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Soviet Objectives and Tactics at the Belgrade Conference

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
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May 1977

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
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Soviet Objectives and Tactics at the Belgrade Conference

*Central Intelligence Agency
Directorate of Intelligence*

May 1977

Summary

- Moscow is on the defensive as preparations for the Belgrade follow-up conference to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) get under way.
- The Soviets misjudged the impact of the human rights provisions of the Helsinki agreement in Eastern Europe and at home, where they credit the Helsinki agreement with contributing to their recent difficulties with dissidence.
- The Soviets are anxious to prevent further Western exploitation of their weakness in the area of human rights.
- Moscow is seeking to head off a renewal of the Western human rights campaign at Belgrade with preemptive diplomatic efforts employing both persuasion and pressure.
- If these efforts fail, the Soviets will be prepared to defend their record on human rights (Basket III) at Belgrade and to attack the Western record on implementation, focusing on areas such as racial discrimination and unemployment in the West.
- The Soviets can also be expected to arrive prepared with a full set of proposals in the general area of detente and security (Basket I) and economic, scientific, and technological cooperation (Basket II).

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Soviet Objectives and Tactics at the Belgrade Conference

On June 15, representatives of the states that took part in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) will gather in Belgrade to prepare for the first follow-up meeting to the Helsinki conference. The Belgrade session—which is expected to last about six weeks—will determine the opening date, duration, agenda, and other modalities for the full meeting, which will take place in the fall.

Moscow is clearly on the defensive as preparations for the full Belgrade meeting get under way. Signs of this defensiveness are visible in the USSR's repeated warnings that the meeting must not be turned into a tribunal, and in earlier diplomatic hints that Moscow might move to postpone the conference.

Results of the Helsinki Conference

The present Soviet mood is markedly different from that with which the USSR entered the negotiations leading up to the CSCE summit in 1975. The Helsinki meeting represented the successful culmination of a long Soviet diplomatic offensive. The immediate origins of this campaign can be traced to Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev's proposal for a European security conference at the Karlovy Vary conference of European Communist parties in April 1967. In its inspiration, however, it is even older, deriving from various Soviet proposals for an all-European collective security agreement current in the 1950s.

Moscow had high expectations for the conference. It was intended to produce a surrogate for a European peace treaty, a document which would contain full and binding Western recognition of the postwar borders in Europe and of the territorial and ideological dividing lines between East and West. Beyond this, the Soviets intended to use the conference to win acceptance of the idea that the Soviet Union had a legitimate right to participate in the resolution of "all-European" issues—that is, a right to be heard in the councils of Western Europe as well as those of the East. Finally, Moscow hoped to use the conference to establish a pattern of bilateral and multilateral economic and technological cooperation which would facilitate the USSR's access to the coveted technology of the West.


The Final Act of the CSCE satisfied all these objectives, at least in part. The signatory states pledged to recognize the existing borders as inviolable and to refrain from interference in the internal affairs of any other signatory state. The accord contained a lengthy list of recommendations intended to

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promote economic and technological cooperation of the sort desired by the Soviets. Finally, although the Final Act did not provide for the permanent institutional structure that the Soviets had originally wanted, it did provide for a series of follow-up conferences that the Soviets could hope to use to make their voice heard in Western Europe.

Moscow has no such expectations for the Belgrade meeting. To the contrary, it finds itself on the defensive. It faces a situation in which it can at best reap only modest gains, but at the risk of taking a severe propaganda beating, and in the process further souring East-West relations.



The conference will be held in the new Belgrade Congress Center, shown here as an architectural model.

Sources of Moscow's Present Difficulties

Moscow's present difficulties stem from its failure to assess accurately the significance of the concessions it made to attain its ends at Helsinki. The Soviets gave ground on two fronts: in accepting a number of measures providing for prior notification and observation of major military maneuvers—the so-called confidence building measures (CBMs)—and in accepting the various human rights guarantees contained in Basket III and Principle 7 of the Final Act.

It is the concessions in the latter area which have proved most troubling for Moscow. In Principle 7, the Communist states pledged themselves to "respect human rights and fundamental freedoms," including the freedoms of thought, conscience, religion, and belief. Moreover, they promised to "promote and encourage" the civil, political, economic, social, and cultural freedoms essential for "the free and full development" of the individual. In Basket III, they expressed their "intention" to facilitate specific forms of

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contact between individuals. These included family visits, the reunification of families, marriage between individuals of different nationalities, and personal and professional travel.

Against the expectations of many Western—and presumably Soviet—observers, these pledges have not proved to be a dead letter in Eastern Europe. They have been seized upon by dissident individuals and groups throughout Eastern Europe—particularly in Poland, East Germany, Czechoslovakia—and in the Soviet Union itself. These groups have differing objectives which reflect local circumstances, but they share a willingness to demand that their governments live up to the obligations that they assumed at Helsinki. At the same time, the ability of these governments to repress dissidence through coercive means is hampered by the spotlight of publicity thrown on their actions by the Helsinki accord and by their knowledge that draconian actions could undermine Western support for detente.

Moreover, there is evidence that, at least in Moscow, the unrest to which the Helsinki accords have contributed is viewed as much more than a minor irritant. In addition to indications of concern over the situation in Eastern Europe—particularly in Poland—[redacted] in February the Soviet leadership was worried about the implications of the “human rights” issue for the Soviet Union. According [redacted] the Soviets feared that any relaxation of the restrictions upon dissidents could give rise to a wave of criticism which could create an explosive atmosphere in the USSR.

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It is undoubtedly this perception of vulnerability to pressure from within—however much it may exaggerate the reality of the threat—which underlies Moscow’s sensitivity to criticism from without. It is this sensitivity, in turn, which is responsible for the strikingly defensive cast of Soviet diplomacy as the June 15 opening of the preliminary phase of the Belgrade conference draws closer.

Soviets Hope to Defuse Human Rights Issue

Moscow’s main objective at Belgrade will be to forestall or limit criticism of its failure to implement the human rights clauses of the Helsinki accord and to prevent any expansion of the Final Act’s provisions for facilitating the exchange of people and ideas in Europe. This objective takes precedence over any hope for gain which the Soviets may entertain through the consideration of proposals for political or economic cooperation which they find more to their liking.

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The present emphasis is revealed by the fact that Soviet diplomatic efforts to date have been devoted to telling Western interlocutors what the Belgrade meeting should *not* consider, rather than what it should do. Soviet diplomats making the rounds of Western capitals in the past few weeks have all carried essentially the same message: the Belgrade meeting must not be turned into a "tribunal" which would pass judgment on how the signatories have carried out the provisions of the Final Act. To do so, they warn, would risk precipitating a "confrontation" which would frustrate the purposes of the conference, and could even revive the tensions of the Cold War.

The Soviets have pitched their message to suit different audiences. They have warned some [redacted] of their unwillingness to tolerate "interference" in their internal affairs at Belgrade. Others [redacted] [redacted] have been cautioned against permitting the Americans to "dictate" the shape of the conference and obscure the "real" issues with others of "secondary" importance.

In still other instances, they apparently have resorted to threats and arm-twisting to make their point. [redacted] the Austrians have been repeatedly reminded of how essential it is for Austria to maintain good relations with the Communist countries, and warned that the adoption of a "negative" stance on issues of interest to the Soviet Union—particularly human rights—would have a detrimental effect on these relations.

Moscow's efforts are aimed at heading off criticism of the Soviet performance in implementation of the Final Act *before* the convening of the Belgrade meeting. Even if they cannot realistically expect to block all such criticism, they can hope to promote divisions between Western governments over how far to press the human rights issue.

The Soviets can be expected to accompany their diplomatic campaign with efforts to cripple the dissident movement before the beginning of the Belgrade meeting. The approach of the meeting at least partly accounts for the campaign of intensified arrests, harassment, and exile of leading dissidents which has virtually decapitated the Soviet human rights movement since the beginning of the year.

There are also unconfirmed reports that the Soviets in recent meetings have pressed their Eastern European allies to stifle their own dissidents. The Soviets presumably favor carefully graduated measures which would minimize the risk of a popular backlash and unfavorable Western press attention.

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This line will be difficult to apply, however, particularly in Poland. An active dissident movement exists there in an unusually volatile political atmosphere. Any effort at repression stringent enough to seriously damage the Polish dissident movement would risk touching off an explosion that could destroy both Eastern and Western plans for the Belgrade meeting. The dangers involved are not lost on the Polish Government, which has launched no major action against its dissidents, despite reported Czechoslovak and Soviet expressions of unhappiness about the internal situation in Poland.

It is unlikely that the Soviets assume their efforts will fully defuse the human rights issue before the Belgrade session opens on June 15. They can therefore be expected to come to the preparatory meeting armed with organizational proposals that will help protect Moscow from attack on these points.

Organizational Objectives

? ✓
The Soviets have already signaled their organizational objectives. Almost certainly they will push for a meeting of limited duration and one confined largely to generalities. They have insisted that the Belgrade meeting cannot entertain any proposals that would modify the Helsinki accord in any way. They are especially intent on heading off Western efforts to expand upon the human rights guarantees contained in the Helsinki agreement. Accordingly, their preference will be for a short agenda, and one emphasizing principles above specifics.

In their preliminary diplomatic spadework, the Soviets have stressed the importance of arriving in Belgrade with a "positive political concept." They have not spelled out what they have in mind, but presumably they are thinking of a generalized reaffirmation of detente and East-West cooperation. They would no doubt be quite satisfied if the principal achievement of the Belgrade meeting were a general agreement to settle for this.

✓
If they cannot prevent a review of implementation, they will push for closed-door sessions and for strict limitations on discussion. Their record is wanting both in regard to the human rights and informational questions covered in Basket III, and in facilitating the commercial procedures and exchanges of scientific, technical, and economic information provided for in Basket II. They will resist being held to account on these points, and have made clear their opposition to any "line-by-line" review of implementation.

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They will continue to insist that Basket III cannot be singled out for attention, and that all parts of the Helsinki accord must be treated "equally." Beyond this, the Soviets will insist that the conferees should look forward rather than backward. ✓

Soviets Prepared To Counterattack

If all their efforts to shunt aside Basket III issues prove unavailing, the Soviets will be prepared to defend their record in implementation and attack those of their critics. To accomplish this, they presumably will rely on the statistical data they have already developed to defend their record. These statistics are heavily weighted in favor of such categories as number of book titles translated and published, films imported, and so on. These are all categories in which the Soviets have an undeniable advantage over the West, where the tastes of the consumer impose a distinct limitation on the ability of the market to absorb the products of Soviet culture.

If pressed into an exchange, they probably would concentrate on such Western policies as the West German bars to employment of Communists in government and American visa and immigration restrictions.

They may arrive in Belgrade prepared to attack the US record on race relations as a violation of the Helsinki agreement. Criticism of racism in the US has become an increasingly popular theme in Soviet propaganda. Cases such as the "Wilmington 10"—a group convicted of arson in North Carolina—have been specifically mentioned and may be brought up in Belgrade.

It is also likely that they will argue that the West has failed to live up to the economic provisions of Basket II, citing such omissions as the American failure to grant most favored nation treatment to the USSR and alleged restrictions on the establishment of Soviet commercial establishments in the West. They can also be expected to dwell on those "social rights"—such as the right to education and employment—which they charge are neglected in the West but guaranteed under their system. ✓

Nevertheless, the Soviets would prefer to avoid such exchanges—in which they are likely to come out second-best—by diverting the attention of the conferees to the consideration of more "positive" matters. By this they mean proposals that fit loosely into the categories of Baskets I and II, which the Soviets see as being in their interest. These include measures designed to promote political and military detente in Europe, as well as

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measures designed to facilitate economic, technical, and scientific cooperation. The Soviets have developed a lengthy list of suggestions in both categories, and may come up with still more before the June meeting.

Possible Basket I Proposals

Among the likely Soviet security proposals are the proposals for agreements to refrain from the first use of nuclear weapons in a European conflict and to prohibit the admission of new members to NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Both were put forward at the Warsaw Pact summit in Bucharest in November 1976 and were communicated to the Western signatories of the Helsinki agreement. Both are heavily weighted to the Soviet advantage. The former would nullify the edge in tactical nuclear weapons which the West enjoys in Europe, and the latter would bar Spanish accession to NATO.

Both were rejected at the NATO foreign ministers' meeting in December, but the Soviets have persisted in bringing up the non-first-use proposal. They have repeatedly urged Western capitals to reconsider the proposal on the grounds that their initial rejection was hasty and ill-considered. It seems likely that the proposal will appear before the Belgrade conference in some form.

There are other possibilities. The Finns, who in the past have been well attuned to Soviet thinking on CSCE, have suggested that mutual force reductions will probably be raised at Belgrade in some form. There is a possibility that the Soviets may choose to permit the East Europeans to introduce this subject. The Romanians have broached the idea of a 5- to 10-percent cut in military forces stationed in Europe. This is an idea which they claim as their own and which they contend would not affect the force reduction negotiations in Vienna because the cuts involved are too "small" to be significant. However, it closely resembles the basic Soviet position, which is to push for reductions that would preserve the existing balance—one that is favorable for Moscow. Moreover, the cuts involved would be more than symbolic.

The Soviets may also propose that the conferees at Belgrade address themselves to the Cyprus problem. The idea that a resolution of this problem is essential to reduce European tensions has surfaced sporadically in the remarks of Soviet officials. Foreign Minister Gromyko told the Turkish foreign minister in March, for example, that the decisions of the CSCE made it "obligatory" to take steps toward resolving the Cyprus problem.

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Moscow and Basket II

The Soviets will also be well prepared to talk about Basket II issues. The proposals for all-European conferences on energy, transportation, and the environment advanced by Brezhnev at the Polish Party Congress in December 1975 are likely to be reiterated. Even though the Soviets acquiesced to the Western demand that these topics be considered by the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe at its mid-April meeting rather than be the subject of special conferences, it seems highly unlikely that they would refrain from bringing them up at Belgrade. This is all the more probable as the proposal for a conference on the environment has aroused some interest in Western Europe. Another possible subject of Soviet attention at Belgrade will be the proposal made in February 1976 by the Council for Economic and Mutual Assistance to establish formal relations with the European Community.

Beyond this, the Soviets are likely to advance a number of proposals aimed at eliminating alleged economic discrimination against them in Western Europe and the US. The Finns have indicated that the East Europeans are unhappy about continuing vestiges of "economic discrimination" and the lack of any progress of extending most favored nation treatment. In better times, Moscow probably would have considered progress on some or all of these proposals as sufficient justification for the conference. The climate has changed, however, and Moscow now sees these proposals primarily as a means of deflecting the conference from consideration of Basket III issues.

Other Possibilities

Soviet attempts to shift the focus away from Basket III are reflected in Moscow's hints that it might consider improvements in areas in which it previously had no interest. The most conspicuous example of this apparent change in Moscow's diplomatic posture--if not in its actual attitudes--concerns confidence building measures. Although the Soviets resolutely opposed such measures at Helsinki, they now have hinted at least once that they might be prepared to consider some improvements in procedures for the notification of military maneuvers. Similarly, the Soviets have indicated interest in the Swiss proposal for the peaceful arbitration of disputes in Europe, which failed to arouse their enthusiasm when it was originally advanced at Helsinki.

There is also a good possibility that the Soviets may attempt to disarm Western critics by proposing a ban on "inflammatory" propaganda--in all likelihood focusing on Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe. If so, they

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would no doubt cite the Final Act's prohibition of intervention, "direct or indirect," in the affairs of other signatory states. Moscow has repeatedly made clear that it regards foreign criticism of its handling of internal matters as impermissible interference and an incitement to subversion.

As matters now stand, the Soviets are unlikely, at least initially, to introduce any of these proposals for the direct consideration of the conferees at Belgrade. To do so would open the way for Western counterproposals on Basket III, and this is something which they are most anxious to avoid. They have firmly insisted that new proposals are completely out of order at Belgrade. Presumably they would prefer to suggest other means of handling these questions, such as the establishment of specialized working groups to consider these questions after the conference.

After Belgrade?


The Soviets have been deliberately vague on the question of a follow-up to the fall conference. They have stated that they will develop their position on the basis of the results and atmosphere at Belgrade. There seems little reason to question their reluctance to submit themselves to the uncertainties of another open-ended conference if their situation remains as difficult as it is now. There is always the possibility, however, that they may succeed in mastering dissidence within the bloc, or that significant differences may develop in the Western camp, in which case their attitudes could change.

It must be emphasized that this analysis is necessarily short range. Moscow's strategy and tactics are largely reactive. As such, they are subject to quick shifts to meet significant changes in the underlying situation. For example, serious disturbances in Eastern Europe would force the Soviets to reconsider their attendance at Belgrade. Soviet officials raised the possibility of postponement earlier this year when their anxiety about developments in Eastern Europe was apparently greater than it is now and while they were reacting to the criticism of the new administration in Washington.

Even without such major developments, the Soviet delegation at Belgrade will inevitably find itself having to react to Western strategy and tactics. Since the US delegation will be emphasizing the need to review implementation—a course most distasteful to Moscow—the odds are that the Soviet delegation anticipates rough going during its stay in Belgrade.

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May 20, 1977

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Presidential Review Memorandum/NSC-28

COPIES TO:
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TO: The Vice President
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense

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D/HA
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NSC-DESK
RF (jhw)

ALSO: The Secretary of the Treasury
The Attorney General
The Secretary of Commerce
The Director, Office of Management
and Budget
The United States Representative
to the United Nations
The Administrator, Agency for
International Development
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, U. S. Information Agency

ADDITION PER LF

ACTION D/HA & S/P
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PM

SUBJECT: Human Rights

The President has directed that the Special Coordination Committee undertake a review of U.S. policy with respect to human rights. The review should:

1. Define U.S. objectives in the area of human rights, including, where appropriate, the timeframe for achieving such objectives.
2. Identify what constitutes "a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights", listing those nations which currently fit this definition.
3. Evaluate actions which the U.S. could take to improve human rights conditions. Consideration should be given but not limited to the following:
 - a. Diplomatic actions, public statements, and various symbolic acts.
 - b. Changes in levels of security and economic assistance and food aid -- as both sanctions and incentives.

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by B. Reger, National Security Council

- c. Initiatives in International Financial Institutions of which the U.S. is a member.
 - d. Use of overseas radio, and later television, broadcast facilities.
 - e. Improved access into the U.S. for refugees and dissidents, with an evaluation of the relevant sections of the Immigration and Naturalization Act.
 - f. Substantive and procedural initiatives the U.S. could take in various international forums.
4. Review national security aspects of U.S. policies on human rights, including consideration of their impact on: U.S. -Soviet detente; friendly states and allies; and other areas of major strategic concern such as the PRC and the Koreas.
 5. Propose actions which can be taken to give authority and bureaucratic access to those charged with the responsibility for integrating human rights considerations into U.S. foreign policy, including in U.S. missions abroad.
 6. Develop a strategy to improve the Administration's relations with Congress in this area.

The review should be completed by July 1, 1977, and should be no longer than 30 pages.



Zbigniew Brzezinski

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MEMORANDUM

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. BRZEZINSKI

FROM: PAUL B. HENZE

SUBJECT: Evening Report - 24 May 1977

0959

Daily Activities:

Pres. does not approve Stanton report

Yes memo

USIA-VOA: John Reinhardt called to give me rundown on developments re USIA/VOA on which he asked me to inform you. He said that Vance will shortly be sending to President a paper re reorganization of USIA and State CU structure. It will apparently offer various options for President to choose from: Stanton recommendations; situation as is; or a re-organized, strengthened USIA, perhaps renamed something like Public Diplomacy Agency, which would combine present CU with all existing USIA functions. This latter option is one Reinhardt favors. This strengthened version of USIA could either remain completely autonomous as it now is, or it could be put in same relationship to State as AID or ACDA. It is not quite clear to me why proposals for reorganization should be submitted only at Vance's initiative. In any event, I assume that you will want to have a look at them, and that President would want to have your views...

Reinhardt tells me that Dante Fascell is going to hold hearings on US Government information organization and policies during second week of June. I will alert BIB/RFE/RL people to these. It happens that Gronouski will be in town that week, so it might be a useful time for him to get involved with Fascell.

Jerry Schecter, Jane Pisano and I, joined at end by Barry Jagoda, had useful meeting with Charlie Bray and Jim Thurber of USIA this afternoon and covered wide range of topics, most of which Jerry will be following up on.

I had lunch with VOA news chief, Alan Heil, and learned a good deal about how VOA is operating these days. He says that new guidelines which John Reinhardt issued few weeks ago have had very positive influence and have cut down most of the minor hassling about what VOA should and should not say.

I know him well

John Reinhardt tells me that Peter Strauss has been selected as new head of VOA and is being cleared for job. Sounds good.

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R 4/24/03 NSC RE NLC-98-179
NARS DATE 6/4/03

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Polish Concerns: Had call from Waclaw Bninski this morning who wanted to bring up and review variety of issues: efforts PAC is making re RFE/RL, putting pressure on Senator Percy, etc; his desire that Prof. J.K. Zawodny (Claremont Graduate School) be involved in Belgrade-CSCE matters; the nefarious activities of a peculiar organization called "Wolna Polska" which is being run by a man named Konstanty Z. Hanff (he thinks it is a Warsaw front); finally he wanted to confirm that you will be seeing Herling-Grudzinski on 16 June. I told him I would check.

Greece-Turkey-Cyprus: Attended State/SE's biweekly GTC meeting this morning. Discussion was mostly about Turkish election prospects and Turkish economic situation. I am taking initiative with NIO to have study done on Turkish economic prospects over next six months, since this will be a determining factor in governmental formation and stability following Turkish 5 June elections.

Continued the hassle with various people re State's request for Presidential approval for additional funding and FMS credits to get Greek-U.S. DCA through final unagreed points. With Christine D.'s help, believe we finally have this on the tracks. OMB is preparing a memo, joint from you and Lance to President; hope it will be ready tomorrow.

Significant Information: Libyans have agreed to send tanks and small arms ammunition to Ethiopia and are also going to explore economic assistance.

Note: In accord with our policy of warmer relations with the Sudan, I am attending Sudanese national day reception here tonight.

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MEMORANDUM

#39A

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET-SENSITIVE
CONTAINS CODEWORD

June 9, 1977

1. Namibia Talks: Ambassador Bowdler reports that the second half of today's discussion was limited to the subject of withdrawal of South Africa from Namibia. During the discussion, Botha again raised the question of who would assume the financial burden shouldered by South Africa, and who would compensate the South Africans for the assets it would leave behind in Namibia. (Cape Town 0946)

2. Allied Patrols in East Berlin: U.S. Mission Berlin provides a summary of allied mission practices regarding flag tours of East Berlin. (U.S. Berlin 1543)

3. GDR Foreign Ministry Protest Against CSCE Report: The GDR foreign ministry delivered an oral protest to Charge Polansky yesterday against the current CSCE report. The protest asserted that attempts were being made to interfere in GDR internal affairs and to depart from the "realities" of the quadripartite agreement. Polansky comments that the East German's, through the use of an oral rather than a written protest, appear to be trying to keep the report from becoming too much of an issue in U.S./GDR relations. (Berlin 6251)

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET-SENSITIVE
CONTAINS CODEWORD

June 24, 1977

#23

1. Egyptian Interpretation of President Carter's Message: Ambassador Eilts reports that the Egyptians (Fahmi and Riad) interpreted the President's oral message to Sadat concerning the Soviet message on Egyptian/-Libyan intentions as urging Egypt to mend its fences with the Soviets. It was used to help convince Sadat to allow Fahmi to go to Moscow. Eilts pointed out that any such suggestion is far-fetched. He also reports that Fahmi continues to be reticent to tell us about his dealings with the Soviets. (Cairo 10528)

2. Belgrade CSCE: Letter from Congressmen on Shcharansky: Our delegation in Belgrade has received a letter from Congressman Lester Wolff requesting that we distribute to all delegations copies of a letter signed by 71 members of the House which attacks the Soviets for the arrest of Shcharansky and persecution of the Orlov CSCE monitoring group and urges delegations to "insist upon a formal discussion of efforts to monitor governmental compliance with the provisions of Helsinki." The embassy requests State's guidance and cautions that the introduction of the letter at this point could produce negative complications. (Belgrade 4239)

3. Yugoslav Transfer of M-47 Tanks to Ethiopia: Ambassador Eagleburger recommends that he be instructed to raise the matter of the Yugoslav transfer of M-47 tanks to Ethiopia with Foreign Secretary Minic on an urgent basis with sufficient proof of our charges that he will not be able to deny our claims. (Belgrade 4238)

4. Consultation with Gromyko on the Middle East: Ambassador Toon has been instructed to initiate the regular monthly consultations with Gromyko on the Middle East. (State 147102)

State Department review completed

TOP SECRET

Central Intelligence Agency
 Directorate of Intelligence
 8 July 1977

Soviet Foreign Policy at the Crossroads

Although Soviet comments in public and private continue to emphasize the importance of East-West cooperation, in recent weeks there has been an increasingly harsh and discordant note in Soviet statements and behavior on a variety of issues. The differences in approach and tone between opposing aspects of Soviet policy are so striking as to raise the possibility of leadership differences on detente as well as a diffusion of central direction and even authority within the Soviet leadership. In view of General Secretary Brezhnev's myriad health problems--particularly his uneven performance in Paris two weeks ago--it is time to examine whether newly modified power relationships among top Soviet leaders have emboldened critics of Brezhnev's detente policy to try to exert greater influence on the shaping of Soviet foreign policy.

This speculative essay examines the possibility of pressure on the current Soviet leadership to move away from previous guidelines on the importance of East-West cooperation. Comments are welcome and may be addressed to the author,

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The Leitmotif of Soviet Propaganda

A recent exchange of views in Soviet party journals on the issue of East-West cooperation tends to support the conclusion that a debate has been going on within the Kremlin on the conduct of foreign affairs. An article late last year in the communist party journal Kommunist by V. V. Zagladin, the deputy chief of the central committee's International Department, and I. T. Frolov, then chief editor of the monthly magazine of the Institute of Philosophy, argued for "intensive economic and scientific-technical cooperation of states with different social systems" as well as a "smashing of old customs and understandings" about global problems. They concluded that East-West collaboration could solve a variety of economic and social issues and, in an apparent aside to internal critics, argued that cooperation would not mean a "renunciation of class struggle as all kinds of 'leftists' sometimes try to portray." (Emphasis added.)

In April of this year, one of the co-authors of this polemical article, Frolov, lost his chief editorship and was replaced by V. S. Semenov, whose writings have been much more conservative than those of his predecessor. That same month, V. V. Kortunov, writing in the journal of Soviet party history, challenged the moderate Frolov-Zagladin thesis. Kortunov denounced cooperative efforts to cope with global problems, which he said ignored the "division of the world into two systems" and provided "in the final analysis only for the salvation of capitalism." Kortunov, who apparently was one of the "leftists" Frolov and Zagladin had in mind, until recently served as a personal assistant to former president Podgorny.

Moscow Goes on the Offensive in the West

In view of Kortunov's militant stance, Podgorny's ouster from the Politburo the following month might have been interpreted as a setback for the policy preferences of Kremlin hardliners. So far, this has not been the case. Since Podgorny's removal from the Politburo and presidency, there has been an acceleration of an ongoing Soviet propaganda offensive over their relations with the US, European communists, the Japanese communist party, and the PRC.

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The Soviets have been particularly hard on President Carter, whom they regard as the inspiration for recent foreign and domestic criticism of the USSR. A Soviet journalist recently claimed, according to [redacted]

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that their propaganda offensive was urgently needed to combat the President's "demagogv" on human rights.

Brezhnev himself recently told [redacted]

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that Moscow was "astonished" by President Carter's position on a variety of issues. The Soviet press, spurred by a sense of Soviet vulnerability to Mr. Carter's policies, has attacked the new US president by name only six months after his assumption of office. These personal attacks have been accompanied by an increase in Soviet warnings that US policies are threatening to undermine detente.

More recently, the Soviets also made two stinging personal attacks on Spanish communist leader Santiago Carrillo, actions which will further seriously strained relations with the Spanish party and have complicated Moscow's relations with the French and Italian parties as well. The attack had no parallel in Moscow's past quarrels with the independent-minded Western parties, and appeared to reflect Soviet frustration with their failure to silence critics among the Eurocommunists.

These Soviet attacks were reminiscent of a hard-line article on communist party tactics that appeared in August 1975, and received a personal endorsement from Brezhnev. The article, written by the editor of the international communist journal Problems of Peace and Socialism, Konstantin Zarodov, argued that the West European parties should put revolutionary integrity ahead of cooperation with non-communist parties and should not let democratic procedures stand in the way of seizing power. Several weeks after the appearance of the article in Pravda, the Soviet press announced that Brezhnev had had a highly unusual meeting with Zarodov. This peculiar event suggested that Brezhnev then felt he needed to appease political pressure from the right.

. . . and on the Offensive in the East

Even before Moscow's determined effort to silence its foreign critics in the West, there was the beginning

of a propaganda campaign in the East as well. Less than two weeks before Podgorny's abrupt ouster from the Politburo, Pravda unleashed the most vituperative attack on the Chinese leadership since Mao's death last year. The article in Pravda bore the signature "I. Aleksandrov," an indication that it carried the Soviet leadership's stamp of approval, and seemed to convey the Kremlin's pessimism and frustration, this time with the policy directions of the new regime in Peking. The article was designed primarily to discourage any US consideration of arms sales to China, according to [REDACTED]

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The Aleksandrov article was followed by a Foreign Ministry note, which was publicized two days after Podgorny's ouster, objecting to a mounting campaign of "slander" against the USSR in Peking. It is highly unusual for Moscow to publicize a Foreign Ministry note expressing a general protest against Chinese polemics. In recent years, publicized protests have been pegged to specific incidents, such as Peking's expulsion of Soviet diplomats on espionage charges in 1974 or its detention of a Soviet helicopter and crew that same year. Tass handling of the protest suggested that it was designed for world opinion more than for the Peking leadership.

Speaking at a Kremlin dinner in honor of Bulgarian President Zhivkov on May 30, Brezhnev personally weighed in with a general indictment of Peking's policies. He added that there were forces both "inside and outside of China" who want to worsen Sino-Soviet relations and fuel international tensions, presumably addressing his remarks to the US and Japan.

Last month, the Soviets also went out of their way to worsen relations with the Japanese communist party. In an authoritative Pravda editorial article, the Soviets rejected the Japanese party's claim that the Northern Territories rightfully belong to Japan.

Moscow Tightens Up at Home

In addition to making a determined effort to silence their foreign critics on a variety of issues, the Soviets are turning the screws on their internal critics as well.

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as those Americans who have been connected with them. If the Soviets follow through on their threats against arrested Jewish activist Anatoly Shcharansky, who is being charged with treason, he would become the first dissident leader to be tried on charges of such gravity under the Brezhnev regime. Similarly, American journalist Robert Toth was the first Western reporter since the beginning of the human rights controversy to be subjected to policy interrogation and the implicit threat of trial and imprisonment. More recently, an American defense attache was stopped and searched in Moscow's Red Square. This occasionally happens in the provinces but rarely in Moscow.

The actions taken against Shcharansky and Toth are of course related, and they were clearly meant to have an impact beyond the cases of these two individuals. The Soviets are bent on stifling contacts between Soviet dissidents and foreign journalists by warning both groups of the possible cost of their actions. Moscow also wants to destroy the domestic appeal of the dissidents by depicting them as creatures of foreign interests, particularly Washington's.

More recently, the Soviets disclosed that Aleksander Ginsburg, once one of the USSR's most active dissidents, would be charged with anti-Soviet activity, which carries a maximum penalty of seven years imprisonment and five additional years of internal exile.*

The Role of the KGB

There are two worrisome aspects of this campaign which suggest that reactionary forces are asserting themselves within the leadership and trying to inhibit increased cooperation with the West.

*Prominent dissident Yuri Orlov, who founded a group last year to monitor Soviet compliance with the human rights guarantees of the Helsinki accords, faces a similar charge.

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- The first aspect is the increased use of the KGB to control internal dissidence, which was particularly manifest during the crude interrogation of Toth.
 - The second is the blatantly anti-Semitic aspect of the harrassment of the dissidents--most of whom are also Jewish activists--with Moscow clearly trying to exploit traditional Russian bias against Jews. US embassy officials and journalists, who have been cited, were also Jewish in nearly every case.

Soviet authorities have obviously decided that it is worth extirpating organized dissidence even at the cost of a great deal of unfavorable publicity in the West.

Soviet Motivation

There are a variety of explanations of these recent signs of Soviet xenophobia, and some tend to imply that Brezhnev's policies are being challenged within the Politburo and that as at other times in the past the Soviet leadership has decided--or indeed has been forced--to take a more conservative tack on external issues. There is also the increased evidence of political uncertainty and maneuvering in the Kremlin as well as the possibility that there will be other major changes within the leadership in the wake of Podgorny's ouster.

One obvious explanation for bumptious Soviet rhetoric for the past two months has been Moscow's frustration and possible anxiety over the paucity of significant foreign policy successes over the past year, particularly in those areas where Brezhnev has some personal attachment and is thus vulnerable. The Soviets appear to be disoriented by US diplomatic initiatives and act as if they are unsure how to react to them.

In sum, Brezhnev's critics are likely to feel that many things are going wrong and some of them may have made the judgment that the party chief can no longer cope with a long string of reverses. The Soviet relationship with the US is continuing to deteriorate without commensurate

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gains elsewhere in the West. The issues stemming from the European security conference in 1975 have proved troublesome, and Moscow is clearly on the defensive at the preparatory meetings in Belgrade because of the human rights issue. The Soviets are also plagued by dissension among the West European communist parties and have thus far been unable to arrange a unified Soviet bloc approach to the challenge of Eurocommunism. In addition to these difficulties, the leadership is contending with a sluggish economy and continued food distribution problems, with more serious economic problems on the horizon.

Certainly the timing of some of Moscow's recent moves can be explained by the Belgrade meeting. The Soviets were anxious to head off any Western efforts at the conference to formalize an indictment of Soviet internal practices, which would explain recent propaganda attacks and threats to stage show trials of leading dissident figures. Soviet warnings and punitive actions are designed to inhibit the activities of the activists at home as well as to inform adherents of detente that the future of East-West cooperation may not be bright.

At the same time, these harsher Soviet statements are apparently designed to cater to more conservative forces at home as well as to intimidate opponents abroad. The attack on Carrillo, for example, is at odds with the professed Soviet interest in detente and may have been intended as a stop to Brezhnev's senior rivals within the Politburo--particularly chief ideologue M. A. Suslov, who is the senior member of the Politburo in terms of service. The shrill statements on human rights and the pressure on the dissidents at home would also be ingratiating to such forces on the right as Suslov and candidate Politburo member P. M. Masherov. The criticism of the US has recently been accelerated despite US willingness to blunt the extent to which it is in fact pressing the USSR on many human rights issues.

The Brezhnev-Suslov Relationship

The possibility that criticism from the right--particularly from Suslov--may be proving to be a problem for

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Brezhnev is reflected in the draft constitution text, which takes several bows in the interests of the senior party secretary. The first three "tasks" identified for the current stage of the USSR's development are placed in the field of ideology, Suslov's bailiwick. Also important symbolically is the fact that, in a brief foreign policy section, the pledge to peaceful coexistence ranked behind support for national liberation struggles, another point congenial to the party's old man.

Brezhnev and Suslov have also apparently disagreed on the permanence of the arrangement by which Brezhnev holds both the General Secretaryship and the Presidency. Suslov, when he proposed the move, asserted that the party plenum in May had found it expedient for Brezhnev to hold both jobs. Brezhnev in effect contradicted him, claiming that the plenum had decided to combine the two jobs. Under Suslov's formulation, Brezhnev could be semi-retired to the Presidency alone by a future plenum decision. Under Brezhnev's formulation, a future plenum would have to separate the two jobs again before he could be semi-retired. The plenum resolution has not been published, but Pravda has used the Brezhnev formulation, indicating that the matter has, at least temporarily, been resolved in Brezhnev's favor. Nevertheless, this public exchange suggests that Brezhnev has not yet consolidated his political advance in taking over the Presidency, and that he may face continued challenge from Suslov on this score--at a time when his health may be weaker.

Following Brezhnev's trip to Paris, [redacted]

[redacted] that Suslov may be the most important figure in the Soviet hierarchy at the moment. While this judgment is probably somewhat exaggerated, Suslov has in fact been playing a prominent role since the party plenum and was rumored to have played a key part in the removal of Podgorny from the Politburo. There are signs that Suslov's influence has increased in recent months and we would expect any pay-off to him to be in terms of policy orientation rather than in political position.

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Soviet Policy Direction

If Suslov has recently been able to increase his already considerable influence over the direction of foreign policy, this would help to explain recent harsh Soviet gestures as reflecting a wish by a Suslov-led consensus to demonstrate a position of strength to foreign adversaries as well as their own political constituency.

Thus far, however, there has been no consistent pattern to these signals, which could portend a fundamental change in policy direction but which also could mean only a momentary hiatus in Soviet efforts to maintain continued cooperation with the West. The shrill message directed at the US appears to be primarily designed not to signal a definite end to detente, but rather to make the US, and not the USSR, chiefly responsible for detente's deflated expectations. The timing of the signals has been haphazard, and the abrasive gestures have been accompanied by certain more conciliatory ones, suggesting that Soviets themselves have not made up their minds. A delegation to the USSR from the National War College was treated in a friendly manner last month and polemics were avoided. Various working group sessions on such subjects as the test ban issue and the Indian Ocean have found the Soviets serious in their approach. The semi-annual "Silver Fox" mission, which is intended to demonstrate the right of free navigation in the Black Sea, did not draw unusual Soviet reaction last month. And Soviet Foreign Trade Minister Patolichev, who publicly put on an abrasive show in Washington last month, commented that his talks with Vice President Mondale and Secretary of State Vance were "most satisfactory."

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There have been similar balancing acts in other areas. Two weeks after the stinging attack on the Spanish communist party, Moscow backed off slightly and called for "solidarity" in the face of imperialist efforts to split the communist movement. Then, on July 6, the Soviet communist party--following talks with the Belgium party--supported "independent" strategies for every communist party. Meanwhile, a tough line went out to the Japanese communist party, but a conciliatory one went to the Japanese government. Soviet charges against the Chinese have been accompanied by Brezhnev's call for "normal

good neighbor relations" with the PRC. The carefully orchestrated scenario for Shcharansky has been followed by the emigration of two prominent Jewish activists, although only after they made depositions on their ties with Shcharansky. Soviet propaganda attacks against dissidents have been matched by recent invitations to five West European countries to observe military exercises in the Ukraine later this month, which is stipulated by the Helsinki accords for large-scale maneuvers.

The Price of Brezhnev's Advances

On balance, however, the Soviets are clearly moving away from the etiquette of detente, and further moves will be dependent in large part on future US behavior. At the same time, it is reasonably clear that Moscow has not yet reached any firm decision about the prospects for the policy of detente and that the internal dynamics of the Soviet political situation will affect the evolution of that decision. Similarly, the readjustment in the handling of Eurocommunists is a likely example of some uncertainty in the USSR, and Soviet behavior has suggested the continued existence of divided counsels. Both previous and recent reporting has indicated that the Soviets were divided between those who want open polemics and direct confrontation with the Eurocommunists and those who believe that such harsh tactics would only be counterproductive to Soviet interests in retaining influence over the Western communists.

In sum, the evidence cited can be interpreted to suggest that Brezhnev is on the defensive in trying to salvage some freedom of maneuver in relations with the West and may be facing serious opposition from the Trotskyites within the Politburo. But there have been no irreversible Soviet moves in this regard, and even a successor to Brezhnev could emerge in a position to pursue detente, despite the blatant rhetorical steps of the past two months.

Nevertheless, Brezhnev's political advances over the past two months, in achieving both the presidency and the constitution, may thus far have been registered at the cost of yielding on certain of his policy interests

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vis-a-vis the US and West Europe. If there has been a trade-off along these lines, then Brezhnev's victory may have been a pyrrhic one that will work against Washington's interests.

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MEMORANDUM

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 19, 1977

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MEMORANDUM FOR: THE VICE PRESIDENT
FROM: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI
SUBJECT: Origins of Soviet Campaign
Against Dissidents

ZB

Attached is a memorandum prepared by CIA/INR at our request on the origins of the current soviet campaign against dissidents. It is a good job, although the statement on page 7 that the current campaign is "the toughest of the decade" is overstated.

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MEMORANDUM

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

July 18, 1977

19A

MEMORANDUM FOR: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI
FROM: JESSICA TUGHMAN^S
SUBJECT: CIA/INR Paper on Soviet Dissident

Attached at Tab A is the paper requested for Mondale on the origins of the current Soviet campaign against the dissidents. It is a good job, although the Statement on page 7 that current campaign "has become the toughest of the decade", is probably overstated in Hyland's judgment.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the memorandum to the Vice President at Tab I.

SECRET/GDS

Central Intelligence Agency
Directorate of Intelligence
15 July 1977

The Evolution of Soviet Reaction to Dissent

Summary

After the signing of the Helsinki accords, several developments converged to heighten the concern of Soviet authorities about dissent in their society.

- The human rights provisions of Basket III became a rallying point for Soviet and East European dissidents.
- The Eurocommunists became much more critical of Soviet internal repression.
- Persistent food shortages in the Soviet Union resulted in isolated instances of active protest on a mass level.

The current crackdown against dissidents is the end-product of a gradual growth in the Soviet regime's anxiety over these related pressures. The initiation of the crackdown, although not its present scope, predates the change in US administrations. The initial impulse for it was probably the desire to silence the dissidents before the Belgrade review conference. The new US administration's public defense of Soviet dissidents apparently did reinforce and intensify Soviet anxieties. The net effect was to impel the leadership increasingly to conclude that harsher measures against dissidents were required.

The current campaign against dissidents is in part related to irritation over the lack of progress in other areas of US-Soviet relations, as well as to the Soviets' desire to keep dissent closely controlled during the Belgrade conference. At the same time, the more defensive and pugnacious tone of Soviet policy, both externally and internally, may also reflect aggravated tensions within the Soviet leadership. Recent policy difficulties may have strengthened the arguments of those leaders somewhat less inclined to conciliate the regime's opponents, both at home and abroad.

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Central Intelligence Agency
 Directorate of Intelligence
 15 July 1977

The Evolution of Soviet Reaction to Dissent

When the Soviets signed the CSCE accords in August 1975, they took a calculated risk that their acceptance of the human rights provisions of Basket III would not create serious internal difficulties for them. After Helsinki and especially during the last year, however, several developments heightened the concern of Soviet authorities about dissent in their society. This increased anxiety has been gradually translated into increasingly tough stands on issues of ideology and social control, and has produced the current crackdown on internal dissent.

The author of this paper is [redacted] USSR
 Division, Office of Regional and Political Analysis,
 who may be reached for comments or questions on

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I. The Dissident Problem

A. CSCE: A Rallying Point for Soviet Dissidents

The human rights provisions of Basket III provided a common ground for Soviet dissidents with a wide range of views and concerns, thus raising the specter for the first time in many years of a unified "opposition." The CSCE monitoring group, the most important dissident group to emerge in the Soviet Union since Helsinki, was organized by physicist Yury Orlov in Moscow in May 1976, and soon sprouted regional branches in the Ukraine, Lithuania, Armenia, Georgia, and Leningrad. These branches were tiny and the degree of actual coordination that existed between them is not known, but the emergence of a dissident organization with links throughout the country was unique in recent Soviet history. More important, the CSCE monitoring group, by espousing the causes of a wide variety of aggrieved religious and national minorities, established some claim to being the center of a broader protest movement.

Although this incipient support of religious and national minorities in itself potentially provided a mass base for human rights activism, the intellectual dissidents remain estranged from the bulk of the working class population. Working class discontent, which has basically economic rather than political objectives, thus did not converge with intellectual dissent.

B. Food Shortages and Unrest

Nonetheless, official apprehension that such a convergence could take place has evidently grown since the bad harvest of 1975. Although consumerism is not a potent political force in the Soviet Union, as it is in some East European countries, the Soviet population has come to expect a gradual improvement in the standard of living. The food shortages caused widespread grumbling, and over the last year and a half there have been reports and rumors of a number of instances of active unrest and protest.

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We know that last winter the Soviet leadership was quite worried about the mood in the country.

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Although the recent instances of violence, some of them related to food shortages, were not perpetrated by human rights activists, the Soviet leadership may not always distinguish clearly between different sources of protest. Some reporting suggests that Soviet officials may vaguely sense some connection between intellectual dissent and popular discontent.

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[REDACTED] Soviet leadership feared that easing restrictions on dissidents could abet a trend of criticism in the country that could create an "explosive" climate.

C. Under Attack From the Eurocommunists

Since early 1976, the Eurocommunists, including the once docile French Communist Party, became more openly critical of the Soviet Union than at any time since the aftermath of the invasion of Czechoslovakia. The Spanish Party has gone furthest, but the larger French and Italian parties pose the more serious problem for the Soviets. From the Soviet perspective, the chief danger implicit in Eurocommunism is not that it has diminished Soviet influence in West European Communist parties, but that it offers a Marxist alternative to the Soviet model in Eastern Europe, and perhaps ultimately within the Soviet Union itself.

Moscow has thus been upset by Eurocommunist support to dissidents in Eastern Europe and the USSR. Particularly annoying to the Soviets in this regard was an unprecedented visit in late December of an Italian Communist delegation to dissident Soviet Marxist Roy Medvedev in Moscow. The Italians presented Medvedev with an Italian edition of one of his books and reportedly asked him to write articles for an Italian party historical journal.

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D. Unrest in Eastern Europe

At the same time, CSCE had a catalytic effect on East European dissent, which became a movement cutting across national borders. Dissidents from different East European countries have reportedly coordinated their activities to a limited degree. Last winter some Soviet leaders were evidently genuinely alarmed that post-Helsinki conditions were creating an unstable situation in Eastern Europe, especially in Poland, and to a lesser degree in East Germany and Czechoslovakia.

The growth of unrest in Eastern Europe increased chronic Soviet fears of a spillover into the Soviet Union itself. Soviet authorities have always been alert to the danger of a political "virus" from Eastern Europe spreading into the polyglot borderlands of the Soviet Union, which have historically been susceptible to influences from that quarter. The fear of such a domino-effect was evidently a factor in the Soviet decision to invade Czechoslovakia in 1968.

E. The US Human Rights Initiative

The new US administration's human rights "campaign," and especially the personal involvement of President Carter in public appeals on behalf of Soviet dissidents, further disturbed Soviet authorities. Many Soviet officials, already fearful of being put in the dock at Belgrade, reportedly regarded the campaign as a deliberate attempt at subversion by the US. At the same time, US protests about Soviet repressions temporarily emboldened Soviet dissidents to make more vigorous protests and to channel their appeals directly to the US administration.

II. The Soviet Response

It is largely as a response to all these related pressures that the current crackdown against dissidents must be seen. It is clear that at least the initiation of the crackdown, although not its present scope, predates the change in US administrations. The original factor of greatest importance in the minds of the Soviet leaders at the

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outset of the crackdown was probably the desire to clean house and silence the dissidents before the Belgrade review conference was convened. Indeed, some dissidents have charged that the climate in the Soviet Union deteriorated immediately after, and as a direct result of, the signing of the Helsinki accords. [REDACTED] among others, claimed that conditions in his prison "tangibly worsened" after Helsinki. In 1976 there were a few trials of dissidents, balanced by occasional regime conciliatory gestures.

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The first clear evidence that a crackdown might be underway did not come, however, until late December 1976, seven months after the formation of the Orlov group in Moscow. In December Soviet authorities moved in a limited way against the CSCE monitoring group, by conducting searches of apartments of the members of its subgroup in the Ukraine. But there is no evidence to indicate that at this early date the Soviets intended the crackdown to assume the major proportions it did in the spring. Rather, it seems likely that they intended to continue "carrot and stick" tactics aimed at controlling dissent by a careful combination of coercive and conciliatory measures, while holding in reserve the option of intensifying repression if circumstances warranted.

The new US administration's public defense of Soviet dissidents apparently was a major factor which reinforced and exacerbated the related Soviet anxieties about the coming Belgrade CSCE meeting, the situation in Eastern Europe, the behavior of the Eurocommunists, and the food situation at home. The net effect was to impel the leadership increasingly to conclude that harsher measures against the dissidents were required. Since February the Soviets have moved to suppress the Orlov group and its regional subgroups, by arresting leading members and encouraging others to emigrate. Moreover, in the spring the Soviets began to make greater and greater efforts to limit the access of Westerners in Moscow to the dissident community, and to link the dissidents with espionage activities.

Two incidents in June were particularly indicative of the changed atmosphere in Moscow: the interrogation of newsman Robert Toth (the first such case in the detente era), and the surfacing of further suggestions that dissident Shcharansky is under investigation for treason. If Soviet authorities do charge him with treason, Shcharansky

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may become the first intellectual dissident since Stalin's day to be tried for this serious crime. Meanwhile, since Toth's departure, the Soviet media have expanded insinuations that he was engaged in espionage.

Conclusions

The Soviets originally believed that they could afford to permit their citizens greater contact with the West, or they would never have signed the Helsinki accords, allowed greater movement between East and West Germany, or stopped jamming some Western broadcasts to the Soviet Union in 1973. The events of the last year, however, have given them pause and reason to reassess their policies. Many Soviet officials have probably decided that acquiescence on Basket III was a mistake.

Objectively, Soviet dissent does not appear to pose a serious threat to the Soviet system, but Soviet officials evidently perceive a greater danger than exists in fact. Both Russian history and Leninist ideology impel them to exaggerate the potential importance of opposing groups, however small. They have always been preoccupied with problems of control. The importance that the leadership attaches to dissent can be seen by the fact that decisions about individual dissidents are sometimes made at the Politburo level.

It is not merely intellectual dissent that disturbs the Soviets. They fear that the "freer movement of people and ideas" which they conceded on paper at Helsinki, and which to a certain extent the circumstances of a modern technological world force upon them, will open their society to a whole host of ideas and influences from the West that are, in their view, not only politically subversive but socially disruptive and morally unhealthy. Identifying Western concepts of liberty with license, they are apprehensive that extensive contact with the "decadent" West will expose the Soviet people not only to alien political ideas but also to crime, terrorism, pornography, and drugs, which could combine to produce a general breakdown of order and discipline. To the extent that they are concerned about the stagnation of their economy, the Soviets may also fear that consumer dissatisfaction will become a more serious political problem in future years.

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In view of the problems the Soviets confronted in the winter and early spring, some sort of domestic crack-down was to be expected. The intensity and duration of the Soviet response, however, is not entirely explained by objective circumstances. Some of the pressures on the Soviets in fact seem to have diminished since the February-March period. The tense situation in Eastern Europe has eased, and the food supply in the Soviet Union itself, while still a subject of considerable concern, seems to have improved somewhat. Meanwhile, Soviet attempts to muffle internal and external criticism have paid off to a considerable extent. Although occasional outbursts of protest continue to take place, the more prominent dissidents have been effectively silenced. Nevertheless, Soviet repression of dissent continues to intensify.

It is true that even now the picture is not one of unrelieved repression. Two prominent Jewish activists, for example, were recently allowed to emigrate. And Orlov, the key figure in post-Helsinki dissent, has been charged with the relatively minor offense of anti-Soviet activity. There are still some restraints on Soviet behavior toward dissidents; the Soviet leadership has no desire, if indeed it has the power, to move in the direction of reinstituting the Stalinist terror apparatus. Nevertheless, the current campaign against dissent in the Soviet Union has become the toughest of this decade.

This increase in the relative harshness of Soviet policy is to some extent a natural partner of the more defensive and pugnacious tone the Soviets have displayed recently in many facets of foreign policy--particularly regarding the Eurocommunists and the United States. The recent expansion of Soviet actions against dissidents is doubtless thus partially related to irritation over the lack of progress in other areas of US-Soviet relations, as well as to the Soviets' desire to keep dissent closely controlled during the Belgrade review conference. At the same time, the exaggerated sensitivity of Soviet policy, both externally and internally, may also reflect aggravated leadership tensions. A confluence of policy difficulties, coming at a time when Brezhnev's health is uncertain, may have strengthened the arguments of those within the leadership somewhat less inclined to conciliate the regime's opponents, both at home and abroad.

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CHRONOLOGY

- August 1975 CSCE accords signed.
- 1976 A few trials of less well-known dissidents continue, despite Helsinki accords.
- May 1976 Formation of Soviet CSCE monitoring group.
- late
December 1976 Apartment searches of members of CSCE monitoring groups in Kiev; visit of Italian communists to dissident Roy Medvedev in Moscow.
- January 8, 1977 Three bomb explosions in Moscow--Moscow rumors attribute to discontent over food shortages.
- February 3, 1977 Solzhenitsyn associate Aleksandr Ginzburg detained in Moscow.
- Two Ukrainian monitors of CSCE detained in Kiev.
- February 10, 1977 Yury Orlov, chairman of CSCE monitoring group detained in Moscow.
- March 2, 1977 Leaders of French, Italian and Spanish communist parties meet in Madrid in the first summit of Eurocommunist leaders.
- March 4, 1977 Izvestia article charging Jewish refusnik Shcharansky and others by name with working for CIA, three U.S. Embassy officers charged by name with having recruited them.
- March 13, 1977 Pravda article warned that the human rights issue could disrupt Secretary of State Vance's impending visit to Moscow.

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March 15, 1977 Shcharansky arrested.

March 16, 1977 Joint "press conference" with western news-
men held by representatives of broad
spectrum of dissent--intellectuals, Jewish
refusniks, Pentecostals, CSCE monitoring
group and others.

March 28, 1977 Soviet-US talks on SALT opened in Moscow.

April 27-29, 1977 Conference in Prague of Soviet, East
European and West European communist parties;
Soviet effort to establish common line not
notably successful.

June 1, 1977 Shcharansky's parents reportedly notified
that treason charges being prepared against
him.

June 11, 1977 Los Angeles Times correspondent Robert Toth
questioned by KGB for allegedly accepting
state secrets on parapsychology from Jewish
refusnik Valery Petyukov.

June 15, 1977 Belgrade review conference on CSCE opened.

June 17, 1977 Toth permitted to leave the Soviet Union.

June 27, 1977 Orlov charged with anti-Soviet activity--
maximum penalty three years prison.

July 4, 1977 Ginzburg reportedly charged with anti-Soviet
propaganda--third "offense," maximum penalty
up to seven years prison plus five internal
exile.

July 12, 1977 TASS statement charged Toth used press card
as cover for intelligence work, hinted at
disclosures to come. Petyukov reportedly
told no action to be taken against him be-
cause he had cooperated in exposing an
"arch-intelligence agent."

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POLICY REVIEW COMMITTEE MEETING

August 23, 1977

Time and Place: 3:00 - 4:00 p.m., White House Situation Room

Subject: CSCE

Participants:

State

Warren Christopher
Patricia Derian
Matthew Nimetz
Ambassador Albert Sherer
Edward Mezvinsky

CIA

Stansfield Turner
[REDACTED]

Defense

Harold Brown
Walter Slocombe
General George Brown (JCS)

ACDA

Paul Warnke
David Clinard

NSC

Robert Hunter
Jessica Tuchman

White House

Zbigniew Brzezinski
David Aaron

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

The PRC meeting on CSCE (followed by a meeting on Eastern Europe) agreed to discuss the following at a further meeting in mid-September:

-- A paper on the consequences of a "confrontation" strategy at Belgrade: in terms of U.S.-Soviet relations, relations with allies and the neutral/non-aligned countries, and reactions in the United States. State to prepare the paper, with assistance from CIA.

-- An outline of a self-critical appraisal of U.S. performance on implementing the Helsinki Final Act (all baskets), and what we are doing to improve it.

-- Joint proposals for each basket (with the Allies); plus some U.S.-only proposals that are more far reaching, and that would push the process forward, even if they were not accepted. These would have propaganda value.

-- The text of the U.S. opening plenary speech for Belgrade.

The pros and cons of a confrontation strategy at Belgrade were considered, with general agreement that we probably should not pursue this course which would

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10/19/82
[Handwritten initials and dates]

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isolate us from the Allies and neutrals and put at risk the desirable objective of continuing the Belgrade process. At the same time, concern was expressed that the U.S. should not be seen to be welshing on human rights or that moderation be misconstrued or subject to exploitation by the USSR.

All agreed on the importance of orchestrating specific actions at Belgrade with other U.S.-Soviet events. There was debate over the consequences of a confrontation strategy for SALT and CTB, with views ranging from "catastrophic" to "little impact." Soviet behavior and statements at the Preparatory Conference suggests that they will be moderate this fall if we are. It was agreed that Soviet hints along this line should not be the controlling element in our strategy, in part because our record on implementation is better. There was some discussion about possible Soviet proposals, and concern was expressed that the Soviets not be permitted to get involved in such Western efforts as transport, energy and the environment -- the areas of Brezhnev's proposals.

It was agreed that public statements by U.S. leaders prior to Belgrade (but not by the President or Secretary of State) would be valuable and that these could be "harder" than our opening statement at the Conference. They could set the CSCE process in its broadest perspective and stress the themes of raising standards and the historical inevitability of human rights concern. It was agreed the opening speech should be firm. There was discussion whether we should bring up specific cases in the speech, with some worrying that raising three or four cases would totally define the opening speech and others believing the opening speech should be a serious review of implementation, letting the chips fall where they may. It was suggested that the speech be neither shy nor demagogic, that it present specific proposals that could be approved and would raise standards; and that it offer other proposals that would have impact even if they were not accepted.

There was considerable agreement that the U.S. should be in the forefront of the Western nations at the Conference, particularly in raising issues, pushing standards of conduct higher, and in drawing new proposals from the Western package and adding one or two of our own such as human rights working groups, and amnesty for political prisoners. It was also agreed that we should support an allied proposal for definition of joint standards for defense budgets. There was agreement that striving for maximum concrete objectives at the Conference itself would not be acceptable if this required us to avoid a leading role and too much weaken our position on issues of importance to us. In the context of this discussion, it was agreed that we could occasionally use the neutral and non-aligned countries (NNAs) to make important points. In fact, if we are out in front on ideology, setting higher standards and putting the Soviets on the defensive, working through the NNAs could help us reach better compromises in terms of our objectives.

It was agreed -- subject to review -- that we have an interest in continuing the Belgrade process, if only because various countries had shown a desire to

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improve their records before this one. But that decision, and similar ones about Belgrade, should be seen in terms of a broader view of European evolution, on which we now have no clear understanding. In this context, there was agreement on the need for an overall policy toward Eastern and Western Europe.

It was agreed that Warren Christopher and Zbigniew Brzezinski should meet soon with Dante Fascell, to seek the cooperation of the CSCE Commission.

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 24, 1977

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~~ATTACHMENT~~

MEMORANDUM FOR

The Vice President
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense

ALSO: The Director, Office of Management and Budget
The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: PD/NSC-18
U.S. National Strategy

Attached is a copy of PD/NSC-18, "U.S. National Strategy".

This PD is to be held very closely and distributed only to those officers in your department or agency with strict need to know.

Zbigniew Brzezinski

Zbigniew Brzezinski

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Declassified/Released on 1/6/92
under provisions of E.O. 12356
by S. Talley, National Security Council

(F87-198)

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

UNCLASSIFIED

August 24, 1977

Presidential Directive/NSC-18

TO: The Vice President
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense

ALSO: The Director, Office of Management and Budget
The Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs.
The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: U.S. National Strategy (U)

I have reviewed the PRM/NSC conclusions and the discussion of the Special Coordination Committee. It is clear that in the foreseeable future, US-Soviet relations will continue to be characterized by both competition and cooperation, with the attendant risk of conflict as well as the opportunity for stabilizing US-Soviet relations.

In that competition, military aspects aside, the United States continues to enjoy a number of critical advantages: it has a more creative technological and economic system, its political structure can adapt more easily to popular demands and relies on freely given popular support, and it is supported internationally by allies and friends who genuinely share similar aspirations. In contrast, though successfully acquiring military power matching that of the United States, the Soviet Union continues to face major internal economic and national difficulties, and externally it has few genuinely committed allies while lately suffering setbacks in its relations with China, parts of Africa, and India.

In this situation I direct that US national strategy will be to take advantage of our relative advantages in economic strength, technological superiority and popular political support to:

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Partially Declassified/Released on 5/27/99
under provisions of E.O. 12958
by R. Soubers, National Security Council
P99-320

- Counterbalance, together with our allies and friends, by a combination of military forces, political efforts, and economic programs, Soviet military power and adverse influence in key areas, particularly Europe, the Middle East, and East Asia.
- Compete politically with the Soviet Union by pursuing the basic American commitment to human rights and national independence.
- Seek Soviet cooperation in resolving regional conflicts and reducing areas of tension that could lead to confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union.
- Advance American security interests through negotiations with the Soviet Union of adequately verifiable arms control and disarmament agreements that enhance stability and curb arms competition.
- Seek to involve the Soviet Union constructively in global activities, such as economic and social developments and peaceful non-strategic trade.


To fulfill this national strategy, the United States will maintain an overall balance of military power between the United States and its allies on the one hand and the Soviet Union and its allies on the other at least as favorable as that that now exists. In this connection, the United States will fulfill its commitment to its NATO allies to raise the level of defense spending by approximately three percent per year in real terms along with our allies.

To carry out US national strategy, I am also providing the following initial guidance regarding US military strategy, programs and policies.



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
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Global Contingencies

In addition, the United States will maintain a deployment force of light divisions with strategic mobility independent of overseas bases and logistical support, which includes moderate naval and tactical air forces, and limited land combat forces. These forces will be designed for use against both local forces and forces projected by the USSR based on analyses of requirements in the Middle East, the Persian Gulf, or Korea, taking into account the contribution of our friends and allies in these regions. US planning should provide that these requirements may be met by a combination of the light deployment forces, supplemented

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by forces in the United States, primarily oriented toward NATO defense. The 2nd Division will be oriented toward deployment in Asia but available for global contingencies as described above.

Asia


With the exception of withdrawals from Korea directed under PD/NSC-12, the United States will maintain the current level of combat forces deployed in the Western Pacific in order to preserve regional stability, to deter aggression in Korea and elsewhere, and to protect US interests and meet treaty commitments in the event of aggression.

Additional Studies

The Secretary of Defense will undertake, subject to separate instructions, a review of US targeting policy, as well as other studies; recommendations on the appropriate level of US capability to sustain a worldwide conventional war against the Soviet Union and its allies should be coordinated by the National Security Council for my decision, as per additional instructions.

Pending the conclusion of the targeting review, the US will continue to employ its strategic forces according to NSDM 242.

Otherwise, this Directive supersedes NSDM 242.

 Jimmy Carter

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SEPTEMBER 7, 1977

Office of the White House Press Secretary

THE WHITE HOUSE

The President today announced that he will nominate Arthur J. Goldberg, of Washington, D.C., to be ambassador at large and U.S. representative to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), and chairman of the U.S. delegation to the CSCE.

Goldberg was born August 8, 1908, in Chicago. He received a B.S.L. in 1929 and a J.D. in 1930 from Northwestern University. He served in the U.S. Army from 1942 to 1944, as captain, then major.

Goldberg was senior partner of his own law firm in Chicago from 1933 to 1961. From 1948 to 1955 he was general counsel of the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO), and from 1948 to 1961 he was general counsel of the United Steelworkers of America. From 1952 to 1961 he was also senior partner in a Washington law firm.

In 1961 and 1962 Goldberg was secretary of labor. From 1962 to 1965 he was a justice of the United States Supreme Court. From 1965 to 1968 he was U.S. representative to the United Nations and U.S. representative in the Security Council of the United Nations. From 1968 to 1971 he was senior partner in a New York law firm.

Since 1971 Goldberg has practiced law in Washington. He has served on the President's Committee on Youth Employment, the President's Advisory Committee on Labor-Management Policy, and the President's Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity. He is former chairman of the President's Committee on Migratory Labor.

Goldberg is the author of "AFL-CIO: Labor United" (1956); "Defenses of Freedom" (1966); "Equal Justice: The Warren Era of the Supreme Court" (1972); and numerous articles.

#

EAST-WEST

"Détente with a Human Face"

In Belgrade, human rights are played forte, not fortissimo

Representatives of 35 nations gathered in Finland more than two years ago to sign a document that unexpectedly ignited human hopes across the Continent. But human rights activism in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe sparked by the Helsinki accord threatened to undo years of work toward East-West détente. Thus when a svelte Swedish woman delegate, two priests from the Vatican, a mustachioed Spaniard and some 400 other delegates to the Belgrade meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation congregated in the corridors of starkly modern Sava Conference Center last week, much more was involved than a club reunion of old friends. They were meeting to assess how the signatory nations have complied with the "Three Baskets" of the agreement—military security, economic cooperation and humanitarian exchanges. It will not be an easy task. Even before the meeting began, there were fears that it would become a bitter political wrangle between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. over human rights.

But any fireworks will apparently come later. As the conference opened, policemen were cordoned around the Sava Center to prevent protesters from entering. With such crucial matters as SALT and the Geneva conference on the Middle East hanging in the balance, both big powers and nearly all of the other 33 Helsinki signatories seemed determined to avoid dissension and provocation.

Former Supreme Court Justice Arthur Goldberg, the chief U.S. delegate, arrived in Belgrade with a big smile and a deft phrase, promising to promote "détente with a human face." Next day

the Soviet Union's Yuli Vorontsov invited Goldberg to lunch at a Belgrade restaurant; the Russians picked up the tab. By the luck of the draw, both delivered their opening remarks on the same day. Confident and assured, Vorontsov boasted that the new Soviet constitution that had just been adopted embodied all the basic principles of the Helsinki accord. He pointedly warned that "cooperation in humanitarian and other fields" is only possible if all countries refrain from interfering in each other's internal affairs. That same afternoon, Goldberg delivered his speech, which had been much revised by Administration policy planners. The final approved version did not clatter over the embassy Teletype from Washington until 2:30 a.m. the day he was to read it. Startling delegates by greeting them in Serbian and frequently ad-libbing (his address ran twelve minutes longer than the prescribed 30 minutes), Goldberg read off a list of human rights violations but named no names or countries. He noted that there had been "encouraging evidence of progress" since Helsinki, but concluded that "the progress displayed is not progress enough."

The U.S. will insist on a thorough examination of how the 1975 agreement worked, including a review of the American performance. Specifically, Goldberg will try to persuade Soviet-bloc countries to make family reunions across East-West borders easier by eliminating exorbitant visa fees and reprisals against would-be emigrants—like dismissal from their jobs. He will also propose multiple-entry visas for businessmen trading with Communist

countries and elimination of red tape that currently restricts journalists' entry into the Eastern bloc.

Both in meetings with European Community nations and in NATO huddles Washington has carefully coordinated its approach on human rights with its European allies. In essence, the consensus has been to play it forte but not dangerously fortissimo. Sweden, Switzerland and The Netherlands are solidly behind the issue, as is France.

The human rights controversy is part of Basket Three, which calls for freer circulation of people and ideas between East and West and more international freedoms. Basket One is devoted to "confidence building" by such means as advance notice of military maneuvers. Basket Two concerns science, technology and trade; the last is of special interest to countries like West Germany that want more commercial and technical exchange between East and West.

Delegates of smaller states will undoubtedly insist that Belgrade '77 take up particular causes dear to their hearts. Switzerland, for example, pressed the case for disarmament; Yugoslavia is expected to complain about the plight of a Slovene minority in Austria; Portugal raised the problem of its migrant "guest workers" in industrialized northern Europe. "Indeed, there are many more issues involved here than human rights, and many more countries present than the two superpowers," the lone delegate from the tiny duchy of Luxembourg remarked proudly. "Here there are a lot more of us than of them."

No need to tell it to the Maltese. Their country is darkly threatening to play the mouse that roared. Already last week its delegates were waxing eloquent about the need to demilitarize the Mediterranean and turn it into a neutral basin—presumably after they have dispatched the Sixth Fleet back across the Atlantic.



Relations, it seems, couldn't be better as the U.S.'s Arthur Goldberg (left) meets the U.S.S.R.'s Yuli Vorontsov at Belgrade's Sava Center

With crucial matters hanging in the balance, nearly everyone was trying his best to avoid provocation.

Goldberg and Aides

By Michael Dobbs

Special to The Washington Post

BELGRADE, Oct. 16—The United States and its Western allies are divided on the best way to pursue the sensitive issue of human rights at the Belgrade conference on East-West detente, and chief U.S. delegate Arthur Goldberg may be part of the problem.

During the first two weeks of formal speechmaking Goldberg has differed from many of his colleagues over the manner in which the 1975 Helsinki declaration on European security and cooperation should be reviewed.

While repeating that he does not seek a confrontation with the Soviet Union, he has shown that he is in favor of citing specific cases of human rights violations. Other Western delegates prefer to take a more general approach, believing that this tactic will be just as effective in the long run.

At the same time, the former Supreme Court justice has been angered by news reports suggesting that the U.S. delegation is somehow going soft on human rights because of delicately balanced arms limitation talks in Geneva.

In private, Goldberg is believed to feel that some Western countries have been too cautious in broaching the human rights issue in Belgrade and he appears frustrated by this.

"Our problem is how to preserve allied unity without sacrificing the essential goals of this conference," one official commented.

In part, the differences between the United States and its Western allies are a product of geography. The Western European delegations have set themselves practical, if modest, objectives of winning a few concessions

of principle out of the Soviet Union that would be reflected in a final statement.

In order to achieve this, most Western European delegates, including the British, the French and the West Germans, have preferred to talk at least initially in general terms. They say they are prepared to cite specific cases, but only if the Communist countries dispute their arguments or deny that problems exist.

Goldberg, on the other hand, appears to be more interested in setting up a forum for discussing human rights abuses, both past and present. U.S. spokesmen have made it clear that they regard the Belgrade conference as a proper place to comment on human rights violations as they occur. It was in this spirit that Goldberg protested to the Yugoslav delegation at the expulsion from Yugoslavia of an American human rights activist and expressed concern at the harassment of a dissident in the Soviet Union.

Some Western delegates, however, believe that the differences in approach are largely a result of Goldberg's projection of himself as a politician rather than a professional diplomat. The ambassador emphasized the distinction between himself and other delegates at the beginning of the conference by the freedom with which he departed from his prepared speech.

Most Western delegations are composed solely of professional diplomats whose natural inclination is to work within narrowly defined limits. Goldberg's tactics, by contrast, appear to have been to try to extend those boundaries by trying to shame the Soviets into a dialogue on human rights.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

September 22, 1977

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~~NODIS~~MEMORANDUM FOR DR. ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Returning the Crown of St. Stephen

Your memorandum of August 4 requested that we ascertain Hungarian wishes concerning return and display of the Crown, without making any commitment to return it. In response to such a query, the Hungarian Government informed Ambassador Kaiser last month that: 1) it would be happy to work out the details of the transfer once our decision had been made and we had indicated how we intended to return it; and 2) it would place the Crown on public display in an appropriate edifice in Budapest, without restriction on foreigners or Hungarians who wish to see it (Tab 1). We believe this latter statement constitutes acceptable assurances about the Crown's "continuing display" as set forth in Presidential Directive/NSC-21 as a precondition for us to indicate to the Hungarians our willingness to return the Crown.

Deputy Prime Minister Aczel reiterated to Dr. Billy Graham that Hungary wants to put the Crown on public display and added that, if the United States decided to return the Crown, the Hungarians would receive it in whatever way would fit the President's requirements.

We believe that we should inform the Hungarian Government before the Belgrade CSCE Conference gets under way of our willingness to return the Crown under appropriate circumstances. Telling the Hungarians that we are taking this important step both because of improved bilateral relations and Hungary's positive attitude toward CSCE implementation should favorably affect Hungary's attitude at Belgrade and after. The President's decision can be conveyed in one of the following manners:

- By the President in a bilateral meeting with the Hungarian Foreign Minister at UNGA;
- By a Presidential oral message to the Hungarian President, delivered by Ambassador Kaiser;

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
-- By the Secretary to the Hungarian Foreign Minister during their UNGA bilateral.

A Presidential bilateral with the Hungarians would be so unusual as to provoke undesirable press speculation about the substance of the meeting -- and might lead to disclosure of our plans before an acceptable scenario of transfer has been arranged. A Presidential oral message delivered by Ambassador Kaiser could be used to convey our intention right now. Since there is no pressing reason to inform the Hungarians immediately, we prefer using the Secretary's bilateral with the Hungarian Foreign Minister (tentatively scheduled for October 1).

In New York the Secretary will also note that the Hungarian Government has already stated its intention to us to place the Crown on public display in an appropriate place. He will add that Ambassador Kaiser has been asked to work out with the Foreign Minister an appropriate scenario of transfer that would permit the Crown's return by the end of 1977.

At that point we would send Ambassador Kaiser guidance, along the lines of the Secretary's July 28 memorandum to the President for his scenario talks with the Hungarians. (Tab 2). Once we have Hungarian agreement to a suitable scenario, we would consult with key Congressional leaders and inform the Vatican.

In working out the scenario of transfer with the Hungarian Government, it will be important to indicate to the Hungarians at an early date whom the President will appoint as head of the US delegation and to suggest exact dates for the ceremony of return that would be convenient to that individual. The Secretary's memorandum to the President of July 28 suggested that the Vice President or Governor Harriman would be appropriate.



Peter Tarnoff
Executive Secretary

Attachments:

- Tab 1 - Budapest 2916
- Tab 2 - Secretary's Memorandum to the President, July 28, 1977

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ISSUE

The Belgrade CSCE meeting begins October 4. The Soviets are interested in what approach we will take.

U.S. OBJECTIVES

We want to encourage maximum implementation of all parts of the Final Act. We believe the best way to do this is for the Belgrade meeting to conduct a thorough, non-strident review of the efforts of all signatories. We also want the CSCE process to continue through, inter alia, the consideration of new proposals and making plans for further Belgrade-style meetings in the future.

GROMYKO'S OBJECTIVES

He may try to ascertain what our approach will be at Belgrade and what new proposals we have in mind. He may stress the Soviet view that a confrontational approach emphasizing only weaknesses in Soviet implementation, especially in the area of human rights, could damage detente and harm U.S.-Soviet relations in other important areas.

POINTS TO BE MADE

- The Preparatory Meeting demonstrated that a constructive meeting is possible this fall.
- We seek a thorough, factual, non-confrontational review of the implementation of all parts of the Final Act, and seek to improve implementation in all 35 countries.
- Our delegation will reflect the particular concern of the Administration and the American public with human rights, Principle VII, and Basket III issues.
- We believe that if handled properly, new proposals can be a positive element in the Belgrade discussions. We have a number of possibilities under consideration, and will consider on their merits any you may advance.
- We think that Belgrade-style meetings enhance detente, and we think that plans should be made for subsequent Belgrade-style meetings.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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October 7, 1977

0590

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI
SUBJECT: NSC Weekly Report #31

Handwritten initials: DS, C, M

1. Opinions

It so happens that today I had three conversations with three thoughtful men, each of whom reflected concerns about U. S. foreign policy that might be more widespread. The first of them was Scotty Reston, whom you know; the second was Kurt Birrenbach, a distinguished European, long devoted to the cause of European unity and close Atlantic relations; the third was Lord Brown, formerly George Brown, a rather provocative and occasionally unpredictable Labor Party leader who at one time served as the British Foreign Secretary.

Reston phoned me to voice concern that your policies are being blocked on a number of fronts by selfish constituencies and organized lobbies, which are increasingly demonstrating the capacity to force you to retreat even on issues of grand principle. In speaking of your foreign policy, he volunteered on his own the opinion that your objectives have "grandeur" and that in some respects you, more than any of your predecessors since Truman, are focusing on truly central issues: reductions in SALT, peace in the Middle East, resolution of the Panama issue. Yet Reston voiced the fear that you will be unable to deliver, in part because you do not have effective influence on Congress, in part because your tactic appears to be one of dodging a confrontation, instead of choosing a good subject on which to go all out, including a direct appeal to the nation. In his view, the energy issue domestically is the one on which to focus, to concentrate all efforts, and to let all other issues pass until we win. In foreign affairs, he seemed to feel that the Middle East falls into that category, and he was especially apprehensive that the newspaper accounts that he was reading seemed to indicate that we were again backtracking and being intimidated by a highly organized constituency. He expressed the view that unless you choose to prevail, you will find yourself increasingly paralyzed

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as organized groups grow in confidence and even form coalitions to defeat you on a variety of issues.

Brown wanted to convey the view that he feels that we are on the right track in seeking patiently an accommodation with the Soviets, without being too eager for a quick settlement. His major preoccupation, however, was the Middle East. In this regard, he voiced concerns in some ways similar to Reston's, but stemming largely from his apprehensions that a Middle East stalemate will be highly damaging to Western Europe. He said that he was much more optimistic two months ago, when he had the feeling that we were prepared to see the matter through.

Birrenbach spoke to me largely of Europe. He wanted me to know -- and I could tell he was hopeful that I would convey this also to you -- that Europe was in worse disarray than at any point since the early fifties. European society is rudderless and has no sense of direction. The welfare society has produced a culture which has no sense of history and no sense of purpose. As he put it, in Britain "nostalgia for the past is no substitute for history." (Incidentally, I pointed out to him that a society based on foreign workers and defended by foreign soldiers is indeed a society in a state of decay.) Birrenbach's hope is that we can somehow infuse the West with a new sense of vitality and purpose, and he particularly applauded your posture on human rights (even though he was critical of some of its early manifestations, particularly the Bukovsky visit). Birrenbach is particularly anxious that the United States demonstrate more vigorous leadership in bringing the West Europeans together, in encouraging more concertation economically and politically, and in defining common perspectives. He was not specific in how it could be done, but he was gravely concerned that the present trends in Europe point to growing parochialism, internal political weakness, and even divisions among the West Europeans. Some of the European leaders are already "Finlandized" in their outlook and this contributes to a further sense of weakness.

Leaving aside my rebuttals to the above, I do think that some of their points are worthy of attention, even if only as echoes of what is being said among concerned Americans and Europeans. I may add that I understood from another comment by Reston that he has recently been talking to several British visitors, and it is conceivable that he was echoing some of their views as well.

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It does occur to me, in the light of the above, that you may wish to use your press conference more frequently to develop a specific theme, in addition to answering questions (which tend to be unfocused or overly focused on a current sensation). The press conference is a unique mechanism which you can use to good purpose. For example, if you were to repeat with the same emotion and effectiveness some of the comments you made the other day on the Middle East, it would gather national support for you and educate the public. This would then help you in overcoming organized pressures. A specific domestic or foreign theme should be chosen for each press conference.

Last on energy

2. Facts

NSC Roundtable on the Future of the Soviet Economy

As you know, last spring the CIA prepared two reports which predicted a decline in Soviet oil production and a generally gloomy outlook for the Soviet economy into the mid-1980s. Recently, Sam Huntington of my staff organized a Roundtable to discuss these reports. Participants included five leading academic experts on the Soviet economy and some 22 officials from the interested government agencies. Here are the main conclusions of the discussion:

The Soviet Oil Situation. With only one or two dissents, the participants agreed that Soviet oil production is likely to peak and level off in the near future and then decline in the 1980s. It is possible that the Soviet Union may be a net importer of oil by 1985. In response, the Soviets may:

- Develop coal and gas as alternative sources of energy;
- Restrict domestic consumption, efforts to do which are already underway;
- Reduce oil exports to Eastern Europe, which they are also beginning to do;
- Reduce oil exports to the West, which currently provide over 40% of Soviet hard-currency earnings and which they will probably delay doing as long as possible.

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Soviet Economic Problems and Prospects. Oil shortages, tight labor supply, and low factor productivity pose problems for future Soviet economic growth. The Soviet growth rate, about 3.5% in 1976, it is likely to be about 3% in the early 1980s. Their responses to this situation, in the most probably order of choice, are likely to be:

- Continued external engagement.
- Repression and centralization.
- Economic reforms.

*This is what
CIA said*

Implications for Soviet-American Economic Relations. The Soviet need for economic engagement with the West manifests itself in three areas:

1. Trade. Here the normal type of exchange of non-strategic goods poses no serious problems for the US.
2. Credits. The Soviets hard-currency debt is already \$14 billion. Additional credits, particularly for investment purposes, would help the Soviets avoid painful choices in allocating their own resources between investment and defense. Consequently, the provision of credit -- to the extent that the relaxation of legislative restrictions makes this possible -- could be appropriately linked to Soviet concessions on political issues.
3. Technology. The Soviets clearly need many forms of US technology in energy and other areas. The provision of non-military technology, however, would help them concentrate their technological efforts in the military field. Consequently, it is useful to think of three types of technology transfers: (1) strategic technology, which, as at present, should be embargoed; (2) critical technology (such as submersible pumps or compressors), which is essential to Soviet development and for which they should be willing to make some political concessions; (3) other technology, which should not be subject to restrictions.

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West European Opinion on Basket III Issues

With the Belgrade CSCE Conference now in session, I think you will find the following survey results of Western European views on Basket III issues of interest. The survey was taken at the end of July and the beginning of August.

Acceptance among Informed Public as Basic Human Rights

	<u>Germany</u>	<u>Britain</u>	<u>France</u>	<u>Italy</u>
Freedom to emigrate	85%	81%	80%	82%
Freedom to travel abroad	76	80	86	80
Free access to information from other countries	77	68	78	90
Freedom from hunger and malnutrition	78	89	77	90
Adequate medical care	71	82	91	93
Assurance of employment	69	65	84	91

3. Alert

Israel's Defense Needs

The Israeli Ministry of Defense delivered to the Pentagon this week a 90-page plan for Israeli military procurement over the next ten years. This plan, entitled Matmon C, is the third such document provided to the US since our intensive military assistance began after 1973. DOD is engaged in a comprehensive study of the document, and it is too soon to provide more than the most general comments. There are several elements which are clear, however:

- The magnitude of Israel's projected defense needs over the next decade is very large. It involves a substantial increase in the size of Israeli military forces, and it calls inter alia for the addition of 400 U. S. tanks, 700 Israeli-produced tanks, 3000 APCs, over 600 self-propelled guns, 25 F-15s, more

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150 F-16s, more than 50 heavy and attack helicopters, and more than 2000 air-launched missiles of various types.

- All equipment provided by the United States will require U. S. financing.
- Significantly increased U. S. financing of Israeli defense industry production is called for.
- Of particular significance are the projected requirements in the area of technology, which include items previously disapproved, systems still in the conceptual stage, and the most advanced "cutting edge" technology in all military fields, some of which has been refused to NATO. The scope of technology requests is unprecedented.

True
The planning document indicates that it is based on U. S. FMS financing at the rate of \$1.5 billion per year through 1987, in constant 1977 dollars. The Israeli plans far exceed U. S. estimates of Israeli military needs. The proposal obviously requires extensive and careful study.

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MEMORANDUM

~~TOP SECRET~~ #3

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

0583

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CONTAINS CODEWORD

October 21, 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

SUBJECT:

NSC Weekly Report #33

ZB. wty.

1. Opinion

We need to look ahead and develop a coherent strategy -- including priorities, timing, and yes, linkages -- for managing our dealings with the Soviet Union, including the barrage of arms control negotiations, and such major political issues as CSCE, human rights, and the Middle East. We need this strategy to guide our own planning and action, and to make sure we do not run into difficulty with Congress and the public on the Soviet front.

For the American public, how the Soviet connection is managed is a central standard for evaluating the foreign policy performance and competence of any administration. The public becomes anxious when they think things are going badly with the Soviets; but they equally -- and sometimes more so -- become nervous when they think things are going too well because they suspect good relations are being bought with concessions. Above all, the American public wants a sense that the Soviet connection is under control and that those managing it know what they want.

Simply put, we may have something of a problem in how the public sees our conduct of Soviet Affairs. Pat Caddell's recent poll is one of a number of straws in the wind. It shows a considerable negative shift in opinion concerning performance on Soviet policy and the related area of human rights. To some extent, attitudes toward our Soviet policy reflect a broader concern (one that you are familiar with) that we are trying to do too much too quickly on too many different fronts. To the extent that we can convey coherence and control in our Soviet policy, we will counter this perception and build public confidence in our general foreign policy efforts.

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DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

PER 8/19/97 NRC H. RE NLC-96-114

BY *J* NARS. DATE 5/4/98

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A key issue is whether we should try to wrap up CTB with SALT in the near term. There is a strong connection between them in that both are about strategic nuclear capabilities -- and to conclude both at the same time would be a powerful realization and demonstration of your commitment to the control of nuclear weapons. Indeed, at one point we accelerated our CTB efforts when it seemed that SALT might be indefinitely stalled.

This said, it is not clear that it is feasible to get to a CTB in the desired timeframe without conceding points important to us. Indeed, if the Soviets sense that we are eager to wrap CTB up with SALT, they would have a major incentive to link the two and try to wring more concessions from us. There is also a good risk that Congress and the public, rather than applauding the simultaneous conclusion of SALT and CTB as two blows struck for peace, instead will question whether we bought the double deal with unwarranted concessions. PNE's, for example, is an area where we may ultimately have to compromise. But it is such an article of faith on the left and the right that they should stop, that any such concession in the SALT II timeframe will be scored as a retreat.

On balance, I think we need a controlled and phased strategy to guide us through the minefields I have sketched above. I think that a step-by-step approach is not only the best way to handle the Soviets substantively, but also to convey a sense of competence and control to Congress and to the public, and to avoid the sort of progressive euphoria which, in the past, has been followed with sharp questions and suspicions about what it really cost. In essence, I am talking of building and staging our relations and agreements with the Soviets over the span of your first term in office. The timetable might look something like this:

-- A SALT II agreement, combined with a Summit, in late winter or early spring after Panama. It could well take us that long to get there in any event.

-- An Indian Ocean stabilization agreement concluded at the same time or perhaps earlier if it looks desirable. It is a moderate step within reach which might help maintain momentum in the relationship, while buying us time on more serious and difficult fronts.

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-- A grey area systems initiative, possibly linked to MBFR, to follow shortly after SALT II and demonstrate our continued concern for Backfire, SS-20's, etc. We have started planning work on this.

*I don't favor it
create a
just
firm on
et
not be in
hurry*

-- A CTB agreement in late 1978, perhaps before the elections. Your Spring Summit meeting could be used to open the way.

-- Intensive negotiations in 1979 looking to the expiration of the SALT II Protocol which coincides with the end of your first term, and is, therefore, a major political benchmark.

These are the key elements. A comprehensive plan would have to fit in such negotiations as MBFR, ASAT, CW, radiological weapons, civil defense, and conventional arms restraints. Each of these could be fitted into a general scheme of steady and controlled progress in our dealings with the Soviets. Indeed, if we want to add something to SALT for a possible Spring Summit, ASAT in some ways is a more directly related subject and perhaps more feasible on terms acceptable to us, than CTB.

Finally, a major argument for the approach I am describing is the need to phase the various negotiations and agreements to give the Soviets a continuing incentive to moderate their behavior in our relationship generally. The Soviets have gotten used to some pressure on human rights and their tack now is to down-play the issue and to suggest that we have learned our lesson. You may have to speak out again publicly on the issue to disabuse the Soviets and to head off domestic charges that you are backing off human rights. When you do speak out, the Soviets' reactions will be moderated to the extent they are enmeshed with us in a controlled process of negotiations, and have something to lose.

But a significant library on Golda are helping

Similarly, in the period immediately ahead, getting to Geneva on the Middle East and what happens once we are there will be real tests of Soviet intentions. How they respond cannot be divorced from SALT or any other negotiation. Especially disruptive Soviet behavior in the Middle East could not help but affect SALT and, above all, how any SALT agreement is received here in the country at large. This is a point which, before long, we ought to convey quietly to the Soviets.

I agree

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TsK KPSS

October 29, 1977
No. 2347-A

Summary on the USA for October 28, 1977

The continued decline in Carter's popularity with the American population, and the growth of criticism within the USA directed at the Administration due to its inability to achieve any concrete results in domestic or foreign policy, is of serious concern to the President, who attaches special significance to the strengthening of his personal prestige, in order to create a firm base for reelection to a second term. Considering the complexity of the USA's socio-economic problems and the difficulty in resolving them, the President is pursuing a course which aims to achieve a major success in foreign policy in the short-term.

In Carter's view, the most realistic opportunity in this area is the conclusion of a new agreement with the USSR on the limitation of strategic arms (SALT). Carter needs to bring about a revision of the agreement as soon as possible, and controversy is emerging in the USA over the the new Panama Canal treaties. The failure of the ratification of these agreements would have a negative impact on the effectiveness of the Administration's subsequent actions; in particular, this would seriously weaken its ability to get other international

agreements passed by Congress. The President calculates that a foreign policy success such as the conclusion of an agreement like SALT would not just considerably enhance the authority of his administration, but also would create favorable preconditions for the ratification of the Panama Canal treaties.

At present the Administration is taking measures to ensure support for the future agreement in Congress and in the American public as a whole. In official speeches, Carter, Vance, and Brzezinski stress that it is necessary for the USA to conclude the SALT agreement. During meetings with influential senators, the President and the Secretary of State try to convince them of the expediency of showing support for a future agreement.

At the same time, the Carter Administration has not ceased its efforts to convene a session of the Geneva Conference on the Middle East. Above all they (these efforts) are based on the USA's aim to continue to hold onto the initiative in the Middle East peace process. Carter suggests that the very fact of the convening of the Geneva Conference would facilitate the strengthening of his position in the USA, insofar as it could be portrayed in American society as a personal success of the President.

The fact that the United States demonstrates its readiness to cooperate with the Soviet Union in the Middle East peace process reflects its awareness that success in this area cannot be achieved without the participation of the USSR. Nevertheless, the Americans will try to limit the activity of the USSR in the Middle East peace process to basic participation in the decision

of procedural questions at the Geneva conference. In particular, Carter is counting on the USSR to influence Syria in a direction favorable to the USA - (Syria being) the main opponent to the joint plan of the United States and Israel to convene and hold the Geneva Conference.

It is notable that at the Belgrade meeting of the representatives of the member-states of the European Conference (CSCE), the U.S. delegation hardened its position on the "violation of human rights in socialist countries." In unofficial discussions with Soviet representatives in Belgrade, the Americans relied on new instructions from the White House, which were formulated under pressure from Congress, which is unhappy with the "excessively soft" position of the delegation at the meeting. According to the Americans, it is suggested in these instructions, however, that outright confrontation with the Soviet Union should be avoided and that efforts should be focused on basic efforts to criticize "the violation of human rights" in Czechoslovakia and the GDR.

The activization of American-Yugoslav contacts that has been noticeable lately stems from the USA's aim to strengthen Yugoslavia's non-aligned position and to prevent a rapprochement between it and the Soviet Union. Moreover, the Americans calculate that Yugoslavia enjoys great authority among non-aligned states and could influence non-aligned countries so as to convince them to refrain from "preconceived relations" to U.S. policies in the international arena. According to the Carter Administration's scheme, demonstrating that the United States is

prepared to expand cooperation with Yugoslavia in the economic and military spheres and emphasizing the "key role of non-aligned Yugoslavia in Europe" would ensure the achievement of the aforementioned goals.

In Carter's circle there is increasing nervousness due to the spreading of rumours about upcoming staff changes. It is increasingly said that Carter may remove Blumenthal from the position of Treasury Secretary because, according to the President, he has not succeeded in his assigned task of improving relations with Congress and business circles. Strauss, who is an ambassador extraordinary, is mentioned as a possible successor. In U.S. political circles, it is noted that Strauss recently has become "one of the most frequent guests at the White House."

The Republican Party has begun to prepare for the mid-term Congressional elections which will take place in Fall 1978. The leadership of the party intends to formulate a program which would be attractive not just to middle-income voters, the traditional base of the party, but also to less well-off Americans. Nonetheless, the party leadership still has not succeeded in organizing a broad campaign criticizing Carter's domestic policies because Carter's approach to the resolution of the USA's socio-economic problems increasingly is assuming the conservative character usually associated with a Republican president. In this respect, the Republicans intend to focus their efforts on criticism of Carter's foreign policy, above all on the new Panama Canal treaties.

Chairman of the Committee on State Security
Andropov

Сов. Секретно

ЦК КПСС

29 октября 1977 года
№ 2347-АСводка по США на 28 октября 1977 года

Продолжающееся снижение популярности Картера среди американского населения, рост критики внутри США в адрес администрации в связи с тем, что она пока не смогла добиться конкретных результатов во внутренней и внешней политике, вызывает серьезную озабоченность президента, который придает особое значение укреплению своего личного престижа с целью создать прочную базу для переизбрания на второй срок. Учитывая сложность социально-экономических проблем США и трудности их решения, президент взял курс на достижение в ближайшее время крупного внешнеполитического успеха.

По мнению Картера, в создавшейся ситуации наиболее реальной возможностью в этом плане является заключение нового соглашения с СССР об ограничении стратегических наступательных вооружений (ОСНВ). Вести дело к скорейшей выработке соглашения Картера вынуждает и ситуация сложившаяся в США вокруг новых договоров о Панамском канале. Провал ратификации этих договоров негативно сказался бы на эффективности дальнейшей деятельности администрации, в частности, серьезно ослабили бы ее возможности проводить через Конгресс другие международные соглашения. Президент рассчитывает, что такой внешнеполитический успех как заключение соглашения об ОСНВ не только значительно повысит авторитет его администрации, но и создаст благоприятные предпосылки для ратификации договоров о Панамском канале.

В настоящее время администрация принимает меры к тому, чтобы обеспечить поддержку будущего соглашения как со стороны Конгресса, так и общественного мнения США в целом. В официальных выступлениях Картер, Вэнс и Бжезинский делают упор на необходимости для США заключения соглашения об ОСНВ. Президент и государственный секретарь проводят встречи с видными сенаторами, в ходе которых стремятся убедить их в целесообразности оказать поддержку будущему соглашению.

Одновременно не прекращаются усилия администрации Картера, направленные на созыв Женевской мирной конференции по Ближнему Востоку. Они обусловлены прежде всего стремлением США сохранить за собой инициативу в деле ближневосточного урегулирования. Кроме того, Картер полагает, что сам факт созыва Женевской конференции будет способствовать укреплению его положения внутри США, поскольку он может быть преподнесен американской общественности как личный успех президента.

Демонстрируемая Соединенными Штатами готовность к сотрудничеству с Советским Союзом в ближневосточном урегулировании отражает понимание американской администрацией того факта, что успех в этой области не может быть достигнут без участия СССР.

Вместе с тем, американцы будут пытаться ограничить деятельность СССР в ближневосточном урегулировании в основном участием в решении процедурных вопросов созыва Женевской конференции. В частности, Картер рассчитывает, что СССР окажет благоприятное для США воздействие на Сирию — главного противника представленного Соединенными Штатами совместно с Израилем плана созыва и проведения Женевской конференции.

Обращает на себя внимание, что на Белградской встрече представителей стран-участниц общеевропейского совещания делегация США ужесточила свою позицию по вопросу "о нарушениях прав человека в социалистических странах." В неофициальных беседах с советскими представителями в Белграде американцы ссылаются на новые инструкции Белого дома, которые были разработаны под давлением со стороны Конгресса, недовольного "слишком мягкой" позицией делегации на встрече. В инструкциях, по словам американцев, вместе с тем предлагается избегать прямой конфронтации с Советским Союзом и сосредоточить основные усилия по критике "нарушений прав человека" в Чехословакии и ГДР.

Отмечающаяся в последнее время активизация американо-югославских контактов вызвана стремлением США закрепить Югославию на позициях неприсоединения, не допускать ее сближения с Советским Союзом. Кроме того, американцы рассчитывают, что Югославия, пользующаяся большим авторитетом в "третьем мире", может оказать влияние на неприсоединившиеся страны, с тем чтобы убедить их отказаться от "предвзятого отношения" к политике США на международной арене. Проявляемая Соединенными Штатами готовность к расширению сотрудничества с Югославией в экономической и военной областях, подчеркивание американцами "ключевой роли независимой Югославии в Европе" и ее "ведущих позиций в движении неприсоединения", должно, по замыслам администрации Картера, обеспечить достижение указанных целей.

В окружении Картера наблюдается усиление нервозности порождаемой распространяющимися слухами о предстоящих перестановках в администрации. Все чаще высказывается мнение, что Картер может снят с поста министра финансов Блименталю, который, по оценке Президента, не справился с возложенными на него задачами по налаживанию отношений с Конгрессом и деловыми кругами. В качестве возможного преемника Блименталю называют посла по особым поручениям Страуса, пользующегося большим влиянием среди законодателей и бизнесменов. В политических кругах США отмечают, что Страус в последнее время стал "одним из наиболее частых гостей в Белом доме."

Республиканская партия начала подготовку к промежуточным выборам в Конгресс, которые состоятся осенью 1978 года. Руководство партии намерено выдвинуть такую программу, которая оказалась бы привлекательной не только для избирателей со средним доходом, традиционно составляющих основу партии, но и для менее состоятельных американцев. Вместе с тем руководству партии пока не удается организовать широкую кампанию критики деятельности администрации Картера в области внутренней политики, поскольку подход Картера к решению социально-экономических проблем США начинает все больше приобретать консервативный характер.

свойственный обычно президенту -республиканцу. В этой связи республиканцы намерены сосредоточить усилия на критике внешнеполитической деятельности Картера, в первую очередь на новых договорах о Панамском канале.

Председатель Комитета Госбезопасности
Андропов

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FOR EUR/RPM AND EUR/SOV FROM USDEL CSCE

EO 11652: NA
TAGS: IFSCE, OCON
SUBJ: BELGRADE CSCE -- SOVIET WARNING IN BASKET ONE HUMAN RIGHTS
DEBATE

SUMMARY: SOVIET REP CAUTIONED AGAINST POSSIBLE RUPTURE IN
BELGRADE MEETING WHEN BASKET ONE RETURNED TO
DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES OCTOBER 31. PRIOR TO SOVIET
WARNING FRENCH, CANADIAN AND UK REPS HAD DELIVERED FAIRLY
MILD HUMAN RIGHTS STATEMENTS WHICH CRITICIZED CZECHS
DIRECTLY BUT TOUCHED ONLY LIGHTLY ON SOVIET
PRACTICES. END SUMMARY.

1. FRENCH REP WAS ONLY SPEAKER TO CITE SOVIETS DIRECTLY
WHEN WORKING BODY FOCUSED ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRINCIPLE
OCTOBER 31. IN CAREFULLY CRAFTED STATEMENT THAT CONCENTRATED
MAINLY ON GENERAL CATEGORIES WHERE PROBLEMS HAD ARISEN
IN "SOME STATES", FOR EXAMPLE RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND
RIGHT OF EMIGRATION, HE EXPRESSED HOPE THAT "CERTAIN
SOVIET AND CZECH PRACTICES WOULD IMPROVE."

2. CANADIAN REP ALSO DEVOTED MOST OF HIS INTERVENTION
TO DISCUSSION OF GENERAL CATEGORIES WHERE IMPROVEMENT
NEEDED. HE EXPRESSED DISAPPOINTMENT, HOWEVER, THAT
"THREE GOVERNMENTS" HAVE HARASSED, EXILED, ARRESTED OR
BROUGHT TO TRIAL INDIVIDUALS SEEKING TO EXERCISE RIGHTS.
HE AYMED RHETORICALLY WHETHER GOVERNMENTS CONCERNED
REALIZED "CORROSIVE EFFECT SUCH ACTIONS HAVE ON THE
CONFIDENCE WE ARE TRYING TO CREATE," ESPECIALLY IF
"LIKE RECENT TRIALS IN PRAGUE THEY TAKE PLACE AT TIME
THAT SUGGESTS THEY ARE INTENDED TO FLOUT FINAL ACT."
CANADIAN REP ALSO CITED CZECH LAW PENALIZING CITIZENS
WHO REMAIN IN CONTACT WITH EMIGRES. HE STRESSED "PRO-
FOUND ADVERSE CONSEQUENCES FOR DETENTE" OF SUCH
MATTERS AND SAID BELGRADE MEETING SHOULD
ENCOURAGE DIALOGUE BETWEEN CITIZENS AND THEIR GOVERNMENTS.

3. UK REP'S STATEMENT WAS MOST GENERAL OF THREE. HE
CONFINED HIMSELF TO ASKING SOVIET REP WHY SEVENTH PRINCIPLE
WAS NOT FULLY REPRODUCED IN NEW SOVIET CONSTITUTION
AS WERE OTHER PRINCIPLES, TO DESCRIBING BRITISH SYSTEM

FOR FOSTERING HUMAN RIGHTS AT HOME, AND TO GENERAL
DESCRIPTION OF PRACTICES IN UNNAMED STATES THAT RAISED
BRITISH CONCERNS FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
PRINCIPLE. UK REP INDICATED HE WOULD SPEAK LATER
IN DEBATE ON SPECIFIC WAYS IN WHICH BELGRADE MEETING
MIGHT FURTHER DEVELOP PROVISION IN SEVENTH PRINCIPLE ON RIGHT
OF INDIVIDUALS TO KNOW AND ACT ON RIGHTS AND DUTIES.

4. AFTER CZECH REP HAD EXPRESSED "DECIDED PROTEST"
AT "VARIOUS INSINUATIONS AND ACCUSATIONS" LEVELLED AT
HIS COUNTRY AND RESERVED RIGHT TO MAKE MORE DETAILED
REPLY NOVEMBER 1, SOVIET REP (VORONTSOV) ALSO EXERCISED
RIGHT OF REPLY. HE NOTED FRENCH REP HAD INDICATED THERE
WERE SOME ASPECTS OF SOVIET SOCIETY THAT WERE DIS-
PLEASING TO FRANCE. HE SAID THIS WAS FRENCH RIGHT, BUT
IF SOVIETS WERE TO VIOLATE PRINCIPLE OF NON-INTERVENTION
IN INTERNAL AFFAIRS AND DESCRIBE ASPECTS OF FRENCH SOCIETY
THEY DISLIKED, THEY WOULD NEED MUCH MORE THAN SINGLE
SPEECH. SOVIET REP SAID ALL DELS SHOULD NOTE THAT
PATTERN OF INTERVENTIONS INDICATED THERE WAS CONCERTED
EFFORT TO "EXERT BLOG PRESSURE ON SOME COUNTRIES IN

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THIS MEETING." HE SAID ALL DELS SHOULD TAKE GREATEST CARE "TO AVOID A RUPTURE IN OUR MEETING." SOVIET REP COMPARED CSCE TO GREAT BRIDGE THAT HAS TAKEN MORE THAN DECADE OF LABOR TO CONSTRUCT. HE SAID ALL DELS SHOULD CONSIDER THAT WHAT TAKES YEARS AND THOUSANDS OF MEN TO CONSTRUCT CAN BE BROUGHT DOWN SUDDENLY BY ONLY TWO OR THREE SOLDIERS. "ALL SHOULD REMEMBER THIS WHEN WE RAISE QUESTION OF AN EXPLOSION OR A RUPTURE OF OUR MEETING."
5. POLISH REP URGED MEETING TO AVOID TEMPTATION TO DESCEND INTO CHARGES AND COUNTERCHARGES. ONLY RESULT, HE SAID, WOULD BE RETURN OF "COLD WAR SPIRIT, MUTUAL DISTRUST, AND POLARIZATION OF ATTITUDES." WHILE ADMITTING THAT NO STATE HAS PERFECT HUMAN RIGHTS RECORD, HE DEVOTED MOST OF INTERVENTION TO PHILOSOPHICAL DISCUSSION OF MARXISM'S CONTRIBUTIONS TO HUMAN RIGHTS, AND SAID POLISH DEL WAS "NOT INTERESTED IN SERMONS, PARTICULARLY NOT FROM THOSE COUNTRIES WHERE WE OBSERVE ESCALATING VIOLENCE, DRUGS, SPIRITUAL EMPTINESS, MORAL DECAY," AND WHICH IN RECENT PAST HAD VIOLATED ALL HUMAN RIGHTS AT HOME AND ABROAD.

6. AUSTRIAN REP GAVE HIGHLY GENERALIZED STATEMENT ON HUMAN RIGHTS AFTER DENYING SIXTH PRINCIPLE COULD BE INVOKED TO BLOCK DISCUSSION. BELGIAN REP ALSO REBUTTED INTERVENTION IN INTERNAL AFFAIRS ARGUMENT, AND ROMANIAN REP GAVE NEATLY BALANCED STATEMENT, AGREEING WITH EASTERN REPS THAT SIXTH PRINCIPLE COVERED MORE THAN FORCIBLE INTERVENTION BUT SAYING THAT IT COULD NEITHER BE INVOKED TO OVERRIDE OTHER PRINCIPLES NOR COULD OTHER PRINCIPLES VITIATE SIXTH PRINCIPLE.

7. US WILL SPEAK ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRINCIPLE NOVEMBER 1 OR 2.
GOLDBERG

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UNCLAS SECTION 1 OF 2 BELGRADE 7807

E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: CSCE, OCON

SUBJECT: BELGRADE CSCE -- AMBASSADOR GOLDBERG'S HUMAN RIGHTS SPEECH
NOVEMBER 9

FOR EUR:RPM AND EUR/SOV FROM USDEL CSCE

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF AMBASSADOR GOLDBERG'S STATEMENT IN
PLENARY NOVEMBER 9 SUMMING UP BELGRADE MEETING AFTER SIX
WEEKS AND IMPLEMENTATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITMENTS.
BEGIN TEXT:

MR. CHAIRMAN, AT THE OUTSET OF MY REMARKS I WOULD LIKE
TO EXPRESS MY DELEGATION'S FULL SUPPORT FOR THE NINE NEW
PROPOSALS SPONSORED BY BELGIUM AND OTHERS TO STRENGTHEN
SEVERAL OF THE FINAL ACT'S BASKET THREE PROVISIONS. WE
WILL ALSO STUDY WITH GREAT INTEREST THE PROPOSALS
MADE BY THE POLISH AND ITALIAN DELEGATIONS.

AS WE HAVE SEEN IN MORE THAN SIX WEEKS OF WORK IN THE
PLENARY AND THE SUBSIDIARY WORKING BODIES, WHILE STEPS
HAVE BEEN TAKEN TO REALIZE SEVERAL OF THE FINAL ACT'S PRO-
VISIONS, A GREAT DEAL MORE NEEDS TO BE DONE. THE NEW
PROPOSALS SPONSORED BY BELGIUM AND OTHERS ESSENTIALLY
AIM AT CLARIFYING AND ENRICHING SEVERAL DIFFERENT BASKET
THREE PROVISIONS, AND SEEK TO CLARIFY THE FINAL ACT.
I WISH TO EMPHASIZE THAT, AS WE UNDERSTAND THE PROPOSALS,
THE SPONSORS DO NOT INTEND TO CHANGE THE FINAL ACT IN
ANY WAY. EACH OF THE PROPOSALS DEAL WITH AN IMPORTANT
AREA WHICH WOULD BENEFIT -- BASED ON THE PAST TWO
YEARS' EXPERIENCE-- FROM A MORE PRECISE DEFINITION,
AS THE FINAL ACT CONTEMPLATES.

I WOULD PARTICULARLY LIKE TO DRAW ATTENTION TO
THE THREE PROPOSALS WE ARE CO-SPONSORING, TOGETHER WITH
SEVERAL OTHER COUNTRIES, CONCERNING VISA
APPLICATION PROCEDURES AND ACCESS TO ARCHIVAL MATERIAL.
THESE TWO PROBLEMS, AS WE MENTIONED SEVERAL
TIMES IN PLENARY AND IN THE WORKING BODIES, ARE OF
PARTICULAR CONCERN TO OUR GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE.

AS THE CONFERENCE CONCLUDES ITS DISCUSSION
OF THE FIRST PART OF THE AGENDA, MR. PRESIDENT, THE
UNITED STATES DELEGATION WISHES TO MAKE SOME GENERAL
OBSERVATIONS ABOUT THE STATUS OF OUR WORK.

IT IS THE CONCEPT OF MY DELEGATION THAT, IN CON-
FORMITY WITH THE FINAL ACT, THIS MEETING OF THE PARTICI-
PATING STATES HAS TWO CENTRAL OBJECTIVES. THE FIRST IS
TO JOIN AS SOVEREIGN NATIONS IN A THOROUGH EXAMINATION
OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE FINAL ACT AND OF THE MANNER AND
DEGREE TO WHICH THEY HAVE BEEN IMPLEMENTED UNILATER-
ALLY, BILATERALLY AND MULTILATERALLY. THE SECOND CONCERN
IS TO DRAW FROM THAT MUTUAL INQUIRY APPROPRI-
ATE CONCLUSIONS ABOUT THE FUTURE CONDUCT OF OUR NATIONS
--ACTING ALONE AND ACTING TOGETHER -- TO REALIZE THE

BROAD GOALS OF THE FINAL ACT.

THE PHASE OF THE CONFERENCE'S WORK KNOWN AS
THE REVIEW OF IMPLEMENTATION IS NOW APPROXIMATELY
SIX WEEKS OLD. THE DISCUSSIONS IN THIS INITIAL PERIOD,
IN OUR VIEW, HAVE BEEN FORTHCOMING IN SOME RESPECTS
AND LACKING IN SPECIFICS IN OTHERS. IT IS A FACT THAT
IN A FEW OF THE SUBSIDIARY WORKING BODIES THE DEBATE
HAS APPROACHED A DIALOGUE. DELEGATIONS HAVE BEEN ABLE
IN LIMITED AREAS TO DESCRIBE THE ACTIONS OF THEIR
COUNTRIES IN PURSUIT OF FINAL ACT GOALS, VOICE THEIR
CONCERNS ABOUT ACTIONS -- OR LACK OF ACTION-- BY OTHER
STATES AND HEAR EXPLANATIONS OF CONDUCT WHICH RE-
QUIRED BOTH QUESTIONING AND JUSTIFICATION. I REFER
TO THE BASKET II DISCUSSIONS AND THAT PHASE OF BASKET
III DEALING WITH CULTURAL AND SOME EDUCATIONAL EX-
CHANGES.

IN THESE RATHER LIMITED AREAS, THEN, THE CONFER-
ENCE HAS SHOWN ITSELF CAPABLE OF MAKING A JOINT ACCOUNT-
ING OF PROGRESS WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE FINAL
ACT. THAT IS NO MEAN FEAT. IN LIGHT OF THE UNDER-
TAKINGS GIVEN AT HELSINKI, OUR DELEGATIONS HAVE BEEN
ABLE ON THESE SUBJECTS TO EXAMINE NOT JUST THEMSELVES,
BUT EACH OTHER -- NOT JUST THE SMOOTH AND NARROW PATH
OF TRADITIONAL COOPERATION, BUT ALSO THE VARIED AND
DIFFICULT ISSUES OF INNOVATION.

IN THE FIELD OF ECONOMICS, WE HAVE BEEN ABLE TO
PROBE THE VERY DISSIMILAR, EVEN DISSONANT PRIORI-
TIES OF MARKET AND NON-MARKET SYSTEMS. IN THE AREA OF
HUMAN CONTACTS, WE HAVE BEEN ABLE TO EXPLORE THE CON-
TINUATION OF RESTRICTIVE VISA PRACTICES THAT DO NOT
ACCORD WITH THE SPIRIT OF THE FINAL ACT OR THE EXIG-
ENCIES OF A SHRINKING PLANET BUT OFTEN WITHOUT RECEIVING
ADEQUATE EXPLANATIONS. IN MATTERS OF INFORMATION, WE
HAVE NOT FOUND A COMMON UNDERSTANDING OF
THE VALUE OF SHARING NEWS AND IDEAS, AND I AM IM-
PELLED TO ADD WE HAVE FOUND SUBSTANTIAL INADEQUACIES.

IT IS A MATTER OF GREAT CONCERN TO MY COUNTRY
THAT MURRAY SEEGER OF THE LOS ANGELES TIMES, A VERY
PRESTIGIOUS NEWSPAPER, HAS BEEN REPEATEDLY REFUSED A
VISA TO WORK IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA, AND ERIC BOURNE OF
THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, ALSO A HIGHLY
RESPECTED NEWSPAPER, HAS BEEN OFFERED CON-
DITIONS LIMITING THE SCOPE OF HIS PROPOSED WORK IN

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INFO USINFO WASHDC IMMEDIATE*Ambassador
Goldberg*

UNCLAS SECTION 2 OF 2 BELGRADE 7807

CZECHOSLOVAKIA WHICH IN ALL GOOD CONSCIENCE HE COULD NOT ACCEPT. AND I MUST ALSO MENTION THAT IT IS A MATTER OF CONCERN TO MY COUNTRY THAT PAUL HOFMANN OF THE NEW YORK TIMES, WHICH IS WORLD RENOWNED, AND LESLIE COLLITT OF NBC HAVE BEEN EXPELLED FROM CZECHOSLOVAKIA DURING WORKING VISITS THERE. I HOPE WE WILL GET AN EXPLANATION OF WHY THIS IS SO AS ALL OF THESE REPORTERS ARE DISTINGUISHED, RESPECTED, AND RESPONSIBLE AND I HOPE TO DISCUSS IT IN THE NEXT PHASE OF OUR WORK.

MY DELEGATION SUPPORTS THE STANDARD FOR DIALOGUE THE THEN PRIME MINISTER OF SWEDEN PROPOSED IN HIS ADDRESS TO THE HELSINKI SUMMIT. "RESPECT FOR ONE ANOTHER'S SOCIAL SYSTEMS AND THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-INTERVENTION," PREMIER PALME SAID, "SHOULD NOT BE GIVEN TO MEAN THAT THIS EXCHANGE SHALL BE RESTRICTED TO ASSENT AND JOINT DECLARATIONS. FRANK CRITICISM MUST ALSO BE ALLOWED IN THE FACE OF PHENOMENA SUCH AS THE OPPRESSION OF DISSIDENTS, TORTURE AND RACIAL DISCRIMINATION."

IT IS IN THIS SPIRIT THAT WE RAISE THE CASES OF ORLOV, SHCHARANSKY AND GINSBERG IN THE SOVIET UNION, AND WE RAISE THEM BY WAY OF ILLUSTRATION BECAUSE THEY HAVE BEEN SEEKING TO MONITOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FINAL ACT IN THE SOVIET UNION. IT IS CLEAR THAT THE FINAL ACT ENDORSES SUCH PEACEFUL ACTIVITIES, AND PERSONS ENGAGED IN THEM SHOULD BE FREE FROM HARASSMENT, ARREST AND IMPRISONMENT.

SOME HERE SAY IT IS BETTER NOT TO MENTION SUCH CASES SPECIFICALLY, AS I HAVE DONE, IN EITHER THE PLENARY OR WORKING GROUPS OF THIS CONFERENCE, BUT RATHER TO RAISE THESE QUESTIONS BILATERALLY. THE UNITED STATES HAS RAISED THESE CASES AND OTHERS BILATERALLY AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL WITHOUT SUBSTANTIAL SUCCESS AND, THEREFORE, WE RAISE THEM HERE, AS ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLES OF MANY OTHERS, BECAUSE WE CONSIDER IT THE JOINT BUSINESS OF OUR CONFERENCE, AND WE HOPE THAT BY DOING SO PROGRESS CAN BE MADE.

NOW I CAN UNDERSTAND THAT THERE MAY BE INTERVENTIONS OBJECTING TO THIS APPROACH. I DON'T LIKE MY COUNTRY TO BE CRITICIZED, BUT I HAVE SAID AND NOW REPEAT THAT, IF THE CRITICISM IS UNJUSTIFIED, I SHALL REPLY, AND IF JUSTIFIED PROMISE REMEDIAL ACTION. IT IS NOT A PLEASANT TASK TO CRITICIZE OTHER COUNTRIES AND I TAKE NO RELISH IN IT. I HAVE BEEN CHARGED BY MY PRESIDENT TO REPRESENT MY COUNTRY HERE -- AND I WILL DO IT TO THE BEST OF MY ABILITY. IN THE SPIRIT OF DIALOGUE, HOWEVER, I SIMPLY DON'T UNDERSTAND WHY IT IS SAID THAT IT IS NOT APPROPRIATE TO RAISE SUCH MATTERS HERE. A FULL, SPECIFIC AND CANDID REVIEW OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS AND OTHER PROVISIONS OF THE FINAL ACT IS THE BUSINESS OF THIS CONFERENCE. I CONTINUE IN THE HOPE THAT SUCH A DIALOGUE WILL TAKE PLACE.

FURTHER, IT IS INEVITABLE IN LIGHT OF NEW PROPOSALS BEARING ON THESE SUBJECTS THAT IF PROGRESS IS TO BE MADE, THE NEW PROPOSALS WILL HAVE TO BE DISCUSSED FACTUALLY AND NOT IN PLATITUDINOUS TERMS.

IT IS IN OUR INTEREST TO CONDUCT OUR DISCUSSIONS WITH CIVILITY AND TACT, BUT WE MUST BE CANDID ENOUGH TO COVER ALL ASPECTS AND SEEK TO ARRIVE AT A CONSENSUS ON THEM. I REPEAT THAT I DO NOT REGARD MY OWN COUNTRY TO BE IMMUNE FROM CRITICISM DURING THESE DISCUSSIONS SINCE WE DO NOT CLAIM TO BE PERFECT.

NOW, MR. CHAIRMAN, MY DELEGATION HAS SOUGHT TO MAKE TWO BASIC POINTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS. FIRST, THE RECORD, DESPITE LIMITED PROGRESS, HAS ON THE WHOLE BEEN DISAPPOINTING. SECONDLY, WE NEED TO DISCUSS THIS RECORD FRANKLY AND TO SEEK IMPROVEMENTS IF WE ARE TO CONVINCE OUR PEOPLE THAT DETENTE MEANS PRACTICAL BENEFITS IN THEIR DAILY LIVES AND THAT THEY SHOULD, THEREFORE, GIVE IT THEIR SUPPORT. I AM PLEASED THAT MANY OTHER DELEGATIONS HAVE BEEN MAKING THE SAME POINT.

WHAT WE SEEK TO DISCUSS CANNOT BE REGARDED AS IMPROPER INTRUSION INTO THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF ANY COUNTRY. HUMAN RIGHTS IS A MATTER OF THE FINAL ACT AND OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AS SET FORTH IN THE UN CHARTER, THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL DOCUMENTS AND AGREEMENTS.

THE DISTINGUISHED REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SOVIET UNION HAS VOICED HIS CONCERN THAT AN EXAMINATION OF DETAILS OF IMPLEMENTATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS COULD SOMEHOW UNDERMINE THE BRIDGES OF UNDERSTANDING SO LABORIOUSLY BUILT OVER THE LAST DECADE BETWEEN THE PARTICIPATING STATES. MY BELIEF, ON THE CONTRARY, IS THAT THOSE BRIDGES ARE ONLY AS STRONG AS THEIR FOUNDATIONS. IT IS THE PRIMARY ROLE OF THIS CONFERENCE TO STRENGTHEN THE FOUNDATIONS SO THAT DETENTE CAN HAVE A STRONG, ENDURING AND NOBLE EDIFICE.

IT IS, THEREFORE, IN ALL OUR INTERESTS AND IN THE INTEREST OF THE OSCE PROCESS TO STRENGTHEN THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE FINAL ACT. THE DIALOGUE WE ARE SEEKING TO CONDUCT IS DESIGNED PRECISELY TO EXPLORE THE UNDERSTANDINGS WE HAVE REACHED, OUR PROGRESS AND SHORTCOMINGS AND TO INSURE THAT THERE ARE NO MISCONCEPTIONS ABOUT THEIR MEANING. ONLY IF THAT EXAMINATION PROCEEDS CANDIDLY AND STUDIOUSLY, CAN WE BE CERTAIN, AS WE MOVE TO THE NEXT PHASE OF OUR WORK, THE DETENTE WE ALL SEEK WILL BE SOLID AND CONTRIBUTE TO SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE. END TEXT.
GOLDZERG

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 10, 1977

TO: Robert Lipshutz

FROM: Joyce Starr *JRS*

RE: Belgrade

Please find attached the copy of Ambassador Goldberg's speech before the Plenary Session. The speech went far beyond the recommendations telegraphed to Goldberg by the Dept. of State. Most significantly, Goldberg emphasized:

1. That there has been substantial inadequacies in the sharing of ideas.
2. That the cases of Orlov, Ginsberg, and Sharansky have been raised bilaterally without much success.
3. That what we seek to discuss cannot be viewed as an intervention in someone else's affairs, but rather as in keeping with the primary role of the Belgrade Conference, which is to strengthen the role of detente.
4. That the tactics and strategy of the U.S. have been echoed by delegations from many Western countries.
5. That Belgrade should impact on the lives of common people.

I would like to suggest that you share this speech with The President.

*FILE: Belgrade
Conference*



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BRIEFING MEMORANDUM

S/S

November 18, 1977

TO: The President

FROM: Arthur J. Goldberg, Ambassador-at-Large *ajg*

SUBJECT: Interim Report on the Belgrade Conference

The Belgrade Conference is the latest stage of an East-West negotiation whose origins go back at least to the 1954 efforts by the Soviet Union to conclude a post-war treaty fixing and legitimizing Communist political and territorial acquisitions in Europe. The actual work of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe only began in July, 1973, with a Foreign Ministers' meeting in Helsinki, after the East had been obliged to agree to the participation of the U. S. and Canada, had concluded the Four-Power Agreement on Berlin and had begun the MBFR talks in Vienna. The actual negotiation of the Final Act took place in Geneva from September, 1973, through June, 1975, when West European diplomats carried the heavier load of pressing the East for commitments to a freer flow of information and people as part of the structure of ongoing detente. The Final Act (or Helsinki Accord) was signed by top representatives of 35 states--including President Ford and Secretary General Brezhnev--in Helsinki, August 1, 1975. It provided, among other specific commitments, for prior notification of military maneuvers, improvement of conditions for commercial, economic, educational and scientific activities and liberalization of safeguards for human rights, including eased restrictions on family reunification and contacts and expanded flow of information and culture. It also called for a meeting of the 35 signatories in Yugoslavia in 1977.

The Belgrade Conference began with a preparatory meeting in June-July which set the agenda for the main round underway since October 4. The agenda--the result of determined Western negotiating--provided for a review of Final Act implementation, the consideration of new initiatives, and agreement on the time and place of the next "similar meeting." The preparatory round insured as much as possible that Belgrade will be but the first of such review proceedings.

The present Belgrade Conference is precedent-setting. The most important and difficult precedent to establish has been that set forth in the President's instructions to me to vigorously pursue a full review of implementation of all provisions of the Final Act, including particularly those provisions concerning humanitarian contacts and human rights. This raising of the human rights issue has been strongly resisted by the Soviets and their allies. I decided to initiate the implementation review with general references to broad problem areas, then to proceed to discuss specific abusive practices without directly naming the countries in question, then to proceed to name the countries violating the specific provisions of the Act, and, finally, to cite the names of actual individuals in named countries when the treatment of those individuals typifies or illustrates continuing conduct contrary to the Final Act's provisions.

The procedure has the full endorsement of the NATO delegations at Belgrade. With respect to U. S. and Allied insistence that human rights questions be fully discussed, the Soviets and their allies have not been responsive. Basically, the Warsaw Pact delegations took the position that governments could not comment at Belgrade on other states' domestic conduct without violating Principle VI's guarantee of non-intervention in internal affairs. There is no foundation to this position. The inclusion of Principle VII in the Final Act makes human rights a clear question of international accord, no longer purely a matter of domestic competence.

It should be noted that a limited dialogue on other matters, such as economic, scientific, and cultural exchanges has taken place. In response to Soviet

arguments, I and other members of the U. S. delegation have always presented the U. S. record of human rights performance as one which we know to be far from perfect, as the President and the Secretary of State have frankly stated on many occasions, but one in which our effort to redress wrongs lays the foundation for our concern about wrongdoing elsewhere. It was in that context and because they are leading members of a group to monitor the Helsinki Accords, a procedure sanctioned by the Final Act, that I specifically raised the cases of the Soviet Helsinki monitors Shcharansky, Ginzburg, and Orlov.

The process of periodic review of implementation and consideration of new proposals to improve performance in all aspects of the Final Act has great intrinsic value and importance.

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

CONFIDENTIAL GDS

December 6, 1977

1033

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI
 FROM: ROBERT KING *RK*
 SUBJECT: Topics for the President's Meetings
 in Warsaw

The Global Overview and the Role of Poland

Special issues of particular concern to Poland include the following:

- US-Soviet relations
- Detente
- SALT
- MBFR
- The Belgrade CSCE Review Conference
- Human rights as a domestic factor in US foreign relations
- The world economic situation

Bilateral US-Polish Issues

- Polish request for rescheduling of debts owed the US Government and the request for a long-term grain purchase agreement with favorable credit terms. These two issues will revolve around the state of the Polish economy and its need for assistance
- US-Polish trade and economic cooperation
- Family reunification (if this issue is not handled by Secretary Vance and Foreign Minister Wojtaszek during the visit)

The Poles have proposed a number of other issues to Ambassador Davies which they would like to include on the agenda. While a number of them are worthwhile, most should be considered in meetings between Vance and Wojtaszek rather than in meetings involving the President. These issues include the following:

- US-Polish cooperation in coal production, research, and marketing
- 1978 quotas for Polish fishermen in US waters

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Q 10/9/78

- Air connections between the US and Poland, including landing rights for LOT airlines in Chicago and other US cities
- US and Polish scientific cooperation
- Polish access to US markets

In addition the State Department will probably want to raise the question of a US cultural center in Warsaw.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

January 11, 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: Robert Lipshutz

FROM: Joyce Starr

Attached please find my memorandum on attendance at the CSCE strategy meeting January 10, 1978. Gregg Treverton of the NSC also participated in this meeting, as did Cliff Brody of the Department of State. The three of us are working together with increasing frequency. We also found ourselves to be in alignment on our approach to this strategy meeting.

One point that I would like to bring to your attention was the fear voiced by the observers to Belgrade that this effort is only minimally understood by the public and does not have the strong, overt backing of the Administration.

I took the opportunity to publicly express White House appreciation to Goldberg for his determined work and dedicated efforts. I also thanked the people who work on a day-to-day basis on CSCE in Belgrade and at home. I also stressed the very widespread and positive public appreciation we in the White House have received with respect to Belgrade.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

January 11, 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: Robert Lipshutz

FROM: Joyce Starr *JRS*

SUBJECT: Attendance at CSCE Strategy Meeting, Department of State, January 10, 1978

The meeting was Chaired by Ambassador Goldberg. Approximately 40 people were in attendance, including all those with principal responsibility for CSCE (Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe). The following points developed from this meeting:

Like the American public, the White House has to be prepared to accept a less than ideal final document, substantively vague on many points. Several drafts exist, one for each of the sections of the document. Each has to be negotiated, and the tradeoffs for keeping or trading language will not suggest themselves until the meeting resumes.

Since consensus is the rule, there will be more compromise than if majority ruled. The United States may have to accept something bland. However, Goldberg will hold out as long as possible for meaningful references to human rights. It may be that the United States will appear as a long holdout; if the time approaches for a mid-February end of the meeting, even our allies might encourage us to be less insistent on having our preferred notions included in the final document.

At that time, a decision by the President may be needed to instruct the delegation to persevere or compromise. Other issues -- such as the time and venue for the next Belgrade-style conference, have less potential for prompting such a high level determination; a better judgment of this will be possible about two weeks after the beginning of the January/February session, when it becomes clear what negotiating instructions the Soviets and their allies bring back to the meeting. The most intriguing aspect of the

of the upcoming Belgrade phase is whether the United States should seek a minimal final document -- we came, we talked, we agreed on scheduling the next meeting -- if negotiations for a substantive, meaningful document prove fruitless. A judgment on this, now, is premature; Goldberg is not happy with this prospect.