

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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SPECIAL COORDINATION COMMITTEE MEETING
January 2, 1980

TIME AND PLACE: 9:30-10:30 a.m.
White House Situation Room

SUBJECT: SCC Meeting on Soviet Forces in Afghanistan (S)

PARTICIPANTS:

<u>State</u>	<u>White House</u>
Secretary Cyrus Vance	Zbigniew Brzezinski
Deputy Secretary Warren Christopher	David Aaron

<u>Defense</u>	<u>NSC</u>
Secretary Harold Brown	William E. Odom
Deputy Secretary W. Graham Claytor	Marshall Brement

CIA
Deputy Director Frank Carlucci

JCS
Admiral Thomas Hayward
Lt. General John Pustay

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

CIA reported that about 40,000 Soviet troops are now in Afghanistan. They are encountering some resistance. The Afghan army is shrinking rapidly through desertions. The rebel tribes will retreat in the mountains and continue resistance, probably increasing in the spring. Thus, the insurgency will continue, and Soviet forces will be the main source of the counterinsurgency effort. (S)

CIA also reported that Egypt is sending equipment to Pakistan to be supplied to the Afghanistan insurgents, [REDACTED] (S)

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It was asserted in the discussion that the degree of resistance in Afghanistan will depend upon two factors: first, the size of the support received covertly through Pakistan, and second, the degree of Soviet pressure on Pakistan to block this supply. (S)

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Revised on January 2, 2000
Extended by Z. Brzezinski
Reason for Extension: NSC 1.13(b)(1)

Declassification: OADR

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under provisions of E.O. 12958
by R. Soubers, National Security Council

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[REDACTED]

Aid to Pakistan - Pakistan's ability to support the insurgency and to resist Soviet pressures, it was agreed will be highly dependent on U.S. assistance and commitment. It was argued that the small support we can now promise Pakistan will be more confusing than reassuring because of the publicity about changing U.S. policy. It is essential, therefore, to address the non-proliferation issue with the Congress and find a satisfactory way to make an exception in the Pakistani case. It was agreed that this matter should be discussed at the National Security Council meeting today and a decision taken on whether to seek an amendment to the law or to seek Pakistani assurances sufficient to certify Pakistan's intentions on nuclear proliferation to the Congress. (S)

Christopher's Trip to the NAC - Warren Christopher gave a brief report on his impressions from the NAC meeting. He added that Japanese participation would be useful. He also argued that we need a standing mechanism for coordinating any joint actions with the Allies which may be taken in response to the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. States are more likely to support actions as a group than alone without the reassuring presence of other states in the group. (S)

NSC on the larger Strategic Questions Posed by Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan - It was agreed to seek a meeting of the NSC later this week to discuss the larger regional issues arising from Soviet actions in Afghanistan as well as issues concerning our Allies in Europe and Asia. (S)

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING

January 2, 1980

NSC026

Time and Place: 1:00 - 3:25 p.m., The Cabinet Room

Subject: Iran, Christopher Mission to Afghanistan,
SALT and Brown Trip to China

Participants:

The President
The Vice President

CIA
Deputy Director Carlucci

State
Secretary Vance
Deputy Secretary Christopher

White House
Zbigniew Brzezinski
Hamilton Jordan
Lloyd Cutler

Defense
Secretary Brown
Deputy Secretary Claytor

Jody Powell
David Aaron

MINUTES

The President began by saying that the NSC would first discuss Iran and Pakistan and then reduce the membership to the statutory members for a more private session.

Dr. Brzezinski said that the Secretary of State would update the Council on the Iranian hostage situation and, time permitting, there should be a discussion of our longer term strategy towards the Iranian Government.

The Secretary of State said that we had a successful vote on Monday in the UN Security Council and that since that time we have been working with others to clear up the language of the resolution on sanctions. He thought this would be completed by the end of the day.

The President asked what the prospects were for the approval of the sanctions resolution. The Secretary of State replied that he could not guarantee nine votes. He said that we had eight certain votes, but not nine. The Secretary of Defense pointed out that there will be new members on the Council. The Secretary of State responded that we would gain the vote of the Philippines who were coming on the Council, but we would lose Gabon. Niger will replace Nigeria and he thought that we will probably have their support if the French will help us. He said we will lose a vote on Bolivia since there is still an impasse over whether Cuba or Colombia will get that seat. He added that the Eastern Europeans, East Germany and Czechoslovakia, will, of course, be of no help.

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Reviewed January 2, 2000
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by R. Soubers, National Security Council
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With the Europeans and ourselves, we have five votes. If you add Niger, that is six; the Philippines, that is seven. He said Zambia is questionable; however, Manley will stick with us and that will make eight votes. However, we could not be certain until we have the text of the sanctions resolution in front of the delegates.

The Secretary of State thought the big question was whether the Chinese would stay with us. In his judgment, if we have nine votes, China will join us; but if China is to be the ninth vote, we could have some difficulties.

The Secretary of Defense asked what the chances were that Secretary General Waldheim would say that we should keep negotiating rather than voting sanctions. The Secretary of State responded that Waldheim is likely to say that there has been some progress and that there should be a few more days permitted to see if diplomacy could achieve more substantial progress. The Secretary of State confirmed the Secretary of Defense's assessment that therefore the vote on sanctions might stretch a few days further, but not for several weeks.

The President asked whether there had been a report from Waldheim. The Secretary of State said no. Indeed, we still do not know if he will be seeing Khomeini. In any event, he did not believe that much would come out of the Waldheim visit.

The President agreed. He doubted whether the Iranians wanted to resolve the crisis at this stage.

The Secretary of State said that he believed the Afghan situation is the only thing that might change the attitude of the Iranian authorities. The Iranian Government has made two statements critical of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and they have indicated that this is supposed to be a signal of the congruence of their view with that of our own.

The Secretary of State noted that the Saudis were interested in putting together an Islamic Foreign Ministers meeting and the Secretary of State said that he had encouraged the Saudi Foreign Minister in that regard. He concluded by saying that it is clear that the Iranians see the Soviet move into Afghanistan as a threat. This is where we must place the weight of our argument.

In response to a question as to the contacts we have with the Iranians on this, the Secretary of State said that we were in contact with them through the Swiss.

The President asked if there was any further comment on Iran.

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The Secretary of State said that Hal Saunders is meeting with people in New York who are purporting to represent members of the Revolutionary Council. He added that he was meeting with a specific individual here in Washington who had come for this meeting. He did not wish to mention his name, but he said he was a person with real influence.

The President said that what the Iranians tell Waldheim privately will be significant. They are in a position to keep open the possibility of a resolution of the crisis. However, he said he had no reason to be optimistic.

The Secretary of State added that Arafat is probably going to Tehran in the near future. The President asked whether Arafat will condemn the Soviets on Afghanistan. Dr. Brzezinski replied that Arafat will follow the lead of the other Arab countries.

The President then asked Warren Christopher to report on his meeting with the allies in London and at the North Atlantic Council.

The Deputy Secretary of State said that he had met in London with five countries' representatives and then went on to NATO in Brussels to meet with the permanent representatives. He said that the people he met with were serious and in a somber mood. He would like to cover several points as a backdrop to the specific decisions which the NSC confronted.

First, everyone recognized that the invasion of Afghanistan was a new dimension in Soviet policy. No ally challenged the Deputy Secretary's statement that it was a major departure in Soviet policy.

France apparently toyed with the idea that the invasion of Afghanistan was simply an extension of their "surrogate" activities in Ethiopia, South Yemen and Angola, but they came off this position quickly. There was general consensus that the Soviets also recognize that this is a major departure and were prepared to run the risks entailed.

Second, the consequences of Soviet action were related to its scope and its persistence. Several of the Allied representatives had experience with the Czech invasion and the Hungarian invasion. They agreed that our response cannot be modest nor short-lived. The allies are willing to consider both positive and negative steps. As to the nature of these steps, the allies were prepared to take "serious steps," steps that would lead back from detente, steps that would hurt themselves even as they signalled to the Soviet Union our displeasure.

Third, the allies emphasized that the TNF decisions reached only a few weeks ago were clearly necessary decisions. They also expressed the hope that the qualifications of Belgium and the Netherlands would now be dropped. However, neither Belgium nor the Netherlands indicated that they would take this step. Nonetheless, there was a concurrence that the U. S. leadership moving ahead on TNF deployments was all the more valid in the light of subsequent Soviet activities in Afghanistan.

Finally, the allies were quite prepared to come to the aid of Pakistan and other countries which might be threatened by these developments.

The President asked whether India was discussed. The Deputy Secretary replied yes. He said that even if the Indians rationalize the invasion and downplay it, down deep they will be worried. This could be exploited if we are careful and it might put us in a position to undercut the Indian/Soviet military relationship.

The Deputy Secretary explained that two groups had been set up: (1) to consider and discuss retaliatory actions towards the Soviets; and (2) to coordinate aid to Pakistan. The Deputy Secretary said that these groups could come under the NATO umbrella or they could be broadened from the six to include Japan. The Deputy Secretary thought that it was important that both in retaliation to the Soviets and aid to Pakistan we could use as many participants as possible.

The Secretary of State noted that Ambassador Hummel in Pakistan said that the aid to Pakistan should not be under NATO. The President noted that the French also were anxious not to coordinate under NATO.

The Secretary of Defense expressed the hope that the Saudis and Japanese could join the group. Dr. Brzezinski said that we may wish to expand it to include Australia. Lloyd Cutler suggested that the Pakistani aid consortium countries might be used for the economic aid coordination.

The President asked what countries in the UN might raise the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, absent U. S. leadership. Mr. Christopher replied that we have had a report that a number of countries want to do it -- several Gulf states, four to five ASEAN countries, as well as several of our allies. Dr. Brzezinski asked whether these countries are willing to go by themselves. The Secretary of State replied no; leadership had to come from others. The UK is holding a meeting with other Western countries to consider drafting a letter to the President of the Security Council.

Dr. Brzezinski asked whether there was a possibility that the United Kingdom, Pakistan and China might co-sponsor an effort to raise this in the Security Council. The Secretary of State said that he did not believe the Pakistanis would participate in something like that.

The President again asked whether any country was prepared to take the initiative apart from the United States. The Secretary of State replied the United Kingdom, France, Portugal -- they are on the Security Council, but they will want to join with us. Norway would be with us as a member of the Western group. Dr. Brzezinski asked if the U.S. has to be a co-sponsor of this effort. The Secretary of State replied yes.

The President said that he had read about the experience in the UN during the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. It had been a mistake going to the Security Council first. They debated it for a long time and ultimately the Soviet Union vetoed any action. Then, when efforts were made to go to the General Assembly, so much time had elapsed that no action was taken.

The Secretary of State noted that the General Assembly was still in session and that we could go there next week. He said that one advantage of that would be to single out Cuba and force it to take a position in the General Assembly. The disadvantage is that the Soviets, as well as a number of Warsaw Pact nations, will argue that their actions were consistent with Article 51. The Secretary did not believe that the Warsaw Pact nations would ask to come before the Security Council on behalf of the Soviet Pact position, although the GDR, which is on the Security Council, would undoubtedly be supportive of the Russians.

The Deputy Secretary of State summarized by saying that if we are prepared to join and appeal to the Security Council President to put this issue on the agenda, many other countries would join as well.

The President asked whether we should go to the Security Council when the Soviets would always veto anything we propose there. The Secretary of State responded that we could go under Chapter VI (peaceful settlement of disputes) and since they are involved, they will not have the right of a veto.

The President noted that Chapter VI says that an accused state has no vote, but that there were also no punitive actions which could be taken under Chapter VI. He wondered whether we shouldn't go to the General Assembly as well. The Deputy Secretary of State commented that our allies say that this is a Chapter VII, Article 39 issue -- a threat to the peace, not a simple dispute among countries.

The President asked what we would get out of a Security Council session in view of the possibility of a Soviet veto. Mr. Christopher said that the Soviets would pay a high political price for a veto. We could then go to the General Assembly. The Secretary of State said that we could go to both at the same time. The President said that he also thought of that possibility. He said the Czech example was disappointing because after a while it was only possible to get NATO support for our opposition to the Soviet invasion.

The Secretary of Defense said that we are likely to have the same experience in this instance. We will not get sanctions nor military action, but we will get a backdrop for individual actions taken by the allied groups set up by Mr. Christopher.

Dr. Brzezinski asked what forum would be best for a punitive public relations exercise. He thought that probably the General Assembly, but that would depend on what the members are prepared to do. In the Security Council, he noted, we can already tell who will support strong action and who will equivocate. The Secretary of State was of the opinion that Bangladesh will not vote against the Soviets in the final analysis.

The Secretary of Defense repeated that, nonetheless, the Security Council debate would provide a positive backdrop for actions to be developed in the groups set up by Warren Christopher.

The Secretary of State said that there was a strong desire by Western nations to take this issue to the Security Council. We do not want to be in a position of blocking this effort. The question is whether we should also go the General Assembly while it is still in session.

The President said his preference would be to go to both the General Assembly and the Security Council. We should go as far as we can and try to get others to join us. He concluded by saying he was willing to accept going only to the Security Council until he had read about our experience during the Czech invasion.

Dr. Brzezinski endorsed the idea of going both to the General Assembly and the Security Council. Mr. Powell said he thought it would make the price of a veto much higher for the Soviet Union.

Dr. Brzezinski asked whether Warren could do both. The Secretary of State thought the answer was yes. He said we will get arguments against it, but he thought it was possible. The President noted that if the Soviets are on the verge of vetoing this matter in the Security Council, it would hurt them in the General Assembly.

The President summarized by saying that he thought we ought to go all out in the UN and in other respects in regard to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. He said he was convinced that we will not be able to get the Soviets to pull out of Afghanistan, but Soviet actions over the next ten to twenty years will be colored by our behavior in this crisis. The President said that if the Gulf states and others are too timid, we should go with our NATO allies and China to try to do the maximum, short of a world war, to make the Soviets see that this was a major mistake.

Lloyd Cutler noted that if we go forward in the Security Council on Afghanistan at the same time as the Iran discussion, the Soviets could veto our sanctions resolution. He also thought the Soviets would use the fact that the Security Council would only have 14 members as an excuse for them to veto any resolution on Iran on procedural grounds.

The Secretary of Defense and others thought that this would be true in any event, whether or not we pursued Afghanistan in the Security Council. The President agreed.

The Secretary of State asked whether he could give instructions to Don McHenry to join a letter to the President of the Security Council and to urge others to also address this issue in the General Assembly. The President approved this suggestion but added that Ambassador McHenry ought to tell others that our preference is to go to the General Assembly, unless it would violate the UN Charter.

Mr. Powell asked that whatever we do, we ought to do it as a package. He realized that consultations take time, but if we dribbled out each of our decisions over several days, we would lose the impact of Presidential leadership. The Secretary of State responded by saying that we cannot hold back on going to the Security Council. Otherwise we will be dragging our feet. There was a meeting today on this issue.

The President said that we should go forward on the Security Council and should not wait for a package. (The Secretary of State then left to call Ambassador McHenry.)

Dr. Brzezinski said we should now go through the separate steps in the paper prepared by the State Department.

The President agreed and asked that Warren Christopher please indicate what the allied reaction was to each of the specific measures.

Dr. Brzezinski said the first issue was SALT. The President said that he had talked to Robert Byrd and the Majority Leader wanted to keep SALT on the calendar but not bring it up onto the Floor.

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The President said that he had been able to persuade Byrd not to make a statement to that effect when he left the White House. It was the President's view that we ought to leave it on the calendar and maintain our approach of working closely with the Majority Leader on this issue.

Dr. Brzezinski said that SALT was important regardless of our relationship to the U.S.S.R., but we will have to accept that at this time it is not advisable to bring it to a vote. Lloyd Cutler agreed. There was no sense to withdraw it completely since it was in our security interest, but that we cannot get the requisite as long as Iran and Afghanistan are unresolved. Therefore, he thought we should defer bringing it to the Floor but leave it on the calendar. However, if the Soviets veto sanctions on Iran, we may have to look even at the possibility of withdrawing it from the calendar.

The President said that Robert Byrd had reminded him that the Executive Branch has no control over the Senate's calendar and that he, the President, could not pull it back by himself. However, he indicated that he would be prepared to consult with us and cooperate.

The Secretary of Defense said the most we can do is to keep SALT alive. He thought that as part of our rationale we could explain that SALT was in our global interest, but that since other negotiations, such as the Indian Ocean talks, were affected by the movement into Afghanistan, we would terminate them. We would make clear the Soviets have removed the basis for Indian Ocean arms control which was to reduce great power rivalry in the region. On the other hand, the basis for SALT was to lessen the danger of nuclear war and avoid an arms race in the nuclear area, particularly when our priorities were to increase our conventional capabilities. Therefore, we were not pulling back the SALT Treaty. We were simply not going forward onto the Floor with it.

Dr. Brzezinski said he thought that leaving arms control activities out of the measures of retaliation against the Soviet Union is consistent with the position that had been adopted with our NATO allies. He pointed to the continuation of MBRF in this connection. Moreover, singling out the Indian talks for rejection would be unwise since the Soviets would exploit this with a new Indian government. However, given that it is dead already, he would be in favor of simply leaving it moribund.

Secretary Brown explained that the Indian Ocean negotiations were not concerned with arms control but rather with arms deployments. He said he was tempted to say that this was true for the conventional arms talks as well. Dr. Brzezinski replied that if we are trying to pursue punitive action, this did not help since the Indian Ocean talks were already dead. Moreover, it would not enhance our position or embarrass them because they could turn cancellation of the Indian Ocean talks against us with the Indians.

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The Secretary of State agreed with Dr. Brzezinski. As for the conventional arms talks, he felt it should be left on the table. But he would not go forward with the meeting next week between the heads of delegation. On SALT, he thought it was important to leave it on the calendar. He reported that Senator Hart and others had heard that Robert Byrd had urged that we pull it all the way back. The President said no, Senator Byrd did not want to do that.

The Deputy Secretary of State said that the Europeans place great store by SALT. They would like the approach that we are considering. They want to keep other arms control negotiations going. On MBRF, the ball is in the Soviet court anyway. Our action to defer SALT would be widely understood by our European allies.

Turning back to the State Department paper of proposed actions, it was noted that the proposed Presidential statement on U.S.-Soviet relations had already been made by the President as had the recall of Ambassador Watson. The latter would be announced today. The suggestion to restrict social and official contact with Soviet officials was described by the Secretary of State as not effective in previous circumstances and therefore was dropped.

In the discussion of the question of reducing the Soviet diplomatic staff, the President indicated his desire to make the two staffs equal. The Secretary of State commented that in retaliation the Soviets will finger our most important people. Dr. Brzezinski said then we both go down hill and they get the advantage.

The President noted that the Soviet Union placed limits on the number of diplomatic personnel that we may have. We place no such limits on them. He said he was against continuing an unbalanced approach with the Soviets. Dr. Brzezinski added that some greater reciprocity was certainly in order.

The Secretary of State pointed to the fact that the imbalance in representation was due in large measure to the existence of the new Soviet UN Mission. The Secretary of Defense suggested that we separate out the UN Mission as a separate matter. Lloyd Cutler suggested we might freeze the level of Soviet representation at the UN to keep that from being a circumvention of a reduction of the embassy in Washington. Frank Carlucci pointed out that we do not have legal authority to do this.

The President again repeated that he was in favor of cutting back the Soviet Embassy representation.

15(d)

1.5(d)

[REDACTED]

The Vice President asked what the disparity is in numbers. The Secretary of State said two to one. Frank Carlucci said it's 1,240 Soviets versus 164 U.S. in the Soviet Union, including the United Nations Mission.

Dr. Brzezinski suggested the State Department come back with a specific proposal on how to equalize representation. The President concluded by saying that he was inclined to do it. Turning to the question of the expulsion of intelligence agents, Frank Carlucci said that the United States would definitely come out the loser. The President said he was willing to defer it.

It was agreed to suspend preparation for the opening of Consulates General in Kiev and New York.

The President was not inclined to raise the level of human rights criticism which he felt ought to proceed as vigorously as the situation warranted. However, it was agreed to step up Radio Liberty, Radio Free Europe and Voice of America broadcasts.

Dr. Brzezinski said we would need a small amount of money from OMB for this purpose. The President asked what the allies were doing and the Deputy Secretary of State said that the British were willing to be very cooperative. In this connection, it was agreed to do all we could to publicize the Soviet role in Afghanistan.

On the question of recognition, Dr. Brzezinski said that we have taken the position that we will not resume normal business. But we have left our personnel there.

The Secretary of State said that he had already taken out all of the AID and ICA personnel and he wants to cut the rest of the staff to a minimum. He said all we have in Kabul at the present time is the Charge d'affaires. The President said he agreed with that if we can fulfill our requirements with a reduced staff.

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The President asked whether we could [REDACTED]. The Secretary indicated that he would rather not.

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The Deputy Secretary of State said that the allies were willing to refrain from political contacts with the new regime. Only two of the countries have the specific policy of recognizing

governments, Great Britain and Canada. Neither of them would recognize the new regime. Italy and the Federal Republic of Germany will withdraw their ambassadors. Bilateral aid will be withdrawn or frozen. Multilateral aid through the World Bank -- the allies will be prepared to join with us in seeking termination. In this connection, the Deputy Secretary of State noted that the international financial institutions were providing aid for Afghanistan on the basis that it was a non-aligned country. But there was now no such basis since Afghanistan was becoming a puppet of the Soviet Union.

The President was then informed by a message from the Secretary of Labor that the longshoremen were on the verge of enforcing embargo on the no shipment to the United States of grain.

The Secretary of State said that he thought that we will have to cut back on grain shipments to the 8 million tons required by our agreement with the Soviet Union from the 25 million tons that were now projected and for which contracts had been led. Without such an action, we do not believe our allies would do anything in the way of economic restrictions or penalties to the Soviet Union. He knew this would be a high price to pay but it would be necessary.

The President wondered whether the longshoremen were going to do it, it was not simply up to them. Dr. Brzezinski agreed. He thought the President could decide later whether the United States would impose an official embargo.

Jody Powell asked if we would have difficulty selling the grain elsewhere. The Secretary of State said that we would have to buy and store the grain. The President noted that this was a considerable amount of wheat and corn. The Secretary of State reviewed our commitments. Our agreement with the Soviet Union requires that we sell 8 million tons. Moreover, we had approved the sale of another 25 million tons. The Secretary said that the issue was whether we were formally required by law to sell the additional 25-35 million tons.

The Secretary of Defense noted that this was a considerable amount of money, approximately \$5 billion in foreign exchange earnings for the United States. The Vice President said that the market would drop right away. Prices would reflect the fact that the sale had not been made. Storage of this much wheat by the United States would be regarded as cash and corn and wheat prices will drop immediately.

Mr. Powell said assuming this is the situation, is there something we could do to compensate, to buy and store the wheat? The Secretary of Defense said it was a timing question. If the price breaks at the announcement of an embargo, then we will only halt the slide by buying it off the market.

Mr. Jordan said he thought it sounded like the total embargo by the longshoremen, not simply a wheat embargo.

The Vice President expressed strong concern that labor and farmers will split on this issue. He said we could not afford being involved, for we will be dragged into court immediately and we will have to take a position. Lloyd Cutler said that it would be better for the President to do it than to be coerced into it by the longshoremen.

Mr. Jordan said that he would feel more comfortable if Bob Bergland and Ray Marshall could explain all the details of this issue before deciding. The President said he thought we should go on to the proposed list of actions by the State Department and consider this issue separately.

The President then asked about France and what they would do in regard to relations with the new regime. Warren Christopher said that they would agree on no new contacts. However, it was not a question of recognition for them. They will follow the lead of others and not engage in any political contact at this time. They may go so far as to recall their ambassador. They are prepared to make some strong signal, but they do not want to close their mission.

The President then called Stuart Eizenstat and asked him to check on the longshoremen embargo issue and report to the NSC as soon as he possibly could.

The Deputy Secretary of State concluded by saying that we should follow up on cancelling loans and on making no new loans by the World Bank.

Turning to other bilateral measures, the Secretary of State said that he would stonewall on Consular review talks. They were in recess and would not be resumed.

The suggestion to reimpose the travel ban on Soviet New York advance party personnel had been overtaken by events.

It was agreed that we should refuse and delay visas for official Soviet visitors on a case-by-case basis. The Secretary of Defense specifically mentioned Gregory Arbatov in this connection.

On the question of reducing Soviet media representation in the United States, Jody Powell said that he had a mixed reaction. He felt that like diplomats we should go to the principle of quality but there may, of course, be retaliation and we could end with no one in Moscow. However, on the other hand, we were not getting any vital intelligence from our newspapermen which the Soviets were apparently getting from theirs. So on balance he felt we could run the risk. The President approved.

Turning to the question of exchanges, there was a discussion of both the scientific exchanges and the transfer of the magneto-hydrodynamic channel as well as certain meetings that had been scheduled. The Secretary of State said that he would urge that Representative Bill Green not take his congressional delegation to Moscow. Also, he would propose cancelling the Joint Committee Meeting in Moscow to be chaired by Hathaway and he would postpone the meeting of the Joint Committee on Health scheduled for mid-February in Washington. On the MHD channel, the Secretary said that transport of that piece of equipment by C-5 aircraft to Moscow would have enormous publicity. Dr. Brzezinski said we could defer that instead of cancelling it. Secretary Brown noted that we had a lot of money invested into it, approximately \$10 million.

The Deputy Secretary of State said that they would review for approval any proposed formal meetings between the Soviet officials in the United States at the Assistant Secretary level or above. The President approved review but said that he would be reluctant to approve such contacts.

Dr. Brzezinski said the next and most delicate issue was that of the Olympics. Secretary Christopher said there was strong feeling in Europe against participating in the Olympics. He said that the West German representative at NATO said that while it was difficult for the German representatives to comment on events in Germany in the 1930's, it was his view that the western nations should not have come to Berlin in the 1930's. He felt the same way about the Moscow Olympics.

Dr. Brzezinski said that we could take the position that we will consider boycotting the Olympics. Mr. Powell said we must strike while the iron is hot if we are serious about boycotting the Olympics. If we could get a few large countries such as the FRG to begin to join us, then we could ask others to go along. But if we are trying to get a lot of others and have to slog it out, he thought that support for boycotting would disintegrate. Lloyd Cutler said that we should only do this if it were combined with other strong measures. It should not be the major step that we take. He thought that we could control participation through our control of passports since the Olympics was a private matter. He also suggested that we organize alternative games so that participants would have an opportunity to still compete.

The Secretary of State disagreed with the latter point. He said we should decide as a country whether we are going to participate and not get involved with the work of the Olympic committees. Mr. Powell thought we needed to publicly call on our allies to participate. If we wait to fight toward a broader consensus, the allies won't be with us.

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Deputy Secretary Christopher said that he thought a boycott of the Olympics would take us too far down the road. Taking that one non-political contact and using it in this way would be destructive of international communication and sense of community. And we should consider the athletes who reach their peak every four years and for whom this is a once in a lifetime opportunity. He said he thought boycotting the Olympics would be a very harsh move which the American people will not understand.

The Secretary of State stated that it depended on our decision on grain sales. If we do that we would not need to take the step in regard to the Olympics.

Lloyd Cutler took a contrary view. He felt we could only boycott the Olympics if we took strong economic sanctions otherwise we would trivialize our actions by only focussing on the Olympics.

Dr. Brzezinski said our position does depend on the others. If we go ahead it will be interpreted as business as usual. But with others we could join them in underscoring the seriousness with which the world community regards the Soviet Union.

The Vice President said that a move like this could capture the imagination of the American people.

The President said it sent cold chills down his spine.

Mr. Jordan said we could, as an alternative, organize some alternative games here.

Dr. Brzezinski said if thirty countries stay out of the Olympics then we will have accomplished something. If only three stay out, we should not do it. The President noted that the winter Olympics will take place here and that they might organize a boycott against us.

Lloyd Cutler repeated that we must not boycott the Olympics without also taking action on grain. Secretary Brown agreed. He said, however, that the Soviets are more concerned about the Olympics than grain. It was designed to show them as acceptable. But he agreed we could not do the Olympic boycott without a restrictive decision on grain sales.

The President concluded by saying that we should take the position that our participation was raised by European countries and we will assess and review this position. He said we should be prepared to make it our public posture that others have advanced the idea of non-participation in the Olympic games and that we are considering it, taking into account the position of other countries.

Turning to the question of travel control, the President said it irritated him that the United States was subject to travel controls that they were not. Dr. Brzezinski said it was not a question of control. We both have controls. It was a question of enforcement and permissiveness on our part.

Deputy Secretary Christopher suggested that their proposals on the level of representation also ought to include recommendations concerning travel restrictions and enforcement. Dr. Brzezinski added that these recommendations point towards more reciprocity.

Turning to military measures, it was agreed that a U.S. military alert was inappropriate. As far as increasing the United States permanent military presence in the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf, that was already underway.

Turning to the economic actions, it was agreed that we would not do anything about the Soviet MFN. There was concern expressed by the Vice President and the Secretary of State that the Soviets could retaliate by cutting Jewish immigration.

Turning to the question of credits, the Secretary of Defense asked how much help we might expect from our allies on curbing trade and credit. Deputy Secretary Christopher replied that that depends on what we do about grain. He said that the allies have major credit agreements coming up for renewal and he was of the opinion that they were prepared not to renew them if we were similarly going to take strong action.

The President said that he hoped Warren Christopher was correct and that the French and Japanese would not run in and take advantage of our restraint. He said that we ought to make a maximum effort to get our allies behind us. He suggested that a message be prepared right after the NSC meeting giving the allies a rundown on what we had decided to do.

The planned joint commercial meeting and business facilitation talks were discussed and it was agreed that they should be postponed indefinitely.

It was also agreed to postpone the Civil Aviation Talks. The President also agreed that for the time being Aeroflot would be strictly restricted to two flights weekly as authorized by our existing agreement.

Turning to the question of export controls and possible tightening, the Secretary of State asked what we were talking about in specific terms. The President said that he favored tightening our export controls on a case-by-case basis.

The Vice President said that this gets into the problem that we will have with the farmers if we have a grain embargo. They will feel that the businessmen are left off the hook if we do not make a similar tightening in trade in industrial goods.

The President noted under COCOM we would tighten our restrictions together with the allies. Harold Brown pointed out, however, that this only dealt with sensitive exports and technology and did not deal with lots of other trade.

The President suggested that we send someone to COCOM and to talk with our allies about tightening up on trade with the Soviet Union. He said he was in favor of tightening our trade even more than the allies so long as it did not disadvantage the U.S. businessmen in comparison with our allies. Dr. Brzezinski said that we would instruct Commerce and DOD accordingly.

On the issue of limiting Soviet commercial expansion in the United States, Secretary Vance said that he thought this subject needed additional study. The President agreed but said that on a case-by-case basis he would favor limiting Soviet commercial expansion. However, he agreed that we need a detailed proposal.

On the subject of Soviet fishing in U.S. zones, Secretary Vance was opposed to suspending such fishing because we also benefitted from the fishing agreement.

Dr. Brzezinski thought that if we do not do something in grain we should do something on fishing. The Secretary of State said we could handle this through the allocation and not cancel the agreement itself.

The President agreed that we should not cancel the fishing agreement but tighten allocations. He said this should be done irrespective of the decision to be taken on grain.

Lloyd Cutler cautioned that it would depend on the type of fishing and on the agreement concerned. He said we needed Soviet cooperation on salmon. The President responded that this should be done on a case-by-case basis.

Lloyd Cutler also pointed out that he felt he should point out to the group that the power existed for the President to free Soviet assets.

The Council then turned to the question of multilateral actions. The Council approved the suggestion that we urge the UK, FRG and France to increase broadcasts to Muslim countries in Soviet Central Asia.

~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE~~
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On the proposal to provide a daily circular to the UN and others in the status of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, the President asked whether this could be done in coordination with others. He also questioned whether we should do it daily but rather periodically. He thought that the circulars should also go to all the media and that we should coordinate with the BBC.

The group also confirmed that we should continue worldwide demarches urging others to take actions complementing our unilateral initiatives.

Turning to the United Nations, the Secretary of State said that Don McHenry was checking whether the General Assembly has the jurisdiction for peace and security without Security Council action or consideration. He said that Ambassador McHenry would call back shortly.

Turning to the issue of multilateral economic actions and the question of COCOM restraints, Dr. Brzezinski said that we were prepared to pursue the "Belgian formula" in COCOM and this would involve liberalizing sensitive exports to China on a case-by-case basis thereby creating a de facto differential. However, we would not announce formally that COCOM had created such a differential. The President approved this approach.

On the question of consultations with others to reinforce U.S. economic actions, the President said that we should consult particularly on credits. That we should deny Soviet Union credits and urge others to do the same. The Secretary of State pointed out that we do not provide credits to the Soviet Union. The President responded by saying we should nonetheless urge others not to provide further credit.

Returning to the COCOM issue, the Vice President suggested to the Secretary of Defense that he use the fact of the China differential in his discussions with the Chinese next week. The President asked what the allied reaction was to the concept of a China differential. Deputy Secretary Christopher said the reaction was good. The Secretary of State said that on a case-by-case basis we would look at China differently. The Secretary of Defense added that he would not explain to China how we would do this but only the fact that we would do it.

Dr. Brzezinski summarized by saying that we accept the idea of a differential in practice but do not establish a public principle. Deputy Secretary Christopher thought that the allies would be prepared to go even further and Secretary Brown said that this would be fine, but that he would proceed as indicated with the Chinese.

~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE~~
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On the issue of increased economic assistance to countries in the region, it was agreed that we should seek additional economic support for Pakistan. It was also agreed that we will urge the international financial institutions in countries with assistance programs to Afghanistan to terminate such assistance. Deputy Secretary Christopher said that the allies will go along with this.

Turning to arms control, it was noted that the arms control negotiations should generally be left alone to proceed as they can. In particular, it was agreed that CSCU would go forward and that the MBFR ball was in the Soviet court. It was also noted that CTB was moving ahead but slowly and that the chemical warfare negotiations were in our interest.

Turning to the question of other concerned countries, the President asked whether Yugoslavia would join us in protesting the Soviet action. Mr. Aaron pointed out that the Yugoslavs had recently issued strong statements and that our embassy had noted that they had acted with unprecedented speed in doing so.

The Secretary of State noted that Matthew Nimetz would be going to Yugoslavia shortly. He thought that they should have high on their list an offer to the Yugoslavs in the way of military cooperation.

Lloyd Cutler asked about the legal problem of providing aid to Pakistan. The President asked what the impediments to our assistance to Pakistan are.

The Secretary of State explained that under the Symington Amendment we are precluded from providing FMS credits to the Pakistanis. He then proceeded to read the law. Thus he concluded we cannot give money under the foreign assistance act.

The President said he thought Zia had given us assurance that he would not test nuclear weapons but that he could not bind his successor. The Secretary of State replied that the Pakistanis have pulled back from that commitment to saying only that they would not test a nuclear weapon in the next six months and that was inadequate to provide the President a waiver under the Symington Amendment. He said our choices were to either change it to make it like the Glenn Amendment (changing and to or) but added that if we take this approach we also confront the whole non-proliferation issue head on. Another way under the circumstances would be to have a special provision that simply said that notwithstanding any other provision of law we will go ahead with assistance to Pakistan.


The President then asked what our treaty with Pakistan provided.

The Secretary of State then read it.

Dr. Brzezinski said that if we had a one-time supplemental to provide ESF the Congress might support the idea of the "notwithstanding and other provision of law" approach. The Secretary of State then read such a proposed amendment.

The President asked whether this could be put on the appropriations bill. The Secretary of State said yes or on the defense supplemental. The Secretary of Defense noted that the latter would take a long time. Mr. Aaron suggested that it could be put through separately.

The Secretary of State said that we could consult with the Congress on the best way to do it. Lloyd Culter noted that the provision should not be a one-time lifting of the Symington Amendment but should be country specific. The President noted that putting it on the foreign assistance bill might be one way to get that bill out of committee.



Dr. Brzezinski asked that before moving to a smaller meeting whether we should try to promulgate publicly the decisions that have been reached in the NSC meeting. The President and the Secretary of State said that they didn't believe that that could be done today. Dr. Brzezinski suggested that it would, however, be important for the President to play a prominent role and to make a brief statement.

Jody Powell said that it depends on how we come out on the tough issues of grain and the Olympics. The issues that had been decided thus far will sound "mighty iffy." He then reviewed the sum of them. He said that restricting further and case-by-case limitations does not sound like much. He personally was inclined to have the President play a role and go to the people on this issue. He thought that the decision to provide additional assistance to Pakistan and lift the Symington Amendment would be a high profile item and would be an opportunity for newspapers to focus on it today. He did not know how much we could do in substance but he thought we should try to make a statement by tomorrow morning.

The Vice President agreed that the list was not too impressive. He said the addition of our decisions on Pakistan would help. He said that the grain embargo would be a major step but he hoped that we would not do it. Jody Powell noted that we would have to tighten up other trade or the farmers will say that big business benefits and then we will have trouble politically.

The Vice President said that trying to curtail food is a loaded dynamite. If the longshoremen go on strike, the Republicans will say we are so pro-union that we will hurt the farmers in the midwest just to go along with the unions.

Mr. Jordan asked whether the government would have to buy the grain if we impose an embargo. The President replied that Stu Eizenstat was trying to find out the answer to that question. Lloyd Cutler said we might want a legislative package to ease the burden on the farmers. In this connection, the Vice President said that if the grain is in storage it is the same as if it is on the market as far as the affect on price is concerned.

Dr. Brzezinski said that if we go forward with the grain embargo, we should try to make it a bipartisan effort and get others to endorse it.

The Vice President thought the idea of the longshoremen taking foreign policy into their own hands was outrageous. If we can talk them out of it before they start it might work. But later they will be ego involved in the embargo.

Secretary Brown said it was a question of sacrifice. We could introduce the sacrifices elsewhere. Such as gas rationing or a plan for resuming the draft, which the Secretary favors. The Vice President said that we had decided not to do things that hurt us. He said that selling the grain was in our interest. It requires the Soviet Union to spend hard currency. It helps the dollar in our balance of payments.

Secretary Brown said that if we cannot do things that hurt us, we cannot get our allies to do things that hurt them. Stu Eizenstat then joined the meeting and explained what our obligations were under the law. He said our obligation is not to use the authority of the U.S. Government to interfere with the 8 million tons to which we are committed to sell the Soviet Union under the agreement. The President asked what were our obligations if there were a suit against the longshoremen. Secretary Brown asked what were our obligations in regard to the 13 million tons additional which we had approved. Mr. Eizenstat said he did not know. Secretary Vance said that there was no obligation not to interfere above the 8 million. That means that there should be no control. Mr. Eizenstat questioned that interpretative.

The President said we could wait until we hear from the allies before deciding our own position of law. Lloyd Cutler noted there are limits in our ability to control food.

The President said that we ought to explore with our allies the possible curtailment of both grain and industrial shipments. He asked that the Vice President, Lloyd Cutler and Stu Eizenstat put together a paper for him on this issue. The Vice President suggested that we might turn down the Soviets on the 10 million tons that we were negotiating about now.

The President reiterated that he wanted Mr. Eizenstat and the Vice President to get involved in examining the legislation. He also wanted to explore the Congressional leaders -- their attitudes. He noted that Robert Dole will shoot at us either way we decide.

Lloyd Cutler noted that we will also need to consult on SALT because others may beat us to the punch. He was not sure that all of these items and in particular SALT could be held for a few days for a package announcement. The President hoped that we could make our announcement within 24 hours. Dr. Brzezinski noted that the allies would be able to respond in that time. The President responded that the allies hope we will get out in front and they will not be involved in it.

Dr. Brzezinski said that we will be ready to go tomorrow on the issues that had been decided. The question was whether we defer the grain decision.

The President said we can decide on how to deliver the package later. The Secretary of Defense said that without grain and the Olympics it won't be much of a package.

The President asked whether the allies are shipping grain to the Soviet Union. The Secretary of State said yes the Canadians, the Australians are shipping it and possibly the Argentines. The President said, however, we are the only ones with corn. The Vice President said there are 17 million tons of corn in the sales to the Soviet Union. Mr. Jordan said he wished we might announce it after the Iowa caucuses.

General Jones said that the Soviet reaction to this package of action should be assessed. The Secretary of State said we have a list of possible Soviet reactions which we have considered. The President asked that they be reviewed.

Lloyd Cutler asked whether it included the possibility that the Soviets would terminate or curtail oil and gas shipments to Western Europe. Secretary Brown noted that there was not all that much oil and gas being shipped to Western Europe.

The Secretary of State said that the worst thing would be if the Soviets went ahead and tested 14 RVs on the SS-18 and did not abide by SALT I.

The President asked whether the Soviets might do something on Berlin as a signal. Dr. Brzezinski said that this would provide a big security confrontation he thought they would wish to avoid. The President noted that the Federal Republic had been very courageous on this issue.

The Vice President asked whether we had gone over the list of crucial imports from the Soviet Union: chrome, platinum and so forth. He asked whether we were still importing titanium. The President said no, that the Soviets were not shipping titanium since they are now building titanium submarines.

Jody Powell asked what would be said about this meeting. The President said the general line should be to say that things are being considered; that Ambassador Watson is coming; that we are consulting with our allies; and that an announcement might be made tomorrow.

The meeting was then restricted to the statutory members plus Mr. Aaron. Dr. Brzezinski reviewed the alternatives to strengthen Harold Brown's instructions in regard to his China trip. He noted in particular that we had added the idea that we would be prepared to provide China with an over-the-horizon radar.

The Secretary of State said that he had not heard of this issue until this morning. Secretary Brown said that that was true of him as well. Dr. Brzezinski noted that it was the Vice President's idea which had been staffed by CIA and which appeared to be an extremely interesting one.

The Secretary of Defense said that we could provide them with something to track and give them an indication of specific actions by the Soviet Union.

The Secretary of State said that if we do this without Congressional approval, we will have a very bad reaction. He said he was against it.

The Secretary of Defense said that he does not need it in his instructions. He felt he had a good package already. The fact that he is going and able to assure the Chinese of our interests in their security and that we were prepared to help the Pakistanis would be adequate.

Dr. Brzezinski said the Secretary of State was correct in that heretofore we would not do something like this either for the U.S.S.R. or for China, but that was before we had an invasion and we now have an increased sense of vulnerability in Asia and China is an important deterrent to Soviet activity.

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Dr. Brzezinski asked whether it was in our interest to stand aside. He thought there was a difference between offensive and defensive military equipment, and with Soviet tanks moving towards the Indian Ocean, our unwillingness to provide anti-tank weapons was not a contribution to regional stability.

The Secretary of State said that this is not a decision that the President had to make now and that he should first consult with the Congress. The President said that he did not have to consult Bob Byrd: that we should sell weapons to China, including F-16's.

15(1) Dr. Brzezinski thought that the public would not understand why we were unwilling to be helpful to the Chinese in this kind of a situation. Secretary Brown said that this issue did not have to be decided before he left. He could raise the question of [REDACTED] our willingness to give them early warning capabilities.

The President said that he did not look upon over-the-horizon radar as violating what we have said previously concerning providing arms to China. He thought it was the sort of thing that should be explored. Our policy is not to sell weapons. We approve of the ally sale of defensive arms.

The Secretary of State intervened to say that that was not precisely it. We do not take the position of approving the sale of defensive arms. We simply say that is our allies' own concern.

The President said that the situation in Afghanistan and Iran does add a new dimension. He thought that we should be prepared to modify our position but how to modify it should be further explored. Something along the lines of the over-the-horizon radar he thought should also be explored. In addition, we ought to reexamine COCOM and our restrictions on sensitive equipment. The most important thing he concluded is that we give a strong signal of support to the Chinese and of displeasure to the Soviets.

Secretary Brown said, however, that we also need to leave some room on the ladder of escalation, otherwise there is no need for Soviet restraint. Dr. Brzezinski added that we do need to give enough of a signal so the Soviets know we are serious.

Dr. Brzezinski said we are facing as acute a dilemma as when the British came to us to say that Greece and Turkey were our problem.

The President said that he was not sure that what we had decided today will deter the Soviet from going into Pakistan and into Iran. Both the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense agreed that it would not, but that it would provide a signal. Secretary Brown said that our response must make the Soviets wonder whether the next step will be worth it.

Turning back to China, the President said that the basic memo from Harold Brown on his instructions for China was good. The Secretary of State agreed.

The President then said that before Secretary Brown leaves, he would like to sit down and review his instructions. He suggested that this be done at the Friday breakfast in order to confirm the Secretary's instructions. The Secretary of State noted that there were two other items suggested to be added to Secretary Brown's list and two others that he could not agree with. Dr. Brzezinski said that Secretary Brown's instructions were generally agreed among the three of them along the lines indicated by the Secretary of State. He summarized by saying that Secretary Brown's memo was generally acceptable, but that the final signoff would await the Friday breakfast. The President agreed. He said that we should continue to explore what further might be done for the Chinese.

He then commented that since discussing the issue of the kinds of signals that need to be sent to the Soviet Union in this crisis, he was inclined to go ahead on a grain embargo in order to give the Soviets a signal on their behavior. The President asked that there be a further discussion of the grain issue tomorrow morning. He said that we need to get broad-based support for a grain embargo which is what he was inclined to go with at this stage.

The meeting adjourned.

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MEMORANDUM

~~SECRET~~THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

NSC 026

ACTION

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MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI *ZS.*

SUBJECT: Possible Steps in Reaction to Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan (C)

Attached at Tab A is a State Department paper prepared for the NSC and SCC meetings on January 2. The paper provides a framework for discussing any actions we pursue in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and lists possible bilateral and multilateral steps we might take. DoD is putting together a separate paper on possible bilateral steps with China. (S)

As you know, I believe that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan requires a firm and tangible response on our part, including our bilateral relationship with Moscow, and that we must show forceful leadership with our Allies and other countries if we are to bring them to agree to punish this Soviet aggression. If the US is perceived as passive in the face of this blatant transgression of civilized norms, our international credibility and prestige will be seriously eroded, particularly in the eyes of those countries most vulnerable to Soviet intervention, either directly or indirectly. Without firm US action, some of these countries may draw the conclusion that they have no choice over the long run except to accommodate themselves to Soviet power. (S)

Before undertaking any action, however, I believe we must be clear about our goals. While we cannot force the Soviets out of Afghanistan, we should:

1. punish Moscow bilaterally; ✓
2. make the consolidation of the Soviet position in Afghanistan as difficult as possible; ✓
3. promote condemnation of Soviet intervention in Afghanistan within the Muslim world and Nonaligned movement; ✓
4. buttress our security ties with countries in Southwest Asia most directly affected by the intervention; and ✓
5. display leadership to the Allies and others, encouraging them to join us in taking punitive steps against Soviet interests. (S)

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Accordingly, I believe it is important, both for domestic and for international reasons, for you to follow your very strong comments of Monday by a package of actions, to be announced all at once for maximum effect. That package should contain responses that are unilateral, multilateral, and regional, in order to meet the goals outlined on page 1 of this memorandum.

You will find at Tab 2 a comprehensive list of possible options. Some, however, are essentially symbolic, and will be criticized as empty. Some do have a certain amount of bite to them, and could have a longer-lasting effect.

My own recommendation would be for you to announce a package composed of the following items:

I. A. 6, 8, 10, 11;

I. B. 2;

I. C. 1, 6, 7, 8.

II. A. 1;

II. B. 1;

II. C. 2, 3.

You will note that I omit all items in category II. D. Finally,

II. E. 2;

II. F. 1, 2;

II. G. 1, 2, 3;

II. H. 1, 2 (limited to clearly defensive items).

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(b)(1)

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(b)(1)

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I. U.S. Unilateral Actions

A. Political

1. Announce Administration decision to withdraw SALT II from Senate consideration in light of atmosphere created by Soviet action in Afghanistan.

2. Announce that Administration will review utility of pursuing other bilateral arms control negotiations (ASAT, Indian Ocean, CAT, CW, etc.) in wake of Soviet action and its impact on SALT ratification prospects.

→ 3. Presidential statement on U.S.-Soviet relations

PROS

-- Would provide opportunity for highest level condemnation of Soviet actions in Afghanistan and implications of Soviet invasion for regional stability and future course of US-Soviet relations.

-- Would focus world public and media attention on situation in Afghanistan.

CONS

-- President has already condemned Soviet role in Afghanistan. Future statement would have to go substantively farther in condemning Soviet activities.

-- Press and public interest in Afghanistan is already high.

done 4. Recall Ambassador Watson

PRO

-- Would be clear and highly visible demonstration of depth of U.S. concern.

CON

-- Might limit U.S. access to highest levels of Soviet government in subsequent exchanges.

no 5. Restrict social contacts with Soviets, and have our officials worldwide keep official contacts with Soviet counterparts to the minimum.

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PRO

-- Would underline seriousness of U.S. displeasure.

CON

-- Would to some degree complicate day to day bilateral business (visas, commercial activities, etc.).

6. Reduce number of permanently assigned official Soviet personnel in the United States to equal that of such American personnel in USSR.

PRO

-- Dramatic impact, both on Soviets themselves and on rest of world -- not to mention its (likely favorable) impact on US public.

-- Unmistakable sign of our displeasure over Afghanistan and of our willingness to put teeth in threat of serious consequences for the relationship.

-- Would provide opportunity to reduce number of intelligence service personnel in US.

-- Would provide us with something quick and visible to do after relations return to more even keel, i.e., graduated approval for return of Soviet diplomatic personnel to the United States.

CON

-- It would be an unprecedented move on our part. We did not take similar action over Hungary (1956) or Czechoslovakia (1968).

-- It would inflame the crisis bilaterally.

-- It would marginally disrupt several ongoing bilateral agreements/projects, especially in exchanges and commercial area.

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-- Reciprocal implications: despite clear imbalance in numbers, Soviets would not hesitate to kick out some of our diplomats in USSR by retaliating on principle. They could be counted on to hit key, hard-to-replace Embassy personnel first.

do

7. Stop all work on opening of new consulates general in Kiev and in New York.

PRO

-- Soviets would view this as a negative and tangible consequence of their actions. (They are ready to go in New York; whereas renovation of our Consulate General Building in Kiev is not expected to be completed until late 1980. Thus, in short term Soviets would lose more financially and administratively than we would.)

CON



(b)(1)
(b)(5)

no

8. Expel Soviet intelligence agents from US

PRO

-- A swift expulsion of Soviet intelligence operatives would galvanize awareness of the damage of Soviet Afghan operation on their bilateral relations with US.



(b)(1)
(b)(5)

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(b)(1)
(b)(5)

[REDACTED]

CON

-- Soviets might read into expulsion more than we intend.

(b)(1)
(b)(5)

[REDACTED]

-- Soviets would retaliate against our people.

(b)(1)
(b)(5)

[REDACTED]

700

9. Consider Raising Level of our Human Rights Criticism of the Soviet Union.

PRO

-- Would fan an old irritant.

-- It would place Soviets on defensive in international dialogue.

-- It could really inject some long-term wedges in Soviet internal politics.

CON

-- Such an action would contradict the justification for our human rights policy that it is world-wide and not directed against any country.

(b)(1)
(b)(5)

[REDACTED]

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-- Such a policy might be construed as a policy of "words" to which we take refuge when we lack any credible policy of "deeds".

-- Soviets would dismiss campaign as meddling in their internal affairs.

Yes

10. Step Up Radio Liberty/Free Europe and/or VOA Broadcasts.

PRO

-- Special programming would be devised to inform the Soviet public of the political and economic risks to which it is being subjected by its government. Our programs would review the history of how small nationalities, especially in Central Asia, have previously been overrun by tsarist and Soviet imperialism and other programs might attempt to clarify for the entire Moslem world the contrasting roles played by the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.

CON

(b)(1)
(b)(5)



-- We might spark troubles within the U.S.S.R. (say, in Lithuania) which we would not want and about which we could do nothing.

Yes

11. Worldwide Demarches and ICA activities to Publicize Soviet Role

PRO

-- Would focus world official and public attention on Soviet role in Afghanistan. Dissimination of information on extent of Soviet involvement and implications of their invocation of Friendship Treaty to cover invasion would have particular impact in Muslim and Third World countries.

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CON

-- Interest in Soviet invasion is already high and their role already being condemned by all but most loyal clients. U.S. effort to further publicize might be interpreted as attempt to capitalize on situation.

12. Delay Recognition of New Afghan Regime; Suspend or Break Off Relations

ok

PRO

-- Would underscore our view of illegitimacy of current regime, and allow more flexibility for other initiatives in international fora.

leave min, no 7/10

[Redacted]

*(b)(1)
(b)(5)*

CON

*Reduce or freeze aid
We need to stop World Bank*

-- Would leave field to Soviets, eliminating what little ability we have to monitor Afghan developments and to insure maximum awareness of the extent of Soviet involvement in Afghanistan.

-- Precipitate withdrawal of U.S. personnel might place them in physical jeopardy, although Soviets would probably wish to guard against such a development.

13. Other Bilateral Moves

a. Consular Review Talks -- Cancel

Stewart

PRO

-- Would hit the Soviets in one stroke on several consular issues where they hope to see movement after four years of discussion.

-- Ball is and has been in Soviet court for nearly four months. To cancel talks now would thus be a symbolic gesture with low cost to us.

CON

-- Since the talks thus far have involved careful horsetrading, we would lose negotiated gains, too.

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b. Rescind temporary lifting of recreation travel ban for Soviet Consulate General Advance Party staff in New York.

PRO

-- It would be a sharp disappointment for Soviet personnel involved, since lifting began on December 28 and will run only through January 10.

CON

-- Small potatoes. Would probably retard rather than help speed up renovation work on our new Consulate General in Kiev.

c. Refuse or Delay Issuance of Visas to Selected Soviet Officials Seeking to Come to the U.S.

PRO

-- Would signal toughened U.S. posture on Soviet official representation here.

CON

-- Probable Soviet retaliations would seriously hamper our operations in the USSR.

[REDACTED]

d. Consider Reducing Soviet Media Representation in the U.S. to 26 from 35 to Achieve Parity with U.S. Media Representation in U.S.S.R.

PRO

-- Soviets could not retaliate without risking further reduction of their press corps.

-- TASS San Francisco (two correspondents) could be removed easily since there is no counterpart for it in U.S.S.R.

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Case by case

*(b)(1)
(b)(5)*

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-- Argument that move against New York-based newsmen infringes UN Headquarters Agreement could be met by revoking accreditation for news coverage outside the UN.

e. Further defer exchange agreement negotiations and cancel or reduce US participation in existing exchange agreements. Actions possible by February 29 are:

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Asst Sec - 260*

-- Delay of resumption of negotiations with the Soviets on the General Exchange Agreement, which expires 31 December 1979. Negotiations were suspended in early December and our position has been to wait for a Soviet request to resume talks.

4/80

-- Cancel or defer shipment by C-5 aircraft of MHD (Magnetohydrodynamic) channel.

PRO

-- Taking any such action would signify our displeasure with the Soviets in unmistakable terms.

-- Shipment of MHD channel via C-5 is a major undertaking that would suggest close technical cooperation at a time when such cooperation seems unwarranted.

-- Cancellation of delivery, especially after making formal request for clearance of C-5 landing and signalling thereby our technical readiness, would impress Soviets with seriousness of our concern.

CON

-- Such actions would severely damage the basic structure of the exchanges and preclude attainment of our objective of opening up Soviet society to American scholars and observers at least in the near future.

-- Most of the academic exchanges are negotiated well in advance and on a strictly reciprocal

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basis. Thus any action here would either need six to nine months to be effective or expose Americans in the USSR to immediate retaliation in the form of expulsion.

-- We have already decided to wait until Soviets request resumption of talks on exchanges agreement. Any further statement on this issue might lead to damage to fundamental structure of the exchanges and loss of those benefits we presently derive.

-- Deferment now, would mean postponement of MHD project for an entire year. This would involve a major professional setback for team of American scientists working on project.

-- The MHD channel has been built exclusively for testing in Soviet facility at a cost of \$10,000,000. It cannot be used elsewhere.

-- MHD technology involves generation of electrical energy by means of coal combustion. This coal-based source of energy has strong support in the Congress.

f. Cancel or Reduce Level of US Participation in Selected Exchanges, such as:

-- Agriculture Joint Committee Meeting, scheduled for January in the USSR at the Assistant Secretary Level.

-- Housing Joint Committee meeting, scheduled for February in Moscow--Secretary Landrileu plans to lead USA delegation.

-- Health Joint Committee meeting, scheduled for mid-February in Washington.

-- Codel Green, scheduled for January 11-18, Moscow and Leningrad.

PRO

-- These are all visits or meetings involving high level participation, and any change in

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composition or cancellation would be a noticeable sign of our displeasure with the Soviets.

-- In most cases, the basic structure of the exchanges and bilateral cooperation would be left undamaged and current levels of participation unchanged.

CON

-- Such actions are limited and might be seen as a weak or ineffectual response.

-- Joint Committee meetings are simply for discussing future of the bilateral agreements. Curtailment of US participation would hinder development of the agreements.

-- In the case of the Health Agreement, such action would introduce an element of politics into an agreement which has been functioning smoothly up to this point.

g. Take some as yet unspecified action in connection with USSR hosting of 1980 Olympics.

PRO

-- US withdrawal from Summer Olympics in Moscow would be serious blow to Soviet international prestige.

CON

-- US announcement might precipitate Soviet withdrawal from Lake Placid Winter Olympics but this would be Soviet initiative.

-- The Olympics is organized totally within the private sector. The President has already pledged the IOC to admit all competitors accredited by that organization. Thus we have no recourse for the Winter games at Lake Placid without violating an existing international agreement.

-- Refusal to participate in the summer games would be too delayed a response, and would

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hurt American athletes far more than it would affect Soviet policies or actions.

h. Harass Soviet diplomatic personnel in US through such measures as:

-- Tightening travel controls

-- Denying Mobile Lounge to Soviet VIP's at Dulles

PRO

-- By moving ahead of the Soviets in the administration of travel controls, we would underscore our displeasure over events in Afghanistan.

-- Denial of mobile lounge would irritate Soviets, especially Dobrynin, in an area where they could not readily reciprocate.

CON

-- Soviets would retaliate by restricting our travel.

-- Denial of mobile lounge would disrupt established pattern of courtesy.

B. Military Measures

1. U.S. Military Alert

PRO

-- Would underscore seriousness of situation.

CON

-- Could be perceived worldwide as unwarranted escalation of situation and might be perceived by Soviets as empty saber-rattling.

2. Increase permanent U.S. military presence in the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf.

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Combine with personnel reciprocity

no

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PRO

Yes

-- While such measures are already underway, greater public emphasis of our intent to move in this direction, commensurate with the state of our negotiations with other countries concerned, would assure our friends in the area of our resolve and would demonstrate to the Soviets that they cannot, with impunity, seek to alter the balance of power in the region.

CON

-- Could provoke regional arms buildup and provide Soviets with justification for maintaining troops in Afghanistan.

C. Economic

1. Announcement that US will not seek MFN for USSR

PRO

-- Clearly indicate that economic relations cannot improve in the absence of improving political relations.

-- Lack of MFN limits Soviet ability to expand exports to the USSR.

CON

-- Soviets have probably already discounted prospects for MFN in the near term.

2. Grain Sales

Suspend grains shipment for the 1980 crop year (October 1, 1979 - September 30, 1980) in excess of those provided for (8 million tons) under the grains agreement.

PRO

-- Would present Soviets with problem of feeding population in the wake of a bad harvest and as 1980 crop year gets off only to a fair start.

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Leave dead -

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-- Since agricultural sales represent largest US exports to USSR would signify that business as usual will not continue.

CON

-- Would damage possibility for developing long-term agricultural sales program with USSR.
-- Would have negative repercussions for US business efforts to expand sales to the USSR.

-- Could lead to opposition from domestic agricultural producers.

NOTE:

(a) Of estimated import need of approximately 35 million tons this year, Soviets can obtain not more than 10 million tons from non-US sources (Common Market, Argentina, Australia, etc.). Only loophole would be if foreign dealers sell from their supplies and then seek to replenish them by purchases from the US.

(b) A suspension of sales could have some effect (presumably downward) on US grain prices.

4/20 3. Postpone US-USSR Joint Commercial Committee Meeting Scheduled for April 14-15 in Washington.

PRO

-- Would indicate depth of our concern over Afghan developments.

CON

-- Would hurt US firms' efforts to expand commercial relations with the USSR.

4/20 4. Postpone Business Facilitation Talks scheduled for January 9 in Moscow.

PRO

-- Would indicate that we are not prepared to proceed on business as usual basis.

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CON

-- We lose opportunity to discuss problems affecting US commercial presence in the USSR.

Yes

5. Civil Aviation

Postpone bilateral talks scheduled for February 13 and ~~consider~~ limiting Aeroflot scheduled service to the US to two flights weekly, the number for which there is basic operating authority.

PRO

-- The talks are unlikely to produce major results, especially in the absence of a US carrier willing to serve the USSR.

-- Reduction of service would be a further step in reducing the imbalance in bilateral civil aviation relations.

CON

-- Could create transportation problems for the summer Olympics.

-- Could make more difficult an effort to induce an American carrier to serve Moscow.

6. Export Controls

Yes

Tighten export controls and review outstanding trade deals (including the licensing of spares for Kama).

PRO

-- Would be visible and would have some impact on Soviet interests.

CON

-- Soviets are not moved by economic considerations when important state interests are at stake.

-- US companies would suffer.

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NB: Any action on export controls would have to be in conformity with the Export Administration Act of 1979 which severely limits the utilization of export controls for foreign policy purposes.

*Yes
Study*

7. Limit expansion of Soviet commercial efforts in US.

PRO

-- Would slow growth of Soviet exports to US.

-- Would reduce national security problems created by increased Soviet presence.

CON

-- Would hurt efforts of US firms seeking to expand commercial links with the USSR.

8. Suspend Soviet fishing activities in the US Fishing Zone

Tighten up allocations

PRO

-- Would underline the extent of our dissatisfaction at their activities in Afghanistan. (Our fisheries activities have been running smoothly and have been mutually satisfactory.)

-- Would deprive the USSR of a needed source of food protein.

CON

-- Would be a unilateral violation of the bilateral fisheries agreement. (Which provides for one year's notice of termination. Moreover, we should be cancelling it without cause related to the purposes of the agreement.)

-- The US has not cancelled a bilateral fisheries agreement with any country for foreign policy reasons.

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-- Unilateral cancellation would harm US fishing activity and interests, as we receive benefit from Soviet fishing operations in our zone, both by obtaining research information and through commercial operations in the US-USSR joint venture. We also receive substantial license fees from the USSR for permission to fish in our waters.

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II. US Multilateral Actions

A. Publicity

Yes

1. Urge [redacted] to increase broadcasts to Muslim countries and Soviet Central Asia.

(b)(1)

2. Daily circular to UN and others on status of the occupation.

(b)(5)

PRO

-- Will ensure high degree of awareness of events and may strengthen willingness to others to take concrete actions in response.

CON

-- Direct identification of information with US may undercut its credibility or make some NAM countries reluctant to confront Soviets on basis of "US allegations."

3. Continue world wide demarches, urging others to take actions complementing our unilateral initiatives.

B. UN

1. Seek Security Council Resolution

PRO

-- Focus international attention on Soviet actions

CON

-- NAM countries may be reluctant to engage in what they may see as East-West issue.

-- Soviets will in any case veto.

-- Complicates our efforts on Iran.

2. UNGA

PRO

-- As above. [redacted] It would find it hard as head of NAM to remain silent.

CON

-- We may encounter large number of abstentions.

(b)(1)
(b)(5)

Coordinate

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C. Economic Actions

1. Consultations with others to reinforce U.S. unilateral moves.

PRO

-- Could significantly increase costs to Soviets by, e.g. denying them access to international credits.

Yes

CON

-- Allied reluctance is likely.

(b)(1)

2. Tighten COCOM restraints on USSR/ [REDACTED]

PRO

Yes

[REDACTED]

*(b)(1)
(b)(5)*

CON

-- Allies might not be able to agree to further restrictions on trade with USSR.

3. Increased economic assistance to countries in region (FY 80 supplemental and FY 81 incremental).

PRO

defer

-- Clear demonstration of heightened US support for friends in region.

CON

-- Budget restraints.

4. Urge International Financial Institutions and countries with assistance programs to Afghanistan to terminate such assistance.

Yes

D. Arms Control

1. CSCE (reserve on response to Warsaw Pact proposals).

PRO

-- Should not appear to lend any credence to Soviet security concepts.

CON

[REDACTED]

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2. MBFR (withdraw Western proposals)

PRO

-- Show we will not reciprocate Soviet withdrawals during Afghan crisis.

CON

-- Adverse impact on TNF; might split allies; in any event ball in Vienna is in Soviet court and we expect no early resolution of differences with East.

3. CTB (delay start of February Trilateral round)

PRO

-- Demonstrate that bilateral relationship is under review.

CON

-- Nonproliferation and other considerations are overriding; could put onus on US at forthcoming NPT Review Conference; should in any event consult with UK.

4. CW (go ahead in initial multilateral CD consideration, but delay US-Soviet round scheduled for Jan 10).

go ahead

PRO

-- Demonstrate US-Soviet relation under review; while keeping international consideration moving.

CON

-- Concerns US is too negative on arms control issues.

E. Afghanistan

1. Withdraw Embassy and urge others to follow suit.

2. Supply insurgents (depends on Pakistani position and cooperation).

PRO

-- Increase casualties, costs to Soviet of occupation of Afghanistan.

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CON

-- Risk of Soviet retaliation against Pakistan.

F. Regional Security

1. Accelerate process of increasing US presence and acquisition of base rights.

2. Increase US arms supplies to Soviet periphery.

(a) Increase FY 81 FMS/IMET budget levels

PRO

-- Provides positive signal.

CON

-- Budget decision has been made in context of budgetary constraints.

-- Deliveries are over a year away.

(b) Increase FY 80 FMS/IMET levels by seeking increase in appropriations (budget still in conference) or through supplemental.

PRO

-- More immediate impact than FY 81 increases.

-- Congress probably would be receptive.

G. Other Concerned Countries

1. Yugoslavia (offer of increased assistance).

2. Romania (closer consultations and gestures)

3. Turkey (respond positively to outstanding requests).

H. China

1. Increased political ties (see other paper).

2. 

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MEMORANDUM

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INFORMATION

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

January 2, 1980

NSC 026

MEMORANDUM FOR: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

FROM: FRITZ ERMARTH

SUBJECT: NSC on Afghanistan (U)

Despite the obvious strategic and historic importance of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, there will probably be a tendency to deal with the event in isolation. This will focus debate on such issues as 1) how to impose political costs on the USSR, 2) should we increase support to the Afghan insurgents.

To combat that tendency we need to articulate an understanding of the broader crisis and a strategy for dealing with it. Because it so illuminates the weight of Soviet land combat power in the north and Soviet willingness to use it in the most cynical way, the invasion sharply increases the prospect of eventual Soviet military domination of the greater Middle East and US exclusion from the region, except perhaps from Israel. Next we shall very probably see civil strife in Iran with direct Soviet involvement, a PDRY take-over of North Yemen, increased Soviet efforts to destabilize Turkey and Pakistan, and intense Soviet pressure on other states in the region to line up with Soviet interests. (S)

The result after several years could be a pattern in the Middle East and South Asia in which most of the region's states are either Soviet vassals (on the model of Afghanistan) or willing members of a Soviet-dominated security system because it seems the safer course (a role India has come close to playing in the past). (S)

US policy overall must be guided by the realization that this prospect is now a fearsome probability, but not a certainty. We must therefore combat the probability as effectively as we can while at the same time planning against its occurrence, without making it a self-fulfilling prophecy. (S)

This will require of us a policy of deeply echeloned containment. In contrast to the situation in the late-1940s and early 1950s, we cannot credibly draw a defensive perimeter and threaten massive military action if it is crossed. There are many perimeters, and some will inevitably be crossed. (S)

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The first layer, or forward echelon, of our policy must be a systematic effort to make Soviet involvement in Afghanistan, Yemen, Ethiopia, and Indochina as costly and painful as possible. This will require extensive support to Soviet opponents wherever we find them, not on the basis of their worthiness or chances of winning, but on the basis of their ability to tax Soviet power. We must proceed in this prepared politically and psychologically for the certain event that some of these clients will fail and that our support may after the fact be regarded as having assured their demise. (S)

The second layer or echelon of policy should be a three-part effort 1) to fortify as best we can the key remaining buffer states of the area, Turkey and Pakistan, with military and economic aid, 2) to win the key "swing states" of Syria and Iraq away from Soviet influence, and 3) to increase our permanent military presence in the area, on-shore as well as off-shore. (S)

With respect to the first two elements -- fortifying the buffers and winning over the "swing states" -- the obvious complications of doing these things become politically tolerable if one simply accepts the necessity of trying to achieve them without a prior guarantee, or even high likelihood, of success. (S)

We need on-shore military presence now mostly for political reasons, to counter the political weight of Soviet military power in the north and to show that we have the nerve to push through the evident political obstacles to get on-shore presence.

[REDACTED]

1.5(d)

But we should also start planning for a more ambitious option [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] to protect Gulf oil against direct attack or stoppage of oil flow through political side effects of events elsewhere. All this, incidentally, calls for the prompt creation of the greater Middle East command we have talked about. (S)

Another element of this second layer of policy we must examine carefully, but not necessarily decide as yet is: under what conditions of Soviet involvement in Iran would we be prepared to put US forces into Iran? (S)

The third echelon of policy should be a composite of actions to increase the level and tempo of our overall defense effort in the context of more active measures to restore national economic health. It is probably not necessary to revisit the

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President's FY81 defense budget decisions now. But against the likely picture of the 1980s, the President's conception of adequate spending levels in the out years is almost certainly too low. Instead of 4.5-5.0% annual increases, we shall be forced into something like 6.0-7.0% rates or even higher. What we need now is a major (not a back room, or one-man) planning effort on how to accomplish this acceleration. Undoubtedly other dimensions of this "quasi-mobilization" policy will involve stiff oil import taxes, tax changes to stimulate investment, somewhat looser monetary policy, and perhaps price controls to manage inflation. (S)

The fourth echelon of policy will involve political efforts on a broad front to get our NATO allies and Japan to do likewise in defense. (S)

The fifth policy echelon will involve the way we manage our direct relationship with the USSR. The foregoing may suggest that we will have foresworn any semblance of detente for the next decade. Quite the contrary is the case. If we move swiftly to create the necessary echelons of containment, we may preserve the basis for a balanced policy toward the USSR in bilateral relations and in Europe. (S)

US resolve and effectiveness in the East-West competition will actually restore in Moscow an incentive to try to deflect us by political means, an incentive that has obviously declined in recent years. We must move to place issues of regional stability at the center of our bilateral relationship where the Soviets will be forced to deal with them. Faced with the certainty of stiff competition on all fronts the Soviets will, in time, at least show an interest in damping... that competition in some regions. In the meantime, there is no reason why the dialogue on strategic arms stabilization cannot in due course resume. The Soviets will probably have an interest in it. The main obstacle to our pursuing a nuanced or balanced policy now is the lack of confidence at home, e.g., in the Senate, that we are adequately postured for the competitive side of the relationship. (S)

Even at this late date, I doubt that the Soviets fully appreciate the depth of the national about-face taking place here. They seem to believe that US-Soviet relations can be returned to the uncertain mix of the last several years after the elections, that the competitive elements of our policy will be ineffective, and that our allies can be coaxed away from us. Only US actions across all the policy echelons discussed above will sober their outlook. But the chances for peace in the next five

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years would be improved if somebody were to go to Moscow now, not to negotiate or to debate, but to tell the Soviets exactly how we view the period of struggle ahead. That person should have the absolute confidence of the President and labor under no suspicions that his mission is to rescue detente by acquiescing in Soviet power grabs. You're the only candidate with the credibility to do this. (S)

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SCC Meeting, January 2, 1980
Afghanistan: Harold Brown's Trip to China

Current plans for Secretary Brown's trip to China were outlined in his December 29 memo to President Carter. Essentially, they contemplate the following steps of relevance to the current Soviet invasion of Afghanistan:

- Public acknowledgement that we are consulting with the PRC about the Afghanistan situation;
- Private exploration of possibilities for US-PRC cooperation in facilitating support for Afghan insurgents and steps to bolster the security of Pakistan;
- Proposals for gradually expanding contacts with the PRC defense establishment, establishment of special communications facilities for conveying messages between Washington and Beijing during crises, and conveying the USG decision on Landsat D -- all of which will underscore the potential for expanded Sino-US defense cooperation in the future;
- A public stance that characterizes these steps as the natural by-product of a normal political relationship. Current plans call for leaving on the record Vice-President Mondale's disclaimers of US interest in a "military relationship" with Beijing (i.e., no joint military planning, no formal security relationship, no arms sales).

Should we wish to go beyond this in order to force the Soviets to pay a higher short-term price for their recent actions, we might consider the following measures:

1. Propose on-going mechanism for continued Sino-US consultations concerning Afghanistan, e.g., announcement of early follow-up discussions in Beijing or Washington between senior State and Defense officials and PRC counterparts concerned with the Southwest Asian security issues.
2. Publicly state that Dr. Brown would explore ways to coordinate US and Chinese support for Pakistan in light of the threat posed to Pakistan's security. This would go beyond discussion to active cooperation and would imply that further cooperation was possible. Specifically, we could seek Chinese agreement to permit overflights of aircraft and equipment being delivered to Pakistan by the U.S. This would provide a more direct route for such deliveries from the US west coast than around Southeast Asia, and would permit us to help transport Chinese military aid to Pakistan as well.
3. Link Soviet aggression against Afghanistan to a decision to differentiate between the USSR and the PRC on technology transfers in announcing the Landsat D decision in Beijing. This could still pose some difficulties within COCOM. However, given Soviet actions in Afghanistan, it is unlikely to precipitate the kind of Congressional backlash on the US-PRC Trade Agreement that was earlier feared. Subsequent visible steps to engage the Western Europeans and Japanese in discussions of this issue could also serve to remind the

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Soviets that their actions in Afghanistan could facilitate growing security cooperation among the US, Japan, China, and NATO.

4. Adjust our public posture on arms sales. Current policy statements emphasize that we will sell arms neither to the PRC nor the USSR. Under the circumstances, we might indicate that given Soviet willingness to use arms against its neighbors and our own stake in a strong, secure, and friendly China, we will have to reexamine our policy on the sale of military equipment to China.

5. Adjust our policy on third country arms sales from one of acquiescence to one of active encouragement. The effect of such a shift, however, is uncertain as Third Country sales are stalled as much by Chinese indecision as European reluctance. Moreover, if our allies see this as a softening of the US position with the likelihood of eventual US arms sales to China, they may wait for us to take the lead -- and the heat -- from the USSR for such sales.

6. If pressed by the Chinese to sell specific military equipment, initiate (and publicize) a review of the policy implications of such sales. Since the PRC has in the past registered interest in various US arms, including F-16s, one cannot rule this out. However, there are such sensitive and delicate issues involved, that we should take care not to rush into decisions that have not been carefully analyzed not only for their impact on US-Soviet and Sino-US relations, but their consequences for our long-standing allies as well.

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Over the Horizon Radar

A system providing the Chinese with early warning of Soviet attack in force would obviously be useful to Beijing. Overt-the-horizon detection (OHD) of missiles or aircraft utilizes the ionosphere, whose properties vary considerably with location, time of day and season as well as sunspot activity. Because of seasonal variation it is necessary to know these properties at a given location over a full cycle of seasons, so that the OHD radar can be designed for optimum performance. Installation of an OHD radar system, therefore, requires a year's lead time for site survey (which could be conducted in parallel at various site locations). In current circumstances the Chinese would probably acquiesce in US monitoring at a number of sites, so long as these are not too numerous. Surveying would have to be fairly extensive, however, since several candidate sites will have to be checked for installation, and several installations would be needed to give complete coverage of the USSR. Practical application of an OHD system would point to an array that would be able to provide early warning of nearly simultaneous launches of many missiles to provide early warning of nearly simultaneous launches of many missiles would be impracticable. The simplest of OHD systems of this sort would require at each site a transmitter of several hundred kilowatts power and a relatively large antenna. These components are difficult to detect from the air, but the Soviets would easily recognize the signature of the transmitter and could take effective countermeasures. Greater sophistication in the systems would make both detection and countermeasures more difficult. If components of simple system were available in modular form, the system could be set up and test in the US before installation in China and while the site survey was underway. Operation personnel could be trained simultaneously; the technical expertise required to operate the system is not great and well within Chinese capabilities. Therefore, within several months after the site survey is complete a relatively simple system could be operating. Costs would probably run in the range of something under ten million dollars. More sophisticated systems, which would change transmitter frequencies, making detection and countermeasures harder, would cost more and take longer to deploy.

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The Chinese would, in current circumstances, welcome a US offer to supply an OED system, taking it as concrete evidence of US interest in promoting a "secure and stable" China, as well as a good indication that Washington did not expect an early improvement of relations with Moscow and was taking countermeasures with respect to Soviet expansionism as manifest in Afghanistan. Deng Ziaoping in particular would adduce this evidence of US interest in a stronger Sino-US security relationship to enhance his own political position (which has been based in part on demonstrating the utility of the US connection)-a position which may have been marginally weakened recently. Deng is almost certainly strong enough to secure Chinese acceptance of a US offer, but his increasing identification of the US could cause him future political problems as the Chinese political pot continues to bubble. Problems regarding to US connection, however, would only be likely to arise if the Chinese conclude that Washington was relying exclusively on its connection with China to "punish" the Soviets and was not taking effective measures to strengthen itself in other spheres. The Soviets would undoubtedly be deeply disturbed by evidence that the US was actively abetting Chinese military defenses. They would conclude that Washington has written off early ratification of SALT II and would unprepared to play even a passively useful role in situations analogous to the UN debate on Iran. Despite its genuine anger, however, Moscow is likely to recognize that a connection exists between its actions in Afghanistan and the US supply of OED to China. It would in any event be unlikely to consider this development a sufficient provocation as to lash out militarily against either the US or China.

* * * * *

Two other projects of interest in connection with establishing a security relationship with China would be possible sales of antitank missiles (Chinese have shown great interest in discussions with Europeans) or P-3 ASW aircraft (Chinese have approached Lockheed on this one).

SECRET SENSITIVE
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

Talking pts for
H.B.

SOUTH WEST ASIA

The Chinese see an alarming increase in present and potential Soviet influence in South West Asia, ranging from India to Yemen. They see the events over the past year in Iran, and now, even more alarmingly, in Afghanistan, as a critical test of our will and ability to protect a crucial Western position in the Gulf. You will want to make clear to them what we intend to do and spell out certain other actions we and they might undertake in consultation.

You should say:

- The Soviet move into Afghanistan is unacceptable. They could have a predominant position in a neutral state but not turn Afghanistan into a member of the Soviet military bloc.

- We intend to make them pay as high a price as possible, largely to deflect any temptation to try to duplicate such a feat in Iran or later, in Pakistan. Iran, in particular, unlike Afghanistan, has a great geopolitical and economic importance to us.

- We also see the move into Afghanistan as aimed at Chinese prestige in Pakistan and India, as well as U.S. interests in the Gulf. We have a number of proposals to make for Chinese action.

- The first task is to make the Soviets pay as high a price as possible in Afghanistan.

- We intend to supply weapons to the rebels, on a covert basis, although the divided loyalties of the opposition to the Kabul government and the very large Soviet commitment make it doubtful that we can force the Soviets out of the country in the short term.

- To assure ourselves the best information and the best opportunities for cooperation, we propose formal intelligence exchanges with you on this subject.

- We will press for action in Muslim Arab and international bodies. We are not well placed in all these to take the initiative, but will do so where we can. Chinese calls for action could be very helpful.

- The NAM is a crucial forum for debating this invasion. We would like to see Cuban leadership blunted, and Soviet Third World appeal dimmed, by the Afghanistan initiatives. We want to consult with China on how to approach this question.

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under provisions of E.O. 12958
by R. Soubers, National Security Council
F91-676

Declassifyoo: DADR

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- We will make sure that the full story of Soviet repression of Muslims is beamed into the Soviet Union as well as into the region from Indonesia to Morocco.

- We will try to improve our relations with Iraq. There are some signs which suggest we could succeed, to some extent, but Saddam Hussein may be frozen by the ideology or internal politics of Iraq into opposition to us.

- Until the hostages are released we intend to do little in Iran, but we will work for a better regime there afterwards.

- In Pakistan, we are unlinking our sales of military equipment from the nuclear issue, and will consider how we can help Pakistan with its financial problems, both bilaterally and in international groups. It would help if China could provide arms for the Afghan nationalists and for Pakistan also.

- We will ease our arms sales policies in the Gulf and in India too and look for opportunities to get local cooperation for the significantly increased force presence we plan in the area of the Gulf and the Indian Ocean.

- We are making sizeable increases in our Defense budget and building a force capable of rapid deployment to troubled areas.

- It would be of considerable importance to this overall effort if China could work to improve its relationships with India. We must bring India---the strongest state in the Sub-continent and a key critic of the Soviet Union in the NAM--along as we try to strengthen Pakistan militarily and economically. The Soviets now play skillfully on Indian anxiety about China.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

January 2, 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

FROM: MICHEL OKSENBERG *MO* ←
DON GREGG *for DG*

SUBJECT: NSC Meeting on China/Brown Trip (U)

Here are five measures which we recommend building into the Brown trip as ways of signaling to the Soviet Union that their behavior in Afghanistan will affect the nature of Sino-American relations:

Just

-- Brown's toast, drafted in the pre-Afghanistan situation, must be toughened, with certain key points made explicit. Namely, our relations with China are not directed against any third countries, but the nature of our relations with China inevitably will be affected by what other countries do. Beyond that, the toast should make explicit reference to Soviet behavior around the world, as well as to the holding of hostages in Iran, noting that these developments run counter to the interest of both developed countries and countries which aspire to a higher standard of living for their people. Sino-American cooperation is intended to create a more stable environment in the world. The NSC meeting could call for a toast which has the President's explicit approval. (S)

-- We should change our policy on arms sales to China, abandoning our previous statement that "We do not sell arms to China" to "We have no present plans to sell arms to China, although we recognize China's right to self-defense." (S)

-- Privately, we should indicate to the Chinese that our policy on arms sales has changed and that we would be prepared to enter into discussions with them on sale of carefully selected, clearly defensive equipment, such as early warning radar systems, command and control systems, and anti-tank weapons. We should make clear that we are not prepared to sell offensive weapons, such as advanced jet fighters. (S)

~~SECRET~~
~~UNCLASSIFIED~~
~~January 2, 1980~~

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-- We should make public that we will establish a China differential in COCOM along the lines of the Belgium proposal. Vance has sent the President a memorandum indicating that we should not do this prior to Congressional action on the China Trade Agreement, but it seems to me the Afghanistan situation places this in a new light. The NSC should recommend immediately consultations with key members of Congress handling the Trade Agreement. (S)

1.5 (A)

-- On the Brown trip, we should let it be known that [REDACTED] We should make this public only if the Chinese agree to it, and we should indicate to the Chinese that the reason we wish to go public is to signal to other parties that we do believe our interests largely coincide in these two areas. (S)

UNCLASSIFIED

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 2, 1980

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MEMORANDUM FOR

THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

ALSO: THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Results of the NSC Meeting, January 2, 1980

The following decisions were reached as a result of the meeting:

1) The SALT II Treaty will be left on the Senate calendar. There will be no effort to bring it to the Floor for a vote. Our public posture will be to reaffirm that SALT is important irrespective of the tone of our relationship with the Soviet Union but, at this time, we do not believe it is advisable to bring it to a vote.

2) We will make no announcement concerning other bilateral arms control negotiations but, if asked, will take the position that they should proceed. The Indian Ocean talks will remain moribund. We will proceed with CSCE. In MBFR, we are awaiting a Soviet response to our initiative. CTB negotiations will continue at a slow pace. CW/RW negotiations will be pursued since they are in our interest. The proposed meeting next week of the heads of delegation for the Conventional Arms talks should be postponed.

3) The recall of Ambassador Watson will be announced today.

4) The Department of State will forward its proposal for reducing the Soviet diplomatic staff in the U.S., excluding the Soviet UN Mission, to the level of the United States in the USSR. This should include measures to tighten restrictions on Soviet official travel in the U.S. to the equivalent of those imposed on the U.S. officials in the USSR.

~~SECRET~~

~~Review on 1/2/2000~~

~~Classified and extended by Z. Brzezinski
Reason for extension: NSC 1.13 (f)~~

~~Declassify on: OADR~~

Partially Declassified/Released on 3-17-95
under provisions of E.O. 12356
by S. Tiley, National Security Council

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5) Preparations for opening the Consultates General in Kiev and New York will be suspended.

6) Radio Liberty, Radio Free Europe and Voice of America broadcasts will be stepped up along the lines proposed in the State Department's December 31 paper. The necessary funds will be made available by OMB. Worldwide diplomatic demarches and ICA actions will be increased to publicize the Soviet role in Afghanistan.

7) Our posture toward the Afghan Government will be not to conduct any formal business for the timebeing. The number of American personnel at the Embassy will be reduced to ten. The question of recognition of the Babrak regime does not arise.

8) The Consular Review Talks which are now in a state of suspension will not be resumed.

9) On a case-by-case basis, The Department of State will reject and delay visas for official visits to the United States.

10) Soviet media representation in the United States will be reduced to the same level as U.S. media representation in the Soviet Union.

11) Shipment by C5A aircraft of the MHD channel will be deferred indefinitely.

12) Negotiations with the Soviet Union on the General Exchange Agreement will not be resumed.

13) We will cancel the following:

-- The Agriculture Joint Committee Meeting scheduled for January in the USSR.

-- The Health Joint Committee Meeting scheduled for February in Moscow.

-- Representative Green will be urged to cancel his Congressional Delegation visit to the Soviet Union scheduled for January 11-18.

14) Any meetings at the level of Assistant Secretary or above will be reviewed on a case-by-case basis with the presumption that they will be cancelled unless there are overriding reasons not to do so.

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15) On the Olympics, we will take the following position which may be used publicly: "Our European Allies have questioned whether we should proceed to participate in the Olympic games in Moscow. We will assess this question and review the position taken by other countries in reaching our decision."

16) U.S. travel controls on Soviet officials and the enforcement of these controls will be reviewed to ensure greater reciprocity with the treatment accorded our officials in the Soviet Union.

17) We should postpone the following meetings: the Joint Commercial Committee Meeting scheduled for April 14-15 in Washington; the Business Facilitation Talks scheduled for January 9 in Moscow; and the Civil Aviation Talks scheduled for February 13. In addition, Aeroflot's scheduled service will be limited to the two weekly flights currently authorized.

18) The United States export controls on exports to the USSR will be tightened up on a case-by-case basis. The United States should be prepared to restrict export licenses to an even greater degree than our allies if it does not disadvantage U.S. business in comparison with our allies.

19) There should be an examination of Soviet commercial expansion in the United States with a view to restricting it. The Department of State should forward proposals to this effect within one week.

20) Allocations to the Soviet Union under our Fishing Agreements should be restricted.

21) The United States should continue to urge our allies to increase broadcasts to Muslim countries and Soviet Central Asia on developments in Afghanistan. There should also be prepared in conjunction with our allies a periodic circular to be distributed at the United Nations on the status of the Soviet invasion and occupation in Afghanistan.

22) The United States will join in a letter to the President of the Security Council urging that the Afghanistan situation be placed on the agenda. Unless it would be a violation of the UN Charter, Ambassador McHenry will be instructed to tell other nations that it is our preference to also raise this issue at the current General Assembly.

(b)(1)
23) 

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24) We will consult with other countries to urge them to deny the Soviet Union further credit.

25) We will work with our allies to urge the IFI's and countries with assistance programs to Afghanistan to terminate such assistance.

26) We will seek an amendment in the Foreign Assistance Bill to except Pakistan from the restrictions of the Symington and Glenn Non-proliferation Amendments so that it will be possible for us to provide FMS and ESP.

The Department of State should immediately inform our allies of our intention to take these actions and should urge appropriate allied support.

W. J. Burns

Y. 2130 H Street, NW, Suite 701, Washington DC, 20037

From the NATIONAL SECURITY ARCHIVE, The Gelman

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IMPLEMENTATION OF INSTRUCTIONS
EMERGING FROM JANUARY 2, 1980
NSC MEETING

1. SALT. The President wrote a letter to Senator Byrd requesting that the Senate delay consideration of the SALT II Treaty. Formal notice of the President's decision to request this delay has been conveyed to Soviet Charge Vasev. The Department of State has released statements on continued compliance with the SALT I Interim Agreement and the US posture vis-a-vis the SALT II Treaty at this point in time. This information has been conveyed to US Allies. (All of the relevant documents are at Tab A along with two memoranda to you on the SALT I and SALT II compliance issues.) (Jasper) - see Tab A
2. Other Bilateral Arms Control Negotiations. The decisions contained in the two instructions from the NSC meeting are being implemented. ACDA has released a statement (Tab B) on the status of all arms control negotiations. This statement has been provided to Allied capitals and conveyed in general terms to our Allies. (Jasper) - see Tab B
3. Watson was recalled January 4 and plans to return to Moscow this weekend. I think this is unwise and have sent you (ZB) a separate memo on the subject. (Brenant)
- 4, 10, 19. State proposals for reducing Soviet diplomatic staff and curtailing media representation, as well as tightening of travel restrictions, will be forwarded January 11. State is having trouble coming up with formulas which do not hurt us more than the Soviets. The problem on diplomatic representation is that we put secretaries, code clerks, etc. on the diplomatic list, while the Soviets do not, and our numbers on the diplomatic list are therefore roughly equal. (If we are going to reduce, then we would want to reduce diplomatic personnel.) On the press, the problem is that the Soviets could accredit their New York correspondents to the UN. (Brenant)
- 5, 8, 9. ~~The~~ Soviets have been notified that we will not be going ahead with ~~consulates~~ General in Kiev and New York; the consular review ~~task~~ will not be resumed; and visa procedures for Soviet officials visiting the United States have been tightened. (Brenant)

Declassify on: OADR

Declassified/Released on 7/29/98
under provisions of E.O. 12958
by R. Soubers, National Security Council
F93-676

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(54)

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Re para 6 - OMB has dragged its feet on providing funds and continues to do so. ICA has not been provided with adequate funds to accomplish all of the actions approved as a result of the SCC Meeting of 11 December; BIB has been denied any extra funds for RFE/RL. (I cannot get anyone in OMB to answer my phone calls to seek an explanation of why this is so.) (C)

State has directed worldwide diplomatic demarches and some ICA actions abroad. Reports on action are trickling in from various embassies; some are coming up with arguments against action. Some of these arguments may be valid. Others are not. All in all I have the impression that the instruction is not being taken very seriously. ICA has not moved on these with unusual vigor. Reinhardt takes the position that ICA cannot act except at the direction of the Ambassador in any given country. This is leading to a certain amount of Alphonse-Gaston. (C) (Heuse)

7. US Posture Toward Afghanistan Government and Reduction of Personnel at Embassy Kabul.

State is reducing its staff at Embassy Kabul and is holding off on any announcement indicating our intention to continue relations. (Thorn))

8.+9. See 5.

10. See 4.

11, 12, 13. Shipment of MHD channel has been deferred; the cultural exchange agreement negotiations will not be resumed; and the various high-level meetings have been indefinitely postponed. Only routine working-level meetings will continue. (Brenant)

14, 15, 16. Meetings at the Assistant Secretary level will be reviewed on a case-by-case basis with the presumption that they will be cancelled. We have informed our Allies of the position taken by the President on the Olympics. Travel controls on Soviet officials will be fully reciprocal. (Brenant)

17, 20, 22. The Joint Commercial Committee Meeting, the Business Facilitation Talks, and the Civil Aviation Talks have been postponed. Aeroflot's scheduled service has been reduced to twice weekly. The Soviets have been informed about fishing restrictions. The Security Council action on Afghanistan has been accomplished and we are now moving this item to the General Assembly. (Brenant)

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18. The President has issued directives to Commerce, Defense, and State to suspend all validated licenses for exports to the USSR and to freeze shipments pending a review and revision of our criteria for allowing technology transfers to the USSR. Commerce has agreed to inform companies of eight or nine high technology denials no later than the morning of January 11th. The review is already underway and should be completed within four to six weeks. (Ddom)

19. See 4

20. See 17

21.* Re Para 21 - ICA continues to maintain that it is not its responsibility to implement these actions--except as State directs. No action has been taken by ICA to prepare (as the ZB memo of 7 January specifically instructs) "a periodic circular to be distributed at the UN on the status of the Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan." Reinhardt maintains that he could not even consider doing this without an invitation from McHenry and that it is really not ICA's job. You will note that State weasels on this issue--stating that information is being "widely disseminated... through the UN debates." This is not what the NSC directed. (C) (Hense)

One of the problems in this whole information/propaganda/broadcasting area is lack of any central point of coordination. ICA shies away from exercising a coordinating role and keeps maintaining that it can't do anything unless State takes the lead. There is no single individual or office in charge of implementing this sort of thing in State. I find I have to call half a dozen people even to get information on what anyone is thinking of doing. We cannot compensate for lack of coordination in State and lack of leadership in ICA by trying to do it from NSC. I find that everyone in NSC concerned with these questions is frustrated and puzzled by how to proceed with State and ICA. The place where leadership should be exercised is ICA. I have already addressed this question in other communications to you in the past two days. I am sending you today a recommendation for setting up a consultants' panel to survey this problem urgently. (C)

22. See 17

* Both Paul + Linc got the #21 item. They did not coordinate; they both submitted entries. Linc's is attached at end of Jasper attachment

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23. COCOM Differential for China

I held a meeting of State, DOD and Commerce to decide on implementation of the COCOM differential. We agreed that State will this week call in the Ambassadors of the key COCOM states to inform them of our policy and request their support in COCOM. Christopher may want to check with you on this before proceeding. You should encourage him to move promptly. We will follow up with a detailed presentation at the experts level.

Significantly, all agencies agreed that we should have as much of the "Belgian Formula" as possible down in writing in the COCOM regulations rather than leaving it vague, oral and ad hoc. Previously, State had opposed this although Vance's memoranda to the President could be interpreted as recommending that we would seek written procedural arrangements. We will also shortly be informing the export control people in Congress of our new policy.

Within the USG the export control bureaucracy has been informed that they are no longer to use the fear of an analogous export to the Soviet Union as a reason for denying an export to China. Furthermore, Commerce will review at a policy level all proposals for denials of exports to China and will consult with me on such denials. After a few months of this procedure, we'll need to see whether we can develop and implement specific criteria for a China differential. (Huberman)

24. Consultations with Other Countries re Denial of Further Credit to the Soviet Union

Consultations are continuing. The initial reaction is mixed, and no firm decisions have been made by the allies. (Blackwell)

Item 25 - Termination of Aid to Afghanistan

State's status report of today on this item can be updated as follows: AID has terminated fully, as have Japan and Germany. State has asked all OECD countries with aid programs in Afghanistan to halt them. The World Bank and Asian Bank managements have privately assured our executive directors that no new commitments will be made and disbursements will be halted to the extent possible; they ask that we not publicize this until their boards have been informed.

(Poak)

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26. Provision of FMS and ESF to Pakistan.

The President has approved a supplemental request for \$100 million each in ESF and FMS in FY 80. Draft legislation has been prepared in State and circulated by OMB authorizing this aid, notwithstanding the Symington amendment, in light of present circumstances. (Theater)

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 2, 1980

~~TOP SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

SUBJECT: Presidential Decisions on Pakistan,
Afghanistan and India (S)

The following decisions were made by the President as a result of the PRC Meeting of December 27 and the NSC Meeting of December 28 and should be implemented:

Afghanistan

1. Our ultimate goal is the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. Even if this is not attainable, we should make Soviet involvement as costly as possible and should use the events in Afghanistan as a rallying point for our policies in the area.
2. We should push these objectives vigorously, going to the United Nations if necessary. It would be preferable, however, for other countries to take the lead in the UN.
3. Messages should be sent to our NATO Allies, China and key leaders in the UN and Non-Aligned Movement, drawing their attention to the events in Afghanistan and calling for appropriate responses.
4. We will not link the Soviet action in Afghanistan to SALT. At the same time, however, we will not permit our interest in SALT to deter us from speaking and acting forcefully.
5. We will send public and private messages to the Soviets, citing the unacceptability of their behavior, the threat to the peace posed by their actions, and their violation of the principles of behavior we agreed to in 1972. (TS)

Pakistan

1. We are prepared to send a high-level mission to Pakistan, headed by Deputy Secretary Christopher, to consult on the new situation in the region.

~~TOP SECRET~~

Review on December 31, 1999

Extended by Z. Brzezinski

Reason for Extension: NSC 1.13(b)&(e)

Declassified/Released on 3-14-95
under provisions of E.O. 12356
By J. Saunders, National Security Council

(5)

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

-2-

2. Military sales will be resumed and facilitated.
3. We shall ask the Saudis to assist on financing military purchases by Pakistan.
4. Two GEARING-class destroyers will be provided to Pakistan expeditiously.
5. We shall move promptly in providing \$40 million in PL-480 assistance.
6. Additional assistance will be provided to help Pakistan deal with the Afghan refugee problem.
7. We will reaffirm our nuclear policy towards Pakistan and make clear the legislative restrictions. We will, however, urge the Pakistanis to put the problem aside for solution later while we deal with the Soviet-Afghan problem. (S)

India

1. A high-level mission will be sent to India following the Indian elections.
2. Ambassador Gerard Smith should provide a memorandum to the President before we move to approve the pending license for supply of fuel to the Tarapur reactor or submit the second Indian request to the NRC. (S)



Zbigniew Brzezinski

cc: The Secretary of Defense
The Director of Central Intelligence

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

Jan 2, 1980

EYES ONLY

TO: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: HEDLEY DONOVAN

I was distressed by your comment on the ABC interview, if accurately transcribed by the Times, that your opinion of the Russians had changed more drastically in the last week than in all your previous time in office. I see how this can be true, and it could be a perfectly sensible observation for you to make privately. But as a public statement by the President I fear it opens you up to charges of naivete. The further language -- "only now dawning on the world . . . even former close friends of the Soviet Union" -- does not help.

It also troubles me to have you assert the Russians will suffer "severe political consequences" but you can't yet say what. This creates an unnecessary and quite uncomfortable resemblance between our stance toward the Russians and toward the Ayatollah.

I have argued in the past for "holding" rather than "ratcheting" vis-a-vis Iran. I think time is now running out. Afghanistan, where we can't do much of anything, builds the pressure for action about Iran. I would hunch you have from now until Congress comes back.

* * * *

- 2 -

I hope you are considering taking the initiative yourself about SALT, by announcing that after consultation with the Senate leaders you are asking them to hold ratification in abeyance.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

January 3, 1980


Dear Senator Byrd:

In light of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, I request that you delay consideration of the SALT II Treaty on the Senate floor.

The purpose of this request is not to withdraw the Treaty from consideration, but to defer the debate so that the Congress and I as President can assess Soviet actions and intentions, and devote our primary attention to the legislative and other measures required to respond to this crisis.

As you know, I continue to share your view that the SALT II Treaty is in the national security interest of the United States and the entire world, and that it should be taken up by the Senate as soon as these more urgent issues have been addressed.

Sincerely,



The Honorable Robert Byrd
Majority Leader of the United States Senate
Washington, D.C.

Declassified Released on 3-14-85
under provisions of E.O. 12958
E.O. 12958 National Security Council

(30)



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

January 8, 1980

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNCLASSIFIED

This memo should not be in "X"

MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE DIRECTOR, INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATION AGENCY

SUBJECT: Results of the NSC Meeting of January 2, 1980

Further on the results of the National Security Council meeting of January 2, 1980, the President has directed the following actions which will affect your agency:

-- The United States should continue to urge our allies to increase broadcasts to Muslim countries and Soviet Central Asia on developments in Afghanistan. There should also be prepared in conjunction with our allies a periodic circular to be distributed at the United Nations on the status of the Soviet invasion and occupation in Afghanistan.

Christine Dodson
Christine Dodson
Staff Secretary

From the NATIONAL SECURITY ARCHIVE, 1755 Massachusetts Ave., NW, Washington, DC 20036

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~Review 1/2/2000~~

~~Classified and Extended by Zbigniew Brzezinski~~

~~Derivatively Classified fr Summary of Conclusions for NSC~~

~~Meeting of January 2, 1980~~

~~Declassify on: OADR~~

*Green check done
1-16-80*

UNCLASSIFIED

Classified on 3-17-93
in violation of E.O. 12958
by National Security Council

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~
~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

January 10, 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHRISTINE DODSON

FROM: MARSHALL BREMENT

SUBJECT: Implementation of January 2 NSC Decisions (U)

3. Watson was recalled January 4 and plans to return to Moscow this weekend. I think this is unwise and have sent you (ZB) a separate memo on the subject.

4, 10, 19. State proposals for reducing Soviet diplomatic staff and curtailing media representation, as well as tightening of travel restrictions, will be forwarded January 11. State is having trouble coming up with formulas which do not hurt us more than the Soviets. The problem on diplomatic representation is that we put secretaries, code clerks, etc. on the diplomatic list, while the Soviets do not, and our numbers on the diplomatic list are therefore roughly equal. (If we are going to reduce, then we would want to reduce diplomatic personnel.) On the press, the problem is that the Soviets could accredit their New York correspondents to the UN.

5, 8, 9. The Soviets have been notified that we will not be going ahead with Consulates General in Kiev and New York; the consular review talks will not be resumed; and visa procedures for Soviet officials visiting the United States have been tightened.

11, 12, 13. Shipment of MHD channel has been deferred; the cultural exchange agreement negotiations will not be resumed; and the various high-level meetings have been indefinitely postponed. Only routine working-level meetings will continue.

14, 15, ~~16~~. Meetings at the Assistant Secretary level will be reviewed on a case-by-case basis with the presumption that they will be cancelled. We have informed our Allies of the position taken by the President on the Olympics. Travel controls on Soviet officials will be fully reciprocal.

17, 20, 22. The Joint Commercial Committee Meeting, the Business Facilitation Talks, and the Civil Aviation Talks have been postponed. Aeroflot's scheduled service has been reduced to twice weekly. The Soviets have been informed about fishing restrictions. The Security Council action on Afghanistan has been accomplished and we are now moving this item to the General Assembly.

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under provisions of E.O. 12958
by R. Souders National Security Council
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington, D. C. 20520

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~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

January 10, 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Actions Taken to Carry Out NSC Decisions of
January 2, 1980

This memorandum reports on the actions which the Department has taken to date to carry out the decisions made at the NSC meeting on Afghanistan of January 2, 1980. Deputy Secretary Christopher announced most of these decisions to Soviet Charge Vasev on January 7. Other decisions have been conveyed to the Soviets in Moscow.

1. SALT II Deferral

Formal notice of the President's decision conveyed to Vasev.

2. Other Bilateral Arms Control Negotiations

All decisions reflected in paragraph (2) of the NSC decision memorandum are being implemented and our allies have been informed of them in general terms.

3. Recall of Ambassador Watson

Ambassador Watson was recalled for consultations on January 4 and plans to return to his post over the January 12-13 weekend.

4. Proposal for Reducing Soviet Diplomatic Staff in the US, Including Tightening of Travel Restrictions

A proposal on this action will be sent to the NSC by January 14.

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

~~REF ID: A66333~~
REF ID: A66333

Declassify on: OADR

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by R. Soberg National Security Council
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5. Suspension of Preparations for Opening the Consulates General in Kiev and New York

Formal notice of this decision was conveyed to Vasev by diplomatic note and the Soviets were also informed in Moscow. The "advance parties" in Kiev and New York are to be withdrawn by March 7, 1980.

6. Stepping up of Radio Liberty, Radio Free Europe, and Voice of America Broadcasts; Increased Diplomatic Demarches and ICA Actions Worldwide to Publicize the Soviet Role in Afghanistan.

(a) Our existing broadcasts are concentrating heavily on the Soviet role in Afghanistan and our allies have been urged to do the same.

(b) The Department has made diplomatic demarches on radio broadcasting and we have approached Saudi Arabia and Egypt about new facilities.

7. US Posture Toward Afghanistan Government and Reduction of Personnel at Embassy Kabul.

We are reducing our staff at Embassy Kabul and are holding off on any announcement indicating our intention to continue relations.

8. Consular Review Talks.

Talks will not be resumed; there is no current Soviet proposal to do so.

9. Visas for Soviet Official Visits to the United States.

The Department has initiated a new procedure to monitor official visa requests closely.

10. Reduction of Soviet Media Representation in the United States.

A proposal on this action will be sent to the NSC by January 14.

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11. Shipment by C5A Aircraft of the MHD Channel.

The shipment of the MHD channel has been deferred indefinitely and the Soviets have been informed.

12. Negotiations with the Soviet Union on the General Exchange Agreement and Cultural Agreement.

These negotiations will not be resumed and formal notice of the decision was conveyed to Vasev.

13. Meeting and Visit Consultations.

(a) Soviets were informed here and in Moscow that the Agricultural Joint Committee meeting has been indefinitely postponed.

(b) The Soviets were informed that the Health Joint Committee Meeting has been indefinitely postponed.

(c) Additionally, the Soviets were informed that the Joint Committee Meeting for Housing has been indefinitely postponed.

(d) All agencies have been informed through the ICCUSA mechanism of the need to cut back on exchanges to a minimum of routine, working level meetings with humanitarian impact.

(e) Representative Green has cancelled his Congressional Delegation Visit to the USSR scheduled for January 11-18

14. US-Soviet Meetings at the Assistant Secretary Level or Higher.

We have informed all Agencies through the ICCUSA mechanism that all such meetings must be reviewed on a case-by-case basis with the presumption that they will be cancelled unless there are overriding reasons not to do so. Additionally, Embassy Moscow has been instructed to refer to the Department all visa requests for travel to the US of officials at the Deputy Minister level and above.

15. Olympics.

We conveyed the position contained in the President's speech to our Allies.

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16. US Travel Controls on Soviet Officials.

US travel controls are being strictly applied and we have taken measures to insure full reciprocity with the treatment accorded our officials in the Soviet Union.

17. Postponement of Additional Meetings/Aeroflot Service.

(a) The Soviets have been informed that we cannot host the Eighth Joint Commercial Meeting scheduled for Washington April 14-15, 1980, and a letter to this effect has been sent to Foreign Trade Minister Patolichev by Treasury Secretary Miller.

(b) The Soviets have been informed of postponement of the Business Facilitation Talks scheduled for January 9 in Moscow.

(c) The Soviets have been informed of postponement of the Civil Aviation Talks scheduled for February 13 and of reduction of Aeroflot's scheduled service to two flights per week, effective January 13.

18. Export Controls.

We have officially notified Vasev that:

(a) No high technology or other strategic items will be licensed for sale to the Soviet Union until further notice, while we revise our licensing policy; and

(b) the President has also ordered a review of certain licenses already issued. We are consulting with other agencies and the NSC about further implementation of the decision. Commerce and Defense are submitting suggestions.

19. Restriction of Soviet Commercial Presence in US.

We sent the NSC a proposal on this subject on January 4. Additional suggestions will be included in the memorandum on diplomatic and media representation, which will be ready by January 14.

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20. Fishery Allocations.

Vasev was informed that US is withholding preliminary catch allocations for the USSR within the US fishery conservation zones in the Bering Sea and the Atlantic Ocean.

21. Encouraging Allies to Increase Broadcasts to Moslem Countries and Soviet Central Asia on Developments in Afghanistan/UN Circular.

(a) We have informed our allies of our intention to increase broadcasting and urged them to do the same.

(b) Information is being widely disseminated on the Soviet invasion and occupation in Afghanistan through the UN debates.

22. Security Council Action on Afghanistan.

Security Council action has been accomplished and efforts are now underway to address this issue at the current General Assembly.

23. COCOM Differential/"Belgian Formula".

We are consulting with our allies on a "China differential" in COCOM, and have been urging them to follow our lead in cutting back in high technology exports to the USSR.

24. Consultations with other Countries re Denial of Further Credit to the Soviet Union.

Consultations are continuing. The initial reaction is mixed, and no firm decisions have been made by the allies.

25. Termination of IPI and Bilateral Assistance Programs to Afghanistan.

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AID is terminating remaining bilateral agreements with Afghanistan and we are discussing with our Allies and the staffs of the IFI's ways in which IFI assistance could be suspended or terminated.

26. Provision of FMS and ESF to Pakistan.

The President has approved a supplemental request for \$100 million each in ESF and FMS in FY 80. Draft legislation has been prepared in State and circulated by OMB authorizing this aid, notwithstanding the Symington amendment, in light of present circumstances.

* * *

The Department immediately informed our Allies and other key countries of measures we are taking, and we are engaged in an intensive, continuing effort of consultations to urge appropriate allied support.


Peter Tarnoff
Executive Secretary

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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SPECIAL COORDINATION COMMITTEE MEETING

Monday, January 14, 1980

TIME AND PLACE: 10:00 a.m. - 12:00 Noon
White House Situation Room

SUBJECT: SCC Meeting on U.S. Strategy for
South West Asia and Persian Gulf

PARTICIPANTS

State
Under Secretary for Political
Affairs, David Newsom
Assistant Secretary Harold Saunders

Energy
Secretary Charles Duncan

White House
Zbigniew Brzezinski
David Aaron

Defense
Deputy Secretary W. Graham Claytor
Mr. Robert Murray

NSC
Colonel William E. Odom
Colonel Leslie Denend
Henry Owen
Thomas Thornton
Robert Hunter
Fritz Ermarth

JCS
Chairman, General David Jones
Lt. General John Pustay

CIA
Director Stansfield Turner

[Redacted]
Mr. Robert Ames

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SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

Dr. Brzezinski opened the meeting with an overview of what is happening and what is at stake in the region. The results of this meeting, he said, are to provide a basis for a National Security Council meeting with the President later this week. We must deal with the continued deterioration of the U.S. position in the region. Whatever the Soviet motives for their actions in Afghanistan, they have created an objective threat and a dynamic development in the area as serious for our security and vital interests as Soviet actions in Greece in 1947. We must provide the President with a basis for responding adequately to this change, specifically what we should do about Pakistan and about the larger Persian Gulf region. The President believes that there will be lasting strategic consequences. He

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Review on January 14, 2000
Extended by Z. Brzezinski
Reason for Extension: NSC [unclear]

Partially Declassified/Released on 3-14-95
under provisions of E.O. 12356
By J. Saunders, National Security Council

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wants to reaffirm that there will be no zig-zag in U.S.-Soviet relations on our side. No warm up is to be expected soon. The mistake in 1968 after the Soviet action in Czechoslovakia was, in the President's view, to ease up on Moscow too early.

The President spoke with Aga Shahi over the weekend and reaffirmed our commitment to the agreement of 1959. The problem is how to define the U.S. commitment under the agreement. If there is major Soviet aggression, the U.S. will respond within the limits of our Constitutional authority. The U.S. will not, however, become involved in border skirmishes. We want our support to help Pakistan to take a firm stand against Soviet forces in the region even if they are faced by a Moscow/Kabul/New Delhi axis. In that case, the U.S. will develop a U.S./Saudi Arabian/PRC/Pakistan/ and eventually Iran axis as a counter.

Dr. Brzezinski next declared that the task before us is how to translate this basic stand by the President into:

-- effective military relations with Pakistan and other countries in the region;

-- economic assistance to Pakistan in a way that supports our broader purposes;

-- a regional web of political relations to counter effectively the threat created by Soviet moves in Afghanistan.

We cannot duplicate NATO in this region; a more eclectic mix of bilateral, multilateral, and informal arrangements must suffice.

There was a brief discussion of the implications of Dr. Brzezinski's framing of the overall context and the tasks to be accomplished. State asked if the U.S. guarantee to Pakistan against aggression was for only a Soviet attack or also an Indian attack, adding that this would be a major problem in our relations with India if it included both. Defense insisted that it must include both because the Pakistanis cannot shift forces between their western and eastern frontiers to meet the Soviet aggression without a guarantee in the east as well as against the Soviets in the west. State accepted this argument by Dr. Brzezinski and Defense that sooner or later we would have to face up to Pakistan's security problem with India. Dr. Brzezinski said that the U.S. commitment was only against a threat from the north. Dr. Brzezinski asked at this point if there were disagreements with his analysis of the situation because it carries a number of assumptions which are key for further decisions. No dissenting views were expressed. Defense strongly supported the analysis. State added that we must include the nuclear issue within this policy context. State also pointed out that we must anticipate the criticism that we are merely restoring a "cold war alliance" with the rebuttal that

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such an alliance is inadequate for the contemporary political and military realities in the region. Dr. Brzezinski accepted both points, especially that we have in mind something more than a cold war alliance as we build a new regional security system.

The meeting next turned to specific issues for decision.

I. Military Assistance to Pakistan

In discussion of the fighter aircraft issue, Graham Claytor reported that the Pakistanis did not request specific U.S. aircraft but rather asked the United States to provide what is necessary for them to defend themselves against the new Soviet threat which includes MIG-23s and MIG-25s. There was discussion of the value of A-7 fighters for close air support along the western borders, the extent to which helicopter gunships could perform the same mission, and whether the A-7s were meant for an air defense role also.

General Jones agreed that helicopters would be useful but added that A-7s would provide much greater air ground capability. All agreed that we should encourage the Pakistanis to use the French Mirage fighter for the larger air defense problem against the Soviet Union.

Tasking: State was asked to:

1. determine whether the Mirages will in fact suffice to meet the threat;
2. clarify with the French their willingness to provide Mirages;
3. with Defense, consider A-7s for Pakistan, about 30.

II. Bases, Political Assurances to Host Nations, and Increased RDF

Bases. Dr. Brzezinski raised the question of a base in Pakistan. General Jones said "facilities" ("bases" have a poor political connotation, it was observed) for air and naval deployments to Pakistan would be a significant advantage. Others pointed out that such U.S. facilities in Pakistan would drive India into closer cooperation with Moscow against Pakistan. Most all agreed that this is possible, but there were differing views on whether we should take the step and the risks it involves. Dr. Brzezinski added that we should consider it but not over load our relations with India by taking the step now.

Tasking: State and Defense will develop a paper on U.S. military "facilities" in Pakistan, describing their purpose, possible Indian reaction, and what those reactions would entail for the United States.

Military Consortium for Pakistan: State reported that George Vest and Peter Constable will be going to Europe for discussions

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about British, French, and Saudi Arabian participation in the military consortium. Dr. Brzezinski added that the Japanese should also be asked to participate. Newsom and others were less enthusiastic about bringing the Japanese in. It would be a new step for them. Newsom and Owen suggested we emphasize greater Japanese economic aid to Pakistan in forms that will release Pakistan domestic funds for military purposes. There was some question about the Japanese laws permitting financing of direct military aid to Pakistan. Dr. Brzezinski argued that the Japanese have greater interests in the area than the U.S. Thirty years after the war, when they are economically powerful, surely they can contribute to the security of the Persian Gulf. We should raise the issue with them even if they do not accept our proposal.

Tasking: State will check what the Japanese law permits. Defense will produce a paper outlining a specific division of labor among the members of the military consortium, integrating each country's contribution to meet the overall Pakistani military needs in the most efficient fashion possible.

Political Assurances to Host Nations: Defense made clear that the technical survey teams can proceed to Oman and Somalia without providing their hosts with "political assurances" on what the U.S. will give for the bases. Work is presently under way to produce a military-economic aid package for each host country with appropriate "political assurances."

Tasking: State will provide a paper which sets forth the assurances for each country, the form in which the assurances should be given, and what consultations with Congress are appropriate.

Diego Garcia: It was recommended that we expand the runways and the storage facilities on Diego Garcia. Conservationists may lobby against this construction. When Dr. Brzezinski asked whether we actually need this expansion in light of acquisition of bases in Oman and Somalia, State and Defense pointed out that it is much better to have a larger number of small bases to absorb minor setbacks if we must abandon some bases in the future.

Tasking: None.

Improved RDF Capabilities: General Jones made a presentation at this point in which he pointed out that Soviet military deployments into Afghanistan will fundamentally change the military threat to our allies on the Persian Gulf:

-- Soviet fighter aircraft based in Afghanistan will be able to reach the Gulf of Hormuz, a wholly new development.

-- Soviet armored ground forces could reach the waters of the Arabian Sea through Baluchistan in 10 to 12 days if unopposed.

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-- Preferred Soviet land routes to Tehran probably still remain those from the Caucasus. Soviet heavy military ground forces on this route could reach the oil field regions in the vicinity of Kuwait in 10 to 12 days.

-- Using sealift from the Black Sea, the Soviets could project forces through the Suez Canal to the Persian Gulf in about 21 days.

-- One Soviet airborne division, about 8,000 troops, with organic armor vehicles, could land anywhere in the vicinity of the Persian Gulf in two to three days if all Soviet airlift is employed.

General Jones outlined our options for rapid short-term measures to meet this changed Soviet threat by early spring this year:

1. Our naval presence in the Arabian Sea will eventually have to be reduced to one aircraft carrier battle group. We do not have sustaining power for the two there at present.

2. Tactical air power projected into Egyptian and Jordanian basis can improve our air projection capability. We should also request that the Saudis "over build" their air fields, something we can do privately with no political costs, but something which will greatly enhance their capability to support "fly in" of U.S. fighter formations.

3. Prepositioning of heavy equipment and supplies backed up by a significant increase in our sealift capability can give us a much larger and earlier force projection capability into the region. To achieve this in the next two to three months, General Jones proposes the following package:

a. Purchase two RO/RO ships which will hold the prepositioned equipment for one mechanized brigade and ground support equipment for three fighter squadrons.

b. Lease three cargo ships to be prepositioned with dry cargo supplies, ammunition, water, and fuels.

c. Followup supply from the U.S. can be moved through the Suez Canal in 11 days by SL-7 class sea-land ships. General Jones proposed to lease a fleet of eight SL-7s, six of which would be kept in use and two of which would be under conversion to a RO/RO capability.

d. The overall costs for this package is estimated at \$450 million.

The advantages of this proposal are:

-- The deployment time for getting heavy ground forces through the region would be cut from roughly 25/28 days to 5/8 days through prepositioning.

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-- For the first time we would have a followup sealift supply capability in the SL-7s which travel at 33 knots, a difficult speed for an enemy to locate and intercept.

-- This capability could be exercised for demonstrations in the region by late spring or early summer.

Tasking: Defense is to submit the proposal in detail to OMB and have the results available for the NSC meeting.

Exercises. Dr. Brzezinski insisted that we need ground force exercises in the area soon in order to improve the local sense of confidence about American commitment to the region. General Jones agreed that he could speed up the deployment of two Marine units, one from the Eastern Mediterranean and one from the Pacific to exercise in Oman and Somalia by March. Airlift of ground forces from the United States would be extremely expensive. General Jones prefers not to take that step but rather only exercise the Marines now. General Jones argued that more importantly, if we purchase the two RO/RO, which are ready for immediate delivery and loading, we can use them for exercises in March or April, exercises that will have a much greater psychological effect for a lesser cost than projecting airborne units with no armor from the U.S.

Tasking: State will give us a paper by Thursday on the political effects that exercises would have. Defense will provide a paper recommending specific exercises.

III. Security Consultations with India and Pakistan

There was debate about the sequence and timing of the upcoming missions to Pakistan and India. Dr. Brzezinski pointed out that the Clifford mission to New Delhi would find the climate all the more hostile if at the same time the Christopher mission is in Pakistan. He argued that it is better to have the mission to India completed in advance so that we can take the results into consideration in preparing the Christopher mission for Pakistan. State agreed to reconsider and suggested that the Clifford mission might best depart on January 20, at the same time that the Defense military technical mission goes to Pakistan to discuss details of military assistance. Five days later the Christopher "political" mission can go to Pakistan, providing a decent interval to take into account the results of the Clifford mission.

IV. Consultations with North Yemen

The danger of an imminent union between North and South Yemen was discussed. An NSC working group recommended that we pursue a two-track strategy, U.S. demarches to President Salih in North Yemen and a Saudi Arabian demarche to Salih. Most argued this is an unpromising course of action. Dr. Brzezinski pointed out that we should consider a much more fundamental political change in South Yemen. It

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is clear that U.S. interests in the area could be greatly damaged by a union of South and North Yemen. Egypt and Jordan interests would be similarly hurt, not to speak of Saudi Arabia's concern. We should, therefore, consider a joint action to bring about a fundamental political change in South Yemen. A discussion followed on Saudi capabilities to do this, which were judged wholly inadequate, and the difficulties of getting Egyptian and Jordanian cooperation.

Tasking: State and CIA are to consult on preparing a high level mission to North Yemen to make Salih aware of the depths of our opposition to a union of the two Yemens. Dr. Brzezinski suggested that Frank Carlucci might be an appropriate person to head such a mission. A NSC-chaired working group will prepare a paper on the Yemen problem.

V. Refugees

The discussion next turned to ways to provide refugee aid other than through the UNHCR. Dr. Brzezinski pointed out that citizens from the Soviet bloc may be officials in the UNHCR. They could use their positions to make it difficult for refugee camps to support the insurgency in Afghanistan. State argued that it is U.S. policy to avoid bilateral transfers of funds for refugees. Others pointed out that this is not always our policy. We do make bilateral contributions to certain countries in Africa.

Tasking: State will examine the alternative ways of supporting refugees in Pakistan other than through the UNHCR so that the UNHCR cannot, if it chooses, interfere seriously with refugee camps supporting the insurgency.

VI. ASEAN, the PRC, and non-Friendly Countries Support for U.S. Policy

Dr. Brzezinski asked about the possibility of getting ASEAN countries to help us reduce India's resistance to our policy toward Pakistan. Most believe ASEAN is unlikely to help. Dr. Brzezinski mentioned that some non-friendly states, might change their policies toward the U.S. in the region in light of the recent Soviet actions. State suggested that relaxing our sanctions on Mozambique might produce a change in that country's policy toward us. It was agreed that we should send messages to a group of non-friendly states, Angola, Cuba, Vietnam, Ethiopia, Syria, and Iraq.

Tasking: State will produce for the next SCC a list of Presidential messages or demarches to ASEAN, some African countries, and non-friendly countries for consideration in light of the above discussion.

VII. The PLO and Mid East Peace Process

Dr. Brzezinski pointed out that it is very important to accelerate the peace process in light of the Soviet action in Afghanistan. Would a public statement by the President on this matter be useful at this time? State and others pointed out the old dilemma that if we want progress for the PLO, then we do not talk about it. If there

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is a lot of public support for the PLO, it might prevent progress in the negotiations by frightening Israel. Newsom pointed out that we might get the Israelis to back down on some of their recent actions in the East Bank.

VIII. A Public Communique on Aid to Pakistan

State offered a public U.S. statement to be released on what we have offered in the way of aid to Pakistan. This was prepared in response to an earlier tasking. It was agreed that events have changed the circumstances so that such a statement is inappropriate.

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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January 14, 1980

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MEMORANDUM FOR: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI
FROM: JERRY SCHECTER 2-5.
SUBJECT: SCC Working Group on Iran and
Afghanistan: Public Posture (U)

We had our first meeting today and we discussed overall themes and dealt with immediate guidance on pressing issues. (U)

Looking at the immediate problems first: State, CIA, and Defense are looking into a report from Kabul by UPI correspondent William J Holstein that a Soviet division comprising at least 10,000 troops has taken up position along Afghanistan's border with Iran, within striking distance of Iran's oil fields. UPI sources said the 66th motorized rifle division, one of an estimated seven Soviet divisions that include about 85,000 troops in Afghanistan, had taken the position within the past "couple of days." (U)

This kind of report raises serious questions about Soviet intention and the possibility of movement or sweeps into Iran. First of all, we need confirmation of this report and a systematic description of the Soviet order of battle on the Iranian border. Then we need guidance on our best estimate of Soviet political and military intentions. (e)

We are also making an effort to single out intelligence items that can be declassified which point to the nature of the Soviet aggress against Afghanistan and efforts by Afghan freedom fighters to repel them. (e)

1.5(c)

CIA will follow up on a report that the Afghan rebels were apparent opening floodgates and flooding rivers in eastern Afghanistan to disrupt Soviet convoys being sent into the area. [redacted] report of January 13 indicated the rebels were stopping the convoys of Soviet troops being sent to Jalalabad by raising the water level and were then firing on those troops. (TS)

In terms of broader public position efforts, some major themes emerge:

- 1. Iran.
 - A. The Hostages.

CIA says it is preparing a study of the students cum kidnapers in the Embassy. This needs to be declassified so that

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under provisions of E.O. 12958
by R. Southern, National Security Council

we can identify the different groups, their leadership, and their political links. Such an effort would make credible our claims that Americans are being held by kidnappers and terrorists and that there is no government to negotiate with in Iran. By underscoring the nature of those holding the hostages, we would undercut their claims to be providing good care for the hostages. (C)

B. Iranian Sanctions

State will follow-up on a report that is being prepared on the impact of sanctions, particularly the political impact, since that appears to be more immediate than any long range economic impact. (C)

C. Iran's Isolation and Economic Desolation

State and CIA are looking into preparing a study on deteriorating economic conditions in Iran, emphasizing unemployment; lack of food and consumer goods, and amenities of life. They are also going to try and document the desertion of foreigners from Iran and the heavy cost that this will have on Iran's technology and economic development. All of this contributes to Iran's isolation and vulnerability. Hopefully, a piece like this would be played back in Iran and have an impact on moderate forces who seek to prevent the country from fragmenting further. (C)

2. Afghanistan: CIA is working on a three-part effort which would:

A. Provide a white paper with a chronology on the Soviet invasion.

1.5(c)

[REDACTED] (S)

B. Provide a paper on the geo-political rationale behind the Soviet invasion. (U)

C. Provide a paper which would relate Afghanistan to Iran to show Soviet efforts with the Tudeh party. The parallels are striking: Tudeh leadership maintained in East Berlin for years by the Russians; new Tudeh newspaper is published in Tehran. Who is the Iranian Babrak Karmal?; are the Soviets preparing an Iranian puppet? (C)

3. Soviet Exploitation and Persecution of Islam:

1.5(c)

We need a documented study on this which I will try to follow-up on with Paul Henze [REDACTED] (C)

or James Critchlow.

In sum, there are various themes which need to be documented and elaborated on in order to stress the basic policy points that the President has made. I suggest that the actual tasking be done not by me but by you or David at the formal SCC meetings. I sense a major gap between the theory propounded at the SCC and the practice of the White House, State, Defense and CIA. One of the things that has to be done is to make clear to the principals at the SCC that public perception of their goals can only be achieved when those goals are articulated with specific and meaningful examples. (2)

revised paragraph: "This would detail the visit of political commissar Yepishov to Afghanistan last spring, followed by the visit of Marshal Pavlovsky last summer with a full team of staff planners. This would be complemented with detail on how the invasion was planned and executed. (5)

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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INFORMATION

January 15, 1980

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MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI 23
SUBJECT: SCC on Southwest Asia and the Persian Gulf

I am attaching for your reading the Summary of Conclusions of the SCC on the overall problem of responding to the Soviet actions in Afghanistan. It should provide you with background on what is to be discussed at the upcoming National Security Council meeting. You may want to skip over some issues, but I call your attention especially to a proposal for a very rapid upgrade of our military land force projection into the region which General Jones provided. His assessment of the fundamental changes in the Soviet strategic position is also worth attention.

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Review on January 14, 2000
Extended by Z. Brzezinski
REason for Extension: NSC 1.13(e)

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BY [Signature] NARS DATE 11/29/98

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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SPECIAL COORDINATION COMMITTEE MEETING

Thursday, January 17, 1980

TIME AND PLACE: 9:00 a.m. - 10:45 a.m.
White House Situation Room

SUBJECT: SCC Meeting on Southwest Asia and
the Persian Gulf

PARTICIPANTS

State
Secretary Cyrus Vance
Deputy Secretary Warren Christopher

Defense
Secretary Harold Brown
Ambassador Robert Komer

JCS
Chairman General David Jones
Lt. General John Pustay

CIA
Deputy Director Frank Carlucci
Robert Ames
Charles Cogan

OMB
Deputy Director John White

White House
Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski
Hamilton Jordan
Jody Powell
Hedley Donovan
David Aaron

NSC
Colonel William E. Odom
Captain Gary Sick
Thomas Thornton
Fritz Ermarth

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

Dr. Brzezinski explained that the purpose today is to cover a number of points, not all of them for decision, but as information and recommendations to the President as a backdrop for the decision he will shortly be making about our policy toward Southwest Asia and the Persian Gulf region. He noted the agreement about the strategic dynamics of the Soviet military move into Afghanistan expressed at the previous SCC, the consequences for Pakistan and Iran, and also the importance of Soviet influence in Yemen and Ethiopia.

Dr. Brzezinski also added that the Soviet publication "New Times" has issued a call for all Communist states and parties to seize new revolutionary opportunities created by the present political conditions in the world, disturbing evidence of present Soviet policy directions

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Review on January 17, 2000
Extended by Z. Brzezinski
Reason for Extension: NSC 1.13(e)

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Military Assistance to Pakistan

Dr. Brzezinski and Secretary Vance commented that the President's meeting with Agha Shahi went as well as could be expected. Secretary Brown asked how we will deal with the situation if the Pakistanis insist they want \$1 billion in aid while we only offered \$400 million. Secretary Vance predicted that they will take our \$400 million and complain, not reject our aid.

Dr. Brzezinski asked about the French willingness to sell the Mirage aircraft to Pakistan. Secretary Vance reported that the French will probably supply the Mirage. As a next step, it will be discussed at the Political Directors Meeting in London on January 24th. State will push France to make a decision by then.

Dr. Brzezinski raised the question of American A-7 aircraft for Pakistan. It was pointed out that the Pakistanis did not ask for them. Rather they asked that they be supplied with aircraft sufficient to protect themselves against the Soviet air threat, implying, of course, for the need for the US F-16 or the Mirage. The A-7, as Dr. Brzezinski pointed out, would be very useful in a ground support role along the Western frontier. Furthermore, because the U.S. has a large number, nearly 700, it can undoubtedly spare 30 or 40. Secretary Brown agreed the Pakistanis might be willing to buy some A-7s.

Military Consortium

Dr. Brzezinski asked for Defense's proposal for a division of labor among the members of the military consortium. Secretary Brown submitted a paper showing which countries can produce what categories of military equipment. The issue of who pays remains to be solved, he added. Secretary Vance noted that according to Agha Shahi, the Saudis promised Pakistan \$800 million for military purchases over a year ago but have not yet delivered. We should press the Saudis to make the promise good.

Concerning Japan, Vance has instructed Phil Habib to ask the Japanese for \$400 million for the consortium. They may give less, but Vance feels we should ask for that much. We will get little from Britain and France, he continued, but the French should be willing to sell them aircraft and the British will certainly be willing to sell tanks and tank guns. Secretary Brown added that the U.S., France, and Germany can provide anti-tank weapons, much needed for insurgency and defense. It was also pointed out that the Pakistanis want foreign assistance for building a communications infrastructure on their western front.

Dr. Brzezinski asked if we need a big consortium figure for public and political effect such as \$1 billion. Secretary Brown observed that one to one and a half billion dollars for equipment spread

over three years could be absorbed effectively by the Pakistanis; therefore, Dr. Brzezinski's figure is about right. Dr. Brzezinski added that we must avoid a figure which is so high that we are open to criticism that we are "saturating" Pakistan with arms the same way we did Iran.

Dr. Brzezinski added that we need a military equipment package and a concept for a division of labor which we can propose to the allies. Secretary Vance suggested that this be done at the upcoming Political Directors Meeting on January 24. Dr. Brzezinski agreed; we must supplement our delegation with technical teams sufficiently competent to make concrete decisions on both funds and equipment.

Agreed action:

- State will press France on the Mirage aircraft.
- The Political Directors Meeting will be reinforced with sufficient staff to discuss military assistance and funding.
- The U.S. will give an exemplary package to the Political Directors as a proposal for a division of labor.
- To fund the consortium, we will press the Japanese for \$400 million and the Saudis for \$800 million which, combined with our \$400 million, should be above \$1 billion.
- Britain and France will be encouraged to supply specific military equipment.

U.S. Assurances to Pakistan

Secretary Vance reported that we are still working out contingency scenarios to define circumstances under which we would come to Pakistan's military assistance against foreign attack. Secretary Vance promised to have a paper by Friday or Saturday which spells these out in considerable detail for the President.

It was agreed, at Secretary Vance's suggestion, that this is the next big decision issue which should be discussed with the President.

Contingency of a Soviet Invasion of Iran

Dr. Brzezinski proposed that the President mention in his speech that the United States has been committed to the independence of Iran for the past 30 years and remains so committed today. Secretaries Vance and Brown wondered if this does not so clearly imply our previous ties to the Shah that it will provoke Khomeini's public rejection and fail to achieve the political effect in the

region for which it is intended. Dr. Brzezinski observed that we must simply accept the cost of a possible Khomeini statement because our vital interests in the area are so great. Secretaries Vance and Brown suggested omitting reference to "30 years." They accepted Dr. Brzezinski's alternative language "as we have been" so that a sentence in the speech might read: "The U.S. remains committed to an independent Iran today as it has been in the past."

Agreed action: The record of the meeting should solicit the President's reaction to this proposal.

*Covered on Meet
the Press*

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Military "Facilities in the Region"

Dr. Brzezinski expressed concern that while progress is being made on the technical level in acquiring military facilities, we are lagging on the political level. We need to expedite giving political assurances to the host countries. Until we do, these countries are vulnerable to Soviet pressure to reject our requests. They have already been exposed in the press as potential locations for U.S. facilities; some are undoubtedly already being pressed by the Soviets to reject the U.S. request.

Secretary Vance reported that State is now drafting messages to our ambassadors in these countries instructing them to discuss political assurances. Hal Saunders added that if the President mentions these countries in his speech, it might kill their willingness. Dr. Brzezinski reemphasized that they have already been fingered in the press. The danger for us is the gap between political progress and technical progress. He proposed a Presidential message, a very candid one to Oman and Somalia, giving political assurances in principle to be followed up by more specific details at the diplomatic level. Vance and Saunders argued that any assurances must be specific because we must also consult with the Congress before we are committed to them. Dr. Brzezinski conceded that while those points may be legally valid, they do not deal with the present political vulnerability of the states we want to assist. Secretary Vance proposed that we go to these states with messages which make the following points:

-- We agree in principle to political assurances and therefore want the technical teams to proceed as rapidly as possible.

-- Ask the head of state if he objects to the President mentioning publicly his country in connection with U.S. military facilities.

-- Promise to consult with the Congress as soon as the details on the assurances can be worked out.

-- Reaffirm publicly that the United States considers its interests in the region vital.

Agreed Action: A draft of the message proposed by Vance is to be cleared later today with the NSC staff.

Harold Brown said we need more flights into Djibouti. They pointed out that we already have access to Pakistan, but more permanent "military facilities" would be desirable. It was argued that we should not raise this issue with the Pakistanis until the military assistance package to Pakistan is worked out in more detail.

Agreed actions:

-- Ask for more flights into Djibouti.

-- Postpone discussion of "military facilities" in Pakistan for a few weeks.

-- Vance, Brown, and Brzezinski will call about ten key Congressional leaders to give them a progress report on our efforts to acquire military facilities in the region. The NSC staff will provide talking points to ensure that the same message is given to all ten Congressmen.

Enroute Basing and Overflights


Secretary Brown said that Defense has been ready for some time and is waiting for State to go forward, asking Spain, Morocco, Portugal, Philippines, and others about contingency overflights and base use. Some argued that to ask now might ensure a turndown. Dr. Brzezinski argued that it is important to tell these countries now that we are serious, that we are making plans, and that we may be asking them in the future but we are not asking for a positive response at present. General Jones noted that we already have effective access to countries and need no commitment; furthermore, what we need in each country is different. In Morocco, for example, we would like to pre-position fuel. The two most urgent cases are Spain and Morocco. Secretary Vance insisted that he needed a chance to check once more on the Moroccan situation before taking a final position.

Agreed action: Pending Vance's check on the Moroccan situation, inform Spain and Morocco that we are planning for crises; vary the message to each according to what we want it to provide. State and Defense will prepare this message.

Military Exercises and Deployments in the Region

Secretary Brown raised Diego Garcia. There are two issues, present use, and longer term construction programs. Komer argued that

because Diego Garcia is the only reliable base in the Indian Ocean, we need to undertake the expansion. General Jones said that it would cost about \$500 million spread over the next five years.



Agreed action: OMB will look into funding not for this year but for FY 1982 and later.

Next the discussion turned to military exercises. General Jones reported that a Marine amphibious unit, about 2,000 strong, and a group of four to six ships can exercise in any number of places in the region, Oman for example, and Egypt. Followup units, up to a Marine brigade, can also participate.

Dr. Brzezinski declared that an exercise is needed for its political effect as a demonstration of American determination to remain in the area. Secretary Vance replied that privately political leaders in the region will like it, but publicly they will have problems. He therefore recommended that an exercise be held in Diego Garcia. Secretary Brown insisted that such an exercise makes no sense, and therefore would have no desired political effect, perhaps even an undesired effect. Oman, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt were discussed as possible exercise sites. Dr. Brzezinski proposed that we ask Oman and Saudi Arabia, and if they turn us down, we should ask Egypt where a positive response is almost assured. Secretary Vance asked that this be delayed ten days until after the President's speech.

Dr. Brzezinski next raised the question of a U.S. airborne brigade projected into the region for an exercise, possibly a combined exercise with Jordan and Saudi Arabia. This could take place later in the spring or summer. Secretary Vance argued that the political problems are simply too great for us to attempt this. Dr. Brzezinski agreed that we should not overload ourselves with this undertaking but that Defense should look into the costs, planning, and other details.

Agreed actions:


-- State will go forward and seek political assurances on enroute basing and overflights.

-- We will wait ten days and seek permission for a military exercise in Oman or Saudi Arabia, then Egypt if the first two are not forthcoming.


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-- Gently probe Jordan on the possibilities of a combined US/
Jordan/Saudi Arabian exercise.



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Afghanistan Insurgency

Secretary Vance reported that Agha Shahi calls the insurgency in Afghanistan "a dangerous lightning rod" and, therefore, a very difficult decision for General Zia. Dr. Brzezinski commented that a massive insurgency at present is probably not in our best interest. Rather a low-level and enduring insurgency is essential to keep the Islamic states mobilized against the Soviets in Afghanistan.

Secretary Brown added that Agha Shahi's comments were probably not meant to indicate that Zia will be backing out, but rather to keep the option open for the future.

Afghanistan Refugees

State reported that it is possible for the United States to provide bilateral aid for refugees in Afghanistan as well as aid through the UNHCR.

Agreed action: State was tasked to prepare a plan for providing at least a small part of their refugee aid through bilateral channels and present it at the next SCC on refugee support.

Dr. Brzezinski observed that the large degree of consensus on all agenda issues today may negate the need for an NSC meeting with the President on the same topics. All agreed and Secretary Vance added that the next issue we need to discuss directly with the President concerns the contingency scenarios for Pakistan and the assurances we give that government.

Secretary Vance then added two additional items to the agenda.

U.S. Boxing Group to the Soviet Union

Secretary Vance reported that a boxing team is to depart for a competition in the Soviet Union in five days. All agreed that we should discourage them from going.

Agreed action: Secretary Vance and the Vice President, and possibly Lloyd Cutler, will discuss the matter directly with them to discourage their participation.

Backgrounder on Christopher Trip to Europe

All agreed with Secretary Vance's proposal that Warren Christopher give a press backgrounder on his recent trip to Europe in order to prevent speculation and misleading reports. Christopher will emphasize the Afghanistan side of his mission because the allies were more forthcoming on that issue. He will deemphasize the Iranian side because the results were less encouraging.

Agreed action: Christopher will give a backgrounder.

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OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

50014

TO : Warren Christopher

DATE: January 22, 19

FROM : Marshall Shulman *MS*

SUBJECT: Notes on SU/Afghanistan

In response to your request, I have tried to reconstruct the points I made at the Genscher luncheon yesterday, as follows:

1) Although the West and much of the rest of the world have properly regarded the Soviet move into Afghanistan as a qualitatively significant step and have reacted to it accordingly, it was probably not viewed by the Soviet leadership as a significant departure in the pattern of their behavior, nor as a significant departure from the prevailing international "rules of the game." (They probably regarded this as less flagrant than the American action in Vietnam, since it involved contiguous territory with more of a security justification.)

2) The preliminary Soviet reaction to the world reaction has been to continue more or less along previous lines of policy, emphasizing their continued commitment to detente, with particular attention to European and Third World audiences.

3) Nevertheless, the world is different as a result of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. This is not only because of the Soviet use of large-scale military force to intervene in the affairs of a country outside the Warsaw Pact--which did in fact mark a qualitative change in their behavior--but more importantly because the Soviet action crystalized U.S. and world reactions to on-going trends in Soviet behavior:

a) Afghanistan put into high relief the contradiction in Soviet policy between the effort to pursue detente at the same time that it has been exacerbating local conflict situations (in the name of "support for national liberation movements")--Angola, Ethiopia, Yemen, Indochina.

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b) Afghanistan also triggered U.S. and world expression of anxiety about Soviet intentions regarding the use of the military capabilities --strategic and conventional--which it has been building since the mid-1960s. It has been taken as an indication that the Soviet Union is prepared to use this capability with less inhibition than was formerly the case.

4) Whatever may have been its initial intentions, the Soviet leadership is now faced with a world reaction that is likely to have serious effects for the Soviet Union, which may result in domestic and foreign policy adjustments in the future:

a) The economic consequences of still higher military expenditures, and of reduced economic inputs into the Soviet economy from abroad, are likely to result in serious revisions of Soviet economic plans. (The Soviet Union appears to have been in the midst of preparations for a new cycle of Five-Year Planning in anticipation of the next Party Congress, and was also perhaps in a weapons system planning cycle.)

b) Considering the economic stringencies under which they have been operating, these developments may have a serious effect in skewing their priorities. It is likely to have serious repercussions in domestic politics, and may lead to an acceleration of the succession, and to second thoughts about foreign policy trends.

c) These repercussions would be reinforced by the adverse effects abroad, if world reaction is sustained, and interferes with Soviet objectives toward Europe and the Third World in particular. (They undoubtedly discounted in advance the effects on their relations with the U.S.)

5) If these events are to result in the modification of Soviet behavior in a useful direction, it is essential that:

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- a) The Soviet leadership perceives a solidarity of responses on the part of the U.S. and Western Europe, and to the maximum degree possible, of the Third World countries, and appreciates that these responses will be sustained until there is a change clearly manifested in Soviet behavior.
- b) The Soviet leadership has the message clearly brought home that a realistic detente policy cannot be realized while the Soviet Union actively seeks to exploit the conflict situations created by this turbulent period in international politics.
- c) It will require careful judgment on the part of the U.S. and its Western European allies to distinguish between atmospheric gestures on the part of the Soviet Union intended to reduce and reverse world reactions to Afghanistan, and indications of serious and substantial changes in Soviet policy.

cc: Secretary Vance



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(SCC 265)
January 30, 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

FROM: JERRY SCHECTER J.S.

SUBJECT: Summary of Seventh and Eighth Meetings of the
SCC Working Group on Iran and Afghanistan:
Public Posture (U)

Following is a summary of the seventh and eighth SCC Working Group Meetings held on January 29 and January 30. (U)

Immediate Actions

1. The CIA is preparing a briefing on Saturday morning for about ten journalists on the Soviet consolidation of the invasion of Afghanistan and the colonialist pattern that is developing. (See attached outline.) Brement is preparing a brief introduction stressing the historic Soviet imperial designs toward Afghanistan over the last 150 years. (U)
2. We are gathering reports of Afghan hostilities toward the Soviet invasion and occupation which can be used to background journalists. Hodding and Jody will be supplied with this material but we have to think of ways to deal with this in terms of overseas distribution as well. (e) (u)
3. Poison Gas: Further inquiries indicate that there is not enough evidence to prepare a white paper on the use of chemical warfare in Afghanistan. Efforts are continuing to find eye witnesses in the field but there is still not enough hard evidence for a formal diplomatic case. (e) (u)
4. We should try to arrange for some public exposure for Abdul Hakim Tabibi, Afghanistan's former permanent representative to the U.N. who has sought assylum in the United States. He is know to Bill Vanden Heuvel at the U.N. and I will personally follow-up on this when we get back from Pakistan. Perhaps he could appear at the Council on Foreign Relations. (U)
5. ICA will distribute in the wireless file the New York Review of Books article entitled "Afghanistan: The Imperial Dream" from the current issue. (U)

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DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

Classified by: ~~Jerry Schecter~~
Review on: ~~January 30, 1986~~

Declassified/Releaser: 7/29/95
under provision: E.O. 12356
by D. Van Tassel National Security Council

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E.O. 12065: RDS-1, 1/30/10 (WATSON, THOMAS J.) OR-W
TAGS: PEPR, UR, US
SUBJ: MEETING WITH GROMYKO

REFS: (A) STATE 25675, (B) STATE 24026

1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT.)
2. SUMMARY: GROMYKO RESPONDED TO OUR DEMARCHE ON US-SOVIET RELATIONS AND AFGHANISTAN BY ELABORATING THE EMERGING PUBLIC LINE THAT THE ADMINISTRATION HAD EMBARKED, LONG BEFORE AFGHANISTAN, ON A COURSE AIMED AT DAMAGING US-SOVIET RELATIONS AND INCREASING INTERNATIONAL TENSION. HE TICKED OFF NUMEROUS "EXAMPLES" TO ILLUSTRATE HIS POINT, BEGINNING WITH NATO'S ADOPTION OF ITS LONG-TERM DEFENSE PROGRAM WHILE THE UNGA SPECIAL SESSION ON DISARMAMENT WAS IN SESSION AND INCLUDING FAMILIAR COMPLAINTS ABOUT THE LRTNF DECISION AS VIOLATING THE EQUALITY WHICH THE PRESIDENT HAD ALLEGEDLY ACKNOWLEDGED EXISTED AT THE TIME OF THE VIENNA SUMMIT. HE ALSO FAULTED OUR HANDLING OF THE CUBAN BRIGADE ISSUE AND CHARGED THAT OUR CONDUCT IN THE VARIOUS ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS INDICATED THAT WE WERE NEGOTIATING SIMPLY

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FOR THE SAKE OF NEGOTIATING, NOT WITH ANY INTENTION OF REACHING AGREEMENT.

ON AFGHANISTAN, THOUGH HE DID NOT REFER SPECIFICALLY TO THREATS TO SOVIET SECURITY AND ONLY INDIRECTLY ACCUSED THE US OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR EVENTS THERE, GROMYKO GENERALLY REPEATED THE PUBLIC SOVIET JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THEIR ACTION. HE FLATLY DENIED A SOVIET ROLE IN THE CHANGE OF GOVERNMENT IN KABUL, AND HE JUST AS FLATLY STATED THAT THE SOVIET TROOPS WOULD NOT BE WITHDRAWN SO LONG AS "EXTERNAL AGGRESSION" CONTINUED. HE TRIED TO DISMISS AS "NOT SERIOUS" ANY SUGGESTION THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAD DESIGNS ON PAKISTAN OR THE PERSIAN GULF REGION, ADDING THAT ANYONE WHO REALLY HAD DOUBTS ON THAT SCORE SHOULD KNOW THAT BREZHNEV HAD CLEARLY DENIED IT.

THE SAKHAROV CASE, GROMYKO SAID, WAS A DOMESTIC AFFAIR WHICH THE SOVIETS WERE NOT PREPARED TO DISCUSS WITH ANY OUTSIDERS.

THE MINISTER INTERSPERSED HIS BASICALLY HARD-LINE RESPONSE WITH APPROPRIATE INDICATIONS OF INDIGNATION, RIDICULE, AND REGRET, BUT FOR THE MOST PART HE SEEMED RELAXED THROUGHOUT THE LENGTHY MEETING. AS WAS PROBABLY TO BE EXPECTED, THERE WAS NO INDICATION IN ANYTHING HE SAID OF ANY GIVE ON AFGHANISTAN IN THE NEAR FUTURE. THERE WAS ONE CONCILIATORY NOTE AT THE END OF HIS PRESENTATION, WHEN HE PICKED UP OUR REFERENCE TO THE PRESIDENT'S WILLINGNESS TO SEARCH FOR AREAS OF COOPERATION AND REDUCE THE RISKS OF CONFLICT. IF HE WERE SINCERE, HE SAID, HE WOULD FIND THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD NOT HOLD BACK, AS THIS HAD ALWAYS BEEN THEIR

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POLICY.

ALTHOUGH STATE 26328, ON YOUR MEETING WITH DOBRYNIN, ARRIVED AFTER I HAD SEEN GROMYKO, I DID NOT RECEIVE ANY CLEAR INTIMATIONS OF INTEREST IN PROVIDING GUARANTEES WITH REGARD TO IRAN AND PAKISTAN--UNLESS HIS OBSERVATION THAT BREZHNEV HAD ALREADY ASSURED THE WORLD THAT THEY HAVE NO DESIGNS ON OTHER PARTS OF THE REGION COULD BE CONSIDERED SUCH. AS FOR SOVIET WITHDRAWAL, HIS ASSERTION THAT THIS WOULD NOT OCCUR UNTIL OUTSIDE AGGRESSION CEASED SEEMS MORE CATEGORICAL THAN DOBRYNIN'S HINT THAT LIMITATIONS ON ASSISTANCE TO INSURGENTS MIGHT SUFFICE. YUGOSLAVIA DID NOT ARISE IN THE CONVERSATION. END SUMMARY.

3. GROMYKO RECEIVED ME AT 4:30 P.M. JANUARY 30 FOR A TWO HOUR AND FIFTEEN MINUTE MEETING. I READ TO HIM THE TALKING POINTS ON US-SOVIET RELATIONS AND AFGHANISTAN FROM REFS A AND B AND THEN ALSO MADE THE INSTRUCTED DEMARCHE ON SAKHAROV, LEAVING COPIES OF THE TALKING POINTS ON BOTH SUBJECTS AS NON-PAPERS.

4. GROMYKO TOOK UP THE SAKHAROV MATTER FIRST,

[REDACTED]

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5. TURNING TO THE MORE SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES, GROMYKO STATED AT THE OUTSET THAT HE WOULD GIVE A PRELIMINARY RESPONSE AND MIGHT ANSWER MORE FULLY LATER. HE THEN BEGAN A LENGTHY DISCUSSION OF HIS VIEWS OF US RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE PRESENT STATE OF OUR RELATIONS.

6. THE SOVIETS LONG AGO NOTED, GROMYKO SAID, THE HOSTILE POSITION WHICH THE US ADMINISTRATION HAS TAKEN TOWARD THE USSR ON A SERIES OF INTERNATIONAL QUESTIONS. WE WERE EARLIER PUT ON GUARD, HE SAID, BY A SERIES OF STATEMENTS BY THE ADMINISTRATION AND BY THE PRESIDENT PERSONALLY AND--MORE IMPORTANT--BY CERTAIN ACTIONS OF THE US VIS-A-VIS THE USSR. SAYING THAT HE WOULD GIVE SOME EXAMPLES, HE BEGAN BY DISCUSSING THE UNGA SPECIAL SESSION ON DISARMAMENT. HE WENT INTO CONSIDERABLE DETAIL ON THE FAMILIAR COMPLAINT THAT THE SIMULTANEOUS NATO SUMMIT MEETING IN WASHINGTON DEMONSTRATIVELY WAS DECIDING ON SHARP INCREASES IN MILITARY BUDGETS AND SHOWING CONTEMPT FOR THE MAJORITY OF THE PARTICIPANTS IN THE SSOD. HE TERMED THIS A DELIBERATE ATTEMPT TO DEMONSTRATE TO THE WHOLE WORLD THAT PLANS FOR STOPPING,

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OR EVEN SLOWING DOWN, THE ARMS RACE ARE ALIEN TO THE USG AND ITS ALLIES.

7. AS EXAMPLE NO. 2, GROMYKO REPEATED THAT AT THE VIENNA SUMMIT HE HEARD SEVERAL TIMES WITH HIS OWN EARS STATEMENTS BY BREZHNEV AND THE PRESIDENT THAT THE US AND THE SOVIET UNION SHOULD CONDUCT THEIR RELATIONS, PARTICULARLY IN CONNECTION WITH DISARMAMENT, ON THE BASIS OF THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY. THE SOVIETS, HE SAID, THEREFORE CONCLUDED THAT THIS MEANT THAT THE PRESIDENT ALSO CONSIDERED THAT THIS WAS THE ONLY SOUND BASIS ON WHICH RELATIONS CAN BE BUILT AND ON WHICH AGREEMENTS CAN BE CONCLUDED. IT WAS ON THAT BASIS THAT SALT II WAS CONCLUDED; OTHERWISE IT WOULD NEVER HAVE BEEN SIGNED.

8. GROMYKO THEN MOVED ON TO THE NATO TNF DECISION BY STATING THAT, ONLY A FEW MONTHS AFTER THE VIENNA SUMMIT THE ADMINISTRATION AND THE PRESIDENT BEGAN TO BREAK THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY. THEY PROCLAIMED AND IMPOSED ON THEIR NATO ALLIES A STATEMENT TO THE EFFECT THAT EQUALITY WOULD ONLY BE REACHED WHEN PLANS FOR DEPLOYING NEW MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES IN WEST EUROPE WERE REALIZED. HE USED THE FAMILIAR STATEMENT THAT ONLY ONE OF THE STATEMENTS COULD BE TRUE--THAT MADE BY THE PRESIDENT IN VIENNA OR THAT MADE BY THE PRESIDENT SEVERAL MONTHS LATER. HIS CONCLUSION WAS THAT THERE IS ONLY ONE TRUTH AND THE PRESIDENT WHO RECOGNIZED IN VIENNA THAT EQUALITY EXISTED WAS SPEAKING CORRECTLY. IT WAS ON THAT BASIS THAT SALT II WAS CONCLUDED. HE ADDED THAT THE SOVIET UNION, MEANWHILE, DID NOTHING--REPEAT NOTHING-- AFTER THE VIENNA SUMMIT TO CONTRAVICT THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY--SOMETHING WHICH HE SAID THE US ADMINISTRATION

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WAS VERY MUCH AWARE OF.

9. AS EXAMPLE NO. 3, GROMYKO TOOK UP THE SALT RATIFICATION PROCESS. ONE FEATURE OF THE STATEMENTS MADE BY SPOKESMEN, INCLUDING THE PRESIDENT, WHO WERE ADVOCATING RATIFICATION STOOD OUT AT THE OUTSET. ADVOCATES OF THE TREATY WERE ADVANCING ARGUMENTS WHICH WORKED MORE AGAINST THE TREATY THAN IN FAVOR OF IT. THIS APPLIED IN VARYING DEGREES TO ALMOST EVERY SPOKESMAN FOR THE ADMINISTRATION; THEY BUILT UP MATERIAL FOR USE BY THE OPPONENTS WHO WERE WORKING VERY HARD TO DEFEAT THE TREATY. THE SOVIETS NOTED ALL THIS BUT DID NOT REACT, FEELING THAT, IF THE PRESIDENT REALLY WAS FOR RATIFICATION AS HE SAID, HE PROBABLY WAS CONVINCED HE COULD ACHIEVE IT AND KNEW HOW BEST TO MANAGE IT. THE PRESIDENT HAD ASSURED THE SOVIETS THAT HE WOULD BE FIRMLY WORKING FOR RATIFICATION. GROMYKO SAID HE DID NOT CONCEAL HIS DISAPPOINTMENT WITH THE POSITION OF THE ADMINISTRATION AND ADDED THAT THIS WAS NOT THE FIRST TIME THE SOVIETS HAD SEEN THAT THE WORDS OF THE ADMINISTRATION WERE ONE THING AND THEIR DEEDS ANOTHER. THIS WAS NOT, HE CONCLUDED, A MINOR ISSUE BUT A MAJOR ONE.

10. EXAMPLE NO. 4 WAS THE ISSUE OF THE SOVIET BRIGADE IN CUBA, WHICH GROMYKO SAID THE US ARTIFICIALLY WHIPPED UP TO UNBELIEVABLE PROPORTIONS. IN ASKING THEMSELVES WHY ALL THIS WAS DONE, THE SOVIETS COULD FIND ONLY ONE ANSWER: TO KEEP UP A CAMPAIGN AIMED AT DAMAGING US-SOVIET RELATIONS AND ALSO AN ANTI-CUBAN CAMPAIGN, THEREBY WORSENING THE CHANCE OF RATIFICATION FOR SALT II.

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WHILE THE ADMINISTRATION HAS ONLY RECENTLY PROPOSED THAT THE SENATE DELAY RATIFICATION PROCEEDINGS, IN FACT EVEN BEFORE THAT FORMAL REQUEST WAS MADE THE ADMINISTRATION HAD BROUGHT THE SITUATION TO THE POINT THAT THE TREATY WAS ALREADY IN DANGER. GROMYKO THEN NOTED THAT, AS THE SOVIETS HAD EMPHASIZED MANY TIMES, THE TREATY WAS A PRODUCT OF THE EFFORTS OF BOTH SIDES AND EQUALLY BENEFICIAL TO BOTH.

11. EXAMPLE NO. 5 (GROMYKO WAS NUMBERING THEM AS HE WENT ALONG, ALTHOUGH HE SPOKE WITHOUT NOTES) RELATED TO OTHER ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS. AFTER MENTIONING NEGOTIATIONS ON INDIAN OCEAN, CTB, CW, RW, AND CAT, HE SAID THE SOVIETS HAD DRAWN A CLEAR CONCLUSION FROM THE COURSE OF THESE: THAT THE US IS CONDUCTING THE NEGOTIATIONS SIMPLY FOR THE SAKE OF NEGOTIATING, TO KILL TIME. THIS WAS AT LEAST TRUE OF THE MAJORITY OF CASES. EVEN WHERE PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE, AFTER A WHILE IT IS DISCARDED; US REPRESENTATIVES REVERSE THEIR POSITION, STATING THAT THE US MAY HAVE FAVORED A CERTAIN MEASURE PREVIOUSLY BUT NOW HAS A NEW POSITION. HOW WAS ALL THIS TO BE EVALUATED? IN NON DIPLOMATIC BUT SIMPLE LANGUAGE, THE ONLY WORD WAS OBSTRUCTION. WHILE HE SAID HE WOULD VERY MUCH LIKE TO BELIEVE HE WAS MISTAKEN IN REACHING THIS CONCLUSION, HE BELIEVED IT TO BE A PRECISE DESCRIPTION OF THE STATE OF AFFAIRS.

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12. WE SHOULD NOT CONCLUDE FROM HIS REMARKS, GROMYKO SAID, THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAS A NEGATIVE ATTITUDE TOWARD THOSE NEGOTIATIONS WHICH ARE GOING ON--OR USED TO BE GOING ON. HE REFERRED TO SECRETARY VANCE'S RECENT DESCRIPTION OF CERTAIN PROBLEMS IN CONNECTION WITH THE VARIOUS NEGOTIATIONS AND SAID THE SOVIETS WERE CONSIDERING THE US POSITION. THIS DID NOT MEAN THAT THEIR INTEREST IN THE NEGOTIATIONS WAS LESSENER, BECAUSE THE ISSUES ARE IMPORTANT.

13. GROMYKO THEN MENTIONED MBFK, SAYING THE WESTERN NEGOTIATING PATTERN THERE WAS CHARACTERISTIC. THE LATEST WESTERN PROPOSAL REVERSED THE STATE OF PLAY; THE NEW WESTERN PROPOSALS PROVIDED NO BASIS FOR A SINGLE STEP OF PROGRESS.

14. STATING THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE ASKED THEMSELVES WHY THE PRESIDENT TAKES SUCH A POSITION IN THESE VARIOUS DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATIONS, GROMYKO SAID THAT ONLY ONE CONCLUSION WAS POSSIBLE--THAT IT WAS DONE IN THE HOPE NOT ONLY OF DEFEATING THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY BUT OF OBTAINING A UNILATERAL MILITARY-STRATEGIC ADVANTAGE OVER THE SOVIET UNION. THE ONLY EXPLANATION WAS THAT THE US WANTED TO BURY THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY DEEP IN THE GROUND. THE CONSEQUENCES OF THIS POLICY WOULD BE SHARPLY NEGATIVE, NOT ONLY FOR US-SOVIET RELATIONS BUT FOR THE WORLD AS A WHOLE.

15. CALLING IT HIS 7TH POINT, GROMYKO TOOK UP AFGHANISTAN, NOTING THAT I HAD SINGLED IT OUT FOR "SPECIAL TREATMENT" IN MY STATEMENT. HE OBSERVED FIRST OF ALL THAT AFGHANISTAN IS NOT AN AMERICAN PROVINCE. I MIGHT REPLY, HE SAID, THAT IT IS NOT A SOVIET PROVINCE

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EITHER. THIS IS TRUE, AND THE SOVIETS NEVER CLAIMED THAT IT WAS. BUT THE SOVIETS RESOLUTELY REJECT ALL EFFORTS TO DENY THE AFGHANIS THE RIGHT TO DECIDE FOR THEMSELVES QUESTIONS OF HOW THEY ARE TO LIVE, WHAT KIND OF LEADERSHIP THEY ARE TO HAVE, AND SO FORTH--AND THE US IS CLAIMING THE RIGHT TO DO THAT.

16. THE US GOVERNMENT CAN BE IN NO DOUBT, GROMYKO CONTINUED, THAT AFGHANISTAN WAS SUBJECTED TO OUTSIDE AGGRESSION. IT WAS IN THAT CONNECTION THAT IT CALLED FOR ASSISTANCE. IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE UN CHARTER AND THE SOVIET-AFGHAN TREATY IT HAD A FIRM LEGAL BASIS AND EVERY RIGHT TO APPEAL FOR HELP, INCLUDING THAT OF A MILITARY CHARACTER IN THE STRUGGLE AGAINST EXTERNAL AGGRESSION. WASHINGTON, HE SAID, DOES NOT LIKE TO TOUCH ON THAT QUESTION; IT PRETENDS NOT TO SEE HOW THINGS REALLY ARE, TO BE AWARE OF THE AGGRESSION FROM THE TERRITORY OF PAKISTAN. PERHAPS, HE SAID, I COULD ADVISE WASHINGTON TO PAY MORE ATTENTION TO THAT QUESTION SO IT COULD SEE THE SITUATION BETTER. HE THEN REFERRED TO CAMPS IN PAKISTAN WHERE THOUSANDS OF PEOPLE WERE BEING ARMED AND TRAINED AND BEING SENT TO STRUGGLE AGAINST THE PEOPLE AND GOVERNMENT OF AFGHANISTAN. IN ANSWERING THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE SENT ON THE HOT LINE, BREZHNEV HAD STATED THAT THERE WAS A GREAT DEAL THE US COULD DO TO STOP THOSE ARMED INCURSIONS FROM PAKISTAN. BUT THIS WAS NOT AND IS NOT BEING DONE.

17. THE SOVIET MILITARY CONTINGENTS ARE IN AFGHANISTAN,

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GROMYKO CONTINUED, AND THERE IS NO BASIS FOR THEM TO BE WITHDRAWN. THEY WILL REMAIN THERE UNTIL SUCH TIME AS THERE IS NO EXTERNAL AGGRESSION AND THE US GOVERNMENT MUST REALIZE THAT. THE SOVIETS POINTED OUT IN THEIR INITIAL STATEMENT TO CERTAIN GOVERNMENTS--WITHOUT WAITING FOR ANY PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGNS TO DEVELOP--THAT THEIR CONTINGENTS WOULD BE WITHDRAWN IF THE EXTERNAL AGGRESSION CEASED. THE SOVIET UNION DOES NOT NEED AFGHANISTAN--ITS TERRITORY OR ITS RICHES. THE US GOVERNMENT AND THE PRESIDENT ARE AWARE OF THAT. AND THE DEEDS AND THE WORDS OF THE SOVIETS--UNLIKE THOSE OF SOME OTHERS--DO NOT DIVERGE.

18. WHAT GROMYKO NUMBERED EXAMPLE NO. 8 WAS THAT WASHINGTON CONTINUED TO REPEAT ONE FALSE THESIS, WHICH HAD ALSO BEEN MENTIONED ALBEIT SOFTLY IN MY EARLIER STATEMENT. THIS WAS THAT THE SOVIET UNION WAS SOMEHOW INVOLVED IN THE CHANGES IN THE LEADERSHIP OF AFGHANISTAN. NYET. THAT IS AN INVENTION OF WASHINGTON'S. THE SOVIET UNION WAS NOT INVOLVED. THE CHANGE WAS BROUGHT ABOUT BY THE AFGHANIS THEMSELVES. THE PRESENT AFGHAN LEADERS DID NOT COME FROM THE MOON. THE AFGHANIS FORMED THEIR GOVERNMENT AND IT IS GENERAL KNOWLEDGE THAT IT IS NOT DOING BADLY. FOR EXAMPLE, TENS OF THOUSANDS OF PRISONERS HAVE BEEN SET FREE, INCLUDING LARGE NUMBERS OF MUSLIM CLERGY. WASHINGTON LIKES TO SPEAK OF HUMAN RIGHTS. IT SHOULD WELCOME THIS MOVE, EVEN IF IT DOES NOT APPLAUD

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IT. BUT IT DOES NOT DO SO BECAUSE THIS DOES NOT INTEREST THE ADMINISTRATION; IT IS ONLY INTERESTED IN "PINCHING THE FOOT" OF THE SOVIET UNION.

19. IT WOULD BE BETTER, GROMYKO WENT ON, TO STICK CLOSER TO THE FACTS. MEANWHILE, NO ONE SHOULD TELL THE AFGHANI HOW TO RUN THEIR AFFAIRS. AND IT IS NOW CLEAR TO THE WHOLE WORLD WHAT KIND OF FIGURE AMIN WAS. ONE CAN ONLY BE ASTONISHED AT WHAT IS BEING SAID ABOUT HIM IN WASHINGTON. EVERY AFGHANI DAMNS HIM, BUT WASHINGTON SEEMS TO LIKE HIM.

20. AS EXAMPLE NO. 9, GROMYKO TOOK UP PAKISTAN AND THE PERSIAN GULF, STATING IN THIS CONNECTION THAT HE FOUND THE TURN OF WASHINGTON'S THINKING ON FOREIGN POLICY QUESTIONS REALLY REMARKABLE. THIS WAS ESPECIALLY TRUE IN CONNECTION WITH THE AGGRESSION AGAINST AFGHANISTAN, AND ALSO IN REGARD TO THE STATEMENT IN MY DEMARCHE WHICH IMPLIED ANXIETY ON THE PART OF THE ADMINISTRATION THAT THE SOVIET UNION MIGHT TAKE SOME ACTION IN REGARD TO PAKISTAN AND THE PERSIAN GULF. IN ACTUAL FACT, HE SAID, HE THOUGHT THAT WASHINGTON DID NOT ACTUALLY THINK THAT WAY; THERE WERE TOO MANY LEADING FIGURES WHO KNEW BETTER, AND ONLY THE PARANOID COULD BELIEVE THAT THE SOVIETS WERE INTENDING ACTION AGAINST PAKISTAN AND IN THE REGION OF THE PERSIAN GULF. HE ASKED THAT I INFORM MY GOVERNMENT AND THE PRESIDENT ACCORDINGLY. MY STATEMENT, HE SAID, SUGGESTED THAT THE SOVIETS WERE SENDING SOME SORT OF CHALLENGE; HE ASKED WHAT KIND OF CHALLENGE AND TO WHOM, AS FOR THE ALLEGED DANGER TO PAKISTAN AND THE PERSIAN GULF REGION, IT WAS NOT ENOUGH TO SAY SIMPLY THAT THIS WAS FALSE; IT WAS FABRICATED. THE THOUGHT COULD ONLY ARISE IN THE MIND OF A PERSON WHO DOES NOT GO TO THE TROUBLE TO ANALYZE

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THE SITUATION. ANYONE WHO KNOWS THE SOVIET UNION KNOWS THAT SUCH ACTION IS ALIEN TO THE SOVIET UNION'S POLICIES, IDEOLOGY, AND FOREIGN POLICY LINE AIMED AT INTERNATIONAL DETENTE AND PEACE.

21. NOTING THAT BREZHNEV HAD MADE IT CLEAR, IN HIS ANSWERS TO A PRAVDA CORRESPONDENT, THAT ANY SUCH INTENTIONS TOWARD PAKISTAN, IRAN AND THE PERSIAN GULF WERE ALIEN TO THE SOVIET UNION, GROMYKO SAID THAT HE WAS THUS SPAKED THE NECESSITY OF SPEAKING IN MORE DETAIL ON THE MATTER. HE COULD ONLY WONDER HOWEVER AT THE PEOPLE WHO POSED SUCH QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE INTENTIONS OF THE SOVIET UNION, AND HE ASKED WHETHER I PERSONALLY, AS AN AMBASSADOR, AND AS AN IMPORTANT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE AMERICAN BUSINESS COMMUNITY, COULD REALLY BELIEVE SUCH FABRICATIONS. BUT IF THERE SHOULD BE SOMEONE, SOMEWHERE, WHO HAS SUCH BELIEFS, HE HOPED THAT HIS CLARIFICATION WOULD HELP THEM UNDERSTAND THE TRUTH OF THE MATTER.

22. AS HIS TENTH EXAMPLE, GROMYKO REFERRED BY INDIRECTION TO THE MEASURES TAKEN BY THE U.S. IN RESPONSE TO THE AFGHANISTAN ACTION. THE ADMINISTRATION, HE SAID, IS NOW WORKING ENERGETICALLY IN SHIRTSLEEVES TO INCREASE INTERNATIONAL TENSION AND sow DISCORD IN U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS. BREZHNEV HAS CLEARLY POINTED OUT THAT IT IS EASY TO DESTROY RELATIONS BUT MUCH HARDER TO BUILD THEM UP AND DEVELOP THEM. THE QUESTION ARISES OF HOW A GREAT POWER CAN SIMPLY THROW ASIDE ALL OF THE POSITIVE THINGS WHICH HAVE BEEN ACCUMULATED OVER THE YEARS BY

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PREVIOUS ADMINISTRATIONS. HE DESCRIBED THE ADMINISTRATION AS LOOKING AROUND, THROWING THINGS OVERBOARD RAPIDLY, AND IF IT FINDS ANY LEFT THROWING THEM OVERBOARD AS WELL. HE THEN MENTIONED WITH SOME FORCEFULNESS THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAD NOT COME INTO BEING DUE TO SOME EXTERNAL FORCE BUT THROUGH THE FORCES OF ITS OWN PEOPLE, IN THE SAME WAY AS THE UNITED STATES CAME INTO BEING AND EXISTS WITH ALL OF ITS SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ATTRIBUTES WITHOUT ANY EXTERNAL APPROVAL. QUESTIONS OF WHETHER WE APPROVE OF A SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OR NOT, IT SEEMED TO HIM, SHOULD BE SET ASIDE IN OUR RELATIONS. MEANWHILE, HE CONCLUDED, IT WAS NOT THE SOVIET UNION BUT THE U.S. SIDE WHICH BEARS RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE GROWTH OF TENSION AND FOR DAMAGE TO U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS.

23. GROMYKO ENDED HIS LONG RESPONSE ON A SOMEWHAT CONCILIATORY NOTE BY PICKING UP THE REFERENCE IN OUR DEMARCHE TO THE PRESIDENT'S CONTINUED WILLINGNESS TO SEARCH FOR AREAS OF COOPERATION AND REDUCE THE RISKS OF CONFLICT. HE STATED THAT, WHILE THIS SOMEHOW WAS NOT IN HARMONY WITH THE REST OF OUR DEMARCHE, HE WANTED TO POINT OUT THAT SUCH WILLINGNESS WAS SOMETHING WHICH HAD NEVER BEEN ALIEN TO THE SOVIET UNION. THE SOVIETS IN FACT SEEK MEANS OF FINDING MUTUAL SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS, AND IF THE USG SERIOUSLY WANTS TO WORK IN THAT DIRECTION IT WILL NOT FIND THE SOVIET UNION HOLDING BACK. BREZHNEV, HE CONTINUED, CLEARLY EXPRESSED THAT IDEA IN HIS PRAYVA

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INTERVIEW IN A PROFOUND, DEEP AND VIVID MANNER. THAT, GROMYKO SAID, ENDED HIS PRELIMINARY REMARKS THOUGH HE RESERVED THE RIGHT TO EXPAND THEM LATER IF NECESSARY.

24. BY THEN THE HOUR WAS LATE AND I DID NOT CONSIDER IT WORTHWHILE TO ANSWER EACH OF GROMYKO'S ALLEGATIONS. I DID, HOWEVER, MAKE THE FOLLOWING OBSERVATIONS:

--I NOTED THAT HE HAD REFERRED INDIRECTLY TO THE SS-20 AND THE NATO DECISION ON LRINF. WHAT WAS SAID AT THE VIENNA SUMMIT ABOUT EQUALITY OF FORCES RELATED TO STRATEGIC ARMS, NOT THE SS-20 OR THE PERSHING II. IT WAS THE CHANGING THEATER NUCLEAR BALANCE THAT CAUSED US TO REACH OUR DECISION ON TNF MODERNIZATION.

--I ALSO POINTED OUT THAT HIS STATEMENT THAT THE U.S. DOES NOT REALLY DESIRE TO REACH DISARMAMENT AGREEMENTS WAS SIMPLY NOT SO, ADDING THAT THIS WAS NOT ONLY THE POLICY OF THE ADMINISTRATION BUT THAT RECENT POLLS SHOWED THAT 75 PER CENT OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE WERE IN FAVOR OF SALT II AGREEMENT.

--AS FOR HIS CLAIM THAT ADMINISTRATION SPOKESMEN HAD LEFT OPENINGS FOR OPPONENTS OF THE SALT TREATY, I POINTED OUT THAT THE AMERICAN PRESIDENT IS NOT OF COURSE FIRMLY IN CONTROL OF U.S. POLITICS AND U.S. POLICY AT ALL TIMES AND THAT THE SENATE HAS A LEADING ROLE TO PLAY. BUT I WAS PERSONALLY FIRMLY CONVINCED THAT HE WAS NOT TRYING TO DELAY RATIFICATION OF SALT II BEFORE THE AFGHANISTAN INVASION. I MENTIONED IN THIS REGARD THAT A TOP WHITE HOUSE AIDE TOLD ME DURING MY RECENT CONSULTATION THAT HE REALLY BELIEVED THAT THE ADMINISTRATION WOULD HAVE WON THE RATIFICATION FIGHT IN THE SPRING IF IT HAD NOT BEEN

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FOR AFGHANISTAN.

--AS FOR AFGHANISTAN, I SAID I HAD HEARD WHAT GROMYKO HAD SAID BUT THAT I ASSUMED HE DID NOT REALLY MEAN THAT HE THOUGHT THE U.S. WAS INVOLVED IN ANY AGGRESSION AGAINST AFGHANISTAN, NOR WAS I AWARE FROM ANY INFORMATION WHICH HAD COME TO ME THAT PAKISTAN CITIZENS WERE INVOLVED IN THE CONFLICT, THOUGH HE HAD REFERRED TO PAKISTAN INVOLVEMENT. GROMYKO RESPONDED THAT I SIMPLY THEN DID NOT HAVE THE FACTS--THAT THERE WAS NO DOUBT ABOUT PAKISTANI INVOLVEMENT. THERE WAS MASSIVE EVIDENCE ABOUT THEIR ASSISTANCE IN TRAINING AFGHAN REBELS, ABOUT THE SUPPLY OF ARMS, AND ABOUT THE FACT THAT U.S. ARMS WERE ALSO INVOLVED.

--I TOLD GROMYKO I WOULD LIKE TO UNDERSTAND MORE CLEARLY WHAT HE HAD SAID ABOUT SOVIET INVOLVEMENT IN THE EVENTS IN AFGHANISTAN, PARTICULARLY WITH REGARD TO THE CHANGE OF GOVERNMENT. OUR INFORMATION, I SAID, WAS THAT BABRAK HAD ARRIVED IN KABUL ON A SOVIET PLANE. GROMYKO RETORTED THAT WE PUT SUCH INFORMATION INTO CIRCULATION OURSELVES AND THEN BELIEVED IT WHEN IT COMES BACK TO US. I SAID I DIDN'T THINK THAT WAS WHERE MY INFORMATION HAD COME FROM AND THAT I HAD IN FACT HAD THE IMPRESSION THAT BABRAK HAD BEEN LIVING IN THE SOVIET UNION.

25. GROMYKO THEN RETURNED TO MY REMARKS ON THEATER NUCLEAR WEAPONS TO STATE THAT THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY DOES NOT RELATE JUST TO STRATEGIC ARMS. WHEN THIS PRINCIPLE WAS ADDRESSED IN VIENNA IT WAS UNDERSTOOD THAT IT

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RELATED TO THE ENTIRE MILITARY AND STRATEGIC POSTURE AND EQUILIBRIUM OF THE TWO SIDES. HOW ELSE, HE ASKED, COULD IT BE? OTHERWISE THERE WOULD BE THE ABSURD SITUATION OF REACHING EQUALITY IN ONE FIELD AND HAVING IT DESTROYED IN A SECOND OR THIRD FIELD. ANOTHER ASPECT OF THE ISSUE, HE ADDED, WAS THAT WHILE U.S. MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES COULD REACH THE TERRITORY OF THE SOVIET UNION, JUST LIKE STRATEGIC MISSILES, SOVIET MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES COULD NOT REACH THE TERRITORY OF THE UNITED STATES.
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E.O. 12065: RDS-3 (1/29/00) SHULMAN, MARSHALL

TAGS: PEPR, UR, US

SUBJECT: MEETING WITH GROMYKO

REF: (A) MOSCOW 01470 / (B) STATE 24026

1. (S-ENTIRE TEXT)

2. WE AGREE WITH YOUR RECOMMENDATION (PARAS 3-5 REFTEL A) THAT YOU SHOULD REFUTE RECENT SOVIET ASSERTIONS RE ALLEGED US ROLE IN AFGHANISTAN AND, IN PARTICULAR, CIA TIES TO FORMER LEADER AMIN. TALKING POINTS FOLLOW:

--SOVIET CHARGES THAT ALLEGED US INTERFERENCE AND PLOTTING AGAINST AFGHANISTAN "JUSTIFIED" YOUR INVASION OF THAT

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COUNTRY ARE COMPLETELY UNFOUNDED AND AN OBVIOUS ATTEMPT TO ESCAPE WORLD CENSURE.

--THE SOVIET CHARGE THAT AMIN WAS AN AGENT OF THE CIA IS LUDICROUS. EITHER YOUR GOVERNMENT IS COMPLETELY MISINFORMED OR THIS IS A DELIBERATE ATTEMPT AT DISINFORMATION.

3. YOUR RECOMMENDATION IN PARA 6 REPTEL A IS ALSO WELL TAKEN. THERE IS NO RECORD OF ANY "WARNINGS" AGAINST THE ALLEGED ACTIONS BY US IN AFGHANISTAN. TALKING POINTS ARE:

--THE SOVIET CLAIM, E.G. AS RECENTLY ENUNCIATED BY ZAMYATIN, THAT THE SOVIET UNION "WARNED" THE US VIA DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS TO STOP ALLEGED ACTIONS AGAINST AFGHANISTAN IS NOT REPEAT NOT SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD. IF ANY SUCH APPROACH HAD BEEN MADE, IT WOULD HAVE INSTANTLY BEEN REJECTED BECAUSE THE US DID NOT "CARRY OUT" ANY ACTION AGAINST AFGHANISTAN. THIS CHARGE ONLY AROSE WHEN THE SOVIET PROPAGANDA ORGANS CONDUCTED IT AFTER THE INVASION

--THE ONLY ACTIONS CARRIED OUT AGAINST AFGHANISTAN ARE THOSE OF THE SOVIET UNION AS PART OF ITS INVASION OF THAT COUNTRY.

--I WOULD FURTHER NOTE THAT YOUR DEPUTY, MR. MALITSEV, TURNED ASIDE ANY DISCUSSION OF AFGHANISTAN WHEN I MET WITH HIM ON DECEMBER 27, 1979, AT THE VERY MOMENT WHEN SOVIET FORCES WERE BEING EMPLOYED TO OVERTHROW THE GOVERNMENT OF PRESIDENT AMIN.

4. RE SAKHAROV, [REDACTED]

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W.F. R.F.

5. PLEASE MAKE FOLLOWING CHANGE TO LAST SENTENCE OF SEVENTH TICK OF PARA 3, REPTEL B (ON OTHER ARMS CONTROL):

DELETE WORD "ACTIVELY." LAST SENTENCE WILL THUS READ: "WE INTEND TO PURSUE OTHER CRUCIAL NEGOTIATIONS, SUCH AS CTB, MBFR, CW AND RW." VANCE

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

February 17, 1980

Mr. President,

Attached is the letter from Gromyko
which Ambassador Dobrynin gave me yesterday.

Attachment:
Letter

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[US Translation]

Dear Mr. Secretary,

Having read your letter of February 8 I would like to tell you frankly the following.

One could only welcome the recognition in the letter of the crucial importance of relations between our countries for the general world situation and the apparent desire to search for ways of overcoming the serious situation prevailing now in these relations.

However, the attempt to evade consideration of the real causes complicating the international situation, efforts to reduce the whole matter to the recent developments in Afghanistan depicted, for that matter, in a completely distorted light, and the raising of various kinds of other far-fetched questions -- all this in no way demonstrates a real intention to rectify the current situation.

Indeed, it is impossible, without sinning against the truth, to dispute the fact that the exacerbation of the international situation by no means began at the end of last December, but rather much earlier. We also pointed out to the US side the reasons for this exacerbation much earlier.

Among these is the decision on deployment in the US of the MX mobile ICBM system which was made almost immediately after the SALT-II Treaty was signed in Vienna.

There is also the artificially created "mini-crisis" on the question of a "Soviet brigade" in Cuba.

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There is also the urgent establishment of the "Rapid Deployment Force" designed for armed intervention in various parts of the world.

There is the long-range program of permanent defense spending increases and arms build-up imposed by the US on its NATO allies.

Finally, there is the decision to deploy new US missiles on the soil of Western Europe, which creates a serious threat to the security of the USSR and its allies.

And what has become of the SALT II Treaty? Incidentally, in taking the decision to develop and deploy MX missiles the US Government stated that this decision would promote the ratification of SALT II. Without addressing now the substance of the MX missile question -- which is a subject for a special discussion -- one cannot fail to observe that in fact the decision on the MX missile is being implemented while the SALT II Treaty has not been ratified. In pressing its NATO allies to agree to the deployment on their soil of new American missiles, the US was also saying that this would facilitate the ratification of the SALT II Treaty. Even putting aside, once again, the question of the invalidity of such linkage, the picture remains the same: the decision on the deployment of new missiles in Western Europe has been adopted and is being implemented, but the Treaty has not been ratified.

Try to see all this through our eyes. Can these facts be seen in any way other than as a departure by the US from the principle of equality and equal security which was reconfirmed

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in Vienna, as evidence of a policy line now pursued by the US to break out of the existing military and strategic parity between the USSR and the US, to rush ahead in an effort to gain military superiority for itself?

No references to events in Afghanistan can conceal this turn in US policy -- a turn from detente to a new aggravation of international tensions, to a new round of the arms race.

In your letter you mention the need for our two states to show restraint and moderation in international affairs and in relations with each other. Well, the thought itself is correct. We, on our part, are also in favor of this. It is important, however, for the United States also to adhere to such a course in international affairs and not treat them with such astonishing light-mindedness as it now does.

As for Afghanistan, our position on this question has been set forth more than once with utmost clarity, specifically as you know in the answers by L.I. Brezhnev to the questions of the Pravda correspondent as well as in our contacts with the US side.

Facts do not cease to be facts because the US side does not want to admit that acts of aggression against Afghanistan have been and continue to be committed from the territory of Pakistan. Also indisputable is the fact that in providing assistance to Afghanistan in repelling external aggression, the USSR has acted in full accordance with the UN Charter and the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between the USSR and the DRA.

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We have also spoken on more than one occasion as to when and under what circumstances the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan will be carried out. I would only like to stress that if the US really wanted this to occur sooner, it could, of course, take measures to stop the aggression against Afghanistan. So far, the practical actions of the United States go exactly in the opposite direction: everything is being done to expand armed incursions into the territory of Afghanistan.

You say in your letter that the US has no interest in seeing a government in Kabul hostile to the Soviet Union. In fact, however, the United States is exerting every effort toward uniting counterrevolutionary Afghan groups under foreign auspices and even toward the virtual establishment of an illegal Afghan "government in exile" in the territory of Pakistan.

Nor does the reference in your letter to some kind of "increasing military activity" on the Soviet border with Iran bear witness to any US desire to contribute to the reduction of tensions. You must be well aware that this is not true. We have no "designs" whatsoever upon Iran or any other countries of this region. It is not for the United States to speak of "concern" about the fate of Iran while it is precisely the US which directly threatens this country and places all kinds of pressure on it.

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For some reason you also raise now the question of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, asserting that the situation in that country and its relations with third countries, particularly with the Soviet Union, are supposedly also a matter of "grave concern" to the US. There is no basis for this, nor can there be. But if we are to speak in terms of concern, the Soviet Union has far more basis for it in connection with the US military presence in, for example, Turkey and Greece, countries which either directly border on the USSR or are situated in close proximity to our borders. It is clear that an approach whereby the US arbitrarily declares regions of the world thousands of kilometers away from it to be a sphere of its "vital interests" and reduces everything only to securing its own narrow egoistic interests without wishing to take account of the legitimate interests of others, cannot lead to anything good.

And what is the meaning of the sudden mention in your letter of Yugoslavia? Presumably it is not just because such a country exists on geographic maps? The fact that the US side for some reason deems it necessary to launch into a discourse about Yugoslavia inevitably prompts us to think that the US itself has some sort of ill-intentioned plans in this regard. But if this is so, the United States runs the risk of gravely burning its fingers in Yugoslavia.

So, as you see, there is nothing we must justify before the United States, but the list of complaints which we have

the right to present to the US happens to be a rather long and impressive one.

Of course, the serious damage to the international situation and Soviet-US relations already inflicted by the actions of the United States can hardly pass without a trace. But it is alien to us to be guided by emotions in our policies. We would be prepared, if the United States is also willing, to seek opportunities to return to the path of cooperation between our two countries and with other states for the sake of improving the international situation, strengthening peace and universal security.

If, as your letter says, Soviet-US relations are now at a "critical juncture," then the choice of which way to proceed is up to the US. Our choice is clear. We would like to hope that the US will also make the only sensible choice -- in favor of detente and peaceful coexistence.

I hope, Mr. Secretary, that you will understand correctly the motives by which I was impelled in speaking in such a frank manner. We would welcome any constructive considerations and ideas in support of detente in Soviet-American relations which you might offer on your part.

Sincerely yours,

A. GROMYKO

February 16, 1980

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#13

VIA ALPHA CHANNEL

UNCLASSIFIED WITH
SECRET ATTACHMENT

February 27, 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

SUBJECT: Schmidt Memcon

I return herewith your memcon with Schmidt, with quite a few comments by the President. Perhaps these should be taken into account when the briefing paper for the President is prepared, in addition to whatever you or I may wish to say to Schmidt on our own.

Zbigniew Brzezinski

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SECRET ATTACHMENT

#131

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

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Ly. 2615.

February 25, 1980

Durrall, I see

nothing encouraging here. IRL opposes any sanctions against Iran or Soviets, are continuing business as usual with SU, refuse to commit publicly to Olympic boycott, &

MEMORANDUM

Herewith is my report of my luncheon conversation with Chancellor Schmidt in Bonn, February 20. *privately & in press are very critical of us.*

Summary: At luncheon in Chancellery February 20, Chancellor Schmidt was accompanied by Genscher and von Staden. I was accompanied by Ambassador Stoessel. Two and one-half hour conversation was wide-ranging and extremely frank; exchange was useful in elucidating Chancellor's concerns about present situation and prospects in connection with Afghanistan situation and highlighted his emphasis on need to understand US conception of overall strategy and aims. He complained with some vigor about several instances where he felt there had been lack of prior consultation by US regarding actions it was taking and on which US expected support from allies; however, he emphasized his firm intention to be supportive of US and he made some suggestions regarding ways to improve consultative procedures. Chancellor strongly emphasized his belief that, however difficult France may seem to be, Giscard will stand with us when chips are down and he suggested continuing efforts to pursue dialogue with French. Chancellor welcomed most warmly my visit and effort to consult with European allies, especially France. Chancellor conveyed his best wishes to President Carter and stressed how much he is looking forward to his talks with him in Washington. End Summary.

However we need each other - Schmidt's visit should help - J

Schmidt dispensed with any small talk and at beginning of luncheon launched at once into lengthy exposition of his concerns and views. He said that, for him, the fundamental question related to the philosophy of the US in dealing with the Soviet Union now and in the next few years; he also said the same question applied to our views on Southwest Asia, China and East-West relations as a whole. As background to these questions, he said his impression was that, within a matter of months we

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
PER 4/2/46 41.11 RE 1116-95-79
BY *[Signature]* NARS DATE 12/16/46

could be in a phase of escalation of tension between East and West. Perhaps this was inevitable, but he wondered if we really intended to have such an escalation. The Chancellor said he had been puzzled by the phrase in the President's most recent letter concerning "punishment" of the Soviet Union. Is it really our goal to punish the Soviet Union and, if so, what do we wish to achieve?

Continuing, the Chancellor acknowledged that he had certain domestic problems, as Giscard d'Estaing and other governments in Europe. Just as President Carter, he also has a political campaign to conduct. He understood that much of what the President says and does has something to do with the domestic situation in the United States and with the political campaign. In an aside, he remarked that this was no doubt the reason that the President was not fulfilling the pledge he made at Tokyo to bring US oil prices up to the world market level in 1980. The Chancellor said that he and other members of his government have refrained from making statements concerning the present situation which would cater to the interests of the political campaign under way in the FRG. He wants to continue to put politics to one side, but this would be a difficult position to maintain if he does not understand the philosophy behind US policies. He said that he has a clear feeling that danger is building up. The Chancellor said he wanted to be frank in what he told the Germans about what is going on, but to do so he must know our overall concepts. For example, do we want to embark on a new arms race? Do we wish to punish a world power and for what reasons?

*If we can
correct our
24 before Tokyo*

The Chancellor then spoke about French policy and Giscard. He urged that we should not let our attitude toward France be influenced by the public media. After reviewing briefly his last meeting with Giscard, the Chancellor said there was not the slightest doubt that, if the chips were down, the French would stand firmly with the US just as they did during the Cuban missile crisis. However, this is not appreciated by the press, which tends to carry "disastrous" reports about French policies. The Chancellor recalled that, in his private meeting with Giscard, he had made a remark -- partly intended to flatter Giscard -- that for obvious

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reasons the US was the FRG's most important ally and that France, for obvious reasons, was the FRG's closest ally. Schmidt said he wanted the President to understand this and that he did not wish to hide the fact that he had made such a remark. He emphasized that any attempt to divide France and Germany would be most unwise -- and this held also for the issue of the Olympic Games. Schmidt said that he would not allow the Soviets to drive a wedge between the FRG and the US and he stated that Giscard feels exactly the same way about his relations with the US.

Schmidt said that we should not worry too much about the FRG-France tete-a-tetes, since this is the only way the French can be carried along with the main stream of European thought. Only the FRG can perform this role. The US cannot do this. As an afterthought, Schmidt remarked that he hoped the UK would not break up Europe because of disputes over the EC budget.

Recalling the events of the past five weeks, the Chancellor said that he had to state frankly that he had not understood some of the US actions. Moreover, on several occasions the US had taken decisions on its own and then had expected the allies to say "me too" within 24 hours. As an example, he mentioned the US position regarding a boycott or postponement of the Olympic Games. He had been assured by Warren Christopher (and von Staden had also been assured by Brzezinski) shortly before his policy statement to the Bundestag January 17 that the US would not make a decision in the near future regarding the Olympics. Thus, he had said nothing about the subject in his statement. He subsequently was informed on Sunday morning that the President would announce that evening his decision concerning the boycott or postponement of the Olympics. The Chancellor said this was all in the past but he mentioned it only as an example of how a lack of prior information regarding US intentions could make matters difficult for others.

Referring to the US hostages in Iran, Schmidt said he deeply admired the manner in which the President had handled this extremely difficult situation. He could understand some of the pressures the President had been under because of the FRG's own -- and much briefer -- experience with the taking of hostages. With all of his

admiration for the President's policy, he had to admit, however, that he had not liked everything we had suggested concerning Iran, especially the idea of mining Iranian ports.

The Chancellor inquired about the scenario leading, hopefully, to the release of the hostages in Iran and I outlined to him the various steps which are under way.

Turning to East-West relations, the Chancellor said that over the past ten years he felt the FRG had not done badly. His approach has always been that of maintaining balance in Europe by striving for a reciprocal limitation of arms or, failing achievement of this aim, having enough military strength in the West to deter the Soviets. Only by maintaining this policy can detente proceed. The Chancellor noted that much has been attained through detente, especially for Germany. Many persons of German origin have been able to leave the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe and he did not want to see this process interrupted. Thanks to the help of the US and the other allies, a Berlin agreement was achieved which had brought great benefits; however, if tensions escalate, Berlin could suffer, as well as the 18 million "hostages" constituting the population of the GDR.

Schmidt felt that some people in Washington see the present FRG Government as "softies." This was definitely not the case. After the experience with the neutron bomb issue, it had been hard to get agreement on TNP, but the FRG had rammed it through. In this connection, the Chancellor recalled that, when he had first raised the issue of grey area weapons in 1977, there had been critical statements out of Washington. However, this had changed and, following the Guadeloupe meeting, Germany had taken the lead in Europe in regard to grey area weapons. He thought it should be remembered that, as far as this subject was concerned, the FRG initially had taken a harder stance than the US; moreover, he would note that, as the neutron bomb, the FRG had been ready to go ahead, although the US finally decided not to do so. The Chancellor said the FRG would be as hard as anyone, but he wanted to be sure it was necessary before taking such a stance. One had to be certain that this would not just be to punish someone. As a divided country, the FRG felt particularly vulnerable. It could be that the Soviets would decide

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to punish the FRG in retaliation rather than the US. Against this background, the Chancellor said he had not been too happy with some of the remarks by Mrs. Thatcher and he preferred the more balanced views of Carrington.

As another example of the firm FRG attitude, Schmidt said that the FRG had never interrupted military aid to Turkey. They had not been wrong to do so, just as they had not been wrong to advocate consistently the need for supporting Pakistan, despite the nuclear problem in that country. Schmidt acknowledged that this problem existed, but the FRG had felt all along that it would be well to assist Pakistan.

Schmidt lamented that there were too few opportunities between allies to talk directly and confidentially about current problems. Also, he regretted there was not more talk between the US and France. Once again, he praised Giscard as a sound and reliable leader who is certainly far better than any personality in the opposition in France. He agreed that, as a Frenchman, Giscard has particular sensitivities. However, this is something which afflicts all leaders of democracies and he was sure that Giscard just as other allies wished to maintain a stable alliance.

Summing up, the Chancellor said that, as we already knew, we could count on the FRG as a partner without any reservations whatsoever. However, such a partner would be more effective if it knew and understood the goals and aims of the US.

In response, I said that the President greatly appreciates his conversations and exchanges with the Chancellor, particularly during the difficult period since the taking of the hostages and during the even more difficult period since the Afghanistan invasion. The President greatly values the Chancellor's views and he understands, as Schmidt had said, that Giscard is a crucial ally with the US and the other allies. There have been irritations with the French and there will undoubtedly be more in the future, but the President knows that Giscard will stand with us when we are pressed. I said that I personally had been irritated by the French attitude toward the

suggested multilateral Foreign Ministers' meeting and the subsequent backgrounding they had given to the press which had been done without prior notice and which had been extremely distorted. I said I had made my irritation clear to the French, while at the same time emphasizing that this would not affect the basic relationship between our two countries.

On the matter of the Olympics, I said there had been a failure to communicate adequately in advance regarding our decision, although this had been foreshadowed by remarks I had made previously. The lack of sufficient prior consultation was regrettable and must be prevented in the future.

Don't apologize

As to our philosophy in the light of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, I said we saw this as an event of very serious proportions requiring a firm, strong response and one which we would be prepared to sustain. We felt the Soviets must be made to pay a price so long as their troops remain in Afghanistan; also we wished to convey the message that we intended to be firm in order to deter Soviet aggression elsewhere. The Soviet strength in Afghanistan represents a potential threat to Pakistan and Iran, especially if there is fragmentation in the latter country.

I said that, in our view, the steps we have taken are both firm and clear and no further major, new steps are required at this point. We believe that we should seek to achieve a return to the status quo ante in Afghanistan, along the general lines suggested by the recent statement of the EC-9 in their Rome meeting. Before that is achieved, our philosophy on East-West relations is that the present sanctions should remain in effect but that we should not try to shut off all dialogue between the US and the Soviet Union or between the other allies and the Soviets. It is essential to maintain arms control discussions. I explained that we have not withdrawn the SALT II treaty for ratification but have deferred it. As soon as we feel there is some chance for ratification, we will bring it to the Senate. Hopefully, this could be before our election, although it might come afterwards. Meanwhile, we will take no actions which would

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violate the SALT II treaty and we expect the Soviets to adopt the same position. I said I had put the question specifically to Gromyko regarding Soviet intentions to abide by SALT II but had received no answer. A Pravda editorial had indicated somewhat ambiguously that the Soviets would continue to observe the treaty provisions.

In conversations with Dobrynin, I said agreement had been reached that most of the other negotiations with the Soviets in the arms control field would continue, such as CTB, MBFR, a chemical warfare treaty and a radiological treaty. The Indian Ocean talks have been suspended in view of Afghanistan, which has made it essential for us to maintain a strong naval presence in the area. In general, I said we will continue arms negotiations, which are in our own interests as well as those of our allies. I believed the CSCE process should be kept alive and we planned to attend the Madrid meeting. We also will be prepared to follow up on the French CDE proposal following Madrid.

When Schmidt inquired if the Soviets know of these intentions, I responded affirmatively. In another aspect of our policy, about which the Soviets have not been informed, I said it is our intention to maintain and observe formal US-Soviet agreement, such as those covering grain shipments, maritime activities, and civil air. With regard to Eastern Europe, I said we believe it is in our interest and that of our allies to continue to seek good relations with Eastern Europe. I repeated that we feel it is important to maintain a dialogue between the US and the Soviets. Schmidt interjected that the last consideration was the most important.

I said I had met three times in recent weeks with Dobrynin and had emphasized our desire to keep alive the basic framework of our relations. We expect that the Soviet troops will be withdrawn.

Schmidt asked if the Soviets understood that no weapons from the West will be sent to the Afghanistan rebels if the Soviets withdraw. I said the Soviets have raised this question and I have responded by saying that I had heard the question but that if there is to be discussion about it, it would be a subject for a talk between

Gromyko and myself. I said that, speaking very confidentially, I have written to Gromyko outlining all of our concerns about Afghanistan, Yugoslavia, the Persian Gulf, and so on. I thought the time would come when it would be helpful for me to have a private talk with Gromyko and that, before doing so, I would wish to consult with the Chancellor.

Schmidt inquired whether I felt there was a real danger to Yugoslavia in present circumstances. I replied that I did not believe this was the case at this time, but might arise later, and Schmidt agreed.

Summing up, I said our philosophy was that the Soviet invasion could not go without a strong response but that we do wish to maintain the overall framework of East-West relations.

The chancellor said he understood I had given Genscher a paper outlining US aims in the current situation. On its side, the FRG had also drawn up a paper which had been developed at least in part on the basis of the recent talks with the French. He thought we would find it of interest to study the German paper and, thereafter, on the occasion of the Chancellor's visit to Washington, the two sides could compare views and reactions regarding the papers. (Genscher subsequently gave me a copy of the German paper.)

After expressing appreciation for my remarks, the Chancellor said he would like to speak in a broad vein about some of his concerns. Quite frankly, he saw the danger of a third world war occurring in the not too distant future -- not immediately but perhaps in 1981. Of course, an "explosion" regarding our hostages in Iran could lead to an escalation which could bring the danger of war even sooner. Outlining various possibilities in which he saw the danger of a war developing, Schmidt said this could come over an incident in the Persian Gulf, as he had already mentioned, it could result from something to do with the hostages, or it could involve pressures in Berlin. He also thought that any hostilities might become nuclear, particularly given the lack of a strong US military potential in the Persian Gulf.

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Schmidt continued that the obsession of the Soviets with China also is a threat. He thought the Soviets probably misread US policy toward China and that it was important for us to explain these policies to them. If the US tries to make the Soviets pay by stimulating their fears of China, this could induce the Soviets to take counter actions which would be dangerous. The Chancellor thought that the situation between China and the West is unclear and could be a cause of war. If China is threatened, this could compel the US to ask -- and to answer -- the question of whether we would help China or not.

Probably the most likely cause of war, the Chancellor thought, would evolve from an increased arms race. From statements made by some US representatives, the impression is given that we wish to see a sharp increase of allied forces in Europe as well as those of the US. How serious all of this is remains unclear to the FRG and it must be even more unclear to the Soviets. In the Chancellor's view, if by 1981 the Soviets conclude that an arms race is beginning -- and they would realize that this is a race they could not hope to win -- there is a risk that they would decide to take early pre-emptive action to strike while they still had an advantage.

This line of thought, the Chancellor said, led him to underline the importance of my talking with Gromyko in order to make clear the true nature of US intentions. I said I agreed completely with the Chancellor concerning the dangers inherent in an arms race. This is why I felt it was imperative to obtain ratification of the SALT II treaty so as to prevent a new spiral in the arms competition.

Reverting to the Afghanistan situation, Schmidt said that, if the Soviets are to leave Afghanistan, they will do so only if a framework is established and if they know that the West will not replace them. A framework probably would have to include a staged withdrawal. For example, removal of their strategic air capability would reduce the strategic threat to the surrounding area.

The Chancellor then raised the possibility that the Soviets, despite all of the sanctions taken against them by the West, may simply refuse to pull out of Afghanistan. If this transpires, the Soviets will appear to have won and the philosophy of containment will no longer be credible. What should the West do if the Soviets refuse to leave Afghanistan? In Schmidt's view -- and he emphasized he was "thinking out loud" -- he thought it would make sense in such a situation to try to push the Soviets out of some other area where they have established a foothold -- i.e., Angola, Libya, Ethiopia, or North Yemen. We might be able to find some areas where our capabilities are greater than they are in far-off Afghanistan and where more direct pressures could be brought to bear. The Chancellor acknowledged that all of this probably sounded very daring and adventuristic, but he urged that consideration be given to what moves might be taken if the Soviets refuse to budge on Afghanistan. If this happens, we must do something in order not to appear impotent.

I expressed my own confidence that, in time, the Soviets could be induced to leave Afghanistan. On China, I reviewed the development of our relationship with China and the measured pace we were following in pursuing normalization. While in the past we have attempted to be even-handed in dealing with the Soviets and the Chinese, the Soviets now perceive that there has been a clear tilt by the US toward China. In fact, they may see more than is really there, since there has been a large increase in contacts following a period where virtually no contacts existed. The Soviets are particularly concerned about the strategic relationship between the US and China and how this might translate into such matters as military sales. When it was disclosed before Secretary Brown's visit to China that we would permit the sale of non-lethal military equipment to China, the Soviets probably saw this as a first step towards selling lethal weapons to the Chinese.

I continued that the Soviets have always been worried about encirclement and these fears are now exacerbated by our contacts with the Chinese. The situation is also being fed by the split in the Soviet leadership, where we can say that the change is already under way. I agreed that the whole relationship with China presents an area of great danger -- when I see Gromyko I will talk to him

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about this and assure him that we are not trying to encircle the Soviet Union and will not sell lethal weapons to the Chinese.

Schmidt picked up my remark about change in the leadership in the Soviet Union, and asked what our views were. I said that Kosygin seems to be totally out of the picture while Brezhnev apparently is experiencing more period of down than up.

Schmidt inquired if it would cause problems for us if he were to stress in public the desirability of contacts between the two super powers. I said I thought there would be no objection if this idea were stated in general terms.

he knew this
Schmidt inquired if the US had proposed officially to the Soviets that negotiations begin on TNF. I said this had been done but that the Soviets had turned the suggestion down. Schmidt thought it would be helpful if I could mention in a speech that we had made the suggestion for such negotiations. I said this would post no difficulties. When Schmidt inquired if I felt the Soviets would stick to their negative stance on TNF negotiations, I said I thought they would do so for some time but eventually they would probably move from this position. Schmidt commented that the recent Gierak speech and proposal for a disarmament conference might indicate a certain erosion in the Soviet position.

Schmidt inquired if, in our contacts with the Soviets, we had evoked the 1973 US-Soviet agreements. I said that this had been done and that the 1972 agreement had also been recalled.

Schmidt reverted to his concerns about an arms race, saying that if this were to develop the position of the FRG would become extremely difficult, in particular, this would be the case if only the US and the FRG on the western side were to contribute to the western buildup. He would not permit the FRG to be singled out among European countries. The FRG, Schmidt said, must remain a NATO partner like the other partners, even if it was stronger economically and militarily than the other allies.

The Chancellor went on to speak of the capability of the FRG army, noting that it was based on a conscription system, that good reserves existed, and that mobilization would be expeditious. These were the important things in estimating military capabilities, and not percentage numbers which could be manipulated in various ways. Nevertheless, in order that no wedge could be driven between the FRG and the US, the Chancellor said that the FRG would fulfill the three percent pledge and that he would tell the President this when he saw him in Washington.

Schmidt then dwelt on the risks assumed by the FRG in regard to the stationing of a large number of nuclear weapons in a small and heavily populated area. He could only hope that the US public could understand this situation and the risks accepted by the FRG in this connection. At this point the Chancellor spoke with some vehemence about his dislike of criticisms from US officials (he mentioned Bob Komer by name in this context) regarding the FRG military contribution. He said he had had enough of such criticisms and was "fed up" with them.

The Chancellor was also irritated by allegations that he is somehow in the hands of the left wing of the SPD. He said in strong terms that the SPD was in his hands and would remain so long as he was the Chancellor. If Strauss were to win -- which Schmidt did not anticipate -- then the nature of the SPD might change. This was one reason why the Chancellor intended to stay in power. He reiterated that, so long as he was there, he would control the party.

> In a discussion of sanctions against Iran, Schmidt said he had agreed to go along with them in the past even though he had not felt them to be correct. I explained why we felt the threat of sanctions had been useful in persuading the Iranians to adopt a more moderate stance on the hostage issue. The Chancellor said he would not argue with this in principle but that he also had some of the same reluctance about sanctions against the Soviet Union as he had felt about sanctions against Iran. For political reasons, the FRG has built up its exchanges with the Soviet Union and he noted that FRG trade with the Soviet Union was five times more important to the FRG than US trade with the USSR. Such trade also contributed to FRG employment, and the

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Chancellor said he would be reluctant to see unemployment rise in the FRG because of sanctions against the Soviet Union. He thought it was wrong to ask what the FRG and others should sacrifice in relation to the Soviet Union. What the FRG wishes to do is contribute to a constructive policy. If it appears that sacrifices really are required by the situation, then they would be accepted, but this should not be done in response to pressure from the public media in the US and elsewhere.

I said I wished to refer to one more issue, that of the Middle Eastern negotiations and the Arab-Israeli dispute. The US fully recognizes the importance of resolving these issues if we were to have a stable situation in the Middle East. Progress is slow but there is hope for a favorable outcome. I noted the interest on the part of some of our Allies in coming forward with a new proposal in the UN relating to the Middle East problem. In our view, such an initiative at the present time would be premature and could hinder the on-going discussions. It is possible that, after the target date for the Autonomy Agreement has passed, an initiative or a new statement might be useful, but I emphasized that for the moment this would not be desirable. Meanwhile, the statements by individual countries relating to the fundamental importance of settling the Middle East problem could be useful.

Schmidt said he assumed that we were putting all possible pressure on Begin to move forward and to meet the target date. I said this indeed was the case and that support from others would be helpful in this regard. Schmidt said that, because of German history, there were limits on what the FRG could do. He remarked that it is clear that many of the Arab countries seem to feel that a solution of the Middle East problem is more important than the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

Regarding assistance to Turkey, the Chancellor said he hoped to see a modus vivendi achieved between Turkey and Greece concerning the Aegean. In the course of the FRG efforts to lead the assistance program for Turkey, it might be possible to sound out the possibilities for such a solution. Schmidt said that the FRG would wish to stay in close touch with SACEUR in this regard. I welcomed this suggestion, while noting that the prospects for success in connection with SACEUR's efforts seem to have improved somewhat.

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Speaking in reflective terms about the position of the President, Schmidt said that clearly the President is now seen as a strong leader. He thought that the President had the prospect of being perceived as well as a wise leader and, hopefully, as a successful leader in resolving the crisis situation with the Soviet Union. Schmidt said it is clear to him that strong emotions have now been built up in the US about the Soviet Union. This may be seen as a positive development, although it is something which needs guidance. Through US contacts and those of other countries, with the Soviet Union, there could be a process leading to a resolution of the present situation of tension. Schmidt hoped that in the period just prior to the US elections in the fall there would not be a competition between the rival candidates as to which one would be the toughest toward the Soviet Union. What is required is leadership in order to ensure the peace and not to lead into a world war.

I have a uneasy feeling still -

On the question of the Olympics, Schmidt said that, as we knew, the FRG will be on our side in the end, but time is needed to bring the others along.

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T. Brown*

Referring to the question of failure of communication which has plagued us at times in the past, I wondered if a mechanism might be developed to improve the situation. For example, perhaps Assistant Secretary Vest might have weekly talks with Ambassador Herme in Washington to review matters and Ambassador Stoessel might do the same in Bonn. Schmidt welcomed the idea of regularized consultations, but he thought it would be far preferable if I, myself, could arrange to meet on a regular basis with the UK, French, and FRG Ambassadors in Washington. This could be done in the office or in my home. Perhaps the Italians could be brought in as well if we felt it desirable, although he cautioned that the Cossiga term might not be around very long. Such an arrangement would provide the opportunity for consultations at a high level and could be extremely useful, if I could find a way to make time in my schedule for such talks. I said I would undertake to do this.

Concluding our start-up discussion, I said I felt that all of the important questions had been discussed either with the Foreign Minister or with the Chancellor. For some of them, neither side had answers at the moment but there would be opportunity to study them and further consideration would be given to them when the Chancellor visited Washington.

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The Chancellor expressed his great appreciation to me for my visit to Bonn as well as to the other capitals in Europe. He was particularly pleased that I would be going to Paris, since otherwise it would have made matters very difficult. He asked me to convey his very best regard to the President as well as the gist of the views he had presented. Schmidt said he looked forward with much pleasure to seeing the President in Washington and hoped he would have the opportunity for a good private talk with the President. Schmidt reviewed the membership of his delegation, noting that it would include several top industrialists and trade union members. These individuals did not have to be present in the political meetings but it would be useful if they could be included in the White House dinner. The Chancellor remarked that this was his way of helping to lead public opinion in the FRG.

Comment: While he appeared somewhat tired, the Chancellor was in good form. He was frank and even blunt in many of his comments, although generally constructive in his approach and his desire to look ahead. His remarks about the difficulties caused by perceived gaps in the consultative process underlined his sensitivities on this score. His emphasis on the need for a long-term strategy for the West, his disquisitions on France and the FRG-French relation, his worries about the possibility of war and his desire to defend the FRG record in the security area highlighted his concerns on these points. The talk was useful in permitting Schmidt to air his views and preoccupations on a wide variety of subjects. He repeatedly expressed his pleasure that he will be visiting Washington soon, and it is clear he looks forward with much anticipation to his consultations with the President.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BRIEFING MEMORANDUM

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SECRET/SENSITIVE

TO: The Secretary
FROM: INR - Ronald I. Spiers
SUBJECT: Soviet Motives in Afghanistan

In choosing to intervene in Afghanistan, the Soviets were primarily motivated by their own security concerns. In their pre-decision deliberations, they apparently underestimated both the strength of the insurgency and the intensity of the international reaction. Despite their miscalculations, however, we believe the Soviets are not now prepared to alter their course. Present efforts seem primarily aimed at stabilizing the situation in Afghanistan, exploiting differences among the western allies, and limiting the damage which Afghanistan has done to overall US-Soviet relations.

* * * *

By late 1979, Moscow was faced with a dire situation in Afghanistan. If it did not act, the best it could hope for was prolonged fighting, further regime coups, and political chaos; the worst, the establishment of an anti-Soviet regime that would develop ties with Iran, Pakistan, the US, and China. From the Soviet perspective, such a turn of events would have overturned a long tradition of Afghan dependence on the USSR and would have meant an unacceptable situation on the USSR's southern border. Tolerance of such an outcome would have called into question Moscow's willingness to back its clients elsewhere in the Third World. By early December, the Soviet leadership concluded that the only solution to the problem was military intervention, and that while such action would carry considerable political costs, the benefits of a stable and secure Afghanistan firmly in the Soviet camp were worth the price.

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Miscalculation

In its deliberations, Moscow miscalculated. In terms of the military situation, the Soviets seem to have misjudged the strength and capabilities of the insurgents. While the Soviets probably calculated that their own troops would have to secure the major urban areas and lines of communication in Afghanistan until the Afghan army could be reorganized and equipped to fight the insurgency, it probably underestimated the time and manpower that would be needed even for this limited objective. Originally, Moscow may have hoped that 40,000 to 60,000 Soviet troops would be enough; present force configurations would seem to indicate that the Soviets now believe that it will need at least double that number, and that the Soviet, rather than the Afghan, army will have to bear the brunt of the fighting for the present.

Moscow apparently also miscalculated the intensity of the international reaction to its intervention in Afghanistan. In terms of US-Soviet relations, Moscow was probably ready to accept a bad press and the delay of SALT II ratification. However, the Soviets may not have anticipated the American actions either to curtail shipments of feed grains and export of high technology or to boycott the Olympics. Indeed, clandestine reporting indicates that the Soviets may have believed that the US was too distracted by the situation in Iran to develop a strong response.

been
The Kremlin also seems to have/taken aback by the strength of the West European response. While it no doubt expected them to denounce Soviet actions, Moscow may not have expected the West Europeans to give the US as much support as they have. Moscow was probably equally surprised by the nearly unanimous hostile Islamic reaction evoked at the Islamabad Conference in January.

In Afghanistan

Resistance in Afghanistan has evidently been stronger than Moscow originally anticipated. The Babrak government has not been more effective than Amin's, and the internal situation has deteriorated since the intervention.

Despite the international reaction and the resistance in Afghanistan, the Soviets are adding men and equipment to their forces, building permanent barracks and are apparently planning for large operations against the rebels. The Soviets have yet

to engage in major operations against the rebels, and seem unlikely to conclude that their intervention will not succeed in its limited military objectives of stalemating the insurgency before a spring offensive is tried.

Diplomatic Posture

Although the Soviet media and leadership have been quick to pick up on the theme of Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan voiced in the West, there has been little or no deviation from their original position of December 27. Indeed, Brezhnev in his speech of February 22, seemed to add to earlier demands on the question of withdrawal when he said that the Soviets will only withdraw when the US and Afghanistan's neighbors are willing to "guarantee" that all outside interference in Afghanistan has ceased. On the face of it, Brezhnev's statement was probably not intended as a signal of Soviet interest in negotiation on the issue. However, Moscow may have been impressed by the subsequent Western reaction to even such a slight shift in the Soviet position and is now attempting to play on this interest to imply reasonableness in the Kremlin.

Similarly, the Soviets have given little public play to the West European proposal for the "neutralization" of Afghanistan. They have not, however, dismissed it outright nor have they ruled out the idea of future discussion or negotiations. Indeed, in his discussion with Armand Hammer, Brezhnev reportedly expressed an interest in mutually acceptable solutions. Thus, it would appear that the Soviets are trying to dangle the prospect of a political solution to the Afghan situation in order, in the short run, to divide western opinion and policy, and, in the longer run, to keep open the possibility of a negotiated agreement that in effect would place a world seal of approval on the Soviet intervention and the resulting permanent satellization of Afghanistan.

At the same time, the Soviets are intent upon limiting the damage Afghanistan which has wreaked on its relations with the West and the Third World. Moscow has repeatedly stressed that detente remains its basic policy line. Similarly, one Soviet article has tried to allay West European fears of an increased Soviet threat to the oil rich Persian Gulf by resurrecting its 1976 proposal that the security of the area be internationally guaranteed. Moscow has also attempted to deflect Arab displeasure by hammering away at the betrayal of the Palestinian cause allegedly inherent in the Egyptian-Israeli

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- 4 -

peace treaty and longer term at the continuing threat which the US poses for the Middle East.

In the longer term, Moscow probably believes that it can eventually stabilize the situation in Afghanistan, and that, as it does, international pressure will decrease, much as it did in 1968 with Czechoslovakia. The Soviets probably have concluded that continued tensions in the Mideast will eventually allow them to recoup their losses, largely because the radical Arabs have few other options in terms of sophisticated arms and great power support. Moscow also probably believes that the very fact that it has secured its position in Afghanistan will enable it to exert more influence on Iran and Pakistan, and in time to undercut US and Chinese influence. To this end, the Soviets probably will try to refrain from overly antagonizing any of the parties involved. As their involvement in the counterinsurgency in Afghanistan grows, however, this moderate position will become increasingly difficult to maintain both as a result of fighting the war itself (which may inevitably come to involve Pakistan's border areas), and as a result of having to justify that war to a worried home front.

Drafted by: INR/RSE:WLimberg, x29201

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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INFORMATION

March 7, 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI
FROM: JERRY SCHECTER *JS*
SUBJECT: SCC Working Group on Iran and
Afghanistan: Public Posture

The SCC Working Group met yesterday and discussed the following.

-- Chemical Warfare in Afghanistan: Discussed our coverage of reports of chemical warfare activities by the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. We agreed that there has been maximum coverage in the press on the available material. However, there is a real need to get more information. Hopefully, that will be done in the next week by Stan Turner, as directed by the SCC. In the meantime, we will have clips of the coverage of chemical warfare as well as on examples of Soviet imperialism and atrocities in Afghanistan. *(S)(u)*

-- Countering Soviet Propaganda on Afghanistan: The group is in the final stages of preparation of a themes paper to counter Soviet claims in Afghanistan. The paper also will focus on Soviet actions, Afghan resistance, Soviet brutality, and the international reactions, especially Islamic condemnation of the Soviet invasion. We see this as an overall position paper that can be used by ICA, Media Liaison for domestic distribution, source material for Congressmen, for speeches and general policy guidance for our Embassies. *(S)(u)*

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~~Review on March 7, 1986~~

Declassify on: OADR

Declassified/Released on 9-15-94
under provisions of E.O. 12356
by D. Van Tassel, National Security Council
(F87-142)

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MEMORANDUM

1604

~~SECRET ATTACHMENT~~ NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

March 11, 1980

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI
FROM: MARSHALL BREMENT *MB*
SUBJECT: Reported Use of Chemical Weapons

Attached is a memo from Peter Tarnoff informing us of State's "broad internationally oriented strategy" to deal with the chemical warfare issue. This matter will require close monitoring by us. The most suitable forum for following-up is the Schecter Committee.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the attached memo at Tab A.

J.S.
Jerry Schecter concurs.

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(F87-142)

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520

March 7, 1980

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MEMORANDUM FOR DR. ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Reported Use of Chemical Weapons

As you know, we are continuing to receive and analyze reports of the use of lethal chemical weapons (CW) by the Soviets and some of their friends in Afghanistan, Laos, and Kampuchea. Press and Congressional attention is intensifying.

Efforts to Date

We have taken a substantial number of steps to assemble pertinent data and make our concerns known. Our country officers conducted the first systematic interviews of Hmong refugees and took the initial steps on the diplomatic front to raise the level of consciousness regarding reported use of gas in Laos and Kampuchea. Working with Defense, we organized a very professional investigation by a medical team sent to refugee camps in Thailand. We have made demarches to the parties concerned with regard to use in Indochina and have had our delegations express concern over the reports in general in the Human Rights Commission (HRC), the Committee on Disarmament (CD), and the US/Soviet negotiations on CW.

Strategy for the Future

We have thought through a broad internationally-oriented strategy that builds on the actions already taken--a strategy intended to mobilize our allies and other concerned states behind the effort to resolve the CW use issue. We particularly need an investigation into the reports by some impartial third party or international group. However, for this approach to succeed we must be careful so that we can avoid being perceived as attempting to engage others in the growing East/West rivalry.

Declassified/Declassify on: 9-15-94
under provisions of E.O. 12356
by D. Van Tassel, National Security Council

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The strategy consists of seven interrelated parts, setting out a number of actions to involve other states and appropriate international fora more actively in the issue. Specifically:

-- Intensified collection efforts to further substantiate the reports, particularly but not exclusively focused on Afghanistan [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Working with the intelligence community and with other countries, we will press for acquisition of physical data (e.g., gas residue, empty canisters or dud rounds, blood samples from victims). We are examining the feasibility of sending a US medical team to Pakistan to interview Afghan refugees who may have first-hand knowledge of CW use.

(a)(4)
(S)

-- Consulting with Allies and other interested countries, stressing US concern over the reports; providing briefings; and seeking support for our strategy.

-- Stimulating multilateral action, most importantly an investigation into this matter by a disinterested third party or an apolitical international organization. In the HRC and appropriate committees of the UNGA we will request that an observer team investigate the reports and/or that the SYG appoint an ad hoc Experts Group to study the issue. As this is unlikely to work, we are also considering other international bodies and approaches.

-- Consulting further with the French on their idea of convening a meeting of the States Parties to the 1925 Geneva Protocol to look into the reports.

-- Making appropriate demarches to the countries involved [REDACTED]

(a)(5)
(S)


-- Public expressions of concern, continuing to say that if the apparently credible reports are true, we would regard such use as outrageous and inhumane.

-- Keeping Congress well informed. And thorough documentation of our actions, as a report on this issue is owed the House Foreign Affairs Committee in four months.

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We will continue to pursue this strategy vigorously, working with your staff and appropriate agencies in its implementation.



Peter Tarnoff
Executive Secretary

cc: ACDA
JCS
OSD
CIA

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

1604




March 12, 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Mr. Peter Tarnoff
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Reported Soviet Use of Chemical Weapons (U)

With regard to your memo of March 7, you should understand that the President has specifically directed that we use all suitable resources to publicize evidence of Soviet atrocities in Afghanistan, and particularly their use of chemical weapons. The strategy outlined in your memo, if carefully implemented, should ensure that this subject be given adequate treatment. It will be monitored in the future by the inter-agency subcommittee of the SCC, currently chaired by Jerry Schecter. This committee will be headed by Marshall Bremant when Schecter leaves the NSC staff. Please ensure that Bremant is kept abreast of all relevant developments in this field. (S)



Zbigniew Brzezinski

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DECLASSIFIED ON: March 7, 1986
PREVIOUSLY
DECLASSIFIED/REMOVED ON: Nov 12, 1982
under provisions of E.O. 12356
by M. Wheeler, National Security Council

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SPECIAL COORDINATION COMMITTEE MEETING

6129

March 18, 1980

Time and Place: 9:00-10:00 a.m., White House Situation Room

Subject: Iran/Afghanistan

Participants:

State

Warren Christopher
Harold Saunders

White House

Zbigniew Brzezinski
David Aaron
Hedley Donovan
Joseph Onek

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OSD

Secretary Harold Brown
W. Graham Clayton, Jr.

NSC

Gary Sick
Marshall Brement

JCS

General David Jones
Lt. General John Pustay

*Present only for Items 1-3

Justice

John Shenefield*

CIA

Frank Carlucci

Treasury

Robert Carswell*
Robert Mundheim*

Declassified/Released on 3-14-95
under provisions of E.O. 12356
By J. Saunders, National Security Council

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6. Afghanistan. The SCC reviewed a State Department paper outlining seven elements of a possible policy directed at achieving the neutralization of Afghanistan (attached). Dr. Brzezinski said that two additional elements needed to be added: (1) Transitional arrangements on how stability would be maintained in Afghanistan during the turnover period if the Soviets should in fact agree to withdraw; and (2) Graduated steps spelling out how we get from here to there, i.e., how would we present this to the allies and to the Soviets, and how would we avoid getting involved in a negotiating situation on issues we would prefer to avoid. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski noted that when he had presented some ideas along this line to Dobrynin, Dobrynin had remarked several times that that was not what they were hearing from America's allies. Who was taking a different view? Mr. Aaron suggested that the original German paper, which had focused on possible concessions to the Soviets to get out of Afghanistan, may have been the source of these reports. The French, Warren Christopher noted, had contributed to that paper. (S)

The SCC agreed that the word "prompt" should be added to the first element in the paper ("Prompt withdrawal of all Soviet military forces . . ."). (U)

Mr. Christopher explained that the preparation of the attached paper had focused on the basic elements of a policy, and had not addressed a negotiating strategy. That was the reason why the two additional elements identified by Dr. Brzezinski were not included. The objective was to put together a reasonable policy package which would put the onus on the USSR. (C)

Secretary Brown noted that the seventh point was the most dangerous since it opened the possibility of negotiating with the USSR about security arrangements in the region outside Afghanistan. The SCC agreed that we should not initially raise this point with the USSR -- at least not in this form -- but that the principle was essential. It would be preferable either to redraft the statement or to hold it back for use if and when the Soviets introduced the idea of negotiating rights for themselves in the region outside Afghanistan. Warren Christopher thought it important to include this point in case the package leaked out. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski wondered if the sixth element did not get us involved in a negotiation about the location of the Afghan border. Although we recognize the Durand line, and we have recently reaffirmed that position, the Durand line is not accepted by the Afghans and some others. The SCC agreed that the sixth point should be made a footnote to the third element concerning non-interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan. If asked,

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in that context, what borders would be guaranteed, we would indicate our recognition of the Durand line as the border we would recognize. (S)

With those changes, the SCC approved the elements proposed by the State Department. The SCC recommended seeking Presidential approval in principle of these elements before proceeding further. (C)

_____ Approve the elements of the policy outlined in the attached paper, with the changes as suggested above.

_____ As amended.

The SCC then discussed how this policy could best be handled with the allies and the Soviets. Mr. Christopher suggested taking it to the other six allies first, getting their acceptance, and then deciding together how best to present it to the USSR. We may not want to seek out the Soviets, but let them come to us. Dr. Brzezinski said he would go over the points informally with Sir Michael Palliser when he met with him today. Mr. Aaron said we needed to think about alternative ways in which we might put the Soviets on the defensive. For example, it might be desirable to call for an international conference on Afghanistan, including the Islamic states, China, and others. Another possibility might be to go to the UN General Assembly. (S)

All agreed that we should take the leadership on this issue, and that we needed to have a well-defined strategy before taking it to the allies. A small group composed of State, Defense, CIA and NSC will meet to work out the next steps. (S)

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6130

SPECIAL COORDINATION COMMITTEE MEETING

March 20, 1980

Time and Place: 9:00-10:40 a.m., White House Situation Room

Subject: Iran/Afghanistan

Participants:

State
David Newsom
Dean Hinton
Harold Saunders***

OSD
Secretary Harold Brown*
W. Graham Clayton, Jr.

JCS
General David Jones*
Lt. Gen. John Pustay

CIA
Admiral Stansfield Turner

Justice
Attorney General Benjamin Civiletti*

Treasury
C. Fred Bergsten*

Commerce
Homer Moyer*

Agriculture
Dale Hathaway*

White House
David Aaron
Hedley Donovan*
Lloyd Cutler*
Joseph Onek*
Henry Owen

NSC
Gary Sick
Marshall Brement
Edward Fried**
Alfred Friendly, Jr.*

26.9
J

*Present only for discussion of items 1 and 2
**Present only for discussion of items 2 and 3
***Present only for first ten minutes

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

1. Possible Diversion of Grain via Hungary to USSR. Hungary has informed us of their intent to sell about 800,000 tons of grain to the USSR this year. It is very difficult to establish a norm of past practice since it has varied enormously, but a strict average would be in the neighborhood of 500,000 tons per year in the past. The Hungarians do not intend to buy grain from us to replace that sold to the Soviets. Rather, they evidently intend to use their anticipated large harvest to sell grain for hard currency and buy barley at lower prices from the European market to meet their own needs. They will buy only about 250,000 tons of soybean meal from the United States, and that is easily replaceable. If we ask them not to sell at the 800,000 ton rate to the USSR or to forego barley purchases from the Europeans, we will

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Classified and Extended by David Aaron
Reason: NSC 1.13(f)
Review March 20, 2000

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

in effect be asking them to take stricter measures than we have thus far asked of our closest allies. We should also then extend the same rules to other Eastern European countries and to nations such as Canada, Australia, Argentina and others. We do not have a good information system for anticipating or controlling grain sales outside the U.S., and any attempt to establish such controls gets us into the area of extraterritorial legal restrictions which could create a major problem. (C)

After considerable discussion, David Aaron suggested that the Hungarian case should be handled on its own terms. They have in effect asked us for our advice. We also have some recent indications that the Hungarians may serve as a funnel for high technology to the USSR in the face of the U.S. embargo. It was recommended unanimously by the SCC that we should deal with the Hungarian case on its own merits, without attempting to expand it into a universal set of guidelines. Since they have asked our views, we should inform them that we consider sales of 800,000 tons to the USSR to be excessive by about 200,000 tons and inform them that sales in that amount -- as well as diversion of high technology items -- would be seen by us as unfavorable and would be taken into account in our future sales of grain and other items to Hungary. (C)

APPROVE ✓

OTHER

2. Olympics. Lloyd Cutler reported on his meeting in Europe with officials of the International Olympic Committees (IOC) and sports federations. Progress has been made in some areas concerning the boycott and the organization of an "International Sports Festival," as they prefer to call it. The most serious problem is the British Olympic Committee which will probably decide next Tuesday to attend the Moscow Olympics despite the strong position taken by the British Government. Cutler is convinced after talking to all the parties that the British Government has taken all the steps available to it -- some of which have been very unpopular with the British public -- but that it cannot stop the BOC from taking this decision. Lord Carrington will ask them to delay until the end of May, but the BOC is stubborn and contemptuous of the government's position. The French and Germans, on the other hand, are moving closer to the U.S. position, and leaked stories out of France, attributed to Francois Poncet, indicate that the Soviet reaction to Afghanistan has not been satisfactory and requires a tougher position by the West. Schmidt made a comparable statement to the Bundestag this morning. (C)

In Cutler's view, unless the U.S. uses the legal powers available, we face a high risk that the entire Olympic effort will unravel. Many in Europe still believe that, in the end, something will happen which will let the U.S. change its position and attend the Moscow Olympics. The U.S. drive is widely viewed as campaign

politics which will fade once the primary battle is settled. This needs to be quelled. The IOCs will meet on April 21-22, and they are considering a rule change which would permit individual athletes to attend the games even if their national OC declined. This would open the way for the Soviets to subsidize travel by individual athletes to Moscow. (C)

The 12-nation meeting in Geneva made good progress toward organization of alternative games. A committee is at work blocking out prospective sites. Despite the article in the Washington Post claiming otherwise, the T.V. networks are very interested in the alternative games and are trying to insure that they will be able to bid. However, the international sports federations are dead set against the idea. They basically view the intrusion of governments into the business of organizing sports events as an intrusion into their turf, which they intend to resist strongly. The USOC now favors alternative games and will talk to the other OCs this weekend in Brussels. However, the French and Germans are now coming to the view that alternative games may be so distasteful to their sports federations that it might be better simply to avoid the issue in order to bring their federations along. (C)

Cutler argued that, in order to make clear that we will not attend the Moscow games and to deal firmly with the sports federations, we need to: (1) block the NBC payment to the Moscow Committee and the IOCs scheduled for April 1; and (2) demonstrate to the sports federations that we are able to interrupt their contacts with U.S. sport and T.V. revenues, which is where they get almost all of their money. To do this, Cutler proposed invoking the IEEPA. This would require a Presidential declaration of national emergency. (U)

Mr. Cutler said that consultations had taken place with the SFRC and the HFAC about possible legislation to provide the necessary legal basis for stopping the NBC payment (and thereby relieving NBC of its potential loss of \$70 million for non-compliance). The view on the Hill was unanimous that legislation would require hearings at which the athletes and OC officials would have to be heard in several committees. It was very doubtful that legislation could be completed by the April 1 deadline, and the hearings might have the effect of undermining the U.S. position. Invocation of the IEEPA was preferable. (C)

Mr. Bergsten argued strongly that use of the IEEPA and declaration of a national emergency was undesirable on several grounds. First, it stretched the intent of the legislation, which was intended to prevent the Executive from using national emergencies to deal with issues only indirectly related to the emergency itself. Declaration of a new emergency involving Afghanistan at this late date, with the primary purpose of blocking a payment by NBC, would risk making us look foolish and would be directly contrary to the original legislative intent. Secondly, it would revive fears by the Saudis and other large foreign investors that we are prepared to use our

emergency powers to deal with every question which arises. We have argued with some success that the Iranian assets freeze was a limited action restricted to the narrow issue of the hostage situation. If IEEPA were invoked to stop a payment, we would be accused of being trigger happy, and it could have a serious impact on the international financial situation. (S)

Mr. Cutler responded that invocation of the IEEPA would be based on the broad series of initiatives we have undertaken with regard to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. It would provide us the necessary powers to deal with a broad range of issues, including tracking grain deals, controlling export of high technology items, etc. He noted that dollars are pouring into the U.S. right now, and he thought this was the best moment to take an act such as this with only limited risks. Henry Owen commented that the real question was not foreign investment in the U.S. but whether the psychological climate would be affected in a way which would persuade the Saudis and others to keep the oil in the ground since the proceeds of those sales were subject to retaliation. Admiral Turner observed that only the Kuwaitis still seem to be showing any real reaction to the assets freeze. (S)

ie must emphasize this - emphasize Olympics - key people - little later

Mr. Cutler said it is necessary to take some action. Time is running out, and unless we are prepared to show determination, there is a high risk that this issue, where the President's prestige is so heavily committed, will fall apart. The Saudis and others are well aware of the importance of the Olympics, and they are with us. We should be able to explain our actions to them in a way they will understand. He had looked at this question in great detail, and he was convinced that IEEPA was the only way we could legally act within the available time. (C)

The Attorney General said that, in his view, the specific question of stopping the NBC payments had been blown out of proportion. The real issue is the resistance of the IOC and sports federations. Stopping the NBC payment will not change that. Declaring a national emergency to stop a \$20 million payment will only make us look foolish, although it appears to be the best available tool. However, he would not oppose use of IEEPA if it could be related to an entire package of U.S. steps related to enforcement of our policy toward the Soviet Union on Afghanistan. (C)

Good

Mr. Bergsten said that it would be much better to find another way of blocking the payment. The Soviets have sizable funds deposited in this country, and declaration of a national emergency could lead them to withdraw. He also noted that, although the dollar is presently strong, there is a sizable move to diversify out of dollars, and this kind of move could intensify that tendency. (S)

Mr. Aaron said that the notes would reflect what he considered to be an informative exchange of views. Since Treasury was most concerned and was proposing alternative means to stop the payment, they should prepare a paper on their views and suggestions of

*Will try
to decide
in
weekend*

specific alternatives by close of business today. In the meantime, a memo by Lloyd Cutler on the issue would be circulated for comment. We will need to reach a decision and act in the very near future. (C)

3. Possible Blockade of Iran: The SCC was then reduced to the small political-military group. Mr. Aaron asked whether it was the judgment of the group that to be effective, Iranian exports of oil would have to be blocked, or would it be enough to block imports into Iran? Secondly, if oil exports should be terminated either by blockade or Iranian retaliation, what would be the effect? Admiral Turner replied to the first question that, if all imports, including food, were blocked, it would have a significant impact on Iran's economy within two weeks. Blocking oil exports, however, would take nearly a year to have a major impact since Iran has sufficient monetary reserves to do without the revenue. It would be reasonable to expect Iran to cut off oil exports as retaliation for any U.S. blockade. About 80% of Iran's exports come in by sea, and the land and rail routes through Turkey and the USSR could not make up the difference. It would not be necessary to block ground and air traffic to have the desired impact. There were no real alternatives to seaborne trade. Mr. Aaron noted that there could be a political problem if Turkey and Pakistan actively helped Iran evade a boycott at the same time we are trying to get large sums of assistance for them. Mr. Sick suggested that we should make it clear from the outset that this was a unilateral U.S. action limited to maritime commerce, that it was not intended to interfere with other commerce, and that we believed that the naval interruption was sufficient to make the political point and to significantly affect Iran's economy. Henry Owen commented that Iran would probably cut off oil, which would raise the level of hostility in the U.S. and elsewhere; that in turn would draw criticism on those nations which were helping Iran avoid the full effects of a blockade. (TS)

Mr. Fried said that, in many respects, this is the best possible time for a possible cutoff of Iranian oil. Iranian exports are down to only 1.5 mbd, world stocks are high, there is slack in the market, and demand is historically low at this time of year. Because of these factors, Kuwait and some other nations are planning to cut back production. Nevertheless, we are not likely to get out of it without a market reaction, and specifically a price increase. The market is very nervous, and the reaction to an Iranian cutoff would be to compete for remaining supplies in order to protect stocks as a hedge against future contingencies. He anticipated a possible price increase of \$5-10 per barrel, i.e., a 15-30% increase, which would represent an increase in the inflation rate of .75-1.5%. Admittedly, these were only rough estimates. It could be half that much. Since there is a good chance of a price increase late in the year, it might simply make that happen

sooner than anticipated. The Saudis would certainly not increase their production. If they should decide to reduce production as a gesture against blockade of an Islamic state, that could be quite serious. More dangerous would be the reaction of Kuwait, Libya and perhaps others who might go ahead with planned cuts or even cut deliberately as a form of counter-embargo. Most of the effects would fall on Japan which relies on Iran for 10% or more of its total consumption. They would be entitled to trigger the IEA sharing mechanism. The actual amount of oil involved would be very small, but the IEA reaction would probably be internal acrimony. The Japanese would scramble to secure alternate supplies, again tending to drive up the price. (S)

Mr. Claytor said it would create hell in the Islamic world. Mr. Newsom said that, if the action was taken suddenly and without advance indication, it would have an adverse effect on the moderates in Iran. It would create a strong public reaction and inspire a new round of anti-Americanism which the hardliners would use to their advantage. However, if this could be relayed in secret in advance to the moderates, it might give them leverage to use in the in-fighting. If handled very carefully, a case could be made that this would improve the chances of getting the hostages out. We would have to be prepared to follow through, however. (S)

Mr. Aaron wondered what the effects would be if the threat had to be carried out. Mr. Newsom said that there would be a very strong reaction in Iran which, in the worse case, could lead the militants to start killing hostages. There would be massive demonstrations and a hellish month or so for us to get through. In the end, however, it could go either way. It could succeed, although it was a high risk. Admiral Turner said it was his judgment that the militants would be very angry but would not kill the hostages. Khomeini would use it as an opportunity to rouse the masses behind him. It could also strengthen the position of Bani-Sadr and the moderates. However, it is not clear that the moderates would succeed in the resulting power play. We might be pressuring the weakest political element. (S)

Admiral Turner wondered if it would be possible for the U.S. to absorb the oil drawdown and make up the Japanese loss. Mr. Fried said that we would have to draw down stocks, and the price increases which would have to be imposed to reduce our own consumption by that amount would have to be very high, with substantial effects on inflation and growth. (S)

At that point, the meeting had to adjourn, with the understanding that this subject would probably be discussed further by principals over the weekend. (C)

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meeting
(a)(4)

SPECIAL ANALYSIS

PAKISTAN-AFGHANISTAN: The Refugee Problem

[REDACTED]

(a)(4)(c)

[REDACTED]

(a)(4)
(a)(5)
(S)

(u)

Support for rebels in Afghanistan by substantial numbers of Afghan refugees in the border zones of Pakistan could provoke retaliatory action by Soviet forces. The Afghan male refugees who reenter Afghanistan from Pakistan to defend their tribal homelands return periodically to Pakistani territory to visit their families, to acquire arms and ammunition, and to seek medical treatment. They are included in the "foreign elements" that the Afghan Government and Soviet spokesmen claim are responsible for the widespread resistance in Afghanistan. (c)(u)

Even if it were so inclined, the Pakistani Government could not prevent the movement of small groups of people across the border, which cuts through mountainous terrain in tribal territory over which government forces have never exercised more than limited control. (c)(u)

The Afghan Government and the Soviets so far have been restrained in their reactions to refugee cross-border activities. Last fall the Afghan Government--probably at the urging of Soviet advisers--attempted to alleviate the refugee problem by establishing a grace period during which there would be no reprisals against returning refugees. (c)(u)

--continued

Pakistan: Afghan Refugee Camps



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Although the period was extended, few refugees accepted the offer. More recently, Soviet sources have privately indicated that unless the refugees return in the near future they would forfeit their rights in Afghanistan. (S)(u)

The Soviets presently are trying to seal the Pakistani-Afghan border from the Afghan side, but their efforts are unlikely to succeed. As time goes on, the Soviets may be tempted to launch air or ground attacks against rebel sanctuaries in Pakistan. The rugged terrain in the border zone would not preclude small cross-border raids by Soviet ground units, although mechanized equipment would be restricted to three or four major crossing points. (S)(u)

Retaliation Danger Zones

The spring offensive by Afghan and Soviet military forces in the Konar Valley in eastern Afghanistan, which began in early March, increased the flow of refugees into Pakistan across the section of the border north of the Kyber Pass. The Soviets have expanded their anti-guerrilla operations into the provinces south of the Kabul River Valley, making the Parachinar area of the Kurram Valley the primary danger zone. The Kurram Valley is a traditional invasion route into Pakistan from Afghanistan. (S)(u)

The Refugees

By current estimates more than 700,000 Afghan refugees are located on the Pakistani side of the border. Most are Afghan Pushtun tribesmen taking refuge among their fellow Pushtun tribesmen who populate Pakistan's North-West Frontier Province. Fewer than 110,000 are in Baluchistan. These rural Afghan Pushtuns, with their warrior traditions and conservative Islamic outlook, are among the most active opponents of Communist rule. The number will grow as refugees displaced by the current military operations make their way to Pakistan. (U)

--continued

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(S)(+)

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There are now 53 concentrations of refugees that in a broad sense can be considered camps. Of these, 23 are in the North-West Frontier Province and 30 are in Baluchistan. The size of these encampments ranges from roughly 500 to 11,000; the number fluctuates as refugees move in and out. (U)

No clear pattern emerges on the composition of the refugee groups. Children up to 14 years old constitute a third to half the total number of refugees, and in most camps there are twice as many children as women. The ratio of men to women is high in some camps, low in others. (S)(U)

Cross-border tribal ties, combined with the tendency to travel in extended family units, have enabled the refugees to survive without much government support. The need, however, for food, shelter, and sanitation systems is great. Most refugees eventually register with government agencies in order to establish eligibility for relief supplies, including UN aid administered by the Pakistani Government. (U)

Outlook

Military activity in the borderlands has intensified and is expected to accelerate. To avoid provoking the Soviets, the Pakistanis may already have tried to move the refugees into camps away from the border. This would also facilitate distribution of relief supplies, allow better control over the movement of refugees in the frontier areas, and reduce the tension that is sure to arise between the refugees and the local population over grazing and water rights and other economically related issues. The refugees, however, have exhibited a reluctance to leave the border area near their homelands and may resist the government's efforts to relocate them. (S)(U)

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

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BT

SUBJ: IR R 800 0037 80

THIS IS AN INFO REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTEL

1. (U) CTRY: AFGHANISTAN (AF), EGYPT (EG), CHINA (CH)

2. (U) TITLE: AID TO AFGHANISTAN INSURGENTS (U)

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7. SUMMARY: REPORTS ON THE SUPPLY OF VARIOUS ARMS AND AMMUNITION BY TWO COUNTRIES TO THE AFGHAN INSURGENTS.

PAGE 1

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

MESSAGE CENTER

PAGE 2

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8A. [REDACTED] DETAILS: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] THE AFGHAN INSURGENTS, AKA ISLAMIC NATIONALIST INSURGENTS (INI), HAVE BEEN RECEIVING ARMS AND AMMUNITION FROM BOTH EGYPT AND CHINA. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] SHIP HAD ARRIVED IN KARACHI AND REMAINED FOR A FEW DAYS. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] THE SHIP WAS CARRYING ARMS FOR THE INI. THIS ARMS SHIPMENT WAS SUPPOSED TO CONSIST OF UNKNOWN AMOUNT OF RPG-TWO AND RPG-SEVEN ANTI-TANK WEAPONS AND ROUNDS, AN UNDES- CRIBED RIFLE GRENADE, [REDACTED] OF THE ANTI-TANK TYPE, AND SMALL ARMS AMMUNITION (TYPE AND QUANTITY UNKNOWN). [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] A LIMITED NUMBER OF SA-7 SAMs HAD BEEN PROVIDED TO THE INI. [REDACTED] THE CHINESE WERE BEGINNING TO PROVIDE THESE HAND HELD ANTI-AIRCRAFT MISSILES TO THE INSURGENTS. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] THE CHINESE HAD PROVIDED SA-7 MISSILES TO THE INI. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] THE CHINESE BROUGHT THEM AND OTHER ARMS INTO AFGHANISTAN BY THEMSELVES. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] THERE WERE TRAILS THROUGH THE MOUNTAINS THAT ALLOWED THE CHINESE TO DEAL DIRECTLY WITH THE INSURGENTS IN THE NORTHEAST PORTION OF AFGHANISTAN. [REDACTED]

8B. [REDACTED] ORIG CMTS: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] THE USE OF MINES AND ANTI-TANK TYPE ROCKETS IS REPORTED TO BE INCREASING IN SEVERAL SECTORS. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] THE AFGHAN MILITARY DID HAVE SA-7 MISSILES DEPLOYED IN ANTI-TANK UNITS BUT THE MISSILES WERE COLLECTED BY ARMY HOTRS IN THE SEPT/OCT 79 TIME FRAME TO INSURE CONTROL OVER THEM. [REDACTED]

9. (U) PROJ NO: N/A
10. (U) COLL MGMT CODES: N/A
11. (U) SPRC INST: DIRC NO
12. [REDACTED]
13. [REDACTED]
14. (U) REQ EVAL: NO; REL TO: NATO ONLY
15. (U) ENCL: N/A

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 3, 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY
THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT
AND BUDGET
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Persian Gulf Security Framework (S)

We have met in the SCC twelve times on the security framework for Persian Gulf. I have given the President a report on the overall progress in those meetings which sets forth the conceptual structure of the security framework and then provides a status report of things accomplished within it, actions in progress, and some possible additional actions. After reviewing the report, he asked that I share the substance of it with you. The remainder of this memorandum provides you with the report which went to the President. (S)

I. The Strategic and Political Context

In his State of the Union Address, the President declared the Persian Gulf and Southwest Asia to be the third strategic zone for western security, interrelated to Europe and Asia because our allies have vital interests there. At the same time, the President set three goals for U.S. policy:

1. To make the Soviets pay a price for invading Afghanistan.
2. To get the allies to help us make the Soviets pay a price.
3. To build a security framework to protect our vital interests in the Persian Gulf region. (U)

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Declassify on: OADR

Partially Declassified/Released on 5-24-90
under provisions of E.O. 12356-
by S. Talley, National Security Council

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The series of SCCs has been devoted to the third goal. The security framework, cross-cutting in its implications, consists of four components which, together with their subcategories, provide an analytical structure and also tend to fit the division of bureaucratic responsibilities in the interagency arena. These four components are:

1. Military Issues, which Defense leads, include:



2. Foreign Policy Issues, which State leads, include four clusters of countries:

- A. The Peace Process (Treated in another interagency forum but key for our regional security efforts).



3. Economic Issues, which State, Energy, and Treasury share, include:

- A. Oil



- B. Western economic assistance.



- D. Western energy policy.

- E. International monetary policy. (S)

4. Intelligence Issues, which the DCI leads. (S)

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
II. Status Report

To provide a summary of the progress made in the SCC in building this framework, results are arrayed for each of the security framework components in chart form at Tab A. More detail on specific programs is at Tab B. In general, we have made more substantial progress on the military issues than we have in other areas. (S)

III. Further Goals

In order to improve our immediate security posture and to provide concrete and compelling answers to the questions about a security framework for the Persian Gulf which flow from the State of the Union Address, it is my view that we should move ahead in the following areas by fall:

A. Military Issues.



B. Foreign Policy Issues.



C. Economic Issues.

- A larger economic and security assistance commitment by both the U.S. and our allies to key states in the region.



- Progress on the energy conservation front and stability in the oil market. (S)

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D. Intelligence Issues.



I believe that these represent realistic near-term goals and that they will add considerable substance to our security framework. (S)

In this context, the President has indicated that he would welcome periodic updates on progress toward these goals and any additional comments you may wish to convey. (U)

Zbigniew Brzezinski

Enclosures:
a/s

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FOR UNDERSECRETARY EAGLEBURGER AND AMBASSADOR SPIERS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PINT, PEPR, US, PK, AF, IN
SUBJECT: SPECIAL NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE ON PAKISTAN

1. ENTIRE TEXT: SECRET/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/ORCON
2. A SPECIAL NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE ON "PAKISTAN: THE NEXT YEARS" WAS APPROVED BY THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD ON NOVEMBER 8 AND WILL BE ISSUED SHORTLY. THE KEY JUDGMENTS OF THIS ESTIMATE ARE AS FOLLOWS.
3. ZIA'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON WILL BE PARALLELED BY THE ARRIVAL IN PAKISTAN OF THE MOST VISIBLE SYMBOL OF THE NEW US RELATIONSHIP--THE FIRST SIX OF 40 F-16 FIGHTER AIRCRAFT. ISLAMABAD IS AWARE THAT ONLY THE UNITED STATES CAN OFFSET SOVIET PRESSURES AND PROVIDE PAKISTAN WITH THE SOPHISTICATED WEAPONS IT BELIEVES IT NEEDS. THE US-PAKISTAN DEAL ON ECONOMIC AID AND WEAPONS SALES UNDOUBTEDLY HAS STRENGTHENED PAKISTAN'S INTERNATIONAL POSITION AND RESTORED SOME OF ITS SELF-CONFIDENCE. THE RELATIONSHIP FACES SEVERAL DIFFICULT

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HURDLES, HOWEVER:

(A)

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(B) THE PAKISTANIS CONTINUE TO DOUBT THE RELIABILITY OF US COMMITMENTS AND US STEADFASTNESS IN TIME OF CRISIS. THESE DOUBTS--BASED ON EARLIER DISAPPOINTMENTS--COLOR CURRENT PAKISTANI CONCERNS ABOUT THE FUNDING OF THE US ARMS PACKAGE AND THE PRECISE EQUIPMENT TO BE SUPPLIED.

4. PAKISTAN'S PRESIDENT ZIA-UL-HAQ FACES GROWING DOMESTIC PROBLEMS BUT NO IMMEDIATE THREAT TO HIS RULE. HIS LARGELY BENIGN AUTHORITARIAN REGIME HAS GIVEN PAKISTAN GENERAL POLITICAL STABILITY AND SUBSTANTIAL ECONOMIC GROWTH. ZIA LACKS AN ORGANIZED CONSTITUENCY OUTSIDE THE ARMY, HOWEVER, AND HE COULD FIND HIS HOLD ON POWER CHALLENGED SHOULD A STRONG OPPOSITION EMERGE.

5. PAKISTAN'S LEADERS BELIEVE THAT THE SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN FUNDAMENTALLY ALTERED THE BALANCE OF POWER IN SOUTH ASIA, AND THE ZIA GOVERNMENT HAS STRONGLY OPPOSED THE SOVIET OCCUPATION OF AFGHANISTAN.

6. BUT PAKISTAN ALSO VIEWS THE INDEFINITE PRESENCE OF 2.5 MILLION AFGHAN REFUGEES ON ITS OWN TERRITORY AS UNACCEPTABLE. PAKISTAN THEREFORE HAS PURSUED THE UN-SPONSORED INDIRECT TALKS ON A SETTLEMENT ON AFGHANISTAN. ISLAMABAD
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PAGE 03 STATE 318440

MIGHT ACCEPT SOME CONDITIONS, SUCH AS ACCEPTING A NEW KABUL GOVERNMENT CLOSELY TIED TO THE SOVIET UNION--WHICH THE UNITED STATES WOULD NOT FAVOR--AS LONG AS MOST SOVIET TROOPS LEFT AND THE REFUGEES RETURNED HOME. MAJOR CONCESSIONS, SUCH AS RECOGNITION OF THE BABRAK GOVERNMENT AND ACCEPTANCE OF A CONTINUED SOVIET TROOP PRESENCE ARE UNLIKELY IN AT LEAST THE NEXT YEAR, EVEN IF THE US RELATIONSHIP SHOULD FALTER, BECAUSE OF CONCERN OVER THE REACTION OF CONSERVATIVE RELIGIOUS PARTIES AND WELL-ARMED AFGHAN INSURGENTS AT HOME AND VITAL FRIENDS ABROAD, SUCH AS SAUDI ARABIA AND CHINA.

7. THE PRIMARY FACTOR IN PAKISTAN'S FOREIGN POLICY IS

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IMPORTANT ELEMENT IN THE STABILITY OF ZIA'S REGIME TO DATE.
THE POTENTIAL FOR CONTINUED STRONG GROWTH EXISTS, BUT IT
IS THREATENED BY SERIOUS STRUCTURAL PROBLEMS, ESPECIALLY
GOVERNMENT OVERREGULATION. ZIA WILL HAVE TO WALK A NARROW
LINE TO CARRY THROUGH ON NECESSARY REFORMS WITHOUT
TRIGGERING PUBLIC DISCONTENT OVER RISING PRICES. FAILURE
TO MAKE THESE REFORMS WILL EVENTUALLY HEIGHTEN ECONOMIC
PROBLEMS; MAKING THEM TOO ABRUPTLY COULD HAVE ADVERSE,
PERHAPS FATAL, POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES. SHULTZ

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*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a
*** Current Classification *** SECRET

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United States Department of State
RELEASED IN FULL

Washington, D. C. 20520

1982



'82 NOV 29 P2:50

BRIEFING MEMORANDUM
S/S

November 29, 1982

SECRET

TO: The Secretary
FROM: NEA - Nicholas A. Veliotos *N.A.V.*
SUBJECT: Your Briefing of the President in Preparation for His Meeting with President Zia-ul-Haq of Pakistan, 10:30 a.m., Tuesday, December 7, 1982

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BACKGROUND

U.S. relations with Pakistan, which have fluctuated markedly over the past 20 years, entered a new phase following agreement in 1981 on a six-year, \$3.2 billion economic and military assistance program. Our respective policies toward South Asia and the Persian Gulf/Indian Ocean region are increasingly compatible, and the U.S. and Pakistan pursue complementary policies on Afghanistan. Despite this growing congruence of interests, however, President Zia's visit takes place in an atmosphere clouded by remaining uncertainties and concerns on both sides. Still unsure of the depth of the U.S. commitment to the restored security relationship, the Pakistanis are deeply worried about budget problems which may make it difficult for us to provide the level of economic and military assistance we agreed on last year. On the U.S. side, we are seriously concerned that Pakistan's efforts to develop a nuclear weapons capability could place at risk the security relationship that serves both countries' strategic interests.

This is Zia's second trip to the United States, but his first formal state visit. He came to Washington in 1980 to confer with President Carter during the early stage of the Afghanistan crisis. Zia seems securely in power, but he could begin to slip if the economy takes a bad turn, or if the now fragmented opposition coalesces to mount effective agitation against his martial law regime. Zia has been a steadfast opponent of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. He has invested substantial personal political capital in the new relationship with the U.S. and wants it to succeed.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: FRANK E. SCHMELZER
DATE/CASE ID: 13 JAN 1999 199403678

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PRIVATE MEETING

ESTABLISHMENT OF PERSONAL RAPPORT (High Priority)

Given the uncertainty and sensitivity surrounding certain areas of our relationship with Pakistan which will be touched on during Zia's visit, the President should endeavor to convince Zia of his personal interest in these concerns and his sensitivity to Zia's views.

U.S.-PAKISTAN RELATIONS (High Priority)

While this issue will be taken up in the expanded meeting, we will want to use the occasion of the President's private session with Zia to reiterate the importance we attach to strengthening our ties with Pakistan. It would be helpful for the President personally to reaffirm the Administration's intention to bend every effort to fulfill our economic and security commitments to Pakistan, but also to be candid with Zia about the serious budgetary constraints facing the U.S.

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THE PAKISTAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM AND U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE (High Priority)

You will have raised this subject separately with the President.

THE PAKISTAN CIVIL NUCLEAR PROGRAM (If raised by Zia)

It is possible that when we express to Zia our concerns about Pakistan's efforts to develop a nuclear weapons capability Zia will complain, *inter alia*, that by refusing to permit U.S. companies to assist Pakistan's civil nuclear program, the U.S. is discriminating against Pakistan. We should emphasize that the U.S. now refuses to participate in any country's nuclear efforts unless the program is fully covered by international safeguards.

EXPANDED MEETING

U.S.-PAKISTAN COOPERATION (High Priority)

We can most effectively address Pakistani doubts about the strength of the U.S. commitment by emphasizing the important strategic perceptions and policy agreements we share with Pakistan, and by reaffirming our intention to maintain the security assistance commitment. Key to persuading the GOP of our steadfastness will be our ability to provide security assistance at agreed levels. Apart from our interest in

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supporting Pakistan's front-line resistance to Soviet expansionism, we want to underscore our desire to assist Pakistan in strengthening its economy and our interest in broadening cooperation in such areas as agricultural research, science, culture and education.

We will therefore want to reassure Zia that the strategic and other considerations that caused this Administration to restore the bilateral security relationship still apply, and that the U.S. continues to place a high value on Pakistan's stability and security. As evidence of this, we are making a special effort to fulfill our aid commitment to Pakistan, during a time of very serious budget constraints.

AFGHANISTAN (High Priority)

We will want to reinforce Pakistan's resolve on Afghanistan by emphasizing to Zia the gravity with which the U.S. views the Afghanistan situation. We should reaffirm our desire to continue to cooperate with Pakistan in our joint multi-track effort to maintain pressure on the Soviets to withdraw, and our belief that nothing should be done that might legitimize the present Kabul regime. We will want to congratulate Zia for Pakistan's courageous stand during the Afghanistan crisis, and ask for his assessment of current and near-term future developments there.

INDO-PAKISTAN RELATIONS (Medium Priority)

There has been a notable trend toward moderation in Indo-Pakistan relations over the last 18 months. Both sides have backed away from provocative rhetoric that had caused us serious concern, and are engaged in talks directed at normalization of relations.

We should indicate our wholehearted support for current Indo-Pak efforts to improve relations, a key element in realizing the U.S. objective of South Asian regional stability and security. It will be useful to exchange assessments of recent U.S. and Pakistan discussions with Indian Prime Minister Gandhi -- the President's meeting with her here last July and Zia's October meeting with her in New Delhi. We should ask for Zia's thoughts on the future of Indo-Pakistan relations, and other South Asian relationships, especially in light of the recent change in Soviet leadership.

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MIDDLE EAST (Medium Priority)

While we have in the past had substantial differences on the Arab-Israeli and Palestinian problems, Pakistan has welcomed the President's September 1 initiative and supports "some of its elements." We will want to emphasize to Zia our firm commitment to the positions outlined by the President and our determination to press ahead, despite Israeli rejection of the initiative. The Pakistanis clearly want the U.S. to play an active, constructive role in the search for Middle East peace. We can best encourage their increased support for our efforts by convincing them of our earnest desire to achieve both a solution to Lebanon's problems and a comprehensive Middle East peace settlement.

NARCOTICS (High Priority)

A substantial quantity of the heroin now reaching the eastern United States originates as opium grown in Southwest Asia; much of it is from Pakistan. We are deeply concerned about this development which has become a very sensitive area of our relations. During his November trip Attorney General Smith expressed to Zia and other Pakistani officials our concern about opium poppy production and narcotics trafficking through and from Pakistan. We also believe that the heroin labs in the Northwest Frontier are an extremely serious threat to Pakistan and other countries. The recent large seizures within Pakistan are evidence of the increasing magnitude of the problem. We are working through our aid and international narcotics programs to encourage and accelerate this trend toward greater cooperation on the narcotics problem. It is therefore critical that Zia deliver on his government's commitment to prohibit opium poppy cultivation and suppress the heroin labs.

ECONOMIC ISSUES (Medium Priority)

Deeply concerned about a continuing fragile external payments position and heavy international debt, Pakistani leaders are seeking increased official financial flows from bilateral aid donors and from international financial institutions, including the IMF and World Bank. They want to increase Pakistan's international trade and to encourage greater private investment flows from all sources, particularly the U.S.

We should point out that our ability to work with Pakistan to increase trade and investment will be enhanced if the GOP.

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United States Department of State
Washington, D. C. 20520

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**BRIEFING MEMORANDUM
S/S**

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November 29, 1982

Exemptions _____ Date FEB 6 1997

ARP Action Cert. [Signature]

TO: The Secretary

FROM: NEA - Nicholas A. Veliotis [Signature]

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Pakistani President Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq, Monday, December 6, 1982, at 11:00 AM

I. YOUR OBJECTIVES

1. Establish a personal relationship with Zia.
2. (In private meeting) Convey to Zia that the Pakistani nuclear weapons program could seriously undermine U.S.-Pakistan relations.
3. (In private meeting) Inform President Zia that the U.S. takes the human rights situation in Pakistan seriously, and encourage him toward democratization of Pakistan's institutions.
4. Reiterate U.S. commitment to Pakistan and our desire to seek broader cooperation between the two countries.
5. Review the regional situation.
6. Touch on our concerns about the narcotics problem.

II. SETTING

President Zia has ruled Pakistan for over five years, first as Chief Martial Law Administrator and now as President. With the signing of the \$3.2 billion economic and security assistance agreement in 1981, Pakistan became a major partner of the U.S. in Southwest Asia. This visit presents an opportunity to consolidate the relationship more fully both publicly and privately. Nevertheless, potential problems remain. We will want to re-emphasize to Zia that some of these, especially Pakistan's nuclear weapons activities, could severely damage the relationship. At the same time, Zia will want to tell you of his own concerns, especially over present indications the U.S. may not be able to deliver all the assistance and military equipment it promised.

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United States Department of State
Office of FOI, Privacy, & Classification Review
Review Authority: MORIN, LAURENT
Date: 01/22/97
Case ID: 9403678A

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The session will be divided into two parts. First, for approximately fifteen minutes, you will meet privately with Zia, at which time you will want to discuss the sensitive nuclear problem. Your private meeting might also present a useful opportunity to raise circumspectly our concerns about Pakistan's human rights record and the prospects for democratization there. You should also preview the coming week's activities with Zia, including his meeting with President Reagan the following day. Following that, an expanded meeting of approximately one hour will be held in which we want to discuss our commitment to Pakistan, broader regional issues, and narcotics, a major bilateral issue. Afterwards, you will adjourn to the Department for a working lunch with Zia.

III. PARTICIPANTS

U.S.

The Secretary
Deputy Secretary Dan
Under Secretary Kennedy
Under Secretary Schneider
Assistant Secretary Veliotos
Assistant Secretary DiCarlo
Admiral Howe
Ambassador Spiers
Deputy Assistant Secretary
Howard B. Schaffer (notetaker)

PAKISTAN

President Mohammad
ZIA-ul-Haq
(phonetic: ZEEah)
Foreign Minister
Sahabzada YAQUB Khan
Finance Minister
Ghulam Ishaq Khan
Lt. Gen. K.M. Arif,
Chief of Staff to
the President
Niaz Naik, Foreign
Secretary
S. Zafarul Islam,
Additional Foreign
Secretary
Ambassador Ejaz Azim

Drafted by: NEA/PAB:GMFeierstein:cm/rs
11/29/82:ext. 22441

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NEA/PAB:HEKirby *HEK*
NEA/RA:RGallucci
M:LDunn
OES:FMGoldrick
PM:ARaphel
INM:HRathner
HA:DRoberts
P:RRaphel

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Convey to Zia that the Pakistani nuclear weapons program could seriously undermine U.S.-Pakistan relations.

You have received a separate Action Memorandum addressing our options in dealing with Pakistan's nuclear explosives program.

It is possible that when we express our concerns about Pakistan's efforts to develop a nuclear weapons capability, Zia will complain, inter alia, that by refusing to permit U.S. companies to assist Pakistan's civil nuclear program, the U.S. is discriminating against Pakistan. We should emphasize that the U.S. now refuses to participate in any country's nuclear efforts unless the program is fully covered by international safeguards.

TALKING POINTS (If raised)

-- Under now prevailing legislation, the U.S. treats all countries involved in nuclear research and development the same way.

-- We are willing to let U.S. companies participate in foreign development programs where all facilities have been placed under international safeguards.

-- We have not discriminated in favor of India's nuclear program. Indeed, we have bowed out as a supplier of fuel for Tarapur.

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Inform President Zia that the U.S. takes the human rights situation in Pakistan seriously, and encourage him toward democratization of Pakistan's institutions.

Pakistan's record on human rights under General Zia's rule is mixed. In general, there have not been serious violations of personal liberties, to the degree experienced during the preceding Bhutto regime. Numbers of political prisoners, while still excessive, are greatly reduced. Allegations of flagrant violations of human rights, such as murders or physical violence, have either disappeared or been significantly reduced. Nevertheless, serious issues of human and political rights remain. First and foremost is the need to return the country to an elected civilian administration. President Zia has announced his intention to develop the framework for a new Islamic system of government by next August. In the meantime, the organized political parties, legally banned, are demanding elections based on the suspended 1973 Constitution. The right of free expression, including freedom of speech and press, while not entirely suppressed, has been substantially diminished. Laws against political activity are unevenly enforced. Some individuals whom the government especially dislike are kept under constant house arrest to prevent their speaking out. We want to encourage Zia to relax these restrictions and begin to lead Pakistan toward a return to civilian rule and democratic standards.

TALKING POINTS

-- As you know, this Administration prefers to use quiet rather than public diplomacy on human rights issues. Nevertheless, our not speaking out should not be misinterpreted as lack of interest.

-- We believe, based on our own experience, that a democratic system of government is inherently stronger than a non-democratic system. That is why we believe it is in Pakistan's interest to return to democratic representative government.

-- I understand that you have pledged to present the format for a new Islamic system of government by next August. We are interested in how you think this will develop.

-- In the meantime, we would urge you to ease restrictions on political activities currently in place. This is also something that the people of the United States will warmly welcome, thus making it easier to sustain and enhance the renewed close U.S.-Pakistan ties.

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-- We will continue to work to ensure that FMS credits are available later in FY 1983 to meet your other financial commitments.

-- (If unresolved) We continue to work urgently on the ALR-69 issue. As you know, there are concerns about protecting the most sophisticated and sensitive U.S. technologies.

-- (If resolved) We are pleased that it has been possible to work out a solution to the ALR-69 issue.

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Review the regional situation.

Most importantly, we will want to review the current situation on Afghanistan with President Zia. A discussion of Afghanistan reportedly figured heavily in Zia's 40-minute meeting with Andropov in Moscow, and you will want to obtain a read-out on that. We also want to reiterate our continued support for the multi-track approach to the Afghanistan problem the Pakistanis and we have been pursuing.

In addition, you may want to discuss the current status of efforts to resolve the Iran-Iraq dispute, and brief Zia on our own views of the Middle East situation, while reinforcing Pakistan's general support for a peaceful resolution of that problem. (Relations with India should be discussed at lunch.)

TALKING POINTS

-- We admire Pakistan's courageous, principled stand on the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. We are gratified that your efforts to unite the members of the U.N. on this issue once again met with their customary success.

-- Our assessment of the Afghanistan problem remains congruent with your own. We welcome the opportunity to work together in diplomatic and other arenas.

-- I would be interested in hearing your views, based on your conversation with Andropov, of what we might expect over the next six months to a year.

-- Like you, we support any genuine effort to find a negotiated settlement, and support the U.N. process so long as it does not compromise stated UNGA requirements for a solution, which include Soviet troop withdrawal and refugee return in safety and honor.

-- We would also be interested in hearing your views on the prospects for a peaceful resolution of the Iran-Iraq conflict.

-- We believe it important to mount a sustained effort to bring about a peaceful resolution of the Arab-Israel issue. We are counting on the support of friends like Pakistan and appreciate your positive response to President Reagan's September 1 Middle East peace initiative.

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Touch on our concerns about the narcotics problem.

A substantial quantity of the heroin which now reaches the eastern United States originates as opium grown in Southwest Asia; much of it is from Pakistan. We are deeply concerned about this development, which has become a very sensitive area in our relations. The Attorney General recently discussed this problem in Pakistan, and the issue is on the agenda for Zia's talks at the White House.

TALKING POINTS

-- Narcotics is a major vulnerability in U.S.-Pakistan relations. Especially among Congressmen with narcotics problems in their districts, there is dismay that a friendly country like Pakistan is a source of the heroin influx into the U.S. The visit of Attorney General Smith was a demonstration of our great concern.

-- The U.S. is concerned about the eradication of the opium poppy crop as a move toward reducing heroin addiction in the U.S. We also believe that the heroin labs in the Northwest Frontier are an extremely serious threat to Pakistan and other countries. The recent large seizures of heroin within Pakistan are evidence of the increasing magnitude of the problem. We hope the GOP will rapidly be able to bring them under control.

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

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November 29, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

COPIES TO: FROM:

George P. Shultz *up*

SUBJECT:

Visit of Zia-ul-Haq,
President of Pakistan, December 6-9

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I. THE SETTING

What was originally intended as an untroubled visit to cement publicly and symbolically last year's re-invigoration of U.S.-Pakistan relations, has become a crucial forum for ameliorating mutual uncertainties and concerns which now cloud our ties. Pakistan, still trying to determine the seriousness of the U.S. commitment to the restored security relationship, is deeply troubled by indications that looming budgetary problems may make it difficult for the U.S. to provide the economic and military assistance we agreed to last year. Pakistan's leaders also resent U.S. resistance to providing certain specific items of military equipment the Paks believe they were promised. While the instant case of the ALR-69 radar for the F16s should be resolved before Zia's arrival, the experience will undoubtedly leave a residue of uncertainty about similar cases in the future.

The U.S., for its part, is gravely concerned that Pakistani efforts to develop a nuclear weapons capability could jeopardize the new security relationship which serves both countries' strategic interests. Our aim should be to try to clear the air and dispel uncertainties through the positive public tone we expect to impart to the visit and through candid private talks. Your meeting with Zia will be key in the latter respect.

Zia is well into his sixth year in power. He is respected in Pakistan, though not widely admired. Although his hold on power seems secure, Zia could begin to slip should the economy turn sour, or the presently fragmented and uncertain political opposition gain cohesion and begin to mount a strident challenge to his martial law regime. Zia has steadfastly opposed the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. He has invested much personal prestige in the new relationship with the U.S. and wants it to succeed.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: FRANK E. SCHMELZER
DATE/CASE ID: 13 JAN 1999 199403678

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Zia comes to Washington after recent visits to Beijing, Moscow (for Brezhnev's funeral), New Delhi, Pyongyang, and several Southeast Asian capitals.

II. ISSUES:**1. History of Friendship and Commitment**

We can address Pakistani doubts about the depth of the U.S. commitment by emphasizing important shared strategic perceptions and policy agreements which underlie the relationship, and our firm intention to maintain the assistance commitment. Our ability to provide aid at promised levels and deliver military equipment the Pakistanis expect will be key elements in persuading the GOP of U.S. steadfastness. We will also want to demonstrate that our interest in Pakistan extends beyond its position as a front-line state resisting Soviet expansionism by underscoring our support for Pakistan's economic development and our desire to expand cooperation in other areas.

2. Nuclear Non-Proliferation Concerns

Zia must hear from the highest levels of the USG our concern that continued Pakistani efforts to develop a nuclear weapons capability would run contrary to deeply-held U.S. non-proliferation goals and have serious consequences for the U.S.-Pakistan security assistance relationship, thereby threatening our mutual strategic goals in South and Southeast Asia. I hope to have some time to talk with you about how I believe this extremely sensitive issue can best be handled during the visit.

3. Afghanistan

It is critical that Zia be strongly reassured of our desire to continue to cooperate closely with Pakistan in our joint multi-track effort to keep pressure on Moscow for withdrawal from Afghanistan, and our belief that nothing should be done to legitimize the present Kabul regime. We must remember that without Zia's support, the Afghan resistance, key to making the Soviets pay a heavy price for their Afghan adventure, is effectively dead. We must also recognize that how we handle the nuclear issue can have a profound effect on our ability to continue to cooperate with Pakistan in supporting the Afghan freedom fighters.

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4. South and Southwest Asia Regional Security Matters

The Pakistanis clearly want the U.S. to stay constructively engaged in the search for Middle East peace, and we can encourage their increased support for our efforts by persuading them of the earnestness of our desire for an equitable settlement. In South Asia, we should indicate our warm support for current Indo-Pak efforts to improve relations, a key element in realizing the U.S. objective of regional stability and security. We should encourage renewed behind the scenes Pakistani efforts to contribute to Iran-Iraq peace.

5. Other Key Issues

We want to convince Zia that, without seeking to interfere in internal Pakistani matters, the U.S. government's ability to sustain the bilateral relationship over time will be significantly enhanced if the Pakistan Government makes progress toward its stated goal of returning Pakistan to representative government. Progress in restricting the growth of opium poppies and limiting the production of heroin will also make a positive contribution to the atmosphere of the relationship. Our ability to work with the Pakistanis to increase trade and investment will be reinforced if the GOP continues the reform process aimed at restoring economic stability. Finally, we want to encourage the GOP to give the private sector a strong role in development.

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December 6, 1982

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Vice President Bush
Pakistani Foreign Minister Yaqub-Khan

Assistant Secretary Veliotis, NEA
Mr. Kemp, NSC
Mr. Gregg, Vice President's Office
Pakistani Ambassador Azim

DATE: December 2, 1982, 4:15 to 5:00 p.m.

PLACE: Vice President's Office, White House West Wing

After the opening amenities, Yaqub-Khan said that President Zia will wish to brief Reagan on his discussions with Andropov but he would give us a summary briefing. Zia had decided to discuss Afghanistan only if Andropov raised it and this happened. In brief, Zia rejected all charges of Pak interference or external interference as a cause of the problem. He insisted that the problem was the Soviet invasion. Zia focussed on the 2.8 million refugees in Pakistan and said they must be allowed to go home in dignity and honor, emphasizing that it was essential that the Soviets withdraw. Yaqub-Khan then noted that in his view the change in the Soviet leadership should be for the better. He noted that under Brezhnev, despite his close identification with "detente," Soviet policy was interventionist in Czechoslovakia, Angola, Ethiopia, Afghanistan and Poland. (He also blamed the Soviets for the 1971 war over Bangladesh.) He then laid out what he thinks is a realistic scenario over the next few years. First, Andropov must consolidate his control over the party. Once this is done, a second phase to take place in about a year would occur. This would consist of a very serious policy review and in the context of the beginning of debunking of the mystification of Brezhnev. Finally, certain policies that are either failures or unpopular or both will be changed and the officials identified with these policies will be eliminated.

Another scenario would be that as a result of the perceived failure of the Soviet system, both internally and externally, Andropov will opt for an aggressive adventuresome policy

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overseas taking a calculated risk that the United States system will not allow it to respond quickly enough.

Yaqub believes that the first scenario is more likely and that Andropov will move in the next few years to rectify the errors of the former regime particularly since he can blame them on others. He gave the view that Andropov was a tough nut who was not in the "prime of health." The Vice President confirmed that his exchange with Andropov on Afghanistan consisted of each side putting forth its own views.

Yaqub said this was essentially what happened in Zia's meeting and noted that although the Soviets never criticized the United States directly by name, at one point by referring to Pakistan's "friends" - the United States and China - Andropov did criticize directly the United States for its policies over Afghanistan claiming these friends were trying to push Pakistan into a confrontation with the Soviet Union.

China-USSR

Yaqub agreed with the Vice President that there would be no early rapprochement between the Soviets and the Chinese. He interpreted the current Chinese position as being one of waiting and seeing. If the new Soviet leaders wish to improve relations, the Chinese will take no initiative to make it harder for the Soviets but neither will the Chinese change any policies which they consider fundamental. Yaqub then gave an interesting analysis of the possibility of changes in Soviet policy, in three areas of importance to China: Kampuchea, withdrawal of troops from the China border and in Mongolia, and withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan. Yaqub ruled out Kampuchea since it was of importance only to Southeast Asia and the Vietnamese were the main players there. Soviet freedom of action was too limited. He ruled out a significant pullout from the Chinese border on the grounds that this would entail considerable risks and might be difficult to get through the security bureaucracy. He clarified that a symbolic move such as the Soviet withdrawal of 20,000 troops from East Germany would not be viewed by the Chinese as worth anything. Finally, this would be an important move but it would only have significance for Chinese-Soviet relations. Through a process of elimination as well as through interpretation of the discussions with Andropov, Yaqub concluded that the Soviets would be most likely to change their policy on Afghanistan. They are clearly in trouble and they could make a virtue out of necessity; and a Soviet withdrawal would impact favorably on relations with China, the nonaligned, the Islamic world, Iran,

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the United Nations and the United States. There would be global significance to such a move.

Yaqub said that "at the risk of being ethnocentric" Afghanistan is the most likely. He said, of course, that the Soviets would try to insist on a pro-Soviet government in the context of any withdrawal. This, however, would be a basic contradiction given the outlook of the Afghans.

Yaqub concluded that especially because Afghanistan is hurting the Soviets and there is a chance for a change in Soviet policy over time, it is essential that the Soviets be kept under very heavy pressure both inside Afghanistan and international forums. He was very pleased with the result of this year's UN vote, noting that the vote would have been higher if some transportation flukes had not resulted in some absences. Returning to the pressure theme, Yaqub pointed out that it was most important not to be "tricked" by the Soviets into prematurely lessening the pressure. He pointed out that if pressure is lessened in any way, we would never be able to reconstruct the pattern of pressure. Therefore, while indicating a willingness to "deal," we must hang firm on our principles and keep the pressure on.

Yaqub raised the problems on the Hill concerning the Pak programs. The Vice President assured Yaqub of the high priority the Administration accords to the Pak program and our determination to be successful.

The Vice President asked Yaqub for his views on US-PRC relations, particularly in the context of the decision by the PRC to escalate tension on Taiwan. The Vice President speculated that this might have been because of internal affairs. Yaqub gave a rather inconclusive response. The Vice President noted our desire for good relations with the PRC. He emphasized that this is not really a China card to be played against the Soviet Union. This is inaccurate and denigrates our relations with the PRC which are very important on their own merits.

Yaqub noted that just prior to the Vice President's trip to China in May 1981, he was in Peking and was an advocate for improved US-PRC relations. The Chinese Foreign Minister said that his government's positions were always based on principle, citing China's refusal of Soviet probes to renew the border talk or otherwise superficially to improve relations. He said that the PRC did not wish to give any impression that it was trying to use a Soviet card in PRC-US relations. He pointed

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out that if the PRC had wished to change relations with us "180 degrees," it would have made sense for the Chinese to play the Soviet card at that time. Yaqub was particularly pleased, therefore, to hear from the Vice President the basis for the US approach to relations with the PRC. To return to the Vice President's original question, Yaqub said that it is possible that the Chinese believe they are responding to statements of Administration spokesmen that they believe are inconsistent with US-Chinese agreements; it is also possible that there could be some internal reasons for these postures. In addition, it is possible that Deng chose to escalate the issue publicly in order to bring China and this issue onto the world stage in a very dramatic manner.

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December 6, 1982

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

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PARTICIPANTS: Secretary Shultz
Pakistani President Zia

Deputy Secretary Dam
Ambassador Ronald Spiers
Assistant Secretary Veliotes, NEA
Pakistani Foreign Minister Yaqub-Khan
Pakistani Presidential Chief of Staff Arif
Pakistani Ambassador Azim

DATE: December 6, 1982, 11:00 a.m. to 12:00 Noon

PLACE: Madison Hotel

DIST : S, D, P, EA, EUR, NEA, S/INM, Islamabad

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The Secretary initiated the conversation by pointing out that our goal is a strong US-Pak relationship built on a firm foundation. This has to be a fundamental relationship for both countries which grows over time and is strong enough to survive disagreements and problems which inevitably occur. He concluded by noting that we must have candor and strength in our relationship.

General Zia said that he completely agreed with the Secretary with respect to the goals he stated for the US-Pak relationship. He noted that our relations had had their ups and downs and what we need now is stability in a growing relationship based on a convergence of interests. General Zia said that he recognized that Pakistan and the United States were in a "union of unequals and incompatible" from many points of view: culture, geography, national power. He noted, however, that we were strongly united by our common interests and Pakistan found it a great honor to be in partnership with the United States. Partners, like spouses, often disagree on specifics but agree on principle and the most important issues.

The Secretary endorsed the description of our relationship as a partnership. The Secretary then made the following points concerning the visit. We would be discussing specific issues in our bilateral relations as well as exchanging views on major strategic issues, including how we saw the new Soviet leadership.

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President Zia agreed that this was also his approach to the visit and then proceeded to discuss his meeting with Andropov in Moscow. He noted he was warmly greeted by the Soviet hosts and gave several examples of this. He also noted that Andropov gave him the impression of not being very well. He said that the meeting was totally devoted to bilateral relations and Afghanistan.

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Andropov started the discussion by noting that one may or may not agree with the Soviet invasion but the fact today is that there are Soviet troops in Afghanistan. The problem, therefore, is how to create the conditions which would allow the Soviet troops to withdraw. After that lead in, he went on to blame the Paks and the US and the Chinese indirectly, etc. Zia deduced from the discussion, including the way it was introduced, that the Soviets are indeed uncomfortable with the situation. In reply, Zia said he spoke bluntly and said the problem was made by the Soviet Union, that the Paks were bound by the resolutions of the Islamic Conference and the United Nations and the Afghan issue was not a bilateral issue but rather a global issue which involved China, Pakistan, Afghanistan, the Soviet Union, Iran, the Islamic Conference and the United Nations. Zia said it was a cordial exchange but that there was no give in the Soviet position. For his part, he told Andropov that the UN-sponsored talks were a good forum for trying to find a solution to this. Zia concluded by noting that there is no doubt that the Soviets are in difficulty in Afghanistan but also that they no doubt "mean business" there. He thinks the Soviets would like Pakistan to help them to get out of the quagmire but emphasized that he did not leave any hint that Pakistan would comply by changing its policies.

The Secretary thanked the President for his very helpful interpretation and description of his meeting with Andropov. He briefly discussed his meeting with Andropov, noting Andropov did not give him the impression of any basic physical weakness and he came through as being in charge. It may have been that he was just tired. Zia said there was no question he was in charge but noted that his hands were shaking and he was wearing an oversized collar suggesting that he had suffered recently from some kind of illness. The Secretary added that although Andropov read from a script he seemed comfortable with the subject matter which was the standard Soviet line. He was at ease with Gromyko. Zia confirmed this, saying that Gromyko

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would break in on Andropov and they had an easy relationship. At the Secretary's request, Zia gave his evaluation of the current status of the Soviet-Chinese relationship. Zia said he was told by the Chinese Foreign Minister in Moscow the PRC is willing to talk and probe but expected no breakthroughs. Turning to PRC-US relations, Zia said he wished to give his own impressions of current problems in the US-Chinese relationship. He said the Chinese appeared "disillusioned" with the United States and said they cannot understand the American mind. He concludes that the PRC will not show any flexibility on Taiwan. He then offered some personal comments which he recognized posed a dilemma for US "super power" policy. Is it better for world peace if US-Chinese relations are on a good basis or if the Chinese and the Soviets patch up their relations?

The Secretary noted that he would be going to China early next year. He pointed out that we have made clear that we will not and cannot turn our backs on Taiwan. He explained that although the Chinese had agreed to the "communique" on arms sales, the PRC seems to want to continue to negotiate this document forever. The Secretary said that the PRC knows our policy has not changed, but the problem is that the PRC doesn't like it. The Secretary concluded that the US accords a very high priority to US-Chinese relations and he will be addressing these issues directly in China early next year.

Zia noted the strong attachment of the Pakistanis to their relations with China. He explained that given Chinese assistance to Pakistan he realized he had an emotional commitment and that's another reason he feels so strongly about good US-Chinese relations. He pointed out that in Pakistan's worst hour of need (presumably after the Bangladesh war), the Chinese gave Pakistan large-scale grant military and economic assistance. The Paks are very grateful. He went on to point out that the Chinese take a long time to make up their minds but once they do they remain faithful to their policies and agreements. In this respect, he explained in some detail the non-threatening posture of China today towards Southeast Asian states.

The Secretary asked if President Zia favors the United States working for improved relations with the PRC. Zia said yes. The Secretary thanked him for his helpful thoughts and

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views on this subject, noting we were of one mind on the importance of US-PRC relations.

The Secretary then turned to Indo-Pak relations and asked if Zia thought they were improving. Zia said they are improving from Pakistan's point of view. The problem was that India always wanted to extract a price for improved relations which the GOP was unwilling to pay. He described his meeting with Mrs. Gandhi in New Delhi as being positive. He noted he was effusively grateful to her for the meeting. He explained that she noted that they should improve relations and he said fine, what do you have in mind; Mrs. Gandhi suggested the joint commission which he immediately accepted. Zia said this quick agreement seemed to "pull the rug out from under her," and she spent about 20 seconds in silence. The Secretary noted we were in favor of improved relations and were optimistic that they would improve. Zia said he discussed Afghanistan with Mrs. Gandhi and after the initial exchange of views asked her point blank if India wished to share a border with the Soviet Union. When Mrs. Gandhi said no, Zia said then "shout a bit" about the Soviet troop presence in Afghanistan. Mrs. Gandhi demurred on grounds that the Soviets must be "persuaded." Zia and the Secretary agreed that on Afghanistan high visible public diplomacy was effective.

North Korea

Zia noted he had met recently with Kim Il Sung in North Korea who asked him to pass the following message to the USG: North Korea wants the armistice to become a treaty of peace. North Korea wants peaceful reunification between the two countries. Zia said he had now discharged his responsibilities to Kim Il Sung. He noted that he explained that East Germany and West Germany have found a way to coexist together, and perhaps that could be a model for the Koreans. Re South Korea, Zia noted that they still did not have formal diplomatic relations, that there was "an astounding amount of trade" between the two countries.

The Secretary took the initiative to describe the current status of the Pak security assistance program on the Hill, noting our commitment to work as hard as required to push this ahead. He pointed out that if we fell short on the continuing resolution during this session, we would be back to the attack

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with the new Congress. Zia expressed his appreciation for this support.

Narcotics

The Secretary also raised the narcotics issue using as a vehicle a briefing for Zia on the role that narcotics played as an issue to the President's recent visit to Colombia. He noted our interest and concern in the Pak enforcement issues, commenting favorably on the recent Pak actions against the heroin labs. Zia picked up the ball and spoke at some length on how Pakistan recognized that it had a problem. This was not a US or foreign problem. Pakistan was determined to solve this problem and the fact that it would have positive international repercussions would be a bonus. He noted that the Pakistanis needed help, however, and looked to us to respond to their needs. He cited as an example the fact that Pakistan has only one dog trained to sniff out narcotics and this dog can only identify marijuana or hashish whereas the major problem is heroin.

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: President Ronald Reagan
Pakistani President Zia

Vice President Bush
Acting Secretary Dam
Secretary Weinberger
Attorney General William French Smith
Ambassador Veliotis
Ambassador Spiers
Mr. McFarlane
Mr. Geoffrey Kemp, NSC
Mr. Howard Teicher, NSC

DATE: December 7, 1982, 11:00 a.m. to 12 Noon

PLACE: The Cabinet Room at the White House

Presidents Reagan and Zia met privately for approximately twenty minutes from 10:40 to 11:00. During this time President Reagan raised our concerns about the Pakistan nuclear program.

The two Presidents joined the larger meeting at 11:00 and the meeting lasted for about an hour. President Reagan asked President Zia to continue the discussions the two had had privately on Afghanistan and Soviet policy. President Zia began by giving an analysis of the reasons why the Soviets invaded Afghanistan:

-- There was a power vacuum to be filled.

-- There was an opportunity to seize important geo-political-strategic territory. Zia emphasized it is only 200 miles across Pakistan to the Indian Ocean and to a position of dominance with respect to Gulf oil.



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President Zia addressed the current status of the Soviet invasion. He noted that in three years the Soviets still could only control major urban areas, adding that 1/3 of the 15 million Afghan population was in exile and emphasizing that all of the Afghan youth will fight the Soviet invasion, with bare hands if necessary.

He then addressed the future of Soviet policy in Afghanistan. He referred to his extensive discussion with Secretary Shultz the day before and repeated the substance of his comments. He added that he told Andropov that the 84 million Paks will resist to the last man if the Soviets attack. He described this exchange in the following manner: he told Andropov that the Soviets may push the Pakistanis and the Pakistanis wouldn't respond; the Soviets might then push harder and the Paks still might not respond; but if the Soviets really pushed too hard, then they would face the entire Pakistani nation in arms. He noted that Afghanistan was the centerpiece of his 50-minute meeting with Andropov and that Andropov's purpose was to try to get Pakistan to cooperate on solving the Soviet dilemma in Afghanistan on Soviet terms. Zia said he had a simple answer for Andropov: the key to the solution was in Moscow's hands. He described it as not a bilateral Pakistani-Soviet problem but a global problem, along lines of his comments to the Secretary. He made clear that Pakistan would insist on:

- Soviet withdrawal;
- refugee return;
- non-aligned, Muslim and independent Afghanistan;
- Afghans must be allowed to work out their political destiny.

The Vice President raised his 40-minute meeting with Andropov in Moscow, noting that he had been instructed by President Reagan to make clear that Afghanistan, Poland and human rights were the major issues standing in the way of improved US-USSR relations. He thought it important that President Zia know that President Reagan had given him these instructions and that Afghanistan was singled out. Zia expressed appreciation for this knowledge, stating in his 50-minute meeting he left no doubts in the Soviet minds where Pakistan stood. President Reagan commented that this was very good to hear.

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President Reagan then initiated a brief discussion of the status of the Pakistan assistance program in the Congress. He then turned to Secretary Weinberger noting he would have the opportunity for discussions with Zia later in the day and asked Weinberger to comment on the subject [REDACTED]

B1

Secretary Weinberger's [REDACTED]

President Reagan raised US-PRC relations, explaining we want good relations with the PRC. But, we were not going to renege on our commitments to Taiwan. He hoped the PRC will understand. Zia replied he understood the US position and counseled patience on the PRC. He was confident these issues will be worked out. President Zia asked Foreign Minister Yaqub to comment and his response was limited to agreeing with President Zia's views.

President Reagan introduced the subject of narcotics and asked Attorney General Smith to comment. Smith reviewed his recent trip to Pakistan and was effusive in his praise of Pak refugee assistance. He then made extensive comments on the narcotic problem, urging continued Pak efforts and noting we want to help. Zia replied in detail, clearly indicating his in-depth grasp of this problem. He noted he discussed this matter with Secretary Shultz. He addressed problems of heroin labs, noting Pakistan does have problems of enforcement in tribal areas. Zia then noted that Pakistan's opium production fell from 800 tons to 40 tons. Most opium comes from abroad. He asked for equipment and other help. Zia made his presentation in the context of Pakistan having a narcotics problem and Pakistan was determined to solve this problem. He understands it has international ramifications as well, and is aware of the need for action along the distribution trail.

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President Reagan [redacted]

[redacted] The President then turned to Acting Secretary Dam indicating that Presidents Reagan and Zia had discussed the Middle East in their meeting. Dam ran over a list of areas of mutual interest including Iran-Iraq, noting the very useful presentation by the Paks at lunch the day before on the Iran-Iraq war.

B1

President Zia picked up the discussion on Iran noting that

[redacted] Zia counseled patience on the US with the goal of improving relations eventually.

Zia then turned to India and said he is doing his best to improve relations with India but we all had to understand it is impossible to pull India too far from the Soviet embrace, given the network of close Soviet-Indian relations.

President Reagan addressed the Middle East, noting that he was determined to pursue our policy. He emphasized the importance of a solution to the Lebanese problem as a necessary first step. Zia made this point during private discussions. Zia wholeheartedly agreed with the importance of early success for American policy in Lebanon. He concluded by emphasizing that an American success in Lebanon would be the first step in the implementation of the Reagan plan in the Middle East. President Reagan agreed and pledged we would be diligent in pursuing our policy. Zia then asked the Finance Minister to address the financial and economic situation. He presented a 10 minute summary of the successes and problems in the Pakistani economy noting the success of their agricultural program and pointing to the enormous increase in oil costs as a major problem. He made a major pitch for multilateral lending institutions and for the US to support them. He also pointed out the need to increase trade between developing and developed countries. Dam responded to the Finance Minister's presentation in considerable detail emphasizing our support for the multilateral lending institutions as well as bilateral assistance, and also noting that the US is firm in its support of the growth of foreign trade.

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S E C R E T STATE 345278

E.O. 12356: DECL: 12/09/02
TAGS: PREL, IN, PK
SUBJECT: INDO-U.S. CONSULTATIONS RE ZIA'S VISIT

1. SUMMARY: DURING A WORKING LUNCHEON HOSTED BY UNDER SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER FOR INDIAN FOREIGN SECRETARY RASGOTRA DECEMBER 9 EAGLEBURGER BRIEFED RASGOTRA ON THE RESULTS OF THE ZIA VISIT TO DATE. TOPICS COVERED INCLUDED AFGHANISTAN AND THE PROSPECTS FOR A SETTLEMENT, THE U.S.-PAKISTANI SECURITY RELATIONSHIP, PAKISTAN'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM, ITS FOREIGN POLICY, ITS VIEWS ON THE MIDDLE EAST, AND ITS DESIRE FOR IMPROVED RELATIONS WITH INDIA.
END SUMMARY.

2. EAGLEBURGER BEGAN THE LUNCH BY GIVING RASGOTRA A READOUT OF THE U.S. VIEW OF PRESIDENT ZIA'S VISIT TO THE U.S. TO DATE. DAS SCHNEIDER SAID THAT HAVING CLEARED UP A NUMBER OF -BILATERAL PROBLEMS SUCH AS THE AVIONICS ;FOR PAKISTAN'S F-16S, COMPENSATION FOR OUR CHANCERY IN ISLAM-ABAD AND NARCOTICS MATTERS BEFOREHAND, IT HAD BEEN POSS-
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IBLE TO FOCUS THE DISCUSSIONS WITH THE PAKISTANIS ON INTERNATIONAL ISSUES.

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: FRANK E. SCHMELZER
DATE/CASE ID: 13 JAN 1999 199403678

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3. AFGHANISTAN IN THE AFTERMATH OF ZIA'S MEETING WITH

ANDROPOV HAD BEEN A MAJOR SUBJECT OF DISCUSSION. THE PAKISTANIS HAD-LEFT MOSCOW WITH THE IMPRESSION THAT, WHILE THE SOVIETS CONTINUE TO TALK TOUGH, THE NEW LEADERSHIP MAY PROVE MORE FLEXIBLE THAN WAS THE CASE WHEN BREZHNEV WAS STILL ALIVE. EAGLEBURGER SAID THAT HIS SENSE OBTAINED DURING HIS VISIT TO ISLAMABAD HAD BEEN THAT SOME PAKISTANIS WERE CONCERNED THAT THE U.S. MIGHT NOT WANT A SETTLEMENT IN AFGHANISTAN. SAYING THAT WE HAD REASSURED THE PAKISTANIS IN THIS REGARD, EAGLEBURGER STRESSED THAT HIS POLICY, THE SECRETARY'S POLICY AND THE PRESIDENT'S POLICY WAS TO SEEK A SETTLEMENT IN AFGHANISTAN WHICH WOULD MEET THE CONDITIONS WE HAD SET FORTH IN OUR JULY TALKS WITH THE SOVIETS, ON WHICH RASGOTRA HAD BEEN BRIEFED.

4. EAGLEBURGER CONTINUED THAT WE RECOGNIZE THE SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN IS NOT STATIC, THAT IT WILL EITHER GET BETTER OR IT WILL GET WORSE. IF THE SOVIETS ARE FORCED TO ESCALATE IN THE FACE OF INCREASED PRESSURE, THEY COULD BECOME EVEN MORE ENTRENCHED, THEREBY THREATENING EVEN MORE SERIOUSLY U.S. INTERESTS BOTH IN PAKISTAN ITSELF AND WITHIN THE REGION AT LARGE.

5. WE THEREFORE WANT A SETTLEMENT AND SUPPORT PAKISTAN'S TWO-TRACK APPROACH OF 1) INSISTING UPON A SOVIET WITHDRAWAL AND THE RIGHT OF REFUGEES TO RETURN AND 2) THE INDIRECT TALKS COORDINATED BY CORDOVEZ. THE PAKISTANIS ARE HOPEFUL THE LATTER WILL MOVE FORWARD. FOR THE MO-
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MENT WE THINK THE CHANCES ARE LESS THAN 50-50 THAT THERE WILL BE QUICK PROGRESS BUT DO NOT RULE OUT THE POSSIBILITY OF MOVEMENT OVER TIME. WE AND THE PAKISTANIS WILL REMAIN ALERT TO ANY SIGNALS THE SOVIETS MIGHT SEND IN THIS REGARD.

6. RASGOTRA SAID HE TALKED TO THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL IN NEW YORK AND THAT HE WAS RATHER OPTIMISTIC ABOUT THE PROXIMITY TALKS. EAGLEBURGER REPEATED OUR SUPPORT FOR THEM, BUT CAUTIONED THAT WE MUST BE CLEAR WHERE THEY ARE LEADING. WE COULD EVEN SUPPORT A PHASED WITHDRAWAL IF ALL OTHER ASPECTS OF A SETTLEMENT WERE FIRMLY NAILED DOWN THROUGH THE TALKS.

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7. TURNING TO OTHER ASPECTS OF OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH PAKISTAN, EAGLEBURGER TOLD RASGOTRA THAT THE ASSISTANCE PROGRAM WAS POTENTIALLY A TROUBLESOME ISSUE BECAUSE OF SERIOUS PROBLEMS IN THE CONGRESS GETTING APPROPRIATIONS BILLS PASSED. WE HAD ASSURED THE PAKISTANIS THAT WE WOULD DO THE BEST WE COULD, HOWEVER. ON F-16S, WE HAD MADE CLEAR TO THE PAKISTANIS OUR VIEW OF WHAT THEY WERE

FOR AND WHAT THEY WERE NOT FOR. HE ALSO NOTED THAT, ASIDE FROM THE SIX AIRCRAFT TO BE DELIVERED IN THE NEAR FUTURE, THE BULK OF THE 40 F-16S WE ARE PROVIDING WILL NOT ARRIVE IN PAKIS-AN FOR SOME TIME YET.

8. HE SAID THAT THE SECURITY RELATIONSHIP WITH PAKISTAN HAD BEEN A DIFFICULT QUESTION FOR THE U.S. SINCE OUR INTERESTS ARE NOT CONFINED TO PAKISTAN ALONE. IN REACHING THE DECISION TO RENEW THAT RELATIONSHIP WE HAD HAD TO CONSIDER SUCH THINGS AS THE IMPACT ON INDIA. EAGLEBURGER SAID, HOWEVER, THAT HE HAD COME AWAY FROM HIS VISIT TO ISLAMABAD IN NOVEMBER CONVINCED THAT WE COULD BE A POSITIVE INFLUENCE ON INTRA-REGIONAL RELATIONSHIPS, AND OUR SECURITY ASSISTANCE TO PAKISTAN WAS A KEY ELEMENT IN

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THAT REGARD.

9. ON THE NUCLEAR ISSUE, THE PRESIDENT HAD MADE CLEAR TO CIA THE EFFECTS OF U.S. LEGISLATION THAT WOULD RESULT FROM A PAKISTANI WEAPONS PROGRAM. HE HAD ALSO SPELLED OUT THE ADMINISTRATION'S ATTITUDE,

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10. EAGLEBURGER SAID THAT IN CONVERSATIONS WITH YAQUB KHAN AND OTHER PAKISTANI OFFICIALS HE HAD A CLEAR IMPRESSION THAT PAKISTAN'S RELATIONSHIP WITH CHINA IS REGARDED AS A SPECIAL ONE.

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11. EAGLEBURGER SAID THAT ZIA HAD ALSO MADE CLEAR THAT NON-ALIGNMENT IS AN IMPORTANT ASPECT OF PAKISTAN'S FOREIGN POLICY. SCHNEIDER POINTED OUT THAT IN EFFECT ZIA WAS SAYING THAT PAKISTAN WOULD GRANT NO BASES TO OTHER COUNTRIES. HE ADDED THAT THERE HAD BEEN AN EVOLUTION OF POLICY IN PAKISTAN SINCE 1971 INDICATING ACCEPTANCE OF THE REALITY THAT PAKISTAN CAN NOT FIGHT ANOTHER WAR WITH INDIA. THIS EVOLUTION WAS SOMEWHAT ERRATIC, AND AFGHANISTAN HAD INJECTED A NEW ELEMENT INTO THE SECURITY SITUATION IN SOUTH ASIA. THE PAKISTANI REACTION TO THIS NEW ELEMENT WAS TROUBLESOME TO INDIA IN SOME RESPECTS, BUT IN OUR VIEW THE SITUATION IS CLEARLY DIFFERENT THAN IN THE PRE-1971 PERIOD AS WITNESSED BY THE IMPORTANCE OF
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NON-ALIGNMENT IN PAKISTAN'S FOREIGN POLICY AND PAKISTAN'S INTEREST IN IMPROVEMENT OF ITS RELATIONS WITH INDIA.

12. ON THE MIDDLE EAST, ZIA HAD BEEN VERY SUPPORTIVE OF THE PRESIDENT'S PEACE INITIATIVE. IT IS, HOWEVER, PAKISTAN'S VIEW THAT THE PLO MUST HAVE A DIRECT ROLE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS AND THAT THERE MUST EVENTUALLY BE A PALESTINIAN STATE. DAS SCHNEIDER SAID THAT, CLEARLY, THE MIDDLE EAST HAS BECOME AN IMPORTANT DOMESTIC ISSUE IN PAKISTAN.

13. FINALLY, WITH REGARD TO INDO-PAKISTANI RELATIONS, EAGLEBURGER SAID THAT HE HAD BEEN IMPRESSED BOTH IN ISLAMABAD IN NOVEMBER AND MORE RECENTLY DURING THE ZIA VISIT WITH PAKISTAN'S SINCERE DESIRE TO IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH INDIA. ZIA HAD BEEN VERY APPRECIATIVE OF MRS. GANDHI'S HOSPITALITY DURING THE BRIEF STOPOVER IN NEW DELHI, AND WE HAD SUBSEQUENTLY BEEN TOLD BY VARIOUS PAKISTANI OFFICIALS INCLUDING YAQUB KHAN AND GENERAL ARIF THAT PAKISTAN IS SERIOUS AND WANTS TO GET ON WITH IMPROVING RELATIONS WITH INDIA. RASGOTRA SAID THAT THE INDIANS, TOO, WANTED BETTER RELATIONS, AND INDICATED THAT HE WOULD SEE NIAZ NAIK AT ZIA'S RECEPTION IN NEW YORK THE FOLLOWING EVENING. HE WAS QUITE COMP

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December 13, 1982

(K6410)

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:

United States:

Vice President Bush
Ambassador Ronald I. Spiers
Admiral Daniel Murphy
Mr. Gregg, Vice President's
Office
Deputy Assistant Secretary
Howard B. Schaffer, NEA

Pakistan:

Pakistani President Zia
Foreign Minister Yaqub-Khan
Finance Minister Ghulam Ishak
Khan
General K.M. Arif
Ambassador Ejaz Azim
Governor of Baluchistan
Rahmuddin Khan
Foreign Secretary Niaz Niaz

DATE: December 8, 1982, 3:45 p.m.

PLACE: President Zia's Suite, Madison Hotel

Vice President Bush called on President Zia of Pakistan at his suite in the Madison Hotel for a meeting of approximately thirty minutes. The Vice President was accompanied by Admiral Daniel Murphy and Mr. Donald E. Gregg of his staff. Also present on the U.S. side were Ambassador to Pakistan Ronald I. Spiers and NEA Deputy Assistant Secretary Howard B. Schaffer. The Pakistan side included Foreign Minister Yaqub-Khan, Finance Minister Ghulam Ishak Khan, General K. M. Arif, Ambassador Ejaz Azim, Governor of Baluchistan Rahimuddin Khan, and Foreign Secretary Niaz Niaz.

The discussion largely focused on two issues, the Zia-Andropov meeting and prospects for a settlement in Afghanistan; and Sino-U.S. relations.

Zia's discussion of his meeting with Andropov closely paralleled the description he had presented earlier to Secretary Shultz at his White House meeting with the President. Once again he stressed that both the Soviets and he himself had stuck to their positions. He asserted again that the tone of the Soviet side was better. For example, for the first time in any conversation with the Pakistanis, a Soviet leader had acknowledged that Moscow and Islamabad might have different views of the Soviet move into Afghanistan in

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December, 1979. Foreign Minister Yaqub-Kahn, picking this up, said that they suggested that Andropov was of a school which may have been opposed to the move into Afghanistan. Zia concluded by assuring the Vice President he had left Andropov in no doubt that Pakistan wanted a peaceful settlement on the basis of the principles it had consistently insisted upon.

Speaking more generally of relations with the Soviet Union, the Vice President said that we should not be insensitive to whatever suggestions the new Soviet leadership now makes. We will be watching carefully for these. If we begin to see signs of movement, it will be incumbent on us to react to them. He mentioned his own background as Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and expressed the hope that as a former head of the KGB, Andropov would be familiar with the process of making a judgment based on intelligence information. In that sense, Andropov's experience at the KGB may have been broadening rather than constricting. Such background, in any event, might be more helpful than that which a party boss might bring to a leadership position. He recalled that he had left Moscow somewhat optimistic about prospects but noted that the Soviets continue to be highly critical of us on certain issues, most recently the President's decision on the AI.

Sino-U.S. Relations

Recalling his own personal interest in China since he served there as U.S. Envoy, the Vice President asked Zia if he had any advice to give us about the Chinese.

Zia recalled that he had had a long discussion with the Chinese during his recent visit to Beijing. He said that he believed the Chinese thought that the question of Taiwan would be settled in due course and that the U.S. would not abandon it. He felt the Chinese, knowing that he would be visiting the U.S. soon thereafter, had made a special point of briefing him on their position. He had said he would mention their views in the U.S. if the opportunity arose.

Zia said that the Chinese never act in a hurry; their moves are always calm and calculated. He thought that they had expected more technology transfer from the U.S. than had actually been accomplished. The U.S., in their view, had failed to keep its word on technology transfer.

The Vice President stressed the importance of confidence in a relationship such as the one between China and the U.S. He thought that perhaps we had not been able to meet what the Chinese perceived to be our commitments in some areas and that that may have affected their assessment of us.

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Zia then raised the question of U.S. allegations to the Chinese that China was assisting Pakistan in its nuclear program. He said he had already mentioned this issue in his private meeting with President Reagan. The Chinese had told him that General Walters had come to Beijing. They had been surprised by the U.S. position. In Zia's view, the Chinese felt that the U.S. had lumped them with Pakistan in "bad publicity" regarding the Pakistan nuclear program. They did not like this. Zia had told him that he would mention this in Washington. The Vice President said he would talk about this issue with the President.

Discussing the broader issue of Sino-U.S. relations, the Foreign Minister recalled an earlier experience when he was Ambassador to the U.S. in 1976. At that time, the Chinese Ambassador had expressed concern that the U.S. was not going ahead as quickly with normalization of relations as the Chinese had anticipated. Their assessment had been related to U.S. relations with Taiwan and specifically to the increase in the number of Taiwan Consulates in the U.S., a move which had been in the works apparently for many years. The Foreign Minister said he cited this as an example because he thought that Chinese assessment of U.S. relations with Taiwan was one of the two important aspects explaining present Chinese unhappiness with the U.S. (The other was the issue of technology transfer). In his view, the Chinese looked closely at the graph of U.S. relations with Taiwan. They will accept this graph if it is going down, or even remaining flat, but if they perceive that it is going up, even if that is not the U.S. intention, this will affect them adversely.

The Vice President said that while he would agree with this assessment, it is also true that the Chinese selectively choose the "beeps" on the graph they perceive. He noted that the Chinese had also hardened their position. He called attention to the importance of the Taiwan Relations Act which the President fully supports and wishes to live by.

Concluding, the Vice President said that it will take time to develop relations between the U.S. and China. We will not try to humiliate the PRC. Indeed, the President is being accused of selling out Taiwan. Secretary Shultz's visit early next year would help. At the very least, we should know what it is that we and the Chinese are disagreeing about. The Vice President said he was optimistic about the issue.

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Reviewed by: Ewan Kelly
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IMMEDIATE SECRETARY

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E.O. 12065: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PK, US, PEPR

SUBJECT: INFORMATION MEMORANDUM -- S/S NO 823818
PAKISTAN PRESIDENT ZIA U. S. VISIT

TO THE SECRETARY FROM NEA - NICHOLAS A. VELIOTES

1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. THE ZIA VISIT APPEARS TO HAVE GONE EXTREMELY WELL. ZIA AND HIS SENIOR STAFF WERE VERY PLEASED BY THE WARMTH OF THEIR RECEPTION BY THE PRESIDENT, YOU, AND OTHER SENIOR US OFFICIALS AND BY THE TENOR OF THE OFFICIAL TALKS. THEY ARE ALSO PLEASED, AND RELIEVED, THAT ZIA'S RECEPTIONS BY SENATE AND HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEES, AND BY THE NATIONAL PRESS CLUB WERE FRIENDLIER THAN ANTICIPATED, AND GRATIFIED THAT ZIA ACQUITTED HIMSELF WELL IN ALL THESE FORUMS, WHERE HE HANDLED QUESTIONS ON PAKISTAN'S NUCLEAR INTENTIONS, NARCOTICS AND HUMAN RIGHTS WITH APLOMB. DECEMBER 9 HE GAVE A WELL-RECEIVED, WIDE-RANGING SPEECH ON PAKISTAN'S FOREIGN POLICY TO THE FOREIGN POLICY ASSOCIATION IN NEW YORK, AFTER WHICH HE ALSO FIELDLED QUESTIONS ADROITLY.

3. THERE WERE NO SURPRISES IN THE DECEMBER 7-8 OFFICIAL

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TALKS WITH THE PRESIDENT AND OTHER U. S. OFFICIALS. THESE TALKS GENERALLY FOLLOWED YOUR OWN DECEMBER 6 DISCUSSION ON AFGHANISTAN, LEBANON AND THE MIDDLE EAST, SINO-U. S. RELATIONS, AND NARCOTICS. THERE WAS A BRIEF DISCUSSION OF THE STATUS IN CONGRESS OF OUR ASSISTANCE PROGRAM FOR PAKISTAN. THE PAKS ASKED FOR MORE TRADE BETWEEN LDC'S AND DEVELOPED COUNTRIES AND FOR U. S. SUPPORT FOR MULTILATERAL LENDING INSTITUTIONS. WE EMPHASIZED OUR SUPPORT FOR THE MULTILATERAL INSTITUTIONS, FOR CONTINUED BILATERAL ASSISTANCE, AND FOR THE GROWTH OF FOREIGN TRADE.

4. THE PRESIDENT ADDRESSED THE NUCLEAR ISSUE WITH ZIA PRIVATELY, OF COURSE. WHILE WE DO NOT HAVE A DETAILED READ-OUT, WE UNDERSTAND THE PRESIDENT EXPLAINED THE SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES A PAK NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM WOULD HAVE FOR THE U.S.-PAKISTAN ASSISTANCE RELATIONSHIP, AND ZIA ASSURED THE PRESIDENT HIS GOVERNMENT HAS NO INTENTION OF PURSUING SUCH A PROGRAM. BEFORE THE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES, THE NATIONAL PRESS CLUB, AND THE FOREIGN POLICY ASSOCIATION, ZIA WAS ALSO CATEGORICAL ON THIS POINT.

5. IN SUMMARY, THIS VISIT HAS ACHIEVED ITS MAJOR OBJECTIVE OF STRENGTHENING BILATERAL RELATIONS AND CREATING A CLIMATE FOR THEIR FURTHER IMPROVEMENT. WE THINK THE PAK LEADERSHIP HAS GONE AWAY FROM THE TALKS WITH MANY OF THEIR DOUBTS ABOUT THE DEPTH OF THE U. S. COMMITMENT ALLAYED. ON THE U. S. SIDE, WE HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO EMPHASIZE TO ZIA THE POINTS WE CONSIDER MOST IMPORTANT TO THE RELATIONSHIP, NOTABLY ON THE NUCLEAR ISSUE, WHICH WAS ADDRESSED AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL OF THE USG. IN THE PUBLIC ARENA, TOO, ZIA'S VISIT SEEMS TO HAVE CREATED A SOMEWHAT BETTER IMAGE OF PAKISTAN, WHICH MAY HAVE A POSITIVE EFFECT ON THE U. S. ABILITY TO DO ITS PART IN SUSTAINING THE RELATIONSHIP. EDITORIALY THE NEW YORK TIMES, AFTER REVIEWING BOTH PAKISTAN'S STRATEGIC POSITION AND THE ZIA REGIME'S RECORD ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND RELATED MATTERS, CONCLUDED THAT THE U. S. SHOULD GIVE ZIA "... A HAND THOUGH NOT A BOUQUET."YYY

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PAGE 02 STATE 348949

TAGS: PEPR, PK, US
SUBJECT: STATE VISIT OF PRESIDENT MOHAMMAD ZIA-UL-HAQ
OF PAKISTAN

Date Printed: 11/21/1997 DOC_NUMBER: 82STATE348949 CHANNEL: n/a 12
FileName : .../t821249/aaaabnuc.tel

1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. PRESIDENT MOHAMMAD ZIA-UL-HAQ OF PAKISTAN MADE A HIGHLY SUCCESSFUL AND PRODUCTIVE STATE VISIT TO WASHINGTON DECEMBER 6-8. THE VISIT WAS MARKED BY AN ATMOSPHERE OF WARMTH AND COOPERATION. FOLLOWING HIS STAY IN WASHINGTON, PRESIDENT ZIA CONTINUED ON TO NEW YORK, HOUSTON, SACRAMENTO, AND SAN FRANCISCO, FROM WHERE HE DEPARTED THE U.S. FOR CANADA ON DECEMBER 14.
3. IN WASHINGTON, ZIA PURSUED A VERY HEAVY SCHEDULE OF MEETINGS WITH ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS, CONGRESS, JOURNALISTS, AND PRIVATE AMERICANS. IN ADDITION TO HIS NINETY MINUTE MEETING AT THE WHITE HOUSE WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN AND SENIOR ADMINISTRATION FIGURES, ZIA MET PRIVATELY WITH VICE PRESIDENT BUSH, SECRETARIES SHULTZ, WEINBERGER, AND REGAN, AID ADMINISTRATOR MCPHERSON, MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE AND THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE, AND SENATOR TOWER OF THE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE. SECRETARIES SHULTZ AND WEINBERGER HOSTED WORKING LUNCHESES FOR ZIA. IN HIS PUBLIC APPEARANCES AND ON CAPITOL HILL ZIA ADROITLY FIELDDED QUESTIONS ON PAKISTAN'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM (HE DENIED THAT PAKISTAN WILL DEVELOP NUCLEAR WEAPONS), NARCOTICS, AND HUMAN/POLITICAL RIGHTS.
4. AFGHANISTAN: DISCUSSION OF AFGHANISTAN FIGURED HEAVILY IN MEETINGS. PAKS SAID THAT IN THEIR RECENT DISCUSSIONS OF AFGHANISTAN WITH SOVIETS THEY HAD NOTED
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SOME IMPROVEMENT IN TONE, BUT HAD SEEN NO REAL GIVE IN THE SOVIET POSITION. SOVIETS HAD ACKNOWLEDGED THAT MOSCOW AND ISLAMABAD MIGHT HAVE DIFFERENT VIEWS ON THE SOVIET MOVE INTO AFGHANISTAN, BUT HAD ALSO SAID THAT WHILE ONE MAY OR MAY NOT AGREE WITH THE SOVIET INVASION, THE FACT TODAY IS THAT THERE ARE SOVIET TROOPS IN AFGHANISTAN. THE PROBLEM, THEREFORE, IS HOW TO CREATE THE CONDITIONS WHICH WOULD ALLOW THE SOVIET TROOPS TO WITHDRAW. PAKS HAD TOLD SOVIETS THAT THE KEY TO A SOLUTION IS IN MOSCOW'S HANDS. PAKS DESCRIBED TO US THE AFGHAN PROBLEM AS NOT A BILATERAL SOVIET-PAKISTANI ISSUE BUT A GLOBAL PROBLEM. THEY MADE CLEAR THAT PAKISTAN WOULD INSIST ON A SETTLEMENT INCORPORATING FOUR DESIDERATA, I.E., SOVIET

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WITHDRAWAL, REFUGEE RETURN, A NON-ALIGNED, ISLAMIC, AND INDEPENDENT AFGHANISTAN, AND AFGHAN SELF-DETERMINATION. PAKS CONCLUDED THAT THE SOVIETS ARE IN DIFFICULTY IN AFGHANISTAN BUT ALSO THAT THEY DOUBTLESS "MEAN BUSINESS" THERE. THEY THINK THE SOVIETS WOULD LIKE PAKISTAN TO HELP THEM GET OUT OF THE QUAGMIRE, BUT EMPHASIZED THAT PAKISTAN HAS GIVEN THE SOVIETS NO REASON TO THINK THAT PAKISTAN WOULD COMPLY BY CHANGING ITS POLICIES.

5. U.S.-PAKISTAN RELATIONS: SECRETARY SHULTZ TOLD PAK LEADERS THAT OUR GOAL IS A STRONG U.S.-PAKISTAN RELATIONSHIP BUILT ON A FIRM FOUNDATION. THIS HAS TO BE A FUNDAMENTAL RELATIONSHIP FOR BOTH COUNTRIES WHICH GROWS OVER TIME AND IS STRONG ENOUGH TO SURVIVE DISAGREEMENTS AND PROBLEMS WHICH INEVITABLY OCCUR. HE SAID WE MUST HAVE CANDOR AND STRENGTH IN OUR RELATIONSHIP. PRESIDENT ZIA EXPRESSED COMPLETE AGREEMENT. HE NOTED THAT THE TWO COUNTRIES ARE IN A "UNION OF UNEQUALS AND INCOMPATIBLES" FROM GEOGRAPHIC AND POWER PERSPECTIVES, BUT ARE, NONETHELESS, STRONGLY UNITED BY COMMON INTERESTS. HE DESCRIBED THE U.S.-PAKISTAN RELATIONSHIP AS A PARTNERSHIP AND ADDED THAT PARTNERS, LIKE SPOUSES, OFTEN DISAGREE ON SPECIFICS BUT AGREE ON PRINCIPLE AND THE MOST IMPORTANT ISSUES. THE
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SECRETARY TOOK THE INITIATIVE TO DESCRIBE THE CURRENT STATUS OF THE PAK SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM ON THE HILL, NOTING OUR COMMITMENT TO WORK AS HARD AS REQUIRED TO TRY TO PROVIDE PAKISTAN THE ENVISAGED ASSISTANCE. HE SAID THAT IF WE FALL SHORT ON THE CONTINUING RESOLUTION DURING THIS SESSION, WE WILL BE BACK ON THE ATTACK WITH THE NEW CONGRESS. ZIA EXPRESSED HIS APPRECIATION.

6. CHINA: PAKS SAID THAT THE CHINESE, AWARE OF ZIA'S IMPENDING VISIT TO THE U.S., HAD MADE A SPECIAL POINT OF BRIEFING HIM ON THEIR RELATIONS WITH THE U.S. THE CHINESE ARE ESPECIALLY CONCERNED BY TWO IMPORTANT MATTERS: TAIWAN AND TRANSFER OF U.S. TECHNOLOGY TO CHINA. IN THE PAK VIEW, THE CHINESE LOOK CLOSELY AT THE GRAPH OF U.S.-TAIWAN RELATIONS. THEY WILL ACCEPT THE GRAPH GOING DOWN OR REMAINING FLAT, BUT ANY SIGNS THAT THE GRAPH IS GOING UP AFFECT THEM ADVERSELY. SIMILARLY, THEY WERE DISAPPOINTED THAT TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER WAS NOT MOVING MORE QUICKLY. WE EXPLAINED THAT WE WANT GOOD

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RELATIONS WITH THE PRC, BUT THAT WE ARE NOT GOING TO RENEGE ON OUR COMMITMENTS TO TAIWAN. THE PAKISTANIS EXPRESSED UNDERSTANDING AND COUNSELLED PATIENCE ON THE CHINESE. THEY WERE CONFIDENT THESE ISSUES WOULD BE WORKED OUT.

7. SOVIET-PRC RELATIONS: THE PAKISTANIS SAID THEY UNDERSTAND THE CHINESE POSITION IS THAT THE PRC IS WILLING TO TALK AND PROBE BUT EXPECTS NO BREAKTHROUGHS.

8. NARCOTICS: BOTH SECRETARY SHULTZ AND ATTORNEY GENERAL SMITH RAISED THE NARCOTICS PROBLEM WITH ZIA. THE ATTORNEY GENERAL MADE EXTENSIVE COMMENTS ON HIS RECENT
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TRIP. HE URGED THE PAKISTANIS TO CONTINUE THEIR EFFORTS AND NOTED THAT WE WANTED TO HELP. ZIA REPLIED IN DETAIL CLEARLY INDICATING HIS FULL GRASP OF THE ISSUE. HE ADDRESSED THE PROBLEMS OF HEROIN LABS AND ENFORCEMENT IN THE TRIBAL AREAS. HE NOTED THAT PAKISTAN'S OWN PRODUCTION OF OPIUM HAD FALLEN FROM 800 TONS TO 40 TONS. MOST OPIUM NOW COMES INTO PAKISTAN FROM OTHER COUNTRIES. HE RECOGNIZED THAT, ALTHOUGH THIS MATTER HAS INTERNATIONAL RAMIFICATIONS, PAKISTAN ITSELF HAS A NARCOTICS PROBLEM AND HE EXPRESSED DETERMINATION IN SOLVING IT. HE ASKED FOR EQUIPMENT AND OTHER ASSISTANCE.

9. INDO-PAK RELATIONS: PAKS BELIEVE THAT RELATIONS WITH INDIA ARE IMPROVING. IN THE PAK VIEW THE PROBLEM IS THAT INDIA ALWAYS WANTS TO EXTRACT A HIGHER PRICE FOR IMPROVED RELATIONS THAN THE GOP IS WILLING TO PAY. NONETHELESS, THEY FOUND ZIA'S MEETING WITH MRS. GANDHI ON NOVEMBER 1 AS BEING POSITIVE. ZIA HAD IMMEDIATELY AGREED TO MRS. GANDHI'S PROPOSAL OF A JOINT COMMISSION. THE PAKS SUGGESTED THAT, WHILE THEY WILL DO THEIR BEST TO IMPROVE RELATIONS, IT IS UNLIKELY THAT THE INDIANS CAN BE SWUNG VERY FAR FROM THE SOVIET EMBRACE GIVEN THE NETWORK OF CLOSE INDO-SOVIET TIES. THE PAKS SAID THAT THE INDIANS HAVE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THEY DID NOT WANT TO SHARE A BORDER WITH THE SOVIETS, BUT RESIST PAK SUGGESTIONS THAT THEY "SHOUT A BIT" ABOUT THE SOVIET PRESENCE IN AFGHANISTAN, SAYING THAT THE SOVIETS MUST BE "PERSUADED."

10. MIDDLE EAST: WE TOLD ZIA WE ARE DETERMINED TO

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PURSUe THE PRESIDENT'S SEPTEMBER 1 INITIATIVE IN THE MIDDLE EAST. WE EMPHASIZED THE IMPORTANCE OF A SOLUTION TO THE LEBANON PROBLEM AS A NECESSARY FIRST STEP. ZIA WHOLEHEARTEDLY AGREED WITH THE IMPORTANCE OF AN EARLY SUCCESS FOR AMERICAN POLICY IN LEBANON. HE SAID THAT SUCCESS IN LEBANON IS A FIRST STEP FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION

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OF PRESIDENT REAGAN'S PLAN IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

11. ECONOMICS: FINANCE MINISTER GHULAM ISHAQ KHAN PRESENTED A SUMMARY OF THE SUCCESSES AND PROBLEMS OF THE PAKISTANI ECONOMY, NOTING THEIR SUCCESSFUL AGRICULTURAL PROGRAM AND CITING THE ENORMOUS INCREASE IN OIL COSTS AS A MAJOR PROBLEM. HE MADE A PITCH FOR THE MOBS AND FOR U.S. SUPPORT FOR THEM. HE ALSO POINTED OUT THE NEED FOR INCREASED NORTH-SOUTH TRADE. ACTING SECRETARY DAM RESPONDED, EMPHASIZING OUR SUPPORT FOR THE MULTILATERAL LENDING INSTITUTIONS AS WELL AS FOR BILATERAL ASSISTANCE, AND ALSO NOTING THAT THE U.S. IS FIRM IN ITS SUPPORT OF THE GROWTH OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE.

1. JOINT COMMISSION: ON DECEMBER 6, SECRETARY SHULTZ AND FOREIGN MINISTER YAQUB SIGNED, IN THE PRESENCE OF PRESIDENT ZIA, AN AGREEMENT TO ESTABLISH A JOINT COMMISSION. THE COMMISSION WILL SERVE AS A FRAMEWORK FOR INCREASING COOPERATION IN SEVERAL NON-POLITICAL AREAS, INCLUDING SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, EDUCATION AND CULTURE, AND ECONOMIC/COMMERCIAL COOPERATION. DAM

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C O N F I D E N T I A L NEW DELHI 11063

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E. O. 12356: OADR
TAGS: OVIP
SUBJECT: OFFICIAL-INFORMAL

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. SCOPE PAPER FOR THE SECRETARY'S VISIT: NEW DELHI 7472 REPRESENTS OUR THINKING ON THE OVERALL PURPOSE OF THE SECRETARY'S VISIT AS OF MID-APRIL. SINCE THEN TWO DEVELOPMENTS HAVE OCCURRED WHICH ARE RELEVANT TO THE VISIT. FIRST, THERE HAS BEEN MRS. GANDHI'S TALK OF A "FOREIGN HAND" INTERFERING IN INDIAN INTERNAL AFFAIRS. SINCE OUR MESSAGES ON THIS SUBJECT, WE HAVE HEARD THAT SHE EXPRESSED TO SOME INDIAN VISITORS A VAGUE CONCERN ABOUT "WHAT THE CIA WAS UP TO."

TOLD ME THAT MRS. GANDHI IS VERY WORRIED ABOUT FOREIGN INTERFERENCE, AND SUGGESTED IT WOULD BE GOOD IF SHE AND THE SECRETARY COULD DISCUSS THE ISSUE. I THEREFORE THINK THIS IS SOMETHING WHICH NEEDS TO BE BROUGHT TO THE SECRETARY'S ATTENTION AND THAT HE SHOULD PLAN TO RAISE DIRECTLY WITH THE PRIME MINISTER OUR CONCERN ABOUT THE EFFECT ON INDO-US RELATIONS OF THE FOREIGN HAND ACCUSATION, AND TO ASSURE HER THAT WE ARE NOT DOING ANYTHING AND THAT WE SUPPORT INDIA'S INTEGRITY.

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THERE HAS BEEN THE PUBLIC AIRING OF INDIAN AND PAKISTANI ALLEGATIONS OF INTERFERENCE IN EACH OTHER'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS. WHEN THE SECRETARY ARRIVES,

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Exemptions <u>B1</u>	
ARP Action Cert. <u>url</u>	Date <u>8/5/00</u>

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INDO-PAK RELATIONS ARE LIKELY TO BE COOLER THAN WE WOULD HAVE EXPECTED, AND THERE MAY BE A GREATER TENDENCY FOR INDIANS TO RAISE THE ISSUE OF US ARMS SUPPLY TO PAKISTAN.

3. BRIEFING PAPERS FOR THE SECRETARY'S MEETINGS WITH MRS. GANDHI AND WITH FOREIGN MINISTER RAO: THE KEY DECISION HERE IS WHICH SUBJECTS THE SECRETARY SHOULD RAISE WITH MRS. GANDHI AND WHICH WITH THE FOREIGN MINISTER. WE RECOMMEND THE LIST FOR MRS. GANDHI INCLUDE: US SUPPORT FOR INTEGRITY OF INDIA (GETTING AT BOTH THE FOREIGN HAND ALLEGATIONS AND THE CONCERN ABOUT THE CHOHAN VISA) US POSITION ON INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ISSUES, INCLUDING GATT, MDB'S AND THE ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK; INDO-US COOPERATION IN THE FIELDS OF SCIENCE, EDUCATION AND CULTURAL EXCHANGE, ETC., (BUILDING ON ANNOUNCEMENTS MADE DURING HER VISIT TO THE US); AND US POLICY TOWARD AFGHANISTAN (AND PAKISTAN). IF TARAPUR SPARES ARE STILL A PROBLEM, THE SECRETARY SHOULD PROBABLY REASSURE HER OF OUR INTEREST IN FINDING A SOLUTION. FOR THE FOREIGN MINISTER, WE WOULD RECOMMEND A TOUR D'HORIZON, COVERING US APPROACH TO FOREIGN POLICY, THE MIDDLE EAST, SOUTH EAST ASIA AND CHINA, AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN AND NON-ALIGNMENT. THE SECRETARY SHOULD PLAN TO REASSURE RAO ALSO OF OUR SUPPORT FOR INDIA'S INTEGRITY, SINCE THIS HAS BEEN THE SUBJECT OF MESSAGES TO RAO. WE WOULD NOT RECOMMEND THAT HE TAKE UP TARAPUR SPARES WITH RAO, WHO HAS NOT BEEN PARTICULARLY INVOLVED IN THE ISSUE AS FAR AS WE ARE AWARE.

4. THE SECRETARY SHOULD BE PREPARED TO HEAR FROM BOTH
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MRS. GANDHI AND RAO INDIAN ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF THE UNGA SUMMIT IDEA AND POSSIBLY THE CONFERENCE ON MONEY AND FINANCE. WHILE WE ASSUME THE SECRETARY WILL NOT WANT TO INITIATE DISCUSSION OF THE UNGA SUMMIT QUESTION, SOME RECOGNITION SHOULD BE GIVEN TO HER ROLE AS NAM CHAIRMAN. ONE WAY MIGHT BE IN CONNECTION WITH THE DISCUSSION ON INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC SUBJECTS, SINCE SHE HAS WRITTEN THE PRESIDENT ABOUT THEM IN HER CAPACITY AS NAM CHAIRMAN.

5. CALLS ON THE PRESIDENT AND VICE PRESIDENT: THESE WILL BOTH BE BRIEF, COURTESY CALLS. PRESIDENT ZAIL SINGH WAS OPERATED ON IN HOUSTON LATE LAST YEAR AND RECENTLY HOSTED DR. MICHAEL DE BAKEY AT

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RASTRAPATI BHAWAN, THUS INQUIRIES ABOUT HIS HEALTH AND HIS TREATMENT IN THE UNITED STATES WOULD BE APPROPRIATE. ZAAL SINGH'S ENGLISH IS LIMITED, AND HE MAY HAVE AN INTERPRETER PRESENT. VICE PRESIDENT MOHAMMAD HIDAYATULLAH IS MORE OF A CONVERSATIONALIST THAN THE PRESIDENT AND COULD BE ASKED ABOUT HIS ACTIVITIES AS CHAIRMAN OF THE RAJYA SABHA, A ROLE HE TAKES SERIOUSLY. HE ALSO MIGHT BE WILLING TO COMMENT ON HIS FEBRUARY/MARCH TRIP TO EGYPT AND JORDAN. BARNES

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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ISLAMABAD 09475

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DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS USCINCCENT AND CINCPAC; ALSO FOR
POLADS

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PREL AF PK XD UR
SUBJECT: THE SECRETARY'S VISIT TO PAKISTAN: AFGHANISTAN

REF: (A) ISLAMABAD 9195; (B) KABUL 0823

1. (S) ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY AND INTRODUCTION: THIS MESSAGE OFFERS
OUR SUGGESTIONS FOR THE BRIEFING PAPER ON THE
AFGHANISTAN ISSUE FOR THE SECRETARY'S DISCUSSIONS WITH
PRESIDENT ZIA AND FOREIGN MINISTER YAQUB KHAN. OUR
OBJECTIVE SHOULD BE TO REVIEW FRANKLY AND
REALISTICALLY THE PROBLEMS FACING OUR TWO COUNTRIES
BEYOND THE TACTICAL SITUATION OF THE CORDOVEZ

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NEGOTIATIONS IN WHAT SEEMS LIKELY TO BE A PROTRACTED
CONTINUATION OF THE AFGHANISTAN PROBLEM WITHOUT AN
INTERNATIONALLY ACCEPTABLE POLITICAL SOLUTION. THE

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: FRANK E. SCHMELZER
DATE/CASE ID: 2 MAR 1999 199403680

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SECRETARY'S DISCUSSION WITH NWFP GOVERNOR FAZLE HAQ IN PESHAWAR SHOULD BE CONFINED TO OBTAINING HIS APPRECIATION OF THE POLITICAL AND SECURITY PROBLEMS FACING HIS PROVINCE. END SUMMARY.

3. AS WE STATED IN OUR COMMENTS ON CHARGE DUNBAR'S END-OF-TOUR ASSESSMENT, IT WOULD BE APPROPRIATE AT THIS TIME TO REVIEW OUR POLICIES ON AFGHANISTAN. IN CONNECTION WITH SUCH A REVIEW, WE THINK THE SECRETARY'S VISIT TO PAKISTAN PROVIDES AN OPPORTUNITY TO BEGIN THIS PROCESS AND TO SET THE STAGE FOR FOCUSING THE ATTENTION OF BOTH WASHINGTON AND ISLAMABAD ON THE CHALLENGES FACING US AS THE AFGHAN-ISTAN PROBLEM IN ALL LIKELIHOOD CONTINUES WITHOUT AN INTERNATIONALLY ACCEPTABLE POLITICAL SOLUTION IN THE SHORT TERM.

4. THERE IS A GOOD CHANCE OUR CURRENT SET OF POLICIES WILL NOT TAKE US WHERE WE WANT TO GO--BRINGING ABOUT THE COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET TROOPS. WITH A POPULATION OF OVER 260 MILLION AND VIRTUALLY NO DOMESTIC PUBLIC OPINION TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE SOVIETS CAN AFFORD TO TAKE CASUALTIES AT THE PRESENT RATE INTERMINABLY. MOST OBSERVERS, WE THINK, WOULD AGREE THAT THE PRESENT LEVEL OF INTERNATIONAL PRESSURES IS NOT EXTRACTING A SIGNIFICANT COST FROM THE SOVIETS. WE SEE NO OTHER SUBSTANTIAL SOURCES OF PRESSURE.

5. MOREOVER, WE ARE NOT GIVING THE SOVIETS ANY COMPELLING INCENTIVE TO NEGOTIATE SERIOUSLY NOW. WE HAVE YET TO DEMONSTRATE THAT WE CAN INCREASE THE COSTS THEY HAVE TO

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PAY; INDEED, OUR EFFORTS ARE NOW DIRECTED AT MAINTAINING THE POSITION WE HAVE BUILT SO FAR. THE SOVIETS HAVE GROUNDS FOR SKEPTICISM ABOUT OUR ABILITY TO DO SO. THE PROCESS OF THE U.N. NEGOTIATIONS HAS COME TO DOMINATE THE DIALOGUE. OUR CURRENT POSTURE TOWARD THESE TALKS, HIGHLIGHTING SUPPORT FOR THE UN EFFORT AND FOR PAKISTAN'S ROLE, IS CORRECT; BUT WE SHOULD HAVE A BROADER BASED POLICY AND DEEPER DIALOGUE WITH THE GOP.

6. THE CURRENT SITUATION FAVORS THE SOVIETS. THE MUJAHIDEEN MAY HAVE FOUGHT THE SOVIETS TO A STALEMATE IN AFGHANISTAN, BUT OVER THE LONG RUN THE DECISIVE FACTOR WILL BE SOVIETS STAYING POWER AND THE LIMITED

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MUJAHIDEEN RESOURCES. THE GOP MAY BE STICKING TO ITS PRINCIPLES ON A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT, BUT AS THE SOVIETS ARE ABLE TO CONSOLIDATE THEIR POSITION, THE GOP WILL FIND IT HAS LESS LEVERAGE. AS ANDROPOV ALREADY HAS INDICATED, WITH THE PASSAGE OF TIME THE SOVIETS WILL HAVE LESS CAUSE TO BE INTERESTED IN A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT. OVER TIME, THERE IS A CONSIDERABLE LIKELIHOOD THAT THE YEARLY UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTIONS WILL BECOME PRO FORMA (LIKE THE PALESTINE AND SOUTH AFRICAN RESOLUTIONS) AND OTHER ISSUES WILL OVERTAKE THEM IN IMPORTANCE.

7. THERE ARE SEVERAL AREAS IN WHICH WE CAN RATCHET UP THE COSTS:

RESISTANCE ACTIVITY: THE REFUGEES CONSISTENTLY COMPLAIN ABOUT THE SUPPORT THEY ARE RECEIVING. CONSIDERATION SHOU BE GIVEN TO WAYS TO IMPROVE THEIR MATERIAL SITUATION

NOTE BY OC/T: NOT PASSED MILITARY ADDRESSEES.

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FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4599
INFO AMCONSUL KARACHI

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AMCONSUL PESHAWAR POUCH
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY BEIJING
AMEMBASSY KABUL

S E C R E T SECTION 02 OF 03 ISLAMABAD 09475

EXDIS

DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS USCINCCENT AND CINCPAC; ALSO FOR
POLADS

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PREL AF PK XD UR
SUBJECT: THE SECRETARY'S VISIT TO PAKISTAN; AFGHANISTAN

IN WHAT ESSENTIALLY WILL REMAIN AN INDIGENOUS STRUGGLE.

RESISTANCE UNITY: WE COULD EXPLORE THE POSSIBILITY OF
A MORE ACTIVE ROLE EITHER BY THE US OR PAKISTAN IN
PROMOTING RESISTANCE UNITY. THE MUJAHIDEEN'S
FRAGMENTATION HAS HURT THEIR EFFECTIVENESS IN THE
FIELD. IT HAS ALSO BEEN A MAJOR REASON THE UN HAS
BEEN ABLE TO IGNORE THEIR DEMANDS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS.

RESISTANCE STATUS: WE AND OUR ALLIES COULD ACCORD A
MORE UNIFIED RESISTANCE SOME SORT OF OFFICIAL STATUS.

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THIS COULD STRENGTHEN THEIR HAND IN DEALINGS WITH THE UN
AND WITH THE SOVIETS.

CHALLENGE TO THE DRA: THESE EFFORTS COULD BE COMBINED
WITH A CHALLENGE TO THE DRA CREDENTIALS IN THE UN
AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGENCIES AS WELL AS WITH THE
CLOSURE OF WESTERN EMBASSIES IN KABUL. WE WOULD
NOT EXPECT PAKISTAN TO BE IDENTIFIED WITH A WESTERN
CHALLENGE.

CHARGE DUNBAR OUTLINED SOME OTHER POSSIBILITIES IN HIS
END-OF-TOUR ASSESSMENT (REF B) AND WE ADDED SOME THOUGHTS
IN OUR COMMENTS ON HIS CABLE. DEPARTMENT AND OTHER
POSTS PROBABLY COULD COME UP WITH SOME MORE IDEAS.

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8. IN THE SHORT RUN, IMPLEMENTING A CHANGE IN APPROACH WOULD PROBABLY REQUIRE SOME DIFFERENTIATION OF OUR POLICY FROM THAT OF PAKISTAN. SINCE THE SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN, WE HAVE LARGELY BEEN CONTENT TO FOLLOW PAKISTAN'S LEAD DIPLOMATICALLY (WITH THE NOTABLE EXCEPTION OF THE US-SOVIET EXPERTS TALKS) AND IN DEALINGS WITH THE RESISTANCE. THERE HAS BEEN A VALID REASON FOR THIS: PAKISTAN WOULD BEAR THE BRUNT OF A SOVIET RESPONSE. SINCE THE SOVIETS WILL ATTEMPT TO EXPLOIT ANY DIFFERENCES, IT WILL BE EVEN MORE IMPERATIVE THAT WE CONSULT CLOSELY AS WE PROCEED.

9. WE BELIEVE WE NOW HAVE MORE ROOM FOR MANUEVER IN RAISING THE COSTS TO THE SOVIETS. THE SOVIET UNION MAY NOW BE LESS INCLINED TO REACT TO US INITIATIVES BY ATTEMPTING TO INCREASE PRESSURE ON PAKISTAN. THE GOP HAS BUILT-UP A STRONG PUBLIC AND GOVERNMENT-TO-GOVERNMENT CASE FOR ITS COMMITMENT TO
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A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT. IN ADDITION, THE SOVIETS ALREADY HAVE A CONSIDERABLE STAKE IN TRYING TO WEAN PAKISTAN FROM OPPOSITION THROUGH NEGOTIATION. THE GOP, MOREOVER, IS IN A BETTER POSITION TODAY TO WITHSTAND SOVIET PRESSURES, SINCE DELIVERIES OF US MILITARY EQUIPMENT HAVE BEGUN AND THE GOP ENJOYS SUBSTANTIAL DIPLOMATIC SUPPORT.

10. A DECISION TO EMBARK ON THIS COURSE WOULD REQUIRE A CONTINUING CLEAR AND HIGH-LEVEL COMMITMENT TO OUR ASSISTANCE PROGRAM FOR PAKISTAN. THE ADMINISTRATION WOULD HAVE TO REDOUBLE ITS EFFORTS FOR FULL FUNDING OF THE PROGRAM UPON WHICH WE AGREED WITH PAKISTAN IN SEPTEMBER 1981, INCLUDING RETROACTIVE PAYMENTS FOR THOSE YEARS IN WHICH SHORTFALLS CANNOT BE IMMEDIATELY MADE GOOD. THE ADMINISTRATION MIGHT EVEN BEGIN TO CONSIDER WHETHER TO INCREASE THE LEVEL OF AID IN A FOLLOW-ON FIVE YEAR PROGRAM.

11. WE DO NOT RECOMMEND AN IMMEDIATE CHANGE IN POLICIES. RATHER, DURING HIS TALKS WITH PRESIDENT ZIA AND FOREIGN MINISTER YAQUB, THE SECRETARY COULD BEGIN TO EXPLORE PAKISTANI VIEWS. HE COULD, FOR EXAMPLE, DESCRIBE OUR CONCERNS RE SOVIET STAYING POWER AND THE LIMITS OF CURRENT INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE SUMMARIZED ABOVE AND INDICATE THAT WE HAVE BEGUN TO CONSIDER

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ADDITIONAL STEPS FOR INCREASING PRESSURE ON THE
SOVIETS IF THEIR APPROACH AND POLICIES REMAIN UNCHANGED.
HE COULD ASK FOR THEIR THOUGHTS ON WHAT COULD BE DONE
ABSENT SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS TO
INFLUENCE SOVIET POLICY IN THE DIRECTION WE WANT TO
MOVE.

NOTE BY OC/T: NOT PASSED MILITARY ADDRESSEES.

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PAGE 01 ISLAMA 09475 03 OF 03 010614Z
ACTION SS-25

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S E C R E T SECTION 03 OF 03 ISLAMABAD 09475

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Date Printed: 11/24/1997 DOC_NUMBER: 83ISLAMA09475 CHANNEL: n/a 3
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E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PREL AF PK XD UR
SUBJECT: THE SECRETARY'S VISIT TO PAKISTAN: AFGHANISTAN

12. THE SECRETARY SHOULD EMPHASIZE OUR DETERMINATION TO REMAIN IN CLOSE PARTNERSHIP WITH PAKISTAN ON THIS ISSUE OVER THE LONG RUN AND ALLAY ANY LATENT CONCERNS THAT PAKISTAN MIGHT FIND ITSELF ONE DAY WITHOUT THE REQUISITE SUPPORT FACING THE SOVIET BEAR. WHILE OF COURSE, THE SECRETARY CANNOT BE EXPECTED TO DISCUSS A THEORETICAL SITUATION FIVE OR TEN YEARS FROM NOW IN ANY DETAIL, HE COULD ALSO INDICATE THAT WE ARE SENSITIVE TO AND CONCERNED ABOUT THE PROBLEMS WHICH MAY FACE PAKISTAN IF THE SOVIETS ULTIMATELY REMAIN OBDURATE

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INCLUDING WHAT TO DO WITH THE THREE MILLION REFUGEES AND THE NEED FOR STRENGTHENED REGIONAL SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS IN THE LATE EIGHTIES. IN SUM THESE DISCUSSIONS SHOULD BE MORE THAN JUST A REVIEW OF THE IMMEDIATE TACTICAL SITUATION BUT A FRANK AND REALISTIC EVALUATION OF THE PROBLEMS WE FACE TOGETHER IN WHAT SEEMS LIKELY TO BE A LONG TERM AND PROTRACTED PROBLEM.

13. KABUL MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.
SPIERS

NOTE BY OC/T: NOT PASSED MILITARY ADDRESSEES.

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United States Department of State

Washington, D. C. 20520

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B1, 1.5(C), 1.5(D)

BRIEFING MEMORANDUM
S/S

SECRET

TO: The Secretary
FROM: NEA - Nicholas A. Veliotos
SUBJECT: Your Meeting with President Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq of Pakistan, Sunday, July 3, 1983

I. YOUR OBJECTIVES

1. Discuss progress in the development of U.S.-Pakistan bilateral security relations.
2. Obtain Zia's views on the Afghanistan situation.
3. Reiterate U.S. concerns on the nuclear issue.

II. SETTING

Your visit to Islamabad provides an opportunity to continue the dialogue established with President Zia during his visit to Washington in December. Discussions with the Pakistani leader, always relatively free and frank, have added depth as our bilateral relationship has continued its positive development. Talks at this stage provide a useful benchmark of the course of Zia's thinking on a number of important issues. Your meeting with Zia will continue through dinner. This briefing paper addresses topics we recommend for the pre-dinner discussion.

III. PARTICIPANTS

U.S.

The Secretary
Nicholas A. Veliotos,
Assistant Secretary, NEA
Ambassador Spiers
Howard B. Schaffer,
Deputy Assistant Secretary,
NEA

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: SHARON E. AHMAD
DATE/CASE ID: 3 AUG 2001 199403680
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 25Y1 REASON: 1.5(D)
PAKISTAN

President Zia
Foreign Minister Yaqub
General Arif
Finance Minister Ghulam
Ishaq

Harmon E. Kirby, Country Director, NEA/PAB
Ambassador Ejaz Azim

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IV. DISCUSSION OF OBJECTIVES

1. Discuss progress in the development of U.S.-Pakistan bilateral security relations.

Since your last conversation with Zia in December, the delivery by the Administration of important, tangible evidence of our commitment to Pakistan has gained momentum. Shortly before Zia's arrival in December, the controversy over release of the ALR-69 radar warning receiver for Pakistan's F-16s was resolved in Pakistan's favor. Since then, the F-16 program and other weapons programs have continued on course. Most important, however, has been the major effort made by the Administration to achieve full funding for the Pakistan economic and military program in Congress. Despite the absence of strong Congressional support for the Pakistan program, it appears that we shall succeed in providing nearly the full amount of assistance envisioned in FY83 (the full \$200 million in economic assistance and \$200 million of \$275 million in FMS, with both the House and Senate Appropriations Committees approving some portion of the remaining \$75 million in the supplemental) and we have done well in the authorizing committee mark-ups of the FY84 request (the House Foreign Affairs Committee approved the full Administration request, the SFRC notionally provided \$200 million of \$225 million in economic aid and \$280 million of \$300 million in the FMS request).

The Pakistanis have informed us that they understand and appreciate the lengths to which the Administration has gone on behalf of the Pakistani program. Nevertheless, Zia is likely to raise several additional items on the Pakistani shopping list, most notably the Harpoon anti-ship missile, AIM-9L missile for the F-16s, the Copperhead anti-tank missile, the advanced Stinger (as opposed to the basic Stinger approved for Pakistan), and, possibly, the desirability of concluding a Memorandum of Understanding on Defense Co-production. On our side, you may want to lay down a marker for Zia on our interest in further enhancing the security relationship between our two countries by inaugurating in the months ahead several low profile cooperative activities. We believe the Pakistani military services favor these activities but approval has been withheld pending a political decision by senior policy-makers. If Zia responds positively to this subject, you might want to suggest that Ambassador Spiers engage in more detailed discussions with a member of Zia's staff.

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Talking Points

-- The inauguration of the Joint Commission at my meeting tomorrow with Foreign Minister Yaqub will mark another important development in our bilateral relationship.

-- In Washington we have been very pleased with the course of our relations over the past year and believe we are well on the way to securing the close, enduring bilateral relationship both countries seek.

-- In particular, we are pleased that we have been able to obtain nearly the entire quantum of assistance for Pakistan for this fiscal year despite the very difficult U.S. budgetary environment.

-- Let me assure you that we will not rest on our laurels but will continue our efforts, through a variety of means, to obtain full funding for Pakistan although it is too soon to say whether we shall achieve total success.

-- Nevertheless, we must face the possibility that we will not obtain the entire quantum of envisaged assistance this year, and I believe that our staffs should stay in close touch.

-- (if raised) I believe that our record in providing to Pakistan the equipment it has sought is very good. I understand that there are additional items which you desire, and we will want to work closely with you to examine these requests on a case-by-case basis. We expect to inform Congress in the weeks just ahead of our intention to provide the Harpoon to Pakistan.

-- As you know, some of these items encompass sensitive technologies and, given the bruising fight we had in releasing the ALR-69 for Pakistan, we want to wait for the right time before considering additional difficult requests.

-- (if raised) We have, from the beginning of our bilateral discussions on support for the Government of Pakistan, agreed with your request for assistance in developing an indigenous defense industry. That support continues.

-- We are currently examining whether a Memorandum of Understanding would be the most efficient way of approaching this issue or whether we should approach it on the basis of individual items. We hope to have an answer shortly.

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-- One matter which we consider important in the further development of our relationship, and which would be very helpful in winning additional Congressional support for our assistance program, would be the enhancement of cooperation by our military services.

-- We envision several low profile efforts which would not compromise your non-aligned status or garner undue attention, such as P-3 access to Pakistani airfields, or some small joint exercises. We hope you will review these possibilities and agree that they would be useful.

-- The inauguration of the Joint Commission at my meeting today with Foreign Minister Yaqub marks another important development in our bilateral relationship since it provides the framework for expansion of our relations in non-military fields.

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2. Obtain Zia's views on the Afghanistan situation

An understanding of Zia's views on Afghanistan has become particularly important as developments in the indirect talks suggest to some observers the possibility of a negotiated settlement. We think Zia has historically been more pessimistic about the prospects for a political resolution and firmer in his support for continued Pakistani opposition to the Soviet invasion than have several of his principal advisers. Recent evidence suggests that this continues to be the case. We will want to explore this and sound out Zia on his overall views on the likely future course of events in Afghanistan.

Talking Points

-- I had a very useful session with Foreign Minister Yaqub in Washington a few weeks ago on the Geneva talks and again this afternoon at the Foreign Ministry.

-- I am hoping to get your own assessment, however, of the overall prospects in Afghanistan. Do you believe these talks can achieve the desired end? How do you think the Afghanistan situation will evolve over the months ahead in its many dimensions?

-- President Reagan shares very much your goal of peacefully resolving this crisis. We have made that point, as well, to Foreign Minister Gromyko and UN Secretary General Perez de Cuellar.

(FYI. If Zia casts doubt on whether all the foregoing is achievable, you should hear him out noncommittally, while encouraging him to give you his full views of how much is obtainable on each element).

-- We feel very strongly, however, that only a settlement based on the four points of the UN resolutions (full Soviet troop withdrawal, return in safety and honor of the refugees, return of Afghan independent status, and self-determination) can be enduring and can meet Pakistan's and everyone else's fundamental interests. I would be interested in your assessment of whether all these desiderata are obtainable in UN or other negotiations.

-- I am also looking forward to my visit tomorrow to an Afghan refugee camp. Let me reiterate the admiration of the American people for the magnificent effort your country has made in caring for these millions of victims.

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
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3. Reiterate U.S. concerns on the nuclear issue.

We want to reaffirm to the Pakistanis the U.S. commitment to non-proliferation, reiterating our concerns about the consequences continued Pakistani nuclear weapons development would have for our relationship, and reaffirm the importance we place on Zia's assurances in Washington last December that Pakistan will not develop a nuclear explosive device.

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Talking Points

-- A subject which remains of great importance to my government is our opposition to the proliferation of nuclear explosives.

-- We have discussed in the past the grave consequences we see for our relationship if Pakistan were to proceed with a nuclear explosives development program, or if it were begin unsafeguarded reprocessing of nuclear fuel

-- We welcome and place great value on your assurances in Washington last December that Pakistan will not develop a nuclear explosive device of any kind.



-- As a matter of law and policy, we will engage in peaceful nuclear cooperation only with nations which accept safeguards on all of their nuclear facilities. We do not intend to discriminate against Pakistan.

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-- We are prepared to assist other countries in developing their nuclear power programs where all facilities have been placed under international safeguards.

-- (if asked) It remains our policy to pursue agreement among suppliers not to provide significant new nuclear assistance to any country which does not accept such comprehensive safeguards.

-- (if pressed) The Tarapur case posed a special dilemma for us. While we had difficulty reaching a decision on spare parts because of our non-proliferation legislation, we believed it important to help resolve a genuine health and safety problem involving these U.S.-built reactors. It would not be in anyone's interest to increase the potential for a major nuclear accident.

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FOLLOWING ISLAMABAD 11511 DTD 7/04/83 SENT ACTION SECSTATE
BEING REPEATED FOR YOUR ACTION

QUOTE S E C R E T ISLAMABAD 11511

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PLEASE PASS TO SECRETARY'S AIRCRAFT FOR RAY SEITZ

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, PARM, PK, US
SUBJECT: SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH PRESIDENT ZIA-UL-HAQ
OF PAKISTAN

1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT. THIS IS A DRAFT MESSAGE FOR
SECRETARY'S APPROVAL.

2. SUMMARY. DURING LENGTHY MEETING WITH SECRETARY
EVENING JULY 3 PRESIDENT ZIA SAID IT WOULD BE "A MIRACLE"
IF INDIRECT GENEVA TALKS OVER AFGHANISTAN LED TO SOVIET
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TROOP WITHDRAWAL, BUT THAT IT WAS PRUDENT TO KEEP TALKS

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GOING TO FORESTALL SOVIETS EXERCISING OTHER POLICY OPTIONS (I.E., MILITARY ESCALATION -- FOREIGN MINISTER MENTIONED POSSIBLE STRIKES AT PAKISTAN SANCTUARIES). ZIA SAID SOVIETS HAD PROBED IN REGARD TO POSSIBLY MORE ACCEPTABLE REPLACEMENT FOR BABRAK KARMAL. SECRETARY CAUTIONED ON DIRECT CONTACT WITH ANY SOVIET-INSTALLED REGIME IN KABUL.

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ON LEBANON ZIA WAS SURPRISINGLY OPTIMISTIC BUT EMPHASIZED THAT PALESTINIANS REMAIN KEY TO A SOLUTION. HE EXPRESSED HOPE U.S.-CHINA DIFFICULTIES WOULD BE RESOLVED AND FELT WE COULD ESTABLISH MORE NORMAL RELATIONS WITH IRAN AFTER KHOMEINI WAS OUT OF THE WAY. ZIA ASKED FOR AND RECEIVED A BRIEFING FROM SECRETARY ON CENTRAL AMERICA. NARCOTICS ISSUE WAS RAISED BY ZIA WHO CITED PROGRESS, PROMISED CONTINUED FIRM ACTION AND ASKED FOR EVEN CLOSER U.S.-PAK COOPERATION. IN CLOSING ZIA EXPRESSED GRATIFICATION OVER CURRENT STATE OF U.S.-PAK BILATERAL RELATIONS. HE FEELS WE HAVE MADE GREAT PROGRESS. END SUMMARY.

3. ON THE LAST EVENING OF HIS VISIT TO PAKISTAN THE SECRETARY MET WITH PRESIDENT ZIA FOR CLOSE TO THREE HOURS AT THE PRESIDENT'S RESIDENCE IN RAWALPINDI. MEETING FLOWED INTO DINNER WITH NO INTERRUPTION IN THE CONVERSATION. THE SECRETARY WAS ACCOMPANIED BY AMBASSADOR SPIERS, ASSISTANT SECRETARY VELLIOTES, ASSISTANT SECRETARY HUGHES, KEMP FROM NSC, DAS SCHAFFER, AND DCM KING. PRESIDENT ZIA HAD WITH HIM FOREIGN MINISTER YAQUB KHAN, AMBASSADOR AZIM, HIS CHIEF OF STAFF GENERAL ARIF, DIRECTOR OF INTERSERVICES INTELLIGENCE GENERAL AKHTAR.

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FOREIGN SECRETARY NAIK AND ADDITIONAL SECRETARIES NAJMUDDIN SHAIKH AND HUMAYUN KHAN.

4. THE SECRETARY BEGAN THE MEETING BY HANDING OVER A LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT, WHICH ZIA READ, EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR, AND PASSED TO FOREIGN MINISTER YAQUB. CONVERSATION TURNED FIRST TO THE MIDDLE EAST, WITH ZIA EXPRESSING SURPRISING OPTIMISM THAT "LEBANON IS PRACTICALLY SOLVED." EXPLAINING BASIS FOR HIS OPTIMISM, ZIA SAID THAT HE FELT U.S. WAS WELL-POSITIONED TO

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ACHIEVE SOLUTION. EGYPT IS ON THE SIDELINES. JORDAN IS TOO SMALL TO PLAY A LEADING ROLE. ARABS HAVE, FOR THE FIRST TIME, SOME CONSENSUS ON A PROPOSED SOLUTION AND LEBANON HAS REGAINED ITS NATIONAL CHARACTER, EVEN IF IT IS AT THE EXPENSE OF THE PLO. IS "LEFT OUT OF THE GAME"

THERE WOULD SEEM TO BE SOME GOOD POSSIBILITIES FOR ACHIEVING A SATISFACTORY RESULT.

5. HAVING EXPRESSED OPTIMISM, ZIA WENT ON TO SAY THAT HE SHOULD ALSO SOUND A NOTE OF CAUTION. PALESTINIAN INVOLVEMENT IS STILL THE CRITICAL ISSUE, AND PALESTINIANS COULD STILL DESTABILIZE THE SITUATION BY DRAWING SUPER-POWERS INTO A CONFRONTATION. HOWEVER, HE BELIEVES PLO HAS FINALLY COME TO RECOGNIZE THE REALITY OF THE SITUATION AND THAT THEY WILL BE VERY LUCKY INDEED TO GET BACK THEIR TERRITORY. NEVERTHELESS, THERE CAN BE NO MIDDLE EAST SOLUTION, ZIA SAID, WITHOUT COMING TO GRIPS WITH THE PALESTINIAN FACTOR. THE SECRETARY SAID PRESIDENT ZIA COULD BE ASSURED THAT WE ARE COMING TO GRIPS WITH THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE, WHICH WE AGREE IS THE KEY TO A SOLUTION. TWO MONTHS AGO WE THOUGHT THAT AN AGREEMENT WAS

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IN HAND, BUT IT FELL APART. THE SECRETARY WONDERED, IN THE MANEUVERING THAT HAD BEEN GOING ON, WHO WAS CONSIDERING THE PLIGHT OF THE PALESTINIANS THEMSELVES AS HUMAN BEINGS. ANYONE CLAIMING LEADERSHIP OF THE PALESTINIANS SHOULD REPRESENT THEIR INTERESTS. YASSER ARAFAT HAS TRIED TO KEEP THE KIND OF THINKING THAT GEORGE HABASH REPRESENTS FROM BECOMING DOMINANT.

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6. PRESIDENT ZIA THEN CHANGED TOPICS BY ASKING WHAT WERE THE SECRETARY'S IMPRESSIONS FROM SOUTHEAST ASIA AND INDIA. THE SECRETARY SAID THAT IT HAD BEEN A GOOD TRIP WITH POSITIVE RESULTS IN THE PHILIPPINES AND AT THE ASEAN MEETING, AND THAT HE WAS GENERALLY PLEASED WITH HIS

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DISCUSSIONS IN INDIA ON BILATERAL MATTERS. THE U.S. WISHED TO HAVE GOOD RELATIONS WITH BOTH INDIA AND PAKISTAN AND WOULD LIKE TO SEE THE TWO COUNTRIES FRIENDS WITH EACH OTHER. IT SHOULD, OF COURSE, BE UNDERSTOOD THAT OUR RELATIONS WITH EACH WOULD BE BASED ON OUR OWN JUDGMENT OF WHAT THESE RELATIONS SHOULD BE. THE SECRETARY SAID IT WAS HIS IMPRESSION THAT INDIA SINCERELY WISHED TO HAVE BETTER RELATIONS WITH PAKISTAN. ZIA RESPONDED THAT HE HOPED THAT THE U.S. WOULD "FIND ITS RIGHTFUL PLACE" IN INDIA. GOOD U.S.-INDIAN RELATIONS WERE IN PAKISTAN'S OWN INTEREST AS WERE GOOD RELATIONS BETWEEN INDIA AND CHINA, WHICH ALSO SEEMED TO BE IMPROVING. THESE TRENDS WERE GOOD FOR REGIONAL STABILITY AS A WHOLE. THE ONE ISSUE THAT IT WOULD BE IMPORTANT TO GAIN INDIAN SUPPORT FOR IS, OF COURSE, ENDING THE SOVIET OCCUPATION OF AFGHANISTAN. ZIA SAID HE HAD RAISED THIS WITH INDIRA GANDHI AS EARLY AS 1980 WHEN THEY MET IN ZIMBABWE. AND
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HE HAD IN ALL SINCERITY TRIED TO INVOLVE HER IN A POSITIVE WAY. SHE, HOWEVER, REJECTED HIS ARGUMENT THAT AS A FRIEND OF THE SOVIET UNION INDIA COULD HAVE CONSIDERABLE INFLUENCE IN EFFECTING SOVIET WITHDRAWAL. SHE DENIED THAT INDIA ENJOYED ANY SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SOVIET UNION AND PUT THE PROBLEM RIGHT BACK ON PAKISTAN'S DOORSTEP.

7. THE SECRETARY SAID IN THIS REGARD THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT TO BE REALISTIC ABOUT THE SOVIET UNION. PRESIDENT REAGAN BELIEVES STRONGLY THAT IT IS A MISTAKE TO AVOID PUBLIC CRITICISM WHEN SOVIET BEHAVIOR CALLS FOR IT. THIS IS WHY WE HAVE SPOKEN OUT FORTHRIGHTLY NOT ONLY ON AFGHANISTAN, BUT ON KAMPUCHEA AND CENTRAL AMERICA. THE SECRETARY SAID THAT ALTHOUGH IT MIGHT NOT BE SO READILY APPARENT, PUBLIC OPPOSITION TO SOVIET MISBEHAVIOR HAS ITS IMPORTANCE; AND HE WAS PARTICULARLY THINKING OF THE UN VOTES CONDEMNING RUSSIAN INVOLVEMENT IN AFGHANISTAN. PRESIDENT ZIA SAID HE BELIEVES IN STRAIGHT TALK TOO, AND HE HAD NOT MINCED WORDS IN DISCUSSING AFGHANISTAN DIRECTLY WITH ANDROPOV, EMPHASIZING THE NEED FOR A POLITICAL SOLUTION AND GIVING EFFECT TO THE UN RESOLUTIONS. FOREIGN MINISTER YAQUB ADDED THAT TO DO OTHERWISE IS TO EITHER CONFUSE THE SOVIETS OR LEAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT YOU ARE SUPINE. THE SECRETARY SAID THAT WE COULD CERTAINLY AGREE

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ON STRAIGHT TALK WITH THE USSR. HE THOUGHT TOO MANY PEOPLE PUT TOO MUCH EMPHASIS ON WHAT SIGNALS WERE BEING GIVEN THROUGH PUBLIC STATEMENTS. THE IMPRESSION WE WANT TO GET ACROSS IS WHAT WE SAY IS WHAT WE MEAN.

8. PRESIDENT ZIA EXPRESSED PLEASURE THAT THE SECRETARY HAD HAD A CHANCE TO VISIT THE AFGHAN BORDER AND SEE THE SITUATION AT FIRST HAND. PAKISTAN'S BORDERS PUT IT NOT ONLY IN A STRATEGIC BUT IN A VULNERABLE POSITION, SURROUNDED BY INDIA, SOVIET-OCCUPIED AFGHANISTAN AND IRAN. THE SECRETARY SAID THAT THE IRANIAN REGIME SEEMED

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FINALLY TO BE TAKING A MORE REALISTIC VIEW OF THE WORLD. ZIA SAID HE AGREED. PAKISTAN KNOWS FROM CLOSE AT HAND HOW SUSPICIOUS THE IRANIANS ARE. EVEN PAKISTAN'S ATTEMPTS TO ASSIST IN FINDING A SOLUTION TO THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR HAD BEEN MET WITH HOSTILITY. AND PAKISTAN'S POLICY OF STRICT NEUTRALITY BETWEEN IRAN AND IRAQ HAD WON IT ABUSE FROM BOTH SIDES. NEVERTHELESS, HE BELIEVED THAT THE U.S. SHOULD NOT GIVE UP ON IRAN, AND HE THOUGHT WE WOULD SOON SEE OPPORTUNITIES FOR ESTABLISHING BETTER RELATIONS. INTELLIGENCE CHIEF AKHTAR SAID A SIGNIFICANT FACTOR IS THAT IRAN NOW REALIZES THE THREAT IT FACES FROM THE SOVIET UNION, AS HAS BEEN DEMONSTRATED BY ITS ACTIONS AGAINST THE TUDEH PARTY AND SOVIET BLOC DIPLOMATS IN TEHRAN. IN FACT, THE SOVIETS HAVE FAILED TO GET THE Foothold IN IRAN THEY EXPECTED. THE SECRETARY THEN ASKED PRESIDENT ZIA WHAT ADVICE HE WOULD HAVE FOR THE U.S. IN REGARD TO IRAN.

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WHAT IS REQUIRED IS PATIENCE. RELATIONS, HE BELIEVED, COULD BE RESTORED OVER A PERIOD OF TIME.

9. THE SECRETARY SAID OUR POLICY OF NEUTRALITY BETWEEN IRAN AND IRAQ HAD COST US SOME FRIENDS AS WELL. ANOTHER FACTOR WE HAD TO CONSIDER WAS THAT, AFTER THE TAKING OF THE HOSTAGES, ANY STEP TOWARDS CLOSER RELATIONS WITH TEHRAN WOULD TAKE A LOT OF SELLING TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE. HOWEVER, WE DID ALREADY HAVE SOME DIRECT CONTACT IN THE INTERNATIONAL CLAIMS TRIBUNAL. VELIOTES ADDED

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THAT WE HAD AN EYE FOR THE FUTURE IN IRAN, AND WE HAVE
URGED OUR FRIENDS TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF DIPLOMATIC AND
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COMMERCIAL OPENINGS. THE TURKS HAD ALREADY ENTERED INTO
LARGE COMMERCIAL DEAL WITH THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT. ZIA
SAID JAPAN ALSO COULD EXERT A GOOD INFLUENCE. THE
SECRETARY SAID HE GATHERED THAT JAPAN WAS RESUMING WORK
ON THE PETRO-CHEMICAL COMPLEX IN IRAN FROM WHICH THEY
HAD WITHDRAWN AT THE TIME THE HOSTAGES WERE TAKEN.

10. ZIA THEN ASKED WHAT THE SECRETARY COULD TELL HIM
ABOUT WILLIAMSBURG. THE SECRETARY SAID THAT THINGS HAD
GONE QUITE WELL NOT ONLY FROM THE STANDPOINT OF SUBSTAN-
TIVE RESULTS BUT ALSO FROM THE STANDPOINT OF THE
PROCESS THAT HAD EMERGED AND THE RELATIONSHIPS THAT
DEVELOPED, FOR WHICH HE GAVE MOST OF THE CREDIT TO RONALD
REAGAN. IN PAST MEETINGS THEY HAD USUALLY FOUND THEM-
SELVES ON THE LAST DAY WITH A STAFF-PREPARED COMMUNIQUE
AND WITH THE HEADS OF STATE FEELING OBLIGED TO PAPER
OVER DISAGREEMENTS SO THAT THEY COULD COME UP WITH SOME
COMMON LANGUAGE. IT HAD BEEN OUR PRESIDENT'S VIEW, HOW-
EVER, THAT PRE-COOKED COMMUNIQUE WERE THE WRONG AP-
PROACH, AND HE HAD SET THE MEETINGS UP SO THAT THE HEADS
OF STATE COULD TALK DIRECTLY TO EACH OTHER WITH NO NOTE-
TAKERS, OR EVEN ANY INTERPRETERS IN VIEW. THEY ARGUED
THINGS BACK AND FORTH, AND AS A RESULT THE DOCUMENT THEY
ENDED UP WITH REPRESENTED WHAT THE HEADS OF STATE REALLY
AGREED ON; AND IT IS SIGNIFICANT THAT ALL OF THEM HAVE
STOOD BY THE RESULTS OF THE MEETING. IN REPLY TO ZIA'S
QUERY ON THE WORLD ECONOMIC SITUATION, THE SECRETARY SAID
THE U.S. RECOVERY WAS WELL LAUNCHED AND THAT THE KIND OF
GROWTH RATE WE HAVE SEEN IN THE LAST TWO QUARTERS, IN
AN ECONOMY THE SIZE OF AMERICA'S, WOULD HAVE A SUBSTAN-
TIAL EFFECT ON RECOVERY ELSEWHERE. PRESIDENT REAGAN
HAD PROVED TO BE RIGHTER THAN HIS OWN EXPERTS ON THE
RATE OF GROWTH THAT COULD BE REACHED BY THIS TIME; AND
NOW THAT THE PRESCRIPTION WAS BEGINNING TO HAVE EFFECT,
THE PRESIDENT WAS SOMEWHAT AMUSED TO SEE THAT THE TERM
"REAGANOMICS", WHICH HAD BEEN USED SO WIDELY BEFORE THE
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RECOVERY GOT GOING, SEEMED TO HAVE DISAPPEARED FROM THE VOCABULARY.

11. AT THIS POINT, THE PRESIDENT SUGGESTED THAT THE GROUP MOVE ACROSS THE HALL INTO THE DINING ROOM WHERE THE CONVERSATION IMMEDIATELY RESUMED, TURNING TO CHINA. THE SECRETARY ASKED WHAT ADVICE DID PRESIDENT ZIA HAVE ON CHINA. ZIA REPLIED THAT THAT WAS LIKE, TO QUOTE AN URDU PROVERB, MAKING A CANDLE LIGHT THE SUN. BUT, SINCE HE HAD BEEN ASKED, HE WOULD EMPHASIZE THE IMPORTANCE WHICH PAKISTAN ATTACHES TO GOOD RELATIONS BETWEEN CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES. HE MENTIONED PARTICULARLY TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY. ZIA SAID THAT PAKISTAN ALWAYS STOOD READY TO HELP IN ANY WAY IT COULD. IN 1971 PAKISTAN HAD, OF COURSE, SERVED AS A GO-BETWEEN IN ESTABLISHING U.S.-CHINESE RELATIONS, AND HE WAS QUITE PREPARED TO DO SO AGAIN IF WE EVER WANTED. THE SECRETARY SAID THAT RELATIONS WITH CHINA ARE QUITE IMPORTANT TO US, AND PRESIDENT ZIA COULD BE SURE THAT WE WOULD MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO PRESERVE THEM. PATIENCE WOULD BE REQUIRED. THE PROBLEM IS OUR DIFFERENT PERCEPTIONS REGARDING TAIWAN. WE ARE CERTAINLY NOT INTERESTED IN HAVING A CONFRONTATION OVER TAIWAN. OUR OBJECTIVE IS FOR THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT AND THE TAIWANESE TO REACH AN UNDERSTANDING WITH EACH OTHER. THE CHINESE, HOWEVER, MUST ALSO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT POLITICAL REALITIES. WE ARE NOT GOING TO TURN OUR BACKS ON OUR FRIENDS; BUT WITH PATIENCE WE BELIEVE THIS PROBLEM IN CHINESE-U.S. RELATIONS WILL WORK ITSELF OUT. ZIA OFFERED THE VIEW THAT THE U.S. TURNING ITS BACK ON A FRIEND WAS DAMAGING TO OUR CREDIBILITY WITH OUR OTHER FRIENDS.

12. PRESIDENT ZIA SAID HE WOULD BE INTERESTED IN HEARING
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SOMETHING ABOUT CENTRAL AMERICA. THE SECRETARY SAID THAT THERE OUR OBJECTIVE IS TO PROMOTE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, SOUND POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND A JUDICIAL SYSTEM WHICH WILL ASSURE SOME DEGREE OF JUSTICE. UNFORTUNATELY THE SOVIET UNION AND ITS ALLIES HAVE CHOSEN TO MEDDLE IN THIS SITUATION, AND IT IS NECESSARY TO PREVENT THEM FROM DESTABILIZING IT TO THE EXTENT THAT THESE OBJECTIVES, WHICH ARE CERTAINLY NOT MILITARY IN

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NATURE, CANNOT BE ACHIEVED. WE ARE GIVING THREE-QUARTERS OF A BILLION DOLLARS IN AID TO CENTRAL AMERICA, WHICH IS FAR IN EXCESS OF OUR MILITARY ASSISTANCE. PRESIDENT ZIA ASKED HOW EFFECTIVE THE MILITARY IS TODAY IN EL SALVADOR. THE SECRETARY SAID THAT THERE ARE OBVIOUSLY INADEQUACIES, BUT PART OF THE REASON IS THAT THE EL SALVADOR GOVERNMENT IS NEVER SURE WHAT KIND OF COMMITMENT IT CAN MAKE MILITARILY, SINCE THIS REQUIRES DEPENDABLE AMERICAN FINANCIAL SUPPORT; AND THE PERFORMANCE OF CONGRESS IN THIS REGARD HAS BEEN UNPREDICTABLE. THE ADMINISTRATION INTEND TO PURSUE POLICIES THAT IT BELIEVES MAKE SENSE IN CENTRAL AMERICA, AND WHICH ARE NOW BEGINNING TO GAIN CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORT. CENTRAL AMERICA IN PAST ADMINISTRATIONS WAS NEGLECTED FOR FAR TOO LONG; AND WE ARE NOW PAYING THE PRICE OF THAT NEGLECT.

13. PRESIDENT ZIA THEN SAID THAT THERE WERE TWO SUBJECTS THAT HAD CAUSED PROBLEMS IN OUR RELATIONSHIP, AND SINCE THE SECRETARY HAD NOT YET RAISED THEM HE WOULD LIKE TO. THE FIRST IS PAKISTAN'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM. ZIA SAID THAT

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14. THE SECOND MATTER THAT HAD CAUSED SOME PROBLEM IN OUR RELATIONS, ZIA SAID, WAS THE NARCOTICS SITUATION. THE GOP WAS TOTALLY COMMITTED TO WIPING OUT OPIUM AND HEROIN PRODUCTION AND TRAFFICKING IN PAKISTAN. ALREADY FORTY-ONE HEROIN LABORATORIES HAVE BEEN SEIZED AND THE ACREAGE DEVOTED TO POPPIES HAD BEEN REDUCED DRAMATICALLY. THE UNITED STATES WAS NOT ONLY HELPING IN DEVELOPING ALTERNATIVE SOURCES OF INCOME FOR FARMERS BUT ALSO BY GIVING MUCH VALUED ASSISTANCE IN INTELLIGENCE AND POLICE

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WORK IN APPREHENDING DEALERS AND TRAFFICKERS IN HEROIN. THE DEA AGENTS IN PAKISTAN WERE COOPERATING VERY SUCCESSFULLY WITH AGENCIES IN THE GOP, EVEN THOUGH THERE HAD BEEN A COUPLE OF "BAD EGGS", WHICH PROBABLY WAS BOUND TO HAPPEN IN THAT KIND OF WORK FROM TIME TO TIME (THIS WAS A REFERENCE TO ALLEGATIONS THAT TWO DEA AGENTS SMUGGLED FIREARMS INTO PAKISTAN TO SELL FOR PROFIT. ZIA SAID HE WISHED TO HAVE EVEN CLOSER COOPERATION WITH US, INCLUDING OUR ASSISTANCE IN ENCOURAGING THE GOVERNMENTS OF OTHER DEVELOPED COUNTRIES (WITH A HEROIN PROBLEM) TO ASSIST PAKISTAN IN FIGHTING THIS MENACE. THE SECRETARY WOULD BE FAMILIAR WITH THE PROBLEMS OF ENFORCING THE LAW IN THE TRIBAL TERRITORIES. THE GOP IS DOING WHAT IS POSSIBLE BUT CAN DO VERY LITTLE TO STOP THE FLOW OF DRUGS COMING ACROSS THE BORDER FROM AFGHANISTAN. THE SECRETARY SAID HE HAD BEEN WELL BRIEFED IN THE FOREIGN MINISTRY AND IN PESHAWAR ON WHAT PAKISTAN IS DOING. HE TOO HOPED WE COULD COOPERATE EVEN FURTHER ON THIS PROBLEM, WHICH WAS A SERIOUS ONE BOTH FOR THE AMERICAN PEOPLE AND THE

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CONGRESS, AND HE ACCEPTED THE PRESIDENT'S ASSURANCES THAT PAKISTAN IS COMMITTED TO SUPPRESSING HEROIN PRODUCTION AND TRAFFICKING.

15. ON AFGHANISTAN, THE SECRETARY SAID THAT HE HAD HAD THOROUGH TALKS WITH FOREIGN MINISTER YAQUB BUT WOULD LIKE TO HEAR HOW THE PRESIDENT SAW THE SITUATION AND WHAT HE THOUGHT THE PROSPECTS WERE FOR THE INDIRECT TALKS GOING ON UNDER U.N. AUSPICES. ZIA SAID THAT IF THE INDIRECT TALKS RESULTED IN WITHDRAWAL OF RUSSIAN TROOPS FROM AFGHANISTAN IT "WOULD BE NOTHING SHORT OF A MIRACLE", AND HE DIDN'T BELIEVE IN MIRACLES IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY. HOWEVER, IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT THE TALKS CONTINUE NOT ONLY BECAUSE ONE MUST ALWAYS HOPE FOR A MIRACLE BUT BECAUSE ONCE THE TALKING HAS STOPPED THE RUSSIANS MIGHT BE TEMPTED TO EXERCISE SOME OF THE OTHER POLICY OPTIONS THAT THEY HAVE. ZIA REITERATED PAKISTAN'S COMMITMENT TO THE PRINCIPLES EMBODIED IN THE UN RESOLUTIONS ON AFGHANISTAN AND SAID THERE WOULD BE NO DIRECT COMMUNICATION WITH BABRAK KARMAL. ZIA SAID THAT THE SOVIETS HAD A COUPLE OF TIMES APPROACHED THE PAKISTANIS ASKING THEM TO IDENTIFY SOMEONE WHO MIGHT REPLACE BABRAK. HE SUGGESTED THAT ALTHOUGH THEY WOULD

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NEVER RECOGNIZE BABRAK, THEY MIGHT CHANCE ACCEPTING SOMEONE ELSE, PRESUMABLY IN THE CONTEXT OF A SETTLEMENT INVOLVING SOVIET WITHDRAWAL. THE SECRETARY CAUTIONED THAT SUCH A COURSE WOULD INVOLVE RISKS; THE SOVIETS MIGHT SUBSTITUTE ONE COMMUNIST FOR ANOTHER IN A COSMETIC CHANGE. ZIA SAID A NEW LEADER MIGHT INITIALLY NOT BE ACCEPTED BUT COULD LATER ATTRACT SUPPORT. IF THE GOVERNMENT IN KABUL BECAME MORE BROAD BASED THERE MIGHT BE SOME POSSIBILITY FOR CONTACT. THE SECRETARY SAID THAT HE COULD SEE LITTLE ADVANTAGE IN CONTACT WITH ANY REGIME THAT WAS INSTALLED BY THE RUSSIANS. AMBASSADOR SPIERS SAID THAT THE INSURGENTS WOULD NOT ACCEPT A GOVERNMENT THAT INVOLVED SIMPLY
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COSMETIC CHANGES. ZIA MENTIONED THAT EX-KING ZAHIR COULD COME FORWARD AND LEAD FOR A BRIEF PERIOD. THE LOYA JIRGA SYSTEM PROVIDED A WAY FOR A GOVERNMENT TO WIN POPULAR APPROVAL IN AFGHANISTAN. ZIA THEN SHARED WITH THE SECRETARY A LETTER WHICH HE HAS JUST RECEIVED FROM FORMER KING ZAHIR SHAH OF AFGHANISTAN, SUGGESTING THAT A COALITION OF THE VARIOUS GROUPS OPPOSING SOVIET OCCUPATION COULD PERHAPS ASSOCIATE THEMSELVES IN AN ALLIANCE THAT WOULD OFFER AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE SOVIET-INSTALLED REGIME.

16. IN A SIDE CONVERSATION WITH VELIOTES ON AFGHANISTAN, YAQUB SAID HE WANTED TO ASK THE UNANSWERABLE. MIGHT NOT THE SUPERPOWER, BLEEDING IN AFGHANISTAN, STRIKE AT TH SANCTUARIES IN PAKISTAN. VELIOTES SAID THAT THE SOVIETS DID HAVE SUCH AN OPTION. HE ADDED THAT HE UNDERSTOOD WHAT YAQUB WAS TELLING HIM.

17. THE SECRETARY EXPRESSED GREAT ADMIRATION FOR THE RESISTANCE EFFORT AND FOR WHAT PAKISTAN IS DOING FOR THE REFUGEES. PRESIDENT ZIA ASKED GENERAL AKHTAR TO SAY A FEW WORDS ABOUT PAKISTAN'S ASSESSMENT OF THE MILITARY SITUATION. AKHTAR SAID THAT THE RESISTANCE COULD EXERT CONTROL WHENEVER THEY WANTED OVER ANY OF THE RURAL AREAS AND WAS PARTICULARLY STRONG IN THE AREAS ALONG THE AFGHAN-SOVIET BORDER. THEY CONTINUED TO INFLECT HEAVY LOSSES ON THE SOVIETS, WITH SO FAR THIRTEEN TO FIFTEEN THOUSAND SOVIET CASUALTIES AND THE LOSS OF 500 SOVIET AIRCRAFT. WHILE THE RESISTANCE SEEMED ABLE

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TO CONTINUE THE STRUGGLE INDEFINITELY. IT LOOKED AS IF THE SOVIETS WERE PREPARED TO CONTINUE THE OCCUPATION INDEFINITELY; AND WITH PRESENT FORCE LEVELS NEITHER SIDE WOULD BE ABLE TO OUST THE OTHER. THE SECRETARY
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SAID HE WAS ENCOURAGED BY THE ESTIMATE OF THE MILITARY SITUATION WHICH CLOSELY PARALLELED OURS BUT DISCOURAGED BY THE EVIDENCE THAT THE SOVIETS WERE PREPARED TO STAY IN AFGHANISTAN A LONG TIME, A JUDGMENT WHICH WE ALSO SHARED.

18. FINALLY, ZIA EXPRESSED HIS GREAT SATISFACTION AT THE CURRENT STATE OF BILATERAL RELATIONS. MUCH PROGRESS HAD BEEN MADE, AND THERE WERE NOW NO MAJOR OUTSTANDING PROBLEMS. HOWEVER, HE MIGHT MENTION AN OUTSTANDING ISSUE INVOLVING THE SUPPLY OF CERTAIN ITEMS OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT TO PAKISTAN, AS YAQUB HAD MENTIONED TO THE SECRETARY EARLIER. THERE WAS ALSO THE QUESTION OF ADJUSTING THE PAYMENT SCHEDULES UNDER FMS FOR EQUIPMENT ALREADY ACQUIRED, WHICH WAS THE SUBJECT OF AN AIDE-MEMOIRE WHICH THE FOREIGN MINISTER HAD GIVEN HIM THE PREVIOUS DAY. THIS WAS AN IMPORTANT PROBLEM FOR THE PAKISTAN TREASURY. THE SECRETARY SAID THAT HE WOULD SEE THAT THE ISSUES RAISED IN THE AIDE-MEMOIRE WERE LOOKED INTO.
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SECTO 07187
EXDIS DECAPTIONED

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: OVIP (SHULTZ, GEORGE P), PK, PK PGOV, IN
SUBJECT: SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER
- YAQUB KHAN, JULY 2, 1983: INDI-PAK RELATIONS

1. (C) - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. IN JULY 2 BILATERAL MEETING, FOREIGN MINISTER YAQUB TOLD THE SECRETARY THAT NORMALIZATION OF INDIA-PAKISTAN RELATIONS IS A MAJOR GOAL OF PAKISTAN'S FOREIGN POLICY. THERE HAS BEEN REAL PROGRESS IN RECENT MONTHS IN REACHING AGREEMENT ON A NUMBER OF CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES. SUCH PROGRESS, HOWEVER, MUST BE MEASURED AGAINST THE PAST RECORD OF HOSTILITY, MUTUAL SUSPICIONS AND DOUBTS. THE RELATIONSHIP IS STILL TENUOUS BUT IT IS NOW BETTER ABLE TO ABSORB SHOCKS THAN IN THE PAST.

3. PAKISTAN IS VERY CONSCIOUS OF THE FACT THAT MRS. GANDHI ALREADY IS ENGAGED IN AN ELECTORAL CAMPAIGN FOR HER POLITICAL SURVIVAL. IT IS CLEAR THAT MRS. GANDHI
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IS FACING A NUMBER OF INTERNAL PROBLEMS SUCH AS THE DEPT OF STATE APPEALS REVIEW PANEL (ARP)

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: FRANK E. SCHMELZER
DATE/CASE ID: 2 MAR 1999 199403680

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KHALISTAN ISSUE. UNFORTUNATE STATEMENTS ABOUT PAKISTAN HAVE BEEN MADE WHICH CREATE SOME PROBLEMS WITH PAKISTANI PUBLIC OPINION. THE GOP, HOWEVER, WILL NOT ALLOW THESE COMMENTS TO DEFLECT IT FROM THE ONGOING EFFORT FOR NORMALIZATION OF INDO-PAK RELATIONS. PAKISTAN HOPES THAT THERE WILL CONTINUE TO BE A STRONG GOVERNMENT IN INDIA SO THAT THE UNDERSTANDINGS WHICH HAVE ALREADY BEEN REACHED BY THE JOINT COMMISSION CAN BE CARRIED FORWARD.

4. THE INDIAN AND PAKISTANI FOREIGN SECRETARIES AGAIN WILL EXAMINE THE PAKISTAN DRAFT NO-WAR PACT AND THE INDIAN DRAFT TREATY OF PEACE, FRIENDSHIP AND COOPERATION AT THEIR MEETING IN NEW DELHI IN AUGUST. PAKISTAN REGARDS ITS PROPOSAL FOR A NON-AGGRESSION PACT AS OF FUNDAMENTAL IMPORTANCE. IT ALREADY HAS MADE CLEAR THAT SEVERAL CLAUSES IN THE INDIAN DRAFT ARE ENCROACHMENTS ON PAKISTANI SOVEREIGNTY. THEY WILL NOT BE ACCEPTED. SPEAKING HYPOTHETICALLY, ANY AGREEMENT WHICH WOULD INCORPORATE SUCH ELEMENTS WOULD NOT LAST. PAKISTAN, NONETHELESS, HOPES TO REACH AGREEMENT ON A POLITICAL DOCUMENT. IN THE SAME SPIRIT, PAKISTAN WILL CONTINUE TO ENCOURAGE ONGOING EFFORTS AT SOUTH ASIAN REGIONAL COOPERATION AS ANOTHER CONTEXT IN WHICH INDO-PAK RELATIONS CAN IMPROVE.

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5. YAQUB BRIEFLY COMMENTED ON PRESS REPORTS ABOUT INDIAN PLANS FOR FURTHER MAJOR ACQUISITION OF SOPHISTICATED ARMS FROM THE USSR, INCLUDING MIGS, TANKS AND SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILES. PAKISTAN, HE SAID, HAS NOT AND WILL NOT MAKE A PUBLIC ISSUE OF INDIAN ACQUISITION OF ARMS, ALTHOUGH THESE ADDITIONAL
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ACQUISITIONS WOULD CAUSE PAKISTAN CONCERN. IT ACCEPTS THAT EVERY COUNTRY HAS THE RIGHT TO ACQUIRE ARMS FOR ITS OWN DEFENSE. AT THE SAME TIME, IF THESE REPORTS ARE CORRECT, IT SEEMS CLEAR THAT THE SOVIET UNION WILL RETAIN ITS PREFERRED POSITION AS THE PRIMARY SUPPLIER OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT FOR INDIA. WHILE THE GOI GENUINELY MAY WANT TO DIVERSIFY ITS SOURCES OF MILITARY SUPPLIES, IT CLEARLY WILL BE VERY HARD FOR ITS CIVILIAN AND MILITARY INDUSTRIES TO DISENGAGE FROM THE USSR AS THEIR PRIMARY SUPPLIER.

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6. SOVIET VIEWS ON INDO-PAK RELATIONS. YAQUB SAID THAT IN THE GOP VIEW, CONTRARY TO SOVIET PUBLIC COMMENTS, THE SOVIETS DO NOT REALLY FAVOR THE EARLY NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS BETWEEN INDIA AND PAKISTAN. THEY DO NOT WANT TO SEE THESE RELATIONS ON A BETTER FOOTING BEFORE THE AFGHANISTAN ISSUE IS SETTLED AS THIS WOULD EASE THE PRESSURES ON PAKISTAN. AT MOST, THEY PROBABLY WANT PARALLELISM BETWEEN PROGRESS ON THE AFGHANISTAN ISSUE AND NORMALIZATION OF INDO/PAK RELATIONS. THEREFORE, IN PAKISTAN'S VIEW, THE SOVIETS MIGHT WELL ACT AS A BRAKE ON INDIA'S APPROACH TO THE NORMALIZATION OF INDO-PAK RELATIONS. AS REGARDS SOVIET SALE OF ARMS TO INDIA, THESE ARE NOT A MATTER OF INDIFFERENCE FOR PAKISTAN. BUT THE INDO-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP WILL NOT DETER PAKISTAN FROM CONTINUING TO SEEK BETTER RELATIONS WITH ITS NEIGHBOR.

7. THE SECRETARY COMMENTED THAT BOTH PRIME MINISTER

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 SECTO 7187

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SECTO

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: OVIP (SHULTZ, GEORGE P), PK, PK PGOV, IN
SUBJECT: SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER

*GANDHI AND FOREIGN MINISTER RAO HAD GIVEN HIM THE
IMPRESSION THAT THEY GENUINELY WANT AN IMPROVEMENT IN
INDO-PAK RELATIONS. THE UNITED STATES WELCOMES THE
DEVELOPMENTS ALREADY UNDERWAY AND WOULD WELCOME FURTHER
IMPROVEMENT IN INDO-PAK RELATIONS.*

B. KABUL MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. SHULTZ

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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 SECTO 7194

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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: OVIP (SHULTZ, GEORGE P.)
SUBJECT: SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER
YAQUB KHAN, JULY 2, 1983: AFGHANISTAN

1. (SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. SUMMARY. IN JULY 2 MEETING WITH THE SECRETARY,
FOREIGN MINISTER YAQUB KHAN EXPRESSED APPRECIATION
FOR CONTINUING CLOSE US-PAKISTAN CONSULTATIONS ON
AFGHANISTAN, REAFFIRMED GOP COMMITMENT TO A NEGOTIA-
TED SETTLEMENT BASED ON THE UN RESOLUTIONS AND GAVE
A QUALIFIED ASSESSMENT OF MODEST RESULTS AT GENEVA II.
THE SOVIET TACTIC, YAQUB SAID, IS TO DELIBERATELY TAKE
A HARDER LINE WITH THE US AND A SOFTER TACK WITH
PAKISTAN IN ORDER TO DRIVE A WEDGE BETWEEN US, AND TO
INDICATE THAT SOVIET CONCESSIONS CAN COME THROUGH A
SOVIET-PAKISTAN DIALOGUE. PAKISTAN IS NOT TAKEN IN
BY THESE "LOLLIPOPS". YAQUB ALSO NOTED DIFFERENCES
BETWEEN SOVIET POSITIONS AS EXPRESSED IN MOSCOW AND
AT GENEVA, WHICH LEAVE THE SOVIET POSITION UNCLEAR.
IN MOSCOW, KORNIYENKO SPOKE OF FOUR SEPARATE AGREE-
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MENTS AND GROMYKO SAID THAT SOVIET TROOP WITHDRAWALS

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: FRANK E. SCHMELZER
DATE/CASE ID: 2 MAR 1999 199403680

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COULD NOT BE INCLUDED IN THE UN TEXT. AT GENEVA, HOWEVER, CORDOVEZ' AGREED NOTE, ACCEPTED BY THE SOVIETS AND THE KABUL REGIME, AGAIN REFERS TO AN INTEGRATED PACKAGE WHICH, IN YAQUB'S VIEW, INCLUDES SOVIET TROOP WITHDRAWALS.

3. THE REVISED UN TEXT, YAQUB TOLD THE SECRETARY, NOW INCORPORATES SOME US/GOP SUGGESTIONS AND HENCE IS AN IMPROVEMENT OVER THE EARLIER DRAFT. NONETHELESS, MAJOR OUTSTANDING ISSUES REMAIN UNRESOLVED. ABOVE ALL, THE SOVIETS HAVE GIVEN NO TIME FRAME FOR WITHDRAWALS. SECONDLY, THERE IS BACKTRACKING ON THE REFUGEE CONSULTATIVE MECHANISM. CORDOVEZ, PRESUMABLY IN RESPONSE TO DRA AND SOVIET PRESSURES, WANTS CONSULTATIONS CARRIED OUT BY THE UNHCR WITHOUT ANY INVOLVEMENT OF THE UN SECRETARIAT; PAKISTAN WANTS A MUCH HIGHER POLITICAL PROFILE. AS REGARDS NEXT STEPS, CORDOVEZ INTENDS TO CONSULT WITH THE US AND THE USSR AS DESIGNATED GUARANTORS BEFORE RESUMING HIS SHUTTLE TO THE REGION. THE KABUL REGIME HAS SAID IT WILL PROPOSE COUNTERBALANCING STATES IF PAKISTAN INSISTS THAT CHINA ALSO BE INCLUDED AS A GUARANTOR. PAKISTAN EXPECTS FURTHER DRA DEMANDS FOR DIRECT TALKS BUT WILL CONTINUE TO FIRMLY RESIST. OVERALL, YAQUB BELIEVES THE UN-SPONSORED TALKS HAVE NOT REACHED A DEADLOCK -- NOT YET ANYWAY. AT THE SAME TIME, HE HAS STRONGLY CAUTIONED CORDOVEZ AGAINST EXCESSIVELY UPBEAT PUBLIC REMARKS SUCH AS HE MADE FOLLOWING THE APRIL ROUND. END SUMMARY

4. US-GOP DISCUSSIONS. AT THE OUTSET, YAQUB EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR THE CONTINUING EXCHANGE
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OF INFORMATION ON US/SOVIET DISCUSSIONS IN MOSCOW. PAKISTAN ALSO GREATLY VALUES THE US COMMENTS ON THE UN DRAFT TEXT WHICH HAD REACHED ISLAMABAD IN GOOD TIME. US COMMENTS, YAQUB SAID, REFLECTED MANY OF PAKISTAN'S OWN DOUBTS AND RESERVATIONS ABOUT THE UN DRAFT. THEY WERE VERY MUCH IN HIS MIND DURING HIS TALK WITH GROMYKO IN MOSCOW AND SUBSEQUENTLY DURING THE RESUMED GENEVA II DISCUSSIONS. MANY OF OUR MUTUAL CONCERNS, HE SAID, HAVE NOW BEEN INCORPORATED IN THE FURTHER REVISION OF THE UN DRAFT. AS A RESULT,

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THE TEXT IS IMPROVING AND BECOMING CLOSER TO WHAT BOTH OF US WANT TO SEE IN IT.

5. SOVIET TACTIC. BEFORE GOING INTO SPECIFICS, YAQUB OBSERVED THAT THE SOVIETS ADOPT A SIGNIFICANTLY DIFFERENT APPROACH IN DISCUSSING THE AFGHANISTAN ISSUE WITH THE US AND PAKISTAN. THEIR TACK WITH THE US IS CONSISTENTLY HARDER AND MORE CONFRONTATIONAL; IN CONTRAST, THE SOVIETS TAKE A SOFTER LINE WITH PAKISTAN. ANY SOVIET SUGGESTIONS WHICH MAY LOOK LIKE CONCESSIONS ("LOLLIPOPS") ARE MADE TO PAKISTAN DIRECTLY. THE SOVIET OBJECTIVE, YAQUB INDICATED, APPEARS TO BE TO DRIVE A WEDGE BETWEEN US AND TO CONVINCE PAKISTAN THAT THE US CANNOT PLAY A SIGNIFICANT ROLE IN BRINGING ABOUT A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT. PAKISTAN, YAQUB SAID, IS ON ITS GUARD AGAINST THESE "LOLLIPOPS". HE ALSO NOTED THAT U.S. PRESSURE ON THE SOVIETS ASSISTS PAKISTAN IN THE UN NEGOTIATIONS.

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AMEMBASSY LONDON
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK*

S E C R E T SECTION 02 OF 04 SECTO 7194

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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: OVIP (SHULTZ, GEORGE P.)
SUBJECT: SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER

6. YAQUB THEN RECAPITULATED THE MAIN IMPRESSIONS OF HIS JUNE 9-10 MEETING WITH GROMYKO. HE TOLD GROMYKO THAT THE FOUR OTHER PERMANENT SECURITY COUNCIL MEMBERS SUPPORT THE GOP POSITION. HE AGAIN STRESSED THE NEED FOR AN INTEGRATED POLITICAL SETTLEMENT IN WHICH THE WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET FORCES IN A SPECIFIC VERY SHORT TIME FRAME IS THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENT. THE RETURN OF THE REFUGEES IN SAFETY AND HONOR WOULD ONLY BE POSSIBLE WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF SUCH A SETTLEMENT. GROMYKO HAD PLAYED THE SAME "OLD GRAMAPHONE" AND THERE HAD BEEN NOTHING FRESH IN THE SOVIET POSITION. HE HAD FOCUSED ON EXTERNAL INTERFERENCE AS THE ROOT OF THE PROBLEM, A POSITION WHICH YAQUB HAD FIRMLY REJECTED. GROMYKO HAD REFERRED TO THE SECRETARY'S LETTER, WHICH HAD ARRIVED A FEW DAYS EARLIER. YAQUB THOUGHT THAT THE LETTER HAD PRODUCED THE RIGHT EFFECT ON GROMYKO. HOWEVER, HE TOOK OBJECTION TO WHAT HE CONSIDERED ITS UNSTATED
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IMPLICATION THAT THE UNITED STATES WANTS TO SUGGEST
WHAT KIND OF GOVERNMENT SHOULD BE IN THE SADDLE IN

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KABUL AFTER SOVIET WITHDRAWAL.

7. YAQUB HIGHLIGHTED TWO POINTS FROM HIS TALKS WITH GROMYKO. FIRST, HE HAD EXPECTED GROMYKO TO PRESS HARD FOR PAKISTAN TO ENTER INTO DIRECT TALKS WITH THE KABUL REGIME. THIS DID NOT HAPPEN AND GROMYKO REFERRED TO DIRECT TALKS ONLY IN PASSING. YAQUB TOLD GROMYKO THAT PAKISTAN REJECTS DIRECT TALKS OUT OF HAND AS IT DOES NOT RECOGNIZE THE KARMAL REGIME. IT ALSO DOES NOT ACCEPT THE SOVIET CLAIM THAT SOVIET FORCES ARE IN AFGHANISTAN AT THE LEGITIMATE REQUEST OF HAFIZULLAH AMIN. HE TOLD GROMYKO THAT TO PRESS PAKISTAN TO ENTER INTO DIRECT TALKS WOULD IN NO WAY HELP TO REACH A SETTLEMENT. PAKISTAN WOULD PERCEIVE THIS AS AN EFFORT TO ISOLATE HER FROM HER FRIENDS IN THE WEST AND THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT AND AS AN EFFORT TO WEAKEN AND ISOLATE HER. SECOND, YAQUB HAD STRESSED THAT PROSPECTS FOR A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT WOULD BE JEOPARDIZED IF THE SOVIETS SOUGHT TO POINT A FINGER AT EITHER PAKISTAN OR ITS ALLIES AS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN. ANY SUCH TEXT WOULD BE COMPLETELY UNACCEPTABLE. SIMILARLY, PAKISTAN IS NOT SEEKING A CONDEMNATION OF THE USSR.

8. AS REGARDS THE UN DRAFT, IN MOSCOW GROMYKO HAD SAID ANY REFERENCE TO WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET FORCES SHOULD BE TAKEN OUT OF THE DOCUMENT AS IT IS AN ISSUE STRICTLY BETWEEN KABUL AND MOSCOW. IN A SEPARATE DISCUSSION, KORNIYENKO HAD SUGGESTED THAT THERE BE FOUR SEPARATE AGREEMENTS (ON WITHDRAWALS, RETURN OF REFUGEES, GUARANTEES OF NONINTERFERENCE
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AND RESPECT FOR AFGHANISTAN'S NON-ALIGNED STATUS). YAQUB SAID HE SPOKE OUT STRONGLY AGAINST SUCH A SUGGESTION. ONE OF THE RESULTS OF GENEVA II HAS BEEN RENEWED SOVIET/DRA ACCEPTANCE OF THE CONCEPT OF AN INTEGRATED ACCORD. THE SECTION ON SOVIET TROOP WITHDRAWALS IS STILL IN THE UN DRAFT. THE SECRETARY OBSERVED THAT GROMYKO SEEMED TO BE MORE UNYIELDING IN MOSCOW THAN THE SOVIET DELEGATION WAS IN GENEVA. YAQUB CONCURRED WITH THIS OBSERVATION. COMMENT: THIS SEEMS TO LEAVE THE SOVIET POSITION UNCLEAR. END COMMENT.

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9. BREZHNEV - ANDROPOV COMPARISON. THE SECRETARY ASKED FOR YAQUB'S ASSESSMENT OF DIFFERENCES IN THE SOVIET APPROACH TO AFGHANISTAN UNDER BREZHNEV AND ANDROPOV. YAQUB OBSERVED THAT DURING THE BREZHNEV PERIOD SOVIET VIEWS ON AFGHANISTAN WERE ACCOMPANIED BY THREATS AND MINATORY LANGUAGE WHICH IMPLIED THAT THE USSR AND PAKISTAN WERE IN A STATE OF WAR. ANDROPOV, IN CONTRAST, DOES NOT THREATEN. GROMYKO AND HE SIMPLY MAKE STRAIGHTFORWARD STATEMENTS. ANDROPOV'S LINE HAS NOT CHANGED SINCE THE BREZHNEV FUNERAL. THE SOVIET POSITION REMAINS THAT IF EXTERNAL INTERFERENCE CONTINUES, SOVIET FORCES WILL HAVE TO STAY ON IN AFGHANISTAN. YAQUB SAID HE ASKED

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ING REFUGEE RETURN AS DISTINCT FROM THEIR POLITICAL REQUIREMENTS. END COMMENT.

13. YAQUB SAID HE ALSO HAS CAUTIONED CORDOVEZ TO BE MORE CAREFUL IN HIS PUBLIC PRONOUNCEMENTS ABOUT THE STATUS OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS. THE CURRENT MEDIA PERCEPTION OF A DEADLOCK HAS LARGELY BEEN CAUSED BY CORDOVEZ' EARLIER EXCESSIVELY OPTIMISTIC STATEMENTS THAT 95 PERCENT OF A SETTLEMENT HAD BEEN ACHIEVED.

14. IN SUMMING UP THE SITUATION, YAQUB SAID THAT, FROM THE US AND GOP VIEWPOINT, THE UN TEXT IS BETTER NOW THAN IT WAS EARLIER BUT IS STILL NOT ENTIRELY SATISFACTORY. IT REFLECTS SOME BUT NOT ALL OF THE

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AMEMBASSY LONDON
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK*

S E C R E T SECTION 04 OF 04 SECTO 7194

NODIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR /
TAGS: OVIP (SHULTZ, GEORGE P.)
SUBJECT: SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER

*CONCERNS RAISED BY THE US COMMENTS. PROGRESS HAS
BEEN ENCOURAGING, YAQUB SAID, AND HE DOES NOT EXPECT
A DEADLOCK -- "NOT YET, ANYWAY". OVER THE SUMMER
CORDOVEZ WILL SHOW THE DRAFT DECLARATION OF GUARAN-
TEES TO THE US AND THE USSR BEFORE HIS NEXT SHUTTLE
TO THE AREA -- POSSIBLY IN LATE AUGUST. YAQUB SAID
PAKISTAN ALREADY HAD SUCCEEDED IN DISSUADING CORDOVEZ
FROM INCLUDING IN THIS DRAFT REFERENCE TO TWO UNGA
RESOLUTIONS UNACCEPTABLE RESPECTIVELY TO THE US AND
THE USSR, I.E., THE 1980 RELOLUTION ON INTERFERENCE
IN THE AFFAIRS OF OTHER STATES AND THE 1972 RESOLU-
TION ON FRIENDLY RELATIONS.*

--
15. THE SECRETARY EXPRESSED HIS APPRECIATION FOR
THIS COMPREHENSIVE BRIEFING. HE SAID THE US AND
PAKISTAN ARE IN AGREEMENT ON THE NEED TO CONTINUE
TO EXPLORE PROSPECTS FOR A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT
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NOTWITHSTANDING THE OBVIOUS DIFFICULTIES, IT WAS
AGREED THAT THE TWO SIDES WOULD HOLD A WORKING-

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LEVEL MEETING ON JULY 3 DURING WHICH THE PAKISTANIS
WOULD PRESENT A MORE DETAILED EXPOSITION ON THE
CURRENT STATE OF THE UN DRAFT. SHULTZ

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S E C R E T SECTO 07197

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NODIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: OVIP (SHULTZ, GEORGE P.) XC
SUBJECT: MY VISIT TO PAKISTAN, JULY 2-4, 1983

1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. ONE OF YOUR VERY FIRST POLICY INITIATIVES WAS REINVIGORATION OF OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH PAKISTAN; PROBABLY THE BEST EVIDENCE OF ITS SUCCESS WAS THE SENSE I HAD IMMEDIATELY ON ARRIVING AT ISLAMABAD SATURDAY MORNING THAT I WAS AMONG FRIENDS. AS I EXCHANGED VEIWS AND PASSED YOUR LETTER TO PRESIDENT ZIA, TALKED FOR HOURS WITH FOREIGN MINISTER YAQUB, AND TRAVELED TO PESHAWAR AND THE KHYBER PASS, THAT FEELING OF WARMTH AND GENUINE FRIENDSHIP HAS PERSISTED AND GROWN. I BELIEVE WE ARE WELL ON OUR WAY TO ESTABLISHING THE MUTUAL CONFIDENCE AND TRUST WHICH YOU STRESSED TO ZIA WHEN HE VISITED THE WHITE HOUSE IN DECEMBER AS THE BASIS FOR OUR TIES WITH THIS IMPORTANT, FRONT-LINE STATE.

3. AS I HAD IN WASHINGTON, I FOUND PRESIDENT ZIA A CAPABLE AND IMPRESSIVE LEADER. EASY IN MANNER AND SENSIBLE AND KNOWLEDGEABLE IN HIS ASSESSMENTS OF BROAD VARIETY OF ISSUES. THE EVENING WE SPENT TOGETHER WITH JUST A FEW AIDES WAS ONE

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OF THE MOST RELAXED AND SUBSTANTIVELY VALUABLE SESSIONS I HAVE

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: FRANK E. SCHMELZER
DATE/CASE ID: 2 MAR 1999 199403680

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Release (Y)
Excise ()
Deny ()
Mandatory Review
Declassify ()
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Class. Rev/Renew ()
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BACK THE FREEDOM FIGHTERS WHILE AT THE SAME TIME PURSUING THE QUEST FOR A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT.

6. THE RETURN OF THE REFUGEES REMAINS A PRIME CONSIDERATION IN PAKISTAN POLICY. THESE ARE NOW ESTIMATED AT THREE MILLION. TO CALL WORLD ATTENTION TO THE PLIGHT OF THESE BRAVE AND HARDY PEOPLE, AND HIGHLIGHT OUR SUPPORT FOR THEM, I VISITED ONE OF THEIR CAMPS NEAR PESHAWAR, A THOROUGHLY MOVING AND UNFORGETTABLE EXPERIENCE. IN ANSWER TO THEIR IMPASSIONED PLEAS, I TOLD THEM THAT THEIR STRUGGLE WAS OUR STRUGGLE AND ASSURED THEM THAT WE WERE WITH THEM.

7. THE PAKISTANIS RECOGNIZED, AS WE DO, THAT THE REFUGEES WILL NOT BE WILLING TO RETURN TO AFGHANISTAN UNLESS THE SOVIETS LEAVE. PAKISTAN IS UNWILLING TO RECOGNIZE THE PRESENT KABUL REGIME, BUT ZIA HINTED THAT IF IT WAS CHANGED AND BROADENED, PRESUMABLY IN THE CONTEXT OF A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT, THE PAKISTANIS MIGHT BE WILLING TO CHANCE A MORE ACCOMODATING POSITION. I SUGGESTED THAT THIS COULD BE RISKY BUSINESS, SINCE THE CHANGE COULD BE MERELY COSMETIC--ONE SOVIET PUPPET SUBSTITUTED FOR ANOTHER. AFTER I RETURN TO WASHINGTON, WE WILL BE PREPARING A FRESH ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION WHICH I WILL WANT TO SHARE WITH YOU.

8. AS IN DELHI, INDO-PAKISTAN RELATIONS ALSO FIGURED IMPORTANTLY IN MY TALKS. THE PAKS, LIKE THE INDIANS, WANT BETTER TIES. LIKE
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THE INDIANS, THEY RECOGNIZE THAT THE BURDEN OF HISTORY MAKES THIS DIFFICULT, BUT THEY SEEM DETERMINED TO PERSIST. ~~THEY ARE CONCERNED BY SOME OF MRS. GANDHI'S RECENT COMMENTS, AND FEAR THAT WHAT THEY JUDGE TO BE HER WEAKENED DOMESTIC POLITICAL POSITION WILL LEAD HER TO TAKE OVER UNHELPEFUL ACTIONS.~~ THEY SEEM CONFIDENT, HOWEVER, THAT RELATIONS HAVE IMPROVED FAR ENOUGH TO ABSORB SUCH SHOCKS. BT, T.S.D)

9. AS HE HAD WITH YOU IN WASHINGTON, ZIA AND HIS COLLEAGUES DID NOT HESITATE TO DEAL DIRECTLY AND CANDIDLY WITH THE SENSITIVE ISSUES IN OUR RELATIONSHIP. DISCUSSING THE NARCOTICS PROBLEM, THEY DESCRIBED FOR ME IN DETAIL THE EFFORTS THEY ARE MAKING TO CONTROL PRODUCTION AND TRAFFICKING OF OPIUM AND HEROIN, FOR WHICH THEY HAVE BECOME A MAJOR SOURCE. THEY TOLD ME HOW MUCH THEY APPRECIATED THE HELP WE ARE PROVIDING, AND URGED THAT WE HELP MOBILIZE GREATER INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT. I CAME AWAY CONVINCED THAT THEIR OWN INTEREST, THE PAKISTANIS ARE SERIOUSLY

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COMMITTED TO DEALING EFFECTIVELY WITH THE NARCOTICS ISSUE IN ALL ITS ASPECTS. THEIR DECISION TO MOVE FORWARD INVOLVES CONSIDERABLE POLITICAL DIFFICULTIES, PARTICULARLY IN LIGHT OF THE LIMITED CONTROL THE GOVERNMENT MAINTAINS OVER THE TRIBAL TERRITORIES WHERE THE NARCOTICS ORIGINATE. I THINK WE SHOULD APPLAUD AND SUPPORT THEIR EFFORTS, AND TRY TO UNDERSTAND THAT THE FORMIDABLE OBSTACLES THEY FACE RULE OUT ANY OVERNIGHT SOLUTION.

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11. SECURITY AND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE ALSO FIGURED IN OUR EXCHANGES, THOUGH IN A RELAXED WAY WHICH REFLECTED THE PAKISTANIS' GENUINE APPRECIATION OF THE EFFORT THE ADMINISTRATION HAS MADE THIS YEAR TO FULFIL THE 1981 MULTIYEAR FUNDING AGREEMENT DESPITE FINANCIAL CONSTRAINTS AND CONGRESSIONAL OPPOSITION THEY URGED APPROVAL OF A NUMBER OF WEAPONS SYSTEMS THEY HAD SOUGHT, AND I WAS ABLE TO TELL THEM THAT WE WOULD GO AHEAD SHORTLY WITH CONGRESSIONAL NOTIFICATION OF THE SALE OF HARPOON MISSLES FOR THEIR NAVY. WE ARE HOLDING THEIR OTHER REQUESTS FOR SOPHISTICATED

WEAPONS IN ABEYANCE AND URGED THEM QUIETLY NOT TO PRESS FOR THESE AT THIS TIME IN LIGHT OF THE DIFFICULTIES FOR BROADER PROGRAM WHICH COULD RESULT ON THE HILL ELSEWHERE. ON FUNDING, THEY ASK THAT WE CONSIDER A MORE RELIABLE AND TIMELY METHOD TO ASSURE THAT THEY COULD PAY THEIR U.S. CONTRACTORS WHEN BILLS

FALL DUE. GIVEN CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET REALITIES, I COULD NOT OFFER THEM ANY ASSURANCES (ENCOURAGEMENT). THESE, HOWEVER WERE MINOR MATTERS WHEN COMPARED WITH THE AGONIZING ISSUES WE FACED LAST YEAR BEFORE THE ZIA VISIT.

12. I LEAVE PAKISTAN PLEASED WITH WHAT WE AND THE PAKISTANIS HAVE BEEN ABLE TO ACCOMPLISH AGAINST SOME TOUGH ODDS OVER THE PAST YEAR AND A HALF. I'M CONFIDENT THAT THE JOINT COMMISSION WHICH YAQUB AND I INAUGURATED CAN HELP FURTHER EXPAND OUR

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RELATIONS IN SUCH IMPORTANT AREAS OF INVESTMENT, TRADE, AND
SCIENTIFIC AND CULTURAL EXCHANGE, AND I'M MORE CONVINCED THAN
EVER THAT IN GIVING THE DEVELOPMENT OF A STRONG SECURITY AND
ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE RELATIONSHIP WITH PAKISTAN A HIGH PRIORITY,
YOU MADE A WISE AND FAR REACHING DECISION.
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DEPARTMENT PASS AMEMBASSY MOSCOW AND ISLAMABAD

E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: AF, UR, PREL, MOPS, PK
SUBJECT: GROMYKO-YAOUB KHAN BILATERAL

Classified by	...
Declassify on	...
Controlled by	...
Category	...
Reviewed by	<i>Elmer</i>
Date	<i>11-3-94</i>

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REF: A) ISLAMABAD 19823. B) MOSCOW 12127

1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY. PAKISTANI ADDITIONAL SECRETARY SHAHARYAR M. KHAN PROVIDED USUN WITH BRIEFING ON FOREIGN MINISTER YAOUB KHAN'S BILATERAL WITH GROMYKO, WHICH TOOK PLACE SEPT. 20. ACCORDING TO S. KHAN, GROMYKO'S PRESENTATION WAS NOT SEVERE, "EVEN CONSTRUCTIVE," PARTICULARLY COMING AGAINST THE BACKDROP OF DETERIORATING SOVIET-PAKISTANI RELATIONS.

3. YAOUB KHAN STATED IN THE COURSE OF HIS PRESENTATION THAT PAKISTAN'S CONCERN ABOUT AFGHANISTAN WAS PROMPTED BY THE SOVIET MILITARY PRESENCE IN AFGHANISTAN AND THE RESULTANT THREE MILLION REFUGEES. IF THE SOVIET TROOPS WERE WITHDRAWN, YAOUB KHAN EXPLAINED, PAKISTAN WOULD NOT BE CONCERNED ABOUT THE CHARACTER OF THE GOVERNMENT IN POWER IN AFGHANISTAN.

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United States Department of State
Office of FOI, Privacy, & Classification Review
Review Authority: LINDSTROM, RALPH
Date: 05/07/96
Case ID: 9403685



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GROMYKO TREATED THIS STATEMENT AS A NEW REVELATION AND RESPONDED BY SAYING THAT IN THAT LIGHT THE USSR WOULD BE INTERESTED IN DISCUSSING A SETTLEMENT WHICH WOULD INVOLVE ITS WITHDRAWAL FROM AFGHANISTAN. GROMYKO STATED HIS WILLINGNESS TO SIGN A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT ON AFGHANISTAN (THE FIRST TIME THE SOVIETS HAVE SO STATED, ACCORDING TO S. KHAN). THE SOVIET CONCERN, GROMYKO WENT ON TO SAY, WAS WHAT ASSURANCES THERE WOULD BE THAT PAKISTAN WOULD KEEP ITS END OF THE BARGAIN AND, IN PARTICULAR, WHAT COMMITMENT PAKISTAN'S "FRIENDS" WOULD BE PREPARED TO MAKE. END SUMMARY

4. PAKISTANI ADDITIONAL SECRETARY SHAHARYAR M. KHAN PROVIDED AMBASSADOR SCHIFTER WITH BRIEFING SEPTEMBER 21 ON YAQUB KHAN'S BILATERAL PREVIOUS DAY WITH GROMYKO.

5. SHAHARYAR KHAN BEGAN HIS PRESENTATION WITH A BRIEF SUMMARY OF THE STATUS OF PAKISTANI-SOVIET RELATIONS ON THE EVE OF THE MEETING. HE SAID THAT THIS WAS THE FIRST SUCH MEETING SINCE JUNE 1983. SINCE THEN, PAK-SOVIET RELATIONS HAVE DETERIORATED, HE SAID, PARTICULARLY IN THE LAST TWO MONTHS. THE SOVIETS HAVE LATELY BEEN REFERRING TO "CHANGED CIRCUMSTANCES," WITHOUT ELABORATION, WHICH S. KHAN EXPLAINED SEEMED TO MEAN USE OF MORE SOPHISTICATED EQUIPMENT BY THE RESISTANCE AGAINST SOVIET FORCES AND INCREASED PAKISTANI SUPPORT AND TRAINING FOR THE MUJAHIDEEN. THE THEME THAT PAKISTANI SUPPORT FOR THE RESISTANCE LEADS TO THE DEATH OF SOVIET PERSONNEL IN AFGHANISTAN IS OF COURSE NOT A NEW THEME, S. KHAN ADDED, BUT THE SOVIETS HAVE BEEN VOICING IT WITH INCREASING VOLUME, BACKED UP BY PRESSURE ON THE AFGHAN-PAKISTAN BORDER.

6. S. KHAN SAID THAT THE MEETING LASTED 1 HOUR AND 50 MINUTES, LONGER THAN EXPECTED. YAQUB KHAN'S

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PRESENTATION EMPHASIZED THAT PAKISTAN HAS NO QUARREL WITH THE SOVIET UNION ASIDE FROM THEIR DIFFERENCE ON AFGHANISTAN. PAKISTAN WANTS NORMAL RELATIONS WITH THE USSR, INCLUDING INCREASED LEVELS OF TRADE, AND IS GRATEFUL FOR SOVIET ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE (A REFERENCE TO THE SOVIET STEEL MILL IN PAKISTAN).

Debb?

7. ON AFGHANISTAN, YAUB KHAN TOLD GROMYKO THAT THE USSR SHOULD NOT ASSUME THAT PAKISTAN ACTS AS A CAT'S PAW FOR THE US. PAKISTAN IS TAKING ITS OWN POSITION ON THIS ISSUE, NOT ACTING AT THE BEHEST OF THE US. HE POINTED TO PAKISTAN'S RECORD OF NONALIGNMENT AT THE UN AND THE SECURITY COUNCIL, WHERE IT HAS TAKEN POSITIONS DIFFERING FROM THE US ON THE MIDDLE EAST, SOUTHERN AFRICA, DISARMAMENT, AND GRENADA. THERE ARE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE USSR AND PAKISTAN ON AFGHANISTAN, YAUB KHAN CONTINUED, LET US FACE THEM FRANKLY. HE URGED THAT PAKISTAN AND THE USSR SEEK A PEACEFUL SOLUTION, WITHOUT RECRIMINATIONS OVER THE PAST. THE PROBLEM IN AFGHANISTAN IS NOT PAKISTANI BASES, BUT INDIGENOUS AFGHAN RESISTANCE TO THE SOVIET OCCUPATION. HE CONCLUDED BY NOTING RECENT AFGHAN-SOVIET MILITARY VIOLATIONS OF THE PAKISTANI BORDER AND AIR SPACE, AND CROSS-BORDER SHELLINGS.

8. GROMYKO RESPONDED WITH A 20-25 MINUTE PRESENTATION, WHICH S. KHAN CHARACTERIZED AS NOT SEVERE, POLITE, EVEN CONSTRUCTIVE. GROMYKO BEGAN BY NOTING THAT YAUB KHAN HAD BEGUN BY DISCUSSING INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND CONCLUDED WITH AFGHANISTAN. GROMYKO SAID THAT THE PROPER WAY TO SEE SOVIET-PAK RELATIONS WAS TO BEGIN WITH AFGHANISTAN, AND DISCUSS THE REST LATER, SINCE THE AFGHANISTAN DISPUTE INEVITABLY COLORED THE ENTIRE USSR-PAKISTAN

RELATIONSHIP. HE SAID THAT PAKISTAN INTERFERENCE IN AFGHANISTAN IS THE CORE OF THE PROBLEM, WHICH HE COULD

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PROVE WITH DOCUMENTS AND PICTURES. HE SAID YAQUB KHAN SHOULD NOT WASTE HIS BREATH BY DENYING THE FACT OF THIS INTERFERENCE. PAKISTANI SOIL IS USED AS A BASE FOR TERRORISM AGAINST AFGHANISTAN. GROMYKO CONCLUDED THAT IF A WAY COULD BE FOUND TO SOLVE THE AFGHANISTAN PROBLEM, PAKISTAN AND THE USSR SHOULD ADDRESS THEIR EFFORTS TO FINDING THAT SOLUTION (NOTE. S. KHAN ADDED PARENTHETICALLY TO US THAT GROMYKO'S CALL FOR A SOLUTION TO THE AFGHANISTAN PROBLEM SEEMED TO BE A DIFFERENT APPROACH FROM PAST SOVIET PRESENTATIONS, WHICH STRESSED THAT THE PROBLEM OF PAKISTANI INTERFERENCE SHOULD FIRST BE ADDRESSED, THEN BROADER SOLUTIONS SOUGHT END NOTE).

9. YAQUB KHAN PROCEEDED TO DISCUSS THE GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS. HE SAID THAT PAKISTAN HAS NO DESIRE TO INFLUENCE AFGHANISTAN'S FORM OF GOVERNMENT OR PERSONNEL AFTER SOVIET TROOPS ARE WITHDRAWN. ONCE THE SOVIET TROOPS ARE GONE, HE SAID, THE AFGHAN PEOPLE MAY CHOOSE THEIR OWN GOVERNMENT, AND THEIR OWN SYSTEM. WHETHER THEIR CHOICE IS A COMMUNIST OR A NON-COMMUNIST SYSTEM IS NOT SOMETHING FOR PAKISTAN TO DECIDE, BUT THE AFGHAN PEOPLE.

10. ACCORDING TO S. KHAN, GROMYKO RESPONDED TO THE PAKISTAN FOREIGN MINISTER'S REMARKS ABOUT PAKISTANI NONINTERFERENCE IN A POST-SOVIET AFGHANISTAN WITH APPARENT SURPRISE. "DO YOU MEAN THAT?" HE REPORTEDLY SAID. "THAT SHOULD BE DISPLAYED IN GOLDEN LETTERS," HE SAID TWICE, ACCORDING TO S. KHAN.

11. CONTINUING ON THE SUBJECT OF NONINTERFERENCE, YAQUB KHAN SAID THAT PAKISTAN ACCEPTS THAT THIS QUESTION COULD BE ADDRESSED FIRST. PAKISTAN HAS AGREED TO THE NONINTERFERENCE INSTRUMENT, AND IS PREPARED TO SIGN IT ONCE ALL THE OTHER ELEMENTS ARE

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ACCEPTED. WHAT MORE IS NEEDED TO PROVE OUR GOOD
FAITH, YAQUB KHAN ASKED RHETORICALLY.

12. GROMYKO RESPONDED THAT THE SOVIET UNION COULD SIGN A COMPREHENSIVE AGREEMENT, THAT THAT WAS NO PROBLEM (NOTE. S. KHAN TOLD US THAT THIS IS THE FIRST TIME THE SOVIETS HAVE EVER EXPLICITLY STATED THEIR WILLINGNESS TO SIGN A COMPREHENSIVE AGREEMENT. END NOTE). OUR PROBLEM, GROMYKO SAID, IS HOW CAN WE BE SURE THAT SUCH AN AGREEMENT WILL BE IMPLEMENTED, THAT "YOUR FRIENDS" WON'T CONTINUE TO INTERFERE AND URGE YOU TO INTERFERE. IF WE SIGN A COMPREHENSIVE AGREEMENT AND THE INTERFERENCE CONTINUES, GROMYKO CONCLUDED, THEN THE SOVIET ARMY MIGHT BE "ASKED BACK INTO AFGHANISTAN."

13. AMBASSADOR SCHIFTER ASKED S. KHAN IF IN VIEW OF THE POSITIVE SIGNS WHICH THE PAKISTANIS SAW IN THE TONE AND SUBSTANCE OF THE BILATERAL, THERE WAS ANY POSSIBILITY THAT THE NEXT GENEVA ROUND MIGHT BE MOVED UP. S. KHAN REPLIED THAT THE PAKISTANI DELEGATION IN NEW YORK MAY PURSUE THE DIALOGUE FURTHER WITH SOVIET DEPUTY MINISTER KORNIENKO IN THE WEEKS AHEAD.

KIRKPATRICK

NOTE BY OC/T: NOT PASSED MOSCOW & ISLAMABAD

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THE SECRETARY

NEA/PAB:JLAROCCO (0233Z)

1.NEA:RMURPHY, 2.PA:JHUGHES, 3.P:MARMACOST, 4.5/S:JCOVEY
S/S-15

USDEL SECRETARY IN NEW YORK
SECSTATE WASHDC, IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD, IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI, IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY KABUL, IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY LONDON, IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BEIJING, IMMEDIATE

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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: OVIP (SHULTZ, GEORGE P.), UNGA, PREL, PK

SUBJECT: PAKISTAN: UNGA BILATERAL MEMCON

NODIS REVIEW	
<u>Cat. A</u>	Caption removed; transferred to LINDSTROM
Cat. B	Transferred to LINDSTROM with additional access controlled by CIG
Cat. C	Caption and custody retained by CIG
Reviewed by:	<i>Glenn</i>
Date:	<i>11-3-94</i>

1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. OCTOBER 1, 1984, 3:15-4:00 P.M., NEW YORK.
PARTICIPANTS: U.S.: THE SECRETARY, UNDER SECRETARY ARMACOST, JOHN HUGHES, ASSISTANT SECRETARY MURPHY, UN AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK, AND DEPUTY COUNTRY DIRECTOR LAROCCO (NOTETAKER). PAKISTAN: FOREIGN MINISTER YAQUB KHAN, AMBASSADOR TO THE U.S. EJAZ AZIM, UN AMBASSADOR SHAHNAWAZ, ADDITIONAL SECRETARY FOR THE UN SHAHRAYAR KHAN AND TARIQ FATMI, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF FOREIGN MINISTER.

3. SUMMARY. YAQUB TOLD THE SECRETARY THAT PRESIDENT ZIA WAS DEEPLY TOUCHED BY THE RECENT THOUGHTFUL LETTER FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN. THE LETTER IS BEING CAREFULLY STUDIED; A REPLY WILL BE FORTHCOMING SHORTLY. U.S. SUPPORT AT THIS CRITICAL TIME IS ESSENTIAL TO PAKISTAN. RECENT RAIDS INTO PAKISTAN FROM AFGHANISTAN HAVE BEEN TROUBLING, ESPECIALLY SINCE PAKISTAN DOES NOT HAVE THE

United States Department of State
Office of FOI, Privacy, & Classification Review
Review Authority: LINDSTROM, RALPH
Date: 05/07/96
Case ID: 9403685

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CAPABILITY TO RESPOND EFFECTIVELY. AIM/9LS SHOULD GIVE PAK AIR FORCE ABILITY TO DROP AFGHAN AIRCRAFT ON PAK TERRITORY. DESPITE RAIDS AND OTHER SOVIET PRESSURE TACTICS, PAKISTAN WILL NOT SHIFT POLICY POSITION ON AFGHANISTAN. YAQUB WAS ENCOURAGED BY SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO'S REMARKS TO HIM LAST WEEK THAT ASSURANCES OF NON-INTERFERENCE BY PAKISTAN CAN GO HAND-IN-HAND WITH SOVIET TROOP WITHDRAWAL TALKS. SHULTZ POINTED OUT, HOWEVER, THAT RECENT RAIDS--COMING AFTER YAQUB-GROMYKO MEETING--ARE NOT POSITIVE SIGNS OF A NEW SOVIET CONCILIATORY POLICY.

4. ON INDIA, YAQUB STATED THAT "WE WILL NOT BE PROVOKED INTO WAR." PAKISTAN WILL MAINTAIN AN IMPECCABLE RECORD OF NON-INTERFERENCE IN INDIAN AFFAIRS. HE EXPECTS PRIME MINISTER GANDHI WILL NONETHELESS CONTINUE TO CLAIM THAT A FOREIGN HAND IS BEHIND INTERNAL UNREST. YAQUB COMMENTED THAT HE DOES NOT THINK A SURGICAL STRIKE ON PAK NUCLEAR FACILITIES BY INDIA IS LIKELY. "BUT LET THERE BE NO DOUBT," HE SAID, "IF IT HAPPENS, THERE WILL BE WAR."

5. SHULTZ-YAQUB DISCUSSION FOCUSED EXTENSIVELY ON SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY (WORLDWIDE, U.S.-SOVIET, AND SOVIET-AFGHAN.) YAQUB STRESSED REPEATED FAILURES OF SOVIET POLICY IN THE LAST FEW YEARS, COMMENTING THAT IT REFLECTED FUNDAMENTAL POLICY DISAGREEMENTS AMONG SOVIET LEADERS. ONLY SOVIET-SUCCESS STORY IN-RECENT YEARS HAS BEEN INDIA; BUT THIS VICTORY HAS NOT BEEN IDEOLOGICAL, BUT RATHER A "MARRIAGE OF CONVENIENCE." END SUMMARY.

6. REAGAN LETTER: YAQUB REMARKED THAT HE TALKED WITH PRESIDENT ZIA JUST BEFORE LEAVING PAKISTAN FOR THE U.S. ZIA TOLD HIM HOW DEEPLY TOUCHED HE WAS BY PRESIDENT REAGAN'S THOUGHTFUL LETTER. HE WAS APPRECIATIVE OF THE U.S. RESTATEMENT OF SUPPORT AT THIS CRITICAL TIME. A REPLY, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE ADDITIONAL POINTS MADE BY AMBASSADOR HINTON TO ZIA, WILL BE FORTHCOMING FOLLOWING A CAREFUL REVIEW OF THE LETTER.

7. AFGHAN CROSS-BORDER ATTACKS: SECRETARY SHULTZ NOTED OUR CONCERN OVER RAIDS CARRIED OUT SEPTEMBER 27-29. YAQUB EXPRESSED GOP APPRECIATION FOR STRONG PUBLIC STATEMENT ISSUED BY U.S. FOLLOWING AUGUST CROSS BORDER ATTACKS. HE SAID "IT MEANS VERY MUCH TO US WHEN THE U.S. SPEAKS OUT." THE SECRETARY SAID HE ALSO STRESSED

U.S. CONCERN OVER THE ATTACKS DIRECTLY WITH SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO LAST WEEK. YAQUB RESPONDED THAT THESE RAIDS AND OTHER SOVIET PRESSURE TACTICS WILL NOT LEAD TO ANY SHIFT IN PAKISTAN'S POSITION ON AFGHANISTAN.

8. YAQUB INDICATED THAT THE GOP IS FRUSTRATED BY ITS INABILITY TO RESPOND TO THE CROSS BORDER ATTACKS. GOP POLICY ON RESPONDING IS FIRM: SHOOT BACK ONLY IF AFGHAN AIRCRAFT CAN BE DROPPED ON PAKISTANI SOIL. PAKISTANI ABILITY TO DO THIS WILL BE GREATLY ENHANCED BY THE DELIVERIES OF AIM/9LS TO PAKISTAN BY THE U.S. YAQUB ADDED THAT PRESIDENT ZIA ASKED HIM TO CONVEY TO THE SECRETARY HIS THANKS FOR THIS STRONG EXAMPLE OF U.S. SUPPORT.

9. CRANSTON AMENDMENT: YAQUB SAID THAT THE GOP APPRECIATES ADMINISTRATION EFFORTS TO DEFEAT THE CRANSTON AMENDMENT.

10. INDIA: YAQUB INDICATED THAT THE GOP IS UNSHAKEABLE IN ITS ENDEAVOR TO PROMOTE AN EASING OF INDO-PAKISTANI TENSIONS. HE SAID THAT PRIME MINISTER GANDHI IS AN EMBATTLED CANDIDATE. IT HELPS HER TO HAVE THE "FOREIGN HAND" ALLEGATION TO FALL BACK ON. IN YAQUB'S PERSONAL VIEW, SHE WILL WIN THE ELECTIONS, BUT NOT BY A WIDE MARGIN. FROM PAKISTAN'S POINT OF VIEW, A STABLE GOVERNMENT IN INDIA IS MORE IMPORTANT THAN THE PARTICULAR INDIAN LEADER IN POWER. HE FEARS, HOWEVER, THAT MRS. GANDHI WILL CONTINUE TO PROVOKE PAKISTAN. BUT "WE WILL NOT BE PROVOKED INTO WAR," HE STRESSED. "WE WILL BE IMPECCABLE" IN CARRYING OUT OUR POLICY OF NON-INTERFERENCE IN INDIAN AFFAIRS.

11. YAQUB NOTED THAT HE HAD A PRIVATE MEETING RECENTLY WITH THE INDIAN FOREIGN MINISTER. HE SAID HE EMPHASIZED TO THE LATTER THAT PAKISTAN HAS NOT BEEN WORKING TO FORMENT UNREST IN INDIA. "IF WE WANTED TO, WE WOULD NOT DO IT WITH MERELY A PISTOL TO A HIJACKER OR A FEW RIFLES IN THE PUNJAB. IS THIS THE WAY TO STOKE FIRES?" YAQUB SAID HE DID NOT GET A SATISFACTORY RESPONSE FROM HIS INDIAN COUNTERPART. THE DISCUSSION WAS PERSONALLY WARM, SUBSTANTIVELY COLD.

12. YAQUB COMMENTED THAT SOVIET-INDIAN COLLUSION DOES EXIST TO A CERTAIN EXTENT. SHULTZ REMARKED THAT IT IS

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IMPLICIT. YAQUB AGREED; HE ADDED THAT PAKISTAN "WILL NOT BE RATTLED BY IT."

13. INDIAN STRIKE ON PAK NUCLEAR FACILITIES: YAQUB INDICATED HE DOES NOT BELIEVE A STRIKE IS LIKELY, "BUT IF IT HAPPENS, LET THERE BE NO DOUBT--THERE WILL BE WAR." NO PAKISTANI GOVERNMENT COULD ALLOW SUCH A STRIKE WITHOUT RESPONDING IN FULL FORCE.

14. AFGHANISTAN: YAQUB REMARKED THAT HE EXPECTED A MUCH TOUGHER LINE ON AFGHANISTAN FROM GROMYKO WHEN THEY MET LAST WEEK. WHILE GROMYKO'S POSITION WAS TOUGH, HE WAS NOT THREATENING. THE IMPORTANT POINT WAS THAT, CONTRARY TO WHAT UNSYG PEREZ DE CUELLAR WAS TOLD LAST SUMMER IN MOSCOW, GROMYKO WAS QUITE CLEAR IN ACCEPTING THAT PAKISTANI ASSURANCES OF NON-INTERFERENCE IN AFGHANISTAN DO NOT HAVE TO PRECEDE TALKS ON SOVIET WITHDRAWAL OF FORCES. YAQUB SAID HE BRIEFED UN UNDER SECRETARY CORDOVEZ ON GROMYKO'S REMARKS, AND ASKED CORDOVEZ TO PLAN FOR THE UPCOMING INDIRECT TALKS IN FEBRUARY '85 TO FOCUS ON MECHANISMS FOR MONITORING NON-INTERFERENCE (AS WELL AS SOVIET WITHDRAWAL).

15. SHULTZ COMMENTED THAT THE RECENT RAIDS ARE NOT POSITIVE SIGNS THAT THE SOVIETS ARE TAKING A MORE CONCILIATORY POSTURE ON AFGHANISTAN. YAQUB REPLIED THAT THE SOVIETS DO HAVE AN INTEREST IN KEEPING THE PEACE TALKS OPTION OPEN. THE SOVIETS ARE INDEED TAKING A BEATING IN AFGHANISTAN, AND IT IS NOT INCONCEIVABLE THAT THEY MIGHT BE PERSUADED THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS TO WITHDRAW. THE SOVIET WAR EFFORT IN AFGHANISTAN IS MARKED BY INEPTITUDE, INCOMPETENCE, AND EROSION OF MORALE. AFTER FOUR AND HALF YEARS, THEY HAVE NOT LEARNED HOW TO FIGHT IN AFGHANISTAN, AND THEY HAVE NOT WON OVER AFGHANS TO THEIR SIDE. AFGHANISTAN HAS FORCED THE SOVIET UNION TO BLATANTLY COMPROMISE ITS STATED WORLD ROLE OF DEFENDER OF THE POOR AND SMALL NATIONS AGAINST COLONIALISM. YAQUB SAID THAT THE U.S. SUPPORT FOR THE AFGHAN CAUSE STANDS IN SHARP CONTRAST TO THE SOVIET BRUTALITY.

16. AT THIS POINT, THE SECRETARY INTERJECTED THAT HE WANTED TO PERSONALLY ASSURE YAQUB THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN'S UNGA SPEECH DID NOT IMPLY A CHANGE IN U.S. POLICY ON AFGHANISTAN. THE OMISSION OF WITHDRAWAL OF

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SOVIET FORCES FROM OUR CALL FOR A SETTLEMENT WAS SIMPLY STYLISTIC--AN ATTEMPT TO TIGHTEN UP THE SPEECH. IF WE HAD ANOTHER CHANCE AT THE SPEECH, WE WOULD LEAVE IT IN. THE SECRETARY ADDED "LET ME ASSURE YOU THAT GROMYKO KNOWS OUR POSITION HAS NOT CHANGED."

17. THE SECRETARY RETURNED TO THE TOPIC OF WHY THE SOVIETS DO NOT WELCOME A NEGOTIATED SOLUTION IN AFGHANISTAN. YAQUB SPECULATED THAT HE BELIEVES THE CURRENT LEADERSHIP STRUGGLES IN THE SOVIET UNION ARE PARTLY RESPONSIBLE. "THERE ARE SERIOUS DIFFERENCES, FUNDAMENTAL DIFFERENCES, AMONG SOVIET LEADERS TODAY. THEY INTERNALLY ARE IN A POSITION OF GREAT WEAKNESS." THIS STRUGGLE IS ILLUSTRATED BY THE SACKING OF MARSHALL OGARKOV. "THIS WAS NO SIMPLE DECISION IN THE SOVIET UNION," YAQUB COMMENTED. HE ADDED THAT THIS WEAKNESS HAS COME AT A TIME OF STRONG U.S. LEADERSHIP. THIS SERVES U.S. INTERESTS AND DEEPENS THE SOVIET CRISIS ON HOW TO FORMULATE THEIR DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN POLICIES.

18. THE SECRETARY RESPONDED THAT THE PRESIDENT INTENDS TO MAINTAIN HIS STRONG POSITIONS VIS-A-VIS THE SOVIETS. WE WILL BE REALISTIC ABOUT SOVIET INTENTIONS. WE WILL STAY STRONG AND NEVER LET DOWN OUR GUARD. WE WILL REMAIN READY FOR CONSTRUCTIVE DIALOGUE WITH THE SOVIETS, BUT WILL NOT BE PUSHED INTO AN AGREEMENT JUST FOR THE SAKE OF HAVING AN AGREEMENT.

19. THE SECRETARY ASKED YAQUB FOR HIS VIEWS ON SOVIET SUCCESSION. YAQUB SAID THIS IS A DIFFICULT ISSUE. THE CONFLICT AMONG "GENERATIONS" IS IMPORTANT, BUT IT IS NOT THE MAJOR CONFLICT. MORE IMPORTANT ARE FUNDAMENTAL POLICY STANCES--DOMESTIC ECONOMIC POLICY, MILITARY POLICY, FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD THE U.S. AND WORLDWIDE--THAT HAVE RESULTED IN REPEATED FAILURES IN RECENT YEARS. IRAN, CHINA, ETHIOPIA, POLAND, NATO AND THE CRUISE MISSILE, AFGHANISTAN, THE MIDDLE EAST...THE SOVIETS REMAIN FRUSTRATED IN ADVANCING THEIR POSITION IN THESE KEY TARGETED AREAS OF THEIR FOREIGN POLICY. AT THE SAME TIME, THEY HAVE LOST THE ALL IMPORTANT TECHNOLOGY RACE. THEY CANNOT CATCH UP ON COMPUTERS, AND REALIZE THIS WILL HAVE A MARKED EFFECT ON THEIR MILITARY PLANNING.

20. YAQUB ADDED THAT THE ONLY SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY

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SUCCESS STORY IS INDIA. HE QUICKLY ADDED, "IN ALL FAIRNESS TO MY INDIAN BRETHREN," THAT THE SUCCESS IS NOT IDEOLOGICAL; IT IS A MARRIAGE OF CONVENIENCE. INDIA FIERCELY GUARDS ITS INDEPENDENCE. BUT INDIA NOW HAS MANY IOUS TO THE SOVIETS, AND THIS TROUBLES PAKISTAN.

21. YAQUB COMMENTED THAT WITH THE SOVIETS ON THE DEFENSIVE WORLDWIDE, A STRONG U.S. POLICY IS ESSENTIAL TO BRINGING THEM TO THE BARGAINING TABLE ON ARMS CONTROL. "SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY CANNOT BE DELINKED FROM ARMS CONTROL TALKS." THE SECRETARY AGREED, AND SAID IT IS THE TRICKIEST ASPECT OF TALKS WITH THE SOVIETS. WE NEED LINKAGE, HE SAID, AND MUST MAKE IT CLEAR WE WILL CONFRONT EXTREME SOVIET BEHAVIOR WHEREVER IT MAY OCCUR REGARDLESS OF ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS. A GOOD EXAMPLE OF THE APPROPRIATE U.S. POSTURE IS PRESIDENT REAGAN'S STRONG DENUNCIATION OF THE SOVIET SHOOTING DOWN OF THE KAL AIRCRAFT. DESPITE THIS DENUNCIATION, THE PRESIDENT SENT OUR NEGOTIATORS BACK FOR TALKS SOON THEREAFTER.
SHULTZ ##

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EXHIBIT OLN-326

OBJECTIVE

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To create a conduit for maintaining a continuous flow of Soviet weapons and technology to be utilized by the United States in its support of Freedom Fighters - Nicaragua, Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, Ethiopia, etc.

2. PROBLEM

With each passing year, Congress has become increasingly unpredictable and uncooperative regarding the President's desire to support the cause of the Freedom Fighters, against growing Soviet oppression. The funds have not been forthcoming to supply sufficient arms necessary for the Freedom Fighters to win. Therefore, in lieu of the necessary funding to support this goal, the following Trade is proposed:

3. PROPOSAL


COUNTRY "A" is capable of producing an ongoing supply of Soviet-compatible arms. COUNTRY "A" is at the same time trying desperately to upgrade their own military forces and equipment. They would like to purchase COUNTRY "B" a wide range of military equipment.

COUNTRY "B" would like to sell to COUNTRY "A", but COUNTRY "B" is not capable of supporting long-term credit or barter agreements. As such, the United States is the key in the successful 3-Way Trade.

COUNTRY "C" - UNITED STATES. The United States is able to provide Israel with desired High Technology equipment and information. Based on this commodity, the Trade would operate as follows:

PARAGRAPH TO 2034

2 WAY TRADE



4 RESULTS

██████████ sells equipment, which in many cases sits stockpiled at present, to ██████████. In return, ██████████ receives from the United States equipment and technology that it could not otherwise afford to purchase.

██████████ receives much-needed modernization for its forces, thereby presenting a stronger threat to the Soviet Union. In return, ██████████ exports an ongoing supply of domestically manufactured arms, as per directions from the United States.

The United States then has at its disposal a large and continuous supply of Soviet technology and weapons to channel to Freedom Fighters worldwide, mandating neither the consent or awareness of the Department of State or Congress.

The United States would be in a position to dispense these shipments through a neutral Foreign Trading Company, established solely for this purpose.

China would only be aware of the fact that it is to ship to the Trading Company such specified goods as requested, comparable in USD value to the equipment received from Israel. China would not be aware of the final destinations of any of the exported arms.

Israel would only be aware of the buying power extended by the United States for US technology, again in comparable USD value to the equipment sent to ██████████.

The United States at present holds to a policy of providing assistance to [REDACTED], a goal which would be forwarded through this transaction. Likewise, the United States is committed to extending financial and technological assistance to the State of [REDACTED]. This too would be accomplished. There are many avenues available regarding the forms of credit which could be extended to Israel.

We have received confirmation from [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] that they are most interested in pursuing their role in this trade arrangement. Upon your encouragement and belief that the United States could perform its role, we will proceed with [REDACTED] and the [REDACTED] defining their respective roles and the equipment they are willing to trade. This will serve to establish our initial parameters of equipment quantities, and the proportionate amount of credit required.

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

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MEMORANDUM FOR: The President
FROM: George P. Shultz
SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Pakistan Prime Minister Mohammad Khan Junejo (July 16, 10:30)

1. WHERE DOES OUR RELATIONSHIP STAND?

-- US-Pakistan relations on firm foundation of mutual interest; general approach on most issues is similar.

-- Keystone of relationship is multi-year assistance programs signed in 1981 and 1986 of \$3.2 and \$4.02 billion respectively.

-- Nuclear proliferation issue nonetheless remains serious threat to relationship; we have concerns also on narcotics, economic policy reform, and GOP hesitancy to approve more public aspects of our Afghanistan strategy.

-- Prime Minister on first US visit, heads new civilian government with whom new aid package was negotiated, but is still new to issues in US-Pakistan relationship.

2. WHAT DO WE WANT?

-- Demonstrate support for peaceful transition to constitutional government and strengthening of democratic process and institutions, which we had urged.

-- Reaffirm long-term US commitment to Pakistan's security in face of continuing Soviet threats.

-- Conduct visit so as to ensure that Junejo, as civilian leader, feels he has political stake in the future of US-Pak relationship, while preserving our important links with President Zia.

-- Gain Junejo's support for genuine restraint in Pakistan's nuclear program, needed to keep assistance relationship on track.

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-- Review Afghan negotiations and overall Afghanistan strategy; convince Junejo he has vested interest in keeping our policies in step.

-- Review our concerns over need for effective program of narcotics control.

3. WHAT DOES JUNEJO WANT?

-- Consolidate ongoing US-Pakistan relationship while establishing a personal relationship with you.

-- Seek reassurance on US commitment to Pakistan's security, while preserving Pakistan's formal non-aligned status.

-- Highlight importance of constitutional changes in Pakistan and use visit to build Junejo's political stature as civilian head of elected government.

-- Foster U.S. awareness that restoration of democracy will impose political constraints on Pakistan's ability to support proposals which raise Pak profile on Afghanistan.

-- Press Pakistan's case on the Hill for understanding and for support of economic and security assistance.

4. WHAT CAN WE ACHIEVE FROM THIS VISIT?

-- Ensure continuation of Pakistan's close collaboration on Afghanistan, re the mujahidin and in the negotiations; lay down marker on vital importance of a short timetable for Soviet withdrawal.

-- Gain Junejo's support for key elements of our Afghanistan strategy (greater alliance visibility, humanitarian assistance, and media aid program) on which he is hesitant.

-- Enhance Pakistan's confidence in our commitment to their security and our intention to press for full funding of current and follow-on assistance packages, despite budgetary stringency.

-- Encourage Junejo to use Hill and media contacts to strengthen support for current and follow-on Pakistan aid packages with the Congress and the public.

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--Reassure Junejo that our improving relationship with India is aimed at reducing Indo-Soviet ties and will not be at the cost of our long-standing commitments to Pakistan.

-- Ensure that Junejo understands critical need for positive steps to meet serious USG concern about Pakistan's nuclear program, assure continuation of US assistance.

-- Obtain Junejo's commitment to effective cooperation to combat growing narcotics production and trafficking.

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United States Department of State

Washington, D. C. 20520

1986

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BRIEFING MEMORANDUM
S/S

SECRET

TO: The Secretary
THROUGH: P - Mr. Armacost
FROM: NEA - Richard W. Murphy
SUBJECT: Your July 16 Lunch at the Department and your July 17 meeting with Pakistan Prime Minister Mohammad Khan Junejo (Presidential Suite, Madison Hotel, 10:00 to 11:00 a.m.)

I. PRIME MINISTER JUNEJO

- o Domestic politician, new to foreign affairs. Need to use this first US visit to expand Junejo's political stake in US-Pakistan relationship, educate him on key US-Pak issues.
- o Point to Make
 - Hope visit opens new areas for US-Pakistan cooperation -- possible Peace Corps program for teachers of English, new extradition treaty, technology transfer memorandum of understanding, strengthened military cooperation.

II. US-PAKISTAN RELATIONS

- o Relations solid; on parallel course re most major issues.
- o Our multi-year assistance programs (agreed in 1981 and 1986 for \$3.2 and \$4.02 billion, respectively) reflect shared interests and the firmness of the US commitment, which together are the keystone of relationship.
 - We cooperate to deny Soviets further inroads in South and Southwest Asia and to reduce Soviet role in India.
 - We both support improved Indo-Pak relations and increased regional cooperation in South Asia.

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o Points to make:

-- US firmly committed to Pakistan's security in face of continuing Communist threats, attacks, terrorism.

-- We support GOP's efforts to improve ties with India, including nuclear dialogue, but we worry about allegations of Pak meddling in Punjab.

-- We recommend accelerating pace of economic policy reforms (e.g., greater mobilization of domestic resources, encourage private sector, eliminate subsidies).

III. NUCLEAR

o Implementing follow-on aid program requires multi-year waiver of Symington Amendment; President must also certify annually that Paks do not have a nuclear device, that our assistance program "reduces significantly" risk they will.

o Pakistan, however, continues pursuit of unsafeguarded uranium enrichment and other activities relevant to acquisition of a nuclear explosives capability.

o Points to make:

-- As the President said, US ability to continue aid to Pakistan depends absolutely on Pak nuclear restraint.

-- Specifically, Pakistan must comply with assurances it has given on uranium enrichment, other sensitive nuclear activities; otherwise, chance of getting Congress to okay new US aid program will be dim, at best.

IV. AFGHANISTAN

A. Policy:

o Pakistan key to effective policy toward Afghanistan; we share objectives of Soviet withdrawal, return of refugees, restoration of nonaligned, sovereign Afghanistan.

o Soviet inflexibility at Geneva, intensified efforts on ground, terrorism in Pakistan, show unchanged Soviet policy.

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- o US support for Pakistan firm in face of Soviet threats; new pressure needed to get USSR to negotiate seriously.
- o President told visiting resistance leaders Afghanistan agreement requires short Soviet withdrawal timetable, consultations with alliance, support of Afghan people.
- o Point to Make:
 - We applaud Pakistan's principled stand on UN negotiations, continued support for Afghan resistance and refugees; we agree timetable for Soviet withdrawals must be short (3 months) and share your concern over escalation of terrorist bombings, cross-border intrusions.

B. Afghanistan Strategy:

- o Junejo committed to hanging tough on Afghanistan but out of sensitivity to political impact of public anxiety re Soviet threat and DRA terrorist attacks, has been slow to approve implementation of public aspects of Afghanistan strategy.
- o Points to Make:
 - Soviet inflexibility at Geneva shows lack of seriousness in seeking settlement; we need to step up pressures on the Soviets.
 - There is growing concern in Administration and Congress about GOP hesitancy on cross-border humanitarian aid, Afghan media assistance program, strategy to build public image of resistance alliance.
 - Positive steps on these programs will help induce Sovs to negotiate seriously and help sell Pak aid on the Hill.
 - US ready to move forward in three areas of humanitarian aid, namely health, education, and commodity support.
 - Urge GOP support for active delegation presence at the UN this fall, opening alliance offices in New York, Jeddah.
 - Urge also substantive involvement of alliance leaders in negotiations; President pledged US will keep alliance informed.

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V. NARCOTICS

- o Opium production in Pakistan in 1985-6 nearly doubled; lapse due to transfer to civilian rule, good weather, and rising domestic demand for heroin.
- o Junejo and Zia told Ann Wroblewski in June that GOP remains committed to eradication of opium crop; INM assessing aerial spraying, at GOP request.
- o Points to make:
 - Recent doubling of Pakistan's opium production, rising Pak heroin addiction, adds to urgency of eradicating crop, destroying heroin labs, prosecuting major traffickers.
 - Encouraged by your pledge to Ed Meese and Ann Wroblewski to eradicate all opium production this fall early in growing season.
 - Welcome GOP interest in updated extradition treaty, possible use of aerial spraying for eradication; ready to help assess if spraying technique would work in Pakistan.

Attachment:

Setting and List of Participants.

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SETTING

Even though he has been in office for more than a year, Prime Minister Junejo is a relative newcomer to the key issues in the US-Pakistan partnership; his preoccupation has been mostly domestic, i.e. consolidating of his own power and guiding transition to constitutional government.

We view the visit as an opportunity to expand Junejo's political stake in the ongoing US-Pakistan relationship. We will accord him the recognition he deserves for his role, with Zia, in pulling off a peaceful transition from martial law to constitutional government. We need to assure him of the steadfastness of the US commitment to Pakistan, provided Pakistan understands the absolute requirement for restraint in its nuclear policy. We need also to emphasize to him the need to stay close on Afghanistan, especially on the negotiations and on the more public aspects of our overall Afghanistan strategy. And we will underscore as well the importance of cooperating to stem the flood of illicit narcotics.

When you meet with Junejo, he will already have heard from the President himself regarding the key nuclear issue. Your reiteration of the main points made on this score will help impress on the Prime Minister how seriously this issue can threaten all that we have built and want to build together. Your main objective, however, will be a full discussion of our Afghanistan concerns in advance of the resumption of the Geneva talks on July 30 and a serious reiteration of our concerns regarding illicit narcotics originating in or near Pakistan.

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PARTICIPANTS IN SECRETARY'S JULY 17 MEETING WITH PM JUNEJO

U.S.

Secretary Shultz
AID Administrator McPherson
Under Secretary Armacost
Assistant Secretary Murphy
Ambassador Hinton
Deputy Assistant Secretary
Raphel
Deputy Assistant Secretary
Peck (notetaker)

Pakistan

The Prime Minister
Foreign Minister Yaqub Khan
Finance Minister Wattoo
Ambassador Azim
Ambassador-Designate Marker
Foreign Secretary Sattar

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[Iranian Second
Channel A]

SUBJECT; Rundown of Visitor's comments on 19/20 Sept 86

1. [] said that they had had a real problem in determining whether overtures made to them were genuine or not. []

[] He said they also did not know what to make of the approach via Gorbanifar and [Iranian First Channel A] because they had fielded many such approaches from arms dealers in the past. They also were curious about the approaches from Senator Kennedy and Alexander Haig. The Haig approach blew their mind because it was via an Iranian hair dresser in Europe. After our May visit, and their mishandling of it, a serious debate took place in Tehran about how to proceed. [] said they had to upgrade the channel and now think they have made the necessary arrangements. [] was told that the three persons in the room would be the only ones on our side until things got further along. [] said that he would be in charge on their side. In an aside, he said that [Iranian First Channel A] was too dumb to handle the channel. [] emphasized that they wanted to gradually improve relations with the United States because they fully realized they were between a rock and a hard place. The war will end soon and Iran must make the fateful decision about rebuilding the military and the country. Since the previous orientation was towards American equipment, they would like to continue in the same manner. They realize that American investment will be essential to the rebuilding of their country. However, for the time being, everything must be carried out in secret. If this were to leak, the radicals would have a field day and would be able to oust the moderates and the conservatives. [Iranian Second Channel A] [] said that when our delegation was in Tehran, the factions that were aware of our presence had put together a story to be released if word somehow got out about our delegation's presence in Tehran. We told him that we faced similar problems in the United States.

2. With regard to the Gorbanifar/[Iranian First Channel A] connection, [] said flatly they mistrust Gorbanifar. We told him that we entertain similar views but are worried about his going public and destroying everything. [] said that they think they can take care of Gorba. He was almost executed in 1981. They have a lot on him and he also has family back in Tehran. The U.S. side is doubtful. Believe this remains a problem since Gorba has told NIR that he would go public. [] said that, although they are grateful to [Iranian First Channel A] for having the courage to get things started, they want him out of the loop because (A) he

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EYES ONLY

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DECL _____
DERIVED FROM _____

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D

has not produced and (B) they do not think him smart enough to handle the contact. Further, they have just uncovered evidence.

In addition, [] said [Iranian First Channel A] played a role in the Reed kidnapping. He did this as a means of putting additional pressure on the U.S. to send the next shipment.

[Iranian Second Channel A]

[] suggested that, if [Iranian First Channel A] calls again, Sam should tell him that everything is up in the air because of the two new hostages and that nothing can be done until they are released.

3. During our discussion, [] emphasized that they are also interested in relations with us on the strategic level. They are very concerned about Soviet machinations in the area as a whole and in recent months have had their eyes opened by how much effort the Soviets are putting into penetrating and manipulating the Iranian government.

[Iranian Second Channel A]

The Iranians agree that we should put the past behind us, and [] said they regret our fruitless trip to Tehran in May. [] proposed a joint committee which would handle the channel and establish secure communications between the two governments. The opening phase will be secret but we will then bring the relationship into the open at an appropriate time.

[Iranian Second Channel A]

4. Hostages: The U.S. side dealt with the hostage issue as an obstacle, not a key issue in arriving at a strategic relationship. [] said that prior to coming on this trip he had talked with the "person directly responsible" twice on the telephone and once personally. He believes that this issue can be resolved and it will be one of the first things he devotes his attention to when he returns to Tehran. He said that it is now a matter of policy that the Iranian government opposes hostage taking and terrorism on humanitarian grounds. He reminded us that the Iranian government did play a positive role in the TWA hijacking case. He said that in addition to recent public statements, Khomeini has prepared a "fatwa" condemning hostage-taking as "unislamic". We thanked him for the Iranian stance on the hijacking of the PanAm flight in Karachi. [] was told that next week there would be a VOA broadcast in which Iran would be mentioned as one of the States we wished to thank for refusing to grant landing rights to the hijackers. [Iranian Second Channel B] also told "Sam" in an aside that he

Iranian Second Channel A

had discussed the hostages with [] earlier and he was certain that the matter would soon be settled. [] also stated that the Parris case would be resolved satisfactorily. The people holding the hostages are very worried about a CIA operation to rescue the hostages. [] urged that we not do anything to fan their fears, as this could make his job harder. He said that he would try to give us 2 or 3 days advanced notice before the hostages are released.

5. Afghanistan: [] said that they are most anxious to cooperate with us on the subject of Afghanistan. They have set up a logistics/training base near the border. They have tried to teach the mujahidin based on Iran's experience, but a lot of it has to do with equipment. For instance, the mujahidin fear the MI-24 gunship. Iran, on the other hand, believes it is a piece of junk. They have had very good success in shooting them down with Red Eye missiles. The MI-24's problem is that it is not very maneuverable; once the missile is locked on target, the MI-24 is a dead duck. Iran has an extremely high hit ratio. Also a pasdar disabled an Iraqi T-72 tank with an RPG. He was 80 meters from the tank when he fired. We pointed out that it takes a lot of guts to fire a missile when you are that close. The other major problem for the Mujahiddin are the Soviet Spetznaz troops. They are very effective. The only battle with Spetznaz which the Mujahiddin won out was recently one near Herat where they also took a couple of Spetznaz prisoners.

Iranian Second Channel A

6. Joint Committee: There was a lot of discussion about a secret US-Iran Joint Committee. [] towards the end of the meetings, stated that they had already set up three people to be on their side. We told him that ours would be three persons also, consisting of "Goode, Kopp and Sam". [] said that they would pick a single courier would carry things from Tehran to where ever we designate as committee Hdqs. We suggested that secure communications be established as soon as possible and [] agreed. We returned to our May suggestion of a two man conso team in Tehran. [] liked this and said that he would bring it up in Tehran.

Iranian Second Channel A

7. [] provided a list of their urgent military requirements. This included tactical intelligence on Iraq which he said they needed desperately. [] said that they badly need 105 and 155 mm howitzers and 175 mm base plate RAP rounds. He asked "Sam" to ship some of these (as much as we can assemble on short notice) as soon as possible. On the shipment that we have put together, [] said to give him an account number as soon as we are ready, and he will have the money ready. He wanted to take the list back and make sure they really needed the spare parts before giving the go-ahead on the shipment. He said that their need for artillery is pressing because they need suppressing fire to make their infantry attacks more successful.

US PARTICIPANTS: George Cave as "Colonel Sam O'Neill"
Oliver North as "Colonel Goode"
Dick Seacord as "General Kopp"

IRANIAN PARTICIPANT: [

Iranian Second Channel A]



March 87

MSGNO

FM JCS WASHINGTON DC
 INFO RUEADWD/OCSA WASHINGTON DC
 RUEMAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC
 RUEAHQA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC
 RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
 RUEHC /SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC
 RUETIAH/DIRNSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD
 RUEACMC/CMC WASHINGTON DC
 RUCLAKA/CDR4THPSYOP GP-FT BRAGG NC//AFVS-POG-E-SSD//
 RUETIAQ/MPC FT GEORGE G MEADE MD
 RUEALGX/SAFE

Super report

DIR
S-13

A-13

M-4 (STINGER)

M-2

S-2

FM CDRUSAOPSGP FT MEADE MD //IAGPC-CM//
 TO AIG 9135
 INFO RUEOAYB/CDRFSTC INTEL OPS CHARLOTTESVILLE VA //AIFICB//
 RUCIAEA/FTD WPAFB OH //XOQP//
 RUEHIL/USDAO ISLAMABAD PK
 RUEHRH/USDAO RIYADH SA

SECRET (U)

SECRET (U)

BT

EZ1:

EZ2:

QQQQ

SECTION 01 OF 04

SERIAL: (U)

PASS: (U) NSACSS FOR ZKZK PP DXD DE FOR INFO

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFO REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE. REPORT CLASSIFIED SECRET NOFORN WMINTEL.

COUNTRY: (U) AF; UR; PK

SUBJ: (U) IMPACT OF THE STINGER MISSILE ON SOVIET AND RESISTANCE TACTICS IN AF.

DOI: (U)

REQS: (U)

SOURCE: (S/NOFORN/WMINTEL)

SECRET (U)

SOURCE HAS REPORTED RELIABLY IN THE PAST.

SUMMARY: (C/NOFORN) THE INTRODUCTION OF THE STINGER ANTIAIRCRAFT MISSILE SYSTEM INTO AF IN SEPTEMBER 1986 HAS HAD A SIGNIFICANT AND EXTENSIVE IMPACT ON SOVIET CLOSE AIR SUPPORT TACTICS.

TEXT: (C/NOFORN) 1. STINGER INTRODUCTION IN AF SINCE THE INTRODUCTION OF THE STINGER MISSILE IN AF IN SEPTEMBER 1986,

THE GENERAL IMPACT HAS FAVORED THE MUJAHIDIN AND ALTERED THE APPLICATION OF AIR POWER AND THE CONDUCT OF CLOSE AIR SUPPORT BY THE SOVIET AND <>>AFGHAN<>> ARMED FORCES. MORE TACTICAL AND AIR SUPPORT CHANGES OCCURRED IN THE LAST QUARTER OF 1986 AND THE FIRST QUARTER OF 1987 THAN IN THE PREVIOUS SEVEN YEARS OF THE CONFLICT.

2. (C/NOFORN) REDUCTION AND CHANGE IN CLOSE AIR SUPPORT ROLE THE QUANTITY OF DIRECT CLOSE AIR SUPPORT TO <>>SOVIET/AFGHAN<>> GROUND OPERATIONS HAS BEEN REDUCED SIGNIFICANTLY, AND THE APPLICATION OF ALL FORMS OF CLOSE AIR SUPPORT HAS BEEN MODIFIED.

BY JANUARY 1987, THE CHANGES IN RESPONSE TO THE INCREASED MUJAHIDIN AIR DEFENSE CAPABILITY WERE UNIFORM AND OBVIOUS THE LOW ALTITUDE CIRCLING AIRCRAFT WERE ABSENT FROM MOST GROUND MOVEMENTS. ON CALL AIR STRIKES ARE STILL AVAILABLE, BUT LESS RESPONSIVE THAN WAS POSSIBLE PREVIOUSLY.

3. (C/NOFORN)

ALL INFO FROM SOURCE

(S) (C) (U) (R) (S) (C) (U) (R)

(S) (C) (U) (R) (S) (C) (U) (R)

SECRET

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

CASUALTIES AMONG
<> THE SUPPORTED <><>SOVIET/AFGHAN<><> TROOPS ARE STILL COMMON AND PROBABLY
OUTNUMBER MUJAHIDIN CASUALTIES IN APPLICATIONS OF CLOSE AIR
SUPPORT.

SECRET

4. (C/NOFORN)

[REDACTED]

BT
#1525
NNNN
NNDD

[REDACTED]

SECRET

[REDACTED]

MSGNO

[REDACTED]

FM JCS WASHINGTON DC
 INFO RUEADWD/OCSA WASHINGTON DC
 RUEMAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC
 RUEAHQA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC
 RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
 RUEHC /SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC
 RUETIAH/DIRNSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD
 RUEACHC/CMC WASHINGTON DC
 RUCLAKA/CDR4THPSYOP GP FT BRAGG NC//AFVS-POG-E-SSD//
 RUETIAQ/MPC FT GEORGE G MEADE MD
 RUEALGX/SAFE

SUPPLY (12)

P [REDACTED]
 FM CDRUSROPSGP FT MEADE MD //IAGPC-CH//
 TO AIG 9135
 INFO RUEOAYB/CDRFSTC INTEL OPS CHARLOTTESVILLE VA //AIFICB//
 RUCIAEA/FTD WPAFB OH //XOQP//
 RUEHIL/USDAO ISLAMABAD PK
 RUEHRH/USDAO RIYADH SA

BT
EZ1:

~~SECRET NOFORN UNINTEL~~

EZ2:

QQQQ

SECTION 02 OF 04

[REDACTED]

5. (C/NOFORN)

[REDACTED]

TTTTT

(1) (a) (b) (c)

137552 (M) 2

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

197 707 898 8200

MORE JETS HAVE BEEN SHOT DOWN WITH HEAVY MACHINE GUNS SINCE JANUARY 1987 THAN IN ANY SIMILAR PREVIOUS PERIOD. THE MUJAHIDIN ALSO INDIRECTLY ATTRIBUTE THIS TO THE STINGER PRESENCE, WHICH IS CREDITED WITH CAUSING THE LOW-LEVEL APPROACHES.

6. ~~(C/NOFORN)~~ CONVOY AIR SUPPORT CHANGES CONVOY AIR COVER HAS SIMILARLY CHANGED, AND THE LOW LEVEL CIRCLING HELICOPTER GUNSHIPS ACCOMPANYING GROUND TRANSPORT CONVOYS HAVE DISAPPEARED;

[REDACTED]

197 707 898 8200

7. (C/NOFORN)

[REDACTED]

<>>SOVIET/AFGHAN<>> ARMED FORCES LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS (LOC'S) HAS BEEN RADICALLY DIMINISHED SINCE LATE 1986. THE PRIMARY FACTORS IN MOTIVATING THIS CHANGE ARE: THE INCREASE IN THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE MUJAHIDIN AIR DEFENSE WEAPONS INVENTORY;

[REDACTED]

8. (C/NOFORN)

[REDACTED]

197 707 898 8200

[REDACTED]



~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]



WASH DC 20505

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

9 October 1987

India's Actions and Intentions on Afghanistan [REDACTED]

Summary

Prime Minister Gandhi views the Afghan issue as an irritant in India's relations with the USSR and the United States, but he does not believe India can do anything that could significantly influence the outcome of the Afghan conflict. Given the signs that US-Soviet relations are improving, Gandhi likely will arrive in Washington with some optimism that in due course the Soviets will withdraw from Afghanistan and the United States will reduce its military assistance to Pakistan. Gandhi privately opposes the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, but he continues to avoid public criticism of either Moscow or the Kabul regime. In fact, New Delhi's increasing diplomatic contacts with Kabul and official statements supporting Kabul's national reconciliation initiatives may assist the efforts of Kabul and Moscow to legitimize the Afghan government and weaken support for Pakistan's resolution on Afghanistan at the UN General Assembly. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Approved for Release
Date [REDACTED] MAR 1988

[REDACTED]

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Gandhi is unlikely to be receptive to any US effort to persuade New Delhi to criticize the Soviet presence in Afghanistan or to limit Indian diplomatic assistance to Kabul's Third World initiative. He probably believes the costs to New Delhi are manageable and that the policy keeps Indo-Soviet relations on track. Gandhi is likely to be receptive to US arguments that India encourage a role for former Afghan King Zahir Shah or non-sectarian political parties in an interim and post-settlement government.

.....

Indian Prime Minister Gandhi's overriding interest in the Afghan situation is to reduce US and Soviet involvement in South Asia. India believes the United States sells Pakistan conventional weapons and subordinates its concerns about nuclear proliferation to advance US interests in supporting the Afghan resistance and in obtaining access to Pakistani military facilities. Gandhi is concerned about the Soviet military encroachment in Afghanistan and has continued his mother's efforts to distance New Delhi from Moscow--without losing the benefits of Indo-Soviet economic and military ties. Gandhi is also interested in limiting Islamabad's influence in a post-withdrawal Afghanistan so that a Pakistani-backed Islamic fundamentalist regime in Kabul does not cause problems for India. His concern is that India's 90 million Muslims could be more susceptible to the influence of an Islamic-ruled Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan after what could be perceived by Indian Muslims as an Islamic victory over the Soviets in Afghanistan.

A variety of sources indicate Gandhi believes Gorbachev wants a political settlement in Afghanistan, albeit one that would leave a regime warmly disposed to Moscow. Gandhi may calculate that New Delhi can contribute to a political resolution of the Afghan conflict by promoting increased diplomatic activity. He likely approved the exchange of visits by Indian and Afghan foreign ministers earlier this year with this hope in mind--an expectation that probably was encouraged by Soviet officials.

Gandhi would face some domestic opposition if he were to be more forthcoming with Washington on the Afghan issue. Leftist officials in his government and Congress Party, some opposition politicians, and media officials on the Soviet payroll are quick to take issue with US policy toward Afghanistan and Pakistan. They regularly claim that cooperation between the United States, Pakistan, and the People's Republic of China on the Afghan issue is a cover for collusion against India. They assert that Islamabad trades on its aid for Afghan

[REDACTED]

refugees and insurgents to acquire modern military equipment from the United States for use against India. There is no comparable Indian lobby pressing for an Indian hard line against the Soviet presence in Afghanistan. [REDACTED]

Moscow and Kabul Exerting Pressure

The Soviets and Afghans view India as key in their drive to increase the Kabul regime's international legitimacy primarily because of New Delhi's influential position in such organizations as the United Nations, South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), and the Nonaligned Movement (NAM). Moscow and Kabul almost certainly believe that even superficially warmer Afghan-India relations are useful for softening anti-Afghan sentiments in Third World-dominated forums. Since Afghan Foreign Minister Wakil visited India in February, two additional delegations have gone to New Delhi for talks: a high-ranking group from the Central Committee of the ruling People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan and a panel led by the Minister of Education. [REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

Gandhi's Response to Pressure

New Delhi will continue to listen to Moscow's and Washington's arguments on the Afghan issue, but is unlikely to undertake a dramatic move on either side's behalf in the near term. Indian officials probably consider restraint in their public statements about the Soviet presence in Afghanistan and diplomatic introductions for Afghan delegations a small price to pay to help keep the military and economic pipeline from the Soviets open. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

He also is likely to withhold support for the Kabul regime's bid to join SAARC because of Islamabad's certain veto and because New Delhi has no interest in giving in to superpower pressure and influence in an organization that it intends to dominate. [REDACTED]

For now, Gandhi's involvement in Sri Lanka in July probably is about as big a gamble as he will be willing or able to take in the foreign policy arena. He is likely to be preoccupied with domestic issues, given continuing difficulties with the Sikhs, the aftermath of the drought, and the political challenge being mounted by the opposition. [REDACTED]

Gandhi's willingness to increase Indian diplomatic activity on Afghanistan--thus far to the benefit of Kabul and Moscow--may reflect New Delhi's efforts to protect its interests in Afghanistan in anticipation of a Soviet withdrawal, but it may also provide an opening for the US. We believe Gandhi would be likely to permit Indian diplomatic activity to encourage a role for the former Afghan King or non-sectarian political parties in an interim and post-settlement government largely to limit Islamabad's influence. He would take a harder line in India's Afghan policy in the unlikely event that the Soviets made an incursion into Pakistan or Islamabad agreed to give United States forces permanent access to military facilities. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

18 March 1988

INDIA'S INTERESTS IN AFGHANISTAN [REDACTED]

Summary

New Delhi believes there is going to be an Afghan settlement over the next year and has concluded that, if India wants influence with the successor regime, it needs to get involved early. India wants to expand its role in Kabul and limit that of Pakistan, Iran, and the Islamists among the resistance groups following a Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. The Indians believe a coalition government dominated by secular and traditional Afghan leaders--including the Communists--would best serve their interests and are establishing contacts with the parties, including Afghan President Najibullah, former King Zahir Shah, and several insurgent factions, in pursuit of that goal. [REDACTED]

New Delhi's preferences for a successor regime in Afghanistan correspond more closely to those of Moscow than Washington. The Indians try to downplay differences with Washington over Afghanistan by stressing what they view as our mutual interest in a Soviet military exit and their willingness to assist in brokering a settlement. Prime Minister Gandhi believed he was responding to US encouragement to take a more active role on Afghanistan when he increased contacts with the Afghans and Pakistanis. He has been upset by US criticism of New Delhi's actions in the region. He does not want to get out in front of either Washington or Moscow on Afghanistan and is likely to increase diplomatic activity and contacts with non-fundamentalist Afghan groups only if the Geneva talks confirm that Soviet troops will depart soon. He probably calculates he can pursue India's interests and not be penalized by either Washington or Moscow on, what are for New Delhi, more important bilateral economic and military matters. Over the next few months, he may quicken the pace of negotiations for military equipment from both Moscow and Washington in anticipation that New Delhi's leverage could be reduced as superpower competition wanes in the region following a Soviet military withdrawal from Afghanistan. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

SECRET [REDACTED]

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Approved for Release
Date 15 OCT 1996

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New Delhi's Afghan policy, like its foreign policy in general, is driven by three concerns:

- The protection of India against foreign subversion including external support for domestic secessionist and insurgent movements
- Advancing New Delhi's claims to regional preeminence in South Asia which traditionally included Afghanistan
- Maximizing its maneuvering room with Washington and Moscow

The Foreign Threat New Delhi does not want Islamists to take over the government in Kabul--not because it has any great sympathy for the Afghan Communists, but because it worries about the consequences for India of energetic Islamic regimes in Tehran, Islamabad, and Kabul. Indian officials likely worry that India, with its large Muslim population, is an attractive target for activist fundamentalists. India's population of nearly 800 million includes approximately 90-100 million Muslims--the fourth largest concentration of Muslims in the world--and its political stability is threatened by increasing sectarianism in both the Muslim and Hindu communities, as well as from Sikh militants. India experienced a series of violent and widespread Hindu-Muslim riots during 1987.

New Delhi believes Pakistan to be the primary foreign backer of separatist and insurgent groups in India and probably is concerned that the rise to power in Kabul of Islamist groups supported by Pakistan would provide Islamabad another lever to stir up trouble inside India. Although New Delhi is most alarmed at Islamabad's limited support for the Sikhs, Indian officials are also convinced Islamabad uses the Pakistani media to encourage disaffection among Indian Muslims and covertly funds Muslim fundamentalist groups in Kashmir.

New Delhi also believes some Indian Muslims are responsive to Iranian influence and may worry that this influence could be magnified by an Islamic victory in Kabul.

The Iranian press criticized New Delhi for its harsh treatment of Muslims during the Hindu-Muslim rioting last spring and has encouraged Indian Muslims to agitate for Islamic law and privileges.

We doubt the Indians believe Afghan Islamists by themselves pose a direct subversive threat to New Delhi. One Pakistani-based Islamic group, Ahl-i Hadith (founded in pre-independence India to combat Hindu influences on the Indian Muslim community), has ties to several Afghan resistance groups because the Afghans studied at Ahl-i Hadith seminaries in Pakistan in the 1950s. We have no evidence, however, that this group currently has ties with Indian Muslims. Most Afghans living in India are refugees from the political unrest preceding the Soviet invasion.

Regional Preeminence We believe New Delhi hopes to wield influence in Afghanistan after the Soviets withdraw. Gandhi's moves during 1987--the dispatch of 50,000 troops to Sri Lanka and his flexing of military muscle against Pakistan and China--reflect his ambitious vision of India's role in the region. New Delhi's support for Afghanistan's membership at the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) summit meeting in November also underscores India's regional ambitions and interest in drawing Afghanistan into a regional organization dominated by India. The Indians consider Afghanistan to be part of the Indian subcontinent--linked historically and ethnically more closely to South Asia than the Middle East. They also have long viewed Afghanistan as a strategic buffer state between India and the Soviet Union and the Middle East.

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India also is interested in limiting Pakistan's influence in the region, including in Afghanistan. The Indians know Pakistan's support for the resistance and the Afghan refugees will be the basis for Islamabad's role in a post-Soviet Afghanistan. The Indians are now, we believe, looking for their own clients there. India will continue to push for a bigger role in Kabul as it sees the Soviets leaving because it believes an expansion of Pakistan's influence in Afghanistan would be detrimental to Indian preeminence in the region.

Courting Superpower Attention

New Delhi's Afghan policy also reflects its strategic concerns with Moscow and Washington. The Indians want the Soviets out of Afghanistan and the United States to reduce its military assistance to Pakistan at the same time that New Delhi retains close economic and diplomatic cooperation with both superpowers. To achieve these goals, New Delhi has tried to avoid taking a position on Afghanistan. Indian leaders avoided the Afghan issue or, when compelled to speak, issued bland calls for an end to outside interference. Early in his tenure as Prime Minister, Rajiv Gandhi offered to be the mediator on Afghanistan, probably believing that such offers would keep India involved with Washington and Moscow without taking sides.

Since late 1987 the Indians have acted on the assumption that a settlement on Afghanistan was in 'the cards'. They almost certainly concluded that the odds were improving that the Soviets, Pakistanis, and United States would cut a deal and that if New Delhi wanted to play in the "endgame," it had to act. Given the encouragement they believe they have received from both Washington and Moscow to get involved, the Indians probably calculate they have some room to pursue their interests.

India's Tactics

New Delhi probably sees four possible outcomes for a post-Soviet Afghanistan and,

we believe, has determined its Afghan policy based on these scenarios:

--A compromise coalition government dominated by traditional and secular leaders takes over in Kabul. Fundamentalist clerics and military commanders hold considerable autonomy in their local areas.

--The Soviet-backed Peoples Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDDPA) leadership holds onto power in the Kabul area, with resistance commanders consolidating their positions in the provinces.

--The more successful Islamic commanders take over in Kabul and eliminate the remnants of the Communist regime.

--Civil war intensifies between Najibullah and the commanders in the provinces.

India's actions and statements in recent months indicate New Delhi prefers a compromise coalition government. Indian officials say publicly that they have increased contacts with all Afghan parties to a settlement and that Gandhi's reception of Afghan President Najibullah last December should be viewed in this context. We believe that a coalition of secular and traditional Afghan leaders would be friendly to India, diminish prospects for Pakistan's influence, and provide the least excuse for continuing superpower involvement in the region.

Failing its first choice, New Delhi probably would prefer a continuation of the PDDPA regime in Kabul.

Although Gandhi met with Najibullah, Indian officials have said they are increasingly doubtful the regime will survive.

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and believe the Soviets may abandon Najibullah according to US Embassy reports.

In our judgment, the scenario the Indians are most worried about is an Islamic government because they fear it would raise Islamic discontent in India and expand Pakistani and Iranian influence in South Asia. New Delhi's concerns probably have escalated as it has received reports of military and political successes by the insurgents over the past year and of Soviet intentions to withdraw. Indian diplomacy suggests New Delhi does not consider an Islamist takeover in Kabul a foregone conclusion.

New Delhi also fears an outbreak of civil war. It probably believes that chaos is likely to favor the militarily stronger Islamic resistance groups over the secular or traditional factions. Gandhi has expressed New Delhi's concern that instability in Afghanistan could be exploited by terrorist groups seeking sophisticated weapons and narcotics traffickers in search of drugs and new transit routes. He also believes civil unrest would limit opportunities for India to expand its influence and leave the door open for superpower, Pakistani, and Iranian meddling.

India's Next Moves

Although New Delhi probably calculates it has negotiated the minefield between the Soviet and US positions on Afghanistan with some dexterity, we expect the Indians do not want to get out in front of either Moscow or Washington. They are likely to increase their diplomatic activity and contacts with non-fundamentalist Afghan groups only if the Geneva talks yield additional evidence that Soviet troops will leave soon.

--We expect New Delhi will continue diplomatic contacts with senior PDPA officials--particularly to encourage the PDPA to talk with other non-fundamentalist Afghan groups.

He has urged to increase contacts with the press for a settlement in Afghanistan to keep the pressure on both Washington and Moscow to end their involvement and to cast Islamabad in the spoiler role.

--New Delhi may offer to contribute troops to an international peacekeeping force and funds for reconstruction.

--New Delhi probably will support membership for a secular or traditional coalition Afghan regime in the United Nations and nonaligned organizations.

Implications for Indo-US Relations

Gandhi appears to be determined to put a spin on New Delhi's Afghan initiatives that pleases Washington. His recent invitation for Zia to come to New Delhi to exchange views on Afghanistan was made, in part, in response to Washington's urging. His latest statements linking an orderly transition in Afghanistan to antiterrorism and antimarcotics objectives follow the same pattern. Despite New Delhi's irritations with US demarches on its Afghan initiatives, we believe the Indians will welcome additional requests from Washington to play a role in negotiations--even requests to contact Moscow. Indian diplomats probably would be willing to consider US arguments that an Islamist regime in Afghanistan would be less inclined to proselytize than the regime in Tehran, but are likely to remain cautious, believing that Washington underestimates the longer term threat of resurgent Islam to India.

Pragmatists in the Gandhi administration probably are advising the Prime Minister that New Delhi's current policy on a successor Afghan regime does not preclude developing a relationship with the Islamists if they take over in Kabul. New Delhi would likely approach the installation of an Islamic regime as it did the Islamic revolutionary takeover in Iran and offer political recognition, sponsorship in regional organizations like SAARC, and

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expanded economic cooperation. New Delhi probably would hope that its sponsorship of Kabul in regional organizations would serve as a constraint to Afghan proselytizing or meddling in India. These advisers may have convinced Gandhi that, if the Islamists take over, the United States and Pakistan would soon share New Delhi's and Moscow's concerns about the new regime's intentions.

We believe that Gandhi is gambling he can pursue India's interests in securing a secular or traditionalist regime in Kabul that will be friendly to India and not be penalized by either Washington or Moscow on what are for New Delhi, more important bilateral economic and military matters with the superpowers. We believe New Delhi may press negotiations for military weapons and economic cooperation with Moscow and Washington over the next year or two in fear that superpower interest in South Asia will wane after the Soviet withdrawal. New Delhi probably is concerned that a Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, if it is followed by additional overtures by Moscow to Beijing, would diminish Moscow's interest in continuing high levels of military and economic assistance to India. The Indian Defense Minister's February trip to Moscow and the flurry of Indo-Soviet deals for submarines and AWACs may be indicative of New Delhi's anxiety as much as Moscow's concern about New Delhi's turn to the West.

We expect a similar quickening of Indian interest in concluding several military deals with the United States. The Indians are probably uneasy that diminished Soviet interest in India will undercut their leverage with Washington. Indian officials almost certainly will increase their complaints to US officials that the transfer of advanced military equipment to Pakistan following a Soviet exit from Afghanistan only serves to fuel a costly arms race on the subcontinent.

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Defense Intelligence Agency
Appraisal

Afghanistan: Soviet Withdrawal Scenario (U)

Summary

The Soviets are expected to begin withdrawing their troops from Afghanistan on 15 May, in keeping with the Geneva agreements signed on 14 April. The pullout will probably be achieved by the successive evacuation of entire garrisons and areas, rather than through the "thinning" of personnel in units. Larger garrisons will be turned over to Afghan forces. As the Soviets withdraw, the Mujahedin will begin to focus their efforts mainly on Afghan forces in an effort to conserve strength. The limited cohesion of the Afghan forces will continue to erode during the withdrawal, and desertions to the resistance will increase.


Discussion

Projected Soviet Withdrawal Scenario

According to the terms of the agreement reached at Geneva, the withdrawal will be "front-loaded." Half the Soviet troops will return to the USSR within the first 3 months of the withdrawal, and redeployment will be completed within 9 months.

Homeward movement will begin as Soviet outposts and remote base camps are closed or turned over to Afghan forces and as Soviet troops are consolidated in larger garrisons. Some equipment, weapons, ammunition, fuel, and other consumables will be passed to Afghan units while most of the armored vehicles and weapon systems will return to the USSR with the units. Certain support elements will depart before combat units, owing to the difficulties of long road marches with cumbersome equipment.

activities and will play down characterizations of the withdrawal as a Soviet defeat or an abandonment of a friendly government.



Once the protective perimeter is manned by Afghan troops, most Soviet troops will depart Kabul by air and land. As this phase nears completion, forces along the LOC

may be removed. The last Soviet combat troops to leave will most likely be withdrawn from Kabul by air, and barring major complications, the withdrawal will probably be completed well before the mandated 15 February 1989 deadline.

The Soviets are expected to publicize at least some unit departures and to stage news media opportunities in order to garner maximum domestic and international propaganda benefits. The Soviet and Afghan news media will emphasize the orderliness of withdrawal

Mujahedin Reactions to the Withdrawal

As the Soviets leave the provinces, the insurgents will probably focus on isolating major government garrisons and cities before attacking them directly. The first priority will most likely be to gain undisputed control of resupply routes, followed by efforts to stop aerial resupply and tactical air support to the Afghan garrisons by rocketing airfields and maintaining anti-aircraft gun and missile teams. Before launching attacks to overrun government positions, Mujahedin commanders will encourage Afghan forces to surrender and will try to negotiate mass defections to their side. If this tactic fails, the Mujahedin will carry out direct assaults.

Disunity among the principal insurgent parties could handicap a coherent strategy aimed at reducing the Kabul redoubt and capturing the capital. In any event, the

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resistance lacks the capability to storm the capital if it is well defended. As a result, the Kabul region may not fall until after several months of steady pressure. The Mujahedin could, however, be successful if the Afghan forces suffer an internal collapse or if serious factional fighting breaks out.

[REDACTED]

Afghan Government's Survivability

The six components of the Afghan Armed Forces

[REDACTED] are the army, the air force/air defense force, the border security forces, the Ministry of Interior's Sarandoi paramilitary units, the Ministry of State Security's (WAD's) combat units, and the militia. The Afghan Government, however, has never been able to fill these forces from the conscript manpower pool, and high desertion rates compound the problem.

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Moreover, Afghan aircraft and ground force equipment are generally older and less capable than those in the Soviet forces.

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On the whole, the largely unmotivated and poorly trained Afghan troops are no match for the Mujahedin.

The Afghan Armed Forces will continue to erode as the Soviet withdrawal progresses. The number of deserters, most of them with arms, will increase, possibly rendering some weaker units completely ineffective. During the later stages of the withdrawal, the internal security situation will most likely deteriorate rapidly.

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This desperate time will be characterized by intense rivalry among People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) factions, and units loyal to the party's Khalq and Parcham factions may clash. The Khalqis are numerous in most combat units of the armed forces. Many believe they can defeat the Mujahedin without Soviet troops and therefore support the Geneva accords. The Parcham faction, which dominates the government, disapproves of the withdrawal agreements.

If these differences are not resolved, the Khalqis may first try to eliminate their PDPA rivals before dealing with the Mujahedin. The Khalqis may also oust President Najibullah as the Soviets withdraw and then form a government that will fight the Mujahedin to the finish. Alternatively, elements of the Afghan military sympathetic to the insurgents could stage a coup following the withdrawal and negotiate with resistance leaders for some type of coalition government.

A less likely scenario envisions the abandonment of Kabul by the PDPA without a climactic battle in order to concentrate in a Communist stronghold in the northern region of Afghanistan. The recent creation of another province in the recently established Northern Autonomous Zone and the numerous direct economic ties established between the northern provinces and the USSR are cited as preparations for a buffer zone between the USSR and veteran Mujahedin bent on carrying an anti-Soviet holy war, or jihad, into the Central Asian minority areas of the USSR.

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
Outlook

Ultimately, the insurgent forces will cause the demise of the Communist

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government. The successor government will probably be an uneasy coalition of traditionalist and fundamentalist groups, and its control will not extend far beyond Kabul. No matter which group wins Kabul, it will be under enormous pressure to proceed quickly with the formation of a permanent government.

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Prepared by:

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Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

21 November 1988


Indian Policy Toward Afghanistan

SUMMARY

India wants to be in a position to influence a successor regime in Kabul, limit Pakistan's influence there, and maintain its regional preeminence as the Soviets withdraw from Afghanistan. The Indians believe that a coalition government dominated by secular and traditional Afghan leaders--including the Communists--would best serve their interests. To influence this outcome, they have established contacts with Afghan President Najibullah, former King Zahir Shah, and several of the insurgent factions.

New Delhi's preferences for a successor regime in Afghanistan correspond more closely to those of Moscow than Washington, but the Indians try to downplay differences with the United States by stressing what they view as mutual interest in a Soviet military exit and their willingness to assist in brokering a settlement. Prime Minister Gandhi believed he was responding to US encouragement to take a more active role on Afghanistan when he increased his contacts with the Afghans and Pakistanis soon after the Soviets announced their withdrawal timetable in February 1988. He has been upset by US criticism of New Delhi's actions in the region and dismayed at the Soviet's threats to stop the withdrawal.

Since the Soviets announced their planned withdrawal from Afghanistan, India has been trying to play a greater role there even though its basic policy has remained unchanged. India supports a coalition government bringing together the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), traditional, and secular Afghan resistance leaders largely because New



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Delhi believes that the current PDPA government will outlast the Soviet withdrawal. Indian officials have said that they believe the PDPA government commands the allegiance of a large number of troops and the Ministry of State Security (WAD) and, although factional fighting might remove President Najibullah, the PDPA government can survive.

Indian policy is largely predicated on opposition to an Islamic fundamentalist successor regime. Indian officials argue that such a regime--particularly if headed by Hizbi Islami leader Gulbuddin Hikmatyar or a coalition dominated by him--would be controlled by Islamabad. They also fear that a fundamentalist regime would present India with a phalanx of Islamic fanatics--stretching from Islamabad, through Kabul to Tehran--that would unsettle India's large Muslim population. Although the specter of an Islamic fundamentalist government in Afghanistan still worries New Delhi, Indian officials have noted that they believe some of the Pakistani impetus for establishing such a regime in Kabul died with Zia.

To advance its policy, New Delhi has tried to meet with all the Afghan players, although those meetings have not appeared to be successful or to have engaged India in the settlement process. Despite rebuffs from Islamabad, Gandhi sent his Foreign Secretary to Pakistan in February to discuss the Soviet withdrawal. Indian Minister of State for External Affairs Natwar Singh travelled to Rome to discuss with former King Zahir Shah his role in a possible successor regime--a visit many Afghans consider the kiss of death for Zahir Shah's prospects in a post-Soviet Afghanistan. In May, Najibullah paid an official visit to India--the only non-bloc country he has visited--to discuss the situation with Prime Minister Gandhi. Not only was the trip inconclusive, it was controversial in India.

Motivating Factors

India's Afghan policy, like its regional foreign policy in general, is driven by two concerns: Indian claims to regional preeminence in South Asia, which traditionally has included Afghanistan, and its perception of the need to guard against foreign, particularly Islamic, subversion.

Regional Preeminence. India believes that it is the preeminent regional power in the subcontinent and that it has a responsibility to play an active role in the region. Recent Indian assistance to the Maldivian Government and the Indian troop presence in Sri Lanka are viewed in India as exercises of this responsibility. The Indians consider Afghanistan to be linked historically and ethnically to the Indian subcontinent and have long viewed Afghanistan as a strategic buffer state between India and the Soviet Union and the Middle East. The Indians, consequently, view their

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recent attempts to play a role in the settlement of Afghanistan to be consistent with their regional responsibilities.

To ensure its regional preeminence, India would also like to divest the subcontinent of any superpower presence. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan brought a superpower's military into the region. Washington's response in arming Pakistan brought the other superpower into the region. These intrusions, New Delhi believes, drastically upset the balance of power in the region. We believe, the Indians continue to favor a Soviet withdrawal, hoping it will reduce or remove the US presence.

Fear of Foreign Subversion. At the same time, New Delhi does not want Islamic fundamentalists to dominate a successor regime in Kabul because it worries about the consequences for India of activist Islamic regimes in Islamabad, Kabul, and Tehran. Indian officials worry that India, with its large Muslim population, is an attractive target for Islamic fundamentalists. India's population of roughly 800 million includes approximately 100 million Muslims--the fourth largest concentration in the world.

[REDACTED]

India also worries that post-Soviet Afghanistan will degenerate into a civil war making the country vulnerable to foreign exploitation. New Delhi probably believes that chaos is likely to favor the militarily stronger Islamic resistance groups. Gandhi has expressed his concern that instability in Afghanistan could be exploited by Indian terrorist groups seeking sophisticated weapons. He also believes that civil unrest in Afghanistan would limit opportunities for India to expand its influence and leave the door open for superpower, Pakistani, and Iranian meddling.

Relations with the Superpowers

New Delhi probably believes that it has negotiated the minefield between Soviet and US positions on Afghanistan with some agility. India believes it has responded to US encouragement to become involved in the Afghan problem. Delhi increased its contacts with the Afghan regime.

[REDACTED]

Although the Indians will probably keep up some diplomatic pressure to keep the Geneva Accords on track, they will temper it with its basic goal of improving relations with Washington. New Delhi probably also calculates that, if it can play the role of a reasonable actor, Pakistan will have less leverage in cajoling

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sophisticated weaponry from the United States after the Soviets leave the area. [REDACTED]

Relations with the Soviet Union after it leaves Afghanistan are less clear. New Delhi supports the Soviet withdrawal but at the same time regards it as the first instance that Moscow has turned its back on an ally. The withdrawal, combined with improving Sino-Soviet relations, has prompted Indians to question Moscow's commitment to the Indo-Soviet relationship. [REDACTED]

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	AMEMBASSY LONDON	PRIORITY	34 RUDTC
	AMEMBASSY MOSCOW	PRIORITY	32 RUEHMO
	AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI	PRIORITY	16 RUSBAE

E.O. 12065: RDS-4 3/25/89 (LAMBRAKIS, G.B.) OR-P

TAGS: PINS, PEPR, AF, IR

SUBJECT: Situation in Afghanistan

1. C - entire text.
2. Sultan Mahmud-Ghazi, member of Afghan royal family, former president of Afghan Civil Aviation and Tourism Authority, and brother of former Afghan Ambassador to Iran, visited Pol Counselor March 25 in connection with visa problem. He said he does not have extensive information on situation in Afghanistan, but had talked with people who have come from there as recently as three days ago.
3. He said rebellion is widespread and affects at least eight provinces. Afghan government has no confidence in most of its army, particularly the conscripts, and there have been cases of military units being bombed by the Air Force because they were believed to be untrustworthy. In Kabul security at night is carried out by many civilians and other Communists rather than the military. Indeed, the military are being kept out of the city to a great extent.
4. If the Afghan government had to stand alone, it would not last "for more than a week", according to Mahmud-Ghazi.

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However, he is sure the Soviets are bucking up the government and reinforcing it with racial Tadzhiks, Uzbeks and Turkomans from across the frontier. This is something which an outsider can never prove, since Afghanistan government can provide the identity cards at will.

5. Unfortunately, neither U.S. nor Pakistani nor Iranian governments appear to be interested in assisting the revolt. Iranians might possibly be providing some financial assistance, but they have no military, and their weapons are almost entirely U.S. or western style. Chinese weapons in the hands of the Pakistani would probably be useful in Afghanistan, on the other hand.

6. Above seems to fit with reporting from Kabul and other sources. Mahmud-Ghazi himself has refused offer of an Iranian passport provided he changes his nationality and has not lost hope of returning to Afghanistan when and if the situation changes some time.

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June 1989

Lessons from the War in Afghanistan

Part I. Introduction

Purpose

(U) This study provides lessons derived from the Soviet war in Afghanistan which may be applicable to the training of US Army soldiers and units. Every effort was made to address low-level tactical problems, although the intelligence summaries and other accounts published during the course of the war tended to focus on higher level matters. Still, in order to appreciate the problem of fighting the Soviet Army at the tactical level, there is much to be learned from these accounts.

Background

"You know you never defeated us on the battlefield," said the American colonel. The North Vietnamese colonel pondered this remark a moment. "That may be so," he replied, "but it is also irrelevant."

(Harry G. Summers, ON STRATEGY)

"No Soviet garrison or major outpost was ever overrun."

(General-Lieutenant Gromov,
last commander of the Soviet
40th Army in Afghanistan)

(U) By 15 February 1989, the Soviet Union had withdrawn its last combat forces from Afghanistan, bringing to an end nine years of combat experience. This was for the USSR a "Low Intensity Conflict," a "foreign internal defense" against a "loosely organized insurgency."

(U) After the Afghan communist coup in April 1978, uprisings against the new government occurred in several areas of the country. Soviet economic and military aid became a major source of Afghan government support. By the Fall of 1979, however, it became clear that government forces were unable to overcome the growing insurgency in the countryside. Although several thousand Soviet military advisors (and ~~some~~ ~~units~~) were already in Afghanistan by late 1979, the introduction of major Soviet units in late December of that year marked the beginning of what was to

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become for the Soviets their first major military campaign outside the Warsaw Pact bloc since 1945, and the longest war in Soviet history.

(U) The Soviets installed in power a new Afghan communist leader, Babrak Karmal, and hoped to shore up the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (later renamed the Republic of Afghanistan) military to the point where it could control the insurgency. What was clearly perceived by the insurgents as a foreign invasion, however, further inflamed the situation. What had earlier been a disjointed 'Jihad' (Holy War) against the communist government in Kabul, now took on greater urgency and served as the strongest unifying factor for the insurgents. As one Soviet news commentator remarked in the newspaper IZVESTIYA in late 1988, "The Afghan people now had invading infidels against whom to unite." Due to this, and the continuing ineffectiveness of the Afghan Army, the Soviets were compelled to go over to the offensive. But no Soviet textbook had prepared them for the tactical problems of counterinsurgency (COIN) warfare.

(U) While the insurgency reflected the classic threat--no fixed battle lines; low technology insurgent warfare; small, short duration insurgent targets--several factors gave the Soviet campaign in Afghanistan a unique set of characteristics. For one, the Kremlin obviously imposed limitations on the size of the Soviet force deployment. There would be no significant build-up in force strength. The Soviet name for their forces in Afghanistan, 'Limited Contingent,' was as real as it was propagandistic. This had a significant effect on the conduct of operations: insufficient forces were available to expand appreciably 40th Army's area of physical control, or to identify and attack many insurgent targets at the same time. When major operations were conducted in one part of the country, forces had to be drawn from other areas, leaving those areas vulnerable to insurgent activities. Moreover, early in the war, especially

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after Brezhnev's death, Soviet leaders apparently assigned a high priority to minimizing personnel and equipment losses. This in turn caused Soviet operations to exhibit an unusual degree of caution and lack of boldness when employing troops at the tactical level.

(U) Other factors influencing the nature of the Afghan War were:

- Geographic proximity to the USSR, with direct access to well-developed and secure Soviet internal LOCs
- Rugged, desolate terrain where movement was limited to a few established routes and often difficult to conceal
- Deep-rooted religious and tribal/regional divisions among both the client and insurgent forces in an environment where there was no well-developed traditional sense of nationalism.
- Primitive nature of the Afghan economic infrastructure and extremely limited LOCs

(U) These objectives and characteristics created a combat environment very different from the European war scenario against NATO which the conscript-based Soviet Armed Forces were trained and equipped to fight. Afghanistan was not a high-intensity war fought by large armored and air forces, with massed formations penetrating deep into enemy rear areas to strike a crippling blow at the enemy's ability to resist. Instead, the 40th Army settled into bases along the primary LOCs and near key cities and towns. It found itself in a protracted war, albeit often intense and at a high tempo, fought at the tactical level, where two-thirds of its forces were committed to resupply or defensive security missions. The elusive insurgents were dispersed throughout the country. With no railways, logistic support for 40th Army and the Afghan economy depended primarily on the sparse, exposed road network, creating a constant, but unavoidable Soviet vulnerability.

Applicability of the Lessons

(U) As a consequence of the special nature of the Soviet war in Afghanistan, lessons derived from the conflict fall into three categories:

Insurgency

Since we recognize that the support of insurgencies is sometimes in the interests of the United States, lessons from the

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Mujahideen experience can be applied by U.S. organizations and units which support and train insurgent forces.

Counterinsurgency

Many lessons from the Soviet COIN experience will appear very familiar to students of the U.S. involvement in Vietnam. They represent many of the tactical dilemmas found in any COIN operation. Soviet failure to learn from the U.S. and other applicable COIN experiences caused them to make many of the same errors.

Soviet Army in Combat

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Part II. Insurgency

Mujahideen Strengths

(U) Many Mujahideen strengths were common to most insurgent movements. These included:

- Familiarity with the terrain
- Tactical mobility
- Ability to achieve surprise
- Ability to operate at night
- Large manpower pool to maintain their numbers

To these must be added the fact that the Mujahideen were unusually rugged and highly motivated fighters. This motivation stemmed from the historic dislike for foreign occupiers, as well as from the religious fervor accompanying the 'Jihad' declared first against the communist Afghan government, and then against the Soviet invaders. The Mujahideen had sanctuaries in Pakistan and Iran and received significant outside material support. For the most part, they enjoyed the support of the Afghan people, although this was sometimes only local. (Some villages insisted on remaining neutral in order to avoid having their homes and fields become battle grounds. Others were actively in league with the communist government.)

Mujahideen Weaknesses

(U) The most glaring weaknesses in the insurgency were:

- No unified leadership or strategic planning
- Sporadic outbreaks of intergroup violence (which subsided somewhat during the course of the war)
- Marginal training base
- Limited firepower
- Difficult logistics
- Limited communications

Mujahideen groups often associated themselves with political organizations in Pakistan or Iran, primarily for the purpose of acquiring weapons, supplies, and intelligence, or as a means for appealing to international sources of assistance. Regional and tribal loyalties, however, complicated these relationships.


(U) Paradoxically, some of what we might perceive to be strategic weaknesses became strengths at the operational and tactical levels. For example, the Mujahideen's disunified

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political leadership often worked to keep the Soviets from infiltrating and eliminating their leadership. Likewise, disorganization in planning turned out to be a strength of sorts: the Soviets could not intercept Mujahideen plans because they simply did not exist, except for local, short-range ones. Flamboyant individual actions, dispersal into small elements, decentralized leadership and spontaneous operations decreased tactical predictability and presented few large-scale targets for the Soviets and the government army.

(U) Although the Mujahideen were inclined to attack any nearby target, regardless of its significance, and often tended to fight only within their local areas, there were some notable (albeit rare) exceptions. The legendary commander in the Panjsher Valley, Ahmet Shah Masood, finally gave up attempts to defend his valley. Instead, he organized and trained Mujahideen groups to attack strategically vital approaches throughout the Hindu-Kush mountains. According to some eyewitnesses, Masood was skilled in the use of speed, surprise and deception. His men were reportedly so experienced in such tactics that they were more than a match for the Soviet elite troops who frequently made forays into the mountain areas.

(U) It is important to keep in mind throughout this study that the term Mujahideen is a name given to all the fighters in the Jihad. It does not imply that there were 'Mujahideen tactics,' or even ways of circulating among all the insurgent groups lessons learned from the on-going struggle against the Soviet forces in their country. Where a tactic proved successful, it may have been successful only to the group used in the example. And this success may have been the result of the individual commander's skills. When a tactic failed, it may have been due to bad intelligence or just plain bad luck. Additionally, many of the accounts of combat between Mujahideen and the Soviet/government forces come to us second or third-hand and are occasionally exaggerated or colored by political motives. Likewise, we do not or cannot always identify when

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certain combat actions occurred. Obviously there were improvements on both sides as the war progressed. Mujahideen success was closely linked to the amount and types of weapons and ammunition they had at their disposal. This varied considerably in different areas and at different times. Nonetheless, the Mujahideen validated several basic tenets of insurgency warfare against overwhelmingly superior conventional forces.

(U) Many of the lessons given below apply to scenarios where traditional guerrilla tactics must be used against conventional forces. US Army advisors or training teams supporting an insurgency may find them relevant when working with fiercely independent, basically uneducated peasant or urban fighters in a diverse ethnic or political environment.

Tactical Lessons from the Mujahideen Experience

LESSON: Do not provide COIN forces with large, lucrative targets.

(U) As the number of insurgents increase, leaders may be tempted to organize them into larger units, with larger and more permanent base camps. Although this presents certain obvious advantages in command and control (C2) and logistics, it diminishes one of the principle strengths of an insurgency; namely, dispersal into small and more mobile targets. One would think this is not a lesson which needs to be learned over and over. But in dealing with insurgent leaders who have no professional training, or who have no previous experience against large conventional forces, learning this lesson early will avoid needless losses.

Examples

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LESSON: Know the enemy's tactics and routines.

(U) Strict adherence to doctrine or even repetition of innovative tactics is a common characteristic of conventional forces with little experience in COIN warfare. Insurgent forces can exploit this weakness if they are familiar with the conventional doctrine or COIN force practices. Such knowledge can provide advance warning of COIN forces intentions and allow insurgents to predict COIN tactics.

Example

LESSON: Be aware of personal and group rivalries and conflicts.

(U) In many insurgencies there are likely to be conflicts between the goals of various fighting groups, or between their leaders. Although they may often cooperate against a common foe, it is likely that each group or leader will seek ways to maximize his own interests while minimizing those of his opponents. This can lead to, at a minimum, tenuous C2 relationships between various groups combined for combat.

Example

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Convoy Ambushes

(U) Although ambushes are common to most insurgencies, the Mujahideen had several distinct advantages. First, the terrain often presented poor off-road trafficability. Second, there were no railroads, which led to the Soviet practice of using ground convoys for most of their supply efforts. This, combined with the traditionally poor march discipline of Soviet drivers, presented the Mujahideen with frequent and lucrative ambush targets. Successful tactics employed by the Mujahideen were as follows:

LESSON: Locate and destroy vehicle marshalling areas.

Examples

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Intelligence and Security

LESSON: Take full advantage of the cultural and linguistic identities between insurgent and government personnel.

(U) In most insurgencies, the common ethnic and linguistic backgrounds of both sides presents great opportunities for infiltration of the enemy force. The Mujahideen had a large number of informants in the government army who provided information used for both defensive and offensive operations. (It was more difficult for government agents to infiltrate the Mujahideen, as the insurgents operated in small groups and generally knew each other personally.)

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Air Defense

(U) Defense against Soviet air attacks was of critical importance to the insurgents. Attack helicopter escorts and quick reaction fixed-wing strikes caused great damage to the Mujahideen. The insurgents found it necessary to move in small groups, and at night. For the first several years of the war, in addition to limited use of the SA-7 and heavy machine guns (HMG), there were some effective passive countermeasures against Soviet air: dispersal, cover and knowledge of the terrain.

LESSON: Position base camps so as to reduce the effectiveness of air attacks.

Example

(U) In the Jagdalek Valley a typical base camp would be tucked into a crease between two ridges of a mountain with steep slopes rising on three sides. Heavy machine guns were placed near the crests of surrounding hills in emplacements chiseled out of the rock, with bomb shelters to protect gunners. There were more emplacements than guns so that the guns could be moved to different positions. The base camp typically had an ammunition bunker and bomb shelters, chiseled out by portable jackhammers.

(U) If an airstrike came over the mountain ridge, bombs and rockets which had to be released after clearing one hill, most

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likely would drift over the site at the bottom of the crease and hit the side of the opposite hill. If a jet or helicopter tried to fly up the crease between the ridges, it had to fly broadside past the machine guns. Even if a helicopter used a stand-off weapon system, considering that the base camp was dug perpendicular into the side face of the crease, a direct hit that would produce extreme damage was very unlikely.

(U) If a ground assault accompanied an air attack, the Soviets would have to fight uphill on foot towards insurgents in concealed positions. The Soviets were reluctant to pay the costs of this kind of ground sweep. A more favored Soviet tactic was to air-assault troops onto the best available landing zone (frequently a mountain top or ridge line), surround a base camp and fight downhill. The Mujahideen could counter this tactic by having many small base camps rather than one large one in an area. If the Soviets surrounded any one camp, the remaining camps were able to counterattack the Soviets. If the Soviets conducted a truly massive ground sweep, or if the Mujahideen found themselves without adequate weapons or ammunition, they simply exfiltrated.

LESSON: Know the effects of terrain on air recce.

Example

(U) A particularly gutsy act on the part of the Mujahideen demonstrated their knowledge of the terrain. The broken surface and mixture of colors of the terrain sometimes made observation from the air of small features very difficult. Air reconnaissance often relied on movement to sight targets on the ground. Thus, the Mujahideen in the Jagdalek Valley developed the tactic of freezing whenever aircraft flew over. They had disciplined themselves to become immediately still at the first sight of an aircraft, even when in the open and very near cover.

LESSON: The use of light-weight, easily operated surface-to-air missiles (SAM) help to overcome the massive fire superiority usually characteristic of COIN forces.

Examples

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Part III. Counterinsurgency

Soviet Objectives

(U) Rather than being an 'invasion,' the introduction of Soviet combat forces in December 1979 was an 'intervention' in a COIN effort which had begun shortly after the Afghan Communist Party coup in April 1978. The USSR sent its forces into Afghanistan primarily for the purpose of taking over security responsibilities, so that government forces could concentrate on putting down the ever-growing insurgency. Thus the initial Soviet objectives were to:

- Control the cities and towns
- Secure the major lines of communications (LOC)
- Train and equip government forces

(U) As the insurgency expanded and the Afghan Army proved inadequate to the task, the Soviet 'Limited Contingent' in Afghanistan soon found itself enmeshed in full-fledged COIN operations. Thus, by mid-1980, the Soviets acquired the following additional missions:

- Eliminate insurgent centers
- Separate insurgents from the population
- Deny by interdiction outside aid and sanctuary

Nonetheless, this 'low-intensity conflict' was to be conducted with a minimum of losses in personnel and equipment. As pointed out above, there would be no significant troop buildup, nor great expansion of the logistics and transportation infrastructures. The Soviets partially succeeded in only the first three of the above missions.

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Battlefield Operating Systems

(U) This section on COIN lessons is organized around the US Army's Battlefield Operating Systems (BOS). The BOS are the major systems a commander and his staff must synchronize in all types of combat. As described in FM 100-15 (Coordinating Draft, January 1988), the BOS appear most appropriate to corps operations. However, to the extent they are responsive to lower level commanders, BOS also make up the essential elements of planning and execution for division, brigade, battalion and company level combat.

Command and Control

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LESSON: Decentralize planning and execution of low-level operations.

Example

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LESSON: Train battalion commanders and staffs to operate with combined arms task forces.

Example

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Maneuver

(U) Soviet efforts to place their forces at an advantage over the Mujahideen were fraught with all the limitations associated with a large, mechanized army facing a low-tech insurgency. Moreover, maneuver of combat forces in Afghanistan was severely restricted by terrain and limited road networks. Based on the Soviets' experience, we can draw the following lessons:

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LESSON: Use dismounted infantry or air assault teams to identify and destroy antitank ambushes.

Example

LESSON: Constantly review and reassess the effectiveness of tactics being applied against insurgent forces.

Example

LESSON: Use smoke as a defensive measure when caught in an ambush.

Example

(U) Soviet units often carried smoke grenades with them which were used to screen escape during Mujahideen ambushes.

Fire Support

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Helicopters

(U) The most significant development in air support for Soviet ground operations in Afghanistan was their use of armed helicopters.

LESSON: Helicopter operations at night require extensive training and familiarity with the terrain.

Examples

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(U) According to several Soviet sources, logistic support in Afghanistan was unsatisfactory. In any case, they seem to have never run out of ammunition or POL, although there were many shortfalls in various combat service support items. One of their biggest problems was transportation. Afghanistan has a very poor transportation infrastructure. There are no railroads or waterways which can be used to transport supplies. Roads are bad, cross very rugged terrain (sometimes allowing only one-way traffic), and the Mujahideen frequently ambushed surface convoys.

LESSON: Use air transport whenever possible.

Example

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Air Defense

(U) There was no air threat to Soviet forces in Afghanistan.

Chemical

LESSON: Develop countermeasures and train to defend against chemical agents under special conditions (e.g. mountain, desert, arctic terrain).

Examples

(U) Attacks with chemical/toxin weapons against the Mujahideen in Afghanistan were reported as early as 6 months before the Soviet invasion on 27 December 1979. For the period from the summer of 1979 until the summer of 1981, the US government received reports of 47 separate toxic agent attacks with a death toll of more than 3000. More recent circumstantial evidence indicated the Soviets may have continued the selective use of toxic agents in Afghanistan. A variety of agents and delivery systems were reportedly used. Fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters usually were said to be employed to disseminate

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agents in rockets, bombs and sprays. Landmines containing toxic agents also were reported. However, none of these reports can be substantiated.

LESSON: Target Soviet chemical defense equipment.

Example

(U) Soviet decontamination equipment is mounted on trucks and thus presents a soft target.

LESSON: Prepare troops to encounter flame/incendiary weapons.

Example

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Part IV. Soviet Army in Combat/ Conclusion

(U) What general conclusions can be drawn from the Soviet Army experience in Afghanistan? What will be the effect on the Soviet Army of the combat experience gained by thousands of Soviet soldiers? How well did the Soviets adjust to the special conditions of their war? How well did the Soviet soldier perform? The Soviet officer? How will the Soviets approach the 'lessons learned' from their War?

Limited Goals, Limited Commitment

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(U) Soviet officers are very highly trained in their branches and specialties. One of the most important obligations placed on a Soviet officer is that of being able to train subordinates. Glasnost, or 'openness,' which is very real in Soviet society, has penetrated the Soviet Army. There are numerous accounts of younger veteran officers speaking out against training practices which do not accord with their own real combat experiences. We must conclude, then, that for the next several years, the combat experience gained by Soviet officers in Afghanistan will have a significant impact on the quality of training in the Soviet Army. Although Soviet doctrine may not reflect major changes based on the experience in Afghanistan, tactical skills, as well as organizational and specialized skills in combat support and combat service support areas, should be enhanced.

Adaptability

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(U) Still, there were instances in Afghanistan where tactical commanders demonstrated quick thinking. For example, on

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a raid to destroy a Mujahideen ammunition storage area, whose location deep in the mountains had been revealed by an Afghan informer, a Soviet battalion commander discovered that his Afghan guide was apparently lost. Remembering that a short distance back, some rockets had been fired at his unit, but apparently had been very wide of the mark, the Soviet commander decided to return to the impact area. He reasoned that the rockets were probably pre-registered on the route to the ammunition storage area. When he arrived back at the rocket impact area, his guide became reoriented and the mission continued in the right direction.

Soviet Lessons Learned