

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

3395

CONFIDENTIAL

INFORMATION

May 16, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY KISSINGER

FROM:

Mr. Clift 

SUBJECT:

Your Meeting with Gromyko: Soviet
Impatience at CSCE Growing

In a two hour conversation with Ambassador Sherer on May 15, Soviet CSCE delegation head Kovalev focused on problems of concern to the Soviet delegation and asked what steps were necessary to bring Stage II to a quick conclusion. Kovalev alluded several times to the need to have a clear idea of U.S. positions on CSCE issues before Foreign Minister Gromyko's meeting with you in Vienna. Several of the substantive issues raised specifically by Kovalev included:

-- Working conditions for journalists: the Soviets are annoyed by what they view as a tougher U.S. position on this Basket III text; Kovalev even accused the U.S. of trying to unite the NATO Allies on this subject. Ambassador Sherer reports that the Allies are indeed now united in pursuing the main points in this text -- travel, individuals as news sources and no expulsion for pursuit of professional activity.

-- CBM's: Kovalev asked what the Soviets should do to reach early agreement on this item and Sherer urged him to come forward soon with maximum moves toward Western positions on numerical parameters.

-- Timing: Kovalev said the Soviets are now prepared to do everything possible to move forward. He asked for U.S. view of the key issues which would bring an early conclusion to Stage II and was told travel, journalists and CBM's.

Kovalev's demarche to Ambassador Sherer is the latest indication of growing Soviet impatience at their inability to wrap up Stage II quickly and without major concessions. In fact, their obvious need to fulfill Brezhnev's timetable of a Stage III conclusion this summer has the Soviets in a corner and, so far, their pressures and bluster aimed at the allied and neutral participants have not produced agreement on the unbalanced pro-East texts they are seeking.

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It therefore would seem very much in our interests to impress upon Gromyko the need for the USSR to take a more reasonable position on issues of importance to the West, and, at the same time, for us to encourage the Allies to stay together and hold their ground in the coming weeks. The Soviets should be forced either to make important concessions or face a major political reverse -- and will probably opt for the former.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

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May 16, 1975

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THE SECRETARY'S PRINCIPALS' AND REGIONALS' STAFF MEETING,
Monday, May 16, 1975, 8:00 a.m.

- pp 2 - 7 Withdrawal of US forces from Thailand. The reaction of Mayaguez affair. Secretary requests he consider any US response to Thai complaints. He is opposed to apologizing to Thailand.
- pp 7 - 14 MAP and economic assistance for Greece. Formulas for a Cyprus solution.
- pp 14-17 Discussion of consultation with Congress on our Egyptian assistance effort.
- pp 18-19 Philippine situation as it relates to our bases.
- pp 20-23 Secretary asks for a list of agreement letters, notes, etc., upon which our military presence in Thailand is based, particularly any "secret" agreements involving US obligations.
- pp 23-29 US policy in a "Congo type" situation in Angola discussed. Secretary asks for US foreign policy decision memorandum with two or three major options to avoid a Congo type situation.
- pp 29-36 OAS developments. Election for Secretary General. Panama, China and Cuban issues mentioned. Rogers will brief the Secretary on OAS elections before vote Saturday afternoon.
- pp 36-41 Need for decision on capacity for uranium enrichment. NSC involvement in decision process.
- pp 39-41 OECD and IEA presentations
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- pp 41-44 CSCE conversations status. Plans for the Chiefs of State meeting discussed.

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SECRETARY KISSINGER: He may be on very weak ground.

MR. KATZ: It's supposed to be a private project. The whole idea was privatization, and it will rest on a substantial contribution from the U. S. Treasury.

MR. INGERSOLL: And any guarantees. In fact, it's all guarantee.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: That may be. I'm not for Lynn, but I'm for Lynn getting a hearing.

MR. INGERSOLL: Yes.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: He can raise just too much havoc if he doesn't.

How about the OECD presentation?

MR. KATZ: I think that's coming along pretty well. I mean that's essentially elaboration of your Kansas City speech, but that's coming along well.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Yes, but that has to be cleared with the other agencies too.

MR. KATZ: Yes.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: O.K. Art? I mean with a different philosophical framework -- or at least with a philosophical framework.

MR. HARTMAN: On the CSCE, I think both in your

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conversations with Schmidt and with Gromyko the date is going to loom large. The Soviets are coming in now from all sides saying they definitely want to nail us down and they want to have a meeting in July. They're very concerned about any efforts -- either consciously or not through design -- to postpone it into the fall. I think, also, the European leadership is going in the same direction.

We know a little bit of that from the Germans. They want to fix the schedule. They want to fix their calendars, and Schmidt particularly -- he's thinking of the third week in July -- so that will come up at that time.

The Europeans have come up with a minimum package now to really wind up that Conference, and we're supporting it. It has everything in it that one could expect, and there are some concessions the Soviets are going to have to make.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I don't know what I expect. What does it have in it?

MR. HARTMAN: It has the minimum acceptable texts on all of the humanitarian affairs. You've got family reunification, marriage texts -- what are the others?

MR. HYLAND: Travel.

MR. HARTMAN: Travel.

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MR. HYLAND: Radio broadcasting, exchange of information -- radio broadcasting where there will not be a commitment.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Will I get a memo?

MR. HARTMAN: You will have a memo which should be with you now, which gives you a status report.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Where is it, Jerry?
Where are any of these memos?

MR. ADAMS: I think they're in your action folders.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: This I have to read before I go to Europe.

MR. HARTMAN: On dates, I'd like to be able to tell people -- for example, on the President's schedule in Brussels -- give them the exact hour.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: You can not, until I have shown it to the President.

MR. HARTMAN: I wondered whether you had done that.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I can't show that to the President until my friends here put it in my folder to take to the President.

O.K. As soon as that's done, I'll take it to the

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President, along with his statement. Where is that?

MR. ADAMS: It's in a special folder.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: If you want me to take it up with the President, you might put it in the folder with the papers that I'm taking to the President. That isn't an unreasonable request, is it? (Laughter.) It doesn't mean I'm harassing you.

MR. HYLAND: According to what Art said, my figures say there will be 175 hours in speeches at the CSC (laughter) -- if the present plan prevails.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Which is what?

MR. HARTMAN: 20 minutes ahead of that.

MR. HYLAND: 20 minutes ahead. But this is --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: How can that be?

MR. LORD: That with 50 countries? (Laughter.)

MR. HYLAND: I'm just kidding. This is an issue that has to be taken up -- how long it's going to last.

MR. HARTMAN: Schmidt would like to have five days in order to allow for good long bilaterals with people.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: It's absolutely out of the question. Our press will kill us. It will be an unbelievable nightmare to have five days.

MR. HYLAND: Most Europeans want at least four.

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MR. HARTMAN: The signature is on the last day; three days of speeches.

MR. HYLAND: Three days of speeches; one day of ceremonies.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I think it will be ridiculed in our press as a total fraud.

MR. HYLAND: But as a practical problem we will have three full days of speeches. And, presumably, every Head of State has to sit there while his colleagues speak.

MR. HARTMAN: If you could ever persuade the Western countries to nominate representative spokesmen. But I can't imagine a guy going there and not wanting to say something. We can discuss it.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: On the other hand, I think three days of speeches and one day of ceremonies, plus the bilaterals that will be inevitable is going to be a nightmare.

MR. HYLAND: You'll probably want to talk to Gromyko about this because I don't think the Russians particularly want to have Brezhnev to sit there for three or four days. They happen to be one of the few countries who want to keep it down.

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

RG 59 ENTRY 5339
BOX 7 SOVIET UNION
APR MAY 1975

SECRET/NODIS/XGDS

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:

Andrey A. Gromyko, Member of the Politburo of the Central Committee, CPSU and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR

Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, Ambassador to the United States

Georgi M. Korniyenko, Chief of the American Department and Member of the Collegium, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Vasily G. Makarov, Chef de Cabinet to the Foreign Minister

Oleg M. Sokolov, Chief, American Section of the American Department

Viktor M. Sukhodrev, Counsellor, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Interpreter)

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Ambassador Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., Ambassador to the USSR

Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor of the Department of State

Arthur A. Hartman, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs

William G. Hyland, Director, INR

Jan M. Lodal, NSC Staff

Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff *PR*

DATE AND TIME:

Monday, May 19, 1975
6:15 - 8:35 p. m.

PLACE:

Gobelin Saal
Hotel Imperial
Vienna, Austria

SUBJECT:

CSCE

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CLASSIFIED BY HENRY A. KISSINGER
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Gromyko: [points to portrait on wall, next to tapestry] There is a good view of a hunter there. It's good for Sonnenfeldt. We need a wild boar.

Kissinger: Sonnenfeldt will shoot it.

Gromyko: Perhaps, as we agreed, we could start by having an exchange on European affairs and the European Security Conference.

Kissinger: I agree. And Mr. Foreign Minister, since we're technically on our ground, I'd like to take this opportunity to reaffirm what I told you privately:

The basic line of United States policy remains intact and we are determined to overcome problems where differences exist. I want to say this in front of my colleagues, and I was asked specifically by President Ford to say this.

Gromyko: Let me say briefly what I've just had occasion to tell the Secretary of State personally, that the line of the Soviet Union towards the United States is the same as the line that has taken shape in recent years mainly as a result of the Soviet-American summits and the documents signed by the two countries. We, for our part, are rigorously following that line and we believe both sides should pursue it. We feel we should not allow events or any countries or combination of countries to cause any harm to that policy or the principles underlying that policy. In other words, we should follow the line to strengthen detente and Soviet-American relations and strengthen peace.

That is something that reflects the thinking of the entire Soviet leadership and of General Secretary Brezhnev personally.

Kissinger: Should we turn to European matters?

Gromyko: Yes, I think we should turn to European matters and take up the European Security Conference first.

Kissinger: As one of the world's great experts on the European Security Conference and as the only Foreign Minister who has read the documents, why don't you start.

Gromyko: I don't know.

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Kissinger: Did I tell you the story about Vladivostok, how you undermined the President's confidence in me?

Gromyko: Yes.

Kissinger: He [the President] turned to me and asked "What is he talking about?" and I said I didn't know. [Laughter]. That problem is settled -- between "equal validity" and "equal applicability." I had two difficulties -- I couldn't tell the difference between the two positions, and what is more embarrassing for a Foreign Minister, I didn't know which side had which position. [Laughter].

Gromyko: Your mind must have been on more significant matters than the European Security Conference.

Kissinger: It's now solved, isn't it?

Gromyko: Let us then turn to those matters, and I trust our discussion will be both serious and productive.

Kissinger: That is our intention.

Gromyko: I may have to say some words on this subject that may not be very pleasant for you to hear. Maybe pleasant, but not very pleasant.

Kissinger: The Foreign Minister is a disciple of Maréchal Foch, always on the attack.

Gromyko: Of late we have formed the impression that the American position at the Conference has become harsher and tougher on several matters related to the European Security Conference and the questions in that forum. In the past the Soviet Union and the United States have in several examples shown they can cooperate quite well. In this context, I'd like to refer to the understanding you and I reached in Geneva on peaceful change of frontiers, and there are other examples of such cooperation. But of late -- I say this just half in jest -- I say it's as if someone has switched somebody else for the American delegation at Geneva, though it's the same good people. Someone has done this.

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Kissinger: Sonnenfeldt.

Gromyko: I hope the line pursued by the United States will be a line aimed at removing differences and reaching agreement. Of course, only you can give clarity to this situation. I say this by way of introductory remarks and I'm sure you'll have something to say in reply.

Kissinger: Mr. Foreign Minister, I'm aware of your view that the United States has perhaps not proceeded as rapidly as desirable. I do not believe this is the case. I believe perhaps it's the Soviet Union that has not made all the moves it could. Be that as it may, I have reviewed the European Security Conference and we believe it's possible to conclude the European Security Conference in substantially the time frame we've discussed, and concluded at the summit level, and have it all concluded by the end of July.

So perhaps we could most usefully spend our time on what needs to be done.

Kissinger: The principles are done. Quadripartite rights and responsibilities. We have the problem of Basket III, of confidence-building machinery, and while we are here we should say something about how it [the summit] should be conducted -- the length of time, speeches, if you're ready.

Gromyko: I am ready.

Kissinger: So that's how we think we should spend the time.

Gromyko: I certainly agree to that approach. Let's direct our gaze into the future and see how we can do away with the remaining complexities and difficulties and see how we can conclude in the period we have agreed upon.

Kissinger: On confidence-building measures, the differences concern the number of days of prior notification, the depth of the zone to be covered, and the size of forces that would be concerned. Those are the three issues.

Regarding the length of time, the Soviet view is 14 days and the Western view is 40 days.

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Hartman: 49 days..

Kissinger: [to Hartman]: How did we arrive at that?

Hartman: Seven weeks.

Gromyko: Ours is 12 days.

Kissinger: Well, we won't accept 12.

On the depth of the area, we have said 500 kilometers, and you had said 100 kilometers. On the size of forces, you had said 30-35,000, informally. What is the formal position.

Hartman: 40,000.

Kissinger: And we had said 20-25,000.

We are prepared to find a compromise on all of these points, and not to insist on our position, if you don't insist on yours. And we could instruct our delegations accordingly to find a compromise.

Gromyko: Let's take up point by point. Depth.

Kissinger: On depth, we'd be prepared to settle in the middle, say 300 kilometers, we had said 500 and you had said 100.

Gromyko: [Thinks] That is not the basis. Even now, 100, when you say it takes all the territory, when compared to Western Europe, our territory is larger, and the whole line, from north to the south. Try to compare it--all the territory, a stripe down.

Kissinger: There is more territory because the Soviet Union is larger?

Gromyko: Eastern Europe is covered. But this is not taken into account by your and the Western European delegations.

You mentioned formal and informal positions.

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Sonnenfeldt: On numbers.

Gromyko: No, on depth.

Kissinger: We gave you no informal position on that.

Gromyko: On numbers.

[Kissinger and Sonnenfeldt confer]

150. I think 150 is much larger if you compare the territory.

Dobrynin: In square miles.

Kissinger: Our problem is some of our allies -- I don't want to mention names because we don't want to be in the position of negotiating separately--say that 300 is their minimum. So we want to agree on something that has a chance to be implemented. I really think the lowest number we could get without difficulty or checking with our allies is 250 kilometers. This is not bargaining because I've taken no interest, but we think that's the lowest.

Gromyko: 150 is our position. This is on depth.

On numbers.....

Kissinger: The official allied figure is 12,000. Our personal compromise is 20-25,000. Your position is 30-35,000.

Gromyko: Yes.

Kissinger: If we would get everything else worked out, we'd recommend to our allies something between 25-30,000 and that would bring us very close to each other.

[There is a conference on the Soviet side.]

Gromyko: On 30,000, that's good. We would be prepared to agree on that, but without being conditioned on another condition. 30,000, that we could agree on, because that represents the maximum you

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are prepared to agree to and it's the minimum we are prepared to accept, but we cannot accept the other figure regarding depth. But the area of the Soviet Union that would be subject to notification would be greater than all of the area in Western Europe.

As regards the third element, that is, the time of notification, frankly speaking we believe this question is raised especially artificially. Why should we be expected to give two months' notice in advance?

Kissinger: Seven weeks. So we can mobilize to go to war.

Gromyko: Let us reason coolly on this. Maybe for one country, one regiment or two or an entire division is a great force which, when it starts moving, really causes the whole world to shake, and maybe they take three or four months to plan. It may take three months for them to get boots and uniforms fitted. But for us a division is nothing.

Kissinger: You're talking about number.

Gromyko: I'm talking about preparation.

Kissinger: My view is, when we need the warning we won't get it, and when we get the warning we won't need it. If one is going to attack, one can violate the agreement.

So I'm not going to insist on seven weeks. I was supporting you. Because I was prepared to settle for six and one-half weeks.

Gromyko: I was just about to come out in solidarity with you when you said the same thing about me.

Two weeks.

Sonnenfeldt: From twelve to fourteen days.

Gromyko: Two weeks ahead of time we notify you that 30,000 troops are about to move.

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Kissinger: In two weeks that information couldn't possibly get from the Secretary of Defense to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. They couldn't put it on the agenda of a NATO meeting in two weeks.

Gromyko: Maybe we should put an effort to rectify matters where it is really needed.

Two weeks.

Kissinger: I gave up four days; you gave up two days. How about 30 days?

Gromyko: Mr. Secretary, I can't give an agreement to that because we think, especially after what you said about the real importance of such matters, that someone is just giving vent to psychology matters.

Kissinger: The whole thing is psychological.

Gromyko: The whole thing is being lauded to the skies.

Kissinger: But you want it to be, because that gives the European Security Conference its importance.

Gromyko: You think it's that that will give it importance.

Kissinger: No, it's "equal applicability" compared to "equal validity."

Gromyko: Is that Mintoff's view?

Kissinger: Mintoff got a tremendous reception in the People's Republic of China and hasn't been the same since.

Gromyko: We read about that.

Kissinger: The minimum we could convince our friends to do is 25 days.

Gromyko: In that case we will have to leave that question open.

Kissinger: All right. Then we have depth and warning....

Gromyko: We cannot accept that figure.

Far more important than this question of number of days are the questions of depth and warning. On numbers, like Apollo, we've managed a docking.

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Kissinger: If it's too short a time and too narrow [an area], it has no significance.

Dobrynin: Here, you can pick up the telephone and call anywhere in two minutes.

Gromyko: Mintoff must have frightened everybody.

Kissinger: A very persuasive man.

Gromyko: He must be virtually terrorizing everyone at the Conference.

Kissinger: He's threatening to join Libya.

Gromyko: Let me add to that, that those who want agreement on a different time should give earnest thinking to our latest proposal. And generally speaking, a strange phenomenon is visible at the Conference, that it's only the Soviet Union and the Socialist countries that should retreat and retreat and retreat and then we'll come to an agreement.

You know our delegation at the Conference has told the Conference that the Soviet Union is prepared to send notification to all participating countries and not only to those bordering on the Soviet Union.

Then when we mention a depth of 100 kilometers, that depth will apply also to Turkey.

Kissinger: What do you mean?

Hyland: Turkey has to notify countries of movements 100 kilometers from its borders.

Gromyko: Turkey won't have to notify everyone of movements, but only those 100 kilometers from its borders.

Kissinger: Not on Bulgaria and Greece. [to Sonnenfeldt:] Well, what's your answer?

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Gromyko: I'm sure your advisers are advising you to accept that proposal.

Dobrynin: They're all making notes urging you to agree.

Makarov: Even Sonnenfeldt.

Gromyko: Even Sonnenfeldt.

Try measuring in terms of square mileage the size of the zone about which we intend to give notification.

Kissinger: Yes, but that's not the problem. It cannot be done on the basis of territory, but it has to be done in terms relevant to the problem people are concerned about.

Dobrynin: It's on the whole border, north to south.

Kissinger: Let me say this: that the problem of voluntary notification raises this problem. When we testify to Congress we will say that though its voluntary, we will expect it to be done, and if it is done and not notified, it will be inconsistent with the spirit of the treaty.

Sonnenfeldt: Agreement.

Kissinger: Agreement. If it is not voluntary, since we will hold you to it anyway, we could be more flexible on other elements.

Gromyko: When we mention the figures we are prepared to accept, we can accept them only on the condition that the principle of the voluntary notification is recognized. This is the principle we discussed with you at Geneva. All we accept is conditioned on that.

Kissinger: Yes.

Gromyko: And we discussed it with France and England, and they accepted. So we consider that's accepted.

Kissinger: Yes, but

Gromyko: We received the suggestion of the form of words from Britain or NATO; we are not entirely satisfied with those, but we have some amendments. Not big ones, but some amendments.

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Let me also say, if the voluntary principle is accepted, the mechanism of notification would operate more effectively in fact than if some other principle will be agreed upon. It's a less sharply worded formula, and would affect the scheme of things less than the other formula. It would be more acceptable politically and legally, and would in fact be more effective. I want to emphasize, more effective.

Kissinger: But in fact that means there would be notification.

Gromyko: Yes.

Kissinger: And we would testify to that effect to Congress.

Dobrynin: Yes, Henry.

Gromyko: If you are prepared to look into this British formula, we are prepared to discuss an amendment to it.

Kissinger: May I see it?

Sukhodrev: This is in Russian, sir.

Gromyko: But we are prepared to lend it to you in Russian. At a very low interest rate.

[Hartman looks for it]

If you are prepared, I could make our suggestions

[Sukhodrev hands over Tab A. Hartman discusses it with Secretary Kissinger]

Korniyenko: The top part, Mr. Secretary.

Sukhodrev: The top part is the British.

Kissinger: What's the second part?

Korniyenko: Some neutral countries.

Gromyko: Don't pay attention to that.

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Korniyenko: The Minister would like to suggest some changes in the British text.

Gromyko: My suggestion is the following:

Sukhodrev: Here is the amendment.

Kissinger: We'll agree to take it out if you add 50 kilometers.

Gromyko: We already added 50 kilometers. [laughter]

Kissinger: 50 more. We have both learned that in some parts of the world that you never get paid anything for services already rendered.

[There is a conference on the Soviet side.]

Gromyko: The preamble does not cause enthusiasm.

Kissinger: I have no particular recollection of this preamble. If this is the agreed text, I have no problem with deleting "therefore" from the preamble. Let us check it. If this is correct text, we agreed to drop "therefore."

Gromyko: This is the original English.

Kissinger: We'll agree to drop the word "therefore". If the British disavow this, then we're in a new situation. But on the assumption that this is the agreed text, we agree to drop the word "therefore".

Gromyko: Check with your delegation and verify it.

Kissinger: We will do it tonight. By the end of the meeting tomorrow, we'll have it.

Gromyko: What I've told you is my tentative concern. Tentative.

Kissinger: We just want to check. If they confirm it, we agree to drop the word "therefore".

Gromyko: The Third Basket.

Kissinger: We'll leave this then. I just want to check. We have not settled the issues of depth.....

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Dobrynin: And timing.

Kissinger: And length of notification.

Can I have a 3-minute break?

[There was a break from 7:25 to 7:34 p.m. The meeting then reconvened.]

Makarov: [Shows a bottle of mineral water on the table labeled Güssinger.] Kussinger.

Kissinger: I saw it. I had the same idea.

Gromyko: Cult of personality. [Laughter]

[Kissinger and Sonnenfeldt confer]

Kissinger: Shall we leave the confidence-building measures now and go to Basket III. Have we finished?

Gromyko: Let's take up Basket III.

Kissinger: All right.

Gromyko: Let me ask you: Is it your intention to set up a state within a state? Because that's a new one in international practice. Up until now we have spoken in terms of -- and this is something you have spoken of on several occasions -- that domestic legislation must be respected. Now it appears -- and I repeat you have spoken of it on several occasions -- that newsmen are to set up a state within a state?

Kissinger: That's already the case in the United States.

Gromyko: On that we can only sympathize with you, but here we are dealing with an international agreement.

Kissinger: We have made a major effort to get our allies to make a global proposal on Basket III, where in turn, we have made a major effort to meet your concerns. If this is acceptable as the basic approach, in Geneva we could instruct our delegation to be flexible in dealing with yours and make an effort to meet your concerns. But we have made a major effort.

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 BOX 7 SOVIET UNION
 APR-May 7 1974

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BOX 7 SOVIET UNION
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As for journalists, no one has suffered more from journalists than I have, so I have no particular affection for them. But in the United States how it will be received will depend very much on how the press presents it, so to be hard on all the press points would be counterproductive.

Gromyko: To accept it as the basis for discussion wouldn't solve the problem. We would be prepared to discuss the text, but only after we get clarification on what we regard as the most thorny, the most prickly. So let's take those points up one by one.

You, in that text, try to put forward the point of view -- even though not in those literal words -- that journalists should enjoy absolute freedom. If we accept the point of view that both journalists and the practices of the states concerned would take into consideration the laws operating in the country concerned, that would help us overcome that difficulty.

Kissinger: Don't we already have that in there?

Gromyko: But, secondly, there is the question of sources of information and accessibility of those sources.

We see one provision, one clause, which says in effect that there must be free access to information including individuals. Now we see that as a sally against us, and we don't think any state could sign such a clause. We don't have any laws that state that journalists cannot have access to individuals. There are no such laws. So if the present situation continues in being, that should suit everybody concerned. But to demand that we give our stamp of approval to an idea which for some reasons -- and you know best for what reasons -- is aimed against us, is at best an insult.

And there is the clause calling for equality in terms of treatment between journalists and so-called technical personnel. I'm sure there are people who come in your office every couple of months to check on maintenance and so on; it's as if we called them diplomats. Just because they work in the same roof.

Kissinger: Are you sending people into my office to check my telephones?

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Gromyko: It is the same with journalists and technical people -- why should we extend the same rights to them on the same footing? That's not in your interest. That's another one that has thorns in it. Even from a purely technical standpoint, if a certain apparatus is used unlawfully, whatever such persons are called -- whether journalist, technician or an angel -- he'll get slapped down.

Kissinger: There is no question about doing something unlawful. There is no question here of sending TV crews onto your strategic missile bases.

I have to go back to the original question. If we could reach an agreement on this as the basic approach, we could take a look at some of the concerns you raise. We are not saying every point here is on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. I can say now, several of the points you raise here are reasonable -- without going into language.

Gromyko: Let's take out the parts of it that are objectionable, and we will not be against taking it as a basis for discussion.

Then there is another question, and that is the freedom of broadcasting. Where did that question spring from? Let me quite frankly say, do you expect us to sign a document whereby we would be sanctioning the creation of radio stations directed against us and other Socialist countries? Do you expect us to accept that?

Kissinger: We can always try. I didn't think you would notice it.

I understand your point on this one. There are two aspects to this. So that we get to the key issues. I have innumerable times expressed my view on Basket III. I don't think you'll change your system as a result of Basket III.

Gromyko: I think there are grounds for doubts.

Kissinger: This paragraph has to do, to put it crudely, with jamming. I think it's poor drafting. It shouldn't be put in terms of sanctioning broadcasting into the Soviet Union. We'd be prepared to put it into better language.

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Gromyko: The problem here doesn't simply boil down to polishing the text. Because you yourself would never accept calling for broadcasting of all forms of propaganda for friendship, peace, detente....

Kissinger: I wouldn't accept it?

No, it's not a question of polishing the text. It's a question of encouraging information flow and not interfering with legitimate broadcasting. One is a positive concept; one is a negative concept.

Gromyko: The word "legitimate" wouldn't solve anything because immediately we'd come to polarization along ideological lines. You know we'd never accept broadcasting that undermined our system or offended public morality. There are some countries that permit publication of pornography or other materials.

Kissinger: Your objection is to access to individuals as laid down in this document, second to treating technicians as journalists, and to this text. Those are your objections.

Gromyko: No. It's not just freedom of journalists. What about questions of security?

Kissinger: What do you mean by freedom of journalists?

Gromyko: If a journalist drove up to a missile installation, I don't think he'd be comfortable there after a while.

Kissinger: Where is it in the text?

[Hartman indicates for the Secretary the place in the text, in his briefing paper.]

But this makes a specific reference to areas closed for security reasons.

Gromyko: You submitted many versions.

Kissinger: The version we submitted on May 18 refers to "regulations relating to the existence of areas closed for security reasons."

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Gromyko: We have areas closed for security reasons, but we would have to open up some.

Kissinger: [reading from briefing paper] The text says "to ease on a reciprocal basis, the procedures for arranging journeys by foreign journalists, thereby facilitating wider travel by them within the country in which they are exercising their profession subject to the observance of regulations relating to the existence of areas closed for security reasons."

Gromyko: It says "wider" in comparison to the existing situation. It means we would have to get rid of some areas.

Dobrynin: We want the status quo.

Kissinger: My impression is that it's not easy for journalists to travel in the Soviet Union. It would have to be somewhat wider, yes.

Is security the only reason?

Gromyko: Yes. Only security.

Kissinger: Can a journalist just buy a ticket and go to Khabarousk?

Stoessel: He would have to get permission.

Dobrynin: It is the same in your country.

Kissinger: But we would abolish some too. It would be reciprocal.

Gromyko: I don't think this can be done.

Kissinger: Let me say a word on some other matters, I see your concerns. On this one, all we want is that in areas permitted for travel, that it be facilitated on a wider basis than before.

Gromyko: I'm sure travel in open areas and assistance given to such travel is greater than in many countries, even the United States.

Dobrynin: In six years, I don't remember a single case where the State Department arranged a tour for Russian journalists.

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Kissinger: It's a different system. We don't organize trips, but we approve them.

Gromyko: We pay attention more to "facilitate" in this country.

Kissinger: You can also keep an eye on them better that way.

Dobrynin: You can too.

Kissinger: We suggested this to take account of the concerns of the journalists. Do you have any other concerns?

Gromyko: Let me make just one general comment. The media and journalistic people generally should be concerned with one basic task -- to strengthen friendship among peoples, and they should do nothing hostile to the social system of the country of their stay.

Kissinger: Can we apply that to American journalists in America?

Gromyko: It would be an interference in your domestic affairs!

But when formulated proposals are placed before us, it turns out they amount to absolute freedom. When someone walks down Park Avenue and insults someone or knifes someone, the police can't do anything?

Kissinger: It happens every day on Park Avenue. We had Human Kindness Day in Washington last week -- we had five people killed. I went to a meeting of the Organization of American States last week and I noticed my security had increased. I asked why? They say, "they're celebrating Human Kindness Day across the street." One senior official lost an eye.

Gromyko: You have efficient writers on your staff. You can change it.

Kissinger: This is something we worked out with our allies, and we made a major effort to meet your concerns. This was not made on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.

Gromyko: You said that.

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Kissinger: There are some of your points we could take into account.

Gromyko: If you take them into account, I would like to see what text you come up with.

Kissinger: I suggest our Ambassador meet with yours in Geneva, rather than my negotiating it here where I can't consult with other countries.

Gromyko: If that is your suggestion, there is nothing we can do about it. That's an expression of a perfectly good desire. But even when we make certain understandings with you, it is very hard to get it across to Geneva.

So what I want to emphasize here is the question of time.

Kissinger: I agree with you. If we work with your characteristic precision, Mr. Foreign Minister, I think we are going to have trouble meeting the deadline. If you can tell us tomorrow which of these paragraphs you can accept, if we give you a new text on three paragraphs, after which the negotiation only begins -- as the entrance price to a negotiation.....

Gromyko: Which do you want? Who can do it? We or you? We, ourselves, could sit down and look.

Kissinger: That's a good idea. We'll take Korniyenko. It's nine paragraphs.

Gromyko: Do you swear by that? Only nine paragraphs?

Kissinger: Ours has nine.

Gromyko: This is a human text.

We'll give you a text with our corrections.

Kissinger: Ours begins with human contacts.

Korniyenko: There are two separate things, contacts and information.

Kissinger: Yes, but we've given you both and we'd like a reaction to both.

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I think this would be a good way to proceed.

Gromyko: I haven't yet read the text on contacts.

Kissinger: This is an historic occasion. Never have we had an occasion when my friend Gromyko hadn't read every document.

Korniyenko: We just got it from Moscow.

Kissinger: When did we present it?

Korniyenko: Today in Geneva.

Kissinger: If you keep in mind that the fewer changes you have, the easier it will be to meet your concerns on the key paragraphs.

Gromyko: All right.

Kissinger: What else?

Gromyko: You mentioned certain organizational matters with the third stage in Helsinki.

Kissinger: Yes. One of our concerns, Mr. Foreign Minister, is the length of the Conference. If we give every speaker a half hour, it would take four and a half hours. The most our President can give is two and a half days, and we would prefer two days. The symbolic importance is not in the speeches made, but in the documents that will be signed. The newspapers will have to report every day. It will devalue the conference. We should focus on a few key speeches.

Gromyko: I spoke also to the General Secretary on this. He, too, would prefer three days, two and a half.

Kissinger: We think it should be two days for speeches and a half day for ceremony.

Gromyko: We're thinking in the same categories.

Kissinger: So, shall we work in the same direction?

I'll tell you, the President won't come for more than two and a half days, so if they want more, it will have to be at a lower level.

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Gromyko: How can we work it out as far as length of time is concerned?

Kissinger: It will be tough.

Gromyko: Mintoff the Terrible.

Kissinger: Mintoff the Terrible will want a half hour. The Greeks and Turks will want a half hour.

Gromyko: We're thinking in the same terms.

Kissinger: The alternative is to begin at the lower level and have the heads of state arrive later.

Gromyko: That will not be good.

Kissinger: If necessary, we'll agree to 10 minutes for everybody.

Gromyko: I think it's better what you said -- five key countries.

Kissinger: If 35 heads of state each speak a half hour, that's 17 hours. No head of state can leave while another head of state is speaking.

Gromyko: Yes.

Kissinger: It's mind-boggling.

Gromyko: You convinced us.

Kissinger: Let's work together on it.

Gromyko: Let's work together on it.

Kissinger: I have to tell you, the President just can't come for five days. I think two days of speeches and one day of ceremony.

Gromyko: You convinced us.

Kissinger: Reluctantly.

Gromyko: So, the other way: We convinced you.

Kissinger: Let's discuss post-Conference machinery.

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Gromyko: What's your thinking?

Kissinger: We would support the Danish proposal, that a group of deputies meet two years from now to discuss....

Gromyko: Foreign Ministers?

Kissinger: Deputy Foreign Ministers, senior officials.

Gromyko: What will be the terms of reference?

Kissinger: To see how best to implement the agreement, and to see what steps should be considered.

Gromyko: Some kind of conference?

Kissinger: Yes.

Gromyko: In two years, such a group would be convened?

Kissinger: Yes.

Gromyko: To see how it's going?

Kissinger: And to see what could be done to strengthen the terms of the agreement and to consider possibly what permanent institutions there might be.

Gromyko: You are not in favor of consultative machinery?

Kissinger: No.

Gromyko: The terms of reference should be simple: to consider the terms and possible institutions.

Kissinger: I would add: to review the progress in implementation, and number two, your formula.

Gromyko: Let us think this over.

Kissinger: All right.

Gromyko: Will your European friends go along with this?

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Kissinger: I think we could convince them.

Gromyko: What about the neutrals?

Kissinger: The neutrals are more difficult.

Gromyko: What about Mintoff?

Kissinger: Yes. We could discuss shortening the interval, if this helps anybody -- to 18 months.

Gromyko: Three to four years.

Kissinger: No, shorten it.

Gromyko: So we would have more experience.

Kissinger: This would not help us with the neutrals.

Gromyko: Fine. Let us think it over.

Kissinger: All right.

Should we have something to eat?

Gromyko: Probably. For the time being. [Laughter]

Kissinger: For the time being? That's all we wanted you to do. We don't expect you to eat all night.

Gromyko: We're in a plot with the Secretary of State to have the dinner last only 30 minutes flat.

Kissinger: We can't do it with dinner, but we'd appreciate it if we could do it with lunch tomorrow. Seriously. A working session. All my colleagues would appreciate it -- a very light lunch.

[The meeting ended]

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Andrey Andreyevich Gromyko, Member of the Politburo of the Central Committee, CPSU, and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR
 Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
 Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff *PIAR*
 Viktor Mikhaylovich Sukhodrev, Counsellor, MFA (Interpreter)

DATE AND TIME: Tuesday, May 20, 1975
 9:50 - 10:17 a.m.

PLACE: Soviet Embassy
 Vienna

SUBJECTS: CSCE Summit; India-Pakistan

Gromyko: Your press is very ingenious.

Kissinger: But we are going to beat them down. I am going across the country and speaking.

Gromyko: Of the newspapers, which ones do you recommend I read?

Kissinger: In Washington, the Washington Post and New York Times are the most influential because everyone reads them. In the country, in St. Louis, no one reads the New York Times and the Post.

Gromyko: Well, Mr. Secretary, what do you think we should discuss, just the two of us?

Kissinger: I leave it up to you.

Gromyko: After all, in which direction are you and your friends conducting matters at the All-European Conference? Can I tell General Secretary Brezhnev

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and my colleagues the thing is in good hands, that Dr. Kissinger and President Ford have things firmly in hand and are working toward an early conclusion?

Kissinger: We are working toward a summit the last week of July. What is the Monday?

Sukhodrev: [Checks calendar] The 28th.

Kissinger: No.

Sukhodrev: The 21st.

Kissinger: Yes. We are planning on that week.

Gromyko: Regarding the length of time to be set aside, I have had several occasions to talk this over with the General Secretary, and his opinion is not in discord from President Ford -- that is, two, two and a half, three days. That too is acceptable to us. It should be conducted in a businesslike style. Who needs those speeches?

Kissinger: I talked to Kreisky and he agrees. I'll talk to Schmidt tomorrow.

Gromyko: I heard he wants four-five days.

Kissinger: So have I.

Gromyko: But I don't think he will be very strong on it.

Kissinger: If we can get Schmidt, I think the French and British will go along.

May I tell him this is agreeable to you?

Gromyko: You may. You may.

Another question I have is this: Yesterday you and I discussed certain specific matters regarding the European Security Conference. You said you would continue to be in touch with your West European friends -- this is our understanding.

Kissinger: That is correct.

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Gromyko: Are you sure they won't cast reproaches on you for being in some kind of collusion? Am I correct you were speaking with their knowledge?

Kissinger: No. It was my best estimate.

Take the confidence-building measures: If we say 30,000, 21 days and 250 kilometers, that I am sure we can get them to accept. If we said less, I can only say we will try. I am not saying it is impossible. It is our best estimate.

Gromyko: I was now asking really about the broad fact. In your estimate, will no one reproach us for collusion?

Kissinger: On what?

Gromyko: On CSCE generally. The French will say, "we are not bound"? I am just asking; because in the past it has happened.

Kissinger: Yes. Look, it is a problem, and it depends how it is handled. If we come to an understanding here and you let us handle it first with them before you approach them . . .

Gromyko: All right.

Kissinger: I think it is better we deal with it.

Gromyko: All right. Let me say quite frankly what we would be prepared to accept on these CBM's. I was quite frank in my opinion yesterday on the depth of the zone. I would like you to understand our situation. And the same with the numbers.

Kissinger: Thirty.

Gromyko: But as regards the time limit of notification, we would be prepared to agree to 18 days. Our private position was twelve. We would be willing to do 18.

Kissinger: Why don't we talk urgently to our allies, and let you know by next Monday, or Tuesday. We want to move it to a conclusion. There is no sense arguing about two days and 50 kilometers.

Gromyko: All right. Do that.

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Kissinger: I think they will find it 50 kilometers too little. But why don't we talk to them and make counterproposals if we have to?

Gromyko: Up'til now we have felt that whenever the U.S. really had the desire, problems were solved to mutual advantage. It happened in many cases, and we feel it will happen in the future.

Kissinger: We will talk to them.

Gromyko: As regards journalists, we have revised your text and made amendments. Korniyenko is supposed to give it to Hartman. But as regards the first part, human contacts, that is for the delegations to go into because I haven't had time.

Kissinger: Except we should discuss them together. Our delegations can do it. Journalists and contacts together. Let them do it at Geneva. But they will move it.

Gromyko: Yes, but please don't forget to give your delegation instructions at Geneva. In earlier cases when we reached agreement, sometimes we had the impression they didn't get instructions.

Kissinger: Sometimes we had the impression your delegation didn't get instructions. [Laughter] Maybe our delegations are both very cautious. We will do it, in the meeting. It depends really on what instructions you give. We have made a major effort; we would like to see some Soviet move.

Gromyko: Please don't demand of us the impossible. Surely you don't want to topple the Soviet system with that document.

Kissinger: I had great expectations. [Laughter]

Gromyko: We don't try to topple the capitalist system.

Kissinger: If the Soviet system toppled, which I don't expect by this document or otherwise, I am not sure the successor wouldn't be more of a problem. The government Solzhenitsyn would establish would be more aggressive.

Gromyko: To us, Solzhenitsyn is a zero within a zero.

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Kissinger: On Basket III, we have met several of your points, and made a major effort. On several points of yours yesterday, I told you your positions were reasonable.

Gromyko: On "appropriate" points.

Kissinger: But also it depends on whether you accept some of the other points.

Gromyko: Then on those several points, Korniyenko probably already has given you our final communique. He has probably already done it.

Kissinger: It should not be significantly shorter than on the earlier occasion. It can be somewhat shorter.

Gromyko: This is a little bit shorter. It might be hard to go into detail, and not good to repeat formulas.

Kissinger: Let's look at it.

There is one point I raised at dinner, that is, our view of Indian intentions, especially since India is buying a lot of Soviet arms. I just hope you keep an eye on it. Because so far, we have sold nothing to Pakistan. We have lifted the embargo but sold nothing.

Gromyko: India's behavior gives us no concern.

Kissinger: If there were another Indian attack, it is something we would not take lightly.

Gromyko: We, generally speaking, are behaving very modestly regarding arms supplies to India. Maybe the information you have is exaggerated. We have absolutely no information that would cause us any concern regarding Indian intentions. There would be no sense for us to ignore any danger there because we are very concerned with the situation there, if there were any. And we say this to India.

Kissinger: And we say it to Pakistan and Iran. There is no danger now. It is for the long range.

Gromyko: We will act in this direction.

Kissinger: Good.

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[At 10:17 a.m. the Secretary and Foreign Minister Gromyko joined their colleagues in the conference room for the main meeting.]

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: President Gerald R. Ford
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
and Assistant to the President
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant
to the President for National Security Affairs
Mr. Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor of the
Department of State

Prime Minister Harold Wilson
Foreign Secretary James Callaghan
Sir John Hunt, Cabinet Secretary

DATE AND TIME: Friday, May 30, 1975
8:35 a.m. - 9:20 a.m.

PLACE: Residence of the American Ambassador
Brussels

[The first five minutes of the breakfast were taken up with picture taking. There was then some discussion of the British Referendum campaign.]

Wilson: Ted Heath seems to be a new man. He is out campaigning vigorously. He is actually writing his own speeches.

Kissinger: He has the advantage now that he doesn't have to face you at question time in the House.

Wilson: Mrs. Thatcher is being criticized for not speaking enough. She is being called a reluctant debutante. Of course, I never attack people unless I am attacked. I always answer in the spirit of the question.

[The conversation then turned to the traditions and uses of question time in the House of Commons.]

Callaghan: Mr. President, do you miss not being in the Congress any longer?

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Wilson: I am relaxed about it. Schmidt is going to talk on economics. I don't know yet exactly what he is going to say. Last year he was all excited about the collapse of the banking system and I don't know yet what his main problem is this year. As far as I am concerned, I will be saying that we never doubted your commitments and your solidarity with us. Of course, more will be done on the fringes here, on Greece, Cyprus, Portugal.

Callaghan: Should we discuss the political consequences of relations with the LDCs? I must say that at the OECD, the US proposals were well received. Of course, people had a chance this time to look at your speech beforehand.

Wilson: I have only read half of my speech so far.

It looks like the snarl-up on producer relations on the question of raw materials has eased a bit.

President: It seems so from my talk with Giscard last night.

Kissinger: We had a good response to my IEA speech.

Callaghan: These problems are as much political as economic. At the Commonwealth Conference, after shouting into the mikes people then began to talk sense. The same thing will happen at the special UN session.

Kissinger: Your initiative at the Commonwealth Conference took a lot of the sting out of the talk.

Wilson: Well, Burnham at first attacked it but he then settled down.

Callaghan: The US proposals for commissioner were well received.

President: What do you think are the prospects for CSCE?

Wilson: What do you think?

Kissinger: The Soviets are moving on Basket III. The only real sticking point is CBMs -- the question of the depth of the zone. I think we could settle on 250 kilometers. On follow-on, I had an exchange with Gromyko in Vienna. I said we supported the Danish proposal, but I said that perhaps there could be meetings after a year or 18 months, but Gromyko said no, it should be after three to four years.

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Callaghan: The Romanians want a much shorter time.

Kissinger: The East Europeans want permanent machinery because they want to be able to monitor the Soviets.

Callaghan: One of the results of CSCE is that it has brought the East Europeans into equal status with other countries.

President: Is a summit likely to be in July?

Kissinger: Yes. I think the chances are two out of three that it will be unless the Soviets change their tactics. They are dribbling out concessions.

Callaghan: Stage II should really be settled in two weeks if the summit is to be in July.

Wilson: It really would kill the Geneva industry. We will need a public works program for all the diplomats who have been so busy with CSCE.

President: How long should we allow for the CSCE summit? Five days is very long. There will be 35 speeches.

Wilson: The more time you allow, the longer the speeches will be. Maybe we should plan to arrive on Monday in the afternoon or evening, and then work Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday, and into Friday.

Callaghan: At the OECD meeting in Paris, I got rid of 20 speeches in one morning. Your's was long though, Henry.

President: It will lose luster if the speeches are too long.

Wilson: Yes, like at the UN.

Callaghan: So maybe it would be arriving on Monday, and then Tuesday, Wednesday and Thursday.

Wilson: Will it all be wrapped up at that point or will there still have to be negotiations?

Callaghan: No. There would be valedictory speeches only.

Kissinger: You know that the Turks don't want Makarios to be there, but Denktash.

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Callaghan: Yes, I gather. Mintoff will make trouble on relations with the Arabs and he may hold that until we all get there.

Kissinger: The conference could end on Thursday and we could then stay on Friday for bilaterals. The press in the United States would get very impatient if it drags on. They are already saying there has been no accomplishment.

Callaghan: There is very little in Basket III.

Kissinger: And it is unenforceable.

Callaghan: We should go for a short conference.

Wilson: I would like to miss question time in the House for once.

Callaghan: And Cabinet.

President: You don't enact bills when you are not there?

Wilson: No, no, it goes right on.

On Turkey, we are going to supply arms.

Callaghan: But no trumpets! I prepared the ground with the Greeks. We will have staff talks with the Turks. Unfortunately, they are harassing UK nationals.

Kissinger: We will tell them to stop. Demirel keeps saying that if we lift the arms ban they will move.

Callaghan: I agree with Henry that the Greeks should make a proposal.

Kissinger: I told Karamanlis that they should accept 30% of Turkish territory. He said maybe they could do 25%, so maybe we are moving. Ecevit seems prepared to accept 32%. If we can get to within 5%, maybe we can move. But I told Karamanlis to drop the percentages for a while and to focus on the general question of territory.

President: What about Famagusta?

Kissinger: It is like pulling teeth, but the Turks might give up something.

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Sonnenfeldt
WJ
from file

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: President Nicolae Ceausecu of Romania
George Macovescu, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Vasile Pungan, Counsellor to the President
Corneliu Bogdan, Romanian Ambassador to the U. S.

President Ford
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
and Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Amb. Harry Barnes, U. S. Ambassador to Romania
Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant
to the President for National Security Affairs

DATE AND TIME: Wednesday, June 11, 1975
3:00 p. m. - 4:15 p. m.

PLACE: The White House
The Oval Office

SUBJECTS: Bilateral economic relations; CSCE;
Middle East; Korea; Spain; Disarmament.

[The press took photographs]

Ceausescu: You had quite a trip.

President: You have just completed a trip to Brazil and Mexico.

[The press was dismissed]

President: Let me say, Mr. President, it is very nice to see you. It is particularly nice of you to stop so we could have this opportunity to discuss matters of mutual interest on your way back to Romania after your trip to Latin America.

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President: If the European Security Conference is in late July and Congress would act on the Trade Agreement for Romania by August 1.

Amb. Barnes: It could come out of committee by July 15, but they may not take action until early September because they have 60 legislative days and the August recess may intervene.

Kissinger: You do not have to link these two things that closely for your visit.

President: But it would be helpful to get the Trade Agreement done and not have it complicated by any announcement. This reinforces the need to get favorable consideration and action before the Congressional recess.

Otherwise there will be five weeks delay. So it is important to get Congress to act, preferably prior to the visit, and then we could announce we would be having a long-term agreement.


CSCE

Ceausescu: As far as European Security is concerned, we are concerned not so much by the fact of delay as by the content and expected results of the Conference. For us, it is not a problem of the dates, but of the results of this Conference. Of course, if it can take place in July, that is fine, or if it is in August or even September, that is fine. The principal thing is to get results which will contribute to the strengthening of confidence and will enhance detente. Therefore, it is not Basket III which is essential, the question of how many journalists or artists travel. That is for the experts. This isn't what is so essential. As far as we are concerned, let as many as want travel around. The essential problems are in the first Basket. On this hangs the movement toward detente and for that matter the conditions of things like cultural exchanges.

In connection with this we see some problems which must be solved if the Conference is going to wind up with good results. First of all there should be firm engagements of states on the renunciation of force and non-interference in the internal affairs of other states. Secondly, there is the problem of certain military aspects. Granted it is not a question of resolving basic problems, but we have sought nonetheless to make sure that there will not be interference in the internal affairs of other states. It is a question for example, of these engagements regarding military maneuvers. And even here it is not so much whether it will be 250 or 180 kilometers or 10 to 20 thousand men, but the very fact that the content of these measures should be obligatory and not something voluntary. Therefore if all these problems

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are going to be reduced to something voluntary, it no longer makes any sense to waste time and energy over 100 kilometers of distance here and there. But what we are doing is introducing into international law certain rules which have existed up to now. When a group of states arrives at certain understandings, these would be mandatory and not voluntary. That is important.

Macovescu: One of the other principal problems is that connected with continuity of the Conference, the follow-up.

Ceausescu: I don't know what your opinion is but we believe the most dangerous situation is still in Europe where there are the two military blocs with modern armaments, huge concentrations of troops, atomic weapons as well. Therefore we would want to have the summit meeting represent not the conclusion but rather the beginning of European security. For this reason we are in favor of an organism, a process for assuring the continuity of this conference.

President: How often do you see it meeting? Every year, every two years?

Ceausescu: Once a year, once in two years, any time when it is necessary. If there should appear some tense situation, if something should happen, then it could discuss what might be done to prevent things getting worse.

Kissinger: What do you think of the idea of a review conference in 18 months or two years?

Ceausescu: In our opinion that is a good idea. We think as a matter of fact that this sort of permanent organism could have the role of preparing such a conference. I don't have in mind something that would be set up with a lot of bureaucracy, but rather something that would meet periodically once a year or every six months. The Minister of Foreign Affairs of one of the countries would have the role of coordinator, and this could be on a rotational basis.

Kissinger: For example, rotating?


Ceausescu: United States, Soviet Union, Romania.

President: [Smiling] Romania.

Kissinger: We have explained to Romania and we have been in close touch with the Romanian delegation to the Conference, that the very reason Romania wants this is why we are not agreeable. We are not eager to grant to

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countries the right of permanent interference in the West. Quite frankly, this is the problem with a permanent mechanism. I understand why you want something to which you could appeal, but we do not want established structures in the West to be exploited. We are sympathetic, though, to your concerns.

Ceausescu: We don't think of this organism as having any sort of right to do this, and in order to avoid this problem we could regulate the basis on which it would act to exclude such possible intervention. We see it as preparing for new conferences and for solving such problems as will appear. We don't want any Eastern intervention in the West or Western intervention in the East or Western intervention in the West or Eastern intervention in the East. I would ask you to reflect ~~some~~ more on this problem and to review your position.

[Both Presidents and the Secretary nod agreement.]

Middle East

Ceausescu: With regard to the Middle East, you are now having discussions with the Israeli Prime Minister.

President: We tried very hard to keep progress going last March, but unfortunately the negotiations had to be suspended. We are now doing our reassessment. We want to avoid any stagnation or stalemate. I have just finished talking with President Sadat. Today and tomorrow we will be discussing with Prime Minister Rabin his observations on the situation.

Ceausescu: Of course the problems, as you know even better than I, are very complicated. We will certainly welcome it if any new steps towards disengagement can be realized. There are conditions now in which agreement could be achieved. Egypt and Syria are in favor of reaching a solution. We know very well the situation can change very rapidly, that the present favorable conditions might no longer appear. I think that Israel too has understood this very well. We have told them our views.

President: You met with Foreign Minister Allon recently.

Ceausescu: Yes, I talked with him for four hours.

Aside from the question affecting Egypt and Syria there is the Palestinian problem and the need to achieve the formation of an independent Palestinian state. There can be no solution unless this problem is resolved.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

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June 13, 1975

SECRETSecretary's Principal's and Regional's Staff Meeting
Friday, June 13, 1975, 8:00 a.m.

- pp 2-11 US actions re German-Brazilian nuclear suppliers agreement discussed. Secretary asked Deputy Secretary to apologize to Brazilian Ambassador Castro when he lunches with him June 13. ARA also to draft message to Brazilian Foreign Minister. Secretary requests a memo on discussions we are holding with nuclear suppliers and progress of preparations for the nuclear suppliers' conference.
- pp 11-14 CSCE Conference in Geneva discussed. Site of next conference session.
- pp 14-16 Simon speech mentioning Shah. Secretary wants reference deleted from speech.
- pp 16-18 Worsening situation in Chile (New NIE has been published. Secretary would like to see.
- p 18 US delegation walk out at ILO conference. Secretary wants George Meany to know that Israeli Government's delegation did not.
- pp 18-19 Cyprus meeting of Security Council visit of Clerides to Washington next week.
- pp 19-20 New Soviet submarines and their missile capability.
- pp 20-23 Mrs. Gandhi's political setbacks discussed.
- pp 23-24 Angola-Egyptian arms deal. Syrian-Jordanian communique.
- pp 25-33 Soviet military facilities in Somalia discussed. Somalian challenge to inspect facilities. Secretary believes we cannot refuse to go. Senator Culver's position. Secretary wants Senator briefed.
- pp 33-37 Clashes between Thai's and Cambodia's SEATO implication. Secretary requests a paper. Clashes between Cambodians and Vietnamese. Situation in Cambodia.
- pp 37-44 Habib reports on his trip.

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We will still announce publicly that you did it.

(Laughter)

Will you draft a letter? We are not accusing them of having done anything wrong.

MR. VEST: We will do that.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Okay.

We will get to you last, Phil.

MR. HARTMAN: We have now a message from Bud Shearer which at least lays out some dates on how we could wind up this conference in Geneva.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Yes. But we have this problem -- I want to talk to you and Hal afterwards -- on the tactics.

MR. HARTMAN: He at least thinks it is still possible --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: How late can it go?

MR. HARTMAN: The 24th of June, on his schedule. It involves mainly trying to get the EC --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: All that is left is the CBMs?

MR. HARTMAN: Well -- and there are a couple of other issues. He thinks the follow-on can be kept even after they have agreed to a date --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The quadripartite -- I have

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had a letter from Sauvagnargues that I want you to look at.

MR. HARTMAN: Yes. That presents a problem.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Why do we get out in front on everything?

MR. HARTMAN: We are not out in front. The British and the Germans feel very strongly -- we can accept any position -- I think we ought to tell them that. But the point is that it is our judgment that his particular solution is not going to be accepted.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: By the Germans?

MR. HARTMAN: Well, they are upset -- the British are upset by it. The neutrals don't like this vague word "responsibilities" which they think has implications for the Brezhnev doctrine.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Is the time enough to let me see the formulation?

MR. HARTMAN: Yes.

MR. SONNENFELDT: It is the one you saw at breakfast, that crazy, convoluted --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I have forgotten it.

MR. HARTMAN: In fact, he is doing more, according to the Germans and the British, to undermine the quadripartite rights by this fuzzy formulation than --

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SECRETARY KISSINGER: I just want to make sure we are staying with the Germans on this.

MR. HARTMAN: Yes.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I don't care about the British. But I want to stay with the Germans.

That means about one more week.

MR. HARTMAN: That is right. And there are so many things that can go wrong there. We still have not heard from all of the smaller countries.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I don't care if the conference doesn't take place in July. If it doesn't take place, I want to make sure we don't get blamed for it. In fact, I would prefer it in September.

MR. HARTMAN: I think it would probably have to wait until after the Finnish elections, which means October.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Or hold it somewhere else.

MR. HARTMAN: Never. Getting agreement on another place I think would be harder than winding up the conference.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Vienna?

MR. HYLAND: They are already in Geneva, all the delegations.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: That is nothing like what is going to happen when the heads of governments get together.

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We will bring at least 800 to 1,000 people. That is our normal travelling party, with the President.

MR. EAGLEBURGER: This is after the fiscal year, I hope.

MR. KATZ: We may have another allusion to the Shah again today. Simon is making a speech in Amsterdam.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Didn't we get a chance to clear it?

MR. KATZ: Yes. Enders saw it in Paris and asked Simon to remove one phrase, and he doesn't know whether he will. I am trying to get another message going through Parsky. The phrase is that the Shah is engaging in sheer demagoguery.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Impossible. Is that in or out of context? Is he attacking the Shah directly?

MR. KATZ: That is my understanding. It is a reference --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: When is he giving the speech?

MR. KATZ: Later today, or this evening.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Later today is now in Europe.

MR. KATZ: Yes. Well, Enders --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: You people have to stop negotiating. On a thing like this, that is my responsibility

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RG 59 ENTRY 5339

BOX 3 SOVIET UNION

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17 JUNE 1975

An oral message
from L.I. Brezhnev
to President Ford

I would like once again to draw your attention, Mr. President, to the question of the European Conference on Security and Cooperation having in mind today's, to be frank, rather strange state of things in Geneva.

On one hand, there is not just a simple movement forward at the Conference especially lately, but a major breakthrough. Now practically the whole set of issues put on the agenda of the Conference has been resolved on the basis of the balance of interests of the sides.

We think you would agree that to a great extent it was possible to achieve due to the goodwill shown by the Soviet Union. Given a desire to complete final agreement on the Conference documents, it would be literally a matter of days to clear fully the way to holding its final stage at a summit level in Helsinki. A similar view, as we have noted with satisfaction, was recently expressed in public also by your at a press conference.

However, we cannot help getting the impression that some new pretexts are being constantly sought, some artificially created and worthless issues are being tossed in with the aim to delay the conclusion of the work in Geneva. Over several weeks in a row the attempts are being made to conduct the matters in such a way that the Soviet Union and other socialist countries would make unilateral concessions. It is clear that this is not the way that could lead to a successful conclusion of the common cause which this Conference in fact represents. We have conceded all that might have been conceded, and what, by the way, the U.S. side had requested in confidence that this would be followed by complete agreement. It is difficult for us to judge who is behind all this and what goals are

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JUNE-JULY 1975

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persued by this. But if someone conscientiously takes up the course of delaying the Conference then we at least should have been told about it straightforwardly.

We talk about all this with frankness since we believe that reservations and lack of clarity on this account could damage the mutual understanding that exists between our countries on the questions of the European Conference.

It may be hardly contested that by now there exist all objective prerequisites to bring the Conference to a conclusion within the shortest period of time. Only one thing is needed - the political decision on the part of the governments of all the countries represented at the Conference.

I would like to express the hope, that you personally, Mr. President, and your Government will proceed, including your contacts with other Western countries, in such a way as to contribute in a maximum degree to the conclusion of the second stage of the Conference and to hold its final phase starting on July 22, which has been agreed upon between us.

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RG 59 ENTRY 5339
BOX 3 SOVIET UNION
JUN 5 - JULY 1975

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BIA/KARA Date 7/11/03

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Delivered To: Amb. Dobrynin
1:45 p.m., Tues. June 17, 1975

The President has carefully considered the oral message from General Secretary Brezhnev delivered by Ambassador Dobrynin on June 16. The President agrees that there has been major progress in recent weeks at the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and he fully appreciates the constructive role of the Soviet Union in bringing this about. From a review of events at the conference, it can be said that there is now a strong movement to bring it to a successful conclusion in the very near future. We are not aware of any deliberate efforts to delay the conference; in any case, the United States will continue, as it has in the past, to use the influence at its disposal to bring about compromise solutions on issues where differences still exist.

As the General Secretary will have been informed, we moved immediately following the very positive Soviet proposals concerning the advance notification of maneuvers -- and we agree that these were indeed a breakthrough -- to have this problem solved on the basis of the Soviet parameters. While we regret that it did not prove possible, despite our efforts, to persuade others to go along with the solution proposed, it is our strong conviction that a compromise can be achieved in the very near future. If the depth of territory subject to notification were set at 300 km, the United States believes it can

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BOX 7 SOVIET UNION
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persuade its allies to accept the other parameters as proposed by the Soviet side.

The President would like the General Secretary to know that we have been in the most intensive contact with our Allies in recent days in an effort to bring matters to a rapid conclusion and we will continue these contacts. We remain prepared to set the beginning of the final stage during the week of July 21 or, at any rate, before the end of July. Once the question of maneuver notification has been settled, our representatives should be in immediate contact to determine how best to bring about conference acceptance of this time frame, bearing in mind the fact that more than 30 sovereign states are involved.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BRIEFING PAPER

CSCE BACKGROUND PAPER

The Soviet Union first proposed a European security conference on February 10, 1954, and periodically reiterated the proposal over subsequent years. But there was little enthusiasm from Western and neutral nations. It appeared that Moscow's principal objective was to exploit such an event as a quasi-peace conference to produce a surrogate World War II peace treaty. However, as nations of both East and West began to take increased bilateral initiatives in recent years toward detente, a renewed Warsaw Pact appeal from Budapest on March 17, 1969, elicited a cautiously positive reaction from NATO. We and our Allies took the position that such a conference might serve a useful purpose, but only after concrete progress had been achieved on the most sensitive aspect of East-West confrontation in Europe--namely Berlin.

Berlin Precondition

It was specified in successive NATO documents, beginning in December, 1969, that conclusion of a new Four-Power agreement on Berlin, aimed at effecting practical improvements in relations between the people on both sides of the Wall and between Bonn and West Berlin, could lead to Allied willingness to participate in a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). The Allies also increasingly emphasized the importance they attached to improving FRG relations with the GDR, USSR, Poland and other Warsaw Pact countries. The Berlin Accord, signed September 3, 1971, took effect in June, 1972, as did the FRG-GDR Basic Treaty normalizing relations between those two states. CSCE Multilateral Preparatory Talks thereupon opened at Helsinki the following November, after the Warsaw Pact countries agreed to commence exploratory talks on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) at Vienna, beginning in January, 1973.

Stage I of CSCE took place at Foreign Minister level in Helsinki from July 3-7, 1973. Ministers approved the "Final Recommendations" of the preparatory phase, which set the agenda and established mandates to committees and subcommittees during the stage II negotiations.

GRFL, ROBERT T. HARTMANN PAPERS
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Pres. Trips 7/ASFS - 8/14/75
EUROPE CSCE (2)



Stage II began September 18, 1973, in Geneva, where experts from the 35 participating countries met to work out an agreed final document organized under the four agenda items, or "baskets." After almost two years of often intense and difficult negotiations, stage III opens in Helsinki on July 30, 1975 -- where heads of state will sign the final document in the six languages of the conference.

Stage II

CSCE work has covered four major substantive areas, known as "baskets," concerning: political and military questions; economic, scientific and technological cooperation; cooperation in strengthening human contacts, the exchange of information, and cultural and educational relations; and post-conference follow-up arrangements.

Basket 1

Under the first agenda item, conference negotiators have produced a declaration of the following ten principles of interstate relations:

- Sovereign equality, respect for the rights inherent in sovereignty.
- Refraining from the threat or use of force.
- Inviolability of frontiers.
- Territorial integrity of states.
- Peaceful settlement of disputes.
- Non-intervention in internal affairs.
- Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief.
- Equal rights and self-determination of peoples.
- Cooperation among states.
- Fulfillment in good faith of international obligations.



The Soviets were especially anxious to gain Western acceptance of an unambiguous principle on inviolability of frontiers by force. Western participants made absolutely clear, however, that their agreement to this precept would in no sense constitute formal recognition of existing European frontiers or imply that present borders are immutable. The Federal Republic of Germany, with the firm support of its NATO Allies, insisted on a reference in the Declaration of Principles to the possibility of effecting border changes by peaceful means. The United States took an active role in negotiation of this key text on peaceful border changes, which is included in the principle of sovereign equality.

Also under agenda item 1, CSCE participants have negotiated limited military security measures designed to strengthen mutual trust and confidence. Specific texts were produced on two modest but significant "confidence-building measures": prior notification of military maneuvers, and exchange of observers at those maneuvers.

Basket 2

Under agenda item 2, the Geneva talks have produced a series of declarations or resolutions concerned with economic, scientific and technological, and environmental cooperation. These declarations should help broaden East-West industrial cooperation, reduce barriers to trade, increase scientific exchanges, and cooperation in the environment.

Basket 3

The third agenda item -- the famous "basket 3" of the conference -- deals with increased human contacts, flow of information, and cooperation in cultural and educational relations. This item was included on the CSCE agenda only as a result of energetic efforts by the United States, our Allies, and the neutral states. Here we have negotiated especially sensitive issues for both East and West, partly because they deal with "ideological coexistence," which has always been anathema to Moscow. At Geneva, agreement was reached on basket 3 texts dealing with such issues as: family reunification,



family visits, marriages between nationals of different states, the right to travel, access to printed, as well as broadcast, information, improved working conditions for journalists, and stepped-up cultural and educational cooperation.

Basket 4

Under the fourth agenda item, the conference produced a text on post-CSCE "follow-up" arrangements. The debate here turned on the degree of institutionalization and continuity to be accorded post-conference activities. The final compromise text provides for unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral actions designed to carry forward the work of the conference and monitor the implementation of agreed texts. A meeting of experts will be convened in the first half of 1977 to prepare for a gathering of senior officials, later the same year, to review results of CSCE and plan for possible additional meetings in the future.

Conference participants view the final CSCE document as a statement of political resolve or declaration of intent, not as an agreement legally binding upon governments. The final document resembles the Universal Declaration of Human Rights or the UN Friendly Relations Declaration. A more formal document could be used by the Soviet Union to portray the results of the conference as tantamount to a World War II peace treaty. We remain loyal to the letter and spirit of the Potsdam Agreement of 1945, which states that the political and territorial problems affecting Germany since World War II must be resolved in a formal peace treaty.

CSCE is sometimes wrongly compared to the 1815 Congress of Vienna that influenced the political order in Europe for much of the 19th Century, but it is a much more modest event. The results of the conference are but a step in the process of detente, raising the hope of further improvement in East-West relations. CSCE is also the beginning of a new approach to consultations on matters of importance by all European states, whether East, West or neutral. The extent to which CSCE agreements are implemented over time will be the true test for judging the success of this conference.



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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

P770112-0152

BRIEFING MEMORANDUM

CONFIDENTIAL S/S
JUL 13 1975

SECRET

To: The Secretary
Through: C - Helmut Sonnenfeldt
From: EUR - Arthur A. Hartman AAH/SL

CSCE

Your meeting with Gromyko takes place during what may be the last full week of negotiations at Geneva. There are no significant differences between US and Soviet positions on remaining CSCE issues which involve mainly EC-Soviet disputes over details or last minute haggling by the smaller powers, especially the Dutch and Romanians.

If Gromyko attacks us for not effectively lining up Allied support for compromised texts, you might point to Romanian obstructionism on the Warsaw Pact side.

This paper briefly outlines issues and offers suggested talking points.

Timing of Stage III

The CSCE Coordinating Committee is holding intensive discussions aimed at setting a date for commencement of stage III, and it is not possible to predict where this issue will stand on July 11, when you meet Gromyko. The French formally proposed on July 7 that the Helsinki finale take place before the end of July, provided all remaining texts are registered by mid-month, and over half of the CSCE delegations reportedly now favor a July summit. But the Finns adamantly insist they must have three weeks advance notification from Geneva in order to make arrangements.

Your Talking Points

-- We are impressed with the substantial progress achieved in Geneva in recent weeks and, for our part, would consider a late July stage III meeting both desirable and feasible.

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-- However, there are those among our allies, your allies and the neutrals who insist that key unresolved issues be settled before a flat commitment is made to any specific date.

Basket 1 -- Principles

The Allies are supporting Genscher's efforts to register final texts on quadripartite rights, peaceful change, and a "Europe clause" extending CSCE benefits to all of Europe (including Berlin), before declaring their willingness to attend the Helsinki finale on a precise date. Virtually all other questions related to the declaration of principles are now settled.

QRR. On July 5, the following revised text was agreed, ad referendum to governments:

"The participating states, paying due regard to the principles above and, in particular, to the first sentence of (the tenth principle), note that the present (title of document) does not affect their rights and obligations, nor the corresponding treaties and other agreements and arrangements."

We support this text and continue to follow the lead of France on QRR matters.

Your Talking Points

-- We support the recently revised text on quadripartite rights and responsibilities and hope that it will provide the basis for a final compromise.

-- We have supported the French initiatives and appreciate Soviet flexibility on QRR matters.

Peaceful Change. The Four Powers plus both Germanies are ready to register the peaceful change formulation, which we negotiated with the Soviets. However, the Romanians have asked that the text be revised, mainly by linking it specifically to sovereign equality language in the first principle. We have emphasized to the Romanians our strong hope that they drop efforts to change this hard-won compromise formulation.

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Your Talking Point

-- We believe it would be in everyone's interest to persuade Romania to drop its request that the peaceful change text be modified; Soviet help in this regard would be welcome.

"Europe Clause." On July 5, the Soviets and FRG worked out a compromise text extending CSCE benefits to all of Europe, implicitly including Berlin. Subsequently, the FRG has sought to steer this text toward rapid provisional registration.

Your Talking Point

-- We welcome the Soviet and FRG success in developing a "Europe clause" and believe it only proper that results of this Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe should be extended to all Europeans.

Basket 1 -- CBMs

Since your last meeting with Gromyko, the Soviets have come around to acceptance of realistic parameters for the maneuvers CBM -- 250 kilometers, 25,000 troops, and 21 days -- and are ready to accept compromise texts on maneuvers as well as movements, provided Ankara drops its demands for notification within only a limited zone of 100 kilometers inland from the Turkish sea coast. The Turks, however, are stubbornly pressing their insistence on exceptions and show little predilection as yet to give way to a compromise acceptable to all parties. At last report, Turkey indicated it would take its case to the NATO Council on July 9. The Soviets recently accepted a CBM on movements based on "voluntary" notification, and Gromyko may emphasize the need for unequivocal NATO acceptance of the "voluntary basis" concept. In NATO, the Dutch continue to balk at voluntary notification, and in the Warsaw Pact, the Romanians also object to this concept.

Your Talking Points

-- We welcome Moscow's acceptance of realistic parameters for the CBM on notification of maneuvers.

-- It is now necessary for both of us to press our Allies to accept final compromises that will permit swift registration of voluntary CBMs on maneuvers and movements.

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Basket 2

The last remaining substantive hurdle to concluding Basket 2 negotiations is development of a text ensuring reciprocity in reduction of trade barriers. We are following the lead of the Nine in their attempt to work out with the Soviets a balanced formulation taking account of MFN, EC quantitative restrictions, and COMECON trading practices.

Your Talking Point

-- We hope all parties will display realism in the search for a final compromise on the question of reciprocity in the reduction of trade barriers.

Basket 3

-- Since their positive reaction, on the eve of the NATO summit, to the Western "global initiative" on basket 3 texts concerning human contacts and information, the Soviets have shown great flexibility on all basket 3 questions, and all texts in this area are now provisionally registered.

Your Talking Points

-- We warmly welcome Moscow's flexibility in recent weeks in permitting a satisfactory conclusion to the negotiations in basket 3.

-- We had long argued for realism on basket 3 issues with our Allies, and we are pleased that the Soviet Union ultimately reciprocated with realistic positions of its own.

Basket 4 -- Follow-up

With the Swedes chairing a Special Working Group on follow-up, negotiations are nearly complete on a satisfactory compromise text which will probably provide for: a preparatory meeting 18 months after completion of stage III; a meeting of senior officials about 24 months after stage III; decisions in follow-up to be taken by consensus; future meetings to be rotated among CSCE capitals; and acceptance, in principle, of a new Conference at some time in the future. The Soviets have displayed flexibility in the Working Group, while trying to enhance the political content of follow-up arrangements.

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Your Talking Point

-- We are following with interest the negotiations on a final compromise on post-CSCE follow-up arrangements, and are prepared to join a consensus on this issue.

Final Document

The Soviets have accepted inclusion of a disclaimer in the CSCE final document making clear its politically, but not legally, binding character and the submission of a letter to the UN Secretary General, the effect of which is to draw a distinction between international treaties and/or legally binding agreements, on one side, and the CSCE declarations of intent, on the other.

Your Talking Point

-- We appreciate Soviet flexibility in negotiations on CSCE final document, which appears to be taking shape in a manner acceptable to all sides.

Helsinki Summit and Public Opinion

We suggest that you consider discussing with Gromyko the US and Soviet approaches to characterization of CSCE results. You could get across that if Brezhnev takes an extreme position in propagandizing CSCE as, for example, a quasi World War II peace conference, the Allies will inevitably have to react sharply.

Your Talking Point

-- We believe it is in the interest of all sides to display moderation in characterizing the results of CSCE as a useful, if limited, step forward in the continuing process of East-West detente.

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MEMORANDUM

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 WASHINGTON

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:

Andrei A. Gromyko, Member of the Politburo
 of the Central Committee of the CPSU and
 Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR
 Anatoli G. Kovalev, Deputy Foreign Minister
 and Chief of Soviet Delegation to CSCE
 Anatoli F. Dobrynin, Ambassador to the
 United States

Georgi M. Korniyenko, Chief of the American
 Department and Member of the Collegium,
 Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Vasily G. Makarov, Chef de Cabinet to the
 Foreign Minister

Viktor M. Sukhodrev, Counsellor, Ministry of
 Foreign Affairs (Interpreter)

Oleg M. Sokolov, Chief, American Section of
 the American Department

Yuri E. Fokin, Special Assistant to the Foreign
 Minister

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and
 Assistant to the President for National Security
 Affairs

Amb. Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., Ambassador to
 the USSR

Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor of the Department
 of State

Winston Lord, Director, Policy Planning Staff

Amb. Albert W. Sherer, Jr., Chief of U. S.
 Delegation to CSCE

William G. Hyland, Director, INR

Jan M. Lodal, NSC Staff

Mark Garrison, Director, Office of Soviet
 Union Affairs

Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff

PWR

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JANUARY 1972

RG 59-ENTRY 5339
BOX 7 SOVIET UNION
JUNE-JULY 1975

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BPMARA Date 7/16/03

SECRET/NODIS/XGDS

DATE AND TIME: Thursday, July 10, 1975
5:15 - 6:35 p.m.

PLACE: Soviet Mission
Geneva

SUBJECT: CSCE

[Large bottles of Coca-Cola were on the table]

Kissinger: This is the biggest Coca-Cola I've ever seen.

Gromyko: Our Pepsi Cola, when you pour it into a glass, it's full and it remains full after two minutes. Your Pepsi, after you pour it, it's half gone.

Kissinger: Ours -- you pay for it all, and don't get it.

Gromyko: That's why you are so rich. Why do we have Pepsi Cola and not Coca-Cola?

Dobrynin: Because their chairman is more energetic.

Kissinger: And he was a friend.

Gromyko: May I greet the Secretary of State and all other gentlemen who are here with him.

We are indeed pleased to have this new opportunity to exchange views on several important problems. These matters we are to discuss relate both to our bilateral relations and to broad international concerns. I would submit -- and we had a brief exchange on this a minute or two ago -- that we start by having a word on European affairs and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

Those were my brief opening remarks and our proposal.

Kissinger: Mr. Foreign Minister, let me say I am glad we are meeting again, and given the responsibility of our two countries, the increasing regularity of our discussions is important to the stability of the world and we should meet even if we have no urgent matters to discuss.

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In spite of the public notices you may hear from America, the President and I are committed to the course we have pursued since 1972 and we believe it is of great importance to peace and security of the world.

As for the agenda, I am in agreement.

Gromyko: Then let us begin to exchange views on the European situation and, first and foremost, the European Security Conference. Would you like to say a few words first?

Kissinger: In my experience no one understands the European Security Conference as the Foreign Minister does. As I understand it, the only thing holding up agreement on the date is Malta, and all the issues are settled. They are getting ready to register all the rest. As I said to the press in Paris, our government favors the most rapid possible conclusion, preferably at the end of this month. I understand the date they're now talking about is July 30th.

Gromyko: I would say the following: The situation at the European Security Conference as of today is this. In substance, practically all questions have been agreed upon. If perhaps there are some third-rate nuances, we believe, given the desire, it would require hours -- literally hours, -- to clear away all those nuances, and would take a matter of days to prepare all the texts for signing. There is a question which is of particular interest to Turkey and they have not given final agreement, and that relates to the depth of the zone on one's territory for giving notice of troop maneuvers. But the basic question is setting a definite date for the final stage of the European Security Conference. Everyone seems to be in agreement with the Canadian proposal to begin the final stage on July 30th, although we have not given our formal approval because we believe more suitable is the proposal you and I discussed, and in fact no one in the Conference objected to it.

Kissinger: To meet on the 22nd.

Gromyko: And no one objected.

Kissinger: It's a little late now.

Gromyko: If we don't agree on an earlier date, we'll probably agree to July 30.

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It is true we are now faced with a most formidable force -- Malta -- and there does seem to be the real possibility that Malta will twist all the others into a ram's horn. But let us see whether all the European states can talk Malta into July 30th as a real possibility. I think it is a possibility.

Kissinger: We are prepared to meet on the 22nd, and we would also accept the 30th. We think there are no issues remaining and we think we can do it. That's really the latest we can do. If we do not have it then, we will have to move to the end of August, because we have other visitors.

Gromyko: Well, let us on both sides make an effort to get that date accepted. Let us then really act in that direction to assure it's accepted. Let us agree that this is not a formal agreement to this, because usually it happens that as soon as the United States and Soviet Union agree on something, someone else comes up with reproaches and says, "Aha, the United States and Soviet Union reached a separate agreement again. And we must have our own view." Let us act so as to insure success. If you want to refer to this agreement for any purpose, you're free to do so. The important thing is to do it defacto.

Kissinger: Let's get Kovalev and Sherer to both come here. I'm prepared to instruct him to work together with you. They know the tactical situation.

[Gromyko tells Fokin to go and call Kovalev. Garrison goes out to call Sherer.]

Don't you think that's the best way?

I want our representative here because I told him if we couldn't do it at the end of July we would do it at the end of August. I don't want him to be confused. He's waiting for a call.

Our preference is the earlier the better. July 28 would be better than the 30th.

Gromyko: What about on the duration?

Kissinger: Two and a half days. On this proposal, we would arrive the evening of July 30.

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Sonnenfeldt: The end of the day on Wednesday...

Kissinger: The end of the day in Finland in July is..... [Laughter]

What about 5:00 p.m.?

We'll talk to our representative.

I spoke to the French President today. He'd prefer to have it in July. Otherwise, August.

Gromyko: July would be best.

Kissinger: He'd prefer July. I see no problem. When I left his office I told the press we wanted it to conclude as rapidly as possible. The Germans I don't know. I'll see Schmidt tomorrow.

But how do you move Malta?

Gromyko: 2-3-4 days -- what do you mean two and a half?

[Kissinger, Sonnenfeldt and Hyland confer.]

Kissinger: Well, we'll just... Let's talk to our two representatives. It's a purely practical problem.

I have no idea how to move Malta. Maybe we could sell it to Libya.

Gromyko: The whole island?

Kissinger: Yes.

Gromyko: As a last resort. As a last resort. But we should first have the meetings. As a precondition.

Kissinger: How to move Malta I don't know. We'll certainly agree to make a joint representation.

Gromyko: Let's set the date and go to Finland, and Mintoff will go to Finland. If he doesn't, well...

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Kissinger: He got a big reception in China. They had four people on the street who had lived in Malta.

The problem is countries that agreed to the 30th may not agree to this procedure, where everybody just accepts and Malta is just left out.

Gromyko: But there is a consensus.

Kissinger: We will agree with you to begin on the 30th. You will hear my instructions to Shorer: to work with you and consult with the Germans, French, and British, but to bring it to a rapid conclusion. We will work it out.

[Kissinger, Sonnenfeldt and Stoessel confer.]

What is old Garrison doing? Is he calling Hartman for authority?
[Laughter]

Did the one who went out for you come back yet?

Makarov: Not yet.

Kissinger: All I want is to make sure the speeches are kept to 15 minutes at the European Security Conference.

Ours is on the way. Yours is coming.

Gromyko: Let me say a few words about our cooperation, while we're waiting. There was businesslike cooperation, but there were times when cooperation was uneven. There were times when the American side preferred to remain on the sidelines. But in recent days it has been smoother.

Kissinger: In the cases when we remained on the sidelines, we were working to the same result, as on the 250 kilometers.

[Garrison and Fokin return.]

He's on the way?

Fokin: Yes.

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Kissinger: [To Garrison] Is Sherer on the way, or is he checking with Hartman?

Garrison: He's on the way.

Kissinger: When I was in Hanoi, I stayed at a palace in the center of town. I went for a walk. They wouldn't let me back in, because I had no pass.

Gromyko: You told me that last time.

Kissinger: Now they're yours.

Gromyko: What's happening?

Kissinger: I understand they're making English a compulsory subject, but they won't have much of an opportunity to practice it.

Gromyko: By two and one-half days, you mean no business on the day of arrival.

Kissinger: I'm told by Sonnenfeldt that the French President is willing to stay only two nights. So we arrive the afternoon of the 30th, stay a full day the 1st and 2nd. That would be our definition.

Gromyko: Three full days.

Kissinger: This gives us two and one-half days. What Schmidt wants to do is to see some people. He can come right before and see them in the morning.

Gromyko: It's really three days.

Kissinger: Probably many delegations will arrive before.

I've talked to Anatol about the possibility of the President meeting Brezhnev while we're there.

Gromyko: All right. I tell you, all right.

Kissinger: Two meetings?

Gromyko: All right.

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Kissinger: The morning after the Conference closes.

Gromyko: Yes.

They'll probably be arriving any minute now, so we can wait.
Let's not switch to other subjects yet.

Kissinger: I agree.

Gromyko: Soon mothers will start frightening their children by saying, "Malta will come get you." Mintoff. If they said, "Mintoff will get you," that would be the cult of personality. [Laughter]

Did you see Mintoff?

Kissinger: I've never seen him. He's often asked me.

I already have half the madmen of the world as my clients. I have to leave some for after.

That's our strategy: We want him to join the Warsaw Pact; we'd never have a conclusion.

He was voted in by a one vote majority. They must be due for another election.

Gromyko: I saw him at Helsinki. He was at the meeting.

Kissinger: Why? Was it a Foreign Ministers' meeting?

Sukhodrev: He's both Prime Minister and Foreign Minister.

Gromyko: It will be speech after speech after speech.

Kissinger: I don't know how I am going to live through two and a half days of speeches.

Gromyko: Suppose they are 20 minutes. Suppose. It would take two and a half days. Two working days, six [hours] plus six.

Kissinger: Plus the closing ceremony.

Gromyko: For signing.

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Kissinger: Can't we make it 15 minutes?

Gromyko: For us, 15 and 20 are the same.

Kissinger: They will take more time anyway.

[Kovalev comes in. The Secretary greets him.]

Gromyko: Here is a victim of Malta.

Kissinger: Where is Sherer? [Garrison goes out.]

Gromyko: Do you think Malta is melting? Maybe Malta is inclined to declare merci. He refused to answer his phone for 24 hours.

Sukhodrev: He is holed up somewhere where there is no phone.

[Lodal goes out.]

Gromyko: Malta wants the unconditional surrender of the United States.

Kissinger: We are prepared to surrender to Malta. As long as we do it in startling fashion.

Where is Lodal? This is all a Soviet trick to cut down our delegation. Will someone go out to get Lodal? [Lodal comes in.]

Gromyko: He [Kovalev] wanted to go to attend NATO. They rejected our proposal. How narrow-minded.

[Sherer and Fokin come in.]

Kissinger: We wondered how you two fellows managed to prolong this negotiation.

Gromyko: Malta intercepted him.

Sherer: They are doing their best.

Kissinger: Could you describe the situation?

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Sherer: I will try to, but it's a fast breaking situation. When I last spoke to Minister Kovalev, before meeting the Secretary's plane, we were faced with a very hard, very hard position by Malta with respect to the situation in the Mediterranean. Even though 34 countries favored the Canadian proposal to go to Helsinki on July 30th. But Malta, it looks like, is going to interfere with that.

While I was meeting with the Secretary, the Soviet Union came forward with two very good initiatives, in my view. The first was to ask the Romanians to talk to Malta to try to soften their position.

Kissinger: That is very clever.

Kovalev: And the Yugoslavs too.

Sherer: I don't know whether it was the Yugoslavs and Romanians who brought about this possible compromise.

Kissinger: When the United States and the Soviet Union have to use intermediaries to talk to Malta!

Sherer: The compromise is that we will ask the Maltese to accept in toto the follow-up paper, which they have also tried to monkey with, fool around with. We will also ask them to accept Quadripartite Rights and Responsibilities by 7:30 tonight, no changes. We will also ask them to accept the Canadian proposal as is. We have to give them something.

Kissinger: Sicily.

Sherer: Two points on the Mediterranean paper that are boring but might be of interest. There are two phrases, that concern not only "contributing to peace and strengthening security in the area" but also "lessening tension." There was concern by someone that this could be used to remove the fleets. But that is arguable. It could be argued that the fleets contribute to stability.

Kissinger: Could you read me the sentence?

Sherer: "In order to advance the objectives set forth above, the Participating States also declare their intention of maintaining and amplifying the contacts and dialogue as initiated by the CSCE with the nonparticipating Mediterranean States to include all the States of the Mediterranean, with the purpose of contributing to peace, strengthening security, lessening

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tensions in the area, and widening the scope of cooperation, ends in which all share a common interest, as well as with the purpose of defining further common objectives."

Kissinger: Is all of this new?

Sherer: Only "lessening tensions." All the rest of the paragraph is agreed to. Only this sentence.

Kissinger: That is all right. We accept it. Is that all right, Mr. Foreign Minister?

Should I refer it to Washington? [Laughter] I will accept it as Assistant to the President.

We have no reason to add it but we have no objection.

My colleagues tell me if I hold out a few minutes, I will get an additional concession.

Sherer: The second one is a compromise worked out by Romania, Yugoslavia and Malta: "The Participating States would seek, in the framework of their multilateral efforts, to encourage progress and appropriate initiatives and to proceed to an exchange of views on the attainment of the above purposes."

Kissinger: What are "the above purposes?"

Sherer: The Mediterranean paragraph.

Kissinger: Could you read it again?

Sherer [Reads the whole paragraph again.]

Gromyko: Without enthusiasm, we will accept it.

Kissinger: This means that all members of the European Security Conference agree to discuss a Mediterranean solution, right?

Gromyko: You see, "the Participating States would seek in the framework of their multilateral efforts" -- it doesn't say what kind, -- "and would encourage. . ."

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Kissinger: "Encourage" doesn't bother me. It's "to proceed to negotiations"

Gromyko: The substance of the matter is in the first paragraph.

Kissinger: [To Sherer] What do our allies think?

Sherer: When I left the Center, there was no problem.

Kissinger: [To Kovalev] Do you know?

Kovalev: According to our information, all the Western Europeans are in favor of this. That is what the French told me. I don't know what the NATO meeting did.

Sherer: There is not time for a NATO caucus.

Kissinger: Let me say that unless there is some objection by our NATO allies, which I don't know about, I will accept. We accept, with that one proviso.

Sonnenfeldt: Malta has not accepted.

Sherer: Mr. Mintoff has been out on the beach, or out riding.

Gromyko: Or on a mountain.

Sherer: Possibly, Mr. Minister. But their representative, Mr. Kingswell, is possibly high enough to accept for the President.

Kissinger: We will accept these two paragraphs. We will support the July 30 date.

[To Sherer] Our allies have no objection to the July 30 date?

Sherer: There is a consensus on July 30.

Kissinger: The only problem is these two paragraphs and to get Malta to agree to the date.

Sherer: It may be hard for Mintoff to swallow.

Kissinger: What happens if they don't yield?

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Sherer: We have several alternatives. There is one which is proposed by the head of the Soviet delegation.

Kissinger: Just issue the invitations.

Sherer: To go on a bilateral basis with the Finns.

Kissinger: Can we get our people to go along?

Sherer: No. The Dutch and others will dig in their heels.

Kissinger: What other alternatives do we have?

Sherer: That is hard to say. We are dealing with a man who is just unreasonable.

Kissinger: [Whispers] Assassination. [Laughter]

What do you think, Mr. Foreign Minister?

Gromyko: I think we must be serious about this. We are doing a serious piece of business and we can't let it turn into a children's game. If one or two don't go along, we can't drag them there. If all the others go, Mintoff will probably go. If he doesn't. . . . it will be a precedent of how to go about a serious job.

Kissinger: Our problem is the Dutch won't go, and many neutrals.
 [To Sherer:] Any others?

Sherer: The Italians.

Kissinger: And some nonaligned.

Gromyko: It's not serious.

Kissinger: The problem will be that some will say it establishes a precedent about treating small countries.

We will know by 7:30.

Gromyko: It's not a matter of principle, it's a matter of meeting the absurd.

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Kissinger: We will know by 7:30 if Malta accepts, true?

Sherer: I can't say.

Kissinger: Why don't we do the following: Let's see by 7:30 whether the allies will accept these two paragraphs. Maybe Malta will accept them. Maybe it's not a good idea to go around about these; Malta will hear about it.

Gromyko: Let me make one correction: We should not start asking other countries their views before 7:30.

Kissinger: I agree. I modified my instruction. Why don't we ask both of them to come back as soon as they know.

Sherer: We should know by the end of the dinner. 9:30.

Kissinger: Does the Maltese Ambassador think he can get through?

[Kissinger and Sherer confer.]

Mr. Foreign Minister, I have no objection to stating -- at the end of this evening, if there is no agreement -- that we and you are prepared to meet on July 30.

Gromyko: Perhaps we could couch it in this form: We have come to an understanding and we agree with those states who agree to July 30.

Kissinger: We agree with those states who accept July 30.

Gromyko: Yes, and to inform the Finns that our heads of government and heads of state are prepared to go to Helsinki.

Kissinger: That will be more difficult. Why don't we wait until 9:30?

Gromyko: All right.

Could we have a 15-minute break?

Kissinger: All right.

[Kissinger and Sherer confer briefly.]

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Gromyko: And then we will go to another subject. We will meet in 15 minutes.

[The meeting broke at 6:35 p. m. It was agreed that Ambassador Sherer would speak to the Maltese representative in the name of the Secretary of State. Kovalev had done it in the name of the Foreign Minister. At 6:40 p. m. the meeting convened in a small group in the anteroom to discuss SALT.]

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Sonnenfeldt

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:

Andrei A. Gromyko, Member of the Politburo
 of the Central Committee of the CPSU and
 Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR

Anatoli G. Kovalev, Deputy Foreign Minister
 and Chief of Soviet Delegation to CSCE

Anatoli F. Dobrynin, Ambassador to the
 United States

Georgi M. Korniyenko, Chief of the American
 Department and Member of the Collegium,
 Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Mikhail D. Sytenko, Chief of the Near East
 Department and Member of the Collegium,
 Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Vasily G. Makarov, Chef de Cabinet to the
 Foreign Minister

Viktor M. Sukhodrev, Counsellor, Ministry
 of Foreign Affairs (Interpreter)

Oleg M. Sokolov, Chief, American Section of
 the American Department

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
 and Assistant to the President for
 National Security Affairs

Joseph J. Sisco, Under Secretary of State for
 Political Affairs

Amb. Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., Ambassador
 to the USSR

Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor, Department of State
 Winston Lord, Director, Policy Planning Staff,
 Department of State

Amb. Albert W. Sherer, Jr., Chief of U. S.
 Delegation to CSCE

Alfred L. Atherton, Jr., Assistant Secretary of
 State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs

Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff *PMR*

DATE AND TIME:

Friday, July 11, 1975

10:45 a. m. - 1:07 p. m.

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 SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
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SECRET/NODIS/XGDS

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PLACE: Carnival Bar
Intercontinental Hotel
Geneva

SUBJECT: CSCE; Middle East

[Photographers and press came in to photograph.]

CSCE

Kissinger: Twice I've given briefings in bars in Moscow in the Intourist Hotel.

Mr. Foreign Minister, first let me welcome you to -- I can't say our place. Could we have our Ambassadors here? I see Ambassador Kovalev. Where is Sherer?

[He looks over draft of joint statement.]

Gromyko: Mr. Secretary, you are the chairman. You didn't know you were elected?

Kissinger: Oh. I thought Mr. Kovalev would give us a report.

Kovalev: We've just received a reply from the Maltese. They are prepared to accept the entire text of yesterday of the Canadian proposal, including the date of July 30, to register all the understandings except the one on the Mediterranean which was the subject of discussion yesterday between the Foreign Minister and Secretary Kissinger. Let me read the text.

Kissinger: To whom did they communicate this?

Kovalev: We received it just now from Mintoff's special representative, Kingswell.

Kissinger: Did we get it too?

Kovalev: It was virtually two minutes ago.

Sherer: I was probably at the hotel.

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Kovalev: "In order to advance the objectives set forth above, the Participating States also declare their intention of maintaining and amplifying the contacts and dialogue as initiated by the CSCE with the nonparticipating Mediterranean States to include all the States of the Mediterranean, with the purpose of contributing to peace"-- the amendment is "reducing armed forces in the region" -- "strengthening security," and so on.

Kissinger: The only amendment is "reducing armed forces in the region?"

Kovalev: Right.

Kissinger: Do you have any problem with this?

Gromyko: Why don't we talk for a minute?

[Kissinger and Gromyko get up and go to corner of the room to confer alone, from 10:57 - 10:59. Kissinger then confers with Sonnenfeldt, Stoessel, Sisco and Sherer to 11:02.]

Kissinger: I assume if we now accept this, you will not be calling for a nuclear-free zone or disarmament.

Gromyko: [Laughs] Nothing.

Kissinger: I will instruct Ambassador Sherer to call the NATO caucus and discuss it. I foresee no problem. If there is, we can discuss it.

Sherer: There will be no problem.

Kissinger: We should know, say, within an hour. Then we can conclude it today.

[Sherer leaves. Kovalev gets up and talks to Gromyko.]

Gromyko: I'm telling him [Kovalev] to grab Sherer by the coattails.

Kissinger: He's joining the NATO caucus?

Gromyko: He will be active among our friends and the neutrals.

Kissinger: I think it will be settled in the next hour.

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7 pages discussion on
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Gromyko: We believe that on this question too we could engage in some preliminary consultation or exchange of views to reach a common position. There are two possibilities: we could hear initially what the parties want to say and propose, and then we could weigh and assess their proposals and maybe put forward our own viewpoints. Or secondly, they could make their proposals -- and they are the appropriate ones to do so since they are the parties directly involved -- and the United States could make its viewpoints known, perhaps concerted, and we could put forward our own. These possibilities could be the subject of exchanges of views between us. After all, we have agreed on occasion to consult on these things, and included this in many documents. So we are flexible on this.

Kissinger: We have two approaches that either of us could pursue. Either of us could compete at this Conference to drive out the influence of the other, for advantage. This would, one, have an effect on our relations and two, would immediately produce a stalemate. Or, we could be a moderating influence. The parties have enough complexities without our adding to them. My view tends to be to let the parties put forward their ideas, and we could consult to try to put forward a common viewpoint. This would be the most constructive approach. Because a stalemate would serve neither of our interests.

CSCE

[Kovalev and Sherer return at 12:19 p. m.],

Kissinger: Should we hear from our Ambassadors first?

Gromyko: Can we guess what they have? Augurs used to guess from looking at them.

Kissinger: I think it is now humanly impossible to make the European Security Conference fail. [Laughter].

Sherer: It took a little time to assemble the NATO chiefs of delegation. They were aware of the Maltese amendments. I polled the room to find out how people felt and I think without exception the major powers have to seek instructions before giving any opinion at all.

Kissinger: You should have said that too.

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Sherer: And the countries almost all took a generally negative view.

Kissinger: Which? Italy?

Sherer: Italy, France, Turkey, the United Kingdom, Germany.

Kissinger: Does Germany have forces in the Mediterranean?

Sherer: They all spoke in a generally skeptical way.

Kissinger: Let me talk to Mr. Sherer for a minute.

[Kissinger, Sherer, Sisco, Sonnenfeldt and Stoessel confer in the corner until 12:37 p. m. and then return to the table.]

Kissinger: Mr. Foreign Minister, on the European Security Conference first, as I understand it from Mr. Sherer, all the NATO delegations are asking for instructions and the answer is expected to be negative. I am asking Sherer to ask the delegations to hold an answer until I have a chance to confer with Schmidt and Callaghan, and I can get in touch with the French.

I think the Conference will take place on July 30. It is only a question of tactics. It's a stupid. . . . We are only committed to maintain contacts and dialogue on these questions.

Sisco: It is not operative.

Kissinger: We are not committed to do anything. I will recommend to them that we stay in low gear on this. [To Sherer] Tell them we construe this only as a commitment to a dialogue, that we don't construe it as calling for a reduction, and we have no intention on our part to reduce our forces. And I don't detect a burning desire by my Soviet colleagues to reduce. No, you speak for yourself.

[The Secretary confers with Sherer]

Sherer will proceed as indicated. I am seeing Genscher tonight and Schmidt tomorrow and Callaghan. I will call Sauvagnargues tonight or tomorrow. I think the Finns should proceed as if it will go forward on the 30th. It is inconceivable to me that it should fail at this late date.

I'm told the Finns are proceeding anyway on the assumption that it will go forward.

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And our two Ambassadors will stay in touch and we will let you know everything we are doing. We will let Vorontsov know Saturday night or Sunday morning what the results are.

Gromyko: All right. I think evidently somebody somewhere seems to be not too aware of the consequences of what is going on.

Kissinger: You are talking about the European Security Conference?

Gromyko: Yes.

Kissinger: I think it has become an industry in each Foreign Office working on the European Security Conference. No one asks himself what the purpose is.

I think of all the countries, Turkey is the most difficult one on this question of reducing forces.

[Gromyko confers with Kovalev]

Gromyko: Yesterday they agreed with the Canadian proposal.

Kissinger: Yes. But on the Maltese addition.

Gromyko: We don't know, since the NATO countries discussed it.

Sherer: The Turks here will consult their government, but the delegation here had a generally negative attitude.

Kissinger: We could cut off arms to them.

[To Sherer] Will they be able to get instructions by this afternoon?

Sherer: The Turks will take a while.

Kissinger: All of them.

Sherer: They are all phoning now.

Kissinger: Let me know the lineup before I leave.

Sherer: All right

[Exeunt Sherer and Kovalev].

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Middle East:

[Gromyko and Sukhodrev confer].

Gromyko: I was just recapping my last remarks on the Middle East: You said we should discuss whether we should concert to put forward proposals of our own or not.

Kissinger: What is your reaction?

Gromyko: That is a possible mode of action.

We can talk over these questions, but what do we do with the Geneva Conference?

Malta is not a factor.

Kissinger: Wait until your Syrian friends go into action. They will drive us all crazy.

[Sonnenfeldt shows him a draft of the joint statement of the meeting].

I was prepared to add "constructive talks in a friendly atmosphere." "Cordial." I would prefer "cordial."

Gromyko: "Friendly".

Kissinger: We will do "friendly."

Gromyko: Do you have any idea when the Conference should be convened?

Kissinger: We will have a more precise idea when the General Secretary and the President meet in Helsinki, because we will know whether there will be an interim agreement or not. It will probably be some time in the course of the fall, but a more precise date we will know perhaps by then.

Can I ask, for my understanding, one or two other questions?

You said there is a possibility of partial settlements coming out of Geneva. I have no fixed view on it. Should they be made as stages of an overall -- that is, first we agree on the overall and then we agree on these as steps in it? Or can there be a partial agreement and then overall?

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(. . .)

July 23, 1975

Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)

The Soviet Union first proposed a European security conference on February 10, 1954, and periodically reiterated the proposal in subsequent years. It received little initial enthusiasm from Western and neutral nations, but following increased bilateral initiatives toward detente, a renewed Warsaw Pact appeal from Budapest on March 17, 1969 elicited a cautiously positive reaction from NATO. The United States and our NATO allies took the position that such a conference might serve a useful purpose, but only after concrete progress had been achieved on the most sensitive aspect of East-West confrontation in Europe, namely Berlin.

It was specified in successive NATO documents beginning in December 1969 that conclusion of a new Four-Power agreement on Berlin, aimed at effecting practical improvements in relations between the people on both sides of the wall and between Bonn and West Berlin, could lead to allied willingness to participate in a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). The allies also increasingly emphasized the importance they attached to improving F. R. G. relations with the G. D. R., U. S. S. R., Poland and other Warsaw Pact countries. The Berlin Accord, signed September 3, 1971 took effect in June 1972 as did the F. R. G. -G. D. R. Basic Treaty normalizing relations between those two states. The Warsaw Pact countries agreed to commence exploratory talks on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) at Vienna beginning in January 1973. CSCE Multilateral Preparatory Talks thereupon opened at Helsinki in November 1972.

Stage I

Stage I of CSCE opened with a meeting of Foreign Ministers of 33 European states plus the United States and Canada at Helsinki from July 3 to 7, 1973. Ministers approved the "Final Recommendations" of the preparatory phase, which set the agenda and established mandates for committees and subcommittees during the Stage II negotiations.

Stage II

Stage II began September 18, 1973 in Geneva. Senior officials from the 35 participating countries met to work out an agreed final document organized under the four agenda items or "baskets:"

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1. Questions relating to security in Europe;
2. Cooperation in the fields of economics, science and technology, and the environment;
3. Cooperation in strengthening human contacts, the exchange of information, and cultural and educational ties (the so-called "freer movement" issue); and
4. Post-conference follow-up arrangements.

Basket 1

Under the first agenda item, conference negotiators have produced a declaration of the following ten principles of interstate relations:

- Sovereign equality, respect for the rights inherent in sovereignty.
- Refraining from the threat or use of force.
- Inviolability of frontiers.
- Territorial integrity of states.
- Peaceful settlement of disputes.
- Non-intervention in internal affairs.
- Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief.
- Equal rights and self-determination of peoples.
- Cooperation among states.
- Fulfillment in good faith of international obligations.

The U. S. S. R. viewed this declaration as the central document of the conference. The Soviets were especially anxious to gain Western acceptance of an unambiguous principle on inviolability of frontiers by force. Western participants made clear, however, that their agreement to this precept would not constitute formal recognition of existing European frontiers or imply that present



borders are immutable. The Federal Republic of Germany, with the firm support of its NATO allies, insisted on a reference in the Declaration of Principles to the possibility of effecting border changes by peaceful means. The United States took an active role in negotiation of this key text on peaceful border changes, which is included in the principle of sovereign equality.

Also under agenda item 1, CSCE participants have negotiated limited military security measures designed to strengthen mutual trust and confidence. Specific texts were produced on two modest but significant "confidence-building measures:" prior notification of military maneuvers, and exchange of observers at those maneuvers. Adoption of these measures was urged by the smaller European countries.

Basket 2

Under agenda item 2, the Geneva talks produced a series of declarations, or resolutions, on economic, scientific and technological, and environmental cooperation. The United States did not pursue major economic policy objectives at CSCE preferring to leave them to such fora as the Multilateral Trade Negotiations. We took care to ensure that the CSCE texts would not conflict with the U. S. Trade Act of 1974. We hope the practical understandings in this area will broaden the scope of East-West exchanges, help reduce barriers to trade, and make a useful contribution to detente.

Basket 3

The third agenda item, "basket 3", deals with increased human contacts, flow of information, and cooperation in cultural and educational relations. This item was included on the CSCE agenda only as a result of energetic efforts by the United States, our allies, and the neutral states. At Geneva, agreement was reached on basket 3 texts dealing with such issues as family reunification, family visits, marriages between nationals of different states, the right to travel, access to printed as well as broadcast information, improved working conditions for journalists, and increased cultural and educational cooperation.



Basket 4

Under the fourth agenda item, the conference produced a text on post-CSCE "follow-up" arrangements. Debate focused on the degree of institutionalization and continuity to be accorded post-conference activities. The final compromise text provides for unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral actions designed to carry forward the work of the conference and monitor the implementation of agreed texts. A meeting of experts will be convened in the first half of 1977 to prepare for a gathering of senior officials later that year to review results of CSCE and plan for possible future meetings.

Special Topics

In addition to the primary East-West focus of the conference, a number of the smaller participants had special interests which were taken into account in evolving a CSCE consensus. Romania urged acknowledgment of the special status and needs of developing countries; and Malta, Cyprus and Yugoslavia requested consideration of the interests of non-participating Mediterranean states. Special consideration was given to the concerns of Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus. In general, the smaller countries of Europe appreciated the opportunity CSCE gave them to participate in the detente dialogue.

Stage III


Stage III will be held at Helsinki from July 30 to August 1, 1975. The U. S. S. R. through Communist Party General Secretary Leonid I. Brezhnev requested that Stage III of CSCE be held at the summit level. The United States and its allies maintained that a final decision on the level of Stage III should come after achievement of satisfactory results in Stage II. In intense negotiations during June and early July, all substantive issues were resolved to the satisfaction of all participants and the date for Stage III agreed.

The CSCE final document resembles the Universal Declaration of Human Rights or the UN Friendly Relations Declaration. Conference participants view the final document as a statement of political resolve or declaration of intent, not as an agreement legally binding upon governments. However, as a carefully negotiated text, solemnly signed by high-level representatives of the 35 nations involved, it generally will be seen as having considerable moral and political force.

CSCE is sometimes incorrectly compared to the 1815 Congress of Vienna that influenced the political order in Europe for much of the 19th Century, but it is a much more modest event. The results of the conference are but a step in the process of detente, raising the hope of further improvement in East-West relations. CSCE is also the beginning of a new approach to consultations on matters of importance by all European states. The extent to which CSCE agreements are implemented over time will be the true test for judging the success of this conference.

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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1. SUMMARY. HERewith ARE OUR THOUGHTS ON CURRENT MISCONCEPTIONS STEMMING FROM CSCE, ITS MAJOR BENEFIT TO US FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD THE SOVIET UNION AND EASTERN EUROPE, AND SPECIFIC SUGGESTIONS FOR OUR POLICY IN THE POST-CSCE PERIOD. END SUMMARY.

2. THERE IS A MYTH BEING PROPAGATED IN THE AMERICAN PRESS AND ELSEWHERE THAT THE CSCE DOCUMENTS SOMEHOW CONFIRM THE STATUS QUO IN EASTERN EUROPE AND CONSOLIDATE SOVIET CONTROL OVER THE NATIONS OF THE AREA. THE FACT OF THE MATTER IS, OF COURSE, THAT EASTERN EUROPEAN BOUNDARIES WERE CONFIRMED BY THE VARIOUS FRG-EAST EUROPEAN TREATIES-- IF NOT BY THE CONQUERING SOVIET ARMIES IN 1944-45. AT MOST, THE CSCE LANGUAGE ON THE INVIOABILITY OF FRONTIERS SIMPLY PUTS THAT IDEA IN A MULTILATERAL CONTEXT. EVEN AT THAT, THE CAVEAT ON PEACEFUL CHANGE DILUTES THE CONCEPT OF THE PERMANENCY OF EASTERN EUROPEAN BORDERS TO THE POINT WHERE THE WEST GERMANS THEMSELVES NO LONGER OBJECT. AS FOR THE POLITICAL STATUS QUO, IT IS PRECISELY THIS THAT THE SOVIETS FEEL CSCE MAY UNHINGE THROUGH BASKET I ASSURANCES OF SOVEREIGNTY AND BASKET III EMPHASIS ON EAST-WEST CONTACTS. IN ANY CASE, WE WOULD FIND IT HARD TO SEE MERIT IN A LINE OF ARGUMENT IMPLYING ANY BENEFIT TO U.S. NATIONAL INTERESTS FROM RAISING ONCE MORE THE HOARY BALKANESQUE TERRITORIAL DISPUTES THAT HAVE PLAGUED EUROPE FOR THE PAST TWO CENTURIES. IT IS TRUE THAT THE QUESTION OF THE ULTIMATE REUNIFICATION OF GERMANY STILL HANGS OVER EUROPE LIKE A TIME BOMB--TICKING INEXORABLY, BUT SLOWLY AND FAR IN THE DISTANCE. HOWEVER, CSCE DOES NOT AFFECT THIS ONE WAY OR THE OTHER.

3. IN ANY EVENT, THE SOVIET POSITION AT HELSINKI AND THEIR OVERALL TREATMENT OF THE CSCE DOCUMENTS ARE FAIRLY PREDICTABLE. THE KREMLIN WILL TRUMPET THAT CSCE STEMMED PRIMARILY FROM BREZHNEV'S "PEACE PROGRAM" AND THE NEW "CORRELATION OF FORCES" IN THE WORLD AND HENCE IS A TRIUMPH FOR THE USSR AND FOR LEONID ILYCH PERSONALLY. UNDERLYING THIS CLAIM WILL BE A LEITMOTIF SUGGESTING THAT BREZHNEV HAS FINALLY ACHIEVED WHAT PETER THE GREAT AND THE VARIOUS SUCCEEDING RULERS OF RUSSIA COULD NOT--I.E., ACCEPTANCE OF



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IN EASTERN EUROPE HAVE AN IMPORTANT, BUT OFTEN INDEFINABLE, EFFECT ON THE OUTLOOK OF SOVIET LEADERS. IT IS NOT UNREALISTIC, THEREFORE, TO THINK OF THIS AREA AS A CONDUIT OF SOCIAL CHANGE FOR THE SOVIET UNION. THE TRICK, OF COURSE, WILL BE TO INFLUENCE THE EAST EUROPEANS IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION WITHOUT BRINGING THE ARMED WRATH OF THE KREMLIN DOWN ON THEM.

6. WITH THE ABOVE IN MIND, AND TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION DOMESTIC SKEPTICISM REGARDING CSCE AS WELL, WE WOULD LIKE TO MAKE SOME SPECIFIC SUGGESTIONS, BOTH LONG AND SHORT RANGE, WHICH U.S. POLICY-MAKERS MIGHT CONSIDER IN THE POST-CSCE PERIOD:

A. FIRST OF ALL, AS NOTED IN REFTEL, WE FEEL STRONGLY THAT WE SHOULD NOT BE SUPINE IN THE FACE OF SOVIET EFFORTS TO MITIGATE THE CONSEQUENCES OF BASKET III. WE THINK WE SHOULD DO ALL WE CAN TO CONVEY TO THE EUROPEANS, INCLUDING THE USSR, THAT WE REGARD CSCE OBLIGATIONS AS REAL GUIDEPOSTS TO FUTURE CONTACTS BETWEEN PEOPLES.

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