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**MAP READING: NATO'S AND RUSSIA'S PATHWAYS
TO EUROPEAN MILITARY INTEGRATION**

Stephen Blank

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STEPHEN BLANK is a Professor at the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College.

As part of NATO's and Europe's continuing and open-ended processes of enlargement and military-political integration, in 1999, NATO presented aspiring members with a Membership Action Plan (MAP) to guide them in their activities preparing their governments and armed forces for membership in NATO. The MAP, if fulfilled according to NATO's requirements and approbation, allegedly would make the aspiring members' military forces more nearly congruent or interoperable with NATO forces. With this document, NATO has arguably created its own version of the EU's *acquis communautaire* "against which the Alliance can assess the technical preparations and capacities of the nine MAP partners and judge their readiness for membership."[1]

Each aspiring member will choose from a list of issues divided into five categories: political and economic; defense and military; resources; security; and legal, from which they would select the most valuable or appropriate issues for them to work on. They would then work with NATO to improve their ability to fulfill the Alliance's criteria by drawing up an annual program to meet the objectives jointly chosen with NATO and would regularly report to NATO on the degree of their success. NATO will remain the ultimate judge of the degree to which the aspirant states have actually succeeded.[2]

Essentially, NATO and the aspirant members are to enter into a continuing process whereby NATO reviews their progress in all areas and works with them to improve shortcomings or encourage further progress along desirable lines. Aspirants must conform to the basic principles of democracy, liberty, etc., set out in both the 1949 Washington Treaty, the original documents of the 1994 NATO Summit on the creation of the Partnership for Peace (PfP), the 1995 NATO study on enlargement, and the 1999 NATO Summit in Washington. The aspirant states must also commit themselves to the peaceful resolution of disputes, civilian democratic control of their armed forces, desist from using force in ways inconsistent with the purposes of

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[*] The views expressed here do not represent the views of the U.S. Army, Defense Department, or the U.S. Government.

the UN, and be able to contribute to the development of peaceful international relations and democracy as well as to the various institutions of the NATO alliance. They would also commit themselves to continuing participation in the PfP and its planning and annual review processes (PARP) in order to maximize their ability to contribute to their own and the Alliance's security and missions.[3]

Like previous NATO initiatives connected with enlargement, the MAP served both political and military objectives and had a Janus faced character. Apart from the obvious intention of raising the applicants' military capabilities and ability to operate alongside of and with NATO, as well as fostering a broader level of European military integration, the MAP fulfills political and even normative functions for both the aspirants and NATO. The aspirants to membership have been encouraged to restructure their defense policy-making processes and institutions to conform more closely to Western models. Yet, they are encouraged to do so along individual lines and thus undergo a process of self-differentiation, each being considered on the basis of its individual MAP.[4] Hence, for example, though all three Baltic states have indicated that they are reorganizing their Ministries of Defense on the basis of a Western model – even to the extent of some governments adapting the Pentagon's Planning Programming, Budget System (PPBS) as their model – they are restructuring their internal organs on an individual basis.[5] Consequently, though all the aspiring members are essentially being told that they have to reorganize their defense establishments and decision-making processes and structures along Western lines, they may choose which Western model or models they wish to adopt and how they will adapt them to their individual needs. This restructuring of political institutions and processes is also intended to achieve and complete a decisive break with past Soviet or Socialist traditions and their residues. NATO's military-political leaders rightly maintain that the structures, values, and behaviors associated with that system are incompatible with the democratic values upon which NATO is founded.[6]

At the level of internal organization, the MAP also represent NATO's first real effort to meet the applicants' widespread demand for a road map of what was required to qualify militarily for membership. This adaptation is also part of the broader process by which NATO is gradually converting its long-standing institutional and integrated military assets to new purposes and roles, making them more accessible to partners and potential members.[7] Candidates for membership are working with NATO and individual members to improve their military-political structures and performance. NATO members provide feedback to them and thus create working relationships and a shared informational base that should enhance future interoperability and performance to NATO's standards.[8] The MAP can thereby be interpreted as NATO's *acquis* and a definite step forward towards clarifying membership requirements and offering prospective members a definite set of standards that they must meet.

On the other hand, since the ultimate decision on admitting new members remains a political and not a military one, the MAP can also be interpreted as another attempt to postpone the wrenching decisions that must be made concerning a second and subsequent rounds of enlargement in 2002. Though the steps to be followed are supposedly clearer now, in fact, NATO retains the discretionary authority to judge whether or not an applicant has completed the required Alliance "*acquis communautaire*," regardless of what it actually accomplishes. Even if an applicant completes the MAP, the decision to admit new members remains a political one. The MAP is not a direct qualifying test for promotion to membership although failure to achieve

the objectives of an individual MAP almost certainly will negate a government's chances for early membership.

By meeting the demand for a road map, NATO has bought itself some time and again illustrated its reluctance to face up to a second round of enlargement even if the further Westernization of post-Communist militaries is objectively necessary as a condition of future membership. As Admiral Guido Venturoni, Chairman of NATO's Military Commission, said in Tallinn,

> "I don't think that this Membership Action Plan must be seen as a kind of examination that nations have to pass. I think that this is part of a process, that commitments will produce results and those results will, of course, bear fruits in due time. Now when is this due time? This is something that has political implications."[9]

The reluctance of major NATO members to contemplate a second round until the first round of new members are fully assimilated, further aggravated by the individual members' fears of Russia's reactions to further expansion, has been made clear to prospective applicants in other, even more direct, ways.[10] There are also substantial misgivings about the new members' contribution to the Alliance and their performance records, especially given the Czech Republic's posture during the Kosovo operation, and these misgivings color views on future enlargement rounds. [11]

The prospective members gratefully accepted the idea of the MAP viewing it as a road map to be implemented in order to qualify for NATO and deny Brussels more opportunities for bolting the door or not letting them through. However, the applicant countries demonstrated a desire to "turn up the pressure" on NATO by urging at a conference in Vilnius, in May 2000, the simultaneous entry into the Alliance of all 9 applicants, even as they accepted a more individualized process of entry into membership.[12] Yet with all the qualifications attached to the MAP, it will, even if implemented only in part, enhance the military integration of Eastern and Western Europe that may occur through the new European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI).[13]

There are however, two other fundamental aspects of the process generated by the establishment of the MAP that also possess great significance for NATO and the aspirant states. First, while the MAP may temporarily satisfy NATO's desire to retain political discretion vis-a-vis applicants while not discouraging them, the process may also unravel out of NATO's control. As Jeffrey Simon of the U.S. National Defense University observes, an implicit contract between NATO and aspiring states has come into being.

> "As NATO encourages MAP governments to implement political, economic, and defense reforms, it is increasingly obliged to choose new members based on these criteria to justify their choices. NATO will find it difficult to decline a partner that clearly has succeeded in implementing serious reforms or to invite one that has not fulfilled them. If NATO were to disregard these criteria, it would undermine the credibility and legitimacy of MAP for those partners (probably the majority) who did implement defense reforms but were not invited, hence destabilizing the process."[14]

It is equally likely that rejection after successfully implementing much or all of the MAP would seriously undermine the government that had staked so much on NATO's approval and membership and unleash a wave of cynicism about NATO and the overall process of "joining the West."

Application to NATO (and to the EU) represents the first time since 1933 or 1939, if not 1913, that these states have been freely able to exercise their sovereign choice of whether or not to join an alliance and be free to choose which alliance or bloc, if any, they care to join. Unlike the Warsaw Pact where the armies of the members were essentially arms of the Soviet military, membership in NATO, and before that in the PfP, gains for each of the applicants an entry into an integrated military structure where their voice can be heard, even if it represents a freely chosen abridgement of their sovereignty. In its own way, NATO constitutes for its members' national security policy what the similarly freely accepted "pooled sovereignty" represents for the EU's members and is thus directly opposed to the constricted, constrained, and sham sovereignty of the Warsaw Pact. The key word throughout this process is integration and, notwithstanding attempts by NATO to delay facing a second round of enlargement, the Alliance is probably irrevocably committed rhetorically and in practice, as Simon suggests, to greater European military-political integration.

MAP and European Integration

The MAPs is part and parcel of the broader process of both military-political and normative integration of post-Communist states with the West. In this context, the MAP exemplifies the insight of French writer Jean Guehenno into the overall democratization process in Europe. As Guehenno observes,

> "However, democracy is not necessary just to control the policy-making process. It is part and parcel of the substance of foreign policy. In the absence of a clearly defined European polity and of self-evident 'European interests,' which could be deciphered by an enlightened elite, the policy-making process which would create a European foreign policy becomes an essential component of a European foreign policy, and an integral part of its substance."[15]

Here European integration and the democratization of foreign policy occurs by coalescing around questions pertaining to the use of force either at home or abroad, democratic civilian-military relations, interoperability, and the formation of a common identity as members of the same alliance with a shared commitment to specific values. Even where there has been regression from proper democratic standards as in Romania and Bulgaria, or in 1995-96 in Poland, Western observers or diplomats can be expected to subject those regressions to public scrutiny, thereby generating pressure for reform that must be answered if the state in question is to achieve its proclaimed goal of membership in Europe.[16]

Due to the growing congruence of officially proclaimed values, capabilities, identities, and pluralist political processes and structures, the MAP is an integral part of the process through which a broader European security community than has existed before 1989 is being constructed. Indeed, as recent research indicates, one of the enduring bases of such a "pluralistic security community" is a shared consensus on values and identities. The issues of defense policy, civilian

democratic control over the military, and the conditions under which military force will be used at home and/or abroad are essential pillars of that consensus.[17] While this does not mean that the creation of this security community is an irrevocable fact, it certainly looks more achievable today than it did in 1990.

Accordingly, the MAP is intended not just to raise military-political organizations, policies, and standards in the former Soviet bloc to Western levels and to Western standards of proficiency in military activities. Nor are they simply vehicles for Westernizing the military and defense organizations of prospective members of NATO. Rather they serve to institutionalize a new political and normative-cultural identification with and integration of Eastern and Western European polities and armed forces. In this respect, NATO, if only by virtue of its power, proven effectiveness, and attractiveness above all other potentially available options, functions much like the EU – as a magnet of integration.

Even if elites in post-Communist Central and Eastern Europe were or remain skeptical about the advantages of democracy, the EU and NATO, the sheer weight of those organizations' presence, the region's own dependence upon Western processes, institutions, and upon the ostensible support of Western values, as well as the absence of any viable security option other than free standing poverty or affiliation with an impoverished Russia, rule out other options. Therefore, the political logic of ruling parties' preexisting choice for "Europe" obliges them to make tangible policy gestures towards NATO even as they do so only grudgingly or only after being instructed to do so by NATO.[18]

In cases where there appears to be regression, as in Romania, public scrutiny and the greater degree of international transparency to which this country is now subject entails very high and immediate costs to its overall international image and can be used to discourage such backtracking. Both in Romania and Bulgaria, as in Poland previously, any backtracking from the goals of the MAP will soon be discerned, publicized, and used against the offending parties, forcing a reform in the desired direction.[19] The same principle also holds true for the Baltic states whose military systems are now under careful scrutiny of the West. Hence their leaders feel obliged at every opportunity to demonstrate how far they are coming along, even if there is backsliding, e as is the case with Lithuania's funding of defense.[20]

The MAP is a NATO policy instrument to integrate Europe militarily, politically, and normatively. Militarily, it integrates European armed forces in terms of structures, policy processes, transparency, democratization, interoperability, and heightened levels of proficiency. Politically the MAP diffuses a common culture of when the use of forces is permissible and under what procedural steps can this use be permitted. The MAP serves as a vehicle for institutional learning and even imitation of Western policy-making processes, institutions, relations, and structures, all of which reflect an enduring commitment to democratic values and procedures. The MAP also serves to create or at least lay the foundation for a common or shared normative ethos on questions of war and peace among NATO and potential members. Finally, the process institutionalizes and extends throughout the new states and their armies a new political identity based on movement towards conformity with well-known Western standards and values in order to be thought of as part of the West.

MAP and the Reform of Candidates' Militaries: Romania and the Baltic States

The pace of European military integration among the NATO aspirants may be compared with those in the CIS by observing the depth and extent of the plans offered by the Romanian and Baltic states as juxtaposed to the still unreformed [except for troop cuts] military of Russia and its plans for the CIS.

From 2000 to 2003, Romania is undertaking major structural reforms to ensure minimum NATO requirements for credible national defense and operational standards agreed to through the PARP in the PfP process. Simultaneously, steady though modest, increases in defense spending will take place and Romania's participation in PfP exercises will continue. By 2003, Romania intends to have one corps ready for rapid reaction missions, comprising three brigades, one armored, one mountain brigade, and one airborne brigade with supporting artillery, air defense, engineer, and air defense units. Efforts to build a Western-like NCO force and improve English language training are taking place as well as attempts to use professionals, not conscripts, for international missions. By 2003, the Army's overall structure will be reorganized to include 50 percent professional and 50 percent conscripts forces, a rapid reaction force Corps HQ, three territorial corps HQs, and a mobilizational force expandable from the existing seven brigades to sixteen. Modernization of weapons will become the focus in 2004, along with interoperability with NATO.

Similarly, an integrated Air Force staff, based on after the prevailing NATO model has been established, and the Air Force is undergoing a force restructuring and modernization program. Likewise, the Navy – whose main mission is to protect Romanian interests in the black Sea and on the Danube – is being reformed towards greater interoperability with NATO under PfP auspices including training of officers in NATO countries and participation in PfP exercises. The Navy's modernization also includes the reorganization of its command, communication, and control weapons systems, and ability to fulfill reconnaissance missions of surveillance and traffic control in the Black Sea. Naval logistical systems and interoperability with NATO is also being undertaken to enable the Romanian Navy to operate as part of capable multinational forces. By the end of 2003, units designated for international operations under PfP and for collective defense of members of NATO must be trained to NATO's collective standards and to the additional standards for specific types of ships.[21]

The reform of the Baltic states' Ministries of Defense has already been stated. As in Romania's case, there are similar efforts to reach the 2 percent of GNP budgeted for Defense by 2003; reform all the defense forces [land, air, and naval]; form and equip both capable credible forces in being and reserve components; develop interoperability with NATO standards, especially C3; and improve logistical and mobilization capabilities for those forces.[22]

The Comparison With Russia

For Russia, such military integration, even if it is included, and especially if it is not included in the enlargement process as appears to be the case, is at best a dubious and questionable, often not fully understood proposition. At worst, and probably most likely for the foreseeable future, it is a nightmare against which Moscow has steadily been fighting. Moreover, this form of integration

is clearly not only feared, but also not understood in Moscow. Russian efforts at military integration in the CIS almost wholly omit ideas about democratization of military affairs and do not rely on or seek to build a normative security community or to represent concepts of "pooled sovereignty" as they are realized in military practice.

Consequently, military integration and extension of NATO represents several tangible threats to the Russian military and government. These threats are not just the often-cited unfavorable correlation of forces and proximity of NATO forces to Russian territory. Not surprisingly, in Russia, the entire thrust of European efforts to devise shared compacts regulating civilian-military interactions and the use of force at home and abroad has encountered serious obstacles. Indeed, some Russian analysts argue that the very idea of civilian and especially democratic control over the armed forces sufficed to dissuade the Russian military from participating in the PfP in 1994. Whether or not that claim is true, it apparently was a factor along with Moscow's refusal to accept equal status with other European states or to advertise its poverty and unpreparedness for such exercises and operations. Judging from recent conversations with defense officials and analysts, Moscow still has no idea what democratic control over its armed forces means or entails.[23]

The most overt European effort made to achieve a shared set of standards and values to regulate these issues was the OSCE's 1995 code of conduct. Even then, Russia was in violation of more than half of its guidelines.[24] Since 1995, Russian policy regarding civilian and democratic control of the army and regulations concerning its use in domestic and foreign conflicts has regressed. As one participant at a recent {U.S.}Army War College conference noted, according to the Yabloko party in Russia, merely to pass a law on civilian democratic control would be unconstitutional since the Russian constitution makes no provision for civilian control and expressly reserves this function for the President alone.[25] This regression both reflects and contributes to the more general crisis of the Russian state.[26]

Russia's newest defense doctrine, made public in April 2000, and the earlier national security concept of January 2000 did nothing to increase the defense establishment's subjection to Parliamentary accountability. Indeed, Parliamentary control over the defense budget may actually be eroding.[27] Instead, these documents reinforced the President's personal control over all of Russia's "power ministries" beyond institutional accountability. These documents also expressly reinforced the possibility of the domestic use of armed forces by linking external and internal threats and expressly invoking possibilities for domestic use of the military. Since April, the Putin regime has increased the domestic politicization of members of the military and secret police (FSB) as well as the likelihood of their being used both at home and abroad in such overtly extra-legal ways.[28]

These documents also reflected virulent anti-NATO sentiment on the part of the military, which named the Alliance as Russia's greatest external threat.[29] These texts and subsequent policy confirmed that the military-political integration of Europe under NATO is still seen exclusively as a threat and that Moscow still refuses to avail itself of its right to participate in the PfP.[30] Moreover, there is (or was) substantial military opposition to dialogue with NATO that clashed with Putin's preferences for resuming such dialogue. When this opposition to dialogue appeared to be finally overcome, a new resistance to Putin's formal position regarding missile defense issues has sprung up to once again stall discussion.[31] This continuing opposition to

Putin's policies and his evident frustration at the failure of military reform suggests very imperfect controls over Russia's armed forces.[32] Clearly the regime's controls over its military leadership are open to question. Indeed, the very propensity to use forces at home or abroad without sufficient controls has already led to numerous internal wars and the threat of another one in Afghanistan.[33]

This hostility towards NATO has spilled over into an ongoing refusal to take part in many Partnership for Peace operations – the general rubric under which multilateral activities of member and aspirant states' armed forces performed joint exercises. Russia has thereby, basically rejected both the tangible military aspect of integration through participation in multilateral activities and the political-normative integrative processes of subjecting its armed forces to ever more democratic processes and procedures that restrict the conditions under which they may be used and impose more transparency upon that use of force. In this respect, Russia remains in substantial violation of the OSCE Code of Conduct that it signed in 1995 and aloof from broader European trends. Worse yet, Russia continues to violate other OSCE agreements relating to the use of military force. The OSCE's 1999 Charter for European Security reaffirmed the earlier Code of Conduct, and declared that the signatory states will promptly consult "with a participating state seeking assistance in realizing its right to individual or collective defense in the event that its sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence are threatened."[34] The signatory states (Russia included) committed themselves politically to a joint review of the nature of threats and actions against them and the steps that may be taken to defend common European values. Unfortunately, Russia's war in Chechnya shows that this commitment is of little value in practice and that Russia is not yet ready to commit in practice to the OSCE's normative community.[35]

In word and deed, Russia has not only taken fright at the process of post-Communist governments and militaries integration with Europe, but it has also basically turned its back on the process, rejecting it and its various components and steadfastly perceiving it as a threat. This opposition to NATO as the main security provider in Europe, to the normative trends linking Eastern Europe to the West, and to the more tangible military-political integration of Eastern and Western Europe, has deep roots in Russian foreign and defense policy that long antedate Russia's unbending opposition to any and all forms of NATO enlargement. Foreign observers have long since noticed these expressions of Russian policy. As Monika Wohlfeld of the WEU's (West European Union) Institute for Security Studies wrote in 1996,

"So far, Russia has not been able to make a clear impact on the evolving European security structure. Deprived of the bipolar relationship with the United States, Moscow appears unable – if not downright unwilling – to participate on an equal footing with other Europeans in the establishment of a new network of security institutions, and Russia's participation in the Contact Group and then IFOR is considered by Moscow to be a meager substitute for a more effective instrument with which to wield it influence over European events."[36]

NATO enlargement in general (and perhaps to a lesser degree EU enlargement as well) overthrows many of the basic precepts of Russian statecraft in Europe that have been honed over centuries. One of the fundamental axioms of Russia's entire geostrategic history has been to frustrate the unification of Europe against her. In any such unification, if Russia is excluded, the

process is immediately and exclusively perceived as being directed against Russia, which is thereby threatened with isolation from Europe. Consequently, the larger issues raised by the development of the MAP, especially as the EU is simultaneously constructing its own ESDI, pose difficult problems for an already strained Russian military-political leadership.

Second, for Russia to be a great power in Europe, its leaders and officials have traditionally postulated that it must have unfettered control over the Baltic Sea and that Poland must at the very least be a friendly satellite of Russia. These conditions would allow Russian forces to move out of Russia into Europe but allow Russia to close the Baltic Sea and Poland to invaders from the West.

Third, Russia has always counted on being able to divide and play off the internal politics of neighboring states and find political factions, elites, and leaders who consented to be Russia's advocates at home. NATO enlargement (as well as EU enlargement) reduces, if not excludes, these strategic opportunities. Since NATO united Europe in a military-political bloc, Poland and the Baltic states are no longer pro-Russian or a Russian lake and, as James Sherr has pointed out, the left or pro-Russian parties can come to power in these states with no effect on these states' foreign policies.[37]

Furthermore, the extension of NATO as an effective provider of security also closes off future possibilities for revising the territorial settlement of 1989-91, a key, long-term objective of many Russian leaders.[38] Many Russian elites and leaders like Yevgeny Primakov and Andrei Kokoshin have stated in public that the 1989-91 post-Cold War *status quo* is either territorially illegitimate or merely provisional and will be rectified to Russia's advantage so that its borders will be "augmented" in the future.[39] It follows therefore – President Vladimir Putin's foreign policy and the Russian foreign policy concept of July, 2000 make this clear – that no consolidation or extension of the current *status quo* is to be tolerated. Russia will fight to maintain a fluid and unresolved situation in Europe to leave open opportunities for future revisions of the existing *status quo* to its benefit. Consequently, any trend that promises to extend or consolidate that *status quo* will be opposed and rejected.[40] An example of this outlook and policy is Moscow's continuing suspicion of and opposition to the Danish-German-Polish corps headquartered in Poland.[41] Support for any form of European military-political integration under American auspices and leadership in NATO and the ensuing *de facto*, if not *de jure*, practical enlargement of NATO would must be resisted even, if necessary, by the threat of force.[42] Finally, as Ambassador Stephen Sestanovich recently observed, "the Russian military shelters some of the country's most reactionary thinking."[43] Not surprisingly, that constituency has been particularly unwilling and unable to shed atavistic security policy notions.

Whereas American policymakers have sought to fashion a situation in which devices like the MAP can bring candidates to a state of "virtual" membership, Russia adamantly seeks to oppose any and all steps in this direction.[44] Putin and the Russian military-political elite endlessly reiterate their view that NATO is now a superfluous and essentially anti-Russian organization that is the example *par excellence* of an outdated and essentially military alliance dictated by the United States that aims to suppress European states' natural and legitimate desires to express their own interests and Europe's desire to constitute a pole of world politics in its own right. These are hardly new ideas for Russian diplomacy. After all, they were part and parcel of the pre-Gorbachevian approach to European security issues.[45]

Moscow also demands equality with NATO as a condition of effectuating the Permanent Joint Council created in 1997, through the Final or Founding Act signed in Paris, as well as exclusive sphere of influence in the CIS and increased dialogue on European security with NATO. According to Sestanovich,

> "Although the Final Act defused a dispute over enlargement, it has not created much of a cooperative relationship between Russia and the Alliance. From the moment the document was signed, the Russians have shown little enthusiasm for the project and Russia's representatives at NATO have acted as if they were under instructions to resist implementing it."[46]

Consequently, Russia views with alarm any and all Partnership for Peace exercises involving the CIS and practical manifestations of European military integration involving those states with NATO's members.[47] Neither is it surprising that Russia has resisted many efforts to involve it in the broader PfP or other multilateral processes of European military-political integration. Even in the Balkans, Russia only deals with the U.S. CINC in Yugoslavia and their chain of command, not NATO. Beyond a deep-rooted great power preference for bilateralism and hunger for a status equal to all of NATO and the United States, this convoluted C2 arrangement betrays Moscow's ambivalence about the overall process of multilateralism in general and multilateral military-political integration in Europe.[48]

Political Integration of Armed Forces as an International Process

Russian positions on the MAP and the broader issues of military-political integration are fundamentally at odds with the general Western trends towards multilateralizing security and "pooled sovereignty" in the EU. As a number of NATO analyses have pointed out, the requirement for unanimity and consensus concerning the use of Alliance forces restrained Germany, as well as Greece and Turkey from any use of their forces in ways inimical to the Aliance and possibly towards more attempts at domestic *coup d'etats*. Certainly, the post-1967 ostracism of Greece's colonels and the recent pressure on Turkey to curb its military as a price of membership in the EU show that the magnetic power of membership in these security organizations do restrain the most basic exercise of a state's sovereign power – the deployment of armed forces. Even the United States paid a severe price in Europe during the Vietnam War and while victory over Saddam Hussein was made possible only through exquisite attention to the finer points of coalition building.

Moreover, military integration of formerly communist states is no longer confined to Europe or NATO. The Marshall Center in Garmisch, Germany, enrolls Ukrainian and Russian officers as students even if the Russian response to these programs and similar ones at American military institutions of higher learning has been decidedly cold. The United States is also actively engaging Central Asian and Transcaucasian states' armed forces as part of its global military strategy of shaping the environment, preparing for future contingencies, and responding to (and deterring) possible future threats. Washington also repeats this tactic with Latin American and Asian militaries and is developing an African Crisis Response Institute to begin that selfsame process for African armies. Viewed from a global perspective, the MAP is thus the

most advanced element of this process.[49]

Washington is not alone in this endeavor. Great Britain carries out some important programs in "defense diplomacy."[50] Turkey also is training thousands of officers from the CIS countries (4000 to date) and expanding its large program of military cooperation with those states by extending more aid to Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan.[51] The CIS states are trying to enter into advantageous security relationships with states other than Russia to obtain training, increased proficiency and better weapons. Uzbekistan, faced with threats from insurgencies originating within Central Asia and Afghanistan has not only turned to Russia, it has also appealed to China, Turkey, and the United States for assistance.[52] Georgia wants to send its officers to the new Baltic Defense College supported by NATO, partially funded by the United States Army and commanded by a Danish general.[53] While this assistance goes beyond the MAP as these states are not yet applicants for NATO membership, they all are in the Partnership for Peace and take part in its programs on a regular basis. Were they to become serious contenders for membership, undoubtedly these governments would have to submit a MAP as proof of their earnestness.

Russia's program for the military integration of the CIS, on the other hand, appears as an opposing model to NATO's program. Certainly, nothing like the NATO integrated military structure exists, nor is there a community of values among these states that could precede the formation of an acceptable and truly active command and controls system. Indeed, the 1999 CIS decision to create a common headquarters for coordination between Central Asian and Russian militaries against terrorism owed as much to the possibility of inter-state warfare among the Central Asian states as it did to the terrorist threat.[54]

On the other hand, Russia's concept of military integration has recently crystallized, due to the precedent of the NATO campaign in Kosovo and due to the real threats of insurgency facing Central Asian states. Allegedly, if not actually, these states cannot deal with those threats by their own means and need foreign assistance. Many Russian officials and analysts believe that these new states inherently cannot defend themselves against threats to their security and therefore Russia's army should be built up and lead them.[55]

Russia's plan of integration however, does not resemble NATO as much as it does a hegemonic system where Russia retains control over its satellites states. Russia's repeated invocation of the Afghan-based threat of insurgency in Central Asia and the desire to respond militarily to it appears as an attempt to bind nascent Central Asian militaries to itself, thereby stifling their autonomous growth. Attempts to integrate the CIS on the basis of police and military officers who reflect and share a pro-Moscow view and can also be vetted by Moscow, illustrate this trend.[56] The nucleus of the future collective CIS forces or "Euro-Asian alliance" grows out of previous exercises conducted by the CIS militaries with Russia and also reflects trends towards economic integration or hegemony, in that Russia will now make available to those states arms and hardware deliveries at below market prices. Russia is thereby, subsidizing its arms industries and their military growth simultaneously, even as it does not have enough money for its own armed forces, which it must cut.[57] Similarly, Russia is trying to legislate and create a unified air defense system for the CIS. The current bill before the Duma already includes Belarus' air space as part of Russia's, signifying the greater development of military integration that has occurred with Belarus.[58]

While this trend must be stopped to preserve Eurasian and Russian security, in many respects this counter-model to NATO remains very much a paper armed force. Moscow will have to drastically subsidize much of this force's development – an act it simply cannot afford. Second, national parliaments have to ratify this decision. Although off the record, Russian officials expect President Lukashenka of Belarus to be able to circumvent his constitution's prohibition of dispatching forces to foreign conflicts despite his claims to the contrary, other presidents might not be so compliant. Third, Article IV of the Tashkent collective Security Treaty of 1994 states that aggression against any one signatory is viewed by other signatories as aggression against all of them – implicitly resembling Article V of NATO's founding Washington Treaty. Moscow itself has already violated that understanding vis-a-vis Armenia and Azerbaijan in Nagorno-Karabakh. Insurgency cannot easily or always be viewed by non-involved parties as outside aggression. Moreover, a decision to move collective forces to a state's territory to take part in another Chechnya could be adopted only subject to consent by the country to which the troops are being moved. In other words, a repetition of Kosovo in Central Asia or the Caucasus is hardly possible. Lastly, the new military-political alliance is still too vague in its mechanisms – the CIS to date has hardly been a model of fidelity to its declarations – to count as an actual functioning alliance. Certainly its command mechanism remains unclear. Will Russia really allow Kazak generals to command its forces? Even though this organization represents the military analog to the Eurasian Economic community created earlier in 2000 in Astana, itself a counter or prototype Russian-inspired EU, the only thing in favor of the new military organization is the often-repeated and often-violated assurances of functionaries that the principles governing its operation resemble those in use around the world.

Concrete decision on the mobilizational readiness of this "coalition's" forces and their funding have yet to be made. While forces will remain on their home territories, in the event of a threat, forces will be relocated, presumably by the governments involved, to the scene of the threat. The coalition therefore, lacks command, funding, and defense integration structures. Certainly, it is not vehicle at present for truly collective defense *a la* NATO.[59]

The transparent purpose behind this military-political alliance and the accompanying economic community is another attempt to reshape the CIS into an instrument for the perpetuation of Russia's exclusive hegemony in the region. However, the globalizing influence of the PfP program and key NATO allies has gone a long way in discouraging extensive Russian programs for military integration with CIS members. The coalition as planned, rests on Russian subsidies that it can ill afford and lacks any true vehicle for becoming an effective instrument of collective defense. Furthermore, the refusal of Georgia, Azerbaijan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan to play along with Moscow calls the viability of this operation into question, notwithstanding Russia's own concurrent military retrenchment policies.

Only with Belarus has there been any true military integration to date and even that is in many respects problematic. It is true that military integration with Belarus has been the pacesetter for Moscow and Minsk relative to other policy domains. Russia's Air Force may soon be stationed on Belarus' airfields from which it would border NATO member Poland.[60] Moreover, Russia's Ministry of Defense strongly favors accelerating the pace of that integration beyond the existing joint air and outer space defense systems.[61] Russia has created joint consortia with Belarus to produce the S-400 missile system and seeks to extend this to Ukraine, a

transparent effort to reconstitute in stages the old unified Soviet defense economy.[62] Russian planners are also examining the potential for the joint use of the Russian-Belarusian regional group of forces – a 300,00 man force (above and beyond Russia's present numbers and presumably including reserves) – as well as a common doctrine based on the primacy of Russian models.[63] Here again, land and other forces involved would directly face NATO and/or Polish forces stationed in Poland.

Finally, Russian and Belarussian security services have preceded their governments by finalizing their union and creating a joint structure made up of members of both states' Justice, Interior, and Security Ministries. This organization also highlights the democratic deficits involved in Russia's model of military-political integration because it precedes the governmental and legislative unification of both states and will therefore, be beyond any true democratic or institutional accountability. Indeed, this structure has yet to explain its mission, which so far appears to be limited to guaranteeing both presidents' power against their domestic opponents.[64]

Boris Bikknin, the Deputy Chairman of the new organization, the SCB (Scientific Consultation board) and Deputy Belarussian Minister for Emergencies, stated that the major obstacle to this integration is the West, particularly the United States, and the two states' principal tasks is to disrupt plans for a buffer zone between Europe and Asia under the aegis of NATO – a task that overrides any consideration of economic cost, and therefore, he implies, merits Russian subsidization.[65] Consequently, in addition to the problem of democratic deficits and its own increased militarization of policy towards Europe and the CIS, Russia must also deal with the problem of Belarussian, and potentially other states', free riding.

Clearly, for the Russian military, the deal, at least until the present, is worth the costs. Sergei Ivanov, Secretary of Russia's Security Council and reportedly Putin's most trusted advisor on security issues, stated that the role of the Kaliningrad military grouping within the framework of common plans with Belarus is of extreme importance since everything is based on the interaction of the two military forces deployed in Kaliningrad.[66] Ivanov also clearly contemplated the use of these forces as suppressors of internal crime in the region and to undertake "specific measures [that] had been envisaged with regard to the obvious necessity of strengthening the verticality of power, especially in the Kaliningrad region."[67] This is an obvious reference to the domestic function of both states' troops and another example of how they diverge from the emerging NATO and European norm. This statement also reveals that for Ivanov, and presumably his colleagues in Moscow, neither Belarussian or Russian sovereignty counts for much if foreign troops are to be brought into Kaliningrad to suppress democracy and the devolution of power.

Russia's alternative version of military-political integration has received its fullest development in Kaliningrad. This development also reveals some of the abiding dilemmas facing Russia in Central and Eastern Europe. For example, despite Russia's announcement in August 2000 of joint Air Force exercises, Belarussian officials denied all knowledge of those exercises and the CINC of Belarus' Air Force, Colonel General Vasil Lazar told the BELAPAN news agency that "no such training will ever be carried out."[68] Naturally, such contradictory information triggered deep concern among the Belarussian opposition and human-rights groups, but it should have also stimulated NATO's watchfulness.

Apart from domestic concerns about secret exercises and operations, there is also the problem of secret commitments. Belarussian President Lukashenka claims that NATO sees Russia as a possible target of aggression, but Belarus cannot let NATO tanks pass through it to deter any potential aggression. Consequently, the duty to protect the Polish-Belarussian border – the Western border of the CIS – against possible military attack falls to the Russian government. For now, Belarus' armed forces suffice to protect Russia.[69]

If this assumption is true, the Moscow-Minsk agreement would be a true bilateral military alliance going beyond even the Tashkent treaty. Yet, military modernization on Belarus' part is apparently increasingly difficult since it bought all its weapons from Russia's Rosvooruzhenie, which has now raised its prices beyond what Minsk can afford.[70] Thus the true state of this "alliance" is quite confused and opaque.

Due to NATO's expansion into Poland and the south and now potentially towards the Baltic states as well as the possibility of NATO's militarization of Poland, a union with Belarus has loomed large in Russian politics. Integration with Minsk is not just deemed to be a critical geostrategic or military-political goal, it is also the first step in the dream of an integrated CIS and a matter of survival for the Russian state as idea and reality.

At the end of 1997, wide-ranging joint military agreements came into being and at the end of 1998 a union was proclaimed. Minsk and Moscow agreed to the principles of joint military cooperation, joint actions to ensure regional security, unification of their air defense forces, and military-industrial cooperation. They also created a work plan of a joint "collegium" of their respective Defense Ministries. Russian troops received rights to use Belarussian airports and other facilities. Russia can deploy troops there "in response to crisis warnings," evidently a clause allowing for occasional rotation of forces in and out of Belarus. Russian Defense Minister General Igor Sergeyev also warned that the two governments might create a joint command in response to NATO enlargement. Belarus' defense minister, Col. General Alyaksandr Chumakov also stated that Belarussian defense policy was seeking to respond to Poland's membership in NATO by attempting to prevent its deployment of nuclear weapons, creating new military groupings, deploying new military infrastructure, equipment, and ammunition depots. The creation of a Russian-Belarussian single defense space and a general economic affairs union are openly advertised as being a response to NATO enlargement.[71] Russia has also achieved the right to station troops on a rotating basis in Belarus. Presumably, any stationing of NATO troops in Poland will lead to a permanent Russian deployment in Belarus. Any effort by Belarus to turn west will then trigger a strong Russian reaction.[72]

On the other hand, closer examination suggests that most of the agreements between Moscow and Minsk presently remain on paper. Moscow cannot bail out Minsk economically and that opportunity was foreclosed when Foreign Minister Primakov tried to bring about economic union in 1997 and lost.[73] Putin's efforts to revive that integration are still hamstrung by Russia's economic weakness and Belarus' bottomless needs for economic aid and resources. As a result, Putin has recently expressed caution about this union – an action which evidently dissatisfied Minsk.[74] The accords that have already been reached cost Russia large sums of money. The same situation exists in military relations. Belarus refuses to let its soldiers serve in external missions. Russia has had to pull out its nuclear forces and infrastructure, nor will it deploy them again in Belarus, echoing NATO's abstention from doing so in the new members'

lands. The opponents of political union in the Russian government have successfully sidetracked efforts to create a political union between the two states. Since NATO's Kosovo operation, attempts to integrate the two states' defenses have progressed to the point of common doctrine and air defense and joint participation in exercises like Zapad-99. It is clear however, that Belarus will not be given a veto over Russian operations involving these shared or integrated forces and that Russian commanders will not accept constraints from other governments of the CIS on their operations if ordered by Moscow. In other words, the model here is rather closer to the Warsaw Pact than to NATO. Obviously, bilateral tensions also persist. Belarussian President Alyaksandr' Lukashenka is not shy about pointing out how Minsk subsidizes Russia's military presence, and the Russians are equally unembarrassed about making similar claims about Belarus' in general.[75] Although Russian security objectives vis-a-vis Belarus' seem to have been achieved, in fact they are a poor compensation for Russia in East Central Europe because they saddle Russia with responsibilities for a state which is in as bad a shape as Russia.

Conclusions

Belarus' contribution to Russian strength is moot and can only be limited. The two states do not exist in a vacuum. The two outstanding features of the geopolitical situation east of Germany are first that the balance of power overwhelmingly favors the West. This **{factor}** limits Russian options since relations with the major Western powers carry more weight and influence than do relations with Minsk. Belarus' will not be a pathway for NATO into Russia, but this is not really a NATO goal. On the other hand, Belarus can no longer be Russia's avenue of penetration into Poland. This leads to consideration of the second feature of contemporary East Central Europe – the independent ability of all the former Soviet republics and satellites to conduct their foreign policy independently and enter into their own regional or sub-regional security organizations.

In the West the idea of membership in NATO enjoys universal support up to and including the Baltic states and one suspects that if Finland and Ukraine were free to do so they might ask to join as well. Indeed, even neutral Sweden was intimately linked to Western contingency plans during the Cold War to provide for its defense and its attitude towards the Partnership for Peace and the MAP is increasingly positive.[76] This developing consensus reflects the penetration of Western states by the ideals of multilateralism as the soundest way of protecting European security and of democratic and civilian controls over the uses of those forces. Admittedly, this is a process that is occurring at different speeds in each state.

In Russia, on the other hand, we find that thinking about Eurasian security remains archaic, wedded to Realpolitik and geopolitical zero-sum game concepts, correlations of force, and inflated threat assessments.[77] Many observers have pointed to the anachronistic nature of Russian thinking about Eurasian and international security in general and its domination by these concepts. This stress on national sovereignty has two major consequences. On the one hand, the failure to come up with an integrated military structure of any meaning is due to the fact that the non-Russian states, including even Belarus' to some degree, are very jealous of their sovereignty and mistrustful of Russian designs upon it. Second, Russia still conceives of the CIS' military integration in essentially hegemonic terms so that observers can describe the process as one of "luring" Russia's partners into its orbit.[78]

As a result of this stress on national sovereignty as an absolute and resistance to the consequences of globalization even as Russia is increasingly drawn into its currents, a "value gap" or ideological differentiation is now emerging between East and West.[79] This ideological chasm is at its deepest and most pronounced point when the subject at hand is democracy and national security policy, for here the two models of military integration could not be more mutually incompatible. As a result, if unchecked, this "values gap" can aggravate existing political differences in practice in the field of military-political integration covered by the MAP and the larger issues of European security as a whole.

When the kinds of reforms contemplated within the framework of the MAP are juxtaposed to the well-known and seemingly unreformable aspects of Russian military life, the practical sources of ideological contestation between East and West can be observed as well as the differing implications for democratization and military proficiency that are emerging. Not only is there a "values gap" in ideological approaches to questions of war and peace, but there is also a "values gap" that emerges from and is manifested in practical military work as indicated in the implementation of the MAP among candidate states when juxtaposed to Russia's well-known obstacles to military reform. This does not mean that everything is working smoothly in either Romania, Bulgaria, or the Baltic states, far from it.[80]

Despite the problems involved in transitioning to a new kind of army, there is a genuine process of reform, rethinking, and restructuring under way towards greater transparency and democracy, i.e. not just interoperability, but also the normative and political values inherent in NATO's mandate and remit. This process of growing democratization and transparency, along with the more general international trend towards a grater role for what British specialists call defense diplomacy suggests that the defense organization of states is becoming an ever more important factor in the overall national security posture seen from abroad. The same is true for alliances and even for international agreements as in the OSCE's Code of Conduct.

Unfortunately the values gap mentioned with regard to Russia is also growing in salience. Not only is NATO integration seen as a strategic and military-political threat to Russia, the specific military organizational patterns that integration with and through NATO have come to require are distinctly at odds with the trajectory of the internal organization and political status of Russia's armed forces. Therefore, the MAP has stimulated a counter-reaction that displays its magnetic pull upon Europe. Furthermore, the processes of which the MAP is a part, have generated an ideological, institutional, and normative gap between East and West. Until and unless this gap is lessened and Europe's true integration can also include Russia, then the current MAP will only be partially transparent to all players and limited in its ability to bring conclusive security to a still troubled Eurasia.

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