

Telegram from Pyongyang to Bucharest, No. 01/06647

Date: 4 July 1975	Source: <i>Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archives, Matter 220/Year 1975/Country: Democratic People's Republic of Korea –US, Folder 1642, Concerning the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's Relations with the US, Started on: 11.03.1975, Completed on: 16.12.1975, Filing deadline: Permanent. Obtained and translated for NKIDP by Eliza Gheorghe</i>
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Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Department I Relations
TELEGRAM
Sender: Pyongyang
No.: 01/06647
Date: 04.07.1975

Comrade Ambassador,

We inform you that Korean sources at the UN consider the letter addressed on June 27 to the President of the Security Council concerning the dismantling of the UN headquarters in South Korea, a "tactical maneuver to create confusion at this year's session of the General Assembly."

When agreeing to dismantle the UN headquarters only if Democratic People's Republic of Korea and People's Republic of China accept that US and South Korean troops will take over the responsibilities of the headquarters, as well as by keeping in place the conditions of the Armistice, the US is seeking to force the Democratic People's Republic of Korea into accepting the presence of US troops in South Korea and recognizing the latter as a state.

The only means to settle the Korean issue is via bilateral negotiations with the US and South Korea, in view of withdrawing US troops and signing a peace treaty.

Signed: Romulus Budura

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3
MR # 08-32, #7

state rev. 6/16/08; NSC-EEA 6/15/09

By dal NARA, Date 9/15/09

ACTION
July 8, 1975

SECRET - XGDS

MEMORANDUM FOR: SECRETARY KISSINGER
FROM: *by Jim* JAN M. LODAL/DAVE ELLIOTT
SUBJECT: Approach to South Korea on Reprocessing

As a result of growing concerns over South Korea's nuclear weapons intentions and specifically over their intention to purchase a pilot reprocessing plant from France, there is a bureaucratic concurrence at the staff level on a guidance cable (Tab A) that would authorize the Embassy in Seoul to approach the Koreans directly and:

-- Point out that the Korean reprocessing plans could jeopardize US peaceful nuclear assistance, particularly a pending Export-Import Bank loan for the KORI-II, their second US-built power reactor;

-- Ask them not to proceed with their planned reprocessing plant; and

-- Offer support for ROK participation in an eventual multinational regional reprocessing plant in East Asia.

Ambassador Sneider supports such an approach (Tab C).

Bureaucratic Factors

Recognizing the inevitable potential for leaks and for resulting difficulties with the French and Koreans, as in the case of the FRG-Brazil affair, and the intimate relationship between the ROK's nuclear weapons plan and our security commitment there; we tasked State/ACDA to prepare an options paper for use in obtaining a policy-level decision on this problem. Unfortunately, they prepared a lengthy advocacy memorandum (Tab B) instead which State only reluctantly submitted to the NSC process (Scowcroft called Eagleburger). This paper does not address the possible impact of such an approach on our defense relationship with Korea but implicitly assumes that the defense relationship can be decoupled from this problem.



Previous Bilateral Approaches

In previous expressions of our concern we have given the South Koreans an Aide Memoire which interprets our Agreement for Cooperation as providing for an effective US veto right over reprocessing of spent fuel from US-built reactors. The ROK is studying this interpretation and is expected to respond soon. Canada who is also negotiating the sale of one of its reactors to Korea, has expressed similar concerns and may condition the sale on ROK foregoing fuel reprocessing.

In a bilateral discussion prior to the Nuclear Suppliers Conference, we told the French that we were considering approaching the Koreans on this issue. They replied that if we succeeded in persuading the ROK to cancel its plans, they would have no objection provided that their reprocessing firm, St. Gobain, would be reimbursed for its roughly four million dollars in expenditures to date.

Prospects

Reprocessing will not be necessary for South Korea's nuclear power economy for several years and, in view of current controversy over the dangers of plutonium recycle, perhaps not for the foreseeable future. Both officials concerned with civil power development and those in favor of weapons production could probably be persuaded to defer the reprocessing effort, if necessary, to avoid jeopardizing acquisition of essential nuclear power reactors. We are pessimistic about longer term prospects, however, since the basic incentives for ROK nuclear weapons development will remain and they could either approach another supplier or eventually build their own reprocessing plant.

Remaining Issues

In reaching **your decision** on this issue, you should also consider its implications for our overall non-proliferation policy. As a result of FRG and French opposition, it is now clear that the Nuclear Suppliers Conference, if successful, will result in controls on reprocessing that are considerably less stringent than those we would impose on South Korea. Following the conclusion of a Suppliers' agreement, it is conceivable that the ROK would approach another supplier such as the FRG and purchase a reprocessing plant under the agreed guidelines and we would then find it more difficult to interfere. In such an event, our own nuclear industry could claim that it should be permitted to export under the same conditions as the other suppliers.



The real question as we work toward the goals of conclusion of a Suppliers Agreement, of strengthened IAEA safeguards and of increased NPT ratification is whether we will be willing to accept these as adequate controls both in terms of permitting US exports on this basis and not objecting to bilateral arrangements between other suppliers and client states. In this regard, a comprehensive review of our non-proliferation policy is in progress in the VPWG and may serve as a useful basis for determining the extent to which we should continue to play an activist role in bilateral approaches rather than being content with the international regulatory mechanisms we are developing. However, the Korean problem is somewhat time-urgent and this study will not be completed in time to serve as a basis for your decision on the Korean approach.

Options

The State proposal would have the advantage of closely following the Canadian demarche and would exert maximum pressure on the ROK to abandon its plans. It would also be timely and perhaps improve the prospects for pending Congressional approval of the Export-Import Bank loan and Nuclear Regulatory Commission licensing of a final shipment for the KORI-I reactor. It would have some risk, however, of antagonizing the Koreans and, through public disclosure, irritating the French who have already complained about publicity on the Suppliers Conference. If successful, the question would also remain of who would reimburse the French for their four million dollars in development costs.

Alternatively we could wait for the Korean responses to our Aide Memoire and the Canadian demarche. If they accept our conditions, it would distinctly lessen the risk of diversion through reprocessing of spent fuel from US reactors, and we could rely on their NPT obligations and the Suppliers Agreement as further barriers to proliferation. If they cannot reprocess fuel from either the US or future Canadian reactors, then South Korea might decide without further pressure to defer its reprocessing plans. If they reject our Aide Memoire we could then consider a somewhat stronger approach than the one outlined in the cable.

Your Decision

_____ That we forward the instruction cable to Seoul.

_____ That we wait for an ROK response to our Aide Memoire.



if they give a positive response to the Aide memoire and proceed with the plant, it is obvious they discontinue



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET 6758

PAGE 01 SEOUL 05016 080507Z

14
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /026 W

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P R 080419Z JUL 75
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1234.
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
INFO USMISSION IAEA VIENNA

D/B 7

~~SECRET~~ SEOUL 5016

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3
MR # 10-131, #20

state dept ltr 4/30/10
By *dal* NARA, Date *8/23/10*

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: MNUC, KS, CA
SUBJECT: ROKG/CANADIAN NEGOTIATIONS ON NUCLEAR ENERGY

REF: (A) SEOUL 4902 (B) STATE 135500

SUMMARY: AS RESULT CANADIAN PARLIAMENTARY PRESSURES,
CANADIAN AMBASSADOR STILES HAS BEEN INSTRUCTED TO
APPROACH ROKG ON PURCHASE OF FRENCH NUCLEAR
REPROCESSING PLANT. END SUMMARY.

1. CANADIAN AMBASSADOR STILES INFORMED AMBASSADOR LATE JULY 7 THAT IN CANADIAN PARLIAMENTARY DISCUSSIONS ON CANDU REACTOR SALE TO ROKG, OPPOSITION HAS PRESSED VERY HARD REGARDING NUCLEAR REPROCESSING PLANT. OPPOSITION HAS CLAIMED NUCLEAR REPROCESSING PLANT PURCHASED BY ROK COULD ONLY BE USED FOR PRODUCTION WEAPONS GRADE PLUTONIUM, BELYING PARK PLEDGE NOT TO DEVELOP NUCLEAR WEAPONS.
2. AS RESULT, STILES WAS INSTRUCTED TO SEEK CLARIFICATION FROM ROKG ON REASONS FOR ITS PURCHASE OF FRENCH NUCLEAR REPROCESSING PLANT. STILES' INITIAL INQUIRY TO KORI PRESIDENT MIN BROUGHT RESPONSE THAT REPROCESSING PLANT WOULD BE USED TO REPROCESS US-PROVIDED SPENT FUEL ELEMENTS FROM US-SUPPLIED

AFR/UN _____
 EUR/CAN _____
 ER _____
 LA _____
 NEA/SA _____
 PRO _____
 SEA _____
 NSC/PLNG _____
 PGM/ANL _____
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SECRET

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE 02 SEOUL 05016 080507Z

NUCLEAR POWER REACTORS.

STILES HAS APPOINTMENT WITH FONMIN LATE AFTERNOON JULY 8 TO SEEK OFFICIAL CLARIFICATION FROM ROKG.

3. WITHOUT GETTING INTO DETAILS, I TOLD STILES THAT WE HAD NOT REPEAT NOT AGREED TO REPROCESSING OF ENRICHED URANIUM FUEL ELEMENTS BY ROKG AND INTENDED TO MAINTAIN FULL CONTROL OVER SPENT FUEL ELEMENTS.

COMMENT: CANADIAN INQUIRY ON FUEL REPROCESSING MAY EXPLAIN, IN PART, ROK DELAY IN RESPONDING TO OUR AIDE MEMOIRE. STILES INDICATED THAT ROKG FAILURE TO EXPLAIN PURCHASE OF FRENCH REPROCESSING PLANT ADEQUATELY COULD RESULT IN CANCELLATION OF CANDU REACTOR SALE. OTTAWA MAY WISH TO COMMENT FURTHER.

RECOMMENDATION: WITH CANADIANS IN FRONT RUNNING, I BELIEVE THAT WE ARE IN A POSITION RIGHT NOW TO PRESS ROKG TO CANCEL FRENCH CONTRACT. EVEN IF ROKG DOES NOT RESPOND AFFIRMATIVELY TO OUR AIDE MEMOIRE VERY SHORTLY, I WOULD SUGGEST GOING AHEAD WITH FURTHER APPROACH ON NUCLEAR REPROCESSING (REF. B), STATING FIRMLY THAT IT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE TO SELL FUEL ELEMENTS WITHOUT ACCEPTANCE OF U.S. INTERPRETATION, CLARIFYING OUR UNWILLINGNESS TO PERMIT REPROCESSING OF U.S. FUEL ELEMENTS IN FRENCH PLANT, AND SUGGESTING THAT ROKG CANCEL FRENCH CONTRACT IN INTEREST OF AVOIDING FURTHER SUBSTANTIAL DIFFICULTIES IN DEVELOPMENT OF ITS NUCLEAR POWER POTENTIAL.
SNEIDER




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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~ GDSACTION

July 11, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: SECRETARY KISSINGER

FROM: JOHN A. FROEBE, JR. 

SUBJECT: Draft State Cable on Approach to South Korea on French Reprocessing Plant

(Tab A)

The NSC memorandum of July 8/on the above subject from Jan Lodal and Dave Elliott was not cleared by Smyser's office. I understand that Jan carried the memorandum with him on your aircraft. We had joint action on this subject and would like herewith to add our comment.

As the Lodal/Elliott memorandum points out, the issue is whether we should consider the various international controls on proliferation toward which we are working adequate in all cases. If so, we should not object to any arrangement between suppliers and client states that accepts these controls. It is quite possible that the proposed French sale of a reprocessing plant to the ROK could meet the general standards we are seeking. The memorandum, however, did not underscore sufficiently the special considerations that pertain in regard to the proliferation question on the Korean Peninsula. If Korea begins to build a reprocessing plant, it will be widely assumed that it is seriously working on a nuclear weapons program. This perception would be potentially destabilizing in all of Northeast Asia. North Korea would certainly press its allies for a similar capability, and both China and the Soviet Union would see potential nuclear threats to their own territory. Perhaps most important such a development might possibly tip the balance on proliferation in Japan. Consequently, the Korean case would seem to warrant special bilateral action with the ROK, in addition to the controls we are contemplating in the international regulatory mechanisms.

~~SECRET~~ GDSDECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4.

102 94-144, #16 NSC Lt 4/25/95
By KBH, NARA, Date 6/13/95



The Lodal/Elliott memorandum notes that an alternative to the approach to the ROK authorized in the draft State cable is to wait for the Korean response to our Aide Memoire. This Aide Memoire which we presented to the ROK some weeks ago interprets our Agreement for Cooperation as providing for an effective U. S. veto right over reprocessing of fuel from U. S. -built reactors. It should be noted, however, that a positive ROK response to our Aide Memoire would be a verbal undertaking similar to its accession to the NPT, and would do little to mitigate the reaction in Northeast Asia if the ROK then proceeded with the purchase and construction of a reprocessing plant.

We recommend that you approve forwarding the State instruction cable to Seoul.



Summary of Twelfth Meeting at Chinese Liaison Office, Washington, D.C., July 1, 1975 (abridged)

Date:
11 July 1975

Source:
Gerald R. Ford Library. Obtained for NKIDP by Gregg Brazinsky.

**SUMMARY OF TWELFTH MEETING AT CHINESE LIAISON OFFICE
WASHINGTON, D.C., JULY 1, 1975 (U)**

Mike Pillsbury

11 July 1975

[...]

1. Korea

I noted that Kim Il-sung had stated in Peking that he would be obligated to invade South Korea if a rebellion broke out against Park Chung-hee and that Kim seemed to me to have recklessly stated that if the United States intervened, he would have nothing to lose but the DMZ.* Surely, I asked, China would not support such a scenario and prefers only a peaceful reunification of the two Koreas as described by Teng Hsiao-p'ing's farewell speech to Kim? Ch'ien Ta-yung leaned forward to speak quietly in English. I can assure you, he said, that foreign press reports stating that we would give Ki, no said are absolutely groundless. If the action of which you speak were to occur, it would be completely caused by the repressive measures taken by Park against the Korean people. Park would have caused it.

I insisted that I could not believe China would aid such a military adventure. Ch'ien dismissed this comment by saying that the matter was for the Korean people themselves to decide. I then asked about two recent provocations of the United States by Kim Il-sung, would not the attack on the American officer at Panmunjom reported this morning cause a problem in Sino-American relations? Ch'ien replied that he knew of the American major's being attacked, but that this had nothing to do with China. I asked what he thought of the recent North Korean troop movements toward the DMZ. These are normal, he answered, and besides, American troops move around, too.

[...]

** Kim's exact words in Peking at the April 18 arrival banquet were: "If revolution takes place in South Korea, we...will strongly support the South Korean people...If the enemy ignites war recklessly, we shall resolutely answer it with war" and "we will only lose the military demarcation line and will gain the country's reunification."

1975 (1)

Record of Talks Between Kim Il Sung and Tokuma Utsunomiya

The record in full of the talks which took place on July 15, 1975, between Kim Il Sung, Chairman of the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea, and Tokuma Utsunomiya, Member of the House of Representatives of Japan, follows:

(PART I)

Chairman Kim: (Holds up copies of news stories on Tokuma Utsunomiya's disappearance from Peking, including an AFP item. He has the interpreter read the stories in Japanese.) Representative Utsunomiya, it seems everyone is watching your movements closely. Besides, it seems there are no secrets in Japan and newspaper reporters seem to know a great deal. Since Prime Minister Takeo Miki knows (of your visit to Pyongyang), everyone in Japan must feel at ease.

Mr. Utsunomiya: The reporters were all waiting for me at Peking Airport and were worried I would disappear from Peking the same day.

However, because of the weather, I was taken away the next day at seven in the morning and was reported missing.

(laughter)

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Yesterday, I was shown a film of your recent visit to Algeria. (Editor's note: Chairman Kim Il Sung visited Algeria in June this year.) Since I know President (Houari) Boumediene and have visited Algeria several times, I greatly enjoyed the film. You certainly received an enthusiastic welcome from the Algerian people. I note that you were also made an honorary citizen of Algeria and was given an honorary degree. You did a great job for the unity of the Third World.

Chairman Kim: Thank you. I had intended visiting a number of other countries during my trip to Algeria. However, because of delays due to weather and because of my fatigue, I returned home with unfulfilled obligations. President (Josip Broz) Tito sent me a letter inviting me to Yugoslavia, and, although I had to leave some countries in Africa unvisited, I got to five countries in all, but it was very trying. I sent letters to the countries I was unable to visit, informing them I will visit them the next chance I have.

Representative Utsunomiya, I understand your visit (to us) follows a recent operation. (Editor's note: Mr. Utsunomiya underwent an operation for removal of an intestinal polyp in June.) Thank you very much for coming to see us. I am grateful from the bottom of my heart for having gained such a fine friend as you. I and the entire people of Chosun feel that way. We have many problems on which we should meet and discuss together.



Mr. Utsunomiya: I thank you for calling me your friend and for according me such a warm welcome.

Chairman Kim: How does our weather compare with Japan's?

Mr. Utsunomiya: It's about the same.

Chairman Kim: It's the hottest time of the year now.

This year the farm crops are good. Last year it was good too.

There are three major difficulties facing the world today. A shortage of raw materials, a shortage of fuel and a shortage of foods. But, we have not encountered these difficulties. We are managing our raw materials and fuel on our own.

We once had a plan to generate electricity by using crude oil, but I opposed that plan.

Mr. Utsunomiya: That was the right thing to do.

Chairman Kim: We do not have oil in our country. But, coal is inexhaustible. We have now found out the party's policy was correct. Our policy is to be self-sufficient



in more than 75 per cent of our raw materials. We are also self-sufficient in foods.

Five million tons is sufficient to make us self-sufficient (in foods), but, last year, we produced 7,000,000 tons. This year our target is 8,000,000 tons, and if we don't suffer damages, such as from typhoons, we should achieve that goal. Thus, although there is a world economic crisis, we don't have one in our country.

On the shortage of foreign exchange, originally our country did not have a shortage. The imbalance began last year. The cause of this was the fact we do not have bottoms. In the past, our trade was only with the socialist countries and there was no problem. However, our trade relations expanded to include the Third World.

Last year, there was a food crisis all over the world. The great powers monopolized shipping and we could not charter bottoms. As a result, goods began to pile up in our harbors. Rice, cement, steel materials and magnesium began to pile up. We could even load 200,000 tons of rice earmarked for Indonesia. As a result our pound sterling balance crumbled.

Thus, we are now building ships. Both in our west coast bases and in our southern bases, we are constructing 20,000 and 15,000 ton ships. From now on, we will build a dozen



or so of these ships each year. In our world trade policy, we were not able to foretell there would be shortage of shipping, but, this is a temporary phenomenon.

The amount of our emergency loan from Japan is \$38,000,000, but this is not a very large sum. Our prime minister was absent due to illness and lower-echelon people handled the matter. I scolded the working-level people and told them to repay Japan.

The working level in our Ministry of Trade say that they will pay Japan \$10,000,000 immediately and settle the entire matter by the end of this year. I knew that if we made even a small mistake, Japan's financial circles would raise an issue. I told our people many times we should not incur any debt with Japan.

Representative Utsunomiya, you helped us and I thank you from the bottom of my heart. Please do not worry. I will see to it that our friendship is not harmed.

Mr. Utsunomiya: I believe that your country's economy is basically sound and a large number of Japanese also believe so. Ordinary countries patch up their currency problems by obtaining loans from foreign countries, but your country did not do that. You are doing well through rehabilitation by self-help.

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The present situation is something like a case of temporary illness. I was worried that Japan-Chosun relations might be harmed as a result of the bureaucratic handling of this matter by government clerks, but, after listening to you, Mr. Chairman, I am relieved. This is, after all, a minor problem.

Chairman Kim: I concluded a contract with Indonesia on exporting 200,000 tons of rice to that country. Both we and they did not have any ships and we could not transport the rice. This is an example of what happened. It was because the great powers monopolized shipping, we could not obtain bottoms. But the problem has been solved and we have no worries now. I've instructed our state workers and so everything will be fine.

Mr. Utsunomiya: There are a lot of people who are taking advantage of this incident to make adverse propaganda against your country.

I talked with the Ministry of International Trade and Industry and had them postpone the clerical disposition of the case for four months so that the matter would not become a problem. In the final stage, I also talked to Prime Minister (Takeo) Miki.

Chairman Kim: I thank you greatly. We'll settle the matter quickly.



I myself did not know about it at all. I have assigned the task to the deputy prime minister with instructions, so everything should be all right.

Mr. Utsunomiya: I saw the motion picture, "Festival of the Good Harvest Year". The good condition of your agriculture and the joy of the farmers came out well in the film.

I also was given the chance to see the progress of housing construction in Pyongyang. It was splendid. I felt there was no reason for such a country as this to want war.

However, the Park (Chung Hee) regime is making propaganda to the effect the North is totally engaged in digging tunnels. It is taking Japanese and is busily showing them only the tunnels.

I would like to introduce to Japan the situation regarding your agriculture and the progress being made in your housing construction. There is need to have Japan come to know the situation in your country well.

Chairman Kim: The Park Regime is utilizing the Kim Das Jung incident, the assassination of Madame Park Chung Hee and the fabrication of the tunnels to increase tension in Chosun and to obstruct peaceful unification. How can troops get out through tunnels? What military people would believe such a thing? Do they think tunnels can be used to send in troops?

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What is the best way of dealing with such machinations?

Mr. Utsunomiya: What I learned through my experiences in connection with the Kim Das Jung incident is that the Park Regime can tell lies without any compunctions.

The main purpose of my trip this time was to meet with you, Mr. Chairman, prior to Prime Minister Miki's trip to the United States.

This was not only my own wish but also the wish of Prime Minister Miki himself.

I want Prime Minister Miki to remove all the difficulties in his way and to talk to the United States for the sake of peace in the Korean Peninsula.

The Park clique is growing haggard with the fear the regime will not last unless there is a war, and this fear is shared by certain segments of the Japanese and American people. I want to halt the activities of these people through the good sense of the Japanese and American people as whole.

I would like to hear from you whether your ideas are the same as before and, if necessary, have your thoughts transmitted to President (Gerald) Ford.



Chairman Kim: There has been no change in our policies following (the fall of) Vietnam. It is Park Chung Hee, (Secretary of Defense James) Schlesinger, (Secretary of States Henry) Kissinger and (President) Ford that are talking about the threat from the North and are making all the fuss. There has been no change in our policies.

Chosun should be unified peacefully. It differs both geographically and politically from Vietnam. Thus, there has been no change whatever in our policies.

Why is Park Chung Hee making all the fuss? It is to obtain aid, to make himself stronger and to suppress democratic forces.

Why is the United States making a fuss? It is to utilize us and allay the misgivings of its allies resulting from the Vietnam failure.

The United States is in no condition now to make war. However, it does not mean there is completely no possibilities of war. The United States has an economic crisis on its hands. It also has war-loving elements among its people and also anti-war forces. However, it raises a fuss, calls South Korea a defence base and threatens to use nuclear bombs against us. One American military specialist writes the United



States would be able to occupy the whole of Chosun in nine days. Does he mean the United States will completely decimate us in nine days? Such a thing is entirely impossible. He says they will attack us in May. Mr. Takeo (please check his first name) Takagi (Chairman of the Japan-Chosun Cultural Exchange Association and honorary staff member of The Yonjuri Shimbun), who visited our country, said on this point that our people are out in the fields engaged in farm work or engaged in peaceful construction. How then, he asked, could such people start a war? Would these people, he asked further, launch a war on the eve of the 30th anniversary of the foundation of their country? In the last analysis, Park Chung Hee wants to wheedle aid out of Japan and the United States.

As you, Representative Utsunomiya, have said, Park Chung Hee would not last if he did not receive aid from Japan and the United States. There is no basis to (the reports) we will advance south. If the United States says it is afraid of Park Chung Hee advancing north, why does it aid Park Chung Hee? The aim of the United States lies in utilizing Park Chung Hee to reinforce its ties with its allies and to create two Koreas.

We have engaged for three years in the North-South talks. When we look at the results of these talks, we find Park Chung Hee's policy is a two-Korea policy and is aimed at



placing the division of Korea on a permanent basis. We will absolutely not agree to a two-Korea policy. Germany was divided into two, but the people of Germany did not desire this division by any means. It was the wish of the Great Powers.

In my way of thinking, the reason why the United States needs South Korea as a military base is because it plans to make South Korea a permanent military base.

We have said many times we will not advance southward. Perhaps, because it was surprised by this, the Japanese Government now says that if the United States goes to war (in Korea), Japan should dispatch troops also.

Mr. Utsunomiya: I have heard this myself in the Diet's Budget Committee, but both Minister of State for Defence (Mitsuo Sakata) and Prime Minister Miki have clearly said Japan will not dispatch National Self-Defence Forces (to Korea). There might be people who advocate sending Japanese troops to Korea, but, not the Japanese Government. Further, because of our Constitution, the Government just can't (dispatch troops overseas).

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The Record of the Talks Between Kim Il Sung
and Representative Tokuma Utsunomiya of Japan

(PART II)

Chairman Kim: Whatever the case, there are no changes in our policies. Park Chung Hee is acting blindly. Could it be the United States has made mistakes in its collection of intelligence?

I would like you to convey the following to Prime Minister Miki:

We have no intention whatever of advancing south. We have been advocating peaceful unification. The way to solve the Korean question is first to conclude a peace treaty to replace the truce agreement. The United States should agree to our proposal. If a peace treaty is signed with the United States, both the North and the South will reduce armaments on an equal basis under the condition of a withdrawal of U.S. forces.

The non-aggression pact referred to by Park Chung Hee is not realistic. This is because South Korea is not a party to the truce agreement and Park Chung Hee does not have any right as a signatory. First of all, the United States should accept our proposal to conclude a peace treaty. We would then mutually reduce our military forces to the level of 100,000 troops. It would be even better if we could reduce

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them still further. If we could develop our natural resources and engage in construction with the surplus labor force resulting from this troop reduction, we would be able to do great things. Then, Japan and the United States would assist us in bringing about a reconciliation between the North and the South. If both Japan and the United States do so, South Korea and we ourselves would be able to accept each other. This is the road to detente.

We do not want by any means to turn South Korea communist. However, we also do not want it to become a colony. If South Korea becomes autonomous, we will respect the national capitaliste and the small and medium entrepreneurs of South Korea and would not force our system on South Korea.

Today, Park Chung Hee talks about "eradicating communism." He also speaks about "victory over communism." Since there are more than 2,000,000 members of the Rodong (Labor) Party in North Korea, what he says is impossible. There are none who agree with him (in North Korea) and even if there were, they would only be a small group of reactionaries.

Park Chung Hee's policy is one of perpetuating the division of Korea and of keeping the North and the South divided. If this policy is continued, it will aggravate tensions and war may break out. What we are advocating is not the separation of the North and the South or the perpetuation of the division, but efforts to unite Korea.



Further, we have said in the Seven-Four Joint Statement (Editor's note: The Joint Statement issued by North and South Korea on July 4, 1972), we will not force communism on South Korea. If the United States cooperates with this policy, it will not be embroiled in war and would be able to withdraw honorably from Korea. Further, the threat of the militarization of Japan would disappear.

We want disarmament. We are having trouble now because of a shortage of labor power. However, the United States has forces stationed in South Korea and Park Chung Hee has an army of 600,000 men. In face of this, we ourselves have been forced to maintain military forces. If both sides have vast armaments, war will break out. We will never attack first from our side. However, we are not afraid of an attack from Park Chung Hee.

Thus, in order to relax tensions, we should replace the armistic agreement with a peace treaty. Then, under the conditions (to be stipulated in this peace treaty), we would be able to reduce armaments and make progress toward peaceful unification.

As for President Ford, I don't know whether he is pro-war or not. However, what can be accomplished by grabbing North Korea? Would it be possible to militarize Japan? Even if Japan were to be militarized, China and the Soviet Union



would be opposed and North Korea could not be swallowed up. If Japan were to enter into a collusion with Park Chung Hee and were to swallow up North Korea, Japan would come to be hated by the entire world and would soon perish. The reason why the United States is hated by the world is because it is an aggressor.

Japan is cooperating economically and technically with the world. If Japan stops this cooperation and militarizes itself in order to swallow up North Korea, further development for Japan would become impossible.

Mr. Utsunomiya: I now fully understand your ideas have not changed from last year. But, the change in the situation from last year is that there has been a heightening of the sense of crisis felt by Park Chung Hee and by the Japanese and Americans who are linked to Park Chung Hee.

However, it is impossible for a consensus to be reached in the United States on shedding the blood of youths once again in the Korean Peninsula.

Even though South Korea may be a colony, it does not provide any benefits to the people of Japan or the United States. It has simply become a colony of corruption profitable only to a small group of people. Even though



South Korea may build up a military force of a million men, there would be no advantage in doing so. Such a buildup is also illogical from the standpoint of the capitalist principles.

It may be that Park Chung Hee's intention is to start a war and drag in the United States, while the United States still has troops in South Korea. In this case, military principles come into play instead of political principles.

We must prevent military principles from replacing political principles and developing into a war. The United States may also be in favor of this.

Chairman Kim: Will the United States agree to a peace treaty?

Mr. Utsunomiya: In a democratic country, there are many ways of thinking and many influences. It is very complex. However, because decisions are not made by lower-echelon bureaucrats, but by responsible people, there is need to work on these responsible people beforehand.

Chairman Kim: Even if Park Chung Hee tries to involve the United States, will the United States go to war?

Mr. Utsunomiya: Once war breaks out, military logic replaces political logic and dominates everything.

I've met Prime Minister Miki a number of times



on this problem and I met him the morning of my departure.

At these meetings, Prime Minister Miki revealed his basic thinking on the problem: The partitioning of the people of Korea is a racial tragedy and Japan should lend moral support to the peaceful unification of Korea; the relaxation of tensions in the Korean Peninsula is necessary also for the security of Japan and the Japanese people cannot ignore the tragedy of a people of the same race, who should be Japan's good neighbors, killing each other.

Chairman Kim: I think it's an admirable attitude.

I would like you to convey to Prime Minister Miki that we do not feel anxiety on our side.

The best thing is to make it clear we will not advance south.

Next is to replace the armistice agreement with a peace treaty and not to increase but reduce arms.

There is no other way to relax tensions but to replace the armistice agreement with a peace treaty and to have both sides mutually reduce armaments in a balanced manner. This will be also good for the reconciliation of the North and the South.



The world does not want us to go to war. Therefore, if Park Chung Hee goes to war, he will only hasten his own destruction. If we are attacked, we will fight to the last man. But, we will never launch an attack from our side.

The problem lies with the United States. If the United States changes its war policies, the problem would be solved.

Mr. Utsunomiya: Here is a copy of a recent speech made by Secretary Kissinger. He is also all for detente.

Chairman Kim: I would like Prime Minister Miki, when he goes to the United States, to speak fully to President Ford about all this. It is not good to force something on us that we don't want.

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1975 (3)

Record of Talks Between Chairman Kim Il Sung and Representative
Tokuma Utsunomiya of Japan

(PART III)

Mr. Utsunomiya: I am going to ask you a rude question. There are reports that when you visited China, you presented some strong advocacies and was told to go easy by China. What is your opinion of this report?

Chairman Kim: I did not make any strong speeches. We remain the same all the time. We belong to the same race of people as our comrades in South Korea and we have never said that we would not assist the South.

We have made no changes in our policies and the Chinese know our three major policies and our five principles well. Thus, there was no need to talk with China on these matters,

Originally, I received an invitation (to visit China) last year. But, because I was busy, I had to make the visit this year. In 1970, Prime Minister Chou En-lai came to our country, but I did not make a return courtesy call. However, I did visit China once unofficially.

I was invited for the 50th birthday of Prince Norodom Sihanouk and I visited China. On this occasion, I talked on



various matters with my Chinese comrades. I also talked at length with Prime Minister Chou En-lai. Thus, although this was my first meeting with the people of China in 10 years, it was not my first meeting in 10 years with my Chinese comrades.

I visited China this time because I received an invitation through diplomatic channels and it was a courtesy call on the people of China.

Mr. Utsunomiya: What kind of changes are necessary in South Korea to get the North-South Coordinating Committee reopened and to make it into something of significance?

Chairman Kim: On July 15, Chang Key Young proposed holding a meeting. (Editor's note: Chang Key Young is South Korea's deputy chairman of the North-South Coordinating Committee, which was formed in accordance with the July 4, 1972, Joint Statement). Our deputy chairman sent him a reply, which was as follows:

First, South Korea should stop provoking war by bringing up the Southward advance threat.

Secondly, South Korea should stop inciting anti-communism, by calling, for example, for "victory of over communism" and the "eradication of communism".



Thirdly, South Korea should stop suppressing the democratic people of South Korea.

Fourthly, South Korea should abide by the Seven-Four Joint Statement.

Then, there's one other thing. That is South Korea should talk to us without trying to place the division of Korea on a permanent basis. If unification is not the goal, the talks would have no meaning. We said that if South Korea stopped doing the things mentioned above, we would reopen the talks any time.

Because the South reported in the press that the North had refused the talks, we had to issue another statement. We said the talks would have no meaning as long as democratic people were being persecuted. If we held talks under such circumstances, even the people of South Korea would hate us. However, we said we would continue the talks between the Red Cross societies of both sides.

Mr. Uteunomiya: Does it mean, in the last analysis, Park Chung Hee has to give up his position to someone else?

Chairman Kim: It doesn't mean that just because Park Chung Hee leaves, the problem will be solved. As long as it is a person whom we can get through to, it can be anyone. We just can't communicate with Park Chung Hee.



When we issued the North-South Joint Statement, I spoke to Lee Hu Rak. I laid down three principles.

I asked him why South Korea continued to rely on foreign forces. I told him Korea was partitioned by foreign forces and I said "Let's quit relying on foreign countries. Let's be autonomous. Let's quit fighting and let's unite peacefully."

Lee Hu Rak said that capitalism and communism were two extremes and, therefore, what I said was unreasonable. I said that they were not two extremes but two theories and since the Korean people was of one race, we could achieve racial unity. If we made concessions and the South made concessions, there was no reason why we couldn't unite. Lee Hu Rak said this was very fine and, saying Park Chung Hee would also likely agree, returned home.

However, less than one month after he returned home, South Korea overturned the Joint Statement. Kim Jong Pil overturned the Joint Statement. I believe that if democratic people take over, we can establish communications. With Park Chung Hee, we just can't get through.

No sooner did Ford become president when he breathed life into Park Chung Hee. This I cannot understand. Is



President Ford seeking to make U.S. military bases in Korea permanent?

Mr. Utsunomiya: I don't think such policies will last long.

Chairman Kim: I hope you have understood what I would like you to convey to Prime Minister Miki.

Mr. Utsunomiya: Yes, I understood you well.

A delegation of Liberal Democratic Party Diet members will visit North Korea. They are almost all members of the Afro-Asia Problems Study Group and the head of the delegation is Hajime Tamura. I thank you from my heart for inviting the group. It's a good thing to have a lot of Japanese people come and see your country. It is a good thing for dispelling suspicions to have people know that you are not engaged in digging tunnels only, but are engaged in agriculture and peaceful construction.

Chairman Kim: Our comrades will give your group an enthusiastic welcome. We will greet the group hospitably.

Mr. Utsunomiya: A certain American says he would like to visit North Korea

Chairman Kim: On this matter, I will give it considerable thought. There's no problem in my meeting him.

However, at a time when the United States is threatening us with nuclear blackmail, to meet this person presents a problem from the standpoint of maintaining our independency.

On the previous occasion you visited us, I told you about (Harrison E.) Salisbury. (Editor's note: Salisbury, then Associate Editor of The New York Times, visited North Korea in May, 1972, with John M. Lee, who was the Chief of The New York Times' Tokyo Bureau. Selig Harrison, Tokyo correspondent of the Washington Post also visited Pyongyang at that time.) However, Americans, who have visited our country, have all returned with unpleasant memories. Everywhere they went, they found anti-American posters pasted on walls. Salisbury went to one factory and pointing to himself asked a worker: "Do you know which country I come from?" The worker replied: "I don't know." At this, Salisbury said he was an American correspondent. The worker then said: "Take a look at this poster," and pointed to a poster on the wall. On the poster, it was written: "America get out of South Korea!"

Another different worker said to him: "I come from South Korea, but because of the United States, I haven't been able to see my family for 30 years."



Further, another worker said: "I've never met an American correspondent, but I killed four or five Americans during the war." Another woman worker said: "My father and mother were killed by Americans."

(Jerome Allan) Cohen (Professor of Harvard University), Salisbury and Harrison -- all Americans -- went home with the same unpleasant feelings.

We cannot change slogans for the sake of a few Americans and we can't change our education also. Americans can come when the United States changes its policies and our policies are also changed.

We have nothing to hide from the Americans. Salisbury asked whether we would let Americans come to North Korea. I replied let's handle it on the basis of reciprocity. But, there hasn't been any reply since.

It's not good for people to come with feelings of hatred. In our relations with Japan, we can get by today without hurting the feelings of the Japanese people. We have no slogans opposing Japanese militarism. This is because such slogans are to be found today in museums and not in our education.



Therefore, if the United States stops making a fuss over such things as the threat of a southward advance, then we will examine our policies. Why is that although the U.S. commander says that there is no threat from the North, the United States continues to cooperate with Park Chung Hee?

Wouldn't Americans find it unpleasant to come (to North Korea) at the present time? It would be better if they came when this sort of situation has improved.

Mr. Utsunomiya: On the surface, the United States says it is supporting Park Chung Hee. However, basically, the United States is changing and is trying to change. I believe (the desire of Americans to visit North Korea) should be regarded with importance as one sign of this change.

Chairman Kim: I will give it consideration. Now, let's have dinner together. You must be tired.

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1975 (4)

Record of Talks Between Chairman Kim Il Sung of North Korea
and Representative Tokuma Utsunomiya of Japan

(PART IV)

(After dinner, the talks between the two are held on a large guest boat on an artificial lake close to the mountain villa where Representative Utsunomiya is staying.)

Chairman Kim: The water in this lake comes through a tunnel and flows out through a tunnel. Tunnels of this kind are necessary. (Laughter)

In 1956, we launched a large-scale irrigation construction project. As a result, we have so far built 1,500 such water storage lakes.

Irrigation is also necessary in Cambodia, but, they just use pumps and do not have to build tunnels like these here.

Mr. Utsunomiya: You recently built some high lakes near the Yalu River.

Chairman Kim: We built one and, then, we later built another. Three additional lakes are scheduled. This lake is strictly for agricultural use. The 1,500 lakes I referred to are for agricultural purposes. We also built a lot of lakes for the generation of electricity.



Mr. Utsunomiya: There must be a lot of fish in this lake.

Chairman Kim: Yes, there are. They enter the lake, but don't leave it.

This lake has a storage capacity of 150 million tons and supplies water at the rate of 40 tons a second. It irrigates three counties. The water level is low at present, but it will not drop any further.

Since the water is clean, you can also swim here. I myself swim here often. In winter, you can skate here also. We have rest and vacation homes for workers and party cadres nearby and many people come here.

Mr. Utsunomiya: When do you skate?

Chairman Kim: You can skate from about December 20. By March, the ice is completely melted. The trees in this area have grown big. We have constructed a lot of storage lakes and have built a lot of rest homes around these lakes.

Mr. Utsunomiya: In Japan, we have the expression, "Two birds with one stone"; but here it's a case of three birds, even five birds, with one stone.



Chairman Kim: We're generating a small amount of electricity from this lake. We are using the electricity to control the flow through the tunnels.

Recently, the necessity of irrigation works has come to be stressed in Europe. Last year, a conference of farm workers was held in Berlin and the construction of irrigation facilities was emphasized at this conference. Since there was no need for us to dispatch representatives, we did not attend.

Mr. Utsunomiya: If the Soviet Union irrigates its farms, its agriculture should be better.

Chairman Kim: That's right.

Mr. Utsunomiya: The utilization of water is more advanced in Asia than in Europe.

Chairman Kim: They're doing it in China also.

Mr. Utsunomiya: However, isn't your country the most advanced in this field?

Chairman Kim: We say that we have completed our irrigation system. But, we plan to irrigate an additional



300,000 chobu. (Editor's note: One chobu is equivalent to 2.45 acres.)

Mr. Utsunomiya: I understand, Mr. Chairman, you are teaching people how to grow corn.

Chairman Kim: No, I am simply relaying what I've heard from farmers. The farmers know many things. I've learnt a lot of things from farmers.

Last year, I heard of a farm which had a harvest of 23 tons of rice from one chobu. I said this was a lie. I, therefore, sent a scientist to this farm and he found the crop was really very good.

Ordinarily, the average yield is 5.9 tons to six tons. These are not low figures by any means. The important thing is the earnestness of the farmers and the way they use fertilizers.

However, the yield in the mountainous areas in the north is not high. There are a 100,000 chobu of paddy fields in the north. After the Liberation, we build a lot of paddy fields. Recently, we have been encouraging dry land rice crops where the yield has been low.

At present, we have 700,000 chobu of paddy fields. Everybody can eat white rice. We use corn for animal feed.



Three hundred kolograms of grain per person is sufficient. Thus, we can get by with 4,500,000 tons of rice. Since we have wheat flour and other cereals in addition, there is no problem.

We have also built a lot of plants to procese corn.

We import from 300,000 to 400,000 tons of sugar from Cuba. But, recently production in Cuba has dropped and we don't get sufficient sugar. We are encouraging our people to make sugar from corn. We get oil from the roots of corn plants and we can press oil equivalent in weight to three per cent of each ton of corn roots. The oil is very good.

Mr. Utsunomiya: Vegetable oil is very good.

Do you produce wheat too?

Chairman Kim: We produce a little.

In our country, the time when wheat ripens coincides with the wet season. We produce a little wheat, then plant the land later with daikon (Japanese radish) and Chinese cabbage.

Mr. Utsunomiya: The farmers of your country who receive your guidance are fortunate.

Chairman Kim: Thank you.

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1975(5)

Record of Talks Between Chairman Kim Il Sung and
Representative Tokuma Utsunomiya of Japan

(PART V)

Chairman Kim: This is not something I heard directly myself, but something which my wife heard.

My wife was invited by the Iranian Royal Family to attend the Women's Conference in Mexico. However, because my wife accompanied me to Europe, she could not attend the conference. The Secretary-General of the Women's League headed our delegation to the conference in Mexico.

She was a lawyer and the daughter of Heu Heun, a fighter who belonged to the Chosun New Democratic Party. (Editor's note: Members of the Chosun Independence League, formed in Yanan in China during World War II, returned to Korea after the war and changed the name of the League to the Chosun New Democratic Party in February, 1946, which was merged in August of the same year with the Communist Party to form the present Chosun Redong Party.) She was a person who had fought all along with me, and could speak English, Japanese and Chinese.

Representatives from 120 countries gathered for the conference in Mexico and many persons of the class of wives



of presidents attended. The wife of the President of Egypt is reported to have attended also. The chairman of the conference was a Mexican and the vice-chairman the U.N. representative from Guinea. Until now, Mexico's attitude toward our country had not been very good, but, this time, Mexico greeted our people warmly and I heard the wife of the Mexican president invited our delegation.

Our representative, I hear, spoke right after the President's wife gave her speech, and our representative was the first delegate from a socialist country to address the conference. I hear she gave a very good speech. She did not attack South Korea and spoke on the position and the social role of women. This was because it is not good to slander in a foreign country the people of the same race. When she ended her speech, people from various countries came to congratulate her on the platform and she received great applause.

The representative from South Korea spoke second from the last. South Korea sent a representative who had lived in the United States. Because she began her speech in English, the chairman pounded his gavel on the desk and asked her which country she represented. She replied she represented the Republic of Korea. At this, the representatives of the socialist and Third World countries all left the conference hall. The only people left, I hear, were delegates from the United States.



and from a small number of countries servile to the United States. She, therefore, bore Korea's shame all by herself.

Unless a person has racial pride, nothing can go well for him. After she came out of the conference hall, she is said to have told newspapermen that our country did not have any freedoms.

Mr. Utsunomiya: Kim Dae Jung used to say there were no freedoms in the North but people were guaranteed a livelihood, while there were no freedoms in the South nor livelihood guarantees.

Chairman Kim: Half of his opinion is correct.

He has not seen the North. That's why he says such a thing (about us). He should come and see our country once.

Mr. Utsunomiya: Everyone should come and take a look once.

Chairman Kim: If Kim Dae Jung had stayed in Japan, he might have been blessed with such an opportunity.

The Third World says it is trying to become socialist. Burma and Iraq and the other newly-independent countries say they will become socialist.



However, the problem is how you become socialist.

We have been in contact with the people of the Third World, but almost all of them are not communists. They are all nationalists. It is this kind of people who are trying to become socialists.

When China was carrying out its Cultural Revolution, President (Julius K.) Nyerere of Tanzania came to visit us. I talked with him for four days. He said that he was trying to establish socialism in his country, but the middle-level farmers were not happy with his plans.

I told him that middle-level farmers who owned property would naturally not be happy with socialism, that he must not be too hasty in switching to socialism and that he must first build the foundation for socialism, which meant elevating poor people to the level of middle-level farmers.

As a matter of fact, after the Liberation, we fostered the growth of individual farmers and small and medium enterprises. However, these were all completely destroyed by the (Korean) war and we found we had to do everything jointly.

You must not be hasty in establishing socialism. You must encourage the economy of the people and build up, thereby,



the nation's economy. Then the strength of the national economy will raise the level of poor farmers to that of middle-level farmers. It is then that you can shift to socialism. If you push unreasonably, you create discontent among the people and give rise to problems.

The Soviet Union pushed ahead forcibly. However, today, we want to achieve socialism by methods in keeping with the actual situation among our people. If you do it this way, there will be no people coming out and opposing your plans.

Thus, even if unification is realized, there will be no suppression of the national capitalists of the South. On the other hand, if the people in South Korea try to establish socialism today, everything will go wrong.

Mr. Utsunomiya: You mean half-way socialism will wreck socialism.

Chairman Kim: People say that socialism deprives people of their individual possessions. But, it can be said that it is because of errors on the part of small segment of people that such effects emerge.

If people like Kim Dae Jung, who have a racial conscience, come to see the North, they just cannot think badly of our country.



In March, the chairman of the Liberation Front of Mozambique visited us. He had visited us previously and I had maintained friendly ties with him.

He said now that Mozambique had become independent, he would make his country socialist and asked us to send a delegation to his country.

I told him I thought he should establish socialism in stages and not to hurry and that he should first protect the interests of his people. I told him it was important to place independence on a strong foundation and, for this, it was necessary to build up a self-sufficient national economy. Then, I said, after he had consolidated the foundations of his state, he could shift to socialism.

Today, we have a delegation in Mozambique, but, since the delegation was asked to see the entire country, it has not returned as yet. I told members of the delegation not to air their opinions as they pleased, but to restrict themselves to telling the people of Mozambique of their own experiences.

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1975 (6)

Record of Talks Between Chairman Kim Il Sung and
Representative Tokuma Utsunomiya of Japan

(PART VI)

Mr. Utsunomiya: You are producing a lot of dyed
textiles.

Chairman Kim: Our light industries have a long
way to go. We need technologies and technicians, but we
don't have either in our country.

In China, Shanghai is the most advanced region.
The other regions can't compare with Shanghai. This is because
there were international settlements in Shanghai.

On the other hand, we are managing with our own
products, without using foreign imports, and we are,
therefore, proud of ourselves. Aside from the question
whether our products are good or bad, we are utilizing things
we produce ourselves in building up our light industries.

Mr. Utsunomiya: What about setting up a committee
on technological exchange between North Korea and Japan?

Chairman Kim: That's not a bad idea. However,
although we may have things to learn from Japan, we have
nothing to teach Japan.



Mr. Utsunomiya: But, you have diligence.

Chairman Kim: Park Chung Hee calls our diligence forced labor.

Mr. Utsunomiya: Under the Park Regime, if you say even of word against the government, you will be subjected to torture. The thing that has made the biggest advance under the Park Regime is the torture techniques.

Chairman Kim: These are lichee nuts from China. Premier Chou En-lai sent Sihanouk and myself these nuts.

Mr. Utsunomiya: Queen Yang Kui-fei, consort of Emperor Hsuan Tsung (712-755) of the Tang Dynasty loved lichee nuts.

Chairman Kim: I've also read the tale of Queen Yang Kui-fei. During that period, they expended a great deal of labor power to ship lichee nuts from the south to Peking.

Mr. Utsunomiya: It is famous tale. It was because of this (expenditure of manpower) that rebellion arose.

I saw the film of last year's Good Harvest Year Festival. Your smiling face made quite an impression. I can understand why you were so happy.

Chairman Kim: Thank you.

In the past, the corn in the intermediate zone between the plains and the mountainous parts of our country did not grow well. Until last year, the farmers were not very enthusiastic about corn.

At this, I made a lot of slogans, such as: "Corn is the king of the fields," and the students from our agricultural universities went out into the farm villages to guide the farmers.

The yield, which was originally about 1.2 tons per hectare, increased to five tons last year. Calculations indicate the yield will be 10 tons this year.

Since there are from 50,000 to 55,000 corn plants per hectare, if each plant produces 200 grams, you get a total yield of 11 tons. Even taking the lowest estimate of 100 grams per corn plant, you get 5.5 to six tons. However, the yield couldn't be this low per plant. So, if we take 150 grams, we get a yield from 7.5 tons to eight tons per hectare. Corn grows very well.

Mr. Utsunomiya: There is the fixed view that agriculture does not fare well under socialism. But, your demonstration of the achievements of intensive cultivation under socialism is a great contribution on your part, Mr. Chairman to humanity.

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In agriculture under socialism to date, all production records were made calculated on a per capita farm worker basis and never on per unit of area basis.

Chairman Kim: The land area of our country is small. That is why we have to engage in intensive farming.

Mr. Utsunomiya: When you speak of a yield of 8,000,000 tons this year, do you mean 4,000,000 tons would be in rice and 4,000,000 tons in corn?

Was the yield last year 3,500,000 tons of rice and 3,500,000 tons of corn?

Chairman Kim: Last year, the rice yield was 4,000,000 tons.

However, the rice yield will not go much beyond this. If we have any reserve capacity, it would be in corn. Thus, we will divert our energy to the production of corn. We are trying to improve strains of corn, reduce the height of corn stalks and develop corn that will grow two ears where only one is produced now. Our scientists say they can produce such a new strain in two years.

Recently, the science of improving strains has made great progress. Our scientists are producing a lot of young disciples.

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As for vegetables, where the yield of Chinese cabbage was 20 to 30 tons per hectare, we are now producing 400 tons. The youths are producing such crops. This is the right kind of revolution.

Thus, I often praise our scientists. We are now able to produce 200 tons of Japanese radishes per hectare.

The problem of strains is important, but fertilization methods are also important. Until now, it was difficult applying trace-element fertilizers. The soil soon became stale.

As a result, we made the students in our agricultural universities make a complete study of soil throughout the nation. Today, we have soil analysis charts for every farm in our country. We provide fertilizer on the basis of these charts. We also provide such trace elements as boron to the soil.

Since the soil analysis charts are handed to the chairmen of the agricultural committees of each province, the agricultural committees know the elements that are lacking in soil of the farms under their jurisdiction. This sort of thing can't be accomplished just through the experience of farmers. Therefore, university professors and students play an important role.

According to data published in Japanese and American magazines, the ice at the North Pole has increased by about 12 to 13 per cent. This is affecting the climate in the United States and Canada.



We also experienced last year the same thing in our own country. In the intermediate zones of the country, frost begins to fall in ordinary years from the middle of October. Last year, the first frost fell on September 17. Thus, it is necessary to harvest crops as early as possible. Unless we grow seedlings in vinyl houses, then plant them early and let the crops ripen early, we would not be able to avoid damages from cold. We began maintaining an alert from last year.

This situation, it is said, will last 10 years. The claims of these magazines have a foundation in fact. Droughts have broken out in the equatorial belt, Bangladesh has been hit by floods and Yugoslavia has suffered heavy hail damages. Rumania was also hit by floods and more than 100 factories were flooded. I saw this with my own eyes. Rumania suffered heavy damages because it had not built any drainage facilities.

In South Korea also, once you have a little rain, you soon have floods. It appears it is not building the necessary facilities by itself, but is asking Japan for \$200 million in aid for its so-called Saemul or New Village Movement.

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Record of Talks between Chairman Kim Il Sung and
Representative Tokuma Utsunomiya of Japan

(PART VII)

Mr. Utsunomiya: Prime Minister Miki is delaying the convocation of the Japan-Republic of Korea Ministerial Conference. However, once Miki meets Ford, the ministerial conference will have to be convened and Japan will have to provide aid. Thus, this conference is important.

Cuba has set up a program to increase production of sugar, but the program seems to have failed.

Chairman Kim: I don't know the situation well. But, according to what I have heard, Cuba may have exploited its land excessively.

They asked for rice and we bought sugar in return. However, Cuba will not sell us sugar now. I don't know the real situation, but, it appears the guidance given the farmers was not good. It's likely the land was exploited too long.

Mr. Utsunomiya: Cuba had set up a production target of 10,000,000 tons.

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Chairman Kim: They haven't reached that goal of 10,000,000 tons. They haven't reached even 5,000,000 tons. At that rate....

Mr. Utsunomiya: If they were to produce 10,000,000 tons, Cuba would become a truly great country.

Chairman Kim: That's right.

I feel that if they had made a soil survey and had provided trace-element fertilizers, they would have been better off. They'll need a bit of time to recover.

Thanks to the Vietnam War, we were able to solve our phosphate fertilizer problem. Because of the war, the apatite ores we used to import from Vietnam stopped coming. We were forced to develop our own supplies. We had each province compete with each other in developing apatite deposits.

This year we produced 1,200,000 tons and had to import only a part of our needs. Next year, we will likely produce 1,500,000 tons. We really suffered because of a lack of phosphate fertilizers. There was no place where we could buy apatite and, besides, the ore from Vietnam was the best, with the phosphate content as high as 35 and 40 per cent.



We are importing apatite from Cairo to supplement our domestic supplies, but the Egyptian apatite has a phosphate content of only 25 per cent. We are also buying ore from Togo, but the transportation costs are high and we can't make the ore self-paying. We buy from Togo for friendship's sake.

We are at a disadvantage because, unlike Japan, we do not have ships.

Mr. Utsunomiya: You can surely buy ships cheaply from Japan at the present time, because of the severe recession in Japan's shipbuilding industry.

Chairman Kim: We are ordering ships from the Netherlands, but it takes two years to have one ship built.

Mr. Utsunomiya: The best thing is to build your own.

Chairman Kim: We began building our own ships and I believe we will be able to solve this problem in the near future.

Mr. Utsunomiya: If you have seas and industrial power, you can solve the problem. You will be able to build ships of 200,000 and 300,000 tons.

Chairman Kim: We do not need 200,000-ton ships. Ships of 15,000 and 20,000 tons will be sufficient. Since we



import oil from China and the Soviet Union, we have no oil problem.

Mr. Utsunomiya: Once I met Madame Nguyen Thi Binh of Vietnam in Pyongyang. (Editor's note: Madame Nguyen Thi Binh is the Foreign Minister of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam.)

What will happen in Vietnam?

Chairman Kim: They will probably unite. The two Vietnams will only be temporary. They don't seem to have any problems. Of course, there is the problem of post-war recovery. However, I believe they will be able to solve that problem quickly.

I also believe the recovery of Cambodia will be speedy.

Cambodia was shipping rice to Vietnam, while fighting a war. Till now, they were building only small irrigation systems. They can now build large systems. If the airports are restored, we will send Cambodia aid also.

Cambodia has fish and rice. They also have plenty of timber. They can build an industrial base with the timber



alone. They have very large quantities of fresh-water fish.

The problem of Indochina has basically been solved.

Next is the problem of our unification.

If only a person like Kim Dae Jung were to take over the reigns of government in South Korea, we would be able to understand each other. If we place the interests of the Korean race high and our own interests low, we would be able to understand and cooperate with each other.

Mr. Utsunomiya: You must be tired after this long conversation.

Chairman Kim: Representative, you must be the one that's tired. Please relax and rest. After all you've just gone through an operation.

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Message from Chairman Kim Il Sung to Prime Minister Takeo Miki

Please convey the following to Prime Minister Miki:

We will make every effort to relax tensions and military confrontation. We have no intention of advancing south and are striving to avoid armed clashes and to achieve peaceful unification as agreed upon in the July 4, 1972 Joint Statement. This is because if war were ever to break out in our country, it would develop into great war of world proportions. However, this does not mean we are afraid of war. But we will not start rise to war and will oppose war to the very end. In order to relax tensions, avoid armed clashes and realize peaceful unification, we must, above all, prevent war. If war breaks out, there is the possibility of Japan and the United States becoming involved.

To relax tensions, we must change the armistice agreement with the United States to a peace treaty. Since the other party to the truce agreement is the commander of the U.S. forces, it is natural for us to want the peace treaty to be concluded with the United States. Then, if, under the condition that all foreign troops withdraw from South Korea, the North and the South disarms to the level of 100,000 troops, war can be prevented. If foreign troops withdraw under the United Nations flag, we can reduce troops to the level of 100,000 men. What is immediately important is to conclude

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a peace treaty and, next, in order to relax North-South tensions and to ease our confrontation, dialogue is necessary.

However, there is an obstacle to this dialogue. This became apparent through our experience with the North-South talks. The obstacle is the Park Chung Hee Government. This is because President Park is speaking of achieving unification through "victory over communism" and through "eradication of communism." This is not all. President Park is suppressing the South's democratic people, and, in particular, is ignoring the July 4 Joint Statement. He is scheming to establish two Koreas and is trying to make the division of Korea permanent. As a result, there must be a change in the South's policies if a dialogue is to be achieved. We want to say that if the South Korea Government is a democratic regime, we would be able to hold a dialogue with it, whoever may head the regime.

President Park is criticizing us and slandering us, saying we want to turn South Korea communist. We have declared many times that whatever the system the South Korean system may be, we will not force our system on the South. We are advocating a dialogue to relax tensions on the basis of the present social systems and to ease confrontation. However, dialogue is difficult with President Park. It is because we can't get through to him. What President Park is saying is that he wants a dialogue in order to perpetuate the division of Korea.



I believe both Japan and the United States should understand our standpoint. They should not start a war and should not support Park Chung Hee who is scheming to establish two Koreas. If Japan and the United States do not take the path toward detente and try to create two opposing Koreas, tensions and the possibilities of war will continue indefinitely.

Consequently, we hope from our hearts that Japan will relax tensions, ease confrontations and adopt a policy of promoting unification.

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Telegram from Pyongyang to Bucharest, No. 059/219

Date:
15 July
1975

Source:
Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archives, Matter 220/Year 1975/Country: Democratic People's Republic of Korea –US, Folder 1642, Concerning the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's Relations with the US, Started on: 11.03.1975, Completed on: 16.12.1975, Filing deadline: Permanent. Obtained and translated for NKIDP by Eliza Gheorghe

Ministry of Foreign Affairs
TELEGRAM
Sender: Pyongyang
No.: 059/219
Date: 15.07.1975

During a protocol event on July 12, Vice-Premier Heo Dam, while referring to the recent US proposal to dissolve the UN headquarters for South Korea, told Ambassador Dumitru Popa the following:

The document is misleading to public opinion worldwide. Presently, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is carefully studying the American proposal and in a very near future will present the UN with its point of view.

Heo Dam mentioned that no point of the US proposal can be accepted as such by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea for the following reasons:

- the document is of a "reactionary and misleading" character. The worldwide public opinion could be induced to believe that the Americans are the one wishing for a dismantling of the UN headquarters in South Korea. In reality, the US will keep its presence in this country, while claiming its troops are not foreign. The US proposal aims in fact at obtaining the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's agreement to US military presence and continuity in South Korea.
- the American proposal aims at making South Korea visible on the international scene and increasing its prestige. Our conversation partner noted that, in its turn, Japan is actively supporting this county, given its strategic importance and the Japanese interests. Moreover, Japan has invested significant capital in South Korea and presently has a good market there for its products.
- the proposal that US and South Korean officers replace the leadership responsible for securing the ceasefire, as well as the presence of Chinese volunteers, would imply that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea accepts interference in its internal affairs from the past of great powers such as the US, the People's Republic China, and would result in a breach of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's national independence and sovereignty. At the same time, US troops presence in South Korea would become permanent and implicitly so would "the continued existence of two Koreas".
- the US has proceeded with presenting its document, knowing that the fall of this year the UN General Assembly will adopt, with overwhelming majority, a resolution favorable to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

Heo Dam has mentioned that his country does not see the document as a step back in the US position towards the Korean matter at the UN, and is therefore "a success of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea." In answering a question of the Romanian Ambassador, the Korean Foreign Affairs Minister noted that this year the Democratic People's Republic of Korea would send special delegations to numerous countries in the world, personal representatives of President Kim Il Sung, in order to explain in detail his country's point of view in the Korean matter, as well as the position the Democratic People's Republic of Korea will adopt during the next UN General Assembly in order to ask for support, prevent the admission into the UN of two Koreas and diminish the effects of South Korean attempts to join the group of non-aligned countries.

Signed: D.Popa

Telegram from Berlin to Bucharest, No. 018.998

Date:
21 July
1975

Source:
Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archives, Matter 220/Year 1975/Country: Democratic People's Republic of Korea –US, Folder 1642, Concerning the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's Relations with the US, Started on: 11.03.1975, Completed on: 16.12.1975, Filing deadline: Permanent. Obtained and translated for NKIDP by Eliza Gheorghe

Ministry of Foreign Affairs
TELEGRAM
Sender: Berlin
No.: 018.998
Date: 21.07.1975
Time: 16:30

Comrade C. Oancea,

The Ambassador of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is visibly showing interests within the diplomatic community in Berlin towards the significance of the statements given by the US State Secretary for Defense, according to which the US would use nuclear weapons in the eventuality of a conflict between North and South Korea.

The Korean Ambassador considers the statement is meant to encourage the dictator Park in the South and spell out again the determination of US imperialist circles to maintain their influence in the area.

The Korean party and government are determined to solve the issue of national reunification during "our generation," say Korean diplomats.

The Ambassador of People's Republic of China considers there is no danger of armed conflict in Korea. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea leadership declared it aims at accomplishing its ultimate ideal: peaceful national reunification. People's Republic of China is fully supporting this position of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

There are certain imperialist circles whose actions aim at adding an element of tension in the Far East, with the obvious intention of changing the focus from other issues and conflict areas in the Middle East and Europe.

The Dutch Ambassador was of the opinion that none of the sides involved are truly interested in generating armed hostilities in the Korean Peninsula.

Signed: Georgescu C.

Telegram from Washington to Bucharest, No. 074.783

Date:
24 July
1975

Source:

Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archives, Matter 220/Year 1975/Country: Democratic People's Republic of Korea –US, Folder 1642, Concerning the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's Relations with the US, Started on: 11.03.1975, Completed on: 16.12.1975, Filing deadline: Permanent. Obtained and translated for NKIDP by Eliza Gheorghe

Ministry of Foreign Affairs
TELEGRAM
Sender: Washington
No.: 074.783
Date: 24.07.1975
Time: 18:00

Concerning: The Korean Matter

- 1) William Buffum, assistant to Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs, told me on July 23 this year that the American side considers the most controversial issue of the UN General Assembly agenda shall be the Korean one. In this context he mentioned again the US proposals for dismantling the UN headquarters for Korea, claiming it is a reasonable proposal meant to eliminate a source of anxiety and friction.
- 2) At the same time however the South Korean side has insistently asked the U.S not to take action towards withdrawal of troops from its territory, a thing which could generate a difficult situation both internally and externally for the South Korean government. The American interlocutor underlined that North Korean intentions preoccupy the Ford Administration most. Considering the "changing" and "uncertain" character of North Korean politics, the dismantling of the UN headquarters should be accompanied, according the US, by an agreement securing the ceasefire. In this context he showed interest in the results of the visit to Bucharest of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea President, particularly in the North Korean perspective on reunification and the Romanian opinion on evolutions in the Korean Peninsula.

I responded in the spirit of our main position in this issue, underlining the North Korean stance to act peacefully towards reunification while at the same time taking measures towards the withdrawal of foreign troops which by definition are a source of tension.

- 3) In the discussions between Comrade Petre Anghel, 3rd Secretary, and John Farbes from the Korea Office of the State Department, the following points were made:
 - a. Up to the present moment the US has received no reactions from the sides interested in his letter concerning the dismantling of UN headquarters in Korea. The only condition imposed by the US was the recognition and backing by its signatories of the Korean ceasefire agreement.
 - b. The US is nervous about the propaganda campaign launched in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea—a diplomatic offensive which has no other aim but internationally isolating South Korea. This campaign only increases tension in the Peninsula.
 - c. There is interest and some anxiety on the part of the US administration about the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's intentions; especially since recently the latter has disapproved of North-South meetings at Panmunjeom.
 - d. Recent declarations of the Japanese government on the Korean issue are supposed to have emphasized the latter requires a solution originating from the Koreans themselves, as well as the responsibility of great powers to take preventive action against an escalation of tensions in the area.

Signed: Corneliu Bogdan

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

July 24, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: JOHN MARCUM *JM*

Attached is a revised memorandum concerning a proposed effort to dissuade South Korea from purchasing a French-built reprocessing plant. The memorandum has been rewritten to reflect recent South Korean assurances that they would not reprocess fuel from US and Canadian reactors.

In addition to the calls you have received, George Vest has asked that we expedite this decision to the extent possible. He is scheduled to testify on Tuesday in restricted session before Senator Symington on US initiatives with regard to this and other proliferation problems.

SECRET - XGDS

By Authority Of General Scowcroft

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.0

NR 94-144, # 11 NARA 1/24/96

By *KSH* NARA, Date *5/27/97*



1578

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SECRET - XGDS

ACTION
July 24, 1975

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MEMORANDUM FOR: SECRETARY KISSINGER
FROM: JAN M. LODAL *by JM*
DAVE ELLIOTT *by DE*
SUBJECT: Approach to South Korea on Reprocessing

As a result of growing concerns over South Korea's nuclear weapons intentions and specifically over their intention to purchase a pilot reprocessing plant from France, there is a bureaucratic concurrence at the staff level on a guidance cable (Tab A) that would authorize the Embassy in Seoul to approach the Koreans directly and:

- Point out that the Korean reprocessing plans could jeopardize US peaceful nuclear assistance, particularly a pending Export-Import Bank loan for the KORI-II, their second US-built power reactor;
- Ask them not to proceed with their planned reprocessing plant; and
- Offer support for ROK participation in an eventual multi-national regional reprocessing plant in East Asia.

Ambassador Sneider supports such an approach (Tab C).

Bureaucratic Factors

Recognizing the inevitable potential for leaks and for resulting difficulties with the French and Koreans, as in the case of the FRG-Brazil affair, and the intimate relationship between the ROK's nuclear weapons plan and our security commitment there; we tasked State/ACDA to prepare an options paper for use in obtaining a policy-level decision on this problem. Unfortunately, they prepared a lengthy advocacy memorandum

SECRET - XGDS
By Authority Of General Scowcroft

DECLASSIFIED - 10/11/95
10/11/95
10/11/95 (XGDS)
NR 94-144 #12 USC 101 7/25/95
KOH:scw Date 6/13/95

Declassified
Photocopy from Gerald R. Ford Library

(Tab B) instead which State only reluctantly submitted to the NSC process (Scowcroft called Eagleburger). This paper does not deal with the basic problem of the ROK's perceived need for long term nuclear guarantees and our inability to provide them or with the problem of French involvement and consistency with our non-proliferation policy.

Regional Factors

If Korea begins to build a reprocessing plant in addition to the essential nuclear reactors we have agreed to supply, it will be widely assumed that it is seriously working on a nuclear weapons program. This perception would be potentially destabilizing in all of Northeast Asia. North Korea would certainly press its allies for a similar capability, and both China and the Soviet Union might see potential nuclear threats to their own territory. Perhaps most important, development of nuclear weapons in Korea could tip the balance on proliferation in Japan.

Korean Intentions

Korea's policy towards future development of a nuclear weapons capability seems fairly clear their armament program plans and from Park's statement indicating that exercise of the nuclear option would depend on the continuation of U.S. security guarantees. Unfortunately, this Korean attitude is well-known in Congress and in the international arms control community. It will make it very difficult for the U.S. to continue normal civil nuclear commerce with Korea unless some specific protective measures are taken.

Reprocessing will not be necessary for South Korea's nuclear power economy for several years and, in view of current controversy over the dangers of plutonium recycle, perhaps not for the foreseeable future. Both officials concerned with civil power development and those in favor of weapons production could probably be persuaded to defer the reprocessing effort, if necessary, to avoid jeopardizing acquisition of essential nuclear power reactors. We are pessimistic about longer term prospects, however, since the basic incentives for ROK nuclear weapons development will remain and they could either approach another supplier or eventually build their own reprocessing plant.

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Korean Assurances

Korea has taken some steps recently in order to reassure us and others that its civil program is for peaceful purposes. They ratified the NPT when Canada made it a condition of acquisition of Canadian reactors, they recently accepted our tortured interpretation of our bilateral nuclear agreement that gives the U.S. veto rights on reprocessing of spent fuel from U.S. supplied reactors, and have provided similar assurances to Canada.

The Koreans undoubtedly have their limits, though, and the request from the U.S. for them to forego a planned reprocessing plant may approach that limit. Compounding this is the fact that they might also have to pay certain termination costs as discussed below.

The French Connection

The reprocessing plant that the Koreans are planning to acquire is of French origin.
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Implications for Non-Proliferation Policy

In reaching your decision on this issue, you should also consider its implications for our overall non-proliferation policy. As a result of FRG and French opposition, it is now clear that the Nuclear Suppliers Conference will result in controls on reprocessing that are less stringent than those in the FRG-Brazil nuclear accord and considerably less stringent than those we would impose on South Korea. In a recent bilateral discussion, the FRG informed us that they would wait until after the conclusion of the Suppliers Conference to finalize their umbrella agreement with Iran probably with the expectation that we would not oppose exports which were in accordance with the Suppliers' agreement. Similarly, following the conclusion of a Suppliers' agreement, it is conceivable that the ROK would approach another supplier such as the FRG and purchase a reprocessing plant under the agreed guidelines and we would then find it more difficult to interfere.

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The real question as we work toward the goals of conclusion of a Suppliers Agreement, of strengthened IAEA safeguards and of increased NPT ratification is whether we will be willing to accept these as adequate controls both in terms of permitting U.S. exports on this basis and not objecting to bilateral arrangements between other suppliers and client states. In this regard, a comprehensive review of our non-proliferation policy is in progress in the VPWG and may serve as a useful basis for determining the extent to which we should continue to play an activist role in bilateral approaches rather than being content with the international regulatory mechanisms we are developing. However, this study will not be completed in time to serve as a basis for your decision on the Korean approach.

Options

The State proposal would have the advantage of closely following the Canadian demarche and would utilize our special leverage to exert maximum pressure on the ROK to abandon its plans. It would also be timely, and if the ROK agrees, would improve the prospects for pending Congressional approval of the Export-Import Bank loan and Nuclear Regulatory Commission licensing of fuel shipment for the KORI-I reactor. The approach would have some risk, however, of antagonizing the Koreans and, through public disclosure, irritating the French who have already complained about publicity on the Suppliers Conference.

If successful, the question would also remain of who would reimburse the French for their four million dollars in development costs. On the basis of a preliminary examination, we have not identified any reasonable method of paying the French directly -- which would be interpreted in Congress as "buying them off", or of compensating the Koreans through our AID or Military Assistance (they are already unhappy over reduced amounts in the latter program).
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Alternatively, we could rely on Korea's NPT obligations -- including safeguards in its facilities and nuclear explosive deployment prohibitions, their assurances that they will not reprocess fuel from Canadian or U.S. reactors, and additional barriers coming out of the Suppliers' Agreement, to satisfy our concerns. Unfortunately, such undertakings can be considered as mere "paper assurances" and some elements of Congress see it in these terms. In addition, if the ROK proceeds with this reprocessing plant, its neighbors would assume it is seriously working towards a nuclear weapons capability.

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Your Decision

- _____ That we continue bilateral efforts to deter ROK acquisition of a reprocessing plant (and forward the instruction cable to Seoul as the next step).

- _____ That we make no further effort to deter their acquisition of a reprocessing plant, and rely instead on the ROK's NPT obligations, LAEA safeguards and Suppliers Conference controls to ensure that they do not develop nuclear weapons.

Jack Froebe concurs.

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Report, Embassy of Hungary in North Korea to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry

Date: 30 July 1975	Source: <i>XIX-J-1-j Korea, 1975, 83. doboz, 81-10, 002835/8/1975. Obtained and translated for NKIDP by Balazs Szalontai</i>
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Kim Il Sung, the general secretary of the KWP and the president of the DPRK, made official visits to

- China (on 18-26 April 1975)
- Romania (on 22-26 May 1975)
- Algeria (between 26 May and 2 June 1975)
- Mauritania (from 30 May to 1 June 1975)
- Bulgaria (on 2-5 June 1975) and
- Yugoslavia (on 5-9 June 1975)

as the head of a party and government delegation. After his visit to China, he also wanted to visit the Soviet Union in the second half of May, but the date he proposed did not suit the Soviet leaders. He also asked to be received in Prague, but the date did not suit [the Czechoslovak leadership] either. His intention to visit Moscow is an important political fact for two reasons. On the one hand, it shows that the DPRK continues to pursue a so-called policy of maintaining a balance of power between the Chinese party and our parties; on the other hand, we should take this intention into consideration while evaluating his trips to China, Europe, and Africa. [...]

We know from Soviet and Chinese sources (the DRV ambassador to Pyongyang informed us about the conversation that he had had with the Chinese ambassador to Pyongyang) that – primarily in China – Kim Il Sung considered the possibility of a military solution. According to the Chinese ambassador, the DPRK wants to create the kind of military situation in South Korea that came into being in South Vietnam before the victory. Taking advantage of the riots against the dictatorial regime of Park Chung Hee, and invited by certain South Korean [political] forces, the DPRK would have given military assistance if it had not been dissuaded from doing so in time.

This dissuasion obviously began as early as [Kim Il Sung's visit] in Beijing, for it is well-known that – primarily in Asia – China holds back and opposes any kind of armed struggle that might shake the position of the USA in Asia. A new Korean War would not be merely a war between North and South [Korea]. With this end in view, during the Korean party and government delegation's stay in Beijing, the Chinese side strongly emphasized the importance of the peaceful unification of Korea [...] For his part, Kim Il Sung said nothing, or hardly anything, about his own proposals to find a peaceful solution. On the contrary, he declared that if a revolution flared up in South Korea, the DPRK could not remain indifferent; it would give active assistance to the South Korean people. If the enemy started a war, it would be met with a crushing repulsion. In such a war, the DPRK could lose only the cease-fire line, but it might achieve the unification of the country, he said.

[...]

Of the six visits, the ones made to China and Yugoslavia were also important in regard to the military equipment and military technology made available to the DPRK. China provides the People's Army of the DPRK with many kinds of military equipment and arms. The possibility of giving certain tactical nuclear weapons [to North Korea] in order to offset the nuclear forces in South Korea also came into consideration. A deputy minister of the People's Armed Forces in Pyongyang, who on 11 June received the Hungarian military [officers who arrived in North Korea for] vacation, alluded to that. Yugoslavia helps [the DPRK] primarily in the field of naval forces.

[...]

Dr. János Taraba
chargé d'affaires ad interim



EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Bucharest, Romania

August 8, 1975

~~SECRET~~/NODIS

Lt General Brent Scowcroft, USAF
Deputy Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
The White House
Washington

Dear Brent:

I'm enclosing a copy of my verbatim notes of the Presidential conversations. I should correct that by saying that the notes are all verbatim except for the conversation on the train going up to Sinaia on August 3 when neither Celac nor I took notes. There's also a summary of a conversation the Secretary had with President Ceausescu over lunch. I've used a NODIS designation for these conversations (with the exception of one LOU/LIMDIS portion of the former) as well as the one on the Middle East.

I'll be working next week on final editing of the June conversation and as we agreed will send it on to you.

You will see that on both the Korean and PLO matters there is a possibility of further exchanges. Along the lines of what we discussed when I saw you in June, I hope you can keep me posted if things are handled through Bogdan. I don't really need to know the substance of such exchanges if they do not bear that directly on our concerns here but I do think I need to be kept informed previously that such exchanges are about to take place and then that they have actually taken place. You will note at the end of the memo on US-North Korean Relations, and the one on the Middle East that I refer a brief discussion between the Secretary and President Ceausescu. Both subjects were actually mentioned at the same time but for clarity's sake and so as not to complicate NODIS distribution problems I've separated the comments and repeated them verbatim with appropriate substitutions of geographical area at the end of each memorandum.

Best regards,

Harry G. Barnes, Jr.



*PS Copies of the notes
Have gone to Hal and
Art also.*

Encl

~~SECRET~~/NODIS
XGDS-1

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
STATE DEPT. CHANNELS, State Sec. 12/2/03
BY , NARA DATE 12/4/03

SECRET/NODIS

August 3, 1975

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION *

SUBJECT: US-North Korean Relations

PARTICIPANTS: Nicolae Ceausescu, President of Romania
 Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
 Harry G. Barnes, Jr., Ambassador - Interpreter

DATE AND PLACE: August 3, 1975, lunch, Peles Castle, Sinaia

Over lunch the Secretary asked President Ceausescu his impression of Kim Il-Sung. President Ceausescu replied that his impressions were good and he said he thought it would be to the advantage of the United States to have talks with the North Koreans although he realized we already had some contacts. The Secretary replied that they really were not of any substantive nature. During Kim Il-Sung's visit, President Ceausescu said he had indicated that he was not seeking a military solution to the Korean problem but rather a peaceful solution. The Secretary said that we'd be prepared to receive a secret message from the North Koreans but it would really have to be secret.

President Ceausescu remarked that one thing that was clear about the North Koreans was that they were pursuing an independent policy. They are much worse off than Romania, he said, in that they have four big powers to contend with - the Soviets, the Chinese, the Japanese and the Americans, thanks to American troops in South Korea. The Secretary said he really wondered whether it wasn't better to have more than one big power on your borders. If Romania was in North Korea's situation, President Ceausescu would play the big powers off against one another so successfully they never would know what hit them.

Just before the train stopped in Bucharest, President Ceausescu took the Secretary aside and returning to the question of secret contacts with the North Koreans suggested that the Secretary let him know when the United States was prepared to move further. The Secretary asked what channel should be used to which President Ceausescu replied whatever channel was most appropriate, the important thing being to convey the message that the United States side was ready for such contacts. Then, he said, the Romanian side would either send somebody to Washington or the American side could send somebody to Bucharest. The Secretary agreed with this suggestion.

DECLASSIFIED
 E.O. 13526, SEC. 1.5
 STATE DEPT, COUNCIL ON INT'L AFFAIRS, STATE & INT'L SECURITY
 BY: [redacted] DATE: 12/2/03

SECRET/NODIS

XGDS-1

*Notes were not taken by the interpreters during this conversation.

Telegram from Tokyo to Bucharest, No. 069.711

Date: 15 August 1975	Source: <i>Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archives, Matter 220/Year 1975/Country: Democratic People's Republic of Korea –US, Folder 1642, Concerning the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's Relations with the US, Started on: 11.03.1975, Completed on: 16.12.1975, Filing deadline: Permanent. Obtained and translated for NKIDP by Eliza Gheorghe</i>
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Ministry of Foreign Affairs
TELEGRAM
Sender: Tokyo
No.: 069.711
Date: 15.08.1975

The Japanese MP Tokuma Utsunomiya, who recently visited the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, publicly announced (after the cessation of Miki-Ford talks) that he was asked by President Kim Il Sung to send a spoken message to Prime Minister Miki, which included the following main points:

- 1) The Democratic People's Republic of Korea wishes that the present tension in the Korean Peninsula reduces and that measures be taken towards reunification
- 2) The Democratic People's Republic of Korea will oppose continued separation of the Korean people, and
- 3) The Democratic People's Republic of Korea wishes to conclude a peace agreement with the US, which would replace the existing ceasefire agreement.

Tokuma Utsunomiya mentioned that Prime Minister Miki is supposed to have communicated the above points to President Ford.

Signed: N. Finanțu

Memorandum, Hungarian Foreign Ministry

Date:
26 August 1975

Source:
XIX-J-1-j ENSZ, 1975, 159. doboz, V-730, 004711/1975. Obtained and Translated for NKIDP by Balazs Szalontai.

The socialist countries' fraternal coordinating meeting in regard to the 19th general conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency (henceforth IAEA) was held on 18-22 August 1975, at the invitation of the Polish Foreign Ministry.

The following states participated in the coordinating meeting: Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, German Democratic Republic, the Soviet Union, Ukraine, Belorussia, Romania, and the representative of the COMECON [Council for Mutual Economic Assistance] Secretariat.

[...]

In the course of the coordinating meeting, the fraternal delegations reached an agreement about the following [several items on the conference's agenda, such as items number 7, 8, 9, and 12, were not discussed at the meeting]:

- 1) They agreed that they would express their protest if a Chilean, Israeli, or South Korean citizen was proposed for any of the posts of vice-chairmen of the General Commission. Of the socialist countries, they would support the nomination of Poland, the Soviet Union, and Czechoslovakia.

[...]

- 6) During the discussion of the annual report, the Soviet delegate said that in the speech he was to make at the general assembly, he would analyze in detail:
 - the results of the Geneva conference [and]
 - the Helsinki declaration,

for the duties of the IAEA had increased as a consequence of the aforesaid [conferences], and these [conferences] played a very substantial role in world politics. The Soviet delegate would go into the issue of making the IAEA safeguards system more effective. Namely, it should be applied to nuclear equipment, materials, and technologies alike. This would mean that the states that had not joined the Non-Proliferation Treaty (henceforth NPT) would not get technological equipment and nuclear materials unless they subordinated their nuclear activity to the IAEA safeguards system. They would do their best to prevent the IAEA from assisting Chile, South Korea, and Israel. He asked for a firm attitude with regard to the issue of technical assistance, namely, that it should be made available only to those countries that had signed the NPT, otherwise the operation of the safeguards system would become ineffective.

The bilateral agreements, such as the one signed by the FRG [Federal Republic of Germany] and Brazil or the one signed by France and South Korea, had created an alarming situation, for in this way certain countries that remained outside the NPT could also obtain the full cycle of nuclear technology. One should achieve the result that complete nuclear technology be held by regional centers [rather than by individual countries], Comrade Arkadiev said.

The participants in the coordinating meeting found the budget too high. The Romanian and Korean delegates declared that they did not support the proposed increase.

[...]

- 10) The Soviet Union, Poland, Hungary, and Bulgaria announced that they would increase their financial contribution.
- 11) The delegates discussed the cooperation between COMECON and the IAEA, in which the DPRK, the DRV, and Yugoslavia also participated, and evaluated it positively.

[...]

- 14) The session also dealt with the election of new members of the governing council. The mandates of Bulgaria and Hungary would expire this year, and Poland and Yugoslavia would be nominated in their places. The Soviet delegate went into the issue of admitting the countries of the Far East into the governing council. He pointed out that hitherto the Philippines had a so-called "floating" status, but now it applied for the place vacated by South Korea, without coordinating [its action] with the region. On the other hand, Mongolia, Kampuchea, and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had not yet been members of the governing council. Of the latter, the Soviet representative proposed the DPRK, rather than the Philippines. However, the representative of the DPRK announced – after consultation – that he did not aspire to membership in the governing council. He explained this by the fact that France had signed a nuclear agreement with South Korea, which, he declared, was dangerous for the DPRK.

[...]

Gyula Szombathelyi

[Section head of the Major Department of International Organizations of the Foreign Ministry]

Report from the GDR Embassy in the DPRK.

Date:

1 September, 1975

Source:

Translated for NKIDP by Bernd Schaefer.

GDR Embassy to the DPRK
Pyongyang, 1 September, 1975

Ministry for Foreign Affairs
Head of Far East Department
Comrade Helmut Liebermann
B e r l i n

Dear Comrade Liebermann!

1. From the bottom of my heart, I thank you for your recent guidance letters. We always evaluate them very thoroughly in the Political Department [of our Embassy].

Since we want to have a special initiative program to honor the IX [SED] Party Congress, we would like to familiarize ourselves with the program of your department to get additional ideas. Thus, I ask of you to send us at your next convenience, if possible, the commitments you have made [in Berlin].

2. With this letter you also receive our assessments on positions of the KWP [Korean Workers' Party] and the DPRK regarding the so-called Third World and the Non-Aligned Movement. Responding to your question about the opinions of the Soviet comrades, I can assure you that all relevant information and assessments are reviewed with the Soviet comrades here, no matter whether they are current events or of a more comprehensive character. The opinions of the Soviet comrades are always reflected [in our assessments] here. Comrade Ambassador Everhartz will be able to confirm that.

The above-mentioned assessment, for instance, I reviewed during the process of writing down the details with a delegate from the Soviet Embassy, Comrade Pimenov, the counselor of the Hungarian Embassy, Comrade Dr. Taraba, and the counselor of the Bulgarian Embassy, Comrade Apostolov.

It would lead to wrong conclusions to measure the intensity of contacts and collaboration here on site by the number of transmitted reports. If you consider it necessary that we write a note for the records about each talk here, we will obviously observe this in the future - even if the content [of these notes] are already reflected in another record or the talk just served the purpose of a mutual review.

Rest assured that your implicit hint will also serve as guidance for us to undertake all efforts to continuously deepen the cooperation with the comrades from the Soviet Embassy on all levels.

3. As we noted in our telex about the celebrations for the 30th anniversary of Korea's liberation, there is growing concern among the Soviet comrades about DPRK attempts to differentiate between the individual socialist states. Our own observations fully conform to this assessment. DPRK relations vis-à-vis the Soviet Union are indeed presently very cold. According to Comrade Pimenov, Soviet citizens [in the DPRK] are frequently treated like unwelcome foreigners. At the same time, the DPRK demonstrates a very cordial relationship with the PR China. This is expressed through the wide media coverage and in the exchange of a large number of different delegations.

In contrast to the Soviet Union, the GDR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Mongolia, the DPRK clearly applies preferential treatment to Yugoslavia, Cuba, and, to be honest, Bulgaria as well, in addition to Romania. This opinion is fully shared by the ambassadors from Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Mongolia. Concerning Hungary, it is currently very difficult to make a clear assessment [of their relations with the DPRK]. The Polish Ambassador suggested [that we] have a thorough discussion on this issue in a meeting of ambassadors from the close fraternal socialist states once the Soviet Ambassador has returned from his vacation.

We are of the opinion that the presently visibly cool relations between DPRK and Soviet Union will only be temporary. The long-term design of DPRK policy rests on the principle of a "balance" and precludes a complete turn towards the PR China. Apparently, we are seeing a misguided [North Korean] attempt to exert pressure on the Soviet Union, which, in our opinion, still requires heightened vigilance and close coordination on all issues.

In the context of the non-materialized Kim Il Sung visit [to the USSR], Comrade Pimenov reiterated that over the last three years, the Korean side has canceled already agreed upon meetings six times on short notice. The Soviet Union could not accept a dictated date (18 to 22 May [North Korean proposed date for Kim Il Sung to Moscow]). In

essence, this fact influenced the Soviet position. The Soviet comrades are correct in their position that the struggle to deepen the relationship with the DPRK will ultimately not be successful with a lack of principles.

In June, specialist meetings by the planning organs of the DPRK and the Soviet Union were held. The Korean side asked for the importation of 12 factories with a value of about 1 billion Rubles. In the case of an official request from the DPRK government, the Soviet Union is willing to expand the thermal power plant, Pukchon, and the smelting plant, Kim Chaek, and to deliver factories for the production of phosphorus fertilizer, detergents, and hydraulic mine equipment. Altogether these five factories have an overall value of 200 million Rubles. The DPRK proposed to increase its annual exports [to the Soviet Union] of rolled steel to 250,000 tons until 1979, as well as of cement to 600,000 tons until 1976 and to 800,000 tons until 1980.

However, the Soviet comrades doubt whether the DPRK can meet such obligations. On the other hand, the DPRK's requests demonstrate that the reality of socialist construction is forcing the DPRK to collaborate with the Soviet Union.

4. Korean comrades already told representatives from the close fraternal embassies that our state telegrams for the 30th anniversary of liberation will not get published since they are only a few and the official national holiday is actually the 9th of September.

Our congratulations (business cards) were not answered except for a few. They were sent in by the ambassadors of Czechoslovakia and Mongolia and the acting ambassadors from the GDR, Bulgaria, and Hungary. The DPRK consequently sticks to its announced policy to accept congratulatory telegrams for an occasion like this only from the Soviet Union.

5. A member from the Department IV in the KWP Central Committee told Comrade Dr. Taraba, Acting Ambassador of Hungary, that no party delegations will be invited to the 30th anniversary of the KWP foundation. If, however, delegations want to visit the DPRK at this time due to other mutual arrangements, they are welcome. The Bulgarian comrades were explicitly told that Comrade Tellalov, Secretary in the BCP Central Committee, might want to visit the DPRK during this 30th anniversary according to a [bilateral] agreement about the exchange of party delegations in the field of international relations.
6. The situation on the peninsula appears calm. Apparently both sides do not wish to have any serious incidents occur before the 30th U.N. General Assembly.

The recent meeting between Red Cross delegations from the DPRK and South Korea ended without results, like all the others before. The DPRK asks for such conditions to realize concrete proposals that they would amount to a change of the power situation in South Korea.

The DPRK is now focused to prepare, in economic regards, for the 30th anniversary of the KWP's founding, which is widely reflected in the mass media.

Finally, I want to inform you that the working process in the embassy is seriously hampered by another failure of the telephone system. We are not able to repair it ourselves anymore. For about two years now, we have been unsuccessful in finding a phone specialist.

I will write another telex to Comrade Mallasch today and ask for his help since the situation is simply unbearable. The Korean comrades caused, through faulty switching, two major disasters in our transformer house. This has resulted in the complete destruction of two voltage transformers in a high voltage area. The embassy still receives its electricity via an emergency cable.

The constant damages and failures of technical facilities are ultimately a result of the fact that they [North Koreans] do not perform the required regular check-ups by specialists.

I ask for your support on the issue of delegating a phone specialist immediately.

With socialist greetings
[signed]
Steinhofer
Acting Ambassador

~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE

5b



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

4 September 1975

MEMO FOR LTG BRENT SCOWCROFT, USAF
DEPUTY ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT
FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

Brent -

FYI: Attached is a copy of a MEMCON between Secretary Schlesinger
and President Pak.

W

Attachment
As stated

JOHN A. WICKHAM, JR.
Major General, USA
Military Assistant

UPON REMOVAL OF ATTACHMENTS THIS
DOCUMENT BECOMES UNCLASSIFIED



~~SECRET~~

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SENSITIVE

Sec Def Cont Nr. X-2593



~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE

5c

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

2 September 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with President Pak Chung Hee in Seoul, Korea
27 August 1975

1. US attendees at this private meeting were limited to Secretary Schlesinger, Ambassador Sneider, General George Brown, Admiral Noel Gayler, General Richard Stilwell, and Major General Wickham.
2. After the initial greetings, Secretary Schlesinger told President Pak that President Ford asked him to convey his unequivocal commitment of support for the ROK and assurances that our forces would remain on the Korean Peninsula.
3. President Pak's opening comments focused on the events immediately after the fall of RVN and Cambodia. He said that these events together with the visit of Kim Il-Sung to Peking produced a peak of tension in the ROK. However, the statements of President Ford, Mr. Kissinger and Mr. Schlesinger about the commitment of the US to the defense of the ROK, together with strong public warnings to North Korea, have provided reassurances and therefore the tension in the ROK has eased. President Pak stated his unequivocal belief that the changes in North Korea are merely ones of tactics because their fundamental objective of a take-over in the South remains unchanged. He went on to point out that the best way to prevent reckless aggression by North Korea continues to be to allow no miscalculation about the intent of the ROK and the US should aggression occur. While he believed that the ROK together with the US forces on the ground possess the capability to defend, Kim Il-Sung might misjudge these capabilities and believe that that international situation would be conducive to renewed aggression. Therefore, to prevent any misjudgment two things must be done -
 - a. Our intent and determination to defend must be clear to North Korea, and
 - b. Deeds must back our statements. We must strengthen our capabilities.

It is for this reason that Secretary Schlesinger's visit is very significant at this time and the Korean people are most appreciative.

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WITH PORTIONS EXEMPTED

E.O. 12958 SEC. 1.5

OSD rev 2/2/09

MR08-06 #1, State rev 9/25/02

~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE

Sec Def Cont Nr. X-2580

BY dal NARA DATE 4/14/09

President Pak noted that Secretary Schlesinger's arrival statement together with the Security Consultative deliberations would represent strong deterrent warnings to North Korea and could contribute to substantial improvement over time in the Korean armed forces.

4. President Pak said that he had been fully briefed by MOD Suh on the SCC deliberations and he was pleased with the US understanding of the ROK situation together with the encouraging statements about the US commitment. Then he went on to note that in the past the ROK has been much too reliant on the US for defense. The ROK should now do their utmost to defend themselves and lessen the burden on the US for the defense of the ROK. He indicated that the ROK was working on several measures with this goal. One of these measures involved the Yulgok plan which is designed for a self-help defense posture. This plan would permit the ROK to develop a level of defense capability so that the ROK could successfully defend alone against a North Korean attack without any substantial help from the PRC or the USSR. President Pak felt that this capability could be reached in 5 years. He said that the ROK will try to do as much as possible to finance this plan themselves. The Legislature had just approved a defense tax which would be used exclusively to finance this plan. The priority of effort in the plan would be to upgrade capabilities in the Air Force and Navy together with fire power and mobility for the ground forces. In addition, it would be necessary to equip and arm more reserve forces so that they could be put into action should war break out. All of this plan will require support and cooperation from the US. Finally, President Pak noted that the current modernization plan is behind schedule and asked if it could be accelerated.

5. President Pak expanded on the needs of the 5-year plan in terms of defense production capabilities in the ROK. He said that this would require the support and cooperation of the US in terms of technology and co-production assistance. He noted that until the objectives of the 5-year plan were reached, the level of US forces in the ROK must be maintained at the present level. He said that recently he had met with various members of the US Congress who had asked if the US forces could be withdrawn after 5 years. President Pak said that his reply noted that North Korea had alliances with the PRC and the USSR and that these nations would only have to cross a river to assist Korea. Therefore, the role of US forces in the ROK must be to help in maintaining the delicate balance of power in this area of the world and thus a substantial level of US forces still would be required to stay in this area of the world subsequent to the 5-year plan for ROK improvement of its defense capabilities. President Pak said that he felt the US Congressmen seemed to agree with this view.



6. Secretary Schlesinger said that he concurred with the basic views which President Pak had just laid out. With regard to the level of US forces, we plan no basic changes in the level. While the strength would remain unaffected, we may make some adjustments in particular detail but the purpose of these adjustments would be simply to enhance the common capability. In our judgment the deficiencies to be remedied in the ROK armed forces' capabilities lie principally in close air support, in armor, and in logistics. To the extent that we make adjustments in US forces, these adjustments will be to shore up the deficiencies in the ROK AF.

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7. Secretary Schlesinger indicated US support for the defense upgrade efforts which President Pak had announced. He said that one of our difficulties in Congress in the past has been perceptions of the extent of the ROK effort to provide for its own defense. To the extent that the ROK increases its own defense effort, it will help with these Congressional and public criticisms. However, he suggested that the ROK must be cautious with its defense improvement program so as to avoid damage to the international economic position of the ROK. It would be important for the ROK to keep its international credit worthiness high, as it is now. Too heavy a commitment on defense self-sufficiency across the board could erode the beneficial foreign exchange position for the ROK. Short term defense objectives should not diminish the long-run economic capabilities for the ROK. Secretary Schlesinger said that we are prepared to help in areas such as logistics, ammunition availability, armor, close air support, and artillery. We can also assist in defense production cooperation.

8. As a final comment, Secretary Schlesinger described his views as to the relationship of the Korean Peninsula to the world strategic situation. He indicated that overall threats in world politics will continue to be influenced by the situation in the Peninsula. After the fall of RVN and Cambodia, it is true that some concern and uneasiness existed in the ROK but there are some favorable results as well and some illusions have been dispelled. The North Koreans should not draw comfort from the current situation. Our plans and public expressions of support for the ROK are indicative. In the US there are attitudes that say "there will be no more Vietnams" -- but this means that we are not going to permit war to blunder along for an extended time. We will have forces and means to deal effectively with war if we are drawn into it. If North Korea miscalculates it would be tragic for them. We plan no more Vietnams. Thus, the Korean Peninsula is an element in the



larger balance around the world. The Soviets continue to make tactical ploys without changing their basic objectives. Detente can, of course, be misunderstood. For it to be effective, it must rest on the maintenance of an equivalence of forces in the world and here in the Korean Peninsula. In summary, the balance of power on the Korean Peninsula is encouraging.

9. President Pak expressed again his appreciation for the Secretary's understanding of the ROK situation and for his supportive remarks concerning ROK defense capabilities.

(W)

JOHN A. WICKHAM, JR.
Major General, USA
Military Assistant

cf: ✓LTG Brent Scowcroft





~~SECRET~~ - SENSITIVE - NODIS
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

Ed 1a

copy sent to Barnes

9 September 1975

General Goweroff

MEMORANDUM FOR LTC ROBERT C. McFARLANE, USMC
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT
FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

Bud:

Per our conversation on Monday, enclosed are the MEMCONS of
Secretary Schlesinger's visits with key South Korean officials.

Howard

HOWARD D. GRAVES
LTC, USA
Military Assistant

Enclosures
As stated

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3
MR # 08-06, #2
OSD Mr 4/28/08
By dal NARA, Date 12/10/09



~~SECRET~~ - SENSITIVE - NODIS

Classified by Sec Def
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF
EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652. EXEMPTION CATEGORY 1
DECLASSIFY ON notification of originator. 1776-1976



SEC DEF CONTR No. X- 2654

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

NODIS

PARTICIPANTS: President Park Chung Hee
 Minister of Defense Suh Jyong-chul
 ROK Chairman of JCS Ro Jae-hyun
 Secretary General, Kim Chong-yom
 Senior Protocol Secretary, Choi Kwan-soo

Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger
 Ambassador Richard L. Sneider
 General Richard G. Stilwell
 Chairman, JCS, General George S. Brown
 CINCPAC, Admiral Noel A.M. Gayler
 Military Assistant to Secretary of Defense, Maj Gen John A. Wickham

TIME & PLACE: President Park's Office, August 27, 1975

During the pre-lunch and luncheon conversation, three areas of particular interest were covered.

1. JAPAN

President Park discussed his concerns about the Japanese attitude toward Korea, particularly his fears about the leftward drift in the Japanese political scene when the younger generation takes over and the diminution of Japanese economic assistance to Korea. During the discussion, Secretary Schlesinger said that he proposed to discuss with Prime Minister Miki the need for greater Japanese economic assistance to Korea.

2. HUMAN RIGHTS

In the course of discussing recent Congressional visits to Korea, Secretary Schlesinger noted that President Park, as a result of these visits, must be aware of Congressional attitudes on human rights and the problems it has caused the Administration.

3. ASW

President Park described his rationale for acquisition of submarines. He said that, in order to deal with the North Korean submarine threat both during a period of conflict and to present infiltration and subversive efforts, he wished to acquire a comparable capability. He felt that, if the ROK had similar capability, North Korea would not utilize its submarines. Secretary Schlesinger suggested that there are probably more cost-effective ways for dealing with the North Korean submarine threat than purchasing or



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E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3

MR # 05-06, #3

OSD-Ltr 4/28/08; State Ltr 11/3/09

By dal NARA, Date 12/10/09

NODIS

building submarines in the South. He mentioned use of P-3's and sensors for the detection and if necessary destruction of the submarines. He also stressed the vulnerability of the North Korean ports to mining and other techniques to close these ports. It was agreed that the U.S. would provide experts to review the options available to deal with the North Korean submarine threat. In addition, the Secretary asked General Brown and Admiral Gayler to look into P-3 operations in the Korean area.



MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: President Park Chung Hee
 Minister of Defense Suh Jyong-chul
 Ro Jae-hyun, ROK Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff
 Kim Chong-yom, Secretary General
 Choi Kwan-soo, Senior Protocol Secretary

Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger
 Ambassador Richard L. Sneider
 General Richard G. Stilwell
 Admiral Noel A. M. Gayler, CINCPAC
 General George S. Brown, Chairman, JCS
 Major General John A. Wickham, Military Assistant to SecDef

TIME & PLACE: President Park's Office, August 27, 1975



NORTH KOREAN THREAT

After an exchange of initial greetings, President Park made a lengthy presentation focussing on his current assessment of the North Korean threat and the ROKG Force Improvements Requirement Plan.

After the collapse of Vietnam, there was a high degree of tension in Korea with the South Korean people anxious and the North Koreans encouraged to launch an attack against the South. The situation in Korea, however, has now stabilized due to two major factors: (1) U.S. statements on reaffirming U.S. commitments and issuing public warnings to North Korea; and (2) the unity and determination demonstrated in the Republic of Korea. North Korea is now frustrated and no longer encouraged to launch an attack. It has changed its tactics and is pressing a "peace offensive".

Secretary Schlesinger agreed that the North Korean moves were tactical and suggested that the counter-strategy is to keep North Korea engaged in a "peace offensive".

President Park stressed that war on the Korean peninsula will be due to miscalculation on the part of Kim Il-sung. If Kim thinks that the ROK can not cope with an attack, then he will attack even though North Korea will not succeed militarily. There is always a danger that Kim might miscalculate and therefore the outbreak of war depends on Kim's assessment of the situation in the South. To prevent miscalculation, President Park suggested that we must make our intent and determination to resist aggression known and back these words by deeds, specifically by building up ROK military capabilities. In this connection, Secretary Schlesinger's visit is a very significant demonstration of U.S. resolve to meet its commitment and a clear warning to North Korea. The President said that he had been briefed on the Secretary's talks with Minister Suh and was pleased by the unity and friendship demonstrated therein and the common resolve to defend against a North Korean attack.

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E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3

MR # 08-06, #4

DATE 4/17/08 BY OSD/LL 9/2/08. DATE 4/13/09

By del NARA, Date 12/10/09

ROK FORCE IMPROVEMENT

President Park went on to describe his plans for strengthening the ROK armed forces, thanking Secretary Schlesinger for his understanding attitude. He said that in the past the ROK had been too dependant on the United States and relied too much on the United States. It is now determined to defend itself and lessen the U.S. burden. It has, therefore, adopted a plan for self-reliant defense "YOLKUK". This plan contemplates upgrading the combat capabilities of the ROK so that it can defend itself alone against a North Korean attack which does not have substantial help from the USSR or PRC. President Park hopes to accomplish this goal in five years. A large sum will be needed to fund the plan and as much as possible of these funds will come from ROK resources, specifically from the new defense tax levied over the next five years. Under the plan, naval and air force capabilities, now inferior to the North, will be upgraded and the mobility and fire power of the ground forces will likewise be improved. In addition, the homeland reserve will be armed with new equipment.

President Park said that the new plan needs American understanding, support, and cooperation. He also urged expediting completion of the modernization plan which is now behind schedule. Finally, he requested U.S. assistance in building up Korea's defense industry

President Park asked that the level of U.S. forces be maintained until the five year plan is accomplished. He had met and explained his plan to a number of members of the U.S. Congress. They asked whether after five years the United States would be able to withdraw. President Park said that we must keep in mind that, even though the South would be able to deal alone with the North, North Korea is allied to the USSR and the PRC which need only cross a river to support North Korea. The role of the United States is to prevent war and to maintain the delicate balance of power in Northeast Asia. Therefore, even after the five year plan is completed a substantial level of U.S. forces will be needed in South Korea. President Park said that most Congressmen agreed with his views.

COMMENTS BY SECRETARY SCHLESINGER

The Secretary said that he concurred with the basic structure of President Park's planning, but had several comments. With respect to the level of U.S. forces, he foresees no basic changes over the next five years. The overall strength of the U.S. forces will not be effected, but there will be adjustments in detail to enhance the common defense structure of the United States in Korea. Furthermore, for the foreseeable future, we will have to maintain the overall complementarity of the U.S.-ROK forces. The principal deficiencies in the ROK forces are close air support, armor, and logistics, and these will have to be shored-up.

The Secretary said that he anticipated South Korea will make progress with regard to its capability for dealing with the North, but he does not believe it is necessary for the South to hold the ring against the USSR and

the PRC should they be inclined to support North Korea, That role will be played by the U.S. Therefore, it is an illusion to view South Korea as entirely dependant and self-reliant. The U.S. must maintain forces in Northeast Asia and in the Western Pacific to deal with these super powers. In order to enhance the U.S. image in this respect, we plan in the immediate future to rotate into South Korea assets which will be most visible against the Chinese and Soviet threat, such as F-111's.

Secretary Schlesinger urged even close joint defense planning for both military and political reasons. He explained that one problem in the U.S. is the view that South Korea is not doing enough in its own defense. The new Korean force improvement plan helps very much in this respect. Secretary Schlesinger then urged that the improvement in the ROK force structure not be implemented in such a way as to damage Korea's international economic position, given its current balance of payments problem. He suggested that the ROK assure that off-shore acquisition of weapons be carefully considered on a cost effective basis so as to limit its impact on the balance of payments deficit. He also suggested that, given Korea's need to maintain its credit worthiness with commercial banks, it avoid publicly making war appear likely, which could have a very bad effect on the banks. He urges that Korea build its economy and defense for the long-term and not take short-term actions impairing its economic future.

Secretary Schlesinger said that the U.S. would be willing to assist in the development of Korea's defense industry and to review the most effective areas for assistance. He suggested logistics, armor, and artillery as the areas with the most serious deficiencies.

The Secretary then discussed Korea's position in relation to international politics. In the wake of the Vietnam debacle, there had been understandable concerns. He wished, however, to stress that U.S. adversaries should gain no comfort from Vietnam. The American public had been bewildered by the Vietnam War. There will be no more Vietnams. This means that we will not permit ourselves to be engaged in another unsuccessful, long war. Instead, we will deal with conflict with adequate determination and force. A North Korea miscalculation would be tragic for the North.

Korea is an important element in the global balance of power. Soviet tactical ploys at the present time do not portend any change in the fundamental Soviet objective to expand its power and influence. The PRC is apprehensive. Detente is misunderstood. For detente to be successful, we need to maintain the balance of power without any expansion of Soviet influence. What happens in Korea affects the balance of power elsewhere and vice versa. Europe is affected by the expansion of Soviet power in Korea while flabbiness in Europe has its effect on Korea.

President Park expressed his strong appreciation for the Secretary's remarks, particularly the comments on balance of payments problems, defense industry development, and the relationship of Korea to the security of the rest of the world. He recognized that, while Korea improves its defense capabilities, it must at the same time develop its economy.



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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: President Park Chung Hee
Senior Protocol Secretary, Choi Kwan-soo

Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger
Ambassador Richard L. Sneider

NUCLEAR MATTERS

Noting that he had discussed the problem with President Ford, Secretary Schlesinger said that the U.S. attached extreme importance to the NPT. This entirely underscored the wisdom of the ROK adherence to the treaty which we warmly welcomed. The ROK action avoided a very serious political problem in the U.S. where major elements attached particular importance to NPT.

The Secretary added that substantively the ROK adherence to the NPT is a sound policy. The problem is not only in the U.S., but elsewhere.

President Park assured the Secretary that ROK had every intention of living up to the NPT. He explained the comments reported by Bob Novak. Novak had questioned him on what the ROK would do in case the U.S. nuclear protection was removed. Park had replied that he did not think the U.S. would remove its nuclear umbrella.

On the other hand if he said nothing, it would be a blow to the morale of the Korean people. He again assured the Secretary that the ROK would live up to its Treaty obligations.

DECLASSIFIED - E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.6
With PORTIONS EXEMPTED
E.O. 12958 Sec. 1.5 (a-b)

MR 94-143, #19 DSD Lt. 11/1/96
By KCH MARR, Date 3/12/96

~~SECRET~~ - SENSITIVE



Secretary Schlesinger commented that it would be best

President Park expressed agreement with the Secretary's views.

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U.S. COMMITMENT

Secretary Schlesinger said that President Ford is unequivocal in his support of Korea. This view goes back to 1950 when President Ford was angered by the previous withdrawal of U.S. forces. In fact, pressures to reduce the U.S. overseas deployment in Congress have weakened. There was no effort during the 1975 Congress nor is one expected in 1976. The next effort to legislate reduction of overseas deployment, he expects, would be in 1977. The secretary said he is not concerned either about such efforts. He expects President Ford to be re-elected, but if not the Democrats are not likely to eliminate U.S. support for South Korea. As an example of the change of opinion in the left of the U.S., he cited Senator Eagleton's recent statement.

One of the lessons of Vietnam is that the left now understands the illusion of U.S. withdrawal and that the Paris Peace Accords would bring peace. They now understand that if the balance of power shifts the Communists will act aggressively. This lesson is specifically relevant to Korea.

U.S. COMMANDERS

President Park asked as a special personal favor from President Ford that General Stilwell and General Hollingsworth be retained for another year in Korea. He praised their contribution to Korea's defense and urged that they not be shifted during the next year which could be critical. Secretary Schlesinger said we have no intention of moving General Stilwell until his age of retirement at sixty and took note of the President's request with respect to General Hollingsworth.

SECRET - SENSITIVE



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In his closing remarks, Secretary Schlesinger praised the political will he had found in Korea for defense of its country. This will was needed in Vietnam and Europe, but there is no need to instill it in Koreans. It is the ultimate source of strength for the Republic of Korea.



MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Minister of Defense, Suh Jyong-chul
Director of Joint Chiefs of Staff, Lt Gen Yur Pyong-hyon
Assistant Minister for Installations and Logistics, Maj Gen Paek Sok-chu
Secretary of Defense, James R. Schlesinger
Principal Deputy Assistant ~~to~~ Secretary of Defense, Amos Jordan
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Morton I. Abramowitz
Military Assistant to Secretary of Defense, Maj Gen John A. Wickham

TIME & PLACE: August 26, 1975, Minister Suh's Office

Minister Suh:

I appreciate the encouraging remarks that you made in the meeting this morning. During that meeting, we covered all essential areas, and, in fact, left almost nothing for us to discuss now. But there are five subjects which I would like to take up with you this afternoon.

U.S. COMMITMENT

Minister Suh:

First, I would like to mention the U.S. commitment to Korea. This morning we talked about your commitment to Korea and deterrence against the outbreak of the war. I appreciated your strong statements and believe they should be included in the joint communique, so that the Korean people can gain as much encouragement as I have. As I said this morning, if we receive enough appropriate aid from the U.S. we can take care of the fighting on the ground. By appropriate aid, I mean fire power, including tactical nuclear weapons, tactical air, and logistics support. Since our naval and air forces are inferior to that of North Korea we need U.S. air and naval support. We have a dedicated armed force of 600 thousand men, 2 million reserve soldiers, plus a population of 35 million. We are united and will not give up one inch of territory.

As you know, China and the USSR have bilateral military alliances with North Korea. They are located close to North Korea and can send support rapidly to Pyongyang in case of war. Thus we expect rapid countermeasures from the U.S. in case of war. We need reassurances from the U.S. in case of war. We need reassurances from the U.S. so that there is no chance of miscalculation on the part of North Korea.

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E.O. 12066 SEC. 3.6

MR 94-143 #20 OSD Ltr 6/15/05

BY del NARA DATE 7/24/04



What I said about taking care of the ground war ourselves does not mean that we do not need the Second Division. The Second Division is a firm deterrent against war, especially from the standpoint of the USSR and China. U.S. forces must continue to be stationed in Korea at the current level.

In this regard, I would like to raise the question of the defense of the Northwest Islands. They are so located that Kim Il-song may be tempted to probe our common resolve in this area. We feel that in the initial stage in any war we must act clearly and steadfastly so that we demonstrate our resolve. Currently, General Stilwell and I are reviewing the defense of the Islands. He is awaiting, however, a political decision from higher authorities. So far he has not received this decision. I hope that the occasion of your visit will furnish a favorable response on this question.

It is easy to think of the Islands as being distant and local in nature, but they are important. The initial reaction to any aggression in this area is vital. You should not let the North have any doubts about your commitments. If we fail to react during the initial stages of aggression, we will see serious repercussions.

It is also important with regard to the U.S. deterrent to increase joint training exercises. Such exercises will help forestall any miscalculations from the North. For example, elements of the Seventh Fleet could engage in joint exercises with the ROK Navy. Such exercises as FOCUS RETINA could also be intensified.

Secretary Schlesinger:

As a general observation, I would say that we have strongly reinforced our deterrent in recent months. Given the present political climate, neither China nor the USSR is concerned about our troop presence. We cannot tell for certain how long this climate will continue, but if I had to guess, I would say that China would continue to be worried about the USSR and would see the U.S. presence in Northeast Asia as a counterbalance against Moscow. Peking would thus not be inclined to join in any action against the U.S. in Korea. The Soviets seem to be interested in detente. We should, of course, be alert for any changes in this climate; but for the time being it appears that it will continue for some time to come.

Neither China nor the USSR has given any overt sign of supporting North Korean ambitions. Of course, absence of overt signs is not necessarily conclusive, and there could be covert support. Nevertheless, I do not believe China is inclined to aid North Korea because of the need for U.S. presence in the area as a counterweight to the Soviet Union. Kim Il-song, during his visit to Peking evidently found that China not only refrained from supporting a move against the South, but discouraged such a move. It is hard to judge Soviet intentions over the long run. For the immediate future, however, we should worry not about encouragement to Pyongyang on the part of China or the Soviet Union, but about the problem of North Korea running amok on its own.



The heart of the problem, then, for the immediate future is North Korea. Deterring North Korea depends on two things: the state of our forces and Pyongyang's perception of the adequacy of our logistics. The state of our forces needs improvement. The perception by the North that those forces can not only defend the South, but can also inflict damage on North Korea will preserve our deterrence. We must have sufficient munitions on hand and be ready to move in more by air. We must keep up open lines of communications. This is one aspect of the complementarity that I spoke about this morning. It presents no difficulty in my judgment. We can keep the lines of communication open. North Korea will not act to interfere with U.S. shipping. It would be our responsibility to provide these supplies and to keep open the lines of communications.

In addition, in the event of major aggression across the DMZ our reaction would be covered by the inherent powers of the U.S. President in light of the presence in the area of U.S. forces. Moreover, under the terms of the mutual defense treaty, we would be prepared to take appropriate action, including the deployment and employment of tactical air units. With respect to what I said about the inherent powers of the President, I am not sure it is advisable to publicly advertise this point. This could lead to criticism in the Congress concerning this issue.

This brings me to the consideration of less direct, more ambiguous challenges which require lesser action to insure deterrence. The Minister mentioned exercises. I think we should move in the direction of greater exercise activity. For example, U.S. air units could come to Korea for exercises. These could be useful because they would be visible and would be factored into the calculations of North Korea, China, and the Soviet Union.

With respect to the offshore islands, these present a less clear-cut problem than a move across the DMZ. I have discussed this issue with the President. He said that the U.S. would object strongly to any North Korean action of this type. However, as opposed to a major aggression across the DMZ in the face of U.S. forces and in the face of our treaty commitment, there would be constitutional problems in our making an advance commitment with respect to the islands. We will have to explore with the ROK what are the options and how we might respond to moves against the islands.

We must continue to develop all options in this area. We must develop joint contingency plans. We will reinforce General Stilwell's own inclinations to plan jointly for the defense of the islands. Since this is a more difficult area for us constitutionally, circumstances will have to determine the implementation of our plans. Such circumstances will include the question of exactly how aggression occurs. We would be best served in this regard if the fact of aggression can be clearly demonstrated to the Congress and the American public. We would hope, in this regard, that the ROKG will act with discretion and not be perceived by the U.S. public as acting precipitously. In the meantime we should proceed with a build-up of the islands' defense so that the North would view a move against the islands as being excessively costly.



With regard to deterrence in general, it may be desirable for me to restate our position on U.S. forces. We plan no adjustment in forces in Korea in the period immediately ahead. I must explain what I mean by "immediately ahead". Sometimes this phrase is misinterpreted to mean that some changes will take place after the immediate future. We do not plan any fundamental changes in U.S. support. Over the long run, we may make some adjustments to advance future complementarity. Such adjustments would in fact be aimed at strengthening deterrence, e.g., the NIKE-MERCULES adjustments. We should feel free in our partnership to make those adjustments which are necessary for efficiency. Such changes do not symbolize any change or weakening in deterrence. If necessary, we could take simultaneous steps to make it thoroughly clear to North Korea that our adjustments were aimed at reinforcing deterrence.

Minister Suh:

I understand your strong statements reiterating your support and the continuation in U.S. policy. However, we are concerned that in the event of major aggression by North Korea the U.S. would have to go through various time-consuming processes. There would be communications between General Stilwell and yourself; the question would be referred to Congress. And while all this was going on, our capital, which is only one hour's drive from the DMZ, would be endangered by a lightning war. We believe that the UNC Commander, who also has operational control of our forces, should be vested with the authority to do something immediately to blunt major aggression and only then have to submit to the various procedures required by U.S. law.

Secretary Schlesinger:

Mr. Minister, you are dealing with a theoretical and not a practical problem. There is no question in my mind as to what the President would authorize to be done in the case of major aggression. I believe the reaction would be immediate.

Minister Suh:

We have no doubt of that with regard to an attack across the DMZ, but such a response should also be the same with respect to the offshore islands. Kim Il-song is no fool. He knows about the treaty and about your statements of support, but he may ask, as a result of Vietnam, whether this commitment is reliable. He may be inclined to attack the islands in order to test the U.S. commitment. If U.S. planes and ships do not immediately participate in the defense of the islands, Kim may think the U.S. might not participate in the defense of Seoul. Therefore, the U.S. must react instantaneously in the event of an attack on the islands. You must remember that OPCON of the UN Commander applies to the ROK in its entirety, including the islands which are under the military control of the UNC.



General Stilwell and I have visited the islands together. We have agreed that they can be defended against surface attack. They are more vulnerable to attack from the air. An air attack on the islands would justify a strong demonstration of joint U.S.-Korean action at the initial stages.

Secretary Schlesinger:

In the event of a move towards Seoul across the DMZ, U.S. forces would come under immediate threat. The President in such a situation can authorize General Stilwell to react in self-defense. There is no problem of constitutional authority in such a situation. The islands present a different situation. I am aware that if Kim Il-song took the islands it would be a psychological blow to Korea and might also embolden him to move across the DMZ. Therefore, we must be prepared to deal with this problem. The islands are part of Korea, like Seoul, and must be defended. The circumstances differ however from an attack across the DMZ. As I have said, we cannot make an advance commitment in the case of the islands. We can, however, plan together and our response to an attack on the islands should be firm. We must in the future undertake a discussion of the nature of our response.

Minister Suh:

What would you think of the idea of sending a small UNC liaison group to the islands? There are already small UNC combat support teams with FROKA. Such a liaison group could maintain communications between the island and UNC and could aid in ground-air communications.

Secretary Schlesinger:

I think the Minister has laid bare this problem. It is clear that the islands are a potentially vulnerable area and that we must work together in planning their defense. I will discuss this matter with the President, and in a general review of the issue, the suggestion the Minister has just made with regard to a UNC liaison group will be examined. I urge, in any case, that you not be unduly concerned. This is not a problem that would be referred to Congress. U.S. action would be firm and speedy, and the issue would not be submitted to Congress for debate.

Minister Suh:

I would like to go over a few of your points. It is my understanding that there will be no changes in the level of U.S. forces in the foreseeable future. Concerning the exercises, I understand that you have endorsed the idea of increasing them.



Secretary Schlesinger:

On the force issue, we plan no changes of a fundamental nature. There might be some changes in detail, but none of a fundamental nature. This is the President's decision. Of course, the subject could be reopened by 1977, but I do not think any successor administration would take steps to weaken the U.S. commitment to Korea.

MOD AND FORCE IMPROVEMENT PLANS

Minister Suh:

The second subject I would like to discuss involves the MOD plan and the five year force improvement plan. We appreciated your statements this morning that you will do your best with regard to these plans. I would like now only to reiterate our need for the unfunded portion of the MOD Plan, that is, \$460 million dollars. We hope that this will be funded by FY-1977 at the latest.

Secretary Schlesinger:

That certainly is our intention. We will be seeking credit to the extent that grant aid is not available. There have been shortfalls in the MOD Plan, but we have made substantial progress. You should not lose sight of this progress.

Minister Suh:

This morning you endorsed the general direction of the force improvement plan. I would like only to emphasize our need to alleviate our foreign exchange problem. We estimate that during the five year period we will need \$1 billion dollars of FMS credit.

Secretary Schlesinger:

I would like to bring up some specific issues in equipment. In FY-77 we will transfer the NIKE-HERCULES battalion to the ROKG. We are seeking to make this transfer essentially costless to the ROKG. The Army has posed a package of 7 and one-half million dollars. We think this would be the upper limit and will try to make it less.

With respect to air, the U.S. of course, provides a complementary force. We are prepared in any case to move ahead with the F4's and F5's in reflection of the desires of the ROKG. Over the longer run we will examine upgrading close air support, for example, the A-10, but this is subject for later discussion.



Regarding the force improvement plan, we have noted certain items which we do not believe have high priority. For example, we have noted submarines. These are expensive and in view of North Korean land communications lines, do not seem particularly useful. They may reflect some tendency to seek a mirror image of North Korean forces. As for your lines of communications, we can keep them open. North Korea sees some use for submarines to try to interdict your lines of communications, although I think they are mistaken. In any event, from the ROKG standpoint, submarines should have a low priority.

On the question of foreign exchange I can not give you a definite answer but have taken note of your desires and we will do our best to meet them.

One additional item. As I said this morning, the Vietnam cloud has had some silver linings, and one of them is the possibility of equipment spill-out. We are ready to make available to you about 18 A-37's on an as-is where-is basis at very low cost. We are also prepared to provide 2 F5A's and, at no cost, a number of O-1's. Our MAG people will discuss the details of this equipment with your people.

Minister Suh:

I have heard that there are 21 F5-E's available. Aren't they included in what you are offering?

Secretary Schlesinger:

They are not part of the package.

Minister Suh:

I must go back to reiterate that the 1 billion dollars of FMS credit needs your strong support.

Secretary Schlesinger:

The billion dollar figure has registered.

WAR TIME LOGISTICS SUPPORT

Minister Suh:

My third topic is the issue of war time logistics support. We are concerned about war reserve munitions. We are authorized a 45-day supply. We are now short about 70 thousand tons. We would also like to authorize war reserve munitions for 10 additional reserve divisions. This would require around 90 thousand tons. Thus we have the need for an additional 163 thousand tons of additional WRM.



Secretary Schlesinger:

As I said this morning I regard logistics support as an item of highest priority because the strategy of blunting drive towards Seoul. We therefore, should closely examine what our requirements are. It is our intention to support the ROKG in this area to the greatest extent possible. We are operating however, under legislative restrictions in this area-- the so-called Kennedy amendment to the foreign assistance act. We are attempting to have this legislation changed.

Minister Suh:

I would like to refer to the Quick Trip plan. In accordance with this plan, the first arrivals of supplies would occur on D-Day + 45. This is not realistic. This plan needs revision.

Secretary Schlesinger:

You are right. We need a quicker trip.

Minister Suh:

The first shipment should arrive on D-Day + 10. If this is not deemed possible, a 60 day supply of material should be prepositioned in Korea. The management of such material would be a mutual ROK-U.S. possibility, while we would provide the storage facilities.

Secretary Schlesinger:

I agree with the thrust of what you have said. We must review the situation in order to insure a rapid flow of materiel. When I reviewed our position on this issue in Honolulu I was not satisfied with where we stood. There were anomalies and contradictions in our planning for logistics. We will straighten this planning out.

Minister Suh:

I appreciate your comment. I appreciate your comment.

Secretary Schlesinger:

We both agree that our logistic plans should be consistent with our strategy.

DEFENSE INDUSTRIES

Minister Suh:

My fourth topic today concerns defense industries. We hope that your support in this field will continue especially in electronics and guided missiles. We will need technical data and training. We must also study the possibility of a division of labor in defense industries between the U.S. and the ROK. There are some things which we could produce more economically than you in view of our low labor costs, e.g., M-60 tanks, helicopters, and light aircraft. We might also cooperate in the field of arms sales. Items which are no longer produced in the U.S. could be manufactured and exported by the ROK, subject to U.S. approval.

Secretary Schlesinger:

I don't think we can resolve these matters in detail at this moment, although in general we would be prepared to be cooperative. You have requested technical assistance in propellant manufacture for the reloading of NIKE missiles. We are prepared to proceed in this direction. We are also prepared to give sympathetic consideration to the production of items no longer manufactured in the U.S. In general, however, we would want carefully to review defense production in Korea and the whole question of the division of labor. We would view the Korean role to involve items not at the high technology end of the spectrum.

We are prepared to provide a team of experts to consider what should be done in the missile area. We are prepared to sell PGM's to Korea, some of the laser guided weapons, which will enhance your weapons capabilities.

Sorting out those areas in which Korea has a comparative advantage represents a considerable undertaking. We are prepared to proceed to a review of this matter on a cooperative basis.

U.S. BASES IN KOREA

Minister Suh:

My fifth and final topic is the question of U.S. strategic bases in Korea. Last year I raised this matter with you when I visited the Pentagon. We offered Cheju Island as a site for a U.S. base and said that the ROK would provide the real estate and share expenses. Now, given the situation in Southeast Asia with Thailand and the Philippines advocating a withdrawal of U.S. bases and the possibility that Japan might do likewise, our offer of Cheju Island is even more timely.



Secretary Schlesinger:

We much appreciated your offer and will take it under careful advisement. Regarding Thailand and the Philippines, it is evident that they either were not entirely serious about U.S. withdrawal in the first place or are now having second thoughts. As for Japan, we can not rule out the withdrawal possibility, but will be in a better position to judge this matter after my talks later this week with the Japanese.

I should point out that military construction is a very difficult area as far as funding is concerned. You know that Senator Mansfield is chairman of the Senate subcommittee in charge of this area. New base acquisitions therefore must be relatively costless.

SCM

Minister Suh:

What do you think about the timing of next year's SCM?

Secretary Schlesinger:

We can leave the details of the time and exact place to an exchange of correspondence. We will of course be the hosts.

NUCLEAR MATTERS

Secretary Schlesinger:

I think that at next year's SCM we probably want to discuss the fundamental question of nuclear deterrence. We want to examine the role nuclear weapons can play and cannot play. The U.S. Government has already welcomed the ratification of the NPT by the ROKG. The question of non-proliferation is of great significance both in strategic and political terms. One finds the deepest and most persistent concern regarding this problem in Congress. Thus the ratification of the NPT helps us enormously in our relationships with Korea. It is also of great importance to the Japanese, who are very sensitive about this issue. If the ROKG had decided to move ahead with nuclear weapons development, it could have undermined the basis of our political relationship. Thus, I endorse the politically sound decision you have made. We discussed the issue of "complementarity". Strategically, nuclear development is an area in which complementarity is necessary and desirable.

Minister Suh:

I greatly appreciate the useful and lengthy talk we have had this afternoon. I am very happy to have had this exchange of views which was frank, straightforward, and most informative.



Secretary Schlesinger:

I am grateful for the extended amount of time you have devoted to our talk this afternoon and I agree that the exchange was very helpful.





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State Dept. Guidelines, State Review 4/02
By KSH, NARA, Date 10/10/02

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E.O. 11652: XGDS-1

TAGS: PFDR, UNGA, KN, KS, US

SUBJECT: FURTHER US-ROK INITIATIVE ON KOREAN QUESTION AT UN FOR AMBASSADOR

1. AS A RESULT OF HIGH LEVEL REVIEW HERE WE HAVE DECIDED TO APPROACH ROKG WITH REGARD TO FURTHER INITIATIVE ON KOREAN QUESTION AT UN. INITIATIVE WOULD EXPLOIT OPPORTUNITY OFFERED US BY PRO-NORTH KOREAN RESOLUTION TO HIGHLIGHT CONTRAST BETWEEN DPRK'S RIGID REFUSAL TO DEAL CONSTRUCTIVELY ON KOREAN QUESTION AND A MORE FLEXIBLE AND POSITIVE US/ROK POSITION.

2. TO COUNTER NORTH KOREAN CALL FOR QUOTE PEACE AGREEMENT UNQUOTE BETWEEN QUOTE REAL PARTIES UNQUOTE TO THE ARMISTICE (I.E., US AND DPRK) WE BELIEVE THAT WE AND

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ROK SHOULD BROADEN OUR PRESENT POSITION INDICATING OUR WILLINGNESS TO MEET WITH THE OTHER PARTIES TO THE ARMISTICE TO DISCUSS ITS MAINTENANCE, CONSISTENT WITH OUR PRESENT RESOLUTION WE COULD ALSO INDICATE OUR MUTUAL WILLINGNESS TO DISCUSS MEASURES TO EASE TENSIONS ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA WHICH WOULD HELP PROMOTE PROGRESS TOWARD PEACE AND SECURITY. THE PURPOSE OF THIS LANGUAGE IS TO ESTABLISH THE LIMITED SCOPE OF OUR PROPOSAL AND TO AVOID IMPRESSION THAT WE ARE CALLING FOR A FULL SCALE PEACE CONFERENCE.



3. WE WOULD ALSO STRESS THAT NOW IS THE TIME FOR ALL PARTIES TO TAKE RECIPROCAL STEPS TO IMPROVE RELATIONS BETWEEN THEMSELVES AND SOUTH AND NORTH KOREA RESPECTIVELY, INCLUDING QUESTION OF ADMISSION OF BOTH INTO THE UN.

4. ABOVE PROPOSALS REPRESENT AT MOST MARGINAL ADJUSTMENTS TO OUR CURRENT POLICY. THEY CONSTITUTE A REASONABLE RESPONSE TO THE HOSTILE RESOLUTION, AND SHOULD BOLSTER SUPPORT FOR OUR RESOLUTION AND HELP IN DEFEATING THE HOSTILE RESOLUTION. FRENCH ARE ALREADY INDEPENDENTLY SURFACING AMENDMENTS TO OUR RESOLUTION ALONG SIMILAR LINES. WE EXPECT THAT FRENCH AMENDMENTS WOULD ATTRACT BROAD SUPPORT AND OUR PROPOSED INITIATIVE WOULD BE USEFULLY COMPLEMENTARY.

5. WHILE NORTH KOREA AND THEIR SUPPORTERS WILL ALMOST SURELY REJECT OUR PROPOSAL SUCH REJECTION SHOULD UNDERSCORE NORTH KOREA'S REFUSAL TO ACCEPT ANY REASONABLE APPROACH TO RESOLUTION OF KOREAN PROBLEM AND ITS INTRANSIGENT REFUSAL TO DEAL WITH THE ROK. THIS SHOULD BENEFIT ROK NOT ONLY IN UN BUT IN THE BROADER CONTEXT OF ITS DIPLOMATIC RIVALRY WITH NORTH.

6. WE ESTIMATE THAT OUR PROPOSAL, COUPLED WITH APPROPRIATE CHANGES IN OUR RESOLUTION, WOULD ASSURE US A SOLID MAJORITY FOR OUR PROPOSAL AND GIVE US A BETTER THAN EVEN CHANCE TO DEFEAT HOSTILE RESOLUTION.

7. IN UNLIKELY EVENT NORTH KOREA AND PRC SHOULD ACCEPT

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Department of State

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PAGE 03 STATE 218820

OUR PROPOSAL, WE BELIEVE A CONFERENCE OF ARMISTICE SIGNATORIES PLUS THE ROK WOULD REDOUND TO OUR ADVANTAGE. WE WOULD EXPECT THE OTHER SIDE TO FOCUS ON THE WITHDRAWAL OF US FORCES, OF COURSE, BUT WE FACE PRESSURE FROM THEM ON THIS ISSUE ALREADY IN A VARIETY OF FORUMS. WE COULD USE SUCH A MEETING TO STRESS ARMISTICE REQUIREMENTS, THE NEED FOR REDUCTION OF TENSIONS, LASTING PEACE ARRANGEMENTS AND RECIPROCAL GESTURES BY NORTH KOREA AND ITS SUPPORTERS IN IMPROVING RELATIONS WITH ROK AS PREREQUISITES FOR ASSURING PEACE AND SECURITY ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA. ALSO, NORTH KOREA/PRC ACCEPTANCE WOULD BE IMPLICIT RECOGNITION OF ROK STATUS.

8. WE DO NOT INTEND TO PROCEED WITH THIS PROPOSAL WITHOUT ROKG AGREEMENT. NOR DO WE INTEND TO PRESSURE THEM WITH RESPECT TO THE TIMING OR FORMAT OF THE PROPOSAL. AT THE SAME TIME WE BELIEVE THAT SURFACING THE PROPOSAL IN THE SECRETARY'S SEPTEMBER 22 SPEECH BEFORE UNGA WOULD HAVE THE MOST DRAMATIC AND POSITIVE EFFECT ON OUR TACTICAL POSITION IN NEW YORK. THIS COULD BE TIMED WITH A CONCURRENT ROKG ANNOUNCEMENT. IF ROKG AGREE TO THIS MOVE, AND CAN SIGNAL AGREEMENT TO OUR PROPOSAL SHORTLY, WE COULD BEGIN NECESSARY CONSULTATIONS WITH OUR CLOSEST SUPPORTERS ON KOREAN ITEM, INCLUDING JAPANESE, IN TIME TO DEVELOP A COORDINATED APPROACH BY SEPTEMBER 22 WHEN THE SECRETARY PRESENTLY INTENDS TO ADDRESS THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY. THE SPEECH MAY, HOWEVER, SLIP TO THE 24TH, GIVING YOU TWO ADDITIONAL DAYS. WE MAY ALSO WISH TO INFORM PRC AND POSSIBLY USSR OF THIS INITIATIVE IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO THE SECRETARY'S SPEECH.

9. IN EVENT ROKG IS NOT ABLE TO MAKE EARLY DECISION, WE WOULD BE PREPARED TO ENGAGE IN MORE EXTENDED CONSULTATIONS WITH VIEW TO SURFACING PROPOSAL SOME TIME IN MID-OCTOBER, FOUR OR FIVE WEEKS BEFORE UNGA CONSIDERATION OF KOREA QUESTION. SUCH A SCHEDULE WOULD ALLOW US SUFFICIENT TIME TO SECURE SUPPORT FOR OUR PROPOSAL IN UNGA DEBATE AS WELL AS TO AVOID ANY IMPRESSION THAT OUR MOVE IS LAST MINUTE TACTICAL PLOY UNDERTAKEN FROM A POSITION OF WEAKNESS.

10. YOU SHOULD SECURE IMMEDIATE APPOINTMENT WITH FOREIGN

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NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE ⁵⁴⁶AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

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MINISTER KIM TO RAISE WITH HIM OUR PROPOSAL. IN THIS APPROACH YOU SHOULD MAKE FOLLOWING POINTS:

(A) WE HAD IN SPRING INDICATED TO FOREIGN MINISTER KIM THAT WE WOULD REVIEW UNGA SITUATION IN SEPTEMBER. WE HAVE NOW COMPLETED THAT REVIEW. AT THIS POINT WE ESTIMATE THAT WE HAVE A WORKING MARGIN OF ABOUT TEN VOTES ON OUR FRIENDLY RESOLUTION. HOWEVER, SOME OF OUR SUPPORT IS QUOTE SOFT UNQUOTE AND WOULD BE SUSCEPTIBLE TO QUOTE CONSENSUS UNQUOTE OR COMPROMISE EFFORTS BY THIRD PARTIES. CURRENTLY, IT APPEARS HOSTILE RESOLUTION WOULD PASS BY FEW VOTES.

(B) IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, WE BELIEVE THAT WE AND ROKG SHOULD CONSIDER CONSTRUCTIVE INITIATIVE, IN CONFORMITY WITH OUR EXISTING POLICIES, WHICH MIGHT SIGNIFICANTLY IMPROVE OUR TACTICAL POSITION.

(C) YOU SHOULD THEN DESCRIBE INITIATIVE AS SET FORTH PARAS 2 - 8 ABOVE, INDICATING THAT WE WILL BE GUIDED BY ROKG VIEWS.

(D) WHILE WE RECOGNIZE SHORT TIMEFRAME, IN OUR VIEW SUCH A PROPOSAL WOULD HAVE MOST IMPACT IF IT WERE PUT FORTH BY THE SECRETARY SEPTEMBER 22 IN HIS SPEECH BEFORE THE UNGA. TO MEET THIS DEADLINE, WE WOULD NEED EARLY ROKG APPROVAL IN ORDER THAT WE MIGHT INFORM OUR CLOSE SUPPORTERS IN THE UNGA, INCLUDING JAPAN, OF OUR INTENTIONS AS WELL AS POSSIBLY INFORMING PRC AND USSR FOR THE RECORD VERY SHORTLY BEFORE ANNOUNCEMENT.

11. IN PRESENTATION YOU SHOULD STRESS THAT OUR PROPOSAL WOULD NOT INVOLVE ANY CHANGE IN OUR SUBSTANTIVE POSITION AND ADVANTAGES IN TERMS OF COUNTERING NORTH KOREAN QUOTE PEACE AGREEMENT UNQUOTE PROPOSAL BOTH IN UNGA AND IN FOREIGN CAPITALS ARE SUBSTANTIAL.

12. YOU MAY ALSO TELL KIM THAT WE WOULD, OF COURSE, COORDINATE WITH ROKG ON CONTENT OF OUR MUTUAL ANNOUNCEMENTS.

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~~SECRET~~

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

→ Staff 6245 2a
3:00 PM hub 2 cy

15 September 1975

NOTE FOR LTG BRENT SCOWCROFT, USAF
DEPUTY ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT
FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

Brent -

Attached message has been in the NSC for coordination and based on the SecDef's discussions with MOD Suh, it should be released to initiate detailed planning. This planning can consider the request of MOD Suh to station a U.S. combat liaison team on the Islands. Definitive guidance on ~~this proposal~~ can be the subject of a separate message. What is needed now is to authorize CINCUNC to discuss planning with the ROK. Request prompt clearance.

(W)

Attachment
as

JOHN A. WICKHAM, JR.
Major General, USA
Military Assistant

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC-8.3
REF # 10-128-#50
OSD letter 1/28/11
By dal NARA Date 2/28/11



Classified by SEC DEF
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF
EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652. EXEMPTION CATEGORY 3
DECLASSIFY ON (MP TO DET)

~~SECRET~~



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DECLASSIFIED w/ portions exempted

EO 12958 (as amended) 5A2 8.2

MAR 10-13/ #31

state let 9/17/10; OSD let 11/4/10

del JARA, Date 12/8/10

ACTION: ROUTINE SEOUL, CINCUNC

INFO: ROUTINE CINCPAC

JOINT STATE/DEFENSE MESSAGE

TAGS: PFOR, MARR, MOFS, PBOR, PINS, KS, US

SUBJECT: DEFENSE OF UNC CONTROLLED ISLANDS

REF: (a) CINCUNC 220935Z May 75;
(b) CINCUNC 140020Z May 75;
(c) seoul 3704

1. Appreciate Embassy/CINCUNC comments contained ref A and C.

2. Assumption is correct that five north west island groups fit definition of territory under ROK administrative control and they therefore come under Article III of the MDT. The forces there are clearly under CINCUNC operational control.


We therefore agree that it is unrealistic to maintain present "hands-off" position in which CINCUNC does not have active planning responsibilities.

3. Consequently CINCUNC is authorized to discuss planning for defense of the Islands with view toward reaching understanding on the following:

(a) ROK will not act precipitously and unilaterally in defense of the islands: CINCUNC will exercise OPCON of ROK forces.

(b) In event of attack on islands CINCUNC will immediately commit ROK forces to contain and restore situation; however, force commitment must not jeopardize the capability to defend the ROK as a whole.

4. In any main North Korean attack there would be a US reponse appropriate to the situation.



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APPROVED BY IO:JABAKER
EAKR:DOIDONOHUE
S/S:MR. MOFFAT

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~~SECRET~~ STATE 224492

NODIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS:PFOR, UNGA, KS, KN, US, FR

SUBJECT: KOREAN ITEM AT THE UN

REF: SEOUL 7334

1. WE APPRECIATE ROK FOREIGN MINISTER'S CONCERN ABOUT
NEED FOR FRENCH COSPONSORSHIP IF FRENCH AMENDMENTS TO OUR
RESOLUTION ARE ACCEPTED. WE INTEND TO PRESS HARD FOR
FRENCH COSPONSORSHIP AND AT A MINIMUM FOR FRENCH ACTIVE
SUPPORT FOR OUR RESOLUTION AND ACTIVE LOBBYING AGAINST
THE HOSTILE RESOLUTION. ADVANTAGES TO US, HOWEVER, OF
HAVING AMENDMENTS PUT FORWARD BY FRENCH AS WELL AS FRENCH
SUBSTANTIVE SUPPORT ARE SUCH THAT WE WOULD STOP SHORT
OF CONDITIONING OUR ACCEPTANCE ON COSPONSORSHIP. USUN
WILL DISCUSS MATTER WITH FOREIGN MINISTER WHEN HE
ARRIVES IN NEW YORK. KISSINGER

SECRET

6/7/81



**Memorandum of Conversation, Qiao Guanhua [Ch'iao Kuan-hua] and Henry A. Kissinger
(abridged)**

Date:
28 September 1975

Source:
Gerald R. Ford Library. Obtained for NKIDP by Gregg Brazinsky.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPATIONS

Ch'iao Kuan-hua, Foreign Minister of the People's Republic of China
Huang Hua, PRC Permanent Representative to the United Nations
Chang Han-chih, Deputy Director, Asian Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Lo Hsu, Deputy Director, African Affairs Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Shih Yen-hua, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Interpreter [Notetaker]
Kuo Chia-ting, Second Secretary, PRC United Nations Mission, Notetaker [Interpreter]

Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Patrick Moynihan, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations
Philip C. Habib, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs
Winston Lord, Director, Policy Planning, Department of State
William H. Gleysteen, Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs
Richard H. Solomon, Senior Staff Member, National Security Council

DATE & TIME,

Sunday, September 28, 1975, 8:10 p.m. – 11:55 p.m.
Dinner Meeting

PLACE:

Suite of the Secretary of State
35th Floor, Waldorf Towers
New York City

SUBJECT:

The Soviet Union; CSCE; Europe; Japan; Angola; Indochina; the President's China Trip; the Global Strategic Situation; Korea

[...]

Secretary Kissinger: [...]

Shall we spend five minutes on Korea?

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: Okay – such a wide range [of topics]

Secretary Kissinger: I think we have publicly stated our positions [on Korea]. They do not seem to be easily reconciled. But we are prepared to improve our relations with North Korea, but not if the price is isolating South Korea. I hope a way can be found during the U.N. debate not to drive this contradiction to its ultimate limit. Your Ambassador is a procedural genius. (Laughter)

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: This is not a big problem.

I think that after the events in Indochina, you exaggerated the situation in Korea. The problem is a very small one.

Our position is that your troops should withdraw at an early date. But you will say this will not do. The overall situation of the world hinges on the situation in Korea?

Secretary Kissinger: You won't agree with me, but I do not think it is in your interests to see another precipitate withdrawal of American power. This would have a significant influence on Japan.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: Things are quite complicated there, but this question has to be settled. I would advise you to have direct talks with the Korean side. But you have problems.

Secretary Kissinger: No, at the right time we are prepared to talk with side that we have not talked to before. (Laughter)

One problem is that if the U.N. Command is abolished, we have to find some way to sustain the Armistice arrangement. Secondly, if we talk to North Korea at some point, it must include South Korea at some point.

Incidentally, your ally [North Korea] did not appreciate my proposal of holding talks with you. So they complained and rejected our proposal.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: Never mind. Things in the world are so complicated. But some day there will be a solution.

Secretary Kissinger (with emphasis): But not in an American election year. It will not come in the fourth year!

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: Everyone will be pleased if this question can be resolved this year. But it will not be terrible if it is not settled this year.

Secretary Kissinger: But then we need to have something to talk about next year! (Laughter)

Foreign Minister Ch'iao (in English): If we didn't, Moynihan would be unemployed! (Laughter)

Secretary Kissinger: I can't imagine the titanic struggle when Moynihan and Huang Hua clash at the U.N. I will tell Moynihan not to be the aggressor.

[...]

Document apparently mis numbered -
no page 4 in original

MEMORANDUM

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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SECRET GDS

ACTION

September 29, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL SCOWCROFT

FROM: THOMAS J. BARNES ~~X~~
SUBJECT: Secretary Schlesinger's Discussions in Seoul

Secretary Schlesinger sent an outline through you to the President on the principal issues that he intended to discuss with the Koreans during his trip to Seoul last month (Tab C). Attached at Tab B are three memoranda reporting his conversations in Seoul with President Park and Defense Minister Suh. There is no doubt Secretary Schlesinger's trip was highly successful in manifesting our commitment to our South Korean allies and in furthering our close alliance with Japan. On several points, however, Secretary Schlesinger went beyond the position set out in the outline. Some of his comments in Seoul also differed from the briefing papers that the Department of Defense prepared for the trip and go beyond the commitments the President made in his conversation with President Park on November 22, 1974. Secretary Schlesinger's comments appear to preempt several basic policy issues being considered in the Korean NSSM.

One basic issue is Secretary Schlesinger's commitment of automatic involvement by U. S. forces in the event of a North Korean attack. On this issue he went beyond any previous comment that I am aware of by high U. S. officials. Also on the question of U. S. involvement in the defense of the Northwest Islands, the Secretary initially kept to his brief but departed from it significantly later on. In a related matter, we are concerned about the manner in which General Stilwell has bored ahead without formal Washington approval with his "short-war strategy" for the defense of the ROK. In addition, Secretary Schlesinger informed the Koreans that U. S. force levels in Korea would remain unchanged for the next five years. A discussion of these points is at Tab A. I raised some of them with Mort Abramowitz and Bill Crowe on September 11.

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E.O. 12858, Sec. 2.4

HR 94-144, #23 NSC 14r. 4/25/95

By KSH NARA Date 6/13/95

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In regard to the U. S. commitments to react to a North Korean attack, Mort explained that the President reportedly instructed Secretary Schlesinger to be as positive as possible with the South Koreans. I do not know what the President said, but I wonder whether he intended Secretary Schlesinger to go as far as he did. Mort acknowledges that Secretary Schlesinger came close to committing the U. S. to defend the Northwest Islands.

There has recently been an exchange of STADIS messages with Embassy Seoul on the question of the "short-war strategy" (Tabs D and E). Ambassador Sneider notes that State officials and others have been orally briefed, and he claims, incorrectly, that the JCS has approved the plan. He maintains that the concept is only a revision of the present defense plan and therefore not new. The concept of winning the war in "nine days," however, has serious implications. They include no planning for evacuation to the south, almost immediate U. S. air intervention, and possible use of tactical nuclear weapons.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you discuss these points with Secretary Kissinger and the President. That you ask General Wickham for information on the status of the "short-war strategy," as well as on DOD plans for seeking White House concurrence in any commitments that have implications for the nature of the U. S. role in the event of hostilities on the Korean Peninsula.

APPROVE

M

DISAPPROVE

Concurrence: *strongly concurred*
Col Granger *EE*

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SECRET GDS

COMMENTS ON SECRETARY SCHLESINGER'S
DISCUSSIONS IN SEOUL

U. S. Reaction in Event of North Korean Aggression

In his conversation with Minister Suh on August 26, Schlesinger said:

In addition, in the event of major aggression across the DMZ our reaction would be covered by the inherent powers of the U. S. President in light of the presence in the area of U. S. forces. Moreover, under the terms of the Mutual Defense Treaty, we would be prepared to take appropriate action including the deployment and employment of tactical air units. With respect to what I said about the inherent powers of the President, I am not sure it is advisable to publicly advertise this point. This could lead to criticism in the Congress concerning this issue.

Minister Suh said the ROK was concerned that in the event of major aggression by North Korea the U. S. would have to go through various time-consuming processes. Secretary Schlesinger replied:

Mr. Minister, you are dealing with a theoretical and not a practical problem. There is no question in my mind as to what the President would authorize to be done in the case of major aggression. I do not believe he would refer the issue to Congress. I believe the reaction would be immediate. [In the DOD memorandum on this conversation, the penultimate sentence is bracketed out.]

the

The "automatic response" Secretary of Defense mentioned goes hand-in-glove with what he referred to in Seoul as "complementarity." In essence, he told the ROK that the U. S. Air Force would handle air defense and they should concentrate their air effort on close air support. This breakout of combat missions has very significant force structure implications for the ROK as well as major political ramifications for us. In addition, the President's guidance on the Korean Mod Plan was for ROK air defense to receive number one priority.

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The Short War

Secretary Schlesinger's pledge that there would be immediate engagement of U. S. forces in the event of major aggression across the DMZ may be related to General Stilwell's new "short-war strategy." This new strategy aims at defending Seoul by utilizing massive firepower to defeat the enemy in a short period of nine days. The "short-war" concept apparently calls for the use of enormous amounts of munitions, weapons, and materials at the onset of hostilities and also for the early employment of U. S. forces. For some months General Stilwell has been engaging in joint planning with the ROK on Command Post exercise FOCUS LENS 76, which is intended to demonstrate the operational feasibility and logistic support ability of the "short-war" concept (Tab I).

In the DOD Issue Paper on the "short-war" strategy (Tab II), it was recommended that Secretary Schlesinger express appreciation for General Stilwell's efforts in evolving the new concept and note that the full implications of the plan are under review by COMUSK. So far as we know, the plan is in fact not officially approved by DOD. CINCPAC and the Joint Chiefs both apparently have some problems with it. Yet General Stilwell has already engaged the South Koreans in joint planning exercises involving this strategy, and in addition General Hollingsworth publicly disclosed the "nine-day war plan" during Secretary Schlesinger's visit to Korea. Hollingsworth told newsmen that Schlesinger "agreed with me 100 percent" on the "nine-day war" concept. Virtually everyone in Korea now assumes the "nine-day war" is the established policy.

There has recently been an exchange of STADIS messages with Embassy Seoul on this question (Tabs D and E). Ambassador Sneider notes that State officials and others have been orally briefed, and he claims, incorrectly, that the JCS has approved the plan. The force structure implications in the "nine-day" concept are very significant, i. e., no planning for evacuation to the south, no long-term U. S. resupply, almost immediate U. S. air intervention, and possible use of nuclear weapons.

The Northwest Islands

Minister Suh made a major effort to obtain a U. S. commitment to help defend the Northwest Islands. The Minister returned to this question several times. In his initial response, Secretary Schlesinger noted that "there would be Constitutional problems in our making an advance commitment with respect to the Islands. We will have to

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explore with the ROK what are the options and how we might respond to moves against the Islands." In keeping with the outline presented to the President, Schlesinger noted that we would agree to joint planning for the defense of the Islands but without commitment of direct U.S. involvement. Minister Suh again argued that the U.S. must react instantaneously in the event of an attack on the Islands. Schlesinger said that this problem would be examined, but at this point he unexplainably departed from his previous cautious replies in regard to the Islands by stating:

I urge in any case that you not be unduly concerned. This is not a problem that would be referred to Congress. U.S. action would be firm and speedy, and the issue would not be submitted to Congress for debate.

Clearly in this last remark Schlesinger contradicted the policy of not committing the U. S. to an automatic military response in the event of an attack on the Northwest Islands. Perhaps he did not mean to say so, but that is how the Koreans will read it. Constitutional restrictions of course apply to the U. S. response to any North Korean attack on South Korea wherever it should take place. U. S. units are deployed in a forward posture near the DMZ and presumably any North Korean attack across the line would threaten them. Thus, the President would have inherent powers to order the U. S. military commander to respond if necessary to counter this threat. Under the War Powers Act, the President would have 60 days to obtain U. S. Congressional sanction for the use of military force in this situation. We could not interpret convincingly a North Korean assault on the Islands as threatening U. S. forces. The President thus would have greater difficulty in justifying their unemployment under his emergency powers. Nevertheless, we have been careful heretofore not to make an explicit commitment to the ROK that the U. S. would automatically employ its forces against a North Korean attack across the DMZ.

U. S. Force Presence

In his conversation with President Park on August 27, Secretary Schlesinger said that with respect to the level of U. S. forces "he foresees no basic changes over the next five years." The strength of U. S. forces, he said, would not be affected but there will be "adjustments in detail to enhance the common defense structure of the United States and Korea." He spoke in greater detail on this subject to Minister Suh:

SECRET

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We plan no adjustment in forces in Korea in the period immediately ahead. I must explain what I mean by immediately ahead. Sometimes this phrase is misinterpreted to mean that some changes will take place after the immediate future. We do not plan any fundamental changes in U.S. support. Over the long run we may make some adjustments to advance future complementarity. Such adjustments would in fact be aimed at strengthening deterrents, e.g., the Nike-Hercules adjustments.

The outline that DOD provided the President stated simply that "the Secretary will reaffirm the determination to maintain our troop presence in Korea." The DOD briefing book indicated a flexible position. It recommended that the Secretary "assure the ROK that the Administration has no plans at present to alter the force level, which is in consonance with the President's assurance in November 1974; and to reaffirm that the ROK will be consulted before any major U.S. troop withdrawals are made." These formulations seem more in line with President Ford's pledge in November 1974 to President Park that "we have no intention of withdrawing U.S. personnel from Korea." In context it was clear that the President was discounting total not partial withdrawals.

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Telegram from Washington to Bucharest, No. 075119

Date: 11 October 1975	Source: <i>Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archives, Matter 220/Year 1975/Country: Democratic People's Republic of Korea –US, Folder 1642, Concerning the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's Relations with the US, Started on: 11.03.1975, Completed on: 16.12.1975, Filing deadline: Permanent. Obtained and translated for NKIDP by Eliza Gheorghe</i>
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Ministry of Foreign Affairs
TELEGRAM
Sender: Washington
No.: 075119
Date: 11.10.1975
Time: 14:00

Concerning: The Korean Issue.

Robert Martens, the director of the External Relations Department for East Asia and the Pacific within the State Department, told Comrade Petre Anghel, third secretary:

- 1) The situation on the Korean Peninsula makes for one of the potentially largest dangers, resulting not only from the concentration of military abilities of the two Korean states, but also from the very real possibility that, in case of threat, Japan as well as three of the great powers be drawn in: the US U.S.S.R. and the People's Republic of China. As a result of events in Vietnam, the Korean solution has earned symbolic value for the US allies in the area, as well as in the context of US prestige in the world in general.
- 2) The resolution introduced by Algeria on the UN General Assembly agenda is entirely unacceptable to the US administration, and its adoption could have implications not only in that particular area, but can undercut the UN role as a peace-maintaining organization. As far as the US is concerned, the adoption of the above-mentioned resolution, depending also on the internal consultations within the administration, can result in the threat of withdrawal, or even in the withdrawal proper, from the UN with implicit consequences on the UN activity and on the détente.
- 3) A withdrawal of American troops from South Korea will seriously affect regional balance, and, in return, the US will have to support the arming of the Seoul government, particularly with developing the aviation. Moreover, there is the possibility that the government in Seoul, as a result of US withdrawal, decides on building nuclear capacity, for which it has both the technology and necessary materials. This will undoubtedly complicate the situation and will diminish chances for a peaceful solution.
- 4) US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's proposal to call for a conference of the Korean ceasefire signatories, as a condition for US acceptance of the UN headquarters dissolution, was not received with particular enthusiasm. The representatives of the P.R. China received it with significant coldness. The rigid position of the People's Republic of China is presumably a result of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's tactics which, depending on the country's objectives, alternates emphasis at various stages on the U.S.S.R. or the People's Republic of China.
- 5) The US are preoccupied at the moment with neutralizing the support for the Algerian resolution, which according to the US, as we previously pointed out, could cause general significant difficulties.

Signed: C. Bogdan

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SECRET/SENSITIVEOBEACTION

October 15, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY KISSINGER

FROM: THOMAS J. BARNES *[Signature]*

SUBJECT: Follow-Up to Our Korean Strategy in the U. N.

As expected, both North Korea and Peking rejected your public proposal that the parties involved in the Korean Armistice, including the ROK, convene a conference to discuss ways to preserve the Armistice Agreement. North Korea, however, has followed up with overtures through U. N. Secretary-General Waldheim, intimating that it would like preliminary contact with us to discuss procedures on future negotiations, and that it understands we would not find it acceptable to leave the ROK "completely out of the picture."

We should now consider our follow-on diplomatic strategy on Korea and an imaginative response to the North Korean tactic. This memorandum suggests that we cannot remain static on the issue of our troop presence; recommends a dynamic posture; and proposes positions we could take with the Chinese on the subjects of an international conference on Korea, and contacts with both North and South Korea.

Discussions with the Chinese on these subjects should await consultation with the ROKG. I believe it would be useful, however, for you to have these thoughts prior to your mid-October consultations with the Chinese.

Our Strategy

I believe that following the UNGA vote, whatever the outcome, our strategy should be to:

-- Reiterate your proposal for a conference of those concerned with the Armistice Agreement, but agree to go directly to a wider international conference if the Communist side desires this approach.

SECRET/SENSITIVE

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

NSC Memo, 11/24/98, State Dept. Guidelines

By KBH, NARA, Date 10/10/02State Review
9/02

-- Drive home in our private discussions and public statements the compelling reality that South Korea must be a party to any peace treaty, and that proposals that attempt to exclude it are not serious ones.

-- Inform the Chinese that we are indeed willing to participate in an international conference on Korea and that such a conference could discuss any and all issues. The conference, for example, could cover the question of troop withdrawal, but agreement on this subject would be possible only in the context of a complex of other agreements that would strengthen stability on the Peninsula.

-- If the Chinese are prepared to talk seriously about such a conference, indicate to them the general outline of the settlement we would see emerging from the conference:

- A pledge by both Korean sides to peaceful unification and the non-use of force.

- The establishment of a "Korean Union" which would institutionally symbolize the unity of Korea but which would have no political powers. (The Korean Union could be entrusted with the functions of promoting cultural communications and economic links between the two Koreas.)

- A commitment to withdraw all foreign military units within a specified time frame (no less than five years).

- A guarantee by the powers, including Japan, of the peace and security of the Peninsula, and an undertaking by the powers not to upset the military balance.

- A continuation of the U. S. -ROK Mutual Defense Treaty, and the Soviet and Chinese treaties with the DPRK.

- The disbandment of the United Nations Command.

- Recognition of an inviolate "provisional demarcation line" in Korea (a term that Ch'iao Kuan-hua employed in his UNGA address).

- The establishment of some form of mutual presence in both Koreas by the three great powers and Japan.

- The admission of both Koreas to the United Nations.



Assumptions Behind the Strategy

The basic assumption behind the proposed strategy is that in the near term we are in a relatively strong position because of:

-- The current lack of serious pressure in the United States against our military presence in Korea.

-- Japan's improved relations with the ROK including renewed expressions of Japanese concern for the security of Korea and the recently enhanced public environment for U. S. -Japanese defense cooperation.

-- The rapid economic growth of South Korea compared to North Korea.

-- North Korea's current international payments problem.

-- The strong interest of both China and the Soviet Union in detente with the U. S. and Japan that overrides their separate inclinations to support North Korea's objectives.

Long-Term Trends

At the same time, while we recognize that the avoidance of hostilities heads the list of U. S. interests, our long-term goal is a stable relationship between the two Koreas. Achievement of this goal requires a dynamic interaction and not simply a change of heart in North Korea. Our basic interests therefore require not only near-term resolution to deter hostilities but also a dynamic and creative approach that exploits present conditions in order to promote long-term stability. Moreover, there are several current trends that suggest that a dynamic rather than a static approach to the Korean question is prudent:

-- While Peking and Moscow are currently amenable to a stabilizing political settlement in Korea, their attitudes on this issue five or ten years from now are unpredictable.

-- Japanese public opinion on the Korean issue may increasingly divert from the official view; a new initiative for a peaceful settlement and an international agreement involving Japan could provide a longer-term Japanese commitment.



-- Even the Japanese Government position is one that seeks to show political movement and flexibility while strengthening bilateral ties with the ROK.

-- U. S. troop presence in Korea, while containing DPRK adventurism in the short term, contributes over the long term to continued confrontation by making it even more difficult for Pyongyang to accept the reality of the Republic of Korea's separate existence. The indefinite U. S. presence also contributes to a psychology of dependence in the ROK.

-- China and the Soviet Union are less likely to deal with the ROK so long as sizeable U. S. forces are stationed there on an indefinite basis.

-- Our force presence also increasingly handicaps the ROK competition with the DPRK for third-world support, as witnessed in the recent decision of the "Non-Aligned Conference."

-- Every year we can expect to be under the heavy pressure of a hostile resolution in the U. N. aimed at our troop presence. Passage of such a resolution would seriously affect public support in the U. S. and Japan for our position.

Our Posture

Basically then we cannot remain static on the question of our troop presence in Korea. Our posture should be that we will withdraw our forces as tension in the area reduces; that we are willing to trade off agreement to gradual withdrawal for a complex of political accords that will constrain North Korean military options while also formally reaffirming the principle of Korean unity. At the same time, we should continue to suggest concrete ways in which the other side could create the conditions for withdrawal.

Very likely North Korea will respond tactically, and reject the minimum conditions for advancement toward a political settlement. At the best, we can expect the North Korean attitude toward an agreement to be cynical and short term. Nevertheless, we must maintain a dynamic posture including a genuine readiness to proceed with negotiations if the other side is prepared to accept conditions.



Contact with North Korea

The question of U. S. contact with North Korea is another area in which we might reflect a more dynamic posture. In Secretary-General Waldheim's recent report to you on his meeting with the North Korean permanent observer to the U. N., Ambassador Kwon Min Jun, Waldheim said that it was his "impression that the North Korean side is fully aware of our opposition to negotiations without South Korea" but wanted to have a first "prise de contact" with the United States before deciding on any concrete negotiating procedures. The North Korean Deputy Foreign Minister later told Waldheim that Pyongyang understood we could not accept total exclusion of South Korea. This is certainly a North Korean gambit but I believe it gives us an opportunity to maintain the initiative and to pin down North Korea on the question of ROK participation in any future talks.

If the ROKG agrees, we should ask the Chinese, possibly during the President's visit to Peking, to inform North Korea of the following:

I received Ambassador Kwon's message via the Secretary-General. The Secretary-General indicated that it was his impression that North Korea was aware of the U. S. position on negotiations, but that it wanted to have a first "prise de contact" with the United States before deciding on any concrete negotiating procedure. The U. S. Government has discussed this question with the ROKG. We agree that if North Korea is prepared to assure confidentiality of a meeting and to confirm North Korea's understanding that in any concrete negotiations on Korean security issues the ROKG will participate, we are prepared after the UNGA vote on the current Korean question, to have a preparatory meeting with North Korea to decide on negotiating procedures.

At the same time, we might inform the Chinese (again with full ROKG concurrence) that South Korea is similarly interested in establishing some sort of direct contact with China in order to discuss the present situation. South Korea, we would inform the Chinese, understands Peking's present policy but it believes that a confidential, preliminary exchange of views would be useful. We would inform the Chinese that if this meeting could be arranged, we would be agreeable to meeting separately at the same time with the North Koreans.



If nothing else, this approach would underscore for both North Korea and the PRC our commitment to full consultations with the ROKG on any contact or negotiations with the North. It would also present the North a dilemma whether to reject our counter offer, or to swallow ROKG participation. North Korea and thus Peking are likely to reject the idea, but the approach will not only maintain the initiative on our side but should also be a useful indication that while we are prepared to negotiate seriously, we will not allow the other side to drive a wedge between ourselves and the ROK.

RECOMMENDATION:

-- That, following consultation with the ROK, you and the President discuss with the Chinese an international conference on Korea.

APPROVE _____ DISAPPROVE _____

-- That, following consultation with the ROK, you discuss with the Chinese the North Korean proposal for a "prise de contact."

APPROVE _____ DISAPPROVE _____

-- That, following consultation with the ROK, you discuss with the Chinese ROKG interest in a similar "prise de contact."

APPROVE _____ DISAPPROVE _____



**Memorandum of Conversation, Deng Xiaoping [Teng Hsiao-p'ing] and Henry A. Kissinger
(abridged)**

Date:
22 October 1975

Source:
Gerald R. Ford Library. Obtained for NKIDP by Gregg Brazinsky.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPATIONS

Teng Hsiao-p'ing, Vice Premier of the State Council, People's Republic of China
Ch'iao Kuan-hua, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Ambassador Huang Chen, Chief of the PRCLO, Washington
Wang Hai-jung, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs
Lin P'ing, Director of American & Oceanic Affairs, MFA
T'ang Wen-sheng, Deputy Director, American & Oceanic Affairs, MFA. (interpreter)
Chien Ta-yung, Counselor, PRCLO, Washington
Ting Yuan-hung, Director for U.S. Affairs, American & Oceanic Affairs, MFA
Chiao Chi-hua, Deputy Director for U.S. Affairs, American & Oceanic Affairs, MFA
Mrs. Shih Yen-hua, MFA (Interpreter)
(plus two notetakers)

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Ambassador George H.W. Bush, Chief of USLO, Peking
Winston Lord, Director, Policy Planning Staff
Ambassador Philip C. Habib, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs
Richard H. Solomon, NSC Staff
William H. Gleysteen, Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs
Oscar V. Armstrong, Country Director, EA/PRCM
Robert L. Funseth, Director, Office of Press Relations
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff
Karlene Knieps, Sec. Kissinger's Office (Notetaker)

DATE AND TIME: Wednesday, October 22, 1975
3:40 – 4:45 p.m.

PLACE: The Great Hall of the People
Peking

[...]

Kissinger: Now, on Korea: We have said that we are prepared to talk to North Korea, in any forum that includes South Korea.

Teng: I think the views of each side are very clear by now to the other. I think you have several sufficient channels leading to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. They have an observer at the United Nations.

Kissinger: Who is extremely active. [Laughter] he thinks David Rockefeller runs the United States. [Laughter] So I hear from him periodically.

Teng: You have others.

Kissinger: We can communicate with them. We just want you to know our position.

Teng: I understand your position.

Kissinger: What is your understanding of how the legal position can be fixed in Korea if the UN Command is abolished?

Teng: You are asking.....?

Kissinger: As I read your Foreign Minister's speech at the UN, he said it is an easy problem, but he did not tell us how to solve it. [Laughter]

Ch'iao: That is to say that an armistice and a cessation of hostilities – an armistice agreement – cannot go on forever. There is bound to come a day when it will be turned into a situation of peace. That can be said. Our view is that once the Armistice Agreement is replaced by a peace agreement, it will not be difficult to settle the issue in principle.

Kissinger: Yes, but if the UN Command is abolished and before there is a peace agreement, there will be no legal status at all.

Ch'iao: Our understanding of the position of our Korean friends is that these two things are connected, that is, the Armistice Agreement will be replaced by a peace agreement.

Kissinger: Yes, but their position is also that the UN Command should be abolished.

Ch'iao: As for the concrete issue of dissolving the UN Command, I think it is something for you to discuss with Korea. And it seems that the time is not yet ripe for the solving of this issue.

Kissinger: I hope we will not fire too many cannons in the debate that is now ahead of us. [Laughter]

Teng: It seems that it won't do if certain canons are not fired. I think it is a saying with you, you also have a considerable number of cannons. [Laughter]

Kissinger: Yes, but we lack the eloquence of some of our critics. [Laughter] And Mr. Habib is very sensitive, because he was Ambassador to Korea. [Laughter]

[...]

Telegram from Pyongyang to Bucharest, No. 059.298

Date: 23 October 1975	Source: <i>Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archives, Matter 220/Year 1975/Country: Democratic People's Republic of Korea –US, Folder 1642, Concerning the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's Relations with the US, Started on: 11.03.1975, Completed on: 16.12.1975, Filing deadline: Permanent. Obtained and translated for NKIDP by Eliza Gheorghe</i>
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Ministry of Foreign Affairs
TELEGRAM
Sender: Pyongyang
No.: 059.298
Date: 23.10.1975
Time: 14:00

Department Relations I

The External Relations attaché of P.R. Hungary to Pyongyang, I. Tabara, told V. Nanu on October 22 he found out from reliable sources that the North Korean authorities asked the People's Republic of China government to intervene with H. Kissinger (with the occasion of the latter's visit to Peking), for establishing contacts between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the US. The Hungarian interlocutor mentioned a new meeting would take place between Vice-Premier Heo Dam and H. Kissinger after the visit to Peking of the US official.

Signed: D. Popa

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ISCAP DECISION ARE BRACKETED IN RED

NLF MR Case No. 94-146
Document No. #31



Department of State

TELEGRAM

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NOFORN

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: MNUC K5
SUBJECT: ROKG NUCLEAR REPROCESSING

REF: (A) STATE 226011 (B) SEUCL 8278

SUMMARY: ROKG'S SECOND REJECTION OF OUR REQUEST THAT THEY CANCEL
FRENCH NUCLEAR REPROCESSING FACILITY CONTRACT LEAVES US WITH
OPTIONS OF SIMPLY LETTING SITUATION DEVELOP, ACCEPTING ROK OFFER
OF INSPECTION, OR APPROACHING PRESIDENT PARK WITH TOUGH POSITION
OR EFFORT TO WORK OUR COMPROMISE. I RECOMMEND COMPROMISE
APPROACH AS BEST ALTERNATIVE. END SUMMARY.

1. AS SET FORTH REF (B), ROKG HAS NOW TURNED US DOWN FOR SECOND
TIME ON CANCELLATION OF PURCHASE OF RENCH NUCLEAR REPRO-
CESSING EXPERIMENTAL FACILITY. WE ARE NOW AT AN IMPASSE ON
THIS ISSUE. IT IS ALSO CLEAR THAT DECISION TO REJECT OUR APPROACH
WAS APPROVED BY PRESIDENT PARK AFTER FULL AND SERIOUS CONSIDER-
ATION OF OUR POSITION.

2. FACTORS UNDERLINING ROKG POSITION ARE COMPLEX, BUT KEY
CONSIDERATIONS APPARENTLY WERE:

(A) STRONG ELEMENT OF NATIONAL PRIDE AND EGO, COMBINED WITH
RESENTMENT ROKG BEING GIVEN DISCRIMINATORY TREATMENT AS COMPARED
TO JAPAN.

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(B) OVERSELL BY KEY KOREAN SCIENTIFIC PERSONALITIES ON ECONOMIC AND TECHNICAL VALUE OF REPROCESSING AND THEIR INABILITY TO REVERSE THEIR POSITION WITHOUT UNACCEPTABLE LOSS OF FACE AND POSITION.

(C) KOREAN CONVICTION THAT NUCLEAR ENERGY IS COMPETITIVE MARKET, THAT SUPPLIERS OUTSIDE THE U.S. ARE READILY AVAILABLE, AND THAT ROKG CAN AFFORD, IF NECESSARY, TO DO WITHOUT U.S. TECHNOLOGY AT LEAST FOR THE NEXT FEW YEARS.

(D) HOPE, WHICH BORDERS ON EXPECTATION, THAT U.S. WILL EVENTUALLY REVERSE ITS POSITION AND AGREE TO SUPPLY, AND FINANCIALLY SUPPORT THROUGH LOANS, NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS, WITH ROK FILLING INTERIM NEEDS THROUGH OTHER SUPPLIERS.

(E) CONTINUED DEEP CONCERN THAT U.S. COMMITMENT, NO MATTER HOW FIRM AT PRESENT, WILL NOT REMAIN DURABLE, AND THEREFORE ROK MUST NOT ONLY DIVERSIFY SOURCES OF SUPPLY BUT PREPARE FOR DAY WHEN UNILATERAL DEFENSE OF KOREA WILL BE NECESSARY AND WHEN ROK WILL HAVE TO COMPETE ON EVEN BASIS IN NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY WITH JAPAN.

(F) FINALLY, FOR PRESIDENT PARK, CRITICAL FACTOR IS PROBABLY DESIRE TO PROVIDE IF POSSIBLE WHERE-WITH-ALL FOR EXERCISING NUCLEAR OPTION SHOULD U.S. NUCLEAR DETERRENT NOT BE AVAILABLE TO HIM, ALTHOUGH PREPARED TO FOREGO EXERCISING OPTION UNDER PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES.

3.

Section 3.4(b)(6) of E.O. 12958

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4. UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, I BELIEVE THAT WE ARE FACED WITH FOUR POSSIBLE OPTIONS, EXCLUDING POSSIBILITY OF PERSUADING FRENCH TO CANCEL SALE OF REPROCESSING FACILITY WHICH STILL

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FEASIBLE AS LONG AS FINAL PAPERS NOT SIGNED. THESE OPTIONS ARE:

- (1) WE CAN NOW LET QUESTION LIE FALLOW WITHOUT FURTHER REPLY LETTING ROKS DISCOVER FOR THEMSELVES DIFFICULTY OF PROCEEDING WITHOUT OUR SUPPORT IN NUCLEAR FIELD;
 - (2) WE CAN ACQUIESCE IN REPROCESSING SALE, ACCEPTING ROK OFFERS OF BILATERAL U.S. AS WELL AS INTERNATIONAL INSPECTION;
 - (3) WE CAN RAISE THIS ISSUE ONCE AGAIN DIRECTLY WITH PRESIDENT PARK SEEKING COMPROMISE OF A MORATORIUM ON REPROCESSING CONTRACT WHICH WE HAVE HEARD MAY BE FEASIBLE; OR
 - (4) WE CAN CONFRONT PARK PERSONALLY WITH UNCOMPROMISING LINE.
5. OPTIONS 1 AND 2: IT IS POSSIBLE PERHAPS TO TAKE CALCULATED RISK AND LET SITUATION DEVELOP WITH CONSEQUENCES OF ADVERSE PUBLICITY AND CONGRESSIONAL REFUSAL OF KORI II LOAN AS WELL AS QUITE POSSIBLY CUT OFF OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE. UNDER THESE PRESSURES, ROKS MAY EVENTUALLY FALL INTO LINE. BUT WE MUST FACE LIKELIHOOD OF PUBLIC CONFRONTATION, WHICH COULD ADVERSELY AFFECT OUR INTERESTS HERE. IN MEANTIME, MOREOVER, ROKS WILL BE WELL DOWN ROAD ON REPROCESSING AND REVERSING COURSE COULD BE VERY DIFFICULT.
6. SECOND OPTION IS TO ACCEPT ROKG ASSURANCES AND DEVELOP UNILATERAL INSPECTION SYSTEM, OFFERED BY ROKS, TO ENSURE AGAINST DIVERSION. DISADVANTAGE OF THIS IS THAT IT WOULD NOT PROVIDE TOTAL ASSURANCE, PARTICULARLY UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES IN WHICH ROKS WOULD RENOUNCE NPT AND INSPECTION BY IAEA OR THIRD COUNTRY. FURTHER DISADVANTAGE IS, THAT, HAVING UNDERTAKEN SECOND ROUND OF DEMARCHES, WE HAVE PROBABLY GONE BEYOND PSYCHOLOGICAL POINT OF NO RETURN, WITHOUT LOSING OUR CREDIBILITY WHICH COULD ALSO AFFECT OUR FUTURE INTERESTS HERE.
7. OPTIONS 3 AND 4: AS I HAVE POINTED OUT PREVIOUSLY, I CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT ONLY A DIRECT APPROACH TO PRESIDENT PARK HAS PROSPECT FOR SUCCESS. WE HOLD MANY HIGH CARDS AND PARK IS ULTIMATE REALIST; THERE IS THEREFORE A REASONABLE PROSPECT FOR SUCCESS. THE PRINCIPAL QUESTION IS NATURE OF APPROACH TO PARK, WHETHER WE THROW THE GAUNTLET DOWN OR TRY TO REACH

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9. ALTERNATIVE (OPTION 3) IS TO APPROACH PARK, Section 3.4(b)(6)
of E.O. 12958 IN STRAIGHTFORWARD MANNER,
EXPRESS TO HIM OUR DEEP CONCERNS REGARDING NUCLEAR WEAPONS
DEVELOPMENT, AND SEEK COMPROMISE. WE WOULD LOOK TO TWO - THREE
YEAR MORATORIUM ON REPROCESSING PLANT PURCHASE, FRANKLY NOTING
THAT THIS WOULD NOT FORECLOSE PARK'S NUCLEAR WEAPONS OPTION FOR
FUTURE. WE SHOULD STRESS THAT THIS APPROACH WOULD PERMIT AN
EXPANDING FLOW OF TECHNOLOGICAL AND ECONOMIC BENEFITS FROM U.S.,
INCLUDING OFFER OF SOME TRAINING OF ROK TECHNICIANS IN REPRO-
CESSING FIELD. WE SHOULD DEAL DIRECTLY WITH PARK'S LONGER-TERM
CONCERNS, STATING THAT IN OUR VIEW ROK IS IN STRONG SECURITY
POSITION AND WE SEE NO NEED FOR CONCERN; BUT, IF THEY ARE INDEED
WORRIED ABOUT WITHDRAWAL U.S. NUCLEAR PROTECTION, WHICH WE DO
NOT ANTICIPATE, WE WOULD BE GLAD TO DISCUSS THIS CONTINGENCY.
WE MUST, AT SAME TIME, MAKE CLEAR THAT SPECTRUM OF OUR RELATIONS
AND OUR ABILITY TO SUPPORT ROK NOT ONLY IN NUCLEAR POWER DEVELOP-
MENTS BUT ACROSS THE BOARD WILL BE IMPAIRED WITHOUT PARK'S
COOPERATION.

10. RECOMMENDATION: GIVEN CONSIDERATIONS SET FORTH ABOVE, I
WOULD RECOMMEND OPTION 3, SEEKING MORATORIUM COMPROMISE WITH
ROK THROUGH DIRECT AND TO EXTENT POSSIBLE UNFRAZSIVE APPROACH
TO PRESIDENT PARK, ASSUMING HE WISH TO CONTINUE DISCOURAGING
ROK FROM NUCLEAR REPROCESSING. MORATORIUM WILL PROVIDE
OPPORTUNITY TO ENGAGE ROK IN REGIONAL APPROACH WHILE IT
COULD AVOID NOW MOST DIFFICULT DECISION OF COMPLETELY REVERSING

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PAGE 02 SEUL 08458 02 OF 02 3112277

POLICY.

11. HAVING SAID ABOVE I WOULD ENTER ONE ESSENTIAL CAVEAT. I DO NOT BELIEVE WE CAN TAKE RECOMMENDED STEP WITH PARK UNLESS WE ARE TRULY SERIOUS ABOUT UNIVERSAL AND STRICT APPLICATION OF OUR MULTILATERAL APPROACH TO NUCLEAR REPROCESSING, TO BE TOUGH WITH KOREANS WHILE GIVING THE APPEARANCE OF LENIENCY TOWARD OTHER COUNTRIES WHICH SEEM TO BE IN SAME POSITION WOULD CAUSE KOREANS TO CONCLUDE THAT U.S. HAS SERIOUS DOUBTS ABOUT RELATIONSHIP OF TRUST WHICH UNDERPINS THE ALLIANCE AND WILL PROBABLY CAUSE PERMANENT DAMAGE TO SPIRIT OF COOPERATION NEEDED FOR ASSURING KOREAN SECURITY.

12

Section 3.4 (b) (6) of E.O. 12958

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3390 (XXX). Question of Korea

A

The General Assembly,

Mindful of the hope expressed by it in resolution 3333 (XXIX) of 17 December 1974,

Desiring that progress be made towards the attainment of the goal of peaceful reunification of Korea on the basis of the freely expressed will of the Korean people,

Recalling its satisfaction with the issuance of the joint communiqué at Seoul and Pyongyang on 4 July 1972 and the declared intention of both the South and the North of Korea to continue the dialogue between them,

Further recalling that, by its resolution 711 A (VII) of 28 August 1953, the General Assembly noted with approval the Armistice Agreement of 27 July 1953,¹³ and that, in its resolution 811 (IX) of 11 December 1954, it expressly took note of the provision of the Armistice Agreement which requires that the Agreement shall remain in effect until expressly superseded either by mutually acceptable amendments and additions or by provisions in an appropriate agreement for a peaceful settlement at a political level between both sides,

Aware, however, that tension in Korea has not been totally eliminated and that the Armistice Agreement remains indispensable to the maintenance of peace and security in the area,

Noting the letter of 27 June 1975,¹⁴ addressed to the President of the Security Council by the Government of the United States of America, affirming that it is prepared to terminate the United Nations Command on 1 January 1976, provided that the other parties directly concerned reach agreement on alternative arrangements mutually acceptable to them for maintaining the Armistice Agreement,

Noting the statement of 27 June 1975 by the Government of the Republic of Korea affirming its willingness to enter into arrangements for maintaining the Armistice Agreement,

Recognizing that, in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations regarding the maintenance of international peace and security, the United Nations has a continuing responsibility to ensure the attainment of this goal on the Korean peninsula,

1. *Reaffirms* the wishes of its members, as expressed in the consensus statement adopted by the General Assembly on 28 November 1973,¹⁵ and urges both the South and the North of Korea to continue their dialogue to expedite the peaceful reunification of Korea;

2. *Expresses the hope* that all the parties directly concerned will enter into negotiations on new arrangements designed to replace the Armistice Agreement, reduce tensions and ensure lasting peace in the Korean peninsula;

3. *Urges* all the parties directly concerned, as a first step, bearing in mind the need to ensure continued observation of the Armistice Agreement and the full maintenance of peace and security in the region, to embark on talks as soon as possible so that the United Nations Command may be dissolved concurrently with arrangements for maintaining the Armistice Agreement;

4. *Expresses the further hope* that these discussions will be completed and alternative arrangements for the maintenance of the Armistice Agreement will be made in order that the United Nations Command may be dissolved on 1 January 1976 so that by that date no armed forces under the United Nations flag will remain in the South of Korea.

*2409th plenary meeting
18 November 1975*

¹³ See *Official Records of the Security Council, Eighth Year, Supplement for July, August and September 1953*, document S/3079; transmitted to the members of the General Assembly by a note of the Secretary-General (A/2451).

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, *Thirtieth Year, Supplement for April, May and June 1975*, document S/11737.

¹⁵ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 30 (A/9030)*, p. 24, item 41.

B

The General Assembly,

Noting that the reunification of Korea has not yet been achieved although thirty years have elapsed since Korea was divided into the North and the South and twenty-two years since the establishment of the armistice in Korea,

Recalling the obligations assumed by States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations on respect for the principle of equality and self-determination of peoples and on refraining from intervening in matters which are within the domestic jurisdiction of any State,

Considering that it conforms with the principles of the Charter to encourage the Korean people to achieve the independent and peaceful reunification of their country at the earliest possible date on the basis of the three principles of independence, peaceful reunification and great national unity and to create favourable conditions for it,

Hoping that the North and the South of Korea will promote their dialogue to accelerate the reunification of the country in accordance with the spirit of the joint statement of 4 July 1972 and with the decision adopted by the General Assembly at its twenty-eighth session, on 28 November 1973,¹⁶ which welcomed the joint statement,

Considering that a durable peace cannot be expected so long as the present state of armistice is kept as it is in Korea,

Considering that, in order to guarantee a durable peace in Korea and accelerate its independent and peaceful reunification, it is urgently necessary to take new decisive measures for terminating foreign interference in its internal affairs, removing tension and preventing armed conflicts in that region,

1. **Considers** that it is necessary to dissolve the "United Nations Command" and withdraw all the foreign troops stationed in South Korea under the flag of the United Nations;

2. **Calls upon** the real parties to the Armistice Agreement to replace the Korean Military Armistice Agreement with a peace agreement as a measure to ease ten-

sion and maintain and consolidate peace in Korea in the context of the dissolution of the "United Nations Command" and the withdrawal of all the foreign troops stationed in South Korea under the flag of the United Nations;

3. **Urges** the North and the South of Korea to observe the principles of the North-South joint statement and take practical measures for ceasing arms reinforcement, reducing the armed forces of both sides drastically to an equal level, preventing armed conflicts and guaranteeing against the use of force against the other side, and thereby remove the military confrontation and maintain a durable peace in Korea, conducive to accelerating the independent and peaceful reunification of the country.

*2409th plenary meeting
18 November 1975*

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

~~SECRET/NODIS/XGDS~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:

PRC: Teng Hsiao-p'ing, Vice Premier of the
State Council
Ch'iao Kuan-hua, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Amb. Huang Chen, Chief, PRCLC, Washington
Wang Hai-jung, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs
Lin P'ing, Director of American & Oceanic Affairs,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
T'ang Wen-sheng, Deputy Director of American
& Oceanic Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
(Interpreter)
Chien T'ayung, Counselor, PRCLC, Washington
Ting Yuan-hung, Director for U. S. Affairs,
American & Oceanic Affairs Department
Chao Chi-hua, Deputy Director for U. S. Affairs,
American & Oceanic Affairs Department
Mrs. Shih Yen-hua, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
(Interpreter)
(Plus two notetakers)

U. S.

President Ford
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs
Joseph J. Sisco, Under Secretary of State
for Political Affairs
Amb. George H. W. Bush, Chief of USLO, Peking
Winston Lord, Director, Policy Planning Staff
Amb. Philip C. Habib, Assistant Secretary
for East Asian and Pacific Affairs
William H. Gleysteen, Jr., Deputy Assistant
Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff
Bonnie Long, Sec. Kissinger's Office (Notetaker)

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, SEC. 1.4
NSC MEMO, NUMBER, STATE DEPT. CHANNELS, State Review 9/16/03
BY: [redacted], NNSA, DATE 11/3/12

DATE AND TIME:

Thursday, December 4, 1975
10:05 - 11:47 a. m.

PLACE:

The Great Hall of the People
Peking



~~SECRET/NODIS/XGDS~~

~~SECRET~~ - XGDS (3)
CLASSIFIED BY: HENRY A. KISSINGER

The President: We are very grateful, Mr. Vice Premier, for your warm welcome. We feel very strongly that the discussions both on bilateral, as well as international matters, have been very fruitful and significant. I think the opportunity to meet you personally and meet the Chairman will be very productive in the long run in our efforts to make possible affirmative action on a parallel basis. And on behalf of myself and my family and all of the delegation from the United States, we are very grateful for the frank and significant, fruitful discussions that we have had.

Teng: I agree with the words of the President, and I would like to take this opportunity to once again express our thanks to the President for the visit.

So, do you think we have come to the end of our discussion?

The President: The only apprehension that I have, Mr. Vice Premier, is that we have gotten along so well that we have not had to take as much time this morning as we anticipated. And our friends in the press might misconstrue that, and they often times do. [Laughter]. So if there is anything that we could discuss, informally, or otherwise, it might be helpful. [Laughter].

Teng: Fine.

Kissinger: See, if the meeting runs longer than planned, it proves we quarreled. If it runs shorter than planned, it also proves we quarreled. [Laughter].

Teng: Yes, the press people do not seem to have any particular noses or ears. I wonder how they get so sensitive.

Kissinger: There were two British correspondents here, Mr. Vice Premier, who wrote articles that there was great tension in our first meeting here.

Teng: I sometimes think perhaps that is due to inspiration. [Laughter].

The President: Mr. Vice Premier, the Secretary has told me that the two Foreign Ministers did discuss Korea, and their discussions I think will not require that we discuss the situation, but I think it is important for them to have a dialogue on this issue.

Teng: As for the Korean issue, during the Doctor's previous visit we discussed that with him, and this time Foreign Minister Ch'iao has discussed it with him again. So I think that our position is very clear and both sides understand each other very well on this issue. We have noticed that there seems to be an idea

That various parties, including ourselves, should participate in the discussion of this question. This is something that we cannot agree to. Because we no longer have any military forces in Korea. Only your side has. But we are in favor of your side having a dialogue with Korea. You also have your channels, for instance, in the United Nations; they have an observer there.

But we can say that we are not of the same impression that you seem to be under. We are not worried like you are about a military attack by the North against the South. But we hope that the American side will keep an eye on Park Chung Hee. Not now and neither in one or two years. The question is that you must keep an eye over him when he gets in a particularly difficult position.

The President Mr. Vice Premier, we are encouraged when you say that the North has no intention and I can assure you that we will keep our eye on the South. We think it would be very ill-advised and very harmful for any military action in that area whatsoever. As a matter of fact, we would not tolerate it. [Teng spits into his spittoon.]

Teng: When Mr. Cyrus Vance led a delegation of world affairs organization people to China, we discussed this with him.

issinger: That is like the Dalai Lama. [Laughter]. A government in exile. [Laughter].

Teng: They stressed that South Korea should be linked with Japan. They stressed the linkage that should be maintained between Japan and South Korea. Of course, if that is perceived from a purely geographical point of view, that might be of some sense. But if you are speaking from a political point of view, Japan and Korea are issues of two different natures. We are always reminding our friends that one must pay attention to the question of national feeling, national sentiment. And to be very frank, on this issue we find that your people, and including Europeans friends, do not seem to have such acute and deep feeling about this issue as we have. Because we have passed through that period.

Take our situation, our state of affairs, pertaining to Taiwan. Some people are saying this is a two-China issue. And so we can feel very acutely the feelings that others have on other similar issues. And we feel that the question of the so-called two Koreas, two vietnams, and two Germanies, are all issues of the same nature. And although the Soviet Union is now in control of East Germany, we believe that not only the West German people, but also the East German people have the same desire to reunify their country, and we feel certain that such an aspiration will eventually be realized.



There are a lot of people who have taken a lot of notice to our mention of 100 years. We think even if it takes 100 years, or even if it exceeds 100 years, this desire will finally be realized. Such a national urge cannot be resisted. Take for instance the question of the two Vietnams. One part of the nation has fought for reunification for 30 years. In Korea, the war did not go on for so many years but shows a basic feeling there too.

President: With respect to the reunification of Germany, as I said the other day, we feel the reunification of Germany is inevitable. How soon I would not predict, but it would surprise me if it were 100 years, Mr. Vice Premier.

As for Korea, I think it might be helpful if the Secretary made an observation.

Kissinger: Only on the relationship between Japan and South Korea, Mr. Vice Premier. I think we both have an interest to prevent Japan from becoming militaristic. If there is turmoil in Korea and if South Korea is threatened, then there is a danger Japan will move in a more militaristic direction. On the other hand, we do not favor Japan having a more political and military role in Korea, and this is why we have attempted to move in the direction we have.

Teng: Japan's interest in South Korea is no lower than that of the United States.

Kissinger: It is greater.

Teng: There is some sense in those words. And there indeed exist forces in Japan that want to restore militarism. These are also forces that are most enthusiastic about South Korea and Taiwan.

Kissinger: [to Ch'iao:] My student.

President: You mentioned Mr. Nakasone.

Teng: Your student is such a man.

Kissinger: I just said it to the Foreign Minister.

President: You mentioned earlier Mr. Cyrus Vance. He was a classmate of mine in Law School. I don't expect he will be back in government for some time. If ever.



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NODIS CHEROKEE

FROM HABIB

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR KS KN US
SUBJECT: CONTACT WITH NORTH KOREANS

1. YOU WILL BE GETTING FULLER REPORT FROM THE EMBASSY ON MY CONVERSATION WITH PRESIDENT PARK ON THE MORE GENERAL SUBJECTS. THIS MESSAGE IS TO REPORT ON A SEPARATE MATTER WHICH WILL NOT BE COVERED IN THE REPORTING CABLE.

2. I RAISED THE PROPOSAL FOR A ONE-TIME CONTACT WITH THE NORTH KOREANS IN ACCORDANCE WITH YOUR INSTRUCTIONS. PARK REQUESTED THAT IN VIEW OF THE MANNER IN WHICH THE NORTH KOREANS HAVE BEEN PUBLICIZING THEIR DEMANDS FOR A MEETING WITH THE UNITED STATES THAT WE NOT PURSUE THIS COURSE AT THIS TIME. HE AGREED TO KEEP THE PROPOSAL UNDER REVIEW. AS YOU INSTRUCTED I DID NOT PRESS HIM ANY FURTHER ON THIS ISSUE. I THINK WE CAN LET IT LIE DORMANT FOR THE TIME BEING.
SNEIDER

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
KBL - NARA Date 10/15/02
State Review 9/02

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NODIS

DEPT PASS TAIPEI FOR ASST SEC HABIB

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: MNUC KS
SUBJECT: ROK NUCLEAR REPROCESSING

REF: (A) STATE 285640 (B) SEOUL 9402

1. FOLLOWING MEETING WITH PRESIDENT PARK, ASSISTANT SECRETARY HABIB RAISED NUCLEAR REPROCESSING ISSUE WITH PRESIDENTIAL SECRETARY GENERAL KIM CHONG-YOM. REFERRING TO AMBASSADOR'S CONVERSATION DECEMBER 8 WITH PRIME MINISTER, HE STRESSED TO KIM MAJOR IMPORTANCE ATTACHED TO THIS ISSUE BY USG, URGING CANCELLATION OF REPROCESSING CONTRACT WITH FRENCH.

2. KIM SAID THAT HE HAD NOT YET RECEIVED REPORT OF CONVERSATION WITH PRIME MINISTER BUT WOULD GIVE VERY CAREFUL CONSIDERATION TO US POSITION ON REPROCESSING ISSUE.
SNEIDER

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With PORTIONS EXEMPTED
E.O. 12958 Sec. 1.6

SECRET

NR 94-146, #35 State 3/18/97

By KBH, NARA, Date 5/27/97



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~~SECRET~~ SEOUL 9459

NODIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: MNUC KS
SUBJECT: ROK NUCLEAR PROCESSING

REF: A. SEOUL 9402 B. SEOUL 9437 C. SEOUL 9440 D. STATE 285640

1. AT DECEMBER 10 MEETING WITH DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER NAM, I REVIEWED WITH HIM MAJOR POINTS IN MY DEMARCHE TO PRIME MINISTER DECEMBER 8 ON FRENCH PROCESSING PLANT. I EMPHASIZED FOR HIM GREAT IMPORTANCE ATTACHED TO THIS ISSUE AT HIGH LEVELS USG AND BROADER STAKE INVOLVED IN US-ROK RELATIONS.

2. NAM SAID THAT THERE HAD BEEN HIGH LEVEL MEETING CALLED BY PRIME MINISTER DECEMBER 9 ON THIS ISSUE, BUT THAT HE UNFORTUNATELY COULD NOT ATTEND DUE TO REQUIRED ATTENDANCE AT NATIONAL ASSEMBLY. NAM THOUGHT THAT THE REACTION TO OUR POSITION WAS NOT TOO GOOD. AFTER I WENT OVER AGAIN WITH HIM VERY ADVERSE IMPLICATIONS OF KOREAN REFUSAL TO CANCEL FRENCH CONTRACT, HE SAID HE WOULD TRY TO SEE PRIME MINISTER GIVEN SERIOUSNESS OF PROBLEM.
SNEIDER



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Authority MR 94-146 #34 discuss on appeal
ISCAP etv. 9/28/98

By dal NLF Date: 7/18/00

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NLF MR Case No. 94-146

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DEPT PASS TOKYO, OTTAWA, PARIS, IAEA VIENNA, FOR INFO

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: MNUC PARM KS FR CA
SUBJECT: ROK NUCLEAR REPROCESSING

REF: A. STATE 285640 B. SEOUL 9440 C. SEOUL 9459

1. NOW THAT I HAVE MADE CALL ON PRIME MINISTER ON NUCLEAR RE-
PROCESSING, I STRONGLY RECOMMEND THAT PLANNED APPROACH ON THIS
ISSUE TO AMBASSADOR HAHM IN WASHINGTON (PARA 4, REF A) BE MADE
SOONEST SO THERE IS AMPLE TIME FOR HIS REPORT TO BE TRANSMITTED
AND DIGESTED PRIOR TO ANY MEETING I MAY HAVE WITH PRESIDENT
PARK NEXT WEEK. GIVEN SERIOUSNESS OF ISSUE AND HIGH LEVEL ROKG

INVOLVEMENT, CONVERSATION WITH HAHM SHOULD BE CONDUCTED AT
HIGHEST POSSIBLE LEVEL.

2. CONVERSATION WITH PRIME MINISTER (REF B) INDICATES THAT TO
BE EFFECTIVE OUR APPROACH MUST EMPHASIZE ADVERSE IMPACT ON
OUR BROADER RELATIONSHIP WITH ROKG IF THEY PERSIST IN COMPLETING
FRENCH REPROCESSING DEAL. THIS POINT IS REINFORCED BY INITIAL
NEGATIVE REACTION TO APPROACH TO PRIMIN WHICH I RECEIVED
FROM DEPUTY PRIMIN HAHM THIS MORNING (REF C). THUS, IN APPROACH
TO HAHM I BELIEVE WE MUST MAKE INDELIBLY CLEAR THAT FAR MORE
THAN OUR NUCLEAR SUPPORT IS AT STAKE HERE, THAT IF ROKS PROCEED
AS THEY HAVE INDICATED TO DATE WHOLE RANGE OF SECURITY AND
POLITICAL RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN US AND ROK WILL BE AFFECTED,



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PAGE 02 SECUL 09407 100915Z

INCLUDING POTENTIAL FOR ADVERSE CONGRESSIONAL ACTION ON SECURITY ASSISTANCE FOR KOREA. WHILE NOT STINTING ON NEGATIVE FACTORS, I WOULD SUGGEST ALONG POSITIVE LINES ASKING ROK COOPERATION IN FOREGOING NATIONAL REPROCESSING IN INTEREST OF PRESERVING AND EVEN STRENGTHENING OUR RELATIONSHIP, A LINE I

INTEND TO TAKE WITH PRESIDENT PARK. WE SHOULD BY ALL MEANS REITERATE OTHER ECONOMIC AND TECHNICAL ARGUMENTS WE HAVE MADE IN PAST BUT AS DEPARTMENT RECOGNIZES IN REF D THESE ARE NOT LIABLE AT THIS STAGE TO WEIGH HEAVILY IN ROK THINKING.

3. Section 3.4(b)(6) of E.O. 12958

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NLF MR Case No. 94-146

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NOD13

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: MNUC, KS
SUBJECT: BRITISH EMBASSY APPROACH ON KORI II

1. BRITISH CHARGE STURDY APPROACHED ECON COUNSELOR TODAY WITH INQUIRY ON STATUS OF KORI II. HE INDICATED THAT GE OF ENGLAND WAS TO SUPPLY EQUIPMENT AND THE EXPORT CREDIT GUARANTEE DEPARTMENT (ECGD) WAS SCHEDULED TO PROVIDE \$200 MILLION IN 15 YEAR CREDITS. HOWEVER, FURTHER DELAY IN CONSTRUCTION AND PRICE RISES WOULD REQUIRE A SUBSTANTIAL INCREASE IN CREDITS WHICH THE ECGD WOULD BE UNABLE TO PROVIDE.

2. STURDY INDICATED HE HAD HEARD WE HAD RAISED THE LEVEL OF OUR OBJECTIONS TO THE FRENCH REPROCESSING FACILITY. WE INDICATED THAT WE HAD DONE SO. WE MADE NO MENTION OF OUR CURRENT APPROACH (THOUGH WE WOULD BE WILLING TO DO SO IF THE DEPARTMENT WISHES), BUT NOTED THE SERIOUSNESS WITH WHICH THE USG VIEWED NATIONAL REPROCESSING FACILITIES.

Section 3.4 (b) (6) of E.O. 12958

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Section 3.4 (b) (6) of E.O. 12958

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E.O. 12958 Sec. 1.5 (d)

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MR 94-146, #39, State Hr. 6/5/97

NO015

By KBH NARA, Date 1/29/98

DEPARTMENT PASS TOKYO, OTTAWA, AND IAEA VIENNA

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1
TAGS: MNUC, PARK, KS, FR, CA
SUBJECT: ROK NUCLEAR PROCESSING PLANT; CANADIAN APPROACH

REF: SEDUL 9526

2. I BRIEFED STILES ON CONVERSATION WITH VICE MINISTER
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY (REPORTED SEPTEL). ON THIS BASIS
HE ANTICIPATES INSTRUCTIONS TO SEE FOREIGN MINISTER
TOMORROW.
SNEIDER

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DEPT PASS TOKYO, OTTAWA, PARIS, IAEA VIENNA FOR INFO

S. O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: MNUC, PARM, KS, FR, CA
SUBJECT: ROK NUCLEAR REPROCESSING



1. UNDER INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE PRIME MINISTER AND IN ABSENCE MINISTER SCIENCE OF TECHNOLOGY (MOST), VICE MINISTER OF MOST YI CHONG-SOK, TOGETHER WITH KAERI PRESIDENT YUN YONG-KU CALLED ON AMBASSADOR DEC. 16 TO ELICIT CONCRETE INFORMATION REGARDING U.S. OFFER ASSISTANCE IN NUCLEAR FIELD IN EVENT ROKG AGREES TO CANCELLATION FRENCH REPROCESSING FACILITY CONTRACT. EXPLAINING THAT MOST HAD BEEN ASKED TO PREPARE POLICY OPTIONS ON THIS QUESTION FOR PRIMIN, VICE MIN YI ASKED FOR ANSWERS TO DETAILED QUESTIONS REGARDING EXTENT PROPOSED U.S. SUPPORT BY DEC. 23. TALKING POINT PAPER CONTAINING QUESTIONS WHICH VICE MINISTER LEFT AT END OF MEETING BEING FORWARDED SEPTEL, IN BRIEF, VICE MINISTER'S QUESTIONS FOLLOW:

(A) WOULD USG BE WILLING PROVIDE TECHNOLOGY AND CAPITAL ASSISTANCE TO COMMERCIAL FUEL FABRICATION PROJECT;

(B) WHEN AND WHERE WOULD ASIAN REGIONAL NUCLEAR FUEL REPROCESSING CENTER BE ESTABLISHED, WHAT WOULD IT DO, WHO WOULD PARTICIPATE, WHAT WOULD BE ROK ROLE, AND WOULD U.S. TRAIN KOREAN TECHNICIANS IN ADVANCE;

(C) WOULD USG GIVE SUPPORT AND TRAINING FOR ROK LONG RANGE

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4.

MR94-146, *40; opened on appeal, ISCAP 9/28/98

By lit NARA, Date 10/14/98



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PAGE 02 SEOUL 09682 161127Z



NUCLEAR POWER DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM IN DESIGN AND MANUFACTURING CAPABILITY, REACTOR SAFETY, WASTE MANAGEMENT TECHNOLOGY, AND WOULD USG ALLOW EMPLOYMENT BY KOREA OF AMERICAN EXPERTS REQUIRED FOR THESE PROJECTS;

(D) WILL USG GUARANTEE ENRICHMENT SERVICES TO MEET ALL FUTURE KOREAN REQUIREMENTS AND REPROCESSING SERVICES BEFORE COMMERCIAL OPERATION OF MULTI-NATIONAL REGIONAL REPROCESSING CENTER;

(E) WILL USG ASSIST ROK WITH LOANS FOR PURCHASE OF U.S. NATURAL URANIUM AND NUCLEAR POWER REACTORS.

2. IN RESPONSE AMB SAID THESE WERE LEGITIMATE QUESTIONS BUT ANSWERS WOULD INEVITABLY TAKE CONSIDERABLE TIME. HE REITERATED WHAT WE HAVE SAID BEFORE THAT WE WISH EXPANDED COOPERATION, AND HE SAID HE WOULD GO BACK TO WASHINGTON FOR AS MUCH IN WAY OF DETAIL AS COULD BE PROVIDED. AT SAME TIME HE WAS DOUBTFUL WE COULD BE MUCH MORE SPECIFIC AT THIS TIME. MORE SPECIFICALLY, AMB MADE FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL POINTS REGARDING QUESTION:

(A) WE HAVE INDICATED GENERAL SUPPORT FOR FUEL FABRICATION TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER BUT TRANSFER FROM U.S. WOULD ENTAIL EXTENSIVE DISCUSSION WITH U.S. PROPRIETARY INTERESTS BEFORE SPECIFIC COMMITMENTS COULD BE MADE;

(B) IAEA DETAILED STUDY OF MULTI-NATIONAL REPROCESSING CENTER WOULD HAVE TO BE COMPLETED PRIOR OUR BEING ABLE TO ANSWER SPECIFIC QUESTIONS REGARDING CENTER AND TO DETERMINE ROKS ROLE IN SUCH CENTER. IAEA STUDY NOT TO BE COMPLETED UNTIL END OF 1976, WHICH YI ACKNOWLEDGED. AS REGARDS TRAINING PRIOR ESTABLISHMENT OF CENTER, AMBASSADOR SAID HE WOULD INQUIRE OF WASHINGTON;

(C) WE HAVE ALREADY PROVIDED SOME TRAINING ON DESIGN, MANUFACTURE, WASTE DISPOSAL, AND SAFETY ASPECTS NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS. AMBASSADOR SAID HE WOULD INQUIRE REGARDING TRAINING POSSIBILITIES IN THESE AREAS. AMBASSADOR NOTED THAT TRANSFER OF DESIGN AND MANUFACTURING CAPABILITY HAS INVOLVED PROPRIETARY INTERESTS;

(D) AS WE HAVE SAID ROKG COULD RELY ON THE U.S. FOR FUTURE

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ENRICHMENT SERVICES; AS FOR REPROCESSING SERVICES AMBASSADOR SAID HE WOULD CONSULT WASHINGTON.

(E) WE HAVE BEEN PREPARED TO SUPPORT FINANCING OF ADVANCED NUCLEAR COOPERATION IN PRINCIPLE, IF NO OTHER PROBLEMS, EXTENT AND SPECIFICS REGARDING LOANS WOULD, OF COURSE, REQUIRE DETAILED DISCUSSION AND KNOWLEDGE OF ROK PLANS.

3. IN MORE GENERAL VEIN TMB THEN REMINDED VICE MINISTER AND KAERI PRESIDENT THAT ISSUE AT HAND WAS NOT ONLY TECHNICAL MATTER, RATHER IT WAS POLITICAL ISSUE OF HIGHEST ORDER. DECISION COULD NOT BE MADE ON TECHNICAL GROUNDS ALONE. WHILE USG WOULD DO WHAT IT COULD TO PROVIDE ADDITIONAL DETAILS, INEVITABLY FULL ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS POSED WOULD TAKE TIME TO DEVELOP AND IN MANY CASES WOULD REQUIRE EXTENSIVE DISCUSSION BETWEEN U.S. AND KOREA. REAL CONSIDERATION FOR KOREANS AT THIS POINT, WHICH AMBASSADOR WISHED CONVEYED TO PRIME MINISTER, WAS WHETHER KOREA PREPARED JEOPARDIZE AVAILABILITY OF BEST TECHNOLOGY AND LARGEST FINANCING CAPACITY WHICH ONLY U.S. COULD OFFER, AS WELL AS VITAL PARTNERSHIP WITH U.S., NOT ONLY IN NUCLEAR AND SCIENTIFIC AREAS BUT IN BROAD POLITICAL AND SECURITY AREAS. ROKG HAD TO WEIGH ADVANTAGES OF THIS KIND OF SUPPORT AND COOPERATION WHICH USG COULD PROVIDE AGAINST THE FRENCH OPTION.

4. AMBASSADOR THEN ASKED WHETHER ROKG PREPARED TO HOLD DECISION ON FRENCH REPROCESSING FACILITY PURCHASE IN ABEYANCE UNTIL U.S. HAD PROVIDED ANSWERS TO VICE MINISTER'S QUESTIONS. VICE MINISTER SAID HE COULD NOT COMMIT ROKG OFFICIALLY, BUT HE FELT CONFIDENT FRENCH REPROCESSING FACILITY PURCHASE WOULD BE KEPT IN A HOLD STATUS PENDING U.S. REPLY. HOWEVER, FINAL DECISION ON THAT MATTER WOULD BE MADE BY PRIME MINISTER PENDING RECOMMENDATIONS HE RECEIVED FROM MINISTER OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY.

5. IN COURSE CONVERSATION VICE MINISTER NOTED NEED FOR ROKG TO DIVERSIFY ITS TECHNOLOGY SOURCES ADDING THAT ROK NO LONGER GETTING AS MUCH SCIENTIFIC ASSISTANCE FROM U.S. AS IN PAST, ALTHOUGH U.S. HELP MOST DESIRABLE. AMB AGREED ON DESIRABILITY ROK DIVERSIFYING ITS ACQUISITION OF TECHNOLOGY, BUT, HE AGAIN POINTED OUT, ROKS SHOULD CONSIDER VERY CAREFULLY BROAD AREAS OF COOPERATION AND SUPPORT THAT POTENTIALLY AVAILABLE FROM U.S. IN ALL AREAS OF OUR CLOSE RELATIONSHIP.

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PAGE 24 SEUOL 09662 1611277

6. COMMENT: AT THIS POINT, IT IS DIFFICULT TO DISCERN THE REAL MOTIVATION FOR APPROACH BY VICE MINISTER YI. HE RECOGNIZED THAT QUESTIONS RAISED WERE NOT PRONE TO READY AND FULL RESPONSE BUT WAS UNDER INSTRUCTIONS NEVERTHELESS SEEK MORE DETAILS ON OUR POSITIVE OFFERS.

7. IT IS QUITE POSSIBLE ROKG OFFICIALS ARE SEEKING RATIONALE IN TERMS OF POSITIVE GAINS FOR PULLING OUT OR SUSPENDING OF FRENCH PROJECT, WITH TECHNICAL GROUNDS PROVIDING BETTER FACESAVER THAN POLITICAL ARGUMENTS. THIS APPROACH WOULD PERMIT REVERSAL WITHOUT DIRECT CONFRONTATION WITH PRESIDENT PARK. THEY MAY ALSO BE BARGAINING WITH US TO RAISE THE ANTE FOR WITHDRAWING FROM FRENCH PROJECT. ON THE OTHER HAND, THEY MIGHT BE STALLING US AND TRYING TO DEMONSTRATE U.S. PROPOSAL IS ONLY BROAD GENERALITIES AND INADEQUATE BASIS FOR CANCELLING FRENCH PROJECT. I TRIED, INTER ALIA TO HEAD THIS OFF WITH MY INITIAL RESPONSE.

8. IN ORDER TO GAIN FURTHER CLARIFICATION, I HAVE BEEN IN TOUCH WITH PRESIDENTIAL SECRETARY-GENERAL KIM CHOM-YON. HE ASSURED ME THAT ANY FURTHER FINAL ACTION ON PURCHASE OF FRENCH PLANT WILL BE HELD OFF UNTIL OUR REPLY RECEIVED. SECONDLY, HE CONFIRMED THAT HE HAS REVIEWED REPORTS ON MY APPROACH AND PRESIDENT PARK FULLY AWARE OF HIGH POLITICAL STAKES INVOLVED. PROBLEM WOULD THEREFORE BE GIVEN FULLEST RECONSIDERATION WHEN OUR REPLY RECEIVED AND STUDIED. AFTER APPARENTLY CONFERRING WITH PRESIDENT PARK, HE URGED ME TO DELAY APPROACH TO PRESIDENT UNTIL THEN.

9. WHILE THIS GAMBIT MAY BE TRAP TO ENSNARE US, IT AFFORDS US A LITTLE DAYLIGHT. I RECOMMEND WE TEST IT SINCE WE HAVE AT LEAST BLUE HOUSE ASSURANCES OF DELAY IN FINALIZING FRENCH PURCHASE. I REALIZE ALL QUESTIONS RAISED BY KOREANS ARE IMPOSSIBLE TO ANSWER DEFINITELY AT THIS TIME, AND I HAVE SO WARNED THEM, AND THAT THERE IS TYPICAL ELEMENT OF KOREAN BARGAINING. I URGE NEVERTHELESS THAT WE BE AS FORTHCOMING AND POSITIVE AS POSSIBLE. WE HAVE LITTLE TO LOSE AND A LOT TO GAIN BY SPELLING OUT IN MORE DETAIL HOW MUCH MORE WE HAVE TO OFFER ROKG PEACEFUL NUCLEAR AMBITIONS THAN THE FRENCH.

10. INCIDENTALLY, I HAVE ALSO BEEN IN TOUCH WITH FONMIN KIM

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DUNG-JO AND HE NOW FULLY RECOGNIZES THAT THIS IS A MATTER OF
HIGHEST POLITICAL IMPORTANCE, AFFECTING BROAD SPECTRUM OF
ROK-US RELATIONS.
SNEIDER



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Telegram from Pyongyang to Bucharest, No. 059.349

Date: 16 December 1975	Source: <i>Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archives, Matter 220/Year 1975/Country: Democratic People's Republic of Korea –US, Folder 1642, Concerning the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's Relations with the US, Started on: 11.03.1975, Completed on: 16.12.1975, Filing deadline: Permanent. Obtained and translated for NKIDP by Eliza Gheorghe</i>
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Ministry of Foreign Affairs
TELEGRAM
Sender: Pyongyang
No.: 059.349
Date: 16.12.1975
Time: 03:00

Department Relations I

Concerning: the visit of President Ford to Beijing

The diplomatic corps in Pyongyang notes that for the first time since the end of the war in the Peninsula, the Korean issue is made the object of extensive talks between US and Chinese leaders (with the occasion of Ford's recent visit to Beijing).

Among others, diplomats from P.R. Poland, P.R. Hungary, G.D.R., S.F.R. Yugoslavia and Egypt, are commenting that, during President's Ford visit to Beijing, H. Kissinger insisted that the People's Republic of China agree with the American desire not to withdraw its troops from South Korea and accept the US proposal to convene an international conference—with the participation of the US, the People's Republic of China, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and South Korea—to discuss the Korean matter. Assumptions are being made that the US is not against a U.S.S.R.-backed proposal that the four countries mentioned above should be joined at the international reunion by the U.S.S.R. and Japan.

Chinese leaders are entirely against an international reunion on the Korean issue to which the U.S.S.R. would participate. It is mentioned (by the G.D.R. counselor) that the People's Republic of China publicly backs the proposal of the Korean government, that the Korean issue be discussed by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the US. In talks with Ford however, Vice-Premier Xiaoping is supposed to have appeared favorable towards the four countries' participation formula.

In a talk with V. Nanu on December 13 this year, Polish Ambassador T. Bialkovsk mentioned that Sa Cheol, member of the Political Committee of the Central Committee of the Korean Workers' Party, during a visit to the Polish Embassy (05.12), was asked if Korean leaders are aware of the particular points discussed in Beijing by President Ford on Korea.

The Korean interlocutor responded that "the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has given no mandate for discussions on the topic, that this is a national issue and should be therefore discussed exclusively among Korean leaders; they are entirely against intermediaries."

Moreover, Sa Cheol said that, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea leaders unofficially found out that the Korean issue was discussed in Peking, but they are convinced no agreement was reached on the topic.

The Korean dignitary said that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is ready to conduct negotiations with the US but no reply had yet arrived from the latter side.

We note that the Korean press has not published anything on Ford's visit to Beijing.

Signed: V. Nanu

