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R 363916Z JAN 78  
 FM AMEMBASSY KABUL  
 TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHINGTON  
 INFO RUEBGO/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 6650  
 RUOTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1043  
 RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 274  
 RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 5154  
 RUMJPG/USLO PEKING 968  
 RUQVHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 5800  
 RUHQQA/CINCPAC

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CONFIDENTIAL

KABUL 0920

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

E. O. 11652: GDS  
 TAGS: PEPR, AF  
 SUBJECT: AFGHANISTAN IN 1977: AN EXTERNAL ASSESSMENT

1. SUMMARY: DURING 1977, AFGHANISTAN'S SECURITY AND INDEPENDENCE REMAINED UNDIMINISHED, THUS SATISFYING OUR FOREMOST POLICY GOAL HERE. PRESIDENT DAQUD ALSO MADE SIGNIFICANT CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE IMPROVEMENT OF REGIONAL STABILITY -- THEREBY HELPING TO FULFILL ANOTHER PRINCIPAL U.S. OBJECTIVE. AVOIDING THE TEMPTATION TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF PAKISTAN'S DOMESTIC POLITICAL TURMOIL, DAQUD CONTINUED TO NURTURE THE RAPPROCHMENT HE AND FORMER PAKISTANI PRIME MINISTER BHUTTO HAD LAUNCHED IN 1976. HE WAS ALSO ABLE TO REACH A MUTUALLY SATISFACTORY SETTLEMENT WITH IRAN OF THE AGE-OLD HELMAND WATERS DISPUTE.

2. THE HIGHLIGHTS OF U.S.-AFGHAN BILATERAL RELATIONS WERE: (A) ESTABLISHMENT OF A JOINT COMMISSION TO COMBAT NARCOTICS; (B) AFGHAN SUPPORT IN THE UN ON THE GUAM AND PUERTO RICO ISSUES; AND (C) AN INVITATION FROM PRESIDENT CARTER TO DAQUD TO PAY A STATE VISIT TO THE U.S. END SUMMARY.

3. RELATIONS WITH THE US: U.S.-AFGHAN RELATIONS DURING 1977 WERE EXCELLENT. THE GOVERNMENT OF AFGHANISTAN (GOA) FULFILLED AN OBLIGATION TO US TO ESTABLISH A JOINT COMMISSION TO CONTROL NARCOTICS PRODUCTION AND TRAFFICKING. UNLIKE 1976, WHEN THE GOA WENT BACK ON A COMMITMENT NOT TO OPPOSE US ON THE GUAM ISSUE, THE GOA GAVE US HELP IN THE 1977 UNGA ON BOTH GUAM AND PUERTO RICO ISSUES. DAQUD ACCEPTED AN INVITATION TO MAKE A STATE VISIT TO THE U.S. IN THE SUMMER OF 1978. FUNDING FOR THE U.S. MILITARY TRAINING PROGRAM FOR AFGHAN OFFICERS WAS DOUBLED IN AN EFFORT TO OFFSET -- ALBEIT TO A MODEST DEGREE -- THE MASSIVE SOVIET PREDOMINANCE IN THE AREA OF FOREIGN SUPPORT FOR THE AFGHAN ARMED FORCES.

4. AS USAID/AFGHANISTAN ENDEAVORED TO SHAPE ITS PROGRAMS TO MEET CONGRESSIONAL AND AID GUIDELINES, AFGHAN DISQUIETUDE WAS EXPRESSED OVER WHAT APPEARED TO THEM TO BE A RECEDING AMERICAN COMMITMENT IN THE DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE AREA. THE AFGHAN LEADERSHIP FREQUENTLY REMINDED LOCAL AND VISITING AMERICAN OFFICIALS THAT AFGHANISTAN WANTS A MORE VISIBLE AMERICAN AID PRESENCE TO OFFER SOME COUNTER BALANCE TO THE PREDOMINANT SOVIET PRESENCE IN THIS COUNTRY.

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5. AFGHAN OFFICIALS HAD TWO HIGH-LEVEL CONTACTS WITH THE US LEADERSHIP IN 1977. WHEN AMBASSADOR ABDUL WAHID KAPIM PRESENTED HIS CREDENTIALS AT THE WHITE HOUSE ON JULY 29, PRESIDENT CARTER TOLD HIM: "THE UNITED STATES HAS FOLLOWED WITH INTEREST THE FORMATION OF YOUR NEW CONSTITUTION AND WE ARE PARTICULARLY AWARE OF ITS HUMAN RIGHTS PROVISIONS... WE ARE ALSO MUCH AWARE OF PRESIDENT DAUD'S EFFORTS TO IMPROVE THE ECONOMIC WELL-BEING OF THE AFGHAN PEOPLE. WE ARE READY TO HELP IN THIS EFFORT." THE PRESIDENT ALSO COMPLIMENTED THE GOVERNMENT OF AFGHANISTAN (GOA) ON THE ESTABLISHMENT TWO DAYS EARLIER OF THE NEW JOINT COMMISSION ON AFGHAN NARCOTICS MATTERS AND EXPRESSED HIS STRONG PERSONAL INTEREST IN NARCOTICS CONTROL.

6. SUBSEQUENTLY, ON OCTOBER 1, SHORTLY BEFORE THE UNGA SESSION, FOREIGN MINISTER WAHEED ABDULLAH MET WITH SECRETARY VANCE AND ASSISTANT SECRETARY AHERTON. ABDULLAH WAS TOLD THAT THE USG REGARDS THE OPIUM-PRODUCTION PROBLEM IN AFGHANISTAN AS "A HIGH PRIORITY ISSUE." (THIS VIEW WAS ECHOED BY SENATOR WILLIAM L. SCOTT OF VIRGINIA DURING HIS NOVEMBER VISIT TO KABUL, WHEN HE BLUNTLY TOLD DAUD THAT FUTURE AMERICAN AID WAS CONDITIONED ON AFGHAN PERFORMANCE IN THE NARCOTICS-CONTROL AREA.) THE AMERICAN SIDE WAS ASSURED BY ABDULLAH THAT PRESIDENT DAUD STANDS PERSONALLY BEHIND THE EFFORTS OF THE GOA IN THE OPIUM-CONTROL FIELD.

7. AT THAT SAME MEETING, ABDULLAH EXPLAINED THAT THE GOA WANTED A CLOSER RELATIONSHIP WITH THE NEW AMERICAN ADMINISTRATION AND A "VERY VISIBLE" U.S. PRESENCE IN AFGHANISTAN. THE SECRETARY REPLIED THAT THE U.S. SUPPORTS THE INDEPENDENCE AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF AFGHANISTAN AND WILL CONTINUE ITS ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS. SECRETARY VANCE FURTHER OPINED THAT OUR TWO PRESIDENTS SHOULD GET TO KNOW EACH OTHER, AND, IN THIS CONNECTION, HE EXTENDED A PRESIDENTIAL INVITATION FOR DAUD TO MAKE A STATE VISIT TO THE US DURING THE SUMMER OF 1978. THE AFGHAN PRESIDENT SUBSEQUENTLY ACCEPTED THE INVITATION.

8. RELATIONS WITH THE USSR: AFGHANISTAN'S MOST IMPORTANT BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP CONTINUED TO BE THE SENSITIVE, BUT LUCRATIVE LINK WITH ITS HIGH NORTHERN NEIGHBOR. THE SOVIETS AVOIDED ANY APPEARANCE OF MEDDLING IN AFGHAN INTERNAL AFFAIRS -- AND MAINTAINED THEIR POSITION AS THE MAJOR AID DONOR TO AFGHANISTAN (MORE THAN ONE BILLION DOLLARS OVER THE PAST QUARTER CENTURY, COMPARED TO LESS THAN ONE-HALF BILLION FROM THE U.S.). ALTHOUGH NO SIGNIFICANT ADDITIONAL AID WAS COMMITTED BY THE SOVIETS IN 1977, THE TWO SIDES DID HOLD DISCUSSIONS IN APRIL ABOUT USES FOR THE OUTSTANDING \$700 MILLION OF SOVIET CREDITS ALREADY COMMITTED TO AFGHANISTAN. SOVIET MILITARY DELIVERIES TO AFGHANISTAN IN 1977 INCLUDED A FEW SIGNIFICANT NEW WEAPONS, SUCH AS SA-3 AND SA-7 SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILES.

9. FROM APRIL 12 TO 15, DAUD PAID WHAT BOTH SIDES STYLED AS A "ROUTINE" VISIT TO THE SOVIET UNION (WHICH, INCIDENTALLY, WAS AMONG THE PRINCIPAL REASONS WHY DAUD WAS SO EAGER TO GET AN INVITATION FROM US -- IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN WHAT THE GOA PERCEIVES

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AS A OPTICAL BALANCE BETWEEN THE TWO GREATEST POWERS). DURING ITS MOSCOW SOJOURN, DAQUD'S PARTY SIGNED A NEW TWELVE-YEAR AGREEMENT TO DEVELOP AFGHAN-SOVIET ECONOMIC AND TRADE RELATIONS.

10. RELATIONS WITH CHINA: IN ORDER TO PROVIDE ANOTHER TYPE OF OPTICAL BALANCE TO DAQUD'S TRIP TO THE USSR, THE AFGHANS RECEIVED ON APRIL 9 A DELEGATION FROM THE PEOPLES' REPUBLIC OF CHINA, HEADED BY CHAI SHU FAN, VICE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN TRADE. THIS VISIT PRODUCED LITTLE OF SUBSTANCE, HOWEVER,

11. ALTHOUGH IN A LOYA JIRGAH SPEECH EARLIER IN THE YEAR DAQUD HAD EXPRESSED HIS HOPE FOR "EVER-EXPANDING RELATIONS" WITH CHINA, NOTHING DISCERNIBLE ALONG THESE LINES WAS ACCOMPLISHED DURING 1977. THE CHINESE BRIDGEHEAD HERE (WHICH INCLUDES SOME MINOR AID PROJECTS) REMAINS QUITE MODEST -- BUT IS SUFFICIENT TO SYMBOLIZE AFGHAN NEUTRALITY BETWEEN MOSCOW AND PEKING.

12. RELATIONS WITH <sup>PAKISTAN:</sup> THE REMARKABLE RAPPROCHEMENT INITIATED THE PREVIOUS YEAR BY DAQUD AND FORMER PAKISTANI PRIME MINISTER BHUTTO CONTINUED THROUGHOUT PAKISTAN'S DOMESTIC POLITICAL UPEHAVAL OF 1977. BHUTTO RECEIVED A CORRECT, BUT RELATIVELY RESTRAINED AND COOL WELCOME DURING A BRIEF JUNE VISIT TO KABUL (SHORTLY BEFORE HIS DOWNFALL), AT WHICH TIME THE GOA SUGGESTED THAT FURTHER DETAILED TALKS ON THE PUSHTUNISTAN ISSUE (DESCRIBED BY THE GOA AS THE "SOLE DIFFERENCE" BETWEEN THE TWO STATES) BE DELAYED UNTIL AFTER THE THEN-EXPECTED PAKISTANI ELECTIONS. SIMILAR UNDERSTANDINGS WERE REACHED LATER WITH GENERAL ZIA-UL-HAQ, PAKISTAN'S CHIEF MARTIAL LAW ADMINISTRATOR, DURING HIS OCTOBER 10-11 VISIT TO KABUL. HAQ ASSURED THE AFGHANS -- APPARENTLY TO THEIR SATISFACTION -- THAT ALL ELEMENTS OF PAKISTANI SOCIETY NOW SUBSCRIBE TO THE DETENTE WITH AFGHANISTAN. FOR THEIR PART, THE AFGHANS HAVE SCRUPULOUSLY AVOIDED ANY SEMBLANCE OF INTERFERENCE IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF PAKISTAN, ALTHOUGH THEY EXPRESSED GREAT SATISFACTION WHEN WALI KHAN WAS RECENTLY RELEASED FROM PRISON AND ALLOWED TO REJOIN THE POLITICAL LISTS.

13. THE SOVIETS HAVE REMAINED OUTWARDLY PASSIVE ABOUT THE AFGHAN-PAKISTANI RAPPROCHEMENT THUS FAR. ON THE OTHER HAND, US OFFICIALS IN BOTH COUNTRIES HAVE MADE CLEAR WASHINGTON'S GREAT SATISFACTION OVER THIS DEVELOPMENT WHICH SATISFIES ONE OF OUR MOST IMPORTANT REGIONAL OBJECTIVES.

14. RELATIONS WITH IRAN: DAQUD ALSO BROUGHT ABOUT BETTER RELATIONS WITH AFGHANISTAN'S CULTURAL COUSIN, IRAN, BY SETTLING -- AT LEAST FOR THE PRESENT -- A LONG-STANDING ISSUE BETWEEN THE TWO STATES: THE DIVISION OF THE WATERS OF THE HELMAND RIVER. AFTER SENDING HIS BROTHER AND SPECIAL ENVOY, MOHAMMAD NAJM, TO TEHRAN TO DO THE WAY, THE GOA EXCHANGED WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAN AN AGOIN INSTRUMENTS OF RATIFICATION FOR THE 1973 HELMAND WATERS TREATY, WHICH HAD BEEN LEFT HANGING IN LIMBO AFTER THE ROYAL GOVERNMENT OF AFGHANISTAN, WHICH HAD NEGOTIATED IT, HAD BEEN DEPOSED BY THE

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NEW REPUBLICAN REGIME. NAHM ALSO SECURED IRANIAN UNDERSTANDING TO WHAT UNTIL THEN HAD BEEN A CONTROVERSIAL FLOOD-CONTROL AND IRRIGATION PROJECT THE AFGHANS WANTED TO LAUNCH IN THE LOWER HELMAND (THIS PROJECT IS NOW IN THE DESIGN STAGE).

15. ON THE DEBIT SIDE, HOWEVER, THE AFGHANS CONTINUED TO RESENT WHAT THEY -- WITH SOME JUSTIFICATION VIEWED AS IRANIAN RENEGING ON PAST AID PROMISES. AS THE YEAR ENDED, MOREOVER, BOTH GOVERNMENTS WERE INTENSELY, BUT DISCREETLY TRYING TO RESOLVE A DISPUTE OVER A SMALL DISPUTED SEGMENT OF BORDER NEAR ISLAM QALA ON THE MESHED-HERAT ROAD. IRRITATED BY REPEATED EXPRESSIONS OF CONCERN BY THE SHAH OVER SOVIET INFLUENCE IN AFGHANISTAN AND THE LACK OF AN ASSURED PLAN OF SUCCESSION FOR DAUD, THE AFGHAN LEADERSHIP COUNTERED AT EVERY APPROPRIATE OPPORTUNITY BY CITING THEIR OWN WORRIES OVER THE SUCCESSION QUESTION IN IRAN.

16. RELATIONS WITH OTHER STATES: DURING THE FALL, THE GOA RECEIVED A RAPID SUCCESSION OF FOREIGN DIGNITARIES, WHOSE VISITS PRODUCED LITTLE OF REAL SUBSTANCE: CUBAN DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER PELEGRIN TORRAS (SEPTEMBER 19-23), HUNGARIAN PRESIDENT PAL LOSONCZI (OCTOBER 15-18), IRAQI VICE PRESIDENT TAHMAMI MUHI-AL-DIN MA'RUUF (OCTOBER 22-25), AND MONGOLIAN FOREIGN MINISTER MANGALYN DUGERSUREN (OCTOBER 26-30). UPON HIS RETURN FROM THE UNCA SESSION (AND A TOUR OF CALIFORNIA), AFGHAN FOREIGN MINISTER WAHEED ABDULLAH VISITED IRAQ, IRAN, AND VARIOUS PERSIAN GULF STATES (WHERE HE TRIED TO ATTRACT FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE FROM THE LATTER GROUP OF WEALTHY CORELIGIONISTS). MOST OF THIS FLURRY OF DIPLOMATIC VISITING WAS DESIGNED TO BURNISH AFGHANISTAN'S CREDENTIALS AS AN ACTIVE NON-ALIGNED STATE, AS KABUL AMBITIOUSLY PREPARED TO HOST THE MAY MEETING OF THE COORDINATING COMMITTEE OF THE NON-ALIGNED GROUP OF STATES. THE GOA HAS BEEN INCREASING ITS ACTIVITY IN SUPPORT OF THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT IN SEVERAL AREAS, SUCH AS THE LAWSOF-THE-SEA CONFERENCES AND NORTH-SOUTH ECONOMIC ISSUES. KABUL IS PARTICULARLY EAGER TO IMPROVE THE STATUS OF LAND-LOCKED DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND HAS THROUGHOUT 1977 UTILIZED EVERY OPPORTUNITY TO PROMOTE THIS CAUSE.

17. ALTHOUGH THE GOVERNMENT-CONTROLLED AFGHAN PRESS REPORTED THE PEACE-TALKS ACTIVITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST IN A THOROUGH AND BALANCED FASHION, THE GOA WARILY CONTINUED ITS LONG-STANDING POLICY OF AVOIDING ANY INVOLVEMENT -- AND HAS BEEN PARTICULARLY CAREFUL IN THIS AREA SINCE SADAT'S BREAK WITH SEVERAL ARAB STATES. THE AFGHANS SEE THEMSELVES AS NON-SEMITIC MUSLIMS, WITH NOTHING TO GAIN BY TAKING ANY STAND OTHER THAN PROVIDING GENERAL LIP-SERVICE TO THE ARAB CAUSE.

18. COMMENT: U.S. INTERESTS IN THE PROMOTION AND PRESERVATION OF REGIONAL STABILITY WERE WELL SERVED DURING THE YEAR BY DAUD'S RESPONSIBLE IMPROVEMENT OF AFGHAN RELATIONS WITH PAKISTAN AND IRAN. HIS HANDLING OF THE DIFFICULT AND COMPLEX RELATIONSHIP WITH THE USSR ALSO CONTINUED TO BE DEFT AND ABLE. IN SEVERAL WAYS, AFGHANISTAN'S GEOPOLITICAL SITUATION ROUGHLY RESEMBLES THAT OF FINLAND -- AND DAUD MANAGES THIS CHALLENGE AT LEAST AS WELL AS, IF NOT BETTER, THAN KEKKONEN.

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19. IN ORDER TO SUPPORT AFGHANISTAN'S EFFORTS TO PRESERVE THE LARGEST POSSIBLE DEGREE OF INDEPENDENCE FROM SOVIET PRESSURES -- WHICH IS THE PRINCIPAL US POLICY GOAL HERE, WE CONTINUE TO DEMONSTRATE OUR FRIENDLY AND TANGIBLE INTEREST THROUGH A VISIBLE AMERICAN PRESENCE IN THIS COUNTRY. THE STATE VISIT WE HAVE ALREADY PROMISED DAUD IS THE KEY ITEM ON THE 1978 US-AFGHAN AGENDA.

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AmEmbassy TEHRAN  
INCOMING TELEGRAM

E 2-5  
CONTROL NO. 6715

O P 030755Z MAY 78

FM AMEMBASSY KABUL  
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7766

MAY 4 1978

INFO:

NR 1

RUEKJCS/SECDEF IMMEDIATE

ICM 1

RUEFHQA/DIDNSA FT MEADE MD IMMEDIATE

MA 1

RUMOHQA/CINCPAC IMMEDIATE  
INFO RUS/ON/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 7050

RU 1

RUSDAI/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 5485

ECGN 2

RURKRR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN PRIORITY 5095

EM 1

BT

SECRET

KABUL 3511

SECRET

RF

ICA 1

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

CONS 1

ISLAMABAD, NEW DELHI, TEHRAN: ALSO FOR UGDAOS

OR 1

ARM 1

3.0. 11650: XGDS-1

GSD 1

TAGS: ASEC, PINS, AF

BF 1

SUBJECT: BIOGRAPHIC DATA ON AFGHAN CABINET

PER 1

REF: KABUL 3423

HU 1

RSO 1

1. FOLLOWING IS BIOGRAPHIC DATA NOW AVAILABLE TO THE EMBASSY  
ON THE MEMBERS OF THE AFGHAN CABINET ANNOUNCED MAY:

MSG 1

TSO 1

MUR MOHAMMAD TARAKI--PRIME MINISTER AND CHAIRMAN OF THE  
REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL. (PIO REPORTED KABUL 3372).

SCRO 1

CF 1

BABRAK KARNAL--VICE CHAIRMAN OF THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL AND  
VICE PRIME MINISTER. KARNAL (FREQUENTLY KNOWN SIMPLY AS BABRAK)

MR 1

WAS BORN ABOUT 1929 NEAR KABUL. HE IS THE SON OF A GENERAL  
AND POSSIBLY A DISTANT RELATIVE OF DAUD. HE WAS A STUDENT

DAO 1

AGITATOR WHILE ATTENDING KABUL UNIVERSITY AND SPENT FIVE YEARS

MAAR 1

IN JAIL (1952-56). AFTER HIS RELEASE HE COMPLETED HIS LAW

MR 1

DEGREE AND BECAME ASSOCIATED WITH MIR AKBAR KHAIBAR, THE

MA 1

COMMUNIST LEADER WHOSE MURDER APRIL 17 WAS THE FIRST CLEAR

MS 1

SIGN OF TROUBLE TO COME (KABUL 3142). APPROXIMATELY

TGR 1

1960 HE BECAME A CLOSE FRIEND (LOVER) OF ANAHITA RATEBZADAN,

GEOR 1

NOW MINISTER OF SOCIAL AFFAIRS, AND IN 1965 HE WAS ELECTED TO

GEOR 1

PARLIAMENT. IN 1965 HE WAS CHOSEN AS A MEMBER OF THE CENTRAL

GRU 1

COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY AT ITS FOUNDING CONGRESS.

GRU 1

IN 1967 HE JOINED WITH KHAIBAR IN OPPOSITION TO THE TARAKI

GRU 1

GROUP (KHALQ) TO FORM PARCHAN. HE WAS NOTED AS A STRONG SUPPORTER

GRU 1

OF THE PUSHTUNISTAN ISSUE WITH CLOSE CONTACTS WITH WALI KHAN

GRU 1

AND THE NATIONAL AFGHI PARTY IN PAKISTAN. IN 1973 HE LED

GRU 1

"THE LARGEST DEMONSTRATION IN AFGHAN HISTORY" TO PROTEST THE

GRU 1

HELMAND WATER AGREEMENT WITH IRAN. BABRAK WAS ONE OF THE

GRU 1

SEVEN COMMUNIST LEADERS ARRESTED BY THE DAUD GOVERNMENT ON

GRU 1

APRIL 25 (KABUL 3277).

GRU 1

HAFIZULLAH AMIN--V. OF PRIME MINISTER AND MINISTER OF FOREIGN

GRU 1

AFFAIRS. AMIN WAS BORN IN PAKISTAN IN 1926. AS EARLY AS 1950

GRU 1

HE WAS CONSIDERED A COMMUNIST AGITATOR. AMIN HAS A MASTERS

GRU 1

DEGREE IN SECONDARY EDUCATION FROM COLUMBIA (1958) AND RETURNED

SECRET

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TO COMBRIA (1963-65) FOR TWO ADDITIONAL YEARS OF EDUCATION. HIS FELLOWSHIPS WERE FINANCED BY DAUOD GRANTS. AMIN WAS ASSOCIATED WITH TARAKI IN THE 1950S AND IN THE BITTER FACIIONALISM BETWEEN KHALO AND PARCHAM. IN 1967 WAS ACCUSED BY PARCHAMISTS OF BEING A CIA AGENT. AMIN IS A MEMBER OF THE LOWER HOUSE OF PARLIAMENT, AMIN WAS OCCASIONALLY OUTSPOKEN AGAINST US

AC  
UNITIES IN AFGHANISTAN. AMIN WAS AMONG THOSE COMMUNISTS ARRESTED BY THE DAUOD GOVERNMENT ON APRIL 25.

CAPTAIN MOHAMMAD AQLAN--VICE P. INC. MINISTER AND MINISTER OF COMMUNICATIONS. (SEE KAMUL 3350)

COLONEL ABDUL QADER--MINISTER OF DEFENSE. (SEE STATE 110974 AND USDAO KAPUL 04-6-841-003R-7F.

MR. AHMAD (AKA) (PARCHAM)--MINISTER OF INTERIOR. AHMAD OR MR. ON PARCHAM IS THE SON OF A HEALTHY LANDLORD IN THE KANDAHAR AREA. IS BELIEVED TO BE A UNIVERSITY GRADUATE, SPEAKS ENGLISH, AND WAS A MIKRO OFFICIAL IN THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS PRIOR TO HIS ELECTION TO PARLIAMENT IN 1965. IN 1969 HE WAS ASSOCIATED WITH NABBAK KARBAL AND THE PARCHAM PARTY. IN PARLIAMENT HE TOOK A HARD COMMUNIST LINE, BUT OUR BIO DATA STATES EMPIRICALLY) THAT HE MAY BE MORE TRACTABLE AND OPEN-MINDED THAN OTHER COMMUNISTS.

SULTAN ALI KESHIMAN--MINISTER OF PLANNING. KESHIMAN WAS BORN CA. 1935. IN 1966 HE WAS REPORTED TO HAVE BEEN ON THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC PARTY (AN EARLIER INCARNATION OF KHALO). IN 1965 HE RAN FOR A LOWER HOUSE SEAT IN PARLIAMENT BUT LOST THE ELECTION. IN 1967 HE HELD THE POSITION OF DIRECTOR GENERAL IN THE ECONOMICS SECTION OF THE MINISTRY OF MINES AND INDUSTRIES. HIS SISTERS HAVE BEEN EARLY SUPPORTERS OF DR. ANAMITA RATEBRADAH, THE PRESENT MINISTER OF SOCIAL AFFAIRS.

ABDUL KARIM MESAO--MINISTER OF FINANCE. (NO BIO DATA).

DR. SALEH MOHAMMAD ZARAY -- MINISTER OF AGRICULTURE. DR. ZARAY WAS A GRADUATE OF THE KANDAHAR UNIVERSITY MEDICAL FACULTY WHERE HE WAS IN THE TOP OF HIS CLASS ALL SEVEN YEARS. HE WAS A CANDIDATE FOR PARLIAMENT FROM KANDAHAR IN THE 1959 ELECTIONS. HE WAS APPARENTLY ARRESTED SOMETIME DURING THE CAMPAIGN. AT THAT TIME HE WAS REPORTED TO BE A MEMBER OF THE "CENTRAL COMMITTEE-BARRAK GROUP."

A SECOND REPORT INDICATED THAT DR. ZARAY SOMETIME AT THE END OF 1960 TENDERED HIS RESIGNATION FROM THE KHALO PARTY ON GROUNDS THAT THE PARTY HAD NOT PROTESTED TO THE GOVERNMENT AGAINST HIS ARREST. HE AT THAT TIME SUGGESTED THAT HAFIZULLAH AMIN (FORMER KHALO GENERAL COMMITTEE MEMBER) SHOULD HAVE BEEN ARRESTED BY THE PARTY TO RESIGN FROM PARLIAMENT IN PROTEST AGAINST HIS OWN ZARAY'S ARREST. HIS RESIGNATION REPORTEDLY WEAKENED THE PARTY IN THE KANDAHAR AREA. HE IS BELIEVED SUBSEQUENTLY TO HAVE REPEALED HIS FORMER PARTY AFFILIATION. ZARAY IS BROTHER-IN-LAW OF ABDEL ULUM, FORMER MINISTER OF CULTURAL AND FOREIGN RELATIONS, AND KARBAL KARBAL.

ABDUL HAKIM SHARAYEE--MINISTER OF JUSTICE AND ATTORNEY GENERAL. SHARAYEE IN 1962 WAS A SECOND YEAR STUDENT IN THE DEPARTMENT OF JOURNALISM, FACULTY OF LETTERS. AT THAT TIME THERE WAS SOME SUGGESTION HE WAS AN INFORMANT OF THE AFGHAN SECURITY FORCES. AT THAT SAME TIME HE TOLD A SOURCE THAT HE WAS ACTIVE IN THE COMMUNIST PARTY AND THAT HE EXPECTED SOME DAY THEREBY TO BE AN IMPORTANT LEADER. IN 1963 HE REPORTEDLY WAS SENT TO THE USSR FOR FURTHER STUDY. IN 1963 SHARAYEE WAS REPORTED TO BE A VERY ACTIVE COMMUNIST WHO WAS ENGAGED IN STIRRING UP CONFLICT BETWEEN UZBEKS AND PUSHTUNS AT SAR-E-PUL, NEAR MAZAR-E-SHARIF. AT THAT TIME HE WORKED IN THE AFGHAN ENCYCLOPEDIA DEPARTMENT OF THE MINISTRY OF EDUCATION. AT THIS SAME TIME ANOTHER SOURCE REPORTED THAT HE WAS ATTENDING REGULAR COMMUNIST PARTY MEETINGS AND INVOLVED IN DISSEMINATING PARTY PROPAGANDA AND "ANTI-ISLAMIC IDEAS." SHARAYEE WAS ONE OF THE COMMUNISTS ARRESTED BY THE DAUD GOVERNMENT ON APRIL 25.

DR. SHAH WALI (ALEKZAI)--MINISTER OF PUBLIC HEALTH. THE LAST NAME ALEKZAI ESTABLISHES HIM AS A PUSHTUN FROM THE KANDAHAR AREA. WALI GRADUATED FROM THE MEDICAL SCHOOL OF KAPUL UNIVERSITY AND WAS AN ASSISTANT PROFESSOR AT THE MEDICAL SCHOOL IN JALALABAD. HE MAY HAVE RECEIVED SOME TRAINING IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA. AT THE TIME OF THE COUP HE WAS DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF KABUL UNIVERSITY WOMEN'S HOSPITAL. WALI WAS ONE OF THE SEVEN COMMUNISTS ARRESTED BY THE DAUD GOVERNMENT ON APRIL 25.

GHULAM DASTIGIR PANJSHIRI--MINISTER OF EDUCATION. PANJSHIRI WAS FORMERLY DIRECTOR OF CENSORSHIP, RADIO AFGHANISTAN (1963-65) AND DIRECTOR OF LITERARY PRIZES, MINISTRY OF INFORMATION AND CULTURE (1968). HE WAS IMPRISONED DURING THE 1969 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS FOR "INSULTING THE KING" AND WAS RELEASED IN 1972. BEFORE HIS ARREST HE WAS ASSOCIATED WITH KHAIBAR AND BABRAK KARMAI, BUT EVIDENTLY WHILE IN PRISON HE RESIGNED FROM THE PARCHAM PARTY IN WHICH HE WAS A MEMBER OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE. IN 1970, PANJSHIRI AND A COUSIN FORMED A SPLINTER GROUP CALLED DEMOCRATIC KHALQ KARCARI AFGHANISTAN. HE WAS ONE OF THE GROUP OF SEVEN ARRESTED ON APRIL 25.

MOHAMMAD HASSAN BAREK SHAFI' (SHAFI'E) -- MINISTER OF INFORMATION AND CULTURE. A "LEADING AFGHAN POET", SHAFI'E WAS THE EDITOR OF THE THEN NEW PUBLICATION "KHALQ" IN 1966, AND WAS DIRECTOR OF PHOTOGRAMMETRY IN THE CARTOGRAPHIC INSTITUTE OF THE MINISTRY OF MINES AND INDUSTRIES FROM 1960 TO 1967. HE ALSO EDITED "PASHTUN JAGH" MAGAZINE AND WAS DIRECTOR FOR "PAYAME ENRAZ" IN 1965. IN 1968 HE WENT TO WORK AT THE MINISTRY OF INFORMATION AND CULTURE IN AN UNSPECIFIED POSITION. DURING THE SAME YEAR HE BECAME A SECRETARY OF THE PARCHAM CENTRAL COMMITTEE, HAVING STAYED WITH PARCHAM AFTER THE TARAKI SPLIT. DURING A 1966 CONVERSATION WITH TARAKI AND SHAFI'E, EMBASSY OFFICERS REPORTED THAT TARAKI WAS VERY SOLICITOUS OF SHAFI'E, AND THAT HE CONSULTED WITH HIM PRIOR TO ANSWERING DIFFICULT QUESTIONS. ALTHOUGH SHAFI'E'S LANGUAGES ARE SUPPOSEDLY LIMITED TO FARSI AND PUSHTO, THESE OFFICERS BELIEVED HE COULD FOLLOW MOST OF THEIR ENGLISH CONVERSATION.

SHAHINAN LAEQ--MINISTER OF RADIO AND TELEVISION. SEE KABUL 3482.

670

ISMAIL DANESH--MINISTRY OF MINES AND INDUSTRIES: DANESH IS 37 YEARS OLD, A GRADUATE OF HABIBIA HIGH SCHOOL AND THE FACULTY OF ENGINEERING OF KABUL UNIVERSITY. HE SPENT THREE AND A HALF YEARS IN THE U.S. IN THE LATE 1960'S -- EARLY 1970'S RECEIVING A BS AND MS IN MINING FROM THE UNIVERSITY OF WEST VIRGINIA. U.S. TRAINING, DANESH SPENT AN ADDITIONAL THREE YEARS IN MOSCOW, WHERE HE RECEIVED A SECOND MASTER'S DEGREE. DANESH HAS SERVED AS DIRECTOR-GENERAL OF THE ISMUSHIA COAL MINES AND DIRECTOR-GENERAL OF SCIENTIFIC RECORDS IN THE MINISTRY OF MINES AND INDUSTRIES. MOST RECENTLY HE WAS CHAIRMAN OF THE PHYSICS DEPARTMENT AT POLYTECHNIC INSTITUTE. ACCORDING TO HIS BROTHER, AN EMBASSY FSL, HIS CLOSE FRIENDS ARE NUR MOHAMMAD TAPAKI, HAFIZULLAH AMIN AND SULTAN ALI KOSHMAND, ALSO NAMED TO THE CABINET. DANESH IS A MEMBER OF KHALQ.

LT COLONEL MOHAMMAD HAI--MINISTER OF PUBLIC WORKS. (NO BIO DATA).

MOHAMMAD MANSUR HASHIMI--MINISTER OF WATER AND POWER. MOHAMMAD MANSUR HASHIMI IS THE SON OF MUHAMMAD HASHIMI; BORN KHASH, JULY, 1934. PREVIOUS OCCUPATION WAS A SCIENCE TEACHER IN THE TEACHER TRAINING COLLEGE. FROM 1956-1966 HE ATTENDED AMERICAN UNIVERSITY OF BEIRUT; IN MAY 1963 HE APPLIED FOR STUDY IN THE UNITED STATES FOR AN 18-MONTH PROGRAM; VISA GRANTED AUGUST 1963 FOR TRAVEL TO COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY. OUR INFORMATION INDICATES THAT HE MET WEEKLY AT THE HOME OF ONE MINISTRY OF JUSTICE OFFICIAL FOR COMMUNIST CELL MEETINGS BEGINNING NOVEMBER 1966.

PROFESSOR MAHMOOD SUMAH--MINISTER OF HIGHER EDUCATION. SUMAH IS A PROFESSOR IN THE FACULTY OF SCIENCE. HE IS EITHER A SYMPATHIZER OR MEMBER OF THE KHALQ PARTY. HE MAINTAINS CONTACT WITH KNOWN PARTY MEMBERS.

DR. ANAHITA RATEBZADAH--MINISTER OF SOCIAL AFFAIRS. BORN ABOUT 1929 IN KABUL, SHE ATTENDED NURSES SCHOOL IN CHICAGO 1951-53, AND MEDICAL SCHOOL AT KABUL UNIVERSITY. SHE BECAME THE LOVER OF BABRAK KARMAL ABOUT 1960 AND, WHEN ELECTED TO PARLIAMENT IN 1967, WAS ASSOCIATED WITH KARMAL AND HER GROUP CALLED AS ONE OF THE "COMMUNIST TRIUMVIRATE IN PARLIAMENT". IN 1973 SHE WAS REPORTED TO BE ON THE PARCHEM PARTY CENTRAL COMMITTEE.

ABDUL QADUS GHORBANDI--MINISTER OF COMMERCE. IN 1974 GHORBANDI WAS A MEMBER OF THE PARCHEM CENTRAL COMMITTEE AND A CLOSE FRIEND OF BABRAK KARMAL. WE HAVE NO OTHER INFORMATION AT THIS TIME.

NIZAMUDDIN TANZIB--MINISTER OF TRIBAL AFFAIRS. TANZIB IS FROM KUNDUZ, BORN APPROXIMATELY 1935. IN THE EARLY 1960'S TANZIB TAUGHT AT HABIBIA COLLEGE AND AID AT THE ISMUSHIA LYCEUM. HE IS A GRADUATE OF THE ISLAMIC FACULTY OF KABUL UNIVERSITY. LATER HE WORKED FOR KABUL RADIO AND THEN TOOK A JOB WITH THE MINISTRY OF EDUCATION WHERE HE WORKED IN THE DEPARTMENT OF ENCYCLOPEDIAS AND WAS A CELL MEMBER OF SOME BRANCH OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY. IN 1966 HE WAS REPORTED TO ATTEND REGULAR WEEKLY MEETINGS AT THE HOME OF NUR MOHAMMAD TAPAKI. AT THAT TIME HE WAS REPORTEDLY INVOLVED IN PARTY TRAINING. IN 1973 HE WAS REPORTED TO BE BACK AT THE TRAINING CENTER AND WAS TO BE A CLOSE FRIEND OF HAFIZULLAH AMIN, SHAFIQULLAH BABRAK KARMAL AND SULAIMAN LAO, AND HIS POSITION IN PARTY ORGANIZATION.



MEMORANDUM

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

May 11, 1978

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI  
FROM: PAUL B. HENZE [Handwritten initials]  
SUBJECT: The Asian "Soft Underbelly" and your Visit to Peking

I would expect the Chinese to be much more upset about the recent turn of events in Afghanistan than about anything that has happened in the Horn in the past year. The Chinese will be concerned not so much because of Afghanistan itself, though it is important to them, but because of the implications of a pro-Soviet government there for Pakistan, which the Chinese have always (perhaps somewhat unrealistically) seen as a counterweight to India. The problem goes deeper, however, and it will be interesting to see whether our views and the Chinese view are very far apart.

Hugh Seton-Watson in his splendid new book, Nations and States, characterizes the area from India/Pakistan through Iraq as one of the most inherently instable parts of today's world. He points out that all the states of this region are potentially brittle and none fully meets his definition of nation. Pakistan's future is problematical, perhaps deeply affected by what happens in India itself. Afghanistan's major peoples all overlap with those of its neighbors. Iran, for all its wealth and ambition, is loosely consolidated as a nation-state with large minorities who must still be expected to have centrifugal tendencies if central control weakens. Iraq has never solved its Kurdish problem. The Russians have been keenly interested in this area since the 19th century and now, with its oil wealth and the absence of a major outside counterforce, it offers them almost irresistible temptations, possibly as a diversion from the growing nationalism of their mushrooming Central Asian Muslim populations. The more successfully Iran modernizes, the more vulnerable it becomes to Soviet subversion. No one who is not deliberately myopic could see expansion of Soviet influence in Afghanistan, whether it has resulted from design or accident, as anything other than a large potential gain for the Soviets.

There is a real case in this part of the world--especially as between Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan - for some political restructuring. But to expect this to occur peacefully and without external major power involvement may be as unrealistic as in the Horn of Africa. Short of this, there is a natural case for Iran and Pakistan to draw closer together in face of a Soviet-supported leftist government in Kabul and to look to us for help. The Chinese will be very interested in knowing how we view all this and what we plan to do to bolster Iranian and Pakistani confidence. We have an instrument at hand: CENTO. It doesn't amount to much. It has not been popular or fashionable recently; we

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PER: [Handwritten signature]  
DATE: 2/18/94  
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have come close to letting it go the way of SEATO. It may be handier than we think as a device for putting some tone into the soft underbelly of Asia. But in the end it will depend upon unilateral and consistent U.S. initiative to get anything meaningful started. The Chinese would be impressed by evidence of resolution on our part in this area.

cc: Huntington  
Quandt/Sick  
Thornton

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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ACTION MEA-11

KABUL 04801 01 OF 02 132026Z

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 EA-10 ISO-00 CIAE-00 OODE-00 JPM-05  
H-01 INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 TPA-01 SP-02  
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AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI  
USLO PEKING  
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN  
CINCEUR  
CINCPAC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 KABUL 4801

CINCEUR AND CINCPAC ALSO FOR POLADS

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PEPR, PGOV, PINS, PINT, AF, IR, PK, US  
SUBJECT: SIX WEEKS AFTER AFGHANISTAN'S REVOLUTION: A SUMMING UP

1. THE FOLLOWING IS A SUMMARY OF MY ANALYSIS OF THE SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY SIX WEEKS AFTER THE REVOLUTION OF APRIL 27-28 AND ON THE EVE OF MY FINAL DEPARTURE FROM KABUL.

2. THE NEW GOVERNMENT OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN (DRA) IS OVERWHELMINGLY DEPENDENT ON THE  
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SOVIET UNION. IT CANNOT STAY IN POWER WITHOUT SOVIET

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HELP. IT RELIES ON HUNDRED PERCENT ON THE SOVIET UNION FOR MILITARY SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT, AND INCREASINGLY ON THE SOVIET UNION FOR ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE, BOTH TECHNICAL AND FINANCIAL, AND FOR TRADE.

3. THE LEADERS OF THE DRA HAVE BEEN IDEOLOGICALLY INSPIRED BY THE SOVIET UNION. THEIR ADHERENCE TO MARXISM-LENINISM IS REVEALED IN THEIR RHETORIC, IN THEIR STATED INTENTION TO FOLLOW THE SOVIET DEVELOPMENT MODEL BY EMPHASIZING HEAVY INDUSTRY AND COLLECTIVIZATION OF AGRICULTURE, IN THE WAY IN WHICH THEY HAVE ORGANIZED THEIR PARTY AND GOVERNMENT, AND IN THEIR CLOSE AFFINITY TO THE SOVIET SATELLITES.

4. THE NEW LEADERS OF THE DRA ARE ELATED BY THE SUCCESS OF THEIR REVOLUTION. AT THE SAME TIME, THEY CLEARLY FEAR THE POSSIBILITY OF ACTION AGAINST THEM FROM BOTH INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL FORCES, AND SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS ARE HIGHLY VISIBLE AND STRICT. A NATIONWIDE NIGHTTIME CURFEW IS STILL IN EFFECT.

5. ~~I AM NOT AWARE THAT ANY OPPOSITION TO THE DRA IS BEING ORGANIZED BY ANY FOREIGN GOVERNMENT. IT IS, HOWEVER, CLEAR THAT THE DRA REPRESENTS A MINORITY OF THE AFGHAN POPULATION AND THAT THERE IS CONSIDERABLE APPREHENSION AND OUTRIGHT OPPOSITION TO THE REGIME INSIDE AFGHANISTAN IN THE MIDDLE CLASSES, THE CLERGY, AND THE TRIBES. AT THE MOMENT, THIS OPPOSITION IS~~

FRAGMENTED AND LEADERLESS AND, HENCE, POSES NO IMMEDIATE THREAT TO THE REGIME. WHETHER IT CAN COALESCE AROUND A LEADER IN THE MONTHS AHEAD REMAINS TO BE SEEN; BUT,

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EVEN IN THAT CASE, IT WOULD HAVE TO OVERCOME THE CONSIDERABLE MILITARY POWER OF THE DRA, BACKED BY THE MILITARY RESOURCES OF THE USSR, IN ORDER TO OVERTHROW IT. A POSSIBLY MORE LIKELY SCENARIO INVOLVES ASSASSINATIONS, TERRORIST ACTS, AND GUERRILLA WARFARE IN THE MOUNTAINOUS TRIBAL AREAS ADJOINING PAKISTAN, OTHER POSSIBILITIES WHICH ARE HARD TO EVALUATE AT THE MOMENT INCLUDE SPLITS WITHIN THE CIVILIAN LEADERSHIP, OR BETWEEN CIVILIAN AND MILITARY LEADERS.

6. THE NEW LEADERSHIP IS INEXPERIENCED IN GOVERNMENT;

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ACTION MEA-11

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 EA-10 ISO-00 CIAE-00 OODE-00 PM-05  
H-01 INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 TPA-01 SP-02  
88-15 ICA-11 OMB-01 TRSE-00 10-13 EB-08 AID-05  
AGRE-00 HA-05 MCT-01 CTME-00 INT-05 DOE-15 SOE-02  
MRC-05 /147 W

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R 131141Z JUN 78  
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8553  
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AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD  
AMEMBASSY LONDON  
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW  
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI  
USLO PEKING  
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN  
CINCEUR  
CINCPAC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 KABUL 4801

CINCEUR AND CINCPAC ALSO FOR POLADS

7. IN FOREIGN POLICY, THE DRA WILL UNQUESTIONABLY NOT WANT TO ENGAGE IN ANY ACTIONS WHICH WOULD DISTURB THE PEACE IN THIS REGION -- AT LEAST UNTIL IT HAS CLEARLY SOLIDIFIED ITS POSITION WITHIN AFGHANISTAN. THEREAFTER, ITS FOREIGN POLICY, PARTICULARLY TOWARD PAKISTAN AND IRAN, IS LIKELY TO BE HEAVILY INFLUENCED BY THE WISHES OF THE SOVIET UNION. THERE IS NO QUESTION IN MY MIND THAT THE SOVIETS WANT TO KEEP THE PUSHTUNISTAN AND BALUCHISTAN CARDS AVAILABLE FOR POSSIBLE FUTURE USE, AND THAT THE DRA WILL BE THEIR INSTRUMENT.

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8. ONE QUESTION THAT COMES TO MIND IS WHETHER THE DRA WILL WANT TO OR BE ABLE TO MAINTAIN ANY DEGREE OF

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AND ADMINISTRATION AND WILL HAVE A DIFFICULT TIME WITHOUT EXTENSIVE EXTERNAL TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE IN COMING TO GRIPS WITH AFGHANISTAN'S ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL PROBLEMS. THE ECONOMY MAY MOVE AHEAD ON ITS OWN STEAM FOR A WHILE, AIDED BY A FAVORABLE AGRICULTURAL SITUATION THIS YEAR, BUT DIFFICULTIES COULD BECOME EVIDENT WITHIN SIX MONTHS TO A YEAR. THE PRIVATE SECTOR, FOR EXAMPLE, IS SLOWING DOWN RAPIDLY, AND THE PRINCIPAL FORM OF GOVERNMENT REVENUE, CUSTOMS RECEIPTS, HAVE FALLEN SHARPLY.

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INDEPENDENCE FROM THE SOVIET UNION. THE LEADERSHIP SAYS IT WANTS TO. IT REMAINS TO BE SEEN WHETHER IT IS ABLE TO. MOST SIGNS SO FAR INDICATE THAT THE SOVIET EMBRACE IS PRETTY TIGHT.

9. ANOTHER QUESTION IS WHY THE SOVIET UNION ITSELF WANTS TO DOMINATE AFGHANISTAN. DURING THE DAUOD -- AND EVEN THE ROYAL -- REGIMES, THE SOVIETS GOT WHAT THEY WANTED OUT OF AFGHANISTAN STRATEGICALLY AND ECONOMICALLY. WHY DO THEY WANT TO ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY FOR THIS FRACTIOUS COUNTRY, AND WHY DO THEY WANT TO ASSUME AN EVEN GREATER SHARE OF THE COSTLY ECONOMIC BURDEN OF AFGHANISTAN'S FUTURE DEVELOPMENT? MY BELIEF IS THAT SOVIET IDEOLOGY PERSUADES THEM THAT HISTORY IS ON THE SIDE OF MARXISM-LENINISM AND, IF MINIMAL RISKS ARE INVOLVED, HISTORY SHOULD BE NUDGED ALONG, PARTICULARLY IF IT INVOLVES THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A SOVIET-DOMINATED REGIME. IN THE CASE OF THE AFGHAN REVOLUTION, IT WOULD APPEAR FOR THE MOMENT THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE GOTTEN AWAY WITH IT WITHOUT ANY SIGNIFICANT DAMAGES TO THEIR RELATIONS WITH US OR WITH THE INDIANS, AND THAT THEY HAVE ACHIEVED SOME NEW PSYCHOLOGICAL ADVANTAGE IN THEIR RELATIONSHIPS WITH IRAN AND PAKISTAN. ON THE ECONOMIC SIDE, THEY ARE GIVING AWAY NOTHING FREE HERE. ANYTHING THEY WILL SPEND IN AFGHANISTAN WILL BE REPAYED WITH AFGHAN MINERAL RESOURCES, ESPECIALLY PETROLEUM, GAS, AND COPPER, BUT POSSIBLY ALSO IRON AND URANIUM.

10. IN THIS SITUATION, WHAT SHOULD THE UNITED STATES BE DOING? WITH RESPECT TO AFGHANISTAN, I BELIEVE WE SHOULD DO OUR BEST TO MAINTAIN A SUFFICIENT PRESENCE  
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PAGE 03

KABUL 04001 02 OF 02 132036Z

HERE SO THAT WE CAN OFFER AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE EXTENT THAT THE AFGHANS ARE WILLING AND ABLE TO USE ONE. WITH RESPECT TO THE REGION, I HAVE LONG FELT AND CONTINUE TO FEEL, THAT THE SECURITY OF IRAN AND THE PERSIAN GULF REGION IS OF VITAL IMPORTANCE TO THE UNITED STATES, AND ALSO THE SECURITY OF PAKISTAN IN SO FAR AS IT AFFECTS OUR INTERESTS IN IRAN AND IN THE GULF. I THEREFORE BELIEVE IT IS INCUMBENT UPON US TO DO EVERYTHING WE CAN TO SHORE UP IRAN AND PAKISTAN AGAINST THE NEW THREAT TO THEIR SECURITY POSED BY THE SOVIET-BACKED REGIME IN AFGHANISTAN. WE SHOULD LEAVE NO DOUBT IN THE MINDS OF

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THE SOVIETS THAT WE REGARD OUR INTERESTS IN IRAN AND  
PAKISTAN AS VITAL.  
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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

**PARTICIPANTS:** Guennady Kazankin, Soviet Embassy, Tehran  
John D. Stempel, American Embassy, Tehran

**DATE & PLACE:** July 18, 1978 - Chinese Restaurant, Pahlavi Ave.

**SUBJECT :** Human Rights, Afghanistan and Internal Iranian Politics

**DISTRIBUTION:** CHARGE, POL, OR, USIS, WFO, NEA/IRN, INR/RNA  
INR/OIL/B, AMEMBASSY KABUL

The tenor of the lunch was set when Stempel invited Kazankin to bring Shcharansky along as an extra guest. Kazankin asked who Shcharansky was and Stempel said he would be delighted to tell him over lunch. The following points of interest came out during the meeting.

Human Rights - Stempel immediately launched into a moderately restrained attack on Soviet policy with respect to dissidents. Why was the Soviet Union being so deliberately abrasive? Did Kazankin realize how silly and counterproductive the recent Soviet trials had been? Kazankin attempted to brunt the thrust with a fairly hard-line response that this was the Soviet way and very quickly shifted to Ambassador Young's statement of political prisoners in the U.S. After a considerable amount of back and forth discussion, talk about human rights more or less dissolved. Kazankin showed himself extremely adroit at bringing Young's comments to bear against American criticism of Soviet dissident activity.

Afghanistan - Kazankin, who had served in Afghanistan in the late 60s said the Soviets were adopting a wait-and-see attitude toward the new regime. When Stempel dryly asked whether placing various Soviet advisors in the ministries down to the privy cleaner level was a wait-and-see attitude, Kazankin said these were all technical specialists and were not advisors. Stempel challenged him on this and asked for his comment on the nearly two dozen economic agreements the Soviets had signed with the new Afghanistan government. Kazankin said the Soviets were giving help to Afghanistan because they felt the government was doing more for the people than previous governments. He said Soviet relations with the two previous Afghan regimes had also been excellent to good. Stempel noted that there remained a good deal of suspicion in many quarters of Soviet activities in Afghanistan. Kazankin pressed for Iran's views of the problem. Stempel merely noted that the Iranians were suspicious. Kazankin described the new Afghanistan's government's program as "a good democratic bourgeoisie" program and resisted with only minor uneasiness Stempel's jabs at communist influence in Afghanistan.

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Internal Iranian Politics - Kazankin pressed at several points for Stempel's views on the Iranian Internal Political scene. Stempel, pleading a recent return from vacation, merely said he had heard the political system was opening up. Kazankin poo pooped this and said, "If the Shah is still around next year, everything will be rigged by the government." Stempel picked up on the "if" and asked if Kazankin had any news that would suggest differently. Were the Soviets planning something in Iran? Kazankin cleared his throat and treated Stempel to the rumor that the Shah was reportedly sick from cancer or some other blood disease. (This rumor has abounded in many quarters and may be of Soviet inspiration.)

Kazankin also said he had heard the U.S. was trying to make Dr. Ali Amini prime minister again. Stempel denied this with a derisive snort and said the U.S. was delighted to see the political system opening up but the U.S. had no preferred candidates.

Visitors - In what has become a ritual, Stempel and Kazankin discussed perspective visitors from their countries to Iran. Kazankin noted that the head of the Soviet chamber of commerce had been in Iran in mid-July and Iran and the USSR had agreed to open a Soviet-Iran joint chamber. Kazankin did not seem very interested in Under Secretary Newsom's visit and Dr. Eugene Rostow's short stay here. (Comment: Perhaps the Soviet intelligence list has not caught up with recent events. On the other hand, maybe they feel they know all they need to know about the visit. Kazankin's lack of interest in these two visits was unusual.)

Bio Note - Kazankin will be leaving for Russia for vacation August 2. He invited the Stempel family for a Thursday afternoon swim lunch on July 27. (Comment: OR notes this is an unusual step; few official Americans are ever invited to Zargandeh, the Soviet summer compound.) Kazankin also expressed interest in seeing journal articles from American publications such as Foreign Policy, which dealt with Iran and the Mideast. Stempel promised to provide a few.

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RUCMFA/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN IMMEDIATE 5766  
RUSPQD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD IMMEDIATE 0320  
RUSPAB/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI IMMEDIATE 2217  
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R.O. 11652: X-GDS

TAGS: PEPR, SA, IN, IR, AF, US

SUBJECT: UNDER SECRETARY NEWSOM'S TRIP TO SOUTHERN ASIA

MISSION MAY DRAW ORALLY ON FOLLOWING OBSERVATIONS CONCERNING UNDER SECRETARY NEWSOM'S JULY 8-19 TRIP TO SOUTHERN ASIA IN POLADS AUGUST 2:

1. A. AFGHANISTAN: AFGHAN OFFICIALS EXPRESSED THEIR DESIRE FOR FRIENDLY RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES AND EMPHASIZED THEIR POLICY OF NON-ALIGNMENT. THEY SAID THAT THEY WERE REVIEWING VARIOUS ISSUES SUCH AS THE FRONTIERS WITH PAKISTAN AND THE WATER AGREEMENT WITH IRAN AND HAD NOT YET DETERMINED THEIR POLICIES. THEY STATED THAT WHATEVER THEIR DECISIONS THEY HOPED TO RESOLVE ISSUES WITH THEIR NEIGHBORS THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS.

B. C. INTERNAL MATTERS, THEY SAID THEY WOULD BE DRAWING UP A FIVE YEAR PLAN AND THAT THEIR FIRST PRIORITY WOULD BE LAND REFORM. THEY SAID THEY FAVORED COOPERATIVES OVER COLLECTIVES.

C. WHILE THERE IS GENERAL IMPRESSION AROUND WESTERN EMBASSIES IN KABUL THAT THE NUMBER OF SOVIET ADVISERS IS INCREASING, THIS WAS NOT MENTIONED BY AFGHAN OFFICIALS, ALTHOUGH OFFICIALS POINTED OUT THAT AFGHANISTAN HAD HAD GOOD RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION FOR SIXTY YEARS AND LOOKED FORWARD TO SUBSTANTIAL HELP FROM THE SOVIET UNION. THEY HOPED TO GET SUBSTANTIAL HELP FROM OTHERS AS WELL.





Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PAGE 01 TEHRAN 09279 260913Z  
ACTION NEA-07

INFO OCT-01 SS-14 ISD-00 EA-06 EUR-00 SP-02 CIAE-00  
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AMEMBASSY JIDDA  
AMEMBASSY KABUL  
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW  
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI  
USLO PEKING

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CONFIDENTIAL TEHRAN 09279

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E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: EATO, PEPR, AF IR, US  
SUBJ: IRANIAN ASSESSMENT OF AFGHAN DEVELOPMENTS AND  
U.S.-AFGHAN RELATIONS

REF: STATE 240411

1. ADDRESSEES ARE THAT SHAH HAS VIRTUALLY FROM THE  
FIRST HELD PRIVATE VIEW OF NEW AFGHAN GOVERNMENT AS FOR  
ALL INTENTS AND PURPOSES A SERVANT OF THE SOVIETS. HE  
HAS DISGUISED THIS VIEW BEHIND AN OFFICIAL POLICY OF  
"WAIT-AND-SEE" GIVING THE NEW GOA EVERY BENEFIT OF THE  
DOUBT. FORMAL RELATIONS HAVE CONTINUED AS BEFORE,  
INCLUDING CONTINUING DISBURSEMENTS ON EXISTING ECONOMIC  
COMMITMENTS (TEHRAN 7818 AND MEMORANDUM TO DEPT AND KABUL  
OF AUGUST 23) BUT ALWAYS WARILY.

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PAGE 02 TEHRAN 09279 260913Z

2. SHAH MADE IT CLEAR TO THE AMBASSADOR, AT THE TIME,

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3. SAUDI ARABIA/YEMENS: SAUDI OFFICIALS CONVEYED DEEP CONCERN OVER THE RECENT COUP IN ADEN WHICH THEY PERCEIVE AS FURTHER EVIDENCE OF A SOVIET EFFORT TO ENCIRCLE THEIR OIL-RICH PENINSULA WITH REGIMES HOSTILE TO MODERATE GOVERNMENTS. THEY EXPRESSED PARTICULAR CONCERN OVER WHAT THEY BELIEVE TO BE AN INFLUX OF FOREIGN TROOPS INTO THE PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF YEMEN FOLLOWING THE COUP. WE COMPLIMENTED THE SAUDI GOVERNMENT FOR ITS ROLE IN JULY 2 ARAB LEAGUE MEETING WHICH RESULTED IN A CONDEMNATION BY A MAJORITY OF LEAGUE MEMBERS OF PDRY'S ROLE IN THE ASSASSINATION OF NORTH YEMEN PRESIDENT GHASEMI AND FURTHER POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ISOLATION OF THE ADANI REGIME. WE ARE ALSO WORKING WITH THE SAC  
BT  
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PAGE FOUR

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RUSBQD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD IMMEDIATE 0821  
RUSBAL/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI IMMEDIATE 2211  
RUQMRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE 4265  
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S E C R E T FINAL SECTION OF 2 STATE 194166/2

LIMIIS

TO ACCELERATE DELIVERY OF ALREADY APPROVED US MILITARY EQUIPMENT TO NORTH YEMEN AND DO NOT INTEND TO RESPOND AT THIS TIME TO ANY PDRY INTEREST IN IMPROVED RELATIONS WITH US.

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 RUQMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 8391  
 RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 4725  
 RUMJDK/AMEMBASSY DACCA 7116  
 RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 3754  
 RUMJFG/USLO PEKING 3985  
 RUQMGU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 6935  
 RUHQHQA/ CINCPAC HONOLULU HAWAII 1843  
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 SECRET SECTION 01 OF 02 STATE 304356/01

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LIMDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PEPR, EAID, AF, US

SUBJECT: ASSESSMENT OF AFGHAN DEVELOPMENTS AND U.S.-AFGHAN RELATIONS

REFS: (A) STATE 240411; KABUL 7370

1. WE AGREE WITH THE BROAD OUTLINES OF YOUR ASSESSMENT OF THE GENERAL DIRECTION OF DEVELOPMENTS IN AFGHANISTAN AND THE UNCERTAIN PROSPECTS FOR A RETURN TO CLOSE U.S.-AFGHAN RELATIONS. NEVERTHELESS, WE STILL FIND OURSELVES UNSURE ABOUT THE SHAPE OF THINGS TO COME, EVEN ASSUMING THAT THE PRESENT REGIME MAINTAINS ITS HOLD ON POWER, AND WE BELIEVE WE SHOULD WORK FROM THE PREMISE THAT A CONSTRUCTIVE U.S.-AFGHAN WORKING RELATIONSHIP COULD STILL EMERGE. WE WONDER, IF AND WHEN THE SITUATION GELS A BIT MORE, WHETHER THE DRA WILL BECOME A DOCILE CAMP-FOLLOWER DOMINATED BY THE USSR, OR A RADICAL-LEFTIST REGIME ON THE FRINGE OF THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT BUT WITH PECULIAR AFGHAN CHARACTERISTICS AND A DEGREE OF INDEPENDENCE. THE MOST ADVERSE DEVELOPMENT IN TERMS OF OUR INTERESTS WOULD BE THE INTRODUCTION OF SOVIET COMBAT TROOPS IN AFGHANISTAN, WHICH WOULD SERIOUSLY DISTURB THE ENTIRE REGION.

2. WE SEE, AS YOU DO, OUR REGIONAL INTERESTS AS PARAMOUNT IN OUR CONSIDERATION OF A PROPER APPROACH TO THE DRA AND WOULD VIEW AN IRRIDENTIST AFGHANISTAN, ESPECIALLY ONE BACKED BY THE SOVIETS, AS A SERIOUS THREAT TO PEACE AND STABILITY IN THE AREA. WE BELIEVE THIS IS A REAL FEAR

ESPECIALLY IN PAKISTAN AND ALSO IN IRAN.

3. THE ASSESSMENTS OF AFGHANISTAN'S NEIGHBORS ARE SIMILAR TO OURS ALTHOUGH PAKISTAN AND IRAN CONTEND THAT AFGHANISTAN IS ALREADY IRREVOCABLY "LOST" TO THE SOVIET UNION. PAKISTAN SEEMS TO WANT US TO SHARE THEIR ASSESSMENT OF THE THREAT, PRESUMABLY TO OBTAIN A GREATER U.S. COMMITMENT TO PAKISTAN'S SECURITY. AT NO TIME HAVE THE PAKISTANIS QUESTIONED OUR POLICY OF MAINTAINING THE U.S. PRESENCE IN

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SECRET FINAL SECTION OF 02 STATE 304356/02

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CONCERN ABOUT THE NEW REGIME'S QUESTIONABLE HUMAN RIGHTS PERFORMANCE. THE AFGHANS SHOULD BE KEPT FULLY AWARE OF THESE CONCERNS IN DISCUSSIONS WITH THE LEADERSHIP.

7. WE REGARD THE SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN AS AN EVOLVING ONE WHICH REQUIRES OUR CONTINUING ATTENTION AS WELL AS A CONTINUING DIALOGUE WITH OTHER STATES IN THE REGION. WE ENCOURAGE EMBASSIES TEHRAN, ISLAMABAD, AND NEW DELHI IN PARTICULAR TO CONTINUE EXCHANGING VIEWS WITH HOST GOVERNMENTS ON THE CHANGING AFGHAN SCENE, KEEPING IN MIND THAT OUR INFLUENCE IN KABUL IS SEVERELY LIMITED AND THAT WE

LOOK TO AFGHANISTAN'S NEIGHBORS TO TAKE THE LEAD IN DEVELOPING A NETWORK OF COOPERATIVE RELATIONS WHICH WILL CONTRIBUTE TO PEACE AND STABILITY IN THE REGION. VANCE

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Afghanistan and U.S.-Afghan Relations

PARTICIPANTS:

Vasiliy K. Gorovoi, First Secretary, USSR  
Embassy

Ronald D. Lorton, Country Officer for  
Afghanistan

DATE: April 11, 1979

DISTRIBUTION:

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Embassy Moscow, Embassy Islamabad,  
Embassy Tehran, Embassy New Delhi, NSC-  
Mr. Thornton

Gorovoi said he had not been able to understand developments in U.S.-Afghan relations since he had last met with Lorton, commenting that on his last visit (February 8) relations between the U.S. and Afghanistan had appeared to be "calm" but that since the terrible event which resulted in the death of the American Ambassador in Kabul there had been an abrupt change in those relations. He cited as evidence, the U.S. decision to reduce economic aid to Afghanistan and calls in Congress for other actions such as withdrawal of the Peace Corps. Gorovoi explained these developments as incomprehensible because the U.S. has always sought to preserve its position around the world.

Lorton agreed there have been difficulties in the U.S.-Afghan relationship, explaining that although relations before February 14 had been normal, we nonetheless had a number of questions on our minds including

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our inability to agree with the Afghans on various matters of International concern and the apparent lack of interest in the part of the DRA in many of the programs we were continuing to offer. What disturbed us about the handling of the kidnapping of Ambassador Dubs was the DRA's complete lack of cooperation or even consultation with us in their handling of the incident. All of these factors were part of our decision to reduce our assistance level, Lorton concluded.

Gorovoi questioned what he called the U.S. view that the Soviets were in a position to control the behavior of the Afghans at that time. He said Afghanistan was a sovereign country and denied that the USSR is in any position to "order" the Afghans to do something. Lorton demurred and said it was not a question of issuing orders, but our view that the Soviets who were advising the Afghans should have been in a position to urge restraint on them. In reality, the Soviets even played an operational role in some aspects of the anti-terrorist operation, according to eyewitness reports. Nonetheless, Lorton noted we have expressed our view to interested Members of Congress and others that it is the Afghan Government which must bear the responsibility for the outcome of their action.

Gorovoi opined it is difficult to see how U.S.-Afghan relations can make progress in the light of the sharp U.S. decisions. Lorton said the U.S. had no desire to see a deterioration in our relationship with Afghanistan but observed that one of the major difficulties in having a cooperative relationship in the future is the continuing charges emanating from Moscow regarding outside interference in Afghanistan's affairs. Lorton noted the two recent public statements made by the U.S. in this regard, reaffirming that the U.S. has not interfered and has no intention of interfering in Afghanistan's affairs. Improvements in U.S.-Afghan relations would be difficult, Lorton concluded, as long as these kinds of charges and the atmosphere they create continue.

Lorton asked Gorovoi for his assessment of developments in Afghanistan and the major problems faced by the Taraki Government. Gorovoi thought that the DRA was facing problems common to all revolutions as the old and new classes vie for control. Gorovoi observed that there is a strong religious tradition in

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Afghanistan and indicated this was a source of opposition to a regime which sought to separate church and state and remove religion from politics. He also noted the autonomous traditions of certain tribal groups and observed that a number of dissidents have crossed the border into Pakistan to carry out anti-DRA activities. However, Gorovoi continued, the DRA enjoys a lot of support for its reform programs (such as land reform) which benefit the masses of the Afghan population. He viewed the military as key to the progress of a revolution in developing countries.

Lorton questioned whether the regime indeed had "mass" support, observing that large segments of the general population appear to have expressed their opposition to the regime in the revolt in Herat and by leaving Afghanistan for Pakistan. Lorton suggested that these were indications of less than mass popular support for the regime and a reaction to the harsh measures the regime is taking against its opponents.

Gorovoi responded that every action provokes counteraction and quoted Lenin on the need of a revolution to defend itself. He recalled that large numbers of Russian peasants had opposed the Russian Revolution because they were uneducated and illiterate and did not know where their real interests lay. He saw the task of the Afghan Government's leadership as being the education of the masses regarding their true interests and described this process as difficult.

Lorton concluded by saying that he thought it would indeed be a difficult time ahead for the Afghan people since the DRA appears to prefer destruction of old institutions in favor of new structures rather than attempting to work with or through those institutions.

Drafted by: NEA/PAB:RDL/ryon:lcb  
x29552; 04/12/79

Cleared by: NEA/PAB: [Signature] AQoon

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RUQMRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 278  
RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1553  
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1592  
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 KABUL 3557

CINCPAC: ALSO FOR POLAD

E.O. 12065: GDS 5-7-85 (TAYLOR, JAMES E.) OR-P  
TAGS: PEPR, PINR, PGOV, PINT, SHUM, AF, PK, UR, IR  
SUBJECT: THE "BIG LIE" BECOMES STANDARD KHALQI TOOL

REF: (A) KABUL 3278; (B) KABUL 3166

1. (C- ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. SUMMARY: SEVERAL NEW POLITICAL WRINKLES WERE PART OF A DE-  
LUGE OF ANNIVERSARY SPEECHES AND PRESS CONFERENCES GIVEN OVER  
THE LAST DAYS BY PRESIDENT NOOR MOHAMMAD TARAQI AND PRIME  
MINISTER HAFIZULLAH AMIN, INCLUDING ANOTHER HINT THAT SOME FRICTION  
BETWEEN THE TWO LEADERS MAY BE A REALITY. FLAT DENIALS THAT ANY  
ARMY MUTINY HAD OCCURRED IN JALALABAD, OR THAT THE REGIME  
TORTURES ITS POLITICAL PRISONERS, INDICATE THAT THE "BIG LIE"  
MAY HAVE BECOME THE REGIME'S PREFERRED PUBLIC TACTIC FOR DEAL-  
ING WITH THORNY ISSUES. ALLEGED INTERFERENCE BY IRAN, PAKISTAN,  
AND "IMPERIALISM" REMAINED THE GOVERNMENT'S PRIMARY EXCUSE FOR  
CONTINUED DOMESTIC OPPOSITION, WHILE THINLY-VEILED BARBS WERE  
LAUNCHED AT "BROTHERLY" COUNTRIES (SPECIFICALLY CZECHOSLOVAKIA)  
WHO MAY CONSIDER PROVIDING REFUGE TO THE EXILED PARHAMIST  
LEADERS. END OF SUMMARY.

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3. TARAKI-AMIN RELATIONS: DESPITE AMIN'S RECENT EFFUSIVE DESCRIPTION OF TARAKI AS "THE MOST GLORIOUS PERSONALITY IN AFGHAN HISTORY" (WHICH ELIMINATES SUCH NOTABLES AS DARIUS, ALEXANDER THE GREAT, GENGHIS KHAN, TAMERLANE, AHMAD SHAH DURRANI, LADY SALES, AND FLASHMAN), HINTS CONTINUE TO SURFACE THAT DIFFERENCES OR FRICTION BETWEEN THE TWO LEADERS MAY EXIST. IN ONE NEWS CONFERENCE RESPONSE REGARDING AMIN'S RECENT CONDEMNATION OF ANY CULT OF PERSONALITY SURROUNDING TARAKI (REF A), THE GREAT LEADER HIMSELF MODESTLY REPLIED THAT THE AFGHAN PEOPLE "LOVE AND RESPECT ME" SO MUCH THAT THEY INSIST ON PUTTING UP PHOTOGRAPHS EVERYWHERE. HE ADDED THAT THE GOVERNMENT HAS ISSUED INSTRUCTIONS TO CEASE THIS PRACTICE, BUT THE REGIME WILL NOT USE FORCE TO PREVENT THE PEOPLE FROM EXHIBITING THEIR AFFECTION. (COMMENT: A LARGE NUMBER OF TARAKI PHOTOGRAPHS HAVE DISAPPEARED RECENTLY.) AT THE SAME CONFERENCE, TARAKI CATEGORICALLY DENIED THAT AMIN HAD EVER SAID, OR EVEN INTIMATED, THAT CERTAIN UNKNOWN ENEMIES ARE ATTEMPTING TO "INFLUENCE" THE AFGHAN PRESIDENT (REF B). TARAKI PETULANTLY INSISTED THAT AMIN HAD SAID "NOTHING OF THE SORT," AND THAT HE KNEW THIS WAS TRUE BECAUSE HE HAD "READ ALL OF AMIN'S INTERVIEWS OVER THE PAST YEAR."

4. HUMAN RIGHTS: OBLIQUELY COUNTERING WIDESPREAD REPORTS, CONFIRMED BY EYEWITNESSES AND VICTIMS, THAT THIS REGIME PHYSICALLY MISTREATS MANY OF THE NUMEROUS PRISONERS IN ITS CUSTODY (INCLUDING LARGE-SCALE NIGHTTIME EXECUTIONS OF POLITICAL PRISONERS, SANS TRIAL, AND THE APPLICATION OF ELECTRICAL SHOCKS TO CERTAIN PARTS OF THE BODY), AMIN CLAIMED THAT "WE HAVE NOT UNDERMINED HUMAN DIGNITY, EVEN WHEN DEALING WITH THOSE HATCHING INTRIGUES AGAINST OUR PEOPLE AND THE COUNTRY," AND ADDED THAT "WE HAVE NOT ACTED AGAINST ANYONE USING MEANS CONTRARY TO RESPECT FOR HUMAN DIGNITY". TARAKI INSISTED THAT ONLY "BETWEEN 1,000 AND 1,100 POLITICAL PRISONERS ARE INTERNED." (COMMENT: WE THINK THAT THE FIGURE IS ACTUALLY WELL OVER TEN THOUSAND.)

5. DOMESTIC SECURITY: BLAME FOR INTERNAL SECURITY PROBLEMS CONTINUED TO BE LAID AT THE DOORSTEP OF "FOREIGN INFILTRATORS," ESPECIALLY "SOLDIERS IN AFGHAN DRESS" FROM PAKISTAN AND IRAN. TARAKI INDIRECTLY ADMITTED THAT FIGHTING IS UNDERWAY IN NORTHWEST AFGHANISTAN WHEN HE INSISTED THAT VIOLENCE AROUND MAIMANA (A TURKMAN REGION NEAR THE SOVIET BORDER) IS THE WORK OF "IRANIAN INFILTRATORS" WHO ESCAPED FOLLOWING THE UPHEAVAL IN HERAT. TARAKI ALSO ASSERTED THAT "INTERFERENCE" BY IRAN AND PAKISTAN HAS COMPELLED THE REGIME TO RETAIN THE OVERNIGHT CURFEW IN KABUL MORE THAN ONE YEAR AFTER THE REVOLUTION. TARAKI BENT THE FACTS SURROUNDING A COUPLE OF POINTS WHEN HE CATEGORICALLY DENIED THAT "ANYTHING," MUCH LESS ANY ARMY MUTINY, HAS HAPPENED IN JALALABAD RECENTLY, AND INSISTED THAT NO ONE (SPECIFICALLY SHI'ITAS) HAS BEEN ARRESTED BECAUSE OF THEIR RELIGIOUS BELIEFS.  
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RUDIC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1554  
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1593  
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 KABUL 3557

CINCPAC ALSO FOR POLAD

6. GOALS OF THE REVOLUTION: TARAKI ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE BUILDING OF A SOCIALIST SOCIETY IS A LONG-TERM TASK, BUT HE CLAIMED THAT THE "FOUNDATION" OF A SOCIALIST SOCIETY WILL BE LAID IN "SIX TO TEN YEARS." AS FOR THE NATURE OF THE REGIME, TARAKI REMARKED THAT "DEMOCRACY MEANS THAT MEASURES SHOULD BE TAKEN FOR THE BENEFIT OF THE MAJORITY," AND ADDED THAT "WE CAN CALL THE DRA A DEMOCRATIC DICTATORSHIP BECAUSE IT IS IN FAVOR OF 98 PERCENT OF THE PEOPLE."

7. RELATIONS WITH IRAN AND PAKISTAN: "REGIONAL REACTIONARY POWERS" (READ IRAN AND PAKISTAN) WITH THE SUPPORT OF "IMPERIALISM" (READ US AND UK) CONTINUE TO CARRY OUT "ARMED AGGRESSION" AGAINST AFGHANISTAN, ACCORDING TO THE AFGHAN LEADERS, AND HAVE "MARTYRED A LARGE NUMBER OF PEOPLE" INCLUDING WOMEN, CHILDREN AND THE ELDERLY. TARAKI CLAIMED THAT SINCE APRIL 8, 1979, "PAKISTANI SOLDIERS HAVE COMMITTED ELEVEN INFRINGEMENTS ONTO AFGHAN TERRITORY". TARAKI INSISTED THAT ALL FURTHER ENCROACHMENTS WOULD BE REPULSED BY THE ARMED FORCES OF AFGHANISTAN, "SUPPORTED BY AFGHANISTAN'S INTERNATIONAL FRIENDS." TARAKI ADDED THAT "WE DO NOT CONSIDER ZIA-UL-HAQ AS OUR ENEMY, BUT MAYBE SOONER OR LATER HE WILL STOP SENDING INFILTRATORS INTO THIS COUNTRY."

8. RELATIONS WITH SOCIALIST COUNTRIES: TARAKI INSISTED THAT THERE ARE ONLY BETWEEN 1,000 AND 1,100 SOVIET ADVISERS HERE, AND, OF THESE, ABOUT 300 ARE SERVING WITH THE AFGHAN MILITARY. (COMMENT: WE BELIEVE THAT THERE ARE APPROXIMATELY 1,000 SOVIET MILITARY ADVISERS HERE -- AND AROUND 2,500 CIVILIAN ADVISERS.) HE SUGGESTED THAT FOREIGN CORRESPONDENTS COMPARE THAT FIGURE WITH THE SITUATIONS IN IRAN, PAKISTAN, AND OTHER COUNTRIES WHERE "SIXTY TO SEVENTY THOUSAND AMERICAN" AND OTHER ADVISERS ARE PRESENT. REGARDING MILITARY ASSISTANCE FROM THE USSR, TARAKI CLAIMED THAT "WHATEVER WE NEED AND CAN MANAGE, WE GET." ON THE POLITICAL FRONT, TARAKI INSISTED THAT "BROTHERLY RELATIONS" BETWEEN AFGHANISTAN AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA INDICATE THAT CZECHOSLOVAKIA WOULD "NEVER GIVE SHELTER" TO FORMER AMBASSADOR BABRAK KARMAL, HIS EXILED PARCHAMIST COLLEAGUES, OR OTHER ENEMIES OF THE REVOLUTION.

9. PARTY RELATIONS WITH THE INTERNATIONAL MOVEMENT: ACCORDING TO TARAKI, THE PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF AFGHANISTAN (PDPA) HAS HAD "HISTORICAL SOLIDARITY WITH THREE MAIN ANTI-IMPERIALIST MOVEMENTS." THE "GLOBAL FRONT FOR PEACE AND PROGRESS;" THE "INTERNATIONAL WORKING CLASS MOVEMENT;" AND, THE "NATIONAL AND SOCIAL LIBERATION MOVEMENTS ALL OVER THE WORLD."

10. CONCLUSIONS: ASIDE FROM THESE NEW FORMULATIONS, THE GREAT DELUGE OF HIGH-LEVEL VERBIAGE SURROUNDING THE FIRST ANNIVERSARY OF THE REVOLUTION COVERED OLD GROUND. PUBLIC DENIALS BY THE LEADERSHIP THAT EVENTS KNOWN TO HAVE TAKEN PLACE (E.G., THE JALALABAD MUTINY, TORTURE OF PRISONERS, ETC.) HAVE EVER OCCURRED APPEAR TO HAVE BECOME THE ACCEPTED "BIG LIE" TACTIC, THEREBY FURTHER UNDERCUTTING WHATEVER DOMESTIC CREDIBILITY THE REGIME MAY HAVE POSSESSED. OF PARTICULAR INTEREST IN THIS CONNECTION IS TARAKI'S DISINGENUOUS DENIAL THAT AMIN EVER MENTIONED THAT "PEOPLE" WERE TRYING TO INFLUENCE THE GREAT LEADER, A REFERENCE BY THE PRIME MINISTER WHICH IS PART OF THE OFFICIAL PUBLIC RECORD IN THE GOVERNMENT-CONTROLLED PRESS. TARAKI'S BARBS DIRECTED AT PRAGUE COULD ALSO HVE BEEN AIMED AT OTHER "BROTHERLY" COUNTRIES (E.G., YUGOSLAVIA, OR EVEN THE USSR) WHO MAY NOW OR AT SOME POINT PROVIDE A SAFE HAVEN FOR THE EXILED PARCHAMIST LEADERS. IN THIS CONNECTION, IT SEEMS THAT THE LONGER THE KHALQI REGIME REMAINS UNABLE TO CONSOLIDATE ITS OWN DOMESTIC SECURITY, THE MORE CONCERNED THE KHALQI LEADERSHIP MAY BECOME THAT ITS "INTERNATIONAL FRIENDS" MAY BEGIN CASTING ABOUT FOR ALTERNATE LEFTIST LEADERSHIP TO SUPPORT.

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E.O. 12065: RDS-1 5/8/99 (TOON, MALCOLM) OR-M  
TAGS: PK, AF, PEPR, MOPS, PBOR, UR

SUBJECT: (C) PAKISTANI DIPLOMAT DISCUSSES SOVIET-PAK  
RELATIONS, AFGHANISTAN

1. (C-ENTIRE TEXT)
2. A PAKISTAN DIPLOMAT (PROTECT) HAD THE FOLLOWING TO SAY ABOUT SOVIET-PAK RELATIONS AND THE SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN DURING MAY 7 CONVERSATION WITH EMBOFF.
3. ON SOVIET-PAK RELATIONS, HE COMMENTED THAT:
  - AMBASSADOR KHAN RECENTLY DELIVERED A LETTER FROM GENERAL ZIA TO PREMIER KOSYGIN. FOLLOWING PRESENTATION OF THE MESSAGE, KHAN USED THE MEETING TO STRESS THAT ISLAMABAD WANTS TO HAVE GOOD RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION AND AFGHANISTAN. IT DOES NOT WANT THE AFGHAN REFUGEES IN PAKISTAN AND DID NOT INVITE THEM. PAKISTAN WOULD BE PLEASED IF THE REFUGEES RETURNED HOME. THE SOVIET UNION AND AFGHANISTAN CAN DO WHAT THEY WANT INSIDE AFGHANISTAN TO KEEP THE REFUGEES FROM ENTERING PAKISTAN, TO THE EXTENT OF BUILDING A WALL IF NECESSARY. HOWEVER, THE INTERNAL SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN AND NOT PAKISTAN SHOULD BE BLAMED FOR THE EXODUS. PAKISTAN HAS THE HUMANITARIAN RESPONSIBILITY TO SEE THAT FOOD AND OTHER ESSENTIALS GET TO THE REFUGEES.
  - KOSYGIN'S RESPONSE WAS "MODERATE". HE NOTED THAT THE AFGHAN VERSION DIFFERED FROM AMBASSADOR KHAN'S PRESENTATION. IT WOULD BE GOOD IF THE REASONS FOR THESE AFGHAN APPREHENSIONS WERE REMOVED, HE SAID.

-- THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR IN ISLAMABAD WAS MORE DIRECT. IN RESPONSE TO PAKISTANI DISAVOWELS OF AIDING ANTI-DRA ACTIVITIES EMANATING FROM THE REFUGEE CAMPS, HE STATED PLUMTLY THAT THE PAKISTAN GOVERNMENT IS PROVIDING ARMS TO THE REFUGEES, RETIRED PAKISTANI MILITARY PERSONNEL ARE TRAINING REFUGEES FOR MILITARY ACTIVITY AGAINST THE DRA, AND "OFFICIAL" PAKISTANI PROPAGANDA IS CRITICAL OF THE DRA.

-- WHILE RELUCTANT TO DRAW ANY DEFINITIVE CONCLUSIONS, THE PAKISTANI EMBASSY IN MOSCOW BELIEVES THAT MOSCOW IS STILL INTERESTED IN PURSUING GOOD RELATIONS WITH ISLAMABAD AND MAY EVEN BE RESTRAINING KABUL FROM MOVING ACTIVELY TO STIR UP BORDER PROBLEMS WITH PAKISTAN. AT THE SAME TIME, THE EMBASSY IS APPREHENSIVE THAT THIS APPARENT SOVIET POSITION COULD CHANGE, DEPENDING ON THE SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN.

-- OTHERWISE, BILATERAL RELATIONS ARE DEVELOPING WELL. NEGOTIATIONS ARE UNDER WAY FOR SHIPPING AND CONSULAR AGREEMENTS. COOPERATION ON THE SOVIET-ASSISTED STEEL MILL IS PROCEEDING WELL. AN EDUCATION AGREEMENT WILL BE SIGNED AT THE END OF THE MAY OR THE BEGINNING OF JUNE.

4. ON AFGHANISTAN, PAKISTANI SOURCE STATED THAT:

-- PAKISTANI INTELLIGENCE HAS OBTAINED INFORMATION FROM LOWER LEVEL AFGHAN BUR. UCRAITS THAT SENIOR DRA OFFICIALS HAVE STRUCK MORE OF A CONFIDENT ATTITUDE FOLLOWING THE VISIT TO KABUL BY GENERAL YEPISHEV. DETAILS OF THE VISIT, HOWEVER, ARE HARD TO COME BY. YEPISHEV MET ONLY WITH TWO OR THREE TOP OFFICIALS IN THE GOVERNMENT. THE RESULTS OF THESE MEETINGS ARE BEING VERY CLOSELY HELD.

-- IT IS UNLIKELY THAT THE HELICOPTERS USED TO HELP SUPPRESS THE JALAHABAD MUTINY WERE FLOWN BY AFGHANS, SINCE THEY HAD ONLY RECENTLY ARRIVED IN KABUL. THEY WERE PROBABLY PILOTED BY SOVIETS. TOON

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RUMJPG/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 496  
RUQMRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 728  
RUSBLK/AMEMBASSY KABUL 9201  
RUSBKR/AMCONSUL KARACHI 7943  
ZEN/AMCONSUL LAHORE POUCH  
RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 3966  
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1318  
RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 787  
ZEN/AMCONSUL PESHAWAR  
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E.O. 12065: GDS 12/5/85 (SHERMAN, RICK) OR-P  
TAGS: PEPR, PBOR, PK, AF  
SUBJECT: (C) GAILANI REPRESENTATIVE REPORTS PROGRESS IN UNIFYING  
AFGHAN DISSIDENT GROUPS

REF: ISLAMABAD 4780

1. (C) ENTIRE TEXT

2. SUMMARY: HUMAYUN ASEFI, AFGHAN ATTORNEY FROM PARIS WHO ACCOMPANIED SYED AHMED GAILANI TO EMBASSY ON APRIL 23 (REFTEL), CALLED ON EMBOFF MAY 13 WITH UP-DATE ON PROGRESS IN FORGING UNITY AMONG PESHAWAR-BASED GROUPS. ASEFI ALSO ADVISED OF SUCCESSES IN FIGHTING BETWEEN DISSIDENT FORCES AND DRA TROOPS. HE LEFT WITH US PARTS HE ALLEGED WERE TAKEN FROM MIG-21 AIRCRAFT DOWNED BY DISSIDENT FORCES IN LATE APRIL. END SUMMARY.

3. ASEFI, WHO HAS BEEN TRAVELING THROUGHOUT PAKISTAN SINCE PREVIOUS VISIT TO EMBASSY IN ATTEMPT TO ESTABLISH UNITY OF DISSIDENT MOVEMENT, SAYS "MEANINGFUL ASSOCIATION" OF THREE GROUPS (ANLF, GAILANI GROUP, AND MIAN GUL JAN GROUP) IS NOW 90 PERCENT ASSURED AND SHOULD BE ANNOUNCED BY MAY 18. THE AGREEMENT WILL BE SIGNED BY LEADERS OF THREE ORGANIZATIONS IN PESHAWAR AND WILL BE ANNOUNCED TO PRESS "THROUGHOUT THE WORLD", ASEFI SAYS. THE ASSOCIATION WILL INCLUDE COMMAND COORDINATION IN FIELD OPERATIONS AND COOPERATION AT TOP LEVELS IN PESHAWAR.

4. ASEFI HAS ALSO ARRANGED FOR EXPATRIATE AFGHAN BUSINESSMEN TO SPONSOR A RADIO STATION WHICH WILL BE PURCHASED IN EUROPE AND SET UP IN WAZIRISTAN UNDER DIRECTION OF UNIFIED GROUPS COMMITTEE. ASEFI REPORTEDLY TOLD HIS COUSIN, GOP FONSEC SHAHNAWAZ, OF HIS INTENTIONS AND ASKED PERMISSION TO IMPORT RADIO EQUIPMENT. ASEFI DID NOT REPORT FONSEC APPROVAL; RATHER, SHAHNAWAZ "DID NOT TELL ME TO STOP THE PROCESS," ASEFI SAID.

5. ASEFI SAYS MAJOR TRIBAL GROUPS OF AFGHANISTAN HAVE RECENTLY BECOME MORE ACTIVE IN SUPPORTING REBEL ACTIVITIES. WAZIRS HAVE ACTIVELY JOINED FIGHT AS OF MAY 11 AND MENGALS, TAJIKS, UZBEKS, AND AFRIDIS HAVE ALL AGREED IN PRINCIPLE TO DO SO BUT LACK ORGANIZATION TO COORDINATE THEIR PEOPLE'S EFFORTS. ANOTHER FACTOR CAUSING SOME HESITATION ON PART OF THOSE ETHNIC/TRIBAL GROUPS IS LACK OF ANY LEADER OF "NATIONAL" STATURE WITH WHOM THEY CAN IDENTIFY. ASEFI HAS LETTER ALLEGEDLY SIGNED BY ALL THESE GROUPS ADDRESSED TO KING ZAHER SHAH APPEALING FOR HIS RETURN, OR THAT OF ABDUL WALI, TO REPRESENT RALLYING POINT FOR DISSIDENT ACTIVITIES. LETTER MAKES CLEAR TO KING, ACCORDING TO ASEFI, THAT RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF MONARCHY NOT, RPT NOT, INTENT OF THE GROUPS. ROYAL PERSONAGE WOULD BE FIGUREHEAD RATHER THAN RULING MONARCH.

5. ASEFI SAID HE HAS ASKED FONSEC SHAHNAVAZ ABOUT POSSIBILITY OF ZAHER SHAH'S OR ABDUL WALI'S BEING PERMITTED TO ESTABLISH A BASE IN PAKISTAN. SHAHNAVAZ' RESPONSE WAS "PERHAPS A LITTLE LATER, BUT NOT NOW." SHAHNAVAZ ALLEGEDLY TOLD ASEFI THAT SOVIETS HAVE MADE DEMARCH AT MFA OPPOSING GOP'S PERMITTING AFGHAN ROYAL FAMILY TO TAKE UP RESIDENCE HERE.

6. WHEN ASKED ABOUT FOREIGN SUPPORT FOR DISSIDENT GROUPS ASEFI SAID THE PRC, UAE, AND SAUDIS HAVE ALL PROMISED ASSISTANCE BUT HAVE YET TO DELIVER. AS SOON AS COMMUNIQUE OF ASSOCIATION OF GROUPS IS ISSUED, ASEFI PLANS TO VISIT UAE AND SAUDI ARABIA TO FOLLOW-UP PROMISES. HE THEN PLANS TO RETURN TO PARIS VIA ROME TO DELIVER APPEALS TO ZAHER SHAH AND ABDUL WALI. THERE IS POSSIBILITY HE MAY BE ABLE ALSO TO ARRANGE STOP IN IRAN, AS HAZARA COMMUNITY IN PAKISTAN HAS OFFERED PUT HIM IN TOUCH WITH AYATOLLAH KHOMHEINI TO ELICIT ASSISTANCE FROM THAT QUARTER.

7. ASEFI SAYS GROUPS IN PESHAWAR TEND TO DOUBT SOVIETS WOULD, IN ANY CIRCUMSTANCES, OCCUPY AFGHANISTAN TO SAVE KHALQI GOVERNMENT. HE SAYS FIRST MOVE AFTER UNIFYING MAJOR GROUPS WILL BE TO CONTACT SOVIETS ON SOME NATURAL "TURF" AND ESTABLISH RELATIONSHIP BASED ON REALITIES OF THE SITUATION, I.E. THAT NO REGIME IN KABUL CAN EXIST WITHOUT GOOD RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION. THESE INTENTIONS CANNOT BE MENTIONED AT THIS TIME, ASEFI CONTENDS, OR THE SUPER-RELIGIOUS WOULD MISUNDERSTAND AND UNITY WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE.

8. PURPORTEDLY REFLECTING VIEWS OF SYED AHMED GAILANI AND OTHER LEADERS IN PESHAWAR AREA, ASEFI WARNED EMBOFF THAT ANCIT ZIA NASSERY IS "PROBABLY A DOUBLE AGENT." ASEFI CLAIMS ZIA NASSERY MET WITH HAFIZULLAH AMIN AT UN LAST YEAR SHORTLY THEREAFTER VISITED KABUL. HE THEN APPEARED IN PESHAWAR AND ALLIED HIMSELF WITH GAILANI AFTER BEING REPULSED ANLF LEADER, MOJEDEDI. GAILANI NOW REGRETS BEFRIENDING ZIA NASSERY AND WANTS IT UNDER STOOD THERE IS NO RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN HIM AND THE AMERICAN, ACCORDING TO ASEFI.

9. ASEFI REPORTED THAT DISSIDENT FORCES HAVE NOT SHOT DOWN THREE DRA MIG AIRCRAFT. THE FIRST AT WOZA IN THE ZADRAN AREA OF PAKTIA ON APRIL 25; THE SECOND NEAR PACHAR OGAN (SIC) VILLAGE PAKTIA; AND THE LATEST, ON MAY 9 NEAR KHOWST IN PAKTIA. HE DID NOT SPECIFY HOW AIRCRAFT HAD BEEN SHOT DOWN BUT LEFT WITH EMBOFF--ON LOAN-- SEVERAL REMNANTS OF THE AIRCRAFT, INCLUDING FIVE MARKINGS PLATES TORN OFF THE FIRST MIG, AS WELL AS PHOTOS OF THE AIRCRAFT. COPIES BEING POUCHED TO LONGETEIG C/O INR/RNA/SOA FOR INTERESTED WASHINGTON CONSUMERS.

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SECRET SECTION 41 OF 23 MOSCOW 13083

E.O. 12958: RDS-3 5/21/99 (TOON, MALCOLM) OR-M  
 TAGS: AF, UP, \*CPS, \*PFR, PINT  
 SUBJECT: (C) AFGHANISTAN: PROSPECTS FOR SOVIET INTERVENTION

REF: (A) KABUL 2626, (B) MOSCOW 8584

1. (C) SUMMARY. WE DO NOT THINK THAT THE SOVIET UNION UNDER PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES VIEWS ITS OPTIONS IN AFGHANISTAN AS OPEN-ENDED. IN OUR OPINION, ANALOGIES WITH THE 1968 SOVIET INVASION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA ARE FAULTY. WE THINK THE SOVIETS WILL CONTINUE TO INCREASE THEIR ADVISORY AND LOGISTICAL MILITARY SUPPORT FOR THE PRO-SOVIET KABUL REGIME. SOME SOVIET PERSONNEL MAY BECOME INVOLVED IN BRA MILITARY OPERATIONS. UNDER FORESEEABLE CIRCUMSTANCES, HOWEVER, MOSCOW WILL PROBABLY AVOID SHOULDERING A SUBSTANTIAL PART OF THE ANTI-INSURGENT COMBAT BURDEN IN AFGHANISTAN. -END/SUMMARY.

24 May 1979

AGREES WITH THE MAIN TENETS OF KABUL'S ANALYSIS IN PARTICULAR WITH THE CONCLUSION THAT THE SOVIETS ABLY ATTEMPT TO AVOID PLUNGING INTO WHAT WOULD BECOME A VIETNAM-TYPE TRAP. IN FACT, WE WOULD GO FURTHER IN DOWNPLAYING THE VALIDITY OF THE CZECH AS MENTIONED REFS 5. IN OUR OPINION THE SOVIETS UNDER FORESEEABLE CIRCUMSTANCES GIVE SERIOUS CONSIDERATION TO THE LARGE-SCALE DISPATCH OF COMBAT UNITS IN THE CASE OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA INVOLVED SOME 14 DIVISIONS PLUS FOUR DIVISIONS FROM OTHER WARSAW PACT STATES TO SAVE THE KHALQI REGIME FROM BEING OVER-

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OUR CONCLUSION IS BASED ON SEVERAL PREMISES:

STRATEGICALLY, AFGHANISTAN IS IN AN ENTIRELY DIFFERENT CATEGORY FROM CZECHOSLOVAKIA. CZECHOSLOVAKIA SITS ASTRIDE NEAR-HISTORIC INVASION CORRIDORS INTO RUSSIA/THE SOVIET UNION. IT IS A MEMBER OF THE "SOCIALIST COMMONWEALTH", THE "WORLD SOCIALIST SYSTEM" AS WELL AS THE WARSAW PACT AND CHANGES IN ITS INTERNAL SYSTEM CAN IMPACT DIRECTLY UPON THE USSR'S INTERNAL SYSTEM.

FROM THE MOSCOW PERSPECTIVE, AND ESPECIALLY IN THE UPCOMING MONTHS, A SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN WOULD LIKELY REDOUND TO THE DISADVANTAGE OF GLOBAL STRATEGIC INTERESTS. IT WOULD DEAL A SEVERE BLOW TO DETENTE WITH THE WEST AT A TIME WHEN MOSCOW IS INCREASINGLY PRE-OCCUPIED BY THE GROWING CHINESE THREAT IN THE EAST. SUCH A MOVE WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY DOOM SALT. IT WOULD PROVIDE EXCELLENT (AND, AS IN THE CASE OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, LONG-TERM) JUSTIFICATION FOR CHARGES BY THE CHINESE AND OTHERS OF SOVIET EX-PANSIONIST, HEGEMONIST OBJECTIVES IN THE WORLD. IT WOULD RUIN RELATIONS WITH THE IMPORTANT MUSLIM WORLD.

(C) IN 1968 THE SOVIETS CALCULATED CORRECTLY THAT THE CZECHS WOULD NOT FIGHT. THIS WOULD NOT HAPPEN IN THE CASE OF AFGHANISTAN. FURTHER, THE SOVIET OBJECTIVE IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA WAS EASILY ACCOMPLISHED BY OCCUPYING AND PACIFYING THE URBAN CENTERS. MOSCOW'S TASK WOULD BE MORE DIFFICULT IN AFGHANISTAN WHERE THE GREAT BULK OF THE POPULATION--AND THE RESISTANCE--ARE LOCATED IN RURAL AREAS. IT IS EVEN POSSIBLE THAT THE INSURGENCY IN AFGHANISTAN WOULD RECEIVE ADDED IMPETUS BY

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 RUMJOM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO 2-60  
 RUMJDX/AMEMBASSY DACCA 155  
 RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 1077  
 RUMHQA/CINCPAC HONOLULU HI  
 RUHRCO/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 102  
 RUOMRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 1475  
 RUSBLK/AMEMBASSY KAPUL 1977  
 RUEJYT/AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU 0212  
 RUFHLG/AMCONSUL LENINGRAD 588  
 RUJDTG/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0459  
 RUSBAF/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 1441  
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SECRET SECTION 02 OF 03 MOSCOW 1125Z

THE DIRECT COMMITMENT OF SOVIET TROOPS, AND THE  
 SURVIVABILITY OF THE TAPAKI-AMIN REGIME, ARE INCREASINGLY  
 DEPENDENT ON THE CONTINUING SUPPORT IN COMBAT  
 OF SUCH TROOPS.

(D) NOT IN TERMS OF PREPARING MILITARILY FOR SUCH ACTION, THE SOVIETS WOULD FIND THE AFGHANISTAN SITUATION IN SOME WAYS MORE COMPLICATED THAN THAT THEY CONFRONTED IN JULY AND AUGUST 1968. THE PREPARATION FOR THE CZECHOSLOVAK INVASION WAS EFFECTIVELY COVERED BY LARGE-SCALE COMBAT, COMMAND AND LOGISTICAL EXERCISES IN THE ESTABLISHED FRAMEWORK OF THE WARSAW PACT. THUS THE NECESSARY GROUND WORK OF RECONNAISSANCE, LOGISTICS BASING AND COMMAND AND CONTROL PROCEDURES WAS LAID, AND, MORE IMPORTANTLY, THE REQUIRED MOBILIZATION AND DEPLOYMENT OF FORCES WAS ACCOMPLISHED UNDER THE SCREEN OF COMPARATIVELY ROUTINE MANEUVERS. IT IS DIFFICULT TO CONCEIVE OF AN EFFECTIVE, COMPARABLE "SCREEN" IN THE CASE OF AFGHANISTAN. THE CONCENTRATION OF FORCES NECESSARY FOR A CZECHOSLOVAK-STYLE OPERATION IN AFGHANISTAN WOULD PROBABLY REQUIRE LARGE-SCALE MOBILIZATION AND REDEPLOYMENT OF TROOPS IN THE CONTIGUOUS AREAS, ALTHOUGH TO SOME EXTENT THESE PROBLEMS WOULD BE MITIGATED BY ALSO DEPLOYING AIRBORNE DIVISIONS. STRETCHING THE POINT TO INCLUDE ALL OF THE TWO MILITARY DISTRICTS HAVING SOME COMMON BORDER WITH AFGHANISTAN, THE SOVIETS HAVE ELEVEN DIVISIONS, ONLY THREE OF WHICH CAN BE CONSIDERED READY FOR COMBAT WITHOUT MOBILIZATION. NONE OF THE THREE IS IDEALLY POSITIONED FOR AN AFGHANISTAN MISSION, AND THEY STILL HAVE TO CONSIDER THE CHINESE BORDER WHICH IS THE MAJOR CONSIDERATION OF AT LEAST ONE OF THE MILITARY DISTRICTS.

4. (C) IT IS OF COURSE NOT POSSIBLE AND WOULD BE FOOLISH FOR US TO RULE OUT COMPLETELY THE POSSIBILITY OF A SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN IN RESPONSE TO AN APPEAL FROM A BELEAGUERED KHALQI REGIME. WHILE WE BELIEVE THAT THE DISINCENTIVES IN TERMS OF MOSCOW'S CALCULATION OF ITS BEST INTERESTS AT THIS TIME APPEAR HEAVILY TO OUTWEIGH THE INCENTIVES, THE FACTORS ADVANCED BY KABUL IN PARA 11 REF A ARE STILL COGENT. IF THE POLITICAL-MILITARY SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN CONTINUES TO DETERIORATE, THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP MAY VERY WELL BE TEMPTED TO CONSIDER THE POSSIBILITY OF SOME LESSER FORM OF DIRECT INTERVENTION TO PROTECT ITS OVERALL INVESTMENT IN AFGHANISTAN. FOR THIS REASON IT IS IN OUR INTEREST TO CONTINUE TO GIVE OCCASIONAL REMINDERS TO THE SOVIETS OF THE SERIOUS VIEW WE WOULD TAKE OF ANY SUCH ACTIONS. REMINDERS FROM WESTERN AND THIRD-WORLD GOVERNMENTS CONSTITUTE IN THEMSELVES DISINCENTIVES TO DIRECT INTERVENTION.

5. (C) SHORT OF DIRECT, LARGE-SCALE SOVIET MILITARY INTERVENTION, WHAT IS THE LIKELY NATURE AND SCOPE OF SOVIET MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO AFGHANISTAN? THE AFGHAN MILITARY'S ABSORPTIVE CAPACITY MAY WELL BE THE ONLY LIMITATION AT THIS TIME ON HOW FAR THE SOVIETS ARE WILLING TO GO. WE BELIEVE THE NUMBER OF SOVIET ADVISERS COULD PROGRESSIVELY INCREASE, AND SOME COULD BECOME INVOLVED IN MILITARY OPERATIONS. SOME SOVIET FIRE SUPPORT COULD BE PROVIDED, FOR EXAMPLE, IN THE FORM OF HELICOPTER GUNSHIP OR TACTICAL AIR SUPPORT FOR GROUND OPERATIONS, OR THE EMPLOYMENT OF SOVIET PERSONNEL TO OPERATE SOPHISTICATED MILITARY EQUIPMENT. THIS WOULD ALL BE IN THE CONTEXT, HOWEVER, OF AFGHAN AND NOT SOVIET TROOPS SHOULDERING THE COMBAT BURDEN IN A SITUATION WHERE THE DEAF'S OWN CAPABILITIES TO SURVIVE AND EXPAND ITS CONTROL --AND NOT MOSCOW'S DIRECT INTERVENTION-- WILL BE THE CHIEF DETERMINANTS OF THE DESTINY OF THE AFGHAN

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RUMJHT/AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU 0213  
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SECRET SECTION 03 OF 03 MOSCOW 13083

"REVOLUTION".

6. (C) FINALLY, RE PARA 11 REF A WE DO NOT CONSIDER THAT CONCERN ABOUT THE MUSLIM POPULATION OF THE SOVIET CENTRAL ASIAN REPUBLICS BY ITSELF WOULD BE AN IMPORTANT INCENTIVE FOR THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP TO ADOPT AN INTERVENTIONIST COURSE IN AFGHANISTAN. ALL THE INFORMATION WE HAVE BEEN ABLE TO GATHER ABOUT THIS REGION INDICATES THAT MOSCOW HAS THE SITUATION WELL UNDER CONTROL. FREQUENT VISITS BY EMBASSY OFFICERS TO SOVIET CENTRAL ASIA IN RECENT MONTHS HAVE UNCOVERED FEW SIGNS OF DISCONTENT. THE CENTRAL ASIAN REPUBLICS HAVE MADE SIGNIFICANT SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC PROGRESS UNDER SOVIET RULE AND ENJOY A SIGNIFICANTLY HIGHER STANDARD OF LIVING THAN IN NEIGHBORING AREAS OF AFGHANISTAN AND IRAN. AND, SHOULD DISCONTENT NONETHELESS SURFACE IN THE COMING MONTHS, THE SOVIETS CAN BE COUNTED ON TO MOVE QUICKLY AND EFFECTIVELY TO CRUSH IT. TOON

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 ISLAMABAD 7075

FOL TEL DATED 21 JUN 79 SENT ACTION ISLAMABAD INFO LAHORE PESHAWAR  
REPEATED FOR YOUR INFO QUOTE:

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 KARACHI 3027

EO 12065: RDS-4 6/20/99 (BRIMS, JS) OR-P  
TAGS: SREF PK AF PINT  
SUBJ: (C) LAW AND ORDER IN BALUCHISTAN - GROWING CONCERN AND  
TENSION OVER AFGHANISTAN

REF: ISLAMABAD A-113, ISLAMABAD 4208

1. (C) - ENTIRE TEXT

2. SUMMARY. THE RECENT TIDE OF AFGHAN REFUGEES SWEEPING INTO  
BALUCHISTAN HAS HEIGHTENED CONCERN THERE OVER THE CONFLICT  
ACROSS THE BORDER. DEBATE OVER WHAT THE MARTIAL LAW  
ADMINISTRATION IS DOING AND SHOULD DO VIS-A-VIS AFGHANISTAN  
REFLECTS AND EXACERBATES DIVISIONS WITHIN THE PROVINCE AND  
BETWEEN THE PROVINCE AND THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT. IN THIS  
DEBATE, THE REFUGEES THEMSELVES ARE BECOMING AN ISSUE.  
ODDS THAT TENSION IN AFGHANISTAN WILL SPARK VIOLENCE  
IN BALUCHISTAN MAY INCREASE WHEN THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN  
BEGINS. MUCH COULD DEPEND ON HOW THE US COMMITMENT TO  
PAKISTAN IS PERCEIVED.

A MULTIPLIER EFFECT

3. FIVE MONTHS BEFORE NATIONAL ELECTIONS, OUR TALKS  
WITH RESIDENTS OF BALUCHISTAN SHOW THEM MORE PREOCCUPIED  
BY THE SPILLOVER FROM AFGHANISTAN THAN BY THE PROSPECT  
OF GOING TO THE POLLS. THE EVENTS ACROSS THE BORDER ARE  
REAL AND IMMEDIATE WHEREAS THE ELECTIONS NOVEMBER 17 ARE  
A MUCH-DOUBTED PROMISE. BEHIND PEOPLE'S CONCERN IS THE  
BELIEF THAT PAKISTANI INVOLVEMENT IN AFGHANISTAN CAN  
HAVE A MULTIPLIER EFFECT ON BALUCHISTAN BECAUSE OF THE  
PROVINCE'S INTERNAL INSTABILITY.

THE TIDE OF REFUGEES

4. UNTIL THIS SPRING, THE TIDE OF REFUGEES FROM NORTH  
AND WEST OF THE DURAND LINE FLOWED INTO THE NORTHWEST  
FRONTIER PROVINCE. THEN, IN APRIL OR MAY, THE EFFLUX  
FROM AFGHANISTAN BEGAN A SECOND CHANNEL TO THE SOUTH,  
PERHAPS REFLECTING A GEOGRAPHIC SHIFT IN THE FIGHTING IN  
THE BORDER AREA. ON ONE DAY A WAVE OF AS MANY AS 12,000  
PERSONS REPORTEDLY CAME ACROSS INTO BALUCHISTAN. THE  
CHIEF SECRETARY OF THE PROVINCE ASSERTS THAT BALUCHISTAN  
AND THE FRONTIER NOW SHARE ABOUT EQUALLY A TOTAL OF  
100,000 REFUGEES. OTHERS ESTIMATE A LOWER BUT STILL  
SUBSTANTIAL FIGURE FOR BALUCHISTAN.

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5. THE UPSURGE OF AFGHAN REFUGEES HAS COINCIDED WITH INCREASING CLEAVAGES OVER THE GOVERNMENT'S ROLE IN DEALING WITH THE INSURGENCY. PERCEPTIONS DIFFER OF WHAT ISLAMABAD IS DOING AND WHAT IT SHOULD DO. THE DEBATE BOTH REFLECTS AND EXACERBATES DIVISIONS WITHIN THE PROVINCE AND BETWEEN THE PROVINCE AND THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT.

#### DIFFERENCE OF OPINIONS

6. THE DIFFERENCE OF OPINIONS APPEARS TO FOLLOW A LEFT-RIGHT PATTERN. MEMBERS OF THE PAKISTAN PEOPLE'S PARTY AND THE PAKISTAN NATIONAL PARTY, ON THE "PROGRESSIVE" END OF THE POLITICAL SPECTRUM, BELIEVE THAT THE MARTIAL LAW ADMINISTRATION IS AIDING THE MUJAHIDS IN THEIR FIGHT TO OVERTHROW THE REGIME IN KABUL. AN URBANE FORMER PROVINCIAL MINISTER FOR THE PPP SAID THAT, IF THE MLA IS SERIOUS IN ITS DENIALS OF SUPPORT FOR THE INSURGENTS, IT SHOULD SEAL THE BORDER. HE ARGUED THAT THE GOVERNMENT COULD MOVE THE REFUGEE CAMPS INLAND AS FAR AS PUNJAB OR SIND TO PREVENT THEIR CONTINUING TO BE A POTENTIAL SOURCE OF PROVOCATION TO KABUL. THE OPPOSITE POINT OF VIEW, THAT THE MLA IS HELPING THE MUJAHIDS BUT SHOULD DO MORE, GENERALLY COMES FROM MEMBERS OF THE PAKISTAN NATIONAL ALLIANCE AND OTHER CONSERVATIVE PARTIES. FOR EXAMPLE, THE PERSONAL ASSISTANT TO TEHRIK-E-ISTIQLAL PRESIDENT ASGHAR KHAN ASKED US WHY THE US CIA HAS NOT ENGINEERED A COUP D'ETAT AGAINST TARAKI.

#### DIVISIONS--HISTORICAL . . .

7. SOME OF THE DIVISIONS REFLECTED AND EXACERBATED BY AFGHANISTAN ARE HISTORICAL. ALTHOUGH WE HAVE YET TO MEET AN ADVOCATE OF GREATER BALUCHISTAN WHO WILL CONFESS HIS VIEWS TO US DIRECTLY, FORMER GOVERNOR OF BALUCHISTAN AKZAR KHAN BUGTI AND OTHERS TOLD US THAT A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF BALUCHIS STILL HARBOR AMBITIONS TO UNITE THE BALUCHI PROVINCES OF IRAN, AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN INTO A SINGLE NATION, POSSIBLE INCLUDING SIND. BUGTI SAID THAT THESE PEOPLE BELIEVE THE AFGHAN REVOLUTION HAS STRENGTHENED THEIR CAUSE, THAT THEY LOOK TO THE TARAKI REGIME AND THE SOVIETS FOR SUPPORT, OVERT OR COVERT, AND THAT THEY MIGHT TAKE ADVANTAGE OF POLITICAL DISTURBANCES WITHIN PAKISTAN TO BEGIN AN OPEN STRUGGLE AGAINST THE MLA. OTHER BALUCHIS, WHO SEEK GREATER AUTONOMY FOR BALUCHISTAN WITHIN PAKISTAN BY CONSTITUTIONAL MEANS, HAVE TOLD US THAT PAKISTAN MARTIAL LAW ADMINISTRATION SUPPORT FOR THE AFGHAN INSURGENTS MAY ALREADY HAVE STIMULATED RETALIATORY SOVIET DABBLING IN BALUCHISTAN. NOT A FEW GO SO FAR AS TO ENVISION THE PROVINCE BECOMING A BATTLEGROUND FOR THE SUPER POWERS. SINCE ILLOGIC AND EGOCENTRISM ARE STRONG, THESE PERSONS SHOW LITTLE INCLINATION TO QUESTION THEIR DOOMSDAY VISIONS OF SOVIET TANKS AND INFANTRY DIVISIONS BEARING DOWN ON QUETTA IN A RACE TO THE "HOT WATER PORTS."

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FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD  
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3537  
INFO RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 961  
RUSBLK/AMEMBASSY KABUL 9352  
RUMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 5285  
RUMRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 780  
BT

25 JUN 79 07 22z

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 ISLAMABAD 7075

... SOCIOLOGICAL...

8. OTHER DIVISIONS ARE SOCIOLOGICAL. BALUCHISTAN REMAINS LARGELY A TRIBAL SOCIETY BUT ONE THAT IS BEING THREATENED BY CHANGE. ON THE ONE HAND WE TALKED TO TRIBAL LEADERS WHO SAID THAT THE FIGHTING IN AFGHANISTAN IS A CRUSADE TO PRESERVE ISLAM AND A WAY OF LIFE, ON THE OTHER TO PERSONS WHO REBELLED AGAINST THE UNJUST RULE OF TRIBAL LEADERS AND PRAISED THE TARAKI GOVERNMENT'S EFFORTS TO DO AWAY WITH THE WORST FEATURES OF THE TRIBAL SYSTEM IN AFGHANISTAN. CLEARLY, PEOPLE OF BALUCHISTAN APPEAR TO BE LINING UP FOR OR AGAINST TARAKI PARTLY ON THE BASIS OF THEIR ATTITUDES TOWARD THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF BALUCHISTAN.

...AND ETHNIC

9. ALTHOUGH OUR EVIDENCE IS SKETCHY, WE BELIEVE FROM TALKS IN KARACHI AND QUETTA THAT DESPITE CROSS CURRENTS THE AFGHAN REVOLUTION, ADDITIONALLY, MAY BE DIVIDING THE ETHNIC BALUCHIS AND PATHANS. THE RIVALRY BETWEEN THESE TWO LARGEST GROUPS OF THE PROVINCE SURFACED CONSTANTLY IN CONVERSATIONS. WE DISCERNED A GREATER DEGREE OF SUPPORT FOR TARAKI AMONG THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE ROUGHLY 50 PERCENT BALUCH POPULATION THAN AMONG THOSE OF THE APPROXIMATELY 40 PERCENT PATHAN. INTERESTINGLY, THE HEAVIEST CONCENTRATION OF REFUGEES IS IN THE NORTHERN DISTRICTS, WHERE THE PATHANS ARE IN THE MAJORITY. TO CROSS DIRECTLY INTO THE AREAS WHERE BALUCHIS PREDOMINATE THE REFUGEES WOULD HAVE TO TRAVERSE A VIRTUALLY IMPASSABLE DESERT.

GOVERNMENT CAUTION

10. THE GOVERNMENT APPEARS TO BE AWARE THAT IT MUST WALK A TIGHTROPE IN DEALING PUBLICLY WITH THE INSURGENCY IN AFGHANISTAN. IN TWO MEETINGS WITH US, FORMER FEDERAL MINISTER FOR LOCAL BODIES KHAN MOHAMMED ZAMAN KHAN ACHAKZAI PRAISED THE "CORRECT" WAY IN WHICH THE MLA HAS ACTED. HE EMPHASIZED THAT HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO THE REFUGEES IN THE LIMIT OF THE GOVERNMENT'S INVOLVEMENT. MANY OPPONENTS OF THE MLA, HOWEVER, TOLD US THEY ARE NOT SO SURE. THEY BELIEVE THAT PRESIDENT ZIA-UL-HAQ, THE SON OF A MAULVI, IS IDEOLOGICALLY MOTIVATED TO FAVOR THE ISLAMIC REBELS, AND THAT THE PAKISTAN ARMY CANNOT SIT ON ITS HANDS WHILE AN OPPORTUNITY EXISTS TO ELIMINATE A HOSTILE NEIGHBORING REGIME.

THE REFUGEES AS AN ISSUE

11. THE REFUGEES THEMSELVES ARE BECOMING AN ISSUE IN THE GOVERNMENT'S RELATIONS WITH THE PEOPLE OF BALUCHISTAN. ALTHOUGH CAMPS EXIST FOR THEM, MANY AFGHANS LIVE OUTSIDE THEIR CONFINES. ALL MUST HAVE TO HAVE SPACE TO GRAZE, AND THE REFUGEES HAVE BROUGHT WITH THEM ALMOST THE NUMBER OF CAMELS, SHEEP, GOATS AND DONKEYS AS THERE ARE OF THEMSELVES. THE DISPERSION OUTSIDE CAMPS MAKES IT DIFFICULT FOR THE GOVERNMENT TO EXERCISE CONTROL AND CREATES SUSPICIONS THAT THE GOVERNMENT DOES NOT WISH TO DO SO. IT IS ALSO CREATING TENSION BETWEEN THE AFGHANS AND PAKISTANIS OVER GRAZING RIGHTS. EVEN WITH

ITS NORMAL POPULATION, THE LAND IS BARELY CAPABLE OF SUSTENTANCE. SO FAR THE HOSPITALITY OF THE NATIVES HAS OVERCOME THE IRRITATIONS. BUT IF THE NUMBER OF REFUGEES CONTINUES TO SWELL AND THEIR STAY LOOKS TO BECOME PERMANENT, THE GOVERNMENT WILL HAVE TO DEVISE POLICIES TO SETTLE THEM OVER A WIDER AREA.

**ELECTION VIOLENCE.**

12. THE ODDS THAT AFGHANISTAN WILL BE THE SPARK FOR VIOLENT TROUBLES IN BALUCHISTAN MAY SHORTEN WITH THE BEGINNING OF THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN. IN A DISCUSSION WITH US, THE PROVINCIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL OF POLICE MADE NO SECRET OF HIS BELIEF THAT LAW AND ORDER WOULD BE BETTER PRESERVED WERE THE ELECTIONS TO BE POSTPONED. RECENT STATEMENTS BY THE BALUCHI NATIONALIST LEADER OF THE PAKISTAN NATIONAL PARTY, MIR GHOUS BUX BIZENJO, SUGGEST THE TYPE OF RHETORIC THAT COULD INFLAME PASSIONS. AT THE PNP'S CONVENTION IN KARACHI JUNE 1, BIZENJO REPORTEDLY SAID THAT THE PROGRESSIVES AND DEMOCRATS OF PAKISTAN WILL RISE TO DEFEND THE REVOLUTION OF THE AFGHAN PEOPLE IF THE COUNTERREVOLUTIONARIES WILL NOT DESIST FROM THEIR ACTIVITIES. KHAIR BUX MARRI, THE LEADER OF THE IMPORTANT MARRI TRIBE, WHO IS SAID TO CONSIDER HIMSELF THE CHE GUEVARA OF BALUCHISTAN, IS A POTENTIAL LEADER OF A GUERRILLA-STYLE INSURGENCY. ECONOMIC DISSATISFACTION IN THE PROVINCE COULD CREAT CONDITIONS FAVORABLE TO DISTURBANCES. TO DATE, HOWEVER, THE PROVINCE IS QUIET.

**THE US**

13. WHETHER BALUCHISTAN ERUPTS COULD DEPEND ON THE TROUBLEMAKERS' PERCEPTION OF THE STRENGTH OF THE US COMMITMENT TO PAKISTAN. THE BELIEF THAT THE US HAS ABANDONED PAKISTAN EMBOLDENS SOME, POSSIBLY INCLUDING BIZENJO, WHO THINK THEIR BEST INTEREST LIE IN MAKING AN ACCOMMODATION NOW WITH THE SOVIET UNION. UNFORTUNATELY, MOST OF THOSE WE TALK TO FROM BALUCHISTAN EXPRESS THE OPINION THAT THE US HAS DESERTED HER FRIENDS. THE REASONS ADVANCED INCLUDE THE STANDARD REFERENCES TO LACK OF US SUPPORT FOR PAKISTAN IN 1965 AND 1971, AND US FAILURE TO STAND UP TO THE SOVIETS IN ANGOLA, ETHIOPIA AND AFGHANISTAN, US "OPPOSITION" TO THE MUSLIM WORLD AND THE US CUT-OFF OF AID TO PAKISTAN.

14. DESPITE THE CRITICISM, MUCH GOOD WILL TOWARD THE US REMAINS. IMPORTANT SEGMENTS OF BALUCHISTAN SOCIETY PREFER TO RETAIN GOOD RELATIONS WITH THE US. THESE INCLUDE GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS (ADMITTEDLY MOSTLY PUNJABI), BUSINESS PEOPLE AND MANY TRIBAL LEADERS. ALTHOUGH HIGHLY CRITICAL OF RECENT AMERICAN ACTIONS, THEY CONTINUE TO HOPE THAT THE US WILL COME TO PAKISTAN'S ASSISTANCE IN THE EVENT OF SOVIET-INSPIRED SUBVERSION OR ATTACK. THE DIFFICULT TASK WE FACE IS TO PUBLICIZE TO THESE PERSONS AS WELL AS TO POTENTIAL QUISLINGS THAT THE US REMAINS COMMITTED TO PAKISTAN'S TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY, INDEPENDENCE AND STABILITY WITHOUT IDENTIFYING OURSELVES WITH THE UNPOPULAR MLA. THIS TASK IS BOTH COMPLICATED AND HELPED BY THE ZIA GOVERNMENT'S EFFORTS TO SHOW THE PUBLIC ITS ARMS-LENGTH STANCE TOWARD THE US WHILE IT NEGOTIATES ENTRY INTO THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT; COMPLICATED BECAUSE WE OFTEN FIND OUR GESTURES OF SUPPORT REJECTED BY THE MLA, AND HELPED BECAUSE ZIA'S TROUBLED RELATIONS WITH THE US ARE SEIZED ON AS EVIDENCE THAT THE US FAVORS AN ALTERNATIVE REGIME. MOST DAMAGING IN THE LONG RUN WOULD BE OUR FAILURE TO COME TO THE AID OF PAKISTAN IN A SITUATION WHICH WE HAVE INDICATED WOULD ENGAGE OUR PLEDGE UNDER THE 1959 BILATERAL PACT. SUCH US INACTION COULD RESULT WERE PAKISTAN NOT TO HAVE CLEAN HANDS. UNQUOTE

KING



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FM AMEMBASSY KABUL  
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4449  
INFO RUS300/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 0041  
RUEKGO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1693  
RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 5906  
RUCMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 256  
BT  
C O N F I D E N T I A L KABUL 4888

25 JUN 79 11 29z

Pol  
CHG  
Econ  
RF  
CHRON

E.O. 12065: GDS 6/25/75 (AMSTUTZ, J. BRUCE) OR/N -  
TAGS: PINT, UR, AF, PINT  
SUBJECT: (C) MEETING WITH SOVIET DIPLOMAT: PART I OF III -  
OBSERVATIONS ON THE INTERNAL AFGHAN POLITICAL SCENE

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT)
2. SUMMARY: HIGH SOVIET EMBASSY OFFICIAL DISCLOSES SOVIETS HAVE BEEN URGING DRA TO ESTABLISH A "NATIONAL FRONT" TO RECAPTURE BASE OF THE GOVT - BUT SO FAR WITHOUT SUCCESS. THE DIPLOMAT DESCRIBED THE INSURGENCY AS CONFUSING. END SUMMARY.
3. THE NEW SOVIET MINISTER-COUNSELOR, VASILY STEPANOVICH SAFRONCHUK, PAID ME AN HOUR-LONG COURTESY CALL JUNE 24. UNQUESTIONABLY THE MOST INTERESTING SOVIET DIPLOMAT I HAVE EVER MET, I FOUND HIS OPENESS FASCINATING, ESPECIALLY FOR WHAT HE HAD TO SAY ABOUT THE INTERNAL AFGHAN POLITICAL SCENE AND SOVIET-AFGHAN POLICY (SEPTEL, PART II).
4. FROM HIS REMARKS, SOME OF WHICH WERE VEILED AND SOME NOT AT ALL, IT WAS CLEAR THAT THE SOVIET EMBASSY FINDS THE AFGHANISTAN SITUATION VERY "DIFFICULT". SOME OF SAFRONCHUK'S MORE INTERESTING COMMENTS I PRESENT BELOW:

5. THE NARROW POLITICAL BASE OF THE DRA. WHEN I MENTIONED THAT THERE WERE REPORTS CIRCULATING THAT THE DRA LEADERSHIP WAS TALKING WITH FORMER PRIME MINISTER'S ETEMADI AND YOUSEF ABOUT JOINING THE GOVT SO AS TO BROADEN ITS POLITICAL BASE, AND THAT THE SOVIETS WERE PLAYING SOME ROLE IN THIS, SAFRONCHUK SHOOK HIS HEAD. "WHAT IS TRUE," HE CONFIDED, "IS THAT WE HAVE BEEN URGING THE DRA LEADERSHIP TO BROADEN ITS BASE BY BRINGING IN NEW PEOPLE INTO THE GOVT, BUT WHAT IS NOT TRUE IS THAT WE HAVE BEEN HOLDING DISCUSSIONS WITH YOUSEF OR ETEMADI." CONTINUING, HE SAID, "ESTABLISHING A NATIONAL FRONT, LIKE OTHER COUNTRIES HAVE DONE, WOULD BE SENSIBLE FOR THEM." SAFRONCHUK COMPLAINED HOWEVER THAT: "THEY (DRA) WILL NEITHER ALLOW ANY OPPOSITION, OR DO THEY WISH TO SHARE POWER. THEIR IDEA ABOUT BROADENING THE POLITICAL BASE IS SOLELY TO ORGANIZE STUDENT, YOUTH, WOMEN AND WORKERS ORGANIZATIONS, BUT THOSE ARE ALL PART OF THE SAME POLITICAL PARTY. THIS IS NOT BROADENING THE POLITICAL BASE." HE REMARKED, "THEY (DRA) ARE VERY SENSITIVE ABOUT ANY SUGGESTION OF SHARING POWER. THEY ARE STUBBORN PEOPLE."

6. REFLECTING ON THE PROBLEMS FACING THE DRA, HE SAID ONE NOTABLE WEAKNESS (AND HE KEPT RETURNING TO THIS POINT) WAS THE "VIRTUAL ABSENCE OF INTELLECTUALS IN THE GOVT." HE SAID: "YOU SEE THIS ABSENCE IN MANY WAYS. THE NEWSPAPERS ARE TERRIBLE, AND THE CULTURAL LIFE IS BARREN." IT WAS IMPORTANT FOR THE GOVT, SAFRONCHUK SAID, TO ATTRACT TO ITSELF "MORE INTELLECTUALS."

7. THE INSURGENCY - SAFRONCHUK SAID HIS EMBASSY FINDS THE INSURGENCY "VERY CONFUSING". THEY CANNOT IDENTIFY ANY SINGLE REBEL LEADER WHO DOMINATES THE OPPOSITION SUCH AS KHOMEINI OR HO CHI MIN DID IN THEIR COUNTRIES. HIS EMBASSY DOES BELIEVE THAT THE IRANIAN AND PAKISTANI GOVTS ARE ABETTING THE REBELS, THE IRANIANS BY PUBLIC STATEMENTS AND RADIO BROADCASTS, AND THE PAKISTANIS BY CLANDESTINELY SUPPLYING ARMS AND MATERIAL SUPPORT. HE BLAMED RELIGION (-ISLAM, IT IS A TERRIBLE RELIGION) AS THE SINGLE MOST IMPORTANT REASON FOR THE INSURGENCY. THE POPULACE, HE SAID, ASSUMES "COMMUNISTS ARE AGAINST ISLAM," AND THIS HE OBSERVED MAKES THE DRA'S TASK VERY DIFFICULT.

Gen!

8. WHEN, AT ONE POINT, I TOLD HIM THE US GOVT WAS NOT AIDING THE INSURGENTS, THAT WE HAVE SEVERAL TIMES TOLD THE DRA THIS, AND THAT I WAS CONSEQUENTLY UPSET BY THE REPEATED PICTURE CAPTIONS IN THE DRA PRESS THIS PAST WEEK, IMPLYING THAT THE SHOWN "CAPTURED" WEAPONS ORIGINATED WITH THE USA (AND CHINA), HE HAD THIS TO SAY. "IN MY MANY CONVERSATIONS WITH TOP LEVEL DRA MINISTERS AND DEPUTY MINISTERS," HE SAID, "NOT ONCE HAVE I HEARD THE US ACCUSED AS ASSISTING THE INSURGENCY". WHEN I POINTED OUT THAT MOST OF THE FOREIGN MILITARY WEAPONS IN PAKISTAN WERE OF US OR CHINESE ORIGIN, AND THUS IT WAS UNDERSTANDABLE FOR THE INSURGENTS ALONG THE PAK FRONTIER TO HAVE SUCH WEAPONS, HE SAID THAT THE DRA LEADERSHIP "KNOWS THIS". RETURNING TO AFGHAN-US RELATIONS, SAFRONCHUK SAID THAT, "THE MAIN DRA COMPLAINT ABOUT THE USA IS NOT ABOUT YOUR GIVING ARMS BUT ABOUT YOUR VERY CRITICAL PRESS."

*No concern about US aid + rebel*

9. THE TIME TO EVACUATE WOMEN AND CHILDREN HAS NOT COME. I TOLD SAFRONCHUK THAT ONE OF MY GNAWING CONCERNS WAS WHEN AND IF TO EVACUATE AMERICAN DEPENDENTS. INCIDENTS LIKE THE JUNE 23 OUTBREAK IN KABUL, I SAID, COMPELLED OUR EMBASSY TO ADDRESS THE QUESTION. SAFRONCHUK RESPONDED THAT, WHILE HE HIMSELF DID NOT HAVE TO WORRY ABOUT THIS KIND OF QUESTION ("THIS IS THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE AMBASSADOR AND THE OTHER MINISTER-COUNSELOR"), HE SAID HE COULD UNDERSTAND MY WORRY. "WHO KNOWS," HE SAID, "WHAT NEXT WEEK OR NEXT MONTH WILL BRING?" AS FOR WHAT HIS EMBASSY HAD DONE, HE SAID IT HAD EVACUATED TO THE USSR "ALL WOMEN AND CHILDREN OF SOVIETS WORKING OUTSIDE KABUL." AS FOR THOSE IN KABUL, HE SAID, ALL THE DEPENDENTS WERE STILL HERE. "WHEN THERE IS TROUBLE, LIKE YESTERDAY," HE SAID, "WE BRING THEM INSIDE THE EMBASSY COMPOUND FOR SAFETY." HE THOUGHT THE DRA WAS IN CONTROL OF KABUL AND DIDN'T THINK THE SECURITY SITUATION IN THE CITY REQUIRED AN EVACUATION.

*SV evacuated non-Kabul dependents!*

10. BIO DATA. FOR A SOVIET DIPLOMAT, SAFRONCHUK IS EXTRA-ORDINARILY OPEN. HE IS WILLING TO ANSWER QUESTIONS, AND HE STRUCK ME AS BOTH INTELLIGENT AND A MAN YOU CAN REASON WITH. WITHIN THE HIERARCHY OF THE SOVIET EMBASSY, HE DESCRIBED HIMSELF AS "PROFESSIONALLY" HAVING THE RANK OF "AMBASSADOR," BUT PROTOCOL-WISE WAS HERE RANKED ONLY AS NO.3. THIS WAS BECAUSE THE OTHER MINISTER-COUNSELOR, YURIY K. ALEXEEV, HAD PRECEDED HIM TO KABUL, AND SINCE HE ARRIVED (FIRST, 771-3 2- 53: #, 8: -) 6, 9.2 AFTER AMEASSADOR PUZANOV. AS FOR HIS OWN RESPONSIBILITIES, SAFRONCHUK SAID HE WAS CONCERNED WITH "EXTERNAL QUESTIONS" WHILE ALEXEEV WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR "INTERNAL QUESTIONS." WHAT HE MEANT BY THIS WAS NOT CLEAR, BUT LATER HE REFERRED TO ALEXEEV'S FIELD AS "AMINISSTRATION."

AMST UTZ  
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*Safronchuk's role = external 9/15*



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PP RUEKHE  
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P R 25 2542Z JUN 79  
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL  
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4450  
INFO RUSBOD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 8942  
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1694  
RUS2AE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 6987  
RUQMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 0267  
BT

25 JUN 79 12 11z

C O N F I D E N T I A L KABUL 4889

E.O. 12065: GDS 6/25/85 (AMSTUTZ, J. BRUCE) OR-M  
TAGS: PINT, UF, AF, PINR  
SUBJ: (C) MEETING WITH SOVIET DIPLOMAT: PART II OF III -  
SOVIET-AFGHAN RELATIONS

Pol  
CHG  
ECON  
RF  
CARON

REF: KABUL 4828

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. SUMMARY. THE MOST INTERESTING COMMENTS SAFRONCHUK MADE DURING OUR MEETING RELATED TO SOVIET-AFGHAN RELATIONS, SPECIFICALLY HIS DENIAL THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD CONSIDER BRINGING IN SOVIET TROOPS TO SAVE THE DRA. SAFRONCHUK QUOTED LENIN AS SAYING, "EVERY REVOLUTION MUST DEFEND ITSELF." END SUMMARY.

3. DURING OUR DISCUSSION OF THE INSURGENCY, I TOLD HIM THAT THERE WAS SPECULATION IN THE DIPLOMATIC CORPS THAT HIS GOVT WOULD, IF NECESSARY, BRING IN TROOPS TO SUPPORT THE DRA. SAFRONCHUK DENIED ANY SUCH INTENTION. HE REFERRED TO BREZHNEV'S JUNE 11 SPEECH IN MOSCOW, IN WHICH THE LATTER SAID, "WE SHALL NOT ABANDON IN TROUBLE OUR FRIENDS - THE AFGHAN PEOPLE," BUT EXPLAINED THAT IN SAYING THAT, "BREZHNEV DID NOT MEAN TO IMPLY THIS INCLUDED MILITARY INTERVENTION." SAFRONCHUK WENT ON TO REPEAT SEVERAL TIMES THAT LENIN HAD SAID, "EVERY REVOLUTION MUST DEFEND ITSELF."

→ see memo  
mark it

4. PURSUING HIS THEME, HE SAID THAT WERE THE SOVIETS TO BRING IN TROOPS, THIS WOULD HAVE BAD REPERCUSSIONS INTERNATIONALLY. HE EXPLAINED, "IT WOULD HARM SALT AND THE POSITION OF THE SOVIET UNION IN THE WORLD," HE THEN ADDED, "QUITE ASIDE FROM INTERNATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS, IT WOULD BE BAD POLICY IN TERMS OF INTERNAL AFGHAN AFFAIRS." I OBSERVED THAT SOVIET TROOPS WOULD HAVE A DIFFICULT TIME IN THIS RUGGED, MOUNTAINOUS COUNTRY. HE NODDED HIS HEAD VIGOROUSLY.

5. ENLARGING ON SOVIET POLICY, HE SAID, "LIKE YOUR COUNTRY, OUR MAIN OBJECTIVE HERE IS TO PROMOTE REGIONAL STABILITY" (HE MUST HAVE STUDIED SOME OF OUR POLICY STATEMENTS). "WHAT WE WISH TO SEE," HE SAID, "IS A PROSPEROUS AND PEACEFUL AFGHANISTAN."

6. WHAT THE COUNTRY NEEDS MORE THAN ANYTHING ELSE, HE CONTINUED, WAS TO ELIMINATE ILLITERACY. IF EVERYBODY COULD BE LITERATE AND ACHIEVE A BASIC EDUCATION, THAT WOULD BE THE BEST THING THAT COULD HAPPEN. THEN HE COMPLAINED, "INSTEAD, THE AFGHANS KEEP ASKING US FOR MORE AND MORE ARMS - NOT FOR MORE HELP IN EDUCATION."

7. IN RESPONSE, I CONFIRMED THAT IT HAD BEEN LONG-STANDING AMERICAN POLICY TOWARDS AFGHANISTAN TO PROMOTE STABILITY IN THE REGION. WE WOULD LIKE TO SEE AFGHANISTAN AT PEACE WITH ALL ITS NEIGHBORS, NOT ONLY WITH THE SOVIET UNION, BUT ALSO WITH IRAN, PAKISTAN AND CHINA. FOR DECADES TOO, WE HAVE HAD A HUMANITARIAN INTEREST HERE, INVESTING ROUGHLY \$20 MILLION PER ANNUM IN THE COUNTRY'S ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT. TO THE EXTENT THE AFGHANS COULD UPLIFE THEMSELVES SOCIALLY AND ECONOMICALLY, WE BELIEVED THIS WOULD PROMOTE STABILITY. SAFRONCHUK AGREED.

8. I ALSO TOLD SAFRONCHUK THAT AS A COROLLARY TO OUR POLICY OF WORKING FOR REGIONAL STABILITY, WE HOPED THAT AFGHANISTAN WOULD NOT BECOME AN AREA OF CONFRONTATION BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES. TO THIS SAFRONCHUK RESPONDED, "I AGREE WITH YOU COMPLETELY." GOING ON, I WARNED HIM, THAT WERE THE SOVIETS TO BRING IN TROOPS INTO AFGHANISTAN, THIS WOULD VERY MUCH COMPLICATE AND HARM SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS. HE NODDED HIS HEAD.

9. COMMENT: I CONSIDER SAFRONCHUK'S REMARKS SIGNIFICANT. I APPRECIATE THAT ONE COULD ARGUE THAT HIS DENIAL OF ANY SOVIET INTENTION TO INTERVENE PHYSICALLY WAS THE ONLY ANSWER A SOVIET DIPLOMAT COULD HAVE BEEN AUTHORIZED TO GIVE TO MY QUESTION, AND FURTHER THAT THE QUOTATION FROM LENIN WAS HYPOCRITICAL IN THE LIGHT OF SOVIET ACTIONS IN EASTERN EUROPE. YET, REFLECTING ON OUR CONVERSATION, I THINK HE GENUINELY BELIEVED WHAT HE WAS TELLING ME, NAMELY THAT SOVIET PHYSICAL INTERVENTION WOULD BE MORE HARMFUL THAN HELPFUL FOR SOVIET INTERESTS, AND THEREFORE IT WOULD NOT OCCUR. AMSTUTZ

BT

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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4655  
INFO RUMJPG/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 611  
RUDKRB/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE 187  
RUFHEB/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 24  
RUFHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN 652  
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 376  
RUMJGM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO 459  
RUSBOD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 8995  
RUQMR/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 333  
RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1672  
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1731  
RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS 3140  
RUDKRP/AMEMBASSY PRAGUE 68  
RUQMR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 311  
RUHQHQA/CINCPAC  
RUSNAAA/CINCEUR  
RUFHNA/USNATO 13  
RUEHOT/USUN 917  
RUEHUB/USINT HAVANA 62

BT  
CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 1 OF 2 KABUL 5246

CINCPAC ALSO FOR POLAD  
CINCEUR ALSO FOR POLAD

E.O. 12065: RDS-1 7/9/99 (FLATIN, BRUCE A.) OR/M  
TAGS: PEPR, EAID, PINT, PORG (NAME), AF, GE, UR, PK  
SUBJECT: (C) PUZZLEMENT OF THE EAST GERMAN AMBASSADOR OVER  
"CONTRADICTIONS" OF THE KHALQI REGIME

REF: KABUL 5146 (NOTAL)

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. AS ANTICIPATED IN THE REFTTEL, DR. HERMANN SCHWIESAU,  
THE AMBASSADOR OF THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC AT KABUL,  
CALLED ON ME JULY 9 TO CHAT ABOUT THE CURRENT SITUATION  
IN AFGHANISTAN. AS IS HIS USUAL PRACTICE, SCHWIESAU  
ENDEAVORED TO APPEAR FRIENDLY AND FRANK.

3. SCHWIESAU EXPRESSED PUZZLEMENT OVER HOW THE AFGHANS SEEM TO MISMANAGE THEIR RELATIONS WITH OTHER COUNTRIES, MISSING OBVIOUS OPPORTUNITIES TO DISPLAY A SMOOTHER DIPLOMATIC IMAGE. USING KABUL'S BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP WITH ISLAMABAD AS AN EXAMPLE, HE WONDERED WHY AFGHANISTAN HAD APPARENTLY CHANGED ITS SIGNALS AT THE LAST MINUTE AND HAD OPPOSED PAKISTANI MEMBERSHIP IN THE NONALIGNED MOVEMENT AT THE RECENT NAM CONFERENCE AT COLOMBO. SCHWIESAU RECALLED THAT THE AFGHANS HAD APPEARED TO HAVE CLEARLY PROMISED PAKISTAN BEFORE THAT CONFERENCE THAT THEY WOULD SUPPORT PAKISTAN'S BID FOR MEMBERSHIP IN THE NAM. SCHWIESAU REVEALED THAT THE RUSSIANS HAD EVEN URGED THIS COURSE OF ACTION. SCHWIESAU SAID THAT HE AND OTHER OBSERVERS WERE SURPRISED WHEN THE AFGHANS TOOK A STRONG ANTI-PAKISTAN STAND AT COLOMBO. 7#3 -8\$ 5#-5 85 297)\$ #-;3 733, 1)3VERER FOR THE AFGHANS TO HAVE INSTEAD STATED THAT, "ALTHOUGH AFGHANISTAN HAS MANY BILATERAL PROBLEMS WITH PAKISTAN, THOSE CAN BE RESOLVED IN OTHER WAYS; THEREFORE, AFGHANISTAN IS NOT BLOCKING PAKISTAN'S ENTRY INTO THE NAM." HE FOUND THE AFGHAN POSITION ESPECIALLY "STUPID" BECAUSE THEY COULD NOT GET ENOUGH VOTES TO BLOCK PAKISTANI MEMBERSHIP ANYWAY.



4. SCHWIESAU ALSO WAS SURPRISED THAT THE AFGHAN POLICE AUTHORITIES WOULD BE SEIZING A PAKISTANI EMBASSY STAFF MEMBER AT THE SAME TIME THE THE AFGHAN MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS WAS PREPARING FOR DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER DOST'S FRIENDLY VISIT TO ISLAMABAD. SCHWIESAU LEFT NO DOUBT THAT HE BELIEVED THAT THE PAKISTANI HAD BEEN FORCIBLY SEIZED BY THE AFGHAN'S SECURITY POLICE, AND HAD NOT DEFECTED VOLUNTARILY TO THE AFGHAN SIDE AS THE KHALQIS CLAIM. WHILE ON THE TOPIC OF THE DOST VISIT, SCHWIESAU WONDERED WHY THE KHALQIS HAD FELT COMPELLED TO REFUTE THE SUBSEQUENT PAKISTANI STATEMENT THAT AGHA SHAHI WOULD BE PAYING A RETURN VISIT ON PRIME MINISTER HAFIZULLAH AMIN. ASIDE FROM THE PROTOCOL SENSITIVITIES INVOLVED, SCHWIESAU THOUGHT AMIN SHOULD BE ABLE TO RECEIVE AGHA SHAHI GRACEFULLY - AND TRANSFER HIM OVER TO A LOWER OFFICIAL, SUCH AS EDUCATION MINISTER JALILI, FOR SUBSTANTIVE TALKS.

5. WHEN I ASKED SCHWIESAU WHY HE THOUGHT THE KHALQI REGIME SO FREQUENTLY SEEMED TO BE OPERATING AT CROSS PURPOSES WITH ITSELF, SCHWIESAU REPLIED THAT IS A MYSTERY TO HIM. HE OBSERVED THAT, ALTHOUGH ONE MINISTRY MIGHT PROCEED ALONG A DIFFERENT COURSE FROM ANOTHER MINISTRY, THERE HAD TO BE SOME OVERALL DIRECTION FROM THE TOP. FOR EXAMPLE, SCHWIESAU NOTED THE AFGHAN DELEGATE'S ANTI-PAKISTAN SPEECH AT COLOMBO HAD TO HAVE BEEN APPROVED IN ADVANCE BY NO ONE LESS THAN PRIME MINISTER AMIN.

6. TURNING TO THE INSURGENCY SITUATION, SCHWIESAU REGARDED IT AS SERIOUS. HE RECOMMENDED THAT THE DEPENDENTS OF ONE OF HIS OFFICERS REMAIN BEHIND IN BERLIN WHEN THAT OFFICER RETURNS TO KABUL FROM HOME LEAVE, BECAUSE HE THOUGHT THE SECURITY SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN IS "DANGEROUS." SCHWIESAU REVEALED THAT THE CZECHOSLOVAKS ARE SENDING SOME TECHNICAL ADVISERS BACK TO THE HERAT REGION, BUT WITHOUT THEIR WIVES AND CHILDREN.

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12 Jul 75 13 00z

3.VV ESA495MJC981  
RR RUQMHR  
DE RUSBLK #5246/2 1920505  
ZNY CCCCC ZZH  
R 110355Z JUL 79  
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL  
HO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4656  
INFO RUMJPG/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 612  
RUDKRB/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE 188  
RUFHEB/AMEMBASSY BERLING 25  
RUFHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN 653  
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 377  
RUMJGM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO 460  
RUSBQD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 8996  
RUQMRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 334  
RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1673  
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1732  
RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS 3141  
RUDKRP/AMEMBASSY PRAGUE 69  
RUQMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 312  
RUHQHQA/CINCPAC  
RUSNAAA/CINCEUR  
RUFHNA/USNATO 14  
RUEHDT/USUN 918  
RUEHUB/USINT HAVANA 63  
BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 KABUL 5246

CINCPAC ALSO FOR POLAD  
CINCEUR ALSO FOR POLAD

E.O. 12065: RDS-1 7/9/99 (FLATIN, BRUCE A.) OR/M

7. SCHWIESAU SAID THAT HE FINDS ESPECIALLY FRUSTRATING THE ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE MESS IN THIS COUNTRY. HE HAS OFTEN TOLD THE AFGHANS THAT THEY ARE FOOLS NOT TO ENCOURAGE THE BROADEST POSSIBLE PARTICIPATION BY ALL NATIONS, EAST AND WEST, IN THEIR DEVELOPMENT. IN THIS CONNECTION, SCHWIESAU STATED THAT HE WAS TOLD KHALQI POLITICAL EXTREMISTS THAT THEY ARE OUT OF STEP WITH THE MODERN SOCIALIST MOVEMENT WHEN THEY ATTEMPT TO SQUEEZE "IMPERIALIST" REPRESENTATION OUT OF KABUL. HE SAID THAT HE TOLD THEM HOW IT IS NECESSARY FOR ALL NATIONS TO WORK TOGETHER FOR PEACE AND ECONOMIC PROGRESS.

8 AS FOR EAST GERMAN PROGRAMS FOR AFGHANISTAN, SCHWIESAU WAS VERY BEARISH. HAVING LONG BEEN VERY SKEPTICAL ABOUT THE ABSORPTIVE CAPACITY OF AFGHANISTAN FOR FOREIGN AID, SCHWIESAU SAID THAT, AT HIS RECOMMENDATION, THE GDR HAS OFFERED THE KHALQI REGIME A MODEST INITIAL AMOUNT OF AID CREDIT TO TEST THE POSSIBLE SUCCESS OF EAST GERMAN PROGRAMMING IN THIS AREA. SCHWIESAU WAS DISCOURAGED, HOWEVER, BY HIS FIRST TECHNICAL CONVERSATIONS WITH AFGHAN AID OFFICIALS. THEY WANTED EAST GERMANY TO BUILD A TURNKEY-TYPE INDUSTRIAL INSTALLATION IN AFGHANISTAN, REQUESTING THAT EAST GERMANY UNDERTAKE THE COMPLETE PROJECT. SCHWIESAU SAID THAT HE TOOK THE AFGHANS TO A WORLD MAP, POINTED OUT HOW DISTANT EAST GERMANY WAS FROM AFGHANISTAN, AND ASKED THE AFGHANS WHETHER THEY WERE SERIOUSLY PROPOSING THAT HE, FOR EXAMPLE, HAVE EAST GERMAN BRICKS TRANSPORTED ACROSS POLAND AND THE SOVIET UNION FOR SUCH A PROJECT. HE CONCLUDED THAT HE HAS THUS FAR GOTTEN NOWHERE IN GETTING THE AFGHANS TO BE PRACTICAL ABOUT SUCH PROPOSITIONS.

8. COMMENT: THE VIEWS EXPRESSED BY SCHWIESAU ON JULY 9 WERE CONSISTENT WITH THE GENERALLY CRITICAL ATTITUDE HE HAS DISPLAYED TOWARD THE KHALQI REGIME IN PRIVATE CONVERSATIONS WITH OTHER DIPLOMATS SINCE HIS ARRIVAL HERE ELEVEN MONTHS AGO. SCHWIESAU DID NOT MENTION THE SUBJECT OF RECENT SOVIET-SPONSORED "NEGOTIATIONS" TO FORM A "NATIONAL FRONT" REPLACEMENT FOR THE KHALQI REGIME (REFTEL).

FLATIN

BT  
#5246



KW - [Handwritten marks]

N. ESA371MJC516  
RR RUQMHR  
DE RUSBLK #5249 1920710  
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C/O  
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TO RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC//DB-2C//  
INFO RUSBGD/USDAO ISLAMABAD  
RUQMHR/USDAO TEHRAN  
RUHQHQA/COMIPAC CP H.M. SMITH HI//IPAC I44/I25/I53//  
RUHQHQA/CINCPAC, HONOLULU, HI//J233/J23//

11 JUL 79 10 00z

BT  
C O N F I D E N T I A L / N O F O R N

SUBJECT: THIS IS IR 6 800 0046 79

1. (U) COUNTRY: AFGHANISTAN (AF)/PAKISTAN (PK)
2. (U) REPORT NUMBER: 6 800 0046 79
3. (U) TITLE: SOVIET INTENTIONS IN AFGHANISTAN/PAKISTAN
4. (U) PROJECT NUMBER: N/A
5. (U) DATE OF INFORMATION: 790709
6. (U) DATE OF REPORT: 790710
7. (U) DATE AND PLACE OF ACQ: 790709; KABUL
8. (U) REFERENCE: INITIATIVE
9. (U) ASSESSMENT: A. F-6, B. F-6
10. (U) ORIGINATOR: USDAO KABUL
11. (U) REQUEST EVAL: NO
12. (U) PREPARING OFFICER: ROBERT C. DISNEY, LTC, USA, ADATT
14. (U) SOURCE: A. SCI 6 800 066, B. ONE TIME SOURCE
15. (U) DIRC: NO

16. CONFIDENTIAL/NOFORN SUMMARY: ACCORDING TO TWO THIRD-COUNTRY DIPLOMATS, THE SOVIET UNION ALLEGEDLY HAS THREE OBJECTIVES IN AFGHANISTAN. THESE ARE SAFEGUARDING THE INVESTMENTS THEY HAVE MADE TO SUPPORT THE REVOLUTION, MAINTAINING A SOCIALIST REGIME IN AF, AND EXTENDING THEIR AREA OF INFLUENCE. IF IT APPEARS TO THE SOVIET'S THAT THE CURRENT (TARAKI) REGIME IS NOT GOING TO BE SUCCESSFUL IN AFGHANISTAN, THEY WILL NOT HESITATE TO REPLACE THE REGIME WITH ONE THAT WOULD BE MORE ACCEPTABLE TO THE BULK OF THE AFGHAN PEOPLE, IN ORDER TO SAVE FACE AND TO ATTAIN THESE OBJECTIVES. THIS NEW REGIME WOULD PROBABLY BE OUTWARDLY MORE NATIONALISTIC AND WOULD PROBABLY BE DRAWN FROM THE ARMED FORCES. THE SOVIETS WOULD NOT HESITATE TO INTRODUCE THEIR OWN TROOPS INTO AF TO INSURE THE SUCCESS OF THE REVOLUTION, A DEVELOPMENT WHICH WOULD, IN SOURCES' VIEW, NOT PROMPT A SERIOUS USG REACTION.

22. CONFIDENTIAL/NOFORN DETAILS: SOURCE A. ON HIS OWN INITIATIVE PAID AN OFFICE CALL ON REPORTING OFFICER (RO). DURING THE RATHER LENGTHY (2 AND A HALF HOURS) VISIT SOURCE AND RO HAD A CONVERSATION WHICH COVERED SEVERAL SUBJECTS. THE PRIMARY TOPIC OF CONVERSATION WAS SOURCE'S VIEWS ON SOVIET INTENTIONS IN AF. IN RESPONSE TO RO'S QUESTION SOURCE STATED THAT IN HIS VIEW THE SOVIET UNION HAD THREE OBJECTIVES IN AF. THE FIRST OF THESE WERE THE SAFEGUARDING OF THE MASSIVE INVESTMENTS OF WEAPONS, EQUIPMENT AND MONEY WHICH THEY HAD PROVIDED THE TARAKI REGIME TO SUCCESSFULLY CONCLUDE THE REVOLUTION. THE SECOND WAS TO ENSURE THAT A SOCIALIST REGIME SURVIVED IN AF, AND LASTLY, TO ENSURE THAT THEIR AF VENTURE, AND EXTENSION OF THEIR AREA OF INFLUENCE, WAS NOT REDUCED BUT FURTHER EXTENDED. SOURCE CONTINUED BY STATING THAT IN HIS VIEW THE CURRENT REGIME WOULD NOT LAST "TOO MUCH LONGER" BECAUSE OF THEIR INCREASING PROBLEMS WITH THE MUSLIM INSURGENTS WHO WERE DIAMETRICALLY OPPOSED TO A SOCIALIST GOVERNMENT AND BECAUSE OF ITS UNPOPULARITY WITH THE FERVENTLY RELIGIOUS MUSLIM POPULATION OF AFGHANISTAN. ALLEGEDLY THE SOVIETS ARE ALSO BEGINNING TO REALIZE THIS AND, IN ORDER TO ENSURE THE SUCCESS OF THE REVOLUTION AND TO ACHIEVE THEIR OBJECTIVES, THEY WOULD NOT HESITATE TO REPLACE THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT WITH ONE WHICH WOULD BE MORE ACCEPTABLE TO THE ISLAMIC MAJORITY, BUT WHICH WOULD ALSO BE PRO-MOSCOW, BUT IN A LESS GLARING SENSE. RO ELICITED SOURCE'S VIEWS ON WHO WOULD FORM THE NEW REGIME. SOURCE STATED THAT IT WOULD MAINLY COMPOSED OF NATIONALISTIC MILITARY OFFICERS WHO WERE SYMPATHETIC TO THE SOVIET CAUSE. HE CONTINUED BY STATING THAT HE KNEW SEVERAL AF OFFICERS WHO WOULD FIT THIS MOLD, BUT DID NOT ELABORATE FURTHER. CONTINUING, SOURCE STATED THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD NOT GIVE UP THEIR ULTIMATE GOAL OF OBTAINING AN ACCESS TO PAK WARM WATER PORTS ON THE ARABIAN SEA. THE PURPOSE OF THIS WOULD BE TO PROVIDE THE SOVIETS WITH A BASE FROM WHICH THEY COULD PROJECT THEIR NAVAL POWER TO CONTROL THE SEA LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS UPON WHICH MOVE THE BULK OF THE FREE WORLD'S FUEL REQUIREMENTS. ACCORDING TO SOURCE THIS ACCESS WOULD BE OBTAINED THROUGH THE ASSISTANCE

OF FRIENDLY ELEMENTS IN THE BALUCHISTAN PROVINCE OF PK. "EVEN TODAY THERE ARE BOTH COVERT AND OVERT ELEMENTS IN BALUCHISTAN, IN THE PAY OF THE SOVIETS, WHO ARE ADVOCATING THE INCREASED AUTONOMY OF THE PROVINCE. IN TIME, AND WITH THE REQUISITE POLITICAL CLIMATE, BALUCHISTAN COULD BECOME A SEPERATE POLITICAL ENTITY AND THEN THE SOVIETS WOULD BE ABLE TO ACHIEVE THEIR LONG-SOUGHT GOAL - ACCESS TO THE ARABIAN SEA". IN SOURCE'S VIEW IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT THE USG PROVIDE THE NECESSARY ECONOMIC AID TO ASSIST PK IN THE RAPID DEVELOPMENT OF BALUCHISTAN IN AN EFFORT TO BLUNT SOVIET INITIATIVES IN THE REGION. ADDITIONALLY SOURCE MADE A STRONG REQUEST FOR USG MILITARY ASSISTANCE IN ORDER TO PROVIDE PK WITH "CREDIBLE DEFENSE FORCES". IN RESPONSE TO RO'S QUESTION AS TO HOW THIS MILITARY AID, IF PROVIDED, MIGHT BE VIEWED BY INDIA, SOURCE STATED THAT IT WAS "LUDICROUS" FOR ANY NATION, INCLUDING INDIA, TO BELIEVE THAT PK HAD ANY HOSTILE INTENTIONS TOWARDS INDIA. "PK IS A SMALL COUNTRY WITH VERY LIMITED RESOURCES AND IT HAS NO INTENTION OF TAKING ANY HOSTILE STEPS AGAINST A MAJOR POWER SUCH AS INDIA. PK WOULD BE WILLING TO PROVIDE ANY GUARANTEES NECESSARY THAT ITS MILITARY CAPABILITY WOULD NEVER BE USED AGAINST INDIA, EXCEPT IN DEFENSE OF ITS OWN SOVEREIGNTY". TO ENSURE THE SUCCESS OF THE SOCIALIST REVOLUTION IN AF AND TO ACHIEVE THEIR OBJECTIVES IN THIS REGION, SOURCE SAID THAT "I AM CONVINCED THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD NOT HESITATE TO INTRODUCE THEIR OWN TROOPS INTO AF" IF THIS PROVIDED NECESSARY. IN RESPONSE TO RO'S QUESTION AS TO HOW THIS DEVELOPMENT MIGHT BE VIEWED BY THE NATIONS OF THE WORLD, AND ESPECIALLY BY THE USG IN LIGHT OF THE RECENT SALT II AGREEMENT, SOURCE COUNTERED BY STATING THAT IT WOULD NOT CAUSE "TOO MUCH CONCERN" ESPECIALLY AS IT APPEARED TO PK AND MANY OTHER FRIENDLY NATIONS THAT THE USG HAD "WRITTEN OFF PK AND THIS REGION AS BEING UNESSENTIAL TO YOUR STRETEGIC AND NATIONAL INTERESTS".

DURING AN ATTACHE FUNCTION WHICH RO ATTENDED LATER THAT DAY, SOURCE B, IN RESPONSE TO RO'S QUESTION REGARDING SOURCE'S VIEW OF SOVIET INTENTIONS, GAVE ESSENTIALLY THE SAME VIEWS AS STATED BY SOURCE A. ONE POINT WHICH BOTH SOURCES STRESSED WAS THE APPARANT LACK OF INTEREST BEING DISPLAYED BY THE USG IN THE UNFOLDING DEVELOPMENTS IN THIS REGION. BOTH SOURCES UNDERLINED THIS POINT BY STATING THAT THE USG MUST TAKE THE APPROPRIATE ACTION TO HALT THE SOVIET EXPANSION IN THIS REGION. ORIGINATORS COMMENTS: (CONFIDENTIAL/NOFORN) BASED ON THE ABOVE IT APPEARED TO RO THAT BOTH SOURCES WERE ENUNCIATING THE PARTY LINE OF THEIR GOVERNMENT. IN AS MUCH AS THIS IS THE FIRST TIME RO HAS OBTAINED ANY INFORMATION FROM EITHER OF THE SOURCES AN F-6 RATING HAS BEEN ASSIGNED.

DECL 10 JUL 85.

BT

#5249





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DE RUSBLK #5360 1970510  
ZNY CCCCC ZZH  
R 160401Z JUL 79  
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL  
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4718  
INFO RUQMGU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 3661  
RUMJPG/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 619  
RUSBQD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 9011  
RUMRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 336  
RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1680  
RUEMNO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1740  
RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 7064  
RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS 3148  
RUMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 320-  
RUHQHQA/CINCPAC  
BT  
C O N F I D E N T I A L KABUL 5360

16 Jul 79 152

CINCPAC: ALSO FOR POLAD

E.O. 12065: GDS 6-15-85 (TAYLOR, JAMES E.) OR-P  
TAGS: PEPR, PINS, PINT, AF  
SUBJECT: (C) AFGHAN UNDERGROUND PROPAGANDA CALLS FOR THE OUSTER  
OF PRIME MINISTER AMIN

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. SUMMARY: A RECENT SPATE OF "UNDERGROUND" LETTERS CALLING FOR THE OUSTER OF PRIME MINISTER AMIN AND HIS COLLEAGUES (BUT NOT PRESIDENT TARAKI), AND THE FORMATION OF A UNITED FRONT OF ALL "TRUE REVOLUTIONARIES," COULD BE PART OF A RUMORED EFFORT TO MODIFY THE COMPOSITION OF THIS REGIME'S LEADERSHIP IN ORDER TO DEFUSE THE GROWING DOMESTIC INSURGENCY. THE LETTERS' THEMES, HOWEVER, ARE THOSE OF THE RIVAL PARCHAM WING OF THE PARTY, AND THEREBY, WITH THEIR EXTREME LEFTIST AND INHERENT ANTI-WESTERN BASES, OFFER LITTLE COMFORT TO THOSE WHO MIGHT HOPE FOR A GENUINE MODIFICATION OF THE KHALQI GOVERNMENT'S POLICIES. END OF SUMMARY.

3. UNDERGROUND "NIGHT-LETTERS" (SHABNAHMAS") STARTED CIRCULATING THROUGHOUT KABUL SEVERAL DAYS AGO. DISTRIBUTION HAS BEEN SURREPTITIOUS, BUT STILL FAIRLY OPEN (I.E., COPIES HAVE BEEN FOUND LYING ON THE STREETS, AND ONE FLUTTERED OVER A DIPLOMAT'S WALL IN BROAD DAYLIGHT) THEREBY SUGGESTING THAT SOME SEGMENTS OF THE GOVERNMENT ARE TURNING THE OTHER WAY. THE SUBSTANTIVE THRUST OF THESE LETTERS IS SIMILAR, AND INCLUDES THE FOLLOWING HIGHLIGHTS:

-- PRIME MINISTER HAFIZULLAH AMIN, AND HIS "FASCIST BAND OF GANGSTERS," REPRESENTS THE PRINCIPAL TARGET, WHILE NO CRITICISM OF PRESIDENT TARAKI HAS YET BEEN SEEN.

-- OTHER TARGETS ARE: "UNITED STATES IMPERIALISM" (WHOSE NEFARIOUS HAND, BY CLEAR IMPLICATION IS BEHIND ALL EVENTS IN THE REGION); THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD ("IKHWAN-I-MUSLIMIN"); THE MILITARY GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN; THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT; AND "REACTIONARY FORCES."

-- GOALS OF "TRUE REVOLUTIONARIES" SHOULD BE UNPROCLAIMED BY MIR AKBAR KHAIBAR (THE FORMER PARCHAMIST INTELLECTUAL WHOSE MURDER ON APRIL 17, 1978, SET OFF THE CHAIN OF EVENTS LEADING TO THE KHALQI REVOLUTION), AND THE "WORKERS' IDEOLOGY," WITH THE SUPPORT OF THE SOVIET UNION AND OTHER SOCIALIST COUNTRIES, SHOULD SERVE AS A GUIDING LIGHT.

-- THE REGIME OF THE "CHIEF OF THE PROFESSIONAL CRIMINALS" (AMIN) IS TYPIFIED BY INDISCRIMINATE ARREST AND TORTURE OF FEMALES, THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE INTERESTS OF "U.S. IMPERIALISM," "ANIMAL TORTURES" OF "TRUE REVOLUTIONARIES," AND THE PILLAGING OF INNOCENT PEOPLES' HOMES, ALL OF WHICH WERE FEATURES OF ADOLPH HITLER'S RULE.

-- PROGRESS OF THE REVOLUTION, AND DEFENSE OF THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND INDEPENDENCE OF THE HOMELAND, IS IMPOSSIBLE WITHOUT THE "IMMEDIATE ELIMINATION" OF AMIN AND HIS ASSOCIATES.

-- "DEATH TO AMIN AND HIS FASCIST PARTISANS, TO THE CIA, TO IKHWANIS, TO MAOISTS," AND "FORWARD WITH ALLIANCE AND UNITY OF THE DEMOCRATIC AND NATIONALIST FORCES."

A COMMENT: THE TRACT CLEARLY REFLECTS A PARCHAMIST AUTHORSHIP, AS MOST OF THE VITRIOL IS DIRECTED AT THE KHALQI LEADERSHIP, ALBEIT MINUS TARAKI. THIS PARTICULAR FEATURE COULD BE PART OF THE RUMORED EFFORT UNDERWAY TO REMOVE SOME MEMBERS OF THE CURRENT LEADERSHIP IN ORDER TO DEFUSE THE DOMESTIC INSURGENCY, SINCE A GENERAL PARCHAMIST BROADSIDE AT THE KHALQIS WOULD PRESUMABLY HAVE RESERVED SOME BRICKBATS FOR TARAKI. IN THIS CONNECTION, THE APPEAL TO FOLLOW THE PREACHINGS OF KHAIBAR -- WHO BEFORE HIS DEATH WAS REPORTEDLY A PROponent OF THE 1977 KHALQ/PARCHAM WEDDING -- AND THE ASSERTION THAT THERE REMAIN "TRUE REVOLUTIONARIES" WITHIN THE KHALQ PARTY, COULD REPRESENT AN APPEAL TO ALL LEFTISTS (PARCHAMISTS AND DISENCHANTED KHALQIS) TO FORM A "UNITED FRONT" FOR THE OUSTER OF AMIN AND HIS COLLEAGUES. WE HASTEN TO ADD, HOWEVER, THAT THE MYRAID ANTI-WESTERN DIATRIBES UNDERSCORE THE CONCLUSION THAT A LEFTIST AFGHAN REGIME'S BASIC POLICIES, EVEN WITHOUT AMIN, WOULD PROBABLY NOT MODIFY TO ANY GREAT EXTENT.

5. FINALLY, THE MERE APPEARANCE OF THESE LETTERS IN SUCH VOLUME (VIRTUALLY EVERY DIPLOMATIC MISSION HAS GAINED POSSESSION OF ONE OR MORE COPIES) AND THE MANNER OF THEIR DISTRIBUTION SUGGEST THAT, FOR SOME REASON, THE POLICE AND SECURITY AUTHORITIES HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO SQUELCH THE SPREAD OF PROPAGANDA CALLING FOR THE REMOVAL (OR WORSE) OF THE COUNTRY'S "STRONG-MAN." HOW LONG THIS SITUATION WILL PERSIST REMAINS TO BE SEEN, BUT AMIN, IN OUR JUDGMENT, IS NOT THE KIND OF POLITICIAN TO MEETLY FOLD HIS TENT AND PERMIT OTHERS TO TAKE OVER "HIS" REVOLUTION.

6. OTHER ANTI-AMIN PROPAGANDA HEARD HERE RECENTLY PORTRAYS THE PRIME MINISTER AS A SECRET CIA AGENT WHOSE MISSION HAS BEEN TO DESTROY THE CREDIBILITY OF THE USSR IN AFGHANISTAN.

AMSTUTZ  
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#5360



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FM AMEMBASSY KABUL  
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4753  
INFO RUMGU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 3663  
RUMJPG/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 621  
RUSBD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 9021  
RUMRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 339  
RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1683  
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1743  
RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 7075  
RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS 3152  
RUGMR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 324  
RUFHNA/USMISSION USNATO 15  
RUHQHQA/CINCPAC  
RUSNAAA/CINCEUR

18 Jul 79 13 01z

Pol  
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BT  
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 3 KABUL 5433

CINCPAC: ALSO FOR POLAD  
CINCEUR: ALSO FOR POLAD

E.O. 12065: GDS 7-17-85 (TAYLOR, JAMES E.) OR-P  
TAGS: PEPR, PINS, PINT, AF, UR  
SUBJECT: (LOW) SOVIET EFFORT TO URGE DRA TO FIND A POLITICAL  
RESOLUTION OF DOMESTIC CONFLICT MAY BE UNDERWAY

REF: (A) KABUL 5092; (B) KABUL 5088; (C) KABUL 5146;  
(D) KABUL 528E; (E) KABUL 5360; (F) KABUL 4695 (ALL NOTAL)

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. SUMMARY: A NUMBER OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN AFGHANISTAN  
SUGGEST THAT A SOVIET CAMPAIGN MAY BE UNDERWAY IN KABUL,  
AIMED AT "HELPING" THE EMBATTLED DRA LEADERSHIP FIND A POLI-  
TICAL, RATHER THAN STRICTLY MILITARY, MEANS TO COUNTER THE  
GROWTH OF DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN OPPOSITION. STEPS TAKEN SO  
FAR, WHILE PERHAPS BUYING THE REGIME AND MOSCOW  
SOME BREATHING SPACE, ARE PROBABLY INSUFFICIENT IN THEMSELVES  
TO GUARANTEE THE FUTURE OF THE REVOLUTION, AND CONSIDERABLY  
MORE SUBSTANTIVE CHANGES WILL PROBABLY BE NECESSARY. OPTIONS  
ALONG THESE LINES ARE FEW, HOWEVER, AND THE "VOLUNTARY" DE-  
PARTURE OF ONE OR MORE MEMBERS OF THE TOP DRA LEADERSHIP  
MAY BE MANDATORY IF MOSCOW WANTS TO AVOID FACING A DRA SOS  
FOR DIRECT MILITARY INTERVENTION IN ORDER TO HELP THE  
KHALQIS STAY AFLOAT. WE ARE NOT CERTAIN THAT SOVIET "ADVICE"  
WILL BE HEEDED BY THE AFGHAN LEADERSHIP, AND MUCH MAY  
DEPEND ON THE PERSONAL DIPLOMACY OF  
VASILY SAFRONCHUK, THE RECENTLY ARRIVED  
"TROUBLESHOOTER" AND SENIOR DIPLOMAT WHO COULD WELL HAVE BEEN  
CHARGED WITH SOME RESPONSIBILITY FOR FINDING A VIABLE EXIT  
FROM THE CURRENT MAZE. PITFALLS AND UNKNOWNNS REMAIN NUM-  
EROUS, BUT CONTINUED SOVIET ASSURANCES TO THE AFGHAN "PEO-  
PLE," AND RECENT INDICATIONS OF INCREASED SOVIET INVOLVE-  
MENT IN THE MILITARY FIELD HERE, SUGGEST THAT A SOVIET  
"GUARANTEE" OF THE REVOLUTION MAY BE THE INDUCEMENT OFFERED THE  
KHALQIS IN RETURN FOR THE SACRIFICES WHICH MAY BE NECESSARY  
TO REVERSE THE TIDE OF CURRENT EVENTS. END OF SUMMARY.

pretty accurate  
except must  
Khalq, being  
in Pashtun

→ right about Sfronchuk  
ok?

*Soviets urging drawdown  
of confrontation, stability (dom. & fp)  
Attributes to  
Soviet*

3. A SEARCH FOR A POLITICAL RESOLUTION OF DOMESTIC PROBLEMS MAY BE UNDERWAY; OVER THE PAST FEW WEEKS THERE HAVE BEEN A NUMBER OF DEVELOPMENTS WHICH SUGGEST THAT THE AFGHAN GOVERNMENT, PROBABLY AT SOVIET URGING, MAY BE SEEKING A POLITICAL RATHER THAN STRICTLY MILITARY, MEANS TO COUNTER ITS DOMESTIC OPPOSITION. THE REGIME HAS BOLDLY, ALBEIT PERHAPS DISINGENUOUSLY, DECLARED ITS LAND REFORM PROGRAM "SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETED" (REF A), THEREBY AT LEAST AVOIDING THE CREATION OF FURTHER OPPOSITION ALONG THE LINES THAT PARTICULAR REFORM MEASURE APPARENTLY HAS PROMPTED SINCE ITS INCEPTION. LIKEWISE, ACCORDING TO RECENT HINTS BY PRIME MINISTER AMIN, THE DRA'S LITERACY CAMPAIGN, WHICH HAS PROVOKED HOSTILITY IN THIS EXTREMELY CONSERVATIVE SOCIETY BECAUSE MOST AFGHANS DO NOT WISH TO SEE THEIR FEMALES EDUCATED EVEN TO RUDIMENTARY LEVELS, OR "EXPOSED" TO MALE TEACHERS, MAY SOON BE DECLARED A "SUCCESS." A DRA ANNOUNCEMENT ON JULY 11 PROMULGATING SEVERAL "CONCESSIONS" TO THE PRIVATE SECTOR OF THE ECONOMY REPRESENTED, INTER ALIA, ANOTHER ATTEMPT TO MOLLIFY ANY OPPOSITION STEMMING FROM FEAR OF THIS REGIME'S FUTURE ECONOMIC POLICIES. THUS, THE GOVERNMENT APPARENTLY HAS BEGUN TO DISTANCE ITSELF FROM A NUMBER OF ITS MORE AMBITIOUS AND GRATING REFORMS, NOT NECESSARILY BECAUSE THEY WERE ILL-CONCEIVED, OR UNNECESSARY, BUT PERHAPS BECAUSE THEY WERE OVERZEALOUSLY INITIATED -- AND APOUSED SERIOUS RESISTANCE.

4. REPORTS OF "NEGOTIATIONS" AMONG THE REGIME, THE SOVIETS, AND SEVERAL LEADERS OF FORMER GOVERNMENTS WOULD ALSO POINT TO AN EFFORT TO ESTABLISH SOME SORT OF "NATIONAL FRONT" (REF B). COMMENTS BY USUALLY WELL-INFORMED EASTERN EUROPEAN AND SOVIET DIPLOMATS HERE LEND A CERTAIN CREDENCE TO THIS PARTICULAR THESIS (REF C). IN THIS CONNECTION, THE REPORTED RELEASE FROM PRISON OF PARHAMISTS (REF D), AND THAT GROUP'S SUBSEQUENT PRINTING AND WIDESPREAD DISTRIBUTION OF "UNDERGROUND" LETTERS (REF E) ATTACKING, INTER ALIA, AMIN AND OTHER ELEMENTS OF THE REGIME, REINFORCE THE CONTENTION THAT CERTAIN FORCES ARE WORKING TO PROVIDE SOME FORM OF LEADERSHIP AND PARTY MORE BROADLY BASED THAN THE PEOPLES' DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF AFGHANISTAN (PDPA).

5. ON THE FOREIGN POLICY FRONT AS WELL SOME SIGNS HAVE BEEN DETECTED THAT SUGGEST A DEVELOPING PROGRAM TO AVOID OR DRAW BACK SELECTIVELY FROM CONFRONTATION. THE EARLY JULY VISIT TO ISLAMABAD BY DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER DOST HAS BEEN THE MOST IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENT ALONG THESE LINES, ESPECIALLY SINCE THERE HAS BEEN RECENTLY A SLIGHT MODERATION IN THIS GOVERNMENT'S ANTI-

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FM AMEMBASSY KABUL  
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4754  
INFO RUQMGU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 3664  
RUMJPG/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 622  
RUSBD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 9022  
RUJMR/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 340  
RUDIC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1684  
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1744  
RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 7076  
RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS 3153  
RUQMR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 325  
RUFHNA/USMISSION USNATO 16  
RUHQQA/CINCPAC  
RUSNAAA/CINCEUR

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 3 KABUL 5433

CINCPAC: ALSO FOR POLAD  
CINCEUR: ALSO FOR POLAD

E.O. 12065: GDS 7-17-85 (TAYLOR, JAMES E.) OR-P

PAKISTAN PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN. MOREOVER, WE HAVE BEEN TOSED  
A FEW MINOR OLIVE-TWIGS LATELY -- RELATIVELY HIGH-LEVEL  
ATTENDANCE AT OUR JULY 4 RECEPTION, A FIRST-EVER MEETING,  
AT AFGHAN INITIATIVE, BETWEEN AMIN AND A VISITING USICA  
LECTURER -- WHICH COULD INDICATE THAT THE DRA MAY BE IN-  
TERESTED IN LIFTING OUR BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP FROM THE MADIR  
IT HAS REACHED IN RECENT MONTHS.

18 Jul 79 14 10z

6. HIGH-LEVEL SOVIET DIPLOMAT COULD BE THE RASPUTIN BEHIND THESE DEVELOPMENTS: ALL OF THESE SIGNS HAVE EMERGED SINCE THE EARLY JUNE ARRIVAL IN KABUL OF SOVIET DIPLOMAT VASILY SAFRONCHUK, FORMER AMBASSADOR TO GHANA, FORMER DEPUTY PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE AT THE UNITED NATIONS, AND A CAREER DIPLOMAT WITH APPARENTLY SOLID POLITICAL CONNECTIONS, WHO IS OBVIOUSLY OVER-QUALIFIED TO SERVE AS THE THIRD-RANKING MAN IN THE SOVIET EMBASSY IN KABUL (HIS PROTOCOL RANK WHICH NO ONE HERE BELIEVES). PRIOR TO HIS ARRIVAL, STORIES CIRCULATED IN KABUL AND IN MOSCOW THAT SAFRONCHUK WOULD SERVE AS SOME SORT OF "ADVISOR" TO THE HIGHEST LEVELS OF THE AFGHAN GOVERNMENT, STORIES WHICH MAY HAVE BEEN BORNE OUT BY SUBSEQUENT EVENTS. GIVEN SAFRONCHUK'S EXPERIENCE, WE BELIEVE IT SAFE TO CONCLUDE THAT HE MAY HAVE COME TO AFGHANISTAN WITH ORDERS TO TRY AND FIND A POLITICAL, RATHER THAN PURELY MILITARY, RESOLUTION OF THIS COUNTRY'S DOMESTIC STRIFE, PROBABLY MOST IMPORTANTLY IN ORDER TO PRECLUDE A DRA APPEAL FOR DIRECT SOVIET MILITARY HELP IN STAYING AFLOAT. IN THIS CONNECTION, MOST OBSERVERS BELIEVE THAT SAFRONCHUK HAS NO NORMAL FUNCTION IN THE SOVIET EMBASSY. ALTHOUGH SOME OF THE SURMISES ABOUT SAFRONCHUK'S MISSION ARE SPECULATION, WE BELIEVE THAT THE SUDDENNESS OF, AND THE PECULIAR CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING, HIS APPOINTMENT, HIS STATUS SINCE HIS ARRIVAL, AND THE POLICY DEVELOPMENTS NOTED ABOVE, CLEARLY INDICATE THAT MOSCOW IS URGING, IF NOT PRESSURING, THE DRA TO TAKE STEPS TO REVERSE THE TIDE OF EVENTS, AND TO PRESERVE THE INTEGRITY OF THE REVOLUTION.



7. LOCAL CONDITIONS WHICH COULD HAVE PROMPTED SOVIET PRESSURE ON THE DRA TO FIND A POLITICAL SOLUTION: THE AFGHAN REGIME'S APPARENT INABILITY -- OR UNWILLINGNESS -- TO UNDERTAKE, ON ITS OWN, STEPS WHICH WOULD STABILIZE THE DETERIORATING SECURITY AND POLITICAL SITUATION IN THE COUNTRYSIDE, OR BROADEN THE GOVERNMENT'S BASE OF SUPPORT, WOULD PROBABLY CONSTITUTE THE GREATEST IMPETUS FOR ANY SOVIET DECISION TO URGE, CAJOLE, OR PRESSURE THE AFGHAN LEADERSHIP TO SEEK POLITICAL SOLUTIONS TO ITS PROBLEMS. LIKEWISE, MOSCOW MAY WELL HAVE WANTED TO DEFLECT THE DRA'S WILLINGNESS TO BUILD TENSIONS WITH ITS NEIGHBORS (ESPECIALLY PAKISTAN), A TREND WHICH COULD HAVE LED TO AN AFGHAN APPEAL FOR SOVIET HELP TO COUNTER FOREIGN "AGGRESSION" (REF F). MOREOVER, THE CHILL IN AFGHAN-U.S. RELATIONS, AND THE DRASTIC REDUCTION OF OUR ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE PROGRAM (ESPECIALLY SINCE THE JULY 13 VOTE BY A SENATE-HOUSE CONFERENCE COMMITTEE TO CUT AID), COULD ALSO HAVE BEEN VIEWED BY THE KREMLIN AS COUNTER TO SOVIET LARGER INTERESTS, SINCE MOSCOW OR ITS SURROGATES WILL PROBABLY HAVE TO TAKE UP THE ASSISTANCE SLACK IF OTHER FREE-WORLD DONORS DEPART FROM THE AID FIELD HERE, AND BECAUSE AND EVEN GREATER PERCEIVED DEPENDENCE BY THE DRA ON THE SOVIETS WOULD PROBABLY EXACERBATE THE DOMESTIC UNREST, RATHER THAN AMELIORATE IT. IN THE LAST ANALYSIS, A CONCERN THAT AN AFGHAN SOS WAS BECOMING MORE AND MORE LIKELY, AS WELL AS "JUSTIFIED" IN TERMS OF THE 1978 BILATERAL TREATY, AT A TIME WHEN MOSCOW HAD LARGER INTERESTS WHICH IT PROBABLY DID NOT WANT TO THREATEN BY PURSUING A DECISION TO INTERVENE, MAY WELL HAVE BEEN THE BOTTOM-LINE CONSIDERATION IN DISPATCHING SAFRONCHUK ON HIS MISSION TO KABUL.

8. A POLITICAL RESOLUTION WILL PROBABLY REQUIRE MORE "CONCESSIONS" THAN HAVE SURFACED HERETOFORE: BASED ON OUR READING OF WHAT MAKES THE INSURGENT'S FIGHT, WE BELIEVE THAT THE DRA LEADERSHIP WILL HAVE TO SWEATEN THE POT CONSIDERABLY MORE BEFORE THE TIDE CAN BE TURNED IN THE COUNTRYSIDE. THE VARIOUS REFORM PROGRAMS DID INDEED CONTRIBUTE A GREAT DEAL TO THE GROWTH OF DOMESTIC HOSTILITY TOWARD THIS REGIME, BUT, NEVERTHELESS, THE OVERWHELMING MOTIVATION FOR MOST AFGHAN PEASANTS WHO HAVE TAKEN UP ARMS HAS BEEN THEIR PERCEPTION THAT THE KHALQIS ARE ATHEISTS, COMMUNISTS, AND SOVIET PUPPETS. TO DISPEL THESE DEEPLY-HELD BELIEFS WILL CLEARLY REQUIRE GREAT SKILL AND SUBSTANTIVE CONCESSIONS WELL EXCEEDING WHAT THE REGIME HAS DONE SO FAR. WHETHER THE SOVIETS AND THE DRA LEADERSHIP CAN COME UP WITH AGREED AND NECESSARY NEXT STEPS REMAINS TO BE SEEN, BUT THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT THEIR TASK IS FORMIDABLE.

9. AVAILABLE OPTIONS ARE NOT PLENTIFUL; IF, IN FACT, THE GROWTH OF THE OPPOSITION HAS NOT BEEN COMPLETELY STUNTED BY THE GOVERNMENT'S REPRESSIVE MOVES SO FAR, THERE STILL ARE NOT MANY MORE STEPS AVAILABLE TO CREATE AN ALTERNATE REGIME WHICH WOULD CARRY ANY GENUINE POSSIBILITY OF TURNING THE TIDE, YET STOP SHORT OF THREATENING THE INTEGRITY OF THE REVOLUTION.

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 RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1635  
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 RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS 3154  
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 3 OF 3 KABUL 5433

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E.O. 12065: GDS 7-17-85 (TAYLOR, JAMES E.) OR-P

10. THE MOST PROBABLE, AND PERHAPS THE MOST NECESSARY, WOULD BE A CHANGE IN THE DRA'S TOP LEADERSHIP, ENCOMPASSING THE DEPARTURE OF AMIN OR TARAQI — OR BOTH. BASED ON SOME INDICATIONS (THE RECENT SPATE OF UNDERGROUND TRACTS, MOST OF WHICH HAVE BITTERLY ATTACKED AMIN), AND ON A GENERAL "FEEL" AMONG VIRTUALLY ALL OUR AFGHAN CONTACTS, TARAQI IS INCREASINGLY VIEWED AS A FIGUREHEAD WHO SHOULD NOT BE TAKEN SERIOUSLY. THE REAL VILLAIN IS AMIN, WHO IS CONSIDERED RESPONSIBLE FOR, INTER ALIA, THE DRA'S OPPRESSIVE POLICIES OF ARREST, TORTURE, AND EXECUTION, AS WELL AS THE DRIVING FORCE BEHIND THE GRATING DOMESTIC REFORM PROGRAMS, AND AFGHANISTAN'S ARDENT EMBRACE OF THE USSR. THEREFORE, ANY SINCERE ATTEMPT TO RECONCILE THE FORCES LOOSE IN AFGHANISTAN THROUGH A LEADERSHIP CHANGE WOULD PROBABLY HAVE TO INCLUDE THE DEPARTURE, OR — BETTER YET — THE DEATH OF AMIN (IN THIS LAND OF THE BLOOD FEUD, SOME KHALQI LEADER HAS TO PAY THE TRADITIONAL PRICE FOR THOUSANDS OF DEATHS). WE COULD FORESEE A SCENARIO IN WHICH TARAQI WOULD REMAIN AS THE POLITICALLY IMPOTENT "GREAT LEADER." IN THIS REGARD, THE CONSTANTLY BUILDING TARAQI "PERSONALITY CULT" (SYMBOLIZED MOST RECENTLY BY THE LAVISH CELEBRATIONS SURROUNDING HIS 62ND BIRTHDAY ON JULY 14) SUGGESTS THAT TARAQI'S DEPARTURE WOULD BE A WRECKING ONE FOR THE REVOLUTION, AND WOULD BE UNDERTAKEN ONLY AS

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A DESPERATE LAST RESORT. INCIDENTALLY, TARAKI IS STILL RESPECTED BY ELEMENTS IN NON-THALQI SEGMENTS OF AFGHAN SOCIETY, PARTICULARLY IN THE RANKS OF THE EDUCATED.

11. THE SALIENT QUESTION, OF COURSE, IS WHETHER THE SOVIETS CARRY SUFFICIENT WEIGHT THAT THEIR "ADVICE" COULD CONVINCE TARAKI AND/OR AMIN TO SACRIFICE HIMSELF FOR THE SAKE OF THE REVOLUTION. EVERYTHING WOULD DEPEND ON HOW SUCH ADVICE WAS COUCHED. PROBABLY THE MOST VIABLE APPROACH ALONG THESE LINES WOULD BE THE THESIS THAT THE STATE OF AFFAIRS FOR THIS GOVERNMENT HAS REACHED THE POINT THAT THE SHEER EXISTENCE OF THE REVOLUTION MANDATES THE "HONORABLE AND VOLUNTARY" RETIREMENT OF CERTAIN MEMBERS OF THE DRA LEADERSHIP. AT THE SAME TIME, MOSCOW WOULD THEREAFTER "GUARANTEE" THE FUTURE OF THE REVOLUTION THROUGH PLEDGES OF INCREASED MILITARY AND ECONOMIC SUPPORT. RECENT STATEMENTS BY THE SOVIET ELITE PROMISING SUPPORT FOR THE AFGHAN "PEOPLE," AND THE ARRIVAL IN AFGHANISTAN OF DOZENS OF SOVIET HELICOPTER PILOTS, INDICATES THAT MOSCOW IS PROBABLY REASSURING THE DRA LEADERSHIP OF CONTINUED SOVIET BACKING, DESPITE THE SIMULTANEOUS CAMPAIGN TO FIND A POLITICAL SOLUTION.

12. SOVIET MISCALCULATION OR HEAVY-HANDEDNESS, OR A TARAKI-AMIN DECISION THAT THEY TRULY HAVE NO OPTION, BUT TO FORGE AHEAD ALONG CURRENT PATHS, COULD VERY POSSIBLY SCOTCH ANY SEARCH FOR A NON-MILITARY APPROACH TO THE INSTURGENCY. WE DOUBT THAT THE SOVIETS ARE WILLING OR ABLE TO FORCE THE REMOVAL OF ANY OF THE DRA LEADERSHIP, ALTHOUGH MOSCOW MAY EVENTUALLY DECIDE TO LEND "SUPPORT" TO ANY ELEMENTS WHICH DISPLAY AN INCLINATION TO SETTLE THE CONFLICT SHORT OF AN APPEAL FOR DIRECT SOVIET MILITARY HELP. THIS COULD INCLUDE A COUP D'ETAT BY THE AFGHAN MILITARY.

13. INTRANSIGENCE ON THE PART OF TARAKI AND AMIN, OR AN ABORTED SOVIET CAMPAIGN WHICH MAY NOW BE UNDERWAY, WOULD PROBABLY SIGNAL "MORE OF THE SAME" FROM THE DRA, A STANCE WHICH WOULD LEAD TO FURTHER CONFLICT, BLOODSHED, AND INSTABILITY. THIS LOWERED THRESHOLD OF VIOLENCE WOULD, OF COURSE, CARRY SERIOUS SECURITY IMPLICATIONS FOR FOREIGNERS STATIONED IN THIS COUNTRY.

14. CONCLUSIONS: WE MAY BE IN THE MIDST OF A SOVIET ATTEMPT TO NUDGE OR PUSH AFGHAN POLICIES IN DIRECTIONS WHICH WOULD REVERSE THE GROWTH OF DOMESTIC OPPOSITION, AND DEFUSE DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN HOSTILITY TO THIS REGIME, SO THAT, IN THE LAST ANALYSIS, MOSCOW WILL NOT HAVE TO FACE AN AFGHAN APPEAL FOR DIRECT MILITARY HELP. AT THE SAME TIME, STATEMENTS BY THE SOVIET ELITE AND INDICATIONS OF INCREASED SOVIET MILITARY INVOLVEMENT SUGGEST A

PARALLEL POLICY AIMED AT INSURING THE FUTURE OF THE REVOLU-  
TION, ALTHOUGH PERHAPS WITHOUT THE PRESENT COMPOSITION OF  
THE AFGHAN LEADERSHIP.

15. SAFRONCHUK COULD BE THE LOCAL BEHIND-THE-SCENES DIRECTOR  
OF THIS PARTICULAR DRAMA, BUT THE PROBLEMS AND PITFALLS CON-  
FRONTING HIM AND THE DRA LEADERSHIP ARE FORMIDABLE, AND THE  
UNKNOWN REMAINING IN THE EQUATION ARE STILL NUMEROUS. AMSTUTZ

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SECRET SECTION 1 OF 2 KABUL 5459

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E.O. 12265: RDS 7/18/99 (AMSTUTZ, J. BRUCE) OR-M  
TAGS: PINT, PINR, AF, US  
SUBJ: (S) GDR AMBASSADOR REPORTS THAT SOVIETS HOPE TO REPLACE  
PRIME MINISTER AMIN WITH A BROADER BASED GOVT.

REF: KABUL 5433

1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT)
2. SUMMARY. I HAVE JUST HAD AN EXTRAORDINARY MEETING WITH GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC AMBASSADOR DR. HERMANN SCHWIESAU. IT WAS EXTRAORDINARY ON ACCOUNT OF WHAT HE "DISCLOSED" WITH RESPECT TO SOVIET INTENTIONS HERE INCLUDING THE LIKELIHOOD OF A SOVIET-BACKED MOVE TO OUST PRIME MINISTER HAFIZULLAH AMIN. OVER THE LAST 3 WEEKS WE HAVE HAD HINTS OF A POSSIBLE SOVIET-ASSISTED INTERNAL COUP, BOTH FROM GDR AMBASSADOR SCHWIESAU (KABUL 5246) AND EARLIER FROM SOVIET MINISTER-COUNSELOR VASILY STEPANOVICH SAFRONCHUK (KABUL 4888). THIS TIME, THE GDR AMBASSADOR WENT MUCH FURTHER IN SPELLING OUT SOVIET DISSATISFACTION WITH THE DRA, THE SOVIET DILEMMA ABOUT WHAT TO DO, AND THE POSSIBILITY OF AN INTERNAL PARTY COUP TO ELIMINATE AMIN. HE HINTED THAT THIS MIGHT OCCUR IN AUGUST. END SUMMARY.

3. ON JULY 17, I PAID A CALL ON SCHWIESAU. HE HAD CALLED ON CHARGE FLATIN ON JULY 9, AND BESIDES WANTING TO RETURN THE COURTESY CALL, I WELCOMED AN EXCUSE TO SEE HIM. WE TALKED AN HOUR. OF ALL THE PRO-MOSCOW COMMUNIST COUNTRY AMBASSADORS HERE, SCHWIESAU IS PERHAPS THE MOST ASTUTE AND INTELLIGENT, AND CERTAINLY THE MOST APPROACHABLE. ALONE AMONG PRO-MOSCOW COMMUNIST DIPLOMATS, HE CALLS PERIODICALLY ON WESTERN AND THIRD-WORLD DIPLOMATS, AND INVARIABLY LIKES TO ENGAGE IN CANDID POLITICAL DISCUSSIONS ABOUT AFGHANISTAN. HE HAS BEEN PROVED TO BE ONE OF OUR MOST IMPORTANT SOURCES OF INFO ABOUT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE KABUL COMMUNIST DIPLOMATIC COMMUNITY AND RECENTLY ABOUT MOSCOW'S THINKING.

4. SOVIET DISSATISFACTION WITH THE DRA: YESTERDAY WE SENT A REPORT (REFTEL) ANALYZING THE PRESSURES SEEMINGLY BUILDING UP FOR AN INTERNAL CHANGE IN THE DRA LEADERSHIP. WHAT SCHWIESAU TOLD ME AT OUR MEETING CONFIRMED ALL THIS, INCLUDING THE EXISTENCE OF BEHIND-THE-SCENES NEGOTIATIONS BY SOVIET MINISTER-COUNSELOR SAFRONCHUK WITH PDPA PARTY LEADERS AND OTHERS TO BRING ABOUT AN INTERNAL CHANGE. SCHWIESAU REPEATEDLY SAID THAT THE SOVIETS WERE DEEPLY WORRIED OVER THE WORSENING SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN. HE SAID, "THEY KNOW THE REGIME HAS LITTLE PUBLIC SUPPORT AND IS LOSING CONTROL OF THE COUNTRY." WHILE TELLING ME THIS, HE ALSO SAID, "WE ARE DETERMINED TO SAVE THE REVOLUTION."

5. SCHWIESAU CLEARLY LAID THE BLAME FOR THE DRA'S TROUBLES ON PRIME MINISTER/FOREIGN MINISTER HAFIZULLAH AMIN. HE DESCRIBED AMIN AS "THE STRONG MAN" IN AFGHANISTAN. "HE PERSONALLY RUNS THE ENTIRE GOVT," HE SAID, "CONTROLLING THE ARMY, THE INTERIOR MINISTRY, AND HE MAKES ALL IMPORTANT DECISIONS." AMIN HAS BLUNDERED BADLY, HE SAID, IN THE WAY HE HAS IMPLEMENTED THE GOVT'S ECONOMIC AND REFORM PROGRAMS, AND PARTICULARLY IN THE WAY HE HAS "HARSHLY" ACTED AGAINST PERSONS HE SUSPECTED MIGHT OPPOSE HIM.

*Amin is  
blamed*

6. SCHWIESAU DISMISSED TARAKI AS INEFFECTIVE. HE DESCRIBED HIM AS AN "OLD, KINDLY TEACHER, PHILOSOPHER, AND WRITER" WHO IS WELL INTENTIONED, AND LOVES THE ADULATION HEAPED ON HIM IN THE PRESS ("ESPECIALLY THE PICTURES"). "WE SUSPECT," SCHWIESAU SAID, "THAT HE DOES NOT KNOW MUCH OF WHAT IS GOING ON IN THE COUNTRY."

7. SOVIET MANEUVERS: SCHWIESAU CONFIRMED THAT SOVIET MINISTER-COUNSELOR SAFRONCHUK HAS BEEN GIVEN THE TASK, BY MOSCOW, TO BRING ABOUT A "RADICAL CHANGE" IN THE GOVT. SAFRONCHUK WAS GIVEN THIS TASK, SCHWIESAU SAID, BECAUSE, "IT IS NOT GOOD FOR THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR HIMSELF TO BE SEEN HOLDING THESE DELICATE NEGOTIATIONS." HE CONTINUED, "IF THESE NEGOTIATIONS FAIL, AND/OR SAFRONCHUK WERE EXPELLED AS PERSONA NON GRATA, THAT WOULD ATTRACT LESS ATTENTION AND BE LESS OF A DIPLOMATIC EMBARRASSMENT FOR THE SOVIET UNION THAN IF AMBASSADOR PUZANOV WERE EXPELLED."

8. AS TO WHAT IS LIKELY TO HAPPEN, SCHWIESAU CLEARLY INDICATED THAT A MILITARY INTRAPARTY COUP, DEPOSING AMIN AND PERHAPS OTHERS, IS WHAT THE SOVIETS INTEND. SCHWIESAU SAID THERE ARE NOW DEEP DIVISIONS IN THE PDPA PARTY, MANY OF WHOSE LEADING MEMBERS ARE VERY DISSATISFIED WITH THE PRESENT COURSE OF EVENTS AND AMIN'S LEADERSHIP. HE SAID THAT WHAT IS NEEDED IS A NEW PRIME MINISTER WHO IS A "STRONG MAN" AND "NOT IDENTIFIED" WITH "PRESENT" POLICIES. *Comp*

9. WHEN I MENTIONED DEFENSE MINISTER WATANJAR AS A POSSIBILITY, SCHWIESAU ACTED AS IF I HAD CAUGHT HIM IN A SECRET. AFTER A PAUSE, HE SAID WATANJAR IS "NOT A POLITICIAN, BUT OF COURSE THE MILITARY IS KEY TO ANY CHANGE." THEN HE WENT ON TO OBSERVE THAT, SINCE THE REVOLUTION, WATANJAR HAS NEVER MADE A SPEECH THAT WAS PRINTED IN THE PRESS AND THAT HIS EXACT POLITICAL VIEWS ARE NOT CLEAR TO THE PUBLIC, IMPLYING BY THIS THAT WATANJAR WAS "CLEAN." SCHWIESAU WENT ON, HOWEVER, TO HINT THAT WHILE WATANJAR MIGHT PLAY A ROLE IN A COUNTER COUP, HE WAS NOT LIKELY TO BE PRIME MINISTER SINCE "HE WAS NOT EXPERIENCED."

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SECRET SECTION 2 OF 2 KABUL 5459

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10. SEVERAL TIMES SCHWIESAU SAID, "WE ARE NOW SEEING THE CLOSING CHAPTER OF THIS GOVT." HE MUST HAVE USED THE TERM, "CLOSING CHAPTER", AT LEAST THREE TIMES TO ME. AS TO WHEN THE CHANGE WAS LIKELY TO OCCUR, SCHWIESAU HINTED THAT IT COULD HAPPEN ANY TIME BUT WOULD MOST LIKELY TAKE PLACE IN AUGUST. HE SAID HE WAS SENDING HIS WIFE TO EAST BERLIN SOON FOR "THREE OR FOUR WEEKS REST," AND LATER HE TOLD ME HE HIMSELF COULD NOT POSSIBLY LEAVE KABUL THIS SUMMER SINCE "AUGUST IS GOING TO BE HOT, AND I DON'T MEAN THE WEATHER." EARLIER IN OUR CONVERSATION, HE SAID THAT THE SITUATION WITHIN THE GOVT WAS HIGHLY UNSTABLE AND THAT SECURITY IN KABUL COULD DETERIORATE ANY TIME, SO FAST IN FACT THAT IT WOULD BE "IMPOSSIBLE TO EVACUATE DEPENDENTS."

11. SOVIET INTERESTS: SCHWIESAU SAID THAT NO INTERNAL PARTY "RADICAL CHANGE" COULD OCCUR HERE WITHOUT SOVIET SUPPORT, AND THAT SOVIET INTERESTS WOULD HAVE TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT BY ANY NEW AFGHAN GOVT. "AFTER ALL," HE SAID, "AFGHANISTAN BORDERS THE SOVIET UNION AND JUST AS YOU HAVE A SPECIAL INTEREST IN ANYTHING HAPPENING IN CANADA AND MEXICO, THE SOVIET UNION HAS A SPECIAL INTEREST IN AFGHANISTAN." THUS, HE SAID, A POLITICAL SOLUTION HAS TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THREE FACTORS: "SAVING THE FACE OF THE SOVIETS, SAVING THE FACE OF THE AFGHAN PARTY (PDPA), AND SAVING THE FACE OF MUSLIMS."



12. IN CONNECTION WITH SAVING SOVIET FACE, SCHWIESAU SAID THAT THE SOVIETS HAD TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THEIR RELATIONSHIP AND REPUTATION WITH "OTHER PARTIES AROUND THE WORLD." IF THE SOVIETS WERE SEEN TO ABANDON THE PARTY HERE IN AFGHANISTAN, HE SAID, IT WOULD HAVE A "VERY UPSETTING EFFECT ON PARTIES ELSEWHERE WHICH WERE FRIENDLY WITH MOSCOW." THIS COMMENT TRACKS WITH HIS COMMENT MENTIONED ABOVE (PARA 4) THAT, "WE MUST SAVE THE REVOLUTION."

13. QUESTION OF SOVIET MILITARY INTERVENTION IN AFGHANISTAN. TOWARD THE END OF OUR CONVERSATION, SCHWIESAU VOLUNTARILY RAISED THIS QUESTION. HE SAID HE WAS AWARE THERE WAS SPECULATION IN THE DIPLOMATIC COMMUNITY AS TO WHETHER THE SOVIETS WOULD, IN THE LAST ANALYSIS, INTERVENE MILITARILY IN AFGHANISTAN. "WERE THEY TO DO SO," HE SAID, "IT WOULD SOLVE ONE PROBLEM BUT CREATE ANOTHER." SOVIET INTERVENTION COULD ELIMINATE THE PRESENT GOVT THEREBY SOLVING ONE PROBLEM. IT WOULD, HOWEVER, CREATE ANOTHER PROBLEM; NAMELY, THAT THE "ENTIRE AFGHAN NATION" WOULD TURN AGAINST THE SOVIETS, JUST AS THE AFGHANS TURNED AGAINST THE "BRITISH INVADERS" IN THE 19TH CENTURE. HENCE, HE SAID, IT MADE NO SENSE FOR THE SOVIETS TO INTERVENE MILITARILY.

14. THE PARCHAMISTS: SCHWIESAU, IN DISCUSSING THE PARCHAMISTS, COMMENTED THAT TARAKI HIMSELF HAD BEEN ACCEPTABLE TO THE PARCHAMIST WING. THIS WAS NOT THE CASE WITH HAFIZULLAH AMIN. EXILED PARCHAMIST LEADER, BABRAK KARMAL, AND AMIN WERE "RIVALS." SCHWIESAU OBSERVED THAT IT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE FOR AMIN AND BABRAK KARMAL TO BE IN THE SAME GOVT. REFLECTING ON THE TWO WINGS OF THE PARTY AT THE TIME OF THE REVOLUTION, SCHWIESAU CONFIRMED OUR IMPRESSION THAT THE PARCHAMISTS HAD A WIDER FOLLOWING THAN THE KHALQIS WITHIN THE PARTY AND AMONG PARTY SYMPATHIZERS, BUT THAT THE KHALQIS WERE STRONGER IN THE MILITARY. THE LATTER'S STRENGTH IN THE MILITARY PROVED DECISIVE, SCHWIESAU OBSERVED, IN PURGING THE PARCHAMISTS. I ASKED HIM WHETHER HE HAD INFORMATION AS WE DID, THAT MANY PARCHAMISTS HAD BEEN RECENTLY RELEASED FROM PUL-E-CHARKI PRISON. HE SHOOK HIS HEAD. HE SAID THOUGH THAT, AT THIS PRESENT JUNCTURE IN THE CRISES FACING THE DRA, IT WAS NOT ENOUGH TO BRING BACK PARCHAMISTS INTO THE GOVT. "IT IS NECESSARY TO BROADEN THE BASE OF THE GOVT FAR BEYOND THE PARCHAMISTS." TWO OTHER THINGS NEED TO BE DONE TOO, HE SAID. ONE WAS TO RELEASE MANY POLITICAL PRISONERS ("EVEN PARTY MEMBERS HAVE BEEN ARRESTED"), AND THE OTHER WAS FOR A NEW GOVT TO BE "FRIENDS WITH THE MOSLEM COUNTRIES."

15. BITS AND PIECES: SCHWIESAU OBSERVED THAT THE DRA HAS "LOST CONTROL OF MANY PROVINCES." WHEN I ASKED HIM FOR EXAMPLES, HE SAID HERAT (THOUGH WE KNOW HERAT CITY REMAINS IN DRA HANDS) AND THE PROVINCES IN THE CENTRAL PART OF THE COUNTRY (THE HAZARAJAT REGION).

16. HE THOUGHT IRANIAN INFLUENCE IN AFGHANISTAN WAS MORE DANGEROUS TO THE GOVT THAN THAT OF PAKISTAN. WHEN I ASKED HIM WHY, HE SAID IT WAS BECAUSE OF IRANIAN RELIGIOUS INFLUENCE OVER THE SHIJA POPULATION WHICH RELIGIOUS ELEMENT PREDOMINATED IN THE PROVINCES BORDERING IRAN AND IN THE PROVINCES MAKING UP THE MOUNTAINOUS CENTRAL MASSIF.

17. THEN, SOMEWHAT IN CONTRADICTION TO THE ABOVE REMARK, HE SAID THAT THE PUSHTUNS WERE POLITICALLY THE MOST IMPORTANT ETHNIC ELEMENT IN THE COUNTRY. HENCE, SINCE SO MANY OF THE PUSHTUNS WERE "OPPOSING THE REGIME MILITARILY," THIS WAS ANOTHER SERIOUS POLITICAL PROBLEM.

(X) 18. COMMENT: AS A RESULT OF THIS CONVERSATION, TOGETHER WITH EARLIER ONES MENTIONED, WE BELIEVE THE EVIDENCE IS NOW CLEAR THAT THE SOVIETS ARE DISSATISFIED WITH HAFIZULLAH AMIN AND ARE TRYING TO ENGINEER A "RADICAL CHANGE." WE ARE ALSO TEMPTED TO BELIEVE THAT THE SOVIETS, BY MEANS OF SAFRONCHUK'S CONVERSATION WITH ME ON JUNE 24, AND SCHWIESAU'S TWO CONVERSATIONS WITH US ON JULY 9 AND 17, HAVE TRIED TO SEND US A SIGNAL. THAT SIGNAL SEEMS TO BE THAT, THEY ARE UNHAPPY WITH THE AMIN REGIME, THAT THEY ARE TRYING TO ARRANGE A CHANGE, AND (I AM SPECULATING HERE) ARE HOPING THIS WILL NOT HAVE A NEGATIVE IMPACT ON US. ONE COULD ALSO DRAW THE CONCLUSION THAT, WITH THE OBVIOUS SLIPPING GRIP THE DRA HAS OVER THE COUNTRY, THE SOVIETS HOPE THAT BY BRINGING ABOUT A CHANGE AND BROADENING THE BASE OF THE GOVT, AND BY POSSIBLY MAKING AMIN A SCAPEGOAT, THEY CAN AVOID LOSING THEIR INVESTMENT IN THIS MARXIST PARTY AND GOVT, AND AVOID A MAJOR BLOW TO SOVIET INTERNATIONAL PRESTIGE. AMST/ITZ

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RUSBQD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 9033  
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1753  
RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 7091  
RUMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 335  
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SECRET KABUL 5470

19 Jul 79 112

*C. H. H. H. H.*  
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EXDIS

E.O. 12065: RDS-1 7/19/99 (FLATIN, BRUCE A.) OR-M  
TAGS: PINT, PINS, PINR, AF, GE, US  
SUBJECT: (S) FURTHER COMMENTS BY EAST GERMAN AMBASSADOR ABOUT  
SOVIET EFFORTS TO ALTER AFGHAN REGIME

REF: KABUL 5459

1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. SUMMARY: EAST GERMAN AMBASSADOR SCHWIESAU HAS IDENTIFIED  
CERTAIN NON-PUSHTUN CABINET MINISTERS AS BEING IN SUPPORT OF  
CURRENT SOVIET MACHINATIONS TO ALTER THE AFGHAN REGIME.  
SCHWIESAU THINKS IT MIGHT BE TOO LATE TO ACHIEVE A POLITICAL  
SOLUTION TO THE PRESENT MESS IN AFGHANISTAN. END OF SUMMARY.

3. DURING A CONVERSATION WITH THE A/DCM AT A SOCIAL  
EVENT ON JULY 18, DR. HERMANN SCHWIESAU, AMBASSADOR OF THE  
GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC, EXPANDED SOMEWHAT ON THE  
PRESENTATION HE MADE TO CHARGE AMSTUTZ ON JULY 17  
CONCERNING CURRENT SOVIET EFFORTS TO RESTRUCTURE THE  
AFGHAN REGIME (REFTEL). SCHWIESAU EXERCISED CARE TO  
CONVEY HIS VIEWS ONLY TO THE AMERICAN OFFICER, CHANGING  
THE TOPIC OF CONVERSATION WHEN THE BRITISH AND JAPANESE  
AMBASSADORS JOINED THE GROUP.

4. WHEN ASKED WHETHER HE THOUGH PRIME MINISTER HAFIZULLAH AMIN, THE PRIMARY TARGET OF THE SOVIET MACHINATIONS, IS AWARE OF WHAT IS HAPPENING, SCHWIESAU AFFIRMED THAT AMIN IS VERY ALERT TO DEVELOPMENTS, BUT ~~PROBABLY NOT AWARE OF EVERYTHING THAT HAS OCCURRED DURING THE PAST WEEK, WHEN THE SOVIET EFFORT HAS MOVED INTO A MORE ACTIVE PHASE.~~ WHEN ASKED WHETHER AMIN WOULD ACCEPT HIS FATE QUIETLY OR FIGHT, SCHWIESAU REPLIED THAT HE DID NOT KNOW.

*Right letter?*

5. AS MEMBERS OF THE ANTI-AMIN ALIGNMENT, SCHWIESAU IDENTIFIED THE FOLLOWING MINISTERS, NOTING THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE FACT THAT ALL ARE NON-PUSHTUN: FINANCE MINISTER ABDUL KARIM MISAQ, A HAZARA; JUSTICE MINISTER ABDUL HAKIM SHARAFI JAUZJANI, AN UZBEK; PUBLIC WORKS MINISTER DASTAGIR PANJSHIRI, A TAJIK; AND MINISTER OF INFORMATION AND CULTURE BAREQ-SHAFIYE, A TAJIK. (HE DID NOT MENTION OTHER NON-PUSHTUNS, LIKE MINISTER OF COMMERCE ABDUL QUDUS GHORBANDI, A TAJIK, OR MINISTER OF MINES AND INDUSTRIES MOHAMMAD ISMAIL DANESH, A KUZILBASH.) SCHWIESAU IMPLIED THAT AN IMPORTANT PART OF THE CURRENT POLITICAL PROBLEM IS THE EXCESSIVE PUSHTUNIZATION TENDENCIES OF THE CURRENT KHALQI LEADERSHIP.

*Name names*

6. WHEN THE A/DCM OBSERVED THAT IT NOW SEEMED A LITTLE LATE IN THE GAME FOR AN ATTEMPT TO ACHIEVE A POLITICAL SOLUTION TO THE KHALQI MESS, SCHWIESAU GRAVELY NODDED HIS AGREEMENT. SCHWIESAU FURTHER AGREED THAT A GENUINELY EXPANDED POLITICAL BASE WOULD NOW APPEAR DIFFICULT TO CONSTRUCT SINCE THE KHALQIS SEEM TO HAVE ALIENATED ALMOST EVERY ELEMENT OF AFGHAN SOCIETY.

7. SCHWIESAU WENT ON TO COMPLAIN BITTERLY ABOUT THE RASH INCOMPETENCE OF THE KHALQI LEADERSHIP THAT INEVITABLY LED TO THE CURRENT SITUATION. AS AN EXAMPLE, HE CITED THE CONTROVERSIAL LAND REFORM PROGRAM, WHICH HAS BEEN RESPONSIBLE FOR MUCH OF THE OPPOSITION IN THIS COUNTRY. SCHWIESAU RECALLED THAT HE HAD WARNED THE KHALQIS LAST YEAR TO GO SLOW WITH A COMPLICATED PROGRAM OF THIS TYPE, ADVISING THEM THAT THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC, "THE MOST ADVANCED SOCIETY IN THE SOCIALIST CAMP," HAD CAREFULLY PHASED ITS LAND-REFORM PROGRAM OVER A FIFTEEN-YEAR PERIOD. SCHWIESAU ADDED GLUMLY THAT THE OVERLY ENTHUSIASTIC KHALQIS REJECTED HIS ADVICE -- AND STATED THEIR CONVICTION THAT THE AFGHAN PEOPLE WOULD SUPPORT THEIR ACCELERATED PROGRAM. AFTER SIX MONTHS, SCHWIESAU OBSERVED, IT WAS CLEAR THAT LAND REFORM WAS A DISASTER. HE RECALLED HOW MANY LANDLESS AND "LAND-POOR" PEASANTS HAD WANTED TO REFUSE TO ACCEPT LAND BECAUSE OF RELIGIOUS SCRUPLES OR FEAR OF FUTURE RETRIBUTION BY THE DEPRIVED LANDLORDS. THE KHALQIS FORCED THEM TO ACCEPT THE LAND, THREATENING THEM WITH IMPRISONMENT IF THEY REFUSED. ACCORDING TO SCHWIESAU, SEVERAL OF THESE PEASANTS LATER COMMITTED SUICIDE.

8. COMMENT: THROUGH SCHWIESAU, THE SOVIETS WOULD SEEM TO BE TRYING TO MAKE CERTAIN THAT WE ARE BEING KEPT "INZRMED" 15 /5-

/S5 \$3;3390.3,5 -- FOGIWHATEVER PURPOSE THEY HAVE IN MIND. (AN INTERESTING NOTE, INCIDENTALLY, IS THAT SCHWIESAU HAD A LARGE BOUQUET OF YOWERS DELIVERED CHARGE AMSTUTZ AFTER THEIR JULY 17 MEETING.)

9. THIS EMBASSY REMAINS SKEPTICAL THAT THE SOVIETS WILL BE ABLE TO BROADEN THE POLITICAL BASE OF THE AFGHAN REGIME SUFFICIENTLY TO STILL THE WIDESPREAD INSURRECTION IN AFGHANISTAN. WE FREQUENTLY HEAR RUMORS THAT THE SOVIETS ARE STILL TRYING TO BUILD A NEW REGIME AROUND FORMER ROYALIST PRIME MINISTER YUSUF, WHO WOULD PROBABLY SERVE AS A FIGUREHEAD PERSONAGE. THE LARGE NUMBERS OF AFGHANS WHO HAVE NOW BEEN INCITED TO BLOOD-FELD ACTION ARE UNLIKELY TO BE FOOLED BY OLD WINE IN NEW BOTTLES. ANY SOLUTION INVOLVING THE REPLACEMENT OF KHALQIS BY PARCHAMISTS WOULD ALSO BE A LOSER. THE LATTER ARE ALSO REGARDED BY AFGHANS AS PRO-MOSCOW ATHEISTS.

AMSTUTZ

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TO RUEFEC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4915  
INFO RUOMGU/AMEMBASSY ANTARA 3576  
RUSPBD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 9070  
RUDTIC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1706  
RUEFFMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1777  
RUS2AE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 7130  
RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS 3179  
RUOMFR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 349  
RUEHQQA/CINCPAC  
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E.O. 12065: GDS 7-29-65 (TAYLOR, JAMES E.) OR-F  
TAGS: PGOV, PINS, AF  
SUBJECT: (LOU) AMIN GIVEN MORE DIRECT ROLE IN PROSECUTING  
COUNTERINSURGENCY

1. (C) SUMMARY: PRIME MINISTER AMIN HAS BEEN GIVEN A MORE DIRECT ROLE IN CARRYING OUT THE REGIME'S TRUGGLE AGAINST THE DOMESTIC INSURGENCY, AS WELL AS RESPONSIBILITY FOR DIRECTLY CONTROLLING AFFAIRS OF THE DEFENSE MINISTRY. THIS ENHANCED POSITION SUGGESTS HIS DEPARTURE FROM THE SCENE IS NOT YET IMMINENT, ALTHOUGH IT IS UNCLEAR WHERE THIS PARTICULAR DEVELOPMENT FITS IN THE STILL UNFOLDING POLITICAL DRAMA HERE. END OF SUMMARY.

2. (LOU) RADIO AFGHANISTAN, IN ITS EVENING NEWS BROADCAST ON JULY 27, CARRIED A "DECREE" FROM PRESIDENT NOOR MOHAMMAD TARAKI WHICH APPEARS TO ENHANCE THE ROLE OF PRIME MINISTER HAFIZULLAH AMIN IN COMBATING THE DOMESTIC INSURGENCY. ACCORDING TO THE ANNOUNCEMENT, "THE CONTINUED AGGRESSION" AGAINST AFGHANISTAN BY "PAKISTANI AND IRANIAN MILITIAMEN" HAS REQUIRED TARAKI TO ASSUME PERSONAL LEADERSHIP OF THE COUNTRY'S DEFENSE AND COMMAND OF THE ARMED FORCES. TARAKI, HOWEVER, HAS "ENTRUSTED" AMIN, IN ADDITION TO HIS OTHER DUTIES, WITH THE EXECUTION OF TARAKI'S ORDERS, AND HAS INSTRUCTED THE PRIME MINISTER TO REPORT REGULARLY REGARDING PROGRESS IN THE COUNTER-INSURGENCY EFFORT. MOREOVER, AMIN HAS BEEN INSTRUCTED TO "TAKE OVER" THE AFFAIRS OF THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE UNDER TARAKI'S

OVERALL COMMAND AND GUIDANCE.

3. (C) COMMENT: WHERE THIS PARTICULAR DEVELOPMENT FITS IN THE CURRENTLY UNFOLDING POLITICAL DRAMA HERE IS STILL UNCLEAR. WHAT SEEMS FAIRLY CERTAIN, HOWEVER, IS THAT THE AUTHORITY AND, PERHAPS, POLITICAL PRESTIGE OF DEFENSE MINISTER MOHAMMAD ASLAM WATANJAR HAS BEEN DIMINISHED. MANY OBSERVERS BELIEVE THAT WATANJAR COULD PLAY A PROMINENT PART IN ANY EFFORT TO ESTABLISH A MORE BROADLY BASED REGIME -- BECAUSE HE IS CONSIDERED MORE NATIONALIST THAN THE TARAKI/AMIN TEAM -- AND HIS FATE MAY PROVIDE HINTS REGARDING DIRECTIONS POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS MAY TAKE.

4. (C) AT A MINIMUM, THE ANNOUNCEMENT POINTS TO A LARGER AND MORE DIRECT ROLE FOR AMIN IN THE DRA'S ANTI-INSURGENCY BATTLE, A POSITION WHICH SUGGESTS THAT AMIN'S DEPARTURE -- TO PAVE THE WAY FOR SOME SORT OF "NATIONAL FRONT" REGIME -- IS NOT YET IMMINENT. UNCERTAINTIES CONCERNING THE LOYALTY AND MORALE OF THE ARMED FORCES COULD HAVE PROMPTED THIS MOVE, SINCE THE DRA LEADERSHIP MAY HAVE FELT THAT AMIN, RATHER THAN PROFESSIONAL SOLDIER WATANJAR, WILL BE MORE CAPABLE OF INSTILLING PROPER REVOLUTIONARY ZEAL WITHIN THE WEARY AND HARD-PRESSED AFGHAN MILITARY FORCES. AT THE TIME OF THE 1978 REVOLUTION, AMIN HAD MANY DIRECT PERSONAL TIES TO MILITARY OFFICERS, MOST OF WHOM HE HAD PERSONALLY RECRUITED INTO THE PARTY. THE CURRENT STATE OF THOSE TIES AFTER MORE THAN ONE YEAR OF PURGES, INSURGENCY, AND INSTABILITY IS UNKNOWN. AMSTUTZ

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Aug. 1979

THE POLITICAL AND MILITARY SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN

I. The localized tribal fighting that erupted in the eastern provinces when the pro-Soviet coup group seized power in late April 1978 has since grown into a countrywide insurgency. (S)

A. Faced with the hostility of the great majority of the traditionally independent population, the regime of President Taraki and Prime Minister Amin has no better than an even chance to complete its second year in power. (S)

B. Taraki and Amin will survive only as long as the loyalty of the military, the security service and the ruling party remains intact, under the heavy pressure being brought to bear by hostile forces. (S)

1. The most likely successor regime would be led by, or at least have the backing of leftist military officers. (S)

2. Coup plotters might seek Moscow's tacit approval to seize power would in any case retain strong ties with the Soviet Union. (S)

The Soviets favor the installation of a more broadly based government as a means of defusing the tribal insurgency. (S)

X- *pro-Communist*  
*in the*  
 Mr. Taraki X  
 Mr. Amin X  
 Mr. Babrak Karmal X  
 Mr. Nur Muhammad Taraki X  
 Mr. Abdulah X  
 Mr. Dost X  
 Mr. Yusuf X  
 Col. Ghulam Sakil A/F  
 Lt. Col. ... A/F

- II. Taraki and Amin have been the key figures in the regime since the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan seized power in April 1978. (S)
- A. However, Taraki, 62, is not in good health and there are signs he is playing a less active role than during the early days of the revolution. (S)
- B. Amin is de facto key decision-maker in the day-to-day affairs of the government. (S)
1. His status as the regime's <sup>4-2-80 P. 1.1.1</sup> mover and shaker was confirmed 31 March when he was promoted from deputy prime minister to prime minister, a post Taraki had held since the revolution. (S)
- C. The regime's key policymaking body is the ruling party's seven-man Political Bureau. (S)
1. Taraki, Amin and Deputy Prime Minister Shah Wali make up the Political Bureau's Secretariat. (S)
- D. The top party leadership seems fairly well united as it faces the country's multiple domestic problems. (S)
1. There are some frictions but the key figures recognize they must submerge their differences at a time when their survival is threatened by a countrywide insurgency. (S)
- III. The beleaguered Taraki regime's survival has come to depend increasingly, as the insurgency has spread, on Soviet political, military, economic and technical support. (There are between 1,500 and 2,000 Soviet advisers presently in Afghanistan.) (S)

- A. Afghanistan's nearly total dependence on Moscow has given the Soviets far more say in the Afghan Government's day-to-day decisionmaking process than they have ever had. (S)
1. Still, Taraki and Amin appear to be setting the main lines of policy. (S)
- B. The regime does not yet face a security situation that might prompt a request to Moscow for the direct intervention of Soviet forces. (S)
1. However, an appeal for Soviet combat units is conceivable within the next 12 months. (S)
- C. The Soviets will go to some lengths to protect their interests in Afghanistan but probably not to the extent of intervening militarily. (S) *at least*
1. The Soviets would be deterred by the prospects that their forces would be bogged down indefinitely trying to shore up a discredited regime. (S) *[Traditionally, strong central govt opposed by tribes when it lacks of tribes fight each other. Any Govt will be unstable & dependent on USSR]*
  2. Soviet leaders also have to weigh the regional-- particularly with respect to Iran, Pakistan and India--and international political costs of direct intervention. (S)
  3. However, if serious fighting broke out in areas near the Soviet border, Moscow might provide increased numbers of tactical aircraft, <sup>(F-24's)</sup> helicopters, <sub>(17)</sub> pilots and advisers to assist Kabul. (S)

*They could put small units in to protect Soviet personnel.*

*(T-62's) - 60 MIG-21 B's  
U-20's*

- IV. The government is making no progress against the tribal insurgency, which continues to spread and erode military capabilities. (S)
- A. If morale in the military continues to decline it will affect the government's ability to hold Kabul and other key cities. (S)
  - B. Casualties and defections to the rebels have left the regime short of men in major commands throughout the country. (S)
  - C. In spite of continuing Soviet support, the Afghans face problems in maintaining equipment and supplying units in the field. (S)
- V. The tribal insurgents operate with impunity in over half of the country. They have overrun a few government positions in the east and interdicted main roads for a few hours but they have been unable to seize an important town. (S)
- A. They lack centralized leadership and strategic coordination needed to unify them into a cohesive force. (S)
  - B. Still, they should be able to maintain pressure against the regime for some time. (S)
    - 1. They have a long tradition of guerrilla warfare and can draw on large manpower reserves. (S)
    - 2. Simple logistic requirements enable them to live off the land and to equip themselves with arms captured from government forces. (S)

Aug. 1979

REF ID: A1954

SOVIET POSITION IN THE THIRD WORLD

- I. The Soviets have suffered setbacks in relations with the US and the PRC and have made little progress in mending rifts inside the Communist alliance and movement, but they have clearly registered gains in the third world, particularly in Africa, the Middle East, South and Southeast Asia. Some of these gains have been marginal but--if cleverly exploited--could lead to larger triumphs.
- II. The extent of Soviet involvement in Africa has increased significantly in recent years.
  - A. The number of Soviet advisers--both military and civilian--in 29 African states now totals nearly 8,000. Cubans total almost 50,000.
  - B. The Soviet Union has signed friendship treaties with Angola, Ethiopia, and Mozambique--but had one abrogated by Somalia in 1977.
  - C. The USSR is the principle <sup>of</sup> foreign backer of the Angol<sub>o</sub> and Ethiopian governments, and is deeply involved with the Rhodesian patriotic front guerrilla movement.
- III. Moscow's greatest success in Africa has, of course, been in Ethiopia.

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*I would like to mention this Soviet presence with emphasis and  
highlight the importance of Cuba in Africa and the  
USSR club of the Americas.*

- A. Mengistu could not have pulled off his military success in the Ogaden and his more limited achievement in Eritrea without Soviet guidance, assistance, and logistic support. The Ogaden campaign in particular was conceived and led by a Soviet general officer--an unprecedented involvement for the Soviets in the third world. And involved 12,400-15,000 Cuban troops, equipped by Soviets.
1. The Soviets have nearly 2,000 military and civilian advisers in Ethiopia and the conclusion of the Soviet-Ethiopian friendship treaty in November indicates that Moscow is digging for the long haul.
  2. Possible base rights to replace those lost in Somalia.
    - a. Dahlak Island with floating pier and floating barge.
- B. But Ethiopia still independent and ethnocentric. Some differences in relations and ultimately Soviets may go out as did in Egypt, etc.

1. Economic agreements suggest Soviets may make a special effort to meet some of Ethiopia's more important needs and thus assure Moscow's long-term presence.

IV. Relations between Moscow and Angola are also good with no indications of serious policy differences.

- A. The Soviet-Angolan friendship treaty provided for the strengthening of military cooperation on the "basis of corresponding agreements which are being concluded," an unusual formulation in a Soviet friendship treaty. (1,000 Soviet military advisers, 19-26,000 Cuban military).

1. So far Soviet military assets in Angola include a shore-based communications link between naval headquarters in Moscow and Luanda. The Soviets reportedly run the Luanda naval base where their naval, merchant and fishing ships enter and depart at will. An AMUR-class repair ship has been stationed at the base and has serviced Soviet naval ships, including hull maintenance for the diesel submarine on patrol in the area. Since 1977, Soviet TU-95 long-range aircraft have deployed to Luanda

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airfields periodically for reconnaissance operations over the South Atlantic and around the Cape of Good Hope.

2. The aircraft-carrier Minsk recently called in Angola and Mozambique.
- B. Military assistance is the foundation of Soviet influence in Angola, but the Soviets have also moved to make their influence felt in key financial and commercial ministries.
- C. There have been reports of friction between the Angolans and Soviets and Cubans at the working level, but so far these do not appear to have led to serious differences between the two governments.

The Soviets also want to carve out a larger, more influential role for themselves in Rhodesia, believing that any majority government that achieves power as the result of military struggle will be more dependent on the USSR and less receptive to Western influence.

- A. To achieve this objective, the Soviets have:
1. Urged an expansion of military operations by the PF against Rhodesia.

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2. Offered to increase deliveries of military equipment to the PF and to increase the number of Soviet and Cuban advisers working in Zambia and Mozambique.
3. Encouraged the major factions of the Patriotic Front to unify their organizations and form a government-in-exile.
4. Have increased military deliveries to Zambia and Mozambique.

B. But, both FLS and PF suspicious of Soviet motives.

C. Military assistance has clearly been the key to Soviet successes in Africa thus far, but poor economic performance could ultimately undermine this success and diminish Soviet prospects in such areas as Nigeria and Guinea where military assistance is accorded a lower priority. Toure has seriously reduced Soviet presence.

1. Nigeria is particularly disenchanted with Soviet economic performance.

VI. President Sadat's willingness to pursue a separate treaty with Israel could provide the Soviets with an opportunity to reverse their recent dismal performance in the Middle East.

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- A. In recent years, the Soviets have witnessed:
1. The complete deterioration of their relations with Egypt--the former linchpin to the Soviet position in the Arab world.
  2. A worsening of relations with Syria because of Syrian intervention in Lebanon against another Soviet client, the PLO. And,
  3. Increased Iraqi flexibility which has been marked by economic and military purchases in the West as well as the execution of prominent Iraqi communists.
- B. There also are trends in the region that are favorable to the Soviets.
1. The US and West Europe are already faced with higher oil prices, which is in Moscow's interest.
  2. Soviet clients in the area--particularly the radical Libyans, the Marxist South Yemenis and the stateless Palestinians--serve as middlemen or at least spokesmen for the USSR.
  3. The authority of established governments in the region is becoming more fragile and, as power bases become smaller, the opportunity for Soviet exploitation becomes greater.

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4 The demise of CENTO.

C. The Soviets will have to move cautiously to exploit these new opportunities, since key Arab states already are alert to an expansion of Soviet influence in the area. Saudi and Iraqi insecurity, for example, has already been heightened by:

1. The toppling of the nonaligned Afghan government in April 1978 by a Soviet-trained army abetted by a small number of local communists.
2. The assassination of the North Yemeni president by a South Yemeni, and the coup in South Yemen in June 1978 that brought to power a leadership more receptive to the Soviet leadership. And,
3. Soviet logistical support for the South Yemeni's in the recent PDRY attack against North Yemen.

D. The Soviets will also try to exploit Arab resistance to the separate treaty between Egypt and Israel, particularly among the Syrians, the Iraqis, and the Libyans.

1. Even Saudi Arabia has been flirting with the idea of diplomatic contacts with the Soviets because of its recognition of expanded Soviet influence in the region.

VII. Moscow's interest in South Asia is less intense than its interest in the Middle East, but the region is close to the USSR and the Soviets do not want it to be used for actions inimical to the USSR.

A. The Afghan government has always needed Soviet political, military and economic support, but the increasingly close relationship with Moscow threatens Afghan independence and President Taraki's own freedom of action and risks increasing popular discontent. The number of Soviet advisers may have doubled since Taraki's coup--to about 3,500 including 1,200 with the military.

1. Taraki's Soviet-backed regime is already facing serious threats from Moslem insurgencies, which have already forced Moscow to become directly involved in keeping the government afloat.
2. Soviet military advisers have been helping government forces combat the insurgencies in eastern Afghanistan, where Soviet pilots reportedly have flown MI-24 helicopter gunship operations along the Afghan border with Pakistan.

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3. Soviet advisers may have also taken part in bombing rebel-held positions in Herat recently, and Soviet military and civilian advisers have been killed by various anti-government forces.
4. Soviet efforts to protect their equity in Afghanistan could complicate Soviet relations with both India and Pakistan and could even jeopardize chances for Senate ratification of the SALT II treaty.

VIII. The Soviets are also acting to bolster their strategic position in Asia in the wake of the Sino-Japanese rapprochement, the normalization of Sino-American relations, and Beijing's abrogation of the Sino-Soviet friendship treaty. The Soviets appear to believe that a stronger military position in the area will in the long term compel the North Asian nations to take Soviet interests into account.

- A. The most dramatic Soviet moves have been in the Pacific.
  1. The Soviets now have the aircraft carrier Minsk under the Pacific command.
  2. Soviet forces along the Sino-Soviet border are being upgraded and, earlier this year,

the Soviets held the most extensive military exercise ever staged along the border.

3. General Petrov reportedly has become the commander-in-chief of a newly formed Far East command and also participated in the exercise.

B. The continuous enhancement of Soviet forces in Asia will not contribute to the success of Moscow's intensified diplomatic activity in the area.

1. The Soviet presence in Vietnam will irritate other Southeast Asia countries and complicate Soviet bilaterals with them.
2. Soviet activity in the Northern Territories will not go down well with the Japanese, who have used it to justify higher military budgets and closer defense cooperation with the US.
3. An antagonistic Soviet posture on the border with China certainly does not augur well for talks that are tentatively slated to begin in Moscow in mid-September.
  - a. It is possible for example in view of China's previous precondition for Soviet withdrawal from Mongolia, that Soviet

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deployments along the Sino-Soviet-Mongolia border will become an intractable problem in the early stages of negotiations.

b. The recent border incident along the Sino-Soviet border could also delay the talks.

c. Soviet activity could, therefore, accelerate trends toward greater Sino-US-Japanese cooperation that Moscow would like to forestall.

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RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 7192  
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 1799  
RUQMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN PRIORITY 375  
RUSBKR/AMCONSUL KARACHI PRIORITY 4308  
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SECRET SECTION 1 OF 2 KABUL 5967

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DEPT. ALSO FOR: A/SY/CC

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E.O. 12065: GDS 8-5-85 (FLATIN, BRUCE A.) OR-P  
TAGS: ASEC, PINS, AF, PK, IR  
SUBJECT: (LOU) AN INITIAL EVALUATION OF THE BALA HISSAR MUTINY

REF: KABUL 5942

1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. SUMMARY: KABUL WAS AGAIN CALM ON AUGUST 6, FOLLOWING SEVERE FIGHTING THE PREVIOUS DAY BETWEEN MUTINOUS AFGHAN TROOPS AND FORCES LOYAL TO THE KHALQI REGIME. AFTER RESTORING ORDER, THE LATTER CLAIMED THAT THE TROUBLE HAD BEEN CAUSED BY "THE AGENTS OF PAKISTANI AND IRANIAN REACTION." THIS WAS AMONG THE MOST SERIOUS CHALLENGES THE KHALQI REGIME HAS YET FACED -- AND IT SHOWED ITSELF CAPABLE OF HANDLING IT. HOWEVER, THE EIISODE FORESHADOWED GROWING PROBLEMS FOR THE KHALQI REGIME AND ITS SOVIET MENTORS. END OF SUMMARY.

3. AS DAWN ROSE OVER KABUL ON AUGUS, THE CITY WAS SULLENLY QUIET, AND UNDER THE FIRM CONTROL OF THE KHALQI REGIME. WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE CONTINUED CLOSURE OF A FEW STRATEGIC STREETS, TRAFFIC WAS ALLOWED TO FLOW FREELY -- OVER PAVEMENTS TORN BY SPEEDING TANK TREADS THE PREVIOUS AFTERNOON.

4. MOST OF THE AUGUST 5 FIGHTING APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN CENTERED AT AND NEAR KABUL'S ANCIENT BALA HISSAR FORTRESS, SCENE OF BATTLES OVER SEVERAL CENTURES. ESSENTIALLY, THE MAJOR CONFLICT APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN BETWEEN MUTINOUS TROOPS IN THAT AREA AND ARMORED UNITS, WHO REMAINED LOAYL TO THE KHALQI REGIME. EXACTLY WHAT INITIATED THE FIGHTING IS STILL UNCLER. SOME KNOWLEDGEABLE OBSERVERS THINK THAT A BALA HISSAR UNIT LAUNCHED THE MUTINY, BUT THAT THE BACKUP FORCES THE MUTINEERS HAD DEPENDED UPON SUBSEQUENTLY CHICKENED OUT. ALTHOUGH MUTINOUS TROOPS WERE FIGHTING INSIDE THE BALA HISSAR, THE RED KHALQI FLAG WAVED OVER THE FORTRESS DURING THE ENTIRE BATTLE. THIS INDICATES THAT THEY PROBABLY NEVER GAINED FULL CONTROL OVER THAT ENTIRE MILITARY COMPLEX. THE AUGUST 5 MUTINY, LIKE THE HAZARA SHI'A UPRISING OF JUNE 23, FAILED TO IGNITE ANY SIGNIFICANT SUPPPRTING ACTION ELSEWHERE IN THE CITY, ALTHOUGH THERE WERE ISOLATED FIRING INCIDENTS THROUGHOUT THE NIGHT AROUND KABUL.

5. ALTHOUGH IT IS DIFFICULT TO EVALUATE THE CASUALTIES AND PROPERTY DAMAGE AT THIS TIME BECAUSE SOME OF THE PRIMARY AFFECTED AREAS ARE STILL CORDONED OFF BY GOVERNMENT FORCES, EXTENSIVE TANK FIRE AND HELICOPTER GUNSHIP FIRE WAS PUMPED INTO THE BALA HISSAR NEIGHBORHOOD FOR OVER TWO HOURS IN A TYPICAL EXAMPLE OF KHALQI OVERKILL TACTICS. ONE AFGHAN SOURCE, WHO LATER WAS ABLE TO GET NEAR TO THE BATTLE SITE, REPORTS THAT LARGENUMBERS OF MUTINOUS TROOPS WERE SLAUGHTERED. ALTHOUGH WE HAVE NO WAY OF VERIFYING CASUALTY FIGURES, WE DID NOTE DURING THE BATTLE WHAT APPEARED TO BE GOVERNMENT FIRING AT TROOPS FLEEING OVER THE SHERDARWAZAH MOUNTAIN INSIDE THAT OVERLOOKS THE BALA HISSAR. WE ALSO NOTED HELICOPTER GUNSHIPS FIRING IN THE VICINITY OF THE KABUL-LOGAR ROAD. THIS MIGHT HAVE BEEN DIRECTED AT FLEEING MUTINEERS.

6. THE MOOD IN KABUL TODAY IS SULLEN AND RESENTFUL. IT IS TYPIFIED BY AN AFGHAN WHO MUTTERED TO AN EMBASSY OFFICER: "IF ONLY THEY DID NOT HAVE THOSE PLANES, WE MUSLIMS WOULD TAKE CARE OF THEM" THIS COMMENT, INCIDENTALLY, ILLUSTRATES THE EFFICACY OF THE KHALQIS' HARDHITTING RETALIATORY TACTICS. THEY DO PRODUCE A SOBERING, INTIMIDATING EFFECT ON ANYONE WHO IS CONTEMPLATING ENTERING INTO THE FRAY.

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RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 7193  
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 1800  
RUGMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN PRIORITY 376  
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SECRET SECTION 2 OF 2 KABUL 5967

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KARACHI: FOR RSS

E.O. 12065: GDS 8-5-85 (FLATIN, BRUCE A.) OR-P

7. COMMENT: THE BALA HISSAR BATTLE OF AUGUST 5 ALSO ILLUSTRATED ONE OF THE MAIN WEAKNESSES OF THE KHALQI REGIME: THEM

E -

TERIORATING RELIABILITY OF ITS REGULAR TROOPS. IT ALSO ILLUSTRATED AT THE SAME TIME AN IMPORTANT COMPONENT OF THE CONTINUING STRENGTH OF THE TOUGH, TENACIOUS KHALQI LEADERSHIP: THE FIRM SUPPORT OF THE COUNTRY'S KEY FORCES, SUCH AS COMMANDO UNITS, ARMORED BRIGADES, AND THE AIR FORCE. AS IN THE REVOLUTION OF APRIL 27-28, 1978, THE TANK AGAIN PROVED ITSELF TO BE A KEY WEAPON IN SECURING THE CONTROL OF KABUL. TO A LESSER DEGREE, THIS WAS ALSO TRUE OF THE HELICOPTER GUNSHIPS. AS WAS THE CASE DURING THE JUNE 23 UPRISING, THE KHALQIS AGAIN MADE QUICK USE OF THEIR PROPAGANDA ASSETS: DROPPING LEAFLETS FROM HELICOPTERS, MAKING ANNOUNCEMENTS FROM SOUND TRUCKS, AND ISSUING BUSINESSLIKE RADIO AND TELEVISION BULLETINS.

8. THE AUGUST 5 BATTLE WAS A MUCH MORE SERIOUS CHALLENGE TO THE KHALQI REGIME THAN THE HAZARA SHI'A UPRISING OF JUNE 23 HAD BEEN. IN THIS LATTER CASE, THE GROWING PROBLEM OF DISAFFECTION WITHIN MILITARY RANKS DISPLAYED ITSELF IN THE CAPITAL -- IN FULL VIEW OF THE AFGHAN ELITE AND FOREIGN OBSERVERS. SINCE THE MILITARY AND POLICE DEFECTIONS OF THE HERAT UPRISING IN MARCH AND THE MUTINY AT THE JALALABAD ARMY BASE IN APRIL, THERE HAVE BEEN REPEATED REPORTS OF DESERTIONS AND DEFECTIONS OF AFGHAN UNITS  
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GED AGAINST REBEL FORCES ALL OVER AFGHANISTAN. SOME OF THE UNITS INVOLVED HAVE BEEN LARGE, PERHAPS UP TO BATTALION AND REGIMENTAL SIZE. ALTHOUGH THE KEY UNITS AROUND KABUL REMAIN LOYAL AND EFFECTIVE -- AS THEY PROVED THEMSELVES AGAIN ON AUGUST 5, THIS HEMORRHAGING OF MANPOWER IS LIKELY TO CONFRONT THE KHALQIS AND THEIR SOVIET MENTORS WITH SOME TOUGH CHOICES. UNTIL NOW, THE USSR HAS BEEN ABLE TO KEEP THE TARAKI-AMIN OPERATION AFLOAT THROUGH GENEROUS INJECTIONS OF FINANCIAL SUPPORT, MILITARY MATERIEL, AND MILITARY ADVISORS. THE LATTER HAVE BECOME STEADILY MORE NUMEROUS -- PERHAPS NOW TOTALLING SOME 2,000 -- AND THEY HAVE BEEN ENTERING INTO DIREIQ

COMMAND ROLES IN SOME UNITS. THEREFORE, THE NATURE OF THE SOVIET COMMITMENT APPEARS TO BE EVOLVING THROUGH STAGES NOT TOO UNLIKE THOSE THE USG WENT THROUGH IN VIETNAM (E.G., THE GRADUAL SOVIET ASSUMPTION OF CONTROL OVER BAGRAM AIR BASE).

9. ~~IN VIEW OF THE WORSENING MANPOWER SITUATION, THE KHALQIS COULD EVENTUALLY ASK THE SOVIETS TO UP THEIR ANTE HERE BY CONTRIBUTING SOME COMBWO UNITS. ONE POSSIBLE SCENARIO THE SOVIETS MAY CONSIDER IS THE ASSIGNMENT OF SPECIAL COMBAT~~

RCES TO KABUL, JALALABAD, AND -634 (36 LOCATIONS "TO PROTECT SOVIET CIVILIANS" THERE. (NOTE: KABUL'S MIKROYAN HOUSING DISTRICT FOR SOVIETS HAD HEAVY MILITARY PROTECTION DURING THE AUGUST 5 FIGHTING.)  
~~END OF COMMENT.~~

10. SECURITY NOTE: NO AMERICANS WERE AFFECTED BY THE AUGUST 5 FIGHTING. THE U.S. MISSION IS CONDUCTING NORMAL OPERATIONS.

AMSTUTZ

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SECRET SECTION 71 OF 06 USNATO 05615

E.O.12065: RDS-1 08/09/89 (GLITMAN, MAYNARD) OR-P  
TAGS: PINS, AF, NATO  
SUBJECT: POLADS DISCUSSION OF AFGHANISTAN (S)

REF: (A) STATE 202431 (NOTAL), (B) STATE 204724

1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. AT AUGUST 7 POLITICAL COMMITTEE MEETING, U.K., FRG, CANADA AND TURKEY SUBMITTED WRITTEN CONTRIBUTIONS ON AFGHANISTAN SITUATION. TEXTS ARE TRANSMITTED PARA 6. U.K. REP WHO HAD SUGGESTED EXCHANGE ON AFGHANISTAN EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR CONTRIBUTIONS AND RECOMMENDED THAT POLADS, IN VIEW OF THE DEVELOPING SITUATION, DISCUSS SUBJECT AT NEXT MEETING AS WELL. THIS WAS AGREED.

3. U.S. REP UNDERLINED PER REP A WASHINGTON INTEREST IN ALLIED ASSESSMENT OF SOVIET INTENTIONS IN AFGHANISTAN (WRITTEN CONTRIBUTIONS ADDRESS THIS SUBJECT IN PART), AND SAID THERE SHOULD BE A CONTINUING EXCHANGE ON THIS WITHIN THE COMMITTEE. CANADIAN REP, IN RESPONSE TO U.S. DESCRIPTION OF SUCCESSFUL EVACUATION OF U.S. DEPENDENTS AND NON-ESSENTIAL PERSONNEL FROM KABUL, SAID THAT CANADIANS TOO WERE "INTERESTED" IN EVACUATION ISSUE. HE WENT ON TO NOTE OTTOWA'S VIEW THAT REBEL MOVEMENT WOULD REMAIN FRAGMENTED AND INEFFECTIVE UNTIL A SINGLE ANTI-TARAKI LEADER EMERGED WHICH HAS NOT BEEN THE CASE TO DATE. CANADIAN REP ASKED FOR ANY VIEWS OR INFORMATION OTHERS MIGHT HAVE ON THIS ASPECT.

4. ITALIAN REQUESTED THAT AUGUST 5 COUP BE THE SUBJECT OF FURTHER DISCUSSION AT NEXT POLADS MEETING. FRG REP SAID HIS AUTHORITIES WERE NOT SURE WHETHER RECENT GOVERN-

MENT RESHUFFLE WAS DUE TO DESIRE TO IMPROVE EFFICIENCY OR WAS DIRECTED AGAINST A POSSIBLE USSR INTERNAL "PLOT".

5. ACTION REQUESTED: NEXT POLADS MEETING WILL BE AUGUST 21. WE WOULD APPRECIATE VLT OOB AUGUST 21 ANY WASHINGTON COMMENTS ON THE ALLIED PAPERS AND THE VARIOUS POINTS RAISED ORALLY.

6. BEGIN TEXTS OF ALLIED PAPERS:

BEGIN TEXT OF CANADIAN DELEGATION PAPER:

SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN

INTERNAL OPPOSITION

1. THE TRIBAL OPPOSITION MOVEMENT IS SLOWLY BUT STEADILY INCREASING IN AFGHANISTAN. ALTHOUGH THE GOVERNMENT CONTINUES TO RETAIN CONTROL OF THE MAJOR URBAN CENTRES AND THE MAIN ROAD NETWORK, IT HAS SURRENDERED ITS AUTHORITY IN THE COUNTRYSIDE.

2. ALTHOUGH ARMED OPPOSITION IS INCREASING, IT CONTINUES TO BE FRAGMENTED WITH LITTLE READILY APPARENT PROSPECT OF MERGING INTO A COHESIVE FORCE. IT HAS NOT YET DEVELOPED THE CAPACITY FOR SUSTAINED CO-ORDINATED MILITARY OPERATIONS SUFFICIENT TO KNOCK OUT THE TARAQI REGIME. DESPITE AN ELEMENT OF DISLOYALTY IN THE ARMED FORCES AND PROBLEMS OF ARMS AND EQUIPMENT SHORTAGES, THE GOVERNMENT SEEMS ABLE TO MAINTAIN ITSELF IN THE URBAN CENTRES WHICH ARE VITAL TO ITS EXISTENCE.

PAKISTAN-AFGHANISTAN RELATIONS

3. PAKISTAN CONTINUES TO RECEIVE AND TO HELP SUSTAIN AFGHANISTAN REFUGEES WHILE AT THE SAME TIME DOING ITS BEST TO LIMIT THE REFUGEES' POLITICAL/MILITARY ACTIVITIES. THE PAKISTAN ATTEMPTS IN THIS AREA MIGHT BE BEARING SOME FRUIT IN THAT THE USSR REPRESENTATIVES AND TASS HAVE IN THE PAST TWO WEEKS BEEN DROPPING VERBAL BOUQUETS ABOUT PAKISTAN AND PAKISTAN/USSR RELATIONS. WE SAY "MIGHT" BECAUSE SUCH ACTIVITIES COULD BE INSPIRED BY SOMETHING OTHER THAN EVENTS IN AFGHANISTAN, I.E. TO MAKE INROADS IN CHINA'S COMPARATIVELY FAVOURED POSITION IN PAKISTAN.

4. THE RECENT REDUCTION IN AFGHANISTAN AND SOVIET ACCUSATIONS OF PAKISTAN'S CONNIVANCE WITH THE REBEL FORCES THROUGH THE ACTIVE SUPPORT OF REFUGEE AGITATORS MAY BE EASING ONE ASPECT OF BORDER TENSIONS. NEVERTHELESS, AN ESTIMATED 125,000 REFUGEES IN CAMPS AS WELL AS THOUSANDS BY

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RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 6424  
RUEHBAC/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 0110  
RUQMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 0012  
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OF OTHER AFGHANISTAN REFUGEES RESIDING WITH BORDER AREA KINSFOLK, IS A DRAIN ON PAKISTAN'S PATIENCE AND RESOURCES. PAKISTAN'S OBSESSION WITH THE SOVIET PRESENCE AND INFLUENCE WITHIN AFGHANISTAN IS UNPREDICTABLE AND A FACTOR CONTRIBUTING TO THE POTENTIAL FOR INSTABILITY IN THE AREA. THE IRRATIONAL ELEMENTS IN THE PAKISTANI FOREIGN POLICY, INCLUDING ITS "ISLAMIC" DIMENSION ALSO PLAY A PART.  
SOVIET ROLE

5. IT WOULD APPEAR THAT AS FAR AS THE SOVIET POSITION IS CONCERNED LITTLE HAS CHANGED IN THE LAST TWO MONTHS.

6. WHILE THERE HAVE BEEN PERSISTENT RUMOURS THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD BE PREPARED TO DROP THE TARAKI LEADERSHIP IN FAVOUR OF A GROUP WHO MIGHT BE MORE ACCEPTABLE TO THE AFGHANISTAN MASSES, THERE HAS BEEN NO HARD EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THIS ASSERTION. INDEED, THE FOREMOST SOVIET OBJECTIVE MUST BE TO KEEP AFGHANISTAN CLOSELY UNDER THE SOVIET THUMB AS ANY CHANGE IN POWER WITHIN THE COUNTRY SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO INTERFERE WITH THE "NEW LEVEL" OF SOVIET/AFGHANISTAN RELATIONS. AT THE MOMENT, THEREFORE, IT WOULD APPEAR THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE DEFINITELY DECIDED TO CONTINUE TO SUPPORT THE PRESENT REGIME UP TO A POINT SHORT OF DIRECT INTERVENTION WHILE AT THE SAME TIME, THEY MAY BE CASTING ABOUT FOR NEW LEADERSHIP WHEREBY THEY CAN MAINTAIN THEIR ACTIVE PRESENCE WHILE OFFERING A MORE PALATABLE GOVERNMENT TO THE AFGHAN PEOPLE.

#### CONCLUSION

7. THE CALL OF AFGHAN MULLAHS FOR A "JIHAD" AGAINST THE TARAKI/AMIN REGIME HAS NOT LED TO THE EMERGENCE OF ONE LEADER FROM WITHIN THE GUERRILLA RANKS. WE HAVE NO EVIDENCE THAT ONE WILL APPEAR, AND SO LONG AS THE OPPOSITION REMAINS DISORGANIZED THE STRUGGLE APPEARS BOUND TO BE PROTRACTED.  
END TEXT.

BEGIN TEXT OF FRG PAPER:

SPEAKING NOTES  
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SUBJECT: AFGHANISTAN; COMMENTS ON THE SOVIET ENGAGEMENT  
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1. AFGHANISTAN'S INTERNAL SECURITY SITUATION IS RAPIDLY WORSENING. THE PRO-MOSCOW TARAQI REGIME IS APPARENTLY FACING DIFFICULTIES. IN SPITE OF MASSIVE MILITARY SUPPORT BY THE SOVIETS IN THE FORM OF LARGE-SCALE DELIVERIES OF WEAPONS AND THE USE OF BETWEEN 3,000 AND 3,500 MILITARY ADVISERS - SOME OF THEM IN LEADING POSITIONS - THE AFGHAN CENTRAL GOVERNMENT HAS SO FAR BEEN UNABLE TO BREAK THE PREDOMINANTLY RELIGIOUSLY-MOTIVATED RESISTANCE OF LARGE PARTS OF THE POPULATION. ON THE CONTRARY, THE RESISTANCE GROUPS ARE ACHIEVING GROWING SUCCESSES. WITHOUT SOVIET SUPPORT, THE REGIME WOULD PROBABLY HAVE FALLEN A LONG TIME AGO.

2. AS FAR AS THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP IS CONCERNED, THIS MEANS THAT IT WILL SOON BE OBLIGED TO TAKE A DECISION CONCERNING ITS FUTURE ENGAGEMENT IN AFGHANISTAN.

3. IT CAN PROBABLY BE RULED OUT THAT MOSCOW WILL DROP THE PRESENT REGIME SINCE THIS MIGHT MEAN THE LOSS OF AN IMPORTANT ZONE OF INTEREST FOR THE SOVIETS, BECAUSE - BY WINNING AFGHANISTAN - THE DISTANCE SEPARATING THEM FROM THEIR GEOSTRATEGIC AIM, THE INDIAN OCEAN, HAS SHRUNK TO 500 KMS. IF AFGHANISTAN WERE TO RETURN TO A MORE OR LESS ISLAMIC STATE, MOSCOW WOULD IN ALL PROBABILITY HAVE AN ANTI-SOVIET NEIGHBOUR. APART FROM SUCH A POLITICAL SET-BACK, IMPLICATIONS ON OTHER SOVIET ZONES OF INFLUENCE AND THE MUSLIM ELEMENTS IN THE SOVIET POPULATION COULD NOT BE EXCLUDED.

4. THE POSSIBLE REPLACEMENT OF THE PRESENT RULERS IN KABUL BY A GOVERNMENT WHICH APPEARS IN A LESS PRO-MOSCOW LIGHT TO THE OUTSIDE WORLD - THIS IS WHAT THE SOVIETS ARE APPARENTLY TRYING TO DO AT THE PRESENT TIME - WOULD HARDLY HAVE AN INFLUENCE ON THE RESISTANCE MOVEMENT. THEY ARE FIGHTING NOT SO MUCH AGAINST THE MEMBERS OF THE PRESENT REGIME BUT AGAINST THE COMMUNIST IDEOLOGY WHICH, FOR THEM, IS PRIMARILY REPRESENTED BY THE SOVIET PRESENCE IN THE COUNTRY.

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INFO RUFHKK/ALL NATO CAPITALS  
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5. THEREFORE, IF MOSCOW WANTS TO MAINTAIN ITS PRESENT POSITION, IT MUST REINFORCE ITS COMMITMENT EVEN FURTHER. THE SOVIET PRESS HAS RECENTLY INDICATED THAT THE ACTIVE USE OF SOVIET TROOPS IN SUPPORT OF THE TARAKI REGIME MIGHT BE CONSIDERED. ACCORDING TO ARTICLE 4 OF THE FRIENDSHIP TREATY BETWEEN THE SOVIET UNION AND AFGHANISTAN, THE SOVIET UNION WOULD BE ENTITLED - AFTER MUTUAL CONSULTATIONS - TO TAKE ACTION TO MAINTAIN THE SECURITY, INDEPENDENCE AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF AFGHANISTAN. THIS COULD BE PREPARED POLITICALLY AND PSYCHOLOGICALLY BY PUBLICATIONS IN THE SOVIET AND AFGHAN PRESS ON THE SUPPORT OF "REBELS" AND THE "AGGRESSION" BY PAKISTAN. FOR THE FIRST TIME, AFGHANISTAN IS DESCRIBED IN THE SOVIET PRESS AS A MEMBER OF THE SOCIALIST COMMUNITY, WHICH WOULD MAKE HER SUBJECT TO THE BREZHNEV DOCTRINE.

6. HOWEVER, IT APPEARS DOUBTFUL WHETHER THE SOVIET UNION WILL STEP UP HER ENGAGEMENT TO THE LEVEL OF MILITARY INTERVENTION SINCE THIS WOULD LEAD TO SERIOUS RISKS. FIRST OF ALL, SUCH A STEP WOULD BE BOUND TO PROVOKE NEGATIVE REACTIONS, ESPECIALLY ON THE PART OF THE ARAB AND ISLAMIC WORLD. BUT MOSCOW MIGHT STILL BE PREPARED TO RUN THAT RISK.

7. MORE SERIOUS, HOWEVER, WOULD BE THE RESISTANCE TO BE EXPECTED FROM THE AFGHAN POPULATION AND THE RESULTING CONSEQUENCES FOR THE SOVIETS. THE AFGHAN POPULATION REGARDS NOTHING AS MORE IMPORTANT THAN ITS FREEDOM; UP TO NOW, IT HAS BEEN ABLE TO DEFEND ITSELF AGAINST ALL FOREIGN CLAIMS OF SUPREMACY AND HAS NEVER BEEN FORCED UNDER ANY FORM OF COLONIAL RULE. IN CASE OF A SOVIET INTERVENTION, THE POPULATION IS LIKELY TO IGNORE ALL THE EXISTING TRIBAL

QUARRELS AND TO RISE AS ONE MAN AGAINST THE SOVIET INVADERS.

8. IT APPEARS QUESTIONABLE WHETHER THE SOVIETS WOULD BE ABLE TO OVERCOME THIS RESISTANCE. THE INACCESSIBILITY OF THE TERRAIN - 80 OF AFGHANISTAN ARE COVERED BY MOUNTAIN COUNTRY WITHOUT ROADS AND ARE FAVOURABLE FOR GUERRILLAS - THE MENTALITY OF THE WARLIKE MOUNTAIN TRIBES AND THEIR FORM OF WARFARE MAKE THIS UNLIKELY. IT MUST BE ASSUMED THAT AN INTERVENTION WOULD LEAD TO A PROTRACTED GUERRILLA WAR WHOSE OUTCOME WOULD BE COMPLETELY UNCERTAIN AND WHICH WOULD TIE DOWN SOVIET FORCES FOR A LONG TIME.

9. THERE CAN BE NO DOUBT THAT THE SOVIET UNION WILL CONTINUE TO TAKE ACTION IN SUPPORT OF THE REGIME IN KABUL. ADDITIONAL ARMS WILL BE SENT, AND THE NUMBER OF SOVIET ADVISERS WILL INCREASE. IT IS ALSO CONCEIVABLE THAT MOSCOW MAY USE SOVIET TROOPS FROM UZBEKISTAN AND TADCHIKISTAN WHO, WHEN PUT INTO AFGHAN UNIFORMS, WOULD REMAIN UNCONSPICUOUS FROM A PHYSICAL AND A LINGUISTIC POINT OF VIEW. HOWEVER, IT IS DIFFICULT TO ASSESS AT PRESENT WHETHER MOSCOW IS REALLY PREPARED TO ACCEPT THE RISK OF A MILITARY INTERVENTION.

END TEXT.

BEGIN TEXT OF TURKISH PAPER:

AFGHANISTAN

THE GENERAL IMPRESSION AFTER THE COUP IN APRIL 1978 WAS THAT THE NEW REGIME WOULD HAVE A DIFFICULT TIME TAKING ROOT AND THAT THE CONSERVATIVE AND INDEPENDENT CHARACTER OF THE AFGHAN PEOPLE WOULD NOT TAKE EASILY TO THE SOVIET-INCLINED AND COMMUNIST NATURE OF THE REGIME.

THIS FORECAST HAS TURNED OUT TO BE TRUE: FIRST THE NOMADIC TRIBES ALONG THE COUNTRY'S INTERNATIONAL BORDERS REFUSED TO COME UNDER THE RULE OF THE REGIME; THEIR RESISTANCE SPREAD GRADUALLY UNTIL THE FIGHTING BROKE OUT IN HERAT IN MARCH 1979 AND THEN IN KABUL ON 23 JUNE AND OVER THE LAST WEEKEND. DESPITE GOVERNMENT EFFORTS TO EXPLAIN AWAY THIS UNREST AS FOREIGN-INSTIGATED, THE MAIN FORCE BEHIND IT SEEMS TO BE THE DISCORDANCE MENTIONED ABOVE.

IT IS PLAIN THAT IRAN AND PAKISTAN DO NOT VIEW THE AFGHAN REGIME WITH A WARM HEART, AND REGARD IT AS A CONTRADICTION OF THEIR OWN ISLAM-INSPIRED REGIMES. NOTWITHSTANDING, NEITHER COUNTRY IS IN A POSITION TO TAKE ACTION.

PAKISTAN: ECONOMIC CONDITIONS AND HFR ISOLATION IN

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THE REGION CONSTITUTE DETERMINING FACTORS IN HER ATTITUDE. IT IS TRUE THAT HER NOMAD POPULATION ALONG THE AFGHAN BORDER UNDERTAKE ACTION DIRECTED AT AFGHANISTAN; WITH OR WITHOUT AFGHANISTAN, THIS IS A MAJOR PROBLEM FOR PAKISTAN FOR, TO BRING ORDER AND GOVERNMENT RULE TO THAT REGION, SHE HAS TO RESORT TO AN EXTENSIVE MILITARY OPERATION ALONG THE LONG AND RUGGED BORDER REGION.

IRAN: VARIOUS STATEMENTS BY IRANIAN RELIGIOUS LEADERS CONDEMNING THE PRESSURE BEING EXERCISED ON THEIR COUNTERPARTS IN AFGHANISTAN NOTWITHSTANDING, IT IS DIFFICULT TO ENVISAGE MORE SUBSTANTIAL IRANIAN MOVES IN HER PRESENT DAY CONDITIONS.

ALONGSIDE DOMESTIC OPPOSITION TO THE AFGHAN REGIME, VARIOUS GROUPS HAVE BEEN FORMED ABROAD, WHO HAVE DEMONSTRATED IN SOME EUROPEAN COUNTRIES AND IN INDIA. THE MAIN ATTRIBUTE OF OPPOSITION GROUPS AT HOME OR ABROAD, ARMED OR NOT, IS THEIR INDEPENDENT NATURE FROM EACH OTHER, LACK OF CO-ORDINATION AMONG THEM AND THEIR LACK OF LEADERSHIP. THESE SHORTCOMINGS MAKE SUCCESS LESS LIKELY.

THE SOVIET ATTITUDE IN THE FACE OF STRONGER DOMESTIC OPPOSITION IN AFGHANISTAN WILL BE OF SIGNIFICANT WEIGHT. THROUGHOUT JUNE THIS YEAR, RUMOURS CONCERNING A POSSIBLE SOVIET INTERVENTION HAVE CIRCULATED IN DIPLOMATIC CIRCLES IN KABUL. AN ARAB AMBASSADOR TOLD HIS TURKISH COUNTERPART THAT TARAKI WENT TO MOSCOW ON 8TH JUNE TO ASK FOR SOVIET TROOPS, AND THAT THE SOVIETS TURNED THIS REQUEST DOWN, ONLY REASSURING THE AFGHAN LEADER THAT ECONOMIC AID WILL CONTINUE. THE CLAUSE IN THE TWO COUNTRIES' FRIENDSHIP TREATY PROVIDING FOR THE EXPEDITION OF SOVIET TROOPS WAS INSERTED AS A RESULT OF AN AFGHAN REQUEST. IT IS OBVIOUS THAT THE SOVIET LEADERS SEE THIS AS A LAST RESORT, AND

EVEN THEN WOULD HAVE TO WEIGH THE SITUATION VERY CAREFULLY, BEARING IN MIND THE FOLLOWING CONSIDERATIONS:

- . - SUCH A STEP COULD LEAD CHINA--PAKISTAN--IRAN AND THE USA TO CLOSE RANKS.
- . - THE SOVIETS COULD THUS END UP PLAYING INTO CHINESE HANDS.
- . - THE SOVIETS COULD BE DIRECTLY CONFRONTED WITH THE AFGHAN PEOPLE, IN A VIETNAM-TYPE ADVENTURE.

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IN THE CASE OF A FURTHER DETERIORATION IN TARAKI'S POSITION, THE SOVIETS COULD HOWEVER PROCEED TO A RESHUFFLE OF THE AFGHAN MARXISTS, THUS TRYING TO RETAIN A SYMPATHETIC APPEARANCE. THIS SEEMS TO BE A STRONGER POSSIBILITY. THEY MAY, FOR INSTANCE, THINK ABOUT INSTALLING SOMEBODY ELSE BELONGING TO TARAKI'S PEOPLE'S PARTY (KHALQ PARTY), OR EVEN ABOUT SUBSTITUTING THE PERCEM PARTY, PREVIOUSLY OUSTED BY KHALQ PARTY. WHETHER OR NOT THESE COULD BE ACHIEVED WITHOUT BLOODSHED IS DIFFICULT TO FORESEE. ALSO IF A POWER STRUGGLE AMONG THE MARXISTS WERE TO TAKE PLACE THIS COULD OFFER THE OPPONENTS OF THE REGIME GOOD PROSPECTS.

INDICATIONS THAT THE EASTERN COUNTRIES ARE NOT ALL THAT HAPPY WITH TARAKI HAVE ALREADY STARTED TO SURFACE. IN THIS CONTEXT, THE FOLLOWING REMARKS MADE TO THE TURKISH AMBASSADOR BY THE GDR AND THE NEWLY-ARRIVED VIETNAMESE AMBASSADORS, ARE ILLUMINATING:

(GDR) "THE REASONS FOR THE REGIME'S DIFFICULTIES LIE IN THE STRING OF MISTAKES MADE. IN THE FACE OF THE COUNTRY-WIDE RESISTANCE AGAINST THE REGIME, THERE IS NO MORE ROOM FOR NEW MISTAKES. THE LEADERS HAVE TO BE VERY WARY FROM NOW ON. THE FIRST WRONG STEP WILL, JUST AS IN CHESS, COST THEM THE GAME. THOSE WHO RESIST ARE PUT UNDER ARREST WITHOUT ANY DISCRIMINATION FOR CHILDREN AND WOMEN. EVERYBODY KNOWS THAT THIS CANNOT WORK. ALL THE SAME, SOVIET SUPPORT SEEMS TO CONTINUE. PERHAPS IN A SHORT WHILE, INTERNALLY AND IN PARTICULAR FROM THE PARTY ITSELF, SOME ALTERNATIVES COULD APPEAR."

(THE VIETNAMESE) "DESPITE MY RECENT ARRIVAL, IT IS NOT DIFFICULT TO OBSERVE THE INTERNAL CRISIS. THIS STEMS FROM THE DISTANCE SEPARATING THE LEADERS AND THE POPULATION, THE TOUGH LINE ADOPTED VIS-A-VIS THE REBELS AND FINALLY REFORMS BEING MADE WITHOUT THE NECESSARY PRELIMINARIES. THESE MAY ALSO BE THE REASON BEHIND THE LATEST GOVERNMENT RESHUFFLE."

AFGHANISTAN'S RELATIONS WITH THE WESTERN COUNTRIES CANNOT BE SAID TO BE GOOD. ALTHOUGH UNTIL A SHORT WHILE

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P 081737Z AUG 79  
FM USMISSION USNATO  
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1546  
INFO RUFH^K/ALL NATO CAPITALS  
RUSBLK/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0022  
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 5427  
RUEHBAC/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 2113  
RUQMR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 0015  
RUSBQD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 0075  
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SECRET SECTION 25 OF 06 USNATO 05615

AGO. THE LEADERS EMPHASIZED THAT THEY WANTED TO HAVE GOOD RELATIONS WITH THE USA, SINCE THE MURDER OF THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR AND THE FOLLOWING COOLING OF RELATIONS, THEY HAVE, IN THEIR PUBLIC STATEMENTS, TENDED TO NAME FRANCE, THE UK AND THE USA FIRST AMONG THE COUNTRIES "AGAINST THE REGIME".

AFGHAN-IRANIAN RELATIONSHIP CONTINUES TO BE TENSE. ON EVERY OCCASION, THE AFGHAN SIDE CALLS THE IRANIAN RELIGIOUS LEADERS AS THE "REACTIONARY AND FANATICAL LEADERS OF IRAN" AND BEHIND EVERY UPRISING LOOK FOR A SHIITE OR IRANIAN FINGER.

THE JULY ISLAMABAD VISIT BY DOST, THE AFGHAN DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER, CONSTITUTED AN OPENER FOR A DIALOGUE WITH PAKISTAN. PAKISTANI AUTHORITIES STRESSED TO THE TURKISH EMBASSY THEIR IMPRESSION THAT DOST DID NOT HAVE MUCH AUTHORITY AND THAT HE DID NOT COMMIT HIMSELF TO ANYTHING DURING THE VISIT. NEVERTHELESS, IT WAS ONLY AFTER THIS VISIT THAT THE POSSIBILITY OF A VISIT BY THE PAKISTAN FOREIGN POLICY ADVISER, MR. AGHA SHAHI, IN PREPARATION FOR A SUMMIT BETWEEN TARAKI AND GENERAL ZIA, APPEARED.  
END TEXT.

BEGIN TEXT OF UK PAPER:

#### AFGHANISTAN

1. RECENT REPORTS DEMONSTRATE THAT THE TARAKI REGIME'S ABILITY TO KEEP CONTROL IS INCREASINGLY DEPENDENT ON SOVIET MILITARY SUPPORT. THE MAINTENANCE OF A FRIENDLY AND CO-OPERATIVE GOVERNMENT IN AFGHANISTAN IS MUCH MORE IMPORTANT TO THE SOVIET UNION THAN THE MAINTENANCE OF TARAKI AND AMIN. BUT WE SHOULD NOT UNDERESTIMATE THE SOVIET COMMIT-

MENT TO THE "AFGHAN REVOLUTION" AS SUCH.

2. THE RUSSIANS HAVE INVESTED MUCH IN THE PROPOSITION THAT THERE HAS BEEN A REVOLUTION IN AFGHANISTAN, THAT IT REPRESENTS A MAJOR GAIN FOR THE AFGHAN PEOPLE AND THAT IT CONFERS A "QUALITATIVELY NEW CHARACTER" ON SOVIET/AFGHAN RELATIONS. IF A SUCCESSOR REGIME WERE TO DISAVOW THE REVOLUTION, THE RUSSIANS WOULD SEE THIS AS A SET-BACK, WHETHER OR NOT AFGHANISTAN REMAINED IN PRACTICE LARGELY DEPENDENT ON THE SOVIET UNION. THEY WOULD BE THE MORE CONCERNED IF THEY HAD REASON TO FEAR AN ANTI-SOVIET BACK-LASH.

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3. IF THERE IS NO ALTERNATIVE TO TARAKI AND AMIN WHICH IS LIKELY TO PROVE VIABLE AND TO PAY AT LEAST LIP SERVICE TO REVOLUTIONARY CONTINUITY, THE RUSSIANS WILL GO TO CONSIDERABLE LENGTHS TO PRESERVE THE PRESENT REGIME. THE DISADVANTAGES OF DIRECT MILITARY INTERVENTION, IN THE SENSE OF LARGE NUMBERS OF SOVIET TROOPS OPERATING DIRECTLY AND VISIBLY UNDER SOVIET COMMAND, ARE MANY AND THE RUSSIANS ARE UNLIKELY TO CONSIDER IT EXCEPT AS A LAST RESORT. THE PROBABLE SOVIET PREFERENCE, AND THE ONE FOR WHICH THERE IS INCREASING EVIDENCE IS TO FURTHER STRENGTHEN THE SOVIET MILITARY PRESENCE IN AFGHANISTAN, MORE ESPECIALLY IN SO FAR AS A DETERIORATING INTERNAL SITUATION CAN BE BLAMED ON EXTERNAL INTERVENTION AND IT CAN BE ARGUED THAT THERE IS A THREAT TO THE "SECURITY, INDEPENDENCE AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY" OF AFGHANISTAN WITHIN THE TERMS OF ARTICLE 4 OF THE SOVIET/AFGHAN TREATY.

4. THE RUSSIANS HAVE REACHED OUT IN AFGHANISTAN FOR MORE THAN THEY REALLY NEED, BUT ARE NOW IN A POSITION WHERE THEY CANNOT EASILY RETREAT WITHOUT CONSIDERABLE LOSS OF FACE AND THE POSSIBILITY OF MORE SERIOUS DAMAGE TO THEIR INTERESTS.

5. SUBJECT TO THE ABOVE, THERE IS SOME EVIDENCE THAT THE RUSSIANS WOULD LIKE TO SWITCH HORSES, IF AN ALTERNATIVE TO TARAKI AND AMIN WERE AVAILABLE. THE PROBLEM IS THAT ANY ALTERNATIVE SET OF LEADERS WOULD FIND IT DIFFICULT TO ESTABLISH A POPULAR BASE UNLESS THEY COULD DEMONSTRATE THAT THEY WERE SUBSTANTIALLY MORE INDEPENDENT OF THE RUSSIANS THAN TARAKI AND AMIN. EVEN WERE THE RUSSIANS PREPARED TO CONTEMPLATE ALLOWING A SUCCESSOR REGIME A LOOSER REIN, THERE IS NO POLITICAL GROUPING AVAILABLE TO TAKE ON THE ROLE. A MILITARY REGIME MIGHT BE AN ALTERNATIVE. THE ARMY MIGHT BE SEEN BY THE POPULATION AT LARGE AS BEING SUFFICIENTLY DISTINGUISHABLE FROM THE KHALQ NOT TO BE TARNISHED WITH THE SAME BRUSH. FOR THEIR PART THE RUSSIANS



MIGHT BE SATISFIED THAT THE LARGE NUMBER OF OFFICERS WITH TRAINING IN THE SOVIET UNION WOULD ENSURE THE CONTINUATION OF THEIR INFLUENCE. HOWEVER, ALTHOUGH IT MIGHT BE RELATIVELY EASY FOR THE RUSSIANS TO ENGINEER A COUP, THERE IS GOOD REASON TO DOUBT WHETHER THE CALIBRE AND RELIABILITY OF THE ARMY ARE SUFFICIENT TO BEAR THE ADDITIONAL

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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1547

INFO RUFBKK/ALL NATO CAPITALS

RUSBLK/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0023

RUEEMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 6428

RUEHEAC/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 0114

RUQMER/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 0016

RUSBQD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 0076

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INCREASE IN RESPONSIBILITY.

END TEXT. GLITMAN

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EE RUSPXX #035 1/1 2200745  
ZNY CCCCC ZZH  
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FM AMEMBASSY KABUL  
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5266  
RUOQGL/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 3693  
RUSG00/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 9177  
RUMJPG/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 681  
RUCMBA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 305  
RUJTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1751  
RUEMHO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1622  
RUSSAD/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 7246  
RUFKPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS 3217  
RUCMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 401  
RUHCHQA/CINCPAC  
RUFHMA/USMISSION USKATG 33

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 4 YADIL 6051

CINCPAC: ALSO FOR POLAD

E.O. 12065: GDS 5-15-85 (TAYLOR, JAMES E.) OR-P  
TAGS: PCOV, FINS, FINI, AF  
SUBJ: (C)UD NATURE OF THE AFGHAN OPPOSITION

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. SUMMARY: GROWING OPPOSITION TO THE NYALCI REGIME OF  
PRESIDENT NOOR MOHAMMAD TARAKI AND PRIME MINISTER HAFIZULLAH  
AMIN IS POSED BY MANY DISPARATE ELEMENTS WHO ARE MOTIVATED  
BY DIFFERING GRIEVANCES. FEARS REGARDING THE REPRESSION  
OF ISLAM AND RESENTMENT OF WHAT THEY PERCEIVE AS A SELL-OUT  
TO MOSCOW OF AFGHANISTAN'S NATIONAL SOUL ARE THE PRIMARY  
INGREDIENTS FUELING THE VARIOUS OPPOSITION GROUPS STRUGGLING  
FOR A DRASTIC CHANGE IN THIS REVOLUTIONARY REGIME. SHORT OF  
MEETING SOME DEMANDS FOR JUST SUCH A DRASTIC CHANGE, THE TARAKI-  
AMIN LEADERSHIP HAS LITTLE MANEUVERING ROOM AND FEW OPTIONS  
WHICH WOULD PRESENT VIABLE CHANCES OF REVERSING THE CURRENT  
TRENDS. HEIGHTENED COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS, THEREFORE,  
ARE PROBABLY ON THE HORIZON, COMPELLED WITH A LARGER SOVIET  
EFFORT TO SAVE THE AFGHAN REVOLUTION ITSELF. IF NOT THIS  
PARTICULAR LEADERSHIP, DESPITE ITS SUCCESS TO DATE FAR, THE  
OPPOSITION REMAINS FRAGMENTED AND ESSENTIALLY WITHOUT LEADERSHIP.



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DE RUSLKA #0251/2 2286745  
ZNY CCCCC ZH  
P R 160700Z AUG 79  
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL  
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5261  
RUGMQU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 3694  
RUSBOD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 9178  
RURJPG/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 682  
RUGMRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 366  
RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1752  
RUEKMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1829  
RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 7247  
RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS 3218  
RUGMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 402  
RUHCHQA/CINCPAC  
RUFHNA/USMISSION USYATO 34  
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 4 KABUL 6251

CINCPAC; ALSO FOR POLAD

OPPOSITION MOVEMENT WHOSE INSURGENCY OPERATIONS HAVE  
NIBBLED AWAY AT THE GOVERNMENT'S CAPACITY TO CONTROL THE COUNTRY  
OUTSIDE MAJOR POPULATION CENTERS -- ALTHOUGH THE REGIME CAN  
STILL RESPOND QUICKLY AND FORCEFULLY (AS DEMONSTRATED IN KABUL  
ON AUGUST 5) TO DIRECT CHALLENGES NEAR THE COUNTRY'S POLITICAL  
HEART. NONETHELESS, THE OPPOSITION, ALBEIT STILL FRAGMENTED  
AND GENERALLY LEADERLESS, IS WIDESPREAD AND APPARENTLY FUELED  
BY DEEPLY-HELD GRIEVANCES THAT HAVE CAUSED THOUSANDS OF

INSURGENTS TO RISK ALL IN AN ATTEMPT TO OVERTHROW A REGIME  
WHICH PROFFERS THAT IT HAS ONLY THE WELFARE OF THE AFGHAN  
MASSES AT HEART.

5. PRINCIPAL ELEMENTS OF THE OPPOSITION EQUATION: THE APPO-  
SITION TO THE DRA IS NOT A MONOLITHIC AND COORDINATED INSUR-  
GENCY, SINCE A NUMBER OF DISPARATE ELEMENTS ARE STRUGGLING  
FOR VARIOUS REASONS FOR A DRASTIC CHANGE IN THIS REGIME.  
THE REBEL GROUPS ACTUALLY ENGAGED IN COMBAT AGAINST THE AFGHAN  
ARMY APPEAR TO DRAW THEIR MANPOWER FROM VILLAGES AND TRIBES,  
WHICH CONSTITUTE ANYWHERE FROM 87-90 PERCENT OF AFGHANISTAN'S  
POPULATION. THESE GENERALLY ILLITERATE SEGMENTS OF AFGHAN  
SOCIETY ARE TRADITIONAL FOES OF ANY CENTRAL GOVERNMENT AT  
KABUL, ALTHOUGH MANY ARE APOLITICAL IF LEFT ALONE. HOWEVER,  
SOME VILLAGERS -- FOR VARIOUS REASONS (E.G., ECONOMIC) --  
UNDOUBTEDLY SUPPORT THE DRA, SINCE THE RURAL POPULATION ALSO  
SERVES AS THE GOVERNMENT'S MANPOWER POOL FOR ITS MILITARY  
ENLISTED RANKS. THUS, RESISTANCE, HOWEVER WIDESPREAD, HAS  
NOT YET COMPLETELY STYMIED THE REGIME'S ABILITY TO MEET  
ITS NEEDS FOR UNSKILLED TROOPS, ALTHOUGH PROBLEMS HAVE  
INDEED BEEN ENCOUNTERED.

TO THE OPPOSITION'S EFFORTS. RELATIVES OF THOSE WHO HAVE BEEN ELIMINATED OR OTHERWISE PERSECUTED BY THIS REGIME UNDERSTAND ONLY ONE VARIATION, AND IS THE TRADITION IN THIS PART OF THE SOCIETY. THE LONGER THIS LEADERSHIP CONTINUES TO PERSIST IN ITS PAST POLICIES, THE LARGER THIS PARTICULAR GROUP WILL BECOME DISCHUNTED AND ISOLATED LEFTISTS (MOSTLY FARQANIS, BUT ALSO SOME DISAFFECTED KHALQIS) ALSO SEEK CHANGE, NOT LEAST OF ALL BECAUSE THEY BELIEVE THE TARAKI-AMIN TEAM HAS BETRAYED THE GENUINE SPIRIT OF THE REVOLUTION, AND HAS SQUANDERED THE INITIAL GOOD-WILL WHICH GREETED THE ADVENT OF A LEFTWING GOVERNMENT SIXTEEN MONTHS AGO. DISILLUSIONED ELEMENTS OF THE MILITARY, WHO MAY SEE NO END TO THE FIGHTING AND KILLING, REPRESENT A POTENTIALLY CRITICAL SEGMENT OF THE OPPOSITION, ESPECIALLY IF DESERTIONS AND DEFECTIONS INCREASE, OR IF FURTHER EXPLOSIONS LIKE AUGUST 5 OCCUR. THE OPPOSITION GROUPS HEADQUARTERED IN PESHAWAR REPRESENT DISSIDENT FROM THE FORMER "ESTABLISHMENT," WHO GENERALLY LOOK WITH DISDAIN UPON THE KHALQIS, MOST OF WHOM DO NOT TRACE THEIR LINEAGE TO THE ELITE CLASSES. IN THEMSELVES, HOWEVER, THESE PARTICULAR "LIBERATION FRONTS" PROBABLY DO NOT POSE A SERIOUS CHALLENGE TO THE DRA, AND FOR THE AFGHAN NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT (ANLF), ET AL, TO PLAY AN IMPORTANT FUTURE ROLE THEY WILL PROBABLY HAVE TO SETTLE THEIR OWN INTRAMURAL DIFFERENCES, AND ESTABLISH SOME CONVINCING ECONOMIC FINES FOR CARRYING OUT INSURGENT OPERATIONS NEARER THE POLITICAL HEART OF THE COUNTRY. GROUPS WITH LESS THAN OBTAIN GOALS ARE ALSO HARASSING THE GOVERNMENT, AS REGULAR BANDITS AND OTHER CRIMINAL ELEMENTS STEP UP THEIR OPERATIONS ALONG SEVERAL OF THE COUNTRY'S PRINCIPAL HIGHWAYS, THEREBY CONTRIBUTING IN NO SMALL MEASURE TO THE OVERALL BREAKDOWN IN LAW AND ORDER IN THE COUNTRYSIDE.

7. MAJOR OPPOSITION GROUPS OPERATING WITHIN AFGHANISTAN: MAJOR AREAS OF SUCCESSFUL OPPOSITION OPERATIONS HAVE BEEN: THE EASTERN PROVINCE OF NURISTAN (WHERE THE NURISTANIS FOR MONTHS APPEARED INTERESTED ONLY IN DENYING THE REGIME ACCESS TO THEIR RUGGED HOMETLAND, BUT WHO MAY NOW ALSO BE ASSOCIATED WITH THE FIGHTING IN THE PANJSHIR VALLEY MUCH NEARER KABUL); PAKISTAN PROVINCE SOUTHEAST OF THE CAPITAL (WHOSE OPPOSITION MOVEMENTS MAY BE MOST CLOSELY RELATED TO THE REFUGEES IN PAKISTAN, AS WELL AS TO THE VARIOUS "FORMAL" GROUPS (ESPECIALLY TO THAT OF GULBUDDIN HEKMATIAR AND SEYED AHMAD GAILANI) HEADQUARTERED IN PESHAWAR, AND WHERE EFFORTS MAY HAVE REACHED THE CITIES OF GARDEZ AND GHAZNI); THE LUNAR-LIKE CENTRAL PART OF THE COUNTRY (WHOSE HAZARA/SHIA POPULATION, THE LOWEST RUNG OF THE AFGHAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL LADDER, IS

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PP RUQMH  
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ZBY CCCC ZZH  
F R 162700Z AUG 79  
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL  
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5262  
RUQMGU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 3699  
RUSSEK/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 9179  
RUMJPG/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 683  
RUSMRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 367  
RUDIC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1753  
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1830  
RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 7248  
RUFNPC/AMEMBASSY PARIS 3219  
RUQMH/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 403  
RUHQQA/CINCPAC  
RUFHNA/USMISSION USNATO 35

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 3 OF 4 KABUL 6251

CINCPAC: ALSO FOR POLAD

PROBABLY FIGHTING IN ORDER TO AVENGE PAST REPRESSIONS  
SUFFERED AT THE HANDS OF PUSHTUN-DOMINATED CENTRAL GOVERN-  
MENTS) THE AREA AROUND HERAT CITY (WHERE THERE HAVE BEEN  
SOME INDICATIONS THAT IRANIAN "INFLUENCE" OR "EXPERIENCE"  
MAY BE AIDING THE FARSIWAN AND PUSHTU INSURGENTS); AND,  
THE TURKOMEN AND UZBEK AGRICULTURAL REGIONS NORTH OF THE  
KINDU KUSH (ALTHOUGH THESE REGIONS ARE LESS HEAVILY-MANNED  
BY THE AFGHAN ARMY, THE FIGHTING HAS NOT REACHED THE PRO-  
PORTIONS OF THAT ALONG THE PAKISTAN-AFGHANISTAN BORDER).  
EVIDENCE OF COORDINATION OF THESE EFFORTS, HOWEVER, REMAINS  
ELUSIVE, AND, SO FAR AT LEAST, THESE SUCCESSFUL OPERATIONS  
HAVE PRINCIPALLY BEEN UNDERTAKEN BY LOCAL INHABITANTS  
FIGHTING TO DEFEND THEIR OWN TURF. IF THE INSURGENTS BE-  
GIN MOUNTING MAJOR OPERATIONS OUTSIDE THESE INDIVIDUAL  
REGIONS (AS MAY BE THE CASE NOW WITH THE NURISTANIS), THE  
REGIME'S PROBLEMS MAY BECOME MANIFESTLY MORE DIFFICULT.

B. FUNDAMENTAL OPPOSITION GRIEVANCES APPEAR SUFFICIENT  
TO SUSTAIN LONG-TERM FIGHTING; TWO FUNDAMENTAL PERCEPTIONS  
TRANSCEND THESE "COMPLAINTS" MOTIVATING INDIVIDUAL OPPO-  
SITION ELEMENTS, AND FUEL THE OVERALL INSURGENCIES TO A FAR  
GREATER EXTENT THAN ANY OTHER CONSIDERATION. THESE ARE  
THE VIRTUALLY UNIVERSAL PERCEPTIONS THAT THE DRA LEADERSHIP  
IS MADE OF OF "GODLESS COMMUNISTS," AND THAT THE TARAKI-  
AMIN TEAM HAS SOLD AFGHANISTAN'S NATIONAL SOUL AND FUTURE  
TO MOSCOW. FEARS OF THE ULTIMATE REPRESSION OF THEIR  
RELIGIOUS RIGHTS A-LA SOVIET CENTRAL ASIA (IT SHOULD BE  
REMEMBERED THAT MANY MUSLIMS FLED THOSE AREAS TO AFGHANISTAN  
IN THIS CENTURY IN ORDER TO PRESERVE THEIR RELIGIOUS INTE-  
GRIETY, AND TRADITIONAL AFGHAN HATRED FOR THE OVERLY POWER-

RETTY HEAVY STUFF WHEN MIXED WITH MODERN WEAPONS AND A  
WILL FOR REVENGE. THEY ARE EMOTIONS UNLIKELY TO DIMINISH  
EASILY, AND ARE, LIKEWISE, EXTREMELY DIFFICULT TO STAMP  
OUT BY FORCE.

BY CONTRAST, THE REGIME'S PRINCIPAL REFORM PROGRAMS (REDUCING ILLITERACY, LAND REFORM, ELIMINATION OF THE TRADITIONAL "BRIDE PRICE," AND BANNING OF USURY PRACTICES) PROVOKED SOME SCATTERED OPPOSITION, BUT THE ONGOING INSURGENCY IS NOT PRIMARILY SUSTAINED BY HOSTILITY TO THESE PROGRAMS, NO MATTER HOW UNPOPULAR THEY MAY HAVE SEEM. WHAT SEEMS CLEAR IS THAT DEEPLY-FELT EMOTIONS ARE NECESSARY TO CAUSE EVEN AFGHANS TO TAKE UP ARMS AGAINST MODERN WEAPONS WIELDED BY A DETERMINED AND RUTHLESS GOVERNMENT, AND WHAT SUCH EMOTIONS DO, IN FACT, PREVAIL ON THE CURRENT AFGHAN POLITICAL SCENE.

10. FEW POLICY OPTIONS ARE AVAILABLE TO THE REGIME TO REVERSE THE PRESENT TREND: THE DRA LEADERSHIP APPEARS TO HAVE VERY FEW POLITICAL OPTIONS AT ITS DISPOSAL WHICH, IF ADOPTED, WOULD HAVE VIABLE CHANCES OF REVERSING THE CURRENT TIDE. THE GOVERNMENT HAS DECLARED A NUMBER OF ITS PROGRAMS (MOST NOTABLY LAND REFORM) "SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETED," BUT THIS ACTION HAS HAD LITTLE NOTICEABLE IMPACT ON THE LEVEL OF FIGHTING, A DEVELOPMENT WHICH WOULD SUPPORT THE CONTENTION THAT THE REGIME'S REFORMS DID NOT REPRESENT ROOT CAUSES FOR THE GROWTH OF THE OPPOSITION.

11. TO ADDRESS THE RELIGIOUS ISSUE, THE LEADERSHIP HAS MOUNTED AN INTENSE PUBLIC RELATIONS CAMPAIGN, INCLUDING REPEATED ASSURANCES BY TARAKI AND AMIN IN THEIR PUBLIC SPEECHES THAT THE DRA IS ABSOLUTELY NOT OPPOSED TO ISLAM. MOREOVER, AN EARLY AUGUST CONCLAVE IN KABUL OF OVER ONE HUNDRED "ISLAMIC SCHOLARS" ISSUED A STATEMENT SUPPORTING THE "DEVOUTNESS" OF THE REGIME AND CLAIMING THAT THE DRA ACTUALLY IS THE "PROTECTOR" OF ISLAM. NONETHELESS, THIS PARTICULAR EFFORT MAY WELL HAVE COME TOO LATE TO CONVINCE THE MASSES THAT THE KHALQI REGIME DOES NOT HAVE THE REDUCTION OF ISLAM IN AFGHANISTAN AS ONE OF ITS PRIMARY GOALS.

12. MODIFICATIONS IN THE DRA'S RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SOVIET UNION MIGHT POSSIBLY MOLLIFY THE OPPOSITION TO SOME EXTENT, BUT IT IS DIFFICULT TO IDENTIFY MEANINGFUL WAYS THE KHALQIS COULD DO THIS WITHOUT RISKING THEIR OWN SELF-DESTRUCTION, SINCE THE SOVIET CONNECTION IS THE CRUCIAL SUPPORT FOR THE CURRENT LEADERSHIP. THUS, THE TARAKI-AMIN TEAM FACES THE QUANDARY THAT THE DRA PROBABLY COULD NOT SURVIVE WITHOUT EXTENSIVE SOVIET SUPPORT, WHILE AT THE SAME TIME, THAT VERY SUPPORT SERVES TO FAN THE FLAMES OF THE NATIONALISTIC OPPOSITION.

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19. AN OPPOSITION "VICTORY" WOULD HAVE MIXED BLESSINGS

... INTERESTS ...  
... A MORE TIMELY ...  
... ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ...  
... THE DEMISE OF THE ...  
... INFORMATION ON THE SPECIFIC ...  
... COUNTRY, ONE ...  
... THE ISLAMIC RE- ...  
... THE CON- ...  
... THE SUPREME ...  
... AFFECTING THE ...  
... PROCESSES ...  
... EVER ...  
... PLACE.

16. CONVERSELY, THE AVAILABLE "MANIFESTO" ISSUED BY SOME OPPOSITION GROUPS CALL FOR A SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC SYSTEM BASED ON THE "FUNDAMENTALIST" TENETS OF ISLAM, AND, THEREFORE, AN OPPOSITION-LED REGIME WOULD PROBABLY NOT HAVE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC REFORMS (SO NECESSARY FOR THIS BACKWARD COUNTRY) HIGH ON ITS PRIORITY LIST. THOUSANDS OF PERSONAL VENDETTAS WOULD PROBABLY BE CARRIED OUT AGAINST SURVIVING KHALQI OFFICIALS, THEREBY PROBABLY TARNISHING A POST-DRA REGIME'S HUMAN RIGHTS RECORD, NO MATTER HOW JUSTIFIED RE-TRIBUTION AGAINST SOME OFFICIALS MIGHT APPEAR TO BE. AN UNFRIENDLY STANCE TOWARD THE US (NOT INEVITABLE, BUT CERTAINLY MORE PROBABLE GIVEN THE FORCES MOTIVATING THE CURRENT OPPOSITION) COULD HAVE DESTABILIZING RESULTS FOR THE REGION, ESPECIALLY GIVEN THE UNCERTAINTIES PREVAILING IN AFGHANISTAN'S NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES. THIS EVENTUALITY, INCIDENTALLY, COULD ENTER MOSCOW'S ASSESSMENT OF HOW FAR TO GO WITH THIS KHALQI REGIME.

17. ON BALANCE, HOWEVER, OUR LARGER INTERESTS, ESPECIALLY GIVEN THE DRA'S EXTREMELY CLOSE TIE TO MOSCOW, THIS REGIME'S ALMOST OPEN HOSTILITY TO US, AND THE ATMOSPHERE OF FEAR IT HAS CREATED THROUGHOUT THIS COUNTRY, WOULD PROBABLY BE SERVED BY THE DEMISE OF THE TARAKI AND AMIN REGIME, DESPITE WHATEVER SETBACKS THIS MIGHT MEAN FOR FUTURE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC REFORMS WITHIN AFGHANISTAN.

AMSTUTZ

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO RUFHNA/USMISSION USKATO IMMEDIATE 7.04  
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RUSGLK/AMEMBASSY KABUL 9615  
RUSBQD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 6770  
RUCMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 4151  
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 5316  
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SECRET SECTION 61 OF 62 STATE 218144/91

CN 336  
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CHRON  
EDON  
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E.O. 12065: GDS, 8/17/85

TAGS: PINS, PEPR, AF, UR, NATO

SUBJECT: POLADS DISCUSSION OF AFGHANISTAN

REF: USKATO 5615

1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. FOLLOWING ARE OUR COMMENTS ON SOME OF THE POINTS RAISED ORALLY AND IN ALLIED PAPERS DURING AUGUST 7 POLADS DISCUSSION OF AFGHANISTAN:

-- WE AGREE WITH CANADIAN REP'S OBSERVATIONS THAT AFGHAN REBEL MOVEMENT IS FRAGMENTED AND LACKS AN AGREED-UPON LEADER. THESE WEAKNESSES, ALONG WITH ONLY RUDIMENTARY LOGISTICAL SUPPORT AND LACK OF HEAVY WEAPONRY, HAVE PREVENTED THE INSURGENCY FROM BEING ABLE TO COORDINATE ATTACKS ON THE REGIME OR TO HOLD MAJOR TOWNS OR INSTALLATIONS FOR ANY LENGTH OF TIME. NONETHELESS, INSURGENCY CANNOT BE CALLED "INEFFECTIVE." IT HAS WHITTLED AWAY AT DRA CONTROL OVER THE COUNTRYSIDE AND NOW THREATENS THE HEART OF DRA POWER--I.E., THE MILITARY, THE MAJOR ROADS, AND URBAN AREAS. THE DRA STILL RETAINS MILITARY SUPERIORITY AS LONG AS THE ARMED FORCES (ESPECIALLY KEY ARMORED AND AIR FORCE UNITS IN KABUL) REMAIN WILLING TO FIGHT FOR THE REGIME AGAINST INSURGENTS AND MILITARY DISSIDENTS.

-- RE FRG REP'S INTEREST IN JULY CABINET RESHUFFLE, OUR VIEW REMAINS THAT IT WAS PRINCIPALLY DESIGNED TO ALLOW TARAKI AND AMIN MORE TIME FOR DEFENSE AND SECURITY MATTERS

AND DIRECT PERSONAL CONTACT WITH THE MILITARY. POOR MORALE AND REPORTS OF DEFECTIONS AND DESERTIONS WOULD BE SUFFICIENT GROUNDS FOR PLANNING SUCH A MOVE. IF THEY MAY WELL HAVE CONCLUDED THAT SUCH A MOVE WOULD BE WORTHWHILE IN VIEW OF THE INCOMPETENCE OF THE CABINET MEMBERS AND THE EVIDENCE THAT CABINET CHANGES WOULD BE POINT TO A LOSS OF INTERNAL FLOT.

-- CANADIAN PAPER: RE PARA 4, WE NOTE THAT AFGHAN AND SOVIET MEDIA HAVE ONCE AGAIN STEPPED UP ACCUSATIONS OF PAKISTANI INVOLVEMENT WITH AFGHAN REBEL ACTIVITIES.

-- FRG PAPER: (A) WE WOULD WELCOME ELABORATION OF FRG'S FIGURES OF 3,000-3,500 SOVIET MILITARY ADVISERS. WE HAVE SEEN FIGURES OF ABOUT 2,000 MILITARY AND AN ESTIMATED 3,000 CIVILIAN ADVISERS. (B) WE ARE NOT AWARE OF ANY SUPPORTING EVIDENCE FOR THE STATEMENTS THAT THE SOVIET PRESS HAS INDICATED ACTIVE USE OF SOVIET TROOPS IN SUPPORT OF THE TARAKI REGIME. IT SHOULD BE CONSIDERED OR THAT IT DESCRIBES AFGHANISTAN REGULARLY AS A SOCIALIST STATE.

-- TURKISH PAPER: WE ARE INTERESTED IN THE STATEMENT THAT THE DEFENSE CONSULTATION CLAUSE OF THE SOVIET-AFGHAN FRIENDSHIP TREATY WAS INSERTED AT THE REQUEST OF THE AFGHANS. COULD THE TURKISH REP ELABORATE ON THIS ASSERTION?

3. ADDITIONAL COMMENTS:

-- YOU MAY DRAW FROM KABUL 6251, WHICH IS AN ANALYSIS OF THE OPPOSITION TO THE TARAKI REGIME AS WELL AS A DISCUSSION OF POSSIBLE DEVELOPMENTS IN AFGHANISTAN. YOU SHOULD NOT RPT NOT PASS ON KABUL'S CONCLUSIONS ABOUT THE EFFECTS ON U.S. INTERESTS OR THE DESIRABILITY OF THE DENISE OF THE TARAKI/AMIN REGIME.

-- WE REMAIN CONCERNED ABOUT SOVIET INTENTIONS IN AFGHANISTAN AND THE IMPLICATIONS OF SOVIET INVOLVEMENT THERE FOR THE REGION. RECENT INDICATIONS ARE THAT THE SOVIETS WILL CONTINUE TO PROVIDE SUBSTANTIAL SUPPORT TO THE CURRENT REGIME. THIS COULD TAKE THE FORM OF MORE DIRECT INVOLVEMENT ON A GRADUATED BASIS.

-- THE GENESIS OF THE AUGUST 5 FIGHTING IN KABUL AS WELL AS THAT WHICH OCCURRED THERE ON AUGUST 15 REMAINS UNCLEAR. IT APPEARS THAT SOME MILITARY ELEMENTS AND PERHAPS CIVILIAN INCURGENTS WERE INVOLVED IN THE BALA HISSAR FIGHTING (AUGUST 5) BUT DETAILS ARE TOO FRAGMENTARY TO BE PRECISE. WHAT IS CLEAR IS THAT THE ERA CAN STILL COUNT ON ITS KEY UNITS (ARMORED AND AIR) TO COME TO ITS DEFENSE WHEN NEEDED.

-- PAKISTANI FOREIGN AFFAIRS ADVISER AGHA SHAHI HAS CANCELLED HIS MID-AUGUST TRIP TO KABUL. THE COP HAS CITED RENewed ANTI-PAKISTANI PROPAGANDA, ANOTHER AFGHAN INCLUSION OF PAKISTANI AIR SPACE, AND THE DRG'S DECISION TO PUBLISH THE DEFECTION (THE PAKS SAY KIDNAPPING) OF A PAKISTANI DIPLOMAT IN Y. ALL AS REASONS FOR CALLING OFF THE LT--IT IS NOT CLEAR IF THE AFGH-PAKIS AND DRG'S ARE THE MAIN REASONS. DRG'S ARE NOT CLEAR ON THIS. DRG'S ARE NOT CLEAR ON THIS. DRG'S ARE NOT CLEAR ON THIS.

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RUEHYO/AMBASSY MOSCOW 1972  
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EXDIS

NOFORN

E.O. 12965: GDS 8/13/85 (FLATIN, BRUCE A.) OR-M  
TAGS: PEPR, PINR, MASS, PINR, AF, LR  
SUBJ: (S) PAVLOVSKIY MISSION TO KABUL

REF: STATE 228642 (NOTAL)

1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. GENERAL PAVLOVSKIY, COMMANDER OF SOVIET GROUND FORCES, AND TWELVE OTHER SOVIET GENERALS HAVE BEEN AT KABUL SINCE AUGUST 17 UNDER VERY TIGHT SECURITY AND HEAVY SECURITY PROTECTION. TRUSTED AFGHAN OFFICIALS HAVE BEEN TOLD THAT THE SOVIET MISSION IS HERE FOR "FACT-FINDING" PURPOSES. PRIME MINISTER AND ACTING DEFENSE MINISTER HAFIZULLAH AMIN HAS DIRECTED THAT LOWER-RANKING OFFICIALS OF THE DEFENSE MINISTRY ARE EMPOWERED TO SIGN ROUTINE AGREEMENTS WITH THE VISITING SOVIET TEAM.

3. COMMENT: THE EMBASSY WOULD PREFER TO AWAIT FURTHER INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION AND EVALUATION BEFORE SPECULATING TOO MUCH ABOUT THE PRIMARY MISSION OF THE SOVIET TEAM. HOWEVER, THE SPECIAL AND SENIOR MILITARY RESPONSIBILITY OF ITS LEADER, THE ALREADY LENGTHY DURATION OF THE VISIT, AND THE FACT THAT SEVERAL MUTS-AND-BOLIS-TYPE AGREEMENTS ARE APPARENTLY BEING "NEGOTIATED," SUGGEST THAT ONE POSSIBLE REASON FOR PAVLOVSKIY'S PRESENCE HERE COULD BE THAT THE USSR IS LAYING THE DETAILED CONTINGENCY GROUNDWORK FOR THE FUTURE INTERVENTION OF SOVIET FORCES IN AFGHANISTAN, SHOULD MOSCOW EVENTUALLY DECIDE THAT THAT STEP IS NECESSARY. ON THE OTHER HAND, IT IS CONCEIVABLE THAT PAVLOVSKIY IS HERE PRINCIPALLY TO PROVIDE EXPERT, TOP-LEVEL GUIDANCE ON COUNTER-INSURGENCY OPERATIONS TO THE AFGHAN MINISTRY OF DEFENSE. AMSTUTZ

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NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/ORCON  
The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D. C. 20505

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14 September 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR: The National Security Council

SUBJECT : Alert Memorandum on USSR-Afghanistan (U)

The Soviet leaders may be on the threshold of a decision to commit their own forces to prevent the collapse of the Taraki regime and protect their sizable stake in Afghanistan. Small Soviet combat units may already have arrived in the country. I am concerned that the Soviets may be underestimating the difficulties of shoring up the regime and may find themselves under growing pressures to escalate the scope of their intervention in the next few months. Moreover, the Soviets may now be more inclined to gamble on a substantial intervention in Afghanistan because of their perception of a downturn in relations with the US and the uncertain prospects for Senate approval of the SALT treaty. (S/NF/NC/OC)

*Stansfield Turner*  
STANSFIELD TURNER

Attachment  
~~TOP SECRET~~

This memo may be downgraded to  
~~SECRET/NF/NC/OC~~ when caveats are  
removed and when separated from  
attachment.  
~~TOP SECRET~~

SANITIZED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 1.6

PER 11/2/99 CA BY NIC-9526  
BY [Signature] NRS. DATE 11/2/00

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

September 17, 1979

~~TOP SECRET~~/CODEWORD

10-9  
JT-  
tells to ICA  
CIA  
about military  
20

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

FROM: THOMAS THORNTON

SUBJECT: What Are the Soviets Doing In  
Afghanistan? (S)

Simply, we don't know. Speculation is, however, intriguing.  
(S)

There appears to be three possibilities:

1. The entire sequence over the weekend (dismissal of the military in the cabinet; retirement of Taraki; Amin's announcement of the end of one-man leadership) was stage-managed by the Soviets as a way of getting a more acceptable government installed in Kabul. This doesn't seem likely. The Soviets made quite a fuss over Taraki last week in Moscow; Taraki would have been a much better figurehead for a national front government in Afghanistan; and the Soviets would not seem to have any reason to do in the military faction. This would seem to be the least likely explanation. (S)
2. Amin is doing the whole thing in defiance of the Soviets, facing them with a fait accompli. This would be a high-stakes game for him, but he is capable of it. It is not clear, however, why Amin would now be calling for broadened leadership unless that is solely window-dressing or nothing more than a gratuitous slap at Taraki. (S)
3. Amin started out on his own, but after the dropping of Taraki, the Soviets stepped in, called his bluff, and are now forcing him to accept a collective leadership -- something the Soviets have probably been looking for for quite a while. (S)

We have no evidence that proves or disproves any of these.  
[REDACTED] before the

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ORIGINAL CL BY Z. Brzezinski  
 DECL  REVW ON 17 Sept 1999

SANITIZED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
PER 8/25/99 CIA RE NLC-95-87

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ouster of the military men may denote foreknowledge, but not necessarily complicity. As between the second and third explanations, I like the second one since I think that Amin would have held out longer in his bluff against the Soviets, and will doubt his vague professions of future collegiality until he starts implementing them. That, however, is only a guess. (TS/Codeword)

It is hard to see how the Soviets can come out winners no matter which is the case. They tried before to put a national front together and failed, probably because nobody else would play. Why would anybody be more willing to sign on now -- unless the Soviets could give credible guarantees that there would be a genuine sharing of power? That doesn't seem too likely. And, given the growing weakness of the regime, why would anybody want to share power now when they might get the whole thing shortly? (There may be in fact reasons that would impel people to do so, arising perhaps from inter-tribal considerations. But I don't understand these and know nobody who does.) (S)

Most likely, the Soviets have just been pushed a big step nearer to their moment of truth in Afghanistan. In this game of "Ten Little Afghans," there is now only one left. (S)

Whatever the Soviet role in this, they should be made to look as if they had a hand in the operation. Taraki was something of a Lenin figure and had a degree of foreign respect. Amin is the Stalin of the drama and the Soviets should have him hung prominently around their necks. (S)

Brement concurs.

TOP SECRET/CODEWORD





MEMORANDUM

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

September 24, 1979

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11-26-79INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI  
 FROM: THOMAS THORNTON *[Signature]*  
 SUBJECT: Regional Cooperation re Afghanistan (S)

Bob Gates said that you wanted a paper on this; one is attached. I have discussed it with Gary Sick and it generally reflects his views. (C)

The paper sets forth two strategies -- A is low-key and would be my preference between the two. B is much higher profile. They could also be characterized as Indian and Iranian strategies. (And that choice tells you something about the problem!) (C)

Beyond this, you are aware of my various efforts to stimulate greater discussion of regional security problems. This is, of course, very long range. In addition, Mike Oksenberg and I are working on ideas to bring the Chinese to a greater degree of cooperation. (S)

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~  
 Original Classif. by Thomas Thornton  
 Review on September 24, 1985

DECLASSIFIED  
 E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
 FER 9/20/96 NSC/HR/NK-95-82  
 BY *[Signature]* NARS DATE 12/1/96

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~Preliminary Observations

First, what are our objectives? Assumedly they involve:

- Preventing a Soviet psychological victory and forcing the Soviets back at least to the status quo ante as regards Afghanistan.
- Second, bringing about a change in government in Afghanistan that will be no less favorable to us than was the Daoud regime.
- Third, developing a self-sustaining security system in South-west Asia that is compatible with US interests. (S)

The third of these needs further examination since it is not only an objective in itself but can also be the means of attaining the first two objectives. (S)

Ideally, we seek a regional approach which comprises an Indian leadership role in South Asia; broad acceptance of this role by strong and independent regional states (especially Pakistan); a substantial improvement in Chinese-Indian relations to the point that each accepts the bona fides of the other; the re-establishment of a strong Iran that has sympathetic relations with us and the other countries involved. The US would have no significant security involvement beyond limited arms sales to Iran, India and Pakistan, and a modest, offshore presence that was accepted as benign by all others. The USSR would play no greater role than we do except that it might be very heavily installed in Afghanistan. We are a long way from this situation and it may be unobtainable. It should, however, be our goal and we should try to avoid actions in conflict with it. (S)

Short-Term Approaches

The following suggestions fall into two groups. The first (Group A) constitutes steps that are consistent with the long term goals; the second (Group B), in varying degrees, less consistent and should be pursued only if it meets the criteria of urgency and probable effectiveness. (S)

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Original Classif. by Thomas Thornton  
Review on September 24, 1985

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E.O.12958, Sec.3.6

PER 3/20/96 NLC/ll RE NLC-15-82  
BY J NARS DATE 12/09/96

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GROUP A

1. We seek to develop increasing awareness of the situation through a program of diplomatic and intelligence briefings. The main aim, from our point of view, is heightening the awareness of the regional states that Soviet involvement in Afghanistan presents a novel security problem for them. Most of them do recognize this; India, which is key to our strategy, is however reluctant to accept the idea. (S)
2. Through these discussions we are seeking to stimulate discussion of the problem among the regional states. We should do more -- e.g. urging Bangladesh, Nepal, Sri Lanka, etc. to put pressure on the Indians to take account of their regional concerns. [REDACTED] (S)
3. The China factor must be turned into a positive rather than a negative element -- i.e. Peking should take added initiatives to improve relations with India and reduce the Indian perception of a Sino-Pakistani (and perhaps US) alliance. (S)
4. Something has to be done about Iran. First, it seems incapable of purposeful action; second, our relations with it are poor; and third, its strident Islamic tone frightens the Indians. The third point might be amenable to improvement if we could convince the Iranians to initiate some discussion with the Indians about their concerns with the Soviet role in Afghanistan. (Similarly, we might encourage the Iranians to start thinking of the Chinese as a potentially useful connection in that regard.) The first and second might be amenable to some improvement if we and the Iranians could find ground for collaboration in approaching the Afghan problem. This subject has been broached discussions could be intensified. (S)
5. The Pakistani element is substantially frozen by the nuclear impasse, although there seems to be increasing Pakistani interest in assistance to the insurgents. The problem with that is ensuring that it not justify a Soviet intervention or otherwise evoke a more direct Soviet threat to Pakistan. We have consultations coming up with the Pakistanis next month and can sound them out better then. Before then, we should concentrate on intelligence exchange [REDACTED] (S)

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6. India is very difficult to deal with because of the absence of a functioning government. This problem will at the earliest be resolved early next year. In the interim, we should play an unobtrusive role, concentrating perhaps on briefings through intelligence liaison channels. We should not take the initiative in urging the Indians to consult with others. (S)

In sum -- We would be relying essentially on the regional states to take initiatives among themselves to heighten mutual awareness and perhaps lay the groundwork for cooperative action. Our role would be limited to behind the scenes efforts and the risks would be small. But the chances of an effective result are also not great unless there is a massive and unambiguous Soviet intervention in Afghanistan that so alarms the regional states that they can put lesser problems behind them. (S)

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GROUP B

This set of actions would escalate Group A significantly in terms of US involvement. The strategy would focus on closer regional coordination, with the US playing as unobtrusive a role as possible, but nonetheless one that would be much higher profile than in the Group A scenario. (S)

1. In this strategy, the emphasis shifts from India to Iran. We would pick up on their offer to discuss the Afghan insurgency problem. If they show further interest, we would have to be prepared to offer Iran help in supporting the insurgency. We could provide arms, money and training; we would consult closely with Tehran and provide intensive intelligence briefings. It is by no means certain that the Iranians (especially Qom) want to play this role but it is one of our few shared interests and a major benefit of this strategy is that it gives us something to talk about with Iran.

2. [REDACTED]

(S)

3. The Pakistanis would be asked to coordinate [REDACTED] with the Iranians [REDACTED]

(S)

4. The Chinese would be urged to add something to the pot for the insurgents, working through both Iran and Pakistan. (S)

5. The overall coordination of this kind of effort would be much more structured than in the Group A case. There would have to be a focal point for coordination of effort among the parties concerned [REDACTED]

(S)


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6. Iraq is not likely to join in. We and other concerned nations should, however, urge Iraq to take a benevolently neutral stance, pointing out that the issue of the day is thwarting Soviet hegemonism, rather than exploiting old regional antagonisms. (S)

7.



(S)

8. A heightened US military presence would be appropriate, demonstrating support for Pakistan and in the Gulf area. (S)

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GROUP C (?)

Theoretically, there is a Group C -- actions that would provide a much more dramatic US profile. This would call for a public and leading US role in the coordination of Southwest Asian security, involving a reborn CENTO or, at least, open US membership in the coordinating body dealing with Afghanistan. (S)

The costs of such action -- polarization, raising of unrealistic expectations, damage to other US policies -- are too high to warrant consideration, given the meager increase in benefits to be expected. (S)

Critique

There are several serious problems involved in the Group B actions (and a fortiori in Group C) that must be kept in mind:

1. Outside involvement in the Afghan situation will serve as a trigger -- and for many a justification -- for Soviet intervention.
2. Aside from the political costs with India, etc., this will make it highly unlikely that whatever we and others may do will save the insurgents from defeat. We will in all likelihood have our bluff called and emerge from the confrontation weakened. Even the regional countries who welcomed our support will have to reconsider their options vis-a-vis the Soviets.
3. The strategy relies heavily on Iran which is one of the more uncertain trumpets around. We could reduce this danger somewhat by focussing mainly on Pakistan and China, but this would simply be the replay of 1971.
4. If we drive India definitively into the Soviet camp the political cost would far outweigh whatever gains we have any reasonable expectation of making elsewhere. Hope for any stable regional security system would be destroyed. (S)

The B Strategy thus shows little promise of meeting the objectives set at the beginning of this paper. In addition, it does

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not meet the test of urgency since nobody really expects us to do anything in Afghanistan. (S)

At the same time, it might be worth pursuing for domestic political reasons; as a means of showing our determination to become involved in Gulf security; or as a global signal to the Soviets. Certainly a successful thwarting of Soviet designs in this important region would be of immense benefit on all fronts. Also, this strategy could be of importance in building a new relationship with Iran and the greater the degree of foreign involvement, the greater the chances for coordination and effective action by the Afghan rebels. (S)

The cost-benefit equation will be more favorable if we can move rapidly, decisively and effectively, and if our role is appreciated. The chances of bringing this off depend partly on skill, but also heavily on our ability to manage the public information side effectively. That has not been our strong point recently. (S)

*Memo: TT to ZB 24 Sept. 1979  
Vertical file, Afghanistan, JCL*

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Director of  
Central  
Intelligence

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ORCUB~~



# Soviet Options in Afghanistan

Interagency Intelligence Memorandum

SANITIZED  
E.O. 11652, 11653  
PER 11/12/99 CIA NO NLC-95-86  
BY J INFO DATE 11/12/00

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## SOVIET OPTIONS IN AFGHANISTAN

### KEY JUDGMENTS

Moscow probably views the situation in Afghanistan as even more unstable after the fall of Taraki. While the Soviets may have previously decided to implement new military measures to support Taraki against the rebels, the uncertain tenure of Prime Minister Amin's regime makes it likely that Moscow is deferring major new initiatives to expand the counterinsurgency effort pending a decision as to whether Amin can consolidate his position. (TS)

The Soviets, however,

may fear that this coup might fragment the Afghan Army and lead to a breakdown of control in Kabul. In this event, they would be likely to deploy one or more Soviet airborne divisions to the Kabul vicinity to protect Soviet citizens already there as well as to ensure continuance of some pro-Soviet regime in the capital. Although we might not receive prior warning, we believe it likely that we would promptly detect a deployment of Soviet forces on this scale once it began. We do not believe that Moscow would intend such a deployment for use in fighting against the Muslim insurgency, although, once in Afghanistan, such Soviet airborne forces could eventually be drawn into such fighting. We have not seen indications that the Soviets are at the moment preparing ground forces for large-scale military intervention in Afghanistan. (TS)

This memorandum was prepared under the auspices of the National Intelligence Officer for USSR and Eastern Europe, National Foreign Assessment Center. It was coordinated within the Central Intelligence Agency; with the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State; with the Defense Intelligence Agency; with the National Security Agency; and with the intelligence organizations of the Departments of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force. Information available through 27 September 1979 was used in the preparation of this memorandum.

In the months before the coup, as the insurgency in Afghanistan intensified and spread, the Soviets increased the numbers and expanded the counterinsurgency role there of what now are at least 2,500 of their military personnel, who are heavily involved in guiding combat operations. Moscow may also have permitted direct participation of Soviet helicopter pilots, and possibly some tank personnel, in combat alongside the Afghans. In addition, we believe that one lightly equipped Soviet airborne battalion has been quietly deployed in Afghanistan since early July to provide security at Bagram Air Force Base.\* Meanwhile, also during the summer of 1979, the Soviets have apparently tried and failed to induce the regime to admit other political elements to the government to broaden its base. All these measures have proved inadequate to halt the deterioration of the regime's position. (TS [REDACTED])

Amin's seizure of sole power within the Khalqist regime in mid-September has further complicated these Soviet problems in dealing with both the regime and the insurgency. We believe that the Soviets probably did not instigate or foresee this move by Amin. Moreover, they probably also evaluated it as rendering the counterinsurgency task more difficult, at least in the short term, because it further narrowed the regime's base of support, and, in fact, threatened to divide the ruling party itself. (TS [REDACTED])

If Moscow, within the next few weeks, concludes that Amin has consolidated his position and that no effective challenge from within the regime and the Army is likely, we believe the Soviets will probably increase their counterinsurgency role over the next few months, albeit incrementally rather than dramatically. In this case, Moscow may further increase the number of Soviet advisers and expand their combat activities, and may gradually bring in additional special battalions or regiments to provide security in key cities. In addition, Moscow could bolster the counterinsurgency effort by providing Soviet-manned combat support and combat service support units, such as attack helicopter, logistic, and maintenance units, to enhance Afghan combat reach and effectiveness. (TS [REDACTED])

\* The Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency believes that there is insufficient evidence to determine the role or function of the Soviet unit deployed at Bagram Air Force Base. There is no evidence that this unit is equipped with crew-served weapons. (TS [REDACTED])

We believe the introduction into Afghanistan of additional Soviet battalion- or regiment-size units for security purposes, like the forces already at Bagram, could be accomplished without immediate detection if this were done gradually, along with the ongoing airlift of materiel. Our ability to detect promptly the incremental introduction of Soviet combat support and combat service support units is similarly limited, although time would increase the probability of our learning that such units had entered Afghanistan.

(TS)

The Soviets are probably well aware of the open-ended military and political difficulties that could flow if such limited intervention were allowed to grow into a larger and more visible commitment. They are also aware of the adverse political consequences this would entail for them in South Asia and the Middle East. On the other hand, it is clear that the Soviets' sense of their interests in Afghanistan is now more ambitious than it was before the advent of the Marxist regime in 1978. They see the maintenance of a Marxist state in Afghanistan as important to their strategic and political interests in the region. This perception has increasingly supplanted the Soviets' earlier and less ambitious goal of simply maintaining a friendly buffer state on their southern border. If they do decide to provide some additional military support to Amin, they are likely to do so in the hope of bolstering the anti-insurgent struggle sufficiently to avoid facing a decision as to whether to use Soviet combat units on a large scale. (TS)

In the event that Amin does not consolidate his position but that an acceptable and viable Marxist alternative emerges, the Soviets are likely to shift their political and military support accordingly. If no such viable leftist alternative appears, and the Khalqi regime fragments, the Soviets would promote installation of a more moderate regime willing to deal with them, rather than accept the political costs and risks of a massive Soviet invasion to fight the insurgency. Nevertheless, we can foresee contingencies under which the chances of large-scale and long-term Soviet intervention would become substantially greater:

- Prolonged political chaos.
- The prospect of advent of an anti-Soviet regime.
- Foreign military intervention. (TS)



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NOFORN NOCONTRACT-ORCON

## DISCUSSION

1. The threat raised by the Muslim insurgency to the survival of the Marxist government in Afghanistan appears more serious now than at any time since the government assumed power in April 1978. During the past 17 months, the government has become increasingly dependent on Soviet political, military, economic, and technical help. The Soviets have been generous but the Afghans remain unsatisfied. Meanwhile, the declining fortunes of the Khalqist\* regime probably have caused Moscow to reassess what level of assistance would be needed to keep the Khalqis in power and at what point the risks and burdens associated with such assistance would outweigh the benefits of preserving the Taraki-Amin regime--and now the Amin regime. (S)

2. Although a fairly important garrison recently surrendered to the rebels, the various insurgent groups do not yet pose an immediate military threat to government control of the major cities, and can only intermittently interdict key communications routes. But the Afghan armed forces are increasingly stretched thin in their efforts to deal with the insurgents, and their willingness to support the government has been continuously eroding. (C)

### Soviet Interests in Afghanistan

3. Until last year's Marxist coup, Moscow's interest in Afghanistan seemed to be focused on ensuring the continued primacy of Soviet influence in a state on the southern border of the USSR. Before last year, Soviet interests in Afghanistan were guaranteed by two treaties (a 1921 Friendship Treaty and a 1931 Treaty of Neutrality and Nonaggression which prohibited Afghan territory from being used for actions inimical to the USSR) and by the USSR's role as chief economic and military aid donor. To be sure, Afghanistan's foreign policy was nonaligned and Moscow's ability to influence Afghan internal affairs was limited, but the Soviets seemed satisfied with their level of influence there, and regularly cited Afghanistan as a model of how two states with differing social systems could peacefully coexist. (C)

\* The dominant faction of the People's Democratic Party (PDPA). (C)

4. We have no convincing evidence to confirm reports that the Soviets were behind the coup which brought the Marxists to power. The USSR undoubtedly had been the chief inspirational force and financial source of support for the Afghan Communist movement since its establishment in the early 1950s. But the Soviets were always worried about the impact which support for the Afghan Communists would have on their relations with the Afghan Government and were extremely circumspect in their direct dealings with them. Indeed, Moscow has never officially acknowledged the existence of an Afghan Communist party, or permitted any Afghan Communists to attend international party meetings, even incognito. (C)

5. The successful seizure of power by the Afghan Communists, however, dramatically changed their status in Moscow. Both the USSR's envoy in Kabul, Ambassador Puzanov, who is reported to be an ideologue with important connections in the Soviet party Central Committee, and the Soviet military, who are likely to have seen an opportunity to enhance the Soviet strategic position, probably urged Soviet leaders to take advantage of the political windfall and to create yet another Communist regime on Soviet borders. In addition, the Soviet leadership probably thought that the consolidation of Marxist rule could take place gradually and be managed in a way that would not jeopardize more important Soviet foreign policy interests. (S ~~NE NC OC~~)

6. It is clear that the Soviets' sense of their interests in Afghanistan is now more ambitious than it was before the advent of the Marxist regime in 1978. They see the maintenance of a Marxist state in Afghanistan as being important to their strategic and political interests in the region. This perception has increasingly supplanted the Soviets' earlier and less ambitious goal of simply maintaining a friendly buffer state on their southern border. (C)

#### Evolution of Soviet Involvement

7

  
Mindful of the narrowness of the new regime's

base of support, and anxious to help it consolidate its position, the USSR also began increasing its military advisory presence, which at the time of the coup numbered an estimated 350 persons. In July 1978, Moscow concluded a \$250 million military aid agreement with the new regime. (S ~~NE-NC-OC~~)

8. As opposition to the government increased last fall and winter, the Soviets continued to augment their military advisory presence. By early this year, their presence had grown to at least five Soviet generals and an estimated 750 to 1,000 military advisers. These Soviets were initially stationed in the Kabul area, assisting newly promoted officers in running the Ministry of Defense and training Afghan recruits. As conditions in the countryside deteriorated, an increasing number of Soviet advisers were sent to the provinces to assist in the government's anti-insurgent effort. (TS )

9. The uprising in Herat last March and the subsequent visit to Kabul by the Soviet military's top political officer, General Yepishev, in early April led to a further augmentation of the Soviet military presence. In June 1979, Moscow deployed eight AN-12s to Afghanistan to assist the government in transporting men and materiel to the various battlefronts. We now estimate that there are at least 2,500 Soviet military personnel in Afghanistan.\* (TS )

10.  there are Soviet advisers attached to every major Afghan Army command, as well as to at least some regiment- and battalion-level units. They appear to be heavily involved in guiding Afghan combat operations, as well as in Afghan Army logistics and administration.

\* This figure does not include up to 3,600 additional troops which, according to unconfirmed reports, have recently been moved into Kabul to safeguard facilities there. See paragraph 39. (TS )

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(TS)

11. In addition, there are some reports which are not confirmed, but which we regard as fairly credible, alleging that Soviets have piloted helicopters together with Afghan pilots in strikes against insurgent positions, and have on occasion furnished tank personnel for combat operations.

12. If these latter reports are accurate, the Soviets, in addition to guiding Afghan combat operations, are themselves already participating in combat on a small scale and in certain limited ways. In general, however, they are not organized in cohesive combat units intended to conduct unilateral operations. (TS)

13. Soviet personnel also appear to be stationed in considerable numbers at Bagram Air Force Base north of Kabul, where they apparently service the airlift from the Soviet Union. In addition to the aircraft service and support contingent at Bagram, an airborne battalion--some 400 personnel--has apparently been at the airbase since early July. The unit is lightly equipped and probably has been deployed to Bagram to provide security. We have no evidence that it has been used in combat operations against the Afghan insurgents.\* (TS)

\* The Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency believes that there is insufficient evidence to determine the role or function of the Soviet unit deployed at Bagram Air Force Base. There is no evidence that this unit is equipped with crew-served weapons. (TS)

14. Soviet civilian involvement in Afghanistan has also grown appreciably since the coup. By the end of 1978, we estimated that the number of civilian advisers had nearly doubled to some 2,000, as the Soviets assumed top managerial and planning jobs in the government's economic ministries and became involved in changing the government's educational system. The Soviets, however, have not promised the Afghans any significant new economic assistance beyond additional debt relief (the USSR is by far Afghanistan's largest creditor) and 100,000 tons of wheat. This is because the Afghan capability to absorb substantial increases in foreign economic assistance is limited and because there is still some \$300 million in unallocated credits from the \$1.3 billion extended to previous regimes. The 60 economic aid agreements that were signed last year allocated only \$200 million of the \$500 million in credits outstanding at the time of the April 1978 coup. Nonetheless, the Afghans are said to be dissatisfied over the level of Soviet economic assistance actually being provided, and annoyed over their unsuccessful attempts to join the Soviet bloc's Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CEMA) in hopes of loosening Soviet purse strings. (S NF-NC 0C)

15. Moscow's political commitment to the new regime was symbolized by its willingness in December 1978 to conclude another friendship treaty with the Afghan Government. The treaty is similar to others signed with Third World countries, in that it said nothing about the Marxist-Leninist character of the new regime, paid lipservice to Afghanistan's professed foreign policy of nonalignment, and contained no explicit mutual defense commitment. Article Four of the Treaty, however, presumably could be invoked to justify Soviet combat intervention on behalf of the regime. It calls for the two sides to "consult with each other and take by mutual agreement appropriate measures to ensure the security, independence, and territorial integrity" of the two states. (C)

16. As the prospects of the Khalqist group for consolidating its rule have declined, Moscow has become increasingly concerned that Afghanistan's neighbors, Pakistan and Iran, might be tempted to aid Afghan insurgents. To deter such support, the Soviets have kept up heavy diplomatic and propaganda pressure on Pakistan and somewhat lesser pressure on Iran. They have also repeatedly accused the United States, China, and Egypt of training Afghan insurgents. (TS)

Recent Soviet Behavior

17. In addition to increasing their military involvement in the government's anti-insurgent effort, the Soviets have urged Taraki and Amin to seek political means for easing the situation. They convinced the government to abandon its land reform program. But they were not able to reverse some of the other social and economic reforms introduced by Taraki and Amin that have alienated deeply religious Afghan tribes who refuse to be wrenched from their near-feudal way of life. (S ~~NE-NC-OC~~)

18. Similarly, the Soviets have apparently had little success in persuading the Afghan regime to modify its hostile posture toward Pakistan in the interest of inducing Pakistan to minimize support for the Afghan insurgents.

[REDACTED]

19. The apparent lack of harmony between the Soviet and Afghan leaderships lent support to the numerous indications that Moscow throughout the summer of 1979 was seeking alternatives to the Taraki-Amin regime. We have received reports that the Soviets encouraged leaders of the rival Parcham faction of the People's Democratic Party, in exile in Europe, to believe that the USSR would back their return to power and, alternatively, that the Soviets were planning a military coup. Jailed members of the Parcham faction in Kabul, who were released at Soviet urging in early July, were rearrested in August after they began circulating anti-Amin and anti-Taraki documents. (S ~~NE-NC-OC~~)

20. Moscow's desire to enlarge the Afghan ruling circle apparently was discussed directly with Taraki and Amin. Ambassador Safronchuk, the Soviets' special envoy to Kabul, told the US Charge on 24 June that Moscow had not yet been able to persuade the regime to bring new people into government. By mid-July the East German Ambassador in Kabul was claiming that the Soviets were going to replace Taraki and Amin by force if necessary. In late July, the public comments of Taraki and Amin made it clear that they were aware of the Soviet machinations and that they would

resist. Amin pointedly reminded Moscow that the prerequisite for continued close ties was Soviet "respect for our national sovereignty and independence." In the same period, there was evidence suggesting that Amin had taken steps to circumscribe the power of the Minister of Defense Watanjar, a key figure in any putative Soviet effort to induce the Afghan military to depose Amin and Taraki. On 28 July, Amin assumed effective control of the Defense Ministry and appointed Watanjar as Interior Minister. (S ~~NE~~ NC DC)

21. Events during the latter half of August suggest that despite the difficulties in its dealings with the regime, Moscow was not prepared to halt the growth of its commitment to the Khalqis. On 19 August Soviet leaders Brezhnev and Kosygin sent an unusually warm message to the Afghan leaders in connection with Afghan independence day. A few days before, a large high-ranking Soviet military delegation led by the Commander of Soviet Ground Forces, General Pavlovskiy had arrived in Kabul secretly to conduct a lengthy assessment of Afghan military needs. (S ~~NE~~ NC DC)

22. In mid-September, Amin's seizure of sole power, ~~air~~ removing both Watanjar and Taraki from the government, ~~rate~~ further complicated the Soviet problems in dealing with both the regime and the insurgency. The Soviets probably saw the Amin coup as rendering the counterinsurgency task more difficult, at least in the short term, because it further narrowed the regime's base of support and in fact threatened to divide the Khalqi party itself. (TS ~~NE~~ NC DC)

#### Military Options

23. On the eve of the Amin coup, in the apparent absence of viable political alternatives, the Soviets seem to have decided by late August to renew their commitment to the Afghan leadership as it was then constituted, and to focus on the scope and character of military support needed to support that commitment. The size and rank of the Pavlovskiy delegation, plus the long duration of its visit, strongly suggest that it was tasked to make that assessment of military needs. If Moscow chose to provide additional military support, its options could be divided into four categories, as discussed below. (S)

24. Equipment and Advisers. The most obvious option is to supply more equipment and to increase the number of Soviet advisers. Because of a shortage of trained Afghan

manpower, such an increase might necessitate allowing Soviet advisers a more extensive role in combat and air support activities and in ferrying men and materiel within Afghanistan. The Soviets, for example, could assign more personnel to fly and maintain tactical ground support aircraft and helicopter gunships for operations against the insurgents. (TS)

25. Introduction of Combat Support and Combat Service Support Units. Another option, at a higher level of involvement, would be to provide the Afghan Army with Soviet-manned combat support and combat service support units--such as attack helicopter and additional logistic and maintenance units--to enhance the Afghan combat reach and effectiveness. Combat support and combat service support units could be moved to areas of the USSR adjacent to Afghanistan and incrementally introduced over a period of weeks without straining the Soviet transport system. Our ability to detect such Soviet movements and intrusions promptly is limited, although time would increase the probability of our learning that such units had entered Afghanistan. (TS)

26. Limited Intervention With Soviet Combat Units. The Soviets might consider deploying a limited number of their own units to provide security or operate in combat as separate entities. The Soviets would have to weigh whether their increased combat presence would alienate rather than bolster the Afghan forces that are now loyal to the regime. Because of this uncertainty the introduction of Soviet combat units probably would be accomplished incrementally. It might begin, for example, with a few battalions up to and including an airborne division or two to help stiffen Afghan Army resolve or provide security for key cities or critical points. As noted earlier, we believe one such battalion has already been introduced to provide security for Bagram airfield since early July. (S)

27. The most likely airborne division to be called in is the one nearest Afghanistan, located at Fergana in the Turkestan Military District (MD). It could be brought up to its operational strength of some 7,900 men in a few hours. (S-NP)

28. The airlift of an airborne division into Afghanistan could be accomplished within a day or so if the transport and airborne forces were previously alerted and prepared. The Fergana division is situated about 380 nautical miles from Kabul, and the flight time between the two locations



is only about one and a half hours. With the short distance involved, the Soviets would probably elect to establish an air shuttle and deliver the division in several regiment-size increments, each requiring about 100 aircraft sorties. Some 200 additional sorties would be required for the division's support equipment. An airlift of this nature would be well within the capabilities of the Soviet military transport fleet. (TS)

29. The Soviets could also airlift to Afghanistan infantry elements up to regimental size from divisions in the Turkestan MD. Without their heavy equipment, these units would not have the firepower or mobility of airborne units but could be used for point defense or, with the commitment of substantial helicopter lift and support units, to protect communication lines or conduct anti-insurgent operations. (S, NF)

30. All of these limited deployments could be supported by fighter aircraft from the three tactical air force bases in the Turkestan MD. Only 45 of the approximately 120 tactical fighters at these bases have a primary role of ground attack, but other aircraft could readily be deployed to border airfields if necessary. The closest combat assault helicopter unit is in the Transcaucasus MD, 1,100 miles from the Afghan border, and other units are farther away in the Carpathian and Transbaikalian MDs. Soviet transport helicopter units are located throughout the western and southwestern military districts. The Soviets probably would not consider that airstrikes by themselves would reverse a deteriorating military situation, but they might use such strikes to support Soviet combat units if they were introduced. (TS)

31. Massive Soviet Military Intervention. Anything beyond securing Kabul or some other key city and a few critical points would require the commitment of large numbers of regular ground forces in a potentially open-ended operation. An overland move to Kabul--particularly with the possibility of Afghan Army and insurgent opposition--would be a multidivisional operation exhausting the resources of the Turkestan MD. An operation of this magnitude would therefore require the redeployment of forces--and their supporting elements--from western and central military districts, in addition to those near the Soviet-Afghan border. (S, NF)

32. Soviet ground forces closest to Afghanistan are located in the Turkestan MD--some 45,000 men in four cadre-level motorized rifle divisions, an artillery brigade, and various MD-level support units. All of these forces are manned considerably below their intended wartime strengths. In about a week some 50,000 reservists could be mobilized to fill out the Turkestan units and an additional division could be moved in from the Central Asian MD. (S~~U~~NF)

33. Six other Central Asian Military District divisions would also be available for operations but would require a few weeks or longer to mobilize reservists and move to the Afghan border. The Soviets probably would be reluctant to move any substantial portion of their Central Asian forces into Afghanistan, however, for fear of weakening their position opposite China. (S~~U~~NF)

34. The Soviets have 12 other divisions located well over 1,000 miles from Afghanistan in the Volga, Ural, and North Caucasus MDs from which they could draw intervention forces. These units are also manned at low levels in peacetime and would require a few weeks to fill out and move to the Afghan border. (S~~U~~NF)

35. The terrain and lack of a modern transportation network in Afghanistan are hampering the Afghan Government's military effort against the insurgents and would seriously complicate large-scale Soviet military operations. Most of the country is hilly or mountainous--terrain that would limit the use of transport and logistic vehicles. In addition to controlling the mountainous areas, the insurgents could disrupt Soviet movement by cutting the roadways that lead from the border area to several key cities as well as those roads between major urban areas. (S~~U~~NF)

#### Prospects

36. The prospect of a successful Communist government in Afghanistan is important to Moscow for ideological reasons: such a government would provide substance to determinist claims that world "socialism" will eventually emerge victorious. The Soviets feel obligated to support such revolutions and embarrassed when they fail. The outcome assumes an added importance when the revolution occurs in a country on the USSR's border. In addition, it is conceivable that some Soviet planners have welcomed the advent of such a revolution in Afghanistan on strategic grounds, arguing that if

this revolutionary regime could be consolidated in power at acceptable cost, it could open the way for the eventual expansion of Soviet influence southward. (C)

37. For these reasons Moscow has been determined to make the Khalqi seizure of power blossom into a workable government, and has been frustrated by the steady decline of the regime's fortunes. We have seen that as the insurgency has worsened and the regime's needs have grown, the Soviets have steadily expanded the flow of military supplies to the regime to the limits of its ability to absorb them. Similarly, they have gradually increased the number and expanded the counterinsurgency role of Soviet advisers in the country. They have placed a battalion at Bagram airfield to provide security for the airlift. As these measures have proved inadequate to halt the deterioration of the regime's position, the Soviets have explored the option of seeking a broader based Afghan leadership but, even before the Amin coup, had clearly failed in their efforts to create a coalition that might attract greater popular support while guaranteeing the government's continued pro-Soviet orientation. (TS)

38. Under these circumstances, the Soviets are likely to have begun more serious consideration of the spectrum of possibilities for direct combat intervention. The likelihood that the Soviets had been weighing the military options discussed earlier was enhanced by the arrival in mid-August of General Pavlovskiy. The delegation led by the Commander of the Soviet Ground Forces was specifically reported to be preparing, among other things, a detailed report on the Afghan insurgency and the Afghan military. (S NE-OC)

39. We cannot rule out the possibility that Pavlovskiy's visit followed a decision already made by Moscow to intervene at one of the levels discussed earlier, and that Pavlovskiy's task involved working out the modalities. One clandestine source in early September alleged that the Soviets had already moved some 3,600 Soviet combat troops into Kabul, with the purpose of protecting Soviet citizens and facilities. The Soviets might have considered such a move into Kabul prudent in view of the uprisings that have occurred in Kabul this year and the continuing possibility of violence in the capital. Sizable numbers of such troops without heavy equipment could have been brought into the city

from the USSR undetected by US intelligence if this had been done gradually and incrementally as part of the ongoing airlift of materiel for Afghanistan. We have been unable to verify this report, however, by other intelligence means.

(TS)

40. It appears reasonable to conclude that the Soviet leadership has wished to avoid allowing the situation to deteriorate to a point where only large-scale intervention by Soviet troops could save the Afghan regime. Moscow would then have to calculate whether Khalqi survival was worth commitment to the grave and open-ended military task of holding down an Afghan insurgency in rugged terrain. The Soviets would also have to consider the likely prospect that they would be contending with an increasingly hostile and anti-Soviet population. The USSR would then have to consider the likelihood of an adverse reaction in the West, as well as further complications with Iran, India, and Pakistan. Moscow would also have to weigh the negative effects elsewhere in the Muslim world of a massive Soviet military presence in Afghanistan. Soviet-Iraqi relations, for example, have already soured because of Baghdad's suspicion about Soviet intentions in the Middle East following the upheavals in Iran and Afghanistan. A conspicuous use of Soviet military force against an Asian population would also provide the Chinese considerable political capital.

(TS)

41. On the other hand, if worse came to worst, and the Soviets chose to abandon the Khalqis rather than accept the political costs and risks of a Soviet invasion, the effects would again be damaging to the USSR. But whatever criticism the Soviets might suffer for not defending a budding revolutionary movement to the end could be deflected by reminding detractors that the USSR had provided Kabul with large amounts of assistance and had warned Taraki and Amin that they were mismanaging the revolution. Moscow's unwillingness to acknowledge the Afghan regime publicly as a Communist government has suggested that the Soviets have wished to leave open a line of propaganda retreat in case the Khalqis collapse.

(TS)

42. To avoid being confronted with an all-or-nothing decision, however, the Soviets seemed prepared before the Amin coup in mid-September to provide the regime with additional military assistance that could include some combat help but would, for the time being, probably be well short

of a major intervention (which we have defined as a multi-division ground force operation.) In short, the Soviets seemed likely to act initially on the smallest and least conspicuous scale consistent with Pavlovskiy's estimate of the regime's needs. (TS)

43. As noted earlier, Amin's seizure of sole power has further complicated the Soviet problems in dealing with both the regime and the insurgency. We believe that the Soviets probably did not instigate or foresee this move by Amin, which in fact may conceivably have been a preemptive step to forestall a Soviet plot to have Taraki remove him. (S, NF)

44. We believe it likely that Moscow views the situation in Kabul as extremely unstable since Taraki's fall, and that the Soviets see the uncertain tenure of Amin's regime as requiring at least a brief deferral of new Soviet military initiatives against the insurgency pending a decision as to whether Amin can consolidate his position. (S)

45. At the same time, the Soviets have seemed ready to act decisively to preserve security in Kabul if the new situation there should rapidly deteriorate.

The Soviets may fear that Amin's coup might provoke fighting within the Afghan Army and a breakdown of control in Kabul. In this event, the Soviets are probably prepared to deploy one or more Soviet airborne divisions to the Kabul vicinity to protect Soviets already there as well as to ensure continuance of a pro-Soviet regime in the capital. We believe it likely that we would promptly detect a deployment of Soviet forces on this scale. We do not believe that the Soviets would intend such a deployment for use in fighting against the Muslim insurgency, although it is not impossible that, once in Afghanistan, such Soviet airborne forces could eventually be drawn into fighting. (TS)

46. If, on the other hand, the Soviets within the next few weeks conclude that Amin has consolidated his position and that no effective challenge from within the regime and the Army is likely, we believe the Soviets will probably increase their counterinsurgency role in the next few months, albeit incrementally rather than dramatically.

Any moderate increase in the Soviet role--involving expansion of the combat activities of advisers, providing some combat support and combat service support elements, and perhaps initially airlifting in additional airborne or lightly equipped battalions or regiments to provide security in key cities--would be primarily intended to buy time. Perhaps the biggest immediate threat to the prospects for a "holding action" of this type is the loyalty of the Afghan Army. Small-scale defections occur almost daily and, with four major mutinies in the past seven months, its continued allegiance is highly suspect. (TS)

47. Unless the Army completely unravels, therefore, additional Soviet advisers and a limited sprinkling of Soviet combat units would improve, but not guarantee, the staying power of the Khalqis. In expanding incrementally the level of their own involvement, however, there is a danger that the Soviets will increase their own stake in the ultimate outcome, making it increasingly likely that they will raise the level of their participation still another notch if the situation continues to deteriorate. (TS)

48. In the event Amin does not consolidate his position but an acceptable and viable Marxist alternative emerges, the Soviets are likely to shift their political and military support accordingly. If no such viable leftist alternative appears, and the Khalqi regime fragments, the Soviets would promote installation of a more moderate regime willing to deal with them, rather than accept the political costs and risks of a massive Soviet invasion to fight the insurgency. Nevertheless, we can foresee contingencies under which the chances of large-scale and long-term Soviet intervention would become substantially greater:

- Prolonged political chaos.
- The prospect of advent of an anti-Soviet regime.
- Foreign military intervention. (TS)

ANNEX

Warning Considerations

1. It is difficult to assess warning time for imprecisely defined military options such as we can postulate for Afghanistan. In Europe, for example, we know the parameters of the "threat" forces and there is an extensive body of good evidence indicating how they intend, in general, to employ these forces against NATO. In Afghanistan, however, we have no evidence on Soviet military objectives or on the forces that the Soviets would consider necessary to accomplish them. Moreover, in estimating warning time in Europe we have evidence of what the Soviets would consider to be a minimum force necessary to launch a deliberate attack and have predicated our minimum warning time on the time necessary for the Warsaw Pact to prepare, and for NATO to detect, such an attack. In an intervention into Afghanistan, however, the Soviets do not face well-organized forces on their frontier to be overcome in an initial assault. Therefore, even the largest intervention, which would take weeks to fully prepare if undertaken as a coordinated assault, could be undertaken piecemeal, beginning with airborne or ground forces near the border. Such an operation could be initiated in a day or so, with little or no warning, as follow-on forces were being mobilized. (S)

2. The options available at the lower end of the scale provide the least warning but also would likely have the least military impact. Soviet airborne troops or small ground forces units probably could be readied for an intervention in a day and it would take about that long to marshal the air transport to move them into Afghanistan in a single lift. We could not be confident that we would detect the increase in troop readiness early on, but the concurrent marshaling of transport aircraft for a major airlift probably would become apparent in a day. In addition, Soviet airborne and airlifted troops could be introduced with no warning at all if they were moved in piecemeal. (TS)

3. The larger intervention options offer more warning time, depending on the level of the Soviet commitment. Multidivisional operations to secure a few lines of communication into Afghanistan, for example, could be initiated, probably in about a week using the four divisions in the Turkestan Military District; it would take us a few days to

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detect the mobilization and movement of these forces. Operations in the face of Afghan Army resistance or efforts to pacify substantial areas of the country probably would require forces from areas beyond the Turkestan Military District and would take up to a few weeks to prepare. We probably would be able to detect the mobilization and movement of divisions in these areas in a few days to a week. (TS)



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CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 010F 02 STATE 256809/01

E.O. 12065: G D S-9/28/85 ( PECK, ROBERT)

TAGS: PEPR, SNAR, AF, UR, US, PK

SUBJECT: NEWSOM MEETING WITH AFGHAN FOREIGN MINISTER

1. CONFIDENTIAL- ENTIRE TEXT.
2. SUMMARY: DURING LENGTHY, BUSINESSLIKE SESSION IN NEW YORK, UNDER SECRETARY NEWSOM AND AFGHAN FONMIN SHAH WALI TRADED MUTUAL EXPRESSIONS OF INTEREST IN IMPROVING BILATERAL RELATIONS, BUT AGREED ON LITTLE ELSE. DISCUSSION TOUCHED ON THE DUBS ASSASSINATION AND THE DRA APPROACH TO ACCEPTANCE OF FOREIGN ASSISTANCE. SHAH WALI AFGHAN "FUGITIVES" WERE BEING TRAINED THERE. HE MINIMIZED THE SOVIET PRESENCE IN AFGHANISTAN AND DEFENDED HIS GOVERNMENT'S INDEPENDENCE AND NON-ALIGNMENT. WE EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR THE DRA'S INTEREST IN CONTROLLING NARCOTICS. END. SUMMARY.
3. AT US INITIATIVE, UNDER SECRETARY NEWSOM CALLED ON AFGHAN FONMIN SHAH WALI FOR A GENERAL HOUR-LONG EXCHANGE OF VIEWS SEPT 27 IN NEW YORK. ASSISTANT SECRETARY SAUNDERS AND NEA/PAB DIRECTOR PECK SAT IN. SHAH WALI HAD ONLY A NOTETAKER WITH HIM.
4. NEWSOM OPENED BY NOTING THAT WHEN HE WAS LAST IN AFGHANISTAN HE MET WITH THEN-PRESIDENT TARAKI AND FON. MINISTER AMIN. HE WANTED TO USE THE OPPORTUNITY OF THE FONMIN'S VISIT TO EXTEND HIS BEST WISHES TO AMIN AND TO SHAH WALI AS THEY ASSUMED THEIR NEW RESPONSIBILITIES. NEWSOM SAID CHARGE AMSTUTZ HAD REPORTED THAT HE HAD A CORDIAL CONVERSATION EARLIER THE SAME DAY WITH PRESIDENT AMIN.
5. IN RESPONSE SHAH WALI SAID THE DRA HAD FROM THE BEGINNING WANTED TO HAVE GOOD RELATIONS WITH ALL COUNTRIES WITHOUT EXCEPTION. AFGHANISTAN HAD TRADITIONALLY FRIENDLY RELATIONS WITH THE US AND THE DRA HAD BEEN DESIROUS OF MAINTAINING THESE TIES. REFERRING TO THE DUBS ASSASSINATION, SHAH WALI SAID " CERTAIN EVENTS" HAD ACCURRED WHICH THE DRA DID NOT WANT. THE DRA HAD DONE ITS BEST TO PROVE THAT THESE EVENTS HAD BEEN OUTSIDE ITS CONTROL.

6. NEWSOM NOTED THAT THE REACTION IN THE US TO THE DUBS ASSASSINATION HAD BEEN VERY STRONG AND LED TO THE CONGRESSIONAL ACTION WHICH REDUCED SOMEWHAT OUR COOPERATION. WE HAVE TRIED TO EXTEND OUR ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS AS LONG AS WE COULD UNDER THE LAW, AND ARE PHASING OUT OUR PROGRAMS IN AN ORDERLY FASHION. THE US WAS ALWAYS READY TO DISCUSS STEPS WHICH MIGHT BE TAKEN TO PUT OUR RELATIONS BACK ON A MORE NORMAL BASIS. WE WELCOMED WORD THAT PRESIDENT AMIN WANTED BETTER RELATIONS. WHEN THE TIME CAME WHEN BETTER RELATIONS COULD BE DISCUSSED, WE WERE WILLING TO EXPLORE HOW THE CONDITIONS LAID DOWN BY CONGRESS MIGHT BE MET.

7. IN REPLY TO SHAH WALI'S SUGGESTION THAT "FALSE PROPAGANDA" ON THIS ISSUE HAD UNDULY INFLUENCED US POLITICAL LEADERS, NEWSOM SAID IT WAS THE EVENTS SURROUNDING THE ASSASSINATION THAT WERE RESPONSIBLE, NOT NEWSPAPER REPORTS. WE ALSO FELT THAT WE HAD NOT GOTTEN AS MUCH COOPERATION IN THE INVESTIGATION AS WE COULD HAVE EXPECTED. IN DEFENSE, SHAH WALI POINTED TO THE SERIOUS DOUBTS STILL REMAINING ABOUT THE KENNEDY ASSASSINATION AND REITERATED THAT THE DRA BELIEVED IT HAD DONE ITS BEST.

8. REMINDED OF PREVIOUS USG ASSISTANCE TO AFGHAN DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS SUCH AS THE HELMAND VALLEY, SHAH WALI SAID THAT IT WAS BECAUSE OF THE PREVIOUS FRIENDLY RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES THAT THE DRA CONSIDERED THE PRESENT SITUATION TO BE "ABNORMAL." HE SAW NO HINDRANCE OR PROBLEM WHICH COULD NOT BE SOLVED. HE DENIED THAT THE DRA WAS TURNING AWAY FROM THE PRIOR AFGHAN PRACTICE OF DRAWING ON MULTIPLE AID SOURCES AND ADVISERS IN PUTTING TOGETHER COOPERATIVE PROJECTS. SHAH WALI POINTED TO THE CONTINUATION OF WORLD BANK, GERMAN AND OTHER PROJECTS, AND ARGUED THAT AFGHANISTAN'S ACTIONS IN SOME "SPECIFIC CASES" ( READ U.S. ) HAD ARISEN FROM A FEELING THAT INDIVIDUALS DID NOT HAVE PROPER QUALIFICATIONS. HE ADDED THAT AFGHANISTAN HAD ASKED FOR MORE PERSONNEL IN CERTAIN CASES, CITING THEIR REQUEST TO CARE-MEDICO ( WHICH HAD A LARGE US PERSONNEL COMPONENT ) FOR MORE MEDICAL SPECIALISTS. HE ADDED WITH APPARENT REGRET THAT CARE-MEDICO HAD BEEN UNABLE TO COMPLY, AND THAT HE HAD LEARNED SHORTLY BEFORE DEPARTING KABUL OF CARE-MEDICO'S DECISION TO WITHDRAW ALL OF ITS PERSONNEL FROM THE COUNTRY.

9. SHAH WALI REPLIED IN THE NEGATIVE WHEN ASKED IF HE EXPECTED CHANGES IN BASIC DRA POLICIES FOLLOWING RECENT LEADERSHIP CHANGES. HE EXPECTED CONTINUITY SINCE THE POLICIES WERE LAID DOWN BY THE PARTY, AND THE PARTY STILL EXISTED. NEWSOM SAID WE HAD NOTICED PRESIDENT AMIN'S

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STATED DESIRE FOR GOOD RELATIONS WITH AFGHANISTAN'S NEIGHBORS PAKISTAN AND IRAN. SHAH WALI SAID THIS REFLECTED THE SINCERE DESIRES OF THE AFGHAN PEOPLE AND THE PARTY. HE SAID DEPUTY FOMMIN DOST'S VISIT TO PAKISTAN HAD RESULTED IN HAVANA AND FORMER PRESIDENT TARAKI HAD ALSO TALKED WITH PAKISTANI PRESIDENT ZIA THERE. HE WAS CAREFUL TO POINT OUT THAT THE LATTER MEETING " REFLECTED THE DESIRE OF OUR GOVERNMENT". HE INDICATED THAT BOTH AGHA SHAHI AND ZIA HAD BEEN INVITED TO KABUL, BUT THAT IT WAS UNDERSTOOD ZIA WOULD COME ONLY AFTER AN AGHA SHAHI VISIT HAD TAKEN PLACE.

10. AT ANOTHER POINT IN THE CONVERSATION, SHAH TOOK A MILD SWIPE AT PAKISTAN WHEN DISCUSSING THE UNDERLAYIN CAUSES OF THE INSURGENCY. HE SAID THE REBLES WERE MOSTLY THOSE WHO HAD LOST THEIR FORMER FEUDAL PRIVILEGES, BUT ADDED THAT PART OF THE PROBLEM WAS CREATED BY AFGHANISTAN'S NEIGHBORS. HE POINTED TO THE CAMPS IN PAKISTAN WHERE AFGHAN " FUGITIVES" WERE TRAINED.

HE ADDED THAT PAKISTAN ALSO SENT SOME "MILITIA" INTO AFGHANISTAN. ASKED ABOUT THE REFUGEE SITUATION, SHAH WALI ARGUED THAT AFGHANISTAN'S BORDERS WERE VERY POROUS AND THAT 2.5 MILLION NOMADS CROSSED THE FRONTIERS EVERY YEAR. THE EXPLANATION, HE CONCLUDED, WAS THAT " THEY HAVE DETAINED OUR NOMADS.

11. ON THE SUBJECT OF RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION SHAH WALI SAID AFGHANISTAN'S TRADITIONAL GOOD RELATIONS WITH ITS NORTHERN NEIGHBOR HAD CHANGED LITTLE WITH THE CHANGE OF GOVERNMENTS OVER THE YEARS. ASKED IF HE SAW ANY CONTRADICTION BETWEEN AFGHANISTAN'S PROFESSIONS OF NON-ALIGNMENT AND THE PRESENCE OF SOVIET TROOPS IN THE COUNTRY, SHAH WALI SAID THE NUMBERS OF SOVIET ADVISORS HAD BEEN EXAGGERATED. A MOUNTAIN HAD BEEN MADE OUT OF MOLEHILL. HE POINTED OUT THAT AFGHANISTAN HAD HAD SOVIET ADVISERS BEFORE THE REVOLUTION, AND SAID THE NUBER HAD NOT CHANGED MUCH. HE DECLINED TO BE PINNED DOWN AS TO EXACT NUMBER THERE NOW, AND SAID THERE WERE ADVISORS FROM OTHER NATIONS SUCH AS INDIA. IN APPARENT CONTRADICTION OF HIS EARLIER STATEMENT, HE CONCLUDED THERE HAD BEEN NO QUALITATIVE CHANGE IN THE SITUATION, JUST A QUANTITATIVE ONE.

12. SHAH WALI ALSO DECLINED TO BE PINNED DOWN AS TO WHETHER THE PEOPLES DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF AFGHANISTAN ( PDPA) WAS A MARXIST-LENINIST PARTY. HE SAID WE COULD JUDGE OURSELVES FROM THE PROGRAM OF THE PARTY. THE PDPA, HE ADDED, REFLECTED THE SOCIALIST STRUCTURE OF THE COUNTRY. NEWSOM RECALLED HIS EARLIER DISCUSSION WITH THEN FOREIGN MINISTER AMIN ON THE NATURE OF THE PDPA IN LIGHT OF US LEGISLATION BEARING ON RELATIONS WITH NATIONS DOMINATED OR CONTROLLED BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST MOVEMENT. DID SHAH WALI CONSIDER THE PDPA A PART OF THE INTERNATIONAL SOCIALIST MOVEMENT OR AS A PURELY AFGHAN ENTITY? SHAH WALI SAID THE PDPA WANTED RELATIONS WITH ALL PARTIES, NOT JUST THOSE IN SOCIALIST COUNTRIES. HE ASSURED NEWSOM THAT HIS WAS A SOVEREIGN GOVERNMENT NOT UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ANOTHER GOVERNMENT OR PARTY. AFGHANISTAN WAS FAITHFUL TO THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT AND WANTED TO HAVE A POLICY OF ITS OWN. NEWSOM COMMENTED THAT THE US RESPECTED "TRUE NON-ALIGNMENT", BUT THAT WE HAD PHILOSOPHICAL DIFFERENCES WITH SOME COUNTRIES' DEFINITION OF NON-ALIGNMENT--SPECIFICALLY THAT OF CUBA.

13. SAUNDERS SAID WE APPRECIATED THE DRA'S INTEREST IN CONTROLLING THE FLOW OF NARCOTICS. DESCRIBING NARCOTICS AS A MAJOR NATIONAL PROBLEM IN THE US, SAUNDERS SAID WE WERE PREPARED TO WORK WITH AFGHAN AUTHORITIES AND WOULD APPRECIATE ANY COOPERATION THE DRA MIGHT GIVE. SHAH WALI BRIGHTENED VISIBLY IN THANKING US FOR MENTIONING THIS MATTER. HE SAID THE DRA HAD BURNED A CACHE OF HASHISH LAST YEAR WORTH DOLS 25 MILLION, BUT THE WESTERN PRESS HAD PAID THIS NO HEED. NEWSOM REGRETTED THE LACK OF PUBLICITY BUT SAID WE IN THE USG HAD NOTICED. WE RECOGNIZED THE DIFFICULTIES COUNTRIES FACED IN INTERFERING WITH TRADITIONAL NARCOTICE CULTURE AND TRAFFICKING, PARTICULARLY SINCE NARCOTICS COULD BE AN IMPORTANT SOURCE OF INCOME FOR POOR FARMERS. IT WAS AN ACT OF COURAGE FOR A GOVERNMENT IN A COUNTRY SUCH AS AFGHANISTAN TO TAKE A STRONG STAND, AND WE APPRECIATED THIS. HE ADDED THIS WAS A POSITIVE ELEMENT IN OUR RELATIONS.

14. IN CLOSING, NEWSOM SAID HE WANTED TO KEEP THE LINES OF COMMUNICATION BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES OPEN. HE HAD ASKED A LOT OF QUESTIONS, BUT THIS HAD BEEN IN THE INTEREST OF FINDING A BASIS ON WHICH WE WOULD IMPROVE OUR RELATIONS. HE HAD BEEN ENCOURAGED BY THE RECEPTION PRESIDENT AMIN HAD GIVEN TO OUR DELEGATION EARLIER IN THE DAY AND HOPED THIS WOULD SIGNAL CONTINUED IMPROVEMENT IN OUR RELATIONS. VANCE  
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RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1537  
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CINCPAC AND CINCEUR ALSO FOR POLAD

E.O.12065: RDS-1 10-1-99 (FLATIN, BRUCE A.) DR-M  
TAGS: PEPR, PINS, MILI, MOPS, AF, UR  
SUBJ: (S) REPORTS OF SOVIET COMBAT TROOPS IN AFGHANISTAN

REF: KABUL 5772 (NOTAL)

1. (S-ENTIRE TEXT)

2. TO SUPPLEMENT THE EMBASSY'S REPORTING IN INTELLIGENCE CHANNELS ABOUT THE PRESENCE OF SOVIET COMBAT FORCES IN AFGHANISTAN, THE FOLLOWING OBSERVATIONS OF FOREIGN DIPLOMATS AT KABUL ARE ADDED.

3. ON SEPTEMBER 30, YUGOSLAV AMBASSADOR BOGDAN MALPASIC (PLEASE PROTECT) ASKED THE A/DCM WHETHER RECENT U.S. NEWS REPORTS OF TROOP ACTIVITY IN SOVIET CENTRAL ASIA INVOLVED AIRBORNE UNITS. MALPASIC, A FORMER ARMY GENERAL, WNET ON TO STATE THAT HE HAD HEARD THAT THE SOVIETS HAD ALREADY PREPOSITIONED SUFFICIENT ARMAMENT AND EQUIPMENT FOR ONE AIRBORNE DIVISION AT BAGRAM AIR BASE, NORTH OF KABUL. HE SEEMED TO BE CERTAIN OF THIS INFORMATION.

4. THE YUGOSLAV AMBASSADOR THOUGHT THAT THE SOVIET UNION WOULD INTRODUCE COMBAT FORCES HERE ONLY AS A LAST RESORT. HE OBSERVED THAT OTHER OPTIONS SHORT OF SUCH A DRASTIC STEP WERE STILL OPEN: E.G., BROADENING THE POLITICAL BASE AND POPULAR APPEAL OF THE KHALQI REGIME -- AND A QUICK MILITARY COUP WHICH WOULD REPLACE THE KHALQI LEADERSHIP WITH FRESH, INITIALLY APOLITICAL PERSONALITIES.

5. ALSO ON SEPTEMBER 30, J. DAULAT SINGH, THE INDIAN DCM (PLEASE PROTECT), TOLD THE A/DCM THAT ONE OF HIS SOURCES HAD RECENTLY DISCUSSED THE PRESENCE OF SOVIET COMBAT TROOPS WITH A FORMER AFGEAN ARMY OFFICER, NOW A PRISONER AT PUL-I-CHARKI, WHO HAD, BEFORE HIS ARREST, SERVED AT THE "HOUSE OF THE PEOPLE" HEADQUARTERS OF THE KHALQI LEADERSHIP. THE AFGHAN OFFICER REPORTEDLY SAID THAT WHEN HE LAST WAS IN A POSITION TO HAVE ACCESS TO SENSITIVE INFORMATION, THERE WERE 9,000 SOVIET TROOPS IN AFGHANISTAN. THE INDIAN DCM DID NOT KNOW THE EXACT DATE OF HIS INFORMATION, BUT WAS OF THE OPINION THAT IT WAS FAIRLY RECENT. SINGH HIMSELF THINKS THE CURRENT FIGURE IS BETWEEN 10,000 AND 20,000 (HE LEANS TOWARD THE UPPER END OF THAT RANGE) -- AND SAID THAT HE HAD ALREADY REPORTED THIS SPREAD TO NEW DELHI.

6. ON SEPTEMBER 30, A WEST GERMAN EMBASSY OFFICER TOLD THE A/DCM THAT GERMAN TRUCK DRIVERS USING THE REBEL/ARMY-DESERTER/BANDIT-INFESTED HERAT-TO-ZANDAHAR ROAD RECENTLY REPORTED SEEING WHAT WERE CLEARLY ETHNIC RUSSIAN SOLDIERS MAN THE LEAD ARMORED VEHICLE IN THEIR ROAD CONVOY. HE CLAIMED THAT THEY TOOK PHOTOGRAPHS AS PROOF. THE GERMAN OFFICER THOUGHT SOME WESTERN NEWS PUBLICATION WOULD PAY MUCH FOR THESE PHOTOGRAPHS.

7. COMMENT: THE ABOVE VIEWS ARE BEING REPORTED WITH SOME RESERVATIONS. THE YUGOSLAV AMBASSADOR'S OBSERVATION ABOUT PREPOSITIONED ARMAMENTS AND EQUIPMENT AT BAGRAM REFLECTS THE SITUATION NOTED AT OTHER LOCATIONS AROUND AFGHANISTAN (E.G., THE PUL-I-CHARKI TANK BASE) WHERE LARGE NUMBERS OF AIRCRAFT, TANKS, AND OTHER MILITARY ITEMS ARE NOW BEING PARKED -- AN ASSEMBLY OF ARMAMENT WHICH WOULD APPEAR TO BE FAR MORE THAN THE AFGHAN ARMY ITSELF COULD MAN IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE. WE HAVE NO INFORMATION TO CONFIRM THE YUGOSLAV'S REPORT OF PREPOSITIONED EQUIPMENT FOR AN AIRBORNE DIVISION.

8. AS FOR THE OBSERVATION OF SINGH, A SOUND DIPLOMAT WHO IS NEVERTHELESS GIVEN OCCASIONALLY TO UNCRITICAL ACCEPTANCE OF THE INFORMATION DRIFTING ABOUT IN THE KABUL RUMOR MILL, IT WOULD BE SIGNIFICANT IF HE HAS INDEED PROVIDED THE 10,000-TO-20,000 FIGURE TO THE DECISION-MAKERS AT NEW DELHI. WE KNOW OF NO OTHER SOURCE HERE CITING A FIGURE THAT HIGH AND

WE DO NOT (REPEAT NOT) BELIEVE IT OURSELVES.

9. ALTHOUGH AMERICAN OFFICERS HAVE OCCASIONALLY SEEN SOVIET SOLDIERS AROUND KABUL, WEARING AFGHAN UNIFORMS (A CUSTOMARY PRACTICE FROM THE ROYAL AND DAUDIST ERAS), NO US OFFICER HERE HAS YET SPECIFICALLY SPOTTED WHAT COULD BE IDENTIFIED AS A "SOVIET COMBAT UNIT." ACCORDING TO AVAILABLE EVIDENCE, HOWEVER, WELL-HIDDEN SOVIET COMBAT FORCES ARE UNDOUBTEDLY ALREADY INSIDE THE COUNTRY. OUR BEST CURRENT ESTIMATE OF SOVIET COMBAT TROOPS IN AFGHANISTAN, INCLUDING THOSE GUARDING BAGRAM AIR BASE, IS PERHAPS 4,000 WITH AN ADDITIONAL 3,000 MILITARY ADVISORS.

10. AS FOR THE GERMAN STORY, IT PROBABLY ILLUSTRATES HOW SOVIET MILITARY ADVISORS ASSIGNED TO REGULAR AFGHAN ARMY UNITS CAN BE EMPLOYED IN DIRECT OPERATIONAL ROLES AT TIMES.

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RUHJDK/AMEMBASSY DACCA 208  
RUSBOD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 3821  
RUKOBT/AMEMBASSY JAKARTA 132  
RUSBLY/AMEMBASSY KABUL 1840  
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1468  
RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 1609  
RUQMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 6160  
RUEHDT/USMISSION USUN NY 3878  
BT  
CONFIDENTIAL ANKARA 7248

E.O. 12065: GDS 10/1/85 ( KUX, DENNIS) OR-P  
TACE: MOPS, PEPR, TU, AF, UR, PK  
SUBJ: (C) TURKISH VIEWS ON USSR-AFGHANISTAN; FOLLOW-UP  
REF : (A) STATE 250373, (B) STATE 250400, (C) ANKARA 7201

1. (C) - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. THIS IS AN ACTION MESSAGE ( SEE PARA 7).

3. SUMMARY: POLOFF FOLLOWED UP REF (C) DEMARCHE WITH WORKING-LEVEL MFA OFFICER WHO HAD SERVED IN AFGHANISTAN DURING THE TARAKI REVOLUTION. THE OFFICIAL STATED THERE WAS SUPPORT WITHIN THE MFA FOR A TURKISH DEMARCHE TO THE RUSSIANS ON AFGHANISTAN, BUT THERE WAS LITTLE LIKELIHOOD OF A PUBLIC STATEMENT. THE TURKS WERE VERY INTERESTED IN OTHER COUNTRIES' VIEWS ON AND RESPONSES TO THE SITUATION. THE MFA OFFICIAL SPECULATED ON POSSIBLE RUSSIAN INTEREST IN ETEMAADI, FORMER AFGHAN AMBASSADOR TO PAKISTAN AND THE USSR, AS A REPLACEMENT FOR AMIN. END SUMMARY.

4. GOT-USSR DEMARCHE: MFA MIDDLE EAST SECTION CHIEF ALP KARAOSMANOGLU INFORMED EMBOFF (RICCIARDONE) SEPTEMBER 28 THAT THERE WAS STRONG SUPPORT WITHIN THE MFA FOR AN UNPUBLICIZED DEMARCHE TO THE SOVIETS ON AFGHANISTAN. HOWEVER, SINCE THE FONMIN WAS NOW IN NEW YORK, IT WOULD TAKE TIME BEFORE A FINAL DECISION WOULD BE TAKEN. IT WAS VERY UNLIKELY THAT THE GOT WOULD MAKE PUBLIC STATEMENT ON AFGHANISTAN. THE GOT WAS VERY MUCH INTERESTED IN OTHER COUNTRIES' REPRESENTATIONS ( IF ANY) TO THE SOVIETS ON THE SUBJECT OF AFGHANISTAN. KARAOSMANOGLU REACTED VERY POSITIVELY TO THE DEPARTMENT'S SEPTEMBER 19 PRESS STATEMENT AS A SIGN OF US INTEREST IN THE AFGHAN SITUATION.

( COMMENT: THROUGHTOUT THE CONVERSATION KARAOSMANOGLU MADE IT CLEAR THE GOT WOULD LOOK FAVORABLY UPON INCREASED US INTEREST AND INFLUENCE THROUGHOUT THE FORMER CENTO REGION ( SEE ANKARA 720) (NOTAL)).

5. USSR INTERVENTION: KARAOSMANOGLU REITERATED THE GOT'S BELIEF THAT THE RUSSIANS WOULD NOT SEND MILITARY FORCES INTO AFGHANISTAN UNLESS A CRISIS DEVELOPED IN WHICH RUSSIAN LIVES BECAME THREATENED. HOWEVER, HE BELIEVED THE RUSSIANS WERE LOOKING FOR ANOTHER HORSE TO BACK IN VIEW OF AMIN'S NARROW BASE OF SUPPORT. THE TURKS BELIEVED THAT ETEMAADI, FORMER AFGHAN AMBASSADOR TO MOSCOW AND LATER TO ISLAMABAD, WOULD BE A LIKELY CANDIDATE AND THAT THE RUSSIANS WERE AT THE MOMENT " TRYING TO GET IN TOUCH WITH HIM". KARAOSMANOGLU SAID ETEMAADI HAD RETURNED TO KABUL FROM PAKISTAN THE DAY BEFORE THE TARAKI COUP, AND HAS BEEN IN JAIL SINCE SHORTLY THEREAFTER. HE ADDED THAT ETEMAADI HAD HAD EXCELLENT RELATIONS WITH THE RUSSIANS AND MIGHT HAVE HAD CONTACTS AMONG EXTREMIST PARCHAMIST GROUPS IN EXILE IN MOSCOW. KARA OSMANOGU ASKED FOR OUR VIEWS ON THE SUBJECT OF ETEMAADI AS A SUCCESSOR TO AMIN.

6. MILITARY INSUBORDINATION INCIDENT: THE TURKS HAD HEARD THAT SOME 20 AFGHAN PILOTS HAD ORIGINALLY BEEN ASSIGNED THE MISSION TO BOMB HERAT DURING THE TROUBLE THERE SEVERAL MONTHS AGO. THE PILOTS DELIBERATELY DROPPED THEIR BOMBS OFFTARGET, RETURNED TO BASE, AND WERE REPLACED BY RUSSIAN PILOTS WHO BOMBED THE ASSIGNED TARGETS IN DOWNTOWN HERAT. THE AFGHAN PILOTS WERE SUMMARILY EXECUTED FOR THEIR INSUBORDINATION.

7. ACTION REQUESTED: PER PARA 5 EMBASSY WOULD APPRECIATE DEPARTMENT'S EMBASSY KABUL'S COMMENT ON TURKISH VIEW THAT SOVIETS MAY BE CONSIDERING ETEMAADI AS POSSIBLE REPLACEMENT FOR AMIN.

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MEMORANDUM

CHRON FILE


NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

DA HAS SEEN

CONFIDENTIAL

October 2, 1979

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR: DAVID AARON  
 FROM: THOMAS THORNTON   
 SUBJECT: Soviet-Afghan Contingency Planning (C)

A week ago you asked where the contingency plan was for responding to a possible Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. You asked for something by last Tuesday. (C)

State has dragged its feet considerably on this and the best that they could come up with by end of last week was the attached outline. They tell me that they will have a fully fleshed out paper by the middle or end of this week. (U)



This has not been a sterling performance. The pressure seems not quite so great, however, and I am inclined to let them have until the end of the week. In all fairness, the office that has to produce this has been under very great pressure on a variety of fronts -- including my demand that they get to work on a contingency plan for a Pak nuclear explosion. (C)




10-3-79

CONFIDENTIAL

Original Classif. by Thomas Thornton  
 Declassify on Oct. 2, 1983

DECLASSIFIED  
 E.O.12958, Sec.3.6  
 PER  RE NLC-95-82  
 BY  NARS DATE 12/9/86

~~SECRET~~

Outline for USG Response Paper to Soviet Options

I. Incremental Expansion of Soviet military Role -  
Equipment and Advisers

A. Diplomatic Responses

1. Consultations

- a. with Regional Countries
- b. with Allies
- c. Stimulate consultations among others

- (1) South Asians
- (2) Iran - India
- (3) Other Moslem and Third World countries

2. Further Reductions in Kabul Staff

B. Publicity

- 1. VOA
- 2. Press Backgrounders

C. Military - None

D. International Fora

- 1. Encourage others to discuss human rights
- 2. UNHCR Refugee program

II. Soviets Undertake Limited Combat Role

A. US Public and Diplomatic Condemnation of Soviets

B. Extensive diplomatic consultations - seek expressions  
of concern publicly and to Soviets

C. Consider break in diplomatic relations

D. Publicity

E. Military - Gestures involving operational contacts  
with Pak military such as joint air/sea maneuvers;  
port calls at Karachi

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

PER 9/20/86 NCL/HR/RE NCL-A-82  
BY [Signature] NARS. DATE 12/19/96

F. International Fora - Encourage regional states to raise in Security Council/UNGA context

G. Talks with Paks under 1959 bilateral with attendant publicity

111. Massive Combat Role

A. Diplomatic Consultations - seek condemnations. Test Indian willingness to reassure Pakistan militarily

B. Breaking of Dip Relations with Kabul

C. Publicity

D. Military - fleet movements, tacair deployment to Pakistan

E. International Fora - Security Council or UNGA to address

F. Talks with Paks under 1959 bilateral

G. Talks with Sovs re Security of Personnel

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P R 021059Z OCT 79  
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL  
TO RUENC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5860  
INFO RUMJPG/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 785  
RUS300/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 9391  
RUDNRB/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE 199  
RUMRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 405  
RIDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1839  
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1958  
RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 7478  
RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS 3305  
RUMMR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 531  
RUMHQA/CINCPAC  
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 KABUL 7281

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CINCPAC ALSO FOR POLAD

IE.O.12065: RDS-1 10-2-99 (FLATIN, BRUCE A.) OR-M  
TAGS: PEPR PGOV PINS AF UR YP PINR  
SUBJ: (C) AFGHANISTAN'S AMIN ROUP; LOCAL YUGOSLAV AND SOVIET  
VIEWS.

1. (C-ENTIRE TEXT)

2. SUMMARY: ACCORDING TO THE YUGOSLAV AMBASSADOR AT KABUL, THE SOVIETS WERE AWARE OF A DEVELOPING TENSION BECHTEN AFGHANISTAN'S FORMER PRESIDENT NOOR MOHAMMAD TARAKI AND PRIME MINISTER HAFIZULLAH AMIN FOR "SEVERAL MONTHS" BEFORE THE MID-SEPTEMBER CRISIS THAT LED TO AMIN'S VIOLENT TAKE-OVER OF FULL POWER. THE SOVIETS DISCLAIM ANY FOREKNOWLEDGE OF THE COUP ITSELF, HOWEVER. MOSCOW APPEARS TO BE WILLING TO WORK WITH AMIN, NOW THAT HE HAS PRESENTED THE SOVIETS WITH A FAIT ACCOMPLI. END OF SUMMARY.

2. REQUESTING ABSOLUTE PROTECTION AS A SOURCE, YUGOSLAV AMBASSADOR BOGDAN MALBASIC BRIEFED THE A/DCM ON SEPTEMBER 30 ABOUT A RECENT CONVERSATION HE HAD HAD WITH SOVIET AMBASSADOR ALEXANDER M. PUZANOV CONCERNING HAFIZULLAH AMIN'S MID-SEPTEMBER COUP D'ETAT. (MALBASIC EXPLAINED THAT HE OCCASIONALLY HAS LONG CHATS WITH PUZANOV, AND HAS FOUND HIM RELATIVELY FORTHCOMING IN SUCH SESSIONS. PUZANOV PROFESSES A CONTINUING FRIENDLY INTEREST IN YUGOSLAVIA, WHERE HE SERVED FOR SEVERAL YEARS.)

4. ACCORDING TO MALBASIC, PUZANOV PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING BACKGROUND TO THE DRAMATIC POWER STRUGGLE WITHIN THE KHALQI HIERARCHY. THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR ACKNOWLEDGED THAT HE HAD BEEN INVOLVED TO A CERTAIN EXTENT -- BUT WAS "STILL NOT CERTAIN" ABOUT ALL THE EVENTS THAT HAD ATTENDED AMIN'S TAKE-OVER. HE DISCLAIMED ANY FOREKNOWLEDGE OF THE VIOLENT SEPTEMBER 14 CONFRONTATION, AND OBSERVED THAT THIS SURPRISE DEVELOPMENT CAUGHT THE LOCAL SOVIET COMMUNITY WITHOUT ADEQUATE SECURITY PRECAUTIONS. (NOTE: AMERICAN OFFICERS SCOUTING AROUND KABUL THAT DAY WHO HAD NOTED INCREASING NUMBERS OF AFGHAN SOLDIERS AND POLICE IN THE STREETS, DID OBSERVE THAT RUSSIAN DEPENDENTS WERE MOVING ABOUT NORMALLY, AND THAT SOVIET HOUSING AREAS DID NOT HAVE ANY OBVIOUS SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS.)

5. PUZANOV TOLD MALBASIC THAT THE STRAIN BETWEEN FORMER PRESIDENT TARAQI AND AMIN HAD BEEN INCREASING OVER THE PAST SEVERAL MONTHS. PUZANOV WAS CRITICAL OF TARAQI'S "CULT-OF-295#3-INDIVIDUAL" PUFFERY -- AND CITED TARAQI'S UNWILLINGNESS TO PASS THE FULL RANGE OF PRIME MINISTERIAL POWERS OVER TO AMIN WHEN THE LATTER WAS DESIGNATED AS "FIRST MINISTER." PUZANOV NOTED, FOR INSTANCE, THAT TARAQI CONTINUED TO CHAIR SESSIONS OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS -- AND THIS GREATLY ANNOYED AMIN.

6. PUZANOV RECALLED THAT THE CURRENT CRISIS STARTED AFTER TARAQI'S RETURN FROM HAVANA AND MOSCOW ON SEPTEMBER 11. AT A SEPTEMBER 12 CABINET SESSION, AMIN "INDICATED THE NEED" FOR CABINET CHANGES -- I.E., THAT MINISTER OF INTERIOR MOHAMMAD ASLAM WATANJAR, MINISTER OF FRONTIER AFFAIRS SHER JAN MAZDOORYAR, AND MINISTRE OF COMMUNICATIONS SAYED MOHAMMAD GULABZOI BE REPLACED IMMEDIATELY. TARAQI OBJECTED, TAKING ISSUE WITH AMIN OPENLY.

7. ACCORDING TO PUZANOV'S ACCOUNT, "THE QUARREL CONTINUED ON SEPTEMBER 13," AND CAME TO A HEAD ON SEPTEMBER 14, WHEN AMIN WENT AHEAD WITH AN ANNOUNCEMENT ABOUT THE CABINET CHANGES. TARAQI "CALLED AMIN OVER" TO DISCUSS THAT ACT -- AND THE GUNFIGHT ENSUED. PUZANOV SAID THAT HE HAD HAD "TWO MEETINGS" WITH THE KHALQI LEADERSHIP DURING THESE CRITICAL DAYS. HE DID NOT GIVE ANY DETAILS ABOUT THE FIRST. THE SECOND WAS THE MORNING SESSION HE HAD WITH AMIN ON SEPTEMBER 15, THE DAY BEFORE THE LATTER WAS DESIGNATED AS TARAQI'S SUCCESSOR. (NOTE: THIS MEETING WAS REPORTED BY THE PRESS).

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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5861  
INFO RUMJPGAXAMEMBASSY BEIJING 0786  
RUSBD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 9392  
RUDNRB/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE 0200  
RUQMR/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 0406  
RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1840  
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1959  
RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 7479  
RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS 3306  
RUQMR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 032  
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 KABUL 7281

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8. MALBASIC HAD THE IMPRESSION FROM HIS TALK WITH PUZANOV THAT THE SOVIETS FOUND THEMSELVES COMPELLED TO ACCOMMODATE THEIR AFGHAN POLICY TO AMIN'S FAIT ACCOMPLI, ALTHOUGH THEY DID NOT INDICATE GREAT ENTHUSIASM. WHEN HE COMMENTED TO PUZANOV ABOUT AMIN'S WEAK POINTS, SUCH AS HIS BAD PUBLIC IMAGE, THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR REPLIED, "AMIN IS STRONG AND WELL-ORGANIZED. OF COURSE, HE HAS SOME FAULTS, BUT WHAT LEADER DOESN'T?"

9. INTERESTINGLY ENOUGH, PUZANOV WENT ON TO COMPLIMENT THE FIRED WATANJAR AS "A GOOD MAN." (NOTE: FREQUENTLY HEARD POST-COUP RUMORS PORTRAYED WATANJAR AS HAVING SOUGHT ASYLUM IN THE SOVIET EMBASSY -- AND THE INDIAN EMBASSY BELIEVES THAT PUZANOV HAD TRIED TO INTERCEDE IN BEHALF OF WATANJAR AND THE OTHER FIRED MILITARY MINISTERS ON SEPTEMBER 14.)

10. MALBASIC GOT THE STRONG IMPRESSION THAT THE SOVIETS HAD EXTRACTED CERTAIN CONCESSIONS FROM AMIN IN EXCHANGE FOR THEIR POST-COUP SUPPORT. HE THOUGHT, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT THE SOVIETS HAD INSISTED THAT TARAKI BE KEPT ALIVE. MALBASIC OBSERVED THAT AMIN IS NOW COMPLETELY DEPENDENT UPON THE SOVIETS -- AND "MUST PAY THE PRICE."

11. MALBASIC OPINED THAT THE SOVIETS WILL NOW ENDEAVOR TO MAKE AMIN "MORE PALATABLE" AS A LEADER. FAILING THIS, THEY MIGHT CONSIDER THE ALTERNATIVES SHORT OF DIRECT MILITARY INTERVENTION, SUCH AS A QUICK COUP D'ETAT BY THE "AFGHAN" ARMED FORCES. HE DID NOT RULE OUT AN EVENTUAL RESORT TO THE USE OF SOVIET COMBAT FORCES, HOWEVER -- BUT THOUGHT IT RATHER UNLIKELY THAT THAT EXTREME STEP WOULD BECOME NECESSARY.

12. COMMENT: MALBASIC'S ACCOUNT SQUARES IN GENERAL WITH THE KEY ELEMENTS OF VERSIONS HEARD FROM OTHER REASONABLY RELIABLE SOURCES. AS CAN BE EXPECTED, HOWEVER, THE KABUL RUMOR MILL HAS PRODUCED A GREAT VARIETY OF ACCOUNTS. MOST STORIES BEGIN WITH TARAKI'S SEPTEMBER 9-10 TALKS WITH BREZHNEV IN MOSCOW. SOME SAY HE WAS THEN TOLD BY THE SOVIET LEADERS THAT HE WAS FIRED -- BUT THAT SOMBER NEWS WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO LINK WITH AMIN'S BUOYANT DEemeanOR WHEN HE RETURNED TO KABUL ON SEPTEMBER 11. OTHERS SAY THAT BREZHNEV TOLD HIM TO GET RID OF AMIN -- AND THAT HE MUFFED THE JOB. THIS EMBASSY IS INCLINED TO FAVOR THE VIEW THAT THE COMING LEADERSHIP CRUNCH WAS NOT DISCUSSED AT ALL IN MOSCOW -- AND THAT TARAKI FIRST CONFRONTED IT UPON HIS RETURN. (INCIDENTALLY, WATANJAR WAS THE SECOND-RANKING MAN IN HIS AIRPORT WELCOMING PARTY--STANDING NEXT TO AMIN.)

13. AS FOR PUZANOV'S OWN ROLE, THE INDIAN EMBASSY VERSION, TO WHICH REFERENCE WAS MADE IN A FOREGOING PARAGRAPH, EVEN HAS AN ARMED PUZANOV PARTICIPATING IN THE SEPTEMBER 14 SHOOT-OUT AT THE HOUSE OF THE PEOPLE. ALTHOUGH WE DOUBT THIS, WE DO THINK IT PROBABLE THAT PUZANOV AT SOME POINT MIGHT HAVE TRIED TO INTERVENE IN BEHALF OF THE WATANJAR GROUP -- AS HIS POST-COUP COMMENT TO MALBASIC INDICATES.

14. ALTHOUGH THERE ARE A FEW LOCAL OBSERVERS WHO THINK THAT THE SOVIETS OPT FOR ITA "IRON FIST" (IN THIS CASE, AMIN) SOLUTION WHENEVER THERE IS A TOUGH PROBLEM TO BE LICKED (E.G., THE CURRENT AFGHAN INSURRECTION), WE ARE INCLINED TO BELIEVE THAT THE SOVIETS WERE PROBABLY NOT COMPLETELY IN THE PICTURE AS THEIR VIOLENT, DIFFICULT-TO-CONTROL HALQI CLIENTS STAGED THEIR INTERNAL CONFRONTATION, LIKE SCORPIONS IN A JAR. THE CONTINUED PRESENCE OF RUSSIAN WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN PUBLIC PLACES AT KABUL DURING THE DEVELOPING SEPTEMBER 14 CRISIS, AS WELL AS THE CONTINUING SOVIET MEDIA PLAY OF TARAKI'S MOSCOW VISIT AFTER AMIN'S SEPTEMBER 16 TAKEOVER, WHICH HAS BEEN REPORTED BY EMBASSY MOSCOW AND FBIS, INDICATE THAT THE SOVIETS WERE PERT QS INDEED SURPRISED.30

15. PUZANOV APPEARS TO HAVE FAILED IN AN ATTEMPT TO KEEP STABLE THE POLITICAL ARRANGEMENT HERE. BECAUSE PUZANOV WAS OFTEN REPORTED TO HAVE FREQUENTLY BEEN AT SERIOUS ODDS WITH AMIN DURING THE PAST YEAR, THE LOCAL DIPLOMATIC COMMUNITY IS ROSSIPING ABOUT HIS CONTINUED TENURE HERE. AN AFCYAN SOURCE, WHO HAS BEEN USUALLY RELIABLE IN THE PAST, TOLD THE A/DCM ON SEPTEMBER 27 THAT MOSCOW HAZ REQUESTED AGREEMENT FOR PUZANOV'S SUCCESSOR. THE SOURCE DID NOT HAVE THE NAME. END COMMENT. AMSTUTZ

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RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1961  
RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 7463  
RUQMR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 534  
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E.O. 12065: GDS 10/3/85 (AMSTUTZ, J. BRUCE) OR-M

TAGS: PINT AF UR

SUB: SOVIET OFFICIAL COMMENTS ON STATUS OF TARAHI AND THE  
PURGED MILITARY OFFICER CABINET MINISTERS

1. (C-ENTIRE TEXT)

2. SUMMARY. A SOVIET EMBASSY OFFICIAL DESCRIBES TARAHI AS  
BEING HELD A PRISONER ALONE IN THE PEOPLE'S PALACE COMPLEX,  
AND THAT TARAHI ALONG WITH THE THREE RECENTLY PURGED  
MINISTERS (WATANJAR, GULABZOI AND MAZDOORYAR) HAVE BEEN  
EXPELLED FROM THE PARTY. END SUMMARY.

3. AT THE AIRPORT TODAY, I RAN INTO SOVIET COUNSELOR VILOR  
G. OSADCHIY, WHO WAS IN THE VIP LOUNGE (A RARE PRIVILEGE)  
AWAITING EMBARCATION ON AN AEROFLOT FLIGHT TO MOSCOW. (THE  
IMPORTANCE OF OSADCHIY, AND THAT OF THE SOVIET EMBASSY, WAS  
UNDERLINED BY HIS BEING ALLOWED TO USE THE VIP LOUNGE  
FOR A VACATION TRIP TO THE USSR, WHICH PRIVILEGE IS  
SOMETHING DENIED TO MOST AMBASSADORS EXCEPT WHEN THEY  
FIRST ARRIVE OR LEAVE PERMANENTLY.)

4. OSADCHIY HAS ALWAYS BEEN ONE OF THE FRIENDLIEST AND  
MOST OPEN OF SOVIET OFFICIALS HERE, AND I SEIZED THE  
OPPORTUNITY TO ASK HIM SOME QUESTIONS. HIS ANSWERS  
WERE, I THINK, WORTH RECORDING:

-- TARAHI IS BEING HELD A PRISONER "ALONE" IN THE PEOPLE'S  
PALACE COMPLEX (WHERE PRESIDENT HAFIZULLAH AMIN ALSO LIVES);  
THE IMPLICATION BEING THAT HIS FAMILY IS NOT WITH HIM. HE IS  
DEFINITELY ALIVE AND WAS NOT WOUNDED BY ANY WEAPON. WHEN I  
ASKED OSADCHIY ABOUT A RUMOR THAT TARAHI MIGHT BE GOING TO  
MOSCOW FOR MEDICAL TREATMENT, OSADCHIY REPLIED, "POSSIBLY  
LATER BUT NOT RIGHT NOW."  
HE IGNORED MY INQUIRY ABOUT THE EXACT STATE OF  
TARAHI'S HEALTH.

-- EX-MINISTERS WATANJAR, GULABZOI AND MAZDOORYAR  
ARE AT LARGE, BUT OSADCHIY PROFESSED NOT TO KNOW THEIR EXACT  
WHEREABOUTS. HE SAID THERE WAS A RUMOR THAT THEY HAD ESCAPED  
TO A NEIGHBORING COUNTRY. WHEN I ASKED IF HE MEANT THE SOVIET  
UNION, HE CHUCKLED AND SAID: "POSITIVELY NOT. IF THEY HAD,  
WE WOULD NOT KEEP THAT A SECRET. AFTER ALL, WE ARE NOT  
DENYING THAT BABRAK KAMAL IS LIVING IN PRAGUE."

-- WHEN I OBSERVED THAT WE HAD JUST HEARD THAT TARAHI AND  
THE THREE EX-MINISTERS HAD BEEN EXPELLED FROM THE PARTY,  
OSADCHIY REPLIED, "THAT IS CORRECT."

5. OSADCHIY SAID THAT HE WAS GOING TO MOSCOW FOR CONSULT-  
ATIONS AND THEN FOR A MONTH'S HOLIDAY IN THE CRIMEA.  
HE SAID HE WAS WORN OUT AND THAT THE LOCAL POLITICAL  
SITUATION HAD MADE HIS WORK DIFFICULT. AS WE SEPARATED,  
HE SAID SOFTLY, "WE NEVER KNOW WHAT TOMORROW WILL BRING  
HERE."

AMSTUTZ

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INFO RUEHBAC/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 0121  
RUSBQD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 0084  
RUSEBLK/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0031  
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 6607  
RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 0074  
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 3247  
RUOMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 0025  
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 0540  
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON 0078  
BT  
SECRET USNATC 06927

LIMDIS

E.O. 12065: RDS-1 10/10/09 (GLITMAN, HAVN/ED) OF-P  
TAGS: NATO, PEPL, PINS, AF, UR, US,  
SUBJECT: (S) SOVIET INTENTIONS IN AFGHANISTAN

REFS: (A) STATE 261991, (B) USNATO 6785 (NOTAL),  
(C) USNATO 5582 (NOTAL)

1. (S- ENTIRE TEXT).

2. DURING OCTOBER 9 POLITICAL COMMITTEE MEETING,  
CANADIAN REP MADE POINTS CONTAINED PARA 5 OF REF  
B ( BEING REPEATED TO OTTAWA) REGARDING CURRENT  
CANADIAN INCLINATION TO FOCUS MORE ON IMPLICATIONS  
OF AFGHAN INSTABILITY FOR PAKISTAN THAN ON LIKELIHOOD  
THAT THAT INSTABILITY COULD PROVOKE DIRECT  
SOVIET INTERVENTION IN AFGHANISTAN. WE HAD PREVIOUSLY  
PROVIDED CANADIAN REP WITH COMMENTS TRANSMITTED  
REF A AND REPEATED THEM IN RESPONSE TO CANADIAN  
INTERVENTION IN POLADS. ON BOTH OCCASIONS, CANADIAN  
REP REGISTERED OTTAWA'S INTEREST IN RECEIVING FURTHER  
INFORMATION, ESPECIALLY CONCERNING SOVIET MILITARY  
ACTIVITIES NORTH OF THE SOVIET-AFGHAN BORDER, WHICH  
MIGHT BE HELPFUL IN REASSESSING THE CANADIAN ATTITUDE  
TOWARDS A POSSIBLE APPROACH TO THE SOVIETS AND WE  
NOTED THAT WE HAD MADE A STANDING REQUEST THAT WASHINGTON  
KEEP USUP-TO-DATE IN THIS REGARD ( REF C).

3. NETHERLANDS REP REPORTED TO THE COMMITTEE ON  
A RECENT CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE DUTCH AMBASSADOR IN  
ISLAMABAD AND THE LOCAL TAGS REPRESENTATIVE IN WHICH  
THE LATTER COMPLAINED THAT, AS WITH TARAKI BEFORE HIM,  
AMIN WAS NOT PREPARED TO ACCEPT ADVICE AND WAS PESSING  
REFORMS IN A CRUDE AND HASTY WAY WHICH EXACERBATED  
DIVISIONS WITHIN THE TRIBAL AFGHAN SOCIETY.  
THE AMBASSADOR, NETHERLANDS REP ADDED, INTERPRETED THESE  
REMARKS AS POSSIBLY INDICATIVE OF SHRINKING SOVIET  
BACKING FOR AMIN. GLITMAN.

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U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1973-507-436

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 RUEGCR/AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY 1211  
 RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PRIORITY 4027  
 RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY BUCAREST PRIORITY 4231  
 RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 3710  
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 RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY JAKARTA PRIORITY 6925  
 RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY JEDDA PRIORITY 1739  
 RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 1845  
 RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN PRIORITY 5257  
 RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 9054  
 RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON PRIORITY 1332  
 RUEHCR/USINT PAFDAD PRIORITY 2236  
 RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 3285  
 RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 7571  
 RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU PRIORITY 7772  
 RUEHCR/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 3259  
 INFO RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY KARL PRIORITY 0223  
 RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 7954  
 RUEHCR/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 6190  
 RUEHCR/ CINCPAC HONOLULU HAWAII 4302  
 BT  
 S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 STATE 273949/21

LIMDIS

F.O. 12785: SDS, 10/17/85 (COON, JANE A.), NEA

TAGS: EOPR, MILI, AF, TP

SUBJECT: DIALOGUE ON AFGHANISTAN

1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT)
2. INP HAS PREPARED FOLLOWING TALKING POINTS ON SOVIET-AFGHAN RELATIONS AND SOVIET INVOLVEMENT IN AFGHANISTAN FROM WHICH ACTION ADDRESSEES MAY AT THEIR DISCRETION DRAW IN CONTINUING DISCUSSIONS WITH HOST GOVERNMENTS ON SOVIET INTENTIONS IN AFGHANISTAN. THESE POINTS SUPPLEMENT INFORMATION PROVIDED PREVIOUSLY IN STATE 23742, DATED APRIL 19, 1979.

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1973-507-426

3. DURING THE SIX MONTHS PRECEDING THE SEPTEMBER 14-16 AMIN TAKEOVER, MOSCOW EMPLOYED A SERIES OF POLITICAL TACTICS TO DEAL WITH A DETERIORATING SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN:

(A) IT FIRST TRIED TO PERSUADE THE TARAKI-AMIN REGIME TO BROADEN ITS BASE OF SUPPORT AND TO MODERATE ITS POLICIES. THIS ADVICE WENT LARGELY UNHEEDED.

(B) FOR A WHILE THEREAFTER, MOSCOW DISTANCED ITSELF SOMEWHAT FROM AMIN AND TARAKI AS INDIVIDUALS, WHILE CONTINUING PUBLICLY TO SUPPORT THE AFGHAN "REVOLUTION."

(C) HOWEVER, MOSCOW EVENTUALLY SEEMS TO HAVE CONCLUDED (ABOUT AUGUST) THAT THERE WAS NO VIABLE ALTERNATIVE TO THE TARAKI/AMIN REGIME (ALTHOUGH THERE HAS BEEN SPECULATION THAT MOSCOW INTENDED TO BACK THE MORE MODERATE TARAKI AGAINST AMIN).

AT ANY RATE, WHEN TARAKI PASSED THROUGH MOSCOW EN ROUTE HOME FROM THE HAVANA NAM SUMMIT IN EARLY SEPTEMBER, HIS MEETING WITH BREZHNEV WAS GIVEN EFFUSIVE PUBLICITY IN A PARTY-TO-PARTY CONTEXT THAT CAME CLOSER THAN EVER BEFORE TO RECOGNIZING THE PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF AFGHANISTAN (PDPA) AS A COMMUNIST PARTY.

4. DURING THE SAME SIX-MONTH PERIOD, SOVIET POLITICAL EFFORTS WERE SUPPLEMENTED BY MILITARY MOVES:

-- THE NUMBER OF SOVIET MILITARY PERSONNEL INCREASED TO ABOUT 3,500 OR 4,000, INCLUDING ADVISERS AND MILITARY SUPPORT PERSONNEL, SOME OF WHOM ARE ATTACHED DOWN TO THE BATTALION LEVEL IN THE AFGHAN MILITARY.

-- INCREASINGLY, SOVIET ADVISERS HAVE TAKEN OVER ROLES THAT WERE STRICTLY ADVISORY ONES, E.G. IN COMMAND FUNCTIONS AND REPORTEDLY IN SOME COMBAT FUNCTIONS AS WELL. WE HAVE, HOWEVER, NO RELIABLE INDICATION THAT SOVIET FORCES HAVE PARTICIPATED IN COMBAT AGAINST INSURGENTS AS UNITS.

-- SOVIET UNEASINESS ABOUT THE AFGHAN SECURITY SITUATION IN THE FACE OF THE INSURGENCY AND ARMY MUTINIES LED THE SOVIETS TO TAKE ON SOME DIRECT SECURITY RESPONSIBILITIES. E.G. AT BARRAM AIR BASE WHERE THERE IS A FORCE OF 420 SOVIETS.

5. AMIN'S SEPTEMBER 14-16 SEIZURE OF POWER BY ALL INDICATIONS OCCURRED WITHOUT ADVANCE WARNING TO MOSCOW.

BUT DETAILS OF WHAT HAPPENED REMAIN UNCLEAR. SOVIET AMBASSADOR PUZANOV APPARENTLY KEPT IN TOUCH WITH EVENTS AS THEY UNFOLDED.

-- THERE WAS A BRIEF PERIOD OF UNCERTAINTY IN MOSCOW, E.G. WHEN SOVIET MEDIA CONTINUED TO PUBLICIZE TARAKI'S LEADERSHIP AFTER HE HAD ALREADY BEEN OVERTHROWN. MOSCOW'S INITIAL MESSAGE OF CONGRATULATIONS TO AMIN ON HIS "ELECTION" TO TARAKI'S POSTS WAS NON-COMMITTAL, BUT SINCE THEN SOVIET MEDIA HAS INDICATED SUPPORT FOR THE NEW REGIME.

-- IT IS LIKELY THAT SOVIET ADVICE WAS REFLECTED IN AMIN'S INITIAL SEPTEMBER 17 SPEECH AND IN SOME OF HIS

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TO RUSBD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 7781

INFO RUMJPG/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0388

RUFHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN 3299

RUSBLK/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0270

RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0032

RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 8189

RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 1994

RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS 1386

RUMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 5135

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 STATE 277901/01

E.O. 12065: RDS-1,3 10/22/99 (PECK, ROBERT A.)

TAGS: PEPR, AF, US, PK, IR, IN, UR, CH

SUBJECT: US-PAK TALKS: REGIONAL ISSUES

REFERENCES: (A) STATE 270484; (B) STATE 274950

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: OVER HALF OF THE FORMAL DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN THE PAKISTANI AND US DELEGATIONS OCTOBER 16-17 IN WASHINGTON WAS DEVOTED TO REGIONAL ISSUES. OUR ASSESSMENTS ON AFGHANISTAN WERE QUITE SIMILAR, THOUGH THE PAKISTANIS VIEWED THE THREAT IN SOMEWHAT MORE IMMEDIATE TERMS THAN DO WE. THE PAKISTANIS WERE FAIRLY RELAXED ABOUT THE STATE OF THE CURRENT RELATIONS WITH INDIA, BUT STILL CONSIDER INDIA TO BE PAKISTAN'S PRINCIPAL LONG-RANGE SECURITY THREAT. ON IRAN, SHAHI EMPHASIZED THE IMPORTANCE OF ESTABLISHING A PERSONAL EQUATION WITH KHOMEINI AND INDICATED THAT PAKISTAN WAS TRYING TO SAVE THE RCD IN THE FACE OF IRANIAN OPPOSITION. THE US STRONGLY REAFFIRMED ITS SUPPORT FOR PAKISTANI SECURITY, BUT WE INDICATED THAT OUR ABILITY TO EXPRESS THIS SUPPORT IN PRACTICAL TERMS WOULD REMAIN CONSTRAINED AS LONG AS OUR DIFFERENCES OVER THE NUCLEAR ISSUE WERE UNRESOLVED. THE US ALSO REAFFIRMED THAT IN THE EVENT OF AFGHAN AGGRESSION AGAINST PAKISTAN WE WOULD CONSIDER THE 1959 BILATERAL AGREEMENT TO BE RELEVANT (SEPTEL). DISCUSSION OF THE NUCLEAR ISSUE, CHINA AND THE INDIAN OCEAN ALSO COVERED IN SEPARATE TELEGRAMS. END SUMMARY.

3. THE FIRST DAY OF DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN THE US AND PAKISTANI DELEGATIONS AT THE DEPARTMENT (OCTOBER 16) WAS DEVOTED LARGELY TO REGIONAL ISSUES. ON THE PAKISTANI SIDE, THE DISCUSSION WAS LED BY FOREIGN AFFAIRS ADVISOR AGHA SHAHI AND FOREIGN SECRETARY SHAHNAWAZ, WITH SOME CONTRIBUTIONS BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE, GEN. GHULAM JILANI KHAN. ON THE US SIDE THE SECRETARY LED OFF WITH AN OPENING STATEMENT (REFTEL A) AND PARTICIPATED IN MUCH OF THE SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSIONS. UNDER SECRETARY NEWSOM PROVIDED AN OVERVIEW OF US INTERESTS IN THE REGION.

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4. AFGHANISTAN: THE TWO DELEGATIONS TRADED ASSESSMENTS OF THE INTERNAL AFGHAN SITUATION AND THE THREAT AFGHANISTAN POSED TO PAKISTANI SECURITY. SHAHI SAID THAT THE AFGHAN REVOLUTION HAD AFFECTED PAKISTAN PROFOUNDLY. THE HISTORICAL ROLE OF AFGHANISTAN AS A BUFFER STATE HAD DISAPPEARED, AND PAKISTAN FOUND ITSELF ILL-PREPARED AND ILL-EQUIPPED TO MEET THE MILITARY THREAT. PAKISTAN DID NOT EXPECT AN IMMEDIATE INVASION, BUT WAS DEEPLY CONCERNED OVER THE LONG-TERM POTENTIAL FOR CROSS-BORDER SUBVERSION.

5. INTERNAL SITUATION: SHAHI SAID THAT THE MARXIST REGIME IN KABUL REMAINED "OFF BALANCE" IN THE FACE OF THE CONTINUING INSURGENCY AND INTERNAL PARTY AND MILITARY DISSIDENCE. THE POLITICAL BASE OF THE REGIME WAS EVEN NARROWER FOLLOWING AMIN'S INTERNAL COUP. AT THE SAME TIME, THE MILITARY AND POLITICAL HOLD OF THE SOVIET UNION ON AFGHANISTAN WAS STRONGER THAN EVER AND APPEARED TO BE GROWING. THE SOVIETS FOCUSED ON CONSOLIDATION OF THE REVOLUTION AND PERSONALITIES DID NOT MATTER. SOVIET AMBASSADOR PLIZANOV HAD RECENTLY WARNED DEPARTING PAKISTANI AMBASSADOR PIKACHA THAT PAKISTAN SHOULD NOW THINK SERIOUSLY ABOUT CHANGING ITS POLICIES TOWARD AFGHANISTAN SINCE THE USSR WAS DETERMINED TO DEFEND THE REVOLUTION. PLIZANOV SAID THAT BY SPRING THE SOVIET UNION WOULD HAVE CREATED A "NEW AFGHAN ARMY" THAT WOULD THEN BE IN A GOOD POSITION TO MOUNT AN EFFECTIVE MILITARY CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE INSURGENTS.

6. SHAHI ARGUED THAT ONCE THE REGIME HAD CONSOLIDATED ITS POSITION, IT WOULD TURN ITS NEWLY ACQUIRED MILITARY CAPABILITY AGAINST PAKISTAN. PAKISTAN VIEWED THE THREAT AS BEING ONE TO TWO YEARS OFF, DEPENDING ON THE PACE OF INTERNAL CONSOLIDATION IN AFGHANISTAN. THE TIME TO DO SOMETHING WAS NOW.

7. THE PAKISTANIS INDICATED THEY WERE EVEN MORE UNCOMFORTABLE WITH AMIN'S ONE-MAN RULE THAN THEY HAD BEEN WITH THE PREVIOUS REGIME. WHILE AMIN HAD MADE SOME PUBLIC STATEMENTS, APPARENTLY AT SOVIET URGING, REGARDING A DESIRE FOR BETTER RELATIONS, HE HAD ALSO GIVEN CONTRARY SIGNALS. THE PAKISTANIS HAD BEEN PARTICULARLY CONCERNED BY THE PRESENCE OF EXILED PUSHTUN NATIONALIST LEADER AJMAL KHATTAK AT A RECENT PUBLIC MEETING IN KABUL, AT WHICH KHATTAK WAS GIVEN EQUAL STATUS WITH DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATIVES ASSEMBLED TO HEAR OF PLANS FOR A NEW CONSTITUTION. SHAHNAWAZ CHARACTERIZED THE REGIME AS A MIXTURE OF PUSHTUN CHAUVINISM AND IDEOLOGICAL MISSIONARY ZEAL, A COMBINATION WHICH POSED A DOUBLE THREAT TO PAKISTANI INTERESTS.

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TO RUSHQD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 7782

INFO RUMJPG/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0389

RUFHQL/AMEMBASSY BONN 3300

RUSBLK/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0271

RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0033

RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0190

RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 1995

RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS 1387

RUQMR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 5136

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 04 STATE 277901/02

8. THE PAKISTANIS DID NOT PLACE MUCH HOPE IN THEIR DIPLOMATIC DIALOGUE WITH AFGHANISTAN, BUT INDICATED THEY WOULD KEEP TRYING. SHAHI SAID HE DID NOT KNOW WHETHER THE INVITATION TO HIM TO VISIT KABUL WOULD BE RENEWED. IN ANY CASE, THE DIALOGUE SEEMED MORE IN THE AFGHAN INTEREST THAN IN PAKISTAN'S INTEREST. THE AFGHANS WANTED TO GET PAKISTAN TO FORCE THE REFUGEES BACK ACROSS THE BORDER (SHAHNAWAZ PRIVATELY SAID WHAT THE AFGHANS REALLY WANTED WAS THE EXPULSION OF KEBEL LEADERS, AND WERE NOT PREPARED TO TALK SERIOUSLY ABOUT ANY OTHER ISSUES. THEIR PURPOSE WAS TWO-FOLD. FIRST, THEY WOULD BE BETTER ABLE TO COPE WITH THE INSURGENCY IF THE PAKISTANI REFUGEE WAS UNAVAILABLE AND, SECONDLY, THEY WANTED TO CREATE A SITUATION IN WHICH THEY COULD AGAIN POSE AS THE CHAMPIONS OF PUSHTUN NATIONALISM. IF THEY COULD FORCE PAKISTAN TO ABANDON THE REFUGEES, PAKISTAN WOULD BE DISCREDITED AND THE DRA WOULD HAVE A BETTER LONG-RANGE CHANCE TO RALLY THE TRIBES TO THEIR SIDE.

9. THE SECRETARY ASKED IF PAKISTAN SAW THE DANGER FROM AFGHANISTAN AS ONE OF LONG-RUN SUBVERSION OR DIRECT MILITARY AGGRESSION. SHAHI REPLIED THAT BOTH WERE A CONCERN, BUT WENT ON TO DISCUSS PRIMARILY THE SUBVERSIVE THREAT. THE AFGHANS, HE SAID, WERE GIVING UP ON THE OLDER GENERATION OF PUSHTUN NATIONALISTS AND WERE CONCENTRATING ON A YOUNGER GENERATION OF PUSHTUNS AND BALUCHIS WHO WERE SHOWING MARXIST TENDENCIES. THE INTELLECTUAL SUBVERSION OF THE PAKISTANI PEOPLE WAS ALREADY SHOWING SOME SIGNS OF SUCCESS, AND MANY PAKISTANIS WERE SHIFTING THEIR ATTITUDES TOWARD AFGHANISTAN. WHEN THE AFGHAN COUP FIRST OCCURRED, THERE WAS BROAD SUPPORT IN PAKISTAN FOR MEASURES TO HELP THE REFUGEES AND ASSIST THE INSURGENTS. MANY PAKISTANIS WERE NOW COMING AROUND TO THE VIEW THAT

AFGHANISTAN -- AND THE SOVIETS THROUGH AFGHANISTAN -- NEEDED TO BE "ACCOMMODATED" SINCE PAKISTAN HAD BEEN UNABLE TO ACQUIRE ADEQUATE OUTSIDE SUPPORT. SOME PAKISTANI TRIBESMEN ARGUED THAT IT WAS PAKISTAN'S DUTY TO FIGHT THE ANTI-ISLAMIC AND MARXIST REGIME IN KABUL BUT, IF THE GOP WAS TOO AFRAID OF THE RUSSIANS TO DO SO, THEN PAKISTAN SHOULD MAKE ITS PEACE WITH THE SOVIET UNION. PAKISTANI LEADERS WORRIED THAT, IF AFGHANISTAN PUT PRESSURE ON PAKISTAN IN THE PRESENT SITUATION (E.G., BY A POLICY OF HOT PURSUIT ACROSS THE BORDERS, DISTRIBUTION OF ARMS IN BALUCHISTAN OR PROVOKING AN INSURGENCY), PAKISTAN WOULD BE IN A VERY DIFFICULT POSITION.

10. ASKED IF PAKISTAN ANTICIPATED THE DIRECT PARTICIPATION OF SOVIET TROOPS IN PUTTING DOWN THE INSURGENCY, SHAHNAWAZ SAID HE COULD NOT GIVE A CATEGORICAL ANSWER. THE SOVIETS CLEARLY WOULD GIVE WHATEVER ASSISTANCE WAS NECESSARY TO AFGHANISTAN, INCLUDING MILITARY AID. HE THOUGHT THEY WOULD TRY TO LIMIT THE PARTICIPATION OF SOVIET TROOPS TO ADVISORY AND SUPPORT ROLES. ASKED IF PAKISTAN HAD ANY EVIDENCE OF THE USE OF SOVIET CENTRAL ASIAN TROOPS MINGLED IN WITH AFGHANS, SHAHNAWAZ OBSERVED THAT THE SOVIETS HAD THIS CAPABILITY. HE THOUGHT IT UNLIKELY THAT THE SOVIET UNION WOULD USE CUBANS IN AFGHANISTAN SINCE THEY HAD THEIR OWN CENTRAL ASIAN TROOPS TO DRAW ON WHO WERE CULTURALLY MORE ASSIMILABLE.

11. ASKED IF THE PAKISTANIS SAW CHINA AS PLAYING A MAJOR ROLE IN CONTAINING GROWING SOVIET INFLUENCE IN AFGHANISTAN, SHAHI SAID THEY DID NOT. THEY HAD ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS TALKED WITH THE CHINESE ABOUT AFGHANISTAN, BUT THE CHINESE FELL BACK ON AN IDEOLOGICAL ANALYSIS FROM WHICH THEY CONCLUDED THAT THE AFGHAN PEOPLE WOULD ULTIMATELY BE VICTORIOUS. THE CHINESE HAD ADOPTED A HANDS-OFF POLICY. THERE WERE ALLEGATIONS THAT THE INSURGENTS WERE RECEIVING ARMS FROM THE CHINESE, BUT PAKISTAN HAD NO EVIDENCE OF THIS.

12. INDIA: THE EXCHANGE ON INDIA CONTAINED NO SURPRISES. THE PAKISTANIS VOICED FAMILIAR CONCERNS ABOUT LONG-RANGE INDIAN INTENTIONS AND INDICATED THAT THEY CONTINUE TO CONSIDER INDIA THE PRINCIPAL THREAT TO PAKISTANI SECURITY, DESPITE THE IMMEDIACY OF THEIR PROBLEMS WITH AFGHANISTAN.

13. SHAHI NOTED THAT PAKISTAN'S RELATIONS WITH INDIA WERE MORE "TENSION-FREE" THAN AT ANY TIME IN THE PAST. THEY GAVE CONSIDERABLE CREDIT TO FORMER PRIME MINISTER DESAI, AND WERE PARTICULARLY APPRECIATIVE OF DESAI HAVING STOOD UP TO BREZHNEV AND KOSYGIN IN MOSCOW BY REFUSING TO PUT

PRESSURE ON PAKISTAN OVER AFGHANISTAN. THIS WAS, SHAHI SAID, A "HEALTHY DEVELOPMENT". THE PAKISTANIS NONETHELESS EXPRESSED CONSIDERABLE ANXIETY REGARDING THE POLICIES WHICH MIGHT BE PURSUED BY WHATEVER INDIAN GOVERNMENT WOULD EMERGE FROM THE NEXT ELECTION.

14. SHAHNAWAZ SAID THAT PAKISTAN HAD TRIED PARTICULARLY HARD IN RECENT MONTHS TO KEEP RELATIONS WITH INDIA AS SATISFACTORY

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RUSBLK/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0272  
RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0034  
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 8191  
RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 1996  
RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS 1388  
RUCMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 5137

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 04 STATE 277901/03

ISFACTORY AS POSSIBLE IN VIEW OF THE SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN. HE NOTED THAT, DURING HIS VISIT TO NEW DELHI IN MAY, HE HAD CONDUCTED PAKISTAN'S FIRST WIDE-RANGING EXCHANGE OF VIEWS WITH INDIAN OFFICIALS. ON AFGHANISTAN, HE HAD FOUND THE INDIANS EXTREMELY CAUTIOUS IN EXPRESSING THEMSELVES, POSSIBLY OUT OF FEAR THAT THEIR VIEWS WOULD GET BACK TO THE SOVIETS. SHAHNAWAZ SPECULATED THAT THE INDIANS ARE PROBABLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE DANGER WHICH SOVIET ADVANCES IN AFGHANISTAN POSES FOR INDIA ITSELF AND CANNOT BE PLEASED THAT AFGHANISTAN IS NO LONGER A BUFFER STATE. THESE CONCERNS, HOWEVER, HAD NOT REACHED THE POINT WHERE THE INDIANS WOULD ADMIT THEM OPENLY. NONETHELESS, PAKISTAN'S EXCHANGE OF VIEWS WITH INDIA ON THIS ISSUE MAY HAVE HAD SOME IMPACT. ASKED IF THE INDIANS HAD AT ANY TIME EXPRESSED THEIR CONCERNS TO THE SOVIETS ABOUT AFGHANISTAN, SHAHNAWAZ SAID HE THOUGHT THEY HAD NOT, BUT THAT THEY HAD DEMONSTRATED THIS CONCERN BY RESISTING SOVIET REQUESTS FOR PRESSURE ON PAKISTAN.

15. THE PAKISTANIS DEVELOPED THE THEME THAT THEY HAD HAD FULL AND FRANK DISCUSSIONS WITH INDIAN OFFICIALS ON THE NUCLEAR QUESTION AND THAT INDIA ACCEPTED PAKISTANI ASSURANCES OF PEACEFUL INTENT AT FACE VALUE. SHAHI RECOUNTED HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH INDIAN FOREIGN MINISTER MISHRA IN BOTH HAVANA AND NEW YORK IN WHICH SHAHI OFFERED TO GIVE WHATEVER ASSURANCES INDIA MIGHT REQUIRE IF INDIA HAD DOUBTS REGARDING THE NATURE OF PAKISTAN'S PROGRAM. SHAHI SAID HE ALSO EXPRESSED CONCERN OVER CHARAN SINGH'S RED FORT STATEMENT. MISHRA REPORTEDLY REPLIED THAT THIS HAD BEEN MADE IN THE HYPOTHETICAL CONTEXT OF A PAKISTANI NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM. SHAHI INDICATED THAT MISHRA WAS SATISFIED BY PAKISTANI ASSURANCES.

16. SHAHNAWAZ CHIMED IN TO POINT OUT THAT THE RED FORT STATEMENT CAME ONLY A FEW DAYS AFTER SENATOR PERCY'S REMARKS IN CALCUTTA REGARDING THE POTENTIAL THREAT TO INDIA'S CITIES OF A PAKISTANI BOMB. (WHILE HE DID NOT DRAW THE CONCLUSION SHARPLY, SHAHNAWAZ SEEMED TO BE IMPLYING THAT THE US BORE SOME RESPONSIBILITY FOR CHARAN SINGH'S OUTBURST.)

17. SHAHNAWAZ ALSO DESCRIBED IN SOME DETAIL HIS DISCUSSION OF THE NUCLEAR ISSUE WITH INDIAN LEADERS, INCLUDING FORMER PRIME MINISTER DESAI, IN DELHI LAST MAY. HE SAID DESAI MADE A "COMPLETELY UNAMBIGUOUS STATEMENT" THAT HE WAS SATISFIED WITH PAKISTANI ASSURANCES. SHAHNAWAZ ALSO WENT OVER FAMILIAR GROUND ON THE DESAI-ZIA CORRESPONDENCE IN WHICH ZIA REPORTEDLY SUGGESTED A JOINT STATEMENT RENOUNCING NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND DESAI COUNTERED WITH A PROPOSAL FOR UNILATERAL STATEMENTS WHICH WOULD HAVE THE EFFECT OF A JOINT STATEMENT. SHAHNAWAZ CONCLUDED THAT, SINCE BOTH DESAI AND ZIA HAD STATED THAT THEY DID NOT INTEND TO DEVELOP NUCLEAR WEAPONS, THE INDIANS WERE APPARENTLY SATISFIED.

18. IRANI NEWSOM DESCRIBED US EFFORTS TO REASSURE THE NEW GOVERNMENT THAT WE ACCEPT THE REVOLUTION. WE HAD NOT YET APPROACHED KHOMEINI DIRECTLY. IRAN'S REFUSAL TO ACCEPT OUR AMBASSADOR MADE COMMUNICATIONS MORE DIFFICULT AND THE CONTINUING EXECUTIONS GAVE US A PUBLIC RELATIONS PROBLEM. NEWSOM DESCRIBED SOVIET-IRANIAN RELATIONS AS "TENSE".

19. IN REPLY, SHAHI STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF HAVING A PERSONAL EQUATION WITH KHOMEINI AND THE AYATOLLAH'S TOUCHINESS ABOUT CONTINUING ANY PROGRAM OR POLICY BEGUN BY THE SHAH. HE FELT THAT SENDING A DELEGATION TO KHOMEINI WOULD BE THE ONLY WAY TO IMPROVE US RELATIONS WITH THE PGOI, BUT RECOGNIZED THAT THIS COULD BE DIFFICULT FOR US IN TERMS OF US PUBLIC OPINION.

20. SHAHI MENTIONED THAT PGOI SUSPICIONS OF ANYTHING ESTABLISHED BY THE SHAH LED IT TO WANT TO ABOLISH THE RCD. HE SAID THAT PAKISTAN WAS TRYING TO SAVE THE ORGANIZATION. PAKISTAN WAS "EVALUATING" THE ROLE OF RCD, AND HOPED THAT THE RESULTS OF THIS STUDY WOULD PERSUADE THE IRANIANS THAT THE RCD HAD UTILITY IN FURTHERING REGIONAL ECONOMIC COOPERATION.

21. IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION, SHAHI NOTED THAT IT WOULD NOT BE EASY TO SET UP A NEW REGIONAL ECONOMIC INSTITUTION. THE PERSIAN GULF SHAIKHDOMS, WHICH WOULD LOGICALLY BE INCLUDED IN A NEW ORGANIZATION, WERE UNEASY ABOUT THE REVOLUTION IN IRAN AND WOULD THEREFORE PROBABLY BE NERVOUS ABOUT AN ORGANIZATION WHICH LINKED THEM WITH IRAN AND WHICH HAD IRAN IN SOME SORT OF LEADERSHIP POSITION.

22. PAKISTANI OPENING THE DISCUSSION ON PAKISTAN'S SECURITY REQUIREMENTS. NEWSOM SAID HE WOULD LIKE TO KNOW HOW THE GOP THOUGHT IT COULD ASSIST PAKISTAN "IF WE ARE

ABLE TO RESOLVE THE PROBLEMS THAT CONFRONT US". NEWSOM INDICATED THAT THE US VIEWED PAKISTAN'S SECURITY REQUIRE-

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C O N F I D E N T I A L FINAL SECTION OF 04 STATE 277901/04

MENTS AS FALLING INTO THREE GENERAL CATEGORIES:

(A) THE DEVELOPMENT OF A HEALTHY BODY POLITIC AND THE SEARCH FOR BALANCED ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT WERE FUNDAMENTAL TO ANY COUNTRY'S SECURITY. OBVIOUSLY THESE ARE ISSUES ON WHICH ONLY PAKISTANIS THEMSELVES CAN MAKE DECISIONS, BUT OTHER COUNTRIES CAN PROVIDE ECONOMIC AND TECHNICAL HELP TOWARD REACHING THESE GOALS.

(B) AN ADEQUATE MILITARY DEFENSE. OUR PERCEPTIONS OF WHAT IS ADEQUATE MAY DIFFER SOMEWHAT, BUT WE DO AGREE THAT CONSIDERABLE MODERNIZATION AND UPGRADING OF EQUIPMENT IS BADLY NEEDED. THESE REQUIREMENTS, HOWEVER, HAD TO BE WEIGHED AGAINST THE NEED FOR SOUND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT.

(C) IN THE DIPLOMATIC ARENA, A COUNTRY WITH LIMITED RESOURCES SUCH AS PAKISTAN ADDS TO ITS SECURITY VERY SIGNIFICANTLY BY SUSTAINING A NETWORK OF EXTERNAL TIES WHICH HELP TO BALANCE THOSE FORCES PAKISTAN FINDS INIMICAL TO ITS INTERESTS. OVER THE YEARS PAKISTAN HAD FOUND IT NECESSARY TO PURSUE A MIXTURE OF PRACTICAL DIPLOMACY DESIGNED TO LIMIT CONFRONTATIONS WITH ITS NEIGHBORS AND EFFORTS TO GAIN DIPLOMATIC SUPPORT AMONG OUTSIDE POWERS.

23. WHILE THERE ARE SOME AREAS IN WHICH PAKISTAN OF NECESSITY WOULD HAVE TO DEPEND PRINCIPALLY ON ITS OWN RESOURCES, THE US HAD IN THE PAST TRIED TO BE RESPONSIVE IN ALL THREE GENERAL AREAS. TO THE EXTENT OUR OVERALL RELATIONS PERMIT IT, WE WOULD LIKE TO CONTINUE OUR SUPPORT IN EACH OF THESE AREAS.

24. PICKING UP THE THEME OF A "MIX" OF MILITARY AND DIPLOMATIC MEASURES, SHAHI ASKED WHAT THE US WAS PREPARED TO DO TO ENHANCE PAKISTAN'S DEFENSE CAPABILITY. NEWSOM DESCRIBED THE LEGISLATIVE CONSTRAINTS ON JUS AID PROGRAM AND NOTED PROBLEMS WITH MAJOR MILITARY SALES, REQUIRING CONGRESSIONAL ACQUIESCENCE. THE PAKISTANIS MADE CLEAR THAT INDIA REMAINED THE PRINCIPAL THREAT AGAINST WHICH PAKISTAN MUST PLAN ITS DEFENSE, AND SUGGESTED THAT THE ABSENCE OF A GOOD FIGHTER AIRCRAFT, SUCH AS F-16S, WAS THEIR KEY WEAKNESS. IN A DISCUSSION OF THE DIPLOMATIC ELEMENTS OF PAKISTANI SECURITY, THE US SIDE STRESSED ITS INTENTION TO CONTINUE TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT PAKISTAN'S INTERESTS IN THE MANAGEMENT OF ITS RELATIONS WITH THE MAJOR CONTINENTAL POWERS OF ASIA. WE ALSO SAID WE WOULD CONTINUE TO USE OUR INFLUENCE IN NEW DELHI TO ENCOURAGE INDIAN RESTRAINT AND COOPERATION WITH PAKISTAN. ON AFGHANISTAN, WE SAID WE

WOULD USE WHATEVER LEVERAGE WE HAD IN KABUL TO ENCOURAGE AFGHAN RESTRAINT RELATIVE TO PAKISTAN, AND THAT WE WOULD CONTINUE TO IMPRESS UPON THE SOVIETS THAT WE EXPECT THEM TO RESPECT AFGHAN INDEPENDENCE AND TO REFRAIN FROM INTERFERING IN AFGHAN INTERNAL AFFAIRS. THE US SIDE SPECIFICALLY AFFIRMED THAT THE 1959 BILATERAL AGREEMENT WITH PAKISTAN WOULD BE RELEVANT IN THE EVENT OF AGGRESSION FROM AFGHANISTAN. (FULLER DISCUSSION OF THIS SUBJECT IN SEPTEL.) VANCE

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RUHMHO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1485  
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 22 ANKARA 27955

E.O. 12065: GDS 10/25/85 (XUX, DENNIS) OR-P  
TAGS: MOPS, PINR, PEPR, AF, TU, UR  
SUBJECT: (C) TURKISH INFORMATION ON AFGHANISTAN SITUATION

REFS: (A) STATE 273049; (B) ANKARA 7248; (C) KABUL 7352;  
(D) STATE 260348; (E) KABUL 6936

1. (C) - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. THIS IS AN ACTION MESSAGE; SEE PARA 9.
3. SUMMARY: DURING DISCUSSION OF EVENTS IN AFGHANISTAN, AN MFA OFFICER TOLD US THAT THE TURKS CONCURRED WITH THE U.S. ASSESSMENT OF THE STRAINS BETWEEN AMIN AND THE SOVIETS. THE TURKS BELIEVED THAT THE THREE MINISTERS WHO FLED FROM AMIN MIGHT BE IN HIDING IN THE SOVIET EMBASSY; THAT SOVIET AMBASSADOR PUZANOV WAS PRESENT AT THE ARG PALACE AT AMIN'S INVITATION WHEN THE BULLETS FLEW; AND THAT FORMER PRIMIN ETEMADI WAS DEAD. THE TURKS WERE VERY INTERESTED IN REPORTS THEY HAD RECEIVED THAT AMIN HAD HAD SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILES INSTALLED AT BAGRAM AIRBASE. THEY HAD ALSO HEARD THAT TARAKI'S FORMER AIDE DE CAMP, CHIEF OF GERNERAL STAFF YAKUP, MIGHT BE HEADED FOR A PURGE, AND THAT MINPUELIC WORKS PANJSHIRI HAD LEFT FOR MOSCOW "FOR HEALTH REASONS". END SUMMARY.
4. AMIN/USSR STRAINS: EMPPOFFS CALLED ON MFA MIDDLE EAST/NORTE AFRICA SECTION CHIEF ALP KARAOSMANOGLU OCTOBER 24 FOR A DISCUSSION BASED ON REF (A). ACCORDING TO KARAOSMANOGLU, THE TURKS SHARED THE U.S. ASSESSMENT THAT THERE WERE STRAINS BETWEEN AMIN AND THE SOVIETS. KARAOSMANOGLU POINTED TO AMIN'S OCTOBER 13 SPEECH BEFORE A MEETING OF THE NEW CONSTITUTION COMMITTEE, IN WHICH HE USED THE MARXIST BUZZWORDS "DICTATORSHIP OF THE PROLETARIAT" AND "STATE OWNERSHIP OF THE MEANS OF PRODUCTION", AS AMIN'S

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CLEAREST PUBLIC DECLARATION TO DATE OF THE KEALQI PARTY'S COMMUNIST AFFILIATION. KARASMANOGLU SURMISED THAT SUCH STATEMENTS AT THIS TIME MUST IRRITATE THE SOVIETS, WHO WOULD PROBABLY PREFER AMIN TO APPEAR AS MODERATE AS POSSIBLE IN ORDER TO BROADEN HIS BASE OF SUPPORT. THE TURKS INTERPRETED ANOTHER INCIDENT AS AN INDICATION OF USSR-AMIN STRAINS: SOVIET AMBASSADOR PUZANOV, "PERHAPS PLAYING THE ROMAN CONSUL", HAD SENT HIS DCM IN HIS PLACE TO ATTEND FOREIGN MINISTER SHADALI'S RECENT BRIEFING FOR SOCIALIST BLOC AMBASSADORS.

5. ASYLUM: AT THE SAME BRIEFING, SHADALI REPORTEDLY ANNOUNCED THAT AFGHAN OFFICERS HAD SEEN WATANJAR AND THE OTHER TWO MINISTERS PURGED SEPTEMBER 13 ENTERING THE SOVIET EMBASSY THE SAME DAY. KARASMANOGLU BELIEVED THAT THE THREE MINISTERS MIGHT WELL STILL BE INSIDE THE SOVIET EMBASSY; IN ANY CASE, HE WAS SURE THEY WERE NOT DEAD, CITING AS SUPPORT AMIN'S RECENT STATEMENT TO FOREIGN JOURNALISTS THAT HE KNEW WHERE WATANJAR, ET AL, WERE. BUT THAT THEY COULD NOT BE REACHED BY TELEPHONE.

6. PUZANOV: THE TURKS "KNOW" THAT SOVIET AMBASSADOR PUZANOV WAS PRESENT AT THE ARG PALACE WHEN THE SHOOTING STARTED. THEY RECONSTRUCTED EVENTS THUS: TARAKI HAD SUMMONED AMIN TO THE PALACE. AMIN, MINDFUL OF A SIMILAR INVITATION THE PREVIOUS YEAR TO A RECALCITRANT MINISTER WHO WAS EXECUTED UPON APPEARING AT THE PALACE, ASKED PUZANOV TO BE PRESENT, HOPING THAT HE WOULD CONSTITUTE A SORT OF LIFE INSURANCE. THE TURKS DID NOT KNOW WHO STARTED THE SHOOTING, AND, GIVEN PUZANOV'S INVITED PRESENCE, THEY BELIEVED IT POSSIBLE THAT AMIN MIGHT NOT HAVE PLANNED TO STRIKE AT TARAKI, AT LEAST NOT AT THAT MOMENT.

7. ETEMADI: THE TURKS NOW BELIEVED FORMER PRIME MINISTER NUR AHMAD ETEMADI (SEES B, C, D) HAD BEEN EXECUTED. AFGHAN GRIEF OF INTELLIGENCE ASADULLAH AMIN HAD REPORTEDLY TOLD "SOME OF HIS FRIENDS" THAT ETEMADI HAD BEEN EXECUTED ON TARAKI'S ORDERS. CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TENDED TO CONFIRM THIS, IN THE TURKISH VIEW: SINCE ETEMADI'S IMPRISONMENT THE DAY AFTER THE TARAKI REVOLUTION, HIS FAMILY HAD BEEN PERMITTED, WITHOUT SEEING HIM, TO BRING FRESH FOOD AND CLOTHES TO THE PRISON AND TO EXCHANGE LETTERS WITH HIM. ABOUT TWO MONTHS AGO THESE PRIVILEGES WERE CUT BACK, AND TEN DAYS AGO, EVEN THE LETTER EXCHANGE WAS STOPPED.

8. SAMs: THE TURKS HAD RECEIVED REPORTS THAT AMIN HAD HAD SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILES INSTALLED AT BAGRAM AIRBASE. THEY SAW THIS AS A VERY SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENT IF TRUE; THE ONLY FORESEEABLE TARGETS OF SUCH WEAPONS COULD BE

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RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1449

RUQMR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 6170

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 ANKARA 07966

AFGHANISTAN'S OWN AIRCRAFT. IF AMIN HAD IN FACT INSTALLED WEAPONS AGAINST THE EVENTUALITY OF A STRIKE BY HIS OWN AIR FORCE, THIS WAS NEW EVIDENCE OF FURTHER REAL OR PERCEIVED EROSION OF AMIN'S CRUCIAL MILITARY SUPPORT. KARROSMANOGLU ASKED US TO CHECK THE REPORTS OF THE SAM INSTALLATIONS AT BAGRAM.

9. PURGES: THE TURKS HAD HEARD THAT AFGHAN CHIEF OF STAFF AND FORMER TARAKI AIDE DE CAMP GENERAL YAKUP WOULD BE PURGED. THEY ALSO "KNEW" THAT MINISTER OF PUBLIC WORKS PANJSETRI (REF E, PARA 5), "ONE OF THE LAST OF THE PACHEMITES" IN THE AMIN GOVERNMENT, HAD DECAMPED FOR MOSCOW "FOR HEALTH REASONS" ONLY FIVE DAYS AFTER ASSUMING HIS PORTFOLIO.

10. ACTION REQUESTED: WE WOULD APPRECIATE ANY CONFIRMATION OR COMMENTS DEPARTMENT OF STATE CAN OFFER ON THE TURKISH REPORTS, PARTICULARLY ON THE INFORMATION OF THE BAGRAM SAM INSTALLATION, FOR USE IN OUR CONTINUING DISCUSSIONS WITH THE TURKS. SPIERS

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RUFHEB/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 0043  
RUETC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1867  
RUSHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 2011  
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CINCPAC ALSO FOR POLAD

E.O. 12065: GDS 10/25/85 (TAYLOR, JAMES E.) OR-P  
TAGS: PEPR, PINR, PINT, AF, UR, GE  
SUBJ: (LOU) NEW EAST GERMAN AMBASSADOR TO REPLACE CENTRAL  
FIGURE IN LAST SUMMER'S REPORTED ATTEMPT TO BROADEN  
REGIME'S POLITICAL BASE

REF: KABUL 6309 (NOTAL)

1. (C) SUMMARY: A NEW EAST GERMAN AMBASSADOR HAS BEEN NAMED TO KABUL TO REPLACE HERMANN SCHWIESAU, A CENTRAL FIGURE HERE IN LAST SUMMER'S PURPORTED SOVIET ATTEMPT TO HAVE THE KHALQI REGIME "BROADEN ITS POLITICAL BASE." WHETHER THERE WAS ANY FIRE BEHIND THAT POLITICAL SMOKE REMAINS UNCLEAR, BUT THERE IS LITTLE DOUBT THAT THEN PRIME MINISTER HAFIZULLAH AMIN, THE REPORTED TARGET FOR THIS "CAMPAIGN" FOR WHICH SCHWIESAU WAS A MAJOR MOUTHPIECE, KNEW ABOUT THE AFFAIR. SCHWIESAU ABRUPTLY DEPARTED KABUL ABOUT THE TIME IT BECAME OBVIOUS THAT AMIN'S POWERS WERE NOT BEING CURTAILED, BUT FIRM EVIDENCE REGARDING THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING HIS DEPARTURE AND REPLACEMENT HAS NOT YET COME TO LIGHT. AT ANY RATE, FOR THE SHORT TERM AT LEAST, THE SOVIETS APPEAR TO HAVE LITTLE CHOICE BUT TO BACK AMIN'S EFFORTS TO CONSOLIDATE THE REVOLUTION.  
END OF SUMMARY.

2. (LOU) ON THE EVENING OF OCTOBER 24, THE DRA ANNOUNCED THAT IT HAD GIVEN AGREEMENT FOR THE APPOINTMENT OF KRAFT BUMBEL (AFGHAN FOREIGN MINISTRY SOURCES INSIST THAT IS THE CORRECT SPELLING) AS THE NEW AMBASSADOR OF THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC TO KABUL. NO FURTHER DETAILS ARE INCLUDED IN THE BRIEF REPORT.

3. (C) COMMENT: BUMBEL REPLACES FORMER GDR AMBASSADOR HERMANN SCHWIESAU WHO WAS A CENTRAL FIGURE IN LAST SUMMER'S REPORTED SOVIET "CAMPAIGN" TO PERSUADE THE DRA LEADERSHIP TO "BROADEN ITS POLITICAL BASE OF SUPPORT." ALONG WITH SOVIET MINISTER-COUNSELOR VASILY SAFRONCHUK, SCHWIESAU AT THAT TIME WAS EXTREMELY OUTSPOKEN WITH HIS DIPLOMATIC COLLEAGUES REGARDING THE DOMESTIC DIFFICULTIES OF THE KHALQIS, AND ESPECIALLY ABOUT THE DRA'S NEED TO BROADEN ITS SUPPORT WITHIN THE COUNTRY. SOME UNCONFIRMED REPORTS WERE HEARD THAT AN INTEGRAL PART OF THIS ALLEGED SOVIET EFFORT WAS THE THEME THAT THEN PRIME MINISTER HAFIZULLAH AMIN'S POWERS HAD TO BE CURTAILED, SINCE HE WAS THE PERCEIVED VILLAIN BEHIND THE DRA'S REPRESSIVE AND RADICAL POLICIES.

4. (C) AS TIME PASSED, AMIN'S REAL POLITICAL POWER APPEARED TO INCREASE, DESPITE THE OSTENSIBLE SOVIET EFFORT TO CLIP HIS WINGS, AND AMIN DROPPED SEVERAL PUBLIC HINTS THAT HE WAS AWARE OF THE SOVIET "MANEUVERINGS" WHICH SAFRONCHUK AND SCHWIESAU WERE PUBLICIZING ALL OVER TOWN. NOT LONG AFTER IT BECAME CLEAR THAT AMIN'S POWERS WERE NOT DECLINING, SCHWIESAU ABRUPTLY DEPARTED KABUL, REPORTEDLY BECAUSE HE HAD SUFFERED A BROKEN LEG WHICH WOULD REQUIRE SIX MONTHS IN GERMANY TO HEAL. OUR GDR COLLEAGUES HERE GAVE NO INDICATION THEN OR IN THE INTERIM THAT SCHWIESAU WOULD NOT RETURN TO KABUL TO TAKE UP HIS AMBASSADORIAL ASSIGNMENT.

5. (C) AS WITH MOST ELEMENTS OF THIS MURKY STORY, THE REASONS BEHIND BUMBEL'S APPOINTMENT ARE NOT CLEAR, AND SCHWIESAU'S PERMANENT DEPARTURE COULD HAVE SEVERAL EXPLANATIONS. THE MOST OBVIOUS IS THAT HIS MEDICAL PROBLEMS HAVE REQUIRED THE GDR TO FILL THE VACANCY HERE, RATHER THAN TO WAIT FOR SCHWIESAU'S FULL RECOVERY. ANOTHER EXPLANATION IS THAT SCHWIESAU HAD SERVED HIS PURPOSE IN ANY "BROADENING THE BASE" CAPER, AND THAT HIS SERVICES AS A SOVIET "SPONSOR" WERE NO LONGER NEEDED IN KABUL. IT COULD ALSO BE, HOWEVER, THAT AMIN, THE SUPPOSED PRINCIPAL TARGET OF ANY EFFORT TO DEFUSE THE DOMESTIC OPPOSITION THROUGH POLITICAL MEANS, ORDERED SCHWIESAU'S ABRUPT DEPARTURE POSSIBLY AS A DEMONSTRATION THAT AMIN WAS, IN FACT, A LEADER OF THE AFGHAN REVOLUTION WHO HAD NO INTENTION OF VOLUNTARILY RELINQUISHING HIS POWER EVEN IF HIS CLOSE FRIENDS THE SOVIETS THEMSELVES WERE SOMEHOW WORKING BEHIND THE SCENES TO BRING ABOUT SUCH A DEVELOPMENT. ON BALANCE, THEREFORE, WE BELIEVE THAT SCHWIESAU'S ABRUPT DEPARTURE AND REPLACEMENT COULD WELL HAVE BEEN IN SOME WAY POLITICALLY AND NOT MEDICALLY MOTIVATED. WHATEVER THE CASE MAY BE, AS A RESULT OF THE STILL UNCLEAR SEPTEMBER 14 SHOOTOUT IN KABUL, THE SOVIETS APPEAR TO HAVE LITTLE SHORT-TERM CHOICE BUT TO SUPPORT AMIN IN HIS ATTEMPT TO QUELL THE DOMESTIC INSURGENCY AND CONSOLIDATE THE SECURITY OF THE REVOLUTION.

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INFO RUMJPS/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0819  
RUSGSD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 9480  
RUCMKA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 0421  
RUEHMC/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 2415  
RUSDAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 7588  
RUCMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 0576  
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6137  
RUHQHGA/CINCPAC  
RUFHNA/USMISSION USNATO 0883

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 KABL 7764

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E.O. 12065: GDS 10/29/85 (FLATIN, BRUCE A.) OR-M  
TAGS: MOPS, PEPR, PINR, AF, UR, TU  
SUBJ: (C) TURKISH INFORMATION ON THE SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN

REF: ANKARA 7966 (NCTAL)

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. PURSUANT TO EMBASSY ANKARA'S REQUEST IN PARAGRAPH 17 OF THE REFTEL, THIS EMBASSY HAS THE FOLLOWING OBSERVATIONS TO MAKE ABOUT THE POINTS DISCUSSED BY KARACIMANOGLU:

(A) AMIN-SOVIET STRAINS: ALTHOUGH THERE HAVE BEEN INDICATIONS IN THE PAST THAT THE SOVIETS MIGHT HAVE PREFERRED SOME OTHER POLITICAL SOLUTION TO THE UNSTABLE AFGHAN SITUATION THAN THE CONTINUED LEADERSHIP OF THE RUTHLESS AND UNPOPULAR HAFIZULLAH AMIN, MOSCOW IS NOW CLEARLY STUCK WITH HIM, AT LEAST FOR THE SHORT RUN. WE AGREE WITH KARACIMANOGLU THAT THE SOVIETS ARE NOW UNDOUBTEDLY GUIDING AMIN TO FOLLOW A MODERATE COURSE IN ORDER TO BROADEN, IF AT ALL POSSIBLE, HIS OWN BASE OF SUPPORT. WE ALSO FOUND THE ABSENCE OF AMBASSADOR PUZANOV FROM FOREIGN MINISTER SHAH WALI'S UNUSUAL OCTOBER 6 EXERCISING A POSSIBLE INDICATIONS THAT THE SOVIET ROLE ON SEPTEMBER 14 COULD HAVE BEEN REGARDED AS ANTI-AMIN. HOWEVER, IN A RECENT CONVERSATION WITH A SOUTH ASIAN DIPLOMAT, SOVIET MINISTER-COUNSELOR SAFRONCHUK TRIED TO DOWNPLAY PUZANOV'S SEPTEMBER 14 ROLE, DESCRIBING IT AS AN EFFORT TO PRESEERVE PEACE BETWEEN THE WARRING FACTIONS OF THE AFGHAN PARTY. ON OCTOBER 29, PUZANOV PRAISED AMIN HIGHLY TO BRITISH AMBASSADOR-DESIGNATE HILLIER-FRY. (WE SHOULD ADD THAT THERE ARE SOME OFFICERS IN THIS EMBASSY WHO BELIEVE THAT PAST TALK OF STRAINS BETWEEN AMIN AND THE SOVIETS HAVE BEEN A "SHELL GAME" -- AND THAT THE "TOUGH" SIKONGMAN HAS BEEN MOSCOW'S MAN SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THE KHALQI ERA.)

AMIN'S REFERENCE TO "DICTATORSHIP OF THE PROLETARIAT" IN HIS OCTOBER 16 SPEECH IS NOT NEW. HE AND FORMER PRESIDENT TARAKI HAVE OCCASIONALLY USED THIS TERM IN THE PAST. HIS STATEMENT THAT "...ALL THE IMPORTANT AREAS OF PRODUCTION WILL BE CONSIDERED PUBLIC PROPERTY" WAS MADE IN THE CONTEXT OF ASSURING THE CONTINUED SECURITY OF PRIVATE PROPERTY (A PROMISE FREQUENTLY MADE BY THE KHALQI LEADERSHIP TO AFGHANISTAN'S "NATIONAL CAPITALISTS"), WHILE THREATENING TO DEPRIVE POSSESSORS OF "SOCIAL PRODUCTS" FROM "THE POWER TO SUBJECT THE LABOR OF OTHERS THROUGH PRIVATE OWNERSHIP THEREOF." THIS FORMULATION ALSO REPEATS A THEME WE HAVE HEARD HERE BEFORE.

(B) ASYLUM: WE DO NOT THINK THE THREE EXPELLED MILITARY MINISTERS ARE STILL WITHIN THE SOVIET EMBASSY, IF, INDEED, THEY HAD ONCE SOUGHT PROTECTION THERE. THE MOST COMMONLY HELD LOCAL VIEW IS THAT WATANJAR, PERHAPS ACCOMPANIED BY GULABZOI, IS IN HIS HOME PROVINCE OF PAKTIA. SAFRONCHUK RECENTLY TOLD A SOUTH ASIAN DIPLOMAT THAT THAT PAIR IS "STILL AT LARGE." THEY ARE BELIEVED BY SEVERAL LOCAL OBSERVERS TO BE TRYING TO ESTABLISH THEMSELVES WITH DISAFFECTED MILITARY FORCES IN SOUTHEASTERN AFGHANISTAN. IT IS ALSO POSSIBLE THAT WATANJAR AND BULAEZOI MAY BE IN THE USSR SO THAT THE SOVIETS COULD KEEP THEIR ACTIVITIES UNDER CONTROL, ALTHOUGH A HIGH SOVIET EMBASSY OFFICER DENIED THIS TO CHARGE AMSTUTZ ON OCTOBER 3 (KABUL 7318). MANY BELIEVE MAZDOORYAR TO BE DEAD, BUT A SOUTH ASIAN DIPLOMAT STATES THAT HE WAS RECENTLY TOLD BY SAFRONCHUK THAT MAZDOORYAR IS BEING KEPT UNDER HOUSE ARREST IN HIS QUARTERS AT THE PUL-I-CHARKI TANK BASE. IF THIS IS TRUE, HE WOULD PROBABLY BE UNDER SOVIET PROTECTION FROM AMIN (THE SOVIETS PROBABLY NOW CONTROL THAT BASE), WHO WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY HAVE HIM KILLED IMMEDIATELY IF HE COULD BE BROUGHT UNDER KHALQI CONTROL. THE SOVIET MOTIVE IN SUCH A SITUATION COULD BE TO MAINTAIN LEVERAGE AGAINST AMIN, WHO MUST BE PAINFULLY AWARE OF THE EXILED AFGHAN LEADERSHIP THE SOVIETS ARE KEEPING ON THE SHELF (E.G., THE PARHAMISTS).

BT

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National  
Foreign  
Assessment  
Center



## Near East and South Asia Review

23 November 1979

Approved for Release  
Date AUG 1997



23 November 1979

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NEAR EAST AND SOUTE ASIA REVIEW

23 November 1979

CONTENTS

Afghanistan: Outlook for the Insurgency During Winter . . . . . 1

The course of the insurgency will be shaped primarily by factors that have been central to the conflict since it began in 1978-- Soviet support, loyalty of the military, and rebel disunity.



5





[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Afghanistan: Outlook for the Insurgency During Winter

The effect of winter--which arrived this month in northern and eastern Afghanistan--on the scale and tempo of the insurgency will depend on the severity of the weather. Last winter insurgent tribesmen took advantage of unusually mild weather to expand their areas of operation in the eastern provinces, currently the scene of the heaviest fighting. [REDACTED]

The course of the insurgency during the winter months ending in April will be shaped primarily by factors that have been central to the conflict since it began in the spring of 1978--Soviet support, loyalty of the military, and disunity of rebel forces. Neither the government nor the rebels appear capable of gaining a decisive edge in the months ahead. Both sides may concentrate on strengthening their respective positions. [REDACTED]

The chances this winter are good for further mutinies in the Army, and this could bring about the collapse of President Amin's regime. Unless the Army turns against the regime and reaches an understanding with the tribes, however, the rebellion probably will drag on inconclusively into the spring. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]


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
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Exemptions: (b)(1) + (b)(3)



Key Factors

Other factors will transcend weather in determining the course of the insurgency during the coming months. The rebel effort will continue to be impeded by the failure of the various independent insurgent groups to coordinate operations. Additionally, unless the rebels receive more meaningful military support than it has thus far--particularly antitank and anti-aircraft weapons--and more financial backing from Saudi Arabia, their effort to bring the Soviet-equipped Army to the point of collapse may lose momentum.



23 November 1979

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E.O. 11652: RDG 12/15/79

TAGS: PORG, AF, UR

SUBJECT: SOVIET MILITARY DEPLOYMENT

REF: A) STATE 323556; B) MOSCOW 27491

1. [S - ENTIRE TEXT.]

2. SHULMAN CALLED IN SOVIET CHARGE VASEV DECEMBER 15 AND MADE POINTS IN REFTEL. VASEV AGREED TO TRANSMIT REQUEST FOR INFORMATION TO MOSCOW. HOWEVER, HE SAID, SPEAKING PERSONALLY, HE BELIEVED MOSCOW WOULD BE DISTURBED BY OUR REQUEST. WHILE HE HAD NO INFORMATION ON SOVIET DEPLOYMENT IN AFGHANISTAN, ANY SUCH ACTIONS WOULD BE IN THE CONTEXT OF SOVIET-AFGHAN RELATIONS AND WOULD CONSTITUTE NO THREAT TO THE US. MOSCOW MIGHT CONCLUDE THAT US FOCUS ON AFGHANISTAN WAS DESIGNED AS A DIVERSION TO DETRACT ATTENTION FROM PLANNED US ACTION AGAINST IRAN.

3. SHULMAN ASSURED VASEV THAT THERE WAS NO FOUNDATION FOR ANY SUCH SUPPOSITION AND THAT OUR CONCERNS REGARDING AFGHANISTAN WERE RELATED ONLY TO THE SITUATION WE SAW DEVELOPING THERE.

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SPECIAL COORDINATION COMMITTEE MEETING

7482

December 17, 1979

Time and Place: 8:45-9:45 a.m., White House Situation Room

Subject: Iran

Participants:

The Vice President

State  
Warren Christopher  
Harold Saunders  
Richard Cooper\*\*

Defense  
Secretary Harold Brown  
W. Graham Claytor

JCS  
General David Jones  
General John Pustay

CIA  
Admiral Stansfield Turner  
Frank Carlucci  
Robert Dean\*\*\*

Energy  
Secretary Charles Duncan\*\*

Justice  
Attorney General Benjamin Civiletti\*\*  
John Shenefield\*\*

Treasury  
Secretary William Miller\*\*  
Anthony Solomon\*\*  
Robert Mundheim\*\*

White House  
Hamilton Jordan\*\*  
Jody Powell\*\*  
Stuart Eizenstat\*\*  
Lloyd Cutler\*\*  
Zbigniew Brzezinski  
David Aaron

NSC  
Colonel William Odom  
Gary Sick  
Thomas Thornton\*\*\*

\*\*Domestic Issues Only  
\*\*\*Afghanistan Only

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

Domestic Issues:

1. Economic Steps. A message was sent out on Saturday clarifying our understanding of the various steps which the allies will implement on a voluntary basis. We should have reactions from the various capitals today. Once those reactions are in, a joint message from Secretaries Vance and Miller will be sent requesting immediate implementation. That message will be prepared for President review today, in anticipation of its being sent tomorrow. State has prepared a matrix showing our present understanding of what the allies are prepared to do. A copy is attached. (8)

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UNCLASSIFIED  
Revised on 11-1-1999  
Classified and Extended by Zbigniew Brzezinski  
Reason: NSC 1.13(f)

Declassify on: OADR

PARTIALLY  
Declassified/Released on 6/8/98  
under provisions of E.O. 12958  
by R. Soubers, National Security Council

State also prepared a paper on the steps available to us in invoking Chapter VII sanctions through the UN. A copy is attached. The SCC was briefed on the President's interest in taking the necessary preparations to move on Chapter VII if and when a decision is made and the President's preference for seeking maximum sanctions. The SCC did not believe that seeking Chapter VII sanctions would provide an excuse for delay of action by the allies since they already seem prepared to proceed with limited voluntary steps but will be reluctant to go beyond those measures in any event without Chapter VI authorization. We will wish to consult in advance with the Soviets since a veto could have serious implications for SALT, as well as preventing sanctions. We should seek Soviet abstention, if support is not possible. Mr. Cutler suggested that we move immediately to get a finding by the SC on Article 39 that the Iranian situation constitutes a threat to the peace, since the Soviets may be willing to support that. State pointed out that a call for a finding under Article 39 is, in effect, a call for sanction and should not be undertaken until we are prepared to follow through with the entire program. (S)

Let go ahead in my case

2 papers 39 & 7 to go thru not a liability

Thurs. ok

Define immediately

The SCC agreed that it would be useful to wait for several days before invoking Chapter VII in order to see the outcome of allied decisions on voluntary steps, effects of the ICJ ruling, reaction to the Shah's departure, and the results of consultations between the new Iranian Ambassador to the UN, Mansour Farhang, with the Secretary General. In order to sustain momentum, it would probably be useful to be prepared to proceed with Chapter VII on about Thursday or Friday. Once the decision is made, the SCC recommended seeking steps 1 and 2 of the State paper (denial of military sales and credits, interruption of normal air, rail, post and telecommunications links, and a selective embargo except for humanitarian items), but stopping short of a total trade embargo which would involve extended debate and possible failure in the UNSC. (S)

APPROVE

DISAPPROVE

my guess: 5:45 for their 4:15 more in UN on sanctions

In order to maintain the public appearance of momentum, it will be necessary to publicize in some form the types of actions which our allies have agreed to undertake. Some will not object; others will wish to keep their advice entirely private. The SCC recommended that State contact the countries involved and determine what they would be willing to announce publicly. Depending on their reaction, we will probably want to do a careful backgrounder to get out the whole story. This can be linked to intelligence information on the decline of shipping into the Persian Gulf, to increase the appearance of effective disruption of trade. We would expect to do the backgrounder by Wednesday. (S)

APPROVE

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2. Presidential Views. Dr. Brzezinski briefed the SCC on the President's comments on the notes of Friday's meeting. The President approved the proposed strategy on the White Paper (that the informati



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be collected and papers prepared, but not to publish a formal document) but asked that the internal documentation be complete for selective use. Approval was granted for leaking information about certain banks' circumvention of restrictions on Iranian assets. At this point, however, there appeared to be no flagrant cases to be exploited. (S)

3. Trials. The President noted that it is important that we do nothing which would lend legitimacy to any trials of the hostages by Iran. The question of the lawyers preparing legal support for the hostages will be raised at the meeting tomorrow. (e)

4. French. The Iranian case against U.S. branch banks in France has been refiled. The SCC agreed that Giscard should be reminded of his assurance to Vance that this case would be tied up in the courts and not be subject to an early court decision. (S)

Political-Military Issues:

1. Afghanistan. Admiral Turner briefed the latest developments. Soviet forces had remained stable from July until recently, but now there is evidence of movement. Two new command posts have been created just north of the Afghan border, there is a buildup of air assets, and two divisions may be on the move. There are about 5,300 Soviet military personnel in Afghanistan and approximately 2,000 civilians, some with families. CIA does not see this as a crash buildup but rather as a steady, planned buildup, perhaps related to Soviet perceptions of a deterioration of the Afghan military forces and the need to beef them up at some point. Most of the countryside is now in rebel hands, but no major cities are expected to fall unless there are significant defections from the Army. We believe the Soviets have made a political decision to keep a pro-Soviet regime in power and to use military force to that end if necessary. They either give this a higher priority than successful completion of SALT, or they may believe it is irrelevant to SALT. They may be ready to dump Amin, but they have not found a suitable replacement. (S)

The SCC, after some discussion, recommended a three part strategy. First, for the record, we will continue our diplomatic demarches to the Soviets on a private basis. There is no benefit in going public at this time. Second, we will explore with the Pakistanis and British the possibility of improving the financing, arming and communications of the rebel forces to make it as expensive as possible for the Soviets to continue their efforts. Third, we will attempt to increase propaganda pressure on the Soviets worldwide. We will recommend to our European allies that they encourage their press to pay more attention to the subject. We will also step up our efforts to cast the Soviets as opposing Moslem religious and nationalist expressions. (S)

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 We are hamstrung by the divisions within the tribes, and an effort to organize them would be a mammoth undertaking. However, we can put in enough to keep them active and perhaps prevent the Soviets from wearing them down. One additional option would be to circulate a letter at the Security Council drawing attention to the Soviet role in Afghanistan. The SCC felt that it would be better to wait until the hostage problem was resolved before such a move since we want to maintain maximum Soviet cooperation at that issue. (S)

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

December 26, 1979

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SPECIAL COORDINATING COMMITTEE MEETING

December 26, 1979

TIME AND PLACE: 9:30-10:30 a.m.;  
White House Situation Room

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions: SCC Meeting  
on Soviet Moves in Afghanistan (S)

PARTICIPANTS:

STATE

Secretary Cyrus Vance  
Warren Christopher,  
Deputy Secretary  
David Newsom,  
Under Secretary for  
Political Affairs  
Harold Saunders,  
Ass't. Secretary for  
Near Eastern & South  
Asian Affairs

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Admiral Stansfield Turner,  
Director  
Frank Carlucci, Deputy  
Director  
Arnold Horelick, NIO for  
Soviet Union  
[REDACTED] Military 1,5(  
Analyst

DEFENSE

W. Graham Claytor, Jr.,  
Deputy Secretary  
Robert W. Komer, Under  
Secretary for Policy  
Affairs

WHITE HOUSE

Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski  
David Aaron

NSC

Thomas Thornton  
Col. William Crom

JCS

General David Jones  
Lt. General John Pustay

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**UNCLASSIFIED**  
Extended by Z. Brzezinski  
Reason: NSC 1.13(b)

Declassify on: OADR

Partially Declassified/Released on 6/8/58  
under provisions of E.O. 12958  
by R. Soubers, National Security Council

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The CIA briefed the SCC on Soviet military actions in Afghanistan over the past two days. As many as 215 transports, including AN-22s, AN-12s, and IL-76s, arrived in Afghanistan from the Soviet Union during December 25th. Kabul airport appears to be a major reception point. Activity at Bagram airport is not known. This size airlift, it is speculated, could raise the Soviet combat force level in Afghanistan to somewhere between two-thirds and one and one-half divisions. No ground forces at Termez or Kushka have yet crossed the border into Afghanistan. Thus we have an unusually large air movement but no ground re-inforcement. There is [REDACTED] direct politburo supervision of parts of this operation. (S)

The greatest risk that we face is a quick, effective Soviet operation to pacify Afghanistan. This would be extremely costly to our image in the region and to your position here at home. Our objective, then, should be to make the operation as costly as possible for the Soviets. The covert actions that you authorized have been very slow in getting off the ground. CIA will submit a full status report tomorrow. (S)

There will be a PRC tomorrow to discuss the broad regional impact of the events in Iran and Afghanistan. By that time we should have a more definitive picture of the scope of Soviet activity. At the PRC we will develop options for dealing with the issue, including possible recourse to the UN. In terms of immediate actions, we decided this morning:

1. We will permit information of the newest Soviet actions to reach the media on its own and maintain our current public posture.
2. The new developments will be briefed promptly to concerned countries in the region as well as other interested parties.
3. State will brief the Congressional leadership today in connection with planned briefings on Iran.
4. You should not become personally involved in a further demarche to the Soviets at this time. We will have Tom Watson reiterate our concerns and press for an explanation of recent troop movements; the Soviets have probably passed the point of no return. (S)

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**UNCLASSIFIED**  
Review on Dec 26, 1999  
Extended by Z. Brzezinski  
Reason: NSC 1.13(b)

Declassifyon: OADR

MEMORANDUM

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

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December 26, 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT  
FROM: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI *ZS.*  
SUBJECT: Reflections on Soviet Intervention  
in Afghanistan

I will be sending you separately a proposed agenda for the NSC meeting on Friday, and it will focus on both Afghanistan and Iran. In the meantime, you are receiving today's SCC minutes on both subjects. This memorandum is meant merely to provide some stimulus to your thinking on this subject.

As I mentioned to you a week or so ago, we are now facing a regional crisis. Both Iran and Afghanistan are in turmoil, and Pakistan is both unstable internally and extremely apprehensive externally. If the Soviets succeed in Afghanistan, and if Pakistan acquiesces, the age-long dream of Moscow to have direct access to the Indian Ocean will have been fulfilled.

Historically, the British provided the barrier to that drive and Afghanistan was their buffer state. We assumed that role in 1945, but the Iranian crisis has led to the collapse of the balance of power in Southwest Asia, and it could produce Soviet presence right down on the edge of the Arabian and Oman Gulfs.

Accordingly, the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan poses for us an extremely grave challenge, both internationally and domestically. While it could become a Soviet Vietnam, the initial effects of the intervention are likely to be adverse for us for the following domestic and international reasons:

Domestic

A. The Soviet intervention is likely to stimulate calls for more immediate U.S. military action in Iran. Soviet "decisiveness" will be contrasted with our restraint, which will no longer be labeled as prudent but increasingly as timid;

B. At the same time, regional instability may make a resolution of the Iranian problem more difficult for us, and it could bring us into a head to head confrontation with the Soviets;

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~~UNCLASSIFIED~~ 26, 1985

Declassify on: OADR

Declassified/Released on 7/27/98  
under provisions of E.O. 12958  
by R. Soubers, National Security Council

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C. SALT is likely to be damaged, perhaps irreparably, because Soviet military aggressiveness will have been so naked;

D. More generally, our handling of Soviet affairs will be attacked by both the Right and the Left.

#### International

A. Pakistan, unless we somehow manage to project both confidence and power into the region, is likely to be intimidated, and it could eventually even acquiesce to some form of external Soviet domination.

B. With Iran destabilized, there will be no firm bulwark in Southwest Asia against the Soviet drive to the Indian Ocean;

C. The Chinese will certainly note that Soviet assertiveness in Afghanistan and in Cambodia is not effectively restrained by the United States.

#### Compensating Factors

There will be, to be sure, some compensating factors:

A. World public opinion may be outraged at the Soviet intervention. Certainly, Moslem countries will be concerned, and we might be in a position to exploit this.

B. There are already 300,000 refugees from Afghanistan in Pakistan, and we will be in a position to indict the Soviets for causing massive human suffering. That figure will certainly grow, and Soviet-sponsored actions in Cambodia have already taken their toll as well.

C. There will be greater awareness among our allies for the need to do more for their own defense.

#### A Soviet Vietnam?

However, we should not be too sanguine about Afghanistan becoming a Soviet satellite.

A. The guerrillas are badly organized and poorly led;

B. They have no sanctuary, no organized army, and no central government -- all of which North Vietnam had;

C. They have limited foreign support, in contrast to the enormous amount of arms that flowed to the Vietnamese from both the Soviet Union and China;

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D. The Soviets are likely to act decisively, unlike the U.S., which pursued in Vietnam a policy of "inoculating" the enemy.

As a consequence, the Soviets might be able to assert themselves effectively, and in world politics nothing succeeds like success, whatever the moral aspects.

What is to be Done?

What follows are some preliminary thoughts, which need to be discussed more fully:

A. It is essential that Afghanistani resistance continues. This means more money as well as arms shipments to the rebels, and some technical advice;

B. To make the above possible we must both reassure Pakistan and encourage it to help the rebels. This will require a review of our policy toward Pakistan, more guarantees to it, more arms aid, and, alas, a decision that our security policy toward Pakistan cannot be dictated by our nonproliferation policy;

C. We should encourage the Chinese to help the rebels also;

D. We should concert with Islamic countries both in a propaganda campaign and in a covert action campaign to help the rebels;

E. We should inform the Soviets that their actions are placing SALT in jeopardy and that will also influence the substance of the Brown visit to China, since the Chinese are doubtless going to be most concerned about implications for themselves of such Soviet assertiveness so close to their border. Unless we tell the Soviets directly and very clearly that our relations will suffer, I fear the Soviets will not take our "expressions of concern" very seriously, with the effect that our relations will suffer, without the Soviets ever having been confronted with the need to ask the question whether such local adventurism is worth the long-term damage to the U.S.-Soviet relationship;

F. Finally we should consider taking Soviet actions in Afghanistan to the UN as a threat to peace.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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PRESIDENTIAL REVIEW COMMITTEE MEETING  
December 27, 1979

TIME AND PLACE: 4:30-6:00 p.m.;  
White House Situation Room

SUBJECT: Southwest Asia

PARTICIPANTS:

STATE  
Secretary Cyrus Vance  
Warren Christopher,  
Deputy Secretary  
David Newsom, Under  
Secretary for  
Political Affairs  
Harold Saunders, Ass't.  
Secretary for Near  
Eastern & South  
Asian Affairs

DEFENSE  
Secretary Harold Brown  
W. Graham Claytor, Jr.  
Deputy Secretary

JCS  
Admiral Thomas Hayward  
Lt. Gen. John Pustay  
Central Intelligence  
Admiral Stansfield Turner,  
Director  
Frank Carlucci, Deputy  
Director

WHITE HOUSE  
Dr. Brzezinski  
David Aaron

NSC  
Thomas P. Thornton  
Marshall Brement

Turner: One unknown at this point is the extent of Soviet activity and their full intentions. They have brought in perhaps an additional 4-5,000 troops. We know that Babrak is a Parchamist who has been in Prague as Ambassador. After his dismissal he remained in Eastern Europe. His father was a Mullah and this is being used to his advantage. Resistance in Kabul has died out for the night.

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**UNCLASSIFIED**  
~~Reviewed on Dec 10, 1999~~  
~~Extended by Bbigniew Brzezinski~~  
~~Reason: NSC 1.13(b & e)~~

Declassifyon: OADR

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under provisions of E.O. 12958  
by R. Soubers, National Security Council

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Brown: Was the Soviet movement designed primarily to force a change in government?

Newsom: Or do they think perhaps that the insurgents can be better dealt with by Babrak?

Brown: The insurgents are not going to buy that.

Turner: They probably felt that they had to replace Amin; we don't know whether they have made a broader commitment. The forces in the Turkestan military district may just be to support this move.

Brzezinski: Who is in charge of the Afghan Army?

Turner: Watanjar was purged and Amin kept the defense portfolio.

Brzezinski: The Soviets have been directly engaged.

Turner: Yes. In Kabul they are engaging in combat. We do not know what is going on in the countryside. There are reports of Soviet flights in Herat and Kandahar.

Brzezinski: What is Radio Afghanistan outside of Kabul broadcasting?

Turner: We don't know.

Vice President: What is the number of Soviet military there now?

Turner: We do not know exactly -- perhaps 10,000 men.

Vice President: What are the reactions of other Islamic countries?

Saunders: We have not got them yet.

Newsom: We sent a message last night to the Islamic posts.

Vance: Let's go to the State paper now. Are there any substantial problems with the "objectives?"

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PRESIDENTIAL REVIEW COMMITTEE

December 27, 1979

~~SECRET~~  
**UNCLASSIFIED**

TIME AND PLACE: 4:30 - 6:00 p.m., White House Situation Room

SUBJECT: Southwest Asia

PARTICIPANTS:

STATE

Secretary Cyrus Vance  
Deputy Secretary Warren Christopher  
Mr. David Newsom, Under Secretary for Political Affairs  
Mr. Harold Saunders, Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs

OSD

Secretary Harold Brown  
Deputy Secretary W. Graham Claytor, Jr.

JCS

Admiral Thomas Hayward  
Lt. General John Pustay

DCI

Admiral Stansfield Turner  
Deputy Director Frank Carlucci

WHITE HOUSE

Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs  
Mr. David Aaron, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

NSC

Mr. Thomas Thornton, Staff Member  
Mr. Marshall Bremant, Staff Member

Declassified/Released on 12/1/94  
under provisions of E.O. 12356  
by D. Van Tassel, National Security Council  
F87-146

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

The PRC met to discuss the situation in Southern Asia, especially in light of recent events in Afghanistan. Admiral Turner briefed on the fast-moving situation in Kabul, noting that the Soviet

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~~ORIGINAL CL BY Thomas Thornton  
 DECL  REV OF 12/28/1999  
EXT BYND 6 YEARS BY Zbigniew Brzezinski  
REASON NSC 1.13(e)~~

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military presence in the country was as high as perhaps 10,000. (S)

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INR/PRT: MCNEELLS (SUSB)  
A/RS: HANFELMAN  
S/S: OIJMULING

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Date: *17/12/02*

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- EMBASSY BUCHAREST NIACT IMMEDIATE
- EMBASSY CANBERRA NIACT IMMEDIATE

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MILITARY ADDRESSEES TREAT AS SPECIAL EXCLUSIVE

R.O. 12805; 608 12/28/85 (MURBLON, MICHAEL)  
TAGSI PEPK, AF, UN, US

SUBJECT: OUR ASSESSMENT OF RECENT EVENTS IN AFGHANISTAN

1. (C) ENTIRE TEXT.
2. ADDRESSEE POSTS MAY DRAW ON THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION IN BRIEFING MOST GOVERNMENTS. ADDITIONAL TALKING POINTS HAVE BEEN PROVIDED IN SEPTEL.
3. ON DECEMBER 27, AFGHAN PRESIDENT HAFIZULLAH AMIN WAS DEPOSED AND EXECUTED IN A COUP D'ETAT CLEARLY PLANNED AND EXECUTED BY THE SOVIET UNION. DURING THE TWO DAYS PRIOR TO THE COUP A MASSIVE SOVIET AIRLIFT COMPRISING OVER 200 FLIGHTS BROUGHT MEN AND MATERIEL INTO KABUL. ALTHOUGH THE PRECISE REASON FOR THE INTRODUCTION OF THESE MEN AND FORCES WAS NOT CLEAR AT THE TIME, IT IS NOW APPARENT THAT THE FIRST TASK WAS TO EFFECT A COUP AGAINST AMIN'S GOVERNMENT WHICH HAD PROVED INEFFECTIVE AND PERHAPS EMBARRASSING TO THE SOVIETS.
4. RELIABLE EYEWITNESS ACCOUNTS FROM KABUL INDICATE THAT SOVIET TROOPS WERE ENGAGED IN FIGHTING AFGHAN TROOPS AND OTHERS FOR CONTROL OF RADIO AFGHANISTAN. THE SOVIETS WERE SEEN TO BE TAKING AFGHAN PRISONERS AND AT LEAST THREE AFGHAN TANKS STATIONED NEAR THE RADIO BUILDINGS WERE DESTROYED. SOVIET CONVOYS WERE SEEN MOVING TOWARD THE CITY AND THERE WAS FIGHTING OVER A PERIOD OF HOURS IN THE VICINITY OF DURULAMAN PALACE, THE RESIDENCE OF AMIN.

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SOVIET TROOPS ARE NOW STATIONED IN KEY INTERSECTIONS AT KABUL AND IN FRONT OF MANY GOVERNMENT BUILDINGS.

5. OUR INITIAL FINDINGS INDICATE THAT THE FIRST ANNOUNCEMENTS OF THE COUP APPEAR TO HAVE COME FROM TRANSMITTERS IN THE SOVIET UNION ITSELF, AND NOT FROM RADIO AFGHANISTAN IN KABUL. THESE ANNOUNCEMENTS WERE CLEARLY PRE-RECORDED AND WERE REPEATED CONTINUOUSLY ON SEVERAL FREQUENCIES PURPORTING TO BE RADIO AFGHANISTAN. ACCORDING TO THESE ANNOUNCEMENTS, BABRAK KARMEI HAD SUCCEEDED AMIN AND WAS NAMED PRESIDENT OF THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL. BABRAK (WHICH HE IS USUALLY CALLED) WAS FOR MANY YEARS A RIVAL OF FORMER PRESIDENT TARKANI FOR LEADERSHIP OF AFGHANISTAN'S MARXIST MOVEMENT. AFTER THE APRIL 1978 COUP BABRAK WAS NAMED DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER BUT WITHIN A FEW MONTHS HE WAS "EXILED" AS AMBASSADOR TO PRAGUE, A POST HE HELD FOR ONLY SIX WEEKS BEFORE BEING ORDERED BACK TO KABUL. BABRAK DID NOT RETURN TO KABUL, BUT WE BELIEVE HE REMAINED IN EASTERN EUROPE UNTIL HIS INSTALLATION BY THE SOVIETS AS THE NEW AFGHAN PRESIDENT. HE IS KNOWN TO BE A DEDICATED MARXIST WHO HAS BEEN CLOSE TO THE SOVIETS FOR YEARS, AND HE WILL PROBABLY BE THOROUGHLY AMENABLE TO SOVIET DIRECTION. GIVEN THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF HIS INSTALLATION, BABRAK WILL CLEARLY BE DEPENDENT ON MOSCOW FOR HIS SURVIVAL.

6. WE HAVE REPORTS FROM KABUL THAT THE SOVIET AIRLIFT IS CONTINUING. EARLIER IN DECEMBER, AT LEAST THE EQUIVALENT OF A COMBAT REGIMENT ARRIVED AT BAGRAM AIR FORCE BASE SOME 40 MILES NORTH OF THE CAPITAL. A VERY SUBSTANTIAL BUILDUP OF SOVIET FORCES IMMEDIATELY NORTH OF THE AFGHAN BORDER INVOLVING THE ELEMENTS OF AT LEAST FIVE DIVISIONS, SUGGESTS THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE ADDITIONAL MILITARY OBJECTIVES BEYOND THE CHANGE OF GOVERNMENT IN KABUL. THIS BUILDUP

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INCLUDES LARGE NUMBERS OF COMBAT AIRCRAFT AND HELICOPTERS.

7. THE NEW REGIME HAS ALREADY MADE SOME CONCILIATORY PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENTS IN AN EFFORT TO MAKE IT MORE PALATABLE TO THE AFGHAN PUBLIC AND HAS OFFERED TO NEGOTIATE

WITH VARIOUS INSURGENT GROUPS. HOWEVER, WE EXPECT THAT MOST OF THE INSURGENTS WILL PROBABLY SPURN THESE APPROACHES SINCE THEY ARE LIKELY TO REGARD BABRAK AS EVEN MORE A CREATURE OF THE SOVIET UNION THAN HIS PREDECESSOR. BABRAK WILL DOUBTLESS GIVE LIP SERVICE TO NON-ALIGNMENT BUT WILL IN FACT BE PURSUING APRO-SOVIET POLICY AND BE SUBSERVIENT TO THE SOVIETS IN DOMESTIC AFFAIRS.

8. THE NEW REGIME MAY HAVE A DIFFICULT TIME CO-OPTING ELEMENTS OF THE FORMER GOVERNMENT. THE AFGHAN ARMY WHICH WAS ALREADY BADLY DEMORALIZED WILL BE FURTHER SHAKEN BY THIS MOST RECENT COUP AND THERE MAY WELL BE MORE DESERTIONS. THE AFGHAN DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM WAS ALREADY IN SHAMBLES DUE TO THE WIDESPREAD, POPULAR INSURGENCY THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRYSIDE. THE SOVIETS WILL FACE A DIFFICULT TASK IN REBUILDING THE AFGHAN ARMY AND RECONSTRUCTING THE ECONOMY.

VANCE

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MEMORANDUM

OUTSIDE THE SYSTEM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

December 28, 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI  
DAVID AARON

FROM: MARSHALL BREMENT *MB*

SUBJECT: Response to the Soviets Regarding  
Afghanistan: A Menu of Possible Actions

To emphasize the outrageous and unprecedented nature of the Soviet coup in Afghanistan would be to belabor the obvious. Any failure to respond adequately on our part would be perceived as glaring weakness by our Allies, by the non-aligned, and especially in the Persian Gulf. The domestic near-consensus on Iran could evaporate over Afghanistan. It is therefore imperative that we not only act to counter what the Soviets have done in Afghanistan, but that we are perceived as having done so.

The speciousness and bald-faced arrogance of the Soviet action can hardly be exaggerated. There was no need, for example, to announce Amin's immediate execution, which gives the lie to the Soviet assertion that they were invited in by the Amin government. Furthermore, the use of the recently-signed Friendship Treaty with Afghanistan as the juridical basis for their actions creates a logical implication that the Soviets could equally undertake the overthrow of any of the ten governments with whom they now have such treaties, e.g. India. Equally to the point, would Sadat and Siad have thrown out the Soviets so cavalierly if they had felt that one serious Soviet option was to fly in an army and set up their rivals in power?

I. The Public Posture

We have no real option of downplaying the significance of the Soviet action. We need a clear, sharp and unequivocal response, which should be given full play by all our communications media. The themes we should stress are as follows:

a. The fact that Amin was assassinated within two days of the Soviet invasion makes a mockery of Moscow's claims that it was invited in by the Amin Government. That Amin's family was killed along with him shows the kind of people we are dealing with.

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DATE 12/28/1983

Declassifyon: OADR

Declassified/Released on 7/25/88  
under provisions of E.O. 12958  
by R. Soubers, National Security Council  
F92-676

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b. The fact that the Soviets cite their Friendship Treaty with Afghanistan as the basis for interference in the Afghans' internal affairs implies that the Soviets have a similar right in all other countries with whom they have friendship treaties.

c. This is the first use by the Soviets of their armed forces in a combat situation outside the Soviet Bloc since the Second World War and is therefore an extremely ominous precedent. Do the Soviets claim such universal rights in all other areas? How can this be squared with the UN Charter?

d. Afghanistan had been the classic buffer state for the past 150 years. The Soviets had no legitimate national interest in taking such actions. The fact of the matter was that the Amin Government was, by any reasonable standard, pro-Soviet, as was the Taraki Government which preceded it. Furthermore, the Afghan Government which existed before the April 1978 coup was not anti-Soviet in nature and maintained cordial state-to-state relations with Moscow. All the military needs of that regime, for example, were supplied by the Soviets.

e. Does the Brezhnev doctrine apply to the entire Third World? What are the limits to the Brezhnev doctrine? As Soviet force projection capabilities increase over the coming decades, they will have the capability to mount such an action anywhere in the world. Is this a tolerable situation for the international community?

f. We are extremely concerned at the human toll which the Soviet-supported combat is taking. There are 350,000 refugees now in Pakistan, and we would not be surprised to see that number rise to half a million in the near future. Thus, as in Cambodia and in so many other countries since World War II, the Soviets are creating another enormous refugee problem, this time in South Asia and among an overwhelmingly Muslim population. The United States is prepared to do its utmost to assist the Afghan refugees with humanitarian aid.

g. The Soviet Union is atheistic by doctrine and has published enormous amounts of anti-religious and anti-Muslim literature. The US, on the other hand, firmly believes in religious freedom and enshrines it in our Constitution. Three million Muslims practice their religion freely in the US. In the USSR, Muslims have been persecuted, mosques have been closed, and religion has been discouraged. In Soviet Azerbaijan, for example, there are only 24 officially recognized mosques now operating, whereas before the Revolution of 1917 there were several thousand in operation.

h. In sum, replacement of one government by another through the use of armed force, as done by the Soviets in Afghanistan, is an egregious violation of normal international standards of behavior, sets a very dangerous precedent, and is regarded by the US as reckless adventurism. We call on all nations, and particularly nations with significant Muslim populations, to appeal to the Soviet Union to allow the Afghan people to settle its own problems in line with the principle of no interference in the internal affairs of other nations.

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## II. Other Possible Actions

1. Dispatch a high-level mission to give the Pakistanis the kind of assurance they need to bolster their confidence and to assist us in our support of the Afghan insurgents.
2. Dispatch a mission to investigate conditions in the refugee camps in Pakistan, which would presumably result in additional US and international assistance to support the refugees.
3. Explore with all pertinent governments the stepping up of covert assistance to the insurgents and in the process commit ourselves to maximizing such assistance.
4. Form a special committee in NATO to examine threats to the peace outside the Treaty area.
5. Liberalize our arms sale policy to the sub-Continent.

## III. Other Possible Actions in the US-Soviet Context

The above actions might be enough domestically and in world opinion if the Soviets are basically unsuccessful in tamping down the insurgency and thus become mired in a Vietnam-type situation. But if they are successful, these actions will not be sufficient and we will look weak and ineffectual. In any case, the Soviet action in Afghanistan almost demands that we take specific bilateral steps to indicate our abhorrence. Among those steps which the President might consider (and it is too early to make definite decisions on this score) are the following:

1. Withdrawal of SALT. If, after consultation with Byrd and others, it is determined that SALT no longer has a chance of early passage, the Administration could consider withdrawing it unilaterally, while waiting for a better climate, although still committed to the fact that the Treaty is in our basic interest and still favoring ratification by the Senate.
2. Grain Sales. The Administration could suspend the US-Soviet Grain Agreement or simply suspend all sales of grain to the USSR for the indeterminate future. This would require Congressional authorization to purchase and store the excess grain.
3. Technology Transfer and Licensing. We could announce a much tougher policy regarding technology transfer to the USSR and a closer look at licenses for petroleum-related exports.
4. MFN. We could announce that we do not intend to introduce legislation giving MFN to the Soviet Union during the current session of Congress.

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5. Postponement of US-Soviet Trade Council. We could announce the postponement of the next session of the US-Soviet Trade Council, scheduled to meet in Washington April 16.

6. Tighten Up COCOM Procedures. We could announce that we are undertaking with our Allies a review of current COCOM procedures with a view to tightening them.

7. Expulsion of a Large Group of Soviet Agents. We could identify and arrest 50 to 100 Soviet KGB agents in the US, making clear to the Soviets that any retaliatory action on their part would mean further expulsions by us at a rate of two Soviets for one American, i.e. the current ratio of Soviet Embassy personnel in the US to Americans in the USSR, leaving out the 550 Soviets at the UN (which makes one-for-one expulsion entirely unsatisfactory and unreciprocal to us).

8. Withdrawal of Ambassador. We could (and probably should) recall Watson for consultations. (Dobrynin's absence is obviously not entirely medical in nature.)

9. Broaden Security Relationships. The US could undertake new security relationships with Oman, Somalia, and Turkey, i.e. three Muslim countries.

10. Broadcasting. The US could announce increased broadcasts to Western Asia and to the Muslim portions of the USSR.

11. China. In conjunction with the Brown visit, the US could let it be known that we have agreed not only to the sale of certain high technology items to China, but to the sale of over-the-horizon radar and anti-tank missiles -- clearly defensive weapons -- as well. We could explain that this was done explicitly in light of the Soviet action in Afghanistan. Future arms sale to China, we could add, would be on a case-by-case basis.

12. Removal of Inhibitions on Covert Actions. The US could ask for revision of all of the legislative inhibitions on our ability to conduct covert actions anywhere in the world.

In sum, Soviet negative reaction to various protests and expostulation including ours, is completely predictable. These were taken into consideration by the Soviets before they made their move. This is an event of such importance that a strong and vivid US response must be made to it, and not just in terms of Soviet action in Afghanistan itself, but in terms of overall US-Soviet relations. The Soviets must be made to understand that this was a very expensive invasion and that it should not set a precedent for future action. The American people and the Congress should be sympathetic to tough responses by the President, especially if the Soviet actions in Afghanistan are cast in the proper light, i.e. the Soviets have kicked us while we were down, and we do not intend to stand for it.

MEMORANDUM

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

INFORMATION

December 28, 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI  
DAVID AARON

FROM: MARSHALL BREMENT

SUBJECT: Where Soviet Actions in Afghanistan Violate  
the Agreement on Basic Principles of  
Relations and the Agreement on the Prevention  
of Nuclear War

The following specific provisions of the basic principles of relations of May 29, 1972, are either violated or called into question by the Soviet actions in Afghanistan:

"The USA and the USSR attach major importance to preventing the development of situations capable of causing a dangerous exacerbation of their relations ... both sides recognize that efforts to obtain unilateral advantage at the expense of the other, directly or indirectly, are inconsistent with these objectives. The prerequisites for maintaining and strengthening peaceful relations between the USA and the USSR are the recognition of the security interests of the parties based on the principle of equality and the renunciation of the use or threat of force."

"The USA and the USSR have a special responsibility to do everything in their power so that conflicts or situations will not arise which would serve to increase international tensions. Accordingly, they will seek to promote conditions in which all countries will live in peace and security and will not be subject to outside interference in their internal affairs..."

From the agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War of June 22, 1973:

"The parties agree that they will act in such a manner as to prevent the development of situations capable of causing a dangerous exacerbation of their relations..."

"The parties agree ... to proceed from the premise that each party will refrain from the threat or use of force against the party, against the allies of the other party, and against other countries in circumstances which may endanger international peace and security..."





MEMORANDUM

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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INFORMATION

December 28, 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI  
FROM: MICHEL OKSENBERG MO  
SUBJECT: Afghanistan (U)

ZB HAS SEEN

I consider the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan a major watershed event. It has profound implications for Soviet willingness to use military might to advance their interests. In strategic importance, it outweighs the hostage problem in Iran. (C)

We must make this a costly effort for the Soviets by insuring that the insurgents have adequate arms and by increasing our aid to Pakistan. The President's nuclear non-proliferation and arms restraint policies must take second place to a concerted effort to teach Moscow that aggression does not pay. Here are the measures -- some admittedly extreme -- which I think we should now consider:

- Significant increases in arms sales to Pakistan. (C)
- Covert arms supply to Afghan insurgents. (C)
- Encourage third countries to take the invasion to the U.N. (C)
- Toughen export controls to USSR. (C)
- Immediately approve sale of telephone switching equipment to the PRC. (C)
- Encourage France to sell military equipment to the PRC. (C)
- Quietly encourage dock workers to disrupt the loading of grain on ships going to Russia. (C)

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Marshall Brement

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Review on  
December 28, 1985

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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December 28, 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI  
DAVID AARON

FROM: ROBERT BLACKWILL RB

SUBJECT: The President's December 28 Telephone  
Calls to European Leaders (C)

I will do a full record tomorrow of the President's calls to Thatcher, Schmidt, Cossiga and Giscard d'Estaing, but I wanted you to have a quick summary now. (C)

The President used the talking points at Tab A almost verbatim except for #4, the one on SALT. He put that issue in the following way: "We are going ahead with SALT independently of what happens in Afghanistan, but we are not going to allow our concern about SALT to interfere with our strong condemnation of Soviet intervention in Afghanistan." (Schmidt's response to this line was "I think that is appropriate.") The President also told each of the leaders that he was going to send a very strong message to Brezhnev on Afghanistan, and he invited Mrs. Thatcher, but none of the others, to do the same. (C)

As you know, Thatcher, Schmidt and Cossiga all immediately agreed to a meeting of deputy foreign ministers this weekend under NATO auspices, but Giscard said "no." He did not favor the NATO structure for this meeting because Afghanistan was not in the NATO Treaty area. Thus, it was not proper to use the NATO instrument in this case. A meeting in London of the NATO members, but not under NATO sponsorship, was the compromise. (C)

Incidentally, Giscard made the important point that we must take the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan seriously because of its impact on Pakistan, Iran and the Gulf States. The latter, said Giscard, would certainly feel threatened if there were no Western reaction to the situation in Afghanistan. (C)

The President urged both Mrs. Thatcher and Giscard not to offer substantial amendments to our UNSC resolution on Iran. He told Thatcher that we could accommodate in the resolution the British concern about the 10 ships that British oil companies jointly own with Iran, but not the other British suggested amendments --

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especially the one concerning extraterritoriality. After indicating that the British concerns were purely technical, Mrs. Thatcher seemed to hint that HMG might eventually agree to our formulation. In response to the President's question on this subject, Giscard said that the only thing about our draft resolution which he could not accept was its prohibition on airline flights in and out of Iran. That would endanger French and other foreigners there who might want to get out in a hurry. The President said that he did not even know this was in our language. (Gary Sick tells me it isn't.) I briefed Bill Maynes on this part of the two conversations and he is getting in touch with the British and French to try to reach an agreed text. Finally, Cossiga told the President that he will be seeing the Soviet Ambassador tomorrow who has asked to come in. Cossiga will say that the Government of Italy is gravely worried about the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan which is contrary to the policies of detente and which bears the risk of creating a far worse situation in the region and beyond. (C)

In sum, none of these leaders showed the slightest hesitation in agreeing with the President's analysis of the strategic importance of Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. We have yet to see what they will be willing to do about it. (C)

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Talking Points for Discussions on Afghanistan  
with Allied Leaders

1. We regard the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan as an extremely grave development.

2. It has profound strategic consequences for the stability of the entire region.

3. We believe that it is essential that we make this action as politically costly as possible to the Soviet Union and to that end will be approaching a number of governments, particularly the non-aligned and the Muslim countries to speak out.

4. We are not going to be deterred from making an issue of this because of SALT. The Soviets have clearly made a decision that this intervention is more important than SALT.

5. We also are prepared to carry it all the way to the United Nations; however, because of our own efforts in the UN with regard to the hostages, we would appreciate it if others could take the initiative there.

6. We also believe the North Atlantic Council should meet immediately at a high political level to assess the matter and to coordinate allied strategy. (For France: I hope that France can work within the North Atlantic Council and show solidarity on this issue.)

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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ACTION

12.29.  
'79

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI *ZB.*

SUBJECT: Our Response to Soviet Intervention  
in Afghanistan (U)

One of our basic problems with the Soviets, as has been the case with all our recent predecessors in office, is maintaining our credibility in Moscow. We have frequently protested Soviet actions (bases in Vietnam, Cubans abroad, etc.). Since we have not always followed these verbal protests up with tangible responses, the Soviets may be getting into the habit of disregarding our concern. (C)

Warren Christopher will be meeting with our major Allies in London on Monday. They will be looking to us for leadership, for specific evidence that we are unwilling to let the Soviets get away with this invasion with impunity. With this in mind, you may wish to instruct Christopher to inform these governments that we are taking tangible steps in our bilateral relationship with Moscow to manifest our displeasure. (S)

Since in your conversations yesterday with European leaders you drew a parallel between the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in 1979 and the one in Czechoslovakia in 1968, it may be useful for you to know what actions Johnson and Rusk took after the August 20, 1968 Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia. (You may be sure the Soviets have the list at hand and will draw comparative conclusions about the international environment in which they operate. The same will be true of most countries of the world, especially those anywhere near Afghanistan.) Within three days of the invasion:

- (1) The President made a strong public statement.
- (2) Secretary of State made a public statement.
- (3) We initiated a Security Council meeting.
- (4) We suspended bilateral talks with the Soviets on peaceful uses of the atom.
- (5) Embassy Moscow was instructed to restrict all official and social contacts with Soviet officials.

Declassified/Released on 3-17-93  
 under provisions of F.O. 123-56  
 by S. Tilley, National Security Council

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(6) We sent the same instructions to all US diplomatic missions worldwide.

(7) Rusk told Dobrynin on August 23 that there would be no movement on other issues until the situation in Czechoslovakia was clarified.

(8) The State Department actively discouraged US business ties with the Soviet Union.

(9) We stopped, turned down or delayed requests for export licenses to the Soviet Union.

(10) We stopped participation in trade fairs in the Soviet Union.

(11) We cancelled pending cultural exchanges with the Soviets. (C)

As you will recall, the invasion of Czechoslovakia also resulted in the cancellation of the scheduled first round of SALT talks between Washington and Moscow. While I would oppose any freeze on our efforts to achieve SALT ratification, I think it would be a mistake to confine our response to this Soviet intervention in Afghanistan to words. In this connection, I enclose a memorandum from Marshall Brent of the NSC Staff which lists a menu of actions we could take to evidence our displeasure with Moscow. I would welcome your guidance on what you feel might be done. I do think something definite in our bilateral relationship with Moscow should follow this extraordinary act of Soviet arrogance and brutality and that Warren Christopher should inform the Allies on Monday what specific steps we intend to take. In my judgment, such resolve on our part would have significant benefits for us, both domestically and internationally. (S)

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MEMORANDUM

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ACTION

December 29, 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI  
 FROM: ROBERT BLACKWILL  
 SUBJECT: Summaries of President's Telephone  
 Conversations with European Leaders (U)

I attach for your approval memoranda of the President's telephone conversations yesterday with Thatcher, Schmidt, Cossiga and Giscard d'Estaing. (C)

Approve       Disapprove

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 E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
 PER [Signature] RE ALG-95-82  
 BY [Signature] MARS. DATE 12/9/96

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERATION

SUBJECT: Summary of President's telephone conversation with Prime Minister Francesco Cossiga of Italy, December 28, 1979, 12:26 - 12:33 p.m. (C)

The President told the Prime Minister that he had called Cossiga to discuss the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. We regarded this as an extremely grave development, equivalent to the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. Moscow had changed a buffer state into a puppet state, and this had profound strategic consequences for the stability of the entire region. Cossiga agreed, and said the consequences would not only be felt in the region. The President said absolutely, that this event would have reverberations throughout the Moslem world, the Non-Aligned world, and even would affect the North Atlantic nations. The President said that we were going ahead with SALT independent of the situation in Afghanistan, but we would not let our concerns about SALT prevent us from strongly condemning the Soviet intervention. The President said we were prepared to carry this issue all the way to the United Nations but, because of our own efforts in New York concerning the hostages, we were not the ones to take the initiative now at the UN on Afghanistan. The President said that he would like to send Warren Christopher, our Deputy Secretary of State, to a North Atlantic Council meeting this weekend in order to exchange views on the Afghanistan situation. Did the Prime Minister think this was advisable? (C)

Cossiga said that he supported the President's proposal and the two leaders agreed that either Vance or Christopher would be in touch with the Italian Foreign Minister to work out the details. The President said that Cossiga's position was very good news for him. We did not want a major confrontation with the Soviets, but we would not let them do this in Afghanistan without some political cost and some expression to the world about our concern. (C)

Cossiga then passed the phone to his diplomatic adviser, Berlinguer, who translated Cossiga's response into English as follows:

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Reason for extension: NSC 1-13(a)

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Cossiga was in complete agreement with all the President had said. He was going to see the Soviet Ambassador next morning, who had asked to come in, most likely on this issue. Cossiga would stress Italy's grave concern about Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan, which was contrary to the policies of detente and which bore the risk of creating a worse situation in the region and beyond. Cossiga was at the President's disposal for any further communication with him as the President wished, and completely agreed to a North Atlantic Council meeting this weekend. (C)

After the President said that the State Department would be in touch in a few hours, he stressed how deeply he appreciated Cossiga's attitude. The President looked forward to meeting the Prime Minister personally and we were already planning our trip to Italy in the late spring. Stressing that Cossiga should call him directly at any time, the President conveyed his best wishes to the Prime Minister, politically and otherwise. (C)

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Summary of the President's Telephone Conversation  
Mrs. Margaret Thatcher, Prime Minister of  
Great Britain, December 28, 1979, 11:40 to  
11:50 a.m. (C)

After an exchange of holiday greetings, the President told Mrs. Thatcher that he wanted to speak to her about Afghanistan. He said that we regarded the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan as an extremely grave development, similar in scope and permanent impact to what the Soviets did in Czechoslovakia. In effect, Moscow had changed a buffer nation into a puppet nation under Soviet direction. This would have profound strategic consequences for the stability of the entire region. (C)

The President continued that it was essential that we make this action as politically costly as possible to the Soviet Union. Although we could not force the Soviets out of Afghanistan, they would have a serious problem with the Nonaligned countries and particularly with the Moslem countries. This was true not only of Pakistan, Iran, India and others of a similar nature in the region, but also of the entire Nonaligned Movement. The President said he intended to call on these countries to speak out against the Soviet intervention. (C)

The President then noted that we were going ahead with SALT independently of what happened in Afghanistan, but we would not let our concern about SALT interfere with a strong US condemnation of the Soviet intervention. The President said that he did not think that we could afford to let the Soviets get away with this intervention with impunity. (C)

Noting that we were prepared to carry the Afghanistan issue all the way to the United Nations in the next number of days, the President said because of our own efforts in the UN concerning the hostages, it was probably not advisable for us to take the initiative on Afghanistan in New York. There were others who could do this -- Britain, China or some of the Nonaligned countries. (C)

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Reason for Extension: NSC 1.13(a)

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The President said that the last point he wanted to make was that we should dramatize our concern about Afghanistan. We would like to have a meeting of the North Atlantic Council solely on the Afghanistan problem. The President would send a high-level person to attend the Council this weekend. It was critical for the Allies to decide as a body how we should address the problem in Afghanistan. (C)

Mrs. Thatcher replied that she and Peter Carrington would be about this weekend and a US representative would be very welcome in London. The President asked if the Prime Minister agreed that we should get the North Atlantic Council together. Mrs. Thatcher said yes, and observed that when something like this occurred, it was important to act right at the beginning. (C)

The President agreed and observed that the Soviets had probably gotten away with this intervention for too many hours already. We had raised our concern about this for two or three weeks, but primarily at the Secretary of State level. The President said that he was probably going to make a personal public statement this afternoon to stress his concern about the Soviet intervention. (C)

Continuing, the President noted that the Germans were very concerned as had been reflected in a conversation between Cy Vance and Genscher that morning. The FRG was worried about the future impact of this event on countries not only like Pakistan, but also Romania and Yugoslavia as well as the precedent it established with relations between the Warsaw Pact countries and the European Allies. (C)

In response to Mrs. Thatcher's repeated willingness to welcome a US representative over the weekend, the President said he would probably send Warren Christopher, our top man second only to Cy Vance. The President suggested that Cy Vance would call Lord Carrington in the next few hours to discuss the details and the Prime Minister replied that she would let Carrington know. Mrs. Thatcher said again that it was important to act quickly. (C)

Turning to Iran, the President said that Cy Vance would be delivering our Iranian message to the Security Council personally tomorrow or the next day. We were especially concerned about the extensive amendments that the UK had offered on our Security Council Resolution, and the President told Mrs. Thatcher he hoped that the UK would not be adamant about these suggested changes. (C)

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Mrs. Thatcher responded that the British amendments were technical in nature, having to do with their own legislation. The President replied that we had a long-standing debate about extraterritoriality, a debate we certainly could not resolve in the next few days. The US could, however, be responsive to the UK concern over jointly-owned Iranian flag ships. But the other British points would be very difficult for us. (C)

In response to Mrs. Thatcher's question about whom her technical boys could get on to to discuss this matter, the President said that Cy and Lord Carrington could work it out. Mrs. Thatcher remarked that she had been told that the British amendments were necessary, [REDACTED]. Her people said that the changes were advisable because of British legislation. She then agreed that we could not solve the extraterritoriality problem in the next few days, not least because several cases were before the courts. (C)

The President then said that we could accommodate the British need on the ten ships owned jointly by UK oil companies and Iran and this could be worked out between Cy and Lord Carrington. (

Noting that he would be calling Schmidt, Giscard d'Estaing, and Cossiga, the President said he wanted to talk to Mrs. Thatcher first. She thanked him and said that they should stay in close touch. She hoped that the US had the requisite number of votes in the Security Council to pass the Iranian resolution. The President said he thought so if we gave the Secretary General a brief period of time to try to work something out pending imposition of the sanctions. This would be a two-step approach with the first step taking five or six days. The President noted that we had just finished a National Security Council meeting and this was what he had decided although he would not announce it publicly. This two-step approach should bring aboard more than enough votes. (C)

Mrs. Thatcher agreed, and said it would give the Iranians an opportunity to react. The President observed that they could save face in this way if they wanted to. However, it was his judgment that Khomeini had no such desire although he was probably getting pressure from other members of the Revolutionary Council. (C)

In concluding the conversation, the President said he would be sending a strong personal message to Brezhnev and that if Mrs. Thatcher would consider doing something similar, it would be helpful. (C)

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Summary of President's telephone conversation with Helmut Schmidt, Chancellor of the FRG, December 28, 1979, 12:01 - 12:09 p.m. (C)

After an exchange of holiday greetings, the President told the Chancellor that he hoped Schmidt was looking forward to a great year, political and otherwise. Thanking the President, Schmidt said that he knew the President was still greatly concerned about our people in Tehran. The President noted that Secretary Vance would be taking our resolution to the Security Council tomorrow. (C)

Indicating that the principal purpose of this call was to discuss Afghanistan, the President said we regarded the Soviet intervention there as an extremely grave development, second only to what the Soviets had done in Czechoslovakia. They had changed a buffer state into a puppet or satellite state under Soviet control. This would have profound strategic consequences for the stability of the entire region. (C)

The President said we had received a message from Schmidt's people earlier in the day and Vance and Genscher had also spoken together. We knew how concerned the FRG was over this matter. The President said he was going to send a strong personal message to Brezhnev, a message in the strongest possible terms. We thought it was important that the Soviets not complete this action in Afghanistan with impunity. Although we could not dislodge them from Afghanistan, we could encourage the Non-Aligned and Moslem countries to speak out and condemn Soviet action in Afghanistan. (C)

The President continued that we would not let the Soviet action interfere with SALT, but, equally, we would not let our concerns about SALT dissuade us from strong condemnation of the Soviets. Schmidt replied that he thought that approach was appropriate. (C)

The President noted that we were prepared to carry this all the way to the United Nations, but given our own efforts in New York concerning the hostages, we were not the proper ones

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to take the initiative in the UN on Afghanistan. Concerning Iran, we hoped to get a Security Council vote on our resolution before the end of the year when the composition of the Council changed. (C)

The President then said he thought we ought to have a special meeting of the North Atlantic Council on Afghanistan. He was prepared to send Warren Christopher, our Deputy Secretary of State, to Europe this weekend to discuss common statements or action we might want to carry out in response to the Soviet intervention. Schmidt replied that he thought this was quite appropriate. Noting that he had talked to Mrs. Thatcher after first trying to reach the Chancellor, the President said she agreed completely about the seriousness of the Soviet matter and the need for a North Atlantic Council meeting. (C)

Schmidt then said he would like to make a formal suggestion regarding the Council. Since Afghanistan was outside the North Atlantic Treaty area, it might be necessary to give the Council meeting a headline that would not lead others to shy away from participation. Given the events in Belgium, Holland and Denmark a few weeks ago, it might be worthwhile to give the session a little different headline. The President asked what sort of headline, and Schmidt stressed that for him, calling a meeting explicitly on Afghanistan was okay; he said that other capitals in Europe might prefer something like "discussion of the global situation." Schmidt then repeated that the idea of this meeting was fine with him, and he would so inform Genscher. The President said Vance would be calling Genscher in a few hours to work out the details, and he would be getting in touch with Giscard d'Estaing next. The President said that he thought it was necessary to move expeditiously on Afghanistan outside the UN since the Security Council was so involved with Iran. Thus, the idea of a North Atlantic Council meeting. (C)

The President closed the conversation by saying how sorry he was to interrupt Schmidt's vacation on Majorca, and the Chancellor stressed that he had welcomed the call. (C)

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WASHINGTON

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Summary of the President's Telephone Conversation with Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, President of France, December 28, 1979, 1:54 to 2:02 p.m. (C)

After a brief exchange of greetings, the President told Giscard that he wanted to talk to him about Afghanistan. We regarded the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan as an extremely grave development. The Soviets had changed a buffer state into a puppet state and this had profound strategic consequences for the entire region. Giscard agreed. (C)

The President continued that we believed it was essential that we make this action politically costly to the Soviet Union. We would be approaching a number of governments, particularly the Nonaligned and the Moslem countries, to speak out. Although the plight of our hostages made it impossible for us to take Afghanistan to the UN now, eventually this would have to be done by the US or someone else. The President said that we considered this Soviet intervention to be a violation of agreements the Soviets have had with us since Nixon concerning general principles of detente. (C)

The President noted that the Moslem countries, and especially those directly adjacent to Afghanistan, would be deeply concerned. He had just talked with President Zia, who said the Soviet intervention was tragic and destabilizing. Zia believed that the direct overthrow of the Afghanistan government was orchestrated by the Soviet Union. The President said that there was no doubt about that. Indicating that we had all that we could handle in the Security Council right now with our hostages and Iran, the President stated that Cy Vance would be presenting our case in New York the next day. (C)

The President said that he felt deeply that we needed to have a consultation about events in Afghanistan, perhaps as soon as this weekend before too much time went by. He was therefore planning to send Warren Christopher, our Deputy Secretary of State, to Europe to talk to some of our North Atlantic Council partners. (C)

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Giscard replied that the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan was an important development and we must take it seriously. This was because of its impact on the countries in the region, not only Pakistan and Iran, but also the Gulf States. The latter would certainly feel threatened if there were no Western reaction. Giscard said that he knew we must present our case to the Security Council and that France would support us. The two delegations were discussing details in New York and, as we knew, the French had spoken to an African country on the Security Council. Giscard thought things were moving in the proper direction. (C)

Giscard had seen the comments on the Soviet intervention made by the FRG and UK and the French statement was about to be issued. It was important, Giscard continued, to have consultations on Afghanistan. However, he did not favor doing this through the NATO structure. Afghanistan was not in the NATO area. It was therefore not proper to use this instrument. On the other hand, Giscard said, if the US sent an envoy to consult in capitals, the French would be willing to have this consultation. (C)

In response to the President's observation that it would be difficult to call in at all the capitals in a short time, Giscard said that was not his problem. In any event, only a few NATO countries had an important interest in the issue. The President asked if Giscard would be willing to have a consultation this weekend in London, Bonn, Paris or Rome. We would send Warren Christopher to the meeting. (C)

Giscard replied "whatever you like." France could match Christopher with a French representative. Bonn was not the best place for such a matter because of its proximity to the Soviets. Giscard said London was the place and it was better to have an umbrella created by the participation of the countries concerned. Any European country could join, but not under NATO auspices. (C)

The President said he had never quite understood France's relationship to NATO. He had talked to Schmidt, Thatcher and Cossiga earlier. They all believed that we should get together, although Schmidt had some of the same concerns as Giscard. The President asked again if Giscard agreed that there should be a meeting this weekend at the Warren Christopher level and Giscard said all right. (C)

Noting that Vance would follow up with François-Poncet, the President said that he would have to check with the other leaders, but he was sure that a meeting in London would be OK with them. Giscard then noted that France would continue to

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support the US concerning Iran and the hostages. In response to the President's expressed hope that France would not suggest substantial amendments to our Security Council Resolution, Giscard said that he would not get into details. However, he did not think it was a good idea to prevent airlines from flying to and from Iran. That could be dangerous to our citizens inside the country who might need to get out in a hurry. The President responded that he did not know that this was part of our resolution, and he understood Giscard's concern. The President then asked if anything else in our resolution worried Giscard, and Giscard said the detail he had mentioned was the only thing. (C)

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Dec 25 1979

SUBJECT. Assessment of Soviet Actions and Intentions  
in Afghanistan

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Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan represents a major watershed in Soviet policy. It is the first time since World War II that the Soviet Union has intervened militarily outside the Warsaw Pact area to overthrow an existing regime and impose another of its choice.

The calculated Soviet intervention in Afghanistan takes on a special dimension because of the implications for the troubled, volatile region of the Middle East. The Soviet intervention was primarily designed to shore up what the Soviets perceived as a deteriorating situation in Afghanistan, i.e. an increasingly alienated leadership challenged by widespread insurgency. However, the USSR surely undertook this major step after weighing its consequences in terms of wider regional considerations, including the effects of the US-Iranian crisis. One cannot exclude from this assessment the probability that the Soviets acted in Afghanistan on the assumption that the "correlation of forces" in the region and elsewhere made the timing propitious for such a major new stage in Soviet military assertiveness.

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Diplomatic and intelligence reports during past months provided conclusive evidence that the Soviet Union was striving to broaden the Afghan regime's base of power and popularity. Although former President Taraki was not a popular figure, much of the opposition in Afghanistan appears to have focused on Amin himself. Following Taraki's visit to Moscow in September 1979, our intelligence indicates that he was given the necessary Soviet backing to seek Amin's removal, i.e. demise, after Taraki's return to Kabul. This plan backfired and resulted instead in Taraki's death with Amin becoming president. Not unexpectedly, insurgent opposition to Amin intensified during the three months of his rule.

The Soviet choice of Babrak Karmel as the new leader of Afghanistan may not be consistent with the earlier Soviet desire to broaden the regime's support and popularity. This is because Babrak, a leader of the Parcham (Banner) wing of the Afghan People's Democratic Party, appears to be even less acceptable to Afghan opposition elements in light of his long pro-Soviet stance. If Babrak now proceeds to purge leading figures of the Khalq (Masses) wing of the party, the Soviets can hardly expect that the

Parchamist faction will achieve much more broadly based support than did the Khalq leadership. A tentative conclusion from this is that Babrak's loyalty to Moscow was considered more important than his likely political acceptability among opposition elements in Afghanistan.

Pre-Soviet intervention assessments of the likelihood of the Soviets taking this step tended to stress the inhibitions posed by the reactions that would be caused in the third world--above all in the Islamic countries--and in the West, principally as US-Soviet relations were affected. In light of the scale and consequences of the Soviet intervention, our assessment of Soviet motivations and assumptions includes the following factors:

- The deteriorating situation in Afghanistan required firm, decisive actions;
- The turmoil in Iran, particularly the US-Iranian crisis over the hostages and the Shah, offered a unique smokescreen for the intervention with less risk of weakening the Soviet position elsewhere in the region;
- The US position in such key regional states as Pakistan was seen as sufficiently troubled so as to deny any US attempt to counter the Soviet intervention effectively;

-- US-Soviet relations, including the prospects for SALT II ratification, were assessed as sufficiently poor to conclude that there was more to be gained in Afghanistan and the region than to be lost in the benefits of the existing US-Soviet relationship.

US-Soviet Relations/East-West Detente

The Soviet leadership's decision to intervene massively in Afghanistan clearly bespeaks, as noted, a judgment that the US-Soviet and East-West consequences would be acceptable in terms of the probable areas of forfeit in these relationships. If one assumes that the Soviets calculated that their intervention would further undermine the prospects for SALT II ratification, this need not mean that the USSR has abandoned its interest in arms control. The Soviet leadership may well believe that the gains in Afghanistan will be consolidated in due course and, after this intervening period, the SALT process can be resumed on its own merits. Correspondingly, there would not appear to be any basis for concluding that the USSR will forego TNF negotiations (other things being equal), withdraw from MBFR, etc. On the contrary, the Soviets have long maintained a clear distinction between their foreign policy and military ventures and most of the arms



control areas.

As for the future of detente, the Soviet action can only be taken as representing a qualitatively new, dangerous stage of Soviet assertiveness. In the past, the Soviet leadership has moved cautiously and deliberately in undertaking moves of such consequence. It is clear that the West should now reassess Soviet policy in terms of how likely it is that the 1980's will see greater Soviet willingness to achieve its foreign policy aims through the overt intervention of its military forces, particularly in the Third World. In this regard, it is extremely probable that the USSR will weigh the success of its intervention in Afghanistan against the ultimate consequences and, if the balance sheet is favorable, the Soviets may well conclude that the discrete use of their military power is a tool which should be more frequently employed.

The most dangerous consequences of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan would derive from a Soviet decision to broaden and extend the "Brezhnev doctrine" to those non-aligned countries where, as in Afghanistan, the opportunity arises to deal with an initially pro-Soviet, anti-US regime with which

the USSR then moves to conclude a treaty of friendship and cooperation, assists militarily, etc. There now arises the legitimate concern that the USSR would be as willing in another country to "safeguard" the revolution by again intervening to crush opposition forces which began to threaten the regime and its pro-Soviet stance.

Recent years have seen the expansion of the number of friendship and cooperation treaties which the Soviet Union is concluding with Third World countries in key world regions. The fact that the Soviets invoked the relevant provisions of the treaty with Afghanistan is an ominous development and only time will tell whether this instrument will become the license for selected Soviet interventions in countries where their position is subsequently weakened. This use of such treaties is much more significant than the accompanying Soviet reliance on Article 51 of the UN Charter in "justifying" its actions in Afghanistan. (A separate INR paper will analyze the Soviet invocation of Article 51 over the years.) Finally, in this regard, the West must seriously consider whether a more assertive and interventionist Soviet Union will, in effect, begin pursuing a dangerous course which is based on the belief that "what's once mine remains mine."

EUR/SOV-G:Matthews:12/29/79

MEMORANDUM

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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INFORMATION

December 31, 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI  
FROM: STEPHEN LARRABEE *SL*  
SUBJECT: Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan (U)

The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan is an event of major political and strategic significance.

-- It is the first time since WW II that the Soviets have used their own combat troops outside Eastern Europe to establish a puppet regime.

-- To defeat the guerrillas, or at least to neutralize them, will probably require significantly more troops than the Soviets presently have in Afghanistan.

-- If the Soviets are successful, Pakistani security and the balance of power in Northeast Asia will be seriously affected.

-- The invocation of the Treaty of Friendship as justification for Soviet actions sets an ominous precedent and suggests that the Soviets may extend the application of the Brezhnev doctrine to any country with whom they have a Treaty of Friendship. (S)

The Soviet intervention requires a firm, measured and forceful response on the part of the Administration, particularly the President. The President must take the initiative and show leadership in coordinating a response with our allies and the non-aligned. If he does, he can help himself considerably, both domestically and internationally. If he doesn't, the U.S. will be perceived as sitting idly by as the Soviets marched into a neighboring country, just as Hitler marched into Austria in 1938. Our prestige -- and that of the President -- will erode further, particularly in the eyes of those countries most directly affected by Soviet actions, who will draw the conclusion that they have no choice but to accommodate themselves to Soviet power. (S)

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Review 12/29/85

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*11/16/82*  
*NLC-45-82*

The Soviet action is so blatant a violation of international law that we should be able to count on tactical allies in many different quarters, particularly among the Moslem countries. We should exploit this tactical advantage to the hilt.

Recommended actions:

Soviets

-- Consider withdrawal of SALT. Soviet action in Afghanistan has probably doomed whatever small chance SALT had of being ratified in 1980. If this analysis is correct (and the President should consult Byrd and others to be sure it is) then the President would be better off seizing the initiative and withdrawing SALT, stating that while he still believes SALT is in the national interest, Soviet actions have made a rational debate impossible (which is true). (He could point to Johnson's decision to delay initiation of the SALT talks after the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia as an example of a precedent.) This would make clear to the Soviets that there are costs, would undercut domestic criticism from the right, and gain the President some points for steady, cool leadership. (S)

-- Simultaneously make clear that MFN for the Soviet Union in the near future is out of the question.

-- Cancel upcoming (late January) USDA joint commission meeting in Moscow.

-- Publically make clear that Soviet actions in Afghanistan will inevitably have an effect on bilateral relations. The Soviets cannot have detente and military intervention in foreign lands at the same time. (S)

Regional

-- increase cooperation and coordination of policy with Pakistan

-- increase arms sales to Pakistan

-- review arms sales policy to Northeast Asia as a whole

-- consider supplying arms to the insurgents. (This makes cooperation with Pakistan and review of arms transfer policy all the more necessary and urgent.)

-- expose Soviet subversion activities in Baluchistan. This would have negative impact on Soviet relations with Iran as well as Pakistan. (S)

Non-Regional

-- encourage Chinese to aid rebels and consider sale of some defensive arms -- anti-tank weapons for instance -- to China.

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-3-

-- encourage NAM to condemn invasion; stress that Soviet actions strike at the heart of the non-aligned movement. Yugoslavia can be helpful here.

-- work through UN to get public condemnation of Soviet action and withdrawal of Soviet troops. While we may not be successful on the latter point, pressure will serve to embarrass the Soviets. (S)

#### Moslem World

-- Step up broadcasting to Moslem world, including Soviet Central Asia. The foundations for this have been set by the decisions taken at December 11 SCC on broadcasting. However, we must keep up the pressure to ensure that the SCC's decisions are implemented, especially by OMB, which is reluctant to appropriate the necessary funds.

-- Publicize Soviet intervention, stressing anti-Islamic element, particularly among countries of Middle East. We should portray regime as a Soviet puppet and Soviet action as anti-Afghan and anti-Moselm. Aim should be to isolate Soviets within Moslem world.

-- Continue to stress our own common interests with Islamic world, contrasting our approach to internal change with Soviet approach.

-- Consult the Saudis with aim of getting them to bankroll arms to Pakistan and insurgents.

-- Strengthen our military presence in the Middle East. We must do this in a gradual, measured way, however, closely coordinating our efforts with the countries in the area as well as our West European allies and Congress. (S)

#### Allies

-- Initiate consultations with our NATO allies, not only on Afghanistan, but on the problem of non-European threats to the Alliance. The latter is one of the major problems that we are likely to confront in the coming years, but the European allies have yet to face up to it. A permanent working group on the subject should be established within NATO. We should also encourage leading foreign policy organizations here and abroad to hold conferences on the subject in order to raise elite and mass consciousness on the subject. (S)

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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INFORMATION

December 31, 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI  
FROM: STEPHEN LARRABEE  
SUBJECT: Soviet Policy in Afghanistan (U)

There is an increasing tendency in the news media and around town generally to make an analogy between Afghanistan and Vietnam. In my view, this is simplistic and dangerous. While the situations do share some similar characteristics -- the danger of a protracted involvement, for instance -- there are important differences:

-- logistics and transport: The US had to transport troops and materiel over 5000 miles; the Soviets can move troops and materiel quickly over short distances and across open borders.

-- organization: The North Vietnamese had been fighting the war for 25 years before the US became heavily involved. They had a well organized, well disciplines army and underground; the Afghan tribes have a history of insurgency, but they are not well organized and many of their actions are uncoordinated -- or at least have been until now.

-- leadership: The North Vietnamese were led by a leader who was generally regarded as a national hero, even in the South; at present no such national leader has emerged in Afghanistan who can rally the disparate tribes and provide cohesive, inspirational leadership.

-- weapons and supplies: The North Vietnamese could count on outside aid and weapons in large quantities; this is not (yet) the case in Afghanistan.

-- political constraints: US was constrained by (1) disunity over its goals; (2) its unwillingness to commit the forces needed to "win" the war militarily; (3) a desire to accommodate its South Vietnamese ally. The Soviet Union is under no such constraints. Having overthrown Amin and installed their own

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BY [Signature] NARS DATE 12/9/96

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puppet, who is completely beholden to them, the Soviets are likely to commit the resources needed to neutralize, if not defeat the insurgents, rapidly and in large number.

-- role of the media: Vietnam was a "media event" and this had a major impact on US domestic and international opinion, turning much of it against the war and US involvement. This will not be the case in Afghanistan. The Soviets will restrict access to the war by the press, and there will be few film clips of Soviet soldiers setting fire to Afghan huts or mopping up Moslem villages being flashed across TV screens into Soviet living rooms -- or for that matter across TV screens anywhere. This will minimize Soviet domestic and international criticism, after the initial furor dies down. (C)

Nonetheless, the Soviets will not have an easy time in Afghanistan. While Moscow will probably attempt to broaden the support for the new government, Karmal is not likely to prove to be any more popular than Amin was; indeed in the eyes of many Afghans he may be regarded as worse, since he is clearly a creature of the Soviets. Moreover, the Soviets

-- will face a hostile climate and terrain, which will make wiping out the insurgents difficult;

-- have difficulty transporting supplies once inside the country; this too will hamper their efforts;

-- lack experience in guerrilla warfare;

-- will probably need to "Sovietize" the war because the regular Afghan army is in no shape to defeat the guerrillas. (C)

The basic point is that, while the Soviets confront significant problems in Afghanistan and the prospect of deepening involvement, they are not likely to face many of the constraints that the US faced in Vietnam. They can be expected to move rapidly and in force to carry out their goals, with little of the vacillation characterized by US efforts in Southeast Asia. This will be a critical advantage. Whether it will be enough remains to be seen and will depend to a large extent on

-- the ability of the Afghan insurgents to coordinate their activities;

-- our ability to work effectively with Pakistan and other countries to aid the insurgents;

-- our ability to keep up public awareness of Soviet actions and to mobilize pressure against them within the Nonaligned and Moslem world. (C)

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cc: Bremont; Thornton; Odom, Ermarth; Griffith; Henze





DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

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December 31, 1979

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MEMORANDUM FOR DR. ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: U.S. Soviet Relations and  
Afghanistan

In accordance with the NSC request, I attach  
the Department's papers on U.S. Soviet relations  
and Afghanistan for Wednesday's NSC meeting.

*Peter Tarnoff*  
Peter Tarnoff  
Executive Secretary

Attachments:

- Tab 1 - Afghanistan: Steps in the Framework  
of U.S. Soviet Relations.
- Tab 2 - Possible U.S. Actions.
- Tab 3 - Possible Soviet Reactions.

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GDS, 12/31/85

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E.O. 12958, COMP. 3  
FE-82468 State Dept. NLC-95-76  
BY *[Signature]* 11/16/88

Afghanistan: Steps in the Framework of US-Soviet Relations

There are three kinds of impact we hope to achieve vis-a-vis the Soviets in our responses to the Soviet moves in Afghanistan. The first is punitive: we want them to pay a price for infringing fundamental principles of international behavior. The second is coercive: we want them to withdraw their troops and allow Afghanistan to return to a semblance of sovereignty and neutrality. The third is deterrent: we want to prevent the Soviets from crossing further thresholds, such as hot pursuit of rebels across international frontiers or escalation of the fighting with the rebels to a massive scale.

We are also interested in the impact of our responses on other international actors, including European Allies, nervous Eastern Europeans, nonaligned Third World countries, and Islamic governments. Thus, even actions that may make little impression on the Soviets can be of value for other audiences; some US actions could cause concern to our Allies.

Many of the steps we might take cut across other high-priority national objectives, including maintaining the strategic nuclear balance. We have already faced this kind of dilemma in considering whether to give priority in the Security Council to achieving our objectives in the Iran hostage situation or to mobilizing international action on Afghanistan. There may also be opportunities as well as problems for us in this crisis to the extent we are able to gain new collaborators or settle old problems, as in our efforts to gain base access on the Indian Ocean periphery.

To achieve these objectives, there are political, economic and military actions we can take in each of two broad categories -- bilateral and multilateral. Soviet reactions may also take the form of countermoves across a broad spectrum. In choosing one course of action over another, the irrevocability of an action will be one important factor to consider. To cite only one example, failure to implement the SALT fractionation limits can lead to testing of a high number of RV's on a single missile, permanently precluding verifiable lower warhead limits and severely affecting MX vulnerability.

With regard to the possible impact on the Soviets of various steps, Moscow will not be much swayed by deterioration in the climate of US-Soviet relations. This deterioration almost certainly was anticipated, and has therefore been discounted in advance. Certain steps affecting US-Soviet relations may have the desired effect on other countries, but the most effective steps in getting our point across to Moscow are likely to be those that directly

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*consult with allies*  
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I. U.S. Unilateral Actions

A. Political

1. Announce Administration decision to withdraw SALT II from Senate consideration in light of atmosphere created by Soviet action in Afghanistan.

2. Announce that Administration will review utility of pursuing other bilateral arms control negotiations (ASAT, Indian Ocean, CAT, CW, etc.) in wake of Soviet action and its impact on SALT ratification prospects.

3. Presidential statement on U.S.-Soviet relations

PROS

-- Would provide opportunity for highest level condemnation of Soviet actions in Afghanistan and implications of Soviet invasion for regional stability and future course of US-Soviet relations.

-- Would focus world public and media attention on situation in Afghanistan.

CONS

-- President has already condemned Soviet role in Afghanistan. Future statement would have to go substantively farther in condemning Soviet activities.

-- Press and public interest in Afghanistan is already high.

4. Recall Ambassador Watson

PRO

-- Would be clear and highly visible demonstration of depth of U.S. concern.

CON

-- Might limit U.S. access to highest levels of Soviet government in subsequent exchanges.

5. Restrict social contacts with Soviets, and have our officials worldwide keep official contacts with Soviet counterparts to the minimum.

PRO

-- Would underline seriousness of U.S. displeasure.

CON

-- Would to some degree complicate day to day bilateral business (visas, commercial activities, etc.).

6. Reduce number of permanently assigned official Soviet personnel in the United States to equal that of such American personnel in USSR.

PRO

-- Dramatic impact, both on Soviets themselves and on rest of world -- not to mention its (likely favorable) impact on US public.

-- Unmistakable sign of our displeasure over Afghanistan and of our willingness to put teeth in threat of serious consequences for the relationship.

-- Would provide opportunity to reduce number of intelligence service personnel in US.

-- Would provide us with something quick and visible to do after relations return to more even keel, i.e., graduated approval for return of Soviet diplomatic personnel to the United States.

CON

-- It would be an unprecedented move on our part. We did not take similar action over Hungary (1956) or Czechoslovakia (1968).

-- It would inflame the crisis bilaterally.

-- It would marginally disrupt several ongoing bilateral agreements/projects, especially in exchanges and commercial area.

-- Reciprocal implications: despite clear imbalance in numbers, Soviets would not hesitate to kick out some of our diplomats in USSR by retaliating on principle. They could be counted on to hit key, hard-to-replace Embassy personnel first.

7. Stop all work on opening of new consulates general in Kiev and in New York.

PRO

-- Soviets would view this as a negative and tangible consequence of their actions. (They are ready to go in New York; whereas renovation of our Consulate General Building in Kiev is not expected to be completed until late 1980. Thus, in short term Soviets would lose more financially and administratively than we would.)

CON

-- We have a clear interest in establishing listening posts in USSR outside of Moscow and Leningrad. This action would harm that interest.

-- Closing down Soviet CG-information in New York would do little to hurt Soviet operations in New York, given large number of Soviet commercial and UN-related personnel there. (On other hand, Soviets say they badly need visa-issuing capability in New York to handle 1980 Olympics flow of visitors.)

8. Expel Soviet intelligence agents from US

PRO

-- A swift expulsion of Soviet intelligence operatives would galvanize awareness of the damage of Soviet Afghan operation on their bilateral relations with US.

-- In the short term, such a mass expulsion would deprive the Soviets of the greater part of their US domestic intelligence capability.

-- In the long term, such a mass expulsion would enable us better to regulate the influx of such agents.



-- Any retaliation against our people can be met with reciprocal response on the basis of two for one. The damage to their intelligence operation would therefore be greater than to our own.

CON

-- Soviets might read into expulsion more than we intend. At the extreme, expulsion of intelligence operatives could look like a preparation for war, but less so than expulsion of diplomatic personnel in general as proposed in item 6.

-- Soviets would retaliate against our people.

-- The expulsion and retaliation could indirectly support charges made by captors of our hostages in Tehran that Embassies are "nests of spies."

9. Consider Raising Level of our Human Rights Criticism of the Soviet Union.

PRO

-- Would fan an old irritant.

-- It would place Soviets on defensive in international dialogue.

-- It could really inject some long-term wedges in Soviet internal politics.

CON

-- Such an action would contradict the justification for our human rights policy that it is world-wide and not directed against any country.

-- It should thus lend substance to Soviet charges that Soviet dissidents are in treasonous league with the West and would expose those who remain at liberty, including Sakharov, to greater danger.

-- Such a policy might be construed as a policy of "words" to which we take refuge when we lack any credible policy of "deeds".

-- Soviets would dismiss campaign as meddling in their internal affairs.

10. Step Up Radio Liberty/Free Europe and/or VOA Broadcasts.

PRO

-- Special programming would be devised to inform the Soviet public of the political and economic risks to which it is being subjected by its government. Our programs would review the history of how small nationalities, especially in Central Asia, have previously been overrun by tsarist and Soviet imperialism and other programs might attempt to clarify for the entire Moslem world the contrasting roles played by the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.

CON

-- To an Islamic audience, many of whom have sympathized with recent attacks on our Embassies, our hands would not appear clean.

-- We might spark troubles within the U.S.S.R. (say, in Lithuania) which we would not want and about which we could do nothing.

11. Worldwide Demarches and ICA activities to Publicize Soviet Role

PRO

-- Would focus world official and public attention on Soviet role in Afghanistan. Dissimination of information on extent of Soviet involvement and implications of their invocation of Friendship Treaty to cover invasion would have particular impact in Muslim and Third World countries.

CON

-- Interest in Soviet invasion is already high and their role already being condemned by all but most loyal clients. U.S. effort to further publicize might be interpreted as attempt to capitalize on situation.

12. Delay Recognition of New Afghan Regime; Suspend or Break Off Relations

PRO

-- Would underscore our view of illegitimacy of current regime, and allow more flexibility for other initiatives in international fora.

CON

-- Would leave field to Soviets, eliminating what little ability we have to monitor Afghan developments and to insure maximum awareness of the extent of Soviet involvement in Afghanistan.

-- Precipitate withdrawal of U.S. personnel might place them in physical jeopardy, although Soviets would probably wish to guard against such a development.

13. Other Bilateral Moves

a. Consular Review Talks -- Cancel

PRO

-- Would hit the Soviets in one stroke on several consular issues where they hope to see movement after four years of discussion.

-- Ball is and has been in Soviet court for nearly four months. To cancel talks now would thus be a symbolic gesture with low cost to us.

CON

-- Since the talks thus far have involved careful horsetrading, we would lose negotiated gains, too.

b. Rescind temporary lifting of recreation travel ban for Soviet Consulate General Advance Party staff in New York.

PRO

-- It would be a sharp disappointment for Soviet personnel involved, since lifting began on December 28 and will run only through January 10.

CON

-- Small potatoes. Would probably retard rather than help speed up renovation work on our new Consulate General in Kiev.

c. Refuse or Delay Issuance of Visas to Selected Soviet Officials Seeking to Come to the U.S.

PRO

-- Would signal toughened U.S. posture on Soviet official representation here.

CON

-- Probable Soviet retaliations would seriously hamper our operations in the USSR.

-- Sets a bad precedent for U.S. visa policy, particularly with respect to UN and diplomatic personnel.

d. Consider Reducing Soviet Media Representation in the U.S. to 26 from 35 to Achieve Parity with U.S. Media Representation in U.S.S.R.

PRO

-- Soviets could not retaliate without risking further reduction of their press corps.

-- TASS San Francisco (and correspondents) could be removed easily since there is no counterpart for it in U.S.S.R.

-- Argument that move against New York-based newsmen infringes UN Headquarters Agreement could be met by revoking accreditation for news coverage outside the UN.

e. Further defer exchange agreement negotiations and cancel or reduce US participation in existing exchange agreements. Actions possible by February 29 are:

-- Delay of resumption of negotiations with the Soviets on the General Exchange Agreement, which expires 31 December 1979. Negotiations were suspended in early December and our position has been to wait for a Soviet request to resume talks.

-- Cancel or defer shipment by C-5 aircraft of MHD (Magneto hydrodynamic) channel.

PRO

-- Taking any such action would signify our displeasure with the Soviets in unmistakable terms.

-- Shipment of MHD channel via C-5 is a major undertaking that would suggest close technical cooperation at a time when such cooperation seems unwarranted.

-- Cancellation of delivery, especially after making formal request for clearance of C-5 landing and signalling thereby our technical readiness, would impress Soviets with seriousness of our concern.

CON

-- Such actions would severely damage the basic structure of the exchanges and preclude attainment of our objective of opening up Soviet society to American scholars and observers at least in the near future.

-- Most of the academic exchanges are negotiated well in advance and on a strictly reciprocal

basis. Thus any action here would either need six to nine months to be effective or expose Americans in the USSR to immediate retaliation in the form of expulsion.

-- We have already decided to wait until Soviets request resumption of talks on exchanges agreement. Any further statement on this issue might lead to damage to fundamental structure of the exchanges and loss of those benefits we presently derive.

-- Deferment now, would mean postponement of MHD project for an entire year. This would involve a major professional setback for team of American scientists working on project.

-- The MHD channel has been built exclusively for testing in Soviet facility at a cost of \$10,000,000. It cannot be used elsewhere.

-- MHD technology involves generation of electrical energy by means of coal combustion. This coal-based source of energy has strong support in the Congress.

f. Cancel or Reduce Level of US Participation in Selected Exchanges, such as:

-- Agriculture Joint Committee Meeting, scheduled for January in the USSR at the Assistant Secretary Level.

-- Housing Joint Committee meeting, scheduled for February in Moscow--Secretary Landrileu plans to lead USA delegation.

-- Health Joint Committee meeting, scheduled for mid-February in Washington.

-- Codel Green, scheduled for January 11-18, Moscow and Leningrad.

PRO

-- These are all visits or meetings involving high level participation, and any change in

composition or cancellation would be a noticeable sign of our displeasure with the Soviets.

-- In most cases, the basic structure of the exchanges and bilateral cooperation would be left undamaged and current levels of participation unchanged.

CON

-- Such actions are limited and might be seen as a weak or ineffectual response.

-- Joint Committee meetings are simply for discussing future of the bilateral agreements. Curtailment of US participation would hinder development of the agreements.

-- In the case of the Health Agreement, such action would introduce an element of politics into an agreement which has been functioning smoothly up to this point.

g. Take some as yet unspecified action in connection with USSR hosting of 1980 Olympics.

PRO

-- US withdrawal from Summer Olympics in Moscow would be serious blow to Soviet international prestige.

CON

-- US announcement might precipitate Soviet withdrawal from Lake Placid Winter Olympics but this would be Soviet initiative.

-- The Olympics is organized totally within the private sector. The President has already pledged the IOC to admit all competitors accredited by that organization. Thus we have no recourse for the Winter games at Lake Placid without violating an existing international agreement.

-- Refusal to participate in the summer games would be too delayed a response, and would

hurt American athletes far more than it would affect Soviet policies or actions.

h. Harass Soviet diplomatic personnel in US through such measures as:

- Tightening travel controls
- Denying Mobile Lounge to Soviet VIP's at Dulles

PRO

-- By moving ahead of the Soviets in the administration of travel controls, we would underscore our displeasure over events in Afghanistan.

-- Denial of mobile lounge would irritate Soviets, especially Dobrynin, in an area where they could not readily reciprocate.

CON

-- Soviets would retaliate by restricting our travel.

-- Denial of mobile lounge would disrupt established pattern of courtesy.

B. Military Measures

1. U.S. Military Alert

PRO

-- Would underscore seriousness of situation.

CON

-- Could be perceived worldwide as unwarranted escalation of situation and might be perceived by Soviets as empty saber-rattling.

2. Increase permanent U.S. military presence in the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf.



PRO

-- While such measures are already underway, greater public emphasis of our intent to move in this direction, commensurate with the state of our negotiations with other countries concerned, would assure our friends in the area of our resolve and would demonstrate to the Soviets that they cannot, with impunity, seek to alter the balance of power in the region.

CON

-- Could provoke regional arms buildup and provide Soviets with justification for maintaining troops in Afghanistan.

C. Economic

1. Announcement that US will not seek MFN for USSR

PRO

-- Clearly indicate that economic relations cannot improve in the absence of improving political relations.

-- Lack of MFN limits Soviet ability to expand exports to the USSR.

CON

-- Soviets have probably already discounted prospects for MFN in the near term.

2. Grain Sales

Suspend grains shipment for the 1980 crop year (October 1, 1979 - September 30, 1980) in excess of those provided for (8 million tons) under the grains agreement.

PRO

-- Would present Soviets with problem of feeding population in the wake of a bad harvest and as 1980 crop year gets off only to a fair start.

-- Since agricultural sales represent largest US exports to USSR would signify that business as usual will not continue.

CON

-- Would damage possibility for developing long-term agricultural sales program with USSR.

-- Would have negative repercussions for US business efforts to expand sales to the USSR.

-- Could lead to opposition from domestic agricultural producers.

NOTE:

(a) Of estimated import need of approximately 35 million tons this year, Soviets can obtain not more than 10 million tons from non-US sources (Common Market, Argentina, Australia, etc.). Only loophole would be if foreign dealers sell from their supplies and then seek to replenish them by purchases from the US.

(b) A suspension of sales could have some effect (presumably downward) on US grain prices.

3. Postpone US-USSR Joint Commercial Committee Meeting Scheduled for April 14-15 in Washington.

PRO

-- Would indicate depth of our concern over Afghan developments.

CON

-- Would hurt US firms' efforts to expand commercial relations with the USSR.

4. Postpone Business Facilitation Talks scheduled for January 9 in Moscow.

PRO

-- Would indicate that we are not prepared to proceed on business as usual basis.

CON

-- We lose opportunity to discuss problems affecting US commercial presence in the USSR.

5. Civil Aviation

Postpone bilateral talks scheduled for February 13 and consider limiting Aeroflot scheduled service to the US to two flights weekly, the number for which there is basic operating authority.

PRO

-- The talks are unlikely to produce major results, especially in the absence of a US carrier willing to serve the USSR.

-- Reduction of service would be a further step in reducing the imbalance in bilateral civil aviation relations.

CON

-- Could create transportation problems for the summer Olympics.

-- Could make more difficult an effort to induce an American carrier to serve Moscow.

6. Export Controls

Tighten export controls and review outstanding trade deals (including the licensing of spares for Kama).

PRO

-- Would be visible and would have some impact on Soviet interests.

CON

-- Soviets are not moved by economic considerations when important state interests are at stake.

-- US companies would suffer.

NB: Any action on export controls would have to be in conformity with the Export Administration Act of 1979 which severely limits the utilization of export controls for foreign policy purposes.

7. Limit expansion of Soviet commercial efforts in US.

PRO

-- Would slow growth of Soviet exports to US.

-- Would reduce national security problems created by increased Soviet presence.

CON

-- Would hurt efforts of US firms seeking to expand commercial links with the USSR.

8. Suspend Soviet fishing activities in the US Fishing Zone

PRO

-- Would underline the extent of our dissatisfaction at their activities in Afghanistan. (Our fisheries activities have been running smoothly and have been mutually satisfactory.)

-- Would deprive the USSR of a needed source of food protein.

CON

-- Would be a unilateral violation of the bilateral fisheries agreement. (Which provides for one year's notice of termination. Moreover, we should be cancelling it without cause related to the purposes of the agreement.)

-- The US has not cancelled a bilateral fisheries agreement with any country for foreign policy reasons.

-- Unilateral cancellation would harm US fishing activity and interests, as we receive benefit from Soviet fishing operations in our zone, both by obtaining research information and through commercial operations in the US-USSR joint venture. We also receive substantial license fees from the USSR for permission to fish in our waters.

II. US Multilateral Actions

A. Publicity

1. Urge UK, FRG, and France to increase broadcasts to Muslim countries and Soviet Central Asia.

2. Daily circular to UN and others on status of the occupation.

PRO

-- Will ensure high degree of awareness of events and may strengthen willingness to others to take concrete actions in response.

CON

-- Direct identification of information with US may undercut its credibility or make some NAM countries reluctant to confront Soviets on basis of "US allegations."

3. Continue world wide demarches, urging others to take actions complementing our unilateral initiatives.

B. UN

1. Seek Security Council Resolution

PRO

-- Focus international attention on Soviet actions

CON

-- NAM countries may be reluctant to engage in what they may see as East-West issue.

-- Soviets will in any case veto.

-- Complicates our efforts on Iran.

2. UNGA

PRO

-- As above. Would put Cuba in the box. It would find it hard as head of NAM to remain silent.

CON

-- We may encounter large number of abstentions.

C. Economic Actions

1. Consultations with others to reinforce U.S. unilateral moves.

PRO

-- Could significantly increase costs to Soviets by, e.g. denying them access to international credits.

CON

-- Allied reluctance is likely.

2. Tighten COCOM restraints on USSR/loosen on China.

PRO

-- Removes existing restraints on China which are becoming difficult to maintain.

CON

-- Allies might not be able to agree to further restrictions on trade with USSR.

3. Increased economic assistance to countries in region (FY 80 supplemental and FY 81 incremental).

PRO

-- Clear demonstration of heightened US support for friends in region.

CON

-- Budget restraints.

4. Urge International Financial Institutions and countries with assistance programs to Afghanistan to terminate such assistance.

D. Arms Control

1. CSCE (reserve on response to Warsaw Pact proposals).

PRO

-- Should not appear to lend any credence to Soviet security concepts.

CON

-- French may react negatively if posture appeared to hurt ODE,

2. MBFR (withdraw Western proposals)

PRO

-- Show we will not reciprocate Soviet withdrawals during Afghan crisis.

CON

-- Adverse impact on TNF; might split allies; in any event ball in Vienna is in Soviet court and we expect no early resolution of differences with East.

3. CTB (delay start of February Trilateral round)

PRO

-- Demonstrate that bilateral relationship is under review.

CON

-- Nonproliferation and other considerations are overriding; could put onus on US at forthcoming NPT Review Conference; should in any event consult with UK.

4. CW (go ahead in initial multilateral CD consideration, but delay US-Soviet round scheduled for Jan 10).

PRO

-- Demonstrate US-Soviet relation under review; while keeping international consideration moving.

CON

-- Concerns US is too negative on arms control issues.

E. Afghanistan

1. Withdraw Embassy and urge others to follow suit.

2. Supply insurgents (depends on Pakistani position and cooperation).

PRO

-- Increase casualties, costs to Soviet of occupation of Afghanistan.



CON

-- Risk of Soviet retaliation against Pakistan.

F. Regional Security

1. Accelerate process of increasing US presence and acquisition of base rights.

2. Increase US arms supplies to Soviet periphery.

(a) Increase FY 81 FMS/IMET budget levels

PRO

-- Provides positive signal.

CON

-- Budget decision has been made in context of budgetary constraints.

-- Deliveries are over a year away.

(b) Increase FY 80 FMS/IMET levels by seeking increase in appropriations (budget still in conference) or through supplemental.

PRO

-- More immediate impact than FY 81 increases.

-- Congress probably would be receptive.

G. Other Concerned Countries

1. Yugoslavia (offer of increased assistance).

2. Romania (closer consultations and gestures)

3. Turkey (respond positively to outstanding requests).

H. China

1. Increased political ties (see other paper).

2. Increased military ties (see other paper).

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POSSIBLE SOVIET REACTIONS TO  
U.S. RESPONSES TO AFGHANISTAN CRISIS

The Soviets have the following options to "shove back" in response to U.S. actions. Lists represent a range of reactions and some are contradictory.

US/SU Bilateral

1. Stop the flow of Jewish immigrants;
- etc* - 2. Severely restrict U.S. diplomatic travel;
3. Jam VOA broadcasts;
- etc* - 4. Harass press, businessmen, and diplomatic corps. Charge members with espionage;
- etc* - 5. Take initiative to withdraw from SALT and refuse TNF negotiations;
6. Take actions in contravention with SALT Interim Agreement and/or contravening SALT II provisions (e.g. encrypt some telemetry).
7. Resume ASAT tests.
8. Take gloves off informal KBG "rules of engagement."

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SU Multilateral

In ME/PG region

1. Veto the UN SC resolution calling for economic sanctions against Iran;
2. Approach Iran and Pakistan with offers of economic and military aid and a new regional security arrangement;

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3. Support Afghan forces in cross-border operations into Pakistan;
4. Actively support Baluchi nationalism in Iran and Pakistan;
5. Offer India advanced weapons under very favorable terms. Hint to India that it will turn blind-eye to Indian nuclear bomb program if Pakistan presses ahead with its weapon program;
6. Expand military presence in South Yemen and Ethiopia.
7. Intensify subversive actions against US allies/friends (Saudi Arabia, Oman, Somalia, Gulf Sheikdoms).

In Asia

1. Offer Vietnamese advanced weapons on very favorable terms. Attempt to significantly expand basing rights in Indochina;
2. Increase air and naval operations off Japan.

In Europe

1. Put pressure on Berlin;
2. Demand greater internal political discipline in Poland. Press for increased defense spending for all NSWP states;
3. Increase threats to Romania that it must tow the "internationalist" line or face severe consequences. Begin economic sanctions;
4. Forward deploy new tactical nuclear systems (i.e., SS-21 and nuclear artillery) into GDR and CSR.

In the Americas

1. Accelerate delivery of advanced arms to Cuba;
2. Provocative ship visits and other military activity in and around Cuba.
3. Increase subversive activities in the Caribbean and Central America.

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