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THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

NSC UNDER SECRETARIES COMMITTEE

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NSC-U/DM-137B

August 16, 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Third Quarterly Report on Implementation
of the Final Act of the Conference on
Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)

This is the third quarterly report submitted
by the NSC Under Secretaries Committee on imple-
mentation of the provisions of the Final Act of the
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
(CSCE). It covers the period February 1 - April 30,
1976, and reports those actions related to the CSCE
which have been taken since the end of the last
reporting period.

Implementation continues to be an extended
form of negotiation on East-West lines, with each
side seeking to establish its interpretation of
the provisions of the Final Act and to position
itself advantageously for the follow-up meetings
scheduled to begin in Belgrade in June 1977. The
approach of East and West to this broad negotiation
clarified during the reporting period as CSCE
participant states began to think more actively
about the Belgrade meetings and to relate those
meetings to their present actions.

The Soviet Union and its allies have acted
along predictable lines. The Soviets have continued
to take modest steps to implement a few of the
provisions of the Final Act, albeit at a slower
pace than in the last quarter. They have also
displayed heightened sensitivity to charges that

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they are giving short shrift to Basket III. At the same time they are attempting to deflect criticism by going over to the offensive in four areas: polemical-style criticism of the West for its alleged failures in implementing Final Act provisions; reinterpretation of the document to suit their own negotiating positions and Communist ideology; exaggeration of their own implementation efforts; and an attempt to shift the focus of public attention away from the concept of implementation toward the idea of the CSCE process as part of a developing and progressing trend in European relations set in motion by the Soviets' so-called Peace Program. The Eastern European states, whose internal policies on humanitarian and information subjects vary but are generally somewhat less severe than those of the USSR, have, with the exception of Romania, followed the Soviet lead in their positions on CSCE issues.

Neither the Soviet Union nor its Eastern allies took any significant new implementation steps during the reporting period, but modest progress was registered in a few areas. There was a marked increase in emigration from the USSR to the US which appears to be continuing, though this was probably a function of various pressures in addition to the CSCE. Soviet Jewish emigration was up slightly in comparison to last year's levels, though it remains far below the 1972-1973 peak reached before the Jackson-Vanik amendment was passed. Greatly increased emigration by ethnic Germans from the USSR is largely due to bilateral FRG-Soviet considerations. Similar emigration from Poland to the FRG is primarily due to the recent Polish-FRG emigration/credits treaty, although FRG officials state that the CSCE made it possible to reach an agreement. The Soviet Union continued to comply with the Final Act's Confidence Building provisions on major military maneuvers through notification, shortly after the end of the reporting period, of a 25,000 troop maneuver held near Leningrad, to which the USSR invited observers from countries in the immediate area. Some progress was also made on increasing the number of direct contacts between US and Soviet institutions, but

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our own ability to follow-up on opportunities continued to be limited by lack of funds. A Soviet dissident group has been formed to monitor the Soviet Government's compliance with CSCE provisions, especially those relating to human rights. Slower implementation progress during the reporting period may reflect Moscow's intention to husband possible further implementation steps until the months leading up to the Belgrade meetings next year.

Soviet and Eastern European efforts to take the offensive on CSCE implementation have been carried out principally through a broad program of propaganda supporting official government statements and initiatives pursued bilaterally and in multilateral forums. The Soviets have also taken a more polemical posture in our previously businesslike private bilateral exchanges. They have advanced interpretations of the CSCE provisions which often do not accord with the language of the Final Act or its negotiating history. The views they have expressed on the legal nature of the Final Act, on several principles, such as inviolability of frontiers and non-intervention in internal affairs, and on a variety of issues relating to Basket III, all demonstrate this tendency to reinterpret and to distort the significance of the Final Act. When it serves their purpose the Soviets have suggested that the principle of reciprocity, which is mentioned in the Final Act only in relation to a few specified points, extends to all of Basket III. More specifically, they have alleged that the provisions of Basket III impose restraints on the activities of journalists and radio broadcasting stations. For example, the Soviet Foreign Ministry Press Chief said in an interview that "the decisions of the Helsinki Conference . . . call upon journalists to promote through their profession and skill the creation of a genuine atmosphere of respect and trust among peoples," which is in contradiction to the Final Act commitment that governments should "facilitate the freer and wider dissemination of information of all kinds." In their complaints about our refusal of visas to Soviet trade union leaders the Soviets have claimed that we are violating Final Act provisions, although there are no specific references

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to trade union exchanges in the Final Act. In fact we carefully eliminated such references during the CSCE negotiations so as to avoid any basis for the charges the Soviets are now making.

The Soviets have played up examples of their own implementation, even when these do not derive directly from the CSCE. They have stressed Brezhnev's grandiose proposal for conferences on transportation, energy and the environment, their announcement of two major military maneuvers and invitations to observers, and the procedural changes on journalists' visas and on emigration applications, which were covered in previous reports. They have also stressed the large amount of Western cultural material used in the USSR and Eastern Europe, in comparison with Soviet and East European material used in the West. At the same time, the Soviets have accused the West of neglecting implementation in these areas, largely on the grounds that there should be strict reciprocity in exchanges of cultural material between states. They have also claimed that the Final Act was not widely circulated in the West and have focused on specific incidents in which they allege the CSCE has been ignored, such as our visa policies and alleged interference in the Italian political campaign. These themes have increasingly been incorporated into Soviet responses to our demarches to them on CSCE implementation. The most recent Soviet response was couched in a significantly sharper and more accusatory tone.

In fact, the US implementation record is generally excellent. Among several recent US implementation activities were meetings between government and publishing industry representatives to discuss implementation of CSCE provisions relating to books. We believe that our emphasis on patient and persistent efforts toward meaningful implementation remains the most valid approach to the Conference and its results. However, the application of US laws concerning visas and the possibility that our consular fees may be raised could make us vulnerable to criticism for failure to carry out the CSCE provisions faithfully,

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and thus give the Soviets a pretext for non-compliance and render it difficult for us to press for maximum implementation. We are also forced to forego opportunities for broadening cultural exchanges because of the reduced availability of funds from private and government sources.

The US and other Western countries have maintained their insistence on the need for meaningful implementation of the Final Act, and implementation remains the central theme of the Western approach to the post-Helsinki period. We understood from the outset that the CSCE would not lead to a fundamental transformation of the internal structure of communist governments, and that patient efforts would be required to bring about implementation of the commitments contained in the document signed in Helsinki. This has been the rationale underlying our bilateral approaches to the Soviet Union and other East European countries where we have sought to use the CSCE provisions in support of our broad foreign policy goals.

In addition to our bilateral approaches, we have worked in multilateral forums such as the ECE to focus on certain specific areas where early implementation is possible. In all our activities we have stressed that the degree to which the CSCE has been implemented will be a key factor in the development of our approach to the Belgrade follow-up meetings at which a review of implementation will take place. In pursuing our efforts, we have continued a pattern of close consultation with our Allies in order to maintain the essential Western unity which made a successful CSCE possible.

With one year remaining before the Belgrade meetings, CSCE countries have begun to look ahead and to prepare for them. Consultations among CSCE participants have already begun, initially among the neutral states which have the deepest interest in a continuing follow-up mechanism of some kind. The follow-up meetings offer useful leverage in our efforts to encourage implementation. Since the CSCE was originally a Soviet proposal, the Soviets retain an overall interest in making the Final Act

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of the Conference a document of historical significance. They are well aware that the Final Act is viewed with great skepticism in the West and that Western acceptance of the value of the CSCE depends on the performance of the USSR and its allies in the area of freer movement of people and ideas. We have been using these factors to encourage Soviet compliance.

A joint Legislative-Executive Commission to monitor the results of the CSCE has been established as the result of a Congressional initiative. This Commission, the legislation for which you signed into law on June 3, has the responsibility not only for monitoring implementation actions, but also for encouraging programs and activities to implement the Final Act.

Deep skepticism remains regarding Soviet intentions to carry through on their commitments in any significant way. We continue to press the Soviets and the Eastern European states for meaningful implementation of the Final Act as the key to developing positive US attitudes toward the CSCE and a more favorable climate for US-Soviet relations.



Charles W. Robinson
Chairman

Attachment:

CSCE report

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SOVIET UNION - EASTERN EUROPE

This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington community by the USSR - Eastern Europe Division, Office of Current Intelligence, with occasional contributions from other offices within the Directorate of Intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome. They should be directed to the authors of the individual articles.

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Background on Gromyko's Call
for Talks on the Indian Ocean

Foreign Minister Gromyko's statement at the UN on Tuesday that Moscow is prepared to talk to "other powers" about reducing outside military activity in the Indian Ocean is probably more a tactic to put the US on the defensive rather than an expression of a genuine Soviet goal. The advantages that would accrue to the USSR from an Indian Ocean arms control agreement are considerable, and if they are serious about pursuing them, we expect that they will approach the US bilaterally.

Gromyko's offer comes on the heels of other signs of Soviet concern about Washington's success over the last year in mobilizing sentiment of the coastal countries against Soviet naval activity in the Indian Ocean and in persuading these countries to grant the US military additional access to monitor Soviet activity. The Soviets are especially concerned about the change in policy of the governments of Australia and New Zealand, which allow port calls by US nuclear-powered ships. They also fear that the US will replace the British when they withdraw from Gan in the Maldives and from Masirah in Oman.

Despite General Secretary Brezhnev's denial at the party congress last February and again during Prime Minister Gandhi's visit to the USSR in June that the USSR had any bases in the Indian Ocean, most of the countries in the area accept the fact that Moscow has a base in Somalia. The Soviets probably calculate that by coming out publicly in favor of talks on the Indian Ocean they will put the onus on the US for being insensitive to the concerns of countries on its periphery. They may also hope to strengthen congressional opposition to any further expansion of US naval activity in the Indian Ocean.

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Moscow's enthusiasm for the idea of arms control in the Indian Ocean seems to have waned considerably since the Soviets first approached the US about the idea of issuing a joint declaration "limiting military bases and fleet concentrations in the Indian Ocean" in March 1971.

For one thing, acceptance of special restrictions for the Indian Ocean would be a dangerous precedent that could erode Soviet positions at the Law of the Sea conference and on freedom of the seas.

For another, the Soviet navy probably does not relish the idea of restrictions on its activities and especially would not want to engage in talks on the Indian Ocean while the USSR is in an inferior bargaining position. The navy would probably also object to the idea of talking only with the US as long as significant French naval forces are located in the Indian Ocean. (~~CONFIDENTIAL~~)

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Kirilenko's 70th Birthday

Soviet party secretary Andrey Kirilenko's 70th birthday last month was saluted with appropriate honors, including the publication of his collected speeches and articles. In garnering his second "Hero of Socialist Labor" award and official praise for his speeches, Kirilenko has caught up with the other senior leaders--General Secretary Brezhnev, President Podgorny, Premier Kosygin, and party secretary Suslov. All except Brezhnev have already celebrated their 70th birthdays. Brezhnev, whose honors came early, will be 70 in December.

A review of Kirilenko's collected works in *Pravda* on September 29 is not yet available here, but the embassy reports that while it reserved direct personal praise only for Brezhnev, Kirilenko is depicted as a wise, experienced leader in defense, internal party affairs, economics, and foreign policy. Earlier reviews of the collected works of other leaders were also laudatory, and Kirilenko has apparently received his due.

As Brezhnev's unofficial deputy, Kirilenko still seems the most likely interim successor in the event of the General Secretary's sudden death or incapacitation, and these almost obligatory honors do serve to draw attention to his favorable position in the hierarchy.

With his second "Hero" award, he joined a select group entitled to have a bust erected in his hometown. Brezhnev's was unveiled with some fanfare in May, Podgorny's with less publicity last month. Kosygin's and Suslov's have not yet appeared. (~~CONFIDENTIAL~~)

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Bucharest PCC Meeting Now
Deferred Until November

A Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee session will now apparently take place in Bucharest in November or December. Earlier reports had suggested it would be held in late October (*Staff Notes*, September 23).

A high-ranking Romanian official in Bucharest recently told the US ambassador that the PCC would meet in November "in any case," although the dates were not yet firm. The Soviet political counselor in Bucharest has confirmed the November date, but added that the gathering might come as late as December. He hinted that Brezhnev is likely to tie an official visit to Romania on either end of the session. Both sides have reportedly agreed to increase exchange visits of high officials, and a trip by the Soviet leader has been rumored for several months.

The main topic, according to the Romanian, will be a review of strategy before the Belgrade CSCE follow-on meeting in 1977. The group reportedly will also consider earlier Romanian proposals for establishing "periodic consultative mechanics" at the foreign ministers level. The Romanian official stressed that both topics fit in with Bucharest's desire to emphasize the Warsaw Pact's political rather than military aspects. He added that he doubted that the group will discuss basic changes in the Pact's military structure.

Romania's proposals to establish "periodic consultative mechanics" may be an attempt to sidestep a reported Soviet proposal for a permanent coordinating secretariat--presumably with a strong Soviet secretary-general. Bucharest is not averse to periodic discussions of foreign policy, but has persistently resisted the formation of supranational bodies that might seek to dictate Romania's foreign policy.

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The Romanians have complained about Soviet attempts to play down the significance of the Belgrade meeting, and will probably welcome the chance to discuss European security topics. Bucharest and Moscow interpret the Helsinki accords differently, but will probably be more willing than in the past to find common ground in hopes of preserving the surface calm that now prevails in bilateral relations. ~~(CON-
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USSR-Hungary

The Hungarians are pleased with Moscow's choice of Boris Sevykin to head the Hungarian section of the Soviet party Central Committee, according to a clandestine source. They believe that Sevykin, who has served more than four years in Budapest, is more favorably disposed toward Hungary than was his predecessor, Leonid Mosin.

Mosin's removal in early August may have been prompted by the publication in *Pravda* August 7 of an article unusually critical of Hungary's controversial economic reform. The article, which was undoubtedly approved by Mosin's section, expressed satisfaction with the current situation in Hungary, but criticized earlier "erroneous views" and "incorrect measures" that had "reduced the party's leading role" in the Hungarian economy.

While the Soviets have in the past been uneasy about Hungary's economic experimentations, they had heretofore refrained from direct criticism in the press. Budapest probably regarded this action as a breach of inter-party protocol--especially because it came long after Hungary had taken steps to reassert the party's pre-eminence in the economy.

The source claims that Kadar engineered Mosin's removal during his meeting with Brezhnev in the Crimea, but Mosin had, in fact, been transferred to a less prestigious job outside the apparatus at least two weeks earlier.

The Hungarians' anticipation that Sevykin will be more tolerant than his predecessor could be misplaced. We have one report that the Soviet embassy in Budapest has taken a more skeptical view of Hungarian developments than has Moscow. Sevykin was the number-two man in the embassy and presumably had a hand in shaping that opinion. ~~(SECRET)~~

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The Soviets and the West German Elections

Soviet relations with West Germany are central to Moscow's policy toward Europe and its policy of detente. The Federal Republic's size, wealth, and position in Europe make the matter of who runs the country a vital Soviet concern. As the West German election campaign goes into its final days, the Soviet Union has gone out of its way to demonstrate that it favors a victory for the ruling Social Democrat - Free Democrat (SPD/FDP) coalition.

The most dramatic Soviet gesture in support of the Schmidt government was the announcement on September 19 that Soviet party chief Brezhnev would visit the West German capital, probably late this year. The invitation to Brezhnev had been extended and accepted in October 1974 during Chancellor Schmidt's visit to Moscow, but during the following two years, Soviet relations with the West German government fluctuated and the visit was repeatedly postponed.

Soviet concern that the progress made in their relations with West Germany in the early 1970s might be undermined was evident in the period following the European security conference last year. Among the targets of Soviet comment was Minister of Defense Leber, a conservative Social Democrat, who has advocated building up the West German military in the face of growing Soviet strength and has disparaged the force reduction proposals advanced by the Soviets at the Vienna MBFR talks. The Soviets were also disturbed by the increasingly critical attitude of Foreign Minister Genscher, the leader of the Free Democrats, who has insisted that the bilateral legal assistance, cultural exchange, and scientific-technological cooperation agreements under negotiation apply to West Berlin as well. As preparations for the West German election campaign quickened last spring, Ambassador Falin openly admitted that he could barely tolerate the foreign minister and implied that one advantage of a victory

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by the Christian (CDU/CSU) parties in the October elections would be the selection of a new man for that position.

The May Note

In a statement handed simultaneously to Schmidt and the world press on May 22, the Soviets said that "certain quarters" who question West Germany's Ostpolitik cannot be strictly categorized by their political labels. In other words, the Soviets recognized that there were "reasonable" politicians in the Christian parties and that they could work with a "reasonable" CDU/CSU government. The statement called those who raised the specter of overwhelming Soviet military strength agents of the West German armaments industry and promoters of larger West German military budgets. The choice for West Germany, the statement concluded, was either peace or war.

In milder terms, the Soviet note reiterated Moscow's desire for disarmament, peaceful coexistence, and closer bilateral cooperation with West Germany. Even though the Soviets implied that they could work with a CDU/CSU government, they explicitly approved the efforts by the ruling coalition to improve relations. In the Soviet view this would have been "simply unthinkable" before 1969 when Christian Democrat-led governments "were unable or, perhaps, not all willing" to pursue constructive cooperation with the USSR. If irresponsible circles would stop trying to frustrate detente, Moscow promised in the note that it would be ready to move on to regular political consultations, probably on the French model; additional treaties expanding bilateral cooperation--implying progress in the three negotiations stalled on the Berlin clause; and increased exchanges and trade.

The Campaign

Having made its position public, Moscow lay back. The West German parties were concentrating on domestic issues, and the Soviets realized that

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no good purpose would be served if by their actions or statements they called attention to the ruling coalition's somewhat tarnished Ostpolitik. But Moscow was not quiescent. It stepped up the number of approvals for exit visas for ethnic German Soviet citizens, promoted trade fairs in West Germany and West Berlin, and let pass minor incidents on the transit routes to Berlin. The steps were designed to be helpful to the ruling coalition, as well as to demonstrate to the West German voter the practical benefits of good relations with the USSR.

As the campaign heated up, the Christian parties shifted the emphasis to foreign policy and accused the Schmidt government of having given much away for little in return. They promised to reassert German interests in a forthright way if elected in October. The opposition's accusations were given particular point by a number of incidents on the West German border with East Germany and East German interference with buses loaded with young Christian Democrats en route to West Berlin to demonstrate against the Berlin Wall. At the same time, the Soviets contributed to the upsurge of negative publicity on relations with the East by issuing a sharp protest against plans to allow West Berlin to participate in the new European parliament that would serve the European Community.

Even so, Soviet support for East German sovereignty on its borders and on the transit routes was fairly low key. The Soviet statement on the European parliament was a careful defense of existing Soviet legal positions rather than the opening salvo of a larger campaign directed against West Berlin and West Germany. Moscow's caution on the neuralgic Berlin question was also evident in the delay of six days before any commentary was issued in support of the East German interference with travel to West Berlin, the less than authoritative medium in which it appeared, and the brief time allotted for further commentary on this subject.

After additional meetings in West Berlin at which CDU/CSU officials and politicians challenged

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the Soviet view of West Berlin's ties with West Germany, the Soviets felt compelled to respond. They issued a series of attacks on the CDU/CSU, in particular against CSU leader Strauss and CDU Hesse leader Dregger, whom they called relentless advocates of an anti-communist, anti-Soviet, cold war line. Conversely, commentary hostile to Genscher ended. Instead he was elevated to the status of statesman alongside Schmidt for advocating continued adherence to Ostpolitik.

Soviet Ambassador Falin held a highly publicized meeting with Genscher on August 26. Although Falin gave Genscher no sign of Soviet concessions on the three stalled treaties, backed East Germany's actions during the summer months, and reiterated standard Soviet positions on Berlin, he sought to keep the atmosphere of the meeting calm. He urged the promotion of a "reasonable atmosphere" around West Berlin, and if Genscher worked for this, he said, the Soviet Union would be his "best friend." Following the meeting it was announced that the West German and Soviet foreign ministers would confer in New York in late September. Both sides conveyed the impression that new developments in bilateral relations would be discussed.

For the Soviets, the West German elections were not simply a choice between the forces of darkness and those of light. Even while they were speaking and acting in ways helpful to the ruling coalition, the Soviets continued to criticize the government and keep open lines of communication to the opposition. After all, the Soviets, too, could read poll results. Human nature may also have played a part. Within days after his fence-mending talks with Genscher, Ambassador Falin was once again defaming the foreign minister, for whom he seems to have a genuine dislike. Of more significance, Falin held a cordial meeting with a prominent Christian Democrat politician to register Soviet uncertainty about the current views of the ruling coalition and to reiterate Soviet willingness to conduct a "constructive" policy with a CDU/CSU government.

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The resulting uproar from the Social Democrats forced Falin to apologize and to convey an optimistic picture of Soviet - West German relations in an interview appearing in a Bonn newspaper. Falin said that the Genscher-Gromyko meeting in New York would produce a new exchange of ideas, and that he foresaw no difficulties in reaching agreement on the three stalled treaties as long as the solutions were "based on the Quadripartite Agreement." Differences over Berlin, he said, should not be exaggerated, and the ties between West Berlin and West Germany could, in fact, be developed, so long as the ground rules were followed. As additional balm to the aggrieved Social Democrats, Falin indirectly criticized those CDU/CSU politicians who persist in the "hardly constructive" tactic of reopening questions that have been solved and insisting on solving insoluble problems in relations with the East.

The Soviet media supported Falin's gestures with a series of successively sharper attacks on the CDU/CSU, with party leader Kohl a specific target in the barrage. One particularly sharp commentary referred repeatedly to the "wild" attacks, full of hatred, on the East made by "Strauss and his satellite Kohl" and predicted the Christian parties would be defeated in the elections. Other commentaries, citing Western press reports that linked Strauss with payoffs from Lockheed, flatly charged the CSU leader with corruption.

After the Elections

Having made their position clear, the Soviets have reduced their coverage of the elections to bland reportage focusing on the benign effect of the impending Brezhnev visit and tendentious extracts from statements by leading West German politicians and from the West German press. The announcement of the Brezhnev visit listed Schmidt as the host, conveying the impression that further progress could be made in bilateral relations after the elections. The Soviets probably feel that this exercise in atmospherics can do Schmidt no harm,

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and if, as they think, he pulls off a narrow victory, they no doubt believe they will be in a good position to guide the course of bilateral relations along more productive lines.

If, contrary to Soviet expectations, the opposition parties win the day, the initial Soviet reaction would be to back off until cabinet posts are filled and a government program emerges. The Soviets would undoubtedly exploit those contacts in the CDU/CSU they have cultivated over the years. They could also use the planned Brezhnev visit as a means to explore the new government's attitudes toward the East. If the situation seemed unpromising, the visit could always be postponed. Even though CSU leader Strauss, who is a likely candidate for the Minister of Finance post, is particularly disliked in Moscow, the Soviets would probably cut off their anti-Strauss propaganda while they see how he behaves in office. Similarly, should an incident involving West Berlin or East Germany take place, the Soviets would react very cautiously, with a sharp eye on the CDU/CSU response. The cardinal rule in Moscow's foreign policy is readiness to deal with whoever is in power, regardless of past feuds, if there is even a shred of hope of gaining some advantage. Soviet-German relations have frequently seen this principle in practice in the past, and there is no sign Moscow will deviate from it after the election returns are in. ~~(SECRET)~~

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DANTE B. FASCELL
CHAIRMAN

COMMISSION ON
SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

October 6, 1976

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The Honorable Gerald R. Ford
The President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

Thank you for your letter of October 2 and your affirmation of the "deep commitment of the Executive Branch to full cooperation with the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)."

I am also pleased that you are ready to appoint the Commissioners from the Departments of State, Commerce and Defense, whose presence on the Commission will formalize and expedite that cooperation. It has always been my feeling -- and my understanding with Secretary Kissinger -- that the Executive Branch Commissioners should participate in the work of the CSCE in accordance with whatever instructions you set to govern their conduct and role. Understanding the policy problems raised by the joint nature of the Commission's membership, I am in general accord with your decision to have the Executive Branch Commissioners act in an observer's role in assisting the Commission's deliberations, investigations and recommendations.

The Commission also intends to continue the practice it has already begun of requesting information and documents from the Executive Branch through the relevant agency or department heads, rather than through those "interim representatives" of the State, Defense and Commerce Departments who have taken part in the Commission's work until now. I am hopeful that use of these channels will provide the necessary information and documentation to the Commission in a prompt manner in order that the staff may expeditiously carry out its tasks.

As you know, Representative Millicent Fenwick of New Jersey was the chief sponsor of the legislation which established the Commission. In testimony before the Subcommittee on International Political and Military Affairs, which I chair, she pointed out how valuable it will be to have one government agency where information on the aftermath of the Helsinki meeting, compiled by the Executive

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
The President
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and Legislative Branches here and abroad, could be pooled and assessed. "I look upon this joint legislative-executive endeavor to produce not only a meaningful and accurate record of European compliance or non-compliance," she said, "but also as an example of intergovernmental cooperation in a most important human field."

I share her sentiments fully, and I intend to do all I can to assure that the Commission conducts itself in a responsible manner, sensitive both to the problems of Executive-Legislative coordination in the area of foreign policy and to the importance of that coordination in fulfilling the role the law has set for the Commission. I see no constitutional problem in the Commission's composition or assignment. I do see a great opportunity, given the will to cooperate on both sides, for the Commission to assist both branches in carrying out a common objective: the fulfillment of an international accord of great significance for the improvement of East-West relations.

As you yourself said before signing the Final Act, "History will judge this Conference not by what we say here today, but by what we do tomorrow -- not by the promises we make but by the promises we keep." I welcome your commitment to the Commission's inquiry into those promises and the subsequent record of performance.

Sincerely,


DANTE B. FASCELL
Chairman
Commission on Security and
Cooperation in Europe

DBF/mdl



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

October 8, 1976

UNCLASSIFIEDMEMORANDUM FOR MR. BRENT SCOWCROFT
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: CSCE Commission

On October 7 the White House announced the appointment of three Executive Branch Member-Observers to the CSCE Commission: Mansfield Sprague of the Department of Commerce, Monroe Leigh of the Department of State, and Harry E. Bergold of the Department of Defense. This action was taken after we had reached general agreement with Dante Fascell on the ground rules under which the Executive Branch Member-Observers would participate in the work of the Commission. We believe it would be appropriate for the President to communicate the appointments to Chairman Fascell in writing.

Unfortunately, in the letter in which he communicated his agreement to the arrangements for Executive Branch participation, Chairman Fascell also characterized the role of the Commission in a manner which is unacceptable. As Chairman Fascell apparently sees the work of the Commission, it would be the Commission rather than the Department of State which could assume primary responsibility for assuring that commitments under the Helsinki Final Act are complied with, and the Commission would become the principal repository of information on such compliance. This approach, we believe, is inconsistent with the President's exclusive responsibility under the Constitution for the conduct of foreign affairs. Moreover, we believe it important at this initial stage to indicate explicitly to the Commission that we are not prepared to accept a Commission role which usurps this authority. For this reason we believe that when


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the President communicates to Fascell the names of the Executive Branch appointments, he should also set the record straight insofar as Commission activities are concerned.

fr 
C. Arthur Borg
Executive Secretary

Attachment:

Draft Presidential letter.

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DRAFT PRESIDENTIAL LETTER

Dear Mr. Chairman:

In my letter to you of October 2, 1976, concerning the Executive Branch Member-Observers of the CSCE Commission, I stated that once it was indicated that the arrangements specified in the letter were acceptable to you I would be advising you of the names of the persons I intended to appoint. As you have indicated in your letter of October 6 that you are in general accord with these arrangements, I am pleased to indicate to you that I have appointed the following persons as Executive Branch Member-Observers:

The Honorable Mansfield Sprague
Counsellor to the Secretary for Congressional
Affairs, Department of Commerce

The Honorable Monroe Leigh
Legal Adviser of the Department of State

Mr. Harry E. Bergold, Jr.
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense (Legislative Affairs)

I believe that you are personally acquainted with all three of these persons and that you will agree with me that they are admirably qualified to serve in these important positions. I have directed them to be prepared to undertake their responsibilities immediately.

The Honorable
Dante Fascell,
Chairman,
CSCE Commission,
House of Representatives.

OCTOBER 1976

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With respect to your letter of October 6, I regret that I cannot concur fully in your characterization of the role of the CSCE Commission. That characterization, if implemented, carries the implication that the CSCE Commission, rather than the State Department, would have primary responsibility within the United States Government for assuring compliance with the Helsinki accords. We do not believe that such a role for the Commission is consistent with the President's exclusive authority under the Constitution for the conduct of relations with foreign governments. I believe that great care must be taken to assure that the primary authority and responsibility of the President under the Constitution with regard to direct and formal contacts with foreign governments are not confused or misrepresented.

Sincerely yours,

Gerald R. Ford

Report Edouard Brunner on importance of the CSCE follow-up for Eastern European countries transformation, (undated) 1976

Entretien avec un diplomate (X.) d'un pays „orthodoxe“ du Pacte de Varsovie qui est détaché pour quelques semaines à New York pour suivre les travaux de la 31ème Assemblée générale et qui fut mon collègue à Genève au cours de la deuxième phase de la CSCE

Document reprinted in:

Edouard Brunner, *Lambris dorés et coulisses: Souvenirs d'un diplomate* (Paris: Edition Georg, 2001), pp. 177-180 (Annexe).

Summary:

This 4 page document is a report by the Swiss diplomat Edouard Brunner, a member and later head of the Swiss CSCE delegations to Helsinki, Geneva, Belgrade and Madrid, who was assigned to the Swiss observatory mission to UN in New York in the year 1976 to follow the XXXI. UN General Assembly of 1976. On that occasion he met with an unidentified diplomat (X.) coming from an "orthodox" Warsaw pact member state, which he knew from the CSCE negotiations in Geneva. In their encounter X. stressed the importance of the continuation of the CSCE-process since the Geneva talks not only had spurred (visible) discussions between the Western and the Eastern camps, but because it had also provoked a confrontation (though invisible for the West) of the more liberal elements with the dogmatic hardliners in each Warsaw pact state over the subject of human rights. X. gives full credit to the neutral and non-aligned states for their dedication to the idea of a follow-up in the Geneva talks. The CSCE according to X. is the only international forum that would be able to keep up a certain level of pressure on the socialist states, which was so important for the more liberal elements to sustain their efforts for human rights in their own societies. Other than pressure of the sort of the Jackson-Vanik amendment in the United States the CSCE provided a legitimate and helpful basis for implementation of these ambitions within the Warsaw pact states. Therefore, X. concluded, it was crucial that the follow-up of the CSCE was secured beyond the Belgrade meeting and the pressure the Helsinki process exerted with regard to human rights questions continued.

Source: Entretien avec un diplomate (X.) d'un pays "orthodoxe" du Pacte de Varsovie qui est détaché pour quelques semaines à New York pour suivre les travaux de la 31ème Assemblée générale et qui fut mon collègue à Genève au cours de la deuxième phase de la CSCE.

De par la nature des propos échangés, je voudrais conserver à cet entretien un caractère confidentiel.

Au cours de l'entretien nous avons eu l'occasion d'évoquer certains aspects de la CSCE, les nombreux points d'accrochage entre pays occidentaux et d'Europe de l'Est, notamment sur les problèmes de la 3ème corbeille. A cette occasion, X. me fait les réflexions suivantes:

a) La deuxième phase de la CSCE a provoqué deux grands débats, l'un visible à Genève entre Occidentaux et "orientaux", l'autre invisible à l'intérieur de chacun des pays du Pacte de Varsovie où les tenants d'une ligne plus libérale se sont affrontés à ceux d'une ligne plus dogmatique avec comme thème la 3ème corbeille de la CSCE. X. me dit qu'à son avis, grâce au débat de Genève, le débat interne dans chacun des pays du Pacte de Varsovie a été provoqué, entretenu et mené à son terme. Le débat de Genève a été en quelque sorte l'étincelle du débat intérieur; à son avis toutefois et tout bien considéré, le débat interne a été plus important que le débat de Genève car il a permis à certains éléments plus libéraux à l'intérieur de ces différents pays de marquer quelques points qui se sont extériorisés par l'acceptation par l'URSS et les autres pays socialistes de certains passages de l'Acte final qui, au départ, étaient considérés inacceptables par eux.

b) Les suites de la CSCE sont pour les tenants de cette ligne libérale extrêmement importantes et beaucoup d'entre nous ont eu peur, dit X., qu'en raison des efforts français et belges à Genève les suites de la CSCE soient réduites à néant. Si nous les avons aujourd'hui quand même nous les devons en grande partie aux pays neutres et non-alignés d'Europe qui ont été les seuls à voir avec lucidité l'importance de maintenir et de développer ce forum multilatéral unique en son genre entre pays à systèmes politiques et économiques différents.

c) Ces suites sont utiles car ce forum est le seul qui maintient sur les pays socialistes d'Europe une certaine pression dans les domaines des droits de l'homme ce qui pour les tenants d'une ligne plus libérale dans les pays socialistes est extrêmement important. C'est là un appui qui leur est indispensable pour exercer à leur tour une certaine pression sur les nombreux éléments du parti qui pour des raisons diverses sont partisans de l'immobilisme.

d) Cette pression-là ce n'est qu'à la CSCE que l'on peut la trouver, à l'ONU en tout cas pas, au contraire, dit X., la pression à l'ONU s'exerce souvent en sens inverse et cela parce que la grande majorité des pays du Tiers-monde ont sur les problèmes des droits de l'homme et des libertés fondamentales à peu près les mêmes vues que les dirigeants les plus dogmatiques des pays socialistes. Il cite comme exemple le fait que l'année passée les pays socialistes n'ont pas eu besoin

de faire le moindre effort pour étouffer dans l'oeuf la tentative américaine de présenter une résolution dans le domaine des prisonniers politiques, les pays du Tiers-monde s'en sont chargés. Cette année, une proposition suédoise allant dans le même sens et la proposition allemande dans le domaine des otages connaissent des difficultés analogues provenant des mêmes pays. Dès lors, X. considère que les travaux des Nations Unies surtout ceux de la Troisième Commission constituent un frein à la libéralisation des pays de l'Europe de l'est d'où l'importance encore plus grande pour lui des suites de la CSCE.

e) Un autre avantage des suites de la Conférence de sécurité, X. le voit dans ce qu'il appelle l'élément de la mesure. En effet, dit-il, le genre de pression qu'exerce la CSCE et qui est contenue dans le texte de Helsinki est une pression mesurée, raisonnable, défendable, car, dit-il, la pire des pressions qui peut être exercée sur nos pays est celle du type de l'amendement Jackson qui en réalité atteint les objectifs opposés à ceux qu'elle poursuit. Au contraire, le type de pression de l'Acte final est d'une nature différente d'abord parce qu'il s'agit d'un document signé par les plus hautes autorités dans chacun de nos pays ce qui fait que l'on peut légitimement se référer à ce texte; sa valeur, dit-il, est de la même nature que l'Acte qui a mis fin aux travaux des partis communistes européens à Berlin, encore que, dit-il, le texte de Helsinki soit moins ambigu que celui de Berlin.

f) X. dit que jamais nous ne devinerons en Occident la somme de travail qu'a nécessité la mise en oeuvre de l'Acte final dans la plupart des pays du Pacte de Varsovie pour modifier, pour harmoniser les lois et les règlements internes avec les décisions prises d'un commun accord dans la capitale finlandaise alorsque, dit-il, du côté occidental, il est sûr que dans aucun de nos pays nous avons eu besoin de réviser la moindre de nos lois et de rajeunir un seul de nos règlements internes. Du côté oriental, cela a dû se faire dans de nombreux cas sans compter les décisions ad hoc qui ont dû être prises pour trouver des solutions sui generis dans certains cas non prévus. Cette pression dit X., doit continuer après Belgrade car il est important et même essentiel pour la sécurité et la paix en Europe que la catégorie de personnes dont les vues sont ouvertes et raisonnables soient encouragées dans les pays socialistes. De surcroît, dit X., une amélioration des relations économiques, de la condition de vie dans nos pays, l'apport technologique de l'Occident sont aussi des éléments importants qui vont dans la même direction.



C.F.

FB 113

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

December 3, 1976

Dear Mr. Chairman: *Dante B. Fassell*

I am transmitting today the first semi-annual report to the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe established by Public Law 94-304.

When I signed the Final Act at Helsinki on August 1, 1975, I stated that:

Our peoples will be watching and measuring our progress. They will ask how these noble sentiments are being translated into actions that bring about a more secure and just order in the daily lives of each of our nations and its citizens.

Since that time our policy toward the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) has continued to be that the test of the Conference will be the extent to which its provisions are actually implemented. This concept, advanced by all the Western leaders present at Helsinki, has made of the CSCE a key yardstick for measuring the significance of the development of East-West relations.

The creation of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, and its work, is part of this measuring process. It reflects how seriously the United States takes the Final Act and how conscientiously we expect all the signatory States to approach the task of implementing its provisions. It is not our purpose to interfere in the domestic affairs of others. We do expect, however, that all those with whom we pledged our word at Helsinki will work with us closely to give life and meaning not only to the noble goals but to the specific practical undertakings in the Final Act.

The CSCE has a long history of diplomatic preparation and hard negotiation against the background of wider diplomatic efforts. It is part of a broader diplomatic process, both bilateral and multilateral. The West, for instance, stipulated that progress in this larger area was necessary before

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Semi-Annual Report

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the Conference could even be convened. As a result of these diplomatic efforts the Soviet Union and its Allies acknowledged, after a quarter-century, that the United States and Canada do play an indispensable role in security and cooperation in Europe. The four powers with responsibilities for Berlin and Germany as a whole concluded the Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin, and the East agreed to begin negotiations on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions in Central Europe (MBFR).

During the CSCE negotiations we worked closely, cooperatively and harmoniously with our Allies. We attached the greatest importance to ensuring that the interests of our friends in Western Europe were supported and reflected in the results of this Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. We worked throughout the Conference in the closest consultation with members of the North Atlantic Alliance and the European Community. Maintenance of this Allied unity has been a major element of our policy since Helsinki and will continue to be a key part of our approach to the Belgrade follow-up meeting. Largely as a result of this unity, the West succeeded during the negotiations in obtaining significant commitments from the Soviet Union and the States of Eastern Europe on human rights and related matters, including especially the freer flow of people and ideas. Through the CSCE the West succeeded in establishing human rights and fundamental freedoms as a basic subject for legitimate East-West discourse. With these commitments in hand, Western leaders signed the Final Act at the Summit sixteen months ago, almost three years after the initiation of preparatory talks and more than two decades after the idea of a conference was first broached.

Since Helsinki our policy has been based on the need for implementation of the provisions of the Final Act; we have stressed this approach in all our contacts on CSCE. We have made a series of demarches to the Soviet Union to convey to the Soviet government the importance which the United States government and the American people attach to implementation of the commitments contained in the Final Act, and have sought to encourage positive implementation. We have also raised specific CSCE commitments with each of the Eastern European governments and have urged that those states fulfill their Helsinki undertakings. Our Allies and many neutral European states have also urged Soviet and Eastern European implementation of specific Final Act provisions, using high-level visits and contacts to press for progress on CSCE-related bilateral problems.

Since Helsinki, the United States has also carefully monitored implementation activity by all CSCE participant states, and has developed a continuing process of exchange and collation of information with our Allies. We have maintained contact and compared notes with other Western countries in order to have the broadest possible picture of how the provisions of the Final Act are being carried out.

We and our Allies are now preparing for the 1977 Belgrade follow-up meeting that is called for in the Final Act. The Belgrade meeting is, of course, closely related to the broader effort to improve East-West relations, of which CSCE is a part. The course of the Belgrade meeting and the future of the CSCE concept, however, will be determined primarily by the degree to which the participating States carry out the provisions of the Final Act.

The Final Act is not a legal document but rather an expression of political will. Nonetheless, we do not accept the argument of some Eastern states that implementation can only occur if there are supplementary legal undertakings. Nor can we accept that behavior contrary to the Act's undertakings is acceptable, even in the absence of such legal undertakings.

The Final Act has not transformed the behavior of signatory nations overnight, but it has committed the national leaders who signed it to standards of behavior which are compatible with Western thoughts about the relationship of people to their governments. With its profoundly Western orientation, the Final Act reflects the great importance that the West attaches to human rights and the self determination of peoples. As stated in greater detail in the accompanying report, the United States rejected in the negotiations and rejects in principle the concept of hegemony. Rather than freezing the political face of Europe the Final Act expresses the determination that Europe should again become a continent of nations free to choose their own course, both domestically and internationally.

The Helsinki document provides an agenda and a detailed framework -- accepted at the highest political level by both East and West as well as by the neutral States of Europe -- for addressing the problems which led to the division of Europe. In other words, we and our Allies have, with CSCE, added a dynamic new dimension to our efforts to reduce the barriers between East and West, a dimension which is based on peaceful contacts between both governments and peoples in Europe and North America.

We are generally satisfied with the initial steps taken to implement the military security or confidence-building measures contained in the Final Act. The East has provided advance notification of several maneuvers, and has invited observers, although on a somewhat more limited basis than the Western and neutral States.

There has been some limited improvement in cooperation in the fields of economics, science, technology and the environment in the last sixteen months, a development which builds upon a process begun before the conclusion of CSCE. Nonetheless, this section of the Final Act affords scope for greater progress.

In the vitally important humanitarian and related fields, progress has been both limited and uneven. Predictably the most difficult areas have involved human contacts and the freer flow of information, concepts in the practical implementation of which the Soviet Union and its Eastern European Allies continue to have ideas very different from the West. There have been some positive developments in the fields of culture and education, which again build upon experiences which predate the Helsinki Summit. It is evident, however, that so far the Soviet and East European record on human rights issues remains inadequate when measured against the important undertakings of the Helsinki Final Act. The success of the Belgrade meeting will depend primarily on constructive Eastern efforts in the period ahead.


As I pointed out in Helsinki, the signing of the Final Act began a process directed toward more normal relations between States and people in Europe. The start has been slow, but a start nevertheless has been made and we are determined to continue our efforts. The Final Act remains a valid set of standards which, if pursued steadily, will contribute toward lowering the barriers between States and people in Europe.

Thus far there has been some limited progress overall, but we are not yet content with what has been accomplished. There is much yet to be done to bring the commitments of Helsinki to life.

The United States intends to continue to work with all the signatories of the Final Act for its full implementation. We will consult widely in preparation for Belgrade and move in concert with like-minded states.

We do not wish to engage in recrimination, but we shall continue to press for real and steady progress both within the context of CSCE and in our broader relationships with the Soviet Union and the States of Eastern Europe. We hope and believe that CSCE will prove a practical and positive step in an historic process. However, as I stated in Helsinki and wish now to re-emphasize, the proof remains in the doing.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Gerald R. Ford". The signature is written in dark ink and is positioned below the word "Sincerely,".

The Honorable Dante B. Fascell
Chairman
Commission on Security and
Cooperation in Europe
House of Representatives
Washington, D. C. 20515

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1976/12/08

MEMORANDUM

Authority NND 009029
By JW NARA Date 4-4

9/17/78
France

SECRET/NODIS/XGDS

THE WHITE HOUSE BY FRANK WISNER
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503
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SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED AT TWO-
YEAR INTERVALS AND DECLASSIFIED ON
DECEMBER 31, _____

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: U.S.: Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor of the
Department of State
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff (Notetaker) *JWR*

France: Louis de Guiringaud, Minister of Foreign
Affairs
Francois de Laboulaye, Director of
Political Affairs

FRG: Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Vice Chancellor
and Minister of Foreign Affairs
Guenther van Well, Assistant Secretary
(Director), Political Department 2,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Dr. Heinz Weber, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs (interpreter)

UK: Anthony Crosland, Secretary of State for
Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs
Reginald Hibbert, Deputy Under Secretary
of State, Foreign and Commonwealth
Office

DATE AND TIME: Wednesday, December 8, 1976
9:07 - 10:02 p.m. (dinner)

PLACE: British Ambassador's Residence
Brussels

SUBJECTS: Impact of CSCE on the GDR; FRG political
situation; Warsaw Pact diplomatic proposals;
Yugoslavia; Spain and Portugal; Italy; CSCE
review conference; future of the Quadri-
partite forum

SECRET

SECRET/NODIS/XGDS

CLASSIFIED BY Henry A. Kissinger
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Crosland: I am told the other Foreign Ministers dislike chit-chat and therefore we should get down to serious business at once, and also that Mr. Sonnenfeldt is in charge of the agenda. Is that agreeable?

Kissinger: It's a fact, whether or not it's agreeable. [Laughter]

Sonnenfeldt: We have first, questions left over on the GDR [from the Berlin discussion earlier]. Second, the Political Directors thought we should discuss the two Warsaw Pact proposals -- freezing of alliance memberships and the nonuse of force. Third, an update on Yugoslavia after the visit of the French President and your visit, Mr. Secretary of State [Crosland]. Fourth, Italy, if you, Mr. Secretary [Kissinger], wish to give an account of your Andreotti discussions. Cyprus is up for grabs. Then Portugal. Then, in the miscellaneous category, Belgrade CSCE preparations. Then, anything else, including the future of this forum among others.

Impact of CSCE on the GDR

Crosland: All right, then, we'll start with your subject, the GDR.

Genscher: I have the impression the CSCE has a particular impact on the GDR. I think this is evident.

Kissinger: Why should it?

Genscher: Because people in the GDR get better information than others because of television from the FRG. Also, because for them the decision to leave their country is probably easier than for people in others. Refusal to let the singer Biermann come back has had a big impact. The fact that they wouldn't let him back, rather than keep him quiet, is in fact rather extraordinary. Stoph is better informed, and has better contacts with the Soviet Union, than Sindermann had. We think everything is being done now to bring things under control now in East Germany. In the last month or two, less shooting has occurred on the border. Until today, when someone set off an automatic firing device.

Your Ambassadors in West Germany have probably reported this article in the SPD paper. There is an article in Vorwaerts that says the GDR should have greater freedom -- which did not have the support of the SPD party. They deny it, and there is no doubt the denial is true.

Hibbert: The denial that it has the support of the SPD leadership.

SECRET/NODIS/XGDS

Kissinger: Which of my colleagues has ever heard of this article? I had not. Louis?

De Guiringaud: No.

Genscher: By denying the article, of course, he's making it better known.
[Laughter]

I see that reporting from the Embassies in Bonn is as slow as that of our Embassies in foreign capitals. [Laughter]

FRG Political Situation

Crosland: Can we carry this on a little, but also get into domestic internal politics in the Federal Republic? What will be the effect of the split between the CDU and the CSU? Particularly since the right wing of the SPD is led by someone even more to the right than Milton Friedman.

Kissinger: What brings up the name of Friedman?

Genscher: The Federal Chancellor has had the name of Friedman on his lips for many weeks. [Laughter]

In the short term, it is a relaxation for the coalition. At least because the regime has a few internal problems, such as relations between legislation and the financial limitations -- provisions which limit the credit the government can take. There is a storm of protest in the country over decisions that have been taken in the last day. Unfortunately, at the same time they announced that pensions would not be increased, they announced that allowances for the Bundestag would be increased. This comes from the fact that Parliamentary allowances will be taxed.

Kissinger: How does this affect the split?

Genscher: Because the CSU and the CDU will now be two different factions and will lose some chairmanships.

Kissinger: I thought they agreed to vote together even though they are separate.

Genscher: No, it won't work in all cases. Strauss wants there to be considerable freedom of action even though they will often vote together. This is a big change in the political landscape. There is no certainty that Kohl can make real his threat to make the CDU active in Bavaria.

SECRET/NODIS/XGDS

Kissinger: Why is there such a threat to make the CDU active in Bavaria?

Genscher: There was considerable opposition to Strauss in Kreuth, at the CSU Congress. Strauss doesn't want any other party coming into Bavaria before the next landtag elections. But if Kohl is to do it, he has to move before the next landtag elections.

Kissinger: What does Strauss gain from this? It seems to help the CDU more.

Genscher: Strauss thinks that voters in northern Germany can now be reached by the CDU that the coalition could not reach. By establishing a sort of National Liberal Party.

Kissinger: It would have to be a three party coalition -- the CDU, CSU and the National Liberals. He's trying to prevent the CDU from gaining in the south by saying he won't move into the northern districts. But the National Liberals would have to get 5%.

Genscher: They could form a list union with the CSU. The three parties together could then form a majority.

Crosland: This offers no particular incentive to the FDP to move in any different direction than it is doing now, regarding the coalition with the SPD.

Genscher: In 1969 we would have been very hard hit by a party that competed with us.

We have naturally discussed whether we would be damaged by this, but we feel now we wouldn't. We have been discussing the possibility of a coalition with the CDU in two laender. But one of our conditions will be that they don't support Strauss in the Bundstag. So it can be regarded for the moment as a release of pressure on us.

Crosland: The most important statement made at the European Council was Chancellor Schmidt's statement that in no case would Germany reflate or expand in order to help the rest of the European economy.

We have three surplus powers -- the US, Japan, and West Germany. In the U.S. there is some debate about reflation. Japan we don't know, and poor Mr. Miki has lost the election and is down the drain. But Mr. Schmidt was very strong and very clear and I would say at this dinner very depressing because he said he would not expand faster.

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It was very important, co~~n~~'t you think, Louis?

De Guiringaud: It was a very important moment in the meeting. And also his pessimistic views about the world economy.

Kissinger: I have heard his views.

Genscher: The mood of the Chancellor at The Hague may have been about decisions that have to be taken in the social field. These are a very heavy load for the SPD.

Crosland: Why? Because the Federal Republic has still a prospective rate of growth of 5%, and a prospective rate of inflation lower than any country, and a good balance of payments, and still a lot of unemployment.

So what logic is there why the German population should be subjected to future mortification by the Federal Chancellor under these circumstances?
[Laughter] I mean by the Federal Government.

Genscher: The situation is very serious because of the unemployed and many foreign workers have left. This has been reduced. The financial basis of the social insurance system is in a bad state. My party forecast this would be so back in 1956 when this system was introduced. This has been produced by the influx from the GDR and from foreign workers. Because of the burden, and for historical reasons, there is panic fear about inflation in Germany and you can't persuade the people in Germany to think otherwise. This has influenced the pessimistic outlook of the Federal Chancellor.

Kissinger: Tony, do you think the Federal Republic should expand, and the United States?

Crosland: Yes. The attitude of the German people about inflation I understand. The argument about the limit of the budget deficit I'm skeptical of because I've always heard it.

Genscher: If you come to Germany and say the financial position of Germany is better, it would be of considerable help. [Laughter]

Crosland: But the Federal Republic like the United States is a rich country. They have a healthy balance of payments -- whatever bloody Mr. Simon says. [Laughter]

There are two problems. The one real problem is unemployment, and the second is the psychological problem -- that the government in fear of inflation is subjecting itself to severe monetarist views.

What is the reason for the unemployment?

Genscher: It's a matter of over capacity in the construction industry, and many workers in the construction industry are now having to leave the industry. There was much investment in the construction industry during the period of upswing.

De Guiringaud: What is the number of your foreign workers?

Genscher: Two million. It was two and a half million before.

Kissinger: What is the political impact of a million German unemployed when two million foreign workers are there?

Genscher: The unemployment payment is so high that there is not much incentive to work. They get 80% of their pay. They work "black" two or three days. There are certain jobs that Germans will not take. There are some streets in a part of Berlin where only the name of the street is German.

Kissinger: Is France the same?

De Guiringaud: In France we have the same problem. We have unemployment more than is usual, and at the same time more than a million foreign workers.

Kissinger: I didn't realize the unemployment payment was so high. Is it the same in Britain?

Crosland: The same.

Kissinger: Eighty percent.

De Laboulaye: In France it's 90% for the first year.

Crosland: We, like France, have some who can't be sent back home. Blacks from the Commonwealth.

De Guiringaud: We have Algerians, Moroccans.

SECRET/NODIS/XGDS

Genscher: We have more workers from countries than these countries have under arms.

De Guiringaud: We have the same as Germany.

Genscher: The big problem in this area is the Yugoslavs. There are several Yugoslav divisions standing on German soil. [Laughter] It's a very, very serious problem. The Yugoslav Government regards the presence of their workers in Germany as a chance for them to get training, and wants them to come back. They get 150 Marks per child from the third child onwards. No one can prove how many children a Turk has!

Kissinger: Even the number of children back home!

Van Well: They need only a certificate from their burgermeister.

Kissinger: Why should you pay for children they have back home?

Van Well: Social justice!

Crosland: When the subject of the EEC and Turkey comes up, you should hear the Dutch -- who are totally irresponsible because they have no responsibility -- argue for more freedom of movement of labor from Turkey. At the last meeting, Herr Genscher, to his credit, said there would be no more Turks in Germany, and he said he wasn't saying this only for the election but he would say it afterwards.

Warsaw Pact Diplomatic Proposals

Hal, should we go through the agenda?

Sonnenfeldt: We should have a word about these two Warsaw Pact proposals. We all agree these Warsaw Pact proposals are both worthless and unacceptable. The only question is the tactics of getting this message back.

De Guiringaud: I would mention the discussions of last night between my President and Marshal Tito [in Belgrade].

You know the Yugoslavs usually are very strong for general disarmament. Right now they are supporting a general discussion in the UN on disarmament. Despite this Yugoslav background, last night when we asked Tito about these

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proposals -- nonuse of force, no first use -- Tito discarded it as pure propaganda! Of course, we said we would not go along with these, and we had already told this to the Soviets. As for nonuse of force, it was already in the Charter of the UN, and on no first use, it would deprive us of all our dissuasive possibilities. And Tito agreed with all of this! So it is different from what their official position has always been on the subject of disarmament.

Kissinger: Does anyone disagree?

Crosland: Not at all. All agreed.

Yugoslavia

De Guiringaud: Such a contradiction with the general attitude of Yugoslavia.

Crosland: I think there is a contradiction on the official level which has upset the Americans, and at the Nonaligned Conference where they upset the British on the Falkland Islands -- such a contradiction between this and the reality as I've seen it in my discussions with Minic, Bijedic and Dolanc.

Kissinger: Official Washington understands Yugoslavia must follow an independent line for its own security, which won't always please us. But we have to shoot one across their bow when they get too enthusiastic, as they did on Puerto Rico. But at the same time I understand what they're up to.

De Guiringaud: You see, Henry, I agree with you. When there was at the Colombo Conference a discussion of condemning us for our attitude on Djibouti and South Africa, the Tunisian made a statement to us and the Yugoslav made a statement too. They said they had to do something in the nonaligned movement to preserve their position in the nonaligned movement.

Kissinger: At the same time it doesn't hurt to protest once in a while.

Crosland: But we shouldn't, as Louis says, take this too tragically. They get very embarrassed when we raise it.

Yugoslavia now is in a very important position. It is clear the successors will be very outspoken men, so from the point of the West it is a good bet. They've prepared very carefully what they'll do if the Soviets do one, two,

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or three. They've worked it out as carefully as has General Haig, put it that way.

De Guiringaud: They made it clear several times they're determined to resist the Russians. I've never heard Tito say this. This time we heard him one or two hours. Very strongly, in every part of his speech and expose, it was clear that they would defend very strongly their independence, their integrity, and it was supported very strongly by Bijedic and others in the Collegial Presidency. We had the impression the Collegial Presidency will resist any Soviet pressure. For how long, we can't say. But whenever they do anything on, say, disarmament, it's done with a very powerful anti-Soviet inner attitude.

Crosland: I had exactly the same impression -- of the likelihood of Soviet military pressures and how they would react. Most likely there wouldn't be military pressure but stirring up the Montenegrins, etc. I asked if the younger generation felt the same way as their grandfathers. Were they weakened by drugs and Western attitudes? I was very encouraged by the answer, which convinced me they were just as determined, and better trained too.

Does this cover Yugoslavia? Except the EEC and Yugoslavia. When van der Stoel goes there, he has to make a ringing declaration.

De Laboulaye: It's been done. He's back.

Sonnenfeldt: I said to the Political Directors that it is important to do as much as possible before Tito dies. Gratuitous advice to the EC.

Hibbert: We are strong on framework but not on content, before Tito dies.

De Laboulaye: Three of us have designated military advisers. The U.S. has not yet.

Kissinger: Because we got into a bloody debate about who would control them. It would be better to leave this to the next administration. I'll have lunch with Vance and will strongly urge him to do it.

De Laboulaye: The point is these military advisors go over contingency plans and report to us, and it will go no farther without instructions from us.

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Warsaw Pact Diplomatic Proposals

One subject we took up before we went to Yugoslavia was whether we should put into the communique anything in reply to the two proposals from the Warsaw Pact.

Sonnenfeldt: There was some feeling that if it was done, it would dignify the proposals too much. But there is a need for a rapid reply.

Kissinger: Then it should be in the communique. Why not?

Sonnenfeldt: There could be responses by Ministers in press conferences. There are some allies who feel we shouldn't be too hasty, some who feel it dignified it. We could instruct our people.

Kissinger: If we all agree it is nonsense, we should say it and get it out of the way.

Genscher: If we don't, we'll get some dangerous remarks made by our Presidency -- the Dutch.

Crosland: Not [the Presidency] of NATO.

Sonnenfeldt: No, it's the Portuguese now [in the NAC Presidency].

Hibbert: But the Dutch are the President of the Nine.

Genscher: I'm always in favor of strong authority and this is why I look forward to the British Presidency. [Laughter]

Hibbert: We've been vaguely in favor of including language but we were worried by the apparent difficulties. We're not opposed to language.

Van Well: We were inclined to put it in.

Crosland: We all seem to agree we want something in.

De Guiringaud: I'd like to be careful about that. Can we get a common stand of the 15 allies? A very strong stand of the 15 members? If we can get only a weak answer, it doesn't serve a purpose.

Kissinger: I can't judge. But if NATO can't answer a no first use proposal, it's in sad shape.

De Guiringaud: There are two problems. One is no first use; that's easy. And the second is more difficult -- expansion of the Atlantic Pact. That raises the question of Spain. If the other one is rejected and this one is not mentioned, it will be noticed.

Kissinger: What is the problem about Spain? They've just allowed political parties and will have elections.

Crosland: There is uneasiness about Spain. If this is discussed, there would be difficulties about language. For example, about the EC: France would like Spain to come in before Portugal; the British would like Portugal to come in before Spain.

De Guiringaud: We feel Portugal isn't yet at the social and economic level to be ready to join the Community. But Spain could manage it. We feel Spain could come in as soon as they have finished their political evolution, which could be the end of 1977. Politically we would put them at the same level, provided that Spain completes its political evolution.

Crosland: Giscard likes the King of Spain but not Mario Soares. [Laughter]

Hibbert: We discussed the possibility of answering that by saying we believe in freedom -- freedom at home and freedom to join.

Van Well: It's in the last paragraph of CSCE -- that all member states are free to join or leave alliances.

Sonnenfeldt: We could say the NATO alliance is an alliance entered into freely by its members and the Soviet proposal isn't relevant.

Kissinger: The first part should be strengthened.

Sonnenfeldt: We have to go into the procedures of the communique.

Genscher: It is formulated very smartly, no first use. We have to come to realize that it is attractive if one stands for the principle of renunciation of force.

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Crosland: But so far we are agreed that in the drafting committee, we four will seek to reject both.

Sonnenfeldt: We have to reject both.

De Guiringaud: Both, or else none mentioned. But in rejection of nonuse of force, the language should be very carefully studied, because we should be wary of the impact on the Third World. We have already said we cannot renounce defensive use, defensive first use.

Kissinger: Who in the Third World specifically? With all respect, who in the Third World really gives a damn whether NATO renounces first use of nuclear weapons if it is attacked by the Warsaw Pact? First of all, if we don't make a strong statement, the Chinese will be uneasy; that's a country that matters. India is determined to become a third nuclear power anyway.

De Guiringaud: It's the propaganda effect that the Soviets will use.

Kissinger: But against our people, not the Third World.

De Guiringaud: All the more.

Genscher: This will be a big issue in the coming year.

Crosland: Hans-Dietrich, are you agreeing with Louis that we should be very careful with the wording?

Genscher: Yes.

Kissinger: You're saying we should reject it now; you're not agreeing with Louis.

Genscher: It should be carefully worded.

De Guiringaud: I'm not against rejecting it, but it should be carefully done. That's my United Nations "deformation," that is where my Third World concern comes from. But our own people....

Kissinger: But if we're too clever we may confuse our own people even more. It won't be too hard in America to get people thinking that no first use is the best way to get the Europeans to build up their forces. I won't be here, so it's not my problem.

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De Guiringaud: We should say the West cannot renounce defensive use.

Kissinger: Why not say the West cannot renounce...

Van Well: "all means."

Kissinger: ... "all means." Then you can mention "in case of attack on itself." Then you don't have to say "nuclear weapons" or "defensive" use, both words which are very elusive.

Italy

Crosland: Italy. Henry?

Kissinger: In this small circle, I can say I wish I had something to report. I can't see why he [Andreotti] came to the United States other than to get his picture taken. I said to him I see there are two parties in Italy, each of whom is trying to outmaneuver the other. The Christian Democrats are always trying to pass reform in order to outmaneuver the Communists; the Communists are calculating that the passage of reforms will win them respectability with the bourgeoisie. One of them must be wrong. He didn't have an answer.

Crosland: A very significant thing is happening in Italy. The PCI is turning out to be deeply divided. The strains on the PCI are turning out to be far greater than on the Christian Democrats. I predicted that at Oslo.

Kissinger: I don't exclude that.

Crosland: He [Berlinguer] had difficulty at the last meeting in drafting a communique. The strain on the PCI, on the unity of the PCI, is extreme, from this quasi-relationship. If this goes on, the Party may split. This is the most significant development in Italy in the last eight months.

[To de Guiringaud] You were in Italy.

De Guiringaud: I was in Pisa for a day, and had a talk with Andreotti, and with Forlani.

Crosland: Forlani was a footballer; he's not stupid. He played for Pesare.
[Laughter]

De Guiringaud: The impression which my President had from his long conversation with Andreotti was very much along the line you [Kissinger] were reporting. Andreotti felt very confident he could outmaneuver the Communists and that the Communists are under severe strain.

Kissinger: I don't exclude it, and I would add that the last time they didn't have much choice except to govern this way. I have no suggestion.

Crosland: The Andreotti-Fòrlani group is much more effective than the Moro-Rumor faction. Craxi is much more effective than his predecessors. He's Secretary General of the Christian Democrats. He is a formidable figure.

De Guiringaud: I've not met him. If the political picture is better than expected, the economic picture seems to be terrible.

Kissinger: Then the political picture will get worse too.

Crosland: The economic picture will be hard to say. It depends in Italy as in Britain on how far Mr. Simon insists on austere measures.

Kissinger: Our impression is the economic picture is not that severe.

Portugal

Crosland: No. That's Italy. Hal?

Sonnenfeldt: That's all on Italy. There is Portugal and the consortium. If you want to discuss Cyprus.... That gets us down to the CSCE conference in Belgrade.

Crosland: In Portugal, Soares is becoming a right wing Social Democrat. He's becoming very anti-communist. He's endangering himself with his left wing. Everyone says his television broadcast the other day was a masterpiece of articulation and persuasiveness but he faces problems with not the Communists but his own left.

Sonnenfeldt: We had a question at the Political Directors meeting that aid should go not only to the Soares Government but to a broader-based government.

Crosland: I wouldn't go along with that.

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Van Well: The opposition there said that in order to have a greater success, there should be a broader based government.

Crosland: Certainly the British Government would never go along with that. To make the Soares Government share power with a coalition would make things worse.

CSCE Review Conference

Kissinger: Maybe we should have a word about CSCE.

Particularly in view of the domestic view of the CSCE in America, we shouldn't slide into a review conference without a clear idea of what we want to achieve in it. I felt we should have a review of both the pluses and the minuses, and the Political Directors should review it.

Certainly the CSCE conference was not well prepared domestically in America. If we don't have something clear about two months beforehand, every pressure group in America will be beating up on the U. S. Government for not having achieved the liberation of Estonia.

As for the future of this group, I will recommend strongly to Cy Vance that he continue it. I see no reason why he wouldn't continue it. The next meeting is in London. He'll probably send word to you before.

Crosland: On your first point, I agree we should examine CSCE probably before Belgrade. We've been doing it in the British Government.

As for the future, I hope this continues. I know you will get intensely bored, Henry, with valedictory speeches, so I'll be brief. Life will be duller without you, but more seriously than that, you've brought a spirit of critical intellectuality to this enterprise that has been unique. In spite of the fact you come late to meetings. [Laughter], despite the fact you're not briefed when you get here [Laughter], despite the fact you didn't know what CMEA is, we'll miss not having you around. You've had a major impact on diplomacy which has been an experience for me for which I've been grateful. I'm sure I speak for my colleagues here.

All: Hear, hear.

[The meeting ended.]

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[Stamp]
Declassified
03.30.94.

Embassy of the USSR in the USA
Washington, D.C.

TOP SECRET, copy No. 1
May 13, 1977
Original # 405

From the Journal
of DOBRYNIN, A.F.

[Stamp]
MFA USSR
Department of USA
Secret
Ent. No. 0987
05.19.1977

RECORD OF CONVERSATION

with the USA Secretary of State

C. VANCE

February 26, 1977

I met with Secretary of State Vance and asked him to pass on as directed the letter of L.I. Brezhnev of February 25, 1977 to President Carter.

"Dear Mr. President,

I attentively studied your letter of February 14 of this year. I want to talk in a frank manner about the impression and the ideas which it provoked here in our country. As I understand, you welcome such direct conversation.

The general remarks in favor of peace and curtailment of the arms race which were contained in the letter, of course, coincide with our own aspirations. We are definitely for the ultimate liquidation of nuclear weapons and, moreover, for universal and total disarmament under effective international control.

However, advancement forward toward these elevated goals will not be accelerated, but, on the contrary, will be slowed down, if we first of all do not value what we already managed to accomplish in this area over the last few years, and, second, if we abandon a balanced, realistic approach to determining further concrete steps in favor of introducing proposals which are known in advance to be unacceptable.

Reviewing the ideas which you expressed from this particular angle, we unfortunately did not find in many of them a desire for a constructive approach, or readiness to look for mutually acceptable solutions to the problems which are the subject of exchanges of opinions between us.

As I already wrote to you, we firmly believe that in the first place it is necessary to complete the drafting of a new agreement on limitation of strategic offensive weapons, on the basis of what was agreed in Vladivostok. The basic parameters of the draft agreement which were fixed there, as well as additional explanatory statements which were agreed on

during subsequent negotiations, were the result of tremendous work. In many cases it was necessary to make difficult decisions in order to find mutually acceptable solutions to an apparently deadlocked situation. And to the extent that this draft agreement has already been worked out, it is all interconnected -- you can not withdraw one important element without destroying the whole foundation.

For example, it is enough to recall that -- and you, Mr. President should know this from the documents from the negotiations -- that the method of counting MIRVed missiles was unequivocally conditioned on the achievement of agreement on the whole complex of cruise missiles. The American side not only agreed to this in principle, but in January of last year a concrete formula for counting "air-to-ground" cruise missiles within the ceilings for strategic weapons was practically agreed. All that was left was to agree on concrete formulas for sea- and land-based cruise missiles. True, the American side later tried to propose the removal of the issue of sea- and land-based cruise missiles from the main agreement, but we categorically rejected such an attempt to break from the agreement achieved earlier.

Now it is proposed to us to withdraw the whole question of cruise missiles from the draft agreement. How should we understand this return to a stage which we moved beyond long ago, to the formula which has absolutely no prospect? To agree to this proposal would have meant that blocking one channel of the strategic arms race we open another channel at the same time. And does it really matter to people the type of missile by which they will perish -- a cruise or a non-cruise one? Nor are there grounds to believe that it will be easier to solve the question on cruise missiles later, when the sides start to deploy them, than now, while they are still being developed. The experience convincingly shows the opposite is true.

The aspiration to maintain artificial urgency about the issue of the Soviet intermediate bomber called "Backfire" in the USA, (which is still the case as we understand from your letter) is in no way consistent with the draft agreement. Let there be no doubts in this respect: we firmly reject such an approach as being inconsistent with the aims and subject of the negotiations and having only one goal -- to deliberately put the conclusion of an agreement altogether in doubt.

Perhaps the United States has less of an interest in this agreement than the Soviet Union? We do not believe so, and if someone has a different opinion -- it is a serious mistake.

In connection with the question you raised about the possibility of a significant reduction of the levels of strategic forces, which were agreed on in Vladivostok, I would like to remind you that we also did and do stand for stopping the arms race, including a reduction of strategic forces. This can be proved by the agreement achieved in Vladivostok, which implies for the USSR a unilateral reduction of strategic delivery vehicles. This, not only in words but also in fact, actually is a striving for arms reduction.

We are in favor of the results which were achieved in Vladivostok being consolidated in an agreement without further delays, and we want to move further ahead. As already mentioned, we are ready to start negotiations on next steps, including the question of possible future reductions, right after the current agreement is concluded.

Yet, we want to make it clear: any steps of this kind must first of all completely satisfy the principle of equality and equal security of the sides. It seems to us, Mr. President, that nobody can argue with our right to pose the question this way.

How does the idea of a dramatic reduction in the nuclear-missile forces of the USA and the

USSR look in this light? In your letter it is put forward in isolation from all other aspects of the present situation. In the meantime, it is evident that in this case the following factors would have immeasurably grown in importance and to the unilateral advantage of the USA: the difference in geographic positions of the sides, the presence of American nuclear forward based systems and the aircraft on aircraft carriers near the territory of the USSR, the fact that the U.S. NATO allies possess nuclear weapons and other circumstances, which cannot but be taken into consideration.

The fact that it is impossible to ignore all these facts while considering the question of reduction of nuclear-missile forces of the USSR and the USA is so obvious that we can not but ask a question: what is the real purpose of putting forward such proposals, which may be superficially attractive to uninformed people, but in fact are directed at gaining unilateral advantages. You yourself justly pointed out that attempts of one side to gain advantage over the other can produce only negative results.

The same one-sidedness reveals itself in proposals on banning all mobile missiles (i.e. including intermediate-range missiles, which have nothing to do with the subject of Soviet-American negotiation), limits on throw-weight, and on-site inspection.

You of course know better the reasons why all these questions are put in such an unconstructive manner. We want to conduct the conversation in a business-like manner from the very beginning, to search for mutually acceptable -- I stress, mutually acceptable agreements. The Soviet Union will continue to firmly protect its interests; at the same time a constructive and realistic approach of the American side will always find on our side understanding and readiness to achieve an agreement. We hope to see exactly this kind of a responsible approach when Secretary of State Vance comes to Moscow.

This refers to the problem of strategic weapons limitation as well as to other questions connected with stopping the arms race. We definitely expect the American side to support our proposals, including the proposal to ban creation of new kinds and systems of weapons of mass destruction, to ban chemical weapons, and to conclude a world treaty on non-use of force. Our proposals on this and some other questions, including that of the Indian Ocean, were presented many times and concretely, in particular, in the United Nations. Keeping in mind the interests of international security and strengthening of peace, we could also discuss questions raised in your letter, such as: warning of missile launch tests, reduction of the sale and supply of conventional weapons to "third world" countries, and others.

We give much importance to the agreement on reduction of armed forces and weapons in Central Europe without prejudice to the security of any of the sides.

Yet a one-sided approach is evident in your letter and as far as negotiations in Vienna are concerned. This is the only way to treat, for example, the statements that the American side views its positions in regard to the Vienna negotiations with the air of some kind of "concern with excessive increase" of military power in East Europe. Not only is an objective evaluation of the real situation missing here, but also the constructive proposals, which were put forward by the USSR and other countries-participants in the negotiations and directed at achieving progress at the Vienna negotiations, are completely ignored. We are ready now and in the future for a search for solutions and outcomes, a search which does not imply that someone will receive unilateral advantages. But if we are expected to unilaterally reduce our defensive capabilities and thus put ourselves and our allies into an unequal position, such expectations will lead nowhere.

It is impossible to agree with the evaluation of the situation relating to fulfillment of the Four-power agreement which is given in the letter. The USSR never encroached and does

not encroach now on the special status of Western Berlin, and the appeal for support in lifting tension in that region is directed to the wrong address. The fact that complications still arise there is connected with the completely definite policy carried out by the FRG with the connivance of three western states, and is which is practically directed at dissolving the Four-powers treaty and its cornerstone resolution -- that West Berlin does not belong to the FRG and cannot be governed by it. But the attempts to break this resolution are a very slippery path leading to aggravation of the situation. We believe that the Four-power treaty should be strictly and faultlessly observed by all interested sides, and we will in every way strive to avoid returning to the period when Western Berlin was a constant source of dangerous friction and conflicts.

Without going into details, I will to say that your letter does not indicate any changes in the USA approach to such questions as settlement in the Near East or improvement in the sphere of trade-economic relations between our countries, which could bear witness to an intention to move to their successful settlement.

And finally. In the letter the question of so called "human rights" is raised again. Our qualification of the essence of this matter and of the behavior of American Administration in this respect has just been reported through our Ambassador. This is our principle position. We have no intention to enforce our customs on your country or other countries, but we will not allow interference in our internal affairs, no matter what kind of pseudo-humane slogans are used for the purpose. We will firmly react to any attempts of this kind.

And how should we treat such a situation, when the President of the USA sends a letter to the General Secretary of the CC CPSU and at the same time starts the correspondence with a renegade, who proclaimed himself to be an enemy of the Soviet State and who stands against normal, good relations between the USSR and the USA? We would not like our patience to be tested while dealing with any matters of foreign policy, including the questions of Soviet-American relations. The Soviet Union must not be dealt with like that.

These are the thoughts, Mr. President, which my colleagues and I had in connection with your letter. I did not choose smooth phrases, though they might have been more pleasant. The things we talk about are too serious to leave space for any kind of ambiguity or reticence.

My letter is a product of sincere concern about the present and future of our relations, and it is this main idea that I want with all directness and trust to bring to you.

I hope that with an understanding of the elevated responsibility which is placed on the leadership of our two countries we will be able to provide the forward development of Soviet-American relations along the way of peace, in the interests of our and all other people.

With respect,

L. Brezhnev

February 25, 1977"

Vance read the text of the letter attentively twice and then, after a pause, said the following.

"Personally I welcome such direct, plain-speaking language of the General Secretary. Our President still approaches certain international problems too lightly. For example, I told

him several times, referring to the conversation with you (the Soviet Ambassador) and to the history of negotiations on the whole, that the Soviet government gives very much importance to solving of the question on cruise missiles. He doesn't pay much attention, in his striving to conclude an agreement without long negotiations on remaining contentious questions, thinking that these questions can be put off for "later". I told him that it is not so, but... (Vance raised his hands to indicate that he had not yet managed to persuade the President that he was right).

I hope that the direct letter from L.I. Brezhnev, Vance went on, will make the President look at the situation in a somewhat different way.

I, of course, do not fully agree with what is written in the letter, but I hope that it is this kind of letter that the President needs to receive now". (...)

The Ambassador of the USSR in the USA

(signature)

/A. Dobrynin/

РАССЕКРЕТНО
"30" мая 1994 г.

ПОСОЛЬСТВО СССР В США 2362
г. Вашингтон

СОВ. СЕКРЕТНО, экз. № 1
"15" мая 1977 года
исх. № 465

Из дневника
ДОБРЫНИНА А.Ф.

ЗАПИСЬ БЕСЕДЫ

с государственным секретарем США
С. ВЭНСОМ

МИД СССР
Отдел СШ А5
СЕКРЕТНО
Вх. № 0487
"19" / 1977 г.

26 февраля 1977 года

Встретился с госсекретарем Вэнсом и попросил его передать по назначению письмо Л.И. Брежнева от 25 февраля 1977 года президенту Картеру.

"Уважаемый господин Президент,

Я внимательно ознакомился с Вашим письмом от 14 февраля с.г. Хочу начистоту поговорить о том впечатлении и мыслях, которые оно вызвало у нас. Как понимаю, Вы за такой прямой разговор.

Содержащиеся в письме высказывания общего характера в пользу мира и свертывания гонки вооружений, конечно же, созвучны нашим собственным устремлениям. Мы определенно за то, чтобы вести дело к ликвидации в конечном итоге ядерного оружия и, более того, ко всеобщему и полному разоружению под эффективным международным контролем.

Однако продвижение вперед к этим высоким целям никак не ускорится, а, наоборот, затруднится, если мы, во-первых, не будем дорожить тем, что уже удалось сделать на этом пути за последние годы, и, во-вторых, будем подменять взвешенный, реалистический подход к определению дальнейших конкретных шагов выдвижением заведомо неприемлемых предложений.

Рассматривая высказанные Вами соображения именно под этим углом зрения, мы, к сожалению, не увидели во многих из них стремления к конструктивному подходу, готовности к поискам взаимоприемлемых решений проблем, которые являются предметом нашего обмена мнениями.

Как я уже писал Вам, мы твердо исходим из того, что в первую очередь необходимо завершить выработку нового соглашения по ограничению стратегических наступательных вооружений на той основе, о которой было договорено во Владивостоке. Ведь зафиксированные там основные параметры этого соглашения, как и дополнительные, конкретизирующие их положения, которые были согласованы в ходе последующих переговоров, явились результатом огромного труда. В ряде случаев потребовалось принятие отнюдь не легких решений для нахождения взаимоприемлемых выходов из, казалось бы, тупиковых ситуаций. И в той мере, в какой это соглашение уже выработано, в нем все взаимосвязано - из него нельзя изъять какой-то важный элемент, не разрушив всю основу.

Достаточно напомнить, например, - а Вам, г-н Президент, это должно быть известно из документов переговоров, - что порядок подсчета ракет с РГЧ был четко обусловлен достижением договоренности по всему комплексу крылатых ракет. Американская сторона не только согласилась с этим в принципе, но в январе прошлого года была практически согласована и конкретная формула учета крылатых ракет "воздух-земля" в уровнях стратегических вооружений. Оставалось согласовать конкретные формулы, касающиеся крылатых ракет морского и наземного базирования. Правда, позже американская сторона попыталась было предложить вынести вопрос о крылатых ракетах морского и наземного базирования за рамки основного соглашения, но мы категорически отвели такую попытку отойти от ранее достигнутой договоренности.

Теперь же нам предлагается вынести за рамки соглашения вообще весь вопрос о крылатых ракетах. Как мы должны понимать этот возврат к давно пройденному этапу, к совершенно бесперспективной постановке вопроса? Согласиться с этим предложением означало бы, что, перекрывая один канал гонки стратегических вооружений, мы тут же открываем другой канал. А какая, собственно, людям разница, от какой ракеты они погибнут - от крылатой или бескрылой? Нет никаких оснований и для того, чтобы думать, что решить вопрос о крылатых ракетах будет легче потом, когда стороны

приступят к их развертыванию, если мы не сделаем этого сейчас, пока они находятся еще в стадии разработки. Опыт убедительно говорит об обратном.

Никак не соответствует договоренности продолжающееся стремление, как видно из Вашего письма, искусственно сохранять вопрос о советском среднем бомбардировщике, который в США называют "Бэкоуайер". Пусть не будет на этот счет никаких сомнений: мы решительно отклоняем такой подход как не соответствующий целям и предмету переговоров и преследующий только одно - заведомо усложнить, а то и вообще поставить под сомнение заключение соглашения.

А разве Соединенные Штаты меньше заинтересованы в этом соглашении, чем Советский Союз? Мы так не считаем, и если кто-то думает иначе, то это - серьезное заблуждение.

В связи с постановкой Вами вопроса о возможности существенного сокращения согласованных во Владивостоке уровней стратегических сил уместно напомнить, что мы со своей стороны выступали и выступаем за прекращение гонки вооружений, в том числе и за сокращение стратегических сил. Об этом свидетельствует договоренности, достигнутая во Владивостоке, которая означает для СССР одностороннее сокращение стратегических носителей. Это и есть не на словах, а на деле стремление к сокращению вооружений.

Мы за то, чтобы результаты, которые были достигнуты во Владивостоке, закрепить в соглашении без дальнейших затяжек и двигаться дальше вперед. Как было уже условлено, мы готовы сразу же после заключения указанного соглашения приступить к переговорам о последующих шагах, в том числе обсудить и вопрос о возможных в дальнейшем сокращениях.

Однако должна быть полная ясность: любые такие шаги должны будут прежде всего и в полной мере отвечать принципу равенства и одинаковой безопасности сторон. Думается, г-н Президент, никто не может оспаривать правомерности такой постановки вопроса.

Как в этом свете выглядит идея резкого сокращения ракетно-ядерных сил СССР и США? В Вашем письме она выдвигается в отрыве

от всех других аспектов существующей ситуации. Между тем очевидно, что в этом случае неизмеримо возросло бы значение - причем к односторонней выгоде для США - таких факторов, как разница в географическом положении сторон, наличие американских ядерных средств передового базирования и авианосной авиации вблизи территории СССР, наличие ядерного оружия у союзников США по НАТО и других обстоятельств, которые нельзя сбрасывать со счета.

Невозможность игнорировать все эти факторы при рассмотрении вопроса о сокращении ракетно-ядерных сил СССР и США настолько очевидна, что у нас действительно не может не возникнуть вопроса, в чем же заключается истинная цель выдвижения подобных предложений - внешне, может быть, и привлекательных для несведущих людей, а на деле направленных на получение односторонних преимуществ. Вы же сами справедливо отмечаете, что попытки добиваться в переговорах преимущества одной стороны над другой способны дать лишь обратный результат.

Такая же односторонность просматривается в предложениях относительно запрещения всех мобильных ракет (стало быть, и ракет среднего радиуса действия, которые никакого отношения к предмету советско-американских переговоров не имеют), ограничений на забрасываемый вес, инспекций на местах.

Вам, конечно, виднее, чем объясняется то, что все эти вопросы поставлены в столь неконструктивном плане. Мы со своей стороны за то, чтобы с самого начала вести разговор по-деловому, искать взаимоприемлемые - подчеркиваю, взаимоприемлемые договоренности. Свои интересы во всех вопросах Советский Союз будет и впредь отстаивать твердо; вместе с тем реалистический, конструктивный подход американской стороны всегда найдет у нас понимание и готовность договариваться. Именно такой взвешенный подход мы надеемся увидеть, когда в Москву приедет госсекретарь Вэнс.

Это относится как к проблеме ограничения стратегических вооружений, так и к другим вопросам, касающимся прекращения гонки вооружений. Мы определенно рассчитываем, что американская сторона поддержит наши соответствующие предложения, в том числе о запре-

щении создания новых видов и систем оружия массового уничтожения, о запрещении химического оружия, относительно заключения всемирного договора о неприменении силы. Наши предложения по этим и ряду других вопросов, включая вопрос об Индийском океане, неоднократно и конкретно излагались, в частности, в ООН. Мы могли бы обсудить и такие затрагиваемые в Вашем письме вопросы, как уведомления об испытательных пусках ракет, сокращение продаж и поставок обычного оружия странам "третьего мира", и другие, руководствуясь при этом интересами международной безопасности и упрочения мира.

Мы придаем важное значение договоренности о сокращении вооруженных сил и вооружений в Центральной Европе без ущерба для безопасности какой-либо из сторон.

Однако в Вашем письме и в отношении переговоров в Вене ясно виден односторонний подход. Только так можно расценить, например, слова о том, что американская сторона рассматривает свои позиции в связи с венскими переговорами в свете какой-то "озабоченности чрезмерным увеличением" военной мощи в Восточной Европе. Здесь не только отсутствует объективная оценка действительного положения вещей, но и полностью игнорируются конструктивные предложения СССР, других социалистических стран - участниц переговоров, направленные на достижение прогресса на венских переговорах. Мы готовы и впредь к поискам развязок и решений, поискам, не подразумевающим получения кем-либо односторонних преимуществ. Но если от нас хотят, чтобы мы в одностороннем порядке сократили свои оборонительные возможности и тем самым поставили себя и своих союзников в неравное положение, то из этого ничего не получится.

Никак нельзя согласиться с той оценкой положения дел с выполнением Четырехстороннего соглашения, которая дается в письме. СССР не посягал и не посягает на особый статус Западного Берлина, и призыв содействовать снятию напряженности в этом районе направлен не в тот адрес. То, что там все же возникают осложнения, связано с вполне определенной линией ФРГ, которая проводится

при попустительстве трех западных держав фактически направлена на размывание Четырехстороннего соглашения, его краеугольного положения о том, что Западный Берлин не принадлежит ФРГ и не может управляться ею. А попытки нарушения этого положения - очень скользкий путь, ведущий к обострению обстановки. Мы исходим из того, чтобы Четырехстороннее соглашение строго и неукоснительно выполнялось всеми заинтересованными сторонами, будем всемерно стремиться к тому, чтобы не было возврата к периоду, когда Западный Берлин служил постоянным источником опасных трений и конфликтов.

Не углубляясь сейчас в детали, скажу, что Ваше письмо отнюдь не указывает на какие-то изменения и в подходе США к таким вопросам, как урегулирование на Ближнем Востоке или исправление положения в области торгово-экономических отношений между нашими странами, которые свидетельствовали бы о намерении действительно двигаться к их успешному разрешению.

И последнее. В письме вновь поднимается так называемый вопрос "о правах человека". Наша квалификация существа этого вопроса и поведения американской администрации в этой связи была только что сообщена через нашего посла. Это - наша принципиальная позиция. Мы не намерены навязывать вашей стране или другим странам свои порядки, но и не допустим вмешательства в наши внутренние дела, под какими бы псевдогуманными лозунгами это ни преподносилось. Мы будем решительно реагировать на любые попытки такого рода.

И как вообще мы должны расценивать такое положение, когда президент США направляет послания Генеральному секретарю ЦК КПСС и в то же время вступает в переписку с отщепенцем, который объявил себя врагом Советского государства и выступает против нормальных, хороших отношений между СССР и США? Мы не хотели бы, чтобы испытывалось наше терпение в ведении любых дел международной политики, в том числе и в вопросах советско-американских отношений. Так вести дела с Советским Союзом нельзя.

Таковы мысли, г-н Президент, которые возникли у меня и моих коллег в связи с Вашим письмом. Я не подбирал округлых формулиро-

вок, хотя, быть может, они и были бы приятнее. Речь идет о вещах слишком серьезных, чтобы оставлять место для каких-то двусмысленностей или недоговоренности.

Мое письмо продиктовано искренней заботой о сегодняшнем и завтрашнем дне наших отношений, и именно эту главную мысль я хочу со всей прямотой и доверительностью довести до Вас.

Я надеюсь, что с пониманием той высокой ответственности, которая лежит на руководстве наших двух стран, мы сможем обеспечить поступательное развитие советско-американских отношений по пути мира, в интересах наших и всех других народов.

С уважением,

Л. Брежнев

25 февраля 1977 года"

Вэнс дважды внимательно перечитал текст письма, а затем после некоторого раздумья сказал следующее.

"Лично я приветствую подобный прямой, без обиняков язык Генерального секретаря. Наш президент все еще слишком легко подходит к некоторым международным проблемам. Я, например, несколько раз говорил ему, ссылаясь и на разговор с Вами (совпослом), и на всю предыдущую историю переговоров, что Советское правительство придает очень большое значение решению вопроса о крылатых ракетах. Он этому особо не внимает в своем стремлении побыстрее заключить соглашение без длительных переговоров по оставшимся спорным вопросам, думая, что эти вопросы можно отложить "на потом". Я ему говорил, что это не так, но... (Вэнс развел руками в знак того, что ему пока не удалось убедить президента в своей правоте).

Надеюсь, что прямое письмо Л.И. Брежнева, продолжал Вэнс, заставит президента несколько по-иному взглянуть на вещи.

Я, конечно, не во всем согласен с тем, что изложено в письме, но надеюсь, что именно такое письмо важно сейчас получить президенту". [...]

ПОСОЛ СССР В США



Source: Diplomatic Archive; Bulgarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Opis 29p.;
arhivna edinitsa [archival unit] 186; pp. 40-43
Format: Original; Type: Instruction; Language: Russian; Document Date: March 2, 1977

Clarifying the position of the USSR and guidelines for the resumption of preparatory work for the Belgrade [CSCE] conference

The work on clarifying our fundamental position on questions of realization of the Final Act of the Pan-European Summit and preparation for the meeting in Belgrade should continue actively. In that respect, it is necessary to be guided by the speech of L.I. Brezhnev from the October 1976 Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union delivered on the solemn meeting in Tula on 18 January 1977, and also by the Declaration of the Warsaw Pact members on 6 November 1976.

1. As the main, central concept, one ought to single the opening remarks of Comrade Brezhnev, which contained the assessment on the decision of the Pan-European Summit as a long-term program for countries' activities, directed towards strengthening peace, security and cooperation in Europe. One should emphasize that the transformation of this program in reality is not a one-time achievement, but a long and an uninterrupted process. Some of the instances of this program have been realized, others are in the process of transformation, some are just being worked out. The implementation of the Final Act depends mainly on the level of disarmament and on the status of the political relations among countries.

Concerning the intensifying propaganda campaigns on the part of some western countries against socialist countries as we near the Belgrade meeting, it is to be stressed that activities of the kind, accompanied with attempts to promote deliberately distorted representations of the positions and the actual content of the Helsinki accord, are found to be in clear breach with the letter and intent of the accord; we decisively reject all attempts for meddling with our internal affairs. Socialist countries are not looking for confrontation in Belgrade; they stand for positive results at the end of the meeting, and for a favorable atmosphere at the meeting – an atmosphere of cooperation and a release of tension.

2. The main focus in sight now should be that among participants at the Belgrade meeting a common political concept for the carrying out the meeting consolidates strongly, mainly a concept of mutual understanding with the intent that the meeting should bear a constructive nature, should be addressed above all to the future, should not turn into a "bureau for complaints," and should serve the goals of continued disarmament.

At the meeting, there could be no speeches on "reporting" [otchetnosti] or "accountability" [podotchetnosti] on the part of the participating countries concerning the realization of the positions of the Final Act.

3. Representatives of western countries nowadays more and more often raise various organizational questions, related to the meeting in Belgrade: in what order it should be carried out, how long it could last, should any committees be created in the course of the meeting, in what form it should be led as a whole, and so on.

In relation to that, it should be emphasized during discussions that questions of this kind are tangential in terms of the main political concept of the Belgrade meeting.

Following mainly from this notion of the Belgrade meeting, the organizational-procedural aspects of the conference course are being thought through in Moscow. In particular, we consider that the meeting should not be unjustifiably drawn out. As it is known, the Final Act stipulates that at the preliminary meeting the duration of the main meeting should be established - not only its opening date, but its closing date as well.

4. The Belgrade meeting is not a second Pan-European Summit, but a conference with a consultative character. The meeting does not have, and cannot have the authority to make decisions that alter or "retouch" the Final Act, signed by the highest political leaders of the participating countries.

It is obvious that, at the meeting, some practical agreements on matters, in principle already decided in the Final Act, could be finalized; for example, the planned duration of the meeting of experts on issues of peaceful mediation of disputes; coordinated recommendations on such concrete questions should be reported by the participants at the meeting to their respective governments.

We have considered the consultative character of the meeting in determining our level of participation in it. Our delegation will be lead on the level of members of the Collegium of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs [Kolegii MID].

5. In the course of the discussion the question may arise whether the Soviet side considers bringing up to the attention of the participants at the Belgrade meeting the decision of the Final Act for no-first-use of nuclear weapons - popular among members of the Warsaw Pact. In answer to that question, consider that in our perspective, this important proposal needs special discussion. As such, the proposition itself represents a major peacekeeping initiative on the part of the Soviet countries, and stands on the agenda for international cooperation, as being in the spirit of disarmament. In this context, it undoubtedly concerns all participants in the forthcoming meeting in Belgrade.

6. It is to be noted, that the Belgrade meeting may facilitate the formation of an agreement among countries participating in the Pan-European Summit concerning the role and place of the suggested by the Soviet Union "congresses" on environmental preservation, transportation, and energy in the broader sense of country-to-country economic cooperation in Europe on the basis of the Final Act. Those questions fascinate many countries, and relate immediately to the lives of millions of people. Obviously, accomplishing this proposal, the results of its further examination on the 32nd session of the European Economic Commission of the UN (in April 1977) will be considered. At the same time, it is to be noted that the "congresses" are considered individual international forums that necessitate the participation of experts with specialized knowledge for their preparation and for carrying them out. The final decision on these congresses should be made on the governmental level.

7. Following the meeting in Belgrade, the Final Act stipulates the execution of another meeting of the same kind for the continuation of the work at the Pan-European level. In the event that the given situation raises questions that concern the duration, the character, and the frequency of such meetings, consider that the respective practical decisions would in considerable degree depend on the note on which the Belgrade conference as whole ends.

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

1671

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March 23, 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: LONDON BUTLER
FROM: ROBERT HUNTER *RH*
SUBJECT: Meeting Between the President
and George Meany

1. George Meany met with Secretary of State Vance on March 18. At Tab I is a memorandum of conversation.

Based on that meeting, Meany may raise three issues with the President:

- visas for Communist "trade union" officials;
- US-Soviet maritime problems; and
- U.S. membership in the ILO.

2. Visas. Most important is the visa problem. The President has stated publicly that, in preparations for the Belgrade Review Conference of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), we should change our visa laws. Current provisions will definitely be a target of Soviet attack at the Belgrade Conference (preparations for which take place in June, with the full conference in the fall).

In comments on a later memo (involving Italy), the President said we should move quickly on ways to change visa practices, but in a context far broader than Italy itself.

3. In response to early expressions of the President's concerns, we have asked State to propose possible changes in the law. A draft response is at Tab II. (Note: This has not yet been cleared with Secretary Vance or the Justice Department.) Secretary Vance is reportedly leaning towards either option three or four (explained below).

4. The position of the AFL/CIO (with the exception of some unions) is that Communist trade unions are not real unions, and that their leaders should be denied visas. This is established U.S. policy. In fact, we did not include the right of travel for trade union officials in the Final Act of the CSCE (Helsinki), nor in our cultural exchange agreement with the Soviet Union.

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5. The problem lies in any possible change to our visa policies or laws -- i.e., how can we get AFL/CIO support for (or abstention from) any changes, unless Communist trade union officials are still banned? But if we continue the ban, how do we gain credit at CSCE for making changes? Note Meany's comment (along with strong feelings on this issue) that "the U. S. would try to show that it was '100% pure' on Helsinki. 'If that's the decision,' he said, 'we can live with it.'"

6. State is leaning to a position that would not entail attempting to repeal any legislation. Rather, it would support either:

- a Presidential statement that we would have a more liberal waiver policy, but not for Communist trade union officials; or
- following this practice, but without a Presidential statement.

Either position would cause little (if any) problem for Meany.

7. However, in view of the President's stated interest (public and private) in moving on the visa question before Belgrade, he may want to go farther, and adopt either Option #1 or #2 of the State draft -- which would entail legislation. He may also want to make a clean sweep -- i.e., not leave in specific language still denying visas to the trade union officials. (We also do not share State's pessimism about the difficulty of getting any change through Congress, provided the President took the lead; there is a good deal of evidence supporting our view).

8. Therefore, it is our advice here that the President seek to preserve his options.

Suggested talking points:

-- The President shares Meany's views about Communist "trade union" officials -- that calling them that is a sham. U.S. policy has been to deny them visas.

-- He is also concerned about the CSCE Review Conference, however. As part of his broader human rights policy -- which includes supporting many objectives also supported by the AFL/CIO -- it is important that the U.S. not be "culpable" at Belgrade. One important issue sure to be brought up by the Russians is our visa policy.

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-- The Administration is reviewing our non-immigrant visa policies, and putting together recommendations. As he reviews recommendations, the President will be acutely sensitive to Labor's concerns, and will consult closely with Meany and others on specific

Department talking points are at Tab III.

The question is on the Russians living up to an agreement to the fraction of US-Soviet bilateral trade that should be carried in U.S. ships. The Administration agrees with the AFL/CIO position that the Russians should be held to the agreement, and they have been so informed.

Talking point:

-- The President agrees that the maritime agreement with the Soviet Union should be lived up to -- to ensure that U.S. ships get their share of bilateral US-Soviet trade.

Meany is unhappy about a misrepresentation of his position on the agreement (where the U.S. gave notice of withdrawal, to try forcing some reforms, particularly concerning Communist bloc involvement). This has now been straightened out.

Talking point:

-- The President is concerned that the ILO better reflect the true needs and aspirations of working men and women around the world, and is sensitive to the concerns of the AFL/CIO.

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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April 13, 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

FROM: GREGORY F. TREVERTON *HT*

SUBJECT: PRC Meeting on Europe,
April 14, 1977, 3:00 p.m.

The PRM-9 response, as we have suggested, is long and loose, and now much of it is overtaken by Summit preparations. It is worth no more than a quick scan. This memorandum sets out four issues that should be discussed, with indications of where we might try to come out at the end of the meeting. (We understand that one of these -- CSCE -- may not be on the State Department agenda, but it is important to raise at least briefly. State also may suggest a brief discussion of how we consult with allies -- what is the relative utility of Summits and special meetings as opposed to attempts to work through existing organizations, like NATO.)

Eastern Europe

The need is simply to frame a coherent policy where one has not existed. Here the PRM response is not bad. It at least sets out four alternative approaches:

(1) Bias toward Eastern European states that act with some independence of Moscow (presumably, Romania, Yugoslavia, Poland);

(2) Bias toward those that are somewhat liberal internally (e.g., Hungary, but not Romania);

(3) Bias toward those that are either relatively independent or liberal (all of the above);

(4) Efforts to expand U.S. contacts across the board to the "minimum floor" now existing only with Poland, Romania and Yugoslavia.

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Those approaches provide a basis for discussion. The need is to begin examining the implications of the alternative approaches, and relating them to issues clearly visible on the horizon (for instance, Eastern debt, human rights).

European Communism

The PRM suggests a two-level approach similar to the thrust most people seem to agree on: we will deal with European governments as they are, but those governments if "dominated" by Communist Parties may find it difficult to deal with us, hence the burden is on them to prove their commitment to Western institutions.

The meeting should make sure that everyone knows what our policy is. The flap over State's press briefing last week suggests how important it is that everyone understand the subtleties. And the policy seems much clearer in the case of Italy than other countries. If -- as we feel proper -- the U.S. should be more cautious in its dealings with the French Communists than with the Italians (or Spanish), what does that imply for guidance to our embassy and to what we say and do here?

CSCE

We have raised CSCE issues in other memos to you. The situation is that preparations for Belgrade, within the government and within NATO, are well in train. There was a NATO decision last December. The approach is not bad, but neither is it imaginative. And we may be putting too many of our CSCE eggs in the Belgrade basket, rather than in bilateral contacts. Principals need at least to be apprised of that. They may well decide that the current approach is not so bad, and the costs of deflecting it so high, that the train should be permitted to run.

NATO Summit

The basic question for the meeting is what we want to get out of the NATO Summit. Our current thinking emphasizes reassuring the Allies of our commitment to NATO and NATO strategy, combined with a limited set of initiatives. The most important of those is a push for a defense improvement program (based in large part on Komer's report to Secretary Brown, on which we will submit a memorandum tomorrow). That is important, but it has not been examined critically. It is heavily weighted toward conventional defense against the blitz krieg. Is that, in fact, our policy? But there are two other issues worth discussing at the meeting:

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-- The defense review aside, other proposed initiatives for the NATO meeting are becoming very thin gruel: a proposal for a high-level planning staff, at NATO headquarters, to perform studies of major political issues for NAC and member governments; a cautious (so as not to demoralize Luns and the NATO staff) call for revamping NATO programming machinery as a prerequisite for implementing any defense improvement program; and the suggestion of a study, perhaps done by the new high-level planning group, of the current state of East-West relations. The issue is: are these really recommendations worthy of a Presidential initiative? Should they be detached from the bureaucratic aspects (yes), or elevated into more of a Harmel report? (Probably not.)

-- As important is the issue of balance between reassurance and new initiatives. The Komer report is a comprehensive plan, entirely conventional in character, likely to smell in toto to the Allies as a half-change in strategy, and sure to put considerable pressure on the French. We must be careful lest our initiatives swamp our initial purpose of reassuring.

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14 April 1977

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REVIEW OF SOVIET INTERNAL AFFAIRS

February-March 1977

Domestic Politics

We believe February may have been the political low point of the winter for General Secretary Brezhnev. There is evidence suggesting that he had been under pressure for some months--probably from Suslov, Mazurov and others--because of economic difficulties and serious food shortages. At the same time, Soviet participation in CSCE and the Conference of European Communist Parties--two international conferences that Brezhnev had pushed through and exploited to burnish his image at home--began to boomerang badly over the winter. The CSCE Final Act, signed by Brezhnev, had made the USSR vulnerable to charges of violating its commitments to improved human contacts and freedom of movement. Soviet agreement to disagree with certain East and West European parties at the Berlin conference last June contributed to the erosion of international communist discipline, which in turn fed dissent in Eastern Europe and resulted in even more pronounced independence on the part of the West European parties.

February brought no relief from these problems and, in fact, added to them two more foreign policy disappointments. Despite small Soviet gestures since last fall to convey to the new Chinese leadership a willingness to improve state-to-state relations, by February it was evident that no

This review is based on analysis and research work completed by CIA's Directorate of Intelligence through April 1, 1977. Questions relating to any part of the review and suggestions for making it more useful may be directed to Robert Gates, Soviet and East European Affairs, Center for Policy Support [REDACTED]

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improvement in Sino-Soviet relations is presently in the cards. More importantly, by late February, Soviet hopes for quickly restoring the bloom to US-Soviet relations and obtaining a quick SALT agreement probably had begun to fade in the face of the new Administration's human rights policy and indications of seriously divergent approaches to strategic arms limitations.

In recent weeks, Brezhnev has helped to cover his embarrassment over foreign policy setbacks and domestic problems by taking the lead in voicing what we believe to be unanimous leadership hostility toward the new US policy on human rights. Through this expedient, and perhaps by trimming his sails on certain contentious policies, Brezhnev seems again to have re-established himself in the front rank of the leadership consensus--at least for the time being.

The one significant change in the leadership during the past two months would seem to bear out Brezhnev's continued political strength. On March 16, Central Committee Secretary for bloc relations Konstantin Katushev was appointed Deputy Premier and Soviet representative to CEMA. While on the surface this might seem to represent an important promotion for Katushev, in fact we expect him to lose his position on the Secretariat, and thus his participation in the leadership collective and higher rank than deputy premiers. (Dual positions in the Secretariat and government are highly unusual: since 1945, only Stalin, Khrushchev, Ponomarenko, Shelepin, Brezhnev, Malenkov and Shepilov have held such positions simultaneously--the latter two respectively for only a week and for six months. Defense Minister Ustinov's position is unclear, but we know that most of his Secretariat functions have been taken over by Ryabov--see following item.) USA Institute Director Arbatov remarked to Ambassador Toon on March 17 that if precedent is followed, Katushev probably would relinquish his Secretariat position at the next Central Committee plenum.

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Just as Brezhnev seems to be coming on strong again, we have been puzzled by the extended absences from public view of two of his purported critics--Suslov and Mazurov. Mazurov underwent surgery in mid-February and has not been seen since. Suslov, age 74, in early April made his first public appearance since mid-December. It is certainly possible that he too has been ill.

In sum, we believe Brezhnev had a hard winter politically but, by the time of Secretary Vance's visit, had exercised his considerable skills to emerge with his influence and power at least temporarily intact. We have no information yet as to the effect on Kremlin politics of the Secretary's visit and the new US SALT proposals. We would speculate that Brezhnev's colleagues approved of his handling of the visit and that, for the short term, this too will help keep him at the forefront of the leadership consensus. It remains to be seen, however, how many times he can lower his sights on arms negotiations and Soviet-US relations without eroding his ability over a longer period to achieve a consensus for forward movement in these fields.

Meanwhile, Kosygin's surgery and long absence last fall, Mazurov's hospitalization, the extended absences of Suslov and Pelshe, Kirilenko's apparently sudden hospitalization the night before Brezhnev met with Secretary Vance, and Brezhnev's own pallor at the end of the Secretary's visit underscore the toll age is taking on the leadership and the actuarial limits to the continued grip on power of the present cast of characters.

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Economic Affairs

Food Shortages: Unusually serious food shortages, mainly of meat and vegetables, continue in many rural areas and cities of the USSR. The overall food situation is difficult to assess from the fragmentary evidence available, but shortages stemming in part from the disastrous 1975 harvest apparently have eased substantially only in major cities. Although overall supplies of staple foods are generally adequate, especially in large cities, free market prices are higher.

The shortages have caused some unrest and even work stoppages. While the situation does not represent a threat to the regime, as noted above it has exposed Brezhnev to criticism in the Politburo. In fact, the General Secretary noted in late March the "special importance" of ensuring an uninterrupted supply of quality food.

Because of a lag effect, meat supplies at the retail level will not turn upward until late spring even if output from government controlled packing plants increases sharply in March and April. Moreover, a reasonable volume of fresh vegetables will not appear in the northern industrial cities before July at the earliest. This outlook for food supplies raises the prospect of more civil discontent over current conditions.

Meanwhile, as of late March crop prospects remain favorable for the 1977 Soviet winter grain. So far, winterkill losses are expected to be less than normal with the most significant damage occurring in parts of the non-black soil zone and the North Caucasus. Winter losses normally average about 16 percent. Winter grains were sown in the fall of 1976 over 38.5 million hectares, the largest area since 1968 and one million hectares greater than the previous year. Soil moisture reserve in both the winter and spring grain regions have continued to be excellent.

Industrial Performance in January-February: Soviet industrial production during the first two months of 1977 continued to grow at a sluggish rate, only slightly faster than the 3-1/2 percent posted in 1976--the slowest growth year since World War II. The results of industry's attempt to rebound have been dismal so far, except in the processed food and machinery branches. Despite the increased production of important food products, meat production during the first two months dropped

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below the depressed output for the comparable period in 1976. This is attributable primarily to Soviet attempts to rebuild livestock herds to pre-1975 levels. As this process is taking longer than expected, meat production may not be to recover until much later this year.

Military Affairs

[1] Ryabov Replaced Ustinov on Party Secretariat: As noted above, [redacted] party secretary Ryabov has taken over Defense Minister Ustinov's duties as party secretary overseeing the defense industry. Promoted to the Central Committee Secretariat last October, Ryabov has been occupying Ustinov's office space there. [redacted]

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Changes in Soviet Military Service Law: The USSR has adopted two important amendments to the 1967 Law on Universal Military Obligation. The first exempts officers in the ranks of general of the army, marshal of branch of service, and admiral of the fleet from the 1967 law's age limit of 60 and permits them to serve indefinitely. The amendment also permits extensions of active duty for lesser officers up to ten years past the retirement age. The amendment legalizes the existing situation in which many Soviet generals have been retained on active duty past the legal retirement age.

The second amendment lengthens the term of service for draftees with higher education. Male university graduates who do not obtain commissions through the military departments in many civilian universities will have their period of service extended from one year to 18 or 24 months depending on the branch of service. The Soviets' decision to lengthen the service of this category of conscript suggests that there are more such men than we would have thought. The extension may be intended to reduce the incentive for Soviet university students

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THE SOVIET VIEW OF THE DISSIDENT PROBLEM SINCE HELSINKI (RP 77-10100D)

Title:	THE SOVIET VIEW OF THE DISSIDENT PROBLEM SINCE HELSINKI (RP 77-10100D)
Abstract:	
Pages:	0024
Pub Date:	5/1/1977
Release Date:	1/29/2001
Keywords:	SOVIET ANALYSIS SOVIET POLITICAL ANALYSIS
Case Number:	CSI-2001-00003
Copyright:	0
Release Decision:	RIPPUB
Classification:	U

22529

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CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
RELEASE AS SANITIZED

The Soviet View of the
Dissident Problem Since Helsinki

~~Secret~~
RP 77-101000
May 1977

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The Soviet View of the Dissident Problem Since Helsinki

Central Intelligence Agency
Directorate of Intelligence

May 1977

Overview

When the Soviets signed the CSCE accords in August 1975, they took a calculated risk that their acceptance of Basket III would not create serious internal difficulties for them. Since Helsinki, however, several developments have heightened the concern of Soviet authorities about dissent within their society.

- The human rights provisions of Basket III became a rallying point for Soviet dissidents with a wide range of views and concerns, thus raising the specter for the first time in many years of a unified "opposition."
- Unrest in Eastern Europe grew, particularly in Poland, East Germany, and Czechoslovakia, increasing chronic Soviet fears of a spillover into the Soviet Union itself.
- The Eurocommunists, including the once docile French Communist Party, became much more outspoken in their criticism of Soviet repression.
- The new US administration's human rights campaign angered Soviet authorities, who fear being put in the dock this summer at the Belgrade review conference, and heartened Soviet dissidents, who were temporarily emboldened to more vigorous and open protests.
- Since the bad harvest of 1975, food shortages have existed in many places in the Soviet Union. Widespread grumbling and isolated instances of active protest have increased Soviet

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apprehension that economic discontent on a mass level might provide the small group of intellectual dissidents with a popular base. The few instances of violence may have also made Soviet authorities fearful that a "freer movement of ideas and people" could introduce into Soviet society new and more threatening forms of protest, such as terrorism, and could lead to a general erosion of discipline.

Objectively, Soviet dissent does not appear to pose a serious threat to the Soviet system. But Soviet authorities are extremely security minded, and they evidently perceive a greater danger than exists in fact. In recent months the Soviets have approached issues of ideology and social control in an increasingly conservative manner. This conservatism has been manifested in reported Soviet pressure on some East European governments to adopt a tougher line with regard to dissent, in pressure on the Eurocommunists to cease their "carping" about human rights violations in bloc countries, in resistance to Western "interference" in Soviet internal affairs, and in somewhat harsher treatment of dissidents within the Soviet Union.

To a considerable extent, these efforts have been successful. The Soviets have persuaded both the Eurocommunists and Western governments to moderate their criticisms, if only for the time being. East European regimes, although employing differing tactics against dissidents, have tended to close ranks with the Soviet Union in the face of Western criticism whether emanating from Communists or "capitalists." The Soviets are uneasy about the ability of the Polish regime to keep the lid on popular unrest, but they probably remain reasonably confident that no East European regime will turn "revisionist" to the extent of throwing in its lot with dissident elements, as happened in Czechoslovakia in 1968. Meanwhile, the euphoria with which most Soviet dissidents initially welcomed US public expressions of concern about their plight is fading in the wake of the Vance visit to Moscow, which they had hoped would somehow improve their situation.

Given these successes, it is unlikely that the Soviets will see the need to deal with their dissident problem in more drastic fashion. A renewal of Western criticism, combined with a further increase in internal dissent, could lead to some further ideological tightening, if necessary at the cost of damaging their relations with Western countries. And the Soviets would not hesitate to react to a major explosion in Eastern Europe with military force. Clearly, however, the Soviet leadership has no desire, if indeed it has the power, to reinstitute the Stalinist terror apparatus. Although the

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developments since Helsinki have raised doubts in the minds of some leaders, most Soviet leaders probably retain a fundamental faith in the basic loyalty of the bulk of the Soviet population. Their belief in the superiority and success of their system probably makes them generally confident of their ability to keep dissent within manageable limits by continued carrot-and-stick tactics, without reverting to Draconian measures.

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The Soviet View of the Dissident Problem Since Helsinki

When the Soviets signed the CSCE accords in August 1975, they took a calculated risk that their acceptance of Basket III would not create serious internal difficulties for them. Since Helsinki, however, several developments have heightened the concern of Soviet authorities about dissent within their society.¹

I. The Dissident Problem

A. CSCE, a Rallying Point for Soviet Dissidents

First of all, the human rights provisions of Basket III provided a common ground for Soviet dissidents with a wide range of views and concerns, thus raising the specter for the first time in many years of a unified "opposition." A basic weakness of Soviet intellectual dissent, especially in the last few years, has been its lack of unity, both in an organizational and in a programmatic sense. Most Soviet intellectual dissidents share a belief in "human rights," but this fundamental commitment has often been inadequately articulated, and overshadowed by the substantial differences existing between dissidents. In addition, most religious and national minorities have tended to define their goals narrowly, failing to relate them to the all-union struggle for civil liberties. CSCE stimulated cooperation among many of these groups.

The most important dissident group to emerge in the Soviet Union since Helsinki, the "Public Group Furthering the Implementation of the Helsinki Agreement in the USSR," exemplified the new tendency to draw together. This group, often called the "Orlov group" after its leading figure, physicist Yury Orlov, was set up in Moscow in May 1976 for the express purpose of monitoring Soviet compliance with the Helsinki Accords. During the last year, branches of the Orlov group were set up in the Ukraine, Lithuania, Armenia, Georgia, and Leningrad. These branches were tiny - under 10 members each - and the degree of coordination between them is not known, but the emergence of a dissident organization having a network of "cells" throughout the country is unique in recent Soviet history.

More important, the Orlov group, by espousing the causes of a wide variety of Soviet dissidents, established some claim to being the center of a broader protest movement. This unifying function is not entirely new. Sakharov has played a similar role, as has *Khrushka*, the chief Soviet *samizdat* journal. But Sakharov is a lone individual, and *Khrushka* has

¹ The strengths and weaknesses of Soviet dissent are covered in [redacted] ORPA memorandum, "The Spectrum of Soviet Dissent," [redacted] soon to be published.

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performed a reportorial rather than an organizational function, while the Orlov group established extensive contacts with other protest elements.

Symptomatic of the new coordination among dissident groups was a public appeal on March 16 to President Carter issued by 21 people from three different dissident groups: the Orlov group and Sakharov, whose wife is a member of this group; the Pentecostals, a fundamentalist Christian sect; and the Refuseniks, as Jews denied permission to emigrate are called. Especially noteworthy was the participation of the Refuseniks. Although individual Jews have played a major role in intellectual dissent in the Soviet Union, the Refuseniks have been concerned almost exclusively with the specific issue of Jewish emigration, evidently seeing little advantage in associating their particular cause with a larger one. They have previously not attempted to liberalize the system, but merely to escape it.

Groups seeking to emulate the Jewish example by applying to emigrate from the Soviet Union are becoming particularly important as a reservoir of support for the human rights movement. The Helsinki provisions encouraging free emigration have given impetus to the emigration impulse, as has the movement of Germans from East Germany to West Germany. Ethnic Germans in the Soviet Union appear to be applying to emigrate in ever increasing numbers. Since 1972 the Soviets have allowed over 20,000 Germans to leave the Soviet Union, as part of a policy permitting German emigration for purposes of family reunification. But many of the almost 2 million Germans who lack family ties to West Germany, and thus are not eligible to emigrate, also want to leave. In March, for example, a group of ethnic Germans denied permission to emigrate staged a demonstration in Red Square. Soviet officials who are grappling on a miniscale with the same problem that East Germany faces on a large scale may share the frustration of an East German official who grumbled recently that "after Helsinki, they think they can go anywhere they like." The Soviets may also be concerned that the emigration fever will spread to other groups. In some cases, whole villages or communities of religious dissenters have sought to emigrate. Most recently, in February 1977 an entire Pentecostal church congregation from Krasnodar Krai came to Moscow and applied for exit permits.

Other religious and ethnic groups have also become more politicized in recent years, and the Orlov group has associated itself with many of their grievances. The group's first formal protest, for example, dealt with the sentencing of Crimean Tatar dissident Mustafa Dzhemilev, in distant Omsk. Dzhemilev had championed the right of his people, who had been deported to Central Asia in 1944, to return to their homeland. The Orlov group

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produced a petition calling for Dzhemilev's release from prison, said to have been signed by as many as 1,600 Crimean Tatars. (Crimean Tatar dissidents have said they hope to have a representative at the Belgrade review conference.) The Orlov group also defended the Evangelical Baptists—who are said to be excited about the prospect of having a "real Baptist" in the White House—and may have endeared themselves to Ukrainian nationalists by pledging to campaign for representation of the Ukrainian republic, an "independent" member of the United Nations, at Belgrade.

Although this incipient support from religious and national minorities in itself suggests a potential for a mass base for human rights activists, the intellectuals remain estranged from the bulk of the working class population. Cooperation between workers and intellectuals is doubtless impeded by the general failure of the intelligentsia to articulate lower class grievances concerning living standards and material welfare. Working class discontent, which has basically economic rather than political objectives, has thus not converged with human rights activism in the Soviet Union.

B. Food Shortages and Unrest

Soviet apprehension that political and economic grievances could draw closer together, that Soviet dissent could follow the path of Poland, has evidently grown since the bad harvest of 1975. Although the supply of bread has increased since 1975, shortages of meat and vegetables continue in many places in the Soviet Union. No significant improvement in the food supply is expected until the summer harvest.

Consumerism is not a potent political force in the Soviet Union, as it is in many East European countries, but consumer expectations have risen in recent years. The Soviet population has come to expect a gradual improvement in the standard of living. Recently, a provincial official, complaining to Moscow about the food supply in his province, reportedly remarked that the people in his area had developed the "habit" of eating an egg a day. The food shortages, aggravated by an inefficient distribution system, have caused widespread grumbling. Over the last year and a half, there have been reports and rumors, most of them unconfirmed, of a number of instances of active unrest and protest.²

2. Examples of these rumors and reports:

- (1) A local party meeting at Volodki was disrupted by a demonstration protesting food shortages; the militia dispersed the demonstrators.
- (2) Workers in Krasnomaisky refused to work until they were supplied with meat.
- (3) A one-day strike of 10,000 workers protesting food shortages took place at a tire plant in Bobruysk.
- (4) There is some reason to suspect that labor unrest may have occurred in Murmansk.
- (5) A Tallin warehouse containing meat scheduled for shipment elsewhere in the Soviet Union was burned.
- (6) Work stoppages to protest food shortages occurred in Tula.
- (7) Dark workers in Riga organized a strike to protest meat shortages.
- (8) "Serious disturbances" took place in Leningrad factories in protest of the meat shortage.

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The only serious incident of violent sabotage in protest of the food shortages that we *know* took place occurred in Moscow in January, when three bombs exploded on the same day, the most damaging one at a metro station. The perpetrators were reportedly young men from Tula, who came to Moscow to buy food on the weekend, and found the food stores closed. Last year many Moscow food outlets began closing on Sunday, presumably to prevent nonresidents from shopping in Moscow on their day off.

A few other violent incidents not necessarily related to economic conditions have occurred, especially in the turbulent republic of Georgia. Notably, there have reportedly been several assassination attempts on Shevardnadze, the head of the Georgian Communist Party, and in April 1976 a bomb exploded in the Georgian Council of Ministers building. The violence in Georgia is probably related, at least in part, to Shevardnadze's campaign against crime and corruption, but nationalist passion against Russification policies runs high in Georgia, and the possibility of a political motivation behind some of the violence and turmoil in that republic certainly cannot be excluded.

The fact that the leaders have thus far not taken emergency measures available to them to alleviate the food shortages—such as purchasing large quantities of meat abroad—suggests that they have considered the food situation manageable. Clearly, however, they have been worried about the mood in the country. [] an official in Moscow instructed a provincial official to watch the temper of the people closely. Brezhnev's trip to Tula, where he made a speech in January, was reportedly prompted by workers' active dissatisfaction with the lack of goods.

The scattered instances of violence which have occurred have not been connected with dissident activities, and the authorities probably know this. And the authorities reportedly decided that no dissidents were involved in the metro bombing.

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The dissidents, for their part, have wholeheartedly disavowed any connection with violent activities, believing that they are vulnerable as potential scapegoats. Thus, Sakharov charged Soviet authorities with bombing the Moscow metro station as a provocation, rather dramatically comparing the incident to the Reichstag fire of 1933. Jewish dissidents in Moscow have expressed shock and revulsion at the violent actions of Jewish extremists in New York City. They believe that such actions can only hurt their position.

Nevertheless, some reporting suggests that the Soviet leadership may not always distinguish clearly between different sorts of criticism. Some Soviet officials may vaguely sense some connection between intellectual dissent and popular discontent.

Official apprehension that a general erosion of discipline could take place in Soviet society may also be fed by continuing morale problems in the Soviet armed forces. Two recent incidents dramatized these problems: the mutiny and attempted escape to Sweden in November 1975 of a crew aboard a ship in the Baltic fleet; and the defection to Japan of MIG pilot Belenko last September. Alcoholism, desertion, and suicide are serious problems, and are recognized as such by high-level officials.

C. Under Attack from the Eurocommunists

After Helsinki the Eurocommunists, including the once docile French Communist Party, became much more outspoken in their criticism of Soviet internal policies. The Spanish party has gone furthest, but the French and Italian parties—because of their influence and their greater chance of coming to power—pose the more serious problem for the Soviets. From the Soviet perspective, the chief importance of Eurocommunism is not that it has diminished Soviet influence in West European Communist parties, but that it offers a Marxist alternative to the Soviet model in Eastern Europe, and perhaps ultimately within the Soviet Union itself. Moscow has also been upset by Eurocommunist support to dissidents in Eastern Europe.

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diminished Soviet influence in West European Communist parties, but that it offers a Marxist alternative to the Soviet model in Eastern Europe, and perhaps ultimately within the Soviet Union itself. Moscow has also been upset by Eurocommunist support to dissidents in Eastern Europe.

Over the last several years, electoral considerations have increased the desire, and greater domestic sources of financing have increased the ability, of the French and Italian parties to assert their independence from Moscow and their acceptance of Western political traditions. Specific events in 1975 gave impetus to this trend. The antidemocratic actions of the pro-Soviet Portuguese Communist Party impelled the Eurocommunists to shore up their credibility by putting new stress on their own commitment to political freedom and their patriotism.

Since late 1975 the Italian Communist Party has permitted its press to reprint items critical of the Soviet Union that had previously appeared in non-Communist newspapers. At the French Communist Party Congress in February 1976, the French renounced two doctrines that once served as articles of faith for the international Communist movement: "proletarian internationalism" (which the Soviets have taken to imply Soviet domination) and "dictatorship of the proletariat" (one-party rule). Since that time the two parties have been more critical of the Soviet Union than at any time since the aftermath of the invasion of Czechoslovakia.

Their denunciations reached a peak in January of this year, when both Marchais and Berlinguer spoke out strongly against human rights violations in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Particularly embarrassing to the Soviets was an unprecedented visit in late January of an Italian Communist delegation to dissident Marxist Roy Medvedev in Moscow. The Italians presented Medvedev with an Italian edition of one of his books and reportedly asked him to write articles for an Italian party historical journal.

D. Unrest in Eastern Europe

The growth of unrest in Eastern Europe,⁴ especially in Poland, East Germany, and Czechoslovakia has increased chronic Soviet fears of a spillover into the Soviet Union itself. The Polish situation, in particular, has many of the earmarks of a "revolutionary situation": a fragile economy and a regime whose sufferance depends on its ability to satisfy growing consumer demands, a military which might not prove reliable in a domestic crisis, a generally hostile population, and, most important, an assertive working class whose interests are defended by two other elements—the Church and the intellectuals.

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If the lid should blow in Poland, the Soviets would have good cause to expect repercussions elsewhere in the bloc. CSCE had a catalytic effect on East European dissent, which has become a movement cutting across national borders. The Czechoslovak dissident cause, Charter 77, which has issued a manifesto on human rights signed by several hundred Czechoslovak intellectuals, has to some extent served as a pegpoint for protest in other countries, including the Soviet Union itself. Sixty-two Soviet dissidents signed a statement supporting the Chartists in early March.

In addition, according to a recent report dissidents in several East European countries, including the Soviet Union, are evidently coordinating their activities to a limited degree.⁵ Contacts between Polish and Soviet dissidents date from the early 1960s, and emissaries from Poland are now being sent periodically to Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev, Vilnius, and Kaunas to coordinate actions and to supply Soviet dissidents with Western literature. The same report indicates that Lithuanian and Polish Catholic students also maintain contacts with each other, as do Polish Catholics and Ukrainian Uniates ("Byzantine Catholics," who recognize the authority of the Pope in Rome, and are closely associated with Ukrainian national feeling). Leading Polish clergymen, including the head of the Polish Catholic church, are reportedly sympathetic to Ukrainian Uniate congregations.

Soviet authorities have always been alert to the danger of a political "virus" from Eastern Europe spreading into the polyglot borderlands of the Soviet Union. The intermingling of nationalities in some of these areas, as well as their geographic proximity to Eastern Europe, make them more susceptible to influences from that quarter. In 1968 sympathy for the Czechoslovaks created enough unrest in the Ukraine to make party officials there jittery. There is evidence that the Soviet leadership's familiarity with Ukrainian conditions and its fear of a domino-effect were factors in the decision to invade Czechoslovakia.

E. The US Human Rights Initiative

A final reason for heightened Soviet concern about the dissident problem was the new US administration's human rights "campaign." Official US protests about Soviet repression, and especially the personal involvement of President Carter in public appeals on behalf of Soviet dissidents, angered Soviet authorities, who already feared being put in the dock this summer at the Belgrade review conference. At the same time, the US human rights

5. One of the dissidents mentioned in this report as being involved in coordination with dissidents in other countries is East German Professor Havemann, who as early as 1944 evidently had close contacts with leading academics in the Soviet Union, including Bonifat Kedrov, until recently chairman of the Soviet Institute of Philosophy.

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offensive heartened Soviet dissidents, and temporarily emboldened them to make more vigorous protests and to channel their appeals directly to the US administration.

II. The Soviet Response

In the face of these related pressures, the Soviets mounted a counteroffensive on all fronts. In recent months the Soviet approach to issues of ideology and social control has been increasingly conservative. This conservatism has been manifested in reported pressure on some East European governments to adopt a tougher line with regard to dissent, in pressure on the Eurocommunists to cease their "carping" about human rights violations in bloc countries, in bitter criticism of Western "interference" in Soviet internal affairs, and in somewhat harsher treatment of dissidents within the Soviet Union.

A. In Eastern Europe

Over the last six months, the Soviets have been less interested in imposing a uniform policy toward dissent on all the East European regimes than in insisting that these regimes somehow come to grips with the problem on their own. Increasingly, however, their mounting concern over unrest in Eastern Europe has reportedly been translated into pressure on the more moderate regimes to take a harder line toward dissidents. Of the regimes which have employed a relatively moderate approach, Poland is more vulnerable to pressure than Hungary, since no serious unrest exists in Hungary.

Soviet concern over the dissident problem was reportedly manifest at the Warsaw Pact summit in late November in Bucharest. At this meeting Hungarian party chief Kadar and East German party head Honecker argued about how best to handle dissent. Consistent with their past policies, Honecker argued for a tougher policy, while Kadar supported a softer approach. The Soviets may have preferred to take a back seat, letting Honecker make the case for harsher tactics, but the Soviet position during this period is not clear. Kadar made a trip to Moscow in December, and reportedly won Brezhnev's approval for preservation of a moderate line.

At the mid-December meeting of Warsaw Pact ideological officials in Sofia, the participants again disagreed, not only about policy toward dissidents, but also about what measures should be taken against elements sympathetic to Eurocommunist ideas within East European parties. The Soviets reportedly lined up with the East Germans, Czechoslovaks, and Bulgarians against the Hungarians, while the Poles stood somewhere between the two extremes.

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As late as February, however, the Soviets were still thrashing about in search of a satisfactory approach. In that month CPSU Central Committee Secretary Kapitonov traveled to Prague, where he reportedly criticized the Czechoslovaks on two counts: for not moving soon enough against the Chartists to nip the movement in the bud; and for then overreacting to the Chartist problem with heavyhanded repression, thereby stirring up more dissent. Husak must have felt that he was "damned if he did, and damned if he didn't." The impression conveyed is that Moscow expected the Czechoslovaks to solve their problems but that the Soviets themselves hardly knew what sort of action was required.

At least by early March, when East European ideology secretaries met again in Sofia, it appears that the Soviets decided to come down in favor of a tough approach. They dispatched three Central Committee secretaries—Ponomarev, Zimyanin, and Katushev—to this meeting, an indication of the importance they attached to it. Most reporting indicates that the Soviets pressed harder than previously for a policy of firm repression. Although the Hungarians once again defended their more flexible line, the Soviets reportedly argued for tough action. The Poles, who also were not enthusiastic about implementing a crackdown, have reportedly been pressed by both the Soviets and the Czechoslovaks since the conference.

B. The Eurocommunists

In an effort to bring the Eurocommunists to heel, the Soviets have since January used every lever available to them, including the "power of the purse," and the threat of compromising some West European parties by revealing details of their past collaboration with Moscow. The Soviets have even raised the possibility of attempting to infiltrate and split recalcitrant parties.

It is possible that some Soviet leaders have reached the end of their patience with the Eurocommunists, and have decided that for their own interests in Eastern Europe it is more desirable to have small loyal parties in Western Europe than large rebellious ones. Ponomarev in early February, referring to Berlinguer as a "monstrous opportunist," reportedly stated that it would be "worthless" for the PCI to come to power by means of an election. Ponomarev indicated that he regarded the Eurocommunists as the main prop for East European dissidents, and believed their ideas were infecting the entire Communist movement.

At the Sofia meeting in December, the Soviets are reported to have expressed the opinion that although the influence of the Eurocommunists was growing, this influence was of questionable value because the

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Eurocommunists had renounced the principle of the "dictatorship of the proletariat." The Soviets also apparently raised the possibility of attempting to split some West European parties, and they may have made good their threat. Whether or not the Soviets were directly involved, one Western party has already divided. In late February the doctrinaire faction of the Swedish Communist Party formed a new pro-Soviet party; the split came over the issue of human rights. Finnish Communist Party leaders have long suspected that Moscow is providing stronger backing to the Stalinist wing of their party.

The Soviets also have tried to influence the Eurocommunists by peer pressure. In early January, at a secret meeting in Moscow of pro-Soviet West European Communist parties, Suslov reportedly rallied the faithful to the banner of "proletarian internationalism," and warned them against being seduced by Eurocommunist ideas. The Soviets have relied heavily on the loyal Austrian Communist Party to make representations for them, and sent Cunhal of Portugal on a tour of European capitals to drum up support for their human rights stand. They even employed the head of the Uruguay Communist Party, reportedly to remind the Eurocommunists that they were only one portion of a larger, international movement centered in Moscow.

Moscow also employed more direct pressure, especially on the Italian Communist Party. A Soviet delegation to Italy in January reportedly threatened to expose publicly past support of the Italian party for Soviet activities, which could prove embarrassing to the party, if the Italians did not cut back their criticism of Soviet internal policies. Having brandished the stick, the Soviets produced the carrot. Later in January they reportedly offered generous funding to an Italian party delegation to Moscow, provided the Italians would tone down their criticism. At this meeting Ponomarev threatened the Italian delegation with a public condemnation, vowing that "if you don't stop, we will attack you frontally." Reportedly, the Soviets also threatened to cut off funding of the Danish Communist Party if it took a "foolish" position on the human rights issue. The Danes were reminded bluntly that without Soviet support, they would amount to "zero."

C. The US

Meanwhile, the Soviets reacted to US public efforts to intercede on behalf of beleaguered Soviet dissidents in an uncompromising manner, not only by public denunciations of US "interference" in Soviet internal affairs, but also by taking actions against some of the dissidents specifically mentioned in US public protests.

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Although the Soviets may not have been as alarmed and angry as their public pronouncements made them appear, they were clearly taken aback and at least initially confused by the new US administration's concentration on the human rights issue. KGB chief Andropov reportedly told his counterpart that the leadership found President Carter's statements on the issue "bewildering."

There was also a search for ulterior motives behind the US attention to the human rights theme. A staff member told [redacted] that Brezhnev and other leaders had "closed minds" about the human rights controversy.

Some Soviet officials chalked up the human rights "campaign" to President Carter's "inexperience," failure to recognize the structural limits to the flexibility of the Soviet system, and "misunderstanding" of the differing historical experiences of the Russian and American people. Others claimed to see the "campaign" as an effort by the President to improve his domestic political position, or a tactical move to lower Soviet prestige in the eyes of the world.

Still others may have believed their own propaganda, and regarded the human rights offensive as a deliberate effort at subversion by the US. This was one view put out by Soviet officials in conversations with Western and East European officials. A staff member told [redacted] in late February that some Soviet leaders viewed the President's letter to Sakharov as a fundamental effort to undermine the Soviet system. Hungarian party officials indicated to [redacted] that the human rights issue was seen by the Soviets as more damaging to Soviet-US relations than the Vietnam war had been, because "then you were bombing Hanoi, but now you are bombing Moscow."

The charge of subversion was also adopted by Soviet propagandists. On March 4 *Izvestia* attacked two former US embassy officers and one current officer (all of them Jewish). On the basis of their contacts with Jewish dissidents in Moscow, *Izvestia* charged these officers with engaging in espionage. In February several Jewish dissidents were arrested while entering the US embassy with embassy officers, whose company had previously

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afforded them protection. In January, for the first time since 1970, a US newsman was expelled from the Soviet Union, probably because of his contacts with dissidents. Meanwhile, the major Leningrad daily implied that the contacts of the West German consul general with dissidents also constituted involvement in espionage. In this way, the Soviets attempted to limit the access of Westerners in the Soviet Union to the dissident community.

D. Internal Repression

The current campaign against dissent, however, predates the change in US administrations. It had its origin in the Soviet desire to clean house and silence the dissidents before the Belgrade review conference was convened. Indeed, some dissidents have charged that the climate in the Soviet Union worsened immediately after, and as a direct result of, the signing of the Helsinki Accords. Bukovsky, among others, charged that conditions in his prison "tangibly worsened" after Helsinki. Particularly ominous have been suggestions that violence and threats of violence against dissidents have increased since Helsinki. There have been several mysterious "accidental" deaths, and more than the usual number of beatings and anonymous death threats.

The US administration's statements defending Soviet dissidents apparently did lead to an acceleration of the crackdown. Since the turn of the year, the Soviets have moved to cripple the Orlov group and its regional subgroups, arresting leading members, encouraging others to emigrate, harassing or threatening others.

In addition, the Soviets have recently made efforts to link the dissidents with espionage activities. In early April the mother of recently arrested Jewish dissident Shcharansky was told by prison officials that her son "might" be tried for treason. The *Izvestia* article which accused US embassy officers of engaging in espionage made similar charges against several Jewish dissidents on the basis of their contacts with US officials. And in early March, in a demarche to Ambassador Toon, First Deputy Foreign Minister Korniyenko used unusually threatening language against Sakharov, denouncing him as a "renegade," and an "enemy of the state." Almost certainly, the use of such language is merely a scare tactic. Although several dissidents were questioned as to their whereabouts on the day of the metro bombing, a US newsman was unofficially told that the authorities did not intend to charge dissidents with this act. Not since Stalin has an intellectual dissident been tried for treason.

Even during the last few months, the Soviets have made a few conciliatory gestures. In March Jewish dissident Shtern was released from

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prison before his term was up, and Leningrad dissident Borisov was released from a psychiatric hospital. The authorities continue to allow some dissidents to emigrate, and to try to win over those on the fringes of the dissident movement. Recently they have attempted to co-opt "unofficial" artists into the system by relaxing restrictions on unconventional art and by offering some of the artists membership in official artists' unions. This month a controversial symbolist play, suppressed for over a decade, was allowed to open in a Moscow theater.

III. A Current Assessment

To a considerable extent, Soviet attempts to silence internal and external critics have paid off. The Eurocommunists have toned down their criticism, if only for the time being. Italian Communist Party Secretary Cervetti, who traveled to Moscow in late January reportedly promised the Soviets that the Italian party's criticism of East European violations of human rights "would not go too far," agreed to stop preparation of a party critique of East European repression, and assured the Soviets that Berlinguer would try to prevent Marchais and Carrillo from using the coming "summit" between the three Eurocommunist leaders as a platform to criticize the CPSU. At the Madrid summit in early March the three Eurocommunist leaders issued a tepid communique endorsing the "full application" of the Helsinki Accords without mentioning the Soviet Union or other East European countries. The Eurocommunists will continue to be a thorn in Moscow's side, but for the moment they have succumbed to Soviet pressure and have retreated.

The US, even before the Vance visit, began to make its statements on human rights less pointed. The Soviets must also be pleased that, generally speaking, West European governments have not enthusiastically supported this aspect of US diplomacy. Reportedly, the Soviets would have regarded the human rights controversy much more seriously had West European governments unequivocally followed Washington's lead.

Even the more independent East European regimes have, like the Soviet Union, firmly rebutted Western criticism—whether emanating from Communists or capitalists. Support for Eurocommunism in Yugoslavia and Romania is based essentially on a desire for independence from the Soviet Union, not on a commitment to human rights. Neither Tito nor Ceausescu is likely to accept Western Communists' tutelage in this area. The Yugoslavs and Romanians are willing to be in the same camp with the Soviets in pursuing a firm policy against dissidents when the only alternative is internal instability.

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In Eastern Europe the Soviets probably continue to find it difficult to impose a uniform tough policy. Were it not for their desire to enforce a crackdown elsewhere in Eastern Europe, Kadar's continued moderation would probably not disturb them, since Hungary has no major dissident problem. But making an exception in the case of Hungary weakens the Soviet case for a repressive policy in Poland; the Soviets remain uneasy about Gierek's ability to keep the lid on popular unrest. Nevertheless, they perhaps console themselves that neither Poland, Czechoslovakia, or East Germany—the three countries where unrest has been greatest—has a government that is disloyal to the Soviets or seriously infected with Eurocommunist ideas. They probably remain reasonably confident that no East European regime will turn "revisionist" to the extent of succumbing to the pressures of dissident elements, as happened in Czechoslovakia in 1968.

Meanwhile, the euphoria with which most Soviet dissidents initially welcomed US public expressions of concern about their plight is fading in the wake of the Vance visit to Moscow. Even earlier, Roy Medvedev had reportedly expressed the view that President Carter's statements were harming rather than helping the dissidents, a criticism which provoked Sakharov to call Medvedev a "traitor." Medvedev, however, had always disagreed with Sakharov about the value of nonsocialist Western support. More indicative of the changing mood was a statement Aleksandr Ginsburg's wife made to US embassy officers before Vance arrived. While she applauded the US stand on human rights, she said that she now felt that only "quiet diplomacy" could bring Soviet authorities to release her husband. Since Vance's departure, other Soviet dissidents have been extremely depressed. They had expected much from the visit, believing that it "just-must" improve their situation.

The Soviets originally believed that they could afford to permit a greater degree of contact between their citizens and the outside world, or they would never have entered into the Helsinki agreement, allowed greater contact between East and West Germany, or stopped jamming some Western radio broadcasts to the Soviet Union in 1973. The events of the past year and a half, however, have given the Soviets pause, and reason to reexamine their policies. Some leaders have probably decided that acquiescence on Basket III was a mistake.

 the Soviet government misjudged the reactions of its own citizens and of Eastern Europe to Helsinki.

Conclusions

Objectively, Soviet dissent does not appear to pose a serious threat to the Soviet system, but Soviet officials may perceive a greater danger than

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exists in fact. Both Russian history and Leninist ideology impel them to exaggerate the potential importance of opposing groups, however small. They have always been preoccupied with problems of control.

It is not merely intellectual dissent that disturbs the Soviets. They fear that the "freer movement of people and ideas" which they conceded on paper at Helsinki, and which to a certain extent the circumstances of a modern technological world force upon them, will open their society to a whole host of ideas and influences from the West that are, in their view, not only politically subversive but socially disruptive and morally unhealthy. Identifying Western concepts of liberty with license, they are apprehensive that extensive contact with the "decadent" West will expose the Soviet people not only to alien political ideas but also to crime, terrorism, pornography, and drugs, which could combine to produce a general breakdown of order and discipline. To the extent that they are concerned about the stagnation of their economy, the Soviets may also fear that consumer dissatisfaction will become a more serious political problem in future years.

Differences exist within the leadership as to how best to handle dissent. Ironically, there is some reason to suspect that KGB chief Andropov is less inclined to move in the direction of more repression. Senior party secretary Suslov, the chief party ideologist, and Ponomarev, head of the Central Committee International Department, favor a harder ideological line at home.

The importance the leadership as a whole attaches to dissent can be seen by the fact that decisions about individual dissidents are sometimes made at the Politburo level. Over the last few years Politburo members have reportedly made the decisions on such matters as conductor Rostropovich's application for a passport extension, and artist Neizvestny's application to emigrate.

Soviet leaders probably realize they cannot eradicate dissent altogether. They could round up several dozen of the more visible dissidents and forcibly deport them, but such a "surgical strike" would only temporarily cripple the dissident movement. Dissent has become endemic to Soviet society; new dissidents would appear to replace those who had departed. Indeed, except for Sakharov, the most important individual involved in dissent since Helsinki—Orlov—is a man who was unknown to the West two years ago. In any event, campaigns of repression are difficult to sustain for long periods, since they run the danger of aggravating the problem they were

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intended to solve. Thus, the Soviets have not attempted to "solve" their dissident problem, but merely to control it through a combination of coercive and conciliatory measures.

In view of their recent successes, it is unlikely that the Soviets will see the need to deal with the dissident problem in the Soviet Union in more drastic fashion. A renewal of Western criticism, combined with a further increase in internal dissent, could lead to some further ideological tightening and to further restrictions on contacts between Westerners and Soviet citizens, if necessary at the cost of damaging relations with Western countries. The Soviets could, for example, begin jamming Western broadcasts again, prohibit dissident meetings with Western newsmen and diplomats altogether, and prevent correspondence and telephone calls from reaching dissidents.

Clearly, however, the Soviet leadership has no desire, if indeed it has the power, to move in the direction of reinstating the Stalinist terror apparatus. The bureaucracy itself suffered greatly in the past from arbitrary and irregular proceedings, and feels more secure with the modicum of legality which now exists. Probably the most important restraint on Soviet behavior toward dissidents is the world view of Soviet leaders themselves. Although the developments since Helsinki have raised doubts about the popular mood in the minds of some leaders, most Soviet leaders probably retain a fundamental faith that their policies are generally accepted by the bulk of the Soviet population. Their belief in the superiority and success of their system probably makes them generally confident of their ability to keep dissent within manageable limits by continued carrot-and-stick tactics, without a reversion to Draconian measures.

The Soviet appraisal of the dissident problem in Eastern Europe is much more pessimistic. Last winter some Soviet leaders were probably genuinely alarmed that post-Helsinki conditions were creating an unstable situation there, especially in Poland, where the climate is still tense. Should a major explosion yet occur in Eastern Europe, the Soviets would not hesitate to respond with military force, accompanied by harsh prophylactic measures against dissidents within the Soviet Union itself.

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*The author of this paper is
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Regional Analysis. Comments and queries are
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