is dead, can still produce these kinds of people, then the possibility of war [*neng chuwai*] is always with us.³

We asked: can a compromise agreement be reached on the various problems that separate you and the British and Americans? Stalin answered: It is very difficult. It is possible to resolve individual issues, but the most important matter is very hard to resolve. Let's wait a bit and see.

[Stalin continued regarding] our present policy of isolating the reactionary party, making use of mass methods and meetings, while in many countries, including America, continuing a propaganda battle, is very effective and should be continued.

Today the American government is forcing non-resolution of the problems with its policies. There are some people in the US who want to have good relations with the Soviet Union, but they are not in power. In the future, if the Americans have a new government and a new policy, it is possible that US-Soviet relations will get better.

The Marshall Plan is already bankrupt. American influence in Germany is already very small.

If imperialism wants to attack, let them attack; if they use nuclear weapons, we will also use nuclear weapons.

The Americans, of course, are not planning to attack themselves, since they always think of how to use other people's hands to attack for them. They even said so publicly, but there are not so many people willing to spill blood for America.

In general, neither do we fear peace, nor do we fear war.
Liu [Shaoqi] Gao [Gang] Wang [Jiexiang]

Printed from an original revised and approved by Liu Shaoqi.

1. Intermediary between the Chinese government and western powers who became part of the Chinese middle class.
2. Probably referring to Warlord Ma Bufang. The ethnically Hui "Ma clique," in particular, controlled Qinghai, Gansu, Ningxia and parts of Xinjiang in the 1940s. Their warlord leader was Ma Bufang, although over 200 relatives, all with the surname Ma, served in his armies, including his son Ma Chi-yuan.
3. Forrestal's apparent suicide on 22 May seems to have attracted Stalin's attention.



DOCUMENT No. 50

Memorandum of Conversation between Liu Shaoqi and Stalin, 27 July 1949

[Source: Jianguo Yilai Liu Shaoqi Wengao (*This selection was co-edited by the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee's Document Research Unit and the Central Archives*) Vol. 1, (Beijing, 2005), pp. 40-41. Translated from Chinese by David Wolff.]

Discussing the overthrow of the Guomintang with Stalin¹

27 July 1949

We said: During the first cooperation between the Guomintang and the Communist Party, after the Guomintang betrayed us by doing an about-face, we were not at all prepared, we suffered a terrible defeat and were terribly taken in [*shangle hendade dang*]. But on account of this our heads were clear during the second cooperation between the Guomintang and the Communist Party. Even as the cooperation began, we were preparing to overthrow Jiang Jieshi. At the time of the anti-Japanese war of resistance, we prepared steadily for eight years, since this time Jiang Jieshi was also planning to destroy the Communist Party. So when the anti-Japanese war of resistance ended, Jiang Jieshi turned to face us, but we were ready. Having listened this far, Stalin said: This is what the enemy has taught you. He also said: Have we harassed or done you harm? We said: No. And we continued: Comrade Mao Zedong did not have to go to Chongqing. It would have been enough to send Comrade Zhou Enlai. But Comrade Mao Zedong went to Chongqing with good result. It gave us an immediate initiative on the political side of things. Stalin said: Mao's trip to Chongqing was dangerous. The CC² or other secret services could have hurt him. At that time the Americans asked us: The Guomintang wants peace. Why do the communists not want peace? I [Stalin] answered them: We do not interfere [*guanbuzhao*] in the affairs of the Chinese Communist Party. Comrade Stalin also asked us: Did your participation with the Americans in the peace movement cause you losses or harm? We answered: The Chinese Communist Party was quite clear-headed going into the peace movement, but there was another responsible comrade who entertained illusions about peace and experienced a minor loss. But this kind of peace movement is very necessary with the result this time that we isolated the Americans and Jiang. When we overthrow the Guomintang later and depose Jiang Jieshi, there will not be a single person to say we have not done right. Comrade Stalin said: The victors are not brought to judgment. Victors are always correct.

Printed from an original revised and approved by Liu Shaoqi.

1. This conversation took place during a banquet at Stalin's dacha.

2. This has a double meaning as the initials of a group within the Guomindang devoted to keeping Jiang Jieshi in power through party and strong-arm activities, many of them violently anti-Communist.



DOCUMENT No. 51

Report, Kovalev to Stalin, 24 December 1949

[Source: APRF: F. 3, Op. 65, D. 584, Ll. 123-144. Reprinted in Andrei Ledovskii, Raisa Mirovitskaia and Vladimir Miasnikov, *Sovetsko-Kitaiskie Otnosheniia, Vol. 5, Book 2, 1946-February 1950 (Moscow: Pamiatniki Istoricheskoi Mysli, 2005), pp. 234-243. Translated for CWIHP from Russian by Sergey Radchenko.]*

To Comrade I. V. Stalin

Reporting to you on some questions of policy and practice of the CC of the Chinese Communist Party.

1. Some data on the economic situation in the country.

You advised the Chinese comrades to “pay special attention to the restoration and development of the national industry, including the industry which is in the hands of the national bourgeoisie.”

One should note that in this respect substantial results have not been achieved, with the exception of Manchuria, and the country is undergoing great economic difficulties.

The volume of production in the main branches of industry is still sharply behind the level, reached in the years of maximum production output. So, for instance, coal production in 1949 will amount only to 33.5 million tons as against 58.7 million tons in the year of maximum production (1942) or 57%.

At the metallurgical plants of Manchuria, which comprise the main metallurgical base of China, production of pig iron will not surpass 150-170 thousand tons or no more than 7% of the plant capacity at the maximum production level (1942), and of steel production 120-150 thousand tons accordingly, or no more than 11% of the steel -making machine capacity.

Production of electrical power at Manchuria’s electricity stations, the ratio of which to China’s determined capacity is over 50%, in 1949 will not exceed 1400 million kilowatt/hours, or 31% of the maximum electrical energy production in 1944.

The situation in other branches of the industry is no better.

Newly created industrial ministries still have not taken into their hands the management of state enterprises, do not know

the plants’ capacities, the character and the volume of products which they manufacture, have not ascertained [the whereabouts of the] unused equipment, located in the ports and warehouses and numbering several thousand machines (cities of Shanghai, Canton, Hankou etc.), and have not taken any measures to establish state control over the work of private capitalist enterprises.

In agriculture in 1949 40% of the harvest was destroyed as a result of drought and floods, which creates great food difficulties with regard to the provision of foodstuff to the population, especially in the cities, and which sharply reduced export possibilities.

A better situation materialized with the railroad transport, where in 1949 some 2,650 km of the tracks and 1,355 bridges amounting to 13,550 meters were restored, which allowed to provide for the movement of trains on the roads of northern, central and southern China, along the length of 9,700 km, to restore movement on the most important lines of advance of the People’s Liberation Army, as well as to connect northern regions of China with central and southern China.

Wholesale and retail trade, with the exception of Manchuria, is almost fully in the hands of the private trader, which takes away the state’s ability to exert any kind of influence on the condition of the market and on the market prices, leads to serious difficulties with the supply of the population with some goods, especially grain, and creates favorable conditions for speculation.

The ratio of state and cooperative trade in the general turnover is appraised at merely 5-8%.

No serious measures to widen and take over by the state of the wholesale trade, as well as to widen state and cooperative trade in the retail turnover, are yet being taken.

In the sphere of external trade the state merely established control over the import and export of goods.

State finances and monetary circulation are in a completely unsatisfactory state.

At the present time there is still no all-state financial, credit and monetary system. There is no unified state budget of China, and there were no unified budgets for separate economic regions. There were merely separate budgets of each local organ of the state power. The aforementioned budgets had large deficits, which were covered by the emission of paper money.

For example, in the 9 months of 1949 the budgetary deficit amounted to: 11% in Manchuria, 35.1% in northern China as a ratio of the total income.

Budgetary deficit for 1949 was determined as being, for cen-

tral China—29.2%, and for northwestern China—43.2%.

At the present time China does not have unified money. 10 various types of money are in the circulation on the liberated territory (yuan of the People's Bank of China, yuan of the Northeastern Bank, money emitted by the former banks of some liberated regions, yuan of the Inner Mongolia and Kwantung area banks, Xinjiang dollars, Guomindang money, the exchange of which is not over yet).

No measures are being taken to regulate money circulation. Large-scale emission of money continues. As of 1 November 1949 there were 1401 billion yuan of the People's Bank of China and 9972 billion yuan of the Bank of the Northeast in circulation, while only in October 1949 664 billion yuan of the People's bank and 1120 yuan of the Bank of the Northeast were put in the circulation. There was also emission of money on substantial scale in November 1949.

Increase in the circulation of money, emitted to cover budgetary deficit, resulted in the systemic increase of goods prices, in the drop of the purchasing power of money, and in the depreciation of its rates in relation to foreign currencies.

The price of one *jin* of foxtail millet increased by 1 November 1949 in comparison with 1 April 1949 15.3 times in Beijing, 14 times in Tianjin, and the price of rice, accordingly, 13.8 times and 11.5 times. Large increase of prices took place for all other foodstuff and industrial goods in the aforementioned and other cities of China.

In November, in comparison with the end of October 1949 prices again increased 3-4 times for foodstuff and 2-3 times for industrial goods.

The official rate of the People's Bank of China yuan in relation to the American dollar on 25 November 1949 fell 16 times in Beijing and Tianjin in comparison with 18 April 1949, the day the rate was first established.

The Central People's government adopted a budget with a large deficit for 1950, equal to 5623.8 tons of foxtail millet, or 18.9% to the total volume of expenditure. A part of this deficit in the amount of 2150 thousand tons of grain is supposed to be covered by the emission of internal debt, and the rest of the sum by additional emission of money.

One's attention is drawn to the excessively large ratio of allocations for military expenditures—38.8%, and for administrative-management expenditures—21.4% from the total sum of budget expenditure. It is characteristic that the Central People's government does not intend to reduce the military forces in 1950, and the state apparatus, which is already very overblown at the present time, is supposed to be increased by 1.5 million people, this being motivated by the aim of not allowing the

increase in the number of the unemployed.

Therefore, the data provided testify to the fact that in 1950 the Central government will still not create necessary economic prerequisites for serious normalization of monetary circulation.

With regard to the work of the banks, no serious measures are being taken to limit the activities of private banks, including foreign ones.

2. On the working class

You advised in January 1949 to “win over to the side of the Chinese Com[munist] Party the majority of the working class,” and drew special attention to the necessity of “strengthening political work among the Chinese working class and creation of material and other conditions, under which the working class would feel that it is the ruling class and possesses the power.”

Since then the CCP CC has not taken any kind of radical measures in this direction.

The situation for the workers has improved somewhat merely at some state enterprises, the railroad transport, mines and metallurgical plants, located on Manchuria's territory.

In other regions the working class, having obtained political freedom as a result of the defeat of the Jiang Jieshi regime, does not feel the improvement of its material circumstances and as before remains in the conditions of semi-hungry existence. Suffice it to say that in the law provisions on labor published in the beginning of December 1949 the length of the working day is set at 12 hours. The same law provisions indicate that “...In the newly liberated regions businessmen must maintain former rates of pay, which existed three months before the liberation of a city, workers cannot demand a pay raise at the low-profit enterprises.” Therefore, the salary of the workers also remained without change and as before maintains a semicolonial character. So, for example, the lowest, literally beggar's salary, exists in the mining and metallurgical industry, and the highest—for postal officials and textile workers.

No laws have been passed yet about the protection of labor of workers and on social security. As for the “Rules, regulating relations between labor and capital” approved by the All-China Federation of Labor in January 1949, they not only fail to develop the main principles, established by the general program of the Political Consultative Meeting but in essence reduce them to naught.

Necessary measures are not being taken to attract workers to study at secondary and higher educational institutions and to prepare engineer and technical cadres from among workers.

Leading circles of the Chinese Communist Party as before underestimate the role of the working class in the revolutionary transformation of the country.

3. On the peasantry and the land reform

In 1926 you said that "...Among the Guomindang and even among the Chinese communists there are people, who do not consider it possible to unveil revolution in the countryside, fearing that involving the peasantry into the revolution will undermine the united anti-imperialist front. This is the deepest delusion, comrades. The sooner and more fundamentally the peasantry is involved in the revolution the stronger and more powerful the anti-imperialist front will be."

Relying for many years on the peasantry as the main force, by which the People's Liberation Army was created, and as a source of material supply of the army, the communist party of China at the same time manifests indecisiveness and apprehension in the conduct of revolutionary activities in the countryside.

By the present time land reform had been conducted merely on Manchuria's territory and some long liberated regions of Northern China with a population of slightly higher than 100 million.

On other territory not only has agrarian reform not been implemented but even the high land rental rates, still charged by the landholders from the peasants, have not been cut back.

The leading organs intend to begin organizational conduct of the land reform in 2-3 years.

In connection with this, peasants in the localities frequently begin re-division of land in spite of the central authorities, without waiting for permission. This lowers the authority of the Chinese Com[munist] Party and the government among the peasantry.

A fallacious "theory" became widespread among a certain part of the communists and in the leading circles of the com[munist] party that new kulaks, who appear after the conduct of the land reform in the previously liberated regions, are a revolutionary force, supporting the com[munist] party and the new government.

4. On the party

You advised "...by means of strengthening mass political work in the cities to widen the ranks of the communist party by drawing on the working class, to create strong party organizations at factories and railroads."

However, the growth of the party in the working class has been

inconsequential up to now. No active work is being conducted to attract workers into the ranks of the party. Party organizations to a considerable extent are polluted by landlord-kulak and bourgeois elements; party recruitment in a number of regions is conducted in an indiscriminate manner.

According to the data of the CCP CC 80% of the entire party membership is made up of peasants. In eastern China only 414 of 34835 party cells are factory-plant party cells. In northern China only 4.1% of party members are workers, and 85% are peasants. In the party organization of Shandong province alone there are more than 10,000 landlords, kulaks and merchants.

As for party tenure, more than a half of CCP members are young communists, who joined its ranks after the defeat and capitulation of Japan. In northern China 54% of all members of the party joined its ranks after 1946.

General educational level of the majority of the CCP members is exceedingly low. In Northern China 60.9% of all communists are completely illiterate, 13.6% are poorly literate, and only 19.7% graduated from the elementary school.

In the ranks of the party, including the members of the CC, there are people who were formerly disposed in a pro-American and anti-Soviet way, whom the leadership of the CC now supports. Thus, for example, Peng Zhen, member of the CCP CC, secretary of the Beijing party committee and deputy chairman of the political-legal government committee, Lin Feng, member of the CCP CC, deputy chairman of the Manchurian government and a member of the Central People's government, Li Fuchun, deputy chairman of the Manchurian government, Li Lisan, minister of labor and member of the Central People's government, Bo Yibo, minister of finance, member of the CCP CC and deputy chairman of the financial-economic committee under the government and others. At the same time, the chairman of the Manchurian government, member of the CCP CC Gao Gang, under whose leadership undeniable successes were achieved in the economic and cultural development of Manchuria, suffers from unjustified criticism, and an unhealthy environment had been created around him. This criticism is spearheaded and organized by CCP CC secretary Liu Shaoqi.

It deserves attention, for example, that Bo Yibo, as the minister of finance, voluntarily (Zhou Enlai told me about this with indignation), without the knowledge and permission of the CC, allowed in October 1949 the emission of 664 billion paper money (in yuan), which led to a sharp drop in the rate of the yuan, a 3-4 times increase of prices for all kinds of goods, lowering of real wages and caused sharp discontent of workers, peasants and cadres.

Besides, Bo Yibo twice sanctioned the increase of the railroad tariff for cargo shipments (each time by 200%), which led to a

situation when 12 types of cargos, from the 20 transported by the railroad, including basic foodstuffs and consumer goods, became unprofitable to transport; transport became underused, food problems emerged in the cities, prices rose again.

Minister of Labor Li Lisan, known in the past for his Trotskyist activities, proposed in June 1949 to create the league of entrepreneurs for organized protection of their interests in connection with the massive demands by the workers about improving conditions of labor.

In November 1949 during the work of the conference of professional unions of Asian countries, in the presence of Liu Shaoqi, secretary of the VTsSPS (All-Union Central Union of Professional Unions of the USSR) Solov'ev, and my own [presence], Li Lisan spoke out against the creation of a liaison bureau of Asia's professional organizations.

Serving as the deputy chairman of the All-Chinese Federation of Labor Li Lisan was one of the initiators of adoption and publication in the newspapers of the "rules, regulating relations between labor and capital," which go against the general program of the political consultative meeting and worsen the conditions of workers at private enterprises.

5. On the press

From September 1949 there has been a sharp decrease in the publication in the press of materials, shedding light on the party life, work of party organizations to involve workers in the party, struggle of the party for the strengthening of the people's democratic dictatorship and the implementation of revolutionary reforms.

This is done to appease the bourgeois capitalist elements inside the country and abroad.

6. On the state apparatus

You advised in June 1949 "not to delay any longer the formation of the Central government... China is left without a government. And this is dangerous from the point of view of internal politics, and also dangerous from the point of view of the international situation."

In September 1949 the Central people's government was formed at the political consultative meeting, which amounts to a coalition of various democratic parties and groups.

In October 1949 central government organs were formed composed of 37 ministries and other central government institutions. Of these 22 are headed by communists, and 15—by representatives of other parties and non-party bourgeois democrats, including such reactionary elements as former Guomintang generals Fu Zuoyi and Chen Jian.

Communists head main leading ministries and central institutions: the State Administrative Council, People's Military-Revolutionary committee, Financial-Economic Committee, Political-Legal Committee; ministries—of Foreign Affairs, State Security, Internal Affairs, Finances, Trade, Heavy Industry, Fuel Industry, Textile Industry, Foodstuff Industry, Railroads, Labor; Supreme People's Prosecutor's Office, Main Directorate of Information, Main Directorate of Press Affairs, People's Bank, Main Customs Directorate, Nationalities Committee and Legal Drafting Committee.

Representatives of the Guomintang Revolutionary Committee head: Ministries of Post and Telegraph, Ministry of Health, Committee for Chinese Emigrants Abroad.

Representatives of the Democratic League head: Ministry of Transport, Ministry of Justice, Supreme People's Court, Main Directorate for Publishing Houses' Affairs. Committee for People's Control is headed by a representative of the Association of Three Principles of the People, Ministry of Enlightenment—by a representative of the Society for Democratic Movement, Ministry of Light Industry—by a representative of the Society for Democratic State Building. The five remaining ministries—of Agriculture, Forestry, Culture, Irrigation and the Committee for Enlightenment and Culture are headed by formally non-party progressive politicians.

Among the deputy ministers and heads of central government institutions there are 57 communists and 35 representatives of other parties and non-party persons.

Filling vacancies in the government apparatus is taking place exceedingly slowly. In the majority of ministries and central institutions apparatus is less than half full, and in some ministries, for example those of light industry, textile industry, forestry, [and] labor, there are no officials at all except for the ministers and their deputies.

Creation of organs of state power in the localities almost has not been embarked upon yet. There activities are continued by either frontline military-administrative organs, or administration is carried out by the apparatus of the former power, consisting in the overwhelming majority of cases of the Guomintang-ists.

Therefore the apparatus of executive power has not been created yet, as a result of which the central government does not carry out centralized management of the whole country, and many of its decisions still remain merely declarations.

7. On the army

You advised not to cut back the size of the military for the time being. This advice of yours was implemented by the CCP CC. The People's Liberation Army at the present time has

grown considerably and counts about 6 million of soldiers and officers.

However, one should note that a substantial part of soldiers and officers of the People's Liberation Army are former Guomintang-ists, who were either captured or voluntarily, in entire detachments, took the side of the People's Liberation Army.

The number of the Guomintang-ists, for example, in some military units of generals Chen Yi and Liu Bocheng reaches 70-80%, at the same time former Guomintang-ists are not dispersed among the tried cadre units of the People's Liberation Army, but are kept in their ranks almost in the same shape, in which they were captured. A small number of command-political workers from the cadres of the People's Liberation Army were appointed to these former Guomintang units. A situation like this conceals a serious danger from the point of view of stability and commitment of the military forces to the cause of the revolution.

8. On the intelligentsia

You advised the Chinese communists to "create their own intelligentsia, so as to fully take control of the country. To teach in the schools, educate in the communist spirit the workers, peasants and democratically-inclined intelligentsia."

The Chinese intelligentsia by and large positively views the policy of the com[munist] party. However, after the declaration of the People's Republic many intellectuals took a wait-and-see position, watching the first steps of the new government. Such a position is partly explained by the fact that a part of the intelligentsia cannot yet find use for their knowledge, and elementary material conditions have not been created for those who work. The wages of specialists of high qualification are equal to the wages of low-qualified workers, or even less. There are instances when, because of material insecurity university professors and docents work as lifters and rickshaws at night, take up petty trade and commercial activities. Some intellectuals have a false impression that they will not find use for themselves and end up excluded from creative activities under the new regime. Slow attraction of the national intelligentsia to active creative work gives certain basis for such suppositions and creates a fertile ground for increasing the activities of reactionary elements and agents of Anglo-American imperialism hostile to the new regime.

The CCP CC has not yet taken a serious policy to prepare its own intelligentsia from among the workers. Workers are not drawn to the communist university, now being organized in Beijing since the leadership considers them insufficiently mature, illiterate, politically backward and allegedly not active participants in the revolution.

9. On the attitude toward the national bourgeoisie.

You advised the Chinese communists "not to push away the national bourgeoisie but draw them to cooperation as a force, capable of aiding the struggle with the imperialists. Advised to encourage trade activity of the national bourgeoisie both inside of China and on the outside."

The CCP CC widely implements this advice of yours in its activity. However a considerable part of the national bourgeoisie eyes cautiously the activities of the new government and expresses doubts that its rights, declared by the political consultative meeting, will not be infringed, manifests caution in the use of their capital in the industry and trade, fearing nationalization. This finds its expression in a partial cut-back of production, the wrapping-up of trade and commercial activity, hiding of goods-material valuables. On the other hand, the lack of any kind of limiting measures with regard even to the big national bourgeoisie creates conditions for the intensification of its reactionary activity. Even the not so high a tax on the trade turnover, established for 1949, has not been collected for 10 months in all the newly-liberated regions, including Beijing. The state monopoly on salt, tobacco and alcoholic products across the entire territory of the country has not been introduced. No determined struggle with the reactionary and speculative elements is being conducted.

10. On the attitude toward foreign capital

You gave advice that "one must not refuse trade with the capitalist countries on the condition, which would not place such economic and financial responsibilities upon, which could be used for limiting the national sovereignty and for strangling the Chinese national industry."

It is necessary to report that the Chinese trade and industrial circles are prepared to conduct trade with any foreign merchants, for as long as it gives them profit. At the present time the Chinese government has not introduced any limitations on the international trade, as well as on trade by foreigners inside the country. Moreover, there is a policy of flirting with regard to foreign capitalist enterprises and trade companies. No kind of a tax regime or any other limiting measures are being implemented. Foreign enterprises in all respects are put in the same conditions as national trade and industrial enterprises. Foreigners conduct themselves differently in China.

In Shanghai American firms, in whose hands are the energy enterprises, immediately after the transfer of power to the people's government doubled the prices for electrical energy, provided to the national Chinese enterprises, having left without a change prices for industrial and trade enterprises of foreign capital.

11. On the class struggle

A serious danger for the cause of the revolution and the Chinese Communist Party is concealed in the views, which have gained currency recently among party members, to the effect that with the full victory at the fronts class struggle will not die out inasmuch as the new government will draw to economic cooperation all segments of the country's population, including the national bourgeoisie.

Liu Shaoqi, in particular, shares such a point of view. In reality many facts speak to the sudden sharpening of the class struggle in all areas.

Class struggle is currently unveiling with particular force on the economic front. Using the fact that the government lacks in its hands effective means of influence on market relations, class-hostile elements inflate the prices for goods, create an artificial goods deficit, buy up and hide grain thereby causing discontent in the population and undermining the authority of the new government.

Nothing else but economic sabotage was the emission in October 1949 of 664 billion yuan of paper money, which resulted in upsetting money circulation, sharp increase in prices for goods and worsening of the material conditions of workers first and foremost; one must count among similar enemy attacks the increase of the railroad tariff fourfold in a short period of time, which was aimed at the disorganization of railroad transport and normal cargo turnover.

In the month of September, just at the time of the work of the political consultative meeting, a powerful turbine at the state power plant in Beijing was put out of service. On the day of the Soviet Union's recognition of the People's Republic of China a turbine of 70,000 kilowatt capacity was put out of service at the country's largest Jilin power plant. On 1 May 1949 the tramway park of Beijing city was set on fire. In the meantime in Tianjin there was an explosion of ammunition warehouses. The desire of some Chinese comrades to look upon these facts as purely coincidental can only be explained by political blindness.

There is information about the reactionary elements' resort to terrorist acts. In the month of October specially prepared terrorist groups with weapons and poisons for killing of party and government workers were dispatched from Formosa to Central China; two public security workers were killed in Beijing; there is information about a series of murders of military-political workers of the People's Liberation Army, the poisoning of a platoon of soldiers through food.

Finally, already at the very recent time, when Mao Zedong was travelling to Moscow, several people were arrested at the Tianjin station, in whose bags were discovered bombs and other explosive substances.

12. On foreign policy

You advised that the new government should not refuse establishing diplomatic relations with capitalist states, including America, if these states officially renounce military, economic and political support for Jiang Jieshi and the Guomindang regime as a whole.

Despite the fact that England and America have actively supported and [continue to] support Jiang Jieshi, the leadership of the CCP CC until November 1949 was infected with illusions of quick recognition of the People's Republic of China by these countries.

As a reflection of these sentiments, Liu Shaoqi and Li Lisan spoke out against participation in the conference of professional unions of Asian countries by Japan, India and other [countries] subordinate or connected to the Anglo-American bloc so as not to cause irritation on the part of America and England.

This also explains the silencing of the fact of Yugoslavia's approach to China with a proposal on the establishment of diplomatic relations and exchanging of ambassadors.

It is characteristic to note that in one of the conversations in Mao Zedong's presence Zhou Enlai stated that "...if we refuse Yugoslavia's proposal and openly censure its policy, then, one may ask, how are we supposed to act in case America, which is the master of Yugoslavia, approached us."

Among similar sentiments counts also Zhou Enlai's negative attitude toward the dispatch of groups of Soviet specialists to Shanghai and Tianjin because big economic interests of America and England are concentrated at these points.

Such sentiments are the result of pressure on the CC on the part of the bourgeois democrats and other capitalist elements inside the country, who wished and wish the soonest recognition by America and England of new China so as to, relying on these imperialist states, the Chinese bourgeoisie could prevent further democratization of China and disallow strengthening and widening of friendship between China and the Soviet Union.

