



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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January 14, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR LIEUTENANT GENERAL BRENT SCOWCROFT
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Issues Paper on CSCE

Attached is an issues paper for the Secretary's use in briefing the President on CSCE.

For the Secretary's further information, there are also attached:

-- a basic background paper on CSCE prepared for the Secretary's use in briefing the President last August; and

-- a more detailed memorandum recently sent to the Secretary on the current state of play in CSCE.

George S. Springsteen
George S. Springsteen
Executive Secretary

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Attachments:

1. Issues Paper on CSCE.
2. Background Paper on CSCE.
3. Memorandum on Current State of Play in CSCE.

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Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)

I. Background

CSCE, a Soviet initiative, is seen by Moscow principally as a way to confirm in a summit-level final gathering Western acceptance of the territorial and political status quo in Eastern Europe, including the division of Germany. The Soviets also view CSCE as a vehicle for promoting a general sense of detente euphoria, especially among our European Allies.

For their part, our Allies were attracted to CSCE because of the visible role it offered them in multi-lateral East-West negotiations. At the same time, they sought, through CSCE, to promote the freer exchange of peoples, ideas and information, including tangible gains, for example, with regard to the reunification of families, access in the East to Western publications and improved working conditions for journalists in Eastern Europe.

The Allies also have sought to obtain agreement on military confidence-building measures (CBM's) like prior notification of major maneuvers and troop movements (neither the Soviets nor we favor the latter).

Europe's neutral states generally have joined in support of Allied objectives, and in some cases have been even more demanding.

The conference, which includes the US, Canada and all except the smallest European states, began in December 1972 with preparatory talks in Helsinki which reached agreement on the following agenda items:

1. Principles guiding interstate relations and CBM's.
2. Cooperation -- economic, scientific/technical and environmental.
3. Humanitarian cooperation (freer movement of peoples, ideas and information).
4. Conference follow-up.

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Stage 1 of the conference itself opened in Helsinki in July 1973 with a meeting of foreign ministers to approve the above agenda and the related "mandates" for the official-level, detailed negotiations of stage 2 that opened in Geneva in September 1973, recessed last July, and will resume September 4.

Based on progress to date, the Soviets appear likely eventually to meet their objective of obtaining from CSCE an agreement on a declaration of principles of relations among states, including the principle of frontier inviolability, and connoting multilateral endorsement of the Moscow and Warsaw treaties. While this declaration would not be legally binding and would not constitute formal US recognition of post-World War II border changes, the Soviets want to give it maximum political and moral force by having it signed at a summit-level concluding stage of CSCE. At the same time, however, the FRG has had a particular interest in seeing that the principles declaration cannot be read as sealing forever the division of Germany. To meet this concern, the Allies have sought and won, with US support, Soviet agreement in principle to language leaving open the possibility of peaceful border changes.

As CSCE has progressed, however, serious differences emerged between the Soviets and the Allies on freer movement, with some of the latter insisting on very significant liberalization of Eastern European practices with regard to such issues as emigration and public access to information. In order to increase their bargaining leverage on freer movement issues and CBM's, the Allies consequently have dragged their heels on other aspects of CSCE, including the principles declaration, any commitment to a summit-level CSCE conclusion or to post-conference permanent machinery.

As Allied demands persisted, the Soviets increasingly have looked to us to aid in abating Allied appetites for far-reaching Eastern concessions, and the Allies at the same time have sought our support for their demands. Since neither side, as yet, has significantly altered its positions, the conference had bogged down prior to the summer recess.

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II. Prospects

When negotiations resume September 2, the Soviets will doubtless continue to press for a rapid conclusion at summit level, while offering only minimal concessions on freer movement and CBM's. However, the cooperation issues (item 2) can probably be wrapped up without much difficulty. Moreover, we anticipate few further difficulties on the principles of interstate relations (item 1), though the Allies will withhold final agreement to retain negotiating leverage on other issues.

The Soviets and their Warsaw Pact allies will seek also CSCE agreement to establish a permanent organization to meet periodically for further discussions of European security and cooperation. Such machinery is doubtless viewed by the Soviets as a way station toward an "all-European" security system that would ultimately replace NATO and the Warsaw Pact. It is likely that the Allies will agree to some form of conference follow-on, but they will not be inclined to reach any firm decisions until there is further progress on freer movement and CBM's.

Our current expectation is that the talks will spin out at least until Christmas and likely beyond.

III. Issues and Choices

We have never seen much to be gained for ourselves in CSCE and attach less importance than do our Allies to Soviet concessions on freer movement and CBM's. At the same time, having acceded to Allied wishes to participate, we have tried to get CSCE concluded expeditiously, have avoided breaking ranks with our Allies over CSCE issues and have suggested that the Allies consult in NATO to agree as soon as possible on a realistic minimum acceptable CSCE outcome.

We have told the Soviets we are making this effort to narrow the range of Allied desiderata. However, our Allies have been reluctant to define goals in detail, fearing that this would establish fall-back positions that would leak to the Soviets.

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Intense Soviet interest in CSCE continues, nonetheless, to offer possibilities for leverage in connection with other East-West negotiations, and serves as an incentive for the Soviets to continue on a restrained course in international relations. For this reason, we have held open the prospect of a summit-level conclusion.

The Soviets, for their part, probably will keep stalling on MBFR until CSCE is concluded. We will thus wish to weigh carefully the tactics we pursue in CSCE against the background of the full range of our relations with the USSR.

IV. Next Steps

We intend to seek Allied agreement on the minimum CSCE results warranting a summit finale, while maintaining a bilateral dialogue as appropriate with the Soviets. We ourselves are not pressing for a summit gathering, but we believe a meeting at that level will be practically a foregone conclusion, once substantive disagreements have been ironed out in Geneva. We should therefore plan for a possible summit, in Helsinki, perhaps next spring.

We also will wish to consider, at an appropriate time, plans for informing the Congress and US public opinion on the likelihood of a CSCE summit.

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x21626:8/27/74
Concur: EUR - Mr. Lowenstein
C - Mr. Sonnenfeldt

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BRIEFING MEMORANDUM

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To: The Secretary
Through: C - Mr. Sonnenfeldt
From: EUR - Arthur A. Hartman

CSCE: State of Play and Next Steps

Against the background of the current state of CSCE stage II negotiations, this memorandum describes the scenario we propose to follow as the conference moves toward conclusion.

State of Play

Good progress was recorded on basket 3 before the Christmas break and, assuming the Soviets hold to their posture of pressing actively for agreements while showing some flexibility, basket 3 issues could be wound up completely by the Easter recess in late March. However, the conference has yet to come to grips with two remaining difficult issues -- audio visual information (the radio jamming question); and the French proposal on libraries/reading rooms. On these and other basket 3 issues, the Allies will be negotiating on the basis of more realistic texts, as you proposed at the Ottawa NATO Ministerial meeting. Moreover, apart from hard-nosed delegations like the Dutch and Italians, the other Allies have not insisted on language that Moscow clearly could not accept.

With respect to the principles declaration and related issues in basket 1, considerable work remains. While the negotiators have completed a first reading of seven of the ten principles, and reached virtual

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agreement on the eighth (self-determination), they have not yet begun to draft the preambular and concluding clauses of the declaration. Moreover, after completion of the first reading of the paragraphs covering the ten principles themselves, a second reading will be required to eliminate a tangle of bracketed language reflecting issues left unresolved during the first reading. We doubt all of this can be accomplished before the Easter break likely to begin about March 20.

There also remain the following important, unresolved substantive issues in basket 1:

-- the peaceful change of frontiers question, where we will need to be in touch with the Soviets to discuss language we have agreed with Bonn;

-- the clause reserving quadripartite rights in Germany and Berlin (language has been agreed among the Four Powers and the FRG but may be challenged by some of the smaller countries);

the matter of the "equal value" and "interrelationship" of the principles; and

-- the Romanian non-use of force proposal (which may become a separate conference document or may be merged with the principles declaration), where Soviet-Romanian differences blocked agreement just before the Christmas break.

On the Romanian proposal, our delegation actively pressed to the satisfaction of the Romanians for completion of drafting on the key third paragraph prohibiting entry of "armed forces" on the territory of other states without their consent. The only remaining difference on this language pits the Soviets against the Romanians; for doctrinal reasons not entirely clear to us, Moscow insists that the language enjoin the use of "military force" rather than "armed forces" against another state.

Work on military security issues in basket 1 has lagged because the Soviets failed to respond to repeated

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signals of Allied flexibility on the major parameters governing preannouncement of maneuvers (threshold for notification; amount of advance notification; and extent of Soviet territory to be covered). Our Allies and the neutrals also insist that the conference should deal with major troop movements, while the Soviets want to remand that issue for further study to a CSCE follow-up body. Finally, the neutrals (especially Yugoslavia), with strong support from Romania and some sympathy among the Allies, want some recognition of the right of CSCE participants to be kept informed about disarmament negotiations affecting their interests -- i.e., MBFR.

In basket 2 (cooperation issues), the drafting work on most topics has nearly been completed, though we expect further tough wrangling, and eventual compromises on doctrinal points relating to trade policy.

On conference follow-up, basket 4, drafting has begun on noncontroversial preambular paragraphs but has not yet addressed major substantive points. We are requesting by separate memorandum your guidance on this issue.

Meanwhile, we will be working with our Allies and others to obtain an explicit understanding that all will consider agreed CSCE texts as political documents, not juridically binding instruments.

After completing the drafting on the four agenda items, and on the separate Mediterranean declaration, the conferees will then have to decide the form of the final document(s), verify for conformity the six official language versions, and agree on a date and on detailed procedures for stage III.. We estimate that these issues will take at least a month to settle and that CSCE will not address them until after the Easter break, which is likely to end about April 15.

Timing of Stage II and Stage III

In light of our preference for a stage III finale in late June or July, we should strive to wrap up

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stage II by May or early June (the Finns will need about a month after the end of stage II to make preparations for stage III). An earlier conclusion of stage II would not be in our interests since there will be considerable pressure, especially from the Eastern side, to hold stage III as soon as feasible after the end of the Geneva talks, and we would not wish stage III to coincide with the May 8 anniversary of the end of World War II.

Assuming no shift in the attitudes of the Soviets and the major Western European participants, it should be possible to meet the timetable set out above, though some "sleeper" issues, described below, could involve protracted wrangling as stage II draws to its conclusion. As indicated above, the Geneva negotiations should make considerable progress between January 20, when the talks resume, and March 20 when they will likely break for the Easter holidays, but a good deal of work will be left over for the post-Easter session.

Thus, to meet our preferred schedule, we believe it will be sufficient to hold essentially, in Geneva, to our previous posture of encouraging a timely conclusion of stage II, while giving quiet support to Allied positions on most of the substantive issues that they consider important. We will, of course, need to reassess our position periodically in light of developments in Geneva and elsewhere.

In addition, we should give early consideration to arranging for a NATO summit to precede the likely CSCE stage III summit. We could use the already scheduled February 7 NAC consultations on CSCE to surface this matter with all of the Allies, but it would be preferable to consult bilaterally in selected capitals before raising the issue in the NAC. A separate memorandum will outline a suggested scenario and request your guidance.

Possible Problem Issues

Several issues, peripheral to the concerns of most but of prime importance to one or several small and middle powers, could delay the progress of stage II

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negotiations. When agreement comes within sight on the central CSCE issues -- and especially if the Soviet and some major Western delegations seem anxious to wrap up stage II in a hurry -- delegations with special causes to plead may conclude that their bargaining leverage has increased. The more determined among them might then decide to block consensus as a means of forcing the conference majority to give them some satisfaction.

The most troublesome issues in this category likely will be the Maltese proposal for a European-Arab federation and a post-CSCE standing committee to monitor progress in that direction; a series of military security proposals (the movements CBM; MBFR oversight; military self-restraint; and preannouncement of separate naval and air maneuvers); and the Cyprus dispute. The individual delegations most likely to use the consensus-blocking tactic to force concessions on one or more of the above issues are perhaps Malta, Yugoslavia, Greece and Romania. These delegations would not stand entirely alone and could count on at least nominal support from several others, depending on the specific issue.

If any of these issues, described in more detail below, should threaten to delay conclusion of stage II beyond our late May-early June target date, we will seek your specific guidance.

The Maltese Proposal. Malta has proposed that the European states should move toward a federation with Arab and Persian Gulf countries. The political weight of this grouping would match that of the two superpowers, who would in due course be invited to remove their fleets from the Mediterranean. CSCE should establish a permanent committee to monitor progress toward this European-Arab federation. Presumably Mintoff personally authored this proposal.

The Maltese proposal is so absurd our assumption is that Mintoff does not take it seriously but hopes to use it to get something else: some form of regularized exchange of views between any CSCE follow-up

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bodies and the nonparticipating Mediterranean states (NPMS); and/or the presence of NPMS' representatives at stage III. Bearing in mind Maltese stubbornness during the last days of the Helsinki MPT and Mintoff's temper tantrum during the CSCE stage I ministerial, we expect the Maltese will threaten to refuse consensus in stage II until they get some satisfaction.

If Malta stood entirely alone, it might be possible to work around the problem and, as a last resort, to convene stage III without the Maltese. However, many of the smaller participants, aware of the added negotiating weight the unanimity principle provides them, would block any moves to carry on without the Maltese. We have spoken out against the Maltese proposal ourselves in CSCE and will continue to urge our Allies and others to take a firm stand against it.

Military Security Issues. All the neutrals and Romania would like to broaden the content of the CSCE military security text well beyond what we and the Soviets regard as acceptable. On the issue of a movements CBM, they are, of course, joined by most of our Allies. The neutrals and Romania also want language that would have the MBFR "forum" inform CSCE participants of the status of the negotiations and receive and "take into account" the views of non-participants. The Yugoslavs especially seem firmly wedded to this proposal. Their basic concern is to prevent redeployment of withdrawn Soviet forces into Hungary. While acknowledging that they could use bilateral channels, both to keep informed on the state of play in Vienna and to make their concerns known, the Yugoslav CSCE delegation insists that formal CSCE acknowledgement of their right to be kept informed on a multilateral basis and to state their views is a matter of cardinal interest to them. In addition, the Yugoslavs, Romanians and others want operative language pledging CSCE participants to the exercise of "self-restraint" in the military field, and finally, Malta, Cyprus, and Spain, with broad neutral and some Allied support, insist on preannouncement of separate naval and air maneuvers.

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We doubt that the delegations named above will allow themselves to be pushed back, without a long struggle, to the preferred US (and Soviet) positions on all of the military security issues mentioned above, although we cannot now predict where they will make their last stand or precisely what concessions would appease them.

The Cyprus Issue. The Greeks have said, both in the CSCE Coordinating Committee and in NAC sessions in Brussels, that they would block consensus in stage II unless there is some movement toward a solution of the Cyprus question. While the Greeks may continue to threaten such a step, we doubt they would actually take it unless there is renewed conflict on Cyprus or a serious deterioration of the situation on the island. The Cypriot delegation has also threatened to block stage II consensus but generally lets the Greeks take the lead on this issue.


Even short of a Greek/Cypriot move to block consensus, the Cyprus problem will continue to complicate the Geneva negotiations. The Greeks, for example, may insist on unacceptable amendments to the Romanian non-use of force proposal or to portions of the principles declaration treating such concepts as sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-intervention. Each of these problems will have to be dealt with as it arises. If any of them assumes major proportions, we will wish to consider urging restraint on the Greeks, in concert perhaps with selected West European Allies.

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger

SUBJECT: Resumption of CSCE Negotiations



The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) will resume in Geneva on January 20. Because the Soviet Union wishes to conclude Stage II of the Conference and proceed to the third stage (the heads of government summit), the upcoming session should produce progress toward resolution of still outstanding issues. The paragraphs below discuss the timing of a CSCE summit, the current status of the negotiations and key issues remaining, the prospects for the next session and the U.S. negotiating position.

Background

In brief, CSCE is seen by Moscow principally as a way to confirm, in a summit-level final gathering, Western acceptance of the territorial and political status quo in Europe, including the division of Germany. Our Allies, for their part, have sought in CSCE a visible role in multilateral East-West negotiations, as well as the possibility of promoting freer exchange of peoples, ideas, and information and of obtaining agreement on limited military confidence-building measures (CBMS) like prior notification of major maneuvers. The European neutrals generally support Allied objectives, and in some cases have been even more demanding.

Possible CSCE and Western Summit Meetings

We want the concluding CSCE stage III meeting, likely to be at summit level, to be set for late June or July -- not in May, a date the Soviets likely prefer because it would coincide with the 30th anniversary of V-E Day. To meet our preferred timetable, stage II negotiations in Geneva should conclude by late May or early June, giving the Finns a month to prepare for the Helsinki finale, which we expect to be a largely ceremonial, three-or-four-day session where heads of government will make formal statements and sign CSCE final documents.

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While these documents will not constitute legally binding instruments, their signature by 35 heads of government could be misconstrued by Western public opinion as marking a profound change in East-West relations. To redress the balance in the public mind, we have been exploring informally with key Allies the possibility of a NATO heads of government meeting just before the CSCE summit.

Current Status of the Geneva Negotiations

When the stage II talks recessed for Christmas, progress on the four "baskets" was uneven. There was encouraging movement in basket III (humanitarian cooperation), including agreement on a text covering family reunification. If the Soviets hold to their posture of pressing actively for agreement while showing some flexibility, basket III issues could be wound up completely by the Easter recess in late March. However, the conference has not yet addressed two particularly contentious issues: the radio jamming question and the French proposal on libraries/reading rooms.

With respect to the principles declaration in basket I, to which Moscow attaches primary importance, considerable drafting work remains, as well as several sensitive and unresolved substantive issues, including the language on peaceful change of frontiers which we have agreed, at the request of the FRG, to try to work out with the Soviets. Work on confidence-building measures (CBMS) has lagged because the Soviets have failed to respond to repeated signals of Allied flexibility with regard to the terms of prior announcement of maneuvers (level of forces whose movements would be notified; time of advanced notification; and the extent of Soviet territory to be covered).

Drafting has nearly been completed in basket II (cooperation issues), but on the question of conference follow-up (basket IV) the conference has not addressed the major substantive difference between those (Warsaw Pact states, neutrals and some Allies) who want the conference to agree to a regular system of post-CSCE consultations, and those Allies, including ourselves, who prefer to remand a decision on institutional follow-up to a meeting of senior officials to be held after a two-year, post-CSCE probationary period.

Stage II Prospects

Assuming no shift in the attitudes of the Soviets and the major Western Europeans participants, we expect the Geneva negotiations to make

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considerable progress between January 20 -- when the talks resume -- and March 20 when they will likely break for the Easter holidays. After Easter, in addition to final drafting on the four main agenda items, and perhaps also on the separate Mediterranean declaration, CSCE will have to decide the form of the final document(s), verify for conformity the six official language versions, and agree on a date and on detailed procedures for stage III. These issues will take, we believe, at least a month to settle.

U.S. Position


To meet our preferred schedule for the conclusion of stage II (late May, early June), we believe it will be sufficient to hold essentially to our previous posture of encouraging a timely conclusion of stage II while giving quiet support to Allied positions on most of the substantive issues that they consider important. We will, of course, need to reassess our position periodically in light of developments, bearing in mind that the unanimity rule of the conference could make it possible for a determined minority of delegations to block consensus as a means of forcing the conference majority to give them some satisfaction on issues peripheral to the concerns of most but of prime importance to one or several small and middle powers.

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E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, UR, US
SUBJECT: CSCE: AMBASSADOR'S CALL ON KOVALEV

REF: A. STATE 11524 B. GENEVA 7461

SUMMARY. SOVIET CSCE DELEGATION CHIEF KOVALEV RECEIVED ME CORDIALLY JANUARY 17 FOR WHAT TURNED OUT TO BE A DETAILED DISCUSSION OF CSCE. KOVALEV EXPRESSED HIMSELF AS "MODERATELY OPTIMISTIC" ABOUT CSCE PROSPECTS AS A WHOLE, AND HE SEEMED PARTICULARLY UPGREAT ON BASKET THREE. KOVALEV'S STRONGEST PITCH WAS ON PEACEFUL CHANGE; HE CALLED IT THE CENTRAL QUESTION NOW BEFORE CSCE. HE SAID HE HAD "CLEAR INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE LEADERSHIP" TO GO NO FARTHER THAN THE SOVIET FORMULATION GIVEN THE U.S. IN SEPTEMBER. HE ACCUSED THE FRG OF BAD FAITH, AND HE URGED U.S. SUPPORT FOR "BURYING" THE JULY 25 LANGUAGE. ON MILITARY MANEUVERS, HE SAID THERE WAS NO POSSIBILITY OF A SOVIET COMPROMISE. ON THE VALUE OF THE PRINCIPLES, KOVALEV SAID THAT THE USSR COULD ACCEPT THE HELSINKI BLUE BOOK LANGUAGE ON EQUAL RESPECT FOR THE PRINCIPLES BUT COULD NOT AGREE THAT ALL THE PRINCIPLES ARE OF EQUAL IMPORTANCE. ON TIMING, HE SAID THAT AN EARLY CONCLUSION DEPENDS LARGELY ON WASHINGTON; WHILE HE WOULD NOT BE PINNED DOWN ON A DATE FOR THE THIRD STAGE, HE DID SAY BY THE END OF THE SPRING. ON THE FOLLOW-UP, HE CRITICIZED THE DANISH PROPOSAL BUT SAID THE USSR IS FLEXIBLE. AS THE FIRST HIGH-RANKING SOVIET OFFICIAL I HAVE SEEN SINCE ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE SOVIET MFN REJECTION,

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KOVALEV GAVE EVERY SIGN OF A DESIRE TO CONTINUE THE BI-LATERAL RELATIONSHIP. HE DID NOT MENTION INTERFERENCE IN INTERNAL AFFAIRS, EVEN IN THE BASKET THREE CONTEXT, AND HE WARMLY AGREED WITH ME WHEN I EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT OUR TWO COUNTRIES COULD MOVE AHEAD ON ALL ISSUES BEFORE US, INCLUDING TRADE. END SUMMARY.

2. PRESENT WITH KOVALEV WAS A. L. ADAMISHIN, A CSCE EXPERT WHO HEADS THE MFA ADMINISTRATION FOR GENERAL INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS. KOVALEV SAID HE PLANNED TO LEAVE FOR GENEVA BY PLANE JANUARY 19 TO BE THERE FOR THE OPENING THE NEXT DAY.

3. BASKET THREE. IN RESPONSE TO MY REMARK THAT ENCOURAGING PROGRESS SEEMED TO HAVE BEEN MADE IN DECEMBER, KOVALEV SAID THAT A GREAT DEAL HAD BEEN DONE AND THERE WERE ONLY A FEW QUESTIONS LEFT TO RESOLVE ON BASKET THREE. HE MENTIONED WORKING CONDITION FOR JOURNALISTS AS THE MOST IMPORTANT PENDING PROBLEM; EVEN HERE, HOWEVER, THE SWISS PROPOSAL PROVIDES THE BASIS FOR A COMPROMISE AND THE SOVIET SIDE IS OPTIMISTIC. I ASKED ABOUT READING ROOMS. HE REPLIED THAT THE USSR HAS A STRONG, CLEAR POSITION: THERE IS NO POSSIBILITY OF COMPROMISE; THE PROPOSAL IS DEAD. HE ADDED THAT THE FRENCH ARE WELL AWARE OF THE SOVIET POSITION.

4. BASKET TWO. KOVALEV SAID THAT HERE THE SOVIET PROBLEMS, LARGELY CONCERNING MFN, WERE WITH THE EC, NOT THE U.S.

5. PEACEFUL CHANGE. KOVALEV THEN LAUNCHED INTO A STRONG ARGUMENT ON PEACEFUL CHANGE. HE SAID HE HAD MADE THE SAME ARGUMENT WITH AMBASSADOR SHERER (REFTEL B), BUT HE WANTED TO BE EVEN MORE FRANK WITH ME (WHICH I TOOK TO MEAN HE WAS GIVING ME A CONSIDERED SOVIET POSITION FOLLOWING A POLICY REVIEW DURING THE RECESS). THERE IS NO PROBLEM WITH PLACEMENT ON PEACEFUL CHANGE, HE SAID, ALL AGREE IT SHOULD BE IN THE SOVEREIGN EQUALITY PRINCIPLE. BUT THE FRG IS MAKING REPEATED ATTEMPTS TO CHANGE THE SUBSTANCE OF THE LANGUAGE FROM THE APRIL 5 FORMULATION WHICH WAS AFTER ALL REGISTERED BY THE PARTICIPANTS. THE JULY 26 U.S. FORMULATION WHICH GREATLY SURPRISED THE

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NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY.



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SOVIET UNION IS NOT ACCEPTABLE TO IT; REFERENCE TO INTERNATIONAL LAW, AS WELL AS TO PEACEFUL MEANS AND AGREEMENT, IS NECESSARY. AN APPROPRIATE BURIAL SHOULD BE ARRANGED FOR THE JULY 26 (24969-). THE FRG REFUSES TO DISCUSS THE PEACEFUL CHANGE ISSUE WITH THE USSR, SAYING THAT IT WAS A U.S. PROPOSAL. KOVALEV ACCUSED THE FRG OF BROACH OF FAITH.


6. KOVALEV SAID THAT HE HAD "CLEAR INSTRUCTIONS FROM OUR LEADERSHIP" TO INSIST THAT THE SUBSTANCE OF THE APRIL 5 LANGUAGE BE RETAINED. THE SOVIET LANGUAGE GIVEN THE U.S. IN SEPTEMBER IS AN EFFORT TO ACCOMMODATE; THE USSR CAN GO NO FARTHER. KOVALEV BRUSHED ASIDE MY REMARK THAT THE BRITISH, AS WELL AS THE GERMANS HAD PROBLEMS WITH THE APRIL 5 LANGUAGE AND THAT THE SOVIETS HAD PRESENTED SEVERAL ALTERNATIVES THEMSELVES. HE DISMISSED THE BRITISH PROBLEM AS NOT SERIOUS AND HE DENIED THAT THERE HAD EVER BEEN MORE THAN ONE SOVIET ALTERNATIVE--THE ONE PRESENTED TO THE U.S. IN SEPTEMBER. TO EMPHASIZE THE POINT HE HAD ADMISHIN READ ME THE EXACT LANGUAGE. HE MADE IT CLEAR THAT THE SOVIETS EXPECTED THE U.S. TO PLAY THE KEY ROLE IN GETTING THE ISSUE RESOLVED.

7. IMPORTANCE OF PRINCIPLES. KOVALEV SAID THAT THE USSR ACCEPTED THE HELSINKI BLUE-BOOK LANGUAGE ON EQUAL RESPECT FOR AND APPLICATION OF THE PRINCIPLES, BUT IT CANNOT AGREE THAT ALL THE PRINCIPLES ARE OF EQUAL IMPORTANCE. HE SAID THAT THE SOVIETS HAD TALKED WITH THE FRENCH ABOUT THIS AND THEIR UNDERSTANDING OF THE SOVIET POSITION HAD "DEEPENED."

8. NON-USE OF FORCE. I ASKED ABOUT THE PROSPECTS FOR RESOLVING THE SOVIET-ROMANIAN DISPUTZ. KOVALEV TREATED THE ROMANIANS SOFTLY, SAYING THAT THE PROBLEM WAS NOT SOLELY A SOVIET-ROMANIAN ONE. HE SAID THE SOVIETS WOULD SEARCH FOR A SOLUTION WITH ROMANIA ON A PRACTICAL BASIS.

9. FOLLOW-UP. KOVALEV EXPRESSED GREAT SUSPICION ABOUT WESTERN MOTIVES IN OBJECTING TO THE VZECH PROPOSAL; HE WISHED THE WESTERN COUNTRIES WOULD EXPLAIN EXACTLY WHAT THE PROBLEM WAS. IN TURN HE CRITICIZED THE DANISH PROPOSAL CALLING IT VERY BUREAUCRATIC. THE SOVIET POSITION, HE SAID, WAS VERY FELEXIBLE. THE CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE MIGHT BE

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
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ALONG THE LINES OF THE SECOND STAGE COORDINATING COMMITTEE, IT WOULD NOT NEED TO BE IN PERMANENT SESSION AND THE LEVEL OF PARTICIPATION AND ITS PLACE OF MEETING COULD BE WORKED OUT. IT WOULD BE A FLEXIBLE ORGAN, FOR EXCHANGE OF VIEWS, CONSULTATIONS, AND CONSIDERATION OF COMPLAINTS. IT WOULD PROVIDE CONTINUITY, A BRIDGE FROM ONE CONFERENCE TO THE NEXT. AGAIN, HE STRESSED THAT THE SOVIETS ARE OPEN-MINDED ON THE QUESTION.

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10. CBM'S. ON MANEUVERS, KOVALEV SAID THERE COULD BE NO COMPROMISE. THE USSR IS READY FOR FURTHER DISCUSSIONS BUT CANNOT GO ANY FURTHER THAN IT HAS. THE MAXIMALIST PROPOSALS FROM THE WEST AND THE NEUTRALS IF IMPLEMENTED COULD LEAD TO A PERMANENT STATE OF ALARM IN THE WEST SINCE THERE ARE SO MANY MANEUVERS. INDEED OUR MILITARY MEN SAY IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO CREATE A SECOND GENERAL STAFF SIMPLY TO HANDLE ANNOUNCEMENTS OF MANEUVERS. KOVALEV RAISED THE ISSUE OF MOVEMENTS, NOTING SOVIET OPPOSITION TO IT. I SAID THAT THE ISSUE HAD BEEN DISCUSSED WITH KORNIYENKO AT VLADIVOSTOK AND THAT AMBASSADOR SHERER HAD INSTRUCTIONS TO TAKE IT UP AGAIN WITH THE SOVIET DELEGATION IN GENEVA. KOVALEV SEEMED CONFUSED ABOUT THE SUBSTANCE OF THE HARTMAN-KORNIYENKO TALK IN VLADIVOSTOK, APPARENTLY FEELING THAT THE U.S.-SOVIET DIFFERENCES WERE SUBSTANTIVE RATHER THAN TACTICAL. I SOUGHT TO REASSURE HIM ON THIS POINT, SAYING THAT OUR POSITIONS WERE CLOSE, AND THAT OUR BASIC PROBLEM WAS WITH THE SOVIET TACTIC OF REMANDING THE ISSUE TO A FOLLOW-UP. I REPEATED THAT AMBASSADOR SHERER WOULD HAVE MORE TO SAY ON THIS IN GENEVA.

11. TIMING. IN RESPONSE TO MY QUESTION, KOVALEV SAID IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT CSCE FINISH AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. AS AGREED IN VLADIVOSTOK, HE SAID THIS SHOULD MEAN LATE FEBRUARY OR EARLY MARCH. HE ADDED THAT THIS DOES NOT DEPEND ON MOSCOW; MUCH DEPENDS ON WASHINGTON, WHICH CAN GIVE THE CONFERENCE THE IMPULSE IT NEEDS. KOVALEV SAID THE THIRD STAGE SHOULD COME SOON AFTER THE END OF

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STAGE TWO, BUT HE WOULD NOT SPECIFY A DATE BEYOND SAYING THAT CSCE SHOULD BE FINISHED IN THE SPRING. I ASKED IF THERE WAS ANY LINKAGE IN TIME BETWEEN CSCE AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNIST CONFERENCE; HE STRONGLY DENIED ANY SUCH LINKAGE.

12. KOVALEV EXPRESSED HIS SATISFACTION AT THE CLOSE BILATERAL COOPERATION AT GENEVA AND AT THE OPEN CONTACTS THERE. HE ENDED BY SAYING THAT, IF THE U.S. WOULD GET MORE ACTIVE, RESULTS WOULD FOLLOW QUICKLY.

13. AS WE WALKED OUT, SAID THAT IN GENERAL IT IS IMPORTANT FOR THE U.S AND USSR TO WORK TOGETHER. I NOTED THE CURRENT PROBLEM IN REGARD TO TRADE. NEVERTHELESS, I HOPED WE COULD MOVE AHEAD ON OTHER PROBLEMS AS WELL AS OVERCOME THE TRADE PROBLEMS. KOVALEV WARMLY AGREED AND EXPRESSED HIS OWN CONVICTION OF THE IMPORTANCE OF THE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP IN ALL FIELDS.

14. COMMENT: IT WAS ENCOURAGING THAT KOVALEV SEEMED TO BE TAKING PAINS TO INDICATE THAT U.S.-SOVIET COOPERATION CONTINUES DESPITE THE TRADE PROBLEM. IN THE CSCE CONTEXT, HIS TOUGH POSITION ON PEACEFUL CHANGE CONFIRMS THE COMMENT IN REFTEL R THAT THE SOVIETS MIGHT MAKE A GREAT DEAL OF THIS ISSUE. HIS LACK OF GIVE ON CBM'S DOES NOT STRIKE ME AS UNSUAL AT THIS STAGE IN THE PROCESS. FINALLY, THERE SEEMS NO DOUBT THAT THE SOVIETS WILL BE LEANING HARD ON THE U.S. TO FIND SOLUTIONS, NOT ONLY TO THE PEACEFUL CHANGE ISSUE, BUT TO MANY OF THE OTHER PROBLEMS WHICH CAN DELAY THE CONCLUSION OF CSCE.
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MODIS/CHEROKEE

FOR THE SECRETARY

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, UR, US
SUBJ: U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS

1. SUMMARY. MOSCOW 1047 SETS OUT THE EMBASSY'S VIEW OF HOW THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP CURRENTLY SEES ITS DETENTE POLICY AND ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH THE UNITED STATES. CLEARLY, IT IS IN THE U.S. INTEREST TO DO WHAT WE CAN TO REINFORCE SOVIET COMMITMENT TO DETENTE IN ITS MAJOR ASPECTS--TO CONTINUED PURSUIT OF STRATEGIC ARMS AND OTHER MILITARY AGREEMENTS, TO THE EXERCISE OF MAXIMUM RESTRAINT IN AREAS OF TENSION, AND TO A CLOSE ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP WHICH REINFORCES SOVIET INCENTIVE FOR POLITICAL RESTRAINT AND COOPERATION. GIVEN THE SOVIET DOUBT, NOTED IN THE REPTEL, ABOUT THE U.S. COMMITMENT TO DETENTE, A LARGE PART OF OUR PROBLEMS IS TO CONVINCE THE SOVIETS--BY SPECIFIC ACTIONS, NOT SIMPLY VERBAL REASSURANCES--THAT THE BROAD SPECTRUM OF RESPONSIBLE U.S. OPINION REMAINS COMMITTED TO THE LONG-TERM BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP ENVISIONED AT THE 1972 SUMMIT. FOUR AREAS ARE OF PRIME IMPORTANCE IN THIS REGARD: SALT, THE MIDDLE EAST, CSCE, AND BILATERAL ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP. IN EACH WE SHOULD TRY, WITHOUT DAMAGE TO OUR OWN INTERESTS, TO DEMONSTRATE TO THE SOVIETS THAT OUR POLICIES ARE TO THE BENEFIT OF, OR AT LEAST COMPATIBLE WITH, THEIR INTERESTS. NEEDLESS TO SAY, OUR APPROACHES NEED NOT BE MADE IN AN ATMOSPHERE OF MEA CULPA OR OF "REWARDING" THE

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SOVIETS FOR THEIR STIFF ACTION ON MFN; OUR OWN INTERESTS, AS WELL AS THEIRS, SHOULD BE READILY APPARENT TO THEM.

2. ON SALT, CONTINUED PROGRESS TOWARD A SUMMIT AGREEMENT IS THE BEST STABILIZING FACTOR WE HAVE IN OUR CURRENT BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP; THE SOVIETS MAY WANT AN AGREEMENT BADLY ENOUGH TO BE RECEPTIVE TO A FAIRLY QUICK LOWERING OF THE NUMBERS, AT LEAST ON MIRVIS. ON THE MIDDLE EAST, OUR BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SOVIETS WOULD OBVIOUSLY BE BEST SERVED BY BRINGING THEM BACK INTO THE POLITICAL PROCESS. RECOGNIZING THAT THIS MAY NOT BE IN THE U.S. INTEREST JUST YET, I RECOMMEND THAT NO ACTIONS BE TAKEN WHICH WOULD LEAD THE SOVIETS TO CONCLUDE THAT THE U.S. INTENDS TO FREEZE THEM OUT INDEFINITELY; SHORT OF THAT POINT, I THINK THEIR IRRITATION IS MANAGEABLE AT LEAST FOR THE TIME BEING. ON CSCE THERE IS A REAL OPPORTUNITY FOR THE U.S. TO ADVANCE THE U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP, WITHOUT SACRIFICE TO ANY OF OUR OWN INTERESTS, BY APPEARING TO HELP CLEAR THE WAY FOR A 1975 HELSINKI SUMMIT. AND ON THE BILATERAL ECONOMIC ISSUE, APART FROM TURNING CONGRESS AROUND ON THE POLITICAL CONDITIONS IT HAS IMPOSED, THE BEST THING I CAN THINK OF WOULD BE EARLY U.S. APPROVAL OF THE AEROFLOT AND INTOURIST REQUEST FOR COMPUTER SALES. MBFR, IN MY VIEW, IS NOT AN AREA IN WHICH WE NEED TO MAKE EARLY OR MAJOR MOVES TOWARD SOVIET DESIDERATA. I BELIEVE THEIR POSITION MAY CONTAIN ADDITIONAL FLEXIBILITY, WHICH THEY HAVE NOT YET SHOWN US.

3. VIETNAM IS IN A SEPARATE CATEGORY; WHILE CURRENTLY DORMANT, IF COULD RE-EMERGE AS A TROUBLESOME FACTOR IN U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS. WE NEED TO MAKE SURE THAT THE SOVIETS UNDERSTAND THAT SUPPORT FOR DETENTE IN THE U.S. REQUIRES THAT VIETNAM REMAIN OFF-LIMITS AS A LOCUS FOR U.S.-SOVIET CONTENTION AND THAT A PANZER-STYLE ASSAULT SPEARHEADED BY SOVIET-SUPPLIED ARMOR WOULD BE INCOMPATIBLE WITH NAILING DOWN THE "IRREVERSIBILITY OF DETENTE."

4. OTHER ACTIONS IN THE BILATERAL FRAMEWORK WOULD HELP PRESERVE THE MOMENTUM OF OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SOVIETS AND THUS BE OF USE BOTH WITH THE U.S. PUBLIC AND CONGRESS AND WITHIN THE SOVIET REGIME. THE SUMMIT ITSELF WILL BE NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

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AN IMPORTANT MOMENTUM FACTOR) SO WILL THE APOLLO-SOYUZ FLIGHT. IF THE U.S. PRESS REACTION TO BEING EXCLUDED FROM THE LAUNCH SITE IS NOT TOO ADVERSE. IN ADDITION TO SALT, AGREEMENTS SIGNED EITHER AT OR BEFORE THE SUMMIT (E.G., PNE, MARITIME) WOULD HELP. IN THIS REGARD, WE MIGHT WELL PROPOSE AN AGREEMENT AT THE SUMMIT TO INSTITUTE LEADERSHIP-LEVEL EXCHANGES (U.S. CABINET TO TOP DEMOCRATIC/REPUBLICAN LEADERS FOR SOVIET POLITBURO OR SECRETARIAT). THIS COULD LEAD OFF WITH A ROCKEFELLER VISIT TO THE USSR AND A KOSYGIN OR MAZUROV VISIT TO THE U.S. (PERHAPS IN CONNECTION WITH THE APOLLO-SOYUZ LAUNCH) OR WITH AN EXCHANGE OF DEFENSE SECRETARIES. I WOULD ALSO ADVOCATE ESTABLISHMENT AT THE SUMMIT OF AN UMBRELLA COMMISSION TO OVERSEE THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE TEN SCIENCE-AND-TECHNOLOGY-RELATED COOPERATIVE AGREEMENTS; THIS WOULD PUT THE U.S. IN A BETTER POSITION TO PRESS FOR IMPROVEMENTS IN AREAS WHICH HAVE BECOME REAL BILATERAL PROBLEMS (E.G., ON ACCESS TO INFORMATION). WHILE THE WORKING CHAIRMEN OF THE COMMISSION COULD BE AT SUB-CABINET LEVEL, I WOULD ENVISAGE CHAIRMEN (OR HONORARY CHAIRMEN) AT THE POLITICAL LEVEL, AGAIN PERHAPS ROCKEFELLER AND KOSYGIN.

5. FINALLY, OF A LOWER ORDER OF IMPORTANCE, THERE ARE SEVERAL UNILATERAL STEPS WHICH THE U.S. MIGHT TAKE TO SHOW THE SOVIETS OUR WILLINGNESS TO MOVE ON ISSUES WHICH HAVE BEEN NEEDLESSLY IRRITATING TO THEM. THE U.S., AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, SHOULD REVERSE ITS POLICY AGAINST TRADE UNION EXCHANGES BY BEGINNING TO ISSUE VISAS TO SOVIET TRADE UNION OFFICIALS WHO WANT TO VISIT THE U.S. ON UNION BUSINESS. AND WE SHOULD UNDERTAKE AN URGENT REVIEW OF OUR VISA POLICY LOOKING TOWARD ELIMINATION OF UNNECESSARY OR OBSOLETE OBSTACLES TO VISA ISSUANCE. END SUMMARY.

6. SALT. WHILE OBVIOUSLY WE CANNOT COMMENT FROM MOSCOW ON THE FULL GAMUT OF THIS ISSUE, I WOULD EMPHASIZE THAT EVERY INDICATOR WE ARE GETTING HERE IS THAT A SALT II AGREEMENT IS OF CARDINAL IMPORTANCE TO THE SOVIETS AND THAT THEY SEEM ANXIOUS FOR AN AGREEMENT ALONG THE LINES WORKED OUT AT VLADIVOSTOK. SALT RANKS ON A PAR WITH CSCE AS PROOF TO THEMSELVES AND TOT THE WORLD THT THEIR PLUICY IS WORKING.

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THIS GIVES US SOME ADDITIONAL NEGOTIATING FLEXIBILITY; WITHIN REASON, I BELIEVE THE SOVIETS MIGHT BE WILLING TO MEET SOME OF CONGRESS'S PROBLEMS WITH THE VLADIVOSTOK UNDERSTANDING, PARTICULARLY ON MIRV NUMBERS.

7. MIDDLE EAST. THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT THE SOVIETS ARE IRRITATED AT BEING KEPT OUT OF THINGS, AND WE NEED TO RECOGNIZE THAT THIS IRRITATION IS A POTENTIAL WEAPON IN THE HANDS OF THOSE HERE WHO MAY FEEL THAT THE SOVIET-U.S. CONNECTION HAS NOT REAPED ENOUGH DIVIDENDS. NEVERTHELESS, I THINK THE RISK OF KEEPING THE SOVIETS OUT A BIT LONGER IS AN ACCEPTABLE ONE. LOGICALLY, THEY MUST KNOW THAT YOUR STEP-BY-STEP APPROACH CARRIES THE BEST CHANCE OF A SETTLEMENT ACCEPTABLE TO THE ARABS. WHAT WE MUST AVOID IS PROVOKING A SOVIET

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NOJIS/CHEROKEE

FOR THE SECRETARY

CONCLUSION THAT WE WANT TO KEEP THEM OUT OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS INDEFINITELY. I ASSUME THAT FOR THE TIME BEING THE ONLY WAY WE CAN DO THIS IS TO KEEP THEM AS WELL INFORMED AS POSSIBLE OF WHAT WE ARE DOING. IF THEY ARE PROPERLY HANDLED, I THINK THEY WILL BE PATIENT A BIT LONGER.

6. CSCE. THIS AN AREA IN WHICH WE MAY BE ABLE TO REAP SOME SIZEABLE REWARDS FROM THE SOVIET WITHOUT GIVING AWAY MUCH OURSELVES. IT IS CLEAR (AND KOVALEV MADE IT EXPLICIT TO ME LAST WEEK) THAT THE SOVIETS EXPECT US TO GO TO BAT FOR THEM IN GETTING THE WAY CLEAR FOR A 1975 CSCE SUMMIT, WITH MUCH OF THE BASKET THREE UNDERBRUSH NOW CLEARED AWAY, I THINK WE CAN AND SHOULD PLAY THE ROLE (ALTHOUGH WE DO NOT NEED TO BE IN A HURRY), MAKING OURSELVES THE AGENTS OF COMPROMISE ON PEACEFUL CHANGE, CBM'S, THE FOLLOW-UP, AND SUCH OTHER ISSUES AS MAY PROVE DIFFICULT. I TRUST IT WILL BE POSSIBLE TO DO THIS WITHOUT DAMAGING OUR POSITION WITH OUR ALLIES, ALTHOUGH I REALIZE THAT THIS COULD BE A PROBLEM. (THE CURRENT DOUBTS IN WESTERN EUROPE ABOUT CONTINUED SOVIET COMMITMENT TO DETENTE MAY MAKE OUR ALLIES SOMEWHAT LESS RIGID AT GENEVA.) IN ANY CASE, SEEN FROM THE MOSCOW PERSPECTIVE, CSCE GIVES US AN EXCELLENT OPPORTUNITY TO PROVE TO THE SOVIETS OUR COMMITMENT TO THE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP. A CSCE SUMMIT IS SOMETHING THEY NEED BADLY, AND ONLY WE CAN ENSURE THAT THEY GET IT. A BREAK-THROUGH DURING BREZHNEV'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON, IF WE

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CAN STAGE-MANAGE IT, WOULD BE IDEAL.


9. THE BILATERAL ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP. OBVIOUSLY A
LT WILL DEPEND ON THE EXTENT TO WHICH CONGRESS CAN BE
TURNED AROUND ON THE CONDITIONS IT HAS PLACED ON THE SOVIETS.
I BELIEVE THE LEADERSHIP HERE WOULD LIKE TO BE IN A POSITION
TO WELCOME AN INCREASE IN THE EX-IM CREDIT CEILING. BUT
AT THE MOMENT I CAN SEE NO CIRCUMSTANCES UNDER WHICH IT
WOULD BE ABLE TO ACCEPT ANY CONDITIONS WHICH COULD BE
CONSTRUED AS MEDDLING IN INTERNAL AFFAIRS. THUS, ADDITIONAL
ACTION BY CONGRESS WILL HAVE TO APPLY NOT ONLY TO THE
ECONOMIC, BUT ALSO TO THE POLITICAL, ASPECTS OF THE DECEMBER
LEGISLATION IF CREDITS OR MFN ARE TO BE REVIVED. IN
ADDITION TO TRYING TO RESOLVE THE CONGRESSIONAL PROBLEM,
WE SHOULD DO ALL WE CAN TO SHOW THE SOVIETS THAT WE ARE
INTERESTED IN A GROWING ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP. THE BEST
FIRST STEP, I BELIEVE, WOULD BE U.S. APPROVAL OF THE SALE
OF COMPUTER SYSTEMS FOR INTOURIST AND AEROFLOT. THE EMBASSY
POINTED OUT LAST SEPTEMBER (MOSCOW 14325) THAT THE SOVIETS
WOULD INTERPRET U.S. APPROVAL OR DISAPPROVAL OF THE COMPUTER
PACKAGE AS A SIGNAL OF THE U.S. VIEW OF THE IMPORTANCE OF
THE ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP. THIS IS ALL THE MORE TRUE NOW,
THEREFORE, ASSUMING NO OVERRIDING NATIONAL SECURITY CON-
SIDERATIONS TO THE CONTRARY, I RECOMMEND IMMEDIATE APPROVAL
OF THE COMPUTERS FOR INTOURIST AND AEROFLOT.

10. MSFN. I BELIEVE THAT THE SOVIETS ARE SERIOUSLY IN-
TERESTED IN AN AGREEMENT AND HAVE YET TO REVEAL ALL OF THE
FLEXIBILITY OF THEIR POSITIONS (SEE MOSCOW 743). THEREFORE
I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT WE NEED TO BE STAMPEDED INTO MEETING THEIR
DESIDERATE. I WOULD RECOMMEND PROCEEDING SLOWLY AND CAUTIOUSLY
IN ORDER TO FORCE THEIR ADDITIONAL FLEXIBILITY TO THE SURFACE.

1. VIET-NAM. IT SEEMS EVIDENT THAT THE
WANT TO SEE VIET-NAM RETURNED TO THE ARENA OF U.S.-SOVIET
CONTENTION. IT IS NOT CLEAR, HOWEVER, HOW MUCH OF A
RESTRAINING INFLUENCE THEY WOULD TRY TO PLACE ON NORTH
VIETNAM IF HANOI DECIDED TO GO ALL-OUT IN AN EFFORT TO WIN
SOUTH VIETNAM. THE SOVIETS MAY FEEL THAT, GIVEN THE DOVISH
ATTITUDE OF THE OLD CONGRESS AND THE APPARENTLY SIMILAR
ATTITUDE OF THE NEW ONE, A MAJOR NORTH VIETNAMESE OFFENSIVE

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WOULD NOT CAUSE SERIOUS PROBLEMS FOR THEIR RELATIONS WITH THE U.S. THEY SHOULD BE LEFT UNDER NO ILLUSIONS ABOUT THIS, AND SHOULD BE MADE TO UNDERSTAND THAT A MAJOR OFFENSIVE BY HAND, USING SOVIET EQUIPMENT, WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY BE REAGROED BY THE U.S. PEOPLE AND CONGRESS AS A SIGN THAT THE SOVIET UNION IS NOT

SERIOUS ABOUT DETENTE AND WOULD SEVERELY COMPLICATE U.S. EFFORTS TO IMPROVE BILATERAL RELATIONS. THIS IS A POINT YOU MIGHT WELL MAKE TO DOBRYNIN IN THE CONTEXT OF A DISCUSSION ON VIETNAM WHICH EMPHASIZES THE IMPORTANCE OF MUTUAL RESTRAINT THERE. ALTERNATIVELY OR CONCURRENTLY, I COULD TAKE THE SAME APPROACH WITH GROMYKO HERE.

12. BILATERAL FACTORS. BOTH THE FORD-BREZHNEV SUMMIT AND THE APOLLO-SOYUZ FLIGHT SHOULD PROVIDE WELCOME IMPETUS TO THE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP AND SHOULD THUS BE USEFUL IN TERMS BOTH OF THE U.S. CONGRESS AND OF ANY WAVERERS WITHIN THE SOVIET REGIME. IT WILL BE IMPORTANT, HOWEVER, TO ENSURE U.S. PRE

ACCESS TO THE SOYUZ LAUNCH SITE. THE SOVIETS REMAIN RIGIDLY OPPOSED TO THIS; IT MAY SOON BE NECESSARY FOR YOU TO REIGH IN WITH DOBRYNIN. THE SIGNING OF SALT II AT THE SUMMIT WILL GREATLY REDUCE THE NEED FOR MANY OTHER AGREEMENTS. IN ANY CASE, I THINK WE ARE PAST THE STAGE WHERE ADDITIONAL COOPERATIVE AGREEMENTS WOULD BE OF MUCH HELP, EITHER IN A SUBSTANTIVE OR IN A PUBLIC RELATIONS SENSE. OF COURSE, SIGNING OF PNE AND PERPHAS MARITIME AGREEMENTS (PROVIDED CURRENT CARGO-SHARING ARRANGEMENT CAN BE PRESERVED) AT OR BEFORE THE SUMMIT WOULD BE MINOR PLUSES.

13. LEADERSHIP-LEVEL EXCHANGES. ONE PROMISING AVENUE FOR EXPLORATION IS AN AGREEMENT AT THE SUMMIT TO INSTITUTE LEADERSHIP-LEVEL EXCHANGES BETWEEN OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS. I HAVE IN MIND EXCHANGES AT THE CABINET/TOP AMERICAN POLITICAL PARTY AND POLITBURO/SECRETARIAT LEVEL. IN ADDITION TO THE DETENTE-MOMENTUM ASPECTS, SUCH AN EXCHANGE COULD BE USED TO GIVE IMPORTANT SOVIET LEADERS A FIRST-HAND LOOK AT THE U.S. I AM CONVINCED THIS IS GREATLY IN OUR INTEREST (THE PONOMAREV VISIT, FOR EXAMPLE, PUT AN IMPORTANT SOVIET IDEOLOGUE CLEARLY ON RECORD AS FAVORING DETENTE). I BELIEVE IT WILL TAKE A SUMMIT DECISION TO GET SUCH EXCHANGES OFF

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THE GROUND; OUR INVITATION TO MAZUROV HAS LAIN ON THE TALOE FOR ALMOST A YEAR NOW. A GOOD BEGINNING WOULD BE A VISIT BY VICE PRESIDENT ROCKEFELLER TO THE USSR, PAIRED WITH A KOSYGIN OR MAZUROV VISIT TO THE U.S. THE APOLLO-SOYUZ LAUNCH MIGHT BE ONE CONTEXT FOR A ROCKEFELLER-KOSYGIN VISIT EXCHANGE; ALTERNATIVE CONTEXT IS SUGGESTED IN PARAGRAPH 13. AN EXCHANGE OF VISITS BY DEFENSE SECRETARY SCHLESINGER AND DEFENSE MINISTER GRECHKO WOULD BE ANOTHER WAY TO KICK OFF A TOP-LEVEL EXCHANGES; IN THE WAKE OF A SALT II AGREEMENT THE ATMOSPHERE SHOULD BE QUITE CONDUCTIVE TO SUCH VISITS. WE MIGHT ALSO CONSIDER ADDITUNAL DEFENSE EXCHANGES--PERHAPS AT CHIEF OF STAFF AND OTHER SENIOR OFFICER LEVEL.

14. A COMMISSION TO OVERSEE COOPERATIVE AGREEMENTS. A MAJOR PROBLEM IN THE U.S. APPROACH TO OUR COOPERATIVE AGREEMENTS WITH THE USSR IS THAT WE HAVE NOT TAKEN A SUFFICIENTLY UNIFIED APPROACH TO THEM, AND HAVE THUS DENIED OURSELVES THE FULLEST OPPORTUNITIES FOR WEIGHING PROS AND CONS ACROSS THE WHOLE RANGE OF AGREEMENTS. RATHER THAN PRESSING FOR NEW COOPERATIVE AGREEMENTS, I WOULD LIKE TO SEE A MORE COORDINATED U.S. APPROACH TO THE AGREEMENTS WE ALREADY HAVE. ONE VEHICLE FOR ACHIEVING THIS WOULD BE TO SET UP A JOINT U.S.-SOVIET UMBRELLA COMMISSION TO OVERSEE AND REVIEW THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COOPERATIVE AGREEMENTS, PARTICULARLY THOSE INVOLVING SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY. THE PRINCIPAL ADVANTAGE FOR THE U.S. WOULD BE THAT WE COULD USE THE COMMISSION TO FOCUS ON SERIOUS PROBLEMS THAT ARE COMMON TO SEVERAL AGREEMENTS; THE PROBLEM OF ACCESS TO INFORMATION AND INSTALLATIONS IS A CASE IN POINT; ASSURANCE OF RECIPROCIDY IS ANOTHER. IN ADDITION, IT WOULD GIVE US AN OPPORTUNITY TO STRENGTHEN OUR INTERNAL MONITORING OF COOPERATIVE AGREEMENTS, TO ENSURE THE PROPER BALANCE BETWEEN POLITICAL AND TECHNICAL ELEMENTS. I THINK KIRILLIN, THE CHAIRMAN OF THE STATE COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, WOULD BE SYMPATHETIC TO SUCH AN APPROACH. THE WORKING CHAIRMEN OF THE COMMISSION COULD BE AT SUB-CABINET LEVEL. IT WOULD BE IMPORTANT, HOWEVER, TO GIVE IT AS MUCH POLITICAL MUSCLE AS POSSIBLE. I WOULD THEREFORE ENVISAGE CHAIRMEN (OR HONDRARY CHAIRMEN) AT THE POLITICAL LEVEL--PERHAPS VICE PRESIDENT ROCKEFELLER AND KOSYGIN (OR MAZUROV). THE COMMISSION COULD BE CREATED AT THE SUMMIT, AND ITS FIRST

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MEETING COULD BE USED FOR A HIGH-VISIBILITY VIP VISIT TO ONE OR THE OTHER COUNTRY. THE AGREEMENTS IT WOULD COVER COULD INCLUDE: SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, AGRICULTURE, ENVIRONMENT, PUBLIC HEALTH AND MEDICAL SCIENCE, TRANSPORTATION, WORLD OCEAN, ATOMIC ENERGY, ENERGY, HOUSING AND CONSTRUCTION, AND ACADEMIES OF SCIENCE.

14. OTHER STEPS, ON A LOWER ORDER OF IMPORTANCE, WHICH COULD BE TAKEN AT THE SUMMIT MIGHT INCLUDE THE LAYING OF CORNERSTONES FOR THE NEW EMBASSIES, ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE NEXT SET OF CONSULATES, AND ESTABLISHMENT OF NATIONAL CULTURAL CENTERS IN EACH OTHER'S CAPITALS. WE WILL BE FORWARDING ADDITIONAL DETAILS ON THESE AND OTHER SUGGESTIONS; AND IT MAY BE APPROPRIATE FOR ME TO DISCUSS SOME OF THEM AT MY NEXT WORKING LUNCH WITH KORNIYENKO IN MID-FEBRUARY.

15. FINALLY, THERE ARE SEVERAL UNILATERAL STEPS WHICH THE U.S. COULD TAKE WHICH--WHILE IN OUR INTEREST ANYWAY--COULD HELP REDUCE AREAS IN WHICH THE SOVIETS FEEL OUR POLICIES AND PROCEDURES ARE UNNECESSARILY IRRITATING TO THEM. I

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FOR THE SECRETARY

WOULD MENTION TWO. FIRST, THE U.S. SHOULD LOSE NO TIME IN REVERSING ITS POLICY AGAINST TRADE UNION EXCHANGES. THIS IS THE ONE GLARING EXAMPLE OF U.S. FAILURE TO PRACTICE WHAT IT PREACHES ON THE IMPORTANCE OF EXPANDING HUMAN CONTACTS. I CAN UNDERSTAND WHY IT MAY HAVE BEEN IMPORTANT NOT TO INCUR GEORGE MEANY'S DISPLEASURE WHILE THE TRADE BILL HAS BEING DEBATED. BUT I WOULD HOPE THAT THIS FACTOR

HAS DIMINISHED IN IMPORTANCE. TALKS HERE WITH VISITING OFFICIALS OF THE UMW, THE STEELWORKERS, AND OTHER AMERICAN UNIONS INDICATE, IN ANY CASE, THAT THE MEANY POLICY IS FAR FROM UNIVERSALLY ACCEPTED AMONG U.S. TRADE UNIONS. WE MIGHT SIMPLY TELL THE SOVIETS PRIVATELY THAT WE ARE NOW PREPARED TO ISSUE VISAS TO TRADE UNION OFFICIALS WHO WANT TO VISIT THE U.S. IN RESPONSE TO INVITATIONS ISSUED BY U.S. UNIONS--AND THEN DO SO. SECOND,

I HOPE WE CAN SHAKE OFF SOME OF THE NEEDLESS OR OBSOLETE OBSTACLES IN OUR VISA POLICY TO SOVIET TRAVEL TO THE U.S. AN AREA OF CURRENT CONCERN IS SOVIET ANNOYANCE OVER RECENT CHANGES IN OUR VISA PROCEDURES FOR SOVIET COMMERCIAL VISITORS (MOSCOW 813 AND PREVIOUS). IN ADDITION, WE SHOULD SEEK WAYS TO ELIMINATE COLD WAR HANGOVERS IN OUR VISA LAWS AND REGULATIONS, FOR EXAMPLE SECTION 212(A)(2B) WHICH GROUPS COMMUNISTS WITH NARCOTICS TRAFFICKERS AND PROSTITUTES AS PERSONS AUTOMATICALLY INELIGIBLE FOR MOST CATEGORIES OF VISAS.

A REVIEW ORDERED BY YOU OF VISA POLICIES AND PRACTICES COULD NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

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SET THIS PROCESS IN MOTION. U.S. ACTION IN THE TRADE UNION AND VISA AREA, WHILE NOT IMPORTANT ENOUGH TO GIVE US MUCH LEVERAGE ON THE SOVIETS, WOULD AT LEAST PUT US IN A BETTER POSITION TO INDUCE SOVIET MOVEMENT ON SUCH WORKING-LEVEL OBJECTIVES AS THE REDUCTION OF TRAVEL CONTROLS, GREATER ACCESS FOR JOURNALISTS, AND ACCESS TO DOCUMENTS FOR U.S. SCHOLARS.


15. IN SUM, THOUGH OUR NEW BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP HAS JUST SUFFERED ITS FIRST SERIOUS SETBACK, I WOULD HOPE THAT WE CAN KEEP IT INTACT BECAUSE I BELIEVE THAT THE SOVIET INTEREST IN DETENTE WITH THE U.S. CONTINUES TO RUN VERY DEEP.
STORSEL

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SAHM CONTINUED THAT FOR SOME WEST BERLIN ORGANIZATIONS THIS OF COURSE WOULD NOT BE NECESSARY AND "SERVICES" BY THE FRG EMBASSY WOULD BE SCALED ACCORDINGLY. HE SAID THAT THE FRG IS READY TO DISCUSS SUCH QUESTIONS ON A CASE-BY-CASE BASIS.

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SOVIET UNION THAT BERLIN CONTINUE TO BE INCLUDED IN DETENTE. THE EFFORTS OF THE SOVIET UNION WERE AIMED AGAINST ATTEMPTS BY THE FRG WHICH COULD CREATE THE "IMPRESSION" THAT WEST BERLIN IS A PART OF THE FRG OR IS GOVERNED BY IT. ZEMSKOV SAID THAT WAS THE FINAL CATEGORICAL STATEMENT OF THE SOVIET POSITION. HE SAID THE SOVIETS WERE NOT READY TO MAKE ANY CONCESSION IN THIS REGARD; FOR THEM IT IS A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE.

10. SAHM REPLIED THAT THE UNITY OF LEGAL SYSTEMS (RECHTSEINHEIT) BETWEEN WEST BERLIN AND THE FRG WHICH HAS DEVELOPED UNDER THREE-POWER AUSPICES WILL CONTINUE TO BE MAINTAINED BY THE FRG EXPECT IN MATTERS CONCERNING SECURITY OR STATUS. SAHM MENTIONED THAT THE MARINE AGREEMENT WOULD HAVE TO INCLUDE A BERLIN CLAUSE. ZEMSKOV ASKED SARCASTICALLY ON WHICH SEA BERLIN WAS LOCATED. SAHM REPLIED THAT JUST AS MUNICH AND STUTTGART WOULD BE INCLUDED IN SUCH AN AGREEMENT, SO WOULD WEST BERLIN BECAUSE OF THE UNITY OF LEGAL SYSTEMS.

11. SAHM THEN SAID THAT THERE IS NO POSSIBILITY OF CONCLUDING BILATERAL TREATIES OR AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE FRG AND THE SOVIET UNION ON ANY ISSUE, EXCEPT THOSE AFFECTING WEST BERLIN'S SECURITY OR STATUS, WHICH DO NOT INCLUDE A BERLIN CLAUSE.


12. ZEMSKOV SUMMARIZED REMAINING DIFFERENCES, WHICH HE SAID WERE OBVIOUSLY IRRECONCILABLE IN THE PRESENT DISCUSSION, AS FOLLOWS: (1) THE SOVIETS BELIEVE THAT THE Q.A. MUST NOT BE OPEN TO "ARBITRARY INTERPRETATION" AND (2) "IT IS USELESS TO BELIEVE THAT THE SOVIET UNION WILL COMPROMISE ON BERLIN."

13. AFTER DISCUSSION OF ABOVE MAIN ISSUES, SAHM ALSO RAISED QUESTION OF DATES FOR SCHEEL AND GENSCHER VISITS. ZEMSKOV MADE NO SUGGESTIONS FOR TIME FRAMES, BUT SAID HE WOULD LOOK INTO THE MATTER.

14. COMMENT: SAHM'S INTERPRETATION OF ZEMSKOV'S REMARKS ON CSCE WAS THAT ZEMSKOV, PERHAPS IN AN EFFORT TO SMOOTH OVER GLARING DIFFERENCES IN OPINION DURING SAHM'S LAST CALL ON JANUARY 20, HAD BEEN "MORE FLEXIBLE IN TONE." SAHM FELT, HOWEVER, THAT ZEMSKOV HAD BEEN TOO VAGUE ON THE SUBSTANCE OF THE ISSUE TO PERMIT ANY CONCLUSIONS ON POSSIBLE CHANGES IN THE SOVIET STANCE. FROM THE FRG EMBOFF'S CHARACTERIZATION OF THE

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Record of conversation
Of Cde. L. I. Brezhnev with Leaders of Fraternal Parties
of Socialist Countries in Budapest
(Gierek, Husak, Zhivkov, Kadar, Honecker were present at the meeting.)

March 18, 1975^x

Comrades E. Gierek, G. Husak, T. Zhivkov, Ya. Kadar, and E. Honecker and also Comrades B. Bisku, V. V. Shcherbitsky, K. F. Katushev, E. A. Shevardnadze, K. V. Rusakov, A. M. Alexandrov, and translators from the Hungarian, German, and Bulgarian sides took part in the conversation with Comrade Brezhnev.

L. I. Brezhnev. I am very glad to see you all, dear comrades. I have to admit that I missed you. The reason that we have not met all together for a long time is that I have been slightly sick in the recent months. This is why, and this is the only reason why I was unable, in particular, to hold the previously scheduled meetings and conversations in Moscow with comrades Gierek and Honecker. There was and there is nothing serious with me, just tiredness, my nerves are getting worn out, and the doctors began to insist on a certain period of rest. It did not work as genuine rest, it was intertwined with work, as you understand, one cannot get away from it in our situation, but still, I had to give up travel, meetings, and sitting in my office for long hours for this period of time.

You also know that it led to a whole wave of rumors and speculations primarily in the bourgeois press. Some questions and conversations started at home as well—we had to reassure people in some way. That is why I decided to hold a meeting with British Prime Minister Wilson, whose visit had been scheduled long ago upon mutual agreement. We also considered it useful to meet with Wilson in order to exert certain influence on him, to engage Britain in the policy of détente, to make it play a more active role at the European Conference. That is why I appeared at the negotiations with Wilson. I think that you, comrades, also approve the steps we took in respect to the British Prime Minister.

The beginning of negotiations with the British was not easy, even in some sense difficult. Wilson and Callaghan were capricious. It was difficult for our comrades to find agreement with them on the appropriate text of the communiqué. They did not like the formulas on the Middle East. They cited their old friendship with Israel. They did not want to say anything definite on the problem of Cyprus. In connection with the European Conference, they cited the fact that there still were many unresolved issues, and so on.

However, the persistent and sincere conversations with Wilson, the work [we] undertook with him, led to the result that we were able to finalize quite good positions on all the above-mentioned problems and on a number of other problems in the joint documents. The British stated that they were going to work for the policy of détente and improvement of British-Soviet relations energetically and constructively. They agreed to quite substantial steps in the sphere of economic relations.

^x Comrade L. I. Brezhnev did not review the transcript.

It remains to be seen, of course, how all this will be implemented in practical life. However, already those documents, which Wilson and I signed in Moscow, put serious obligations on the British government, and give us all additional political weaponry in our hands.

Later, even though I continued to feel unwell, the circumstances developed in such a way that we had to, even though for short time, meet with Cde. Husak. Gustav Nikodimovich flew to Moscow, we talked with him for several hours, had dinner together, and he left right away. Of course I was glad to have that meeting, although I clearly was not strong enough yet.

After the negotiations with Wilson, I switched to the treatment regime again, but then there was the decision that I should appear at the special session for the International Women's Day—March 8. And today, responding to the invitation from our common friend Janos Kadar, I am here, at the Congress of Hungarian Communists, and I am glad to see all of you.

I would like to tell you beforehand, dear comrades, that everything on which we reached agreement earlier—together or in the bilateral framework—remains in force. What I have in mind is to carry out (although somewhat later than initially planned) the short working meetings with comrades Gierek and Honecker, and if necessary, with other comrades as well. I think that we will be able to meet and talk before the Victory Day.

I will tell you frankly, dear comrades, today I am unable to, and I would consider it inexpedient to raise any issues of economic ties between our countries. You all remember well the recent contacts and negotiations dealing with price regulation and other problems, which were held at various levels. Even though I was not well during this period, I still took active part in all this. Our comrades—cde. Patolichev, cde. Baibakov, and others—entrusted with the task by our Politburo, put a lot of effort in order to find solutions to the problems, which would be most acceptable for all the sides.

In the process of work, which comrades Baibakov and Patolichev conducted with your comrades, we considered this issue at the Politburo several times, and we are satisfied that a seemingly good and mutually acceptable solution has been found. One cannot run away from issues raised by life itself. Cde Kadar was right when he said in his report to the Congress that we, the socialist countries, do not live somewhere in cosmos or some airless space, but we are connected with the external environment, with the world market. Therefore, we have to react in some way to the processes, which affect us.

Today I came here, figuratively speaking, with empty pockets, and I am not ready for a concrete discussion of economic problems. I don't think we should even start such discussion at this short meeting, especially since these problems require comprehensive study. Obviously, I myself, just like all of you, understand that far from all the issues are resolved. There are some loose ends remaining, we have to make our minds on some issues. Today all I want to say is that it is important to approach the economic questions from a certain party point of view, with the party patience, attention and competence.

Then it would be easier to find a solution. It would be easier to define our positions on the questions of our future five-year plans.

Naturally, we are not refusing to continue to develop our cooperation. It is not accidentally that I emphasized the importance of COMECON and other forms of our economic cooperation when I was speaking at the Congress of Hungarian comrades today.

Now we need to look at the drafts of our own five-year plan for 1976-1980. The volume of our investment, and many other things will depend on how it is going to come together. Our Gosplan promised to present its version (or versions) in 15 to 20 days. Frankly speaking, we are not yet ourselves clear regarding this plan—what do we want from it in the first place, and what we will be able to [accomplish].

We have to state honestly that we are faced with a number of difficult problems. Among them are the further improvement of the agriculture, increase of production of oil, [natural] gas, and lumber, construction of the Baikal-Amur railroad, obligations to the fraternal countries, and further improvement of the living standards of the population. In short, I think that these are mainly the same problems that each of you faces, only on a larger scale.

We cannot avoid making efforts to improve the agriculture. But it is much more difficult to do at home in the USSR than in your countries. The reasons for that are the difficult, severe, and unstable climate, the quality of the soil, and other factors. For example, a republic like Kazakhstan, with the same labor effort of the people, could produce a billion of pounds of grain one year, and 400 million—another year. It is not easy in the Ukraine either, especially this year.

In other words, first we have to undertake some serious accounting of our own to come to some clarity, and then it would be easier [for us] to respond to you.

Currently, as you know, we set a priority of raising the effectiveness of production, of increasing the return of the investment. And our investment funds are large, and even a modest step in this direction would mean a lot. In the current five-year period (which will end in 1975), for example, we set the overall volume of investment at over 500 billion dollars. These are great expenses. In order to transport [natural] gas from Tyumen to the European part, to deliver it to Bratislava or Budapest, we need huge financial and material resources. We do not have enough pipes of our own, so we have to use currency to purchase them abroad.

In short, there are many problems. We have to think seriously about how to make our economy more profitable. So far, unfortunately, the return of the investment has been decreasing. We have to think seriously about the issue of future investment. Of course, every republic and every oblast put forth some demands and proposals. The issues, which they raise, per se, are almost always correct and justified. However, from the state point of view, the picture is often quite different. As you know, we have many republics,

and many nationalities in the country, but the soviet people is one, and one needs to think about its interests as a whole first of all.

Our most important capital, and our most powerful weapon is the unity of our party, and the heartfelt support of its policy by all the people. In response to the appeal by the Central Committee to the Party and to the people, the situation of a great labor improvement has emerged in the country. Collectives of industrial enterprises, state and collective farms take increased labor commitments upon themselves, and the Central Committee receives thousands of letters.

In other words, we will have to deal seriously with all these issues upon our return to Moscow.

As far as the foreign policy plans are concerned—various visits to our country and trips to foreign states—our perspectives are also not easy. So many events are planned, and one event conflicts with another, and we cannot reject anybody. We are internationalists. The cause of relations with fraternal socialist countries is always a priority for us. We also have to give assistance to the countries of the third world. This is a requirement of high politics.

As far as our bilateral relations are concerned, I would like to emphasize here that we do not look at them as some kind of unilateral assistance from the Soviet Union to other countries. In many areas, we receive good and necessary assistance from you, and we are thankful for that. I spoke about it many times at our closed meetings, and spoke on behalf of the Central Committee publicly.

You all, comrades, of course, understand well that the questions of relations between our fraternal countries, the principles and the atmosphere of these relations have the utmost importance for our common cause. If some problems arrive somewhere, our duty as party leaders is to exhibit calm and balanced [approach], to remember about the most important things, and to monitor carefully who reports to the Central Committee leadership, and what and how they report. It is not unimportant ...

I don't want to reproach anybody here, I have no grounds for that whatsoever. But life is life. In the last 30 years, we had some difficult moments, but we always found a way to overcome those, by putting the most important—our main political goals and convictions--above the particularities. And whatever the transpiring difficulties were, we have been moving ahead, not backward. This relates to the development of the economy, improvement of lives of our peoples, and to the strengthening of our friendship. Maybe we are not moving ahead as fast as we would want in the economic realm, but the progress is obvious and indisputable. Based on our own experience, I can say that it is very bad when we earmark resources to solve some specific economic tasks, but don't provide specific materials for those amounts. That [situation] leads to freezing of the money, and the volume of unfinished construction projects is growing, and growing unjustifiably.

I think that after we ourselves take a look at what Gosplan proposes for the next five-year period, discuss the issues and come to a certain position, we will be able to continue our business conversations with you. Whether it will be at the level of the Council of Ministers or [at the level of] Gosplans, or some commissions, I cannot say now. However, I am convinced that we will come to an agreement in the end.

Yes, we have difficult tasks and problems of several kinds. This is natural. It is worse that there are some people, who quietly engage in dishonest conversations, and purposefully sow doubts or inflame passions. One day they say that Czechoslovakia is to blame, then somebody else, but mostly the USSR. It is incorrect and unfair. We work together for many years now. It is unlikely that someone could say that the Soviet Union gained great profits as a result of this collaboration to the detriment of others. I don't know about profits, but we already incurred debts to your countries. In other words, we have to find solutions to the emerging problems. Maybe we all should show more initiative, more attention to these problems on the part of the Central Committees of our parties.

However, I don't think that anybody could say that the work of the COMECON did any harm to any one of us. It is true that they write too many papers and move too slowly, but all in all, this work is necessary and useful. Maybe we should put some pressure on the officials of relevant apparatuses somewhere. Maybe we should study economic issues better ourselves. Each of us has problems in this area, and often those are different problems.

In the USSR, I repeat, one of the serious difficulties is that it is hard to ensure material supplies for the huge investments. We cannot maintain this situation any longer.

We have many difficulties, and probably sins as well. However, if we all tackle the problems with sufficient energy and attention, the affairs will improve. I was saying to our comrades here that when we deliver our oil and gas from the heartland to the western regions, then we will be able to throw in an additional cistern to each fraternal country (Laughter).

G. Husak. Our planners say that it would be necessary to throw in approximately half a million tons.

L. I. Brezhnev. The appetites are growing. In the past, I remember, your plant "Slovnaft" received 3 million tons a year, and today it wants, I think, 6 or 7 [million tons].

G. Husak. Altogether we receive 16 million tons.

V. V. Scherbitsky. This is all that our Ukraine extracts in a year.

L. I. Brezhnev. To develop new reserves is not as easy as it seemed to us earlier. One has to clear the forest, and to build housing, and schools, and movie theaters, and to build

the pipelines. I am telling you about all this so that you would cut your requests to us. (Laughter).

We also deliver supplies to Cuba. You cannot leave it without bread or fuel. We also provide clothing for the Cuban Army free of charge. And we pay special prices for their sugar. We send grain supplies to several countries. Poland and the GDR still cannot provide themselves with their own bread. In other words, there are many tasks and we have things to think about.

All this, comrades, of course, does not mean that I am telling you: "Do not ask for anything, it will not work." I only want you to have a full understanding of the complexity of the issues that we are facing.

Today, as far as I understand, we achieved a complete agreement among our countries regarding setting sliding prices for 1975 and for the subsequent five-year period. If this is acceptable for all the parties, it means that we will live for 6 more years and will achieve new successes.

I started with economic questions because it is important for everybody, for our friendship. We need to continue the work, search for new paths of integration and other forms of cooperation. We are using far from all of the opportunities.

The second very important question, dear friends—is the European Conference. All of us, our entire commonwealth should work skillfully and with great energy to bring this conference to completion successfully.

Europe's bloody history tells us a lot and puts many tasks before us. If we, Communists from socialist countries and capitalist states, in alliance with progressive, peace-loving, and realistically thinking people from other social strata eventually achieve the outcome where at the European conference the highest leaders of countries-participants sign clear and precise documents about the principles of relations between European states, it would be a great political victory. It would give new power to all proponents of peace and progress. That is why we are making all possible efforts to achieve such a goal.

President Ford told me firmly in Vladivostok that he would act as we agreed in regard to the European conference. Giscard D'Estaing (I don't know his personality very well yet) expressed himself quite definitively. Chancellor Schmidt also promised support, but his situation is not simple. Influential forces in the FRG put forward demands both in regards of West Berlin as well as the "voluntary changes of borders," and the latter in practice means—to gobble up Honecker. Those revanchists are insatiable. Lessons of history mean nothing to them. Tens of millions of people who died are not enough for them. This is the danger, which we should always remember, and which we should always counter.

Now it looks like the cause of the European Conference is on the right track. The Americans did some work, and with our assistance they were able to find an acceptable

formulation regarding the peaceful change of borders. Apparently, the coordination on this issue is coming to a conclusion.

The issue of the so-called third basket, it seems to me, is being untangled as well. The excessive and obnoxious demands of some western countries have been repelled.

Up to the last moment, the main problem was the so-called "confidence building measures," i.e. the issues related to information about maneuvers and movements of troops, with invitation of observers and so on. I can tell you in confidence that we recently considered this complex of issues at our Politburo, and decided that it was possible to adopt a somewhat more flexible position in certain details. We gave appropriate instructions to our delegation in Geneva, which will act in close contact with your representatives. They will be informed of all the details. Therefore I will limit myself here to mentioning this issue only in general.

Now to the question of the conclusion of the Conference's work. So far one could hear quite definitive words everywhere: "This year." But this is too fuzzy, and we are not satisfied with it. You are already aware that we have recently appealed to the leaders of the USA, FRG, France, Britain and Italy with a proposal to act in such a way that the final stage of the European Conference could commence at the highest level on June 30 of this year. I spoke about this with Kekkonen during my conversation with him in Moscow. He expressed his support for our proposal and [said that] he would encourage other countries appropriately. Now we are waiting for responses from the leaders of the above-mentioned western countries. We believe that your countries, comrades, could provide some energetic support for the USSR proposal concerning the dates.

And there is one more consideration here. Ford, as you know, insists on my visit to the United States this summer. He has a great personal interest in it, politically. However, we tend to think that it would be inexpedient to go to America before the European Conference is completed. That is what we made clear to the Americans. Maybe it would push them a little toward the conclusion of the Conference.

Now several words about the Middle East. You are well aware of the situation there. Our position remains unchanged. Speaking about the Arabs, they, or rather some of them, recently became less conciliatory than they used to be. The latter primarily concerns Syria and the Palestinians.

We are not against agreements about further pulling back the troops at the fronts. However, it would be desirable if it would take place with some form of our participation (so that we could exert some influence over the substance). And most importantly—so that such agreements on partial measures would not become a substitute for a final settlement. Israel should not keep any part of the others' territories, which she captured.

Kissinger persists with his efforts and trips to the Middle East. Over the next couple of days he should meet with Gromyko in Austria or in Iran. And then he will probably inform our Minister in detail.

In general, we are trying to keep you informed on this and on many other important issues. Maybe we are late with such information sometimes, but you cannot reproach us for acting not in the spirit of our common political line.

One more question. We are approaching the 30th anniversary of [our] victory over Hitler's Germany. [Our] people assign special importance to this date. Of course, celebration of the Victory Day assumes different nuances in different times. Obviously we will not celebrate this date for 200 years. One has to take into account the international situation of détente, as well as the fact that there are now entire generations of people actively living and working, who did not know the war in practice, who did not see or experience it.

We believe that while celebrating the 30th anniversary of the Victory, it would be important to emphasize that having defeated Fascism, we have been waging an active and consistent struggle for stable peace for 30 years now. We have all the reasons to be proud of the victory and by what this victory gave to the peoples. Obviously, the role of the liberation struggle of the peoples in the occupied countries, and the role of the allies of the anti-Hitler coalition will be emphasized accordingly.

In [my] conversations with Ford, Giscard D'Estainge and Wilson, I touched upon the question of the possibility of organizing some joint events scheduled for the 30th anniversary of the Victory (for example, exchange of veterans' delegations, visits of military ships etc.). If our former coalition allies officially take part in the celebration of the anniversary of the victory, it would remind peoples of many things.

As far as the celebration of the anniversary itself, we will probably eventually come to the conclusion to celebrate it as one joint holiday. After all, it is not all that important if a certain country was liberated one day earlier or later. I believe that May 9, the day of Hitler's Germany capitulation, could be considered the main date.

Comrade Kadar expressed his wish for me to come to Hungary on the dates of the 30th anniversary of the liberation of the country, and comrade Husak invited [me] to come to Czechoslovakia on Victory Day. I would like to thank [our] fraternal parties, and you personally, my dear friends, from my whole heart for this invitation. However, I see great difficulties on their road to their fulfillment. During these months we will be involved in some great and intense internal work. And the external affairs do not allow one a breathing spell. We have to prepare for the concluding stage of the European Conference, we have to think through and finally formulate our five-year plan, we have to receive numerous foreign visitors and delegations. In the nearest future, as I already mentioned, we will have to meet with comrades Honecker and Gierek. High-level delegations from several African countries are either in Moscow now, or are expected in the next several days. Prime Minister of France Chirac is arriving tomorrow, and then [we] have to prepare for a visit to the United States, and to receive President of France in our country. And this is far from a complete [list].

Therefore, I would like to thank you all once again wholeheartedly for the invitation, and for your high esteem for the role of the Soviet Union and its armed forces in bringing about our joint victory. Each one of us will probably celebrate this holiday in their own way in their countries. When we invited party and state delegations from the fraternal countries to Moscow for the anniversary celebrations, they asked us—what level of delegations did we have in mind. We still have to make the final decision on that and other questions concerning the anniversary after I return to Moscow. However, I would like to say in a preliminary way that we do not intend for the highest leaders of the fraternal countries to come to Moscow during the anniversary days. Obviously, their presence will be needed in their own countries during those days. Therefore, we were thinking that delegations with for example Politburo members, Central Committee secretaries, deputy Chairmen of the Councils of Ministers, delegations of war veterans, workers and so on will visit us for the celebration.

We plan to hold our anniversary session on the evening of May 8. I was asked to speak at the session. I believe that my speech will be very compact—only 30 to 40 minutes. The reason is that I already had the occasion to speak at the celebration of the 20th anniversary of the Victory, and I have already said many things. And there is no need to repeat oneself. Of course, I will pay our regards to everyone who fought for the victory—to our soldiers, to the Soviet people, to the people of other countries, and to our allies. However, a large part of the speech will be probably devoted to the general assessment of the results of the victory and to the pressing tasks of the struggle for stable peace on our planet.

Besides that, as is our tradition, other people will speak at the anniversary session too—representatives of workers, war veterans, youth and so on.

I am telling you all this in a preliminary fashion. In Moscow, we will discuss all this at the Politburo. If anything changes, we will let you know immediately, but mainly, I think, everything will look like I have just described it to you.

Of course, the foreign delegates will be received with all due respect; they will be seated in the Presidium, will take part in the reception, and will make visits to plants or collective farms.

We also discussed the question of the military parade, and we came to the conclusion that it would be inexpedient to have it. There is no need to rattle the tanks and the missiles along the square [Red Square] during the period of the intensive struggle for peace, which we started in the international arena. However, we still have to make the final decision on the issue of the parade.

I would like the comrades to understand me correctly. Of course, each of the fraternal countries deals with its own concrete conditions, and determines the forms of celebration and the events to hold, on its own.

I would like to reiterate that we will inform you about our final decisions regarding the anniversary events.

Returning to international issues, I would like to say that we are keeping an eye on the events in Portugal, and we are trying to provide possible assistance to our Portuguese friends and to all the democratic forces of that country. Currently an economic delegation from Portugal is visiting Moscow. The issues they raise will be considered with all the appropriate attention. I think that every one of our countries could do something to support the progressive revolutionary forces of Portugal, who are engaged in a difficult struggle with the reactionary forces. We have things to think about here.

As far as China is concerned, there is nothing new. Our delegation headed by cde. Ilyichev has recently returned to Beijing, held two more sessions, but with no results.

I would like to point your attention, dear comrades, to the developments in FRG. It is not all that simple there. The social democrats and the free democrats continue to lose votes. Strauss is striving for power, and we know his face very well. It is hard for me to propose anything concrete now, but we need to follow the situation in West Germany carefully and with all our attention.

It is good that the Communist party of Italy is feeling confident and continues to strengthen its authority in the country. Today, as you know, our delegation headed by cde. Kirilenko is attending their Congress. Our Italian friends, as well as the government of Italy express their interest in my visit to that country, and believe that it would be useful. In principle, we responded to the invitation of the Italian government positively, but did not establish the concrete date yet.

Now regarding the Conference of European Communist parties. We came to the point of view that it would be more expedient to hold this Conference after the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe completes its work. (Voices: "Yes!")

In short, none of us will have an easy life. Yes, we, party leaders, work, as they said at the Congress of the Hungarian comrades, not so that we could sit in comfortable chairs, or drive in nice cars. We live in order that we could give ourselves wholly to the cause of peace, security for the people, the cause of socialism and communism.

One more small practical question. In our Armed Forces, we have some units (regiments, divisions), which took part in the liberation of certain capitals and cities of the fraternal countries, and therefore were named after the cities liberated by them. The participants of those battles are not with us any more, and the numbers of those divisions and regiments do not exist any longer, but the names are kept forever. Therefore, the personnel of those units could send letters, addresses, greetings to those who live in those towns during the anniversary days. I think your comrades will consider it possible to answer those greetings in some form.

Ya. Kadar. We are very thankful for this conversation, for comrade Brezhnev telling us about some issues. These are our common issues, and it was very important for us to hear comrade Brezhnev's information. We should all think about these issues—separately and all together.

I would like to start with the question of comrade Brezhnev's health. I think I will express the common opinion of all comrades, who gathered here. We all were very worried, as human beings, as comrades, and we were very glad when Leonid Ilyich said that he was simply fatigued, that there was no specific illness. We are sincerely glad [to hear] that, and we wish Leonid Ilyich good health.

We, Hungarians, are especially grateful to Leonid Ilyich for finding it possible to come to our party congress. It is important not only for the Hungarian Communists, it has a great international importance.

I would like to wish you good health once again from the bottom of my heart. You should remember that your health belongs not just to you, but to your party, and your people, and to us all.

As much as possible, try to follow some [healthy] schedule.

(The rest of the participants support cde. Kadar)

L. I. Brezhnev. Thank you very much.

Ya. Kadar. Leonid Ilyich was saying about the development of the five-year plan in the USSR. We all want the economic issues in the Soviet Union to be resolved in the best manner. The power of the Soviet Union is the power of us all. The relations between the Soviet Union and our countries can be compared to the relations between the powerful oak tree and the young undergrowth. We would not be able to live without the Soviet Union.

However, we cannot live like parasites on the Soviet Union either. We should be talking about cooperation, precisely, i.e. about working together. Of course there will be requests from us in the future, such is Soviet Union's fate. But we should do everything we can to help ourselves.

There were periods when we relied on the USSR reserves completely. However, we should understand what the Soviet comrades have been telling us recently. We have to see that the Soviet Union has its own problems. When cde. Baibakov visited us here, we had a conversation, and I looked at him, and thought that it is not easy for him, cde. Baibakov, either. He has to take into account not only the needs of his own country, but also he has to think about the problems of the fraternal countries. We understand you. We want to cooperate in the closest and the most correct way. Everything we can do ourselves, we will do.

As far as the European Conference is concerned, here we have been acting together, and we will be acting together, fully coordinating our actions.

We also want to celebrate the Victory Day, May 9. Not so long ago, in Hungary celebration of this date could have created a problem, but now the situation is completely different. Today there is no division in our commonwealth into the countries-winners and the defeated countries.

In the nearest future we will have a number of joint events. We agree to discuss the COMECON issues collectively, and ultimately at the highest level. The session of the PCC [Political Consultative Committee] on the anniversary of the Warsaw Treaty is coming. We also completely agree that it would be better to convene the conference of European Communist parties after the completion of work of the European Conference on Security and Cooperation.

I would like to express one more thought. Initially we were thinking that we should not publish any statements about this meeting, so that we don't offend those comrades who are not taking part in it. But they all know that we were due to meet over these days, they would not understand if such a meeting did not take place. Therefore, it would be quite all right to publish a communiqué about this friendly meeting. We also have a purely formal basis for having a meeting in this composition: those First Secretaries of Communist Parties of the socialist countries, who were presently in Budapest had a meeting. (Other participants express their agreement).

L. I. Brezhnev. I would ask the comrades to please have in mind that although I was really not well for some time, back home we firmly decided not to say anything about it publicly. I will need appropriate regime for some time to remove the fatigue. I have nothing else. I am grateful to the comrades for their concern about my health, and I would like to use this occasion to state that I am a fighter, and I will be so till the end. (Applause of the participants).

I would like to mention two more issues.

When should we hold our XXV Congress? Some factors are in favor of holding it already in the end of 1975, but there are some problems with it. If we finally settle the question of the five-year plan completely, then probably it would be better to hold the congress in the end of the year. Some comrades think that it would be better to hold it in February 1976. We have not made a final decision on this issue. Of course what matters is not the timetable but the program, which we will present at the congress.

This is more or less all I wanted to say to the comrades today. Thank you very much for coming. As far as the press statement about our meeting is concerned, I propose entrusting our Hungarian comrades with preparation of a draft of this statement.

Participants of the meeting agree with this proposal. With this the meeting adjourns.

Recorded by: [Signature] (A. Alexandrov)

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Translated by Svetlana Savranskaya
For the National Security Archive

ЗАПИСЬ БЕСЕДЫ

тов. Л. И. Брежнев с руководителями братских партий
социалистических стран в Будапеште

18 марта 1975 года ^{х)}

В беседе с тов. Брежневым приняли участие т. т. Э. Герек, Г. Гусак, Т. Живков, Я. Кадар и Э. Хонеккер, а также т. т. Б. Биску, В. В. Щербицкий, К. Ф. Катушев, Э. А. Шеварднадзе, К. В. Русаков, А. М. Александров и переводчики венгерской, немецкой, болгарской сторон.

Л. И. БРЕЖНЕВ. Я очень рад видеть всех вас, дорогие товарищи. Должен признаться, что я по вас соскучился. То, что мы сравнительно давно не виделись все вместе, объясняется тем, что я последние месяцы был немного нездоров. Именно поэтому и только поэтому мне не удалось, в частности, провести намечавшиеся ранее встречи и беседы в Москве с т. т. Герекком и Хонеккером. Ничего особенного со мной не было и нет, просто переутомление, нервы поизносились, и врачи стали настаивать на определенном периоде отдыха. Настоящего отдыха не получилось, он перемежался с работой, от этого, как вы понимаете, никуда не денешься в нашем положении, но все же от поездок, встреч, долгих сидений в кабинете пришлось на это время отказаться.

Вы знаете также и то, что это вызвало целую волну различных слухов и спекуляций прежде всего в буржуазной печати. Начались кое-какие вопросы и разговоры и у себя дома, надо было как-то успокоить людей. Поэтому я решил провести встречу с английским премьером Вильсоном, визит которого уже давно был намечен по

^{х)} Тов. Л. И. Брежневым запись не просматривалась.

договоренности сторон. С Вильсоном мы считали полезным встретиться и потому, чтобы оказать на него определенное влияние, привлечь Англию к политике разрядки, активизировать ее роль на общеевропейском совещании. Поэтому я и появился на переговорах с Вильсоном. Думаю, что и вы, товарищи, одобряете то, что было предпринято нами в отношении английского премьера.

Начало переговоров с англичанами было не простым, даже в какой-то мере трудным. Вильсон и Каллагэн капризничали. Нашим товарищам трудно было договориться с ними о подходящем тексте коммюнике. Формулировки по Ближнему Востоку им не подходили. Они ссылались на свою давнюю дружбу с Израилем. По кипрской проблеме определенно высказываться не желали. В связи с общеевропейским совещанием ссылались на то, что еще много нерешенных вопросов и т.д.

Однако настойчивые и откровенные разговоры с Вильсоном, работа, проведенная с ним, привели к тому, что удалось зафиксировать в совместных документах совсем неплохую позицию по всем упомянутым вопросам и по ряду других. Англичане заявили, что намерены энергично и конструктивно содействовать политике разрядки и улучшению англо-советских отношений. В области экономических связей они пошли на довольно существенные шаги.

Остается, конечно, посмотреть, как все это будет претворяться в жизнь на практике. Но уже те документы, которые мы подписали с Вильсоном в Москве, ко многому обязывают английское правительство и дают всем нам в руки дополнительное политическое оружие.

Потом, хотя я и продолжал еще чувствовать себя неважно, обстоятельства сложились так, что нам пришлось, хотя бы накоротке,

встретиться с т. Гусаком. Густав Никодимович прилетел в Москву, мы побеседовали с ним несколько часов, пообедали вместе, и он тут же улетел. Я, конечно, был рад этой встрече, хотя силенок было явно еще недостаточно.

После переговоров с Вильсоном я опять перешел на лечебный режим, а потом было решение, чтобы я появился на Торжественном заседании, посвященном Международному женскому дню - 8 марта.

Ну, а теперь вот, откликаясь на приглашение нашего общего друга - Яноша Кадара, я здесь, на съезде венгерских коммунистов, и рад видеть вас всех.

Хочу заранее сказать вам, дорогие товарищи, что все, о чем мы договорились ранее совместно или в двустороннем порядке, остается в силе. Я имею в виду осуществить (хотя несколько позже, чем первоначально предполагалось) краткие рабочие встречи с т. т. Герекком и Хонеккером, а если понадобится, то и с другими товарищами. Пока же, учитывая обстановку, мне пришлось заменить эти встречи телефонными переговорами. Думаю, что мы сможем встретиться и побеседовать еще до Дня Победы.

Скажу вам откровенно, дорогие товарищи, сегодня я не могу и не считал бы целесообразным поднимать какие-либо вопросы экономических связей между нашими странами. Все вы хорошо помните недавно состоявшиеся на различных уровнях контакты и переговоры, связанные с урегулированием цен и других проблем. Хотя я и был в этот период нездоров, я все же принимал во всем этом активное участие. Наши товарищи - и т. Патоличев, и т. Байбаков, и другие - по поручению нашего Политбюро приложили немало усилий, чтобы найти наиболее приемлемое для всех сторон решение возникших проблем.

По ходу работы, которую т.т. Байбаков и Патоличев вели совместно с вашими товарищами, мы не раз слушали этот вопрос на Политбюро и мы довольны тем, что теперь как будто бы найдено неплохое взаимоприемлемое решение. От вопросов, которые ставит жизнь, все равно никуда не уйдешь. Прав тов. Кадар, когда говорил в своем докладе на съезде о том, что мы, социалистические страны, не живем где-то в космосе или безвоздушном пространстве, а связаны с окружающей нас средой, с мировым рынком. Вот и приходится как-то реагировать на затрагивающие нас процессы.

Сейчас я приехал сюда, фигурально выражаясь, с пустыми карманами и не готов к конкретному обсуждению экономических проблем. Вряд ли нам на этой краткой встрече надо начинать их обсуждение, тем более, что эти проблемы требуют глубокой проработки. Разумеется, я, как и все вы, понимаю, что далеко не все вопросы решены. Какие-то концы остались, в чем-то еще надо определиться. Сейчас мне хотелось бы сказать лишь одно: важно подходить к экономическим вопросам с определенной партийной точки зрения, с партийным терпением, вниманием и компетентностью. Тогда легче будет находить выход. Легче будет определиться в вопросах наших будущих пятилетних планов.

Само собой разумеется, мы не отказываемся развивать наше сотрудничество. Не случайно, выступая сегодня на съезде венгерских товарищей, я подчеркнул значение СЭВа и других форм нашего экономического сотрудничества.

Сейчас надо нам посмотреть наметки нашего собственного пятилетнего плана на 1976-1980 годы. От того, как он будет сверстываться, зависит объем наших капиталовложений и многое другое. Наш Госплан обещал дать свой вариант (или варианты) дней через 15-20. У нас у самих еще, откровенно говоря, нет

ясности в отношении этого плана: чего мы от него хотим в первую очередь, что сможем.

Надо прямо сказать, что перед нами ряд нелегких проблем. Это и дальнейший подъем сельского хозяйства, и увеличение добычи нефти, газа, леса и строительство Байкало-Амурской магистрали, и обязательства перед братскими странами, и дальнейший подъем жизненного уровня народа. Словом, я думаю, в основном это примерно те же проблемы, как и у каждого из вас, только в более крупных масштабах.

От усилий по подъему сельского хозяйства нам никуда не деться. Но у нас в СССР это много сложнее, чем в ваших странах. Это объясняется и трудным, суровым и неустойчивым климатом, и качеством почв, и другими факторами. Такая республика, как Казахстан, может, например, при равных трудовых усилиях людей один год дать миллиард пудов зерновых, а другой год - 400 миллионов. На Украине тоже недросто, особенно в этом году.

Словом, нам надо самим по-настоящему все учесть у себя, прийти к какой-то ясности, тогда легче будет отвечать и вам.

Мы сейчас, как известно, выдвигаем на первый план задачу повышения эффективности производства, повышения фондоотдачи. А фонды у нас большие, и даже скромный сдвиг в этом направлении означает очень многое. В этой пятилетке (которая кончится в 1975 году) мы, например, определили общий объем капиталовложений в сумме более 500 миллиардов рублей. Затраты огромные. Чтобы провести нефть или газ из Тюмени в Европейскую часть, доставить в Братиславу или Будапешт, нужны огромные финансовые и материальные затраты. Своих труб у нас не хватает, приходится расходовать валюту на покупку за границей.

Словом, проблем много. Приходится серьезно думать о том, как сделать наше хозяйство более рентабельным. Пока что, к сожалению, фондоотдача у нас падает. Придется серьезно разобраться в вопросах будущих капиталовложений. Конечно, каждая республика, каждая область выдвигают какие-то требования и предложения. Сами по себе вопросы, которые они поднимают, почти всегда правильные и обоснованные. Но с общегосударственной точки зрения картина иногда получается другая. Республик у нас, как вы знаете, много, национальностей в стране много, но советский народ один, и надо думать прежде всего о его интересах в целом.

Самый наш дорогой капитал и самое наше сильное оружие - это сплоченность нашей партии, горячая поддержка ее политики всем народом. В ответ на обращение ЦК к партии, к народу в стране возникла обстановка большого трудового подъема. Коллективы промышленных предприятий, совхозов и колхозов берут на себя повышенные трудовые обязательства, в ЦК идут тысячи писем.

Словом, по возвращении в Москву придется серьезно заняться всеми этими вопросами.

Непростые перспективы у нас и в том, что касается мероприятий внешнеполитического плана, различных визитов к нам и поездок в иностранные государства. Намечено очень многое, одно мероприятие накладывается на другое, и отказать никому нельзя. Мы - интернационалисты. Дело отношений с ^{социалистическими} братскими странами для нас всегда на первом плане. Необходимо оказывать содействие и странам третьего мира. Это - требование большой политики.

Что касается наших с вами взаимных отношений, то мне хотелось бы подчеркнуть здесь, что мы отнюдь не смотрим на них,

как на какое-то одностороннее оказание Советским Союзом помощи другим соцстранам. Мы во многом получаем от вас нужную и хорошую помощь и благодарны за нее. Об этом я не раз говорил и на наших закрытых беседах, и выступая публично, говорил от имени нашего ЦК.

Вы все, конечно, хорошо понимаете, товарищи, что вопросы взаимоотношений между нашими братскими странами, принципы и атмосфера этих отношений имеют величайшее значение для нашего общего дела. Если возникают какие-то проблемы, наш долг как партийных руководителей - проявлять спокойствие и уравновешенность, помнить о главном, внимательно следить за тем, кто как и что докладывает руководству ЦК. Это немаловажно...

Я не хочу здесь упрекать кого-либо, у меня для этого нет никаких оснований. Но жизнь есть жизнь. За 30 лет у нас бывали и сложные моменты, но мы всегда находили способы их преодолевать, подчиняя частности главному, нашим основным политическим целям и убеждениям. И каковы бы ни были возникающие сложности, мы все же идем все вперед, а не назад. Это касается и развития экономики, и улучшения жизни наших народов, и укрепления нашей дружбы. Может быть, в хозяйственном плане мы продвигаемся вперед не так быстро, как хотели бы, но прогресс очевиден и бесспорен. Основываясь на нашем собственном опыте, я могу сказать, что очень плохо, когда мы выделяем средства на решение каких-то экономических задач, но не покрываем эти средства материальным обеспечением. Это приводит к замораживанию денег, растет объем незавершенных строящихся объектов, причем растет неоправданно.

Видимо, после того, как мы посмотрим у себя, что предлагает Госплан на будущую пятилетку, обсудим эти вопросы и займем определенную позицию, можно будет продолжить и наши с вами деловые разговоры. Будет ли это вначале на уровне Советов Министров или

Госпланов, или каких-то комиссий, я не берусь сейчас сказать. Но я уверен, что в конце концов мы договоримся.

Да, у нас есть непростые задачи и разного рода проблемы. Это естественно. Хуже, что находятся люди, которые исподтишка ведут недобросовестные разговоры, нарочито сеют сомнения или разжигают страсти. То они объявляют, что в чем-то виновата Чехословакия, то еще кто-то, а главным образом СССР. Это неправильно и несправедливо. Мы с вами сотрудничаем много лет. Вряд ли кто-то может сказать, что в итоге этого сотрудничества Советский Союз получил огромные прибыли за счет других. Насчет прибылей не знаю, а вот долги вашим странам уже имеются. Словом, надо находить правильные выходы из возникающих проблем. Может быть, всем нам надо проявлять больше инициативы, больше внимания к этим вопросам со стороны Центральных комитетов наших партий.

Однако я не думаю, чтобы кто-то мог утверждать, будто работа СЭВ повредила кому-то из нас. Правда, они пишут слишком много бумаг и слишком медленно поворачиваются, но в целом все же эта работа нужная и полезная. Может быть, кое-где нам надо нажать на работников соответствующих аппаратов. Может быть, больше надо самим вникать в экономические дела. У каждого из нас есть свои проблемы в этой области, и нередко разные.

В СССР, я повторяю, одна из серьезных трудностей состоит в том, что огромные капиталовложения трудно обеспечить материальным снабжением. Такое положение дальше сохранять нельзя.

Трудностей да и грехов у нас, наверное, много. Но если возьмемся все вместе с достаточной энергией и вниманием, то дела пойдут лучше. Я вот тут говорил нашим товарищам, когда проведем

нефть и газ из глубинки в западные районы, то сможем дополнительно подбросить и братским странам по цистерне добытой нефти. (Смех).

Г.ГУСАК. Наши плановики говорят, что надо подбросить примерно полмиллиона тонн.

Л.И.БРЕЖНЕВ. Аппетиты растут. Раньше, я помню, ваш завод "Словнафт" получал по 3 миллиона тонн нефти в год, а теперь, кажется, хочет 6 или 7.

Г.ГУСАК. Всего получаем 16 миллионов тонн.

В.В.ЩЕРБИЦКИЙ. Это все, что добывает в год наша Украина.

Л.И.БРЕЖНЕВ. Освоить новые месторождения дело не такое легко как это представлялось нам вначале. Надо и тайгу расчистить, и жилье выстроить, и школы, и кинотеатры построить, и трубопроводы проложить. Это я вам все рассказываю для того, чтобы вы сократили свои запросы к нам. (Смех).

Мы осуществляем поставки и Кубе. И ее не оставим без хлеба или без топлива. Мы и армию кубинскую одеваем бесплатно. И платим им за сахар по льготным ценам. Поставки зерна идут в ряд стран. Польша и ГДР, например, тоже пока еще не обеспечивают себя своим хлебом. Словом, задач много, нам есть над чем подумать.

Все это, конечно, не означает, товарищи, что я заявляю вам: "Не просите больше ничего, не выйдет". Я хочу лишь, чтобы с вашей стороны было полное понимание сложностей возникающих перед нами вопросов.

Сейчас, насколько я понимаю, между нашими странами достигнуто полное согласие относительно определения скользящих цен на 1975 год и на последующую пятилетку. Если это приемлемо для всех сторон,

то значит, мы проживем еще 6 лет и достигнем новых успехов.

Я начал с экономических вопросов потому, что это важно для всех, важно для нашей дружбы. Надо продолжать работу, искать новые пути интеграции и другие формы сотрудничества. Мы использовали еще далеко не все возможности.

Второй очень важный вопрос, дорогие друзья, - это общеевропейское совещание. Все мы, все наше содружество должны умело и с большой энергией работать над тем, чтобы успешно завершить это совещание.

Кровавая история Европы говорит о многом и ко многому обязывает. Если мы, коммунисты стран социализма и капиталистических государств, в союзе с прогрессивными миролюбивыми и реально мыслящими людьми из других общественных слоев сможем в конечном итоге добиться того, что на общеевропейском совещании высшими руководителями стран-участниц будут подписаны ясные и четкие документы о принципах взаимоотношений между европейскими государствами, то это будет огромной политической победой. Это придаст новые силы всем сторонникам мира и прогресса. Поэтому мы прилагаем все возможные усилия для достижения такой цели.

Президент Форд во Владивостоке сказал мне твердо, что будет действовать в отношении общеевропейского совещания, как мы договорились. Жискарь д'Эстэн (характер/^{его}я мало еще знаю) тоже высказался довольно определенно. Обещал поддержку и канцлер Шмидт, но у него положение непростое. Влиятельные силы в ФРГ выдвигают требования как в отношении Западного Берлина, так и "добровольного изменения границ", причем последнее на практике означает - скупать Хонеккера. Эти реваншисты ненасытны. Уроки истории для них ничего не значат. Им мало десятков миллионов погибших людей. Это - опасность,

о которой мы всегда должны помнить и которой постоянно должны давать отпор.

Сейчас вроде дело с общеевропейским совещанием идет на лад. Американцы немного поработали и с нашей помощью нашли подходящую формулировку относительно мирного изменения границ. Как будто ее согласование сейчас завершается.

С так называемой "третьей корзиной" дело тоже, по-моему, в общем распутывается. Непомерные и нахальные претензии некоторых западных стран отбиты.

Главной проблемой до последнего времени оставались так называемые "меры доверия", то есть вопросы, связанные с оповещением о маневрах и передвижениях войск, с приглашением наблюдателей и т.д. Доверительно могу сказать вам, что на днях мы рассматривали у себя в Политбюро этот комплекс вопросов и сочли возможным занять несколько более гибкую позицию в отдельных деталях. Мы дали соответствующие указания нашей делегации в Женеве, которая будет действовать в тесном контакте с вашими представителями. Все детали будут там сообщены. Поэтому я ограничусь здесь только общим упоминанием этого вопроса.

Теперь вопрос о сроке завершения работы совещания. До сих пор повсюду можно было слышать весьма определенные слова: "В этом году". Но это слишком туманно, и нас не устраивает. Вам уже известно то, что мы недавно обратились к руководителям США, ФРГ, Франции, Англии и Италии с предложением действовать так, чтобы последний этап общеевропейского совещания открылся на высшем уровне 30 июня этого года. Об этом же я говорил и с Кекконеном во время беседы с ним в Москве. Он поддержал наше предложение и будет оказывать

соответствующее влияние на другие страны. Сейчас мы ожидаем ответов от руководителей упомянутых западных держав. Думаем, что ваши страны, товарищи, могли бы весьма энергично поддержать предложение СССР о сроке.

Да, тут еще одно обстоятельство. Форд, как вы знаете, очень настаивает на моем визите в Соединенные Штаты этим летом. Он в этом заинтересован политически, лично он. Но у нас складывается такое мнение, что ехать в Америку до завершения Общеввропейского совещания было бы нерационально. Так мы и дали понять американцам. Может быть это немного подстергнет их с завершением совещания.

Теперь несколько слов о Ближнем Востоке. Положение там вам хорошо известно. Наша позиция остается неизменной. Если говорить об арабах, то, пожалуй, они, или кое-кто из них, стали за последнее время менее уступчивыми, чем ранее. Это, конечно, прежде всего, касается Сирии и Палестинцев.

Мы не против соглашений о дальнейшем разводе войск на фронтах. Но желательно, чтобы это происходило при какой-то форме нашего участия (чтобы иметь возможность оказывать влияние на существо дела). И самое главное, чтобы такие соглашения о частичных мерах не стали заменой окончательного урегулирования. Израиль не должен сохранять никакую часть захваченных им чужих земель.

Киссинджер продолжает свои усилия и поездки на Ближнем Востоке. Он должен на днях встретиться с Громыко в Австрии или Иране. И тогда он, видимо, проинформирует нашего министра подробнее.

В общем, по этой проблеме, как и по многим другим важным вопросам, мы стараемся вас информировать. Может быть мы иногда опаздываем с такой информацией, но вы едва ли можете упрекнуть нас в том, что мы действуем не в духе нашей общей политической линии.

Еще один вопрос. Близится 30-летие Победы над гитлеровской Германией. Народы придают большое значение этой дате. Конечно, празднование Дня победы в разные периоды приобретает различные нюансы. Видимо, мы не 200 лет будем отмечать эту дату. Надо учитывать и обстановку международной разрядки, а также то, что сейчас активно действуют целые поколения людей, которые на практике не знали войны, не видели ее и не прочувствовали.

Нам кажется, что, отмечая 30-летний юбилей Победы, важно подчеркнуть, что разгромив фашизм, мы в течение 30 лет ведем активную и последовательную борьбу за прочный мир. У нас есть все основания гордиться одержанной победой и тем, что эта победа дала народам. Видимо, будет объективно, в должной мере оценена и роль, которую сыграла освободительная борьба народов в оккупированных странах, и вклад союзников по антигитлеровской коалиции.

В беседах с Фордом, Жискаром д'Эстэном и Вильсоном я затрагивал вопрос о возможности проведения каких-то совместных мероприятий, приуроченных к 30-летию Победы (например, обмен делегациями ветеранов войны, визитов военных кораблей и т.п.). Если наши бывшие союзники по коалиции примут официальное участие в праздновании юбилей Победы, то это о многом напомнит народам.

Что касается самого празднования юбилей, то, видимо, мы все придем в конце концов к тому, что будем отмечать единый, общий праздник. Не имеет ведь большого значения, если та или иная

страна была освобождена днем ранее или днем позднее. Полагаю, что 9 Мая, как день капитуляции гитлеровской Германии, может рассматриваться как основная дата.

Тов.Кадар выражал пожелание, чтобы я приехал в Венгрию в дни 30-летия освобождения страны, тов.Гусак приглашал приехать в Чехословакию на День победы. Я хочу сердечно поблагодарить братские партии и вас лично, дорогие друзья, за это приглашение. Однако я вижу огромные трудности на пути их осуществления. У нас разворачивается в эти месяцы большая, напряженная внутренняя работа. Да и внешние дела не дают передышки. Нужно готовиться к последнему этапу Общеευропейского совещания, нужно обдумать и окончательно сформировать нашу пятилетку, предстоит принимать многочисленных иностранных посетителей и делегации. В ближайшее время, как я уже упоминал, нам нужно будет встретиться с т.т.Хонеккером и Герекком. Сейчас в Москве находятся или ожидаются в ближайшие дни высокопоставленные делегации из ряда африканских стран. Завтра прибывает премьер Франции Ширак, а затем надо будет готовиться и к поездке в Соединенные Штаты, и к приему у нас президента Франции. И это еще далеко не все.

Поэтому я хочу еще раз от души поблагодарить всех вас и за приглашения, и за высокую оценку роли Советского Союза и его Вооруженных Сил в достижении нашей общей победы. Видимо, каждый из нас у себя будет по-своему отмечать этот праздник. Когда мы пригласили в Москву на юбилейные торжества партийно-правительственные делегации из братских стран, то нас стали спрашивать, какой уровень делегаций мы имеем в виду. Окончательное решение по этому и другим, связанным с юбилеем вопросам, нам еще предстоит принять после моего возвращения в Москву. Но в предварительном

порядке хочу сказать, что мы не имеем в виду прибытие в Москву в юбилейные дни высших руководителей из братских стран. Видимо, их присутствие будет необходимо в эти дни в своих собственных странах. Поэтому мы представляли себе дело так, что к нам на праздник приедут делегации, например, с членами Политбюро или секретарями ЦК, заместителями председателей Совминов, делегации ветеранов войны, рабочих и т.д.

Свое торжественное заседание мы имеем в виду провести вечером 8 мая. Мне поручено выступить на этом заседании. Я предполагаю, что выступление мое будет очень компактным, минут на 30-40. Дело в том, что мне уже приходилось выступать во время празднования 20-летия Победы, так что многое уже сказано. И повторяться едва ли есть необходимость. Конечно, я отдам должное всем, кто боролся за победу — и нашим воинам, и советскому народу, и народам других стран и нашим союзникам. Но большая часть выступления будет, видимо, посвящена обобщенной оценке итогов победы и актуальным задачам борьбы за прочный мир на нашей планете.

Кроме того, на торжественном заседании, как это у нас обычно бывает, выступят и другие товарищи — представители рабочих, ветеранов войны, молодежи и т.п.

Это я все говорю вам в предварительном порядке. В Москве мы еще обсудим эти вопросы на Политбюро. Если что-то изменится, мы немедленно дадим вам знать, в основном, думаю, дело будет выглядеть так, как я вам сейчас рассказал.

Разумеется, иностранные делегаты будут приняты со всем почетом, будут находиться в президиуме, примут участие в приеме, совершат поездки на заводы или в колхозы.

Обсуждали мы вопрос и о военном параде, и пришли к выводу, что проводить его нецелесообразно. Нет необходимости бряцать на площади танками и ракетами в период интенсивной борьбы за мир, которую мы развернули на международной арене. Однако по вопросу о параде тоже еще предстоит принять окончательное решение.

Я хотел бы, чтобы товарищи меня правильно поняли. Конечно, каждая из братских стран имеет дело со своими конкретными условиями и сама определяет формы празднования и мероприятия, которые будут проводиться.

Еще раз хочу сказать, что мы поставим вас в известность о своих окончательных решениях, связанных с юбилейными мероприятиями.

Возвращаясь к международным вопросам, хочу сказать, что мы держим в поле зрения события в Португалии и стараемся оказывать португальским друзьям и всем демократическим силам этой страны возможную помощь. Сейчас у нас в Москве находится экономическая делегация Португалии. Вопросы, которые она ставит, будут рассмотрены со всем надлежащим вниманием. Думаю, что каждая из наших стран могла бы что-то сделать для поддержки прогрессивных, революционных сил Португалии, ведущих нелегкую борьбу с силами реакции. Тут есть о чем подумать.

Что касается Китая, то тут нет ничего нового. Наша делегация во главе с т. Ильичевым недавно возвратилась в Пекин, провела еще два заседания, но результатов никаких.

Хотел бы обратить ваше внимание, товарищи, на то, что происходит в ФРГ. Дело там не простое. Социал-демократы и свободные демократы продолжают терять голоса. Штраус рвется к власти, а его лицо нам хорошо известно. Мне трудно сейчас предложить

что-то конкретное, но следить за положением в Западной Германии необходимо постоянно и со всем вниманием.

Отрадно, что Коммунистическая партия Италии чувствует себя уверенно и продолжает укреплять свой авторитет в стране. Сейчас, как вы знаете, наша делегация во главе с тов. Кириленко находится у них на съезде. Итальянские друзья так же, как и правительство Италии высказываются за мой визит в эту страну, считают, что это было бы полезным. Мы в принципе ответили согласием на приглашение итальянского правительства, но конкретную дату визита еще не устанавливали.

Теперь относительно Совещания европейских компартий. У нас сложилась такая точка зрения, что это Совещание целесообразнее всего провести после того, как Общеввропейское совещание по безопасности и сотрудничеству завершит свою работу. (Голоса: "Да!")

Словом, легкой жизни ни у кого из нас не будет. Да, мы, партийные руководители, работаем, как говорилось на съезде венгерских товарищей, не для того, чтобы сидеть в удобных креслах или ездить в хороших машинах. Мы живем, чтобы отдать целиком себя делу мира, безопасности народов, делу социализма и коммунизма.

Еще один небольшой практический вопрос. У нас в Вооруженных Силах есть соединения (полки, дивизии), которые принимали участие в освобождении тех или иных столиц или городов братских стран, и получили поэтому названия по имени освобожденных городов. Самих участников боев за освобождение, как и номеров этих дивизий или полков, уже нет, но названия остались навечно. Так вот, личный состав этих соединений может в юбилейные дни прислать письма,

обращения, приветствия гражданам соответствующих городов. Думаю, что ваши товарищи сочтут возможным как-то ответить на такие приветствия.

Я.КАДАР. Мы очень благодарны за эту беседу, за то, что товарищ Брежнев рассказал нам о некоторых вопросах. Это наши общие вопросы, и для нас очень важно услышать информацию товарища Брежнева. Над всеми этими проблемами мы должны думать — по отдельности и вместе.

Хочу начать с вопроса о здоровье товарища Брежнева. Думаю, что я выражу общее мнение всех собравшихся здесь товарищей. Мы все очень волновались, по-человечески, по-товарищески, и мы были очень рады, когда Леонид Ильич сказал, что у него просто переутомление, но какой-либо особой болезни нет. Мы искренне рады этому и желаем Леониду Ильичу доброго здоровья.

Мы, венгры, особенно благодарны Леониду Ильичу за то, что он смог приехать на съезд нашей партии. Это важно не только для венгерских коммунистов, это имеет и большое международное значение.

Еще раз хочу от всего сердца пожелать Вам доброго здоровья. Вы должны помнить, что Ваше здоровье принадлежит не только Вам, а вашей партии и народу и нам всем.

Насколько возможно попробуйте соблюдать какой-то режим.
(Остальные присутствующие поддерживают тов.Кадара).

Л.И.БРЕЖНЕВ. Большое спасибо.

Я.КАДАР. Леонид Ильич говорил о работе над составлением пятилетнего плана в СССР. Мы все заинтересованы в том, чтобы вопросы народного хозяйства в Советском Союзе решались наилучшим

образом. Сила Советского Союза - это наша сила. Отношения между Советским Союзом и нашими странами можно сравнивать с отношениями между могучим дубом и молодым подлеском. Без Советского Союза мы не могли бы жить.

Однако мы не можем и паразитировать на Советском Союзе. Мы должны вести речь именно о сотрудничестве, то есть трудиться вместе. Просьбы с нашей стороны, конечно, будут и впредь, такая уж судьба у СССР. Но надо сделать все от нас зависящее для того, чтобы помочь самим себе.

Были периоды, когда мы полностью полагались на резервы СССР. Однако мы должны понять то, о чем недавно говорили нам советские товарищи. Надо видеть, что и Советский Союз имеет свои проблемы. Когда у нас здесь был товарищ Байбаков и мы вели с ним беседу, я посмотрел и подумал о том, что ему, товарищу Байбакову, нелегко. Он должен учитывать не только нужды своей страны, но и думать о проблемах братских стран. Мы вас понимаем. Мы хотим сотрудничать самым тесным и самым корректным образом. Все, что мы сможем делать сами, мы будем делать.

Что касается Общеввропейского совещания, то мы тут действовали и будем впредь действовать совместно, полностью координируя свои усилия.

День Победы 9 Мая мы тоже хотим отметить. Еще не так давно в Венгрии празднование этой даты могло бы создать проблему, но ныне положение иное. Ныне в нашем содружестве нет деления на страны-победительницы и страны-побежденные.

У нас в недалеком будущем предстоит ряд совместных мероприятий. Мы согласны обсудить коллективно вопросы СЭВа, причем в конечном счете на высшем уровне. Предстоит также заседание ПКК

в связи с юбилеем Варшавского Договора. Мы полностью согласны также с тем, что совещание европейских компартий лучше всего провести после окончания работы Общеввропейского совещания по безопасности и сотрудничеству.

Хочу высказать еще одну мысль. Сначала мы думали, что о нашей сегодняшней встрече не надо публиковать никаких сообщений, чтобы не обижать тех товарищей, которые в ней не принимают участия. Но все знают, что мы должны встретиться в эти дни, никто бы не понял, если бы такой встречи не было. Поэтому вполне можно опубликовать коммюнике о нашей дружественной встрече. Есть и чисто формальная основа для того, чтобы встреча произошла именно в таком составе: встретились первые секретари компартий социалистических стран, находящиеся сейчас в Будапеште. (Другие участники встречи выражают свое согласие).

Л.И.БРЕЖНЕВ. Я очень просил бы товарищей иметь в виду, что хотя я действительно некоторое время был нездоров, мы у себя твердо условились не говорить ничего об этом публично. Мне нужно некоторое время и соответствующий режим, чтобы снять утомляемость. Ничего другого у меня нет. Я признателен товарищам за заботу о моем здоровье и хочу, пользуясь этим случаем, заявить вам, что я боец, и буду им до конца. (Аплодисменты присутствующих).

Хочу упомянуть еще о двух вопросах.

Когда нам проводить XXV съезд КПСС? Кое-что говорит за то, чтобы провести его уже в конце 1975 года, но здесь есть и свои трудности. Если вопрос о пятилетке будет у нас окончательно утрясен, то возможно лучше сделать съезд в конце года. Некоторые товарищи считают, что лучше провести в феврале 1976 года. Вопрос


этот мы решили не окончательно. Конечно, имеет значение не срок, а программа, с которой мы выступим на съезде.

Вот, собственно, и все, что я имел в виду рассказать товарищам сегодня. Большое спасибо за то, что вы пришли. Что касается сообщения для печати о нашей встрече, то предлагаю поручить венгерским товарищам подготовить проект этого сообщения.

Участники встречи соглашаются с этим предложением.

На этом встреча заканчивается.

Записал:



(А.Александров)

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 Authority NND 989755
 BY 6166 Date 7/16/03

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
 WASHINGTON

SECRET/NODIS/XGDS

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:

Willy Brandt, Former Chancellor of the Federal
 Republic of Germany
 President Ford
 Amb. Berndt Von Staden, Federal Republic of
 Germany Ambassador to the United States
 Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and
 Assistant to the President for National Security
 Affairs
 Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant
 to the President for National Security Affairs

DATE AND TIME:

Thursday, March 27, 1975
 11:00 a.m.

PLACE:

The Oval Office
 The White House

SUBJECT:

Portugal; Middle East; Turkey; CSCE;
 Southeast Asia

President: It is delightful to have you here. I had a fine opportunity to get to know the Chancellor. We talked economics, the situation in Europe, broad topics. We had a good opportunity to talk substance and to get acquainted.

I know you are interested in Portugal. I would appreciate your observations.

Brandt: The last word I have is that the new government has been formed but they haven't gone as far as might have been feared. Soares, with whom we Socialists have ties, is still in the Cabinet, as Minister without portfolio, so he can be in the campaign. Also, the Minister of Interior stayed in his post -- that is important to the elections. We shouldn't give up. The question is what kind of moral and material help we can give.

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We have done a little. The Dutch did some and the Swedes did. I plan to get a little group of officers together to try to make contacts.

President: Are the military in the grip of the Communists?

Brandt: Some are Communists, some are Social Revolutionaries. Like Peron. There are Cubans among them. The Soviet Union may not be playing so critical a role. They may be playing a more minor role.

Kissinger: But wouldn't it be even harder to manage if they had a rabid left dictatorship?

Brandt: It's difficult to say, but it may go like Finland. They had a difficult period but got the Communists out eventually.

President: What effect will the election have?

Brandt: The Socialists will be stronger than the Communists if they don't falsify the results. They plus the PDP will be much stronger. Soares says he will be tough and if he doesn't get represented proportionally, he will go underground. But the Revolutionary Council looks like it will continue to play a dominant role.

President: What will be the parliamentary role?

Brandt: Their main task will be to draft a Constitution. Then they will have elections for parliament.

President: I have read that Cunhal is very able.

Brandt: He seems to be able and may be relatively independent vis-a-vis the Soviet Union.

President: It would certainly complicate our situation in NATO.

Kissinger: The Portuguese representative will also get MBFR information when it goes to the NAC.

President: I appreciate Schmidt's phone call. We certainly are willing to work with you.

Brandt: I talked to the Latin Americans about this, and the Venezuelans and Mexicans were very interested. They were concerned about the

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influence on Spain. Spain is very different from Portugal, but it could have an impact. We would like to see a gradual evolution in Spain and I can eventually see them in the European Community.

President: Let's talk a bit about the Middle East. We are disappointed in the Middle East, naturally. We made a massive effort which would have gone a long way toward peace. I am not optimistic about what may happen at Geneva. I think Israel may be disappointed at the prospects of Geneva. Any help you can give...

Brandt: I don't know when I will see any of them. Based on my talks with Allon, I thought there would be more flexibility.

President: We did too. I spoke with Rabin, with Allon, with Mrs. Meir, and we had the same impression. We can see a difficult situation in Geneva.

Kissinger: I told Mr. Brandt to see if he and Schmidt can try to induce flexibility of mind. They have thwarted us and now they seem to be doing the same with Geneva -- to return to the period after the '67 war. That would mean a war.

President: Stalemate certainly would enhance the chances of war, with all the dangers of a confrontation, a new embargo.

We must seek to avoid a stalemate and we may be forced into a different relationship with Israel. We have to look to our self-interests.

Brandt: Has Sadat been weakened?

President: I think he will have to align himself more with the other Arabs. If he does that, he may be all right.

Kissinger: We heard he is likely to suffer because of his orientation with us. Even if he moves to the radicals, they all know it is his second choice.

Brandt: I met with him and was amazed at how close he feels to the United States. He said he had daily contact with two leaders -- Boumediene and Faisal. Now one is dead. The Vice President is there now.

President: Yes. He met there with Sadat. We feel we have a very constructive relationship with him.

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Brandt: I thought he was in danger of forgetting there was another great power.

President: We are also concerned about Turkey. We are doing what we can but Congress is difficult. If Turkey moves away from NATO it would be very serious.

Kissinger: Germany has many Turks working there.

Brandt: I met with Ecevit. He was flexible but he said that as time goes on it is more and more difficult to reduce the Turkish area of Cyprus. He thinks the Greeks now understand that there will be only two zones, not cantons. That is important -- that, and some reduction of the zone.

President: What is it now -- about 40 percent?

Kissinger: Bitsios said they would settle for 20-28 percent. The Turks are willing to go to 30-35 percent. We are close, but as long as they think they can run to Congress....

Brandt: Ecevit told Waldheim he would settle for 30 percent.

Kissinger: If Ecevit were Prime Minister it would be settled in one month. The problem is that only the Parliament can dissolve itself.

Von Staden: It's similar to our structure.

President: They have more than five major parties.

Kissinger: They have two major fairly balanced ones and some minor ones. Ecevit gambled and lost last fall. They were all afraid of his popularity and blocked him.

President: We are hamstrung because of the aid cutoff. I can't certify that there has been progress and the cutoff has taken place. The Greek opposition is very vocal and there are some tough Congressmen. I think we can get something through the Senate but it looks impossible right now in the House.

What are your thoughts on CSCE?

Brandt: My feelings are that we should bring it to a conclusion. It has been a good exercise -- developing positions and discussing with the other

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side in a way I wouldn't have thought possible. This is one more way which links the United States and Canada to Europe, in a way that is not derived from the last war. This shows that the United States, like the Soviet Union, is a European power, not just as a result of World War II. The Soviet Union talks about a permanent secretariat. The West isn't in favor of that, but I would recommend -- and my Government agrees, I think -- that after one or two years the Foreign Ministers should meet to review the results of the agreement.

Kissinger: We are basically in favor.

Brandt: It gives the Communists something to work for.

Kissinger: It puts pressure on them not to be intransigent.

Brandt: I would move it from Helsinki to Vienna also. It would be less under Soviet influence.

President: We would appreciate any help with Israel. It is a difficult period and we have to be firm. Any help to avoid stalemate will be helpful.

Brandt: May I make one remark on Southeast Asia? It is very hard to make up my mind on what is right, but you should know that whichever way you decide, it would not influence our belief in the vitality of the United States and its institutions.

President: It is a very difficult situation. It is a tragedy for those of us who have supported President Johnson and President Nixon. I haven't made a decision, but my feeling is to be strong. On a worldwide basis, too.

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ACTION
April 2, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY KISSINGER

FROM: Mr. Chitt
SUBJECT: Status Report on CSCE

The information memorandum for your signature to the President at Tab A would forward a status report on CSCE in the current phase of the Stage II negotiations. The memorandum states that earlier expectations of progress by Easter have proved unfounded and that, despite general acceptance of a Stage III summer summit, there has been no rush of concessions by the Soviets -- or by anyone else. It points out that the Soviets are beginning to get nervous about timing and that they are starting to lean more heavily on pressure tactics. The report briefly reviews the four major remaining issues at the Conference, concludes that the substantive negotiations will probably continue down to the wire, and points out that this will make it more difficult to meet an early summer deadline for Stage III.

This memorandum is based on the reporting cable from Ambassador Scherer at Tab B.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum at Tab A.

RGates:nw:4/2/75

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E.O. 12958, SEC 3.5
NSC MEMO, 11/24/69, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES
BY Gls, NARA, DATE 7/18/01



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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger

SUBJECT: Status Report on CSCE

Summary

As the pressures of the final negotiating phase of CSCE start to build, the Soviets have tried to advance in certain subject areas, but have continued to probe Western positions and to remain firm on issues which they consider sensitive, such as individual contacts. Thus, there has been no rush of Soviet concessions and, partly as a result of this, many Western and neutral delegations are sticking to the ideas they consider important. The Soviets may have begun to feel time pressure, but thus far have been unwilling to make concessions to meet their own schedule. Nevertheless, our delegation in Geneva believes that if the Soviets make at least some key concessions, it is still possible to finish Stage II negotiations in time for a Stage III in early to mid-July.

The Current Situation

As Stage II of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe resumes following an Easter recess, earlier expectations of visible progress by Easter have proved unfounded. The optimism and compromising spirit of two months ago have been tempered by the dawning realization that the Soviets will not produce a rush of concessions -- at least not yet. The lack of Soviet willingness to find reasonable compromises has produced a similar attitude among Western and neutral participants, who believe that if they simply accept Soviet terms, even on minor issues, the Soviets will be encouraged to insist on their way on issues of more fundamental importance.

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The Soviets have reacted in this situation by beginning to use pressure tactics, coming down particularly hard on the French and the FRG. It seems likely that they have perceived the negotiating box now closing in around them: a deadline for completion of the Conference set by Brezhnev himself, and a limited number of concessions to offer in order to meet it. These trends are expected to continue to develop in this post-Easter period, which will compound the difficulty of trying to meet the timetable envisaged by most participants -- completion of Stage II about the end of May or mid-June and a Stage III in early to mid-July.

Summary of Remaining Issues

The key remaining substantive issues at the Conference are as follows:

-- Principles (Basket I): Agreement is blocked by a knot of interlocking issues related to Germany and the Brezhnev doctrine. The United States has tabled a draft on peaceful changes of borders which is widely accepted. The French, however, have linked their agreement to this text to acceptance of language which would protect Quadripartite rights and responsibilities in Berlin and which would assert the equal value of all the principles. Romania objects to the U.S. peaceful change text and, with the neutrals, strongly rejects the French position on Quadripartite rights as too general and as reinforcing the Brezhnev doctrine.

-- Confidence Building Measures/Maneuvers: The Soviets have announced that they would be flexible on the geographic area and size of forces subject to prior notification of maneuvers if the Conference can agree "in principle" that such notification will be voluntary. The NATO countries and neutrals generally see no objection in principle to a voluntary approach to prior notification, if the Soviets will give a clearer idea of parameters acceptable to them. The Romanians have rejected the voluntary approach, with support from the Dutch.

-- Freer Movement (Basket III): Several separate questions relating to the overall issue of freer movement remain unresolved: introductory language for the human contacts and information sections of Basket III (human contacts), language on travel, audio-visual information

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(broadcasting), working conditions for journalists, libraries/reading rooms, and direct contacts among creative artists. Four out of the five remaining subjects under human contacts and information are presently stalled, due entirely or in part to US-Soviet differences. Our efforts to achieve better texts on the introduction on human contacts, travel, journalists and broadcasting have run up against the Soviets on matters they consider quite sensitive.

-- Final Documents (Basket IV): The EC-9, NATO and most neutrals support a Dutch proposal to include all CSCE resolutions in one overall signed document called "The Final Act" of the Conference. The Soviets indicate that they prefer four separate signed documents, one for each Basket. The Western participants believe that one overall document is the only way to ensure that each Basket has equal status. This promises to be a difficult issue.

-- Peripheral Issues: There are several political issues which, while not central to the CSCE negotiations, could make it difficult to conclude the Conference at an early date. These include Cyprus (with the Greek and Cypriots stating they will not join a consensus on the results of the Conference unless there is clear progress toward resolution of the Cyprus situation, and the Turks threatening to question the credentials of the Cypriot delegation and refusing to accept the presence of Makarios at Stage III) and Mediterranean representation (the Maltese and Yugoslavs might hold out for some role for non-participating Mediterranean states in Stage III). Other international events, in the Middle East for example, or internal developments in participating states (such as Portugal) could also affect the timing of a summit conclusion.

Conclusion

Soviet reluctance to reach reasonable agreements on sensitive subjects, and the general unwillingness to give up important points has slowed Conference progress and will add to negotiating pressures in the weeks to come. However, it is still mechanically feasible for Stage II to be completed about the end of May or mid-June, provided the Soviets make some key concessions and peripheral problems can be kept under control.

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
This status report is for your information. As the Conference works toward a conclusion of Stage II during the next several weeks, I will keep you informed of the substantive developments and the timing of the Stage III summit in Helsinki.

RGates:nw:4/2/75

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APR 1975

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THE COUNSELOR
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

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April 2, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY

FROM: Helmut Sonnenfeldt *HS*

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Dobrynin

You have agreed to receive Dobrynin Thursday, April 3, at 3:30 p.m.

Check List:

-- SALT. You agreed in your meeting with Dobrynin last Saturday to discuss SALT in greater detail at this meeting. Dobrynin raised Backfire, MIRV verification, changes in launcher dimensions, and entirely new types of systems. At Tab A are talking points and background information. [*Done with Lodal*]

-- Soviet Submarine. Dobrynin handed you a note protesting the raising of the Soviet G-class submarine. Talking points for your response and the Soviet note are at Tab B.

-- US/Japanese Space Cooperation. Dobrynin handed you a note raising this issue as contravening efforts to limit strategic arms. The note you approved in response is at Tab C, together with the Soviet note. We recommend that you hand the US response to Dobrynin.

-- Berlin Camera. Dobrynin handed you a note protesting photography of Soviet forces as evidenced by a camera which fell out of a US military aircraft approaching Berlin. The Soviet note and talking points which Hartman has used with Vorontsov are at Tab D.

-- Middle East. Apart from any further discussion of the diplomatic situation--Geneva--you may want to reinforce the protests already conveyed to Vorontsov

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by Sonnenfeldt (3/31) and Hartman (4/2) concerning continued Soviet propaganda intimations of US complicity in the Faysal assassination. The text of the latest Soviet broadcast is at Tab E.

-- Threshold Test Ban Talks. These are on track and we see no reason for you to raise them. A status report is at Tab F.

-- CSCE. A status report is at Tab G.

-- V-E Day Preparations. A status report is at Tab H.

-- McClellan Case. Soviet authorities on March 31 turned down the application of Professor McClellan's wife to emigrate to the U.S. A memorandum recommending that you express your disappointment to Dobrynin is attached at Tab J.

Attachments:

- Tab A - SALT Talking Points & Background Information
- Tab B - Soviet Submarine Talking Points and Soviet Note
- Tab C - Soviet Note on US/Japanese Space Cooperation and Your Approved Response
- Tab D - Soviet Note on Berlin Camera and Talking Points
- Tab E - Text of Soviet Broadcast on Assassination of King Faysal
- Tab F - TTBT Status Report
- Tab G - CSCE Status Report
- Tab H - V-E Day Status Report
- Tab I - Sonnenfeldt-Hyland Memo of March 28, 1975
- Tab J - Hartman Memo on McClellan Case

- Detached for memo of 4/4

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MARCH 1975

Brezhnev's recent letters to the President, and other Western leaders pressing for acceptance of June 30 as a target date for the Helsinki stage III meeting reflect Moscow's growing desire to conclude CSCE by mid-1975. At Geneva, the Soviets have been showing limited flexibility on some key issues--the CBM on notification of maneuvers, in particular--but have made a strenuous effort to eliminate or weaken formulations on "individual contacts" in texts under Baskets 2 and 3 and displayed increasing nervousness over their steadily shrinking timetable. After Easter, Moscow might make sufficient concessions at Geneva to permit conclusion of at least substantive aspects of stage II before the end of May--the 30th anniversary month of VE-Day. If so, Brezhnev's objective of meeting in Helsinki on June 30 might attract increasing support from many conference participants. In our judgment, it still appears more likely, however, that stage II will not be over until about early June. Thus, a more realistic date for convening stage III appears to be mid-July.

Basket 1--Principles and CBMs

On the eve of the Easter recess, tentative agreement was reached on the 9th principle--cooperation among states. Thus, negotiations will soon begin in earnest on the 10th and last principle--fulfillment in good faith of international obligations. We are pleased with the compromise text recently reached with the Soviets on the "peaceful change" issue and hope both Moscow and Bonn will display continuing flexibility in resolving differences over the German language version of this text. Because of firm French views that the peaceful change text should not be provisionally registered until agreement is reached on Quadripartite Rights and responsibilities and on "equal respect" and interpretation of every principle in the context of all the others, the US delegation has refrained from pushing hard for early registration of the peaceful change compromise. The Soviets appear to understand French concerns and have not pressed us on this point.

With regard to "equal respect" of principles, our objective is to concur in any consensus acceptable to our Allies and the Soviets. The French tell us that Moscow can accept a compromise on the basis of paragraph 18 of the Helsinki Final Recommendations, which

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states inter alia that "the participating states will respect and apply the principles equally and unreservedly." Gromyko accepted this approach at the stage I meetings in July 1973, and it would now be helpful to elicit continuing Soviet support for it, as well as for a formulation calling for interpretation of every principle in the context of all the others.

Regarding Quadripartite Rights, we continue to follow Sauvagnargues' lead in defending the Bonn Group formulation of last year that was tabled by France in December for inclusion in the 10th principle. However, we believe that sooner or later this formulation must be either altered to meet concerns of the neutrals, who believe it plays into Moscow's hands by reinforcing the Brezhnev Doctrine, or it must be replaced by a separate disclaimer protecting Allied rights. The Soviets are generally taking a low profile on this question.

The Soviets have recently announced that they would be flexible on parameters for a CBM on notification of military maneuvers, if it were agreed in principle that such a CBM would be "entirely voluntary." The Allied and neutral reaction has been that there is no objection in principle to the idea of voluntariness, provided Moscow can give a clearer picture of parameters it can accept. The Romanians oppose the idea of a voluntary CBM on maneuvers.

Basket 3--Human Contacts

In basket 3, the West has been facing very heavy pressure from the Soviets who are trying to keep their concessions to a minimum. Their attitude has recently provoked a corresponding stubbornness among many Allied and neutral delegations. Meanwhile, we continue to press for "realistic," not minimal, basket 3 results.

Key issues yet to be resolved in basket 3 are: introductory language for the human contacts and information sections; placement of agreed language in the text on right to travel; the radio jamming issue; working conditions for journalists; the French effort to open reading rooms in the USSR; and individual contacts among creative artists.

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APR 1975

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ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 NEA-09 IO-10 ISU-00 CIAE-00 NSAE-00 NSCE-00
 SSO-00 USIE-00 INRE-00 ERDA-05 H-02 INR-07 L-02
 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-03 PRS-01 SAJ-01 SAM-01 SP-02
 SS-15 TRSE-00 NSC-05 ACDA-05 BID-01 STR-04 CIEP-01
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 AMEMBASSY SOFIA
 AMEMBASSY TUNIS
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C O N F I D E N T I A L GENEVA 2532

F.O. 11652: GDS
 TAGS: CSCE, PFOR, PARM, EGEN, FEWT, SGEN, XG
 SUBJECT: CSCE: STAGE II HIGHLIGHTS - APRIL 7-11

S. SUMMARY: THE PACE OF NEGOTIATIONS WAS FACT AND SERIOUS
 THIS WEEK, AS EAST AND WEST BEGAN TO STEP UP THEIR EFFORTS

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TO COMPLETE WORK ON PENDING BUSINESS, AND DOUBTS BEGAN TO BE VOICED AS TO WHETHER IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO COMPLETE STAGE II WORK IN TIME FOR STAGE III THIS SUMMER. CONCRETE PROGRESS WAS LIMITED BUT WORK ON TENTH (AND LAST) PRINCIPLE NEARED COMPLETION AND INFORMAL DISCUSSIONS BEGAN ON QRR SAVING CLAUSE. MILITARY SUBCOMMITTEE VIRTUALLY AGREED TO MOVE AHEAD WITH PARALLEL CONSIDERATION OF SPECIFIC PARAMETERS AND SOVIET IDEA FOR A VOLUNTARY BASIS FOR CBM ON MANEUVERS. IN BASKET III US-SOVIET DIFFERENCES OVER HUMAN CONTACTS INTRODUCTION, WORKING CONDITIONS FOR JOURNALISTS AND BROADCASTING BECAME MORE APPARENT AS SOVIETS PRESSED FOR PROGRESS ON THESE AND CERTAIN OTHER OUTSTANDING ISSUES. END SUMMARY.

2. PRINCIPLES AND THEIR IMPLEMENTATION -- PRINCIPLES SUBCOMMITTEE NEARED COMPLETION OF WORK ON TENTH PRINCIPLE (FULFILLMENT IN GOOD FAITH OF OBLIGATIONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW), WITH QUESTION OF QRR SAVING CLAUSE PUT ASIDE TEMPORARILY FOR PRIVATE DISCUSSION. MEANWHILE FRENCH DELEGATION MET WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF NEUTRALS TO DISCUSS THEIR OBJECTIONS TO QRR LANGUAGE. NEUTRALS HAVE EVIDENTLY REDUCED THEIR DEMANDS FOR CHANGES IN QRR TEXT, AND WAY MAY NOW BE OPEN FOR PROGRESS TOWARD RESOLUTION OF THIS ISSUE. IN SPECIAL WORKING BODY ON IMPLEMENTATION SOVIETS CONTINUED TO RESIST DRAFTING ON PREAMBLE TO ROMANIAN NON-USE OF FORCE PAPER, WHICH THEY SAID WOULD PREJUDICE QUESTION OF WHETHER THIS WILL BE A SEPARATE DOCUMENT.

3. MILITARY SECURITY -- BY THE END OF THE WEEK VIRTUALLY ALL SUBCOMMITTEE REPS HAD AGREED ON PROCEDURAL UNDERSTANDING FOR FURTHER WORK ON MANEUVER LRM, WHICH WAS READ OUT BY AUSTRIAN REP AS FOLLOWS: "THERE WAS A WORKING AGREEMENT TO DEAL, IN PARALLEL, WITH THE PARAMETERS WHICH HAVE BEEN UNDER CONSIDERATION FOR PRIOR NOTIFICATION OF MAJOR MILITARY AMANEUVERS AND THE CONCEPT OF A VOLUNTARY BASIS, BEARING IN MIND THAT THIS CONCEPT AND THE PARAMETERS ARE INTERLINKED". TEXT WAS DESIGNED BY ALLIES TO SHOW LIMITED POSITIVE REACTION ON VOLUNTARY BASIS WITHOUT ACCEPTING IDEA IN PRINCIPLE, AND TO PROCEED TO DRAW SOVIETS OUT ON THEIR PROMISED CONCESSIONS ON PARAMETERS. ROMANIANS

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ENTERED SOLE OBJECTION TO ANY REFERENCE TO VOLUNTARY BASIS, WITH RESULT THAT TEXT COULD NOT BE ENTERED IN RECORD. DESPITE ROMANIAN OBJECTION, SUBCOMMITTEE WILL BEGIN INFORMAL PARALLEL SESSIONS NEXT WEEK, AND ALLIES WILL PROBE FURTHER FOR SOVIET FLEXIBILITY, PARTICULARLY ON POINT OF PRINCIPLE THAT MANEUVER CBM SHOULD APPLY IN ALL OF EUROPE, WITH EXCEPTION FOR PORTIONS OF TERRITORY OF EUROPEAN COUNTRIES BORDERING OTHER CONTINENTS (I.E., USSR AND TURKEY).

4. ECONOMICS AND SCIENCE/TECHNOLOGY -- FULL COMMITTEE CONTINUED DISCUSSION OF PARAGRAPH ON LDC'S BUT MADE LITTLE HEADWAY. SUBCOMMITTEE ON COMMERCIAL EXCHANGES CAME NEAR TO AGREEMENT ON INTRODUCTION TO PARAGRAPH ON DOUBLE TAXATION AND REPATRIATION OF CAPITAL, ONE OF ITS FEW REMAINING ISSUES. SUBCOMMITTEE ON OTHER ECONOMIC AREAS FINALIZED ITS RESOLUTION ON TRANSPORTATION BY REMOVING ALL BRACKETS AFTER AGREEING ON TWO PENDING PARAGRAPHS. THIS SUBCOMMITTEE HAS NOW COMPLETED TWO OF ITS FOUR RESOLUTIONS -- TOURISM AND TRANSPORTATION -- AND HAS TWO MORE -- MIGRANT LABOR AND TRAINING OF PROFESSIONAL STAFF -- STILL TO BE FINISHED. LAST TWO PAPERS ARE EACH ONE PARAGRAPH SHORT OF COMPLETION.

5. HUMANITARIAN COOPERATION -- IN HUMAN CONTACTS SUBCOMMITTEE, SOVIETS SEEMED SOMEWHAT IMPATIENT, EXPRESSING ANNOYANCE AT THE FAILURE TO REGISTER THE TOURISM TEXT, WHICH EC-NINE WISH TO PUT ASIDE UNTIL THE QUESTION OF TITLES AND SUBTITLES IN BASKET III DOCUMENT IS RESOLVED. SOVIETS HAVE PROPOSED THAT SUBCOMMITTEE SEEK TO REMOVE BRACKETS IN TEXTS ALREADY REGISTERED, WHILE INFORMAL DISCUSSIONS CONTINUE ON OUTSTANDING TEXTS, AND SAID THEY WOULD NOT OBJECT TO AN FRG SUGGESTION THAT THE SUBCOMMITTEE ALSO TAKE UP THE ORGANIZATION OF THE FINAL TEXTS. INFORMAL DISCUSSION OF THE TRAVEL TEXT WAS MOVED FORWARD BY AGREEMENT TO CONSIDER ALL FIVE PARAGRAPHS IN PARALLEL AND BY SOVIET WILLINGNESS TO DROP REFERENCES TO WORKERS AND TRADE UNIONS. THERE WAS NO PROGRESS ON INTRODUCTORY TEXT, WHICH REMAINS STUCK. IN INFORMATION INFORMAL MEETINGS WERE HELD ON INTRODUCTORY TEXT AND WORKING CONDITIONS FOR JOURNALISTS, WITH NO CONCRETE PROGRESS. IN SUBCOMMITTEE ON CULTURE, EAST/WEST

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STALEMATE CONTINUED, AND EC-NINE BEGAN CONSIDERATION OF FRENCH PROPOSALS DESIGNED BREAK IMPASSE ON KEY ISSUES OF IMPORTANCE TO WEST. IN EDUCATION SUBCOMMITTEE, LIMITED PROGRESS WAS ACHIEVED ON RELATIVELY NON-CONTROVERSIAL TEXTS CONCERNING EXCHANGES OF EXPERIENCE IN TEACHING METHODS. MEANWHILE, FRENCH DELEGATION INITIATED INFORMAL TALKS WITH SOVIETS IN RENEWED EFFORT TO AGREE ON WESTERN PROPOSAL FOR CONTACTS AMONG EDUCATORS AND ON CONTROVERSIAL USSR TEXT CONCERNING CONTENT OF TEXTBOOKS.

6. MEDITERRANEAN -- WORKING GROUP HELD INFORMAL DISCUSSION OF THREE PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPHS WHICH RESULTED FROM CONSULTATIONS AMONG DELEGATIONS WHICH SPONSORED DRAFTS FOR MEDITERRANEAN DECLARATION. AGREEMENT ON THESE PARAS WOULD LEAVE ONLY ONE, OR POSSIBLY TWO, PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPHS TO BE DRAFTED TO COMPLETE SUBSTANTIVE WORK ON MEDITERRANEAN DECLARATION.

7. FINAL DOCUMENTS AND STAGE III -- NEWLY ESTABLISHED WORKING GROUP ON STAGE III HEARD FINNISH PRESENTATION ON TECHNICAL PREPARATIONS FOR STAGE III, AND RECEIVED ADDITIONAL VIEWS ON LIST OF ISSUES RELATING TO STAGE III WHICH SHOULD BE RESOLVED BEFORE THE END OF THE STAGE II NEGOTIATIONS.

8. FOLLOW-UP -- SWISS DELEGATION PRESENTED COMPOSITE DRAFT FOR FIRST ELEMENT OF OPERATIVE PART OF FOLLOW-UP RESOLUTION, AS A BASIS FOR FURTHER WORK, BUT FRENCH AND BELGIAN DELS STRONGLY RESISTED EFFORTS TO MOVE DISCUSSION FORWARD ON THIS SUBJECT, AND PROGRESS WILL PROBABLY BE SLOW, AT LEAST FOR THE TIME BEING.

9. COMMENT: ALTHOUGH CONCRETE PROGRESS WAS LIMITED THIS WEEK MANY ISSUES MOVED TOWARD POSITIONS WHICH WILL FACILITATE THEIR RESOLUTION. THIS WAS TRUE PARTICULARLY IN THE CASE OF THE PRINCIPLES AND CBMS, WHERE THE GENERAL LINES OF EVENTUAL AGREEMENT ARE BECOMING CLEARER. THE SOVIETS, WHO CONTINUE TO EXHIBIT CERTAIN INDICATIONS THAT THEY ARE GROWING ANXIOUS UNDER THEIR SELF-IMPOSED DEADLINE, ARE NOW MOVING MORE ACTIVELY AND OPENLY TO PRESS FOR CONCLUSION OF WORK IN BASKET III. NEVERTHE-

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
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LESS, THEY HAVE MAINTAINED THEIR STURBORN RESISTENCE TO EVEN MINOR CONCESSIONS ON SUBSTANCE, AS WELL AS THEIR CONVOLUTED NEGOTIATING TACTICS. DESPITE A GENERAL WILL ON THE PART OF WESTERN AND NEUTRAL DELEGATIONS TO FINISH THE STAGE II NEGOTIATIONS, THIS CONTINUED SOVIET OBSTINENCE HAS RESULTED IN THE FIRST INFORMAL EXPRESSIONS OF DOUBT BY DELEGATES HERE THAT SUBSTANTIVE WORK CAN BE FINISHED IN TIME FOR A STAGE III CONCLUSION THIS SUMMER. THESE DOUBTS APPLY TO WORK ON THE PRINCIPLES, CBMS, AND BASKET III, BUT ALSO RELATE TO NEWLY OPENED ISSUES SUCH AS THE ORGANIZATION OF THE FINAL DOCUMENTS, AND TO PERIPHERAL MATTERS LIKE CYPRUS WHICH COULD DELAY PROGRESS. MEANWHILE, NATO ALLIES AND NEUTRALS HAVE SHOWN APPRECIATION FOR THE FIRM LINE TAKEN BY US ON SEVERAL SPECIFIC ISSUES IN BASKET III. END COMMENT.
ABRAMS

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Briefing Item

Soviet Policy After CSCE: Ambassador Stoessel has offered his views on what actions the Soviets may take following the CSCE summit. He expects the Soviets to use the summit as a springboard for advertising the triumphs of their detente policy, for devoting new emphasis to arms control (including SALT and MBFR, but also including a world disarmament conference and other unhelpful initiatives), for convening a European communist conference, for increasing their presence in Western Europe, and for pressing their idea of an Asian collective security system. While the Ambassador believes that Basket III is a clear, if modest, asset for the West, he suspects that one immediate result of the Helsinki Summit will be an ideological tightening up in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union.

In terms of the Soviet leadership, a CSCE summit will be viewed as a major plus for Brezhnev and his policies. From a Western point of view, the ending of CSCE will remove an element of Western leverage on Soviet behavior. The Ambassador thinks that there are enough additional moderating factors to keep the Soviets after Helsinki from a qualitative increase in their efforts to exploit Western weaknesses. In any case -- short of a rapid Portuguese collapse into communist dictatorship, which he assumes would make a CSCE third stage academic -- he does not think the West would gain by delaying a CSCE conclusion, since Western leverage

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would soon reach a point of diminishing returns. It seems likely that, at the Helsinki finale, the West will come out with more, and the Soviets less, than either side expected when the Warsaw Pact leaders renewed their call for a conference in 1969. But, while the Soviets will make more of it, CSCE should be a plus for both sides and a further step toward consolidating a Soviet detente policy, important elements of which remain in the overall U.S. and Western interest.

(RGates:4/29/75)

(Moscow 05822)

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