

From Helsinki to Gorbachev, 1975-1985: The Globalization of the Bipolar Confrontation

A CWIHP and CIMA Document Reader

Dear Conference Participants,

We are pleased to present to you this document reader, intended to facilitate the discussion at the upcoming international conference to be held in Artimino, Italy, on April 27-29, 2006. The reader consists of two parts—a CD and a briefing book—containing selected documents from US, Russian, and East European archives. This collection, compiled by the Cold War International History Project and the Machiavelli Center for Cold War Studies, is by no means comprehensive. In selecting the documents, we sought to include some of the most important materials available. The CD is organized chronologically and separated into five major sections: *1) US Strategy toward the USSR and European East-West policy; 2) Human Rights; 3) The Middle East and Asia; 4) Africa; and 5) Latin America.* The briefing book, reflecting the organization of the conference panels, is organized chronologically and in seven sections: *1) General US-USSR Relations; 2) CSCE and Human Rights; 3) The Strategic Dimension – ERW, TNF and SALT; 4) Western and Eastern Europe; 5) Latin America; 6) Africa; 7) Asia and the Middle East.*

A note on the documents: as with all document collections, the availability of documentation vastly outstrips the resources available to our projects to obtain, copy, and catalogue the material. The CD contained in your package is a selection of documents available in US, Russian, and European archives on the topic; the briefing book merely highlights some of the most important documents that closely relate to the papers presented at the conference. A majority of US documents were obtained by Barbara Zanchetta (CIMA) during a research trip to the Ford and Carter Presidential Libraries. Other Ford Administration documents were obtained in preparation for the 2004

international conference *The Road to CSCE*, by Hedi Giusto (CIMA) and Mircea Munteanu (CWIHP). The editors of this volume also obtained documents from the National Security Archive's collection in Washington, DC. The Archive's Svetlana Savranskaya donated a wealth of materials obtained from the Russian archives concerning the Soviet record on human rights. Last, but not least, we would also like to recognize the team of CWIHP interns who worked diligently to make sure the document reader was ready for dissemination: Kalin Kanchev, Joan Gabel, Rene Schneeberger, and Josephine Vu.

We would also like to recognize the efforts of the organizers, without whom this conference would not have been possible – the organizing committee: Marilena Gala, Maria Eleonora Guasconi, and Alberto Tonini; and the conference staff: Duccio Basosi, Francesca Battaghini, Matteo Gerlini, and Angela Romano, as well as CWIHP's Ryan Gage. Last but not least, we would like to thank Massimiliano and Michele Cricco for their support with the graphic design for the conference.

Mircea Munteanu

Barbara Zanchetta

Washington DC

April 18, 2006

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A CIMA-CWIHP Document Reader

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- 15 October 1974, **M**: For Lieutenant General Brent Scowcroft. *“Issues paper on Southern Africa”*
- 14 June 1975, **M**: For Scowcroft from Springsteen. *“Issues Paper on Angola”*
- 28 December 1975, **M**: From Scowcroft for the President. *“CIA Assessment – Future of Soviet Commitment on Angola”*
- 27 February 1976, **M**: For Mr. Brent Scowcroft. *“suggested Presidential Response to Letter from President Senghor of Senegal”*
- 27 February 1976, **M**: For Scowcroft from Springsteen. *“Draft Letter to the President of Zaire for the President’s Signiture”* (Draft attached)
- 11 March 1976, 3-3:40 pm, **MoC**: Sangremba (UNITA), Fernandes (UNITA), Chitunda (UNITA), McFarlane (US). *“The Map Room; The White House”*
- 16 March 1976, **M**: For the President from Brent Scowcroft. *“Correspondence with the President of Zaire and Senegal”*
- 16 March 1976, **M**: For Brent Scowcroft from Hal Horan. *“Presidential correspondence: Proposed replies to letters from Presidents Mobutu and Senghor.”*
- 28 August 1975 10:40 Zulu time, **T**: Amconsul in Luanda to Secstate in Washington DC. *“Assistance to Angola Refugees”*
- 10 October 1975 10:30 Zulu time, **T**: From Amconsul in Luanda to Secstate in Washington DC. *“Cuban Troops in Angola”*
- 17 October 1975 1:00 Zulu time, **T**: From Secstate in Washington DC to Amconsul in Luanda. *“Disposition of Portuguese military equipment in Angola”*

- 17 October 1975 22:36 Zulu time, **T**: From Secstate in Washington DC to Amconsul in Luanda. "*Angolan Contingency Planning*"
- 21 October 1975 1735 Zulu time, **T**: From Amconsul Luanda to Secstate in Washington DC. "*Portuguese Arms in Angola*"
- 23 October 11:15 Zulu time 1975, **T**: From Amconsul in Luanda to Secstate in Washington DC. "*Angola Contingency planning*"
- 27 October 18:25 Zulu time 1975, **T**: From Amconsul in Luanda to Secstate in Washington DC. "*Contingency planning in anticipation of an MPLA takeover.*"
- 22 April 1976, **L**: From his Excellency Leopold Sedar Senghor, President of the republic of Senegal to the President.
- 22 April 1976, **L**: From Lieutenant General Mobutu Sese Seko, President of the the Republic of Zaire to the President.
- 08 February 1977, **MoC**: Memorandum for the President from Zbigniew Brzezinski. "*Information Items.*"
- 17 March 1977, **MoC**: Memorandum for the President from Zbigniew Brzezinski. "*Information Items.*"
- 22 March 1977, **MoC**: Memorandum for Dr. Brzezinski from the Situation Room. "*Evening Notes.*"
- April 1977, **R**: CIA. "*Soviet Interest in Latin America.*"
- 01 April 1977, **MoC**: Intelligence Memorandum from CIA. "*Dissident Activity in East Europe: An Overview.*"
- May 1977, **R**: CIA. "*Soviet Objectives and Tactics at the Belgrade Conference.*"
- 24 June 1977, **MoC**: Memorandum for the President from Zbigniew Brzezinski. "*Prospects for Eastern Europe.*"
- 19 July 1977, **MoC**: Memorandum for the Vice President from Zbigniew Brzezinski. "*Origins of Soviet Campaign against Dissidents.*"
- 12 August 1977, **MoC**: Memorandum for the President, Secretary Vance, Mr. Brzezinski from Senator Church. "*Conversations with Fidel Castro.*"
- 01 March 1978, **MoC**: Memorandum for the President from Cyrus Vance.

“Warnke’s Briefing of the SFRC re SALT.”

12 May 1978, **MoC**: CIA memorandum from National Foreign Assessment Center. *“China and South Asia.”*

29 September 1978, **M**: For Carter from Brzezinski. *“Your SALT Decisions”*

29 September 1978, **M**: For Carter from Brzezinski. *“Your SALT meeting with Gromyko”*

24 December 1978, **MoC**: Memorandum. *“Review of Judgments from IIM 78-10021C, 15 September 1978, Situation in Nicaragua.”*

28 February 1979, **Bp**: *“Consultative Security Framework for the Middle East.”*

1 May 1979, **M**: For Sec. of defense from Brzezinski. *“CNA – 78 (U)”*

1 May 1979, **M**: For David Aaron from Brzezinski. *“CAN – 78 (U)”*

1 May 1979, **M**: For Brzezinski from Peter Tarnoff. *“Comprehensive Net Assessment 1978”*

17 May 1979, **M**: For The President from Brzezinski. *“Vance/Brown memo on TNF”*

9 May 1979 **M**: For the President from Cyprus Vance and Harold Brown. *“TNF Modernization –US Diplomacy, Your role and the Schmidt Visit.”*

18 May 1979 **M**: For the Sec. of State and the Sec. of Defense from Brzezinski. *“TNF Modernization.”* (TNF decision/consultation track attached, Illustrative deployment program also attached)

6 June 1979 **T**: To John Hunt from Brzezinski.

8 June 1979 **T**: To Prime Minister Thatcher from Jimmy Carter.

8 June 1979 **M**: For the Sec. of State and the Sec. of Defense. *“the PM Thachers letter etc.”*

11 June 1979, **MoC**: For Brzezinski from Odom.

15 June 1979, **R**: USICA report. *“West European views on key issues: Troubled US-European Economic Relations.”*

21 June 1979, **M**: For the President from Brzezinski. *“Secretary Vance’s Speech before the OAS on Nicaragua.”*

- 28 July 1979, **M**: For the President from Cyprus Vance. “*The Shah*” Telegram from the American Embassy in Iran attached.
- August 1979, **R**: CIA report from National Foreign Assessment Center. “*Central America: Short-term Prospects for Insurgency.*”
- 06 August 1979, **MoC**: Memorandum from National Foreign Assessment Center. “*Libyan Expropriation of US Oil Company Interests.*”
- 15 August 1979, **MoC**: Memorandum for Zbigniew Brzezinski from the Director of the CIA. “*Communist Intervention Comparison.*”
- 22 October 1979, **MoC**: Memorandum from CIA National Foreign Assessment Center. “*Changing Power Relations Among OECD States.*”
- 6 November 1979, **L**: To Ayatollah Khomeini from Jimmy Carter.
- 27 November 1979, **MoC**: Memorandum for Robert Gates from William E. Odom. “*CIA Paper on U.S./Soviet Relations.*”
- 07 December 1979, **MoC**: Memorandum from CIA National Foreign Assessment Center. “*US Relations with the Radical Arabs.*”
- 12 December 1979, **MoC**: FBIS Trends. “*East-West Relations.*”
- 08 January 1980, **MoC**: Memorandum for Zbigniew Brzezinski from Robert D. Blackwill. “*Western European Reaction to U.S. – Soviet Tension.*”
- 14 January 1980, **Min**: Special coordination committee meeting on the US strategy of South West Asia and the Persian Gulf.
- 21 January 1980, **L**: From Jimmy Carter to Schmidt.
- 28 January 1980, **MoC**: Memorandum for Peter Tarnoff from National Security Council. “*Eurocommunist Reactions to Afghanistan.*”
- 29 January 1980, **M**: For the Secretary of defense from Brzezinski. (draft letter to the President of USSR from Jimmy Carter attached.)
- 5 February 1980, **T**: To the Sec. of State from the American Embassy in Moscow. “*Soviet occupation of Afghanistan: updated assessment and policy recommendations.*”

8 February 1980, **M**: For the Sec. of State and the Sec. of Defense from the American Embassy in Moscow. "*Embassy in Moscow's analysis of US – Soviet Relations.*"

21 March 1980, **L**: From Princess Pahlavi to Jimmy Carter.

21 March 1980, **L**: From Jimmy Carter to Princess Pahlavi.

17 March 1980 1-10:30pm, **MoC**: Brzezinski and Dobrynin.

17 June 1980, **MoC**: Memorandum for Zbigniew Brzezinski from National Foreign Assessment Center. "*Soviet Activities Affecting US Interests.*"

21 June 1980, **W**: Reuters Agency wire from the Situation Room to Dr. Brzezinski.

03 July 1980, **Moc**: Memorandum for the President from Warren Christopher. "*Cuba.*"

28 August 1980, **MoC**: Memorandum for Zbigniew Brzezinski from Steve Larrabee. "*The Polish Crisis and Beyond: Implications for US Policy.*"

08 September 1980, **MoC**: Memorandum from CIA National Foreign Assessment Center. "*The Prospects for Soviet Military Intervention in Poland.*"

22 September 1980, **MoC**: Memorandum from CIA National Foreign Assessment Center.

26 September 1980, **MoC**: Memorandum for Zbigniew Brzezinski from the Department of State. "*The Iran-Iraq Conflict.*"

26 September 9-9:10 am 1980, **MoC**: Carter, Muskie, Christopher, Brzezinski.

06 October 1980, **MoC**: Memorandum from CIA National Foreign Assessment Center. "*Likely Soviet Approach to Preliminary Exchanges on TNF.*"

05 December 1980, **W**: Warsaw Pact Leaders Meet in Moscow.

10 December 1980, **MoC**: Memorandum from CIA National Foreign Assessment Center. "*Allied Responses to a Soviet Invasion of Poland.*"

10 December 1980, **MoC**: Memorandum for Dr. Brzezinski from the Situation Room. "*Noon Notes.*"

Documents without dates:

R: Report from CIA. "*Situation in Nicaragua.*"

R: Report. "*Economic and Political Factors Relating to Possible Soviet Exchange of Petroleum Customer with a Latin American Supplier.*"

Bp: Department of State Briefing paper. "*Scientific and Technological Cooperation.*"

R: CIA report. "*Significant Developments related to the US stand on Human Rights (20-26 May 1977).*"

R: Foreign Policy Survey Executive Summary.

M: For Jimmy Carter from Brzezinski. "*Decisions on Summit Objectives*"

PP: (Written during the Carter administration). "*Non-paper for Muskie-Gromyko re Iran and PG area*"

Key to abbreviations

A – Article

Bp – Briefing Paper

C – Cable

Cq – Communiqué

D – Declaration

L – Letter

M – Memorandum

Min – Minutes

MoC – Memorandum of Conversation

Nie- National Intelligence Estimate

P – Proposal

PP – Position Paper

PR – Press Release

O – Other

R – Report

T – Telegram

Tr – Transcript

W – Wire

Key to sources

FRUS – Foreign Relations of the United States

CIA – Central Intelligence Agency

CPL – Jimmy Carter Presidential Library

FPL – Gerald Ford Presidential Library

USICA - United States International Communication Agency

AVP RF – [USSR]

TsKhSD – Center for the Storage of Contemporary Documentation, Moscow

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS 1975-1985*

1975

July 28/August 2 – Heads of State in Helsinki for CSCE summit; signing of the Final Act

August 5-6 – Japanese Prime Minister Miki visits Washington for talks with Ford; both reaffirm support for US-Japan Security Treaty

September 19 – Portugal's sixth provisional government formed, with participation of Socialists and Communists

September 24 – Israel and Egypt sign protocol implementing Sinai agreement

October 9 – Soviet dissenter Andrei D. Sakharov is awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. His wife accepts for him on 12 December after he is denied a visa to travel to Oslo to accept

October 7 – USSR and GDR sign new treaty of friendship, eliminating all reference to German reunification

October 19-23 – Kissinger visits Peking in preparation for Ford visit. Chinese criticize US policy of détente with the USSR

October 20 – US and USSR sign five-year grain agreement

October 24 – Portuguese armed forces placed on alert after threat of left wing coup

November 3 – Ford announces major cabinet changes; Schlesinger dismissed as Secretary of Defense, replaced by Donald Rumsfeld; William Colby replaced by George Bush as Director of CIA; Vice-President Rockefeller announces he will not seek re-election with Ford

November 11 – Angola gains independence but power struggle ensues between MPLA, backed by Cuba, and the FNLA plus UNITA, backed by South Africa and the USA

November 15-17 – Leaders of US, Britain, France, West Germany, Italy and Japan meet at Rambouillet for discussions on joint economic action to counter recession

November 25 – State of emergency declared in Portugal

December 1-4 – Ford visits Peking

December 16 – The Senate Foreign Relations Committee's Subcommittee on Africa votes to cut off all US aid to the pro-western forces in Angola; Senate votes to cut off military assistance to US-backed factions in Angola (December 19)

* compiled by Barbara Zanchetta on the basis of CWIHP timelines and Strategic Survey (IISS, London) chronologies

December 17 – Cuban Communist Party holds party congress; Castro promises continued Cuban involvement in Angola

1976

January 8 – Chinese Prime Minister Chou En-lai dies

January 13 – Department of Defense announces that US military equipment will be made available to Yugoslavia for purchase

January 20-23 – Kissinger visits Moscow for talks on the Angolan situation and SALT

January 27 – House of Representatives votes to ban all military aid to anti-Communist forces in Angola, following Senate vote of December 1975

February 11 – US agrees to arms sales to Saudi Arabia

February 24-25 – USSR Communist Party Congress opens in Moscow with speech by Brezhnev which notes that détente process should be kept separate from continuing ideological struggle

March 14 – Ford indicates that Administration may not sign SALT agreement in 1976

March 15 – Egyptian People's Assembly passes abrogation of Friendship and Cooperation Treaty with USSR. Sadat withdraws port facilities for Soviet navy (March 26)

March 31 – Agreement between the US and USSR to limit the yield of underground nuclear tests to 150 kilotons

April 15 – India announces restoration of diplomatic relations with China

April 19 – US accused of violating Helsinki Agreement by opposing Western Communist parties

April 25 – Kissinger begins visit to black African states

April 26 – Soviet Defense Minister, Marshal Grechko, dies; Dimitri Ustinov succeeds him

May 20-21 – NATO Foreign Ministers in Oslo voice continued support for détente

June 8-13 – Mrs Gandhi visits Moscow and in joint declaration USSR and India agree to continue close relations

June 21 – In Italy's general election, Christian Democrats win 38.7%, Communists 34.4%

June 24-25 – Polish government announces price rises for some food articles, withdraws them after widespread protest and workers' strikes resulting in casualties

June 26 – Ford convenes two-day economic summit with Britain, France, West Germany, Italy, Japan and Canada in Puerto Rico

June 27 – Socialist candidate, General Eanes, becomes Portugal's president

June 29 – Conference of European Communist Parties opens in East Berlin with strong statements of independence by Western Communist leaders

July 29 – US government reports imminent Soviet deployment of SS-20 IRBM in western USSR

August 2 – Romanian President Ceausescu in Moscow for talks on improving relations

August 8 – Kissinger, in Tehran, promises continued military sales to Iran and signs long-term trade agreement

September 9 – Chairman Mao-Tse-tung dies

September 15 – Kissinger begins peace mission to southern Africa

September 21 – Cuba announces withdrawal of 3,000 troops from Angola

October 8 – USSR and Angola sign treaty of friendship and cooperation during visit of President Neto to Moscow

October 12 – Hua Huo-feng becomes Chairman of Chinese Communist Party

October 18 – Ford establishes commission to monitor compliance with Helsinki CSCE agreement

November 2 – Jimmy Carter wins US presidential election

November 15 – No change in Yugoslav-USSR relations reported after visit by Brezhnev to Belgrade

November 16 – President-elect Carter says SALT is first foreign policy priority; Brezhnev welcomes the statement (November 29)

November 22 – USSR and Romania agree on closer political and economic coordination after visit by Brezhnev

December 19 – Soviet dissident Vladimir Bukovsky released to the West and Chilean Communist leader Luis Corvalan flown to Moscow

1977

January 6 – “Charter 77” manifesto in support of human rights, signed by over 300 prominent Czechs, appears in Western press

January 20 – Jimmy Carter is inaugurated President

January 14-17 – Czech government arrests at least 16 dissidents

January 25 – Secretary of State Vance announces US will cut aid to Argentina, Uruguay and Ethiopia for human rights violations

January 26 – the US accuses Czechoslovakia of violating the Helsinki agreement

February 3 – Lt. Col. Mengistu seizes power in Ethiopia in palace coup

February 10 – Yuri Orlov, leading Soviet dissident, arrested by KGB

February 17 – Andrei Sakharov receives letter from President Carter

March 2 – Leaders of French, Italian, and Spanish Communist parties meet in Madrid and reaffirm importance of full application of Helsinki Agreement

March 16 – In India's general election Janata Party wins absolute majority. Mrs Gandhi resigns (March 22). Morarji Desai named Prime Minister (March 24)

March 27 – Afghan President Sadar Mohammed Daud forms civilian cabinet, ending more than 3 years of military rule

March 30 – Brezhnev rejects US proposals for new strategic arms-control agreement after talks with Secretary of State Vance in Moscow

March 31 – USSR and Mozambique sign friendship treaty in Maputo

April 4 – Cuban premier Castro in Moscow to report on his tour of African and Arab countries

April 24 – Ethiopia announces closure of US facilities

April 25-27 – Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko in New Delhi, signs agreements on increased financial aid

May 4-6 – Lt-Col Mengistu, Ethiopia's head of state, in Moscow. Ethiopia and USSR sign a series of cooperation pacts

May 5 – For the first time in 30 years, Italian Christian Democrat and Communist leaders jointly plan program for next Italian government

May 9 – French Communist Party accepts the principle of France's nuclear defense

June 30 – Carter halts production of B-1 bomber, citing cruise missile as equally effective, less costly alternative

July 7 – The US announces that it has tested a neutron bomb

July 12 – Carter announces plans to keep neutron bomb as a US options, but final decision on production and deployment not yet made

July 17 – Heavy fighting reported near Dire Dawa in Ogaden region between Western Somali Liberation Front and Ethiopian troops

June 26 – Spanish Communist Party tells the Soviet Union to stop interfering in its affairs, following Soviet attacks on Party Secretary Carrillo and “Eurocommunism”

July 19 – Teng Hsiao-ping regains positions as Chinese Politburo member, First Deputy Prime Minister and Chief of Staff of Armed Forces

August 3 – Carter affirms US commitment to use nuclear weapons if NATO is attacked

August 11 – US and Iran end 3-day talks on proposed agreement on peaceful uses of atomic energy and possible Iranian purchase of 8 nuclear reactors

September 2 – USSR and Ethiopia sign a major arms agreement

September 7 – US and Panama sign Panama Canal Treaties, which will transfer canal to Panama by the year 2000

September 7 – Carter asks Congress to allow sale of AWACS to Iran

October 6 – Secretary of Defense Brown announces approval of full development funds for MX missile

October 6-16 – US Defense Secretary Brown visits NATO countries. Discusses neutron bomb in Italy. Attends Nuclear Planning Group meeting, but NATO fails to agree on neutron bomb, declaring it militarily useful but politically sensitive

October 21-26 – Desai in Moscow, despite his election pledge to scrap USSR-India peace treaty. Joint declaration emphasizes closer relations and long term Soviet economic aid to India

November 13 – Somalia announces renunciation of 1974 Treaty of Friendship with the USSR; expels Cubans and Soviet use of military facilities is withdrawn (November 17)

November 24 – USSR begins large-scale airlift of men and arms to Ethiopia to supplement shipments by sea

December 17 – US intelligence sources claim USSR is deploying the new mobile SS-20 IRBM against Chinese targets

December 29 – National Security Advisor Brzezinski announces that USSR has deployed SS-20 against Western Europe

December 29 – Carter begins a 9-day trip to Poland, Iran, Saudi Arabia, France, and Belgium

December 30 – Italian Prime Minister Andreotti rejects Communist pressure for emergency government with Communist participation

1978

January 5 – At NATO summit Carter pledges 8,000 more US troops for Europe within 18 months

January 8 – Brzezinski declares that Cambodia-Vietnam border war is “proxy war” between USSR and China

January 10 – In Nicaragua, the assassination of the leader of the opposition Democratic Liberation Union, Pedro Joaquín Chamorro, triggers general strike

January 23 – Brezhnev writes a letter to the heads of the government of the NATO countries warning them not to deploy the neutron bomb

January 27 – USSR deploys over 300 new SS-20 missiles near Polish border

January 27 – The demonstrations in Nicaragua demand for President Somoza’s resignation

February 7 – Ethiopia launches attack in the Ogaden

February 27 – Nicaraguan opposition demonstrators clash with National Guard; ten killed

March 8 – Belgrade CSCE Review Conference ends after 6 months with impasse over human rights; decides to meet again in November 1980

March 11 – President Pinochet of Chile ends 4½ years of martial law

March 15 – Somalia withdraws from the Ogaden

March 16 – Italian Prime Minister Aldo Moro kidnapped by leftist “Red Brigade” guerrillas

March 20 – Political opposition in Iran calls general strikes. Violence follows in several cities (March 31)

April 7 – President Carter defers production of enhanced radiation warheads (neutron bomb)

April 18 – Leading dissident General Pyotr Grigorenko exiled; goes to the US

April 12-13 – Talks between Carter and Romanian president Nicolae Ceausescu at the White House. They agree on the expansion of commercial relations

April 20 – NATO’s Nuclear Planning Group agrees to modernization of tactical nuclear weapons and to retain option of introducing neutron warheads into Europe

April 27 – Military coup overthrows Afghan President Daoud; pro-Soviet government installed

May 9 – Italian premier Moro found murdered in central Rome

May 18 – Leading dissident Yuri Orlov sentenced to 12 years in prison for anti-Soviet acts

June 6 – In Iran, general strike called to protest against death of anti-Shah demonstrators

July 9 – Carter Administration cancels high-level US scientific mission to Moscow and orders review of all cooperative agreements with the USSR in response to dissident trials in Moscow

July 13-14 – Dissidents Ginzburg and Shcharansky sentenced to 8 and 13 years hard labor respectively for anti-Soviet activities and espionage

July 19 – Leaders of Nicaraguan Broad Opposition Front call another general strike protesting at Somoza regime's policies

July 25 – Yugoslav President Tito criticizes Soviet-backed Cuban intervention in Africa

August 4 – Vance leaves for Egypt and Israel to try to revive peace talks. Egypt and Israel agree to US-mediated peace talks at Camp Davis in September (August 8)

August 9 – Libya establishes diplomatic relations with China

August 12 – Shah of Iran declares martial law in four more cities as violent demonstrations continue

August 26 – Sandinista guerrillas fail in attempt to take over National Palace in Nicaragua

September 5-17 – Begin, Sadat and Carter meet at Camp David. Summit concludes with “framework for peace in the Middle East”

September 6 – Iranian government bans all opposition rallies; under martial law, a series of arrests in clampdown on opposition groups (September 12)

September 13 – In Nicaragua, Somoza invokes martial law; then accepts multi-national mediation scheme (September 30)

October 3 – USSR signs agreement to supply Libya with nuclear power complex, research center and laboratories

October 12 – Egypt and Israel open peace negotiations in Washington

October 25-31 – In Iran two major universities closed, demonstrations in 13 urban centers, over half public work force on strike

October 27 – Sadat and Begin awarded Nobel Peace Prize

November 2 – To press Somoza into concession, the IMF, upon US request, delays loan to Nicaragua

November 5 – Major anti-Shah demonstrations in Tehran

November 19 – Brezhnev warns US against intervention in Iran

November 20 – Ethiopia and USSR sign Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation

December 5 – Common Market nations, except Britain, agree to European Monetary System

December 6 – Afghan President Taraki signs friendship treaty with USSR at the end of 2-day meeting in Moscow

December 7 – Somoza lifts martial law, grants general amnesty, abolishes strident censorship but opposition refuses to meet him

December 15 – Carter announces full normalization of relations with China to begin on January 1st, 1979; formal diplomatic relations with Taiwan will end then, and security treaty will lapse after one year.

December 30 – Shah of Iran designates Shahpour Bakhtiar Prime Minister of new civilian government

1979

January 1 – Formal diplomatic ties established between China and USA

January 4 – Four-day US-British-French-German summit opens in Guadeloupe

January 10 – Over 10, 000 Nicaraguans peacefully protest against government, calling for fall of President Somoza

January 13-14 – US flies 14, 000 troops to Europe to test ability to reinforce NATO in a crisis

January 16 – As protests against the Shah of Iran and his regime intensify, the Shah is forced to flee the country

January 28-31 – Deng Xiaoping visits the US

February 1 – Khomeini returns to Iran after 14 years, invited by the anti-Shah revolutionaries

February 17 – Chinese troops invade Vietnam

February 20 – Sandinista guerrillas open offensive against Somoza regime

February 22 – Over 100 killed on the Iran-Iraq border in clashes between Kurds and supporters of new government in Tehran

March 5 – China announces the beginning of the withdrawal from Vietnam

March 7 – France lifts 3-month veto on the start of the European Monetary System

March 19 – Cease-fire reached between Kurds and Tehran government

March 26 – Begin and Sadat sign peace treaty in Washington

April 1 – Khomeini announces an Islamic Republic after 18 million vote for it in a referendum

April 26 – US completes military withdrawal from Taiwan

May 18 – China breaks off peace talks with Vietnam after 5th meeting

June 1 – Heavy fighting reported in Nicaragua

June 5 – West German Chancellor Schmidt holds wide-ranging talks with Carter in Washington before Vienna Summit

June 18 – Brezhnev and Carter sign SALT II Treaty in Vienna

July 16 – President Bakr of Iraq resigns, replaced by Saddam Hussein, Vice President of Revolutionary Command Council

July 17 – President Somoza flees the country

August 2 – Brezhnev and Ceausescu discuss foreign policy differences in the Crimea

September 6 – US announces no “toleration” of Soviet combat troops in Cuba

September 10 – President Neto of Angola dies. Jose Eduardo dos Santos announced as acting president (September 20)

September 16 – Afghan President Taraki overthrown by Amin. Taraki’s death announced later

October 6 – Brezhnev announces unilateral withdraw of 1,000 tanks and 20,000 troops from the GDR

October 18 – US sends carrier *Midway* and 6 other ships to the Indian Ocean in repose to Middle East tension

October 22 – Shah of Iran arrives in US for surgery

November 28 – Aircraft carrier *Forrestal* sails to Mediterranean to strengthen US presence in the Middle East. *Kitty Hawk*, with 5 warships, joined *Midway* in the Arabian Sea

November 4 – The Iran hostage crisis begins as Muslim students seize US Embassy in Tehran. The hostage crisis lasts for 444 days during which the US government applied strong economic and diplomatic pressure on Iran. The crisis ends on January 20, 1981.

December 6 – US Senate announces there will be no debate on SALT II Treaty before 1980

December 12 – NATO adopts dual track decision to develop intermediate range missiles while, at the same time, negotiating for their demise

December 12 – Carter proposes 5% real increase in defense budget for 1981

December 15 – Shah of Iran leaves US for exile in Panama

December 17 – US Defense Department team in Saudi Arabia to discuss possible American use of bases there. It also visits Kenya, Oman and Somalia

December 25 – Soviet Union invades Afghanistan and installs a new government. Hafizullah Amin is overthrown at the request of Babrak Karmal, who then replaces him

December 30 – Sadat announces Egypt will provide military facilities for American troops to defend Arab countries in the Gulf

1980

January 3 – After Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, President Carter asks Senate to delay debating SALT II Treaty

January 4 – Carter announces that US grain ordered by the USSR will not be delivered in protest at Soviet intervention in Afghanistan

January 20 – Carter gives the USSR until Feb. 29th to withdraw troops from Afghanistan, or US will boycott Moscow Olympics

January 22 – Leading dissident and Nobel Peace Prize winner Andrei Sakharov sent to internal exile

January 23 – In State of the Union message, Carter declares that if US interests in the Gulf are threatened “such an assault will be repelled by use of any means necessary, including military force”

January 30 – Proposed meeting of West German Chancellor Schmidt and East German President Honecker postponed in wake of Afghanistan invasion

February 4 – Brzezinski holds talks in Riyadh with Prince Fahd on Soviet invasion of Afghanistan

February 5 – President and Chancellor Schmidt, meeting in Paris, condemn Soviet intervention in Afghanistan

February 15 – European Parliament calls for boycott of 1980 Olympics; urges they be held on “agreed international territory”

February 18 – Gromyko says USSR will agree to talks on reducing nuclear arms in Europe if NATO repeals decision to deploy US missiles in Europe

February 20 – Carter’s deadline for Soviet troop withdrawal from Afghanistan passes unheeded; US will boycott Moscow Olympics

February 29 – Chinese Communist Party Central Committee strengthens the power of Vice Chairman Deng Xiaoping

March 30 – US and Turkey sign Defense Cooperation Agreement which assures continued US use of military bases

April 2 – Pentagon confirms American personnel to be stationed in Oman, Kenya, and Somalia as part of build-up in Indian Ocean

April 25 – US reports failure of attempt by special military force to rescue hostages from Iran; Carter accepts full responsibility, Vance resigns in disagreement (April 28)

April 29 – Senator Edmund Muskie named Secretary of State

May 4 – Yugoslav leader Tito dies; succeeded by collective leadership

May 14 – US begins withdrawing 1,000 outdated nuclear warheads from Europe according to December 1979 NATO decision

May 16 – Secretary of State Muskie meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister in Vienna. First high-level contact between US and USSR since invasion of Afghanistan

May 18 – Portugal readmitted to NATO's Nuclear Planning Group (from which it had been excluded in 1979 because of Communist influence in the government)

May 18 – China successfully tests first intercontinental missile

May 22 – EEC trade embargo against Iran goes into effect

June 20 – Iraqi elects first Parliament since 1958; President Saddam Hussein's Arab Ba'ath Party wins control

June 26 – President Giscard confirms France has tested neutron bomb and decided in principle to acquire it

June 27 – South Africa acknowledges its troops are in Angola; UN Security Council demands immediate withdrawal

July 1 – Chancellor Schmidt, after meeting with Brezhnev, says he has made progress towards negotiations on medium-range missiles in Europe

July 18 – Strikers blockage railway station in Lubin as unrest spreads in Poland, following introduction of higher meat prices

July 19 – The Moscow Olympics open with 81 countries attending, and 62 boycotting the games

July 27 – Former Shah of Iran dies in Cairo

August 14 – Polish radio and television admits strikes are occurring throughout Poland

August 20 – OAU Committee recognizes Ogaden region as integral part of Ethiopia

August 22 – US and Somalia sign agreement giving US access to Somali port and airfield at Berbera

August 24 – Emergency meeting of Polish Communist Party Central Committee

August 27 – Tass says anti-socialist forces trying to subvert socialist system in Poland

August 31 – Lech Walesa and Deputy Prime Minister Jagielski sign agreement allowing workers to set up their own trade unions and giving them the right to strike

September 6 – Polish Communist Party Central Committee replaces Gierek with Stanislaw Kania as party leader

September 7 – Carter agrees to talk with USSR on medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe

September 9 – Preparatory session for the second CSCE Review Conference opens in Madrid

September 10 – Clashes along disputed border between Iran and Iraq

September 23 – Iraqi forces invade Iran at four points

September 24 – Polish independent labor organizers present charter of their movement, *Solidarity*, to the Warsaw district court seeking legal recognition for first free trade unions in Soviet bloc

September 30 – Khomeini rejects any compromise with Iraq

October 16 – US and Soviet delegations begin preliminary talks on limiting nuclear forces in Europe

October 21 – Mikhail Gorbachev, aged 49, elected to Politburo

October 22 – China and US sign multi-billion-dollar agreement for Chinese grain purchases over next 4 years

November 4 – Ronald Reagan elected President of the United States

November 11 – Col. Mengistu and Soviet leaders describe planned US bases in Horn of Africa as threat to peace

November 20 – Trial of “Gang of Four” begins in Peking

December 2 – East Germany closes areas along Polish border

December 4-5 – An emergency meeting of Warsaw Pact party secretaries reaches, or confirms, a decision not to intervene militarily in Poland but to allow Polish Communist Party leadership another chance to restore full communist authority

December 16 – President-elect Reagan nominates Gen. Alexander Haig to be his Secretary of State

December 18 – Former Premier Kosygin dies

1981

January 1 – President Carter extends US embargo on grain sales to USSR for another 12 months

January 1 – Greece becomes tenth member of EEC

January 6 – Iran accepts Algeria as guarantor of agreement to release American hostages. Hostages released and reach Algiers (January 20)

January 20 – Reagan inaugurated as 40th President of the United States

January 21 – After release of American hostages, European governments and Japan lift the trade embargo imposed on Iran

January 29 – Reagan calls SALT II Treaty unacceptable and says future arms limitation agreements should be based on actual reduction in number of nuclear warheads

February 8 – US State Department announces first large-scale sale of defensive military equipment to Somalia

February 18 – Reagan’s budget proposes a \$7.2 billion rise in military spending

February 28 – At Soviet Party Congress, Brezhnev proposes meeting with Reagan and “active dialogue” to ease US-Soviet relations

March 10 – Walesa holds first meeting with Jaruzelski

March 31 – US confirms in Brussels commitment to resumption of arms control talks with USSR and delegates discuss prospects for US-USSR agreement on reduction of TNF in Europe

April 1 – US ends financial aid to Nicaragua because of links with Salvadorean rebels

April 3 – *Solidarity* publishes first issue of its own weekly newspaper

April 3 – Reagan expresses to Brezhnev concern over situation in Poland

April 8 – China’s leader Deng Xiaoping offers India unconditional talks on restorations of good relations

April 10 – Nicaragua announces signing of agreement for technological, cultural and economic cooperation with Libya

April 23-24 – Soviet Politburo member Suslov in Warsaw for talks with Polish Communist leaders

April 24 – Calling it unfair to US farmers, Reagan lifts the grain embargo on the USSR

April 26 – *Pradva*, for the first time, attacks “revisionist” elements in Polish Communist Party

April 27 – Libyan leader Gaddafi in Moscow for talks with Brezhnev. USSR reported disappointed at his refusal to grant military bases in Libya

April 27-31 – Marshal Ogarkov, chief of Soviet armed forces, visits New Delhi

May 4-5 – At NATO Foreign Ministers meeting in Rome, US says it will resume negotiations with USSR on limitation of nuclear weapons in Europe by end of 1981

May 6 – US, accusing Libya of supporting international terrorism, closes Libyan embassy

May 6 – USSR to give 29,000 tons of wheat to Nicaragua

May 13 – In Rome, Pope John Paul II is shot by Mehmet Ali-Agca

May 26 – West German Bundestag approves 1979 NATO LRTNF decision

June 14 – Haig visits Beijing and announces US decision to sell arms to China (June 16)

June 20 – In Hamburg, 100,000 protest nuclear policies

June 21 – Chancellor Schmidt reaffirms West Germany's willingness to deploy US missiles

June 26-28 – On official visit to India by China's Foreign Minister Huang Hua, India and China agree to try to normalize relations

June 28 – *Pradva* denounces US-Chinese military cooperation

July 13 – Mozambique announces it will join COMECON

July 30 – House of Representatives approves resolution warning Moscow and Polish authorities against the use of force

July 30 – Angola announces that South African forces have invaded, penetrating 90 miles into Angolan territory

July 30 – Britain agrees to allow US to station B-52 bombers on Diego Garcia

August 8 – Reagan orders full production of neutron bomb to be stockpiled in US

August 14 – Polish leader Kania and Prime Minister Jaruzelski meet Brezhnev and other Soviet leaders

August 25 – Angola announces general mobilization; US vetoes UN Security Council Resolution condemning South Africa (August 31)

September 23 – Haig and Gromyko meet in New York; talks on nuclear weapons in Europe will begin 30 November in Geneva

October 2 – Reagan authorizes building of 100 MX ICBM and the new B-1 bomber

October 2 – In Poland, Walesa re-elected chairman of *Solidarity*

October 6 – Egypt’s President Sadat is assassinated. Vice-President Mubarak elected (October 13)

November 14 – *Operation Bright Star 82*, designed to test US Rapid Deployment Force, starts with joint US-Egyptian military exercise

November 18 – Reagan presents “Zero Option” plan as negotiating position for Geneva talks

November 20 – West Germany and USSR sign natural gas pipeline agreement

November 21 – In Amsterdam, 400,000 people protest deployment of nuclear missiles in Europe

November 23-25 – Brezhnev holds talks with Schmidt in Bonn; offers to unilaterally reduce the number of nuclear weapons in European USSR

November 30 – US-USSR talks on reduction of nuclear weapons in Europe begin in Geneva

December 13 – USSR welcomes Poland’s decision to impose martial law

December 14 – Following Poland’s imposition of martial law, US suspends food aid

1982

January 5-6 – On visit to Washington, Schmidt agrees on a forceful alliance response to Polish crisis

January 21 – Angolan delegation visits Moscow and stresses loyalty to the USSR and hostility to the US

January 25 – Polish parliament ratifies martial law decree of 13 December, 1981

January 26 – Haig and Gromyko meet in Geneva, but differences over Poland prevent positive results

February 2 – In Geneva, US submits a draft arms treaty to carry out “Zero Option” proposal

February 5 – Great Britain imposes sanctions against Poland and the USSR. It is the first European NATO state to do so

February 9 – CSCE resumes in Madrid

February 9 – The Soviet Union publishes its position on the Geneva talks. It claims a balance of intermediate missiles deployed in Europe at 1,000 per side, including British and French forces

February 18 – The EEC Commission rejects US demands for cancellations of planned gas pipeline from the USSR to Western Europe

March 2 – At the end of 2-day visit to Moscow, Jaruzelski is assured of Soviet support

March 16 – Brezhnev announces unilateral freeze on Soviet deployment of SS-20 missiles in Europe, and threatens NATO with “retaliatory steps” if it proceeds with its plans; NATO Defense Ministers meeting in Colorado Springs: reject freeze offer, agree that INF deployment should proceed as planned (March 24)

March 28 – Iraqi President Hussein calls for cease-fire with Iran

April 1 – Panama takes control of Panama canal on the basis of 1978 US-Panama Treaties

April 6 – Haig claims that if the US renounces the first use of nuclear weapons, it would give a free hand to an aggression committed by conventional forces in Europe. Therefore, the West should maintain the same amount of forces in Europe as the Soviets and their allies

April 17 – Brezhnev offers a summit to Reagan

April 25 – Israel completes withdrawal from Sinai and returns it to Egypt

May 5-9 – US Vice President Bush visits Beijing for 4 days of talks with Chinese leaders, but no solution to Taiwan’s arms sale problem is found

May 10 – Nicaragua and USSR sign aid package covering 5 years

May 14 – Reagan rejects the revival of SALT II

May 30 – Spain becomes the 16th member of NATO

June 2 – Reagan arrives in Paris on 10-day visit to 5 European countries

June 5 – Demonstrations against nuclear weapons in Paris, Rome and London (June 6)

June 12 – 800, 000 join demonstration in New York in support of Freeze Movement

June 18 – According to US intelligence, USSR conducts first successful test of “killer satellite”

June 20 – Iraq announces decision to withdraw invasion force from Iranian territory; Khomeini says Iran will continue the war

June 29 – In Geneva, START are convened

July 5 – Somalia claims Ethiopian troops and tanks are invading its territory; US begins airlift of military equipment to Somalia (July 25)

July 25 – Angola rejects proposals for simultaneous withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola and South African forces from Namibia

July 13 – Iran invades Iraq

June 25 – Haig resigns in protest at shifts in US foreign policy; George Shultz is nominated to post

June 29 – START negotiations open in Geneva

July 30 – Reagan extends sale of US wheat and corn to USSR for another year

August 15 – Somalia declares a state of emergency along the Ogaden border

August 17 – In a joint communiqué, issued in Washington and Beijing, the US promises it will “reduce gradually” its arms sales to Taiwan

August 22 – Shultz refuses to ease sanctions against the Soviet gas pipeline until martial law is relaxed in Poland

September 1-11 – Chinese Communist Party holds 12th Party Congress establishing moderate line

October 1 – Helmut Kohl elected Chancellor in West Germany

October 3-22 – In Beijing, USSR and China hold first high-level official talks in almost 3 years, with no sign of progress

November 2 – The Reagan Administration admits CIA is providing aid and training for guerrilla groups attacking Nicaragua from Honduras

November 10 – Brezhnev dies and is replaced by Iurii Andropov

November 13 – Reagan lifts sanctions over the Soviet gas pipeline as part of a broad East-West agreement between US and its European allies

November 19 – After 3 failures, a *Pershing II* missile is successfully launched

November 29 – UN General Assembly votes again that Soviet troops withdraw from Afghanistan

November 30 – In Brussels, NATO Defense Ministers pledge to begin deploying American missiles by the end of 1983 “in absence of concrete arms control agreement”

December 1 – Reagan begins 5-day 4-nation Latin American tour

December 15 – In Chile, over 200 people are arrested in biggest anti-government demonstrations of the Pinochet regime

December 17 – Iran elects assembly of experts to chose a successor to Khomeini

December 23 – India and Pakistan sign 5-year pact to strengthen economic and cultural ties

December 30 – In Poland, martial law is officially suspended

1983

- January 2** – France refuses to include its nuclear forces in INF talks; Britain does the same
- January 7** – Heavy fighting reported in South-East Angola between army and UNITA guerrillas
- January 25** – USSR agrees to UN talks on Afghanistan
- January 27** – For the first time, Tass reports that 100,000 Soviet troops are fighting in Afghanistan
- February 2-4** – Secretary of State Shultz in Beijing agrees to discuss defense issues
- February 8** – Iran launches big offensive in Iran-Iraq border area
- March 8** – Reagan denounces Soviet Union as an “evil empire”
- March 23** – Reagan outlines his Strategic Defense Initiative, or "Star Wars," and is accused by the Soviets of violating the 1972 Antibalistic Missile Treaty
- March 30** – Reagan announces new INF proposal for “interim agreement” involving equal Soviet warheads worldwide; Soviets rejects proposal (April 2)
- April 1-3** – More than 500,000 demonstrate in West Germany against NATO missile deployment
- May 4** – Nicaragua claims invasion by 1,900 rebels
- May 16** – In Moscow, Andropov and Angolan President Dos Santos sign new arms agreement
- May 26** – Iran rejects Iraqi proposal to sign a peace agreement under UN auspices
- May 28-30** – Leaders of 7 leading industrial nations meet in Williamsburg to discuss economic and security problems
- June 10** – US special envoy to Central America talks with Nicaragua Sandinista leaders
- June 16-23** – Pope John Paul II visits Poland, denounces martial law and on the last day secretly meets with Walesa
- July 22** – Poland lifts martial law after 19 months
- July 30** – Soviet Defense Minister Ustinov warns that the USSR will take counter measures if US missiles are deployed in Europe
- August 9-11** – American delegation holds talks in Moscow on ways of improving the “hot line”
- August 11** – At least 17 killed in Chile’s fourth national day of protest
- August 25** – US and USSR sign 5 year grain agreement

August 26 – Andropov offers to destroy all SS-20 missiles over the number of British and French missiles if US does not deploy new missiles in Europe; US rejects the offer (September 20)

August 29-31 – Secretary Shultz visits India

September 1 – South Korean Boeing 747 airliner shot down by Soviet air force; Gromyko insists airliner was spying for the US

September 25 – Secretary of Defense Weinberger has talks in Beijing

October 5 – Lech Walesa awarded 1982 Nobel Peace Prize

October 11 – Chinese Foreign Minister visits Washington

October 22 – Well over 1 million take part in anti-nuclear demonstrations in West Germany, Britain and Italy

November 9 – UNITA guerrillas admit shooting down Angola airliner, killing all on board

November 14 – First US cruise missile delivered to British base

November 22 – West German Bundestag votes in favor of *Pershing II* deployment; first missiles arrive the following day

November 23 – USSR walks out of INF talks after US missiles arrive in Germany

December 8 – Soviets suspend START negotiations

1984

January 1 – EEC and EFTA abolish almost all remaining tariffs between them and become world's largest free-trade area for industrial goods

January 6 – UN Security Council condemns South African military attacks on Angola

January 10 – Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang visits Washington and has talks with Reagan

January 17 – 35-nation Conference on Confidence and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CSDE) opens in Stockholm

January 25 – US intelligence reports deployment of SS-20s to East Germany

February 9 – Yuri Andropov dies and is replaced by Konstantin U. Chernenko

February 10 – China and USSR agree to increase trade by nearly 60%

February 13 – Iran launches new offensive against Iraq

February 16 – South Africa and Angola meet for the first time in tripartite session with US and agree to form joint commission to monitor cease-fire in southern Angola

February 28 – Russian troops launch major offensive in Afghanistan's Panyshir Valley, marking end of a year long cease-fire

March 5 – Soviet Defense Minister Ustinov visiting India agrees to sell more advanced weapons systems

March 17 – Angolan President Dos Santos visits Cuba for talks on withdrawal of Cuban troops

March 22 – In Washington, French President Mitterand and Reagan discuss need to reopen East-West arms control talks

March 26 – UN report accuses Iraq of using chemical weapons against Iran

April 3 – Italian Defense Minister Spadolini announces first 16 cruise missiles are operational at Comiso, Sicily

April 5 – France offers to help Nicaragua clear its ports, allegedly mined by CIA

April 9 – Nicaragua charges US in Court with illegal operations

April 19 – Egypt and USSR agree to resume diplomatic relations after a 3-year break

April 25 – Angola and South Africa hold talks in Lusaka on troops withdrawal

April 26 – Reagan arrives in China for his first Presidential visit to a Communist nation

May 8 – The Soviet Union officially withdraws from the Los Angeles Olympic Games

June 1 – Dutch government announces it will accept cruise missile deployment in 1988 if USSR continues deploying SS-20s; Dutch Parliament approves government plan (June 14)

June 20 – President Mitterand arrives in Moscow for a 3-day visit

July 21 – Polish government announces amnesty for 652 political prisoners

July 17 – US and USSR agree to expand the "hot line" link

July 26 – Castro calls for improvement of US-Cuba relations

September 28 – Gromiko-Reagan talks in Washington

October 2 – At UN, Nicaragua accuses US of planning invasion

October 27 – Western European Union's "Declaration of Rome"

October 31 – Assassination of Indira Gandhi; her son Rajiv is appointed Prime Minister

November 6 – Reagan re-elected with 59% of the total vote

November 6 – Chilean President Pinochet orders “state of siege” after series of guerrilla attacks

November 9 – NATO’s Defense Planning Council approves FOFA concept

November 26 – US and Iraq resume full diplomatic relations after 17 years

December 19 – US Defense Secretary Weinberger disparages differences within NATO over SDI; British Premier Thatcher, in talks with Reagan in Washington, expresses support for research phase of SDI (December 22)

1985

January 7 – Shultz-Gromyko talks in Geneva on arms control

January 10 – Daniel Ortega inaugurated President of Nicaragua

January 21 – Reagan stresses his commitment to the SDI program

February 4 – Reagan requests a tripling of the military budget to support SDI “Star Wars”

February 10 – King Fahd of Saudi Arabia visits the US

February 21 – USSR signs agreement with IAEA to open Soviet nuclear plants to international inspection for first time

March 3 – West German Foreign Minister makes 2-day visit to Moscow to discuss arms control

March 10 – French Foreign Minister in Moscow to discuss arms control

March 11 – Soviet President Chernenko dies; Mikhail Gorbachev is named Chairman of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union

March 11 – Iraqi planes attack Tehran for the first time

March 14 – Belgium government decides to deploy initially 16 of the 48 cruise missiles that it is expected to receive

March 26 – Weinburger invites 17 countries to join US in SDI research program

April 1 – Iraq continues bombing Iranian cities

April 4 – Reagan calls for 60-day cease fire and negotiations between Nicaragua and the “contras”

April 7 – Gorbachev declares a definitive stop to missile deployment in Europe

April 17 – French government, in initiative code-named *Eureka*, proposes European collaboration on wide range high technology research

April 18 – South African forces withdraw from the region of southern Angola occupied for 5 years

April 18 – Reagan agrees to a compromise whereby assistance to Nicaraguan rebels would be for non-military purposes only

April 26 – Warsaw Pact Treaty renewed for another 30 years

April 30 – Angola signs Lomé convention with EEC

May 1 – Reagan arrives in West Germany; attends 7-nation economic summit in Bonn (May 3)

May 7 – CSCE opens in Toronto to review compliance with human rights pledges of 1975 Helsinki Accords

May 14 – Shultz-Gromyko talks in Vienna

May 17 – India signs agreement with US permitting transfer of US high technology

June 11 – US Senate votes to repeal 1976 Clark Amendment prohibiting aid to Angola; House of Representatives votes repeal on July 10

July 9 – Chinese Vice Premier Yao Yilin visits the USSR; signs 5-year agreement to increase Sino-Soviet trade

June 10 – Reagan announces US will adhere to unratified SALT II Treaty

June 12 – Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi makes first official visit to US

June 12 – Spain and Portugal enter EEC

June 14 – Saddam Hussein announces 15-day halt to air raids

July 21 – President Li Xiannian of China makes 10-day visit to US

June 22 – Vice President Bush's European tour to clarify US policy on SDI

July 17 – *Eureka* project formally launched in Paris

August 2 – West Germany, Britain and Italy sign agreement to develop new European fighter aircraft

August 25 – Opposition groups in Chile jointly call for an end to state of emergency and direct presidential and parliamentary elections

September 9 – EEC intergovernmental conference begins discussion in Luxemburg on reform of Treaty of Rome

September 13 – US successfully conducts first ASAT test against orbiting target

October 2 – Gorbachev's official visit to France

October 10 – First Soviet parliamentary delegation to visit China in 20 years arrives in Beijing

October 29 – NATO Defense Ministers endorse US summit negotiating position on arms control and SDI

October 30 – Reagan says US would share SDI research with others, including USSR

November 1 – Holland agrees to deployment of US cruise missiles

November 4 – Shultz in Moscow to prepare Reagan-Gorbachev summit in Geneva

November 18-21 – First summit meeting between Reagan and Gorbachev takes place in Geneva; they agree to accelerate arms reduction talks



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

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September 4, 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR LIEUTENANT GENERAL BRENT SCOWCROFT
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Issues Paper on Southern Africa

Attached is an issues paper for the President's briefing by the Secretary. The memorandum describes the situation in Southern Africa, with particular attention to the implications for the region flowing from the current moves toward independence of the Portuguese territories of Angola and Mozambique.

Rich Perman for
George S. Springsteen
Executive Secretary

Attachment:

As noted.

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HR 6/19/01



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AFRICA

Southern African Issues

BACKGROUND

The Portuguese coup of April 25 and Lisbon's subsequent decision to divest itself of its African territories has opened the door to far-reaching changes affecting the entire southern African region.

-- Black rule in Mozambique next year, and later in Angola, will create the first potential breach in the cordon of friendly buffers between South Africa and black Africa. Pretoria is hopeful that peaceful relations based on economic interdependence can be established with an independent Mozambique, but is also increasing defense expenditures and preparing to augment its support for Rhodesia.

-- Heartened by Portuguese African developments, black Africans are likely to step up their efforts to isolate Rhodesia and South Africa.

-- Developed countries are considering policy changes vis-a-vis Pretoria. The United Kingdom is reviewing the need for continued naval facilities at Simonstown and is considering acceptance of the 1971 International Court of Justice advisory opinion on Namibia, which upheld the termination of South Africa's League of Nations mandate over the territory and made it a UN responsibility (the U. S. accepts the ICJ decision); France is reconsidering its practice of arms sales to South Africa; and Japan has announced new visa restrictions on visitors from South Africa.

-- The Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China presumably look upon the developing situation as an opportunity to develop relationships with Angola and Mozambique that would extend their spheres of influence. The Soviets may well be interested in acquiring the use of port facilities. U.S. Navy vessels currently call at Angolan and Mozambican ports roughly once a month.

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GRFP, NSA, PCF Africa 1974-77
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U.S. STRATEGY

The racial policies of the white regimes of southern Africa have become highly-charged internationalized issues inevitably affecting United States interests and concerns at home and abroad. In recognition of our conflicting interests in southern Africa, elsewhere in Africa and at the UN, and in response to differing domestic demands, we have sought to strike a balance. Since the late nineteen fifties, the United States has consistently supported the principle of self-determination for all peoples in southern Africa through the support of constructive alternatives to the use of force. For us to condone or support violence, we believed, would risk damage to our economic and strategic assets in the region. Specifically:

-- Toward South Africa, we have followed a two pronged approach: one of "restraints" (e.g., a strict arms embargo, limits on contacts with its military establishment, a ban on naval visits, a neutral stance on U.S. investment) and one of "communication without acceptance" (e.g., opposition to South African expulsion from the UN, an active exchange-of-persons program, multi-racial representational activities by our Mission, and encouragement to American employers to adopt enlightened employment practices for all their employees.)

-- We continue to recognize British sovereignty over Rhodesia. With the exception of the Byrd amendment, we have supported the UN and U.K. in the enforcement of economic sanctions. We have consistently opposed the use of force to resolve the Rhodesian dispute.

-- As for the Portuguese African territories, our policy has been to support the right of all peoples to self-determination. Our embargo on arms to either side reflected our preference for a non-violent solution. We have opposed resolutions in the UN which we have considered extreme and not conducive to peaceful resolution. We voted in August for Guinea-Bissau's admission to the UN. We have maintained low-level contacts with liberation group representatives, and recently approved contacts at the Chief of Mission level.

-- We have supported and have sought to give effect to the International Court of Justice advisory opinion on Namibia. We accept the ICJ's view that South Africa is illegally occupying that territory. We endeavor to prevent



any U.S. official actions that would fortify South Africa's de facto control and administration of the area. We maintain no official representation there, discourage new U.S. investment, and withhold Export-Import Bank guarantees and other facilities from trade with Namibia. We supported the 1972-73 talks between the UN Secretary General and the South African Government aimed at eventual independence; we opposed their discontinuance.

-- To help lessen their dependence on South Africa, we have increased our economic assistance to the three small majority-ruled states of the region: Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland.

Satisfying our competing economic, political and strategic interests without acquiescing in the racist policies of the region has necessarily entailed an uneasy and imperfect balancing act. We have inevitably suffered some loss of political support in black-ruled Africa and elsewhere among the "non-aligned" and, to some extent, have offended domestic interest groups on both sides of the question (e.g., church and black groups who have wanted our opposition to apartheid or South African control of Namibia to be reflected, for example, in greater pressures on U.S. businesses operating there, as contrasted with those groups who believe we should not harass South Africa on such issues). However, our differentiated strategy has enabled us to maintain reasonably good relations with both black and white Africa.

THE SITUATION NOW

South Africa's racial policies, although ameliorating somewhat in recent years, still involve resort to arbitrary police powers, forced mass migrations, indentured labor under penal sanctions, and deprivation of the human and civil rights of millions of persons. South Africa continues to rule Namibia with an iron hand despite strong international opposition and significant internal unrest.

A recent bid for a quiet dialogue by Zambia may provide an opening to begin a process of peacefully resolving conflict in the region. Zambian Foreign Minister Mwaanga plans to meet later this month with South African Foreign Minister Muller to discuss "peace and stability in southern Africa". According to Mwaanga, President Kaunda believes that Lisbon's decision to negotiate independence for the Portuguese African territories has so altered prospects for the whole region that a fresh exchange of views is required between Lusaka and Pretoria.



PORTUGUESE TERRITORIES

Developments in the Portuguese territories are proceeding more rapidly and in more orderly fashion than anticipated.

-- Guinea-Bissau: Portugal agreed at Algiers on August 26 to recognize Guinea-Bissau's independence on September 10 and to withdraw all of its troops by October 31. The agreement promised long term economic and other cooperation between the two states. Portugal also accepted the right of independence for the Cape Verde Islands and agreed to permit the PAIGC (the successful insurgent group in Guinea-Bissau) to organize politically on the islands.

-- Mozambique: Portuguese Foreign Minister Soares told us that Portugal and FRELIMO, the predominant insurgent group in Mozambique, have tentatively agreed on the early establishment of a provisional government composed of FRELIMO and Portuguese members which would lay the groundwork for independence by June 1975. Discussions to formalize these arrangements are to be held in Lusaka, Zambia, later this week.

-- Angola poses more difficult problems. Whereas Portugal has publicly accepted Angola's right to independence and has asked liberation groups to join a provisional government which would prepare for independence, the three principal insurgent groups--MPLA, FNLA and UNITA--are actively competing for dominance and have been unable to agree on how to deal with the Portuguese offer.

RHODESIA

Despite increasing internal African militancy, continuing insurgency on its borders, moves by Britain and others to tighten up the implementation of sanctions, and growing peril underlined by approaching majority rule in Mozambique, Rhodesia's white minority regime remains intransigent and has shown no signs of seriously seeking a negotiated settlement with its African majority.

ISSUES AND CHOICES

Do recent developments suggest the need for major modifications or adjustments of our policies vis-a-vis southern Africa?

In a recent re-examination of our policies, we concluded that the delicate balancing act we have performed has served us



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well in protecting our conflicting interests in black and white Africa. The evolving situation in the region prompts further questions, however.

Should we increase our efforts to promote dialogue between black and white Africa, including Rhodesia?

Pretoria's statements concerning peaceful coexistence with an independent Mozambique have not dispelled African doubts about South Africa's intentions. Should we take the initiative to counsel South Africa not to engage in cross-border military adventures? Might this involve us beyond our interests? Can Pretoria be convinced of the need for rapid progress toward racial equality within South Africa and for setting a timetable for self-determination in Namibia?

Should we consider playing a more active role in supporting Portugal's efforts to facilitate the rapid decolonization of Angola and Mozambique?

Our relationship to the decolonization process, and especially our relations with Angola and Mozambique (both during transition and upon their independence), will attract particular attention throughout Africa. Our posture will be viewed by Africans and other third world states as an indication of our attitude toward decolonization in general, and of President Ford's attitude toward black Africa in particular. Moreover, Angola (with its oil, other resources and location) and Mozambique (with its long coastline on the Indian Ocean) could be of considerable economic and strategic value to us in the future.

How should we prepare for anticipated African efforts to increase the isolation or ostracism of South Africa and Rhodesia?

Pressures on both countries, spurred by developments in Mozambique and Angola, are being reflected in the expected move to deny South Africa its seat at the 29th UNGA. We could signal our awareness of these pressures by abstaining on, rather than opposing, the expected upcoming vote in the UN denying South Africa's credentials. However, we do not believe exclusion or expulsion of South Africa is in our or Western interest. It would establish a precedent of acting against--as opposed to condemning--any other nation which was unpopular because of its policies. Additionally, by staying in the UN, South Africa remains exposed to criticism for its policies and can be held responsible for human rights violations.

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While we continue to recognize the U.K.'s primary responsibility for Rhodesia, we could do more to encourage a negotiated settlement between the Smith regime and legitimate representatives of the African majority.

Zambia and the U.K. have separately urged us to encourage the South Africans to withdraw their "military" support from Rhodesia. Although we have limited leverage over South Africa's internal affairs, particularly including its policies toward Rhodesia and Namibia, we might consider using our influence in this direction. Any success achieved would contribute to increasing the severe psychological pressure on Smith to move toward serious negotiations. Zambia might be enlisted to reinforce our efforts if a meaningful dialogue with South Africa should develop from current initial moves.

We would also want to continue our support for and enforcement of UN economic sanctions against Rhodesia--by far the best way to make our influence felt in this respect would be to obtain House concurrence to repeal of the Byrd amendment permitting the importation of Rhodesian chrome.

While we have no special responsibility for Namibia, we have been seeking to break the current impasse by supporting efforts to re-establish communication on the issue between South Africa and the UN, and by encouraging South Africa to accept the view that peaceful resolution is in its own best foreign policy interests. Given the expected political evolution in Angola, movement toward self-determination in Namibia may be the only way to remove this issue as a major element in destabilizing the area and imperiling South Africa's long-range economic and political future. We continue to discourage U.S. investment there despite interest in its mineral resources: uranium, copper, zinc, diamonds, and possibly oil. The Mondale amendment proposes to eliminate the tax credit for U.S. companies in Namibia that pay taxes to South Africa. It has also been proposed that the SEC require U.S. companies operating in Namibia to inform their stockholders of Namibia's controversial status.

NEXT STEPS


South African Credentials

Our tactics on seeking to prevent the exclusion of South Africa from the UNGA are not yet firm. We are continuing to consult with the British, French and West Germans on the problem.

Rhodesia

The House vote on the Byrd amendment was postponed until after the Labor Day recess because proponents did not believe

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they had the votes for passage. While White House statements on the issue have indicated a clear Presidential stand against the amendment, a special effort with Congress would seem necessary to assure success of the repeal effort.

Portuguese Territories

We are prepared to open a small resident diplomatic mission in Guinea-Bissau at the appropriate time after independence. We are slightly augmenting the staffs of our Consulates General in Angola and Mozambique. We intend to beef up our exchange of persons program and to institute modest new USIA programs there. We have begun to study ways in which we could be responsive to possible requests for development assistance from the emerging nations. A strong public expression of our satisfaction at Guinea-Bissau's independence and at Portugal's determination to free its other two African territories would provide an appropriate framework for these initiatives. Either the President's or your speech at the UNGA might provide such an occasion.

CONFIDENTIAL





DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

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NARA -- GRFL, NSA, PCF,
Africa 1974-1976,
Box 1, Folder Africa General (1)

October 15, 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR LIEUTENANT GENERAL BRENT SCOWCROFT
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Issues Paper on Southern Africa

Attached is an updated Issues Paper on
Southern Africa for the President's Morning
Briefing.

George S. Springsteen
George S. Springsteen
Executive Secretary

Attachment:

Issues Paper on Southern Africa

UNCLASSIFIED

(with CONFIDENTIAL-EXDIS Attachment)



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BRIEFING PAPER

NARA -- GRFL, NSA, PCF,
Africa 1974-1976,
Box 1, Folder Africa General (1)

AFRICA

Southern African Issues

BACKGROUND

The Portuguese coup of April 25 and Lisbon's subsequent decision to divest itself of its African territories has opened the door to far-reaching changes affecting the entire southern African region.

-- Full independence under black rule in Mozambique scheduled for June of next year, and later in Angola, will create the first potential breach in the cordon of friendly buffers between South Africa and black Africa. Pretoria is hopeful that peaceful relations based on economic interdependence can be established with an independent Mozambique, but is also increasing defense expenditures.

-- Heartened by Portuguese African developments, black Africans are beginning to step up their efforts to isolate Rhodesia and South Africa.

-- Developed countries are considering restrictive policy changes vis-a-vis Pretoria. The United Kingdom is reviewing the need for continued naval facilities at Simonstown and is considering acceptance of the 1971 International Court of Justice advisory opinion on Namibia, which upheld the termination of South Africa's League of Nations mandate over the territory and made it a UN responsibility (the U. S. accepts the ICJ decision); France is reconsidering its practice of arms sales to South Africa; and Japan has already announced new visa restrictions on visitors from South Africa.

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-- The Soviet Union and the Peoples Republic of China presumably look upon the developing situation as an opportunity to develop relationships with Angola and Mozambique that would extend their spheres of influence. The Soviets may well be interested in acquiring the use of port facilities. U.S. Navy vessels currently call at Angolan and Mozambican ports roughly once a month.

U.S. STRATEGY

The racial policies of the white regimes of southern Africa have become highly-charged internationalized issues inevitably affecting United States interests and concerns at home and abroad. In recognition of our conflicting interests in southern Africa, elsewhere in Africa and at the UN, and in response to differing domestic demands, we have sought to strike a balance. Since the late nineteen fifties, the United States has consistently supported the principle of self-determination for all peoples in southern Africa through the support of constructive alternatives to the use of force. To condone or support violence, we believed, would risk damage to our economic and strategic assets in the region. Specifically:

-- Toward South Africa, we have followed a two pronged approach: one of "restraints" (e.g., a strict arms embargo, limits on contacts with its military establishment, a ban on naval visits, a neutral stance on U.S. investment) and one of "communication without acceptance" (e.g., opposition to South African expulsion from the UN, an active exchange-of-persons program, multi-racial representational activities by our Mission, and encouragement to American employers to adopt enlightened employment practices for all their employees).

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-- We continue to recognize British sovereignty over Rhodesia. With the exception of the Byrd amendment, which we seek to repeal, we have supported the UN and U.K. in the enforcement of economic sanctions. We have consistently opposed the use of force to resolve the Rhodesian dispute.

-- As for the Portuguese African territories, our policy has been to support the right of all peoples to self-determination. Our embargo on arms to either side reflected our preference for a non-violent solution. We have opposed resolutions in the UN which we have considered extreme and not conducive to peaceful resolution. We voted in August for Guinea-Bissau's admission to the UN and subsequently recognized that country. We have always maintained low-level contacts with liberation group representatives, but recently approved contacts at the Chief of Mission level.

-- We have supported and have sought to give effect to the International Court of Justice advisory opinion on Namibia. We accept the ICJ's view that South Africa is illegally occupying that territory. We endeavor to prevent any U.S. official actions that would fortify South Africa's de facto control and administration of the area. We maintain no official representation there, discourage new U.S. investment, and withhold Export-Import Bank guarantees and other facilities from trade with Namibia. We supported the 1972-73 talks between the UN Secretary General and the South African Government regarding Namibia's future and favor the resumption of this dialogue.

-- To help lessen their dependence on South Africa, we have increased our economic assistance to

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the three small, multi-racial, majority-ruled states of the region: Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland.

Satisfying our competing economic, political and strategic interests without acquiescing in the racist policies of the region has necessarily entailed an uneasy and imperfect balancing act. We have inevitably suffered some loss of political support in black-ruled Africa and elsewhere among the "non-aligned" and, to some extent, have offended domestic interest groups on both sides of the question (e.g., church and black groups who have wanted our opposition to apartheid or South African control of Namibia to be reflected, for example, in greater pressures on U.S. businesses operating there, as contrasted with those groups who believe we should not harass South Africa on such issues). However, our differentiated strategy has enabled us to maintain reasonably good relations with both black and white Africa.

THE SITUATION NOW

South Africa's racial policies, although ameliorating somewhat in recent years, still involve resort to arbitrary police powers, forced mass migrations, indentured labor under penal sanctions, and deprivation of the human and civil rights of millions of persons. South Africa continues to rule Namibia with an iron hand despite strong international opposition and significant internal unrest. However, the ruling National Party of South West Africa issued a call in late September for representatives of the various population groups in Namibia to meet together to discuss the future of Namibia. It is not clear yet whether this announcement signals a major shift in South African policy regarding Namibia.

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Zambian interest in a quiet dialogue with South Africa may provide an opening to begin a process of peacefully resolving conflict in the region. Zambian Foreign Minister Mwaanga has expressed interest on several occasions in meeting with South African Foreign Minister Muller to discuss "peace and stability in southern Africa." According to Mwaanga, President Kaunda believes that Lisbon's decision to negotiate independence for the Portuguese African territories has so altered prospects for the whole region that a fresh exchange of views is required between Lusaka and Pretoria.

PORTUGUESE TERRITORIES

Developments in the Portuguese territories are proceeding more rapidly and in more orderly fashion than anticipated.

-- Guinea-Bissau: Portugal recognized Guinea-Bissau's independence on September 10 and has agreed to withdraw all of its troops by October 31. Portugal and Guinea-Bissau have agreed to economic cooperation. Portugal also accepted the right of independence for the Cape Verde Islands and agreed to permit the PAIGC (the successful insurgent group in Guinea-Bissau) to organize politically on the islands.

-- Mozambique: On September 7 at Lusaka, the Portuguese and FRELIMO, the predominant insurgent group in Mozambique, signed an agreement providing for the independence of Mozambique on June 25, 1975. The agreement sets up, in the interim, a transitional government which has two-thirds FRELIMO participation.

-- Angola poses more difficult problems. Whereas Portugal has publicly accepted Angola's right to independence and has asked liberation groups to join a provisional government which would prepare for independence, the three principal

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insurgent groups--MPLA, FNLA and UNITA--are actively competing for dominance and have been unable to agree on how to deal with the Portuguese offer. There are recent indications that at least informal ceasefires have been agreed upon between the three groups and the Portuguese and that the Portuguese may now be actively encouraging these groups to come to the negotiating table.

RHODESIA

Despite increasing internal African militancy, continuing insurgency on its borders, moves by Britain and others to tighten up the implementation of sanctions, and growing peril underlined by approaching majority rule in Mozambique, Rhodesia's white minority regime remains intransigent and has shown no signs of seriously seeking a negotiated settlement with its African majority.

ISSUES AND CHOICES

Do recent developments suggest the need for major modifications or adjustments of our policies vis-a-vis southern Africa?

In a recent re-examination of our policies, we concluded that the delicate balancing act we have performed has served us well in protecting our conflicting interests in black and white Africa. The evolving situation in the region prompts further questions, however.

Should we increase our efforts to promote dialogue between black and white Africa, including Rhodesia?

Pretoria's statements concerning peaceful coexistence with an independent Mozambique have not

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dispelled African doubts about South Africa's intentions. Should we take the initiative to counsel South Africa not to engage in cross-border military adventures? Might this involve us beyond our interests? Can Pretoria be convinced of the need for rapid progress toward racial equality within South Africa and for setting a time-table for self-determination in Namibia?

Should we consider playing a more active role in supporting Portugal's efforts to facilitate the rapid decolonization of Angola and Mozambique?

Our relationship to the decolonization process, and especially our relations with Angola and Mozambique (both during transition and upon their independence), will attract particular attention throughout Africa. Our posture will be viewed by Africans and other third world states as an indication of our attitude toward decolonization in general, and of President Ford's attitude toward black Africa in particular. Moreover, Angola (with its oil, other resources and location) and Mozambique (with its long coastline on the Indian Ocean) could be of considerable economic and strategic value to us in the future.

How should we prepare for anticipated African efforts to increase the isolation or ostracism of South Africa and Rhodesia?

Pressures on both countries, spurred by developments in Mozambique and Angola, are reflected in the UNGA decision on September 30 to request the Security Council to "examine the relationship between South Africa and the UN". We do not believe exclusion or expulsion of South Africa is in our or Western interest. It would establish a precedent of acting against--as opposed to condemning--any other nation which was unpopular because of its policies. Additionally, by staying in the UN, South Africa remains exposed to criticism for its policies and

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can be held responsible for human rights violations. At the moment it is not clear whether an expulsion resolution or one proposing some less severe action will be presented to the Security Council.

While we continue to recognize the U.K.'s primary responsibility for Rhodesia, we could do more to encourage a negotiated settlement between the Smith regime and legitimate representatives of the African majority.

Zambia and the U.K. have separately urged us to encourage the South Africans to withdraw their "military" support from Rhodesia. Although we have limited leverage over South Africa's internal affairs, particularly including its policies toward Rhodesia and Namibia, we might consider using our influence in this direction. Any success achieved would contribute to increasing the psychological pressure on Smith to move toward serious negotiations. Zambia might be enlisted to reinforce our efforts if a meaningful Zambian-South African dialogue should develop.

We would also want to continue our support for and enforcement of UN economic sanctions against Rhodesia--by far the best way to make our influence felt in this respect would be to obtain House concurrence to repeal of the Byrd amendment permitting the importation of Rhodesian chrome.

While we have no special responsibility for Namibia, we have been seeking to break the current impasse by supporting efforts to re-establish communication on the issue between South Africa and the UN, and by encouraging South Africa to accept the view that peaceful resolution is in its own best foreign policy interests. Given the expected political evolution in Angola, movement toward self-determination in Namibia may be the only way to remove this issue as a major element in destabilizing the area and imperiling South Africa's long-range economic and political future. We continue to

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discourage U.S. investment there despite interest in its mineral resources: uranium, copper, zinc, diamonds, and possibly oil. The Mondale amendment proposes to eliminate the tax credit for U.S. companies in Namibia that pay taxes to South Africa. It has also been proposed that the SEC require U.S. companies operating in Namibia to inform their stockholders of Namibia's controversial status.

NEXT STEPS

South African Membership in the UN

The UN Security Council is expected to meet October 18 to discuss South Africa's relationship with the UN. A resolution calling for the expulsion of South Africa is quite possible although there are indications that a resolution calling for the suspension of South African membership or some other less drastic measure is also under consideration. We are campaigning to obtain the defeat of an expulsion resolution by abstentions. However, we are seeking your authority to veto, if necessary, South Africa's expulsion from the UN. Our position on less drastic resolutions is under study.

Rhodesia

The House vote on the Byrd amendment was postponed until after the November election recess because proponents did not believe they had the votes for passage. While White House statements on the issue have indicated a clear Presidential stand against the amendment, a special effort with Congress would seem necessary to assure success of the repeal effort.



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Portuguese Territories

We are prepared to open a small resident diplomatic mission in Guinea-Bissau. We are slightly augmenting the staffs of our Consulate General in Mozambique. We intend to beef up our exchange of persons program and to institute modest new USIA programs there. We have begun to study ways in which we could be responsive to possible requests for development assistance from the emerging nations.

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Washington, D.C. 20520

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NARA -- GRFL, NSA, PCF,
Africa 1974-1976,
Box 1, Folder Angola (1)


June 14, 1975

UNCLASSIFIED
(With ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~/EXDIS Attachment)

MEMORANDUM FOR LIEUTENANT GENERAL BRENT SCOWCROFT
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Issues Paper on Angola

Attached is a copy of an Issues Paper on Angola.
The original is being held in the Department for
inclusion in the President's Morning Briefing Book.


George S. Springsteen
Executive Secretary

Attachment:

Issues Paper on Angola

UNCLASSIFIED
(With ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~/EXDIS Attachment)



AFRICA

Angola

BACKGROUND

Portugal's decolonization of its African territories following the April 1974 coup in Lisbon is bringing to an end almost 500 years of colonial rule in Angola. The years 1961 - 1974 were the most bitter of them all. After it became apparent that the wave of independence sweeping Africa in the late 50's and early 60's would not weaken Portugal's resolve to maintain its colonies, nationalist groups formed to fight for independence. Growing unrest turned into guerrilla warfare in 1961, and did not end until 1974.

-- Despite the fact that fighting had been underway in Angola longer than in Portugal's other colonies, the insurgents had not made significant inroads on the military front. The Portuguese were firmly in control and the three liberation groups pitted against them were ineffective, at odds with each other and, in one case, divided. Ethnic and ideological differences between the three groups -- the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA), which receives support from, among others, Zaire and the PRC, the Marxist-oriented and Soviet-supported Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), and the Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) -- are responsible for the fighting (mainly between FNLA and MPLA) which now threatens to develop into widespread civil strife.

-- Although the Portuguese started their decolonization effort almost immediately after the coup, the three liberation groups were unable to agree on a common negotiating position until January 1975. Temporarily papering over their differences, they reached agreement with Portugal on January 15 to schedule independence for November 11, 1975. A transitional government, composed equally of the three groups and the Portuguese, was installed on January 31, and constituent assembly elections are scheduled to be held by the end of September. However, there is decreasing likelihood of their actually taking place.

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E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES

BY 66, NARA, DATE 5/17/01

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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U.S. STRATEGY

The racial policies of the white regimes of southern Africa have been highly-charged international issues affecting United States interests at home and abroad. We have consistently supported the rights of the people of the Portuguese territories to self-determination. During the period of insurgency we maintained a strict embargo on arms to either side, reflecting our hope for a non-violent solution.


-- Following Portugal's decision to decolonize, we sought contacts with leaders of the liberation movements, congratulated the new transitional government in Angola upon its installation in January and, through your toast to President Kaunda of Zambia on April 19, welcomed its coming independence and offered our future cooperation.

-- Angola is economically the most important of Portugal's African territories. It is sub-Saharan Africa's second largest oil producer (after Nigeria), the world's fourth largest coffee producer, and is a major exporter of diamonds, cotton and iron ore. U.S. investments total about \$400 million, over 75% of which is by Gulf Oil in Cabinda. Although our strategic interests in Angola have been marginal (COMIDEASTFOR vessels have called about four times a year for bunkering and ship visits), events in Angola will importantly affect both southern and central Africa. Increased intervention in the form of the supply of arms and ammunition by outside powers (e.g., the USSR and/or the PRC) could broaden the current conflict.

THE SITUATION NOW

The recent fighting, which early in June spread to Cabinda for the first time, seems preparatory to an eventual all-out effort by the mutually antagonistic MPLA and FNLA to achieve military predominance over all, or at least parts of, Angola. The MPLA has been gaining military strength and control of territory north and northeast of Luanda, where its ethnic strength is greatest. FNLA has been moving its main strength from Zaire into northern Angola. UNITA, militarily weakest but popular in central and southern Angola, is only beginning to be involved in the fighting to any great extent. At the present time each of the three

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- 3 -

groups is in control of the area of its ethnic support and all are represented in Luanda.

The recent violence has led our Consul General to evacuate dependents of U.S. Government employees (5 employees and 13 dependents) and to recommend the evacuation of dependents of private U.S. citizens (total number of private U.S. citizens in Angola as of April 21 was 287). Many dependents have left. The fighting has begun to cause a white exodus that, combined with general dislocation of the population and the subsequent fall-off in oil, coffee and diamond production, could affect Angola's generally bright economic picture, at least over the short term.

ISSUES AND CHOICES

To what degree, if any, do our interests dictate that we should become involved in the Angolan situation?

A NSSM response to this question is under preparation.

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

8438X

SECRET/SENSITIVE/XGDS

Handwritten initials: RRY

INFORMATION
December 28, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Brent Scowcroft *BS*
SUBJECT: CIA Assessment -- Future of Soviet Commitment
in Angola

NARA -- GRFL, NSA, PCF,
Africa 1974-1976,
Box 1, Folder Angola (2)

The Director of Central Intelligence has sent you (at Tab A) an Agency assessment focussed specifically on how determined the Soviet Union will be to support the MPLA in various Angolan contingencies in the near term.

Principal points are:

-- Moscow at present is willing to go a significant distance in support of the MPLA.

-- Moscow does not yet see Soviet involvement in Angola as a real threat to detente.

-- At the same time, consensus within the Kremlin for the current Angolan policy is not deep.

-- The Soviets have probably not yet made up their minds on whether to increase support for the MPLA or move toward a political compromise if the Angolan conflict begins to settle into a prolonged and indecisive stalemate.

The following paragraphs summarize the Agency analysis.

Background

-- Moscow's performance in Angola over the past several months bespeaks a rather tough and unyielding cast of mind regarding its support for the MPLA. Moscow seems to be saying, both on the ground in Angola and in its public utterances, that it is willing to go a significant distance to support an MPLA victory.

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WITH PORTIONS EXEMPTED
E.O. 12958 Sec. 1.5 (c)

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Handwritten: By del NARA Date 3/19/04

-- Moscow is also saying that appeals to the idea of detente will not deter the Soviet Union from pursuing what it regards as its legitimate role as a world power.

-- In their present frame of mind, the Soviets are unresponsive to arguments that their actions in Angola will unduly complicate their broader relations with the US. The detente atmosphere was palpably soured over trade, emigration and SALT II before Angola became a political issue between the two countries. The Soviets are skeptical that Washington will step back from a SALT agreement or will refuse to market its surplus grain in the Soviet Union because of Angola.

-- This kind of analysis would commend itself to Brezhnev because he has strong domestic political reasons for pursuing a tough line now on Angola. It is a place where he can demonstrate that detente not only creates opportunities for "social progress," but also does not inhibit the Soviet Union from taking advantage of them.

The Near Future

-- The factors which have contributed to Moscow's Angola policy could change in significant ways over the next few months. For one [redacted] is some evidence of disagreement in the Kremlin on Angola.

[redacted]
The consensus behind the current Angola policy is not deep, according to [redacted] If this is true, then Moscow may be inclined to show some restraint in the period ahead.

-- If Brezhnev gets through the Party Congress in good shape, politically as well as physically, he may feel under less pressure to show that he is willing and able to stand up to the Americans in Angola. The pain associated with the setbacks in agriculture and the economic retrenchment may become less evident. The Soviets may therefore feel somewhat less defensive and less compelled to demonstrate that they are dealing from a position of strength.

-- Any progress on bilateral issues such as SALT would tend to refocus attention on the detente relationship and relegate, in the eyes of the world as well as the leaders in Moscow, Angola to the wings. This would then make it easier for Moscow to cut a deal on Angola.



-- As we move into the next year, the Soviets will also be paying more attention to the impact of their actions on US politics. They may wish to show some restraint in the interest of not poisoning the atmosphere during the elections.

Conclusion

-- Whether the Soviets demonstrate "restraint" will depend greatly on the situation on the ground in Angola. At one end of the spectrum, the Soviets are unlikely to show much restraint if there is a serious threat to the continued existence of the MPLA. Moscow cannot afford another highly visible defeat. If this contingency threatened, the Soviets could be expected to send in more arms, more Cubans, and more of their own advisors, together with a token show of naval force in the area.

-- At the other end of the spectrum, Angola does not yet figure so prominently in Soviet priorities that Moscow feels a strong imperative for an early and decisive victory there. But Moscow is not likely to apply significant pressure on the MPLA or the Cubans to refrain from significantly strengthening their territorial position, or routing the opposition if that seems possible with the forces and material at hand or in the pipeline.

-- This does not mean that the MPLA has a blank check. A gradual victory in Angola, which minimized the complications on the detente front would be the ideal outcome for Moscow. If the Soviets judged that events were moving in this fashion, they would probably resist pressures from their clients to support a course aimed at a dramatic early victory.

-- If the conflict seemed to settle into a prolonged and indecisive stalemate, strong MPLA pressures would arise for an increase in aid. But the situation would also probably lead other Africans to argue more strongly for a political compromise. The Soviets probably have not yet made up their minds about how to handle this possibility. If it confronted them, the state of their relations with the US in general would be a factor in their reaction and would probably lead them to accept some compromise solution rather than holding out and pressing for a total MPLA "victory." If they had to make such a decision now, however, they would likely opt for raising their Angolan stake, in the belief that the US is not likely to take effective preventive action.



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

861
 NARA -- GRFL, NSA, PCF,
 Africa 1974-1976,
 Box 1, Folder Africa General (3)

February 27, 1976

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BRENT SCOWCROFT
 THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Suggested Presidential Response to Letter
 from President Senghor of Senegal

(NSC #861, February 12, 1976)

The attached letter from President Leopold Senghor of Senegal was handed to President Ford on February 11 by Zairian Commissioner for Foreign Affairs N'Guza. In it, President Senghor reiterates his appeal for our support of anti-communist factions in Angola. In the proposed reply, President Ford thanks President Senghor for his past support of our position on Angola, states our current view of the situation, and promises to remain in contact regarding future developments in Angola.

George S. Springsteen
 George S. Springsteen
 Executive Secretary

Attachments

As stated

~~SECRET~~

GDS

DR 6/2/01



SUGGESTED REPLY

Dear Mr. President:

Thank you for your thoughtful letter on Angola which was delivered to me by Ambassador Coulbary and Zairian Commissioner for Foreign Affairs Nguza during our meeting on February 11. I had a most fruitful discussion with your Ambassador and Commissioner Nguza on issues of mutual interest.

I assure you, Mr. President, that our basic policy on Angola has not changed. We remain deeply concerned over the threat posed to Africa and to the world by the presence in Angola of large numbers of Cuban troops supported by Soviet arms and advisers. In examining the question of future recognition of the Luanda regime, a priority consideration will be how best to use our influence to reduce substantially that Soviet-Cuban presence so that discussions, both within Angola and between Angola and its neighbors, can proceed in an atmosphere free of outside intervention. We have no objection in principle to the MPLA itself. However we do object, and will continue to address ourselves, to that minority movement's dependence on ~~foreign~~ ^{militant force} foreign communist ~~army~~ to achieve and maintain power.

His Excellency
Leopold Sedar Senghor
President of the Republic of Senegal
Dakar

NARA -- GRFL, NSA, PCF,
Africa 1974-1976,
Box 1, Folder Africa General (3)



We believe our policy, which seeks to avoid superpower confrontations in Africa, is in the best interest of both Africa and the ^{rest of the world.} ~~United~~ States. The Soviet Union, as well as Cuba, will have to consider very seriously the consequences of actions it has taken and realize the necessity for restraint in future conduct. Otherwise, the potential for dangerous misunderstanding will only increase.

Thank you again, Mr. President, for your letter, and for your welcome support over the past several months. Our consultations with you have been very useful in formulating our policy regarding Angola, and we deeply appreciate the wisdom and leadership you have ~~shown~~ shown on this and on many other issues. I look forward to continued close cooperation between our two Governments as we work to strengthen and broaden American-Senegalese relations.

Sincerely,

GRF



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF LANGUAGE SERVICES

(TRANSLATION)

LS NO. 54358
MM/JRP
French

THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC

No. 261/PR/SP

Dakar, January 27, 1976

Mr. President:

In the message you had delivered to me by your ambassador in Senegal, Mr. Rudolph Aggrey, you suggested that I remain in contact with you. To that end, I am entrusting this letter to Mr. N'Guza, Permanent Secretary of the Political Bureau of the People's Revolutionary Movement of Zaire.

I shall make no secret of the fact that the situation in Angola is very grave for the defenders of freedom, the FNLA and UNITA. If you were to allow their defeat, I must make it plain that the United States of America would lose its credibility in Africa, despite the fact that exactly two hundred years ago it founded freedom in America.

I thought it advisable to request Mr. André Coulbary, Ambassador of Senegal at Washington, to convey a verbal message on my behalf to Senators Hubert Humphrey and Edward Kennedy, an appeal from those fighting for freedom in Angola.

In thanking you for your attention to my letter, I beg you to accept, Mr. President, the assurance of my very high consideration.

[Signature]

Léopold Sédar Senghor

Mr. President,

Mr. President,

President of the
United States of America,
Washington.

24
NARA -- GRFL, NSA, PCF,
Africa 1974-1976,
Box 1, Folder Africa General (3)





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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520


February 27, 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BRENT SCOWCROFT
THE WHITE HOUSE

NARA -- GRFL, NSA, PCF,
Africa 1974-1976,
Box 1, Folder Africa General (3)

Subject: Draft letter to the President of Zaire
for the President's Signature

In response to Mrs. Davis' Memorandum of February 12 (NSC Log Number 862) there is attached a draft letter proposed for signature by the President. The letter is in reply to a letter to the President from President Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire which was delivered to President Ford by the Foreign Commissioner of Zaire Nguza Karl-I-Bond on February 11.


George S. Springsteen
Executive Secretary

Attachment

Draft Letter.



SUGGESTED LETTER

2
NARA -- GRFL, NSA, PCF,
Africa 1974-1976,
Box 1, Folder Africa General (3)

Dear Mr. President:

Your thoughtful and constructive letter of January 23 was delivered to me by Foreign Commissioner Nguza Karl-I-Bond during our meeting on February 11. I appreciated the opportunity to meet Commissioner Nguza and was impressed with his insight into the Angolan problem.

The United States places great importance on its friendship with Zaire and is concerned over the possible emergence in Angola of a hostile, minority-based government dependent for its existence on a Soviet-backed Cuban expeditionary force. We recognize the serious threat this could pose to Zaire. It is the firm intention of my Government to continue its ^{efforts} to ~~effect the reduction, and if possible the elimination,~~ of the Cuban and Soviet ^{interference} ~~presence~~ in Africa and to encourage a free dialogue both within Angola and between Angola and its African neighbors.

The attitudes of our two Governments toward the MPLA are similar. My Government has no objection in principle to the MPLA. However, we do object, and will continue to address ourselves, to that movement's dependence on ^{military forces} foreign communist ~~army~~ and its apparent unwillingness to broaden its narrow political base. ^{We will} ~~The~~ ^{policy of the United States, regarding recognition of the MPLA, will} ~~not change~~ ^{without first consulting fully with your Government.}

Confidential
policy of the United States, regarding recognition of the MPLA, will not change without first consulting fully with your Government.
Other African
policy
R. FORD LIBRARY

With respect to Zaire's own security, we share your belief that the MPLA will be more likely to respect your sovereignty and less inclined to subversion if it clearly recognizes that Zaire is economically and militarily strong. Therefore I intend to work diligently with the United States Congress to help insure that your country receives adequate economic and military assistance. In this connection, ^{I greatly respect} your courageous decision to work out a stabilization agreement with the International Monetary Fund, ~~has played a major role in influencing~~ key members of the United States Congress ~~to take under serious~~ consideration the value of providing ~~increased aid to Zaire.~~

Thank you again, Mr. President, for your letter and for sending your personal emissary to give me your views on the difficult problems of peace, security and development in central Africa which we are both working to resolve.

Sincerely,

GRF

Lieutenant General Mobutu Sese Seko
President of the Republic of Zaire
Kinshasa



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF LANGUAGE SERVICES

(TRANSLATION)

LS NO. - 54359
MM/JRP
French

PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT-FOUNDER
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC

Kinshasa, January 23, 1976

24
NARA -- GRFL, NSA, PCF,
Africa 1974-1976,
Box 1, Folder Africa General (3)

Mr. President:

I have received the various emissaries and messages that you have sent to me, and I wish to express to you my sincere appreciation for the unceasing efforts of the United States of America in seeking a peaceful solution to the Angolan problem.

Thanks to the active diplomacy engaged in by our two countries, it was possible to avert the worst at the recent summit meeting of the Organization of African Unity at Addis Ababa, where the group of pro-Soviet countries made the situation very dangerous.

Africa is currently experiencing one of the darkest moments of its history. The situation is even graver for Zaire because the present closing of the shipping routes of mineral products from the Shaba through Angola, as well as the MPLA's total control of the mouth of the Zaire River, constitute a true catastrophe for my country's economy.

Consequently, I am sending to you one of my most trusted colleagues, Mr. Karl-i-Bend Nguza, Permanent Secretary of the Political Bureau, whom I have instructed to deliver this message of friendship to you.

His Excellency
Gerald Ford,
President of the United States of America,
Washington, D.C.



I am appealing to Your Excellency because since 1960 we have maintained close relations of friendship with your country on all levels.

However, the most burning issue affecting our relations is that of the safety and defense of Zaire. Mr. Kas-i-Bond Nguzo, who is very well informed on this subject, will explain it to you in detail.

The means of destruction that are available to Zaire's adversaries far exceed those that are available to my country at the present time.

The Republic of Zaire has always endeavored to seek peace and strengthen unity, not division, in Africa. Unfortunately, foreign interference by the great powers, and, primarily, massive military intervention by the Soviet Union and Cuba in Angola, threaten Central Africa and Zaire specifically.

For these reasons, Mr. President, I feel that the United States of America must face its responsibilities toward Zaire.

In these early days of the new year, it is my wish that the friendly relations existing between our two countries may continue to undergo an ever greater and more harmonious development.

Accept, Mr. President, the assurances of my very high consideration.

[Signature]

Nobutu Sese Seko Kuku Ngbendu Wa Za Banga

Lieutenant General



MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

SECRET/SENSITIVE

NARA -- GRFL, NSA, PCF,
Africa 1974-1977,
Box 2, Folder Angola (4)

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: George Sangremla, Minister of Foreign Affairs, UNITA
Tony Fernandes, Minister of Information, UNITA
Jeremiah Chitunda, Representative to the UN, UNITA
Lt. Colonel Robert C. McFarlane, Military Assistant
to the Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs

DATE & TIME: Thursday - March 11, 1976
3:00 - 3:40 p.m.

PLACE: The Map Room
The White House

The two Ministers and Mr. Chitunda had come to Washington to visit with key Congressmen and officials at the State Department to report the status of UNITA's effort in Angola and their intentions for the months ahead. They made several points as follows:

They conveyed the deep appreciation of President Savimbi for U.S. assistance and support during their struggle of the past months.

- They expressed the President's firm intention to continue with determined guerrilla tactics from now on.
- Notwithstanding Cuban and MPLA successes they estimate that 70 percent of the people remain sympathetic to UNITA and an additional 15 percent in formerly FNLA areas remain anti-Communist.
- The Cubans are concentrating in large population centers and have not attempted to establish any sort of control or indoctrination in rural areas. Savimbi believes this bodes well for establishing "friendly waters in which the UNITA fish can swim easily."

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E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.0

SECRET/SENSITIVE

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dat NARA Date 5/30/02

- They are confident that they can carry on an effective guerrilla campaign for approximately 10 to 12 months.
- They are certain that the Cubans will provide major support to Rhodesian Freedom Fighters and once control is established in Rhodesia will then move promptly into Namibia and Zambia. They expressed as fact that President Kaunda believes that Zambia has only a few months to go before it will face Cuban aggression.

The Minister did not ask for any U.S. assistance but simply expressed the hope that the United States would continue to provide the necessary leadership in the West that will be needed to stop the above scenario from playing out.

I expressed appreciation for their having come, and stated that the United States remains sympathetic to their efforts and, notwithstanding the setbacks we have experienced, will continue efforts to find a way to provide a measure of assistance.

MEMORANDUM

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN

20

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ (GDS)

861/862

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT *BS*

SUBJECT: Correspondence with the Presidents of Zaire and Senegal

GROUP NSA, PCF, BOX 2
FOLDER: AFRICA-GENERAL (3)

At Tabs A and B are letters to President Mobutu of Zaire and Senghor of Senegal responding to their letters [Tabs C and D] delivered to you personally by Zairian Foreign Commissioner Nguza Karl-I-Bond and Senegalese Ambassador Coulbary. The proposed responses would be delivered by Secretary Kissinger.

In his letter President Mobutu describes the security of Zaire in the aftermath of the Soviet/Cuba-backed MPLA victory in Angola. Mobutu states that given the massive intervention by the Soviets and Cubans the United States "must face its responsibilities toward Zaire." President Senghor, one of the strongest leaders against the MPLA, urged the United States not to allow the defeat of the FNLA and UNITA.

With the MPLA now in power and recognized by most African states, the replies to Mobutu and Senghor reiterate our opposition to Soviet and Cuban intervention in Africa, regret the unwillingness of the MPLA to broaden its narrow political base, and then refer to particular matters related to each country. The letter to Senghor expresses appreciation for Senegalese support and asks for continued counsel as the situation in Central and Southern Africa evolves. The letter to Mobutu discusses security and economic assistance. The replies will reinforce the importance of Secretary Kissinger's trip and will link his discussions to your correspondence with both heads of state.

Bob Hartmann's office has cleared the texts of both letters.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the letters to Presidents Mobutu and Senghor at Tabs A and B.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ (GDS)

LR 6/21/01



861/262

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 22, 1976

GRFD, NSA, GCF, Box 2
FOLOBR: AFRICA - GENERAL (3)

Dear Mr. President:

With Secretary Kissinger about to depart for his trip to Africa, I would like to thank you for your thoughtful letter on Angola delivered by Ambassador Coulbary and tell you how much I valued your counsel during that difficult period. I had an excellent discussion with your Ambassador and with Zairian Commissioner for Foreign Affairs Nguza on several issues of mutual interest and am pleased that you and Secretary Kissinger will continue this dialogue in person during his visit.

I appreciated your invitation for United States participation in the Second Dakar International Fair and your positive comments on our participation in the first Fair. I take pleasure in informing you that the United States does plan to take part in the second Fair.

I regret the turn of events in Angola. The United States has no objection in principle to the MPLA. I am concerned, nevertheless, about the heavy reliance of the MPLA on foreign communist military forces and its apparent unwillingness to broaden its narrow political base. My Government will continue to oppose Cuban and Soviet interference while standing for majority rule in Africa. The course of events is still uncertain in Central and Southern Africa, and I hope that I will continue to have the benefit of your thoughts in the coming months.



I am most gratified that Secretary Kissinger will have the opportunity to examine with you personally the issues of mutual concern to our countries. He comes to Senegal with my personal encouragement to look carefully at what needs to be done to assist you in your efforts to promote peace, security, and development in Africa.

Sincerely,

Ronald R. Ford

His Excellency
Leopold Sedar Senghor
President of the Republic of Senegal
Dakar



861/1
2A

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 22, 1976

Dear Mr. President:

I was very pleased to receive Foreign Commissioner Nguza Karl-I-Bond earlier this year and to read and consider your thoughtful letter which he delivered. I appreciated the opportunity to meet Commissioner Nguza and was impressed with his insight into the Angola problem. I have kept in mind the concern for the safety and defense of Zaire expressed in your letter and have asked Secretary Kissinger to pursue this matter further during his meetings with you.

The United States places great importance on its friendship with Zaire. Although the hostilities in Angola have subsided, we are concerned about the heavy reliance of the MPLA on foreign communist military forces and its apparent unwillingness to broaden its narrow political base. My Government will continue to oppose Cuban and Soviet interference in Africa and will encourage a free dialogue within Angola and between Angola and its African neighbors.

I share your belief that Zaire's security can best be preserved by ensuring that Zaire is economically and militarily strong. Therefore I intend to work diligently with the United States Congress to provide adequate economic and military assistance. I greatly respect your courageous decision to work out a stabilization agreement with the International Monetary Fund. The United States will do what it can to reinforce this effort to stabilize and develop the Zairian economy.

GRFP, NSA, PEF, Box 2
FOUR: AFELIA - GENERAL (3)



I have asked Secretary Kissinger to continue our exchange of views on the problems of peace, security, and development in Central Africa during his visit to your country. He carries my warmest personal regards and comes with my personal encouragement to review with you what needs to be done to assist Zaire through this difficult period.

Sincerely,

Ronald R. Ford

Lieutenant General Mobutu Sese Seko
President of the Republic of Zaire
Kinshasa



MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

861/862

Tab I Folder 107
4.19 1000

26

*Jobs A & B
returned*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ (GDS)

4/22 6/2/1/01

ACTION

March 16, 1976

NARA -- GRFL, NSA, PCF,
Africa 1974-1976,
Box 1, Folder Africa General (3)

MEMORANDUM FOR: BRENT SCOWCROFT
FROM: Hal Horan *EH*
SUBJECT: Presidential Correspondence: Proposed
Replies to Letters from Presidents Mobutu
and Senghor

Attached is a self-explanatory memorandum to the President recommending that he respond to correspondence from Presidents Mobutu of Zaire and Senghor of Senegal, delivered to him on February 11 by Zaire's Foreign Minister and Senegal's Ambassador to the United States.

I regret the delay in forwarding this memorandum, but State's initial draft responses became OBE and had to be redone.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you forward to the President the memo at Tab I.



THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 22, 1976

861/252
2
NARA -- GRFL, NSA, PCF,
Africa 1974-1976,
Box 1, Folder Africa General (3)

Dear Mr. President:

With Secretary Kissinger about to depart for his trip to Africa, I would like to thank you for your thoughtful letter on Angola delivered by Ambassador Coulbary and tell you how much I valued your counsel during that difficult period. I had an excellent discussion with your Ambassador and with Zairian Commissioner for Foreign Affairs Nguza on several issues of mutual interest and am pleased that you and Secretary Kissinger will continue this dialogue in person during his visit.

I appreciated your invitation for United States participation in the Second Dakar International Fair and your positive comments on our participation in the first Fair. I take pleasure in informing you that the United States does plan to take part in the second Fair.

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I am most gratified that Secretary Kissinger will have the opportunity to examine with you personally the issues of mutual concern to our countries. He comes to Senegal with my personal encouragement to look carefully at what needs to be done to assist you in your efforts to promote peace, security, and development in Africa.

Sincerely,

Ronald R. Ford

His Excellency
Leopold Sedar Senghor
President of the Republic of Senegal
Dakar



THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 22, 1976

863
2A
NARA -- GRFL, NSA, PCF,
Africa 1974-1976,
Box 1, Folder Africa General (3)

Dear Mr. President:

I was very pleased to receive Foreign Commissioner Nguza Karl-I-Bond earlier this year and to read and consider your thoughtful letter which he delivered. I appreciated the opportunity to meet Commissioner Nguza and was impressed with his insight into the Angola problem. I have kept in mind the concern for the safety and defense of Zaire expressed in your letter and have asked Secretary Kissinger to pursue this matter further during his meetings with you.

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I share your belief that Zaire's security can best be preserved by ensuring that Zaire is economically and militarily strong. Therefore I intend to work diligently with the United States Congress to provide adequate economic and military assistance. I greatly respect your courageous decision to work out a stabilization agreement with the International Monetary Fund. The United States will do what it can to reinforce this effort to stabilize and develop the Zairian economy.



I have asked Secretary Kissinger to continue our exchange of views on the problems of peace, security, and development in Central Africa during his visit to your country. He carries my warmest personal regards and comes with my personal encouragement to review with you what needs to be done to assist Zaire through this difficult period.

Sincerely,

Richard R. Ford

Lieutenant General Mobutu Sese Seko
President of the Republic of Zaire
Kinshasa



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Department of State

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PAGE 01 LUANDA 01275 281201Z

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ACTION SS-25

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~~SECRET~~ LUANDA 1275

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F.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR EREF EAID AN ED
SUBJECT: ASSISTANCE TO ANGOLA REFUGEES

REF: STATE 203574, B. LUANDA 1262

1. FURTHER ON THE REFUGEES, MANY OF THE REFUGEE/CIVIL SERVANT FLIGHTS LEAVE HERE WITH EMPT Y SEATS BECAUSE THE PORTUGUESE ARE RELUCTANT TO LEAVE UNTIL THEY SEE THEIR EFFECTS ABOARD SHIP. AS THEY CANNOT SELL THEM EXCEPT AT A DISCOUNT AND IF THEY SOLD THEM THEY WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO CONVERT THEIR ANGOLAN ESCUDOS EXCEPT AT A GREAT DISCOUNT, THEY PACK THEM UP AND WAIT HERE FOR WEEKS IN THE HOPES OF GETTING THEM ABOARD SHIP. ONE OF THE BIGGEST ISSUES FOR THE DEPARTING PORTUGUESE IS THE LACK OF SUFFICIENT OCEAN TRANSPORT AND THEIR DEMONSTRATIONS HIGHLIGHT THIS FACTOR.

2. I DO NOT KNOW WHAT THE USG CAN DO TO HELP OUT IN THIS MATTER, BUT IT SEEMS TO ME THE PORTUGUESE



NARA - GRFL, NSA, PCF,
Africa 1974-1977,
Box 2, Folder Angola-State Dept. Telegrams

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Gln 5/17/01

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 02 LUANDA 01275 281201Z

GOVERNMENT MUST HAVE VESSELS IT COULD PUT INTO SERVICE TO CARRS HOUSEHOLD EFFECTS AND AUTOMOBILES AND WE SHOULD OBTAIN A COMMITMENT FROM THEM TO MOVE MORE CARGO OUT OF LUANDA BY SEA.

3. ON REREADING MY 1202, I FIND I LEFT THE IMPRESSION THAT DEPARTING PORTUGUESE CANNOT CONVERT ANY ANGOLAN ESCUDOS INTO PORTUGUESE ESCUDOS. THEY CAN CONVERT 5,000 ESCUDOS (ABOUT 200 DOLLARS AT THE OFFICIAL RATE.) KILLORAN



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Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET 7090

PAGE 01 LUANDA 01527 101125Z

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ACTION SS-35

INFO OCT-01 150-00 550-00 NSCE-00 7026 W

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FM AMCONSUL LUANDA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0265
INFO AMEMBASSY KINSHASA 1303
AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEMBASSY LUSAKA
AMEMBASSY PRETORIA

~~SECRET~~ LUANDA 1527

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E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.8

EXDIS

MR 02-34 #24: 02. etc. 4/3/02

DEPT PASS CINCLANT AND CINCEUR FOR INFO

By del NARA Date 5/30/02

R.D. 1165: EXDIS11
TAGS: MASS, CU, AO
SUBJ: CUBAN TROOPS IN ANGOLA

1. THE HIGH COMMANDER, ADMIRAL CARDOSO, TOLD ME ON OCTOBER 9 THAT HE HAD RECEIVED INFORMATION FROM A RELIABLE SOURCE ON OCTOBER 8 THAT CUBAN TROOPS AND ARMS HAD LANDED IN ANGOLA AT PORTO AMBOIM. THE SOURCE, A CIVILIAN WHOM THE ADMIRAL KNOWS AND TRUSTS, SAID HE SAW THE SHIPS AND TALKED WITH THE CUBANS.

2. ACCORDING TO THE SOURCE, TWO SHIPS, THE "ISLAS CORACED" AND THE "VIETNAM HERDICO" ARRIVED AT PORTO AMBOIM WITHIN THE PAST FEW DAYS (NO DATE GIVEN) AND OFFLOADED ARMS AND "LARGE NUMBERS" OF TROOPS. SOURCE TALKED WITH THE SOLDIERS, WHOM HE SAID WERE BLACK AND SPOKE SPANISH.

3. I PRESSED THE ADMIRAL ON NUMBERS. HE SAID THE SOURCE TALKED IN TERMS OF SEVEN HUNDRED, BUT THE ADMIRAL DOUBTS THERE ARE THAT MANY. HE IS CONVINCED, BASED ON SOURCE'S STORY, THAT THERE ARE A LOT OF BLACK CUBAN SOLDIERS IN ANGOLA. THEY TOLD THE SOURCE THAT THEY WERE VOLUNTEERS COME TO

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NARA - GRFL, NSA, PCF, Africa 1974-1977, Box 2, F: Angola, State Tel.

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 R

DRAFTED BY AF/C:WLCUTLER:OSM
APPROVED BY AF:AMB, MULCAHY
EUR:MR. BARBOUR
S/S-O:OLMACK
P:MR. WISNER
S: MR. ADAMS

NARA - GRFL, NSA, PCF,
Africa 1974-1977,
Box 2, Folder Angola-State Dept. Telegrams

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E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, AD

SUBJECT:DISPOSITION OF PORTUGUESE MILITARY EQUIPMENT IN
ANGOLA

REF: A) STATE 239085; B) STATE 234968

1. AS YOU ARE AWARE FROM REFTELS, IN RESPONSE TO OUR HIGH-
LEVEL DEMARCHES GOP HAS PROMISED TO DO ALL POSSIBLE TO
PREVENT MILITARY EQUIPMENT FROM FALLING INTO MPLA HANDS IN
ANGOLA. THE SECRETARY AGAIN RAISED THIS MATTER DURING
MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER ANTUNES OCT. 10 (REPORT OF
CONVERSATION BEING SENT SEPTEL).

2. DESPITE THESE REPEATED ASSURANCES, DEPT IS UN-
AWARE WHETHER GOP HAS IN FACT TAKEN ALL FEASIBLE ACTION
TO IMPLEMENT ITS ASSURANCES AND, EVEN IF INSTRUCTIONS

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.8

MR 02-34 #25, Pt. 4/3/02
By *dlr* NARA Date 5/30/02



Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02 STATE 246921

HAVE BEEN PASSED TO LUANDA, WHETHER PORTUGUESE OFFICIALS IN ANGOLA ARE CARRYING THEM OUT. DEPT ALSO UNDERSTANDS INCREASING DIFFICULTY LISBON EXPERIENCING IN EXERCISING ANY CONTROL OVER DEVELOPMENTS IN ANGOLA. IN VIEW OF THESE FACTORS, REQUEST YOU APPROACH HIGH COMMISSIONER CARDOZO WITH VIEW TO VERIFYING THAT HE IS TAKING EFFECTIVE STEPS TO CARRY OUT GOP POLICY ON

EQUIPMENT AS CONVEYED TO US BY PORTUGUESE PRIME MINISTER AND FOREIGN MINISTER. IN MAKING YOUR DEMARCHE, YOU SHOULD SEEK TO DETERMINE CARDOZO'S PRECISE PLANS FOR EITHER RETURNING EQUIPMENT TO PORTUGAL OR OTHERWISE DISPOSING OF IT PRIOR TO INDEPENDENCE. WE ARE PARTICULARLY CONCERNED ABOUT HEAVY EQUIPMENT SUCH AS ARMORED VEHICLES AND ARTILLERY, NAVAL SHIPS WE UNDERSTAND REMAIN IN LUANDA HARBOR, AND PAF AIRCRAFT. IN THIS CONNECTION, WE WOULD LIKE CLARIFICATION OF CARDOZO'S STATEMENT IN RECENT PRESS INTERVIEW (REPORTED FBIS OCT. 9) THAT "ANY ARMS WHICH PORTUGAL LEAVES ON ANGOLA'S INDEPENDENCE WOULD BE HANDED OVER TO THE ORGANS OF THE INDEPENDENT STATE OF ANGOLA, AND NOT DISTRIBUTED EQUITABLY AMONG THE THREE LIBERATION MOVEMENTS." SUCH A POSITION WOULD NOT SEEM CONSISTENT WITH ASSURANCES GIVEN US BY GOP IF, AS SEEMS LIKELY, MPLA MOVES TO SEIZE CONTROL OF GOVERNMENT IN LUANDA AT TIME OF INDEPENDENCE. AT A MINIMUM IT WOULD SEEM FEASIBLE FOR PORTUGUESE TO TEMPORARILY REMOVE MAJOR EQUIPMENT (E.G., SHIPS AND AIRCRAFT) TO PORTUGAL OR SOME ACCEPTABLE NEARBY LOCATION (PERHAPS SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE) AND RETURN IT TO ANGOLA ONCE REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT FORMED.

3. ON RELATED MATTER, WE NOTE CARDOZO'S EXPLANATION IN SAME PRESS INTERVIEW THAT HIS OCT. 4 DECISION TO TRANSFORM POSITIONS OF THREE PRIME MINISTERS INTO GOVERNMENT MINISTRIES WITHOUT PORTFOLIO HAD EFFECT OF GIVING THESE MINISTERS LEGAL STATUS PROVIDING THEY ARE IN LUANDA AND THAT, PRACTICALLY SPEAKING, THIS DECISION BENEFITED ONLY MPLA MINISTER NASCIMENTO. ON THE SURFACE THIS WOULD SEEM TO CONSTITUTE STEP TOWARD GIVING MPLA GREATER LEGITIMACY AND THEREBY STRENGTHENING CLAIM OF SOVEREIGNTY IT EXPECTED TO MAKE AT INDEPENDENCE. IF

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PAGE 03 STATE 248921

THIS INTERPRETATION CORRECT, REQUEST YOU REGISTER OUR CONCERN WITH CARDOZO AND STRESS OUR EXPECTATION THAT NOTHING WILL BE DONE ALONG THIS LINE CONTRARY TO SPIRIT OF GOP'S ASSURANCES THAT IT WOULD TREAT ALL THREE MOVEMENTS WITH COMPLETE IMPARTIALITY. KISSINGER

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PAGE 01 STATE 247557 COPY 12 OF 15 COPIES

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INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /021 R

DRAFTED BY AF/C:VLCUTLER:OSM
APPROVED BY AF:AMB, MULCAHY
EUR/IB:MR. KELLY
S/S -RKUCHEL
P/MR. WISNER
INR/PAF:MR. THORNE

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E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS:PFDR, AO

SUBJECT:ANGOLAN CONTINGENCY PLANNING

1. DEPT NOW IN PROCESS OF REVIEWING OPTIONS RE RECOGNITION OF AN ANGOLAN GOVT AND STATUS OF US REPRESENTATION AFTER NOV. 14. WOULD APPRECIATE RECEIVING ASAP YOUR COMMENTS ON FOLLOWING QUESTIONS:

2. WHAT SHOULD BE US POSITION ON RECOGNITION IF MPLA SETS UP OWN GOVT IN LUANDA AT TIME OF INDEPENDENCE AND IF:
A) FNLA AND UNITA DENOUNCE MPLA'S LEGITIMACY AND CONTINUE FIGHTING? (B) FNLA AND UNITA SET UP SEPARATE RIVAL GOVERNMENTS? (C) FNLA AND UNITA COOPERATE IN ESTABLISHING SINGLE RIVAL GOVERNMENT?

3. WHAT SHOULD BE LEVEL OF US REPRESENTATION, IF ANY, IN LUANDA IN THREE DIFFERENT SCENARIOS OUTLINED PARA 2

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E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.8

MR 02-34 #26: et. etc 4/3/02
del NARA Date 5/30/02

NARA -- GRFL, NSA, PCF,
Africa 1974-1977,
Box 2, Folder Angola-State Dept. Telegrams

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 247557

ABOVE? COULD CONGEN LUANDA CONTINUE TO SERVE USEFUL
ROLE WITHOUT US RECOGNITION OF MPLA GOVT? WOULD SUCH
GOVT ACCORD CONGEN APPROPRIATE TREATMENT, OR WOULD IT
IMPOSE CONDITIONS ON CONGEN THAT WOULD BE TANTAMOUNT
TO RECOGNITION? WHAT WOULD BE FNLA AND UNITA'S REACTION
TO OUR MAINTAINING CONSULAR RELATIONS WITH MPLA GOVT
IN LUANDA? WHAT WOULD BE MPLA'S REACTION TO OUR
ESTABLISHING CONSULAR RELATIONS ALSO WITH FNLA/UNITA

GOVT THAT MIGHT BE SET UP ELSEWHERE IN ANGOLA?

4. IN CONNECTION WITH QUESTIONS RAISED ABOVE, ON OCT 16
UK EMBASSY CONVEYED TO DEPTOFF STATUS OF UK GOVT'S
PLANNING RE RECOGNITION/REPRESENTATION. UK WORKING
LEVEL VIEW IS THAT UNDER PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES MPLA-
CONSTITUTED GOVT WOULD NOT RPT NOT QUALIFY FOR
RECOGNITION BUT MIGHT EVENTUALLY IF MPLA SUCCEEDS IN
EXPANDING CONTROL OVER MOST OF ANGOLA FOLLOWING INDEPEND-
ENCE. BRITISH ARE WEIGHING PROS AND CONS OF REOPENING
THEIR CONSULATE IN LUANDA WITHIN NEXT WEEK OR SO, IN
ORDER TO AVOID ISSUE OF RECOGNITION WHICH WOULD ARISE IF
THEY WAIT UNTIL AFTER INDEPENDENCE. THEY ALSO BELIEVE
THAT THE CLOSER THEY WAIT TO INDEPENDENCE TO REOPEN, THE
MORE THEIR ACTION WILL LOOK LIKE A STEP TOWARD
RECOGNITION. ON THE OTHER HAND, BRITISH WOULD BE
RELUCTANT TO REOPEN IF WE HAVE ANY IDEA OF CLOSING OUR
CONGEN, OR IF THEY WOULD BE FACED WITH CLOSING UP AGAIN
BECAUSE OF THE RECOGNITION ISSUE. DEPTOFF BRIEFED
UK REP ON PRELIMINARY STATUS OF OUR OWN PLANNING AND
AGREED TO STAY IN CLOSE TOUCH. WOULD APPRECIATE CONGEN
LUANDA'S COMMENTS ON UK VIEWS, PARTICULARLY ON THEIR
IDEA OF EARLY RESTAFFING OF THEIR CONSULATE. INGERSOLL

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NOV 15

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1
TAGS: PFOR, AD
SUBJ: PORTUGUESE ARMS IN ANGOLA

REF: STATE 245921

1. I TALKED WITH HIGH COMMISSIONER ADMIRAL CARDOZO ON OCTOBER 20 ABOUT THE DISPOSITION PORTUGAL PLANS TO MAKE OF ITS REMAINING ARMS AND AMMUNITION STORES IN ANGOLA.

2. THE ADMIRAL GAVE THE FOLLOWING RUNDOWN ON ACTIONS TAKEN OR UNDERWAY:

- A) ALL BREECH MECHANISMS REMOVED FROM RIFLES.
- B) 100 TONS OF AMMUNITION HAVE BEEN BURNED OR DUMPED IN THE OCEAN.
- C) ONLY NON-FLYING AIRCRAFT WILL BE LEFT BEHIND.
- D) 25 ASSORTED VESSELS HAVE ALREADY BEEN PASSED TO THE MARITIME SERVICE AND WILL BE LEFT BEHIND ON NOVEMBER 11. TWO ARE IN SANTO ANTONIO DO ZAIRE. THE CRAFT ARE OF NO GREAT VALUE, AS THE MOVEMENTS DO NOT HAVE TRAINED PERSONNEL TO RUN THEM OR TO MAINTAIN THEM. THE NAVAL TRAINING SCHOOL THE ADMIRAL INSTITUTED WITH 200 STUDENTS IS NOW DOWN TO THE FIFTY OR SIXTY MPLA TRAINEES. THE VESSELS WILL BE OF NO GREAT USE TO MPLA.
- E) NO ARMORED VEHICLES WILL BE LEFT.
- F) VERY FEW HEAVY ARTILLERY PIECES WILL BE LEFT, ALL OF THEM

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E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.8

MB 02-34 # 27; 02-200 4/3/02

By dal NARA Date 5/30/02

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3. THE ADMIRAL REPORTED THAT THE MPLA IS QUITE UPSET ABOUT WHAT IT CONSIDERS THE ANTI-MPLA STANCE OF THE PORTUGUESE AUTHORITIES HERE AND THE ATTEMPT TO KEEP EQUIPMENT FROM FALLING INTO ITS HANDS. HE ADDED THAT MPLA IS STILL BITTER ABOUT THE PORTUGUESE CONFISCATION OF MORE THAN 300 TONS OF ARMS ABOARD THE LCI "MAYOMBE" IN JUNE-JULY.

4. THE ADMIRAL SAID PORTUGUESE ARE DOING ALL THEY CAN OR SHOULD. THE ITEMS BEING ABANDONED TO THE MPLA ARE NOT GOING TO MAKE THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN VICTORY OR DEFEAT, HE EMPHASIZED.

5. WITH RESPECT TO CARDOSO'S APPOINTMENT OF FORMER MEMBERS OF THE PRESIDENTIAL COLLEGE AS MINISTERS WITHOUT PORTFOLIO, THIS ACTION LEGITIMIZED THE STATUS OF MPLA MINISTER LCPS DO NASCIMENTO WHO ALONE OF THE THREE COUNCIL MEMBERS CONTINUES TO FUNCTION IN THE GOVERNMENT. UNTIL CARDOSO'S DECREE LCPS DO NASCIMENTO WAS DOING GOVERNMENT BUSINESS WITH NO LEGAL RIGHT TO DO SO. IN ORDER TO AVOID POSSIBLE CRITICISM AND CLAIMS OF NULLIFICATION, THE ADMIRAL HIT UPON THE MINISTER WITHOUT PORTFOLIO IDEA. THE BUSINESS OF GOVERNMENT HAS TO GO FORWARD AND THERE HAS TO BE A LINK BETWEEN THE HIGH COMMISSIONER AND THE INTERNAL GOVERNMENT OF ANGOLA (OR CERTAIN PARTS OF IT). NASCIMENTO SERVES AS THAT LINK AND THE ADMIRAL FELT THAT MUCH THE BEST COURSE WAS TO PROVIDE HIM WITH THE REQUISITE AUTHORITY.

KILLGRAN

CC/T NOTE: NOT PASSED TO LISBON BY CC/T

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Department of State

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E.O. 11652: XGDS-3
TAGS: PFCR, AQ
SUBJ: ANGOLA CONTINGENCY PLANNING

MR 02-34 # 28; de-cls 9/3/62

del NARA Date 5/30/02

REF: STATE 247557

1. THE DEPARTMENT HAS ASKED FOR MY COMMENTS ON THE POSITION THE U.S.G. SHOULD ADOPT IF MPLA SETS UP ITS OWN GOVERNMENT IN LUANDA AND IF A) FNLA AND UNITA DENOUNCE THE MOVE AND CONTINUE FIGHTING; B) FNLA AND UNITA ESTABLISH THEIR OWN GOVERNMENTS; AND C) FNLA AND UNITA COOPERATE IN SETTING UP A SINGLE RIVAL GOVERNMENT.

2. I RECOMMEND THE SAME COURSE OF ACTION FOR ALL THREE SCENARIOS: ANNOUNCE THAT WE CAN TAKE NO POSITION ON RECOGNITION AND SHUT DOWN THE CONSULATE. OUR REMAINING HERE WOULD BE TANTAMOUNT TO RECOGNITION. FNLA AND UNITA WOULD NOT UNDERSTAND OUR ACTION AND WE WOULD PREJUDICE OUR ABILITY TO INFLUENCE THEM. MPLA WOULD NOT ACCEPT THE OPENING BY US OF OFFICES IN UNITA AND FNLA TERRITORY AND PROBABLY WOULD SHUT US DOWN IF WE WERE STILL IN LUANDA.

3. AS WE COULD NOT RECOGNIZE AN MPLA GOVERNMENT, WE WOULD REMAIN HERE WITH NO STATUS AND NO PROTECTION FROM THE GOVERNMENT DURING WHAT PROMISES TO BE A SAVAGE CIVIL WAR. THE LIVES OF STAFF WOULD BE CONSTANTLY IN DANGER FROM ORGANIZED AND UNORGANIZED ARMED CIVILIANS. SHOULD CABINDA BE TAKEN FROM MPLA, THERE WOULD BE A VERY REAL DANGER OF REPRISALS, WITH KIDNAPPING A DEFINITE THREAT.

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IF, AS EXPECTED, A BATTLE ENSUES FOR THE CONTROL OF LUANDA, THE CITY WILL BECOME UNLIVABLE, THERE WILL BE NO MEANS OF ESCAPE AND ALL FOREIGNERS WILL BE TARGETS OF OPPORTUNITY FOR VIGILANTES AND HOODLUMS.

4. THERE FOLLOW A FEW OBSERVATIONS ON THE ISSUE OF RECOGNITION THAT THE DEPARTMENT SHOULD TAKE INTO ACCOUNT BEFORE IT ADOPTS ITS POLICY.

5. THE MOST LIKELY SCENARIO AT INDEPENDENCE IS ONE IN WHICH THERE WILL BE NO AGREEMENT AMONG THE LIBERATION GROUPS; MPLA WILL DECLARE ITSELF THE LEGITIMATE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ANGOLAN PEOPLE AND ANNOUNCE THAT THE OTHER MOVEMENTS ARE REBELS. FNLA AND UNITA CAN BE EXPECTED TO ADOPT ANALOGOUS POSITIONS. SOME OBSERVERS EXPECT A UNITA/FNLA COALITION; WHILE POSSIBLE, A COALITION PROBABLY WILL NOT EMERGE ON INDEPENDENCE DAY. WE CAN ACCEPT AS GIVEN THAT THE PORTUGUESE WILL BE OUT OF THE PICTURE ON NOVEMBER 11. IF MPLA IS ALONE IN LUANDA, THE HIGH COMMISSIONER WILL NOT TURN OVER SOVEREIGNTY, BUT WILL MERELY DISAPPEAR IN THE NIGHT OF NOVEMBER 10-11. BEFORE LEAVING HE WILL MAKE A STATEMENT DEPLORING THE SITUATION AND STATING THAT THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY WILL HAVE TO TRY AND BRING THE WARRING FACTIONS TOGETHER. HE WILL REFER TO THE RIGHT OF ALL THREE LIBERATION MOVEMENTS TO PARTICIPATE IN THE GOVERNMENT.

6. AN MPLA GOVERNMENT ESTABLISHED IN LUANDA AS THE "NATIONAL GOVERNMENT" WILL IMMEDIATELY OBTAIN THE RECOGNITION OF SEVERAL AFRICAN STATES, THE USSR AND THE EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, POSSIBLY SOME SCANDINAVIANS, A FEW LATIN AMERICANS, ARABS AND ASIANS - ENOUGH, IN ANY EVENT, TO GIVE IT A BASE ON WHICH TO BUILD. IF IT CAN HOLD OUT, MPLA WILL OVER TIME WIN ADDITIONAL RECOGNITIONS AND STAND A CHANCE OF GAINING THE STATUS OF THE "LEGITIMATE" GOVERNMENT OF ANGOLA THROUGH A DEVELOPING INTERNATIONAL CONSENSUS. MPLA WILL WANT AS MANY RECOGNITIONS AS POSSIBLE IN ORDER QUICKLY TO WIN INTERNATIONAL RESPECTABILITY, AND RECOGNITION BY US WOULD BE A SIGNAL VICTORY FOR THEM. I THINK MPLA DEFINITELY DOES WANT TO MAINTAIN RELATIONS WITH ALL NATIONS, AT LEAST DURING THE INITIAL PHASE WHEN IT WILL BE SEEKING TO WIN OUT OVER ITS RIVALS. NEITHER FNLA NOR UNITA CAN HOPE TO GARNER ANYTHING LIKE THE NUMBER OF BACKS MPLA WILL GET.

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PAGE 03 LUANDA 01629 231842Z

7. IF WE DO NOT RECOGNIZE MPLA, IT CAN EITHER IGNORE THE MATTER AND LET THE CONSULATE GENERAL SIT HERE UNTIL THE POLITICAL SITUATION SORTS ITSELF OUT, OR IT CAN ASK US TO LEAVE. AS LONG AS THERE IS A HOT WAR, THE HARD-LINERS IN THE MPLA WILL HAVE THE GREATEST WEIGHT AND I DOUBT THEY WILL TOLERATE OUR PRESENCE IF WE REFUSE TO RECOGNIZE THE MPLA.

8. IF WE ARE NOT THROWN OUT, SHOULD WE STAY OR LEAVE? IF WE STAY, WE WILL HAVE LITTLE TO DO AND IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY IMMUNITIES OR GUARANTEES FROM THE GOVERNMENT OUR EMPLOYEES WOULD BE AT ALL TIMES IN DANGER OF PHYSICAL HARM AND ARBITRARY ARREST. AGAIN, OUR MERE PRESENCE, EVEN IN THE ABSENCE OF RECOGNITION, IMPLIES AN EXPECTATION THAT MPLA WILL, IN FACT PREVAIL. BY LEAVING WE MAKE CLEAR WE DO NOT RECOGNIZE MPLA'S CLAIM TO BE THE SOLE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ANGOLAN PEOPLE

9. IF WE MAKE NO ANNOUNCEMENT OF OUR POSITION ON RECOGNITION, THERE EXISTS THE POSSIBILITY THAT MPLA WILL EXTEND DIPLOMATIC RECOGNITION TO US. IF WE DO NOT RESPOND TO THIS OFFERING, MPLA LEADERS PROBABLY WILL WAIT FOR SOME TIME BEFORE GIVING US AN ULTIMATUM. ONCE HAVING MADE THE OFFER, THEY WILL BE UNDER SOME OBLIGATION TO PROTECT OUR PERSONNEL. WE COULD NOT RESPOND AFFIRMATIVELY BECAUSE OF THE DAMAGE THAT WOULD DO TO OUR RELATIONS WITH FNLA AND UNITA. A NEGATIVE REPLY WOULD BE CAUSE FOR THE MPLA TO THROW US OUT.

10. I BELIEVE THAT THE PREFERRED COURSE OF ACTION IS TO ISSUE A STATEMENT AT INDEPENDENCE IN WHICH WE REFER TO THE REFUSAL OF THE GOVERNMENT OF PORTUGAL TO TRANSFER SOVEREIGNTY TO ANY ONE GROUP. WE SHOULD STATE THAT IN LIGHT OF THE SITUATION WE CANNOT RECOGNIZE ANY GOVERNMENT AT THIS TIME AND THAT OUR EVENTUAL POSITION WILL DEPEND UPON INTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS AND DECISIONS TAKEN AT THE REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LEVELS BY COMPETENT AUTHORITY. MEANWHILE, WE RECOGNIZE THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE STATE OF ANGOLA WITH THE SAME BOUNDARIES AS THE FORMER COLONY. IF THE DEPARTMENT IS INTERESTED IN KEEPING THE CONSULATE GENERAL OPEN, IT SHOULD SO STATE IN THE ANNOUNCEMENT. TO DO SO WOULD PUT MPLA ON THE DEFENSIVE; IF THEY THROW US OUT THEY IN EFFECT DENY THEIR PROFFERED INTENTION OF MAINTAINING RELATIONS WITH ALL NATIONS. THEY MAY BE WILLING TO TAKE UNOFFICIAL RELATIONS IN PREFERENCE TO NO RELATIONS. IF WE WISH TO CLOSE DOWN

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WE SHOULD ANNOUNCE IN OUR STATEMENT THAT BECAUSE OF THE UNCERTAIN SITUATION, THE LACK OF SECURITY AND THE DANGER TO U.S. NATIONALS, WE ARE CLOSING UNTIL SUCH TIME AS THE POLITICAL ISSUES ARE RESOLVED.

KILLORAN

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By del NARA Date 5/30/02

DEPARTMENT PASS INFO AMEMBASSY LISBON

E.O. 11652: XGDS
SUBJ: CONTINGENCY PLANNING IN ANTICIPATION OF AN MPLA TAKEOVER

1. I ASSUME THAT ONE OF THE CONTINGENCIES BEING CONSIDERED BY THE DEPARTMENT IS A SHUTDOWN OF THE CONSULATE GENERAL IN ANTICIPATION OF A UNILATERAL DECLARATION BY MPLA THAT IT IS THE LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT OF ANGOLA. FNLA AND UNITA CAN BE EXPECTED TO MAKE SIMILAR DECLARATIONS AND OUR POSITION IN LUANDA WILL BECOME UNTENABLE. SOME PORTUGUESE AUTHORITIES STILL HAVE HOPES OF BRINGING ABOUT AN AGREEMENT AMONG THE THREE LIBERATION MOVEMENTS, BUT THE PROSPECTS ARE REMOTE AND THERE IS NO HOPE OF AN AGREEMENT THAT WILL LAST MORE THAN A FEW DAYS, OR WEEKS.

2. IF WE WAIT UNTIL NOVEMBER 11 OR THEREAFTER TO CLOSE DOWN, WE MAY FIND OURSELVES WITH A NUMBER OF ADMINISTRATIVE, SECURITY AND LEGAL PROBLEMS ON OUR HANDS THAT WILL BE DIFFICULT TO RESOLVE AND WHICH MAY PLACE USG PERSONNEL IN JEOPARDY. MPLA IS INCREASING ITS PROPAGANDA ATTACKS AGAINST THE US AND ALTHOUGH MODERATES IN THE MOVEMENT MAY NOT WANT TO PROVOKE US, I SUSPECT ANY USG PERSONNEL HERE AFTER NOVEMBER 11 WILL BE SUBJECT TO HARRASSMENT, ARBITRARY ARREST AND POSSIBLY INTERNMENT. INCREASING NUMBERS OF FOREIGNERS AND PORTUGUESE ARE BEING PI-

CKED UP BY THE MPLA ON SUSPICION OF ESPIONAGE AND THE PARANOIA IS GROWING. FAR FROM PREPARING FOR AN ACCOMMODATION

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PAGE 02 LUANDA #1664 280857Z

WITH THE OTHER MOVEMENTS, MPLA IS GETTING READY FOR ALL OUT WAR--A GENERAL MOBILIZATION OF ABLE BODIED MEN HAS BEEN DECLARED AND DRAGNETS HAVE BEEN PUT OUT IN SEVERAL COMMUNITIES TO PICK UP ALL MALES OF FIGHTING AGE. IN ADDITION TO CUBAN TROOPS NOW HERE, UNCONFIRMED REPORTS ARE COMING IN OF TROOPS FROM SAO TOME, GUINEA BISSAU AND CAPE VERDE SOON TO COME TO HELP THE MPLA CAUSE.

3. IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES, IT SEEMS TO ME THAT THE ONLY PRUDENT COURSE IS TO CLOSE DOWN THE CONSULATE GENERAL PRIOR TO INDEPENDENCE AND MOVE OUT ALL USG PERSONNEL AND SENSITIVE EQUIPMENT. TO DO OTHERWISE WOULD EXPOSE EMPLOYEES TO UNACCEPTABLE HARDSHIPS AND RISKS. WE SHOULD PETAIN OUR LEASES ON THE OFFICE AND THE VARIOUS RESIDENCES IN ANTICIPATION OF A RETURN TO LUANDA AFTER A LAPSE OF SEVERAL MONTHS. I BELIEVE I CAN INDUCE ONE OR TWO LOCAL EMPLOYEES TO REMAIN IN LUANDA TO ACT AS CARETAKERS. THE QUESTION OF A PROTECTIVE POWER TO LOOK AFTER OUR INTERESTS DURING THE INTERREGNUM CAN ONLY BE RESOLVED AFTER WE FIND OUT WHICH NATIONS PLAN TO RECOGNIZE AN MPLA GOVERNMENT.

4. OUR IMMEDIATE GOAL IS SUCCESSFULLY TO COMPLETE THE US AIRLIFT. TO THIS END, I HAVE DIRECTED THAT FSO LOWELL KILDAY REMAIN IN LUANDA. MY PRINCIPAL REASON FOR SO DOING, AND WHICH I DID NOT STATE IN ANOTHER MESSAGE ON THE SUBJECT, IS THAT THE AIRLIFT OPERATIONS ARE IN CHAOS: THERE IS NO CENTRAL CONTROL; THERE IS LOW LEVEL HARASSMENT BY MPLA; A NUMBER OF PEOPLE ARE BECOMING IRKATIONAL AND I MUST HAVE A COOL HEAD LIKE KILDAY ON TOP OF EVENTS. BEAUCHAMP IS NOT UP TO THE JOB FOR A NUMBER OF REASONS, CHIEF AMONG THEM BEING A HEARING IMPEDIMENT AND NO PORTUGUESE. AT ONE POINT I DELUDED MYSELF INTO THINKING HE COULD HANDLE THE JOB, BUT I WAS WRONG. HE HAS BEEN INVOLVED IN EMBARRASSING INCIDENTS THAT WERE SET STRAIGHT ONLY BECAUSE OF THE PRESENCE OF KILDAY. I ATTACH THE GREATEST IMPORTANCE TO THE SUCCESSFUL COMPLETION OF THE AIRLIFT AND I AM CONVINCED OUR EFFORT MIGHT FALL APART WITHOUT KILDAY, WHO HAS DONE A SUPERB JOB UNDER VERY TRYING CIRCUMSTANCES.

5. IN SUM, MY IMMEDIATE GOAL IS TO SEE THE AIRLIFT THROUGH TO A SUCCESSFUL TERMINATION. ONCE THIS IS ACCOMPLISHED, WE SHOULD

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PAGE 03 LUANDA 01064 280857Z

SHUT DOWN CONSULATE AND MOVE OUT ALL USG PERSONNEL BEFORE
NOVEMBER 11, PREFERABLY ABOARD THE LAST US AIRCRAFT OUT OF HERE
ON OR ABOUT NOVEMBER 3.
KILLORAN

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET-SENSITIVE
CONTAINS CODEWORD

February 8, 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

SUBJECT:

Information Items

Boyd Continues to be More Optimistic than Torrijos: Foreign Minister Boyd's optimistic statements -- the most recent of which being a press conference on arrival in Panama Sunday -- continue to be out of step with Torrijos' repeatedly expressed pessimism regarding the Canal negotiations. This pessimism is partially a negotiating tactic, but Torrijos does appear genuinely to fear -- among other things -- that the "sudden U.S. haste" to conclude a treaty masks a plan to "put something over on him." Moreover, he probably also feels unready to make the major policy decisions (e.g., duration, compensation, neutrality and defense) necessary before a treaty can be signed. Boyd told the press that he was generally satisfied with his visit to Washington since he had had the opportunity to discuss the Canal treaty with the highest U.S. officials. The foreign minister also noted that while he must be cautious until he had reported to General Torrijos, he was "undefeatably optimistic" and that he had found a general feeling in Washington that a treaty will be concluded within the next six months.

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PRC Guidance on Sino-U.S. Relations: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Peking recently provided official guidance on Sino-U.S. relations to PRC officials overseas. The guidance reportedly emphasizes that any new initiatives on normalization, however welcome, must come from the U.S. Taiwan was identified as the key to normalization, but the U.S. must take the initiative. The guidance also noted close PRC interest in U.S.-USSR relations, gradual expansion of Sino-U.S. trade over the next two years, and a preoccupation with Chinese domestic development. The State Department comments that this guidance apparently reflects the PRC view that improving relations with the U.S. is important to the PRC, but not urgent. It also indicates that Peking is preparing to resume their criticism of detente, which had eased during the U.S. election campaign.

State Department review completed

TOP SECRET-SENSITIVE
CONTAINS CODEWORD

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CONTAINS CODEWORD

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Meanwhile, Prime Minister Huang Hua recently attacked speculation that China might agree to peaceful liberation of Taiwan as a part of a Sino-U.S. "normalization" package. The prime minister reportedly told [redacted] that Taiwan would have to be liberated sooner or later [redacted]. The U.S. Liaison Office in Peking comments that the Chinese may be smarting from U.S. media speculation that they might agree to a softer line on Taiwan. It is interesting to note, however, [redacted].

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[redacted] Huang Hua confirmed that China does not see Taiwan as a major problem in the current overall situation.

European Communists to Hold Summit in Madrid: Embassy Rome has learned that leaders of the Spanish, French and Italian Communist parties will meet in Madrid either late this month or in early March. The purpose of the meeting is allegedly to give a boost to the Spanish Communist party in its efforts to gain support and legitimacy in Spain. An Italian communist official reportedly rejected the suggestion that the summit draw up a "Charter for Eurocommunism," hinting obliquely that each national party should operate without having to refer to a central authority.

TOP SECRET-SENSITIVE
CONTAINS CODEWORD

MEMORANDUM

27

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET-SENSITIVE
CONTAINS CODEWORD

March 22, 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. BRZEZINSKI

FROM: The Situation Room

SUBJECT: Evening Notes

Resignation of Dutch Government: The government of Prime Minister Joop Den Uyl resigned today following the inability of the coalition cabinet to agree on contentious domestic legislation. An election was already scheduled for May 25 and Den Uyl probably will continue in a caretaker capacity until then. The most important consequence of today's action will be the inability of a caretaker government to take a firm position during the next three months on a number of important issues such as the AWACS, enlargement of the Almelo centrifuge project, the Rome meeting of the EC, and the London NATO summit.

NATO Discussion on Human Rights in Eastern Europe: U.S. Mission NATO reports that the North Atlantic Council and senior officials of NATO countries recently discussed East European developments focusing on the relationship between human rights considerations and broad East-West issues. Deputy Assistant Secretary Armitage gave a detailed exposition of the U.S. position on these issues which was well received by Allied representatives. In the course of the discussion, most Allied officials sounded cautionary notes about pushing the Soviets too far and too fast on human rights questions.


While there were variations of approach and emphasis, several Allies perceived a potential threshold beyond which such Western pressure might lead to Soviet reactions that could hinder further progress in detente. Most speakers, however, thought the Soviets were reconciled to a certain amount of criticism as the price of maintaining detente and agreed on the need for the West to continue to express its moral support for dissidence in the East. However, care must be exercised to avoid endangering either detente or the dissidents in the Eastern countries.

NSA, STATE reviews completed


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Soviet Interest in Latin America


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April 1977

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NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
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Exempt from General Declassification Schedule
of E.O. 11652, exemption category:
Sec. 5B(1), (2), and (3)
Automatically declassified on:
date impossible to determine

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Soviet Interest in Latin America

*Central Intelligence Agency
Directorate of Intelligence
April 1977*

Key Judgments

The Soviet Union has long been interested in increasing its influence in Latin America, but has had difficulty in formulating a successful policy for the area. Early attempts by Moscow to use the local communist parties to gain a foothold failed, in part, because the Soviets did not understand the Latin American milieu and had little expertise in Latin American affairs. Until the early 1960s they seemed to assume that because of the basic instability of the area, "socialist" revolution was inevitable once a local communist party was activated. The basic flaw was their belief that Latin America was, and is, overwhelmingly dominated by conservative forces that have been unsympathetic to Moscow. Moreover, the area did not fit the Soviet mold of revolution in less developed nations. The countries have been independent for a long time; they are culturally and politically developed; they have a rather extensive educated elite, and for the most part, they are not attracted to foreign political ideologies and have regarded the Soviet Union as a political and ideological pariah.

In recent years, however, the Soviets have had some success in the area—most dramatically, of course, in Cuba. They have made these gains by shifting their emphasis from local communist party relationships to state-to-state relations. Soviet prospects are still limited, however, by Moscow's own economic problems and its inability in most cases to provide the Latins with any civilian technology they do not already have. Soviet successes have been partly the result of growing expertise in Latin American affairs and a relative decline of US influence in the area. Other factors have been the latent anti-US nationalism present in Latin America, the Soviet Union's emergence as a global power with observable economic, military, and political clout, and the survival of Castro's Cuba with Soviet assistance.

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There now seems little doubt that the Soviet presence in Latin America will increase in the future, especially as East-West tensions relax. The Soviets are now beginning to view the area not as a region within the US sphere of influence, but as an arena for US-Soviet competition. Although Latin America certainly is not on the "front burner" of Moscow's priorities, the Soviets are not likely to ignore any opportunity to erode the economic and political power of the US. The Latin Americans' grudging appraisal that they have been overly dependent on the US for political, economic, and military assistance and should now seek alternative friends, suppliers, and markets is made to order for Soviet exploitation.

The current economic recession in the West, the increasing effort by many Latin nations to use their raw materials as an economic lever against the US, and the current impasse between Washington and much of Latin America over the human rights issue can only encourage Moscow. As long as the Soviets continue their low-key approach to the region, as long as they are willing to cut their losses during periodic reversals such as in Chile, and as long as the US fails to stabilize its own relationship with the Latins, Moscow will be able to make inroads on the still-preponderant US influence in the area.

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Soviet Interest in Latin America

Following the revolution of 1917, the Soviets had little time to give much thought to Latin America. Unlike the West European powers and the US, the USSR had no political, economic, or cultural ties with the area. Peruvian political leader Haya de la Torre, who visited Moscow in 1924 and talked with the new Soviet leaders, was struck by how little they knew about Latin American social conditions. Other Latin American visitors to Moscow came away with similar impressions. Lenin himself had some knowledge of Mexico, but was more interested in the country as a source of potential opposition to US imperialism than in the local politics.

The Soviet Union's first diplomatic incursion into Latin America came in 1924, when it established relations with Mexico. Almost immediately, however, the Mexican government was faced with heavy-handed and crude subversive tactics, and six years later diplomatic relations were severed.

In South America, the Soviets made their greatest headway in Argentina and Uruguay. The first Latin affiliate with the Communist International was the Argentine party. In 1926, Uruguay recognized the USSR, and in the following year, the Argentines allowed the Soviets to set up a trade agency in Buenos Aires. Because of the agency's subversive activities, however, the Argentines closed it in 1931.

During the 1920s, the Soviets were unable to win over any prestigious or popular Latin American political leaders to their cause. In 1931, however, Luis Carlos Prestes, a Brazilian involved in the "Tenentes Movement" was invited to Moscow to be groomed for leadership of the Brazilian Communist Party. Prestes' success in attracting a following was shortlived, and in 1936 he was arrested after being involved in a mutiny of army units. As a result of the uprising, Uruguay—under Brazilian pressure—broke relations with Moscow and protested Soviet attempts to foment revolution in Latin America.

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World War II

The heroic image of the Soviet people during the war and Moscow's alliance with the Western democracies created a favorable climate for the renewal of relations between the USSR and Latin America. Between 1942 and 1945, 13 Latin American countries established relations with the USSR (mainly because the US encouraged them to do so). Communist parties were formed in each of the 20 Latin American republics. In addition, Communist-front organizations, such as the World Federation of Trade Unions, the International Federation of Democratic Women, the World Federation of Democratic Youth, the International Union of Students, the International Association of Democratic Jurists, the World Peace Council, and the World Federation of Teachers Unions, became active in the hemisphere.

None of the parties or front organizations was successful in rallying Latin Americans to communism; yet they did serve to mold public opinion and open channels of communication for the Soviets. By the end of 1946, the USSR was formally recognized by 15 Latin American nations and appeared to have gained respectability in the area.

The Cold War

The advent of the Cold War in 1947 ushered in yet another era in Soviet-Latin American relations and reversed the good feelings established during World War II. Brazil and Chile broke relations with Moscow in October 1947, citing interference in local affairs. Ecuador subsequently denied that it had ever established relations. Colombia severed ties in May 1948 following communist-inspired riots in Bogota. In June, Costa Rica and the Dominican Republic followed suit. In 1952, one month after Batista came to power, Cuba severed ties. Havana's action was followed by Venezuela under Perez Jimenez. Guatemala broke relations in 1954 shortly after the overthrow of the communist-dominated Arbenz regime, and Bolivia severed its relations the following year.

The 1960s

The late 1950s and early 1960s marked another turnabout in Soviet-Latin American relations. The major breakthrough was the establishment of relations with Castro's Cuba in 1960. Other factors contributing to the resurgence of the USSR were the Soviets' obvious military and economic power and their potential for increased trade with the region. The campaign to increase cultural ties between the two areas also began to meet with some success, and many Latins, even though they did not approve of the Soviet government, came to admire Russian accomplishments in technology and the arts. Gone from the scene, moreover, were most of the crude Soviet tactics of the 1920s and 1930s. Soviet representatives now appeared to be genuinely interested in state-to-state contacts as well as in Latin American culture, economics, and politics.

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Current Soviet Strategy and Activity in Latin America

During the post-Stalin era, the Soviets have tried to carve a niche for themselves—diplomatically, economically, and culturally—in the Third World. In 1961, Khrushchev outlined this policy and made particular reference to the Third World for waging the key battle against colonialism and imperialism.

At the 24th Party Congress of 1971, which is best remembered for its approval of the larger concept of detente with the West, Premier Kosygin announced, "In the coming five-year period, the further expansion of the USSR's foreign economic ties with the developing countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America is planned." These ties were to be established on the basis of a state-to-state relationship. The conspiratorial approach that had dominated Soviet policy in the early days was largely abandoned. Although the Soviets keep in close touch with the local communist parties, there have been few examples in recent years where this contact has been illegal or has been subject to criticism from the local government.

Political Objectives

The Soviets' long-range political objectives in Latin America, as cited by Soviet leaders, were to be attained by continued utilization of the local communist parties, state-to-state relations, and proselytization among university students, labor unions, and cultural organizations. For a period in the 1960s Moscow also viewed the rural peasantry as a revolutionary social force. The Soviets pointed to Cuba as an example of how the destruction of agrarian capitalism by rural-based insurgents can lead to the rise of the peasantry. Moscow concluded that far-reaching and democratic agrarian reform in Latin America was an inseparable part of the antifeudal and anti-imperialist revolution.

Moscow's propaganda support for rural guerrillas, however, was not the same strategy as Castro's, which featured monetary assistance and active participation—actions that severely complicated relations between the Latin American and Soviet governments. The Soviets, nonetheless, certainly would have been happy with a Cuban-supported guerrilla victory. But the crushing of insurgent activity in Bolivia in 1967, coupled with failures in Venezuela, Colombia, Guatemala, and Peru, dampened the USSR's belief in the rural strategy.

The propensity of the Cubans to support the most radical elements rather than the local communist parties, in fact, led to a continuing dispute between the Soviets and the Cubans over what strategy should be utilized in Latin America to bring about "liberation"—Cuba's active support for revolutionary movements or the USSR's utilization of the local communist party as well as state-to-state relations. Only in recent years has this argument been resolved in favor of the Soviets. Moscow is still hopeful that some "progressive" leader will emerge from the governing elite—perhaps a military officer—who will be able to rally both the urban proletariat and the rural peasantry.

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This hope notwithstanding, Soviet policy has been pragmatic enough to cover all possibilities. Essentially, the Soviets will give at least moral support to any group or class, acceptable to Moscow, demanding liberation or at least improved living conditions, and will espouse the cause of any nation claiming to be a victim of imperialism. The current situation in Latin America, characterized by underdeveloped, stagnating agrarian, or semi-industrialized economies, presents an opportunity for possible Soviet exploitation. Many Latin American countries—especially in the Caribbean—so badly need economic assistance that they are beginning to look for help anywhere and everywhere.

The situation in Chile under Allende seemed a Soviet dream come true. In Moscow's view, however, the Chilean regime never was well enough entrenched to prevent the moderates and the right wing from returning to power. When the coup finally occurred, the Soviets were unwilling and unable to intervene to protect their friends. While many Latin American communists undoubtedly were disheartened by Moscow's failure to act decisively, noncommunist leaders apparently were gratified by the Soviets' restraint. One outcome of the Chilean affair has been that many Latins are more willing than before to accept the Soviets as a responsible source of support against US economic or political sanctions. Moreover, since Allende's overthrow, Moscow has identified Peru as a substitute "progressive" nation and has been lavishing attention on the military leadership there.

There is, of course, a coincidence between the Latin American desire to reduce their dependence on the US and the Soviet desire to reduce the US presence and influence in the hemisphere. Moscow has been heartened in this regard by the lifting of OAS sanctions against Cuba, its own increasing diplomatic relations with Latin America,* and Latin support for some of the Soviet line at international forums.

The successful transformation of Cuba into a Soviet client has also been a gain for Moscow. It demonstrated that the Monroe Doctrine—preventing extrahemispheric interference in Latin America—is a dead issue. In the Cuba-USSR relationship, although Havana is not necessarily a surrogate for Soviet policies in the hemisphere or the rest of the world, there are obviously times when there are coincidences in ambitions and policies. From the viewpoint of the political support the Cubans can provide the Soviets in Third World—especially Latin American—forums, Moscow's investment in Havana has been paying off.

* The Soviets now have relations with 14 Latin American countries: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Ecuador, Guyana, Jamaica, Mexico, Peru, Surinam, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, and Venezuela.

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Economic Objectives

Soviet economic relations with Latin America have expanded markedly in recent years. Mutual commercial exchanges still are not a significant portion of the overall trade of the USSR or of Latin America's global trade. The Soviet market, however, has become important for some major countries—the USSR, for example, was Argentina's largest importer in 1975 and is currently Brazil's fifth largest market. Between 1969 and 1976, Soviet economic credits extended to the area, exclusive of Cuba, rose from \$140 million to over \$500 million. This upsurge reflected a Soviet desire to expand exports in the face of burgeoning deficits within the area. Latin American drawings on these credits to the end of 1976, however, amounted to less than \$142 million because of the private sector's unwillingness to make purchases from the USSR. Although Soviet deficits have continued to grow—the deficit in 1975 approached \$900 million—trade continues to dominate Soviet relations with Latin America.

The Soviets also have signed a number of technical and scientific agreements with various Latin American countries. Mexico has signed contracts with the Soviet-dominated Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CEMA) for cooperation in agriculture, industrial technology, and science, and Jamaica and Guyana are seeking observer status in the organization. While Soviet economic trade and aid is minuscule in comparison with Moscow's total effort in the less developed countries, there is a pronounced tendency among the Latin American nations to diversify their trade and economic relations. A continuation of this tendency, as well as the growing Latin receptivity to Soviet purchases, will ultimately lead to increases in Soviet commercial activity in the area.

Military Objectives

Moscow has long called for the independence of the Latin American armed forces from US influence and armaments. The Soviets see the Pentagon's influence as all-pervasive in the various Latin American military establishments. Moscow views the current squabble between the US and the Latin American military over the human rights issue and the renunciation by many of the Latin countries of US military assistance programs as an exploitable situation. The Soviet press in recent weeks, in fact, has played up the "worsening relationship" between the US and the Latin militaries.

In the meantime, the Soviets have been offering themselves as an alternative weapons supplier. A few Latin American military delegations have traveled to Moscow to inspect military equipment. Peru, however, has been the only Latin American country to buy Soviet hardware. Its purchases include SU-22 fighter-bombers, MI-8 helicopters, T-55 medium tanks, and antiaircraft artillery as well as SA-3 and SA-7 surface-to-air missiles. Moscow also has 35 military advisers in Peru assisting in training and maintenance of the Soviet equipment.


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The USSR has recently offered to sell military equipment to Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, and Venezuela. Ecuador is also reportedly interested in purchasing Soviet interceptors, but military leaders in Quito are hopeful that the threat of another Soviet arms client in Latin America will force Washington to come up with an arms deal. It is likely that most of the Latin nations will continue to look to France, West Germany, the United Kingdom, and Israel as the major weapons suppliers. Many Latin American countries may be enticed by Moscow's attractive arms offers, but few will probably actually sign any military contracts.

From the Soviet viewpoint, the most important aspect of their military equipment sales to Latin America is the incursion into the previously exclusive Western market. Soviet technicians and advisers may introduce some political leverage. In the case of Peru, however, their presence so far has not led to substantial political gains. In fact, last year Lima became more moderate even as Soviet military assistance increased.




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Cultural Objectives

Soviet cultural exchanges with Latin America are designed to win sympathy and friends and to prove, as Lenin once said, that "the Bolsheviks are not such terrible barbarians as they are supposed to be." The Soviets have repeatedly claimed that US culture has been designed for the privileged minority, whereas theirs is universal and popular. Student exchanges are one way to lessen Latin fear and distrust. The long-range effectiveness of the cultural exchange program cannot be determined, but an improving political, economic, and cultural atmosphere will certainly increase Soviet acceptance in the area.

Organizational Presence in Latin America

The Soviet diplomatic presence in Latin America is organized along lines similar to that of the US. Each embassy contains a political and economic section. There are press people, trade and aid personnel, and consular officers. Of the approximately 500 Soviets residing in Latin America, excluding Cuba the best estimate is that about 20 percent are intelligence officers.  Presumably, these people handle the liaison activities with the local communist party.

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Soviet Diplomatic Presence in Latin America

	Total	Trade Mission	KGB ¹ (known or suspect)	GRU ² (known or suspect)
Argentina	51			
Bolivia	34 (plus about 150 technical aid personnel)			
Brazil	70 (plus about 22 technical aid personnel)			
Chile	3 (UN/ECLA)			
Colombia	40			
Costa Rica	27			
Ecuador	38			
Guyana	16			
Mexico	75 (plus about 15 technical aid personnel)			
Panama	8 (no official representation: 2 Tass representatives and 6 cultural exchange people)			
Peru	112 plus 35 military advisers			
Trinidad	1 (lives in Caracas)			
Uruguay	38			
Venezuela	17			

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¹ Committee for State Security.

²The military's Main Intelligence Directorate

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The Latin View

Historically, the Soviet Union has been regarded as a kind of pariah by most Latin Americans. The Luso-Hispanic world has little in common with Russia. Early Soviet attempts to subvert a number of Latin governments reinforced this image. The world situation has changed, however, and many governments that are interested in finding new sources of credits and technology, as well as new markets, have overcome their deep-rooted fear and repugnance of communism. The Argentines, for example, do not link the guerrillas operating in their country with the pro-Soviet communists as they might have in the past. (Indeed, they are not associated.) The military government says that it is willing to have diplomatic relations and trade with everyone, regardless of political ideology.

Unquestionably, detente has also added to Soviet respectability. The Latin American argument is that if the US can have cordial relations with Moscow, then surely they can follow suit. In addition, the military and economic development of the Soviet Union is admired by many Latins and viewed as a potential counterweight to US influence.

One cannot underestimate the role of Cuba in this equation. Latin American nationalism, of course, was present before Fidel Castro appeared on the scene. The Cuban leader did prove, however, that it was possible to thumb one's nose at Washington and still have an alternative source of economic and military assistance. This picture has appealed particularly to several other nations in the Caribbean. Conversely, the enormous cost of economic assistance to Cuba may have sobered Soviet pretensions to aid other Latin American countries trying to disassociate from the US. (The Soviets frequently cautioned Allende, in fact, against cutting himself off economically from the West.) Cuba still remains, however, as a symbol of Soviet support against "US imperialism." As Latin American countries increase trade and diplomatic relations with Cuba, the standing of the Soviet Union in the area will inevitably be enhanced.

This does not mean that economic and political relations between the USSR and Latin America have been completely friendly and smooth. There is continuing suspicion among the Latin American nations of Soviet intentions. Most of the governments maintain a tight watch on Soviet diplomats, and any suggestion of interference in domestic matters is quickly rebuffed. In their commercial relations with Latin America, despite the prospect of lucrative terms, the Soviets have been hampered by a lingering reputation for exporting overpriced and inferior goods.

The overriding factor in all aspects of Latin-Soviet relations has been the appeal of the USSR as an alternative economic partner and military supplier to the US. The Latins are becoming more receptive to Soviet aid offers because of their balance-of-payments difficulties. The Soviets, in turn, have encouraged sales by concentrating their efforts on areas of high priority such as energy—they have been promoting low-cost funding for hydroelectric projects in Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, and Guyana.

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As for military equipment sales, even though the utilization of Soviet equipment would probably pose logistic and technical problems, many Latin countries may find Soviet military aid offers difficult to turn down in the future. The US Government's refusal to sell certain military equipment to the Latins has been an important factor, but the most significant problem has been the US stance on the human rights issue. Brazil, El Salvador, Guatemala, Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay have already rejected further US military assistance in protest of Washington's "interference in internal affairs." Their desire for new military equipment will lead them to buy from someone, and attractive Soviet offers may generate sales.

In the political sphere, many Latins are probably appreciative of the Soviets' pro-Third World stance at international forums on many issues of the north-south dialogue. Again, as in the economic and military cases, the USSR is being used by the Latins to balance off the US. The Latin reaction to the human rights issue is also important politically because many nations of the area—especially those in the southern cone—already felt neglected by Washington. This issue will increase their sense of isolation from and irritation with the US. The USSR could be the final beneficiary.

Soviet Prospects in Latin America

The Latin American world, with the major exception in Cuba, has not been very susceptible to Soviet overtures over the past 50 years. The people have been less receptive to propaganda than Soviet leaders expected, and the major social movements of the area have been national rather than international. In the Soviet view, however, economic "contradictions" in the industrially developed nations inevitably lead to "contradictions" between them and the less developed states. Moscow, therefore, expects an ultimate intensification in the anti-imperialist national liberation struggle throughout the Third World, including Latin America.

The Soviets appear to be undecided on how to go about exploiting the opportunities presented by this economic crisis. In the past, they have worked through the various local communist parties; they have provided moral support to rural guerrillas; they have increased state-to-state relations; and they are now trying to establish military equipment liaisons with the various Latin American military establishments. Moscow's constant objective in all this is the erosion of US economic and political influence.

Despite its occasional setbacks, Moscow seems to believe that Latin America's economic and political nationalism—particularly its anti-US aspects—will persist and deepen. The Soviets hope that as this occurs their own trade and diplomatic relations with Latin America will continue to grow and that the USSR will become a significant economic force in the area. This economic involvement will do away once and for all with the pariah image, which more than anything else has isolated the Soviets from the hemisphere.

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In the final analysis, the key factor governing the extent of the Soviet-Latin American relationship is the US. The Soviet Union still cannot influence Latin American affairs as much as it can exploit economic and political conditions and US policies. So long as the US fails to develop a consistent and acceptable policy for the region, political opportunism and tactical flexibility will work to Moscow's advantage and further erode US influence.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
 Directorate of Intelligence
 1 April 1977

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUMDISSIDENT ACTIVITY IN EAST EUROPE: AN OVERVIEW

To those who think history unfolds in cyclical patterns, the recent events in Eastern Europe have an ineluctable logic. Twenty years ago or so it was the street upheavals in East Germany, the Poznan riots in Poland, and the Hungarian revolution. A decade later it was the "Prague Spring" and then the food riots in Polish coastal cities. And now, there is again very serious trouble in Poland and a recrudescence of unrest and dissident activity in Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Yugoslavia and, to a lesser extent, Hungary and Romania.

The underlying causes remain essentially unchanged:

- All of the regimes in Eastern Europe are, to varying degrees, repressive and do not command the loyalty of their people.
- The geopolitical ties to the USSR are at war with strong nationalist sentiment and the emotional and cultural pull of the West.
- The economic performance of the regimes is deficient.

But there are new elements contributing to the current problems in Eastern Europe. Foremost among them is the USSR's detente policy. It has:

- Promoted and therefore made legitimate the idea of increased interchanges with the West.

This paper was prepared by the Office of Regional and Political Analysis of the CIA.

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- Resulted in a series of agreements, notably those involving increased contacts between the two Germanies and the Helsinki accord that reduced the isolation of the East European people (particularly its elites) and raised expectations of more to come.
- Fostered an atmosphere that has made it more difficult for the regimes to deal with their internal control problems in authoritarian ways abhorrent to Western sensibilities.
- Increased Moscow's stake in order, stability, and quietude in Eastern Europe even while it increased pressures from the West that tend to be destabilizing.

The flowering of Eurocommunism in Western Europe is another new and troublesome problem for the East European regimes and Moscow--not only because its leading proponents have given verbal aid and comfort to East European and Soviet dissidents but, more important, because it has appeal within the ruling parties in Eastern Europe.

The Soviets and East Europeans must also be concerned that President Carter's statements on human rights and particularly his exchange of letters with Soviet dissident spokesman Andrey Sakharov, give evidence of a new policy that is designed to cause trouble for the USSR in its own backyard. Even if the Soviets believe that is not Washington's intention, they will be worried that the effect will be the same. Moscow's misgivings in this regard will be in proportion to its concerns about the degree of unrest in Eastern Europe. Given the history of the postwar period, Moscow may well have a bias toward alarm. But in view of the prevailing situation in Poland, even an outside observer would conclude that Moscow has cause for concern.

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The Dissidence: Where Things Stand

Poland --The situation in Poland is by far the most volatile in Eastern Europe. A major blow-up could come at any time. The popular mood has remained tense and sullen since the outbreak of workers' unrest last summer, although the regime has taken steps to dissipate the discontent. Dissatisfaction is rooted in economic problems that the regime cannot solve nor significantly ameliorate any time soon. Moreover, the dissatisfaction of the Polish people extends beyond the economic and into fundamental questions regarding the competence and legitimacy of the entire system and its leaders. Under these circumstances, Poland's professional intellectuals and dissidents have a good deal to work with. They established a Workers Defense League, raised funds for the families of workers jailed after the June rioting, and are now calling for an amnesty and an investigation of police abuses. Not surprisingly, while the Polish dissidents have given some verbal support to the Czechoslovak Chartists, they have been preoccupied with their own problems and opportunities in Poland.

The authorities who beat a hasty retreat before the workers' wrath last summer have, since last fall, handled the intellectuals with kid gloves. The leadership is acutely aware that they face a volatile situation and that a direct confrontation, with the potential creation of martyrs, must be avoided. The regime is trying to prevent the growth of cooperation between the workers and the dissident groups, and Gierak has released some workers and promised an amnesty for others, even while he has refused to undertake the investigation the Workers Defense League hopes will provide a focus for more fundamental criticism.

East Germany --The problem in East Germany is somewhat analogous to that in Poland in that it also involves popular unrest. It is different in that disquiet has not manifested itself in violence or overt acts of hostility to the regime. The temper in East Germany seems to be less churlish than in Poland and far less volatile. There is no evidence that any of the dissident groups are united.

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The Honecker regime is greatly concerned about the attraction of the West, particularly West Germany, for the East German population. Three out of every four East German homes receive, and presumably watch, West German television. Millions of travelers from the West enter East Germany every year. Against this kind of "subversion," Honecker's attempts to create an East German nationalism have faltered, and the regime's classical means of control seem almost irrelevant.

The Helsinki accords have made life ever more difficult for the East German regime. Acting under its provisions, large numbers--perhaps tens of thousands--of East Germans have applied for exit visas to emigrate to the West. The regime is taking steps to discourage such applications, and it is doubtful that it will allow many East Germans to emigrate no matter what the pressures from the West. No one knows the degree of skepticism or cynicism with which such applications are made, but disillusionment and resentment toward the regime could prove to be a problem.

We have seen some signs of increased restiveness among workers manifest in complaints about working conditions, wages, and hours. It is hard to tell how serious this is. So far, we see little evidence that the regime feels itself under great pressure from the workers. A worsening of the economic situation could lead to unification of the various groups dissatisfied with the regime's policies.

Last fall, the regime had some trouble with clergy in the Lutheran church and with a few outspoken dissident intellectuals. The latter have not been overtly sympathetic with the Czechoslovak Chartists, nor have they brought organized sustained pressure on Honecker. The regime's carrot-and-stick tactics have been relatively successful in keeping things quiet within the intellectual community.

--The Czechoslovaks have taken center stage among East European dissident intellectuals by their direct challenge to regime practices regarding civil rights, as outlined in "Charter 77," a manifesto which was prepared early last fall but not propounded until January. The Chartists--a mix of

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well-known oppositionists who were active in the political arena during the "Prague Spring" and a surprisingly large number (more than 600) of other intellectuals and technocrats--clearly have the authorities worried. One Czech diplomat abroad has reported that nervous colleagues have been watching what the Chartists say, particularly on ideological questions, since they went public. One reason the regime is concerned is that the Chartists represent, in a figurative sense, the plight of a vastly larger number of people (perhaps as many as half a million), who were purged after 1968 and whose political and other rights remain severely circumscribed. As apostles of the aborted effort to give socialism a "human face," many of the Chartists consider themselves forerunners of the Eurocommunism of the 1970s. The government has harrassed the Chartists and has arrested several, but has not initiated a thoroughgoing crackdown. One of the Chartists' leading spokesmen, Jan Patocka, died shortly after interrogation last month (he was not physically abused), but his funeral took place without incident, and as far as we know there was no popular reaction to his death.


Romania --The small number of Romanian dissidents have been deeply divided by personal feuds and different goals, but some common ground has been found in Charter 77. The dissidents consist mainly of unknown artists and intellectuals who do not command national prestige. Novelist Paul Goma's "open letter" in support of the Chartists and a Romanian version of the Czech manifesto are the only recent evidence of vitality. The dissident's letter strongly criticized party leader Ceausescu's personal role and his authoritarianism. In Romania, they make clear, the problem is not the Soviets, but Ceausescu himself. This personal attack may account for Ceausescu's vitriolic speech blasting the dissidents, but the Romanian leader did not follow up with harsher measures. On the contrary, Goma was allowed to see the party number-one man on cultural affairs, and there were even suggestions that some of Goma's work might be published. Goma has not backed off and joined by a hundred-odd known sympathizers who signed his manifesto, he continues his struggle.

Hungary --Dissidence in Hungary has elicited no signs of serious concern from the regime. A small number of intellectuals have

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publicly supported the Chartists, but thus far they have not criticized conditions in Hungary. Ironically, while party leader Kadar's soft line has been successful at home, it has caused him some troubles with colleagues in Eastern Europe and perhaps the USSR as well. He is in a strong position as long as the Hungarian dissidents behave themselves and Hungary continues to be one of the quieter countries in Eastern Europe.

Bulgaria --There is little active dissent in Bulgaria, still Moscow's most dependable and ideologically conformist ally. Some passive resistance and unhappiness with living standards is evidenced by occasional work slowdowns and a widespread apathy, but this is nothing new. The aged top leadership will inevitably need to be replaced before long, and this might provide a new climate that would stimulate dissent.

Yugoslavia --Opposition to the political establishment in Yugoslavia is unorganized, and factionalized, but is nevertheless worrisome to the Tito regime. Evidence of dissatisfaction, and the employment of harsh measures to suppress it, would bring into the open the regime's repressive character and make it more difficult for the leadership to argue that Yugoslavia is qualitatively "different" from other communist states. The regime's attitude toward dissent is colored by its abiding concern regarding the nationalities problem; all dissent is seen as potentially destabilizing.

Although such well-known personalities as Milovan Djilas and Mihajlo Mihajlov have long spoken out against government policies and communist practices, the intellectuals and students now criticizing passport policies and supporting the Chartists are not known to the general public.

The government has responded cautiously to dissident accusations that it is ignoring the human rights provisions of Helsinki. But it quickly expelled three West Germans who tried to publicize the issue in February, and is making strenuous behind-the-scenes efforts to keep dissent under wraps. The regime is also showing the stick to Yugoslav protesters. Two signers of the petition on passport policy have reportedly lost their jobs, and more punitive actions may be taken. The Constitutional Court rejected their appeal on 24 March. Belgrade's immediate concern is to limit adverse

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international publicity, as this would seriously embarrass the regime in view of Yugoslavia's role as host of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) review meetings.* It has circulated the word that it may pardon some well known dissenters such as Mihailov before the meeting as a gesture of Yugoslavia's good intentions on the human rights front.

The Dissidents


There have always been individuals in Eastern Europe, even in quiet times, who have called themselves or have been called "dissidents," and have come forward to criticize the existing socio-political order. In recent months nascent dissident organizations in two countries of Eastern Europe, Poland and Czechoslovakia, have come into the open. The Workers Defense League in Poland, by the very act of adopting a name, has sent a signal that it aspires to, if it is not in fact, a corporate organization. The Charter 77 group in Czechoslovakia has not been quite so adventuresome; indeed, because organizing or joining political groups is illegal, the Chartists have denied that they constitute a political organization. How close the League and Charter 77 have the attributes of real organization--active membership, coherent structure, recognized leadership and thought-out programs, strategies, and tactics--we do not know. Elsewhere in Eastern Europe the dissidents tend to be small, loosely organized groups of dissatisfied persons, whose political philosophy in many cases comes close to social democracy, but who frequently have varying views, interests, and objectives.

By and large, the leading figures and spokesmen for the dissidents are individuals who have had a history of fighting for increased freedoms. No new charismatic figure has emerged. But a large number of new people who have not previously been identified as dissidents have signed letters and petitions in

*It was agreed at Helsinki in August 1975 that the 35 participating nations would meet in two years to review implementation of the act's provisions. A preparatory meeting of experts is scheduled to be held on June 15 in Belgrade to decide on the dates and agenda for the main follow-up meeting, at, or below, the foreign minister level, which also is to be held in Belgrade this fall--possibly starting in early October and lasting up to three months.

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Czechoslovakia and Poland. The emergence of such people must be of concern to the regimes. One danger in instituting a harsh crackdown on the petition signers is that these new people who have come forward will be turned into hard-core activists.

There is evidence of some contacts among East European dissidents, but it is doubtful that there has been much consultation or coordination of tactics. Not surprisingly, the dissidents are not only preoccupied with their own problems, but also must be aware of their limited power to influence political developments elsewhere in Eastern Europe. More important are the practical difficulties that stand in the way of a coordinated effort.

Still, there is no question that, despite the problems of communication and the like imposed by operating in closed societies, a dissident movement now exists in Eastern Europe. It finds expression in the open support given to the Czechoslovak Chartists by dissident groups in several East European states. The East European dissidents have also learned from one another, and particularly from their Soviet counterparts. The Soviet dissidents have led the way in showing how the Western media, especially under the conditions of detente, can be used to embarrass the regime and to promote the activities, and even well-being, of the dissidents. More than that, Sakharov and others have shown that it is possible to speak out and be heard and still survive.

The Soviet dissidents, for their part, have gone on record that they share a common cause with like-minded individuals in Eastern Europe. Sakharov, for example, recently noted that his efforts "are part of a struggle throughout the world, a struggle that seems especially important at this moment when in Czechoslovakia, Poland, and other countries of Eastern Europe the movement is reaching a new level." A statement signed by 62 Soviet dissidents, released in early March, specifically expressed support for the Chartists, and the so-called Helsinki monitoring group in the USSR has also praised the efforts of the East European dissidents.

The impact of such statements is to buttress the concept of a common cause among the dissidents and to encourage them

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Coordination Between East European Dissidents	Soviet Role	Dissident Strategy	Regime Labelling of Dissent as Inspired by Western Forces Impact of US Policy on Human Rights	CSCE as Potential for Dissident Activity The "Other" Factors, Including Economic Conditions	Leadership Unity	Belgrade Review Conference	Support from West European Communists, Other Outsiders
No evidence that Romanian dissidents coordinate activities with other East European dissidents. Aside from discussions in Warsaw Pact framework, no evidence that subgroups discussing matters bilaterally with other East European governments.	Moscow may not be completely unhappy over Party leader Ceausescu's dismissal problems as long as it does not get out of hand. Soviets advise on many subjects but it is seldom followed. No evidence that Soviets are concerned over internal developments in Romania.	No strategy as such. CSCE provides regime of creating civil liberties and disorganizing commitments to human rights provided for in Constitution and international agreements.	Remains controversial becoming more evident in maintaining that Belgrade CSCE meeting and Soviet East European regime for holding human rights. Regime is not likely to support from West European governments.	CSCE is not viewed as CSCE and Charter 77. CSCE is not viewed as CSCE and Charter 77. CSCE is not viewed as CSCE and Charter 77. CSCE is not viewed as CSCE and Charter 77.	Current doctrine. Assumes there is little open disagreement with Ceausescu's policy.	Eager that Belgrade meetings be held in order to push through concrete measures which would, in effect, leave Ceausescu in security against Moscow. Regime view is maintaining the Belgrade and other East European regimes by spreading human rights. Warned that regime will be "torn" with reparative break because of its poor record on family reunification, emigration, etc.	N.A.
N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	Support Soviet line on CSCE and Belgrade meetings fully.	N.A.
No evidence of coordination with other East European dissidents. Individuals like Diba and Majoran are receiving support from East European governments. Disruption to government coordination on question neutral, but exchange of views possible during recent state visits.	Probably a general discussion of problems with Soviet.	Group of 50 focused on narrow range of rights issues. Group of 10 individuals have signed letter of support for Charter 77. Regime press coverage doesn't provide desired impact on policy. Regime can readily stimulate more such coverage. Individuals, such as Diba, make sweeping condemnations of regime but impact at home has not been great.	Written support has shifted to regime of Yeltsin. Regime has indicated as "aid-donors" in Western interference. Trend of propaganda response is to countercharge on human rights in West and question Western motives. Dissident releases of "false alarms" and "fabrications" in Western press now predominating over earlier Soviet criticism of destruction in Warsaw Pact countries.	Dissident movement linked in CSCE; also plays a role in development of top levels on domestic politics. Economic play no role; economic performance is, in fact, improving a little. Nationality issues of concern and always prospect of trouble arising from this area.	Clear division in leadership over degree of repression. Current legislation must be seen in framework of overall Yugoslav policy on matter of authoritarianism.	Belgrade, as yet, has not made in testing efforts take place. Should they break down, and dissent suffer, Soviets would be less inclined to deal benevolently with Yugoslavs.	Clearly puts pressure on regime and shows no records of dissent.
No evidence of coordination with other East European dissidents. Polish problems discussed in Warsaw Pact framework. Probably try to hold coordination to a minimum as they are inclined toward dissent and want to sidestep pressure.	Moscow generally concerned about "Polish problem" but no indication evidence in strong pressure. Note advice Soviet dissidents and may be encouraged by their escape.	Verbal reports that regime is not happy (i.e., release of imprisoned workers, etc.) but they are not to challenge the regime on the grounds that legality is violated. There is not a concrete threat of dissent strategies.	Claims that dissidents are only a small group of long-time, anti-regime and anti-socially "aid-donors" forces in the West, mainly Polish regime and RFE. The US position on human rights probably has not had much impact, at least so far.	CSCE is not viewed as CSCE and Charter 77. CSCE is not viewed as CSCE and Charter 77. CSCE is not viewed as CSCE and Charter 77.	No real evidence; leadership is too fragmented that it seems poor. Most leaders are not united and are estranged by dissidents as they draw attention from dealing with economic problems. Goal is to prevent growth of rapprochement between workers and leadership.	Want to avoid embarrasment and any damage to doctrine which might affect economic relations with the West. In event of breakdown they would be constrained to follow Soviet lead.	N.A.
Little evidence of coordination with other East European dissidents. Regime's actions coordinated most closely with Moscow, although other East European States have not indicated intention to coordinate.	Prague has traditionally kept Moscow fully informed and backed Soviet "action" toward Soviet dissidents. Regime has been noted Czechoslovakia to some extent. Soviets probably have signs of tougher attitude in Moscow will inhibit dissent in Czechoslovakia.	Dissident professional groups with regime that could lead to some relaxation of treatment they have received since 1968.	Prague certainly sees a large Western head behind Charter 77 from the beginning and has reacted strongly in US statements. It must be clear that the US will not give them. Dissidents may be ambivalent about ability of US support and hope Washington the human rights issue to bilateral issues.	CSCE is not viewed as CSCE and Charter 77. CSCE is not viewed as CSCE and Charter 77. CSCE is not viewed as CSCE and Charter 77.	Hardliners would undoubtedly prefer a crackdown but apparently are not in touch by Soviet. Differences within the leadership more than likely would be bridged by Moscow and what it wants.	A crackdown is possible as it would reduce dissent, and in the region's view, possibly allow dissent to fade somewhat from Western mentions before Belgrade.	Western media, especially RFE, are made link between different areas of national dissidents. The dissidents have tried to pressure the leadership by publicizing their views to the West. Dissidents may see support of the East European media as more important than that of US.
N.A.	Some reports that the Soviets criticized Belgrade for not refusing those who supported the Charter and to pressure Hungary to take a harder attitude.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	No meaningful dissent appears. Therefore not a policy problem for leadership.	Would follow the Soviet lead, but would see a coordination as a setback in dissent and Hungarian efforts to normalize relations with US.	N.A.
No evidence of any coordination between dissidents. No evidence of inter-governmental coordination, aside from Warsaw Pact consultations, but security matters so dense discussed during recent state visits.	The Soviets are presumably concerned about Western influence on GDR population. Regime leaders, dissidents to frequent contact with Berlin as GDR dissidents. If GDR cannot resolve matter of Western contacts, Soviets may pressure it to take stronger measures.	Dissidents involved in all rights have no challenge. Regime is not likely to challenge the regime on the grounds that legality is violated. There is not a concrete threat of dissent strategies.	GDR most susceptible to influence from "Western forces", availability of RFE media and contacts enable regime to minimize that such forces responsible. So far somewhat contact in Prague and US dissidents but has not had much impact. GDR is not likely to challenge the regime on the grounds that legality is violated. There is not a concrete threat of dissent strategies.	Many incidents showing dissent have occurred in past six months. CSCE has had a major role in work of GDR dissidents, especially in the East German issue. Economic conditions are still basis for further discontent but not now serious. Could provide a rallying point for many of the, in date, unemployed dissident groups. GDR is not likely to challenge the regime on the grounds that legality is violated. There is not a concrete threat of dissent strategies.	No hard evidence but regime not totally united on how to deal with dissent problems. Public has divided on dissent case with "hard" winging out. Regime does not appear to have shown a really firm policy toward dissent. Would dissent increase and minority voices, even that movement would likely be forced to handle their position.	GDR will do whatever USSR would concerning Belgrade meetings. Will try to avoid it if there is no support for borders, "conditioning" etc.	Reconciliation does not appear to be an important factor for would-be regime as most of them just want out of the Communist system.

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	<u>Characterization of Dissidents; New Faces, New Leaders?</u>	<u>Popular Support for Dissidents</u>	<u>How Might Dissidence Develop? Reliability of Security Forces</u>	<u>Government Response to Dissidence</u>
ROMANIA	No real "dissident movement" only dissatisfied persons with disparate interests and objectives deeply divided by internal feuds. Only well-known personality is writer Paul Goma. Signatories of "open letter" to Czech Chartists have no influence and are mostly artists and intellectuals.	Apparently <u>very little support</u> or popular following.	Security forces very effective and reliable; they closely monitor suspects. Romanian society is harshly authoritarian and this inhibits plotting. Doubt that dissent will grow bolder. If Goma letter attracts more signatories—which unlikely—authorities will quash.	Lack of popular support has led authorities to take <u>moderate approach</u> to dissidents; they are relatively unharassed. Allows dissenters to depart country.
BULGARIA	Virtually no tradition of active political dissent; <u>scant evidence of any organized opposition</u> . No meaningful threat to regime. There is passive resistance in form of work slowdowns, theft, etc., as well as widespread apathy.	N.A. Peasantry has shown no unrest since 1951; student agitation has diminished.	Little prospect that significant dissent will develop; some groups have the potential for proving to be occasionally troublesome. Security forces effectively blunt open opposition. Populace aware organized resistance would provoke Soviet intervention.	N.A.
YUGOSLAVIA	Dissident leaders and signatories largely unknown; signors of petition are mainly students and intellectuals. Familiar names—such as Djilas and Mihajlov—do not lead any organized movement.	Difficult to gauge, especially as basis for current protests do not affect man-in-the-street. <u>Mass identification with dissidents presumably fairly low.</u>	Regime's interest in protecting its image abroad may invite new protests. Closer CSCE approaches, likelihood of more protests challenging regime authority; possibly might demonstrate during meetings themselves. Security forces loyal and maybe overzealous to stifle dissent; they are under tight control.	Response has been <u>cautious</u> because they do not want to be lumped with Warsaw Pact countries, nor tarnish their image as hosts for CSCE talks. Expulsion of 3 West German human rights protesters was prompt and decisive. They assume weaker response would only encourage domestic dissidents. Dissident appeal rejected by Constitutional Court on 24 March.
POLAND	Cover wide spectrum of political positions and few common grievances, although they can come together for tactical reasons. Dissident activity quiescent between 1968 and late 1974. No new faces of note; mostly persons with history of dissident activity. A broader spectrum of intelligentsia is participating. <u>Hard core is in Workers Defense League established last fall.</u> New organization entitled Movement for the Defense of Human and Civil Rights announced on 27 March. Regime responds immediately with strong criticism.	People undoubtedly tense and unhappy but probably <u>little active support for intellectuals' political goals</u> . Workers would not demonstrate if WDL leaders imprisoned. Populace discontent due to shortages of consumer goods and other economic factors, compounded by latent hostility to political system and ties to Soviets.	WDL's long-term goals are to secure Soviet acquiescence in a more open Polish political system, less censorship, etc. Economic problems will continue and keep population tense and frustrated; confrontation will thus continue. Worker discontent will have to be kept under control; if it subsides then the intellectuals' clout diminishes. Offer of amnesty may take some wind out of intellectuals' sails. Security forces reliable and under tight rein. Perhaps unreliable under crisis conditions (massive rioting) and regime takes this into consideration. Active military might not fire on workers.	Intellectuals handed with <u>kid gloves</u> as Giersek does not want to create martyrs and does not want confrontation or bad press.
CZECHOSLOVAKIA	Members of Charter 77 are mostly intellectuals and technical intelligentsia. Leaders not new, several were prominent in 1968. 600 signers represent new element on scene and their forwardness and activism are of concern to regime.	Most signatories apparently joined cause since Charter 77 signed; they are mostly intellectuals. <u>Cause has not apparently garnered wider support nor emboldened others to air their grievances.</u>	Charter is a bold act difficult to top. Authorities now on alert and will take strong measures to inhibit dissent. Security forces reliable and competent but there are unconfirmed reports that Party leader Husak not entirely happy with them. Overreaction possible but not likely at present.	<u>Campaign of harassment and intimidation</u> and several arrests but has stopped short of a major crackdown.
HUNGARY	Thirty-four Hungarian intellectuals have expressed support for Chartists but have not criticized conditions in Hungary.	N.A.	Dissidents may have little compulsion to press for more liberties as Hungary relatively tolerant. Some intellectuals may believe that demonstrative public stands can be counter-productive. Regime has come to terms with dissenters and no flare-up during last several years.	N.A.
EAST GERMANY	Probably no common anti-regime front formed by <u>several groups of dissidents</u> . Dissent found in varying forms in church, youth, intellectual and worker sectors. No leaders; only in intellectual circles do we find specific names. Present leaders are those active in 1960s, although new flood at lower levels.	Youth, church and intellectual dissenters have <u>little support outside their individual circles</u> . Massive discontent with restrictions on travel and human contacts. Dissent has <u>regular support only in that several large, amorphous groups have a variety of complaints</u> . Helsinki and the economy are most serious areas of possible fusion of sentiment.	Dissent may increase. The reliability of security forces—plus 20 Soviet divisions—is certain. Regime cannot do much about economy but can reduce personal contacts with West. This would be unpopular but possible if regime careful.	<u>Uneven—at times hesitant and others hard-biting.</u> If liberal, uses salami tactics. Lesser known figures bought off or "persuaded". No known arrests; one dissident expelled. Church: quiet; intellectuals: pressure forces lesser known lights to be quiet; there are not enough others to cause problems; exit visa applicants: have been told to forget it; subtle pressure at job level. Stricter measures possible; workers: only grumbling to date. More problems likely if economy stagnates.

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Soviet Objectives and Tactics at the Belgrade Conference

*Central Intelligence Agency
Directorate of Intelligence*

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Summary

- Moscow is on the defensive as preparations for the Belgrade follow-up conference to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) get under way.
- The Soviets misjudged the impact of the human rights provisions of the Helsinki agreement in Eastern Europe and at home, where they credit the Helsinki agreement with contributing to their recent difficulties with dissidence.
- The Soviets are anxious to prevent further Western exploitation of their weakness in the area of human rights.
- Moscow is seeking to head off a renewal of the Western human rights campaign at Belgrade with preemptive diplomatic efforts employing both persuasion and pressure.
- If these efforts fail, the Soviets will be prepared to defend their record on human rights (Basket III) at Belgrade and to attack the Western record on implementation, focusing on areas such as racial discrimination and unemployment in the West.
- The Soviets can also be expected to arrive prepared with a full set of proposals in the general area of detente and security (Basket I) and economic, scientific, and technological cooperation (Basket II).

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Soviet Objectives and Tactics at the Belgrade Conference

On June 15, representatives of the states that took part in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) will gather in Belgrade to prepare for the first follow-up meeting to the Helsinki conference. The Belgrade session—which is expected to last about six weeks—will determine the opening date, duration, agenda, and other modalities for the full meeting, which will take place in the fall.

Moscow is clearly on the defensive as preparations for the full Belgrade meeting get under way. Signs of this defensiveness are visible in the USSR's repeated warnings that the meeting must not be turned into a tribunal, and in earlier diplomatic hints that Moscow might move to postpone the conference.

Results of the Helsinki Conference

The present Soviet mood is markedly different from that with which the USSR entered the negotiations leading up to the CSCE summit in 1975. The Helsinki meeting represented the successful culmination of a long Soviet diplomatic offensive. The immediate origins of this campaign can be traced to Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev's proposal for a European security conference at the Karlovy Vary conference of European Communist parties in April 1967. In its inspiration, however, it is even older, deriving from various Soviet proposals for an all-European collective security agreement current in the 1950s.

Moscow had high expectations for the conference. It was intended to produce a surrogate for a European peace treaty, a document which would contain full and binding Western recognition of the postwar borders in Europe and of the territorial and ideological dividing lines between East and West. Beyond this, the Soviets intended to use the conference to win acceptance of the idea that the Soviet Union had a legitimate right to participate in the resolution of "all-European" issues—that is, a right to be heard in the councils of Western Europe as well as those of the East. Finally, Moscow hoped to use the conference to establish a pattern of bilateral and multilateral economic and technological cooperation which would facilitate the USSR's access to the coveted technology of the West.


The Final Act of the CSCE satisfied all these objectives, at least in part. The signatory states pledged to recognize the existing borders as inviolable and to refrain from interference in the internal affairs of any other signatory state. The accord contained a lengthy list of recommendations intended to

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promote economic and technological cooperation of the sort desired by the Soviets. Finally, although the Final Act did not provide for the permanent institutional structure that the Soviets had originally wanted, it did provide for a series of follow-up conferences that the Soviets could hope to use to make their voice heard in Western Europe.

Moscow has no such expectations for the Belgrade meeting. To the contrary, it finds itself on the defensive. It faces a situation in which it can at best reap only modest gains, but at the risk of taking a severe propaganda beating, and in the process further souring East-West relations.



The conference will be held in the new Belgrade Congress Center, shown here as an architectural model.

Sources of Moscow's Present Difficulties

Moscow's present difficulties stem from its failure to assess accurately the significance of the concessions it made to attain its ends at Helsinki. The Soviets gave ground on two fronts: in accepting a number of measures providing for prior notification and observation of major military maneuvers—the so-called confidence building measures (CBMs)—and in accepting the various human rights guarantees contained in Basket III and Principle 7 of the Final Act.

It is the concessions in the latter area which have proved most troubling for Moscow. In Principle 7, the Communist states pledged themselves to “respect human rights and fundamental freedoms,” including the freedoms of thought, conscience, religion, and belief. Moreover, they promised to “promote and encourage” the civil, political, economic, social, and cultural freedoms essential for “the free and full development” of the individual. In Basket III, they expressed their “intention” to facilitate specific forms of

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contact between individuals. These included family visits, the reunification of families, marriage between individuals of different nationalities, and personal and professional travel.

Against the expectations of many Western—and presumably Soviet—observers, these pledges have not proved to be a dead letter in Eastern Europe. They have been seized upon by dissident individuals and groups throughout Eastern Europe—particularly in Poland, East Germany, Czechoslovakia—and in the Soviet Union itself. These groups have differing objectives which reflect local circumstances, but they share a willingness to demand that their governments live up to the obligations that they assumed at Helsinki. At the same time, the ability of these governments to repress dissidence through coercive means is hampered by the spotlight of publicity thrown on their actions by the Helsinki accord and by their knowledge that draconian actions could undermine Western support for detente.

Moreover, there is evidence that, at least in Moscow, the unrest to which the Helsinki accords have contributed is viewed as much more than a minor irritant. In addition to indications of concern over the situation in Eastern Europe—particularly in Poland—[redacted] in February the Soviet leadership was worried about the implications of the “human rights” issue for the Soviet Union. According [redacted] the Soviets feared that any relaxation of the restrictions upon dissidents could give rise to a wave of criticism which could create an explosive atmosphere in the USSR.

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It is undoubtedly this perception of vulnerability to pressure from within—however much it may exaggerate the reality of the threat—which underlies Moscow’s sensitivity to criticism from without. It is this sensitivity, in turn, which is responsible for the strikingly defensive cast of Soviet diplomacy as the June 15 opening of the preliminary phase of the Belgrade conference draws closer.

Soviets Hope to Defuse Human Rights Issue

Moscow’s main objective at Belgrade will be to forestall or limit criticism of its failure to implement the human rights clauses of the Helsinki accord and to prevent any expansion of the Final Act’s provisions for facilitating the exchange of people and ideas in Europe. This objective takes precedence over any hope for gain which the Soviets may entertain through the consideration of proposals for political or economic cooperation which they find more to their liking.

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The present emphasis is revealed by the fact that Soviet diplomatic efforts to date have been devoted to telling Western interlocutors what the Belgrade meeting should *not* consider, rather than what it should do. Soviet diplomats making the rounds of Western capitals in the past few weeks have all carried essentially the same message: the Belgrade meeting must not be turned into a "tribunal" which would pass judgment on how the signatories have carried out the provisions of the Final Act. To do so, they warn, would risk precipitating a "confrontation" which would frustrate the purposes of the conference, and could even revive the tensions of the Cold War.

The Soviets have pitched their message to suit different audiences. They have warned some [redacted] of their unwillingness to tolerate "interference" in their internal affairs at Belgrade. Others [redacted] [redacted] have been cautioned against permitting the Americans to "dictate" the shape of the conference and obscure the "real" issues with others of "secondary" importance.

In still other instances, they apparently have resorted to threats and arm-twisting to make their point. [redacted] the Austrians have been repeatedly reminded of how essential it is for Austria to maintain good relations with the Communist countries, and warned that the adoption of a "negative" stance on issues of interest to the Soviet Union—particularly human rights—would have a detrimental effect on these relations.

Moscow's efforts are aimed at heading off criticism of the Soviet performance in implementation of the Final Act *before* the convening of the Belgrade meeting. Even if they cannot realistically expect to block all such criticism, they can hope to promote divisions between Western governments over how far to press the human rights issue.

The Soviets can be expected to accompany their diplomatic campaign with efforts to cripple the dissident movement before the beginning of the Belgrade meeting. The approach of the meeting at least partly accounts for the campaign of intensified arrests, harassment, and exile of leading dissidents which has virtually decapitated the Soviet human rights movement since the beginning of the year.

There are also unconfirmed reports that the Soviets in recent meetings have pressed their Eastern European allies to stifle their own dissidents. The Soviets presumably favor carefully graduated measures which would minimize the risk of a popular backlash and unfavorable Western press attention.

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This line will be difficult to apply, however, particularly in Poland. An active dissident movement exists there in an unusually volatile political atmosphere. Any effort at repression stringent enough to seriously damage the Polish dissident movement would risk touching off an explosion that could destroy both Eastern and Western plans for the Belgrade meeting. The dangers involved are not lost on the Polish Government, which has launched no major action against its dissidents, despite reported Czechoslovak and Soviet expressions of unhappiness about the internal situation in Poland.

It is unlikely that the Soviets assume their efforts will fully defuse the human rights issue before the Belgrade session opens on June 15. They can therefore be expected to come to the preparatory meeting armed with organizational proposals that will help protect Moscow from attack on these points.

Organizational Objectives

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The Soviets have already signaled their organizational objectives. Almost certainly they will push for a meeting of limited duration and one confined largely to generalities. They have insisted that the Belgrade meeting cannot entertain any proposals that would modify the Helsinki accord in any way. They are especially intent on heading off Western efforts to expand upon the human rights guarantees contained in the Helsinki agreement. Accordingly, their preference will be for a short agenda, and one emphasizing principles above specifics.

In their preliminary diplomatic spadework, the Soviets have stressed the importance of arriving in Belgrade with a "positive political concept." They have not spelled out what they have in mind, but presumably they are thinking of a generalized reaffirmation of detente and East-West cooperation. They would no doubt be quite satisfied if the principal achievement of the Belgrade meeting were a general agreement to settle for this.

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If they cannot prevent a review of implementation, they will push for closed-door sessions and for strict limitations on discussion. Their record is wanting both in regard to the human rights and informational questions covered in Basket III, and in facilitating the commercial procedures and exchanges of scientific, technical, and economic information provided for in Basket II. They will resist being held to account on these points, and have made clear their opposition to any "line-by-line" review of implementation.

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They will continue to insist that Basket III cannot be singled out for attention, and that all parts of the Helsinki accord must be treated "equally." Beyond this, the Soviets will insist that the conferees should look forward rather than backward. ✓

Soviets Prepared To Counterattack

If all their efforts to shunt aside Basket III issues prove unavailing, the Soviets will be prepared to defend their record in implementation and attack those of their critics. To accomplish this, they presumably will rely on the statistical data they have already developed to defend their record. These statistics are heavily weighted in favor of such categories as number of book titles translated and published, films imported, and so on. These are all categories in which the Soviets have an undeniable advantage over the West, where the tastes of the consumer impose a distinct limitation on the ability of the market to absorb the products of Soviet culture.

If pressed into an exchange, they probably would concentrate on such Western policies as the West German bars to employment of Communists in government and American visa and immigration restrictions.

They may arrive in Belgrade prepared to attack the US record on race relations as a violation of the Helsinki agreement. Criticism of racism in the US has become an increasingly popular theme in Soviet propaganda. Cases such as the "Wilmington 10" a group convicted of arson in North Carolina—have been specifically mentioned and may be brought up in Belgrade.

It is also likely that they will argue that the West has failed to live up to the economic provisions of Basket II, citing such omissions as the American failure to grant most favored nation treatment to the USSR and alleged restrictions on the establishment of Soviet commercial establishments in the West. They can also be expected to dwell on those "social rights"—such as the right to education and employment—which they charge are neglected in the West but guaranteed under their system. ✓

Nevertheless, the Soviets would prefer to avoid such exchanges—in which they are likely to come out second-best—by diverting the attention of the conferees to the consideration of more "positive" matters. By this they mean proposals that fit loosely into the categories of Baskets I and II, which the Soviets see as being in their interest. These include measures designed to promote political and military detente in Europe, as well as

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measures designed to facilitate economic, technical, and scientific cooperation. The Soviets have developed a lengthy list of suggestions in both categories, and may come up with still more before the June meeting.

Possible Basket I Proposals

Among the likely Soviet security proposals are the proposals for agreements to refrain from the first use of nuclear weapons in a European conflict and to prohibit the admission of new members to NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Both were put forward at the Warsaw Pact summit in Bucharest in November 1976 and were communicated to the Western signatories of the Helsinki agreement. Both are heavily weighted to the Soviet advantage. The former would nullify the edge in tactical nuclear weapons which the West enjoys in Europe, and the latter would bar Spanish accession to NATO.

Both were rejected at the NATO foreign ministers' meeting in December, but the Soviets have persisted in bringing up the non-first-use proposal. They have repeatedly urged Western capitals to reconsider the proposal on the grounds that their initial rejection was hasty and ill-considered. It seems likely that the proposal will appear before the Belgrade conference in some form.

There are other possibilities. The Finns, who in the past have been well attuned to Soviet thinking on CSCE, have suggested that mutual force reductions will probably be raised at Belgrade in some form. There is a possibility that the Soviets may choose to permit the East Europeans to introduce this subject. The Romanians have broached the idea of a 5- to 10-percent cut in military forces stationed in Europe. This is an idea which they claim as their own and which they contend would not affect the force reduction negotiations in Vienna because the cuts involved are too "small" to be significant. However, it closely resembles the basic Soviet position, which is to push for reductions that would preserve the existing balance—one that is favorable for Moscow. Moreover, the cuts involved would be more than symbolic.

The Soviets may also propose that the conferees at Belgrade address themselves to the Cyprus problem. The idea that a resolution of this problem is essential to reduce European tensions has surfaced sporadically in the remarks of Soviet officials. Foreign Minister Gromyko told the Turkish foreign minister in March, for example, that the decisions of the CSCE made it "obligatory" to take steps toward resolving the Cyprus problem.

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SECRET**Moscow and Basket II**

The Soviets will also be well prepared to talk about Basket II issues. The proposals for all-European conferences on energy, transportation, and the environment advanced by Brezhnev at the Polish Party Congress in December 1975 are likely to be reiterated. Even though the Soviets acquiesced to the Western demand that these topics be considered by the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe at its mid-April meeting rather than be the subject of special conferences, it seems highly unlikely that they would refrain from bringing them up at Belgrade. This is all the more probable as the proposal for a conference on the environment has aroused some interest in Western Europe. Another possible subject of Soviet attention at Belgrade will be the proposal made in February 1976 by the Council for Economic and Mutual Assistance to establish formal relations with the European Community.

Beyond this, the Soviets are likely to advance a number of proposals aimed at eliminating alleged economic discrimination against them in Western Europe and the US. The Finns have indicated that the East Europeans are unhappy about continuing vestiges of "economic discrimination" and the lack of any progress of extending most favored nation treatment. In better times, Moscow probably would have considered progress on some or all of these proposals as sufficient justification for the conference. The climate has changed, however, and Moscow now sees these proposals primarily as a means of deflecting the conference from consideration of Basket III issues.

Other Possibilities

Soviet attempts to shift the focus away from Basket III are reflected in Moscow's hints that it might consider improvements in areas in which it previously had no interest. The most conspicuous example of this apparent change in Moscow's diplomatic posture—if not in its actual attitudes—concerns confidence building measures. Although the Soviets resolutely opposed such measures at Helsinki, they now have hinted at least once that they might be prepared to consider some improvements in procedures for the notification of military maneuvers. Similarly, the Soviets have indicated interest in the Swiss proposal for the peaceful arbitration of disputes in Europe, which failed to arouse their enthusiasm when it was originally advanced at Helsinki.

There is also a good possibility that the Soviets may attempt to disarm Western critics by proposing a ban on "inflammatory" propaganda—in all likelihood focusing on Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe. If so, they

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would no doubt cite the Final Act's prohibition of intervention, "direct or indirect," in the affairs of other signatory states. Moscow has repeatedly made clear that it regards foreign criticism of its handling of internal matters as impermissible interference and an incitement to subversion.

As matters now stand, the Soviets are unlikely, at least initially, to introduce any of these proposals for the direct consideration of the conferees at Belgrade. To do so would open the way for Western counterproposals on Basket III, and this is something which they are most anxious to avoid. They have firmly insisted that new proposals are ~~completely out of order at Belgrade. Presumably they would prefer to suggest other means of handling these questions, such as the establishment of specialized working groups to consider these questions after the conference.~~

After Belgrade?

The Soviets have been deliberately vague on the question of a follow-up to the fall conference. They have stated that they will develop their position on the basis of the results and atmosphere at Belgrade. There seems little reason to question their reluctance to submit themselves to the uncertainties of another open-ended conference if their situation remains as difficult as it is now. There is always the possibility, however, that they may succeed in mastering dissidence within the bloc, or that significant differences may develop in the Western camp, in which case their attitudes could change.

It must be emphasized that this analysis is necessarily short range. Moscow's strategy and tactics are largely reactive. As such, they are subject to quick shifts to meet significant changes in the underlying situation. For example, serious disturbances in Eastern Europe would force the Soviets to reconsider their attendance at Belgrade. Soviet officials raised the possibility of postponement earlier this year when their anxiety about developments in Eastern Europe was apparently greater than it is now and while they were reacting to the criticism of the new administration in Washington.

Even without such major developments, the Soviet delegation at Belgrade will inevitably find itself having to react to Western strategy and tactics. Since the US delegation will be emphasizing the need to review implementation—a course most distasteful to Moscow—the odds are that the Soviet delegation anticipates rough going during its stay in Belgrade.

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June 24, 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI
SUBJECT: Prospects for Eastern Europe

The Intelligence Community recently published a report entitled "Prospects for Eastern Europe." The estimates provided in that report are interesting and I have summarized them below:

-- Unrest is likely to grow in Eastern Europe over the next three years. Destabilizing factors include detente, slower economic growth, and dissident activity.

-- Poland will be the most volatile of the East European states. A blow-up there, which might bring down Gierak and even conceivably compel the Soviets to restore order, cannot be ruled out. (I have included an additional note on the possibility of Soviet intervention at the end of this memo.)

-- The situation will be less volatile in East Germany, but the Honecker regime is going to have a harder time balancing its economic need for closer ties to the West with the unsettling effect those ties have on the East German people.

-- In the rest of Eastern Europe, the tension is not likely to get out of hand. Nowhere will dissident activists by themselves seriously challenge the regime.

-- Under economic pressures, all of the East European countries will show more interest in expanding their trade with the West. Despite misgivings, the Soviets will acquiesce or even encourage such expansion because they are increasingly reluctant to subsidize the East European economies.

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DIA review(s) completed

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-- East European leaders will continue to give ground, sporadically and reluctantly, on human rights issues of interest to the West. The prospects are fair for a slow evolution toward less authoritarian methods of rule in East Europe. I should note here that the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) does not agree with this part of the estimate. According to DIA, the necessity for tight centralized party control, the likelihood of growing unrest, constraints imposed by the USSR, and the example of Soviet treatment of dissent all argue against these developments.

-- The US is not likely to have a major impact on how the internal picture develops in any of the East European countries. But the East Europeans will attach more importance to developing relations with the US.


* * * *

I mentioned above that the Soviets might feel compelled at some point to restore order in Poland. A recent CIA report entitled "Probable Soviet Reactions to a Crisis in Poland" assessed this possibility. The report noted that there have been three political-economic crises in Poland over the past 20 years -- all without Soviet armed intervention. Here is the key assessment in that report:

"The Soviets, of course, have the military capability to invade and occupy Poland (Tab A). The Kremlin evidently prefers, however, to have the Polish leadership make minor concessions to the people to reduce public frustration. Polish regimes have thus far successfully used such tactics. At the same time, they have preserved the leading role of the party, while initiating and executing the transfer of party authority. There is currently no evidence to conclude that either the Soviets or the Poles intend to alter this pattern. A crisis could come in the event that ameliorating tactics failed to pacify the public, or in the event that the economic situation became sufficiently untenable that austerity measures would have to be strictly enforced."

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**Major Soviet Units
Adjacent to Poland**



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*The author of this paper is [redacted]
USSR Division, Office of Political and
Regional Analysis. Comments and queries are
welcome [redacted]*

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MEMORANDUM

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19

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 19, 1977

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MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE VICE PRESIDENT

FROM:

ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI *ZB*

SUBJECT:

Origins of Soviet Campaign
Against Dissidents

Attached is a memorandum prepared by CIA/INR at our request on the origins of the current soviet campaign against dissidents. It is a good job, although the statement on page 7 that the current campaign is "the toughest of the decade" is overstated.

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MEMORANDUM

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

July 18, 1977

19A

MEMORANDUM FOR: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI
FROM: JESSICA TUCHMAN⁵
SUBJECT: CIA/INR Paper on Soviet Dissident

Attached at Tab A is the paper requested for Mondale on the origins of the current Soviet campaign against the dissidents. It is a good job, although the Statement on page 7 that current campaign "has become the toughest of the decade", is probably overstated in Hyland's judgment.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the memorandum to the Vice President at Tab I.

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Approved For F

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19B

Central Intelligence Agency
Directorate of Intelligence
15 July 1977

The Evolution of Soviet Reaction to Dissent

Summary

After the signing of the Helsinki accords, several developments converged to heighten the concern of Soviet authorities about dissent in their society.

- The human rights provisions of Basket III became a rallying point for Soviet and East European dissidents.
- The Eurocommunists became much more critical of Soviet internal repression.
- Persistent food shortages in the Soviet Union resulted in isolated instances of active protest on a mass level.

The current crackdown against dissidents is the end-product of a gradual growth in the Soviet regime's anxiety over these related pressures. The initiation of the crackdown, although not its present scope, predates the change in US administrations. The initial impulse for it was probably the desire to silence the dissidents before the Belgrade review conference. The new US administration's public defense of Soviet dissidents apparently did reinforce and intensify Soviet anxieties. The net effect was to impel the leadership increasingly to conclude that harsher measures against dissidents were required.

The current campaign against dissidents is in part related to irritation over the lack of progress in other areas of US-Soviet relations, as well as to the Soviets' desire to keep dissent closely controlled during the Belgrade conference. At the same time, the more defensive and pugnacious tone of Soviet policy, both externally and internally, may also reflect aggravated tensions within the Soviet leadership. Recent policy difficulties may have strengthened the arguments of those leaders somewhat less inclined to conciliate the regime's opponents, both at home and abroad.

RPM 77-10184

I. The Dissident Problem

A. CSCE: A Rallying Point for Soviet Dissidents

The human rights provisions of Basket III provided a common ground for Soviet dissidents with a wide range of views and concerns, thus raising the specter for the first time in many years of a unified "opposition." The CSCE monitoring group, the most important dissident group to emerge in the Soviet Union since Helsinki, was organized by physicist Yury Orlov in Moscow in May 1976, and soon sprouted regional branches in the Ukraine, Lithuania, Armenia, Georgia, and Leningrad. These branches were tiny and the degree of actual coordination that existed between them is not known, but the emergence of a dissident organization with links throughout the country was unique in recent Soviet history. More important, the CSCE monitoring group, by espousing the causes of a wide variety of aggrieved religious and national minorities, established some claim to being the center of a broader protest movement.

Although this incipient support of religious and national minorities in itself potentially provided a mass base for human rights activism, the intellectual dissidents remain estranged from the bulk of the working class population. Working class discontent, which has basically economic rather than political objectives, thus did not converge with intellectual dissent.

B. Food Shortages and Unrest

Nonetheless, official apprehension that such a convergence could take place has evidently grown since the bad harvest of 1975. Although consumerism is not a potent political force in the Soviet Union, as it is in some East European countries, the Soviet population has come to expect a gradual improvement in the standard of living. The food shortages caused widespread grumbling, and over the last year and a half there have been reports and rumors of a number of instances of active unrest and protest.

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[REDACTED]

We know that last winter the Soviet leadership was quite worried about the mood in the country.

[REDACTED]

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Although the recent instances of violence, some of them related to food shortages, were not perpetrated by human rights activists, the Soviet leadership may not always distinguish clearly between different sources of protest. Some reporting suggests that Soviet officials may vaguely sense some connection between intellectual dissent and popular discontent.

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[REDACTED] Soviet leadership feared that easing restrictions on dissidents could abet a trend of criticism in the country that could create an "explosive" climate.

C. Under Attack From the Eurocommunists

Since early 1976, the Eurocommunists, including the once docile French Communist Party, became more openly critical of the Soviet Union than at any time since the aftermath of the invasion of Czechoslovakia. The Spanish Party has gone furthest, but the larger French and Italian parties pose the more serious problem for the Soviets. From the Soviet perspective, the chief danger implicit in Eurocommunism is not that it has diminished Soviet influence in West European Communist parties, but that it offers a Marxist alternative to the Soviet model in Eastern Europe, and perhaps ultimately within the Soviet Union itself.

Moscow has thus been upset by Eurocommunist support to dissidents in Eastern Europe and the USSR. Particularly annoying to the Soviets in this regard was an unprecedented visit in late December of an Italian Communist delegation to dissident Soviet Marxist Roy Medvedev in Moscow. The Italians presented Medvedev with an Italian edition of one of his books and reportedly asked him to write articles for an Italian party historical journal.

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Central Intelligence Agency
Directorate of Intelligence
15 July 1977

The Evolution of Soviet Reaction to Dissent

When the Soviets signed the CSCE accords in August 1975, they took a calculated risk that their acceptance of the human rights provisions of Basket III would not create serious internal difficulties for them. After Helsinki and especially during the last year, however, several developments heightened the concern of Soviet authorities about dissent in their society. This increased anxiety has been gradually translated into increasingly tough stands on issues of ideology and social control, and has produced the current crackdown on internal dissent.

The author of this paper is [redacted] USSR
Division, Office of Regional and Political Analysis,
who may be reached for comments or questions on
[redacted]

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D. Unrest in Eastern Europe

At the same time, CSCE had a catalytic effect on East European dissent, which became a movement cutting across national borders. Dissidents from different East European countries have reportedly coordinated their activities to a limited degree. Last winter some Soviet leaders were evidently genuinely alarmed that post-Helsinki conditions were creating an unstable situation in Eastern Europe, especially in Poland, and to a lesser degree in East Germany and Czechoslovakia.

The growth of unrest in Eastern Europe increased chronic Soviet fears of a spillover into the Soviet Union itself. Soviet authorities have always been alert to the danger of a political "virus" from Eastern Europe spreading into the polyglot borderlands of the Soviet Union, which have historically been susceptible to influences from that quarter. The fear of such a domino-effect was evidently a factor in the Soviet decision to invade Czechoslovakia in 1968.

E. The US Human Rights Initiative

The new US administration's human rights "campaign," and especially the personal involvement of President Carter in public appeals on behalf of Soviet dissidents, further disturbed Soviet authorities. Many Soviet officials, already fearful of being put in the dock at Belgrade, reportedly regarded the campaign as a deliberate attempt at subversion by the US. At the same time, US protests about Soviet repressions temporarily emboldened Soviet dissidents to make more vigorous protests and to channel their appeals directly to the US administration.

II. The Soviet Response

It is largely as a response to all these related pressures that the current crackdown against dissidents must be seen. It is clear that at least the initiation of the crackdown, although not its present scope, predates the change in US administrations. The original factor of greatest importance in the minds of the Soviet leaders at the

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outset of the crackdown was probably the desire to clean house and silence the dissidents before the Belgrade review conference was convened. Indeed, some dissidents have charged that the climate in the Soviet Union deteriorated immediately after, and as a direct result of, the signing of the Helsinki accords. [REDACTED] among others, claimed that conditions in his prison "tangibly worsened" after Helsinki. In 1976 there were a few trials of dissidents, balanced by occasional regime conciliatory gestures.

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The first clear evidence that a crackdown might be underway did not come, however, until late December 1976, seven months after the formation of the Orlov group in Moscow. In December Soviet authorities moved in a limited way against the CSCE monitoring group, by conducting searches of apartments of the members of its subgroup in the Ukraine. But there is no evidence to indicate that at this early date the Soviets intended the crackdown to assume the major proportions it did in the spring. Rather, it seems likely that they intended to continue "carrot and stick" tactics aimed at controlling dissent by a careful combination of coercive and conciliatory measures, while holding in reserve the option of intensifying repression if circumstances warranted.

The new US administration's public defense of Soviet dissidents apparently was a major factor which reinforced and exacerbated the related Soviet anxieties about the coming Belgrade CSCE meeting, the situation in Eastern Europe, the behavior of the Eurocommunists, and the food situation at home. The net effect was to impel the leadership increasingly to conclude that harsher measures against the dissidents were required. Since February the Soviets have moved to suppress the Orlov group and its regional subgroups, by arresting leading members and encouraging others to emigrate. Moreover, in the spring the Soviets began to make greater and greater efforts to limit the access of Westerners in Moscow to the dissident community, and to link the dissidents with espionage activities.

Two incidents in June were particularly indicative of the changed atmosphere in Moscow: the interrogation of newsman Robert Toth (the first such case in the detente era), and the surfacing of further suggestions that dissident Shcharansky is under investigation for treason. If Soviet authorities do charge him with treason, Shcharansky

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may become the first intellectual dissident since Stalin's day to be tried for this serious crime. Meanwhile, since Toth's departure, the Soviet media have expanded insinuations that he was engaged in espionage.

Conclusions

The Soviets originally believed that they could afford to permit their citizens greater contact with the West, or they would never have signed the Helsinki accords, allowed greater movement between East and West Germany, or stopped jamming some Western broadcasts to the Soviet Union in 1973. The events of the last year, however, have given them pause and reason to reassess their policies. Many Soviet officials have probably decided that acquiescence on Basket III was a mistake.

Objectively, Soviet dissent does not appear to pose a serious threat to the Soviet system, but Soviet officials evidently perceive a greater danger than exists in fact. Both Russian history and Leninist ideology impel them to exaggerate the potential importance of opposing groups, however small. They have always been preoccupied with problems of control. The importance that the leadership attaches to dissent can be seen by the fact that decisions about individual dissidents are sometimes made at the Politburo level.

It is not merely intellectual dissent that disturbs the Soviets. They fear that the "freer movement of people and ideas" which they conceded on paper at Helsinki, and which to a certain extent the circumstances of a modern technological world force upon them, will open their society to a whole host of ideas and influences from the West that are, in their view, not only politically subversive but socially disruptive and morally unhealthy. Identifying Western concepts of liberty with license, they are apprehensive that extensive contact with the "decadent" West will expose the Soviet people not only to alien political ideas but also to crime, terrorism, pornography, and drugs, which could combine to produce a general breakdown of order and discipline. To the extent that they are concerned about the stagnation of their economy, the Soviets may also fear that consumer dissatisfaction will become a more serious political problem in future years.

In view of the problems the Soviets confronted in the winter and early spring, some sort of domestic crack-down was to be expected. The intensity and duration of the Soviet response, however, is not entirely explained by objective circumstances. Some of the pressures on the Soviets in fact seem to have diminished since the February-March period. The tense situation in Eastern Europe has eased, and the food supply in the Soviet Union itself, while still a subject of considerable concern, seems to have improved somewhat. Meanwhile, Soviet attempts to muffle internal and external criticism have paid off to a considerable extent. Although occasional outbursts of protest continue to take place, the more prominent dissidents have been effectively silenced. Nevertheless, Soviet repression of dissent continues to intensify.

It is true that even now the picture is not one of unrelieved repression. Two prominent Jewish activists, for example, were recently allowed to emigrate. And Orlov, the key figure in post-Helsinki dissent, has been charged with the relatively minor offense of anti-Soviet activity. There are still some restraints on Soviet behavior toward dissidents; the Soviet leadership has no desire, if indeed it has the power, to move in the direction of reinstating the Stalinist terror apparatus. Nevertheless, the current campaign against dissent in the Soviet Union has become the toughest of this decade.

This increase in the relative harshness of Soviet policy is to some extent a natural partner of the more defensive and pugnacious tone the Soviets have displayed recently in many facets of foreign policy--particularly regarding the Eurocommunists and the United States. The recent expansion of Soviet actions against dissidents is doubtless thus partially related to irritation over the lack of progress in other areas of US-Soviet relations, as well as to the Soviets' desire to keep dissent closely controlled during the Belgrade review conference. At the same time, the exaggerated sensitivity of Soviet policy, both externally and internally, may also reflect aggravated leadership tensions. A confluence of policy difficulties, coming at a time when Brezhnev's health is uncertain, may have strengthened the arguments of those within the leadership somewhat less inclined to conciliate the regime's opponents, both at home and abroad.

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CHRONOLOGY

- August 1975 CSCE accords signed.
- 1976 A few trials of less well-known dissidents continue, despite Helsinki accords.
- May 1976 Formation of Soviet CSCE monitoring group.
- late
December 1976 Apartment searches of members of CSCE monitoring groups in Kiev; visit of Italian communists to dissident Roy Medvedev in Moscow.
- January 8, 1977 Three bomb explosions in Moscow--Moscow rumors attribute to discontent over food shortages.
- February 3, 1977 Solzhenitsyn associate Aleksandr Ginzburg detained in Moscow.
- Two Ukrainian monitors of CSCE detained in Kiev.
- February 10, 1977 Yury Orlov, chairman of CSCE monitoring group detained in Moscow.
- March 2, 1977 Leaders of French, Italian and Spanish communist parties meet in Madrid in the first summit of Eurocommunist leaders.
- March 4, 1977 Izvestia article charging Jewish refusenik Shcharansky and others by name with working for CIA, three U.S. Embassy officers charged by name with having recruited them.
- March 13, 1977 Pravda article warned that the human rights issue could disrupt Secretary of State Vance's impending visit to Moscow.

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March 15, 1977 Shcharansky arrested.

March 16, 1977 Joint "press conference" with western news-
men held by representatives of broad
spectrum of dissent--intellectuals, Jewish
refusniks, Pentecostals, CSCE monitoring
group and others.

March 28, 1977 Soviet-US talks on SALT opened in Moscow.

April 27-29, 1977 Conference in Prague of Soviet, East
European and West European communist parties;
Soviet effort to establish common line not
notably successful.

June 1, 1977 Shcharansky's parents reportedly notified
that treason charges being prepared against
him.

June 11, 1977 Los Angeles Times correspondent Robert Toth
questioned by KGB for allegedly accepting
state secrets on parapsychology from Jewish
refusnik Valery Petyukov.

June 15, 1977 Belgrade review conference on CSCE opened.

June 17, 1977 Toth permitted to leave the Soviet Union.

June 27, 1977 Orlov charged with anti-Soviet activity--
maximum penalty three years prison.

July 4, 1977 Ginzburg reportedly charged with anti-Soviet
propaganda--third "offense," maximum penalty
up to seven years prison plus five internal
exile.

July 12, 1977 TASS statement charged Toth used press card
as cover for intelligence work, hinted at
disclosures to come. Petyukov reportedly
told no action to be taken against him be-
cause he had cooperated in exposing an
"arch-intelligence agent."

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CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM

From: Senator Church
To: The President, Secretary Vance, Mr. Brzezinski
Re: Conversations with Fidel Castro
Date: Friday, August 12, 1977

The following is a summary of the major points of the conversations on substantive issues that took place between Senator Church and President Fidel Castro during the Senator's visit to Cuba, August 8 through August 11, 1977.

A. August 10 (PM)

* Multinationals: The subject turned to multinational corporations. President Castro said: "We must achieve a balance between the Western world - the energetic and industrialized world - and the underdeveloped countries. We must find a middle ground between them with regard to the role of multinational corporations." President Castro went on to say that he saw a role for such corporations in Cuba, but in such a way that they would fit in with the priorities of the revolution and really help in the development process. He continued: "These problems (concerning multinationals and development) are not all clear right now. We cannot be dogmatic. I do not agree that other countries or multinationals cannot provide useful assistance. Multinational corporations have a role to play in development of underdeveloped countries. The third world will need the cooperation of the industrialized world. I think a 'combination' of ways will be necessary - private funds, state loans, etc. Private investments are going to be needed along with state efforts... Underdevelopment is good for no one, I think, not the United States, not the countries themselves, not Cuba. But loans must only be given for projects that help achieve the real priorities of the underdeveloped countries."

State Department review completed

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CONFIDENTIAL

Memorandum (cont.)

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* OPEC: "There is a great deal of resentment of oil producers in the third world. Some of the arguments of the OPEC countries I can understand and they are good, but the method they are using to achieve their objectives is wrong. The industrialized countries can better adjust to the oil price increases, but the countries of the third world cannot. (There followed an explanation of how the developed countries can offset the oil price increased by raising the price of technology or manufactured goods, by selling arms or receiving investments, but countries like Tanzania, Sri Lanka and others do not have this possibility. And Arab investment in the third world, which leaders of underdeveloped countries had hoped for, never really came about.)

President Castro said that many third world countries were reluctant to criticize OPEC because they were hoping for loans to help them financially, but he (Castro) believes that these loans have not been forthcoming and therefore there was really a great resentment under the surface in the third world.

Senator Church raised the problem of the debt burden of the underdeveloped countries. President Castro said he did not think they would be able to pay these debts. The problem of oil had made it nearly impossible for most poor countries. Tanzania, for example, required the export of all of its top three crops just to pay for imported oil. How could it ever hope to pay its debts and still develop the country, he wondered.

"Cuba is in a position to withstand the economic crisis because of her relatively good trade position, assistance from the Soviet Union on sugar and oil, and because of the efforts and determination of her people," he said. But other countries who were not so fortunate may find that economic distress will lead to violence. He said he is glad that in Cuba he does not have to resort to violence, but can achieve his objectives through persuasion.

CONFIDENTIAL

Memorandum (cont.)

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* Detente and SALT: President Castro then brought up the subject of detente which he said was very personally and seriously concerned about. He said: "Detente must succeed and military expenditures must be decreased. I have often wondered how the atmosphere of lack of trust between the United States and the USSR can be decreased... Maybe China bets on a war between the US and USSR. There is no other conclusion I can draw, politically speaking, on this... I am not sure, Senator, whether our grandchildren will survive."

* Castro's rhetoric against the US: "We have been very militant against the US, it is true, but we have been harrassed and this produced and encouraged such militant talk. I admit that. The best thing for us, though, is that our relations with the United States not be relations of desperation."

* Sugar Agreement: The President said, "We know that a sugar agreement is necessary." The Cubans, according to President Castro, have no desperate need for such an agreement now and it is not a matter of the Cubans conquering new markets (in the US). That will take time, he pointed out. But he feels such an agreement is in the best interest of both the US and Cuba.

* Meeting with President Carter: Senator Church suggested that perhaps it would be a good idea for a meeting to take place between President Carter and President Castro - possibly at the UN in the fall. President Castro said he felt it would be more difficult for President Carter than for him.

* Senator Church brought up the value of a gesture toward the US, mentioning first the political prisoners and then the situation of the American citizens and their families - although he realized the difficulty of such a gesture. As for the political prisoners, Church said their release would have a dramatic impact on public opinion in the U.S.

CONFIDENTIAL

Memorandum (cont.)

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* Castro on the American Political Prisoners and American Citizens in Cuba: "If this problem (of American political prisoners) were in my hands alone, I would be more than happy to do this for you. But the problem is that 3 of the 7 "pure" Americans in prison in Cuba are CIA agents and the other 4 "pure" Americans are here because of the hijacking of planes. I cannot, am not, able now to get the agreement of my comrades on the CIA prisoners. Many are out of the country. I could not take such a decision (with regard to the prisoners) personally. And I cannot now get a consensus.

"I think we should think on other terms. The problem (of political prisoners) is in a political context which includes such other items as Guantanamo, the embargo, etc. But I will study this more. I have no information now in front of me about these particular cases.

"With regard to the American citizens, I may assure you that if in one week you send a plane, or if you have the names now and wish to take them out with you in your plane, I guarantee to you that these people - if there are 50 or 100 or 300 - may leave with their families and children and aunts and uncles. We have no problem with that. Just give us a list.

"As for the political prisoners, we will review these cases now on an individual basis and release them as we can, but we cannot bring them all together in one package now."

* On the American Boats: Castro said to his knowledge Cuba had only two boats with American citizens aboard in its possession and he had ordered those released. "With regard to the question of releasing the American boats, this was not analyzed from a legal point of view. I chose to decide the question on the basis of politics. Legally, these individuals violated Cuban law and could have been detained, but I chose to release them for political reasons."

CONFIDENTIAL

Memorandum (cont.)

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Asked if one of those released was the "Nita Sue" with Byron Moore aboard, the President checked with his personal advisors who said that they believed that boat had been released on the day Senator Church arrived. President Castro said he would check on the boats to make sure.

B. August 11 (PM)

*President Carter: President Castro said of President Carter: "I am very impressed with his modesty and his austerity. Without this, there is a great danger that in the United States the Presidency will begin to appear more like a monarchy than a Presidency."

* On US-Cuban Relations: Senator Church asked if there was anything Castro would like the Senator to convey to President Carter when he returned to the United States. President Castro replied: "We are pleased with the development of relations between Cuba and the United States since President Carter took office. We understand realistically that the process of improving relations must be a slow process. There cannot be dramatic changes overnight, but for our part we intend to continue the positive direction of relations so that eventually Cuba and the United States can solve their problems. I understand the difficulty that the President has in solving Panama and Cuba at the same time. But please tell the President that we are pleased with what has been done and that we plan to continue in the same direction."

"I want him to know that I understand that Panama must receive first priority. Two important things (like Cuba and Panama) cannot be done at the same time. You may tell the President this."

"I would like to point out something else, too. I feel it is my duty to convey to President Carter the necessity of making an effort to achieve detente with the USSR. This is the most essential problem of all. I sincerely believe I know how the Soviets think."

CONFIDENTIAL

Memorandum (cont.)

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I believe that they are seriously interested in a real peace. This is the central point of Brezhnev's policy. The Soviets did not ask me to say this or bring this up. They may not even like it that I am discussing it with you. But this is my opinion and I must say it. It is an extremely important problem and it must be dealt with."

C. Private Conversations between the President of Cuba and Senator Church at various points throughout the trip:

* Terrorism: Senator Church said that whatever earlier activities in this regard our government had encouraged, he felt confident that our government was no longer engaged in such activities against either President Castro or his government. According to Senator Church, President Carter is a "religious man, a moral man, a man who will not condone terrorism." President Castro replied that from all he knew about President Carter he also believed this to be so.

Senator Church then said that during the campaign President Carter had made it plain that the activities of Federal Agencies under his Administration would be required to comport with the law. And during his inaugural address he said that foreign persons would be treated the same way as American citizens. The Senator believes that the Carter Administration will actively do all in its power to suppress any form of terrorism against Cuba and said this to Fidel.

President Castro then said he accepted this. He mentioned the warnings about exile attacks that he had recently received and said that he was very grateful to the President for them. It was because of these warnings of terrorist activity that the Cubans were especially vigilant in recent days about boats approaching their shores and this was what led to recent seizures. He wanted the President to know this. For his part, President Castro says he no longer believes that the United States Government is connected with

CONFIDENTIAL

Memorandum (cont.)

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terrorist activity, but many people trained by the CIA originally are still at large. According to President Castro, "this is a monster that has been created and will be extremely difficult to control."

* On the Anti-Hijacking Agreement: On the subject of the agreement, President Castro said that when the Cubana Airlines plane was blown up and 80 persons died, including members of Cuba's champion fencing team, the destruction so enraged the Cuban people that over one million attended the funeral. Even though he did not believe that the CIA had participated in the criminal act, he thought it was done by terrorists who had received their training at one time from the CIA. This was also generally believed by the Cuban people, and made it politically necessary for him to terminate the agreement. Nevertheless, he made it clear that he intends to deal with hijackers as required by the agreement. According to the President, there would be no substantive changes on Cuba's part. But it was politically impossible for him to reinstate the formal agreement at this time.

SECRET #1ATHE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTONSECRET

March 1, 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Cyrus Vance *CV*

1. Warnke's Briefing of the SFRC re SALT - Paul Warnke briefed the Senate Foreign Relations Committee this morning on the status of the SALT negotiations. It was a friendly session and the Senators attending were: Chairman Sparkman and Senators Church, Pell, Clark, Glenn, Stone, Case, Javits, Percy and Baker. Paul indicated that considerable progress has been made at Geneva and that the remaining issues are very few. In his presentation he indicated that the following are the principal unresolved issues: (1) non-circumvention, on which the two sides are no longer far apart because the recent Soviet move to include non-transfer as merely a specific example of non-circumvention brings them near our fall-back language; (2) the heavy bomber problem of how to deal with Soviet heavy bomber variants while providing flexibility in our choice of long-range cruise missile carrier aircraft (the sides are substantively very close but we have not yet developed and tabled language to reflect our position); (3) new types of ICBMs where the Soviets want one exception for a single warhead ICBM but have made a significant move in the direction of the US on limiting modernization of existing ICBMs; (4) the Statement of Principles on which we have now to respond to a Soviet move softening their position on FBS and proposing general language on quantitative and qualitative constraints; and (5) Backfire, which is not being addressed at Geneva.

There were a number of questions about verification, largely from Senator Glenn. Several Senators expressed strong support of our negotiating position at SALT. Others, however, indicated they had questions but remained open-minded; these were Senators Glenn, Stone and Baker. Senator Javits and Senator Stone emphasized the importance of starting to sell SALT publicly as soon as possible.

State Department review completed

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Senator Clark asked about the effect on the SALT process should we either not reach agreement this year or not ratify the Treaty this year. Paul replied that he believed it important to bring the Treaty into effect this year for the following reasons: the informal extension of the Interim Agreement will come under pressure as more Soviet SLBM submarines become backed up awaiting sea trials as the Soviets are currently at the Interim Agreement limit of 62; the Protocol concept might not survive the continuing of the negotiations into 1979 as the US has proposed that it expire by the end of 1980; the uncertain state of Brezhnev's health and the fact that a successor government could be unable to deal with SALT for some considerable period of time; and we must soon stop the new generation of Soviet ICBMs currently under development or these programs will acquire a momentum that cannot be stopped.

2. Brezhnev Letter - We have studied the Brezhnev letter

which Dobrynin delivered late yesterday and have the following additional reflections:

These are supposed to be private & personal - to me & not to the State Dept.

-- The letter matches your letter of January 25 in its blunt tone. While Brezhnev rebuts specific points, he takes care to do so in a framework of according high priority to US-Soviet relations and his personal correspondence with you.

-- The letter is consistent with Brezhnev's speeches last week that express concern about the state of the US-Soviet relationship. His call in the letter for urgent "practical constructive measures" in US-Soviet relations corresponds to his public focus on the need for new efforts toward constructive relations.

-- There is no hint as to what new measures Brezhnev has in mind, apart from his clear interest in moving ahead on SALT.

-- Unlike his public speeches, which ignored the Horn of Africa, the letter acknowledges this as a problem in relations, but Brezhnev offers no new approaches. He appears to regard the Horn as a "momentary" rather than a long-term question, preferring that both countries rise above it.

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3. Administration Policy Toward Turkey - The Department's Counselor, Matt Nimetz, briefed Congressman Lee Hamilton this afternoon on his recent discussions in Turkey. Nimetz said the Administration would prefer more time to consider whether to ask Congress to proceed this year with the Turkish DCA, and Hamilton readily agreed to postpone his scheduled hearings on Greece and Turkey, where we have promised to announce our policy, from mid-March to April 4. This may give us time to review the Turkish proposals on Cyprus, which should go to UN Secretary General Waldheim later this month. Hamilton said he had planned to discuss the Turkish DCA with you today, and would tell you when the meeting was re-scheduled that he favored Administration action to remove the embargo during this session of Congress.

4. State Elections in India - The results of the February 25 Indian state elections make clear that Indira Gandhi's faction of the Congress Party has won a real victory in two major southern states, Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh. The ruling Janata Party apparently will win at least a plurality in Maharashtra (Bombay) and is headed for victory in Assam. Congress (R), i. e., the "Regular Congress," which expelled Indira Gandhi a few months ago, was decisively rejected in these contests and this may lead its members to seek association with either Indira's Congress or the Janata Party.

Local rather than national issues dominated the elections. Nevertheless, the election results clearly give a major fillip to Mrs. Gandhi's political future. At 60, she is still very young by Indian political standards and cannot be ruled out for the future.

The elections also indicate that Janata has a long way to go in building up a local political base in southern India and that its record in handling India's domestic, especially economic, problems is viewed by the electorate as less than impressive. There are no immediate implications for Indo-U. S. bilateral relations arising out of the state elections.

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5. Visit by South Africa's Security Chief - We have instructed our Embassy in Pretoria to discourage General Hendrik Van den Bergh, Director of South Africa's Bureau for State Security, from requesting a U. S. visa, about which he had inquired. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] Giving him a visa so soon after the death of Steve Biko and the bannings and detentions of last October 19 would almost certainly give rise to strong public and Congressional criticism.

6. Conference on Human Rights - The Department of State sponsored a successful two-day conference on human rights for about 500 representatives of non-governmental organizations this week. The conference was the first ever held on human rights under our auspices. Its success resulted in large part from the fact that we and the non-governmental organizations cooperated in designing the program, and domestic human rights issues were discussed along with foreign policy issues.

The organizations were vocal in appreciation for and support of the human rights policy of the Administration. Specific aspects of our policy were criticized. Particular criticism was voiced concerning arms sales and military support for countries which engage in serious violations of human rights. Eastern European ethnic group representatives pressed for a more vigorous policy in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. On the domestic front some conference participants argued for greater attention to U. S. compliance with international human rights norms.

7. Discussion with Kenyan Delegation - The Kenyan Delegation which will meet with you tomorrow morning made essentially the same points to me today as did Ambassador Mbogua, underscoring Kenya's perception of Somalia's threat to Kenyan security. They emphasized that Somali withdrawal was the key to an Ogaden solution; only following this could Kenya call for the withdrawal of Soviet and Cuban forces from Ethiopia. I made the points to them that we support the sanctity of borders in Africa; we have emphatically called on Somalia to withdraw its forces from Ogaden; and we have informed the Somalis and their Arab friends that we cannot

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supply arms for Somalia while they have any troops in Ethiopia. I added that despite Ethiopia's assurances that its forces would not cross the Somali frontier, we continue to receive information which indicates the contrary may happen. I also said that we believed it important that the Somalis have a guarantee that there would not be reprisals against the Ogaden population once Somali withdrawal has occurred.

The Kenyans seemed receptive to the idea of a neutral entity to observe Somali withdrawal and provide guarantees against reprisals, but were not sanguine about the prospects of success for mediation efforts now underway within the OAU, or UN action on the Somali-Ethiopian dispute.

The Kenyans concluded by giving me a copy of their military shopping list (attached), another copy of which will be provided you tomorrow. The major items they seek would, of course, do violence to our arms transfer policy. I told the Kenyans we would consider their military needs sympathetically, and were prepared to provide economic aid for their North Eastern province if that would help; I cautioned, however, that any consideration of arms assistance would have to be in the context of our general policy of restraint in arms supply to Africa.

Attachment.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
NATIONAL FOREIGN ASSESSMENT CENTER

12 May 1978

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUMCHINA AND SOUTH ASIA

Peking's policies toward South Asia have for more than a decade been shaped by the overriding goal of combating the spread of Soviet influence along China's southwestern flank. Lingering frictions with the Indians, Peking's evolution into the major ally of Pakistan, and endemic regional instability have, however, created a setting weighted against China. Faced by continued tensions between local governments--tensions upon which China believes Soviet influence feeds--and by persisting Indian suspicion of Peking, the Chinese have followed a patient and conservative course. In essence, China has been maintaining sound relations with the region's smaller nations, holding open the door to future improvements in Sino-Indian relations, and relying on the US as the primary counterweight to the Soviets.

Recent Developments in Sino-South Asian Relations

Within this broad framework, China has recently adopted a higher profile in South Asia. The visits to Nepal and Bangladesh this year by vice premiers Teng Hsiao-ping and Li Hsien-nien respectively, along with

** This memorandum was prepared by the East Asia-Pacific Division of the Office of Regional and Political Analysis in response to a request from the National Security Council. Questions and comments may be addressed to*

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the month-long tour of Pakistan, India and Bangladesh by an important Chinese "friendship" delegation, add up to more Chinese attention to these countries than they have received in some time.

Chinese interest in capitalizing on Indian Prime Minister Desai's desire to pursue a more balanced foreign policy is the key for interpreting the shift in China's approach. During his stay in New Delhi in March, Wang Ping-nan--the head of the friendship delegation and a senior diplomat--trumpeted Peking's hopes for improved Sino-Indian relations and hinted that China was prepared to address the thorny border issue. India has responded cautiously to the Chinese overture. It accepted the Chinese invitation for Minister of External Affairs Vajpayee to visit Peking--but only after Wang gave assurance that Vajpayee would bring back "concrete results." At the same time, however, Desai publicly affirmed his commitment to the 1962 Indian parliamentary resolution calling for Chinese withdrawal from Indian soil. New Delhi clearly believes that Peking's eagerness to offset Soviet influence in Asia puts India in a strong bargaining position.

While these recent developments--which followed the decision in 1976 to exchange ambassadors after a 15-year hiatus--indicate that both sides are serious about repairing past damage, the process will probably be a slow one. Besides the border issue, a number of other thorns prick the relationship. China is apparently still providing modest amounts of aid and training to the 1,500 to 2,000 Naga and Mizo tribal separatists in northeastern India. India, for its part, has given sanctuary to Tibetans who fled China two decades ago. More important, however, China continues to support policies in South Asia that are objectionable to New Delhi, such as Pakistan's "South Asia nuclear-weapons-free zone," Nepal's "zone of peace," and to make pointed statements regarding Pakistan's and Bangladesh's territorial integrity--which can be threatened only by India.

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For New Delhi the most important brake on rapid forward progress in Sino-Indian relations probably lies in the Indian need to manage improvements with Peking so that Indo-Soviet ties will not be severely strained. New Delhi will also have to devise a way to prepare Indian public opinion for a compromise border settlement that probably will result in Indian loss of some of the 14,000 square miles of territory in dispute.

As in the past, China has been careful to couple moves toward promoting a thaw in Sino-Indian relations with efforts designed to reassure China's regional friends of continued political, economic, and--in some cases--military support from Peking. As China's closest ally in the area, Pakistan received strong representations along this line during Wang Ping-nan's stopover in Islamabad in February. The high-level reception Peking gave to the commander of Pakistan's navy when he visited China in late April and early May was probably designed to signal Islamabad--as well as New Delhi--that China's role as the chief supplier of military assistance to Pakistan will not be affected by any changes in Sino-Indian relations.

Chinese leaders had personal ties with former Pakistani President Bhutto--who had paid a number of state visits to China--and Peking has urged the new regime not to execute him. Peking, however, did not allow Bhutto's ouster to damage the fundamental relationship between the two states. The Chinese, in fact, gave an enthusiastic welcome to General Zia during a state visit he paid to China last year when such gestures of international backing were important to the new regime's efforts to establish its legitimacy. China continues to consult closely with Islamabad on a variety of international issues, and Chinese economic assistance programs in Pakistan remain extensive despite the overall reduction in Chinese aid to the Third World.

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The recent visit by Li Hsien-nien to Bangladesh and by Teng Hsiao-ping to Nepal reciprocated visits by the leaders of these countries to China, but they were also plainly undertaken with the aim of providing the same type of reassurance as was given to Pakistan. Li signed scientific, technological, and economic aid agreements while in Dacca, and Teng promised more aid to Nepal. The Chinese media also continue to pay special attention to both governments' particular concerns and sensitivities.

Sino-South Asian Relations and Dr. Brzezinski's Visit

Chinese leaders may be particularly eager to discuss with Dr. Brzezinski the recent change in government in Afghanistan--which abuts China near the disputed Pamir area of the Sino-Soviet border. Comments by several Chinese officials reflect Peking's belief that the new government in Kabul is in the "Soviet orbit." The Chinese have relatively little information on the new leaders, but what they do have reinforces their perception of Afghanistan's Soviet "tilt." They are reportedly adopting a "wait and see" attitude toward the new government, but are not optimistic about the future of Sino-Afghan relations. The Chinese embassy in Kabul was apparently damaged during the coup.

Peking had considered the Daoud government to be heavily influenced by Moscow but was heartened by what it saw as a diminution of this influence in recent years. China was particularly gratified by Iran's decision in late 1973 to extend economic assistance to Kabul, seeing the potential for a loosening of the Soviet's economic and political grip. China itself extended a \$53-million development credit to Afghanistan in late 1974, but now apparently have decided that future aid will depend on the degree of pro-Soviet behavior exhibited by the new regime.

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Aside from the direct implications that increased Soviet influence in Afghanistan would have for China, Peking may also be concerned that renewed tensions between Kabul and Islamabad over dissident tribal minorities along Pakistan's border with Afghanistan could result in an internally weakened Pakistan, or in requests for more arms from China.

On other matters, the Chinese may advise Washington to approach with extreme caution any talks with the Soviets on military restraint in the Indian Ocean. The Chinese media have carefully catalogued the growth in Soviet naval strength in the area, and Peking undoubtedly believes that the only formal agreement Moscow is likely to sign is one that perpetuates what is seen by China as a Soviet military edge. Peking gave favorable coverage to President Carter's recent visit to India and may urge the US to follow up with increased offers of economic assistance as a means of encouraging the Desai government to further loosen its ties with Moscow. As for Pakistan, Peking quietly applauded the Ford administration's decision to resume US military equipment deliveries to Islamabad and may urge the Carter administration to allow even further sales. But, leaders in Peking may also repeat to Dr. Brzezinski the line the Chinese ambassador took with his US counterpart early this year, that China will not contribute to Islamabad's efforts to develop nuclear weapons by helping them acquire a nuclear spent-fuel reprocessing plant.

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

September 29, 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI **ZB.**
SUBJECT: Your SALT Decisions

Folder: Carter - SENSITIVE
01/77 - 09/78

Box 21

JCL, DHM, ZBC

The enclosed memo gives you the basic options regarding the major contentious issues. Positions of the different agencies are briefly summarized using their own language.

Let me briefly state where the NSC comes out:

1. Number of ALCMs and Heavy Bombers

Option A. The conditional part of the statement, though probably not essential, summarizes our concerns and thus might have some utility in general and specifically for SALT III. Options C and D will, first of all, deprive us of some potential capability (which could be needed in the essentially unforeseeable circumstances of the 1980s) and they will provide grist for those who will argue, with some legitimacy, that we have permitted the Soviets to constrain those U.S. programs that are of concern to them while protecting those of theirs that are of concern to us (e.g., heavy missiles).

2. Cruise Missile Definitions

Option A. You will have very serious problems with Senator Nunn and with our Allies (and it is hard to tell which is worse) if you go for the Soviet cruise missile definition contained in Option B. To the Soviet concern about being about to distinguish between conventional and nuclear, you should reiterate to Gromyko our commitment to make the two versions distinguishable (the so-called airframe rule).

3. Backfire

I support the DoD position (Option A), largely because of our consensus that we should state to the Soviets (and publicly) that we retain the right to deploy an aircraft comparable to the Backfire. Under those circumstances, it really makes no sense to include the ban on association with an intercontinental mission since this implies the acceptance of a fraudulent Soviet claim and would prejudice our efforts to build a useful and comparable aircraft.

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
DATE 12/21/91
BY SP-11/BJT
PER 251-98-718-24

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~ XGDS
INFORMATION

9.29.78

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI *ZB.*
SUBJECT: Your SALT Meeting with Gromyko

JCL, DHM, ZBC, Box 21
FOUNDER: CARTER - SENSITIVE
01/77 - 09/79

Attached at Tab A is a table summarizing the current US and Soviet SALT positions and the agreed recommended changes in the US position as discussed at today's SCC meeting. The issues on which you will have to make a decision are described below. (Issues are numbered as in Tab A.)

5/9. Number of ALCMs per Heavy Bomber/Multiple Warhead Cruise Missiles

ISSUE: How do we respond to the Soviet proposal for limits on heavy bombers equipped with more than 20 ALCMs and a ban on multiple warhead cruise missiles?

Option A. US statement indicating that we will continue to develop and test cruise missile concepts and various cruise missile carriers, but do not plan to deploy cruise missile carriers with more than 20 ALCMs or to deploy multiple-warhead ALCMs during the period of the agreement dependent on deployment of Soviet Soviet air defense and other forces including the total number of Soviet warheads.

Option B. Same as Alternative A but delete the conditional part of the statement (dependent on . . . Soviet warheads.)

Option C. Count cruise missile carriers equipped with more than 20 ALCMs as "two" in the 1320. Provide statement that US has no plans for multiple warhead ALCM deployment prior to 1985.

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Classified by Zbigniew Brzezinski

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PER *1/14/88 NLC/H* RE *NLC-4B-152*
BY *J* MAR. DATE *11/30/82*

Option D. Limit the number of cruise missiles deployed on heavy bombers to an average of 35 (with a fallback to 30). Provide statement that US has no plans for multiple warhead ALCM deployment prior to 1985.

AGENCY POSITIONS / ARGUMENTS

SecDef and CJCS favor Option A. We are not convinced that strict ALCM number limits are a necessary trade for a ballistic missile fractionation limit. A CMC could be brought into the force as early as 1984. That would be the only option for a major increase in the number of U.S. warheads before 1986 in response to unexpected Soviet increases in warheads or defenses as allowed by SALT TWO. Option A would allow such a response without abrogating SALT TWO.

The SecDef believes that foregoing this option would have a significant negative political effect both now on ratification and soon thereafter on Congressional funding support for the CMC. Moreover, this U.S. potential is virtually the only leverage we have to get air defenses limits seriously considered in SALT THREE.

State/ACDA favor Option D. We will have to accept some ALCM limit to get ballistic missile RV limits; and we get more than we give up in such an exchange. An average of 30 corresponds to 100 B-52's and 20 very large (80 ALCM) cruise missile carriers, thus giving us a substantial cruise missile carrier program. For the same reasons, Option C is also acceptable. Averaging would be harder to negotiate with the Soviets than Option C, but easier to sell at home. With regard to the idea of tying ALCM limits to Soviet air defense limits, we do not need it, we will not get it, and it would become the "Backfire issue" of SALT THREE. In any event, we are very unlikely to have large cruise missile carriers before 1985.

6/7. Cruise Missile Definition/Cruise Missile Range Definition

ISSUE: How do we respond to the new Soviet proposal on the cruise missile range definition as part of the effort to resolve this issue and the cruise missile definition issues?

(NB: The agreed cruise missile definition is that the cruise missile limits in the Protocol apply to both nuclear-armed and conventionally-armed cruise missiles. After the expiration of the Protocol, our position is that the ban on ALCMs over 600 km on non-heavy bombers applies only to nuclear-armed CMs unless determined otherwise in future negotiations. The Soviets want the definition to cover nuclear and conventional ALCMs. We have also stated that we reserve the right to propose different limits on nuclear-armed and conventionally-armed GLCMs and SLCMs in future negotiations. Acceptance of the Soviet definition would affect this negotiation position.

Option A. Offer to accept the new Soviet proposal on the cruise missile range definition if they accept our position on the cruise missile definition issue, making it clear that we have not accepted limitation of any conventionally armed cruise missile after the expiration of the Protocol.

Option B. Accept the new Soviet proposal on the cruise missile range definition; be prepared to accept the Soviet position on the cruise missile definition issue.

AGENCY POSITIONS/ARGUMENTS

SecDef and CJCS favor Option A. To make the Soviet range definition acceptable, we must have Soviet agreement to our current position on cruise missile definition. Otherwise the Soviet range definition would impact heavily on ongoing programs for conventionally-armed cruise missiles, including anti-ship Tomahawk, the radar harassment vehicle, and "returnable cruise missiles" to attack airfields, etc. Restrictions on conventional weapons have no place in SALT and would create grave political problems, both here and with our allies.

In addition, to reduce problems with the allies, it must be clear within the USG that the non-circumvention clause would not preclude us from cooperating with our allies on cruise missile tests to beyond 600 km, for deployment after the Protocol. We already have a cooperative program with the FRG for a conventional weapon which could be caught by the Soviet range definition, and preservation of the right to cooperate on cruise missiles for theater nuclear applications is important for the credibility of our argument that we have left NATO options unconstrained.

State/ACDA favor Option B. Soviets made major concession to us on no limits on ALCM range (overcomes our air defense problems through 1985 by permitting unlimited stand-off capability and unlimited maneuvers against defense) in return

for the 600 km limit on GLCMs and SLCMs. If we now tie this to other issues, we jeopardize this concession. In any event, we are not hurt by the 600 limit since it is only for the Protocol for GLCMs and SLCMs.

Additionally, State/ACDA believe that instead of tying this issue to Soviet acceptance of our CM definition, we should be prepared to accept the Soviet all-armed definition. Our current position cannot be verified and would allow deployment of "alleged" conventionally-armed, long-range CMs on Backfire. In any event, GLCMs and SLCMs are covered only in the Protocol.

12. Backfire

ISSUE: Should the ban on association with an intercontinental mission be included in our list of Backfire assurances?

There is agreement on including the freeze on the Backfire production rate (2 1/2 per month) and the ban on upgrade in range/payload capability. There is also agreement that we should state to the Soviets (and publicly) that we retain the right to deploy an aircraft comparable to the Backfire.

Option A. Include the ban on association with an intercontinental mission.

Option B. Do not include the ban on association with an intercontinental mission.

AGENCY POSITIONS/ARGUMENTS

State/ACDA favor Option A. Since we could monitor the Soviets' changing Backfire operations from theater to strategic, this ban would provide some additional constraint on the use of the Backfire. It thus provides a basis for challenging changes in Backfire missions. In these ways, it improves our case with Congress.

SecDef and CJCS position. The JCS position remains that Backfire should count in the aggregate.

In the event it is not, the ban on "association" is not crucial. It would provide some basis for challenging Soviet actions, but even without it, conversion of forces not covered by SALT for intercontinental missions would raise compliance and non-circumvention problems. To avoid the appearance of trusting in Soviet assurances that are not verifiable and pose easy breakout opportunities, DOD prefers Option B, i.e., to drop the "association" assurance.

The table at Tab A shows where there is interagency agreement on other unresolved issues.

-- 2. ICBM Fractionation. Oppose the Gromyko proposal for a 6-RV limit on the exempted ICBM, in particular in light of the existence of a 10-RV variant of the SS-18. Hold to 10 RVs.

-- 3. New Types Definition. This issue can be quickly settled in Geneva, since Gromyko indicated flexibility.

-- 4. Size of ICBM Exemption/Heavy Mobile Missiles. Gromyko did not address our proposed ban on heavy mobile missiles (heavy mobile ICBMs, heavy SLBMs, and heavy ASBMs). It need not be mentioned since initial Soviet reactions in Geneva to this proposal have been positive and it should be easy to resolve.

-- 8. Intercontinental Cruise Missiles (ICCMs). In agreeing to the Soviet proposal to drop all cruise missile range limits over 600 km, we would also be dropping our proposal to ban ICCMs through 1985. This might be noted for Gromyko in discussing the cruise missile range definition issue.

-- 10. Depressed Trajectories. Our proposed ban on testing SLBMs on depressed trajectories would be desirable, although this will not be a barrier to completion of the agreement.

-- 11. Dismantling to 2250/Duration of Protocol. Accept the Soviet-proposed December 30, 1981 date for completion of dismantling, provided: (1) they accept June 30, 1981 for Protocol termination and (2) those systems to be dismantled to reach 2250 are put in a state of irreversible inoperability by June 30, 1981. With regard to the second point, we have tabled in Geneva criteria for rendering inoperable systems to be dismantled to reach 2250. We are willing to negotiate on them.

-- 13. Telemetry Encryption. We have proposed in Geneva that the sides agree on a Common Understanding to clarify the issue of telemetry encryption. This Common Understanding would obligate the sides not to engage in deliberate denial

of telemetric information, such as through the use of telemetry encryption, which impedes verification of compliance with the provisions of the Treaty. You might reiterate this position to Gromyko and stress its importance.

It would be appropriate to mention to Gromyko that there are a number of other issues that need to be resolved in Geneva, without naming them. (This includes such items as bomber counting rules, data based issues, statement of SALT THREE principles, ICBM test notification, etc.)

IA NICARAGUAN

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SIT REP

24 December 1978

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Review of Judgments from IIM 78-10021C,
15 September 1978, Situation in Nicaragua 25X1

1. President Somoza appears more confident of his ability to retain power than at any time in recent months. His dilatory tactics in the mediation -- making concessions in order to buy time and to challenge his opponents to follow suit -- have been reasonably successful. Because the opposition has neither the cohesive strength nor the flexibility of Somoza's power structure, continued concessions over time will likely further splinter the Broad Opposition Front (FAO). Consequently, he will not reject outright the mediators' general proposals, for this would place on him the onus of destroying the mediation. 25X1

2. As long as the mediation continues, Somoza appears likely to strengthen his position further. He has increased the size of the National Guard from 8,200 to roughly 10,000, an effective increase in combat forces of more than 30 percent. These forces are now well armed and facing no critical munitions shortages, save perhaps field rations. Guard loyalty to Somoza still appears solid. He evidently believes that only mass civil uprisings, direct foreign intervention, or guerrilla neutralization of his air power -- none of which seems likely at the moment -- would pose a critical military threat to his government. 25X1

3. Somoza's confidence is also likely bolstered by his perceptions that: the Broad Opposition Front is headed for collapse; international pressures from Venezuela, Panama, and Costa Rica have lessened; and completion of the coffee and cotton harvests in a few months will ease Nicaragua's financial crisis. 25X1

4. The Sandinista guerrillas are well armed and number roughly 2,000. They have not, however, staged the long expected all-out offensive, and currently they seem inclined to restrict their activities to hit and run strikes. The reasons

This memorandum was prepared by the Latin America Division of the Office of Regional and Political Analysis. Questions and comments may be addressed to 25X1

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for this are: continuing factionalism, counsel from such foreign backers as Fidel Castro and Venezuelan President Perez, the lure of the recently granted amnesty, the military imbalance in favor of the Guard, and, for some, the hope that the mediation and plebiscite might remove Somoza peacefully. [REDACTED]

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5. Over the longer term, however, if the mediation effort fails, some of these factors will change. The current low level of violence and polarization is due to guerrilla inactivity and the anticipation of peaceful change through a plebiscite, not resolution of the fundamental issues. Collapse of the hope for peaceful change -- and presumably the US disassociates itself from the Somoza government -- will serve to galvanize anti-Somoza efforts inside Nicaragua as well as abroad. This would not remove all the causes of factionalism within the FSLN, but it would boost public support for the guerrillas as they would increasingly be seen as the only means to oust Somoza. [REDACTED]

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6. Foreign support for the guerrillas and for the anti-Somoza movement in general would likely increase. Regardless of how technically sound Somoza's case might be on the question of whose intransigence killed the mediation, international opinion will simply become more polarized, with the bulk of it against Somoza. [REDACTED]

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7. Under these circumstances, Panama's General Torrijos would probably step up the level of arms support to the FSLN, and, particularly if mass civil war were to ensue, might well go beyond that. Venezuelan President Perez has retreated from his previous policy of providing arms to the guerrillas. Because he would like desperately to see Somoza ousted before his own term ends in March, however, his greater involvement cannot be ruled out. Costa Rica would probably continue to provide the guerrillas their critical sanctuary as well as more concrete forms of support. Cuban backing has been cautious but increasing, and as the level of violence grew, Castro would be tempted to up the ante. [REDACTED]

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8. All of this would exacerbate polarization, and while Somoza might be able to retain power through draconian measures, the only two choices would be a police state or a downward spiral of violence ending in the ascendancy of the radical left.

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[REDACTED]

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There are no assurances, on the other hand, that should Somoza depart peacefully, the relatively untested opposition would be able to govern effectively enough to win the confidence of the Guard, while at the same time thwarting encroachment from the radical left. But the radical outcome seems less certain if the Somoza dynasty is dismantled systematically and with a measure of control than if it is put to the violent test in which only one extreme can prevail. [REDACTED].

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[REDACTED]

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February 28, 1979

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

#12A

CONSULTATIVE SECURITY FRAMEWORK FOR THE MIDDLE EAST (U)

The fall of the Shah's regime in Iran has added a new and dangerous dimension to the crisis in the Middle East. Immediately, we face a problem of perceptions and expectations. For all countries, and especially those with whom we have good relations, the future is uncertain and threatening. They lack confidence in the direction of U.S. policy and in the willingness of the U.S. to use its power on behalf of their security. This political and psychological crisis can only be contained by forceful and purposeful U.S. action. (S)

The basic sources of instability in the Middle East remain:

-- The Arab-Israeli conflict and the frustrated political aspirations of Palestinians.

-- Political radicalism that feeds on that conflict and on the unevenness of socio-economic development.

-- Determined, opportunistic Soviet efforts to exploit these stresses to displace U.S. influence in the area and to expand that of the U.S.S.R. for ideological, strategic and economic purposes.

-- The great disparity in wealth and human resources with the region. (C)

The stakes at the moment are extremely high. Another major setback to U.S. policy in the area -- such as collapse of Camp David, the fall of Sadat, political instability in Saudi Arabia, or another slump in U.S.-Turkish relations -- could put the region dangerously out of control. Another Arab-Israeli war, reentry of Soviet influence at the center of the region, sharp diminution of U.S. influence in the Arab world, and denial of Western access to Middle East oil could ensure. (TS)

Instability in the Middle East interacts closely with U.S., Western European and Japanese economic conditions. Anxieties on all fronts are intensified by the great dependence of the West on Middle East oil resources. The reaction of oil-producing states in the region to the impact of Iran on the market seems destined to intensify inflationary pressures resulting from tight energy conditions in Western economies. At the same time,

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CLASSIFIED BY Johnnie B. Brzezinski
ON 2/28/1999

TOP SECRET 6 YEARS BY Johnnie B. Brzezinski
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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

PER 10/17/96 NK BYRE MR-116-95-65

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JCL, DHM, ZBC, SF, BOX 20
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the voracious appetite of the West for oil makes it difficult to manage the economic development of the oil-producing states, especially Saudi Arabia, in an orderly manner. This set of conditions makes it highly desirable that U.S. steps to enhance Middle East security be coupled with new steps to reduce U.S. dependence on Middle East oil and to coordinate policy initiatives with the Europeans and Japanese. Such steps would have the salutary effects of demonstrating policy discipline and giving U.S. diplomacy somewhat greater freedom of action in the Middle East. (S)

In response to these developments, the United States should seek to develop a consultative security framework for the Middle East. This concept does not envisage a formal alliance system in the Middle East, nor is it simply another name for bilateral cooperation on security issues between the U.S. and selected regional countries. Instead, it postulates a case of countries sharing common interests with the United States and, at least implicitly, with each other who would consciously enhance their security and intelligence relations with us, and to some degree with one another.

We would have varying degrees of close relations with these countries; we would seek opportunities to build a sense of common purpose in dealing with specific threats; and we would institutionalize to some extent the sharing of information with the core countries. (TS)

Strategic Concept

The U.S. should react to the immediate crisis in ways that lay the groundwork for the consultative security framework in the Middle East. The elements of that framework should be:

- Peace between Israel and Egypt.
- A political process designed to contain, and if possible resolve, the Palestinian dimension of the Arab-Israeli conflict over a period of several years.
- A security framework that enhances stable military relationships within the region, with appropriate arms controls, and exclusion of destabilizing influence from outside.
- A region-wide campaign of socio-economic development that mobilizes and pools the now disconnected resources of the

region -- population, technical-organizational skill levels, wealth from oil, and political authority -- toward greater prosperity and political institution-building. (S)

These elements or goals are interrelated and must be advanced to a substantial degree. These features of a new order in the Middle East will not spring up spontaneously, and they cannot be imposed from the outside. But they can be nurtured from the outside. The U.S. is the only nation with the power and political influence to bring about these changes, and even our role will of necessity be primarily that of a catalyst. Our ultimate objective in the Middle East must be to cultivate an awareness of common security problems that will lead to cooperative actions. This will take many years, because the region lacks a common, dominant political culture and a capacity to submerge internal conflicts in the face of a common threat. This problem is compounded by the widespread perception that the U.S. is not a reliable ally. (S)

In some ways, launching a regional security strategy with the goals stated above can be likened to the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, and the creation of NATO in Western Europe after World War II. Then, too, a strategically vital region faced external threat, intra-regional conflicts, socio-economic privation, and local radicalism for which U.S. power, wealth, and leadership toward unity were the remedy. (C)

The principal asset of the U.S. in developing a consultative security framework is its basically good relations with [redacted] nations of the region: [redacted]

[redacted] Building up the strength of these nations and their confidence in the U.S. is the foundation on which our longer-term strategy can best be constructed. Our NATO allies, and to some extent the Japanese, are aware of the degree to which our traditional security ties and concerns must reach out to affect conditions in the Third World, especially the Middle East. This is an additional asset to be mobilized. (TS)

The U.S. Commitment

To advance our basic goals, the U.S. will have to assume heavy political, economic and military burdens:

-- We shall have to take the lead in defining security concepts and institutions that are suited to the needs of the regional states.

-- We shall have to continue to work for the broadest possible Arab-Israeli accommodation.

-- U.S. security guarantees to the region will have to be more extensive and perhaps more formal than those currently in existence.

-- We shall have to augment our military presence in the region, particularly in the vicinity of the Persian Gulf.

-- Over the course of the next five years, we shall probably have to spend an additional \$10-15 billion over and above our present annual outlays of \$3 billion in military and economic assistance, even if Saudi, West European, and Japanese resources can be enlisted -- which they should be.

-- Whether we like it or not, we shall probably be forced by pursuit of this strategy to take steps in U.S.-Soviet bilateral relations that call into question the cooperative elements of those relations. This is because the Soviets will see our new purposefulness in the area as directly hostile to their interests, and they are likely to escalate their own efforts to oppose ours.

-- We shall have, finally, to demonstrate a new level of commitment to energy policies at home that reduce the U.S. national reliance on Middle East oil imports, and encourage within the limits of the possible similar policies on the part of Europe and Japan. (S)

Words and Actions

To explain our new strategy toward the Middle East to friends in the region, allies, and to our own public will at some early point require a major Presidential pronouncement. This message will have to lay out our security concept for the region and link it with new domestic steps in the energy field. Such a statement should follow, not precede, tangible steps which demonstrate the viability of this approach. Any sense that lofty U.S. rhetoric will not be followed by strong actions would be counterproductive. (S)

Action Agenda

1. Brown's trip should be followed by a Vance or Brzezinski trip to the key countries [redacted] to give political structure and momentum to our new commitment to the area, and to elicit support for next steps.

2. The President should make a speech promulgating the Carter Plan for the Middle East, preferably after the signing of an Egypt-Israel peace treaty.

3. The Camp David peace process should continue, mindful that success will be ambiguous in value because it will tend to polarize the Arabs, and that failure must not be allowed to weaken our overall position in the Middle East. A U.S. dialogue with Palestinians should be part of any post-treaty negotiation on the West Bank/Gaza.

4. We should increase U.S. military capabilities and off-shore presence relevant to the Persian Gulf (see following) and attempt to persuade the Egyptians, Saudis, and Omanis to agree to permit access and landing rights to needed on-shore basing facilities.

5. We should develop a comprehensive plan for modernizing, and reducing, the Egyptian armed forces for self-defense and some projection capability on behalf of Sudan and against Libyan threats. A comprehensive program of economic assistance should also be developed.

6. A major effort in military and economic assistance to Turkey must be initiated.

7. We should undertake a major policy review of our entire relationship with, and presence in, Saudi Arabia.

8. With Saudi cooperation, overt and covert action against the PDRY regime should be considered. Similar steps in cooperation with Egypt against Qadhafi should be reviewed.

9. We should put such pressure as we can on the U.S.S.R. to take concrete steps that will reduce destabilizing Soviet influences in the area, e.g., a halt to anti-American propaganda in Iran; a reduction of Soviet-Cuban presence in Libya, the PDRY, and Ethiopia.

10. Iraq, Syria, and Iran's new leadership should be approached to prevent their concluding that we have written them off.

11. In collaboration with the Saudis and, perhaps, the Egyptians, a comprehensive plan for the security of Oman should be implemented. This should include military and internal security support, joint exercises and planning, and occasional demonstrations of presence.

12. We should immediately begin exploring with key NATO allies and with Japan the possible forms of support they could offer to implementation of our strategy. While some allies will object, we should begin to engage the formal staff machinery of the Alliance in examining the problems of Middle East security. (TS)

U.S. Military Capabilities and Presence

We should immediately undertake a series of demonstrative actions, stretched over a period of months, to underscore U.S. interests and capabilities. Examples are:

-- Visits by U.S. military forces and personnel to key countries for symbolic and consultative purposes, avoiding the hollowness of the F-15 visit to Saudi Arabia.

-- Upgrade our plans for Diego Garcia.

-- Add several combatant vessels to Middle East Force.

-- Cruise a carrier strike element from Seventh Fleet through the Arabia Sea.

-- Exercise the passage of a U.S. nuclear-powered combatant through the Suez Canal, to which Sadat evidently agreed in principle during Brown's visit.

-- Conduct a series of low-keyed, but visible, combined force exercises in the U.S. Southwest, testing logistics, air, sea, and land combat capability relevant to operations in the Persian Gulf.

-- Establish an East-of-Suez Command entity of some kind, located in the U.S. but equipped to move. (TS)

Meanwhile, we should consolidate, update, and act on the appropriate force posture and programming recommendations contained in OSD, JCS, and PRM-43 studies. We should resolve the matter of making South Asian contingency capabilities fully independent of capabilities for a NATO war, and program accordingly. (S)

Consulting with the Saudis, we should get Oman to agree to a small, but visible joint amphibious landing exercise on the southern coast of Oman. (S)

We should begin a careful, but systematic policy review of the option of getting the Saudis and the Egyptians to agree to regular base access for U.S. contingency forces in Saudi Arabia and in the Sinai. Provision for prepositioning appropriate stocks should be sought. (S)

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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Box 20, Folder: Alpha Channel -
Miscellaneous 5/19-8/79

~~TOP SECRET/EYES ONLY~~

May 1, 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: CNA-78 (U)

Your comments of April 30 are highly pertinent and helpful. As you know, I share many of your concerns. Indeed, I feel strongly that we need to take some decisions now if the negative trends, which could so adversely affect our position in the early eighties, are to be averted.

I am glad that you approve the notion of an NSC meeting on the subject, and I will proceed to schedule one.

To give it focus, and to make the discussion of Presidential import, I intend to structure the agenda around the following three fundamental questions:

1. What are the requirements of stable deterrence, now and up to the mid-eighties?
2. What are the requirements of stable crisis bargaining, now and up to the mid-eighties?
3. What are the requirements of effective war management with defined political purposes, now and up to the mid-eighties?

I will ask my staff to coordinate with your staff and that of State in the development of some appropriate issue papers, covering the three questions indicated above.

Zbigniew Brzezinski

cc: The Secretary of State

~~TOP SECRET/EYES ONLY~~
Review May 1, 1985

DECLASSIFIED
E.O.12958, Sec.3.6
PER 8/27/97 NSC/RE NLC-96-145
BY [signature] NARS DATE 11/10/97

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DA ✓ #2
we need to
set up the
NSC work
+ timing of
the meeting
28.
to me

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May 1, 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR: DAVID AARON
FROM: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI
SUBJECT: CNA-78 (U)

Please note my response to Brown, as well as Brown's rather significant comments on our CNA-78. I think we need to consult carefully on the development and organization of the NSC meeting. The first step ought to be the development of a proposal to the President for such a meeting, giving its rationale and focus.

The second step ought to involve a coordinated effort to provide the President with appropriate papers.

In relationship to the foregoing, I would welcome your thoughts on the timing of such a meeting, particularly bearing in mind the ongoing exercises on targeting and CG. My instinct would be to use the NSC meeting as a cap for the foregoing, with the CNA as the framework for discussion.

What are your thoughts?

David: The State response is also attached.

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I agree we should include it to the Secret Debate
There is a lot of work to be done
is a good way to start

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Review May 1, 1985

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
PER 9/27/97 NLC/RE NLC-96-145
BY [signature] NARS DATE 11/10/97



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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

May 1, 1979

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MEMORANDUM FOR DR. ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Comprehensive Net Assessment 1978
(CNA-78)

We believe CNA-78 is a useful effort to review overall East-West trends and changes since the earlier PRM-10 exercise. The paper correctly confirms most of the broad lines of existing Administration policy in PD-18. It also identifies several important issues which deserve and are receiving continuing attention, including:

-- US clear-cut non-military advantages and the need to exploit them fully in the on-going competition with Moscow;

-- destabilizing Soviet military programs and the need to counter them through military modernization and arms control;

-- the changing situation in the Persian Gulf (and oil prices) and the need for an effective US strategy; and

-- the US-USSR-PRC relationship and the need to consider how relations with China aid and damage our relations with Moscow.

We have some problems with the CNA methodology, which appears to be based on zero-sum assumptions. Scorecards of US/Soviet "gains" and "losses" are inherently difficult to evaluate and the CNA criteria seem unclear and incomplete; the study discerns two US defeats but it is not apparent what they (or the gains) were. Moreover, "popularity" is a questionable indicator of power. The focus on political and military trends is potentially misleading without the perspective of existing absolute balances.

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XDS-3 5/1/09, (LAKE, Anthony)

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We believe that the treatment of the substantive issues is far too broad to allow any policy decisions to be made. Instead, we should continue to use the SCC and PRC for high-level decision-making, as we now are doing (for example) with MX, strategic targeting and numerous regional issues.

We have some specific concerns about the military, political-diplomatic and economic areas of the US/Soviet balance as assessed by CNA-78.

Military Balance - CNA appraisals of strategic and power projection force trends are too somber, the positive NATO trends may be somewhat overstated and theater nuclear forces are discussed only elliptically.

-- Strategic Forces. We agree that the Minuteman survivability problem will be with us earlier than anticipated but the paper conveys undue alarm.

- This year's CG shows a substantial increase in US capability, whether or not we deploy MX, and a US advantage over the Soviets after 1986. If MX is not deployed, we will almost certainly advance the Trident II and CMC IOCs and accelerate production of missiles, submarines, CMCs and cruise missiles.
- The report does not address the survivability of each side's forces. For example, only 20% of our warheads, but 70% of theirs, are in ICBMs. Both sides' ICBMs can become vulnerable, placing the Soviets in a worse situation.
- The statement that adverse strategic trends result from US program trends is not sound. In fact, we are in the midst of a major strategic forces modernization drive -- with ALCM, Trident SSBNs, Trident I missiles and MK-12A all coming on line soon.
- The CNA recommendation for greater emphasis on limited nuclear options (LNO) is a highly contentious one which would require detailed interagency study.

- ° The paper does not consider the capability of US forces to meet their basic deterrent tasks.

-- European balance. As far as we can tell, the CNA judgments are not based on any rigorous analysis of changes in NATO and Warsaw Pact forces (e.g. ratio of Armored Division Equivalents or of tactical aircraft). We agree that NATO has begun to improve the military situation but the CNA may be too optimistic given Western economic constraints. This year's CG shows that no significant change in the balance can yet be measured and that we need to pursue the LTDP and maintain our European emphasis through the 1980s to have an important impact on the balance.

-- Theater Nuclear Forces (TNF). CNA-78 expresses concern over the evident political problems but does not analyze the complex military issues involved and exaggerates the implications for Germany. It also fails to note encouraging allied progress toward a dual modernization/arms control strategy and the real possibility that these two policy instruments may be able to resolve our TNF problem.

-- Power Projection. The paper offers no evidence to support the judgment that the trend has favored the Soviets during the last two years. The Soviets have demonstrated their capacity to supply troubled allies or friends but not to carry out these actions if opposed nor to wage distant wars themselves. This remains an area of large overall US advantage.

In sum, the document appears to downplay an emphasis on NATO vis-a-vis strategic and power projection forces. We do not find the arguments persuasive and strongly favor continuation of DOD's current European emphases as stated in PD-18.

Political/Diplomatic Balance

-- Great power triangular relations are treated primarily in terms of the costs and benefits of using our relations with Beijing either to induce Soviet cooperation or to constrain Soviet expansion. We agree that these two elements are important factors to be considered in our relations with the Soviet Union and China but the discussion

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- 4 -

oversimplifies the range and significance of our relationships with both countries. There are prospective interests and activities we may wish to consider vis-a-vis the Soviet Union which may have a minimal impact on China, and a comparable set of relationships with China that may neither work to constrain the Soviets nor induce their cooperation. Our overall objective should be to strengthen and improve our relations with both China and the Soviet Union in ways which enhance global US security and influence.

-- We believe more weight should be accorded to Europe and Japan in the political/diplomatic balance. The strength of the industrial democracies is a fundamental factor in our international position. This is in contrast to the significant problems faced by the USSR in a potentially unstable Eastern Europe.

-- The paper's speculation concerning a Soviet "German card" is highly misleading and could lead to policy judgments and conclusions which would be potentially destructive of US/FRG relations.

-- US/Soviet competition in the Third World significantly complicates our bilateral and overall East-West relations. As the CNA acknowledges, however, it is far from clear that the turbulence in the Third World translates into durable Soviet gains. Perhaps because of the time at which the CNA was written, it does not take account of (a) the Egyptian-Israeli treaty; (b) the Baghdad Summit and shift of conservative Arab governments; (c) the current anti-Soviet unrest in Afghanistan; or (d) the shift in US policy from arms control to increased military presence in the Indian Ocean/Persian Gulf area. These recent events underscore the difficulty of drawing balances in a time of significant and rapid political flux and the dubiousness of weighting all countries the same.

-- While we have an overall advantage in international political and diplomatic standing compared with Moscow, the picture is far more complex than that depicted in CNA-78. There was no pro-Soviet trend in 1977 as the CNA states. On the other hand, we have clearly had our share of problems and reversals in the last two years. In fact, some of the policies which have improved our overall standing have at least temporarily worsened our relations with some important governments. The balance between our global policies and some of our bilateral

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objectives has on occasion been hard to maintain. It is difficult to mesh these factors with the trends described in CNA-78 other than to emphasize the complexity of the issues and the difficulties of defining the world in terms of US-Soviet relations.

The CNA recommendations on specific countries and on covert action are addressed more appropriately when we deal with specific issues relating to US security presence in the Middle East and to our relationships with Ethiopia and Afghanistan.

Economic/Technological Balance. CNA-78 states that the "trend in technology remains strongly favorable to the Soviet Union" since Soviet R&D expenditures as a percentage of GNP are higher than the US. In real terms, however, the US has a major technological advantage over the USSR which the Russians are most unlikely to overcome. This technological advantage is still greater when comparing East and West as a whole. Indeed, given the West's technological base, the East may well feel further behind the West, regardless of their relatively greater R&D investment.


The paper also contends that the US should exploit its economic and technological advantage as a lever to affect Soviet behavior. Such leverage has proven difficult to apply (e.g. Jackson-Vanik Amendment; oil drilling equipment). Support for "national liberation struggles" remains a basic tenet of Soviet foreign policy, which Moscow is unlikely to alter in order to obtain Western economic favors. Moreover, US economic leverage is weakened by domestic political pressures from US producers (especially farmers) and the clear

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unwillingness of our OECD partners to adopt a common
stance on this issue with Moscow.



Peter Tarnoff
Executive Secretary

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MEMORANDUM

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THE WHITE HOUSE

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WASHINGTON

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ACTION

May 17, 1979

C

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

SUBJECT: Vance/Brown Memo on TNF (C)

Tab A is an important memo from Cy Vance and Harold Brown outlining our approach to TNF, which I endorse in full. The approach aims at reaching an Alliance consensus on TNF deployments, as well as a TNF arms control approach, by December of this year. (S)

The memo underscores the important role that you must play in leading the Alliance to this consensus. First by making clear to Allied leaders, starting with Schmidt next month, your concern with Soviet TNF efforts and your commitment to see this process through to TNF deployments. Next by giving your endorsement to a set of concrete US proposals for TNF modernization that would be discussed with the Allies by a Presidential emissary over the course of the summer. And, finally, by going on record publicly to set the tone for the debate that must necessarily occur before the Alliance announces its decision in December. (S)

Since the Vance/Brown memo was drafted, we have had indications that the prospects for the success of this approach are increasing:

- The Germans have emerged from the uncertainties of the March Bundestag debate with a more constructive attitude. Even Minister of Defense Apel, who has wavered in the past, has taken a more strong and supportive position with Harold, so long as the new systems are based in more than one country (as the Germans have repeatedly said).

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 E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
 PER 12/17/87 NK/H RE ALL-96-195
 DATE 11/10/97

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Despite these positive signs there are clearly risks in this approach. But Cy's and Harold's judgment, which I share, is that we will face greater risks -- for us and for the Alliance -- if we do not take a strong lead now in forging the Alliance consensus. Because they are uncertain that you are willing to take that lead, Cy and Harold are seeking your guidance. If we are to continue on the track that Cy and Harold outline -- a track that we have already started to move down -- we need to move quickly. We have little time before December and much to do, as the Tab B decision / consultation track, which the NSC staff drafted, shows. To get the ball rolling, we need your authorization:

- To initiate SCC studies aimed at pulling together by the end of June an initial US TNF modernization proposal to be discussed bilaterally with the Allies in July.
- To prepare a letter to Schmidt, outlining your approach to the TNF problem as described in the Vance / Brown

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memo (if you agree), to prepare him for your discussions. This letter would also provide an opportunity to link MBFR with TNF, making clear that MBFR progress, if it occurs, should not stand in the way of TNF deployments or implementation of the remainder of the LTDP. (S)

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the above course of action. (U)

Approve Disapprove

J

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#73

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

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May 9, 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
From: Cyrus Vance *cvl*
Harold Brown *HB*
Subject: TNF Modernization -- US Diplomacy,
Your Role and the Schmidt Visit

Background

Soviet theater nuclear modernization efforts, coupled with Soviet attainment of strategic parity, enhance the significance of the situation in which NATO does not have missiles on the continent of Europe that can strike Soviet territory. Although this situation has existed since the early 1960s, it now has political, as well as military, significance: vocal Allied -- (especially West German) concerns about the SS-20 and Backfire and about the SALT II protocol constraints on US cruise missiles manifest this. Chancellor Schmidt defined this issue politically in a 1977 speech.

In order to meet both political and military requirements, we believe that the US needs to take the step of deploying new long-range nuclear systems on the European continent -- either Pershing ballistic missiles or cruise missiles, or perhaps some combination. This would maintain a perception of a firm US commitment to the defense of Europe, forge Alliance unity, and strengthen deterrence by providing credible escalation options. Without prodding from us, the NPG High Level Group (HLG) has reached the same conclusion. The HLG believes that deployments of 200 - 600 additional long-range warheads are all that is needed; there is no need to match the large Soviet long-range theater force, and doing so might be seen as "decoupling" US strategic forces from Europe. The total number of US nuclear warheads in Europe would be held constant and might even decrease.

Diplomacy

We are embarked on a course designed to secure by December an Alliance consensus for new deployments. The Allies must share in the responsibility for the decision; they agree and are calling for a consensus themselves,

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Declassify on: 1 May 85

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PER 12/27/87 NSC BY RE ALL-46-147
BY: [Signature] NARS DATE 6/23/87

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especially the Germans.

The Europeans will not come independently to a consensus within the Alliance, nor should we expect them to: the US bears the ultimate responsibility for the nuclear affairs of the Alliance and reaps substantial benefits (political leverage, non-proliferation, internal European stability, etc.). In our role as Alliance leader on nuclear matters, we have been building the basis for consensus by gathering Allied views through consultations and then periodically by injecting our own views as the basis for consensus. Consistent with this approach, David Aaron, per your instructions, has informed senior officials in six Allied capitals of US support for the High Level Group recommendations.

We now need to reach a consensus on a concrete Alliance deployment program. To reach this consensus, we will have to approach each country soon and explain our view that a security problem exists and that the Alliance must undertake deployments of long-range systems to fix it, and suggest to each how we feel they should participate in the consensus solution (what systems on whose soil, and what statements we expect). It will take time to work out these details bilaterally. Once this is done, we will be in a position to forge a consensus in the Alliance. Before we can begin discussing our ideas we need to develop our own position on the details of participation; this is the immediate task before us internally.

Obtaining a consensus will not be easy. It will require steady guidance from us in the face of Allied wavering. Each Ally confronts major political problems, both domestically and vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. Nuclear issues provoke strong reactions among European publics. The certain Soviet propoganda campaign against deployments will find resonance in many countries because of this, and because of interest in protecting detente.

Each Ally has special conditions that must be taken into account if it is to support deployments. The conditions of the smaller countries are made all the more important by the German condition that at least one other NATO country on the Continent must participate concretely in deployment (by what means the Germans have not made clear). Given concerns about the military, especially nuclear, role of Germany, we ought to share the German view that they should not play a singular role on this most sensitive nuclear matter, but this doesn't make obtaining consensus any easier.

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There are risks for us as well. For instance, the political reaction from Moscow will strain US-Soviet relations. The Europeans' desire for complementary TNF arms control efforts could burden the SALT process, even if we are able to devise a workable proposal for negotiating TNF. But, if we fail to take this step, the problem will remain with the Alliance, seriously aggravated by the knowledge -- here, in Europe, and in Moscow -- that NATO was unable to respond.

Your Role

Your personal role -- first in private and later in public -- will be pivotal in influencing the outcome. Until you have communicated your views to the European leaders, we are likely to find ambivalence as we consult with their governments on how to proceed. These leaders are influenced by the legacy of the neutron bomb affair. For this reason, once leaders in Europe are prepared to deal with the issue, it will be necessary for you to go on record publicly.

Even though a formal, public NATO consensus would not be reached until year's end, at the earliest, it's important for you personally to become engaged now. If Allied leaders see US leadership, they'll assume that in the end NATO will decide for deployment, and they will begin to work toward that end. If they are unsure of where you stand, they will try to put off a decision and not become politically exposed.

Alternatives

Recognizing the risks, we could, of course, decide now not to pursue this potentially rough course and adopt a fall-back position. For example, we could stand aside from the leadership role and hope that the issue subsides. Or, we could seek only new deployments at sea (of SLICMs) or in the UK (of GLICMs); or, we could commit more SSBNs to NATO. But these fall-backs, if adopted now, would not be seen as answering the challenge posed by Soviet deployments. Nor would they ease European doubts about US political will and commitment to European security; on the contrary, these doubts could even increase. The ultimate outcome could be a weakened NATO and a Western Europe more independent of the United States. More immediately, should it become known that the US was attempting to side-step the issue of

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- 4 -

new long-range TNF deployments, chances for SALT ratification would clearly be harmed.

Some of these fall-backs (SLOM) might be more politically acceptable if the Europeans conclude in the face of US leadership that a consensus on Continental systems is not possible.

Schmidt Visit

If you agree with the course outlined here, your personal role in our diplomacy should begin with the Schmidt visit. Schmidt has got to be convinced of both our constancy and our willingness to accept the responsibility of leading the Alliance -- and Germany -- to a consensus for deployments in the face of political wavering in Europe and hostility from the Soviets.

You should also give the Chancellor an opportunity to tell you if he sees real problems for Germany in following the course toward eventual deployments. If he has strong misgivings, or if he has ideas on how to respond to the problem militarily in ways different from the consensus of the HLG, we should know now.

Schmidt's domestic situation encourages procrastination and equivocation on his part. The Left Wing of his own party -- the main source of his problem -- wants to avoid deployments, largely because of fear of damage to Ostpolitik; the opposition and his coalition partner (the FDP) favor deployments. Schmidt's strategy for managing this situation involves his conditions for deployments in the FRG: it must be an "Alliance decision;" at least one other NATO country on the Continent must participate concretely in deployments; a deployment decision must be accompanied by sincere arms control attempts.

We share Schmidt's interest in SPD party unity and the political and humanitarian gains of Ostpolitik for the German people. But at the same time, Schmidt has to realize that there are stakes that transcend the vicissitudes of German politics. Schmidt probably agrees: he wants an Alliance consensus and US leadership to help contain the problem on his Left and to limit the impact of Soviet political and propaganda maneuvers.

In June, you should tell Schmidt that you believe that the Alliance faces an important military and political problem and that some deployments are needed to correct it,

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- 5 -

including deployments in Germany -- probably of the Pershing II missile. You should tell him that the US intends to work with other countries on this basis and to move to an Alliance consensus by December. You will have to convince the Chancellor of your determination to bring about the conditions (including second country participation in deployments and a serious TNF arms control approach) that would make a deployment consensus as painless as possible for him and for Germany. You will want to make clear to Schmidt that you are sensitive to his -- and Germany's -- political problem on this issue, and that you are therefore willing to accept primary responsibility, though his support of our efforts is necessary.

Ideally, it would be desirable if Schmidt responded by giving you unconditional agreement to deployments in Germany. He will almost certainly not do so, at least partly out of concern that we would only make a perfunctory effort to meet his conditions; but we can expect him to be fairly positive and to indicate his support. He does not want the burden of derailing deployments after you have indicated that you think there's a need, especially since he was instrumental in raising the issue in the first place.

Even if we can't expect an unconditional agreement to deployment in Germany, presenting your thoughts to Schmidt will show him that you have assumed a firm lead and that the burden for not going forward with deployments will be that much more on his shoulders. Also, having given him this chance to state misgivings, he'll feel he has less freedom to maneuver later on if he does not give you a negative signal.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff concurs with the thrust of this memorandum.

~~SECRET~~

Alpha. Lee
18

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

May 18, 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: TNF Modernization (C)

The President has approved the general approach outlined in your memorandum of May 9, and, more specifically, he has authorized: (S)

-- SCC studies aimed at pulling together by the end of June an initial TNF modernization proposal which will be discussed bilaterally with the allies in July. (S)

-- A letter to Schmidt outlining the U.S. approach to the TNF problem as described in your memorandum. This letter could also preview a possible link between TNF and MBFR progress, making it clear that the latter would not be an obstacle to the necessary steps on TNF within the context of the LTDP. (S)

I will have my staff by in touch with yours regarding the proposed text of such a letter, which we could submit to the President in time for dispatch to Schmidt, so that Schmidt can consider it before coming to Washington. (S)

Zbigniew Brzezinski

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Review on May 18, 1985

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

PER *8/27/97 NCS* BY *MLC-96-145*
NARS DATE *11/10/97*

#70

TNF Decision / Consultation Track

The Goal

In December, a two-part culmination, consisting of: (1) a NAC, DPC or joint NAC / DPC statement reflecting Allinace consensus on TNF deployments and arms control; (2) Individual NATO government statements of support and indications of what they will do to implement the consensus (specifically, what deployments they will accept, etc.).

In addition to general language about the context -- NATO doctrine, the threat, arms control, etc. -- the consensus would contain the following major elements:

- Endorsement of a US program to deploy -- for example -- 400 - 600 Pershing II and cruise missile warheads.
- A statement that a like (or perhaps larger) number of warheads (for shorter-range systems) will be withdrawn from Europe, perhaps with a reference to MBFR or a beefing-up of the MBFR warhead offer.
- Endorsement of SALT III negotiations on theater systems accompanied by guiding principles.
- Announcement of establishment of a NATO consultative mechanism to deal with SALT III theater arms control.

In their own statements, individual governments would be explicit about implementation. This is necessary so that the NATO program is firm and not hostage to future political vacillation by any countries. It is also needed to bring the Soviets to negotiate seriously about their own TNF.

The Track

1. May DPC and NAC Ministerial meetings are used for a general exchange on the TNF problem, and the need for decision by December. Communiques used to begin sensitizing publics to the problem.

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 PER 9/27/97 NSC/RE/ALL C-96-145
 BY [Signature] NARS DATE 11/10/97

2. On June 6, the President lays out to Schmidt US position (deployments are needed; Alliance consensus is needed; arms control could help, but not eliminate need for deployments; US will lead Alliance in formulation of consensus; US will work to bring about conditions for deployment in Germany -- widespread participation, arms control; US needs German support). The President also reviews this track with Schmidt to indicate more clearly what we intend to do.
3. Early June François-Poncet visit provides opportunity to outline US position and encourage French to support US efforts, not to impede Alliance procedures, and to indicate to Schmidt that the French support NATO TNF modernization and are willing to say so publicly. We might encourage the French to time their own modernization decisions in the December period to help Schmidt with his two-country basing position.
4. At the June 28 / 29 Economic Summit the President will be able to outline the US position to Thatcher, Giscard and Andreotti.
5. At the US / Soviet Summit, the President will be able to put down some markers on TNF that will be important to have on-the-record and to cite publicly: that the US is concerned about Soviet efforts; that the Alliance must take these efforts into account in its own defense efforts, but is also willing to discuss both US and Soviet theater systems in SALT III (under the terms of the US unilateral formula. We might seek Soviet agreement in the communique to the terms of the formula that any future limits on theater systems must be mutual.)
6. During the month of June, the US will internally develop a detailed TNF deployment program, which will be the basis for approaching the Allies bilaterally to seek their agreement. Of necessity, this program will be maximal; we will have to be prepared to alter the

Program and probably scale it back to accommodate Allied interests. An illustrative maximal program is attached. The US will also develop options for the total US nuclear warhead stockpile in Europe to see if it is possible to respond to Dutch interest in reducing the stockpile at the same time that long-range TNF are increased.

7. The period of July through September will see bilateral consultations on the US suggestions. At least two rounds will be necessary. First, a high-level US presentation (by David Aaron) followed by embassy contacts and perhaps a second round of high level discussions.
8. Based on these consultations, the US will be in a position in late September to introduce a program into the Alliance for HLG review, perhaps including a few options and an overall reduction in US nuclear warheads in Europe.
9. At this point -- if consultations have gone well and Allied leaders are prepared to deal with the issue publicly -- it would be desirable for the President to make a public statement supporting new deployments. This would help solidify Allied support and perhaps help with SALT ratification.
10. Through the summer, the US will work internally to develop a concrete SALT III TNF arms control position, so that it can -- if necessary -- be able to advance a proposal in December or sooner, depending on the SALT III situation.
11. At the end of September, the NATO Special Group will complete its report and forward to the NAC suggestions for TNF arms control principles.

#7E

Illustrative Deployment Program

General

The following program illustrates how the US might initially approach the Allies to gain their agreement to specific forms of participation. It is an ambitious approach which would almost certainly have to be scaled-back or altered during negotiations.

Before initiating contact we would have to be able to make clear to each country:

- where we suggest the forces should be deployed;
- the approximate number of personnel involved (military, civilian and dependents);
- the cost to the host government;
- the facilities construction required;
- the peacetime pattern of deployments (both within and outside military installations);
- how the force might deploy in crises.

For US single-key deployments, the US would normally pay for the procurement and operation of the forces. For two-key deployments, the Allied country would normally pay for everything except the warheads. The best opportunity for cost-sharing is in the construction and maintenance of installations, either through host-nation support or NATO Infrastructure funding. The latter is preferable because it brings all countries into the program, but the former is probably easier to obtain in a short period of time. Host nations might also be asked to provide security forces.

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E.O.12958, Sec.3.6
PER 8/27/97 N84 RE XLC-96-145
BY [Signature] NARS DATE 11/10/97

This illustrative program is based on permanent basing only. We should also be prepared to discuss alternatives, such as semi-permanent basing schemes, if some Allies refuse to accept basing. We should also be prepared to deal with the desiderata of some countries -- e.g., [redacted] interest in reduction of short-range warheads, [redacted] interest in some kind of voice in the release authority for systems based on their soil.

Illustrative Specific Program

This illustrative program contains 108 Pershing II launchers (200 missiles/warheads) and 112 GLCM TELs (448 missiles/warheads). Assuming retirement of UK Vulcan bombers, this would be a net increase of about 600 warheads -- the upper end of the HLG recommendation.

[redacted]

-- Upgrading of existing US Pershing I to Pershing II (108 launchers, 200 missiles).

[redacted]

-- Deployment of 4 US flights ($\frac{1}{2}$ squadron) of GLCM [redacted] [redacted] * / -- 16 TELs, 64 missiles and roughly 400 US military personnel.

[redacted]

-- Deployment of 4 US flights of GLCM [redacted] * /

[redacted]

-- Deployment of 4 US flights of GLCM [redacted]

* /
These two bases are close together and could probably share some support.

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-- Statements that GLCM or Pershing could be deployed in those countries in a crisis or wartime.



-- Statements that long-range TNF could be based there some time in the future.

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#10F

OP I N E L
DE NYE #4781 1591531
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FM ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

TO JOHN HUNT

~~TOP SECRET~~ SENSITIVE VIA CABINET OFFICE CHANNELS WHO1188

TO: JOHN HUNT

FROM: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

THE PRESIDENT IS INFORMING PRIME MINISTER THATCHER OF HIS AGREEMENT TO RECEIVE A UK TEAM TO DISCUSS STRATEGIC FORCE MODERNIZATION ALTERNATIVES THE UK IS CONSIDERING AND HAS ASKED ME TO CONTACT YOU TO ARRANGE AN EARLY MEETING.

TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE TWO SUMMITS BEFORE US AND THE PREPARATIONS REQUIRED, WE CAN BE READY FOR A PRODUCTIVE MEETING BY THE LATTER PART OF JULY AND SUGGEST JUL 30-31 AS WORKING DATES. THE PEOPLE ON OUR SIDE WILL BE DAVID AARON (NSC), REGINALD BARTHOLOMEA (STATE), AND WILLIAM PERRY AND WALTER SLOcombe (ODD).
0134

JCL, DHM, ZBC
SF, Box 20
Folder: ALPHA CHANNEL (MISC)
05/79 - 08/79

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PER 8/27/97 NKC/HRE NLC-96-145
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FM PRESIDENT CARTER

TO PRIME MINISTER THATCHER

~~TOP SECRET~~ SENSITIVE VIA CABINET OFFICE CHANNELS WHO1107

DEAR PRIME MINISTER THATCHER:

YOUR MAY 30 LETTER PROPOSED TO SEND UK OFFICIALS TO WASHINGTON TO DISCUSS STRATEGIC FORCE MODERNIZATION ALTERNATIVES WHICH THE UK IS CONSIDERING. THE VIABILITY AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THE BRITISH DETERMENT HAS LONG BEEN A MATTER OF INTEREST TO THE UNITED STATES AND COOPERATION BETWEEN US. I HAVE ASKED MR. BRZEZINSKI TO CONTACT JOHN HUNT TO ARRANGE AN EARLY MEETING ON THE LINES YOU PROPOSE. OF COURSE, WE WILL BOTH WISH TO CONSIDER THE RESULTS OF THESE TALKS AND FURTHER EXCHANGES BEFORE REACHING ANY DECISIONS. I CAN ASSURE YOU THAT ALL THE ALTERNATIVES YOU MENTION REMAIN OPEN UNDER THE SALT II TREATY.

SINCERELY,

JIMMY CARTER

0157

JCL, DHM, ZBC
SF, Box 26
FOUNDER: ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~
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#10A

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

June 8, 1979

JCL, DHM, ZBC
SF, Box 20
FOUNDER: ALPHA CHANNEL (MISC)
05/79 - 08/79

MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Attached is Prime Minister Thatcher's letter to the President and the response he sent following the lines we discussed Tuesday, and my follow-up message to John Hunt. (T/S)

As we agreed, we will manage this enterprise under the Steering Group and procedures established by Presidential Directive on French Cooperation. The US team for the late July talks (Aaron-NSC, Bartholomew-State, Perry and Slocombe-DOD) will constitute a Working Group. (T/S)

The following papers should be prepared as indicated and transmitted to Working Group members by July 7, 1979:

-- DOD: succinct review of US-UK nuclear cooperation. This should include, inter alia: a description of our current assistance to the British and its role in their programs; the present and projected status of the UK deterrent; and an assessment of our legal and other commitments concerning US-UK nuclear cooperation, as they might bear on the systems the British have mentioned (e.g., 1962 Polaris Sales Agreement, 1958 Law and Agreement).

-- DOD: an analysis of the modernization alternatives cited in the Thatcher letter, including, inter alia: what we know about British thinking on the alternatives; the UK questions on technical implications, cost, and likely availability, and other relevant aspects; and the relative effects on British strategic capabilities.

-- State: an analysis of the political dimensions of the modernization alternatives, including inter alia: US-UK relations; relationship to our TNF modernization/arms

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Declassify 6/7/2009

Classified and Extended by Z.Brzezinski

Reason for Extension: NSC 1.13(a)

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E.O.12958, Sec.3.6

PER 2017 NCC HRE NLC-96-145
BY Q NARS DATE 11/16/97

control track; SALT implications; relationship to US-French nuclear cooperation and possible Anglo-French cooperation. State should also prepare a statement to be used with the UK on the French program in fulfillment of the Mildenhall Agreement. (T/S)

Drawing on these papers, the Working Group should then prepare an issues and alternatives paper and draft guidance for the talks by July 18 for Steering Group consideration and recommendations to the President. (T/S)

This matter is to be treated with exceptional confidentiality, and access should be tightly limited. (T/S)



Zbigniew Brzezinski

Enclosures:

- a. Prime Minister Thatcher's message to the President.
- b. President's response to Prime Minister Thatcher.
- c. Brzezinski message to John Hunt.

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ZB HAS BEEN 11-26-79

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

OUTSIDE THE SYSTEM

WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET/SPOKE/UMBRA/TALENT KEYHOLE

INFORMATION

June 11, 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI
FROM: WILLIAM E. ODOM WO
SUBJECT: Weekly Report on Soviet Affairs

Because the President is headed for Vienna to see Brezhnev this week, I have changed the format to describe what our last week's intelligence tells us about the view Brezhnev will bring to Vienna of his: (a) domestic political scene; (b) domestic economic scene; (c) Soviet power projection activities world-wide; and (d) tactics for "one-upping" the President at the summit. (C)

25X1

A. Soviet domestic politics. Brezhnev will arrive in Vienna knowing that:

[Redacted]

25X1

-- Non-working class persons in Georgia pay about 5,000 rubles for party membership. (S)

[Redacted]

-- The Soviet navy is developing towed-array sonar systems (our first evidence arrived last week) thanks to technology transfers. (C)

B. Economics. Brezhnev will know that serious, although not crisis-proportion, problems beset the Soviet economy:

-- Shortfalls in grain production could force Moscow to import as much as 24-26 million tons of feed grains. (S)

-- The first quarter industrial results compare unfavorably with the first quarter of 1978 in five of eight major branches of industry. (S)

NSA review completed

TOP SECRET/SPOKE/UMBRA/TALENT KEYHOLE

Derivative Classification by CIA

Review on June 11, 2009

25X1

Extended [Redacted]

TOP SECRET/SPOKE/UMBRA/TALENT KEYHOLE

2

25X1

-- Energy production increases (oil, gas, coal) will reach less than four percent (as compared with 4.6% in 1978) this year, and Deputy Premier Tikhonov is already talking of a hike in domestic oil prices. (C)

-- A sharp shift has occurred in metal trade, exports cut back (platinum, nickel, titanium sponge) while imports are up sharply to refurbish military stocks (cobalt, copper, aluminum, molybdenum, lead, and zinc). (C)

Brezhnev will not know how much he spends for military capabilities and he will have little incentive to seek reductions in military outlays not least because GOSPLAN cannot disaggregate military from non-military allocations in most areas. (S)

C. Soviet Power Projection. Brezhnev will know that the USSR is projecting its military and political influence on a growing worldwide basis:

-- Turkey. A joint economic protocol has been signed recently, including a promise of more than 1.5 million metric tons of oil supplied to Turkey; a dam, iron and steel investments, aluminum production, and an oil refinery may lead to 8 billion dollars in Soviet financing. (C)

25X1

-- Iran. Moscow has ordered Tudeh party cadres back into Iran to assimilate and to support anti-Western sentiments. (S)

-- Jordan. King Hussein confirmed last week that he will visit Moscow late this year or in early 1980; he also praised Moscow's "invariable support" of an independent Palestine. (C)

-- Yemen Arab Republic. North Yemen is apparently working on a new arms deal with Moscow to include a large number of T-62s, MIG 21s, and spare parts for previously supplied Soviet equipment. (S)

-- Syria and the PLO. The Soviets continue sending military supplies, aiding the more radical PLO elements but also trying to avoid trouble with Syria for overdoing it. (C)

-- Oman. A PFLO delegation was received in Moscow recently, signalling a greater interest in the revolutionary potential there. (C)

TOP SECRET/SPOKE/UMBRA/TALENT KEYHOLE

TOP SECRET/SPOKE/UMBRA/TALENT KEYHOLE

3

-- Mozambique. The number of Soviet military advisers has risen to nearly 500. This increase has been necessary to support training for the new SA-3 sites, new ground units, new military schools, and border guards. When MIGs begin to arrive in the near future, the number of advisers will grow higher. Cuban advisers engaged in guerrilla training number about 200-250. (S)

-- Canary Islands. Large Soviet shipping and fishing traffic is accompanied by greater Cuban commercial and social activities, causing Suarez recently to launch a major intelligence investigation. (S)

-- Grenada. KGB activity has become rather open, and Cuban military advisers no longer try to hide their presence. (C)

-- Nicaragua. Cuban support of the Sandinistas may be greater than we realize, and the Soviets for the first time have openly chided the U.S. for "interfering" in the domestic affairs in Nicaragua. (C)

25X1

D. Soviet Pre-Summit Diplomatic Tactics. Brezhnev will arrive in Vienna, having taken a number of initiatives which limit the President's maneuver room and make Brezhnev himself appear more in command of the scene:

-- PRC. To get talks going with China, Moscow has made the first favorable press comments about China in years. PRC interests in spoiling the summit coincide with Soviet interests in denying the President the advantage of a healthy U.S.-PRC connection as a backdrop for Vienna. Although no real change in Sino-Soviet relations is likely, China will allow illusions to thrive for the next few months, probably throughout next fall and winter, during SALT ratification. (S)

-- Europe. The Warsaw Pact proposal for another all-European security conference, in 1979 if possible, opens the possibility of alternative arms control fora to the Europeans at the very time the U.S. is trying to retain arms control leadership through SALT III. (S)

-- India. During the summit, Desai will be making his diplomatic sojourn through East Europe, having arrived in Moscow on June 11. (U)

Implication: The irreversibility of detente and the "relevancy" of the U.S. to detente. These initiatives give the Soviets a number of opportunities outside the summit to push detente forward from

TOP SECRET/SPOKE/UMBRA/TALENT KEYHOLE

TOP SECRET/SPOKE/UMBRA/TALENT KEYHOLE

4

its "political" to its "military" phase and at the same time to make the U.S. less important to the overall process. Many Europeans will be pleased to see more arms control opportunities as well as less tension between China and the USSR. If SALT III looks too complicated to promise movement, some Europeans may be tempted to accept Moscow's "disaggregated" approach by beginning new negotiations in the CSCE Basket I context and by supporting the Warsaw Pact proposal for an all-European security conference to develop other negotiations to achieve "military detente." If this Soviet scheme works, even partially, the U.S. will find its control over the detente process diminished and more difficult. Moscow could insist that the U.S. participate in Moscow's game or risk becoming "historically irrelevant." (C)

SUM UP

On the domestic front, Brezhnev has problems, political and economic, but none he cannot contain in the short run. In projecting Soviet power abroad, Brezhnev's latest intelligence brief probably encourages him to be optimistic and happy about past investments in his military capital stock and covert action capabilities. Tactically, he has done more to position himself for the summit than could have been expected a few weeks ago, particularly in playing his European card and moderating the effect of our China card. The President may be facing a semi-corpse in Vienna, but the vital half shows every sign of remaining a formidable opponent. (S)

I have omitted one major event of the last few days: Pope John Paul's visit to Poland. I do not know how to assess its implications for the summit, but it certainly reveals, in its spiritual and emotional enormity, the "certainty of political uncertainty" in East Europe, something Brezhnev cannot be complacent about. (C)

25X1

cc: David Aaron

TOP SECRET/SPOKE/UMBRA/TALENT KEYHOLE

June 15, 1979 27

WEST EUROPEAN VIEWS ON KEY ISSUES: TROUBLED
US-EUROPEAN ECONOMIC RELATIONS

Summary: Recent USICA survey findings indicate that most Europeans believe the Continent's economy will do better by being more independent of the US than by strengthening economic ties with it. This is so despite the fact that their traditional perceptions of the US as the leading world economy appear to have weathered the "dollar crisis."

Suspensions of US economic motives run deeply in Europe, many believing that the US engineered the dollar crisis to gain trade advantages, wishes to dominate Europe economically and is insensitive to EC views on issues of mutual concern.

Despite lip service to free trade, there is strong protectionist sentiment running in Europe which could affect interpretations of potentially controversial codes contained in the recently negotiated trade package.

Not unexpectedly, Europeans consider the need to secure reliable sources of oil as the most important external problem facing the European Communities. This suggests that US efforts to assure Europeans that it is sensitive to other countries' deep concerns about potential oil shortages, and not just its own, would enhance America's standing in European eyes.

These are highlights of a USICA survey conducted in six EC countries in late April.¹ The poll was timed to coincide with the direct elections to the European Parliament conducted June 7-10. It probes European public attitudes toward the US on a variety of issues at a time when Europe enters a new stage in its development. This report, the first of several on the USICA survey, treats US economic issues.

¹Representative national samples of about 1,000 persons in each country were interviewed in Britain, Germany, France, Italy, Belgium and the Netherlands by reputable European research organizations.

-2-

Assessments of the US Economy

Positive European public perceptions of a strong US economy appear to have weathered the 1977-78 dollar crisis. Little more than one European in ten considers the dollar's decline indicative of a "permanent" enfeeblement of American economic power. Five times as many either attribute the dollar fall to "temporary" economic frailties or believe the US economy continues to be strong despite the vicissitudes of the dollar.

These positive public perceptions of US economic strength may be attributable to the dollar's recovery vis-a-vis most EC currencies in the months prior to the survey, though it is unlikely that the general public is as yet fully alert to this turnabout. More probably, the finding reflects traditional post-war public perceptions of the US as the leading world economy; an image apparently only slightly tarnished by the dollar crisis and other US economic difficulties.

Significantly, however, it is in Germany--where the public's confidence in their own economy is strong--that a sizeable minority (almost three times as many as in the other five countries) believes that the dollar crisis symbolizes "permanent" US economic deterioration. Elsewhere, faith in the present or long-run strength of the US economy remains relatively unshaken.

"Do you think the fall of the dollar reflects a temporary weakness in the American economy, a permanent weakness, or do you think the American economy continues to be strong?"

	<u>Britain</u>	<u>Germany</u>	<u>France</u>	<u>Italy</u>	<u>Belgium</u>	<u>Nether-lands</u>	<u>Average</u> ¹
Temporary weakness	50%	38%	26%	27%	32%	52%	36%
Permanent weakness	6	28	10	6	12	15	13
Continues to be strong	27	13	40	44	25	19	29
Don't Know	17	22	24	24	31	15	22

¹Weighted by the size of each country's population aged 15 and over.

-3-

Atlantic or European Economic Cooperation?

Confidence in the US economy does not, however, appear to be a major factor in stimulating support for Atlantic economic cooperation. In fact, it is only in Germany-- where pessimistic views of the US economy are most pervasive-- that support for closer US-EC economic ties exceeds the desire for greater independence. This support may be a reflection of the German public's acute consciousness of their country's political and military dependence on the US and thus of the importance to Germany of a strong, stable US economy.

In the other five countries, the widely prevailing view is that the EC will prosper better if it is more independent of the US. It is particularly pervasive in France, where the Gaullist concept of l'Europe independante has a long tradition, and in Italy, where support for the EC runs high and the strong Communist Party champions a Europe "equidistant" from the two superpowers (i.e., less closely linked to the US). The conjunction of these forces--each of which has its adherents in other EC countries--campaigning for reduced US influence in Europe could over time prove to be a powerful force for limiting US-European cooperation in the political and military as well as the economic spheres.

"The European Community seeks to achieve economic stability and prosperity in Western Europe. All things considered, do you think it can best do so:"

	<u>Britain</u>	<u>Germany</u>	<u>France</u>	<u>Italy</u>	<u>Belgium</u>	<u>Nether-lands</u>	<u>Average</u>
By working more closely with the United States	20%	44%	5%	20%	16%	22%	23%
Or by working more closely with the Soviet Union	2	7	3	2	2	3	4
Or do you think the European Community should be more independent of both the United States and the Soviet Union	60	32	71	67	54	61	57
Don't Know	18	17	21	10	27	14	17

Does Europe Trust the US?

Responses to other questions in this survey suggest that many Europeans hold views of US economic motives which, if left unchallenged, could fuel those forces wishing to separate Europe from the US. Increased European confidence in the Continent's economic strength and the natural desire to pursue one's own course are powerful psychological considerations for seeking greater EC independence from the US. But perceptions of US economic Machiavellianism--generated in part by the extensive and at times sensational media play given to US-European economic quarrels of the past generation--should not be discounted.

For example, in France, Italy and Belgium, majorities of those with an opinion believe the main reason for the fall of the dollar was "a deliberate effort to increase US exports by making them cheaper to buy." Half the Germans with an opinion also see self-seeking US motives as responsible for the currency crisis. The more charitable British and Dutch tend to attribute the dollar plunge to "basic market forces and economic trends beyond American control."

At a more general level, suspicion of US selfishness is somewhat less diffuse. Pluralities in Britain, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands believe "the US seeks to cooperate with Western Europe for mutual economic advantage." But sizeable minorities in these four countries, a 39 per cent plurality in Belgium and a 56 per cent majority in France think the US seeks either to undercut Western Europe or to "dominate it economically."

These adverse perceptions are accompanied, and perhaps bolstered, by the belief, widely held, that the US is not sufficiently sensitive to EC views on economic issues of mutual concern. Half the French population and large pluralities (44-46%) in Britain and Italy believe the US pays little or no attention in its economic decision making to the views of the European Community. German and Belgian opinion on this question is evenly divided, leaving only the Dutch with more positive than negative views on the adequacy of US economic consultations with the EC.

-5-

Are Europeans Free Traders?

The majority of West Europeans pay lip service to the free trade ideal. In reality, however, there is widespread protectionist sentiment running in all six countries surveyed. This suggests that the European governments, in coming to terms on the Multilateral Trade Negotiations (MTN) package, went about as far in making concessions as public opinion would permit. More importantly, it suggests that these governments will be under considerable public pressure to put the most favorable interpretation--from their country's viewpoint--on any question which may arise about the precise intent of the treaty's codes (i.e., the injury test for countervailing duties).

"There has been some concern about the growing volume of imports from non-European countries. Do you think our industries need stronger protection against imports from countries outside the Common Market, or do you think that the present Common Market restrictions on non-European imports are sufficient?"

	<u>Britain</u>	<u>Germany</u>	<u>France</u>	<u>Italy</u>	<u>Belgium</u>	<u>Nether-lands</u>	<u>Average</u>
Need stronger protection	49%	40%	57%	49%	53%	54%	49%
Present restrictions are sufficient	34	38	21	23	19	31	29
Don't Know	17	23	22	29	29	15	23

The EC's External Economic Problems

Protectionist sentiment in Europe is doubtless inspired in part by media reports of massive Japanese imports into Europe and Europe's unfavorable trade balance with that country. One European in four noted the need to reduce Japanese imports as one of the two most important economic problems facing the EC. About the same number mentioned the need to control multi-national (read US) corporations and to increase trade with East Europe and the Soviet Union. There is also a high level of support for helping the LDCs.

-6-

For most Europeans, however, the number one international economic concern is to assure reliable sources of oil. Majorities in all countries but the Netherlands listed this as one of the two most pressing problems for the European Communities. Gas shortages in the US and the reappearance of car queues in many states, subsequent to the interviewing, have probably aggravated this concern.

"At the present time, the European Community (Common Market) faces a number of problems with countries outside the European Community. Which of the problems on this list do you consider the most important one to solve? (Show Card). And which next?"¹

	<u>Britain</u>	<u>Germany</u>	<u>France</u>	<u>Italy</u>	<u>Belgium</u>	<u>Nether-</u> <u>lands</u>	<u>Average</u>
Controlling the activities of multi-national corporations	17%	28%	34%	30%	41%	33%	28%
Reducing the volume of imports from Japan	38	23	33	13	17	29	26
Increasing West-European trade with Eastern Europe and the USSR	27	29	21	25	18	36	26
Helping the less developed countries improve their prospects for economic growth	32	29	30	47	24	43	34
Securing reliable sources of oil	54	57	54	58	51	38	55
Don't Know	33	34	27	38	37	21	30

¹First and second choices combined throughout.

CONFIDENTIAL

June 21, 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI
SUBJECT: Secretary Vance's Speech before
the OAS on Nicaragua

#12
JCL, DHM, ZBC
SF, Box 20
Folder: ALPHA CHANNEL (MISC.)
05/79-08/79

I attach a proposed draft.

My comments are as follows:

1. I do not consider the reference to Cuba as adequate. My understanding was that it would be a strong statement that external Cuban involvement is transforming domestic civil strife into a wider international and even ideological conflict. I believe that such a strong statement is necessary, and at the SCC meeting the State Department concurred. The only reference in the speech to Cuba is on page 3, and I do not consider it very strong. An additional reference could be inserted at the top of page 6, if you so approve.

2. I believe there ought to be a more explicit reference to the need for security during the difficult transitional phase. In the second half of page 6 there is a hint to the effect that some external assistance for the maintenance of order will be necessary. I think it is too weak, and it does not give Somoza any incentive to step down.

In the light of the above reactions, I would recommend the insertion of the following phrases:

"There is mounting evidence of direct Cuban involvement in the internal problems in Nicaragua. Such involvement raises the danger that the internal difficulties of Nicaragua will be transformed into international and ideological issues. This hemisphere has already once before rebuffed Cuban efforts at the export of revolution. The United States will not stand idly by if Cuba resumes such efforts."

CONFIDENTIAL

Review June 21, 1985

DECLASSIFIED

E.O.12958, Sec.3.6

PER 8/27/97 NSC 16 RE 11LC-96-145
BY [Signature] NARS DATE 11/10/97

Immediately after the first two lines of page 7, I would propose the insertion of the following wording:

"All the member nations of this organization, collectively or in some other way, ought to consider on an urgent basis the need for a peacekeeping force, to insure peaceful transition to a genuine democracy. Without such a peacekeeping force, a new government of national reconciliation is likely to confront a disintegrating and polarizing situation, likely to be exploited by extremist elements, abetted from abroad."

#18

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

ALPHA CHANNEL



~~SECRET~~

SENSITIVE

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: Cyrus Vance
SUBJECT: The Shah

JCL, DHM, ZBC
SF, Box 20
FOLDER: ALPHA CHANNEL (MISC)
05/79-08/79

Attached is the report we requested from our Charge in Tehran. I find the Charge's reasoning persuasive and recommend that we not consider allowing the Shah in for the time being but review the situation again in two months.

Attachment:

Tehran 7930 (NODIS/CHEROKEE).

~~SECRET~~

RDS-3, 7/28/89

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

PER 6/13/87 NUC RE NLC-86-117
BY [Signature] NARS DATE 6/23/87

#17A

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Department of State

INCOMING TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~ N00686

PAGE 01 01 01 02 290425Z
ACTION NODS-06

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FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2904

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 TEHRAN 07900

NGDIS

CHEROKEE - FOR THE SECRETARY
CORRECTED COPY TEXT
E.U. 120655: NDS-3 7/28/79 (LAINGEN, L. BRUCE) UR-M
TAGS: PEPR
SUBJECT: SHAH'S DESIRE TO RESIDE IN THE U.S.

REF: STATE 194782

1. YOUR MESSAGE ASKS FOR MY PERSONAL AND PRIVATE EVALUATION OF THE EFFECT, ON THE SAFETY OF AMERICANS IN IRAN AND ON OUR RELATIONS WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAN, OF THE SHAH BEING ALLOWED TO ESTABLISH RESIDENCE IN THE UNITED STATES.

2. A JUDGMENT ON THAT ISSUE MUST INEVITABLY BE (AND REMAIN) SPECULATIVE, CLOUDED BY THE ENORMOUS UNCERTAINTIES OF THE CURRENT IRANIAN SCENE--WHERE THERE HAS BEEN ALMOST NO PROGRESS TO DATE TOWARD RESOLUTION OF THE ULTIMATE POWER STRUCTURE. SUBJECT TO THAT RESERVATION, I CONCLUDE THAT FOR THE SHAH TO TAKE UP RESIDENCE IN THE U.S. IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE, BY WHICH I MEAN THE NEXT 2-3 MONTHS, WOULD CONTINUE AS BEFORE TO BE SERIOUSLY PREJUDICIAL TO OUR INTERESTS AND TO THE SECURITY OF AMERICANS IN IRAN. ON THE OTHER HAND, I BELIEVE THAT THIS SITUATION COULD BEGIN TO CHANGE WITHIN THAT TIME

~~SECRET~~

JCL, DHM, ZBC
SF, Box 26
FOUNDER: ALPHA CHANNEL (MISC)
05/79-08/79

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
PER 6/27/97 BY NSX/H RE 116-96-147
NARS DATE 6/28/97

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

NODS-06



Department of State

**INCOMING
TELEGRAM**

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 01 OF 02 290425Z

PERIOD TO MAKE THE RISKS MANAGEABLE BY LATE FALL. EVEN THAT JUDGMENT, I MUST CONFESS, IS INEVITABLY SPECULATIVE AND PRESUPPOSES A GOOD DEAL OF GOOD FORTUNE FOR ALL CONCERNED. MY RATIONALE FOLLOWS.

3. I BELIEVE THE NEXT 2-3 MONTHS REPRESENT THE WRONG TIME PERIOD FOR TWO BASIC REASONS: FIRST, THE HIGH DEGREE OF FRUSTRATION (AND THUS THE POTENTIAL FOR A SEARCH FOR SCAPEGOATS) IN THE CURRENT IRANIAN POLITICAL SCENE AND, SECOND, THE STILL SENSITIVE NATURE OF OUR BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP.

4. IRAN TODAY REMAINS POLITICALLY ADRIPT, ITS "GOVERNMENT" UNDER BAZARGAN STILL SUBJECT TO THE WHIMS AND ULTIMATE CONTROL OF THE AYATULLAH AND HIS ENTOURAGE AT OOM. DAY-TO-DAY DECISION MAKING IS DIFFUSED, EXERCISED MORE OFTEN THAN NOT BY REVOLUTIONARY GROUPS AND INDIVIDUALS SCATTERED IN AND OUT OF THE FORMAL ADMINISTRATIVE APPARATUS OF GOVERNMENT. THERE IS GROWING POPULAR FRUSTRATION OVER THE FACT THAT THE REVOLUTION HAS NOT CHANGED THINGS VERY MUCH IN IRAN; INDEED FOR MANY SEGMENTS OF THE POPULATION, CONDITIONS ARE WORSE THAN THEY WERE BEFORE.

5. IN THIS ATMOSPHERE, WE REMAIN THE CONVENIENT SCAPEGOAT, TO THE POINT WHERE KHOMEINI THIS PAST WEEK EVEN TARGETED US AS SOMEHOW BEHIND THE BURNING OF HARVESTS IN THE FIELDS IN CERTAIN PARTS OF IRAN. FOR US NOW TO GIVE REFUGE TO THE SHAH WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY TRIGGER MASSIVE DEMONSTRATIONS AGAINST OUR EMBASSY. WITH LUCK, THEY MAY STOP AT THAT, WITHOUT A PHYSICAL ASSAULT OF THE KIND WE EXPERIENCED LAST FEBRUARY. BUT THERE COULD BE NO ASSURANCE OF THAT, SINCE IRAN'S REGULAR MILITARY AND

~~SECRET~~

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Department of State

INCOMING
TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 03

01 OF 02 290425Z

POLICE FORCES REMAIN LARGELY DEMORALIZED AND CANNOT YET BE RELIED ON TO APPLY THE FORCE THAT MIGHT BE NEEDED TO PREVENT VIOLENCE AGAINST US. INDEED THE GOVERNMENT HERE HAS YET TO FIND THE STRENGTH OR MEANS TO REPLACE WITH A UNIFORMED FORCE THE IRREGULAR GUERRILLA FORCE ASSIGNED BY KHOMEINI TO "GUARD" OUR COMPOUND SINCE LAST FEBRUARY. THE POSSIBILITY OF INDIVIDUAL OR GROUP TERRORIST ACTION AGAINST OUR CHANCERY AND PERSONNEL WOULD OF COURSE ALSO BE GREATER WERE THE SHAH TO COME TO THE U.S. NOW, THOUGH THAT IS A POSSIBILITY THAT ALREADY EXISTS.

6. NOR IS OUR BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP YET OF THE MUTUAL CONFIDENCE AND SUBSTANCE EASILY TO WEATHER A GESTURE OF THIS KIND TOWARD THE SHAH. I THINK WE ARE MAKING PROGRESS IN REMOVING AT LEAST SOME OF WHAT HAS BEEN A DEEPLY FELT SUSPICION AMONG REVOLUTIONARY IRANIANS THAT WE HAVE NOT YET ACCEPTED THE NEW REALITIES IN IRAN AND THAT WE ARE CONNIVING WITH THE SHAH, ZIONISM, OR WITH SAVAKIS TO UNDERMINE THE REVOLUTION. BUT IT IS SLOW GOING, AND WE DOUBT VERY MUCH THAT OUR CREDENTIALS HAVE BEEN ENHANCED MUCH AT ALL AS YET WITH KHOMEINI. GRANTING ASYLUM TO THE SHAH NOW WOULD NEGATE MUCH THAT WE HAVE ACHIEVED TO DATE, AND I WOULD NOT EXCLUDE A REPEAT IN SOME FASHION, DICTATED BY KHOMEINI, OF A KNEE-JERK TYPE OF POLICY ACTION AGAINST US AS DEMONSTRATED AT THE TIME OF THE JAVITS RESOLUTION.

7. WHAT I AM SAYING IS THAT WE NEED SOME ADDED CUSHION ON BOTH FRONTS--ON THE INTERNAL IRANIAN SCENE AND IN OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS--BEFORE WE ACCEPT WHATEVER RISKS

EOT

~~SECRET~~

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NATIONAL
Foreign
Assessment
Center

Secret

25X1

Central America: Short-Term Prospects for Insurgency

25X1

25X1

Part I: Overview
An Intelligence Assessment

*Information available as of 27 July 1979 has been used
in the preparation of this report.*

25X1

This paper was prepared by the Latin America
Division of the Office of Political Analysis. Comments
and questions may be directed to

25X1


This paper was coordinated with the Directorate of
Operations, the Office of Economic Research, the
Office of Central Reference, and the National Intel-
ligence Officer for Latin America.

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PA 79-10347
August 1979

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Northern Tier Countries



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**Central America:
Short-Term Prospects
for Insurgency**

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Part I. Overview

25X1

This paper is the first in a three-part assessment of the outlook for revolutionary violence in Central America over the next three to six months. Part II, Cuban and Nicaraguan Policy, considers Havana's and Managua's views in the post-Somoza era and reviews the extent of their links to leftist groups in the region. Part III, Vulnerability of the Northern Tier, looks in detail at the potential of revolutionary groups and conditions in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras.

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Key Judgments

In Nicaragua over the short term there are significant forces at work to constrain the radical impulses of the Sandinista movement. But in the inherently unstable first phase of the Nicaraguan revolution, Communist and pro-Cuban elements may be irresistibly tempted to bid for dominance and try to overcome pressures for moderation.

While it is possible that Cuba will try to orchestrate a drive to revolutionize the region, Havana is more likely to adopt a policy of measured increases in support to radical forces to strengthen their chances for success over the medium term. Cuba will maintain a presence in Nicaragua that will by itself unsettle Central America's military-dominated regimes.

The rabidly anti-Communist governments of the Northern Tier expect to contend with a surge of revolutionary activity throughout the region. Their unidimensional response to the threat could serve to fulfill their worst-case prophecies, especially in El Salvador.

Of the three governments to the south that aided the Sandinista cause—Costa Rica, Panama, and Venezuela—the Carazo government in Costa Rica has risked the most domestic political capital if the new government in Nicaragua turns out to be “too leftist.”

The various participants and parties interested in the region will be looking for a redefinition of US policy and will compete to sway Washington in different directions.

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**Central America:
Short-Term Prospects
for Insurgency**

Part I: Overview

The success of the Sandinista revolution in Nicaragua will send profound—possibly epochal—aftershocks throughout Central America. The long-term outlook for this once essentially conservative, backwater region is clouded by a maze of interlocking new variables. Even over the short term, considerable uncertainty obtains. The prime element is the fact that the tactics of two key players—the new government in Nicaragua and Cuba—will probably not emerge clearly for several months. Although necessarily tentative, it is still possible to assess the likely short-term reactions of contending forces in and around Central America as they affect the odds for developments more or less adverse to US interest.

Some immediate effects of the Nicaraguan drama already stand out clearly:

- New political lines and new economic challenges have been drawn in the region. Sandinista Nicaragua and its sympathizers in Costa Rica and Panama will not communicate easily with the passionately anti-leftist governments of the Northern Tier, making the longstanding if elusive ideal of a prosperous Central American economic union all the more remote.
- Anxiety over their future pervades the rightwing governments of Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador, which expect to have to contend with a new rash of insurgency.
- Both the pro- and anti-Sandinista governments in the region, from their opposite perspectives, give low marks to the United States for its role in the area over the past year. Yet all recognize Washington's potential and will be highly sensitive to every US word and act.
- In contrast, both pro- and anti-Somoza forces give Cuba high marks for making an impact on their interests, as they try to control their respective destinies. Cuba, for its part, will reassess its opportuni-

ties with one eye to the Central American countries and another eye to the United States and the stronger Latin American governments.

Beyond these effects, what is in the cards for the region over the short term will be strongly affected by the comportment of the Government of National Reconstruction (GRN) in Nicaragua. As the GRN begins implementing its national and foreign policy goals, the early signals emitted will be important not just to Nicaraguans living under the new regime, but also to the antipathetic Northern Tier governments and to the four countries—Costa Rica, Panama, Venezuela, and Cuba—that assisted the Sandinistas to victory.

Nicaragua

The attitude the GRN brings to consolidating the revolution and establishing authority will be pivotal to the unfolding of Nicaragua's prospects. If the leadership is patient and conciliatory, it will use an incremental approach in its effort to implant new political and civic habits and will offer practical means for the skeptics and even for former enemies to participate in the national recovery. Similarly, if the GRN's first priorities are to get the country on its feet and to facilitate humanitarian assistance, the bitterness left in the wake of the war will decline. Even the more radical leaders may judge that by dampening fears about the future, within and without the country, they will create a more hospitable environment for constructing a durable regime.

Although the GRN confronts an enormous task in rebuilding the country physically as well as politically, it will probably begin under auspicious circumstances. The euphoria over Somoza's departure will provide a helpful opportunity for generating a national consensus. And the government will enjoy a respectable mix of foreign supporters, the lines to Cuba offset in part by those to well-wishing close neighbors to the south, most of the Caribbean, and the Andean group.

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The early phase of a revolution, however, is inherently unstable, and a number of developments could upset this best-case scenario. For example, isolated resistance by remnants of the Somocista forces might discredit a conciliation strategy and instead incite a vengeful imposition of authority. Or, if radical members of the new government are impatient to cast the revolution in a Marxist framework, their efforts might split the GRN, introducing a new kind of instability. Hostile or threatening statements by other governments could feed paranoia and provoke overreaction. In the excited atmosphere of revolution, rumors of impending intervention from the United States or from rightwing governments in the north might be believed. Other possibilities are that the inexperienced regime will make miscalculations that will trigger unwanted consequences, or that the "leadership" in the GRN will be unwitting of what the Sandinistas do behind the scenes.

The big question on the minds of interested neighbors is what kind of relationship with Cuba will develop. Everyone expects some kind of socialist government with ties to Cuba. For the Northern Tier, that suffices to mark Nicaragua as hostile to its interests. For the others—Panama, Venezuela, and Costa Rica, for example—shades of difference will be important. They can live with, and even put a favorable light on, a Third-World-style leftist regime; a low-profile presence of Cuban political and military advisers would make them uneasy, but it would seriously alarm only Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala. But if the government adopts a flagrantly Marxist style, openly advocating and supporting revolution elsewhere, or becomes highly dependent on Cuba, the sense of nationwide crisis would greatly intensify. Over the short term at least, there are significant forces at work to produce something better than a worst-case model in Nicaragua. Practical considerations work to constrain the radical impulses that certainly exist within the Sandinista movement: the period of relative calm essential to rehabilitating the country and establishing a new official network of authority; the diplomatic shelter that a broad-based foreign policy affords in contrast to the risk that a provocatively abrupt Communist tilt would entail; and the lurking fear of US intervention—which some

Sandinistas believe already occurred during the civil strife. Many of the revolution's spokesmen abroad have worked assiduously to assure various government and other political groups that they represent no "Communist threat" to the Americas or to Nicaragua; to flout the acceptance they have sought would hardly seem in their short-term interest. Over time, however, continuation of this tack could become increasingly mortgaged to frustration and tensions at home and to pressure, even intervention, from abroad.

Cuba

How Havana will respond to the changed circumstances in Central America is another of the cardinal unknowns. Cuba would seem to need a period of assessment and digestion of the results of Nicaragua, and some debate in Castro's inner circle over the practical implications of what has happened in recent months seems likely. Exuberant over having effectively aided the Sandinistas' overthrow of its despised enemy, Somoza, without incurring any visible political cost, Cuba is certain to increase its attention to Central America. Even so, Cuba may see a measured increase in activity as its most profitable mode over the short term. Castro has a good fix on the sensitivities and latent fears of Latin American capitals that are friendly to Nicaragua now, and he may wish to avoid alienating those governments by openly ignoring their concerns and moving vigorously for mentorship of the Sandinista revolution. Even a relatively restrained Cuban policy, however, is likely to include sending advisers to Nicaragua if requested to do so by the new government, as well as greater clandestine assistance in the form of training and arms to terrorists and revolutionary opposition groups in the other countries.

There is some prospect, however, that Cuba will do much more and attempt to orchestrate a drive to speed revolution throughout the region. The opportunities, with Somoza gone, are enticing, and the constraints may appear less formidable. It seems likely that the Cubans will continually assess US tolerance for their activism and over time test Washington's reactions to a variety of Cuban probes.

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View From the South

Nicaragua's neighbors to the south, having actively assisted the Sandinista cause, will continue to feel free to offer advice to the GRN, and to varying degrees will be urging moderation. The leaders of these governments are somewhat apprehensive that they have taken out stock in an anti-Somoza venture that will turn out "too leftist." They have made their investments, however, and will not merely hope for the best but do what they can to protect them. If their gamble is successful, and a favorable or at least tolerable situation emerges in Nicaragua, their political prestige will be enhanced, especially since they acted more boldly than the United States. In Venezuela, both major political parties could take some credit, but Carlos Andres Perez, who envisions another presidential term in his future, would be the obvious hero, having started the stream of anti-Somoza aid and having stayed well ahead of even his own party in advocating increased support. Panama's de facto leader, Omar Torrijos, would be all the more invulnerable at home; he has risked the least.

A moderate regime in Nicaragua is essential only for Costa Rica's Rodrigo Carazo, who has the most on the line. Carazo has risked a costly political blunder, given the strong Marxist orientation of the Sandinistas. Carazo's leadership and judgment are already in question now that the public is beginning to comprehend how heavily involved Costa Rica was with the Nicaraguan revolutionaries. If it develops that Carazo's policy greased the skids for Somoza only to see him replaced by something worse—a government that behaves in conservative Costa Rica's image of a Communist regime—Carazo might have undercut his own effectiveness as President and the small democracy might face a rare political crisis of its own. Carazo's assistance to the Sandinistas was excessive by Costa Rica's generally cautious foreign policy standards, and is likely to net a good deal of political heat for him however Nicaraguan developments play out. A constitutional crisis seems in the realm of possibility, although it would be unlikely in the light of the country's high tolerance for madcap politics. Carazo also has a political buffer in the strong feelings of enmity toward Somoza throughout Costa Rica.

View From the North

The military-dominated governments of Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador see the world through a different lens from that used in the south. In recent weeks, as the Sandinista victory seemed imminent, the rulers in the Northern Tier could already envision the whole of the region all but lost to the Communist camp. Their defensive instincts warn them of their own impending battle with foreign-assisted insurgency. The military establishments in these nations are staggered that Washington did not "save Nicaragua from the left." Their confidence in US leadership had been eroded by what they saw as ineffective US handling of situations elsewhere abroad, but they had continued to expect that small countries so close to the United States could count on protection, especially from Cuban-supported challenges.

For these governments, the long-hovering specter of Communism has materialized as stark reality—no matter how moderate the GRN proves to be nor how unobtrusive Cuban influence is in Nicaragua. Their expectations are mostly for the worst: the stimulation of extreme leftist groups in their societies; training, arming, and encouragement available in Nicaragua for would-be revolutionaries in the rest of Central America; and their own vulnerability heightened by US passivity.

25X6

All of the governments of the Northern Tier identify in important ways with prerevolutionary Nicaragua. None is legitimately empowered by any hard test except de facto control.

25X6

All have basically the same constituency: the military establishment, principally, and the business and agricultural elite secondarily.

25X6

All three societies are essentially closed, without a free flow of ideas or meaningful lines of communication from the public at large to the government. Economic development is at varying levels, but each economy is at the service of a small elite, and opportunities for upward mobility remain limited. As in Nicaragua, the militaries understand that national security means first and foremost internal control; none has ever hesitated to use force against fellow citizens. The people's alienation from the government is plain in El Salvador, less obvious in Honduras; Guatemala has for years been engaged in a low-grade but bitter civil war fought by selective assassination.

Probably all three countries are more stifling politically than Nicaragua was under Somoza before the civil war. Honduras is sometimes cited as a relatively nonviolent society, but this judgment probably is off the mark; because the society is more backward and less politicized than the others, violence in the countryside goes unremarked. During periods when political competition has become intense, the government's response has been violent.

In these countries, the elites are professedly anti-Communist, virulently so, for Marxism and its adherents are believed real and, now, imminent threats. As in most highly conservative countries, "Communist" has no careful definition and the label is loosely applied, but with real conviction, to anyone who threatens the status quo. The political focus is highly parochial and tends to leap from the local to the largest East-West international struggle. In the latter, the United States is widely viewed as less skilled and determined than the USSR, and the instability in Central America bears witness to the reality of the global contest.

Apart from their shared mindset, these governments confront different circumstances at home. Honduras, relatively tranquil in terms of domestic politics, is trying to cope with upwards of 50,000 Nicaraguan refugees. Guatemala is locked in its brutalized, retaliatory politics. And El Salvador is already seething with conflict between activated and polarized political and social groups.

El Salvador

If there is to be a Central American domino, El Salvador is the first candidate. Over the past year its situation has closely paralleled that of Nicaragua. A chronic national crisis exists; antigovernment activity is rampant, often begetting violence; and efforts at negotiation go nowhere because trust is lacking on all sides. Actors in the piece who are inclined to be accommodating are paralyzed by the consequences they foresee. President Romero might want to respond to certain demands for reform, but he worries that conservative military officers would conspire against him. Nonradical organized groups that might be willing to discuss possible political formulas with the government end up vacillating, concerned that any association with the regime—no matter how remote—would discredit them. And, under the circumstances, extremist opposition groups, encouraged by developments in Nicaragua, are unlikely to settle for political promises or compromises. Almost every objectively reasonable step toward moderation seems to risk a fundamentally counterproductive outcome. As each chance to work for national reconciliation falters, some radical alternative plan gains new proponents.

President Romero, prodded in a repressive direction by hardliners in the military but urged to reform by others, has settled for halfhearted steps in both directions. Proposals for dialogues and national forums lie dead in the water; the security forces react inconsistently to antigovernment demonstration, sometimes placidly, sometimes brutally. Romero's failure to set a course one way or the other leaves little room for optimism that he is large enough for his task, which may be no less than sparing El Salvador the destructive and convulsive war Nicaragua has experienced.

On the other hand, Romero's very malleability, along with other positive or neutral features of the Salvadoran scene, suggests that some maneuvering room still exists. Except for the confessed Marxists in the terrorist and guerrilla front organizations, most opposition groups are probably not as adamant as those

in Nicaragua in refusing to negotiate with the government, and the good offices of an interested outsider might stand a chance of effecting a workable channel. The failure of the moderates in Nicaragua stands as an inescapable object lesson for nonradical groups in El Salvador; several prominent civilians have remarked on its relevance. As for Romero, he may be ripe for suggestion now that he takes aboard the Nicaraguan experience. He will probably be subject to heavier pressure than before from the military if, as seems likely, terrorism and demonstrations go on the upswing; unless he has been well primed to risk an alternate plan, Romero will probably succumb to the hard line.

Guatemala

Unlike El Salvador, Guatemala's Government contends with no mass mobilization and it seems perfectly comfortable with the near absolute intolerance for dissidence it imposes. The list of assassinated political reformists is long, as is the list of government officials who have been assassinated by leftwing terrorists. The establishment is set up to protect a dynamic economy which, more than in the rest of the area except for Costa Rica, has spawned a vigorous middle class. The business community, like the dominant military, is paranoid about a rise of the political left, and only a minority has reservations about the manner in which the security forces discourage political activists.

The moderate Christian Democrats are working to persuade the private sector that the provision of political safety valves is in its long-term interests. Not seeing much chance to influence in this direction, however, the party is considering arming itself, the lesson it has drawn from Nicaragua is that the democratic opposition there, lacking a military capability of its own, ceded to the far left all political leverage.

The Guatemalan Government is the least likely in the Northern Tier to consider political liberalization. It worries that with the Sandinista example leftist terrorists will become more of a problem, but it believes its formula of repression has worked well.

Very little, if any, visible effect of the events in Central America is likely to show up in Guatemala in the short term, except for a rise in assassination statistics. The government is appalled that the United States failed to act in Nicaragua. Even political moderates believe that US policy has been confusing and ineffectual.

Honduras

The Honduran population has remained politically inert for some years and no evidence suggests imminent change. The military government seems to have no clear mission beyond that of protecting its vested interests while proceeding to control national elections next year. Most likely, a military candidate will be the victor, and the political system will merely assume a new facade.

The government and the business community nevertheless read the Nicaraguan situation with foreboding. They may be somewhat sympathetic to the notion that encouraging the development of a more open political system would reduce the prospect of political violence. But so long as the threat remains latent, they are unlikely to take further initiatives in this direction.

Implications

From a US perspective, the forces for unfavorable developments have increased; the range of policy options has narrowed to a list of unappealing choices; and new challenges are rising just as Washington's influence has diminished. Nevertheless, while the US role is not commanding in post-Somoza Central America, it could still prove pivotal, for what the United States does or does not do will continue to nudge or constrain other actors. Whether the balance of forces shifts decisively against a hospitable environment for the great variety of US interests in the region—military, diplomatic, economic, cultural, humanitarian—will depend in part on interpretations the players give to signals that they read as defining the US stake.

The various participants and parties interested in the region will be looking for a redefinition of the US role and competing to sway Washington in different directions.

In *Nicaragua* itself, moderates will want support in their effort to contain Marxist and pro-Cuban proclivities in the revolution. They do not want the United States to display hostility that might stimulate a Cuban-style turn to the East. But they will warn that failure by the United States to react to testing by Cuba of the limits of US tolerance could touch off strife that will spread to other countries and polarize pro- and anti-Castro forces throughout the hemisphere. The Nicaraguan Communists, on the other hand, could consider the revolution incomplete without total alienation from the United States, and they may work for this.

Cuba's interest in seeing US influence in the region continue to wane is obvious, but it is too early for firm judgments about how quickly Havana will move to promote this outcome. The temptation to continue to test Washington's tolerance and to assume continued US passivity will be great. The Central American Northern Tier, especially *El Salvador*, will press hard to convince the United States that its human rights criteria are dangerous for them and counterproductive for Washington.

The moderate governments of Latin America, especially *Venezuela* and *Costa Rica* will want to help maintain a measure of pluralism in Nicaraguan domestic and foreign policies. They may consider dramatic responses as evidence of a Cuban thrust for a dominant role in Central America. But their own role will be inhibited by the likely confusion about trends in the region and by their near-equal revulsion toward leftist extremists and unregenerated rightists. These governments would be responsive to signs that the United States was again willing to pay serious attention to the region's basic problems.

In sum, the short-term prospects for Central America are for mixed signals and considerable uncertainty. Over the longer term, the pressures for the spread of internecine violence and severe threats to conservative regimes are formidable. But, because of the weight of inertia or leadership galvanized by fear, the chances for incremental change, for pluralistic or nonaligned policies cannot be written off. The role of moderate Latin American governments could grow and prove important. They will have to define their interests judiciously, and maintain their close attention amidst tactical setbacks and continuing ambiguities. In this, they will probably seek to cooperate with the United States—without, however, seeming to bow to US direction.



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6 August 1979

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Libyan Expropriation of US Oil Company Interests

1. Relations between the United States and Libya regarding the sale of C-130s, 727s, and 747s have over the years taken heavily symbolic overtones, which in large part account for Libya's consideration of drastic measures in retaliation for the US denial of these planes. The possible nationalization of the remaining US oil company assets in Libya in retaliation for the US Government refusal to permit the sale of transport aircraft to Libya [redacted] should be viewed as a credible threat. [redacted]

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2. The contract for the original contingent of eight C-130s dates back to mid-1969, before the revolution in Libya that brought Qadhafi to power. Those planes were delivered without incident, but by the time the new Libyan regime sought to exercise its right under the contract to purchase another eight planes, it had established a record for supporting terrorism that induced the United States to hold up the export license. (Strictly speaking, the license has not been denied; it is still "under consideration.") Lockheed had been warned in advance of potential problems with the license but accepted full payment (\$4.5 million per plane) from the Libyans, who are still paying monthly storage and service charges for their maintenance in Georgia. The Libyans have chosen to make the issue a matter of principle, not finances; they have refused to re-sell the planes, although with the rise in prices—the C-130, substantially unaltered, now goes for \$10.5 million—they would stand to recapture their money and probably make a tidy profit. The C-130 question has remained an irritant in Libyan-US relations for years. [redacted]

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This memorandum, requested by the National Security Council on 26 July, was prepared under the auspices of the National Intelligence Officer for Near East and South Asia by analysts in NEAC's Office of Economic Research and Office of Political Analysis and was coordinated at the working level in State's Bureau of Intelligence and Research.

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[REDACTED]
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3. In March 1978, Boeing applied for a license to export two 727s and was turned down. That fall, however, the decision was reversed—apparently the result of Congressional pressure to help [REDACTED], although the reversal also came at a time when the Libyan government was seeking improved relations with the United States to balance its growing ties with the Soviet Union. The license was granted under condition that the aircraft not be put to military use or altered to enhance their military capabilities, and that they not be used for military training. The 727s were delivered in November.

4. In March 1979, [REDACTED] the Libyans had used 727s to transport troops and military equipment to Uganda—though, as it later developed, the 727s used were not those sold under the US conditions. The United States nevertheless decided that the spirit if not the letter of the agreement had been violated, and decided to block the export of the three 747s. [REDACTED]

5. The Libyans already had reason for irritation at the United States. They have been attempting for some time to persuade the United States to upgrade its representation in Libya to the ambassadorial level, without success. Libya looks with considerable suspicion at the US alliance with Egypt, particularly the US willingness to help Egypt out with arms, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Qadhafi is also convinced that the US-sponsored Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty represents a sell-out of the Palestinians, Syrians, and Jordanians. Qadhafi resents US opposition to the Libyan involvement in Uganda and the fact that Libyan oil—10% of US oil imports—seems to be given no weight in the US attitude toward Libya. [REDACTED]

6. Since the US decision on the 747s was announced, Qadhafi has made clear his intense annoyance and the fact that he would seriously consider retaliation—specifically by withholding US oil supplies—if the decision were not reversed. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Qadhafi talked angrily about "anti-Libyan actions" by the United States and indicated that Libya was interested in expanding oil exports [REDACTED] shifting oil from US contracts. In a magazine interview given on 25 June, Qadhafi said that Libya was "seriously thinking" of reducing or even stopping oil production for two or three years in response to "pressure and threats of invasion." (The article was originally mistranslated to sound as if the decision to stop production had already been taken, and caused a minor panic on Wall Street.) During the course of his three-week tour of various Arab countries beginning at the end of June,

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[REDACTED]
[25X1]

Qadhafi apparently attempted to persuade the oil-producing countries that they ought to freeze production to defend Arab rights. He made no converts, but may still be thinking about a unilateral use of the oil weapon. [REDACTED] [25X1]

7. Qadhafi has made no public statements implying that he is considering nationalizing the remaining US oil interests in Libya as an alternative form of retaliation, but the step could hold considerable appeal for him. The move would probably cost him very little, particularly if the US companies could be induced to remain in place—a strong possibility in light of the current tight oil market. With the tenth anniversary of the Libyan revolution approaching on 1 September, moreover, Qadhafi may be tempted to announce the nationalization as a dramatic gesture suitable to the occasion. [REDACTED] [25X1]

8. Nevertheless, we believe that Qadhafi will not make a final decision until he has given up hope of persuading the United States to approve the aircraft sales. Moreover, Libya is currently negotiating revenue-sharing agreements with US and West European firms now operating in the country in an effort to encourage exploration and development commitments; nationalization would presumably upset the applecart.

9. Finally, Libya—probably as a result of its own intelligence assets in Egypt—expects an attack from Egypt, possibly as early as this month. It realizes that the United States is the only country that might successfully dissuade Sadat from the attack, and would not wish to alienate the United States—or provoke the United States to support the Egyptians—at this critical juncture. If, however, Qadhafi held the United States partly responsible for an Egyptian attack, he might take any one of the following retaliatory moves: nationalization, embargo of oil deliveries to the United States, or possibly even cut off of total production for a time. [REDACTED] [25X1]

10. After a decision to nationalize, two main issues would remain: terms of compensation and the future role of the US companies in Libya. (U)

11. Although companies frequently argue that compensation should be based on replacement cost, net book value or some portion of net book value is more frequently settled on as the basis for a compensation agreement. A comprehensive audit would be required to determine the exact value of these assets and disputes between Tripoli and the companies over the results could be expected. [REDACTED] [25X1]

[25X1] 12. [REDACTED] the net book value of the remaining producing assets of American firms in Libya is around \$100 million. This compares with an original cost on the order of \$1 billion. American equity in Libyan producing assets currently represents about 30 percent of the total. [REDACTED]
[25X1]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] (25X1)

(25X1)

13. [REDACTED] replacement costs for facilities to produce an equivalent amount of production—about 600,000 b/d—would amount to between \$1.6 billion and \$1.9 billion.

[REDACTED] the finding costs necessary to establish a reserve base to support this level of production at an additional \$1.8-2.6 billion, bringing the grand total for replacement to an estimated \$3.4-4.5 billion. The companies clearly would not expect the Libyans to agree to such compensation. [REDACTED] (25X1)

(25X1) 14. The above estimates do not include an LNG plant owned by [REDACTED] with an estimated book value of around \$35 million and a replacement value of about \$800 million. They also do not include an estimated \$100 million worth of equipment in Libya belonging to American oil service companies. [REDACTED] (25X1)

15. Compensation could take forms other than cash. For example, Libya might offer the companies better long-term purchase agreements "guaranteeing" future access to Libyan crude or a slight discount on crude purchases. The former concessionaries in Kuwait, for example, purchase crude at a 15 cent-per-barrel discount. Current Libyan financial arrangements allow the companies operating there to maintain a 50-55 cent per barrel profit margin on their equity oil. [REDACTED] (25X1)

16. While the Libyans need technical assistance, they do not necessarily need US technical assistance. Although US oil technology and services are in general superior to those of other nations, Tripoli probably would be willing to arrange technical service contracts with non-US firms to replace US operators. Qadhafi could probably obtain good terms in the current market by providing access to Libyan crude denied to the nationalized US companies. Similarly, while the Libyans clearly want US investment in exploration and production, they could find European investors. [REDACTED] (25X1)

17. If US companies are to be excluded from Libya and denied access to Libyan crude, their attempts to find new supplies would put further pressures on the world market. [REDACTED] (25X1)

(25X1) [REDACTED]

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The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D. C. 20505

15 August 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Zbigniew Brzezinski
Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs

SUBJECT : Communist Intervention Comparison

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During our meeting on July 26th you asked if we could develop a paper discussing a comparison of Soviet, Cuban, and East German interventionist activities around the world from 1977 to 1979. I am sending you the attached matrix which was prepared with the help of Marshall Brent. I think that the matrix format is an appropriate device which permits crisp treatment of the data in a way that facilitates comparison.

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John
William P. Turner
STANSFIELD TURNER

Attachment
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9 August 1979

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Soviet, Cuban and East German Interventionist Activities, 1977-1979

Place	Nature of Involvement	Results to Date
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JSSR: Afghanistan

Since coup in 1978 Soviet involvement has increased substantially: total Soviet presence jumped from estimated 1500 to 3-4000, including military advisory mission, which grew from about 350 to 1500-2000. The countries signed 40-50 new economic aid agreements and a large new military accord; Moscow agreed to reschedule Afghan debts, and promised some food aid. Soviets have become deeply involved in directing government's anti-insurgent effort, but their combat role has thus far been limited

[Redacted]

Afghan foreign policy now virtually identical to that of USSR, but inability of regime to consolidate power and stabilize domestic situation may prompt Soviets to attempt to replace present leadership in bid to achieve stability and to arrest progressive erosion of Soviet position and that of central leadership. There are no indications that the Soviets are preparing a large-scale military intervention, and they must realize that massive involvement on the ground could be costly in terms of regional relations with India and Iran as well as ratification of the SALT II treaty. Moscow could decide on a more limited operation, however, that would involve an assault unit with air cover in order to assure control of key installations or to protect the Kabul garrison.

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Place Nature of Involvement Results to Date

Angola
Moscow intervened actively in 1975 to ensure the victory of the MPLA over its rivals, UNITA and FNLA. Moscow provided about 1,400 military and civilian advisers and large amounts of equipment for use by MPLA and Cuban troops. In addition to small arms and ammunition, the Soviets delivered tanks, artillery, aircraft and air defense weapons with a value of \$400-450 million. Soviet personnel did not play a combat role during the civil war. Their number remains the same.

The Soviet intervention was successful to the extent that the MPLA is recognized as the government of Angola. UNITA insurgency however, continues to be a serious problem. Relations between the two states are good but economic difficulties and the insurgency have produced strains between Moscow and Luanda. Moscow remains the dominant foreign influence in Luanda and a radical change in the relationship does not appear likely in the near term.

Ethiopia
The Soviets began a large-scale airlift and seairlift of military equipment to Ethiopia in 1977. They supplied massive amounts of equipment including tanks, artillery, MIG aircraft, air defense weapons and vehicles. The Soviets also dispatched some 1,300 military advisers that included the then first deputy commander-in-chief of Soviet ground forces.

The Cuban-Soviet intervention was successful in expelling the Somalis from the Ogaden, and Moscow has capitalized on its initial success by expanding its economic and political ties to Ethiopia. While Ethiopia is dissatisfied with some aspects of its relationship with the Soviets (such as Soviet failure to deliver economic, especially hard currency, aid), relations are good and Ethiopia continues to support Soviet policy in Africa and the Middle East and has taken the Soviet side in the Sino-Soviet dispute.

[redacted]

[redacted] Since 1977, Moscow has provided about \$2.1 billion in military assistance.

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9 August 1979

Place Nature of Involvement Results to Date

South Yemen

The Soviets have established a military, economic, and political presence in South Yemen, including increased use of naval and air facilities to support their Indian Ocean fleet, use of Aden as a transshipment point for personnel and material. The Soviets have assisted in establishing staging facilities used by the South Yemenis in lending military support to leftist forces operating against Oman. There are currently some 1,000 Soviet military advisers and 600 economic technicians in South Yemen. In the past decade the Soviets have extended approximately \$400 million in military assistance and \$200 million in economic aid to South Yemen. Military deliveries in 1978 reached a record high of \$133 million, most of it delivered in the second half of the year.

The Soviets have established close political relations with the Ismail regime. While they have gained neither the Friendship Treaty nor the unlimited access to South Yemen's naval and air facilities which they want, they have increased their access to those facilities and have transferred surveillance and monitoring functions to Aden which they previously maintained in Berbera. The USSR and South Yemen share a commitment to support "progressive" forces in the region, and Aden has been used as a transshipment point for material and personnel destined for Ethiopia.

Vietnam

Soviet economic presence in Vietnam quite large since 1975--perhaps as many as 3,000. Military presence quite low until Chinese invasion in 1979, when military presence may have grown from several hundred to over a thousand.

Main military payoff for Moscow thus far has been Vietnamese willingness to allow [redacted] TU-95 aircraft to Vietnam as well as [redacted] port visits by Soviet naval combatants and auxiliaries since February. Soviets almost certainly sold this to Vietnamese on grounds it would worry the Chinese, but principal Soviet objective is desire to conduct reconnaissance against the US in the area. Regular access to Vietnamese facilities would be useful to Soviets if they plan to maintain a permanent naval presence in the South China Sea. Secure repair

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[redacted] There is no evidence of Soviet combat involvement in Vietnam or Kampuchea.

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Place Nature of Involvement Results to Date

Vietnam (continued)

facilities in Vietnam would relieve over-crowding at Soviet facilities in the Far East, but Moscow would have to build the facilities in Vietnam. Soviets reportedly have asked for permanent access rights, but decline in their use [redacted] suggests Vietnamese sincere in their protestations that no bases will be permitted.

Zimbabwe-Rhodesia

The Soviets are counting on their role as principal backer for the ZAPU faction of the Patriotic Front to help expand their influence in Zambia, Mozambique and Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. The Soviets provide almost all of ZAPU's weapons as well as training for ZAPU guerrillas at camps in Africa and the USSR. There are at present [redacted] military personnel in Mozambique itself acting as advisers to the Mozambique army, and [redacted] Zambia working as advisers both to Zambian military and ZAPU.

Soviet support for ZAPU has strained Soviet relations with one of the principal front-line states, Mozambique, which supports ZANU. Despite extensive training by Soviet advisers and large amounts of Soviet equipment, ZAPU has not developed into an effective fighting force. Moscow has so far resisted pressure from Mozambique and Tanzania to provide weapons and training for ZANU. The recent unity agreement announced by ZANU and ZAPU meets one of the Soviet preconditions for such aid, and Moscow's East European allies have recently been more cordial in dealing with ZANU. Moscow could cite the agreement as a major ZANU concession should it choose to provide assistance to the more active guerrilla organization.

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9 August 1979

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Place	Nature of Involvement	Results to Date
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CUBA: Angola

By 1977, Havana's involvement had escalated into a full-scale military operation to preserve the Neto Government, including 25,000-30,000 military personnel, many of whom were engaged in a direct combat role. Soviet aircraft began to transport Cuban troops to and from Angola in 1976. Soviet military advisers increasingly assumed a major role in planning of anti-guerrilla operations conducted by Cuban and Angolan troops. 18,000 - 19,000 Cuban troops remain, actually engaging UNITA forces in the south and maintaining defensive positions which free Angolan forces to assume direct combat role.

The Cuban military presence has stabilized the military situation in Angola, but anti-Neto forces still control a significant portion of territory, particularly in southern Angola. Cuban troops are increasingly turning over ground combat missions to the Angolans, reflecting Havana's unwillingness to incur continued casualties. Angola is especially vulnerable to air strikes from South Africa and Zimbabwe-Rhodesia

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The protracted guerrilla struggle is having a debilitating impact on Cuban-Angolan relations, but the Neto regime has no viable alternative to a continued Cuban military presence. These minor tensions are unlikely to create serious strains in their relationship.

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9 August 1979

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Place	Nature of Involvement	Results to Date
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Ethiopia

The Cuban military intervention in Ethiopia was closely coordinated with the USSR from the start in order to provide the Mengistu regime with the military support necessary to repel an invasion by Somali troops. The Soviets transported almost all of the 15-17,000 Cuban combat personnel to Ethiopia, where Soviet generals joined with Cuban and Ethiopian officers to form a unified command structure responsible for planning and conducting the war in the Ogaden. Cuban combat units have not become directly involved in the fighting in Eritrea, but Cuban military personnel have acted in a support role, including training, logistical support, and limited indirect combat support such as providing artillery fire.

The Cuban presence has declined since the defeat of the Somali invasion force. A large contingent remains in the Ogaden primarily as a garrison force, but it has also participated in the counterinsurgency campaign against the Somali-backed Western Somali Liberation Front. Most of the remainder are serving in northern Ethiopia and Eritrea where they provide training, logistical support, and combat support in the Ethiopian conflict with Eritrean separatists. Relations between Cuba and Ethiopia--solidified during the Ogaden conflict--continue to be close despite occasional friction.

Zimbabwe-Rhodesia

Cuban participation in the Rhodesian conflict has been limited by the traditional reluctance of some of the frontline presidents to permit the involvement of non-Africans. There are about 100 Cuban military personnel training ZAPU guerrillas in Zambia, and Cubans have been training ZAPU personnel in Angola, Ethiopia, and Cuba. Havana has also provided the ZAPU forces with a limited amount of military supplies and weaponry. Cuba and the USSR so far have resisted supplying arms requested by ZANU, but have indicated they would reverse their position if the rival factions made significant progress toward uniting their forces.

The level of Cuban involvement in the Rhodesian conflict has not increased significantly over the past year. The guerrilla conflict shows no signs of early resolution. Cuba seems to be focusing primarily on urging unity on the factions of the Patriotic Front before agreeing to increase its support.

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9 August 1979

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Place	Nature of Involvement	Results to Date
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Namibia

Although Cuban logistical assistance to the Namibian insurgents has been limited, Cuban instructors have played a primary role in training SWAPO's guerrilla force which totals at least 6,000. Most training has been conducted at SWAPO bases in southern Angola and southwestern Zambia. In addition, at least 500 SWAPO trainees have gone to Cuba for advanced training. Cuba sees the South African presence in Namibia as an important obstacle to the consolidation of the Neto regime in Angola. Havana is convinced that the UNITA forces are able to survive only because of the aid they receive from South Africa, much of it through Namibia. Consequently, Cuba has refrained from interfering with Western diplomatic initiatives on Namibia in the hope of reducing the South African military presence there.

The level of Cuban involvement in the Namibian situation has not increased significantly over the past year. The conflict shows no signs of early resolution. Cuba's policy priorities are oriented primarily to the security of the Neto regime and the liberation struggle in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. Support for the SWAPO insurgents is likely to be accorded less importance for the time being.

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South Yemen

Cuba has sent military contingents to South Yemen during the past 13 months to augment its 350-600 military advisers engaged in the organization and training of a people's militia. There is no evidence that these contingents have engaged in combat. The power struggle between Party Secretary Ismail and President Ali erupted into open conflict in 1978 and culminated in the execution of Ali; there is no hard evidence to support charges of direct Cuban involvement in Ali's removal, but Cuban advisers reportedly played a key role in rallying the militia in defense of Ismail. In addition,

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The Castro regime undoubtedly would act again to assist the Ismail Government should another internal or external threat arise. In the meantime, the number of Cuban military advisers in South Yemen will probably remain at the present level, estimated at 350-600.

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9 August 1979

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Place	Nature of Involvement	Results to Date
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South Yemen
(continued)

Cuba reportedly shifted as many as 1,000 troops to Aden from Ethiopia shortly after the coup to ensure the dominant position of Ismail, whose dedicated Marxist ideology made him clearly preferred by Cuba and the USSR. The Cuban troops left when the threat posed by Saudi Arabia and North Yemen began to subside, but a smaller contingent--about 500-- was sent in 1979 when fighting broke out between North and South Yemen. The Cuban personnel reportedly gave tactical combat advice, helped supervise the logistical system, and were involved in directing artillery fire from South Yemen. This contingent probably departed in late April.

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Nicaragua

Cuban arms shipments as well as tactical combat guidance provided by some two dozen Cuban military advisers based in Costa Rica played an important role in helping the Sandinistas oust the Somoza regime. The Cubans were careful, however, to coordinate their effort with other governments in the region in order to minimize the risk of a US reaction. During the FSLN offensive [redacted] support flights--primarily by Panamanian and Costa Rican aircraft--carried arms, ammunition, and other supplies from Cuba to the FSLN forces.

Following the Sandinista victory, [redacted] Cuban military advisers moved quickly into Nicaragua [redacted]

[redacted] The Cubans may thus already have begun to assist the new regime on security matters. The new government in Managua is likely to look to the Cubans to send additional military advisers to help transform the guerrilla forces into a conventional army. The Cubans can also be expected to begin using Nicaragua to support guerrillas from countries in the northern tier of Central America.

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9 August 1979

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Place	Nature of Involvement	Results to Date
Grenada	<p>While Cuba reportedly planned late last year to provide paramilitary training to members of Maurice Bishop's New Jewel Movement (NJM), we have no credible evidence that this training ever took place. Nevertheless, Cuba provided the NJM with some financial and material support in the months prior to the coup, and Havana clearly had foreknowledge of the event. Since the coup, Havana has reportedly supplied small arms, including rifles, revolvers, and light machine guns [redacted] as well as an unknown quantity of heavy machine guns and four anti-aircraft guns.</p>	<p>Since Bishop assumed power, approximately 30-50 Cuban military advisers have been sent to Grenada. These advisers are probably providing guidance on internal security matters and could also serve as a small defensive force should former Prime Minister Gairy attempt to stage a counter-coup. In addition, it is likely that some Grenadians are receiving military training in Cuba.</p>

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9 August 1979

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Place	Nature of Involvement	Results to Date
GDR: Angola	There is no evidence of combat participation by the GDR in Angola although there are about 400 East German military personnel in the country in a training and advisory capacity. Some \$60 million in military agreements covering small arms, ammunitions, vehicles and spare parts have been concluded between Berlin and Luanda since 1977. From 1964 to 1977 East German military aid amounted to \$4 million.	East German support was not decisive for the MPLA's success in Angola.
Ethiopia	There is no evidence of combat participation by East Germans in Ethiopia although there are some 250 East German military personnel stationed in the country in a training and advisory capacity. In 1977-78, \$19 million in military agreements were concluded between Berlin and Addis Ababa calling for tanks, anti-aircraft guns, small arms, ammunition, training, and medical supplies.	The GDR's support has been helpful, but not essential, to the regime's success in Eritrea and the Ogaden.
25X1 Zambia	There are [] East German military personnel with the ZAPU forces in Zambia.	The GDR's involvement is important to Nkomo's efforts in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, but not decisive, and Lusaka is not dependent on Berlin's support for its continued viability.

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9 August 1979

Place	Nature of Involvement	Results to Date
Mozambique	The GDR has about 50 military personnel engaged in training and advisory capacities in Mozambique. The \$24 million in military agreements concluded between Maputo and Berlin since 1977 call for the delivery of assault and anti-aircraft guns, armored personnel carriers, and training.	The treaty of friendship signed last February opens the possibility of increasing the low levels of existing East German support.
South Yemen	There is no evidence of combat participation on the part of the estimated 300 East German military advisers, who provide training and technical assistance to the Yemenis.	Berlin's support has not been a major factor in the PDRY's efforts to unify North and South Yemen.

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9 August 1979

Estimated Number of Communist Military Personnel Present in Less Developed Countries Outside Sub-Saharan Africa (as of July 1979)

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	<u>Total</u>	<u>USSR</u>	<u>Cuba</u>	<u>East Germany</u>	<u>Other</u>
<u>Total</u>	<u>10,990</u>	<u>8,470</u>	<u>1,375</u>	<u>300</u>	<u>845</u>
<u>North Africa</u>	<u>2,935</u>	<u>2,310</u>	<u>215</u>	<u>NA</u>	<u>410</u>
Algeria	1,015	1,000	15 ¹	-	-
Libya	1,910	1,300	200 ¹	NA	410
Morocco	10	10 ¹	-	-	-
<u>Latin America</u>	<u>160</u>	<u>150</u>	<u>10</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>
Guyana	10	-	10 ¹	-	-
Peru	150	150 ¹	-	-	-
<u>Middle East</u>	<u>6,355</u>	<u>4,560</u>	<u>1,150</u>	<u>300</u>	<u>345</u>
Iran	5	5 ¹	-	-	-
Iraq	1,380	1,100 ¹	150 ¹	NA	130 ¹
Kuwait	5	5 ¹	-	-	-
North Yemen	155	150	-	-	5 ¹
South Yemen	2,300	1,000 ²	1,000	300	-
Syria	2,510	2,300	-	-	210 ¹
<u>South Asia</u>	<u>1,540</u>	<u>1,450</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>90</u>
Afghanistan	1,300	1,300 ³	-	-	-
Bangladesh	50	-	-	-	50 ¹
India	150	150 ¹	-	-	-
Pakistan	40	-	-	-	40 ¹

¹ 1978 estimate.

² Increased from 500 present in 1978.

³ Increased from 700 present in 1978.

ER M 79-10459
9 August 1979

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Estimated Number of Communist Military
Personnel Present in Sub-Saharan Africa
(as of July 1979)

Country	<u>USSR</u>	<u>Cuba</u>	<u>East Germany</u>	<u>Other</u>	<u>Total</u>
<u>Total</u>	<u>3160</u>	<u>32335</u>	<u>800</u>	<u>870</u>	<u>37165</u>
Angola	1000	19000	400	-	20400
Benin	30	10	-	115	155
Botswana	-	-	-	5	5
Burundi	-	-	-	10	10
Cape Verde	55	5	NA	15	75
Cameroon	-	-	-	10	10
Chad	5	-	-	-	5
Congo	50	300	25	-	375
Equatorial Guinea	40	25 ¹	-	140	205
Ethiopia	1000 ²	12500 ²	250	-	13750
Guinea	35 ³	50 ³	40	30	155
Guinea-Bissau	50	50	5	-	105
Madagascar	15	15	-	100	130
Mali	180	-	-	-	180
Mozambique	475	215 ⁴	50	100	840
Nigeria	35	-	-	-	35
Sao Tome-Principe	50	50	-	-	100
Sierra Leone	-	15	-	-	15
Sudan	-	-	-	25	25
Tanzania	120	-	-	50 ⁵	170
Togo	-	-	-	10	10
Zaire	-	-	-	45	45
Zambia	20	100	30	215	365

- 1 Reduced from 150 present during 1978.
- 2 Reduced from 1300 Soviets and 16,500 Cubans in 1978.
- 3 Reduced from 100 Soviet and 200 Cuban technicians present in 1978.
- 4 Revised from 1978 data.
- 5 Reduced from 180 present in 1978

ER M 79-10455
8 August 1979

[Redacted]

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
NATIONAL FOREIGN ASSESSMENT CENTER

Partly accurate
fallacious
C #9
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22 October 1979

MEMORANDUM

(Western Europe + Japan)

CHANGING POWER RELATIONS AMONG OECD STATES*

Overview

Over the past several years, United States relations with its major OECD partners have undergone a series of gradual changes whose cumulative impact suggests that the United States is losing its leadership position within the OECD arena, without being replaced by any one, or group, of its allies.

The multitude of ties that constitutes the OECD power relationship is so complex that it is difficult to gauge how far the erosion of American leadership has progressed, and what reciprocal impacts changing economic, military, political, West-West, East-West, and North-South relations have on each other. Nevertheless, American influence is declining, albeit to different degrees and at different rates, in all phases of the allied relationship.

To a considerable extent, that decline is a product of the consistent and conscious US effort throughout the post-war period to enhance its partners' military and economic capabilities. But it is questionable whether the ultimate consequences of that policy for allied solidarity were ever thoroughly considered--by either the United States or its allies.

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* This memorandum was prepared by [Redacted] International Issues Division, Office of Political Analysis. It has been discussed, but not coordinated, with other interested NFAC analysts. The author offers one interpretation of a complex, evolving relationship, and is aware that the issues discussed lend themselves to different interpretations. [Redacted]

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*An alliance of more equal partners could eventually prove stronger than one under American dominance. But such a positive outcome would require major changes in the OECD decisionmaking process, based on substantial alterations in the allies' behavior and expectations vis-a-vis one another. Some changes have already occurred--for example, in the broadening and deepening of allied consultations on national economic policy issues--but they have not gone far enough, nor have they been fully accepted by all of the participants. Unless substantially more progress is registered, there is a real prospect of an essentially leaderless OECD with a substantial increase in uncertainty, complexity, and friction on basic political, military, and economic issues.**

The Nature of the Change

The change in the relationship between the United States and its major allies has not been marked by dramatic, easily identifiable turning points. Instead, it can best be described by a "take-off" analogy, wherein a series of limited quantitative changes eventually leads to a qualitative change. That kind of shift may be far more basic and less reversible than one brought about by dramatic events whose effects might disappear as quickly as they arose.

The problem is not one of increased enmity or even--as yet--of basic divergencies in interests between the United States and its allies. The change entails, instead, a diminution of American decisionmaking power and influence with its allies resulting from lack of trust in US responsiveness and policymaking skill, as well as from a perceived decline in relative American political, economic, and military power.

Allied mistrust of, and differences with, the United States are not new phenomena in Atlantic relations. No state can entirely trust another on which it is economically and militarily dependent; too much is at stake for it to do so. In the past, however, the allies ultimately had no choice but to accept US leadership, even if they worried that some American decisions might not be in their best

* In this memorandum, the acronym "OECD" is used loosely to denote not the specific organization, but the general relationship of the major Western industrial countries to each other. The words "alliance" and "ally" are used equally loosely to cover political and economic as well as military ties.

interests. They could resist major US initiatives--like the Multilateral Force--which required their active collaboration. They could even--like France--go so far as to withdraw from NATO. But they could not initiate. And their occasional resistance to the United States was a sign of weakness rather than strength, since it was predicated on the assumption that they could do little to influence--either positively or negatively--the American strategic commitment to them.

Now the allies believe that their capabilities go far beyond resistance, and that their interests increasingly demand that they seize the initiative or even act independently. In part their increased power and independence vis-a-vis the United States is the inevitable result of normal political and economic development. Nation-states with a long tradition of independent action and with significant capabilities could not be expected to remain indefinitely docile.

While the current situation in the alliance was probably inevitable eventually, its appearance was hastened by the years of American dominance. The United States worked directly for its allies' growth and development in a variety of ways: in the immediate postwar period through economic and military assistance, and pressure for West German rearmament and for West European unity; later through calls for allied "burden-sharing" in the political and economic, as well as military, fields. The indirect contribution of the United States was even more important. By assuming most of the responsibility for allied defense and for the maintenance of the postwar trade and monetary systems, the United States helped to create an environment for the allies that was both conducive to, and allowed almost exclusive concentration on, their domestic economic and political development. At the same time, the economic costs of the leadership role undermined the economic strength of the United States itself.

In encouraging the revitalization of its allies, the United States probably never directly confronted the probability that they would eventually want to steer a more independent course. Instead, US policy was based on an implicit assumption that continued common interests would allow it to share the responsibilities, more than the rights, of leadership with its strengthened allies.

At the same time as the United States finds it difficult to abandon that assumption, the West Europeans and Japanese are having even more difficulty in defining their preferred role in the alliance. On the one hand, they are frustrated by the remaining sizable limits on their capacity for independent

action, especially in the military field. On the other hand, they are reluctant to accept the costs of increased initiative and autonomy. The result is an alliance in transition to an unknown end, characterized by both continuity and change. But the changes, and the attendant strains between the United States and its partners, are becoming increasingly dramatic.

Signs of Change

OECD Economic Relations

By definition, neither the United States nor its allies can act completely independently in the area of OECD economic relations, which is the area of interdependence *par excellence*. But the West Europeans, rather than waiting for American action, have recently shown a marked tendency to take the initiative in OECD economic matters, presenting the United States with policy proposals to which it must react.

Monetary questions provide one of the best current examples of changing allied relationships on OECD economic policy issues. The ability of the United States to direct the international monetary system was once virtually unquestioned, based as it was on American economic, political, and military dominance, and on the advantages stemming from the American guarantee of the Bretton Woods system to the allies' economic interests. By the early 1970s, the United States could no longer play that role, but the allies continued to look to it for international monetary leadership. Now they have ceased to do so.

The anti-inflation and dollar support programs adopted by the United States in the fall of 1978 were the result in great part of allied pressure. At the same time, France and West Germany seized the initiative by launching the European Monetary System (EMS). The EMS was established to provide some exchange rate stability in Western Europe, as long as it was impossible to achieve on the OECD level. West European leaders assert privately that the EMS was made necessary in large part by US economic and fiscal mismanagement, which they claim is heavily responsible for continued international monetary disorder.

The EMS has experienced considerable strain, caused to a great extent by the unwillingness of West Germany to play in the EMS a role equivalent to that of the United States in the Bretton Woods system, and by the absence of an EMS dollar policy. The problems in the EMS reflect several

general factors that severely limit West European ability to exercise leadership in OECD economic affairs: the absence of common economic policies; the unwillingness of key West European states to make domestic sacrifices for international reasons; and the continued preeminence of the United States.

Nevertheless, the EMS has accomplished the goal of providing some monetary stability within Western Europe. And the members feel that their political and economic credibility is too much at stake for them to allow the EMS to fail. Periodic currency realignments like those of September 1979 are to be expected, but no member is likely to leave the system in the foreseeable future.

Energy provides a second major example of changing decisionmaking patterns within the OECD. The oil boycott and price increases of 1973-1974 enhanced American power in the eyes of its allies, because the United States was comparatively self-sufficient in energy. The United States could, therefore, fairly easily persuade its OECD partners--with the notable exception of France--to accept its proposals on consumer country energy policy and establish the International Energy Agency. In the ensuing years, however, the United States has not been able to exercise effective leadership over OECD energy policy, in large part because of its steeply rising dependence on imported oil.

The West Europeans therefore decided to take the initiative in the allied response to the "second world energy crisis" of 1979. They reached a compromise among their national energy proposals at the Common Market Summit in late June, in order to present a united proposal at the Tokyo Summit one week later. The EC members were explicit in their belief that a West European energy program could not succeed without the participation of the United States, the world's leading energy consumer, but that the United States could not be relied upon to initiate an adequate program for itself or its allies.

The limited success which the West Europeans registered on the energy issue in June reflects the same general constraints which have plagued the EMS. The EC members had difficulty agreeing among themselves on a joint proposal, and still more in persuading the United States to accept their ideas. The outcome, at both Strasbourg and Tokyo, was disappointing to many. Implementation of the Tokyo decisions is proving even more difficult. Nevertheless, the West

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Europeans did show an ability to act quickly in response to a perceived crisis situation, and perhaps more important, gave additional evidence of their determination to take a leadership position on OECD economic questions.

Military Issues

By comparison to OECD economic issues, American decisionmaking power in allied strategic relationships remains largely intact. United States control of the strategic arsenal of the West cannot be disputed. But that fact no longer has the spillover effect into other issue areas that it once had, and there are important signs of increased West European and Japanese restiveness with United States military dominance.

Two recent sets of US decisions highlighted to the allies not only their military dependence on the United States, but also the costs of that dependence. First the United States decided to produce the "neutron bomb" (enhanced radiation warhead) and pressured the West Germans to overcome the considerable domestic opposition to its deployment on their territory. After the West German Government had launched a major campaign to win domestic support for the weapon, the United States decided not to produce it.

Similarly, Japanese feelings of strategic vulnerability were considerably heightened by the United States decisions to withdraw from South Korea and to terminate its mutual defense pact with Taiwan. The subsequent United States suspension of the South Korean troop withdrawal assuaged many of the Japanese fears, but also did not help the United States' reputation for decisiveness and reliability. Those decisions have all strengthened the Japanese doubts about the American defense commitment which were inspired by the end of the Vietnam War. Those doubts have in turn helped significantly to heighten discussion in Japan about rearmament, and about establishing formal ties with NATO.

Neither Japan nor West Germany is likely to become a major, let alone an independent, military power. Even if such an evolution were technically and economically feasible, the domestic and international political costs would be unacceptable--the legacy of the Second World War remains too strong. Nevertheless, resentment and frustration within West Germany and Japan at the disparity between their economic strength and their military weakness vis-a-vis the United States inevitably has a wearing effect on their relationship with the United States in both areas.

Allied dissatisfaction with their military dependence on the United States is now focused on the SALT II ratification process. The West Europeans are genuinely worried that the US executive may not be able to win Senate approval of the treaty, and have broadly hinted that they may have to rethink their security relationship with the United States and the Soviet Union if the Senate rejects the treaty. The situation is strikingly reminiscent--in reverse--of that in December 1953, when the US Secretary of State threatened an "agonizing reappraisal" of American policy toward Western Europe if the French Parliament rejected the European Defense Community Treaty. Nothing would be likely to result from any West European "agonizing reappraisal" (any more than it did from Secretary Dulles'), but the concerns expressed--and the changed relationship which they reflect--are very real.

West European concern that SALT II may not be ratified does not mean that they are satisfied with the treaty. On the contrary, they fear that it may further narrow the strategic gap between the United States and the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, the West Europeans are even more concerned about the negative implications for the international position of the US Government if the Executive can not keep a major foreign policy commitment because of Congressional opposition.

Relations with Developing Countries

The structural limitations on allied independence evident in military and OECD economic matters are not as great in regard to allied relations with LDCs. In that area, the West Europeans and Japanese are tending increasingly to pursue their political and economic interests independently of the United States.

That tendency causes least friction between the United States and its allies in Africa and Southeast Asia. France's policy in Africa continues to reflect its longstanding desire to retain postcolonial ties, but it now also has a wider aim that the French consider at least as important--to counter or stem the growth of Soviet influence in the region. The same consideration underlies a significantly increased West German involvement in the area. Given its anti-Soviet motive, West European activity in Africa has generally been consonant with American interests. The West Germans have been scrupulous in keeping the United States apprised of their actions in the region. Even the French tend to coordinate their activities with the United States; the most notable example is in the allied response to the Shaba invasion.

In Southeast Asia, heightened West European and Japanese activity reflects their desire to help foster political stability (and take advantage of economic opportunities) in the region now that the United States has reduced its presence in the area. The allies, however, are not likely to become militarily involved in Southeast Asia, if that should ever appear warranted. Southeast Asia is less important than Africa to the West Europeans for simple geographic reasons. Perhaps an even more important deterrent is the historical legacy of past Japanese, French, and American military involvement in the region. The nonmilitary nature of allied activity in Southeast Asia limits the need--and memories of the Vietnam War limit the desire--for close allied consultations in the area. But West European, Japanese, and American interests there are still generally consistent with each other.

Although West European and Japanese activity in Africa and Southeast Asia has not yet caused any major friction with the United States, tensions might arise in the future. The allies' activity in both areas is based on their definition of their own interests, not on any desire to be a proxy of the United States. As their involvement in those regions deepens, they will become progressively less likely to change their policies if they encounter American opposition.

In other Third World regions, the West Europeans, and to some extent the Japanese, already define their interests as different from those of the United States, and are therefore pursuing more independent policies. Their activity in Latin America, the Middle East, and South Asia has already caused considerable friction with the United States, and threatens to cause more in the future. The United States has clashed with the French and West Germans over sales of nuclear technology and conventional arms to those regions. Further conflicts with OECD partners over access to nonmilitary-related markets and raw material supplies appear likely. The most obvious, and most important, example is the Middle East, where the latest oil price increases have inspired the West Europeans--and especially the French--to escalate their already active efforts to forge special bilateral and bi-regional ties, to the exclusion of the United States.

In some cases of friction between the United States and its allies over policy toward Latin America, the Middle East, or South Asia, the United States has apparently been able to persuade its allies to change their policies. The suspension of the French nuclear sale to Pakistan is a good example. But in most instances the United States has not

been able to convince its allies of any common interest sufficiently overriding to justify the costs of a change in course.

Indeed, in the Middle East, the West Europeans, and to a lesser extent the Japanese, increasingly believe that their interests not only differ from those of the United States, but also call for their explicit dissociation from the United States, since many states in that region seek an alternative to their ties with the United States for political reasons. The same observation applies to West European and Japanese activity in Latin America, with two important qualifications. The allies view that region as less vital to them than the Middle East, although Mexico and South American countries such as Brazil are increasingly economically important to them. And, in Central America, the existence of a Communist threat provides a common interest with the United States which may override their differing interests.

Causes of the Change

West European and Japanese Perceptions of the United States

US influence on its allies has waned primarily because they believe that the relative political, economic, and military power of the United States has declined, and that it is ineffectively managing its still sizable remaining power. As a result, the allies believe that greater independence or initiative on their part is both possible and necessary.

There is considerable doubt among the allies that the US Executive pays sufficient attention to international factors when devising policies that will have both domestic and international impact. Even if it does, they question whether it has the political power vis-a-vis the US Congress and various domestic interest groups to be able to execute its foreign policies and promises. There is also a widespread belief that, after Vietnam, the United States no longer has the political will to be the kind of alliance leader and global actor that it once was. (Even as they make that complaint, it is obvious that the allies would resist any US effort to reassert that role, unless it were carefully coordinated with them.)

Finally, the allies believe that the United States no longer has the economic power necessary for dominance. United States productivity growth continues to be lower than that of most industrialized countries. The dollar is

subject to speculative attack more often than not. Whereas relative economic self-sufficiency was once one of the major strengths of the United States, foreign trade now holds a steadily growing place in the American economy. Most obvious, and most important politically and economically, in that respect is increased US dependence on imported oil.

The fact that the United States is no longer self-sufficient in energy has several consequences in the minds of the allies: it cannot be relied upon for help in the event of an oil cutoff; its ability to withstand pressure from the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries is severely diminished; and it is increasingly a competitor with its allies for access to oil. In addition, US political and economic management is suspect because the United States has allowed itself to become more dependent on imported fuel at a time when the political and economic costs--to both itself and its allies--of that dependence are all too obvious.

The economic problems of the United States' have inspired a variety of specific policy moves by its allies--in OECD monetary and energy policies and in relations with LDCs --that are designed to reduce the adverse impact on them of those problems. More generally, the US economic difficulties heighten allied doubts about America's freedom of action in foreign policy. US foreign policy was once conducted with relatively little regard to its economic costs; that era reached its high point--and its end--during the Vietnam War. Now the allies fear that the United States will eschew some actions (for example, the development of the B-1 bomber) and feel forced into others (for example, arms control agreements) because of economic considerations, when political and military factors might have pointed in another direction. An economically strapped alliance leader, in short, must to some extent be considered an unreliable one.

On the more purely political side, the West Europeans and Japanese question the wisdom (and sometimes suspect the motives) of various American initiatives in areas like nuclear proliferation, conventional arms transfers, and human rights. America's allies view those US policies as presenting both a threat and an opportunity--a threat because mistaken American policies might harm them if they are too closely tied to the United States; an opportunity because dissatisfaction with those policies heightens the interest of advanced developing countries in pulling away from the United States and toward Western Europe and Japan.

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Western Europe and Japanese Perceptions of Themselves

As West European and Japanese doubt in American capabilities has grown, their confidence in their own power has increased--at least relative to that of the United States. The most dramatic, and the most important, change has been in West Germany. The economic giant is no longer the political dwarf who was reluctant to take any initiatives and who was usually ready to do the bidding of the United States. Instead, it is increasingly pursuing independent political-economic interests (for example, in Brazil) and working at persuading its EC colleagues to join it in policies designed to advance their common interests (for example, the EMS, and the developing EC relationship with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations). The 1979 Guadeloupe Summit--where the Big Four* for the first time discussed strategic issues in a formal meeting--and West Germany's increasingly vocal expression of security concerns, may signal the start of a new, though still cautious, activism in the strategic sphere as well.

In part, the change in the West German attitude can be attributed to the presence in office of Chancellor Helmut Schmidt--supremely confident of his own abilities, disdainful of many others, and able to work in close cooperation with French President Valery Giscard d'Estaing. It is unlikely, however, that West Germany will return to its previous docility when Schmidt leaves the Chancellorship; it simply took someone of his personality, ability--and generation--to make the breakthrough.

Japan has kept a much lower international political profile than West Germany. It has however, become steadily more assertive (not to say obstreperous) in OECD economic negotiations. It has also been quietly, but significantly, expanding its political activities throughout Asia, and has expended considerable political effort to ensure access to markets and raw material supplies in other developing regions.

One of the most interesting signs of change in OECD relations is in the attitude of France. It is often more accommodating to the United States now than it was in the past, but in large part because it can afford to be. Its

* *The United States, United Kingdom, France, and West Germany.*

battles have been won: its independence is widely recognized; it can deal with the United States on a more equal basis; and it has forged a close relationship with West Germany that enhances its influence. Being relatively weak, de Gaulle had to dictate; he could not afford to bargain with the United States, and often could not even bargain with his EC partners. Giscard can be more cooperative when that suits his interests (for example, in NATO and Africa), while going his own way when that appears more profitable (most notably in the Middle East).

The "special relationship" between the United States and the United Kingdom, finally, has lost much of its meaning. The United States is no longer significantly closer to Britain than to its other major allies. Even if the old relationship still existed, it would not mean a great deal, given the United Kingdom's now largely secondary political, economic, and military role in the EC, in NATO, and in the Third World. Insofar as the Thatcher government is interested in expanding that role, it apparently intends to do so in an EC more than an Atlantic framework.

Western European and Japanese Perceptions of the Advanced Developing Countries

If the West Germans, French, and Japanese perceive that their power has increased relative to that of the United States, they may be even more impressed by the growing strength of the oil producers and other rapidly developing countries.

The United States is one of the most important economic partners of the other OECD members. But they tend to take that situation for granted, and concentrate more on its attendant liabilities than on its positive aspects. In strategic protection, the United States has something vital to offer its allies, but it is vital only in an ultimate sense, and the need for it impinges less and less on practical current concerns. At the same time, the allies' strategic dependence on the United States is a source of friction as well as cohesion.

The OPEC states and other rapidly developing countries, by contrast, offer the West Europeans and Japanese some things that they badly need in the here and now and which they do not take at all for granted--primarily raw materials, but also expanding markets. This is not to say that the allies would abandon NATO for Iran or Saudi Arabia. And a clear Communist threat in the Third World still tends usually to inspire allied solidarity. But they do not often perceive such

threats, and the competition for scarce resources in the advanced developing countries inevitably means that the allies pursue their national interests there aggressively, while sometimes paying relatively limited attention to the possible global strategic implications of their actions.

Western European and Japanese Perceptions of the Soviet Union

In part because of their own perceptions of declining American power, in part because of more objective considerations, the West Europeans and Japanese increasingly believe that the United States is losing international political-military position to the Soviet Union. For evidence, they point particularly to the narrowing of the strategic gap and to the activities of Soviet proxies in Africa and Southeast Asia.

To some degree that development has drawn the allies closer to the United States, because of their heightened fear of the USSR. But it has also led to increased attention, especially in West Germany, to a possible long-term need to forge an independent accommodation with the Soviets. Any real movement in that direction in the foreseeable future is hard to imagine, but the fact of the discussion is significant.

The Consequences of Change

The relationship among the major OECD countries is complex and difficult to define, and promises to become more so if present trends continue. United States influence over its allies is clearly declining, to differing degrees and at different rates depending on the issue area, but with spillover from one to another. At the same time, mutual dependence is increasing; neither economically nor militarily can the partners afford consistently independent, much less aggressively competitive, actions.

No successor to the United States as the dominant OECD partner seems likely to emerge. While it is theoretically conceivable that the European Community as a whole could assume economic, and perhaps even military, leadership in the alliance, it is highly improbable that it could achieve the sustained, virtually total unity necessary for it to play that role. Moreover, none of the allies appears willing to pay the political and economic costs associated with either military or economic leadership.

In asking the United States to give priority consideration in its decisionmaking to international over domestic factors, and to alliance interests over national interests, the allies are asking it to do something that they have by and large never had to do themselves. Although they want to have more influence over their own futures, they are still loath to give up the advantages that their previous lack of international responsibilities have given them.

It is possible that the OECD would be stronger as a relationship of rough equals than it was earlier, provided that the United States accepted the reduction in its influence, and the allies accepted new responsibilities commensurate with their new power. If common decisions could be reached in such a relationship, the alliance would probably be more stable and healthier in the long run than it would be if the United States continued to dominate--even though it would not be one whose decisions neatly conformed to initial American wishes.

While common decisions are possible among equals, however, they are not necessarily probable. Joint or even coherent policy decisions within the OECD area will necessarily become more difficult with the United States no longer the final arbiter, and with no other OECD member--either singly or in concert--able to assume the place that the United States once held. If the alliance cannot in fact reach common decisions, the strains within it will inevitably increase. The members will probably pursue a growing number of independent actions, and this over time will be likely to lead to an increasing divergence of basic interests.

These considerations lead the West Europeans and the Japanese to be ambivalent about the apparent decline in United States influence over them. On the one hand, they welcome the opportunity to advance their own interests as they see fit. On the other, they are reluctant to incur the attendant economic costs, and they fear the weakness that could result from the lack of a clear leader in the alliance. The West Germans, in particular, appear anxious for the re-emergence of the United States as the undisputed power center within the OECD. Otherwise, they would probably not be as openly concerned as they currently are about the decline in American leadership. Nevertheless, they will probably never return to their former pliancy; in the growing number of areas where they have a choice, they want US leadership only if it conforms to their interests.

This paper is classified CONFIDENTIAL

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Dear Ayatollah Khomeini:

Based on the willingness of the Revolutionary Council to receive them, I am asking two distinguished Americans, Mr. Ramsey Clark and Mr. William G. Miller, to carry this letter to you and to discuss with you and your designees the situation in Tehran and the full range of current issues between the U.S. and Iran.

In the name of the American people, I ask that you release unharmed all Americans presently detained in Iran and those held with them and allow them to leave your country safely and without delay. I ask you to recognize the compelling humanitarian reasons, firmly based in international law, for doing so.

I have asked both men to meet with you and to hear from you your perspective on events in Iran and the problems which have arisen between our two countries. The people of the United States desire to have relations with Iran based upon equality, mutual respect, and friendship.

They will report to me immediately upon their return.

Sincerely,

His Excellency
Ayatollah Khomeini
Qom, Iran

JCL, DHM, ZPC
SF Box 20
FOUR: ALPHA CHANNEL (MISC)
01/80 - 03/80

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Some good
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
National Foreign Assessment Center

7 December 1979

MEMORANDUM

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US RELATIONS WITH THE RADICAL ARABS

The radical Arabs' strongly nationalist and Third World orientation, their ties to the USSR, and their anti-Israel feelings make it unlikely that any actions taken by the US Government within the parameters of its traditional foreign policy will significantly improve relations with the radicals as a group in the coming year. Only a change in US policy to include recognition of the Palestine Liberation Organization and explicit backing for Palestinian self-determination would lead to a general improvement in relations, but even then serious differences would remain.

Views of these Arab states and the Palestine Liberation Organization toward the US vary widely, however, and there are thus opportunities for the US to improve its bilateral relations with some. A failure of the ongoing Egyptian-Israeli negotiations on West Bank autonomy to make significant progress would not in itself hinder US efforts to firm up its relationship with the radicals; the latter have never believed that the autonomy talks would end in an agreement acceptable to them.

The new government in Algeria has indicated that it would like closer relations with the US, and there are concrete steps the US could take to improve bilateral ties.

This paper was prepared in the Near East South Asia Division, Office of Political Analysis. It was coordinated in substance with the National Intelligence Officer for the Near East and South Asia, the Office of Strategic Research, the Office of Economic Research, and the Directorate of Operations. Comments and questions are welcome and may be addressed to Chief, Near East South Asia Division, OPA, on

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In recent years the Libyan government has also been seeking a more satisfactory relationship and US cooperation in several specific areas; this presumably is now a thing of the past, but Qadhafi's erratic nature makes even this uncertain. Iraq and Syria for the most part see the existing relationship as meeting their current needs, with the result that neither--barring a continued, serious deterioration of relations between Iran and Iraq--is likely to respond to US initiatives by seeking significantly closer or more public bilateral ties. Key leaders of the PLO would like a better relationship with the US, but their demands are so high that the US can at best expect only a continued uneasy truce in the near term. In only one case, South Yemen, is there no realistic potential for improved relations.

The fundamentals of the relationship between the US and the radical Arabs will remain unchanged so long as the US provides massive economic and military assistance to Israel, pushes Arab-Israeli negotiations that do not involve the PLO, and maintains a substantial military presence in the Mediterranean. But the radicals, like all Arabs, know that these things will not change. Those who seek better relations with the US, despite this realization, have lesser expectations. Typically, although with exceptions and varying emphasis, they want:

- Reduced or less public US military, economic, and political backing for their generally conservative opponents within the region (Morocco, Egypt, North Yemen);
- Access to US technology and equipment, especially aircraft, and increased trade;
- Reduced US military presence in the Persian Gulf and off the coast of Libya.
- Higher level US diplomatic representation;
- US pressure on Israel to temper its aggressive Jewish settlements policy in the occupied territories and its military actions in southern Lebanon;
- Reaffirmation of US backing for Palestinian rights and ideally the continued evolution of this position into support for Palestinian self-determination and recognition of the PLO;

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- US movement toward direct and acknowledged dealings with the Polisario Front;
- Economic assistance;
- More positive US reaction to concerns of the nonaligned movement.

The ability of the leaders of the radical Arab states to respond positively to US initiatives in any of these forms over the coming year will turn in large part on the outcome of the current crisis in Iran. Although the radical Arabs have praised the revolution in Iran, they have also been critical of the seizure of the US hostages and believe that the US to date has acted responsibly. In some cases, Arab irritation with Khomeini's tactics and the experience of working with the US on the hostage problem may help pave the way for an overall improvement of relations with the US. On the other hand, the radical Arabs would find it difficult to move toward closer relations if the US had taken actions in Iran that were popularly seen as attacks on Islam or threatening to the economic and military security of the area. US military action against Iran's oil installations or locations with religious significance, such as Qom, would of course create the gravest obstacles to any improvement in relations with the US.

The radical Arab states in general fear and feel inferior to the West, and to the US in particular. They will use every opportunity to exploit the current difficulties of the US, yet they privately want signals that the US considers them worthy and is not conspiring against them. They are sensitive to what they see as condescending superpower attitudes, and want to be treated as equals. If the US can react less to their rhetoric--recognizing it for what it is--and if it can conduct relations with them on a frank and equal basis, this will remove some latent distrust. This will mean explaining US actions in greater detail and in advance, as if the US were seeking their advice, as well as advising them of intended actions where possible.

A country-by-country review of the potential for improved relations with the radical states follows.

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Algeria

Given the expressed desire of Algerian President Bendjedid for improved relations with the US, efforts by the US to resolve existing military, diplomatic, and energy issues would be well received and probably would lead to marginally stronger bilateral ties. The United States could enhance military cooperation with Algeria by expediting Algeria's request for a defense attache in Washington, approving sales of C-130 transport aircraft, and increasing the provisions for US military training for Algerian nationals. Diplomatic efforts to ensure that the projected visit of Algerian President Bendjedid occurs and is successful would strengthen bilateral ties, as would the extension of similar invitations to other ranking officials. A US move toward a formal, public dialogue with Polisario leaders would be seen as evidence that the US favors a peaceful resolution of the Western Saharan conflict, and could provide a basis for future good relations if and when Polisario leaders come to power in an independent state.

Factors that would limit the success of any US effort to improve bilateral relations in the near term include Algeria's basic commitment to a socialist economy, its Third World outlook--as manifested in its support for Iran--the close Soviet-Algerian relationship, and Bendjedid's still insecure hold on power. The importance of these factors may diminish, however, if Bendjedid is able in the coming months to solidify his position and thus feel confident enough to pursue his clear preference for a closer relationship with the US. The US military supply relationship with Morocco will remain, of course, a further irritant to the Algerians.

Libya

Relations between the US and Libya seem virtually certain to deteriorate over the coming months in the wake of the attack on the US Embassy in Tripoli. The most obvious step for the US to take if it were to seek improved relations with the Libyans, however, would be to clear the way for the sale of the 747 and/or C-130 aircraft that have

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been denied an export license. Libya has regarded the issue as a litmus test of US intentions, and relations will unquestionably worsen if the US stand is not reversed. Another significant move would be to raise the level of US representation in Libya to the rank of ambassador--something the Libyans have long sought (they are insisting that only an ambassador will be allowed direct meetings with Libyan leader Qadhafi). Libya is unique among radical Arab countries in having attempted for some time to improve relations with the US, both for prestige reasons and to protect against US backing for any move against Libya by Egypt. As Libyans see it, it is the US that has rebuffed Libyan overtures.

Qadhafi's personal ideological orientation probably precludes any meaningful cooperation on most issues; his behavior will continue to undercut efforts by others in the Libyan government to establish closer ties. Libya will continue to regard US military aid to Egypt as directed against itself. Qadhafi will continue to support "progressive", revolutionary regimes in a way that benefits long-term Soviet, rather than Western, interests. Even if Qadhafi cuts back on his support of terrorism--as he currently is--he regards Palestinians as freedom-fighters rather than terrorists and will continue to fund radical Palestinian groups. So long as output cannot be increased Libya has a special interest in keeping the price of oil high. Libya has been careful to date to retain a mutually profitable relationship with US oil companies, although this policy too could become a casualty of currently deteriorating bilateral relations.

Iraq

Some potential for an improved US-Iraqi relationship is offered by Iraq's opposition to the expansion of Soviet presence and influence in the Gulf region, by the danger posed by Khomeini and political fragmentation in Iran, and by Iraq's desire for trade with the West and for its technology. The opening is quite limited, however, because there remains a basic ideological hostility and strong tensions flowing from the US relationship with Israel.

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Iraq wants access to Western technology, especially in the oil and aircraft sectors. Iraq's pragmatic President Saddam Husayn is willing to mute Iraq's differences with the US to the extent necessary to gain that access. The current limited bilateral relationship has facilitated trade in agricultural commodities and specialized goods and appears adequate from Iraq's point of view to ensure that end. Baghdad would prefer a more liberal US trade policy, but it probably would not be willing to pay much of a political price. It is possible that Washington could exploit an increased Iraqi interest in US oil technology and equipment if a recent report that Iraq intends to increase oil capacity proves to be accurate.

Iraq also shares with the United States an antipathy to the rise of Khomeini in Iran. His influence with Iraq's Shia community constitutes a threat to the minority Sunni government in Baghdad. Paradoxically, Iraq also sees danger in a weakening of Khomeini's power. Iraqis anticipate that further fragmentation in Iran will result in takeover by a leftist government more sympathetic to, and influenced by, the USSR. A strong Soviet position in Iran would greatly increase Soviet leverage over Iraq, once more tying its principal Persian Gulf rival to a superpower, capable of building up Iran's military capabilities. There is room for the US to exploit these concerns, but the opening is limited by Iraq's hostility, not just to Soviet penetration of the Persian Gulf, but to any outside foreign influence, especially that of the US. The willingness of the US to talk frankly to the Iraqis about options in Iran could possibly begin to break down some of the ideological barriers.

Syria

US relations with Syria will be strained as long as the peace process remains in a narrow forum such as the Egyptian-Israeli autonomy talks. If these talks fail and if Israel is internationally perceived as the cause of the failure, there will be opportunities to improve relations with Damascus substantially. Syria, looking for a more comprehensive forum and a formula that took account of all issues, might respond favorably to any US proposal along these lines.

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The US could also take several other, less far-reaching steps that would show continuing US interest in Syria and might at least improve the tone of bilateral relations. Washington could adopt a more positive attitude on the sale of commercial aircraft and on non-lethal equipment to the Syrian military, for example, and it could attempt to encourage more US business investment in Syria, which would help to offset congressional reductions in foreign aid originally programmed for Syria. Any US actions to restrain Israel's active Jewish settlements policy in the occupied territories or its military involvement in Lebanon would, of course, be welcomed by the Syrians and would help strengthen relations with the US.

The constraints on such US action include Syria's continuing support of Palestinian terrorist activity through its surrogate, Saïqa. Opinion in Congress is against Syria on this score and is becoming more negative because of Syria's recent public support of Iran. Given the obstacles facing business ventures in Syria there may not be much private sector interest.

Palestine Liberation Organization

Yasir Arafat and the moderates in his Fatah organization are attempting to gain US recognition of the PLO as the representative of Palestinian interests, US support for the principle of Palestinian self-determination, and US help in pushing Israel toward acceptance of these goals. Public statements by the US that it is sympathetic to these aims probably would be the necessary first step toward any significant overt improvement in relations between the US and the PLO. Arafat would probably be favorably influenced by a reaffirmation that the US does not consider the autonomy talks as the final act in the Middle East peace process and will continue negotiations with the aim of resolving the question of Palestinian political rights. Arafat would also consider as helpful such steps as US approval of a UN Security Council resolution on Palestinian political rights acceptable to the PLO, or an explicit US statement that the expanding PLO-European relations complement Middle East peace efforts.

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Any US actions that had the effect of restraining Israel's aggressive Jewish settlements policy in the occupied territories or its actions in southern Lebanon would also help to minimize strains in the US-Palestinian relationship.

There are constraints on the US ability to improve relations even with PLO moderates. The Palestinians' extreme wariness about taking any step that would appear to involve them in the Camp David process may cause them to misinterpret any US overtures for better relations. The PLO rejectionist groups, for their part, continue to exhibit militant opposition to the US and Israel.

South Yemen

South Yemen is the only country in the Middle East with no US presence and is the most violently anti-American Arab state. It has the only Marxist government in the Arab world and is the USSR's most dependent client. South Yemen recently concluded a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with the USSR; Iraq is the only other Arab state that has such a treaty in effect at this time. In these circumstances, there is virtually nothing that the US can do that would significantly improve bilateral US-Yemeni relations or lead the regime in Aden away from its close ties to the Soviet Union.

Before pro-Soviet President Ismail's purge of opponents in June 1978, South Yemen had approved an American initiative to send a delegation to explore the possibility of improving relations. However, given South Yemen's adamant opposition to the Camp David Accords, its closer ties to Moscow following Ismail's coup, US aid to North Yemen, and Aden's fears of US military intentions in the Persian Gulf area, it is very unlikely that any elements in the country's leadership would entertain the idea of rapprochement with the US. Ismail still has his challengers, but relations with the superpowers do not appear to be in dispute. There are sporadic indications of Yemeni displeasure at what they see as the low level of Soviet economic aid, and US-Yemeni relations conceivably could be improved by resuming trade--but this would be at best a marginal improvement.

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Warsaw Pact

EAST-WEST RELATIONS

The Warsaw Pact took a series of steps in early December apparently timed to the NATO Council session that opened in Brussels on the 11th. Between 4 and 6 December, the Pact foreign ministers met in East Berlin, the defense ministers conferred in Warsaw, and Pact media announced the first withdrawals of Soviet military units from East Germany as a result of President Brezhnev's 6 October proposals in East Berlin. The Pact foreign ministers reiterated opposition to NATO's impending decision on deploying new medium-range missiles, but judging from a final communique their attention was already focused on the East-West dialog on security issues that still lies ahead.

WARSAW PACT MEETINGS, SOVIET TROOP PULLOUT PRECEDE NATO TALKS

Both the Pact Defense Ministers Committee meeting on 4-6 December and the Foreign Ministers Committee meeting on the 5th and 6th exhibited some features out of the ordinary. The foreign ministers meeting in East Berlin was held only seven months after the last such session in Budapest in May, a much briefer interval than usual. While not claiming unanimity, the communique recorded an atmosphere of "comradely cooperation and fraternal friendship," a formula virtually identical to the one used for the May meeting.

A political purpose was also apparent in the report on the 4-6 December Warsaw Pact defense ministers meeting in the Polish capital. In a departure from the exclusively military content of past reports on such gatherings, TASS said that the Defense Ministers Committee "unanimously and fully supports the new peace initiatives expounded in the speech of Leonid Brezhnev" in East Berlin on 6 October. While the report claimed unanimity on the Soviet disarmament initiative, its description of the defense ministers' talks as "businesslike" suggested some level of disagreement, possibly related to Romanian resistance to closer coordination of the Pact armed forces. The same characterization had been used for the Pact Military Council meeting, at the deputy defense ministers level, in Bucharest at the end of October, after being absent from reports on such Pact meetings for five years.

SOVIET TROOP WITHDRAWAL Soviet and East Berlin media have hailed the 5 December pullout of the first contingents of the 20,000 troops and 1,000 tanks which Brezhnev said would be withdrawn from the GDR over the next 12 months. TASS on the 6th said that 1,500 troops had been withdrawn. As reported by ADN,

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12 DECEMBER 1979

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a speech in Halle on the 5th by Army General Ivanovskiy, commander of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, repeatedly specified that the troops were returning "home"—an apparent response to Western conjectures that the Soviet troops may be moved from the GDR to another East European country. Ivanovskiy said the troops would be welcomed in the Soviet Union with gratitude for carrying out their responsibility of "reliably protecting the western frontiers of the socialist community of states."

WARSAW PACT RENEWS CALL FOR CONFERENCE ON MILITARY DETENTE

The Warsaw Pact Foreign Ministers Committee communique, issued on 6 December, renewed the group's call of last spring for a Europe-wide conference on "military detente." Given its appearance on the eve of the NATO Council's meeting to consider theater nuclear force modernization, the communique's focus on arms control issues for the coming year made its reiterated warning against a go-ahead alliance decision appear almost pro forma. The foreign ministers' proposals seem designed to insure that security issues play a major role at the second Helsinki review conference scheduled for November 1980 in Madrid. Pact leaders undoubtedly are attempting to avoid the pattern of the first review conference, held in late 1977 in Belgrade, when Soviet proposals for security consultations got nowhere and "third basket" issues of cultural exchange and human rights stressed by the West dominated the proceedings.

As they had in their previous meeting last May, the foreign ministers appealed to NATO to forego its theater nuclear force modernization plans, expressly holding out the prospect this time of negotiations instead. The foreign ministers' language in this connection seemed to soften the implication in earlier remarks by Foreign Minister Gromyko last month that early talks would be ruled out if NATO went ahead as planned. Not just the adoption of a production and deployment decision alone, it said, but the "implementation" of such a decision, would destroy the basis for negotiations.

The largest part of the foreign ministers' communique was devoted to an elaboration and clarification of European security proposals first presented at their meeting in Budapest last May. The communique indicated that the call last May for a Helsinki-style conference on reducing military confrontation in Europe has now been explicitly cast within the framework of the Helsinki review process. The document also confirmed that Moscow intends several of its longstanding disarmament initiatives to occupy a major place on the agenda. Preparatory talks on such a conference, the document suggests, should begin right away, with a "working meeting"

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to take place in the first half of 1980. As a final step, it suggests, the working meeting should agree on a tentative agenda for the conference to be submitted to the Madrid review conference for its final approval.

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SECRET

January 8, 1980

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI
FROM: ROBERT D. BLACKWILL *RB*
SUBJECT: Western European Reaction to U.S.-Soviet
Tension (S)

The Interagency paper on Western European reaction to a downturn in U.S.-Soviet relations is at Tab A. Should you wish to forward it to the President, a transmittal memorandum containing the paper's principal conclusions, is at Tab I. (S)

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Review on January 8, 1986.

MEMORANDUM

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SECRETINFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

SUBJECT: Western European Reaction to U.S.-Soviet Tension (S)

Under the direction of the NSC Staff, CIA has prepared the memorandum at Tab A which analyzes probable West European responses to a sharp downturn in U.S.-Soviet relations. The study has been cleared by State and Defense. Its principal conclusions are:

- The European stake in detente in Europe is very large and they will want to protect it; the prospect of heightened tension between the U.S. and the Soviet Union thus causes deep apprehension among the Europeans.
- How the Europeans interpret the events in Afghanistan will strongly influence their response to the measures the U.S. takes against the Soviet Union. If they accept that the Soviet invasion has broad strategic implications, and they have not yet definitely reached this conclusion, they will be more willing to take steps to shore up Western security in South Asia and the Middle East.
- The Germans are most vulnerable to Soviet countermeasures and have the most to lose from revived U.S.-Soviet tension. Because of this, Schmidt will seek to maintain FRG reconciliation with Moscow and Eastern Europe -- especially East Germany.
- Unlike the UK, the Italians are also vulnerable to Soviet pressure; the French will play an independent hand.
- Under these conditions, most Europeans will hesitate to reinforce East West tension. They will instead stand apart a certain distance to try to limit and confine the crisis, and to ensure that detente in Europe is not damaged at the core. (S)

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With these factors in mind, the paper suggests that European support for U.S. actions against the Soviet Union will depend especially on their confidence that:

- Their relations with Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, and especially inner-German relations, can be insulated to some degree from the U.S.-Soviet confrontation.
- The U.S. intends to preserve the framework of detente in Europe to the greatest possible extent, and in particular to pursue ratification of the SALT agreement and negotiation of further arms control agreements focused on Europe.
- The U.S. will not play the China card so strongly as to encourage a Soviet backlash in Europe or elsewhere.
- The U.S. itself is acting in response to an objectively perceived and substantial external threat rather than to domestic political imperatives, and can maintain firm control and steady management of its policy toward the Soviet Union despite the pressures of an election year. (S)

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SECRET/SENSITIVE

SPECIAL COORDINATION COMMITTEE MEETING

Monday, January 14, 1980

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TIME AND PLACE: 10:00 a.m. - 12:00 Noon
White House Situation Room

SUBJECT: SCC Meeting on U.S. Strategy for
South West Asia and Persian Gulf

PARTICIPANTS

State
Under Secretary for Political
Affairs, David Newsom
Assistant Secretary Harold Saunders

Energy
Secretary Charles Duncan

Defense
Deputy Secretary W. Graham Claytor
Mr. Robert Murray

White House
Zbigniew Brzezinski
David Aaron

JCS
Chairman, General David Jones
Lt. General John Pustay

NSC
Colonel William E. Odom
Colonel Leslie Denend
Henry Owen
Thomas Thornton
Robert Hunter
Fritz Ermarth

CIA
Director Stansfield Turner
Mr. Robert Ames

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

Dr. Brzezinski opened the meeting with an overview of what is happening and what is at stake in the region. The results of this meeting, he said, are to provide a basis for a National Security Council meeting with the President later this week. We must deal with the continued deterioration of the U.S. position in the region. Whatever the Soviet motives for their actions in Afghanistan, they have created an objective threat and a dynamic development in the area as serious for our security and vital interests as Soviet actions in Greece in 1947. We must provide the President with a basis for responding adequately to this change, specifically what we should do about Pakistan and about the larger Persian Gulf region. The President believes that there will be lasting strategic consequences. He

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Review on January 14, 2000
Extended by Z. Brzezinski
Reason for Extension: NSC 1.13(e)

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wants to reaffirm that there will be no zig-zag in U.S.-Soviet relations on our side. No warm up is to be expected soon. The mistake in 1968 after the Soviet action in Czechoslovakia was, in the President's view, to ease up on Moscow too early.

The President spoke with Aga Shahi over the weekend and reaffirmed our commitment to the agreement of 1959. The problem is how to define the U.S. commitment under the agreement. If there is major Soviet aggression, the U.S. will respond within the limits of our Constitutional authority. The U.S. will not, however, become involved in border skirmishes. We want our support to help Pakistan to take a firm stand against Soviet forces in the region even if they are faced by a Moscow/Kabul/New Delhi axis. In that case, the U.S. will develop a U.S./Saudi Arabian/PRC/Pakistan/ and eventually Iran axis as a counter.

Dr. Brzezinski next declared that the task before us is how to translate this basic stand by the President into:

-- effective military relations with Pakistan and other countries in the region;

-- a regional web of political relations to counter effectively the threat created by Soviet moves in Afghanistan.

We cannot duplicate NATO in this region; a more eclectic mix of bilateral, multilateral, and informal arrangements must suffice.

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The meeting next turned to specific issues for decision.

I. Military Assistance to Pakistan

In discussion of the fighter aircraft issue, Graham Claytor reported that the Pakistanis did not request specific U.S. aircraft but rather asked the United States to provide what is necessary for them to defend themselves against the new Soviet threat which includes MIG-23s and MIG-25s. There was discussion of the value of A-7 fighters for close air support along the western borders, the extent to which helicopter gunships could perform the same mission, and whether the A-7s were meant for an air defense role also.

General Jones agreed that helicopters would be useful but added that A-7s would provide much greater air ground capability. All agreed that we should encourage the Pakistanis to use the French Mirage fighter for the larger air defense problem against the Soviet Union.

Tasking: State was asked to:

1. determine whether the Mirages will in fact suffice to meet the threat;
2. clarify with the French their willingness to provide Mirages;
3. with Defense, consider A-7s for Pakistan, about 30.

II. [REDACTED] Political Assurances to Host Nations, and Increased RDF

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] describing their purpose, possible Indian reaction, and what those reactions would entail for the United States.

Military Consortium for Pakistan: State reported that George Vest and Peter Constable will be going to Europe for discussions

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[REDACTED]

Tasking: State will check what the [REDACTED] law permits. Defense will produce a paper outlining a specific division of labor among the members of the military consortium, integrating each country's contribution to meet the overall Pakistani military needs in the most efficient fashion possible.

[REDACTED]

Tasking: State will provide a paper which sets forth the assurances for each country, the form in which the assurances should be given, and what consultations with Congress are appropriate.

Diego Garcia: It was recommended that we expand the runways and the storage facilities on Diego Garcia. Conservationists may lobby against this construction. When Dr. Brzezinski asked whether we actually need this expansion in light of acquisition of bases in Oman and Somalia, State and Defense pointed out that it is much better to have a larger number of small bases to absorb minor setbacks if we must abandon some bases in the future.

Tasking: None.

Improved PDF Capabilities: General Jones made a presentation at this point in which he pointed out that Soviet military deployments into Afghanistan will fundamentally change the military threat to our allies on the Persian Gulf:

-- Soviet fighter aircraft based in Afghanistan will be able to reach the Gulf of Hormuz, a wholly new development.

-- Soviet armored ground forces could reach the waters of the Arabian Sea through Baluchistan in 10 to 12 days if unopposed.

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-- Preferred Soviet land routes to Tehran probably still remain those from the Caucasus. Soviet heavy military ground forces on this route could reach the oil field regions in the vicinity of Kuwait in 10 to 12 days.

-- Using sealift from the Black Sea, the Soviets could project forces through the Suez Canal to the Persian Gulf in about 21 days.

-- One Soviet airborne division, about 8,000 troops, with organic armor vehicles, could land anywhere in the vicinity of the Persian Gulf in two to three days if all Soviet airlift is employed.

General Jones outlined our options for rapid short-term measures to meet this changed Soviet threat by early spring this year:

1. Our naval presence in the Arabian Sea will eventually have to be reduced to one aircraft carrier battle group. We do not have sustaining power for the two there at present.

2. [REDACTED]

3. Prepositioning of heavy equipment and supplies backed up by a significant increase in our sealift capability can give us a much larger and earlier force projection capability into the region. To achieve this in the next two to three months, General Jones proposes the following package:

a. Purchase two RO/RO ships which will hold the prepositioned equipment for one mechanized brigade and ground support equipment for three fighter squadrons.

b. Lease three cargo ships to be prepositioned with dry cargo supplies, ammunition, water, and fuels.

c. Followup supply from the U.S. can be moved through the Suez Canal in 11 days by SL-7 class sea-land ships. General Jones proposed to lease a fleet of eight SL-7s, six of which would be kept in use and two of which would be under conversion to a RO/RO capability.

d. The overall costs for this package is estimated at \$450 million.

The advantages of this proposal are:

-- The deployment time for getting heavy ground forces through the region would be cut from roughly 25/28 days to 5/8 days through prepositioning.

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-- For the first time we would have a followup sealift supply capability in the SL-7s which travel at 33 knots, a difficult speed for an enemy to locate and intercept.

-- This capability could be exercised for demonstrations in the region by late spring or early summer.

Tasking: Defense is to submit the proposal in detail to OMB and have the results available for the NSC meeting.

Exercises. Dr. Brzezinski insisted that we need ground force exercises in the area soon in order to improve the local sense of confidence about American commitment to the region. General Jones agreed that he could speed up the deployment of two Marine units, one from the Eastern Mediterranean and one from the Pacific to exercise in Oman and Somalia by March. Airlift of ground forces from the United States would be extremely expensive. General Jones prefers not to take that step but rather only exercise the Marines now. General Jones argued that more importantly, if we purchase the two RO/RO, which are ready for immediate delivery and loading, we can use them for exercises in March or April, exercises that will have a much greater psychological effect for a lesser cost than projecting airborne units with no armor from the U.S.

Tasking: State will give us a paper by Thursday on the political effects that exercises would have. Defense will provide a paper recommending specific exercises.

III. Security Consultations with India and Pakistan

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IV. Consultations with North Yemen

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V. Refugees

The discussion next turned to ways to provide refugee aid other than through the UNHCR. Dr. Brzezinski pointed out that citizens from the Soviet bloc may be officials in the UNHCR. They could use their positions to make it difficult for refugee camps to support the insurgency in Afghanistan. State argued that it is U.S. policy to avoid bilateral transfers of funds for refugees. Others pointed out that this is not always our policy. We do make bilateral contributions to certain countries in Africa.

Tasking: State will examine the alternative ways of supporting refugees in Pakistan other than through the UNHCR so that the UNHCR cannot, if it chooses, interfere seriously with refugee camps supporting the insurgency.

VI. ASEAN, the PRC, and non-Friendly Countries Support for U.S. Policy



Tasking: State will produce for the next SCC a list of Presidential messages or demarches to ASEAN, some African countries, and non-friendly countries for consideration in light of the above discussion.

VII. The PLO and Mid East Peace Process

Dr. Brzezinski pointed out that it is very important to accelerate the peace process in light of the Soviet action in Afghanistan. Would a public statement by the President on this matter be useful at this time? State and others pointed out the old dilemma that if we want progress for the PLO, then we do not talk about it. If there



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is a lot of public support for the PLO, it might prevent progress in the negotiations by frightening Israel. Newsom pointed out that we might get the Israelis to back down on some of their recent actions in the East Bank.

VIII. A Public Communique on Aid to Pakistan

State offered a public U.S. statement to be released on what we have offered in the way of aid to Pakistan. This was prepared in response to an earlier tasking. It was agreed that events have changed the circumstances so that such a statement is inappropriate.

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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To Helmut Schmidt

In my opinion, withholding participation in the Moscow Olympic games is the most significant and effective action we can take to convince the Soviet leaders of the seriousness of their invasion of Afghanistan.

Many others will be strongly influenced by your decision, and I hope that you will agree on the advisability of such action.

The exile of Dr. Satharav is evidence of a Soviet desire to "clean out" Moscow before the summer.

Your friend
Jimmy Carter

JEL, DHM, ZBC
SE, Box 20
FOUNDER: ALPHA CHANNEL (MISC.)
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

January 28, 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Mr. Peter Tarnoff
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: "Eurocommunist" Reactions to Afghanistan (U)

The Department should prepare an analysis of the reactions of, and positions taken by, the Communist parties of France, Italy, Spain, and Portugal to the Soviet actions in Afghanistan. The analysis should include significant statements in the public domain, including press interviews or comments by Communist party officials in these four countries. While the main focus of the analysis should be on the so-called Eurocommunist parties, it will also be useful to have, where relevant, information pertaining to the positions of other Communist parties in Western Europe, especially in Benelux and the Scandanavian countries. (C)

The Department's analysis should be coordinated with appropriate elements in the intelligence community. It should reach the NSC by COB Thursday, February 7. (U)

Christine Dodson
Christine Dodson
Staff Secretary *for*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Review on 28 Jan 1986

DECLASSIFIED
Per, Rac Project
ESDN: NLC- 6-1-4-9-1
BY *PAH* NARA, DATE *9/28/05*

#13

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

SECRET/SENSITIVE

January 29, 1980

JCL, DHM, ZBC
SF, Box 20
FOLDER: ALPHA CHANNEL (MISC)
01/30-03/80

VIA ALPHA CHANNEL

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

I propose that we meet tomorrow in my office, after the regular SCC meeting to review the attached letter. In particular, I would like to address the following questions:

- Is it timely?
- Should we be taking the initiative?
- What kind of signal does it send?
- Does it say the right thing?

I know that you will be spending a good part of this week on the Hill testifying; however, if you cannot participate, I would like your views on the proposed letter in any case.

Zbigniew Brzezinski

Attachment

SECRET/SENSITIVE

Review on January 29, 1986

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
FER 10/17/96 NICK BY RE MR 116-15-65
BY g NARS DATE 11/17/97

SECRET/SENSITIVE

Dear Mr. President:

Because the dangers of misunderstanding are greater now than at virtually any other time in our relations, I believe it would be important if you and I could clarify a number of urgent points through this private and personal channel of communications.

As I stressed in my State of the Union message to the Congress and the American people, the relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States is the most critical factor in determining whether the world will live in peace or be engulfed in global conflict. Soviet actions in Afghanistan have brought us to a fundamental turning point in these relations. It is vital, I believe, that both of us give the most sober, dispassionate consideration to the implications of the current situation for future generations.

In my State of the Union message, I gave particular emphasis to the importance of SALT in the prevention of nuclear war. It is my intention to press for the ratification of SALT II at the earliest moment that the political climate permits. We continue to believe that the ratification of SALT II is in our mutual interest, and that this ratification will be possible when the causes of present heightened tensions have been changed.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

PER 62075 NK HIRE MR-11C-99-58

BY  NARS. DATE 11/7/97

In the meantime, as we have said both privately to you and publicly, we will continue to abide by the provisions of the SALT I agreement and we will not take any action that could defeat the object or purpose of the SALT II treaty, so long as it appears that the Soviet Union follows the same practice. I would hope that this intention also corresponds to your own thinking.

Let me emphasize once again what I told you personally in Vienna and repeated in my January 23 address. Despite the differing political convictions of our two countries, we have sought to establish common rules of behavior which would reduce the risk of conflict, and to search for areas of cooperation which would produce a more stable world. I remain persuaded that you and your colleagues see the urgent necessity of avoiding the mortal dangers of confrontation. But there is a basic gap in our approach to our mutual relations which must be bridged if there is to be any possibility of durable, genuine mutual understanding. No U.S. President can agree to consider U.S.-Soviet relations in isolation from Soviet actions elsewhere in the world. If you and your colleagues are no longer prepared to recognize this fundamental fact, and act in accordance with it, I fear that we have indeed reached a turning point in our relations.

Our most serious concern at present centers on the Persian Gulf area. The presence of massive Soviet military force in Afghanistan has created an entirely new situation in Southwest

Asia. Unfounded allegations about U.S. and other assistance to Afghan nationalist forces would appear to be a possible pretext for a lengthy Soviet military presence in Afghanistan, as well as for eventual Soviet military action against Pakistan. The fragile political situation in Iran could create opportunities for Soviet actions designed to undermine the independence and territorial integrity of that crucial country. As I made clear on January 23, we would regard such moves as an assault on the vital interests of the United States. A private and confidential expression of your intentions with regard to Pakistan and Iran would help to counteract the impression created by recent public and private statements indicating that Soviet intentions in Southwest Asia extend well beyond Afghanistan.

Only the withdrawal of Soviet military forces from Afghanistan can restore the stability of this region. While the information available to me shows no indication of any intention of an early Soviet withdrawal, such a step would indeed do much to improve the international climate. We have no interests in seeing a government in Kabul hostile to the Soviet Union or aligned with the United States. A neutral and non-aligned but independent Afghanistan would be to our mutual benefit and would contribute to the equilibrium of the region.

I feel it important to raise one other matter with you personally. With the failing of President Tito's health, the future of

Yugoslavia has been the cause for much speculation. I think it is important that you understand our view with regard to developments in Yugoslavia in the period ahead. We and our allies attach the highest importance to the independence, unity and territorial integrity of non-aligned Yugoslavia. The Yugoslav Government, under whatever leadership, must remain free to choose its own course, foreign and domestic. The United States and its allies have no intention of interfering in the internal affairs of Yugoslavia now or in the future. We expect the Soviet Union and its allies to act in a similar fashion. In particular, you should understand that any effort to weaken Yugoslavia's internal cohesion or undermine its traditionally independent foreign policy would be unacceptable to the United States. I would welcome your confirmation that you indeed intend to follow a policy parallel to our own.

Mr. President, I must tell you frankly that Soviet refusal to consult about Afghanistan, or to provide any adequate explanation for its actions there, made a deep impression on me. Yet I am not prepared to abandon the effort to establish a responsible dialogue on issues which could threaten world peace. I look forward to your response to the issues I have raised.

Sincerely,

Jimmy Carter

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Department of State

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NODIS/CHEROKEE

E.O. 12865: ROS=1,3 02/5/2008 (WATSON, THOMAS J.) OR-M
TAGS: UR, US
SUBJECT: SOVIET OCCUPATION OF AFGHANISTAN: UPDATED
ASSESSMENT AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

REF: MOSCOW 2026

1. (CONTINUE TEXT)

2. BEGIN SUMMARY. THIS CABLE UPDATES THE EMBASSY'S
CONTINUING ASSESSMENT OF THE CURRENT CRISIS IN U.S.-
SOVIET RELATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR DEALING WITH IT.

MY OVERALL RECOMMENDATION IS TO MAINTAIN A TOUGH STANCE
ON THE SANCTIONS ALREADY ANNOUNCED (WITHOUT DRIBBLING OUT
MINOR NEW ONES), WHILE LEAVING OPEN THE DOOR FOR LATER
REDEMPTION; TO MAKE CLEAR BY OUR ACTIONS THAT THE OBJECT
ONLY TO SOVIET BEHAVIOR AND DO NOT SEEK TO OVERTHROW THE
SOVIET SYSTEM; TO PROCEED CAREFULLY IN DEFENDING AREAS
OF VITAL INTEREST IN ORDER TO AVOID OUR HAVING FORCED ON
US A CHOICE BETWEEN DEFEAT ON THE GROUND AND NUCLEAR WAR;
AND TO EXPLORE WAYS TO MAINTAIN A DIALOGUE.

SPECIFICALLY, I RECOMMEND:

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
PER *[Signature]* MR-ALC-95-CC
BY *[Signature]* MAR. DATE 10/17/95

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MOSCOM 02027 01 OF 05 0518J52

--CONTINUED FREEZE ON MOST IF NOT ALL NEW TRADE DEALS WHILE ALLOWING, SUBJECT TO MORE STRINGENT STRATEGIC GUIDELINES, THE COMPLETION OF CONTRACTS ALREADY UNDERWAY AND CONTINUED DELIVERY OF SPARE PARTS)

--CONTINUED HONORING OF EXISTING AGREEMENTS AT THE GOVERNMENT LEVEL, INCLUDING CIVIL AIR AND MARITIME (WITH GOOD FAITH EFFORTS TO OVERCOME TRADE UNION RESISTANCE), EMBASSY CONSTRUCTION, ETC.)

--CONTINUED FREEZE ON SCIENTIFIC AND CULTURAL EXCHANGES EXCEPT FOR ROUTINE ACADEMIC EXCHANGES AND OTHER LOW-LEVEL EXCHANGES ON A CASE-BY-CASE BASIS)

--STOP FURTHER MOVES WITH CHINA, ESPECIALLY IN MILITARY-RELATED FIELDS)

-- INFORMAL EXPLORATIONS ON GETTING THE SOVIETS OUT OF AFGHANISTAN AND ALSO ON STARTING UP ARMS CONTROL TALKS, USING ME AND DOBRYNIN FOR SMOKING OUT THE POSSIBILITIES AND POSSIBLY BY SENDING AN UNOFFICIAL INTERLOCUTOR SUCH AS AVERELL HARRIMAN. END SUMMARY.

3. I AM DEEPLY CONSCIOUS OF THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE PRESENT CRISIS IN U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS. MY STAFF AND I ARE CONTINUING TO REVIEW OUR ASSESSMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO BE SURE THAT WE GIVE YOU OUR BEST ADVICE, BOTH AS TO SOVIET MOTIVATIONS AND TACTICS AND AS TO U.S. ACTIONS.

4. WE CONTINUE TO THINK THAT MUSCOM MISCALCULATED THE CONSEQUENCES WHEN IT WENT INTO AFGHANISTAN, BUT ARE NOW INCLINED TO THINK THE MISCALCULATION WAS MORE ACUTE WITH REGARD TO THE REST OF THE WORLD THAN TO THE U.S. THEY

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PROBABLY EXPECTED, AND POSSIBLY INTENDED, A WORSENING OF RELATIONS WITH THE U.S., THOUGH NOT OF THE BREADTH AND DEPTH THAT MATERIALIZED. PERHAPS THE OPERATION IN KABUL WAS BOTCHED, AND THEY HAD EXPECTED A SMOOTHER CHANGE OF REGIME FOLLOWED BY A CALL FOR SOVIET SUPPORT, UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES IN WHICH WORLD REACTION WOULD HAVE BEEN NARROWER AND THE U.S. COULD HAVE BEEN MORE EASILY DEPICTED AS AN EXCITABLE ANTI-SOVIET WARMONGER, THE LINE NOW BEING PURVEYED, BOTH PRIVATELY (INCLUDING BY GROMYKO) AND PUBLICLY-- THAT EVEN BEFORE AFGHANISTAN THE U.S. HAD DELIBERATELY WORSENERED RELATIONS WITH THE USSR--INDICATES AN INTENT TO BLACKEN US BEFORE THE REST OF THE WORLD AND TO UNDERMINE OUR POLICY AT HOME.

5. THE SOVIET LEADERS MAY ACTUALLY HAVE CONVINCED THEMSELVES THAT THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION IS OUT TO DO THEM IN. THEIR RESTRAINT AT VIENNA--THEIR REFUSAL TO GO MUCH BEYOND THE SIGNATURE OF SALT, TO RESOLVE THE JACKSON-VANIK PROBLEM, OR TO TAKE OTHER STEPS--SIGNALLED THEIR RESERVATIONS. THEIR PARANOIDIA ABOUT CHINA MAY HAVE BEEN ONE REASON FOR THEIR POLISH ATTITUDE THROUGHOUT 1979. (I HAVE RECENTLY READ BREZHNEV'S LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT IN DECEMBER 1978 WARNING AGAINST THE ARMING BY THE WEST "OF A NEIGHBORING COUNTRY WHICH PURSUES AN OPENLY HOSTILE POLICY TOWARD US. . . WE MUST DO WHAT WE CONSIDER NECESSARY. . . DUE ATTENTION TO OUR DEFENSE," AND ASSERTING WE WERE AT A CROSSROADS, ONE TURNING OF WHICH THREATENED "CONFRONTATION AND INCREASED THREAT OF WAR.") THE STANDARD LITANY OF CHARGES AGAINST US ALSO INCLUDES MANY OTHER ITEMS INCLUDING TNF AND THE MIDDLE EAST, ABOUT WHICH THE SOVIETS ALSO FEEL STRONGLY. IT IS ODD THAT OUR CHINA POLICY HAS DROPPED OUT OF THIS LITANY, FOR EXAMPLE AS RECITED BY GROMYKO TO ME LAST WEEK. IT PROBABLY MEANS THAT THEY THINK TALKING ABOUT IT MAY BE COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE, THAT WE ARE TOO FAR ALONG THE ROAD OF WORKING CLOSELY WITH CHINA TO BE DELECTED BY WORDS.

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6. OF COURSE THE GREAT DISADVANTAGE OF THE SOVIET SYSTEM IS THAT THERE IS NO BUILT-IN BALANCE, NO ONE TO POINT OUT EMPHATICALLY AND PUBLICLY THE FALLACIES IN THE SKEWED

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NODIS/CHEROKEE

VIEWS OF THE OLD MEN IN THE POLITBURO. IF THEY DECIDE IT IS RIGHT TO TRY TO "TEACH THE U.S. A LESSON," TO SHOW THE U.S. ELECTORATE THAT FAILURE TO COOPERATE WITH THE USSR WILL LEAD TO A DANGEROUS SITUATION, THERE APPARENTLY IS NO ONE TO EXPLAIN TO THEM THAT SUCH A POLICY IS HIGHLY COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE IF NOT DANGEROUS. SINCE THEY PRIDE THEMSELVES ON JUDGING OTHERS BY ACTIONS, NOT WORDS, IT IS UP TO US BY OUR ACTIONS TO GET ACROSS TO THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP THAT THEY HAVE MISJUDGED US: WE ARE NOT TRYING TO DO THEM IN, BUT WE CANNOT BE STAMPEDED BY A SHOW OF STRENGTH.

7. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, THE PRESIDENT'S COOL BUT DETERMINED APPROACH MAY HAVE TO CONTINUE FOR SOME TIME. WE WILL WANT TO SHOW OUR CAPABILITY FOR MOVING ALONG LINES THAT COULD HURT THEIR INTERESTS ON KEY SENSITIVE POINTS-- CHINA, INTERNATIONAL ISOLATION, A POSSIBLE NEW ARMS RACE. AT THE SAME TIME WE MUST MAKE CLEAR THAT WE ARE NOT TRYING TO DESTROY THE SOVIET UNION; WE ARE PREPARED TO TALK ARMS CONTROL; AND WE ARE PREPARED FOR THE PRESENT TO MOVE SLOWLY ON THE ABOVE SENSITIVE POINTS TO SEE IF THE SOVIETS WILL CHANGE THEIR BEHAVIOR. WE MAY HAVE TO CONTINUE ALONG THESE SOMEWHAT LIMITED AND CONSTRAINING LINES FOR SEVERAL MONTHS, IF NOT LONGER. MY GUESS IS THAT THEY WILL NOT SHOW MUCH DESIRE TO TALK SERIOUSLY UNTIL THEY BECOME CONVINCED OF THE INEVITABILITY OF PRESIDENT CARTER'S POLICY.

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ELECTION. MEANWHILE, IT WILL BE IMPORTANT NOT TO MOVE TOO QUICKLY ON MATTERS THEY CONSIDER AFFECT THEIR VITAL INTERESTS, PARTICULARLY CHINA.

B. I WANT TO OFFER A FEW THOUGHTS ON SETTING OURSELVES UP FOR CONFRONTATIONS.

A. THERE IS AN OBVIOUS DANGER THAT ONE SIDE OR THE OTHER WILL MAKE A MISTAKE ABOUT THE OTHER SIDE'S DETERMINATION AND PERCEPTION OF ITS OWN INTERESTS. IT IS OF COURSE VITAL TO COMMUNICATE ONE'S OWN PERCEPTION OF VITAL INTERESTS, AS THE PRESIDENT HAS DONE WITH REGARD TO THE PERSIAN GULF REGION. A GREAT DANGER ARISES HOWEVER IF WE ASSUME THAT THE THREAT OF DIRECT MILITARY COMBAT BETWEEN SOVIET AND AMERICAN FORCES WILL CAUSE MOSCOW TO BACK AWAY AND THAT THEREFORE ONLY TOKEN FORCES WILL BE REQUIRED TO MAKE THE THREAT VALID.

B. I CAN SEE AT LEAST TWO CIRCUMSTANCES IN WHICH THE SOVIETS WOULD NOT ESCHEW LOCAL HOSTILITIES. ONE WOULD BE THAT THEY CONSIDER THEIR OWN VITAL INTERESTS DIRECTLY ENGAGED, THEREFORE GIVING THEM--IN THEIR EYES--NO CHOICE. THE OTHER, LESS LIKELY BUT NOT OUTSIDE THE REALM OF POSSIBILITY, IS THAT THE SOVIET LEADERS WOULD CONCLUDE THAT THE U.S. MUST BE TAUGHT A MORE POWERFUL LESSON BY BEING FORCED TO BACK AWAY FROM NUCLEAR CONFRONTATION AS THE USSR DID IN 1962. HOWEVER MISGUIDED, THE CALCULATION COULD BE THAT IF U.S. THEATER FORCES WERE DEFEATED IN, FOR EXAMPLE, THE PERSIAN GULF AREA, THE U.S. WOULD DECLINE TO GO NUCLEAR AND THAT THE SHOCK OF THIS DECISION WOULD REINVIGORATE FORCES IN THE U.S. AND THE REST OF THE WORLD SEEKING AN ACCOMMODATION WITH THE SOVIET UNION.

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C. BUT I BELIEVE IT WOULD BE A GRAVE ERROR ON OUR PART TO CONTINUE ASSUMING THAT THE SOVIETS WANT TO AVOID AT ALL COSTS ANY CONFRONTATION WHICH COULD GO NUCLEAR. I CAN EVEN ENVISAGE SOME SOVIET LEADERS WANTING SUCH A CONFRONTATION IF THEY EXPECT (HOWEVER NAIVELY) TO BE ABLE TO PREORDAIN AN AMERICAN BACKDOWN BY ARRANGING IT AT A TIME AND PLACE OF THEIR CHOOSING. AT THE MOMENT THEY FACE A NEW ARMS RACE--BOTH STRATEGIC AND TACTICAL--EVEN IF SALT II IS RATIFIED; THE U.S. MAY BE SEEN AS MOVING TOWARD A MILITARY ALLIANCE WITH CHINA; AND THE SOVIET ECONOMY IS RAPIDLY LOSING MOMENTUM. THEY MAY FEEL THAT IF A CONFRONTATION MUST COME, IT SHOULD BE SOONER RATHER THAN LATER.

D. MY POINT IS THAT WE SHOULD NOT BLUFF IN MOVING TOWARD CONFRONTATION WITH THE SOVIETS AT THIS STAGE IN HISTORY AND AT A POINT NEAR THEIR BORDERS. TRIP-MINE FORCES MAY NOT DETER THEM, AND MIGHT EVEN INVITE THEIR ATTACK; THEY MAY NOT BELIEVE ANY THREATS TO USE TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS; AND IF WE ARE FORCED TO USE THEM I PERSONALLY BELIEVE THE WORST PREDICTIONS ABOUT ESCALATION WILL COME TRUE.

9. I ALSO HAVE SOME OTHER POLICY SUGGESTIONS, FLOWING FROM THE ABOVE ANALYSIS AND IN MOST CASES NOT MUCH DIFFERENT FROM WHAT WE ARE ALREADY DOING.

A. A GENERAL POINT IS THAT WE SHOULD NOT GIVE MOSCOM GROUNDS TO BELIEVE THAT THE U.S. FOLLOWS A POLICY OF TRYING TO DESTROY, FRAGMENT OR OVERTURN THE SOVIET REGIME; IF THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP COMES TO THAT CONCLUSION ITS INFERIORITY COMPLEX COULD RESULT IN A "CORNERED RAT" SYNDROME AND A TURN TOWARD CALCULATED CONFRONTATION.

B. OUR REMAINING "CHINA CARDS" SHOULD NOT BE PLAYED THIS

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MOSSCOM 02027 02 OF 05 051844Z

C. BUT I BELIEVE IT WOULD BE A GRAVE ERROR ON OUR PART TO CONTINUE ASSUMING THAT THE SOVIETS WANT TO AVOID AT ALL COSTS ANY CONFRONTATION WHICH COULD GO NUCLEAR. I CAN EVEN ENVISAGE SOME SOVIET LEADERS WANTING SUCH A CONFRONTATION IF THEY EXPECT (HOWEVER NAIVELY) TO BE ABLE TO PRE-GRAB AN AMERICAN BACKDOWN BY ARRANGING IT AT A TIME AND PLACE OF THEIR CHOOSING. AT THE MOMENT THEY FACE A NEW ARMS RACE--BOTH STRATEGIC AND THEATER--EVEN IF SALT II IS RATIFIED; THE U.S. MAY BE SEEN AS MOVING TOWARD A MILITARY ALLIANCE WITH CHINA; AND THE SOVIET ECONOMY IS RAPIDLY LOSING MOMENTUM. THEY MAY FEEL THAT IF A CONFRONTATION MUST COME, IT SHOULD BE SOONER RATHER THAN LATER.

D. MY POINT IS THAT WE SHOULD NOT BLUFF IN MOVING TOWARD CONFRONTATION WITH THE SOVIETS AT THIS STAGE IN HISTORY AND AT A POINT NEAR THEIR BORDERS: TRIPWIRE FORCES MAY NOT DETER THEM, AND MIGHT EVEN INVITE THEIR ATTACK; THEY MAY NOT BELIEVE ANY THREATS TO USE TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS; AND IF WE ARE FORCED TO USE THEM I PERSONALLY BELIEVE THE WORST PREDICTIONS ABOUT ESCALATION WILL COME TRUE.

9. I ALSO HAVE SOME OTHER POLICY SUGGESTIONS, FLOWING FROM THE ABOVE ANALYSIS AND IN MOST CASES NOT MUCH DIFFERENT FROM WHAT WE ARE ALREADY DOING.

A. A GENERAL POINT IS THAT WE SHOULD NOT GIVE MOSCOW GROUNDS TO BELIEVE THAT THE U.S. FOLLOWS A POLICY OF TRYING TO DESTROY, FRAGMENT OR OVERTURN THE SOVIET REGIME; IF THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP COMES TO THAT CONCLUSION ITS INFERIORITY COMPLEX COULD RESULT IN A "CORNERED RAT" SYNDROME AND A TURN TOWARD CALCULATED CONFRONTATION.

B. OUR REMAINING "CHINA CARDS" SHOULD NOT BE PLAYED THIS

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CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 03 OF 05 MOSCOW 02027
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YEAR, PARTICULARLY THOSE WHICH APPEAR TO BE INTENDED TO BUILD UP CHINESE MILITARY POTENTIAL, BECAUSE THAT TOO COULD SUPPORT ANY INCLINATIONS HERE TO SEEK A CONFRONTATION WITH THE U.S. SOONER RATHER THAN LATER. MOREOVER, ONCE PLAYED THEY LOSE THEIR USEFULNESS AS LEVERAGE AND BECOME EXCUSES FOR SOVIET COUNTERREACTION, AND THEY HELP UNIFY THE SOVIET PEOPLE BEHIND THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP.

C. OBVIOUSLY THE VARIOUS SANCTIONS IMPOSED AFTER AFGHAN-ISTAN MUST BE MAINTAINED FOR AN EXTENDED PERIOD UNLESS SOVIET POLICY GIVES US CAUSE TO EASE OFF. THE LESSON WE ARE TRYING TO TEACH BY MEANS OF THE SANCTIONS WILL BE EASILY DISSIPATED IF WE DO NOT ASSIDUOUSLY MAINTAIN THEM.

D. A COROLLARY IS THAT HAVING ADMINISTERED THE LESSON (OF WHICH THE OLYMPICS BOYCOTT IS IMPURTANT AND DESERVES DETERMINED FOLLOW-THROUGH), WE SHOULD STAND BACK AND AWAIT THE RESULTS. CONTINUED DRIBBLING OUT OF FURTHER SANCTIONS BEYOND THOSE SPECIFIED BY THE PRESIDENT WILL GIVE THE IMPRESSION OF TERMINAL ANTI-SOVIETISM RATHER THAN A STERN LESSON. MOREOVER, WE OUGHT TO SAVE A FEW MEASURES FOR COUNTER-RETALIATION FOR ANY SOVIET RETALIATION AGAINST OUR SANCTIONS AND AS NEW SANCTIONS IN THE EVENT OF FURTHER SOVIET MISBEHAVIOR.

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F. ANOTHER POINT ABOUT ECONOMIC SANCTIONS: OUR POLICY OF STERN APPLICATION OF SANCTIONS EVEN TO THE POINT OF SELF-SACRIFICE, IF IT IS TO HAVE ANY CHANCE OF CONTRIBUTING TO IMPROVED SOVIET BEHAVIOR, MUST ALSO LEAVE OPEN THE POSSIBILITY OF SOMEDAY RESUMING NORMAL TRADE RELATIONS. I WOULD BE DEEPLY CONCERNED IN THIS REGARD IF WE WERE TO CUT OFF COMPLETELY THE DELIVERY OF CONTRACTED ITEMS AND PARTICULARLY OF SPARE PARTS. IT WOULD BE SATISFYING INDEED TO SEE MAJOR SOVIET PROJECTS GRIND TO A HALT UNTIL THEY CAN ARRANGE ALTERNATE SUPPLIERS OR INSTALL NEW MACHINES NOT DEPENDENT ON U.S. SPARE PARTS. BUT THIS WOULD ONLY BE A TEMPORARY SETBACK TO THEM, WHILE SIGNALLING THAT WE HAVE WRITTEN OFF U.S.-SOVIET TRADE FOR DECADES TO COME. I BELIEVE THAT WOULD BE A DANGEROUS SIGNAL TO SEND. INSTEAD I RECOMMEND THAT CONTRACTS WHICH ARE SIGNED AND WELL LAUNCHED, AS WELL AS NORMAL SPARE PARTS SUPPLIES, SHOULD BE OBSTRUCTED ONLY IF A GOOD CASE CAN BE MADE UNDER REVISED, MORE STRINGENT STRATEGIC GUIDELINES. I AM NOT CONCERNED ABOUT THE POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF DISCOURAGING NEW DEALS EVEN IN TOTALLY NON-STRATEGIC AREAS DURING THE COMING YEAR; THIS CONVEYS THE PROPER MESSAGE AND IS IN TUNE WITH OUR POLICY ON AGRICULTURAL EXPORTS.

G. SCIENTIFIC, CULTURAL AND EDUCATIONAL EXCHANGES SHOULD BE AN IMPORTANT PART OF OUR LONG-TERM REPEAT LONG-TERM STRATEGY, BECAUSE THEY CAN BE HELPFUL IN GRADUALLY OPENING UP THIS SOCIETY TO THE KIND OF COUNTERPRESSURES AGAINST FOREIGN ADVENTURISM AND DOMESTIC DEPRESSION WHICH WE WOULD LIKE TO SEE GAIN A Foothold. BUT SINCE THAT INTERNAL PROCESS WILL REQUIRE DECADES, AT THE PRESENT JUNCTURE WE CAN AFFORD TO PROCEED TACTICALLY AND WE SHOULD THEREFORE CONTINUE TO HOLD DOWN LARGE-SCALE AND VISIBLE EXCHANGES (WHILE IF POSSIBLE PRESERVING THE BASIC ACADEMIC EXCHANGES)

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UNTIL THE SOVIETS GIVE GOOD REASON FOR US TO SIGNAL THAT THEY ARE WORTHY PARTNERS IN THIS SORT OF ENDEAVOR.

H. THE MOST IMPORTANT AND URGENT POSITIVE SIGNAL IS THE ONE WE HAVE ALREADY GIVEN, THAT WE ARE PREPARED EVEN NOW TO CONTINUE THE ARMS CONTROL DIALOGUE. TACTICS AND TIMING ARE IMPORTANT AND ARE DISCUSSED BELOW.

I. FINALLY, THERE IS THE URGENT QUESTION OF THE STRUGGLE FOR THE SUPPORT OF THE REST OF THE WORLD IN OPPOSING SOVIET EXTERNAL AGGRESSION. IT IS STILL TRUE THAT THE SOVIETS, WHEN THEY THINK THEIR BACKS ARE TO THE WALL, WILL PURSUE WHAT THEY SEE AS THEIR VITAL INTERESTS WITHOUT REGARD TO WORLD OPINION. BUT IT IS ALSO TRUE THAT THEY HAVE GRADUALLY COME TO PLACE INCREASED WEIGHT ON THEIR ACCEPTANCE BY THE REST OF THE WORLD. THIS IS A POSITIVE DEVELOPMENT AND IT IS OBVIOUS THAT WE SHOULD EXPLOIT IT TO THE FULLEST. WITHOUT TRYING TO SPELL OUT SPECIFICS, I WOULD MERELY COMMENT THAT IT IS IMPORTANT THAT WHILE ORGANIZING THE POWER TO RESIST SOVIET AGGRESSION WE ALSO CONTINUE THE EFFORT TO PERSUADE THE NEUTRAL AND NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES TO PUT POLITICAL PRESSURE ON THE SOVIETS. INDIA AND THE ISLAMIC COUNTRIES ARE OBVIOUSLY IMPORTANT IN THIS REGARD. NOW WE APPROACH THE THIRD WORLD AS A WHOLE IS OUTSIDE MY COMPETENCE, BUT EVEN FROM HERE IT SEEMS OBVIOUS THAT SIMPLY APPEALING TO THEM TO BE ANTI-SOVIET MAY STRIKE THEM AS SELF-SERVING. ONE OF OUR WESTERN FRIENDS HERE, WITH MUCH THIRD WORLD EXPERIENCE, HAS URGED THAT WE APPROACH THE DEVELOPING NATIONS IN TERMS OF HELPING THEM ACHIEVE THEIR OWN GOALS AND ASPIRATIONS.

10. RECOMMENDATIONS ON MECHANICS AND TIMING.

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Department of State
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N00948

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~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 04 OF 85 MOSCOM 02027

NODIS/CHEROKEE

A. IT IS IMPORTANT THAT WE CONTINUE TO TAKE A TOUGH STANCE, NOT APPEARING TO HAVE SECOND THOUGHTS ABOUT OUR PRESENT COURSE, EVEN WHILE LEAVING OPENINGS FOR THE SOVIETS TO SIGNAL WILLINGNESS TO START TALKING ABOUT SOME OF THE MOST SERIOUS ISSUES. THIS WILL NOT BE EASY BUT DESERVES OUR BEST EFFORTS.

B. OBVIOUSLY A KEY ELEMENT WILL BE CONTINUED DIALOGUE BETWEEN YOU AND GROMYKO THROUGH BOTH ME AND DOBRYNIN. AS WE HAVE SEEN IN THE MOST RECENT EXCHANGES, DOBRYNIN HAS BEEN OFFERING "PERSONAL IDEAS" FOR A SOLUTION OF THE AFGHANISTAN PROBLEM ITSELF; THE TACTIC IS TO GET WASHINGTON TO VENTURE OUT ON A LIMB ON THE BASIS OF DOBRYNIN'S SUGGESTIONS. YOU MIGHT WISH TO RESPOND BY FEEDING ME SOME IDEAS TO GIVE GROMYKO, ALSO ON A "PERSONAL" BASIS, THAT MAY WE GET SOME REACTION FROM GROMYKO FIRST HAND WITHOUT COMMITTING YOU AND THE PRESIDENT TO ANYTHING. THIS COULD BE DONE EVEN MORE UNOFFICIALLY BY USING ARBATOV (WHO IS EXPECTED TO BE BACK TO WORK SOON). I AM FRANKLY NOT OPTIMISTIC THAT WE COULD FIND ANY BASIS FOR AN EARLY SOVIET WITHDRAWAL, BUT I SEE AN ADVANTAGE IN DANGLING SOME IDEAS FOR LETTING THE SOVIETS EXTRACT THEMSELVES GRACEFULLY IF THEY ARE SO INCLINED. AT LEAST WE COULD FIND OUT FOR SURE WHETHER THEY ARE SO INCLINED. MOVEMENT TOWARD AN INTERNAL REGIME OF "NATIONAL RECONCILIATION"

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JCL, DMM, ZBC.
SF, Box 20
FOLDER: ALPHA CHANNEL (MISC)
01/80 - 03/80

Department of State

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PAGE 02

MOSCOW 02027 04 OF 05 051902Z

TOGETHER WITH SOME SORT OF EFFORT TO REPATRIATE THE REFUGEES BACK FROM PAKISTAN AND PACIFY THE BORDER SEEMS UNLIKELY AT THIS STAGE, BUT THERE WOULD BE NO HARM IN EXPLORING IT IF IT COULD BE DONE UNOFFICIALLY. PERHAPS SOME UN INVOLVEMENT WOULD BE FEASIBLE. CONCEIVABLY WE COULD ALSO DISCUSS SOME SORT OF "HANDS OFF" AGREEMENT REGARDING IRAN.

C. WE NEED TO FOLLOW UP QUICKLY ON SALT I AND SALT II INTERIM OBSERVANCE (GROMYKO DID NOT RESPOND TO THAT PORTION OF MY DEMARCHE) AND, EVEN WITHOUT WAITING FOR A SOLUTION IN AFGHANISTAN, TO PURSUE EXPLORATIONS ABOUT TNF TALKS, AND ABOUT HOW TO PREPARE FOR SALT III. PERHAPS WASHINGTON WILL CONCLUDE THAT TALKS COULD BE HELD BEHIND THE SCENES AT THE SCC, AUGMENTED AND KEPT IN CONTINUOUS SESSION FOR THE PURPOSE, OR PERHAPS YOU WOULD WISH TO DEVELOP A SCHEME ALONG THE LINES OF MY SUGGESTION FOR A NEAR JOINT COMMITTEE OF EXPERTS TO EXPLORE THE POSSIBILITIES FOR BALANCED UNILATERAL RESTRAINT. IN ANY CASE I THINK WE SHOULD SETTLE ON SOME COHERENT PROPOSAL AND THEN BEGIN TO EXPLORE IT, ALSO IN AN UNOFFICIAL WAY THROUGH "PERSONAL IDEAS" WHICH I WOULD FLOAT ON SOME OTHER MEANS. (OF COURSE WE HAVE TO BE CAREFUL NOT TO APPEAR TOO EAGER ON INTERIM OBSERVANCE OF SALT, LEST THEY DECIDE TO SHAKE US UP BY INDICATING DOUBT THAT INTERIM OBSERVANCE CAN CONTINUE VERY LONG.)

D. ONE OTHER AVERAGE FOR EXPLORING SOME OF THESE IDEAS INFORMALLY WOULD BE TO SEND AVERELL HARRIMAN OVER ON A PRIVATE VISIT. HE WOULD HAVE ACCESS TO BREZHNEV AND OTHER LEADERS AND WOULD BE TAKEN SERIOUSLY, BUT HE COULD ALSO DISCUSS THESE ISSUES INFORMALLY AND UNOFFICIALLY. IF HARRIMAN IS TOO POLITICAL AND TOO CLOSELY CONNECTED TO THE ADMINISTRATION, YOU MIGHT CONSIDER SOMEONE ELSE, PERHAPS A

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PAGE 03

MUSCOM 02027 24 OF 45 051902Z

BUSINESSMAN WITH GOOD CONNECTIONS HERE.

E. THE MEASURES WE HAVE TAKEN THUS FAR HAVE HAD A THREE-FOLD PURPOSE: SHAMING THE SOVIETS THAT SUCH BEHAVIOR CANNOT BE COST-FREE; DETERRING FUTURE AGGRESSIVE BEHAVIOR; AND, IDEALLY, FORCING A HELL-BACK IN AFGHANISTAN. THE FIRST POINT WE WILL HAVE MADE IF WE STAY THE COURSE. IF WE SUCCEED IN THE SECOND ONE--DETERRENCE--THE EFFORT WILL HAVE BEEN WELL WORTH IT, PARTICULARLY IF WE WERE ABLE TO GAIN BELIEVABLE COMMITMENTS AGAINST FUTURE SUCH ACTIONS. BUT REALISTICALLY WE MUST ADMIT, FOR PURPOSES OF CHOOSING OUR LONG-RANGE APPROACH TO RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIETS, THAT THE THIRD MAY NOT HAPPEN. WE MAY BE FACED WITH A FAIR ACCOMPLI, THE CONTINUED EXISTENCE OF AJKOVIAN AS AN 3-5-EUROPEAN STYLE--OR EVEN MONGOLIAN-STYLE--SATELLITE. IN OUR ACTIONS AND OUR PUBLIC PRONOUNCEMENTS ABOUT THE DURATION OF THE MEASURES WE HAVE TAKEN, WE NEED TO BALANCE THAT POSSIBILITY AGAINST THE INTRACTABLE NEED FOR THAT MINIMUM LEVEL OF DEALINGS WITH THE SOVIETS WHICH WILL HEAD OFF NUCLEAR CONFRONTATION.

F. IT IS NEVERTHELESS JUST BARELY POSSIBLE THAT THE SOVIETS ARE HAVING SECOND THOUGHTS, AND WE SHOULD NOT NEGLECT OPPORTUNITIES TO EXPLORE THE POSSIBILITY OF A RELATIVELY QUICK REVERSAL IN AFGHANISTAN. IF THERE IS ANY SUCH OPPORTUNITY, IT MIGHT LIE IN THE EARLY DEADLINE CREATED BY THE OLYMPICS. THEREFORE IF WE ARE GOING TO GIVE THE SOVIETS ANY PRODDING ON AFGHANISTAN WHILE OFFERING TO DROP OUR OPPOSITION TO THE MOSCOW OLYMPICS, WE SHOULD DO SO QUICKLY.

G. I FRANKLY DOUBT, HOWEVER, THAT IT WILL BE SUCCESSFUL.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

VIA ALPHA CHANNEL

SECRET/SENSITIVE

February 8, 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Embassy Moscow's Analysis of
U.S.-Soviet Relations

JCL, DHM, ZBC
SF, Box 20
FOUNDER: ALPHA CHANNEL (MISC.)
01/80-03/80

I am using this very sensitive channel to share with you some real concerns I have over a recent cable from Moscow, which perhaps we ought to discuss at an early V-B-B. The cable contains some rather extraordinary statements, which I hope will not be taken seriously by anyone here and which perhaps require some clarification to Watson/Garrison as to where the President stands on some key issues. Among them are the following:

- We should "make clear by our actions that we object only to Soviet behavior and do not seek to overthrow the Soviet system."
- We should "proceed carefully in defending areas of vital interest in order to avoid having forced on us a choice between defeat on the ground and nuclear war."
- "The Soviet leaders may actually have convinced themselves that the Carter Administration is out to do them in."
- "Less likely, but not outside the realm of possibility is that the Soviet leaders would conclude that the U.S. must be taught a more powerful lesson by being forced to back away from nuclear confrontation as the USSR did in 1962... if U.S. theater forces were defeated, for example, in the Persian Gulf area, the U.S. would decline to go nuclear and the shock of this decision would reinvigorate forces in the U.S. and the rest of the world seeking an accommodation with the Soviet Union."

SECRET/SENSITIVE
Classified by MOSCOW 02027
Review on January 2, 2000

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
PER 10/18/96 NSC/RE MK-NLC-95-65
BY [Signature] NARS DATE 1/21/97

- "I can envisage some Soviet leaders wanting such a confrontation ... they may feel if a confrontation must come it should be sooner rather than later."
- "We should not give Moscow grounds to believe that the U.S. follows a policy of trying to destroy, fragment, or overthrow the Soviet regime: If the Soviet leadership comes to that conclusion its inferiority complex could result in a 'cornered rat syndrome' and a turn toward calculated confrontation."

As a result of this analysis, the following specific recommendations are put forward:

- Continue to freeze new trade deals. (This is meaningless, since it is literally impossible in the current climate for an American firm to conclude a trade deal with the Soviets.)
- Allow completion of contracts already underway and continue delivery of spare parts. (This would be very helpful to the Soviets, particularly in the Kama River plant, which produces the Kamaz truck that has performed so ably in Afghanistan.)
- Continue honoring of Civil Air, Maritime, and other current agreements with the Soviets.
- Allow routine academic exchanges and other minor exchanges on a case-by-case basis, while continuing to freeze more important scientific and cultural exchanges. (Such exchanges in the current climate are not profitable or possible anyway.)
- Stop further moves toward China for the remainder of this year because (a) such moves could strengthen inclinations in Moscow to seek a confrontation with us sooner rather than later; and (b) "once played, China cards lose their usefulness as leverage and become excuses for Soviet counteraction." (We should also obviously not do anything constructive with China when relations improve, since such action by us would jeopardize hopeful movement back toward detente. The question which arises is -- at just what point of stasis in our relations with the Soviets can we do anything with the largest and most enduring country in the world?)
- Demonstrate clearly "that we are not trying to destroy the Soviet Union." (There is a myopia in the use of this phrase which I find remarkable. Is there a Soviet leader who at this stage really believes that we are attempting "to destroy the Soviet Union"? I strongly doubt it.)

- Not "bluff" at this "stage in history" and at a point near Soviet borders. "Trip wire forces may not deter them and might even invite their attack." (In other words, the thrust behind the State of the Union speech, was, to say the least, ill-considered.)
- "Resist the temptation" to continue "dribbling out" further sanctions against the Soviets, since this will "give them the impression of terminal anti-Sovietism." (i.e., those sensitive chaps in the Kremlin, afflicted as they are by "an inferiority complex," would think we were guilty of "terminal anti-Sovietism" if we respond to further Soviet provocations with more bilateral sanctions.)
- Persuade the neutral and non-aligned countries to put political pressure on the Soviets, but without appealing to them to be anti-Soviet (i.e., adopt a "balanced" approach).
- "Dangle some ideas" for letting the Soviets extract themselves gracefully from Afghanistan, "if they are so inclined." (If they are so inclined -- and this beggars the imagination -- they will manage to find their own way out of Afghanistan without assistance from us.)
- Follow up quickly on SALT I and SALT II interim observance ... and pursue explorations about TNF talks and about how to prepare for SALT III." (This would be a mistake. We have clearly spelled out our position and seized the high ground. We should not be the demandeurs on this, particularly at this stage.)
- Send Averell Harriman or a "businessman with good connections" (Hammer? Kendall? Verity?) on a private visit. (Earlier, Watson noted that his "guess is that the Soviet leadership will not show much desire to talk seriously until they become convinced of the inevitability of President Carter's reelection." I agree with this analysis. Sending somebody on a "private visit" is exactly the wrong signal until the Soviets are convinced of our seriousness of purpose and our determination to avoid future Afghanistans. This will take many months.)

A cable of this sort, while perhaps a useful contribution to our internal dialogue, can also result in leaks, and considerable confusion as to where we stand on some fundamental issues. I cannot suppress the feeling that there is a considerable discrepancy between what the President and the Secretary of State have been saying on this subject and what the cable contains. Cy's letter to Gromyko takes exactly the proper line, but we have somehow to

make certain that some of the remarkable assertions in the Moscow cable are not left unanswered. If you agree, as I mentioned earlier, perhaps we could discuss this quietly among ourselves at a V-B-B meeting and decide what should be done next.

Zbigniew Brzezinski

Zbigniew Brzezinski

Department of State
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 05 OF 05 MOSCOM 02027

N0013/CHEROKEE

IT IS FOR THAT REASON, AND WITH AN EYE TO THE LONG-RANGE
PROSPECTS AND DANGERS, THAT I THINK WE SHOULD BEGIN EXPLO-
RING POSSIBILITIES FOR GETTING BACK TO THE ARMS CONTROL
TABLE. SOME SAY THAT IT WILL BE IMPOSSIBLE TO HAVE ANY
SERIOUS TALKS, EVEN ON ARMS CONTROL, WHILE CONTACTS ARE
FROZEN IN OTHER AREAS. BUT I THINK WE HAVE TO GIVE IT A
TRY. WATSON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

JCL, DHM, ZBC
SF, Box 20
FOUNDER: ALPHA CHANNEL (MISC.)
01/80 - 03/80

281

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March 21, 1980

JCL, DHM, ZBC
SF, Box 20
FOUNDER: ALPHA O'HANWEL (MSC)
01/80-03/80

Dear Mr. President:

On August 10th of last year I wrote you to implore you to come to the aid of my desperately ill brother in Mexico. Sadly enough eight days later Undersecretary of State Christopher informed me by mail that you were on vacation but that your interest in my brother's well being was noted. More than two months later you saw fit to admit him for emergency treatment to the United States after being informed he was near death in Mexico. No assistance whatsoever was given in his transfer to New York. Not one word of well wishing came forward from the United States Government to a friend of four decades. Your State Department felt confident that this year long fear of American hostages being taken in my country was no longer a problem and that the United States Embassy in Tehran had been adequately protected. Unfortunately as events proved this reasoning was grossly deficient.

Since that time my brother has attempted to be helpful in whatever way possible to achieve freedom of the hostages. He made the ultimate sacrifice of departing the United States as soon as possible after his surgery and radiation treatment even though we all knew well he was still very ill and in constant need of medical attention. He separated himself from his children and placed his life in jeopardy by going to Panama. On December 14th in your name, Mr. Jordan and Mr. Cutler made several assurances and commitments to my brother concerning future health care, safety and peace. His sad experiences in Panama are now a matter of record.

Mr. Jordan and Mr. Cutler's promises remain unkept and their statements in Lackland with regard to Panama have proven factually incorrect. All which has contributed to mental anguish and physical deterioration of a very sick man. The calls for assistance by my brother's top advisors on visits to the White House have produced no results.

Today I urge you not as a sister concerned for a brother nor as one who served as President of the Human Rights Committee of the United Nations but as one human being concerned for another. Mr. President, you know very well what he did for his country, you know very well what he did for your country and you know what he tried to do for the free world which you both cherish so much. You, Mr. President, like six of your predecessors praised him for his accomplishments in good times. Don't abandon him in bad times. To assist in attempts to free American hostages he has remained silent while the United Nations he helped found and so actively supported was used as a tool by terrorists to falsely accuse both my brother and your beloved country with the most outrageous lies and distortions of the truth.

Now, Mr. President, despite the commitments you made to him through Mr. Cutler and Mr. Jordan at Lackland Air Force Base your State Department appears to be saying to him, "Your Majesty, we regret we cannot help you find a safe haven and adequate medical care and ask you to die quietly in Panama".

In the very name of human rights, I urge you to come to his aid as promised and assist him in receiving the proper medical attention. his physicians have advised you he needs in peaceful surroundings. Petty nationalistic circumstances denied this gravely ill man the operation he needed last week. Each day this operation is stalled my brother moves closer to death. I cannot believe that you can turn your back on any man let alone one whom you once called friend and ally.

I pray that you can find an adequate site for his urgent operation within the prescribed time his physicians have dictated.

Sincerely yours
Achim of Pahlav

P.S. I would appreciate your personal reply.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

3-21-80

To Princess Ashraf

I share your concern about your brother's health and well-being. I have understood that each of his moves since leaving Iran has been at his own initiative or with his concurrence. Our preference now is that he receive treatment under Dr. DeBakey's care either at Gorgas, the U.S. hospital in Panama, or in Houston, Texas. If you have any additional suggestions we will certainly appreciate them.

Respectfully,

Jimmy Carter

JCL, DHM, ZBC
SF, Box 20
FOUR: ALPHA CHANNEL (MISC)
01/80-03/80

DECLASSIFIED
E.O.12958, Sec.3.6

PER 10/17/80 NLS BY RE MR-NLC-95-65
BY 0 NARS. DATE 11/21/97

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

JCL, DHM, ZBC
SF, Box 20
FOUNDER: ALPHA CHANNEL (MISC)
01/80 - 03/80

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski
Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin

DATE, TIME & PLACE: March 17, 1980
8:00-10:30 p.m.
Dr. Brzezinski's Residence

The conversation started with Dobrynin expressing considerable pessimism about the longer range trends in U.S.-Soviet relations. He feels that we are on a spiral -- that both sides are becoming increasingly antagonistic, and that he does not see much prospect for an early improvement.

I suspect that this was a deliberate line designed to "smoke me out." I made the point in response that he may well be right, but that what happens this year in U.S.-Soviet relations is likely to influence a great deal the next four years. This is why we both have an obligation to see if something could not be done in the near future to reverse the negative trends set in motion by the Soviet action in Afghanistan.

Substance

The discussion then turned more specifically to the question of Afghanistan. Dobrynin spoke at some length, reviewing recent history. He said that the Soviets had no intention of moving into Afghanistan but the deteriorating situation gave them no choice. (Incidentally, he told me that Babrak returned secretly to Kabul in October of last year.)

The Soviets have no intention of dominating the region according to him and will withdraw once a "stable government" has been created. He put a lot of emphasis on organizing a new Afghanistan army which will carry on once the Soviets have left. In response to a question, he indicated that it may be up to a year or so before the Soviets can leave, but he professed great optimism about their capacity to crush the resistance.

He said that the Soviet Union would be willing to give guarantees to us that it has no designs against Pakistan and Iran.

~~SECRET~~

Review March 18, 2010

I responded by saying that the key issue is whether the Soviet Union insists on imposing a Communist government on Afghanistan or whether it desires an Afghanistan that is genuinely non-aligned and non-hostile to the Soviet Union. If it is the former, conflicts between us will persist because it will require the Soviet army to maintain such a regime. But if it is the latter, I am sure that we could work out international arrangements, including transitionally some neutral forces from Moslem countries to assure Afghanistan's genuine neutrality. Communists could participate in such a government, even if they could not dominate it. (I cited Finland as an example.) In effect, the Soviets have to decide whether their objective is to make Afghanistan into a Mongolia or whether they can live with an Asian variant of Finland. In the latter case, there could be a relatively quick upswing in U.S.-Soviet relations.

Dobrynin responded by saying that the above is a "harder" statement than made to Moscow by "some of your allies." He gave me the impression that my position on this is also harder than he thought the U.S. position actually was. He maintained that his impression was that we would be satisfied with Soviet "guarantees" for the region and with Soviet departure after Afghanistan has become "stable." Our allies are more interested in the region than in Afghanistan and the Soviets can assure us about the region.

I responded that the President in his letter to Tito made it clear that we saw neutralization and departure of the Soviet troops as linked, though we are not insisting that the latter is sequentially a precondition for the former. I drew his attention to the sentence in the letter which said that we would be prepared to enter into guarantees "with the prompt withdrawal of all Soviet troops" and I emphasized that the word "with" implied simultaneity.

I went on to say that the issue is not assurances but arrangements than can endure. If the Soviets insist on a Communist government in Kabul, the Soviet army will have to stay in Afghanistan for a long time and this has objective consequences not only for relations with us but for stability in the region.

At this point, Dobrynin seemed to hint that it is not to be excluded that there could be some change in the Afghani government and Babrak could become non-essential -- though he immediately qualified this by saying that he is not in a position to negotiate on this subject with me.

I responded by saying that the creation of a genuine Afghani government need not be the point of departure for a solution because it is not our intention to humiliate the Soviet Union, but we do have to agree in advance on where we will end up (i.e. a genuinely neutral and independent Afghanistan) and then we can work on the steps of getting there. (I have to add that the hint

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about Babrak's dispensability was quite vague and I am not certain whether it did indicate some flexibility on the Soviet part.)

Procedure

Dobrynin said that formal talks on the Vance-Gromyko level are premature. He thinks it is better to continue his discussions with Vance and occasionally perhaps with me, and then formal Vance-Gromyko talks can be held when the time is right. He thought it would be inappropriate to hold them at Tito's funeral. He then referred disparagingly to the idea of sending Shulman as an emissary to Brezhnev, but I did not respond to his baiting.

Other Matters

On the Olympics, he did not respond to the possibility of postponement.

On this Administration, he asserted a similarity between its anti-Sovietism and Reagan's, but I felt he was saying that for the record. I did talk to him about SALT and MBFR and reiterated our intention to pursue both. I told him flatly that we will not wage the Presidential campaign on an anti-Soviet basis but that we will also not rescind our current measures unless the situation in Afghanistan alters in a reasonable fashion.

He is leaving this weekend for Moscow and hopes to see Cy before he goes. He said he would call me if he has any afterthoughts, and he also urged me to do the same.

The whole evening was very cordial and also involved some exchange of personal gifts.

~~SECRET~~

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Tay

*file
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NATIONAL FOREIGN ASSESSMENT CENTER

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505


17 JUN 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Zbigniew Brzezinski
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs

SUBJECT : Soviet Activities Affecting US
Interests

This is the fifth in a series of reports that chart the USSR's actions to advance their interests abroad. It gives special attention to those activities that either seem deliberately designed to counter US policy or have the potential for developing into issues inimical to US interests.

25X1



Bruce C. Clarke, Jr.

Attachment:
As stated

[Redacted]

25X1

12A

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
National Foreign Assessment Center

15 June 1980

MEMORANDUM

Soviet Activities Affecting US Interests

[Redacted]

25X1

Summary

Soviet leaders probably believe that they have made considerable progress in limiting international damage as a result of the invasion of Afghanistan and in habituating the international community to a long-term Soviet military presence in Afghanistan. Last month's meeting with French President Giscard and the scheduled meeting with West German Chancellor Schmidt later this month allowed the Soviets to demonstrate a high-level political dialogue with the key states of West Europe despite the Afghan invasion and the US "quarantine." The Soviets probably also believe that they did not do badly at the second Islamic Conference in view of the fact that the US bore the brunt of criticism at last month's meeting and that there were signs that the Moslem consensus on Afghanistan was weakening.

[Redacted]

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This memorandum was prepared by the USSR-East European Division of the Office of Political Analysis.

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[Redacted]

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PA M 80-10275

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With prospects for resuming detente with the US poor, the Soviets are encouraging West Europeans to engage in a political dialogue that involves such sensitive Third World areas as Afghanistan, the Persian Gulf, and the Middle East. Moscow is trying to show the West that it understands Western concern for the security of Middle East oil routes and that the invasion of Afghanistan was not intended to threaten the control of the region's resources. The Soviets will in turn exploit any US unwillingness to enter a direct dialogue on these sensitive issues in their discussions with the West Europeans. [REDACTED] 25X1

Regardless of Washington's level of enthusiasm for Soviet proposals to inaugurate a high-level dialogue over outstanding political differences, the Soviets will maintain a propaganda campaign against the US. The Soviets consider the campaign particularly important for their propaganda efforts in Europe and for support of their efforts to drive a wedge between the US and some of its more important European allies. Playing on the fears of some West European leaders, the Soviets will blame the US for destabilizing the international situation and for refusing to restore the atmosphere of detente. [REDACTED] 25X1

Damage Limitation in the Aftermath of Afghanistan

Moscow's success in limiting the damage of its invasion of Afghanistan is probably a source of satisfaction in the Kremlin. The Soviets have reason to believe that they have seen the worst of West European and Islamic reaction and that their ability to hold high-level political discussions with West European leaders is symptomatic of the divergence in US and West European policies toward the USSR. These meetings allow the Soviets to try to enlarge the existing divergencies between the US and its allies. 

- The summit with Giscard produced no movement on the issue of Afghanistan, but it eased the way for the Schmidt visit to the USSR later this month.
- The meetings with Schmidt will provide an opportunity to exploit Bonn's concern with the direction of US policy and to portray Bonn and Moscow as interested in lessening international tensions and buttressing detente.
- Swedish Foreign Minister Ullsten's visit in May and the scheduling of Norwegian Foreign Minister Frydenlund are additional examples of Moscow's ability to conduct "business as usual" with the West Europeans without US approval or participation.

-2-

SECRET

[REDACTED]
25X1

SECRET

[REDACTED]
25X1

The Soviets will use all of these occasions to try to exploit US-West European differences over Middle East peacekeeping issues, the appropriate response to the Iran and Afghanistan crises, the modernization of theater nuclear forces, and European security issues. [REDACTED] 25X1

The Soviets similarly have reason to believe that they did not do badly at last month's Islamic Conference in Islamabad, where the consensus on Afghanistan that was hammered out in January showed signs of weakening. The conference failed to issue a new condemnation of the USSR, and several radical Arab states expressed reservations about the January condemnation. The Soviets were also pleased by the fact that the Afghan rebels failed to gain recognition at the conference and are probably hopeful that a newly formed Islamic committee will lead to greater acceptance of the Babrak Karmal government. Even the Iranians--Moscow's harshest critic--admitted that the committee must enter into some kind of dialogue with Kabul. More importantly, the Soviets probably took comfort in the fact that the US came in for the lion's share of criticism at the meetings, where US rescue efforts were equated with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. [REDACTED] 25X1

The Soviets have had the least success in countering the adverse effect of the US trade embargo, particularly the grain embargo, and the Olympic boycott, which have caused unexpected expenditure of hard currency and some loss of international prestige. No single aspect of US retaliation appears to have bothered the Soviets unduly, but Washington's across-the-board response caught the Soviet leadership off guard. The disruption these actions have caused may be responsible for the recent increase in propaganda activities and forgeries aimed at the US. [REDACTED] 25X1

Soviet Search for Dialogue

The Soviets presumably want to use their contacts with the West Europeans not only to divide the US from its allies but to encourage Washington to enter a political dialogue with Moscow as well. Moscow's pitch is twofold: to establish that the USSR is willing to discuss the breakdown in relations with the US in a serious fashion but that Washington remains intransigent; to convince the West Europeans that US overemphasis on Afghanistan is having deleterious effects on the delicate balance in Europe. In this way, the Soviets hope either to get their dialogue with the US eventually or at least to establish that Washington is responsible for the failure to do so. [REDACTED] 25X1

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[REDACTED] 25X1

[REDACTED]

(25X1)

Soviet probes on guaranteeing the security of the oil routes of the Persian Gulf are designed to project a sympathetic pose toward the West and, at the same time, to assert a comparable interest and gain a possible negotiation forum on Persian Gulf issues. Last month's Warsaw Pact proposal on "unhindered access to the main international sea routes" was an effort, for example, to keep alive the idea of East-West negotiations on the security of oil routes and to generate some interest among the nonaligned states. The proposal has not elicited much response from the West thus far, but the Soviets are likely to try other variations on the theme of East-West negotiations to protect the oil routes, if only to convince the West Europeans that it is the US--not the USSR--which jeopardizes the stability of the Persian Gulf area and access to its oil resources. This tactic is particularly important to the Soviet effort to drive a wedge between the US and its allies.

(25X1)

[REDACTED]

Presumably the Soviets also see opportunities for inserting themselves into the Arab-Israeli settlement process by exploiting the Egyptian-Israeli impasse and playing up to both Arab and European desires for new initiatives for a settlement. Before the invasion of Afghanistan, Soviet officials condemned the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty. More recently, however, Soviet foreign ministry officials have hinted that the USSR may be considering a tactical shift in their approach to Middle East peace negotiations, which could presage Soviet efforts to exploit US-West European differences over the role of the Palestinians in the peace process and the use of US political leverage against Israel. Brezhnev recently referred publicly to the need to return to "collective efforts" by all of the interested parties in the Middle East, particularly the US and the USSR, and the deputy chief of the foreign ministry's Near East Department privately indicated that the return of the Sinai and the establishment of Egyptian-Israeli diplomatic relations could be accepted as the foundations for building a comprehensive settlement.

[REDACTED] (25X1)

New Opportunities

The Soviets have already intensified their activity in Latin America, which is designed in part to exploit the worsening of relations between the US and key Latin American states. The Soviets no longer appear to be constrained by the need to placate Washington in its own backyard and, as a result, have offered military training to the new radical government in Grenada and have concluded several assistance agreements with Nicaragua. There is also the possibility that the Soviets will provide weapons through third parties to leftists in El Salvador. Moscow has also gained from the refusal of

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
25X1

Argentina and Brazil to join US efforts to restrict grain sales to the USSR, and the Soviets will intensify their contacts with these key states. [REDACTED] 25X1

The Soviets will also press to advance their interests in areas where they have previously been excluded. Jordan's King Hussein has agreed to visit the USSR following the Olympics, and the Soviets will use the occasion to lobby for Jordanian purchases of Soviet weaponry. Both Libya and Algeria have reportedly tied their subsidies to Amman to purchases of Soviet arms. In the wake of Moscow's emphasis on guaranteed access to the oil of the Persian Gulf, Kuwait announced that it would be willing to sell oil to the Soviets for hard currency. [REDACTED] 25X1

25X1 [REDACTED] The Soviets in any event intend to increase the volume of the current propaganda campaign against Washington. [REDACTED] the Soviet campaign will be directed primarily against President Carter and Zbigniew Brzezinski in order to blame them for the current decline in East-West relations. The Soviets consider the campaign important for their propaganda efforts in Europe (particularly in West Germany) and for support of their efforts to drive a wedge between the US and some of its more important European allies. In order to protect Moscow's European equity, Soviet propagandists have been instructed to ignore West German support for the US-inspired boycott of the Olympics. [REDACTED] 25X1

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

July 3, 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Warren Christopher, Acting ^{W.C.}

1. Cuba. In a meeting with Wayne Smith, Cuban Vice President Rodriguez has responded positively to Ed Muskie's message about the freighter in Mariel Harbor. Rodriguez said that he would consult with Castro, but that a decision has been taken not to do anything which could be seen as deliberately provocative. He said that any further action at Mariel would be done with that in mind. When Smith pointed out that loading the freighter would be seen as provocative by the U.S., Rodriguez repeated that Cuba would do nothing provocative.

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2. TNF. Chancellor Schmidt's report to the Bundestag today on his Moscow visit struck most of the right notes. While characterizing the Soviet response as "new" and "constructive," he was careful to say that it was not a "breakthrough" since success in the talks is "not yet in the offing." Schmidt made public the key details of his talks: the rejection of a freeze on Soviet deployments, and Soviet willingness to enter bilateral talks with the U.S. without the precondition that NATO deployments be halted and prior to SALT II ratification on medium-range systems, including so-called "forward based systems" of the U.S. He shed no new light on the relationship of these bilateral talks to the SALT III framework, but noted Brezhnev's statement that the Soviet Union cannot open negotiations in SALT III before it has "gained clarity about the destiny of SALT II."

State Department review completed

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Reaction at today's North Atlantic Council meeting was generally sound. All present emphasized the correctness of the December 12 decision and the need for Belgium to confirm its deployment decision. Although some talked about a quick start to negotiations and the need to develop the Alliance position in the Special Consultative Group, Van Well stressed that there was no breakthrough yet. The most somber theme was sounded by the Belgian representative, who thought Foreign Minister Nothomb would still visit Moscow. Nothomb said that TNF opponents are making the perverse argument that, now that negotiations are in sight, there is no longer an immediate need for Belgium to confirm its decision. To counter this, we and Schmidt are insisting that the Soviet reaction confirms the wisdom of NATO's two-track approach and that, now more than ever, Belgian confirmation is essential.

3. Mexico. Mexico has notified us that on July 7 it will begin enforcing its January 1980 decree requiring the purchase of licenses by U.S. fishermen seeking tuna within Mexico's 200-mile limit. Enforcement will mean seizures, fines, and confiscation of fish and gear. The U.S. tuna industry appears ready to risk a confrontation with the Mexicans. Seizure of even one of the 40 U.S. tuna boats now in Mexico's 200-mile zone would trigger a U.S. embargo on Mexican tuna. The Mexicans attribute their decision mainly to failure to come to an interim agreement with us on tuna fishing in the Eastern Pacific. The Mexicans have taken a very tough position that would eventually result in sharp cutbacks in the U.S. catch.

We have warned the Mexicans of the consequences of enforcing their tuna decree. In case of a seizure, we should apply the mandatory embargo as quickly as possible, thus signaling the Mexicans that we will not back down. Ambassador Krueger has arranged with Treasury to prevent any delays in this connection.

4. Jordan. While the sudden death of Jordanian Prime Minister Sharaf is a profound personal and political loss for King Hussein, it should not lead to basic shifts in either foreign or domestic policies or destabilize Jordan. Hussein has moved quickly to name a replacement, Dr. Qasim Ar-Rimawi, a Palestinian who has served over the years in various government posts, most recently as

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

CONFIDENTIAL

August 28, 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

FROM: STEVE LARRABEE SL

SUBJECT: The Polish Crisis and Beyond:
Implications for US Policy

As the crisis in Poland enters its second week, it may be useful to step back a bit and analyze what has transpired, both for its implications for future developments in Poland as well as US policy.

At the moment it still remains difficult to predict exactly how and when the present strikes will end. The government is clearly on the defensive. It has given into the majority of the workers' demands, with the exception of "free" trade unions, which remains the chief stumbling block in the current negotiations. For the moment Gierek has chosen a policy of accommodation. He seems genuinely intent upon avoiding the use of force, which he knows would seriously exacerbate the crisis and probably precipitate his own downfall (which may occur anyway). But the workers are remaining firm in their demand for free trade unions, which they see as the essential concession. Moreover, this firmness has been reinforced both by the history of past hopes dashed and their present success in forcing the party to accede to their other demands.

However, the party cannot agree to the establishment of genuinely free trade unions without seriously eroding its own power and risking Soviet intervention. As the party daily Trybuna Ludu put it today, free trade unions would be a "de facto political movement...contradicting the Socialist system and order, hence aimed at the Polish 'raison d'etat'." This does not leave much room for maneuver. At the same time Lech Valesa, the leaders of the strikers in Gdansk, has threatened to call for a general strike if the demands regarding trade unions are not met. Thus the next couple of days could be decisive.

Soviet Policy

In the end some compromise solution may be found which gives the workers more de facto control of the trade unions but does not actually institutionalize their independent role, thus not openly antagonizing the Soviets, who can not help but regard the present spectacle with considerable misgivings. To date they have been relatively restrained and have been willing to give Gierek a chance to handle the situation himself. They know any invasion would be politically very costly. Among other things it would:

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Review August 28, 1986

State Department review completed

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- completely kill any hope of SALT ratification;
- lead to the indefinite postponement of any TNF talks;
- seriously exacerbate relations with the Europeans at a time when they are trying to get detente back on track;
- kill any prospect of improved relations with the US after the elections and for some time to come (and would probably elect Reagan president);
- lead to a further strengthening of NATO and a military build-up on the part of the West, especially the US;
- severely tarnish their image (already hurt by Afghanistan) in the Third World;
- risk an escalation of the conflict if the Poles resisted, as they most likely would.

But, if the situation were to show signs of spiraling out of control and threatening the leading role of the party, they could feel compelled to intervene. And from their point of view it would be better to act precipitously to arrest the rot, than risk the danger of its spreading elsewhere in Eastern Europe at a later date.

The Crisis: Political Implications

Given its enormous prestige the Church -- and particularly Cardinal Wyszynski -- will play a crucial role in any settlement. While sympathizing with the workers, Wyszynski is clearly concerned that the strike may precipitate Soviet intervention and has indirectly sided with the government in an effort to try to defuse the crisis. But he is likely to exact a price for his support. Thus one outcome of the current unrest is likely to be a strengthening of the Church's role vis-a-vis the party and an expansion of its autonomy. Indeed, by broadcasting Wyszynski's homily at Czestochowa, the regime has already given in to one of the key demands of the Church: de facto access to the State-controlled media.

However the present strike is resolved, it is likely to leave a lasting impact on Polish politics. Most important of all, it has led to a shift in the internal balance of forces in the country. The power of the workers has been dramatically demonstrated, and the concessions that Gierek will have to make to resolve the strike will strengthen their hand further. The workers have seen that they have the capacity to bring the government to its knees, and neither they nor the government is likely to forget it. Secondly, the Church, for reasons cited above, is likely to emerge in a stronger position. Lastly, for the first time, politically meaningful bonds have been established between the workers and the intellectuals which are likely to last beyond the end of the strike.

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All these changes have the effect of weakening the party's grip on society and will force it to engage in a complex game of political bargaining in the future, especially in any new crisis. Moreover, within the Party there has been a shift in the balance of forces as well. Gierek's own political position has been considerably weakened and it seems likely that he will have to step down in the near future, making way for someone who is not tainted by his association with past policies, most likely Olszowski. But even if he survives, Gierek will be dependent upon men whose views he once repudiated and who are not beholden to him. And with Olszowski's return there is now a ready alternative waiting in the wings, should he slip.

Moreover, the economy, which was already in dire straights prior to the strikes, is likely to be in even worse shape in their immediate aftermath. It is difficult to estimate the economic impact of the current unrest (CIA and Treasury have both been tasked to put together an estimate) but the government's agreement to an increase in the workers' wages and other fringe benefits will add to the inflationary spiral and make it more difficult to carry out its austerity program -- not to mention the direct loss in hard currency, which will accrue as a result of the strikes.

In short, the crisis in Poland will not end with the return of the workers to their factories. New unrest is likely to break out intermittently over the next year, especially as the economic impact of the strikes begins to be felt, and the party fails to live up to some of its promises. As a result, Poland is likely to be a festering sore within the Soviet bloc -- and political flashpoint -- for some time to come. Thus, we need to recognize that the "Polish problem" will be with us for the near future.

US Interests and Policy

The resolution of the current crisis will depend to a large extent upon developments within Poland and the Soviet Union. Our ability to influence these events is limited, but we do have definite interests:

- to deter Soviet intervention, which would halt the gradual process of liberalization that has taken place in Poland and Eastern Europe over the past decade;
- to encourage gradual political liberalization and social pluralism;
- to encourage a more independent Polish foreign policy;
- to encourage Poland to undertake a structural reform of its economy which leads to greater self-sufficiency and an improvement in the well-being of the Polish people.

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The optimum outcome from our point of view would be one in which the power of the workers is expanded without violence and without incurring Soviet intervention. At the moment events seem to be moving in this direction, though the situation is fluid and could change rapidly, especially if the workers prove too rigid in their demands.

Public Posture

We need to tread a fine line between actions and/or statements which could exacerbate the situation, on the one hand, and those that give an appearance of indifference, on the other. The impression that we were indifferent to developments in Poland or afraid to speak out could encourage Soviet intervention almost as much as inflammatory statements that inject us into Polish internal affairs. Moreover, such an impression could undermine the President's human rights policy, alienate politically important constituencies, and give Reagan a ready-made club to use against the President.

In my view, the President's statement to the Boston Globe and Muskie's statement last Friday have set the right tone and established a statesman-like posture which covers all bases -- restraint, concern for human rights, non-interference. We should basically continue this posture, though we may want to elaborate on Muskie's statement at some point, depending on events.

Economic Assistance

To offset the adverse economic impact of the strikes as well as implement a much-needed program of structural reform, Poland will need considerable economic assistance and there is likely to be some sentiment in Congress and in the Polish-American community to do something for Poland. State is currently putting together a paper which examines the things we might be able to do and fiscal or legislative obstacles to doing them. Under current budgetary constraints, however, we will not be able to do much without a Presidential decision. We should also encourage the Europeans to do more and coordinate any assistance with them.

CCC Credits

The Poles have asked USDA for \$670 million this year but, as you know, meeting this request will be difficult. We may need a Presidential determination to raise the overall ceiling. A decision is due at the end of September.

There has been some suggestion that we ought to accelerate the CCC decision. I would oppose doing so. The CCC credits are one of the few forms of leverage we have: the longer we string out the decision, the more the regime must weigh its actions against their possible impact on our decision. If we announce our intention in advance, we undercut our own ability to influence -- however marginally -- developments in Poland during these crucial upcoming weeks.

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While we should not directly and publicly link the CCC issue with support of the workers' demands, I do think we ought to make it clear to the Poles privately that if the regime were to use force against the strikers, this would have a decidedly negative impact on public and Congressional opinion and make it difficult for us to be forthcoming in regard to CCC credits. We should also continue to press the Poles to undertake much needed structural reforms in their economy.

Allies

Poland is likely to remain a potential flashpoint for some time to come, and we ought to begin consultations and contingency planning with the allies. Much of this can be done within the Quad, but it would be good to discuss the issue at the highest level as well, particularly regarding economic assistance. While each country has specific concerns, we need a coordinated approach.

Soviets

At present I feel it would be premature to approach the Soviets on Poland, but if the situation begins to deteriorate, we may want to. State has prepared a paper and a draft message. State also has a paper on possible US responses to an imminent and/or actual Soviet invasion.

Congress

State has been briefing interested Congressional members and Committees and so far (with the exception of Derwinski) they have been supportive of our policy. But we will need to do more if we want to do something economically for Poland. Muskie could be particularly helpful here. The Select Intelligence Committee is using the Polish crisis as a test case of the effectiveness of our intelligence and we should try to ensure that this does not blow up into some sort of political embarrassment.

Polish-American Community

We need to be sensitive to their concerns and give them the feeling that their views are being heard, if not always completely heeded. Periodic briefings and meeting would be helpful in this regard. The President's speech, which I am working on with Jan Novak, should also help.

Vatican

The Pope is obviously a key actor, even behind the scenes. We should intensify contacts and consultations.

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May Contain Congressional Material

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High Level Meetings

-- Muskie-FM Czyrek. The Poles have approached us about a meeting between Muskie and Pinkowski at the UNGA in September/October. State has not yet made a decision -- and I don't think they should until we have a clearer picture of how the current crisis is going to be resolved. A meeting with Muskie would give the new regime -- and Pinkowski personally -- a degree of legitimacy, which we may or may not want to grant. It also gives us a bit of leverage, and we ought to use it. In my view, we should tell the Poles that we have not yet made a decision and are watching developments in Poland closely before we do. If things turn out positively -- and Muskie can find the time -- we could then agree to a meeting.

-- Gierek Visit. We should hold this in abeyance to see how badly Gierek's prestige and authority have been eroded by the unrest. If Gierek is forced to resign, we should consider an early invitation to his successor in order to encourage a dialogue and put relations on a firm footing.

Gierek Letter

We should hold off sending this until the dust clears. We don't want to send a letter in the middle of a crisis or to a lame duck.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
NATIONAL FOREIGN ASSESSMENT CENTER

8 September 1980

MEMORANDUM

THE PROSPECTS FOR SOVIET MILITARY INTERVENTION IN POLAND

SUMMARY

We do not think that Moscow is now seriously considering military intervention in Poland. Although the Soviets are deeply troubled by developments there, they probably do not view the concessions granted so far regarding independent trade unions as sufficient cause for the use of Soviet military force in Poland. The Soviets probably also do not consider these concessions irreversible and will place substantial pressure on Warsaw to curtail them. In fact, with Kania's replacement of Gierek as first secretary, their hopes appear buoyed that the development of political and social chaos in Poland that might have compelled them to use military force in the near future has been forestalled. Nevertheless, Moscow's anxieties are still high, and if Kania does not limit the concessions granted the strikers or if he cracks down too forcefully and sparks a violent popular reaction which the government cannot control, the Soviets may yet have to step in militarily.

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Current Soviet Attitudes

The Soviets behaved cautiously during the Polish labor crisis. Only after the settlement of the strikes on the Baltic coast--that is, when the immediate danger of an explosion had lessened--did they openly begin to express their

This memorandum was prepared by [redacted] Office of Political Analysis, and was coordinated with the Offices of Strategic Research and Economic Research, and the National Intelligence Officer for USSR-Eastern Europe. Comments and queries are welcome and may be addressed to the Chief, [redacted] OPA,

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anxieties. Subsequent critical commentary reflected Moscow's recognition that the negotiated settlement with the strikers may have set in motion a process of political liberalization of the Polish system, which could at some point prove to be beyond the control of the Polish Communist Party and could spread elsewhere in Eastern Europe. It also was a sign of Soviet dissatisfaction with Gierek's handling of the crisis. Whether or not Moscow had a hand in Gierek's ouster, the Soviet leadership is openly pleased with the choice of Kania as first secretary and consider him to be the best possible replacement at this juncture. [REDACTED]

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It remains to be seen whether Kania will live up to his image as an orthodox, hardline apparatchik, who will strictly limit the gains made by the strikers. At the very least, the Polish party has bought time as far as Soviet military intervention is concerned. But if Kania proves unable or unwilling to curtail the new unions, the Soviets would step up first the political, then the military, pressure tactics on him to reverse the erosion of party control in Poland. If these pressures failed, Moscow would intervene militarily. [REDACTED]

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Fundamental Threat to Party Control

The agreement reached between the strikers and the Polish regime at the end of August, if implemented liberally, would threaten the very foundations of the Communist system in Poland. The theoretical justification of the Communist party's control is its claim to rule as the vanguard of the working class. But with the overwhelming majority of the workers rejecting the party-run unions for unions that will truly represent their interests, that justification would be undermined. [REDACTED]

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The Soviet Union, quite clearly, would not stand by idly if this occurred. The case could even be made that Moscow has already decided that its military intervention is necessary--that the threat is so dangerous that it should be stamped out before it has a chance to spread. [REDACTED]

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The Soviets may have already decided that the Polish leadership has given up too much of its authority in agreeing to the unprecedented establishment of free trade unions and the partial lifting of censorship. The Politburo may have reasoned that, as in Czechoslovakia in 1968, the political and social conditions for continued dissipation of the party's authority had been established. There is no reason to believe, however, that this is the case and that the Soviets have gone that far in their thinking--let alone their contingency planning. We believe that the Soviet decision to intervene will depend on where the situation goes from here, not on what has happened so far. [REDACTED]

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Even if the Soviets had decided in favor of intervention-- and there have been no signs of Soviet military preparations that would precede such a move--Kania's accession to power would call for a delay in plans. If Kania can erode the concessions and restore the Polish party's shaken authority, thus obviating the need for Soviet military intervention, Moscow would be delighted. It would much rather achieve its goals without suffering the substantial damage to Soviet global interests military intervention would bring. [REDACTED]

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Possible Precipitants of Intervention

The Soviets nevertheless realize that the situation in Poland will continue to be unpredictable and unstable for the immediate future and that they must monitor events closely during the coming months for any signs that their concerns are materializing. The breakdown of the Polish party's control does not appear imminent, but should it occur, the development could be a rapid one and the Soviets would move in quickly with force. [REDACTED]

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The essential grounds for Soviet military intervention in Poland are:

- the Communist Party's loss of control over Poland, including its ability to contain the political actions of the workers and the dissidents, and
- any compromise of the basic socialist orientation of the regime's domestic and international policies.

The path to either or both of these worst case scenarios (from Moscow's point of view) could be lengthy and full of zig-zags. An accumulation of seemingly minute factors could convince the Soviet leaders to intervene. We will not necessarily realize when the Soviets, themselves, actually cross that decision threshold to intervene, but once they do there may not be any turning back even if it appears to Western analysts that the Polish regime is getting the situation under control. [REDACTED]

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Moscow will keep a particularly sharp eye on the development of the new independent trade unions, which pose a potential serious threat to the Communist Party's control over Polish society. Moscow would be particularly concerned if unions spring up across the country, cohere into a potent political force, and influence national economic decision-making, especially trade with the USSR and defense spending. In the wake of Cardinal Wyszynski's meeting with Lech Walesa, the Soviets will be especially sensitive to any signs that the unions are developing meaningful alliances with the Catholic Church or political dissidents, receiving

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substantial aid from unions and other organizations in the West, or adopting openly hostile attitudes and policies toward the Soviet Union. Soviet media are already attacking assistance provided to the independent unions from Western trade unions. [REDACTED]

The relaxation of censorship is another issue that the Soviets will find difficult to live with. Although the media restrictions the Gierak regime pledged to lift are minimal when compared to the near total abolition of censorship agreed to by the Dubcek regime in Czechoslovakia in 1968, this issue was one of the primary Soviet complaints to the Czechoslovak party in the months before the invasion. [REDACTED]

Although it appears unlikely at the moment, the possibility exists that the present or a future Polish leadership--whether out of fear of the consequences a crackdown could bring or from a genuine sympathy with the workers' desires--could assume the lead in the liberalization process and take it much further. This could create a situation reminiscent of Czechoslovakia in 1968. Soviet party officials have already noted [REDACTED] that there are trends evident in Polish society similar to those present in Czechoslovakia during the Prague Spring. If Moscow perceived these trends in the Polish party leadership, it might feel compelled to take preventive action before the process reached an unmanageable stage. [REDACTED]

An opposite course by the Polish leadership--a crackdown on the unions and all opposition--while probably more in line with the desires of the Soviet leaders, could inadvertently lead to Soviet intervention. If the workers responded to this tightening by resuming their strikes, there would be a strong likelihood of violent confrontation which, if it got out of the Polish authorities' control, could trigger the use of Soviet force. [REDACTED]

Another development that would profoundly disturb the Soviets is a serious outbreak of labor unrest elsewhere in Eastern Europe or in the USSR. Unrest appears unlikely in the USSR at the moment, but the reports of strikes at major automotive plants in Tolgiatti and Gorkiy earlier this year have to give the Kremlin pause. Strikes and/or calls for free trade unions in other East European countries will induce the Soviets to step up their pressure on the Polish leadership to curtail the new unions. [REDACTED]

These variables will interact in a complex, protracted process, the specific developments of which cannot be predicted with any certainty. Moscow's perception of this process may be quite different from ours or the Poles'. No one of these factors is likely to develop by itself. But a combination

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of developments could suggest to Moscow that a trend toward liberalization was approaching the point of irreversibility and that Soviet vital interests were at stake and that the situation could only be put right by military intervention.

25X1 [REDACTED]

A Decision to Intervene

Once the Soviet threshold of tolerance is crossed, Moscow would take direct action. The Soviets would first demand that the Polish leadership contain the liberalization process. If Warsaw either refused or was unable to bring the situation under control, the Soviets might opt for still another change in leadership, believing that only a more hardline group could put a stop to the erosion of power.

25X1 [REDACTED]

Past experience suggests that the Kremlin would resort to political and military pressure to get the Poles themselves to bring the situation under control before sending in troops. This would probably include high-level visits between Moscow and Warsaw, increasingly explicit warnings in the Soviet press, and possibly threatening military movements. Several factors probably would be at work here--among them a hope that the Poles would back down when faced with a display of overwhelming force. The absence of unanimity within the Soviet Politburo could also be a vital factor. It would be no easy matter to get the entire Politburo--or perhaps even a significant majority--to agree that armed intervention was the only way to hold the Poles in line. This certainly seems to have been the case in 1968, when Kosygin, Suslov and others reportedly held out to the last moment in opposing the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia.

25X1 [REDACTED]

The Soviet leaders, in reaching a decision to use military force, would have to weigh the constraints, which are substantial. They must assume that:

- the strongly anti-Russian Polish people would fight, as might part or all of the Polish Army.
- Poland's submission would require the largest military operation by the Soviet armed forces since World War II and would involve protracted combat.
- Moscow's effort to salvage detente in one of its most critical areas--Europe--would receive a setback from which it would be a long time recovering.
- intervention would probably entail a substantial long-term occupation that would complicate Soviet security planning in both Europe and Asia. [REDACTED]

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In the final analysis, however, the Soviet leaders would decide to bear these enormous costs rather than lose control of Poland:

- Poland lies astride the traditional invasion routes to and from Russia and is thus a vital corridor, essential to Soviet military planning.
- A less politically reliable Poland would leave East Germany in an exposed position.
- A Soviet failure to act forcefully could encourage similar unrest elsewhere in Eastern Europe and, possibly, in the Baltic republics of the USSR as well.

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22 September 1980

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MEMORANDUM

CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS

The Iraqi air attack against Iran on Monday greatly broadened the scope of the border conflict and may be preliminary to further air and ground action. Baghdad appears intent on seizing and holding a buffer zone of Iranian territory until Iran recognizes Iraqi claims to disputed border territory, including the Shatt al-Arab. Only a limited Iranian response to the Iraqi attacks has been noted so far, but Tehran has threatened to stop shipping destined for Iraq.

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On Monday, Iraq began attacking Iranian military installations, particularly airfields and air defense installations well away from the border. Iraq claimed to have launched air strikes on at least ten targets at mid-day. A second wave of attacks on some installations occurred at dusk. Unconfirmed reports indicate Iraq used surface-to-surface missiles in the attack on Iranian supply depots in the Dezful area. Baghdad appears to be attempting to defuse Iran's strength by destroying aircraft and airfields before making ground force advances.

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Iraq has been building its capability for major ground force action over the past year.

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This memorandum was prepared by analysts in the Office of Political Analysis and the Office of Strategic Research.

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
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
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The evidence of Iran's initial reaction to Iraq's airstrikes is fragmentary. Iranian aircraft appear to have attempted to retaliate against Iraqi targets in the Basrah area and in the southcentral border area. Iran called up reserves over the weekend; Iraq began widespread call ups on Monday. [redacted]

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Iran reportedly has declared all waterways near Iran a war zone and has claimed it will not allow merchant ships to carry cargo to Iraqi ports. Iraqi President Saddam Hussein condemned the Iranian action as providing the precondition for "foreign intervention" in the area. He declared Iraq would take "suitable measures" to counteract Tehran's move. [redacted]

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




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Iran claims to have sunk four Iraqi missile boats in airstrikes in the northern Persian Gulf. [redacted]

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22 September 1980

MEMORANDUM

PROSPECTS FOR ESCALATION OF IRAN-IRAQ CONFLICT

Military Indicators

The military signs point toward further escalation of the Iran-Iraq conflict. The surprise attacks on Iranian airfields obviously changed the scope of the conflict in a major way. The attacks are an attempt to quickly and decisively gain air superiority--an area in which Iraq feels Iran has an edge--so that Iraq can take advantage of its superiority on the ground. We do not believe that this or previous actions reflect a preconceived plan with a precisely defined schedule and objectives. Rather, Iraq appears to be making the most of Iran's current weakness and its own initial tactical successes. In the current context, then, the air strikes strongly suggest that Iraq will now conduct a major ground offensive into Iran. [redacted]

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We cannot define the limits of the probable offensive and indeed, the Iraqis may not yet have a clear definition of its objectives. Their goals will probably be influenced by the effectiveness and extent of Iran's response. We anticipate border crossings of battalion and even brigade-sized units, primarily into Iran's Kuzhestan province, but look for the deepest penetration in the central border area--Khanaqin, Mandali, and Merhran. [redacted]

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We believe that the Iraqis will limit their objectives to force Iran ultimately to recognize their border claims. We do not expect Iraq to attack or occupy population centers or

This memorandum was prepared by analysts in the Office of Political Analysis and the Office of Strategic Research. Information as of 22 September 1980 was used in its preparation.

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[redacted]

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[redacted]

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[redacted]

industrial and economic facilities unless provoked by similar attacks from Iran. There are large areas of Khuzhestan which could be effectively occupied by Iraq without much ground resistance from local Iranian forces. [redacted]

Ground Forces--Balance

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Iraq presently has a significant edge over Iranian ground forces all along the border from Khanaqin to Basra. [redacted]

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We do not believe that Iraq would have any difficulty sustaining an occupation force of division size in Western Kuzhestan. Even if the one Iranian and one Iraqi divisions were fully engaged, we believe that logistics would not be a constraint on Iraq. On the other hand, in the short run, Iraq probably would have difficulty sustaining the multi-division operations that would be required to seize and hold all of Kuzhestan. [redacted]

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Iran has virtually no capability to sustain military operations at a high level of intensity. Iran's ground forces in the southwest consist of only one, half-strength regular division reinforced by lightly armed Revolutionary Guards. We believe it alone would not be able to provide organized resistance against a major Iraqi ground offensive for more than a few days. [redacted]

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Iran would not be able to quickly enforce forces in Khuzestan. Most plausible Iranian reinforcements are either stationed far from the border or are largely tied down by insurgent activity. [redacted]

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Iran's Air Force, although at less than 50 percent of its pre-revolution level of combat capability, presents the greatest threat to Iraqi forces. Even so, the Air Force probably could not sustain combat operations for more than a week. [redacted]

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Iran's capability is also restricted by a shortage of spare parts and a lack of access to a reliable foreign supplier. [redacted]

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The Iraqi Air Force, to a greater degree than the Army, depends on Soviet support for major maintenance and parts. The Iraqi Air Force could not maintain large-scale air operations of any duration without resupply from the USSR. The Iraqi mission to the USSR at the end of last week may have succeeded in obtaining at least tacit Soviet support. [REDACTED]

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Political Indicators

There seems little prospect for an early end to the Iraq-Iran fighting unless Iraq scores a quick military victory. Baghdad appears determined to use all necessary force to restore its sovereignty over disputed border areas, including establishing buffer zones on Iranian territory in order to force Iranian recognition of Iraqi border claims. Iran, for its part, does not seem ready to submit to Iraqi bullying to redraw the border, especially along the Shatt al-Arab. [REDACTED]

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We lack good intelligence on Iraq's ultimate intentions toward Iran, but Baghdad's immediate aim is to redress border grievances. The Iraqis, however, appear to have miscalculated Iran's will to resist and now find themselves in a situation in which they are being forced to expand the conflict in order to secure their original limited objectives. Fighting has now spread to the Shatt al-Arab region, an area of great economic significance. [REDACTED]

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Two other issues promise to keep tension high for some time. Iraq seeks an early end to the current Tehran regime and will continue its strong support for Khomeini's political opponents as well as Iran's dissident ethnic minorities, especially the Arabs of Khuzestan province. There is some speculation that Iraqi President Saddam Hussein's Arab leadership aspirations might eventually lead him to back the creation of an independent Arab state in Khuzestan with strong ties to Iraq. Baghdad might also seem intent on forcing Iran to restore to the UAE three small islands located near the Strait of Hormuz occupied by Iran in 1971. [REDACTED]

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
NATIONAL FOREIGN ASSESSMENT CENTER

22 September 1980

MEMORANDUM

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SUBJECT: Soviet Reactions to Iraq-Iran Hostilities

The Soviets have long been concerned that a military clash between Iran and Iraq would damage their relations with both countries, and are worried that such a clash might lead Tehran to reduce its hostility to the US. Consequently, they probably believe their interests are best served by an early cessation of the conflict. Thus far, however, they have tried to maintain a balanced position in order to avoid alienating either Baghdad or Tehran. The major escalation in the fighting now underway, however, could make it difficult for the Soviets to maintain this balance and lead them to adopt more active policies designed to bring about a resolution of the conflict and to enhance the Soviet position in the process.

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Moscow's first response to such an escalation in the fighting may be to offer its "good offices" as mediator as it did between India and Pakistan in 1965. The USSR would hope that a successful Soviet mediation effort would enhance its position in both Tehran and Baghdad and facilitate the USSR's emergence as a key regional security player. The Soviets probably would also see a mediatory role as an opportunity to exploit the lack of US diplomatic ties with either Tehran or Baghdad.

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[Redacted]

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Should Iraq move to permanently occupy Iranian territory, the Soviets might attempt to manipulate their arms supply relationship with Iraq to induce it to desist. It is doubtful, however, that the Soviets

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This memorandum was prepared by [Redacted] USSR-Eastern Europe Division, Office of Political Analysis. It was coordinated with the National Intelligence Officer for the USSR-Eastern Europe.

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would actually threaten a cut-off. They are anxious to avoid damaging their ties with Baghdad and forcing it to look to the West for arms. The Soviets are more likely to send a subtle message to the Iraqis, perhaps by slowing the delivery of arms already promised, in order to warn Iraq of the risks of future military actions. [redacted]

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It is very unlikely the Soviets would undertake any major air resupply effort to Iraq. [redacted]

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[redacted] The Soviets would fear that an airlift almost certainly would alienate Tehran and could induce the Iranians to look to Western sources for spare parts for its US-manufactured military hardware. In addition, a Soviet rapid resupply effort would enable Iraq to prolong the fighting--something the Soviets want to prevent. [redacted]

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The Soviets might also hope that Iran's weakened position vis-a-vis Iraq would create an opportunity for the USSR to enter into a substantial arms supply program with Iran. It is unlikely, however, that Moscow thinks such an opportunity will develop during the heat of an Iraqi-Iranian conflict nor if Iran is humiliated by Soviet-supplied Iraqi arms. [redacted]

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If the Soviets think Iraq is seeking to control substantial portions of Iran--such as the oil fields--pressure on them to act more strongly will increase and their actions will be more unpredictable. The Soviets have little interest in seeing Iraq emerge as an even stronger power in the Persian Gulf. Their influence and leverage in Baghdad is already limited. Even more compelling to Moscow will be concern that a major Iraqi invasion will lead to an Iranian-US rapprochement. The USSR may also fear that such a move could lead to the fragmentation of Iran and US exploitation of the resulting chaos. In order to deter a major Iraqi move into Iran, the Soviets may, therefore, warn Baghdad that the USSR would intervene in Iran to protect its interests along its southern border. Should such a warning fail to sway Iraq, the Soviets might move into bordering areas of Iran or seek to ensure that any new regime in Tehran is pro-Soviet. It is also conceivable that the Soviets could see the new situation as a major opportunity to develop a close relationship with Tehran and--in a reversal of alliances similar to that which took place in the Horn of Africa in 1977-78--back Iran openly. [redacted]

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22 September 1980

MEMORANDUM

IMPACT OF ESCALATION ON AREA STATES

Iran

Tehran will use the escalated fighting with Iraq to rally the Iranian people and to shift attention from domestic problems. Preoccupation with this issue, however, may delay further discussion of the hostages--and could increase the danger to them--as extremists charge that Iraq is acting as a surrogate for the US. In Khomeini's first statement on the increased fighting, he labelled Iraqi President Saddam Husayn an "American mercenary." The militants, who seem afraid that the National Assembly will seek resolution of the hostage issue, could again call for trials of some of the hostages. [redacted]

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The various Iranian political factions probably will curb their differences in public, and the protracted infighting at the top should also fade, at least temporarily. If Iranian losses mount, however, we cannot discount the possibility of significant domestic political changes. Khomeini's own position will probably not be hurt by the crisis as Iranians focus on the threat to the nation. If moderates can convince Khomeini that the survival of the Islamic Republic is at stake, more pragmatic leaders may exploit the situation to weaken the influence of the extremists. Moderates might push for obtaining military spare parts from the West and for appointment of a strong military officer as Minister of Defense. Such a move could weaken the extremists' influence over policy decisions. The extremists, however, will argue for retention of some hostages as insurance against US retribution. [redacted]

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In the present highly charged atmosphere, the Khomeini regime is likely to be unable to reach a negotiated settlement on terms acceptable to Iraq. Anyone willing to seek a settlement

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This memorandum was prepared by analysts in the Office of Political Analysis, Office of Economic Research, and the Office of Strategic Research.

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now would be charged with capitulating by extremists. The
Iranians may find it politically easier to accept a stalemate
while using continued Iraqi occupation of their territory
both as a domestic rallying cry and a device to press for
redress of their grievances against the US and Iraq in
international forums. They may gamble that Arab and inter-
national opinion will build on Iraq to limit its military
activity. [redacted]

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Iraq

Iraq's apparent high morale as a result of the escalated
fighting reflects its early successes in retrieving territory
ceded under the now-abrogated Algiers Accord. Early success
may be emboldening Iraq to more aggressive action. The Iraqi
regime, ruled primarily by Sunni Muslims, has successfully
portrayed the conflict to its Shia population in ethnic terms--
Arab versus Persian. This situation could be reversed if the
war becomes protracted, and results in substantial personnel
losses. [redacted]

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The fighting has renewed Iraq's campaign to pose as the
defender of the Arabs and the protector of the Persian Gulf.
Iraq has been disappointed, however, that the Arab states,
particularly in the Gulf, have failed so far to support Iraq
in its conflict with Iran [redacted]

[redacted] Soviet willingness to resupply Iraq with
military equipment is a major consideration for Iraq. [redacted]

The Gulf States

Saudi Arabia and the smaller Persian Gulf states see nothing
to gain and much to lose if the Iran-Iraq conflict is not con-
tained quickly. They fear that the fighting could:

--spill over into the gulf and threaten the flow
of oil, especially if Iraq were to attempt to
seize Abu Musa and the two Tunbs islands near
the Strait of Hormuz;

--generate violent unrest among their Shia popu-
lations, egged on by Iranian agents and propa-
ganda;

--lead to great power intervention and possible
confrontation. [redacted]

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percent of Iraq's import tonnage. In addition to general cargo, the port receives most of Iraq's bulk grain imports estimated this year at about 2 million tons including 1.7 million tons of wheat. Wheat is Iraq's most widely consumed grain--about 65 percent is imported. Alternative import routes have only limited capacity and could not compensate for the interdiction of imports via the Shatt al-Arab. Iraq has two other ports but they normally handle only about 25 percent of imports. Umm Qasr, used for general cargo and military deliveries, is located on the Khawr abd Allah near the Persian Gulf and Khor al-Zubair, which is only partially completed, is located further up the river and just west of Al Basrah. [REDACTED]

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Overland alternatives to importing via the Shatt al-Arab are also limited. Baghdad signed an agreement with Kuwait last fall allowing Iraqi bound cargo to be discharged at Mina Shuwaikh, which could easily handle more cargo. An excellent highway from Kuwait connects with the Iraqi road system, but there are no rail links between the two countries. [REDACTED]

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An expanded conflict also threatens seaborne shipments to Kuwait. Expanded use of overland routes through Jordan and Turkey are hampered by limited roads and bureaucratic red-tape. Syria, currently Iraq's major overland connection with outside suppliers, has almost no excess capacity at its ports. Furthermore, Syria is Iraq's political enemy and an outspoken supporter of Iran. [REDACTED]

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Iraq's oil facilities are also threatened. Most Iraqi oil exports pass through two offshore facilities located about 125 kilometers southeast of Al Basrah in the Persian Gulf. Pipelines connecting the export terminals with the producing fields also would be vulnerable to an extension of the conflict. The major southern fields are less than 50 kilometers west of Al Basrah, while the Maysan fields--about 200 kilometers north--straddle the Iraq-Iran border. Al Basrah is also the site of Iraq's largest oil refinery--newly expanded to 140,000 b/d--which process about one-third of Iraq's domestic refined products requirements. [REDACTED]

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Iran. Further escalation of the conflict would compound Iran's already serious economic problems. Present fighting is likely to further reduce needed imports into Iran's Persian Gulf ports, which are already congested due to internal distribution problems. Khorramshahr, one of Iran's major ports

[REDACTED]

before the revolution, and Abadan are directly on the Shatt al-Arab. While these two ports handled only about 10 percent of Iran's import tonnage last year, diversion of ships from these ports will add to congestion at Bandar Khomeini and Bandar Abbas. In addition, Bandar Khomeini, Iran's most important non-food port, is located only 100 kilometers from the border, with the entrance to its estuary only 50 kilometers from the Shatt al-Arab. Continued naval engagements could prompt shipowners to refrain from calling at Bandar Khomeini even if fighting does not reach the port itself. [REDACTED]

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Closure of Iran's three other Persian Gulf ports would leave only the ports of Bushehr, a relatively small facility, and Bandar Abbas, Iran's busiest port and the major handler of bulk grains, available for trade. Adding to the problems, Iran's northern overland entry points with the USSR, Jolfa and Astara, are seriously congested because of increased overland trade resulting from Western sanctions. The recent agreement with the USSR to increase trade via overland routes offers no immediate help because of transportation problems in Iran. [REDACTED]

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Fighting around Abadan threatens Iran's largest refinery which accounts for around 60 percent of the country's current refining capacity and provides roughly 50 percent of domestic oil product consumption. Khuzestan Province, which borders Iraq, produces more than 80 percent of Iranian oil. Important oil related facilities, such as the Trans Iranian Pipeline which delivers crude oil to the Tehran and Tabriz refineries, are also located within 100 kilometers of the border. Destruction of these domestically oriented facilities would lead to heating fuel shortages this winter. [REDACTED]

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Kharg Island, Iran's major crude oil export terminal is located about 200 kilometers southeast of the Shatt al-Arab and is highly vulnerable to disruption. A prolonged cessation of Iran's crude and oil product exports would be a serious blow to the economy as oil sales provide over 95 percent of hard currency earnings and over 50 percent of total government revenue. [REDACTED]

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Shipping in the Persian Gulf

The current Iraqi-Iranian conflict has frozen merchant shipping on the Shatt al-Arab and the major ports of both countries served by the waterway--Basra, Fao, Khorramshahr, and Abadan. Ships of all flags will probably stay where they are or put into the nearest port. Ships visiting Khor-al-Amaya

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and Mini-al-Bakr, Iraq's offshore oil loading ports in the northern Gulf, and the nearby Iranian ports of Bandar Khomeini and Bandar Shahpur are probably also subject to a freeze. Prudence and withdrawals of insurance coverage will cause most foreign shipowners to divert vessels currently en route to any of the above ports. The already high cargo insurance rates for vessels calling in Iranian ports were quadrupled in the past week and extended to ships trading with Iraq. War risk insurance premiums on ships trading with non-belligerent ports in the Gulf and their cargoes are also likely to go up. [REDACTED]

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Oil Market Impact

We have no details on how the fighting has affected oil liftings in Iran and Iraq. Normal oil-related activity, however, has almost certainly been disrupted. Even if hostilities end in the next few days without damage to oil loading facilities, the world market will have lost perhaps a week's worth of loadings from Iran and Iraq. At worst, escalated fighting could do major damage to the oil facilities of one or both of the countries. In this event the losses could be large and prolonged. [REDACTED]

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Together Iran and Iraq have been exporting about 3 million b/d through the Persian Gulf ports. Gulf loading accounts for 2 million b/d or about 70 percent of Iraqi oil exports and all of Iran's exports which have been running roughly 1.0 million b/d in recent weeks. Iraq also exports about 1 million b/d to the Mediterranean through pipelines that transit Syria and Turkey. Little underutilized capacity is available through these pipelines; indeed, if the conflict continues, Syria might shut down its pipeline in sympathy with Iran. [REDACTED]

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The impact of lost oil exports from Iran and Iraq would vary among major industrial countries. France and Japan, particularly, import large volumes of oil from both Iran and Iraq. During first-half 1980, Japanese imports from Iraq and Iran totalled 1.1 million b/d, or 20 percent of imports. France imported 630,000 b/d, or 24 percent of imports. Italy, West Germany and the United Kingdom also import between 10 and 15 percent of their total imports from Iran and Iraq. US imports from Iran and Iraq account for about 1 percent of total oil imports. Among developing countries, Brazil is a large importer of Iraqi oil, deriving about 50 percent (500,000 b/d) of its total import needs from Iraq. [REDACTED]

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If supplies from both Iran and Iraq are disrupted for a sustained period the oil market would quickly tighten. With Saudi Arabia still producing at 9.5 million b/d, only about half the potential 3 million b/d loss could be offset by increased output elsewhere. Most of this would have to come from Kuwait, Abu Dhabi, and Libya. Although free world inventories are quite high, we doubt that oil companies would be willing to draw down stocks fast enough to eliminate strong upward price pressures. Much will depend on their view of how long the conflict will last and their assessment of damages to oil-related facilities in the area. [REDACTED]

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Major Developed Countries
Dependence on Iran and Iraq

(thousand b/d)

	<u>Imports from Iraq</u>	<u>Percent of Consumption</u>	<u>Percent of Imports</u>	<u>Imports from Iran</u>	<u>Percent of Consumption</u>	<u>Percent of Imports</u>	<u>Imports from Iran and Iraq</u>	<u>Percent of Consumption</u>	<u>Percent of Imports</u>
United States	50	Negl.	1	30	Negl.	Negl.	80	Negl.	1
Japan	360	7	7	710	14	13	1,070	21	30
Canada	10	1	2	5	Negl.	Negl.	15	1	2
West Germany	30	1	1	330	12	12	360	13	13
France	545	24	21	80	4	1	625	28	24
Italy	255	13	10	15	Negl.	1	270	13	11
United Kingdom	110	6	12	25	1	3	135	7	14

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25X1 Despite their antipathy to the Iranian revolution, none of these states wants Iraq to score a decisive military victory. The preferred outcome from their standpoint is a military stalemate that preserves the present precarious balance of power in the Gulf. [redacted]

25X1 Gulf states also remain mistrustful of radical Iraq. Kuwait in particular is now worried that Iraq might scrap their border agreement and reasserted its longstanding claim to Kuwaiti territory. [redacted]

25X1 If pressed by Baghdad, the Saudis and others would reluctantly throw their support publicly to Iraq. So far, however, they have sought to remain neutral, presumably to avoid arousing the antipathy of their sizable Shia populations. [redacted]

25X1 [redacted]
[redacted] worrisome to these states is the possibility of the US intervening militarily to protect the West's oil lifeline. All the conservative Gulf states would fear that such a step would raise tensions internally and conceivably provoke a superpower confrontation. [redacted]

Economic Impact of the Conflict

25X1 The current level of hostilities is already threatening key economic facilities in both countries and shipping along the Shatt al-Arab waterway. Any further escalation of hostilities would severely curtail Iraqi and Iranian imports and could remove 2.0 million b/d of Iraqi oil and 800,000 b/d of Iranian crude and product from the international market. [redacted]

25X1 If hostilities spread, imports and exports of all the major Persian Gulf oil producers would be threatened. The international oil market so far has accepted the conflict fairly calmly, in part because of the large overhang of oil stocks accumulated in the last six months. If the conflict goes on much longer, however, anxieties will mount, no doubt leading to strong upward pressure on world oil prices. [redacted]

Iraq. Iraq's economic lifelines run through the Persian Gulf ports. Al Basrah, located on the Shatt al-Arab waterway, is Iraq's principal deepwater commercial port handling 65-70

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

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September 26, 1980

EXDISMEMORANDUM FOR DR. ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: The Iran-Iraq Conflict

Described below is the summary outcome of an interagency meeting on the Iranian-Iraqi conflict held today, chaired by Hal Saunders, which aimed at anticipating SCC needs for information or policy suggestions. Participants also reviewed the prospect of new problems and new opportunities emerging from the crisis.

1. Dealing with the energy implications:

Discussion: We must prepare for two contingencies: (a) If the present curtailment of Iranian and Iraqi oil shipments continues for 2-3 months, there will be psychological pressure on prices. Consumers heavily dependent upon Iraq--France, Brazil, and India for instance --might feel strongly inclined to resort to the spot market, adding to price pressures. (b) If exports from a significant number of other Gulf producers are also curtailed, we should have assessed the consequences in advance and readied steps to minimize them.

Decisions:

-- to ascertain precisely how much oil the Iraqi pipelines to the Mediterranean through Turkey, Syria, and now Lebanon could handle and, conversely, the consequences of shutdown. (Action: State/EB, State/INR, DOE, Treasury, CIA)

-- to estimate how partial or total further curtailment of Gulf oil production and shipments (caused by harassment of shipping, damage to facilities, political actions, etc.) might affect the world energy scene. (Action: DOE, State/EB, State/INR, Treasury, CIA)

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RDS 1-2-3, 9/26/2000

State Dept. review completed

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-- to prepare a paper analyzing in what fashion France and Brazil, among other major consumers of Iraqi oil, might be protected adequately, noting that France has a closer connection with the IEA than Brazil. (Action: DOE, State)

-- to consider preparing a cable to appropriate posts providing our assessment of the oil situation, and how key consuming countries could best deal with the situation through inventory management and care in entering the spot market. The principal objective would be to avoid driving prices up. (Action: State/EB, with DOE and Treasury)

-- to identify countries where we have important military strategic understandings, aside from major states such as France and Brazil, which might be affected by the oil situation. The ultimate purpose might be to provide such countries special help in bridging future supply problems. (Action: State and DOD)

-- to consider consulting with the major oil companies to assess the market picture and potential problems with the most seriously affected nations. (Action: DOE and State, after consultation with the Justice Department)

-- to consider contingency discussions with major producing states on accommodating short-term demands and helping to bridge problems. (Action: State/EB, DOE, Treasury)

-- to investigate whether the new tanker routing in the Gulf ordered by Iran will prevent or imperil movement of the largest tankers. (Action: State/EB, with Commerce)

-- to continue an informal interagency oil group to monitor these problems, which would not cut across the Carswell efforts. (Action: State, DOE, Treasury)

-- to consider an nearly IEA Governing Board meeting to discuss coordinated action. (Action: State and DOE)

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2. Efforts to end the war and to mediate the crisis:

Discussion: The Foreign Minister of Pakistan, in his capacity as Chairman of the Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers, presided over an extraordinary session of the Conference in New York on September 26. At the conclusion, he announced that the President of Pakistan, assisted by the Secretary-General of the Islamic Conference, had been unanimously entrusted with a goodwill mission "to contact the Governments of Iran and Iraq to ascertain their views with regard to a solution of their conflict in the spirit of Islamic solidarity." Both Iran and Iraq have accepted this mission, he also stated.

The Pakistani Foreign Minister announced President Zia will be coming to New York and will meet with the Conference (presumably next week after his trip to Tehran and Baghdad).

The Chairman further stated this initiative is independent of the Security Council and its responsibilities under the Charter. However, he said the President of the Security Council (Slim of Tunisia) has taken note of the Islamic Conference's decision and had welcomed it. The Council President also reportedly considers it an important factor in anything the Security Council will be doing.

Mexico and Norway have just requested a formal meeting of the Security Council which presumably will take place September 26. They are consulting about a draft resolution which would have the Council reiterate the Charter's requirement to settle disputes peacefully, call for a ceasefire and endorse conciliation moves.

Decisions:

-- to analyze more precisely than heretofore the military staying power of both Iran and Iraq, given the problems of POL, spare parts, re-supply, attrition, etc. (Action: intelligence community, CIA, DIA, State/INR)

-- to ascertain the nature, the magnitude, and timing of re-supply efforts to the two warring parties by such states as the USSR, France, Pakistan, North Korea, etc. (Action: CIA, DIA, State/INR)

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-- once this re-supply situation is ascertained, to prepare policy options for consideration in the SCC (i.e., whether to urge supplying countries to embargo the supply of equipment, and when). (Action: State).

3. Problems relating to the Gulf and Straits of Hormuz:

Discussion: The Iranian declaration of a war zone extending 12 miles out from the Iranian coast and also 12 miles from the two Tumbs islands and Abu Musa has narrowed safe passage being employed by ships to relatively more shallow and less easily navigable waters along the southern (Arab) continental shelf in the key area just inside the narrows of the Strait of Hormuz.

Passage through the narrows of the Strait currently presents no problem since the Omanis have passively permitted shipping once again to use the deep channel that passes south of the Quoin islands close to the Omani coast.

Decisions:

-- to prepare today instructions for presenting our general political/economic assessment regarding possible impediments to shipping in the Gulf and our policy objectives to the political levels of the British, French, Australian, New Zealand, and Italian governments to supplement the exploratory talks on naval patrols or other actions already under way between representatives of our Navy and their naval authorities. (Action: State/PM, with DOD)

-- to develop a concept paper, providing options for dealing with all possible contingencies curtailing free movement through the Strait and Gulf or oil exports from the countries there. This would examine such possibilities as a diplomatic push by third parties with the Iranians, but in a way that does not drive the Iranians into a corner. This paper would also deal with the tactics and timing of approaching Gulf countries on the issue of a naval "peace patrol." (Action: State/PM, with DOD)

-- to develop for SCC consideration key policy issues involved with a naval "peace patrol." These issues would include the degree of U.S. participation and the "rules of engagement" under various scenarios. (Action: DOD and State/PM)

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-- to develop instructions to our Gulf posts to urge that host governments there, including Saudi Arabia, try to maintain a posture of neutrality, even if they have already shown political sympathy for Iraq. The purpose would be to hold open the possibility that these states could carry out a mediating role in the conflict but, equally important, to ensure that they do not invite retaliatory action by Iran which could damage oil installations or curtail shipping. (Action: State/NEA)

4. Problems and opportunities to anticipate:


-- talk seriously to the Soviets about their continuing propaganda directed against the U.S. (Action: State is talking with the Soviets in New York)

-- explore opportunities to strengthen the U.S. special relationship with Saudi Arabia, through intelligence exchanges, offers of special military assistance, etc. (Action: State/NEA/INR, and DOD to consult)

-- explore whether we could gain some political advantages with such states as Brazil and India if the U.S. assists them in overcoming some of their energy problems. (Action: State and DOE)

-- assure that statements by friendly states such as Egypt do not complicate our efforts to resolve the Tehran hostage situation. (Action: State)

The NSC staff will be kept fully involved in this work as appropriate, and significant issues will be prepared for SCC consideration.



Peter Tarnoff
Executive Secretary

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MEMORANDUM

#1 | 2

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

SECRET

September 26, 1980

JCL, DHM, ZBC
SF, Box 20
INDEX - ALPHA CHANNEL (MISC)
09/80 - 10/80

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: President Carter
 Secretary of State Edmund Muskie
 Deputy Secretary Warren Christopher
 Zbigniew Brzezinski

DATE, TIME September 26, 1980; 9:00-9:10 a.m.
 AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President said that in dealing with the Iranians we should not restrict ourselves to any one channel. ZB proposed we tell the Iranians that we are willing to send a high-level emissary to Tehran, on a totally secret basis, to try to cut the Gordian knot. The President said this is all right, and we should tell the Germans to explore it with the Iranians.

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
Review September 26, 1986

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

PER 4/28/05 NLS RE NLY -05-94
BY [Signature] NARS. DATE 9/28/05

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


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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

NATIONAL FOREIGN ASSESSMENT CENTER




ACIS - 101/80
6 October 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR: TNF Working Group

SUBJECT : Likely Soviet Approach to Preliminary Exchanges on TNF

Attached for your information is a memorandum summarizing CIA's views on the likely Soviet approach to the upcoming TNF exchanges. It was prepared at Spurgeon Keeny's request for use by the US Delegation.

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Arms Control Intelligence Staff

Attachment:
As stated

Cys to MB SL, JR, MK

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


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
9A

SUBJECT: Likely Soviet Approach to Preliminary
Exchanges on TNF

Distribution:

- 1 - Reggie Bartholomew (State/PM)
- 1 - David Gompert (State/PM)
- 1 - Dick Clarke (State/PM)
- 1 - Avis Bohlen (State/EUR)
- 1 - Charlie Thomas (State/EUR)
- 1 - David Clinard (ACDA)
- 1 - David McGiffert (DoD)
- 1 - Walter Slocombe (DoD)
- 1 - Lynn Davis (DoD)
- 1 - BG Joseph Skaff (JCS)
- 1 - Jim Thomson (NSC)
- 1 - Bob Blackwell (NSC)
- 1 - Fritz Ermarth (NSC)
- 1 - Roger Molander (NSC)

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[Redacted]

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
NATIONAL FOREIGN ASSESSMENT CENTER

3 October 1980

MEMORANDUM

Likely Soviet Approach to Preliminary Exchanges on TNF

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[Redacted]

This memorandum provides a summary assessment of likely Soviet objectives, arguments, and positions in the preliminary US-Soviet exchanges on theater nuclear forces (TNF) scheduled to begin the week of 13 October. It sets out Soviet purposes in agreeing to the exchanges at this time. It then addresses probable Soviet approaches to the issues of primary concern--especially establishing what geographic area and which weapons systems should define the scope of future TNF negotiations. Lastly, it assesses the possibility of a Soviet "freeze" proposal.

[Redacted] 25X1

25X1

[Redacted]

This memorandum was prepared by the Offices of Political Analysis and Strategic Research and the Arms Control Intelligence Staff in response to a request by the Deputy Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. It was coordinated with the National Intelligence Officers for the USSR and Eastern Europe, Strategic Programs, General Purpose Forces, and Western Europe.

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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CONFIDENTIAL

[Redacted]

CONFIDENTIAL 30 OCT 1980

Objectives

The Soviet delegation will probably have tactical instructions similar to those of our own--to explain their own views, explore ours, and avoid bargaining. More broadly, the Soviets hope the exchanges will diminish West European support for new long-range theater nuclear forces (LRTNF) deployments, revitalize the US-Soviet relationship, and put Afghanistan farther behind them. [redacted] 25X1

The overriding Soviet objective with respect to TNF-- demonstrated in their behavior already and to be expected in any actual negotiations in the future--is to prevent, or limit the level of, deployment of NATO's new LRTNF. Thus, we have observed Soviet diplomacy and political actions aimed originally at preventing the NATO deployment decision and subsequently at undermining Alliance resolve to implement it, and we will observe efforts in any future negotiations to achieve agreed limitations on deployment levels. The seriousness of the concern the Soviets have regarding the issue is reflected in their willingness to talk with us on a bilateral basis and before the ratification of SALT II. [redacted] 25X1

The Soviets see utility now, however, in a lengthy period of discussion, and almost certainly will not seek to achieve progress toward substantive agreement in these preliminary exchanges. The Soviet delegation will be well informed about our approach to the exchanges--Moscow possesses copies of the Special Group Report and the Integrated Decision Document--and consequently will come prepared to counter our positions. In addition to laying out their concerns to us, they will publicly address the West Europeans, upon whose cooperation eventual deployment depends, in much the same terms. They will also continue to try to influence them by diplomacy and other political efforts. By announcing their readiness to talk with Washington through Chancellor Schmidt nine days before conveying it directly, they symbolized their recognition of the important role they expect the West Europeans to play on the periphery of--and feeding into--the exchanges. [redacted] 25X1

Another major Soviet purpose in entering into these exchanges is to revitalize the US-Soviet relationship and SALT. Although worried that agreement to talks now might be taken as Soviet acceptance of non-ratification of SALT II--a consideration partly responsible for their six-month delay--the Soviets were even more concerned that they might lose the

SALT process entirely. Even though it no longer buoys the rest of the relationship, the Soviets regard SALT as a core element worth preserving if at all possible. (They have "linked" SALT to only one contingency: a Sino-US military alliance.) The Soviets look upon these exchanges as the first step in restarting SALT, and they will probably seek to come out of the exchanges with a US commitment to continue them. 25X1

Why Now?

Their relative international isolation after their invasion of Afghanistan and Western resolve on TNF led the Soviets to realize the limits of an intransigent attitude toward opening an exchange of views. They also wished to get the SALT process back in motion before the US elections and demonstrate the continued viability of detente. 25X1

Although the Soviet leaders have long been concerned about the threat posed by US "forward-based systems" (FBS), they seemed slow to react politically to the emerging threat of new LRTNF deployments. Perhaps lulled by disarray within the Alliance over enhanced-radiation weapons three years ago and preoccupied during the first half of last year with getting SALT II nailed down, they waited until last fall before stepping up pressures on West Germany. The "progress" in top-level Soviet pronouncements referring to TNF as an emerging problem (and to their own "medium-range nuclear means" as being a part of it) since Chancellor Schmidt drew attention to it in October 1977 has been glacial, as though they believed their non-reference to their SS-20s would allow the problem to go way. 25X1

Faced with the additional pressures caused by the NATO decision itself and by their own action in Afghanistan, the Soviet leaders were unable initially to bring themselves to devise an effective political strategy to deal with the new LRTNF threat. Their comprehension of it has not changed since the NATO decision was taken, but their political calculation of the value of entering into bilateral discussions was altered by several factors. 25X1

Intransigence, while perhaps helpful in affecting the Belgians, proved to be of limited value in symbolizing Soviet concern and increasing the doubts in West European parliaments

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and governments about the decision. It hindered Moscow's ability to portray arms control as an alternative to (rather than, as NATO regards it, an accompaniment of) deployment.

 (25X1)

Also important was the intervention in Afghanistan, which raised afresh the image of a Soviet military threat. Moscow found itself fighting against international isolation and therefore could ill afford using a policy of aloofness to maintain pressure on the TNF issue.

 (25X1)

Another factor was Western resolve. Moscow may have hoped for a time that the relative lack of firmness displayed by some West Europeans this year on the US-led punitive policies would be reflected in the LRTNF issue as well. But the evident West German and US--if not Dutch and Belgian--determination to proceed placed strong pressure on the Soviets. They knew that "hanging tough" by both sides would lead inexorably in the direction of new NATO deployments as implementation advanced. Their impression of US resolve is reinforced by their readiness to interpret the NATO LRTNF plan as part of a larger, long-term strategy (now, in their view, codified in Presidential Directive 59).

 (25X1)

The approaching US elections probably also affected Soviet calculations. They fear that a change of administration could occur and perhaps lead to a change of US policy worse from their point of view than the March 1977 SALT proposals, or even to the breakdown of the SALT dialogue entirely. By holding these exchanges now, they at least force on the administration elected in November, new or old, a decision to change an activity that is already under way if it wishes to alter or drop its SALT policy. In this regard, the situation is similar to the initiation of SALT I, which was scheduled (before the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia) to occur before the 1968 presidential elections.

 (25X1)

Finally, the Soviets hope the exchanges will demonstrate that the USSR has emerged from the shadow cast by Afghanistan and is no longer being isolated by the United States. They also hope the exchanges will serve as evidence that US-Soviet detente is still viable, thus making the West Europeans more willing to conduct business with them as usual and showing that the United States itself cannot afford to refuse to deal with the USSR on security matters.

 (25X1)

Scope of Future Talks: Geographic Area and Systems

Foreign Minister Gromyko's remarks last month to Secretary Muskie clearly indicate the Soviets will insist that any future negotiations on TNF focus on Europe. They will also be firm in arguing for the inclusion of Europe-based US FBS in the negotiation of LRTNF limitations and on the inadmissibility of the planned future deployment of US ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs) and Pershing II ballistic missiles in Europe. [] 25X1

The fundamental Soviet concern about TNF is the same as that voiced in SALT I and II: any nuclear weapons system that can strike the territory of the USSR is relevant to the military balance and should be subject to agreed limitations. To Moscow, the strategic nuclear forces of the United Kingdom, France, and China as well as US FBS fall into this category. Although this concern is global, encompassing US systems and bases and Chinese systems outside the European theater, the Soviets have indicated they wish to focus any future TNF negotiations on Europe. This position provides a basis for excluding Soviet theater systems based in or targeted principally against other regions. [] 25X1

They have recently expanded their definition of this concern to include the territory of their Warsaw Pact allies, as if to indicate that they, as well as Washington, will consult often with allies during these exchanges and future negotiations. This position strengthens their argument for including all US FBS, including systems that cannot or can barely reach the USSR. It is probably designed also to take into account the possible inclusion of short-range systems in future negotiations. It could also support a Soviet proposal, such as was made at MBFR, that deployments of nuclear systems in forward areas be reduced. [] 25X1

With respect to weapons systems, the Soviets will seek to focus attention on US FBS. Their willingness to open discussions bilaterally in part reflects their desire to talk especially about systems controlled by the United States. The Soviet position that discussion of US FBS must be "organically and simultaneously" linked to discussion of Soviet missiles and planned future US LRTNF in Europe is based on a Soviet perspective in which they are in fact

closely interconnected. This does not necessarily mean that Moscow will not agree in future negotiations to separate limits on different kinds of systems. But it does indicate that in the preliminary exchanges the Soviets will probably press their comprehensive view vigorously, trying to cement the link they see between FBS and LRTNF.

[] 25X1

The Soviets reject the argument that NATO lacks a long-range theater nuclear delivery capability equal to their own. In their view, NATO suffers no strategic disadvantage since its strategic strike missions can be performed by US intercontinental forces, British and French systems, and existing US FBS. Similarly, in their view, Soviet "medium-range" nuclear forces--although they free intercontinental forces from theater missions--confer no special advantage to the Warsaw Pact. [] 25X1

Soviet security policy in Europe for a long time has sought to acquire through force improvements and arms control talks, some control over the numbers and capabilities of Western nuclear delivery systems based in Europe and likely to be committed to NATO in the event of a central war involving the European theater. A major Soviet goal in developing and deploying modern LRTNF has been to be able to deter theater-based nuclear threats to the homeland during an escalating military conflict in Europe. Achievement of this goal would force the United States to rely on its intercontinental forces in contemplating strikes on the USSR and thus put its own homeland at risk. The SS-20 missiles and Backfire bombers are seen by Moscow as crucial elements needed to achieve that goal. Combined with the parity now achieved by Moscow in intercontinental systems, they give the Soviets a deterrent that covers the full spectrum of threats posed by all Western forces. [] 25X1

To the Soviets, full implementation of NATO's current LRTNF plan would be a major setback to this effort. Defense Minister Ustinov has argued that the new NATO LRTNF could perform "strategic" tasks that could affect a theater conflict decisively. Central Committee official Zamyatin has declared that the new NATO LRTNF are "bound to cope with quite different tasks as compared with those means which were deployed earlier" in West Europe. First Deputy General Staff Chief Akhromeyev has asserted that, because of their range and accuracy, the new NATO forces will be able to destroy targets "up to the Volga line"--beyond the heart of the Soviet military infrastructure. In contrast, they insist that their own improved forces, while marking a qualitative

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advance over previous systems, have the same "combat tasks" as their predecessors and thus have not disrupted the TNF balance. (25X1)

The Soviets do not see the theater balance in NATO's terms, as a comparison of modern weapon systems of similar types and performance characteristics, to which aging US FBS will contribute relatively little additional capability in the future. In contrast, they focus on the missions that the new LRTNF would perform and the uses to which the "old" FBS and bases (freed from their former tasks) could then be put. Consequently, the NATO proposal to focus the discussion of limitations on land-based missiles, with its implication that the United States would need to have roughly the same number of such weapons as they did, seems to them to have been devised to legitimize the new US deployments. Also, the FBS demand--which they were willing to bypass in SALT I and II in order to achieve limitations on intercontinental systems--is much more important to Moscow in any new talks encompassing TNF. (25X1)

The same comprehensive list of FBS presented at the opening session of SALT II will probably be presented again at these exchanges. At least initially, the Soviets would probably condition their acceptance of a narrower scope for systems to be addressed in future negotiations on, for example, demands for withdrawal of US attack carriers and nuclear missile submarines beyond agreed limits, withdrawal to US territory of land-based nuclear delivery aircraft and missiles that can reach the USSR, and liquidation of foreign US bases capable of supporting such systems. The current Soviet position makes specific reference to US bases as an item of concern additional to the FBS themselves, presumably because of the potential expansion of deployed FBS they make possible in a time of tension or conflict. (25X1)

Other Issues

The Soviets may well stick with their European geographic focus and comprehensive systems definition and let the US side initiate the discussion of more specific criteria and rationales that might define the systems at issue. But they will not be passive on other issues, and their probable views on the most important of them are briefly set forth below. (25X1)

Unit of Limitation. Launchers have been the basic SALT units for counting systems, and agreement to an equal balance of numbers of new unMIRVed US LRTNF missile launchers and MIRVed SS-20 missile launchers would of course leave the USSR far ahead in numbers of warheads. The Soviets have shown a willingness in the past, however, to discuss the balance in terms of numbers of warheads. This criterion was incorporated into the SALT II treaty in its provisions governing MIRV fractionation and ALCM loading limits. President Brezhnev's LRTNF proposal of last October, however, mentioned specifically only systems, launch pads, yield, and location, not warheads. (25X1)

Compensation. In the basic Soviet view, the British and French strategic nuclear systems are part of the Western side of the European theater nuclear balance. An article by Ustinov in Pravda last October included them in discussing the theater balance, and the Soviets have said that the other nuclear powers must at some point be brought into SALT III. They have indicated, however, that initial discussions on European TNF could be undertaken without focusing on the British and French systems. (25X1)

Thus, initial Soviet presentations in the talks will probably refer to the British and French systems as relevant to the discussion, thereby providing a basis for a future Soviet request for compensation in any mutual limits agreed for US and Soviet systems. Generalized references to the relevance of the Chinese nuclear systems may be a part of the presentation as well (with the progressive improvement in Sino-US relations, the Soviets seem less reluctant to refer to China as a problem for them). But they almost certainly will not ask for compensation for Chinese systems unless global ceilings are at issue. (25X1)

Verification. One element of the Soviet presentation about NATO's planned LRTNF will probably be a complaint about difficulties in verification, especially regarding cruise missiles. They may not wish in these preliminary exchanges to get into a detailed discussion of collateral constraints or cooperative measures, although they have demonstrated in SALT a willingness to treat these issues on a case-by-case basis. But they will wish to tell Washington that they think the United States should not have a blank check on modes of deployment for new LRTNF. (25X1)

Data. High Soviet officials have publicly discussed numbers of Western nuclear systems relevant to the theater balance--Ustinov's figure in Pravda last year was 1500--and in the preliminary exchanges the Soviet side may well present

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data on NATO systems drawn from Western open sources. They are unlikely, however, to share with the US side specific data on their own systems. At least at the outset of discussions, the Soviets probably will portray their theater systems as roughly comparable to a combined total of British and French systems and US FBS, but will decline to present a specific breakdown of their side of the balance. 25X1

Future Systems. Besides raising the specter of an expanded future TNF threat staging from US bases located in Europe, the Soviets may well express concern about the refire capability or future models (including MIRVed versions) of both GLCMs and Pershing IIs. They also are concerned about the possible future transfer of these or similar systems to the Allies. At a minimum, they would view such transfer as a circumvention of an agreement limiting US and Soviet systems. In future negotiations, they would probably ask for specific prohibition of such transfer. 25X1

Equality of Ceilings. "Equality and equal security" is still the root SALT principle to Moscow, and Soviet officials have said that arms control agreements have to look, as well as be, good. But the Soviet position linking LRTNF missiles with US FBS suggests that Moscow will argue against simple equal ceilings for missiles alone as long as US FBS continue to be deployed in Europe. To the extent they assess the impact on future theater warfare of equal limits applying to LRTNF, however defined, they may view the remaining imbalance in NATO's favor in shorter-range nuclear systems as less acceptable. This would incline them to seek comprehensive limits, either on all TNF or on TNF with a range exceeding some agreed limit. 25X1

Although not likely to be an idea proposed early in the exchange of views, the concept of unequal limits may be raised by the Soviets. It has been raised informally by a Soviet scholar. The similarity of the basic LRTNF situation today--a dynamic Soviet deployment program and a static US posture--with the basic strategic forces situation at the outset of SALT I may suggest to the Soviets that Washington would be interested in freezing the number of Soviet and US LRTNF (favoring the USSR) in exchange for freezing the number of all other TNF (favoring the United States). 25X1

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A Freeze?

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[REDACTED] ON
 balance, we think it probable that they will suggest a general pledge not to change the TNF balance in Europe during discussions, but improbable that they will propose a freeze on actual deployments. [REDACTED]

25X1

At the beginning of SALT II, the Soviets stated that they expected neither side to start new major strategic offensive weapons programs, but they did not ask for a formal pledge. At the Pugwash and Dartmouth sessions held in Europe last spring, however, Ambassador Falin pressed the idea of a mutual pledge that neither side would change the TNF balance as negotiations proceeded. He and a US participant agreed to the following formulation at the Pugwash working group meeting that took place in Geneva in April: "To facilitate negotiations under more favorable conditions, it is proposed that during the negotiations themselves, both sides should agree not to take any practical steps that would change the present balance of nuclear forces in Europe." The Soviets could well suggest this at the outset of the preliminary exchanges. By continuing to maintain that the SS-20 is merely a replacement system, they could claim that continuing its deployment would not violate such a pledge. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Brezhnev and Gromyko [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] rejected West German suggestions of a freeze (made by Chancellor Schmidt in public speeches), declaring that a freeze was at the time disadvantageous to the USSR. One disadvantage the Soviets may perceive is that, in working out and monitoring a freeze, attention would focus on their own forces. Are refires to be included? Are aircraft? If so, can Backfire deployment continue in replacement for Badgers and Blinders? In addition, Soviet willingness to freeze its LRTNF deployment (presumably short of planned levels), while presentable as a Soviet concession, could be taken to imply that the NATO claim of Soviet theater nuclear superiority is valid. There is also the possibility that the main Soviet rationale advanced for the SS-20--that it is needed to replace obsolescent systems such as SS-4s and SS-5s and to maintain an equilibrium in the theater--is their real view as well, thus making incomplete SS-20 deployment unacceptable to them. [REDACTED]

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TASS: WARSAW PACT LEADERS MEET IN MOSCOW

TAKE 1--WARSAW TREATY MEETING

L8051815 MOSCOW TASS IN ENGLISH 1808 GMT 5 DEC 80

(*MEETING OF LEADING FIGURES OF WARSAW TREATY MEMBER-STATE TASS HEADLINE)

(TEXT) MOSCOW, 5 DEC (TASS)--A MEETING OF PARTY AND LEADING FIGURES FROM THE WARSAW TREATY MEMBER-STATES WAS HELD HERE TODAY. THE MEETING WAS ATTENDED BY:

FROM THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF BULGARIA--FIRST SECRETARY OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE BULGARIAN COMMUNIST PARTY, CHAIRMAN OF THE STATE COUNCIL OF BULGARIA TODOR ZHIVKOV, MEMBER OF THE POLITICAL BUREAU OF THE BCP CENTRAL COMMITTEE, CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF THE BCP CENTRAL COMMITTEE, FOREIGN MINISTER OF BULGARIA PETER MALDENOV, MEMBER OF THE BCP CENTRAL COMMITTEE DIMITR METODIEV;

FROM THE HUNGARIAN PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC--FIRST SECRETARY OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE HUNGARIAN SOCIALIST WORKERS' PARTY JANOS KADAR, SECRETARY OF THE HSWP CENTRAL COMMITTEE ANDRAS BYENES, MEMBER OF THE HSWP CENTRAL COMMITTEE, DEPUTY CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF HUNGARY JANOS BORBANDI;

FROM THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC--GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE SOCIALIST UNITY PARTY OF GERMANY, CHAIRMAN OF THE STATE COUNCIL OF THE GDR ERICH HONECKER, MEMBER OF THE POLITICAL BUREAU OF THE SUPG CENTRAL COMMITTEE, CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF THE GDR WILLI STOPH, MEMBER OF THE POLITICAL BUREAU OF THE SUPG CENTRAL COMMITTEE, SECRETARY OF THE SUPG CENTRAL COMMITTEE HERMANN AXEN, MEMBER OF THE POLITICAL BUREAU OF THE SUPG CENTRAL COMMITTEE, MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENCE OF THE GDR HEINZ HOFFMANN, MEMBER OF THE POLITICAL BUREAU OF THE SUPG CENTRAL COMMITTEE, MINISTER OF STATE SECURITY OF THE GDR ERICH MIELKE;

(MORE)

9 DEC 1839Z WJA/CAJ '****'

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FBIS 104*****

TAKE 3--99 (WARSAW TREATY MEETING)

/// CZECHOSLOVAKIA ASIL BILAK.

(TEXT) THE MEETING PARTICIPANTS EXCHANGED OPINIONS ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION IN RECENT MONTHS. THEY ARE OF THE VIEW THAT THE COURSE OF EVENTS CONFIRMS THE CORRECTNESS OF THE ASSESSMENTS AND THE TOPICALITY OF THE PROPOSALS PUT FORWARD AT THE MEETING OF THE POLITICAL CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE OF STATES PARTICIPANTS IN THE WARSAW TREATY IN WARSAW (MAY 1980). THESE PROPOSALS ARE HAVING A POSITIVE IMPACT ON THE PROCESSES WHICH ARE AT WORK IN EUROPE AND IN OTHER AREAS OF THE WORLD. THEY ACCORD WITH THE INTERESTS OF THE PEOPLE.

THE SIDES NOTED WITH SATISFACTION AN ACTIVISATION OF THE POLITICAL CONTACTS BETWEEN STATES WITH DIFFERENT SOCIAL SYSTEMS; CONTINUATION OF THE DIALOGUE ON THE MAJOR INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS; THE FRUITFUL EXAMINATION BY THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE PROPOSALS OF THE SOCIALIST AND OTHER COUNTRIES AIMED AT A RAPID IMPLEMENTATION OF EFFECTIVE MEASURES OF RESTRICTING AND ENDING THE ARMS RACE. ALL THIS CONTRIBUTES TO THE PROCESS OF DETENTE.

THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES EXPRESSED THEIR INTENTION TO CONTINUE TO MAKE A CONTRIBUTION TO IMPROVING THE INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE, STRENGTHENING PEACE, CONTINUING THE POLICY OF DETENTE, DEVELOPING INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION, RESOLVING ALL CONFLICTS BY NEGOTIATIONS. THE PARTICIPANTS IN THE MEETING FIRMLY DECLARE IN FAVOUR OF DEVELOPING RELATIONS WITH ALL COUNTRIES, IRRESPECTIVE OF THEIR SOCIAL SYSTEMS, ON THE BASIS OF THE PRINCIPLES OF INDEPENDENCE, SOVEREIGNTY, IN FAVOUR OF RENOUNCING THE USE OR THREAT OF FORCE IN RELATIONS BETWEEN STATES, IN FAVOUR OF STRICT RESPECT FOR THE UN CHARTER.

THE PARTICIPANTS IN THE MEETING STRESSED THAT THEY COME OUT IN FAVOUR OF COOPERATION WITH ALL PROGRESSIVE, DEMOCRATIC, ANTI-IMPERIALIST FORCES, IN FAVOUR OF STRENGTHENING SOLIDARITY OF ALL PEOPLES IN THE STRUGGLE AGAINST THE THREAT OF WAR, FOR THE POLICY OF PEACE, DISARMAMENT, PRIMARILY NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, FOR DETENTE AND EQUITABLE COOPERATION.

THE PARTICIPANTS IN THE MEETING EXPRESSED READINESS FOR A CONSTRUCTIVE APPROACH TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, IF THE NEW AMERICAN ADMINISTRATION DISPLAYS THE SAME APPROACH.

(MORE)

5 DEC 1911Z WJA/SAH*****

FBIS 106''''

FBIS WIRE NOTE: SEE PENULTIMATE PARAGRAPH MENTION OF POLAND.

TAKE 4 OF 4--99 (WARSAW TREATY MEETING)

/// THE SAME APPROACH.

(TEXT) THE COUNTRIES PARTICIPANTS IN THE MEETING WELCOME THE BEGINNING OF THE MADRID FORUM AND COME OUT IN FAVOUR OF SUCH ITS (AS RECEIVED) DEVELOPMENT WHICH WOULD OPEN NEW PROSPECTS FOR IMPLEMENTING THE HELSINKI DOCUMENTS, FOR THE CAUSE OF PEACE AND DETENTE ON THE CONTINENT.

THE PARTICIPANTS IN THE MEETING STATED AT THE SAME TIME THAT THE SITUATION IN THE WORLD REMAINS TENSE. THE ARMS RACE IS ACQUIRING AN INCREASINGLY MORE DANGEROUS NATURE. SEATS OF MILITARY CONFRONTATIONS AND TENSION ARE PRESERVED IN VARIOUS PARTS OF THE WORLD; NEW CONFLICTS BREAK OUT. THE SITUATION CALLS FOR HIGHER VIGILANCE IN RESPECT TO AGGRESSIVE ASPIRATIONS OF THE IMPERIALIST FORCES; THE ATTEMPTS BY REACTION TO DAMAGE THE POSITIONS OF SOCIALIST COUNTRIES, DEVELOPING STATES AND NATIONAL-LIBERATION MOVEMENTS.

THE MEETING PARTICIPANTS DECLARED THEIR RESOLVE TO CONTINUE TO CONSOLIDATE THE UNITY OF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES ON THE BASIS OF MARXISM-LENINISM AND INTERNATIONAL SOLIDARITY AND EQUAL MUTUALLY-ADVANTAGEOUS COOPERATION.

CONVICTION WAS EXPRESSED AT THE MEETING TO THE EFFECT THAT THE UNITED EFFORTS OF ALL COUNTRIES AND PEOPLES CONCERNED FOR PEACE, SECURITY AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION ARE CAPABLE OF ASSURING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF DETENTE AS THE LEADING TREND IN INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT.

AN EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION WAS HELD BETWEEN THE MEETING PARTICIPANTS ON THE SOCIALIST AND COMMUNIST CONSTRUCTION IN THEIR COUNTRIES. THEY FAVOUR A FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF THE ECONOMIC AND SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL COOPERATION, COORDINATION OF PLANS IN THE INTERESTS OF THE SOCIALIST AND COMMUNIST CONSTRUCTION IN THEIR COUNTRIES AND THE RAISING OF MATERIAL WELL-BEING OF THEIR PEOPLES.

REPRESENTATIVES OF THE POLISH UNITED WORKERS' PARTY INFORMED THE MEETING PARTICIPANTS ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SITUATION IN THE POLISH PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC, ABOUT THE RESULTS OF THE 7TH PLENUM OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE POLISH UNITED WORKERS' PARTY. THE MEETING PARTICIPANTS EXPRESSED THE CONFIDENCE THAT COMMUNISTS, THE WORKING CLASS, THE WORKING PEOPLE OF FRATERNAL POLAND WILL BE ABLE TO OVERCOME THE PRESENT DIFFICULTIES AND WILL ASSURE THE COUNTRY'S FURTHER DEVELOPMENT ALONG THE SOCIALIST PATH. IT WAS REITERATED THAT THE SOCIALIST POLAND, THE POLISH UNITED WORKERS' PARTY AND THE POLISH PEOPLE CAN FIRMLY COUNT ON THE FRATERNAL SOLIDARITY AND SUPPORT OF COUNTRIES MEMBERS OF THE WARSAW TREATY. REPRESENTATIVES OF THE POLISH UNITED WORKERS PARTY STRESSED THAT POLAND HAS BEEN, IS AND WILL REMAIN A SOCIALIST STATE, A FIRM LINK IN THE COMMON FAMILY OF THE COUNTRIES OF SOCIALISM.

THE MEETING OF THE PARTY AND STATE FIGURES OF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES WAS HELD IN AN ATMOSPHERE OF COMRADELY MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING AND UNITY OF VIEWS.

(ENDALL)

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
NATIONAL FOREIGN ASSESSMENT CENTER

10 December 1980

MEMORANDUM

ALLIED RESPONSES TO A SOVIET INVASION OF POLAND

Summary

All of the allies would be deeply concerned by a Soviet invasion of Poland, and would participate to some degree in a collective response. Propinquity dictates, however, that concern would be strongest in Western Europe. There governmental and public interest in a good political, social, and economic working relationship with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe is high. This interest would impel the West Europeans toward a strong reaction in order to demonstrate the limits of acceptable Soviet behavior. Concurrently, however, these concerns make West Europeans wary of entering a long-term confrontation with the Soviet Union. In the initial months after an invasion, Western reactions probably would be fairly strong. But enthusiasm for punitive economic measures and higher defense budgets would probably wane as costs mounted. A Soviet intervention that was less clear-cut and brutal would also make a strong and concerted Western response more difficult to achieve.

Western Europe

West European governments are not convinced that a Soviet invasion of Poland is imminent. They are anxious, therefore, to avoid any appearance of overreaction or premature reaction by the West. Nevertheless, some West European governments--especially the French--are eager to

This memorandum was prepared by [redacted] analysts in the Western Europe and East Asia/Pacific Divisions of the Office of Political Analysis. It was coordinated with the National Intelligence Officer for Western Europe and the

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consult on the European and Atlantic levels about possible responses to an intervention. This eagerness derives mainly from a desire to avoid the interallied tangles that occurred after the invasion of Afghanistan; it does not imply West European willingness to accept all that the United States may propose for joint actions following an intervention. While the West Europeans hope to ensure a common allied front, they will stress that their recommendations should carry considerable weight because Poland is a European problem.

The West European response to a Soviet invasion would be influenced primarily by their views of its impact on East-West relations in Europe and by domestic political pressures. The extent of individual countries' financial exposure in Poland would probably have little impact on their initial reactions. It would be politically impossible to extend continued financial aid to Poland after a Soviet invasion.

In the wake of a Soviet invasion, the USSR would probably not allow Poland to renounce its debt to the West, because of the serious damage this would do to the USSR's credit rating and that of the rest of CEMA. However, renunciation, if it did take place, would be unlikely to cause widespread bank failures in Western nations or serious disorganization in the international monetary system.

Roughly three-quarters of Poland's hard currency debt is held by Western Europe, the FRG, France, the UK, and Austria. The impact on the banking system in Western Europe if Poland repudiated its debt would be serious, but not devastating, since

- at least \$10 billion of the \$25 billion debt is government-guaranteed;

- the unbacked portion of the debt is held mainly by larger, presumably generally well-managed banks that would not be destroyed by Poland's renegeing on its obligations. (The share of Polish debts in just the foreign assets of Western banks, including those of major creditor countries, is small.)

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--Even if a few bankruptcies did occur and threatened damage to the banking system as a whole, through ripple effects, governments presumably would provide assistance, even where the debt was not officially guaranteed. Such action could be justified on grounds that the stricken banks were victims of a hostile post-invasion political act that should not be allowed to wreak financial havoc in the West.

Thus, West European NATO governments and bankers would hope that existing Polish debts to the West could be honored, but they could weather the effects of a debt repudiation, and they would be prepared to take that chance to show the unacceptability of the Soviet action.

Public opinion and political pressure would push almost every West European country toward a strong response. But the leaders' perception that it would be necessary to continue communications with the Soviets to achieve an eventual easing of tensions would pull them in the other direction. This blend of considerations would probably lead to strong rhetorical and political gestures, temporary freezing of new economic relations, and consideration of the need to strengthen NATO defenses. Whether the economic response would be sustained and the defense response made tangible would depend upon the international situation in the months that followed. Unless there were a new exacerbation of East-West tensions, economic sanctions would be gradually discontinued, and the traditional political and economic constraints would once again hinder increased defense efforts.

The depth of West European reaction to an invasion would depend to a degree on Soviet tactics and the extent of Polish resistance. Suppression of the workers by Polish police or Army units with the encouragement but not participation of the Soviet Union would have less impact than the open use of Soviet military power. A large-scale invasion by the Soviets, accompanied by protracted and bloody fighting, and large numbers of refugees into Western Europe, would provoke vociferous protests in Western Europe and both deepen and prolong the subsequent bitterness in relations with the Soviet Union.

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West European leaders would draw the line at military responses they regarded as provocative to the Soviet Union. They would therefore oppose military alerts or quick reinforcements of NATO forces in Central Europe, as well as threats aimed at getting the Soviets out of Poland. They would respond to an invasion with denunciations, some economic and political sanctions, and careful strengthening where possible in the security field.

West Germany

West Germany would be affected more deeply than any other Western country by a Soviet invasion of Poland. The Schmidt government would be forced to set aside for a considerable period the Ostpolitik which has been the basis of West German foreign policy for a decade.

Factors encouraging a tough response toward the Soviets would include:

- the desire to show the Soviets the seriousness of the blow they have delivered to detente;
- the anger and disillusionment that an invasion would produce among the West German public;
- political pressure both from the conservative opposition parties, which frequently criticize Schmidt as too soft toward the Soviets, and from the FDP and much of Schmidt's own SPD which might feel obliged to demonstrate their toughness.

Factors working against a tough response include:

- the government's conviction of the importance of avoiding East-West confrontation in Europe;
- the government's expectation that public support for detente would re-emerge sometime after the invasion;
- the influence of the SDP left wing, some of whose members may even see more reason than ever to get along with the Soviets;

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- the fundamental and widespread West German desire to promote closer relations with East Germany and perhaps eventually achieve reunification;
- the belief of governmental and private economic actors in the benefits of financial, trade, and energy relations with the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact countries.

On balance, these factors point toward an initial response involving tough public condemnation of Soviet conduct and a drastic limitation of political, cultural, and economic contacts. Major projects like the pipelines would probably be held in abeyance. Certainly new economic dealings would be out of the question while memories of the Soviet action were still fresh. Schmidt would welcome the opportunity to coordinate responses as much as possible within the EC, NATO, and among major Western powers.

Bonn would probably be more willing than before to accept new NATO defense programs. The extent of that willingness, however, would be limited by domestic economic constraints and the long-term West German interest in arms control. A working relationship with the Soviet Union would remain a long-term goal of West German policy.

France

The French have long believed that they have a special relationship with Poland. Repression by the Soviet Union would call into question much of Giscard's Eastern policy.

Factors encouraging a tough response toward the Soviets include:

- the desire to impress the Soviets with the international costs of such behavior;
- a strong public outcry against an intervention with heightened impact on governmental decisions due to the proximity of the April presidential election;

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--pressure from domestic political opponents, who would be ready to denounce Giscard for weakness if given a chance. Both the Gaullists and the Socialists have accused Giscard of failing to understand the Soviets, and of subverting Allied solidarity after Afghanistan. The Socialists eagerly attack Soviet behavior because that is a way of attacking the French Communist Party (PCF). The PCF too would probably condemn an invasion, but without breaking with Moscow.

Factors working against a tough response include:

- French desire to maintain freedom of action in a multipolar world and belief that they have a special role to play as a link to the East;
- traditional French resistance to limitations on their economic dealings with the East.

President Giscard would want to respond firmly to a Soviet invasion, but not so firmly as to burn all bridges to the East. The French government would probably accelerate some aspects of its already strong defense program, cooperate more closely in NATO activities, and participate in some joint economic and political measures. The government would not be willing, however, to engage in broad, long-lasting economic sanctions against the Soviet Union. Despite French recriminations against the Soviet Union after an invasion, Paris would try to avoid participation in a prolonged East-West confrontation.

United Kingdom

The British government consistently has been more wary of Soviet intentions than other West European governments. A Soviet invasion of Poland would only reinforce London's negative attitude.

Factors encouraging a tough response against the Soviets:

- distaste, particularly strong in the Conservative government, for the Communist system;

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- the desire to exact a price from the Soviets for reprehensible behavior, which reflects the inclination of the Thatcher government to oppose Soviet adventurism anywhere in the world;
- bipartisan support, as shown in recent statements by Labor Party leader Michael Foot that an invasion would be a "crime against the whole world."

Factors working against a tough response:

- fear of jeopardizing trade and other economic ties to the East;
- the desire not to get too far out in front of European allies or to appear as tools of the US;
- domestic economic problems, particularly budgetary constraints.

The factors supporting a strong response would be overriding for the government of Prime Minister Thatcher, which would press even harder for a strong British defense effort while using every available forum to indict the Soviets. The British would support concerted efforts within the Alliance framework to strengthen NATO's military capabilities. While the British have been skeptical about the effectiveness of sanctions, they would probably be willing to join in some form of economic action and strong diplomatic pressure to protest the Soviet action.

Italy

The Italians would have a strong desire to be consulted at an early stage about any measures the leading Western nations might be contemplating.

Factors encouraging a tough response:

- public outrage, accentuated by the Pope's identification with Poland, and the steady flow of Polish emigres to Italy in recent months;

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- government perception of the need to exact a price from the Soviets for this unacceptable action;
- the discomfiture of the Italian Communist Party, which would denounce an invasion but would be hurt by it politically;
- the possibilities for consolidating domestic support for the government in a crisis situation.

Factors working against a tough response:

- the political fragility of the government;
- economic problems, which limit the government's ability to pay for programs and its inclination to participate in costly measures such as sanctions;
- desire to maintain economic ties with the East;
- government concern that some return to a detente-like policy might be desirable in the long run.

The Italian government could be expected to denounce an invasion and to join an Alliance consensus on punitive measures. Bolstered by a strong public reaction against the Soviets, the government might feel strong enough to do more in upgrading its defense capabilities, but it would not be able to transcend basic economic constraints.

Canada

Factors encouraging a tough response:

- desire to demonstrate to the Soviets that such action has a price;
- negative public reaction against the Soviets, accentuated by the fact that about a third of Canada's people are of East European origin or descent, and many of these are Polish.

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Factors working against a tough response:

- economic incentives to maintain trade and financial relations with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, especially in the grain trade;
- government perception that Canada lost important markets to the US and others by supporting the grain boycott;
- Trudeau's desire to maintain, in a modest way, a mediating position between the superpowers.

Prime Minister Trudeau is anxious to meet with other Western leaders to formulate a common response to an invasion. He probably would not take the lead in calling for specific reprisals, but probably would agree to any decision that had general backing. The most difficult measure for Canada to support would be a grain embargo, but they might accept it if assured that it would be total and unconditional.

Japan

Factors encouraging a tough response:

- desire to maintain good relations with the US;
- widespread belief that the invasion furnished additional evidence of Moscow's belligerence.

Factors working against a tough response:

- governmental and business community view of the Soviet Union as an important market and source of raw materials;
- uncertainty about West European response.

Tokyo would, initially at least, react favorably to proposals for political and economic sanctions against the Soviet Union, provided that West European leaders took similar measures. An invasion would also strengthen the position of those Japanese who advocate a heightened defense posture to counter the Soviet threat. Nevertheless, should sanctions be imposed over a long period of time, the government would come under increasing pressure from the business community to relax them, especially if there were any weakening in the West European stance.

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Australia

Factors encouraging a tough response:

- alliance ties with the US;
- Prime Minister Fraser's deep antipathy toward the Soviet Union.

Factors working against a tough response:

- importance of agricultural exports;
- powerful domestic pressure from farm interests to push exports without reference to political considerations, heightened by the newly strengthened position of the rural-based National Country Party in the coalition government;
- limited political, economic, or social ties with Poland.

The Australian government would certainly make a strong verbal condemnation of a Soviet invasion of Poland. It would probably participate in multilateral restrictions on grain sales to the USSR, as it has since the invasion of Afghanistan. The government would, however, be reluctant to continue an embargo if it believed that other Western governments were violating it.

New Zealand

Factor encouraging a tough response

- alliance ties with the US.

Factors working against a tough response:

- overwhelming economic dependence on agricultural exports;
- growing trade ties with the Soviet Union, which is now New Zealand's fifth largest export market;
- lack of significant economic, political, or social ties to Poland.

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New Zealand would probably limit its response to verbal condemnation of the Soviet Union, and largely symbolic economic gestures. As it did after the invasion of Afghanistan, it would be likely to cooperate with Western trade sanctions only on products--such as barley--which were not economically significant. Prime Minister Muldoon has said that New Zealand's foreign policy is foreign trade.

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON**TOP SECRET-SENSITIVE**
CONTAINS CODEWORD

December 10, 1980

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MEMORANDUM FOR DR. BRZEZINSKI

FROM: The Situation Room

SUBJECT: Noon Notes

Soviet Charge Says USSR Preparing to Provide "Military Assistance" to Poland:

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[redacted] Soviet charge abroad said that the USSR was concerned by the detrimental effect a military thrust into Poland would have on the international communist movement, and will therefore move slowly and with every degree of "legitimacy" possible. He added that Moscow does not expect the Kania regime to be able to resolve the situation, and the USSR is therefore preparing to provide "military assistance." The charge said the sabre rattling on the Polish border has succeeded in temporarily quieting the situation, but the Soviets expect the labor unions to continue to push for more power, creating an "intolerable situation which would eventually mark the end of the socialist state in Poland." Two factors -- the expectations of widespread resistance, and the fact that Moscow must consider other Bloc countries and communist parties outside the socialist world -- are inhibiting an immediate move. They will therefore try to create the impression that intervention was inevitable and being openly done at the request of the Polish government, and will act as if "every TV camera in the world was watching." When asked when this would come about, he said it has started and should be completed in coming months, adding that winter would be the best time since cold weather inhibits counter-revolutionary activities.

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Soviet Official's Perceptions of Future Soviet-U.S. Relations:

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Skorov said the Soviet leadership was quite

TOP SECRET CODEWORD
REVIEW ON DECEMBER 10, 2010
CLASSIFIED BY MULTIPLE SOURCES

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willing to talk about a SALT agreement, but this was presently of secondary concern. The major problem was the U.S. decision to use, if necessary, tactical nuclear weapons in a limited war. He stated that President-elect Reagan would have to withdraw this policy if the U.S. seriously wanted detente, though he did not link the future of SALT talks with this concern. [REDACTED]


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[REDACTED] Skorov wanted his message delivered to U.S. officials. On numerous occasions he would steer the dialogue back to the fact that Moscow viewed the change in U.S. nuclear policy as completely unacceptable, and of prime importance to the Soviet government. (C)

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Preparations Being Made for Commutation of Kim Dae Jung's Sentence:

[REDACTED] Defense Security Command (DSC) and the supreme court to study ways to reduce Kim Dae Jung's death sentence without losing face. The recommendations are to be submitted prior to Secretary Brown's arrival. To lay the groundwork for the possible commutation of the sentence, the government has directed the ROK press to reduce significantly the ongoing anti-Japanese campaign and to cease using Kim's name when describing U.S.-ROK relations. (S)

[REDACTED] South Korean military commanders believe Kim must not be executed, arguing that the losses to Seoul would far outweigh any gains. Reportedly, a large number of ROK generals now feel Kim should not be executed, however, hard-line retired officers close to Chun in the Blue House still favor execution. (S)

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
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
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Situation in Nicaragua

Interagency Intelligence Memorandum

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


SITUATION IN NICARAGUA

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
Nicaragua



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SITUATION IN NICARAGUA


Military Situation

On 9 September Nicaragua's Sandinista National Liberation Front guerrillas launched a series of attacks in Managua and four other cities. The National Guard in the capital responded effectively to what were little more than hit-and-run strikes against five police posts. In Masaya, Leon, Esteli, and Chinandega, however, the guerrillas were able to gain control of major sections of the cities and rally support from local youths.


The Guard set about restoring control of Masaya the next day. It employed well-trained combat forces from the capital, and cleared out the city systematically one section at a time. The fighting was heavy for three days, but on 13 September Masaya was secured and the bulk of the troops moved northward to Leon.

The latest reports indicate that Guard troops are making headway in Leon, but they have not concluded the operation. Guerrillas still hold major portions of Chinandega and Esteli, where the existing Guard garrisons are engaged in holding actions only. One Guard officer reported that Esteli would be especially difficult to recapture. For this reason, and because of geography, Chinandega will probably be invested following Leon.

In addition to the three towns where the guerrillas still have some continuous control, there are reports of sustained clashes in Diriamba, and sporadic fighting in Rivas, Jinotepe, and Penas Blancas. These strikes on Wednesday and Thursday were evidently repulsed by the Guard garrisons.

Managua has been tense, but calm since the first attacks on 9 September. 

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This memorandum was prepared in the Office of Regional and Political Analysis and was coordinated with the Directorate of Operations, INR, in the Department of State, and with DIA in the Department of Defense. 

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 all indicate that a major guerrilla strike will take place on 15 September or soon thereafter.

Armed Opposition - Nature and Strength

Armed opposition is centered in the guerrilla Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN). Even in areas such as Matagalpa and Masaya where significant numbers of the local populace have taken up arms against the government, a large majority of the rebel force has been pro-FSLN youth--and trained Sandinista cadres have been an instigating element helping to touch off the violence. This FSLN tactic, acting as a catalyst for violence in urban centers, has been evident since the first general strike against President Somoza in January. Although anti-Somoza sentiment is strong at almost all levels of Nicaraguan society, it generally has not reached the flash point where popular uprisings have been generated external to FSLN action.

The FSLN

With Cuban support, the FSLN was founded in the early 1960s out of the remnants of several other revolutionary organizations. By the mid-1960s, after two small invasion attempts from Honduras, the group settled into a pattern of predominantly rural operations by scattered bands and occasional acts of urban terrorism. Prior to the surge of activity that began late last year, the FSLN's most spectacular success was in December 1974 when it seized a government minister's house and a number of hostages, extorted a ransom, secured the release of 14 fellow guerrillas, and gained safe passage to Cuba. During 1975 and 1976, the government's proclamation of martial law and its more active pursuit of the guerrillas put the FSLN on the defensive, with most encounters being initiated by the National Guard.

Following the lifting of martial law in September 1977, the FSLN carried out several dramatic strikes against National Guard units. The increased anti-Somoza sentiment over the last year, given major impetus by the assassination of opposition leader Chamorro in January, has spurred FSLN recruitment because of the organization's

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image as the only active opposition to Somoza. A year ago, we estimated that there were only approximately 250 FSLN activists in the country; Nicaraguan intelligence estimated last month that there were some 600 guerrillas within the country and an equal number abroad--a figure we find credible, [redacted]

25X1 [redacted] An FSLN leader's public boast that some 1,100 guerrillas are now involved in the struggle against Somoza in Nicaragua could well be accurate; over the last few weeks a large number of FSLN members staged outside the country, principally in Costa Rica, have probably crossed back into Nicaragua. The number of active sympathizers and supporters is much larger and growing, but impossible to determine exactly.


25X1 FSLN recruitment is, if anything, intensifying. [redacted] new adherents are being taken on board in Costa Rica so quickly that they are being incorporated directly into FSLN urban and rural units without training. Indicative of the decreased emphasis on ideology by the leading FSLN faction, the new recruits are given little screening other than to determine that they are anti-Somoza.

Traditionally, the FSLN has been a Marxist, pro-Castro, revolutionary organization that, like other Latin American guerrilla groups, has increasingly shifted its focus to the urban front.

Throughout most of its existence, the FSLN has been plagued by factionalism. In recent years, the organization has split into three primary groups--Terciario, Popular Prolonged War, and Proletarian Tendency--all espousing variations of Marxist ideology. The chief reason for this splintering was disagreement over strategy and tactics.

The Terciario faction--estimated a month ago at 550 members--has generally been the largest of the three. It has undertaken most of the urban guerrilla actions, including the capture of the National Palace on 22 August. The Terciarios are the least doctrinaire of the Sandinistas, and for the past year have downplayed Marxism in favor of nationalistic, anti-imperialistic, anti-US, and anti-Somoza themes. The Terciarios also have shown the

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greatest willingness to cooperate with other, non-Communist opposition groups for the expedient of bringing down the Somoza government as quickly as possible.

The Sandinistas' chief link to other anti-Somoza organizations has been through the Group of 12, a collection of prominent professionals formed in Costa Rica last year but now openly campaigning against Somoza in Nicaragua. Members of the group have lobbied for acceptance of the Sandinistas as a legitimate element in the overall opposition movement. At least two of the Group of 12 have been members of the FSLN, and others have sons who are Sandinistas. While in Costa Rica, members of the Terciario faction worked closely with the Group of 12 in planning guerrilla operations as well as propaganda and fund-raising activities.

The Popular Prolonged War (GPP) faction is largely a military organization. The Nicaraguan intelligence service's current estimate of 550 members is higher than previous reporting had indicated. The GPP hopes to mobilize a people's war to force Somoza out, but only in the context of a "socialist revolution" that will require a more protracted struggle than that envisioned by the Terciarios. Specializing in guerrilla operations against National Guard personnel and installations, the GPP has generally avoided such terrorist tactics as kidnaping and assassination. As the FSLN offensive has gathered strength, there has been increasing cooperation between the GPP and the Terciarios at the upper echelons, but stopping well short of a unified command. Each group reportedly maintains its own leadership, and working-level members of the two factions function independently.

The Proletarian Tendency (TP), with only about 100 members, is clearly the smallest FSLN faction. It is also the most doctrinaire and insular of the three. Its primary activities are infiltrating worker, peasant, and student organizations and promoting strikes. It carries out some guerrilla actions, but does not work for the immediate overthrow of Somoza. Rather, it sees a need for his continued presence to catalyze mass discontent, paving the way for a socialist government to succeed to power. During the most recent guerrilla activity, its only participation appears to have been to act as a propaganda support mechanism.

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Terciario members in general appear to have little respect for this group.

General Resistance

Resistance is spreading in the sense that more towns have been the sites of serious antigovernment attacks and violence, but there is only a random geographic pattern. The worst problems have been in those cities that have been centers of discontent from the outset, such as Matagalpa and Masaya. The FSLN has chosen urban targets of opportunity, in concert with attacks on National Guard outposts by bands that range across the borders from Costa Rica and Honduras. The objective is to demonstrate the government's vulnerability and at the same time to stretch the National Guard thin--and so encourage conditions propitious for a general uprising or a major FSLN attack in the capital once Somoza's forces are wearied and depleted.

Thus far, we have evidence of only one other organization that has joined with the FSLN in its military campaign, but contacts and cooperation, at least on an informal or individual basis, are clearly wider. One of the factions of the extremist Nicaraguan Socialist Party has engaged in joint planning with the Terciarios for a major armed action in the capital that is still expected. Members of other organizations have probably also cooperated--likely candidates include the other Socialist faction as well as the Revolutionary Student Federation--which for years has been the FSLN's primary source of recruits. In addition, radicalized businessman Alfonso Robelo, one of the opposition's principal leaders and head of the Nicaraguan Democratic Movement, recently indicated that members of his group had been active in the most recent outbreaks of violence. Similarly, a prominent oppositionist has related that the head of the Union for Democratic Liberation, one of the political coalitions within the opposition front, has also been involved in FSLN planning.

Outside Support - Cuban Involvement

Since their information in the early 1960s, the Sandinistas have looked to Cuba for ideological inspiration, strategic guidance, tactical training, material support, and sanctuary. In the last few years, however, Cuba

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appears to have declined repeated Sandinista appeals for money, arms, and increased training outside Cuba. Havana has apparently concentrated its material support on training in Cuba and related expenses, including transportation and documentation. The bulk of our reliable evidence to date points to a role, but we believe it would stop short of a direct military participation.

The Cubans were cautious in their dealings with the FSLN because they have been skeptical about the group's capabilities and sensitive to international opinion. Havana has insisted that the FSLN first purge itself of factionalism, establish a unified leadership base, and prove itself under fire.

The Cubans have, however, apparently increased their contacts with Central American groups. At least three times this year, a high-level Cuban representative has tried to meet in Costa Rica with FSLN leaders to help iron out their factional differences, but there are no indications that he succeeded in bringing all three groups together. Late last year,

reported that he felt that Cuba was taking a more active role in promoting insurgency in Latin America, particularly in Nicaragua and El Salvador. More recently, a member of the Guatemalan Communist Party related that Havana intends to hold a meeting before the end of the year of all the Communist parties of Central America to plan a coordinated campaign against Somoza, but details of the campaign were not spelled out.

Some aspects of Cuba's support role have long been documented. Throughout the FSLN's existence, Cuba has been a training site; even two years ago there were 60 Sandinistas there in various stages of training. Cuba is also both safehaven and propaganda base; one of the guerrillas flown to Cuba after the December 1974 operation remained in Havana until earlier this year to act as FSLN liaison with the Cuban Government, to direct Sandinista propaganda over Radio Havana, and to contact representatives of other radical organizations. Sandinistas in Cuba may also correspond with support groups in the United States and other third countries.

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Such Cuban support is clearly continuing. The leader of the recent assault on the National Palace appears to be one [redacted] FSLN members who were supplied with Cuban passports in alias by the Cuban Embassy in Panama. Last year, a Cuban Prensa Latina official in Venezuela was reportedly trying to help collect money for the FSLN. Occasional reports alleging that Cuba is providing the Sandinistas with funds to purchase weapons and is sending selected members to the Near East for training by the Palestine Liberation Organization cannot be confirmed, however.

25X1 Similarly, there have been two recent reports of a Cuban presence in Nicaragua, both of which are suspect. [redacted] 25X1 [redacted] alleged in August that three Cuban advisers were training Sandinistas in underground sites in a town 50 kilometers (30 miles) from Managua. The same source had also reported that the FSLN planned to bomb vehicles with diplomatic license plates--a change in FSLN strategy that would seem counter-productive to FSLN efforts to isolate the Somoza government diplomatically. [redacted] 25X1 [redacted]

Cuba has been trying to play down its direct involvement with the FSLN. On 6 September, for example, Fidel Castro said that the Sandinistas know how to obtain arms and money and do not need Cuba's help. However, a member of the Group of 12--which serves as the FSLN's political arm--reportedly visited Cuba recently to request that Castro provide arms, money, and even direct military intervention. We believe that the Cubans may well increase support to the Nicaraguan guerrillas in the weeks ahead but stop short of sending Cuban personnel into Nicaragua. Both we and the Cubans would reassess if there were some dramatic turn in the Nicaraguan situation--for example, if the FSLN secured an area and established a provisional government recognized by some Latin American regimes.

Costa Rica's Role

Costa Rica continues to be the FSLN's principal, and critically important, staging area.

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The FSLN attacks last October that began the offensive against the Somoza government were staged by groups that quickly fled into Costa Rican and Honduran territory before Nicaraguan National Guard forces could react. In November, there were some 70 well-equipped Sandinistas operating from Costa Rica. A member of the FSLN high command has publicly acknowledged that the group uses that neighboring country as its principal training ground and safehaven. The Group of 12, prior to returning to Managua earlier this year, functioned out of San Jose.

The FSLN's continued reliance on its safehaven was evidenced by the raid launched from Costa Rica on 12 September, as well as the fact that the guerrillas have intensified their recruitment drive there. In addition, the spectacular FSLN August raid on the National Palace was planned and staged from Costa Rica.

The Sandinistas receive material aid from the Costa Rican Committee of Solidarity With the Nicaraguan People and are provided safehavens and false documents by the Costa Rican Communist Party. Sandinistas have occasional contacts in Costa Rica with Cuban officials and--according to unconfirmed reports--with Soviet Embassy officials as well.

The FSLN has been able to operate from Costa Rica with virtual impunity for a variety of reasons. The government is militarily incapable of policing the border and, in any event, may lack incentive because the Somoza government is unpopular in Costa Rica. Some government officials may also fear retaliation from the FSLN. When Sandinistas do fall into government hands, they are deported to Mexico, Venezuela, or Panama.

25X1 [REDACTED] Costa Rican President Carazo has decided to "stiffen" his policy on FSLN activists apprehended in his country--by deporting non-Costa Ricans and giving short jail sentences to nationals. At best, this is only a slight shift that is unlikely to have any appreciable effect on FSLN tactics.

FSLN raids from across the border have been a continuing thorn in the side of Somoza's counterinsurgency

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


effort and a very important asset to the guerrillas and will likely remain so.

Other Significant External Support

The Somoza government is unpopular in Venezuela, and President Perez is waging a personal campaign against it. Perez has met openly with members of the FSLN and Group of 12.

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Past reporting has conflicted on the question of whether Perez is providing money to the anti-Somoza movement in general and to the Sandinistas in particular. In the most recent reports, however,


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said that Perez is providing money and unsophisticated arms to the guerrillas, and he is kept apprised of their plans as well as the extent of support they receive from Cuba. Venezuela also has a Committee of Solidarity With the Nicaraguan People, which lobbies against Somoza and raises funds for the Sandinistas.

In mid-August Panamanian Chief of Government Torrijos told Ambassador Young that he was giving some support to the FSLN, but not much. This week,

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he told that he was providing nothing but hotel accommodations for the guerrillas who staged the operation against Nicaragua's National Palace. Earlier this month, however,

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Torrijos promised to provide guerrilla training to the FSLN unit that went to Panama following the National Palace operation, but that the Sandinistas departed before any training took place.

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
In August, discovered a 30-man pro-FSLN cadre training in Panama's western Chiriqui Province and did not interfere with the group's return to Nicaragua.

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Nicaraguan President Somoza is evidently aware of this incident. The guerrilla commander of the National Palace operation reportedly was seen in

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
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Chiriqui on Monday loading what appeared to be munitions onto a plane flown by a Panamanian Air Force pilot. The aircraft supposedly had been making two flights nightly to Costa Rica for the previous four days. In addition, two top FSLN commanders visited Panama in the past few weeks in hopes of meeting with Torrijos, 



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

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The FSLN operates out of sanctuaries in Honduras, but finds the atmosphere less hospitable than in Costa Rica. As many as 60 guerrillas were staging regular raids from Honduras into Nicaragua late last year, but the Honduran Army swept the border region in May to suppress these activities. Like Costa Rica, Honduras deports captured Sandinistas to third countries.

Honduras also has a Committee of Solidarity With the Nicaraguan People, which provides aid to the FSLN. In addition, students and faculty members of the national university and a new leftist organization, the Popular Unity Movement, reportedly give added moral and material support.

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 believes that the Mexican Government is sympathetic to and probably provides "support" to the Sandinistas, but  has no concrete information beyond these previous reports.


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-- In early 1978, Joaquin Cuadra Chamorro, of the Group of 12, said that he had met with Mexican President Lopez Portillo and Secretary of Government Reyes. Cuadra said the Mexican Government was providing important political and propaganda support to the effort to remove Somoza from power. Cuadra said the Mexicans had not yet provided any financial support, and he did not indicate that support to date had specifically included the FSLN.


-- Ernesto Castillo, also of the Group of 12, in early January 1978 "intimated" that the FSLN had the sympathy of and a good relationship with the Mexican Government. He hoped that the Chamorro assassination would generate concrete assistance.

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-- The FSLN has members in Mexico, including Carlos Gutierrez Sotelo, whose farm near Cuernavaca is used for training and recuperation by Sandinistas. Because of Mexico's traditionally tolerant atmosphere, many far-left Latin American groups have chosen to set up such exile operations there.

Cohesiveness of the National Guard

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 the Guard's cohesiveness and loyalty to Somoza remain intact. This unity derives from 40 years of cultivation through financial incentives; screening of enlistees; use of informants, checks, and balances; and other classic patron-client techniques. In the current crisis, this cohesion does not come strictly from blind devotion, but from the pragmatic recognition by guardsmen that without Somoza their interests will be in peril. Moreover, during the current clashes, Somoza has lifted some of the restraints he had imposed on the Guard to reduce human rights abuses, and the greater latitude initially boosted Guard morale.

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 the continuing strain of the past five days, however, is beginning to lower Guard morale slightly. Guard loyalty might be tested if the FSLN could field a large number of urban combatants in Managua and involve the urban poor in a confrontation with the military. The Guard's cohesiveness, especially at the enlisted men's level, could be stretched to the breaking point.

Somoza's Strategy

The first priority of Somoza's basic military strategy has always been ensuring firm control of the capital. Managua is the political, financial, and strategic heart of the country. Half of the 8,200 men in the National Guard are stationed in the Managua area, including the best combat units as well as virtually all of the heavy weapons, armor, and Air Force. The rest of the Guard is widely dispersed, with half stationed in each of the 16 departmental capitals and half occupying small outposts in rural villages.

Somoza evidently believes he can ultimately control, from the military perspective, anything short of a mass

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civil uprising in the capital. He does not seem to feel a need for haste in recapturing the provincial cities, and consequently is willing to dispatch only limited reinforcements from Managua. He may also believe that such extended operations will cause the guerrillas to expend their presumably limited supplies of ammunition.

Nevertheless, there is a sense of urgency, if not haste, in Somoza's current strategy. The tenacity of the guerrilla offensive has probably surprised him. Declaring martial law gives the Guard the freer rein it has wanted. The troops are taking harsher measures and using weapons--such as M-79 grenade launchers, recoilless rifles, and aircraft--that had not been employed in the past. The Air Force has engaged in hot pursuit of guerrillas into Costa Rica, their chief sanctuary. In short, Somoza is taking the gloves off.

Somoza's political strategy is unchanged. His objectives are to retain power until his term officially ends in 1981 and to protect his financial and family interests beyond that time. Clearly he does not envision relinquishing all personal power even after his retirement. At present, no one in the opposition will negotiate on his terms, and he stands firm. If he comes to feel that his back is to the wall militarily, he would agree to negotiate and make concessions as a tactical fallback in the hope of buying time, drying up popular support for the guerrillas, and splitting the opposition. Even acquiescence to the demand that he step down is conceivable as a final tactical retreat, with the intent to renege or in hopes of coming back some years hence.

Somoza's diplomatic strategy is to thwart international initiatives by unfriendly countries, such as Costa Rica and Venezuela. If he is unable to restore order in the next two weeks or so, he would be more inclined to accept outside mediation, but without preconditions. Again he would hope to turn the process to his advantage and buy time. Particularly if the United States were somehow involved in the mediation, Somoza could be expected to appeal to influential friends in this country to buttress his negotiating position.


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Somoza's Prospects for Success


Barring a substantial increase in external material support for the FSLN, Somoza's military "get tough" strategy may well succeed in the short run. The guerrillas are low on ammunition and militarily out-classed, while the Guard has been given a freer rein. Somoza should be able to restore systematically some semblance of control.

Circumstances in Nicaragua have changed, however, and, over time, Somoza will probably fail to reverse the tide of active opposition. He may manage to suppress individual uprisings, but the guerrillas will reappear in other cities in a matter of days or weeks. Since he cannot jeopardize Managua's defenses to subdue the rest of the country, only the most draconian measures and a massive increase in the size of the Guard would permanently eliminate the Sandinistas and their growing reserve of young followers. Even if by these measures he managed to stay in power until 1981--and the odds seem hedged against it--the dynasty could continue only as a police state.

Presumably, Somoza's political strategy--accepting some form of outside mediation--would enter the picture before the military situation slipped from his grasp. The opposition would agree to such mediation expecting that the United States would take a hand in assuring Somoza's retirement from power. Somoza's strategy would be to marshal all his political savvy and influence to resist his ouster as well as any ban on political participation by his relatives. Even if ultimately compelled to yield his offices and dismantle his power structure, he would probably never quit maneuvering for a return to power.

Government Shortages



Major "Tachito" Somoza acknowledged on 12 September that the Guard was rapidly exhausting its ammunition but said it had found sources of additional supplies in other Central American countries. He indicated that his rapid-reaction forces, however, were in urgent need of C-rations.

 there is some concern in the Guard over the adequacy of munitions reserves and other materiel. Inability to replenish stocks of small-arms ammunition and field supplies could weaken the

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regime's military position, but Somoza probably has the sources and connections to avert a shortage.

Of more serious, if not immediate, concern is the current financial crisis compounded by the national strike and wave of violence. Facing a serious liquidity crisis and capital flight, the government requested advance tax payments and imposed currency controls. Most foreign firms are expected to comply with the tax request, which will ease but not eliminate the economic squeeze. The government has already had problems meeting public teachers' salaries, and if the business strike and nonpayment-of-taxes movement continue, the government's position could be undermined.

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Economic and Political Factors Relating to Possible Soviet Exchange of Petroleum Customers With a Latin American Supplier

Background

Since the early seventies, the USSR periodically has raised with Venezuela and Mexico the possibility of either or both of those countries supplying a portion of Cuba's crude oil requirements -- now met by the USSR -- in return for equivalent shipments of Soviet crude to their European customers.

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Savings in transport costs are the primary incentive for the proposed swap. Although tanker charter rates are now only about a fifth of their 1973 peak, we estimate that transport costs could be reduced by \$6.5 million a year for every 10,000 barrels per day (b/d) of crude involved in such a tri-lateral exchange. The USSR could net about \$5 for every dollar saved by the other suppliers, but some of the savings may have to be offered as incentives to other participants. Currency transfers would not necessarily be a factor for Venezuela or Mexico, inasmuch as shipments would be made on Soviet account for reimbursement in hard currency. Some hard currency savings could accrue to the USSR because Soviet tankers would be freed

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to replace free world tankers now under charter to the USSR.

The probable upper limit for a crude oil swap motivated by transport savings is now 60,000 b/d, about half the current volume of Soviet crude petroleum deliveries to Cuba. This conclusion follows from the fact that somewhat less than half of the Soviet tankers return home empty. The others carry cargoes -- e.g., Cuban sugar and U.S. grains -- that would have to be moved in any case.

Cuba's crude requirements are due to increase sharply in the early eighties, however, thereby increasing the transport savings potential. Cuba's three refineries process about 121,000 b/d of Soviet crude and up to 3,000 b/d of domestic crude.

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Soviet reluctance to increase petroleum exports to Cuba may also be a factor in the current negotiations. By introducing new suppliers via a swap agreement, the Soviets could be opening the door to outright purchases of oil for Cuba. Moscow recently warned [REDACTED] not to expect increased petroleum supplies in the eighties. While there is no evidence that a similar statement has been

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directed to Havana, Soviet representatives there have stated that it would be unwise for the USSR to underwrite development of an export-oriented Cuban petrochemical industry.

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Venezuela The possibility of an oil swap agreement with the USSR had been ballyhooed by President Perez on the occasion of his November 1976 visit to Moscow. Since then, negotiations have been hung up on a satisfactory division of transport savings. The Venezuelans have been holding out for an even split.

Although a trial shipment of Venezuelan crude is to arrive in Cuba during the last half of July, there is strong opposition to the deal within Perez's own party and in Venezuela's large Cuban exile community.

Spain At one point, the Venezuelan deal called for Spain to take an equivalent amount of Soviet crude in exchange for the Venezuelan crude to be sent to Cuba. Spain currently imports about 17,000 b/d of Venezuelan crude, which is distributed by

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
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a government-controlled monopoly. Madrid's proclaimed desire to increase trade with Eastern Europe will facilitate negotiations over the price of Soviet oil.

Mexico Despite some trial shipments of Mexican crude in 1975, negotiations with Mexico bogged down over disagreement on (a) comparability of oil price and quality; (b) whether payment would involve cash or Soviet goods; and (c) lack of a third party participant. Earlier negotiations involved an exchange of up to 30,000 b/d.


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Lopez Portillo sees distinct domestic political advantages in consummating his proposal. It would (a) mollify leftist elements and (b) demonstrate independence from the US.

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Peru Cuba's recent appointment of its Vice Minister of Petroleum, an engineer with no previous diplomatic experience,

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as Ambassador to Peru may be indicative of Cuban concern for its future petroleum supplies. Although Lima now has little exportable petroleum beyond what is committed to Japan, its export capacity is scheduled to increase by 50,000 b/d by the early eighties when Cuba's new refinery is scheduled to begin operations.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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BRIEFING PAPER

14

Scientific and Technological Cooperation

The European Community (EC) started to develop a common policy in the field of Science and Technology (S&T) in 1974. Community activities have progressed slowly but steadily since that time, and today respectable programs are underway in the areas of Resources (energy and raw materials), Industrial Development (standard reference materials and data processing), Living and Working Conditions (medical research) and Environment (air pollution, carcinogens). The EC Commission carries out R&D under its own auspices and also plays a small but growing role in the coordination of national programs.

Cooperation with the U.S. has its origin in the US/EURATOM agreement of 1958 which, along with the IAEA, still serves as a framework for information exchange on nuclear safety and reactor safety R&D. This cooperation has expanded to several of the areas in which the Commission is active. Most of this collaboration is on an informal, ad hoc basis, brought about by mutual technical interest, and there is no certainty within the governmental S&T community about the nature of the policy base on which it rests. Presidential endorsement of such cooperation can be expected to stimulate and assist its development. The informal character of the cooperation has served us well, and there is no need to erect ceremonial machinery.

It may also be an appropriate time to explore with the Commission the prospect of its collaboration in some of the demonstration facilities and experiments which we are putting in train in our search for long-term energy resources. These include new experiments in fusion and the conversion of the Glomar Explorer, which is seen as a vital step in our search for deep ocean hydrocarbon deposits.

We have no assurances that the EC will be receptive to this approach. Also, it may not be viewed with favor by those with whom we already have direct, bilateral relationships, at least in the nearterm. This is especially the case with the Japanese, who have exhibited some sensitivity toward immediate expansion of the cooperation to be formalized on a bilateral basis under the "Fukuda Initiative" in March/April 1979.

State Department review completed

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The Commission has no present capability in coal liquefaction. It has recently proposed to the EC Council of Ministers a demonstration program in this area, and might seek a US endorsement as a means of promoting more favorable Council consideration. The member countries are not enthusiastic about this Council initiative, and our need for access to European expertise is fully accommodated by present bilateral channels.

The biological/medical proposals anticipated from the EC include work on tritium toxicity and the effects of continuous low level irradiation, and the calibration of carcinogenic compounds. In both areas the Commission's own laboratories have a record of successful achievement, and closer cooperation would be desirable.

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

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS RELATED TO THE US STAND ON HUMAN RIGHTS
(20-26 May 1977)

SOVIET UNION

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We still have no evidence that the Soviets have resolved the conflicting gains and losses of putting Shcharansky on trial during the initial session of the CSCE review conference next month in Belgrade. Espionage charges against Shcharansky would be designed to discredit the dissidents, bolster Soviet allegations of US interference in the USSR's internal affairs, and further inhibit contacts between foreigners and Soviet citizens.

--Moscow has announced that it will soon publish a new draft constitution to replace the so-called Stalin constitution of 1936. The draft almost certainly will be made available for popular "discussion" prior to the opening of the CSCE review conference on 15 June. *The many socio-economic rights allegedly enjoyed by Soviet citizens are likely to be spelled out in great detail in order to demonstrate the extent to which human rights are guaranteed in the USSR.*

EAST EUROPE

--Dissident playwright Vaclav Havel was released by Czechoslovak authorities on 20 May but still faces trial on criminal charges. *The regime's anxieties over dissident activity appear to be waning as the Charter 77 movement loses some momentum. Czechoslovakia now has freed two of the four intellectuals arrested in mid-January when the initial Charter manifesto appeared.*

This compilation is prepared weekly by the Office of Regional and Political Analysis.

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

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- President Tito's 85th birthday passed on 25 May with no announcement of an amnesty for Yugoslav political prisoners. *An amnesty has been in the wind for several months, but resistance from hard-liners and reluctance to appear responsive to Western pressure on human rights appear to have caused the regime to reconsider and--at least temporarily--back off.*
 - No demonstrations related to the suspicious death of a student human rights activist have been reported in Poland since 20 May, but seven leaders of the Workers Defense League remain under arrest. *The regime has gotten through a difficult period without additional damage. What the next few weeks will bring depends on how well second echelon WDL leaders can mobilize interest and support, and on how the government conducts itself.*

WESTERN EUROPE

- The Political Committee of the Assembly of the Western European Union has approved a report that stresses the need to avoid East-West friction over human rights at the Belgrade CSCE review conference. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] *it concedes more to Soviet views on the Belgrade meeting than the position papers worked out by representatives of the allied governments in the EC and at NATO. The report is, however, in basic harmony with European views on giving all sections of the Helsinki Final Act equal emphasis, and on conditioning allied tactics on the East-West climate prevailing when the review conference convenes.*

LATIN AMERICA

- General Torrijos has decided to grant pardons to several Panamanian women serving prison sentences for subversion. *In another effort to improve its human rights image, Panama is preparing to allow some political exiles to return. The press, probably with government encouragement, is playing up the theme.*
- El Salvador's President Molina has charged that leftist priests are involved in subversive activities. He denies accusations that his government is persecuting the Catholic Church. *Church-State relations remain strained in El Salvador, and president-elect Romero reportedly plans to crack down on the Jesuits, three of whom already have been expelled.*

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- Brazil's nominal opposition party, the Brazilian Democratic Movement, has formed a permanent advisory commission on human rights to monitor reports of violations. *The party recently suffered a major political setback at the hands of the Geisel administration, and its willingness and ability to investigate alleged violations vigorously are questionable.*

EAST ASIA

- The Philippine military tribunal hearing the case of Benigno Aquino (*an opposition Liberal senator against whom the government trumped-up conspiracy charges*) met on 23 May and rejected three defense motions seeking dismissal of the case. There had been speculation that Aquino would read a long reply to the charges, but he failed to appear. *Marcos seems determined to leave the affair to the courts despite foreign publicity and pressure, but he apparently plans to grant a pardon if Aquino is found guilty. Aquino's vitality seems to have been sapped by the strain of the case and he no longer is a focal point of opposition to the Marcos regime.*

AFRICA

- Practically all of the 200 Togolese detained and questioned in connection with the attempted smuggling of Marxist-oriented political tracts into Togo from France last month have now been released. *The few remaining prisoners probably will be given short jail sentences at an unpublished trial.*
- The government of Transkei has released nine of fourteen persons arrested for opposing the Transkei's "independence," but it also has announced plans to bring to trial under the Suppression of Communism Act at least five others, including political and religious leaders. *Democratic Party leaders reportedly fear that opposition to independence (their basic policy) will be defined as a criminal offense in a soon to be passed Treason Act.*
- Nigeria's most influential newspaper has urged the government to speak up and lead the way in openly condemning human rights violations in Uganda. *The Tribune suggests that Uganda be expelled from the British Commonwealth at its Heads of Government Conference in London next month. Ambassador Easum believes*

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the hard-hitting editorial reflects increasing popular concern in Nigeria over the actions of Idi Amin. The Obasanjo government thus far has been reluctant to comment publicly on the internal affairs of other black African states.

--Prime Minister Vorster told Vice President Mondale that South Africa is favorably disposed toward having an international commission decide which Namibians jailed by Pretoria should be considered political prisoners. Vorster's contention is that all Namibians in South African custody are criminals, but he says South Africa might free them if Namibians held by Zambia and Tanzania also are released. *Perhaps as many as 1,000 SWAPO dissidents have been detained in Zambia and Tanzania, apparently at the behest of SWAPO President Nujoma. Most of the prisoners are confined in a camp guarded by Zambian troops in an isolated rural area north of Lusaka. They are mainly supporters of a former SWAPO minister now under house arrest in Dar es Salaam.*

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A young former SWAPO activist, meanwhile, is scheduled to be executed by the South African administration in Namibia shortly--perhaps as early as 30 May. SWAPO insists that the case against Nduvuu Filemon Nangolo is purely political and has appealed to the US, among others, to persuade the South Africans to relent.

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FOREIGN POLICY SURVEYExecutive Summary

Anti-Sovietism has anchored Chinese foreign policy for nearly 20 years and for the foreseeable future is likely to remain a consistent element of Beijing's (Peking's) policy. China's perception of an expansionist USSR led to the initiation in 1969 of China's openings to the United States, Western Europe, and Japan in order to blunt the Soviet thrust and create an international balance of power which would reduce the Soviet threat to China. In early April China symbolically marked this long-run change in foreign policy by notifying the USSR that Beijing will not renew the 1950 Treaty of Friendship with Moscow. [REDACTED]

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This policy, evolved under the late Chairman Mao and Premier Zhou (Chou), has become increasingly pragmatic and flexible. Added to the anti-Soviet thrust is a major effort to put foreign policy more fully in the service of economic growth by seeking industrial goods, technology, modern education, and even weapons from the West and Japan. China's current reexamination of economic priorities and the implementation of its modernization program does not imply abandonment, but a pragmatic effort at modification. [REDACTED]

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The recent visit of Vice Premier Deng (Teng) to the United States was only the latest high point in the pursuit of a highly activist foreign policy. High-ranking Chinese officials have toured every quarter of the globe, preaching resistance to the USSR and calling for economic cooperation. [REDACTED]

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China views with concern trends which seem to undermine, rather than enhance, efforts to contain the Soviets. Set-

This memorandum was prepared by the East Asia-Pacific Division of the Office of Regional and Political Analysis, National Foreign Assessment Center, in response to a Commerce Department request. Questions and comments may be addressed to [REDACTED]

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backs for the United States, other Western nations, and Japan, such as the turmoil in Iran, have become setbacks for Chinese foreign policy. Beijing is deeply concerned with Soviet and Cuban activities in the Middle East, Africa, and South Asia. Chinese officials never tire of describing Soviet efforts to gain influence in areas of strategic and economic importance in the West, such as the Middle East with its oil resources. Nearer to home, the Chinese perceive Moscow to be using Vietnam to encircle China and believe the USSR is attempting to manipulate events in Southeast Asia to advance Soviet influence. China's limited invasion of Vietnam last winter was meant at least partially to deal with this challenge. Although Chinese-North Korean relations appear excellent, Beijing is reluctant to press the North Koreans, on such issues as reunification, lest Moscow be provided an opening to redress Pyongyang's current tilt toward Beijing. []

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China hopes that its global activity and efforts to fashion a loose anti-Soviet entente based on ties with the United States, Japan, and Western Europe will provide the peaceful environment and time needed to develop its own economic and military strength. []

Overview

The Major thrust of Chinese foreign policy--hostility toward the USSR--has proved remarkably durable over the past three years. Also unchanged is Beijing's view of the United States as an important strategic counterweight to Moscow--a view underscored by Beijing's move to establish diplomatic relations with the United States and by China's accelerated pursuit of closer links with Washington's allies in Western Europe and Japan. These major policy tenets were unaffected by such dramatic changes in Beijing as the deaths of Zhou Enlai and Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung), the purge of top-level leftist ideologues and the return of Deng Xiaoping (Teng Hsiao-ping) to important policy positions. []

Chinese foreign policy rests on the fundamental strategic perception that the USSR is a growing expansionist power that represents a direct threat to China, while the United States is a declining power slowly withdrawing from forward positions in Asia and, therefore, not an immediate threat to China. Beijing has concluded that its connection with the United States--and by extension with much of the industrialized

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Western world--makes the USSR's efforts to encircle China much more difficult.

Beijing's recent decision, however, to rely extensively on foreign assistance and involvement in China's modernization effort does constitute a significant break with the recent past. China began to increase its economic dealings with Japan and the West in the early 1970s, but from 1973 to 1977 China's ability to follow up these initial openings was sharply limited by political and ideological constraints. Most importantly, with the ascendancy of Deng Xiaoping, the United States, Western Europe, Japan, and even some semi-industrialized nations now are seen as sources of modern industrial equipment, technology, and management techniques. Many of the same countries are to be used to train Chinese scientists and engineers to help overcome the educational losses resulting from the Cultural Revolution. In another demonstration of new flexibility and pragmatism, China now appears ready to borrow from foreign banks--and even governments--and to consider foreign investment in China. Citing the Soviet military threat, Beijing also is seeking to modernize its armed forces through the import of foreign weapons, military technology, and modern military doctrine.

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A second, more tactical shift in Chinese policy has been the higher degree of activism with which the Chinese are pursuing their twin objectives of containing USSR and enlisting support for China's modernization efforts. Diplomatic activity has been expanded dramatically, exemplified by numerous visits of high-level officials to nearly every quarter of the globe. Through its more open and active style abroad, Beijing is trying to enhance China's credentials as a responsible member of the international community and a leader of the Third World. China, of course, has long sought the support and assistance of Third World countries in its struggle against the USSR. In the past, Beijing's efforts have been undercut by its support for radical opposition groups in many of these countries. While China has been reluctant to sever ties completely with some of these groups--especially in Southeast Asia where it fears the Vietnamese or Soviets would step in--it has sharply curtailed this kind of activity in order to clear the way for a rapid

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and more effective expansion of conventional diplomacy.

There appear to be no serious domestic challenges to China's current foreign policy line. In party meetings this December, China's leaders formally pronounced the handling of foreign affairs "correct and successful," blessing the pragmatic policy of rapidly expanding political and economic relations with the West and Japan. On balance, Beijing indeed can take considerable satisfaction from the results of its new approach. The securing of the Peace and Friendship Treaty with Japan and the normalization of relations with the United States are seen in Beijing as important steps toward China's hoped-for global cooperation against Soviet hegemonism. The Chinese view both agreements as providing new opportunities to concentrate their own limited resources and direct those of Japan and the West against the USSR. Conversely--although Beijing seems reconciled to a SALT agreement--there has been as yet no major rapprochement in Soviet-US relations. The Chinese do not perceive a marked warming trend in Moscow's relations with Western Europe and have worked to consolidate their own ties in this region. Relations with West European governments are limited, however, by differing policy goals. West European governments are forced to give more thought to the effect of their relations with China on detente with the USSR. China's successful restoration of party ties with Belgrade and the felicitous tour last summer by Hua Guofeng, (Hua Kuo-feng) of Yugoslavia and Romania represented a marked gain in Eastern Europe and a painful goad to Moscow.

There are, of course, debit items on China's foreign policy balance sheet. In general the Chinese remain militarily and economically weak compared to the superpowers. Beijing is unable to project effectively its power far from its borders. Heightened awareness of China's own domestic needs has led Beijing to reduce its economic and military foreign aid. Instead of large projects, such as the Tanzam railroad, China now gives modest economic and military aid in situations where it will have a maximum anti-Soviet impact, such as in Tanzania or Zambia, and in supporting several liberation movements in southern Africa. Particularly in the field of military aid, however, Beijing realizes that it cannot outdo Moscow in open competition. (China's recent shipment

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of obsolescent MIG-19s to Egypt was more important as a symbolic gesture than as a move of practical military significance.)

This leaves Beijing dependent on the United States to meet the Soviet challenge in a way that will benefit China. Beijing, even after normalization of relations, remains highly uncertain and often dissatisfied with US resolve. For example, Vice Premier Deng's recent statement that China could do little to influence events in Iran has been coupled with implicit messages of reproach for the United States.

On the other hand, the Chinese have attempted to change unwelcome trends in a region where they have some leverage--Indochina. Hanoi's tilt toward Moscow over the past year, its occupation of Kampuchea, and a series of incidents in the Sino-Vietnamese border damaged Chinese prestige. China sought to restore Vietnamese respect for Chinese interests by mounting a limited invasion of Vietnam. The results have been mixed. Beijing has demonstrated its willingness to act forcefully when circumstances permit, and it has successfully tweaked the nose of Vietnam's Soviet ally, but Hanoi's Vietnamese forces remain in Kampuchea and Hanoi remains within the Soviet camp. More positively, with the exception of Indonesia, Southeast Asian governments probably view the invasion as a demonstration of China's usefulness as a check on Vietnam. Aside from further souring China's relations with the Soviets and their allies, the invasion appears not to have damaged seriously other parts of Chinese foreign policy.

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Regional Survey

Relations with Japan. China's main trading partner, Japan, is expected to play a major role in Beijing's drive for economic modernization. In February 1978 China signed a \$20 billion trade agreement with Japan. Japanese firms hope to engage in a wide spectrum of industrial projects, such as helping China drill for oil in the southern Bohai (Pohai) Gulf, building a multi-million-dollar steel plant near Shanghai, and aiding the Chinese electronics industry. Tokyo has refused, however, to help China modernize its military forces and purely military industries.

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Beijing's current reexamination of its economic priorities and its commitments for imports of advanced industrial equipment and technology have raised questions about the future extent of Japanese participation on China's industrialization program. Beijing may not go through with all the projects in which Tokyo is interested. Chinese officials have made clear, however, that they intend to honor all of their agreements with Japanese firms.

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Financing is the major obstacle. In their discussions, both sides have shown themselves to be astute bargainers, with Beijing using the threat of US and West European competition to induce the Japanese to offer favorable terms and interest rates.

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Japan also is important to China strategically and in Beijing's scheme to contain the USSR. The Chinese believe they achieved a coup by including an antihegemony clause in the Peace and Friendship Treaty signed last summer. Although the Soviets have criticized the clause, Moscow did not retaliate harshly against Japan. At this point the climate of Soviet-Japanese relations suggests that both sides want to keep bilateral affairs on a constructive track. The Chinese also have urged Japan to improve its defense capabilities and maintain security ties with the United States.

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Once more, however, China faces a situation of "same bed, different dreams." Tokyo has no desire to engage in an anti-Soviet crusade. Chinese efforts to create the illusion of Sino-Japanese military cooperation, such as the visit to Tokyo of Deputy Chief of the General Staff Ziang Caigian (Chang Tsai-chien) have been greeted circumspectly. Even the visit of Vice Premier Deng last October to sign the Peace and Friendship Treaty did not shake Japanese determination to avoid creating the appearance of a broad alliance with China.

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Nevertheless, the Chinese probably estimate that their diplomacy with Japan over the last year has resulted in a net gain. In the long run they probably are relying on economic lures, Japan's own strategic perceptions, historical cultural affinities, and popular Japanese anti-Russian feelings to keep Japan tilted

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toward China in the Sino-Soviet context. In the context of Chinese-Japanese-US relations, Beijing will be content indefinitely with the primacy Tokyo gives to its relationship with Washington. Indeed, the Chinese endorse the stationing of US forces in Japan and hope for increased US strength in the Western Pacific as a counterweight to the USSR. [REDACTED]

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The Korean Problem. Both China and the USSR have a manifest interest in maintaining the status quo in Korea. Both recognize that a major conflict there would seriously complicate their relations with the United States. They also worry that sharply increased tensions in Korea could stimulate dramatic changes in Japanese security policy and introduce new uncertainties into the overall power balance in East Asia. Since 1973, Beijing has become Pyongyang's major source of political, economic, and military assistance, winning in return North Korean support for China's major foreign policy positions. But the competing nature of Beijing's two principal objectives in Korea--the maintenance of stability on the Peninsula and the preservation of a North Korean tilt toward Beijing in the Sino-Soviet dispute--reduces the leverage China derives from its role as North Korea's main great-power ally. Beijing is well aware that Kim's present pro-Chinese stance is based more on Soviet unwillingness to compete seriously for Pyongyang's favor in terms of political, military, and economic assistance than on any positive North Korean commitment. The Chinese remain sensitive to any sign of Moscow's reentering the bidding or of renewed overtures on the part of Kim to the Soviet Union. [REDACTED]

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Beijing is careful to support North Korean reunification policies without getting out in front of Pyongyang on these issues. China backs Pyongyang's demand for US troop withdrawal and approves, with a North Korean bias, the recently renewed North-South talks at Panmunjom. During his recent travels, Vice Premier Deng clearly expressed China's unwillingness to consider approaches such as cross recognition of the two Koreas or a major power conference on the Korean question that would risk reversing Pyongyang's tilt toward China. In return, China receives carefully modulated Korean political support on such issues as the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea. Pyongyang voiced no opinion, however, of

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the Chinese invasion of Vietnam. China's setback in Kampuchea and difficulties with Vietnam could cause Beijing to pay greater attention to protecting its eastern flank against Soviet encirclement and become even less willing to put new strains on its relationship with Pyongyang. 


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Southeast Asia. Sino-Vietnamese rivalry--in evidence long before the end of the Indochina war in 1975--originates from a conflict of regional interests. China long has seen Vietnam to be intent on becoming a regional power, challenging Beijing's influence in Southeast Asia and among the region's Communist movements. The Chinese saw the conclusion late last year of the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between Moscow and Hanoi as evidence of Vietnamese willingness to further its own interests by acting as a Soviet cat's-paw. Disputes over small areas on the Sino-Vietnamese border and islands in the South China Sea further poisoned the atmosphere and gave Beijing issues it could manipulate to put pressure on the government in Hanoi. 

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With the end of the war in 1975, Kampuchea quickly became the focal point of the Sino-Vietnamese controversy. The wartime constraints that had muted the Sino-Vietnamese dispute quickly evaporated. Beijing, supporting the status quo, concentrated on cultivating ties with the non-Communist states of Southeast Asia and on exploiting heightened Southeast Asian fears of Vietnamese aggression. The focal point of Chinese strategy was Kampuchea. Beijing saw its bitterly anti-Vietnamese client regime in Phnom Penh as an obstacle to Vietnamese domination of all of Indochina and to the expansion of Vietnamese, and by extension, Soviet, influence throughout the region. In short, Kampuchea became the leading marker in a new Chinese version of the domino theory. 

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The fall of Kampuchea acted as a catalyst. Hanoi directly challenged Chinese prestige in Southeast Asia and Beijing's credibility as an effective counterweight to a Soviet-backed Vietnam. These circumstances, combined with bilateral Sino-Vietnamese disputes, prompted Beijing to a limited invasion of Vietnam as a method of redressing the situation by demonstrating Hanoi's vulnerabilities and Chinese willingness to act if provoked, despite Hanoi's Soviet treaty. 

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At this early date, the results of the invasion appear mixed. The contestants apparently will proceed to negotiate, although the talks may be used mainly to score political points off each other and there is little likelihood that a definitive settlement of their differences will soon be reached. Tension on the Sino-Vietnamese border is likely to remain high for a considerable period. Hanoi continues its war in Kampuchea, China continues its support for the anti-Vietnamese resistance. Vietnam is more dependent on the USSR, and Soviet naval vessels have visited Vietnamese ports.

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Although perhaps reassuring to Southeast Asian governments who fear Vietnam, in the long run China's military action also may reinforce historical fears of Chinese domination. Governments in Malaysia and Indonesia view the large overseas Chinese populations in the region as potential fifth columns for Chinese Communist subversion. Beijing's refusal to abandon its links to regional Communist movements--largely out of fear that Soviet and Vietnamese influence would quickly fill the vacuum--kindles further apprehensions. The prospect of a modernizing, more powerful China, is in itself intimidating to many Southeast Asians. Regardless of how the present confrontation plays itself out, the non-Communist states of Southeast Asia will continue to seek a strong US economic and political role in the region and attempt to limit their involvement in the Sino-Vietnamese and Sino-Soviet conflict to a minimum.

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Western Europe. Western Europe is a major element in Beijing's concept of containment. In the past two years scores of important Chinese officials have visited there in pursuit of political, economic, and military goals. The interests of China and various West European governments are not identical, however, putting limits to Sino-West European rapprochement. For example, the reactions of West European governments to the Chinese search for modern arms has been mixed--France and Great Britain appear the most receptive, West Germany and Sweden the most reluctant. Italy appears ambivalent. The interests of each government vis-a-vis the USSR appear the key element and Soviet pressure not to sell arms to China clearly slows the process. Even in the case of France and Britain, no major new armaments contracts have been signed, although bargaining is under way.

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Chinese doctrine and propaganda portray Soviet activity in the Middle East and Africa as a scheme for the eventual neutralization or "Finlandization" of Western Europe. As a result, Beijing advocates a more powerful NATO and encourages greater West European unity, strength, and self-reliance. [REDACTED]

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Beijing also encourages the major West European nations to cooperate with Third World nations. The motive is again anti-Sovietism, illustrated by China's endorsement of active French support for the Mobutu government of Zaire in turning back what China characterizes as a Soviet-inspired invasion of Shaba last spring. [REDACTED]

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Additionally, the industrial nations of Western Europe rank with the United States and Japan as potential sources of industrial imports, technological expertise, and advanced education. Last year China concluded a trade agreement with the European Economic Community. China's reexamination of its economic priorities and modernization programs, however, creates uncertainty about the future of Sino - West European trade and may dampen enthusiasm among West European businessmen about future trade. [REDACTED]

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Up to now Beijing has demonstrated interest in a wide variety of expensive goods from Western Europe, including mining machinery from Great Britain and West Germany, West German electronic and satellite communications equipment, and help in improving domestic transport from the Netherlands and Denmark. Every major West European nation, with the possible exception of Spain, has received feelers about industrial prospects. As for military equipment, an incomplete list includes antitank missiles and helicopters from France, ships and Harrier aircraft from Britain, and naval equipment and electronic gear from Italy. Over the past two years Chinese military delegations have examined military equipment and technology from every major West European arms industry. China also uses these visits to create an impression in Moscow of burgeoning cooperation between Western Europe and China. [REDACTED]

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Eastern Europe. China's main goal in Eastern Europe is to encourage independence among Moscow's satellites. Relations with independent Romania and Yugoslavia have improved, while ties with Albania have deteriorated sharply. State relations with the other East European Communist regimes are correct at best, and party relations are nonexistent, the latter by Beijing's choice. Despite its increasing industrialization, the region is not expected to play a significant role in China's plans for economic modernization. [REDACTED]

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China has enjoyed excellent state, party, and military relations with Romania for many years, with the Chinese naturally endorsing President Ceausescu's attempt to maintain a degree of independence from Moscow. Last summer Yugoslavia and Romania played host to Chairman Hua Guofeng's first excursion outside East Asia. Since President Tito's visit to Beijing a year earlier, relations had improved, including renewed party ties. Both countries are concerned about Soviet intentions toward Yugoslavia after Tito's death. The Chinese also regard the aged Yugoslav leader as a useful ally in opposing Soviet and Cuban attempts to manipulate the nonaligned movement to Moscow's advantage. Given the sensitivity of Yugoslav and Romanian relations with the USSR, Beijing has been circumspect in its military contacts with both countries. Tito in particular is careful not to let his relations with China severely damage his relations with the Soviets, thus providing a limit to Sino-Yugoslav rapprochement. [REDACTED]

South Asia and the Middle East. Beijing is interested in regional stability here in order to curb Soviet expansion. The Chinese favor negotiation of regional problems in order to preclude Soviet involvement. [REDACTED]

Although China lacks the capability to wield great influence, it pursues an active diplomacy in South Asia and the Middle East. Chinese-Indian relations have improved since the Indo-Pakistani war of 1971. While under no illusions that the current Indian Government will sharply curtail its ties with the USSR, the Chinese believe that New Delhi is pursuing a more independent approach than in the era of Indira Gandhi. The major bilateral issues dividing Beijing and New Delhi are conflicting border claims and lingering Indian resentment about the China-India border war of 1962. The Chinese do not expect an early settlement of the border problem

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but appear satisfied that the visit to Beijing in February of Indian Foreign Minister Vajpayee was useful in putting Sino-Indian relations on a better footing. Vajpayee was miffed that China invaded Vietnam during the visit and cut it short, but the Indian Government too appears satisfied with its bilateral aspects and will cautiously continue to improve relations with China.

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China is attempting to combine pursuit of better relations with India with maintenance of its close relations with Pakistan. Over the years China has given Pakistan considerable diplomatic, economic, and military assistance in order to balance Islamabad against New Delhi and to prevent Pakistan from drifting toward the USSR. At the moment, however, Beijing appears most concerned about the effect on Pakistan of increased Soviet influence in Afghanistan. The Chinese are apprehensive that should Afghanistan press its territorial demands against Pakistan, Islamabad would ask Moscow to intercede with Kabul, thus opening the door to Soviet influence. Conversely, Beijing hopes Pakistan will avoid giving the Soviets an opening by becoming directly involved in supporting insurgency in Afghanistan. Uneasiness over the situation in the area prompts Beijing to urge the United States to understand Pakistan's concerns and supply military aid to Islamabad.

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China is even more concerned about developments in Iran. Beijing previously regarded Iran as a major anti-Soviet bulwark in the Middle East and an important friend of Pakistan. The Chinese fear that Moscow will use the turmoil in Iran to increase its influence in the Persian Gulf. Chinese officials associate Soviet gains in the Horn of Africa and South Yemen with the upheaval in Iran as aspects of a Soviet effort to surround the oil-producing states of the Arabian Peninsula with pro-Soviet regimes. Beijing is concerned that such developments will force the Saudis and others to adopt a more balanced policy between the US and the USSR, ultimately complicating the West's energy problems. Beijing sees one ray of hope in Ayatollah Khomeini's anti-Sovietism. Chinese propaganda has criticized Beijing's former friend the Shah, thus laying the groundwork for building relations with the new regime.

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China has tried to counter the USSR diplomatically by improving its relations with most Middle East governments, except those of Israel and Saudi Arabia. Last year high-ranking Chinese officials visited nearly every Middle Eastern capital, with mixed results. China's major success was with Egypt, where cordial relations were further enhanced by a shipment of MIG-19 fighters for Cairo's weakened Air Force. Relations with Syria remained stagnant, while those with Iraq improved mildly. Chinese regional influence, however, failed to grow appreciably. [redacted]

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China's relations with Egypt have been further strengthened by Beijing's support for President Sadat's efforts to achieve a settlement with Israel. Beijing privately welcomed the recently signed Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, but has refrained from endorsing the treaty publicly lest their relations with hardline Arab governments suffer. Chinese officials, however, believe the treaty will bring only limited relief from Middle East tensions. They are concerned that Sadat be isolated in the Arab world and worry that the unresolved Palestinian problem will continue to embroil Arabs with Israelis and Arabs with each other. Beijing is happy that Moscow has been excluded from the settlement process so far, but is not as sanguine about the prospects for completely eliminating the Soviets regional role. [redacted]

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Africa. China has lavished attention on Africa for 15 years, yet the leadership in Beijing may wonder if the political return has been worth the effort. Economic and military aid has flowed to a number of African governments, especially Tanzania, Zambia, Sudan, and Somalia. China's greatest foreign aid project has been the Tanzam railroad. Despite this effort, China lost influence rapidly after the Angolan civil war when it quickly backed away from the heightened competition with the USSR. Later, a promising relationship with Ethiopia disappeared when China was unable to compete with the Soviets in the provision of arms. [redacted]

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Over the past year Beijing has started to recoup. Numerous high-ranking Chinese officials visited Africa, the most recent high point being the visit last month of Vice Premier Li Xiannian (Li Hsien-nien), to Tanzania, Zambia, Zaire, and Mozambique. Li is the highest ranking

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Chinese official to visit Africa since the tour of the late Premier Zhou Enlai in the mid-1960s. [REDACTED]

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By restoring its own prestige and influence, China seeks to curtail that of the USSR. The Chinese appear particularly interested in the situations in Southern Africa, the Horn, and Zaire. China hopes for negotiated settlements in both Rhodesia and Namibia because it believes fighting will work to the advantage of the USSR. China has urged greater US pressure on Ian Smith and on the South African Government to force them to come to terms with their black opponents. Beijing, which backs the Zimbabwe African National Union of Robert Mugabe, does not support Smith's "internal solution." [REDACTED]

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Through experience, the Chinese know that while African leaders may accept Beijing as a useful balancer in their relations with the USSR, China cannot compete with Moscow as a source of arms once African security concerns become paramount. Nevertheless, China keeps its hand in as a military supplier rather than leave the field to the Soviets. In the past year Beijing has given modest amounts of military aid to Tanzania and Zaire, and MIG-19s and tanks to Zambia, as well as strong diplomatic support to Zaire during each invasion of Shaba. [REDACTED]

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Anti-Soviet motives also led to limited Chinese military assistance for Somalia in its losing war against Soviet- and Cuban-supported Ethiopia. Since the war China has continued to supply arms, probably for the Somali guerrillas in Ogaden. Conscious of its own limitations, however, Beijing hopes that US diplomacy and aid, supplemented by West European efforts, will limit Soviet encroachments. [REDACTED]

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Beijing's pragmatism also is evident in the decision to discuss establishment of diplomatic relations with the Soviet-supported Neto government in Angola. The Chinese probably wished to take advantage of Neto's desire to expand his diplomatic and political ties. They also probably calculated that China's holdout had only left the field open to the Soviets and Cubans. [REDACTED]

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Latin America. This region has not been as important to Chinese foreign policy as are other areas, although last year Beijing evidenced new interest. Vice Premier Keng Piao visited several Latin American and Caribbean nations. China's relations with Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina appear particularly cordial. Beijing has signed a major "iron ore for oil" agreement with Brazil, and Argentina is an important supplier of grain for China. [REDACTED]

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China's main opponent in Latin America is Cuba. Beijing regards Havana as a Soviet surrogate. Sino-Cuban relations have soured as Cuban intervention in Africa has increased. Beijing also attempts to counter Cuban attempts to dominate the nonaligned movement. [REDACTED]

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In the future, China probably will continue working to expand diplomatic relations in Latin America, hoping that momentum has been generated by Sino-US normalization. Beijing is likely to continue to encourage visits by Latin American leaders to China, and may reciprocate by sending an occasional high-ranking delegation. Beijing also is likely to continue its efforts to expand Sino - Latin American economic relations, with economic criteria acquiring increasing importance as a measure of suitability for major deals. [REDACTED]

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