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SPECIAL FOLDER
TOP SECRET

N° St-109/31gs of 8.1.1974

DECREE
of the Secretariat of the CC CPSU

An Appeal to the Leaders of the PDPA Groups "Parcham" and "Khalq"

1. Approve the text of an appeal to the leaders of the "Parcham" and "Khalq" groups and send it to Kabul through USSR Council of Ministers KGB channels (attached).

2. Brief the Soviet ambassador to Afghanistan with the text of the appeal.

[illegible signature]

Results of the voting:

[7 illegible signatures, all recorded as voting "for"]

[At the bottom of the page: "Excerpts send to Cdes. Andropov and Ponomarev"; below, "To Cde. B. N. Ponomarev, 15.5.78 (instructions to Cde. K. M. Bogolyubov); date to the left: "3.1.1974"; at the end: "Distributed: 8.1.1974. Khalturina"]

[Translator's note: the last 8-10 letters of each column of the reproduction of the two pages of the next document were cut off; I have placed an "XM" where the spelling of the complete word cannot be assumed.]

KABUL

Meet with K. Babrak and N. M. Taraki and give the following [to them] separately.

" In Moscow they regard with deep alarm the reports coming from Kabul about the continuing mutual fighting between the leadership of "Parcham" and "Khalq". This internal strife [XM] unfortunately and its prolonged nature are leading to a weakening of both [sides], and is introducing a split in the ranks of the progressive forces and the democratic [movement] as a whole.

The situation which has been created can gladden only the domestic [and] foreign enemies of the Republic of Afghanistan, who are organizing [XM] plots, sabotage, and other malicious [XM], and trying to restore previous regimes. In this [regard] complex situation all progressive forces guided by the interests of the country and the people should throw aside [XM] and combine their efforts at giving comprehensive aid to the republican regime, strengthening its social base, [XM] repel domestic and foreign reactionaries. Only joint [XM] of all progressive and patriotic forces can [bring] success in this crucial period for Afghanistan".

Brief the Soviet ambassador in Afghanistan with the text of this appeal.

Report when this has been carried out.

2vzh

[illegible signature]

CC CPSU

An Appeal to the Leaders of the PDPA Groups "Parcham" and "Khalq"

In connection with the CC CPSU Decree [XM] 1973 the CC CPSU International Department together with [XM] USSR Council of Ministers has been entrusted with sending the leaders of the PDPA "Parcham" ["Banner"] Karmal Babrak and "Khalq" ("The People"), Nur Mohammed [Taraki] an appeal with a call to concentrate their efforts on [XM] support to the government in strengthening the social [base] of [XM] regime and fighting reactionary forces.

A draft of the appeal to K. Babrak and N. M. Taraki [XM].

It has been coordinated with the USSR Council of Ministers KGB (Cde. F. K. Mortin).

It would be advisable to brief the text of the appeal to [the Soviet ambassador in] Afghanistan.

A draft CC CPSU decree is attached.

Deputy Chief of the CC CPSU International Department
[illegible signature]

2 January 1974
N° 25-S-2

2nd Sector
Subject to return to the
CC CPSU General Department]

CC CPSU

Information for the Leaders of the Progressive Afghan Political Organizations
"Parcham" and "Khalq" Concerning the Results of the Visit of Mohammed Daud
to the USSR

The leaders of the progressive political organizations of Afghanistan Karmal Babrak ("Parcham") and Nur Taraki ("Khalq"), who maintain unofficial contact with the CC CPSU via the USSR Council of Ministers KGB Resident in Kabul, soon after the establishment of the republican regime in the country in July 1973, using the progressively minded elements in the CC of the Republic, the government, and the army, have been carrying on internecine fighting to strengthen the positions and influence of their groups and for the right to "represent the Communist Party" in the country. At the same time they, like the pro-Chinese and nationalist groups, have organized active political work in the army and government bureaucracy, which has aroused the serious concern of the head of state and Prime Minister of the Republic of Afghanistan, Mohammed Daud.

M. Daud is specially concerned about information given him by security agencies of plans supposedly hatched by leftist forces to remove him from power if he does not embark on accelerating social and economic reforms and start Afghanistan in the direction of non-capitalist and eventual socialist path of development.

In February and March of 1974 M. Daud carried out a series of measures directed at suppressing progressive forces and forbidding "Parcham" and "Khalq" from political activity.

In January 1974 a recommendation (ST 109/31-gs of 8.1.1974) was given K. Babrak and N. Taraki about the need to cease internecine fighting, unite both groups in a single party, and concentrate their combined efforts on comprehensive support of the republican regime in the country.

It would be advisable to again state this recommendation to them; it could be included in the information about the recent visit of M. Daud to the Soviet Union. The Soviet ambassador in Kabul ought to be apprised of the information.

A draft CC CPSU decree is attached.

Deputy Chief of the CC CPSU
International Department

[signature]
R. Ul'yanovskiy

21 June 1974

N° 25-S-1183

DECREE
OF THE CC CPSU SECRETARIAT

Information for the Leaders of the Progressive Afghan Political Organizations
"Parcham" and "Khalq" Concerning the Results of the Visit of Mohammed Daud
to the USSR

[Handwritten before the text: "(Cdes. Suslov, Kirilenko, and Ponomarev)"]

1. Approve the text of a telegram containing information for the leaders of the Afghan progressive political organizations "Parcham" (K. Babrak) and "Khalq" (H. Taraki) concerning the results of the visit of M. Daud to the USSR and send it through KGB channels to Kabul to give to the addressees (attached).

2. Brief the text to the Soviet ambassador in Kabul.

[two illegible signatures]

Results of the voting:

Adopted at the CC Secretariat meeting of 26.6.1974, pr. 129, p. 11s

CC Secretaries	Cde. M. A. Suslov	- for
	Cde. V. I. Dolgikh	- for
	Cde. I. V. Kapitonov	- for
	Cde. K. F. Katushev	- for
	Cde. A. P. Kirilenko	- for
	Cde. F. D. Kulakov	- for
	Cde. B. N. Ponomarev	- for
	Cde. D. F. Ustinov	- for
	Cde. A. Ya. Pel'she	- for

[handwritten: A. [illegible]]

[faded CC stamp]

149 Excerpts to Cdes. Andropov and Ponomarev
15.5.78 [SIC] to Cde. B. N. Ponomarev (instructions to Cde. K. [M.]
Bogolyubov)
21.6.1974

Distributed: 27.6.1974 Khalturina

SPECIAL FOLDER

Top Secret

Attachment

[handwritten:] to point 11s, [[illegible]] 129]
by KGB cipher

KABUL

TO THE KGB REZIDENT

When you next meet K. Babrak and N. Taraki give them the following, referring to an assignment.

"In Moscow the results of the official friendly visit to the Soviet Union of the head of state and Prime Minister of the Republic of Afghanistan, Mohammed Daud, are being highly praised and are recorded in a joint Soviet-Afghan announcement published in the USSR and Afghanistan. It expressed confidence that this visit will make a great contribution to strengthening the relations of friendship and fruitful cooperation between our countries. The fact that the leader of republican Afghanistan paid his first visit abroad to Moscow, his northern neighbor, was noted with great satisfaction.

The direct participation of CC CPSU General Secretary L. I. Brezhnev, Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet N. V. Podgorny, and Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers A. N. Kosygin in the talks with M. Daud and other Afghan government leaders, which were held in an atmosphere of cordiality, mutual understanding, and a high level of trust, was evidence of the great attention which Soviet leaders pay to the strengthening and expansion of friendly, good neighborly relations with the Republic of Afghanistan and raising these relations to a new, higher level.

A broad range of issues of bilateral relations and the international situation were discussed in the course of the talks.

The Soviet leaders, responding to the wishes of the Afghan side, announced that the Soviet Union, as before, will assist their southern neighbor in implementing the plans of the republican government directed at a further expansion and development of the national economy, and an increase in the prosperity and culture of the Afghan people. Agreement was achieved on a broad range of issues of bilateral cooperation raised by the Afghan side.

A commonality or closeness of the views of both sides on many of the most important issues was recognized when discussing international issues which Soviet leaders and the head of the Republic of Afghanistan noted with satisfaction.

It can be confidently stated that the results of the official friendly visit of M. Daud to the Soviet Union will exert a favorable influence on the further

development and strengthening of the close friendship and fruitful cooperation between our two countries for the good of the Soviet and Afghan peoples and in the interests of world peace.

The expansion and strengthening of friendly Soviet-Afghan relations based on the principles of equality, mutual respect for sovereignty and independence, and non-interference in the internal affairs of one another will doubtless facilitate a further strengthening of the republican regime which was established in July of last year in Afghanistan. This will also aid the desire of the Afghan people and the leadership of the Republic to carry out social and economic reforms whose time has come and advance the country on the path of peace, creativity, and national and social progress.

It goes without saying that the tasks standing before the Republic of Afghanistan are very great and quite complex. "But they, as experience has shown, can be successfully solved", declared the Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, N. V. Podgorny, on 5 June 1974 in a speech at a breakfast in the Kremlin in honor of M. Daud, "when the chosen course is firmly followed, and the broad masses are involved in the building of a new life, when forces which are genuinely interested in strengthening the new order operate actively and in solidarity".

Tasks of enormous importance stand in front of the progressive forces of Afghanistan who are objectively loyal and reliable supporters of the republican regime. In conditions of constant struggle [against] domestic and foreign reactionaries who are trying to restore old regimes, the leaders of progressive organizations should cast present differences aside, since a continuation of internecine fighting among them only weakens them and essentially provides grist for the mill of reactionary forces.

The consolidation of the forces now joined in "Parcham" and "Khalq" in order to defend the interests of workers, peasants, and all the working sections of Afghan society based on cooperation with the republican regime and the government of the Republic headed by Mohammed Daud would be in accord with the interests of strengthening the national independence of the country".

Acquaint the Soviet ambassador with the text of this telegram.

Report when this is done.

SPECIAL FOLDER
Top Secret
[Stamp: CC CPSU
1796
2June1974

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N. I. Marchuk "Neob'yaviennaya voyna v Afganistane : ofitsial'naya versiya i uroki pravdy" Moscow "Luch", 1993, p. 80 RTsKhDS CC CPSU Special Folder d. 3, t. 2, l. 193

from "The Delivery of Special Equipment to the DRA", CC CPSU Politburo meeting of 21 April 1978 [SIC]

The Soviet government has granted this request and has found it possible to deliver to Afghanistan free of charge 45 BTR-65 PB armored personnel carriers with ammunition; 26 combat radios for border troops; 10,000 Kalashnikov rifles (AK); and 5,000 Makarov pistols (PM) with ammunition, totalling about 6.3 million rubles.

**Minutes from Conversation between Babrak Karmal and the Head of the
Diplomatic Protocol Tucek**

12 September 1978

Babrak Karmal visited the head of the diplomatic protocol on 11 September at 3 P.M. He introduced the discussion by stating that he had been informed that his diplomatic activities in Czechoslovakia were at an end. The head of the diplomatic protocol replied that the Foreign Ministry had learned news to this effect through the Czechoslovak Embassy in Kabul.

Karmal said that he realized that, officially, his function in Czechoslovakia was over, but that as a member of his Party's leadership, he would like to meet with Comrade Bifak and inform him of the situation in his country as well as his own situation. Karmal also declared that he would not return to his homeland under the present circumstances, but that he had no desire to move to any capitalist country. He stated his intention to ask for political asylum in Czechoslovakia.

When Karmal asked what his status in Czechoslovakia was after he ceased to be the ambassador, the head of the diplomatic protocol replied that as an Afghan citizen, he was under the care and protection of the Afghan Embassy.

Source: Central State Archive, Archive of the CC CPCz, file Husak, unsorted materials, box Afghanistan. Provided by Oldrich Tuma.

Memorandum of conversation between the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Dusan Spacil and Soviet Ambassador Novikov written by Spacil

12 September 1978

On 11 September 1978, I informed Comrade Novikov, who monitors problems among diplomats, at a gathering at the Chinese Embassy of the situation that resulted on account of the recalling of the Afghan ambassador Babrak Karmal. Comrade Novikov then had a long discussion with Karmal and his report is as follows:

Karmal had requested an audience with Comrade Mackevitch in order to resolve his personal situation. Comrade Novikov replied that Mackevitch was terribly busy and that he (Novikov) would be of assistance. Karmal said that he was at a loss as to what to do. The Afghan leadership had recalled him from the post of ambassador. He cannot return to Afghanistan because he would be arrested, perhaps even executed. He also doesn't wish to return to Afghanistan because his return as well as that of other PARCHAM comrades scattered throughout the world could result in great social disturbances and an eventual uprising against Taraki, who is losing the support of the people. Under no circumstances does Karmal wish to leave Czechoslovakia for some capitalist country because that would be used by imperialist countries against the revolution in Afghanistan. At the same time, he is aware that he cannot remain in Czechoslovakia. Not long ago, a relative contacted Karmal, also a Parchamist and a leading Party member who had served as ambassador to Pakistan and informed Karmal of his request for asylum in Yugoslavia. Karmal considers even this solution to be problematic. Therefore, he had sent forth his request for assistance to Novikov and he is waiting for a recommendation from his "older brother" as to what to do. Comrade Novikov informed me that he will immediately pass on this information to Moscow. I told Comrade Novikov that our Communist Party representative had already informed Moscow about the situation and looked forward to the disclosure of Moscow's position.

Comment:

The head of the diplomatic protocol, Comrade Tuček, spoke with Karmal that very day and stated that, according to Kabul, Karmal is no longer the ambassador. Despite this, Karmal showed up at a cocktail party hosted by the Chinese ambassador. It remains unclear whether he came in order to meet someone or whether he is not considering departing for China.

Source: Central State Archive, Archive of the CC CPCz, file Husak, unsorted materials, box Afghanistan. Provided by Oldrich Tuma.

**Dispatch from the Head of the CC CPCz Department of International Policy M.
Stefanak to the Czechoslovak Embassy in Kabul**

28 September 1978

Comrade Kouba

Foreign Ministry-Kabul

Visit the Afghan representative and inform him that Babrak Karmal was accepted in Czechoslovakia as the ambassador of a friendly country. While in office, Karmal asked for permission to undergo treatment. This request was granted and treatment was administered. It became evident that Karmal suffers from heart problems, which require long-term treatment. After the Afghan Government's decision to recall Karmal, he asked that his treatment be continued. In consideration of his poor health, we could not refuse Karmal's request. He stated later that he cannot return to Afghanistan. He has not requested asylum. He is in Czechoslovakia for necessary treatment. We believe that a stay for treatment in a socialist country is more appropriate than in a Western or other country because his activities can be better controlled.

M. ŠTEFAŇAK

Source: Central State Archive, Archive of the CC CPCz, file Husak, unsorted materials, box Afghanistan. Provided by Oldrich Tuma.

**Telegram from the Czechoslovak Ambassador in Kabul, Karmelita, to Prague
about his conversation with Taraki.**

4 October 1978

Telegram from Kabul
Arrived: 4.10.78 at 10AM
4.10.78 at 12:15PM

#059.236

Lightning

To your 072 516

I was received today, 4 October, by the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the People's Democratic Party, Nur Mohamad Taraki, whom I informed of the contents of the depeche mentioned above. He listened to the information attentively and calmly. He said that Karmal's illness was fictitious and that he should be returned as a warrant had been issued for his arrest.

Taraki said in a somewhat unpleasant tone that Czechoslovakia is an independent country, which can act on the basis of its own judgment. He added that he had expected a different reply. Finally, Taraki requested that we convey the information in writing to the prime minister and the foreign minister, Hafizullah Amin.

In case you concur that we should indeed make this confirmation, send the text in English.

In contrast to previous times, the parting of ways was rather terse. (Ka)

Karmelita 0354

Source: Central State Archive, Archive of the CC CPCz, file Husak, unsorted materials, box Afghanistan. Provided by Oldrich Tuma.

Soviet communication to the Hungarian leadership on the situation in Afghanistan

17 October, 1978

TOP SECRET!

Budapest, 17 Oct. 1978

BULLETIN

On 16 October 1978, Comrade András Gyenes received Comrade Vladimir Pavlov, the Soviet Union's ambassador to Hungary at his request, who gave the following oral information in the name of the CPSU Central Committee:

" On behalf of the CPSU Central Committee, between 25 and 27 September this year, B. N. Ponomaryov, the candidate member of the CPSU CC Political Committee, the secretary of the CC, stayed in Kabul to carry on talks with the leaders of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan and the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan about some topical questions concerning the political situation of the country and the Soviet-Afghan relations. He met Noor Mohammad Taraki, the secretary-general of the PDPA, the president of the Revolutionary Council and Hafizullah Amin, the secretary of the PDPA, vice-premier and minister of foreign affairs.

The main purpose of the trip was to prevent those tremendous mass reprisals that, after the Afghan revolution, were aimed also against the Parcham group participating in overthrowing the despotic system.

During the talks we placed special emphasis on these unjustified reprisals. In connection with this, we pointed at the fact that we did so because we had brotherly scruples about the question of the Afghan revolution, the more so since some aspects of the development of events in Afghanistan might affect the Soviet Union and the CPSU as well.

After being the first to recognize the new system in Afghanistan, the Soviet Union expressed her solidarity with her before the whole world. This point of view was newly confirmed at high level in L. I. Brezhnev's speech given in Baku. It is widely known that we provide extensive support and aid to the new power. Under such circumstances, both within Afghanistan and outside of her borders, hostile propaganda is aimed at showing that any development of events within Afghanistan, especially their negative aspects are directly or indirectly related to the Soviet Union.

We drew the Afghan leadership's attention to the fact that reprisals had reached a mass-like character in the past period, they were carried out without complying with the law, and not only against the class enemies of the new system /"Muslim brothers", the supporters of the monarchy, etc./ but against people who could also be used in the interests of the revolution. This caused dissatisfaction among the inhabitants, undermined the prestige of the revolutionary leadership and would lead to the weakening of the new system.

Our opinion was listened to with great attention but noticeable tension. Without questioning it directly, the Afghan leaders tried to justify their politics with the anti-governmental activity of Parchamists. /Parchamists are the members of the Parcham group, which was united with the Khalq group into one party in 1977./

"We - said Taraki - had no confidence in Parcham even before the revolution, the union with them was only formalistic. In reality they did not participate in the armed uprising. But after the revolution, the leader of the Parchamists, B. Karmal demanded that the leading posts in ministries and other organizations should be divided equally. He strove to assume a leading role in party-building. He stated, "The army is in your hands, give us the party matters". Besides - when we rejected his demands -, he threatened us with breaking out an uprising. We had only one alternative in this situation: either them or us".

Besides this, N. Taraki tried to prove that the measures taken against the "Parcham" leaders did not have a negative influence on the masses. The people of Afghanistan support the new system and the PDPA Khalq leadership. The leaders of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan and the government of the Democratic Republic and of the Revolutionary Council - said Taraki - completely understand the worries of the CPSU CC, but they guarantee that the latest events in the country will not disturb the further development of the Afghan revolution and the consolidation of the people's democratic system.

We paid special attention to the questions of party-building, the work of the People's Democratic Party, the direction of the country and the masses. We emphasized the necessity of setting up and strengthening the party on the whole territory of the country, the normalization of the work of the higher and lower level party organizations without delay, setting up the power organs of the people and the need for an increase in attention paid to economic issues. The masses must experience in their own lives the real achievements of the revolution. Therefore the improvement of people's lives must be a first rank problem of the new power.

Consistently we moved into the foreground the idea that the main tasks were strengthening the people's democratic system, the well-balanced and flexible policy, which would isolate the counter-revolution from the people and deprive it of the opportunity to ill-use the backwardness of the masses. For the short period of time following the creation of the new system, important measures had been taken to the benefit of the people. At the same time the immense creative possibilities of the Afghan revolution had to be discovered to a greater extent and should be put to practice.

During the meetings, the Afghan party mentioned briefly the question of the relations between Afghanistan and the imperialist countries. Imperialism - said Taraki - puts many hurdles in our way, among others, "soft" methods. The West and the Americans unequivocally strive to divert us from the path chosen with economic help. At present, we do not intend to deteriorate our relations with the West, although we understand that their offers are not unselfish at all. From Soviet side, we have underlined we must not allow the West to trap us.

With reference to the Chinese question, N. Taraki, by all means, disapproved of the Maoist leadership and their activity, remarking that the leaders of China allied themselves to the enemies of communism. The People's Democratic Party has cleared the army and the state apparatus of the Maoist elements.

The meetings with Taraki and Amin made the impression that the persecution of Parchamists was mainly motivated by a fight for position and personal antipathy. At the same

time, it was clear that the Afghan leadership did not fully understand the negative influence of reprisals on the general situation of the country and the mood of the army and the party.

The talks were carried on in comradely atmosphere. The, on the whole, warm welcome, the attention devoted to the position of the CPSU CC, the readiness to discuss even the most delicate questions with us witnessed of the fact that they considered the friendship with the Soviet Union and the socialist countries to be of great importance. Taraki requested us to deliver to the CPSU Central Committee: Afghanistan will always be on the Soviet Union's side together with the socialist countries.

The CPSU Central Committee thinks that, during their further activities, the Afghans will consider our opinion, although - naturally - only the future will tell. Based on our information, repressive actions are being relaxed, and the process of the partial rehabilitation of the leaders of the Parcham group has started."

Budapest, 17 October 1978

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N° ST-134/16gs of 15.11.1978

TOP SECRET
Special Folder

DECREE
of the CC CPSU Secretariat

Concerning an appeal to the Czechoslovak Communist Party about K. Babrak

Approve the text of a telegram to the Soviet Ambassador to the ChSSR
(attached).

[Mostly illegible signatures and coordination entries follow]

[CC CPSU letterhead]

N° St-134/16gs
of 15.11.1978

Excerpt from Minutes N° 134 § 16gs CC Secretariat

Concerning an appeal to the Czechoslovak Communist Party about K. Babrak

Approve the text of the telegram to the Soviet ambassador to the ChSSR
(attached).

CC SECRETARY

Sent to: Cdes. Gromyko, Ponomarev

Top Secret
Attachment
to point 16gs of N 134

PRAGUE

SOVIET AMBASSADOR

Meet with the Chief of the CC CPC [Communist Party of Czechoslovakia]
International Policy Department and, referring to the instructions of the CC
CPSU, inform [him] of the following.

The former ambassador of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan in Prague, Babrak Karmal, who is in the CSSR is doing certain work among Afghans abroad both in socialist and in capitalist countries. His efforts are concentrated on establishing ties with Parchamists (members of the "Parcham" group headed by K. Babrak), an organized consolidation of them on a platform against the current regime in Afghanistan, against the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) and the DRA government. He is also trying to establish ties with his supporters in Afghanistan working in the PDPA, the Afghan army, in government institutions, and other organizations for this purpose.

Similar activity by K. Babrak has become known to the Afghan leadership and is causing a negative reaction. It puts those who offer him hospitality and Soviet comrades in a false and difficult position before the current revolutionary regime in Afghanistan.

Activity directed at weakening the ruling party in Afghanistan, the PDPA, and undermining its efforts to build a new Afghanistan can be viewed as mistaken and bringing only harm to Afghanistan.

According to available information, repression against Parchamists have stopped who are loyal to the regime and who work honestly in government institutions and families of Parchamists are not subjected to persecution. K. Babrak ought to consider these circumstances and draw the correct conclusions from this: he is not to participate in anti-government activity and is not to incite his supporters to the same.

[scribbled signature, probably R. Ul'yanovskiy]

2lf

Top Secret

CC CPSU

Concerning the appeal to the Czechoslovak Communist Party about K. Babrak

The USSR Committee of State Security Resident in Kabul informs [us] that the former Ambassador of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan in Prague, Karmal Babrak, whom the Czech comrades have given political asylum after he was removed from the post of DRA ambassador and he refused to return to his homeland, is conducting work among Parchamists (members of the "Parcham" group headed by K. Babrak) located abroad (in capitalist and socialist countries) and in Afghanistan, to consolidate them to combat the current regime in Afghanistan, against the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA)

and the DRA government (cipher telegram from Kabul, spets. N° 1537 of 25.10.1978).

We consider it advisable to appeal to the CC CPC with a proposal to hold a conversation with K. Babrak about the need to cease activity by him which is hostile to the ruling regime in Afghanistan.

A draft CC CPSU resolution is attached.

Deputy Chief of the CC CPSU
International Department

[signature]
R. Ul'yanovskiy

9 November 1978
N° 25-S-2175

INFORMATION

about the visit of the Afghan party and state delegation, headed by the Secretary General of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), chairman of the Revolutionary Board and Prime Minister of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, Nur Mohamed Tarakhi to the USSR

[Source: Diplomatic Archive, Sofia, Opis 35, File 335]

In the period December 4th - 7th the Afghan party and state delegation, headed by Nur Mohamed Taraki visited the Soviet Union.

The delegation included many of the members of the politburo of the Central Committee - Hafizula Amin, Shah Vali, and comrade Suma, the ministers of industry, agriculture, energy and communications, deputy-ministers of commerce, culture and housing.

To meet Nur Mohamed Tarakhi's desire, the delegation visited only Moscow.

Top-level talks were held at two of the meetings. The Soviet party was represented by comrades Brezhnev, Kossygin, Gromiko, Ponamarev.

Twenty-four meetings took place between the Afghan delegation and the top-level Soviet party and state leaders.

Hafizula Amin met the following comrades: Kossygin, Gromiko, Andropov, marshal Agorkov and Sholokov.

[...]

The visit was initiated by the Afghan party.

Its objectives were:

1. To make face-to-face contacts with the Soviet Union's party and state leaders;
2. To specify the major trends of the development of the cooperation between the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan and the Soviet Union;
3. To share opinions on the most topical issues of international affairs.

This is Brezhnev's official statement on behalf of the Soviet delegation:

"With the coming to power of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, and the progressive socioeconomic policies to the benefit of working people is an event of historical importance for Afghanistan. We are sincerely happy that the Afghan people have succeeded in defending the revolution and the revolutionary achievements from all internal and international predators within such a short period." Comrade Brezhnev pointed out that the relations between the Soviet Union and the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan were assuming a completely different nature. These relations are now based on class belonging; they are imbued with the spirit of friendship and revolutionary solidarity.

Comrade Brezhnev assured Tarakhi and all delegation members of the assistance and support they can firmly rely on; all activity towards the revolutionary transformation of the Afghan society will be backed up.

Mr Tarakhi pointed out that the Afghani party attached prime importance to their visit to the Soviet Union. All talks and meetings will contribute to the strengthening of the revolutionary regime in Afghanistan; they will enhance the support from within the country and abroad.

In its domestic policy PDPA has adopted a program of radical revolutionary socio-economic reforms to the benefit of the working class; these reforms will help abolish any remains of feudalism and semi-feudal social relations; they will provide for the non-capitalist development of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan and the building up of a society free from exploitation, based upon the progressive ideology of the working class and scientifically-grounded socialism. Here is what Tarakhi emphasized about foreign policy: "The Democratic Republic of Afghanistan has been conducting a policy targeted at strengthening the brotherly relations with the socialist countries; this policy is also aimed at non-alignment as a form of struggle against imperialism and colonialism, protecting world peace, favoring détente and disarmament, and providing support for the national liberation movements.

A joint communiqué emphasizes the policies adopted by the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan; this policy was outlined in Tarakhi's speech at the dinner given by the CC of the CPSU, the Supreme Council of the USSR and the Soviet government.

An important result of the visit of the Afghan party and state delegation to the Soviet Union was signing the Treaty on the establishment of friendly relations and close cooperation between the two neighboring countries.

The latter was drawn up upon the Afghani party's initiative.

Both parties pointed out that this treaty was of considerable political significance in terms of strengthening the relations between the two countries, and supporting peace and security throughout the world. This treaty enhances Afghanistan's image and authority in international affairs; it guarantees its national independence, territorial integrity and security. This treaty will have an impact on all opponents of the revolutionary regime in Afghanistan and prevents their action towards undermining the revolutionary process. The documents agreed upon state the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan's initiative to

set up the movement of non-aligned countries; at present, since the April Revolution the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan has adopted the correct stance on many of the movement's major issues. Together with the Republic of Korea, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, and other progressive member-countries, the movement will contribute to the consolidation of the anti-imperialist positions.

Tarakhi informed the Soviet comrades of the anti-Afghanistan action taken from the territory of Pakistan. He pointed out that the two countries had different attitudes towards the pushtuns and the beludzuns.

The Soviet leaders, Brezhnev and Kossygin stressed that it was inappropriate to take any measures. Such measures would provoke anti-revolutionary action by both internal reactionary forces and external enemies; thus the situation in the region will be complicated. The Soviet party shares the concern about the future of the pushtuns and the beludzuns; it is of the opinion that only negotiations with the participation of these two groups can contribute to reaching a solution of the problem.

[...]

The Soviet leaders laid down their opinion of the necessity that the party's unity be strengthened and all progressive forces to take part in the revolutionary restructuring of Afghanistan.

They suggested that the USSR assume the responsibility to carry out many of the properties in Afghanistan's development. The properties, talks about which have already been held, are to become part of an agreement in the field of economics, science and technology. All newly proposed properties are to be a matter of further negotiations between the Soviet and Afghan ministers; following preliminary consultations, these must become an integral part of the agreement on economic cooperation.

The following was agreed upon: an increase in the oil supplies to the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan; setting up a link between the Soviet energy network and that of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan; refurbishment and reconstruction of the oil-processing plant.

The establishment of a joint commission for economic cooperation on the level of ministers was agreed upon.

All Afghani members of the delegation made a statement about the successful visit. Useful and fruitful talks were conducted. The Soviet leaders, and comrade Brezhnev in particular, expressed their interest towards Afghanistan, their warm and cordial attitudes. Comrade Brezhnev drank to the health of Tarakhi, Amin, and other members of the Politburo of the Central Committee of PDPA.

The major conclusion finally arrived at was that the April Revolution is a crucial historical moment for Afghanistan. Under PDPA's leadership, Afghanistan was to abolish the centuries-long backwardness in its development; it was to carry out deep social and economic reforms to bring feudal social order to an end; it was to start establishing a society free from any exploitation. Most views of contemporary foreign affairs issues were common.

Hence there are sufficient grounds to claim that all necessary conditions to develop relations with the socialist countries, and coordinate all efforts in the struggle for peace, cooperation, détente, disarmament between the peoples in Asia and throughout the world, are present.

Upon the delegation's return from the Soviet Union, the politburo of the Central Committee of PDPA considered all results of the visit.

Tarakhi pointed out the attentiveness and interest by both the CC of the CPSU, and comrade Brezhnev in particular.

The visit and its results were highly appreciated. All members of the delegation, the Afghan State and Party functionaries were satisfied with these results.

[Translated by Assistant Professor Kalina Bratanova; Edited by Dr. Jordan Baev]

18.12.78
4 Exempl.

Gen. H. Ojzani
Vertraulich
Ht

I n f o r m a t i o n

Über den Besuch des Generalsekretärs des ZK der Demokratischen Volkspartei Afghanistans, des Vorsitzenden des Revolutionsrates und Ministerpräsidenten der Demokratischen Republik Afghanistan, Nur Mohammed Taraki, in der UdSSR

Als wir Taraki zu einem offiziellen Freundschaftsbesuch nach Moskau einluden, ließen wir uns von der dringend gebotenen Notwendigkeit leiten, persönliche Kontakte mit den neuen afghanischen Führern herzustellen, die Hauptrichtungen der Weiterentwicklung der sowjetisch-afghanischen Beziehungen mit ihnen zu erörtern sowie einen Meinungsaustausch über die aktuellsten Probleme der gegenwärtigen internationalen Lage zu führen.

Ergänzend zu den in der Presse veröffentlichten Dokumenten und Materialien zu den sowjetisch-afghanischen Verhandlungen möchten wir Ihnen noch die nachfolgende vertrauliche Information zukommen lassen.

In den Gesprächen mit Taraki und seinem Stellvertreter Amin legten L.I. Breschnew und andere führende sowjetische Persönlichkeiten unsere grundsätzliche Linie gegenüber der Demokratischen Republik Afghanistan dar. Es wurde betont, daß die Beziehungen zwischen der UdSSR und der DRA einen qualitativ neuen Charakter erhalten haben, daß sie auf einer klassenmäßigen Basis fußen und vom Geiste der Kameradschaftlichkeit und der revolutionären Solidarität getragen sind. Es wurde gesagt, daß die Führung der DRA fest auf unsere Hilfe und Unterstützung bauen kann, selbstverständlich unter Berücksichtigung unserer Möglichkeiten, wenn sie auf dem Wege der revolutionären Umgestaltung der afghanischen Gesellschaft weiter voranzuschreiten gedenkt.

Die afghanische Seite betonte, daß sie diesem Besuch erstrangige Bedeutung beimißt, denn die Begegnungen und Verhandlungen in Moskau auf höchster Ebene würden für das revolutionäre Regime in Afghanistan eine wesentliche politische Unterstützung sowohl im Innern als auch in internationaler Hinsicht sein.

N.M. Taraki informierte darüber, daß die DVPA in ihrer Innenpolitik bestrebt ist, ein umfassendes Programm radikaler sozialökonomischer Umgestaltungen im Interesse des schaffenden Volkes zu verwirklichen, die darauf abzielen, die feudalen und halbfeudalen Zustände zu beseitigen, das Land auf einen nicht-kapitalistischen Entwicklungsweg zu führen und eine neue Gesellschaft zu errichten, die frei ist von Ausbeutung und sich auf die fortschrittliche Ideologie der Arbeiterklasse, auf den wissenschaftlichen Sozialismus gründet.

Hinsichtlich ihrer Außenpolitik hoben die afghanischen Führer hervor, daß die Demokratische Republik Afghanistan für die Festigung der freundschaftlichen Beziehungen mit den sozialistischen Ländern und für eine aktive Politik der Nichtpaktgebundenheit eintritt, die sie als Kampf gegen den Imperialismus und Kolonialismus, für die Gewährleistung des Friedens und der Entspannung, als Unterstützung der nationalen Befreiungsbewegungen versteht. In den wichtigsten internationalen Fragen stimmen die Positionen der neuen afghanischen Regierung, die in der Rede N.M. Tarakis auf dem Empfang im Kreml am 5. Dezember 1978 und in dem gemeinsamen sowjetisch-afghanischen Kommuniqué ihren Niederschlag fanden, mit den Positionen der sozialistischen Bruderländer überein, sie entsprechen unseren gemeinsamen Interessen im Kampf für die Festigung des Friedens und für die internationale Sicherheit.

Das wichtigste Ergebnis des Besuchs war die Unterzeichnung des Vertrags über Freundschaft, gute Nachbarschaft und Zusammenarbeit zwischen der UdSSR und Afghanistan. Die Initiative war dabei von den Afghanen ausgegangen. Beide Seiten betonten die große Bedeutung des Vertrags als eines herausragenden politischen Dokuments, welches berufen ist, wirksam zur weiteren Festigung

der sowjetisch-afghanischen Freundschaft beizutragen und zugleich den Interessen des Friedens und der Sicherheit in Asien und somit auch in der ganzen Welt zu dienen. Es versteht sich, daß der Vertrag nicht gegen irgendeinen dritten Staat gerichtet ist. Zugleich fördert er aber zweifelsohne die Stärkung der Positionen der DRA in der internationalen Arena und hilft die Interessen "der Sicherheit, der Unabhängigkeit und der territorialen Integrität beider Länder" (Artikel 4) wahren, was angesichts der gegenwärtig rund um Afghanistan und in dieser Region insgesamt herrschenden Verhältnisse eine zügelnde Wirkung auf die Gegner dieses Regimes, die eine subversive Tätigkeit gegen die DRA entfalten, ausüben kann.

Bei der Darstellung der außenpolitischen Lage Afghanistans äußerten die afghanischen Führer ihrer Besorgnis über die vom Territorium Pakistans aus gesteuerten antiafghanischen Aktivitäten und verwiesen mit einigem Nachdruck auf die Meinungsverschiedenheiten mit diesem Lande in der Frage des Schicksals der Puschtunen und Belutschen. Von unserer Seite wurde in taktvoller Form erklärt, daß die Anwendung extremer Maßnahmen nicht angebracht sei, weil dies von den äußeren und inneren Feinden Afghanistans zum Nachteil der Interessen der Volksrevolution mißbraucht werden und eine Komplizierung der Situation in diesem ganzen Raum heraufbeschwören könnte. Es wurde betont, daß wir die von Taraki und anderen Führern der DRA öffentlich geäußerte Meinung teilen, wonach es geboten ist, die Frage der Puschtunen und Belutschen mit friedlichen politischen Mitteln, auf dem Verhandlungswege zu lösen.

Während des Besuchs unterzeichneten L.I. Breschnew und N.M. Taraki einen Plan der Parteibeziehungen für das Jahr 1979, der den Ausbau der Kontakte auf der Linie der Parteien vorsieht. Der Wortlaut dieses Planes ist nicht für die Veröffentlichung bestimmt.

Bei den Verhandlungen wurden von unserer Seite in freundschaftlicher Form Überlegungen zur Festigung der Einheit der Reihen der Partei, zur Konsolidierung aller revolutionären und fortschrittlichen Kräfte des Landes vorgetragen.

Die afghanischen Führer zollten der von der Sowjetunion für Afghanistan erwiesenen Wirtschaftshilfe hohe Anerkennung, sie äußerten die Hoffnung auf eine weitere Vertiefung und Ausdehnung der handelswirtschaftlichen, wissenschaftlichen, kulturellen und sonstigen Verbindungen und trugen dementsprechende Bitten vor.

Wir versicherten sie der aufmerksamen Prüfung dieser Bitten. Mit den konkreten Fragen des Ausbaus und der Vertiefung der technischen und wirtschaftlichen Zusammenarbeit zwischen der UdSSR und der DRA wird sich eine ständige gemischte sowjetisch-afghanische Regierungskommission für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit befassen; das Abkommen über die Bildung dieser Kommission wurde während des Besuchs unterzeichnet.

Zusammenfassend kann gesagt werden, daß die Verhandlungen mit Taraki und den ihn begleitenden Ministern nützlich und zeitgemäß waren.

Auf der Basis der weitgehenden Übereinstimmung der Auffassungen der sozialistischen Länder und des neuen Afghanistans zu aktueller außenpolitischer Problemen, des Bestrebens der afghanischen Führer, in der Gestaltung ihrer Innen- und Außenpolitik von Positionen auszugehen, die den Interessen der Friedenskräfte, der Demokratie und des Sozialismus entsprechen, bieten sich hoffnungsvolle Voraussetzungen für die weitere, wesentlich aktivere Entwicklung der Zusammenarbeit der Länder der sozialistischen Gemeinschaft mit dem revolutionären Afghanistan und für die Koordinierung (mit Afghanistan) gemeinsamer internationaler Anstrengungen im Kampf für den Frieden, für die Freiheit und Unabhängigkeit der Völker, für die Entspannung, für die Beendigung des Wettrüstens, für den sozialen Fortschritt.

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Subject to return within 3 days
CC CPSU General Department (1st Sector)

[CC CPSU letterhead]

TOP SECRET
SPECIAL FOLDER

N° 137/27

to Cdes. Brezhnev, Kosygin, Gromyko, Ustinov, Ponomarev, Ryabov, Skachkov,
Serbin, and Smirtyukov

The Issue of Ministry of Defense and USSR State Committee for Foreign
Economic Relations

1. Approve the draft instruction of the USSR Council of Ministers regarding this issue (attached).
2. Approve the attached draft of the instructions to the Soviet ambassador to the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.

CC SECRETARY

regarding point 27 of Minutes N° 137

TOP SECRET
SPECIAL FOLDER

Draft

USSR COUNCIL OF MINISTERS
INSTRUCTION

of [date not filled in] January 1979

Moscow, the Kremlin

1. In connection with the request of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan and in partial modification of the USSR Council of Ministers instruction N° 2473 of 20 November 1978, agree to bear the expenses connected with the travel of Soviet specialists to work in the armed forces of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan to the Soviet side.

Charge GKEhS with proposing to the Afghan side that they pay for the Soviet specialists and translators sent to work in the armed forces of Afghanistan, and provide them living spaces with the necessary equipment, transport for official purposes, and medical services.

2. The expenses connected with the travel of Soviet specialists and interpreters to Afghanistan in accordance with this instruction are to be borne: in Soviet rubles, from the USSR State Budget appropriations for free aid to foreign countries; in foreign currency, to the GKEhS currency plan appropriations.

Chairman
of the USSR Council of Ministers A. Kosygin

regarding point 27 of Minutes N° 137

TOP SECRET
SPECIAL FOLDER

KABUL

[to the] SOVIET AMBASSADOR

Spets. N° 978. Visit H. Amin or another person who will be instructed to receive you and, referring to instructions, inform him that the request of the Afghan side about making deliveries of property of a generally civilian nature for the armed forces in the procedure established for deliveries of special equipment, via GKEhS, and also about sending specialists at Soviet expense to work in the armed forces of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan has been carefully examined.

Say that the Government of the USSR, based on the friendly relations which exist between our countries, is extending aid to strengthen the armed forces on exceptionally favorable conditions. The special equipment and the spare parts for it is being delivered to the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan at 25% of the cost on credit at 2% annual interest with repayment over 10 years. It ought to be noted that the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan is in the most favorable condition in comparison with other friendly countries to which special equipment is being delivered.

Explain that according to the current firm procedure we have deliveries of all property of a generally civilian nature, including vehicles, and civilian fixed-wing aircraft, and helicopters, regardless of whether the equipment is used in the armed forces or in other organizations, are done exclusively by the Ministry of Foreign Trade under commercial conditions.

Say further that the Soviet government has decided to grant the request of the Afghan side to send all the specialists to work in the armed forces of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan at Soviet expense.

Report by telegraph when this has been done.

[Source: Boris Gromov, "Ogranichenny Kontingent ("Limited Contingent")", Progress, Moscow, 1994]

[pp. 34-40. The complete Kosygin-Taraki telephone conversation of March 18, 1979; a partial translation was published in Bulletin #8-9, pp. 145-6, UNDERLINED]

*Top Secret
Special Folder*

KOSYGIN. Tell Cde. Taraki that I would like to pass on to him warm greetings from Leonid Il'ich [Brezhnev] and from all members of the Politburo.

TARAKI. Thank you very much.

KOSYGIN. How is Cde. Taraki's health, is he very tired?

TARAKI. I'm not tired. There was a meeting of the Revolutionary Council today.

KOSYGIN. This is good, I am very glad. Ask Comrade Taraki [The conversation was conducted through an interpreter. - B. G.], perhaps he will outline the situation in Afghanistan.

The situation is bad and getting worse. During the last month and a half about 4,000 servicemen in civilian dress have come from the Iranian side and infiltrated the city of Herat and military units. Right now the entire 17th Infantry Division is in their hands, including the artillery regiment and an air defense battalion, which is firing on our aircraft. Battles are continuing in the city.

KOSYGIN. How many people are in the division?

TARAKI. Up to 5,000. All the ammunition and depots are in their hands. We're carrying food products and ammunition by air from Kandahar to our comrades who are fighting with them now.

KOSYGIN. How many people do you have left there?

TARAKI. Five hundred men. They are at the Herat airfield headed by the division commander. We have sent an operations group there from Kabul by air as reinforcements. They've been at the Herat airfield since morning.

KOSYGIN. But have the division's officers or the part located with the division commander at the airfield also betrayed you?

TARAKI. A small part is on our side; the rest are with the enemy.

KOSYGIN. Do you have support among the workers, city petty bourgeoisie, and the white collar workers in Herat? Is there anyone still on your side?

TARAKI. There is no active support on the part of the population. It is almost wholly under the influence of Shiite slogans – follow not the heathens, but follow us. The propaganda is underpinned by all this.

KOSYGIN. What is the population of Herat?

TARAKI. Two hundred to two hundred fifty thousand. They are behaving in accordance with the situation. They will go where they are led. Right now they're on the side of the enemy.

KOSYGIN. Are there many workers there?

TARAKI. Very few – between 1,000 and 2,000 people in all.

KOSYGIN. What is the outlook in Herat, in your opinion?

TARAKI. We think that Herat will fall this evening or tomorrow morning and be completely in enemy hands.

KOSYGIN. What are the prospects?

TARAKI. We are convinced that the enemy will form new units and will develop an offensive.

KOSYGIN. Do you have the forces to rout them?

TARAKI. I wish it were the case.

KOSYGIN. What, then, are your proposals on this issue?

TARAKI. We ask that you extend practical and technical assistance, involving people and arms.

KOSYGIN. It is a very complex matter.

TARAKI. Otherwise the enemy will go in the direction of Kandahar and on in the direction of Kabul. They will bring half of Iran into Afghanistan under the flag of the Herat division.

Afghans are returning who had fled to Pakistan. Iran and Pakistan are working against us, according to the same plan. Hence, if you now launch a decisive attack on Herat, it will be possible to save the Revolution.

KOSYGIN. The whole world will immediately get to know this. The rebels have portable radio transmitters and will report it directly.

TARAKI. I ask that you extend assistance.

KOSYGIN. We must hold consultations on this issue.

TARAKI. While we consult, Herat is falling and there will be even greater difficulties for both the Soviet Union and Afghanistan.

KOSYGIN. Now, can you possibly tell me what forecast you can give about Pakistan and then about Iran, separately? Do you not have connections with Iran's progressives? Can't you tell them that it is currently the United States that is your and their chief enemy? The Iranians are very hostile toward the United States and evidently this can be put to use as propaganda.

TARAKI. Today we made a statement to the Iranian government and transmitted it by radio, pointing out that Iran is interfering in [our] internal affairs in the area of Herat.

KOSYGIN. But do you not consider it necessary to make any announcement to Pakistan?

TARAKI. We will make such a statement about Pakistan tomorrow or the day after.

KOSYGIN. Do you have hopes for your army? What is its reliability? Can you not gather troops to make an attack on Herat?

TARAKI. We think that the army is reliable. But we can not take troops from other cities to send them to Herat, since this would weaken our positions in other cities.

KOSYGIN. But if we quickly gave you aircraft and weapons could you not form new units?

TARAKI. This would take some time and Herat is falling.

KOSYGIN. You think that if Herat falls then Pakistan would attempt the same actions from its border?

TARAKI. The probability of this is very high. Pakistani morale is rising after this. The Americans are giving them suitable aid. After the fall of Herat the Pakistanis will also send soldiers in civilian dress who will begin to seize cities and the Iranians will begin to actively intervene.

Success in Herat is the key to all the remaining issues connected with the fight.

KOSYGIN. What foreign policy activities or statements would you like to see coming from us? Do you have any ideas on this question, propaganda-wise?

TARAKI. Propaganda help must be combined with practical assistance. I suggest that you place Afghan markings on your tanks and aircraft and no one will be any the wiser. Your troops could advance from the direction of Kabul.

KOSYGIN. They still need to get to Kabul.

TARAKI. It's much closer from Kushka to Herat. But troops can be delivered to Kabul by air. If you send troops to Kabul and they go from Kabul to Herat then, in our view, no one will be the wiser. They will think these are government troops.

KOSYGIN. I do not want to disappoint you, but it will not be possible to conceal this. Two hours later the whole world will know about this. Everyone will begin to shout that the Soviet Union's intervention in Afghanistan has begun. Tell me, Cde. Taraki, if we deliver weapons to you by air to Kabul, including tanks, then will you find tank crews or not?

TARAKI. A very small number.

KOSYGIN. How many?

TARAKI. I do not have exact figures.

KOSYGIN. But if we quickly airlift tanks, the necessary ammunition and make mortars available to you, will you find specialists who can use these weapons?

TARAKI. I am unable to answer this question. The Soviet advisers can answer that.

KOSYGIN. It means, to put it another way, that there are no well-trained military personnel or very few of them. Hundreds of Afghan officers were trained in the Soviet Union. Where are they all now?

TARAKI. Most of them are Moslem reactionaries, Akhvanists [akhvanisty], or what else do they call themselves, the Muslim Brotherhood. We are unable to rely on them, we have no confidence in them.

KOSYGIN. What's the population of Kabul?

TARAKI. About a million people.

KOSYGIN. Can't you recruit a further 50,000 soldiers if we quickly airlift arms to you? How many people can you recruit?

TARAKI. We can gather a certain number of people, primarily from among the youth, but it would require a lot of time to train them.

KOSYGIN. But is it impossible to recruit students?

TARAKI. One might talk of pupils and 11th and 12th grade secondary school students.

KOSYGIN. But is it impossible to recruit from the working class?

TARAKI. The working class in Afghanistan is very small.

KOSYGIN. But what about the poor peasants?

TARAKI. The core can only be formed by older secondary school pupils, students, and a few workers. The working class in Afghanistan is very small, but it is a long affair to train them. But we will take any measures, if necessary.

KOSYGIN. We have decided to quickly deliver military equipment and property to you and to repair helicopters and aircraft. All this is for free. We have also decided to delivery to you 100,000 tons of grain and to raise gas prices from \$21 per cubic meter to \$37.82.

TARAKI. That is very good, but let us talk of Herat.

KOSYGIN. Go ahead. Can you not form several divisions right now of progressive people on whom you can rely, not only in Kabul, but in other places? We could give [them] suitable weapons.

TARAKI. There are no officer personnel. Iran is sending military men to Afghanistan in civilian dress. Pakistan is also sending their people and officers in civilian dress. Why can't the Soviet Union send Uzbeks, Tajiks, and Turkmens in civilian clothing? No one will recognize them. We want you to send them.

KOSYGIN. What else can you say about Herat?

TARAKI. We want you to send us Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Turkmens. They could drive tanks, because we have all these nationalities in Afghanistan. Let them don Afghan costume and wear Afghan badges and no one will recognize them. It is very easy work, in our view. If Iran's and Pakistan's experience is

anything to go by, it is clear that to do this work, they have already shown how it can be done.

KOSYGIN. You are, of course, oversimplifying the issue. It is a complex political and international issue, but irrespective of this, we will hold consultations again and will get back to you. It seems to me that you need to try to create new units since it's impossible to count only on the strength of numbers that are coming from elsewhere. You see from the experience of the Iranian revolution how the people threw out all the Americans there and everyone else who tried to paint themselves as defenders of Iran.

We'll agree to this: we will talk it over and give you an answer. And you, for your part, consult with your military and our advisers. There are forces in Afghanistan who will support you at the risk of their lives and fight for you. These forces need to be armed now.

TARAKI. Send us infantry combat vehicles by air.

KOSYGIN. Do you have anyone to drive them?

TARAKI. We will find drivers for between 30 and 35 vehicles.

KOSYGIN. Are they reliable? Won't they flee to the enemy, together with their vehicles? After all, our drivers do not speak the same language.

TARAKI. Send vehicles together with drivers who speak our language – Tajiks and Uzbeks.

KOSYGIN. I expected this kind of reply from you. We are comrades and are waging a common struggle and that is why we should not stand on ceremony with each other. Everything must be subordinate to this.

We will call you again and give you our opinion.

TARAKI. Give our respects and best wishes to Cde. Brezhnev and the members of the Politburo.

KOSYGIN. Thank you. Send greetings to all your comrades. And I wish you firmness in deciding questions, confidence, and prosperity. Goodbye.

[Source: Boris Gromov, "Ogranichenny Kontingent ("Limited Contingent")", Progress, Moscow, 1994]

Vertraulich

4. Ex.
26.3.1979

In den letzten Monaten spitzte sich in Afghanistan die innenpolitische Lage zu, verstärkten sich die Aktionen der Konterrevolution, die durch die Geheimdienste der imperialistischen Mächte, Chinas, Pakistans und Irans aktive Hilfe und Unterstützung erhielt. Die Verschärfung der innenpolitischen Lage in Afghanistan entstand durch den wachsenden Widerstand der Ausbeuterklassen sowie des reaktionären Teils der islamischen Geistlichkeit. Die afghanischen Konterrevolutionäre nutzen im Kampf gegen die volksdemokratische Regierung die konservativen und reaktionären Traditionen des Islams, den Einfluß der Stammesführer, die im Zusammenhang mit der Agrarreform sich vertiefenden Klassenwidersprüche sowie die wirtschaftlichen Schwierigkeiten, die Unerfahrenheit der Parteifunktionäre und bestimmte Fehlentscheidungen der afghanischen revolutionären Machtorgane.

Das Programm der Demokratischen Volkspartei Afghanistans sieht weitgehende sozialökonomische Veränderungen im Interesse der werktätigen Massen vor, mit deren Realisierung jedoch faktisch erst begonnen wird. Die DVPA ist noch keine Massenpartei und wurde lange Zeit durch Spaltung geschwächt.

Sowohl bei der Lösung von Parteifragen als auch Belangen des Staates ließ die afghanische Führung Überspitzungen zu, indem Repressalien nicht nur gegen offensichtliche Feinde der Republik, sondern auch gegen schwankende Elemente, besonders unter der Intelligenz, angewandt wurden. Allen Anschein nach griff die Unzufriedenheit mit diesen Maßnahmen auch auf die Armee über, die im Kampf gegen die Konterrevolution die Hauptstütze war und bleibt.

In letzter Zeit ging die afghanische Reaktion mit Unterstützung von außen zu organisierten bewaffneten Aktionen über. Es gelang ihr, einen Teil der Bevölkerung sowie eine Armee-Einheit in Herat auf ihre Seite zu ziehen (am 20. März wurde in dieser Stadt die

normale Lage wiederhergestellt).

Die aktivste reaktionäre Kraft ist die Organisation "Moslembrüder", die ihren Hauptstützpunkt auf dem Territorium Pakistans hat und durch die pakistanischen Behörden aktiv unterstützt wird. Von den Territorien Pakistans, Irans und Chinas aus wird gegen das demokratische Afghanistan und seine Regierung Hetzpropaganda betrieben. Von Pakistan aus werden bewaffnete Divisionsabteilungen auf das Territorium Afghanistans eingeschleust, die zum "heiligen Krieg" gegen die legitime Macht, zu Sabotage und bewaffneten regierungsfeindlichen Aktionen aufrufen.

An den regierungsfeindlichen Aktionen nimmt der reaktionäre Teil der schiitischen islamischen Geistlichkeit teil. An ihnen ist auch die maoistische Gruppierung "Shoale Javit" (?) beteiligt. Viele Mitglieder dieser Gruppierung haben eine Spezialausbildung in China absolviert und wurden mit Unterstützung der chinesischen Behörden zur Durchführung von Divisions- und Terroraktionen in Afghanistan eingeschleust.

Die Sowjetunion erwies und erweist der Demokratischen Republik Afghanistan weiterhin, besonders im gegenwärtigen komplizierten Augenblick, umfassende politische und materielle Unterstützung, darunter auch bei der Stärkung ihrer Streitkräfte. Die sowjetische Presse, Funk und Fernsehen entlarven aktiv die Machenschaften der inneren und äußeren Reaktion gegen die revolutionäre Regierung der DRA und treten für die Konsolidierung des neuen revolutionären Regimes in Afghanistan ein.

Wir haben mehrfach, darunter auch auf höchster Ebene, die führenden Politiker der DRA auf Mängel in der Tätigkeit der DVPA und der Regierung aufmerksam gemacht.

Das ZK der KPdSU gibt der Hoffnung Ausdruck, daß die Freunde ebenfalls die erforderlichen Maßnahmen ergreifen, um der Demokratischen Republik Afghanistan in diesem für sie schwierigen Moment entsprechende Hilfe und Unterstützung zu erweisen.

Soviet communication to the Hungarian leadership on the situation in Afghanistan

28 March, 1979

TOP SECRET!

Budapest, 28 March 1979

BULLETIN

On 27 March, Comrade János Berecz received Comrade Vladimir Pavlov, the Soviet Union's ambassador to Hungary at his request, who gave the following oral information on behalf of the CPSU Central Committee:

"In the past months in Afghanistan the internal political situation has become strained, counter-revolutionary reactions have become stronger, which are actively supported and helped by the special services of imperialist powers like China, Pakistan and Iran. The strained internal political situation has been caused by the increasing opposition of the exploiting classes and the reactionary circles of Muslim religion. In their activity against the people's democratic government, the Afghan counter-revolutionaries make use of the conservative and reactionary traditions of Islam, the influence of tribal leaders, the deepening class conflicts coming to the surface because of the land reform, the economic difficulties, the lack of experience of party cadres and certain mistakes of the Afghan revolutionary power.

The program of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan is aimed at wide social-economic changes in the interest of the working masses, at the same time, in practice, they are only in the beginning phase of realization. The People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan has not yet become a mass party and it has also been weakened by internal conflicts for a long time.

The Afghan leadership have abused their position both in the solution of party and state questions, because they have not only taken repressive measures against the obvious enemies of the republic but against the hesitating as well, especially among the intelligentsia.

According to all indications, dissatisfaction concerns the army as well, which has always been the main supporter of the fight against the counter-revolutionary forces.

Recently the Afghan reactionary forces have organized armed actions with foreign support. They have managed to draw one part of the population and a unit of the army to their side in the town of Herat. /The order in the town was restored on 20 March./

The most active counter-revolutionary force is the organization of "Muslim Brothers", the headquarters of which can be found on Pakistani territory and has the wide-range support of the Pakistani government. From Pakistan, Iran and China an enraged propaganda campaign is aimed at democratic Afghanistan and her government. From Pakistani territory armed diversion units are transferred to Afghanistan, who call upon the people to start a "holy war", actions of sabotage and an armed mass uprising against the government.

In the anti-governmental movements participates a reactionary group of the Site Muslim religion as well. Also participates in it a Maoist clique, many of whose members have received special training in China, and have been deployed in Afghanistan to execute diversion and terrorist actions with the support of Chinese authorities.

The Soviet Union has provided wide-range political and financial support to the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, including the consolidation of her armed forces and does so even more in the present complicated situation. The Soviet press, the radio and the television reveal to a great extent the intrigues of the internal and external reactionary forces against the revolutionary government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan and fight for the consolidation of the new revolutionary system.

As far as we are concerned, we have drawn the attention of the leaders of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan several times - moreover at the highest level as well - to the mistakes of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan and the government.

The CPSU Central Committee expresses its hope that the friendly countries will also take the necessary steps to provide aid and support to the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan in this hard period.

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[From Bulletin 8/9, pp. 152-53; previously translated portions underlined:]

[CC CPSU letterhead]

TOP SECRET
SPECIAL FOLDER

Nº P156/IX

to Cdes. Brezhnev, Kosygin, Andropov, Gromyko, Kirilenko, Suslov, Ustinov,
Ponomarev, Zamyatin, and Smirtyukov – everything;
to Pegov and G. Pavlov – point 3.

Excerpt from Minutes Nº 156 of the CC CPSU Politburo meeting of 29 June 1979

The Situation in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan and Possible Steps to Improve It.

1. Agree with the proposals described in the note of the USSR MID, USSR KGB, Ministry of Defense, and CC CPSU International Department of 28 June 1979 (attached).

2. Approve the draft instructions to the Soviet ambassador in Kabul with the text of the Appeal of the CC CPSU Politburo to the CC PDPA Politburo (attached).

3. Consider it advisable that Cde. B. N. Ponomarev go to Kabul to talk with DRA leaders regarding questions raised in the Appeal.

[circular CPSU stamp] CC SECRETARY [signed: L. Brezhnev]

in reference to point IX of Minutes Nº 156

[Gromyko-Andropov-Ustinov-Ponomarev Report to CPSU CC on the Situation in Afghanistan, 28 June 1979]

TOP SECRET
SPECIAL FOLDER

to the CC CPSU

The situation in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) continues to deteriorate. The actions of the rebel tribes are taking on a broader and more organized nature. The reactionary clergy is intensifying anti-government and anti-

Soviet agitation and in this regard preaching the idea of creating a "free Islamic republic" in the DRA similar to Iran's.

The difficulties in the coming-into-being of the DRA have a primarily objective character. They are related to the economic backwardness, the small size of the working class, the weakness of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA). These difficulties are becoming more intense, however, as the result of subjective reasons: In the Party and the government a collegial leadership is lacking, all power in fact is concentrated in the hands of N.M. Taraki and H. Amin, who none too rarely make mistakes and commit violations of legality; there is no People's Front in the country and local bodies of revolutionary authority have not yet been created. The recommendations of our advisers regarding these questions have not been put into practice.

The main support of the Afghan government in the struggle with counter-revolution continues to be the army. Recently, security forces, border troops, and newly-created self defense forces have begun to take a more active part in this struggle. However, broad strata of the population are involved in the struggle with reaction only insufficiently, the consequence of which is that the measures which the DRA government has taken to stabilize the situation have been not very effective. In these conditions the counterrevolutionaries are concentrating their main efforts at demoralizing the Afghan army. In the process they use various means: religious fanaticism, bribery, and threats. Individual methods of cultivating officers are used to incline them toward treason. Such actions of the reactionaries are becoming more widespread and can lead to dangerous consequences for the Revolution.

Regarding this information the USSR MID, USSR KGB, Ministry of Defense, and CC CPSU International Department consider it expedient:

1. To send a letter to the PDPA Politburo in the name of the CC CPSU Politburo in which in a comradely manner it expresses the concern and anxiety of the Soviet leadership in connection with the real danger of the loss of the gains of the April Revolution and state recommendations to intensify the fight against the counterrevolutionaries and strengthen people's power. Note several mistakes in the leadership of the Party and government and recommend steps to correct them, directing special attention to the principle of collective leadership in the work of the CC PDPA and DRA government. Recommend that the political leadership of the DRA create an effective system of local bodies of people's power in the form of revolutionary (people's) committees, and also considerably improve the ideological and political educational work among the population and the personnel of the armed forces.

2. Take measures to strengthen the Party adviser's staff and expand its activity, and also consent to sending Party advisers to provincial and city government bodies.

3. To assist the main military advisor, send to Afghanistan an experienced general and a group of officers to work directly among the troops (in the divisions and regiments). Consider the chief task of this group to be to help the commanders of formations and units [Translator's note: using the generic terms here for "divisions" and "regiments"] organize combat operations against the rebels and improve the command and control of units and subunits. In addition, send Soviet military advisers to the DRA to the government security brigade and tank brigades down to battalion level inclusively (40-50 men, including 20 political advisers), and also [send] military counterintelligence advisers to all DRA regiments.

4. To provide security and defense for the Soviet air squadrons at the Bagram airfield, send to the DRA, with the agreement of the Afghan side, a parachute battalion disguised in the uniform (overalls) of an aviation-technical maintenance team. For the defense of the Soviet Embassy, send to Kabul a special detachment of the KGB USSR (125-150 men), disguised as Embassy service personnel. At the beginning of August, after preparations have been completed, send to the DRA (to the Bagram airfield) a special detachment of the GRU of the General Staff to be used in the event of a sharp aggravation of the situation for the security and defense of particularly important government installations.

5. Bring goal-oriented information to the attention of the Indian leadership through USSR KGB and General Staff GRU channels about the plans for including Indian Kashmir together with Afghanistan in a "world Islamic republic" in order to induce the government of India toward active steps to counteract the anti-Afghan activity of Pakistan.

6. Soviet mass media are to intensify propaganda against attempts at interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan by Pakistan, Iran, China, and the US under the slogan of "Hands off Afghanistan". Assist in the publication of similar materials in the press of third countries.

Please review [this].

A. Gromyko, Yu. Andropov, D. Ustinov, B. Ponomarev

28 June 1979
N° 0552/gs

Source: A.A. Liakhovskii, The Tragedy and Valor of the Afghani (Moscow: GPI "Iskon", 1995), p. 76. Liakhovskii notes that the recommendations made in

this document were approved during the CC CPSU Politburo meeting of 28 June 1979 in Resolution N° P156/XI).

in reference to point IX of Minutes N° 156

TOP SECRET
SPECIAL FOLDER

KABUL

TO THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR

First. Urgently meet with Taraki and pass the following Appeal of the CC CPSU Politburo to the CC PDPA Politburo to him:

"Dear comrades!

The CC CPSU Politburo sends its fraternal greetings to the CC PDPA Politburo and expresses feelings of comradely revolutionary solidarity with the heroic struggle of the PDPA in the defense of the gains of the 1978 April people's revolution.

We note with great satisfaction that in the brief time which has passed since the Revolution was accomplished the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan has begun to carry out political, socioeconomic, and cultural reforms in accord with the aspirations of the people of the country.

We well understand all the complexity of the conditions in which your work proceeds. From our own experience and the experience of revolutions in other countries we know that the enemies of the workers have never given up their positions without a battle.

Dear friends, at this difficult time for you we Soviet Communists, prompted by feelings of proletarian internationalism, consider it necessary to share some ideas with you in an open, comradely way.

1. We share your concern that the domestic situation in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan continues to remain complex and tense.

In the current situation it is our deep conviction that a union of all revolutionary and patriotic forces of the country is of very great importance. In our view, the first priority tasks are to ensure the support of the broad masses of the population with revolutionary measures by the PDPA and the DRA government and to achieve a neutralization and then elimination of the harmful influence of class enemies, the reactionary part of the Muslim clergy, and Afghan emigrants..

In turn, an improvement in the methods of political work will be required to transform these tasks into reality.

First, about the principle of collective leadership. The experience of our Party and also of other Parties of the socialist countries unambiguously speaks for the need to adhere to the principle of collective leadership. It creates an opportunity for a fuller consideration of all points of view which, without question, facilitates the success of the cause and permits mistakes and blunders to be avoided. Any important issue is decided only collectively among us, with the participation of all members of the Politburo. We counsel you to also act in this manner.

It is collective leadership in the Party and government at various levels – from top to bottom – that ensures the adoption of correct, well thought out decisions which objectively reflect the will and desires of the popular masses. For we Communists should always remember the words of Lenin that “In the popular masses we are all a drop in the sea and we can lead them only when we correctly express what the people think”.

The consistent implementation of the principle of collective leadership should of course be combined with the fulfillment of the Leninist requirement of personal responsibility. In other words, a broad free discussion in the process of formulating decisions and, at the same time, complete unity and the strictest discipline in carrying out the decisions reached.

2. Such a question as creating a orderly and effective system of local governments also requires serious attention.

The political structure of any government, and socialist countries are not an exception here, stipulates the creation of government bodies not only in the capital but also in the provinces. The issue of the organization of local government bodies within a multiethnic country such as Afghanistan is of especially great importance.

Local governmental bodies allow the central government to put their decisions into effect throughout the country more quickly. In doing so it is important that the officials heading the local bodies, as a rule, be of the same ethnic group or tribe as the majority of the population of the region. Such government bodies allow political influence to be exerted on the population more effectively and inspire the people's confidence in the democratic institutions of the new political system.

It is also very important that the impression is not created among the population that people's power shows itself only where there is a military unit.

3. It would be of primary importance, in our opinion, if the PDPA Politburo would continually carry out work to expand the social support of the new regime, actively enlist the people on its side, and not permit any alienation to arise between the people and the DRA government. In this regard we would like again to direct attention at the need to observe revolutionary legality and not permit unjustified mass repression. Such repression are only capable of undermining the authority of the new government among the population and impede the cause of defending the Revolution. In our view taking effective measures to ensure legality and put an end to administrative abuses would greatly facilitate a normalization of the situation in the country.

4. In conditions where the internal enemies of the Revolution, relying on external support, are stepping up their activity, the question of uniting all the healthy forces of the Afghan nation acquires especially great importance. United around the PDPA, Party members and those without party affiliation, workers and peasants, officers and soldiers, craftsmen and office workers, students and intellectuals, the national bourgeoisie and the patriotically-minded part of the clergy, and youth and women would constitute a force which would not fear the intrigues of enemies of the Revolution, domestic or foreign.

It seems that the matter of primary importance in these conditions should also be the resolution of the question of a broader acceptance into the PDPA of representatives of the workers, peasants, and other patriotically-minded strata of the Afghan population who are devoted by class [*klassovo*] to the cause of the Revolution.

5. We know that you are doing much work to strengthen the armed forces, including bringing divisions up to strength which are not now at full strength and are accordingly not complete combat-ready. Meanwhile there are weapons for these divisions in Afghanistan and more can be delivered when needed.

In this regard we would like to stress the exceptional importance of the task of strengthening the army, both as regards bringing existing divisions up to strength as quickly as possible as well as in terms of the subsequent creation of new units and formations. It would be correct to consider this one of the main tasks in the matter of ensuring the defense of the Revolution.

6. One more question, which in our view has a quite substantial importance in Afghan conditions. The enemies of the DRA tirelessly spread false reports that Muslims are supposedly being persecuted in Afghanistan and that "the canons of Islam are trampled on" there, etc. Both domestic and foreign Muslim reactionaries are playing on this. Their treachery and the dangerousness of their attempts to rouse the masses of believers against the PDPA government can in no way be underestimated. It seems to us that it would be useful to discuss this in a comprehensive manner in the Politburo and map out specific steps directed at countering this malicious propaganda, attracting an ever greater

number of Muslim ulemas [scholars] on the side of the Revolution, and convincing the broad masses of Muslims that the socioeconomic reforms being carried out by the PDPA and people's power, the need for which is advocated in Islam, not only do not affect and will not affect the religious beliefs of Muslims.

The Soviet leadership expresses the hope that our Afghan friends correctly understand our comradely appeal to them. It was dictated by a genuine desire, relying on our own experience, to give you every kind of assistance in the cause of strengthening people's power, which was established in Afghanistan as a result of the April Revolution".

Report by telegraph when this has been done.

Second. In your daily contacts with Afghan leaders it is necessary for you and the heads of all Soviet groups in Afghanistan, naturally, to consistently maintain the necessary tact and assiduously instill in them the thoughts which are described in the CC CPSU Politburo Appeal to the CC PDPA Politburo.

[Source: A. A. Lyakhovskiy's "Tragediya i Doblest' Afgana" ("Tragedy and Valor of the Afghanistan Veteran"), Iskon, Moscow, 1995]

[pp. 90-91]

REPORT FROM KABUL

(Secret)
(Urgent)

... In conversations with us on 10 and 11 August H. Amin noted that the use of troops deployed in Kabul against rebels would be possible after a favorable decision by the Soviet leadership regarding the request of the DRA government and N. M. Taraki personally about the quartering of three Soviet special battalions in the Afghan capital.

On 12 August the Chairman of the Security Service Sarwari, on instructions of H. Amin, asked us to speed up fulfillment of the request of the DRA leadership about sending Soviet special battalions and transport helicopters with Soviet crews.

... They think it advisable to send one special battalion to Kabul in the near future... and transport helicopters with Soviet crews...

At the same time we request that the issue of sending two more special battalions to the DRA be studied – one to reinforce security at the air force base in Bagram and the other to be quartered in the outskirts of Kabul in the Bala-Hissar Fortress.

Puzanov, Ivanov, Gorelov

12.8.1979

[Source: A. A. Lyakhovskiy's "Tragediya i Doblest' Afgana" ("Tragedy and Valor of the Afghanistan Veteran"), Iskon, Moscow, 1995; Translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg]

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[pp. 91-92]

REPORT FROM KABUL

(Secret)
(Urgent)

... During the conversation Cde. Amin raised the question of a large number of troops being concentrated in the region of Kabul, including [ones] heavily-armed (tank, artillery, and other units) who could be used in other regions to fight the counterrevolutionaries if the USSR agreed to provide formations (1500-2000) of "commandos" (airborne troops) who could be quartered in the Bala-Hissar Fortress.

Cde. Amin further raised the question of replacing the crews of the 77th AAA regiment who are covering Kabul located on the commanding heights around the city with Soviet crews, as he is not confident of their reliability.

Pavlovskiy

21.8.1979

[Source: A. A. Lyakhovskiy's "Tragediya i Doblest' Afgana" ("Tragedy and Valor of the Afghanistan Veteran"), Iskon, Moscow, 1995; Translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg]

[p. 92]

REPORT FROM KABUL

(Secret)

On 23 August... Cde Amin raised the question of introducing our troops into Kabul who, in his opinion, could free one of the two divisions of the Kabul garrison to fight the rebels...

Pavlovskiy

25.8.1979

[Source: A. A. Lyakhovskiy's "Tragediya i Doblest' Afgana" ("Tragedy and Valor of the Afghanistan Veteran")", Iskon, Moscow, 1995; Translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg]

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[p. 96 15 September 79 Chief Military Adviser report from Kabul]:

(Secret)

... In connection with the outbreak of disagreements in the DRA leadership, combat readiness N° 1 was declared in the Kabul garrison at 0930 14 September on orders of H. Amin. At 1620, at the signal of Chief of the General Staff Yakub, the troops entered the inner zone of the city and by 1800 had taken up their defensive positions.

At 1750 a report was transmitted on Kabul Radio about changes in the DRA government. At this very same time in the units of the garrison the commander of the 8th Infantry Division [PD], the commanders of the artillery regiment and the independent tank battalion of the 8th PD, and the chiefs of staff of the 4th and 15th Tank Brigades were removed from their posts.

During the night the situation in Kabul remained relatively quiet. All the facilities of the city were guarded by troops and the streets were patrolled by reinforced details of army subunits. The residence of N. M. Taraki was blocked by troops and all communications lines with it were cut off...

from a report of the Chief Military Adviser to the DRA, Kabul

15 September 1979

[Source: A. A. Lyakhovskiy's "Tragediya i Doblest' Afgana" ("Tragedy and Valor of the Afghanistan Veteran"), Iskon, Moscow, 1995; Translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg]

U. Oguz

17. 9. 1979
4 Exemplare

~~Streng Vertraulich~~

U.S.

Im Zusammenhang mit gewissen Ereignissen in Afghanistan möchten wir die Freunde über einige Aspekte der Entwicklung der Lage in diesem Land informieren.

Es gab bereits seit einiger Zeit in der Partei- und Staatsführung Afghanistans Reibereien und Meinungsverschiedenheiten, die mit dem Streben Amins zusammenhängen, alle Taraki nahestehende Politiker zu beseitigen und in seinen Händen die gesamte reale Macht, darunter auch die Führung der Armee, zu konzentrieren.

In den allerletzten Tagen hat sich die Lage in der Führung Afghanistans kraß zugespitzt, der Konflikt hat einen offenen und äußerst scharfen Charakter angenommen. Unter Berufung darauf, daß während des Aufenthalts von Taraki auf der Konferenz in Havanna eine Reihe Persönlichkeiten in der afghanischen Führung versuchten, ihn, Amin, zu diskreditieren, forderte Amin ihre Abberufung und Bestrafung.

Die Bemühungen Tarakis, Amin zu überzeugen, auf seine Forderungen zu verzichten und die Lage zu normalisieren, haben offensichtlich keinen Erfolg gehabt. Amin, der verbal zwar seine Unterstützung für Taraki zusagte, hat in der Tat eine Reihe von Maßnahmen eingeleitet, die darauf gerichtet sind, Taraki faktisch unter Anwendung von Gewalt zu isolieren.

Im Zusammenhang mit der jüngsten Entwicklung der Ereignisse haben wir ^{uns} vor einigen Tagen unverzüglich im Namen des Politbüros des ZK der KPdSU und persönlich des Genossen L. I. Breschnew an Taraki und Amin mit der dringenden Aufforderung gewandt, sich zusammenschließen und im Namen der Rettung der Revolution abgestimmt, von der Position der Einheit zu handeln. Wir haben sie direkt gewarnt,

daß eine Spaltung in der Führung verheerend wäre und unverzüglich von der inneren Konterrevolution und den äußeren Feinden Afghanistans ausgenutzt werden würde. Wir forderten die Führer Afghanistans auf, ein hohes Verantwortungsgefühl gegenüber der Revolution walten zu lassen.

Sowohl Taraki als auch Amin haben damals diesen unseren Appell positiv aufgenommen. Nach eingegangenen Informationen zu urteilen, wirkte jedoch Amin in der Tat aktiv weiter im Sinne der Realisierung seiner Pläne und Taraki zeigte offensichtliche Unentschlossenheit bei der Unterbindung dieser Aktionen. Die Ergebnisse bis zum heutigen Tage sind Ihnen bekannt. Die faktische Entfernung Tarakis aus der Führung hat die Lage wohl kaum entspannt, wenn man berücksichtigt, daß er nach wie vor die Unterstützung eines bestimmten Teils der Mitglieder der Demokratischen Volkspartei Afghanistans genießt. Insgesamt bleibt die Lage äußerst angespannt, und es ist schwer, jetzt zu sagen, in welcher Richtung die Entwicklung der Ereignisse verlaufen wird. Unsererseits verfolgen wir weiterhin aufmerksam die Lage.

28.9.1979

4 Ex.

Gen. H. Ayer

~~Streng vertraulich~~

26
GHA

Wie wir Sie bereits früher informiert haben, hat es in der Partei- und Staatsführung Afghanistans schon seit geraumer Zeit Reibungen und Meinungsverschiedenheiten gegeben. Das waren keine Meinungsverschiedenheiten zu prinzipiellen Fragen, es handelte sich in Grunde genommen um Rivalitäten, um einen Machtkampf zwischen den Anhängern Tarakis und Amins.

Nach der Rückkehr Tarakis von seiner Reise nach Havanna und Moskau komplizierte sich die Lage in der Führung Afghanistans noch mehr. In dem Bestreben, Taraki und ihm nahestehende Politiker auszuschalten, die ganze reale Macht, einschließlich der Führung der Armee in seinen Händen zu konzentrieren, hatte Amin seine Tätigkeit enorm aktiviert. Trotz unserer eindringlicher Appelle an beide Seiten, im Interesse der Verteidigung und Festigung der Errungenschaften der Revolution abgestimmt zu handeln, die Lage nicht zu verschärfen, wurden weder von der einen noch von der anderen Seite erforderliche Maßnahmen zur Wiederherstellung der Einheit unternommen.

Amin nutzte die Unentschlossenheit Tarakis und seine Unfähigkeit, operativ und schnell zu handeln, entfernte ihn schließlich aus der Führung, wechselte die Leiter der Organe des Sicherheitsdienstes und der Organe für innere Angelegenheiten aus und begann im Kommandeursbestand der Armee, eine Säuberung durchzuführen. Natürlich muß man sich zu vielen Methoden und dem Vorgehen Amins kritisch verhalten, besonders zu seiner übermäßigen Herrschsucht, der Grausamkeit gegenüber seinen Kollegen von gestern, dem Voluntarismus in den Einschätzungen und in einigen seiner Handlungen. Wir kommen jedoch nicht umhin, die jetzt entstandene Lage zu berücksichtigen und werden uns mit der neuen Führung Afghanistans arrangieren müssen.

Nach der Machtübernahme gab Amin mehrere Erklärungen ab, aus denen hervorgeht, daß er den Kurs auf die Entwicklung der Revolution, auf

die Festigung der Zusammenarbeit mit der Sowjetunion und der sozialistischen Staatengemeinschaft fortzusetzen gedenkt. In seiner Umgebung gibt es viele ehrliche Menschen, die auf den Positionen des Marxismus-Leninismus stehen, wirkliche Revolutionäre mit einer guten Einstellung zur Sowjetunion, die in unserem Lande ausgebildet worden sind. Wir gehen davon aus, daß die sowjetisch-afghanischen Beziehungen, ebenso wie die Beziehungen Afghanistans zu anderen sozialistischen Ländern keine prinzipiellen Veränderungen erfahren werden. Dazu wird Amin durch die gegenwärtige Lage und die Schwierigkeiten gezwungen, mit denen sich das afghanische Regime nach längerer Zeit konfrontiert sehen wird. Afghanistan wird wie bisher daran interessiert sein, von der UdSSR und den anderen sozialistischen Ländern militärische, ökonomische und andere materielle Hilfe zu erhalten.

Wir gehen davon aus, daß man mit Amin zusammenarbeiten muß, und daß dies eine aufwendige, ziemlich komplizierte und subtile Angelegenheit sein wird. Wie Sie wissen, haben wir an Amin ein Glückwunschtelegramm (allerdings ohne überflüssige Lobpreisungen und Vorschußlorbeeren) gesandt. Wir werden im weiteren wie bisher die Bitten der afghanischen Führung um diese oder jene konkreten Hilfeleistungen bei der Entwicklung des Landes und im Kampf gegen die Konterrevolution im positiven Sinne prüfen. Zugleich werden sich unsere Vertreter an Ort und Stelle bemühen, auf Amin dahingehend Einfluß zu nehmen, daß keine Repressalien gegen Taraki und seine Umgebung unternommen und überhaupt nach Möglichkeit extreme Schritte seitens Amins verhindert werden.

Wir werden das Verhalten Amins und wie er die abgegebenen Versicherungen erfüllt aufmerksam verfolgen und entsprechend der weiteren Entwicklung der Lage handeln.

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[Missing points from 29 October 1979 Gromyko-Andropov-Ustinov-Ponomarev
note to the CC CPSU; entered in Lyakh3 file:]

2. Proceeding from our common policy regarding Amin at this stage and considering his repeatedly expressed desire to make an official or working visit to Moscow to meet with L. I. Brezhnev and other Soviet leaders we ought to give him a favorable reply in principle without, however, giving specific times for his visit right now.

7. In the area of economic cooperation we should adhere to a policy of fulfilling current obligations according to signed agreements. However we should approach a consideration of all new requests coming from Amin to give economic and financial aid, including delivery of petroleum products, food, and industrial goods very cautiously and decide these questions considering our capabilities and the actual needs of the Afghan side, not allowing them to create long-term reserves at our expense.

10. In the Soviet press they limit themselves mainly to reports of a factual nature about what is going on in Afghanistan, describing only favorably the measures of the Afghan government which facilitate a deepening of Soviet-Afghan cooperation, consolidate the gains of the April Revolution, and develop the DRA along the path of progressive socioeconomic reforms.

Nº 0937/gs

reference point 108 of Minutes Nº 172

Top Secret

KABUL

[to the] SOVIET AMBASSADOR

First. Visit H. Amin and, referring to instructions, tell him that in Moscow they regard his desire which he expressed to visit the Soviet Union to talk with Cde. L. I. Brezhnev and other Soviet leaders with understanding.

We see his desire as an expression of an intention by the PDPA and DRA leadership to strengthen and deepen the friendship and the across-the-board collaboration between our Parties, countries, and peoples.

The Soviet leaders will be ready to receive H. Amin in Moscow in order to exchange opinions on issues of interest to both sides in a comradely and businesslike way as soon as an opportunity presents itself for this. As regards

the question of setting mutually agreeable times for such a visit we can return to this after some time, taking into consideration the important Party and government measures previously planned in the USSR and also the foreign policy measures already agreed upon.

Second. Also tell H. Amin that they note with satisfaction the official announcements and also the statements recently made by H. Amin in conversations with Soviet representatives about planned measures by our Afghan friends to develop intra-Party democracy, ensure the inviolability of the rights and democratic freedoms of citizens, strict observation of revolutionary legality, and the development of a draft constitution. The advancement to the forefront of these and other overdue questions of the domestic life of the country is, in our view, completely natural and justified. We have expressed our opinion on this score to the Afghan leadership more than once. It is these very aspects of Party and government policy that we had in mind when we expressed comradely desires and recommendations about the means and methods which would ensure the steady advancement of revolutionary Afghanistan along a path of social progress towards democracy.

It is important that work to ensure the principle of collective leadership, the correct assignment of personnel, the prohibition of violations of the norms of Party life, and the development of democratic institutions become the standard of daily activity of DRA Party and government bodies. We would like to especially stress the need to cease unjustified mass repression which cannot fail to harm the cause of the April Revolution.

All this will strengthen revolutionary authority and facilitate the transformation of the PDPA into a leading organizing force, relying on the broad popular masses themselves. This will permit all the genuinely patriotic forces of the country capable of making a positive contribution to the implementation of the ideals of the April Revolution to rally around the Party.

The efforts of our Afghan friends directed at achieving these goals will find support from the CC CPSU and the Soviet government.

Report by telegraph when this has been done.

[pp. 110-113; also in p. 102 of Lyakhovskiy's "Tragediya i doblest' Afgana" ("The tragedy and Valor of the Afghanistan veteran"), Iskon, Moscow 1995. APRF, f. 3, op. 32, d. 173, pp. 118-127; a full version is to be found in an archive of documents on the Internet obtained by Vladimir Bukovsky, including the associated Politburo minutes:]

Subject to return within
3 days to the CC CPSU
General Department
(1st Sector)

CC CPSU letterhead

TOP SECRET
SPECIAL FOLDER

N° P172/108

to Cdes. Brezhnev, Kosygin, Andropov, Gromyko, Suslov, Ustinov, and Ponomarev

Excerpt from Minutes N° 172 of the CC CPSU Politburo meeting of 31
October 1979

About the Situation in Afghanistan and Our Policy in this Regard

1. Agree with the ideas about this issue described in the note of Cdes. Gromyko, Ustinov, Andropov, and Ponomarev of 29 October 1979 (attached).
2. Approve the draft instructions to the Soviet ambassador in Kabul (attached).

CC SECRETARY

[Translator's note: This is a complete version of this document; portions previously translated in Bulletin 8-9, pp. 157-8 are underlined]

(Top Secret)
SPECIAL FOLDER

to the CC CPSU

The situation in Afghanistan following the events of 13-16 September [1979], as a result of which Taraki was removed from power and then physically eliminated, remains extremely complicated.

In his efforts to consolidate power Amin, with conspicuous gestures such as beginning development of a draft constitution and releasing some of those arrested earlier, has in fact expanded the scale of repression in the Party, the army, the government bureaucracy, and public organizations. He is clearly pursuing the removal from power of practically all eminent figures of the Party and government whom he views as his real or potential enemies.

According to available information at the present time Amin is preparing a reprisal against a group of CC PDPA Politburo members (Zeray, Misak, Panishiri) who are being subjected to fabricated accusations of "anti-Party and counterrevolutionary activity". At the recent CC PDPA plenum Amin installed the people most loyal to him into leadership positions, including his relatives.

These actions of Amin led to a further aggravation of the split in the PDPA, the liquidation of the healthy nucleus in the Party, and the weakening of its influence on the social and political life of the country. They are even distracting the leaders of the country from solving the urgent problem of building a new society and from the fight against the internal counterrevolution. Moreover, although at the present time the military situation in Afghanistan has somewhat stabilized, there are no grounds to think that the rebels have rejected attempts at overthrowing the government by force.

Amin's actions are provoking growing unrest among progressive forces. If earlier the members of the "Parcham" faction spoke against him, now the supporters of the "Khalq" faction and individual representatives of the government bureaucracy, the army, intelligentsia, and youth have also joined them. This has generated mistrust on the part of Amin, who is looking for a way to step up repression, which will narrow the social base of the regime to an even greater degree. A considerable part of the population of the country is taking a watchful and expectant position in regard to the new leadership and the measures they are taking. This also refers to the sentiments of army personnel.

Incoming warnings about the organization of contacts by Amin with representatives of the right-wing Muslim opposition and the leaders of tribes hostile to the government are suspicious. In the course of [these contacts] he displays a readiness to settle with them about the cessation of armed combat against the present government under "compromise" conditions, which are actually to the detriment of the progressive development of the country.

Recently there have been noted signs that the new leadership of Afghanistan intends to follow a more "balanced" policy regarding the Western powers. It is known, in particular, that US representatives, on the basis of their contacts with the Afghans, are coming to a conclusion about the possibility of changing the political policy of Afghanistan in a direction favorable to Washington.

Amin's conduct in the area of relations with the USSR ever more distinctly exposes his insincerity and duplicity. In words he and those closest to him are in favor of a further expansion of collaboration with the Soviet Union in various fields, but in fact they permit actions which run counter to the interests of this collaboration. Outwardly agreeing with the recommendations of Soviet representatives, including about the issue of preserving unity in the PDPA and DRA leadership, and declaring [their] readiness to strengthen friendship with the USSR, in practice Amin does not only not take steps to put a stop to anti-Soviet sentiments but he himself actually encourages such sentiments. In particular, at his initiative a story is being spread about the supposed involvement of Soviet representatives in "making an attempt" on him during the 13-16 September events. Amin and his closest circle do not stop at slanderous inventions about the participation of Soviet representatives in repressive actions being conducted in Afghanistan.

Thus in the person of Amin we have to deal with a power-hungry leader who is distinguished by brutality and treachery. In conditions of organizational weakness of the PDPA and the ideological immaturity [*nezakalennost'*] of its members the danger is not precluded that, thanks to the preservation of his personal power, Amin might change the political orientation of the regime.

At the same time, judging from everything, Amin understands that the domestic and foreign difficulties of advancing the Afghan revolution, the geographic factor, and the dependence of Afghanistan in providing for the daily requirements of the army and the economy, dictates an objective interest of the Afghan leadership in maintaining and developing comprehensive Afghan-Soviet relations. Amin's understanding of the fact that at this stage he cannot do without Soviet support and aid will give us the capability to exercise a certain restraining influence on him.

In the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan and in the Afghan army healthy forces have been preserved who express serious concern about the developing situation in the country, which could lead to a loss of the gains of the April Revolution. However these forces are disunited and are essentially in an illegal position.

Taking account of this and starting from the necessity of doing everything possible not to allow the victory of counterrevolution in Afghanistan or the political reorientation of H. Amin towards the West, it is considered expedient to hew to the following line:

1. Continue to work actively with Amin and overall with the current leadership of the PDPA and the DRA, not giving Amin grounds to believe that we don't trust him and don't wish to deal with him. Use the contacts with Amin to assert appropriate influence and simultaneously to expose further his true intentions.

2. Proceeding from our common policy regarding Amin at this stage and considering his repeatedly expressed desire to make an official or working visit to Moscow to meet with L. I. Brezhnev and other Soviet leaders we ought to give him a favorable reply in principle without, however, giving specific times for his visit right now.

3. Constantly direct Amin's attention to the need to maintain collective leadership, the norms of party life and law and order, and the inadmissibility of continuing unjustified repressions of Party, military, and other personnel.

4. Through the channels of all Soviet institutions in Afghanistan intensify the study of the situation in the country and also of the leading figures of the Party and government apparatus and the command staff of the army and security agencies. In conversations with people who are well-disposed toward the USSR and concerned for the fate of the April Revolution, do not create the impression that we approve of everything that is going on right now in Afghanistan and do not put such people off. At the same time avoid open criticism of one or another actions of the present Afghan leadership in order not to give Amin and his supporters grounds to accuse us of interference in [their] internal affairs.

5. Military aid is to be given to Afghanistan in limited quantities right now. Considering the real situation in the country and the need for future combat operations to be waged against the rebels, continue deliveries of small arms, spare parts, and the minimally necessary amount of ammunition and auxiliary military equipment. Consider the request of the Afghan leadership for delivery of light small arms for the DRA people's militia favorably. Hold off for now on deliveries of heavy weapons and military equipment, especially as there is no real need for them right now, but it is inadvisable to create excess reserves of such weapons and ammunition in Afghanistan.

6. The Soviet subunits located in Afghanistan (communications centers, the parachute battalion, the fixed-wing and helicopter transport squadrons) and also the Soviet institutions' security detachment are to continue to perform the assigned missions.

7. In the area of economic cooperation we should adhere to a policy of fulfilling current obligations according to signed agreements. However we should approach a consideration of all new requests coming from Amin to give economic and financial aid, including delivery of petroleum products, food, and industrial goods very cautiously and decide these questions considering our capabilities and the actual needs of the Afghan side, not allowing them to create long-term reserves at our expense.

8. Our advisers located in Afghanistan on behalf of the Ministry of Defense, KGB, and other Soviet ministries and agencies should remain there

and carry out the missions assigned to them earlier. However, taking into account that Amin insistently pursues the point of "equal responsibility" of Afghan officials and Soviet representatives for the work of the corresponding Afghan agencies, the participation of Soviet representatives and advisers in measures of the Afghan side which could cast a shadow on the Soviet Union should be precluded.

Requests of the Afghan side to send additional Soviet advisers of one or another specialty should be carefully weighed and be granted only in those cases when this would correspond with our interests.

9. Continue the practice of mutual consultations and exchanges of opinions with Amin and other DRA representatives on questions of foreign policy with the idea of explaining our position on specific issues and also revealing the intentions of the Afghan side in foreign affairs. In necessary cases and in an appropriate form let Amin know of our disapproving attitude of his playing up to the West.

At the same time, though diplomatic and also through special channels continue to take measures against the interference of other countries, particularly neighboring [countries], in its internal affairs.

10. In the Soviet press they limit themselves mainly to reports of a factual nature about what is going on in Afghanistan, describing only favorably the measures of the Afghan government which facilitate a deepening of Soviet-Afghan cooperation, consolidate the gains of the April Revolution, and develop the DRA along the path of progressive socioeconomic reforms.

11. The Soviet Embassy in Kabul, the USSR Committee for State Security, the Ministry of Defense, and the CC CPSU International Department are to study the policy and practical activities of H. Amin and his circle regarding Afghan internationalists, patriots, and also personnel who have undergone training in the Soviet Union and socialist countries; the reactionary Muslim clergy and tribal leaders; and the foreign policy ties of Afghanistan with the West, particularly with the US...

Upon the availability of facts bearing witness to the beginning of a turn by H. Amin in an anti-Soviet direction, introduce supplemental proposals about measures from our side.

A. Gromyko, Yu. Andropov, D. Ustinov, B. Ponomarev

29 November [SIC] 1979
N° 0937/gs

[Source: A. A. Lyakhovskiy's "Plamy Afgana" ("Flame of the Afghanistan veteran"), Iskon, Moscow, 1999; Translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg]

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[pp. 104-05]

REPORT FROM KABUL

(Secret)
(Urgent)

...On 2 December 1979 H. Amin called in the Chief Military Adviser and announced that in conditions where the rebels in Badakhshan are getting active support from China and Pakistan and we have no opportunity to withdraw troops from the areas of combat operations I request the Soviet government send one reinforced regiment to this province for a short time to help normalize the situation.

At the conclusion of the conversation Cde. Amin requested that [I] transmit his request to the USSR Minister of Defense and said that he was ready to turn to L. I. Brezhnev about this issue...

[Chief Military Adviser General-Colonel S. K.] Magometov

2.12.1979

[Source: A. A. Lyakhovskiy's "Tragediya i Doblest' Afgana" ("Tragedy and Valor of the Afghanistan Veteran)", Iskon, Moscow, 1995; Translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg]

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[p. 105]

REPORT FROM KABUL

(Secret)
(Urgent)

...On 3 December there was a meeting with H. Amin. During the conversation H. Amin said: "We intend to send part of the personnel and weapons of the 18th and 20th divisions (from Mazari-Sharif and Baghlan) to form people's militia subunits. In this case, instead of the introduction of regular Soviet troops into the DRA, it is better to send Soviet militia subunits which together with our people's militia could ensure and restore order in the northern regions of the DRA.

Magometov

4.12.1979

[Source: A. A. Lyakhovskiy's "Tragediya i Doblest' Afgana" ("Tragedy and Valor of the Afghanistan Veteran"), Iskon, Moscow, 1995; Translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg]

[p. 121, 10 December 1979; Ogarkov, as later quoted by Varennikov to the author:]

"We will reestablish the entire eastern Islamic system [*islamizm*] against us", said Ogarkov, "and we will lose politically in the entire world". [Translator's note: Perhaps here Ogarkov has the Basmachi resistance in the Central Asian republics during the Civil War in mind]. Andropov cuts him off: "Stick to military affairs! We, the Party, and Leonid Il'ich will handle policy!" Ogarkov tried to object: "I am Chief of the General Staff", but again Andropov stopped him: "No more". The KGB Chairman was supported by K. U. Chernenko, M. A. Suslov, D. F. Ustinov, and A. P. Kirilenko. Then L. I. Brezhnev has his word: "Yuriy Vladimirovich should be supported".

[Source: A. A. Lyakhovskiy's "Plamya Afgana" ("Flame of the Afghanistan veteran)", Iskon, Moscow, 1999; Translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg]

[p. 153, Directive N° 312/12/001 of 24 December 1979 signed by Ustinov and Ogarkov]

"Considering the military-political situation in the Middle East, the latest appeal of the government of Afghanistan has been favorably considered. The decision has been made to introduce several contingents of Soviet troops deployed in southern regions of the country to the territory of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan in order to give international aid to the friendly Afghan people and also to create favorable conditions to interdict possible anti-Afghan actions from neighboring countries..."

[Source: A. A. Lyakhovskiy's "Plamya Afgana" ("Flame of the Afghanistan veteran)", Iskon, Moscow, 1999; Translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg]

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[p. 135 Ustinov's 25 December 79 directive to cross the border]

(Secret)

to the CINC of the Air Forces
to the Commanding General of the TurkVO
to the Commanding General of the Airborne Troops

Copy:

to the CINC of the Ground Forces
to the CINC of the Air Defense Forces of the Country
to the Chief of the Operations Group of the General Staff (Termez)

The crossing and overflight of the state border of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan by the troops of the 40th Army and aviation of the Air Forces is to begin at 1500 25 December (Moscow time).

D. Ustinov
№ 312/1/030

25.12.79

[Source: A. A. Lyakhovskiy's "Tragediya i Doblest' Afgana" ("Tragedy and Valor of the Afghanistan Veteran"), Iskon, Moscow, 1995; Translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg]

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[pp. 162-3, Chernenko's notes of a 26 December 1979 meeting at Brezhnev's dacha attended by Andropov, Ustinov, Gromyko, and Chernenko to discuss the progress of implementation of CC CPSU Decree N° 176/125 of 12 December
[[Translator's note: the now-infamous handwritten "On the Situation in 'A'" decision, found in Bulletin #4, p. 76]]

(Top Secret)

...the progress of implementation of CC CPSU Decree N° P176/125 of 12.12.79 was reported by Cdes. Ustinov, Gromyko, and Andropov.

Cde. L. I. Brezhnev, having approved the plan of action in this matter scheduled for the time being by the comrades, expressed a number of desires.

It was recognized as advisable that the CC Politburo Commission is to act with the same membership and direction of the reported plan, carefully weighing each step of its actions. Proposals are to be submitted to the CC CPSU in a timely manner.

[signature] K. Chernenko

N° 13-op (1 page)
27.12.79

[Source: A. A. Lyakhovskiy's "Plamya Afgana" ("Flame of the Afghanistan veteran)", Iskon, Moscow, 1999; Translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg]

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[Previously untranslated attachments to Politburo Decree P177/151 of 27
December 1979:]

Reference point 151 of Minutes N° 177

Top Secret
SPECIAL FOLDER
Attachment 1

BERLIN, WARSAW, BUDAPEST, PRAGUE, SOFIA
HAVANA, ULAN BATOR, and HANOI –
to the SOVIET AMBASSADOR

Immediately visit Cde. Hoenecker (Gierek, Kadar, Husak, T. Zhivkov, F. Castro, Tsendenbal, Le Duan) personally or a person filling in for him and, referring to instructions of the Soviet government, inform him of the following.

We consider it necessary with all directness to inform the leadership of our friends of the actions we are taking in the face of a sharp deterioration of the situation around Afghanistan. The situation right now appears that the foundations of the April Revolution of 1978 and the democratic and progressive gains of the Afghan people are under great threat. The gross interference on the part of several powers into the affairs of Afghanistan is continuing, its scale is increasing, and armed formations and weapons are being sent into Afghanistan for counterrevolutionary elements and groups whose activity is being directed from abroad. The goal of this interference is completely obvious – the overthrow of the democratic and progressive system established by the people of Afghanistan as a result of the victory of the Revolution.

In spite of the fact that the people of Afghanistan and their armed forces have been repelling the armed interference of imperialist and reactionary forces for a long time now, the dangers that threaten them continue to grow. This to a considerable degree is connected to the fact that Amin and the narrow group on which he relies undertook a brutal and criminal removal of the leader of the Afghan revolution, Cde. Taraki and many other eminent figures, and subjected hundreds and thousands of Communists devoted to the ideals of the Revolution and the cause of socialist internationalism to massive repression, including Parchamites and Khalqis.

Thus, the intervention from without and the terror unleashed by Amin within the country have actually now created a threat to liquidate what the April Revolution brought Afghanistan. Under these conditions Afghan forces consisting of people committed to the cause of the Revolution who are now inside the country or due to well-known reasons ended up abroad, are taking steps at the

present time to remove the usurper, preserve the gains of the April Revolution, and defend the independence of Afghanistan.

Considering all this and the request of the new Afghan leadership for aid and assistance in repelling foreign aggression, the Soviet Union, guided by its international duty, has decided to send limited Soviet military contingents to Afghanistan which will be withdrawn from there after the reasons which occasioned the necessity of this action disappear.

In undertaking this temporary forced action we are explaining to all governments with whom the Soviet Union maintains diplomatic relations that are responding to the request of the newly formed leadership of the government of Afghanistan which turned to the Soviet Union for aid and assistance in a struggle against foreign aggression. The Soviet Union thereby is proceeding from a commonality of interests of Afghanistan and our country in issues of security recorded in the 1978 Treaty of Friendship, Good Neighborliness, and Cooperation and the interests of maintaining peace in this region.

The favorable reaction of the Soviet Union to this request of the leadership of Afghanistan also proceeds from the provision of Article 51 of the UN Charter stipulating the inherent right of countries to collective and individual self-defense in order to repel aggression and restore peace.

Like our friends we of course think that both in the West and the East there will be found people who will raise a propaganda campaign against the aid and support which the Soviet Union is legally giving to revolutionary Afghanistan. But, as has happened in the past, the sudden attacks of our class and ideological enemies should not stop us from being equal to defending the broad interests of our security, and the security of our allies and friends, including such countries as Afghanistan, whose people express unswerving will to henceforth travel the path of cooperation with the countries of socialism and the path of revolutionary reforms of society on progressive and democratic principles.

We are confident that our friends will well understand the motives which dictated to us the need to give decisive aid to Afghanistan in the present situation and for their part will support our internationalist action. Our friends also understand, of course, that events have developed in such a way that they have not afforded an opportunity for a timely exchange of opinions.

Report by telegraph when this has been done.

Reference point 151 of Minutes N° 177

Top Secret
SPECIAL FOLDER
Attachment 4

TASS ANNOUNCEMENT

For a long time interference in the internal affairs of a neighboring state friendly to the Soviet Union, the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, has been taking place from abroad, including the direct use of armed force. The goal of such interference – and this is evident to everyone – is the overthrow of the democratic system established as a result of the 1978 April Revolution. The Afghan people and its armed forces are actively repelling these aggressive acts and rebuffing attempts on the democratic gains of recent years, the sovereignty and national dignity of the new Afghanistan.

However the acts of external aggression have not ceased and have acquired every greater dimension; armed formations and weapons continue to be sent from abroad to Afghanistan.

In the face of gross foreign interference, including armed interference, the leadership of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan has repeatedly turned to the Soviet Union in the last two years with a request to help the Afghan people repel aggression.

The Soviet Union expected that the enemies of people's Afghanistan would all the same listen to the warnings of the Afghan and Soviet sides, manage to heed the voice of reason, and cease further attempts to suppress the freedom and independence of the Afghan people by force of arms. However, this did not happen. The foreign interference and aggression started to take on all the more intolerable forms and dimensions for the Afghan people.

Under these conditions the government of Afghanistan again turned to the Soviet Union with an urgent request to give aid and assistance in the fight against external aggression. The Soviet Union, proceeding from a commonality of the interests of both countries on security issues, which were also recorded in the 5 December 1978 Treaty of Friendship, Good Neighborliness, and Cooperation, and the interests of preserving peace in this region, has responded favorably to this request of the government of Afghanistan and decided to send limited military contingents to Afghanistan to perform missions which the government of Afghanistan is requesting, that is, missions of an exclusively of assisting in repelling foreign aggression. The Soviet Union thereby also proceeds from the corresponding provisions of the UN Charter, particularly Article 51, stipulating the right of countries to individual and collective self-defense in order to repel aggression and restore peace.

Of course, when the necessity and the reasons which occasioned this action of the Soviet Union pass, it will carry out a complete withdrawal of Soviet military contingents from Afghan territory. As before, the desire of the Soviet Union is to see Afghanistan independent and sovereign, following a policy of

good neighborliness and peace, and firmly respecting and fulfilling its international obligations, including those according to the UN Charter.

Reference point 151 of Minutes N° 177

Top Secret
SPECIAL FOLDER
Attachment 5

TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL,
GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE CC PDPA, AND
PRIME MINISTER OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN

Cde. Karmal BABRAK

I heartily congratulate you on [your] election as General Secretary of the PDPA and high government posts of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.

In the name of the Soviet leadership and on behalf of myself personally I wish you great success in all your multifarious activity for the good of the Afghan people. I am confident that in the present circumstances the Afghan people will be able to defend the gains of the April Revolution, the sovereignty, the independence, and the national dignity of the new Afghanistan.

L. BREZHNEV

Reference point 151 of Minutes N° 177

Top Secret
Attachment 7

TO THE MEMBERS AND CANDIDATE MEMBERS OF THE CC CPSU
THE MEMBERS OF THE CPSU CENTRAL AUDITING COMMISSION
THE CC OF THE COMMUNIST PARTIES OF UNION REPUBLICS,
KRAY COMMITTEES, AND OBLAST COMMITTEES OF THE PARTY,
THE MOSCOW CITY COMMITTEE OF THE CPSU,
THE LENINGRAD CITY COMMITTEE OF THE CPSU, AND
THE MAIN POLITICAL DIRECTORATE OF THE SOVIET ARMY AND NAVY

The Central Committee of the CPSU considers it necessary to inform the Party organizations about the situation in Afghanistan and about the measures taken by our side. Recently, especially after the removal of N. M. Taraki and the ascent of H. Amin to power, the situation in Afghanistan suddenly became

complicated and deteriorated. This is with respect to both the domestic and the foreign environment. As matters stood, the gains of the Revolution, the democratic, progressive regime were under threat of elimination. The interference on the part of several countries into the affairs of Afghanistan is obvious and the scale of this interference is increasing. Armed groups are being sent into Afghanistan and weapons are arriving for the counterrevolutionary groups in the country. The activities of several of them are directed from abroad, malicious propaganda activity is being conducted, and religious fanaticism is being fanned. The goal of all these acts is the overthrow of the democratic system established by the people of Afghanistan as a result of the victory of the Revolution. In spite of the fact that the people of Afghanistan and their armed forces have for a long time been repelling the sudden attacks of foreign and domestic reactionary forces, the danger for the existing system continues to grow. This to a considerable degree is associated with the fact that the narrow circle of leaders (H. Amin and his henchmen) pursued a cruel and criminal destruction of cadres and leaders of the Afghan Revolution. Hundreds and thousands of Communists devoted to the cause of the Revolution and socialism and also non-Party personnel were subjected to repression.

The CC CPSU repeatedly turned to the Afghan leadership, trying to get the illegal repression stopped, calling for revolutionary law to be observed and not to operate at the whim of one or another persons in powers. H. Amin repeatedly gave assurances that such acts had stopped but in fact intensified the repression. Recently H. Amin, who had removed the former General Secretary of the PDPA and President of the Republic, N. M. Taraki, hypocritically stressed his friendly relations with the Soviet Union and gave ultra-revolutionary speeches, but in fact undermined the foundations of the revolutionary regime.

Thus the intervention from abroad and the terror against honest cadre devoted to the regime actually created a threat of eliminating what the April Revolution had brought Afghanistan.

Conditions were created in which H. Amin could have turned the development of Afghanistan in a direction which pleased him, including linking up to imperialism.

As a result of the entire policy of H. Amin an enormous discontent and protests against it grew in the country, but at the same time open attacks of armed formations sent from abroad revived and intensified.

However forces were found in Afghanistan which, in spite of the heavy losses as a result of unjustified, illegal repression conducted at the insistence of H. Amin, rose up resolutely against him, removed him from power, and created new control bodies for the Party and government authority. They included those comrades who had fought for many years against the despotic monarchy and had made the April Revolution together with Taraki. The new government and

Party leadership headed by Karmal Babrak turned to the USSR with a request to give political and material aid, including military support.

The CC Politburo decided to give such support. In doing so the Soviet and Afghan governments relied on an intergovernmental treaty concluded between the USSR and Afghanistan on 5 December 1978. Chapter 4 of this treaty reads: "The High Contracting Parties, acting in the spirit of the traditions of friendship and good neighborliness and also the UN Charter, will consult and with the agreement of both parties, take the appropriate steps to ensure the security, independence, and territorial integrity of both countries. In the interests of strengthening the defense capacity of the High Contracting Parties they will continue cooperation in military field".

The CC Politburo has given its consent to the government of Afghanistan to the introduction of a small military contingent for some time. Its very presence in Afghanistan will serve as a guarantee (a check) on the sudden armed attacks of hostile foreign forces (mainly from Pakistan) and the attacks of domestic counterrevolutionary forces.

The Soviet military contingent will be withdrawn from Afghanistan as soon as the situation there stabilizes and the reasons which occasioned this action disappear.

In taking these measures, the Politburo of the CC has considered the strategic position of Afghanistan. It is located in direct proximity to our borders, neighboring on the Soviet republics of Central Asia, has a long border, and China is not far away. Therefore we need to show concern for the security of our socialist Motherland and consider our international duty.

In making such a decision the Politburo has considered the probable negative reaction of imperialist countries and their mass media, and also the possible inability of our friends to understand at first – some Communist parties of the capitalist countries and their allies. But the sudden attacks of class and ideological enemies and also the vacillations of unstable elements should not stop our Party and the Soviet Union from being equal to the interests of defending the security of the Motherland and supporting a progressive anti-imperialist regime in a neighboring country.

The CC CPSU Politburo expresses confidence that the Party organizations and Soviet Communists will well understand the motives which dictated the necessity of giving military support to democratic Afghanistan and will support these measures.

with Communist greetings

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[pp. 88-9, 27 December 1979 from timeline context]

[Translator's note: This circular is an implementation of Attachment 2 of the document agreed upon at the 27 December 1979 Politburo meeting, "Our Steps in Connection with the Development of the Situation Around Afghanistan"; the Politburo decision also carries the notation "Regarding Point 151 of Minutes N° 177" and the classification "Top Secret"]

*Top Secret
Special Folder*

TO ALL SOVIET AMBASSADORS
(except Berlin, Warsaw, Budapest, Prague, Sofia, Havana, Ulan Bator, and Hanoi)

Immediately visit the head of government (or the Minister of Foreign Affairs or the person acting for him) and, referring to instructions of the Soviet government, announce the following:

As is well known everywhere in the world, including the government of... for a long time there has been outside interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan, including the direct use of armed force. It is completely evident that the purpose of this interference is the overthrow of the democratic system established as a result of the victory of the April Revolution of 1978. The Afghan people and their armed forces are actively repelling these aggressive acts and giving a rebuff to assaults on the democratic achievements, sovereignty, and national dignity of the new Afghanistan. However the acts of external aggression continue in ever wider scale; armed formations and weapons are being sent from abroad to this day.

In these conditions the leaders of the government of Afghanistan have turned to the Soviet Union for aid and assistance in the struggle against foreign aggression. The Soviet Union, proceeding from a commonality of interests between Afghanistan and our country on security issues which has also been recorded in the 1978 Treaty of Friendship, Neighborliness, and Cooperation, and in the interest of preserving of peace in the region, has responded to this request of the Afghan leadership with approval and has decided to send a limited military contingent to Afghanistan to carry out missions requested by the Afghan government. The Soviet Union thereby proceeds from the corresponding articles of the UN Charter, in particular Article 51, which stipulate the right of states to individual and collective self-defense to repel aggression and restore peace.

The Soviet government, in informing the government of... of all this, considers it necessary to also announce that when the reasons which prompted

this action of the Soviet Union no longer exist it intends to withdraw its military contingent from the territory of Afghanistan.

The Soviet Union again stresses that, as before, its sole wish is to see Afghanistan as an independent, sovereign state conducting a policy of good-neighborliness and peace, firmly respecting and carrying out its international obligations, including those according to the UN Charter.

The text of this announcement can be left with the interlocutor.

Report by telegraph when these instructions have been carried out.

[Source: Boris Gromov, "Ogranichenny Kontingent ("Limited Contingent")", Progress, Moscow, 1994]

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[pp. 91-5]

[Translator's note: This circular is an implementation of Attachment 8 of the document agreed upon at the 27 December 1979 Politburo meeting, "Our Steps in Connection with the Development of the Situation Around Afghanistan"; the Politburo decision also carries a "Flash" message precedence, the designation "Special", the notation "Regarding Point 151 of Minutes N° 177" and "Special Folder", and the classification "Top Secret"]

*Top Secret
Special Folder
Flash [precedence]*

TO THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR

Meet with the representatives of the leadership of friends and inform them in the name of the CC CPSU of the following:

Dear comrades!

Following the tradition which has developed in relations between our Parties, the CC CPSU would like to share with the leaders of your Party our views and an assessment of recent events in Afghanistan.

As you well know, a new progressive national [political] system was created in Afghanistan as a result of the April 1978 Revolution. Much work was done in the country to eliminate the despotic monarchy by enlisting the broad popular masses on the side of the Revolution; land reform has been carried out, and a large amount of land has been transferred to the working peasantry; the payment of kalym (compensation) for a bride has been abolished; and other reforms have been carried out in the interests of the people.

However the revolutionary events in Afghanistan have met with fierce opposition on the part of hostile foreign reactionary forces. Constant subversive activity from Pakistan, Iran, and China has been unleashed. In turn, the reactionary remnants of the old regime, landowners deprived of land, the former minions of the monarchy, and part of the Muslim clergy have unleashed a struggle against the revolutionary order.

To this was added the mistaken, it must be frankly said, dictatorial, despotic actions of H. Amin, violations of elementary norms of legality, widespread repression of everyone who did not agree with him, including those who for many years fought against the monarchy and actively participated in the April Revolution.

Having eliminated the former General Secretary of the People's Democratic Party and President of the Republic N. M. Taraki, H. Amin has recently hypocritically talked of humaneness and legality, given ultrarevolutionary speeches, etc., but in fact has carried out massive repression and undermined the foundations of the revolutionary order.

Thus external intervention and terror against honest persons devoted to the cause of the Revolution and the interests of the people has created a threat of liquidation of what the April Revolution brought the Afghan people.

As a result of the harmful and impermissible acts of H. Amin and his closest associates enormous discontent and protests against the policy of H. Amin have arisen in the country and at the same time subversive activity of reactionaries has revived and attacks of armed formations sent from abroad have intensified.

All this has been exploited by foreign reactionary forces. They have intensified the infiltration of sizable armed groups (mainly from Pakistani territory), they have supplied various military formations with weapons and money, etc.; in a word, they have worked towards establishing the previous reactionary regime and subordinating Afghanistan to imperialism. American imperialism and the CIA, and also the Beijing leadership have acted as the main force in carrying out this policy.

However in Afghanistan there have been found forces which have risen decisively against the regime of H. Amin, removed him from power, and created new governing bodies for the Party and the country. Those who for many years fought against the monarchy and brought about the April Revolution together with Taraki have been brought into them. Karmal Babrak [SIC] has become the head of the Party and the government. His speeches and appeals to the people of Afghanistan are directed at ensuring the national independence of Afghanistan; rallying the people together; carrying out a progressive, democratic policy; observing legality; establishing firm law and order, and [having] a humane attitude toward people. The new leadership is setting as its task the assurance of civic peace in the country. All of this gives reason to say that such a leadership will facilitate the strengthening of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan and a progressive republican system.

The new government and Party leadership has turned to the USSR with a request to give it political and material aid, including military support.

The Soviet Union has decided to give this support. In this matter the Soviet and Afghan governments have relied on an international treaty concluded between the USSR and Afghanistan on 5 December 1978. Chapter 4 of this treaty says: "The High Contracting Parties, acting in the spirit of the traditions of friendship and neighborliness and also the UN Charter, will consult and with the

consent of both Parties undertake the appropriate measures to ensure the security, independence, and territorial integrity of both countries. They will continue to collaborate in the military field in the interests of strengthening the defensive ability of the High Contracting Parties."

The Soviet Union has given consent to the Afghan government to the introduction of a small military contingent for a period of time. Its very presence in Afghanistan will serve as a guarantee (barrier) against sudden armed attacks of hostile foreign forces (mainly from Pakistan) and from the actions of internal counterrevolutionary forces.

The Soviet armed formation will be withdrawn from Afghanistan as soon as the situation there stabilizes and the reasons which prompted this action no longer exist.

In taking this decision, the CC CPSU considered the possible negative reaction of imperialist states and their mass media. But the political attacks of class and ideological enemies should not deter the CPSU and the Soviet Union from granting the request of the Afghan leadership.

The CC CPSU expresses confidence that your Party will well understand the motives which dictated the need to give this kind of aid to democratic Afghanistan and will support these measures.

With Communist greetings

THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE
OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY
OF THE SOVIET UNION

LIST

of Communist and workers' parties
of non-socialist countries
who are being sent the CC CPSU letter

The Communist Party of Austria
The Party of the Socialist Avant Garde of Algeria
The Communist Party of Argentina
The Communist Party of Bangladesh
The Communist Party of Belgium
The Communist Party of Bolivia
The Brazilian Communist Party
The Communist Party of Venezuela
The Communist Party of Great Britain
The German Communist Party

The Communist Party of Greece
The Communist Party of Denmark
The Communist Party of Israel
The Communist Party of India
The Iraqi Communist Party
The People's Party of Iran
The Communist Party of Ireland
The Communist Party of Spain
The Italian Communist Party
The Communist Party of Canada
The Progressive Party of the Working People of Cyprus – AKEHL
The Communist Party of Colombia
The Lebanese Communist Party
The Communist Party of Luxembourg
The Communist Party of Malta
The Mexican Communist Party
The Communist Party of the Netherlands
The Communist Party of Norway
The Peruvian Communist Party
The Portuguese Communist Party
The Reunion Communist Party
The San Marino Communist Party
The Syrian Communist Party
The Communist Party of the USA
The Communist Party of Turkey
The Communist Party of Uruguay
The Communist Party of the Philippines
The Communist Party of Finland
The French Communist Party
The Communist Party of Chile
The Swiss Party of Labor
The Workers' Party – Communists of Sweden
The Leftist Party – Communists of Sweden
The Communist Party of Sri Lanka
The Communist Party of Ecuador
The Communist Party of Japan

[Source: Boris Gromov, "Ogranichennyy Kontingent ("Limited Contingent")", Progress, Moscow, 1994]

Soviet communication to the Hungarian leadership on the events in Afghanistan

28 December, 1979

**HUNGARIAN SOCIALIST WORKERS' PARTY
CENTRAL COMMITTEE**

TOP SECRET!

Written in one copy

Budapest, 28 Dec. 1979

Seen by Comrade János Kádár

BULLETIN

for Comrades János Kádár, Károly Németh, Imre Györi, Mihály Korom, János Berecz and György Lázár, György Aczél and Frigyes Puja

In the name of the CPSU CC Political Committee, on behalf of János Kádár, Comrade Pavlov Vladimir, the Soviet Union's ambassador to Hungary informed Comrade Imre Györi - giving highly confidential and exclusively private information, about the following concerning the events in Afghanistan:

"We consider it necessary to inform the leaders of our friends with full frankness about the action we executed facing the heavily strained situation concerning Afghanistan. Under the present circumstances, the foundations of the April 1978 revolution, the democratic and progressive achievements of the Afghan people have become endangered. The rude interference of some powers in the matters of Afghanistan does not cease, moreover its extent is increasing; armed formations are directed to Afghan territory, weapons are sent to counter-revolutionary elements and gangs, whose actions are governed from abroad. The purpose of this interference is quite obvious: to overthrow the democratic and progressive system created by the Afghan people as the result of the revolution.

The danger threatening the Afghan people is increasing despite the fact that the people and armed forces of Afghanistan have been beating off the military interventions of imperialist and reactionary forces heroically for a long time. All this is closely related to the fact that Amin and the small group supporting him have cruelly and treacherously done away with T. Taraki, the leader of the Afghan revolution and many other outstanding personalities, they have subjected to mass repression hundreds and thousands of communists faithful to the ideas of the revolution, including the Parchamists and Khalqists.

This way, the external intervention and the internal terror developed by Amin threaten with a real danger of destroying everything given to Afghanistan by the April revolution. Considering all these circumstances, the Afghan forces that are faithful to the cause of the revolution, staying at present within the country or - for the known reasons - abroad, are making steps to put out of the way the usurper, to defend the achievements of the April revolution and the independence of Afghanistan. Considering all this and the new Afghan leadership's requesting us to give support and aid to beat off the external aggression, the Soviet Union - governed by her internationalist obligations - took the decision to direct military troops of restricted strength to Afghanistan. These forces will be withdrawn after the cessation of causes making the action necessary.

The Soviet Union would like to make all the countries maintaining diplomatic relations with her understand that executing this inevitable, provisional measure she is obeying the request of the new, just formed leadership of Afghanistan, turning to the Soviet Union for aid and support in the fight against external aggression. Concerning this, the Soviet Union starts from the fact that, in matters of security, the interests of Afghanistan and our country are identical, what was laid down in our pact of friendship and cooperation of 1978, and that they should defend the interests of peace in this area of the world.

The Soviet Union's affirmative answer to this request of the Afghan leadership results also from the statement of Provision 51 of the UN Charter, which interprets collective and individual self-defense applied to beat off aggression and restore peace as the inseparable right of states.

Just like our friends, we also count on the fact that both in the West and East there will be circles initiating a propaganda campaign against the support and aid given by the Soviet Union to revolutionary Afghanistan. But, as it has already happened before, the fault-finding

of our class and ideological opponents cannot prevent us from doing our best to defend the global interests of our security and protect our allies' and friends' safety, including states like Afghanistan, whose people are firm in expressing their will to progress resolutely along the path of cooperation with socialist countries, of revolutionary social changes taking place on progressive and democratic grounds.

We are convinced that our friends will interpret in the right way the reasons dictating the necessity of definite help to Afghanistan in the present situation and fully support this internationalist action of ours. Our friends will naturally also understand that the development of events did not make a preliminary exchange of opinions possible for us."

Ciphered Telegram from Bulgarian Embassy in Kabul, 30 December 1979

[Source: Diplomatic Archive, Sofia, Opis 35, File 362]

URGENT

TO: Fifth Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Sofia

We are sending you here bellow The Declaration of the Revolutionary Board of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan on the death of Amin

“To all comrades, friends, intelligentsia, and people of our country that have put their whole soul, common sense and conscience in thinking about their fatherland; they cannot put up with Amin’s activity and that of his clique, that have killed thousands of people. We now appeal to all our countrymen with strong confidence in our future; we call for their determination in continuing their work at the various positions - party, state, government or administrative.

Taking into consideration the beastly violence and crime against the people of Afghanistan, Hafizula Amin has been sentenced to death by the National Court of the People of Afghanistan.

The sentence has been put into effect.

Dear countrymen,

The fierce hangman’s death has put an end to all criminal and appalling action of insanity typical of Amin and his clique.

Babrak Karmal, who has assumed the grandiose historical and national responsibility and mission, the party leadership and the Revolutionary Board of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan would like to state their determination before the valiant, honest

and tested in periods of trouble people of Afghanistan that crimes such as despotism, terror, torments, harassment and suppression, unmotivated arrests, life sentences, violent and beastly murders and forced labor will not be admitted. It will employ all methods and put all effort in preventing any anti-human, anti-national, anti-democratic action and relentlessly fight any such action on the part of these criminals. On behalf of the Party, State and Government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, ignoring all forms of racial, language, national and religious discrimination, Babrak Karmal firmly states that the people of Afghanistan must continue working in an honest and peaceful manner, in an atmosphere of freedom and safety and security of their lives and property.

Babrak Karmal will fulfill his national mission with honour and will defend the objectives of the Great April Revolution, of the new state of Afganistan and the government of of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan; he is strongly determined to protect the territorial integrity and independence and the sovereignty of our great motherland.

Hafizulla Amin's fascist regime has been abolished, for he has betrayed both our country and our people.

Amin's criminal clique has been done away with.

No. 2769/ 30.12.1979

Charge D'Affair:

/Kasov/

[Translated by Assistant Professor Kalina Bratanova; Edited by Dr. Jordan Baev]

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CC CPSU letterhead

Subject to return within 3 days
CC CPSU General Department (1st Sector)

TOP SECRET
SPECIAL FOLDER

N° 177/239

to Cdes. Brezhnev, Kosygin, Andropov, Ustinov, Savinkin, and Smirnyukov

Excerpt from Minutes N° 177 of the CC CPSU Politburo meeting of 2
January 1980

Increasing the strength of the USSR Armed Forces

Approve the draft decree of the CC CPSU and USSR Council of Ministers
on this issue (attached)

CC SECRETARY

[a faded circular stamp is in the
lower-right hand corner above
the stamped number "2477"]

11-nv
nv
Attachment – 1 p.

to Point 239 Minutes N° 177

Top Secret
SPECIAL FOLDER

DECREE OF THE CC CPSU AND THE USSR COUNCIL OF MINISTERS

of 2 January 1980

Increasing the strength of the USSR Armed Forces

The CC CPSU and the USSR Council of Ministers DECREE:

Beginning in 1980, the Ministry of Defense is permitted to increase its authorized strength by 50,000 servicemen and two thousand laborers and office workers, including 1,000 servicemen for the USSR Committee of State Security, to create a grouping of forces in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.

Secretary of the
CC CPSU

L. Brezhnev

Chairman of the USSR
Council of Ministers

A. Kosygin

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[pp. 99-104, a fuller account of a 4 Jan 80 conversation, translated in part in
Bulletin 8-9, pp. 161-2, UNDERLINED]

**A RECORD OF THE MAIN CONTENT OF A CONVERSATION OF A. A.
GROMYKO WITH DRA MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS SH. M. DOST**

GROMYKO... It is good for us to hear that the present DRA leadership regards the advice and good wishes of the Soviet side with attention. Moreover I would like to stress that the final decision regarding one or another issue will be left to the Afghan side, to you, and only you.

Comrade Minister, I would like to share some thoughts regarding the situation which has now developed in the Security Council and also about the nature of your statements at the upcoming meeting.

Of course, these thoughts are not anything conclusive, but they reflect the point of view of our country and the Soviet leadership about events occurring in and around Afghanistan.

First. The Western powers, chiefly the US, have unleashed a broad hostile propaganda campaign against the Soviet Union and revolutionary Afghanistan, which has firmly embarked on the task of building a new society. Imperialism has decided to "let off steam."

There is nothing surprising in this malicious propaganda. It would be surprising if imperialism took a benevolent position toward the revolutionary reforms being carried out in Afghanistan. Then you and we would have to think about what we had done wrong that the imperialists commended us for. Consequently there is nothing surprising in the propaganda fuss raised by the West about the events in Afghanistan.

Second. Regarding the tone of the speech of the head of the Afghan delegation at the Security Council meeting.

Comrade Minister, you have every grounds to speak not as the accused, but as the accuser. It appears there are enough facts for this. Thus, it is quite important not to be defensive but to vigorously attack and vigorously expose the imperialist intrigues.

Third. It is necessary to especially stress that the introduction of the limited contingent of Soviet troops into Afghanistan was done by the Soviet Union in response to the repeated appeals of the DRA government to the leadership of the USSR. These requests were made earlier by both N. M. Taraki, when he was in Moscow, and by H. Amin.

Carter wants to create the impression that the Soviet Union received a request for the introduction of limited contingents into Afghanistan only from the new Afghan leadership. However it would decisively refute this idea and, possibly to show by reference to dates, that it was forced to turn repeatedly to the Soviet Union for aid, including military [aid], in connection with the incessant interference of external forces in the internal affairs of Afghanistan.

In this part of the speech it would be appropriate to remind the participants of the Security Council meeting of Article 51 of the UN Charter, and also the provisions of the existing Treaty of Friendship, Good-neighborliness, and Cooperation between the USSR and the DRA.

Fourth. It ought to be clearly stressed that the limited Soviet military contingent was introduced into Afghanistan only to aid it in repelling the incessant aggressive acts of external forces, in particular from Pakistani territory where camps of refugees, through the efforts of the US, other Western countries, and China, have been turned into a center for training and infiltration into Afghanistan of numerous armed groups.

Fifth. The change in the leadership of the DRA is a purely internal problem of Afghanistan and the business of the Afghans themselves. No one has the right to point out to the Afghan people what they ought to do or how to proceed.

Representatives of Western countries, particularly Thatcher, are trying to draw a parallel between the change of the Afghan leadership and the introduction of the Soviet military contingent into Afghanistan, talking of a supposed inherent connection between these two events. However, it ought to be especially noted that there is no causal relationship here. This is simply a coincidence.

It would be desirable to direct attention to the fact that even in the time of N. M. Taraki and H. Amin the official representatives of the US and other Western powers shouted to the whole world about the introduction of our two combat battalions into Afghanistan. This means that they themselves contradict the words of "reliable information" that the introduction of the Soviet military contingent began before the events of 27 December 1979, which led to the change of the Afghan leadership.

Sixth. It can be stated again that the limited Soviet military contingent will be completely withdrawn from the DRA after the need for their presence in Afghanistan ceases, as soon as armed incursions and aggressive provocations from without cease and the security of Afghanistan is accordingly assured.

Seventh. Voices ring out in the West about continuing mass repressions in Afghanistan involving prominent Muslims and that the Islamic religion is being scorned in this country. These "condolences" are expressed not in connection

with the acts of Amin and the victims of his repression and despotism, but about the removal of this executioner of the Afghan people from power.

Considering this, the positive policy being followed by the new government of the DRA headed by Babrak Karmal regarding Islam and Muslim believers ought to be firmly and vigorously stated in the speech of the head of the Afghan delegation.

Eighth. It is obvious that the nature of H. Amin as a dictator possessed of the ideas of carrying out repression and mass terror against the population of the country in general ought to be revealed. Give examples and facts. There are many of them.

Ninth. It is useful and important to say that the new leadership of the DRA has announced its firm intention to establish normal good-neighborly relations with its neighbors Iran and Pakistan. This DRA government announcement is being made when interference from Pakistan into the internal affairs of the Afghan people is unceasing and when the infiltration of armed groups from Pakistan into Afghanistan is occurring, that is, aggression is occurring.

Tenth. In connection with the decision of the US to expand the quantity of weapons deliveries to Pakistan, it is necessary to state an opinion that some external forces, in particular the US, are interested not in establishing peace, but on the contrary, in aggravating the situation, in inflaming a conflict situation in this region. It ought to be firmly stated that the arming of Pakistan to the teeth by the Americans can not leave the government of the DRA indifferent inasmuch this could create a constant threat of an armed invasion of Afghanistan from Pakistan. The DRA would be forced to be concerned about its security in these conditions.

Eleventh. It is well known that attempts are being made to set Afghanistan against other Muslim countries. In this regard it ought to be stated that Afghanistan holds out the hand of friendship to all Muslim countries, even those who put their signatures to the letter demanding the convening of the Security Council. It is necessary to stress that the new DRA leadership in fact is ready to show respect toward Islam and constant solidarity with the Non-Aligned Movement. It is advisable to say that not one clergyman will be punished if he does not oppose the legal government of Afghanistan with a weapon in his hands.

Comrade minister, I can confidentially inform you that we have information about Saudi Arabia's intention to convince six countries bordering it to break off diplomatic relations with the DRA.

Twelfth. It is important to stress that the governments of the countries whose signatures are on the letter to the chairman of the Security Council have

embarked on a path of hostile activities against the Afghan people. Afghanistan is firmly travelling along a path of revolutionary reforms and there is no power which can force it to turn from this path. At the same time it is necessary to state that the new DRA government sincerely wishes to cooperate with all countries, even with those who signed the letter. The DRA government will continue to participate in the Non-Aligned Movement.

DOST. It remains for me to cordially thank you, comrade minister, for the advice which is very useful and valuable to me regarding the nature of the speech in the Security Council.

I did not only listen to it closely but recorded it in detail. All the wishes you expressed to me will be the core of my speech in the Security Council. Again, my thanks for the open comradely conversation.

GROMYKO. For my part, there were expressed thoughts which, in my view, could be useful to you in preparing the speech. Of course, because of limited time it was done in condensed abstract form. However the comradely advice and wishes expressed give a clear idea of the Soviet point of view about the issues touched on.

As you have requested, we have prepared for you a number of materials, in particular concerning American military bases. These materials will be sent to New York with V. S. Safronchuk, who is going there to assist you as you have requested earlier.

When you are assaulted concerning the deployment of a Soviet military contingent in Afghanistan, you can parry this by exposing the aggressive policy of the US. In Cuba, the US, despite the constant demands of the Cuban government and people, continues to maintain its military base in Guantanamo. This is an example of open and gross interference in the internal affairs of a sovereign nation.

On a comradely level I would like to wish you and the members of your delegation a cheerful spirit, confidence, and firmness in defending your positions. Meet more often with representatives of countries taking part in the meeting and fearlessly explain to them the essence of the events occurring in Afghanistan, since the truth is on your side and our side.

Concerning contacts with Safronchuk and your conversations with him, it is desirable to use discretion and certain caution during conversations in New York, especially inside premises. Meetings and exchanges of opinions can be realized in turn on the premises of the Soviet UN mission or in the buildings of the Soviet consulate general. It is desirable not to advertise that Safronchuk arrived in New York to render you assistance. Officially, he is going in the

capacity of a member of the UN General Assembly, which, as is well known, is still carrying on its work.

4 January 1980

[Source: Boris Gromov, "Ogranichennyy Kontingent ("Limited Contingent")", Progress, Moscow, 1994]

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[pp. 174-75 The first combat report from the 40th Army, 9-10 January 1980:]

At 0900 9 January the 2nd MSB [Motorized Rifle Battalion] began moving out from Kunduz along the route Ishakchi – Burka - Nakhrin. The 2nd MSR [Motorized Rifle Company] moved from Baghlan through the Shekhjalal Pass to Nakhrin. The lead march element (gpz) of the 2nd MSB, travelling a total of 4 km from the initial point (elevation 525.0) was stopped by a group of about 100 horsemen. The helicopters escorting the column scattered this group of rebels.

At 1030 in Ishakchi the gpz of the 2nd MSB encountered resistance from a group of up to 150 rebels with three guns and firing positions located on the southern edge of Ishakchi. With the organized fire of the gpz and the tank platoon with helicopter support the attack was repulsed and the attackers retreated to the mountains, suffering losses of 50 men, 3 guns, and 2 vehicles.

At 1130 the 2nd MSR left for the Shekhjalal Pass where its path was blocked by a slide, concealing an ambush of 2 mountain guns. Having killed 15 rebels and destroyed both guns the company cleared the slide and continued movement.

By 1500 of 9 January the gpz of the 2nd MSB encountered a group of up to 50 horsemen at the northern edge of Burka. The company deployed in battle formation, attacked the rebels, and by 1600 had occupied Burka. At 1700 the 2nd battalion reached the Towamak Pass (3 km north of Nakhrin), where it "stumbled on" a three-meter-high slide. It could not pass it on the march and it did not seem possible to detour past it. Only after the slide was cleared was the battalion able to continue moving toward Nakhrin. By this time the 2nd MSR had reached the area of Awsarin.

At 2100 the 2nd MSB from the north and the 2nd MSR from the west reached Nakhrin, covered the roads from the city, and encircled the garrison of the 4th Artillery Regiment [Afghan]. They posted a watch during the night of 9–10 January.

At 1000 10 January the artillery was deployed in firing positions without leaving the BMPs and under the cover of attack helicopters the motorized rifle subunits quickly moved forward to the barracks, making haste and disarming the rebels.

The losses of the 4th ap were: 100 killed, 7 guns and 5 vehicles destroyed.

Our losses: 2 killed, 2 wounded, and one BMP (destroyed on a precipice at a pass).

The rebels did not manage to get the 29 (76-mm) guns, two depots with ammunition and weapons, or the food storehouse from the artillery regiment.

The population has neither offered resistance nor supported the rebels. Two days after the occupation of the garrison measures to disarm the population began to be carried out under the supervision of local Afghan authorities. [We] managed to find the commander of the 4th ap who had hidden and find the place where our advisers had been killed and buried...

Source of information: the command of the 40th Army, Kabul

January 1980

[Source: A. A. Lyakhovskiy's "Tragediya i Doblest' Afgana" ("Tragedy and Valor of the Afghanistan Veteran"), Iskon, Moscow, 1995; Translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg]

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[pp. 202-3, Excerpt "Some Ideas About Foreign Policy Results of the 1970s (Points)" of Academician O. Bogomolov of the Institute of the Economy of the World Socialist System sent to the CC CPSU and the KGB on 20 January 1980]

The introduction of Soviet troops did not lead to the abatement of armed struggle by the opposition against the government. The Islamic fundamentalists have sharply stepped up their propaganda activity among the population using a new slogan: fight against foreign troops. Attempts have been stepped up at joining all Islamic groups into a single anti-government and anti-Soviet front.

After the introduction of the Soviet troops the United States, their allies, some Arab and Muslim countries, and also China announced their support and aid to the opposition. This aid had been given earlier, but now it has grown considerably. Afghanistan ended up isolated at the international level and relies only on the socialist camp, mainly the Soviet Union.

With the introduction of troops into Afghanistan our policy... crossed the permissible bounds of confrontation in the "Third World". The advantages of this action turned out to be insignificant compared to the damage which was inflicted on our interests:

1. In addition to the confrontations on two fronts – in Europe against NATO and in East Asia against China – a third dangerous hotbed of military and political tension on the USSR's southern flank has arisen for us in unfavorable geographic and sociopolitical conditions...
2. A considerable expansion and consolidation of the anti-Soviet front of countries surrounding the USSR from west to east has taken place.
3. The influence of the USSR on the Non-Aligned Movement, has suffered considerably, especially in the Muslim world.
4. Détente has been blocked and the political prerequisites to limit the arms race have been destroyed.
5. Economic and technological pressure on the Soviet Union have risen sharply.
6. Western and Chinese propaganda have received strong trump cards to expand a campaign against the Soviet Union in order to undermine its prestige in Western public opinion, developing countries, and also the socialist countries.
7. The Afghan events have eliminated the preconditions for a possible normalization of Soviet-Chinese relations for a long time.

8. These events have served as a catalyst to overcome the crisis relations and for a reconciliation between the Iran and the US.

9. Mistrust toward Soviet policy has been intensified and Yugoslavia, Romania, and North Korea have distanced themselves from it. Even in the Hungarian and Polish press signs have been observed of a restraint in connection with Soviet actions in Afghanistan. Evidently they reflect the sentiments of the public and the fears of the leaders of these countries of being drawn into the global actions of the Soviet Union, for which our partners do not have sufficient resources to participate.

10. The nuanced policy of the Western powers has been intensified and it has switched to a new tactic of active intrusion into the sphere of relations between the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, openly playing on the contradictions and incompatibility of interests between them.

11. The burden of economic aid to Afghanistan has rested on the Soviet Union...

[Source: A. A. Lyakhovskiy's "Plamya Afgana" ("Flame of the Afghanistan veteran)", Iskon, Moscow, 1999; Translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg]

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Subject to return within 3 days
CC CPSU General Department (1st Sector)

[CC CPSU letterhead]

TOP SECRET
SPECIAL FOLDER

Nº 180/64

to Cdes. Brezhnev, Kosygin, Andropov, Gromyko, Suslov, Tikhonov, Ustinov,
Savinkin, Pegov, and Smirnyukov

Excerpt from Minutes Nº 180 of the CC CPSU Politburo meeting of 23 January
1980

The procedure for sending servicemen, laborers, and office workers to the
Soviet forces temporarily located in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan

Adopt a proposal of the Ministry of Defense to grant it the right to
independently send servicemen, laborers, and office workers to the Soviet forces
temporarily located in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan and issue them
foreign passports in the procedure established for Soviet citizens abroad.

**Report on the talks of Gyula Horn, representative of the HSWP CC Foreign
Department in The United States and Canada**

January 23, 1980

**HUNGARIAN SOCIALIST WORKERS' PARTY
CENTRAL COMMITTEE
FOREIGN DEPARTMENT**

TOP SECRET!
Written in 44 copies
Seen by Comrade András Gyenes
Inf/ 1363

BULLETIN /2/

for the members of the Political Committee and the Secretariat

CONTENTS:

**The meetings of the deputy head of the Foreign
Department in the United States and Canada.**

/The record of the Foreign Department/

The meetings of the representative of the Foreign Department in the United States and
Canada

/The record of the Foreign Department/

Organized by the HSWP Committee of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Comrade Gyula Horn visited Washington, New York and Ottawa as a courier between 7 and 20 January. In all the three places he participated in the membership meeting of the foreign representation party organization concerning congress guidelines and electing a leadership.

Our ambassadors to Washington and Ottawa informed the American State Department and the Canadian Ministry of Foreign Affairs about his staying there and announced his readiness to participate in meetings.

In Washington Comrade Gyula Horn was received separately by Deputy Secretary of State George West, Robert Barry, the head of the group of European affairs, Marshall D. Shulman, the minister's counselor /in Soviet Matters/, James E. Goodby, the head of the group dealing with European security and the questions of the NATO. He had a meeting with E. Larraby, a leading member of the National Security Council and the leaders of the Georgetown University Center for Strategic and International Studies.

In New York, on the initiative of our ambassador to Washington, rabbi Arthur Schneier, being the president of several American foundations and the member of several institutions including the Foreign Council, organized a meeting in his flat with the leading representatives of great financial and economic monopolies and religious organizations. A meeting took place with Helen Winter, the foreign secretary of the United States' Communist Party.

In Ottawa Comrade Horn was received by Klaus Goldschlag deputy foreign minister and his leading colleagues.

The recurring element of the conversations in the various meetings was that they welcomed the opportunity for the exchange of opinions, which was extremely important in such a strained situation, without exception, the conversations were centered around the international relations of the events in Afghanistan.

The Americans emphasized that the Soviet Union's direct interference in Afghanistan meant a change in the quality of international political relations and especially in Eastern-Western relations. The United States could not accept that the Soviet Union should use its advantage in the sphere of traditional arms outside the borders of the Eastern-European alliance, namely in an area that was extremely important in providing for the United States' needs for raw material. The event might constitute a significant drawback in the process of easing, and considering the headway made by the Soviet Union in Angola, Ethiopia, South-Yemen and in the development of their armed forces and the increase in their military power, hopes for easing had become weaker in the United States.

According to American evaluations, in 1972 - that is at the beginning of easing - there was an approximate balance in the armed forces of the two great powers. According to 1979 surveys, the general balance in power changed to the advantage of the Soviet Union. Thus, in the past period, new conditions had appeared in the international strategic relations. But what caused the biggest problem for the United States was that it could not assess the Soviet intention, to what extent the Soviet Union wanted to increase her power and to what extent she wanted to exploit the imbalance in power relations to its advantage in the areas that were crucially important to the West. Therefore the United States would have to react to the present situation by scaring off the Soviet Union from making such steps. The American leadership had already received much criticism for the military inability in Iran and elsewhere while the Soviet Union put to practice those necessary measures that enabled her to protect her basic interests.

Concerning this, during the New York meeting the leading representatives of the monopoly capitalist groups unanimously emphasized that the Soviet Union had to prepare for an extremely hard fight. Practically all conditions were given for the United States to step forward. In principle, the Soviet action carried out in Afghanistan meant putting the last obstacles out of the way leading to the increase in the defensive power of the USA and her allies to an extent that would mean a leading position. They had also defined that the politics of hard hand required leaders who could meet the new requirements.

There were positions that approached the situation and perspectives of Soviet-American relations from an analytical point of view. Several of them emphasized that the two

great powers had not regulated to the necessary extent the competitive elements present in their relations. The melting pot-like international situation brought unexpected events and decisions that had to be made by the Soviet Union and the United States. The coming decade would have been a hard phase even without the Afghan events. Nor were the two powers successful in regulating military competition either. Both parties blamed the other for their own increase in armament.

The SALT-II could not effectively put a stop to continuing the arms race either, but without the agreement the situation will certainly be more difficult and worse. Besides, the ratification of the SALT-II agreement was expected by the White House by February 1980. According to the evaluations of the government and the senators playing a positive role in the procedure, despite the pressure against the putting into force, it seemed realistic to ensure the two third majority needed for the ratification. But the events in Iran and Afghanistan favored the opponents of SALT, and in this situation the government considered it better to delay the request for ratification. Restarting the procedure of putting into force greatly depended on the general international and internal American political situation.

According to Shulman, when looking for the way out of the situation resulting from the Afghan events, the following would be crucially important:

- a) the two great powers should define at the very beginning what is meant by the necessary self-restraint and in which spheres it should be applied;
- b) to what extent they would manage to reach the appropriate regulations concerning the competition between the two great powers, especially concerning the arms race.

The representatives of the foreign affairs apparatus expressed their dissatisfaction with the fact that allies of the USA did not follow the United States in the Iran question and even less in the repressive anti-Soviet measures. The Western-European countries and Japan supported the United States less and less in the question of economic boycott against Iran, and they emphasized more and more their position according to which additional diplomatic and political efforts were needed to solve the Iran crisis.

The allies of the USA agreed only not to fill in the gap caused by the economic measures of the USA in Soviet-American relations and not to join those American measures that would lead to the deterioration of their economic and trade relations with the Soviet Union.

The Americans were worried about the fact that the allies' behavior did not make it possible to exercise enough influence on the Soviet Union. They calculated that the Soviet Union needed to buy, apart from the 8 million tons of American corn already under contract, factually another 17 million tons of American corn, the two thirds of which are corn fodder. On the other hand, Brazil had undertaken a large-scale soy-export to the Soviet Union in the past days and similar steps might be taken by several Western-European and developing countries. They also reckoned with the fact that the socialist countries would increase their corn purchases in the capitalist world. It would be difficult for them to prevent this.

They said that the American government had elaborated plans and concepts to ease the military tension, to defend the process of European security and cooperation, to prepare for the Madrid conference, to continue the Vienna talks. As a consequence of the Afghan events, however, the government was forced to re-evaluate its plans. The experts continued working on the elaboration of newer American positions and, although their preparation was not so intensive at present as earlier, they were making new efforts to elaborate and execute the common Western position.

They still attribute great importance to the initiatives concerning European security and in their view, they will serve as a basis for talks in the future too. The decision of the NATO of 12 December outlined the suggestion of the organization about talks concerning the reduction in European armament. In Brussels the NATO experts are working at present on giving a definite form to the suggestions and they trust that the technical problems will be solved by the end of spring. They consider it unfortunate that the Soviet Union has not so far reacted in effect to the suggestions about talks concerning European strategic missiles. They can reasonably count on the fact that progress will be extremely complicated in this matter, and every step depends on the European political situation and the Soviet-American relations.

The Americans studied the proposals of the Budapest session of the Warsaw Treaty concerning measures to increase confidence. They had some reservations concerning the "enunciation-like" proposals, but they did not exclude the possibility of progress.

They emphasized that the United States and its allies had taken one-sided steps too concerning the reduction in armament, such as the evacuation of a thousand nuclear warheads from Europe; the USA's commitment not to increase the number of her nuclear armament above 7 thousand in Europe; the declaration of the United States' and the NATO allies' readiness to hold a conference on European disarmament; the support of numerous measures increasing confidence.

The American talking partners emphasized, without exception, the United States was ready to develop Hungarian-American relations. They underlined that the USA wished to continue the subtle political discussions with the socialist countries in the same way as earlier. Several of them defined that, in the present situation, the relations maintained with the individual socialist countries could ensure the continuity of the politics of peaceful coexistence.

At the same time, they stated that this readiness could not be one-sided, as such Hungarian statement as those about the Afghan question, were of no help. They made it clear that in the United States there was a substantial number of people who tried to use the given situation to change the positive tendency in the bilateral relations. The increase in their influence could result in difficulties concerning the official procedures of the further extension of the most-favored-nation-clause. A lot depended on how far the official Hungarian circles would go in their statements criticizing the United States' foreign politics. They consider it also extremely important that the Hungarians should not make any backward steps in the Hungarian-American relations. They underlined the importance of the Hungarian-American foreign political consultations, of further specific economic talks and of the realization of the talks to be carried on with the Hungarian parliamentary delegation visiting the United States headed by Comrade Antal Apró.

The following arguments were generally received with understanding:

- 1.) The deterioration of the Soviet-American relations did not start with the Soviet support given to Afghanistan. The United States had taken earlier steps endangering the Soviet Union, more generally the Eastern-Western relations both in the spheres of military and politics. The American efforts to upset the balance of strategic strength increased the tension, decreased the mutual confidence between the two world systems. It was the USA who made the change according to which it tries to show the Soviet Union's behavior in Third World countries in the light of being the preliminary condition for the continuation of easing. This opens up new sources of tension in Eastern-Western relations.
- 2.) It was the United States' leadership that took strict and direct measures to weaken the Soviet-American relations.
- 3.) The Soviet support of the revolutionary forces in Afghanistan is not the concern of the Warsaw Treaty but the internal affair of the Soviet Union and Afghanistan, but all countries have sovereign rights to take a point of view according to their ideological-political convictions. The Hungarian government's official position was born in this spirit.

During the talks carried on with the representatives of the Canadian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the talking partners' evaluation and statements coincided with the American position. At the same time, serious worries could be felt about the increasing international tension, they considered it very important to preserve or restore at least the minimum of mutual confidence indispensable in Eastern-Western relations.

x x x

During the meeting with the foreign secretary of the Communist Party of the USA, Comrade Helen Winter expressed her worries about the latest international events, the repeatedly increasing anti-Communist hysteria and hysteria against the socialist countries, which made the party's situation even more difficult in the United States.

Budapest, 23 January 1980

János Berecz

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TOP SECRET

N° P181/2

to Cdes. Brezhnev, Kosygin, Andropov, Gromyko, Suslov, Tikhonov, Ustinov,
Ponomarev, Savinkin, Smirnyukov

Excerpt from Minutes N° 181 of the CC CPSU Politburo meeting of 25 January
1980

Holding talks about the conclusion of a Treaty between the Government of the
USSR and the Government of the DRA about the conditions of the temporary
presence of Soviet forces on DRA territory

1. Agree with the USSR MID, Ministry of Defense and USSR KGB proposal about holding talks to conclude a Treaty between the Government of the USSR and the Government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan about the conditions of the temporary presence of Soviet forces on the territory of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.

2. Approve the text draft Treaty (attachment I) on the whole.

3. Charge the USSR MID with coordinating a draft of the above Treaty with the Afghan side. It is permissible to enter additions and changes into the text of the Treaty which are not of a fundamental nature.

The time and procedure for signing the Treaty will be determined separately.

4. Approve the draft instructions to the Soviet ambassador in Kabul (attachment II).

CC SECRETARY

to point 2 of Minutes N° 181

Attachment I
Draft

TREATY

Between the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan about the Conditions of the Temporary Presence of Soviet forces on the territory of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan

**The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the
Government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan,**

**Firmly resolved to safeguard the security and independence of the Soviet
and Afghan peoples,**

**Expressing a fixed determination to facilitate the strengthening of peace
and security in Asia and the entire world,**

**Guided by the Soviet-Afghan Treaty of Friendship, Good Neighborliness,
and Cooperation of 5 December 1978**

**Confirming fidelity to the goals and principles of the United National
Charter,**

Have agreed on the following:

Article 1

**The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the
Government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan have agreed that the part
of the limited Soviet military contingent introduced into the territory of the
Democratic Republic of Afghanistan in accordance with a request of the
Government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan will remain temporarily
on DRA territory in order to help the Afghan people repel aggression from
without.**

**The strength and deployment locations of the Soviet forces temporarily
remaining on the territory of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan are
determined by agreement between the Governments of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics and the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.**

**Soviet forces temporarily located on the territory of the Democratic
Republic of Afghanistan will remain subordinate to the Soviet military command.**

Article 2

**1. The temporary presence of Soviet forces on the territory of the
Democratic Republic of Afghanistan does not violate its state sovereignty. Soviet
forces are not interfering in the internal affairs of the Democratic Republic of
Afghanistan.**

**2. Soviet forces and the personnel comprising them and members of their
families located in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan will observe the laws
in force in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.**

Article 3

1. The Soviet Side bears the expenses for the maintenance of Soviet forces on the territory of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.

2. The Government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan grants the Soviet forces and the persons comprising them and members of their families barracks and premises in military garrisons, office, storage, and other space, and also airfields with permanent structures and equipment by agreement of the Sides and in accordance with the Protocol (attached) for the period of their temporary presence in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.

Test ranges, firing ranges, and training grounds will be used jointly with the People's Armed Forces of for the period of their temporary presence in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.

The procedures and conditions for use of these facilities and also the utilities, commercial, and other services will be determined by agreement of the Contracting Parties.

Article 4

Soviet military units, the personnel of the Soviet forces comprising them, and members of their families can proceed to the deployment locations of Soviet forces in for the period of their temporary presence in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan and from for the period of their temporary presence in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan by vehicle, air, and other transport.

Personnel comprising the Soviet forces and their family members are exempt from passport or visa control when entering, resident in, or leaving for the period of their temporary presence in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.

The point and procedures for crossing the Soviet-Afghan border, the means of control, and also the types and forms of the appropriate documents are to be determined by agreement of the Contracting Parties.

Article 5

The Afghan Side agrees to let [the following] cross the state border of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan without imposing duty or customs or border inspection:

- Soviet forces and personnel comprising them proceeding as part of military units, subunits, and teams;

- all military freight, including freight intended for commercial and general operations of the Soviet forces;

- persons comprising Soviet forces proceeding to or departing the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan alone or with family members with articles for their personal use when presenting documents to customs authorities for the right to cross the Soviet-Afghan border.

Property, gear, and combat equipment taken into the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan by the Soviet Side can be taken back to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics without customs duties and fees.

Article 6

1. The commercial and general maintenance of Soviet troop personnel temporarily stationed on the territory of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan and their family members will be done by Soviet commercial and general enterprises.

2. The Afghan Side will deliver to the Soviet commercial and general enterprises good within the amounts agreed between the competent commercial organizations of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan at government retail prices, granting a commercial discount adopted for the corresponding commercial enterprises of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.

Calculations for the good being delivered will be made in the currency of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.

3. The Afghan Side will delivery food and industrial goods, including fuel (natural gas, coal, coke, wood) for the planned supply of Soviet forces in the agreed quantities according to contracts concluded between the corresponding Soviet and Afghan foreign trade organizations at the prices in effect in trade relations between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.

Article 7

The Government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan will grant the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics the necessary sums in Afghan currency for expenses associated with the temporary presence of Soviet forces on the territory of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. The amount of these sums will be established by agreement of the competent bodies of the Contracting Sides.

Article 8

The procedure for accounting for services stipulated in Article 3 and also for the sums in Afghan currency granted in accordance with Article 7 of this Treaty will

be determined by a supplemental Agreement between the Contracting Parties within two months after this Treaty goes into force. A recalculation of these sums in Afghan currency into rubles will be done from the relationship of the domestic prices and rates of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan and foreign trade prices.

Article 9

Questions of jurisdiction associated with the temporary presence of Soviet forces on the territory of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan are to be regulated in the following manner.

1. For matters concerning crimes and offenses committed by persons comprising Soviet forces or family members on the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, Afghan law, Afghan courts, procurators, and other Afghan bodies are used which are competent regarding the issue of prosecuting the punishable deeds.

Matters regarding crimes committed by Soviet servicemen are prosecuted by the military procuracy and reviewed by the military justice agencies of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.

2. The rulings of Point 1 of this Article are not used:

a) if crimes or offenses are committed by persons comprising Soviet forces or family members only against the Soviet Union and also against persons who comprise Soviet forces or their family members;

b) in crimes or offenses are committed by persons comprising Soviet forces or family members in the execution of official duties in the areas where military units are deployed.

Regarding matters indicated in sub-points "a" and "b" of this point, the Soviet courts, the procuracy, and other bodies acting on the basis of Soviet law are competent.

3. In case punishable acts are committed against Soviet forces temporarily stationed on the territory of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan and also against persons comprising them, the guilty parties will bear the same responsibility as for punishable acts against the People's Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan and persons comprising them.

4. The competent Soviet and Afghan bodies can turn to one another with a request to transfer or receive jurisdiction regarding individual cases stipulated in points 1 and 2 of this Article. Such requests will be examined favorably.

5. The competent Soviet and Afghan bodies will give one another legal and any other sort of aid regarding questions of prosecuting punishable acts described in points 1, 2, and 3 of this Article.

Article 10

1. The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics agrees to reimburse the Government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan for material damage which might be inflicted on the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan by the actions or neglect of Soviet military units or persons comprising them and also the damage which might be inflicted by Soviet military units or persons comprising them in the performance of their official responsibilities on Afghan citizens, institutions, or citizens of third countries located on the territory of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan; in both cases in the amounts established (on the basis of the presentation of claims and considering Afghan ordinances) by the Plenipotentiaries for the affairs of the temporary presence of Soviet forces in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan appointed in accordance with Article 13 of this Treaty.

Disputes which might arise from the responsibilities of Soviet units are subject to examination on these same grounds.

2. The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics also agrees to reimburse the Government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan for damage which might be inflicted on Afghan institutions and citizens and also citizens of third countries located on the territory of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan as a result of actions or neglect of family members; in both cases in amounts established by competent Afghan courts on the basis of claims presented by the persons suffering damage.

Article 11

1. The Government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan agrees to reimburse the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for damage which might be caused to the property of Soviet military units temporarily stationed on the territory of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan and to persons comprising Soviet forces by actions or neglect of Afghan government institutions in amounts established by the Plenipotentiaries for the affairs of the temporary presence of Soviet forces in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan on the basis of claims presented and considering Afghan laws.

Disputes which might arise from the responsibilities of Afghan government institutions are subject to examination on these same grounds.

2. The Government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan also agrees to reimburse the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for damage which might be inflicted on Soviet military units temporarily stationed on the territory of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan on persons comprising Soviet forces and family members as a result of actions or neglect of Afghan citizens in amounts established by Afghan courts on the basis of claims presented by the persons suffering damage.

Article 12

The reimbursement of damage stipulated in Articles 10 and 11 will be done by the Parties within three months of the day of a decision is made by the Plenipotentiaries for the affairs of the temporary presence of Soviet forces in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan or the date a court's decision becomes effective.

The payment of sums due the injured parties, units, and institutions will be done by the competent bodies of the Parties in cases stipulated in Article 10 – by the Afghan bodies- and Article 11 – by the Soviet bodies.

Article 13

In order to properly regulate current issues associated with the temporary presence of Soviet forces the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan appoint their Plenipotentiaries for affairs of the temporary presence of Soviet forces in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.

Article 14

1. In the interpretation of this Treaty:

"a person comprising Soviet forces" is

a) a serviceman of the Soviet Army;
b) a civilian who is a Soviet citizen and works in units of Soviet forces temporarily located on the territory of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.

2. "Members of the families of those comprising Soviet forces" are;

a) spouse,
b) unmarried children,
c) close relatives who are dependents of these people.

3. "Area of deployment" is the territory allotted by the Government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan or by local governmental authorities at the disposition of Soviet forces, including places where military units are located.

Article 15

This Treaty enters into force on the day of its ratification by both Contracting Parties and will be in effect during the temporary presence of Soviet forces on the territory of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.

Done in the city of [location and date left blank] January 1980 in two copies, one in Russian and the other in Dari, each of which has identical force.

FOR THE GOVERNMENT
OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST
REPUBLICS

FOR THE GOVERNMENT
OF THE DEMOCRATIC
REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN

Secret
Draft

PROTOCOL

to the Treaty between the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan about the Conditions of the Temporary Presence of Soviet forces on the territory of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan

In accordance with the Treaty between the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan about the Conditions of the Temporary Presence of Soviet forces on the territory of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan of January 1980

The Contracting Parties have agreed on the following:

1. Temporarily quartering of Soviet on the territory of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan up to a total strength of 60,000 men.

The will consist of infantry, artillery, tanks, and other troop arms.

In addition, aircraft numbering up to 200 fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters will be quartered.

The appropriate control organs will be created for command and control of troops.

Representatives of the Soviet command will be located in the cities of Kabul and Herat for issues of the temporary presence of Soviet in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.

2. By 30 January 1980 the Afghan Side will grant for the Soviet forces described in point 1 of this Protocol barracks and premises in military garrisons, office, storage, and other space at population centers and garrisons necessary and suitable in accordance with the attachment in accordance with the attachment, and also airfields, including military housing areas and other facilities located at these airfields.

Test ranges, firing ranges, and training grounds for combat training of the will be used jointly with the People's Armed Forces of the DRA.

When necessary in order to improve the quartering of troops and to ensure combat training Soviet may build necessary structures on the grounds of garrisons set aside for them which will be the property of the Soviet Union.

3. Soviet temporarily located on the territory of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan are granted the right to use all types of military communications equipment in accordance with the procedure established in the Armed Forces of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for communication among themselves and with the Command of the Soviet in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

4. Soviet military aircraft can make flights over the territory of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan while performing combat training missions and air shipments in the interests of the Soviet temporarily located in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan and also flights from the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and back in accordance with the Rules jointly developed and approved by the Command of Soviet forces and the Command of the People's Armed Forces of the DRA.

The use of air defense by Soviet troops temporarily located in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan for operations against foreign aircraft intruding over the airspace of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan will be done in accordance with a special Regulation developed jointly by the Command of Soviet forces and the Command of the People's Armed Forces of the DRA.

5. The movement of Soviet troops between training centers and deployment locations will be done according to the plans of the Command of Soviet forces.

The areas where exercises are conducted with the participation of a division or higher are determined by coordination between the Plenipotentiaries of the Sides for affairs of the temporary presence of Soviet forces on the territory of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.

6. This Protocol enters into force simultaneously with the Treaty between the Government of the USSR and the Government of the DRA about the conditions of the temporary presence of Soviet forces on the territory of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan signed in [location and date left blank] January 1980 of which it is an inseparable part. It will remain in force as long as this Treaty is in effect.

Done in [location and date left blank] January 1980 in two copies, one in Russian and the other in Dari, each of which has identical force.

FOR THE GOVERNMENT
OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST
REPUBLICS

FOR THE GOVERNMENT
OF THE DEMOCRATIC
REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN

Secret

LIST

of population centers and garrisons in which the Afghan side is allotting barracks, office, and other spaces, airfields and storehouses for Soviet forces temporarily located on the territory of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, and also test ranges jointly used with the People's Armed Forces

Billeting space

Garrisons (facilities)	Existing, in square meters	From additional allotment, in square meters	Total, in square meters	Total storage area	Garages
I. Garrisons and military housing areas					
Fayzabad					
Kabul					
Bala-Hissar Fortress (Kabul)					
Sarasiab (Kabul)					

Katai-Ashru (Maydan)					
Bagram					
Charikar					
Jabal os- Saraj					
Doshi					
Jaybar					
Pol-e Khomri					
Baghlan					
Murgau (Herat)					
Shindand					
Dekh-Nau					
Adraskan					
Total					

II. Joint basing airfields

Shindand, Kabul, Bagram, Kandahar, Kunduz

III. Storehouses

Garrison	Type of property	Unit of measurement	Quantity
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Regarding point 2 of Minutes N° 181

Secret

Attachment II

KABUL

SOVIET AMBASSADOR

Visit Babrak Karmal and, referring to instructions, tell him the following.

In the estimation of Afghan friends, which we fully share, the foreign policy situation around the DRA will be difficult and tense for some time.

World imperialism and reaction together with the Chinese hegemonists are arranging the coordination of their activities to step up the scale of armed

interference in the affairs of the DRA. Recently bourgeois propaganda has intensified a malicious anti-Afghan and anti-Soviet campaign directed at distorting the meaning of the presence of Soviet forces in Afghanistan.

In this connection it would be useful to conclude a Treaty between the Government of the USSR and the Government of the DRA about the conditions of the temporary presence of Soviet forces on the territory of the DRA in which the temporary nature of this measure would be pointed out and also it would stress that the Soviet forces were introduced into the territory of the DRA at the request of the Afghan leadership in order to repel aggression from without, do not interfere in the internal affairs of Afghanistan, and will observe domestic Afghan laws. The Treaty would stipulate the allotment by both sides of plenipotentiaries for the affairs of the presence of Soviet forces in Afghanistan and also regulate issues of the stationing of military units, their material support, maintenance, jurisdiction, and other questions.

If B. Karmal expresses agreement in principle with our proposal, tell him that you can send a draft of the Treaty for coordination to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the DRA or to another person whom B. Karmal would indicate.

Telegraph when this has been done.

=====

N° 195/59gs of 29.1.1980

SPECIAL FOLDER
TOP SECRET

DECREE
of the Secretariat of the CC CPSU

Granting Technical Assistance to the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan in the
Construction of a 1000 kWt Medium-Wave Radio Broadcasting Station

Approve the draft USSR Council of Ministers instruction regarding this issue (attached).

[Translator's note: there are many signatures at the bottom of this page, only a few of them readable, e.g. Ponomarev, Skachkov, Talyzin, Simonov, Smirtyukov); to the left is the number "6" crossed out and replaced by "12" and the date "14.1.80" crossed out and replaced by "18.1.1980"; at the bottom it says "With a copy of the note to GKEhS and the USSR Ministry of Communications" and "distributed 29.01.80, Khalturina"]

SPECIAL FOLDER
Top Secret
Attachment
to Point 59gs, Minutes N° 195

Draft

USSR COUNCIL OF MINISTERS
INSTRUCTION

[date not filled in] 1980

Moscow, the Kremlin

I. In connection with an appeal by the Afghan side consent to the granting of technical assistance in 1980-1983 in the construction and operation of a 1000 kWt medium-wave radio broadcasting station on the territory of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.

To pay the expenses associated with giving this assistance, grant the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan a credit in the sum of up to 10 million rubles at 3-4 percent annual interest with repayment over 10 years, beginning two years after the corresponding part is used.

GKEhS jointly with the USSR Ministry of Communications is to hold talks with the Afghan side and write up the agreement reached in an appropriate document.

2. The USSR Ministry of Communications is to ensure the performance of the obligations of the Soviet side to grant technical assistance to the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan in building and operating the above radio station.

3. The Ministry of the Communications Equipment Industry is to deliver to the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan in 1981-1982 according to production orders of the general supplier, the USSR Ministry of Communications, a 1000 kWt medium-wave radio transmitter complete with the regulating equipment, spare parts, and measuring devices needed for regulating work and operation.

4. The USSR Ministry of Installation and Special Construction Work [*Minmontazhspetsstroy*] is to manufacture and deliver to the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan in 1981 according to production orders of the general supplier, the USSR Ministry of Communications, the complete metalwork of the antenna system and send specialists to the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan to install the delivered metalwork.

Chairman
of the USSR Council of Ministers

A. Kosygin

[two illegible signatures]

Top Secret

NOTE
(to N° 0142)

The USSR ambassador to the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, Cde. Tabeyev, has reported (spets N° 117) that the new government of the DRA confirms the earlier adopted decision to build a 1000 kWt radio broadcasting station.

Chief of the CC CPSU Transport
and Communications Department

[signature]

K. Simonov

4 January 1980

[Handwritten note:]

What is the attitude of the new
Afghan government toward this?

M. S. [Translator's note: perhaps Suslov]
14.1.80

[Final version:]

SPECIAL FOLDER
Top Secret
SPECIAL FOLDER

[Stamp: "CC CPSU
0142
11 Jan 1980
2nd Sector

Subject to return to the
CC CPSU General Department"]

CC CPSU

Granting Technical Assistance to the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan in the
Construction of a 1000 kWt Medium-Wave Radio Broadcasting Station

In connection with an appeal by the Afghan side, the USSR State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations (Cde. Skachkov) and the USSR Ministry of Communications (Cde. Talyzin) are proposing to grant technical assistance in 1980-1983 to the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan in the construction and operation of a 1000 kWt medium-wave radio broadcasting station with an antenna system by performing planning and surveying operations, delivery of equipment and materials, and also sending Soviet specialists. Keeping in mind that the Afghan side will provide the planning and construction of secondary and offsite structures, the general construction work and provision of a labor force for the installation work for the radio station, and also its subsequent operation.

The expenses of Soviet organizations come to about 10 million rubles; it is proposed they be paid by granting the DRA a credit under the conditions specified in USSR Council of Ministers Decree N° 1018-291 of 14 November 1979.

GKEhS jointly with the USSR Ministry of Communications is to hold talks with the Afghan side and write up the agreement reached in an appropriate document.

The CC CPSU departments support the proposal of GKEhS and the USSR Ministry of Communications. It has been coordinated with the USSR MID

(Cde. Mal'tsev), USSR Gosplan (Cde. Inozemtsev), and the USSR Ministry of Installation and Special Construction Work (Cde. Mekryukov).

A draft CC CPSU decree is attached.

Chief of the CC CPSU Transport
and Communications Department

Deputy Chief of the CC CPSU
International Department

[signature]
K. Simonov

[signature]
R. Ul'yanovskiy

11 January 1980
N° 25-S-78

SPECIAL FOLDER
[handwritten "62"]

Top Secret

Copy N° 1

[Stamp on the right: CC CPSU
0090

07 Jan 1980

2nd Sector

Subject to return to the
CC CPSU General Department"]

[Stamp on the left: "Outgoing N° 029
7/2 1980
First [[faded, perhaps "Department
CC CPSU"]] USSR]

CC CPSU

In accordance with a decision of 22 March 1979 a group of GKEhS, USSR Ministry of Communications, and USSR Gosplan experts held talks with the Afghan side in Kabul in August 1979 regarding the question of building a powerful medium-wave broadcasting station on the territory of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan to organize national broadcasting, the conditions and timeframes for construction of this radio station and its location.

In the course of the talks the construction site of the radio broadcasting station was specified as in the area of Kandahar [underlined by hand].

In November 1979 the Afghan side requested to change the location of the radio station, having in mind that it be built in the area of Kabul [underlined].

GKEhS and the USSR Ministry of Communications, considering the capabilities of the construction organizations of the Afghan side, think it possible to give technical assistance to Afghanistan in building and operating a 1000 kWt medium-wave radio station with an antenna system in 1980-1983, deliver equipment and materials, and also send Soviet specialists.

The Afghan side should thereby provide planning and construction of secondary and offsite structures, the general construction work, and provide a labor force for the installation work for the radio station, and also its subsequent operation.

["mb. 1045" typed at the bottom of a page]

The payment of the expenses of Soviet organizations to help create a powerful radio station in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, which comes to about 10 million rubles, can be done by granting the DRA a credit under the conditions specified in USSR Council of Ministers Decree N° 1018-291 of 14 November 1979. In this case it means that the payment of expenses associated with the travel of Soviet specialists and the deliveries of materials will also be done by extending a credit. The part of the credit used in 1980 for payment of work connecting with planning will come to 300,000 rubles.

The CC CPSU draft decree coordinated with the USSR MID (Cde. Mal'tsev), USSR Gosplan (Cde. Inozemtsev), USSR Minfin (Cde. Dementsev), Minpromsvyaz' [Ministry of the Communications Industry] (Cde. Kobin), and USSR Minmontazhspetsstroy (Cde. Mekryukov) is attached [Translator's note: found on a separate document with Skachkov's and Talyzin's signatures and the date 21.12.79].

Please review [this].

Chairman of GKEhS
[signature]
S. Skachkov

USSR Minister of Communications
[signature]
N. Talyzin

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[CC CPSU letterhead]

TOP SECRET

N° St-198/9s
of 19.2.1980

Excerpt from CC Secretariat Minutes N° 198 § 9s

Assisting the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan in Strengthening the Mass Media

1. Considering the political situation in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) Soviet mass media are to continue work to explain the actions of the Soviet Union directed at defending the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of Afghanistan, the good neighborly relations of friendship and cooperation between the peoples of the Soviet Union and Afghanistan, and unmask the anti-Soviet, anti-Afghan policy unleashed by imperialist circles and the Peking hegemonists. Give comprehensive aid to the Afghan mass media in propagandizing the policy of the new leadership.

2. Draw the attention of the Afghan friends to the need to increase the publications reflecting the positive changes in the domestic life of Afghanistan. The USSR State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting and the "Novosti" Press Agency are to widely distribute these materials through their foreign channels.

3. In order to help the DRA mass media charge:

USSR Gosteleradio:

with allocating, in cooperation with the USSR Ministry of Communications, available radio broadcast equipment and doubling the time of Soviet radio broadcasts in Dari and Pashto on fixed frequencies, ensuring their reception in Afghanistan and contiguous areas of Pakistan;

receiving a group of five Afghan television and radio workers in the USSR for a three-month internship in the 2nd or 3rd quarters of 1980;

reorganizing the correspondents' office of USSR Gosteleradio in Kabul into a branch and adding the positions of radio correspondent and secretary to its table of organization;

sending a three-person Soviet television photography group to Afghanistan (correspondent, camera operator, and sound man) in the 1st or 2nd quarters of 1980 for two months;

increasing the amount of television materials send to Afghan television, primarily topical television news items and counterpropaganda material. Prepare a half-hour program about the USSR [entitled] "Our Great Northern Neighbor" dubbed in Dari for a monthly television program.

TASS:

help the "Bakhtar" Agency organize a foreign service. With this in mind, TASS and the USSR Ministry of Communications are to set up a Kabul-Moscow radiotelegraph communications channel and provide a subsequent relay of information received from Kabul to Arab countries, Europe, and countries bordering the DRA;

help the "Bakhtar" Agency to sign an agreement with the Indian agency UNI about distributing materials about the life of the Afghan people through its channels;

send the Afghan side 20 teletypes with Farsi type and spare parts free of charge and also Soviet-made equipment and operating manuals worth up to 200,000 Soviet rubles;

send an adviser for up to six months to be put at the disposal of the "Bakhtar" Afghan News Agency to help in organizing its work;

receive up to six workers of the "Bakhtar" Afghan News Agency in Moscow for a three-month internship, entering them temporarily on the TASS rolls within the allotted limits of the labor and wage fund and paying the expenses for their winter equipment [*ehkipirovka*] of the interns;

send give specialists to the DRA to help train personnel, install, and tune transceivers.

APN:

increase the total single-issue circulation of the magazine "Akhbar" published by APN in the DRA in Dari and Pashto to 20,000 copies;

beginning in 1980 increase the publication of literature by APN in Dari and Pashto, primarily on issues of the theory and practice of the CPSU and the experience of political and ethnic policy in the USSR;

organize the publication of illustrated newspapers with labels [*nadpisi*] in Dari and Pashto.

The USSR State Committee for Publishing, Printing, and the Book Trade:

in coordination with the DRA Ministry of Information and Culture send a group of specialists to Kabul to improve the organization of production, the training, and upgrade the qualifications of the local printing house workers;

in coordination with the DRA Ministry of Information and Culture and jointly with the USSR State Committee for Professional and Technical Education organize the training of Afghan printers in the USSR within the established quota;

in conjunction with the USSR Ministry of Installation and Special Construction Work train and send specialist to Kabul to help start a six-color offset newspaper rotary printing press.

4. The USSR Ministry of Higher and Specialized Secondary Education jointly with the Afghan side is to select up to 20 Afghan students with an education in the humanities studying in Soviet higher educational institutions and train them to work in Afghan newspapers, radio, and television, and also to hold talks with the Afghan side about the acceptance of Afghan students in the journalism schools of Soviet higher educational institutions in 1980 and 1981.

5. The USSR State Committee on Cinematography is to conclude an agreement with the Afghan side for collaboration in the area of the joint creation of documentary films in Dari and Pashto showing the changes in the life of the Afghan people, denouncing the subversive activity of imperialist circles and Peking against the independence of Afghanistan; assistance to the Afghan side in distributing Soviet feature and documentary films dubbed in Uzbek and Tajik.

6. For the material, technical, and financial provision of aid to the Afghan mass media charge:

The USSR Ministry of Finance:

with providing a targeted designation of appropriations from the state budget to cover the expenses of TASS and the USSR Ministry of Communications in organizing a Kabul-Moscow radiotelegraph communications channel and providing the relay of information received from Kabul for 1980 and succeeding years;

with attributing the expenses for sending specialists to Kabul through the channels of the USSR Goskomizdat and USSR Minmontazhspetsstroy to the USSR State Budget [appropriation] for giving free aid to foreign countries;

with jointly deciding the issue with APN of the source of financing of the expansion of Agency's publishing activity in Dari and Pashto.

The USSR Ministry of Communications:

to organize the radio communications channels of the "Bakhtar" Agency from Kabul with the capitals of 10 provinces as the places are ready; send the Afghan side 20 complete RSO-300 and RSO-30 transceivers with antennas and gasoline generators worth up to 100,000 Soviet rubles;

send 10 specialists to the DRA to help train personnel, install, and tune transceivers.

The Ministry of the Communications Equipment Industry is to manufacture 10 RSO-300 transceivers in 1980 from the USSR Ministry of Communications stock [fond].

USSR Gosplan is to allot an additional 80,000 rubles to TASS in freely convertible currency to purchase equipment for the Afghan news agency "Bakhtar".

The Ministry of Foreign Trade is to purchase 20 Siemens teletype machines with Farsi type in 1980 with delivery to TASS for the Afghan news agency "Bakhtar".

The Ministry of Civil Aviation:

is to provide passage of Afghans to Moscow and back to Kabul with payment in Soviet rubles (six people upon request of TASS, five people upon request of USSR Gosteleradio);

provide delivery to Kabul of 20 RSO-300 and RSO-30 transceivers with antennas and gasoline generators at the expense of the USSR Ministry of Communications with payment in Soviet rubles;

provide delivery to Kabul of 20 Siemens teletypes with spare parts and also Soviet-made equipment and operating manuals allotted by TASS at TASS' expense in Soviet rubles.

The Main Directorate of Foreign Tourism of the Council of Ministers is to permit payment for the boarding of TASS' Afghan interns in Moscow according to the price list used for Soviet citizens.

CC SECRETARY

Sent to: [not filled in]

33vs

Report on the meeting of the foreign secretaries of the closely cooperating socialist countries in Moscow on 26 February, 1980

29 February 1980

**HUNGARIAN SOCIALIST WORKERS' PARTY
CENTRAL COMMITTEE
FOREIGN DEPARTMENT**

TOP SECRET

**Written in two copies
Budapest, 29 February 1980.**

**INFORMATIVE REPORT
to the Political Committee**

The foreign secretaries of the central committees of the parties of the closely cooperating socialist countries - the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, the German Democratic republic - held a conciliatory meeting in Moscow on 26 February concerning the topical international questions.

Representing the CPSU Central Committee, Comrade Boris Ponomaryov emphasized that in the present international situation it was extremely important to make detailed analyses and to draw the consequences. For this the contents of Comrade Leonid Brezhnev's declaration of 16 January and his pre-election speech of 22 February provided a good basis. The CPSU thinks that recently the process of easing has suffered serious losses. The basic causes can be defined as the aggressive endeavors of the USA, the arms race provoked by it and the intensification of attacks against socialism. In the foreign political steps of the USA, a role is played by fight concerning presidential elections and the internal political and economic problems of the United States. More and more obvious are the intentions to make the NATO member states line up to support the American politics and to increase the influence of the United States in the world.

The dangers threatening human peace are great, but we must see that Carter's "new" policy has not had the expected result. The United States could not turn

Afghanistan into a base of operations for American imperialism, and it is of principal importance that the USA did not consider it possible to announce military confrontation. This is due to the substantial defensive force of the SU and the socialist community. It means that we should develop our economic and military ability in the future too and improve our armed forces within the framework of the Warsaw Treaty.

The Western-European allies of the USA, with a few exceptions, are unwilling to follow Carter's policy unconditionally. The intentions to block the Soviet Union's economy were thwarted, in this the United States was not followed by Europe, moreover by Latin-America either. Carter is aware that the formation of an anti-Soviet front is impossible without the active participation of Western Europe. The European capitalist countries are interested in staying away from Carter. Some countries are definite, others are more moderate in demonstrating their faithfulness to the Atlantic Alliance, and in reality the unity of the NATO is much smaller than seen in the propaganda.

France's opposition to the United States is becoming stronger and stronger. The behavior of the Federal Republic of Germany is of key importance. The government of the FRG played a decisive role in passing the NATO resolution concerning medium-range missiles, and they express their solidarity with the Carter administration. At the same time, the West-German government declares its commitment to the policy of easing. This is strongly emphasized by Schmidt too, in his message sent recently to Comrade Brezhnev. It is also worth mentioning that, at the session of the leaders of the German Social-democratic Party held in chambers, Schmidt explained that the presence of Soviet troops in Afghanistan served a defensive purpose. The chancellor expressed his disapproval with the refusal to ratify the SALT II, and with the fact that Carter subordinated the USA's interests more and more to his own purposes. The chancellor defined it explicitly that his country would not participate in the economic sanctions against the Soviet Union, it would not sacrifice its Eastern policy and endeavored to prevent the American president from making other mistakes. But the Americans exercise great influence on Schmidt, who shows less resistance than expected probably because he has to take into consideration the political requirements concerning the autumn elections.

The Soviet leadership pays great attention to the points of view of the communist, social-democratic parties and the non-aligned countries. The majority of the sister-parties represents the right position even in the strained international situation, the evolution process started in the leadership of the French CP is especially important. At the same time, we have to sum up the negative phenomena too. The wrong position of the Italian and Spanish communist parties is especially worrying. The Vienna meeting of February of the parties of the Socialist International showed that the social-democracy does not intend to sacrifice easing on the altar of the adventurist politics of the USA.

The USA puts great emphasis on using the events in Afghanistan to increase her influence on the movement of non-alignment and in the Muslim world. The political and economic interests of the developing countries and of existing socialism still coincide but a complicated situation has evolved. Cuba's position has become particularly complicated, the Cuban comrades should receive support to alleviate their situation. We must contribute to the neutralization of the resolutions of the Islamabad conference, and we should prevent the creation of the alliance of hostile Muslim states on the Southern borders on the Soviet Union.

Comrade Ponomaryov gave a brief summary of the events in Afghanistan. He said Taraki and Amin had requested the Soviet Union 14 times since March 1979 to give military help. At the definite request of Amin the number of Soviet military experts and counselors was increased in the middle of December. Obeying the express demanded by the members of the revolutionary council and the government, Amin himself requested 4 times in December the strengthening of the Soviet troops stationed there. On the basis of all this it is obvious that the soviet troops are stationed in Afghanistan complying with the norms of international law. There is no question of occupying the country, the Afghan authorities act independently. The task of the Soviet troops is to ensure the territorial sanctity in close cooperation with the Afghan authorities. The contents of Comrade Brezhnev's pre-election speech confirms that the Soviet Union is ready to withdraw its troops as soon as the United States and Afghanistan's neighbors guarantee non-interference in the country's internal affairs.

In connection with practical problems and tasks, Comrade Ponomaryov emphasized that the Soviet Union definitely disapproved of all American attempts aimed at breaking up the unity of the socialist community. At the same time, she endeavors to maintain relations with the USA according to the words and spirit of the agreements in effect. Reacting to the anti-Soviet steps of the American administration, the Soviet Union suspends the trips of cultural groups, the organization of exhibitions and decreases tourism. At the same time, it maintains connections with some American firms in the sphere of publishing, the protection of copyright, radio and television. If the Americans sabotage the service provided to the planes of the Aeroflot in the future too, the Soviet Union will stop the transportation by Soviet vehicles of the supplies of American representations on the territory of the Soviet Union.

The economic and trade relations between the two countries have always taken place on the basis of mutual advantages. It seems reasonable to further maintain normal business relations, but on the other hand, to show that the socialist countries act on the basis of a harmonized policy.

The Soviet Union endeavors to constructively renew or continue the talks concerning disarmament. The Soviet party is willing to start talks concerning medium-range missiles, independently of the ratification of SALT II and outside the framework of SALT III, demanding to modify or at least, suspend the NATO decision of 12 December and its execution.

In the present situation, the Warsaw Treaty's initiative to summon an all-European conference to deal with the questions of military easing and disarmament is particularly important. It is reasonable to continue the consultations preparing the Madrid meeting, but meanwhile we have to make clear the intentions of the capitalist countries, what character they want to give to the conference.

It was important and timely to cancel the planned political contacts at high level with the United States and the FRG. The Soviet Union's further behavior with the latter depends on whether the West-German government will take concrete steps to contribute to easing. It is beyond doubt that the communist community cannot be interested in the defeat of the present coalition government. Taking this as a starting

point, according to the plans, Chancellor Schmidt's visit to Soviet Union will take place in spring.

It seems right and reasonable to develop political relations further with France and the other member states of the NATO in order to prevent the Carter politics from prevailing.

By boycotting the Moscow Olympics, Carter wants to diminish the prestige of socialism. His endeavors have been thwarted so far, but the situation is still very complicated. The Soviet Union will hold the Olympic Games and we must achieve that the sportsmen of as many countries as possible took part in it.

In the present international situation, it is of particular importance to consolidate economic and scientific-technical cooperation between the countries of the socialist community. We must make efforts to specialize production and develop cooperation to reduce our economic dependence on the capitalist world. The competent Soviet organs should study the possibilities of accelerating the process and of elaborating our agreed activity in the capitalist world market.

We should increase the cooperation between European communist parties. For this, a good opportunity is the joint French-Polish initiative to hold a conference in Paris in April of the representatives of the communist parties of the continent on the reduction of military tension and the promotion of the issue of disarmament. Although e.g. the Italian and Spanish parties categorically object to participating in the conference, it is reasonable to organize the event and look for other opportunities to convince those who disagree.

The CPSU keeps up the conversation and relations with the socialist and social-democratic parties. It considers necessary to make relations more active with the Finnish, West-German, Belgian and other parties in order to solve tense international problems. To beat off the American government's cold war endeavors, all forces supporting peace and the progressive international public opinion should be mobilized.

The representatives of the other sister parties contributing to the meeting unanimously underlined the necessity of the more frequent harmonization of the positions and ideas concerning tasks between the closely cooperating socialist countries under the circumstances of the deterioration of the international situation. They also thoroughly analyzed the causes of international tensions and their position coincided with the Soviet evaluation.

In his speech, Comrade Dimitry Stanishev put a great emphasis on the Bulgarian evaluation concerning the political situation in the countries of the Balkans. He sharply criticized the Yugoslav foreign political endeavors. He underlined the importance of activating our existing relations in order to influence the Western-European political circles in a favorable way.

During the presentation of the Polish point of view, Comrade Andrzej Werblan dealt with the behavior of the governments of France and the FRG emphatically. He stressed that we should approach the individual countries of Western Europe differently. We should treat flexibly the existing political, cultural and other relations and we should strive to make new contacts.

Comrade Vasil Bilak pointed at the extreme danger of American foreign and internal politics, the traditions of anti-imperialist endeavors of socialist countries and the fact that we should make use of the conflicts between the Western states. He stated that we should set up the conditions for the self-sufficiency of socialist countries concerning food and other products.

Comrade Herman Axen presented in detail the evaluation of the Party of Socialist Unity of Germany concerning the West-German situation and political endeavors. He underlined the danger of the hegemonic and revenge-seeking endeavors of the right wing in the FRG. This is why it is our interest to support the present coalition of government, we should contribute to the prevention of Strauss from coming to power.

Comrade András Gyenes analyzed the international situation, pointed at the importance of the offensive peace policy of socialist countries. He presented the point

of view of the HSWP concerning the capitalist countries, first of all, the maintenance of political, economic, cultural and technical-scientific relations with the Western-European countries. He underlined the importance of the consolidation of our relations with the communist parties of socialist countries and the social-democratic parties.

After the meeting of secretaries, with the chairmanship of Comrade O. B. Rahmanyin, a meeting took place at the level of deputy heads of department. At this meeting, the Soviet side emphasized among other things that greater attention should be paid to influencing the Yugoslav foreign politics in a positive direction. According to the CPSU, no "political earthquakes" are expected even after Tito. Surely, the collective system of government will prevail, which has been created by now.

The Soviet side considers it necessary to make further efforts to hold the Paris communist conference successfully in order to make our activity concerning the non-aligned countries more active. They also suggested that the closely cooperating socialist countries should start the elaboration and harmonization of their ideas and recommendations concerning the questions of the contents of the May session of the Political Deliberative Body of the Warsaw Treaty.

The report was prepared by
Gyula Horn

Approved of by
András Gyenes

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[p. 186 Optimistic reports from the Soviet ambassador and 40th Army, April and June 1980:]

Together with the military operations of the counterrevolutionaries, hostile agitation is constantly being improved. At the political level there is an intensification of anti-government and anti-Soviet propaganda. Special ideological groups of the Islamic committees are trying to mislead the masses of peasants and sow mistrust toward the revolutionary DRA government and the democratic reforms being carried out in the country. Considerable efforts are being undertaken to defame Soviet troops. There have been noted cases where the rebels rob and murder the population posing as Soviet soldiers.

Using the methods of terror and intimidation and playing on religious and national sentiments, the counterrevolutionaries have a strong influence on a considerable part of the country's population...

(excerpt from a report of 40th Army HQ)

April 1980

Recently organized mass political and military work has been leading to the well-known consolidation of PDPA ranks, the expansion of ties between the leadership and the population, and a certain stabilization of the situation in a number of regions.

Positive factors in the matter of stabilizing the situation are the operations of DRA armed forces units against counterrevolutionary detachments and groups which are being carried out in a majority of cases with the support of Soviet subunits.

The DRA leadership has begun to step up measures to consolidate the military successes achieved by creating Party and governmental bodies created locally and by organizing mass political work...

[Ambassador] Tabeyev

June 1980

[Source: A. A. Lyakhovskiy's "Tragediya i Doblest' Afgana" ("Tragedy and Valor of the Afghanistan Veteran"), Iskon, Moscow, 1995; Translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg]

23. 6. 1980
4 Exemplare

Gen. H. Creyer
Vertraulich

GA
21. 6. 30

Der in den Beziehungen zwischen unseren Parteien entstandenen Tradition folgend, möchten wir Sie vertraulich über folgendes informieren.

Wir haben Sie seinerzeit über den Einsatz eines begrenzten sowjetischen Truppenkontingents auf dem Territorium der Demokratischen Republik Afghanistan informiert. Wir haben damals auch mitgeteilt, daß diese Aktion entsprechend den mehrfachen Bitten der Führung Afghanistans erfolgte, die/sie an uns richtete im Zusammenhang mit der drastischen Verstärkung der Aggression imperialistischer Kräfte, vor allem der USA sowie Chinas, die Bandenformationen afghanischer, in Pakistan und Iran verschanzter Konterrevolutionäre ausnutzten.

Unter Berücksichtigung dessen, daß den Interventen ernsthafte Niederlagen zugefügt wurden und in diesem Zusammenhang das Bedürfnis nach der Präsenz des gesamten ursprünglich in Afghanistan eingesetzten Truppenkontingents entfällt, erachtet es das ZK der KPdSU jetzt für zweckmäßig, einige Truppenteile zurückzuführen, deren Verbleib zum gegenwärtigen Zeitpunkt nicht notwendig ist. Diese Maßnahme wird in vollem Einverständnis mit der Regierung Afghanistans durchgeführt.

Wenn die gegen die progressiven Kräfte des afghanischen Volkes gegen die Unabhängigkeit und territoriale Integrität der DRA gerichtete Intervention fortgesetzt oder mehr noch, verstärkt wird, dann werden selbstverständlich alle erforderlichen Maßnahmen nicht nur zur Verstärkung der afghanischen Streitkräfte, sondern auch unseres Truppenkontingents in Afghanistan getroffen.

Bei der Rückführung einiger sowjetischer Truppenteile aus Afghanistan gehen wir davon aus, daß die Sowjetunion Afghanistan auch weiterhin politische, militärische und ökonomische Unterstützung zur Gewährleistung der nationalen Unabhängigkeit und territorialen Integrität Afghanistans, zur Festigung des volkdemokratischen Regimes und der führenden Rolle der volkdemokratischen Partei gewähren wird.

Wir wollen die Rückführung einiger sowjetischer Truppenteile aus Afghanistan dazu benutzen, um von Pakistan und Iran die Einstellung der Feindseligkeiten gegen die DRA und der Einschleusung von Interventionen von ihren Gebieten aus nach Afghanistan zu erreichen. Wir rechnen damit, daß unsere Freunde ebenfalls in dieser Richtung wirken werden.

Memorandum of conversation between Vadim Zagladin, first deputy head of the International Department of the CPSU CC and Gyula Horn, deputy head of the HSWP CC Foreign Department on debates inside the Soviet leadership on issues of international politics

16 July, 1980

**HUNGARIAN SOCIALIST WORKERS' PARTY
CENTRAL COMMITTEE
FOREIGN DEPARTMENT**

TOP SECRET!

**Written in one copy
Budapest, 16 July 1980**

RECORD

On 16 July, Wednesday, a private interview took place with Comrade Vadim Zagladin, the first deputy of the head of the International Department of the CPSU CC. Comrade Zagladin said that for several months in the CPSU Political Committee, there had been heated arguments about the Soviet Union's specific foreign political steps, the general evaluation of the international situation and the situation of the communist movement. He emphasized that in this argument Comrade János Kádár's message to the Soviet leadership played an important role, which created a stir and met with different reactions among the individual members of the Political Committee.

Those competent in the Central Committee, including Comrades B. N. Ponomarev and K. V. Rusakov were of the position that the HSWP's opinion contained many elements deserving attention and consideration, which should be implemented in the individual international questions. Mainly this was expressed in the evaluation of the situation and suggestions presented by Comrade B. N. Ponomarev at the February conference of the central committee secretaries of the sister-parties of the closely cooperating socialist countries. Among these the most important could be considered the fact that the socialist countries should make the maximum use of the possibilities contained in existing relations with the Western-European countries to counter-balance the United States' foreign political policy.

During the February conference and afterwards the divergence of opinions and arguments increased between the Central Committee and the leaders of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Comrade Korniyenko, the first deputy foreign minister accused the CC apparatus of opportunism, the lack of principle because of the concessions made to Western-European countries. In the practical sphere this was also expressed by the fact that, following the instructions of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Soviet cultural organs, pushing aside all agreements in effect, cancelled the Soviet cultural events scheduled in France, the FRG and other capitalist countries. The determined manner of the Central Committee was needed to revoke this provision.

After Comrade Brezhnev's recovery and return to work, the power relations between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Central Committee changed significantly. Comrade Gromiko, against his own and his counselors' opinion, was forced to accept the proposal to meet Foreign Minister Muskie in Vienna. They also managed to do away with the position of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, according to which Chancellor Schmidt's visit to Moscow would have been organized so that it could become obvious to the West-German government that the Soviet Union would be willing to strengthen partnership relations with the FRG only if certain conditions were fulfilled.

There is a remarkable divergence of opinions between the leaders of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Central Committee in military questions too. The MFA leadership categorically objected to making any gesture, having talks with the NATO concerning medium-range missiles. Comrade Brezhnev's personal influence and his direct action were needed for the CPSU Political Committee to make them approve of the new suggestions about talks.

There are arguments concerning the solution of the Afghan problem too. The Central Committee thinks that the efforts should be concentrated on the normalization of the Afghan internal situation, they must strive to achieve that the so-called Afghan question would not be a world political question. Several members of the leadership, first of all, Comrade Gromiko and others, still think that this question should be treated as one that shows the Soviet Union's resolution to defend the interests of strategy.

Within the Soviet leadership there are arguments going on also about what steps are necessary to solve the new problems arising in the international communist movement. Some think the reduction of financial aid, the narrowing down of bilateral relations and strict criticism are needed to suppress opportunist trends. Such opinions are sometimes expressed in different statements, publications. Comrade Zagladin thinks that there is a need for stating what one thinks in principle, but it would be a mistake to take steps that would harm relations seriously and so would minimize the possibility of influencing.

Gyula Horn

12. 8. 1980

4 Ex. *DJK*

Gen. Arlee

Vertraulich

35

Wie bekannt, hat eine Gruppe von Mitgliedsländern der UNO den von den Vereinigten Staaten inspirierten Vorschlag über die Aufnahme des Punktes "Die Lage in Afghanistan und ihre Folgen für den internationalen Frieden und die Sicherheit" in die Tagesordnung der XXXV. Tagung der UNO-Vollversammlung eingebracht.

In diesem Zusammenhang wurde den sowjetischen Botschaftern, natürlich unter Berücksichtigung der Position des Aufenthaltslandes, die Weisung erteilt, darauf hinzuwirken, daß den amerikanischen Plänen entgegengewirkt wird, die UNO für gegen die Sowjetunion, die sozialistische Gemeinschaft und die Demokratische Republik Afghanistan gerichtete Ziele auszunutzen.

Dabei werden sich die sowjetischen Vertreter bei den Gesprächen mit Staatsmännern und Politikern über Afghanistan betreffende Fragen von den Beschlüssen des Juni-Plenums des ZK der KPdSU (1980 den Reden des Genossen L. I. Breschnew und anderer führender sowjetischer Funktionäre sowie anderer, in diesem Zusammenhang früher erteilter Weisungen leiten lassen.

Für die Erläuterung der Position Afghanistans zu den Fragen der politischen Regulierung wird die Erklärung der Regierung der DRA vom 14. Mai 1980 genutzt werden (der volle Wortlaut des Textes wurde in der "Prawda" vom 15. Mai 1980 veröffentlicht).

Bei der Arbeit mit offiziellen Vertretern der Gruppe von Ländern, die früher (im Januar d. J.) unter den Initiatoren waren, die "afghanische Frage" vor der UNO zu stellen, und jetzt nicht zu denjenigen gehören, die den Vorschlag über die Erörterung dieser Frage auf der XXXV. Tagung der UNO-Vollversammlung eingebracht haben (die Türkei, Griechenland, die BRD u.a.), gilt es hervorzuheben, daß eine weitere Nichtbeteiligung des entsprechenden

Landes an dem offen propagandistischen Vorhaben, die "afghanische Frage" auf der bevorstehenden Tagung der UNO-Vollversammlung erneut zu erörtern, den Interesse der internationalen Entspannung und der politischen Regelung der Lage um Afghanistan sowie einer konstruktiven Arbeit der Tagung der Vollversammlung zu wirklich wichtigen Problemen dienen würde.

In Gesprächen mit Vertretern der Länder, die Mitautoren des Resolutionsentwurfes sind, wird betont werden, daß diese Länder mit ihrem Einverständnis, als Mitautoren des Vorschlags über die Aufnahme der "afghanischen Frage" in die Tagesordnung der XXXV. Tagung der UNO-Vollversammlung zu gelten, gewollt oder ungewollt in die Rolle von Handlangern derjenigen geraten sind, die danach streben, die Spannungen um Afghanistan und in der Welt insgesamt zu verschärfen.

Es wird bekräftigt werden, daß die hegemonistischen Mächtschaften der USA und Chinas gegenüber Afghanistan nicht nur gegen die DRA, wo sie unvermeidlich scheitern werden, sondern auch gegen andere Entwicklungsländer und nichtpaktgebundene Länder gerichtet sind. Die USA nutzen die Ereignisse in Afghanistan als falschen Vorwand für die Verstärkung ihrer militärischen Präsenz im Mittleren und Nahen Osten sowie den umliegenden Regionen, womit sie die Sicherheit und Unabhängigkeit der Länder Asiens und Afrikas gefährden.

Die sowjetischen Botschafter werden der Hoffnung Ausdruck geben, daß das entsprechende Land seine Position korrigieren und keinerlei Aktivität zur Behandlung der "afghanischen Frage" auf der UNO-Vollversammlung an den Tag legen wird, deren alleinige Stellung wir schon nicht anders als eine gegen Afghanistan und die Sowjetunion gerichtete Aktion bewerten können.

In den Gesprächen mit Politikern der Länder, die gegen die Ausnutzung der UNO durch die Kräfte des Imperialismus und des Hegemonismus für die Einmischung in die inneren Angelegenheiten Afghanistans und für

die Entfaltung einer antiafghanischen und antisowjetischen Kampagne auftreten, wird deren Position hoch bewertet und der Hoffnung Ausdruck gegeben werden, daß diese Länder nicht nur selbst gegen die Erörterung der sogenannten "afghanischen Frage" auf der XXXIV. Tagung der UNO-Vollversammlung auftreten, sondern diesen Standpunkt auch anderen Ländern nahebringen, zu denen sie Kontakte unterhalten. In den Gesprächen mit Vertretern Indiens wird bekräftigt werden, daß die Sowjetunion das ausgewogene Herangehen Indiens an die um Afghanistan entstandene Lage und die richtige Einschätzung der Grundursachen für die Verschärfung der Lage in Südwestasien durch die indische Führung hoch bewertet.

In Moskau wird der Tatsache große Bedeutung beigemessen, daß die Regierung Indiens die Schädlichkeit der Versuche bestimmter Kräfte sieht, die UNO und insbesondere die bevorstehende Tagung der UNO-Vollversammlung in eine Diskussion hereinzuziehen, die die Atmosphäre um Afghanistan nur anheizen, jedoch in keiner Weise zu einer politischen Regelung der Frage beitragen kann.

Wir werden der Hoffnung Ausdruck geben, daß Indien sein hohes internationales Ansehen, darunter unter den nichtpaktgebundenen Ländern, nutzen wird, um der Erörterung der sogenannten "afghanischen Frage" in der UNO entgegenzuwirken.

Die afghanischen Genossen werden wir über die Arbeit informieren, die wir differenziert mit den verschiedenen Gruppen der UNO-Mitgliedsländer leisten werden, um einer Behandlung der "afghanischen Frage" auf der bevorstehenden Tagung der Vollversammlung entgegenzuwirken.

Gleichzeitig wird sich der sowjetische Botschafter dafür interessieren, wie die von den afghanischen Genossen vorgesehenen Maßnahmen für eine entsprechende Arbeit mit UNO-Mitgliedsländern in der bis zur Tagung der Vollversammlung verbliebenen Zeit in der Praxis realisiert werden.

Unserer Meinung nach wäre es sehr nützlich, in kurzer Zeit einen
Sammelband von Dokumenten und anderen Materialien vorzubereiten,
die einerseits von der breiten Binnischung der imperialistischen
Mächte und ihrer Handlanger in die inneren Angelegenheiten der
DRA und andererseits von den Anstrengungen der Regierung der DRA
zur politischen Regelung der um Afghanistan entstandenen Lage
zeugen, der von afghanischer Seite in der UNO verbreitet werden
sollte. Wenn die afghanische Seite diesen Standpunkt teilen sollte,
wird die Presseagentur "Nowosti" bereit sein, ihr jede notwendige
Hilfe bei der Vorbereitung eines solchen Sammelbandes zukommen zu
lassen.

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[pp. 230-1, unsourced September 1980 document, presumably from intelligence sources]

On 30 January [1980] a group of Afghans from counterrevolutionary groups (48 men) arrived in the US. It was sent for military training at US armed forces bases in Texas and California.

In order to acquire intelligence information, in particular, information about new airfields, deployment areas of Soviet troops, and also the "facts" of their use of chemical weapons, US servicemen (Deyver) and (Kimpen) George were sent into Afghanistan from the regular Pakistani Army in March.

Construction of an American training center to train Afghan counterrevolutionaries was completed in March in the area of the village of Sarabrud (40 km from Quetta, Pakistan). About 20 American advisers work at the center, who teach Afghans the tactics and methods of waging guerilla warfare. After training, the personnel who have received the highest marks are sent to the US for one year to continue training.

In April the US Congress voted to allocate "direct and open aid" to the rebels (\$15,000,000), officially legalizing interference in the internal affairs of a sovereign member state of the UN...

At a conference of leaders of the Afghan counterrevolution in Peshawar in April US Ambassador to Pakistan Hinton announced the readiness of the US to increase financial and military aid to the counterrevolutionaries on condition they joined in a united front.

In April the US Air Force delivered to Peshawar about 4000 chemical grenades, which were distributed among rebel representatives for use in combat operations in the DRA.

Representatives of American special services have requested permission of Pakistani authorities to help the Afghan counterrevolutionaries by direct deliveries of weapons and ammunition...

In the area of Musan (15 km south of Kabul) American advisers and specialists are directly participating in teaching rebels the tactics of waging combat operations. Two Americans work as instructors in the "Lambar-2" camp in the population center of Warsak (Peshawar region).

From March to June the US delivered weapons worth \$4,500,000 to the Afghan counterrevolutionaries....

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[CC CPSU letterhead]

TOP SECRET

N° St-227/73gs
of 09.09.80

Excerpt from CC Secretariat Minutes N° 227 §73gs

Measures Against a Discussion of a Draft Resolution Containing Points of an
Anti-Soviet and Anti-Afghan Orientation at the 67th Conference of the
Interparliamentary Union

Approve the text of the instructions to the Soviet ambassador to the
Democratic Republic of Afghanistan on this issue (attached)

[the draft contains two illegible signatures]

[the final version is signed by "CC SECRETARY"]

Results of the voting: "For" [probably "M. Suslov"]

Gorbachev, Kapitonov,
Dolgikh "For" (see the proceedings)

[illegible signature]

4930 Excerpts to Cdes. Gromyko and Ponomarev
10.9.80 to Cde. A. P. Shitikov
[date missed] Sept 1980

Distributed: 09.09.1980 (Shareve)

[TsKhSD identification stamp on the draft copy]

Secret

CC CPSU

[08Sep80 24651
2nd Sector
Subject to return to the
CC CPSU General Department]

Measures Against a Discussion of a Draft Resolution Containing Points of an
Anti-Soviet and Anti-Afghan Orientation at the 67th Conference of the
Interparliamentary Union

In connection with preparations for the 67th Conference of the Interparliamentary Union (it will be held from 14 to 25 September of this year) the Westerners have managed at meetings of the bodies of this Union to draft points distorting the events around Afghanistan and the nature of the Soviet aid to the DRA into the draft of the resolutions.

In accordance with the charter and the rules of procedure of the Interparliamentary Union consideration of this draft will be continued in Berlin first in the Political Commission and then it will be put to a vote of the plenary session of the Conference itself. According to preliminary information parliamentarians of about 80 countries will take part.

In accordance with directives the delegation of the USSR Parliamentary Group (lead by Cde. V. P. Ruben) will speak against discussion of the "Afghan issue" in bodies of the Interparliamentary Union at the meetings in Berlin.

Considering the stubborn attempts of the Westerners to impose an unacceptable decision on the Conference about the "Afghan issue", the CC CPSU International Department and the CC CPSU Department [SIC] ought to draw the attention of the corresponding departments of the CC's of other fraternal Parties of the socialist countries to the need to speak out together against these attempts. We think it also advisable to turn to the DRA leadership with a suggestion to protest to the Interparliamentary Union against intentions to grossly interfere in the internal affairs of Afghanistan (drafts of these resolutions have been printed in publications of the Interparliamentary Union).

Inasmuch as at the present time Afghanistan does not have a parliament and is not represented at the Interparliamentary Union such a protest could be sent on behalf of the highest body of government authority, the Revolutionary Council.

Deputy USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs Cde. S. P. Kozyrev supports the suggestion.

A draft CC CPSU Decree is attached.

Deputy Chief of the CC CPSU
International Department

[signature] A. Chernyayev

8 September 1980
N° 18-S-1630

KABUL

[to the] SOVIET AMBASSADOR

Inform the DRA leadership of the following.

The 67th Conference and meetings of other bodies of the Interparliamentary Union will be held in Berlin from 14 to 25 September of this year.

One of the main themes of the Conference will be the issue of strengthening détente. By a majority of votes Westerners have managed to drag into a draft resolution about détente and disarmament points which grossly distort the events around Afghanistan and the nature of the internationalist aid being given the DRA by the Soviet Union within the framework of discussing this issue at meetings of the bodies of the Interparliamentary Union.

These points read as follows:

"3. Condemns as unacceptable any situation arising as a result of the use of force in international relations, invasion, or interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states, in particular the USSR's invasion of Afghanistan;

4. Calls upon the Soviet Union to withdraw its troops from Afghan soil as soon as possible and give the Afghan people the opportunity to decide their affairs without interference and manipulation from without and insists on the implementation of the UN General Assembly Resolution of 14 January 1980 which contains an appeal to all countries to respect the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence, and non-aligned status of Afghanistan and refrain from any interference in the internal affairs of this country".

The discussion of the "Afghan issue", obviously instigated by representatives of the US, was formally started at the initiative of 12 Muslim parliamentarians (including Morocco, Sudan, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Turkey, Tunisia, and the United Arab Emirates).

In spite of our active countermeasures and appropriate work which our friends from the GDR and other fraternal countries are doing, there remains the possibility that the Westerners will try to impose a resolution on the Conference in Berlin containing points with an anti-Soviet and an anti-Afghan orientation.

In this connection it would be desirable that the highest body of government authority in Afghanistan – the Revolutionary Council – would send a telegram with an expression of appropriate protest to the leadership of the Interparliamentary Union (the Chairman of the Interparliamentary Council is Rafael Caldera and the General Secretary of the Interparliamentary Union is Pio Carlo Terenzio; the headquarters is in Geneva).

The telegram could declare a resolute protest against the discussion in the Interparliamentary Union of the "Afghan issue" which cannot fail to be considered by the DRA government as premeditated gross interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan and disclose the democratic reforms occurring in the country and the importance of the aid being given by the Soviet Union.

It is advisable in the telegram to demand that the leadership of the Interparliamentary Union convey the principled position of the highest body of government authority of the DRA to the members of the Executive Committee, the Interparliamentary Union, and all members of the Conference. It would be desirable to send a copy of the telegram to the Chairman of the 67th Interparliamentary Conference, who will be the representative of the GDR Volkskammer, and also to the parliamentary groups of the countries of the socialist commonwealth.

It would also be advisable that the Afghan side make appropriate demarches to the ruling circles of the countries whose parliamentary representatives were initiators of raising the "Afghan issue" at the meetings of the Interparliamentary Union executive bodies in Oslo.

Report by telegraph when this has been done.

3vv

[Source: A. A. Lyakhovskiy's "Plamya Afgana" ("Flame of the Afghanistan veteran)", Iskon, Moscow, 1999; Translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg]

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[CC CPSU letterhead]

TOP SECRET

Nº St-233/67gs
of 22.10.1980

Excerpt from CC Secretariat Minutes Nº 233 §67gs

[Faded CC CPSU stamp with the words "2nd Sector" readable]

Secret

CC CPSU

Publication of an Article in Connection with the Anti-Soviet Action of the Italian Socialist Party

At the end of September an international conference with the name: "Leftists for Afghanistan" was held in Rome (cipher telegram from Rome, spets. Nº 1227 of 29 September 1980). The monthly magazine of the Italian Socialist Party (ISP) "Mondo Operaio" was the organizer. The conference had an openly anti-Afghan and anti-Soviet thrust and followed a course of demonstrating solidarity with the Afghan rebels, who were presented as "fighters for democracy and freedom".

Together with the representatives of the French and Spanish socialist parties well-known anti-Soviets such as the Frenchman (Ellenstein) and the Italian Strada, the Czech renegade Pelikan, and others took part. Representatives of emigrant Afghan counterrevolutionaries were also invited to the conference.

Although the Italian Communist Party did not officially take part in the conference a member of the CC ICP R. Ledda spoke at its concluding stage and a member of the ICP leadership U. Terracini was part of the so-called "Committee of Solidarity with Afghanistan" which was created.

We consider it advisable to speak out with a critical article in connection with the malicious act of the Italian Socialist Party and the participation in it of members of the Italian Communist Party. The article could be published in the magazine "Novoye Vremya".

A draft CC CPSU Decree is attached.

Deputy Chief of the CC CPSU

International Department

[signature] A. Chernyayev

16 October 1980

N° 18-S-1846

Publication of an Article in Connection with the Anti-Soviet Action of the Italian Socialist Party

Publish an article in the magazine "Novoye Vremya" in connection with the anti-Soviet action of the Italian Socialist Party (attached).

[Translator's note: the above text was also used in a CC CPSU Resolution]

CC SECRETARY

[two illegible signatures in the draft]

Results of the voting [all "for":]

[seven mostly illegible signatures]

651 Excerpts to Cdes. Ponomarev, M. Fedorov, and Tyazhel'nikov
11980

Distributed: 22.10.1980 (Shareve)

6iye

[TsKhSD identification stamp on the draft copy]

Attachment
to point 67gs of Minutes N° 233

REGARDING A CONFERENCE IN ROME

At the end of September a meeting of a small group of people organized by the magazine "Mondo Operaio" published by the Italian Socialist Party was held in Rome. The meeting was called an international conference on a topic with a quite ambiguous name: "Leftists for Afghanistan". Such a name could easily mislead an inexperienced person (which, however, the organizers of the meeting were counting on).

Therefore we will say right out: there was no one "for Afghanistan". On the contrary, there was a direct attempt to organize another propaganda stunt directed both against Afghanistan and the Afghan revolution, and against the Soviet Union. What distinguishes this spectacle from many others organized by

imperialist propaganda services was that its chief agents were "leftists". A familiarization with the list of participants of the meeting will help decipher what this means. Together with the official representatives of several socialist parties (Italian, French, and Spanish) in the list there figured people who have turned anti-Sovietism into their main profession. Among them are the Frenchmen (Ellenstein) and Daniel, the Italians Coletti and Strada, the Czech emigrant Pelikan, and several so-called dissidents of lower rank. Also among the "leftists" was an American "Afghanistan specialist" M. Barry, whom the press has repeatedly pointed out as being in touch with the CIA.

Representatives of the Afghan counterrevolution abroad acted as consultants to this gathering of the "left" public. These are the same people entrenched in Pakistan and several other countries who are directing the vile blows of bandit gangs against the Afghan people. ON their consciences are the murders of Afghan women and children, teachers and religious figures, the torching of schools and the poisoning of wells. The aforementioned "leftists" sat at one table with such "freedom fighters".

The above composition of the participants naturally determined the direction of the discussion. The speakers completely ignored the most important facts determining the situation in Afghanistan today: the strengthening of people's power in the country and the elimination of bandit gangs in many regions of Afghanistan with the broad support of Afghan workers.

Out of touch with the reality of Afghanistan, the participants of the Rome meeting have drawn up fanciful projects to "liberate" the Afghan people and even create a "Committee of Solidarity with Afghanistan" (!?)

Of course, the "liberators" are shooting the main arrows in the direction of the Soviet Union, which has given international aid to the Afghan people in a fight against foreign interference. In doing so they have not at all been confused that this aid to revolutionary Afghanistan has been given in full accordance with the existing treaty between our two countries and at the request of the Afghan government.

There have been found among them such people (such as the Italian, Coletti, for example) who have called for the West to close ranks against the Soviet Union. All of them who, in the opinion of this ardent "philosopher", violate "Western solidarity" ought to be anathematized.

All this fuss of "the leftists" in Rome around the Afghan issue is needed to deflect attention of the public from what they are actually seriously concerns them. But what really troubles them right now first of all is a real stepping up of the American military presence and the all the more open interference into the affairs of the countries of the Near and Middle East. The public sees that the greater threat to world peace is in these facts.

The story of the unworthy spectacle arranged by the leadership of the Italian Socialist Party could end with this. And the participation of representatives of French socialists in it is not surprising. Our magazine has already twice this year directed readers' attention at correcting the positions of the leadership of this socialist party. Hence the organization of a meeting of numerous "Euroleftist" in Rome and its nature should not evoke special surprise. Yes and it should not generally be of special interest in the Italian capital, even if some representatives of the Italian Communist Party play up to it.

It is true that the ICP refused to officially participate in this meeting; however at its concluding stage all the same a member of the CC ICP Ledda and a member of the ICP leadership Terracini became a member of the aforementioned "Committee of Solidarity with Afghanistan" (read - Committee of Support to Counterrevolutionary Groups).

Not for the first time have representatives of the ICP ended up as participants in campaigns hostile to our country. This cannot fail to provoke questions; obviously by no means just from Soviet people.

[on the final copy:] 14vv

[on the draft copy:] 2 copies

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ST 333/14gs of 24.10.1980

TOP SECRET

DECREE
of the CC CPSU Secretariat

Regarding Payment of the Travel of Foreign Journalists in Connection with
Events of the International Union of Journalists (MOZh)

Charge the Ministry of Civil Aviation with transporting two Afghan journalists according to the itinerary Kabul-Moscow-Prague-Moscow-Kabul and give members of an International Union of Journalists delegation from Moscow to Kabul with payment of the expenses by the USSR Union of Journalists in Soviet rubles.

[two illegible signatures]

Results of the voting

"For" [M. Suslov]

Gorbachev, Ponomarev, Kapitonov,
Dolgikh, Zimyanin, Rusakov "for"
(see the proceedings)

5784 Excerpts to Cdes. Ponomarev, [Minister of Civil Aviation Marshal of Aviation B.] Bugayev, Afanas'yev, Tyazhel'nikov, and Garbuzov.
23Oct1980

Distributed: [illegible]

Secret
Copy N° 1

[faded CC CPSU stamp probably belonging to one of the General Department's sectors]

CC CPSU

On 27 October an expanded meeting of the General Secretariat of the International Union of Journalists (MOZh) will be held in Prague to which two representatives of the leadership of the DRA Union of Journalists have been invited. After the meeting in Prague a group of its participants headed by President of the MOZh K. Nordenstreng (totalling six representatives of the SRV [Socialist Republic of Vietnam], GDR, USSR, Czechoslovak SSR, and the DRA) will visit Afghanistan, India, and Sri Lanka.

In accordance with an appeal of the MOZh we request Aeroflot be permitted to transport with payment in Soviet rubles

a) two Afghan journalists on the itinerary Kabul-Moscow-Prague-Moscow-Kabul;

b) five foreign journalists from Moscow to Kabul and from Colombo to Moscow (the part of the route from Kabul to Colombo will be paid by the MOZh).

Please examine [this].

Deputy Chairman of the Board of the
USSR Union of Journalists

Ya. A. Lomko

[signature]

Outgoing N° 0143
8 October 1980

Secret

CC CPSU

Regarding Payment of the Travel of Foreign Journalists in Connection with
Events of the International Union of Journalists (MOZh)

On 27 October an expanded meeting of the General Secretariat of the MOZh will be held in Prague at which it is intended to accept the DRA Union of Journalists as a member of the MOZh. Two representatives of the DRA Union of Journalists have been invited to the meeting.

Days of international solidarity with Afghan journalists are being held on the occasion of the acceptance of the Union of Journalists of Afghanistan as a member of the MOZh. A five-member MOZh delegation (representatives of Finland, Sri Lanka, the SRV, GDR, and CSSR) headed by MOZh President K. Nordenstreng is being sent to participate in this event.

The MOZh has turned to the USSR Union of Journalists with a request to help them pay for the passage of two Afghan journalists from Kabul to Prague and back and for five members of the MOZh delegation to travel from Moscow to Kabul.

The USSR Union of Journalists (Deputy Chairman of the Board, Cde. Lomko) considers it advisable to support the request of the MOZh and requests that Aeroflot be instructed to carry the Afghan journalists and the MOZh

delegation with payment of the expenses in Soviet rubles by the USSR Union of Journalists. The Ministry of Civil Aviation (Deputy Minister Cde. Pavlov) is agreeable to this.

We consider it possible to support the proposal of the USSR Union of Journalists.

A draft CC CPSU Decree is attached.

Deputy Chief of the CC CPSU
Propaganda Department
[signature] G. Smirnov

Deputy Chief of the CC CPSU
International Department
[signature] R. Ul'yanovskiy

23 October 1980

FOR INFORMATION

The USSR Union of Journalists (Deputy Chairman of the Board, Cde. Lomko) has proposed that the Union pay for the travel of a 5-member delegation of the International Union of Journalists (MOZh) on the itinerary Prague-Moscow-Kabul-Colombo and from Colombo to Moscow.

The CC CPSU Propaganda Department considers it advisable to only pay for the travel of the MOZh delegation from Moscow to Kabul. It is recommended that the remainder of the expenses be attributed to the MOZh.

[signature] (Sh)ubkov

24. 10. 1980
4 Ex.

24. 10. 80
Vertraulich

I n f o r m a t i o n

Über die in Moskau durchgeführten Verhandlungen mit dem Generalsekretär des ZK der Demokratischen Volkspartei Afghanistans, Vorsitzenden des Revolutionärsrates und Ministerpräsidenten der DRA, Babrak Karmal

Die wichtigsten politischen Ergebnisse der Verhandlungen sind in der von L. I. Breschnew und Babrak Karmal unterzeichneten "Erklärung der Sowjetunion und der Demokratischen Republik Afghanistan" enthalten, die am 20. Oktober d. J. in der sowjetischen Presse veröffentlicht wurde und mit der sich die Freunde bestimmt bereits bekanntmachen konnten.

In Ergänzung dessen möchten wir die Freunde vertraulich über folgendes informieren.

B. Karmal und die anderen afghanischen führenden Funktionäre brachten ihren aufrichtigen Dank für die Hilfe zum Ausdruck, die die Sowjetunion der Demokratischen Republik Afghanistan im Kampf gegen die ausländische Intervention, bei der Verteidigung der Errungenschaften der April-Revolution sowie beim Aufbau eines neuen Lebens erweist. B. Karmal hob hervor: Ohne die rechtzeitige Hilfe der Sowjetunion, darunter die militärische Hilfe, wäre die Revolution niedergeschlagen worden und Afghanistan hätte aufgehört, ein souveräner und unabhängiger Staat zu sein.

Von unserer Seite wurde bekräftigt, daß die Sowjetunion auf der Seite des revolutionären Afghanistan gestanden hat und immer fest stehen wird und daß wir die Hilfeleistungen und die Unterstützung des afghanischen Volkes und seiner Regierung als unsere internationale Pflicht betrachten.

Beim Meinungsaustausch über die Kernfragen der Entwicklung des revolutionären Prozesses in Afghanistan wurde von uns die Richtigkeit des von den afghanischen Freunden eingeschlagenen innenpolitischen Kurses hervorgehoben, der von der Einschätzung des Charakters der April-Revolution als einer national-demokratischen Revolution ausgeht. Hier ist es wichtig, nicht voreilig zu handeln, allseitig den Erfolg jedes der nächsten Schritte bei der Entwicklung der Revolution durchzuarbeiten und zu sichern.

Ein derartiges Vorgehen, sagte L. I. Breschnew Babrak Karmal, ermöglicht es, mit bedeutend mehr Überlegung und Flexibilität an die Lösung vieler Fragen der Entwicklung der Revolution heranzugehen, als es - aus diesen oder jenen Gründen - von der früheren Führung des Landes getan wurde. Es geht insbesondere um solche Fragen wie das Verhältnis zu den religiösen Kreisen, die Kontakte zu den Stämmen und natürlich die Verwirklichung der Agrarreform.

Die Aufmerksamkeit B. Karmal wurde auch darauf gelenkt, daß jetzt neben den Aufgaben der Mobilisierung der Partei und des Volkes für den Kampf gegen die Intervention und Konterrevolution Fragen der Wirtschaftstätigkeit immer mehr in den Vordergrund rücken. Es muß alles für die Hebung und Entwicklung der nationalen Wirtschaft, die Erhöhung des Lebensniveaus der Bevölkerung, vor allem der Arbeiter und Bauern getan werden. Diese Klassen müssen die realen Früchte der Revolution so schnell wie möglich zu spüren bekommen. Denn gerade sie müssen doch die breite soziale Stütze der revolutionären Macht sein.

In diesem Zusammenhang haben wir B. Karmal mitgeteilt, daß das ZK der KPdSU beschlossen hat, der DRA zur Realisierung eines Komplexes von Maßnahmen zur Entwicklung der Volkswirtschaft der Republik und Erhöhung des Lebensniveaus der Bevölkerung zusätzliche Hilfe zukommen zu lassen.

In Hinsichtung der militärisch-politischen Situation im Lande sagte B. Karmal, daß insgesamt genommen in den Stimmungen des afghanischen Volkes positive Wandlungen zu verzeichnen sind und daß das Vertrauen zur revolutionären Macht wächst, daß jedoch die Gewährleistung der Sicherheit und die Säuberung des gesamten Territoriums Afghanistans von inneren Konterrevolutionären und aus dem Ausland, vor allem aus Pakistan, eingeschleusten Banden immer noch Aufgaben von erstrangiger Bedeutung bleiben.

Im Interesse einer erfolgreicherer Lösung der Aufgaben zur endgültigen Zerschlagung der Konterrevolution und der Mobilisierung breiter Volksmassen für den Kampf gegen sie mißt die afghanische Führung der schnellsten Schaffung einer breiten nationalen Front große Bedeutung bei, einer Front, die Vertreter aller Klassen und Schichten der afghanischen Gesellschaft, darunter auch die patriotisch gesinnte Geistlichkeit und die Stämme vereint, mit denen ständig gearbeitet wird.

Während der Verhandlungen und in einem unter vier Augen geführten Gespräch zwischen L. I. Breschnew und B. Karmal wurde der Frage der notwendigen Überwindung der Fraktionemacherei in den Reihen der DVPA und der erforderlichen Sicherung der Einheit der Partei in allen ihren Gliederungen besonderes Augenmerk geschenkt. Völlig offen wurde er darauf hingewiesen, daß die immer noch bestehenden Meinungsverschiedenheiten innerhalb der Partei sich negativ auf die Kampfkraft der Partei selbst und folglich auch auf die Lage in der Armee, im Staatsapparat und im Lande insgesamt auswirken. Es wurde betont, daß die Frage der Herbeiführung der organischen und nicht mechanischen Einheit der Partei die Schlüsselfrage ist. Von ihrer schnellsten Lösung und der Fähigkeit, sich über die früheren Meinungsverschiedenheiten zu stellen, hängt ab, inwieweit sich die Partei als fähig erweist, ihre revolutionäre Mission zu erfüllen, hängt auch das Schicksal der Revolution selbst ab. Es wurde auch hervorgehoben, daß die DVPA nicht nur gegenüber dem eigenen Volk die Verantwortung für das Schicksal der Revolution trägt. Ihre Verantwortung ist ebenso international, wie die Hilfe und Unterstützung international sind, die der afghanischen Revolution gewährt werden.

Babrak Karmal erklärte, daß das Politbüro des ZK der DVPA der Frage der Einheit vorrangige Beachtung schenkt und ständig an dieser Frage arbeitet. Er schätzt ein, daß die Frage der organisatorischen und politisch-ideologischen Einheit der DVPA zu 70-75 Prozent als gelöst betrachtet werden kann.

Die Fragen der politischen Regelung der Lage um Afghanistan wurden entsprechend den den Freunden bekannten Vorschlägen der Regierung der DRA vom 14. Mai d.J. erörtert. Dabei wurde unterstrichen, daß die konsequente Durchführung der zwischen der UdSSR und der DRA abgestimmten Linie und die Unterstützung durch andere Bruderländer ihre Früchte tragen. Die auf eine Veränderung des Charakters des revolutionären Regimes in Afghanistan ausgerichteten Pläne brechen nach und nach zusammen. Die Versuche, die Legitimität der Regierung des revolutionären Afghanistan in Zweifel zu stellen und gegen

Afghanistan eine Verschwörung der Nichtanerkennung anzusetzen, sind fehlgeschlagen. Die äußere und innere Konterrevolution hat natürlich noch nicht die Waffen gestreckt, doch die Zeit arbeitet für das neue, revolutionäre Afghanistan, das unbeirrt an Stärke gewinnt.

Was die Einschätzung der gegenwärtigen internationalen Lage und der außenpolitischen Initiativen der Bruderländer anbelangt, so teilen und unterstützen die afghanischen Freunde diese voll und ganz.

Bei der Erörterung der Lage in Südasien wurde festgestellt, daß die subversive Tätigkeit der USA und Chinas in dieser Region an Aktivität gewonnen hat. B. Karmal hob besonders die Gefahr hervor; die davon ausgeht, daß das Regime des Zia-ul-Haq zum willfährigen Werkzeug der Politik des amerikanischen Imperialismus und des chinesischen Hegemonismus wurde und in der Rolle eines unverwundlichen Feindes der Aprilrevolution in Afghanistan auftritt.

Babrak Karmal stimmte der von uns geäußerten Meinung zu, daß die Festigung der Beziehungen Afghanistans zu Indien sich als ein wichtiger Beitrag zur Vereitelung amerikanisch-chinesischer Pläne in dieser Region erweisen kann. In Anbetracht der Notwendigkeit, die Lage im Mittleren Osten zu verbessern, beabsichtigen die afghanischen Freunde auch, die Arbeit zur Regelung der Beziehungen zu Iran fortzusetzen, obwohl das gar nicht so einfach ist.

Insgesamt können wir, daß der Besuch Babrak Karmals in der Sowjetunion zeitgemäß und nützlich war. Wir hoffen, daß die Gespräche mit B. Karmal und den anderen afghanischen Genossen, die noch über keine genügenden Erfahrungen der Führung des Landes verfügen, ihnen helfen werden, diese Erfahrungen zu gewinnen.

Babrak Karmal brachte seinerseits die Überzeugung zum Ausdruck, daß sein Besuch in der UdSSR einen positiven Einfluß sowohl auf die Konsolidierung der innenpolitischen Situation und die Stärkung des revolutionären Regimes in Afghanistan als auch auf die Festigung der außenpolitischen Positionen der DRA haben wird.

Soviet briefing on the talks between Brezhnev and B. Karmal in Moscow

29 October, 1980

**HUNGARIAN SOCIALIST WORKERS' PARTY
CENTRAL COMMITTEE
FOREIGN DEPARTMENT**

TOP SECRET!

BULLETIN

On 28 October 1980, Comrade János Kádár received Comrade V. Pavlov - at his request -, who informed him in the name of the CPSU Central Committee about the talks carried on with Babrak Karmal, the secretary-general of the Afghan People's Democratic Party CC, the president of the Revolutionary Council of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, prime minister.

"The main political achievements of the talks are reflected in the document signed by L. I. Brezhnev and B. Karmal, "The Declaration of the Soviet Union and the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan", which was published in the Soviet press on 20 October, and which our friends are already probably familiar with.

We would like to give our friends the following complementary confidential information:

B. Karmal and other Afghan leaders have expressed their frank appreciation of the support the Soviet Union is providing to the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan in the fight against the foreign intervention, in defense of the April revolution, in building the new life. B. Karmal emphasized that, without the timely, among other, military help of the Soviet union, the revolution would have been put down and Afghanistan's existence as a sovereign and independent state would have ceased.

We have confirmed that the Soviet Union has stood up firmly and will do so in the future for the Afghan revolution and we consider it our internationalist obligation to provide support and aid to the Afghan people and government.

During the exchange of opinions about the central questions of the development of the Afghan revolutionary process, we pointed at the correctness of the internal policy chosen by our Afghan friends, which started from the fact that the April revolution was of a national democratic character. Related to this, it is important not to rush forward, so that they would be able to elaborate from various aspects and ensure the success of the next step in the development of the revolution.

L. I. Brezhnev explained to B. Karmal that such an approach made possible greater consideration and flexibility in the solution of several questions of the development of the revolution than was shown by the earlier leadership of the country for some reason. Here we think of questions like the relations with religious circles, tribes and, of course, the execution of the agrarian reform.

We also drew B. Karmal's attention to the fact that, besides the tasks of the mobilization of the party and the people to fight against the intervention and the counter-revolution, the questions of economic activity are being moved more and more to the first place. It is necessary to do everything to revive and develop the national economy, to raise the standard of living of the population and, first of all, of all workers and peasants. As it is them who have to form the wide social base of the revolutionary power.

Concerning this, we told B. Karmal that the CPSU CC had taken a resolution to provide additional aid to the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan having the aim of the realization of comprehensive measures concerning the development of the people's economy and the raise in the standard of living.

Evaluating the military-political situation in the country, B. Karmal said that in the mood of the Afghan people there were on the whole positive changes, the confidence in the revolutionary power was increasing. At the same time, it would always remain a task of first-rank importance to defend the security of Afghanistan's territory and to clear it of internal counter-revolution and the gangs arriving from abroad, mainly Pakistan.

In the interest of the more successful solution of the tasks of the final destruction of the counter-revolution and the wide-range mobilization to fight against it, the Afghan leadership attributes great importance to the setting up of a national front with a wide base, which would embrace the representatives of all classes and layers of the Afghan society, including the patriotic clergy and the tribes, among whom they are carrying on continuous work.

During the talks and the private meeting of B. Karmal and L.I. Brezhnev, special attention was paid to the need for putting an end to cliques among the members of the PDPA and for guaranteeing the unity of the party at each level. We told B. Karmal with full frankness that the still existing controversies within the party had a negative influence on the party's readiness to fight and consequently the situation of the army, the state apparatus and the whole country. We emphasized that the creation of the organic, not mechanical unity of the party was a key problem. It depended on the solution of this as soon as possible and on the readiness to rise above earlier conflicts, to what extent the party would be able to carry out its revolutionary mission, the fate of the revolution itself depended on this. We also emphasized that the PDPA bore responsibility for the fate of the revolution not only to its own people. Its responsibility was of internationalist character just like the aid and support given to the Afghan revolution.

B. Karmal stated that the Political Committee of the PDPA Central Committee paid special attention to the question of unity and carried on continuous work aimed at it. According to his evaluation, the question of the organizational and ideological-political unity of the PDPA can be considered solved to 70-75%.

We discussed the questions concerning the political settlement of the Afghan situation based on the recommendations of 14 May this year of the government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan well-known by our friends. In this respect, we emphasized that the consistent realization and support by other brotherly countries of the policy harmonized between the Soviet Union and the DRA would have its positive results. The plans to change the character of the Afghan revolutionary system would be thwarted and so would be the attempts to question the legality of the revolutionary Afghan government and invent plots to prevent its recognition.

The internal and external counter-revolution has not surrendered yet, but time is on the side of the new, revolutionary Afghanistan becoming stronger and stronger with undiminished energy.

As for the evaluation of the international situation and the foreign political initiatives of the brotherly countries, our Afghan friends gave expression to their approval and full support.

During the discussion of the South-Asian situation, we pointed to the activation of the USA's and China's intrigues in this area. B. Karmal put special emphasis on the danger of the Zia-ul-Haq regime playing the role of the unforgiving enemy of the Afghan April revolution after becoming the obedient means of the politics of American imperialism and the Chinese hegemony.

B. Karmal approved of our opinion concerning the fact that the consolidation of relations between Afghanistan and India might contribute to a great extent to the prevention of American-Chinese intrigues in this area. Realizing the need for the improvement of the near-East situation, our Afghan friends also intend to continue the work concerning the settlement of their relations with Iran, although this is not a simple task.

On the whole, we think that B. Karmal's visit to the Soviet Union was timely and useful. We hope that the talks carried on with B. Karmal and the other Afghan comrades who do not have enough experience in governing the country will be of help to them in acquiring such experience.

B. Karmal expressed his conviction that his visit to the Soviet Union would have a positive influence on the consolidation of the internal political situation and the strengthening of the system of the revolutionary power in Afghanistan, just like on the stabilization of the foreign political positions of the DRA."

Budapest, 29 October 1980.

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[p. 190 Soviet ambassador in Kabul reports the use of armed Party activists against the rebels, October 1980]

Armed detachments of Party activists and members of the Democratic Organization of the Youth of Afghanistan are becoming an ever more practical [*real'naya*] force. Right now detachments of Party activists and members of the youth organization have been created in all provinces; essentially they are the most organized force among the various Afghan formations and it is advantageous that they are notable among them for their good fighting spirit.

The operations of the detachments of Party activists and SGI officials [The Service of State Information later became the Ministry of State Security – author's note] together with military operations played no little role in the improvement in the situation in such provinces as Herat, Kandahar, and Nangarhar to some degree...

Tabeyev, Kozlov

October 1980

[Source: A. A. Lyakhovskiy's "Tragediya i Doblest' Afgana" ("Tragedy and Valor of the Afghanistan Veteran)", Iskon, Moscow, 1995; Translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg]

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CC CPSU letterhead

[Translator's note: This document and its attachments are a combination of various drafts]

TOP SECRET

St-241/8s
of 16.12.80

Excerpt from Minutes N° 241, para 8s of the CC Secretariat

Additional Measures to Aid the PDPA in the Development of Ideological Work

1. The editors of the newspapers "Pravda", "Izvestiya", "Komsomol'skaya Pravda" are to each send one employee to the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan for a period of up to one year each as advisers to the newspapers "Pravda of the April Revolution ["Pravda Aprel'skoy Revolyutsii"]", "Khiwad", and "Banner of Youth ["Znamya Molodezhi"]", paying their wages at the same rate as their own correspondents abroad.

Expenses to send the "Pravda" employee are to be drawn from the reserve account in the Party budget; for the "Izvestiya" employee, from the "Izvestiya" Publishing House; for the "Komsomol'skaya Pravda" employee, from the CC VLKSM [Komsomol].

2. The USSR Ministry of Higher and Specialized Secondary Education is:

- to send two Soviet instructors to work in the journalism school of Kabul University for a period of up to two years, [expenses] to be paid by the Soviet side;

- to jointly organize with the USSR Ministry of Culture the selection of up to 30 Afghan citizens annually for study in secondary and higher creative and cultural and educational institutions from the total quota of Afghan students studying in the USSR.

3. The CC CPSU Publishing House "Plakat" is to publish and send at the request of the Afghan side 50,000 rubles annually worth of posters, illustrated pamphlets, and other publications in the Dari and Pashto languages, free of charge.

4. The "Novosti" Press Agency, in coordination with the Afghan side is to prepare and publish in the Dari and Pashto languages in the 2nd and 3rd quarters

of 1980 a series of brochures explaining the main principles of DRA domestic and foreign policy directed at the mass Afghan reader.

5. The CC VLKSM, the VTsSPS [All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions], and the USSR Ministry of Health are to help the DRA Central Council of Trade Unions and the CC of the Democratic Youth Organization of Afghanistan organize restful relaxation for Afghan youth in 1981-82.

6. The Union of Soviet Societies for Friendship and Cultural Ties With Foreign Countries jointly with the All-Union Copyright Agency, the USSR Union of Journalists, the USSR Union of Writers, the USSR Union of Artists, the USSR Union of Composers, the USSR Union of Cinematographers, and the All-Russian Theater Society within two months are to develop and present proposals to the CC CPSU about the establishment of annual prizes of a Soviet cultural center in Kabul (one prize each from each of the above organizations) for representatives of the Afghan creative intelligentsia.

7. The USSR Ministry of Culture is:

- in coordination with the DRA Ministry of Information and Culture to make purchases of drawings and works of applied art from Afghan artists for USSR museums;

- to organize a book exchange between leading Soviet and Afghan libraries.

8. The USSR Ministry of Finance together with the USSR Ministry of Higher Education, the USSR Ministry of Culture, the USSR Ministry of Communications, the Ministry of the Communications Industry, the USSR State Committee for Publications, the "Novosti" Press Agency, the USSR Union of Journalists, the USSR Union of Writers, the USSR Union of Journalists, the USSR Union of Composers, the USSR Union of Cinematographers, the All-Russian Theater Society are to determine sources for covering the expenses associated with extended additional aid to the PDPA.

9. Approve the draft instruction of the USSR Council of Ministers (attached).

[A 10 December draft signed by:] Chief of the CC CPSU Propaganda Department, Ye. Tyazhel'nikov; Deputy Chief of the CC CPSU Department of Foreign Political Propaganda, V. Falin; and Deputy Chief of the CC CPSU International Department, R. Ul'yanovskiy]

CC SECRETARY

[From an earlier draft: Adopted at the CC Secretariat meeting of 16.12.1980 [[by]] CC Secretaries M. A. Suslov, A. P. Kirilenko, I. V. Kapitonov, M. V. Zimyanin, and K. V. Rusakov [[all recorded as having voted in favor]]; the surname "Yermolayev" is handwritten below these names. Excerpts are noted as having been sent to: "Cdes. Andropov, Gromyko, Demichev, Ponomarev, ?Yelyutin?, Garbuzov, Shamshin, ?Peshetrovskiy?, Pervyshin, Stukalin, ev, Pastukhov, Kruglyakov, Pankin, Tolkunov, V. Norash_s'yev, Distributed 16.12.80 Finozhanov

Sent to: [from an earlier draft]:

34-lf

Attachment
To Point 8s, Minutes N° 241

Draft

USSR COUNCIL OF MINISTERS

INSTRUCTION

of [date not filled in] December 1980

Moscow, the Kremlin

In order to extend additional aid to the PDPA in developing ideological work:

1. The USSR Ministry of Communications is to send to the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan 16 mobile amplifiers in the second half of 1981 for use in the "zones of responsibility". The Ministry of Communications is to manufacture and deliver 16 AGU-20 special-purpose vehicle-mounted loudspeakers. The USSR State Supply Committee is to allocation 16 UAZ-469 vehicles from the USSR Council of Ministers' reserve for this purpose.

Expenses associated with the manufacture and shipment of these mobile amplifiers to the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan are to charged to the USSR State Budget appropriations for free aid to foreign countries.

2. The USSR State Committee for Publishing jointly with GKEhS [the State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations] is to organize the training of five Afghan polygraphers in the Soviet Union for a period of up to four months each.

The expenses associated with the training of these Afghan polygraphers are to be charged to the USSR State Budget appropriations for free aid to foreign countries.

Chairman of the
USSR Council of Ministers

N. Tikhonov

MEMO

1. The proposals described in the note of the CC CPSU Departments about additional measures to aid the PDPA were coordinated:

- Point 1 – with Chief Editor of the newspaper "Pravda", Cde. V. G. Afanas'yev; First Secretary of the CC VLKSM Cde. B. N. Pastukhov; Chief Editor of the newspaper "Izvestiya", Cde. P. F. Alekseyev;

- Point 2 – with Deputy USSR Minister of Culture, Cde. Yu. Ya. Barabash;

- Point 3 – with Deputy USSR Minister of Higher and Secondary Specialized Education, Cde. N. N. Sofinskiy and Deputy USSR Minister of Culture, Cde. Yu. Ya. Barabash;

- Point 4 – with Deputy Chairman of the SSOD [Union of Soviet Friendship Societies] Cde Ye. V. Ivanov; Deputy Chairman of the VAAP [All-Union Copyright Agency], Cde. A. A. Vvedenskiy; Deputy Chairman of the USSR Union of Journalists, Cde. Ya. A. Lomko; Secretary of the USSR Union of Writers, Cde. Yu. N. Verchenko; Secretary of the USSR Union of Artists, Cde. V. I. Volodin; First Secretary of the USSR Union of Composers, Cde. T. N. Khrennikov; First Secretary of the USSR Union of Cinematographers, Cde. L. A. Kulidzhanov; and Deputy Chairman of the VTO [All-Russian Theater Society], Cde. B. N. Sorokin;

- Point 5 – with the First Secretary of the CC VLKSM, Cde. B. N. Pastukhov; Secretary of the VTsSPS Cde. L. A. Zemlyannikova; and with Deputy USSR Minister of Health, Cde. Ye. Ch. Novikova;

- Point 6 – with Director of the CC CPSU Publishing House "Plakat", Cde. A. V. Shumakov;

- Point 7 – with Chairman of the Board of APN [Novosti Press Agency], Cde. L. N. Tolkunov;

- Point 8 – with USSR Minister of Communications, Cde. V. A. Shamshin; Deputy USSR Minister of the Communications Equipment Industry, Cde. V. A. Kripytis; and Deputy Chairman of the USSR State Supply Committee, Cde. V. N. Ksintaris;

- Point 9 – with Chairman of the USSR State Committee for Publications, Cde. B. I. Stukalin and Deputy Chairman of GKEhS, Cde. V. G. Morozov;

- Point 10 – with Deputy USSR Minister of Finance Cde. S. M. Borisov.

Deputy Chief of the CC CPSU Department of Propaganda

[signature]

V. Sevruk

Secret

[Stamp: 26Feb81 14900
Subject to return to the CC
CPSU General Department]

CC CPSU

The Progress of the Implementation of CC CPSU Decrees About the
Strengthening of Information and Propaganda Work in the Democratic Republic
of Afghanistan

In accordance with the CC CPSU decrees St-198/9s of 19.2.1980; St-209/2s of 6.5.1980; St-220/18s of 22.7./1980; and St-241/8s of 16.12.1980 Soviet institutions and agencies have carried out a series of measures to strengthen the information and propaganda work in the DRA and help the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) in its ideological activity.

Specifically, the following work was and is being done in the second half of 1980 and the beginning of 1981

USSR Gosteleradio

- since June 1980 it has doubled (to 2 hours a day) radio broadcasting to the DRA from Uzbekistan in the Uzbek language;

- from November 1980 to February 1981 five DRA radio and television employees have worked as interns in Tashkent.

TASS

- an adviser has been sent to Kabul to help the Bakhtar Agency;

- TASS communications equipment is used to transmit Bakhtar news to the US, France, the FRG, and also to countries bordering the DRA;

- an exchange of news bulletins has been organized on the basis of an agreement between the Bakhtar Agency and the Indian News Agency UNI;

[Handwritten note at the bottom of the page: Cde. B. N. Ponomarev has been briefed [[signature below, partly off the reproduced page]]

- the Bakhtar Agency has been sent photographic materials and photographic equipment for a photo laboratory.

THE CC CPSU PROPAGANDA DEPARTMENT

- two lecturers of the Department have gone to the DRA to give lectures;

APN

- publication of the magazine "Khambastegi (a version of the magazine "Socialism: The Theory and Practice") in Pashto and Dari began in October 1980 with a press run of 3,000 copies; [publication] of the youth magazine "Yunost" began in November 1980 in these languages with a press run of 10,000;

- publication of a textbook "A Political Literacy Course" in Pashto and Dari began in October 1980; the total press run of literature in Afghan languages sent to the DRA in 1980 was 720,000 (in 1979 it was 290,000);

- a "Handbook for the Party Worker" has been prepared for publication and the handbook "Political Parties of the World" is being prepared;

- materials explaining the Afghan point of view on international events are being distributed through APN channels;

- the augmented staff of the APN bureau in Kabul is being brought up to strength;

- news bulletins of the Bakhtar Agency are being resent to Afghan embassies in a number of capitalist countries.

USSR Goskomizdat

- eight printers were sent to the DRA in November 1980 to organize production, training, and upgrading the skills of local printers;

- fifteen printing specialists arrived in the USSR in February for training;

- the "Russkiy Yazyk" Publishing House issued the "Russian Language for Everyone" training course in Pashto and Dari; the "Gorizont-1" training course is in production;

- the "Progress" Publishing House is preparing the 1st volume of a 3-volume set of the "Selected Works of V. I. Lenin"; it will be handed over for production in the 4th quarter;

- specialists from the "Judicial Literature" Publishing House and the VGO "Soyuzkniga" went to the DRA to help the Afghan publishing house, "Baykhaki" and "Saur";

- two photo correspondents of the "Plakat" Publishing House worked in the DRA in December 1980 and January 1981 to prepare the photoalbum "Afghanistan Today";

USSR Minvuz

- two Soviet instructors went to the DRA to work in journalism courses at the CC PDPA;

- thirty Afghan citizens were selected for a training course in the field of culture in the USSR;

- two candidates for instructor [jobs] at Kabul University are being selected.

USSR Goskino

- ten Soviet FEATURE and documentary films in Uzbek were sent to the DRA in 1980; in 1981 40 films in Uzbek are planned to be sent;

- a joint Soviet-Afghan film "The Plot Against the Republic" dubbed into Pashto and Dari was sent to the DRA.

The USSR Ministry of Communications

- in USSR Gosplan they are working on the issue of building on the border with the DRA a television station and a communications relay system to relay Tajik television to Afghanistan;

- fifteen RSO-300 have been prepared and sent to the DRA and a RSO-30 [has been prepared] for transfer to the Afghan side;

- a 80 kW transmitter and a two-way telegraph channel for the Moscow-Kabul TOR system have been allocated for transmission of Bakhtar Agency news to provincial newspapers of Afghanistan.

The V. I. Lenin Central Museum

- a photo exhibit was sent to the DRA in October 1980; a V. I. Lenin Museum was opened in November 1980 based on it.

The USSR Union of Journalists

- a photographic training laboratory was sent to the Afghan side.

The CC VLKSM

- the configuration of 8 automobile clubs for the Democratic Organization of the Youth of Afghanistan (DOMA) is being concluded; their dispatch to the DRA is planned for May of this year;

- the reception of 15 people in Artek from the DRA is being planned; [they] will be working on the issue of organizing the rest of about 300 Afghan students pioneer camps of the republics of Central Asia in summer of this year.

Glavpur [The Main Political Directorate [[of the Soviet Army and Navy]]

- four groups of singers went to units of the Soviet Army located in the DRA in the second half of 1980; in 1981 it is planned to send 21 groups;

- twenty sets of regimental libraries, 220 complete sets of the works of V. I. Lenin, and 90 sets of selected works of V. I. Lenin have been sent;

- at the present time 122 film projectors and 3 film circulation points are operating;

- three garrisons of Soviet Army have been EQUIPPED FOR TELEVISION; by the end of 1981 all garrisons will be.

The All-Union "Znanyie Society

- a room for technical propaganda equipment has been prepared for the PDPA; the equipment will be sent to the DRA in February 1980.

The "Plakat" Publishing House

- three Afghan artists were interns in the USSR in November 1980;

- eighteen posters in Dari and 18 posters in Pashto have been issued and sent to the DRA free of charge;

- three Soviet artists have been working altogether for eight months in the DRA helping a local political poster school.

The USSR Ministry of Culture

- a regular book exchange has been organized between the V. I. Lenin USSR State Library, on the one hand, and the libraries of Kabul University, the Academy of Sciences, and the Historical Society of Afghanistan, on the other;

- in the 2nd quarter of 1981 a trip of specialists is planned to the DRA to select and purchase pictures and works of applied art from Afghan artists for Soviet museums.

This is reported for your information.

Chief of the CC CPSU
Department of Foreign
Policy Propaganda

[signature]

L. Zamyatin

Deputy Chief of
the CC CPSU
Propaganda
Department

[signature]

P. Luchinskiy

Deputy Chief of
the CC CPSU
International
Department

[signature]

R. Ul'yanovskiy

26 February 1981
19-42

[handwritten at the bottom of the page: "To the archives"]

Secret

CC CPSU

The Progress of the Implementation of CC CPSU Decisions About the Aiding the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan in the Development of Ideological Work

The following could be added to the note of Cdes. L. M. Zamyatin and Ye. M. Tyazhel'nikov:

In August of 1981 one more CC CPSU decree was adopted "Aiding the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) in Propaganda Work", which is being carried out. Monitoring of its implementation has been instituted. The appropriate note will be submitted. The part of the measures specified in the August decision should be carried out in the 1st and 2nd quarters of 1982 (the beginning of operation of the USSR Ministry of Culture complex of buildings in Kabul and an exhibition of Soviet scientific literature in the capital of Afghanistan with subsequent transfer of its displays to the Public Library in Kabul as a gift).

In addition, with the consent of the CC CPSU (June 1981), Soviet ideological institutions have given and continue to give rapid aid to the PDPA in propaganda support of its efforts directed at countering the anti-Afghan campaign in the UN and in the mass media abroad.

The implementation of measures specified by the December 1980 and August 1981 CC decisions will doubtless play their own positive role in the matter of developing agitprop activity among the Afghan population. Additional aid is not required in the immediate future.

This has been reported to Cde. B. N. Ponomarev.

[signed]
(R. Ul'yanovskiy)

4 December 1981
to N° 39030

18-10

[Handwritten at the bottom:]

To the archives [illegible
initials]

To Cde. Ul'yanovskiy

Please [two faded and sometimes
illegible paragraphs, possibly readable]

Secret

[Stamp: 04NOV81 39030
Control
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to the CC CPSU General Department]

CC CPSU

The Progress of the Implementation of CC CPSU Decrees "Additional Measures
to Aid the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan in the Development of
Ideological Work

In accordance with a CC CPSU Decree of 16 December 1980 (N° 241/8s) Soviet institutions and public organizations have carried out a series of measures to give assistance to the PDPA.

The editorial boards of the newspapers "Pravda", "Izvestiya", and "Komsomol'skaya Pravda"

One employee from each editorial board has been sent to the DRA for a period of one year to work as advisers in the Afghan newspapers "Pravda Aprel'skoy Revolyutsii", "Khiwad", and "Znamya Molodezhi".

The USSR Ministry of Higher and Specialized Secondary Education:

Thirty-two Afghan students have begun studies in secondary and higher creative and cultural and educational institutions of the USSR.

Candidates are being selected for two Soviet instructor [positions] for work in the journalism school of Kabul University.

The "Plakat" Publishing House

Thirty-four placards in Pashto and Dari have been printed and sent to the Afghan side and the printing of six more is planned by the end of 1981.

The "Novosti" News Agency

In the 3rd quarter of 1981 using the printing facilities of the city of Kabul 10,000 copies of each of [these] brochures were printed, "Vnutrennyaya politika DRA [The DRA's domestic policy]" and "Rasskazy o reformakh ["Stories of reforms]"; a collection "Vystupleniya Babraka Karmalya ["The speeches of Babrak Karmal]" is being prepared for printing.

The CC VLKSM, VTsSPS, and the USSR Ministry of Health

In order to assist the DRA Central Council of Trade Unions and the CC of Democratic Youth Organizations of Afghanistan restful relaxation for 737 children and 30 teachers from the DRA has been organized in Pioneer camps of the Uzbek SSR, Tajik SSR, and Turkmen SSR; ten Afghan schoolchildren rested at the "Artek" Pioneer camp.

The Union of Soviet Societies for Friendship and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries

Together with the All-Union Copyright Agency, the USSR Union of Journalists, the USSR Union of Writers, the USSR Union of Artists, the USSR Union of Composers, the USSR Union of Cinematographers, and the All-Russian

Theatrical Society proposals were developed to establish annual prizes for representatives of the Afghan creative intelligentsia; the presentation of the prizes will be held annual in April, beginning in 1982.

The USSR Ministry of Culture

Two Soviet specialists have left for the DRA in order to select and subsequently purchase pictures of Afghan artists and works of applied art for Soviet museums. An agreement has been reached with the Afghan side about holding an exhibition of the works of Afghan art in Moscow in May 1982 within the framework of an Afghan Culture Month; upon conclusion of the exhibit a part of the displays will be purchased. The organization of exhibits of contemporary Afghan painting through the USSR Union of Artists is envisioned for the beginning of 1982 in Moscow; it is suggested that a part of the pictures presented at the exhibition be purchased.

A regular film exchange between the leading libraries of the USSR and DRA has been organized.

This is reported for your information.

Chief of the CC CPSU Foreign
Policy Department
[signature]
L. Zamyatin

CC CPSU Propaganda
Department
[signature]
Ye. Tyazhel'nikov

4 November 1981

DECREE

of the CC CPSU Secretariat

The decoration of a group of USSR MVD internal affairs agency workers and
Internal Troops servicemen with USSR awards and medals

1. Adopt the proposal of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs to decorate a group of USSR MVD internal affairs agency workers and Internal Troops servicemen with USSR awards and medals for successful performance of a special assignment to give international aid to the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.

Approve the draft Decree of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium regarding this matter [Translator's note: the word "attached" follows in parentheses but is crossed out].

2. Submit to the Politburo for approval.

[illegible signature]

Results of the voting

"For" [seven signatures, mostly illegible]

330 Excerpts to Politburo
26.12.1980

Distributed: 31.12.1980 Khalturina

Copy

St N° 244/19gs
of 31.12.1980

244 19gs

The decoration of a group of USSR MVD internal affairs agency workers
and Internal Troops servicemen with USSR awards and medals

1. Adopt the proposal of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs to decorate a group of USSR MVD internal affairs agency workers and Internal Troops

servicemen with USSR awards and medals for successful performance of a special assignment to give international aid to the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.

Approve the draft Decree of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium regarding this matter [Translator's note: the word "attached" follows in parentheses but is crossed out].

2. Submit to the Politburo for approval.

SECRETARY

Sent to the CC CPSU Politburo:

- | | |
|--|---------|
| 1. A draft of a CC CPSU Decree | 1 page |
| 2. A note of the CC CPSU Department of Administrative Organs (Cde. Savinkin) of 24 December 1980, Incoming N° OP-3703 | 1 page |
| 3. A note of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs (Cde. Shchelokov) of 8 December 1980 Incoming N° 34060 with an attachment | 3 pages |
| 4. A draft Decree of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium about decorating a group of USSR MVD internal affairs agency workers and Internal Troops servicemen with USSR awards and medals | 2 pages |

Total: 7 pages

31 December 1980 Khalturina

[Stamp:] [Distributed]
[Handwritten:] 231 29 4.1.81

1EN

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[pp. 189-90 December 1980 report and combat plans for January and February
1981]

1. In December Soviet troops in the DRA and Afghan units, together with security organizations, tsarandoy, and Party activists, waged combat operations to defeat rebels mainly in the area of Kabul, the eastern and southern provinces, and also individual groups in the north of the country. As a result of the combat operations more than 3500 rebels were killed and 700 taken prisoner.

At the present time power is being firmly held in all provincial centers. Of the 290 districts (rural districts) in the country, 70% are controlled by the government. Seventy-four districts (rural districts) are under the control of the rebels, or 30% (of these, half of the districts are controlled by rebels in nearly inaccessible mountain regions).

As a whole in Afghanistan significant results have been achieved in the matter of stabilizing the situation. In December alone government authority was consolidated in 34 districts (rural districts).

2. A plan of combat operations for Soviet troops in the DRA and the Afghan armed forces for January and February 1981 has been approved. The plan provides for a concentration of main efforts at defeating rebel formations and consolidating government authority in the most important regions (24 districts in all). Thus no more than 50 districts (rural districts) would remain under rebel control by the end of February.

It also provides for strengthening the protection of the state border. In January and February two additional border battalions will be moved to the border in addition to the 18 already there. The manning level of the border battalions is to be increased to 70% (right now it is 25-35%).

At the present time 400 minefields have been laid in the border zone (more than 500,000 mines along a length of 125 km).

It is planned to create 20 more minefields (25,000 mines along a length of 10 km).

In January and February 1981 tactical military operations [*operativno-voyskovyye operatsii*] are continuing to liquidate the counterrevolutionary underground in the cities of Kabul, Kandahar, Herat, Jalalabad, and Khowst...

Discrimination against officers who previously belonged to the Khalqi wing of the Party continues. As regards those who made the provocations, those who have been identified are not being rewarded and are not being promoted; attempts are being made to remove them from their posts...

(January 1981)

[Source: A. A. Lyakhovskiy's "Tragediya i Doblest' Afgana" ("Tragedy and Valor of the Afghanistan Veteran)", Iskon, Moscow, 1995; Translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg]

Approved
USSR Minister of Defense
Marshal of the Soviet Union

D. Ustinov

8 January 1981

PLAN

of measures to increase the effectiveness of the combat operations of Soviet and Afghan troops in the DRA, summarize, and circulate their combat experience and upgrading of weaponry for January-March 1981

Point number	Measures	Action officers	Period of implementation
1	2	3	4
I. Measures to increase the effectiveness of combat operations			
1	Completely carry out the plan of combat operations for January and February approved on 30 December 1980 by the USSR Minister of Defense to defeat rebel formations and the counterrevolutionary underground. As a result of the combat operations no less than 70% of the territory of the country and 80% of the district and rural district centers are to be liberated from the rebels by the end of February. Disrupt the counterrevolutionaries' plans to step up combat operations during the summer period.	General Staff, Chief Military Adviser in the DRA, Commanding General[s] of the TurkVO, 40 th Army	January-February
2	Take additional measures (use of new technical equipment, increasing the scale of ambush operations and mining, improving intelligence, increasing the effectiveness of attack helicopters) to more reliably cover the Afghan border with Pakistan and Iran	Chief of the MO Engineer Troops, Chief Military Adviser, Commanding General[s] of the TurkVO, 40 th Army	January-February
3	Provide security for the movement of military columns on the main	Chief Military Adviser,	Constantly

	lines of communications of the country. (Further improvement of security and defense, development of engineer constructions, mixed minefields, etc.)	Commanding General[s] of the TurkVO, 40 th Army	
4	Improve and step up all kinds of (especially) agent intelligence to give more reliable support to the combat operations of the troops in the winter period and to identify the intentions and plans of the rebels in a timely manner when switching to operations for the summer period	Commanding General of the 40 th Army, Chief Military Adviser	Constantly (take additional measures on site, [Chief of the GRU] Cde. Ivashutin)
5	Ensure the strengthening of local Party and government authorities in liberated areas (by temporarily quartering Afghan and Soviet subunits in them, and creating and arming Party activists, the local state security organs, and militia)	Chief Military Adviser, Commanding General of the 40 th Army	January-February
6	Form an additional five border battalions and one headquarters of a border brigade and place them on the border. Bring the manning level of the border battalions up to 70%	Chief Military Adviser, KGB representative in the DRA	by 20 March
7	Analyze and evaluate the activities of the counterrevolutionaries in the winter period and the results of combat operations of Afghan and Soviet troops. Prepare ideas about the sequence of operations for the spring-summer period and a directive to the troops specifying the missions for the spring period	General Staff, Chief Military Adviser, Commanding General[s] of the TurkVO, 40 th Army	by 15 March
II. Giving aid, generalizing, and adopting combat experience			
1	To study the state of affairs on site and help increase the combat effectiveness of the troops of the 40 th Army and Afghan army visits to the DRA are to be made by: - the Commander-in-Chief of the Air Forces; - the Deputy to the Minister of Defense for Construction and Quartering of Troops; - the Chief of the USSR MO	according to a special plan	January February

	Engineer Troops		February
2	Operations groups of the Transcaucasus, Central Asian, and Carpathian MD's are to pay visits to the troops of the 40 th Army in order to study the experience of the troops' combat operations in mountainous and desert terrain	according to a special plan	January - March
3	Conclude work on materials to generalize the combat experience, publish it, and distribute it to the field	General Staff, Main Political Directorate, Commanders-in-Chief of the branches of the VS	Conclusion of work - 15 January; Publication - 15 March
4	Prepare a USSR Ministry of Defense directive about the procedure to use the experience of combat operations in Afghanistan during the combat and political training of troops and send the directive to the field together with materials about the generalization of combat experience	General Staff	by 30 March
III. Measures to upgrade combat equipment and weapons and improve their repair and operation			
1	Examine the draft decree of the CC CPSU and USSR Council of Ministers "The Development of Work to Create and Manufacture Reconnaissance Signal Systems" in the USSR Council of Ministers Presidium Commission on Military-Industrial Issues and present it for approval	Deputy to the Minister of Defense for Armament together with the Ministry of Communications Equipment	January
2	The USSR Ministry of Defense (Air Forces) jointly with the Ministry of the Aviation Industry and the Ministry of the Radio Industry are to prepare a draft decision of the USSR Council of Ministers Presidium Commission on Military-Industrial Issues about urgent development of a helicopter-borne heat sensor to determine the coordinates and moment of launch of missiles by studying the engine exhaust (codenamed Mak-V) and	Commander-in-Chief of the Air Forces, Deputy to the Minister of Defense for Armament	January

	present it for approval		
3	Complete preparation of a draft decision of the USSR Council of Ministers Presidium Commission on Military-Industrial Issues about conducting experimental design testing to install 30-mm cannons on a BMD-1 [type of airborne combat vehicle] instead of the 76-mm "Grom"	GBTU [Main Armor Directorate], Main Missile/Artillery Directorate, and Airborne Forces jointly with the Ministry of Agricultural Machinery and the Ministry of the Radio Industry	January
4	Examine the progress of taking measures to increase the reliability and effectiveness of weapons and military equipment on the basis of their combat use and operation in the RA	Deputy to the Minister of Defense for Armament, members of the special coordinating group	February
5	Inspect on site how the decision adopted in October 1990 to organize the operation and repair of armor and wheeled vehicle equipment is being carried out by a visit to the 40 th Army and the Afghan army	Chiefs of the GBTU and Central Autotractor Directorate	March

Chief of the General Staff
 Marshal of the Soviet Union

N. Ogarkov

3 January 1981
 N 312/2/036

[Source: A. A. Lyakhovskiy's "Tragediya i Doblest' Afgana" ("Tragedy and Valor of the Afghanistan Veteran"), Iskón, Moscow, 1995; Translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg]

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[Stamped form, filled in:] P.B. Minutes N° 7 1981
sent to CC CPSU Politburo members for voting

Top Secret
SPECIAL FOLDER

CC CPSU

Delivery of special equipment to the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan for
border forces and detachments of Party activists and for the defense of the
Revolution

According to reports of the Soviet ambassador (spets. N° 397, 424) the Deputy Prime Minister of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, S. A. Keshtmand, has requested free delivery of special equipment to the border forces and detachments of Party activists and to defend the Revolution.

A proposal is being submitted to consent to free delivery to the DRA in 1981 of the requested 45 BTR-60PB with ammunition and 26 field radios for the border forces and 10,000 Kalashnikov AK rifles, 5 thousand Makarov PM pistols and ammunition for detachments of Party activists and to defend the Revolution, all totalling 6.3 billion rubles.

The draft CC CPSU decree is attached.

V. Andropov A. Gromyko D. Ustinov M. Sergeychik

20 April 1981
N° 318/18/001138

[handwritten:] ?initials? – 0938
[a few faded recordkeeping numbers]

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[CC CPSU letterhead]

[Stamp: Subject to return
within three days to the
General Department, 1st
Sector]

TOP SECRET
SPECIAL FOLDER

N° P7147

to Cdes. Brezhnev, Tikhonov, Andropov, Gromyko,
Suslov, Ustinov, Ponomarev, Skachkov,
Smirnyukov

Excerpt from Minutes N° 7 of the CC CPSU Politburo meeting
of 21 April 1981

The Delivery of Special Equipment to the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan

1. Approve the draft instruction of the USSR Council of Ministers on this issue (attached).
2. Approve the text of the instructions to the Soviet ambassador to the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (attached).

CC SECRETARY

[circular stamp with
illegible printing within]

regarding point 47 of Minutes N° 7

Top Secret
SPECIAL FOLDER
Draft

USSR COUNCIL OF MINISTERS
INSTRUCTION

of [date not filled in] April 1981

Moscow, the Kremlin

1. In connection with requests of the government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, consent to free delivery to the DRA in 1981 of special equipment according to attachments N° 1 and 2.

2. GKEhS and the Ministry of Defense are to hold talks with the Afghan Side, guided by point 1 of this instruction. When an agreement is reached GKEhS is to sign the respective agreement.

3. On signature of the Agreement, hold [the following] responsible:

a) the ministries described in attachment N° 1 are to manufacture together with the ministries and agencies in existing cooperation and ship special equipment according to attachment N° 1 for delivery to the RA. While carrying out work associated with the delivery be guided by attachment N° 4 to the USSR Council of Ministers Decree N° 46-13 of 8 January 1981.

b) the Ministry of Defense is to ship from its stock for delivery to the RA special equipment according to attachments N° 1 and 2 to shipping addresses which will be supplied by GKEhS. While the work connected with the delivery is being performed be guided by attachment N° 4 to the USSR Council of Ministers Decree N° 46-13 of 8 January 1981.

4. The MPS [Ministry of Railroads] is to provide first-priority allocation of rolling stock according to Ministry of Defense and supplier factory requests for the shipment of cargo being delivered to the DRA in accordance with this instruction.

5. The Ministry of the Maritime Fleet is to allocate ships in accordance with GKEhS requests for delivery of cargo being delivered to the DRA in accordance with this instruction.

6. The expenses associated with extending free aid in accordance with this instruction are to be borne in Soviet rubles from the USSR State Budget appropriations for free aid to foreign countries and in foreign currency from the GKEhS hard currency plan appropriations.

Chairman
of the USSR Council of Ministers

N. Tikhonov

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illegible printing within]

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Cheremnykh "Ne po stsenariyu Moskvy: Afganistan – pervyye gody tragedii".
"Klint", St. Petersburg, 1995
May 1981 report of military leaders to Ustinov

Appendix № 8

REPORT OF MILITARY LEADERS TO D. F. USTINOV

to USSR Minister of Defense
Marshal of the Soviet Union
Cde. Ustinov, D. F.

We report.

Imperialism is waging an undeclared war in Afghanistan. Following an active policy of political and economic isolation of the DRA, the US, Pakistan, Egypt, and China are giving significant economic aid to the so-called Afghan refugees and are creating and training large contingents of rebel bands on Pakistani and Iranian territory who are then sent into Afghanistan to fight the legal government of the DRA. Political, economic, and purely military sanctions against the DRA have been especially stepped up in the last 2-3 months (in connection with coming to power of the Reagan Administration). Political circles of the US and other countries are following a rigid policy of uniting all counterrevolutionary forces in the DRA in order to concentrate their efforts at overthrowing the legal government of the DRA in the final account.

Naturally, in this situation the chief subject of the political, economic, and spiritual life of the country should be the interests of defending the gains of the April Revolution and subordinating all measures in the country to the actions of the Party and government, the DRA VS [Armed Forces], SGI [State Information Service], and MVD to defeating the domestic counterrevolution, cleaning it out of provincial districts, and establishing government authority in them. The CC PDPA and the government are carrying out measures in this direction to strengthen public institutions, taking economic measures, and also organizing the combat operations of the DRA VS together with the 40th Army in order to defeat rebel groups and establish popular democratic rule in the country. As of 1 August 1980 the DRA government controlled only 134 of 286 provincial districts (46%); as a result of combat operations and work done to organize government rule in the localities, as of 1 May of this year the DRA government controlled 184 of 286 districts (64%), which are practically all of the vital areas of the country. However, as before, rebel influence remains in a majority of the districts which are controlled by the government.

At the same time, we think that in the present military and political situation in Afghanistan, at the present time and in the future, to solve the

problem of defeating the counterrevolution and establishing popular democratic rule in the entire country by the military efforts of the 40th Army and the DRA VS alone would take a very long time, moreover [it would be] unproductive. Thus, for the six month (from 1.11.80 to 1.5.81) 63 districts were liberated from the rebels and [government] rule was established in 31 districts. To successfully defeat the organized counterrevolution in the country and establish popular democratic rule efforts are needed from the Party, government, the DRA VS, SGI, and MVD in the organization of combat against the rebels, attracting broad sectors of the population to their side. Unfortunately, coordinated efforts which are so necessary are not at present being attempted. The political and government leadership of the DRA is not involved in solving this pressing problem in real earnest in full measure; it mainly operates at the highest levels and the rebels [operate] among the populace. As before, in all the political life of the country and also in the resolution of military and other problems a policy is being followed of achieving narrow factional goals (removal of Khalqis), which affects the status of affairs in the Party, DRA VS, and other political and government institutions of the country very negatively.

In our opinion, in this complex situation the efforts of the DRA political leadership need to be directed at solving the main problems and subordinating all political, military, economic, and organizational measures toward this for positive progress and solution.

The military and political situation in the DRA dictates a need for a positive understanding of the role and authority of the PDPA which ought to take upon itself responsibility for the defense and development of the April Revolution. This is possible only if the Party is united and has [close] ties with the people, which is not borne out in practice. Moreover, in recent months the actions of the CC PDPA leadership from the former "Parcham" wing are characterized as a blatant attempt to increase the numbers of its supporters by any means, including in DRA VS Party bodies. This is [also] being done in leading Party and government bodies. The attempt to change the balance of power in the Party in favor of "Parcham" is leading to unscrupulous acceptance in Party provincial and district Party organizations which, in the absence of Party cards and other Party records is connected with a gross violation of a PDPA statute and permits politically immature people or adventurers personally devoted to individual Parchamists to be enrolled on a mass basis as members and candidate members. The Party strength on 1.8.1980 was 26,000. As of 1 January 1981 it was already about 50,000 and on 1 April 1981 as many as 60,000 PDPA members and candidate members. However we have not permitted any attempt at a forced growth of the Party at the expense of Parchamist supporters in the DRA VS. Thus, on 1.8.80 there were about 13,000 PDPA members and candidate members in the DRA VS, among them 11,300 Khalqis and 1,500 Parchamists. As of 1.5.81 there were 15,000 PDPA members and candidate members, of which as before up to 70% were former Khalqis. Thus, for example, in January of this year in the 18th Infantry Division the political department instructor gathered a group of 94 men

from the former Parcham wing who were supposedly in an illegal status and were submitted to CC Secretary Nur for enrollment in the Party and he demanded this be done. We halted the processing.

Representatives of the former Parcham wing are, as a rule, appointed to leading Party and administrative positions in place of workers from the former "Khalqi" wing. Thus the governors of the provinces of Kandahar, Nangarhar, and Parwan have been replaced by Parchamists. The former secretary of the Kandahar GK [City Committee] Cde. Kayum was removed, arrested, and imprisoned without presentation of charges. In a situation which is hostile toward former Khalqis in Kandahar province (the CC PDPA and Revolutionary Council plenipotentiary in the "South" zone is Cde. Sarboland) many Party and government workers and bureaucrats have abandoned their posts, been removed from their positions, or have left Kandahar. At the present time there are practically no Khalqis left in the Kandahar provincial Party committee. The strength of the Party organization in the province has dropped from 530 to 180 PDPA members and candidate members in the past six months. In the Party committees of Kunduz, Baghlan, and several other [provinces] of the 11-13 members of the Party committee 3-4 from the former Khalqi wing are left in each.

An unconcealed attempt to create an overwhelming majority of Parchamists in leading Party and government bodies was displayed by Minister of Defense Cde. Rafi and the Chief of the GlavPU [Main Political Directorate] Cde. Gol Aka on 6 May of this year when 17 of the 20 candidates nominated to the CC and Revolutionary Council were former Parchamists.

With such actions the leading PDPA members have expressed a desire to quantitatively dissolve Party members on the basis of loyalty to former Parchamists and this is more easily accomplished when there are no Party cards and there is no single system of accountability for Party members.

The main and pressing tasks are to strengthen and raise the authority of the PDPA are, firstly, to stop its "Parchamization". This is a dangerous and harmful political game in the face of the decisions adopted about Party unity and should be decisively condemned and halted in all Party organizations. Secondly, establish a period of no more than 2-3 months for issuing Party documents to all members and candidate members; that is, to organizationally form it, the Party, on the basis of "equal" political rights for both Khalqis and Parchamists. It cannot be tolerated and understood that a Party which has been in power for three years is not politically unified and organizationally documented.

Any delay in the issuance of Party cards ought to be viewed as a selfish, intentional political policy of discrediting the numbers of Khalqis in the PDPA, a gradual expulsion of their representatives, and the goal of the CC PDPA's complete "Parchamization" of the Party, which could be fatal in the complex military and political situation in the DRA and lead in the final account to political

revenge against their former enemies (the Khalqis) and an ideological resurrection of adventurism in the Revolution.

Raising the role and authority of the PDPA in the everyday life of the country requires an immediate expansion of the CC PDPA by cooptation. Elections to the CC PDPA in this situation could deprive the former Parcham wing in Party of [its] leading position.

Therefore both the CC PDPA membership and the Politburo and Secretariat ought to be expanded uniformly from both former wings. A preference to just the Parcham wing can lead to a still greater estrangement of the Party CC from the workers of the sectors of the country's population and a considerable part of ordinary PDPA members.

At the present time the leaders of the Party and government of the country are rarely found at the grass roots. Thus, for six months Cde. B. Karmal, except for a recent trip to Jalalabad, has not once been in the provinces and has not met with representatives of the popular masses at the grass roots.

Cdes. Keshtmand, Nur, Zeray, and others rarely travel to the provinces.

Meanwhile the government of the republic is running the country in a passive-bureaucratic, cabinet way and therefore does not know the real state of affairs in the economy and the other processes taking place in the social and political life of the DRA well.

Deputy Prime Minister of the DRA Keshtmand, being the best educated and businesslike, is meanwhile acting in the role of Minister of Planning and does not run the government in practice. Therefore his appointment as Prime Minister of the DRA could exert some influence to increase the activity and efficiency of the government.

The poor functioning of government bodies in the provinces negatively influences the stabilization of the situation in the country.

CC PDPA and Revolutionary Council plenipotentiaries appointed with great powers for the country's zones do not realize their rights in practice and deal with political and organizational work unsatisfactorily. They see the chief purpose of their activity in taking leadership posts from representatives of the former Khalqi wing and replacing them with retainers who are personally trusted people, even with poor political and businesslike qualities. The plenipotentiaries, except Cdes. Layek and Berek (the "East" and "Northwest" zones), do not live right in the zones and therefore rarely deal with the people and if they meet them it is only at meetings in zonal centers, the provinces, and in offices. They do not know the economy of the zones well and do not delve into the activity of the districts.

Thus, Cde. Dekhneshin, who is Chief of the CC PDPA Propaganda Department and Plenipotentiary for the "North" zone, has not visited the zone in more than six months.

Cde. Sarboland ("South" zone) has been in Kandahar from time to time and broke up the administrative organizations under the guise of struggling for Party unity and then tried to do this in the 2nd Army Corps. Cde. Takhzib ("Northeast" zone) took a practically anti-Soviet position.

Such an irresponsible attitude of a majority of zonal plenipotentiaries toward such great and important work in the field occasioned a need to gradually replace them with other more mature and principled people having good organizational capabilities.

The poor work of zonal plenipotentiaries to a considerable degree is explained by the lack of necessary oversight over their activity. There is no demand for their work in the CC PDPA and in the Revolutionary Council of the republic.

The activity of CC PDPA secretaries needs considerable improvement. The small size of the secretariat and the lack of specific direction and sectors for their work does not help at all, which takes away the initiative and businesslike nature in resolving pressing and critically important issues of the Party's and country's activity.

On 5 May Cde. B. Karmal at a meeting with us proposed a system of weekly meetings between the USSR Ambassador to the DRA, the Chief Military Adviser to the DRA, and the heads of the groups of Party advisers and USSR KGB representatives with the Deputy Prime Minister and CC PDPA secretaries, and sometimes with the DRA Minister of Defense and Minister of the State Information Service to examine all issues which arise.

B. Karmal himself will not take part in these meeting-conferences [SIC].

We think that the proposal of these weekly meetings with the participation of the above people will not be advantageous for the Soviet side for the following reasons:

First, the system which has already been in existence for six months [whereby] any of the four named Soviet representative or their deputies meet with senior Afghan leaders allows for not only a mutual exchange of information but for necessary measures to be quickly taken;

Second, meetings of the top people on the Soviet side with just CC PDPA and DRA government officials who do not actually have the right to make

important decisions, even one more time per week, will lead to the consideration of a considerable number of problems which have arisen possibly being dragged out and turned into lengthy and fruitless discussions.

The attitude toward our proposal of 30 April about creating an extraordinary commission headed by one of the CC secretaries to restore Party and government control in Kandahar can serve as an example of this. Everyone agreed with the proposal but the commission has not been created:

Third, Cde. B. Karmal has announced that at these meetings he foresees the possibility of criticism of not only Afghan leaders but also of Soviet [leaders], and thus is not afraid of accusations of anti-Sovietism.

This could be used to blame existing shortcomings and oversights in the leadership of the country on Soviet comrades;

Fourth, the decision of B. Karmal not to participate himself in the work of these meetings ought to be viewed as an attempt to place himself above all the Soviet representatives in Afghanistan. Under such a system the tendentious provision of information to B. Karmal is not precluded, and accordingly unjustified and ill-advised decisions. All the more, at no level can the military aspects of our activity approved by the USSR Ministry of Defense be examined.

Cde. Karmal did not comment on personal meetings with Soviet managerial personnel in the DRA;

Fifth, if B. Karmal does not delve into the socioeconomic problems of the country right now then his intention not to participate in the Soviet-Afghan meetings which were proposed to him and the reduction of meetings with them could lead to him further distancing himself from current problems and a loss of authority in the Party.

Thus, if at the outset of the second stage of the April Revolution the concentration of Party and government authority in a single person's hands and the narrow makeup of the Politburo corresponded to the goals and tasks of the Revolution then at the present time an urgent need has come to defend and advance the Revolution in the country when multifaceted activity and an increase in the collegial leadership of the Party and government are required:

First, relieve Cde. B. Karmal of the post of DRA Prime Minister;

Second, appoint a DRA Prime Minister (Cde. Keshtmand) and increase the responsibility of the government for solving the problems facing the country;

Third, expand the composition of the CC PDPA Politburo and Secretariat, distributing functional responsibilities among them.

A delay or procrastination in deciding these very important political and organizational measures ought to be viewed as the preservation of the totalitarian power of one person, which is not appropriate to the current military and political situation in the DRA and slows down the revolutionary process in the country.

[We] ought to also pay the most serious attention to other very important problems.

1. The problem of relations with the tribes is the most important and decisive in political and national life in the DRA and in the nationality issue in the country. More than 60 tribes numbering more than 4,500,000 live and roam on the borders with Pakistan and Iran. The DRA government's problem of relations with the tribes has not been studied and is not being resolved with due diligence. Only the Ministry of Borders and Tribes is dealing with this issue right now. A minister has not been appointed to [lead] this Ministry for about a year now, which reflects the indifference of the leadership toward improving relations with the tribes. Although several tribes in the provinces of Kunar, Nangarhar, Paktia, Paktika, and Zabol like the Nuristani, Sofi, Khugiani, Wazir, and others, could have already been cooperating with the government if [it] had a different attitude toward this problem. A number of tribes (Jadran, Tani, Mangal, Jaji, and others) have begun to take a position hostile to the government and they are facilitating the penetration of rebel detachments and caravans into the DRA with weapons and they themselves are waging armed combat against the authorities (within their territory). The tribal militias (*malishi*), which were created for the protection of district capitals and individual border sectors are not commanded by anyone in practice and therefore the effectiveness of their operations is extremely low or harmful. Counterrevolutionary organizations are conducting active ideological recruitment of the tribes but the DRA government is not undertaking the necessary efforts to work with the tribes and their leaders and is not countering the work of the rebels with a well-reasoned position in order to draw the tribes to their side.

Up to now the DRA VS and the 40th Army have not waged active combat operations in the areas where the tribes live, local governmental bodies have not been established, and the borders with Pakistan and Iran in the areas where the tribes live remain open.

It is necessary to solve the problem of relations with the tribes politically, economically, and organizationally (a national front) on a national scale, which would on a whole facilitate the stabilization of the situation in the country. The delay in solving this problem is leading to a further distancing of the tribes from the DRA government and their rapprochement with the rebels.

2. The CC PDPA and the DRA government are dragging their feet in putting land reform into practice in the interests of the main part of the country's population and hence drawing the peasants to their side. As is well known, the first step of land reform was carried out in 1979 and a number of important mistakes were made in the process. The preparations themselves for the second stage of land reform are now in their second year. A department of land reform (600 workers), and a commission for work in the provinces have been created, but all the organizational and preparatory measures are of a formal nature, but meanwhile more than half of the plowed land is still not being used. A quick solution to this problem, even if only in the main agricultural areas controlled by the government, would facilitate the strengthening of government authority in the provinces. Any red tape in deciding this problem is impermissible; the class division among the peasantry and the enlistment of its broad masses to the side of popular democratic rule is being delayed by this. In a country with a semi-feudal and tribal structure the main problem has not been resolved – land and water – and its resolution has been entrusted to secondary people (the chairman of the commission is the Deputy Minister of Agriculture and Land Reform, Cde. Lakanwal).

3. An undeclared war is underway in Afghanistan and naturally the general political and socioeconomic situation in the country is reflected in the condition of the armed forces. In this situation an important concern of the Party and government, and Cde. B. Karmal personally, should be the strengthening of the fighting ability of the armed forces and the fulfillment of the laws concerning them so that they can independently and in coordination with detachments of Party activists and SGI and MVD subunits defeat the counterrevolution and protect the country's borders.

According to the table of organization approved by the VS DRA there should be 206,000 men; at the present time they have 124,000 men (60% manning); as of 1 May of this year there are 4,700 deserters from the army. [The desertion rate] in MVD subunits is still worse – up to 32%.

The DRA Revolutionary Council has adopted two laws – “Universal Liability to Military Service” and “Criminal Responsibility for Crimes Affecting the Military Preparedness of the DRA”. The laws are not being enforced. They were adopted under pressure and actually serve as political camouflage for other intentions.

Thus, the draft of young men for military service is only occurring at a forcible manner (dragooning [*otlov*]). Nothing changed after the adoption on 7 January of this year of the “Law of Universal Liability to Military Service”. The number drafted in 1359 (21.3.80-20.3.81) is less than those discharged from the ranks of the VS DRA and the deserters (60,000 and 67,500, respectively). No one is dealing with the draft of young men into military service, that is, enforcement of the law, except Soviet military advisers. The extraordinary

commission which was created has not received the necessary authority and is not capable of solving this problem. The CC PDPA Politburo and DRA government are not dealing with the problem of the military draft in a businesslike manner. Therefore the CC PDPA and Revolutionary Council zonal plenipotentiaries, the secretaries of Party provincial committees, and the governors of provinces have removed themselves from deciding this most important problem and bear no responsibility for it. The "Law on Criminal Responsibility for Crimes Affecting the Military Preparedness of the DRA" was adopted on 6.9.80, but was effective, and just formally, only since 1.1.81. As a consequence of the poor explanatory work, like the inertia of the procurators and courts, the effectiveness of this law boiled down to nothing. In the VS DRA thefts, losses, and the sale of weapons and ammunition are not ceasing, draft-dodging has become widespread, and many other crimes are being committed. However the preparation for examination and the examination itself of criminal deeds do not give tangible results. In 1359 only 112 criminal cases were examined with pronouncement of sentence.

The non-enforcement of laws by the DRA government ought to be examined as an intentional policy of reducing their armed forces in order to shift efforts in armed combat to the 40th Army. Several senior Party and government leaders (Cdes. Nur, Takhzib, and Sarboland) have said this in private conversations.

We have studied the military and political situation and the processes connected with the progress of the Revolution and life in the country deeply and comprehensively. In the course of our work we have repeatedly voiced all these most important problems to the political, governmental, and military leadership of the country. Our ideas regarding these problems have been examined and discussed at various times with the Soviet Ambassador, representatives of groups of Party advisors, and leaders of other missions.

Six months of the second stage of the April Revolution have passed. Without question, certain social reforms have been carried out, events are developing on a positive level, and the authority of the new government is being strengthened.

But evaluating the state of affairs reasonably, it ought to be seen that all this has been done mainly by the political authority of the USSR and our economic power, but in the fight (the main task) against the counterrevolution inside the country the 40th Army remains the decisive force as before.

The Afghan political leadership is completely satisfied with such a state of affairs and it is trying to prolong it as much as possible, meanwhile solving its narrow factional problems of defeating political opponents, creating a Parchamist Party, but shifting the fight against the counterrevolution in the country completely onto the 40th Army, and not the DRA VS, SGI, and MVD.

Assurances about allegiance to the USSR, the decisions of the CC PDPA plenum, and the laws concerning the VS DRA, on the whole reflecting a correct policy of furthering the Revolution are being ignored and not enforced, and evidently serve as political camouflage of the genuine intentions of the DRA leadership in the practical activity of the Party, the country, and the VS DRA.

In our view at this time it is necessary to evaluate the real state of affairs in the DRA, to mark out a political and military strategy, and the main thing – to demand the DRA leadership switch from assurances to decisive actions: concentrate all the efforts of the Party, VS DRA, and the country at defeating the counterrevolution in the near future, establishing government authority in the provinces, and solving other social and economic problems mainly by their own efforts, unquestionably with necessary economic aid from the USSR.

The CC PDPA and Cde. B. Karmal personally should take the entire range of responsibility on themselves for the fate of the Revolution in the country and should switch from words to real deeds.

Delay in this historically important matter cannot be permitted.

We request you consider this.

Signed

General of the Army M. Mayorov
General-Lieutenant V. Samoylenko
General-Lieutenant V. Cheremnykh

10 May 1981

Signed

[General-Colonel] Yu. Maksimov
[General-Lieutenant] V. Rodin

(Coordinated with them in Tashkent on 12 May when V. Cheremnykh was proceeding to Moscow with this document).

[Translator's note: Maksimov was Commanding General of the Turkestan Military District and Rodin was Chief of the Political Directorate of the MD].

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4 July 1981 pp.225-26 record of a conversation between Cheremnykh, Chief
Military Adviser Mayorov, and N. A. Nur, Karmal's deputy

Nur: Respected comrades, I invited you here to inform you that the CC PDPA Politburo has entrusted me with responsibility for the armed forces. Now we will pursue the general policy of the Party in the armed forces together with Zeray and you, the military advisers... (Seriously, the thought came to mind: "Think quickly!"). As regards our comrades the Minister of Defense and Gol Aka, they as before will perform their responsibilities in their positions. They are dealing with their tasks and you, the Soviet military advisers, will help them. We are confident of this...

//Author then notes PDPA infighting//

Mayorov – You don't want to observe the laws but a danger hangs over the Revolution.

Nur - We will observe the laws but it will require time to observe them. I well understand and ask you to excuse me for sometimes speaking in an elevated tone, but the laws should conform to the situation.

Mayorov – What situation?... You're facing a catastrophe! Understand this!

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[p. 271; fuller text in Krasnaya Zvezda, 13 August 1992 and 15 February 2000;
[[Translator's note: Curiously, the 2nd appearance of these notes in Krasnaya
Zvezda is word for word the same as in Lyakhovskiy's book, omitting the
additional words found in the earlier issue]]

(Top Secret)
SPECIAL FOLDER
Only copy
(Working record)

CC CPSU Politburo meeting of 30 July 1981

Chaired by Cde. M. A. SUSLOV. Present were Cdes. Yu. V. Andropov, M. S. Gorbachev, A. P. Kirilenko, A. Ya. Pel'she, [N.] A. Tikhonov, V. V. Kuznetsov, B. N. Ponomarev, M. S. Solomentsev, I. V. Kapitonov, V. I. Dolgikh, M. V. Zimyanin, K. V. Rusakov

SUSLOV has the agenda. I would like to consult about one issue. Cde. Tikhonov has submitted a note to the CC CPSU and a draft instruction regarding perpetuating the memory of the soldiers who have died in Afghanistan. It is proposed to allocate a thousand rubles to each family to put an epitaph on the headstone. The matter is not the money, of course, but whether if we perpetuate the memory of soldiers who died in Afghanistan, what will we write about this on the epitaph of the headstone; in some cemeteries there could be several such headstones, so from the political point of view this would not be entirely correct. What do you think, comrades?

ANDROPOV. Of course, I think we need to bury soldiers who died in Afghanistan with honors, but it seems to be that it is a bit early to perpetuate their memory right now.

KIRILENKO. I think that it would be inadvisable to erect epitaphs right now.

PONOMAREV. Many letters are coming to the CC CPSU and other organizations; parents of the dead especially complain that their children and relatives died in Afghanistan. We need to consider this.

TIKHONOV. Of course, they always need to be buried. It's another matter whether inscriptions ought to be made.

ANDROPOV. Two questions arise from this. First, the issue of burial with honors and, second, about perpetuating the memory. I think we ought to accept this proposal to bury dead soldiers with honors, but regarding perpetuating the memory, we need to wait a while.

TIKHONOV. It's good that together with the Ministry of Defense we will submit new proposals on the basis of an exchange of opinions.

SUSLOV. Comrades, we also ought to think about replies to the parents and relatives whose children and friends died in Afghanistan. We should not take liberties here. The replies should be brief and, moreover, standard. We could charge Cdes. Zimyanin, [General of the Army and Chief of the Main Political Directorate A. A.] Yepishev, [N. I., Chief of the CC CPSU Administrative Organs Department, which oversaw the military] Savinkin, and [possibly General of the Army and Chief of the Main Directorate of the Border Troops V. A.] Matrosov with thinking about this.

[Source: A. A. Lyakhovskiy's "Plamya Afgana" ("Flame of the Afghanistan veteran)", Iskon, Moscow, 1999; Translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg]

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Cheremnykh, p. 199

30 August 1981 conversation between the author and Babrak Karmal regarding the situation in the "Center" zone; the author described plans to defeat the rebels in the southwestern Panjshir Valley. From the record of the conversation:

I - To avoid bloodshed it is advisable to present an ultimatum to the rebels... In this regard, Comrade General Secretary, we request your consent.

B. Karmal - They won't flee?

I - They should not. Presenting an ultimatum allows us firstly to exert psychological influence on the rebels and secondly to warn the civilian population.

B. Karmal - How will the ultimatum be presented? By handbills or loudspeakers?

I - By handbills with the aid of a group of POWs whom we will free.

B. Karmal - Good. I agree

Cheremnykh, "Kto blefiroval?: Stseny iz Afganskoj Tragedii", "Art Contact", St. Petersburg, 1994, p. 28

6 September 1981 transcript of the author, Babrak Karmal, and Baba Jan through an interpreter

Karmal – We are worried that the rebels are continuing to display activity in direct proximity to Kabul, in particular in Paghman.

Cheremnykh – You are correct. Recently the situation in Paghman has been complex. We are following it and are taking the necessary steps. First, today at 0730 General-Lieutenant P. P. Safronov [Translator's note: identified in a footnote as Adviser to the Commanding General of the Air and Air Defense Forces of the Afghan armed forces] flew around this area. Second, we're transferring the 444th Regiment of "Commandos" from Jalalabad to Karga [Translator's note: in a footnote Karga is identified as being a settlement on the road from Kabul to Paghman]. Third, we have allotted a detachment in BMP's in case of an unfavorable turn of events.

Karmal – It will be necessary to talk with Najib. The enemy is too well-informed about our plans. Is there perhaps a leak of secret information?

Baba Jan is silent!

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Cheremnykh, pp. 215-16 Diary of the events surrounding the September 1981
defection of the 913th Afghan Border Battalion

12 September. It became known that the battalion was besieged by the rebels. Two Soviet helicopters landed 500 meters from the battalion and brought in ammunition. At the same time 10 fighters launched strikes on the rebel positions. Four Afghan servicemen flew out to Kandahar on the helicopters but no one gave orders for the wounded to be sent out.

17-18 September. The battalion was again supplied with ammunition by helicopter.

22 September. The battalion was reinforced with a group of eight officers and 22 soldiers headed by the chief of the political department of the brigade brought in by helicopter.

23 September. Radio communications with the battalion were cut off.

25 September. An assault party under the command of advisers was landed in Maruf. Not one person was left at the battalion's location. The structures were ruined and partly burned, and three broken-down armored personnel carriers and two automobiles had been abandoned...

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[pp. 275-6, a late September 1981 report by "representatives of military intelligence":]

...recently the US, the countries of Western Europe, and Egypt together with Pakistan have noticeably stepped up aid to the Afghan counterrevolutionaries. In order to coordinate the activity in this direction a working group has been created in Islamabad which includes officials of the General Staff and military intelligence [ISI] of Pakistan and representatives of the US, British, and Egyptian embassies. At a meeting of the group they discuss specific operations to conduct subversive operations and the participation of individual countries in organizing the rebel movement on DRA territory. In particular, the training of saboteurs and terrorists is done in the FRG where by the end of 1980 a number of centers operate to teach guerilla warfare methods to Pakistani servicemen and persons of Afghan nationality. The period of training is set at 1.5 months. In the first half of September the next group of saboteurs flew to the FRG for training.

Egypt is increasing deliveries of modern weapons to the Afghan counterrevolutionaries (Kalashnikov rifles, ground-to-air missiles, light anti-aircraft weapons, explosives, and mines with a timing device). Weapons are delivered to Peshawar at night on C-130 aircraft; instructors for military training of counterrevolutionaries on Pakistani territory periodically fly on them, including Americans.

Recently Britain has also stepped up its participation in subversive activity against the DRA government. Thus, in the first half of September of this year a group of 10 British experts in organizing guerilla warfare arrived in Pakistan. The mission of the group, which is now located in areas bordering the DRA, includes the comprehensive study in the field of the present situation of the "civil war" ...and preparation of a report with specific proposals about the forms of practical participation for Britain to give assistance.

[Source: A. A. Lyakhovskiy's "Plamyā Afgana" ("Flame of the Afghanistan veteran")", Iskon, Moscow, 1999; Translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg]

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11 October 1981 conversation with Babrak Karmal, p. 217

Babrak Karmal – How do you determine the precise number of rebels and distinguish them from the local population?

Cheremnykh – It's not easy. Reliable information is needed. I'll give you an example regarding Petawa, Karabagh District. Not so long ago Yakubi came to us and reported that up to 600-900 rebels were concentrated not far from Petawa. I thought a bit. Petawa is a small settlement and there is no room there for a large band. Our scouts went down there and reported that a group of 15 headed by Safi Ahmaddin had come to Petawa from Pakistan. These 15 men had forced local [people] (up to 80 men) to join them and a band of up to 100 men was formed. If these 15 men had not come from Pakistan the local population would not have joined. This example is also characteristic of other regions.

Lyakhovskiy 2nd book

[p. 264, excerpts from several reports about the situation in the PDPA compiled by the KGB in January 1983]

An analysis of the military political situation in the DRA shows that the situation conditions to remain complex and tense. No substantial improvement has taken place in the past year. The process of social reform and strengthening of revolutionary power by the regime is slow and protracted.

The leadership nucleus of the PDPA does not have sufficient energy and decisiveness to carry out the tasks of economic and social development of the DRA and organize a military defeat of the counterrevolution...

At the top echelons of the leadership and in Party organizations recurrences of intra-Party disagreements between the former "Parcham" and "Khalq" factions have taken place. These disagreements have taken over the armed forces and the government bureaucracy and are evident even when accepting new members into the Party. If decisive measures are not taken to stop them in a number of cases this could lead to uncontrollable consequences.

In evaluating the situation in the Afghan army and tsarandoy it ought to be noted that at today's level of combat training and political education they cannot completely ensure the independent performance of missions to defeat the counterrevolutionaries and normalize the situation in the country... (USSR KGB representative, 26 January 1983)

**Report on the secret talks of the representatives of the People's
Democratic Party of Afghanistan and the German Social-Democratic
Party in Hungary**

[May, 1983]

Bulletin

- 1) The visit of the delegation of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan to Hungary /The record of the Foreign Department/

In August last year, the Central Committee of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan requested the support of the HSWP CC to be able to have a confidential conversation in our country about the restoration of relations with the German Social-Democratic Party. Between 27 and 31 May 1983, headed by Mahmood Baryalai, the assistant of the PDPA CC PB, the secretary of the Central Committee, the delegation of the Afghan party stayed in Hungary. The members of the delegation were Enajet Allah Sadat, the charge d'affaires of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan in Bonn, Nayetullah madani, the head of the press department of the Afghan ministry of foreign affairs. Between 27-29 May, H. E. Dingels, the head and member of the SPD Foreign Department, visited Hungary.

Comrade Péter Várkonyi received the head of the Afghan party delegation, who reported on the meetings with the representatives of the SPD. He stated that the meetings taking place in a good atmosphere were successful and ended with more favorable results than expected.

During the meetings it became obvious that the leadership of the SPD had little information about the Afghan situation and was strongly influenced by hostile propaganda. As a result of the information received about the situation in the country, especially the results achieved in the past two years, their point of view has changed favorably. They stressed that Afghanistan should choose the road to follow alone, they did not want to interfere. It was surprising that the representatives of the SPD did not mention either the role of the Soviet Union or the presence of Soviet troops. Moreover,

Dingels remarked as his personal opinion that there had not been any other alternative than to ask for the help of the Soviet Union. He declared they were not against Afghanistan, they dissociated themselves from those who were attacking Afghanistan. They do not support the counter-revolutionaries, the various groupings of Afghans living in the FRG, among them, they do not recognize the group calling themselves the Social-Democratic Party of Afghanistan, they do not have any contacts with them.

The representatives of the SPD emphasized that, despite the ideological differences, they were ready to develop relations. After the due preparations, they might also lay down the relationship between the two parties in a formal agreement as well, which would be signed by Wischnewski from the SPD's side and it would be also published. They offered their support in establishing relations with the Swedish social-democratic and the French socialist party. They suggested that the PDPA should seek relations with the American politicians of the Reagan opposition. In order to inform the public opinion of the FRG in a more authentic way, the SPD would send journalists to Afghanistan and encourage the government of the FRG to normalize inter-state relations.

The FRG is visibly disturbed by the quick pace of development of Afghan-GDR relations. The West-Germans have a German language secondary school in Kabul, many study at the universities of the FRG, there are close relations between the Afghan universities and the Goethe Institute. They are afraid that the GDR may easily oust them from these fields. The Afghan leadership informed the FRG that it was not enough to encourage cultural relations. Before the revolution, the FRG was interested in numerous investments, which were cancelled after the revolution. These should be finished with the participation of the FRG.

Comrade Baryalai said that they intended to extend relations with the different political parties. They manage to form close relations with the Japanese Socialist Party and the Australian Socialist Party. With the participation of parliamentary representatives, friendly societies are formed in England, the FRG, India and other countries. Talks are continued with Pakistan about the normalization of relations, they seem to be ending with a favorable outcome, but they do not want to announce it publicly yet.

Comrade Baryalai expressed his party's gratitude for the help provided in the organization of the meeting. He said that the SPD had originally suggested one of the Western-European capitals, but was happy to accept the Afghan suggestion about Budapest. He stressed that the relations between our parties and countries were developing favorably.

Comrade Várkonyi stressed that we were happy about their achievements. We would continue to support by political and diplomatic means in the future too those Afghan initiatives that served the purpose of putting an end to the international isolation of Afghanistan and the extension of its relations.

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[p. 265 June 1983 Sokolov report about factional warfare in the PDPA]

(Secret)

to the USSR Minister of Defense
Marshal of the Soviet Union
Cde. D. F. Ustinov

I report

...factional warfare continues in the PDPA. It is reflected to the greatest degree in personnel policy, in the increasing Parchamization of the leadership in the center, and in the field. All the main leadership posts in the CC PDPA are held at the present time by former Parchamists. The leadership in the provinces, districts, and rural districts has also been given mainly to representatives of this wing of the Party. The layer of "Parcham" representatives in SGI organs is about 90%, in the armed forces, 30-35%, and in the tsarandoy, 20-25%. Recently a firm policy is being followed so that the ratio of Khalqis and Parchamists at the leadership level in all formations and units of the armed forces and the tsarandoy be equal...

One can say that the attitudes regarding the problems of the further Parchamization in the Party issue from Cde. Babrak Karmal and their practical realization is being carried out chiefly by Politburo member and CC PDPA Secretary Nur...

The intra-Party conflict remains the main hindrance in the process of stabilizing the situation in the country. The main efforts of the leadership level of the Party as before are expended on intra-Party warfare, and not for the cause...

June 1983

Marshal of the Soviet Union S. Sokolov

[Source: A. A. Lyakhovskiy's "Tragediya i Doblest' Afgana" ("Tragedy and Valor of the Afghanistan Veteran)", Iskon, Moscow, 1995; Translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg]

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[pp. 325-26, "noted" in CC CPSU Decree N° 147 of 8 July 1983:]

... The rebels are taking feverish measures to distribute anti-government propaganda and agitation, resorting to intimidation, repression, and psychological pressure on people. In one of their handbills it said that the first time one listens to Radio Kabul or "Voice of the Motherland" broadcast the guilty party will be fined 10,000 afghanis, and for the next offense, the death penalty. Their words have often differed from their deeds. The rebels killed 3 elders of jirgas [councils] created in Kabul province to elect local self-governing bodies; seven more elders received warnings from the rebels. The bandits dealt mercilessly with mullahs who spoke in support of people's power. The case of mullah Nasrula, who was killed by the rebels, is indicative. The Supreme Council of DRA Ulemas proclaimed him a "saint"; at the same time, his family was not granted a pension and his children were left practically without means of existence. This fact was immediately used as anti-government propaganda.

The opposition has been devoting great importance to work with refugees. They tried to keep them from returning to their homeland on any account. In particular, after the government announced a new policy of reconciliation many Afghan refugees began to ever more frequently display a desire to return to their native villages; according to the testimony of witnesses, the Pakistani and Iranian authorities in contact with the leaders of "Alliance-7" prevented them from returning, even as far as physical removal of those who did not want to remain in the camps. For example, the authorities have prevented the return of 890 families to Afghanistan from Zabol (Iran), 610 from the Nasar-Bagi camp, and 280 from the Sawabi (Pakistan) camp. During a firefight which broke out between refugees and roadblocks from opposition formations, army subunits, and the police of Pakistan and Iran, 213 people died, mainly women, old men, and children.

The leaders of the "Alliance-7" saw a chance for personal enrichment from the refugee problem. The governments of Islamabad and Teheran were also interested in it. Pakistan, for example, used the aid coming to refugees to increase its own treasury and weapons supplies for its own armed forces.

If one evaluates the rebel movement in Afghanistan as a whole then one can say: the individual training of the rebels was quite high and improved from year to year; they have operated successfully in small groups, especially when carrying out sabotage and acts of terrorism; as regards operations to seize large population centers which have military garrisons, even comprised of government troops, then the rebels displayed complete failure here. They were in no position to win a victory over government or Soviet forces – they did not create a joint organization, nor did they adhere to particular tactics and strategy, nor did they even fight sufficiently actively. However, in inflicting "pinprick" blows they did not allow the government to carry out planned reforms, diverted considerable

resources (personnel and material) for providing the country with security, and maintained tension in the domestic political situation in Afghanistan, like rust, constantly eating away at government authority.

However, the experience of many countries testifies: in modern conditions when small weapons have become powerful added to comprehensive support of various governments, such tactics of combat often permit global political goals to be achieved and themselves lead to the downfall of the ruling regime.

[Translator's note: It is unclear where the quotation from the CC CPSU Decree ends here and where the author's narrative resumes. Only the next paragraph makes it clear that the narrative takes place after the rebels came to power].

[Source: A. A. Lyakhovskiy's "Plamya Afgana" ("Flame of the Afghanistan veteran"), Iskon, Moscow, 1999; Translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg]

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[pp. 265-66 Soviet ambassador's critique of Karmal's activity, December 1983]

(Secret)

...Recently B. Karmal in his practical work has started to more decisively carry out a policy of further strengthening the unity of the Party and removing the present shortcomings in the activity of Party and government bodies.

Twice at a CC PDPA Politburo meeting, in particularly when discussing the issue of the progress in carrying out a multi-faceted plan to combat the counterrevolution, B. Karmal directed the attention of the leadership of the DRA to the need for strict, uncompromising attitudes toward those who do not carry out Party and government directives to develop organizational and political work among the masses and consolidate and expand government authority in districts and rural districts.

B. Karmal's speech at an open expanded meeting of the DRA Council of Ministers evoked a broad positive response among Party activists and the patriotically-inclined part of the managers and bureaucracy of the country's government. Many Afghan comrades in conversations with us have expressed their positive attitude toward such a decisive formulation of the important tasks of revolutionary policy and express hope that their realization will substantially improve the work of the Party and government staff and facilitate the creation of conditions to strengthen the unity of the PDPA...

Tabeyev, Lomonosov

December 1983

[Source: A. A. Lyakhovskiy's "Tragediya i Doblest' Afgana" ("Tragedy and Valor of the Afghanistan Veteran)", Iskon, Moscow, 1995; Translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg]

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[pp. 345-46 Report of a USSR Ministry of Defense Operations Group headed by Marshal of the Soviet Union S. L. Sokolov about the results of operations so far that year, June 1984; more complete text found in Lyakhovskiy's second book, pp. 284-5, which has been used here];

The military situation as a result of conducting a whole series of operations against counterrevolutionary forces has notably improved.

During the five months there were 85 operations, of which 51 were joint operations of the 40th Army and Afghan army units, and 34 independent operations by Afghan units.

The Panjshir operation and combat operations in Herat had especially great importance for the improvement of the military situation...

A serious defeat was inflicted on the enemy in the course of combat operations in the Panjshir and Andarab Valleys and to the north. His main base was destroyed...

Secret documents seized in Panjshir by our forces on 18 May 1984 permitted us to uncover and destroy a broad IOA agent network existing in Kabul (in the central Party and government bureaucracy, including in the SGI [Government Information Service], *tsarandoy* [police], and Ministry of Defense) and other regions of the country...

In May and especially in June the number of groups entering into talks ready to recognize the DRA government and cease armed combat increased and the surrender of a number of groups (in Panjshir and Andarab not counting the band of the leader Jumakhan ((700 men)), 8 groups totalling 600 rebels surrendered)...

At the present time in accordance with the decision approved by you, measures are being taken in the Panjshir and Andarab valleys to consolidate government authority. To this end, pressure has been put on the DRA government to increase its activity...

Recently the enemy has displayed activity in the southeast and the south of the country in the areas of Khowst and the provinces of Kunar, Kandahar, and in individual sectors of lines of communications.

Considering this, besides Panjshir and Andarab, at the present time troop combat operations are being conducted in the area of Khowst (25th Infantry Division, 666th Regiment "K", 2nd PGBR [trans. note: some kind of brigade; note that these are all Afghan units]; in the area of Kandahar (70th Independent Motorized Rifle Brigade, 15th Infantry Division, and the 466th Regiment "K" of the

2nd Army Corps); in the area of Farah (21st Motorized Infantry Brigade with the 4th Tank Brigade); in the area of Gurian, west of Herat (17th Infantry Division with the 5th Tank Brigade).

Combat operations will soon begin in the area of Jalalabad and Asadabad, in the provinces of Nangarhar and Kunar [with] the 66th Independent Motorized Rifle Brigade, and the 11th and 9th Infantry Divisions.

The closing of possible routes for the movement of caravans and groups from Pakistan continues using three "spetsnaz" [special forces] battalions...

The 40th Army continues to remain a decisive factor in stabilizing the situation in the DRA and takes on itself the main burden of the fight with the counterrevolutionaries...The Army is combat ready. Combat operations in the Panjshir and Andarab valleys have shown the capability of the troops of the Army and aviation to carry out combat missions in difficult mountainous conditions without special equipment at altitudes of 4,000-5,000 meters and where there are glaciers.

The personnel have operated selflessly and bravely. The overwhelming majority of combat mission carried out by aircraft have been at low altitudes. The Su-25 ground attack aircraft have displayed their good combat capabilities...

The operations of the troops permit several conclusions to be drawn about further improvement of their combat training and technical supplies not only of the 40th Army, but of the Armed Forces as a whole...

Several individual conversations have been held with DRA Minister of Defense Cde. Kadyr and Chief of the Main Political Directorate Cde. Sadeki. In them the need was stressed for greater activity and regular visits to the troops to analyze the results of combat operations and to take steps to increase their effectiveness; to step up political educational work with personnel, combat desertion; and to give other necessary aid to the formations and units of the Afghan army...

[Source: A. A. Lyakhovskiy's "Plamya Afgana" ("Flame of the Afghanistan veteran)", Iskon, Moscow, 1999; Translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg]

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[pp. 285-88 Main Directorate of Combat Training report, September 1984]

(Secret)

Report of the Chief of the Main Directorate of Combat Training of the Ground Forces

... During the five months of the summer period of 1984 the troops of the 40th Army continued to wage combat operations to defeat rebel groups and help consolidate government authority in their zones of responsibility.

During this time 22 planned and 19 unplanned operations were carried out, 2084 ambushes were set up, and 248 intelligence items exploited [realizovano].

According to confirmed data, during combat operations more than 18,000 rebels were killed, and 3839 small arms, 146 DShKs, 42 mortars, 101 RPGs, and more than 2,300,000 rounds of small arms ammunition were seized.

The largest operations in the number of men and equipment used, length, and significance were those in the Panjshir and Andarab River Valleys and in the forested zones around the cities of Kabul and Herat.

... Some improvement is being noted in the organization and waging of combat operations and in the use of artillery and aircraft. An example of a well thought out and planned operation is the operation conducted in the area of 'Iskapol' in June of this year. During it a large group of rebels was defeated (70 men killed, 3 mortars, 3 ZGU [anti-aircraft mountain guns], 4 DShKs, more than 50 mines, and a large quantity of small arms ammunition were seized). Our subunits suffered no losses. The commander of the regiment, Lt. Col. L. Ya. Rokhlin, deserves great credit for this [Translator's note: a long account of Rokhlin's military career, beginning with his service in Afghanistan, is appended here as a footnote].

... Good results were achieved in operations conducted under the command of General-Major A. A. Luchinskiy, Colonel Yarygin,...

The main form of combat with rebel formations, as before, remains conducting large planned and specific operations in order to eliminate rebels in vitally important regions, capture their bases and training centers, and also inflict defeat on groups in forested zones and villages.

The primary method of troop operations consists of blockading bases and regions occupied by rebels with the wide use of tactical assault groups and

subsequent combat sweeps [*prochesyvaniye*] with Afghan army subunits with constant artillery and air support.

... Repeat blockades after a brief interval and combat sweeps of areas checked earlier are also practiced where, as a rule, the rebels return after combat operations shift to other regions.

... At the same time a large number of operations are conducted in a stereotyped manner, according to a previously developed plan (open approach from garrisons, straight-line movement, blockading, and a combat sweep). As a result of so many "straight-line operations" and a lack of concealment and deception [*maskirovka*] and also a leak of information during joint operations with government troops (the rebels undertake preemptive measures), the results of such operations are, as a rule, low.

Basic indices	1983 May-September	1984 May-22 September
1. Operations conducted		
Planned	12	22
Unplanned	10	19
2. Intelligence items exploited	198	248
which were productive	160 (88%)	181 (72%)
3. Ambushes laid	2800	2084
which were productive	262 (9%)	181 (8%)
4. Rebels killed	17,632	18,184
5. Seized		
- small arms	4334	3839
- DShG*	98	146
- RPG	129	101
- mortars	79	42
- ZGU, recoilless guns	-	46
- small arms rounds	1,772,000	2,305,000
6. Rebel sabotage committed, including	261	246
- shelling columns	103	81
- shelling deployment locations	116	96
- detonations of mines	38	53
7. Losses of our troops **		
- killed	491/74	886/111
- wounded	1,182/179	1,958/233

* Translator's note – probably an error for DShK

** [Author's footnote] The number of officers is in the denominator.

Moscow, 22 September 1984

[Source: A. A. Lyakhovskiy's "Tragediya i Doblest' Afgana" ("Tragedy and Valor of the Afghanistan Veteran"), Iskon, Moscow, 1995; Translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg]

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[pp. 242-45 October 1984 Main Directorate of Combat Training analysis of rebel
tactics]

(Secret)

Analytical note of the Main Directorate of Combat Training of the Ground Forces

... The tactics of rebel combat operations become more flexible and competent with each year. The means and methods of waging armed combat are constantly undergoing modification considering the specifics of the military and political situation in the country and the operational tactics used by the Soviet and Afghan troops, which they constantly study and to which they skillfully adapt themselves.

In the process, the mujaheddin use various means and forms of combat in the various regions of Afghanistan. If, for example, in the central and northern provinces they have operated mainly in small groups (10-15 men each)... in the southeastern provinces adjoining Pakistan large formations remain and they make attempts to seize administrative centers and entire regions.

... Guerilla operations have become more decisive and varied. The rebels have started to devote more attention to the factor of surprise, secrecy, mobility, and operational efficiency. Combat operations are waged actively, especially at twilight and the onset of darkness (1800-2400) and also in conditions when aircraft cannot be used.

Rebel formations are never used without careful reconnaissance of Soviet and Afghan troops, skillfully using the stereotyped nature and the smallest blunders and mistakes of our commanders in organizing combat operations or combat support.

Observation of guard posts, garrisons, and travel routes of Soviet and Afghan troops is carried out successfully and the agent network is well organized. Warnings are made by sound and light signals (lanterns, bonfires, mirrors, etc.). The local population, shepherds, and even children are widely enlisted for these purposes. When their bases and forming-up areas are sealed off all this permits the rebels to withdraw their main forces away from attacks of troops in a timely manner and create ambushes and mine the terrain with the remaining forces (the best-trained and hardest fighters).

If the mujaheddin were not able to withdraw their formations, reserves of material resources, and ammunition from the areas of combat operations in time as a result of unexpected operations by government troops, using long-range weapons and small arms (BUR [Boer] rifle, DShK [a type of machine gun]) fire from a great distance (about 1000 meters) or with sudden fire from a range of

200-300 meters, they try to inflict defeat on the attacking troops, especially if they remain without the fire support of armored groups, artillery, and aviation, delay them until the approach of nightfall, and then withdraw. The retreat is usually done in small groups (10-15 men each) in various directions under the cover of previously-laid mines, and the fire of snipers and large-caliber machine guns (using irrigation tunnels, systems of irrigation ditches, and mountain paths and clefts). But the most successful retreat is done at night through intervals and gaps in the combat formations of Soviet and Afghan troops.

Not infrequently, receiving suitable information about the approach of troops, the rebels retreat from a village area to the mountains or hide weapons and melt into the local population, leaving observers and small groups of 2-3 men each to cover their retreat.

The rebels prepare base areas with storehouses of weapons and material reserves (for example, Jawara, Iskapol', Melawa, Marul'gad, Tora Bora, Shpal'kay, L'markhauza, Srana, Shinaray, Islamdar, etc.) and also vitally important areas (for example, the Panjshir and Andarab Valleys, and the Black Mountains northwest of Jalalabad) for a stubborn defense in the engineering sense. They are equipped with trenches, connecting passageways, emplacements, and other structures. The defense of these areas is prepared, as a rule, by all the personnel of the rebel formations located there until all their weapons, ammunition, and material reserves are evacuated to new base areas. If they do not manage to do this, stiff resistance is offered until the complete withdrawal of the main rebel formations from the area of combat operations...

The rebels organize defense of hills in 2 to 3 tiers. Large-caliber machine guns and mortars are usually sited in the second and third tiers. A circular defense is occupied in population centers and green belts.

The supply of groups with weapons and ammunition has been improved. If earlier they were mainly supplied with small arms weapons, DShK and RPG, at the present time the rebels are getting mortars, recoilless guns, PZRK [portable surface-to-air missile launchers], and rocket launchers, which are already widely used against our troops and Afghan troops, in ever-increasing quantities.

It has been established that just at the beginning of August of this year [1984] 20,000 automatic weapons, 20,000 boxes of shells and cartridges, 70,000 bulletproof vests, 50,000 pairs of boots, binoculars, and other weapons arrived from China. In addition, on 4 August 2,000 hand grenades, 1,000 anti-tank shells, and 400,000 [small arms] rounds were delivered at a base in Pakistan. A large quantity of weapons is coming from Iran and Saudi Arabia.

Weapons and ammunition delivered from abroad are being stored in the following manner:

- small arms weapons and RPGs and the ammunition for them are being distributed immediately to detachments and groups; reserve ammunition ("NZ" [emergency reserves]) are kept by commanders;

- heavy weapons (mountain guns, mortars, DShK) and ammunition for them go to bases, fixed storehouses dug into caves, cellars of mosques, and commanders' homes.

At the present time the following standards for rebel weapons have been established regardless of their Party affiliation: a group of 10 men gets one RPG and 9 AKM [model of Kalashnikov rifle]; a group of 20 men gets 2 RPG and 18 AKM; a group of 25 men gets one DShK, one recoilless gun, one mortar, 2-3 RPG, and 16 AKM; a detachment of 100 men is allocated 1 anti-aircraft gun or PZRK, 4 DShK, 5 recoilless guns, 4 mortars, 10 RPG, and a suitable amount of small arms ammunition.

... In the autumn-winter period of 1984-85 the tactical means and methods of rebel operations against our troops evidently will undergo special changes and will boil down to the following: - the daily conduct of combat operations by guerrilla methods (ambushes, shelling, raids, mining, sabotage, terror);

- the creation of a centralized system of command and control of formations by uniting separate [razroznennyye] forces;

- a concentration of considerable forces in the southeastern and eastern provinces with the goal of conducting large-scale operations directed at the seizure of the areas bordering Pakistan and the creation of a so-called "liberated territories of Afghanistan" under the control of a "provisional government";

- a concentration of forces and an accumulation of weapons to restore the situation in the Panjshir and Andarab Valleys (Ahmad Shah Masoud);

- the reinforcement of men and equipment to combat our aircraft both in the air and at airfields. The wide use of PZRK is possible;

- an increase in the number of caravans with weapons and ammunition, and the infiltration of groups of rebels from across the border;

- a buildup of weapons in rebel formations. Special attention in this regard will be paid to their supply with new modern types of weapons (PZRK of the "Stinger" and "Blowpipe" type, increased-range PURS [Translator's note: a variant abbreviation of PTURS, "anti-tank guided missile"], etc.), permitting successful combat operations to be waged against a regular army;

- conducting wide-scale and targeted propaganda among the population, and also among the servicemen of the DRA armed forces.

October 1984

[Source: A. A. Lyakhovskiy's "Tragediya i Doblest' Afgana" ("Tragedy and Valor of the Afghanistan Veteran"), Iskon, Moscow, 1995; Translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg]

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[p. 289 Winter 1984-85 summary report by the Commanding General, TurkVO]

Looking into the details of combat operations, we find examples of carelessness, a lack of conscientiousness in organizing combat operations, the low quality of missions carried out, and the senseless death of people. For example, the combat operations in the province of Parwan conducted by Lt. Col. A. V. Zinevich in the period from 18 to 26 December 1984 were disorganized and poorly led. The subunits fell into an ambush after escorting an Afghan column to Pishgor. As a result, five people died and 33 were wounded.

In the period from 5 to 14 December 1984 combat operations conducted under the leadership of the commander of the 682nd Motorized Rifle Regiment seven died, 29 were wounded, and an Su-25 aircraft was shot down. For four days the subunits could not escape the shelling of the rebels but the division and army commands gave practically no help to the leaders of the combat operations.

Quite enough such cases and examples of superficiality, lack of organization, and carelessness when conducting combat operations have been provided...

[Source: A. A. Lyakhovskiy's "Tragediya i Doblest' Afgana" ("Tragedy and Valor of the Afghanistan Veteran")", Iskon, Moscow, 1995; Translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg]

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[p. 337-8]

An uprising of Soviet and Afghan POWs in Pakistan

26 April 1985

At 1800 local time a group of Soviet and Afghan POWs totalling about 24 men held for three years in a special prison of the Islamic Society of Afghanistan at the combat training center for Afghan rebels in the area of Badaber (24 km south of Peshawar) made an armed uprising in order to escape captivity. Having selected a suitable moment when only two of the 70 guards remained (the rest had left for prayer) the POWs attacked the guard of the prison and the IOA weapons and ammunition storehouse located within. They seized weapons, took up a defensive position, and demanded a meeting with representatives of the Soviet and Afghan embassies in Pakistan or a UN representative from B. Rabbani, who had come to the location of the events. Talks with B. Rabbani were held with the use of loudspeaker equipment and a telephone.

The site of the incident was blocked off by detachments of Afghan rebels and Pakistani *malish* [militia], and also infantry, tank, and artillery subunits of the 11th Army Corps of Pakistan.

After brief talks with the insurrectionists the leader of the IOA, B. Rabbani, in coordination with the Pakistan troops, gave the order to storm the prison in which Pakistani subunits took part, together with detachments of Afghan counterrevolutionaries. Artillery, tanks, and attack helicopters were used against the defenders. The resistance of the insurrectionists ceased by 27 April as a result of an explosion of ammunition located in the storehouse. All the Soviet and Afghan POWs who took part in the armed uprising died. As a result of the explosion and the resulting fire a number of facilities were destroyed, including the prison office in which, according to available information, the documents with lists of prisoners were stored. Up to 100 Afghan rebels died in the course of the operation to seize the prison. There were also losses among the Pakistanis.

This event caused serious concern in the Pakistani administration and also the leadership of the Afghan counterrevolutionaries. At a meeting of the leaders of his organization, Rabbani declared that in view of the resolute will of the insurrectionists he was forced to give an order to use artillery to put down the resistance. On 29 April the leader of the IPA, G. Hekmatyar, sent an enciphered collective-call order by radio to all of his groups in which he demanded reinforcement of the guard of "Russian POWs" in connection with the fact that as result of the previous incident "there were dead and wounded among the brothers."

The Governor of the Northwest Frontier Province, Lieutenant General Fazl Haq, visited the site of the incident. On 29 April the President of Pakistan was informed about this issue and considering the entire seriousness of what had happened near Peshawar, he came to the area himself and plainly demanded that the heads of all the groups prevent a repetition of such "incidents" which confirm the presence of Soviet POWs on Pakistani territory seized by the rebels in the DRA and also ordered that all measures be taken to prevent a leak of information about the real reasons for the incident, in particular:

- It was suggested that Rabbani openly announce that in the area of Badaber an armed conflict had occurred between two hostile groups of his organization;

- Entry of outsiders to the area of the incident was forbidden;

- The press run of the Pakistani magazine "Safir", which contained information about the uprising in Badaber, was completely confiscated.

The Pakistani Cabinet of Ministers decided not to comment on what took place in Badaber, referring to lack of information about this issue.

However events in Badaber received publicity (the artillery fire was heard even in Peshawar). On 2 May a telegraph agency, referring to their correspondents in Islamabad, reported about the unequal battle waged by Soviet and Afghan servicemen in Pakistan. The mass media, in particular the radio station "Voice of America" in its 4 May broadcast, were forced to say that "in one of the Afghan mujaheddin bases in the Northwest Frontier Province of Pakistan 12 Soviet and 12 Afghan prisoners died as a result of an explosion."

The fact of an armed uprising in Badaber was confirmed by a representative of the International Red Cross who visited the Soviet Embassy in Islamabad on 9 May 1985.

Unfortunately, it was not possible to identify the exact surnames of the participants of the armed uprising in view of the destruction of the lists of prisoners during the explosion of the ammunition storehouse and the fire and also [because] Pakistani authorities and the leaders of the Afghan counterrevolution took steps to isolate witnesses to the events in Badaber...

Sources of information: Headquarters of the 40th Army, the USSR Embassy in Pakistan, and the Main Intelligence Directorate of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff, May 1985

[Source: A. A. Lyakhovskiy's "Plamy Afgana" ("Flame of the Afghanistan veteran")], Iskon, Moscow, 1999; Translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg]

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[p. 292-93]

REPORT FROM KABUL

(Secret)

to USSR Minister of Defense
Marshal of the Soviet Union
Cde. S. L. Sokolov

... The 40th Army of the TurkVO is continuing to bear the main weight of armed combat with the counterrevolutionaries in Afghanistan.

All this could provoke a need for an additional increase in our contingent of troops, although the last time such an increase was made was December 1984 – January 1985.

Everyone admits that it is impossible to resolve all the issues of the April Revolution by military means alone: indeed because of a lack of other effective measures the scale of combat operations is expanding, which entails many negative consequences.

The situation requires a reevaluation of forces and capabilities and a determination of the future ways and means of Party and government reforms in the country.

It seems advisable for a representative Party-Government commission to examine the military and political situation in and around Afghanistan and, considering the capability of the present Afghan regime to function, work out specific suggestions which could change the development of the situation in the country...

Varennikov

Kabul, June 1985

[Source: A. A. Lyakhovskiy's "Tragediya i Doblest' Afgana" ("Tragedy and Valor of the Afghanistan Veteran"), Iskon, Moscow, 1995; Translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg]

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[pp. 289-91 6 June 1985 report by Chief of the Ministry of Defense Operations
Group in the DRA, General of the Army V. I. Varennikov]

In spite of increasing efforts the rebels have not managed to achieve destabilization in Afghanistan. In a number of cases because of a military defeat they lose influence and control for a period of time in several regions of the country and are forced to limit themselves to subversive activity, attacks on columns and posts, shelling population centers and garrisons, and also mining individual sectors of lines of communications.

The counterrevolutionaries have not been discouraged by high losses (17,000 in 1985 alone). The active, significant, and comprehensive support of the US, China, and several other reactionary regimes have helped the counterrevolution to constantly increase their military efforts. In 1981 the rebel detachments and groups numbered 30,000, in 1983 – 40,000, and in 1985 – 50,000 in actively operating formations (the USSR KGB notes that the figure for 1985 is considerably higher)...

The forms of combat operations of the enemy are constantly being improved. This is clearly seen in the events in the province of Kunar. In December 1984 when we were conducting joint combat operations a limited number of troops were involved considering the corresponding enemy grouping – the 66th OMSBR [Independent Motorized Rifle Brigade] and the 45th ISP [Combat Engineer Regiment] of the 40th Army and part of the men of the 9th PD of the DRA Armed Forces... The combat operations lasted for a week. The missions were completely carried out. Meanwhile the enemy did not offer much resistance, tried to maneuver, and avoided direct encounters with our troops.

Combat operations in this region in May and June of this year had another character. The number of our troops in action was considerably increased: the 103rd VDD [Airborne Division], the 66th OMSBR, the 56th ODSBR [Independent Airborne Assault Brigade], and part of the men of the 108th and 201st MSD [Motorized Rifle Divisions], the 45th ISP [Combat Engineer Regiment], and a large part of the air forces of the 40th Army; the 1st AK [Army Corps] consisting of the 8th, 9th, and 11th PD and also the 37th BR [Brigade] "K", the 10th ISP, and the 10th PGBR [Translator's note: evidently some kind of brigade, possible border troops] of the DRA Armed Forces.

The employment of such a large number of troops was due to the fact that the enemy has considerably augmented his grouping in this region. In addition, knowing of our preparations for combat operations (the leak was through DRA organizations), he not only did not take steps to withdraw his groups but, on the contrary, moved forward an additional 1,500 men from Pakistan on the eve of our combat operations and during the combat operations [moved in] another 2,000

men. The rebels created large engineer works to prepare lines of defense and defensive regions. They did considerable minelaying, placing 100 land mines...

The battles in Kunar and especially in Pechdara Canyon in the areas of the population center of Mena, north of Asmar, and southeast of Naray were fierce and prolonged. There were noted instances where the rebels transitioned to counterattacks. Only thanks to the powerful strikes of aircraft and artillery fire could the resistance be broken. The enemy used a large amount of anti-aircraft equipment against our aircraft and north of Asmar even ground-to-air missile systems.

During May and June of this year in just the provinces of Kunar and Helmand the rebels lost more than 4900 dead (4200 of them in Kunar); in addition, more than 100 guns and mortars were destroyed and seized, about 200 large-caliber DShK machine guns and ZGU, more than 160 various storehouses, 2.5 million various kinds of small arms rounds, and a training center. It is characteristic that the Pakistani press is not commenting on this great defeat of the Afghan counterrevolution...

At the same time the actions of the Party and government bodies of the DRA seem passive in using the results of the successful combat operations of the 40th Army and the DRA Armed Forces in Kunar and Helmand. In the province of Helmand, for example, generally nothing has been undertaken in spite of our persistent desires. In the province of Kunar only after repeated and insistent demands were limited steps taken already in the course of the operation itself to expand the zones of influence in those villages in which Afghan troops garrisons were located. No organizational nuclei are being established in liberated areas. Free material aid for Kunar province coming through government channels has not been delivered in a timely manner.

Therefore the results of combat operations which have been carried out to stabilize the situation in the country can only be of a temporary nature. With the passage of time the rebels are capable of regaining their lost positions in these regions...

[Source: A. A. Lyakhovskiy's "Tragediya i Doblest' Afgana" ("Tragedy and Valor of the Afghanistan Veteran")", Iskon, Moscow, 1995; Translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg]

4 Ex.

5. 2. 1986

Az. F. H. B.

*Sein Lt. Oberst
USA*

Vertraulich

39

In jüngster Zeit führt das reaktionäre Regime von Pakistan gegen die im Grenzgebiet zu Afghanistan lebenden Paschtunenstämme der Afridi und Shinwari großangelegte Operationen durch. Diese Aktionen haben sich in ihrer Brutalität zu einem regelrechten Völkermord an den Paschtunen gesteigert. Die pakistanische Armee macht ihre Ansidlungen dem Erdboden gleich und ermordet unschuldige Greise, Frauen und Kinder. Das stellt eine eklatante Verletzung der Menschenrechte dar.

Die Ereignisse in Pakistan haben auch einen bestimmten internationalen Aspekt. Bekanntlich misbrauchen die pakistanischen Machthaber die Gebiete der Stämme der Afridi und Shinwari, die ihre Unterstützung für die Aprilrevolution von 1978 in Afghanistan erklärt haben, als Aufmarschbasis für den unerklärten Krieg gegen die Demokratische Republik Afghanistan. In diesem Krieg stützt sich das pakistanische Regime auf die breite Hilfe und Unterstützung der USA.

In der Sowjetunion wird den Ereignissen in Pakistan größte Aufmerksamkeit geschenkt. Unsere Massenmedien berichten umfassend über den Kampf der Paschtunenstämme gegen die pakistanische Militärclique und entlarven vor aller Welt, wie Islamabad die afghanischen konterrevolutionären Banden für die Abrechnung mit den Paschtunen benutzt.

6. 5. 1986

4 Ex.

Jan. H. Oude
7.5.86
Vertraulich

Wie von den afghanischen Massenmedien offiziell gemeldet wurde, fand am 4. Mai 1986 in Kabul ein Plenum des ZK der Demokratischen Volkspartei Afghanistans (DVPA) statt, das organisatorische Fragen behandelte. Es wurde der Beschluß gefaßt, die Funktionen des Generalsekretärs des ZK der DVPA und des Vorsitzenden des Revolutionsrates (des obersten gesetzgebenden Organs des Landes) zu teilen. Das Plenum gab der Bitte Babrak Karmals statt, ihn auf Grund seines Gesundheitszustandes von der Funktion des Generalsekretärs des ZK der DVPA zu entbinden. Er bleibt Mitglied des Politbüros und Vorsitzender des Revolutionsrates. Das Plenum wählte einmütig T. Najib zum neuen Generalsekretär.

Diese Veränderungen in der Führung der DVPA sind weder als unerwartetes noch als außergewöhnliches Ereignis zu betrachten.

Der große persönliche Beitrag Babrak Karmals zur Sache der Aprilrevolution ist bekannt. Im Grunde genommen symbolisierte er in vieler Hinsicht ihre Ideale. Sein ganzes Leben und seine Tätigkeit sind mit der Demokratischen Volkspartei Afghanistans verbunden. Eine bedeutsame Rolle spielte Babrak Karmal bei der Vorbereitung und Durchführung des November-Plenums (1985) des ZK der DVPA, das Beschlüsse von prinzipieller Bedeutung für die Partei und das ganze Land faßte. Dies betrifft vor allem die vom Plenum beschlossene Aufgabe der Verbreiterung der sozialen Basis der Revolution, ausgehend von ihrem nationaldemokratischen Charakter, sowie die Gewinnung breiter Schichten der Bevölkerung zur Unterstützung der neuen Macht.

Die Beschlüsse des Plenums machten eine Umgestaltung der gesamten organisatorischen und politischen Arbeit der Partei- und Staatsorgane erforderlich. Daraus ergibt sich eine gewaltige angespannte Arbeit der gesamten afghanischen Führung zur Lösung der auf der Tagesordnung stehenden komplizierten Aufgaben.

Mit anderen Worten, es sind große physische Ausdauer und die Fähigkeit zu häufigen operativen Reisen an die Basis erforderlich. Hier wirkte sich aus, daß der Gesundheitszustand Babrak Karmals sich bereits seit längerer Zeit verschlechtert hat. Er hatte darüber bereits mehrmals selbst geklagt, und dies wurde auch von anderen afghanischen Führern bestätigt.

Während seiner Teilnahme am XXVII. Parteitag der KPdSU in Moskau bat Babrak Karmal darum, einige Zeit später zur Behandlung nach Moskau kommen zu können. Kurz danach wurde er in Moskau über einen Monat lang behandelt. Während dieser Zeit fanden zwei Begegnungen mit Michail Gorbatschow statt. Babrak Karmal beriet mit Michail Gorbatschow unter Hinweis auf seinen Gesundheitszustand und die vor dem Lande und der Partei stehenden wichtigen Aufgaben über die Zweckmäßigkeit der Teilung der höchsten Partei- und Staatsfunktionen. Man muß sagen, daß auch andere afghanische Genossen etwa die gleichen Gedanken äußerten.

Michail Gorbatschow äußerte Verständnis für die von Babrak Karmal ausgesprochenen Gedanken. Dabei betonte er die Bedeutung der Tatsache, daß Babrak Karmal, als eine Persönlichkeit, mit der vieles in der afghanischen Revolution verbunden ist, nach seinen Möglichkeiten weiter aktiv tätig bleibt. Michail Gorbatschow empfahl Babrak Karmal, diesen gesamten Fragenkomplex mit seinen Genossen in der Führung zu beraten.

Nach seiner Rückkehr nach Kabul führte Babrak Karmal, wie wir wissen, Einzelgespräche mit den Mitgliedern des Politbüros des ZK der DVPA und erläuterte diesen seinen Wunsch, von der Funktion des Generalsekretärs der Partei zurückzutreten. Danach wandte er sich mit einer offiziellen Erklärung zu dieser Frage an das Politbüro. Dieses beachtete die Fragestellung, die höchsten Partei- und Staatsfunktionen voneinander zu trennen, und die Bitte Babrak Karmals, ihn von den Pflichten des Generalsekretärs des ZK der DVPA zu entbinden, als begründet.

Auf dem Plenum der ZK der DVPA am 4. Mai 1986 wurde der Bitte Babrak Karmals einmütig stattgegeben. Dabei hoben die Redner seine Verdienste um die Revolution und das Land hervor. Sie begrüßten die Tatsache, daß er als Mitglied des Politbüros des ZK der DVPA und Vorsitzender des Revolutionsrates seine aktive Tätigkeit fortsetzen wird.

Ebenso einmütig wählte das Plenum auf Vorschlag des Politbüros, der von Sultan Ali Keshtmand vorgetragen wurde, Genossen Najib zum neuen Generalsekretär des ZK der DVPA. In den Gesprächen mit uns und auch mit den Mitgliedern des Politbüros hatte Babrak Karmal ihn als den geeignetsten Nachfolger vorgeschlagen. Alle 11 Genossen, die auf dem Plenum sprachen, brachten ihre begeisterte Unterstützung für die Kandidatur Najibs zum Ausdruck.

Wir kennen Najib, der in der letzten Zeit als Sekretär des ZK der DVPA gearbeitet hat, als energischen, zielstrebigem, willensstarken und sachlichen Genossen. Diese Qualitäten erlangen in der gegenwärtigen Etappe der Revolution, angesichts der gewaltigen Aufgaben, die vom November-Plenum des ZK der DVPA beschlossen worden sind, besondere Bedeutung. Mit anderen Worten, wir sind der Meinung, daß das ZK der DVPA die richtige Wahl getroffen hat.

Zusätzlich möchten wir informieren, daß bei Babrak Karmal neben seinem schlechten Gesundheitszustand wiederholt eine Neigung zum Alkoholmißbrauch festgestellt wurde. Übrigens erklären die afghanischen Genossen damit auch die Abwesenheit Babrak Karmals auf dem Plenum des ZK der DVPA am 4. Mai, als sein Antrag auf Entbindung von der Funktion des Generalsekretärs des ZK der DVPA behandelt wurde.

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[pp. 230-33; this is the full text of a 13 November 1986 message signed by Chebrikov, Shevardnadze, Sokolov, and Dobrynin noted in pp. 371-2 of Lyakhovskiy's book, "Plamya Afghanistana", Iskon, Moscow 1999]

Secret

Special Folder [This notation omitted in the Gromov book]

CC CPSU

Some positive movement in the activity of the Afghan leadership and the PDPA noted after the election of Najib as General Secretary of the CC PDPA continues to develop. The party organs have begun to work more actively, the forms and methods of propaganda are being reexamined, and new ways are being more intensively sought to influence broad sectors of the population. There are certain positive changes in the condition of the Afghan armed forces and the level of their combat ability.

Nevertheless no noticeable improvement in the military-political situation in the country has been achieved. Cde. Najib is objectively assessing the situation and understands the complexity of the problems which lie before him.

Najib described his assessment of the situation in the country in conversations in Kabul with Cde. Yu. M. Vorontsov from 18 to 22 October 1986 (telegrams from Kabul N° 1179, 1182, 1188, and 1190).

In particular, Najib noted that of the 31,000-35,000 villages in Afghanistan the government has only 8,000 formally under control and they managed to hold elections to local bodies in a still smaller number of villages near cities, in only 2,000. In Najib's words, the urban population actively supports the Revolution, but there is no such support in the villages and the PDPA itself is at fault for not having explained the essence and the goals of the Revolution to the population. Cde. Najib thinks that at the present time the mission of the Party is to go from the city to the village.

Cde. Najib noted that the military activity of the counterrevolutionaries is not slackening. He said that at the present time 5,017 rebel groups are operating on DRA territory, which include 183,000 men, eighty thousand of which comprise the active combat force of the counterrevolutionaries. The tactics of the counterrevolutionary forces are changing and improving. Part of the caravan routes along which the supplies of the counterrevolutionaries travel are generally not covered at all. This requires a further stepping up of efforts to close the border.

Cde. Najib stressed that if we proceed from the position of solving all problems by military means then it will take 20-30 more years to normalize the situation at the present rate of strengthening and expanding government

authority. In this regard he considers the stepping up of efforts directed at achieving national reconciliation as a pressing task.

In the opinion of Cde. Najib, they ought to enter into talks with those Islamic parties and organizations inside Afghanistan and beyond its borders who are ready to compromise and do not bear responsibility for bloodshed to such a great degree. A dialogue could also be held with monarchists. Cde. Najib thinks that they will never compromise with the aristocracy, feudal interests, large private landowners, and reactionary mullahs – the "fundamentalists". Nevertheless it's possible to establish contacts with representatives of some of these individuals. When the PDPA achieves national reconciliation he considers it necessary to keep the posts of Chairman of the State Council, Chairman of the Council of Ministers; the Ministers of Defense, State Security, Internal Affairs, Communications, and Finance; the management of banks, the Supreme Court, the procuracy, and military justice bodies. Representatives of the other side could get the posts of Deputy Chairman of the State Council and Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers, and also the posts of Minister of Agriculture, Health, Irrigation; Deputy Minister of various ministries, and governors. The former king, Zahir Shah, could be given the post of Chairman of the National Patriotic Front or Chairman of Parliament. The political organizations of Islamic groups could become collective members of the National Patriotic Front and legitimize their activity on this basis. Cde. Najib expressed the completely reasonable opinion that they ought not to be hasty in adopting the DRA constitution, keeping in mind that much contained in it will depend on how the process of national reconciliation develops.

Cde. Najib is considering the possibility of a public announcement concerning questions of national reconciliation with a simultaneous proposal to the counterrevolutionaries for an armistice, let's say, for six months.

Cde. Najib views the issues of a political settlement and the withdrawal of Soviet troops as linked with national reconciliation. He said that he considers a reduction of the period of Soviet withdrawal from the DRA to two years is possible after a settlement is reached and expressed several ideas about the number of troops to be withdrawn during the first and second years. In connection with the other aspects of the settlement, he expressed an opinion about the advisability of international monitoring within the framework of a settlement without UN involvement; he suggested several versions of Iranian involvement in the settlement; he has a favorable attitude toward a possible increase in our contacts with the Pakistanis regarding the issues concerning the situation around Afghanistan.

Cde. Najib understands that until the present time little has been done in practice toward national reconciliation. It is evident that he is inclined to search for real approaches to this problem. He needs our support in this, especially since indeed far from everyone in the PDPA accepts the idea of reconciliation. Of

great importance in this regard would be the organization of an official visit to the USSR by Cde. Najib before the end of this year in the course of which the questions of national reconciliation and a political settlement around Afghanistan could be discussed. The visit could further facilitate the strengthening of the position of this energetic, can-do Afghan leader.

Cde. Najib thinks that several personnel questions need to be decided to increase the effectiveness of the activity of the Afghan leadership.

In conversations with Cde. Yu. M. Vorontsov and also in other conversations in Kabul in the last few days he has especially stressed that B. Karmal ought to be removed from the PDPA Politburo and the position of Chairman of the DRA Revolutionary Council as soon as possible. Cde. Najib said that B. Karmal has abandoned Party and government work, occupies himself with faultfinding, and speaks against the policy of national reconciliation. Cde. Najib is afraid that B. Karmal's ambitiousness, aggravated by illness and alcohol abuse, could lead him to unpredictable acts. Quiet actions could remove him from his present posts if he were first convinced to do this.

For Cde. Najib's part, he raised the issues of replacing Minister of Defense N. Muhammed with Politburo member M. Rafi and Minister of Foreign Affairs Sh. M. Dost with A. Wakil (Dost would meanwhile continue to handle questions of national reconciliation but as a Minister for Special Assignments and simultaneously DRA Permanent Representative to the UN).

Najib's ideas concerning personnel issues are well-founded. The observations of Soviet representatives in Kabul, in particular, confirm that B. Karmal has not drawn the necessary conclusions on his own and his selfish opposition and lack of self-control displayed in ever more abrupt forms are paralyzing the activity of Cde. Najib and seriously impeding his work in the CC PDPA Politburo and the Party as a whole.

13 November 1986

[Source: Boris Gromov, "Ogranichenny Kontingent ("Limited Contingent")", Progress, Moscow, 1994]

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Vom 11. bis 14. Dezember d.J. weilte der Generalsekretär des ZK der DVPA, Genosse Mohammed Najib, in der Sowjetunion. Schwerpunkt der Verhandlungen zwischen Michail Gorbatschow und Najib war die allseitige und freimütige Erörterung der Lage in Afghanistan, der Probleme der nationalen Versöhnung und der politischen Regelung der Lage um dieses Land sowie der Fragen, die die Entwicklung und Ausgestaltung der sowjetisch-afghanischen Zusammenarbeit in allen Aspekten und allen Richtungen betreffen.

Bei den Verhandlungen wurde darauf verwiesen, daß die erfolgreiche Verwirklichung des von der Führung der DRA verfolgten Kurses der nationalen Versöhnung, des Zusammenschlusses aller Afghanen, die sich für Frieden in ihrem Land und für den sozialökonomischen Fortschritt der afghanischen Gesellschaft einsetzen, unter den derzeitigen Bedingungen von besonderer Bedeutung ist. Die afghanischen Genossen haben diese Arbeit bereits in Angriff genommen, und ihre Konturen und Perspektiven wurden in der Ansprache von Genossen Najib beim Essen im Kreml dargelegt.

Natürlich ist dieser Weg nicht einfach, und neben der Aktivierung der Tätigkeit der DVPA in jeder Hinsicht bedarf es einer breiten internationalistischen Unterstützung für die Anstrengungen der afghanischen Führung. Dabei geht es um Unterstützung bei der Stärkung der internationalen Positionen der DRA, darunter in internationalen Organisationen und internationalen Gremien. Die Sowjetunion ist bereit, diese Unterstützung sowohl auf bilateraler Ebene als auch gemeinsam mit den anderen Ländern der sozialistischen Gemeinschaft weiter fortzusetzen und auszubauen.

Bei den Verhandlungen wurden die Fragen einer politischen Regelung der Lage um Afghanistan erörtert. Der Meinungsaustausch zu diesen Fragen machte erneut deutlich, daß dieses Ziel bereits in nächster

Zeit erreicht werden kann. Es wurde festgestellt, daß hinsichtlich einer politischen Regelung ein Fortschritt erzielt wurde. Für Februar 1987 ist die nächste Etappe der siebenten Runde der afghanisch-pakistanischen Verhandlungen in Genf vorgesehen, die nach dem Willen der UdSSR und der DRA zur entscheidenden Etappe werden soll. Die afghanische Seite legt ein Höchstmaß an gutem Willen bei der Suche nach gegenseitig annehmbaren Kompromißlösungen für die noch offenen Fragen an den Tag, was positive Wirkung zeigt.

Die Verhandlungen mit Genossen Najib haben erneut Überzeugend gezeigt, und dieser Gedanke wurde konzentriert und öffentlich ausgesprochen, daß ein eindeutiger wechselseitiger Zusammenhang zwischen der Schlüsselfrage - der Erreichung einer gerechten Regelung um Afghanistan auf der Grundlage der völligen Einstellung und der garantierten Nichtwiederaufnahme der bewaffneten und jeder sonstigen Einmischung in die inneren Angelegenheiten der DRA von außen - und der Frage der Beschleunigung des Rückzugs der sowjetischen Truppen besteht. Unter diesen Gegebenheiten ist es besonders wichtig, entschieden allen Versuchen entgegenzutreten, das Problem auf den Kopf stellen zu wollen.

Die Moskauer Verhandlungen haben die Übereinstimmung der Positionen der Sowjetunion und Afghanistans zu allen akuten internationalen Problemen der Gegenwart bestätigt. Genosse M. Najib würdigte hoch die Ergebnisse des Indien-Besuchs von Michail Gorbatschow, die während dieses Besuchs unterzeichnete Deklaration von Delhi sowie das Herangehen der Sowjetunion an die Frage der Schaffung eines Sicherheitssystems in Asien.

Der Besuch von Genossen Najib bekräftigte erneut die brüderliche Solidarität zwischen der UdSSR und der DVPA und trug zur weiteren Festigung des Ansehens der afghanischen Führung und von Genossen Najib persönlich in der internationalen Arena bei. Die sowjetische Seite ist mit den Ergebnissen des Besuchs zufrieden.

15. 1. 1987

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I n f o r m a t i o n über den Arbeitsbesuch des Mitglieds
des Politbüros des ZK der KPdSU und Außenministers der UdSSR,
Eduard Schewardnadse, und des Sekretärs des ZK der KPdSU
Anatoli Dobrynin in der Demokratischen Republik Afghanistan

Die Übereinkunft über diesen Arbeitsbesuch wurde während der Verhandlungen des Generalsekretärs des ZK der KPdSU, Michail Gorbatschow, mit dem Generalsekretär des ZK der DVPA, Najib, im Dezember vergangenen Jahres in Moskau erzielt.

Während des Besuchs erhielten die führenden Vertreter der Sowjetunion die Möglichkeit, sich an Ort und Stelle mit der Lage in Afghanistan bekanntzumachen. Die Gespräche mit den afghanischen Genossen bestätigten, daß die Situation in der DRA kompliziert bleibt. Einerseits hat sich der Partei- und Staatsapparat nunmehr wesentlich aktiviert. Die Mitgliederzahl der DVPA, der Nationalen Vaterländischen Front und anderer gesellschaftlicher Organisationen wächst. Der Konterrevolution sind empfindliche Schläge zugefügt worden. Die afghanischen Genossen arbeiten energisch, mit guter Stimmung und klarem Verständnis für die vor ihnen stehenden Aufgaben.

Andererseits haben die bisher zur Normalisierung der Lage ergriffenen Maßnahmen bisher nicht die gewünschten Ergebnisse gezeigt. Die afghanischen Genossen weisen u.a. darauf hin, daß die Arbeit zur Verbreiterung der sozialen Basis der Revolution bisher relativ formal durchgeführt wurde. Die Möglichkeiten der Arbeit mit den Bauern, die die Masse der

15. 1. 1987

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I n f o r m a t i o n über den Arbeitsbesuch des Mitglieds
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Bevölkerung des Landes darstellen, mit den Stämmen, darunter auch mit denen, die in den Grenzgebieten leben, sind bisher nicht genügend genutzt worden. Im Grunde wurde noch nichts unternommen, um den privaten Sektor auf die Seite der Revolution zu ziehen, obwohl es Möglichkeiten dafür gibt.

Die Streitkräfte der DRA stärken sich allmählich, aber ihre Kampfkraft hat das notwendige Niveau immer noch nicht erreicht.

Die afghanischen Genossen gehen davon aus, daß die Hauptaufgabe gegenwärtig die Einstellung des Blutvergießens in Afghanistan mit Hilfe des Kurses der nationalen Aussöhnung ist.

Zu diesem Zwecke erweitern sie den Dialog mit verschiedenen politischen Persönlichkeiten und Kreisen. Dieser Dialog muß nach ihrer Meinung sowohl mit Vertretern früherer Regimes, als auch mit zentristischen und monarchistischen Gruppierungen und sogar mit den sogenannten "Unversöhnlichen" geführt werden. Dabei wird davon ausgegangen, daß die führende Kraft der nationalen Aussöhnung die Demokratische Volkspartei Afghanistans ist.

Ein erster Schritt zur nationalen Aussöhnung ist die erklärte Feuereinstellung, die am 15. Januar in Kraft tritt. Natürlich erwartet die afghanische Führung nicht, daß dabei alles glatt geht. Jedoch hat der Vorschlag zur Feuereinstellung bereits bestimmte Verwirrung im Lager der Konterrevolution hervorgerufen. Er wird zweifellos bei der Einstellung des Blutvergießens seine Rolle spielen und hat großen internationalen Widerhall gefunden.

Mit den afghanischen Genossen wurde die Erörterung der Fragen der politischen Regelung der Lage um Afghanistan im Lichte der bevorstehenden dritten Etappe der siebenten Runde der afghanisch-pakistanischen Verhandlungen in Genf fortgesetzt. Die Situation

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Information über die Reise des Ersten Stellvertreters des Ministers für Auswärtige Angelegenheiten der UdSSR, Anatoli Kowaljow, nach Islamabad vom 17. bis 21. Januar d.J.

Entsprechend dem Plan der sowjetisch-pakistanischen Kontakte auf der Ebene der Ministerien für Auswärtige Angelegenheiten waren für Anfang 1987 Konsultationen vorgesehen, die wir vor allem für eine Einflußnahme auf Pakistan in der afghanischen Frage nutzen wollten. Um die pakistanische Position gründlicher zu sondieren, insbesondere unter dem Aspekt des von der DRA eingeschlagenen Kurses auf nationale Aussöhnung, entschlossen wir uns, die Bedeutung der Konsultationen anzuheben. Das entsprach auch den Absichten der Vertreter Pakistans.

Anatoli Kowaljow traf in Islamabad mit dem Präsidenten, dem Premierminister, dem Außenminister, seinem ersten Stellvertreter und anderen leitenden Mitarbeitern des Außenministeriums zusammen. Von großer Bedeutung war der Umstand, daß er das Gespräch mit Präsident Zia-ul-Haq als persönlicher Abgesandter des Generalsekretärs des ZK der KPdSU, Michail Gorbatschow, führte.

In den Gesprächen wurden einige Aspekte der sowjetisch-pakistanischen Beziehungen, internationale und regionale Probleme behandelt, wobei die mit Afghanistan zusammenhängenden Fragen, insbesondere die Feind Einstellung und die nationale Aussöhnung in Afghanistan sowie die politische Regelung der Fragen um Afghanistan, den Schwerpunkt bildeten.

Unsererseits wurde die Linie der politischen Regelung der um die DRA entstandenen Situation erläutert und das Wesen der von der Regierung der DRA verkündeten Politik der nationalen Aussöhnung sowie der konkreten Schritte dargelegt, die von der afghanischen Führung zur Realisierung dieser Politik unternommen werden. Auftragsgemäß wurde dem Präsidenten mit großem Nachdruck erklärt, daß wir auf keinerlei Lösungen oder Vereinbarungen eingehen können und werden, die den Interessen der DRA, des afghanischen Volkes widersprechen. Die Erklärung der "Siebener-Allians" afghanischer konterrevolutionärer Gruppierungen, in der diese den Vorschlag der FeuerEinstellung ablehnen, wurde verurteilt. Es wurde auch Befremden darüber zum Ausdruck gebracht, daß die pakistanische Führung, die ihr Interesse an der Normalisierung der Lage um Afghanistan erklärt hat, keinerlei Schritte unternimmt, um auf diese Gruppierungen Einfluß zu nehmen und sie zu bewegen, auf die Vorschläge der DRA zur nationalen Aussöhnung positiv zu antworten.

Die Vertreter Pakistans hielten im großen und ganzen an ihren bekannten Positionen fest, gaben jedoch zu verstehen, daß dies keine starren Positionen sind. Es entstand der Eindruck, daß sie jetzt aufgeschlossener für unsere Argumentation sind.

Die Verhandlungen mit den Vertretern Pakistans verliefen kompliziert und in scharfer Form, waren jedoch sachlich, und insgesamt war das Interesse der pakistanischen Seite zu spüren, den direkten Dialog zum afghanischen Thema aufrechtzuerhalten.

Zum Zwecke seiner Fortsetzung und Vertiefung wurde ein Besuch des pakistanischen Außenministers, S. Yakub Khan, in der nächsten Zeit in der UdSSR vereinbart.

Top Secret

**Instructions to the Soviet ambassador to the Democratic Republic
of Afghanistan
(approved at the CC CPSU Politburo meeting of 12 February 1987)**

Special N° 1311.

Visit Cde. S. A. Keshtmand and, referring to instructions, inform him that the request of the government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan for delivery of special equipment in 1988 for the DRA Ministry of Internal Affairs has been carefully considered. The Soviet government, in order to further raise the combat capability of DRA Ministry of Internal Affairs units and subunits, has found it possible to deliver to the DRA in 1988 125 BTR-152 armored personnel carriers; 45 BRDM-2 armored combat reconnaissance vehicles; 6 D-30 A 122-mm howitzers; 20 82-mm mortars; 17,750 rifles; 1,288 radios, ammunition, and other special equipment, the total sum of which is 52,000,000 rubles, with payment of 25% of the cost on credit for 10 years at 2% annual interest...

[Source: A. A. Lyakhovskiy's "Tragediya i Doblest' Afgana" ("Tragedy and Valor of the Afghanistan Veteran)", Iskon, Moscow, 1995; Translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg]

17. 2. 1987

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17. 2. 1987

Wir übermitteln Ihnen eine weitere Fakteninformation über den Verlauf der nationalen Aussöhnung in Afghanistan.

Trotz der fortgesetzten militärischen Aktionen seitens der von den USA geförderten aggressivsten konterrevolutionären Gruppierungen nimmt der Prozess der nationalen Aussöhnung in der DRA allmählich an Intensität zu.

Seit Anfang Februar wurden im ganzen Lande weitere über 300 Kommissionen für nationale Aussöhnung gebildet, wobei die Mehrheit in ländlichen Gemeinden entstanden (die Gesamtzahl beträgt jetzt 795).

Über 10.000 ehemalige Banditen haben den bewaffneten Kampf gegen die Volksmacht freiwillig eingestellt und den Wunsch geäußert, mit der Regierung der DRA zusammenzuarbeiten. Von der Obersten Kommission für nationale Aussöhnung wurden Bandenführern, Stammesführern und angesehenen Afghanen in der Emigration ca. 1 500 Garantisekklärungen zugesandt. Auf die Aufrufe zur Aussöhnung haben viele Gruppen afghanischer Emigranten, die in den USA, Indien und anderen Ländern leben, positiv reagiert. In Afghanistan haben in den letzten Tagen 50 Banden dem Beginn von Verhandlungen zugestimmt.

In 285 Moscheen des Landes wurde festgestellt, daß die örtlichen Mullahs in Predigten die Gläubigen zu Frieden und Aussöhnung mit der Regierung der DRA anrufen.

Die Banden, die früher im Amtbezirk Sarai-Sang (Provinz Takhar) und im Kreis Wasakha (Provinz Paktia) operierten, riefen diese

Gebiete in Volksversammlungen (Jirghas) zu "Ikonen des Friedens" aus und informierten die Kommissionen für nationale Aussöhnung offiziell darüber.

Entsprechend einem Erlaß des Revolutionsrates der DRA wird im Rahmen der Aussöhnung die Amnestie in Haft befindlicher ehemaliger Banditen und desertierter Armeeinghöriger fortgesetzt (im ganzen Lande wurden bereits 1 800 Personen freigelassen, die Mehrheit auf Ersuchen der Kommissionen für nationale Aussöhnung).

Seit der Verkündung der einseitigen Feuereinstellung durch den Revolutionsrat der DRA sind 20 000 Familien aus dem Ausland nach Afghanistan zurückgekehrt, die die Heimat aus verschiedenen Gründen, vor allem aber unter dem Einfluß der gegnerischen Propaganda verlassen hatten. Die Anzahl der sogenannten "afghanischen Flüchtlinge" im Ausland würde rascher zurückgehen, wenn ihnen bei der Rückkehr in die DRA nicht Hindernisse in den Weg gelegt würden. So wollen nach dem Eingeständnis der pakistanischen Zeitschrift "Herald" bis zu 80 Prozent der Flüchtlinge aus Afghanistan, die sich in Pakistan aufhalten, in die Heimat zurückkehren, werden jedoch gewaltsam zurückgehalten.

In den Lagern der afghanischen Flüchtlinge in Pakistan nehmen die repressiven Maßnahmen seitens der örtlichen Machtorgane zu.

In der nordwestlichen Grenzprovinz Pakistans (dem Hauptaufenthaltsgebiet der Afghanen) wurde ein vereintes Kommando gebildet, das aus pakistanischen Militärs und den Anführern der Konterrevolution besteht. Dieses Kommando kontrolliert 255 Lager afghanischer Flüchtlinge, um diese an der Rückkehr in die Heimat zu hindern.

Den afghanischen Lagerinsassen ist es verboten, Radio zu hören und Zeitungen zu lesen. Im Lagerbereich gilt von 6 Uhr abends bis 5 Uhr morgens eine Ausgangssperre. Intensiv werden

afghanische Flüchtlinge in das Innere Pakistans, insbesondere in den Punjab umgesiedelt, wo im Eiltempo neue Lager aufgebaut werden.

Eine große Gruppe afghanischer Flüchtlinge, die versucht hatte, die Grenze zu überschreiten, wurde von pakistanischen Grenzsoldaten aufgehalten und in Landikotal (Khyberagentur) den Anführern der Gruppierung "Islamische Gesellschaft Afghanistans" übergeben. Die Anführer richteten die Entflohenen persönlich, unter den Augen vieler Tausend Flüchtlinge, hin.

Es liegen Informationen darüber vor, daß aus Pakistan und Iran speziell angeworbene Terroristengruppen auf das Territorium Afghanistans entsandt werden, die die im Rahmen der nationalen Aussöhnung durchzuführenden Maßnahmen verhindern und die Bevölkerung einschüchtern sollen.

In Host (Zentrum des gleichnamigen Bezirks) wurde ein Transportflugzeug mit einer Rakete abgeschossen. Ungefähr 30 afghanische Bürger, darunter Frauen, Greise und Kinder, kamen ums Leben.

In Jalalabad (Zentrum der Provinz Nangarhar) wurde in einem dichtbesiedelten Viertel eine Autobombe zur Explosion gebracht. Es gab Tote und über 50 Verwundete, die umliegenden Gebäude wurden zerstört.

Im Zusammenhang mit dem zunehmenden Interesse der Bevölkerung an der nationalen Aussöhnung erhöhen sich auch die von den Bandenführern verhängten Geldstrafen für diejenigen, die die Wahrheit wissen wollen und sich für die Feuereinstellung aussprechen.

Zum Beispiel führte der Anführer Ahmad Schah Massud in der Provinz Parwan unter seinen Bandenmitgliedern eine Strafe von 50 000 Afghani für den Besuch von Städten und die Todesstrafe

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für diejenigen ein, die den bewaffneten Kampf freiwillig einstellen. Zugleich nimmt die Unruhe unter den Bandenmitgliedern zu, und es gelingt den Anführern nicht immer, diese zum Gehorsam zu zwingen.

Insgesamt sollte in Gesprächen hervorgehoben werden, daß die von der Führung der DRA verfolgte Linie der nationalen Aussöhnung nicht nur in Afghanistan selbst, sondern auch im Ausland auf Zustimmung und Verständnis trifft.

Fortschritte bei der nationalen Aussöhnung sind ein wichtiger Faktor, der zu einer schnelleren Regelung der Lage um Afghanistan beiträgt.

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18. 2. 1987

Information über die Verhandlungen mit dem Außenminister Pakistans, Yaqub Khan, und dem Stellvertreter des UNO-Generalsekretärs, D. Cordovez, die kürzlich in Moskau stattfanden

Hauptthema der Verhandlungen sowohl mit Yaqub Khan als auch mit Cordovez war das Afghanistan-Problem. Einen unmittelbaren Zusammenhang zwischen diesen beiden Besuchen gab es nicht, d.h. wir hatten Cordovez nicht eingeladen, um ihn über die Gespräche mit Yaqub Khan zu informieren, und wir hatten den Aufenthalt von Yaqub Khan nicht in einen zeitlichen Zusammenhang mit dem Cordovez-Besuch gebracht. Sie kamen beide getrennt nach Moskau unter Berücksichtigung der für Ende Februar bevorstehenden neuen Etappe der afghanisch-pakistanischen Verhandlungen in Genf.

1. Wie wir bereits informierten, hatte Yaqub Khan den Wunsch, nach Moskau zu kommen, im Gespräch mit dem ersten Stellvertreter des Außenministers der UdSSR, A.G. Kowaljow, in Islamabad geäußert. Wir haben ihm eine derartige Einladung übermittelt, um den Dialog mit der pakistanischen Seite nun schon auf Außenminister-Ebene fortzusetzen und unseren Einfluß auf sie in der Afghanistan-Frage zu verstärken.

Bei den Gesprächen mit Yaqub Khan (er weilte vom 5. bis 8. Februar in Moskau) erklärte die pakistanische Seite, daß sie eine politische Regelung der Situation anstrebt. Yaqub Khan äußerte, daß man in Pakistan an unsere ernsthafte Absicht glaubt, die sowjetischen Truppen aus Afghanistan zurückzuführen, und daß man ausgehend davon bereit sei, nach gegenseitig annehmbaren Lösungen zu suchen. Dabei sah sich Yaqub Khan gezwungen anzuerkennen, daß eine Einmischung in die inneren Angelegenheiten der DRA unzulässig ist.

In offener^{er} Form als früher brachte die pakistanische Seite ihre Unzufriedenheit über den Druck zum Ausdruck, den sie in der Afghanistan-Problematik von seiten der Amerikaner ausgesetzt ist.

Die Verhandlungen gestalteten sich sehr schwierig, insbesondere als es um konkrete Aspekte einer Regelung ging. Die pakistanischen Vertreter nannten eindeutig unrealistische Fristen für den Rückzug unserer Truppen (einige Monate). Unsererseits wurde in diesem Zusammenhang darauf verwiesen, daß solche Fristen in keiner Weise die Situation in und um Afghanistan berücksichtigen und natürlich von der sowjetischen und der afghanischen Seite nicht akzeptiert werden können.

Es wurde Yaqub Khan unmißverständlich gesagt, daß wir nicht zulassen können, daß es nach dem Rückzug unserer Truppen aus Afghanistan dort zu Blutvergießen und Bürgerkrieg kommt. Es wurde die Wichtigkeit der Initiative der DRA zur nationalen Aussöhnung unterstrichen, die ihren konkreten Ausdruck in der Feuereinstellung durch die Regierungstruppen gefunden hat. Es wurde darauf verwiesen, daß die pakistanische Seite, falls sie tatsächlich eine Regelung will, auf die auf ihrem Territorium befindlichen konterrevolutionären Gruppierungen einwirken müsse, daß diese den Aussöhnungsprozeß nicht erschweren. Vorläufig handeln diese Gruppierungen gerade in entgegengesetzter Richtung. Sie verstärken den Beschuß von Garnisonen afghanischer und sowjetischer Truppen sowie die Terroranschläge gegen Personen, die für die Aussöhnung eintreten.

Im Zusammenhang mit den Versuchen Yaqub Khans, uns in eine Diskussion über die mögliche Zusammensetzung einer Koalitionsregierung der nationalen Aussöhnung zu verwickeln, wurde ihm mit Nachdruck erklärt, daß die Fragen der inneren Verhältnisse in Afghanistan ausschließlich von den Afghanen selbst zu erörtern sind. Ungeachtet aller Kompliziertheit der

Verhandlungen mit der pakistanischen Seite halten wir es für zweckmäßig, auch weiterhin den direkten Dialog mit ihr zu pflegen. Davon ausgehend, erklärten wir Yaqub Khan gegenüber unser Einverständnis, erneut mit ihm zum Thema Afghanistan zu sprechen, wenn er Ende Februar auf der Durchreise zu den afghanisch-pakistanischen Gesprächen in Genf in Moskau sein wird.

- 2. D. Cordovez, der vom 9. bis 12. Februar in Moskau weilte, wollte, wie uns scheint, vor der Wiederaufnahme der afghanisch-pakistanischen Verhandlungen in Genf die Lage sondieren und die Überzeugung gewinnen, daß unsere Verhandlungen mit der pakistanischen Seite nicht die Bedeutung seiner Mission als Beauftragter des UNO-Generalsekretärs schmälern.

Wir sagten ihm, daß man in der Sowjetunion seine Anstrengungen bei den Genfer Verhandlungen mit großem Vertrauen verfolgt und daß unsere direkten Kontakte mit den pakistanischen Vertretern in keiner Weise die Genfer Verhandlungen ersetzen, sondern vor allem das Ziel verfolgen, zum Erfolg dieser Verhandlungen beizutragen. Es wurde darüber hinaus unterstrichen, daß die sowjetische und die afghanische Seite bereit sind, darauf hinzuwirken, daß bei der bevorstehenden Runde in Genf endgültige Vereinbarungen über eine politische Regelung erzielt werden.

D. Cordovez brachte seine Überzeugung zum Ausdruck, daß das Streben der Sowjetunion nach einer möglichst baldigen Lösung des afghanischen Problems aufrichtig ist. Er äußerte sich dahingehend, daß zum heutigen Tag nur die UdSSR und die DRA konstruktive Schritte in Richtung einer Regelung unternehmen.

D. Cordovez stimmte unserer Einschätzung des Kurses der nationalen Aussöhnung in Afghanistan als des einzig richtigen Weges zur Einstellung des Blutvergießens und zur Normalisierung der Lage im Lande zu. Er gab den Maßnahmen der afghanischen Führung zur Verwirklichung dieses Kurses eine hohe Würdigung.

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Vom 25. Februar bis zum 9. März d.J. fand in Genf die dritte Etappe der siebenten Runde der afghanisch-pakistanischen Verhandlungen über eine politische Regelung der Lage im Afghanistan statt, die über den persönlichen Beauftragten des UNO-Generalsekretärs, Diego Cordovez, geführt werden.

Wie bisher ging die afghanische Seite bei den Verhandlungen von einer flexiblen und konstruktiven Position aus und war bestrebt, diese Etappe zur Abschlußetappe werden zu lassen. Sie versuchte, endgültige Vereinbarungen zu allen noch offenen Fragen zu erzielen, darunter zur Einbeziehung des Iran in den Prozeß der Regelung, zum Kontrollmechanismus der Einhaltung der Abkommen sowie zum Terminplan für den Abzug der sowjetischen Truppen nach der Einstellung der bewaffneten Einmischung von außen in die inneren Angelegenheiten der DRA. Die afghanische Seite war bereit, schon zum Ende dieser Runde die entsprechenden Dokumente zu unterzeichnen. Die pakistanischen Vertreter stellten wie bisher die Vereinbarung des Terminplans für den Abzug der sowjetischen Truppen in den Vordergrund der Verhandlungen. Dabei behaupteten sie, dieser Terminplan sei das Schlüsselproblem für die Regelung, ohne dessen Lösung endgültige Übereinkünfte zu anderen bisher noch offenen Fragen unmöglich seien.

Die vom Außenminister Abdul Wakil geleitete afghanische Delegation legte ihr aufrichtiges Interesse an einer Regelung an den Tag und unternahm bei den Verhandlungen äußerst kühne und entschlossene Schritte. Sie erklärte, daß es die Regierung der DRA in Absprache mit der Sowjetunion für möglich erachtet hat, die Dauer des Rückzugs der sowjetischen Truppen von den früher angekündigten drei Jahren auf 18 Monate zu verkürzen.

Bei dieser Entscheidung ging die afghanische Seite natürlich davon aus, daß die Führung Pakistans als Antwort darauf ebenfalls

guten Willen an den Tag legt. Doch das war nicht der Fall. Offenkundig unter dem Druck der USA bezog die pakistanische Delegation bei den Verhandlungen eine offen unkonstruktive und unmachgbare Position. Sie versuchte, ihr "Einverständnis" zur Verlängerung der von ihr im Juli-August 1986, während der vorangegangenen Etappe der siebenten Runde, gestützten Dauer von 3 Monaten auf 7 Monate als "Zugeständnis" auszugeben. Entgegen ihren eigenen früheren Äußerungen, daß der Rückzug der Truppen eine politische Frage ist, erklärten die pakistanischen Vertreter wiederum, daß die Rückführung der Truppen nur vom technischen Standpunkt aus zu behandeln ist. Diese Haltung der pakistanischen Seite trägt nicht nur nicht zur Erzielung einer politischen Regelung bei, sondern erschwert auch beträchtlich die weiteren Verhandlungen.

Cordovez erklärt, daß in dieser Verhandlungsetappe ein wesentlicher Fortschritt erwies wurde, da der Unterschied in den Positionen der Seiten zum Zeitplan des Abzugs der Truppen von 33 auf 11 Monate verringert wurde. Die afghanische Delegation verwies darauf, daß die Unterschiede beim Zeitplan tatsächlich abgebaut wurden, allerdings ausschließlich durch die Flexibilität der IRA.

In ihrer Antwort auf den Vorschlag von Cordovez, die Verhandlungen nach zwei Monaten fortzuführen, erklärte die afghanische Delegation mit Nachdruck, daß sie zu einem beliebigen Zeitpunkt zu ihrer Fortsetzung bereit ist, wenn die pakistanische Seite die letzten Vorschläge der IRA zum Zeitplan für den Abzug der Truppen berücksichtigt und einverstanden ist, gleichzeitig auch weitere ungelöste Fragen zu erörtern. Abdul Wakil stellte fest, daß er keine Notwendigkeit sieht, bereits jetzt einen konkreten Termin für die Wiederaufnahme des diplomatischen Prozesses in Gang festzulegen. Des Weiteren wurde von afghanischer Seite unterstrichen, daß die Verhandlungsteilnehmer an konkreten Endergebnissen interessiert sein sollten und nicht danach trachten dürften, den Anschein einer Weiterführung des Prozesses der politischen Regelung zu erwecken.

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Dann weist weiterhin einer Teilnahme an den Genfer Verhandlungen aus, wovon insbesondere seine letzten Verschlüsse zur Durchführung von vierseitigen Afghanistan-Verhandlungen unter Beteiligung der UdSSR, des Iran, Pakistans und der sogenannten "Madscheddins" (jedoch ohne Regierung der DRA) zeugen.

Man muß die Flexibilität und konstruktive Haltung der afghanischen Seite, ihr aufrichtiges Streben nach einer möglichst raschen politischen Regelung hervorheben. Haupthindernis für einen Erfolg der Verhandlungen ist die antiafghanische Politik der USA in dieser Frage sowie der Umstand, daß sich die pakistanische Führung unter dem Druck der Amerikaner nicht zu einer Position durchringen kann, die in der Tat den nationalen Interessen Pakistans entsprechen und zur Lösung des afghanischen Problems sowie zur Herstellung von Frieden und Sicherheit in der Region beitragen würde.

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[p. 252 40th Army report on the effectiveness of "Stinger"s, April 1987]

The rebel groups operating in the DRA have 341 PZRK in service, including 47 "Stinger"s. The number of PZRK has doubled in comparison with a similar period in 1986.

The number of PZRK launches against fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters of Soviet and Afghan air forces has sharply increased. Thus, if in 1984 62 PZRK launches were noted, in 1985 it was 141 and in 1986 847 (26 fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters were shot down). For the three and a half months of this year 86 PZRK launches have been conducted (18 aerial targets have been shot down). Meanwhile the effectiveness of the use of PZRK by the rebels has considerably increased: according to the results of last year the probability of hitting an aerial target was 3%, but this year it is 20%...

Source of information: HQ of the 40th Army
Kabul

20 April 1987

[Source: A. A. Lyakhovskiy's "Tragediya i Doblest' Afgana" ("Tragedy and Valor of the Afghanistan Veteran")", Iskon, Moscow, 1995; Translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg]

4.5.1987
4 Ex.

Vertraulich!

Unter den komplizierten Bedingungen der derzeitigen Lage in Afghanistan mißt die Führung der DRA, wie unseren Freunden in der DDR bekannt ist, der Entwicklung der Zusammenarbeit mit den sozialistischen Ländern, besonders große Bedeutung bei. Dieser Tage fand ein Arbeitstreffen des Genossen Najib mit diplomatischen Vertretern dieser Länder in Kabul statt, in dessen Verlauf Genosse Najib diese eingehend über Fragen der innenpolitischen Lage und der Außenpolitik der DRA informierte.

Unter diesen Bedingungen wächst auch die Bedeutung des Zusammenwirkens der sozialistischen Länder bei der Unterstützung der DRA.

Darüber wurde auf dem Treffen in engem Kreise während der Tagung des Komitees der Außenminister der Teilnehmerstaaten des Warschauer Vertrages in Moskau gesprochen.

In Afghanistan ist jetzt eine qualitativ neue Situation entstanden. Entschlossen wird der Kurs der nationalen Aussöhnung, der Einstellung des Blutvergießens und der politischen Regelung der Lage in Afghanistan durchgesetzt. Auf diesem Wege wurden sowohl in innenpolitischer als auch in außenpolitischer Hinsicht erste spürbare Ergebnisse erzielt. Einige Banden legen die Waffen nieder, die ersten Flüchtlinge kehren zurück, es gibt zahlreiche Äußerungen der internationalen Öffentlichkeit über die Vorgänge im Lande.

Uns ist jedoch klar, daß der Hauptkampf für die nationale Aussöhnung in Afghanistan noch bevorsteht. Die Kräfte des Imperialismus und der Reaktion wollen sich nicht damit abfinden, daß dieser Spannungsherd beseitigt wird, und behindern die Lösung der Afghanistan-Frage. Sie haben neue Lieferungen moderner

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Waffen an die Konterrevolution aufgenommen, stellen ihr weitere Hunderte von Millionen Dollar zur Verfügung und versuchen den Prozeß der afghanisch-pakistanischen Verhandlungen in Genf zu behindern. Terror und Diversion dauern weiterhin an, die ohnehin schwache Wirtschaft des Landes wird weiter untergraben.

Es ist natürlich, daß die afghanischen Freunde ohne eine allseitige Unterstützung der sozialistischen Länder kaum auf Erfolge im Kampf für ein friedliches, nichtpaktgebundenes und neutrales Afghanistan rechnen können. Völlig offensichtlich ist auch, daß die ungelöste afghanische Frage gegen die Interessen aller sozialistischen Länder genutzt wird.

In dieser für die afghanischen Genossen sehr schweren, schicksalhaften Zeit ist es äußerst wichtig, daß sie mit maximal gestärkten Positionen am nationalen Dialog teilnehmen und den Widerstand der Gegner der nationalen Aussöhnung überwinden können.

Wir haben unsererseits in den letzten Monaten eine Reihe von Beschlüssen über bedeutende unentgeltliche Hilfe für die Demokratische Republik Afghanistan gefaßt. Faktisch wird unsere Hilfe auf das Mehrfache steigen. Von humanistischen Erwägungen ausgehend, haben wir bedeutende Mengen dringend erforderlicher Waren zur Verteilung unter den armen Schichten der Bevölkerung sowie unter den afghanischen Flüchtlingen, die in die Heimat zurückkehren, zur Verfügung gestellt. Wir erachten das als sehr wichtig, weil viele einfache afghanische Menschen durch die Aktionen der Konterrevolution ihre Habe, ja, sogar das Dach über dem Kopf verloren haben. Auch zur Unterstützung des afghanischen Volkes auf dem Gebiet der Bildung, des Gesundheitswesens sowie der Ausbildung nationaler Kader soll zusätzlich viel getan werden. Die Linie der Entwicklung der allseitigen sowjetisch-afghanischen wirtschaftlichen Zusammenarbeit wird weitergeführt. Dabei wird - unter Berücksichtigung der Aufgaben der nationalen Aussöhnung - dem afghanischen Privatsektor, einschließlich der Schaffung gemischter Betriebe, große Aufmerksamkeit geschenkt.

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Bedeutende Unterstützung ist zur Stärkung der afghanischen Streitkräfte vorgesehen, die die Stabilität des Prozesses der nationalen Aussöhnung garantieren sollen. Unsere politische und diplomatische Unterstützung der DRA wird ebenfalls weiter verstärkt.

Wir schätzen auch den Beitrag der sozialistischen Länder zur Stärkung der Solidarität mit dem afghanischen Volk gebührend ein. Unserer Meinung nach wäre es in der derzeitigen besonderen Situation jedoch wünschenswert, die Möglichkeiten für einen Ausbau der Zusammenarbeit mit der DRA nochmals abzuwägen.

Vor allem wäre es wichtig, die politischen Kontakte mit der DRA, besonders auf hoher Ebene, zu aktivieren und den Delegationsaustausch in den verschiedenen Bereichen zu verstärken. Es gibt sicher auch Reserven für ein aktiveres und initiativreicheres Zusammenwirken in der afghanischen Frage im Rahmen der UNO, auf anderen internationalen Foren, unter den nichtpaktgebundenen Ländern. Es müßte aufmerksam geprüft werden, was auf dem Gebiet der Propaganda und Konterpropaganda zur Verbreitung einer wahrheitsgemäßen Information über die Lage in und um Afghanistan zusätzlich getan werden kann. Das ist gegenwärtig eine der aktuellsten Aufgaben. Kurz gesagt, geht es darum, alles zu tun, damit bei niemandem auch nur ein Schatten des Zweifels an unserer Unterstützung für den gegenwärtigen Kurs der Führung der DRA aufkommen kann.

Wir wissen, daß die Freunde in der DDR, von internationalistischen Positionen ausgehend, der Regierung der DRA eine bestimmte ökonomische Hilfe zuteil werden lassen. Es wäre jedoch wünschenswert zu überlegen, wie diese Hilfe noch effektiver gestaltet und entsprechend den heutigen Erfordernissen der DRA an ihrem Umfang und ihren Formen Korrekturen angebracht werden könnten.

Wir hoffen, daß die Freunde in der DDR diesen Appell richtig
verstehen, der von der Sorge um unsere gemeinsame Sache dik-
tiert ist, und alles von ihnen Abhängende tun werden, um zum
Erfolg der Politik der nationalen Ausöhnung in Afghanistan
beitragen.

TO
Politburo of the CC BCP
Reg. No. 00.41-78/20.5.87

MEMORANDUM

of the CC BCP department of "Foreign Policy and International Relations"

Re: Activating the relations with the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan and increasing the assistance to Afghanistan with view to promoting the national reconciliation process.

[Source: Central State Archive, Sofia, Fond 1-B, Opis 68, File 87]

Comrades,

Our Soviet comrades have proposed that the People's Republic of Bulgaria, together with the other countries of the socialist community provide additional help to the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan with view to promoting the national reconciliation process.

The Secretary General of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan Nadzib at a meeting with the ambassadors of the socialist countries to Kabul, held on 12th April this year, declared that the PDPA and the DRA are in favor of strengthening and accelerating the relations with the fraternal socialist countries; more initiatives are expected on the latter's part, including initiatives in terms of an increase in the socio-economic assistance provided to Afghanistan.

The relations between the People's Republic of Bulgaria and DRA, between the BCP and the PDPA have been improving since December 1981, when the Treaty on the establishment of friendly relations and close cooperation was signed in Sofia.

The summit meetings held and treaties signed between the two countries have been of particular significance for the further development of our bilateral relations. In this respect an invitation to undertake an official friendly visit to the PR Bulgaria has been made to comrade Nadzib, Secretary General of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, on comrade Todor Zhivkov's behalf. Afghanistan suggests that this visit take place in the period 18th - 20th July or 12th - 14th August. The BCP and the PR Bulgaria have been actively supporting PDPA's policy and that of the revolutionary Board and DRA's government towards national reconciliation and normalizing the overall situation both within Afghanistan and in its neighboring countries by peaceful means; they firmly back up the friendly Afghani people's struggle to build a new, peaceful and independent and non-aligned Afghanistan.

A mass-scale exchange of delegations is being carried out. In 1986 our country was visited by the Politburo member of the CC of PDPA and prime minister of DRA Sultan Ali Kashtmand, the Politburo member of the CC of PDPA and deputy prime minister of DRA Mohamed Rhaffi, three ministers and other important politicians and state officials from Afghanistan. There have been several visits on the Bulgarian part since the beginning of 1987, such as: Krastyo Trichkov's, vice-president of the national council of the Fatherland Union, or Rumens Serbezov's, chairman of the Central Cooperative Union. There has been exchange visits of other party, state or public delegations. A sustainable legal framework, within which bilateral relations may develop, has been established.

So far our country has been providing and still provides significant socioeconomic assistance and aid to the DRA. This aid may be divided into the following items:

- a government credit of \$31.3 mln has been extended to fund the establishment of cattle-breeding farm, a chicken-breeding farm, a fishery, a pottery and leather-processing works, and other properties on Afghanistan's territory; the agreements already signed in this respect total \$31 mil.

- a new government credit of \$30 mil has been extended in 1986 to fund the designing of a brick works, the delivery and installation of its equipment, supplying with

electricity villages throughout the country, building medium-size and small water-power stations, a mixed-type fodder plant, the expansion of a chicken-breeding farm, a fruit and vegetable-processing technological line;

- a credit line of 3mil exchange leva granted by the Central Cooperative Union in 1986;

- aid of over 1.5 mil exchange leva for telephone stations of the CC of PDPA and other organizations and agencies, textbooks, medicines, foods, shoeware, clothing and special equipment;

- experts sent to work in various industries of Afghanistan's economy

- covering fees and other expenses for the education of about 100 students annually at the universities and the Academy of Social Sciences and Economic Management (the ASSEM) at the CC of the BCP;

- covering fees and other expenses for an 11-year education of 20 Afghani orphans at boarding-schools in Bulgaria;

- covering all expenses, including travel and accommodation of all Afghani people visiting Bulgaria.

A sign of our solidarity with the people of Afghanistan and our support for PDPA and the DRA are the wide range of events organized in our country such as meetings, rallies, press conferences to honor such important historical events as the anniversary of the April Revolution (April 27th), the Day of Independence (August, 18th), the International Day of Solidarity with the people of Afghanistan (October, 25th).

We suggest that our country accept the Soviet comrades' proposal, and respond to PDPA's appeal to provide assistance to PDPA's policy of national reconciliation in Afghanistan.

We are therefore tabling a draft resolution of Politburo of the CC of the BCP, drawn up after considering the remarks and suggestion made by the following Politburo members: comrades Georgi Atanassov, Grisha Philipov, gen. Dobri Dzhurov, Petar Mladenov and

Ognian Doimov. The financial aid for designing a new hospital in Kabul has been considered with the chairman of the Bulgarian Red Cross, K. Ignatov.

18 May 1987

First Deputy Head, CC BCP "Foreign Policy and International Relations" department

/K. Atanasov/

[Translated by Assistant Professor Kalina Bratanova; Edited by Dr. Jordan Baev]

On the Present Situation in Afghanistan

6 May 1987

The leadership of the Afghan Democratic Republic attaches special significance to expanding cooperation with socialist countries at a time when the situation there is complicated. For example, some days ago a working meeting between Comrade Najib and diplomatic representatives of socialist countries took place in Kabul. During this meeting, Najib informed the others of Afghan domestic and foreign policy.

In these circumstances, the need for a common approach by socialist countries to aid Afghanistan is becoming more significant. This was discussed at a gathering of Warsaw Pact foreign ministers in Moscow. A new situation, however, has emerged in Afghanistan. A path to national reconciliation has been followed, bloodshed has been curtailed, and a political solution is being sought. The first tangible domestic and foreign policy results have been achieved. Some bands are laying down their arms, refugees are returning, and the international community is taking an active interest in Afghan events.

At the same time we realize that the basic struggle for national reconciliation in Afghanistan still awaits us. The imperialist and reactionary forces cannot reconcile themselves with the pacification of this tense flashpoint and are thus doing all they can to prevent a solution to the Afghan problem. It is sufficient to recall the new supplies of modern weapons to the counterrevolutionaries, the sending of hundreds of millions of dollars, and attempts to stifle discussions between Afghanistan and Pakistan in Geneva. The terror continues and the already weak Afghan economy is being further undermined. Naturally, without the overall support by socialist countries to our Afghan allies, it would be difficult to imagine victory in the struggle for a peaceful, non-aligned, and peaceful Afghanistan. It is obvious that the absence of a solution to the Afghan problem is being used to harm the interests of all socialist countries.

In this trying time for our Afghan comrades, it is crucial that they be firm in their pronouncements so that they can overcome their enemies' attempts to hinder national reconciliation.

Over the last months, the Soviet Union has decided to provide substantial, non-returnable aid to Afghanistan. In fact, Soviet assistance is increasing by several times. Out of humanitarian considerations, the Soviet Union has provided large quantities of basic needs for the poor in Afghanistan as well as for returning refugees. The Soviet side considers this to be important because many ordinary Afghans have lost their property and even the roof over their heads as a result of counterrevolutionary activities. Other significant assistance being prepared for the Afghan people includes education, health care, and the training of national cadres. When taking into account the issue of national reconciliation, great attention is devoted to the private sector and the creation of "mixed" enterprises. Also, significant aid is oriented towards the bolstering of the Afghan armed forces, whose role it will be to safeguard to stability of the national reconciliation process. The Soviet Union is strengthening its political and diplomatic support for Afghanistan.

The Soviet Union appreciates the benefits provided by the solidarity of socialist countries with the Afghan people. In the current situation, it is crucial once again to reconsider possibilities of expanding cooperation.

Concretely, it is important to activate political contacts with Afghanistan, particularly on a high level, and delegations on various levels should be exchanged more frequently. It is quite clear that there exist serious reservations regarding a more active and involved approach to Afghanistan in the United Nations as well as other international gatherings between uninvolved countries. It is definitely worth considering looking into possible measures in the areas of propaganda and counterpropaganda with the aim of disseminating truthful information about the situation in Afghanistan. For the sake of brevity, we must do everything in our power so that nobody can doubt our support for the present policies of the Afghan leadership.

The Soviet Union is aware that its Czechoslovak friends, guided by an internationalist approach, are providing economic assistance to Afghanistan. Nevertheless, it would be good for us to consider how to make this assistance more effective and how best to suit the needs of Afghanistan.

The Soviet side believes that its Czechoslovak friends will correctly interpret this call to action, which involves our common goals, and that the Czechoslovaks will do everything in their power to further the goal of national reconciliation in Afghanistan.

Source: Central State Archive, Archive of the CC CPCz, presidium of the CC, 35.session, 6 May 1987. Provided by Oldrich Tuma.

Report on Meeting between Minister Chňoupek with the General Secretary of the Afghan People's Democratic Party Central Committee, Comrade Najib

6 May 1987

Najib warmly welcomed Comrade Chňoupek in Afghanistan in the name of the Afghan People's Democratic Party. Najib then spoke of the main goals of the national reconciliation policy. First, he emphasized guaranteeing the peace and security of the country. Most importantly, it is important to mobilize political forces in the struggle for state sovereignty and to gain the support of wide segments of the population for the revolutionary process. The main goal is to lay the groundwork for the ongoing realization of the April National Democratic Revolution. He characterized the present situation as follows: 100 days had passed since the national reconciliation policy was declared. 80 days remain until the passing of the first phase, namely the validity of the declared ceasefire. Much has been accomplished over the past 100 days. However, even more work still awaits us. First of all, a great organization of labor is to take place. The Party is undertaking widespread massive propaganda activity in order to realize the new policy. At the present time, the Party is taking energetic strides in the economic sphere. The first year of the current Five Year Plan represents the effective beginning of a national resolution of the country's economic difficulties. A pan-Afghan conference of national private businessmen took place for the first time in Afghan history. The goal here is to develop cooperation with the private sector, which accounts for eighty percent of the national economy. Najib expressed his appreciation for the speech by the Czechoslovak ambassador at this conference, in which he stated basic Czechoslovak support for the reconciliation process. At issue is finding common ground with businessmen.

The Afghan leadership is also undertaking a new offensive on the international scene. It is defending the new policy more dynamically, which has yielded positive results such as diplomatic relations with Cyprus and Zimbabwe. The Afghans are approaching the Geneva discussions with generous and courageous policies aimed at solving the Afghan situation. Relations with India are being consolidated. Unfortunately, Pakistan has completely disregarded the local interests of its population by not adopting a constructive approach at the Geneva discussions. As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, there is an overall concurrence with all present aspects of Afghan policy.

The realization of national reconciliation policy is no easy task. Najib likened it to overcoming an unknown mountain where there is no smooth path, but where it is necessary to find an alternative way to overcome obstacles.

The Party is realizing national reconciliation policy with the burden of economic tasks that have gone unfulfilled over the past eight years. It is paying the price for past negligence and dilly-dallying in economic policy. The revolution brought with it many broken promises. It was like water dissolving in sand. The Party thus recognized the need for fundamental change. For this reason a special session of the Afghan People's Democratic Party Central Committee took place, resulting in the declaration of the national reconciliation policy. The idea of national reconciliation had existed previously. For example, the 16th plenum of the People's Democratic Party Central Committee had presented a ten-point plan concerning this policy, but the concrete mechanisms and methods for realization were accepted later by the special session of the Afghan People's Democratic Party Central Committee. This policy does

not represent some theoretical experiment, but rather it is a concrete reaction to a concrete situation, that is, a reaction to the needs of the people. This is a people's policy. Slogans expressed earlier had not gained the support of the wide masses.

Ever since the new policy was announced, certain presumptions have been created according to which the Party must intensively work. At present, the Party has 180,000 members in 5,600 organizations. The task of the Party is to remedy past mistakes, formulate new plans, and to consider matters from a long-term perspective. Thus far, the Party has not achieved a qualitative change in the country. In spite of this, it is possible to point to some significant results over the past 100 days. A mechanism to realize the new policy has been created, namely national reconciliation commissions. About 1,300 of these commissions sprang up, which is not an insignificant number when considering the circumstances. The commissions are comprised of a large number of activists, including 3,000 former opponents of the Party.

Najib cited other tangible results. 25,000 counterrevolutionaries surrendered to Government forces, in all 1,100 armed groups. An additional 100,000 members of the armed opposition are in contact with state organs. Another 30,000 have adopted a wait-and-see approach. Between 25,000 and 30,000 counterrevolutionaries continue to wage an armed struggle. However, their social base is dwindling, which is largely the result of their irrational, mad policy of terror. This will only increase their isolation. There are great disagreements among the opposition inside the country.

On the international scene, the United States administration continues to hold a hard, uncompromising position towards Afghanistan. The same holds true for Iran. In addition, China has not changed its position and continues to provide assistance to the extremists.

Overall, it is fair to describe the international response to national reconciliation policy in Afghanistan as favorable. The fact that the empty place at the Islamic Conference was not given to the extremists can be described as a success. On the contrary, the Conference resolution recognized the good will of both Afghanistan and the Soviet Union. An appreciation of the new policy has also been expressed in two United Nations resolutions. Twelve out of fourteen opposition parties in Pakistan support national reconciliation policy. This leads the Party to believe that its new policy has not only local significance, but also international significance. The relationship to refugees has also been favorable. In the last six months, 44,000 refugees have returned compared with 35,000 over the past seven years. The number of repatriated refugees could be higher if obstacles were not placed in their way by the Pakistani and Iranian bureaucracies. 5,500 political prisoners have been released as a result of amnesty. 1,100 villages have been peacefully liberated. The second round of local elections is taking place. These results are greater than those over the course of seven years.

National reconciliation policy does not signify an end to the Party's struggle against extremists who still oppose the Party with arms in hand. This struggle continues with the difference that the Party no longer has to contend with 175,000 counterrevolutionaries, but rather a mere 35,000.

The national borders are being consolidated. Even the armed forces are being consolidated with 40,000 new fighters called up. In addition, the salaries of soldiers and officers have risen.

The backbone of support for national reconciliation policy remains the assistance provided by the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. Among the supporters is also Czechoslovakia. This year the Soviet Union provided especially significant assistance.

In other news, Najib expressed his heartfelt gratitude for assistance provided by Czechoslovakia and described in detail the quantitative nature of this support in individual economic sectors. Najib requested that Minister Chňoupek convey the Afghan leadership's sincere gratitude to Comrades G. Husák and V. Bílak.

There is a long tradition of relations between our countries, which precede the revolution and the founding of the Afghan People's Democratic Party. The diplomatic relations established in 1937 turned into brotherly relations after the revolution.

Najib recalled his conversation with the Czechoslovak ambassador two weeks before and just prior to the present gathering, in which he openly expressed the pressing need for Czechoslovak assistance to Afghanistan in the struggle against international imperialism so that the burden of such assistance would not be solely on the Soviet Union. Difficult tasks await the Party in its attempts to implement the national reconciliation policy. A new initiative will need to be developed after the initial six-month period in a manner such that this policy will become irreversible and influence the masses both inside and outside Afghanistan and keep the opponents of the Afghan regime forever divided. The main organizer of this activity must be the Afghan People's Democratic Party. One of the main aspects of the new policy is the creation of a coalition Government of National Unity. The Afghan People's Democratic Party has decided that it must correct its past mistakes by relaxing its power monopoly. The Party must be a mobilizing, guiding force in society. The Party must get Afghanistan out of its present international isolation. Therefore, the Party's policy must be alive and realistic, conducted in new conditions and in cooperation with new forces. The Party can no longer rely solely on itself. Its policy must be open, patient, and enjoy the confidence of other social forces. The main aim is to achieve the unity, united character, and mobilization of the Party. At the same time, the Party must actively pursue social policy both in Kabul and in the countryside.

In order to achieve these goals, the Party is organizing a large gathering of all its members in Kabul as well as in the countryside. The accepted resolutions express full support for national reconciliation policy. In this, the Party sees a confirmation of its mandate to lead society and strengthen the Party through Leninist-style labor.

In his conclusion, Comrade Najib emphasized a need for close consultations with allies regarding the most effective implementation of national reconciliation policy on both a bilateral and multilateral basis where allied countries can provide significant assistance to those with whom they enjoy friendly relations.

Source: Central State Archive, Archive of the CC CPCz, presidium of the CC, 35.session, 6 May 1987. Provided by Oldrich Tuma.

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[p. 334-37 April-May 1987 list of recommendations by the Soviet ambassador
and other Soviet representatives in Kabul]

(For Official Use)

1 April

A draft directive of the CINC of the DRA Armed Forces has come to the Embassy [Tsentri] for examination [entitled] "Increasing the Effectiveness of Troop Command When Combating Caravans and Rebel Formations in the Border Zone".

The draft directive stipulates:

1. The commanders of the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th AKs and infantry divisions in the border zone, the commanders of border brigades are to consider their primary mission the waging of combat operations to destroy rebel groups and detachments in the border zone and on caravan routes in order to prevent them from reaching the central regions of Afghanistan.

2. Determine the zone of responsibility for each army corps and infantry division.

3. Subordinate the corresponding border brigades and the commanders of operational MVD and MGB battalions deployed in their zones of responsibility to the commanders of corps and infantry divisions.

4. Develop plans for joint operations in each army corps, corresponding infantry division, and border brigade.

5. Send the personnel of operational DRA MVD and MGB subunits formed on a tribal basis in the border zone, etc. to the border troops.

7 April

A request was expressed to approve our last proposal which envisions an increase in the monetary compensation for soldiers in their first year of service to 1000 Afghanis and those in their second year to 2500 Afghanis; soldiers and sergeants who have finished their period of service (reservists) and who are continuing their service on a voluntary basis – to 5500 Afghanis. In addition, servicemen should have coupons for 50% of [their] monetary compensation by which (for the money they have) they could get appropriate goods at closed military trading stores, whose prices should be 2-3 times less than market prices...

17 April

A note was submitted about the main directions of the efforts of Soviet advisory bodies in carrying out decisions of the Soviet leadership directed at strengthening the present regime in the DRA and creating conditions for the withdrawal of Soviet troops with a description of the possible alternate developments of events in the country.

Ideas were described about the system of government administration in Afghanistan in the light of the policy of national reconciliation.

25 April

In connection with the acts of Pakistani armed pressure on Afghanistan the following proposals have been submitted:

1. Through the Soviet ambassador and DRA charge d'affairs in Islamabad convey demands to the Pakistani administration to cease assistance to Afghan rebels and shut down their bases on Pakistani territory.

2. Warn the Pakistani leadership that Pakistani Air Force operations against Soviet and Afghan aircraft over DRA territory will not remain unpunished.

3. Give an official assessment of the activity of the Pakistani Air Force in protecting rebel bases in the Soviet press in the form of an announcement or an interview with a USSR Ministry of Defense representative.

4. Immediately react in the mass media to similar types of incidents in the future.

5. Offer armed opposition to Pakistani aircraft in the border zone.

6. In the event of new aggressive acts of Pakistani aircraft make a practice of proportional retaliatory actions of a defensive nature in a selected manner without letting the conduct of the Pakistani side remain unpunished.

27 April

In fulfillment of the CC CPSU and USSR Council of Ministers Decree N^o 349-77 of 26 February 1987 about giving free economic aid to the armed forces, refugees, and the poorest sections of the DRA population, a request has been made to allot 95 million tons of foodstuffs, 250 automobiles, 500 wheelchairs, 1000 heavy trucks, and other industrial goods for the support of servicemen.

8 May

A proposal has been submitted to examine favorably an appeal of the Afghan government to transfer to them free of charge part of the free storage space in storehouses of the limited Soviet military contingent in the DRA; the allotment and delivery in 1987 of material handling and warehouse equipment; and carrying out work to set up storehouses and accommodate bases.

10 May

Consent has been requested for the Afghan side to carry out the following measures planned with the aid of Soviet representatives to intensify the political initiative in the struggle for the masses and strengthen the present regime and the PDPA.

1. Step up the resolution of the issue of forming a PDPA bloc with leftist democratic groups (parties). Create and include in this bloc a party, which would represent the interests of the working peasantry.
2. In May and June 1987 hold an all-Afghan Jirga of Islamic authorities in Jalalabad at which the basic principles of the policy of national reconciliation would be approved with respect to Islam as the most important constituent part of the policy of achieving national accord. Announce at the Jirga the possibility of creating an independent – alternative counterrevolutionary – party acting under national patriotic and Islamic slogans.
3. In May and June 1987 hold an Extraordinary Session of the DRA Revolutionary Council at the suggestion of the all-Afghan Extraordinary Reconciliation Commission at which a decision to rename the DRA to the Islamic People's Republic of Afghanistan is to be adopted. The Revolutionary Council is to be reorganized into a State Council.
4. Give the work to create coalition government bodies in the provinces and districts a government-wide character.
5. Conduct further consideration and study of the problems associated with the resolution of the ethnic problem in the DRA.
6. In June and July 1987 publish a draft Constitution of Afghanistan for general public discussion.
7. Actively continue measures to increase the combat efficiency of the DRA Armed Forces.
8. Continue efforts to actively involve former King Zahir Shah in the process of national reconciliation.

Begin to create a coalition government; for this purpose, propose to the opposition that five or six of their influential representatives be included in the DRA government.

11 May

Evaluations of the state of affairs in the DRA Armed Forces and several ideas have been made to strengthen their combat effectiveness - bring the strength of the army up to 200,000 men; improve the training of officers; conduct joint combat operations with the 40th Army on the most important operational axes; and organize the reception, distribution, and delivery of Soviet economic aid, etc.

18 May

Proposals have been submitted in connection with the talks which were held between the Minister of Foreign Trade B. I. Aristov and the Afghan leaders and the agreements reached.

1. The USSR Mintorg [Ministry of Trade] [SIC] and Tsentrsoyuz [Central Council of Consumer Cooperatives] are to take additional measures to complete work associated with the selection of goods for free delivery to the DRA.

2. USSR Gossnab [State Supply Committee] and USSR Mintorg are to accelerate the selection of goods totalling up to 50 million rubles for additional delivery to the DRA in 1987 for sale to the private sector.

3. The RSFSR Ministry of Trade is to submit proposals in the established manner about opening specialized stores for the sale of Afghan goods in Moscow and Leningrad...

Source of information: the Soviet Embassy in the DRA,
the USSR missions in the MGB and the MVD,
the Chief Military Adviser's staff in the DRA,
the USSR MO Operations Group

May 1987

[Source: A. A. Lyakhovskiy's "Tragediya i Doblest' Afgana" ("Tragedy and Valor of the Afghanistan Veteran")", Iskon, Moscow, 1995; Translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg]

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[p. 343 April-May DRA MGB and General Staff, 40th Army, and GRU report of instances of DRA military desertions and treason]

(Secret)

Cases of treason and desertion in the DRA VS [Armed Forces]

... The combat readiness and political morale of a number of units and subunits of the DRA VS remains at a low level and the manning level of a majority of them is 40-70%. The desertion of Afghan army servicemen is growing in the provinces; they desert singly or in small groups (often with a weapon) and go over to the side of the rebels. Thus, according to official data, in January 2350 deserted from the DRA VS, 2600 in February, 2900 in March, and more than 3000 in April (about 11,000 total).

One could take the following as examples. On the night of 3 April a battalion of the 34th PP of the 2nd AK (Kandahar city) went over to the rebels. By order of the battalion commander the officers and soldiers who had not deserted were shot.

On 27 April the 93rd Tsarandoy Battalion (110 men, 2 BRDM, 3 MNM [expansion unknown], and 5 vehicles) deployed in northern Baghlan went over to the rebels with their equipment right after participating in the parade celebrating the 9th anniversary of the April Revolution.

On the night of 11-12 May the Commander of the 72nd Tsarandoy Regiment, Shabon, (deployed in central Baghlan) at the head of a detachment of up to 300 men (a BTR, 2 MNM, and 368 small arms) also went over to the side of the rebels. This defection sharply worsened the morale of the tsarandoy servicemen in the area of Baghlan and could cause other tsarandoy subunits to defect.

The plan for calling up youth and reservists in the DRA VS is only being fulfilled by 20-60% (depending on the province) which creates serious difficulties in manning the Afghan army...

Sources of information: DRA MGB,
GSh VS DRA, Headquarters of the 40th Army,
GRU GSh VS SSSR

April-June 1987

[Source: A. A. Lyakhovskiy's "Tragediya i Doblest' Afgana" ("Tragedy and Valor of the Afghanistan Veteran"), Iskon, Moscow, 1995; Translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg]

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[pp. 339-41 June 1987 40th Army and Chief Military Adviser reports of DRA government 1987 military operations to date]

MEMO

Top Secret

In the period from 1 January to 15 June of this year government troops conducted 31 combat operations, including 17 jointly [with Soviet troops] and 14 independently.

Results:

- rebels killed – 3096, captured – 60;
- destroyed – 44 PU RS [rocket launchers], 53 mortars, 16 BO [probably "recoilless guns"], 4 ZGU, 56 DShK, 29 RPG, more than 100 small arms, 1148 rockets, 624 mortar shells, 1804 rounds for BO, 410 RPG grenades, 45,800 small arms rounds, 1530 kg of explosives, 93 hand grenades, 25 land mines, 959 PTM [antitank mines], 542 PPM [antipersonnel mines], 29 firing positions, 6 dugout shelters, 12 storehouses (8 - ammunition, 1 – food, 3 – clothing), and 4 "IK" [expansion unknown] documents.

- seized – 13 rocket launchers, 21 mortars, 15 BO, 10 ZGU, 7 PZRK, 39 DShK, 68 RPG, 33 machine guns, 1157 small arms, 5013 rockets, 7033 mortar shells, 6424 rounds for BO, 2,958,000 small arms rounds, 5280 RPG grenades, 2130 kg of explosives, 1222 hand grenades, 76 land mines, 2835 PTM, 2014 PPM, 23 storehouses (7 – ammunition, 5 – food, 6 – clothing, 5 – medicine), and 11 "IK" documents.

- removed – 58 land mines, 751 PTM, and 434 PPM.

The combat operations conducted in [the following] provinces had the following results:

- joint – Kandahar (February), Nangarhar, Kabul (May), Laghman, Nangarhar (April), and Kandahar (May-June);

- independent – Herat (May) and Baghlan (May).

Forty-six villages were liberated during combat operations. The losses of the Afghan army were:

1) personnel:

- killed – 370;

wounded – 1232.

2) weapons and equipment:

20 tanks, 2 BMP, 23 BTR, 4 BRDM [combat reconnaissance vehicles], 7 [field] guns, 15 mortars, 14 ZGU, 4 DShK, 15 machine guns, 1998 small arms, 108 vehicles, 9 aircraft, and 15 helicopters.

During the same period Soviet troops conducted 9 joint combat operations:

- "Shkval" in the province of Kandahar (forward base [at] Shinaray) from 4.02 to 11.03 with the forces of the 5th MSD (3 battalions); the 70th OMSBR (1 battalion), and a battalion of the 45th ISP together with the 7th PD (2 battalions), the 7th TBR [tank brigade] (2 battalions), the 466th ODSHP [Independent Airborne Assault Regiment] (2 battalions), and an MGB ob-n [independent battalion].

Twelve battalions total. The commander was General Yu. P. Grekov.

- "Udar" in the province of Kunduz (the Madrasa region) from 16 to 21.02 with the forces of the 201st MSD (4 battalions) together with the 20th PD, an MGB ob [independent battalion], and an MVD ob.

Eight battalions total. The commander was Colonel V. N. Shekhovtsov.

- "Groza" in the province of Ghazni (base area [at] P'yadara) from 2 to 21.03 with the forces of the 56th ODSHBR (2 battalions) and the 191st OMSP [Independent Motorized Rifle Regiment] (2 battalions) together with the 14th PD, 38th ODSHBR, an MGB ob, and an MVD ob.

Ten battalions total. The commander was General N. P. Pishchev.

- "Krug" in the provinces of Kabul and Logar (Jigdalay region), 64 km west of Jalalabad from 8 to 21.03 with the forces of the 108th MSD (2 battalions), the 103rd VDD (3 battalions), and the 66th OMSBR (2 battalions) together with the 11th PD (2), 8th PD (5), an orb [independent reconnaissance battalion] of the 1st AK, MGB ob (2), and MVD ob (2).

Nineteen battalions total. The commander was General G. G. Kondrat'yev.

- in the province of Herat (western outskirts of Herat) from 11 to 21.04 with the forces of the 5th MSD (4 battalions) together with the 17th PD (4), 14th TBR (3), an MGB ob, and an MVD ob.

Thirteen battalions total. The commander was General A. V. Uchkin.

- "Vesna" in the province of Kabul (base area [at] Kukhi-Safi, 23 km southwest of Surubi; base area [at] Chakaray, 30 km southeast of Kabul) from 12 to 24.04 with the forces of the 108th MSD (3 battalions) and 103rd VDD (3) together with the 8th PD (5), an orb of the 1st AK, the 61st OPP [probably "Independent Infantry Regiment"] (2), an MGB ob, and an MVD ob.

Sixteen battalions total. The commander was V. P. Dubynin.

- "Zalp" in the provinces of Logar, Paktia, and Kabul (base area at Khisarak, Azrau, and the regions of the city of Noray and Alikhel) since 20.5 with the forces of the 108th MSD (3 battalions), 103rd VDD (3), 66th OMSBR (2), 56th ODSHBR (2), and the 345th OPDP [Independent Parachute Regiment] (2) together with the 8th PD (5), 11th PD and 12th PD (6), the 14th PD (5), MGB ob (2), and MVD ob (2).

Twenty-five battalions total. The commander was General V. P. Dubynin.

- "Yug-87" in the province of Kandahar (the forested zone of the Argandab river) since 21.05 with the forces of the 5th MSD (3 battalions), 70th OMSBR (2), 191st OMSP (2), and the 3rd OMSB [Independent Motorized Rifle Battalion] SPN together with the 7th PD (5), 15th PD (5), 7th TBR (2), 466th ODSHP (2), 38th ODSHBR (2); 21st MPD [motorized infantry division] (2), 1st MVD op [independent or operational regiment] (2), 93rd op (1), an MGB ob, and an MVD ob.

Thirty-one battalions total. The commander was N. P. Pishchev.

Six combat operations in support of the DRA Armed Forces and 11 individual combat operations were conducted, 32 intelligence items were exploited, of which 24 produced results (66%), 2071 ambushes were laid, of which 259 produced results (12.5%).

For this period:

- 11,925 rebels were killed and [the following] were destroyed: 111 PZRK; 279 rocket launchers; 14,855 rockets; 438 DShK and ZGU; 302 mortars; 180 BO; 314 RPG; 1566 small arms; and 230 storehouses.

- 349 prisoners were taken and [the following] were seized: 102 PZRK; 69 rocket launchers; 38,019 rockets; 142 DShK and ZGU; 3,800,000 rounds for DShK and ZGU; 73 mortars; 64,019 mortar shells; 58 BO; 26,026 BO rounds; 169 RPG; 28,283 RPG grenades; 2155 small arms; 8,190,000 small arms rounds; and 686 various storehouses.

The rebels in turn conducted: 927 acts of sabotage, of which 452 were shelling of posts and guard outposts, 142 of columns, 182 of garrisons; 100 detonations of mines; and 51 other acts of sabotage.

Losses of the Army were: 68 killed, of which 15 were officers, and 46 wounded.

Results of the combat operations of spetsnaz subunits:

1. Combat sorties made 840
of which 168 (20%) produced results

2. Destroyed [/killed]:

caravans – 131
storehouses – 31
rebel groups – 53
rebels – 1416
rocket launchers/rockets – 2/3002
DShK/ammunition – 23/74,300
BO/rounds – 6/1860
mortars/shells – 2/1402
RPG/rounds – 52/1584
PZRK – 10
small arms/ammunition – 110/1,301,000
vehicles/tractors – 80/14
pack animals/motorcycles – 690/5
PTM/PPM – 290/709
medicines/narcotics – 6500/3160 kg

3. Seized:

prisoners – 176
rocket launchers/rockets – 11/4437
DShK/ammunition – 28/295,807
mortars/shells – 11/4014
BO/rounds – 30/2778
RPG/rounds – 51/3431
PZRK – 69
small arms/ammunition – 624/2,757,000
vehicles/tractors – 36/1
pack animals/motorcycles – 22/33
PTM/PPM – 481/873
medicines/narcotics – 2038/9000 kg

Sources of information:
summary of the staff of the Chief Military Adviser in the RA,
report of the Headquarters of the 40th Army,
Kabul

June 1987

[Source: A. A. Lyakhovskiy's "Tragediya i Doblest' Afgana" ("Tragedy and Valor of the Afghanistan Veteran"), Iskon, Moscow, 1995; Translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg]

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[p. 347-49 August 1987 letter by Colonel Tsagolov to Yazov about Afghanistan containing an analysis and suggestions] [Translator's note: the analysis has been previously translated in the National Security Archive's Afghanistan Dossier, Document 20]

...

SUGGESTIONS

1. As the first and immediate step to develop new approaches to solve the Afghan problem and increase the personal responsibility of the heads of various agencies for the objectivity of the information and forecasting of the future political situation in the DRA I consider it to be fundamentally necessary:

a) conduct an honest analysis of the existing situation and the anticipated military and political situation. Hold a meeting of heads of government agencies for this purpose ...

b) the unfolding military and political situation demands the concentration of supervision in a single person's hands with imperative necessity. This official should be given extraordinary authority and bear personal responsibility to the CC CPSU Commission on Afghanistan for the practical results of our efforts. I consider it my duty to report my opinion that of all the departmental representatives General of the Army V. I. Varennikov best and most deeply understands the entire complexity of the existing situation in the DRA. He combines a military, political, and economic vision of the problems in their entirety and interdependency.

2. Convince the Afghan Party leadership of the need to carry out the following exceptional, fundamentally new political steps which are indicated by the critical situation in the country and the existing alignment of forces:

- prepare a PDPA Manifesto to the Afghan people which gives an honest analysis of the entire course of the Revolution indicating the successes and an open admission of the mistakes...

- describe in detail the condition of Afghan society which results after the announced period of national reconciliation, and the status of the PDPA;

- turn to the Party and the people with a decision to disband the PDPA in the interests of consolidating the patriotic forces of the country for the sake of preserving a united democratic government...

- recognize in this same appeal the existence and practical activities in the country of such political parties as "Parcham", "Khalq", ROTA [Revolutionary

Organization of the Workers of Afghanistan], ROBTA, OFTA [Organization of Fedayeen of Afghanistan], AOTA, AMRA...

- recognize the formation of a political alliance "The Union of National Salvation" as the only thing advisable in existing conditions, where all these organizations would join on an equal basis with the full consent of the leadership of all political parties...

- turn to all the important leaders of the armed counterrevolution with a call for a peaceful political dialogue in order to work out a compromise platform to create a coalition government;

- recognize it expedient to facilitate the creation of an Islamic Party of Afghanistan and its incorporation into the "The Union of National Salvation";

- announce to the people a new name for the country: "The Islamic Democratic Republic of Afghanistan" and a new national emblem and national flag;

- prepare and submit for popular discussion a program on the ethnic issue [called] "The Union of National Salvation" with the announcement of the right of autonomy for each ethnic group within a united and indivisible Islamic Democratic Republic of Afghanistan;

- declare martial law throughout the entire territory of Afghanistan with the introduction of emergency wartime laws until a preliminary treaty with the armed opposition is achieved ...

All the suggestions presented above relate to problems of the political arena. At the present time they have the highest priority nature. Many problems in the military sphere have also accumulated. Their analysis and suggestions are a special topic of discussion...

I am ready to honestly give detailed reasons regarding all the suggestions formulated in the letter based on the personal practical experience of working in the DRA for many years and a knowledge of Afghan reality at various levels... At the same time, I report my readiness for a practical decision of the problems ensuing from these suggestions. I am convinced that everything suggested can be realized in practice if we display political courage and self-criticism, a breadth of thinking and a concern for the interests of the Motherland, and not the corporate honor of the uniform.

[Source: A. A. Lyakhovskiy's "Tragediya i Doblest' Afgana" ("Tragedy and Valor of the Afghanistan Veteran")", Iskon, Moscow, 1995; Translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg]

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[p. 351 Statement of the DRA political leadership on their armed forces strength]

The total strength of the Armed Forces of Afghanistan has grown by 127,000 from 1982 to 1987, including by 40,000 in the army and by 30,000 in the tsarandoy. The state security agencies have practically been created anew. If in 1360 (1981) there were 8,000 border guards then today in 1366 (1987) border troops have been created in which 30,000 men serve. In general there were no territorial troops earlier; at the time the PDPA all-Party Conference on National Reconciliation was held there were 36,000. There are 16,000 border *malish* (guards) [Note: The word derives from "militia", so "militiamen" may be a better translation than that provided by the author]. There are about 42,000 men in detachments and self-defense groups, which also did not exist before. The DRA VS have modern combat equipment and excellent weapons "including ones which the rebel groups do not and can not have.

An object of pride of the PDPA is the quantitative and qualitative growth of the Party organizations of the Armed Forces. In comparison with 1360 (1981) the total number of primary Party organizations in the army more than doubled, in the tsarandoy by 2.3 times, and in the state security organs by about eightfold. As regards the Party breakdown [*prosloyka*] in this period in the army among the officers it rose from 58% to 83%, among sergeants from 17% to 47%, and among soldiers from 5% to 11%. In the tsarandoy the number of Party members grew two and a half times and in the state security organs, sixfold. The DOMA [Democratic Youth Organization of Afghanistan] organizations in the Armed Forces grew considerably during this period.

[Source: A. A. Lyakhovskiy's "Tragediya i Doblest' Afgana" ("Tragedy and Valor of the Afghanistan Veteran"), Iskon, Moscow, 1995; Translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg]

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[pp. 385-86 October 1987 report from Kabul by Varennikov (Ministry of Defense,
Mozhayev (Ministry of Foreign Affairs)[MID], and Golovanov (KGB):

REPORT FROM KABUL

(Secret)

The results of the PDPA Party conferences in the DRA

The Party conferences which took place at the end of August and the beginning of September in all provinces of the DRA and in the city of Kabul at which progress in implementing the policy of national reconciliation was examined and delegates chosen to the II PDPA All-Party Conference were a very important event in the domestic political life of the country. The conference participants as a whole actively supported the policy of the PDPA of accelerating the process of national reconciliation and strengthening the unity of the Party ranks, and approved the practical activity at this level of the CC PDPA Politburo headed by Cde. Najib.

At the conferences the delegates discussed progress in carrying out the decisions of the June CC PDPA plenum with interest, analyzed the work of their Party organizations, and made suggestions for their improvement and acceleration for the sake of the process of achieving national accord in the country.

Noteworthy was the circumstance that the proposal and discussion of candidacies to participate in the All-Party forum were accompanied in many cases by a sharply critical evaluation of the practical activity of senior officials of the central and local government and Party bureaucracy, mainly in connection with the failure to carry out their responsibilities, failure to observe Party ethics, and misuse of their official positions.

The atmosphere of glasnost and criticism reigning at many Party conferences was used in several provinces (Kunduz, Jowzjan, Nangarhar, and Herat) and also in individual regions of the city of Kabul as factional elements by a number of supporters of B. Karmal...as attempts to block candidacies put forward on the central list and advance their own representatives. With this goal the factionalists, having found supporters both in the central and local government and Party bureaucracy, conducted a purposeful indoctrination of conference participants, leading in several cases to serious complication of the work of the conferences. Beyond that, B. Karmal was elected practically unanimously in Jalalabad by a conference delegate [SIC] and in the 7th Regional Committee of Kabul, A. Ratebzad. Individual work was conducted in this connection with many delegates, as a result of which a majority rejected their

initial views, recognizing them as mistaken. The results of the voting for B. Karmal and A. Ratabzad were annulled.

Considering such a development of events, the Party leadership took urgent measures which, in our view, were justified in such a situation. In the 7th Regional Committee of Kabul more than 20 members of the Regional Committee headed by the secretary were expelled from the Party and removed from their jobs. More than 10 senior officials have been discharged from the CC PDPA staff who were involved in pro-Karmal activities...

Thanks to these energetic measures adopted by the Politburo on the initiative of Cde. Najib, they managed to remove the complications which had arisen...

A certain dissatisfaction among the Party members elected by the delegates at the II PDPA All-Party Conference was caused by the intensive work of a specially created CC PDPA Politburo commission to identify their points of view about events which are taking place in the Party and the government. During individual conversations all the members of this commission (Najib, Nur, Zeray, and Razmjo) insistently explained the impermissibility of speeches at the upcoming conference with partisan ["kryl'yevyye"] positions against the Party policy of national reconciliation. We think that such work is justified in the present circumstances, although some violation of intra-Party democracy takes place.

...However all the more often there are found in the Party elements of complacency, parasitic attitudes, and an underestimation of the importance of work to strengthen ties with the masses and constantly conduct explanatory work. Regarding the latter, in particular, witness the fact that a majority of residents of Kabul know little about the work of the city [Party] conference. Its results... are poorly explained to both rank-and-file Party members and the population [in general], which is used by enemies of the Party to spread various malicious rumors and fabrications...

P. Mozhayev (MID), V. Varennikov (MO), and V Golovanov [KGB]

Kabul, October 1987

[Source: A. A. Lyakhovskiy's "Plamya Afgana" ("Flame of the Afghanistan veteran)", Iskon, Moscow, 1999; Translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg]

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[pp. 435-36 Issues proposed to Jelaluddin Khakani for discussion by a Soviet
[military] adviser, November [1987]]:

Letter [trans. note: according to Lyakhovskiy, the text is from his own "archive"]

Issues proposed for discussion

1. The recognition of the independence of the Pushtun tribes in the southeastern part of Afghanistan within the framework of the Republic and the principles of their relationship to the central government.

2. The representation of Jelaluddin and the Pushtun tribes in the leadership of the Republic and eastern provinces - in the National Council and government of the country.

3. The legalization of the activity of the IPKh and its registration as a legal and independent party of Afghanistan.

4. The organization of economic aid to the population of the provinces of Paktika, Paktia, and the district of Khowst from central government agencies.

5. A cease-fire within the indicated provinces and the opening of the Kabul-Gardez-Khowst road. The organization of transport along this road and its protection using local tribal personnel.

6. Granting military aid to the armed formations of the tribes from the RA Armed Forces in the form of equipment, weapons, and ammunition.

The issues sent by me were coordinated with the Soviet Ambassador in Afghanistan, Yu. M. Vorontsov, and General V. I. Varennikov, who, for their part, coordinated them with the leaders of the Republic. Adviser.

[Source: A. A. Lyakhovskiy's "Plamya Afgana" ("Flame of the Afghanistan veteran)", Iskon, Moscow, 1999; Translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg]

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[pp. 358-61 1987 memo about Afghan refugees in Pakistan and Iran from multiple Soviet and Afghan sources]

MEMO

Afghan refugees in Pakistan and Iran

In the light of the policy of national reconciliation being pursued by the leadership of the Republic of Afghanistan and the efforts being made by the Soviet and Afghan sides to normalize the situation the problem of Afghan refugees is acquiring ever greater importance. The acuteness and importance of this problem is determined by a number of factors, the main one being the size of the Afghan colony outside the RA (more than 4,500,000, which is 25% of the entire population of the country), the considerable scale of the refugees' involvement in the counterrevolution, and the unavoidability of additional substantial material expenses to ensure the return of this category of refugees to their homeland and find peaceful labor for them. The resolution of the refugee problem is complicated further by the fact that all the countries which are waging an undeclared war against the Republic are trying to keep the main mass of them under the influence of the opposition, create additional roadblocks on the path of the Afghans' return to their homeland, and continue using this problem to justify their anti-Afghan policy and anti-Soviet demarches on the international scene.

The largest number of refugees at the present time are in Pakistan (3,000,000) and Iran (1,500,000). The colonies of refugees in India (13,000), the Arab states of the Persian Gulf region (about 25,000), and Turkey (20,000) are insignificant in number. There are Afghan political emigrants from the times of the monarchy and Daud in Western Europe and the United States (no more than 30,000 in all).

The main mass of refugees are former residents of the RA provinces bordering Pakistan and Iran and nomads of Pushtun border tribes who left their homeland under the impact of the repression of Hafizullah Amin's rule, malicious propaganda, and compulsory measures by the counterrevolutionaries, and also in view of the fact that their previous residences ended up in a zone of combat operations. By social origin the contingent of refugees is relatively uniform. About 90% of them are representatives of the poorest and middle Afghan strata (peasants, craftsmen, and merchants). At the same time a large number of the representatives of the civilian and military bureaucracy of the pre-revolutionary regimes, the intelligentsia, the senior clergy, the upper bourgeoisie, and landowners have settled in Pakistan and Iran.

The main source of sustenance for ordinary indigent refugees is the humanitarian aid given through the channels of the UN High Commission for Refugees and Displaced People and other international organizations of

countries and charitable organizations. About \$1 billion comes through these channels annually. Of secondary importance as a source is the economic activity of the refugees themselves in the regions bordering Afghanistan (working the land, cattle-raising, handicrafts, and commerce). They are involved in contraband trafficking in weapons, narcotics, food, and consumer goods. Payments from opposition groups for participation in anti-government activity in armed formations on RA territory are also sources of income for many Afghan families who have ended up in refugee camps. All their deeds are being paid for.

The condition of ordinary Afghans in Iran and Pakistan, especially those who are in refugee camps, is quite difficult. Both Iranian and Pakistani authorities try to gain the maximum advantage for themselves from the presence on their territory of large colonies of Afghans. Both in Iran and in Pakistan the refugees are kept in special camps (more than 300 in Pakistan and 100 in Iran). This allows local authorities to exercise rigid control over their activity, conduct targeted ideological conditioning, and control the distribution of aid, appropriating a considerable part of it and using it as a means of influencing the refugees. It is well known that only one-sixth of resources and donations make it to those Afghans living in the camps in Pakistan. The rest remains in the hands of the Pakistani authorities, is transferred to the heads of the opposition groups, [or] is stolen by representatives of the Pakistani camp administration. In Iran Afghan refugees are used at the Iran-Iraqi front.

The main camps of the Afghan refugees are:

in Pakistan: Chitral, Sevay, Haripur, Kacha-Garkhi, Naserbat, Fakirabad, Saranan, Zardakkot, Minyanwali, Bannu, Azim-Banda, Hangu, Mamasangar, Kamkol-Sharif, Azakheil-Bala, Pabbi, Kakabiyar, Damadola, and others.

In Iran: Birjand, Tebese-Mesina, Tayyebat, Tabas, Zabol, Zahedan, and others.

The difficult material conditions in the camps, the rigid administrative restrictions, and a practically complete lack of rights for the refugees facilitates the formation of a sentiment among a considerable part of them in favor of returning to their homeland. The only requirement for this in the refugees' environment is considered to be the establishment of peace in Afghanistan.

In order to preserve their influence in the midst of Afghans abroad, in the very first months after the declaration of the policy of national conciliation with the assistance of foreign advisers the leadership of the Afghan parties developed a specific plan for measures to counteract the peace efforts of RA authorities. Active anti-government propaganda is conducted in the refugee camps with the participation of the leaders of the opposition, important chiefs, authorities from previous regimes, and also representatives of foreign delegations from the US, FRG, France, Saudi Arabia, China, and other countries visiting the camps. The

main emphasis is made on intimidating the refugees with repressions of the security organs of the Republic and Soviet troops. Those camps in which the mood to return is the most widespread are sealed off by armed rebel groups. At the same time measures are being taken to reduce the tension in them by various increases in material assistance and improvement in living conditions. Repression and terror are used with regard to active supporters of the policy of national reconciliation.

The opposition and the international forces supporting it view the numerous colonies of refugees in Iran and Pakistan as a primary and practically inexhaustible base for replenishing their armed formations operating on RA territory and therefore they try not to allow a sharp reduction in their numbers. Special attention is devoted to children and adolescents living in the camps for whom special schools have been created and where primary attention is devoted for their education in the dogmas of Islam. The counterrevolutionaries manage to select up to 75,000 rebels annually from among the refugees and train them in training centers.

As regards the Iranian ruling clergy, in its work with the Afghan refugees it also strives to make them staunch supporters and champions of the idea of an "Islamic revolution" in Afghanistan.

Sources of information:
the RA MGB, and Intelligence Directorate of the RA VS GSh,
Headquarters of the 40th Army,
the USSR GRU GSh VS,
and the Soviet embassies in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran

1987

[Source: A. A. Lyakhovskiy's "Tragediya i Doblest' Afgana" ("Tragedy and Valor of the Afghanistan Veteran)", Iskon, Moscow, 1995; Translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg]

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[p. 331-34 1987 KGB, Ministry of Defense, and Ministry of Foreign Economic
Relations report on the Afghan economic situation]

The Issue of the Economic Situation in the DRA

The economic situation of Afghanistan remains quite difficult. It has been brought about by the practical failure of all earlier adopted social and economic plans and programs, growth in the government budget deficit, a further increase in domestic and foreign debt, the low level of productivity of gross revenues and national income, etc. By level of development of the economy, at the present time Afghanistan is in one of the last places in the world, for in 1986 its national income per capita fell below \$125 annually (before 1978 it exceeded \$126 by a little).

The most negative influence on the development of the economy of the country is the continuing subversive activity of counterrevolutionary forces and, as a consequence, the growth of defense expenditures. For the period since April 1978 the material damage just to the governmental sector alone is estimated at 50 billion Afghanis (about \$1 billion). The estimated losses to the private sector exceed 450 billion Afghanis (mainly due to the destruction of more than 1000 various industrial enterprises, commercial and communications facilities, and the destruction of more than 2700 schools, housing, and other material resources).

At the same time, during this period the amount of funds allocated for defense and security increased elevenfold and in 1986 reached 60% of all budget expenses of the country.

Under these conditions the execution of the government budget for recent years has boiled down to a constant 15-16% deficit, which is covered entirely by the issue of an additional 11.5-12 billion Afghanis a year. As a result of this by the end of 1986 a paper mass of 90 billion Afghanis was in circulation (4 times more than in 1978) which led to an unchecked process of devaluation of the national currency and a growth of inflation and prices for the basic kinds of goods.

The gulf between the official and the market rate of the dollar more than tripled. Inflation is 20-25%, but the market prices for the period since 1978 rose by an average of 2.5 times.

The domestic government debt by the end of 1986 reached 82 billion Afghanis, which is almost 100% of the expenditures of the state budget planned for the current Afghan year of 1365 (which ends on 20 March 1987).

The external debt of Afghanistan is \$2.7 billion, including Soviet government and commercial credits of \$2.1 billion. As of 1 January 1987 the debt reached \$300 million through just the clearing of accounts with the USSR.

The low level of development of industrial and agricultural production also does not facilitate an improvement of the economic situation. In the gross national product the share of industry does not exceed 20%; only 47% of gross production of industry is produced in the government and mixed sectors. This important sector continues to experience a shortage of electricity, raw material, spare parts, technical workers and unskilled labor [*rabochiye kadry*], etc.

The fuel and energy problem continues to remain acute. Thus, only two of the five mines in the DRA are functioning and the coal output has fallen from 218,000 tons in 1978 to 150,000 at the present time. The production of natural gas has also fallen. In 1986 2.6 billion cubic meters of natural gas were produced, of which 2.2 billion cubic meters were exported to the USSR. In 1987, according to an estimate, the figures are 2.1 and 1.7 cubic meters respectively, which will lead to a reduction of export earnings of 50 million clearing dollars.

The DRA military and political leadership has not managed in recent years to begin work on extracting and reprocessing oil, as a result of which the import of petroleum products from the USSR for civilian needs alone exceeds 500,000 tons a year.

The existing energy situation of the country clearly reflects such a figure as the low annual production of electrical power per capita. Thus in the DRA it does not exceed 65 kilowatt hours at the same time as in India it is 220 kwh, in Iran 415 kwh, etc.

The difficulties listed above have led to a majority of industrial enterprises of the government, mixed, and private sectors being partially utilized (20-25% of industrial power), especially regarding the production of basic necessities. Moreover, 45 private industrial enterprises (including 30 in Kabul) have been generally shut down.

A difficult situation also remains in agriculture, where at the present time 85% of the population is employed and [which] produces up to 65% of the national income. The basis of agricultural productivity remains the small private farm whose share is more than 99% of total agricultural production. In 1986 the gross wheat harvest was 2,800,000 tons; however the government purchased only 40,000 tons (1.5%) from the peasants; as a result 240,000 tons of wheat were imported from the USSR, 160,000 tons of which was free. Matters are no better with other crops.

As a whole, right now Afghanistan is not in a condition to supply independently its own needs in agricultural production because of the conditions

of civil war and due to a whole series of objective reasons ensuing from this and also because of mistakes and excesses in the DRA leadership's attitude toward the agrarian issue and the enlistment of the peasantry. Thus, the conclusion can be drawn that the present economic and hard currency situation of the DRA can be characterized as critical. The country's economy right now and in the near future is not able to function normally or rely only on its own resources without enormous external financial and economic aid. At the present time the DRA's share of Comecon total foreign aid is about 90%; including the USSR, it is 75%.

In the 1980-1985 period the scale of Soviet economic and technical aid reached 430 million rubles and for the next stage (1986-1990) it has been set at 570 million rubles.

Deliveries from the USSR (free of charge) through foreign trade channels in 1978-1986 exceeded 600 million rubles and through GKEhS [State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations] channels, more than 200 million rubles. In 1987 140 million rubles of free aid from the Soviet Union is planned.

At the same time the Afghan side displays great interest in acquiring approximately up to 1 billion rubles free of charge, which it plans to use in the following manner: for monetary and material support of the armed forces, up to 500 million rubles; to cover part of the deficit of the government budget – 300 million rubles, etc. The DRA military political leadership expects to get free aid up to 1990 in such annual amounts.

This policy being followed by the DRA leadership is a realistic reflection of the continuing parasitic attitude on the part of the senior bureaucracy, which is confident that the Soviet government will henceforth satisfy their requests and demands. They therefore do not pay sufficient attention to bringing the necessary order to the country's economy, in particular the area of economic management.

Proceeding from an estimate and analysis of the existing situation the conclusion can be drawn that for the near future (1.5-2 years) the PDPA and the DRA government will not be able to normalize the difficult economic situation of the country or raise the standard of living of the main mass of the population and thereby attract a majority of the people to its side...

Sources of information: MVEhS [Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations], KGB, and the USSR MO

1987

[Source: A. A. Lyakhovskiy's "Tragediya i Doblest' Afgana" ("Tragedy and Valor of the Afghanistan Veteran")", Iskon, Moscow, 1995; Translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg]

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[pp. 327-31 1987 analysis by Soviet military experts]

The policy of national reconciliation (PNP) has not yet yielded the expected results. After the announcement of the new policy by the DRA government and the unilateral cessation (beginning 15.01.1987) of combat operations by troops against the rebels no substantial reduction of subversive counterrevolutionary activity has occurred. The rebels continue to shell administrative centers, organizational nuclei, the posts and garrisons of Soviet and Afghan troops, commit sabotage on lines of communications and acts of terrorism against Party and government employees, and to transfer weapons, ammunition, and other material resources and a trained reserve force from Pakistan and Iran to the DRA.

The rebels display the greatest activity in the eastern and southeastern border regions of the DRA, several central and northeastern provinces (Kabul, Kapisa, Baghlan, Kunduz, and Takhar), areas of the Lower and Middle Panjshir, the green belts of Kandahar and Herat, and on major lines of communications of the country.

The rebel grouping in the DRA continues to remain at a rather high level and at the end of May 1987 numbers 3,785 detachments and groups, 133,700 men (8,000 more than 01.01.1987), of which 1,400 are active (52,000 men). The largest number of groups (70%) are concentrated in the Northeast, Central, Eastern, Southeastern, and Southern zones where there are 2,510 detachments and groups, more than 90,000 men, comprising 67% of the total number of rebels in the country.

The most important feature of the military and political situation in the DRA at this stage is the practical implementation of measures in accordance with the policy of national reconciliation announced by the country's leadership. To counterbalance the measures of government authority taken within the framework of the new policy, the leadership of the Afghan counterrevolutionaries has unleashed a broad propaganda campaign to discredit and distort its substance and goals. The main goal of this campaign is to convince the local population and independent leaders who had been perceived as having approved of the policy of national reconciliation not to enter into negotiations with government authority and not to cease armed combat against it before Soviet troops are withdrawn from the DRA. At the same time it is implied that the policy of national reconciliation being followed by the government is evidence of the weakness of the existing regime which could not defeat the counterrevolutionary movement by force of arms, is trying to divide it with a new policy, and bring the leaders of large and active formations to its side by deceit and destroy them.

In this regard the leaders of the largest and most active formations have taken an uncompromising position regarding the new policy. This applies in particular to: A. Shah (IOAP, 3600 rebels, the Panjshir Valley and adjoining areas), Farid (IPA, 1500, green belt of Kapisa), M. Alam (IOA, 480, Balkh province), Rakhmatullo (IOA, 700, Kunduz province), M. Wadud (IOA, 290, forested zone of Taloqan), Khirodmand (IPA, 710, Badakhshan province), S. Mansur (IPA, 560, Baghlan province), Abdul Khay (IOA, 858, Nakhrein district, Baghlan province), Anwar Dangar and Sufi Rasul (both IOA, up to 700, Kabul province), and many others.

Besides the unbridled anti-Soviet and counterrevolutionary propaganda campaign the leaders are taking active measures to prevent the PNP from being transformed into reality. With this purpose, they are blockading villages and not allowing the local population and elders to go to administrative centers to meet and negotiate with representatives of government authority. Under the threat of death they prohibit listening to broadcasts of Kabul Radio, break up meetings, and in every way disrupt the work of extraordinary provincial national reconciliation commissions, even as far as committing acts of terrorism against their members. Thus, on 28 January the rebels killed the Chairman of the National Reconciliation Commission of Kunduz province, A. Razak, and on 8 May they killed the Chairman of the National Reconciliation Commission of Kandahar province, M. Usman. As a result of threats and acts of terrorism many members of national reconciliation commissions have ceased work or even display obvious passivity.

The rebels have increased the intensity of armed actions against government authority, especially against Soviet troops, chiefly by shelling various facilities and sabotaging lines of communications. This was clearly evidenced by the following data: during the current year (from 01.01.1987) the number of shellings of Soviet troop garrisons, security posts, guard outposts, and columns is 630 (for this period last year it was 210); [the shelling] of administrative centers, posts and bodies of government authority, DRA Armed Forces garrisons and Afghan columns was 3350 (for this period last year it was 1600). Thus the number of shellings has increased in comparison with a similar period last year: shellings of Soviet troops have tripled and for Afghan facilities it has doubled.

The intensity of shellings increased especially sharply during the preparations for and the celebration of the 9th anniversary of the April Revolution. In a majority of provinces of the country meetings of leaders of formations were held at which missions were assigned to commit subversive acts during the holiday period. As a result, on just 27 April 1987 alone the rebels shelled 46 various facilities (administrative centers, troop deployment locations, security posts, etc.), of which 24 were Soviet and 22 were Afghan. On ordinary days the number of shellings are 8-12 targets a day.

Thus on 27 April during the parade the provincial center of Mazar-i-Sharif was shelled by rockets, as a result of which seven were killed and 18 wounded. Thirty and 40 rockets were launched on the provincial centers of Kunduz and Taloqan, respectively. In the province of Kunar massive shelling was conducted of practically all the organizational nuclei in the rural district centers and the posts around them; the provincial center of Asadabad was subjected to the most intensive shelling, as well as Birkot [Translator's note: probably Barikowt], Asmar, and Sarkani. In areas of the DRA bordering Pakistan (in the provinces of Nangarhar, Paktia, Paktika, and the district of Khowst) practically all the posts and subunits of the Afghan border troops were shelled. The provincial and district centers of Charikar, Gul'bakhar, Maydanshahr, Jalalabad, Khowst, Naray, Alikhel, Ghazni, Qalat, Kandahar, Babasahib, Saidalim-Kalay, Lashkar Gah, and others were shelled.

From the moment of the announcement of the policy of national reconciliation 100 detachments and groups (of 3785) having a total strength of 6370 men (4.7% of the total number of rebels in the DRA) have come over to the government side. At this stage negotiations with the government about a possible switch to its side are being conducted with 326 leaders having a total strength of about 13,000 men (9%). Thus it is necessary to stress that many of the leaders who are concluding agreements or entering into negotiations with government bodies about ceasing armed combat are pursuing tactical goals: avoiding AU and ON (air strikes and artillery strikes – author's note) on their formations, conserving men and equipment, receiving aid from the government, and biding their time to determine their position depending on the further development of the situation.

Foreign-based [*vneshnyaya*] counterrevolutionaries who have settled in Iran and Pakistan are also taking active measures to disrupt the PNP. Besides training and sending new armed formations and infiltration of additional consignments of OBPR (weapons and ammunition – author's note) into the DRA to continue subversive activity, the foreign-based [*zarubezhnoye*] leadership of the counterrevolution continues to intensify an agitprop campaign in the camps of the Afghan refugees in order to prevent their return to the DRA. Officials of Pakistan and Iran facilitate this activity of the counterrevolutionary forces.

In spite measures taken by the counterrevolutionaries, during the period of the PNP more than 6200 refugee families (about 36,000 people) returned to the DRA. For comparison: about 3 million refugees live in Pakistan and up to 1,500,000 in Iran.

In turn, the refugees who managed to return to the DRA are being subjected to persecution by counterrevolutionary forces (even as far as murder). In this regard the refugees who returned are afraid of the vengeance of the rebels and try to avoid contact with government authority by all possible means, preferring to settle in villages among their relatives and friends, refusing the aid

being offered by the government, or preferring to receive it secretly from the rebels. For this reason the free material aid earmarked, including that of the Soviet Union, often does not make it to the refugees, is accumulated by local leaders and their relatives, and sometimes falls into the hands of the rebels. For example, the campaign presently being carried out in the area of the provincial center of Taloqan to give out the foodstuffs and essential goods from the stock of free Soviet material aid to the population encounters active resistance from the rebels. On 15 May after aid was given out the village of Polikok (3 km southwest of Taloqan) was surrounded by the rebels of commander Zobi (IPA, 40 [men]) and each resident who had received aid was forced to pay a fine of 15,000 Afghanis. Similar acts by rebels are disrupting such measures, reducing their role, and demoralizing the population.

In the immediate future one ought to expect a further increase of subversive activity by the rebels in all areas; an expansion in the scale of counterrevolutionary propaganda among the population and workers of the Party and government bureaucracy, and servicemen of the DRA Armed Forces, the MGB, and tsarandoy in order to persuade them to switch to the side of the counterrevolution; a disruption of the policy of national reconciliation; an increase in the destabilization of the general situation in the country; and thereby the creation of conditions to seize power after Soviet troops withdraw from the DRA.

[Source: A. A. Lyakhovskiy's "Tragediya i Doblest' Afgana" ("Tragedy and Valor of the Afghanistan Veteran")", Iskon, Moscow, 1995; Translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg]

13. 1. 1988

4 Ex.

Vertraulich

Eduard Schewardnadse, Mitglied des Politbüros des ZK der KPdSU und Minister für Auswärtige Angelegenheiten der UdSSR, stattete der Republik Afghanistan vom 4. bis 6. Januar 1988 einen Arbeitsbesuch ab.

Die Materialien dieses Besuchs sowie das Interview Eduard Schewardnadses für die afghanische Nachrichtenagentur Bachtar, in dem unsere Haltung und das neue Herangehen an eine Regelung der Afghanistan-Frage ausführlich dargelegt sind, wurden in der Presse veröffentlicht. Zugleich halten wir es für notwendig, unsere Freunde vertraulich über die wichtigsten Ergebnisse dieses Besuchs zu informieren.

Das Hauptziel dieser Reise Eduard Schewardnadses nach Kabul bestand darin, den afghanischen Freunden und Präsident Najibullah persönlich moralisch-politische Unterstützung in einer für Afghanistan besonders bedeutsamen Zeit zu erweisen, da die Frage des Abzugs der sowjetischen Truppen in einem Zeitraum von höchstens 12 Monaten endgültig entschieden ist.

Es mußten gemeinsam alle Fragen der Realisierung des Kurses der nationalen Aussöhnung besprochen sowie ein Schema praktischer Aktionen vor Wiederaufnahme der afghanisch-pakistanischen Verhandlungen im Februar d.J. abgesprochen werden, die über den persönlichen Vertreter des UNO-Generalsekretärs, Diego Cordoves, geführt werden. Diese Verhandlungen befinden sich jetzt auf der Zielgeraden und können, wie wir hoffen, zu endgültigen Übereinkünften über den gesamten Komplex der politischen Regelung führen, einschließlich internationaler Garantien für die Nichtwiederaufnahme der Einmischung in die Angelegenheiten Afghanistans nach Abzug der sowjetischen Truppen und eines konkreten Zeitpunktes für den Beginn ihrer Rückkehr in die Heimat.

Konkret und ausführlich wurden unsere bilateralen Beziehungen mit Afghanistan auf den verschiedenen Gebieten erörtert. Es geht vor allem darum, diesen Beziehungen noch mehr Dynamik zu verleihen und einen maximalen positiven Einfluß auf die Lösung der sozialen und ökonomischen Aufgaben zu gewährleisten, wodurch der Prozeß der nationalen Aussöhnung der Afghanen weiter beschleunigt werden soll.

Wir haben der afghanischen Führung mitgeteilt, daß die Sowjetunion auch weiterhin alles Mögliche und von ihr Abhängende tun wird, um unsere Beziehungen auszubauen, zu vertiefen und aktiv zur Überwindung der Rückständigkeit der afghanischen Wirtschaft beizutragen. Gegenwärtig werden unsere Handels- und Wirtschaftsbeziehungen in Übereinstimmung mit den Forderungen der Zeit umgestaltet. Die Praxis unserer Beziehungen mit Afghanistan wird aktiv um neue, effektive Formen der Zusammenarbeit bereichert, wie z.B. Direktbeziehungen von Republiken, Gebieten und Städten der Sowjetunion mit Provinzen und Städten Afghanistans.

Eduard Schewardnadse führte zwei mehrstündige Gespräche mit Präsident Najibullah.

Es zeigte sich, daß der führende Repräsentant Afghanistans sich konsequent auf konkrete Aktionen orientiert, die zu einer schnellstmöglichen Deblockierung der Afghanistan-Frage sowie zur Normalisierung der Lage in und um Afghanistan führen. Dabei verliert er ungeachtet zahlreicher Komplikationen und Schwierigkeiten objektiver und subjektiver Art nicht seinen Optimismus und verfolgt voller Überzeugung eine Linie der Übereinkommen mit Pakistan in Genf (in die auch Iran im weiteren einbezogen werden soll), der Schaffung einer Koalitionsregierung, d.h., einer Regierung des nationalen Einvernehmens, die alle Kräfte Afghanistans, darunter auch die Opposition, vertritt, und die weitere friedliche Entwicklung Afghanistans als unabhängiger, souveräner, neutraler und nichtpaktgebundener Staat gewährleistet.

3

Wie uns Najibullah sagte, führt die afghanische Delegation im Februar mit einer einzigen Direktive nach Genf - die vier Genfer Dokumente, die die politische Regelung darstellen, endgültig abzustimmen. Dabei wird die afghanische Delegation mit der Delegation Pakistans ausschließlich im konstruktiven Geiste sprechen. Wir unterstützen diese Linie der afghanischen Freunde voll und ganz.

Najibullah und andere Vertreter der afghanischen Führung brachten zum Ausdruck, daß sie sich in ihrem Kampf für Frieden, nationale Eintracht und eine umfassende Regelung vollständig auf die Hilfe und Unterstützung der befreundeten Länder stützen, auf deren Verständnis für alle Komplikationen und Schwierigkeiten vor allem politischen und ökonomischen Charakters, die Afghanistan in der gegenwärtigen Entwicklungsetappe zu überwinden hat.

Die afghanischen Freunde haben hervorgehoben, daß sie sehr auf unsere breiteste gemeinsame internationale Unterstützung ihres Landes rechnen, insbesondere unter Bedingungen, da das sowjetische Militärkontingent in die Heimat zurückkehrt.

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[pp. 397-98 January 1988 report to Minister of Defense Yazov from Varennikov in
Kabul]:

(Secret)

to the USSR Minister of Defense
General of the Army, D. T. Yazov

I report:

...after the visit of Cde. E. A. Shevardnadze Cde. Najibullah asked to meet with Cde. Layek for a conversation. It ought to be noted that there are very close relations between Najibullah and Layek. They often meet together to discuss various questions, chiefly to submit them to the Politburo or the Defense Council. For the last year and a half Najibullah has repeatedly sent Layek to me for frank conversations, the content of which was doubtless transmitted to Najibullah.

On 10 January the meeting with Layek took place. He arrived under the pretext of discussing the situation in the Gardez – Khowst region, [but] in fact he was interested in the opinion of Soviet representatives about the results of Cde. Eh. A. Shevardnadze's visit to Kabul.

At the beginning of the conversation I shared with Layek our estimate of the influence of the meetings with Cde. Eh. A. Shevardnadze on the Party and government bureaucracy of the country. In this regard Layek confirmed the conclusion that the Afghan leadership has finally understood that Soviet troops would soon begin a withdrawal from Afghanistan and this predetermines the necessity for decisive steps to strengthen the position of the PDPA regime and further stabilize the situation in the country.

I further described to Layek the most important problems which should be solved in the shortest possible time. He agreed that it is quite necessary:

1. To speed up the elections to local governments (villages, rural districts, provinces). During the elections the people themselves will decide whom to elect. Fearlessly start to involve the heads of local [rebel] groups in government bodies...

2. Consolidate the positions of government authority. The main figure in the province should be the governor. Examine the leadership echelon at the provincial level and remove people who do not enjoy authority among the population...

3. Strengthen the Party. At the upcoming CC PDPA plenum determine the role and place of the PDPA in the new conditions (a multi-Party system, coalition,

the upcoming withdrawal of Soviet troops) and the tactics of their future activities right now and for the long term...

4. Accelerate the strengthening of the bloc of leftist forces and its active inclusion in the political processes in the country...

5. Concentrate efforts in 8-9 key provinces (Kabul, Herat, Kandahar, Paktia, the Khowst district, Nangarhar, Jowzjan, Balkh, and Kunduz), firmly holding the west, south, and some of the east of Afghanistan.

6. Start creating a coalition government now while Soviet troops are in the country. For this, it is necessary to look for nontraditional means, make contacts, and use all the possibilities for work with the most influential group leaders such as Ahmad Shah and Jelaluddin.

Regarding the question of strengthening the Party, Layek assured me that this would not be difficult to achieve. It is enough to stop factionalism at the highest level and everything will be in order. In his words, the differences at middle and lower levels of the Party bureaucracy are not sharp and easily eliminated. It is necessary to achieve Politburo unity [by] removing 3 or 4 people who are strenuously pursuing factional activity. Layek did not name who these people are.

...Layek noted that the policy of national reconciliation is the only correct way to solve the Afghan problem. Afghan leaders should not scare off the opposition while carrying it out – "the doors to talks should be open".

I said to Layek that the opposition will not crawl to these doors itself. They need to be assiduously invited, moreover, into talks as equals so that the opposition can maintain their political face. Only in this case can you count on anything. For a long time only one method was used regarding the intransigent leaders – active combat operations. Now the time has come to again reexamine the attitude toward authoritative [rebel] leaders and make a decision about each one personally. The main thing is to draw them into contact, into talks, and into participation in coalition government bodies and offer [them] prestigious positions in the provinces and in Kabul. At the same time, decide the problem of reducing the influence of important leaders by splitting away small detachments.

Not all Afghan leaders correctly understand this issue. The DRA Special Revolutionary Court has not yet revoked the sentence which in 1986 handed down a death sentence in absentia to seven important and authoritative leaders, including A. Shah and Jelaluddin. Threats are directed against them on Afghan television. All of this is obviously not going to help establish contact with them.

Layek agreed with these conclusions. However he expressed doubt that A. Shah and those like him would sit at a negotiating table (although the Afghan

comrades still have not tried to propose this) since they hope that the absence of unity in the PDPA will lead to the destruction of the Party, which would facilitate the seizure of power...

Varennikov

January 1988

[Source: A. A. Lyakhovskiy's "Plamya Afgana" ("Flame of the Afghanistan veteran)", Iskon, Moscow, 1999; Translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg]

TELEGRAMM

6P

Kabul blitz -n-

ct 62/88 1. ausf.

Genossen Erich Honecker

praesident ra, dr. najibullah, uebergab 8.2.
botschafter sozialistischer staaten seine erklaerung vom
gleichen tage und machte folgende ausfuehrungen:

prozess genfer gespraechе sei in entscheidende phase getreten,
an der auch andere selten interessiert seien, herangehen
zla-ul haq,s und am pakistans an weiterfuehrung verhandlungen
sei nicht konstruktiv, es bestehe absicht, prozess gespraechе
in genf zu blockieren.

positionen ra zu genfer gespraechen wurden in engen
konsultationen mit udssr und anderen laendern formuliert.
erklaerung gen. m. gorbatschow und najibullah gebe
auf alle fragen antwort, die im zusammenhang mit
genfer verhandlungen stehen, sie ziele darauf ab,
verhandlungen in genf voranzubringen und sie gebe keinen
anlass fuer eine negative antwort. diejenigen die darauf
negativ reagieren, muessen konsequenzen daraus tragen.
dr. n. weiter informierte, dasz cordovez 7. oder
8.2. zu kuerzen besuchen in kabul war. im verlauf
gespraechе ra nochmals erlaeuterte konstruktives und
flexibles herangehen. cordovez vorschlug, maerz naechste
runde genf zu beginnen. ra stimmte dem zu.

auf anfrage botschafter zu reaktion usa auf erklaerung
zla-ul haq,s vom 24.1. (washington post) dr.
n. erklarte, dasz usa selbst davon ueberrascht wurden,
aber zu aehnlichen auffassungen neigen. auf weitere
anfrage nach treffen cordovez mit chef der 7-er
allianz,

j. khails, informierte dr. n., dasz cordovez ihn
am 7.2. getroffen habe. ausser khails haetten auch
andere vertreter 7-er allianz (jedoch nicht die
fuehrer dieser gruppen) teilgenommen. offensichtlich
wollte khails einheit allianz demonstrieren. tatsaechlich
habe sich innerhalb allianz gezeigt, dasz politische
konfusion herrsche.

position ra zu abschluss der gespraechе in genf sowie
bildung einer koalitionsregierung sei eindeutig.
dies seien zwei unterschiedliche prozesse, bei denen
die genfer gespraechе absolute prioritaet besaessen.
bildung koalitionsregierung sei alleinige angelegenheit
afghanistans, bei der andere helfen koennten. ra sei
haelfte des weges gegangen, als vor einem jahr
absicht zur bildung koalitionsregierung erklart wurde.

TELEGRAMM

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-2-

koalitionsregierung bedeute nicht nur die zusammenarbeit mit der 7-er allianz, sondern sie sei breiter angelegt und sehe vor, kommandeure der zweiten reihe der 7-er allianz, fluechtlinge, kommandeure oppositioneller gruppen im lande, mullahs, staemme, andere organisationen im ausland, gruppierung um saher shah usw. einzubeziehen. wer darauf bestehe, dasz koalitionsregierung vor abschluss genfer verhandlungen gebildet werde, beabsichtige damit, verhandlungen ueberhaupt zu verhindern.

dr. n. abschliessend bekraeftigte, dasz abzug sowjetischen truppenkontingents und bildung koalitionsregierung zwei unabhængige prozesse seien. wenn sich alle afghanen an einen tisch setzen wuerden, koennten sie alle probleme loesen.

dr. n. informierte, dasz erklaerung vom 8.2. ebenfalls an cordovez und r. ghandi uebermittelt wurde. botschaft empfiehlt sprechereklaerung, in der erklaerung praesident dr. najbulahs unterstuetzt wird.

bumbel
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Gegenwärtig haben sich bestimmte Voraussetzungen für eine politische Regelung des militärischen Konflikts in Afghanistan, eines der schwierigsten und schmerzhaftesten regionalen Konflikte, herausgebildet.

In den afghanisch-pakistanischen Verhandlungen in Genf ist die Ausarbeitung der Dokumente nahezu abgeschlossen, die alle Seiten der Regelung umfassen. Es handelt sich dabei um afghanisch-pakistanische Abkommen über die gegenseitige Nichteinmischung in die inneren Angelegenheiten und die Rückkehr der afghanischen Flüchtlinge aus Pakistan, um internationale Garantien für die Nichteinmischung in die inneren Angelegenheiten der Republik Afghanistan und um ein Dokument über den wechselseitigen Zusammenhang aller Elemente der politischen Regelung. Es liegt auch eine Übereinkunft über die Schaffung eines Kontrollmechanismus vor. All das schafft die reale Möglichkeit, daß die bevorstehende Verhandlungsrunde in Genf die letzte sein wird.

In dem Bestreben, zu einem raschen und erfolgreichen Abschluß der afghanisch-pakistanischen Verhandlungen in Genf beizutragen, sind die Regierungen der UdSSR und der Republik Afghanistan übereingekommen, den 15. Mai 1988 als konkretes Datum für den Beginn des Abzugs der sowjetischen Truppen festzusetzen und diesen innerhalb von 10 Monaten zu beenden. Dieses Datum würde festgesetzt, da die Unterzeichnung der Abkommen über die Regelung spätestens bis zum 15. März 1988 erfolgen wird und alle Dokumente gleichzeitig nach 2 Monaten in Kraft treten werden. Wenn die Unterzeichnung der Abkommen vor dem 15. März erfolgt, wird auch der Struppenabzug entsprechend früher beginnen. Die Sowjetunion und die afghanische Führung sind auch damit einverstanden,

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bereits in der ersten Etappe den relativ größeren Teil des sowjetischen Kontingents abzuziehen.

All das, heißt es in der Erklärung, wird die notwendigen Voraussetzungen dafür schaffen, um die Abkommen über die Regelung so schnell wie möglich zu unterzeichnen. Dies bedeutet natürlich nicht, daß eine Regelung jetzt von niemandem mehr blockiert werden kann. Jedoch wir möchten nicht annehmen, daß sich Staaten oder Politiker finden, die gegenüber dem Volk Afghanistans und anderen Völkern die Verantwortung für das Scheitern der Regelung auf sich nehmen.

Was den Beginn des Abzugs der sowjetischen Truppen betrifft, so muß hervorgehoben werden, daß damit die Bemühungen zur Schaffung einer neuen Koalitionsregierung in Afghanistan nicht eingestellt werden. Die nationale Aussöhnung und die Schaffung einer Koalitionsregierung sind eine zutiefst innere Angelegenheit Afghanistans. Sie kann nur von den Afghanen selbst geklärt werden, mögen sie auch zu unterschiedlichen oder sogar einander gegenüberstehenden Lagern gehören. Eine Teilnahme der Sowjetunion an Verhandlungen über diesen Fragenkreis, möglicherweise sogar mit Drittländern, würde nicht verstanden werden. Nach unserer Überzeugung haben auch nur die Afghanen selbst das Recht, den endgültigen Status ihres Landes zu bestimmen. Was die Sowjetunion betrifft, so werden wir froh sein, an unseren Südgrenzen einen unabhängigen, nichtpaktgebundenen und neutralen Nachbarn zu haben.

Die von der afghanischen Führung und Präsident Najibullah verfolgte Politik der nationalen Aussöhnung ist Ausdruck des neuen politischen Denkens der afghanischen Seite. Sie ist kein Zeichen von Schwäche, sondern von moralischer Verantwortungsbewußten Haltung zum Schicksal des Landes. Wir haben es hier mit einer sehr kühnen und mutigen Aktion zu tun.

Es wird nicht einfach dazu aufgerufen, den bewaffneten Konflikt einzustellen, sondern der Vorschlag gemacht, eine Koalitionsregierung zu bilden und die Macht mit der Opposition zu teilen, darunter auch mit denjenigen, die den bewaffneten Kampf gegen die Regierung führen. Die Politik der nationalen Aussöhnung hat für alle eine politische Plattform geschaffen, die Frieden in Afghanistan wollen.

Michail Gorbatschow hat die Meinung geäußert, daß nach dem Abzug der sowjetischen Truppen eine militärische Auseinandersetzung vermieden werden kann, wenn diejenigen, die jetzt gegen ihre Brüder kämpfen, eine verantwortungsvolle Haltung einnehmen und versuchen, in der Tat am friedlichen Aufbau teilzunehmen. Wenn es jedoch notwendig werden sollte, kann in dieser Etappe daran gedacht werden, die Möglichkeiten der UNO und des Sicherheitsrates zu nutzen.

Der Abschluß einer politischen Regelung in Afghanistan wird ein wichtiger Durchbruch in der Kette der regionalen Konflikte sein.

In der Erklärung heißt es, daß die Staaten und Völker über genügend Verantwortung, politischen Willen und Entschlossenheit besitzen, um in einigen Jahren allen regionalen Konflikten ein Ende zu setzen. Dafür lohnt es sich zu arbeiten. Die Sowjetunion wird in dieser wichtigen Angelegenheit keine Anstrengungen scheuen.

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[pp. 403-04 Joint report by MID, MO, and KGB representatives in Kabul,
February 1988]:

REPORT FROM KABUL

(Secret)

... Detailed conversations conducted in recent days with Cde. Najibullah and other Afghan comrades and an analysis of the information arriving through various channels allows certain conclusions to be drawn about several features of the current military and political situation in Afghanistan.

With the publication of the announcement by M. S. Gorbachev and Najibullah an important period in the policy of national reconciliation is ending for which, as they note here, considerably more has been done to restore peace in Afghanistan than in previous years. At the same time a qualitatively new phase in the development of the situation is beginning, [but] by no means all of its constituent elements could be discerned right now. However the main thing is clear – the point is coming when Afghans must identify and solve their problems themselves by those means which best correspond to their historical traditions. The forms of clarifying relations will be varied – in some places associated with armed struggle and in other places with negotiations - with the need for serious concessions, obviously mainly on the part of the government. But this will be an Afghan solution of an Afghan problem.

The comrades understand that the first period after the withdrawal of Soviet troops will be the most crucial when the armed opposition, judging from everything, will try to unleash massive pressure on government forces. As Cde. Najibullah thinks, it is important to hold out for two or three months, after which the opposition will begin to dissipate and different circumstances will present themselves which will weaken it. Most likely, government forces will have to retreat in several sectors, for in the opinion of Chief of the General Staff Sh. N. Tanay, [they] ought possibly to abandon in advance those places where the opposition has obvious military supremacy. This needs to be done so that the opposition can not then paint each local success as a great military victory.

... With the withdrawal of Soviet troops the opposition is deprived of the capability of using anti-Sovietism as a unifying factor. The conflicts between the commanders of the internal counterrevolution operating in Afghanistan itself and the leaders of their own parties outside the country have a very bitter nature...

In the opinion of Cde. Najibullah two outcomes are possible. The first: serious, prolonged battles with the counterrevolutionaries; the second – more favorable, where issues are decided not so much by military means as by various

combinations, compromises, and talks using clan, ethnic, and local [zemlyacheskiye] relations.

Cde. Najibullah himself is inclined to think that the situation will not develop according to the worst outcome. He returned repeatedly to these thoughts and every time his statements expressed optimism.

... The situation in Afghanistan, as it seems at the present time, confirms that the election of Cde. Najibullah as President is already bringing tangible results. In particular, recently a number of important figures of the domestic opposition are trying to make contact with Cde. Najibullah. Judging from their statements, they attach much importance just to the fact that they do not have to do business with a Party leader but with a President. Such a policy is being observed in the provinces where the commanders of armed groups prefer to do business with governors.

Of course it is not possible right now to foresee all the twists and turns of the situation. But it is very important for the Afghans to travel their own path, finally shedding attitudes of dependency and making decisions themselves. Doubtless here there might be and even will be unavoidable miscalculations and delays. But the main thing is not to commit big political mistakes.

Practice has confirmed the correctness of the main thrusts of future work which were outlined during the meetings between Cde. Gorbachev and Cde. Najibullah and specified during the working visit of Cde. E. A. Shevardnadze to Kabul in January of this year...

[Source: A. A. Lyakhovskiy's "Plamya Afgana" ("Flame of the Afghanistan veteran"), Iskon, Moscow, 1999; Translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg]

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[pp. 407-09 Varennikov's proposals of how the Afghans should use their forces
after the Soviet withdrawal, March 1988]:

The armed forces today are in condition to independently counter opposition pressure only in instances where they constitute large units. Small subunits (posts, outposts) and small garrisons, to battalion level, are extremely unsteady.

The leaders of the opposition, the US, and Pakistan are counting on the overthrow of the current regime and the seizure of power in the country under all alternatives of the development of events after the withdrawal of Soviet troops. Thus, if the Geneva Accords are signed, when Afghanistan receives certain guarantees of non-interference, rebel operations will to a considerable degree be fettered by the responsibilities of the Pakistanis and the Americans, and will not be of an open nature, let's say, by shipping weapons and ammunition across the border. Accordingly, the counterrevolutionaries will be forced to operate in an atmosphere which is more difficult for them.

It is important to keep in mind that the counterrevolutionaries will obviously start to place their main reliance not on large-scale actions of armed groups but on infiltrating agents into the Party and government bureaucracy. Occupying responsible official positions, they can demoralize and recruit. At a certain time the counterrevolutionaries will try to occupy suitable positions in the government bureaucracy with these forces and support their operations with rebel detachments, which could sneak in with refugees (there are weapons in each population center)...

The military doctrine of the Republic of Afghanistan, with the proclamation of a policy of national reconciliation, has been completely subordinated to the mission of stopping the war. It has a peace-loving nature, having as its main idea ensuring the security of the government and the relative stability of the situation in the main regions of the country.

But in achieving the designated strategic goals and, in addition, tactical missions, the leadership of the Republic has still been relying not only on their own forces but on the international aid of the Soviet Union and the troops of the 40th Army.

... The withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan will fundamentally change the military and political situation and considerably reduce the opportunity for the Afghan leadership to stabilize it. If measures are not taken in advance then many critically important regions and facilities can end up beyond the control of government forces in enemy hands.

Considerable men and equipment are required to protect such regions and facilities. Considering the low combat reliability of Afghan units in comparison with Soviet troops, one can make the conclusion that only bold and decisive steps in the use of actually available forces can allow [them] to count on success in holding important facilities.

In this regard it is advisable:

1. To examine critically the current dispersal of the troops of the RA armed forces throughout the entire country (especially the army troops, including border troops). Try not to hold all the main regions, as was ensured by the presence of the 40th Army, but concentrate efforts only on the selected axes ensuring the daily activity of the government and stability for the situation in key regions.

To create a concentrated grouping of armed forces. All garrisons which even now, when our troops are here, are difficult to provide for and support when they conduct combat operations are to be eliminated. Withdraw the subunits of these garrisons to troop basing areas. This chiefly affects garrisons in the areas of Barikot, Panjshir, and Badakhshan...

Such activities preclude the possibility of the defeat and occupation of these small garrisons by the rebels, which would cause political damage to the government and negatively influence troop morale.

The abandonment of small garrisons is to be carried out by holding a preliminary meeting with local authorities and concluding an agreement with them about handing over this area to local authorities for protection who, for their part, would be obligated not to take actions harmful to government bodies.

2. To carry out similar operations regarding those "nuclei" [*orgyadra*] of government authority in a number of districts and rural districts (totalling 17) which were at one time established by force.... These "nuclei" are to be removed and agreements signed with local authorities that they will hold elections for administrative bodies themselves without displaying hostility to government bodies.

3. At the present time and also after the withdrawal of Soviet troops the Afghan armed forces (in addition, the 40th Army) are not to organize large-scale combat operations and not to exacerbate the military and especially the political situation. When necessary, launch small, but effective, strikes only on targets which pose a direct threat (outside population centers).

4. Concentrating the main efforts at holding the most important areas and facilities of the country, the main cities and highways of the country, the armed forces are to be used to carry out the following fundamental missions:

The Army. The main forces are to be in constant readiness to maneuver in order to inflict defeat on counterrevolutionary formations presenting a special danger to the existing regime – in the regions of Kabul, Herat, Kandahar, and Jalalabad. Part of the forces are to be used to cover the main lines of communications, pipelines...

MGB. The main mission is the timely identification of the counterrevolutionary underground, both in the capital and in provincial centers and also, and especially, in the armed forces.

Tsarandoy. Its main forces are to be sent to protect and defend security zones, the most important cities, economic facilities, sectors of lines of communications, and also to support public order in Kabul and its suburbs...

5. Considering that the fate of the present regime mainly depends on holding the capital and the Kabul-Termez highway, bring up additional troops to Kabul, its suburbs, and also to the main airbase, Bagram...

6. Make a fundamentally new decision about border troops. The border troops of Afghanistan do not actually perform routine protection of the state border but wage combat operations the same as army troops to hold specified regions or population centers and also to cover sectors of routes from Pakistan into Afghanistan via which weapons and ammunition are delivered to the rebels.

At the present time the border troops, having a considerable man power level (more than 60%) and complete (up to regulation) supply of combat equipment and weapons (from 80 to 100%) have been making a combat contribution for a year now. However they cannot provide guaranteed protection of the state border from penetration by enemy caravans even if they are reinforced severalfold. It is impossible to do this without the complete involvement of the free tribes in the problem of protecting the border. The latter are even interested in the passage of the caravans since they get considerable reward from this.

A situation is developing in which there is no sense in having the border troops located right at the border. But considering that their maintenance and support is already a large problem even now, the need arises to transfer the majority of border subunits to the main lines of communication of the country, putting them at the main population centers.

...All the issues described have been tentatively discussed with Najibullah with the exception of the border troops, and has found his full support. As regards suggestions regarding the use of border troops he has for now only a general idea. The Supreme Commander-in-Chief needs some more time to recognize the need for such a step...

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[pp.410-11 March 1988 GRU report on US aid to the rebels]:

Memo

About US aid to the counterrevolutionaries

The US Administration, in spite of the prospect of achieving mutually advantageous agreements at the indirect Afghan-Pakistani talks in Geneva, continues to give broad military, financial, and political support to the Afghan counterrevolutionaries.

The policy and practical activities of the US on the Afghan question are directed first of all at achieving the withdrawal of Soviet troops in the shortest possible time, the failure of the implementation of the program of national reconciliation, and the preservation of the military potential of the counterrevolutionaries at a level sufficient to support a struggle for power in the new conditions – that will arise in the event of a successful conclusion of the Geneva talks. Under pressure of extremist forces in Congress several representatives of the Administration are trying to put an end to the aid to the antigovernment forces, depending on the withdrawal of Soviet military contingent. The demand is advanced that aid is not to be stopped right after the signing of the corresponding documents in Geneva, but it is to be maintained proportionate to a reduction in the numbers of Soviet troops in Afghanistan. The root goal of the American policy is to establish a pro-Western reactionary regime oriented mainly towards Washington.

At the present time the CIA, the State Department, the Department of Defense, and other US agencies are active in planning anti-Afghan actions. The amount of official American aid to the counterrevolutionaries has exceeded two billion dollars. In 1988 the planned aid amounts to more than \$700,000,000. Recently the Americans have been emphasizing deliveries of modern anti-aircraft weapons to the rebels. In 1987 about 600 "Stinger" portable surface-to-air missiles were sent to the counterrevolutionaries and more than 100 rebels have been trained, having completed an expanded course for instructors in the use of this weapon in US armed forces training centers and military bases in Texas and California. American military aid is being implemented directly via the headquarters of the rebel parties. The main part of the military cargo intended for the rebels is initially delivered to the port of Karachi. Subsequent operations – storage, transshipment to regions bordering Afghanistan, and transfer of the weapons to the rebels – are done as a rule with the participation of Pakistani armed forces subunits and special services.

Since the beginning of 1988 intensive deliveries of military cargo from the US to ports and airbases of Saudi Arabia, Oman, and several other countries

have been noted. Weapons and ammunition are stored with the expectation of future [use].

With the participation of the Americans measures are being implemented to convert the rebel groups to a regular troop structure. As of 1 March 1988 22 so-called regiments have been formed on Pakistani territory and in Afghanistan, 43. New fire bases are being created for the counterrevolutionaries and the system of command and control is being improved.

The number of American advisers training rebels in military training centers in Pakistan and active in organizing combat operations and engineering works on Afghan territory has reached 250. The presence of American advisers has been noted in specialized centers situated in the region of the Pakistani cities of Barsak, Kohat, Parachinar, Quetta, Peshawar, Jamrud, Sadda, and Miram Shah. Their presence (the advisers) in rebel groups was confirmed by chairman of the "Alliance-7" Khales at a press conference in Peshawar when he reported the death of one of the military advisers in December 1987.

With the active participation of Washington a broad psychological offensive has been organized against the Republic of Afghanistan which has the goal of discrediting the policy of national reconciliation being pursued by Kabul and preventing the formation of coalition government bodies. More than 50 radio stations overseen or run by the CIA and USIA make subversive transmissions in the various languages of the peoples of Afghanistan. More than \$1,000,000 was allocated by the CIA for the training of propagandists from among the rebels in 1988.

[Source: A. A. Lyakhovskiy's "Plamy Afgana" ("Flame of the Afghanistan veteran")], Iskon, Moscow, 1999; Translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg]

REPORT

Foreign Military Aid to the Afghan Opposition and Refugees in 1987
(millions of dollars)

Country	Direct aid to the opposition	Aid to Afghan refugees
US	700	100
Pakistan	25	100
Iran	100	-
Saudi Arabia	750	75
other Arab countries	100	170
Western countries	100	50
Japan	10	10
China	50	20
the [UN] High Commission for Refugees	-	75
other countries and organizations	250	250
TOTAL	1985	850

Note: of the \$850 million designated for refugees, \$350 million were sent to opposition organizations. Thus, of the total amount of foreign aid of \$2,830,000,000 in 1987, \$2,330,000,000 were designated for leaders of opposition parties.

from information of the USSR GRU GSh VS

April 1988

[Source: A. A. Lyakhovskiy's "Tragediya i Doblest' Afgana" ("Tragedy and Valor of the Afghanistan Veteran"), Iskon, Moscow, 1995; Translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg]

NOTE

Several points from a speech by V. P. Polyanichko to Party activists of the Soviet missions in the RA [Translator's note: a long biographical footnote mentions that he was a political adviser to Karmal and Najibullah from 1985 to 1988.]

1. Regarding the policy of national reconciliation. Today the PNP is a powerful complex [*kompleks*] which include 15-16 areas of activity for the government. The main ones are:

- the return of Soviet troops;
- the problem of refugees (in eight years about 12,000 returned; last year 120,000;
- the strengthening of government authority (an administrative system was created in a year and the government spent 560 million Afghanis);
- preparations for elections to a National Council (229 districts have been formed and it is proposed that 186 be elected to a Senate from three constituencies: 1/3 from executive committees, 1/3 from the population, and 1/3 – 62 people – to be appointed by the President. Eighty to eighty-five seats are allocated to the zone controlled by the opposition, thus the President himself can appoint opposition leaders to 15-20 seats at his discretion).

2. Regarding elections to local government bodies. Work is going poorly, especially in the village area. This year it was planned to hold elections in 4000 villages by the 10th anniversary of the Saur Revolution. However even a loss of positions by people's power occurred. Thus, in Badakhshan 240 villages left government control.

Regarding the forms of power:

- people's power maintains the present regime;
- a mixed alternative of rule (the opposition and Party organizations);
- opposition rule.

3. Regarding military training. The training of Party members is lagging. Meanwhile a Party militia is being created.

4. The 10 years of the Saur Revolution (27 April 1988) will be celebrated strictly and in a military fashion.

5. Regarding troop withdrawal. Do everything so that the Afghan and Soviet peoples remain friends; boost the friendship. We will leave as troops and we will visit as broad mutually advantageous economic aid.

The strategic task is the formation of an Afghanistan as an independent, sovereign, indivisible country.

The organization of the withdrawal will be festive. It is necessary to do everything so that the Soviet soldier leaves not as a soldier with a sword but as a soldier-internationalist.

Cde. Najibullah has created a staff to organize the farewell. The events will be held in rural districts, provinces, and large cities. The "Letter of Thanks" for Soviet international aid will be widely covered in May and June.

[The following] are intended:

- a 100% decoration of all Soviet soldiers and Soviet Army employees with a memorial medal or badge. There is a proposal to decorate all soldiers who served in Afghanistan;

- a festive transfer of military garrisons (several ministries have a negative attitude toward military garrisons being transferred to the army, MVD, and MGB balance sheet);

- the presentation of greetings to each Soviet soldier from the CC PDPA;

- Cde. Najibullah will send a personal message to each Hero of the Soviet Union who received this distinction in Afghanistan;

- an exchange of addresses and souvenirs between soldiers of the Afghan and Soviet armies.

6. Previous shortcomings regarding the withdrawal:

- in a number of places no local population was present;

- there is no need on our part to prepare speeches for statements to the Afghans;

- work with the press (it is necessary to change the style of its work and to supply each correspondent with his own representative);

- it is necessary to involve the personnel of the 40th Army more widely in the resolution of social problems (repairing roads, schools, and mosques, and planting "friendship gardens");

- the issuance of free aid should be organized by job category [*po trudu*]. It is necessary to present this to the clergy and village authorities and not distribute it according to the principle "whoever is poorest needs it";

- give medical aid more widely to the local population (no one touches a medical worker in Afghanistan)...

Kabul, April 1988

[Source: A. A. Lyakhovskiy's "Tragediya i Doblest' Afgana" ("Tragedy and Valor of the Afghanistan Veteran"), Iskon, Moscow, 1995; Translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg].

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[pp. 405-06 12 April 1988 report from the Soviet military attaché to Afghanistan]:

The election campaign to the National Council [NS] has entered its final stage. According to official data more than 1,000,000 voters participated in the election.

The final results will be totalled on 15 April 1988, but there are already grounds to say that the RA leadership will only be able to solve partially a number of important problems in the interests of forming a new governmental structure.

The official statistics of the progress of the election do not reflect the real state of affairs for the following reasons:

1. The high percentage of voters is being achieved by directly violating the election law. Fearful of inflaming a situation when an insufficient number of votes were cast for the nominated candidates, which would discredit the idea of "free" elections and put the competence of the NS into doubt, the RA leadership made a secret decision about the need for repeat (up to 3-4 times) voting in various electoral districts by PDPA members, servicemen, officials of government institutions, and other persons loyal to government authority. A similar practice became widespread, especially on the third and succeeding days of the elections when the activity of the voters began to slack off.

The method of election to the NS has aroused discontent and the indignation of people forced to participate in the voting under pressure. Thus, in the "Friendship" School in the city of Kabul a number of instructors pointedly refused to obey the demands of their management: vote 3-4 times each in various electoral districts under someone else's name.

Displays of discontent at a similar practice were noted even in a number of RA armed forces subunits. In particular, in an independent agitprop battalion of the RA Ministry of Defense Main Political Directorate the personnel openly expressed complaints to their commanders about soldiers dressing in civilian clothes and scattering to vote immediately in several electoral districts.

There have been observed numerous cases of the use of a demonstration of the "popular appeal [*massovost'*]" of the electoral campaign — students of schools and lycees who had not yet reached age 18 and were not on the electoral rolls were brought to the polls... It is significant that a similar practice was sanctioned and rewarded by representatives of the highest echelon of government authority, including Najib.

2. The election campaign did not involve the majority of the population of the country and was limited to large administrative centers. More than half of

those who participated in the voting (even according to official data) come from the cities of Kabul, Mazari-Sharif, Sheberghan, Herat, and the personnel of the MO, MVD, and Ministry of State Security.

3. Representatives of the opposition (both the armed and the "moderate") in fact remained outside the electoral campaign, having boycotted the elections. Data about the participation of rebel groups in the voting (several thousand men) was acquired from work with so-called "contractual [*dogovornyye*]" detachments.

Thus the progress of the elections to the RA NS is witness that the PDPA and its policy of national reconciliation has not yet received sufficient support among various strata of Afghan society. The instances of falsification noted on the part of the RA government exerted a negative influence on the mood of the people and their approach toward the electoral campaign.

In accordance with the orders of the leaders of the "Alliance-7", their missions in Quetta gave instructions to the commanders of formations operating the southwest provinces of Afghanistan (Zabol, Kandahar, Helmand, Nimruz, and Farah) to prepare for active combat operations against columns of Soviet troops leaving Afghanistan. A considerable number of groups, having positioned themselves in villages including regions controlled by the authorities, have been ordered to redeploy to the communications zone of [*zona kommunikatsii*] Kalat, Kandahar, Girishk, and Shindand to accomplish this. Appropriate work is to be conducted among the population to support this mission in order to give the necessary aid and assistance to the rebels.

When organizing attacks and shelling of columns firepower is to be used en masse with a maximum expenditure of shells.

Military Attaché to the RA Colonel V. Ser'

12 April 1988

[Source: A. A. Lyakhovskiy's "Plamya Afgana" ("Flame of the Afghanistan veteran)", Iskon, Moscow, 1999; Translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg]

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[Underlined portions previously translated by the NSA]

Appendix N° 8
For Official Use

CC CPSU Letter on Afghanistan,

Exactly ten years ago, in April 1978, a revolutionary coup occurred in Afghanistan, one of the most backward countries of Asia.

It was carried out by a relatively small number of military men, members of the PDPA advocating Marxist-Leninist slogans. The Afghan revolutionaries honestly were trying to reform their country. But having taken power in their hands they pursued matters along an unsustainable maximalist path: in a feudal society with deep vestiges of tribal foundations and the predominance of the Muslim religion in all spheres of public life they promoted a mission of radical socialist reforms for which there was neither a social nor an economic basis nor was there support from the masses. In Afghanistan a revolution objectively could only be national democratic for its own purposes and with gradual implementation. Only in this case could it be accepted in the country and be supported by a broad front of progressive forces headed by the PDPA.

From the very beginning the situation was still further complicated by the sharp differences between the two factions in the PDPA who were still feuding with one another in the period preceding the Revolution and during another time fighting one another more than with the forces opposing the Revolution. In an atmosphere of political disorientation and intra-Party conflict the President and General Secretary of the PDPA, the popular leader Taraki, was removed from power and murdered. H. Amin, who seized power in the Party and the country, was a man with adventurist inclinations, a dubious political profile and foreign ties, and who demoralized the Party with brutal repression, isolating the Revolution from the people further still.

This created favorable conditions to intensify the counterrevolution which established ties right away with the forces of international imperialism and reaction. With external support they began to form combat detachments of rebels who relied on politically backward peasants and craftsmen. The Muslim clergy, which had been persecuted by the Amin regime, took a hostile position. Unrest arose among the tribes whose interests and historical traditions the government did not consider. A stream of thousands of refugees to Pakistan formed, some of them [going] to Iran.

Military camps of rebels sprang up on Pakistani territory, which had been turned into a military and political base of the Afghan counterrevolution from where ever newer and larger armed detachments were sent into Afghanistan.

American and Chinese and other weapons and various kinds of aid from Western and Muslim countries came to the rebels through Pakistan in ever increasing scale.

At the same time the new government turned out to be incapable of responding to the aspirations of the broad masses of the people and securing their support. Land and water reforms and reforms in the social field had a incomplete nature and did not consider the peculiarities of Afghan society. The most glaring mistakes and leftist deviations were committed in the socioeconomic sphere with regard to religion, alienating the people from the Revolution.

It soon became clear that the government was in no condition to control the situation in the country, especially since the Revolution did not have firm support in the Armed Forces and desertions had become massive.

More than ten times the Afghan leadership (Taraki, then Amin) appealed to the Soviet Union for military aid to put down the counterrevolution. The response did not come right away. The then Soviet leadership vacillated for some time. A decision was made about this at the end of 1979. The danger that the interference of imperialist forces in Afghan could create a threat to the security of our southern borders played its own part.

The decision was made in the conditions when there was a lot of uncertainty in the balance of forces within the Afghan society. [Our] picture of the real social and economic situation in the country was also insufficiently clear. We do not want to say it, but we should: at that time, we did not even have a correct assessment of the unique geographical features of that hard-to-enter country. That found its reflection in the operations of our troops against small highly mobile units, where very little could be accomplished with the help of modern military technology.

In addition, [we] completely disregarded the most important national and historical factors, above all the fact that the appearance of armed foreigners in Afghanistan was always met with arms in the hands [of the population]. This is how it was in the past, and this is how it happened when our troops entered [Afghanistan], even though they came there with honest and noble goals.

Babrak Karmal became head of the Afghan government at the time. His first steps in that capacity gave grounds to hope that he would be able to solve the problems facing his country. However, nothing new had emerged in his policy, which could have changed the attitude of the significant portion of the Afghan population to the new regime to the better. Moreover, the intensity of the internal Afghan conflict continued to grow, and our military presence was associated with the forceful imposition of customs alien to the national characteristics and feelings of the Afghan people, which did not take into account

the multiple forms of economic life, and other characteristics, such tribal and religious ones.

One has to admit that essentially we put our bets on the military solution, on suppressing the counterrevolution with force. We did not even fully use the existing opportunities for neutralization of the hostile attitudes of the local population towards us. We have to assess critically some aspects of functioning of our adviser apparatus in Afghanistan as well. It did many things to provide assistance in strengthening the PDPA and the people's regime. However, often our people, acting out of their best intentions, tried to transplant the approaches we are accustomed to onto the Afghan soil, encouraged the Afghans to copy our ways. All this did not help our cause, it bred feelings of dependency on the part of the Afghan leaders in regard to the Soviet Union both in the sphere of military operations and in the economic sphere.

Meanwhile the war in Afghanistan continued, and our troops were getting engaged in extensive combat actions. The situation developed, which made any way out more and more difficult as the time passed. Combat action is combat action. Our losses in dead and wounded—and the CC CPSU believes it has no right to hide this—were growing, and becoming more and more heavy. Altogether, by the beginning of May 1988, we lost 13,310 people [dead] in Afghanistan: 35,478 Soviet officers and soldiers were wounded, many of whom became disabled; 301 people are missing in action. There is a reason that people say that each person is a unique world, and when a person dies, that world disappears forever. The loss of every person is very hard and irreparable, it is hard and sacred if one died carrying out one's duty.

The Afghan losses, naturally, were much heavier [than ours], including the losses among the civilian population.

One should not disregard the economic factor either. If the enemy in Afghanistan received weapons and ammunition for hundreds of millions and later even billions of dollars, the Soviet-Afghan side also had to shoulder adequate expenditures. The war in Afghanistan costs us 5 billion rubles a year.

The stern reality of the military and political situation in Afghanistan required, first of all, objectivity and deep analysis. We did it soon after the April (1985) CC CPSU plenum. Its results were described by Cde. M. S. Gorbachev at a closed meeting of the Soviet leadership with the then Afghan leadership headed by B. Karmal in October 1985.

On the Soviet side the opinions and estimates were expressed with complete openness. We said that we consider the evaluation of the Afghan revolution as socialist to be mistaken, that it is national democratic with all the ensuring consequences for the understanding of the distribution of class forces and determining political policy, strategy, and the tactics of struggle. We stressed

that the policy which was being followed at that time by the Afghan leadership was mistaken in most respects inasmuch as it did not consider the actual nature of the Revolution, the specifics of Afghan society, the level of its development, the role of the Muslim religion and clergy, the multi-ethnic composition of the population, and the presence of numerous tribes weakly connected to central authority.

The Afghan leadership was directly told of the serious distortions and excesses of the then PDPA policy which had been displayed in particular in the promotion of socialist slogans for which the conditions were not ripe, and in ignoring the diversity of the economy and the considerable role of the private sector in it. Especially stressed was the mistakenness of copying the socioeconomic experience of the Soviet Union in Afghan conditions.

We called upon the Afghan leaders to examine aggressively and reconstruct their policy, correct the government structure and style of work with the masses, and to consider their most important mission to be the expansion of the social base of the new order.

We said in this regard that we cannot and will not wage war endlessly for the Afghans, that they need to make matters into their own hands and strengthen the armed forces. At the same time it was stated that the weapons for the Afghan armed forces will be supplied by the Soviet Union, and more.

The Soviet command was ordered not to get directly involved in combat operations if possible and to shift [its] emphasis to a service of protection, guarding lines of communications, and security of the most important strategic facilities. This led to a reduction of losses in our armed forces.

B. Karmal and his colleagues throughout the leadership assured us that they understood everything well and would take real measures in the shortest possible time to put the ideas which he had expressed into practice. However in practice, besides barely cosmetic embellishments, nothing was done in this area, nothing changed, and no perceptible ray of hope appeared in the situation. Talks about land reform just remained talks. The truth is, repression against the clergy and tribal authorities ceased, but no real steps were taken capable of attracting them to the side of the government. Nothing significant was done to strengthen the Afghan armed forces. The parasitic dependence was too strong and had deeply affected the upper echelon of power by this time.

The situation continued to worsen, all the more strongly affecting the international prestige of the Soviet Union, socialism as a whole, and our political image: the Afghan issue was the only one in which our policy, especially in conditions of perestroika, remained quite vulnerable on the international front. We did not encounter understanding even from many of our friends.

World public opinion condemned our actions in Afghanistan. At UN General Assembly sessions a resolution with such a condemnation received an overwhelming majority of the votes, including the votes of many non-aligned countries. It undermined trust in the Soviet Union and its peace-loving policy. They stopped believing us.

The negative influence of the war in Afghanistan also began to occur inside our country. And what other influence could the deaths of Soviet citizens in a foreign land have? Many of our kids actually did wonders of courage and heroism in the Afghan mountains and canyons and honorably fulfilled their military duty. But this did not bring consolation to their relatives and comrades.

The 27th Congress of the CPSU [25 February-6 March 1986] was unanimous that Soviet troops needed to be withdrawn from Afghanistan. Such a radical decision was, of course, a very difficult matter. But our people were expecting a word of truth and hope. They heard it from the rostrum of the Congress. From that time the new policy which was adopted was subsequently put into practice, of course, with such an expectation that there be no further harm to our prestige and Afghanistan itself.

The CC CPSU Politburo began to deal with Afghan affairs systematically. A Politburo Commission on Afghanistan was created, examining all the aspects and all the details of the Afghan situation on a regular basis. It promptly reported its ideas and proposals to the Politburo.

A change of leadership occurred in 1986. The post of PDPA General Secretary and then President of the Republic of Afghanistan was taken by a new leader, Najibullah, a man ready to search for a solution to the problem and understanding of the aspirations of his fellow countrymen. From the very beginning he began to implement a completely new policy called upon to put an end to the war, the policy of national reconciliation. We had been telling our Afghan friends of the need to follow such a policy since October 1985 during an exchange of opinions in Moscow. Najibullah and many of his colleagues recognized that they really need to work with us toward the withdrawal of Soviet troops and that there is no other way -- a military solution to the problem simply does not exist.

The new Afghan leadership started work to strengthen the armed forces and local government, and to expand the mass base of people's power. The Afghan comrades have begun to feel their personal responsibility for their actions in a real way.

The leadership of the country also got down to resolving socioeconomic problems, dealing with the real needs of all the people. But this process is not developing quickly, of course: the stratifications of the past are so strong and so right now not everything is not being done as it needs to be.

Najibullah and his colleagues must be given their due: they have displayed outstanding courage, decisiveness, and consistency, having proposed and put into practice a policy of stopping military conflicts where it is possible there. They have come out with an announcement about their readiness to share power with those with whom they have waged and even continue to wage combat operations, on condition that the war is stopped. They have proposed the creation of coalition organs of power in Kabul and in the provinces, and expressed readiness to collaborate in their creation with all political groups, including those which are headed by rebels inside the country and abroad, and also with the old, even pre-revolutionary Afghan emigrants.

Cde. Najibullah has said that while keeping the posts of President and Commander-in-Chief for himself, he and the Afghan leadership are ready to give the posts of Prime Minister, Chairman of the Supreme Court, and Chairman of the People's Council (Parliament), 50% of the ministerial portfolios, and also the post of Deputy Minister of Defense and the post of governor of a whole series of provinces to representatives of the opposition. In other words, a genuine coalition of equals in the interests of the quickest possible termination of a fratricidal war has been proposed.

Of course, the policy of national reconciliation requires from the PDPA leaders and the entire Party a deep restructuring of thinking, readiness, and skill in working in completely new conditions, the ability to see in yesterday's enemies today's partners in reconciling and running the country.

On our part [what is required are] the most active support and aid to the government of Najibullah and his policy of national reconciliation, both ideological and political as well as material, in order that the Afghan peasant, craftsman, worker, soldier, and his family can tangibly feel that the Soviet Union is not abandoning them.

It ought to be especially noted: the policy of national reconciliation was begun in circumstances when the enemy was continuing to receive an ever-growing quantity of the most modern weapons, including the American "Stinger" missiles and the British "Blowpipe". The increased zeal of the combat operations on the part of the rebels in spite of the government's call for a cease-fire in the interests of national reconciliation and the anti-Afghan activity of a number of countries from without has unavoidably limited the actual results of the policy of national reconciliation.

All the same, in 1987 and in the first months of 1988 thousands of rebels ceased military operations. At the present time there are no Soviet troops in 13 Afghan provinces. Part of the leaders of the antigovernment forces have begun to display vacillation and doubt regarding the advisability of continuing the war. The differences and competition among the leaders of the "Alliance of Seven"

(the union of the seven main opposition groups of the armed opposition which are organizing the war against the government and the peoples of Afghanistan) in Peshawar has intensified and the lack of unanimity, political and religious, of the entire opposition has been revealed. Some ideas of national reconciliation have been accepted by émigré circles in Western Europe, including the former King, Zahir Shah.

The signs of Pakistan's fatigue from the war have become notable, the main base for which, like the mass of Afghan refugees, is on their territory. They cannot be failing to think in Islamabad about the war in Afghanistan interfering with Pakistan's objectively establishing the necessary relations with the Soviet Union, in which all influential Pakistani circles have an interest.

In the general context of improving relations between the Soviet Union and the US the Afghan issue has also taken on a quieter tone.

Thus the prerequisites have been formed in order for the Geneva process to move forward – the Afghan-Pakistani talks through the personal representative of the UN Secretary General Diego Cordoves concerning the problems of settling relations between the two countries. These talks have been held since 1982, but for a long time neither side had placed great hopes on them. The situation began to change a year or a year and a half ago, about the same time the government of Najibullah announced the policy of national reconciliation.

The Statements of the CC CPSU General Secretary M. S. Gorbachev and RA President Najibullah of 8 February 1988 gave the strongest impulse toward progress in the Geneva talks; they contained a program for a settlement which was fair to all interested parties and proposed specific outcomes [*razvyazki*] for the most complex problems.

From this moment the Geneva process entered its concluding phase. But right here is where it gained a dramatic character since the enemies of a settlement sharply stepped up their activity and began to place ever newer obstacles at the last minute.

Now the Pakistanis demanded that before the signing of the agreements a "transitional" government be formed in Afghanistan with a predominance of the opposition and declared that they would not sign any agreement with Najibullah's government.

Now the Americans advanced a demand about the cessation of Soviet weapons shipments to the government of Afghanistan, which would mean our rejection of treaty obligations to this country with whom we have been collaborating since 1921.

Now Pakistan intensified its insistence that the issue of the Afghan-Pakistani border along the "Durand Line" be resolved simultaneously with the signing of the agreement; it was arbitrarily drawn by the British a hundred years ago, cutting the Pushtun people in two and not recognized by the previous governments of Afghanistan, including the monarchy.

The greatest restraint and firmness in defending principled positions in combination with tactical flexibility and high maneuverability were required in these days by the CC CPSU Politburo, the Soviet government, and the leadership of the Republic of Afghanistan. It needs to be said that large roles in this were played by direct Soviet contacts with the Americans and Pakistanis, the positive contribution of India (as R. Gandhi himself said, "We acted quietly, but constructively"), and an appeal to world public opinion in the interests of the quickest possible conclusion of an agreement.

In the final account the unjustified requests were withdrawn. The meeting between M. S. Gorbachev and President Najibullah on 7 April in Tashkent had exceptional importance for the final coordination of the parameters of future agreements.

On 14 April 1988 the ceremonial act of signing the Geneva accords by the foreign ministers of all interested parties took place.

The Geneva Accords have been completely published in the press. What is the most significant in their content? At the fundamental level they solve the main issue of the Afghan situation – terminating armed and other interference in the affairs of Afghanistan from without.

Soviet troops are being withdrawn and at the same time the interference of Pakistan and the United States is being halted. The fulfillment of obligations will be monitored by an observation mechanism created by the UN Secretary General.

Pakistan has taken on itself a categorical and unconditional obligation to cease any interference in the affairs of Afghanistan and not to create military bases and camps of forces hostile to Afghanistan on its territory, neither to train nor arm nor finance them, nor to transfer weapons, equipment, or combat detachments across Pakistani territory, nor to carry out any other measures to destabilize the internal situation there.

This, if you will, is the most important of all: the now open border between Pakistan and Afghanistan is being legally closed – the very same open border, all the mountain passes, which for ten years were used to infiltrate armed detachments of rebels and the weapons for them into Afghanistan. Thus the main military base for the undeclared war against Afghanistan is being torn down.

We have taken upon ourselves the obligation to begin the withdrawal of our troops from Afghanistan on 15 May 1988. According to the Geneva documents, half of these troops will return home by the middle of August 1988.

Of great importance is the obligation of the USSR and US in their Declaration of International Guarantees to refrain from any acts which could assist a violation of the obligations of the parties.

Of great political and humanitarian importance is the agreement about ensuring the free and unhindered return to Afghanistan of all refugees as citizens with full rights, enjoying all the civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights, including freedom of religion. According to incoming information, the first reaction of the refugees to this agreement was, on the whole, favorable.

Practical implementation will require some time since we are talking about the return of millions of people. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees and his staff will help here.

If we put all this together the Geneva Accords create an international legal basis to withdraw Soviet troops from Afghanistan and to stop the interference into the internal affairs of Afghanistan from Pakistani territory. Their signing also strengthens the international legal and political positions of the present power structure headed by Najibullah.

But all this still does not mean that the Geneva Accords solve all the aspects of the Afghan problem. There still remains the so-called "Iranian angle": there are a large number of Afghan refugees on Iranian territory and several counterrevolutionary organizations function there, have military camps for the military training of rebels who are trained and supplied there with Iranian weapons and transported into Afghanistan for combat operations. All this is in a considerably smaller scale than in Pakistan but all the same it exists.

Proposals have repeatedly been sent to the government of Iran to join the Geneva process. However a negative reply has followed each time. Right now the Iranian government has come out and condemned the Geneva Accords and refused to recognize them. Until recently the Iranian government as a method of "solving" the Afghan problem proposed to us no more or less than to install a government in Kabul composed of fundamentalist Shiite figures capable of pursuing the same policy as the present government of Iran itself.

What and when will happen with the "Iranian angle" of the Afghan problem is hard to say. But only one thing is clear: the Iranian "plans" do not encounter significant support in the Afghan opposition itself.

Another unresolved aspect – the domestic [aspect]. The "Alliance of Seven" continues to operate. True, in accordance with the Geneva agreements Pakistan should not permit them to remain on their territory after the beginning of the withdrawal of Soviet troops. But the "Alliance" can be moved directly to Afghanistan or Iran.

A large number of armed rebel detachments operate on Afghan territory; several of them are quite large, having hundreds, and even thousands of men. Many of them are also not yet inclined to lay down their weapons.

In these matters the main thing will depend on whether in the more or less foreseeable future they will manage to begin an all-Afghan dialogue and form a coalition government in which other political forces of the country will participate together with the PDPA, even if including only a part of the influential opposition groups. There is a chance of this and the Najibullah government will naturally devote maximum efforts to translate them into reality. But there are no guarantees of success, especially a quick one. It is possible they won't manage to create a coalition government very quickly. It is impossible to preclude in this case that combat operations will continue in the country for some time between government forces and the opposition.

But meanwhile the results of those measures which the Afghan leadership has recently been carrying out in the social and political spheres, and of the formation of a presidential guard and its supply with everything necessary should begin to take shape. On the other hand, dissention and disagreements are intensifying among the "Alliance of Seven".

In the West many talk of the intention of the US to go on delivering weapons to the opposition groups. The following needs to be said on this account.

During the Geneva negotiations the Americans wanted to restrain us, demanding a unique "symmetry": if they stopped deliveries of weapons to the armed rebels then we must not send any more weapons to the government of Afghanistan. We decisively rejected such a formulation of the issue, for then we would have to reject our obligations to the government of the Republic of Afghanistan and the agreements concluded ten years ago.

The Geneva Accords do not prohibit but do not permit the US from delivering weapons to their clients. If they go the route of continuing such deliveries it will not be simple to do this: it is only possible to supply the rebels across Pakistani and Iranian territory. Pakistan is bound by the Geneva Accords and now cannot transship American weapons to Afghanistan without violating its obligations. It would also be difficult via Iran with whom the Americans have developed a confrontation. In resolving the issue of the withdrawal of Soviet

troops from Afghanistan the Soviet Union has not waived the interests of its Afghan friends.

The conclusion of the Geneva Accords had a truly colossal response in the world. It is developing in our favor. People have seen what the new political thinking of the Soviet Union means and are convinced that our words do not differ from our deeds.

However it is necessary to always remember that the fact of the signing of the Geneva Accords itself is still not everything. The Geneva Accords do not just have supporters, but covert and open opponents who can try to disrupt their implementation. It will still be necessary to fight to put the spirit and letter into practice and actually fulfill the agreements. We need to display necessary activism and vigilance. The CC CPSU and the Soviet government understand this well and will act accordingly.

The conclusion of the Geneva Accords is the conclusion of an enormous stage in the development of Afghan affairs and at the same time the beginning of a new stage.

The Afghan comrades will have to rethink much in new conditions, understand anew, and find forms of work in the masses appropriate to new conditions. Naturally, many theoretical and practical problems will arise here.

But they have a starting base for this work. In the years before the Revolution political and government systems, an armed forces, and public institutions were created in the country. The strength of the PDPA rose from 12,000 to 200,000 members. Its unity, skillful tactics, capability of strengthening ties with the masses to convince them of the correctness of their policy, and to establish cooperative relations with other political forces – all this will have a decisive importance in the new stage. A youth organization numbering 220 thousand, labor unions, and a women's organization have been created.

But, of course, it is necessary that a corresponding qualitative side stand behind all the quantitative indicators. For a long time the situation in the PDPA was gradually worsening. Things have gotten better in the last two or three years.

The main thing is the economy. A country ravaged by war has to be put on its feet. This is an enormous task. And no one except the Afghan people themselves are in a position to do this. But it is our duty to help the Afghans. Economic assistance and scientific and technical cooperation will be required of us to do this.

The international authority of Afghanistan is growing. The recent visit of President Najibullah to India signifies a serious success in this direction.

Our aid to Afghanistan to strengthen and develop its national economy is a precept of V. I. Lenin. Back during the conclusion of the Soviet-Afghan Treaty of 1921 V. I. Lenin insightfully pointed out in a message to the Emir of Afghanistan Amanullah Khan: "The Soviet Russian government and the Great Afghan state have common interests in the East; both countries value their independence and want to see one another and all peoples of the East free and independent. Not only the above conditions bring both countries closer but particularly because there are no issues between Afghanistan and Russia which could cause differences and cast even a shadow on Russian-Afghan friendship. The old imperialist Russia has disappeared forever and the northern neighbor of the Great Afghan state is the new Soviet Russia, which extends its hand of friendship and brotherhood to all peoples of the East and firstly to the Afghan people.

From that moment relations between the Soviet Union and Afghanistan were built for decades on the principles of peaceful coexistence and trust. Having proclaimed neutrality (on the basis of the Soviet-Afghan Treaty of 1931) and having strictly observed it, Afghanistan gave us the opportunity of not being concerned about a significant sector of our southern border in the most difficult time of the Great Patriotic War.

Our collaboration also continued in the postwar era; the Soviet side gave substantial assistance in modernizing its economy and social infrastructure.

Our economic collaboration with Afghanistan has not stopped even in the last decade when combat operations were being waged on its territory.

In all, our country helped Afghanistan to create more than 270 economic facilities, of which more than 130 have already been put into operation. These facilities include vehicle transport enterprises, elevators, high-voltage power transmission lines, satellite communications stations, scientific institutions to train Afghans, and a number of others. During the years of collaboration with the USSR about a thousand Afghan received professional training; more than 80,000 workers were trained by Soviet specialists during the construction and operation of facilities in Afghanistan itself.

The enterprises of Soviet-Afghan collaboration supply more than 60% of the entire production of the manufacturing industry of the country, 100% of the natural gas output, large-panel housing construction, carbamides, the citrus and olive harvest, the government baking of bread, and about 60% of the generation of electrical energy.

Soviet-Afghan contacts took on a stable and wide-scale nature through scientific, cultural, youth, women's, and trade union organizations. These ties are constantly being enriched and deepened.

Nevertheless the current level of Soviet-Afghan economic, trade, and scientific and technical cooperation does not respond to the needs which the task of liquidating the economic consequences of a decade of war pose.

A large role is played here by unusual and out of the ordinary forms and methods of cooperation. Already direct ties have been established between Soviet republics and individual oblasts with all 30 provinces of Afghanistan; cities are connected with cities, ministries with ministries, and enterprises with enterprises. There is a great future for this. But collaboration with private enterprises? The creation of joint enterprises? All this is still scarcely beginning. It is important all this also be retained and acquire further development during the implementation of the program of national reconciliation in Afghanistan.

If in new conditions on the Afghan side an interest is displayed in using our advisers it will be necessary to meet them halfway. It is important only that people actually do this who are capable of deeply and realistically evaluating the situation and giving useful advice.

Our collaboration with a peaceful Afghanistan will be multidimensional, progressively developing in all areas of the economy, trade, science, and technology. This needs to be organized in order to do business not only with the government sector but also with the most diverse sectors of the diverse Afghan society, including with merchants and private entrepreneurs.

Of course, peaceful economic collaboration with Afghanistan will require considerable expense from us. We should do this, the more so because the expense for one month of peaceful collaboration are somewhat less than one week of military operations. Expenses for peaceful collaboration are certainly justified, both politically and economically. There are objective opportunities to give our economic ties with Afghanistan a mutually advantageous nature.

Thus the mission is threefold: aid in organizing normal economic life; preserve the traditions, the accumulated capital of many decades of Soviet-Afghan economic collaboration; and give this collaboration a new stimulus, bringing it to new forms, directions, and frontiers.

The Soviet people are taking the fate of the Afghan people closely to their hearts. A symbol of this is the concern for hundreds of Afghan children, war orphans who have found warmth and shelter in our land. They are getting education and professional training from us and will return home as good specialists. Many of our people now ask whether we ought not create a People's Fund for Aid to Afghanistan in our country, having in mind, of course, aid to restore the economy.

Doubtless many countries of the socialist commonwealth will make their contribution to the final resolution of the Afghan question and in rebuilding and

developing the economy of the country. Talks about this are already underway right now.

The Soviet government is now endeavoring that a future peaceful Afghanistan remain our partner in the international political arena. A country located in the center of Asia cannot fail to be close and understanding of our initiatives oriented toward peace, stability, and trust in the Asia-Pacific region.

However one may be sure that other countries and other forces will try to follow their own policy with respect to Afghanistan and especially after the withdrawal of Soviet troops. All avenues of influence will be used – political, public, and Muslim; in a majority of cases doubtless this will run counter to our interests and that of the Afghans.

And therefore it is impossible to expect a quiet development of events here. It is impossible to foresee all their twists and turns. For our part, we will consistently follow our principled policy directed at strengthening the status of Afghanistan as non-aligned, neutral, and independent country friendly with all countries, and, of course, with the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Union and the Soviet people wish the Afghan people prosperity and happiness.

One more thing. The conclusion of the Geneva Accords is the beginning of the climax of a large and complex conflict. There is much here that is instructive and useful for developing the means for a political settlement of conflicts in other regions of the world. Of course, we should not talk about copying – this is impossible, since each regional conflict has its own roots and forms of development and its own correlation of forces. But certain lessons can and need to be drawn. The main one of these is obviously that the most complex problems can be decided by the collective forces of all interested parties. The UN can play a useful role in this regard.

In informing Party members openly and in detail about all the aspects of the Afghan problem the CC CPSU is acting in the spirit of the democratic principles which are affirmed in the daily reality of our Party and in all of society.

The Central Committee of the CPSU considers its first duty to the entire Party and all of society to display the maximum concern for the people who underwent the most difficult trials in Afghanistan, to properly evaluate the combat exploits and the military service of Soviet soldier and officers who fought and served there, and to display concern daily for their needs and to more actively involve them in public activity.

The Soviet people, who have honestly and with dignity worked and are working today in Afghanistan, also deserve our deepest gratitude, be they specialists, Party advisers, or diplomats.

The fate of each person who honestly fulfilled their duty should be in the attention of each Party organization and Party Committee of Soviet [Council], labor union, and Komsomol body. This should be done first of all with regard to the families and friends of those who died or were disabled or wounded.

The CC CPSU expresses its deep gratitude to hundreds of thousands of people for their honest and selfless performance of their responsibilities in Afghanistan, for their high patriotism and internationalism, and devotion to military and civic duty. In the conditions which developed the envoys of our country showed themselves to be worthy sons of the socialist Motherland.

The Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.
May 10, 1988

[Source: A. A. Lyakhovskiy's "Tragediya i Doblest' Afgana" ("Tragedy and Valor of the Afghanistan Veteran")", Iskon, Moscow, 1995; Translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg]

[pp. 449-51]

to the Soviet Ambassador to the RA
to the USSR KGB and MVD representatives in the RA (advisers)
to the Commanding General of the 40th Army

**Shortcomings in the transfer of garrisons, property, weapons, and
ammunition to the RA VS**

...In accordance with a decision of the Soviet government, the return of Soviet troops to the Motherland from Afghanistan began on 15 May of this year. By decision of headquarters [*Instantsiya*], in support of the RA Armed Forces (MO, MGB, and MVD) it is stipulated that the 40th Army is to directly give the Afghan side many physical assets, including all structures and their support systems. Also, several reserves are being created for all three branches of the VS – the MO, MGB, and MVD (ammunition, fuel, food, clothing and medicines, firewood, coal, and engineering, armor, and motor vehicle kits).

The practical experience from handing over the first garrisons, guard posts in security zones and on highways, including weapons and combat equipment, and also the creation of reserves in the main garrisons of the Afghan army has shown that there are substantial shortcoming in the transfer methods.

At the present time garrisons, guard posts, combat equipment, weapons, material reserves, and other property are being transferred by the usual established method – joint commissions are created which count by item (by facility); inspect the quality, condition, and operating capability of systems; and draw up receipt and acceptance records which are approved by superior commanders of the corresponding garrisons, both Afghan and Soviet. The documents are attested to by a stamp.

However, because of poor organization and the desire of a number of people on the Afghan side to use this moment for personal gain, and also the presence of elements among the servicemen of the army, MGB, and MVD who are hostile to the Soviet Union, theft, pillaging, and crippling of combat equipment and material are being committed.

Three months before the withdrawal of our troops from Afghanistan the Soviet command in Jalalabad organized training courses for Afghan specialists to correctly maintain and reliably operate all the garrison systems (power stations and electrical systems, water supply systems, sewage, refrigeration plants, bakeries, modern electrical kitchen equipment, medical institutions, television centers, public address systems, heating systems, etc.)

Ten days before the withdrawal of the troops all the weapons and combat equipment to be handed over were counted by the local commissions and

checked by field firing and road testing, and the garrison property was carefully inspected.

Beginning on the morning of 14 May the servicemen of our brigade completely vacated their garrison (the brigade lived in field conditions for a day) and handed it over to the Afghan side, which posted their own guard and signed the appropriate documents. The command of the 40th Army – the First Deputy to the Commanding General, General-Major A. G. Sheyenko, the Chief of the Political Department, General-Major A. I. Zakharov, Deputies to the Commanding General for Armament, Construction and Quartering of Troops, and the Rear personally took part in checking the readiness to hand over the garrisons, military equipment, and property. And before this the Commanding General of the Army, General-Lieutenant B. V. Gromov, worked for several days in the units being withdrawn.

However during the second half of the 14th and particularly on the 15th and 16th of May the brigade garrison was completely plundered and valuable property was sold through city shops (televisions, radios, refrigerators, air conditioners, furniture, including even soldiers' beds). In a majority of buildings doors and window frames were torn out.

A situation which was created required that a report be sent to Cde. Najibullah about the unworthy conduct of Afghan servicemen when receiving garrisons. The desire was expressed that similar incidents would not be permitted in the future. Najibullah gave the necessary instructions. However in another brigade on the second day after handing over the garrison two barracks were destroyed by fire.

The Chief of the General Staff of the VS RA, General-Colonel Shah Nawaz Tanay, who visited the Jalalabad garrison two or three days after it was abandoned by troops of the 40th Army, was convinced of a irresponsible and criminally careless attitude toward the reception of garrisons from Soviet troops.

... The personnel of the 40th Army did everything so that a good memory would be left with the Afghans and so that the Soviet people would have a good attitude toward the Afghan people and their armed forces. However for the reasons above these good intentions not only came to naught, but negative ones were created. Moreover, it suggests a desire of the military leadership of the province - the Commander of the 1st AK, the Chief of the MGB Directorate, the Commanding General of the tsarandoy, and others – to shun responsibility for the state of affairs and also to present an unseemly picture to the President supposedly created by the Soviet troops when leaving the garrison. The submission of false information to the President about the improper condition of equipment and weapons transferred to an MGB unit was to set the stage which would excuse the leaders of the province in case of a possible defeat by the counterrevolutionaries when launching combat operations.

The Commander of the 1st AK, Lieutenant General Asef, lowered himself to reporting to the President of the Republic the absence of reserves in Jalalabad (ammunition, fuel, food, communications equipment, clothing, spare parts for armor and vehicles, etc.) , even though he himself had approved their acceptance record.

It is advisable:

1. before the transfer of garrisons, guard posts, weapons, military equipment, and any kind of reserves for the Commanding General of the 40th Army to execute the receipt and acceptance document in the presence of not only those receiving and drawing it up, but also [in the presence of] appropriate representative of the RA MO, State Security, and Internal Affairs of Afghanistan. Also invite the leaders or their deputies of the Soviet missions in Afghanistan (the Chief Military Adviser's staff and the USSR KGB and MVD missions in the RA) for these purposes.

Obtain from the Afghan side the creation of conditions ensuring the safeguarding of the garrisons being transferred by units of the 40th Army. Besides receipt and acceptance records take photographs of the facilities being handed over...

2. Insist the MO, MGB, and MVD, and also the RA VS General Staff report in writing to the President of the RA on the day of receipt and acceptance of the corresponding garrison, guard post, combat equipment and weapons, and material reserves, indicating the quantity and quality of the equipment being received.

3. The basis of the actions of each of us and [our] subordinate collectives should be the higher national interests of the Soviet Union. All our efforts should be directed toward this.

Only truthful and honest attitudes from the Afghan side, a prohibition of leniency toward people who act to harm Soviet-Afghan relations, and a broad display of the scale of the aid which the Soviet Union is giving Afghanistan can eventually create a favorable atmosphere among the broad public of the country toward the Soviet people and their Armed Forces after the withdrawal of Soviet troops...

General of the Army Varenikov
3 June 1988

[Source: A. A. Lyakhovskiy's "Tragediya i Doblest' Afgana" ("Tragedy and Valor of the Afghanistan Veteran")", Iskon, Moscow, 1995; Translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg]

6. 7. 1988

4. Ex.

H. Fries

Vertraulich

6. 7.

Der Stellvertreter des Ständigen Vertreters der UdSSR im RGW übergab den Stellvertretern der Ständigen Vertreter der Länder im RGW eine Information darüber, daß gegenwärtig vom Sekretariat der UNO ein Komplexprogramm der Sonderhilfe für Afghanistan (KPSHA) ausgearbeitet wird. Dieses auf 3 Jahre angelegte Programm wird mit 2 Mrd. Dollar eingeschätzt. Der vom UNO-Generalsekretär eingesetzte Beauftragte zur Realisierung des KPSHA hat die möglichen Spenderländer aufgefordert, ihre Zuwendungen einem speziell dafür eingerichteten Sonderfonds für Afghanistan bzw. den entsprechenden Programmen der UNO-Spezialorganisationen zukommen zu lassen.

Die Frage der multilateralen Hilfe für Afghanistan wird auf der bevorstehenden Tagung des ECOSOC im Juli d.J. und wahrscheinlich auch in der UNO-Vollversammlung behandelt werden.

Gegenwärtig ist um das KPSHA und insbesondere im Zusammenhang mit der Organisation der multilateralen Zusammenarbeit zur Lösung des Problems der afghanischen Flüchtlinge ein scharfer politischer Kampf entbrannt. Im Grunde genommen geht es darum, ob die Hilfe der UNO zur Lösung dieser äußerst wichtigen Frage auf eine Stabilisierung der Lage im Lande und die Verankerung der Ergebnisse der Genfer Abkommen in dem die Flüchtlinge betreffenden Teil gerichtet ist.

In Anbetracht der großen politischen und ökonomischen Bedeutung, die einer Lösung der Fragen der Hilfe für Afghanistan, darunter für die afghanischen Flüchtlinge über internationale Organisationen zukommt, halten wir es für wichtig, uns mit den Bruderländern zu beraten und sie über die von der UdSSR unternommenen Schritte auf diesem Gebiet zu informieren.

Unsererseits wurde bereits mit den Vorbereitungsarbeiten im Zusammenhang mit der bevorstehenden Behandlung dieser Frage in den UNO-Gremien begonnen. Die UdSSR verkündete ihren Entschluß, an einer Spenderkonferenz unter UNO-Schirmherrschaft teilzunehmen, wo sie die Höhe ihrer Beiträge zum KPSHA bekanntgeben wird.

Die sowjetischen staatlichen Organe arbeiten an der Systematisierung unserer bilateralen und multilateralen Leistungen für Afghanistan; es wird die Berechnung der Hilfeleistungen, darunter auch der für afghanische Flüchtlinge, nach der UNO-Methodologie vorgenommen.

Die sowjetischen gesellschaftlichen Organisationen prüfen ebenfalls die Möglichkeit, den entsprechenden afghanischen Organisationen direkt bzw. über multilaterale Programme zusätzliche materielle Hilfe zu gewähren.

Wir möchten das Augenmerk der Bruderländer auf die Frage der Koordinierung des Vorgehens im Zusammenhang mit der Lösung der Probleme der Hilfeleistung für Afghanistan im Rahmen der UNO richten und darum bitten, die Möglichkeiten der Mitgliedsländer des RGW zu prüfen, Afghanistan entsprechende Hilfe, darunter auch über die multilateralen Kanäle der UNO und ihrer Spezialorganisationen, zu gewähren.

Wir denken, daß diese Fragen Gegenstand der Erörterung über verschiedene Kanäle sein könnten, darunter im RGW-Komitee für die Zusammenarbeit auf dem Gebiet der Außenwirtschaftsbeziehungen sowie auf dem im Juli d.J. in Phjongjang stattfindenden Treffen der stellvertretenden Außenminister.

Decision "A" No 130
Of Politburo of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party
from 12th August 1988

[Source: Central State Archive, Sofia, Fond 1-B, Opis 68, File 130-88]

In connection with the new situation in Afghanistan after signing the Geneva agreements Politburo of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party finds it necessary to widen the political, economic and moral support to the Republic of Afghanistan. In view of that aim:

1. Suggests that the Council of Ministers adopts a comprehensive decision for further activating the economic and scientific-technological cooperation and the preparation of cadres for the Republic of Afghanistan, including the private sector.
2. Does not object to the Council of Ministers offering free of charge to the Republic of Afghanistan clothing, shoes, tents, blankets, medicines, food and other things amounting to two million leva, including transport expenses for the returning refugees.
3. Offers that the National Council of the Fatherland Front, The Central Council of the Bulgarian Trade Unions, the Central Committee of the Dimitrov Communist Youth Union and the Committee of the Movement of Bulgarian Women organize a campaign for collecting clothes and other means to help the returning refugees in the Republic of Afghanistan.
4. Offers free of charge to the Central Committee of the People's democratic Party of Afghanistan a small enterprise amounting to 1mln leva and 100 thousand currency leva.

The help should be realized via the Ministry of Foreign-Economic relations.

To
Politburo of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist
Party

MEMORANDUM
of the "Foreign Policy and International Relations" department of the CC BCP

Regarding: widening the political, economic and moral support to the Republic of
Afghanistan

Comrades,

In connection with comrade Michail Gorbachev's letter to comrade Todor Zhivkov regarding Afghanistan, in view to the new situation in that country after signing the Geneva agreements, Politburo of the CC BCP entrusted the Foreign Affairs Commission at Politburo and Secretariat of the Bulgarian Communist Party with the preparation of an offer for the further widening of the political, economic and moral support of the Republic of Afghanistan (protocol No 72 from 17th May 1988).

Additionally a letter was received for comrade Georgi Atanassov from Afghanistan's Prime-Minister Mohamad Hassan Shark with an appeal for help at this difficult moment.

We are proposing a project for decision, worked out by the Commission for foreign issues at Politburo and the Secretariat of the CC BCP with the participation of the "

Foreign Policy and International Relations" department of the CC BCP, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Foreign-economic relations.

The draft of a resolution has been coordinated with the "Organizational", "Economic and Scientific-technical policy" and "Financial-economic" departments of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party.

August 3rd 1988

First deputy-head of the "Foreign Policy and International Relations" department of the CC BCP: /K. Atanassov/

[Translated by Assistant Professor Kalina Bratanova; Edited by Dr. Jordan Baev]

[p. 327, 26 December 1988 letter from Ahmad Shah Masoud to the Chief Military Adviser; also found in Lyakhovskiy's *Plamya Afgana*, pp. 499-500]

Mister Adviser!

I already wanted to go to the place to meet the Soviet representatives when I received your latest letter. I should say for the sake of clarity: we have endured war and your presence of 10 years. God willing, we will endure it a few more days. But if you begin combat operations then we will give you a fitting rebuff. That's all. From this day we will assign our detachments and groups the mission of being in full combat readiness.

With respect, Ahmad Shah Masoud
26 December 1988

[Source: Boris Gromov, "Ogranichenny Kontingent ("Limited Contingent")", Progress, Moscow, 1994]

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[p. 402 August 1988 40th Army report on the effect of successful rebel operations on DRA morale]

(Secret)

...As a result of carefully prepared actions in the province of Kunduz counterrevolutionary groups have managed to actually seize the provincial capital and other population centers without a fight, although the government forces had superiority in numbers of garrison personnel, and complete [superiority] in the degree of weapons supply, combat equipment, and ammunition.

The enemy inflicted much political, morale, and material damage on the supporters of the RA government. The population of Kunduz was indignant at the actions of the rebels, who robbed all the stores, destroyed government institutions and enterprises, and took a large number of valuables and captured military equipment out of the city with them, as well as about 200 young women. In order to lay the responsibility for their deeds on government forces, the rebels organized a kangaroo court against a group of captured tsarandoy troops, who were accused of massacring shopkeepers. Their hands were chopped off publicly.

Expressing indignation at the actions of the rebels, the population of Kunduz also expressed dissatisfaction with the government defenders who were charged with the responsibility of defending the city from attacks by rebel groups and who were completely unable to cope with their missions. They actually surrendered the city without a battle and several of them went over to the side of the rebels...

Source of information: Headquarters of the 40th Army, Kabul

August 1988

[Source: A. A. Lyakhovskiy's "Tragediya i Doblest' Afgana" ("Tragedy and Valor of the Afghanistan Veteran"), Iskon, Moscow, 1995; Translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg]

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[pp. 438-39 August 1988 report from the GRU and 40th Army HQ of fighting between the IOA and IPA]:

At the end of July of this year IOA detachments from the provinces of Laghman and Panjshir numbering up to 900 men attacked IPA groups in the area of Pachegan in Tagab district (Kapisa province); having forced them out they set up their own operations post in the area of Ashli.

Combat operations have begun between detachments of commanders Ar'yanpur (IOA) and Muhammad Bahadur Modafe (IPA) in the areas of Wakhshi, Dashti Aga, and Khaybak in Kishim district of Badakhshan province. Both sides have suffered considerable losses. After prolonged armed conflict the formation of Muhammad surrendered to Ar'yanpur.

The detachments of Ahmad Shah Masoud (IOAP) were more active in the northern and central regions in a struggle to expand their sphere of influence. In just the last two or three months his detachments made no less than nine attempts to drive back IPA forces from the northern regions of Baghlan province.

At the end of July and the beginning of August there has been noted a sharp exacerbation of the disagreements between the formations of various counterrevolutionary parties and organizations in the province of Wardak. For example, at the end of July there were renewed conflicts between the groups of DIRA (led by M. Nabi) and the NFSA (led by Mojaddadi) in the area of Shamiz (Nerkh district).

The IPA intelligence units have information that an infiltration of groups of ISOA and DIRA rebels from Pakistan into the province of Wardak under the command of Mula Nik is planned; the goal is to seize the areas of Dadal and Sadmarda of Nerkh district which are controlled at the present time by IPA forces.

In the opinion of the IPA leadership an extremely unfavorable situation for their supporters has developed in Hazarajat. Taking advantage of the weakness of IPA positions in this region, detachments of "Nasr" and other Shiite formations are intercepting and looting caravans of this party travelling to the northern regions of Afghanistan. At the end of July the Hazaras intercepted a caravan under the command of Moulana Safar Muhammad travelling to Kizim district in Badakhshan province. Weapons, ammunition, and other property with a total weight of 10 tons as well as 4,000,000 Afghans were taken.

[Source: A. A. Lyakhovskiy's "Plamy Afgana" ("Flame of the Afghanistan veteran")", Iskón, Moscow, 1999; Translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg]

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[pp. 441-2 August 1988 Varennikov report to Yazov]:

REPORT FROM KABUL

(Secret)

to the USSR Minister of Defense

General of the Army Cde. D. T. Yazov

I report.

... three important issues were discussed at a routine meeting of the Supreme High Command on 8 August of this year, besides a critique of the military-political and operational situation in all areas of the country, the adoption of decisions, and issuance of necessary instructions...

Third. About strengthening the Kabul security zone. The issue of conducting additional measures to improve the defense of the city of Kabul was discussed. A detailed conversation was held in advance with Cde. Najibullah on this topic. Proceeding from the existing arrangement a draft directive of the RA Armed Forces Supreme High Command was drawn up in the USSR MO OG, "Urgent Measures to Ensure the Security of the Population of the Capital and Improve the Defense of the Kabul Security Zone," which was sent to the Ministers of Defense, State Security, and Internal Affairs for coordination. The draft directive envisioned the creation of a Joint Security Zone HQ under the direct command of the President; the appointment of Minister of Internal Affairs General-Colonel Gulyabzoy as his First Deputy and Chief of the Kabul Garrison with the transfer of all men and equipment of the security zone to his operational subordination; the formation of an MVD division; and a number of other measures whose implementation would help improve the protection and defense of Kabul. However several changes made to the draft directive during coordination provoked an extremely negative reaction from Najibullah.

The President spoke harshly against appointing General-Colonel Gulyabzoy as Chief of the Kabul Garrison and handing over to him operational subordination of all formation and units deployed in the capital, including the Special Guard. The President noted that Gulyabzoy wanted to create a cumbersome staff for which there was no need. Najibullah stressed that he would personally exercise the responsibilities of Chief of Garrison. He proposes to appoint General-Colonels Gulyabzoy, Shah Nawaz Tanay, and Yakubi as his deputies.

In spite of all Gulyabzoy's arguments that carrying out the planned measures would considerably increase the protection and defense of Kabul,

Najibullah held to his opinion and continued to accused Gulyabzoy of trying to concentrate all the men and equipment in his hands.

This incident at the Supreme High Command meeting again is evidence of the mistrust displayed by the President toward one of the leaders of the Khalqi wing of the PDPA and an attempt to limit his influence and power...

Varennikov

August 1988

[Source: A. A. Lyakhovskiy's "Plamya Afgana" ("Flame of the Afghanistan veteran)", Iskon, Moscow, 1999; Translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg]

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[pp. 450-52 August 1988 Varennikov report to Yazov]:

REPORT FROM KABUL

(Secret)

to the USSR Minister of Defense

General of the Army Cde. D. T. Yazov

I report.

...Recently, especially in August of this year, among the Afghan leaders, mainly and including Najibullah, a tendency has been displayed toward possibly receiving as much material and other resources as possible from the Soviet Union and also forcing the Soviet military to use maximally the men and equipment of the 40th Army. In this regard the favorable solution of these problems does not cause a feeling of gratitude from the Afghan friends but on the contrary, induces them to still greater demands, even complaints...

And what is more, if the Afghan army, MGB, and MVD units displayed unreliability then Najibullah initially indirectly, and now even more directly, says that this is explained by insufficient assistance from the 40th Army. At the same time he is trying to reduce the negative aspects in the operations of Afghan army units.

Here are several examples of such operations.

1. Constant unfounded inquiries about additional deliveries of weapons and combat equipment for the RA armed forces. At the present time there only exists an objective need to increase deliveries of combat transport helicopters. It is necessary to note in this regard that the organization of the combat employment of helicopters remains extremely poor in spite of measures taken by Soviet advisers. This leads to an unjustifiably large number of losses (in just the last month the RA Air Force lost four fixed-wing aircraft and eight helicopters). As regards other types of weapons, there should not be issues here. On the contrary, it has been repeatedly reported to Najibullah that the available combat equipment and crew-served weapons are not completely employed since they are very badly supplied with specialists (from 20 to 40% of tanks, BMPs [infantry combat vehicles], BTRs [armored transport vehicles], field guns, and mortars do not have crews, and many vehicles do not even have drivers) and accordingly are not being used.

In varied form and constantly (for the third year) insistent desires are expressed that military draft work be improved... Only in this case can they can

count on the maximum use of the potential which the army and the other branches of the armed forces already have through their own supply of technical equipment...

The Ministers of Internal Affairs and State Security are carefully concealing the situation of their troops, even their authorized strength; however, in these conditions it is known that the level of technical supply of the troops subordinate to them is normal (considering their possible missions) and there are even reserves of several kinds of weapons. For example, in the MGB arsenal alone there are 425 82-mm mortars.

As regards ammunition, Najibullah is carrying out a policy according to which there are to be no norms or procedures for expenditures; the phrase is simply used, "The enemy is shelling us but we are sticking to some kind of norms there". This incorrect judgment leads to irresponsibility in performing combat missions. The troops are, in general, shooting, but not at targets.

Such actions, in turn, will lead after the withdrawal of Soviet troops to the Afghan combat units not being in a condition, even minimally, to ensure the supply of troops with ammunition and fuel (right now the transport of the 40th Army has been put in operation for the needs of the Afghan army). It costs the military (the MO, MVD, and the MGB) nothing, with Najibullah's knowledge, for example, to consume a large amount of equipment, ammunition, fuel, and other material valuables at previous deployment areas when redeploying units from one point to another and while carrying out combat missions.

Examples: when withdrawing the 2nd Infantry Division from Panjshir in the 64th Infantry Regiment there were lost: four 76-mm guns, nine 82-mm mortars, two anti-aircraft machinegun mounts [ZPU], 1 heavy machinegun [DShK], and 180 assault rifles [AKM]; large reserves of material resources were thrown away by MVD and MGB battalions in Kunduz...

Many such examples could be given.

The Afghan leadership has constantly demanded additional deliveries of weapons, equipment, and ammunition, but does not show any frugality in this regard. It probably knows that any of their requests will be met by the Soviet side...

2. The attempt to gloss over the actual situation of the reliability of the troops of the RA armed forces. On 7-8 August Afghan troops abandoned the cities of Kunduz, Khanabad, and Taloqan.

The Khanabad garrison consisted of two MVD battalions and one MGB battalion and in Kunduz, three MGB battalions and two MVD battalions. The enemy, having one-third to one-fourth the forces, seized both population centers

without a battle. During all this part of the garrisons went over to the enemy side right away and the rest were disarmed or fled to the area of the Kunduz airfield.

The Afghan leaders were initially indignant at the events. They remarked that all this was a surprise to them. Then they began to look for reasons to substantiate what had happened. Finally to an increasing degree they began to point out the bravery and courage of the combat units which had fled the cities without a defense.

On 18 August at a meeting of the Supreme High Command Najibullah stated that a majority of Afghan units which had participated in combat operations in the area of Khanabad and Kunduz had displayed heroism. I was forced to present a memo noting that the President had been deceived. Indeed, on 12 August I personally looked into the situation in detail which had developed when Kunduz and Khanabad had been abandoned on the scene. Even the leader of the combat operations, Lieutenant General Atsak, and member of the CC PDPA Politburo Karwal' sharply criticized the representatives of the former garrison which had been present at the meeting and the leaders of the province's Defense Council who had themselves displayed cowardice. Units of the garrison surrendered the city without a battle, had no wounded, not to mention killed. He noted that if these units subsequently comprise a Kunduz garrison then the disgrace which had already occurred would be repeated. In this situation the President was forced to change his opinion and partially replace the units of the Kunduz garrison, putting army subunits in them...

3. There are attempts in a number of cases to shift responsibility for failures to the Soviets. North of Kabul is the district of Shakardara. A surface-to-air missile battalion was deployed within this district.

The situation around the battalion with time developed not in its favor; therefore, in July of this year it was proposed to withdraw the unit to a suburb of Kabul and thereby not create a conflict situation among the local population which is completely under the influence of the rebels.

However the proposal was not adopted. At the beginning of August the enemy blockaded the battalion. In connection with this they were forced to carry out massive strikes by artillery and aircraft (mainly Soviet) on all areas adjoining the battalion. Combat operations by Soviet troops were not envisioned since at this time they were supporting the withdrawal of troops of the 40th Army to Soviet territory in accordance with the approved schedule, and Afghan units of the Kabul garrison were occupied with battles in the provinces of Wardak and Logar along with other units of the 40th Army.

Having held out for four days, the personnel of the battalion threw away their weapons and combat equipment and fled. The enemy, exaggerating their victory, reported by radio to the leaders in Peshawar about their great success.

This report was intercepted by an Afghan communications intelligence [unit] and reported to Najibullah, who stated harshly at a meeting of the RA Supreme High Command that "all this happened because the 40th Army did not use ammunition which would have more effectively destroyed the enemy." In connection with this I had to turn to the leadership of the Soviet Union so that it could give orders about the use of such ammunition; moreover, I said that here (in Shakardara) everything was wiped from the face of the Earth.

I explained to Najibullah that Soviet artillery had expended more than 9,000 shells and mortar shells on this area and 169 ground attack aviation sorties were conducted; any garrison could confidently hold out for months with such support. The battalion fled under pressure of rebel propaganda...

Analyzing both the above and the other actions of Najibullah one can conclude the increasingly tense situation in the country is making him less reliable.

At the same time a constant striving to solve all problems by military means is leading to a repetition of the mistakes of the past – to an aggravation, and not a rapprochement [in the relations] of the sides. The desire to hold on to all regions of the country by force and not seek a compromise with the opposition cannot lead to favorable results in Afghanistan in general, primarily including the regions where the situation is heating up: Kunduz, Takhar, and Bamian...

Varennikov

August 1988

[Source: A. A. Lyakhovskiy's "Plamya Afgana" ("Flame of the Afghanistan veteran")", Iskon, Moscow, 1999; Translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg]

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[pp. 483-85 11 Aug 88 GRU report on Masoud and his Panjshir forces]:

The Panjshir group of the opposition headed by Ahmad Shah Masoud (IOAP) has recently been increasingly acting as the core armed force of the IOA (led by B. Rabbani) in the central and northern provinces of the country. Its activity is being carried out in the following primary directions:

- expanding the zone of their control with the creation of local governmental bodies;

- rejecting active combat operations against Soviet troops in the interest of conserving men and equipment and intensifying armed combat against IPA groups competing with the IOAP. For example, at the end of July – beginning of August [1988] on orders of A. Sh. Masoud the combined detachments of the IOAP (up to 900 men) began active combat operations against IPA groups (overall leader, U. Farid) in the provinces of Kapisa and Parwan;

- drawing IOA armed forces to their side from various regions of the country (Badakhshan, Balkh, Baghlan, Nuristan, ...) and transferring operational subordination of them to Ahmad Shah;

- implementing plans for logistical support of the combat activity of a future IOAP "army" against government authority, for engineering equipment of areas under their control (expanding and rebuilding of lines of communications to reduce the time for the extraction of precious stones and the delivery of weapons and ammunition from Pakistan), and to step up counterintelligence and checkpoint procedures;

- strengthening ties with the local population, giving them comprehensive aid in normalizing their life, and supplying them with essential goods.

Special attention in this regard is being paid to the Panjshir River valley. On 2 August of this year Ahmad Shah Masoud arrived here and for the first time in two years stayed in his own house in Bazarak. The leader of the IOAP holds numerous meetings with representatives of various regions of the Panjshir, discussing the practical issues of giving material assistance to the population to rebuild housing, roads, clear the area of mines, build schools, etc. He is favorably inclined toward the establishment of direct ties between Panjshir merchants and Soviet missions in the RA.

Ahmad Shah is regularly visited in Panjshir by natives of this region now living in Kabul, including PDPA members and servicemen. No hostile acts have been noted against them. According to available information, about 5,000 Panjshir families who were earlier forced to abandon the valley intend to return here to their permanent residence.

At the political level Ahmad Shah Masoud's orientation has not been conclusively determined, although it is evident that as a whole he is anti-Pushtun. Categorically rejecting the possibility of cooperating with the Najibullah regime, the IOAP leader has a negative opinion of the activity of the Peshawar (overwhelmingly majority Pushtun) leadership of the armed opposition, especially G. Hekmatyar (IPA).

He takes an irreconcilable position regarding relations with the present regime and asserts that he will never contact it for the following reasons:

- the existing system of government is not viable and is weak, by virtue of which there is no sense in concluding an alliance with it;
- any attempts to establish contact with Najibullah are immediately cut short by the Peshawar leadership and the Pakistani regime by direct pressure and a threat to embargo weapons and ammunition deliveries;
- an alliance with government authority is impossible due to ideological considerations since it is impossible to abandon Islamic slogans which have for a long time ensured the effectiveness of the fight with the RA government.

As Ahmad Shah himself admits, he has no special problems as regards the Soviet Union and as a whole he is inclined to establish direct contacts. However, in his opinion, conditions are not yet ripe to do this and it is necessary to wait for the further development of events and to take specific steps depending on their course. Ahmad Shah has not conducted active combat operations against Soviet troops for half a year.

At the end of July – beginning of August of this year a commission of national reconciliation composed of eminent authorities – natives of Panjshir who are presently living in Kabul - arrived in Panjshir. Several days later an IPA delegation (about 20 men) arrived here from Peshawar to discuss issues associated with the organization of a personal meeting between Masoud and G. Hekmatyar. However the IOAP leader declined contacts with both delegations, designating the well-known group leader Mahmud, who is responsible for the Panjshir zone, to hold talks with the commission of national reconciliation.

The independence of Ahmad Shah's conduct in relation to the "Alliance-7" leadership is becoming all the more an object of dispute between G. Hekmatyar and B. Rabbani. At the same time, Masoud has been forced to stress his respectful attitude toward IOA leaders in connection with the fact that he is dependent to a certain degree on the latter for the continuity of weapons and ammunition deliveries from Pakistan.

... It is advisable to continue work to establish direct contact with the IOAP leader by the Soviet side since the alternative to this, launching BShU on the bases and detachments of Ahmad Shah Masoud, would not give favorable practical results either from the military or moreover from the political points of view; it could only lead to additional complications in the second stage of the withdrawal of Soviet troops... (excerpt from a report of a GRU representative, 11 August 1988)

[Source: A. A. Lyakhovskiy's "Plamya Afgana" ("Flame of the Afghanistan veteran"), Iskon, Moscow, 1999; Translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg]

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[pp. 485-86 Varennikov report to Yazov, August 1988]:

(Secret)

to the USSR Minister of Defense

General of the Army Cde. D. T. Yazov

I report.

Concerning Ahmad Shah Masoud... At the present time A. Masoud is a figure who enjoys undisputed authority among the population and has powerful detachments with high combat [*boytsovskiy*] and propaganda qualities. The well thought-out social policy he follows and the agitprop work (construction of mosques, schools, hospitals, roads, providing the population with essential goods) enjoy the wide support of the people. A. Shah has categorically prohibited his formations from waging combat operations against Soviet troops, which they rigorously observe. At the same time he continues to speak out as an irreconcilable opponent of government authority, although he refrains from using force if government troops do not shoot (which is in accord with the policy of national reconciliation).

However, in our opinion, the existing roadblocks in the way of rapprochement between Najibullah and A. Shah can be overcome, although the President also thinks that Masoud will not now enter into any contact.

On 24 August of this year at a meeting of the Supreme High Command Soviet military representatives in the RA made the latest (in 1987-88) attempt to direct the attention of the Afghan leadership toward the need for an immediate resolution of this important problem. Fundamental measures are necessary regarding Ahmad Shah, primarily political ones. Najibullah, who agreed, said that it is Ahmad Shah Masoud, not the "Alliance-7," that is the real threat to the regime right now. At the same time he said: "Comrades E. A. Shevardnadze and V. A. Aleksandrov [the pseudonym of V. A. Kryuchkov - author's note] during their visit to Afghanistan at the beginning of this year were disposed toward the necessity of holding talks with Ahmad Shah, but if he refused them, then his groups need to be decisively smashed." In the presence of the ministers of the RA armed forces Najibullah let it be known in this regard that the main role in the solution of this problem (that is, smashing A. Shah) should be left to the 40th Army. He further noted that he (the President) had reliable information about A. Shah's ties with the CIA. Considering this, Najibullah continued, the strategic intention of A. Shah could be clearly imagined: to split off the 14 (although there actually are 12) northern provinces of Afghanistan, put the Americans in, and present this to the Soviet Union as a *fait accompli*. I replied to the President that nothing is excluded, but the problem [he] touched on needs to be studied (I have

given information on these issues to Soviet Ambassador Cde. N. G. Yegorychev and the USSR KGB representative, Cde. V. A. Revin).

In our view, the adoption of the proposal of the President about involving the 40th Army in battles with A. Shah could place our troops in an extremely serious situation during the second stage of their withdrawal from Afghanistan. Doubtless there will be additional large losses; in general, their organized withdrawal at the set times could be disrupted. It is impossible in this matter to achieve the goal – namely the destruction of A. Shah – since it is necessary to know where he is and this has been ruled out – the agent network of Afghanistan has not been able to handle such a mission for eight years now. In addition, the operations of our troops would become a direct violation of the Geneva Accords. This step would inflict damage to the prestige of the Soviet Union from which it would be difficult to recover [*trudnovospolnimyy*] and would also provoke a negative reaction inside our country... any violations of them would negatively reflect on the authority of the USSR.

... The following conclusions can be drawn:

1. The main danger for the current regime in the present situation is the domestic opposition (the so-called "second echelon"), but among all of its leaders it is Ahmad Shah Masoud. This conclusion is not new and has been made for the last two years, but the political steps regarding this figure remain unchanged (and they even often slip into military measures).

At the concluding stage and after the withdrawal of Soviet troops one ought to expect that Ahmad Shah will step up operations to seize the northern provinces. He will primarily concentrate them on the Kabul-Hayraton highway.

2. The time when a rapprochement was possible with A. Shah, dictating conditions to him, has actually long since been lost and he has become practically invulnerable. However opportunities to establish contact with him have not been exhausted. Therefore the Afghan leadership needs to offer the maximum possible concessions to him and make any compromises. He should know that all his conditions will be satisfied, including granting autonomy to the northern provinces, etc.

3. In the future Ahmad Shah might grow into an important political figure with whom the Soviet Union, in all probability, will have to cooperate and it would be to our advantage to have him as an ally and not an enemy.

Considering this, Soviet operational services [*operativnyye sluzhby* –SIC] should establish direct contact with him as quickly as possible; especially since, as A. Shah himself acknowledges, because he has no special objections to this...

Varennikov

August 1988

[Source: A. A. Lyakhovskiy's "Plamya Afgana" ("Flame of the Afghanistan veteran"), Iskon, Moscow, 1999; Translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg]

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[p. 487 [[late summer 1988] Varennikov letter to Masoud, noted as being from
"the author's archive"]:

Dear Mr. Ahmad Shah Masoud!

For many years the blood of innocent people has been shed on the holy land of Afghanistan.

Women and children, old men and healthy men have died. Family homes have been ruined and sacred land devastated.

This is a great misfortune for the people. But the main thing is that there are dark forces which are indifferent to people's fate and they are continuing their vile deeds.

A serious example of such vile deeds are the recent events in Kunduz, which in August of this year was seized mainly by IPA detachments. While the mujaheddin were there the city was completely looted, burned, and barbarically destroyed. Even the mosque in Kunduz was destroyed. Rapes occurred and completely innocent people died. All the responsibility for this should be borne by the commanders of IPA detachments.

The people will not forgive this.

Dear Mr. Ahmad Shah Masoud!

In our opinion, the time has long come for us to think together what can be done to establish peace for the people of the northern and northeastern provinces of Afghanistan. Obviously we need to consult about a decision to organize the administration of these regions, although this question is a purely internal, that is, an Afghan question. But nevertheless your proposals about the administration of the province of Kunduz could be examined as a first step in order to prevent such future serious consequences as those which the residents of the city suffered in August 1988.

In our opinion the governor of the province, for example, should be an authoritative person respected by the people, a true Muslim capable of maintaining the peace and prosperity of the people; specific names could be mentioned.

We turn to you with this proposal inasmuch as we know you as a person who has devoted much effort to ensure peace not only in Panjshir but in many other provinces of Afghanistan.

We hope that your desire for peace and a correct understanding of our goals, which also reflect peace and prosperity, allow you to respond to this letter in the near future, for which we thank you in advance. It would be desirable to send a response via a person whom you trust and we know personally.

[Source: A. A. Lyakhovskiy's "Plamy Afgana" ("Flame of the Afghanistan veteran)", Iskon, Moscow, 1999; Translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg]

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[pp. 391-93 September 1988 Soviet embassy and Ministry of Defense
Operations Group report on the actions of UN monitoring agencies]

Memorandum for the Record on the Work of UN Monitoring Agencies

In accordance with the bilateral Afghan-Pakistani Noninterference Agreement the sides took a broad range of responsibilities upon themselves to prohibit the presence or concealment of groups on their territories in camps and bases, and also the organization of the training, financing, supplying, and arming of people, political, and other groups for subversive activity. The need arose to verify the fulfillment of these conditions by the sides. This mission was entrusted to the UN Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan (UNGOMAP) which was created on 14 April 1988. The initial number of military observers was 50 (25 in Kabul and 25 in Islamabad), but in October [SIC; note that the memorandum is dated September] they were reduced to 10. The Mission was headed by General Rauli Helminen. The senior political adviser to the Secretary-General of the UN, Benon Sevan (a Cypriot) took an active part in its work.

Contact was established with its leaders and real-time communications set up with it through military channels in order to provide rapid coordination with the Mission's activities. Measures were taken to observe the cessation of interference by Pakistan. A schedule of our joint activities was developed and coordinated with the Afghan side. The corresponding information was gathered about camps, bases, and weapons supply of the Afghan opposition on Pakistani territory and was sent to the MID via the Chief of the RA VS Directorate of External Affairs and included in official notes of protest.

The activity of the Good Offices Mission actually applied to two processes; first, to the cessation of the interference into Afghanistan's affairs from Pakistani territory and second, to conducting observation of the withdrawal of Soviet troops.

The UN staff group in Kabul has been monitoring the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the very beginning. It was given information about the total strength of the Limited Contingent of Soviet Troops (100,300), the garrison locations, and other information.

During the Soviet troop withdrawal the UN observers have been located at monitoring posts at the border locations of Hayraton and Towraghondi, have visited the garrisons of Jalalabad, Kandahar, and Fayzabad, and periodically have been at the airfields of Kabul, Shindand, and Kandahar which we have abandoned. Therefore they have personally confirmed the strict and complete fulfillment by the Soviet Union of its responsibilities and have informed the UN leadership to this effect.

The Pakistani side has delayed the fulfillment of its responsibilities to curtail its interference in Afghanistan's affairs under the pretext of "symmetry" of military aid. After the Geneva Accords went into effect the subversive and sabotage activity of the opposition, which counted on the demoralization of the population and the armed forces and a destabilization of the situation, increased. It was supplied by a constant stream of weapons of American and other manufacture coming to rebel formations across the Afghan-Pakistani border and often on Pakistani transport.

At meetings with UN representatives (D. Cordovez, R. Helminen, B. Sevan) they have been notified of instances of violations by Pakistan of the responsibilities which it had taken upon itself. It has been suggested to them to make a map of the facilities on Pakistani territory to be torn down (camps, bases, rebel training centers) from which specific observations of the fulfillment of the Geneva Accords by Pakistan could be conducted. However this document simply was not submitted. The UN Control Organ was reminded that the UN ought to monitor not only the withdrawal of Soviet troops but also the process of tearing down the bases and rebel training centers in Pakistan.

UN representatives have often referred to the impossibility of conducting strict monitoring because of the position of the Pakistan leadership which has been giving comprehensive support to the "Alliance-7" rebels in every possible way, has been hindering the work of the UN observers in every possible way, and has not created normal conditions for visits to the areas where the rebels are located.

The UN cannot use their influence to stop Pakistani and American interference in the affairs of Afghanistan and stop the bloodshed in this country.

Sources of information: the USSR Embassy in the RA and the USSR MO Operations Group in Afghanistan

September 1988

[Source: A. A. Lyakhovskiy's "Tragediya i Doblest' Afgana" ("Tragedy and Valor of the Afghanistan Veteran")", Iskon, Moscow, 1995; Translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg]

(Secret)

Analytic Note

Some results of combat operations in Kunduz and Takhar provinces in August 1988

... The military and political situation in northeastern Afghanistan has been relatively stable recently and outwardly presents no special danger. This led to a slackening of attention toward this area on the part of the Afghan government, which assumed that there would be no sudden changes in Kunduz, Takhar, and Badakhshan provinces after the withdrawal of Soviet troops. Therefore the defense of government positions in these provinces was mainly entrusted to subunits of MVD, MGB, territorial defense, and ROTA formations and only the airfield in Kunduz was taken under guard by the 75th Regiment of the 20th Infantry Division of the Afghan army. In spite of our recommendations the Afghans did not take comprehensive measures to reinforce the army units of the garrisons of provincial capitals and organize reliable security and defense for them, which were significantly weakened after the withdrawal of Soviet troops, and also reinforce the Defense Councils of these provinces with strong-willed, decisive, militarily-trained officials.

As the course of subsequent events showed the underestimation of the enemy, the complacency displayed at all levels, treachery, and the low morale of government forces, as well as a reevaluation of their capabilities led to Kunduz, Takhar, Taloqan, and Khanabad being surrendered to the rebels actually without a battle. The Defense Councils of these provinces displayed confusion and showed their complete incapability of carrying out the missions assigned to them. From the beginning subunits of the MGB, MVD, and the territorial troops made no attempt at resistance. One of their units partially went over to the rebels and another, which had abandoned their weapons and equipment, left for the airfield under the protection of the 75th Infantry Regiment of the 20th Infantry Division.

Initially an underestimation of the danger of an increase of rebel activity was also displayed in Kabul and an incomprehensible foot-dragging in the actions of the Afghan leadership was observed. All the recommendations of Soviet representatives were heard out attentively, but no practical actions followed. And only after the capture of the provincial capitals did they take decisive measures in Kabul as a result of which in the final account the situation was restored.

In evaluating the situation in the northeast of the country completely one can draw preliminary conclusions (lessons):

1. The rebels chose the moment to attack very successfully. The government forces had still not managed to take up defensive positions and organize coordination as they should have. The Defense Council did not have the experience of organizing combat operations and did not have the skills of command and control of troops.

2. The enemy attack on Kunduz and Taloqan were a complete surprise to the Afghan leadership. Even when the organizational nucleus in Khanabad was destroyed no one could dream that the rebels would attack Kunduz.

3. The leaders of the so-called "second echelon" of the leadership of the armed opposition are involved in a struggle for power in Afghanistan. The particular "surprise" in stepping up combat operations by the rebels is connected with the personal plans of the most important of the IOAP leaders operating on RA territory, Ahmad Shah Masoud, who is pursuing a political policy largely independent of the "Alliance-7" leadership in Pakistan.

4. The counterrevolutionaries, in spite of the conflicts and differences between the group commanders of various party affiliations, can join together on the basis of personal contacts and agreements to carry out actions against government forces.

5. Using the disunity and differences in provincial Party and government bodies, long before the attack the enemy conducted preliminary conditioning of the Party and government bureaucracy, personnel of Armed Forces subunits, and the population, which assured their success to a large degree.

6. A comprehensive study of the enemy and an increase in reconnaissance requirements will permit "surprise" deteriorations in the situation to be precluded in the future.

7. Radical measures are needed to increase the morale and fighting spirit of the Armed Forces, especially the MVD and MGB subunits. Combat training, political and educational work, and material supply of the troops needs to be organized in a regular manner.

8. An additional reinforcement by army units is necessary to hold liberated provinces; otherwise the enemy will seize them again.

9. The Defense Councils of the provinces in key regions of the country should be headed by people who have military training and are capable of commanding the defense of administrative centers (as was done, for example, in Kandahar).

10. Under the influence of rebel propaganda the population initially greeted them as heroes, but after they began plundering they turned all the residents against them and therefore could not hold populations centers for long. It is advisable to use this fact in the [government's] agitprop work.

11. Carrying out deterrent actions in the provinces bordering the Soviet Union could be viewed as an attempt by certain forces to delay the withdrawal of Soviet troops and tie them up in the process of internal political settlement for a long time.

12. When planning and organizing the defense of provincial capitals special attention needs to be devoted to airfields (where they exist), since the aid which central authority could give to restore the situation in case of a rebel attack depends on their tenacity.

13. Considering the decisive role which the troops brought in by air from Kabul played in the liberation of Kunduz, it is advisable to have "quick reaction" units as a reserve of the Supreme High Command...

Varennikov

September 1988

[Source: A. A. Lyakhovskiy's "Tragediya i Doblest' Afgana" ("Tragedy and Valor of the Afghanistan Veteran")", Iskon, Moscow, 1995; Translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg]

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[pp. 425-26]

REPORT FROM KABUL

(Secret)

The condition of the Armed Forces of the RA

At the present time the total strength of the Armed Forces is about 300,000 men and consists of three branches: the Ministry of Defense – about 132,000 men, the Ministry of Internal Affairs – 100,000 men; and the Ministry of State Security – up to 80,000 men, including the Special Guard of 11,500 men. All branches of the VS are equipped with modern combat equipment and weapons. They are trained and have combat experience.

However for a number of reasons the RA VS can not right now completely use their available potential and therefore are forced to mainly wage defensive combat.

The main reasons for the insufficient combat effectiveness are: the low manning level of combat units associated with poor conscription work, an undiminishing desertion rate, poor fighting spirit and morale, and also a reluctance of a considerable part of the servicemen to wage armed combat against the counterrevolutionaries.

The manning levels are: army – 50%, MVD – 60%, and MGB – 70.5%.

...Regarding several characteristic features of the branches of the Armed Forces.

The Afghan army (Ministry of Defense)

It consists of ground forces, air forces and air defense forces, border troops, civil defense formations, military training institutions, and logistical units and institutions. The primary control organ of the armed forces is the General Staff.

The ground forces are the basis of the army, comprising four army corps, and centrally subordinate formations and units.

The Ministry of State Security

The organs and combat units of the MGB consist of operational battalions, operational companies and platoons, and also the Special Guard of the President. The main efforts of the MGB are concentrated on:

- military intelligence and counterintelligence work;
- timely identification and elimination of the counterrevolutionary underground;
- waging combat operations jointly with army units using the personnel of operational subunits;
- providing security to the higher organs of power. In addition, MGB units and subunits are used at several security posts and to escort vehicle columns.

A Special Guard has been created from the MGB using the best officers, sergeants, and soldiers of the army; it is specially provided with the highest conditions of material and financial support. This is positively reflected in the overall condition of the Guard and it compares favorably with the line units of the arm, MVD, and MGB, especially in their reliability.

Recently the units of the Guard have been more actively operating in battles with the irreconcilable opposition (Kunduz, Maydanshahr, Kandahar, and carrying out a sweep around Kabul).

The Ministry of Internal Affairs

It consists of operational, territorial, and tribal forces, public order subunits, and also special services.

The Ministry ensures public security and order in the country, the protection of government, public, and private property, the defense of the rights and interests of citizens, the investigation and timely identification of crimes, etc.

The most mobile, well-equipped, and trained component of the MVD is the Main Directorate of Defenders of the Revolution.

The main types of equipment and weapons of the MVD are supplied at a 60-70% level, but small arms [are supplied] at a level of more than 100%.

The morale and fighting spirit of MVD personnel is not at a high level, as a consequence of which the subunits often display low reliability in combat with counterrevolutionaries. There are many cases of desertion and treason in the MVD.

...As a whole the RA Armed Forces have everything necessary and are capable of defending the democratic regime if they wish...

N. Yegorychev, V. Varennikov, V. Zaytsev, M. Sotskov, V. Yegorov

September 1988

[Source: A. A. Lyakhovskiy's "Tragediya i Doblest' Afgana" ("Tragedy and Valor of the Afghanistan Veteran"), Iskon, Moscow, 1995; Translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg]

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[pp. 455-56 September 1988 Varennikov report to Yazov]:

REPORT FROM KABUL

(Secret)

to the USSR Minister of Defense

General of the Army Cde. D. T. Yazov

I report.

... On 4 September I met with the RA President at the HQ of the USSR MO Operations Group at his insistent request. During the conversation Najibullah said: "enemies are spreading rumors that the President is undervaluing the aid given by the 40th Army and that he says that Soviet troops are avoiding combat operations and not giving real support to the RA armed forces. On the contrary, the leadership of Afghanistan is now making insistent efforts to halt the withdrawal of Soviet troops in response to violations of the Geneva Accords by the US and Pakistan, having thereby created conditions to prevent the elimination of the gains of the April Revolution..."

In our view the troops of the 40th Army are not to remain in Afghanistan on any account. This step will bring nothing but harm. Damage which is difficult to predict will be inflicted on the Soviet Union internationally and domestically...

Varennikov

September 1988

[Source: A. A. Lyakhovskiy's "Plamya Afgana" ("Flame of the Afghanistan veteran"), Iskon, Moscow, 1999; Translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg]

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[pp. 456-57 [[Fall 1988 from source context]] assessment of the withdrawal by
the 40th Army command]:

... 1. If Soviet troops remain on Afghan territory after the announced withdrawal deadline the indicated chiefs of rebel groups will unleash active combat operations against the OKSV. The possibility ought not to be excluded that they will combine for large-scale joint operations. In addition, IPA handbills being distributed in Parwan province contain calls to step up combat operations against Soviet troops if the withdrawal drags on until the end of winter.

2. A change in the deadline for the withdrawal of the OKSV would unavoidably lead to a renewal of combat operations against IOAP rebels. Launching BShU [bombing and strafing attacks] and ON [artillery strikes] on a group's location could cause considerable casualties among civilians. It would unavoidably become a cause of an increase in rebel activity in areas of Afghanistan bordering the USSR and cause a renewal of combat operations along the Kabul-Hayraton lines of communication.

3. Pushing back the withdrawal of the OKSV would exacerbate the problem of Afghan refugees in Pakistan and Iran even more. The Pakistani and Iranian authorities would have a convincing excuse to completely close the border with Afghanistan, preventing them from returning to their homeland. While the documents signed in Geneva have special importance in the opinion of a majority of Afghans both in the country and abroad, it is in the withdrawal of Soviet troops that the refugees have an opportunity to return to their homeland.

4. A broad stratum of Afghan workers associate the withdrawal of the OKSV with the end of the war and a return to a peaceful life. A violation of the Geneva Accords caused by a delay in the withdrawal of Soviet troops would undermine the authority of the government even more (this would also not be understood by the personnel of the formations and units of the OKSV)...

[Source: A. A. Lyakhovskiy's "Plamya Afgana" ("Flame of the Afghanistan veteran"), Iskon, Moscow, 1999; Translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg]

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[pp. 458-59]

The Likelihood of the Development of the Military-Political Situation in the Republic of Afghanistan After the Withdrawal of the OKSV

(from a written report to the USSR MO leadership)

The military-political situation in Afghanistan considering the conclusion of the withdrawal of Soviet troops is becoming complex, in spite of the signing of the Geneva Accords.

It is necessary to prepare for a worse development of the situation. The irreconcilable part of the opposition is not ceasing armed resistance. It is stepping up its efforts in a struggle for power. Groups are also intensifying [their] activity, the basis for whose existence is not political struggle but banditry...

The practical steps of the irreconcilable opposition after the withdrawal of Soviet troops might be as follows:

- increase the activity of the agent network inside the Party and government bureaucracy (subverting it from within), including in the armed forces;
- concentration of main efforts on the most important objectives – the capital, provincial capitals, airfields, hydroelectric stations, and the main thing, the Kabul-Hayraton highway (cutting it will be equivalent to blockading Kabul);
- transfer of the entire "government" to RA territory and taking measures to get it recognized by the West and the US as the transitional government.

... The policy of national reconciliation announced by the RA government is the only real way to achieve peace in the country.

... Considering that the Afghan armed forces are in condition to independently resist armed pressure of the opposition only when they are constituted as large units, we recommended that the Afghan leadership concentrate formations and units at the most important axes and facilities as much as possible. Practical measures have begun.

We think that this will give [them] the possibility of the guaranteed retention of Kabul, Herat, Kandahar, Gardez, Jalalabad, Khowst, and the Kabul-Hayraton highway.

At the same time measures are being taken to liquidate small garrisons before the withdrawal of Soviet troops so as not to lose them and given the rebels a cause to celebrate a victory.

The leadership of the country has finally understood the importance of carrying out measures to consolidate its power in Kabul and in the provinces. Organizational work has begun in the field – the strengthening of nationhood and the approval of provincial “fives [pyaterki]”. Elections to local councils and the National Assembly have been held, but everything is being done slowly. It is obvious that the Afghan leadership hoped until recently that the Soviet troops would still not leave. It is hard to find another explanation for the passivity of the leadership at all level...

... In spite of our repeated recommendations an unjustified overemphasis on the leading role of the PDPA in everything continues to occur (especially at the provincial level). But the multi-party system introduced in the country is not being taken into consideration in full measure. The government administrative bureaucracy does not have sufficient authority and is playing a secondary role for now.

The PDPA still has the previous diseases (factionalism, etc.), while they are not displayed blatantly. However there is a real danger of internecine warfare breaking out (even as far as armed conflict) on the basis of factional differences, tribal and ethnic attitudes, and blood feuds.

A bloc of leftist parties is being formed. However their hopes are few – they have missed the boat.

Source of information: The USSR MO Operations Group in the RA, Kabul

October 1988

[Source: A. A. Lyakhovskiy's "Tragediya i Doblest' Afgana" ("Tragedy and Valor of the Afghanistan Veteran"), Iskon, Moscow, 1995; Translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg]

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[pp. 492-93 October 1988 MID, MO, and KGB report]:

(Secret)

On 4 October we met with RA President and General Secretary of the CC PDPA Najibullah.

...During the discussion of urgent domestic political problems we noted that the time had come now for active operations by each one of us. Something has already been undertaken – letters to Ahmad Shah and also the dispatch of RA government and USSR KGB representatives to Hazarajat.

The Soviet Ambassador expressed readiness to personally contact Ahmad Shah, if required, keeping in mind that the Soviet Ambassador does not have the burden of the past and is free in his contacts with the opposition.

...President Najibullah noted that... there is little time left, the four remaining months need to be used as if it were four years; therefore we need to follow the principle of military-political specificity; that is, proceeding from the situation on-site, employing force or negotiating and compromising. The key object of employing this policy, in his opinion, is the situation with Ahmad Shah. Only after deciding the issue with Ahmad Shah can the security of the highway be ensured...

N. Yegorychev (MID), V. Varennikov (MO), V. Zaytsev (KGB)

October 1988

[Source: A. A. Lyakhovskiy's "Plamya Afgana" ("Flame of the Afghanistan veteran)", Iskón, Moscow, 1999; Translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg]

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[pp. 429-30 October 1988 report to Varennikov from General-Major
Serebrov about military-political matters in the DRA]

(Secret)

to General of the Army
Cde. V. I. Varennikov

I report.

...At your instruction on 22.10.88 I had meetings with the RA Minister of Defense, General-Colonel Shah Nawaz Tanay, and the Chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Army, Lieutenant General Ziyarmal'. The object was to determine the opinion of the RA Ministry of Defense leadership about the results of the XXVI Plenum of the CC PDPA held on 19 October.

General-Colonel Shah Nawaz Tanay was extremely reticent in his evaluations. He tried to avoid sharp questions. He said that he completely and fully agrees with the conclusions of the Chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Army and recommended that I talk with him. At the same time he admitted that he voted against the removal of Zeray and Zukhur from the Politburo since the arguments advanced against them were unconvincing. "We have such people in the Politburo such as, for example, Keshtmand and others, who have not been working for a long time and only occupy an honorary position but no one raises any questions about them for some reason", said Tanay. Regarding Zukhur, he added that six months ago we first put him in as a candidate member and then as a member of the Politburo; he is a young and energetic worker and now we are depriving him of his posts only because he became unsuitable to someone (it is characteristic that the Khalqi Shah Nawaz showed caution about the Parchamist Zukhur).

As the conversation continued we discussed the unfolding military and political situation in Afghanistan. In the opinion of the Minister of Defense, it worsens with every day but the government has fewer and fewer forces to combat the enemy. The conscription zone for military service is narrowing and because of this the formations and units of all branches of the RA VS are smaller. On this basis he drew the conclusion that we are doomed to constantly be on the defensive, which will become less and less active. Regarding the protection and defense of the Kabul-Hayraton lines of communications, he noted that the measures proposed by the government would not give the desired results, again because of the weakness of the troops. The MYD and MGB units also will not cope with the missions entrusted to them as has repeatedly been the case in the past. Shah Nawaz Tanay tried to convince me that the only way out was to come to an agreement with Ahmad Shah Masoud as quickly as possible,

but if he is deceptive and stalls (indeed he does not want an agreement), Soviet troops need to force him to do this.

At the end of the conversation he passed the thought that "Ahmad Shah does not have the great influence which is ascribed to him. The majority of Afghans will never accept and support him. He has only Panjshir and the population of the southern part of Badakhshan, Takhar, and Kunduz. But we are forced to seek a compromise with him since we are vitally interested in the Kabul-Hayraton road. And to do this before the withdrawal of the OKSV since then he will not seek any compromise".

The Chief of the Main Political Directorate, Lieutenant General Ziyarmal', was more open and did not conceal his great concern at the results of the October plenum of the CC PDPA. In particular, he noted that, "In the last 2-3 years the situation in the Party's leadership has developed in favor of people who, occupying a high position, can permit themselves any misuse of power and factionalism and suffer no punishment for this".

Great damage was also inflicted in the past by the existing opinion of a majority of Politburo members that all issues should be decided only unanimously; otherwise they could not be submitted for discussion of the CC.

In this sense the CC PDPA October plenum became a good exception...

Ziyarmal' noted that the President's power extends only to the MGB; the MVD and the army are out of his control. As regards the decisions of the CC PDPA plenum, they did not strengthen the unity of the ranks but on the contrary introduced still more discord into the Party.

In reply to a question about why there was no discussion at the plenum about the main issue, Ziyarmal' replied, "Understand, there has never been a battle of views and ideas in our Party. There was and remains a battle for posts. Therefore discussions simply were not necessary. All proposals expressed in the President's report about the main issue were adopted unanimously and approved during the voting".

As regards the President Ziyarmal' made the following critical comment, "Our President and General Secretary has outgrown the Party. He is leading like he is dealing with a Party of a more civilized society. But we are the East. It demands observance of traditions and personal contacts with CC members. Unfortunately, this is not the case".

I report this for your decision.

23 October 1988. General-Major Serebrov

[Translator's note: according to an Internet source Serebrov was Varennikov's political officer]

[Author's note:] On this written report the head of the USSR MO Operations Group made the notation, "Please report [this] to Cdes. Yu. M. Vorontsov and V. P. Zaytsev".

[Source: A. A. Lyakhovskiy's "Tragediya i Doblest' Afgana" ("Tragedy and Valor of the Afghanistan Veteran)", Iskon, Moscow, 1995; Translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg]

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[p. 492 Autumn 1988 unspecified Soviet report of meetings between members of the Operations Group and rebels in the South Salang]

In our view... [we] ought to step up efforts to establish contacts with A. Shah to assure [our] prospects. It is inadvisable to get involved in combat operations with him. Our troops could end up in an extremely serious situation if they suffer large losses, are forced or stay for a long period, or are evacuated by air from regions located to the south of the Salang [Pass] since ground communications will be cut off.

Moreover, to conduct a large-scale operation against A. Shah would require an additional introduction of troops from the Soviet Union; one cannot be conducted with the forces which remain. But this would lead to an escalation of combat operations with all ensuing consequences...

[Source: A. A. Lyakhovskiy's "Plamy Afgana" ("Flame of the Afghanistan veteran)", Iskon, Moscow, 1999; Translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg]

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[pp. 439-40]

REFERENCE DOCUMENT

The Status of Shipments to Kabul and Conditions at the Hayraton Base as of 1.11.1988

(received by the Soviet ambassador and MO Operations Group in the RA)

The situation with the delivery of freight to Afghanistan by rail continues to worsen. The situation developing at the Hayraton [railroad] station is especially strained, where on 17 October more than 570 freight cars had accumulated, including 150 cars with wheat and other foodstuffs. Several cars with crockery, footwear, etc. have been sitting idle since 1987. Such a situation in Hayraton in turn entails an accumulation of rolling stock with Afghan freight at the Termez junction of the Central Asian railroad where at the present time there are already more than 1100 cars with freight given by Soviet republics and oblasts in connection with free aid to Afghanistan.

The main reason for such a situation is the practically complete cessation of shipments in the direction of Kabul caused by an acute shortage of vehicles, the lack of which by "AFSOTRA" as of today amounts to 75-80%. Another aspect slowing down shipments to Kabul is the poor security of the columns being formed which do not give a complete guarantee of their safe passage along the entire Hayraton-Kabul route.

[Translator's note: An Internet source says AFSOTRA is "[[ob'yedineniye]] *Afgansko-Sovetskoye sotrudnichestvo*" ["Afghanistan-Soviet Cooperation [[Association]]"]]

The amount of storage space at the Hayraton station has already been completely used.

The current situation negatively affects the operation of the bridge crossing, reduces the traffic capacity and the flexibility of the Termez junction right before the second stage of the withdrawal of the OKSV, and also inflicts considerable material damage because of the idleness of a large number of RR cars and spoilage of freight.

Source of information: Headquarters of the 40th Army,
Kabul

November 1988

[Source: A. A. Lyakhovskiy's "Tragediya i Doblest' Afgana" ("Tragedy and Valor of the Afghanistan Veteran"), Iskon, Moscow, 1995; Translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg]

MEMO

The Barracks Accommodations of OKSV Garrisons in the RA Which Will Be Transferred to the VS of Afghanistan in the 2nd Stage of the Withdrawal of Soviet Troops

The Soviet troops in Afghanistan were quartered in 179 housing areas (32 garrisons). The value of the barracks accommodations, the communal facilities, the equipment, and the inventory is 699,362,000 rubles. In connection with the partial withdrawal of Soviet troops, as of 10 November 1988 57 housing areas have been handed over to the Afghan armed forces with their barracks accommodations, worth 202,510,000 rubles.

At the present time the military units of the 40th Combined Arms Army are quartered in 122 military housing areas (17 garrisons) and the value of the barracks accommodations is about 497,000,000 rubles, including:

Kabul garrison

Twenty-five thousand nine hundred men are quartered in 33 military housing areas (including 3,900 officers; 2,000 warrant officers; 17,700 sergeants and soldiers; and 2,200 white and blue collar workers. Part of them have already left.

The barracks accommodations of these military housing areas consist of 1200 buildings and structures.

Bagram garrison

Nine thousand three hundred men are quartered in 14 military housing areas (including 1,500 officers; 800 warrant officers; 6,200 sergeants and soldiers; and 800 white and blue collar workers. Part of them have already left.

The barracks accommodations of four military housing areas consist of 533 buildings and structures.

Pol-e Khomri

Six thousand seven hundred men are quartered in 25 military housing areas (including 600 officers; 400 warrant officers; 5,200 sergeants and soldiers; and 400 white and blue collar workers. Part of them have already left.

The barracks accommodations of the garrison consist of 376 buildings and structures.

Hayraton

Two thousand six hundred men are quartered in 25 military housing areas (including 200 officers; 200 warrant officers; 2,000 sergeants and soldiers; and 200 white and blue collar workers.

The barracks accommodations consist of 188 buildings and structures.

Charikar

One thousand four hundred men are quartered in one military housing area (including 149 officers; 98 warrant officers; 1095 sergeants and soldiers; and 46 white and blue collar workers.

The barracks accommodations consist of 40 buildings and structures.

Jabal os-Saraj

Two thousand six hundred eighty men are quartered in two military housing areas (including 240 officers; 130 warrant officers; 2200 sergeants and soldiers; and 64 white and blue collar workers.

The barracks accommodations consist of 63 buildings and structures.

Kalawulang

Seventy men are quartered in the garrison (including 5 officers; 5 warrant officers; and 60 soldiers).

The barracks accommodations consist of two structures.

Salang

The garrison houses 95 men and consists of one military housing area which comprises 11 buildings and structures.

Shaul'

The garrison houses 270 men and consists of one military housing area which comprises 33 buildings and structures.

Dushakh

The garrison houses 250 men and consists of one military housing area which comprises 21 buildings and structures.

Chaugani

The garrison houses 980 men (including 90 officers, 50 warrant officers, 800 soldiers, and 12 white and blue collar workers). The military housing area comprises 17 buildings and structures.

Aybak

The garrison houses 150 men and the barracks accommodations consist of 19 buildings and structures.

Tashkurgan

The garrison houses 3000 men (including 240 officers, 150 warrant officers, 2400 soldiers, and 180 white and blue collar workers). The barracks accommodations consist of 42 buildings and structures.

Shindand

The garrison houses 8600 men (including 1200 officers, 600 warrant officers, 6000 soldiers, and 800 white and blue collar workers). Part of them have already left.

The garrison consists of 175 buildings and structures.

Adraskan

The garrison houses 440 men (including 40 officers, 20 warrant officers, 370 soldiers, and 7 white and blue collar workers). The barracks accommodations consist of 22 buildings and structures.

Herat

The garrison houses 2800 men (including 250 officers, 140 warrant officers, 2300 soldiers, and 80 white and blue collar workers). The barracks accommodations consist of 69 buildings and structures.

Towraghondi

The military housing area of the garrison houses 540 men (including 85 officers, 80 warrant officers, 310 soldiers, and 65 white and blue collar workers). The barracks accommodations consist of 42 buildings and structures.

Training of the Maintenance Personnel

To operate and service the communal facilities and engineering systems of the military housing areas being handed over, Soviet instructors and Quartering Operations Unit specialists of the regions have trained 620 personnel of the Afghan Armed Forces at a training center in Kabul, including:

RA MO - 347;
RA MVD - 110;
RA MGB - 163.

At the present time training has begun for personnel [designated] to operate military housing areas being handed over in the second stage of the withdrawal.

Source of information:
Headquarters of the 40th Army, Kabul

November 1988

[Source: A. A. Lyakhovskiy's "Tragediya i Doblest' Afgana" ("Tragedy and Valor of the Afghanistan Veteran"), Iskon, Moscow, 1995; Translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg]

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[pp. 493-94 10 November 1988 Report from Colonel S. Antonenko, Deputy
Commander of the 108th Motorized Infantry Division]:

to the Chief of the USSR Operations Group in the RA,
the Commanding General of the 40th Army, and
the Commander of the 108th Motorized Rifle Division

I report.

The 2nd Infantry Division of the RA armed forces deployed in Jabal os-Saraj is constantly directing unsystematic small-arms, mortar, and rocket-propelled artillery fire on peaceful villages where, according to intelligence, there are no rebels.

Examples of the most intensive shelling: on 27 October 88 rocket-propelled artillery fire was launched on the population center of Tutumdarayi-Ulim (up to 80 missiles were expended) where, according to a report of the elders of the village, many children, old men, and women died in spite of the fact that the situation in the area of the population center of Tutumdarayi-Ulim had been quiet recently and the rebels had not had an effect on columns or guard posts, either Soviet or Afghan.

On 10 November 88 disorderly fire was opened from all kinds of weapons, including rocket-propelled artillery launchers. The following were shelled by small-arms fire: the 36th Guard Post (1 km north of Tajikan), the "Gora-1" and "Mars" remote posts (1.5 km north of Tajikan); by mortars: the 36th Guard Post, the "Zamok" remote post (2 km north of Jabal os-Saraj); from a BM-21 [multi-barrel rocket launcher]: the "Yupiter" and "Stvol" remote posts. Rocket-propelled artillery fire was directed on the Koklami canyon, from where there was no impact on the 2nd Infantry Division.

In reply to our demand to cease fire sent via the advisory staff it was, on the contrary, intensified. As a result 2 Soviet servicemen were wounded. With difficulty we managed to avoid unleashing an armed conflict between the 2nd Infantry Division and Soviet guard posts and mobile posts...

Similar actions by the 2nd Infantry Division became possible because of treachery and a lack of firm control of the division (the commander is General Faruk who spends most of his time in Kabul).

As a rule, the shelling of peaceful villages is done when the commander is in Kabul...

The Division advisory staff which lives on the grounds of a motorized rifle regiment has no influence on the actions of the command of the 2nd Infantry Division...

Please withdraw the 2nd Infantry Division from the area of the entrance to the Salang Pass since it is not performing any combat mission in this area and the acts of its commanders are directed at disrupting...the passage of Soviet and Afghan columns through the Salang [Pass Tunnel].

Colonel Antonenko

10 November 88

[Source: A. A. Lyakhovskiy's "Plamya Afgana" ("Flame of the Afghanistan veteran)", Iskon, Moscow, 1999; Translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg]

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[pp. 443-44 19 November 1988 memo to Najibullah from the RSFSR
Minister of Transport]

MEMORANDUM

To the President of the Republic of Afghanistan, Cde. Najibullah

A routine meeting of the Soviet-Afghan Subcommittee on Transport was held in the period from 14 to 20 November.

The following was noted:

... The transport situation in Afghanistan took a sharp turn for the worse beginning with September 1988. Shipments of freight from Hayraton have been reduced from 4,000 to 1,000-1,200 tons a day. The remaining dry goods in Hayraton exceed 140,000 tons, including more than 40,000 tons of food (wheat, sugar, fats [*zhiry*], and tea). In addition, the oil storage reservoirs at the port of Hayraton (17,400 tons) are completely full. The number of RR cars at the Termez-Hayraton transport junction exceeds 1500.

In the current situation Soviet transport organizations are forced to halt shipments of exported and transit cargo to Afghanistan.

The recommendations of the Soviet side sent in June of this year to the leadership of the Republic of Afghanistan about increasing highway security and also increasing the economic interest of transport enterprises of the government and private sectors are not being implemented.

As a result of this individual sectors of the Hayraton-Kabul highway have come under the control of the opposition, which essentially blocks the delivery of freight to the country's capital.

In the past two months more than 250 trucks have been destroyed on this road in comparison with six for all of 1987. The cargo losses for this same period are estimated at about 900 million Afghanis against 4.8 million for the entire preceding year.

In this regard the problem of supplying Kabul with food and petroleum products has become extremely aggravated. There are practically no reserves of fuel, wheat, flour, sugar, and fats in the city, which could lead to unforeseeable consequences in the near future if urgent, very radical measures are not taken.

In addition and to expand on the measures specified by the 12 November 1988 Working Protocol of the sides concerning transport issues it seems advisable to resolve the following issues without delay:

1. Considering the exceptional nature of the situation, by 1 December create a single service to ensure cargo transport on the Hayraton-Kabul route to be headed by a Chief of the Road, giving him extraordinary powers...

3. In order to more widely involve the local population in security and provide protection along the route, grant the Chief of the Road the right to give local authorities part of the food and the consumer goods coming into the free aid account.

4. In order to search for a compromise and a settlement of conflict situations arising when transporting cargo, grant the Chief of the Road the right to enter into contact with the leadership of opposition groups and give them part of the free cargo for use in the regions which they control...

5. Taking into account the considerable volume of goods designated for delivery to the account for humanitarian and economic aid to Afghanistan through UN channels, hold talks in Kabul in the first half of December with representatives of the coordinator of these programs about organizing shipments of this cargo under the UN flag...

... In sending the above recommendations for your consideration, we express the hope that their implementation will help improve the transport situation on the Kabul-Hayraton highway.

Respectfully,

Yu. Sukhin

19.11.1988

[Source: A. A. Lyakhovskiy's "Tragediya i Doblest' Afgana" ("Tragedy and Valor of the Afghanistan Veteran"), Iskon, Moscow, 1995; Translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg]

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[pp. 494-95 [[November 88] Issues for discussions with Masoud [from author's
"archive"]]

LETTER

Issues for discussion with Ahmad Shah

1. The creation of a Tajik autonomous region [*avtonomiya*] within the framework of a united Afghanistan based on areas where Tajiks live, including territory from the provinces of Badakhshan, Takhar, Baghlan, and parts of Parwan and Kapisa, and also the forms of self-government of this region.
2. The representation of Tajiks and specific posts in the president's staff, the National Council, and the Cabinet of Ministers of Afghanistan.
3. Official recognition of the IOA Party as an independent party of Afghanistan with equal rights.
4. Creation of regular troops of the Tajik autonomous region based on IOA formations, including them in the RA armed forces. The missions of these troops are to be decided in both ethnic and the national interests, including security for the Hayraton-Kabul route.
5. The establishment of peace within the Tajik autonomous region and the creation of conditions for the restoration of normal life for its population.
6. Questions of the economic development of the northeastern region. Assistance from the government of Afghanistan in this area and also comprehensive aid, including economic and financial aid.
7. The establishment of direct trade, economic, and cultural ties between the Tajik SSR and the RA Tajik autonomous region in the interests of acquiring economic, medical, and other aid, and also the development of border trade.

The issues which I have sent have been coordinated with the Soviet Ambassador to Afghanistan, Yu. V. Vorontsov, and General of the Army V. I. Varennikov, who, in turn, have coordinated these issues with the leadership of the Republic.

Adviser [a GRU officer who maintained contact with Ahmad Shah operated under this pseudonym – *author's note*]

[Source: A. A. Lyakhovskiy's "Plamy Afgana" ("Flame of the Afghanistan veteran)", Iskon, Moscow, 1999; Translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg]

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[pp. 496-97 Draft agreement for Masoud [[from author's "archive"]]:

Being guided by goodwill and the desire to secure peace in Afghanistan the contracting parties have signed this protocol in accordance with which they take upon themselves the following obligations:

1. To completely cease combat operations in the Southern Salang and other regions adjoining the Kabul-Hayraton highway, including shelling places where IOA groups and detachments are located, villages, guard posts, and the posts of Soviet and Afghan troops, the MGB, and the *tsarandoy* by any manner of weapon.
2. In order to prevent shelling, robberies, and other acts against Soviet and Afghan columns and solitary transport equipment, the armed detachments of Panjshir will take upon themselves the responsibility for the security of the lines of communications in the sector from Tajikistan to Chaugani.
3. To support the population of Panjshir and the areas adjoining the above sector of the highway the Soviet side is obliged to deliver the necessary amount of food, essential goods, and other material resources at dates agreed to between the parties by mutual arrangement.
4. Not to permit detachments or groups of other parties to enter the agreed area in order to shell Soviet and Afghan columns, commit acts of terrorism, or sabotage the pipeline. If attempts are made by the armed forces of other parties to carry out these acts the Soviet side expresses readiness to help the Panjshir detachments with artillery and air support at their request.
5. To exchange information and undertake joint efforts to search for missing Soviet and Afghan citizens in the agreed area.
6. In the event of a sudden worsening of the situation to hold meetings with the purpose of mutual consultations to prevent the renewal of combat operations in the interest of preserving peace in the agreed zone.
7. This protocol applies to the territory adjoining the Tajikan-Chaugani line of communications (30 km from both sides).

Beyond this area Soviet troops and the armed detachments of the Panjshir have the right to conduct operations to liquidate the armed detachments and groups belonging to any party without ceasing armed combat against the contracting parties.
8. This protocol enters into force from the moment of signing.

[Source: A. A. Lyakhovskiy's "Plamya Afgana" ("Flame of the Afghanistan veteran)", Iskon, Moscow, 1999; Translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg]

NOTE

The number of rebel groups which have come over to the side of the government and entered into negotiations

Zone, province	Crossed over to the government side		Entered into negotiations	
	Groups	rebels	groups	Rebels
Kabul Zone	6	213	7	150
Provinces:				
Bamian	-	-	3	130
Parwan	3	28	18	654
Kapisa	-	-	6	318
Takhar	6	454	-	-
Kunduz	1	60	-	-
Baghlan	11	1692	8	305
Badakhshan	5	115	-	-
Kunar	7	395	7	900
Nangarhar	10	344	25	454
Laghman	5	149	1	38
Ghazni	4	420	4	295
Paktia	-	-	-	-
Paktika	1	350	-	-
Zabol	1	250	1	30
Helmand	7	184	6	215
Kandahar	1	150	5	685
Uruzgan	-	-	-	-
Nimruz	3	135	-	-
Farah	9	567	10	567
Herat	55	5555	10	1720
Ghowr	2	92	4	1580
Badghis	4	131	2	1300
Faryab	14	5947	16	735
Balkh	1	70	14	700
Jowzjan	16	1247	6	315
Samangan	-	-	4	94
Sar-e Pol	-	-	-	-
Khowst District	1	14	6	305
TOTAL	173	14 [SIC]	163	11533

Sources of information: headquarters of the 40th Army and the staff of the Chief Military Adviser in Afghanistan, Kabul, 30 November 1988

[Translator's note: For some reason, this is not a complete list of Afghanistan's 32 provinces]

[Source: A. A. Lyakhovskiy's "Tragediya i Doblest' Afgana" ("Tragedy and Valor of the Afghanistan Veteran)", Iskon, Moscow, 1995; Translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg]

(Secret)

Counterrevolutionary forces on Afghan territory

The strength of the armed detachments of the opposition operating on RA territory remains at a fairly high level. At the end of 1988 the total strength of the rebel formations was 4500 detachments and groups and 173,000 rebels, of which 1920 detachments with a strength of up to 82,3000 rebels are the most active.

The rebel formations' weapons are chiefly small arms, anti-personnel and anti-tank mines, light artillery mortar and anti-aircraft equipment, the weight and size of which allow them to be transported in small trucks, pack animals, or carried by hand.

During 1987 and 1988, in spite of the losses suffered during armed combat with government troops the counterrevolutionaries managed to increase the equipment level of their formations. Thus, at the present time the rebel formations have: 692 PZRK, 1020 PURS, 28 PTRK [anti-tank missiles launchers], 86 GP [mountain guns], 1440 BO, 2780 MNT [mortars], 770 ZGU, 64050 DShK, and 10140 RPG [Translator's note: here the author expands some of the above abbreviations]

For military training the rebels continue to use a network of specially created training centers and militarized camps in which recruits are trained in the means and methods of armed combat and develop skills in the use of various weaponry under the supervision of foreign instructors and specialists.

A new aspect in the activity of opposition leaders is their striving to implement a program of forming so-called Islamic regiments which were developed under pressure and with the assistance of the US, Pakistan, and other countries which are financing the activity of antigovernment forces. Its main goals are the simplification of the organizational structure of rebel formations and an increase on this basis of the effectiveness of their actions against the OKSV and the Afghan army. In addition, in the estimation of the counterrevolutionary leaders and the representatives of Western countries working with them, the creation of the regiments approximating regular army units in their organization should facilitate a growth in the prestige of the rebel forces in the international arena and ensure them a future influx of financial, military, and other aid. The opposition leadership is counting on using them in the future to implement the idea [they] are harboring, the creation of a so-called united Islamic army, which could become the primary instrument in the matter of struggling for power after the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan.

The Afghan counterrevolutionaries have already formed 62 regiments, 22 of them on Pakistani territory; the rest are mainly in the areas bordering Pakistan (Kandahar, Paktia, Paktika, Nangarhar, Kunar, and Zabol) and several other provinces (Herat and Baghlan). Each counterrevolutionary organization thereby has its own regiments. Thus the IPA has 40, the IOA, 14, etc. There have been noted instances of attempts to create regiments which include detachments and groups of different party affiliations.

The armed formations of a regimental type on Afghan territory are being created from several groups and detachments along territorial and tribal [*rodoplemennoy*] lines. Such regiments have their own clearly defined zones of responsibility. Each of them consists of a regimental headquarters, three 3-company battalions, and several auxiliary subunits, including fire preparation and anti-aircraft [subunits].

The regiments formed on Afghan territory, according to the intent of the leaders of the counterrevolutionary groups, should in time become the primary organizational and combat units of rebel forces in the areas of their responsibility. Each such regiment is directly subordinate to its organization and maintains radio communications with its headquarters in Pakistan.

The regiments deployed on Pakistani territory are used to form and transfer detachments and groups of rebels and also as transshipment bases for the rapid transfer of weapons, ammunition, and supply materials to Afghanistan. The combat battalions of the regiments are enlisted to participate in rebel combat operations in border regions of the RA. Military storehouses are constructed at the regiments' deployment sites.

There are 172 primary rebel facilities on Afghan territory, including 14 base areas [*bazovyye rayony*], 4 transshipment bases, 9 transshipment points, and 145 basing areas [*rayony bazirovaniya*]. The largest number of facilities are located in the northeastern, central, and southern provinces and in the Kabul zone.

Intensive construction of approximately 110 new facilities, primarily OPBR (weapons and ammunition) storehouses, is underway in the border areas of the Northwest Frontier Province (in the territory where the Pushtun tribes live) and also in central mountainous regions of the RA.

The greatest intensity in the subversive activity of rebel formations is being displayed in the provinces of Kabul, Takhar, Badakhshan, Parwan, Kapisa, Wardak, Kunar, Nangarhar, Paktia, Ghazni, Kandahar, and the district of Khowst, and on the main highways of the country, where about 70% of the total rebel strength is concentrated.

In spite of the signing of the Geneva Accords, the US and Pakistan continue to supply the opposition with everything necessary to conduct subversive activity on Afghan territory. In October 1988 alone the passage of more than 100 caravans from Iran and Pakistan with OBPR was noted.

Since May 1988 about 21,700 men have been transferred from Iran and Pakistan to replenish losses and reinforce groups (May – 9,500; June – 2,300; July – 3,400; August – 2,500; September – 1,600; October 2,400).

From the moment the withdrawal of Soviet troops began (15.05.1988) the territory controlled by the government has begun to shrink. The provinces of Bamian, Paktika, and Kunar are completely under rebel control. Of 30,191 villages the government controls about 8,500 (28%), 22 provincial capitals and the city of Khowst, 39 districts and rural districts, 91 district and rural district centers (of 290).

Sources of information: the RA MGB, the RA GSh VS Intelligence Directorate, the headquarters of the 40th Army, the USSR KGB, the USSR GSh VS GRU, Kabul

November 1988

[Source: A. A. Lyakhovskiy's "Tragediya i Doblest' Afgana" ("Tragedy and Valor of the Afghanistan Veteran")", Iskon, Moscow, 1995; Translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg]

(Secret)

On the Situation in Afghanistan

The military-political situation in Afghanistan has a tendency toward further deterioration and exacerbation.

...The RA leadership is implementing measures of a military-political nature within the framework of the policy of national reconciliation to counter the extremist part of the opposition. The process of the transformation of a single-party regime into a multi-party one and the restructuring of the state political structure of the country on the basis of political pluralism and coalition rule continue. Of course, to successfully carry out the policy of national reconciliation Najibullah's regime should ensure, from a position of strength, not of weakness, that the most irreconcilable opposition factions are driven back which, relying on the aid and support of Pakistan and the US, are rejecting peace initiatives of the Afghan government to reach compromise agreements and are increasing military pressure on government positions in a majority of provinces of the country.

At the present time the rebels control four of the 32 provinces of the country (Takhar, Bamian, Paktika, and Kunar), and have sealed off the provincial capitals of Kapisa, Wardak, Laghman, Uruzgan, and Ghazni. Rebel activities in the provinces of Herat, Farah, and Nimruz, which border Iran, have recently been stepped up.

The rebels are whipping up tension and trying to undermine the population's faith in the viability of the current regime by increasing the shelling of administrative centers, military and civilian facilities and attacking them; sealing off roads and seizing automobile convoys with freight; penetrating the Party and government bureaucracy and the RA Armed Forces to demoralize them from within; and disrupting VS conscription and increasing desertion.

Along with the incitement of malicious activity by the rebels in the central provinces of Kabul and Parwan, the armed opposition has recently increased attempts at setting up an economic blockade of the capital. The rebels are trying to impede the delivery here of freight to here via the roads from Soviet-Afghan border to Kabul and [from] Kabul to Jalalabad and to interrupt the power supply of the Afghan capital.

...Against the background of a systematic increase of activity by the armed opposition, with the start of the withdrawal of the OKSV from Afghanistan the passivity and declining morale of the RA Armed Forces have become distinctly clear, which has found its reflection in their incapability in many

instances of organizing effective resistance to the rebels. The events in the provinces of Kunduz, Takhar, Baghlan, and Kandahar (the capture of areas south of Kandahar, including the population center of Spin Buldak) are witness to this. The Afghan military leadership has not taken decisive and effective measures to increase the level of military, psychological, and morale reliability of the Armed Forces. The capabilities of existing training centers and courses for the training of military specialists are being poorly used. This negatively reflects on departmental attitudes and the lack of coordination of the activity of the military ministries.

The remaining partisan and factional differences in the PDPA leadership, which, although some were muted after the recent CC PDPA plenum, have not yet permanently removed and are also leaving a serious negative imprint on the political morale and military condition of the RA Armed Forces.

... Many representatives of the Party and state bureaucracy in the provinces [*na mestakh*] are all the more often taking passive, temporizing positions, ignoring orders and demands coming from Kabul to strengthen government positions and implement the policy of national reconciliation, and in a number of cases, under the influence of demoralizing propaganda, are entering into deals with the opposition to capitulate to ensure their personal security.

... The measures recently carried out to reorganize the governmental structure of Afghanistan in accordance with the principles of coalition government and a multi-party system have not yet had a serious stabilizing influence on the domestic political situation. The activity of the government of M. H. Sharq to a certain degree is hampered by the CC PDPA staff, but governors without party affiliation among local authoritative figures, for example, in Nangarhar province, [are being hampered] by the heads of several PDPA provincial committees. The national council (parliament) of Afghanistan, the majority of whose members are without party affiliation (more than 70%), are still pursuing a waiting game and not seriously looking for ways to more actively transform the policy of national reconciliation into reality, although they have declared it to be their main task. The activity of the bloc of leftist democratic parties as before does not go beyond the bounds of formal episodic meetings of their representatives and declarations of support for the policy of national reconciliation.

Taking the above into account, Soviet military aid continues to remain the most important stabilizing factor in the development of the situation in Afghanistan and largely thanks to it the armed opposition has not managed to seize key positions in the country, in spite of their efforts.

... Objectively, the present RA regime has considerable military and political potential (superior to the forces of the opposition). The task of the leadership of our Afghan friends is to ensure its maximum effective use. Special

attention in this regard needs to be paid to organizing political propaganda work by all RA organizations...

Yu. Vorontsov, V. Varennikov, V. Zaytsev, V. Yegorov

November 1988

[Source: A. A. Lyakhovskiy's "Tragediya i Doblest' Afgana" ("Tragedy and Valor of the Afghanistan Veteran"), Iskon, Moscow, 1995; Translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg]

NOTE

Soviet Military Advisers in Afghanistan

As of 1 January 1988 1007 Soviet military specialists (SVS) were working in the Afghan army, including 694 advisers.

The SVS have been withdrawn as the formations and units of the 40th Army left VS RA military housing areas for Kabul. They have subsequently been sent back to the Soviet Union.

During June to October of this year the advisory collectives were withdrawn from the 7th, 9th, 11th, 12th, 14th, 15th, 21st pd, the 7th tbr [tank brigade], the aviation units of the Kandahar garrison, and the headquarters of the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th AK. The corresponding posts in the Kabul garrison have been reduced to a certain limit. As a whole the advisory staff has been reduced to 498 men during the first stage of the withdrawal of the 40th Army.

At the present time there are 509 military advisers and specialists in the Afghan army, including 320 SVS in the Kabul garrison. They work in the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff, centrally-subordinate formations and units, the Afghan Air and Air Defense Forces, and also in the operations groups of the 1st, 2nd, 3rd AK and the 21st pd...

Source of information: the staff of the Chief
Military Adviser in the RA

November 1988

[Source: A. A. Lyakhovskiy's "Tragediya i Doblest' Afgana" ("Tragedy and Valor of the Afghanistan Veteran")", Iskon, Moscow, 1995; Translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg]

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[pp. 483-84 December 1988 Varennikov report of a meeting with the RA
Minister of Defense]

(Secret)

... On 15 December the Minister of Defense of the Republic of Afghanistan General-Colonel Shah Nawaz Tanay met with the Chief of Staff of the staff of the Chief Military Adviser to Afghanistan, General-Lieutenant L. T. Levchenko, with whom he has close relations and informed him of the following, "The Chief of the Main Political Directorate of the army, Lieutenant General Ziyarmal', has insistently expressed to him (Tanay) a desire that the military should raise the issue of an immediate convocation of a Loya Jirga, at which it is necessary for the Minister of Defense, the Chief of the Main Political Directorate, and other military leaders to call for an initiative for the Loya Jirga to appeal to the Soviet Union to leave Soviet troops in Afghanistan for a longer period.

Ziyarmal' raised the issue so that the Soviet military advisers and especially the subunits which protect them would remain in Afghanistan in the largest possible number. Shah Nawaz Tanay noted that these proposals would need to be discussed with the Soviets beforehand.

In our view such actions by Ziyarmal' are not at his personal initiative but express the views and interests of many people among the country's leadership...

Varennikov

December 1988

[Source: A. A. Lyakhovskiy's "Tragediya i Doblest' Afgana" ("Tragedy and Valor of the Afghanistan Veteran")", Iskon, Moscow, 1995; Translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg]

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[pp. 497-98 18 December 1988 proposals to Masoud from "Adviser"] [[from author's "archive"]]:

Dear Mister Ahmad Shah Masoud!

Being guided by goodwill and a desire not to permit renewed armed conflict between RA government troops and Soviet troops on the one hand, and IOAP detachments on the other, the representatives of the Soviet command in Afghanistan have repeatedly sent you letters containing specific proposals about a whole range of issues, including the stabilization of the situation in the zone your troops occupy and, in particular, the Kabul-Hayraton highway in the Kalawulag - Jabal os-Saraj sector.

Inasmuch as the issues are complex and require some time for you to decide, the representatives of the Soviet command have displayed patience. At the same time during this entire period you have let it be known that you are ready to meet. Your assistants have communicated this repeatedly. And the respected ... has talked about this [SIC]. However more than two months have passed. It is not our fault that the meeting has not taken place. Obviously we have the right to regard your actions as a reluctance to meet us halfway. In this regard an opportunity is being lost to discuss all problems in a businesslike atmosphere from the positions of the interests of [both] sides and in the name of the interests of the people of Afghanistan. A situation is beginning to develop where everything achieved during 1987-1988 could be lost. There are no talks and [therefore] no mutual understanding. Under these conditions each [side] acts at its own discretion.

Without touching on other important problems, it is important to note the need to examine one specific issue, providing security for the movement of columns of vehicles along the Kabul-Hayraton highway in the interests of a continuous supply of food and essential goods for the residents of Kabul and many provinces. Some short-sighted people think that it is possible, even necessary, to disrupt shipments and attack the columns. With these acts they bring harm not to individual RA persons, as they think, but to thousands of peaceful residents, including children, women, old men, and people who are sick and weak. With these acts they violate the main provisions of the Holy Quran. That is why Soviet and government troops are forced to strengthen route and column security. At the same time we understand that the food and various goods being delivered as aid by the Soviet Union must be delivered to the people of Afghanistan. Therefore the residents of South Salang and Panjshir also have the same right to it, but can receive it peacefully, without bloodshed.

In connection with this we make the following proposals:

1. During the next week (that is, until 25.12.88) our representative and the representative of government authorities are ready to meet with your authorized representative at the Soviet garrison of Jabal os-Saraj or at another location of your choosing and specifically decide: who, when, where, and how much food and other property are needed. This could be done in full for December and January.

2. If your detachments take upon themselves the responsibility for ensuring the Kalawulag – Jabal os-Saraj sector of the line of communications this needs to be formalized with local authorities and the corresponding protocols signed. The main condition (the obligation) should be a ban on shelling and plundering the columns on the line of communications.

3. If your detachments do not take the above road sector in South Salang under guard we are forced to set up additional Soviet and Afghan posts. It is proposed that while doing so this the peaceful situation be preserved and the establishment of the posts of government troops not be impeded. If disruptions are committed – the posts subjected to shelling - we in turn will be forced to take retaliatory measures and the responsibility for the consequences will be on your people (detachments). It is necessary to keep in mind that similar acts by your formations will be disseminated (made known) in all regions and provinces of the country.

On instructions of the USSR Ambassador Yu. Vorontsov and General of the Army V. Varennikov I request that you show a serious, deliberate approach to the proposals of the Soviet side, including the proposal to hold a meeting.

Adviser
18.12.88

[Source: A. A. Lyakhovskiy's "Plamya Afgana" ("Flame of the Afghanistan veteran"), Iskon, Moscow, 1999; Translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg]

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Marchuk p. 160 RTsKhDS CC CPSU Special Folder 1989 N° P147/5, formulated
as a January 1989 USSR Council of Ministers Instruction: "...to transfer free of
charge to the organs of people's power in the northern provinces of
Afghanistan...military and special equipment, ammunition, and other military and
general civilian equipment totalling up to 6 million rubles in internal Soviet
prices..."

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[pp. 445-46 January 1989 report of food shipments from Hayraton to Kabul]

MEMO

The Shipment of Food from Hayraton to Kabul

... The monthly requirements of Kabul in food are about 33,000 tons (minimum). In November and December of 1988 27,500 tons of food were delivered, half of it by OKSV transport.

In spite of this, the food reserves in Kabul have fallen and that as of 2.01.1989 they were: flour - 1800 tons, rice - 532 tons, fats - 28 tons, sugar - 20 tons, and legumes - 200 tons.

On 3.01.1989 OKSV transport delivered to Kabul 600 tons of flour and 2000 more tons are on the way. About 700 Soviet vehicles are being used at the present time to ship food to the capital.

But the shipment of food products cannot be resolved without sharply increasing the operation of the means of transport of Mintrans [Ministry of Transport], Mintorg, and the RA private sector. Only 800 vehicles with food arrived in Kabul in December 1989 [SIC] (the Mintrans fleet is 2200 vehicles, Mintorg - 1200, and the private sector about 6000), of which 52 vehicles were of the Ministry of Commerce and 50 of the private sector. A considerable amount of the transport arriving in Kabul in December, 1000 a/m [vehicles], brought in secondary freight - cement, coal, fertilizer, etc.

To supply the daily needs in foodstuffs of the population of the capital of the RA (the food brought in by OKSV transport is now planned to be used to create a reserve) it is necessary for the main part of the transport to operate to bring in flour, rice, legumes, sugar, salt, butter, etc. and to use private sector vehicles more efficiently.

There is food in sufficient quantity at Pol-e Khomri (30,000 tons of wheat), Mazari-Sharif (20,000 tons of wheat), and at Hayraton - 4,000 tons of excellent rice; 3,000 tons of flour; 12,000 tons of sugar, etc.

In addition, 2,500 tons of sugar, 500 tons of flour, 250 tons of fats, etc. have been stored at Hayraton for a long time (up to two years) which ought to be delivered to Kabul for the Ministry of Commerce with subsequent full compensation to the merchants for their cost.

An instruction of the Minister of Trade is needed to ship food from Hayraton to Kabul.

An instruction about bringing in an additional quantity of trucks and the procedure to pay for them is needed to ensure loading and unloading work at Mazari-Sharif and Pol-e Khomri.

... The shipment of flour to Kabul by military transport aviation is being performed smoothly. An average of 350-375 tons is delivered daily. A total of 1,375 tons of flour (of 3,500 tons) has already been delivered. Soviet troops have organized its storage and issuance to capital enterprises by coupon in accordance with a decision of the RA President...

Sources of information: the USSR MO Operations Group in the RA and the Headquarters of the 40th Army,
Kabul

January 1989

[Source: A. A. Lyakhovskiy's "Tragediya i Doblest' Afgana" ("Tragedy and Valor of the Afghanistan Veteran)", Iskon, Moscow, 1995; Translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg]

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[p. 501 13 January 89 Shevardnadze statement in Kabul regarding operations
against Masoud]

I agree that they have delayed conducting operations against Ahmad Shah. The reasons for this are not completely understandable, the more so since M. S. Gorbachev discussed the issue with the Afghan ministers of the armed forces during their visit to Moscow three months ago. It is obvious that we ought to also look at the progress into the progress of the preparations for the planned operation. It is understandable that no local or limited measures will resolve the problem of Ahmad Shah..."

[Source: A. A. Lyakhovskiy's "Plamya Afgana" ("Flame of the Afghanistan veteran)", Iskon, Moscow, 1999; Translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg]

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[pp. 485-87 Excerpts of Shevardnadze's 13-14 January 1989
conversations with Najibullah and Afghan military leaders]

Najibullah (President of the RA). An Afghan brigade of 900 men and an MGB regiment are hardly capable of holding out against the rebels in Ahmad Shah's zone of influence in a proper manner. In this regard I request that the Soviet leadership examine the issue of the possibility of placing Soviet military units in the Salang area on a temporary basis; their functions would consist only of guarding the road.

The survival of the government itself depends on ensuring deliveries of cargo via the Hayraton-Kabul highway. The opposition cannot seize Kabul by military means but it will gamble on an economic blockade, fomenting discontent among the population and instigating it to act against the government. Therefore it is extremely important right now to create a sufficient reserve of food, fuel, and other essential goods in Kabul. However it will be possible to ensure the organization of shipments by ground or air only with the direct assistance of the Soviet side.

In this context I would like again to request the creation of an "air bridge" from Soviet territory to Kabul.

We think it desirable for a certain number of aviation resources [*aviasredstva*] to be at Soviet airfields in direct proximity to the Afghan border on continuous duty which could act quickly against the rebels in case a threatening situation arises in one or another area of the country.

The problem of creating the necessary reserves in Kandahar has remain unresolved until now. It seems that the situation right now permits [us] to try to send a column with freight to that city. The Afghan side can provide part of the subunits of the 4th AK and 2nd AK totalling 2,000 men. However, without the participation of Soviet troops it is impossible to escort the column.

Eh. A. Shevardnadze. As far as I know, the provision of considerable military forces is required to escort a column. A danger of armed conflict with the enemy is not precluded but at the present stage [we] would not want to suffer unnecessary losses.

On the preliminary level we would say that the idea of creating an "air bridge" to Kabul is completely doable.

The issue of carrying out air strikes from the Soviet Union has a very delicate nature. We understand that it will be difficult for you to do without the support of Soviet aircraft but it is one thing to launch strikes when Soviet troops are present and other after their withdrawal... Such measures could unavoidable

provoke countermeasures from the US and Pakistan and an unfavorable international reaction.

We also consider it necessary to urgently study the issue of providing security for the Hayraton-Kabul highway, It is clear that without the use of the road it would be practically impossible to solve the problem of supplying the capital...(Kabul, 13.1.1989)...

M. H. Sharq (RA Prime Minister). Earlier we thought that all the damage which our motherland had suffered was connected with the war; however now we are convinced that the current administrative system has done us no less harm... We have a completely unrealistic budget which is based not so much on domestic sources of income but on free aid from the Soviet Union... You are giving us across-the-board aid but we have not justified your trust. The people ask why this happens... Our armed forces cannot provide security for freight shipments. At the transshipment bases bordering the USSR there is a three-month reserve of food for Kabul but we cannot deliver the food to the capital.

Eh. A. Shevardnadze. Understand, it is not so simple for us to give aid to Afghanistan. The butter, sugar, and flour which we are delivering to you is taken from the Soviet people but it doesn't reach those for whom it is intended. Therefore providing security for the Hayraton-Kabul road and the possibility of organizing an air bridge to supply the capital get top priority. (Kabul, 14.1.1989)...

G. F. Yakubi. (RA Minister of State Security). As long as Ahmad Shah Masoud lives the Kabul-Hayraton route will be closed and consequently the problem of delivering freight and special equipment not only to the capital but to other regions of the country will remain acute. Whether or not this regime stands or falls depends on the solution of this problem...

Eh. A. Shevardnadze. Will there be a coup, if we admit such a possibility, supported by the population of the capital if the city is supplied with everything necessary, in particular kerosene, bread, etc.?

G. F. Yakubi. I think they will not support one since the residents of Kabul are confident that in case of a coup G. Hekmatyar, who does not enjoy popularity in various social strata in the capital, will come to power... (14.1.1989, Kabul).

Sh. N. Tanay (RA Minister of Defense). The rebels are carrying out active operations directed at disrupting the Geneva Accords and demonstrating their power in the hope of overthrowing people's power. In my opinion, the military and political situation in the country is in a crisis and this crisis will grow. (14.1.1989, Kabul).

A. Wakil (RA Minister of Foreign Affairs). It is necessary for the Soviet side, considering the provisions of the Geneva Accords, to continue to help our

armed forces by launching rocket, bombing, and strafing attacks, especially after 15 February [Translator's note: the self-imposed deadline for completion of the Soviet troop withdrawal]... It is vitally important for us to maintain control of the airfields at Bagram and Kandahar and also the port of Hayraton. After the conclusion of the Soviet troop withdrawal Ahmad Shah Masoud will doubtless try to close the road through the Salang [Tunnel pass]... (14.1.1989, Kabul).

[Source: A. A. Lyakhovskiy's "Tragediya i Doblest' Afgana" ("Tragedy and Valor of the Afghanistan Veteran")", Iskon, Moscow, 1995; Translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg]

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[pp. 500-501 January 1989 Najibullah assessment of the "Ahmad Shah problem"
during Shevardnadze's visit]

Switching to more important and urgent problems, I would like to especially stress the following. At the present time no one has any doubt that the priority area should be the implementation of peaceful, political measures in the name of achieving a settlement. But at the same time it appears evident that in conditions of continuing interference in the affairs of Afghanistan by Pakistan, the US, and other countries and the opposition's rejection of a cease-fire, it is also impossible to forget military means. As it appears that right now it is exceptionally important as before to launch powerful missile, artillery, and air strikes on the bases, storehouses, and gatherings of enemy personnel in order to preempt his attempts to unleash a large-scale offensive after the withdrawal of Soviet troops.

In this context the issue of fighting the group of Ahmad Shah Masoud, who belongs to the Islamic Society of Afghanistan, holds special importance. Considering that his forces are capable of cutting the strategic Hayraton-Kabul highway in the area south of Salang right after the withdrawal of [Soviet] troops, blockading Kabul, and thereby creating a catastrophic situation for the capital, Ahmad Shah should be viewed as the main enemy of the government at the present stage.

The problem of Ahmad Shah has been around a long time but, in spite of measures taken, it is a very critical one, as before. In our view it is unwarranted to delay its resolution.

... For the last four years practically no large operations have been conducted against him with the exception of small individual strikes. As a result he has managed to create a powerful grouping totalling about 11,000 men and 2,500 [of them] right in the Panjshir. It needs to be recognized that Ahmad Shah is also skillfully using the advantages arising as a result of our passivity.

At the present time a joint operation of Soviet and Afghan forces against Ahmad Shah has been planned, but it will be of a local nature, essentially limited to a cleaning out of adjoining road sectors and the replacement of Soviet posts with Afghan ones. We say that such an operation cannot inflict notable damage on the enemy and change the fundamental nature of the situation...

[Source: A. A. Lyakhovskiy's "Plamya Afgana" ("Flame of the Afghanistan veteran)", Iskon, Moscow, 1999; Translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg]

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[pp. 502-03 Excerpt from 24 January 1989 40th Army HQ operational summary of
the 2nd day of operations against Panjshir]:

On 24 January bombing and strafing air strikes were launched, strikes were carried out by artillery, and possible approach routes for enemy reserves were mined.

Sweeping of the terrain for groups has begun and blocking forces [*bloki*] were set up on the highway by Afghan troops. The main efforts were concentrated on guarding bridges, underpasses, and tunnels. The locale is constantly being raked by fire and at night it is illuminated by aircraft and artillery. Snowfall and rockslides on the road are being cleared. The highway is temporarily closed.

The rebels are demoralized as a result of the strikes. Retaliation has been insignificant for a day. The command and control of the groups has been disrupted. The constant strikes by aircraft and artillery are hindering the ability to restore their combat capability. An approach march by the group's reserves is being interdicted by long range artillery strikes.

In all, during the two days of combat operations more than 600 rebels have been killed and 32 mortars, 15 recoilless guns, 46 large caliber machine guns, 490 small arms weapons, 10 storehouses, 36 strongpoints, and 15 vehicles have been destroyed. Seventeen grenade launchers and 190 small arms weapons have been seized.

In the area of Chaugani a tent city has been set up to receive local residents fleeing the area of combat operations and to give them material and medical aid. Political workers of military units are conducting work to explain the unfolding situation, denouncing the criminal position which Ahmad Shah has taken.

Our losses for the two days are 3 killed and 5 wounded...

[Source: A. A. Lyakhovskiy's "Plamy Afgana" ("Flame of the Afghanistan veteran")², Iskon, Moscow, 1999; Translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg]

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[pp. 462-63 24 January 1989 CC CPSU Politburo minutes about measures in connection with the upcoming withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan]:

(Top Secret)

SPECIAL FOLDER

N° P 146/VI

to Cdes. Gorbachev, Ryzhkov, Slyun'kov, Chebrikov, Shevardnadze, Yakovlev, Maslyukov, Yazov, Murakhovskiy, Kryuchkov, Boldin, and Falin – everything; Gostev – points 2 and 6; Volkov – point 5; Katushev – point 6.

Excerpt from Minutes N° 146 of the CC CPSU Politburo meeting of 24 January 1989

Measures in connection with the upcoming withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan

1. Agree with the ideas described in the note of Cdes. E. A. Shevardnadze, V. M. Chebrikov, A. N. Yakovlev, D. T. Yazov, V. S. Murakhovskiy, and V. A. Kryuchkov of 23 January 1989 (attached [in Bulletin 8/9, pp. 181-84]).

2. Proceed from the need to ensure the functioning of the Kabul-Hayraton highway and give the Afghan comrades comprehensive assistance to organize security for this highway using their own forces, even as far as assuming the provisioning of these Afghan subunits [*vztyatiye...na nashe dovol'stviye*] for a certain time. USSR Gosplan and the USSR Ministry of Finance together with the USSR MID, the USSR Ministry of Defense, and the USSR KGB are to present suitable proposals by 1 February 1989.

3. Cde. D. T. Yazov is charged with making a trip to Kabul for an additional evaluation of the developing military situation and to give practical assistance to the Afghan Side in the resolution of defense issues, including those affecting the security of the Kabul-Hayraton highway.

4. The USSR Ministry of Defense is to help the President of the Republic of Afghanistan work out various arrangements to declare martial law in Afghanistan.

5. The USSR Ministry of Defense and the USSR Ministry of Civil Aviation are to study the issue of the possibility of using Soviet pilots on a voluntary basis and with appropriate material rewards on Afghan transport aircraft or Soviet transport aircraft which would be leased to the Afghan Side.

6. The USSR Gosplan, the USSR Ministry of Finance, and the USSR Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations are to present ideas about granting additional economic aid to Afghanistan in the prescribed manner by 10 February 1989.

In this regard, provide for a trip to Kabul by Cdes. Yu. D. Maslyukov, B. I. Gostev, and K. F. Katushev.

7. Protocol. The CC CPSU Politburo Commission on Afghanistan with the participation of the CC CPSU General Department is to submit material on a documentary basis to the CC CPSU regarding all stages of the development of events in Afghanistan, beginning with the decision to introduce troops into this country and also ideas about possible alternatives of the future development of the situation in Afghanistan and the consequences for us ensuing from them.

CC SECRETARY M. GORBACHEV

[Source: A. A. Lyakhovskiy's "Plamya Afgana" ("Flame of the Afghanistan veteran"), Iskon, Moscow, 1999; Translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg]

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[pp. 503-04 January 26 1989 reply from Ahmad Shah Masoud after the above
operation [{"from the author's archive"}]:

Mister Vorontsov!

I received your warning. The bombings which followed it and those crimes which your people committed in Salang and Jabal os-Saraj will change nothing.

It should be said in this regard that the position of the Soviet leadership which has recently been adhering to its approaches to international problems, and in particular to the Afghan problem, has inspired in us the belief that the new regime in the Soviet Union has changed in comparison with its predecessors, considers the real situation, and wants the Afghan problem to be solved by means of negotiations. We also think that, as a minimum, after 10 years of the horrors of war and murder, the Soviets have understood the psychology of the Afghan people and are convinced from experience that it is impossible to drive them to their knees or do anything by force or threats. Unfortunately, the unnecessary pressure is continuing which you are exerting for hordes of hirelings who have betrayed themselves and for whom there is no place in the future fate of our country. The brutal and shameful operations which your people have been conducting in Salang, Jabal os-Saraj, and other regions during the last days of your presence in this country have killed all the recently-developed optimism. On the contrary, this forces us to believe that you want to impose a dying regime on our Muslim people. This is impossible and illogical.

We hope that the new Soviet leadership and its responsible representatives in Afghanistan will act in accordance with their own convictions and acquire the courage to realize reality and act in accordance with it.

Respectfully, Ahmad Shah Masoud
7.11.1367 [Afghan calendar date] (26.01.89 – *author's note*)

[Source: A. A. Lyakhovskiy's "Plamya Afgana" ("Flame of the Afghanistan veteran"), Iskon, Moscow, 1999; Translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg]

APPROVED

TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN
AND COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE ARMED FORCES
OF THE REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN

NAJIBULLAH

31 January 1989

REPORT

of the placement of a 3-month supply of material goods for the Armed Forces of
the Republic of Afghanistan in emergency reserves

[date not filled in] January 1989

COMMISSION CONSISTING OF:

CHAIRMAN - Vice President of the RA RAFI

DEPUTY CHAIRMEN:

RA Minister of Defense - General-Colonel SHAH NAWAZ TANAY

RA Minister of State Security - General-Colonel YAKUBI

RA Minister of Internal Affairs - General-Lieutenant WATANJAR

The conditions of storage, security, and protection of the material goods in the
corresponding storehouses have been provided.

ATTACHMENT: Reports of the placement of a 3-month supply material goods in
emergency reserves for the troops of the RA MO, MGB, and MVD.

CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMISSION: Vice President RAFI

DEPUTY CHAIRMEN OF THE COMMISSION: - General-Colonel Shah NAWAZ TANAY

- General-Colonel YAKUBI

- General-Lieutenant WATANJAR

COMMISSION MEMBERS:

- General-Lieutenant FATEKH
- General-Major ZAKHIN
- General-Lieutenant (MASHCHUK)
[name obscured by signatures]
- General-Lieutenant FARIN
- General-Major KADYR
- General-Major AYUB
- General-Major Mohamed Jan
- General-Major Alimjan
- Colonel Muhamed Nazem

[seal in Dari or Pashto]

COORDINATED WITH:

**CHIEF MILITARY ADVISER
IN THE REPUBLIC OF
AFGHANISTAN**

**CHIEF OF THE USSR MVD
MISSION TO THE RA MVD**

**CHIEF OF
THE USSR
KGB
MISSION TO
THE RA
MGB**

General-Colonel

[signature] Sotskov, M. M.

17 January 1989

General-Lieutenant

[signature] Yegorov, V. D. Major

14 January 1989

General-

[signature]
Zaytsev,
V. P.

17 January

1989

CHIEF OF THE USSR VS GENERAL STAFF OPERATIONS GROUP

General-Lieutenant Gaponenko, A. G.
[signature]

15 January 1989

[Translator's note: This information is presented in chart form in Appendix N° 10, which was not translated]

MEMO

The procedure for the withdrawal from the Republic of Afghanistan of the formations and units of the 40th Combined Arms Army

I. In accordance with a directive the conclusion of the withdrawal of formations and units of the army from the RA is to be accomplished by 15.02.89 according to the following schedule.

II. The Commanding General of the Army has DECIDED:

the withdrawal of formations, units, and installations of the army from the Republic of Afghanistan is to be performed along two axes (East - Kabul, Bagram, Pol-e Khomri, Hayraton; West - Shindand, Herat, Towraghondi), successively, garrison after garrison, beginning with those most distant from the Soviet-Afghan border.

Eastern axis

In the period from 2 to 10 January 89 blockade the withdrawal route by occupying platoon strongpoints in order to preclude rebel action on the columns.

Create artillery groups and firing positions which are to be occupied along the route of troop movement. The technical support units are to be taken to SPPM [disabled vehicle collection points] and the personnel of the 201st MSD are to equip and maintain the night rest areas in Pol-e Khomri and Hayraton [by] on the order of 1500 men and 300 units of equipment. The ZKP [Alternate Command Post], OG of the Army, and KP [Command Post] of the 108th MSD are to be taken to earlier planned areas.

In the period from 10 to 28.01.89 withdraw the rear support formations and units and the rear [units] of divisions, regiments, and garrison installations to Soviet territory.

The transport of personnel (about 30,000 men) not involved in combat operations for the withdrawal of troops is to be done by air from Kabul airfield, Pol-e Khomri, and Shindand in the period from 3.01 to 31.01.89.

In the period from 28.01 to 15.02.89 withdraw combat units and subunits to Soviet territory.

Artillery firing on the enemy is to be done with 10-15 minute artillery strikes from the moment the columns enter the zone of responsibility and they are to be accompanied by harassing fire on planned targets and fire as called by artillery spotters located in the columns.

Air cover of moving columns on the march is to be performed by the Air Forces of the 40th Army and aviation of TurkVO from Kabul, Mazari-Sharif, and Kokaydy airfields.

Control of the troop withdrawal is to be exercised from the Kabul CP, Naybabad ZKP, and also by detailing an OG in the areas of Jabal-os Saraj, the Salang Pass, Chaugani, Pol-e Khomri, Hayraton, Termez, and Tashkent.

To ensure the security of the troop withdrawal and to preclude rebel action block the withdrawal route by occupying platoon strongpoints on the commanding heights and in the areas of the most probable rebel movement in the [following] sectors:

Kabul-Kalakan – with two battalions of the 181st MSP; Kalakan-Charikar – with two battalions of the 180th MSP; Charikar-Jabal os-Saraj – with two battalions of the 682nd MSP; Jabal os-Saraj-Chaugani – the 345th OPDP; Chaugani-Doshi – the 668th ob "SN" [Independent Spetsnaz Battalion]; Doshi-SZ [Guardpost] N° 15 – the 350th PDP [Parachute Regiment] of the 103rd VDV; SZ N° 15-Naybabad-1st and 2nd [battalions], 122nd MSP and 873rd ORB of the 201st MSD.

III. Control of the Army troop withdrawal will be exercised from the CP in Kabul, ZKP- Naybabad, VPU [Auxiliary Control Post] – Shindand, and also by operations groups of the Army headed by:

Jabal os-Saraj – Colonel V. F. Yakubovskiy
Salang Pass – General-Major A. F. Sheykov
Chaugani – General-Major V. G. Profatilov
Pol-e Khomri – General-Major V. A. Vasenin
Hayraton – Colonel V. A. Dybskiy
Termez – Colonel V. P. Shcherbiy
Tashkent – Colonel S. F. Kitsak

The operations groups are to depart of their places of operation on 3.01.89. The departure of the operations group for Tashkent – 9.01.89. The departure of the ZKP of the Army – 7.01.89.

The Commanding General of the Army and the operations group of the Commanding General will control the withdrawal from the Army CP in Darulaman

[Palace] until 14.01.89; from 14.01.89 to 2.02.89 control will be exercised from the Army CP deployed at the base of the 103rd VDD; after 2.02.89 [from] the Army CP in Naybabad.

Upon conclusion of the withdrawal the operations group of the Commanding General of the Army will relocate to Tashkent and control the disbandment of the Army from the CP – the transfer point [in] Tashkent.

IV. The withdrawal of rear formations and units of the Army, the rear [units] of divisions, regiments, and garrison installations

13.01.89 – the 59th BRMO [Material Support Brigade] and the rear [elements] of the 108th MSD will be withdrawn from Bagram. Crossing of the border: 59 BRMO on 14.01.89; the rear elements of the 108th MSD on 16.01.89;

15.01.89 – the 47th ORDN [Independent Missile Battalion] with the 668th ob "SN". The 668th ob "SN" seals off the Chaugani-Doshi sector and the 47th ORDN from Pol-e Khomri under the protection of the 783rd of the 201st MSD continues movement to Hayraton.

The border is crossed on 18.01.89;

17.01.89 – Army signals units are withdrawn from Kabul to Hayraton;

The border is crossed on 20.01.89;

19.01.89 – Army support units march from Kabul.

The border is crossed on 22.01.89;

21.01.89 – The rear elements of the 103rd VDD move out.

The border is crossed on 24.01.89;

23.01.89 – The 45th ISP (without the IDB [Road Engineering Battalion]) begins movement from Charikar.

The border is crossed on 26.01.89;

26.01.89 – The 278th DKBR [Road Traffic Control Brigade] is withdrawn from Chaugani.

The border is crossed on 27.01.89;

28.01.89 – The 276th TIBR [unknown type of brigade] is withdrawn from Pol-e Khomri.

The border is crossed on 29.01.89;

29.01.89 – The rear elements of the 180th MSP and 181st MSP leave Kabul.

The border is crossed on 31.01.89;

30.01.89 – The rear elements of the 201st MSD begin to move; they cross the border on the same day.

V. The withdrawal of combat formations and units

Bagram garrison: 28.01.89 – withdrawal of the garrison is done in a single column comprising: the ground echelon of the Air Forces and the 177th ob "SN" which, when it reaches Hayraton, will set up a defense and reinforce the security zone.

The ground echelon of the Air Forces crosses the border on 30.01.89;
28.01.89 – the 2nd Battalion of the 180th MSP and the 2nd Battalion of the 682nd MSP, after they are relieved from guard posts, are moved out to reinforce the route in the regiments' zone of responsibility;

29.01.89 – the 781st ORB of the 108th MSD, after it is relieved from blockade [duty], is formed up in the area of the Bagram crossing as a reserve force;

Kabul garrison: It is withdrawn in the period from 1 to 4.02.89 in three columns:

- the ground echelon of the Air Forces is moved out as the first column. It begins movement on 01.02.89 and crosses the border on 04.02.89;

- the 371st PDP [Translator's note: probably an error for 317th] moves out as the second column after assembling in Kabul.

- the 357th PDP moves out as the third column. It begins to move on 04.02.89 and crosses the border on 07.02.89. Thus, the withdrawal of the Kabul garrison concludes on 04.02.89.

04.02.89:

- after the withdrawal of troops from Kabul and the transfer of guard posts the subunits of the 181st MSP are removed from blockade duty and march to Jabal os-Saraj;

- subunits of the 180th MSP are relieved from blockade duty on the Kalakan-Bagram crossing sector and form up in the area of the crossing.

05.02.89:

- the 181st MSP marches from Jabal os-Saraj to Hayraton and crosses the border on 07.02.89.

- the 180th MSP is relieved from blockade duty on the Bagram crossing-Charikar sector and forms up at Jabal os-Saraj.

06.02.89:

- the 180th MSP marches to Hayraton and crosses the border on 08.02.89.

07.02.89:

- the CP of the 108th MSD and the 682nd MSP move from Jabal os-Saraj to Hayraton and cross the border on 09.02.89;

- the 2nd Battalion of the 177th MSP is relieved from blockade duty on the Jabal os-Saraj-Kalawulang sector and forms up in Chaugani;

- the 1st Battalion of the 345th OPDP is relieved of blockade duty on the Jabal os-Saraj-Kalawulang sector and forms up in Kalawulang.

08.02.89:

- the 177th MSP forms up in Pol-e Khomri after handing over guard posts on the Kalawulang-Doshi sector;

- the 345th PDP forms up in Chaugani after being relieved from blockade duty on the Kalawulang-Chaugani sector.

09.02.89:

- the 345th OPDP marches to Pol-e Khomri;

- the 688th ob "SN" is relieved of blockade duty in the Chaugani-Doshi sector and forms up at Pol-e Khomri;

- the 2nd Battalion of the 350th PDP is relieved of blockade duty on the Doshi-Pol-e Khomri sector and forms up in Pol-e Khomri, 10.02.89;
- the 345th OPDP and the 668th ob "SN" march to Hayraton and cross the border on 11.02.89;
- the 395th MSP, after handing over guard posts in the security zone and on the Pol-e Khomri-Mirza Pass sector, forms up in the area of the Pass (Guard Post N° 15), 11.02.89;
- the 395th MSP marches from SZ [Guard Post] N° 15 to Hayraton and crosses the border on 12.02.89;
- the 350th PDP is relieved of blockade duty and forms up in the area of Aybak, 12.02.89;
- the 350th PDP marches to Hayraton and crosses the border on 13.02.89;
- the 122nd MSP forms up in Naybabad after handing over guard posts and being relieved of blockade duty in the area of the Tashkurgan Canyon, 13.02.89;
- the 1st Battalion of the 149th MSP marches with the ground echelon of the Air Forces from Mazari-Sharif to Hayraton and crosses the border on 14.02.89;
- the 122nd MSP (without the 3rd MSB) marches from Naybabad to Hayraton and crosses the border on 13.02.89, 14.02.89;
- the Army CP, HQ of the 201 MSD, and the 783rd ORB march to Hayraton and cross the border on 14.02.89;
- 15.02.89:
- the 3rd Battalion of the 122nd MSP, the OPTADN [Independent Anti-Tank Artillery Battalion] of the 108th MSD, and the transshipment base are withdrawn to Termez before 1200;
- the 783rd ORB crosses the border before 1500.
- The Commanding General of the Army crosses the border at 1500
- 15.02.89

Western axis

The withdrawal of troops along the western axis is conducted from 1 to 15.02.89 in 10 columns.

The leader of combat operations for the withdrawal of troops of the western axis is General-Major N. P. Pishchev.

General-Lieutenant B. Gromov

[Source: A. A. Lyakhovskiy's "Tragediya i Doblest' Afgana" ("Tragedy and Valor of the Afghanistan Veteran)", Iskon, Moscow, 1995; Translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg]

[Underlined portions previously translated]

STATEMENT
of the Soviet Military Command in Afghanistan on the Withdrawal of Soviet Troops

In our view an announcement of this sort, although it touches on historical events, should not seem formal or statistical. The withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan can be correctly understood and evaluated only if we digress into the past and linger on the relations between Afghanistan and the Soviet Union, even if in general outline, and the fact of the introduction and presence of our troops in the RA and evaluations of the results of this presence.

From the very beginning they were established Soviet-Afghan relations were characterized as friendly and good-neighborly. V. I. Lenin and Amanullah Khan were at the source of these relations. In 1919 Soviet Russia, as is well known, was the first country to recognize the independence of Afghanistan and established diplomatic relations with it.

The 28 February 1921 Treaty between the RSFSR and Afghanistan and also the 1926 Paghman Pact of Neutrality and Mutual Non-aggression between the USSR and Afghanistan laid a strong foundation of friendship and collaboration inasmuch as they were based on the principles of equality, mutual respect, and non-interference in one another's internal affairs. These fundamental documents were a reliable guarantee for the strengthening of the national independence of Afghanistan and also the development of friendly relations and the expansion of economic ties between both countries.

For seven decades the Soviet state gave aid and support to a friendly neighboring country in the most diverse forms. This aid was always genuine and never infringed on the independence and sovereignty of Afghanistan.

In 1978 a national democratic revolution occurred in Afghanistan. The solution of the main problems of political, economic, social, and cultural development of the country in the interests of all ethnic groups and workers occupied a central place in the activity of the revolutionary democratic authorities of the Republic. Some successes began to be noted.

The Afghan revolutionaries were guided by genuine and pure motives – helping their people and carrying out progressive reforms in the country. But they set a maximum possible course, promoting programs of reforms for which there was no social nor economic basis. There was no support from the masses, who were completely devoted to the Muslim religion and tribal foundations and

traditions. The opposition made use of this and under the flag of Islam they managed to set a considerable part of the population against people's power and unleash armed combat against it. The opposition pursued its own mercenary goals and the Afghan people suffered.

Some words about the background of the introduction of Soviet troops onto RA territory. The Afghan government (first Taraki, then Amin) repeatedly turned to the Soviet Union with a request to give international assistance for protection against external aggression. For a long time the Soviet government refrained from such a step, persuading their Afghan friends to solve their problems themselves. At the same time, by the end of 1979 the situation had boiled over and the Soviet Union was forced to favorably consider the request of the Afghan leadership. It was decided to introduce troops with the main mission of stabilizing the situation in the country, helping the Afghan armed forces, and protecting Afghanistan from the aggressive actions of the rebel formations on Pakistani and Iranian territory and thereby create conditions for the defense of our southern borders.

Our soldiers came with a mission of peace; however they were drawn into combat operations. This absolutely was not part of our plans and was not appropriate to our aspirations in this country. Therefore with time the main accent increasingly became changed to political settlement of the conflict.

The beginning of perestroika in the Soviet Union and the advancement by M. S. Gorbachev of new ideas and approaches to the solution of international political issues and new thinking in resolving conflicts had decisive influence in settling the Afghan problem.

The policy of national reconciliation chosen by Najibullah who was elected CC PDPA General Secretary announced at the beginning of 1987 envisioned the cessation of combat operations and the settlement of differences by negotiations and compromises. At first this policy had some success. The leaders of hundreds of formations entered into collaboration with people's power, which had a positive effect on stabilizing the situation in many areas (Herat, Kandahar, Kunduz, etc.) Refugees began to return to their homeland. At the same time the Afghan Armed Forces were strengthened, which cemented and ensured national reconciliation.

However the counterrevolutionaries, feeling a mortal danger to themselves in this policy, took steps to block it and disrupt it and increased their activity inside the Republic. They began to place obstacles in the path to the return of refugees to Afghanistan and increased their sabotage and terrorist activity.

Soviet soldiers actively participated in putting the policy of national reconciliation into practice. Combat operations against opposition formations stopped completely and only security functions were performed. The main efforts of our troops were shifted to helping build roads, schools, hospitals, irrigation

ditches, wells, and enterprises (an asphalt plant in Kandahar), power transmission lines, and the delivery and distribution of Soviet free aid to Afghanistan. The attitude of the Afghan people to the Soviet soldier was always very favorable. In recent times this feeling even appeared from many opposition detachments. All this was because they were convinced that the Soviet people were bringing good.

About Geneva. A large role in the preparation and signing of the Geneva Accords belongs to the UN. This act demonstrated the enormous capabilities of the UN to settle regional and other conflicts. The success of Geneva was predetermined by our country's policy proclaimed by CC CPSU General Secretary M. S. Gorbachev of resolving acute international problems exclusively by political means.

The Geneva accords, of which the USSR and US are guarantors, when they are fully implemented will cover the entire spectrum of activities and actions regarding interference in Afghanistan, create preconditions so that the Afghan people can determine their own fate, and end the war.

The Soviet Union and Afghanistan, following the letter and spirit of Geneva, have completely fulfilled the responsibilities they have taken upon themselves. Soviet troops completely left Afghanistan by 15 February (today it is already 14.02.89). On the other hand, unfortunately, this cannot be said of Pakistan and the US. All of international public opinion has counted on the Geneva Accords being accompanied by respect and discretion by the parties who signed and guaranteed their fulfillment. The expectation was that the actions of the parties would be mirrored; that is, during the withdrawal of Soviet garrisons from certain regions the bases, headquarters, and training centers for training opposition formations would accordingly be eliminated. Such actions also could have been conducted asynchronously, with a certain concession to the opposition. However this only did not follow, but on the contrary, during the summer and autumn of 1988 Pakistani and US officials organized additional aid to the opposition, publicly declaring that they would continue their previous policy in the future. In essence, they trampled on the Geneva Accords. They thereby inflicted damage on the authority of the United Nations under whose aegis the Geneva Accords were concluded and whose special bodies were monitoring their fulfillment. By their actions Pakistan and the US put into doubt the UN's ability to act as a mediator in resolving international conflicts. But the Soviet Union and the world community of nations will look after the honor and dignity of the UN.

New initiatives were proposed to give a new stimulus to the Afghan settlement in the address of CC CPSU General Secretary and Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet M. S. Gorbachev at the 43rd UN General Assembly Session. Unfortunately, these proposals were not implemented

although they fully reflected the interests of the Afghan people, again through the fault of Pakistan and the US.

At the present time RA government agencies have sufficient resources to maintain the stability of the situation in Afghanistan, but if aggressive manifestations by the opposition occur [they have sufficient resources] to defeat them. Everything will depend on how these capabilities are implemented.

About troop withdrawal. The Soviet Union also carried out withdrawal measures earlier as far as possible, considering the situation (October 1986 – six regiments, or 8,000 men).

Right now Soviet soldiers, having completely fulfilled their internationalist duty, have returned home to their Motherland. They left in an organized manner, with honor and dignity, not throwing away but handing over their reserves, property, and their positions to Afghan troops. The withdrawal was accomplished as a whole in a good, favorable situation, practically without losses, both in the initial and the final stages. The opposition, with some exceptions, did not in the main hinder the withdrawal of Soviet troops nor the occupation of security zones, guard posts, and security posts by the RA Armed Forces. And only as a result of the lack of foresight by individual leaders of some opposition detachments was it necessary to use weapons against them. In particular, this took place in the Southern Salang – force was used against detachments of Ahmad Shah Masoud. The Afghan government and the Soviet military command held talks with him for a long time in the expectation that he would cooperate with government authority, sign a protocol with the government, and take a sector of the vitally important highway under the protection of his own forces. However he rejected all proposals. Moreover, he started to threaten not to let government troops into the Southern Salang. But in connection with the fact that the road is government property and should be controlled by the government, Ahmad Shah was warned that if his detachments opened fire on posts while they were being set up by the Afghan Armed Forces they would receive an appropriate rebuff. He ignored the warning. As a result of the retaliatory actions by the Afghan troops a serious defeat was inflicted on the detachments of A. Shah in the area of the Southern Salang with our support.

We are leaving but friendship with the Afghan people remains. Doubtless economic and other forms of aid will be given. We will also help in healing the wounds of war. We are ready to cooperate with the UN in this matter. Afghanistan for us was and remains a good neighbor, and independent, neutral, sovereign state.

It is important to note that some people are trying to create an analogy between the presence of Soviet troops in Afghanistan and the American actions in Vietnam. It is not only unfair but even absurd to draw such parallels. There cannot be any comparison here, because these two missions are diametrically

opposite both in their objectives and tasks as well as in their content and results. Starting with the fact that nobody had invited the Americans in Vietnam, whereas the Soviet troops were sent to Afghanistan after numerous requests from the legitimate Afghan government. Completely different forms and methods were used [in Afghanistan]. We came in not with the goal to occupy and split the country, as it happened as a result of American actions, not with the goal capturing foreign territory, but with the goal of providing internationalist assistance in the defense of sovereignty and territorial integrity of Afghanistan. We never pursued any selfish goals or set any conditions.

Withdrawal of Soviet forces, precisely withdrawal, not flight, as was the case with the American troops in Vietnam, is carried out according to the plan, in strict accordance with the Geneva Agreements on Afghanistan, and according to the will of the Afghan and Soviet people, with the support from the world community. It demonstrated once again that the Soviet Union is true to the principles of new political thinking, its political statements and positions. In the process of withdrawal, we transferred objects and property to the Afghan people with overall value of over 830 million rubles.

At the same time, we did everything we could not to allow the withdrawal of the last Soviet soldier from Afghanistan to become the beginning of a civil war in this country. In the future we will continue to undertake all necessary measures to help the political settlement [in Afghanistan] in the name of bringing peace and security to the Afghan people.

The Soviet Union is pursuing a principled policy of resolving regional conflict situations. In our view, the experience of the Afghan settlement should lay the groundwork for the resolution of similar problems in other regions. At the same time it needs to be kept in mind that it is necessary to apply the most persistent efforts to achieve success in this complex business so that agreements are fulfilled by all parties, not unilaterally as occurred in Afghanistan. M. S. Gorbachev's reminder of the ancient Roman maxim in his address at the 43rd UN General Assembly Session was correct in these terms: "Agreements should be fulfilled". It is impossible to permit an aggressor to act from a position of force cloaked with the authority of the international community but in fact simply defying its opinion. The lessons of Afghanistan need to be considered in Angola, Kampuchea, and other countries. We wish the UN new successes on this path but the Soviet Union will do everything that depends upon it in this area.

[Source: A. A. Lyakhovskiy's "Tragediya i Doblest' Afgana" ("Tragedy and Valor of the Afghanistan Veteran"), Iskon, Moscow, 1995; Translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg]

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[pp. 539-41 April 1989 Soviet Embassy in Pakistan report on the situation around
Jalalabad]

The Situation Around Jalalabad

...On 4 April RA government forces beat back one more attempt at a rebel offensive near Jalalabad. An enemy grouping attacking from the Sorkhrud direction was thrown back, losing 20 men killed and as many wounded. Pakistani intelligence agencies are planning a new rebel offensive in the next few days which, they think here, will unavoidably lead to great losses on both sides, but primary on the attackers'. According to summary data, in a month of battles from the moment the general offensive by Afghan rebels and Pakistani militia began near Jalalabad (6 March), they have lost more than 8500 men (6000 of them killed), 12 tanks, 5 BMP and BTR, and about 160 guns and mortars. The leaders of the Afghan rebels oddly enough explain their defeats near Jalalabad by the presence there of Pakistani military subunits and 17 Pakistani generals. The leaders say that the Pakistani subunits interfered with them, having almost no idea about the tactics of waging combat operations here. The Pakistani interference itself, in their words, is the main reason for the extremists' large losses near Jalalabad. It is hard to believe these explanations, but they are still one more confirmation of Pakistan's violation of the Geneva Accords and its large-scale participation in the war.

After the defeats the rebels and militias changed their organization and tactics of waging combat operations. Effective types of weapons appeared among them, such as rocket launchers with a range of 20 to 40 km, "Milan" PTURS, American and Japanese communications equipment, and modern PZRK.

Many thousands of the rockets and artillery shells and mortar shells [*miny*] being transported daily into Nangarhar province by the Pakistani VS in violation of the Geneva Accords come down not only on the positions of government forces but also on residential areas of Jalalabad, as a result of which hundreds of residents of the city have been killed and wounded. Thus the joint adventure of the Pakistani military clique and the leaders of the Afghan "irreconcilables", actively supported by Washington and Islamabad, have already brought and will bring yet more losses to Afghans on both sides.

Information continues to arrive that foreigners who are in rebel combat formations near Jalalabad are preventing the removal of wounded rebels from the field of battle. According to information received from competent RA organs, as a result of a bombing and strafing attack launched in the district of Chapriyar (Nangarhar province) on a formation of the well-known leader Jelaluddin Khakani of the Jadran tribe, nine rebels were killed and seven wounded. According to prevailing Pushtun tradition Jelaluddin Khakani was planning to sending the

bodies of the deceased to relatives and the wounded to Peshawar. However Arab advisers located in his detachments who personally finished off the wounded prevented this. The murder of the wounded caused indignation among the other members of the formation who forced the commander to leave the position and go toward Pakistan.

A wave of protest demonstrations in Peshawar against the participation of Afghan refugees in combat operations near Jalalabad was noted, caused by the delivery to the city of the bodies of the dead rebels and the wounded of other formations. The Pakistani police and rebels opened fire on them in order to stop the demonstrations of the Afghan refugees. At the present time the Pakistani authorities are prohibiting informing them of losses near Jalalabad in order to prevent new mass protests by refugees. In addition, the dead and the rebels finished off on the field of battle are often counted as missing in action.

Source of information: the Soviet Embassies in Pakistan and Afghanistan

April 1989

[Source: A. A. Lyakhovskiy's "Tragediya i Doblest' Afgana" ("Tragedy and Valor of the Afghanistan Veteran)", Iskon, Moscow, 1995; Translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg]

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[no letterhead or classification noted on the document]

to Cdes. I. S. BELOUSOV
M. A. MOISEYEV
B. M. BELOUSOV

Please examine the issue of the rate of production of warheads and deliveries of R-17 missiles to the Republic of Afghanistan, take the necessary measures, and report to the CC CPSU.

to Cde. O. S. BELYAKOV

[signature] L. Zaykov
26 July 1989

1272 [printed on the page]

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the page with illegible printing within]

Secret
Copy N° 1

[General Staff letterhead]

[Stamp with handwritten entries: CC CPSU
08-09 N1272-89 -OP [[handwritten]]
03 Aug 89 1316 OP
Subject to return to the
CC CPSU General Department]

CC CPSU

to Cde. L. N. Zaykov

31 July 1989
N° 312/1/0297

Dear Lev Nikolayevich!

In accordance with your instructions I report:

At the present time the supply of 8K14 missiles with 8F44 high-explosive warheads to the Republic of Afghanistan is being done without disruption. In the R-17 missile battalion deployment area in Afghanistan a transitional reserve of no less than 20-25 missiles is maintained (on the order of 2-3 missiles per launch installation).

There is a reserve of 64 missiles with warheads in TurkVO.

In addition, beginning 27 July VTA [Military Transport Aviation] aircraft have been delivering 41 warheads for R-17s from the manufacturer (Novosibirsk) to Kokaydy airfield (TurkVO). Such an availability of missiles permits the complete supply of 6-8 days' requirements of the RA.

At the same time, considering the flight capabilities of the VTA VVS [Military Transport Aviation of the Air Forces] are exhausted delivery of spare parts from the manufacturer to Kokayty airfield would best be done by rapid rail transport, which would permit the creation of the necessary reserve of warheads for the R-17 missile system and subsequently a complete transfer to their delivery by rail.

In exceptional circumstances, if there is any threat of disruption of delivery of warheads by rail their delivery their delivery by VTA VVS is stipulated.

This is reported for your decision.

Respectfully,

[signature]

[Chief of the General Staff] M. Moiseyev

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[p. 523 2 September 89 letter from Masoud to Soviet Ambassador Vorontsov]:

Mister Vorontsov!

In reply to your letter of 31 July 1989 I want to say that the past support of the PDPA by your government has been the reason for the deaths of more than 1,500,000 citizens of our country. About 5,000,000 people have left their homes, become refugees in neighboring and other countries, and Afghanistan has been turned into ruins. In exchange for this support you have received only shame and thousands of young Russian men have been killed in the mountains and deserts. As a result you have suffered a military defeat and considerable economic loss.

With the ascension of a new leadership in the Soviet Union and the admission of past mistakes it was expected that the USSR would pay attention to the incorrect policy and reject a continuation of a similar policy in regard to Afghanistan, as a result of which peace and quiet would be restored in a country exhausted by war.

However, an analysis of the actions of the Soviet Union during the last six months forces us to conclude with regret that it has not changed its position in regard to the Afghan conflict and intends to attain its goals only by another means, that is, by using Afghans to murder Afghans.

Recognizing the Soviet Union as the chief culprit in the continuation of the war and the bloodshed in Afghanistan we would like to again stress the fact that in the first stage of the revolution a majority were thinking as though the Afghan people were in no condition to resist in the face of the tanks and aircraft of the Soviet superpower and that the Red Army would resolve all the issues in several days. However with the passage of time it has turned out that it was impossible to break the will of the people by force of arms. And before still more blood is shed, before the burden of responsibility on the Soviet leadership before God and history grows even more, and the fissure which has arisen between the Muslim people of Afghanistan and the Soviet people becomes wider, we would like to again remind you that the war in Afghanistan will not fade out until Soviet interference in Afghan affairs ends completely and the PDPA, which is impeding the implementation of the just aspirations of our Muslim people, leaves the political arena. As I believe, you and all the peoples of the world are again witnesses to the intensification of the fire of war on this Earth, which is not in accord with the interests of either the freedom-loving Muslim people of Afghanistan or the Soviet people.

Respectfully, Ahmad Shah Masoud
2 September 1989

[Source: A. A. Lyakhovskiy's "Plamya Afgana" ("Flame of the Afghanistan veteran"), Iskon, Moscow, 1999; Translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg]

Top Secret
SPECIAL FOLDER

Instruction of the USSR Council of Ministers
(approved at the 1 November 1989 meeting of the CC CPSU Politburo)

1. In connection with the request of the government of the Republic of Afghanistan, consent to the performance in the 4th quarter of 1989 and the 1st quarter of 1990 of additional work to build office and living quarters for the President of Afghanistan with bulletproof glass and of metal sheathed construction and also to increase the protection of the roof of the President's villa against rockets (a lounge in the old CC PDPA building; a reception room and Politburo meeting room in the new CC PDPA building; a room for members of the President's family to stay on the first and second floors of the villa; an office and reception room for the President on the first and second floors, a meeting room for the Supreme High Command, a dining room, and a small reception room at Gul'khan).

The expenses of the Soviet side associated with performing the above work, including the expenses for the travel of Soviet specialists to Afghanistan, the manufacture, and transport of the items and material and technical equipment, are to be attributed to the USSR State Budget allocations in Soviet rubles for free aid to foreign countries and for foreign currency, to the USSR MVEhS currency plan...

N. Ryzhkov

[Source: A. A. Lyakhovskiy's "Tragediya i Doblest' Afgana" ("Tragedy and Valor of the Afghanistan Veteran")", Iskon, Moscow, 1995; Translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg]

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[pp. 525-26 11 December 1989 Gorbachev letter of reassurance to Afghan government]:

It is absolutely obvious that while the irreconcilable opposition, warmed and encouraged by the US, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia holds to an extremist policy, military measures will remain an important method of action to "persuade" the enemy of the evidence of the truth: there is no alternative to an intra-Afghan dialogue and peace talks.

At the same time the positive aspect in the military field already achieved opens new domestic and foreign opportunities to step up the political process...

Retaliatory missile strikes doubtless have great importance in the matter of repelling the barbaric acts of the opposition with respect to cities and the peaceful civilian population and disrupting its attacks. The Soviet Union decided some time ago, as you know, to allocate an additional 500 R-300 missiles for our Afghan friends. In this regard it is extremely desirable that the R-300 missiles being delivered be used in the most rational manner. I want to stress that we have done this by removing missiles from Soviet military subunits. Deliveries of such effective equipment such as the "Luna-M" have been restarted. One hundred such missiles will be sent to the Afghan side between the end of November and the new year, 1990.

We confirm our readiness to deliver modern MiG-29 aircraft to you...

Mi-35 [attack] helicopters will be delivered in the first quarter of 1990. Other issues are being examined regarding the deliveries of weapons which you raise in your message... (The text of the letter was approved at a CC CPSU Politburo meeting, Protocol N° P175/5).

[Source: A. A. Lyakhovskiy's "Plamya Afgāna" ("Flame of the Afghanistan veteran")", Iskon, Moscow, 1999; Translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg]

Kononenko, "Shuravi: Vospominaniya voyennogo sovetnika", Volgograd, 1999,
p. 83

INFORMATION
regarding advisers, specialists, interpreters, and extended servicemen who
died or were wounded in the period from 1980 to 1987

Year	Died				Wounded			
	Total	Advisers	Interpreters	Extended Servicemen	Total	Advisers	Interpreters	Extended Servicemen
1980	18	12	5	1	19	16	2	1
1981	23	14	6	3	53	39	10	4
1982	12	8	2	2	50	41	4	5
1983	26	21	3	2	81	65	12	4
1984	26	19	2	5	53	37	11	5
1985	14	13	1	5	139	94	13	32
1986	30	19	3	8	129	81	18	30
1987	57	9	1	6	101	54	15	32
Total	180	115	23	32	625	427	85	113

Chief of the Personnel Section
Of the Chief Military Adviser's
Staff of the VEhRA
Colonel

Yu. Ryazantsev

[Translator's note: The expansion VehRA is unknown but "RA" presumably stands for "Republic of Afghanistan"; "VEh" may be a corruption of "VS" -- Armed Forces (of)]

Table 108

Kinds of losses		Total	Including			
			Ground Forces	KGB	MVD	Other ministries and agencies
Died in battle	Number % of losses	9511 65.81	8984 64.95	499 87.24	28 100	
Died of wounds	Number % of losses	2386 16.51	2337 16.89	49 8.57		
Total of combat losses	Number % of losses	11897 82.32	11321 81.84	548 95.80	28 100	
Died in accidents, crashes, mishaps, suicide, etc.	Number % of losses	1739 12.03	1708 12.35	11 1.92		20 100
Died of illness	Number % of losses	817 5.65	804 5.81	13 2.27		
Total non-combat losses	Number % of losses	2556 17.68	2512 18.16	24 4.20		20 100
Total irrecoverable losses	Number % of losses	14453 100	13833 100	572 100	28 100	20 100
Average monthly irrecoverable losses	Number % of losses	131 0.91	126 0.91	5 0.87	- -	- -
Including those who died: generals	Number % of losses	4 0.03	4 0.03			
officers	Number % of losses	2129 14.73	1975 14.28	129 22.55	25 89.29	
sergeants and soldiers	Number % of losses	11549 79.91	11120 80.39	427 74.65	2 7.14	
blue- and	Number	139	118	-	1	20

white-collar workers	% of losses	0.96	0.85	-	3.57	100

Note. Among the 190 military advisers killed were 145 officers.

[Translator's note: "Irrecoverable losses" are a total of those killed and missing]

Table 109

Types of losses and the outcome of treatment	Number	%
Wounded, bruised, injured including:	53753	100
returned to duty	44056	81.96
discharged for reasons of health	7311	13.60
died*	2386	4.44
fell ill including:	415932	100
returned to duty	411015	96.82
discharged for reasons of health	4343	1.04
died*	574	0.14
Total medical losses	469685	100
Including:		
returned to duty	455071	96.89
discharged for health reasons	11654	2.48
died*	2960	0.63
Average monthly medical losses	4269	0.91
Including wounded, bruised, injured, and those who fell ill:		
officers and warrant officers	10287	2.19
sergeants and soldiers	447493	95.28
blue- and white-collar workers	11905	2.53

* Included in the number of irrecoverable losses.

Table 110

Stages of combat activity and their length		Irrecoverable losses		Medical losses		Total	
		Number	%	Number	%	Number	%
First (December 1979- February 1980) 2 months	All losses	243	1.76	5306	1.14	5549	1.15
	Monthly average	121	0.88	2653	0.57	2774	0.58
Second (March 1980 - April 1985) 62 months	All losses	8945	64.66	226649	48.59	235594	49.06
	Monthly average	144	1.04	3656	0.78	3800	0.79
Third (May 1985 - December 1986) 20 months	All losses	2700	19.52	114861	24.63	117561	24.48
	Monthly average	135	0.98	5743	1.23	5878	1.22
Fourth (January 1987- February 1989) 26 months	All losses	1945	14.06	119609	25.64	121554	25.31
	Monthly average	75	0.54	4600	0.99	4676	0.97
Total for 110 months	All losses	13833	100	466425	100	480258	100
	Monthly average	126	0.91	4240	0.91	4366	0.91

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REFERENCE DOCUMENT

[pp. 127-28]

**Soviet Ministry of Defense [MO SSSR] and USSR Armed Forces General Staff
[GSh VS SSSR] Operations Groups in Afghanistan**

... During the entire period Soviet troops were in Afghanistan from time to time various operations groups of the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces worked there. The first such group, headed by Deputy Commanding General of the VDV [Airborne Troops] General-Lieutenant N. N. Gus'kov, arrived in Kabul 23 December 1979. It was this [group] that exercised control of the transfer by air of the airborne units to Bagram and Kabul from 25 to 27 December, their quartering, and operations during the overthrow of H. Amin's supporters.

On 3 January 1980 a USSR Ministry of Defense Operations Group headed by Marshal of the Soviet Union S. L. Sokolov (General of the Army S. F. Akhromeyev was his deputy) flew into Afghanistan from Termez; it remained there until November of that year. Then this group went to the DRA from time to time for up to half a year to coordinate the combat operations of Soviet and Afghan troops when conducting the largest operations (for example, in Panjshir).

Beginning with the second half of 1984 command of the USSR MO Operations Group in the DRA was entrusted to General of the Army V. I. Varennikov who at that time was a First Deputy Chief of the General Staff. Initially he only visited Afghanistan periodically, but beginning on 2 January 1987 until the end of the Soviet withdrawal he was continually in Afghanistan.

The generals and officers of the USSR MO OG [Operations Group] systematically worked in the units and formations of the 40th Army to give practical aid to their commanders and staffs when preparing for and carrying out combat operations, organize combat training considering accumulated experience, and also coordinate activities and support coordination with the Afghan army. It aided the advisory staff in the planning of combat operations, increase the combat efficiency of the Afghan armed forces, and resolve various problems of combat activity.

In addition, this very group carried out the most diverse missions, both of a military as well as of an economic, political, and social nature.

In connection with the fact that the first time the MO USSR OG was in Afghanistan it was there only occasionally, mainly to direct large operations, in March 1985 a group of General Staff representatives (consisting of 5 men) was sent to Kabul who were led by the General for Special Assignments for

Afghanistan to the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces, General-Lieutenant B. V. Gromov (March 1985 – April 1986). It later was led by: General-Major Yu. V. Yarygin (April 1986 – May 1987) and General-Major V. S. Kudlay (May 1987 – January 1989).

With the beginning of the withdrawal of Soviet troops in 1988 a special Operations Group of the General Staff under the leadership of General-Lieutenant A. G. Gaponenko began work in Afghanistan; it was involved in the creation of a three-month supply of emergency reserves for the RA [Republic of Afghanistan] Armed Forces in key regions of the country (Kandahar, Jalalabad, Ghazni, Gardez, etc.) and at guard posts.

Source of information: the USSR VS General Staff, the MO SSSR Operations Group in the DRA-RA

1979-1989

[Source: A. A. Lyakhovskiy's "Tragediya i Doblest' Afgana" ("Tragedy and Valor of the Afghanistan Veteran"), Iskon, Moscow, 1995; Translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg]

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[pp. 125-26 A list of Afghan leaders' requests in 1979 for Soviet troops:]

ESPECIALLY IMPORTANT DOCUMENT [SIC]

A list of requests by the Afghan leadership for the introduction of various contingents of Soviet troops into the DRA in 1979 (the dates indicated are the date of dispatch of secret reports to Moscow)

14 April	To send 15-20 Soviet attack helicopters with crews to the DRA
16 June	To send Soviet crews for tanks and BMPs [infantry combat vehicles] to the DRA to guard the government and Bagram and Shindand airfields
11 July	To bring several Soviet special groups of up to a battalion each into Kabul
19 July	To bring in up to two divisions into Afghanistan
20 July	To bring an airborne division into Kabul
21 July	To send 8-10 Mi-24 helicopters with Soviet crews to the DRA
24 July	To bring three army subunits into Kabul
1 August	To send a special brigade to Kabul
12 August	It is necessary to bring Soviet subunits into Kabul as quickly as possible, which the Afghans will need until spring
12 August	To send three Soviet special subunits and transport helicopters with Soviet crews to Kabul
21 August	To send 1500-2000 Soviet airborne troops to Kabul to replace Soviet anti-aircraft equipment crews with Soviet crews.
25 August	To bring Soviet troops into Kabul
2 October - 17 November	To send a special battalion for Amin's personal guard

20 November - 2 December	To bring a reinforced regiment into Badakhshan province
4 December	To bring Soviet militia subunits into the northern regions of Afghanistan
12 December 17 December	To quarter Soviet garrisons in the north of Afghanistan and to take the roads of the DRA under guard

[Source: A. A. Lyakhovskiy's "Tragediya i Doblest' Afgana" ("Tragedy and Valor of the Afghanistan Veteran"), Iskon, Moscow, 1995; Translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg]

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[pp. 144-5]

USSR Ministry of Defense and General Staff Operations Groups in the DRA

... During the period Soviet troops were in Afghanistan from time to time various operations groups [OG] of the Ministry of Defense [MO] and USSR Armed Forces General Staff operated there. The first, headed by a Deputy Commanding General of the Airborne Forces, General-Lieutenant N. N. Gus'kov, arrived in Bagram at the beginning of December and rebased to Kabul on 23 December 1979. From 25 to 27 December it exercised leadership of the transfer of airborne units, their housing, and operations from Bagram to Kabul during the overthrow of H. Amin's supporters.

On 3 January 1980 a USSR OG MO flew into Afghanistan from Termez headed by Marshal of the Soviet Union S. L. Sokolov (General of the Army S. F. Akhromeyev became his deputy), which was located there until November of that year. Then from time to time this group went to the DRA to coordinate the combat operations of Soviet and Afghan troops when conducting the largest operations (for example, in Panjshir) for up to six months.

Beginning with the last half of 1984 the leadership of the OG MO of the USSR and DRA was entrusted to General of the Army V. I. Varennikov, at that time a First Deputy Chief of the General Staff. At the very beginning he periodically visited Afghanistan, but beginning 2 January 1987 until the conclusion of the withdrawal of Soviet troops he was in Afghanistan continuously. The generals and officers of the USSR OG MO systematically worked in the units and formations of the 40th Army to give practical aid to their commanders and staffs in preparing and carrying out combat operations, organizing combat training considering accumulated experience, and also coordinating operations and maintaining coordination with the Afghan army. Aid was given to the advisory staff in planning combat operations, increasing the combat ability of the Afghan armed forces, and resolving various problems of combat activity. In addition, this group decided the most varied problems, both of a military, as well as of an economic, political, and social nature.

In connection with the fact that the first time the USSR OG MO was in Afghanistan was only on occasion, mainly to lead large operations, in March 1985 a group of representatives of the General Staff was sent to Kabul (five men in all), headed by the general for Afghanistan-related special assignments of the Chief of the USSR General Staff, General-Major B. V. Gromov (March 1985-May 1987) and General-Major V. S. Kudlay (May 1987-January 1989).

Operations groups were also sent to work among the [40th] Army's troops from the Turkestan Military District HQ.

With the start of the withdrawal of Soviet troops in 1988 a special Operations Group of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff under the command of General-Lieutenant A. G. Gaponenko began to work in Afghanistan; it dealt with creation of a three-month emergency supply for the Afghan armed forces in key areas of the country (Kandahar, Jalalabad, Ghazni, Gardez, etc.) and at guard posts.

In the initial stage the "Afghan campaigns" of the USSR OG MO did an enormous amount of organizational work. It exercised supervision of the regrouping, mobilization, and introduction of troops onto the territory of Afghanistan, and also the implementation of measures to remove H. Amin from power and form the regime of B. Karmal. In subsequent years the largest combat operations were conducted under its supervision and also the most complex issues of a military-political nature were resolved.

[Source: A. A. Lyakhovskiy's "Plamya Afgana" ("Flame of the Afghanistan veteran"), Iskon, Moscow, 1999; Translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg]

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[pp. 102-3, from "Amin's Dossier", probably from GRU sources, as are the other
dossiers in his books]

Hafizullah Amin, a member of a small Pushtun tribe, the Kharatal, was born into the family of an office worker in 1927 in the small town of Paghman, not far from Kabul. He lost his father early and was raised by an elder brother who was then a schoolteacher and then secretary to the president of a very large cotton company, "Spencer" (he was president of this company after the 1978 Revolution).

He graduated a higher teacher's college and the scientific faculty of Kabul University. After graduation from the University he worked as an instructor, deputy director, then director of the "Ibn Sina" Kabul Lycee. In 1957 he went to the US to further his education where he received a master's degree. After return to Afghanistan he taught for some time at Kabul University, again occupied the post of director of the "Ibn Sina" Lycee, and then was director of the higher teacher's college and chief of the department of primary education of the Ministry of Education. During this period H. Amin had a reputation as a Pushtun nationalist.

In 1962 again went to the US to prepare and defend a dissertation. He had begun active political work by this time. In 1963 he was elected chairman of the federation of Afghan students in the US; he was expelled from the US for his activity in [the federation] not long before completing work on his dissertation.

After his return to Afghanistan during the period of preparation for the founding congress of the PDPA (1965) he established close ties with N. M. Taraki and took an active part in the work of the congress. During the split in the PDPA he firmly supported Taraki, winning his [Taraki's] personal sympathies and becoming his closest associate.

On Taraki's recommendation in 1967 he was made a member of the CC PDPA "Khalq". However, after a conflict with T. Badakhshi the January 1968 plenum of the CC PDPA demoted him from a member to a candidate member [for] departing from the principles of internationalism. In the plenum's decision it was written that he is described as a person "known from his past public life for fascist traits and associated with highly-placed functionaries with those same qualities."

In 1969 Amin was elected a deputy of the lower house of parliament. He used the parliamentary forum to sharply criticize the monarchy. After M. Daud came to power and right up to the military coup of 27 April 1978 he was no longer in government service, being completely involved in Party and political work. This aided the growth of his authority and influence in the "Khalq" faction.

In the summer of 1977 he was elected a member of the united CC PDPA and at the same time was the leader of the Khalq military organization of the PDPA in the army (after the Party united, the military organizations of the "Khalq" and "Parcham" operated separately). After the arrest of PDPA leaders in April of 1978, he led the direct preparations for the armed attack by the army against the M. Daud regime.

Having come to power, the PDPA appointed Amin Deputy Prime Minister and DRA Minister of Foreign Affairs by decision of the Revolutionary Council. He was elected a member of the Politburo and a member of the Secretariat, and after the removal of A. Kadyr from the post of Minister of Defense, he was authorized to "assist N. M. Taraki in carrying out the functions of Minister of Defense". All the weight of power was really in the army.

Amin gradually concentrated the hands-on work of party organization and government policy in his hands and established complete control over the operations of the security agencies. The unlimited trust of Taraki and his outstanding personal qualities facilitated his rise. Amin is marked by great energy, a businesslike nature, a desire to get to the heart of the issue, and firmness in his views and actions. He also has the talent of attracting people to him who have subordinated themselves to his influence. In conversations he is precise, brief, and has a good memory. He is able to win his interlocutor over to his side.

Using his influence, he brought relatives and people personally devoted to him into the PDPA and the government bureaucracy. He knows English fluently, does not smoke, and does not abuse alcoholic beverages.

He is married and has seven children.

[Source: A. A. Lyakhovskiy's "Plamya Afgana" ("Flame of the Afghanistan veteran)", Iskon, Moscow, 1999; Translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg]

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[pp. 176-7, Babrak Karmal's GRU dossier]

Babruk Karmal was born in 1929 in the small town of Kamari near Kabul. He is a Pushtun and comes from a military family. His father is General-Colonel Mukhammed Husein, a Pushtun from the Mollakhel tribe; during the monarchy he was commander of the Paktia Corps and Governor-General of Paktia, and [then] headed the Financial Directorate of the Ministry of Defense. He retired before the 1973 coup, but during Daud's rule he returned to service and commanded the 17th Infantry Division and was Governor of Herat. In 1976 he finally left the army. Karmal's mother is a Tajik.

In connection with the frequent travels of his father he was raised in the mixed Tajik-Pushtun family of Doctor Keramuddin Kakar, where he met the wife of the latter, Anahita Rotebzad, who became an eminent figure of the PDPA.

In 1952 B. Karmal graduated the Law School of Kabul University. In 1953 he was arrested for organizing student demonstrations and was in prison for about three years. He served in the army in 1957-1959. From 1960 to 1964 he worked in the Ministry of Education and Planning. He was elected a deputy to Parliament under Prime Ministers Ettamadi, Zahir, and Musa Shafik.

He was one of the founders of the PDPA. In 1967, after the split in the PDPA, he headed the "Parcham" faction. After the Party reunited in June 1977 he was the Deputy General Secretary of the CC PDPA. In April 1978 (after the military coup) he became Deputy Chairman of the Revolutionary Council and Prime Minister of the DRA. In May 1978 he was sent to Czechoslovakia as the DRA ambassador. In August, under pressure from H. Amin, he was removed from all of his posts. Fearing reprisal, he did not return to Afghanistan and stayed to live in the USSR.

He is a skilled orator, emotional, and inclined to abstraction to the detriment of a specific analysis. He has a poor grasp of economic issues which interest him at a general level.

He knows Dari and Pashto, but most often uses Dari.

He is fluent in English and knows some German.

He is married and has four children. His younger half-brother by his father is Mahmud Baryalai.

[Source: A. A. Lyakhovskiy's "Plamya Afgana" ("Flame of the Afghanistan veteran)", Iskon, Moscow, 1999; Translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg]

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[pp. 369-70 GRU dossier on Najibullah]

Muhammad Najib (Najibullah) was born in 1947 in the province of Paktia into a prosperous family. He is a Pushtun and a Sunni Moslem. His father Akhtar Muhammad was the leader of a tribe and maintained relations with the former president of Afghanistan, M. Daud. Najibullah's roots are from the Ahmadzai, part of the Gilzai union of Pushtun tribes.

In 1964 Najibullah entered the medical school of Kabul University. He joined the "Parcham" faction of the PDPA in 1965. He was twice arrested in 1966 for active participation in anti-government demonstrations [*vystupleniya*]. He followed B. Karmal after the Party split in 1967. He was imprisoned in 1969 for political activity. In 1970 he was elected Secretary of the underground PDPA City Committee in Kabul from the "Parcham".

Nevertheless, in 1975 he graduated the University and began his profession as a gynecologist; he worked several years in a number of provinces. He joined the united CC PDPA in 1978. After the coup in April 1978 he became a member of the DRA Revolutionary Council. In June of that year (when N. M. Taraki and H. Amin were in power) he was sent to Iran as DRA ambassador.

But he was removed from the post of ambassador in the summer of 1979 and emigrated to Yugoslavia. In the process he appropriated \$100,000 from Embassy funds. He returned to his homeland after the entry of Soviet troops into the DRA. In 1980 he headed the state security organization and was again elected to the Revolutionary Council. He has been a member of the CC PDPA Politburo since 1981 and since 1985 he has been the Secretary of the CC PDPA for Ministry of Defense [MO], Ministry of State Security [MGB], and Ministry of Internal Affairs [MVD] issues.

He is an intelligent, clever, and a vicious politician. He is vain and ambitious.

A Pushtun nationalist, he is one of the motivating spirits of the policy of "Pushtunization" of Afghan society. Within his closest circle he speaks only in Pashto. He is inclined to select colleagues not for their professional qualities but for their personal devotion to him, predominantly relatives and fellow-villagers [*zemlyaki*].

He knows English, is married, and has three daughters. His wife is from a wealthy family. [From the dossier of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate on M. Najib]

[Source: A. A. Lyakhovskiy's "Plamya Afgana" ("Flame of the Afghanistan veteran)", Iskon, Moscow, 1999; Translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg]

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[pp. 282-88, from dossiers of "Alliance-7" rebel leaders, mid-1980s]

1. *Gulbuddin Hekmatyar* – Leader of the Islamic Party of Afghanistan (IPA). He comes from the family of a large landowner. He was born in the village of Wartapur in the Imamsahib District, Kunduz Province in 1944 and is of the Pushtun Kharuti tribe.

He finished primary school in Imamsahib and studied 8 years in a lycee in Kabul, finishing grades 9 to 12 in the Shirkhan Lycee in Kunduz. Afterwards he studied for a while in the engineering school of Kabul University, where he became one of the founders and leaders of an Islamic organization, "Muslim Youth". In 1972 Hekmatyar was arrested and imprisoned for extremely sharp criticism of the monarchy, the Afghan aristocracy, and participation in a clash with members of the "Shoalee Dzhavid" organization. He was freed after the overthrow of the monarchy in 1973.

There are a number of people in the Afghan leadership who know G. Hekmatyar and observed the beginning of his political activity at Kabul University. In their opinion, the elements of patriotism and thoughts about a progressive future of Afghanistan and its role in the region were characteristic of his views at that time. The present implacability and extremism were formed as a result of a confluence of unfavorable circumstances.

Hekmatyar's advancement into the ranks of leaders of the Islamic movement took place in 1973-1975 when repression against the clergy began on order of M. Daud. Having emigrated to Pakistan in 1974, he created the Islamic Party of Afghanistan from the surviving members of the extremist organization "Muslim Youth".

He received financial and other aid to create the Party from Pakistani military circles and special services. From this time he has been the Pakistan secret service's man. In the summer of 1975 the just-created IPA made an attempt to incite an armed peasant revolt in Panjshir, Laghman, Sorkhrud, Barikot, Uruzgan, and Mangal. The peasants did not support the revolt and the government troops crushed it. The leaders and activists of the IPA who survived fled to Pakistan where they received the status of political asylees. After an unsuccessful revolt against M. Daud's regime in April 1976 Hekmatyar handed over leadership of the Party and was replaced by Qazi Muhammad Amin; only in January 1979 was he again elected the leader (amir) of the IPA.

He is described as being inclined to extremist actions, imperiousness, great ambition, and eccentricity; this has forced him into an isolated position among other leaders of the Afghan opposition. He is an ardent Pushtun nationalist who has more than once declared "I am first a Pushtun and then a Muslim". However he was born in northern Afghanistan where Pushtuns are a

minority. He was therefore never associated with the tribal system. Obviously he enjoys the greatest support from Pakistan, not being interested in strengthening the Pushtun tribes and solving Pushtun problems.

At the same time G. Hekmatyar has closely followed the course of the Iranian Islamic revolution, trying to determine the direction of its political platform. He visited Iran in 1979, where he met with Ayatollah Khomeini.

Sharp differences with the leaders of almost all the opposition parties, constant control, and pressure from Pakistani authorities (even as far as personal complaints from Zia ul-Haq) are his reality. In the interests of receiving maximum financial aid from the US and other Western countries he has been forced to exploit [*spekulirovat*] the possibility of relocating his HQ from Pakistan to Iran, threaten to reduce the IPA's ties with the US, and the establish close collaboration with Muslim countries, firstly Iran.

He is the owner of gem-processing and narcotic production enterprises and also two factories which manufacture water hoses and china. He has 150 rickshaws in Peshawar. Appropriating money from funds intended for the delivery of food, medicine, and clothing to Afghan refugees, he buys up stock in industrial and trading firms, and puts hundreds of thousands of dollars in his personal accounts in West European and American banks. Just one of them, "American Express Bank" in Basel (Switzerland), received \$245,000 from Hekmatyar in February and March of 1987. Part of his money is held in "Habib Bank" (Pakistan). He pays up to 18,000 Pakistani rupees for rental of a house.

Hekmatyar is not at all squeamish about his financial and commercial activities. Through a widespread network of front men and minor sales representatives – wholesale and retail – he sells batches of medicines, clothing, and food intended for refugees in Pakistan and Iran. He does not reject the sale of threadbare clothing or generally anything that is profitable. He operates on the principle: money does not smell bad.

He is the owner of enterprises that produce narcotics. According to some information, G. Hekmatyar and his closest circle in the Northwest Frontier Province of Pakistan (SZPP) have organized a network of laboratories to process opium poppies into heroin. The narcotics are exported to Europe and the Americas (including the US) through the Pakistani port of Karachi. The opium sales yield fabulous profits. Hekmatyar's interests in the narcotics business explains the insistence which the IPA armed formations display in trying to seize the cities of Jalalabad and Khowst in southeastern Afghanistan. It is in these very provinces bordering Pakistan, like the SZPP, where plantations of opium poppies cultivated by the IPA rebels are located.

In one of the letters to the commander of a subordinate armed detachment Hekmatyar informed him that "international friends" had given his group toxic

chemical agents. He gave orders that several fighters be sent to acquire the skills of using them from American specialists.

2. Burnahuddin Rabbani – Leader of the Afghan counterrevolutionary party Islamic Society of Afghanistan (IOA). He was born in 1940 into a religious family in Fayzabad, in the northern province of Badakhshan. He is a Tajik of the Yaftali tribe and is therefore especially attractive to many non-Pushtuns.

After his general educational school, where he displayed an outstanding aptitude for religious disciplines, he entered the "Abu Hanifiya" Islamic school in Kabul. He has been a member of the "Muslim Brotherhood" since 1958. He graduated the school in 1959, receiving his clerical degree [*dukhovnyy san*]; in 1963 he graduated the college of theology and law of Kabul University. He then taught at the University. He was one of the leaders of the "Muslim Brotherhood" organization in Afghanistan. On instructions of the leadership of this organization he headed the youth group at the university which received the name "Muslim Youth".

In 1965 he left for Egypt and entered "al-Azhar" University, where he displayed outstanding abilities. He received an academic degree in Islamic philosophy in 1968. On return to Afghanistan he was appointed an instructor of Kabul University. He published several works in print on Islam. As a professor of theology he was quite widely known among foreign Islamic theologians and maintained ties with Muslim figures in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and with the leadership of "Jamiat-e Islami" and "Jamiat-e Ulema" in Pakistan.

He knows Persian, Arabic, Urdu, English, and Turkish.

In 1973 Rabbani was elected head of the "Muslim Brotherhood" organization, holding this post until 1976. When M. Daud came to power he was persecuted by the authorities. In 1974 he avoided arrest and hid in the territory of the tribes who continued to fight the Daud regime. Then he emigrated to Pakistan, where he created a new party, the Islamic Party of Afghanistan, from amongst the members of the "Islamic Youth" organization.

B. Rabbani was one of the biggest exporters of rugs until April 1978 and dealt in contraband. He owns poultry processing and carpet and textile production enterprises in Pakistan, receiving a profit of up to 20,000,000 rupees a year. Another source of income is trade in contraband goods and narcotics, conducted in Iran and Pakistan by the gang leaders of his organization. Right now he is one of the biggest suppliers of opium and heroin in Muslim countries. The export of contraband lazurite from Badakhshan and emeralds from Panjshir is carried out with his participation.

Rabbani uses the funds and organizational structure of the IOA for the operation of his secret syndicate, shamelessly appropriating huge sums - aid to

the Afghan refugees. In particular, for the six months at the end of 1988 and the beginning of 1989 his personal deposits in US and European banks under the name of "Tafil Muhammad" increased by more than 600,000,000 Pakistani rupees. There are underground laboratories to process opium under his control in the regions of Dara-Adam-Khel and Cherat in Pakistan. A network of narcotics contraband agents has been created abroad.

A third of the guerillas Rabbani sends to Afghanistan are chronic drug addicts and about half use drugs periodically. These "warriors of Islam" are stoned on drugs and brag that they are entrusted with the most important actions during their raids – burning hospitals, poisoning wells, killing women and children, highway robbery, and robbing the civilian population. The lion's share of what is stolen goes to B. Rabbani himself; he invests his money in his business and improves the production and transport of narcotics, trying to conceal the indecent occupation of a "defender of Islam" from the eyes of Interpol.

He favors the creation of an Islamic republic in Afghanistan based on unquestioning observance of the laws of sharia. He relies on the development of relations with Muslim countries while at the same time trying to use maximally the aid and support of the US and the West in competition with G. Hekmatyar for the leadership of the "Alliance-7".

B. Rabbani enjoys the strongest influence among the population of the central and northern regions of the country.

3. *Sebkhatulla Mojadaddi* – Leader of the National Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan (NFSA) party. He was born in Kabul in 1925, the offspring of the most influential family clan in Afghanistan, hereditary hazrats (descendants of the prophet [Mohammed]). The clan, Arab in origin, resettled to Afghanistan from India and has played a large role in the political, religious, and ideological life of the country. Sebkhatulla received an education in the famous Cairo university, al-Azhar, where he became acquainted with the "Muslim Brotherhood", including the founder of the organization, al-Banna.

He then taught in the "Habibiya", "Gazi", and "Istiqlal" Lycees and was a professor of Islamic law at Kabul University where he advocated the ideas of the "Muslim Brotherhood". In 1960 he was sentenced to 4 years in prison for anti-government activity and for trying to organize an attack [*pokusheniye*] on a Soviet delegation then in Kabul, but after several weeks he was freed from custody. He emigrated from the country and based himself in Copenhagen, where he headed an Islamic center distributing propaganda among Muslims living there.

He later became known in Afghanistan as an academic theologian and skilled orator. In his speeches and printed works he argued the need for "a rebirth of Islam in [its] original form and give it an aggressive (militant) nature".

He was an ardent opponent of the reforms conducted by the monarchy and spoke out against the King. An Islamic extremist organization, the "Muslim Brotherhood", was created in 1966 with his direct participation. According to testimony of A. Sayaf, the "Muslim Youth" refused turned him down when Mojaddadi requested membership. Evidently its leaders feared they would end up in secondary roles if Mojaddadi joined.

In 1976-77 while in Pakistan he created a "Society of Muslim Theologians" from members of the moderate wing of the "Muslim Brotherhood". He lived in the Netherlands from 1977 to the beginning of 1979, where he was the imam [*nastoyatel'*] of a mosque.

On 12 March 1979 S. Mojaddadi issued an appeal to all Muslims of Afghanistan, having issued a fatwa about the start of a "jihad" against the PDPA regime... He is considered a supporter of a "Western option" for solving the Afghan problem. The final goal of the organization he heads is the creation of a bourgeois clerical government based on the teachings of Islam and proper democratic principles.

S. Mojaddadi is a leader of the "Sufi Nakshbandi" order and he knows five foreign languages.

After the [April 1978] Saur Revolution 75 members of his clan were repressed, of which more than 30 were executed by the Taraki-Amin regime. With the aid of relatives S. Mojaddadi established close ties with Islamic circles of Saudi Arabia, Iran, Egypt, Pakistan, and India. His first cousin Hashem and sister live in Saudi Arabia; she married one of the princes of the ruling dynasty.

Mojaddadi has four sons by Merkhnegor (the older sister of Suleyman Layek, the Minister for Ethnic Groups and Tribes). One of his sons (Azizulla) was killed by IPA terrorists, which became one of the reasons for the personal hatred of the father toward the leader of the IPA, G. Hekmatyar.

In the national archives of India there are British Intelligence Service materials on the people of the Mojaddadi clan who have cooperated with British special services to varying degrees.

This person has long valued only wealth. The fate of Afghans suffering in a foreign land does not touch him. There are many facts attesting to this. Take this case for example. When residents of two camps in the area of Aravali and Alizay, exhausted by hunger and illnesses, raised their voices in protest, their resentment was unceremoniously suppressed with the help of guerrillas directly subordinate to S. Mojaddadi. He simply accused the dissatisfied people with treason and shot them on the spot.

Thanks to the political, business, and financial connections of his clan and also religious authority, Sebkhataulla Mojaddadi has become one of the leading figures of the Afghan counterrevolution. He enjoys special influence in the zone where Pushtun tribes have settled – in the eastern and southeastern provinces and in a number of regions of the provinces of Samangan and Baghlan. He declined the proposal of the Afghan leaders to form a coalition government. He is a supporter of entrusting the functions of head of state to Zahir Shah.

4. *Said Ahmad Gilani* – Leader of the National Islamic Front of Afghanistan (NIFA) party, who claims the role of ideological mentor and inspirer of the Afghan nation. He was born in 1931 into a family of hereditary spiritual leaders [*piriy*] of Iraqi Arab origin. His father, Khezrat Sekhab, maintained close ties with the family of Nadir Khan, the father of King Zahir Shah. He has constantly and actively collaborated with British intelligence. With the aid of the British he was elected supreme representative of the Sunni order "Kadiriya" in Afghanistan. Gilani's mother, Marta Richter, is the daughter of an important German police official.

S. A. Gilani became a hereditary spiritual leader (*pir*) of the order of "Kadiriya Sufi"; he inherited this from his father and the majority of Afghans belong to this order, especially Pushtuns. It has numerous Murid followers.

Gilani received his secular education in the West and his spiritual education in Iraq; he visited Egypt and Saudi Arabia for the latter purpose. He speaks five languages fluently.

The Gilani family was rich and influential in Kabul. Before the overthrow of the monarchy it was close to the King (Gilani was an unofficial personal adviser to Zahir Shah). It had similar close ties with highly-placed government officials and high-ranking army officers who joined the NIFA after 1978.

He inherited parcels of land from his father in Nangarhar, Paktia, Laghman, Khowst, and Lashkar Gah; he had a large income from trade in Astrakhan hats and owned real estate in Kabul, Kunduz, and other cities of the country. In Kabul he owned a store which sold "Peugeot" automobiles on a consignment basis.

Before April 1978 his personal wealth was estimated at \$7,000,000. After he fled to Pakistan, Gilani purchased two villas in Rawalpindi (Mol Road) and Islamabad (Garden Road), several luxury automobiles, repair shops and stores in Quetta and Peshawar from the proceeds of theft [*za schet nagrablennogo*]. Gilani spends most of his time in Europe and often visits the US where he pursues an idle and dissipated lifestyle. He feeds a weakness for women, wine, and luxury, wasting resources earmarked for refugees, for which he was criticized by fundamentalist leaders of the Afghan opposition.

Thanks to broad ties with the royal family, the clergy of Pushtun tribes, and his personal wealth he has authority among the Pushtun population of Nangarhar, Paktia, Logar, and Paktika. S. Gilani is described as a religious and political figure with moderate views. He supports the idea of establishing a "Muslim democracy" of a new type and the creation of a government and republican structure headed by Zahir Shah or a person from his immediate entourage. He has numerous business and social connections in the US, Western Europe, and Arab countries. He is married to the granddaughter of the former king of Afghanistan, Zahir Shah.

5. Muhammad Nabi (Muhammadi) – leader of the Movement for the Islamic Revolution of Afghanistan (DIRA) party, he was born in 1920 in the district of Baraki in Logar province. He is a Pushtun from the Andar tribe, from a wealthy family of the cleric Maulawi Abdul Wakhaba. He studied in religious schools in the provinces of Logar, Ghazni, and Laghman. In 1946 he completed his theology studies, having received permission from the senior sheikhs of the Kadirya religious order and then of Nakshbandiya to teach Islam and interpret sacred texts.

He gained fame and authority in religious circles. He has a university theological education and is an orthodox Muslim, knows the Koran and the laws of sharia well, is an excellent orator, and is fluent in Arabic. Until 1973 Nabi worked as an instructor in a religious school in Logar province and was a deputy to Parliament. Using his position, he illegally obtained about 100 hectares of irrigated land in the province of Helmand. He is an opponent of the penetration of Western culture into Afghanistan.

He is an ardent nationalist and anticommunist. He created a circle of religious figures where they fought for an Islamic way of life, and a denunciation of communism, progressive ideas and tendencies.

With the ascent to power of M. Daud in 1973, dissatisfied with the overthrow of King Zahir Shah and the loss of his place in Parliament, he opposed carrying out reforms and the Daud regime; he wrote and distributed antigovernment verses, for which he was arrested and was held by the police for a short time. He then went to the south of the country where he yet again preached.

In 1975 he was recruited on a patriotic basis by the police into an agent network for political snooping.

In 1978 he fled to Pakistan and founded his own party from the "Servants of the Koran" organization; its framework was composed of famous ulemas and theologians, predominantly from the southwestern regions of Afghanistan. DIRA is an extremely reactionary Islamic organization. Its detachments are characterized by religious fanaticism, which explains the presence in their ranks

of a large number of low-ranking mullahs who reportedly do not fear death at all. Being a supporter of armed struggle against the government of Afghanistan, Nabi does not share the extremism of Hekmatyar, favoring the participation of Zahir Shah in settling the Afghan problem.

He appropriated about 300,000 Pakistan rupees from DIRA funds. He ordered a golden crown for his bride.

M. Nabi is little known in the Muslim religious circles of other countries. He maintains contact with Maulawi Mufti Mahmud, the leader of the "Jamiat-e Ulema" of Pakistan, receiving aid and support from him.

6. *Muhammad Yunus (Khales)* – Leader of the Islamic Party (IPKh), he was born in 1919 in the village of Dekh-Qazi, Khugiani district, Nangarhar province, into the family of a wealthy religious figure and landowner. He is a Pushtun from the Khugiani tribe of the Ibrahimkheyl family of the Nabikheyl clan. He received a religious education from his father, then from his uncle, an eminent cleric of Nangarhar province, Abdul Rezak.

He does not have a university theological education, although he passes himself off as an academic theologian and gave himself the title of Maulawi. He was a mullah of one of the mosques of Kabul, became a member of the "Muslim Brotherhood" organization, and committed a number of crimes. He is a paid agent of special services.

In 1963-1973 he headed a narrow fundamentalist group of his followers [called] "Tawabin" in Kabul, consisting of mullahs; it propagandized in mosques of the capital. It had a number of publications on political and religious subjects. He maintained contacts with the family of the former King, Zahir Shah. In 1976 Yu. Khales and his group became part of the IPA. During the period of Daud's rule he worked as a cleric in the provinces of Kunar, Paktia, and Paktika.

At the end of 1979, because of personal differences with Hekmatyar, he created his own party with a similar name.

He sent his first wife and two children to Saudi Arabia, but in spite of the disapproval of his entourage, in May 1982 he himself married an 18-year-old woman from a rich family of a religious authority in Kandahar province, Kadyra Kandahari, calculating thereby on strengthening his ties and restoring [his] financial situation.

Yu. Khales is the only leader of the Afghan opposition who is continually in Afghanistan with his detachments; his Islamic fanaticism has dictated a policy of terror, sabotage, and the lowest methods of combat against people's power.

7. Abdul Rab Rasul Sayaf – Leader of the Islamic Union for the Liberation of Afghanistan (ISOA), was born in the district of Paghman, Kabul province, in 1944. He is described as a perfidious and cruel individual. He graduated the Islamic school "Abu Khanifa" in 1963 and the theological school of Kabul University in 1967. In 1964 he joined an illegal fundamentalist circle. Five years later he joined the "Muslim Brotherhood". After graduating the university he did a year's service in the army. In 1970, according to the quota given the clergy, Sayaf (as the offspring of a family of seids, according to tradition, descendants of the Prophet) was sent to get an academic theological education at the Cairo university "al-Azhar", where he studied together (in one group) with Saudi King Fahd.

At the end of 1973 he went to the US on a government stipend to study Islamic law. After return to Afghanistan he was arrested and sentenced to 6 years, accused of preparing and carrying out anti-government acts and brutal reprisals against the population.

Released from prison, he arrived in Pakistan at the start of 1980. He became a highly-placed member of the "Muslim Brotherhood" organization. He created his organization in March 1982 after unsuccessful attempts to unite the opposition parties into a single union. He does not enjoy authority among the leaders of the counterrevolution.

He is inclined to intrigue and is disposed to commit any crime to achieve personal ends. He is noted for contraband and trading in narcotics. He frequently uses bribery as a means of operation. Having bought parcels of land in the area of Babu (Peshawar) at a high price, he is building 500 homes, intending to rent them. Together with this, he owns trucks and they are also for rent. There are "dark" spots in Sayaf's biography, in particular the appropriation of funds of the first Islamic Union for the Liberation of Afghanistan.

[Source: A. A. Lyakhovskiy's "Plamya Afgana" ("Flame of the Afghanistan veteran)", Iskon, Moscow, 1999; Translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg]

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[pp. 294-8 Dossiers of rebel field commanders, 1986 and after]

Ahmad Shah, son [of] Dust Mukhammajan, was born in 1953 in the village of Jangalak (Bazarak rural district, Panjshir district) into the family of an important feudal lord who was a career military man (his father retired in 1976 as a colonel). He is a Tajik and Sunni Muslim. He graduated the Kabul theological lycee "Abu Hanifiya" and studied at the engineering school of Kabul University, where he joined the "Muslim Youth" organization, where among the founders were B. Rabbani, G. Hekmatyar, R. Sayaf...

In 1973 after the coup the supporters of "Muslim Youth" organized a plot in the army to overthrow the Daud regime and proclaim an Islamic republic. The plot was exposed and its participants executed. A. Shah managed to hide.

In 1974-5 he took an active part in preparing and carrying out an uprising in the village of Bazarak in the Panjshir district; it took place on 21 June 1975, but it was crushed because of a lack of support from the population. According to some information, Ahmad Shah emigrated (Egypt, Lebanon), where he took part in combat operations and committed terrorists acts in armed Palestinian groups. He studied the experience of guerilla warfare in the Near East, Latin America, and Southeast Asia. The M. Daud regime declared him a war criminal. In 1977 Ahmad Shah joined with B. Rabbani (IOA), a Tajik, whom he considered the most worthy leader of the Islamic movement in Afghanistan.

In 1978 he returned to Afghanistan after the April Revolution and began to create armed detachments in the Panjshir Valley. Having organizational and propaganda skills and theological training (a factor of no little importance in the Muslim world), combat experience, and skillfully using the nationalist sentiments of the Tajiks and the dogma of Islam, enjoying the personal patronage of B. Rabbani, by the end of 1979 Ahmad Shah managed to create and lead a group of rebels in the Panjshir.

Initially there were 20 fighters by his own admission, but the experience of terrorist acts allowed him to quickly kill chiefs contending for leadership in the area and establish his supremacy. Ahmad Shah did not acquire the pseudonym Masoud, which means "lucky", by coincidence. Moreover he has proved this to everyone: he is a strong-willed and energetic person who displays persistence and purposefulness in achieving set tasks.

Ahmad Shad considers the US and Pakistan together with the Soviet Union to be to blame for Afghanistan's predicament, but he is convinced that no regime can exist without the support of and friendly relations with the USSR.

He has a negative opinion of the leaders of the "Alliance-7" and here his main enemy is G. Hekmatyar.

After the Parchamists came to power in 1979 persecutions of the Khalqists began. The majority of officials of government institutions were representatives of this faction of the PDPA in the Panjshir district; fearing repression by the Parchamists they defected to the IOA, joining the ranks of A. Shah.

He is one of the most influential leaders of the counterrevolution. Being an ardent opponent of the present political system, Ahmad Shah considers the leaders of the PDPA and the government to be his main enemies. An active nationalist and an anti-Soviet, he opposes the presence of Soviet troops. He has close contacts with representatives of the leading capitalist countries; he especially eagerly established ties with the French (he speaks French and English fluently).

He has organizational abilities and outstanding personal and professional qualities. He is a strong-willed, energetic, bold, and decisive leader. He is resolute in achieving the assigned missions and keeps his word. He is an intelligent, clever, and brutal enemy. He has unchallenged authority among the rebels and a strong influence on the civilian population of the zones under [his] control. An experienced conspirator, he is reserved, cautious, vain, and ambitious.

An analysis of the closest circle of Ahmad Shah permits the conclusion that he does not completely trust any of his subordinates.

He places constant emphasis on ensuring his security. His personal guard was selected from those devoted to him. He always has three bodyguards with him. Detachments of up to 100 rebels are selected as his escorts and guard force during movements. He has no permanent residence and changes his location constantly.

He is religious and observes the Muslim way of life strictly. He is unpretentious in manner and hardy. He dresses modestly, as a rule wearing a semi-military style uniform and a "Nuristani" (a beret-type headgear made of wool). His personal weapon is an AKSU [trans. note: the folding-stock assault rifle issued to Soviet airborne troops] and a pistol.

Rumors are spread among the local population in order to mislead [enemies] about Ahmad Shah's activities and the places he stays; they are also spread through an agent network and inserted into various government institutions, even to the highest levels of the Party and government staff, the Ministry of State Security and Ministry of Defense. His persona, which has become legendary and semi-mythical, is aided by spreading disinformation about his personality. Many Afghans eagerly accept the most improbable stories about

his victories, believe in him, and help spread [the disinformation] further, as a rule, embellishing it.

Ismail son of Muhammad Aslam (Ismail Khan) was born in 1947 in the village of Nasrabad, Shindand district, Herat province. He is a Pushtun of the Alizai tribe. He graduated the "Kharbi pukhantun" Military School. Until 1979 he was a captain ("turan") and commanded a battalion of the 17th Infantry Division, so he received the nickname "Turan". After the Herat mutiny (March 1979) he deserted and headed an armed formation of the IOA in the Herat vicinity.

He is married and his family lives in Tayabad (Iran). He is reserved and cautious and often changes the location of his headquarters. He is extraordinarily cruel and deals personally with prisoners.

He is the commander of the armed groups of the IOA in the province of Herat and considered second after Ahmad Shah as a rebel leader in Afghanistan.

About 2,000 rebels operate under his command. He enjoys the respect of the local population since he forbids plundering.

Maulawi Jelaluddin Khakani was born in 1935 into the Mizi family of the Jadran tribe. He graduated from a religious school (medressah) in Pakistan. He received his clerical degree and opened a medressah in the village of Farakh, Paktia province, on return to Afghanistan. During the rule of Zahir Shah and M. Daud he took an active part in the anti-government activity of the "Muslim Brotherhood" (Paktia) organization.

After April 1978 he was one of the first to fight against the PDPA. He supported the political policy of the IPA and was considered a representative of G. Hekmatyar in Paktia. Then he joined the IPKh. He later declared himself independent of the remaining opposition organizations and the military commander of the Jadran tribe. With full mobilization of his tribe he is able to deploy up to 10,000 armed fighters.

Jelaluddin regularly visits Saudi Arabia, where he holds direct talks with representatives of the government of that country. He also receives weapons, ammunition, and also financial support personally, bypassing the IPKh headquarters in Peshawar.

He is described as a cruel and uncompromising person. He is implacably opposed to the Najibullah regime in Afghanistan. He wages armed combat on a platform of establishing an Islamic republic on orthodox Islamic principles. Jelaluddin's armed formations number up to 3,000 and are located mainly in the area the Jadran tribe lives in the provinces of Paktika and Paktia.

Said Mansur son [of] Said Marteza (pseudonym - Said Pancha) was born in the province of Parwan in 1955. A Tajik, he graduated a 12-year lycee and worked for some time as a petty trader. He then entered Kabul University but completed only two years. He joined the Islamic Party of Afghanistan during his first year. In 1978 G. Hekmatyar appointed him head of the IPA rebels in the province of Baghlan. The main area of operations of his group adjoins a sector of the Doshi-Salang route.

He displays exceptional brutality toward people suspected of loyalty to the ruling regime. He is intelligent, clever, and resourceful. He has repeatedly played games with Party and government bodies, giving the appearance of wanting to begin negotiations on collaboration. However he used the time gained to strengthen his groups and his authority among the heads of detachments and groups.

He is careful and constantly changes his location, fearing attacks. He distributes disinformation through his agent network regarding his movements. He has a personal guard of 20 men. The main basing areas are situated in the canyons of Wal'yan and Bajga (in the rural district of Khinzhan, Baghlan province). He has up to 1,500 armed rebels actively operating under his command.

Muhammad Bashir son of Zergul' was born in 1951 in the province of Baghlan. He is a Pushtun.

He is married and his family lives in the village of Davlyazan (in the area of Baghlan). He worked earlier as an official of the directorate of agriculture in the province of Baghlan. At the present time he is a major group leader of the IPA. The rebels operating under his command number 500.

He is described as cautious and brutal. He has personally participated in executions and is fanatically devoted to the leader of the IPA, G. Hekmatyar. The activities of his group have a criminal nature; the rebels steal and terrorize local residents.

Ustad Farid was born in 1949. He is a Tajik. He graduated Kabul University and worked as an instructor at a lycee then director of a school. Even back during his studies at the university he approached Hekmatyar and became a member of the "Muslim Youth" organization. By nature he is reserved and clever. He is an irreconcilable foe of the PDPA and Kabul authorities. He maintains ties with Hekmatyar and carried out only his personal orders. He is the head of the IPA group in the province of Kapisa, who numbers total about 1,500 men.

Abdul Khalid Basir son of maulawi Mamad Aslam was born in 1945 in the city of Fayzabad (Badakhshan province) into the family of a cleric. He is a Tajik.

In 1965 he graduated the "Pamir" Lycee. During M. Daud's rule he worked as a teacher in Fayzabad and in the rural district of Koran-o-Munjan.

After April 1978 he initiated an armed struggle in the province of Badakhshan. Basir personally took part in combat operations both against government and Soviet troops and against the groups of other parties. He is trying to expand the zone of his influence and reach the lazurite deposits in the Jarm district (he even competes with Ahmad Shah in this). During combat operations he has shown himself to be an experienced commander and a cruel and crafty enemy. Only relatives are in his closest circle. Basir's authority rests on feelings of fear, even among those close to him.

He relies on the support of local residents in his activity. His armed detachments number about 1,000 men. Basir devotes much attention to the engineer preparation of base areas in canyons and setting up firing positions.

Said Ali Beheshti was born in 1930 in the village of Chejchi, in the rural district of Varas, Bamian province, into the family of a cleric. He is a Hazara and a Shiite Muslim. He graduated a medressah in Bamian, then continued his education in Najaf (Iraq) under the supervision of Ayatollah Khomeini [then leader of Iraq's Shiites]. On return from Iraq he energetically occupied himself with religious activity among the Hazaras; with the financial support of a large feudal lord of Hazarajat, Sarvar Khan, in a short time he advanced to be one of the well-known Shiite religious figures.

After the April Revolution he took an openly anti-government position. In August of 1978 a government of the so-called "Islamic Republic of Hazara Shiites" was formed in Bamian province. The "Central Islamic Council" headed by Sheikh Said Ali Beheshti was declared to be the highest authority. In 1982 the "Central Council" ceased to exist but S. A. Beheshti rose to head a group, the Council of Islamic Accord (SIS).

The political platform of Beheshti includes a demand for the withdrawal of Soviet troops, the creation of an Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, and the granting of autonomy to Hazarajat. At the same time, being more of a theoretician and a mild individual, he does not advocate the harsh position of a need for armed combat with government authority. He has repeatedly spoken out for a dialogue with the government in order to stop the armed combat in Hazarajat. But because of his indecisiveness he advanced the condition that other leaders of the SIS should take part in the talks. [His] armed formations number more than 1,000 men.

Said Muhammad Hasan son of Said Mubin (better known as Said Jagran), was born in 1925 in the village of Sporepkhawar, Nuwar district, Ghazni province, into the family of a mid-level feudal landlord. He is a Hazara.

He studied for seven years in a military lycee and graduated the "Kharbi pukhantun" Military School in Kabul, then the Higher Military Artillery School in the USSR. His last place of service was the 14th Infantry Division in Ghazni and his [last] rank was Lieutenant Colonel. He deserted during the rule of H. Amin in 1979. In 1980-81 he waged active and comparatively successful combat operations against DRA armed forces.

In 1982 S. Jagran declared a wish to hold talks with the government about ceasing combat operations, but as a result of provocative actions on the part of the DRA government (combined bombing and strafing attacks by aircraft in the areas he was deployed), Jagran refused to do this.

Later he ceased active combat operations against people's power, but did not dismiss his armed groups; he fought against groups of the "Nasr" (Victory) and KSIRA, trying to gain a dominant position in the provinces of Ghazni, Wardak, Bamian, Gur, and the northern part of Uruzgan.

S. Jagran enjoys influence among the Hazaras both as a political and a military leader. His armed detachments number up to 6,000 men.

Muhammad Asef Mohseni (Kandahari) was born in Kandahar in 1925. He is a Pushtun. He received a theological education in Najaf and is close to Ayatollah Khomeini. In 1981 he was declared the spiritual leader of Shiites in the DRA at a world Islamic conference in Pakistan.

He maintains a firm pro-Iranian orientation and once had close contact with former Iranian President A. Bani-Sadr; now he maintains close ties with the Iranian clergy, including with the eminent Iranian religious figures Shariatmadari, Qomi, and Shirazi. He closely collaborates with the leaders of "Hezbe Allah" (Party of Allah).

He firmly favors the need for armed combat with the government of the republic, its overthrow, the withdrawal of Soviet troops, and the establishment of an Islamic republic in Afghanistan on the Iranian model.

Kandahar and Beheshti are waging a covert struggle for sole leadership in the SIS organization, although Beheshti is a follower of Ayatollah Khomeini and Kandahari is an ardent supporter of Ayatollah Khomeini.

[Source: A. A. Lyakhovskiy's "Plamya Afgana" ("Flame of the Afghanistan veteran)", Iskon, Moscow, 1999; Translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg]