A blog of the Kennan Institute
Moscow’s unexpected decision not to prop up Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria this time, followed by the regime’s collapse, resonates with Russia’s Cold War–era geopolitical legacy. For decades, Syria was the linchpin of a network of Soviet-backed and Soviet-aligned regimes in the Middle East—a crucial foothold and strategic asset in Moscow’s global rivalry with the West. With Assad’s fall, the last remnant of that Cold War–era network may be on the verge of disappearing.
The future of Russia’s military bases in Syria remains uncertain, but Moscow has already begun efforts to secure some foothold in the region—with or without Assad. If Russia manages to maintain a presence, it will likely be under a new power structure dominated by regional players such as Turkey, significantly diminishing Moscow’s once dominant role. Russia’s naval and airbases in Syria are essential for Moscow’s capacity to assert its influence across the Middle East and Africa, where it is involved in distant conflicts spanning Libya, Sudan, the Central African Republic, Mali, and Niger.
Failed Attempt to Revive the Cold War Playbook
Russia’s military intervention in 2015 was a calculated attempt at a revival of its Cold War strategy, aimed at reasserting influence in the Middle East. Under the pretext of combating terrorism, Moscow deployed its air force, special forces, and military advisers, reshaping the course of the Syrian civil war. This intervention entrenched Russia’s presence in the eastern Mediterranean, securing a naval base in Tartus, leased for forty-nine years in 2017, and the Khmeimim airbase in Latakia—strategic footholds echoing Soviet-era military deployments. The mission to Syria bolstered Russia’s image as a global power, and was for years viewed as a more significant foreign policy issue by the average Russian than the conflict in Eastern Ukraine or relations with the West.
The then US administration, while critical of Russia’s intervention, responded cautiously but acknowledged that both nations shared an interest in defeating ISIS, a stance for which it was criticized at the time. That limited cooperation consisted largely of the establishment of deconfliction channels to prevent accidental clashes and coordinate airspace operations.
In December 2017, Vladimir Putin struck a triumphant tone. Speaking at Khmeimim, he proclaimed that Syria had been preserved as a sovereign and independent state. He also announced the victorious completion of Russia’s main military operation in the country. “If the terrorists raise their heads again, we will deal unprecedented strikes unlike anything they have seen.” In 2024, nothing of the kind happened. In the lead-up to the capture of Damascus, Russian bombers made attempts to slow the rebel advance but fell far short of the intensive bombing campaigns seen in 2016–2017. The United States’s cautious approach seems to have proven strategically sound and ultimately justified.
“Axis of Resistance” Severely Weakened
Official Moscow’s shift on Assad has been striking. In an ironic about-face, Russian officials abruptly stopped labeling the advancing forces “terrorists” and, on the day of Assad’s fall, referred to them as the “opposition” instead. Meanwhile, Russia’s embassy in Damascus has continued to operate. In Moscow, a group of men raised the opposition flag at the Syrian embassy a day after Bashar al-Assad’s government fell. “Today, the [Syrian] embassy opened and is functioning normally under a new flag,” an embassy representative told Russia’s state news agency TASS on Monday.
Russia’s state-controlled media have quickly adapted, offering a platform to former Assad officials who have become his fiercest critics overnight. “The shameful and humiliating escape of the head of this system under the cover of night, without any sense of national responsibility to the country, confirms the need for change and awakens hope for a better future,” Syrian Ambassador to Moscow Bashar al-Jaafari said of Assad's flight from Damascus in an exclusive interview with RT Arabic.
Days before Sunday, speculation mounted that Moscow was preparing to abandon Assad. According to a Bloomberg report citing a source close to the Kremlin, by last Friday Russia had no plan to save Assad and saw little chance of one emerging as long as the Syrian president’s army continued retreating from key positions. At the time, the Russian embassy in Damascus advised Russian citizens that commercial flights were still available for those wishing to leave.
That same day, Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi declared Tehran’s readiness to support Assad “to the extent necessary,” though he offered no specifics. Previously, Iran had only promised to “consider” requests for troop deployments—a tepid assurance from a nation that considers Syria a central pillar of its so-called axis of resistance against the West. Iran’s restraint may have been influenced by its direct and indirect clashes with US-backed Israeli forces.
Assad’s growing desperation became evident when reports surfaced that he had attempted to reach out to US President-elect Donald Trump, first through the UAE and later through Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, in a last-ditch effort to secure support.
Remembering the Old Soviet Axis
Syria played a central role in the Cold War rivalry between the Soviet Union and the West, particularly through its conflicts with Israel. The Soviet Union provided extensive military aid to Syria during the Six-Day War in 1967, the War of Attrition, and the Yom Kippur War in 1973. Soviet advisers trained Syrian military officers, while Damascus became a key recipient of Soviet-made tanks, fighter jets, and missile systems. For nearly four decades, until the late 1980s, Syria was the greatest Middle East recipient of Soviet economic, military, and political support.
A landmark endeavor was the construction of the Tabqa Dam on the Euphrates River. Initiated in 1968 and completed in 1973, this earth-fill dam created Lake Assad, Syria’s largest reservoir, significantly enhancing the country's hydroelectric capacity and irrigation systems. This combination of military and economic support underscored Syria’s strategic importance to Moscow during the Cold War, particularly as a front-line state in the Arab-Israeli conflict.
Apart from Syria, the Soviets—at various times and to varying degrees—were involved with several key states across the Middle East and North Africa. In Egypt, in the late 1950s and 1960s, Moscow had a strategic alliance with Gamal Abdel Nasser, supplying arms, funding major infrastructure projects such as the Aswan Dam, and supporting his pan-Arab socialist agenda. In Iraq, Soviet ties strengthened after the Ba’athist Party seized power, with Moscow providing military and economic aid to successive regimes, including Saddam Hussein’s in its early years.
South Yemen became the only Marxist state in the Arab world, serving as a key ideological outpost with a bonus of privileged access to the port of Aden. In Libya, Muammar Gaddafi’s radical socialist government cultivated close ties with Moscow, receiving advanced weaponry and military training. Algeria, after winning its independence from France, also became a significant Soviet partner, benefiting from arms deals and economic assistance as it pursued a socialist development model.
The remnants of the old Soviet-backed order in the Middle East have now all but disappeared. Egypt pivoted westward after the 1970s; South Yemen ceased to exist as a separate state in 1990; Iraq fell to a US-led invasion in 2003; Libya descended into chaos after Gaddafi’s ouster and assassination in 2011. A cooperation with Algeria does continue.
Assad’s regime, hollowed out by war, economic collapse, and international sanctions, depended increasingly on Russia and Iran, whose interests were never fully aligned. Russia sought geopolitical leverage; Iran pursued regional dominance through its proxy nonstate actors such as Hamas, Hezbollah, and Houthis. Unlike the oil-rich monarchies of the Gulf or emerging powers with diversified economies, Assad’s Syria rested on a fragile foundation of military rule, foreign support, and repression—elements that crumbled once its two key backers chose to withdraw their support.
The opinions expressed in this article are those solely of the authors and do not reflect the views of the Kennan Institute.
Authors
Editor-at-Large, Meduza
Kennan Institute
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