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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

January 30, 1978

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MEMORANDUM FOR DR. ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Human Rights Policy

I am enclosing a report prepared by S/P
for your information. The report contains one
bureau's assessment of the Administration's
human rights policy one year after its inception.

Peter Tarnoff
Executive Secretary

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
PER 3/11/91 SKH/RE:KIR-NLS-91-12
BY Jgy NARS DATE 4/1/91

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ACTION MEMORANDUM

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January 20, 1978

TO : The Secretary
THROUGH: D - Warren Christopher *WC*
FROM : S/P - Anthony Lake *AL*

The Human Rights Policy:
An Interim Assessment

The attached memorandum takes stock of the human rights policy, one year on. It begins with a description of what we have done, and especially of how much the policy actually has affected our economic or military programs. This review is useful to have, but may be the least interesting part of the paper.

You might want to begin with our assessment of accomplishments (pp 5-6) and of whether there have been setbacks (to human rights, on p 6, and to other American interests, on pp 7-10). The paper then discusses the problem of consistency: ways in which we are being less, or perhaps in some cases more, consistent than we should aim for (pp 11-15).

The memorandum ends with recommendations for future directions:

-- A Presidential Decision would help to clarify to the bureaucracy how the President views the policy, its application, and the range of instruments being used. (A draft reportedly is with the President).

-- We badly need country strategy papers that will integrate our human rights interests with other American concerns in each country, and give useful guidance for coherent application of all our instruments of influence.

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
PER *Blukis* *sk* *hr* RE *102-NLC-91-12*
BY *Jay* NARS. DATE *4/17/91*

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-- Our country strategies should try to emphasize what is most likely to be effective in improving human rights situations, rather than what decisions will make us look consistent.

-- We need better procedures to integrate our economic with our military assistance decisions.

-- We have hard choices to make on compliance with the legal requirements about our role in International Financial Institutions.

-- We should look for more ways to multilateralize our human rights efforts, both to reduce suspicions of a smug American moralism and to further enlist the weight of world opinion in conjunction with our efforts.

-- We should draw more attention to what we are doing to correct our human rights problems in this country.

-- We need to do a better job of explaining, at home and abroad, the complexities of our policy and the reasons for some apparent inconsistencies.

The memorandum was written by my staff and we take responsibility for its judgments. But we have solicited the opinions of many others -- in HA, D, EB, H, T, IO, the regional Bureaus, and AID. Most were eager to express what they do and don't like about how the policy is working and the paper tries to reflect their opinions, with indications of important disagreements within this building. Some still think the overall tone and thrust are wrong. Comments range from "Pollyannaish" to "overly negative".

We believe this memorandum might be useful at the White House, and suggest that it be sent under cover of a Tarnoff-Brzezinski memorandum.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachment

Tab A - Memorandum: The Human Rights Policy: an interim assessment

cc: P - Mr. Habib
E - Mr. Cooper
T - Mrs. Benson
HA - Ms. Derian

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

BRIEFING MEMORANDUM

SS

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TO : The Secretary
THROUGH: The Deputy Secretary
FROM : S/P - Anthony Lake
SUBJECT: The Human Rights Policy: An Interim Assessment

The human rights policy is off to a good start but, to no one's surprise, problems remain. In the following paragraphs we apply hindsight to the year's experience, with deliberate emphasis on problem areas and what now needs to be done.

I. What Are We Actually Doing?

Human rights advocacy has become a standard, visible, and important feature of our diplomacy. The President has repeatedly emphasized that it is a cardinal tenet of his foreign policy--a theme you and other key officials have elaborated in speeches. Early in the Administration we signed the UN Covenants and the American Convention on Human Rights (but have yet to send them to the Hill for ratification). We have made scores of diplomatic demarches on the specific human rights problems of individual countries. Not least important, discussion of our human rights concerns has been integrated into all our dealings with foreign governments--from the President's and your own private conversations, to the most routine dealings of Embassy and Department desk officers with their foreign counterparts. The very pervasiveness of such exchanges makes them hard to quantify or even summarize. But their impact in conveying our seriousness should not be underestimated.

We also have had some months of experience with using more concrete instruments of American influence: bilateral aid programs; International Financial Institutions; and security relationships. These two kinds of actions--diplomatic exchanges and use of our material support--are closely related. For example, we generally put a government on specific notice

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

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BY Jay NARS, DATE 4/12/91

that particular human rights problems would cause us to oppose loans to it before actually abstaining or voting no. We often use the occasion of a positive vote to make some form of human rights demarche--warning that continued positive votes will be difficult absent improvement, or advising that only certain apparent or promised improvements make it possible for us to be positive.

Bilateral Aid

Our bilateral aid programs are designed to serve basic human needs, and so intrinsically promote human rights. Consequently, only in extraordinary circumstances have we cut or delayed programs in order to signal objection to a repressive government:

-- We are suspending new programs to the Central African Empire, partly in response to Congressional pressure;

-- We have been deferring decision on some loans to Nicaragua since mid-September, in order to assess what appear to be human rights improvements there;

-- After press reports of our decision to delay some assistance to Chile, Santiago cancelled our FY 77 program and it is not in future AID budgets;

-- We have reduced the PL 480 allocation to Guinea, and increased it to Peru, on human rights grounds;

-- We appear to have indefinitely delayed one CCC credit to Chile, and the Interagency Group on Foreign Assistance and Human Rights is also available for advice to ExIm when the latter requests (as it has done on Uruguay and Argentina).

But most of our bilateral effort has focused not on determining who is a deserving recipient of aid, but rather on ensuring that it does in fact promote human rights:

-- \$750,000 was earmarked in AID's FY 78 budget for projects which promote civil and political rights (e.g., legal aid for the poor).

-- We are beginning to implement the new legislative requirement that human rights violators which receive PL 480 Title I assistance report on how food or the proceeds from its sale is used to "directly benefit needy people."

Reporting requirements have been signed with Indonesia and Guinea and negotiations are underway with Bangladesh, South Korea, Zaire and Somalia. They may begin with a few others.

Human rights concerns may cut more deeply into AID programs--including country allocations--in the future, beginning with the 1979 budget. This is a difficult and controversial business since, even though AID money can be reprogrammed to other countries, we would be reducing aid specifically designed to benefit needy people in a particular country in order to express disapproval of their government and try to influence its performance on civil or political human rights.

The International Financial Institutions

The human rights policy has had greater--and more visible--impact on our role in International Financial Institutions, especially on loans for industrial development which seldom meet the "basic human needs" criteria. Since the Carter Administration took office we have abstained from voting on eleven loans on human rights grounds (to Ethiopia, Benin, Argentina, the Philippines, Korea and the CAE) and voted against seven (to Chile, Argentina and Guinea).

We have not thus far formally opposed any loans when our opposition would have meant their defeat. We only have veto power over the IDB's Fund for Special Operations (FSO), and in several cases we have indicated that we might oppose an FSO loan if it came to a vote; in most, the applicant government has chosen to hold it back. Some \$143,252,000 worth of loans are currently being held up because of our action--to Chile, Paraguay, Uruguay and Nicaragua.

Few other participants in IFI deliberations have joined us in opposing loans on human rights grounds. West European opposition to loans for the Pinochet regime began before ours. Venezuela recently abstained on one loan to Chile. British and Swedish representatives in the IDB recently put on record that they would have opposed a loan to Argentina had they national votes; but the European regional group of which they are a part cast its collective vote in favor.

Security Assistance and Sales

Human rights considerations have become perhaps the dominant factor in arms transfers to Latin America. This has resulted

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from a combination of factors: Congressional prohibitions (to Argentina and Uruguay); refusals of our security assistance by Brazil, El Salvador, and Guatemala in response to our reporting to Congress on their human rights situations; the low risk of Soviet inroads if our arms flows are reduced; and, possibly, the relatively small economic importance to us of arms sales in the area. Most cases involving major lethal equipment to serious violators have not been approved, at least absent progress on human rights. However, some significant non-lethal items (e.g., C-130's to Argentina) as well as some spare parts, still are approved after careful review.

The great bulk of our arms transfers, however, are to East Asia and the Middle East, and they have been only marginally affected by human rights considerations. We have, for instance, opposed economic loans in IFI's to both South Korea and the Philippines and are including Korea and Indonesia among the problem countries which must report on their use of PL 480 Title I. But base negotiations in the Philippines and troop withdrawal considerations in Korea have thus far led us to continue very large security assistance programs to both. There has been some impact on security relations with Indonesia, where sale of F-5 aircraft was made contingent on the actual freeing of some political prisoners whose release already was scheduled.

The East Asian record will be somewhat better in 1979. Human rights considerations have contributed to adjustments in allocations, especially for military training, for Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand. This probably is known by the recipient governments (although they could rationalize their cuts as flowing from Congressional reduction of the overall budget). But the general public perception is likely to be of continued high levels of security assistance.

Similarly, in the Middle East, our desire to move Arabs and Israelis toward a peace settlement and the importance of Mideast oil have kept arms sales high.

Nor have the human rights considerations cut into arms transfers to black Africa, either because the amounts sold are minimal or because of an interest in supporting "moderate" governments (e.g., Morocco and Zaïre).

Finally, although we are working toward a policy of reviewing straight commercial sales to police forces of items not on the munitions list, no decision has yet been reached.

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II. Human Rights Accomplishments and Setbacks

What Have We Accomplished?

The human rights policy has helped us at least as much as it has produced changes abroad. Our post-Vietnam, post-Watergate image has been greatly improved. To a large degree we have taken the ideological initiative from the Soviets. This boosts our standing--and that of traditional friends--in Europe, and helps in our relations with a number of LDC's. The policy is especially appealing--and encouraging--to many people living under repressive regimes.

This underscores what many of us frequently forget--the US is a model for many countries; our influence transcends our political, economic, and military power and is strikingly important in ethical, cultural, and value areas; other governments find themselves unable entirely to ignore the impact of US policy and actions--particularly when we join action to rhetoric.

Our championship of human rights is encouraging others to do likewise. Activity in the UN and OAS has picked up considerably, and the OAS and Red Cross human rights commissions are being allowed into countries which previously excluded them. The West Europeans are more active both in international fora and in diplomatic dialogue with problem countries. Once-lonely private activists now find themselves deluged with invitations to conferences. Some who long have been working to advance human rights have taken new hope from the Administration's policies; others doubtless are bandwagon-hopping. But they all contribute to a growing international lobby which combines its influence with our own.

Most important, this increased international focus already has led to human rights improvements in several countries. Significant numbers of political prisoners have been released, in Iran, Poland, Morocco, Bangladesh, Pakistan, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Togo, Nepal, the Gambia, Guinea and Indonesia. Iran and Thailand are opening trials of political prisoners for the first time. Emigration from the Soviet Union, some East European states, and Syria, has become a little easier. In some of these countries there also has been backsliding; moreover, we often question whether an improvement is more than cosmetic. Nonetheless, the overall balance is decidedly positive.

No authoritarian regime has fundamentally altered its political system, nor are the hard-core dictatorships likely to take action which they would perceive (in some cases rightly) as political suicide. But some political systems are becoming somewhat freer. The opposition in Brazil is increasingly active. El Salvador and Nicaragua have lifted states of seige. Bolivia, Peru, and Ecuador have announced intentions to hold elections in 1978. The most notable advances in political freedom--in India, Portugal and Spain--were independent of our human rights advocacy; but democratic forces in all three seem to be taking heart from our new focus.

In sum, a trend seems to have begun which could gather momentum and which already is improving the plight of individuals--including those under some still-authoritarian regimes. And since individuals are what the human rights policy is primarily about, even the scattered and partial successes registered to date are important. Moreover, even marginal reductions in repression offer more latitude to dissidents, which in turn contributes to an internal dynamic that may produce further change.

It is neither possible nor very useful to specify the precise weight of our influence in these developments. The important thing is that we are contributing to an international consciousness-raising and a climate conducive to human rights improvements.

Are We Jeopardizing Human Rights Anywhere?

Maybe, at least in the near-term. Worry about the "destabilizing" effect of international attention to human rights may lead some authoritarian regimes to tighten domestic screws. This may already have happened in the Soviet Union and South Africa, where the governments fear that our human rights advocacy has or might stimulate critics of the regime. In both, however, many of those most affected seem to want us to continue our efforts; they apparently believe that the near-term risk is in their own long-range interest.

There may be similar risks elsewhere. In South Korea, for instance, the regime now seems eager to resolve differences with us. But it is possible that human rights behavior, combined with withdrawal of our ground combat troops and the "Koreagate" probe, could produce a seige mentality which would make easing of repression less likely, or indeed even reduce tolerance for domestic dissent.

III. Are We Damaging Other US Interests?

Not yet in any quantifiable way, although the risk always is present when we are pursuing several interests at once.

Eastern Europe

Soviet leaders fear the human rights policy, which they see as an effort to discredit them in world opinion and to undermine the political systems of the Warsaw Pact states. Our early high profile contacts with leading Soviet dissidents, combined with our initial SALT proposals, did badly rock the relationship. And we cannot know just how a general unhappiness with the human rights policy affects the atmosphere of Soviet decision-making across the board. But it does not, in fact, seem yet to have interfered with SALT and other arms control negotiations, or US-Soviet dealings in other areas, where the Soviets seem to be pursuing their specific interests much as usual. Indeed the improvement in US-Soviet relations following the SALT breakthrough during Gromyko's September visit to Washington has survived even the human rights beating Moscow has been taking at the Belgrade CSCE conference. The spillover might in fact work the other way: progress on SALT may be making Soviet leaders more willing (within limits) to stomach our human rights position.

Latin American

Several Latin American governments are at least as unhappy with our promotion of human rights as the Soviets. With some, like Uruguay, Paraguay, and Nicaragua, our bilateral interests are so modest that our prime interest is human rights. This could, of course, become a situation in which the sum is greater than the parts: if enough such governments become sufficiently angry over our human rights approach, there could be a spillover effect which damaged the OAS, and our interests in it. But this is not yet the case: to the contrary, last summer's OAS General Assembly was notable for a surge of human rights enthusiasm.

And in those Latin American countries where we have more at stake, no concrete damage seems to have been done. Our severe criticism of Argentina's human rights record did not prevent it from agreeing to make some nuclear non-proliferation commitments during the Secretary's November visit; and it is highly unlikely that Brazil would have agreed to forego its reprocessing agreement with West Germany even had we had no

human rights policy. We cannot know what price we might one day pay for the deterioration in our once close military relationships with Brazil and Argentina. That obviously depends in part on the political evolution of the countries themselves--an evolution to which the human rights policy, if successful, could contribute positively.

Middle East

The impact of our human rights policy on US interests in Middle Eastern countries has been modest. Few of them are recipients of economic assistance and, as noted, we have not put primary emphasis on human rights considerations, in view of our other pressing interests, when deciding on arms sales or determining our approach to the area generally. The quiet diplomacy we have undertaken in the region has been palatable to the governments concerned, and shown some success (e.g., in increased Jewish emigration from Syria).

Africa

The human rights policy, far from damaging our interests with African governments, has served them. This is partly because the chief targets of our criticism have been South Africa and Rhodesia, and that greatly enhances our stature in the area as a whole. We have refrained from criticism of the human rights problems of frontline states whose support we want in southern Africa (e.g. Tanzania, which has more political prisoners than South Korea). Our criticism of Uganda is not so enthusiastically endorsed by other African governments, but certainly does not hurt us with them; that criticism, moreover, has been somewhat muted because of the American citizens who remain there.

Nor have other US interests been damaged in South Africa itself. The human rights policy does not seem to have reduced Pretoria's cooperation on Rhodesia and Namibia, where it continues to act in consonance with what it sees as its national interests. The government's sense of international isolation could, however, in time affect its nuclear weapons policies.

Ethiopia's closure of US facilities and expulsion of American personnel probably stemmed more from the new regime's desire to seek a more ideologically compatible political and military relationship with Moscow than from unhappiness with our human rights advocacy. And Guinea--so far--continues to deny overflight and refueling rights to Soviet reconnaissance aircraft, despite our opposition to loans to it and our action on its PL 480 allocation.

In much of Africa, like much of Latin America, promotion of human rights is our chief interest. Since a number of African leaders either have good human rights records (Gambia, Senegal, Liberia) or are working actively to improve them (Rwanda, the Sudan, Nigeria, Upper Volta), our human rights policy is more often supportive of local efforts there than in Latin America.

East Asia

The greatest risk to other US interests from the human rights policy may be in East Asia, and especially in Korea. It is possible that North Korea might miscalculate the degree of deterioration in US-ROK relations; or that US-Korean tensions (including over human rights) could make South Korea harder to deal with on a range of issues, including nuclear ones.

Other potential victims of the human rights policy could be President Marcos' cooperative stance toward re-negotiation of our base rights in the Philippines, and our close relations with Indonesian leaders. But both governments would balance their irritation with our human rights policies against their own interest in preserving the security and economic relationships. So far, they clearly are coming down in favor of the latter.

More broadly in Asia there is confusion about US purposes and uncertainty about the validity of our commitments to long-standing friends. The human rights policy is not primarily responsible, but it is a contributing factor. This could in time effect our relations even with those in the region (e.g. Japan) whose own human rights practices we are not criticizing.

International Financial Institutions

Some believe that we also risk damaging the IFIs, by politicizing their work in violation of their charters. This did not start with the Carter Administration. We opposed loans to Allende's Chile on political grounds, and long have used our influence to channel international lending to anti-Communist regimes. Nonetheless, no country has heretofore made non-economic considerations so consistently and overtly a factor in its attitude to IFI loans. This could come back to haunt us if other governments decide non-economic criteria should be applied to governments we want to support. (The discrepancy between our alleged politicization of the IFIs, and our departure from the ILO because others had politicized it, is widely noted) We also are inadvertently strengthening Congressional opponents of the institutions.

West European governments have mixed feelings about what we are doing. The British, French, and West Germans have asked for advance notice of our negative votes; the EC has asked for "cooperative exploration" of how to pursue human rights concerns in the IFIs; and Sweden has asked us to consult with the Nordic Group.

Some of these requests for consultation may suggest interest in joining us; others from a hope of putting a check on what some European financial officials see as a dangerous American practice.

* * * * *

This survey of all the damage our human rights advocacy might have caused to other US interests--but hasn't--is a useful reminder that other governments' concrete interest in cooperation with us is often as great as ours with them, and sometimes greater. In the past we sometimes have made the mistake of acting as though we were the only party with much at stake in a relationship, and so must avoid giving offense. Obviously there is a point where national pride or general irritation could loom larger than practical considerations for some governments. Anticipating that point remains one of our chief tasks. But the need of others for us--in security or economic or diplomatic relations--usually is great enough to give us considerable room for human rights advocacy, without serious damage to other US interests.

Beyond the specific and quantifiable, however, there is a perhaps greater danger that we will come to be seen as the self-appointed guardian of the world's morals, having shifted from an anti-Communist crusade to one equally sanctimonious. If our human rights policy should come to be seen as designed to further some definition of US geopolitical interests, it would not only damage our ability to press the human rights cause, but also make us suspect on other issues. This could be especially damaging to North-South relations. The same human rights policy which many in the third world admire in principle could, as it works out in practice, make us seem insensitive to LDC economic development needs as perceived by the LDCs themselves. So far, the human rights policy has gone far to reverse situations where cooperation with us was based more on need than respect. A perception of moral arrogance and/or hypocrisy in our human rights advocacy could shift the balance once again.

IV. Are We Being Consistent?

No. And we should not try to be completely so. There are times when security considerations, or broader political factors, lead us to be "softer" on some countries' human rights performance than others. Moreover, it often is a close call just what action is most likely to produce improvement in a human rights situation. We sometimes, for instance, approve a loan in recognition of a positive trend--even though the overall situation in the country remains as bad or worse than that in countries whose loans we oppose. One of the most difficult questions in the human rights business is what actions on our part are most likely to encourage a government to believe that further progress is worthwhile, without leading it to think we believe its human rights problem is solved. This can only be done on a case-by-case basis, and some of our decisions will turn out to have been wrong.

That said, we do have potentially serious problems at least with the appearance, and perhaps with the reality, of inconsistency:

Bilateral vs. IFI Loans

We often continue bilateral aid programs to countries whose IFI loans we oppose. We understand that bilateral programs, which we control, are designed to serve basic human needs. But it can look to others as though we are only posturing when our votes will not make a decisive difference, but avoiding action which actually would deny a human rights violator any money.

Economic vs. Military Assistance

We have been far more rigorous in applying human rights criteria to economic assistance, which is designed to help poor people, than military assistance or sales, which are perceived by some as helping governments be repressive. As noted, this is sometimes because we think our own security interests are at stake, or because sales of military equipment contribute to such vital objectives such as oil price stability, or help pay for oil imports. In Korea, it is because we are engaged in a delicate maneuver to reduce our military involvement without damaging our security interests. But the apparent discrepancies in our application of human rights criteria to economic as opposed to military decisions can give the impression that we are less interested in human rights--including economic development of the LDC's--than in traditional cold war criteria for "friends."

The Weak vs. The Strong

We sometimes seem to be "punishing" countries which don't matter very much to our security or economic interests (Paraguay, Uruguay, the Central African Empire, Benin, Guinea) while glossing over the human rights record of some who do (Iran, Zaire, Saudi Arabia, Israel, the PRC, even, of late, the Soviet Union).

The charge is not always justified. In the case of Israel, our apparent leniency is in fact part of a general strategy to resolve, inter alia, its only serious human rights problem--the military occupation of Arab lands. At the CSCE, we have been harder on Moscow's human rights failings than is generally realized. And when the charge is true, it sometimes is for the good reason that our human rights concerns are being kept in context with other important national interests, or that we are concentrating on countries where we have some hope of being effective (i.e., recipients of our aid) rather than posturing toward, for instance, the PRC. Nonetheless, we risk the unhappy image of being tougher on the weak than the strong.

Regional Discrimination

Our actions can also be read as focusing on Latin America as the best theater for human rights activity, at little risk to other American interests. As earlier noted, we have opposed or urged deferral of 22 IFI loans to Latin America; seven to Africa; and four to East Asia. Our military programs in Latin America have been massively affected by human rights considerations; only marginally so in East Asia; and not at all in the Middle East.

There are reasons for this, some better than others: we have a good deal of leverage in Latin America; more countries there are traditional recipients of our economic and military assistance than in, for instance, East Asia; our security and economic stake is less than in East Asia or the Middle East; Latin American governments are ideologically disinclined to turn to Moscow; we expect more of it because it is part of the West and therefore more culturally attuned to the claims of individual rights; in much of the area there has been a deterioration in human rights situations; and our past support for military regimes in the area does identify us with their excesses. It may also be true, however, that some human rights activists (in and out of government) are more interested in castigating those rightist dictatorships

supported by previous US Administrations than in an evenhanded application of the policy. Whatever our motives, we do risk letting the human rights policy appear to be yet another incarnation of traditional big-stick interventionism, while we shy away from more risky problems in other parts of the world.

Sticks vs. Carrots

We are on record as being more interested in helping governments who are trying to improve their human rights situations than in denying assistance to offenders. In practice, however, we are doing far more of the latter than the former.

Especially in foreign assistance--our chief concrete source of influence--we have been mostly responding to human rights violations. That possibly was inevitable during this first year of a new policy. We have had to decide what position to take on loans as they came forward in the international financial institutions; changing the internal focus of the IFI's so that their lending programs would do more to promote human rights would be harder, and take a lot more time. Even in our bilateral aid programs, which we can control, it is difficult and time consuming (years rather than months) to develop and obtain local and Congressional approval of new programs. Similarly, it is easier--and makes us look better--to reduce or end military programs than to consider how or whether some of them (and especially the training programs) can be used to promote human rights. Thus across-the-board the "reward" approach is lagging well behind the punitive.

Our Criteria: Rhetoric vs. Actions

Finally, we say that all three aspects of human rights (integrity of the person; economic rights; political rights) are equally important. But our loan decisions are in fact much tougher on governments which practice torture, arbitrary arrest and detention, and other violations of the person, than on countries where there is little political liberty. Moreover, while we try to promote economic human rights by supporting "basic human needs" loans even to most serious human rights offenders, we do not give a government's own efforts to promote economic development or equity equal weight with its record on political liberties when assessing its overall human rights performance. (South Korea, most socialist states of Eastern Europe, and Vietnam might rank quite high if we did.)

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We think this is the right approach in the IFIs. To accept a tradeoff of economic progress or equity for a government's locking up its opposition would run counter to American principles, and could undercut public support for the human rights policy. It would mean lowering our sights and abandoning the principle that American resources should promote American values. But to go beyond our present policy, and oppose international developmental assistance to countries which do not meet our standards of political liberty (a parliamentary democracy; a free press) would be going too far toward imposing our standards on the rest of the world. This reflects the point, stated in your Atlanta speech, that building democracies is a longer-term proposition than putting a stop to torture.

The present approach does, however, involve problems. Some we probably have to resign ourselves to living with; others we can try to do something about.

We must expect the resentment of LDC governments over a policy which clashes with their view (and possibly that of many of their citizens as well) of the requirements of their present state of economic and political development. We will encounter charges (some specious, some sincere) of moral arrogance and of insisting, once again, that we know what is best for other people. But we need not resign ourselves to the present lack of appreciation (or even understanding) of what we are doing to promote economic human rights, especially through the basic human needs focus of the AID program. We should try harder to get this message across.

We also need to intensify our efforts to find ways of promoting political rights. As noted above, the "punitive" approach would be inappropriate here; and it is far harder to devise positive action than to react to loans on the IFI agendas. Moreover, some of the possible ways of promoting the economic pluralism that can lead to political openings (e.g., economic assistance which would strengthen the middle class or labor unions in a society that now is an oligarchy), could run counter to the basic human needs approach to AID. This might give us legal problems in dealing with some of the countries where such development might do the most good. But promotion of political rights should not take a backseat to personal and economic ones just because it is harder and because progress will be slower in coming.

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V. Bureaucratic Complexities

The human rights policy is not only complicated substantively; it also is complex and difficult bureaucratically. It crucially affects our bilateral relations with foreign governments--the bread and butter of State Department work--and yet it cuts across areas of responsibility which other government departments (e.g., Treasury or Agriculture) have thought of as their own. Consequently, important decisions are taken in committee sessions from which, sometimes, no one emerges entirely happy. Our case-by-case approach--the absence of clear guidelines that certain human rights violations will always receive certain treatment, much less a "hit list" of the most offending countries--further complicates the process.

For all the problems involved and the resentment of those who feel that their good advice went unheeded, we still think this is the best way to do the human rights business. The issues do go beyond the purview of any one bureau or department. It is a perhaps extreme example of the fact that key foreign policy issues these days are not bilateral or even regional, but functional. But some degree of bureaucratic resentment probably is inevitable.

VI. How Do We Stand With Congress?

Reasonably well at present, but we face potentially serious (and conflicting) pressures.

Those Congressmen most interested in human rights like what we say, but remain skeptical of our actions. Our role in legislation has so far been largely reactive, and is seen by many as damage-limiting. It is generally believed, for instance, that we would not be applying human rights criteria to economic assistance if Congress had not ordered us to do so. Our record on military assistance to human rights offenders is especially criticized.

Congressional unhappiness with perceived softness in our application of the policy, combined with the desire of many Congressmen to seem tough (especially on South Korea), could

produce new proposals not only to shorten our leash in the IFIs, but also for restrictive legislation governing our participation in UN organizations or the IMF. Moves already are afloat to inject human rights concerns into appropriations for the Witteveen Facility. (Such efforts would of course be supported by those who don't like the UN or IFIs for other reasons.) The major coalition of human rights groups intends to focus on security assistance to violators. Congressional unhappiness with our performance could even impede the arms transfers we want to make to South Korea in compensation for troop withdrawals.

Pressure from human rights activists on the Hill is a familiar problem. We may have a new and growing one with Congressmen who fear that our human rights advocacy will interfere with other American interests. The outcry over PL 480 reporting requirements could be a sample of what is to come, especially if the human rights policy does in fact do visible damage to other interests (e.g., if US agricultural exports are hurt, or if the Philippine base negotiations should go sour). The fact that we were carrying out the expressed will of Congress would not greatly lessen the wrath of some of its members who belatedly realized what was going on.

VII. The Lessons of Hindsight

Most of the problems noted above will be with us as long as we have an active human rights policy. They are part of an unavoidable balancing act. But there is room for improvement, and some hard questions need attention.

Policy Reaffirmation

A Presidential Directive would help (the human rights PRM hasn't had one) to clarify to the bureaucracy how the President views the policy, its application, and the range of instruments being used. We understand that a draft is now with the President.

Country Strategies

We badly need country strategy papers that will integrate our human rights interests with other American concerns, and give useful guidance for applying all our instruments of influence. There is still an inclination on the part of many to fight the problem and to avert any measures which may affect

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countries with which they deal. Country strategy papers which took for granted the objectives of our human rights policies and outlined alternative means for achieving these ends, including both incentives, sanctions, and other approaches would vastly contribute to the process of decision making.

Senior policy officials still would have to give time-consuming attention to, for instance, individual loan proposals, in light of the human rights situation at a particular moment and what else was happening (e.g., an important visit or negotiation). But we need a better context for those decisions--general guidance as to the relative weight to be given to our different instruments of leverage in a particular country, and why, and a sense of how to phase in the use of those instruments

The regional bureaus have most at stake here. The tenacity of this Administration's commitment to an active human rights policy is now clear; it is in the bureaus' interest that it be sensibly implemented. Assistant Secretaries and their Deputies (and regional experts in S/P) should consider country action strategies a matter of high priority.

Bureaucratic Gaps

Gaps in our internal procedures would inhibit implementation of coherent country strategies, even if we had them. We especially need better integration of our economic and military assistance decisions. Good country strategies, and a better flow of information about individual decisions between the Interagency Group on Human Rights and Foreign Assistance, on the one hand, and the Arms Control Export Board, on the other, would help. Opinion is divided as to whether there should be a more institutionalized advisory link between the two. We think the various ways of establishing such a link should at least be explored.

The Foreign Assistance Group also should continue to improve its procedures for putting human rights in context of other American interests--and be seen to do so. Regional Bureau experts have recently been playing a larger role (in preparation of the Group's agenda and in introducing issues at its meetings). That trend should be encouraged, and representatives of other Departments also urged to speak not just to a human rights situation or the basic human needs relevance of a loan, but to their view of our overall interests in and strategy toward a problem country.

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Effectiveness

Except for countries whose human rights violations are so serious that legislation requires us to treat them in certain ways, we should try to emphasize what will be effective over what will make us look consistent. That may not prove possible. It certainly would be more time-consuming, since it would be even less clear that a certain kind of human rights violation, wherever it occurred, would require a certain response from us. A more serious problem is that country desk officers might be unable to resist the temptation to say that only quiet diplomacy could ever work in the country with which they have to deal; or, even if we overcame the temptation, we might be unable to convince Congress that we had done so. In that case, we might only provoke legislation which further restricted our flexibility. But it is worth trying to develop country strategies which emphasize effectiveness. It would be essential to consult with human rights activists and critics alike on the Hill about country strategies--not just transmit to them our finished papers--well in advance of our decisions about particular assistance programs.

Our Role in the IFI's

We are required by law to use our voice and vote to promote human rights in the IFI's, including channeling loans to countries with good human rights records; consulting with other donors about standards for meeting basic human needs and promoting human rights; and devising with them mechanisms for acting together. There are various ways (or combinations of ways) we could meet the requirement. Each has advantages and drawbacks.

-- We could try to get other donor countries to join us in applying human rights criteria to their votes. That would increase the risk of politicizing the IFI's; further complicate our relations with LDC's who would suffer not only the onus of our opposition, but also a denial of cash; and might alarm other donors. But failure to do so might lead some Congressmen to believe that we are not serious about using the IFI's to promote human rights, and produce further legislative restrictions on our role in them.

-- We could encourage the UN and OAS Human Rights Commissions to make independent reports to the IFI's. This would be consistent with our desire to multilateralize our human rights policy and to make clear that we are applying internationally recognized standards. But the UN Human Rights Commission in particular is likely to render judgments which we--and Congress--could not accept as objective.

-- We could try to channel IFI lending programs away from human rights violators. This would meet the letter of the law. But since IFI programs are a long time in the pipeline, it could impede our ability to respond to changing human rights conditions.

-- We could try to design IFI programs to meet basic human needs criteria. This might lessen the risk that our votes would politicize the IFI's and would be consistent with the World Bank's own stated intention. It might do more to promote human rights (especially economic rights) than denial of funds, or US opposition to loans that are approved anyway. But it would also reduce our opportunities for demonstrating our disapproval of countries' human rights failings. That might so displease some in Congress that we would face new efforts to reduce our contributions to the IFI's, or to require that we oppose all loans to certain countries. It also would remove a remaining source of support for capital intensive "growth" projects and run counter both to our urging the IFI's to make loans for energy development to non-oil LDC's, and to our argument that a commodities' Common Fund needs no capacity to finance measures such as market development and infrastructure because the development banks meet that need.

The Perception of Arrogance

We should intensify efforts to multilateralize our human rights efforts. This would help reduce suspicions of a holier-than-thou attitude or an ideological crusade against selected states. More important, it would help the cause of human rights, by further enlisting the weight of world opinion.

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We either have done or are doing most of the immediately important things to bring our human rights policy in line with international standards (e.g., signing the UN Covenants and the American Convention on Human Rights) and are working to improve the capacity of both the UN and OAS to deal with human rights issues. We should now be consulting with others--at the UN, in the OAS, and with other regional leaders (e.g., in black Africa)--about their suggestions for effective human rights strategies in their areas, in the context of their own cultural, economic, and political situations. We also should intensify consultations with West Europeans and Canadians--private and official--about what all of us can do to promote human rights.

Perhaps even more important, we should draw more attention to what we are doing to correct our own human rights problems. The general perception seems to be that we've done nothing but allude to our domestic problems in a few speeches. The President's program is better than that, but its human rights impact is dulled because we seldom talk of welfare or tax reform, or proposals for urban renewal, or for youth employment, under a human rights heading. We should make a point of stressing that these are part of our commitment to improve the lot of individual Americans.

In Sum....

Generalized conclusions on such a complex of issues are very risky, and certain to be controversial. But this is the balance S/P draws:

-- The human rights policy may be the best thing this Administration has going for it. It has enormously improved America's international standing and our claim to moral leadership. It already has done quite a lot to help individuals, in widely varying situations, and to contribute to political dynamics that can lead to further improvements. While the potential damage to other American interests needs to be kept in mind, no actual harm has yet been done. That suggests to us that such damage can in fact be avoided.

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-- Any serious human rights policy will be subject to conflicting criticisms. Limiting ourselves to rhetoric and quiet diplomacy would produce (and deserve) charges of superficiality and hypocrisy. Using material pressure (i.e., economic and military assistance) produces charges of moral arrogance. Softening our human rights advocacy in some cases to protect other American interests produces accusations of double standards. Adjusting our tactics in order to try to be effective in different situations produces accusations of inconsistency. There is some justice in most of these criticisms. Any policy as difficult and complex as this inevitably has a debit side. The balance, however, is decidedly positive, and we do not believe a major change of course is called for.

-- But we have not done a good enough job of articulating publicly what we are doing, and why, and the possibilities and limits of what we can hope to accomplish. Both the policy and its execution are far more complex than we have managed to convey. Opinion shapers (including human rights activists) here and abroad are likely to be far more responsive to candid discussions of difficulties, dilemmas, and inevitable inconsistencies, than to generalized rhetoric which seems to gloss over our problems. We have done a lot in a short time to inject new considerations into American foreign policy--to move beyond formal relations with other governments to a concern with how our actions affect people living under those governments. We have done so with encouraging success, and with little if any cost. We can expect to learn from experience and do even better next year. But it is in the nature of the problem that our performance will not become "perfect." We should go on the offensive to convey that message, and especially a sophisticated understanding of the obstacles we confront.

Drafted: S/P: JWalker: jk; eeg
1/16/72; x28613

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

January 31, 1978

MEMORANDUM TO: Robert Lipshutz

From: Joyce Starr *JRS*

Spencer Oliver, the Director of the CSCE Commission, recommended that I prepare an update on the Scharansky and Kuznetsov cases for Ambassador Goldberg.

Attached please find this memorandum which Cliff Brody will cable directly to Goldberg in Belgrade. This copy is for your information and files.

Attachment: 1

*File - Belgrade Conference
for Soviet Dissidents*

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

January 31, 1978

MEMORANDUM TO: Honorable Arthur Goldberg
From: Dr. Joyce Starr
Subject: Update on Scharansky and Kuznetsov Cases

I have met over the last few days with Avital Scharansky and Sylva Zalmanson, wife of Edward Kuznetsov. A number of facts were communicated to me which I thought should be brought to your attention.

With regard to Scharansky:

- 1) Several lawyers from the West during their recent visit to Moscow were told by Apraksyn, the head of the Moscow Bar, that Scharansky's mother (Ida Milgron) had been allowed to see him. Ida Milgron denies she has been offered an opportunity to see her son. In fact, she claims the Procurator told her that she will not be allowed to see Anatoly until after his sentence is proclaimed, indicating that this will be a closed trial. Furthermore, several days ago there appeared in Ida Milgron's mailbox an unofficial letter from the KGB stating that according to Article 360, it is entirely within the bounds of the law that she be denied the opportunity to see her son until after sentence is passed.
- 2) Activists, friends of Scharansky, and his family have not been shown the decree which extended his case for six months despite their many requests to do so.
- 3) The Soviets are apparently in violation of their own laws on criminal procedure in connection with Scharansky's legal defense. According to Soviet law he should be consulted face-to-face and then in writing with regard to his preference on legal representation. Yet the authorities told Scharansky's mother that it is she who must obtain the lawyer. In turn, she has responded that this choice must be made in consultation with her son.
- 4) Over 100 people have been interrogated in this case. One of these is a prisoner in exile who has not seen Scharansky since February 1975, but was threatened with labor camp if he should refuse to testify against Scharansky.

Memorandum to Honorable Arthur Goldberg
January 31, 1978

Page 2

- 5) Scharansky's father is ill with a heart ailment; he had his attack when he learned of the six months' extension of the case.
- 6) Over 20 lawyers in the Soviet Union have refused to take the case. The one lawyer who agreed to do so is Dina Kaminskya, who has since been exiled from the Soviet Union. She is currently in Europe with plans to come to the United States.

With regard to Kuznetsov:

- 1) Kuznetsov has been on a hunger strike since December 17, 1977. He has been forced-fed by the Soviets, and his wife has received information that his throat has been badly damaged. Sylva Zalmanson is, therefore, requesting that a relative or friend be allowed to see her husband to convince him to stop the hunger strike. Sakarov's wife, who is Kuznetsov's aunt, has asked permission to see him, but this request has been repeatedly denied.

I have also been asked to bring to your attention the case of Isaac Zlotzer. Zlotzer is critically ill with cancer and may not live for more than a few months. His wife died of cancer in 1977. Zlotzer requested that he be allowed to leave the Soviet Union to see his children before he dies. The children are in their late 20s and reside in Israel. Zlotzer has never seen his grandchild who is now six years of age.

Finally, HIAS in Rome has recently reported that the 20% rise in emigration figures is due to a marked increase in the emigration of elderly people. Younger Soviet Jews are now informed that due to the Helsinki Agreement providing for non-separation of families, they must take their elderly parents with them if they want to emigrate. Many of these elderly people are pensioners and do not particularly want to emigrate. It was also reported that the emigration figures were higher during the months of October and November, not any higher in December, and that the recent statistics do not represent any major change in policy.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 31, 1978

MEMORANDUM

TO: The Vice President Frank Moore
Hamilton Jordan Jack Watson
Jody Powell Midge Costanza
Stu Eizenstat

FROM: Bob Lipshutz *JP*
Zbig Brzezinski *ZB*

SUBJECT: Meetings with Representatives of Citizens of Foreign
Countries Relating to Human Rights Matters and
Similar Situations

Each of us is fully aware of the basic policy of the Administration in the field of human rights, and of the concern of the President for individual human beings throughout the world.

Within the Department of State we have a section of human rights, which is headed by Patt Derian; her chief assistants are Mark Schneider and Cliff Brody. Jessica Tuchman is directly responsible for human rights matters for the N.S.C.

Because of the various types of actions which are taken by our government in an effort to implement the human rights program, and to help both groups of persons and individual persons in foreign countries, it is important for us to cooperate fully with the Department of State in these matters.

Therefore, we would like to urge that any of us who anticipate meeting with representatives of foreign persons who are dissidents, or writing letters in this regard, or meeting with groups who are concerned with these matters, or giving speeches, first contact Jessica Tuchman, who will coordinate with Patt Derian and request her advice and guidance.

This not only should make your activities more effective and be of great assistance to you, but also it would tend to ensure that actions taken by us are consistent with the plans and actions being taken by the entire Administration, and particularly the Department of State.

Please circulate this memorandum among all of the members of your staff.

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February 17, 1978

Presidential Directive/NSC-30

TO: The Vice President
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense

OSIA
MAY 27 1978
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

ALSO: The Secretary of the Treasury
The Attorney General
The Secretary of Commerce
The Director, Office of Management and Budget
The United States Representative to the
United Nations
The Administrator, Agency for International
Development
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Director, United States Information Agency

SUBJECT: Human Rights

It shall be a major objective of U.S. foreign policy to promote the observance of human rights throughout the world. The policy shall be applied globally, but with due consideration to the cultural, political and historical characteristics of each nation, and to other fundamental U.S. interests with respect to the nation in question.

Specifically:

1. It shall be the objective of the U.S. human rights policy to reduce worldwide governmental violations of the integrity of the person (e.g., torture; cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment; arbitrary arrest or imprisonment; lengthy detention without trial, and assassination) and, to enhance civil and political liberties (e.g., freedom of speech; of religion, of assembly, of movement and of the press; and the right to basic judicial protections). It will also be a continuing U.S. objective to promote basic economic and social rights (e.g., adequate food, education, shelter and health).

Declassified/Released on 1/8/81
By the National Security Council
under provisions of E.O. 12958
by B. REGER

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2. In promoting human rights, the United States shall use the full range of its diplomatic tools, including direct diplomatic contacts, public statements, symbolic acts, consultations with allies, cooperation with non-governmental organizations, and work with international organizations.
3. Greater reliance should be placed on positive inducements and incentives acknowledging improvements in human rights whenever appropriate and possible, through preferential treatment in political relations and economic benefits.
4. To this end, countries with a good or substantially improving record of human rights observance will be given special consideration in the allocation of U.S. foreign assistance, just as countries with a poor or deteriorating record will receive less favorable consideration. Programs for each fiscal year shall be reviewed in this light.
5. In the evaluation of the human rights condition of a foreign nation in the course of the implementation of this directive, primary emphasis shall be placed on longer term trends and on the cumulative effect of specific events.
6. The U.S. shall not, other than in exceptional circumstances, take any action which would result in material or financial support to the police, civil law enforcement authorities, or others performing internal security functions of governments engaged in serious violations of human rights.
7. U.S. human rights actions within the International Financial Institutions shall be designed and implemented so as not to undermine the essential U.S. interest of preserving these institutions as effective economic instruments. To this end, future U.S. actions in the International Financial Institutions shall seek to: utilize most effectively both our voice and our vote; understand and attempt to influence the Banks' actions as early as possible in the loan process; and, engage the support of other nations and multilateral organizations.

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8. The Interagency Group shall report to the EIC/NSC on the actions taken or recommended pursuant to this Presidential Directive. In particular, the Interagency Group shall, within two months, report on the effectiveness of recent U.S. actions in the International Financial Institutions, with particular attention to: Congressional attitudes and prospective legislation; views of other nations as to the propriety and legality of actions we may take; and, the effect of our actions on the advancement of U.S. human rights objectives.

Jimmy Carter

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

February 27, 1978

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM

TO: Robert Lipshutz

FROM: Joyce Starr; Greg Treverton *JS, GT*

RE: Belgrade CSCE: Issue of Follow-up

As we discussed on Saturday, our principal public approach to the meeting--and our belief as well-- is that the review of implementation, the heart of the meeting, was a success.

That said, however, we will still face the problem of defending a Final Document that is brief and non-substantive. This difficulty will be all the greater if we concede to the Soviets the last ounce of flesh they seek: language that opens up afresh the issue of rules to govern the Madrid meeting (that is, no fairly direct reference to the "Yellow Book"). The issue is small in appearance but does matter. If we give on this point, at best we will have to go through again the hard--and perhaps protracted-- preparatory negotiations of last summer. At worst, the Soviets might use those negotiations to delay--or even derail--the Madrid meeting.

As we discussed on Saturday, it seems to us worth making one more attempt to solidify support among our Allies and the Neutrals for standing firm on procedure. We spoke on Saturday and again this morning with our delegation in Belgrade; events are moving fast, but they believe that there is sufficient agreement with this approach to put us on safe ground in taking a strong action.

In light of this, we suggest:

1) A cable to our delegation reiterating our concern and suggesting another effort to marshal support for a firm stand. The cable to Goldberg would include the suggestion that he urge the Allies to take an active stand on this issue.

2) This approach should be buttressed by a separate communication to the Danes in Copenhagen, with whom our cooperation has been consistently positive and who still hope that the United States will take a stronger position on retaining the precedent of the Yellow Book. The Danes will then have to rally the Common Market delegations, a feasible undertaking in their capacity as EC President if the United States weighs in now. The Neutral and Non-Aligned delegations, particularly sensitive to retaining the Yellow Book, would then not be alone in this objective. Even if our last minute efforts are not successful at the Conference, we can stress to President Tito during his visit that we appreciated and shared the importance attached to the Yellow Book by the Neutral and Non-Aligned European states.

Time is of the essence. The telegrams must be sent out within the next 24 hours if we are to have any chance of success. If the events in Belgrade over the next 2 days indicate that this initiative will not succeed, we should be prepared to accept the delegation's judgement on the best alternative.

Archival reference:

Swiss Federal Archive, Berne, E 2001 (E) 1988/16, 215, EPD, Politische Direktion

Die Mitarbeit der Schweiz in der Gruppe der neutralen und

nichtpaktgebundenen Staaten im Rahmen der KSZE

Daniel Woker

Februar 1978

Die Mitarbeit der Schweiz in der Gruppe der neutralen und nichtpaktgebundenen Staaten im Rahmen der KSZE

1. Einführung

Mit der aktiven Teilnahme der Schweiz an der Konferenz über Sicherheit und Zusammenarbeit in Europa (KSZE) kamen zwei neue Elemente in den Gesamtzusammenhang der schweizerischen Aussenpolitik. Die Beteiligung an einer multilateralen Konferenz mit primär politischer Zielsetzung und entsprechendem Charakter ist zwar für die Schweiz eher ungewöhnlich, liegt aber durchaus auf der traditionellen aussenpolitischen Linie unseres Landes. Da alle von der Materie betroffenen Parteien an der Konferenz vertreten sind, kann von einer Gefährdung der Neutralität keine Rede sein. Weiter ist das Recht gerade des Neutralen, eine eigene Aussenpolitik zu führen, unbestritten; dazu gehört auch eine mit der Staatsauffassung und den Grundüberzeugungen übereinstimmende eigene Haltung beispielsweise an einer Konferenz wie der KSZE.

Hier muss bei einer Beurteilung des zweiten Elementes, der Mitarbeit der Schweiz in der Gruppe der neutralen und nichtpaktgebundenen Staaten (Gruppe der N+N) angesetzt werden. In der Folge wird zu zeigen sein, wie die schweizerische Delegation dazu kam, ihre Haltung und ihr Vorgehen in verschiedenen Bereichen der Konferenz innerhalb der Gruppe der N+N zu koordinieren, wie diese Zusammenarbeit praktisch aussieht und was schliesslich deren Vorteile und Probleme sind. Die durch die Teilnahme der Schweiz in einer so verschiedenartig zusammengesetzten Gruppe - neben den drei übrigen Neutralen Oesterreich, Schweden und Finnland die Blockfreien Jugoslawien, Malta und Zypern sowie die Kleinststaaten Liechtenstein und San Marino umfassend - aufgeworfenen grundlegenden Fragen werden so von der Konferenzpraxis her gesehen und beantwortet.

Damit ist auch schon gesagt, um was es sich bei der vorliegenden Arbeit handelt. Sie ist in erster Linie ein auf eigener Erfahrung während des Belgrader Treffens 1977/78 und auf Gesprächen mit

den Akteuren der N+N Zusammenarbeit beruhender Erlebnisbericht, der sich kaum auf schriftliche Unterlagen oder Analysen stützen kann, da solche mit einer kleinen Ausnahme nicht bestehen. Hier eine abschliessende Wertung der N+N Mitarbeit der Schweiz in der Gruppe der N+N im Rahmen der KSZE zu geben, ist unmöglich. Einmal ist das Belgrader Treffen bei der Niederschrift noch nicht beendet, die N+N Zusammenarbeit wird voraussichtlich mit dem Weiterbestehen des KSZE Prozesses als Ganzes andauern und schliesslich ist diese Zusammenarbeit bedingt durch ihre pragmatische, dem Konferenzverlauf folgende Natur ständiger Evolution und konstantem Wechsel unterworfen.

2. Entstehung und Entwicklung der Gruppe der N+N

Anstoss zur Zusammenarbeit der N+N gab die Erkenntnis, welche Basis und gemeinsamer Nenner innerhalb der Gruppe geblieben ist: die Existenz gemeinsamer Interessen und die Wünschbarkeit deren einheitlicher Vorbringung im Rahmen der Konferenz. Entsprechend lässt sich die Entstehung der Gruppe der N+N nicht auf ein bestimmtes Datum zurückverfolgen sondern stellt sich vielmehr als kontinuierlicher Prozess dar.

Während der Vorbereitungsphase der KSZE in Helsinki, die vom November 1972 bis zum Juni 1973 dauerte, bestand eine gewisse Form der Zusammenarbeit ausschliesslich zwischen den vier Neutralen. Im Verlauf der daran anschliessenden Hauptkonferenz fanden ein erstes Mal Ende 1973 und Anfang 1974 engere Konsultationen zwischen einzelnen neutralen Delegationen einerseits und Jugoslawien andererseits in den Sachbereichen statt, die in der Folge für die N+N Zusammenarbeit symptomatisch werden sollten, den vertrauensbildenden Massnahmen auf militärischem Gebiet in Korb I und den Folgen der Konferenz. In der Folge gesellte sich Malta zu dieser im Entstehen begriffenen Gruppierung von Staaten, die dabei waren, zur Vertretung gemeinsamer Interessen eine Plattform zu schaffen. Im Frühjahr 1974 wurde ein erstes Mal von den N+N Staaten ein gemeinsam ausgearbeitetes Papier der Konferenz vorgelegt, welches symptomatischerweise den Bereich der vertrauensbildenden Massnahmen betraf. Zum eigentlichen

Katalysator der Gruppe der N+N mit einheitlichem Auftreten gegen aussen wurde in der Folge aber im Sommer 1974 die Ausarbeitung und erfolgreiche Lancierung des sogenannten "package-deal's von 1974", der im wesentlichen einen Ausgleich auf prozeduraler Ebene zwischen Korb I und Korb III ermöglichte.

Dieser Werdegang zeigt, wie die Gruppe der N+N aus der Konferenz selbst hervorging. Dies im Gegensatz zu den grossen Blöcken innerhalb der Konferenz - EG und NATO Länder einerseits und Warschauerpaktstaaten andererseits - welche auf festen, auch ausserhalb der KSZE bestehenden Allianzen beruhen und damit von Beginn an gegeben waren. Wie im nächsten Kapitel gezeigt wird, schafft die Tatsache, offensichtlich primärer KSZE Interessenverband zu sein, die Basis für ein erfolgsversprechendes Wirken der Gruppe der N+N im Rahmen der gesamten Konferenz, beinhaltet gleichzeitig aber auch die Grenzen deren Tätigkeit.

Auch die Zusammensetzung der Gruppe der N+N ist von deren Entstehung her zu sehen. Wie oben ausgeführt, stiess zum natürlichen Interessenverband der vier Neutralen zunächst Jugoslawien, als wichtigster nichtpaktgebundener Staat. Hier kam über die allen Mitgliedern der N+N Gruppe gemeinsamen Beweggründe noch ein spezifisch jugoslawisches Interesse dazu. Belgrad konnte so seiner erklärten Konferenzstrategie, sein Sicherheitsmilieu zu verbessern, ohne sich der einen oder anderen Seite anzunähern, auch formal Ausdruck geben. Für Malta, mit seinen speziellen Interessen im Mittelmeerraum, waren die Vorteile einer breiteren Plattform offensichtlich. Ähnliches gilt für Zypern, das für seine durch die Teilung der Insel bedingten Partikularanliegen mit der Teilnahme in einem Verband einen gewissen natürlichen Verstärkungseffekt erwartet. Das Interesse an der Teilnahme Maltas und Zyperns in der Gruppe der N+N ist durchaus gegenseitig. Die dadurch einbezogenen weiteren Dimensionen verleihen der Gruppe innerhalb der Konferenz vermehrtes Gewicht, gleichzeitig passieren die Vorstellungen dieser beiden Delegationen einen ersten Filter und unterliegen so einem dämpfenden Einfluss. Der Einbezug Liechtensteins und San Marinos ist wohl in erster Linie als Geste von kleineren Staaten gegenüber Kleinststaaten zu sehen, wobei es

diese durchaus in der Hand haben, durch eine geschickte personelle Besetzung ihrer Delegation innerhalb der N+N Gruppe gewisse Funktionen wahrzunehmen. Die Frage bleibt allerdings offen, ob für die Gruppe als ganzes der Vorteil des Einbezuges zweier weiterer Länder den "Verniedlichungseffekt", den die Teilnahme zweier Mikrostaaten mit sich bringt, wirklich aufwiegt. Spanien, neben dem Vatikan einzig übriggebliebenes Land ohne Zugehörigkeit zu einer Gruppierung, war zur Zeit der Entstehung der N+N Gruppe politisch nicht unbedingt salonfähig und speziell für Jugoslawien zu diesem Zeitpunkt kaum akzeptabel. Madrid bekundete seinerseits damals kein Interesse an einer Mitarbeit. Rumänien mit seiner Sonderstellung innerhalb der osteuropäischen Staaten liebäugelte von sich aus hin und wieder mit einer Form der näheren Zusammenarbeit. Ein Einbezug Bukarests wurde aber sowohl aus formalen (Mitglied des Warschauerpaktes) wie vor allem auch aus Gründen der Kohärenz der N+N Gruppe im ideellen Bereich nie ernsthaft in Betracht gezogen.

Seit ihrem Bestehen im Jahre 1974 haben sich die Gruppe der N+N und ihre Aktivitäten stetig weiterentwickelt. Schon in Genf waren es primär die N+N, die dem Bereich der Folgen der Konferenz entscheidende Impulse gaben und dadurch die Substanz in diesem Bereich sicherten. Um im Hinblick auf das Belgrader Treffen einen ersten Gedankenaustausch zu ermöglichen, fand zu Beginn des Jahres 1977 in Belgrad zweitägige Konsultationen innerhalb der N+N Gruppe statt. Die Belgrader Vorkonferenz vom Juni bis August 1977 bot sich als fruchtbares Feld einer N+N Aktivität an; handelte es sich doch bei der Konferenzmaterie in erster Linie um prozedurale Fragen. Während in Genf Initiativen der N+N immer erst dann eingesetzt hatten, wenn es zwischen Ost und West zum ergebnislosen Patt gekommen war, brachte diesmal die Aktivität der N+N den Stein erst ins Rollen. Im gewissen Gegensatz zu den allgemeinen Erwartungen setzte sich diese Entwicklung in der Folge auch am Belgrader Haupttreffen, das im Herbst 1977 eröffnet wurde, fort. Mit der Vorlage eines Papiers am 1. Februar 1978, das praktisch die ganze Konferenzmaterie umfasste - siehe nächstes Kapitel - wurden die N+N zeitweilig zu Hauptakteuren der Konferenz.

3. Form, Inhalt und Bedeutung der N+N Zusammenarbeit

Die Form der N+N Zusammenarbeit ergab sich wie die Zusammensetzung der Gruppe aus deren Entstehung selbst. Dabei führte die Entwicklung von zunächst völlig informellen Kontakten über Arbeitsessen der Delegationschefs der betreffenden Länder zu ein und mehrmal wöchentlich tagenden Sitzungen der Gruppe als Ganzes, an der oft die Delegationen in corpore teilnehmen. Daneben wurden zeitweilig auch kleinere Arbeitsgruppen für einzelne Teilbereiche geschaffen, so beispielsweise bei der Ausarbeitung des erwähnten N+N Papiers vom 1. Februar 1978. Die Sitzungen fanden immerhin durchwegs nach Bedarf statt, eine eigentliche Institutionalisierung wurde möglichst vermieden. Logische Folge der gemeinsamen Ausarbeitung eines Papiers ist dessen Präsentation in den entsprechenden Gremien der Konferenz - in erster Linie in der Plenarversammlung - mit vorher unter den Koautoren vereinbarter Einführung.

Die übereinstimmenden Interessen aller N+N Staaten, die zum Zusammenschluss in einer Gruppe führten, bestehen primär in den Bereichen der vertrauensbildenden Massnahmen des Korbes I und den Folgen der Konferenz. Auf diese beiden Sachgebiete konzentrierte sich in Genf und auch in Belgrad die Arbeit der N+N. Einen zweiten Schwerpunkt der N+N Aktivität bilden traditionellerweise Prozedurfragen, die sich für eine vermittelnde Tätigkeit von ihrer Natur her anbieten. Die am Ende des letzten Kapitels erwähnte Einbringung eines N+N Vorschlages für ein abschliessendes Dokument der Belgrader Konferenz, der die gesamte Konferenzmaterie umfasste (Abschnitte über die Bereiche Mittelmeer und Folgen der Konferenz wurden aus rein konferenztaktischen Gründen weggelassen) schien auf den ersten Blick eine grundsätzliche Trendwende anzudeuten. Wie war es möglich, dass sich alle N+N Staaten, trotz verschiedenen Gesellschaftssystemen und unterschiedlichem wirtschaftlichem Entwicklungsstand, auf einen grundsätzlich klar westlichen, in Korb I und III die Bedeutung des Individuums betonenden und in Korb II marktwirtschaftliche Positionen hochentwickelter Industrieländer widerspiegelnden Text einigen konnten? Mit anderen Worten: Wie konnte in erster Linie Jugoslawien an der Ausarbeitung und

Präsentierung eines Papiers teilhaben, das keineswegs eine Mittelposition zwischen westlichen und östlichen Auffassungen darstellte, sondern Linien folgte, die beispielsweise durchaus den schweizerischen und damit westlichen Vorstellungen von Menschenrechten, individueller Freiheit und Marktwirtschaft entsprachen? Das jugoslawische Verhalten liess sich im konkreten Falle folgendermassen erklären. Einmal abgesehen von der trotz ideologischer Verwandtschaft vom osteuropäischen Muster grundsätzlich verschiedenen Gesellschaftsordnung Jugoslawiens, auf die hier nicht weiter eingegangen werden kann, hatte für Belgrad als Gastgeber der Wunsch nach einem erfolgreichen Abschluss der Konferenz absolute Priorität. Aus diesem Grund und um darüberhinaus die ihnen teure Solidarität innerhalb der N+N Gruppe nicht zunichte zu machen, sprangen die Jugoslawen praktisch über ihren eigenen (ideologischen) Schatten. Dazu war es faktisch so, dass die entscheidenden Parteien über die Prinzipien im Korb I und die menschlichen Kontakte sowie die Information im Korb III von den Neutralen und dabei in erster Linie von Schweden, Oesterreich und der Schweiz ausgearbeitet wurden und sich die Jugoslawen in Korb III zusammen mit Finnland den für sie weniger explosiven Bereichen Kultur und Erziehung widmeten. Damzufolge wäre es zumindest verfrüht, aus der einmaligen Vorlage eines Gesamtpapiers durch die N+N nun allgemein zu schliessen, in Zukunft würden diese durchwegs in allen Bereichen der KSZE gemeinsam vorgehen.

Welches ist nun die Bedeutung, die der N+N Zusammenarbeit im Rahmen der Konferenz im allgemeinen zukommt und unter welchen Voraussetzungen kann es im speziellen zur Vorlage eines gemeinsamen N+N Dokumentes kommen? (Wie beispielsweise neben dem erwähnten Papier vom 1. Februar 1978 dem N+N Vorschlag zum Ausbau der vertrauensbildenden Massnahmen, der im November 1977 dem Belgrader Treffen vorgelegt wurde.) Vorschläge und vor allem Kompromissformeln, die aus politischen oder prestigebedingten Gründen nicht von einem der Grossen oder dessen Alliierten vorgebracht werden können, sind unter Umständen für die andere Seite dann akzeptabel, wenn sie von Seiten der unverdächtigen N+N kommen. Weiter ist es im Kräftespiel der Konferenz nur natürlich, dass beide Hauptparteien, die Gruppe der N+N gerne auf ihrer Seite

wissen; insbesondere die östliche Seite versucht immer wieder, zumindest den Anschein zu erwecken, die N+N seien einer Meinung mit ihr. Eine gewisse grössere Bereitschaft ^{des Ostens} zum Kompromiss ist von da gesehen nicht auszuschliessen. Die Position der N+N ist allerdings oft recht heikel und diese müssen sich einer ganzen Reihe potentieller Gefahren ihres Vorgehens bewusst sein. Geht es um die Einreichung eines Vermittlungsvorschlages, so muss bei allen Beteiligten eine grundsätzliche Bereitschaft zur Kompromissfindung vorhanden sein. Von Seiten der N+N ist ein zu frühes Vorprellen dabei ebenso verhängnisvoll wie der Versuch, einen Kompromiss für Probleme anzustreben, deren Lösung von der einen oder anderen Seite gar nicht wirklich gewollt wird. Beides kann zum Vorwurf führen, Ausverkauf zu betreiben. Ähnlich gefährlich ist es weiterhin, wenn die N+N sich von der einen Seite als deren Werkzeug vor den Karren eines aussichtslosen Unterfangens spannen lassen, um dann bei einem allfälligen Misserfolg als Sündenböcke abgestempelt zu werden.

Zweifellos bieten sich den N+N dank ihrer Stellung als keiner Seite direkt verpflichtete Staaten auch echte Chancen. So können in einem Vermittlungsvorschlag ja auch eigene Ideen eingebracht werden, eigene Vorstellungen in einem umfassenden "package deal" sozusagen mitverpackt werden. Die auch hier oft gebrauchten Begriffe Vermittlungs- und Kompromissvorschlag können zu falschen Vorstellungen führen. Es ist keineswegs so, dass in den besagten N+N Vorschlägen wie auch in der Tätigkeit dieser Gruppe ganz allgemein etwa immer ein geometrischer Mittelpunkt zwischen den westlichen Vorstellungen einerseits und denen des Ostens andererseits gesucht wird. Dies kommt sehr deutlich zum Ausdruck beispielsweise im N+N Papier vom 1. Februar 1978, das über weite Strecken die Standpunkte seiner Autoren widerspiegelt, die eben in ^{viele} gewissen Bereichen mit denen des Westen praktisch identisch sind. Dass der Osten gerade in diesen Bereichen das N+N Papier nicht akzeptierte, hat mit der darin zum Ausdruck kommenden Substanz zu tun, nicht mit dem formalen Aspekt, ein N+N Vorschlag zu sein. In der Folge reichten die Franzosen bekanntlich einen eigenen Vorschlag für ein Schlussdokument ein, der

über weite Strecken näher bei den östlichen Vorstellungen lag als der der N+N Gruppe. So entstand für einmal die Situation, dass ein Papier eines westlichen Staates sich zwischen dem letzten sowjetischen und dem N+N Vorschlag befand, diesem damit jeglichen Vermittlungscharakter nehmend.

4. Gründe der Mitarbeit der Schweiz in der Gruppe der N+N

Die Schweiz ist an positiven Resultaten im Bereiche der KSZE und ganz speziell am Weiterbestehen des Prozesses an sich direkt interessiert. Ihr sind die Möglichkeiten, über die auch ein kleinerer blockgebundener Staat durch seine Zugehörigkeit zu einem grösseren Verband verfügt, verwehrt. Die KSZE gibt unserem Lande im europäischen Rahmen auf primär politischer Ebene ein Mitsprache- und Mitbestimmungsrecht, eine Plattform also, wo eigene Belange und Ueberzeugungen im multilateralen Rahmen vertreten werden können.

Unbestritten ist, dass die Gruppe der N+N massgeblichen Anteil an gewissen positiven Ergebnissen der KSZE hatte, darunter nicht zuletzt an der Sicherung des Weiterbestehens durch das Kapitel der Folgen der Konferenz. Ist der Schweiz an einem Erfolg der KSZE als ganzes gelegen und hat die Gruppe der N+N massgeblichen Anteil daran, so ergibt sich daraus offensichtlich ein primäres Interesse unseres Landes an der N+N Zusammenarbeit.

Im Rahmen der Konferenzarbeiten ist es selbstverständlich, dass eine gemeinsame Verfolgung ähnlicher Interessen durch die N+N weit wirkungsvoller ist als individuelles, unkoordiniertes Vorgehen. Die Gruppe bietet weiter eine Plattform auf der spezielle Eigeninteressen besser zur Geltung gebracht werden können, als dies einer einzelnen Delegation möglich wäre. Dabei ist klar, dass ein einzelnes Land von der Mitarbeit in einem Verband nicht nur profitieren kann, sondern im Interesse der Solidarität auch bisweilen einer Sache seinen Support leiht, die es auf sich selbst gestellt vielleicht nicht unterstützt hätte. So gehörten die Mitglieder der N+N Gruppe zu den ersten und aktivsten Befürworter der schweizerischen SRPD

Initiative und die Schweiz ihrerseits machte sich Anliegen anderer N+N Staaten im Bereich der vertrauensbildenden Massnahmen zu eigen, die an sich nicht zu ihren ersten Prioritäten gezählt hatten.

Schliesslich, und dies ist wohl der beste Grund für die Mitarbeit der Schweiz in der Gruppe der N+N, steht gar keine Alternative zur Diskussion. Sicher liegen uns gewisse westliche Länder ideell näher als etwa Jugoslawien, Malta und Zypern. Da die institutionalisierte Zusammenarbeit innerhalb des Westens an der KSZE aber auf der Zugehörigkeit zu Allianzen beruht, denen wir nicht angehören, ist uns diese Möglichkeit verwehrt. Dass ein isoliertes Vorgehen im Alleingang kaum als ernsthafte Alternative in Betracht gezogen werden kann, geht aus den bisherigen Ausführungen hervor.

5. Bedeutung und Grenzen der Mitarbeit

Wie aus dem vorangehenden Kapitel hervorgeht, hat die Schweiz ein eindeutiges Interesse an der Mitarbeit in der Gruppe der N+N, als einem Zusammengehen verschiedener Länder mit teilweise übereinstimmenden Interessen im Rahmen der KSZE. Damit sind zwei Hauptelemente der N+N-Zusammenarbeit genannt. Ein gemeinsames Vorgehen ist dann möglich und wünschbar, wenn gemeinsame Interessen bestehen, was je nach Konferenzlage in unterschiedlichem Ausmasse der Fall sein kann. Dies erklärt, warum eine Festlegung der N+N-Zusammenarbeit in starre Formen kaum nötig erscheint und bis jetzt von den Beteiligten auch gar nicht angestrebt wird. Bestehen gemeinsame Interessen, läuft die Zusammenarbeit ohnehin, fehlen diese, so würde eine Institutionalisierung nur unnützen Leerlauf bringen.

Ein zweites Hauptelement der N+N-Kooperation ist deren Beschränkung auf die KSZE. Es ist kaum vorstellbar, dass diese in einem anderen internationalen Gremium zum Tragen kommen könnte. Grundsätzlich andere Interessenlagen und von der KSZE abweichende Zusammensetzung in zahlreichen internationalen und regionalen Organisationen, denen die Schweiz angehört, lassen den Gedanken einer N+N-Zusammenarbeit gar nicht aufkommen. Aber auch da, wo beispielsweise ein vom Aeusseren her vergleichbares Gremium besteht - die Europäische Wirtschaftskommission - fehlt sowohl die Grundlage übereinstimmender Interessen, als auch die Notwendigkeit der Schaffung einer gemeinsamen Plattform.

Ein für die Schweiz zweifellos positives Ergebnis der Mitarbeit in der Gruppe der N+N bildet das sich unter den einzelnen Teilnehmern ergebende Vertrauensverhältnis. Das mag weiter durchaus auch positive Auswirkungen auf die bilateralen Beziehungen zwischen der Schweiz und einzelnen N+N-Staaten haben. Trotzdem sollte dieser Effekt nicht überschätzt werden, bestehen doch zu den betreffenden Ländern ohnehin gute und teilweise sehr enge Beziehungen. Interessant sind in diesem Zusammenhang immerhin die Beziehungen zwischen Oesterreich und Jugoslawien,

tätenprobleme), welche durch die gemeinsame N+N-Zusammenarbeit bis zu einem gewissen Grade kompensiert werden.

Zu fragen bleibt schliesslich, wieweit die Schweiz bei ihrer Mitarbeit in der Gruppe der N+N im konkreten Fall gehen kann. Eine Solidaritätsgrenze, jenseits derer die Vorteile gemeinsamer Interessenvertretung die Nachteile einer möglichen Kompromittierung grundlegender Werte und Ueberzeugungen nicht mehr aufwiegen, lässt sich nicht allgemein gültig formulieren. Da kein äusserer Zwang etwa in der Form einer Allianzzugehörigkeit besteht, wird bei offensichtlich unterschiedlicher Interessenlage, ein gemeinsames Vorgehen der N+N meist gar nicht versucht. In der Praxis war es bis anhin so, dass die Schweiz im einzelnen Fall kaum je in die Nähe einer solchen Solidaritätsgrenze geriet. Dies nur schon darum, weil beispielsweise für Finnland die diesbezügliche Reizschwelle fast durchwegs tiefer liegt als bei uns und so der Spielraum der N+N-Gruppe von da eingeengt wird.

Aus der vorliegenden Arbeit sollte klar hervorgehen, warum die aus innenpolitischer Sicht sicherlich zu Recht zu diesem Thema gestellten Fragen oft am Kern der Sache vorbeizielen. So beispielsweise Fragen, welche eine allfällige Beeinträchtigung der Glaubwürdigkeit der Neutralität durch die N+N-Zusammenarbeit oder die Möglichkeit, sich mit Jugoslawien auf eine gemeinsame Linie im Bereich der Menschenrechte zu einigen, betreffen. Die Mitarbeit der Schweiz in der Gruppe der N+N muss als von Fall zu Fall verschiedenes, auf die speziellen Gegebenheiten der KSZE zugeschnittenes Vorgehen in einem Interessenverband gesehen werden. Daraus grundlegende Schlüsse auf veränderte Zielsetzungen in der schweizerischen Aussenpolitik zu ziehen, wäre falsch.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 2, 1978


MEMORANDUM

TO: ROBERT LIPSHUTZ

FROM: JOYCE STARR *JRS*

RE: Belgrade CSCE Report

The attached should be viewed as a positive critique of our performance at the Belgrade Conference. I have stressed areas of weakness over our strong points, but the latter should not be undervalued. We can be justifiably proud of our policy, our negotiating posture, and the people who took part in our delegation -- disagreements notwithstanding. Human rights became the cornerstone of this Conference through the force of our delegation's efforts.



THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 3, 1978

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: Robert Lipshutz
FROM: Joyce Starr *gjs*
SUBJECT: Belgrade CSCE trip, February 15 -
February 24: observations and
recommendations

1. Leadership of Arthur Goldberg

It may not be often during this term of the Carter Presidency that we can evaluate with some assurance whether a bold and decisive course of action was the right one. Ambassador Goldberg's appointment and the leadership which he brought to the CSCE process does provide us that opportunity.

In a few words, to observe Ambassador Goldberg in action is to have enormous pride in the spirit of a country that produced such a tireless advocate for universal justice. At 69 years of age, Ambassador Goldberg attended, I am told, almost every plenary and caucus session, absent only for reasons of competing but equal demands. During the time I was there, the closing phase of a long and tedious six month negotiating process, he was yet committing his total energies to the objectives of the day at hand. When you consider the relative isolation of this task -- carrying the President's message on human rights to a conference some thousands of miles from home, one that is outside the realm of awareness of the vast majority of Americans, and when reported on, generally subject to mixed review -- this is significant.

2. Allied Unity

Ambassador Goldberg was under instructions to preserve allied unity. Cliff Brody of the Department of State says

it was his understanding that Goldberg was not to emphasize these instructions at the cost of exertion of U.S. leadership. Cliff admits, however, there was considerable disagreement within the Department on the priority that should be attached to this instruction. Goldberg's statements within the context of private staff meetings, coupled with the role he took during the NATO caucus sessions, made it evident that he interpreted the instructions to read "preserve allied unity at all cost".

Privately the Ambassador told me that if he ever heard the term "allied unity" again, he would "murder the person who said it". He was deeply frustrated and disappointed by the failure of our Allies to rally behind the American effort for a substantive, final document.

Sitting in on the NATO sessions, I believe he was in fact unduly constrained by this instruction with an unanticipated result: we were often unable to back up initiatives by the more aggressive Allied and Neutral countries that were consistent with our own policy objectives out of deference to others who were not so sympathetic to our interests. In other words, while the U.S. objective in maintaining Allied unity may have been a "strong front" and a clear statement of differences with the Eastern European bloc, the actual result was a dissolution of leadership and consensus within our own.

3. CSCE Staff Structure

Ambassador Goldberg was not given the option of appointing staff assistants of his own choosing, but had to rely principally on foreign service personnel; this would not have been an inherent obstacle were it not that most of these people had served under Ambassador Scherer during the original negotiations at Helsinki and resented Goldberg's replacement of Scherer as the principal figure at Belgrade. Scherer himself, while much too proper to let a public controversy develop over his differences with Goldberg, did let it quietly be known quietly exactly where he stood. As a footnote, Scherer will be joining, no less, the Republican National Committee. (I might add with some concern that Scherer took copious notes on everything Goldberg said, including comments made in the privacy of CSCE staff meetings.)

Our failure to provide Goldberg with several additional slots was probably more an oversight than a matter of intent. I discussed this point with David Aaron on my

return. He noted that Goldberg could have made this request, but to his knowledge had not done so. I cannot say whether in fact Goldberg raised this question within the Department and was turned down, or simply failed to address it at the time; the result was a drain on his energies and attention, having to continuously consolidate support and oversee the implementation of his directives within our own delegation.

3. A Substantive Final Document

We are now taking the position with the press that we never really expected to achieve a substantive final document. You may recall Greg Treverton's emphasis on this point at our Saturday meeting concerning strategy during the final phase.

Based on numerous conversations with representatives of the NATO Caucus delegations, I believe we could have generated sufficient support to this end had we assumed a leadership stance. In my opinion, the instructions on allied unity did more to render this a foregone conclusion than the nature of the task.

If we did not expect to win, we made a serious error in allowing our public credibility to be tied to this goal. (You may have seen the CBS report last night underscoring this failure.) We now face an uphill public relations battle of confidence that could have been foreseen and probably avoided. Again, Department guidance on this probably suffered more from a conflict of views than an intent to weaken Goldberg's negotiating posture. Nevertheless, the result only reinforces the need for improved coordination on our approach to the Madrid Conference by the White House and with sufficient lead time to spare.

I have already begun to discuss this with the NSC staff, Treverton and Hunter; we are in agreement (as we tend to be on most aspects of this process) and will be considering how to best ensure such future coordination and consensus.

4. Human Rights Principles versus Human Contacts Provisions

It was our policy decision to emphasize the human rights principles of Basket One at this conference. My conversations with our Allies suggested some frustration with this strategy.

Our Allies (and many of the Neutrals) applauded the U.S. for its commitment to human rights; still they questioned repeatedly why we could not appreciate the significance of the

human contacts provisions (Basket Three) as an operationalization of this principle. (Although the human contacts provisions would not provide any protection to a prisoner such as Scharansky -- to have medical attention or to see a lawyer -- such protections could be built in to this section at the next conference.)

I raised this with Greg Treverton and with John Kornblum of the Department of State immediately upon my return. I suggested that we use Goldberg's concluding speech to signal our Allies that we were attentive to their position on this matter and will be giving it serious consideration as we move towards the Madrid Conference. They agreed and the appropriate language has now been inserted.

5. East-West Cooperation

One of the most interesting facets of the conference was the extent of cooperation between the Neutral and Nonaligned bloc, particularly Yugoslavia and the West. A Washington Post article of February 23 (see attached) points to this cooperation as one of the interesting developments of the conference. A separate Post article (February 28) noted this Administration's emphasis on strengthening relationships with the Warsaw pact countries, as differentiated from Kissinger's approach in negotiating almost solely with the Soviet Union. My experience at Belgrade affirmed the forward-looking potential of our policy.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Follow-up Strategy

We came into the game very late, yet I think its fair to say that we exerted influence and improved a process that might have otherwise proved, at best, a non-event or, at worst, a defeat for the West. Therefore, while we can be proud of our involvement, we should not fail to realize the importance of avoiding such a reactive stance in the future. I've discussed this with Gregg and with Cliff Brody and, again, we are in agreement. We can't predict whether we and other concerned actors will have the same involvement one or two years hence. But we are already thinking along the lines of the next conference.

2. Generating Public Support

Ambassador Goldberg has suggested the convening of a meeting or conference with leading figures in the country, which would produce a United States Helsinki Monitoring Watch Group. We do have a Congressional Commission to monitor Helsinki, but this does not have broad based support. I

noted in a Time magazine article some reference to White House sponsorship for a human rights foundation. I intend to talk to Jessica Tuckman about this idea; it may in fact prove to be the vehicle for the kind of initiative Goldberg is describing.

Goldberg does not believe that such a group should come under the sponsorship of the White House; however, the White House might serve as a catalyst, perhaps through contacts with various foundations. I mentioned this idea to David Aaron who thought it had merit and said he would get back to me with suggestions.

3. Arthur Goldberg

I would like to propose that Arthur Goldberg be given the Medal of Freedom for his leadership at the CSCE Conference. This is the one remaining honor that would have significant meaning for him.

Goldberg's report to the President should be received with some fanfare. I also urge that time be found on the President's schedule for a private meeting with the Ambassador; this would be viewed by Goldberg as a sign of respect and appreciation. It could perhaps take the form of a private lunch, followed by the presentation of the report to a wider audience.

Bridge Meeting: Lost Hopes and Stalled Effort at Deteriorate

By Mitchell Keller
Washington Post Personal Service

HELIXIAHE—The East-West conference on European security and cooperation here, once looked upon with great expectations, will soon become merely one more interesting in the pile of generally stampeding Soviet-American relations.

After nine months of debate, it is now clear that there is virtually no chance of any positive resolutions emerging out of this 35-nation gathering.

As the conference moves through its final, crucial days in this Yugoslian hotel capital, the inevitable questions are being asked about whether any better results could have been achieved with a different approach—particularly by the United States and its articulate yet controversial spokesman here, former Supreme Court Justice Arthur Goldberg.

About the most accurate thing you could say about Ambassador Goldberg is that he made it easier for the Russians to do what they were going to do anyway," says a delegate from a neutral nation.

The remarks are not meant as criticism of Goldberg, but rather, he says, as the best way he can sum up in a single sentence the forces that lead to frustration and indifference at the event.

"You must guard against the idea that the West is to blame for lack of progress here. That is the Soviet line and it is false," a Norwegian delegate says. "When I reflected here really in two years of a stagnant climate in U.S. Soviet relations generally, I do believe it is just a part of it."

Delegates from 23 European nations plus the United States and Canada have been gathered here to review how well their governments have implemented the agreements they signed in Helsinki in August 1975.

Although the Helsinki accords dealt with many questions of security and economic cooperation, they also pledged all signers—including the Soviet Union and its allies—to respect "human rights," a fundamental freedom of people and nations.

It is these human rights pledges that have caused the most controversy. Many national states between East and West, and especially, Germany and France, have been particularly concerned.

In contrast to its opening days and weeks, when thousands of delegates and journalists flooded the new center and glass center built by the Yugoslians, the scene this morning, the var-



ARTHUR GOLDBERG
... maintaining credibility

much more quiet than of six weeks, in particular, of often bitter debate behind closed doors over the implementation of human rights provisions.

The talks have been accomplished. The participants have agreed to meet again in Madrid in 1980. So the Helsinki review process will continue.

That is it, men and women? Can it help the real life situation of dissidents in Eastern Europe or families who want to emigrate? Would a different American strategy—one that was gentler and didn't hammer away at the Soviets on human rights in front of 34 other countries—work better, or did the Soviets come here prepared not to give an inch on human rights no matter what anybody said or how they said it?

Not surprisingly, there are many questions.

In general, however, the participants would view human rights as a major concern for the West. The Soviets and the most hardline of their six allies in the Warsaw Pact took a beating in the eyes of the West and many of the neutral and nonaligned countries, and that in much more progress could have been made without

That is a potentially crucial factor to explain what is happening here and one that a number of Western delegates also seem to share.

In this view, Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev so badly wanted a prestigious Helsinki agreement in 1975 to verify Soviet-dominated post-war boundaries in Eastern Europe and to lead to a SALT agreement and summit meeting with the United States, that he yielded, endlessly in the view of Kremlin hard liners, to the human rights provisions tacked on by the West.

Now, despite reports for years that Brezhnev was ill, there is widespread

View Analysis

belief that he is indeed on the way out and that the power struggle now going on in the Kremlin contains a sizeable degree of backwash against Brezhnev for the Helsinki human rights provisions and that the strong U.S. stand here has given the group ammunition.

A delegate from neutral Sweden is also heard on the U.S. stance, agreeing with former Czechoslovak foreign minister, Jiri Hasek, who recently criticized the Carter administration's tough approach to Communist human rights violations. "It is more important," Hasek said, "to strengthen the whole process of détente in which respect for human rights has its own place."

Most delegates don't seem to question the sincerity of the American interest in human rights. Yet the awareness of the heavy hand of domestic U.S. politics had produced doubts as to whether it is that the administration is most interested in.

Despite the doubts, however, the broader opinion seems to be that "whatever the West, and especially the Americans, have done has been generally for the good," says a delegate from neutral Austria. "The



LEONID BREZHNEV
... accepts no criticism

American made it lively, interesting and gave the initiative to the West. It was no failure because the Soviets know they will be subjected to this again. You have to exert some pressure on them."

Toward the end, he says, the West was left in pulling together a counterproposal for a final document against a Soviet offering. And, Goldberg has drawn criticism for another sharp attack on the Soviets near the final stages on Jan. 27 that is viewed by some here as ending any doubts in the Kremlin to reject any but the most bland final statement and accept no criticism.

Goldberg, 69, says everyone knows it is unrealistic to expect the Soviets to allow a conference to dictate their internal situation. "But we had to speak out honestly to maintain our credibility, because the Final Act of Helsinki provides for this, and because it will not deter the process of détente. The SALT talks go on, they

"The West made it a little too easy on them at the end," the Austrian says. "But it was a collective faith, not Goldberg's. Had he not spoken up on January 27, it wouldn't have changed anything. It just gave the Soviets a pretext for saying 'now you get nothing'."

"Maybe there have been some initial disappointments and there is a need to rethink tactics," says the Norwegian delegate. "But Soviets clearly know now that everyone else except their own kind take it seriously and it can't be ignored and it's not coming just from the U.S."

"Would the Soviets have invaded Czechoslovakia in 1968," asks an American delegate. "If there had been a Helsinki agreement and they knew they'd be taking a lot of fall at a review conference? Maybe they would have, but maybe they also would have thought more about it."

One of the most complex undertones here is among the Kremlin's allies. Officially, they have adhered to the Soviet line. But, if some Western delegates are to be believed, they also have held some U.S. delegates to "keep sticking it to them," meaning Moscow.

In this view, the Bridge review procedure does give the East European some maneuvering room. Hungary, for example, has not said a word in defense of the Czech crackdown on dissidents.

"The Soviets' refusal to allow any major new decisions to be taken here means that Moscow support among neutrals and nonaligned, who hoped that the review forum would be one in which they could have a policy-making voice."

Goldberg, 69, says everyone knows it is unrealistic to expect the Soviets to allow a conference to dictate their internal situation. "But we had to speak out honestly to maintain our credibility, because the Final Act of Helsinki provides for this, and because it will not deter the process of détente. The SALT talks go on, they

"We have given hope to dissenters in Prague and the Soviet Union and others in Eastern Europe that they are not overlooked."

stated a grain deal with us, and the tone of talks in Washington is not the same as in Belgrade.

"Meanwhile, we have given hope to dissenters in Prague and the Soviet Union and others in Eastern Europe that they are not overlooked. That their rights to organize into nongovernmental groups is not ignored because to do so would be a treacherous betrayal, they're pretty realistic. That we're not going to change the system, but it gives them heart."

"Does anyone have any doubt about the restraining influence that the eyes of the Western and neutral world has on them?" he asks.

"How long—after trying quiet diplomacy—could you sit here and not make a statement on a family reunion ration case in which the person loses his job because he asks for a visa and then is arrested as a parasite for not having a job?"

Goldberg believes the Bridge process—temporarily at least—has had a restraining effect on arrests and trials of dissidents in both the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia.

Another American, trying to sum things up, says "You can't say it was anything either way on the question of whether we got as much as possible out of this. The delegation is working under. While House orders and you couldn't sweep human rights under the rug, it's a part of American foreign policy."

Grade Meeting: Lost Hopes and Stalled

By Mitchell Tetler

Canadian Post Feature Service
LONDON—The East-West conference on European security and cooperation here, once looked upon with great expectations, will soon become merely one more ingredient on the list of generally stagnating Soviet-Western relations.

After nine months of debate, it is now clear that there is virtually no chance of any positive resolutions being put out of this 35-nation gathering.

As the conference moves through its final, obligatory days in this Yugoslav host capital, the inevitable questions are being asked about whether or not the results could have been achieved with a different approach—articulated by the United States and its articulate yet controversial spokesman here, former Supreme Court Justice Arthur Goldberg.

“About the most accurate thing you could say about Ambassador Goldhamer is that he made it easier for the Russians to do what they were going to do anyway,” says a delegate from a neutral nation.

His remarks are not meant as criticism of Goldhamer, but rather, he says, the best way he can sum up in a single sentence the forces that lead to inaction and inactivity on the scene.

“You must guard against the idea at the West is to blame for lack of progress here. That is the Soviet line and it is false,” a Norwegian delegate says. “What is reflected here really is a years of a stagnant climate in S-Soviet relations, generally. Not one is just a part of it.”

Delegates from 22 European nations and the United States and Canada have been gathered here to review how all their governments have implemented the agreements they signed in Helsinki in August 1975.

Although the Helsinki accords dealt with many questions of security and economic cooperation, they also rejected all signatures—including the Soviet Union and its allies—to respect human rights. . . . fundamental freedoms . . . and the freer movement of people and ideas.”

It is these human rights pledges that have been the review conference's major point of contention between East and West, and especially, though not exclusively, between Washington and Moscow.

In contrast to its opening days and weeks, when thousands of delegates and journalists flooded the new conference and glass center built by the Yugoslavs to have this meeting, the conference now seems empty. The only



ARTHUR GOLDBERG: Maintaining credibility

much but alive with kind of six weeks, in particular, of often bitter debate behind closed doors over the penetration of human rights provisions.

One thing has been accomplished. The participants have agreed to meet again in Madrid in 1980. So the Helsinki review process will continue.

But is it meaningful? Can it help the real life situation of dissidents in Eastern Europe or families who want to emigrate? Would a different American strategy—one that was quieter and didn't hammer away at the Soviets on human rights in front of 34 other countries—work better, or did the Soviets come here prepared not to give an inch on human rights no matter what anybody said or how they said it?

Most skeptically, there are many opinions.
In general, however, the predominant view based on numerous interviews seems to be that the Soviets and the most hardline of their six allies in the Warsaw Pact took a beating here in the eyes of the West and many of the neutral and nonaligned countries, and that not much more progress could have been made with

That is a potentially crucial factor to explain what is happening here and one that a number of Western delegates also seem to share.

In this view, Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev so badly wanted a prestigious Helsinki agreement in 1975 to verify Soviet-dominated postwar boundaries in Eastern Europe and to lead to a SALT agreement and summit meeting with the United States, that he yielded, expressly in the view of Kremlin hard liners, to the human rights provisions packed on by the West.
Now, despite reports for years that Brezhnev was ill, there is widespread

News Analysis

belief that he is indeed on the way out and that the power struggle now going on in the Kremlin contains a sizeable degree of backwash against Brezhnev for the Helsinki human rights provisions and that the strong U.S. stand here has given the group ammunition.

A delegate from neutral Sweden is also hard on the U.S. stance, agreeing with former Czechoslovak foreign minister and now exiled dissident spokesman, Jiri Fialek, who recently criticized the Carter administration's tough approach to Communist human rights violations. “It is more important,” Fialek said, “to strengthen the whole process of détente in which respect for human rights has its own place.”

Most delegates don't seem to question the sincerity of the American interest in human rights. Yet the awareness of the heavy hand of domestic U.S. politics had produced doubts as to why it is that the administration is most interested in.

Despite the doubts, however, the Brezhnev opinion seems to be that “whatever the West, and especially the Americans, have done has been generally for the good,” says a delegate from neutral Austria. “The



LEONID BREZHNEV: accepts no criticism

American made it lively, interesting and gave the initiative to the West. It was no failure because the Soviets know they will be subjected to this again. You have to exert some pressure on them.”

Toward the end, he says, the West was too late in putting together a counterproposal for a final document against a Soviet offering. And, Goldhamer has drawn criticism for another sharp attack on Jan. 27 that is viewed by some here as ending any doubts in the Kremlin to reject any but the most bland final statement and accept no criticism.

“The on the one side,” says “T. Goldhamer, anything perfecting.”

“Many” that this broad Norwegian clearly except easily in not com

“You” Czechoslovak America a Helsinki they'd b view cool have, but thought

One o rents he lies. Off the Soviet delegate have to “keep si Moscow.”

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In which ing score Goldbe It is unt to allow internal speak on creditabil Helsinki cause it, delicate.

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March 3, 1978

TO AMEMBASSY BELGRADE IMMEDIATE 7383

INFO CSCE COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE

UNCLAS STATE 056175

BELGRADE FOR USDEL CSCE
E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: OCON, CSCE

SUBJECT: ~~WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT ON BELGRADE MEETING~~

1. AT NOON BRIEFING ON MARCH 3, WHITE HOUSE RELEASED
FOLLOWING STATEMENT ON BELGRADE MEETING:

BEGIN TEXT:

WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, NOON BRIEFING, MARCH 3, 1978

THE PRESIDENT TODAY CONGRATULATED JUSTICE GOLDBERG,
AND THE U.S. DELEGATION TO THE BELGRADE REVIEW CONFERENCE
OF CSCE, ON THEIR SUCCESSFUL WORK DURING THE PAST FEW
MONTHS. THE PRESIDENT IS PARTICULARLY GRATIFIED THAT THE
DELEGATION HAS WORKED IN CLOSE HARMONY WITH THE U.S.
COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE, CHAIRED
BY REPRESENTATIVE PASSELL, CO-CHAIRMANED BY SENATOR OLIVERBORNE
PELL, AND INCLUDING BOTH CONGRESSIONAL AND ADMINISTRATION
MEMBERS.

THE UNITED STATES HAS ACHIEVED ITS BASIC GOALS AT THE
BELGRADE CONFERENCE, WHICH WILL CONCLUDE ITS WORK NEXT
WEEK:

-- WE CONDUCTED A FULL AND FRANK REVIEW OF THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT IN ALL OF ITS
ASPECTS. THIS INCLUDED DETAILED DISCUSSION OF HUMAN
RIGHTS, INCLUDING SPECIFIC COUNTRY-PERFORMANCE AND

***** W H S R C O M M E N T *****

INDERFURTH, BATES, SCHECTER
ROG: HUNTO, TUCH, OTG, HUNT, BARTH

HUMAN RIGHTS HAS NOW BEEN FIRMLY
INSCRIBED AS A LEGITIMATE AND PROPER CONCERN ON THE
AGENDA OF INTERNATIONAL DISCUSSIONS:

-- WE MAINTAINED UNITY AMONG THE NATO ALLIED STATES;

-- WE HAVE WORKED WITH OTHER NATIONS TO ENSURE THAT
THE PROCESS OF SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE, BEGUN
AT HELSINKI, WILL CONTINUE AT MADRID IN TWO YEARS
TIME;

-- WE TOOK ALL OF THESE STEPS, IN A SPIRIT OF SEEKING
TO ENLARGE THE POSSIBILITIES FOR COOPERATION AMONG ALL
THE 35 STATES REPRESENTED AT BELGRADE, AND WE WILL
AGREE TO THE FINAL DOCUMENT ONLY TO PERMIT THIS PROCESS
TO CONTINUE.

FOLLOWING THE ACHIEVEMENT OF THESE BASIC GOALS AT
CSCE, WE ALSO PRESENTED, WITH OUR ALLIES, A NUMBER OF
SPECIFIC NEW PROPOSALS, DESIGNED TO MAKE MORE EFFECTIVE
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT. RE-
GRETTABLELY, THE SOVIET UNION WAS NOT PREPARED TO ENGAGE
IN A SERIOUS DISCUSSION OF NEW PROPOSALS, LEADING TO
AGREEMENT AMONG THE 35 STATES TAKING PART. NOR, UNDER
THE CONSENSUS PROCEDURE FOLLOWED AT BELGRADE, WAS THE
SOVIET UNION PREPARED TO AGREE TO A FINAL DOCUMENT THAT
WOULD TAKE NOTE OF THE FULL REVIEW OF IMPLEMENTATION--
INCLUDING HUMAN RIGHTS--THAT WAS THE CENTERPIECE OF THE
CONFERENCE.

WE REGRET THAT THE SOVIET UNION FAILED TO PERMIT THE
CONFERENCE TO PROCEED TO ITS PROPER CONCLUSION. WE INTEND
TO PRESS THE SOVIET UNION TO FULFILL ITS COMMITMENT TO
RESPECT HUMAN RIGHTS, TO FULFILL THE HELSINKI PROCESS,
AND TO ADHERE TO THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT ITSELF. THE
SOVIET REFUSAL, UNDER THE CONSENSUS PROCEDURE, TO ACCEPT
A FULL FINAL DOCUMENT IN NO WAY DETRACTS FROM THE
SUCCESS OF THE CONFERENCE IN CONDUCTING A FULL REVIEW
OF IMPLEMENTATION, ESPECIALLY IN THE AREA OF HUMAN RIGHTS.
WHAT HAS BEEN DONE CANNOT BE IGNORED, WHETHER OR NOT THE
SOVIET UNION IS PREPARED TO SEE IT RECOGNIZED IN A FORMAL
DOCUMENT.

WE WILL CONTINUE TO BUILD ON THE SUCCESS THAT THE
BELGRADE CONFERENCE AS A WHOLE REPRESENTS. DURING THE
PERIOD BETWEEN NOW AND THE MADRID MEETING, WE WILL

CONTINUE OUR EFFORTS TO PROMOTE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
HELSINKI FINAL ACT. WE WILL WORK CLOSELY WITH OUR

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ADDRESS AND WITH THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, IN THAT PROCESS,
AND AT MADRID, WE WILL REMEM THE PROCESS OF REVIEW,
SEEKING ALWAYS TO RAISE THE INTERNATIONAL STANDARD OF
BEHAVIOR, IN ALL ASPECTS OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT AND
PARTICULARLY IN THE AREA OF HUMAN RIGHTS. END TEXT.

2. FOR USDEL CSCE: TEXT OF MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT
TO AMBASSADOR GOLDBERG FOLLOWS IN SEPTEL.

CHRISTOPHER
BT

*****CONFIDENTIAL***** COPY

OP: [unclear]
DE RUE-U #6170 0030385
O 040312Z MAR 78
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY BELGRADE IMMEDIATE 7384

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE STATE 056170
EXDIS BELGRADE FOR AMBASSADOR GOLDBERG
E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: CSCE, OCON

SUBJECT: MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT

1. FOLLOWING IS PERSONAL MESSAGE TO YOU FROM PRESIDENT CARTER:

BEGIN TEXT:

TO JUSTICE ARTHUR GOLDBERG:

I WANT TO CONGRATULATE YOU PERSONALLY FOR THE WORK THAT YOU AND YOUR DELEGATION HAVE DONE AT THE BELGRADE REVIEW CONFERENCE. UNDER YOUR ABLE LEADERSHIP, THE UNITED STATES DELEGATION HAS DEMONSTRATED OUR NATION'S FULL COMMITMENT TO THE LETTER AND THE SPIRIT OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT. YOU HAVE SUCCEEDED IN CONDUCTING A FULL AND FRANK REVIEW OF IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FINAL ACT IN ALL OF ITS ASPECTS, INCLUDING HUMAN RIGHTS. AMONG YOUR OTHER ACHIEVEMENTS, HUMAN RIGHTS HAS NOW BEEN FIRMLY INSCRIBED AS A LEGITIMATE AND PROPER CONCERN ON THE AGENDA OF INTERNATIONAL DISCUSSION.

YOU HAVE ALSO SUCCEEDED IN MAINTAINING UNITY AMONG THE NATO ALLIES, IN WORKING CLOSELY WITH THE MEMBER STATES

OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, AND IN BUILDING USEFUL RELATIONS WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF THE NEUTRAL AND NON-ALIGNED STATES AT BELGRADE.

*****WHHR COMMENT*****

EGS: BARTH, HUNTER, PARSON

DECLASSIFIED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE GUIDELINES, JULY 21, 1997
BY *[Signature]* NARA, DATE 10/24/06

PSN: 044903

PAGE 01

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I AM GRATIFIED THAT THE PROCESS OF SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE, BEGUN AT HELSINKI, WILL CONTINUE AT MADRID IN TWO YEARS' TIME, AND THAT ALL OF YOUR EFFORTS HAVE BEEN IN A SPIRIT OF SEEKING TO ENLARGE THE POSSIBILITIES FOR COOPERATION AMONG ALL THE THIRTY-FIVE STATES REPRESENTED AT BELGRADE.

I ALSO WISH TO COMMEND THE INVALUABLE ROLE PLAYED BY THE COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE, WHICH HAS BEEN SO VITALLY INVOLVED IN THE ENTIRE BELGRADE PROCESS.

AGAIN, CONGRATULATIONS FOR YOUR SPLENDID WORK AT BELGRADE, AND PLEASE ACCEPT MY PERSONAL THANKS TO YOU FOR ACCEPTING THIS DIFFICULT ASSIGNMENT, WHICH YOU HAVE DISCHARGED TO SUCH GREAT CREDIT, BOTH TO YOURSELF AND TO THE UNITED STATES. I LOOK FORWARD TO RECEIVING YOUR PERSONAL REPORT ON THE CONFERENCE, AFTER IT HAS CONCLUDED AND YOU HAVE RETURNED TO THE UNITED STATES.

WITH warmest regards,

SINCERELY,
JIMMY CARTER
JIMMY CARTER
END TEXT.

CHRISTOPHER
BT

*****CONFIDENTIAL***** COPY

I AM GRATIFIED THAT THE PROCESS OF SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE, BEGUN AT HELSINKI, WILL CONTINUE AT MADRID IN TWO YEARS' TIME, AND THAT ALL OF YOUR EFFORTS HAVE BEEN IN A SPIRIT OF SEEKING TO ENLARGE THE POSSIBILITIES FOR COOPERATION AMONG ALL THE THIRTY-FIVE STATES REPRESENTED AT BELGRADE.

I ALSO WISH TO COMMEND THE INVALUABLE ROLE PLAYED BY THE COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE, WHICH HAS BEEN SO VITALLY INVOLVED IN THE ENTIRE BELGRADE PROCESS.

AGAIN, CONGRATULATIONS FOR YOUR SPLENDID WORK AT BELGRADE, AND PLEASE ACCEPT MY PERSONAL THANKS TO YOU FOR ACCEPTING THIS DIFFICULT ASSIGNMENT, WHICH YOU HAVE DISCHARGED TO SUCH GREAT CREDIT, BOTH TO YOURSELF AND TO THE UNITED STATES. I LOOK FORWARD TO RECEIVING YOUR PERSONAL REPORT ON THE CONFERENCE, AFTER IT HAS CONCLUDED AND YOU HAVE RETURNED TO THE UNITED STATES.

WITH WARMEST REGARDS,

SINCERELY,
JIMMY CARTER
JIMMY CARTER
END TEXT.

CHRISTOPHER
BT

Human Rights: A Resort To Quieter Diplomacy

The shift in President Carter's human-rights campaign from shrill publicity to quiet diplomacy became evident in one aspect of his talk with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko Sept. 30.

Although strategic arms and a Mid-east settlement were the centerpieces, the President pointedly raised one of the most celebrated Soviet human-rights cases, believed here to be a direct violation of the Helsinki accords: the case of Anatoly Scharansky. Scharansky, a leading dissident, was arrested without public charge in mid-March and, so far as any one in the West knows, is still in jail.

Eschewing hints of threat or retaliation (both clearly in the U.S. arsenal), Carter repeated privately what he had said publicly on June 13: that the still-unpublished charge of high treason against Scharansky as a U.S. spy is without foundation. He asked Gromyko to convey his strong personal hope to President Leonid Brezhnev that Scharansky be set free.

Carter's new hush-hush approach to human rights, a keystone of his foreign policy, was dramatically different from the soap-box treatment of earlier days, but so was Gromyko's response. He accepted the Carter message without reproach.

This toned-down exchange between the two leaders also contrasted sharply with the ferocious exchange between Rita Hauser, a U.S. delegate, and key Communist Party leaders at the so-called U.S.-Soviet "Dartmouth" conference in Riga, Latvia, last July. When Hauser raised the Scharansky case and asked for an explanation, Soviet mem-

bers of the conference flared, caustically telling her it was not the business of the United States, that it was strictly an "internal" matter and that Soviet legal authorities had "evidence" against Scharansky.

The muted publicity now being given the human-rights campaign has led many critics toward this angry but unproved conclusion: Carter, his White House adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, and the State Department, stung by the Kremlin's public fury in expressing displeasure over the U.S. campaign, have backed away from human rights to reach an accommodation with Moscow on strategic arms and other issues.

The critics may prove right in the end, but evidence is lacking today as witness the following:

Item: In a high-level session with State Department bureaucrats in the National Security Council's situation room the afternoon of Aug. 23, Brzezinski switched signals on U.S. plans for the second session of the post-Helsinki Belgrade conference. In collaboration with Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher, he recruited Arthur Goldberg as chief U.S. delegate. Middle-level U.S. diplomats, wanting to minimize U.S.-Soviet disagreements, backed Ambassador Albert W. Sherer, a Class Leaver Foreign Service officer who headed the U.S. delegation in last spring's preliminary Belgrade session, but clearly lacks Goldberg's stature.

Item: Goldberg laid down a condition for accepting the post. Although he would not court "confrontation" with the Russians over mind-boggling Soviet violations of "basket three"—outlining basic human rights for nations that signed the 1975 Helsinki accords—he insisted on his unqualified right to "push compliance" by the Soviets.

Item: Pro-human-rights hardliners in the U.S. Commission on Security and Cooperation—set up to police the Helsinki accords—claim that Goldberg's public speeches and private argumentation during closed-door sessions at Belgrade so far are beyond complaint by those wanting the United States to keep Soviet feet to the fire.

Whether this mid-course judgment proves correct by the time the Belgrade conference ends remains to be seen. One unknown factor is how the Soviets themselves maneuver through the Belgrade conference and deal with pressures from the West to open the human-rights crack wider.

Gromyko's acceptance of Carter's appeal for Scharansky's release, without provocative response, indicates extreme Soviet wariness as the world spotlights the grim human-rights picture in the Communist heartland. Likewise, the Kremlin has suddenly permitted increased Jewish emigration, which reached more than 1,600 last month—higher than any other month in 1977 (though way below the peak rate of 1973 at the height of détente).

The shift to quiet diplomacy by President Carter has cost him a powerful cutting edge for domestic politics, but quiet diplomacy, as much as the Belgrade conference, may be having a more productive impact on Moscow than the headlines of early 1977. Scharansky still rots in jail, but no formal charge has yet been made against him.

Additional

Belgrade

Conf.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 26, 1978

MEMORANDUM TO: Robert Lipshutz
From: Joyce Starr *JRS*
Subject: Belgrade Conference Report

NNA stands for Neutral and Non-Aligned countries, i.e.,
Rumania, Yugoslavia, and others.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 18, 1978

MEMORANDUM TO: Bob Lipshutz
Stu Eizenstat
Joe Aragon

FROM: Joyce Starr *JS*

Attached you will find State Department statement issued at noon along with the Goldberg release. The statement is strong, but its force is considerably weakened by the failure of the White House to respond to this blatant contravention of the Helsinki Accords.

Attachment: 1

file in safe

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E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: PINT, UR, US, CSCE

SUBJECT: STATEMENT ON DRLOV

REF: MOSCOW 10480

1. THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT WAS RELEASED AT THE MAY 18
NOON PRESS BRIEFING:

2. "THE UNITED STATES STRONGLY DEPLORES THE CONVICTION
AND SENTENCING BY A SOVIET COURT OF DR. YURIY DRLOV, THE
LEADER OF THE MOSCOW PUBLIC GROUP TO PROMOTE OBSERVANCE
OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT IN THE USSR. THE HARSH SENTENCE
WAS AGGRAVATED BY PROCEDURES AND ACTIONS DESIGNED TO
HUMILIATE BOTH THE DEFENDANT AND MRS. DRLOV. YET THE CON-
DUCT FOR WHICH DR. DRLOV IS BEING PUNISHED WAS THE MONITOR-
ING OF THE PERFORMANCE OF THEIR GOVERNMENT UNDER THE CSCE
FINAL ACT. SUCH PARTICIPATION BY PRIVATE CITIZENS IN THE
CSCE PROCESS SHOULD BE WELCOMED BY SIGNATORY GOVERNMENTS
RATHER THAN REPRESSED BY THEM. TO PUNISH AS 'SUBVERSIVE',
ACTIVITIES AIMED AT INCREASING FREE EXPRESSION OF OPINION
AND AT PROMOTING GOVERNMENTAL OBSERVANCE OF FORMAL OBLIGA-
TIONS SOLEMNLY UNDERTAKEN IS A GROSS DISTORTION OF INTER-
NATIONALLY ACCEPTED STANDARDS OF HUMAN RIGHTS SET FORTH IN
SUCH DOCUMENTS AS THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN

RIGHTS, THE UNITED NATIONS COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL
RIGHTS, AND THE CSCE FINAL ACT. VANCE

BT

***** W H S R C O M M E N T *****

S/P

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AMEMBASSY PRAGUE
AMEMBASSY SOFIA
AMEMBASSY WARSAW

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ MOSCOW 13691

LIMDIS

E. O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: CSCE, UR, US, BU, CZ, GE, HU, PL, RO
SUBJECT: NEW CSCE APPROACHES TO SOVIET UNION AND EAST
EUROPEAN STATES

REF: STATE 120984

1. EMBASSY CONSIDERS THAT THE CURRENT STATE OF U.S.-
SOVIET RELATIONS ARE SUCH AS TO ARGUE AGAINST MAKING A
NEW CSCE APPROACH TO THE SOVIET UNION AT THIS TIME. IT
HAS BEEN EIGHTEEN MONTHS SINCE OUR LAST PRESENTATION
OF THIS TYPE, AND FIFTEEN MONTHS SINCE THE SOVIET
RESPONSE. AFTER SUCH A LONG HIATUS, WE BELIEVE THE
REINSTITUTION OF THE DIALOGUE, SUCH AS IT MAY BE,
SHOULD AWAIT A MORE PROPITIOUS MOMENT IN OUR RELATIONS.
IN THE PAST WE HAVE HAD, AT BEST, A DIFFICULT TIME
TRYING TO BALANCE THE POSITIVE AND THE NEGATIVE AND
TO GIVE EQUAL WEIGHT TO ALL THREE BASKETS IN MAKING
OUR PRESENTATIONS. DESPITE OUR EFFORTS THE SOVIETS
HAVE CHARGED US WITH OVEREMPHASIZING SHORTCOMINGS AND
BASKET THREE ISSUES. AT THIS JUNCTURE THE PROBLEM
WILL BE MAGNIFIED.

2. WE ARE JUST FINISHED WITH THE ORLOV TRIAL AND
AWAITING THE GINZBURG AND SHCHARANSKIY TRIALS, THE
SOVIET CRACKDOWN ON DISSIDENTS HAS INCREASED AND THE
FRUSTRATION OF THE REFUSENIKS HAS HEIGHTENED, THE
MCCLELLAN CASE REMAINS. OUR JOURNALISTS HAVE CAUSE
FOR COMPLAINT (E.G., PULLING THE TV PLUG DURING THE
SECRETARY'S VISIT HERE), AND CONCERN THAT THEY MAY
BE IMPLICATED IN THE COMING TRIALS. INDEED ONLY A
SLIGHT INCREASE IN EMIGRATION FIGURES IS THE MOST
POSITIVE POINT TO BE RAISED IN BASKET THREE ISSUES.

3. WE ARE ALSO IN A HOLDING PATTERN WITH RESPECT TO
THE STATUS OF MILITARY EXCHANGES AND VISITS, WITH A
GOOD PROSPECT OF MORE DELAY BEFORE THIS MATTER IS
WORKED OUT. WE WOULD HAVE TO MENTION THE SOVIET
TURNDOWN OF THE WAR COLLEGE EXCHANGE AND THEY WOULD
PROBABLY RESPOND WITH A COMPLAINT ABOUT THE LACK OF
U.S. RESPONSE TO THEIR PROPOSAL ON THE SENIOR OFFICER
EXCHANGE. ON THE PLUS SIDE THERE IS THE FACT THAT
THE SOVIETS HAVE FINALLY INVITED U.S. MILITARY
OBSERVERS TO ONE OF THEIR EXERCISES, BUT EVE IN THIS
CASE WE WOULD HAVE TO MENTION THAT THE RESTRICTIONS
ON THE OBSERVERS WAS, IN OUR OPINION, EXCESSIVE.

4. ALL OF THE ABOVE ADDRESSES ONLY THE DIRECTLY CSCE
RELATED ISSUES WHICH WOULD TEND TO CAST A PALL OVER
THE PRESENTATION AND GIVE IT EVEN MORE OF A NEGATIVE

CONTENT THAN IN THE PAST. BUT, APART FROM THIS THERE
ARE NUMEROUS HASTY PROBLEMS (SUCH AS CHARGES AND COUNTER-
CHARGES OF SPYING, THE ARREST OF AN AMERICAN BUSINESS-
MAN AND OTHER MATTERS), THAT, WE THINK, SHOULD BE
SETTLED OR LEFT TO COOL DOWN BEFORE WE AGAIN APPROACH
THE SOVIETS AND ATTEMPT TO ENGAGE THEM IN A "CON-
STRUCTIVE DIALOGUE." THE PROSPECTS FOR A POSITIVE
SOVIET RESPONSE AT THIS POINT ARE NOT HIGH.

5. FURTHERMORE, WE THINK THAT WE SHOULD CONSIDER WHETHER
WE WOULD BE GIVING A FALSE, OR CONFUSING, SIGNAL TO
THE SOVIETS IF WE GO TO THEM NOW AND SUGGEST THAT A
ROUTINE OR REGULAR DIALOGUE CAN BE INSTITUTED DESPITE
THE MANY, SERIOUS POLICY DIFFERENCES WHICH EXIST.
IT WOULD NOT BE TO OUR ADVANTAGE EITHER TO IGNORE THESE
ISSUES IN OUR PRESENTATION, OR TO DEPRECATE THEIR
IMPORTANCE BY TREATING THEM SUMMARILY ALONG WITH THE
MANY LESSER ISSUES WHICH WOULD HAVE TO BE MENTIONED.

6. HAD THE OVERALL ATOSPHERE IMPROVED FOLLOWING
THE GROMYKO VISIT TO WASHINGTON, A CASE MAY HAVE
BEEN MADE FOR GOING AHEAD WITH AN APPROACH DESPITE
SERIOUS DIFFERENCES IN THE PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES.
HOWEVER, IT WOULD SEEM BETTER TO US TO SPEND THE
SUMMER MONTHS TRYING TO WORK OUT SOME OF THE SERIOUS
DIFFERENCES AND TO APPROACH THE SOVIETS IN THE
AUTUMN, WHEN RELATIONS MIGHT BE ON THE UPSWING.
TO GO IN NOW WITH A DEMARCHE WOULD, WE BELIEVE, CONDEMN
THE DIALOGUE TO SUDDEN DEATH THROUGH AN INITIAL,
STRONG, NEGATIVE SOVIET REACTION AND THE LIKELIHOOD
OF EITHER NO FORMAL REPLY OR AN OVERLY CONTENTIOUS
ONE. TOON

Jay 12/8/06

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 20, 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT LIPSHUTZ
STU EIZENSTAT

FROM: JOYCE STARR *J*
RE: ED MEZVINSKY

Ambassador Goldberg has informed us (June 12th. meeting) that Ed Mezvinsky is his candidate for the slot of Ambassador-at-Large for CSCE. Mat Nimitz, Counselor to the Secretary of State, is a close associate of Mezvinsky and also thinks he is the best person for the job.

Nimitz communicated this preference to me during a conversation we held several weeks ago. He stated, however, that the recommendation would have to be initiated by the White House; he, in turn, would give it full support.

I feel Mezvinsky has the strongest background and understanding of the process that we are likely to find. I am told by Derian's shop that he has "worked miracles" at the Human Rights Commission. His experience on the Hill, 1973 to 1977, provides the added advantage of close ties to Members of Congress, along with political savvy.

I have known him only for a few months, but in that time have been impressed by his capacity and commitment.

I have attached his bio for your information.

EDWARD M. MEZVINSKY

Edward Mezvinsky was appointed the United States Representative to the United Nations Commission on Human Rights by President Jimmy Carter on July 15, 1977. Ambassador Andrew Young administered the oath of office on August 4.

From 1973 to 1977 Mr. Mezvinsky served as a Member of the United States Congress, representing the First District of Iowa. As a Member of Congress he served on the Judiciary and Government Operations Committees. He was elected a member of the Democratic Party Steering and Policy Committee and served as elected Chairman of the Freshmen Democratic Members of Congress. Congressman Mezvinsky also served as a member of the National Study Commission on Records and Documents of Federal Officials.

During his service in Congress Mr. Mezvinsky was actively involved in the review, enactment and implementation of legislation relating to foreign affairs dealing with subjects such as foreign assistance, trade, refugees and emigration. He introduced and sponsored a number of human rights legislative proposals. He served as a member of the Judiciary Committee Delegation to the Soviet Union and participated in the Ditchley Foundation Seminar on Anglo-American comparative government.

Mr. Mezvinsky was born January 17, 1937 in Ames, Iowa. He received a B.A. degree in 1960 from the University of Iowa and a Masters Degree in government from the University of California in 1963. In 1965, he received his law degree from Hastings College of Law, University of California.

Mr. Mezvinsky served as a member of the Iowa State Legislature, as the legislative assistant to Congressman Neal Smith, and has been a practicing attorney.

He is married to Marjorie Margolies, an NBC television news reporter based in Washington, and they have six daughters, Margot, Vera, Elga, Eve, LeeHeh (Korean), and Holly (Vietnamese-American), and a son, Marc.

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DEPT PLEASE PASS WHITE HOUSE FOR ROBERT LIPSHUTZ,
STUART EIZENSTAT, AND JOE ARAGON
P. O. 116521 N/A
TAGS: OTRA, IS
SUBJECT: TRAVEL OF DR. JOYCE STARR
TIME DIFFERENCE, SCHEDULING, MAKE CALL IN DIFFICULT.
PLEASE ADVISE THROUGH EMBASSY TEL AVIV (ARRIVE JULY 28TH)
IF ANY PROBLEMS, NEW DEVELOPMENTS I SHOULD BE AWARE OF,
PARTICULARLY HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES. WILL BE ADDRESSING
THESE MATTERS IN ISRAEL, IN ADDITION TO THE ECONOMIC.
WILL PHONE WASHINGTON EARLY NEXT WEEK. REGARDS.
DR. JOYCE STARR SENDS. SUDDARTH
BT

*file: (Re. Human Rights)
Belgrad Conference*

*****WHSR COMMENT*****

LIPSHUTZ, EIZENSTAT, ARAGON
BOBIQUANDT

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE GUIDELINES, JULY 21, 1997
BY *gaj* NARA, DATE *10/24/06*

SECRET12

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET-SENSITIVE
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August 3, 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

SUBJECT:

Information Items

Information

Gromyko's Deputy Defends Soviet CSCE Record: Deputy Foreign Minister Kovalev defended the USSR's "principled and consistent" observance of the Helsinki Final Act and its stance on the recent dissident trials at a press conference marking the third anniversary of the agreement. He faulted the U.S. administration as such only for attempting to use trade for political leverage, but -- in an exchange with reporters -- he stressed the need to approach U.S.-Soviet relations from a broader political perspective.

Kovalev's measured defense of the Soviet record emphasized the European context of the CSCE. His primary purpose appears to have been to put the Soviet case on record, without polemics, and to spell out the distinction Moscow wishes to see others draw, as Moscow does, between acceptable "ideological struggle" and pernicious "psychological warfare." The Western campaign about alleged Soviet violations of human rights and a Soviet war menace falls into the latter category.

According to State, the longer-term perspective on U.S.-USSR relations with which he concluded the press conference and his general avoidance of counter-accusations while defending the Soviet record on CSCE seem designed to:

- keep the Helsinki Final Act a viable frame of reference for detente, especially in the European context;
- dampen the polemics caused by the dissident trials; and
- make those points without further exacerbating relations with the U.S.

State Department review completed

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
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Venezuelan Oil Delivery to Cuba: Venezuela has made its first shipment of oil to Cuba since the early 1960s. The delivery, which took place last month, was probably the initiation of an oil swap arrangement with the USSR announced with considerable fanfare by President Perez during his visit to Moscow in November 1976.

Under the terms of the agreement, Venezuela is to provide a portion of Cuba's crude oil requirements, and the USSR is to supply equivalent amounts of Soviet crude to Venezuela's European customers. Cuba may receive as much as 10,000 to 20,000 barrels per day of Venezuelan crude in the deal. Although CIA expects further shipments of crude under the agreement, it is unlikely to outlast the Perez administration, which leaves office in March 1979.

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NSC Activity



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MEMORANDUM

NSA review completed

THE WHITE HOUSE

OUTSIDE THE SYSTEM

WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET/UMBRA/TALENT KEYHOLE

INFORMATION

May 29, 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR:

ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

FROM:

WILLIAM E. ODOM *WO*

SUBJECT:

Weekly Report on Soviet Affairs (U)

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IMPORTANT TO KNOW

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Signs of the Succession Struggle. The signs of a struggle are beginning to emerge: the Kirilenko picture-dubbing affair on May Day; [redacted] the Romanov protege assignments in East Europe and to the CC Secretariat; and reports from East Europe that Soviet policy could change on Egypt. As yet, I see no clear tie of a potential successor to a particular policy line. (TS/□)

A Number of Foreign Policy Items are Worth Noting:

Sino-Soviet Talks. The Soviets have responded positively to the Chinese invitation to talk about bilateral relations. PRC Embassy officials told me Friday that the agenda and date are not yet firm, and they are not likely to be before the end of the year. (S)


Tito Visit to Moscow. Both the media and Embassy Moscow conclude that the Brezhnev-Tito summit did little to reverse the slide in Soviet-Yugoslav relations. (S)

Soviet Position on Egyptian-Israeli Treaty. The French report that the Soviets were extremely tough on the issue of the treaty during the most recent Soviet-French consultations, but the Soviets did not directly threaten a veto of the UNEF deployment. (C)

A Number of Military and Arms Control Items are Worth Noting:

TASS on Jody Powell and the SS-21. TASS took public notice of Jody Powell's correction of the record on "new missiles in the GDR" and tied the original "misinformation" to a U.S. push for TNF modernization at the NPG in Florida. (U)

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Derivative Classification

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TOP SECRET/UMBRA/TALENT KEYHOLE

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Press coverage called the exercise "low-key." At post-exercise ceremonies, Ustinov hailed the upcoming Vienna summit but also called for more defense vigilance. Marshal Kulikov added that the "successes of detente are not yet firm enough." (U)

Soviet Disapproval of U-2 Flights. FBIS reports that speaker of the Supreme Soviet, Shitikov, said in Izmir that the USSR would "receive it positively" if Turkey declined to allow U-2 flights over Turkey. (U)

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LONGER TERM ISSUES

Warsaw Pact Proposal for a New European Security Forum. The Warsaw Pact Foreign Ministers meeting in Budapest, May 14-15, endorsed an unusually comprehensive list of familiar European security proposals plus one new one -- a call for a political level conference this year of all European states as well as the U.S. and Canada. State INR rightly suspects, in my view, that this is a tactic for moving attention at CSCE away from human rights and onto security issues. (S)

Another implication should also be kept in mind. Having stood so firm on the data dispute at MBFR, even in the Gelb-Bessmertnykh bilateral discussion -- a stand that surprised Jonathan Dean in Vienna -- the Soviets are in no position to use MBFR for thwarting NATO TNF modernization. They need an alternative forum. CSCE could serve that purpose if Basket One were taken more seriously. An all-European conference this year might provide the stimulus for making Basket One lively next year at Madrid. (S)

Less Economic Data Published. Reportedly, a recent high-level decision has been made to reduce further the publication of economic data, a trend started in 1976. We are witnessing larger lacunae in both foreign trade data and in domestic economic reporting, corroborative evidence for the report. The largest gaps in industrial production are in energy production, particularly oil and gas, but also coal and electricity. Agriculture, until recently, a bright spot, is showing more reporting gaps. This year, the Soviets have begun dragging their feet on monthly reporting

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required by the US-USSR Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Agriculture. The Soviet refusal to reverse this trend is clearly inconsistent with Basket Two of the Helsinki Accord. (U)

ITEMS TO ACT ON

-- You might want to have the Soviet economic data issue added to the summit agenda. This trend toward less public data can only hamper U.S.-Soviet economic relations.

-- The Soviet position on U-2s over Turkey must be answered. (C)

FOR THE PRESIDENT TO KNOW

As the summit approaches, I am inclined to recommend that the President be apprised of numerous small items to texture his background for Vienna. For example, he should know that:

✓ -- a succession struggle is in progress;

✓ -- Sino-Soviet talks are planned;

✓ -- Tito got nothing from Brezhnev;

? -- the Soviets are keeping options open to relations with Egypt. (TS)

He should also have a clear picture of the way the Soviets are moving ahead with military power projection notwithstanding summitry:



The President should also know that Senator Byrd is planning to visit the Soviet Union in early July. (U)

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112-02

4013 Add-on

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

July 11, 1979

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INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

FROM: THOMAS THORNTON

SUBJECT: Bloomfield Material -- Human Rights

The attached is per your request. Time did not permit talking to Jessica.

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HUMAN RIGHTS

I have been holding this horse for you only since Jessica's departure; hence, I have not been deeply involved in a number of aspects of it -- substantive or procedural. It is very important that you get together soon with Jessica and have her fill you in. I do have a number of observations to make however; perhaps you will find some of them mildly interesting. (U)

Human rights is probably the main success story of this administration's foreign policy, at least in a long-term historical view. We have developed a policy in which we can take pride. We have made human rights an issue of international standing. We have had a definite beneficial impact on the lives of thousands of people throughout the world. And we have created a basis for mutual respect with leaders such as Morarji Desai, Julius Nyerere and others who were alienated from the previous administration. Most important, perhaps, we have stuck with the policy. The President continues to support it strongly (more so than many of his would-be advisers) and the administration in general has not gotten too "bored" with the issue. (C)

Clearly, not all is roses. There are quixotic aspects to the policy and quixotic people associated with it. There has been some misdirection of our efforts. And, of course, there are many areas that we simply cannot affect. (C)

Sometimes the quixotic elements are positive. Our single-minded voting against loans to HR violators in the IFIs has no impact on the loans since they are approved anyway. It is important, however, that we portray a picture of consistency as part of our overall campaign. (C)

You are going to have to risk looking quixotic yourself, if you are going to do this job adequately. The human rights portfolio is an adversarial one. Your geographic colleagues will often have good political reasons not to push human rights too hard. Don't let them get away with it. Sometimes you will have to take fairly extreme positions just to force a reasonable compromise. Your function (and this is true of non-proliferation as

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well) is to keep your teeth firmly dug into others' heels. Otherwise you will be disregarded -- even by people who are at least as warm-hearted as you, but who are faced with a different set of issues. And not all of them are quite that warm-hearted. There are plenty of people in State -- and not only there -- who consider human rights a misguided effort and play along with it only to the minimum extent necessary to humor a President who "doesn't understand" the realities of international politics. Kissinger lives. (C)

A major problem at the beginning of the administration was the inability of some to understand that there are different categories of human rights; that there are differences among torture, lack of free press, and inadequate access to pure water. Fairly early on, we were able to get the theoretical distinction accepted, and not too long thereafter, even Patt Derian was brought around to the belief that some violations had priority over others. It is an issue that needs to be watched constantly, however, for there are still many who simply aggregate all human rights listed in the UN declaration. (C)

An unfortunate example (albeit one that the Administration is not responsible for) is our concentration on Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union. There are many worse things that happen to people in the Soviet Union than (a) being Jews and (b) having to stay there. Many much worse things happen to people outside the Soviet Union. Obviously Jewish emigration is a legitimate human rights issue. It should not, however, enjoy the priority that it gets. (C)

An example of ineffectiveness is not hard to find. We are unable to do anything about Equatorial Guinea and never did much about Pol Pot or Amin, although there may have been some glimmering in the latter case. The point here is that we are able to do less about countries that (a) receive no aid or other benefits from the US and/or (b) are ruthless enough to keep outsiders from finding out what is going on in their countries. Clearly Chile and Korea are less egregious offenders than Kampuchea or Eq. Guinea. But you would never know it by reading the international press or reviewing the list of US actions taken. Unfortunately, there is no ready answer to this. Nor, for that matter, to the unwillingness of LDCs to cast stones at others' glass houses. We just have to keep plugging away. (C)

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Warsaw Pact

EAST-WEST RELATIONS

The Warsaw Pact took a series of steps in early December apparently timed to the NATO Council session that opened in Brussels on the 11th. Between 4 and 6 December, the Pact foreign ministers met in East Berlin, the defense ministers conferred in Warsaw, and Pact media announced the first withdrawals of Soviet military units from East Germany as a result of President Brezhnev's 6 October proposals in East Berlin. The Pact foreign ministers reiterated opposition to NATO's impending decision on deploying new medium-range missiles, but judging from a final communique their attention was already focused on the East-West dialog on security issues that still lies ahead.

WARSAW PACT MEETINGS, SOVIET TROOP PULLOUT PRECEDE NATO TALKS

Both the Pact Defense Ministers Committee meeting on 4-6 December and the Foreign Ministers Committee meeting on the 5th and 6th exhibited some features out of the ordinary. The foreign ministers meeting in East Berlin was held only seven months after the last such session in Budapest in May, a much briefer interval than usual. While not claiming unanimity, the communique recorded an atmosphere of "comradely cooperation and fraternal friendship," a formula virtually identical to the one used for the May meeting.

A political purpose was also apparent in the report on the 4-6 December Warsaw Pact defense ministers meeting in the Polish capital. In a departure from the exclusively military content of past reports on such gatherings, TASS said that the Defense Ministers Committee "unanimously and fully supports the new peace initiatives expounded in the speech of Leonid Brezhnev" in East Berlin on 6 October. While the report claimed unanimity on the Soviet disarmament initiative, its description of the defense ministers' talks as "businesslike" suggested some level of disagreement, possibly related to Romanian resistance to closer coordination of the Pact armed forces. The same characterization had been used for the Pact Military Council meeting, at the deputy defense ministers level, in Bucharest at the end of October, after being absent from reports on such Pact meetings for five years.

SOVIET TROOP WITHDRAWAL Soviet and East Berlin media have hailed the 5 December pullout of the first contingents of the 20,000 troops and 1,000 tanks which Brezhnev said would be withdrawn from the GDR over the next 12 months. TASS on the 6th said that 1,500 troops had been withdrawn. As reported by ADN,

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FBIS TRENDS
12 DECEMBER 1979

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a speech in Halle on the 5th by Army General Ivanovskiy, commander of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, repeatedly specified that the troops were returning "home"--an apparent response to Western conjectures that the Soviet troops may be moved from the GDR to another East European country. Ivanovskiy said the troops would be welcomed in the Soviet Union with gratitude for carrying out their responsibility of "reliably protecting the western frontiers of the socialist community of states."

WARSAW PACT RENEWS CALL FOR CONFERENCE ON MILITARY DETENTE

The Warsaw Pact Foreign Ministers Committee communique, issued on 6 December, renewed the group's call of last spring for a Europe-wide conference on "military detente." Given its appearance on the eve of the NATO Council's meeting to consider theater nuclear force modernization, the communique's focus on arms control issues for the coming year made its reiterated warning against a go-ahead alliance decision appear almost pro forma. The foreign ministers' proposals seem designed to insure that security issues play a major role at the second Helsinki review conference scheduled for November 1980 in Madrid. Pact leaders undoubtedly are attempting to avoid the pattern of the first review conference, held in late 1977 in Belgrade, when Soviet proposals for security consultations got nowhere and "third basket" issues of cultural exchange and human rights stressed by the West dominated the proceedings.

As they had in their previous meeting last May, the foreign ministers appealed to NATO to forego its theater nuclear force modernization plans, expressly holding out the prospect this time of negotiations instead. The foreign ministers' language in this connection seemed to soften the implication in earlier remarks by Foreign Minister Gromyko last month that early talks would be ruled out if NATO went ahead as planned. Not just the adoption of a production and deployment decision alone, it said, but the "implementation" of such a decision, would destroy the basis for negotiations.

The largest part of the foreign ministers' communique was devoted to an elaboration and clarification of European security proposals first presented at their meeting in Budapest last May. The communique indicated that the call last May for a Helsinki-style conference on reducing military confrontation in Europe has now been explicitly cast within the framework of the Helsinki review process. The document also confirmed that Moscow intends several of its longstanding disarmament initiatives to occupy a major place on the agenda. Preparatory talks on such a conference, the document suggests, should begin right away, with a "working meeting"

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FBI'S TRENDS
12 DECEMBER 1979

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to take place in the first half of 1980. As a final step, it suggests, the working meeting should agree on a tentative agenda for the conference to be submitted to the Madrid review conference for its final approval.

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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

National Intelligence Officers

NFAC 0155-80

7 January 1980

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Western Europe: Responses to US-Soviet Tension in Wake of
Afghan Crisis

Almost from the beginning of the Cold War, detente has been a powerful aspiration for the Europeans. They pursued it earlier and more intensely than did the US -- because of their proximity to the Soviets; their individual weakness and hence vulnerability to Soviet threats; their sense of shared social and cultural destiny with Eastern Europe, hence hopes for political reconciliation; their uncertainty that US security guarantees would prove effective in a real crisis; their discomfiture at the dominant role assumed by the US in the West as a result of the Cold War.

All these concerns remain alive in Western Europe. The European stake in detente has grown even larger over time. In particular, since the Soviet Union achieved strategic parity with the US, the Europeans have viewed detente not as a product of assured security but rather as an essential ingredient of it. Chief among the benefits of detente for Europe have been the relaxation of political tensions on the Continent and the framework for arms control negotiations that has been established. Detente has also become an important condition for the effective management of domestic politics in European countries where parties of the left play important roles, because with East-West detente, sharp polarization between left and right is easier to avoid. Europeans count on preserving and extending the trade gains and the freedom of movement between East and West that have accompanied detente. (European Community exports to the Soviet Union grew

This memorandum, requested by the staff of the National Security Council, was prepared by [redacted] the National Intelligence Officer for Western Europe. It was coordinated with the NFAC Office of Political Analysis and takes into account comments received from Robert Blackwill, NSC; Jenonne Walker, State S/P; Sandra Vogelgesang, State/EUR; and Paul Cassidy, DOD/ISA. Questions and comments may be addressed to [redacted]

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five-fold from 1970 to 1978; and the number of immigrants to West Germany from the East was over 57,000 in 1978 alone.) The Europeans also hope that in a climate reasonably free of tension, the Soviets will exercise restraint not only on the Continent but in the Third World, where the Europeans must preserve their access to raw materials.

Therefore the prospect of heightened tension between the US and the Soviet Union creates deep apprehension among the Europeans. They would necessarily share in that tension and in the uncertainties it would create. They would see the interests they have pursued through detente put in jeopardy -- their security first of all. The adequacy of means they have to defend themselves against Soviet pressure would be again in doubt. At the same time, a clash between the superpowers would threaten the Europeans' own freedom of action in relation to both the US and the Soviets, and compel them again to rely on US management of the East-West crisis at a time when their doubts about the adequacy and steadfastness of US leadership are grave.

Because they have so large a stake in East-West harmony, the Europeans have often been reluctant to support the US when they believed the issues in question were peripheral rather than central to the East-West relationship from their particular perspective. This view was most dramatically reflected in the Europeans' attitudes toward the Vietnam and even Korean wars. It was also evident in the European reservations about the US alert during the 1973 Middle East war. It is reflected in Europe's heavily nuanced approach to Africa -- the argument that although the West should oppose Soviet or Soviet-sponsored incursions there, it should do so more by means of economic and technical aid to the Africans than by challenging the Soviets or the Cubans directly. Yet the Europeans have firmly stood with the US in cases where they believed the East-West balance was directly attacked -- in Berlin, for example, or during the Cuban missile crisis.

How the Europeans interpret the events in Afghanistan will strongly influence their response to the measures the US takes against the Soviet Union. They are likely to view the Soviets' actions as prompted in part by the need to maintain control over the Moslem population within the Soviet Union, by concerns arising from threats to the Soviet role in Eastern Europe, and by obscure internal struggles related to the coming succession. On such an explanation, the Soviet move into Afghanistan might be thought to have rather limited significance in the long run, and to call for only quite restrained reactions on the part of the West.

Yet the Europeans also appreciate that Soviet behavior may have major strategic implications, requiring certain kinds of firm resistance on the part of the West in order to ward off any further expansion of Soviet influence in the Third World, to prevent in particular eventual Soviet dominance in the Middle East oil producing region, to deter the Soviets from

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similar behavior in Europe itself (possibly Yugoslavia), and to discourage Soviet efforts to exert political pressure on the Europeans based on Soviet "successes" elsewhere.

European responses to Soviet behavior in Afghanistan will also be affected by the course the Soviet intervention takes in the longer term, and by the threats and inducements the Soviets pose in the European theater as US-Soviet relations chill. Public opinion will be important too -- it may surprise European governments by pressing for a firm reaction to the Soviets.

At this stage of the crisis, however, the Europeans emphasize that the Afghan crisis is primarily a confrontation between the Soviet Union and the Third World -- especially the Moslem nations -- and that any response to the Soviets must include the participation of such countries. They have stressed that the Western reaction should be directed specifically to the region of Afghanistan, that it should be restrained in any case, and that major elements of detente such as SALT should be preserved as far as possible.

However the Europeans eventually assess the Afghan crisis, the extent to which they will support US actions depends crucially on their own special interests and vulnerabilities in relation to the Soviet Union. The British will probably be most forthcoming. The government of Prime Minister Thatcher, which is uniquely sensitive to Soviet abuses of power and to ideological differences that persist between the East and the West, has already shown a willingness to undertake firm defense policy measures at considerable cost. Moreover, the British are less vulnerable to the Soviets than the Continental countries; they are still protected to a certain extent by a special relationship with the US; and they have rather less to lose economically by trade restrictions. The British also have traditional links to South Asia that allow them to influence events in that region independently of actions the US may take.

The countries on the Continent, however, are highly dependent on continuing oil supplies from the Middle East and would find the prospect of growing Soviet influence on those supplies profoundly alarming. France, in particular, has championed the idea of a special link between Europe, the Middle East, and Africa, and has been willing to intervene in Africa -- even militarily -- to quell disturbances that might create opportunities from which the Soviets could profit. Yet President Giscard, whose government is already under pressure from the Gaullists in view of next year's presidential elections, cannot afford to provoke their criticism by taking measures against the Soviets in obvious deference to US wishes; he must maintain a certain distance from US policies. Apart from such domestic considerations, the French government believes that it retains a "special relationship" with the Soviet Union which it would be extremely reluctant to jeopardize. The French

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have worked especially hard to win Soviet support for the French proposal for a Conference on European Disarmament, and they are most unlikely to take actions that would undermine that effort.

Italy has an interest in supporting US measures against the Soviet Union in order to preserve the status it has lately won in the Alliance for backing theater nuclear force modernization and to enhance its role as EC President and Venice Summit host in the coming months. But the government is especially vulnerable to Soviet economic pressures and inducements -- in particular the Soviets are an important natural gas supplier for Italy -- and the Italians would press hard for compensation for any costs it might incur in supporting US actions. Domestically, a climate of hostility between the superpowers places the Italian government in an awkward position because of its need for some degree of political cooperation from the Italian Communist Party. Thus, some Italians would be tempted to minimize the crisis, but many others would view it as an opportunity to push the PCI back into a quasi-illegitimate status.

West Germany clearly has the most to fear from revived US-Soviet tension. It is most directly vulnerable to Soviet pressures -- for example in Berlin -- and it has won, correspondingly, the greatest direct benefits from detente. Chancellor Schmidt's own Social Democratic Party initiated West Germany's reconciliation with the Soviets -- the Ostpolitik -- and has pursued and defended it for more than a decade. The Chancellor must demonstrate enough firmness against the Soviets in crisis to escape unfavorable comparison with his rival in this fall's elections, the conservative Franz Josef Strauss. But at the same time he cannot afford to abandon detente in Europe -- and thus the prospects for some continuing improvement in inner-German relations in particular -- unless he has no other option. To do so would risk splitting his party, whose vocal left wing prizes detente especially highly. It could also severely strain his close relationship with French President Giscard. The West Germans might well contribute to a stronger Western position in Southwest Asia but they will try to protect their hard-won reconciliation with the Soviets and Eastern Europe -- especially East Germany.

Under these conditions, most Europeans will certainly hesitate to reinforce East-West tension. They will try instead to limit and confine it, to ensure that detente in Europe is not damaged at the core. They may be tempted to view their proper role as that of mediator between the superpowers, as often in the past. While recognizing that they must stand with the US to the extent that broad strategic interests are involved, they will also be tempted both collectively and individually to stand apart a certain distance -- to preserve and enhance their own influence over how the crisis evolves.

In any event, their support for US actions against the Soviet Union

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- 5 -

following the Afghan invasion will depend especially on their confidence that

- their relations with Eastern Europe, and especially inner-German relations, can be insulated to some degree from the US-Soviet confrontation;
- the US intends to preserve the framework of detente in Europe to the greatest possible extent, and in particular to pursue ratification of the SALT agreement and negotiation of further arms control agreements focused on Europe;
- the US will not play the China card so strongly as to encourage an uncontrolled Soviet backlash in Europe or elsewhere;
- the US itself is acting in response to an objectively perceived and substantial external threat rather than to domestic political imperatives, and can maintain firm control and steady management of its policy toward the Soviet Union despite the pressures of an election year;
- such measures will impose real costs on the USSR, outside the European framework, of a kind that will dissuade it from future such actions and that will limit the gains it can derive from its Afghan move (rather than merely signaling the West's displeasure);
- while some costs may be incurred in their own relationships with the Soviets, the position of the West in the Middle East may be improved (by wider base rights, for example) and relations with the Third World generally will at least not be impaired;
- they will not be asked to take actions that will clearly not command the necessary domestic political support;
- they will be consulted fully on the implementation of US actions;
- the US will help compensate for any economic costs the Europeans may incur by supporting US actions;
- to the maximum extent possible they can individually avoid the risk of Soviet reprisals by acting collectively in some multilateral context;
- US-European cooperation in the current crisis might lead to a larger European voice in the broad range of East-West issues.

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16

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SECRET

January 8, 1980

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

FROM: ROBERT D. BLACKWILL **RB**

SUBJECT: Western European Reaction to U.S.-Soviet
Tension (S)

The Interagency paper on Western European reaction to a downturn in U.S.-Soviet relations is at Tab A. Should you wish to forward it to the President, a transmittal memorandum containing the paper's principal conclusions, is at Tab I. (S)

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Review on January 8, 1986.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SECRETINFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

SUBJECT: Western European Reaction to U.S.-Soviet Tension (S)

Under the direction of the NSC Staff, CIA has prepared the memorandum at Tab A which analyzes probable West European responses to a sharp downturn in U.S.-Soviet relations. The study has been cleared by State and Defense. Its principal conclusions are:

- The European stake in detente in Europe is very large and they will want to protect it; the prospect of heightened tension between the U.S. and the Soviet Union thus causes deep apprehension among the Europeans.
- How the Europeans interpret the events in Afghanistan will strongly influence their response to the measures the U.S. takes against the Soviet Union. If they accept that the Soviet invasion has broad strategic implications, and they have not yet definitely reached this conclusion, they will be more willing to take steps to shore up Western security in South Asia and the Middle East.
- The Germans are most vulnerable to Soviet countermeasures and have the most to lose from revived U.S.-Soviet tension. Because of this, Schmidt will seek to maintain FRG reconciliation with Moscow and Eastern Europe -- especially East Germany.
- Unlike the UK, the Italians are also vulnerable to Soviet pressure; the French will play an independent hand.
- Under these conditions, most Europeans will hesitate to reinforce East West tension. They will instead stand apart a certain distance to try to limit and confine the crisis, and to ensure that detente in Europe is not damaged at the core. (S)

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With these factors in mind, the paper suggests that European support for U.S. actions against the Soviet Union will depend especially on their confidence that:

- Their relations with Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, and especially inner-German relations, can be insulated to some degree from the U.S.-Soviet confrontation.
- The U.S. intends to preserve the framework of detente in Europe to the greatest possible extent, and in particular to pursue ratification of the SALT agreement and negotiation of further arms control agreements focused on Europe.
- The U.S. will not play the China card so strongly as to encourage a Soviet backlash in Europe or elsewhere.
- The U.S. itself is acting in response to an objectively perceived and substantial external threat rather than to domestic political imperatives, and can maintain firm control and steady management of its policy toward the Soviet Union despite the pressures of an election year. (S)

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MEMORANDUM

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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
April 14, 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

FROM: The Situation Room

SUBJECT: Additional Information Items

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
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Meanwhile, [redacted]

[redacted] pilot capability has sharply diminished and the overall effectiveness of the radar system is poor. Only 35-40 percent of the F-4s are actually being flown and the rate for F-5s is only marginally better. The F-14 is not now considered part of the air defense system and the Phoenix missiles are kept in storage.

(S)

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REVIEW ON APRIL 11, 2010
CLASSIFIED BY MULTIPLE SOURCES

NSA review completed

State Department review completed

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-2-

Soviet Dissent -- Repression and Optimism: Recent reports from Embassy Moscow portray Soviet dissidents as discouraged and disorganized, with their ranks decimated by arrests. By rough estimate, some 58 activists have been arrested or brought to trial since September 1979. Georgiy Vladimov, head of the Moscow branch of Amnesty International, recently estimated that about 50 persons remain active in the Soviet "Democratic Movement" and that the arrest of perhaps 15 more activists could suppress dissent in its present form. Many activists, however, remain optimistic that the movement will survive the current repression, as it has survived earlier periods of repression.

- Activists removed by arrest and imprisonment can be expected to be replaced by new personalities;
- The movement can adapt by developing different forms and more effective methods of struggle;
- The term "Democratic Movement" does not include other forms of dissent, religious and nationalist, which remain strong and tenacious. (S)

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Kosygin's Testiness on Soviet-US Relations

Premier Kosygin's image as one of the Soviet leadership's more optimistic and persistent supporters of improved Soviet-US relations has been blurred during the past year by a series of acrimonious and sometimes emotional exchanges with visiting US officials. His failure to control his temper could be read as a sign that old age or the wounds of recent political battles are taking their toll. The circumstances of these outbursts and consistency of their target, however, indicate that a change may actually have occurred in Kosygin's attitude toward the relationship. A review of his remarks during meetings in the past year suggests a cynicism regarding US intentions and a reserve about prospects for improved relations that has not been reflected in his public statements.

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Kosygin and Brezhnev: "As Different as Night and Day"

Kosygin's irascibility concerning the state of Soviet-US relations was first observed during a March 1978 meeting [redacted] the Premier tried to force [redacted] a discussion of political matters and gave [redacted] a "rough time" (especially on the neutron bomb issue), for which, however, he later apologized. The next--and most acrimonious--meeting with Americans came in November, when Kosygin received a Congressional delegation led by Senators Ribicoff and Bellmon. Apparently angered by Senator Ribicoff's presentation linking the ratification of SALT II with other issues (including emigration, the delivery of Soviet MIG-23 jet fighters to Cuba, and the presence of Cuban troops in Africa), Kosygin said he disagreed with Ribicoff's assessment. "One could get the impression," he said, "that the Senator was stating that only the Soviet Union was interested in SALT." Kosygin said that there were two forces at work in the world--the force of war and the force of peace--and that if the Senate failed to ratify SALT, it would show that the Senators who opposed it represented the force of war. Asserting that the Soviet Union, unlike

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29 March 1979

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China, wanted peace, he asked the Senators how his country should react when it was referred to in the United States--even by President Carter--as "our adversary (protivnik)."
 After the Senators' stormy session with Kosygin, they met with Brezhnev, whose attitude, according to one member of the delegation, was as different from Kosygin's as "night and day." [REDACTED]

25X1

A well-placed Soviet official, attempting to explain Kosygin's extraordinary behavior, told one Senator that the Premier was in a sour mood because he had been attacked earlier that day at a meeting (presumably of the Politburo) on the economic plan. While the evidence indicates that such a meeting may, in fact, have taken place, the cause-and-effect relationship seems dubious. Kosygin's irritability was to resurface later at several other meetings with Americans. His talks with Treasury Secretary Blumenthal and Commerce Secretary Kreps the following month were almost a repeat performance of his meeting with the Senate delegation, with the focus of his anger shifting to US trade policy. Complaining about the hue and cry that arose when the Soviets attempted to purchase US petroleum equipment, he wondered aloud why the Soviets should sign contracts with people who did not honor them. [REDACTED]

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Sino-US Relations

While Kosygin's subsequent meetings with Americans were less emotional, his remarks seemed no less biting, with the Sino-US relationship increasingly on his mind. At talks [REDACTED] in December he complained about the US failure to give most favored nation (MFN) treatment to Soviet exports while granting such treatment to exports from other countries, including China. When told that the United States did not accord MFN treatment to China, Kosygin persisted that all Americans are now going to China and that the Chinese undoubtedly would be given MFN status. [REDACTED]

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At a meeting with EPA Administrator Douglas Costle in February, Kosygin succeeded in using even a discussion of environmental protection as a peg for criticism of US policy. He complained that the United States had not objected to continued Chinese testing of nuclear devices in the atmosphere even though it had contaminated US air and

29 March 1979

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that Deng Xiaoping was being treated as if he were an "icon" in the United States. Talks with the President's science adviser held later that month were also punctuated by sharp exchanges, with Kosygin repeating his complaint about President Carter's use of the term "adversary" in relation to the Soviet Union. [redacted] (25X1)

From Optimism to Exasperation

The cumulative effect of all these comments is an impression that the one-time champion of detente (a title he acquired in 1968 when he became the first Politburo member to call for an arms limitation agreement with the United States) may have hung up the gloves. While he has continued to make some appropriate positive noises in public, Kosygin's remarks during these talks suggest that his former optimism about putative benefits to be accrued from the Soviet-US relationship--namely, a diversion of resources from military expenditures to the civilian sector and modernization of the Soviet economy through the acquisition of American technology--may have turned to exasperation as SALT dragged on, Soviet-US trade became mired in political debate, and Sino-US relations developed. [redacted]

(25X1)

Kosygin's bitterness about these developments may also stem from a belief that the Soviet leadership has become overly committed to a policy that has been less than a total success. Fragmentary evidence suggests the possibility, at least, that he may ultimately have embraced the policy with less enthusiasm than Brezhnev and even voiced some reservations in internal policy debates

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29 March 1979


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
Metropol Writers Pose Problems for the Soviet Leadership


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Intimidation of the literary figures involved in the unofficially produced publication Metropol appears to be easing, perhaps as a result of Politburo consideration of the matter last month. A reliable Soviet source recently told the US Embassy that the Politburo had discussed the Metropol at two recent sessions and General Secretary Brezhnev opted to take a relatively moderate line toward the group of Metropol writers. The reported Politburo involvement came after weeks of direct confrontation between the publication's authors and the Moscow Writers Union, accompanied by increasing publicity in the West. 

(25X1)

Origins of Metropol

Several things set Metropol apart as a special problem for the authorities. It is a collective effort by 23 writers, some of them prominent and influential establishment liberals. The five-man editorial board is made up of well-known prose writers Vasiliy Aksenov, Andrey Bitov, and Fazil Iskander, literary critic Viktor Yerofeyev, and playwright Yevgeniy Popov. Other contributors to the volume include the popular poets Bella Akhmadulina and Andrey Voznesenskiy, who was awarded a state prize for literature in 1978. All are members of the USSR Writers Union. One of the contributors, poet Yusif Aleshkovskiy, emigrated to the West after the first publicity surrounding Metropol.  (25X1)

The avowed purpose of Metropol is to be a purely literary, apolitical, nondissident vehicle designed to fill the gap between officially sanctioned but censored Soviet literature and the dissidents' illegally published works. In the prefatory note to the collection, the editors pointed out that Metropol was made up primarily of works that had been rejected by the government censorship agency, Glavlit.  (25X1)

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April 17, 1980

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MEMORANDUM FOR: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

FROM: PAUL B. HENZE *[Signature]*

SUBJECT: Dissidence in Eastern Europe and the USSR--Are We Doing Enough? (U)

Dissidence in this paper is used to mean not simply actions by regime critics who achieve prominence, but the entire range of activity, some obvious, some extremely unobtrusive, which generates pressures for freedom of thought and expression, human rights and the advantages of a pluralistic society. (U)

On the demonstrative and declarative level the record of the Carter Administration is second to none in the past fifteen years. The President has personally identified himself with prominent Soviet dissidents such as Bukovsky, Shcharansky and Sakharov and during his visit to Poland insisted on contact with both dissident and church figures. Other Administration officials, most notably yourself, have repeatedly met, endorsed and communicated with dissidents in the USSR and Eastern Europe. The "spies for dissidents" exchange you arranged last year was one of the most politically astute moves the U.S. Government has ever made on behalf of Soviet dissidents. The Administration's human rights policy has generated worldwide debate on human rights on which dissidents in Communist societies have capitalized. Our participation in the Belgrade CSCE meetings under the vigorous leadership of Arthur Goldberg underscored our commitment to principle and highlighted Soviet efforts to avoid honoring commitments they accepted in 1975. The Administration took early decisions which will soon expand the power of VOA and RFE/RL. (U)

Other programs for communicating with Eastern Europe and the USSR have been modestly expanded. (S)

Allocation of resources--both manpower and money--to programs encouraging dissidence and serving the needs of dissidence has not been proportionate to the high level of attention the Administration has given this field in statements and demonstrative actions. There have been other problems in respect to performance and procedure. No new operational instrumentalities have been created for implementing human rights policies, sustaining research effort and channeling and coordinating human rights initiatives on a self-propelled basis. (C)

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Review on April 17, 1986

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E.O.12958, Sec.3.6

PER *2/4/99 NLC* RE *NLC-98-153*
BY *[Signature]* NARS DATE *2/24/99*

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Human rights have been overly politicized domestically as a result of priority assigned by the State Department to more energetic pursuit of human rights issues with non-Communist Latin American and African countries than with Communist-ruled states. As a result human rights is in danger of becoming a negative concept among conservatives both in the U.S. and abroad. The subject needs to be brought into better balance. (C)

Our most valuable instruments for communication with Eastern Europe and the USSR are the big radios. New investment in transmitters has not been matched by comparable investment in programming. Though budgetary allocations for broadcasting have risen each year, they have not been sufficient to offset inflationary increases in both the U.S. and Europe and the declining value of the dollar. As a result manpower rejuvenation and expansion of programming and research support have continued to be postponed. The effect is evident in decline in Radio Liberty listenership in the USSR. New investment for programming improvement is urgently needed. This has been strikingly demonstrated as we have taken up the question of broadcasting in Muslim languages, where Radio Liberty's current level of performance is only a fraction of its potential. The same is true to a lesser extent for VOA. (C)

Book and publication programs for Eastern Europe and the USSR, like the radios, provide the basic seed and fertilizer on which dissidence is nourished. These programs were at a low ebb in 1977, at a far lower level of real-dollar input than they had been ten years earlier. They have received modest increases each of the past four years but are still, at a total expenditure of less than \$5 million per year, funded at levels which do not enable them to exploit the new opportunities for penetrating the Communist world with ideas and information which are constantly developing. Samizdat and tamizdat available for republishing and distribution into Eastern Europe and the USSR are becoming available at a much faster rate than they are able to take advantage of because of limitations of funds and manpower. (S)

Realization of the importance of Islam, national self-assertion among the Muslim peoples of the USSR (as well as Christian peoples such as the Balts, Ukrainians and Georgians) and the ferment and feedback generated by events in Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, (inter alia the resultant suppression of dissidents of which the Sakharov exile is only the most flagrant example) are developments which have highlighted new opportunities. Existing resources are inadequate to meet these opportunities. Existing manpower working on these subjects is insufficient to do all the research and operational planning that is required. (C)

RECOMMENDATIONS:

Programs for exploiting dissidence in Eastern Europe and the USSR (and perhaps Cuba as well?) are, comparatively, in terms of the continuing effect they generate within Communist societies, the most cost-effective activity the U.S. Government undertakes. (U)

- * While maintaining and refining its verbal commitment and demonstrative public actions in behalf of dissidents and human rights in these countries, the Administration should urgently consider immediate increases in resources allocated to these activities. At a minimum they merit classification as essential national security operations subject to real annual increase of 3-5% on a par with defense outlays. (U)
- * The creation of one or more semi-autonomous institutions for sustained implementation of human rights goals, with perhaps a combination of governmental and private funding, should be urgently studied. (C)
- * Expansion and refinement of radio programming by all instrumentalities available--VOA, RFE/RL--should be undertaken at a steady tempo. (U)
- * Plans should be made for future expansion of radio transmitters to counter continued Soviet increases in transmitter power and efforts to jam our transmissions. The long lead-time required for building transmitters makes this essential. (C)
- * Expansion of publication and distribution operations should also be undertaken. Even modest increments of funds enable existing publication and distribution projects to perform at a much higher level of efficiency. E.g., publishing 6,000 rather than 3,000 copies of a Ukrainian dissident book costs much less than the initial cost of the original 3,000. (S)
- * A tape-cassette distribution program should be developed to augment existing book and magazine programs; there is increasing evidence that cassettes are popular and effective in the Communist world. (S)
- * Substantively, areas and peoples who are poorly served by current or even planned publication and distribution programs include:
 - The Baltic States, especially the Lithuanians.
 - The Ukrainians.
 - The Caucasus, including the Georgians, Armenians and Muslim peoples. (C)

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* Religion, not only Islam, should be given higher priority for planning new operations. E.g., the potential of persistent Orthodox tradition in the Ukraine and among Russians as a focal point for anti-Communist nationalism (or nationalism that regards Communism as irrelevant) needs to be examined. (C)

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